The Edinburgh Companion to Contemporary Liberalism

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THE EDINBURGH COMPANION TO CONTEMPORARY LIBERALISM

General Editor Mark Evans

Edinburgh University Press

The Edinburgh Companion to Contemporary Liberalism

This page intentionally left blank

The Edinburgh Companion to Contemporary Liberalism

General Editor Mark Evans

Edinburgh University Press

#

in this edition Edinburgh University Press, 2001.

Copyright in the individual contributions is retained by the authors. Edinburgh University Press 22 George Square, Edinburgh Typeset in Goudy by Hewer Text Ltd, Edinburgh, and printed and bound in Great Britain by Bookcraft Ltd A CIP record for this book is available from the British Library ISBN 0 7486 1359 5 (hardback) The right of the contributors to be identified as authors of this work has been asserted in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.

CONTENTS

Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii List of Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

ix

Part One: The Liberal Trajectory

1. Issues and Trends in Contemporary Liberalism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Mark Evans

2. Twentieth-Century Liberal Thought: Development or Transformation? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 Michael Freeden

Part Two: Citizenship: Universalism and Particularism

3. Human Rights and Ethnocultural Justice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 Will Kymlicka

4. Liberalism and Citizenship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 Andrew Vincent

5. The Sword of Faith and the Shield of Fear: Liberalism and the Power of the Nation. . . . . . . . . . 63 Margaret Canovan

6. Liberal Citizenship and Feminism. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75 Andrea Baumeister

Part Three: Justice: Identity and Distribution

7. Liberalism and the Politics of Recognition. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89 Jonathan Seglow

8. The Essential Indeterminacy of Rawls's Difference Principle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101 Rex Martin

9. Rawlsian Theory, Contemporary Marxism and the Difference Principle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113 Rodney G. Peffer

Part Four: Problems of Liberal Justification

10. Disenchantment and the Liberalism of Fear . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135 Peter Lassman

11. Pragmatist Liberalism and the Evasion of Politics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148 Mark Evans

CONTENTS

12. Liberalism and Contingency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162 Bruce Haddock

Part Five: Liberalism versus Republicanism?

13. Back to the Future: Pluralism and the Republican Alternative to Liberalism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175 Richard Bellamy

14. Accommodating Republicanism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188 David Rasmussen

Part Six: The `Autonomous Individual': Feminist Critiques and Liberal Replies

15. Liberalism, Feminism, Enlightenment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197 Kate Soper

16. Feminism and Women's Autonomy: The Challenge of Female Genital Cutting . . . . . . . . . . . . . 208 Diana Tietjens Meyers

Part Seven: Liberalism Beyond the Nation-State

17. Civil Association: The European Union as a Supranational Liberal Legal Order . . . . . . . . . . . . 225 Robert Bideleux

18. The Idea of a Liberal-Democratic Peace. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 241 Howard Williams

19. Constructing International Community: Liberal Theory, Developmental Communitarianism and International Ethics . . . . . . . . . . . . . 253 Peter Sutch

Part Eight: New Directions for Liberal Thinking

20. Liberalism and Post-communism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 269 Richard Sakwa

21. Liberalism, Ecocentrism and Persons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 287 Brian Baxter

22. Prolegomenon to a Liberal Theory of the Good Life . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 299 Mark Evans

Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 312 Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 323

vi

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank the University of Wales Academic Support Fund for a generous grant that financed several conferences and seminar sessions at which early versions of most of these chapters were aired and discussed. Thanks are also due to the following for permission to include revised versions of articles they have published: to the editor of the Review of Constitutional Studies, published by the Centre for Constitutional Studies at the University of Alberta, for Chapter 3; to the editor of Journal of Political Ideologies for Chapter 5; to Kluwer Academic Publishers and Larry May and Marilyn Friedman, editors of Rights and Reason, for Chapter 8; and to the editor of Environmental Values for Chapter 21. My colleagues in the Department of Political Theory and Government at the University of Wales, Swansea have been very supportive of this project, not least in relieving me of teaching and administration at a crucial time in its gestation. I would particularly like to thank David Boucher, Bruce Haddock and Rex Martin for their advice and encouragement. Nicola Carr and the staff of Edinburgh University Press have been patient, cheerful and immensely helpful. Having taken on such a large volume as my first collaborative project, I could hardly have wished for a better team. My family, as ever, has been immensely supportive, too, and Anne in particular has never flagged in her encouragement during my many distractions and absences throughout the production of this book.

vii

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LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS

Andrea Baumeister is Lecturer in Politics at the

Rex Martin is Professor of Philosophy at the Uni-

University of Stirling.

versity of Kansas and was, until 2000, Professor of Political Theory at the University of Wales, Swansea.

Brian Baxter is Lecturer in Politics at the Uni-

Diana Tietjens Meyers is Professor of Philosophy

versity of Dundee.

at the University of Connecticut.

Richard Bellamy is Professor of Politics at the

Rodney G. Peffer is Professor of Philosophy at the

University of Reading.

University of San Diego.

Robert Bideleux is Reader in Politics at the Uni-

David Rasmussen is Professor of Philosophy at

versity of Wales, Swansea.

Boston College, Massachusetts.

Margaret Canovan is Professor of Politics at the

Richard Sakwa is Professor of Politics at the Uni-

University of Keele.

versity of Kent at Canterbury.

Mark Evans is Lecturer in Political Theory at the

Jonathan Seglow is Lecturer in Politics at Royal

University of Wales, Swansea.

Holloway and Bedford New College.

Michael Freeden is Professor of Politics at the

University of Oxford and a Fellow of Mansfield

Kate Soper is Professor of Philosophy at the Uni-

College.

versity of North London.

Bruce Haddock is Reader in Politics at the Uni-

Peter Sutch is a Tutorial Fellow in the School of

versity of Wales, Swansea.

European Studies at the University of Wales, Cardiff.

Will

Kymlicka

is

Professor

of

Philosophy

Andrew Vincent is Professor of Politics in the

at

School of European Studies at the University of

Queen's University, Ontario.

Wales, Cardiff.

Peter Lassman is Senior Lecturer in Politics at the

Howard Williams is Professor of Politics at the

University of Birmingham.

University of Wales, Aberystwyth.

ix

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Part One THE LIBERAL TRAJECTORY

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1

ISSUES AND TRENDS IN CONTEMPORARY LIBERALISM Mark Evans

literature. Although it would be an exaggeration to

Introduction

say that the `Rawls industry' has swamped all other

For most contemporary liberal political theorists, it is

dimensions of liberal academic argument, it is never-

a defining tenet of their historical self-consciousness

theless obvious that liberalism's theoretical revival in

that political theory was `reborn' in 1971 with the

the last quarter of the twentieth century was largely

publication of John Rawls's magisterially weighty A

powered by the critical response to Theory. Even

1

After many years in which the grip

non-liberals have found it difficult to address the

of linguistic analysis reduced it to the supposedly

central questions of political theory without being

impartial role of clarifying the meaning of political

expected to orient themselves with respect to `the

concepts (and which led one commentator to de-

Rawlsian position'. The influence of Rawlsianism ± if

clare the more substantive activity of normative

only as a critical springboard ± can be detected in

position-taking in political philosophising to be

most breaths of the resurrected tradition of political

Theory of Justice.

2

theorising.

`dead' ), this book triumphantly demonstrated to liberals that intellectual validity could, after all, be

For anyone working in this tradition, it is thus

claimed for a philosophical theory that proposed

profoundly disturbing to encounter the charge that

what the content of political morality should be

the `revitalisation' of liberal political theory as any-

and how it might be justified. No longer need the

thing more than an `academic' preoccupation (in-

grand theorising of the just or good political society

cluding the pejorative sense of that term) is actually

be taken up only by liberalism's enemies ± particu-

illusory. In a series of excoriating critiques, John

larly, in the years immediately before Theory's ap-

Gray charges that contemporary liberal theorising

pearance, those to its left whose thinking shared

`has done little more than articulate the prejudices of

none of its hesitation over position-taking (a point

an Anglo-American academic class that lacks any

which demonstrates the overly parochial nature of

understanding of political life in our age.'

liberals' `death of political theory' claims).

contemporary philosophical guise liberalism lamen-

3

In its

Rawls's importance lies not only in his restoration

tably mistakes its own parochial, historical and cul-

to liberals of a confidence that they were indeed

tural specificity for an ahistorically and universally

justified in using philosophical argument for the

applicable mode of political discourse and analysis.

substantive end of defending the liberal order. It lies

Further, its concepts and concerns ± indeed, the very

also in the way in which both the specific principles

methods by which it conducts its theorising and the

of his theory and the way in which he defends them

forums in which it takes place ± are peculiarly

have generated a truly enormous debate and a vast

divorced from the actual politics even of those

3

MARK EVANS

western societies in which liberalism is said to be the

than does the academic study of it. Moreover, pol-

dominant political tradition. So for all of their

itics is hardly alone in being a concern whose full

hubristic pretensions to speak to the pressing poli-

comprehension is beyond all bar those few who have

tical problems of our times, liberal theorists ± who

the time, resources and aptitude to master its detail

have encouraged a wholly delusive perception that

even when it impacts greatly upon everyone. So

these can be all addressed within liberal terms of

when liberal political theorists decide to take, say,

reference

4

± `are reduced to talking with each other,

a Kantian approach to a concrete political problem ±

and to no one else, about topics of interest to no one

the selection and justification of basic constitutional

else, least of all in the liberal democracies they are

principles, for example ± they are obviously not

supposed to be addressing.'

5

Rather than a `rebirth'

political theory suffered a tragic `still birth' in 1971.

immediately vulnerable to the charges of unworldli-

6

ness and irrelevance simply by virtue of using ideas

Given this conclusion, Gray proposes that perhaps

unknown to, and probably not fully appreciable by,

political theory is not suited to substantive norma-

those to whom the problem nevertheless applies.

tive position-taking after all. Maybe it would be best

We might, of course, justifiably challenge the

for it humbly to retreat once again to the insular

appropriateness of the approach taken and/or the

world of the ivory tower and engage, if not in the

proposed solutions to it. Certainly, this is what Gray

dextrous niceties of linguistic philosophy, then to the

attempts to do and there is obviously a serious debate

`modest exegesis of texts ± like Mill's Liberty, say ±

to be had about the applicability of contemporary

whose charm is in their distance from the world, or

liberalism's methodology and recommendations. But

any world we are likely to find ourselves in.'

7

to reach any conclusion on this question substantive

Now such a devastating critique is hardly likely to

engagement with such theory is required; its rele-

be accepted with alacrity in the massed ranks of

vance to the practical problem at stake must be put

contemporary liberal political theorists, who are

to the test rather than denied straight away. And

much more likely than some of their linguistic-

even if the results of such assessment are ultimately

philosophical predecessors to be wounded by the

negative, it is still possible that the approach has

charge of `practical irrelevance'. Doubtless there is

thrown valuable light upon the concrete problem.

a temptation to treat it with an instantly dismissive

There is no argument here, then, for abandoning

contempt. Yet despite the critique's intemperance,

contemporary liberal political theory's normative

there may be a lurking fear that there is something to

ambitions.

its claims. For example, liberal thinkers who deal

Gray's critique, however, amounts to much more

with what they regard as issues that affect all of their

than just the ineffective charge that liberalism's

fellow citizens (and are therefore concerned to keep

theoretical approaches are remote from the `real

in view the `relevance' of their ideas to the wider

world of politics'. It urges that the very problems

world) need little perceptiveness to sense that, out-

taken up by liberal theorists and those critics who

side of the academic community, their work may be

debate with them in the same philosophical tradi-

8

Whatever their intentions

tions are simply not the problems (or at least the

to the contrary, they are indeed effectively talking

prime or only problems) of the real world, either of

only to each other.

liberal-democratic societies or of human commu-

completely inaccessible.

9

nities more widely. Gray finds it deeply absurd that,

If `inaccessibility' is simply a question of the technical difficulty of their writings, then there

for example, the journal Ethics ± which is one of the

may be no great cause for concern. After all, political

foremost vehicles for contemporary liberal academic

problems do tend to be extremely complex. We

moral and political theory ± should devote an entire

should not necessarily expect there to be any easy,

issue to a discussion of the merits and drawbacks of

publicly comprehensible ways of theorising them and

market socialism.

their possible resolution. The actual business of

have done better to discuss the prospects of the

politics requires no less technical understanding

restoration of monarchy in Russia ± far less of an

and expertise, unavailable to the citizenry as a whole,

exercise in anachronism, and just conceivably a topic

4

10

The contributors, he says, `might

ISSUES AND TRENDS IN CONTEMPORARY LIBERALISM

it as nothing other than the genteel exchanges of

of some interest to those whose fates it might affect.'

11

philosophical

In more measured moments, Gray is happy

claims

between

professional

aca-

to grant that some of liberal theory's concerns do

demics. By highlighting the issues, we can see di-

connect with the practice of liberalism. But he still

rectly how liberalism engages with the problems of

wants to insist that there is much more to humanity's

practical political life today. And with the emphasis

political condition than liberal theory has allowed.

upon agenda-setting ± the topics that can and should

The purpose of the Edinburgh Companion to Con-

be addressed as well as what are currently being

temporary Liberalism is to demonstrate just how far

addressed ± contemporary liberalism can be seen

liberal theory can stand from the kind of abstract,

to be live: relevant, proactive, continuously engaged

unworldly,

and adaptable.

trivial

philosophical

navel-gazing

de-

picted in this caricaturising critique. I do not wish

If the Companion does not ultimately address all

to deny that the Rawls-inspired strand of liberal

the issues that Gray thinks to be so strikingly absent

theorising in particular has perhaps tended towards

from contemporary western political theory, it may

narrowness, both in terms of the issues discussed and

not be for want of space alone. Despite the claim

the range of authors who have engaged with them.

favoured by some that liberalism is becoming a global

Without in any way wishing to belittle the value and

doctrine and despite, too, the fact that its theorising

importance of this body of thought, it has probably

of international relations touches matters of concern

become all too easy to mistake its prominence as

for everyone in the world, many contemporary lib-

meaning that it signifies all that to which liberalism

erals are very wary (much more so than their pre-

necessarily amounts today. `Contemporary liberal-

decessors typically were) of any hubristic idea that all

ism' is often reduced to what Rawls and a select band

of their concerns are matters for humanity in its

of thinkers ± such as Dworkin, Nagel, Scanlon and

entirety. They recognise that `politics' may not be

Raz ± have to say. This phenomenon may well have

exhausted by their account of it alone, so that some

softened liberalism up in the face of the kind of

of the (sometimes rather bizarre) issues whose ab-

critique rehearsed above. Yet not only is it still unfair

sence Gray observes (such as theism, theocracy,

to say that Rawls, his interlocutors and their con-

`Byzantinism' and monarchism) are indeed best left

cerns are divorced from what really matters in po-

to other traditions of political thought to address.

litical practice, it is simply wrong to think that

Nor need it be thought that the `contemporary

contemporary liberalism does not and cannot range

agenda', wide-ranging though I believe it should

far beyond the `Rawlsian ambit'. This Companion,

be, is completely exhaustive of the issues that could

then, will certainly engage with liberal theory's `usual

legitimately warrant liberals' concern now and in the

suspects', but it will also show how liberalism can

future. Some issues in practice come to matter more

tackle issues that Gray's critique might fool us into

than others at certain times (a feature which will be

thinking are somehow out of its reach.

evident in the selection of themes covered in this

To this end, the book does not simply present

volume). But precisely because its fluidity and flex-

`contemporary liberalism' in terms of a survey of what

ibility is emphasised, we need not think ± as many of

its main protagonists have said over the past thirty

its critics seem implicitly prone to believe ± that

years or so. Instead, its guiding principle is to con-

liberalism is somehow conceptually and/or morally

ceptualise it as a set of issues and approaches that

incapable of addressing the topics with which it is

might be said to constitute liberalism's current prac-

not currently engaging.

tical challenges and hence its current research agen-

In short, the Companion hopes to present what will

da. After all, the importance of any one theorist

hopefully be compelling evidence that contemporary

ultimately rests upon the importance of the political

liberalism has not misidentified the relevant political

problem she or he is addressing; only once that is

concerns and that its approaches to their analysis are

recognised, perhaps, is the value of their work fully

not naõÈvely misguided. Even if debates about such

assessable. An `issue-led' account of contemporary

concerns may still rage and even if ± as some of the

liberalism shows how unilluminating it is to think of

chapters will show ± it may be justifiably doubted

5

MARK EVANS

whether liberal theory is always the best-equipped to

The other tendency is a product of Rawls's pro-

deal with them, there is still much theoretically and

minence in contemporary debates and has already

practically useful insight to be gained from it.

been alluded to. It identifies liberalism with the specifically anti-perfectionist politics of constitutional-democratic justice that his work has popu-

Contesting the Nature of `Liberalism'

larised and which has subsequently engaged so many

One feature that the discussion thus far might seem to

in liberal political theory. Thus, it has become very

share with much contemporary political theory is the

easy to think it axiomatic that liberalism is about the

apparent assumption that `liberalism' needs no expli-

`neutrality of the state', `the priority of the right over

cit definition, as if it is enough simply to name it to

the good', `the politics of public reason' and other

convey what kind of politics is intended. Those who

leitmotifs of Rawlsian theory. Now we have already

accept any version of Francis Fukuyama's belief that

conceded that Rawls has inspired a very influential

liberalism's ideals have morally triumphed over all

and perhaps attractive conception of liberalism. And

others and that ideological conflict in the realm of

I will shortly sketch how it frames many of the

ideas is now over may be particularly inclined to hold

predominant themes in liberalism's `post-Rawls' re-

12

Perhaps in earlier times, when this

search agenda. But as Michael Freeden forcefully

battle was still being fought, it was always necessary for

demonstrates in Chapter 2, it offers a very histori-

liberals to be explicit and detailed about that for which

cally and culturally specific interpretation of liberal-

they were fighting. When positions no longer need

ism (and one whose Kantianism is, moreover, not

defending, they may no longer need demarcating.

nearly as faithful to its cultural roots as it likes to

this assumption.

think).

In fact, of course, liberalism's meaning has always been contested by liberals themselves and even if we

One consequence of this narrowing of liberalism's

accept some version of Fukuyama's controversial

definition has been to render it vulnerable to criti-

claim we should not delude ourselves into thinking

cisms that would comfortably bypass other members

that this particular contest is also over. We should be

of the liberal tradition. Indeed, it often gives the

especially wary of two opposing tendencies in con-

impression of being blind to the existence of such a

temporary political theory's definitional handling of

diverse tradition behind it. Chapter 2 therefore

`liberalism'. One, which may be particularly encour-

serves to remind contemporary liberals of its exis-

aged if one accepts that it now has no serious

tence. In doing so, it suggests that one research task

competition in the Enlightenment tradition of pro-

of liberal theory now is to open up possibilities of

gressive politics (as socialism, say, once provided),

redefinition and perhaps retrieval of certain liberal

equates liberalism with a few very general Enlight-

self-images and commitments, lost from sight in the

enment moral commitments centring around some

fog of Rawlsianism, which may be valuable resources

notion of `equal individual freedom'. On this ac-

for the doctrine's defence and development.

count, if it is going too far to say that we are `all

Neither tendency serves us well, then, in trying to

liberals now', then it is still the case that non-liberal-

characterise liberalism. But this claim does not rest

ism ends up being defined very narrowly in terms of

upon any assumption that we can describe an ade-

doctrines such as fascism, ethnic nationalism and

quate, generally acceptable typology for it that is at

certain types of religious fundamentalism. In other

once sufficiently expansive to cover all liberalisms

words, `liberalism' is little more than a label to cover

but also sufficiently detailed not to become indis-

all adherents to the general progressive standpoint

tinguishable from related but distinct political doc-

opposed to these. From this perspective, it might

trines. In fact, it is probably best to treat liberalism as

therefore be thought difficult for any `reasonable'

in essence internally contested. The `liberal label'

person to argue against it. But with such a capacious

denotes a political identity to be regarded as one

definition `liberalism' would no longer be able to

that is not permissively open-ended but which oper-

stake specific political standpoints within the broad

ates within certain conceptual and historical con-

range of `progressivism'.

straints, yet whose diversity within these boundaries

6

ISSUES AND TRENDS IN CONTEMPORARY LIBERALISM

should be celebrated rather than regretted. As most

dependence and strong ties of mutually supportive

of the chapters implicitly demonstrate, `liberalism'

obligations between people. Given the accelerating

remains an invaluable shorthand term. But, while its

spread of what Richard Rorty calls the `human rights

various usages cannot be totally antithetical to each

culture', however,

other without at least one of them being a misuse, we

general have increasingly employed the notion of

should not make the mistake of thinking there must

`individual human rights' as the conceptual device by

be any thoroughgoing identity of views and commit-

which to express at least part of their moral commit-

ments behind them all.

13

15

it is fair to say that liberals in

ment. They are not, however, conceptually bound to do so; there are other ways of formulating the general

Leaving it, then, to the individual contributors to use the term as they wish, I will here confine myself

commitment

to the identification of a few general themes and

should it be thought that liberal individual rights

tendencies in definitions of liberalism, to preface the

are necessarily characterised and prioritised in a

arguments in the rest of this introduction.

14

to

equal

individual

freedom.

Nor

manner that would negate or trump any official

It is

support for social justice.

important to note that the term can be used to characterise quite distinct topics or areas of concern

Area (2) concerns how liberalism's moral commit-

in particular ways and that confusion between them

ments are cashed out in terms of political institutions

may contribute to the vagaries of debating liberal-

and practices. As we might expect given the ob-

ism's nature. Three areas in particular are worthy of

servations above, the liberal tradition has ranged

note: (1) liberalism as a political morality; (2) lib-

from support for minimal or `night-watchman' states

eralism as a form of political regime; (3) liberalism as

presiding over loosely regulated free-market capitalist

a form of culture, or social order.

economies (sometimes now grouped under the heading of `libertarianism'

Under (1), liberalism posits the individual as the

16

) to the kind of economically

fundamental unit of moral and political concern.

interventionist welfarist politics sometimes thought

Although this need not be incompatible with a

to be the preserve of socialism or social democracy.

strong commitment to a notion of community and

Once again, though, we can identify certain wide-

the common good (and should not be thought to

spread tendencies across the liberal spectrum. For

imply an unavoidable reliance upon an atomistic

example, liberals tend to support some version of

methodological individualism at the heart of its

representative democracy as being (a) the most ideal

social-explanatory

does

and/or efficient way in which citizens can be given a

not deliberately subsume the individual in, or totally

say in how they are ruled; (b) the most ideal and/or

subordinate it to, any collective unit. The liberal

efficient way in which power can be held accoun-

individual is held to be `equally free' and the purpose

table by those over whom it is exercised; (c) the best

of liberal moral and political society is, in the first

means by which the state's power can be limited to

instance, to protect and promote the interests of

those specific areas of social life in which liberal

individuals as equally free beings. This is at the heart

politics is deemed to be rightfully concerned.

theory),

liberal

morality

17

of the justifications for whatever constraints such a

The argument for liberalism's equal individual

society will wish to place upon its members. How

moral freedoms is reinforced by the commitment

precisely this notion of equal freedom is to be inter-

to democracy, for it emphasises how the exercise

preted is part of what fuels the ongoing contest over

of political choice requires freedoms of expression

liberalism's nature. The concept of `justice' is often

and association (for example) to be rendered mean-

used nowadays as the peg upon which to hang this

ingful. The idea that politics is also a limited activity,

debate. And in their accounts of what justice de-

with realms of life being left free from direct political

mands of people to facilitate the equal freedom of all,

regulation, is a further consequence of the liberal

liberals can range from very individualistic moral-

account of freedom. Though the extent to which it is

ities, which emphasise political `non-interference', to

to be regulated is significantly variable within liberal

highly proactive theories of redistributive social jus-

thinking, liberals tend to support the general idea of

tice that posit substantial degrees of individual inter-

a market economy in which private property is

7

MARK EVANS

allowable (if not necessarily to the exclusion of any

individual identities and projects. But, again, they

form of public ownership). The capitalist character

tend to want to resist the possibilities of such iden-

of the liberal order will obviously inform the nature

tities swallowing up individual opportunities not to

of area (3), in which we can isolate two prominent

conform to them, and certainly to oppose any iden-

features of liberal society.

tity that fundamentally compromises the commitments of liberal citizenship.

The first feature is civil society, the recognition that a significant part of public social life should be left

The above is not meant to be an exhaustive

free from direct state control, instead being the realm

description; it merely indicates some of liberalism's

in which people may freely associate themselves for

prominent general characteristics. But this is enough

their various ends. This includes not just (significant

to orient the rest of this introduction. For next, I first

parts of) economic life, but other institutional asso-

identify the main research interests in liberal think-

ciations, some perhaps devoted to providing services

ing that followed in Rawls's wake. We will then be in

(private health-care providers, for example), others

a position to see how the chapters of this volume

tied

commitments

might build upon that legacy and address the kinds of

(churches, charities, working people's associations,

concerns that Gray's critique would have us regard as

and so on).

alien to it. Finally, I suggest a further line of argu-

to

particular

projects

or

ment in support of the claim that there are still

The second feature consists of the cultural charThis

crucial issues with which contemporary liberal poli-

phrase is designed to capture two aspects of the

tical theory may substantively engage. Liberals, I

character-ideal that liberalism tends to hope, expli-

contend, have nothing to be complacent about.

acteristics

of

`liberal-democratic

individuality' .

citly or implicitly, will flourish among citizens.

18

There are good reasons to think hard about the

First

longer-term viability of the liberal order.

is the disposition to act towards others in ways that uphold the institutions and the ethos of liberal society: to be, for example, respectful, tolerant of

Issues for a

disagreement and alternative lifestyles, prepared to

Contemporary Liberal Research Agenda

cooperate with others to live under mutually acceptable terms of social and political accommodation.

In outlining the main themes in contemporary lib-

Second is the idea that the interests of the individual

eral political theory to date, I don't pretend to be

are (within terms laid down by justice) to be cele-

offering an exhaustive account of liberal scholarship

brated. The fact that `people's lives are their own to

in the years since Theory's publication. I hope instead

lead' is something that liberal politics is designed to

simply to offer a sketch to place in context the

facilitate, proactively and/or through non-interfer-

directions in which this book suggests liberal thought

ence. Many liberals (including Rawls, his `anti-per-

may run hereafter. Bearing in mind the caveat that

fectionism' notwithstanding) favour the idea that

not everything even in today's liberalism is reducible

individuals should freely develop their own, unique

to `Rawls and his critics', it is nevertheless easy for a

characteristics and capacities as the central project in

schematic account such as this to tease out these

the pursuit of the good life.

themes in terms of debates raised by and generated

This is not to say that liberalism's `cult of the

from Rawls's work. Two in particular can be traced in

individual' in principle favours egoism at the expense

their current form back to Theory. The first concerns

of other-directed social concerns. As contemporary

the content of justice: what is it that a just state

liberals have arguably become more sensitive to what

should seek to secure for its citizens and by what

they regard as the expanding range of permissible

principles does it distribute what G. A. Cohen has

differences in human forms of life, cultural pluralism

called justice's `currency'?

has come to play a more prominent role in their

tion of distributive social justice, Rawls's answers to

thinking. Hence, liberals now tend to attach great

these two questions were that `social primary goods'

significance to cultural (that is, collective) identities

were the raw material of justice, and that they should

as crucial social resources in the constitution of

be distributed within the institutions and relation-

8

19

In defending a concep-

ISSUES AND TRENDS IN CONTEMPORARY LIBERALISM

ships of society's `basic structure' according to his `two principles of justice'.

have already observed how Rawls propagated the

20

image of liberalism as committed to a politics of

Perhaps the most politically resonant attack on his

impartiality or neutralism. For him, liberal politics

theory came from Robert Nozick's Anarchy, State and

was fundamentally about justice alone. Justice em-

Utopia.

Capturing the ethos of the New Right

bodied principles of `right', to be justified largely

(which

in

the

upon the basis that they were acceptable by all to

1970s and 1980s electorally eclipsed the kind of

whom they applied. These were distinguishable from

politics many believed Rawls to be defending), No-

`conceptions of the good', the various forms of life-

zick attacked the very concept of distributive justice

style from which individuals should be allowed to

and defended a rights-based, purely procedural ac-

choose and which were not therefore the proper

count of the just state that largely served to protect

objects of political favouritism.

numerous

western

states

during

individual property holdings from redistributive po21

licies.

Much interest was generated over Rawls's revival

At the same time, there was also renewed

of contractarianism as a method of derivation and

interest in the work of F. A. Hayek, who provided a

justification. His use of the `original position' and its

far more intellectually rigorous defence of procedural

assumptions about individual rationality and moral

against distributive social justice.

22

Together, these

motivation generated an extensive literature, seeking

authors contributed much to the revival of what

to test the plausibility of the general idea that

many thought was harking back to a `classical liberal'

political principles could be derived from idealised

political theory (as we have already noted, people on

bargaining between equally free, rational indivi-

both sides of the debate felt sufficiently embarrassed

duals.

by this family connection to parcel off this revanchist

came known as the `communitarian' critique of

classical liberalism under the heading of `libertarian-

liberalism developed in reaction against this whole

ism').

tendency, epitomised by Michael Sandel's attack on

It is a measure of where many academics' sympa-

24

From the early 1980s, however, what be-

Theory in his Liberalism and the Limits of Justice .

25

thies tended to lie that there was more extensive and

Communitarians argued that contractarianism fun-

innovative intellectual work done on the other side

damentally

of the political spectrum. This embraced rather than

agency given its tendency to use `abstractive' meth-

jettisoned the notion of distributive social justice,

odologies, attempting to generate moral and political

and sought to contest Rawls's specific characterisa-

principles from hypothetical conceptions of `rational

tion of it. Indeed, it was precisely because of the fact

moral agents' drawn in abstraction from any parti-

that political ideas to the centre and left of the

cular identities, commitments and social contexts.

political spectrum were in electoral retreat that many

By ignoring the crucial fact that individuals were

thinkers became particularly concerned to bolster

essentially social creatures, with their identities and

their philosophical credibility. Here, then, the de-

moralities being the products of particular cultures,

bate was posed around how best to pattern the

such theories were predestined to fail to generate

distribution of whatever it was that justice demanded

conceptually and substantively adequate moralities.

should be equalised. Amartya Sen's seminal 1979

Hence, as exemplified by Michael Walzer's Spheres of

Tanner Lecture `Equality of What?' set the tone for

Justice, communitarians argued for what amounted to

the debate, and helped to generate a plethora of

a hermeneutic political theory, deriving its moral

rivals for Rawls's claim that social primary goods

principles from an interpretive analysis of concrete

were the proper focus for egalitarian policy.

23

misunderstood

the

nature

of

moral

social understandings. Acknowledging the diversity

The second issue raised by Theory concerned the

of societies and social meanings, this approach con-

justification of political principles: how are they to

sequently leant towards (even if it often wished to

be derived and what reasons could be given for

resist a total capitulation to) a normative as well as

accepting them? Committed to the idea that political

an epistemological relativism.

26

principles should respect all citizens as equals and be

The debate between liberals and communitarians

at least the potential object of their agreement, we

also broke off into separable questions about the

9

MARK EVANS

content and justification of political morality.

27

Part

manner that, on the one hand, doesn't rest upon

of the communitarian argument over political mor-

dubious claims about actual universal consensus in

ality's

cham-

liberal societies on liberal principles yet, on the other

pioned by Rawls, denying that the `right' can be

hand, still holds out as plausible the possibility of

conceptually separated from the `good'. One sub-

genuine agreement. Particularly in so far as many

stantive consequence of this was to give politics

(though emphatically not all) liberals have accepted

responsibility for promoting rather than avoiding

the need for a Rawlsian `communitarian turn', this

the `good' and, in some versions, communitarism

debate has partially substituted for the more abstract

was happy to bring into political thinking a direct

notions of rational calculation favoured in the earlier

concern with, for example, cultivating virtues of

contractarian debate.

content

character.

28

attacked

the

impartialism

30

Although many communitarians did

One of the possible limitations of the `commu-

not reject liberal morality in toto, they tended to

nitarian' school is that, ironically enough, some of its

criticise the narrowness of what they perceived to be

exponents have tended to use abstractly unspecific

liberalism's overly individualistic moral stance, con-

conceptions of `community' which are, in fact, im-

tending that it is ill-equipped to accommodate the

plicitly homogenising. They suppress full recognition

importance of group identities and collective goods

of diversity and conflict over values and practices,

to political morality.

overly simplifying the project of hermeneutically

Much liberal writing in recent times has thus been

obtaining a singular political morality for a commu-

devoted to showing that liberalism is not as blind to

nity. Many liberals have therefore paid close atten-

such concerns as the communitarians believe. The

tion to theorising this diversity and the relevant

complaints that it is insufficiently responsive to the

sense of `community' for the politics of a pluralistic

demands of community have led, for example, to an

society. Often, they now raise their concerns within

increasing interest in what is often called `civic

the terms set by `multiculturalism' and `the politics of

liberalism'. This frequently draws upon republican

difference.' Feminist thinkers have been at the fore-

traditions of thought to postulate interdependence

front of the project to expose and jettison from

between liberal individuality and `good citizenship',

political theory concepts that they argue to be

which rests upon the willingness and ability of

`difference-blind' to the extent that they utterly fail

citizens to participate in and uphold certain shared

to spot their own partiality. (Iris Marion Young's

practices in liberal-democratic society.

29

Justice and the Politics of Difference is representative of

And, as his

31

contribution to this volume shows, Will Kymlicka

this trend.

has been at the forefront of the attempt to establish

regard tend to argue that the whole Enlightenment

the coherence and desirability of `group-based' con-

heritage, which liberalism is held to exemplify, un-

cerns in liberal politics.

successfully masks its own particularity (western and/

) Many of liberalism's critics in this

Liberals have also been prompted to respond to

or masculine and/or bourgeois) in a cloak of cosmo-

the communitarian assault on their favoured justifi-

politan universalism. They want to displace from

catory strategies. Rawls himself has led liberalism's

political thinking any abstractly conceptualised mor-

response; in his Political Liberalism he effectively

al concerns with `humanity' (those which treat

localises his political theory in that he now believes

objects of moral concern only as `equal rational

that political justifications for liberalism need to be

moral agents', for example) and any other concepts

drawn from the shared ideas in the public political

which in fact represent a very particular, partial way

culture of a constitutional democracy (a strategy

of seeing the moral and political world.

sometimes called `liberal communitarianism', pro-

In reaction, we find a greater engagement by

posing the dissolution of the antithesis). His recent

liberals with other cultures, seeking to understand

work has given much prominence to the theme of

and appreciate their differences in a quest to con-

`public reason' as the source of justifications for

ceptualise what might be necessary to establish a

liberal principles. Strenuous efforts are now made

political order that can justly accommodate `differ-

to explicate its notion of `reasonable agreement' in a

ence'. As the chapters by Will Kymlicka, Andrea

10

ISSUES AND TRENDS IN CONTEMPORARY LIBERALISM

Baumeister, Jonathan Seglow and Kate Soper show,

essential diversity. It contends that the Anglo-Amer-

for example, this has resulted in liberal arguments

ican philosophical liberalism, whose pre-eminence

which are much more sympathetically responsive to

in contemporary liberalism has already been identi-

the kinds of concerns that critics may rightly have

fied, has not displaced the myriad other forms of

complained to have gone unrecognised in certain

liberal thought and discourse. Future research on

strands of liberalism but who wrongly charged lib-

liberalism would do well to bear this in mind.

eralism in general to be incapable of addressing. We

Next, Will Kymlicka demonstrates how liberalism

also find a rejection of the apparent normative

is capable of addressing many of the concerns raised

localisation of some communitarians and `difference

by those critics who contended that it was concep-

theorists' in the recent upsurge of interest in norma-

tually incapable of catering for group- rather than

tive international relations theory.

individual-centred demands. He develops a case for

Concluding this brief summary, we should note

`group rights' as the centrepiece of an account of

how the heightened sensitivity to diversity contri-

what he calls `ethnocultural justice'. The following

butes to a further problematisation of liberalism's

four chapters analyse issues of the nature of liberal

justificatory project. Where, not so long ago, con-

community and citizenship, and the particular un-

tractarianism and `morals by rational and reasonable

derstanding of `justice', that emerges from his dis-

agreement' seemed to be predominant themes, the

cussion. Andrew Vincent argues that liberalism's

debate has widened and fragmented as the `fact of

account of citizenship ± the centrepiece of many

pluralism' (itself variably interpreted) has suggested

liberals' arguments against the communitarian cri-

to some that only a Hobbesian politics of modus

tique ± sits extremely uneasily astride two contra-

vivendi is possible and, to others (the postmoder-

dictory

nists), that the whole philosophical project of liberal

which underpins liberalism's moral principles and

justification is redundant. Here again, there is a

a highly particularist nationalism which actually

tendency to question liberalism's supposedly Enlight-

grounds the criteria for citizenship in liberal states.

enment-bound conceptions of morality and moral

By explaining the nature and implications of these

justification.

currents, he puts this issue firmly on liberalism's

currents:

a

universalist

cosmopolitanism

research agenda as requiring urgent attention. Mar-

From this overview, the following seem to emerge

garet Canovan's chapter throws light on this pro-

as contemporary liberalism's main preoccupations:

blem from a different angle. She identifies two 1. the content of `justice';

ostensibly very different liberalisms: the `Crusaders'

2. the justification of liberal political principles;

(those liberals who prioritise a universalist human

3. the conception of `citizenship' and its relation-

rights agenda) and the `Sceptics' (much more con-

ship to individual freedom, civic virtue and the

tent with the conduct of a limited politics inside

requirements of civil order;

their own national boundaries). She argues that,

4. the conception of a liberal political commu-

their highly distinctive commitments notwithstand-

nity as applicable to a pluralistic, multicultural

ing, both rely tacitly but crucially upon notions of

society;

nationhood. The suspicion that they share of `na-

5. the defence of liberal (`Enlightenment') poli-

tionality' in politics may therefore be misplaced;

tical concepts and concerns in the wake of the

again, it is shown that there is an intimate yet

challenge posed by pluralism and `difference'.

contentious

relationship

between

liberalism

and

`the nation', the nature of which requires much closer analysis than has been hitherto given.

We are now in a position to summarise the con-

Andrea Baumeister then presents a comprehen-

tributions to this volume, seeing how they pick up,

sive discussion of various feminist critiques that have

advance and supplement these themes. As already indicated, Michael Freeden's opening

condemned liberal conceptions of citizenship for

chapter takes us through numerous academic char-

their apparent blindness to the political significance

acterisations of liberalism's nature to confirm its

of difference. She argues, however, that Kantian

11

MARK EVANS

liberalism may not fall foul of this deficiency and

which, for liberals in particular, is compounded at

that, hence, feminist politics may not need to aban-

the heart by controversy over how to understand `the

don paradigmatic liberal ideas. Jonathan Seglow's

fact of pluralism' in the first place. His suggestion is

chapter provides an account of one of the newer

that the project of liberal justification may best be

additions to liberalism's reflections upon justice,

advanced by the argument Judith Shklar puts for-

which is implicit in Will Kymlicka's notion of

ward for an apparently modest `liberalism of fear'. In

`ethnocultural' justice: the idea that `recognition'

`Pragmatist Liberalism and the Evasion of Politics', I

of one's identity as well as `redistribution' of resources

evaluate Richard Rorty's rather more laid-back and

is part of what justice requires.

sanguine approach to the project, which is prepared

Having raised the question of `justice', the follow-

to dispense with philosophical argument in support

ing two chapters take us back to its distributive

of liberal principles altogether. I argue that the

aspect. Their analyses are crucially informed by

`Rortyean view' can and should be elaborated more

Rawls's `difference principle', but they draw notice-

fully than Rorty himself musters, to grasp just what

ably divergent conclusions over its import. Rex

consequences his notion of `contingency' might have

Martin agrees that it has been absolutely pivotal

for liberal theory and politics. Bruce Haddock con-

in liberalism's debates about justice. He offers a

tends, however, that the Enlightenment-inspired

rigorous account of how it is intended to work

aspiration of achieving a universal morality justified

and then seeks to demonstrate that it is critically

by reason, challenged in the previous two chapters,

indeterminate in specifying particular institutional

can be kept alive. He proposes that a neo-Kantian

and policy recommendations. To the extent that it

practical reason can come into play whenever people

still takes the difference principle as one of its

are faced with moral dilemmas. It is upon this basis

benchmarks, this conclusion indicates that liberal

that we may be able to construct a case at least for

discourse about justice may have reached a theore-

some of liberalism's fundamental principles. The

tical logjam through which it is urgent for liberals to

perturbing uncertainties of `contingency' in morals

think. Rodney Peffer, on the other hand, is happy to

± principles ungrounded by reason ± can be avoided.

argue that Rawlsian theory ± with only a few mod-

Pluralism, of course, poses practical problems of

ifications ± can lead us in a definite political direc-

political organisation as well as theoretical ones of

tion.

philosophical justification. For

However,

he

believes

it

is

one

that

can

Richard

Bellamy,

justifiably be called Marxist and he sets out to defend

liberal theory and practice as it stands is not well

the application of this label to his Rawlsian theory.

suited to resolve them. He forwards a robust case for a

He would stridently disagree with Gray's claim,

more participatory form of governance that draws

noted earlier, that reflections upon market socialism

upon the venerable republican political tradition. In

and the like are exercises in irrelevance and fantasy.

light of this proposed revival of `republicanism',

But the striking point is the argument that this is

David Rasmussen comments upon the recent debate

where liberal justice may well lead us: reason enough

between John Rawls and Ju È rgen Habermas, which

for radicals not to be dismissive of it.

can be seen as an exploration of the possible accommodation by Rawlsian liberalism of republican po-

The following three chapters turn us to the debate

litical insights.

about the justification of liberal values. It is not

As described earlier, many feminists have shared

implausible to suggest that the increased interest in, and perplexity of, the justification debate reflects

with

a wider cultural anxiety about the status of moral and

spired' critique of the Enlightenment and hence

political principles, in a world of such plural values

the forms of moral and political thinking informed

and moral outlooks that scepticism seems to be the

by it, of which liberalism is a paradigm. To combat

irresistible conclusion even when one would so

some of the more drastic conclusions drawn from

desperately wish otherwise. Peter Lassman's chapter

this, Kate Soper argues against a wholesale rejection

confirms that pluralism constitutes the distinctive

of the Enlightenment tradition. She shows that it

problem of modern politics. But the problem is one

was a good deal more sensitive to feminist causes

12

postmodernists

a

pluralistic,

`difference-in-

ISSUES AND TRENDS IN CONTEMPORARY LIBERALISM

than many contemporary postmodernists in particu-

lighting some issues fairly new to liberal research but

lar allow. To persist with an `anti-Enlightenment'

which may become established preoccupations. In

theme in championing such causes today may there-

another example of new seams for liberals to mine,

fore be to do violence to what is valuably progressive

Richard Sakwa shows how strikingly varied liberal

in that tradition. This is not to deny that cultural

discourse has become in post-communist states, as

diversity, among other considerations, should rightly

the doctrine attempts to define and orient itself in a

prompt liberals into a re-evaluation of some of their

social and political context deeply unfamiliar to

concepts. Diana Tietjens Meyers's chapter is pre-

those which provide the backdrop of much liberal

sented as an example of how this critical self-analysis

thought to date. Brian Baxter takes up the charge

may proceed. She provides a powerful, innovative

that liberalism is ill-equipped to face the challenges

argument for the need to rethink many standard

of ecologism and environmental politics. He con-

conceptions of autonomy. She deals with exactly the

tends that `ecocentric' theories are indeed likely to

kind of question upon which so many liberals stum-

be inimical to liberal concepts and politics, but

ble: how to conceptualise `autonomy' in light of the

argues that these are not in fact desirable as they

fact that women in some cultures appear autono-

stand. He then presents a `personcentric' argument

mously to affirm the practice of female circumcision,

which shows how liberalism may be reconciled to

which western liberals usually cannot imagine being

ecologist concerns. Finally, in the last chapter I

supported at all by anybody in a genuinely autono-

address a question that many liberals once had no

mous way. Drawing upon material rarely utilised in

qualms in tackling but which the `Rawlsian ten-

liberal debate, this chapter indicates some of the new

dency' has tried to push out of liberalism's concerns:

directions to be taken and sources to be pursued in

the articulation of personal ideals of how it is good to

liberal research.

live, with a view to sanctioning their promotion by a

In the post-Cold War world, many traditional

liberal state under certain conditions. I note that this

understandings of politics are becoming redundant

`perfectionist' liberalism has been rehabilitated in

as power increasingly slips from nation-states to

Rawls's wake, but it remains peculiarly reluctant

regional and global sites. As an example of how

to articulate any particular ideal of the good, an

political theory must innovate conceptually to keep

abstinence which I claim is neither necessary nor

pace, Robert Bideleux substantially adapts the liberal

always desirable for liberals. Accordingly, I begin to

conception of civil association to characterise the

sketch some of what I call `candidate conceptions of

institutional form being taken by the European

the good' in an effort to reconnect liberal politics and

Union, still very much in the process of evolution.

the classical practice of ethical reflection on the

Provocatively, he argues that in the context of

nature of the good life.

European politics we must recognise that liberalism

Amid all this it is difficult, I think, to spot too

is decisively shedding its connections with democ-

much `irrelevance' and `triviality' in the subjects

racy. Howard Williams's chapter switches our atten-

covered, as we might be led to expect given Gray's

tion to the question of the global order and the

critique. They engage with real issues concerning the

normative goal of securing principles by which states

defence and promotion of the kind of politics that,

may live together in peace. He assesses the utility of

after all, most people in the West ± and, increasingly,

Kant's thinking in this regard as a classical and

beyond ± wish to support. The argument that this

quintessentially liberal starting-point from which

Companion wishes to promote is that political theory

contemporary reflections may proceed. A flavour

is a vital component of the political project to defend

of the latter is provided in Peter Sutch's contribu-

or contest the liberal order. This claim is based upon

tion, which goes on to articulate the concept of

the idea that the problems faced by the liberal order

`developmental communitarianism' as the justifica-

are sufficiently complex and perplexing to demand

tory strategy that a liberal `law of peoples' (to borrow

serious, rigorous philosophical reflection. That is

Rawls's phrase) may usefully adopt.

what contemporary liberal political theory attempts to deliver.

The Companion ends with three chapters high-

13

MARK EVANS

To end this introductory chapter and to supple-

proceed too far without indulging in the speculative

ment the research agenda already mapped out above,

realm of crystal ball-gazing. (It would also obviously

I propose a further demonstration of the potential for

be perverse to persevere with contemporary liberal-

relevant, serious-minded analysis in liberal political

ism, as many chapters in this book argue we might, if

theory. This is designed to test its capacity for critical

one believed it to be so pitifully doomed.) But

self-reflection and to put on its own menu the most

forcing liberals to analyse such negative arguments

fundamental challenges that liberal practice could

could strengthen their thinking and convictions,

actually face. It will outline yet more avenues for

perturbing to the liberal imagination though they

liberal theory to take, dispelling even more vigor-

may be. Here, at the beginning of the twenty-first century,

ously the illusion that it is complacently trivial.

it is particularly apposite to ponder the permanence of the liberal achievement. Confidence in liberal-

Prospects for Liberalism

ism's ability to adapt in the face of modernity's

and the Liberal Order

problems, or at least to be able to cope with them

Many of the contributions to this volume suggest or

better than any possible alternative, doubtless re-

imply that, though the challenges it faces may indeed

flects the widespread belief (epitomised in Fukuya-

be perplexing, it is conceivable that liberalism has

ma's work) that it represents the pinnacle of a

the resources to address them not only theoretically

successful struggle by humanity to work out the most

but also practically. That is to say, the challenges can

commodious form of political system. But I urge that

be understood from within a recognisably liberal

contemporary liberal theory should not begin with

conceptual framework and the institutions and prac-

this belief as an automatic presumption. Instead, it

tices of a liberal social and political order need not

should commit itself at most to a continuous testing

have to undergo a revolutionary transformation for

of such a proposition; it can never be taken for

them to be tackled adequately. On this view some

granted, for circumstances are too fluid to have blind

may argue that, though liberalism may not have all

faith in the `historical vindication' of liberalism.

the answers to every problem or even the best answer

So let us consider the argument that, though it

in certain instances, it informs what is, on balance,

may have beaten off many rivals to date, liberalism

the best standpoint from which to engage with

remains fundamentally flawed. There is no guaran-

politics in the modern world.

tee, it says, that liberalism's intellectual apparatus

It is hoped that this Companion will help readers to

will be able to help us cope with all of the practical

draw their own conclusions about the validity of this

problems that the liberal political order may face.

claim, ranging as it does across many of the issues by

And those problems could threaten to overwhelm

which liberalism should be judged. However, the test

liberal practice. Note that this scenario can be

or thought-experiment I wish to sketch hypothesises

imagined without believing that there is an alter-

deep internal tensions within the liberal `settlement',

native doctrine that, all things considered, will cope

which might plausibly threaten to destroy the very

any better with liberalism's predicament. For who

coherence of liberalism's commitments. My proposal

can say whether the victor in the `battle of the

is that there is no reason why liberals themselves

ideologies' will not still be torn apart as its panoply

cannot describe such scenarios, which are not ne-

of moral ideals and political prescriptions founder in

cessarily exercises in fantasy but which point to real

this deeply suboptimal social world of contradictions,

potentialities. If they can face up to such possibilities

complexities and antagonisms?

and think hard about how to address them, then it is

To substantiate this idea, we can reflect upon how

difficult to think of anything more serious for them to

a historical awareness should jolt us out of any

tackle. I hasten to note that I emphatically do not

sanguine

support the gloomily anti-Panglossian view that I

might now think we can forever harvest from liberal

shall construct to show how this test might be

society. A hundred years ago, the optimistic faith in

conducted, not least because no such exercise could

the direction of rational human development had yet

14

complacency

concerning

the

fruits

we

ISSUES AND TRENDS IN CONTEMPORARY LIBERALISM

to be darkened by the slaughter of the Somme, the

be blithely ignorant of the problems these political

bureaucratically managed genocide of Stalin's purges

currents

and the Nazis' Final Solution, and the spectre of

democracies (as manifest, for example, in the per-

global nuclear destruction. No such underestimation

sistence of racism and other forms of violent `hate

of the human capacity for evil is now likely to be

politics'). But let us for the sake of argument deny

accepted without grave reservation. Moreover, glo-

that they constitute ± or are likely in the foreseeable

bal capitalism is producing such profound institu-

future to constitute ± genuine systemic threats to

tional and cultural changes at an ever-accelerating

the latter.

rate that it is increasingly difficult to think of many

strength to destroy liberal democracy as did fascism

of the norms, artefacts and `certainties' of our civi-

in many European states did during the inter-war

lisation as settled. Change is too dizzying, too dis-

years.

cause

33

within

actually-existing

liberal

They alone do not appear to have the

orientating for us to feel `at home' for long in any one

A more relevant and hence perplexing theoretical

manifestation of modernity; as Marx and Engels so

challenge is this. Even if we grant the argument that

presciently put it, `all that is solid melts into air.'

32

liberalism does not now seem to have seriously

Given all this, with what reason, exactly, could we

credible, morally and practically superior rivals, it

hold firm to the beliefs that, whatever happens,

is possible that liberal commitments and practices

liberalism's ideals will be capable of remaining our

may be torn apart from within. There are two ways in

moral inspiration? What follows is a selection of

which this might happen:

perhaps numerous ways in which `anti-liberal' pos1. At the level of ideals, some of its moral goals

sibilities might be postulated. Where once the liberals' `bogeymen' were primar-

may be realisable only at the expense of some

ily fascists and communists of various hues (and they

of its others. All of the goals may be thought to

may still threaten them in places, of course), it is

be valuable and we might have hoped that the

nowadays more often the figures of the authoritarian

victor in the battle of the ideologies might

nationalist and the religious fundamentalist who are

have been able to preserve them together. But

seen as either the main threats to established liberal

our destiny is not so rosy; we cannot but

orders or as the actually-existing obstacles to the

endure significant moral loss because of the

spread of liberalism in, say, post-communist societies.

practical uncombinability of liberalism's aims.

The basic themes of their anti-liberalism, however,

Whatever doctrine emerges from the choices

have largely remained the same as their predecessors

we will ultimately have to make may not deserve the name of `liberal'.

in liberalism's gallery of rogues: the denial of basic liberties as the prime political concern, the prepa-

2. At the level of practice, the kind of society that

redness to subordinate individual interests to (illu-

liberal doctrine supports ends up inadvertently

sory)

discrimination

subverting at least some of its aspirations.

between groups of people in a shameless abandon-

There is no way to fit the latter with the

ment of equal respect, and a willingness to prefer

socio-economic order that the doctrine sup-

coercion over persuasion in pursuit of such repressive

ports. Again, in crude terms, something will

political ends.

have to give way and what results may not

`common

goods',

an

overt

warrant the liberal label at all.

It is obviously right to confront the challenges that movements such as nationalism and religious fundamentalism pose to the liberal order. A recog-

To illustrate just a few of the ways we might render

nition that liberalism may not be appropriate in all

vivid this conclusion in our thought-experiment, we

four corners of the world should not necessarily

can return to our division of liberal concerns into (1)

mean that we should automatically forego the mak-

a moral theory; (2) an account of the ideal political

ing of the case for liberalism in at least some parts of

regime; (3) an account of the ideal social culture. In

the globe where anti-liberal nationalisms and fun-

so doing, we can see how on this account some of the

damentalisms currently hold sway. Nor should we

faults of which, it was argued above, liberalism's

15

MARK EVANS

principles are incorrectly convicted may yet emerge

moralities of individual freedom and social justice

as unintended consequences of its practice.

may not be sustainable in the kind of world in which we find ourselves. Perhaps liberalism's notions of `individuality' and

Challenges to the Morality of Liberalism

`individual projects' can be preserved in the face of

Although I have already indicated that liberalism is

justice so conceived only if we in the rich nations

by no means incompatible with the robust concep-

undergo a radical reconceptualisation of our pre-

tions of community favoured by `communitarians'

ferred or ideal individual modes of good living. If

(loosely defined), its central moral focus remains the

liberals become more prepared to lead lives that are

individual and some notion of the interests of in-

much less exorbitant in their use of resources, they

dividuality. And the more pluralistic one's concep-

may be more capable of reconciling themselves to

tion of human nature, the more individualistic (that

justice. I raise this point in the final chapter to

is, less communitarian) that notion may turn out to

indicate a possible twist in my argument about

be. It could be argued (as I will suggest below) that

perfectionist liberalism's theorisation of the good

modern capitalist society further `individualises' its

life. There I link it to the second concern that

subjects by undermining the culture and indeed the

can be raised under the present heading: what needs

physical

communities

to be done to preserve the global natural environ-

while creating no new `community' in their places.

ment. It may be the case that Brian Baxter's inge-

Liberalism, it might then be contended, tends to

nious melding of liberal and ecological concerns will

reinforce such developments by favouring the inter-

ultimately not demand enough of individuals (in

ests of individual freedom over human collectives.

fundamentally changing the way they live and the

Here, I shall mention just two moral issues that could

resources they use to do so) to do what is necessary to

place this doctrine ± and its reinforcement of `in-

stave off the destruction of the precarious ecological

dividualisation' ± under intolerable strain.

balance between humanity and the earth. The con-

constitution

of

traditional

The first is the ongoing scandal of international

sequences of this catastrophe (even from the most

distributive injustice: the billions who live in the

`personcentric' point of view) would be much more

most desperate, degrading poverty, a tragedy that

difficult to ignore in the way that many in the rich

seems to render them all the more prone to the other

world are presently capable of physically and psy-

terrible catastrophes brought by war, weather and

chologically isolating themselves from the demands

disease. We need not believe that redistribution of

of distributive justice.

35

wealth from the rich nations alone would be enough to solve these problems altogether to recognise that

Challenges to the Political Principles

they could be substantially alleviated if such redis-

and Institutions of Liberal Democracy

tribution were to take place. But to the extent that liberalism seeks not to swallow up all individual

It is as close as one gets to received wisdom in

projects and concerns is the extent to which it

political

may not be sufficiently responsive.

34

science

that

the

`formal'

constitutional

It may be that,

paraphernalia of modern liberal democracy do not

to meet even fairly minimal demands of justice (such

house the only, or even the main, sites of power.

as satisfying basic needs), the richer nations would

These are located instead in state and party bureau-

have to transfer such enormous amounts of resources

cracies, organised interest groups and other socio-

that many of the kinds of lifestyle that liberalism is

economic elites. Socialists in particular have always

valued for accommodating would not be sustainable.

attacked liberalism for a blindness with regard to the

Maybe justice would then require far more than the

power that capitalists wield over the liberal-demo-

voluntary acts of charity, necessitating a coercive

cratic state. In contemporary politics, this charge has

limitation upon people's freedoms to live such com-

taken on a heightened perspicacity with the phe-

paratively expensive lives. Here, then, is the possi-

nomenon of `globalisation'. Alongside the develop-

bility that liberalism's accommodation between the

ment of regional and genuinely global institutions,

16

ISSUES AND TRENDS IN CONTEMPORARY LIBERALISM

there is a growing realisation that the nation-state's

democracy). Democratic institutions thus begin to

increasing dependence upon the support of capital is

wither. Further, as social unrest intensifies (through

undermining its very existence as a meaningful

industrial militancy and/or extra-systemic political

political entity in so far as that capital is acquiring

protest and/or increases in crime rates due to the

an increasingly multinational character.

widening gaps between rich and poor, and the

Now we could agree that a liberalism which is

destruction of meaningful economic and social op-

wholly ignorant of these facts, stubbornly clinging to

portunities for the latter), the state becomes more

the obvious fiction that real power rests solely with

authoritarian, undermining civil liberties as it at-

the `superficial' structures of the nation-state, should

tempts to impose civil order (or at least contain the

not be entertained at all seriously. But the mistake

effects of disorder).

37

which liberalism's critics may continue to make is to

In light of this, my suggestion is that in western

believe that liberals necessarily peddle such naõÈvety.

states it is likely that the biggest threat to liberal

In the same way that the defence of liberal politics

democracy does not come from liberal theory's tradi-

need not be based upon the kind of philosophical

tional nemeses of `fascism' or `religious fundament-

beliefs that the communitarians rightly argue to be

alism'.

discreditable, so it need imply no ignorance of the

authoritarian form of economic libertarianism, as

realities of power and the limitations imposed upon

the competitive pressures of globalising capitalism

its favoured institutions. Max Weber's `competitive

increasingly subordinate politics to the satisfaction of

elitism' offers one, albeit noticeably unenthusiastic,

its own exacting needs. (It might be suggested that

defence of liberal-democratic politics while conced-

certain South-East Asian capitalist states provide the

ing many such limitations.

36

It

lies

instead

in

the

drift

towards

an

none-too-enticing models for this.) As David Held

However, it is always possible that these limita-

points out, the New Right's rise from the mid-1970s

tions will profoundly undercut the possibility of

was a direct response to precisely the kinds of

liberal politics. The economic and institutional con-

intractable pressures from which liberalism in its

straints of the contemporary capitalist world may

Keynesian welfare-state form suffered.

place too much strain upon it to keep its aspirations

as observed above, an earlier form of classical liberal-

alive. Take, for example, its commitments to uphold

ism as its inspiration, cutting away at least part of its

an extensive range of civil liberties and to promote

later connections to democracy and certainly its

social justice for its citizens. We could envisage

commitments to social justice. The paradox of this,

something like a `legitimation crisis' crippling its

of course, was that it sanctioned a politics that also

ability to meet them. Sketching this thesis briefly:

threatened the commitments even to its more mini-

the capitalist state is ever more beholden to the need

mal conceptions of equal freedom, as the inequities

to attract rather than repel multinational capital

of power in capitalism were exacerbated by economic

which can roam the world in search of the most

`deregulation'

profitable sites to invest. Forced into ever more

Á -vis the basic civil liberties of instrengthened vis-a

exclusively `business-friendly' policies and progres-

dividuals. It is, then, hard to suggest that even

sively sapped by capitalism's economic cycles of

classical liberalism was being fully realised in this

`boom and bust', the state finds itself increasingly

situation.

unable to fund its other commitments adequately,

The

idea

and

of

the

power

`legitimation

of

38

It retrieved,

the

crisis'

state

prompts

was

the

primarily those most directly demanded by citizens in

thought that this drift to authoritarian economic

the form of public services and welfare provisions.

libertarianism may not be entirely led `from the

The citizens thus become disenchanted and embit-

top', either. If citizens become frustrated at the

tered. As part of its increasingly frantic attempts to

perceived failings of the liberal-democratic system

control expenditure by reducing the number of in-

and, in particular, disturbed by its inability to control

stitutions with the authority to spend at their own

rising crime rates and the other objects of the `moral

discretion, the state is forced to centralise political

panics' that periodically seize such societies, they

control (even where it promises the extension of

themselves may be tempted to support altogether

17

MARK EVANS

more illiberal politics in the name of law and order.

what is thought to be the traditional liberal idea of it

This fear, whose origins can be traced as far back as

as a (political) capacity to influence others. They

Plato's critique of democracy in The Republic, finds its

contend that power is the effect of all manner of

most disturbing expression in the spectre of the

social practices and relationships, `disciplining' or

Weimar Republic's fall and the willingness among

even constituting subjects in society. As critics of

many German citizens to accept (at least in its early

capitalist society, they attack the forms of subjectiv-

stages) the Nazi dictatorship.

ity produced by the social practices that liberalism

The ultimate crisis of progressive politics on this

upholds.

40

view, though, may lie in an inability plausibly to

Others, perhaps not always as prepared to give off

recommend any of the radical alternatives to capit-

the scent of cultural elitism that attaches to some

alism that might be necessary to secure and build

versions of the previous argument, nevertheless urge

upon the values that the present critique suggests

that there is something about the way in which social

liberal democracy might hope in vain to uphold in its

space and time is nowadays constructed that turns

midst. Socialism, for example, may just not be

individuals into withdrawn, privatised selves. Such

thought to be practicable. If some form of capitalism

people are increasingly unwilling and unable to reap

is regarded as unavoidable, and liberalism remains

those fruits of genuinely communal relationships

the progressive's best `match' for it, then progressi-

that once were so central to ideas of the good life.

vism has nowhere else to turn ± and yet even a

Fukuyama

shrunken neoclassical liberalism may not be able to

Nietzschean `last man' as the ominously possible

withstand the intensification of capitalist practices.

paradigmatic character of modern liberal capitalist

The relationship of liberal-democratic politics to the

society, content with mediocrity now that funda-

exigencies of capitalism will, I suspect, become one

mental social struggles for improvement are over.

of liberal theory's most urgent concerns in the years

But this development need not be due simply to a

ahead.

lack of character and lazy contentment with every-

himself

resurrects

the

image

of

the

41

day life in capitalist consumer society. Such are the pressures of this life that the hedonistic retreat into

Challenges to the Culture

the private realm becomes a perfectly understandable

of Liberal-Democratic Individuality

and, perhaps for some, existentially necessary reac-

The economic realities of capitalism impact as much

tion.

upon culture as they do upon political institutions.

As republican thinkers remind us, the privatisa-

The third category suggests, then, that liberalism's

tion of the self may have direct political conse-

support for capitalism ± which, as indicated in the

quences too. As Tocqueville influentially noted,

previous section may be far from unalloyed enthu-

democracy depends upon a culture of participation.

siasm even though there is no more preferable

If individuals are not prepared in significant numbers

alternative ± undermines its cultural ideals.

to engage in public political life at least to some

For example, there are those who think that

degree, then the practices of liberal democracy will

capitalist commodification tends to turn the project

wither, leaving a vacuum to be filled, if only by

of `individual conceptions of the good' into shallow

default, by non-democratic institutions. In modern

simulacra of flourishing individuality, reducing it to

times, the phenomenon of power slipping to une-

mere hedonism and the shaping of one's identity

lected bureaucratic `quangos' may well be testimony

purely with respect to the fashions that are just

to this (as well as to the anti-democratic tendencies

insidious ways of manipulating the tastes of indivi-

cited in the previous section).

duals as consumers.

39

42

If it is not almost a new kind of

More widely, such privatisation contributes to an

slavery, these critics would certainly regard it as a

increasing unwillingness to embrace social obliga-

travesty of liberalism's ideal of free human develop-

tions, narrowing if not individualising altogether our

ment. Many who argue in these general terms sup-

sense of to whom our responsibilities lie.

port a conception of power that ranges well beyond

tioned above in indicating how liberalism has re-

18

43

As men-

ISSUES AND TRENDS IN CONTEMPORARY LIBERALISM

sponded to the communitarian critique, there has

case. In so doing, I think this can orient liberal

been a renewed interest in ideas of `civic liberalism'

thinking towards a maximisation of its own depth,

which are designed to address such fears. But there

strength and self-confidence.

may be forces at work that would entirely undermine

In setting an agenda for contemporary liberal

the stability of any such ideal in practice. Within

research, this Companion is a contribution towards

civil society, therefore, an egoistic mentality is fos-

that orientation. Even those liberals who already feel

tered that causes the decline of many social institu-

confident enough to accept a Fukuyama-style verdict

tions and practices which formerly encouraged co-

on liberalism's moral superiority should not, then,

operation and mutual support. Given the obvious

regard this book as a final, definitive pronouncement

unwillingness of many major liberal-democratic po-

of that victory. Liberal political theory does not

litical parties to advocate an increased acceptance by

come to an end even if one thinks that `history'

the state of this social burden, this trend means that

in Fukuyama's sense has. There are always vexing

more and more social obligations go unfulfilled.

issues to be addressed, some of which may move to the fore and supplant some of those emphasised here. And we must constantly remain alert to the possi-

Conclusion

bility that liberalism does not constitute the end of our ideational and institutional development.

It is not perverse to end this introduction to a further twenty-one chapters on liberalism with such dire

Conversely, however, awareness of liberalism's

anti-liberal possibilities. As I have insisted, painting

problems ± both actual and potential ± need not

such dystopian pictures does not commit one to

commit one to the belief that continued support for

affirming them. But by taking full measure of the

liberalism necessarily represents some failure of ima-

problems it may face, I believe that liberalism can

gination by today's political thinkers. If any of the

become more emboldened to analyse its own con-

anti-liberal possibilities described above do threaten

dition honestly, and articulate, defend and refine

us, it may take great effort to sustain liberal ideas and

itself as robustly as possible. As much as anything,

practices ± and this is no small, meek undertaking.

this exposes the limitations of Gray's critique: unless

For liberalism's morality and politics has inspired and

we are blithely indifferent to the fate of liberal

sustained much hope through even the darkest

civilisation it is surely strange to think of these

periods of recent human history. Critical but con-

questions as somehow divorced from our real-life

structive engagement with its problems is vital to the

political concerns. Taking them as seriously as they

preservation of its legacy ± and that is the project this

are stated in the hypotheses above may be overly

book aims to keep alive.

melodramatic ± but it is up to liberalism to argue that

Notes

theoretical complexity and public comprehension in

1. Note that many wish to distinguish `political theory'

contemporary political theory.

and `political philosophy' and would doubtless stress

9. Gray (1995a), pp. 3±4, 11±13.

that it is the fate specifically of the latter which such claims announce. For my purposes in this discussion,

10. See Ethics, 102 (April 1992).

nothing significant hangs upon the distinction, which

11. Gray (1995a), p. 4.

is far from universally recognised.

12. See Fukuyama (1989), (1992). 13. For a comprehensive discussion of how to characterise

2. P. Laslett, `Introduction', in Laslett (ed.) (1956), pp.

liberalism illuminatingly and substantively while at

vii, xiii. Cf. Berlin (1969), pp. 118±19.

the same time doing justice to its diversity, see Freeden

3. Gray (1995a), p. 1.

(1996), parts I and II.

4. Ibid., p. 16. 5. Ibid., p. 3.

14. By `general themes' and `tendencies' I refer to features

6. Ibid., p. 2.

which occur in some form to a greater or lesser extent

7. Gray (1995a), p. 17.

in most versions of liberalism; I intend nothing more

8. See Bertram (1997) for a discussion of the problems of

specific than that.

19

MARK EVANS

15. Rorty (1998), p. 170.

29. For an example, see Dagger (1997).

16. See Freeden (1996), chapter 7.

30. See Rawls (1996) and, for commentary on this type of liberalism, Evans (1999).

17. For examples of this type of liberalism, see ibid.,

31. Young (1990).

chapter 5 and pp. 456±80.

32. Quoted in Kamenka (ed.) (1983), p. 207.

18. A `character-ideal' specifies certain dispositions, aptitudes and tastes which constitute what is deemed to

33. Having warned against complacency, I don't wish this

be the ideal form that a person's character could take.

point to be taken as ignorance of the activities of neo-

Anti-perfectionist liberals may be thought to eschew

Nazi movements and suchlike in contemporary wes-

such notions, but in fact they tend not to: Rawls, for

tern democracies. Certainly, liberals should steadfastly

example, has no qualms over talking about the ideal

resist them in theory and practice, for this is what will

characteristics of citizens. However, he attempts to

help to resist any future slide into fascist barbarism. I

avoid idealising forms of character outside of the

maintain that the latter is indeed unlikely, but I am

political realm. Perfectionist liberals, as is evident

primarily concerned here to divert attention to other possible anti-liberal trends.

in Chapter 22 of this book, do not accept this

34. Nagel phrases this problem in terms of balancing the

restriction. 19. See Cohen (1989).

impartial demands of morality with the partial con-

20. See Rawls (1972), especially part one.

cerns of particular relationships and projects; see Nagel (1991).

21. Nozick (1974).

35. See Singer (1993) for a cautiously optimistic assess-

22. See Hayek (1993).

ment about our ability to change our lives to meet

23. A. Sen, `Equality of What?', in Sen (1982), pp. 353±

such moral and ecological challenges.

73. Representative pivotal works in this debate in-

36. See Held (1996), pp. 157±77 for a discussion of

clude Dworkin (1981a) and (1981b), Cohen (1989)

Weber's political views.

and Arneson (1989). 24. Other

representative

contractarian

works

37. For a summary of `legitimation crisis' theory, see ibid.,

include

pp. 240±53.

Scanlon (1986) and, for a more libertarian position,

38. Ibid., pp. 253±63.

Gauthier (1986).

39. Classic statements of this kulturkritik, which blames

25. Sandel (1982). 26. See Walzer (1986) and, for a comprehensive discus-

the processes that liberal society has historically en-

sion of the liberal-communitarian debate, Mulhall and

couraged, are found in Marcuse (1964) and `The

Swift (1996).

Culture Industry: Enlightenment as Mass Deception', in Adorno and Horkheimer (1986), pp. 120±67.

27. As Charles Taylor has argued, `the liberal-communitarian debate' was often presented in a manner which

40. See Hindess (1996) for a discussion of the concept of

conflated the distinguishable questions of `ontology'

`power' in liberal political theory. I suggest in Chapter

(such as those on the nature of the self and its

22 that a Foucauldian rethinking of `power' may benefit the concept of a perfectionist liberalism.

relationship to society), which were centrally relevant to the justification debate, and `advocacy', which

41. Fukuyama (1992), part V.

specifically contested the content of political morality.

42. For illuminating discussion of Tocqueville in this regard, see Macedo (1989).

See his `Cross-Purposes: The Liberal-Communitarian

43. See Singer (1993), chapter 1 and passim, for discussion

Debate', in Taylor (1995), pp. 181±203.

of this claim.

28. See, for example, MacIntyre (1985).

20

2

TWENTIETH-CENTURY LIBERAL THOUGHT: DEVELOPMENT OR TRANSFORMATION? Michael Freeden

In this chapter I seek to investigate how liberalism

liberalism in time-honoured conventional manner

was portrayed throughout the twentieth century in

on a unidimensional sequence, we need to draw

dedicated liberal literature, that is works primarily

conclusions from the variable presentation of histor-

devoted to an exposition of the basic tenets of

ical liberal narratives, or from their juxtaposition

liberalism. On the surface many, though not all,

with non-narrative justifications of liberalism. The

of these works present themselves as `second-order'

history of liberalism in the last century, and indeed in

overviews of liberal theory and ideology. Sometimes,

previous centuries, is not merely the reflection of its

as with the Rawlsian family of arguments, they

development, or evolution, or change, or perchance

intend both to offer a novel interpretation of liberal

regression. It is not a single story to be told. We now

principles and, in parallel, to reflect given cultural

recognise that all current theories are located in time

understandings unconsciously and unintentionally.

as well as in space. But when we say that, we are not

On the whole, though, writers about liberalism have

engaging in the simplistic assertion that `context

tended to elucidate a tradition rather than depart

counts'. Contexts are multi-temporal and multi-spa-

from it. But this raises a fundamental methodological

tial even with respect to one family of beliefs such as

problem: when does a `secondary' text become a

liberalism, and they generate both deliberate and

`primary' one? The response to that is: when we

unintentional meta-assumptions quite irrespective of

interpret it as itself an act of interpretation; and

whether liberalism itself contains views on univers-

when we acknowledge that the role of the political

alism or relativism or, as we have now come to

theorist incorporates not only prescription and its

appreciate, multiculturalism. Moreover, individual

investigation but also interpretation and its investi-

liberals, and conventional social norms concerning

gation. The analysts, chroniclers and popularisers of

what liberalism is, exercise choice over what con-

liberalism

understanding

stitutes a context and over which contexts to select

when we query its status as a transcendent moral

among the many contexts ± existing or yet to be

position and explore it instead as a diverse and

discovered or invented ± in which liberalism may be

flexible set of readings concerning the epistemology

located. A context, like a historical narrative, is not a

of the political.

reflection of events out there. It is an act of private or

become

pivotal

to

our

Whatever else liberalism is, it is a cultural artefact,

public imagination superimposed upon a set of per-

consciously intended to be adopted by large social

ceived, if fragmented, facts. This chapter will at-

groups. But rather than explore the Ideengeschichte of

tempt to identify more precisely not why and when

21

MICHAEL FREEDEN

liberalism changes in terms of objective contexts, but

intellectual history. Behind it stands a broader agen-

what it is that has changed in the imaginative

da, whose task it is to provide an analysis of a family

presentation of liberalism, and how different em-

of political theories and ideologies. To do so we

phases on various aspects of liberalism reflect and

ought to come to terms with liberalism as a complex

transform the political understandings of some of its

and elusive tradition of thinking about politics, and

more salient, or representative, purveyors.

we may gain from locating the analysis on offer here squarely among the activities in which political

Far too often, recent scholars of liberalism have

theorists engage.

confidently and stipulatively approached it as if that theory or ideology represents a clear and unitary moral position encompassing knowable and objec-

Liberal Movement: Evolution and Energy

tive, or at least reasonable, standards of justice and human rights: a homogeneous model which could

The twentieth century has witnessed three main

then be incisively contrasted with alternative `mono-

modes of writing about liberalism: as a development

lithic' theories such as communitarianism. This is

of political thought over time; as a political mani-

not the issue under discussion here; nor is it the most

festo against extremism, authoritarianism or conser-

challenging and rewarding question when examining

vative complacency; and as a philosophical view of

liberalism. Rather, liberalism is that semantic field in

the rational and moral relationship between the

which the political understandings of people who

individually unique and the socially common. In

regard themselves as liberals, or whom others regard

intricate and concrete argumentation, these modes

as liberals, may be investigated. It is a plastic, chan-

often overlap. When in 1911 L. T. Hobhouse wrote

ging thing, shaped and reshaped by the thought-

his famous volume entitled Liberalism, he was writing

practices of individuals and groups, and though it

a tract for the times, forged out of the successful

needs to have a roughly identifiable pattern for us to

battles fought by the new liberals, but it was a tract

call it consistently by the same name, `liberalism', it

with a moral purpose: that of consolidating the

also presents myriad variations which reflect the

reforms liberalism had undertaken from within. He

questions posed, and positions adopted, by various

did so by emphasising above all one aspect of liberal-

liberals.

ism, offering it as an evolutionary body of thought

In the space available, some samples will be

which not only advocated progress as a social ideal,

provided of the conceptualisations of liberalism dur-

but was itself controlled by that same evolutionary

ing this century, through examining a number of

law. This was not a particular liberal view of history,

books on liberalism which were written as central

such as the much-mooted Whig interpretation of

textbooks, introductions, surveys, statements, or cri-

history, but rather a particular historical view of

tiques. The assumption adhered to is that these

liberalism, which regarded it as a set of beliefs itself,

books mirrored, moulded and disseminated broad

crucially, subject to historical processes. In other

understandings of what liberalism was, as well as

words, one defining feature of liberalism, in sharp

carrying some unintentional baggage which has been

contrast to current philosophical liberalism, was that

left for us to unpack. Ultimately, in order for liberal-

its theorists held to a specific interpretation of time

ism to be comprehended we must observe it `at

as a central conceptual component of liberal ideol-

thought' by exploring the mind-sets of some of its

ogy. Time was not strictly sequential in its trajectory

typical agents. The result, one would hope, would be

of human and social improvement, nor totally open-

an enriched and rather more subtle view than can be

ended in accompanying human and social matura-

provided by attempting to construct a philosophi-

tion, but it nevertheless dictated that liberalism itself

cally `ideal' or `best-practice' liberal moral theory.

had to undergo steady transformation. In the past

Those philosophical approaches necessarily lose in

liberalism had experienced a process of growth which

breadth and political applicability what they gain in

was now reaching its apotheosis by aligning itself

internal cohesion and ethical persuasiveness. Nor is

with the development of a newly emerging social

this chapter about `mere' history, nor even `mere'

rationality, embodied in an integrated and organic

22

TWENTIETH-CENTURY LIBERAL THOUGHT

7

society and regulated by a benevolent and empha-

the modern world'.

tically non-neutral agency ± the state.

`an effective historical force', is sustained by move-

Movement in the first sense, as

Like Mill, and many previous liberals, Hobhouse's

ment in this second animated, living sense. Liberal-

story about liberalism begins as a historical-anthro-

ism is the release of dynamic biological and spiritual

pological narrative. It is one of social harmony and

energy, a view reiterated by Guido de Ruggiero in his

community undermined by later authoritarian poli-

seminal The History of European Liberalism, when he

tical arrangements. Liberalism dawns as a `destruc-

identified liberalism as concerned with the free play

tive criticism', a project of release in order to enable

of individual forces which have `vital importance and

free, and natural, order and progress. Here are some

energising power'.

of the recognisable liberal core concepts of the

vigorous and liberalism is above all an instrument for

nineteenth and twentieth centuries. But there is a

freeing this flowing human essence. This is no mere

deeper and ulterior ontology of liberalism in opera-

`exercise concept' in Charles Taylor's phrase,

tion. Hobhouse endows the idea of release with a

the setting free of organic, non-static, life which will

specific complexion: `a movement of liberation, a

otherwise be suppressed. Unsurprisingly, well-being

clearance of obstructions . . . for the flow of free,

is for Hobhouse as important as liberty. Moreover,

1

8

The world is naturally active and

9

but

vital, spontaneous activity'. The idea of `movement'

the identification of processes as natural indicates

is subtly and only half-consciously recruited to un-

the typical ideological device of insulating funda-

derpin this specific understanding of liberalism. First,

mental ontological claims from the sphere of debate

liberalism is a movement, to be sure: it is an organised

and contention. In adhering to that thought-practice

body with, in J. A. Hobson's words, an `active

liberalism is no different from other ideological

2

mission' directed towards the attainment of political

families. Furthermore, although an understanding

objectives. Second, however, liberalism is a carrier of

of twentieth-century liberalism should not be deter-

truth, which moves for Hobhouse in `an expanding

mined merely through the yardstick of some of its

3

When in Chapter II Hobhouse lists

later manifestations, the contrast with Rawls here is

the types of liberty embraced by liberals, he con-

striking. For if liberalism is `all-penetrating', it pro-

ceives them as spatial, embracing parallel activities

vides both the common element enabling the ex-

such as civil, fiscal, economic and social, and located

pression of all human cooperative activity, a function

in arenas such as the personal, domestic, local,

allocated by Rawls to narrow political liberalism, and

circle of ideas'.

4

national and international. Similarly, Hobson could

the comprehensive liberalism which Rawls firmly

assert that `liberalism will come more definitely to

detaches from the political.

concern itself with the liberation and utilisation of the faculties and potencies of a nation and a muni-

Liberal Emotionalism

cipality, as well as with those of individuals and 5

voluntary groups of citizens.' The liberty at the core

Hobhouse unequivocally relates liberalism to human

of liberalism is hence conceptualised as undergoing

emotion on two levels. On the one he observes that

movement both through space and through time, and is aligned with the concept of spreading and

the philosophies that have driving force behind

contagious progress. Thus it contains seeds of uni-

them are those that arise . . . out of the practical

versalism, not in an analytical or intrinsic sense, but

demands of human feeling. The philosophies that

a historically and spatially contingent universalism,

remain ineffectual and academic are those that

called forth `by the special circumstances of Western

are formed by abstract reflection without relation

Europe'.

6

to the thirsty souls of human kind.

10

Third, as the initial quotation suggests, movement suggests vital activity. We arrive now at the semantic

Liberalism opens the door by means of the rational

kernel.

method `to the appeal of reason, of imagination, of

Hobhouse

instructs

us

that

`the

Liberal

11

movement . . . is coextensive with life'; `Liberalism

social feeling'.

is an all-penetrating element of the life-structure of

have emotions and imagination that demand respect

23

It is not only that human beings

MICHAEL FREEDEN

in social arrangements, but that expressivism and

relations between rulers and ruled; and is able

spontaneity are defining features of life, and hence of

to turn this experience to the ends of the eleva-

the liberalism that enables life. Liberalism contains

tion of human society.

17

core rational attributes, but is nonetheless irreducible to the contemplative faculty. Reason and emotion

The liberal spirit is possessed of a `lofty impartial-

coexist and support each other in a manner ruled out

ity'.

of court by most current manifestations of philoso-

refers to the liberal who `likes to preen himself on the

phical liberalism. Hence Hobhouse's support for

triumphs of human intelligence and virtue', and to

forms of nationalism, for

the liberal tradition as a `call to adventure: the

18

A mid-century American review of liberalism

adventure of growing up, becoming autonomous, inasmuch as the true social harmony rests on

living spontaneously' (and note, incidentally, the

feeling and makes use of all the natural ties of

constructive tension between development, freedom

kinship, of neighbourliness, of congruity of char-

and unreflectiveness).

acter and belief, and of language and mode of life,

mood, Laski identified a `flavour of romanticism' in

the best, healthiest and most vigorous political

its temper. It tended to be `zealous' for individual

unit is that to which men are by their own feelings

action, `subjective and anarchist, to be eager for the

strongly drawn.

12

19

In describing liberalism as a

change which comes from individual initiative, to be insistent that this initiative contains within itself 20

In addition, if `rational' may be contrasted with

some necessary seed of social good.'

`emotional', it may also be contrasted with `unre-

insistence ± these features of liberalism are necessa-

flective'. Hobhouse also drew attention to these

rily the attributes of an ideology whose reforming,

latter components of liberalism when he contended

even revolutionary, ardour is part and parcel of its

that `human progress, on whatever side we consider

appeal. For the over-critical Laski, the energising

it, is found to be in the main social progress, the work

power of liberalism had become exhausted.

of conscious or unconscious co-operation.'

13

Zeal, eagerness,

21

It may

Indeed,

be the case that the fervour of liberalism diminished

in his later work Hobhouse was to associate the

upon attaining many of its initial goals, though the

emergence of the ethical precepts of liberalism with

emotional aspects of its beliefs have never quite

fundamental psychological processes.

14

disappeared.

Similar views

on the evolution of liberalism were expressed by Laski, for whom it was `never direct and rarely conscious.'

Liberal Coherence and Liberal Diversity

15

From another perspective, most twentieth-century

Throughout the twentieth century there has been a

liberals adopt an emotive idiom when addressing

curious tension between the static and dynamic

liberalism. For Hobhouse, liberalism aims at `a spirit

facets of liberalism. This problematic of liberalism

of comradeship'; its vision of justice `kindles a pas-

may be redefined by asking whether it is a pliable

sion that may not flare up into moments of dramatic

structure or heavily rule-bound. The editors of The

scintillation, but burns with the enduring glow of the

Liberal Tradition, published in 1956, stated that `at

16

± hardly the predominant phraseology

first sight, the most striking thing about the Liberal

of current Anglo-American philosophy. De Ruggiero

tradition is its intellectual incoherence . . . This is

put this similarly:

the strongest argument in favour of treating Liberal-

central heat'

ism historically'. Considering liberalism as developLiberalism possesses that kind of tact or flair . . .

ing and changing allows such differences to fall into

which in its highest manifestations is true poli-

place.

tical sensitiveness, and serves to recognise every-

narrative alone, because invented narratives are

thing that is human ± human strength and human

contingent and selective. It is importantly the pro-

weakness, human reason and human passion,

duct either of the formulation of directive rules or

human interest and human morality ± in the

the discovery of unintended patterns (a discovery

24

22

Coherence, however, is not the product of a

TWENTIETH-CENTURY LIBERAL THOUGHT

which itself may then be fashioned into a set of

liberal concepts of liberty, rationality, progress, in-

directive rules). If liberal history is not accidental or

dividuality, sociability, a common good, limited and

contingent, if liberalism is not a mathematical ag-

responsible power ± in other words, a theory that,

gregate of its historical parts, that is because history is

according to Hobhouse, undergirds every version of

understood as constituting the ineluctable design of

liberalism.

liberalism. To write about liberalism is for Hobhouse,

De Ruggiero's notion of history rested on similar

and no less so for de Ruggiero, always and necessarily

conceptions of liberal movement, but his Hegelian

to write about its history. They both conceptualise

historical scheme reshaped the liberal time-space

liberalism as the vehicle best encompassing the

relationship into a different pattern of coherence.

dynamic of individual and social life. Liberalism is

His comparative treatment of liberalism permitted

a process and it evokes an activity, the activity of

the postulation of multiple, interacting liberalisms,

being self-directively spontaneous, inventive and

but his reading of the logic of liberalism was not, as

imaginative. Process entails history; history is the

with Hobhouse, through its diffusion in ever-expand-

intellectual coherence of liberalism, rather than

ing circles but through convergence and conciliation

being superimposed to account for it. By contrast,

of opposite liberal currents. Liberalism has to be

the liberal projects of Rawls or Ronald Dworkin

understood `in the diversity of its national forms

prioritise rules as stasis, equilibrium and consensus

and the unity of its historical organism'.

over rules of change. The idea of a liberal constitu-

progress which is liberalism's lifeblood is not Hob-

tion, to which they are wedded, is precisely such a

house's non-teleological `onward course'. For Hob-

device, creating inviolable space, such as a Bill of

house, a release of energy is not necessarily self-

Rights or the two principles of justice, removed from

realisation. For de Ruggiero, `a more comprehensive

the ravages of social time. From a slightly different

Liberalism would recognise the dialectical ground of

perspective, the liberalism of foundational rules pri-

the antithesis and would see resistance and move-

vileges mechanics, whereas the liberalism of creative

ment, conservation and progress, justified and vali-

expressivism privileges organics, both as growth and

dated in a higher synthesis which is political life in its

as human interrelationship. Hobhouse summed up

concreteness'.

his position as follows:

thus a single liberalism which can be retrospectively

25

24

The

The end-result for de Ruggiero is

accounted for as the diachronic emergence of a The heart of liberalism is the understanding that

civilising strain in modern societies, the `irresistible

progress is not a matter of mechanical contri-

operation of civil society'.

vance, but of the liberation of living spiritual

ness crowds out rival arguments and secures victory

energy. Good mechanism is that which provides

in a multi-ideational world of really-existing compet-

the channels wherein such energy can flow un-

ing viewpoints.

26

Its political persuasive-

impeded, unobstructed by its own exuberance of output, vivifying the social structure, expanding and ennobling the life of mind.

The study of the historical forms of European

23

Liberalism has shown us, through all the differences of the various national minds, a process of

Current philosophical liberals tend to concentrate

mutual assimilation, gradually building up a Eur-

on the channels while professing to have no view on

opean Liberal consciousness pervading its parti-

the consequences of providing them, other than the

cular

tautological attainment of justice which has already

differences.

manifestations

without

destroying

their

27

been furnished by the very construction of the mechanical channels themselves. Hobhouse's agen-

Without such reconciliation, the liberal enterprise

da consisted rather in attaching liberalism to an idea-

would be undermined by the damaging potential of

environment formed through concepts such as re-

its disparate currents.

lease, movement, energy and vitality. That is his

That argument was taken even further by Bene-

`thin' theory of the good, which informs the core

detto Croce. In a chapter revealingly titled `Liberal-

25

MICHAEL FREEDEN

ism as a Concept of Life' he, too, combined devel-

As Hobson noted, reviewing de Ruggiero's book, `in

opmentalism with a view of liberalism as coinciding

each country the spirit of liberalism was largely

`with a complete idea of the world and of reality,'

formed by the practical tasks which the needs and

beginning in the world but going `beyond the formal

interests of the dominant classes incited them to

theory of politics'. The very tolerance built into

undertake'.

32

liberalism located it as the framework doctrine with-

Both Hobhouse and de Ruggiero subscribed to a

in which a dialectic competition among ideas could

concrete spatial universalism which is a function of

be resolved. It was characterised above all by this

time (as of course does Marxism) rather than a

immanent

the

transcendental and spaceless universalism which is

authoritarian fiat of otherworldly, externally im-

a function of atemporal reason. But de Ruggiero

posed, transcendental beliefs. History as struggle

removed internal pluralism and unstructured open-

was endemic to liberalism, and struggle encompassed

endedness from liberalism as it emerged as a tele-

process

which

impulse and spontaneity.

28

removed

it

from

Nevertheless Croce was

ological world-view in a very real, and irreversible,

drawn into joining to that profoundly secular doc-

sense. Hobhouse, to the contrary, voiced an increas-

trine an extra-rational, quasi-religious understanding

ing postwar despair concerning the future of liberal-

of liberty, attached to human `vocations' and `mis-

ism when he identified `arrest, retrogression or decay'

sions'. He believed that `the liberal mind regards the

as part of the historic course of change and con-

withdrawing of liberty and the times of reaction as

cluded: `Hence if progress means the gradual realisa-

illnesses and critical stages of growth, as incidents

tion of an ethical ideal no continuous progress is

and steps in the eternal life of liberty.' As with Hegel,

revealed by the course of history.'

timelessness engulfed and superseded time in the last

that pessimism concerning the evolution of the hu-

resort; moreover, this afforded a standpoint from

man mind in de Ruggiero's 1927 deluded prognosis

which history manifested pathologies as well as

that `one may conclude that the omens are favour-

normalities. The transcendental status of liberty

able towards the capacity of the German people to

returned to do the work of faith and underlying

win for itself that liberal education in politics which

essential meaning, justifying the course taken by a

the old regime denied it'.

non-transcendental history. That such liberal his-

giero was epistemologically unable to criticise liberal

tories attained impartiality, as Croce claimed, is

practices and beliefs in their current form because of

hardly borne out by the language in which that

liberalism's inherent evolutionary capacity of self-

claim is expressed.

29

34

33

There is none of

Consequently, de Rug-

development and improvement. These distinctions

A similar viewpoint, with different conclusions, is

aside, the liberalism of Hobhouse and de Ruggiero is

evident in Louis Hartz's modern classic The Liberal

primarily about individual and social expression and

Tradition In America. Liberalism has multiple facets,

development, and only secondarily about pluralism

crucially situated not above politics but in it: `we

and difference, especially in view of its allegiance to

know the European liberal, as it were, by the enemies

the nation-state. By contrast, current liberal plural-

30

Whereas European liberals experi-

ism, in some of its multicultural forms, applies a pre-

enced social diversity and conflict, the American

formed, ahistorical, singular liberal morality to con-

variant

invisibility

crete societies comprised of many components. It

through a cultural and ideological uniformity, `on

regards structural variety as a service concept for

the basis of a submerged and absolute liberal faith'.

autonomy, rather than regarding temporal develop-

Hartz identified a central ideological feature at work

ment as a service concept for individuality, socia-

in the manner American liberalism decontested its

bility or welfare. What de Ruggiero noted about

basic premises, one involving `silent omissions as

liberty and liberties ought to be said about the

he has made.'

acquired

non-contentious

31

Hence while American

tension between liberalism conceived of as universal

liberalism pre-empted political and ideational com-

philosophy and as situated ideology. The one is `an

petition, European liberalism had to fight its ground

abstraction, a concept intended to express the es-

within a culturally and historically disputed space.

sence of human personality, exalted above all his-

well as explicit inclusions'.

26

TWENTIETH-CENTURY LIBERAL THOUGHT

torical and empirical contingency', the other a com-

dignity of human personality, and the construction

plex of features `acquired one by one as circum-

of impenetrable boundaries which the state may not

stances

pervade. Liberal principles are, or ought to be, un-

dictate'.

Each

on

its

own

is,

totally dispossessed of the Liberal spirit.

tellingly,

35

touched by history, even by the experimental reason which many liberals see fit to encourage in people. Instead, they are to be secured to transcendental

The Renewed Search for Certainty

standards and eternal truths, beyond the contami-

The experience of totalitarianism in the 1930s and

nating reach of untrustworthy human judgement.

1940s dramatically changed some interpretative lib-

Hallowell occupies a strange position in relation

eral paradigms. One of the most striking reformula-

to the liberal epistemology of this century, both

tions of liberalism to emerge from the Second World

regressive and progressive. The notion of progress,

War was John Hallowell's The Decline of Liberalism as

so central to liberal values,

an Ideology. His analysis constitutes a watershed in

attached to a theory of evolution which, when

twentieth-century

had in his view become

self-conceptualisation

applied to liberalism itself, undermined the absolute

mainly through its disentangling and counterposing

moral value of the individual. It did so by legitimat-

of the historical and the ahistorical mode of liberal-

ing humanly directed change, especially through the

ism. If for Hobhouse and de Ruggiero liberalism

German construct of the Rechtsstaat, which estab-

embodies a vital growth impetus, Hallowell reversed

lished positive law ± a law that was made and not

this historical tendency to identify a move from

found ± as the guarantor of equality. One of Hallo-

something live and vigorous to something decadent

well's inputs into the liberal debate was to re-em-

and degenerate. Growth may also imply regression,

phasise not its polysemic but its static character.

especially once de Ruggiero's Hegelian dialectic of

Another was to distinguish between liberalism as

progress is abandoned. `As a political ideology born

philosophy and as ideology, a move of importance

of a particular historical period in a specific socio-

associated with the mid-century decline in prestige of

logical environment [liberalism] is subject, like all

the concept of ideology. However, the decline of

such systems of ideas, to development, decline, and

ideology is not articulated in terms of the postwar

death.'

36

liberal

38

debate

Significantly, and in contradistinction to

over

undesirable

dogmatism

versus

com-

Hobhouse's anxieties concerning external impedi-

mended pragmatism, but in terms of undesirable

ments to liberalism, Hallowell attributed the death

pragmatism versus incontrovertible truth. Hallowell

of liberal ideology to liberals themselves, for a man-

approvingly quoted C. E. M. Joad, for whom prag-

made belief system is subject to human fallibility.

matism ministered

That fallibility has revealed itself in the forsaking of a parallel but morally and intellectually superior lib-

to human complacency by assuring human beings

eralism, `integral' liberalism, couched in the language

that right and wrong, beauty and ugliness, reality

of absolutes which would have prevented the in-

and unreality, are not external facts, features of

tellectual perversion of liberalism, particularly by

the universe to which human beings must in the

Nazism. Hallowell's version of liberalism embodied

long run subject themselves, but are the products

the typical disillusionment of postwar scholars with

of human consciousness and, therefore, amenable

the fickle impermanence of legal systems, unless

to human desires.

39

anchored in dictates of objective reason. The rediscovery of normative foundationalism became promi-

Hallowell proposed the following ideational com-

nent in the American legal tradition, in its renewed

pound as liberalism's epistemological base: first, a

anti-positivist appeal to natural law and its conse-

humanist doctrine that relinquishes anthropocentr-

quent revival of the notion of universal human rights

ism and rejects intuitive judgement; second, a theory

during the 1940s and 1950s.

37

Liberal ontology

of human freedom that dismisses the view of indi-

therefore sought refuge in invoking new variants

viduals as autonomously capable of exercising their

of traditional certitudes: the absolute value and

subjectively free wills; third, a conception of ration-

27

MICHAEL FREEDEN

ality that subjugates individuals to the `dictates of

factual thought experiments which translate the

reason' and the external criteria of justice as obliga-

requirements of coherence and procedure, rather

tion to transcendental law, accessed through an

than growth and energy, into structural fundamen-

inner conscience. For a liberal, Hallowell imposed

tals of liberalism. Is this, intriguingly, a parallel

a particularly stringent limitation on value pluralism,

tendency to what Orton describes as `the queer

for liberalism relies on `a common knowledge, or

double

recognition, of values transcending individuals.'

40

strain

in

nineteenth

century

liberalism.

The rationalistic, system-making tradition in lais-

Nevertheless all this is a `theory of political order

sez-faire theory never found common ground with

based upon individualism', and it is identified as a

the personalistic and humanitarian impulse' ± an

`comprehensive Weltanschauung'.

41

Contrast this

inspirational, empathetic and energy-liberating hu43

with the Rawlsian view of rationality emerging

manism?

volitionally from individuals and expressed in a

cidity of purpose belong essentially to Liberalism',

reasonable, overlapping and public consensus over

rather than `organic purpose' and `free enthusiasm'.

Hobson denied that `coldness and pla44

principles of justice, and moreover a view that now

Is it also the case that what some feminists term

relegates individualism to a feature of comprehensive

the colder philosophical liberalism is a product of the

liberalism, a liberalism which is no longer specifically

Cold War that never got round to thawing? Not for

endorsed as necessary to a just social order. And

nothing has the end of the Cold War witnessed a

contrast this with the Hobhousian faith in the

reheating of liberalism under the impact of nation-

evolution of social understandings of valued prac-

alism and the accompanying revalorisation of the

tices which release the potential and sustain the

emotional resonances that have always existed with-

well-being of a community as well as those of its

in liberal discourse: the language of bonds, alle-

members.

giance, sympathy. What nonetheless sustains the current philosophical variant is the predominant and overwhelmingly shared image of the American

Ontological Minimalism

constitution as mediating between the presumption

and the Supra-Political

of the reasonableness emanating from human beings

Works such as Hallowell's which began as manifestos

and the requirement of permanent, supra-political

against totalitarianism have been transformed into a

standards. This avoids the language of transcendent-

richer and deeper philosophical position. The heri-

alism while attaining some of its ends. It is hence

tage and motivation are plainly visible in late twen-

unsurprising to find Rawls describing the Supreme

tieth-century

Court as `the exemplar of public reason'.

liberal

theorising,

but

so

are

the

45

Is that

epistemological and conceptual modifications. One

another way of asserting, as Hartz did, that `the

of the residues of this mode of thinking has been to

absence of ``opposing principles,'' the fact that be-

reduce liberalism once again to a form of ontological

neath its political heroics the nation was of the

minimalism, captured in the loose use of the inde-

``same mind'' on the liberal formula, settled in ad-

terminate word `thin'. But one of the modifications it

vance the philosophic question'?

has undergone is the rediscovery of a Kantian-in-

the nation are we not referring to the academic

spired autonomy, an autonomy unavailable or de-

community, sustained by its Justices with their pre-

centred in early and mid-century liberal thought.

sumption of expressing the vox populi? Indeed, Hartz

The two have combined in the revival of the private-

had given the role of the Supreme Court, and the

public dichotomy as a moral statement about the

liberalism it sustained, a totally different and more

inherent but socially indifferent good sense of in-

persuasive gloss: `the Supreme Court had always

dividuals, detached from the impact of sustaining

been the Hebraic expositor of the American general

groups, the latter now perceived as more dangerous

will, building on the irrational acceptance of Locke

than formative.

42

46

Only instead of

the Talmudic rationality involved in his application

In addition liberalism has been

47

absorbed into the dominant Anglo-American phi-

to specific cases.'

losophical practice of model-building and counter-

cognisant of the emotive aspect of concrete liberal-

28

Moreover, Hartz was deeply

TWENTIETH-CENTURY LIBERAL THOUGHT

isms. The American version, he argued, possessed

reasonable yet incompatible comprehensive doc-

`the ideologic power of the national irrational liberal-

trines is the normal result of the exercise of human

ism' which, in the case of the New Deal, `was

reason within the framework of the free institutions

responsible for its whole pragmatic orientation, for

of a constitutional regime' ± a philosophical anthro-

its whole aversion to systematic social thought.'

48

pology diametrically opposed to Hobhouse's. Rawls's

In view of the above, Croce's reaction to critics of

overriding aim is for a political liberalism which

liberalism, who labelled it as `formalistic', `empty',

provides not only justice but also unity in what

`sceptical' and `antagonistic', is edifying. Rather than

would otherwise be a fissiparous, even Hobbesian,

see these terms as referring to foundational categories

society. The difficulty with the core liberal concept

whose generality enables the integration of all rea-

of non-necessitarian development was that it had to

sonable ways of life, Croce saw them as embodying

allow for a choice which could include error. The

the essence of non-dogmatism in the spirit of modern

risky model of development, even riskier when `ir-

philosophy. The liberal conception thus denied `first

reconcilable conflict' is assumed to be socially la-

place to laws, casuistry and charts of duties and

tent,

virtues, and places the moral conscience at its cen-

of justice, stability and autonomy, which would

tre.' This was `like modern aesthetics, which refuses

eliminate

models, categories and rules, and places at its centre

too, had attempted to eliminate choice on a grander,

the genius that is good taste, both sensitive and very

supra-individual scale by positing a Hegelian neces-

strict.' That approach was formalistic only in the

sitarianism, but that variety had been extinguished as

sense that it shied away from imposing philosophical

a fashionable archetype under onslaughts such as

formulae and principles. The end result was strongly

Karl Popper's.

50

was replaced with a more advantageous model unpredictable

choice.

51

De

Ruggiero,

emotive and parti pris: `the liberal conception is not

Nor was Hallowell's transcendentalism acceptable

meant for the timid, the indolent and the pacifist,

to 1960s and 1970s Anglo-American philosophy.

but wishes to interpret the aspirations and the works

Hence the foundational assumptions of Rawls's sys-

of courageous and patient, of belligerent and gener-

tem were couched in anthropocentric terms of em-

ous spirits.' No wonder that Croce could refer to

pirically attainable reasonableness, even though the

Hobhouse's opus as `a beautiful English eulogy and

outcome of this process was to all effects and pur-

apology for liberalism' ± language more apposite for a

poses equally invariable. Like the contract model,

work of art than for the mechanics of a system of

Rawls's theory simulated open-ended liberal choice

rules.

49

without, of course, offering it, through assuming both a pre-discursive rationality (the veil of ignorance) and a convergent reasonableness (the overlapping

The Rawlsian Project: A Paradigmatic Shift

consensus). Rawls's political liberalism was presented

Looking back at liberalism from our vantage point,

as a western paradigm, but one whose rightness would

the unity of the Rawlsian project is conspicuous. In

gain it universal recognition, moving from historicity

the early years of the twentieth century, as in much

to ahistoricity. Its universal appeal would not be

of the nineteenth, the growth model central to

forged out of competition over legitimacy with other

liberal conceptions of human nature was applied

ideological arrangements, as most liberals have mea-

to liberalism itself. The development of liberalism

sured their successes, earning their spurs on the

was tantamount to the development of civilisation.

battlefield of ideas, but as a non-pluralist procedural

After the Second World War that very capacity for

and moral necessity.

change, with its newly highlighted contingency, lost

Put differently, this liberalism employed a second-

its attractiveness, and was increasingly replaced with

order argument not over substantive goods, but over

an

standards.

justifiable rules. Justification depended not on the

Rawls himself commenced his argument in Political

nature of the political benefits available, but ± and

Liberalism with that problematic: `political liberalism

here lay its novelty ± on the shared acceptance of

assumes that, for political purposes, a plurality of

those rules by all the members of the polity.

appeal

to

independent

immutable

29

52

Locke's

MICHAEL FREEDEN

liberalism by contrast, had sought a limited general

Modern: `liberal education is the necessary endeavour

acceptability only as a prior arrangement to estab-

to found an aristocracy within democratic mass

lishing relations of mutual and substantive trust,

society.' The point, however, as Mill recognised,

anchored in the norms of natural rights. Late twen-

was that liberalism was shaped by a few and then

tieth-century liberalism has, however, been charac-

disseminated to the many. Some of its substantive

terised as being that system of ideas which requires

values might precede the full evolution of demo-

and attains general acceptance, even prior to the

cratic consent and might not be entirely sustained by

political implementation of those ideas. The only

that evolution. As is the case with all ideologies,

ideas which comply with this scheme are those

liberals wish to protect the values they most cherish.

concerning the public rules of moral engagement

The problem with liberalism is that some of those

and interaction. In earlier versions of liberalism,

values (such as self-determination or participation)

acceptance had to be won through the substantive

are intrinsically dependent on the exercise of choice

benefits that would accrue from the liberal way of life

by all, and may be catered to instantly, and some

in the struggle with other political options.

(such as individuality or progress) are dependent on

Moreover,

the

Rawlsian

procedure

was

con-

the exercise of good choices by as many as possible,

structed to create boundaries and hence moral spaces

but by less than all if unavoidable, and are time-

in which individuals were responsibly reflective.

sensitive.

Intentionally or otherwise, that accomplished three

Third, it disposed of change in the arena of

ends. First, it restored liberalism's emphasis on the

political liberalism. Gone was the experimental at-

inviolability of individual space, rather than on the

titude of Hobhouse and his colleague J. A. Hobson

controlled permeability of space which organicist,

towards some of the decontestations of liberal va-

communitarian liberals had encouraged. This was

lues.

closely linked to a thinning of the sociability com-

tiveness. `We may', he writes, `reaffirm our more

ponent of liberalism and a resurrection of individu-

particular judgements and decide instead to modify

alism as an attribute of separate personal existence.

53

55

Rawls assumed coherence rather than tenta-

the proposed conception of justice until judgements at all levels of generality are at last in line on due

Second, it focused on equality ± a concept to

56

which evolutionary liberal traditions could not fully

reflection.'

subscribe because of the unpredictable dynamics of

to iron out kinks in the overlapping public reason-

human relationships. The a priori rule-following of

ableness of political liberalism, not experimentation

Rawlsian liberalism had to assume not only temporal

that can provide different and contrasting views of

stasis but relational stasis: equality as the participa-

liberalism's values. Compare this with another mid-

tion of each and every member in decision-making

century appraisal of liberalism: `as a form of social

and hence in justifiable and responsible action.

thought Liberalism has been empirical, scientific,

Strikingly, this limited notion of equality was a

mundane, and more or less skeptical-minded.'

non-voluntarist view of participation. Participation

The sense of paradigmatic shift is palpable.

and sharing in responsibility had become the be-all

If there is experimentation, it is in order

57

Gone also were Hobhouse's and Hobson's anxi58

and end-all of liberalism, rather than adjacent con-

eties concerning an unknown liberal future.

cepts that could be put into practice by those who

lsian liberalism is curiously unperturbed, not only

wished to participate.

54

Raw-

As an ethical exercise, this

because logic, procedure and coherence are by defi-

liberalism offers no space to opt out or to refrain from

nition emotionally neutered (though their outcomes

opting in. Obtaining the considered and uncon-

are hardly value-neutral) but because moral conflicts

strained consent of all ± a mechanical view of politics

are politically soluble. Certainty allows one to dis-

± becomes the heart of the liberal process rather than

pense with some of the affective language in which

the attainment of a package of values. The extreme

liberalism has usually indulged. How can that non-

view of this position, outside current exemplars of

transcendental certainty be sustained? Because the

the liberal family, was expressed by non-liberals such

precarious nature of progress based on human rea-

as Leo Strauss in his book Liberalism Ancient and

son

30

59

is eliminated at a stroke by removing liberalism

TWENTIETH-CENTURY LIBERAL THOUGHT

from the impact of a temporal perspective.

± as a comprehensive doctrine, and hence bereft of

One pre-eminent consequence of this paradig-

the reasonable pluralism that a narrower political

matic change has been the drastic contraction of

liberalism requires.

the natural habitat of liberalism, the political arena.

60

63

Other theorists, as we have seen, have distin-

The bulk of the liberal conceptual configura-

guished between good and bad forms of liberalism,

tion now spills over into a politics-free area, as

but no one prior to Rawls proposed to regard liberal-

61

and individuals are

ism as a two-tier edifice. What has this done to

literally abandoned to their own fates in the names

liberalism? It has injected into it a spurious neutrality

of autonomy and self-determination. The result is a

and dissociated it from gathering the fruits of the

political liberalism that claims to be compatible with

political process, hitherto a central aim of the liberal

an indeterminate variety of reasonable comprehen-

agenda. It has upset the delicate balance between

sive social and political beliefs, as long as they accept

essence and contingency so typical of liberal argu-

the procedural `minimum-kit' of democratic consti-

ment. And it has emaciated liberalism by relegating

tutionalism. This has significant repercussions for

its comprehensive values to the status of equal

liberalism. For in universalising political liberalism,

contenders with other socio-political doctrines, thus

the specific appeal of other doctrines is undercut

undercutting the specific ideological appeal of lib-

either by excluding them as unreasonable or by

eralism which its other proponents have been so

reducing them ± through revealing them as congru-

eager to advance. That is another way of arguing that

ous with political liberalism. Political liberalism thus

what are now termed the liberal virtues are excluded

becomes a particularly potent weapon that can out-

from the static preconditions concerning justice and

bid the attractions of other doctrines/ideologies by

pluralism. Maybe we should take Rawls at his word

subsuming aspects of them into itself. The shrinkage

and stop calling his project liberal in a doctrinal

of the political is thus both very modest and highly

sense altogether?

Dworkin has reminded us,

ambitious. To judge this enterprise as successful

Of course, liberalism continues to exist as a devel-

depends on whether one thinks such formulae work,

opmental and humanist theory. While universities

or on whether one can demonstrate that such phi-

have over the past two decades sent liberalism on a

losophical liberals are unaware, or in denial, of their

confusing trajectory, the ideology called liberalism is

own surpluses of meaning. As I have argued else-

still a comprehensive and culture-bound set of con-

where, Rawls's political liberalism contains almost all

ceptual decontestations that operates, like any ideol-

of the crucial attributions of meaning that typify the

ogy, to compete over the legitimate meanings of

family of liberal concepts. His political liberalism has

political language. Philosophical notions of liberal-

gone so far down the road towards a comprehensive

ism have not replaced historical, concrete, polysemic

liberalism that there is no turning back, no fork in

and hence ideological understandings. The former

the road that could lead on to a comprehensive

too may be seen in that latter light and simply serve

socialism, conservatism or reasonable religious doc-

as further evidence of the contingent and manifold

trine.

62

guises liberalism adopts within the broad constraints

It is therefore edifying to find Rawls's most

of shared family resemblances.

recent utterances redefining his theory of justice as fairness ± hitherto understood to be a general theory

Notes

1. Hobhouse (1964), p. 28.

8. De Ruggiero (1927), p. 359.

2. Hobson (1909), p. 91.

9. See C. Taylor, `What's Wrong With Negative Liberty?', in Ryan (ed.) (1979), pp. 175±93.

3. Hobhouse (1964), p. 60. 4. Ibid., pp. 16±29.

10. Hobhouse (1964), p. 30.

5. Hobson (1909), p. 95.

11. Ibid., p. 66.

6. Hobhouse (1964), p. 15.

12. Ibid., p. 72.

7. Ibid., pp. 28.

13. Ibid., p. 71. See also Freeden (1998).

31

MICHAEL FREEDEN

14. See Freeden (1986), pp. 234±7.

46. Hartz (1955), p. 141.

15. Laski (1936), p. 11.

47. Ibid., pp. 208±9.

16. Hobhouse (1964), pp. 90, 127.

48. Ibid., pp. 249, 307.

17. De Ruggiero (1927), p. 390.

49. Croce (1946), pp. 87, 106.

18. Ibid., p. 437.

50. Rawls (1996), p. xxvi.

19. Orton (1945), pp. 78, 303.

51. Rawls (ibid., pp. 72±8) attempts to distinguish be-

20. Laski (1936), p. 14.

tween various types of autonomy in a discussion that is

21. Ibid., p. 171.

highly contentious. Suffice it to observe that his

22. Bullock and Shock (1956), p. xix.

notions of rational and political autonomy, as distinct

23. Hobhouse (1964), p. 73.

from full ethical autonomy, are posited on an unten-

24. De Ruggiero (1927), p. 90.

able divide between political and comprehensive lib-

25. Ibid., p. 361.

eralism, and on a blindness to the thickness of his

26. Ibid., p. 437.

notion of an autonomous person in the space occupied by political liberalism.

27. Ibid., p. 347. 28. Croce (1946), pp. 79±81.

52. See Evans (1999).

29. Ibid., pp. 84±5.

53. See M. Freeden, `Liberal Community: An Exercise in

30. Hartz (1955), p. 16.

Retrieval', in A. Simhony and D. Weinstein (eds),

31. Ibid., pp. 7, 10.

Non-Individualist

32. Hobson (1928).

University Press, forthcoming).

Liberalism

(Cambridge: Cambridge

54. This is notably the case for Locke, who in a little-noted

33. Hobhouse (1924), p. 30. 34. De Ruggiero (1927), p. 274.

comment on the transition from the state of nature to

35. Ibid., p. 348.

civil society notes: `This any number of Men may do,

36. Hallowell (1946), p. 1.

because it injures not the Freedom of the rest; they are

37. For a discussion of these developments within the

left as they were in the Liberty of the State of Nature'

American legal profession, see Primus (1999), pp.

(Locke, 1991, section 96). This historically astute nonuniversalism is inconceivable in the Rawlsian project.

177±97.

55. See J.A. Hobson, `Character and Society', in Parker

38. In the extreme case, progress is seen as the central

(ed.) (1912), p. 96.

structural principle of liberalism: `Progressivism is indeed a better term than liberalism for the opposition to

56. Rawls (1996), p. 45.

conservatism. For if conservatism is, as its name in-

57. Neill (1953), p. 18.

dicates, aversion to change or distrust of change, its

58. Hobhouse (1964), pp. 115±17; Hobson (1909), passim.

opposite should be identified with the opposite posture toward change, and not with something substantive

59. Neill (1953), p. 21.

like liberty or liberality' (Strauss, 1968, p. vii).

60. Contrast this with Laski's complaint that liberalism

39. Hallowell (1946), p. 88.

has been far too political, in the sense of espousing the

40. Ibid., p. 109.

ends of political, but not economic, democracy. For

41. Ibid., pp. 21, 108±9.

Laski, `it was inherent in the Liberal idea that men

42. Kymlicka attempts to attach the (cultural) properties

should use their political power for the improvement of their material position' (Laski, 1936, pp. 158±9).

of groups to the promotion of individual identity-cum-

61. R. Dworkin, `Liberalism', in Dworkin (1985), pp.

autonomy alone. See Kymlicka (1995).

181±204.

43. Orton (1945), p. 308. 44. Hobson (1909), p. 92.

62. See Freeden (1996), chapter 6.

45. Rawls (1996), pp. 231±40.

63. Rawls (1999), p. 614.

32

Part Two CITIZENSHIP: UNIVERSALISM AND PARTICULARISM

This page intentionally left blank

3

HUMAN RIGHTS AND ETHNOCULTURAL JUSTICE Will Kymlicka

issue for anyone who wishes to defend and promote

I Introduction

the liberal project in the twenty-first century. But what exactly is the challenge which ethnocultural

It is an honour for me to be giving this Lecture in the 1

whose influential book on

diversity raises for human rights? We can distinguish

John Stuart Mill helped to clarify my understanding

two separate challenges. The first is foundational.

memory of John Rees,

2

Liberal democ-

Some critics argue that the conception of human

racy rests on principles of freedom and equality, but

personhood and human needs underlying the doc-

as Rees noted, it is not easy to specify or define these

trine of human rights is culturally biased. More

principles. He suggested, however, that these prin-

specifically, it is `Eurocentric', and in particular it

ciples are perhaps best illustrated or reflected in the

exhibits a European commitment to individualism,

doctrine of human rights ± that is, the doctrine that

whereas other non-western cultures have a more

each person has an intrinsic moral worth; that each

collectivist or communitarian understanding of hu-

person's interests must be taken into consideration

man identity. On this view, given the depth of

by the state; and that each person should receive

cultural differences around the world, the very idea

certain inviolable protections against mistreatment,

of developing a single set of universal human rights is

of liberalism and liberal democracy.

abuse and oppression.

3

inherently ethnocentric, and involves imposing one culture's view of human personality and human

The articulation and diffusion of the doctrine of

identity on other cultures.

human rights is indeed one of the great achievements of postwar liberalism. This year represents the fiftieth

The second challenge is more modest. Some

anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human

critics say that the idea of universal human rights

Rights, and it is impressive how far we have come in

is acceptable in principle, but that the current list of

those fifty years in ensuring the protection of human

human rights is radically incomplete. In particular, it

dignity and human rights. Yet amid the anniversary

fails to protect minority cultures from various forms

celebrations there are an increasing number of scep-

of injustice, and so needs to be supplemented with an

tics and critics who attack the doctrine of human

additional set of what are sometimes called `collec-

rights for neglecting the realities of ethnocultural

tive rights' (or `group rights', `minority rights' or

diversity, and for being unable to deal with the

`cultural rights'). Most discussions of cultural diversity and human

conflicts which arise from this diversity, either with-

rights have focused on the first, foundational, chal-

in a society or between societies. This is an issue which Rees did not foresee, and

lenge. Here, however, I will focus on the second,

perhaps could not have foreseen. But it is an urgent

since it is less explored. Many commentators tend to

35

WILL KYMLICKA

confuse and conflate the two challenges; they assume

Individual Rights and Group Rights

that any group which is demanding `collective rights' must be doing so because they are `collectivist' in

According to many commentators, human rights are

their cultural outlook and attitudes, and so are,

paradigmatically individual rights, as befits the in-

implicitly at least, raising the foundationalist chal-

dividualism of western societies, whereas non-Eur-

lenge to the very idea of universal human rights. If

opean societies are more interested in `group' or

we conflate the two debates in this way, it will seem

`collective' rights, as befits their communalist tradi-

that we need to revisit the foundationalist issue every

tions. I think this way of framing the debate is quite

time an ethnocultural group demands collective

misleading. For one thing, individual rights have

rights. This tendency to conflate the two debates is, I

typically been defended within the Western tradi-

think, profoundly unhelpful. It is a source not only of

tion precisely on the grounds that they enable

philosophical misunderstanding, but also, and per-

various group-oriented activities. Consider the para-

haps more importantly, of political confusion which

digmatic liberal right ± namely, freedom of religion ±

has prevented liberals from understanding and effec-

which Rawls argues is the origin and foundation for

tively responding to ethnocultural conflicts around

all other liberal rights. The point of endowing in-

the world. So my aim is to discuss the second issue on

dividuals with rights to freedom of conscience and

its own terms. I will try to show why current con-

freedom of worship is to enable religious groups to

ceptions of human rights leave serious issues of

form and maintain themselves, and to recruit new

ethnocultural injustice unaddressed, and why these

members. And indeed according individuals rights to

issues of injustice are not reducible or dependent on

religious freedom has proven very successful in en-

the foundationalist challenge to human rights. I

abling a wide range of religious groups ± including

hope to show that these claims of injustice are

many non-western religions ± to survive and flourish

relevant and urgent even for those of us who reject

in western societies.

the foundationalist critique of human rights. Indeed,

Based partly on this example of religious toler-

I think that we will only be in a position to effec-

ance, many commentators have argued that indivi-

tively address the foundationalist critique of human

dual rights provide a firm foundation for justice for

rights if we have first made sure that our conception

all groups, including ethnocultural minorities. In-

of human rights deals satisfactorily with these issues

deed, this was explicitly the argument given after

of ethnocultural injustice.

the Second World War for replacing the League of

The discussion is divided into two main sections.

Nations' `minorities protection' scheme ± which

In the first section, I discuss why human rights are

accorded collective rights to specific groups ± with

insufficient for ethnocultural justice and may even

the UN's regime of universal human rights. Rather

exacerbate certain injustices, and hence why human

than protecting vulnerable groups directly, through

rights standards must be supplemented with various

special rights for the members of designated groups,

minority rights. In the second section, I ask whether,

cultural minorities would be protected indirectly, by

if human rights are supplemented with minority

guaranteeing basic civil and political rights to all

rights, we can hope or expect to get greater agree-

individuals regardless of group membership. Basic

ment on the transnational application of human

human rights such as freedom of speech, association

rights. I argue that we can indeed hope for greater

and conscience, while attributed to individuals, are

agreement on the principles of human rights, but that

typically exercised in community with others, and

there will still be very difficult issues remaining about

so provide protection for group life. Where these

appropriate institutions for the enforcement of these

individual rights are firmly protected, liberals as-

rights. I will conclude with some broader reflections

sumed, no further rights needed to be attributed to

on the relationship between cultural diversity and

the members of specific ethnic or national mino-

human rights.

rities:

36

HUMAN RIGHTS AND ETHNOCULTURAL JUSTICE

The general tendency of the postwar movements

Âbe Â cois in North America, the CatRicans and Que

for the promotion of human rights has been to

alans and Basques in Spain, the Flemish in Belgium,

subsume the problem of national minorities under

the Sami in Norway, and so on. Most countries

the broader problem of ensuring basic individual

around the world contain such national minorities,

rights to all human beings, without reference to

and most of these national minorities were involun-

membership in ethnic groups. The leading as-

tarily incorporated into their current state ± a testa-

sumption has been that members of national

ment to the role of imperialism and violence in the

minorities do not need, are not entitled to, or

formation of the current system of `nation-states'.

cannot be granted rights of a special character.

Very few if any of these national minorities are

The doctrine of human rights has been put for-

satisfied merely with respect for their individual

ward as a substitute for the concept of minority

human rights, and it is easy to see why. I will discuss

rights, with the strong implication that minorities

three examples where individual rights do not ade-

whose members enjoy individual equality of treat-

quately protect their interests: decisions about inter-

ment cannot legitimately demand facilities for the

nal migration/settlement policies, decisions about

maintenance of their ethnic particularism.

4

the boundaries and powers of internal political units, and decisions about official languages.

Guided by this philosophy, the United Nations

In each of these examples, and throughout the

deleted all references to the rights of ethnic and

analysis, I will be using the term `human rights' in an

national minorities in its Universal Declaration of

imprecise way. I am not referring to any particular

Human Rights.

canonical statement or declaration of international

There is of course much truth in this claim that

human rights, but rather to the constellation of

individual rights protect group life. Freedom of as-

individual civil and political rights which are for-

sociation, religion, speech, mobility and political

mulated in western democratic constitutions, and

organisation enables individuals to form and main-

which many advocates of human rights would like to

tain the various groups and associations which con-

see entrenched and enforced as transnational stan-

stitute

to

dards of human rights. Some of these rights are

changing circumstances, and to promote their views

included in the original Declaration, others in sub-

and interests to the wider population. The protec-

sequent conventions (such as the 1966 Covenant on

tion afforded by these common rights of citizenship is

Civil and Political Rights), others are still being

sufficient for many of the legitimate forms of group

debated. In short, I am referring more to a particular

diversity in society.

public and political discourse of `human rights', than

civil

society,

to

adapt

these

groups

to the actual list of human rights in any particular

However, it is increasingly clear that the list of

document.

common individual rights guaranteed in western democratic constitutions, or in the UN Declaration, is not sufficient to ensure ethnocultural justice,

5

Internal Migration/Settlement Policies

particularly in states with national minorities. By national minorities, I mean groups which formed

National governments have often encouraged people

functioning societies, with their own institutions,

from one part of the country (or new immigrants) to

culture and language, concentrated in a particular

move into the historical territory of the national

territory, prior to being incorporated into a larger

minority. Such large-scale settlement policies are

state. The incorporation of such national minorities

often deliberately used as a weapon against the

is usually involuntary, as a result of colonisation,

national minority, both to break open access to their

conquest or the ceding of territory from one imperial

territory's natural resources and to disempower them

power to another, but may also occur voluntarily,

politically by turning them into a minority even

through some treaty or other federative agreement.

within their own traditional territory.

Examples

of

national

minorities

within

6

western

This process is occurring around the world, in

democracies include the indigenous peoples, Puerto

Bangladesh, Israel, Tibet, Indonesia, Brazil, for ex-

37

WILL KYMLICKA

7

ample. It has also happened in North America. The

Chinese citizens have a basic human right to settle

nineteenth-century Canadian Prime Minister, Sir

there.

Âtis that `these John A. MacDonald, said of the Me

To protect against these unjust settlement poli-

impulsive half-breeds . . . must be kept down by a

cies, national minorities need and demand a variety

strong hand until they are swamped by the influx of

of measures. For example, they may make certain

8

And the same process occurred in the

land claims ± insisting that certain lands be reserved

American Southwest, where immigration was used

for their exclusive use and benefit. Or they may

to disempower the indigenous peoples and Chicano

demand that certain disincentives be placed on

populations who were living on that territory when it

in-migration. For example, migrants may need to

was incorporated into the United States in 1848.

pass lengthy residency requirements before they can

settlers.'

This is not only a source of grave injustice, but is

vote in local or regional elections. Or they may not

also the most common source of violent conflict in

be able to bring their language rights with them ±

the world. Indigenous peoples and other homeland

that is, they may be required to attend schools in the

minorities typically resist such massive settlement

local language, rather than having publicly funded

9

One would

education in their own language. Similarly, the

hope, therefore, that human rights doctrines would

courts and public services may be conducted in

provide us with the tools to challenge such policies.

the local language. These measures are all intended

Unfortunately, there is nothing in human rights

to reduce the number of migrants into the homeland

doctrine which precludes such settlement policies

of the national minority, and to ensure that those

(so long as individual members of the minority are

who do come are willing to integrate into the local

not deprived of their civil and political rights). There

culture.

policies, even with force, if necessary.

are other elements of international law which might

These are often cited as examples of the sort of

be of some help, in exceptional circumstances. For

`group rights' which conflict with western individu-

example, UN Resolution Number 2189, adopted in

alism. They are said to reflect the minority's `com-

December 1967, condemns attempts by colonial

munal' attachment to their land and culture. But in

powers systematically to promote the influx of im-

fact these demands have little if anything to do with

migrants into their colonised possessions. But this

the contrast between `individualist' and `commun-

only applies to overseas colonies or to newly con-

alist' societies. Western `individualists societies also

quered territories, not to already incorporated na-

seek protections against in-migration. Take any wes-

tional minorities and indigenous peoples. So it is of

tern democracy. While the majority believes in

Âtis or Tibetans. no help to the Me

maximising their individual mobility throughout

Human rights doctrines are not only silent on this

the country, they do not support the right of in-

question, but in fact may exacerbate the injustice,

dividuals outside the country to enter and settle. On

since the UN Charter guarantees the right to free

the contrary, western democracies are typically very

mobility within the territory of a state. Indeed,

restrictive about accepting new immigrants into their

ethnic Russians in the Baltics defended their settle-

society. None has accepted the idea that transna-

ment policies precisely on the grounds that they had

tional mobility is a basic human right. And those few

a human right to move freely throughout the territory

immigrants who are allowed in are pressured to

of the former Soviet Union. It is important to

integrate into the majority culture. For example,

remember that most countries recognised the bound-

learning the majority language is a condition of

aries of the Soviet Union, and so the UN Charter

gaining citizenship, and publicly funded education

does indeed imply that ethnic Russians had a basic

is typically provided only in the majority's language.

right to settle freely in any of the Soviet republics,

Western democracies impose these restrictions on

even to the point where the indigenous inhabitants

immigration into their country for precisely the same

were becoming a minority in their own homeland.

reason that national minorities seek to restrict in-

Similarly, human rights doctrines, far from prohibit-

migration into their territory ± namely, massive

ing ethnic Han settlement in Tibet, imply that

settlement would threaten their society and culture.

38

HUMAN RIGHTS AND ETHNOCULTURAL JUSTICE

The majority, like the minority, has no desire to be

with the territory of a national minority, the degree

overrun and outnumbered by settlers from another

of meaningful autonomy may be undermined if the

culture.

central government usurps most or all of the sub-

To say that the desire of national minorities to

unit's powers and eliminates the group's traditional

limit in-migration reflects some sort of illiberal com-

mechanisms of self-government. And indeed, we can

munalism is therefore quite hypocritical. When the

find many such instances in which a minority nom-

majority says that mobility within a country is a basic

inally controls a political subunit but has no sub-

human right, but that mobility across borders is not,

stantive power, since the central government has (1)

they are not preferring individual mobility over

removed the traditional institutions and procedures

collective security. They are simply saying that their

of group self-government; and (2) arrogated all im-

collective security will be protected (by limits on

portant powers, even those affecting the very cultural

immigration), but that once their collective security

survival of the group ± for example, jurisdiction over

is protected, then individual mobility will be max-

economic development, education, language. (Con-

imised, regardless of the consequences for the col-

sider the plenary power of the American Congress

lective

over Indian tribes in the United States.)

security

of

minorities.

This

is

obviously

hypocritical and unjust, but it is an injustice which

This usurpation of power is, I believe, a clear

human rights doctrines do not prevent and may even

injustice, particularly when it involves seizing powers

exacerbate.

10

or undermining institutions which were guaranteed to the minority in treaties or federating agreements. Yet here again, it seems that human rights doctrines

The Boundaries and

are inadequate to prevent such injustice. So long as

Powers of Internal Political Subunits

individual members maintain the right to vote and

In states with territorially concentrated national

run for office, then human rights principles pose no

minorities, the boundaries of internal political sub-

obstacle to the majority's efforts to gerrymander the

units

Since

boundaries or powers of internal political subunits in

national minorities are usually territorially concen-

such a way as to disempower the national minority.

trated, these boundaries can be drawn in such a way

This is true even if the arrogation of power violates

as to empower them ± that is, to create political

an earlier treaty or federative agreement, since such

subunits within which the national minority forms a

internal treaties are not considered `international'

local majority, and which can therefore be used as a

agreements (the minority which signed the treaty is

vehicle for meaningful autonomy and self-govern-

not seen under international law as a sovereign state,

ment.

and so its treaties with the majority are seen as

raise

fundamental

issues

of

justice.

In many countries, however, boundaries have

matters of domestic politics, not international law).

been drawn so as to disempower national minorities.

Not only do human rights doctrines not help

For example, a minority's territory may be broken up

prevent this injustice, but they may exacerbate it.

into several units so as to make cohesive political

Historically, the majority's decisions to ignore the

action

of

traditional leadership of minority communities and

France into 83 `departments' after the Revolution

to destroy their traditional political institutions have

which intentionally subdivided the historical regions

been justified on the grounds that these traditional

of the Basques, Bretons and other linguistic mino-

leaders and institutions were not `democratic': they

rities, or the division of nineteenth-century Catalo-

did not involve the same process of periodic elec-

nia);

tions as majority political institutions. The tradi-

impossible

conversely,

(for

a

example,

minority's

the

division

territory

may

be

absorbed into a larger political subunit so as to ensure

tional

that they are outnumbered within the subunit as a

consensus and decision-making may well have pro-

whole (such as the Hispanics in nineteenth-century

vided every member of the minority community with

Florida).

11

mechanisms

of

group

consultation,

meaningful rights to political participation and influence. However, they were swept away by the

Even where the boundaries coincide more or less

39

WILL KYMLICKA

majority in the name of `democracy' ± that is, the

long in the modern world unless they are used in

right to vote in an electoral process within which

public life, and so government decisions about offi-

minorities had no real influence, conducted in a

cial languages are, in effect, decisions about which

foreign language and in foreign institutions, and

languages will thrive, and which will die out.

14

within which they were destined to become a per-

Just as the traditional political institutions of

manent minority. Thus the rhetoric of human rights

minorities have been shut down by the majority,

has provided an excuse and smokescreen for the

so too have the pre-existing educational institutions.

subjugation of a previously self-governing minor-

For example, Spanish schools in the American

ity.

12

Southwest were closed after 1848, and replaced with English-language

To avoid this sort of injustice, national minorities

schools.

Similarly,

French-lan-

need guaranteed rights to such things as self-govern-

guage schools in Western Canada were closed once

ment,

English-speakers achieved political dominance.

group-based

political

representation,

veto

rights over issues that directly affect their cultural

This can be an obvious source of injustice. Yet

survival, and so on. Again, these demands are often

here again, principles of human rights do not prevent

seen as conflicting with western individualism and as

this injustice (even when, as in the Southwest, there

proof of the minority's `collectivism'. But in reality,

were treaties guaranteeing Hispanics the right to

these demands simply help to redress clear political

their own Spanish-language schools). Human rights

inequalities. After all, the majority would equally

doctrines do preclude any attempt by the state to

reject any attempt by foreign powers to unilaterally

suppress the use of a minority language in private,

change its boundaries, institutions or self-govern-

and may even require state toleration of privately

ment powers. So why shouldn't national minorities

funded schools which operate in the minority lan-

also seek guarantees of their boundaries, institutions

guage. But human rights doctrines say nothing about

and powers?

rights to the use of one's language in government.

15

In a recent paper, Avigail Eisenberg details how

On some interpretations of more recent interna-

the debate over Aboriginal political rights in the

tional conventions which include minority rights,

Canadian north has been seriously distorted by the

public funding for mother-tongue classes at elemen-

focus on western `individualism' versus Aboriginal

tary level may under some circumstances be seen as a

`collectivism'. This way of framing the debate misses

`human right'. But this remains a controversial de-

the real issues, which are the ongoing effects of

velopment.

colonisation ± the political subordination of one

the elementary level is clearly insufficient if all jobs

people to another, through the majority's unilateral

in a modern economy require education at higher

efforts to undermine the minority's institutions and

levels conducted in the majority language. Indeed,

powers of self-government.

13

16

Moreover, mother-tongue education at

the requirement that education at senior levels be in the majority language creates a disincentive for minority parents to enrol their children in minor-

Official Language Policy

ity-language elementary schools in the first place.

17

In most democratic states, governments have typi-

To redress the injustice created by majority at-

cally adopted the majority's language as the one

tempts to impose linguistic homogeneity, national

`official language' ± that is, as the language of gov-

minorities may need broad-ranging language poli-

ernment, bureaucracy, courts, schools, and so on. All

cies. There is evidence that language communities

citizens are then forced to learn this language in

can only survive intergenerationally if they are nu-

school, and fluency in it is required to work for, or

merically dominant within a particular territory, and

deal with, government. While this policy is often

if their language is the language of opportunity in

defended in the name of `efficiency', it is also

that territory. But it is difficult to sustain such a

adopted to ensure the eventual assimilation of the

predominant status for a minority language, particu-

national minority into the majority group. There is

larly if newcomers to the minority's territory are able

strong evidence that languages cannot survive for

to become educated and employed in the majority

40

HUMAN RIGHTS AND ETHNOCULTURAL JUSTICE

language (for example, if newcomers to Quebec are

common language have been important tools in

able to learn and work in English). It may not be

these nation-building efforts. There is no evidence

enough, therefore, for the minority simply to have

that states intended to relinquish these tools when

the right to use its language in public. It may also be

they accepted human rights conventions, and indeed

necessary that the minority language be the only

no evidence that states would have accepted a

official language in their territory.

18

If immigrants, or

conception of human rights which would preclude

migrants from the majority group, are able to use the

such nation-building programmes.

majority language in public life, this may eventually

Of course, human rights standards do set limits on

undermine the predominant status, and hence via-

this process of nation-building. States cannot kill or

bility, of the minority's language.

19

In other words,

expel minorities, or strip them of citizenship or deny

minorities may need not personal bilingualism (in

them the vote. But human rights standards do not

which individuals carry their language rights with

preclude less extreme forms of nation-building. And

them throughout the entire country), but rather

if these nation-building measures are successful, then

territorial bilingualism (in which people who choose

it is not necessary to restrict the individual civil and

to move to the minority's territory accept that the

political rights of the minority. Where nation-build-

minority's language will be the only official language

ing programmes have succeeded in turning the in-

in that territory). Yet this sort of territorial bilingu-

corporated group into a minority even within its own

alism ± which denies official language status to the

homeland, and in stripping it of its self-governing

majority language on the minority's territory ± is

institutions and language rights, then the group will

often seen as discriminatory by the majority, and

not pose any serious threat to the power or interests

indeed as a violation of their `human rights'.

of the majority. At this point, there is no need to

These demands for extensive language rights and

strip minority members of their individual rights.

territorial bilingualism are often described as evi-

This is not necessary in order to gain and maintain

dence of the minority's `collectivism'. But here again

effective political control over them.

the minority is just seeking the same opportunity to

In short, human rights standards are insufficient to

live and work in their own language that the ma-

prevent ethnocultural injustice, and may actually

jority takes for granted. There is no evidence that the

makes things worse. The majority can invoke human

majority attaches any less weight to their ability to

rights principles to demand access to the minority's

use their language in public life.

20

homeland, to scrap traditional political mechanisms of consultation and accommodation, and to reject

One could mention other issues where human rights

linguistic policies which try to protect the territorial

are insufficient for ensuring ethnocultural justice

viability of minority communities.

(public holidays, school curriculum, national sym-

In these and other ways, human rights have in-

bols, dress-codes and so on). But enough has been

directly served as an instrument of colonisation, as

said, I hope, to make the general point. Moreover, it

various critics have argued. However, I would not

is important to note that the three issues I have

agree with those critics who view this solely as a

examined ± migration, internal political subunits

problem of `western imperialism' against non-Eur-

and language policy ± are all connected. These are

opean peoples. After all, these processes of unjust

all key components in the `nation-building' pro-

subjugation have occurred between European groups

grammes which every western state has engaged

(such as the treatment of national minorities by the

21

Every democratic state has, at one time or

majority in France, Spain, Russia), and between

another, attempted to create a single `national iden-

African or Asian groups (such as the treatment of

tity' among its citizens, and so has tried to undermine

the Yao minority by the Chewa majority in Malawi,

any competing national identities, of the sort which

or the treatment of the Tibetan minority by the Han

in.

22

Policies designed

majority in China), as well as in the context of

to settle minority homelands, undermine their poli-

western colonisation of non-western peoples. These

tical and educational institutions and impose a single

processes have occurred in virtually every state with

national minorities often possess.

41

WILL KYMLICKA

national minorities, and to ascribe it to western

equally serious mistake to privilege minority rights

individualism is to seriously underestimate the scope

over human rights. In questioning the priority of

of the problem.

traditional human rights over minority rights, I am

If human rights are not to be an instrument of

not disputing the potential for serious rights viola-

unjust subjugation then they must be supplemented

tions within many minority groups, or the need to

with various minority rights ± language rights, self-

have some institutional checks on the power of local

government rights, representation rights, federalism

or minority political leaders. On the contrary, all

and so on. Moreover, these minority rights should

political authorities should be held accountable for

not, I think, be seen as in any way secondary to

respecting the basic rights of the people they govern,

traditional human rights. Even those who are sym-

and this applies as much to the exercise of self-

pathetic to the need for minority rights often say that

government powers by national minorities as to

we should at least begin with human rights. That is,

the actions of the larger state. The individual mem-

we should first secure respect for individual human

bers of national minorities can be just as badly

rights, and then, having secured the conditions for a

mistreated and oppressed by the leaders of their

free and democratic debate, move on to questions of

own group as by the majority government, and so

minority rights. When national minorities oppose

any system of minority self-government should in-

this assumption, they are often labelled as illiberal or

clude some institutional provisions for enforcing

anti-democratic. But as I've tried to show, we cannot

traditional human rights within the minority com-

assume that human rights will have their desired

munity.

consequences without attending to the larger con-

It is not a question of choosing between minority

text within which they operate. Unless supplemen-

rights and human rights, or of giving priority to one

ted by minority rights, majoritarian democracy and

over the other, but rather of treating them together

individual mobility rights may simply lead to min-

as equally important components of justice in eth-

ority oppression. As we've seen, various forms of

noculturally plural countries. We need a conception

oppression can occur while still respecting the in-

of justice that integrates fairness between different

dividual rights of minorities. As a result, the longer

ethnocultural groups (via minority rights) with the

we defer discussing minority rights, the more likely it

protection of individual rights within majority and

is that the minority will become increasingly wea-

minority political communities (via traditional hu-

kened and outnumbered. Indeed, it may over time

man rights).

23

become so weakened that it will become unable even to demand or exercise meaningful minority rights

The Enforcement of Human Rights

(for example, it may lose the local predominance or territorial concentration needed to sustain its lan-

Assuming that we can come up with some new

guage or to exercise local self-government). It is no

theory which combines human rights and minority

accident, therefore, that members of the majority are

rights, would the existing level of opposition to

often loudest in their support for giving priority to

transnational

democracy and human rights over issues of minority

Would we then get consensus on the enforcement

rights. They know that the longer issues of minority

of international standards of human rights?

human

rights

standards

diminish?

rights are deferred, the more time it provides for the

We can expect, I think, that the elites of some

majority to disempower and dispossess the minority

groups will continue to say human rights principles

of its land, schools and political institutions to the

contradict their cultural `traditions'. I will return to

point where the minority is in no position to sustain

this possibility in my conclusion. But my guess is that

itself as a thriving culture or to exercise meaningful

much of the current opposition to human rights

self-government.

would fade away. As I noted earlier, human rights

This is why human rights and minority rights must

are not inherently `individualistic' and do not pre-

be treated together, as equally important compo-

clude group life. They simply ensure that traditions

nents of a just society. Of course, it would be an

are voluntarily maintained, and that dissent is not

42

HUMAN RIGHTS AND ETHNOCULTURAL JUSTICE

forcibly suppressed. To be sure, self-serving political

majorities are not going to give all groups the max-

elites who want to suppress challenges to their

imal rights demanded by the largest and most mo-

authority from within the community will continue

bilised groups (which may include secession).

to denounce human rights as a violation of their

I see no way to overcome this problem. While

`traditions'. This explains the recent criticisms of

minority rights are indeed essential, the solution is

human rights doctrines by the Indonesian and Chi-

not to add a detailed list of minority rights to human

nese governments. But my guess is that if human

rights declarations in international law. Instead, we

rights doctrines are no longer seen as a tool for

must accept that traditional human rights are in-

subordinating one people to another, but rather as

sufficient to ensure ethnocultural justice, and then

a tool for protecting vulnerable individuals from

recognise the need to supplement them within each

abuse by their political leaders, then such opposition

country with the specific minority rights which are

to human rights will increasingly be seen simply as a

appropriate for that country. As I will discuss later,

self-serving defence of elite power and privilege.

24

international bodies can play a useful role in adju-

So I would hope that we could gain greater

dicating minority rights conflicts, but this role is

international consensus on the principles of human

unlikely to take the form of adjudicating or enforcing

rights. But this is not to say that we are likely to get

a single codified international list of minority rights.

consensus on the appropriate enforcement mechan-

This then leads to the second problem. If human

isms of human rights/minority rights, either at the

rights and minority rights must be integrated at the

international level or even in the domestic setting.

domestic level rather than through a single interna-

There are at least two major difficulties here. First, it

tional code, can we find an impartial body to ad-

is difficult to see how minority rights can be codified

judicate and enforce these rights at the domestic

at the international level. Minorities come in many

level? Many people will naturally assume that these

different shapes and sizes. There are `national' mino-

rights should be listed in a single national constitu-

rities,

tion which is then adjudicated and enforced by a

indigenous

guestworkers,

peoples,

single supreme court. Certainly most liberals have

religious

assumed that the supreme court in each country

groups, and so on. All of these groups have different

should have final jurisdiction regarding both human

or

indentured

settlers,

refugees, of

slaves

colonising

immigrants,

labourers,

descendants Roma,

needs, aspirations and institutional capacities.

25

rights and minority rights.

Ter-

ritorial autonomy will not work for widely dispersed

But in fact we find strong resistance to this idea

groups, and even territorially concentrated groups

among some minority groups, even if they share the

differ dramatically in the sort of self-government

principles underlying the set of human rights and

they aspire to or are capable of. Similarly, language

minority rights listed in the national constitution.

rights (beyond the right to private speech) will not

Consider the situation of Indian tribes in the United

be the same in India or Malaysia (which contain

States. American constitutional law protects both

hundreds of indigenous languages) as in France or

certain minority rights for Indian tribes (they are

Britain.

recognised as `domestic dependent nations' with

This is why international declarations of minority

treaty-based rights of self-government) and also a

rights tend to waver between trivialities like the

general set of individual human rights (in the Bill of

`right to maintain one's culture' (which could simply

Rights). This could be seen as at least the beginnings

mean that respect for freedom of expression and

of an attempt to fairly integrate minority rights and

association, and hence add nothing to existing de-

human rights at the domestic level.

27

clarations of human rights) and vague generalities

But who should have the power to enforce these

like the `right to self-determination' (which could

constitutional provisions regarding individual and

mean anything from token representation to full-

minority rights? American liberals typically assume

blown secession).

26

Minorities are not going to

that the federal Supreme Court should have this

accept the lowest common denominator, which even

power. But many American Indians oppose this idea.

the smallest or most dispersed group seeks, but

They do not want the Supreme Court to be able to

43

WILL KYMLICKA

And why should they trust this court to act impar-

review their internal decisions to assess whether they 28

And they would

tially in considering their minority and treaty rights?

prefer to have some international body monitor the

For all these reasons, to assume that supreme courts

extent to which the American government respects

at the national level should have the ultimate

their treaty-based minority rights. So they do not

authority over all issues of individual and minority

want the federal Supreme Court to be the ultimate

rights within a country may be inappropriate in the

protector either of the individual rights of their

case of indigenous peoples and other incorporated

members or of their minority rights.

national minorities.

comply with the Bill of Rights.

29

There are good reasons why

Needless to say, Indian demands to reduce the

American Indians do not trust federal courts either

authority of the federal Supreme Court have met

to uphold the minority rights needed for ethnocul-

with

has

tural justice between majority and minority, or to

shown no desire to accept international monitoring

fairly determine whether the minority is respecting

of the extent to which the treaty rights of Indians are

human rights internally.

resistance.

The

American

government

respected. Indeed, the American government has

It is quite understandable, therefore, that many

jealously guarded its sovereignty in these matters,

Indian leaders seek to reduce the role of federal

and so refused to give any international body jur-

judicial review. But at the same time they affirm

isdiction to review and overturn the way it respects

their commitment to the basic package of human

the treaty rights, land claims or self-government

rights and minority rights which is contained in the

rights of indigenous peoples.

US constitution. They endorse the principles, but

And the demand to have internal tribal decisions

object to the particular institutions and procedures

exempted from scrutiny under the Bill of Rights is

that the larger society has established to enforce

widely opposed by liberals, since it raises the concern

these principles. As Joseph Carens puts it, `people

in many people's minds that individuals or subgroups

are supposed to experience the realisation of prin-

(such as women) within American Indian commu-

ciples of justice through various concrete institu-

nities could be oppressed in the name of group

tions, but they may actually experience a lot of

solidarity or cultural purity. They argue that any

the institution and very little of the principle.'

acceptable package of individual rights and minority

This is exactly how many indigenous peoples per-

rights must include judicial review of tribal decisions

ceive the Supreme Court in both Canada and the

by the American Supreme Court to ensure their

United States. What they experience is not the

compliance with the Bill of Rights.

principles of human dignity and equality, but rather

Before jumping to this conclusion, however, we

30

a social institution which has historically justified

should consider the reasons why certain groups are

their conquest and dispossession.

distrustful of federal judicial review. In the case of

What we need to do, therefore, is to find impartial

American Indians, these reasons are, I think, ob-

bodies to monitor compliance with both human

vious. After all, the federal Supreme Court has

rights and minority rights. We need to think crea-

historically legitimised the acts of colonisation and

tively about new mechanisms for enforcing human

conquest which dispossessed Indians of their prop-

rights and minority rights that will avoid the legit-

erty and political power. It has historically denied

imate objections which indigenous peoples and na-

both the individual rights and treaty rights of Indians

tional minorities have to federal courts.

on the basis of racist and ethnocentric assumptions.

What would these alternative mechanisms look

Moreover, Indians have had no representation on

like? To begin with, many Indian tribes have sought

the Supreme Court, and there is reason to fear that

to create or maintain their own procedures for

white judges on the Supreme Court may interpret

protecting human rights within their community,

certain rights in culturally biased ways (such as

specified in tribal constitutions, some of which are

democratic rights). Why should Indians agree to

based on the provisions of international protocols on

have their internal decisions reviewed by a body

human rights. It is important to distinguish Indian

which is, in effect, the court of their conquerors?

tribes, who have their own internal constitution and

44

HUMAN RIGHTS AND ETHNOCULTURAL JUSTICE

courts which prevent the arbitrary exercise of poli-

of their conquerors). But they want this sort of

tical power, from ethnocultural groups which have

external monitoring to examine how well their

no formal constitutions or courts, and which there-

minority rights are upheld by the larger society,

fore provide no effective check on the exercise of

not just to focus on the extent to which their

arbitrary power by powerful individuals or traditional

own decisions respect individual human rights. This

elites. We should take these internal checks on the

seems like a reasonable demand to me.

misuse of power seriously. Indeed, to automatically

These international mechanisms could arise at the

assume that the federal courts should replace or

regional as well as global level. European countries

supersede the institutions which Indians have them-

have agreed to establish their own multilateral hu-

selves evolved to prevent injustice is evidence of an

man rights tribunals. Perhaps North American gov-

ethnocentric bias ± an implicit belief that `our'

ernments and Indian tribes could agree to establish a

institutions are superior to theirs.

31

similar multilateral tribunal, on which both sides are fairly represented.

Indian tribes have also sought to create new transnational or international procedures to help

My aim here is not to defend any particular

monitor the protection of their minority rights.

proposal for a new impartial body to monitor the

The international community can play an important

protection of individual rights and minority rights.

role, not so much by formulating a single list of

Rather, it is to stress again the necessity of treating

minority rights that applies to all countries (for that

individual rights and minority rights together when

is impossible), but rather by providing an impartial

thinking about appropriate enforcement mechan-

adjudicator to monitor the extent to which domestic

isms. On the one hand, we need to think about

provisions regarding minority rights are fairly nego-

effective mechanisms which can hold minority gov-

tiated and implemented.

ernments accountable for the way individual mem-

From the point of view of ethnocultural justice,

bers are treated. I see no justification for exempting

these proposals might be preferable to the current

minority self-government from the principles of hu-

reliance on the federal Supreme Court. But it would

man rights ± I believe that any exercise of political

be even better, I think, to establish international

power should be subject to these principles. But we

mechanisms which would monitor both the indivi-

need to simultaneously think about effective me-

dual rights and minority rights of Indian peoples.

chanisms for holding the larger society accountable

While the internal courts and constitutions of tribal

for respecting the minority rights of these groups. As

governments are worthy of respect, they ± like the

I argued in the previous section, minority rights are

courts and constitutions of nation-states ± are im-

equally important as individual human rights in

perfect in their protection of human rights. So it

ensuring ethnocultural justice, and so should be

would be preferable if all governments ± majority and

subject to equal scrutiny. Moreover, focusing exclu-

minority ± are subject to some form of international

sively on the latter while neglecting the former

scrutiny.

is

counter-productive

and

hypocritical.

Minority

Many Indian leaders have expressed a willingness

groups will not agree to greater external scrutiny

to accept some form of international monitoring of

of their internal decisions unless they achieve greater

their internal human rights record. They are willing

protection of their minority rights. And since exist-

to abide by international declarations of human

ing institutional mechanisms are typically unable to

rights, and to answer to international tribunals for

meet this twin test of accountability, we need to

complaints of rights violations within their commu-

think creatively about new mechanisms that can

nities. But they would only accept this if and when it

deal impartially with both individual human rights

is accompanied by international monitoring of how

and minority rights.

well the larger state respects their treaty rights. They

I should emphasise again that in questioning the

accept the idea that their tribal governments, like all

role of federal courts in reviewing the internal de-

governments, should be accountable to international

cisions of tribal governments I am not trying to

human rights norms (so long as this isn't in the court

diminish the significance of human rights. On the

45

WILL KYMLICKA

contrary, my goal is to find fairer and more effective

suggests a number of new avenues for future research

ways to promote human rights, by separating them

± avenues which would depart dramatically from the

from the historical and cultural baggage which makes

existing patterns of research and debate. At the

federal courts suspect in the eyes of incorporated

moment, wherever there is a conflict between `local

peoples. History has shown the value of holding

practices' and `transnational human rights standards',

governments

human

commentators tend to locate the source of the con-

rights, and this applies equally to Indian tribal

flict in the `culture' or `traditions' of the group, and

governments. But the appropriate forums for review-

then look for ways in which this culture differs from

ing the actions of self-governing indigenous peoples

`western' culture. This tendency is exacerbated by

may skip the federal level, as it were. Many indi-

the rhetoric of a `politics of difference' or a `politics of

genous groups would endorse a system in which their

identity' which encourages groups to press their

self-governing decisions are reviewed in the first

demands in the language of respect for cultural

instance by their own courts, and then by an inter-

`difference'.

accountable

for

respecting

national court, which would also monitor respect for

My suggestion, however, is that we should not

minority rights. Federal courts, dominated by the

jump to the conclusion that cultural differences are

majority, would not be the ultimate adjudicator of

the real source of the problem. Rather, in each case

either the individual or minority rights of Indian

where a group is objecting to the domestic or trans-

peoples.

national enforcement of human rights principles, we should ask the following questions:

The human rights movement has always set itself against the idea of unlimited sovereignty and pushed for limitations on the power of governments to

1. Has the majority society failed to recognise

mistreat their citizens. But we need to do this in

legitimate minority rights? If so, has this cre-

an even-handed manner. We should hold the min-

ated a situation in which the implementation

ority accountable for respecting the human rights of

of human rights standards contributes to the

its members, but we need also to hold the majority

unjust disempowerment of the minority? I

accountable for respecting minority rights, and we

have discussed three contexts or issues where

need to find impartial enforcement mechanisms

human rights standards can exacerbate ethno-

which can do both of these together.

cultural injustice if they are unaccompanied by minority rights, but it would be interesting to come up with a more systematic list of such

Conclusion

issues.

I have argued that our aims should be twofold: (1) to

2. Is there any reason to think that the existing or

supplement individual human rights with minority

proposed judicial mechanisms for adjudicating

rights, recognising that the specific combination will

or enforcing human rights are biased against

vary from country to country; and (2) to find new

the minority group? Have these judicial me-

domestic,

mechanisms

chanisms treated minorities fairly historically?

which will hold governments accountable for re-

Is the minority group fairly represented on the

specting both human rights and minority rights.

judicial bodies? Were these judicial mechan-

regional

or

transnational

If we manage to solve these two (enormous) tasks,

isms consensually accepted by the minority

then I believe that the commitment to universal

when it was incorporated into the country,

human rights need not be culturally biased. Indeed, if

or is the imposition of these judicial mechan-

we resolve these issues satisfactorily, then the idea of

isms a denial of historical agreements or trea-

human rights can become what it was always in-

ties which protected the autonomy of the

tended to be ± namely, a shield for the weak against

group's own judicial institutions?

the abuse of political power, not a weapon of the My guess is that in many cases where minority

majority in subjugating minorities.

groups object to transnational human rights stan-

If the present arguments are at all valid, then it

46

HUMAN RIGHTS AND ETHNOCULTURAL JUSTICE

dards, it will be for one of these reasons, rather any

restrictions on its members, we should first make

inherent conflict between their traditional practices

sure we are respecting all of its legitimate minority

and human rights standards. Where these problems

rights. In short, the current conflict between local

are addressed, I expect that many minority groups

practices and transnational standards may not be the

will be more than willing to subscribe to human

result of a deep attachment to some long-standing

rights standards.

`tradition' in the local community, but rather the

I don't mean to deny the existence of illiberal or

(regretted) result of some new vulnerability which

anti-democratic practices within minority commu-

has arisen from the denial of their minority rights.

nities or non-western societies. But it's important to

To be sure, there will be some cases where mem-

note that at least in some cases the existence of such

bers of a group really do object to the very content of

practices is itself the consequence of some prior

the human rights standard on the grounds that it is

ethnocultural injustice. That is, many minorities feel

inconsistent with their cultural traditions. Even if we

compelled to restrict the liberties of their own mem-

solve the problem of minority rights and enforce-

bers because the larger society has denied their

ment mechanisms, we will still find some people

Âaume has legitimate minority rights. As Denise Re

rejecting `western' notions of human rights. They

noted, part of the `demonisation' of other cultures is

will say that restricting the liberty of women or

the assumption that these groups are naturally in-

suppressing political dissent is part of their `tradition',

clined to use coercion against their members. But in

and that human rights theories reflect a biased `euro-

so far as some groups seem regrettably willing to use

centric' and `individualistic' standard.

coercion to preserve group practices, this may be due,

may come from minority groups, or indeed from large

not to any innate illiberalism, but to the fact that the

and powerful majority groups or governments, as in

larger society has failed to respect their minority

Indonesia or China.

33

These claims

rights. Unable to get justice from the larger society

I do not want to enter into that debate and the

in terms of protection for its lands and institutions,

issues of cultural relativism which it raises. As I said

the minority turns its attention to the only people it

earlier, we are all familiar with that debate and I have

does have some control over, namely its own mem-

little to add to it. My aim, rather, is to insist that this

bers.

32

is not the only debate we need to have. On the

This tendency does not justify the violation of the

contrary, we may find that such conflicts are fewer

human rights of group members, but it suggests that

once we have properly dealt with the issues of

before we criticise a minority for imposing such

ethnocultural justice.

Notes

2. Rees (1985).

1. I'd like to thank David Boucher for inviting me to give the Rees Memorial Lecture and for his hospi-

3. Rees (1971), p. x.

tality during my stay in Wales. I'd also like to thank

4. Claude (1955), p. 211.

David Schneiderman for encouraging me to write this

5. There are now several attempts to define a theory of

paper, and for his helpful comments. Thanks also to

ethnocultural justice in the literature, for example

John McGarry for his comments, and to Thomas

Minow (1990), Young (1990), Kymlicka (1995). It

Nagel and Ronald Dworkin for inviting me to discuss

would take a separate paper to explain or defend any

this paper in their Colloquium in Law, Philosophy

particular one. But for the purposes of this paper we

and Political Theory at New York University in

can use a minimalist definition of ethnocultural justice

September 1997. (Editor's note: Professor Kymlicka's

as the absence of relations of oppression and humilia-

chapter was delivered as the J. C. Rees Memorial

tion between different ethnocultural groups. A more

Lecture, commemorating the founding professor of

robust conception of ethnocultural justice could be

the Department of Political Theory and Govern-

developed by asking what terms of coexistence would

ment, on 23 February 1998 at the University of

be freely consented to by the members of different

Wales Swansea. The opening remarks of that occa-

ethnocultural groups in a Habermasian/Rawlsian set-

sion have been preserved.)

ting where inequalities in bargaining power have been

47

WILL KYMLICKA

neutralised. For example, a Rawlsian approach to

(a process they had no real hope of influencing), they

ethnocultural justice would ask what terms of coex-

had to relinquish any claims to participate in long-

istence would be agreed to by people behind a `veil of

standing

ignorance', who didn't know whether they were going

This transparent attempt to undermine Aboriginal

to be born into a majority or minority ethnocultural

political institutions was justified in the name of

Aboriginal

processes

of

self-government.

promoting `democracy'.

group. Such a Rawlsian approach is likely to produce a more demanding conception of ethnocultural justice

13. Avigail Eisenberg, `Individualism and Collectivism in

than the mere absence of oppression and humiliation,

the Politics of Canada's North', paper presented at the

but the main claim of this chapter is that human rights

annual meeting of the Canadian Political Science

are insufficient even to ensure this minimal compo-

Association, May 1995. A revised version of this paper

nent of ethnocultural justice.

will appear in Painting the Maple: Essays on Race,

6. See McGarry (1998).

Gender and the Construction of Canada, edited by Joan

7. See Penz (1992) and (1993). I discuss these cases in

Anderson, Avigail Eisenberg, Sherril Grace and Veronica Strong-Boag (Vancouver: UBC Press, forthcom-

Kymlicka (1996).

ing).

8. MacDonald, quoted in Stanley (1961), p. 95.

14. On the necessity of extensive language rights for the

9. Gurr (1993).

survival and flourishing of linguistic minorities, see

10. It would not be hypocritical to criticise minority

Kymlicka (1995), chapter 6.

demands to limit in-migration if one also criticised state policies to limit immigration ± that is, if one

15. The view that language rights are not part of human

defended a policy of open borders. But such a policy

rights was explicitly affirmed by the Canadian Su-

has virtually no public support, and is certainly not

preme Court in MacDonald v. City of Montreal [1986] 1

endorsed by most of the people who criticise minority

Â te Â des acadiens du Nouveau-Brunswick v. SCR 460; Socie

demands. However, this raises an important limita-

Minority Language School Board no. 50 [1986] 1 SCR

549.

tion on my argument. I am discussing what justice requires for minorities in the world as we know it ±

16. For a comprehensive review of the current status of

that is, a world of nation-states which retain signifi-

language rights in international human rights law, see de Varennes (1996).

cant control over issues of migration, internal political structures and language policies. One could

17. Low enrolment is then often (perversely) cited by

(with difficulty) imagine a very different world ± a

majority politicians as evidence that most members of

world without states, or with just one world govern-

the minority are not interested in preserving their

ment. The

be

language and culture, and that it is only a few ex-

different in such a hypothetical world, since the

tremists in the minority group who are the cause of

rights

of minorities

would

clearly

ethnic conflict.

power of majorities would be dramatically reduced, including their ability to impose relations of oppres-

18. This is called the `territorial imperative', and the trend

sion and humiliation. My focus, however, is on what

towards territorial concentration of language groups is

ethnocultural justice requires in our world. See also

a widely-noted phenomenon in multilingual western

note 20.

countries. For a more general theoretical account of the `territorial imperative' in multilingual societies, see

11. Cf. Kymlicka (1998). In cases where national mino-

Laponce (1987) and (1993).

rities are not territorially concentrated different meinvoked.

19. This is obviously the rationale given for requiring

During the period of devolved rule in Northern Ire-

immigrants to Quebec to send their children to

chanisms

of

disempowerment

are

often

French-language schools.

land (1920±72), for example, the Catholics were disempowered not so much by the gerrymandering

20. Here again, it would not be hypocritical to criticise

of boundaries (although this occurred), but by the

minority demands regarding self-government rights

adoption of an electoral system (with single-member

and language rights if one applied the same standard

constituencies and plurality rules) designed to ensure

to majorities. For example, one could imagine letting

unity within the Protestant majority while ensuring an

the United Nations determine the boundaries and

ineffective Catholic opposition. This is another ex-

language policies of each state. Imagine that the

ample of how a rhetorical commitment to democracy

UN, in a free and democratic vote, decided to merge

and human rights can coexist alongside the oppression

all countries in the Americas (North, South and

of a national minority.

Central) into a single Spanish-speaking state. If the

12. A related example is the law which existed in Canada

anglophone majority in Canada or the United States

prior to 1960 which granted Indians the vote only if

would accept such a decision ± that is, if they were

they renounced their Indian status, and so abandoned

willing to abandon their own self-government powers

any claim to Aboriginal political or cultural rights. In

and language rights ± then it would not be hypocritical

order to gain a vote in the Canadian political process

to criticise the demands of Francophone, Hispanic or

48

HUMAN RIGHTS AND ETHNOCULTURAL JUSTICE

Aboriginal minorities in North America. But I don't

declarations, see Donald Horowitz, `Self-Determina-

know any English-speaking Canadians or Americans

tion: Politics, Philosophy and Law', in Kymlicka and Shapiro (eds) (1997), pp. 421±63.

who would agree to amalgamate into a single Spanishspeaking state, even if this merger was supported by

27. It is, at best, an imperfect beginning, in large part due

most countries in the Americas (and/or by most people

to the Plenary Power which Congress arbitrarily asserts over Indian tribes. See Kronowitz (1987).

living in the Americas). In reality, the anglophone majorities in both the United States and Canada

28. Indeed, tribal councils in the United States have

zealously guard their right to live in a state where

historically been exempted from having to comply

they form a majority, and their right to have English

with the federal Bill of Rights, and their internal

recognised as a language of public life. This defence of

decisions have not been subject to Supreme Court

the boundaries and linguistic policies of existing na-

review. Various efforts have been made by federal

tion-states is as `collectivist' as the demands of mino-

legislators to change this, most recently the 1968

rities for protection of their self-government and

Indian Civil Rights Act, which was passed by Con-

language rights.

gress despite vociferous opposition from most Indian

21. And, in a different way, in the Communist bloc. See

groups. American Indian groups remain strongly op-

Walker Connor's (1984) account of how Communist

posed to the 1968 Act, just as First Nations in Canada

leaders dealt with the issues of settlement policy,

have argued that their self-governing band councils

gerrymandering and linguistic policies, all of which

should not be subject to judicial review by the Ca-

were key policy tools in the Communist approach to

nadian Supreme Court under the Canadian Charter of

national minorities.

Rights and Freedoms. They do not want their members to be able to challenge band decisions in the

22. For the ubiquity of this process, see Gellner (1983).

courts of the mainstream society.

23. See the related analysis in de Sousa Santos (1996). He argues that attention to the claims of indigenous

29. See also the analysis in David Schneiderman, `Human

peoples and ethnic minorities can help develop a

Rights, Fundamental Differences? Multiple Charters

new `non-hegemonic' conception of human rights

in a Partnership Frame', in Beyond the Impasse, edited

which would retain its commitment to protecting

by Guy Laforest and Roger Gibbins (Montreal, In-

the

weak

and

vulnerable

without

serving

as

stitute for Research on Public Policy, forthcoming).

an

30. Joseph Carens, `Citizenship and Aboriginal Self-Gov-

instrument of western colonialism (for example on

ernment' (paper prepared for the Royal Commission

p. 353).

on Aboriginal Peoples, Ottawa, 1994).

24. As a general rule, we should be wary about the claims of elite members of a group to speak authoritatively

31. To be sure, some Indian tribal constitutions are not

about the group's `traditions'. Some individuals may

fully liberal or democratic, and so are inadequate from

claim to speak for the group as a whole, and may say

a human rights point of view, but they are forms of

that the group is united against the imposition of

constitutional government, and so should not be

`alien' ideas of human rights. But in reality, these

equated with mob rule or despotism. As Graham

people may simply be protecting their privileged

Walker notes, it is a mistake to conflate the ideas

position from internal challenges to their interpreta-

of liberalism and constitutionalism. There is a genuine

tion of the group's culture and traditions. In other

category of non-liberal constitutionalism which pro-

words, debates over the legitimacy of human rights

vides meaningful checks on political authority and

should

over

preserves the basic elements of natural justice, and

whether to subordinate local cultural traditions to

which thereby helps ensure that governments main-

transnational human rights standards, although this is

tain their legitimacy in the eyes of their subjects. See

how conservative members of the group may put it.

Walker, `The Idea of Non-Liberal Constitutionalism',

not

necessarily

be

seen

as

debates

in Kymlicka and Shapiro (eds.) (1997), pp. 154±84.

Instead, debates over human rights are often debates over who within the community should have the

Âaume (1995). 32. Re

authority to influence or determine the interpretation

33. As I said earlier, I do not think that the substantive

of the community's traditions and culture. When

interests protected by human rights doctrines are

individual members of the group demand their `hu-

either

man rights', they often do so in order to be able to

may well be that to talk of these interests in terms

participate in the community's process of interpreting

of `rights' is a specifically European invention which

its traditions.

does not fit comfortably with the discourse or self-

individualistic

or

Eurocentric.

However,

it

Minority

understandings of many cultures. I don't think we

Groups', in Encyclopedia of Applied Ethics, edited by

should get hung up on `rights talk'. What matters,

Ruth Chadwick, (San Diego, CA: Academic Press,

morally speaking, is that people's substantive interests

forthcoming).

in life and liberty are protected, but we should be

25. For

a

typology,

see

my

`Ethnocultural

open-minded about what institutional mechanisms

26. For an acute criticism of existing minority rights

49

WILL KYMLICKA

best provide this protection. There is no reason to

of the language of rights as Eurocentric, see Turpel

assume that the best way to reliably protect people's

(1990). On ways to protect the substantive human

basic interests will always take the form of a judicially

interests underlying human rights without using the

enforceable constitutional list of `rights'. For a critique

language of `rights', see Pogge (1995).

50

4

LIBERALISM AND CITIZENSHIP Andrew Vincent

The central argument of this chapter is that liberal-

sically committed to agency and individualism, then

ism has a strong conceptual relationship with `citi-

liberalism is the most succinct modern bearer of

zenship' yet citizenship, in turn, has an ambiguous

citizenship claims. This argument is problematic,

conceptual relationship with nationalism. `Liberal

as we shall see. If, however, we can accept the

citizenship' is thus at the interstice between two

compound `liberal citizenship', then there are further

potentially contradictory forces.

implications which follow from the intrinsic logic of both citizenship and liberal beliefs.

There are two theses implicit in the issue of liberalism and citizenship, which need to be exam-

These can be summed up in the concept of

ined. The first concerns the cosmopolitan implica-

`cosmopolitanism'. The argument for this claim is

tion of liberal citizenship; the second concerns the

as follows: the core values of liberal citizenship ±

criteria for citizenship in liberal states.

autonomy, agency, individualism, liberty, rights,

First, intuitively, we tend to see a close conceptual

equality, justice and so forth ± are universalising

relation between liberalism and citizenship. This

values. They contain an intrinsic logic which shows

relation has deep philosophical roots, bound up with

that when dealing with the justice, rights or free-

ideas of self-determination, autonomy and individu-

doms of human beings there are no rational grounds

alism. The citizen is conceived as markedly different

to stop at state boundaries. In other words, to think

from the subject by dint of possessing, intrinsically,

within the ontology of liberal citizenship is to think

agency. Citizenship denotes choice, an opportunity

oneself into cosmopolitanism. This logic would

or space to act. It thus links conceptually with

account for the stress often laid on human rights,

freedom and agency. This intrinsic connection also

international justice, cosmopolitan democracy and

combines with other fundamental ideas in liberal

the like by many liberal theories. Boundaries be-

thought ± conscience, rights, equality, free speech

come morally arbitrary in this context, since we are

and so forth. Thus, there is a more than fortuitous

dealing with humanity as a single moral category.

connection between citizenship and liberalism. In

This consideration leads to the concept of `inter-

the last two centuries, citizenship has been integrally

national' or `global citizenship'. Now there are

part of a web of liberal values and beliefs.

many problems here, not least the legal, moral,

Second, citizenship has a complex and diverse

political and social implications of this concept.

etymological history which will be analysed here.

However, my central claim is that it is `concep-

In light of this chapter's critical focus upon the link

tually' natural for us (`natural' in the sense that it

with liberalism, it might nevertheless be claimed that

appears to be an unforced implication of the con-

since liberalism, above all other social and political

cepts we use) to read cosmopolitanism into liberal

theories, embodies a belief in moral and political

citizenship. The impact of Kant's thought upon the

individualism and agency, and citizenship is intrin-

modern western intellectual psyche has been pro-

51

ANDREW VINCENT

1

found here. It is, therefore, a short step from being a

universe.'

good liberal citizen to being a good member of

tractive to Christian thinkers like St Augustine. For

Amnesty International or being a proponent of

Stoics, we dwell both in the community of our birth

international human rights.

and the community of human argument, reason and

This argument alone made Stoicism at-

My own response to this is deeply ambivalent. The

aspiration. Our decisive moral values come from the

core intuition concerning cosmopolitanism is im-

latter, which is a moral, not a legal community. This

mensely compelling, but it also contains some quite

does not deny the separateness of peoples, but it

fundamental problems. The deepest problem relates

argues that such `separateness' is relatively unimpor-

to the link between nationality and citizenship.

tant in comparison with the wider moral community.

My discussion will first flesh out the cosmopolitan

Thus, world citizenship should be our ultimate moral

intuition. Secondly, it will examine the ambiguity of

focus.

liberalism itself. Thirdly, it will review the diverse

The cosmopolitan view, developed under the

senses of citizenship and the ambiguous relation with

aegis of Christianised natural law thinking, surfaces

nationalism. Overall, the chapter draws attention to

again most significantly (for the last century) in the

a complex of ideas which form an unresolved subtext

work of Kant.

to much current, legal, moral and political thought.

Pogge, most cosmopolitan arguments contain, firstly,

Hence it seeks to illuminate the dimensions of the

a commitment to individualism as against commu-

problem and indicate an important topic for further

nities or tribes; secondly, a belief in universalism,

research, one which liberals have tended to overlook

namely that all humans are valued equally; and,

but which exposes considerable tensions at the heart

thirdly, a sense of generality, that is that cosmopo-

of their political thinking.

litan concerns are not limited to specific regimes.

2

For a modern Kantian, like Thomas

Persons are of concern to everyone, wherever they are. Our fellow countrymen are no more or less

A Cosmopolitan Intuition

important than anyone else in the world. Pogge also

As suggested, the central premise of this argument is

distinguishes types of cosmopolitanism. `Legal' cos-

that citizenship embodies a strong conception of

mopolitanism is committed to a concrete juridical or

agency which is, in turn, a central value for liberal-

governmental order under which people will have

ism. Citizenship ± although a concept with a broader

equal basic rights, as in international courts on hu-

ambit ± can therefore be seen as a very important

man rights or international codes and covenants.

element of the liberal perspective, a characteristic

Most commentators see the central problem here of

liberal motif. The `citizen' can literally (and for-

jurisdiction, namely, will the courts be able to en-

mally) denote the individual person (agent) with

force their rulings? `Moral' cosmopolitanism, on the

basic legal or moral rights to life, freedom, con-

other hand, holds that all persons stand in certain

science and association.

moral relations to each other ± mutual concern or

However, the central purpose of this section is to

respect is incumbent upon us. Every human being is 3

substantiate the argument that liberalism embodies,

therefore an ultimate unit of moral concern.

in turn, an underlying cosmopolitan impetus and

cosmopolitanism can, however, vary in its content

that the logic of liberal citizenship would appear to

with different moral positions. It can thus require

be directed towards a global perspective. One of the

simply leaving individuals alone and not harming

first western philosophies to expound this cosmopo-

them (which might equate with a more passive sense

litan perspective was Stoicism. It involved a quite

of civil citizenship), or taking a definite responsi-

conscious rejection of the singularity and bounded

bility for others, even distant individuals (which

citizenship of the Greek city-state. The citizen/bar-

might entail strong civic duties).

barian

distinction,

common

to

such

Moral

Hellenic

The basic `logic of citizenship' argument would be

thought, was anathema to Stoics. As Marcus Aur-

this: citizenship, historically, has been used within

elius put it, `my city and my country, so far as I am

states to equalise, generalise and regularise treat-

Antonius, is Rome; but so far as I am a man, it is the

ment, thus preventing exclusionary practices within

52

LIBERALISM AND CITIZENSHIP

states. If citizenship, within the state, is used against

Nussbaum

therefore

contends

that

we should

exclusionary practices, why not extend it to `exclu-

automatically educate ourselves and our children

sionary practices' beyond state boundaries? An ex-

in a cosmopolitan mode of thought. In so doing,

clusionary practice remains an exclusionary practice

first, we will learn more about ourselves. Education

wherever it appears. What is so significant about

which

state boundaries?

courages irrationality. To be ignorant of humanity

focuses

within

national

boundaries

en-

Citizenship is thus embroiled in the logic of a

is to be ignorant about ourselves. Second, we can

universalising ethics which does not necessarily have

only make headway solving international problems if

to stop at the national boundary. Rights before the

we acknowledge global issues. The air that citizens

law, rights of participation and freedom, justice, the

breathe and the water they drink, for example, are

requirement for consent, and duties to promote a

not confined by national boundaries. Third, we

social good (all implicit within citizenship), are all

should be troubled by the fact that our high living

potentially universalisable. Thus, for Andrew Link-

standards are not more widely available. We should

later, recent theorists like Charles Beitz and Ju È rgen

therefore train children in a basic universalising

Habermas who appear to be engaging in this kind of

`Kantian awareness', otherwise we will nurture only

reasoning `universalise ideas about consent and dia-

hypocrites. Nussbaum remarks that if `we do believe

logue which are intrinsic to citizenship in the domes-

that all human beings are created equal and endowed

tic domain' and `enlarge the meaning of citizenship by

with certain inalienable rights, we are morally re-

conferring rights of participation on every member of

quired to think about what that conception requires

the species.'

4

Moral universalism thus arises automa-

us to do.'

tically out of domestic liberal citizenship.

7

We should work to acquire knowledge

that will enable us to consider these rights seriously.

One comparatively recent example of the above

Fourth, nationalist writers often seek to encourage

argument is deployed by Martha Nussbaum. Using a

nationals to join hands across racial or economic

Stoic analogy, she contends that we should think of

divisions; why, asks Nussbaum, stop at the arbitrary

ourselves as surrounded by concentric circles: the

boundary of the nation ± `what is it about the

self, the family, the neighbourhood, the city, the

national boundary that magically converts people

country and humanity. We cannot ignore our lo-

towards whom we are both incurious and indifferent

cality, but we must work to make all humans part of

into people to whom we have duties of mutual

our community, drawing all the circles to the centre.

respect?' Multicultural respect within a nation must

For

Nussbaum,

we

should

`recognise

lead to wider world respect. The `respect argument',

humanity wherever it occurs, and give its funda-

in nationalist writers, must carry us in this direction.

mental ingredients, reason and moral capacity, our

These arguments of Nussbaum's clearly illustrate the

first allegiance as respect.'

5

therefore

8

logic-of-citizenship argument, which Linklater as-

She puts the point well

sociates also with Beitz, Pogge and Habermas.

when she states that

Some of these cosmopolitan ideas have been I believe that . . . [the] emphasis on patriotic

translated into deeply practical concerns. The liberal

pride is both morally dangerous and, ultimately,

rights of the citizen to freedom, conscience, proce-

subversive of some of the worthy goals patriotism

dural justice, speech, or to dissent, can also be seen as

sets out to serve . . . These goals . . . would be

universal `human' rights. Although there are pro-

better served by an ideal that is any case more

blems

adequate to our situation in the contemporary

rights have also been codified and translated into

world, namely the very old idea of the cosmopo-

positive legal rights. So far the main obstacle to the

litan, the person whose allegiance is to the world-

full realisation of such rights has been persuading

wide community.

6

with

ratification

and

application,

human

states to agree and work with the United Nations and International Courts. The global citizen is there-

Even good nationalism ultimately subverts the values

fore one who simply acknowledges universal human

it upholds.

rights and believes, either on a personal level or on

53

ANDREW VINCENT

9

the institutional level of international courts and

and must take precedence over collective goals.

conventions, that he or she should accept the duties

Michael Walzer characterises this procedural liberal-

correlative to such rights.

ism as

There is a major problem here, namely that statebased citizens have a rich panoply of well-established

committed in the strongest possible way to in-

positive rights, whereas the global citizen's rights are,

dividual rights and, almost as a deduction from

in comparison, thin. One way out of this dilemma for

this, to a rigorously neutral state, that is, a state

some theorists would be to argue for an extension of

without cultural or religious projects or, indeed,

international legal organisations, expanded interna-

any sorts of collective goals beyond freedom and

tional courts of human rights and at the most ex-

physical security.'

10

treme end, an elected parliament at the United Nations. In the latter scenario, states which recog-

This is a view that one finds, according to Charles

nised cosmopolitan citizenship would provide full

Taylor, in writers like Rawls, Dworkin and Acker-

diplomatic and economic support to the UN, pro-

man.

mote arms control, uphold human rights, and pro-

substantive view about the ends of human life.

vide

generous

foreign

aid.

These

ideas

11

This conception of liberal society has no

are

Rather, society is united behind an idea of equal

speculative, although not overly so. The fact that

respect. For Taylor, the roots to this procedural view

we have international commissions, like that on

are very deep. Kant is probably the single most

Global Governance with their report Our Global

important figure articulating this perspective. Hu-

Neighbourhood, indicates that many take such ideas

man dignity focuses on autonomy and the ability of

very seriously. As such the logic of global citizenship

the individual to determine their own notion of the

certainly shows little sign of diminishing in world

good life. Taylor has his own thoughts on the

politics.

problems that this notion of liberalism has caused

The discussion now turns to three crucial, over-

in the Canadian situation. For him, procedural

lapping ambiguities, which are often glossed over, in

liberalism enshrines a politics of equal respect which

the above arguments. These are, first, the ambiguity

is hostile or indifferent to difference, because it

of liberalism itself; second, the ambiguity of citizen-

insists on the uniform application of rights and is

ship qua liberalism; and thirdly, the ambiguous rela-

thus suspicious of any collective goal.

tion of nationalism, liberalism and citizenship. By

Second, social or `new' liberalism appeared in

explaining and analysing each, the nature of liberal-

Britain in the 1880s and 1890s, although variants

ism's problem here will become more fully apparent.

also developed in America with John Dewey, in Italy with writers such as Guido de Ruggiero, and in Germany in the writings of Albert Lange and Karl

Liberalism

Ènder. Social liberal thought was committed to Vorla

Is liberalism a clear doctrine such that we could

collective welfare goals pursued through the state. It

postulate a particular understanding of a potentially

was thus statist, but not overtly nationalist. Essen-

cosmopolitan citizenship, as outlined in the previous

tially, social liberals were reacting to certain themes

section? The quickest response is `no': differing

present within classical liberalism, notions like ato-

conceptions

re-

mised individualism, the negative conception of

sponses to the question. There have been many

liberty, the radically free market economy and mini-

typologies of liberalism and so, to survey such re-

mal state theory. They wished to replace these with a

sponses, the following argument draws a distinction

more socialised, holistic and developmental under-

between three types of liberalism: classical liberalism,

standing of the individual, a more `positive' concep-

social liberalism and cultural liberalism.

tion of liberty linked to notions like self-realisation

of

liberalism

provide

divergent

First, the classical view (a predominantly proce-

and self-development, a conception of a mixed

dural view, certainly in its modern guise), which

economy and a more responsive, collectivised and

insists that individual rights must always come first

ethical conception of the state. State intervention

54

LIBERALISM AND CITIZENSHIP

was premised upon the common good and the full

might not share beliefs with social liberals about, say,

realisation of human personalities. It implied a de-

the market. It only affirms that culture is immensely

licate balance between self-government and corpo-

important for choice and that groups, as well as

rate government action. The new liberals were, in

individuals, have rights. There is therefore nothing

effect, developing the embryonic form of the Wol-

inherently to stop cultural liberalism from being

fartstaat. Their arguments were rooted in evolution-

assimilated with either an older variant of classical

ary theory, social utilitarianism and philosophical

liberalism (one less overtly procedural, like J. S.

idealism.

12

Mill's liberalism) or, alternatively, social liberalism.

Thirdly, cultural liberalism, which developed in

Cultural liberalism might thus legitimately share a

reaction particularly to procedural liberalism. Cul-

classical liberal antipathy to distributive justice and

tural liberals promote the conception of collective

the welfare state ± especially if the existent cultures

cultural goods, such as the French language for the

embody that antipathy. It therefore seems to have no

Quebeckers. This view of liberalism has been devel-

specific economic or political content.

oped by Will Kymlicka, among others and it claims

Secondly, cultural liberalism arrests, but does not

that classical, procedural liberalism overemphasises

undermine, the argument for citizenship leading to

individual rights against collective goals. For classical

cosmopolitanism. Because cultural liberalism tends

liberals, communities (and cultural goals) have no

to be more sympathetic to liberal nationalism, its

moral existence. For Kymlicka, however, group and

universalising appeal is stunted. Thirdly, because

individual rights are not necessarily opposed. He thus

social liberalism is statist and centralist in content,

tries to defend group rights within the framework of

it is ideologically antipathetic to classical liberalism.

cultural liberalism. The crux of his move is to suggest

It would also have little sympathy with cultural goods

that when we exercise our liberty it `is determined by

and group rights. Further and crucially, because it

13

Agency requires culture.

sees citizenship in the context of the state, it would

Culture provides the content of choice, its norms

also inhibit the force of any cosmopolitan argument.

and historical heritage. Thus, `the primary good

Fourthly, classical liberalism is intrinsically critical of

being recognised is the cultural community as a

the statism of social liberalism. It also feels deep

our cultural heritage.'

14

Contrary to his perception of

unease with the cultural goods and group rights being

communitarians, Kymlicka thinks that we can ab-

pursued at the expense of individual rights and

stract ourselves from ways of life and criticise them.

procedural justice.

context of choice.'

We can be thus `unencumbered'. We do not just

Thus classical liberalism is, oddly, most susceptible

discover views and we are not haplessly trapped by

to the cosmopolitan thesis outlined in the previous

them. Cultural liberalism, therefore, distinguishes

section. It is, literally, much easier to universalise the

fundamental liberties from privileges and immu-

generic negative individual rights of classical liberal-

nities. Provided the exponents of collective goals

ism ± life, liberty, property. Yet, at the same time,

and cultural goods respect the fundamental rights of

most recent postcolonial writers see classical liberal-

minorities and individuals, they can still be consid-

ism as the expression, par excellence, of a particular

ered liberal. This liberalism is seen as more sensitive

historically oppressive community. In this latter

to `cultural survivals' and, for Taylor, is the most

scenario, minimal generic rights are no longer con-

relevant model for contemporary porous and cultu-

sidered through the lens of cosmopolitanism, but

rally diverse societies. Liberalism has to do more than

rather through imperialism. This critical argument

let differences exist. It has to recognise the `worth' of

has, paradoxically, been applied to the treatment of

different cultures.

internal minorities, even within the USA, by Iris

Some very general claims can be made concerning

Marion Young. Rights-talk and notions of neutrality

liberalism and cosmopolitanism from this brief sur-

are conceived of as modes of group and cultural

vey. First, cultural liberalism is the least politically

domination.

distinctive of the three in that it tells us little about the nature of the state or welfare. Thus, it might or

55

ANDREW VINCENT

Ás's use of the term `active citizen'. on aspects of Sieye

Citizenship

However, the active sense of the citizen also refers

The upshot of the previous section is the suggestion

(in my use) to a more rigorous conception of political

that, given the profoundly contestable character of

involvement, which was revealed at certain mo-

liberalism, the initial intuition concerning cosmo-

ments during the French revolution, and harks back

politan citizenship looks less secure. Indeed, some

to an older civic tradition. In my usage, the active

senses of liberalism might be at odds with cosmopo-

conception conceives of the citizen as politically

litanism. The same observation also applies to citi-

involved and identified with the wider community.

zenship itself, as this section will now demonstrate by

Such an idea can be found ± in differing formats ± in

surveying examples of both its theory and empirical

the doctrines of Aristotelianism, some civic repub-

practice.

licanism and the later Rousseauist and Hegelian

On the theoretical level, there are certain con-

traditions. It can also be found implicitly in some

ceptual parameters which reveal the dimensions of

recent expressions in communitarian thought. The

the concept. These parameters are active and passive

active/passive divide bears some conceptual parallels

notions of the citizen, the character of rights and

with the distinction, made by Benjamin Constant,

duties and their correlativity. The origin of the terms

between ancient and modern liberty. Another way of

`active' and `passive' is debatable, but they can be

formulating it is in terms of `civic citizenship' and

Â Sieye Ás. (Sieye Ás's found in the writings of the Abbe

`civil citizenship'. The civic idea corresponds with

use is not quite my present usage, although there are

the activist vision and the civil with the more passive

sufficient parallels to warrant discussion here.) For

tradition.

Ás, passive citizenship referred essentially to the Sieye

The category of civic or active citizenship is the

natural and civil rights of individuals. Such rights

oldest view. The good of the individual citizen was

concern the protection of all persons equally in their

seen as closely tied to the common good of the polis.

Ás, despite the fact that liberty and property. For Sieye

It implied, say, for Aristotle, minimally, membership

all persons within a state possess passive rights, not

of a city-state, the possession of certain claims and

all can take part in the `formation of public power'.

duties, the duty to participate in the adjudication

Passive citizenship is thus available to all. Active

processes of the polis (at least in Athens) and, finally,

citizens, on the other hand, are those who `contri-

an inner capacity for rational virtue, entailing the

bute to the public establishment' and can be likened

internalisation of communal norms ± an art of both

to `true shareholders in the great social enterprise'.

ruling and being ruled. The themes of political self-

At the time, active citizenship excluded women,

discipline, public spirit, a conception of the common

foreigners and children, who were all regarded as

good, unease with private gain and self-interest, and

`passive citizens'. However, within the class or group

a belief in simplicity and piety of life were reasserted

of `active citizens' no one has more rights than

in the later civic republican tradition. Again, the

anyone else.

active citizen was one who (mythically or not) gladly

It is worth noting here that active citizens are not

and intelligently participated in the promotion of

Ás primarily in the context of rights. discussed by Sieye

the public good. The civic world of the small city-

Active citizenship, although it incorporated concep-

state was more overtly small-scale and defensive in its

tions of political voting rights, also included a sense

stance. Its citizenry, despite being mobilised to a

of higher vocation. Taking part in the `great public

common task were, nonetheless, premised upon a

Ás in terms of the enterprises' is seen more by Sieye

large body of non-citizen slaves and foreign workers.

performance of public duties. He thus remarks that,

The spectre of civic citizenship developed once more

`it is a major error to envisage the exercise of public

with the rise of nationalism in the nineteenth cen-

power as a right; it is . . . a duty. The officers of the

tury. Its ethos, though, was `more creative and

nation are distinguished from other citizens only in

protective,

having more duties.'

15

fence.'

In terms of the present discussion I wish to pick up

stressing

liberation

rather

than

de-

16

However it is couched, one major criticism of

56

LIBERALISM AND CITIZENSHIP

`civic citizenship' is that, at its extreme, the citizen

it also incorporates political rights to vote or stand

will be asked to participate continuously in every

for office. The argument about political rights de-

aspect of political life. The public realm would

pends upon how significant one regards them; it is

totally absorb the private realm of the individual.

arguable that such rights can still be viewed as quasi-

Liberals, from Constant to Isaiah Berlin, have been

passive notions. As one recent writer has noted, `the

profoundly worried by such arguments as potentially

occasional visit to the polling booth has seemed to

undermining the value of individual liberty and

many a pathetically inadequate definition of citizen-

privacy. Ralf Dahrendorf has referred to this com-

ship.'

munal conception as the `total citizen'.

17

18

Some writers, like Schumpeter, have of

The total

course made a virtue of this quasi-passivity. How-

citizen and the total state would be seen, in this

ever, the intuition to grasp here is the point that

argument, as two sides of the same coin.

political citizenship, as it has been conventionally

The civil citizen, on the other hand, is a product of

understood, can be viewed as constrained, passive

the era of developing individualism and embryonic

and perfectly in accord with classical liberal theory.

liberal thought. The citizen is understood as separate

In sum, citizenship in classical liberal thought is

and, at least partially preformed, with desires, inter-

generally confined to a relatively narrow field, being

ests and often basic (natural) rights. The function of

defined in terms of constrained political rights to

a constitutional legal order is to protect and uphold

political involvement, combined with legal or civil

these fundamental interests or rights. Citizenship is

rights of persons, their liberty and their property,

thus conceived more negatively in terms of the legal

which prohibit mutual coercion. Classical liberal

protection of pre-existing rights to life, liberty and

thought on citizenship

property. The private moralities of the individual are

and entitlements to economic and social resources.

generally

excludes rights

distinct from the formal but minimal public ethics of

A well-established criticism of civil citizenship is

citizenship. For classical liberal theorists, although

that it is too minimalist. It ignores the socially and

individuals may have lost some of the benefits of

historically embedded (or encumbered) character of

close communal life, nonetheless they gained from

individuals and abandons any clear sense of perfec-

the privacy, modern liberty and new-found prosper-

tionism, community and nationality. This is a char-

ity of commercial liberal society. Later nineteenth-

acteristic

and twentieth-century versions of this understanding

consequentialist liberal individualism, to the present

of citizenship extends further into features like po-

day, by communitarians. The citizen of deontological

litical representation.

liberal individualism could be described as a `mini-

criticism

made

of

deontological

and

mal citizen', essentially being the other side of the

Civil citizenship, in my usage, is thus more con-

minimal state.

ventionally associated with classical liberalism, implying negative rights (understood largely as `side-

Turning now to the parameters of rights and

constraints') to protection of one's person, property

duties, the older tradition of civic or active citizen-

and liberty. The classical liberal view of citizenship

ship did not have such a rich vocabulary of rights at

thus favours limited political rule, a framework of

its disposal. Aristotelian-influenced proponents of

laws and minimal welfare. Markets are the preferred

active citizenship tended to speak more in terms

technique for allocation of resources. Essentially, this

of the duties of the citizen or what was due to the

is a more procedural view of politics. Politics does

citizen. The assertion of the importance for citizens

not pursue any particular social or moral goals. The

to perform their civic duty was not therefore neces-

consequences of this for citizenship are that indivi-

sarily premised on any correlative right, rather what

duals secure maximum negative liberty. They are left

was due to and from the common good. Later ex-

alone and free from coercion. The good citizen

ponents of a more active vision of citizenship, like T.

therefore upholds the rule of law and equal liberty

H. Green, transformed this form of argument into

for all. This is the conventional liberal Rechtstaat.

the vocabulary of rights, although, characteristically,

However, this is not a purely passive conception

it was usually the vocabulary of social (ethicised)

within classical liberal thought. In my own reading,

rights, not natural or human rights. Such socio-legal

57

ANDREW VINCENT

rights were also usually conceptually tied ± in the

lective goals and claims to collective resources.

case of Idealist thinkers ± to a conception of the

Social citizenship, as it developed in the twentieth

common good.

century, was more characteristic of a different species

The civic citizenship tradition also embodied a

of liberalism ± social liberalism. In many ways social

strong correlativity thesis. Rights were premised on

liberalism was a hybrid of the civic and civil forms of

the common good. Such rights implied that the

citizenship. The social liberal case is essentially that

citizen had correlative duties to that good. Citizen-

individual citizens are morally justified in claiming a

ship was not just a juridical category or an indication

particular economic status and a right to resources,

of nationality. It implied rather the consciousness of

via the welfare state and social justice. The social

the ends of human life as embodied in the institu-

liberal theorist therefore wants to extend arguments

tional forms of the public life. It was thus an ethical

beyond civil and political rights to social rights.

disposition, where the individual developed to a

Marshall recognised that this created immense pro-

level of self-consciousness and ethical awareness

blems and strains for a liberal capitalist society ±

inclusive enough to be identified with the public

problems which he never claimed to resolve. The more empirical approach to the citizenship

sphere of the whole community. The conception of definite individualistic rights

issue raises a different range of problems. First,

was more characteristic of civil citizenship. Rights

citizenship ± despite all that has been said earlier

expressed, ontologically, the separate or independent

± empirically is a technique of exclusion. The state is

identity of individuals. They were claims asserted

a state of a bounded citizenry. It is about closure.

against other individuals, groups or states. The more

Citizenship creates the concept of a foreigner, an

general of such rights ± natural and human rights ±

alien. Second, the character of citizenship changes

were fundamental claims to life, liberty, happiness,

between state traditions, even liberal-democratic

property, speech, opinion, association and so forth.

states. This change is one that crucially cross-cuts

Such rights correlated loosely with duties of forbear-

the civic/civil distinction outlined above.

ance or non-interference, usually with the proviso

The two best-known ways of conceiving the citi-

that such rights did not overtly injure or harm others.

zen has been the jus soli and the jus sanguinis con-

They did not, characteristically, demand positive

ceptions. Jus sanguinis associates citizenship with

public action by any individual ± except in the duty

direct descent and blood relations. If one can trace

to discharge one's debts and fulfil contracts. They

direct blood or birthright descent then citizenship is

were usually more negatively protective rights, im-

automatic. In jus soli citizenship follows prolonged

plying passive and relatively costless duties. This

residence or birth within a territory. There are

latter conception of rights is, to some extent, en-

usually combinations of these in most countries.

capsulated in the categories of civil and political

Thus, in the UK since 1981, where one parent must

citizenship, discussed by T. H. Marshall in his locus

be lawfully resident and settled, then birth in the

classicus account of citizenship, Citizenship and Social

territory gives citizenship. France and Germany offer

Class. For Marshall, civil citizenship, which he saw

purer examples of the two conceptions.

developing from the early eighteenth century, im-

Two phenomena affected the German case ± the

plied a comprehensive equality of rights to civil

Prussian state and romanticism. The Prussian state

freedoms, which might broadly be called `constitu-

view of the citizen was a corollary of the absolutist

tional' freedoms. Political citizenship, which devel-

state in intrinsic conflict with the older, medieval

oped

century,

Standestaat. Territorial residence took precedence in

concerned the extension of suffrage rights, namely

the Prussian conception. The romantic movement

the right to participate in the political process which

provided more of a background `pattern of thought'.

determines the condition of one's life.

The aesthetic socio-historical idiom of romanticism

gradually

over

the

nineteenth

The problematic category in the Marshall schema

was ideally suited for the misty formulations of

is `social citizenship'. It was still deeply individualis-

ethnocultural ideas, namely conceptions of unique-

tic and rights-orientated, but it also embodied col-

ness, inwardness, feeling over reason and organic

58

LIBERALISM AND CITIZENSHIP

growth over conscious artifice. These latter ideas

would be the bad citizen. Self-determination (in

provided a frame for jus sanguinis, developing be-

individuals or nations) was conceived in terms of

tween 1871 and 1913. Before 1913, German citizen-

the universal demand for liberty. The doctrine of the

ship was a partly contradictory affair. The older

`citizen' and the `citizen-nation' moved hand-in-

Prussian absolutist model of the citizen ± as member

hand. Republican ideology usually emphasised mili-

of territorial community ± jostled with the ethno-

tary service as a key factor here. Schools and the

cultural `community of descent' idea. It was the latter

army were engines of assimilation. Second- and

which won out, largely in 1913 with citizenship

third-generation immigrants in France became citi-

legislation which established the concept of Aus-

zens and were expected to save the nation militarily.

landsdeutsche. This legislation aimed at the preserva-

National purpose and assimilation were reinforced in

tion of the pure German Volkstum. Citizenship was

the Third Republic by the civilising mission of the

severed from questions of residence. Blood and des-

French nation. French citizenship was therefore al-

cent now became critical.

ways a peculiar brand of chauvinism and universal-

The difference between the Wilhelmine and the

ism. Before the 1870s it was very much a liberal and

National Socialist ideas of citizenship was that in the

radical push; after the 1870s it migrated to the right,

latter there was a definite ideology of ethnocultural

reaching an ascendancy in the Dreyfus Affair. The

dominance, coupled with the desire to deprive groups

left still, however, promulgated universalism through

of citizenship. In the Wilhelmine case, the ideology

imperialism.

was not so well-developed and the desire was rather

Ethnocultural criteria did appear in France in the 20

to prevent immigrants acquiring citizenship. As Ro-

mid-1800s.

gers Brubaker comments, `remarkably, German citi-

the citizen lost some of its universalising aspect. In

zenship today remains governed by a law of the

Arthur de Gobineau's work citizenship and nation-

Wilhelmine period.' He continues:

alism began to take on racial dimensions, a theme

As they developed, the French idea of

reflected in Taine, Renan and Thierry, particularly As a result of this continuity across two world

after the Franco-Prussian war. Still, the issue of

wars, three regime changes, and the division and

citizenship has exercised the French Republican

reunification of the country, the marked restric-

tradition, even to the present day. Whereas the

tiveness of citizenship law towards non-German

Dreyfusard ethnocultural line of thought is still

immigrants was carried over from the Wilhelmine

represented

Germany into the Federal Republic and, in 1990,

thought remains motivated by an underlying, if

into the new German nation-state. The 1913

semi-dormant, cosmopolitanism.

in

the

Front

Nationale,

republican

system of jus sanguinis, with no trace of jus soli continues to determine the citizenship status of immigrants and their descendants today.

Nationality, Liberalism and Citizenship

19

How does citizenship link up liberalism and nationIt is important to note here (in my reading) that we

ality? The French case is particularly instructive here.

are still looking at a liberal state in Germany, but its

French citizenship traditionally involved a core of

citizenship is deeply exclusive and measured by blood

universal human or natural rights. The declaration of

descent. Something does not seem to be quite right

1789 speaks stridently of the rights of `man' and

here.

`citizen'. The rights involved are `imprescriptible'

The French case is more interesting yet for my

and `inalienable', and governments are instituted

purpose, namely the question concerning the uni-

to uphold them. Thus, `the end of all political

versalising aspect of citizenship. In the French case,

associations, is the preservation of the natural and

jus soli is predominant. The drive for citizenship was

imprescriptible rights of man'. The French National

always state-centred and assimilationist. It was part

Assembly `recognises such ``sacred'' rights. It does not

of a revolutionary republican tradition. In its purest

create them. All men are all born free and equal, with

universalist reading, the only foreigner in France

respect to these rights'; thus `civil distinctions can be

59

ANDREW VINCENT

founded only on public utility.' Yet, at the same time

fore, a central motif within liberalism, and liberalism

as these assertions, the nation is also conceived of as

has always believed in equality of individual rights,

sovereign. Thus, no individual or group are `entitled

regardless of race, gender, class or birth. In the

to any authority which is not expressly derived from

French Republican tradition particularly, in the

it.'

classical liberal tradition, there has been a strong

So what is the relation between the nation and the

leaning to some form of cosmopolitanism. Yet, co-

universal cosmopolitan rights of man? The pro-

existing with this universalising dialectic is the na-

foundly direct (but also equivocal) answer is that

tion ± usually read through the state. As Rogers

the nation is the will of the whole community of

Brubaker has put it:

citizens and it embodies the imprescriptible rights of humanity within its own prescriptions. Law and

Almost all [states] claim to derive state power

government, as an expression of the national will,

from and exercise it for (and not simply over) a

are only there to give `security to the rights of man

nation . . . A state is a nation-state in this

and of citizens'. Thus, `the acts of the legislative and

minimal sense insofar as it claims (and is under-

executive powers of government, [can be] . . . every

stood) to be a nation's state: the state `of' and `for'

moment compared with the ends of political institu-

a particular, distinctive, bounded nation . . .

tions.'

21

How the state-bearing and state-justifying nation

is culturally or legally bounded is irrelevant; that it

The above forms the substance of my analysis of

is bounded is what matters.

this question and my key theme. Particularistic

22

nationalism and cosmopolitanism coexist, simultaneously, in liberal citizenship. Strikingly, it is actu-

One has only to think of the commonplace usage of

ally possible to assert simultaneously an extreme

`citizenship law', as directly synonymous with `na-

chauvinism and an extreme cosmopolitanism. In

tionality law', to see the truth of this point.

the case of jus sanguinis, the particularism and inclu-

The above observation creates an oddity in the

siveness comes to the fore unproblematically. Eth-

liberal argument outlined above. In the context of

nocultural

racism,

the nation, the citizen has rights which are premised

nationalism and cultural liberalism. The liberal ci-

citizenship

links

easily

with

on the natural arbitrariness of birth, even in the jus

tizenship/nationalism connection is thus more ob-

soli and liberal settings. In one sense, closure is

vious here. However, jus soli, particularly in the

pragmatically necessary, for the purposes of military

French republican tradition, reveals more clearly

service, taxation and public administration. Yet the

the intrinsic ambiguity of liberal citizenship, namely

nation, birth, citizen relation is stronger than simple

its continual alternation between cosmopolitanism

pragmatism. Given the history that liberalism re-

and particularism.

lates,

Liberalism, generically, often represents itself as a

and

given

its

lurking

cosmopolitanism,

something strange is taking place. As Brubaker

form of historical emancipation from older political

comments:

traditions ± the conventional portrayal of status to contract or the release from the medieval Standestaat.

[Citizenship] represents a striking exception to

Liberal citizenship sees itself as removing feudal

the secular trend away from ascribed statuses. And

shackles. It casts off the `subjecthood' status of in-

it is difficult to reconcile with a central claim ±

dividuals under absolute monarchy or feudalism.

perhaps the central claim of liberal political the-

Liberal rights theory thus rejects conceptions of

ory: the idea that political membership ought to

status based upon birth or position. There is, there-

be founded on individual consent.

23

fore, an insistent `progressive Whig' logic or dialectic to ideas of equality and freedom. Such ideas, it is

The ascription of rights based on birth or blood

suggested, cannot be checked by any hierarchical

descent is at odds with the panoply of liberal rights

regime. Liberal citizenship identified equal rights

and liberal agency, in general, and yet they all

with individuals as individuals. Citizenship is, there-

coexist within liberal citizenship.

60

LIBERALISM AND CITIZENSHIP

more cynical appraisal of this would be Gray's nicely

Conclusion

sour observation of `Kantianism in one country'. For

We can now appreciate exactly how liberal citizen-

Ackerman, the poor Europeans would, however, be

ship is at the interstice between contradictory forces,

condemned to be `rootless cosmopolitans'.

incorporating both an embracing cosmopolitanism

But note the problem in Ackerman's view of the

and an exclusive nationalism. There are, though, a

precise character of the national mission and liberal

number of forms of exclusion and some are more

universalism. There are a number of liberal states

problematic than others. But still the exclusions of

where global citizenship can be seen as an extension

citizenship do not rest easily with the cosmopolitan

of their own rights structures. Yet, different inter-

dialectic. The nationalist/birth connection of citi-

pretations of both liberalism and cosmopolitanism

zenship does not readily conjoin with the liberal

are inevitably involved. North Americans might

narrative. The two theses discussed in this chapter ±

well embrace generic liberal rights (on a civil level)

the cosmopolitan implication of liberal citizenship

but not widespread distributive justice (social and

and the potentially illiberal criteria for liberal citizen-

social-democratic rights) let alone specific cultural

ship ± present us with a dilemma. Another, possibly

rights. Social rights and demands for widespread

simpler, way of framing the unease here is through

redistribution would be a universalisation of civil

Veit Bader's recent reflections on transnational ci-

citizenship. Others might see distributive justice and

tizenship. Bader, reflecting procedural and cultural

social rights as a logical extension of human rights to

liberalism, remarks that procedural liberalism `has

life. If this happened, it would imply large transfers of

underestimated the importance of communities and

wealth across the globe. However, since this latter

cultures.' But cultural liberalism, which he describes

conception has been to date reliant upon social

as `communitarian liberalism', has actively taken

liberal or social-democratic sovereign states, it is

culture and nation on board, but to Bader has

an unlikely international scenario. France, on the

`not yet fully addressed the exclusionary effects of

other hand, would give full legal rights within its

communities and cultures.'

24

I would add to this the

Republican notion of citizenship. These would in-

point that even procedural liberalism subsists with

clude civil, political and social rights. But this would

radical exclusion.

not necessarily allow any special or cultural rights and would also imply an unacceptable level of im-

A number of thinkers appear to want to address

perial control.

this dilemma. Bruce Ackerman, for example, has 25

Lib-

Thus the implications of `liberalism' and `citizen-

eral universalism is seen to be virtually implicit

ship' seem to be inevitably linked ± but the tensions

within

described himself as a `rooted cosmopolitan'.

Conse-

and countervailing currents exposed here show just

quently, Ackerman is therefore provisionally per-

how the nature of this common fate remains pro-

suaded to `embrace the American Constitution'. A

foundly unclear.

the

United

States

Constitution.

Notes

1. Heater (1990), p. 12.

tional cosmopolitanism assigns moral responsibility

2. Kant argued for the moral autonomy of states within a

(for example, maintaining and promoting human

voluntary league of states committed to maintain peace.

rights) to institutional schemes. It is dependent upon

A liberal constitutional republic would thus be inclined,

the

in his view, to international peace. Liberal theory, qua

through institutions. Some argue, in this scenario,

Kant, conceives of citizenship in terms of contract and

for supranational state-like institutions to be set up.

consent. The citizen comes to the state ideally or actually

Interactional cosmopolitanism is `ethical' in the sense

with entitlements. The citizen will agree to limitations

that it assigns moral responsibility to individual or

for the common good. Liberal citizenship is thus a bearer

collective agencies. Each person is equally a subject of

or vehicle of rights within the state.

moral concern. Note that there is no necessary link

existence

and

maintenance

of

human

rights

3. Thomas Pogge proposes two forms of moral cosmo-

here between the institutional and interactional/ethi-

politanism: `institutional' and `interactional'. Institu-

cal types. One could therefore believe in the institu-

61

ANDREW VINCENT

accounts of the new liberalism can be found in

tional conception and not adhere to the ethical.

Vincent (1990).

Equally, one could be an ethical cosmopolitan and not believe in an institutional setting or, at least, a

13. Kymlicka (1989), p. 165.

central world state. Therefore, even if one rejects

14. Ibid., p. 172.

world government, it does not lead to a rejection of

15. Quoted in Forsyth (1987), pp. 117±19.

moral cosmopolitanism. See T. Pogge, `Cosmopolitan-

16. Kelley (1995), p. 91.

ism and Sovereignty', in Brown (ed.) (1994), pp. 89±

17. Dahrendorf (1974).

122.

18. Heater (1990), p. 96.

4. Linklater (1992), p. 32.

19. Brubaker (1994), p. 165.

5. M. Nussbaum, `Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism', in

20. Ibid., p. 99: `The legal nationality conferred by the state and the ethnocultural nationality invoked by the

Cohen (ed.) (1996), pp. 2±17, at p. 7. 6. Ibid., p. 4.

``principle

7. Ibid., p. 13.

things; the former may be conferred in utter disregard

8. Ibid., p. 14.

of the latter. Yet the thrust of the principle of nation-

9. This is close to Michael Sandel's use of the term

ality

was

of

nationality''

precisely

to

are

of

connect

course

the

two

different

±

not

`procedural republic' for this liberalism. See Sandel

directly . . . but indirectly via the redrawing of po-

(1984).

litical boundaries so as to make legal and ethnocultural nationality converge.'

10. Walzer, `Comment,' in Gutmann (ed.) (1994), pp.

21. Tom Paine's translation of the `Declaration of the

99±103, at p. 99; see also Habermas in the same

Rights of Man and of Citizens' by the National

volume, p. 123ff.

Assembly of France (1789), in Ritchie (ed.) (1954),

11. For Taylor, the `procedural' view is best encapsulated

pp. 291±2.

in Dworkin's early paper on `Liberalism'; see Taylor

22. Brubaker (1994), p. 28. Debates about both nation-

`The Politics of Recognition', in ibid., p. 56. 12. The term `new liberal' is immensely complex and

ality and citizenship are also closely associated with

contested. I have not attempted to examine it, but

distinct state traditions, although this is an even bigger issue.

have largely taken for granted in this chapter that we can speak of its ideology and social theory. This is by

23. Ibid., pp. 31±2.

no means an uncontroversial position. My own at-

24. See Bader (1997), p. 772.

tempt to summarise and assess some of the diverse

25. Ackerman (1994).

62

5

THE SWORD OF FAITH AND THE SHIELD OF FEAR: LIBERALISM AND THE POWER OF THE NATION Margaret Canovan

When the terms `Liberal' and `Liberalism' first ar-

former is cosmopolitan in its appeal as well as its

rived in English politics in the early nineteenth

aspirations, though it is particularly well represented

century, they indicated support for national libera-

among political thinkers in the USA. The latter has

tion in Greece and South America.

1

The struggle of

always had a narrower academic base. On this side of

oppressed nations for freedom continued to be a

the Atlantic it is particularly (though not exclu-

liberal cause, so much so that liberalism has over

sively) associated with a school of political thinkers

the past two centuries been as closely associated with

influenced by Michael Oakeshott.

nationalism as internationalism.

2

4

To provide a

Revulsion against

frame for these two different sorts of liberalism, I

fascism after the Second World War weakened this

shall begin with some of Oakeshott's own reflections

association except in the case of anti-colonial move-

on two contrasted styles of politics, which corre-

ments; liberals became more wary of nationalism,

spond neatly to the versions of liberalism with which

and the dominant strand in liberal political thinking

we shall be concerned.

during the past half-century has been cosmopolitan. Even so, we have recently seen a revival of liberal

The Politics of Faith

nationalism among philosophers who argue that

and the Politics of Scepticism

liberal respect for individuals and their rights entails

Oakeshott was fond of dichotomous analyses of

respect for the national identities those individuals value.

3

political styles. His celebrated contrast between `rationalism in politics' and the practical activity of

Despite obvious tensions, therefore, liberalism and

5

nationalism do have affinities. I shall argue that the

`attending to the arrangements' of a society

connections go deeper than one might suppose and

followed by the more elaborate analysis in On Hu-

that even versions of liberalism that are explicitly

man Conduct of two opposed understandings of the

hostile to nationalism rely for much of their plausi-

modern state, as an `enterprise association' (universi-

bility on tacit assumptions about the presence and

tas) and in terms of `civil association' (societas).

efficacy of nationhood. I shall try to show that this is

Each of these contrasts carried the message that

equally true of two sharply opposed contemporary

the former of the two types of politics was dominant

versions of liberalism: on the one hand, the crusading

in the modern world but that the latter was to be

liberalism of universal human rights, and on the other

preferred. The contrast that concerns us here is a

the sceptical liberalism of limited government. The

third variant on the same theme, elaborated in an

63

was

6

MARGARET CANOVAN

essay (published posthumously) on `The Politics of

may seem unglamorous, `the sceptic understands

Faith and the Politics of Scepticism'. For the past five

order as a great and difficult achievement never

hundred years (according to Oakeshott), European

beyond the reach of decay and dissolution,'

politics has been marked by a tension between the

a political system that can properly carry out these

two

modest tasks is doing very well.

opposed

styles

named

in

the

essay's

title.

Although the two have mingled in practice, they

11

so that

Although these two styles of politics can be pre-

7

can in principle be characterised as opposites. These

sented in ideal-typical form, Oakeshott maintains

two ideal types bear obvious resemblances to Oake-

that they have been continuously intermingled with-

shott's more familiar pair of antagonists, but the

in European political traditions, and he even suggests

characterisation is more vivid than in the case of

that neither is sufficient without some infusion of the

universitas and societas and the treatment consider-

other.

ably more even-handed than in the case of political

own preference for the politics of scepticism is clear.

`rationalism' and its rival.

He preserves impartiality by arguing that in a poli-

12

Despite this formal even-handedness his

Those who practice `the politics of faith' (so

tical climate dominated by the politics of faith, a

Oakeshott would have us believe) approach the

modern `trimmer' will add his intellectual weight to

business of government with ambition and confi-

the beleaguered cause of scepticism.

13

dence, for within this style `the activity of governing

Following this long tug-of-war, our political vo-

is understood to be in the service of the perfection of

cabulary is systematically ambiguous because it has

mankind.'

8

Political

action

(it

is

assumed)

been `obliged for nearly five centuries to serve two

can

14

achieve such perfection in this world, though Oake-

masters.'

shott stresses that the `perfection' aimed at can be

styles and capable of being plausibly used for opposite

understood in many different ways. Seventeenth-

purposes. Oakeshott himself chooses to focus on the

century projects for using the state to establish a

ambiguities of democratic discourse to illustrate his

godly commonwealth stand alongside the secular

point,

projects of the last two hundred years under the

I believe, identify two sharply contrasted versions

banner of the politics of faith.

9

15

We inherit terminology marked by both

but if we now turn back to liberalism we can,

Interestingly, the

(both current within contemporary political thought

projects Oakeshott had earlier called `rationalist' fall

and each boasting a proud liberal ancestry) which

within this category: `faith' should be seen as the

vividly illustrate Oakeshott's contrasted styles. These

opposite not of reason but of scepticism. The most

are not the only sorts of liberalism there are, and I do

important political implication of this faith in the

not wish to imply that the rest could be fitted onto a

capacity of government to save mankind is that it

spectrum of which these two are the ends. But I hope

justifies great increases in power. No legalistic re-

it will be agreed that both sceptical liberalism and the

strictions can be allowed to stand in the way of such a

liberalism of faith ± which I shall call crusading

crusade, with the result that government becomes an

liberalism ± are familiar presences not only in the

`unlimited activity' and even a `godlike adventure.'

10

liberal tradition but within the complex contempor-

The `politics of scepticism' differs from this in ways

ary discourse of liberalism. My characterisations of

that any reader of Oakeshott might expect. Political

the two will verge on the ideal-typical, though

sceptics have lower expectations of government,

illustrated with examples from specific thinkers.

together with greater suspicion of power. Instead of looking to power to save the world, they deny

Crusading Liberalism

that it has any single overriding purpose. Rather, it is a matter of maintaining order, moderating the con-

A large proportion of all those who have ever

flicts that continually arise in human affairs and

thought of themselves as `liberal' could without

trying to minimise concentrations of arbitrary power.

undue distortion be assigned to this camp, and its

Rule according to settled law is crucial, as is the

roots are older than the term itself. But the first true

gradual development and maintenance of institu-

manifesto of crusading liberalism was the Declaration

tions that check power. Although such concerns

of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, approved by

64

THE SWORD OF FAITH AND THE SHIELD OF FEAR

the French National Assembly in 1789, and its most

Whereas the academic representatives of crusading

characteristic twentieth-century document is the

liberalism are linked more or less closely to politi-

Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted

cians, campaigners, UN agencies and NGOs, scep-

by the United Nations in 1948. Although there is

tical liberalism is much less conspicuous within the

more to crusading liberalism than the discourse of

contemporary political arena and owes its continuing

human rights, that discourse vividly illustrates the

significance to the intellectual stature of its expo-

salient features of this kind of liberalism. In the first

nents. Oakeshott himself, Hayek, Shklar and others

place, crusading liberalism is a political project.

16

stand in a distinguished line of sceptics that runs

However abstract discussions of human rights may

back through Tocqueville and Constant to Mon-

at times become, they are more or less closely linked

tesquieu.

to a movement with practical political aims. The

cerned with limits: limits on power and on ambition

liberalism of human rights is a crusade today, just as it

in the uses of power. Mindful of the long history of

was in the days of the nineteenth-century campaign

misuse of political power, it is concerned (as Judith

against slavery.

Shklar says) with `damage control.'

Secondly, crusading liberalism is a

19

This sort of liberalism is essentially con-

20

Whatever their

universalist

views on the universality or relativity of moral and

creed. The notion of human rights clearly expresses

political principles, sceptical liberals share the view

the conviction that liberal principles do not lose

that the liberal institutions of civil society are a fragile

their relevance at the borders of states or at the

achievement, one that can be easily endangered by

fringes of cultures. Despite the worries about cultural

hubristic political projects. Like Oakeshott himself,

variation provoked by such claims,

17

the dominant

they see themselves swimming against a political tide

assumption is that a single moral and political order

fed by torrents of crusading enthusiasm and trying to

is right for all human beings: for those suspected of

maintain the crumbling dikes that hold it in check.

crimes in Sweden or in Saudi Arabia; for religious

In doing so they lay particular emphasis upon the

minorities in Ireland or in Iran; for political dissi-

rule of law (according to Hayek, liberalism is `the

dents in Canada or in China; for women in Australia

same as the demand for the rule of law'; similarly for

or in Afghanistan. Thirdly, besides being a univers-

Shklar, `the rule of law' is `the original first principle

alist project, crusading liberalism is radical in its

of liberalism'

confidence that the world must and can be changed

temporaries that it cannot be taken for granted.

21

) and they seek to remind their con-

to conform to this universal order. Institutions and

There is little love lost between crusaders and

practices that contravene human rights have no

sceptics within the liberal camp. To the former, the

justification, whatever the weight of established

latter seem mere conservatives,

tradition and cultural sanctity supporting them. If

that their cherished heritage of liberal institutions is

the institutional traditions and culture of the US

put at risk by the hubris of crusaders.

armed forces contravene the rights of women and

however, there is one topic on which they are agreed:

gays, then they must be changed, and if the entire

nationalism is anathema to both of them. Should a

historic culture of China or of Islam clashes with

crusader and a sceptic find themselves stranded

human rights, then they must all be changed as well.

together in a snowstorm, they could generate a warm

It is clear enough that crusading liberalism manifests

glow of mutual solidarity by denouncing the perni-

the ambition and confidence described in Oake-

cious political influence of national feeling. True,

shott's account of the `politics of faith',

18

22

while sceptics fear 23

Interestingly,

and (as

their hostility has different grounds, but on both

we shall see later) it also harbours the quest for power

sides the hostility is pronounced. Crusading liberals

that he found there.

object to the particularity of nations, which builds

To shift one's focus from crusading liberalism to

barriers against the universality of human rights. This

sceptical liberalism is to enter a different (and very

is in a sense an argument against any kind of political

much smaller) world. Unlike the former, sceptical

demarcation, but non-national boundaries may at

liberalism has never been a vast political movement

least be regarded as temporary matters of practical

but

convenience. National boundaries are more formid-

the

business

of

a

handful

of

intellectuals.

65

MARGARET CANOVAN

able obstacles, buttressed by the widespread belief

be, and in each case the nation has to be smuggled in

that they have moral significance, so that our fellow

to stuff the gap. With convenient symmetry, the way

nationals have special claims that trump the claims

this is done illustrates Oakeshott's observation that

of other human beings.

24

Similarly, the notion that

neither of his two styles of politics is self-sufficient,

national cultures and traditions have value in them-

for we shall see that sceptics need nationhood to

selves often seems (from the crusading point of view)

provide an infusion of enthusiasm, while crusaders

like an excuse to deny the universal rights of those

need it to give them a stiffening of realpolitik.

traditionally victimised.

25

Sceptical liberals have quite different reasons for

Sceptical Liberals and the Power Deficit

disliking nationalism, which they associate with the populist enthusiasm and `ideologies of solidarity'

26

Sceptical liberals are deeply suspicious of power and

that put liberal institutions at risk. In their view, it is

of grand political schemes that rely on expanding the

a fundamental mistake to expect political institu-

role of government and mobilising the people be-

tions to express the `identity' of their subjects.

27

By

hind a common cause. But that concern with the

chasing the mirage of `self-government' for members

dangers of excessive power leads them to overlook a

of a nation, nationalism undermines established

power deficit within their own style of politics. They

political systems that may in themselves have been

tend to underestimate the power that a limited

relatively benign, and replaces them at great political

government needs and to overlook the problem of

cost with others that exercise arbitrary power in the

where such power might be found. At first sight their

name of the nation. For the sake of national self-

political ambitions seem modest ± deplorably so to

determination, many people who had enjoyed a

those whose politics is concerned with righting

relatively high degree of liberty under law as subjects

wrongs

of the Habsburg or of the British Empire, found

schemes and do not expect perfection. Virtually

themselves `liberated' into subjection to local tyr-

all they ask is that arbitrary power should be re-

ants. In any case, the mixed societies of the late

strained by known rules, and that established rights

twentieth century are inappropriate sites for nation-

to person and property should be protected by an

alist fantasies. To quote John Gray:

impartial judiciary and by fair and effective enforce-

across

the

world.

They

have

no

grand

ment of the law. In the words of John Gray, what The aspiration to make states correspond to com-

they look for is a state that is `strong but small'.

29

munities cannot be other than a dangerous illu-

This may not seem much to ask. In criticising the

sion. Where moral solidarity is lacking, where (as

excessive ambitions of crusaders, sceptics often imply

in all modern societies) there is cultural diversity

that their own aims are much less demanding, some-

rather than seamless community, the role of

times even that they are really quite easy to attain.

government is first and last that of preserving

(Hayek says, for example, that his kind of liberalism

liberty in civil association under the rule of law.

28

is `an essentially modest creed'.

30

) But this is an

illusion. The crucial point to bear in mind is that So far I have been attempting to establish two

(despite their proximity to the more sceptical ver-

contrasted ideal types of liberalism corresponding to

sions of conservatism) our sceptics are liberals and it is

Oakeshott's `politics of faith' and `politics of scepti-

their liberal commitments that expose the power

cism', and to show that one of the few areas of

deficit in their thinking. If they were simply Hobbe-

common ground between them is that both are

sian conservatives, asking nothing from politics but

(for different reasons) hostile to nationalism. The

peace and order, then that `strong but small' state

remainder of the chapter will try to show that despite

might be easier to come by. Peace and order have on

this hostility, crusaders and sceptics are both much

occasion been achieved by a wide variety of regimes

more dependent on national attachments than they

in many different kinds of society: by traditional

would like to admit. Each version of liberalism has a

monarchies and military juntas, by oligarchic repub-

hole at its centre where a theory of power ought to

lics, and even by communism in its phase of Brezh-

66

THE SWORD OF FAITH AND THE SHIELD OF FEAR

nevite immobilism. Neither social cohesion nor

grave difficulties in providing the rule of law in

democratic politics is required. Indeed, if peace

particular regions where that legitimacy is not gen-

and order are really what you are looking for, then

erally recognised, as the sorry history of British rule in

the power to enforce them may in some circum-

Ireland demonstrates. This is not to say that regimes

stances be more effectively achieved by non-demo-

enjoying this recognition will necessarily provide

cratic

by

equal justice ± far from it. But to have even a sporting

coercion, by traditional authority, or through a

chance of enjoying the rule of law, we do need a

negotiated

government with legitimate power.

tions.

than

by

democratic

modus

vivendi

means,

between

whether powerful

fac-

31

Followers of Hayek or Oakeshott will object that

But although sceptical liberals may be tempted by

the authority of the law should not be confused with

the Hobbesian politics of peace, in so far as they

popular support for the regime; all that is required is

remain liberals they cannot accept such solutions,

recognition of the authority of a system of rules and

simply because most ways of establishing peace and

of judicial decisions in accordance with it.

order are not compatible with the rule of equal law.

shott himself might cite as an analogue the authority

John Gray was deluding himself when, daringly

to adjudicate on the rules of cricket gradually ac-

dismissing the notion that democracy is necessary

quired by the MCC.

to `the practice of liberty', he claimed that the `civil

acceptance of the system of rules and, crucially, trust

condition' so much valued by sceptical liberals `is

in the judicial processes by which they are adminis-

fully compatible with a variety of political regimes',

tered and enforced. And that begs a vital question:

although it `presupposes always the rule of law and

under what political conditions is that impartial rule

equality before the law.'

32

34

33

Oake-

But this implies popular

Very few kinds of political

of law most likely? For this is the Holy Grail sought

regime and political society are in fact compatible

by republican thinkers from Cicero to Rousseau, who

with that `civil condition', because the equal rule of

wanted `the government of laws, not men', and who

law implies two very demanding conditions. The first

knew that such a government required a strong sense

is that the state enjoys a fund of consensual power,

of shared, inherited public good and its accompany-

enabling it to enforce the law without employing a

ing public spirit. Under modern conditions that

degree of coercion which would be inconsistent with

public spirit, like legitimacy and consensual power,

the civil condition. The second is that it presides

is most likely (though far from certain) where the

over a society sufficiently united to allow it to

polity is supported by a strong sense of collective

enforce equal law across the whole country. What

identity ± where it belongs to a people. Much as

this amounts to is a high level of identification of the

sceptical liberals may deplore populism, they can

polity with the population and vice versa, which in

hardly deny that impartial law enforcement with

the condition of modern politics normally means

minimum coercion is normally easier where the state

nationhood. Let us look more closely at these two

enjoys the legitimacy of being generally regarded as

conditions.

our state.

35

It may still be objected that my argument confuses a contingent historical cause with a necessary con-

Consensual Power

dition: that although as a matter of historical fact the

For the `strong but small' state to generate its

establishment of the rule of law in England owed a

strength in a manner compatible with the rule of

lot to collective national attachment to `the laws of

law, it must be recognised as legitimate by the mass of

England',

its subjects. Without that support the minimal liberal

that could be freely transferred elsewhere. In other

state is impossible; impartial justice is scarcely to be

words, while a strident national pride may have been

expected from rulers who have seized power in a

crucial in enabling Coke, Hampden and their heirs

military coup, or from a conquering army sitting on

to defend law and limited government against the

rifle butts. Even a state that is recognised by most of

Stuarts, the system has since become self-sustaining:

its subjects as their legitimate representative may find

wherever a state does provide the benefits of impar-

67

36

once established it became a practice

MARGARET CANOVAN

tial justice, then popular consent will follow. Bhikhu

obstacles a plural society poses to the achievement

Parekh argues, for example, that nothing by way of

of impartial judicial treatment of (say) felonies.

national cohesion is required because `the modern

Sceptics like to claim that the minimalist state they

state is a self-sufficient institution. It has a commonly

favour is particularly suited to ethnically divided

accepted structure of public authority, a set of pro-

societies, because its modest ambitions allow con-

cedures for taking collectively binding decisions, and

tentious issues to be depoliticised.

a body of widely shared politico-legal values', notably

implausible claim, perhaps betraying the confusion

`the rule of law, equality before the law, respect for

we noticed earlier between the conservative insis-

human dignity and common citizenship.' Although

tence on peace as the political goal and the more

this `self-sufficient state' is a contingent product of

demanding aims of liberals. A sceptical conservative

history, it does not now need the support of national

could argue that, where a political entity (such as

sentiment. Being a member means recognising its

Bosnia) is sharply divided between hostile commu-

`politico-legal values' and abiding by the laws. `Noth-

nities, then the best that can be hoped for is a

ing more is required of its members in order for it to

minimal state based on negotiation between leaders

remain united and stable.'

37

of

the

contending

factions,

38

But this is an

themselves

holding

power within their own patches as best they can.

For the increasing number of cosmopolitan individuals who move easily between different western

But that is not a solution any liberal could be content

liberal democratic countries, expecting much the

with, for it would certainly not imply equality before

same legal protections and offering the same minimal

the law, especially for minorities in the various

allegiance in each, this account may seem reasonable

enclaves.

enough, and the national identity of the local po-

divided, the Hobbesian concern for peace and order

pulation may seem irrelevant. But we should not be

may well clash with the rule of law. For despite the

misled by talk of `the modern state' into supposing

sceptics' image of the law as an umpire presiding

that there is something about the advent of the

impartially over communal divisions, in such cir-

millennium that makes such `modernity' easy to

cumstances everything to do with the legal process

achieve without a background of nationhood. Most

becomes politicised. Apart from the problems of

modern states (in the sense of states actually in

staffing juries and making judicial appointments,

existence today) are not `modern' in this sense. As

the outcome of every contentious trial becomes a

a matter of empirical observation, most UN members

victory or defeat for different sections of society. The

do not provide anything near enough to the rule of

tensions surrounding the trial of O. J. Simpson in the

law to earn the consent of a sceptical liberal. Cor-

USA is perhaps sufficient comment on the notion

ruption, violence and arbitrary power are common-

that the rule of equal law can comfortably coexist

place, even in many of the states that have formally

with communal divisions, even in a deeply legalistic

liberal constitutions. Evidently a properly `modern'

polity. For the equal rule of law to function, it is vital

state as understood by Parekh is one that does provide

that the apparatus of justice should not be seen by its

equal law, but we need to consider the role of

recipients as their law rather than ours.

nationhood or the lack of it in making that more

39

Even in societies that are less radically

The notion of the law as impartial umpire above

or less likely.

the fray may in some cases be a piece of unconscious post-imperial nostalgia, a regretful glance back to the days when relatively upright British officials admi-

Equal Law

nistered justice between the castes and religious

If taken seriously, the sceptic requirement of equality

groups of India, or when relatively professional im-

before the law seems to demand a substantial degree

perial bureaucrats dealt with the multifarious nation-

of social unity. This is the case even if we leave aside

alities

all the problems of equal justice between rich and

observations are apposite. In the first place, imperial

poor and men and women that would take us into

systems have never been models of impartial justice,

crusading liberal territory, and consider only the

as anyone who fell foul of the imperial authorities

68

of

the

Habsburg

Empire.

If

so,

two

THE SWORD OF FAITH AND THE SHIELD OF FEAR

quickly discovered. Secondly, imperial regimes have

the product of a much more strident history. There is

in this century proved quite unable to attract enough

a good deal to be said for Michael Ignatieff's distinc-

popular consent to maintain peace and order, let

tion between `hungry' and `sated' nations,

alone the rule of law.

caveat that even the satisfied nations sometimes

In other words (as John Stuart Mill pointed out long ago

40

45

with the

wake up feeling peckish. Sceptical Liberal distrust

) the ideal venue for the kind of politics

of nationalism is reinforced by the fear that even

favoured by liberals is actually a polity belonging to a

apparently innocuous forms of the virus are liable to

people bound together by the mutual sympathies of

flare up if given the slightest encouragement.

nationhood. A state in which there is a long-estab-

Nevertheless, if the argument of this section holds,

lished sense of collective identification with the

sceptical liberals cannot afford to be so fastidious, for

polity, and in which state, government and laws

they cannot easily do without some measure of

are seen as ours rather than an alien imposition,

national feeling to underpin the rule of law with

provides a particularly favourable basis for strong but

the power of popular legitimation. Instead of dream-

consensual government, a sense of public interest

ing of a polity untroubled by any such emotional

and support for the fair and impartial rule of law.

41

stirrings,

the

far-sighted

sceptical

liberals

would

This is an ideal never fully realised in practice, like

choose a polity that belongs to a `sated' nation where

the republican ideal of the polity of virtuous citizens

the `pathologies of national sentiment' are buried

united in their devotion to the patria. But the

several generations deep in the past, and where the

historical connection between liberalism and nation-

rule of law is cherished as a national heritage.

hood is not accidental. Sceptical liberals are inclined to take this background of nationhood for granted

Crusading Liberalism and the Power Deficit

without reflecting upon its contribution to the in-

If sceptical liberals find it hard to do without political

stitutions they value. Some critics might concede this last point but

faith in nationhood to support the power needed by

object that I am ignoring a vital distinction between

their minimal state, a complementary point can be

nationhood and nationalism. They would argue that

made about crusading liberalism. For crusaders can-

one can acknowledge a debt to nationhood while

not find salvation through faith alone, and their

deploring

movements.

good works take them into a world of realpolitik in

This is (for example) the position that John Gray

which they find themselves relying to a degree not

attributes to Isaiah Berlin. Unlike most other liberals

normally acknowledged on the power generated by

of his time, according to Gray, `Berlin perceives that

nationhood. Power is not something that crusading

a liberal civil society cannot rest upon abstract

liberal political theorists like to think about; as their

principles or common rules alone, but needs a com-

critics (including sceptics) have observed, their pre-

mon national culture if it is to be stable and com-

occupations often seem more moral than political,

mand allegiance.' But (he continues) `in common

and questions about the sources, limits and costs of

with

the

power are rarely raised in their writings. But liberal-

This position

ism of this kind is more than a set of moral injunc-

is attractive but simplistic. It may seem easy in

tions addressed to individuals; it is a political project.

principle to affirm nationhood while condemning

Crusaders want to see human rights recognised and

`the pathology of nationalism', but the line is not so

protected across the world, and questions of political

easy to draw in particular cases (including Zionism,

agency inevitably follow.

all

nationalist

liberal

ideologies

thinkers,

and

Berlin

pathology of nationalist sentiment.'

which Berlin supported).

43

repudiates 42

46

Seeking to make the

It is significant that the

Marxist political project effective, Lenin hit on

word `nationalism' can itself refer not only to move-

the notion of the powerful party: what collective

ments and an ideology but also to the sense of

actor or actors can (by analogy) bear the project of

nationhood itself, perhaps indicating the difficulty

human rights?

44

In practice, where a strong

Having as little instinctive trust in professional

but civilised national sentiment exists it is normally

politicians as sceptical liberals have in popular move-

of distinguishing them.

69

MARGARET CANOVAN

ments, crusading liberals might be inclined to look

sponsibility to act in defence of rights across the

first to the non-governmental organisations that

world.

have to such an extraordinary degree furthered hu-

The experience that supports this claim goes back

manitarian projects across the world since the Sec-

nearly three hundred years. The role of global stan-

ond World War. But however good they may be at

dard-bearer for what later came to be called liberal

famine relief, NGOs are not well suited to protect

principles was first played by Britain, in a secularisa-

the human rights of individuals under threat from

tion of the responsibilities borne since the sixteenth

tyrannical regimes or ethnic militias. The former can

century by the Protestant English as God's chosen

simply refuse to admit them, while in the times of

people.

civil war and anarchy that breed the latter, NGOs

out of its more religious precursor in the poems of

themselves need protection, as events in Bosnia and

Thomas Tickell, who wrote in the days of Queen

elsewhere have shown. It is clear that political power

Anne:

is

required.

tion',

47

Calling

for

`humanitarian

50

We can see the political mission evolving

intervenHer guiltless glory just Britannia draws

crusaders will turn next to international

From pure religion and impartial laws

organisations that sprung up (like NGOs) in the second half of the twentieth century. Organisations of this kind (established by the more liberal nation-

Her labours are to plead the Almighty's cause

states) have indeed transformed the conduct of

Her pride to teach the untamed Barbarian laws.

51

international politics, and the ways in which they have modified older notions of state sovereignty should not be underestimated.

48

During the French Revolution Britain's mission as

Nevertheless, their

the universal shield of liberty was challenged by

inability (so far) to take the sort of decisive action

France. In the consciousness of the revolutionaries

crusaders often want has been cruelly exposed by

who carried the banner of the Rights of Man across

recent events. If action is to be taken to guard human

Europe, their universal mission of liberation became

rights where they are most seriously under threat, it

inextricably entangled with national pride. Interest-

can be taken only by a political agent able to project

ingly, this entanglement was not a foregone conclu-

power effectively, which means a powerful state or

sion, for at the start of the Revolution no one could

alliance of such states.

49

have been more critical of nationalism than the

It seems, then, that crusaders must compromise

Jacobins. Istvan Hont has shown, however, that

with political reality to the extent of calling on the

despite Robespierre's insistence that the Republic

power of states to further their cause. What is more

`was acting only on behalf of the peoples of the

interesting for our present purposes, though, is that

world . . . nothing was more striking than the

only certain sorts of state will do. Power alone is not

turning of Jacobin republicanism into the most dra-

enough; it must be power of a certain kind, based not

matic form of national patriotism.'

on the coercion of its own subjects but their support.

similar fusion of power, patriotism and messianic

So the state in question will need to enjoy popular

fervour has made the USA the favoured agent for

consent (with the implications already indicated in

the projects of crusading liberalism from Woodrow

relation to sceptical liberalism), and will need to be

Wilson to the present.

52

In our century a

53

one in which public opinion supports the cause of

Some may argue that the USA is peculiarly suited

international human rights to the point of being

to the task of defending universal human rights

willing to send `our boys' to fight for them. Under

precisely because it is not a nation, but instead a

what circumstances are these conditions most likely

polity united by subscription to universal liberal

to be fulfilled? History offers an answer: the kind of

principles. This case has been eloquently stated by

state most likely to function as the secular arm of

John Schaar, who defends American patriotism as

crusading liberalism is one in which liberalism of that

something quite different from the `parochial and

kind is perceived as a national mission, implying that

primitive fraternities of blood and race'. It is instead a

the state and people concerned have a special re-

`covenanted patriotism', which is ethically superior

70

THE SWORD OF FAITH AND THE SHIELD OF FEAR

to nationalism because it is `guided by and directed

even take a possessive national pride in overcoming

toward the mission established in the founding

the limitations of nationalism, like the ingenious

covenant' of the Republic. Being committed to

nineteenth-century Frenchman who congratulated

universal principles of liberty, equality and self-gov-

his fellow countrymen on their cosmopolitanism: `it

ernment, this kind of patriotism `is compatible with

is we who taught the nations of Europe to detach

the most generous humanism' and indeed `assigns

themselves from a narrowly national ideal and to

America a teaching mission among the nations.'

54

march resolutely towards a human ideal.'

58

A less

But this is a red herring. Nations vary a great deal

strident example of the same phenomenon is the

and are by no means exclusively defined in terms of

national pride Swedes feel in being (collectively) a

55

What is much more crucial is the

shining example of internationalism. While this is

collective consciousness that enables a nation to act

(from a liberal point of view) an enormous improve-

as a single body and, for all its internal divisions, the

ment on more obviously chauvinistic versions, it

sense of being American is something that the USA

remains a form of nationalism.

ethnic unity.

has in abundance. That collective identity gives the

To sum up this section, then, in so far as crusading

country a unique capacity to act on the world stage

liberals leave the realms of pure faith and consider

and to mobilise power proportionate to its size and

the conditions of political effectiveness, they must

resources. It is true that the USA's peculiar suit-

realise that despite the real difficulty of reconciling

ability as a vehicle for the projects of crusading

universalist humanitarianism with the exclusiveness

liberalism comes from the conjunction of national

of national attachments, liberal nations with a strong

power with a universal mission. It may even be true,

sense of their national mission as representatives of

as Schaar implies, that belief in human rights is part

the `world community' are their most useful allies.

of what it means to be an American. But crusaders inclined to argue that this is a redeeming feature

Conclusion

should take note of the other side of the coin, which is a proprietary attitude towards such beliefs. Liberal

I have argued that liberals are a great deal closer to

principles tend to be experienced as American prin-

national enthusiasms than most of them like to

ciples ± seen by Americans as our principles, a

think, and that even those who are actively hostile

legitimate source of national pride. Reflecting on

to the nation and all its works find it hard to do

the ideological quality of American identity, Benja-

without the political power it can offer. Nationhood

min Barber remarks that `the American trick was to

offers sceptical liberals their best chance of a polity

use the fierce attachments of patriotic sentiment to

able to conduct its affairs according to the rule of law,

bond a people to high ideals. Our ``tribal'' sources

while the most effective support crusading liberals

from which we derive our sense of national identity

can summon up in defence of human rights around

are the Declaration of Independence, the Constitu-

the world is a sense of national mission ± the US

tion and the Bill of Rights.' He admits, however, that

Cavalry, in a manner of speaking. It might perhaps

`cosmopolitanism too has its pathologies and can also

be thought that this conclusion adds weight to the

breed its own antiseptic version of imperialism.'

56

arguments of the new `liberal nationalists' I men-

The dilemma for those who favour `humanitarian

tioned at the beginning of the chapter, and that

intervention' by the `international community' is

liberals of all kinds should join them in celebration of

that nations cast as the representatives of humanity

(some versions of) nationalism. But that would be

always have their own axes to grind.

57

too hasty an inference, for the argument I have been

The unpalatable truth facing crusading liberals, in

presenting is of a quite different kind. One way of

other words, is that their universal mission gains

highlighting the difference is to say that the present

maximum political clout when it is in effect captured

argument is concerned with contingent political

by a powerful nation and becomes part of that

considerations to do with power and feasibility,

nation's own identity and national pride. Such are

whereas defenders of liberal nationalism normally

the contortions of national identity that nations may

argue their case on moral and philosophical grounds.

71

MARGARET CANOVAN

The standard arguments for liberal nationalism try

dilemmas that nations pose for liberals in the con-

to show that liberalism and nationalism are morally

temporary world is not the whole story. There is a

compatible, and even that liberal principles entail

second reason for bearing in mind the tension as well

rights to national self-determination. These are not

as the link between nationhood and liberalism.

positions defended here. On the contrary, the reluc-

I have argued that sceptics and crusaders alike rely

tance of so many liberals to acknowledge their debts to

on the nation's capacity to mobilise and institutio-

nationhood is entirely understandable, for the nation

nalise consensual power:

makes an uncomfortable bedfellow for either of the

equal laws at home and provide a launching pad for

versions we have been looking at. Many nationalisms

universalist projects. But although this dependence

are, after all, explicitly hostile to liberalism in any of its

on national power is important and too little no-

forms; more crucially, even the most liberal version of

ticed, it is a matter of political contingency rather

nationalism is too irrational and populist really to suit

than philosophical necessity. In principle, it may

the fastidious sceptics, and too narrow in its identity

some day turn out to be the case that consensual

and commitments for the visions of crusaders. Re-

power can be mobilised and institutionalised in other

membering the tensions (as well as the links) between

ways. It may be significant that some of the inter-

liberalism and nationalism is important, for two rea-

national institutions launched from national bases in

sons. Fittingly, one of these reasons recalls Oakeshott's

the past half-century are showing signs of acquiring a

`politics of scepticism', the other his `politics of faith'.

legitimacy that enables them to some extent to

The first is that both kinds of liberals need to come

mobilise power of their own. While deeply depen-

to terms with the political cost of their aspirations.

dent on nation-states (and especially on a few states

The cost of the liberal freedoms valued by sceptics is

with strong national identities and political and

a greater or lesser degree of the nationalist enthu-

economic clout to match), these institutions are

siasm they deplore. For crusaders, the costs of effec-

already far from negligible, since they constrain

tiveness under present conditions are considerably

the activities of those same states. In the long term

higher, amounting (if crusading aspirations were to

(who knows?) crusading liberalism may free itself

be seriously pursued) to a new imperialism to be

from its national launching pad and build a home of

undertaken not by the `world community' but by the

its own, a political space station able to circle the

United States. Whether or not the goal is worth such

globe in serene detachment from the blood and soil

a price is another matter, but the question deserves

of nationality.

more attention than it currently gets.

59

61

60

power that can support

At any rate, as crusaders look for-

ward in faith to that day, sceptics are in no position

But sceptical

to declare it impossible.

`realism' about the genuine and serious political

62

Notes

8. Ibid., p. 23.

1. Blease (1913), p. 12.

9. Ibid., p. 59.

2. On mid-Victorian liberal enthusiasm for national selfdetermination (and on tensions between this and the

10. Ibid., pp. 27±9.

Cobdenite tradition of a non-interventionist foreign

11. Ibid., p. 32.

policy), see Bradley (1980), pp. 97±104, 133.

12. Ibid., p. 91. 13. Ibid., p. 128.

3. See, for example, Miller (1995), Tamir (1993), N. MacCormick, `What Place for Nationalism?', in Ca-

14. Ibid., p. 21.

ney, George and Jones (eds) (1996).

15. Ibid., pp. 130±1. I have pursued some of the intimations of that discussion in Canovan (1999).

4. Friedrich Hayek's `Anglo-American' as opposed to `continental' liberalism belongs to the wider family

16. Judith Shklar acutely observes that, whereas her own

of sceptical liberalism, as does Judith Shklar's `liberal-

`liberalism of fear' is prompted by `memory' ± memory

ism of fear'.

of the awful things that people have done to one another ± the `liberalism of natural rights' is prompted

5. Oakeshott (1962), pp. 1±36, 123±7.

by `hope'; Shklar (1989), pp. 26±7.

6. Oakeshott (1975a), pp. 200±6, 313±16.

17. See, for example, Renteln (1990).

7. Oakeshott (1996), p. 21.

72

THE SWORD OF FAITH AND THE SHIELD OF FEAR

18. Cf. Donnelly (1989), Waldron (1993), pp. 23±4;

82. Though strong, the connection is historically

Bobbio (1996), pp. 12±14, 30, 61±70. The volume

contingent. Bruce Haddock has drawn my attention

edited by Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen (Nuss-

to the counter-example of contemporary Italy, where

baum and Sen (eds), 1993) forms a particularly inter-

long-standing dissatisfaction with the performance of

esting illustration because its contributors are acutely

the Italian state expresses itself in a popular support for

aware of many of the objections to which this sort of

EU institutions that seems to indicate a wish not to be

project is open, but nevertheless mostly endorse it.

ruled by one's `own' state. Might this be a harbinger of a new form of empire-by-consent?

19. The most conspicuous recent British defender of

36. Helgerson (1992), p. 65, 81; Pocock (1957), pp. 30±

sceptical liberalism has been John Gray; see, for ex-

55.

ample, Gray (1993), especially pp. 314±20 (though, as we shall see below, in his most recent work Gray seems

37. Parekh (1995), pp. 139±40.

to have gone beyond liberalism altogether). See also

38. Gray (1993), p. 265; O'Sullivan (1997), p. 753.

O'Sullivan (1989) and (1997), especially pp. 748±54.

39. John Gray seems recently to have recognised this

20. Shklar (1989), p. 27.

point, and has taken to describing his position as

21. Hayek (1967), p. 165; Shklar (1989), p. 37.

`pluralist rather than liberal', seeing the appropriate

22. Sceptical liberalism does indeed share a border with

arrangement for deeply plural societies not as a suppo-

the more sceptical versions of conservatism, with a

sedly impartial legalism but as a kind of millet system

number of notable political theorists (including Mon-

with different laws for different communities related to

tesquieu and Tocqueville) inhabiting the disputed

one another by a process of political bargaining; Gray (1995a), pp. 126, 136±7.

territory. Even Hayek, who actually wrote an essay entitled, `Why I am Not a Conservative', can be

40. Mill (1972), pp. 391±4.

plausibly treated as one in some contexts. See, for

41. Scruton (1990), p. 322; Miller (1995), pp. 90±3.

example, Devigne (1994), p. 33. Oakeshott himself is

42. Gray (1995b), pp. 99±100.

most often categorised as a conservative, which is

43. Ibid., p. 117.

justified, but only with the qualification that he is

44. Hutchinson and Smith (eds) (1994), p. 4.

an unusual kind of `sceptical liberal conservative,

45. Ignatieff (1994), p. 189.

lacking both the emotional attachments of Burkean

46. Consider, for example, Robert Goodin's assertion that

conservatives and the faith in capitalism of the ``New

since we all have `general duties' to all other people,

Right''.' Cf. Gray (1989), p. 199; Franco (1990). As

regardless of nationhood or citizenship, `if some states

we shall later see, however, where nationalism is

prove incapable of discharging their responsibilities

concerned, there is a test that can distinguish between

effectively, then they should either be reconstituted or

the more liberal and the more conservative aspects.

assisted.' The choice of passive verbs conveniently dodges the tricky question of who is to do the `recon-

23. For example, Gray (1993), pp. 326±7.

stituting'; Goodin (1988), p. 685.

24. For a classic critique of this last belief, see Goodin

47. Cf. Ramsbotham and Woodhouse (eds) (1996), Har-

(1988).

riss (ed.) (1995).

25. See Donnelly (1989), pp. 119±20.

48. For example, states that desire acceptance by Western

26. Shklar (1989), p. 36. 27. On the dangers of atavistic `tribal' loyalties, see Hayek

clubs such as the Council of Europe or the EU find

(1993), volume II, p. 143. In Hayek's view, nation-

themselves under pressure to respect minority rights.

alism shares with socialism the dubious distinction of

This point was drawn to my attention by Richard Sakwa.

being one of `the two greatest threats to a free civilisa-

49. Bhikhu Parekh suggests that `morally concerned citi-

tion,'; ibid., volume III, p. 111.

zens' from around the world might move into such

28. John Gray, `The Politics of Cultural Diversity', in Gray

situations and

(1993), pp. 253±71.

`stage well-publicised and carefully

29. Ibid., p. 270.

planned acts of a Gandhian type of non-violent

30. Hayek (1967), p. 161.

resistance', such as placing themselves between the warring parties in an ethnic conflict. This is a heroic

31. The classic view of nationalism from a sceptical conKedourie

idea, but could be effective only if it mobilised public

(1993); see, for example, Kedourie's comments on

opinion inside powerful states to pressure those states

servative

perspective

can

be

found

in

themselves to take action; Parekh (1997).

Mazzini at p. 92. 32. Gray (1993), p. 318.

50. Greenfeld (1992), pp. 60±6.

33. Hayek (1993), volume I, chapter 4.

51. `On the Prospects of Peace', in Tickell (1822), pp. 135±6.

34. Oakeshott (1975a), p. 154.

52. Hont (1994), pp. 207, 219, 222.

35. Cf. Beetham (1991), p. 127. On the relation between national identity and the `generalised trust' required by

53. See, for example, Shue (1980).

modern civil society, see Seligman (1992), pp. 147±

54. Schaar (1981), p. 293.

73

MARGARET CANOVAN

59. Cf. Miller (1995), pp. 77±8.

55. On the nature and variability of nations, see Canovan

60. So successfully, indeed, that such power has come to

(1996), pp. 50±80. 56. B. Barber, `Constitutional Faith', in Cohen (ed.)

be taken for granted in nation-states, as if it existed by

(1996), pp. 30±7, at pp. 32±3. Cf. C. Taylor, `Alter-

nature. This point is more extensively discussed in Canovan (1996).

native Futures: Legitimacy, Identity and Alienation in Late Twentieth Century Canada', in Cairns and Wil-

61. For a vision of this kind, see Linklater (1998).

liams (eds) (1985), p. 215. As in the British and

62. I have benefited from the criticisms and observations

French cases, secular American universalist national-

of the other participants at the `Liberalism at the

ism owes a lot to a pre-existing sense of religious

Millennium' conference organised by the Department

mission. See O'Brien (1988).

of Political Theory and Government in the University

57. Parekh (1997), p. 58.

of Wales Swansea. I am also indebted to John Horton

58. Quoted in Newman (1987), p. 49. For a more sophis-

for his characteristically incisive and helpful comments.

ticated contemporary restatement of similar sentiments, see Schnapper (1994).

74

6

LIBERAL CITIZENSHIP AND FEMINISM Andrea Baumeister

differences, which are also more fluid than fixed in

Introduction

character, an appeal to a unified women's politics is

One of the most striking features of contemporary

liable to prove just as exclusionary as the traditional

feminist discourse has been the increasing disen-

liberal preoccupation with universality. Yet, while

chantment with traditional liberal conceptions of

the dangers of exclusion are widely acknowledged, a

citizenship. Whereas early reforming feminists ap-

number of feminists have recently expressed concern

pealed to the liberal principles of equality and uni-

about the implications of such a rejection of all

versality in their attempts to include women in the

universal claims and norms. Not only does the

realm of citizenship, many contemporary feminists

anti-essentialist commitment to `radical otherness'

have criticised liberalism for failing to acknowledge

potentially undermine the idea of an effective fem-

the significance of difference and particularity. In the

inist politics, it also fails to recognise the important

eyes of critics such as Pateman and Young,

1

the

role appeals to universality and formal equality have

traditional emphasis upon formal equality and uni-

historically played in the struggle by oppressed groups

versality encourages liberals to ignore the extent to

to be included in the realm of citizenship. In the light

which our identities are irrevocably shaped by the

of these concerns feminists like Susan Moller Okin

particularities and contingencies of our existence.

and Martha Nussbaum have reasserted the impor-

Thus, whereas liberal conceptions of citizenship

tance of women's shared experiences and the con-

typically relegate difference, particularity and affec-

tinued

tivity to the non-political private sphere, many

struggle for equality for women worldwide.

relevance

of

universal

standards

in

the

3

contemporary feminists have sought to undermine

Faced with this lively debate among feminists, a

this liberal public/private distinction in their attempt

number of writers have attempted to strike a balance

to assert the political significance of our unique and

between the claims of difference and the concerns

particular characteristics.

which have traditionally given rise to the liberal

This regard for difference and particularity has led

emphasis on universality. One of the most influential

some feminists to be sceptical of all universal claims.

examples of such an approach is Iris Marion Young's

Thus writers such as Spelman, Harris, hooks and Flax

model of a `heterogeneous public'. Although Young

not only reject liberal universalism but also question

stresses that each social group has its own unique

the validity of a general, unified women's politics.

4

2

experiences, histories and social life, which can

For these feminist anti-essentialists gender is intrin-

never be entirely understood or adequately repre-

sically bound up with other aspects of identity such

sented by outsiders, she nonetheless recognises the

as class and race. In the face of such multifaceted

potential appeal of liberalism's commitment to uni-

75

ANDREA BAUMEISTER

versality and the equality as a justification for the

and marginalised women. If, due to their capacity for

inclusion of all in moral and social life. Yet, while

rational thought, all human beings deserve equal

Young's model of a heterogeneous public overcomes

rights and respect, then women, as beings capable of

many of the problems associated with earlier feminist

reason, are surely entitled to the same rights and

reconceptualisations of citizenship, this chapter will

privileges as men. Thus first-wave feminists, such as

argue that her model of group representation remains

Macaulay and Wollstonecraft,

at odds with both her dynamic conception of the

tions of universal reason and formal equality to show

social collective and her commitment to deliberative

that sexual differences should be seen as merely

democracy.

which

contingent and, in the final analysis, inconsequen-

Young combines an emphasis on universality at

tial. Ultimately men and women shared the same

the point of participation with the recognition of

faculties and capacities. Women's apparent failure to

the claims of difference in the allocation of rights and

develop their rational faculties did not rest upon

resources is, from a feminist perspective, rather at-

deep-seated biological differences between men and

tractive.

women but simply reflected the social norms and

Nonetheless,

the

manner

in

7

employed liberal no-

However, an attempt to strike such a balance need

pressures placed upon them. Not surprisingly, early

not imply a rejection of the liberal tradition. It is a

feminists regarded education as a vital stepping stone

rich and complex body of thought and practice

in the campaign for the enfranchisement of women.

which, in the final analysis, may not be as hostile

If granted access to equal education, women would

to diversity as is frequently assumed. Indeed, careful

realise their rational faculties and develop the capa-

reading reveals that questions of difference and

city for autonomous action. Once these goals had

particularity play a significant role in the Kantian

been attained women could not reasonably be de-

strand of liberalism. The distinction Kant draws

nied the vote. After all if the notion of self-sover-

between perfect and imperfect obligations and the

eignty is to be meaningful it must surely include the

open-ended, context-responsive manner in which a

right to self-governance in the political sphere. Yet,

Kantian approach determines specific obligations

while many first-wave feminists actively advocated

allows for the recognition of the complex relation-

liberal ideals and endorsed the liberal vision of a

ship between the public and the private and is

common citizenship, the attainment of equal legal

sensitive to the demands for more effective repre-

and political rights did not bring about the radical

sentation on the part of traditionally marginalised

improvement in the position of women first-wave

groups.

5

These traditional Kantian concerns have

feminists had so confidently anticipated. In the light

continued to inform the work of contemporary

of this failure many second-wave feminists have

6

This strand of

questioned the values which underpin the liberal

liberalism, therefore, can provide a framework for

notion of individual rights in general and the liberal

citizenship which potentially enables feminists to

conception of citizenship in particular. They have

resolve one of the most troubling tensions at the

argued that these commitments blind liberals to the

heart of contemporary feminist theorising.

significance of difference in their conception of both

Kantians such as Ju È rgen Habermas.

individual and citizen. At the level of the self, feminist theorists such as

Women and Liberal Citizenship

Pateman have drawn attention to the manner in

In their battle for equal rights for women many early

which liberals have attempted to abstract the in-

feminists were clearly inspired by the liberal Enlight-

dividual from all social, economic and biological

enment ideals of reason, progress, individual freedom

contingencies.

and equal rights. For example, the notion of uni-

comes disembedded and disembodied, giving rise

versal reason, central to the thought of liberal En-

to a unitary vision of the self ± a self that is the

lightenment philosophers such as Kant, provided

same for all humanity. Hence morality is equated

early feminist thinkers with powerful arguments to

with impartiality, with recognising the claims of the

challenge those social conventions which excluded

other who is just like oneself. Thus, we are invited to

76

8

Subsequently,

the individual

be-

LIBERAL CITIZENSHIP AND FEMINISM

view one another as abstract, autonomous beings,

women's experiences, feminists fear that the liberal

unencumbered by the particularities of our existence.

appeal to `generality' and the subsequent public/

To act morally is to follow the norm of formal

private distinction denies women an effective voice

equality enshrined in a system of justice based on

within the political arena. In this context they have

a network of formal rights and duties. However, for

drawn attention not only to the fact that historically

many feminists such an account of the individual

women have been assigned to the private sphere, but

ignores the extent to which our identity is irrevoc-

also to the point that this genderisation of the public/

ably shaped by the particularities and contingencies

private distinction formed for many centuries the

of our existence. Here, a number of feminists have

basis for excluding women from citizenship. Women

highlighted the impact our physical being has on our

were identified with the sphere of the particular and

identity. As Pateman notes, if the individual is to be

the affective, with nurture, reproduction, love and

a universal figure, liberalism must ignore that `hu-

care, and, consequently, were seen as lacking in the

mankind has two bodies, female and male.'

9

This,

qualities required for public life. Yet, if particularity is

however, glosses over the political implications of

assigned to the non-political private sphere, then

women's bodily capacities and passions. For feminists

once women enter the `male' public sphere the way

such as Pateman, the tendency to regard the ato-

in which they differ from men is seen as deviating

mised individual as the norm has led liberal theorists

from the norm. As Susan Mendus points out,

either to view women and children as `deviant' cases

equality then becomes defined in terms of the re-

or to ignore or deny the interdependence between

moval of women's `disadvantage' or `disability', with

women and children.

10

12

`disadvantage' being determined by a model which is

To many feminists, liberal-

intrinsically male.

ism's failure to acknowledge women's experiences has given rise to a discourse in which what consti-

In the eyes of critics such as Young, this margin-

tutes a proper person, a true individual, is represen-

alisation of women's voices in the public realm is

tative of men's experience and reasoning specifically,

indicative of the limitations of the very ideal of

not women's. Paradigmatically, the liberal individual

`generality'. Given that different groups have differ-

becomes synonymous with the independent, proper-

ent experiences, histories and perspectives on social

tied male head of a household.

life, no one group can entirely understand the ex-

Since this conception of the individual shapes

periences of another. Hence no one group can speak

liberal notions of citizenship, the exclusion of the

for another. To adopt, in the face of such profound

perspective of all but one group has important

diversity, a conception of citizenship based upon

political consequences, not only for women, but also

formal equality and impartiality is merely to privilege

for marginalised groups in general. Just as liberals

the dominant group. If all are given equal rights, but

seek to abstract the individual from all social, eco-

no one can speak for the other, the interests of the

nomic and biological contingencies, traditional lib-

dominant group will prevail as the members of the

eral conceptions of democratic citizenship require

dominant group will be able `to assert their experi-

the exclusion of particularity. For Young, liberal

ences of and perspectives on social events as im-

citizenship is therefore characterised by an appeal

partial and objective.'

to an ideal of `generality'.

11

13

So not only does the denial

Citizens are expected to

of difference allow privileged groups to ignore their

transcend their differences and act on the basis of the

own group specificity, it also disadvantages groups

common good or the `general will'. This appeal to

whose experience, culture and socialised capacities

generality entails a sharp distinction between the

differ from this allegedly neutral standard. Given

public and the private sphere. Here the public realm

that, on Young's analysis, the ostensibly neutral

is identified with normative reason and the pursuit of

standards of the liberal public sphere merely reflect

shared interests, whereas difference, particularity and

the experiences of the dominant group ± white,

affectivity are firmly relegated to the private non-

middle-class, western males ± the liberal appeal to

political sphere. Yet, just as the liberal notion of an

formal equality and impartiality prevents the mem-

abstract, disembedded, disembodied self excludes

bers of groups such as women, whose experiences and

77

ANDREA BAUMEISTER

perspectives differ significantly from those of the

unitary self that is relatively stable and unchanging

dominant group, from effectively participating in

and the belief that, although there are significant

the public sphere.

differences between men and women, this self is the same for all women and for all men regardless of class, race or sexual orientation. For anti-essentialists such

Radical Diversity

feminist essentialism is as unsustainable as earlier

and the Dangers of Fragmentation

liberal claims to universality: just as liberalism's fail-

In order to remedy this marginalistion of women's

ure to acknowledge the significance of gender differ-

perspective many feminists have attempted to dis-

ences led theorists to presume that the experience of

place the traditional liberal emphasis upon univers-

male adults can be taken as normative for humanity

ality and formal equality with a notion of citizenship

at large, so the focus on `women as women' has given

which recognises the political significance of differ-

rise to a discourse in which the experiences of

ence and particularity. Initially this led them to focus

western, white, middle-class women have been con-

on the differences between men and women in an

flated with the experiences of all women. Conse-

attempt to highlight the political significance of

quently, just as liberal universalism defines difference

women's traditional experiences as mothers and

in terms of a deviation from a standard that is

carers. Writers such as Elshtain, Dinnerstein and

essentially male, so feminist essentialism views dif-

Ruddick

14

argued that the virtues of love, empathy,

compassion

and

emotional

sensitivity

ferences among women as a divergence from a

associated

with women's traditional role as mothers and carers

standard that is defined by the experiences of Wes-

15

tern, white, middle-class women. Hence in Spel-

have potentially important political implications and

man's opinion `the phrase ``as a woman'' is the

are indeed capable of laying the foundations for a

Trojan horse of feminist ethnocentrism.'

better society. However, while such attempts to stress

eyes of these writers, feminist essentialism treats the

the political consequences of women's experiences

experiences of women who are subject to multiple

provide a forceful critique of liberal universalism and

forms of oppression as merely `addition' problems:

the liberal public/private distinction, an increasing

black women suffer from sexism plus racism, while

number of contemporary feminists have argued that

working-class women are oppressed by sexism plus

such attempts to formulate a `women's politics' con-

class structures. For Spelman and Harris such an

tinue to endorse a unitary vision of individual iden-

approach not only forcibly fragments the experiences

tity

of black, poor and lesbian women, but also leads

and

ultimately

still

fail

to

take

difference

seriously.

19

In the

feminists to presume that the oppression women face

This regard for the wider implications of difference

`as women' is best identified by studying the position

is informed not only by an increasing awareness of

of women who are not subject to other forms of

the experiences

and other

oppression. This privileges the experiences of wes-

minority feminists, but reflects the general scepticism

tern, white, middle-class women. For example, char-

regarding all universal claims typical of postmodern

acterisations of the dominant feminine stereotype as

thought. For writers like Spelman, Harris, hooks and

passive and dependent failed to recognise the ex-

Flax,

16

of African-American

concepts such as `gender' and `woman' are

periences of black women who have struggled against

profoundly problematic unless they are `qualified by

images of matriarchy and sexual permissiveness. In a

and seen in the context of race, class, ethnicity and

similar vein the claim by many second-wave femin-

17

From this perspective the em-

ists that the solution to women's oppression was to be

phasis a `women's politics' places on the experience

found in work outside the home ignored the experi-

and identity of `women as such' implies an unsus-

ences of millions of women who had always worked

tainable essentialism. As Harris notes, the claim that

outside the home, but for whom work had been a far

the `biological and social implications of mother-

from `liberating' experience.

other differences'.

18

rests

Spelman and Harris conclude that instead of

upon two key assumptions: the supposition of a deep

holding onto unsustainable notions of a deep, uni-

hood shape the selfhood of all or most women'

78

LIBERAL CITIZENSHIP AND FEMINISM

tary and stable women's self, feminists must recognise

fragmentation which may not only threaten the

that women are enmeshed in many and often contra-

viability of a wider feminist politics, but may ulti-

dictory discourses of sexuality, race and class. There-

mately undermine the very notion of democratic

fore, in place of the objective, rational and universal

citizenship. As Young notes,

standpoint central to the liberal disembedded and

as Spelman have tended to regard the categories of

disembodied self, Spelman and Harris posit a vision

class, race and nationality as relatively fixed, the

of a radically embedded, subjective self. From such a

stability of these categories is just as doubtful as the

perspective identities are seen as multiplicitous, con-

appropriateness of the category of `women'. One

tingent and context-bound. Differences are always

possible response to this complex interaction be-

relational not inherent. Thus `the social agent is

tween race, class, nationality and gender is to dis-

constituted by an assembly of subject positions that

tinguish further between subcategories. Thus one

can never be totally fixed in a closed system of

could, for example, subdivide working-class women

differences.'

20

23

whereas theorists such

further according to race, religion, nationality, eth-

Since identity is always defined in a gender

nicity, region and sexuality, or distinguish between

should not only be viewed as a relational concept,

the different attributes of an African-American gen-

whose characteristics and attributes can only be

der in relation to African-American men on the one

identified by comparing the situation of women with

hand and white men on the other. However, given

that of men. The construction of gender attributes

that `any category can be considered an arbitrary

will also vary according to race, class and nationality.

unity', such a strategy ultimately gives rise to an

The task of feminist theorising is not to attempt to

infinite regress which dissolves all `groups into in-

construct essences, but to explore these contingent

dividuals'.

relationships. Such an approach clearly has far-

fragmentation is liable to undermine the wider sym-

reaching implications with regard to the political

pathies essential to a shared sense of citizenship.

sphere. Given that what constitutes a woman differs

While cooperation for the common good and gen-

across cultural and social contexts, a common wo-

eral solidarity are widely regarded as important ele-

men's perspective cannot simply be regarded as a

ments of democratic citizenship, a commitment to

metaphysical given. On the contrary, `while some

`radical otherness' is liable to give rise to a focus on

women share some common interests and face some

sectional interests.

common enemies, such commonalties are by no

norms and standards, understanding and cooperation

means universal; rather they are interlaced with

across group lines is likely to prove difficult, if not

specific

context

Á -vis vis-a

specific

differences, even with conflict.'

21

others,

24

In the eyes of critics such a process of

25

Indeed, in the absence of shared

Feminism, there-

impossible. From the perspective of traditionally

fore, constitutes a complex network of different

marginalised groups this failure to generate wider

strands, which link discourses of gender to those

sympathies is potentially rather worrying. In the

of

orientation.

absence of a general sense of solidarity, not only

Rather than a unitary political movement, it is

may we lose any reason to hope that the dominant

therefore best regarded as the product of a complex,

groups within society could cultivate feelings of

shifting and often difficult `patchwork of overlapping

obligation to take into account the perspective

class,

alliances'.

race,

ethnicity

and

sexual

22

and needs of less powerful groups, but the possibility

While this vision of deep and radical diversity has

of solidarity between the latter may also recede.

been highly influential, not all second-wave femin-

Indeed, the process of differentiation could lead to

ists have endorsed such an outright rejection of

the fragmentation of wider political movements such

liberal principles. Indeed a number of feminists have

as feminism.

expressed profound disquiet about the political im-

In the light of these fears a number of feminists

plications of a commitment to `radical otherness'.

have reasserted the importance of women's shared

The basic worry here is that in the absence of any

experiences and the continued relevance of universal

appeal to universally shared standards, an emphasis

standards. In contrast to the anti-essentialist denial

upon radical diversity will give rise to a process of

of

79

a

`generalisable,

identifiable

and

collectively

ANDREA BAUMEISTER

shared experience of womanhood',

26

feminists such

influential contemporary feminist conceptions of

as Okin assert that sexism does constitute `an iden-

citizenship. For example, in Iris Marion Young's

tifiable form of oppression many of whose effects are

model of `the heterogeneous public' the commitment

felt by women regardless of race and class.'

27

Thus,

to difference and diversity is tempered by a recogni-

she claims that, if the findings of Anglo-American

tion of the appeal of liberal values and preoccupa-

feminists about justice within the household are

tions.

compared with the burdens and benefits in poor

group has its own unique experiences, histories and

households, the injustices of gender are revealed

perspectives on social life, which can never be

to be quite similar: `in both situations, women's

entirely understood or adequately represented by

access to paid work is constrained both by sex

outsiders, she nonetheless retains a commitment to

segregation in the workplace and the assumption

universality and the equality of moral worth of all

that women are ``naturally'' responsible for all or

persons. While the principle of equal moral worth

most of the unpaid work of the household.'

28

32

Although Young stresses that each social

Not

provides a powerful argument in favour of the in-

only does feminist anti-essentialism fail to recognise

clusion of all members of society in social and

the significance of women's shared experiences, it

political life, the liberal commitment to formal pro-

also underestimates the potential appeal of the lib-

cedural rules and basic rights safeguards minorities

eral

ob-

against the whim of the majority by setting limits to

historically the standards of impartiality

democratic deliberation and outcomes. However,

implied by the liberal notion of a common humanity

although Young appeals to the value of universality

have been employed by many oppressed groups,

at the point of inclusion, she stresses that `univers-

including women, in their struggle for equality. Thus

ality in the sense of the participation and inclusion of

liberal notions of universality and formal equality

everyone in moral and social life does not imply

have enabled oppressed groups to show that the

universality in the sense of the adoption of a general

manner in which they differ from the dominant

point of view that leaves behind particular affilia-

group ± be it in terms of gender, race or religion ±

tions, feelings, commitments and desires.'

does not constitute a legitimate ground for excluding

the liberal ideal of `impartial reason' (the `general

them from citizenship. For Okin and Martha Nuss-

point of view') fails to recognise the significance of

universalist

serves,

baum,

29

30

project.

As

Anne

Phillips

33

For her,

such an appeal to universal standards is

difference and particularity on at least three counts:

today still likely to be the most effective tool for

it insists that all situations are treated according to

31

A crucial

the same moral rule and thus `denies the particularity

problem is that the victims of oppression and dom-

of situations'; it tries to `master or eliminate hetero-

ination frequently not only lack the intellectual and

geneity in the form of feeling' by abstracting the

economic resources to challenge these injustices, but

individual from the needs, inclinations and feelings

have often internalised the very values which op-

which accompany particular situations; and, most

press them. According to Nussbaum and Okin, then,

importantly, it reduces the `plurality of moral judge-

such deeply entrenched discrimination can only be

ments to one subjectivity' by abstracting the subject

challenged effectively by an appeal to universal

from the particularities which individualise her.

standards. These can be employed to hold local

Thus, while acknowledging the potential appeal of

government,

international

liberal values and preoccupations, Young contends

bodies such as the UN to account for their failure

that the scope and nature of these values must be

to improve the position of women.

reconceptualised to account for the political claims

securing equality for women worldwide.

aid

organisations

and

34

of difference and particularity. Since each group differs with regard to its experiences, history and

The `Heterogeneous Public'

perspective on social life, equality in terms of the

This awareness of the potential strength of the

participation and inclusion of all groups requires a

traditional liberal emphasis upon universality and

specific set of rights for each group and for some

equality has been reflected in some of the most

groups a more comprehensive system than for others.

80

LIBERAL CITIZENSHIP AND FEMINISM

In place of the liberal emphasis upon formal equality,

unified passively by the objects around which their

Young proposes a differentiated citizenship which

actions are orientated or by the material effects of the

guarantees `the effective recognition and representa-

actions of the other.'

tion of the distinct voices and perspectives of those

do not see themselves engaged in a common en-

of its constituent groups that are oppressed or dis-

terprise and hence do not identify with one another,

advantaged.'

35

37

While the members of a series

Since dominant groups within society

their actions are constrained by the same set of

will always attempt to shape the public sphere in the

material objects and collective habits which provide

light of their experiences and perspective, tradition-

the background for the actions of each member of

ally marginalised groups, such as women, the poor,

the series. For Young, the series of `women' is con-

ethnic minorities and the old, should be granted

stituted by the `rules, practices and assumptions of

additional rights to group-specific representation at

institutionalised heterosexuality' and the accompa-

the various levels of government, thereby increasing

nying sexual division of labour.

their opportunities for political participation. Op-

structures both enable and constrain action, they do

pressed groups should be provided with the resources

not define it and different individuals may adopt a

to organise themselves, should be invited to analyse

whole range of strategies to deal with gender struc-

and formulate social policy proposals and should

tures.

have the right to veto specific policies which affect

identity . . . will escape the markings of gender . . .

groups directly. Young contends that, given the

how gender marks her life is her own.'

different

experiences

and

perspectives

of

Hence,

although

38

`no

While these gender

individual

woman's

39

social

On Young's account, it is this serialised existence

groups, such measures are vital to promote justice.

which provides the basis for women's collective

Thus group-specific representation for traditionally

action. Groups of women are formed when women

marginalised groups ensures greater procedural fair-

take up and reconstruct `the gendered structures that

ness in the setting of the public agenda, allows for the

have passively unified them'.

recognition of all needs and interests in democratic

unlikely to incorporate all women, but are usually

deliberations and adds to democratic accountability

socially, historically and culturally specific. Here she

by providing an `antidote to self-deceiving interest

is careful to distinguish her conception of a social

masked as an impartial or general interest.'

36

40

Such groups are

group from both interest and identity groups. Thus social groups are neither merely an `aggregate or

Young's heterogeneous public clearly offers a so-

41

phisticated model for a feminist reconceptualisation

association of persons who seek a particular goal',

of citizenship which combines a recognition of the

nor are they the expression of an essential set of

political significance of difference and particularity

characteristics. Rather, social groups define them-

with a commitment to universality and equality of

selves in relation to one another. Since group iden-

moral worth at the point of inclusion. Yet, despite its

tities

apparent strength, her model of group representation

differentiation, they are fluid and often shifting.

remains at odds with both her dynamic conception

Group membership, therefore, does not signify a

of social collectives and her commitment to delib-

shared set of attributes; it is the product of a sense

erative democracy.

of identification and affinity. But, while social groups

are

the

product

of

this

process

of

Young offers a fluid and multi-layered conception

are partially constitutive of their members' identities,

of social collectives, which seek to acknowledge the

an individual is not wholly determined by her group

worries expressed by feminist anti-essentialists while

membership. In many ways she remains independent

safeguarding the possibility of a women's politics

from the group's identity and can transcend and

based upon collective action. Women should not,

reject group membership. In a complex, plural so-

in the first instance, be conceived of as a unified

ciety this sense of fluidity is further reinforced by

social group but are best viewed as a series. While

multiple group

groups are self-conscious, mutually acknowledging

every social group has group differences cutting

collectives with a shared sense of purpose, a `series'

across it.

refers to `a social collective whose members are

membership, which ensures that

However, while Young's fluid, multi-layered con-

81

ANDREA BAUMEISTER

ception of social collectives may allay many of the

principles which are not merely local. She herself

fears of anti-essentialists, her sophisticated under-

appears to recognise this when she maintains that

standing of collective identity and action does ap-

only those claims `are normatively valid which are

pear

group

generalisable in the sense that they can be recognised

representation. The notion of a guaranteed right

without violating the rights of others or subjecting

to group representation implies that groups can be

them to domination.'

readily identified, have a stable membership and are

dards by which such claims are to be assessed are not

sufficiently homogeneous to be able to formulate a

merely local. Yet, although such an emphasis upon

group response. A system which guaranteed op-

`generalisability' would offer an effective route for the

pressed groups the right to representation would

resolution of group conflict, it entails a commitment

hardly encourage them to recognise the contextual

to impartiality that is at odds with the regard for

nature and fluidity of their boundaries. On the

particularity and partiality central to the notion of

contrary, it would be in the interests of groups to

group representation. While Young could potentially

remain distinct and to attempt to build a loyal, fixed

overcome this tension by basing her defence of group

membership. Therefore, group representation may

representation upon an appeal to impartiality, this

not only be divisive, but it could also encourage

would place her conception of a `differentiated citi-

precisely the `essentialism' Young is so keen to avoid.

zenship' back within the liberal tradition she rejects.

to

be

at

odds

with

her

notion

of

45

This suggests that the stan-

The degree of division associated with group

However, such a return to liberal ideas should

representation will in part depend on the wider

arguably neither alarm nor surprise feminists. Liberal-

mechanisms for democratic decision-making.

42

In

ism is a rich and complex tradition which in the final

this context Young is keen to distinguish her model

analysis may not be as hostile to diversity as feminists

of communicative democracy from interest-group

frequently assume. Here, the distinction Kant draws

pluralism. Rather than simply assert their predeter-

between perfect and imperfect obligations and the

mined interests, democratic deliberation requires

open-ended, context-responsive manner in which a

that `participants discuss together the issues and

Kantian approach determines specific obligations are

come to a decision according to principles of jus-

of particular interest. These traditional Kantian con-

43

Therefore the participants in democratic

cerns have continued to inform the work of con-

discourse must express their demands not as wants

temporary Kantians such as Habermas. His context-

but as entitlements of justice. However, given the

responsive conception of impartiality allows for the

specificity of group experience, the various partici-

recognition of the complex relationship between the

pants will not always be able to recognise the claims

public and the private and is sensitive to the de-

of others and a certain amount of conflict is inevi-

mands for more effective representation on the part

table. The manner in which such conflicts are to be

of traditionally marginalised groups.

tice.'

resolved will largely depend upon the nature and character of the public standards that govern demo-

Liberal Citizenship,

cratic deliberation. Yet here Young remains vague.

Difference and Particularity

At times she suggests that these standards are local and do not entail an appeal to impartiality and the

From a Kantian perspective the imperative to treat

`general point of view'. Thus she contends that `the

humanity as an `end' and never merely as a `means'

rationality of norms can be grounded only by under-

requires of us not only to abstain from infringing the

standing them as the outcome of discussion includ-

rights of others, but also to take, as far as possible, an

44

But, if

active interest in the well-being of others. This

these standards are strictly local, then once negotia-

concern is central to the Kantian conception of

tion has broken down the decision-making process

imperfect duties. Therefore, while perfect obligations,

comes to a standstill. However, Young's own appeal

such as non-coercion and non-deceit, address ques-

to universality at the level of participation indicates

tions of justice, imperfect duties, like benevolence

that such conflicts should be resolved by an appeal to

and charity, focus upon the specific circumstances of

ing all those who will be bound by them.'

82

LIBERAL CITIZENSHIP AND FEMINISM

particular individuals. For Kant,

46

important to ensure de facto rather than mere de jure

such imperfect

48

obligations are not supererogatory; they constitute

equality.

a vital aspect of a balanced moral approach. How-

citizens formal equality, equal rights and liberties can

ever, whereas perfect obligations can be discharged by

be used differently and may impact upon citizens

simply abstaining from certain actions, such as, for

differentially depending upon their circumstances.

instance, coercion or deceit and are, therefore, uni-

Thus genuine equality can only be guaranteed if the

versally

require

specific needs and circumstances of particular others

time, presence, resources and an understanding of

are taken into account. These considerations are

the particular situation and circumstances of the

akin to the concerns Kant addresses via the notion

other. Consequently, imperfect obligations are con-

of imperfect duties. Furthermore, just as a context-

text-specific. Once the principle of universalisability

responsive reading of the categorical imperative

is combined with the recognition of particularity,

differentiates between ancillary and fundamental

indifference to the specific circumstances and needs

principles of action, Habermas stresses the need to

of others is not permissible since it may constitute a

distinguish between the formulation and the appli-

threat to the agency of the other.

cation of norms. While norms can be justified by

applicable,

imperfect

obligations

While a formal system of rights may grant

This regard for difference and particularity is

reference to universal principles, the impartial jus-

further underlined by the context-responsive reading

tification of a norm requires careful attention to the

of the categorical imperative advocated by modern

specific circumstances of a given situation. To apply

Kantians such as O'Neill and Herman.

47

While the

a norm impartially we must determine whether, in

categorical imperative aims to rule out fundamental

the light of all relevant facts, a specific norm is the

principles of action which could not consistently be

most appropriate one in these circumstances.

adopted by all, it does not apply to ancillary prin-

Within the context of citizenship the sensitivity of

ciples. After all since the particular considerations

the Kantian tradition to specific circumstances and

which inform our actions in particular circumstances

particular needs provides a potentially powerful the-

vary widely, the more specific principles upon which

oretical framework for voicing the concerns that have

human beings may act cannot be universally acted

preoccupied many contemporary feminists. For in-

upon. While the categorical imperative rules out

stance, the distinction between perfect and imperfect

certain fundamental principles, it cannot, by itself,

duties enables a Kantian approach to be sensitive to the

discriminate among more specific principles of ac-

problems highlighted by feminists such as Young.

tion. Consequently, the adoption of ancillary mo-

While the emphasis on our common humanity which

tives which could not be consistently adopted by all

informs the Kantian notion of perfect duties provides a

is not prohibited. Thus the categorical imperative

powerful justification for the extension of citizenship

merely provides us with a criterion against which to

to all members of society and offers a clear set of

measure principles. It does not tell us which princi-

standards for resolving potential conflicts between

ples to select in specific situations and how to

the demands of various citizens, the idea of imperfect

implement them. To work out what an obligation

duties ensures that a Kantian conception of citizenship

entails in a specific situation requires careful evalua-

will be sensitive to the specific needs and circum-

tion of the various elements which influence the

stances of particular citizens. From a Kantian perspec-

situation. The main purpose of the categorical im-

tive citizenship is not merely a question of granting

perative, therefore, is to provide a starting-point for

everyone the same formal rights. It also implies an

this process of critical reflection.

obligation to ensure that all individuals are in a posi-

Kant's concern with the specific circumstances of

tion to effectively fulfil their role as citizens. In the light

particular others and context sensitivity in the ap-

of these considerations Habermas (and other contem-

plication of norms have continued to inform the

porary Kantians) have stressed the need for greater

work of contemporary Kantians. Thus, for example,

political participation on the part of traditionally

in his recent work Ju È rgen Habermas has argued that

marginalised or socially disadvantaged groups.

if the autonomy of all citizens is to be protected, it is

as imperfect obligations highlight human vulnerability

83

49

Just

ANDREA BAUMEISTER

and particularity, Habermas highlights the complex

Rather than placing the burden on marginalised

relationship between the public and the private

groups to claim their rights, the language of obliga-

sphere. Given that persons are individuated through

tions reminds the powerful of the moral requirement

the processes of socialisation, personal autonomy can

to fulfil their duties. Consequently the powerful

only be safeguarded if the life-context within which an

cannot simply ignore the needs and aspirations of

individual's identity is formulated is also protected.

traditionally marginalised groups. Furthermore, the

This can only be achieved if all citizens participate in

open-ended manner in which an obligation-based

the formulation and interpretation of the rights and

approach establishes specific obligations is well-sui-

norms that safeguard individual autonomy. After all,

ted to capture the emphasis contemporary feminists

unless all citizens participate in public debate and

have placed on the complex and multiplicitous

express their specific needs, there is a real danger that

nature of women's identities. Whereas a rights per-

the specific needs of socially disadvantaged groups will

spective requires the prior establishment of a set of

be misunderstood. This in turn may undermine the

rights in order to function, an obligation-based

capacity of such groups to pursue effectively their own

approach can allow for obligations to be established

conception of the good life. Thus for Habermas gen-

as situations arise. All an obligation-based approach

uine equality between men and women cannot be

needs is a formula, such as the categorical imperative,

achieved unless women take part in the formulation of

which can be applied to specific situations in order to

the criteria which determine what kind of treatment is

establish which obligations flow from these situa-

to count as equal. Yet, since traditionally marginalised

tions. A Kantian perspective therefore recognises

groups may require support to organise themselves and

that the nature and extent of the obligation to ensure

to effectively participate in the political process, Ha-

the effective exercise of citizenship can only be

bermas acknowledges that some citizens may require

established in response to the particular needs and

special cultural and social rights. However, in contrast

circumstances of given individuals.

to Young, Habermas not only conceptualises such

The regard for particularity and human vulner-

cultural and social rights as individual rights, he clearly

ability already evident in Kant's work suggests that

grounds them in a liberal appeal to impartiality. There-

this strand of liberal thought is potentially capable of

fore while, like Young, Habermas advocates a discur-

providing a framework for a richer and more ba-

sive model of democracy, his approach avoids the

lanced account of citizenship. Undoubtedly the re-

tensions inherent in Young's `heterogeneous public'.

sponses to the claims of difference and diversity

Although modern Kantians such as Habermas

advocated by contemporary Kantians remain proble-

invoke the language of rights, feminists, in their

matic. Habermas, for example, has quite rightly been

struggle to secure greater participation for women,

criticised for advocating a model of communication

may find it advantageous to formulate their demands

which places an undue emphasis upon critical, ra-

in Kant's language of obligations. Since on Kant's

tional argumentation, marginalising the speech pat-

account those in power have a clear duty to assist

terns of traditionally disadvantaged groups such as

those less fortunate, an obligation-based approach

women.

which firmly places the onus on those in positions of

an approach tempers its commitment to `universal-

influence to take all steps in their power to ensure

ity' with a recognition of `diversity' suggests that such

that every citizen is capable of effectively exercising

an account of liberal citizenship may enable feminists

her citizenship is liable to strengthen the position of

to resolve one of the most troubling tensions at the

traditionally marginalised groups such as women.

heart of contemporary feminist theorising.

50

Nonetheless, the manner in which such

Notes

1. Pateman (1988); Young (1990).

3. Okin (1994); M. Nussbaum, `Human Capabilities,

2. Spelman (1988); Harris (1990); hooks (1981); Flax

Female Human Beings', in Nussbaum and Glover

(1995).

(eds) (1995), pp. 61±104.

84

LIBERAL CITIZENSHIP AND FEMINISM

4. Young (1990).

31. For Nussbaum the commitment to the `radical other-

5. Kant (1963b).

ness' of different cultures has led some theorists to

6. Habermas (1993).

defend or at least condone many traditional cultural

7. Ferguson (1985); Wollstonecraft (1989). See, also, Kate

practices which systematically discriminate against

Soper's chapter in the present volume for a close analysis

women. Here Nussbaum cites two vivid examples of

of early feminism's relationship with the Enlightenment.

the approaches to which she objects. The first one

8. Pateman (1988).

refers to an American economist who cites the ex-

9. Ibid., p. 8.

tension of the idea that menstruating women pollute

10. Frazer (1996).

the kitchen to the workplace as an instance of the

11. Young (1989).

integration of the values that prevail in the workplace

12. Mendus (1992).

with those that shape home life, an integration which

13. Young (1989), p. 259.

he regards as lacking in Western countries. The

14. Elshtain (1981); Dinnerstein (1976); Ruddick (1989).

second one refers to a French anthropologist who

15. Many of these early attempts to formulate a `politics of

`expresses regret that the introduction of smallpox

maternal thinking' were influenced by Carol Gilligan's

vaccination in India by the British eradicated the cult

work on moral development (Gilligan, 1982). For

of Sittala Devi, the goddess to whom one used to pray

Gilligan not only the self but also the other person

in order to prevent smallpox,' (Nussbaum, `Human

towards whom one is acting has to be viewed as

Capabilities, Female Human Beings', in Nussbaum and Glover (eds) (1995), p. 65).

radically situated and particularised. Thus, the generalised other of liberal theory is replaced by the

32. Young (1990).

notion of the concrete other.

33. Ibid., p. 105. 34. Ibid., p. 100.

16. Spelman (1988); Harris (1990); hooks (1981); Flax

35. Ibid., p. 184.

(1995). 17. Okin (1994), p 6.

36. Ibid., p.185.

18. Harris (1990), p. 603.

37. Young (1995), p. 199.

19. Spelman (1988), p. 13.

38. Ibid., p. 204.

20. Mouffe (1992), p. 28.

39. Ibid., p. 209.

21. Fraser and Nicholson (1988), p. 391.

40. Ibid., p. 210.

22. Ibid.

41. Young (1990), p. 186.

23. Young (1995). As Young notes, it is, for example,

42. For an interesting discussion of the relationship be-

simply misleading to assume that a working-class

tween Young's commitment to group representation

woman's gendered experiences can only be properly

and her model of communicative democracy see J.

identified by comparing her situation to that of work-

Squires, `Group Representation, Deliberation and the

ing-class men. After all, gendered experiences such as

Displacement of Dichotomies', in M. Saward (ed.),

sexual harassment cut across class lines.

Innovations in Democratic Theory (London: Routledge,

forthcoming).

24. Ibid., p. 195.

43. Young (1990), p. 190.

25. See, S. Mendus, `Time and Chance: Kantian Ethics and Feminist Philosophy', Morrell Discussion Paper

44. Ibid., p 116.

(York: Department of Politics, University of York,

45. Ibid., p 107.

1990).

46. Kant (1963b). 47. O'Neill (1986); Herman (1985).

26. S. Benhabib and D. Cornell, cited in Okin (1994), p.

48. Habermas (1993).

9. 27. Ibid., p. 7.

49. Ibid.

28. Ibid., p. 9.

50. See I. M. Young, `Communication and the Other:

29. Phillips (1993).

Beyond Deliberative Democracy', in Benhabib (ed.)

30. S. Okin, `Inequalities Between the Sexes in Different

(1996), pp. 120±35. Feminists such as Warnke have

Cultural Contexts', in Nussbaum and Glover (eds)

also questioned whether it is possible to draw a sharp

(1995), pp. 275±97; M. Nussbaum, `Human Capabil-

a distinction between the application and formula-

ities, Female Human Beings', in Nussbaum and Glover

tion of norms as Habermas advocates (see Warnke,

(eds) (1995), pp. 61±104.

1995).

85

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Part Three JUSTICE: IDENTITY AND DISTRIBUTION

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7

LIBERALISM AND THE POLITICS OF RECOGNITION Jonathan Seglow

automatically be resolved in favour of the latter.

I

Rather, there must be some interpretive compromise

Liberals, it is said nowadays, are having trouble com-

on both sides so that recognition can be incorporated

ing to terms with the concept of recognition. They are

into the liberal canon.

not sure what it is and hence do not know how to evaluate it, whether to incorporate it into the liberal

II

canon or eschew it altogether. And this is odd because recognition is always familiar to us. Or at any rate, less

We should begin by acquainting ourselves with the

glibly, the concept of recognition is not a difficult one.

kinds of claims to recognition actually made by

It is the universal human need to have one's identity

minorities, of different sorts, in a liberal society.

esteemed and valued by others. It is a vital need

The sorts of cases I have in mind include the

because in order to be an effective agent in a liberal

following:

society, with a secure sense of one's own identity, you

.

require recognition ± positive affirmation ± from

Should the children of recent immigrants be

others. Politically speaking, recognition is the need

entitled to schooling in their mother tongue on

to have one's group identity publicly appraised and

the grounds that without it their language

affirmed. But political recognition is in short supply

would swiftly die away, depriving the second

among some groups in liberal societies. Many mem-

generation of an important sense of orientation and identity?

bers of minority cultures, in particular, do not receive

.

the public recognition they deserve. And one reason

Should racist (`hate') speech against specific

for that is a lacuna in liberal theory itself: it does not

minorities be outlawed on the grounds that it is

recognise the importance of recognition in forming

not just offensive but threatens their fairly

individual and social identities. In this chapter, then, I

fragile public presence in a wider community not of their making?

will argue for an agenda: that recognition should enter

.

the normative constellation of liberalism (of some

Should a gay couple be entitled to a legally

sort). I say `of some sort' because there are certainly

recognised same-sex marriage on the grounds

conflicts between recognition and orthodox liberal

that they should enjoy public recognition of

values such as freedom, opportunity and impartiality.

their mutual commitment just like a mixed couple?

But, as this volume amply demonstrates, the liberal

.

identity is itself contested so there is no reason that

Should religious minorities enjoy exemptions and privileges with respect to dress codes at

conflicts between recognition and these values should

89

JONATHAN SEGLOW

work (for example, Sikh policemen who wear

.

.

.

I mentioned just now that recognition

place of a conventional school uniform)?

disadvantage and this idea is crucial to the liberal

Should public resources be directed towards

account of social justice. The crucial distinction is

measures which benefit minority communities

between unchosen circumstances, which people are

and only them (such as building cultural or

not responsible for, and their own freely made

religious centres)?

choices, which they are. While we quite properly

Should there be quotas which make it easier for

must bear the cost of our choices, we are not

under-represented groups such as ethnic mino-

responsible for the unchosen circumstances which

rities and women to gain university places and

diminish our capacity to choose in the first place.

certain jobs?

Some people in society ± the poor, the ill, the

Should curricula in state schools be revised to

handicapped, the unemployed, for example ± la-

promote a positive image of minority commu-

bour under disadvantages which other members of

nities' history and cultural achievements?

1

suffer

from

some

those who claim

turbans or Muslim girls who wear the chador in

sort

of

unchosen

society do not face and which prevent them from choosing how to live their lives. The basic principle

These cases are all quite different, and involve

of

the

liberal

theory

of

social

justice

is,

`cultures' in the very broadest sense of the term to

therefore, that unchosen circumstantial disadvan-

include ethnic groups, religions and genders. None-

tages should be compensated for, and in a way that

theless, at the risk of distorting some particular cases I

enables each person to determine for herself how

shall consider them all together as claims for recog-

she should live her life.

nition made by `collectives' or `groups', or cultures in

Two critical normative assumptions are made by

this broad sense. Now all these recognition claims are

this liberal account. First, all human beings are

claims for justice too because each group suffers from

regarded (for the purposes of justice) as morally

some sort of unchosen disadvantage and that is what

identical choice-making agents. Looking beyond

social justice aims to correct. They are not mere

the fact that someone is confined to a wheelchair,

wants as when, for example, I demand that you

for example, we see that she is a person who wants to

recognise my `need' for a million pounds. However,

be able to determine how she lives her life. It is just

as claims of justice, they are all highly contentious

the bad luck of being disabled which prevents her

from a liberal perspective. For they are claims for

from doing this. The second assumption is that the

special treatment, for something extra in the way of

circumstantial disadvantages which people face ±

rights or resources which other people do not have.

such as illness, handicap and poverty ± are all

This goes against the central liberal idea that the

contingent and not essential aspects of a person's

state should be impartial among different citizens

identity. By this I mean that people regard them-

whatever their particular identities and allegiances.

selves fundamentally as choice-making agents. Very

The impartial liberal state does offer respect for each

often, this is evidenced by the fact that a person

person's abstract moral worth, but for it to recognise

would much rather be without the disabling aspect of

particular concrete identities appears to be a viola-

her identity. Hence the compensation individuals

tion of impartiality. Put another way, the liberal state

receive in order to overcome their disadvantage has,

allows people to be different, but why should it

whatever its specific form, the same generic purpose:

actively sponsor such difference?

to enable them to regain the capacity for being a choice-making agent.

To address these questions we need first to examine the theory of social justice of which liberal

Can this account of social justice address the

political theory typically avails itself. I shall sketch a

claims for recognition I listed earlier? There are good

simplified version of the account of equal opportu-

reasons for thinking it cannot. To begin with, the

nities developed by John Rawls and Ronald Dwor-

kinds of people who make claims for recognition do

kin, and then we can assess whether it can address

not regard themselves first and foremost as choice-

these sorts of claims to recognition.

2

making agents. Rather it is a particular identity they

90

LIBERALISM AND THE POLITICS OF RECOGNITION

want recognised. Immigrant ethnic groups who de-

looking at Charles Taylor's essay, `The Politics of

mand a more positive public evaluation of their

Recognition'.

3

culture, for example, want the culture to be recognised, not their choice-making capacity. While they

III

are in a disadvantaged position because of their cultural membership, they do not regard their culture

The notion of recognition takes as central a person's

as a disabling circumstance which merits compensa-

own view of what she is about, her identity. Identity

tion like the wheelchair-bound person. On the

involves taking a normative attitude towards one's

contrary, they want their culture positively affirmed

own substantive traits and abilities, what following

and promoted. More generally, the liberal theory of

Taylor I will call an agent's self-interpretations.

social justice seems ill-equipped to deal with what we

These self-interpretations are basic and constitutive

might call `ideational' issues that relate to ethnicity

of who I am: there is no prior autonomous self that

and culture, gender and sexual orientation, religion

can assess and revise them. To assume otherwise just

and language, and so on. It seems better suited to

pushes the question back a stage of what this auton-

addressing material disadvantages such as poverty,

omous self is. Thus as Taylor puts it, `to ask what a

illness and handicap. Indeed, many ideational in-

person is, in abstraction from his or her self-inter-

justices may not appear to be injustices at all for the

pretations, is to ask a fundamentally misguided ques-

liberal theory. Is it an injustice for the children of

tion, one to which there couldn't in principle be an

recent immigrants not to be entitled to schooling in

answer.'

their mother tongue, for example? Is it unjust (as

fundamental way, formed by others. I have the

opposed to unfortunate) to have overwhelmingly

self-interpretations that I do because I have inter-

negative images of some minority ethnic group dis-

nalised how others see me. The basic idea is that only

played in the media? It is hard to see how the liberal

through others' recognition can one acquire an

theory can view these as injustices.

identity. But of course if that were the only way

4

Now one's self-interpretations are, in a

This leads us naturally to ask whether the idea-

of acquiring an identity the individual person would

tional realms of culture, ethnicity and so on are really

merely be a locus for external social forces. So we

fit subjects for justice at all. If they were not, there

must add a second, more individual, moment to

would be no need to extend liberal social justice to

personal identity which appropriates the internalised

accommodate them. But I think there are two very

attitudes of others for its own purposes, and, no less

good reasons which show that ideational issues are

critical, looks outwards and takes attitudes towards

injustices which liberalism must address. The first

others. These two moments ± self and others ±

reason, which I discuss in the next section, hinges on

synthesise in the identity of a psychologically fully

the phenomenon of self-esteem. Drawing on Axel

formed person. Hence identity is fundamentally a

Honneth's theory of recognition, I will argue that it

negotiated achievement. There is no pure self-making

is only through having one's substantive traits and

(that ignores the need for others' recognition), but

attributes positively appraised by others, that one can

neither are persons constituted by external social

esteem them oneself, and only yet only through self-

forms.

esteem that one can become a properly functioning

pretations, but at the same time I can revise them

agent. I then discuss in section IV how the public

myself and project them outwards in the form of

culture in a liberal society systematically privileges

attitudes to others which in turn help to shape them

certain peoples' identities and derogates others. We

and so on. From this complex and ever-shifting

simply do live in societies that appraise some people's

matrix, different persons' identities are formed.

5

Others' attitudes shape my very self-inter-

identities more positively than others. This gives

In his important recent book on recognition Axel

some groups much greater collective esteem than

Honneth argues that there are three distinct dimen-

others which, since esteem is necessary for identity

sions to the phenomenon: love, rights and solidar-

and agency, is an injustice. In the final sections of the

ity.

chapter I will ask how liberalism might address this,

develops basic self-confidence; she has faith in her

91

6

The human infant who is loved by her parents

JONATHAN SEGLOW

ability to express her needs and desires without being

This quotation highlights the fact that we cannot

abandoned as a result. This capacity to trust one's

disassociate recognition as respect from the more

needs and desires is, Honneth argues, a precondition

substantive recognition which brings self-esteem.

for self-realisation in any human community. I shall

Both aspects (along with self-confidence) are neces-

not discuss it here. When a person is recognised by

sary to produce a person with a fully formed identity.

her community as a bearer of rights, by contrast, she

Substantive recognition of one's traits and abilities is

is recognised to share those universal features of

not simply a welcome endorsement of what you

personhood, such as agency, rationality and respon-

think you are about. It is fundamentally necessary

sibility, which make her able to assert claims upon

to become a properly functioning agent capable of

others. Others' recognition help enable people to

forming intentions and pursuing projects in the first

become claimers of their own rights. Honneth calls

place. It is not an intrusion upon one's autonomy,

this self-respect. Finally, self-esteem connotes a posi-

but rather a precondition of it.

tive relation to one's own substantive, concrete traits

Let us consider the idea of self-esteem more

and abilities. Against the background of a shared, yet

closely. It is a central self-interpretive attitude and

open and plural, value horizon, individuals recognise

takes as its object the substantive empirical traits that

each other as beings with positive traits and abilities

a person has. Someone with a healthy sense of self-

which enable them to contribute to the common

esteem regards her concrete identity as morally valu-

good. This final form of recognition enables indivi-

able, as something worth having and developing. As

duals, operating in a nexus of approving others, to

a precondition for pursuing one's ends, an adequate

realise their own concrete identities.

sense of self-esteem is a universal human need. Of

Honneth's central insight is that to become a

course, a crucial source of self-esteem is success in

person with a fully formed, integrated, fulfilled iden-

one's own projects. If I do well as a painter or a

tity requires recognition by others and this must

footballer, developing certain skills and attributes in

include respect, esteem and love. As he summarises

the process, I generally significantly raise my self-

it:

esteem. But here I want to focus on the converse, the way that self-esteem is a precondition, as much as a It is only due to the cumulative acquisition of

result, of engagement in projects. For a person will

basic self-confidence, of self-respect, and of self-

only engage in her own projects, developing her

esteem ± provided, one after another, by those

traits and abilities, if she thinks they are things worth

three forms of recognition ± that a person can

developing, in other words if she has a degree of self-

come to see himself or herself, unconditionally, as

esteem to begin with. As Honneth shows, this is not

both an autonomous and an individuated being,

the same as self-respect which liberal theory is more

and to identify with his or her goals and desires.

7

familiar with.

9

Self-respect involves recognition of

one's general capacity to make claims upon other These three forms of recognition are not an extra

people. An agent with self-respect is confident that

bonus for agents who are already autonomous any-

she is entitled to pursue her own projects when

way. Rather, they help create the self-interpretations

others disagree that she should do so. But this

which constitute any person's identity. Thus:

confidence in one's abstract moral worth is quite distinct from the value one places on one's own traits

The connection between the experience of re-

and abilities, and projects as externalisations of those

cognition and one's relation-to-self stems from

abilities. Self-esteem involves a positive self-evalua-

the intersubjective structure of personal identity.

tion of the particular person one is, self-respect that

The only way in which individuals are constituted

one shares the inherent dignity of all rights-bearing

as persons is by learning to refer to themselves as,

persons.

from the perspective of an approving or encoura-

When we claim that a person with self-esteem

ging other, beings with certain positive traits or

believes her own traits, abilities and projects are

abilities.

8

valuable and worth having we are making a claim

92

LIBERALISM AND THE POLITICS OF RECOGNITION

about the prior and independent value of those traits,

they will suffer a deficit in their practical capacity to

abilities and projects. The more immediate and less

be agents in the public realm. In sum, the public

significant decisions an agent takes are genuinely

evaluative status of collective identities has a crucial

matters of taste where we can say of a person that,

bearing on their members' self-esteem and in turn on

because she wills it, a goal is valuable for her. But in

their ability to become properly functioning agents.

order to summon the motivation to pursue longerterm projects and goals, which are externalisations of

IV

her particular abilities, a person must perceive that they have independent value. I could not esteem

I now want to consider the role of the public culture

myself as a good parent or a good doctor, for example,

in providing an orientating medium within which

unless I believed that parenting and medicine were

citizens conduct their lives. Sometimes liberals write

morally valuable goals.

as if individual choice and agency takes place merely

Some putatively valuable features of persons that

within a thin `framework' of rights and liberties with

are significant sources of self-esteem are individual,

no further relevant values. This may be an ideal

such as a talent at music or the virtue of generosity,

inspired by the `fact of pluralism', but as a descriptive

but many others have an irreducible collective di-

claim it is certainly incorrect. Even the most liberal

mension which refers to (for example) gender and

societies contain thick, substantive public cultures

sexuality, ethnicity and religion, and linguistic and

which articulate a great many normative values and

national aspects of one's identity. These are all

ideals. Notwithstanding the fact of pluralism, liberal

features of persons who belong to the relevant group

citizens live by a set of shared ideas and values about

and from which they take pride or, in our terms,

how to live that help bind and integrate their

10

Of course, like other largely unchosen

community and serve as points of reference for

aspects of identity these collective memberships

individual members making their own choices about

may be more or less salient in a person's life. But

how to live. Because this culture is implicit and in

for many people a thriving culture or religion, say, is

the background we do not always realise its great

an important aspect of their self-interpreted identity

power in orientating our ethical identities. But con-

and will contribute significantly to their self-esteem.

sider the attitudes in this country to, say, the role of

On Honneth's view, that self-esteem will in turn

the Christian religion in public life (including its

help fulfil an individual's own identity and develop

implications for free speech), the value and status of

her capacity for agency. It follows, therefore, that if

the family compared to other modes of human

people need recognition in order to develop their

relationship,

identity and capacity for agency, they require it of

health care, our history of Empire and conquest,

these collective aspects as well as of their more

the place of languages other than English in public

individual traits and abilities. In other words, for

life, and more broadly the degree to which immi-

people who do identify with these collective groups,

grants must adapt themselves to our way of life. I

a positive evaluation of them by others enables them

hope that even this (almost) random list reveals the

better to be agents, that is effective pursuers of their

extent to which our public life is substantially nor-

own projects. This is true even where people are

matively

respected as rights-bearing citizens by the rest of the

transmitted through many sorts of social relation-

community. If ethnic minority X is generally re-

ships and amplified by the media, help maintain a

garded to be an uncivilised, backward tribal group,

nation as an `imagined community'. Like all com-

for example, then members of X who identify with it

munities, it takes a stand in moral space. The point is

will suffer a lack of self-esteem and have demeaned

that whatever scope people have for individual

individual identities. If the general view of women is

choice in liberal societies they cannot but take their

that they should do nothing but raise children and

bearings from the public moral consciousness ± the

(to use Mill's phrase) `beautify and adorn the home'

public culture ± of the nation. Of course, this public

then, independent of their legal status as citizens,

culture is not some hypostatic entity standing over

esteem.

93

the

importance

encoded.

Shared

of

publicly

values

and

funded

attitudes,

JONATHAN SEGLOW

and above individual agents. It is woven from the

personal agency. A theory of justice which addresses

fabric of our own attitudes. My claim is simply that

the problem of misrecognition, then, instead of

its normative encoding means that a huge number of

merely respecting people's abstract moral worth,

values and attitudes are privileged from the start and

should focus directly on the public evaluative status

this unfailingly structures whatever choices people

of significant collective identities. Policies of recog-

are formally free to make. Political societies which

nition which raise that status should improve the

are conscious of themselves as such are integrated by

collective self-esteem of members by legal means and

shared norms and values which cannot but have a

by gradually shifting the attitudes of the public

certain moral mass.

culture.

Public cultures are, of course, revisable and re-

As part of a liberal theory of justice, policies of

vised. They change in an evolutionary way. But the

recognition must of course be justifiable not only to

relevant

conservative,

the minority community which benefits from them

theistic or nationalistic society where the public

but also to the majority of citizens who do not. The

culture is seen to be an objective and unchangeable

problem is that policies of recognition will very often

moral system and a liberal society where individuals

involve a redistribution of freedom and opportunity

can participate in the progressive redefinition of

between different groups, and those who lose out will

their public culture. (I will return to the latter

demand some justification. The sorts of redistribu-

ideal.)

between

tions I have in mind include affirmative action

the former ultra-communitarian ideal and a purely

policies which reduce the opportunity for those

procedural republic constituted merely by abstract

who do not benefit from them to gain jobs and

values of freedom and equality in which individuals

places in education; restricting property ownership

can choose to be whatever they like with no moral

in a territory to those whose ethnic homeland it is

`externalities'. A perfectly competitive free market

(which erodes others' rights of movement); abridging

for values and ways of life is an ideal not yet realised

freedom of speech in order not to offend minority

and perhaps unrealisable. (Analogously, consider

religions; and more general redirections of resources

how supposedly value-neutral natural and social

to fund minority activities (their own schools, cul-

scientific research works through dominant para-

tural events, etc.) which of course take away from

digms which orientate practitioners' questions and

resources that could be spent on everyone.

distinction

The

relevant

is

between

distinction

a

is

not

The basic justification undergirding all these mea-

findings.) In sum, a liberal public culture is subor

sures of recognition is an ideal of equality which aims

values are not fixed and immutable but nonetheless

to achieve a rough parity of the social bases of self-

they seep into the crevices within which individuals

esteem, as expressed in law and the public culture, for

exercise freedom of choice.

different social groups. Rather than set out and

stantive

though

revisable

over

time.

Norms

defend how that justification would work in full, which is beyond the scope of this chapter, I would

V

like here merely to explore one aspect of it, and that

When the theory of recognition is linked to the

is the issue of moral value. As I argued above, what

sociological truth about the normative encoding of

disadvantaged groups want recognised is the moral

the public culture we can more clearly see that

value of their collective identities. And the majority

members of certain collectivities have a case in

who do not benefit from the kinds of policies of

justice for political recognition, and more specifically

recognition I've just listed would be more willing to

the kinds of measures I sketched at the beginning.

assent to them if they too appreciate the value of the

The public culture contains a negative appraisal of

way of life the policy is designed to benefit. Hence

certain religious, ethnic, cultural and sexual identi-

the value question is at the heart of the justification

ties which can lower the self-esteem of those for

of a recognition-sensitive liberalism.

whom that collective identity is important. That in

We might argue that only objectively valuable

turn has a negative impact on their own capacity for

collective identities merit official recognition. On

94

LIBERALISM AND THE POLITICS OF RECOGNITION

this view, collective ways of life that bear great moral

is encapsulated in the notion of authenticity and we

value but which, nonetheless, are systematically

would do well to analyse this first.

devalued by the public culture should be recognised

Authenticity is `the idea that each of us has an

in the ways I've catalogued. Well, we might, but it

original way of being human: each person has his or

isn't promising because whatever moral consensus

her own ``measure'' '.

exists in a political community about the value of

particular, original accent on the human condition.

different ways of life is expressed by the public

Taylor encapsulates the idea of authenticity thus:

13

Each person has their own

culture and yet this, as we've seen, denigrates them. The objective view would have to appeal to a more

There is a certain way of being human that is my

abstract, ideal account of values in order to generate

way. I am called upon to live my life in this way

the moral authority for recognition. But even sup-

and not in imitation of anyone else's life. But this

posing this could be done ± which I doubt ± it would

notion gives a new importance to being true to

suffer from a further drawback: it would begin to lose

myself. If I am not, I miss the point of my life; I

touch with the self-interpretations of those groups

miss what being human is for me.

14

who it seeks to benefit. For it is only by positively evaluating their identity as they perceive it that the

The authentic person tries to construct for herself

self-esteem of demeaned groups is raised; their self-

a unique yet coherent and narratable life-project

interpreted account of the value of their identity may

rather than being an unthinking social conformist.

or may not have any connection with the objective

She will of course internalise others' normative

one. Conversely, then, we could embrace a subjec-

attitudes as her identity cannot but be part-formed

tive account. In this instance any collective whose

by them. But rather than being captive to these

members believed that their way of life was insuffi-

attitudes she will use them as symbolic material to

ciently valued by the public culture would merit

construct an identity that is her own.

official recognition.

11

15

This account has the advan-

As a value claim, authenticity is the idea that

tage that it perfectly tracks the normative self-inter-

particular identities have value just because of their

pretations of collectives. Indeed, the justification for

particularity. They have objective value, but not

policies of recognition is assimilated precisely to their

because they can be subsumed by a moral universal

subjective feeling. But the subjective account would

(as when we claim that all persons have equal moral

no longer be a justification for recognition: it would

worth). Rather, authentic identities possess exemp-

commit the state positively to recognise debased,

lary validity; they are valuable just because of their

harmful and valueless ways of life and would remove

authentic originality.

the evolutionary power of what Kymlicka calls the

moral value from the singular experience of the

`cultural marketplace' in helping them to wither

subject.

away.

12

16

Authenticity, in sum, wrests

Of course, Taylor's main concern is with cultural authenticity and cultural recognition. Straight after introducing the idea of personal authenticity, he goes

VI

on to claim that collective identities such as cultures

What we need is an account of the value of collec-

also have their own particular way of worth or

tive identities that does justice to their self-inter-

measure.

pretations while at the same time provides a firm

authenticity, Taylor writes, `Herder applied his con-

moral basis for justifying policies of recognition.

ception of originality at two levels, not only to the

With these criteria in mind I want in the remainder

individual person . . . but also to the culture-bearing

of this chapter to examine Charles Taylor's influen-

people . . . Just like individuals, a Volk should be

tial essay `The Politics of Recognition'. Although he

true to itself, that is, its own culture.'

does not use the term, Taylor presents a theory of the

Taylor says little more to defend cultural authenticity

justice of recognition grounded in a particular ac-

than this. The value of cultural authenticity is a

count of the value of collective identities. That value

simple deduction from personal authenticity.

95

Commenting

on

Herder's

notion

17

of

However,

18

The

JONATHAN SEGLOW

main reason for this, I think, is that Taylor sees the

We (white Europeans) simply lack the perspective

central constituent of cultures as language. People

from which distortion-free judgements of the worth

who share a culture speak the same language and

of alien cultures can be made. For Taylor, no purely

thus language defines and demarcates different cul-

impartial perspective exists, and the solution instead

tures. Cultures, then, as formed and maintained by

is to construct a shared cross-cultural language from

different languages, have their own authentic col-

which comparative judgements of the worth of

lective identities.

19

different cultures can be made.

22

By entering into

The norms and values of the public culture provide

dialogue with alien cultures, he argues, we enlarge

the medium by which cultural members evaluate their

the moral horizon from which we make judgements

own collective identities. If the public culture system-

of worth and a more perspicuous understanding of

atically denigrates a minority culture then this de-

the other culture becomes available to us. For both

means its identity internally. Unfortunately, this is

cultures, orientating beliefs which were deep yet

20

The example of

implicit are suddenly brought to consciousness as

misrecognition which especially exercises Taylor is

they face the challenge of other values. What was

his native province of Quebec. His question is how

previously strange and unfamiliar becomes clearer as

Âbe Â cois maintain their own authentic can the Que

new values reconfigure old attitudes and beliefs. The

very often just what happens.

21

Taylor catalogues how the Quebec

result is a `fusion of horizons' where both sides

government introduced various policies of recogni-

develop a new vocabulary of comparison from which

tion the most important of which was the requirement

to make moral judgements of cultural worth.

cultural identity?

23

that French-speaking parents send their children to

In approaching other cultures we presume that,

French-speaking schools. The reason for this was the

unfamiliar though they are, their values have some

overriding good of survivance of the authentic cultural

objective status. `As a presumption the claim is that

identity of Quebec, constitutively defined by its being

all human cultures that have animated whole socie-

French-speaking. Taylor does not himself employ the

ties over some considerable stretch of time have

concept of self-esteem which I borrowed from Hon-

something important to say to human beings.'

24

For

neth. But we can certainly translate his politics of recognition into those terms and say that the rationale

It is reasonable to suppose that cultures that have

for promoting Quebec culture is precisely that it gives

provided the horizon of meaning for large num-

Âbe Â cois a secure sense of self-esteem, and in the Que

bers of human beings, of diverse characters and

turn identity and agency.

temperaments, over a long period of time ± that

The question is whether Quebec culture does have

have, in their words, articulated their sense of the

authentic moral value such that its claim for recog-

good, the holy, the admirable ± are almost certain

nition is justified when, clearly, members of other

to have something that deserves our admiration

collective identities (Anglophone Canadians, for

and respect even if it is accompanied by much

example) may not recognise the exemplary moral

that we have to abhor and reject.

25

value of Quebec culture. This takes us to Taylor's larger concern which is when and how different

This, then, is the `starting hypothesis with which

cultures should recognise each other's moral value

we ought to approach the study of any other cul-

in general. And this is our concern too for we saw

ture.'

how public cultures are normatively encoded so as to

from our more enlightened perspective we see that a

privilege certain cultural identity. The problem is a

culture does possess authentic moral value, its claim

particularly acute one when the `cultural gap' be-

to recognition is then justified.

26

If the starting hypothesis is redeemed, so that

tween two groups is large ± as it can be, for example with black and Asian cultures (whether immigrants

VII

or indigenous peoples) who demand the recognition from the white majority in Europe and North Amer-

Taylor's essay has aroused much comment. The two

ica when it is the latter's identity that is privileged.

main arguments made against him are, first, that

96

LIBERALISM AND THE POLITICS OF RECOGNITION

there is no such thing as an authentic cultural

a politics of recognition seeks to achieve a rough

identity since cultures are in fact internally plural

parity of the social bases of self-esteem for different

and diverse, and second, that the state promotion of

social groups (where self-esteem is crucially depen-

a particular cultural identity entailed by recognition

dent on how one's collective identity is appraised by

is unfair since it privileges one form of life at the

the public culture). Since a positive evaluation of

expense of others and hence derogates individual

people's concrete collective identities affects their

freedom and opportunity.

27

These two objections

very capacity for agency (the linkage we drew from

are, of course, related. If there are no authentic

Honneth), the former merit recognition to bolster

cultural essences then there is certainly no justifica-

their appraisive status in the public culture, provided

tion for politically recognising one culture at the

that, as we have been exploring, the collective

expense of others.

identity possesses exemplary moral value ± a judge-

I think Taylor can be rescued from these objec-

ment that can only be made post facto after a dialogic

tions, although not without modifying his position

encounter. It is worth recalling too that the liberal

somewhat. I shall address the second problem and

theory of social justice, which I sketched at the

then the first, but, before doing so, let me mention

beginning of this essay, also redistributes freedom

briefly a particularly acute version of the second

and opportunity, as when for example better off

argument made by K. Anthony Appiah in his com-

people disproportionately finance the welfare state.

mentary on the essay. Appiah agrees that many

The justification there is that the state should pro-

collective identities such as members of minority

vide roughly equal opportunity for each person to

ethnic cultures do suffer from systematic low collec-

exercise their capacities for choice and agency. The

tive esteem. Hence `one form of healing the self that

justification for political recognition is very similar,

those who have these identities participate in is

only that the primary focus is on the constitution and

learning to see these collective identities not as

maintenance of the capacity for personal agency in

sources of limitation and insult but as a valuable

the first place, and that the beneficiaries of recogni-

part of what they centrally are.'

28

But, he goes on,

tion are people who esteem their own culture rather

some recipients of recognition might object that it is

than people whose self-identities are primarily as free

not they who are receiving it, but just some attribute

choosers. If we follow Honneth we should not see a

of theirs ± first language, skin colour ± which they

morally great distinction between `free choosers' and

invest with no special significance. There are many

`culturally-encumbered peoples', but whether that is

people whose self-interpretations do not have a

so must await a full justification of liberal recogni-

central place for an authentic collective identity.

tion.

`It is at this point that someone who takes autonomy

I'm not sure the misrecognition of those who

seriously will ask whether we have not replaced one

regard themselves primarily as free agents as cul-

kind of tyranny with another.'

29

ture-bearing ones is really a kind of `tyranny', as

The second ± `freedom' ± objection to Taylor

Appiah claims. For it is arguable that a measure of

appears to take, therefore, two separate forms. One

misrecognition ± as when, for example, ethnic min-

is that other people's (non-beneficiaries) freedom

ority citizens complain that policies of affirmative

and opportunity is limited by policies of recognition;

action denude them of the opportunity to compete

the other is Appiah's subtle point that the benefi-

for jobs or university places on their own merits ± is

ciaries of political recognition have their identity as

simply a price worth paying for the undoubted

autonomous agents misrecognised by being viewed

benefits which recognition brings to those who do

through a cultural lens when their fundamental self-

identify with their collective cultural identity. Ap-

interpretation is simply as free agents.

piah's critique might also be put in terms of the

I have already sketched the general justification

public/private division so that the distinction is

for policies of recognition which very often redis-

between those who wish publicly to assert their

tribute freedom and opportunity. Beginning from a

collective identity (the gay pride movement, for

fundamental commitment to the equality of persons

example) and those who regard their identity (for

97

JONATHAN SEGLOW

consistent with the truths that (1) people want to be

example, their sexual identity) as essentially a pri30

But again, is it really

recognised not just through their culture but often in

tyrannical to have ± to continue the example ± the

other ways besides, and (2) that there is disagreement

right to a same-sex marriage, or is it rather an

among cultural members about the proper interpre-

opportunity which gay couples can take advantage

tation of their collective cultural identity. Problem

of if they wish? I have written all along of `claims' for

instances of (1) occur when a person is politically

recognition so perhaps the solution here is a kind of

recognised as being black, for example, when what

consent test which would prevent the introduction

she regards as much more central to her identity is

of policies of recognition which a majority of mem-

that she is a doctor. This problem is a version of

bers of the collective identity in question did not

Appiah's critique above, but it is worth pointing out

themselves desire. Finally, it is also worth recording,

here that there is no obvious inconsistency or in-

against Appiah's critique, that there are already

justice for the state to recognise doctors (some of

many other ways that the state misrecognises our

whom are black) for the purposes of collective pay-

self-interpreted identities which arise from less con-

bargaining and to recognise, say, a black arts group

troversial principles of justice. Unemployment or

which receives government money (and of which

disability benefit, for example, was sometimes said

our doctor is not a member). Issue (2) is a problem

vate, non-political matter.

because it seems to militate against the authenticity of

(by the New Right) to demean its recipients by labelling

them

with

a

negative

stereotype.

31

cultures. Perhaps authenticity is the wrong term here

Although the argument was over-inflated ± since

for we need only really say that cultures are real and

the positive relief brought by these benefits vastly

embody morally valuable human possibilities. In any

outweighs the negative stereotype ± the point re-

case, we must be careful not to go too far in the other

mains a valid one. And if that is true then cultural

direction and implicitly contrast the inauthenticity

recognition of the kind Taylor commends does not

of minority cultures with the authenticity of the

uniquely misidentify its subjects: Appiah's tyrannical

public culture in a way that denies the justice of

effects may be an unfortunate by-product of all

claims to recognition. The latter is the hegemonic

progressive policies of justice.

strategy of cultural conservatives. In reality, neither

It remains true nonetheless that if there are no

the public nor minority cultural identities are more

authentic collective cultural identities then there is

authentic or real than the other. Each borrows from

no case in justice to recognise them. This is the first

the other and both are constantly reformed and

objection made against Taylor. And it is also true

revised. Demands for recognition made by members

that, compared to the brute facticity of being poor or

of minority cultures are best understood as challenges

disabled or unemployed (all collective identities),

to the current self-interpretations of the public cul-

cultures are always amalgams, mongrel entities, the

ture. For these reasons, I think Taylor's dialogue

products of internal compromise and contestation

between different cultures is best understood as

and, indeed, prevailing legal norms. There are no

one about the best ± authentic ± self-understanding

pure, crystalline cultural identities waiting to be

of the public culture. This is given a recognition on

recognised by the public culture. There are few (if

all sides that no group of citizens possesses the

any) people in liberal societies who construct their

authoritative and final interpretation of what their

social role from a homogeneous cultural script and

public culture is about and that minority groups have

nothing else. But in reply to this objection, we

the right to participate in the progressive redefinition

should ask, simply: what needs to be true in order

of the public culture just like everyone else.

that cultural identities merit recognition? The an-

view dialogue is about reaching a public consensus

swer is that, first, there are people who recognise

on the self-interpretation of the political community

each other as members of a shared cultural identity,

and the value of cultural identities as part of that

and second, that that cultural identity is disadvan-

political community. The moral challenges which

taged with respect to the public culture. The second

minority cultures inevitably bring to the public

answer I have already argued for. The first answer is

culture will always provide a rationale for dialogue

98

32

On this

LIBERALISM AND THE POLITICS OF RECOGNITION

and I am suggesting that this process should be

become part of what a liberal theory of social justice

formalised and institutionalised.

tries to accommodate. A full justification of liberal

This more deliberative-democratic interpretation

recognition needs to elaborate further the key con-

of intercultural dialogue in fact supplies two rather

cepts of recognition, identity, self-esteem, and the

different justifications for rights to recognition. The

public and minority cultures. I shall conclude briefly

first says that official recognition is justified when

by signalling three further issues which liberal re-

there is an appraisive consensus on cultural value.

cognition needs to address. First, I have said nothing

But since, in a complex, plural society, where the

about illiberal cultures which deny their members

public culture is ever-revisable, such a consensus can

freedom and choice. Illiberal cultures are especially

only ever be regarded as the ideal aim not the

problematic because they may be significant sources

concrete result of public deliberation, this first jus-

of self-esteem for (at least some of) their members.

tification has its limits. The second justification

Should they, then, merit political recognition? I

explicitly links claims for recognition with public

have argued only that the value of a culture is an

deliberation by regarding the rights granted to min-

emergent property of dialogic interchange and that

ority cultures as participatory rights which enable

harmful cultures do not merit recognition. But this

them to enter into collective deliberation with their

takes us to the second problem which is separatist

fellow citizens about the proper understanding of the

cultures who refuse to interact with the wider public

public culture on terms that are fair. Rights to

culture but demand political recognition (group

recognition, in other words, are recursively justified

autonomy, for example, or separate schooling) none-

by the need for public deliberation itself. They help

theless. Perhaps we should just say that entering into

to foster a more secure sense of identity and status for

some kind of dialogue with the wider world is the

minority groups, not just for their own sake, but to

price to be paid for political recognition (even if that

empower them to participate in the collective re-

transforms a group who wished to use recognition to

definition of the public culture. The right to wear

insulate their collective identity in the first place).

religious dress at work, for example, or the right to

The third issue is the complex relationship I have

bilingual schooling do not just boost the self-esteem

glossed over between material social justice and

of members of minority cultures. Rather, they help to

cultural recognition. As Nancy Fraser effectively

create citizens who feel secure and esteemed as

argues, these two forms of justice can conflict with

members of the public culture too and are therefore

each other.

better able to co-deliberate on what its identity

cies, for example, would appear to conflict with

should be.

recognition-based affirmative action policies that

33

Race-blind equal opportunities poli-

positively esteem a marginalised racial group. Here I will only say, banally, that a unified liberal theory of

VIII

social justice needs to reconcile both sorts of claims.

As I said at the beginning of this chapter my aim has

But my main point in this essay is not, I hope, banal:

merely been to argue for an agenda: that claims for

recognition should be incorporated into the liberal

recognition need not be illiberal but rather should

identity in the twenty-first century.

Notes

1. Cf. the lists of `recognition rights' in E. A. Galeotti,

Citizenship (1995) offers a very sophisticated defence of

`Neutrality and Recognition', in Bellamy and Hollis

minority rights grounded in the Rawls/Dworkin account

(eds) (1999) and Kymlicka (1995), pp. 30±1.

of justice. However, Kymlicka does not view these as

2. For the theory of justice explaining and underlying the

rights which recognise the value of particular cultural

choice/circumstances division, see Dworkin (1981a)

and collective identities. Unfortunately, there is not the

and Rawls (1972), esp. pp. 83±90, 100±8, and for a

space to discuss Kymlicka's theory in this chapter. But

discussion of Rawls and Dworkin, see Kymlicka (1990),

see the discussion in Seglow (1998), pp. 966±9 and the

chapter 3. Kymlicka's well-known book Multicultural

secondary literature on Kymlicka cited there.

99

JONATHAN SEGLOW

17. Taylor, in Gutmann (ed.) (1994), p. 31.

3. Taylor, `The Politics of Recognition', in Gutmann (ed.) (1994), pp. 25±73. Taylor's is perhaps the best

18. Cf. K. Anthony Appiah, `Identity, Authenticity, Sur-

known, but by no means the only, theory of cultural

vival: Multicultural Societies and Social Reproduc-

recognition on the intellectual market. See, for ex-

tion', in Gutmann (ed.) (1994), pp. 149±63, at p. 153.

ample, the important works by Tully (1995) and

19. Hence Taylor's focus is somewhat narrower than our interest in the recognition of gender and sexual and

Young (1990).

religious identities.

4. Taylor (1989), p. 34.

20. Taylor in Gutmann (ed.) (1994), pp. 32±5.

5. Hence the recognition view cross-cuts the (false)

21. Taylor states that it `is axiomatic for Quebec govern-

dichotomy between the liberal autonomous self and

ments that the survival and flourishing of French

the communitarian encumbered one.

culture in Quebec is a good': Taylor, in Gutmann

6. Honneth (1995).

(ed.) (1994), p. 58.

7. Ibid., p. 169. 8. Ibid., p. 173.

22. For the philosophy behind this, see Taylor (1995).

9. Rawls, of course, lists self-respect as `the most impor-

23. A phrase Taylor borrows from Gadamer. See Gutmann (ed.) (1994), pp. 66±73.

tant' of his primary goods: see Rawls (1972), pp. 440± 6. For a brief critique of this see Seglow (1998), pp.

24. Ibid., p. 66.

965±6. For a distinction between self-respect and self-

25. Ibid., pp. 72±3.

esteem similar to Honneth's see Sachs (1981).

26. Ibid., pp. 66±7.

10. Although Honneth has been criticised for glossing

27. For examples of the first argument see Ferrara (1998),

over the more collective media of recognition such as

p. 17; Rorty (1994); and S. Wolf's `Comment', in

group identity ± see Alexander and Lara (1996), esp.

Gutmann (ed.) (1994), pp. 75±85. The best examples

pp. 133±5.

of the second are Cooke (1997) and Habermas's

11. I. M. Young's very interesting book Justice and the Politics

`Struggles for Recognition in the Democratic Con-

of Difference (1990) comes close to a wholly subjective

stitutional State', in Gutmann (ed.) (1994), pp. 107± 48.

account. She writes, for example, that `groups cannot be socially equal unless their specific experience, culture

28. Appiah, in Gutmann (ed.) (1994), p. 161.

and social contribution are publicly affirmed and re-

29. Ibid., pp. 162±3.

cognised' (p. 174) and she calls for a `politics [of

30. This example comes from Miller (1995), pp. 133±4

difference which] asserts that oppressed groups have

who argues for a democratic public culture but is critical of Taylor's politics of recognition.

distinct cultures, experiences and perspectives on social

31. Another example is the way that labelling people as

life with humanly positive meaning' (p. 166). 12. See Kymlicka (1995), pp. 107±9.

criminals,

13. Taylor, in Gutmann (ed.) (1994), p. 30.

through the judicial process, helps make them into

by

putting

those

charged

with

crime

criminals.

14. Ibid., p. 30. 15. This theme of self-sincerity links Taylor's account of

32. A consequence of this interpretation of the public

authenticity to that developed by another contem-

culture as ever-evolving is that no rights to recogni-

porary proponent, Alessandro Ferrara: see Ferrara,

tion are justified forever; they are instead revisable as

(1998), chapter 1.

the self-understanding of the public culture changes through public deliberation.

16. For more on the idea of exemplary validity, see ibid.,

33. Fraser (1995).

chapters 1 and 4.

100

8

THE ESSENTIAL INDETERMINACY OF RAWLS'S DIFFERENCE PRINCIPLE Rex Martin

allows for differences in income and wealth Rawls

I

refers to it as the `difference principle'.

1

John Rawls is probably the leading theorist of justice

A society that met this particular set of standards ±

in the world today (certainly the English-speaking

that is, which satisfied the goals set by equal basic

world). For him justice is, or should be, a virtue of

liberties, equality of opportunity and the difference

society, specifically of the political and social and

principle understood as mutual benefit ± would be

economic arrangements in its `basic structure'. In

`thoroughly just', in Rawls's view. But to be `perfectly

Rawls's view, what justice requires of these basic

just' it would also, at some point, have to maximise

institutions, as a set, is not only that they exhibit (1)

the level of income and wealth of the least well-off

the principle of equal basic liberties and (2) that of

group in particular ± say, the bottom one-fifth.

2

equality of opportunity, but also (3) that they work

This point about the maximising of the minimum

together in such a way as to (a) encourage contribu-

is not intended to identify a benefit for everyone in

tions that (b) increase the production of goods and

the target group. Rather, the relevant effects here are

services, which in turn are so distributed as (c) to

the effects on a `representative' person; they are

improve continually the level of income and wealth

effects on an ideal-type average individual in the

of all the various income groups involved, when

bottom group.

considered from the perspective of a representative

3

In the present chapter I want to focus attention on

person's whole life, a normal life.

Rawls's difference principle. In order to avoid con-

We might, following Rawls, describe (1) equal

fusion and distraction, I will specify this focal project

basic liberties and (2) equality of opportunity as prior

rather narrowly. Rawls is concerned principally to

demands of justice and (3) the principle of mutual

describe normal or standard patterns of just distribu-

benefit as a secondary demand, one that is to be

tion (without regard to prior maldistributions). In

fulfilled in the context of fulfilling these prior de-

other words, we are being asked to consider (at least

mands and without sacrifice by them. On this view,

as a first stage, in order to see what picture would

then, in a just or well-ordered society, inequalities in

result) what it would be like for a society simply to

economic or social positions and attendant inequal-

satisfy the difference principle and the other de-

ities in economic or social positions can be allowed ±

mands of justice.

4

indeed, should be allowed ± subject to meeting these

Rawls typically states his difference principle as

three conditions. Since the third of the conditions

being itself closely attached to the principle of

101

REX MARTIN

this, such a society should be concerned to reduce

equality of opportunity: the two together make up, in 5

I want to

the inequalities in income and wealth that will arise

begin, then, by examining the reasoning Rawls offers

between individuals and between groups of people.

his view, a single principle of justice.

in support of this single but composite principle.

6

We can treat these three thoughts as steps in a

First, he establishes the importance of the idea of

single overall argument designed to justify the com-

equality of opportunity. We can assume here, for

posite principle of justice we are here concerned with

purposes of exposition, that a group of people are

and to specify both a precise notion of equality of

thinking seriously about the way societies are ar-

opportunity and the content of the difference prin-

ranged respecting such matters as social and econom-

ciple. The argument we are examining, as Rawls

ic position and attendant income and wealth. They

initially states it, is an `informal' or `intuitive' argu-

note that, typically, there is considerable inequality

ment.

between persons and between classes in these mat-

we'll look briefly at what it would take (in Rawls's

ters. We can imagine now the following interior line

view) for it to become a fully formal and conclusive

of thought going on in the minds of the people in our

argument.

7

After we've canvassed the argument further,

group: each realises that inequality in position and

The argument starts with the idea of `democratic'

attendant wealth may well be involved for the

equality of opportunity ± conceived as the taking of

society they are in, but no one wishes to accept

remedial steps, conscientiously, to reduce the initial

an inferior position for oneself, even though it might

inequality in advantages accruing to individuals from

prove to be for the common good in a particular

two main sources. The idea that dominates this

society. Each person sees, then, upon reflection, that

particular discussion is that no one is responsible

it would be irrational from anyone's point of view

for ± hence no one deserves ± their own starting

simply to take an inferior position as their lot in life.

points, their natural endowment or the social posi-

Nor could anyone regard it as desirable to be forced

tion into which they are born and reared. Since

to take such a position. So, granting that inequality

equality of opportunity can never be strict or abso-

in positions is both highly likely (perhaps inevitable)

lute, Rawls introduces a further idea, the difference

and conceivably useful, each would want income-

principle, to complement equality of opportunity

and wealth-generating positions to be open to all on

and complete the initial line of argument. The

some principle of equality of opportunity.

difference principle adds two more ideas, two further

This establishes the point Rawls wants to make,

remedial steps; it adds the principle of everyone's

that equality of opportunity is important and that we

continual benefit, which in turn is constrained by

should want a principle specifying it. Then, next, in

the idea that, where there are several mutually

a series of further reflections on this very point,

improving options available, we should choose that

Rawls elaborates a set of ideas that, taken together,

option which most reduces the resultant inequality

constitute an argument for the composite (or sec-

in outcomes between the top-most and bottom-most

ond) principle of justice.

groups. The object of this three-step process is to

There are, in my view, three main thoughts or

reduce, ideally to minimise, the gap between persons

ideas advanced here. Let me sketch them briefly and

by taking account of both starting points and end

loosely, just to set the big picture in view.

results.

8

The first thought is that no person is responsible

The idea of collective asset, the name Rawls gives

for that person's own starting point in life. The

the argument just described, provides the rationale

second is that, in view of this first point, it makes

and justification for the main features of Rawls's

sense for people (acting as members of a single

second principle of justice. It underwrites both equal-

political economy) to attempt to achieve a higher

ity of opportunity in its `democratic interpretation'

index of wealth and income for all representative

and the principle of distributive economic justice ±

persons at the various income levels there (higher,

that is, the difference principle.

that is, than existed at some initial point of presumed equality). And the third thought is that, in doing

102

9

INDETERMINACY OF RAWLS'S DIFFERENCE PRINCIPLE

between the top-most and the bottom-most group.

II

This iterated pattern continues until we reach an

We get to the usual specification of the difference

optimum point, at which no further mutually im-

principle by reiterating the set of ideas just sketched.

proving moves are possible. At this point we have

That is, we do so (assuming here a continuing

minimised absolutely the difference in question, and

conscientious effort at achieving `democratic' equal-

those least well-off here have their greatest benefit.

ity of opportunity) by repeatedly deploying the

The leading ideas of this argument were sum-

principle of everyone's continual benefit as con-

marised (at the end of the previous section) under

strained by egalitarianism (thereby reducing differ-

the name `the argument from collective asset'. Per-

ences in outcome between the top-most and bottom-

haps calling it an argument may not convey the

most group) up to the optimum point, where this

exact picture I have in mind. Let us call it instead,

difference is absolutely minimised and the least well-

taking a hint from Rawls's later writings, a `procedure

off are as well-off as they can be (without making any

of construction'.

other group worse-off in the process).

more like a constructive proof in mathematics ± say,

12

A procedure of construction is

This particular iterated argument has a singular

a geometrical proof ± in which we get a result by

virtue; it explains a puzzling fact about Rawls's

making certain moves (constructing certain figures,

exposition

holds

making certain assumptions) than it is like a classical

throughout his book A Theory of Justice (hereafter

syllogism in which certain propositions simply fol-

TJ). Repeatedly, Rawls seems to shift between talk-

low, by logical entailment, from ready-made pre-

ing about the difference principle as improving every-

mises.

of

the

second

principle

that

body's prospects and, alternatively, as maximising the

So the kind of argument I have in mind is itself

benefits of the least well-off group. But the puzzle

best understood as a procedure of construction. Here

dissolves once we see that both these versions belong

a procedure is identified and then employed, by

to one and the same story. Each formulation specifies

reference to certain leading ideas (which give the

a single feature of the overall argument; one for-

point of the procedure), to get a certain result; that

mulation emphasises the idea that drives the differ-

procedure is iterated, repeatedly deployed, until the

ence principle ± the notion of everyone's continual

identified end point is reached. This point is the

benefit ± while the other emphasises the optimal

intended or optimum result (given the iterated pro-

result, the goal or end point of the entire argument.

cedure and its governing assumptions).

13

That goal can be stated in either of two distinctive

What is curious about Rawls's informal (or `col-

ways: (1) as absolutely minimising the difference

lective asset') argument ± as we actually find it in TJ

(measured in terms of income or wealth) between

(the heart of the discussion being at Chapter 2,

the top-most and bottom-most group, consistent

section 13) ± is that, while Rawls presents its gov-

with the realisation of everyone's continued better-

erning concerns clearly enough (in what I have

ment; or (2) as achieving `the greatest benefit of the

called three main `thoughts') and while he presents

least advantaged',

10

its goal point equally clearly (as the `greatest benefit

that is, the greatest benefit for

14

the least well-off group. Here we have a distinction

of the least well-off group'

without a difference; the two goal-point formulations

intermediate step (the procedure of construction

(1) and (2) say the same thing.

11

), he never lays out the

itself) whereby, through repeated deployment, we can get from these concerns to the goal point.

And here I come to the heart of my analysis, the main point I want to make. The difference principle

But once we actually `see' the procedure of con-

can be represented as an argument that proceeds

struction in action, as I have tried to represent it in

through a series of stages, each one of which embo-

the previous section, the move from governing con-

dies a conscientious effort at achieving equality of

cerns (as given in the three main thoughts) to goal

opportunity and each one of which repeats the same

point seems natural enough and even plausible. One

theme: first satisfy the standard of mutual benefit (or

point of the procedure is to show how in fact Rawls's

efficiency) and then reduce differences in income

conclusion (for example, the maximin result) follows

103

REX MARTIN

from his premises, the governing considerations (the

that the curves of the other groups could be higher as

three main thoughts).

well; and that (2) so long as reciprocal benefit is

In the present account, then, I'm suggesting that

possible or feasible it is in fact sustained right on up

Rawls's argument from collective asset is best under-

to the optimum or goal point.

stood as constituted by three distinct things. It

Clearly, we are not talking here about actual social

involves: (1) certain governing considerations which

relations in a certain pattern but about a `logical'

together model or specify a procedure of construc-

situation that must be realised whenever such a

tion; (2) the repeated deployment of that procedure

pattern actually does hold. We might describe this

up to an identified end point; and (3) the actual

situation, then, as the `presupposition' behind chain

reaching of that point by using that procedure.

connection: the presupposition that, so long as the

Is this argument, so understood, conclusive? I

benefit of the least well-off group could possibly be

think not. But it becomes logically conclusive if

higher, that of the other groups could also be higher,

we make certain simplifying assumptions.

right on up to the optimum or goal point.

We must assume, as does Rawls, that we start from

With the presupposition (or, if you will, the

a hypothetical `zero point' of strict equality. And,

possibility)

second, we must assume that chain connection (or

the idea here (as a simplifying assumption belonging

something like it) holds. Chain connection means,

to mathematics, not to social policy or, at least, not

roughly, that `if an advantage has the effect of raising

to a description of social reality) in place, as one of

the expectations of the lowest position, it raises the

the background assumptions, we have completed our

expectations of all positions in between.'

15

account of Rawls's informal argument for the second

Or, as

principle.

Rawls redescribes the same idea, so long as the `curve'

How would the argument fare as a formal argu-

of the least well-off class shows improvement, all the other classes do so as well.

16

of chain connection, as we are using

ment? How would it do in the original position?

The point is that,

without assuming chain connection (or something like it), we cannot guarantee ending up at the

III

optimum or goal point while deploying the threestep collective asset argument and the procedure of

Rawls's contractarian method is very complex. I will

construction identified in it. But with it we can.

be able to mention only a few of its main features

Chain connection is an idea Rawls himself uses

here. One which is often emphasised ± and that

and, with qualification, endorses. The qualifications

Rawls has continued to include even in his more

have to do with whether chain connection holds in

recent writings ± is that the `parties' to the contract

actual societies or would hold invariably in a just

are placed, in the original position, behind a thick

society modelled on the two principles. So under-

`veil of ignorance'. Here they are instructed in their

stood, chain connection is a description of actual

subsequent reasoning to ignore their own particular

social relations. The difference principle is not lo-

traits (traits that distinguish them from all or most

gically contingent on whether this actual relation

other people), to be unaware of (or, at least, to

holds or not.

17

ignore) their actual place in society, to be unaware of their society's place in history or in institutional

However, we are not in the present account using

evolution, and so on.

our variant of chain connection as a description of actual social relations. Rather, it is like the assump-

Thus extreme uncertainty (as to starting points

tion of starting from a position of strict equality in

and outcomes for any given individual) would char-

social primary goods. It is a simplifying assumption, a

acterise the deliberations in the original position

regulatory constraint designed to keep the collective

setting, in which individuals are called upon to

asset argument (and the deployment of the proce-

construct and then choose the principles of justice

dure of construction) in focus. The constraint re-

that they would prefer to govern the society in which

quires (1) that so long as the `curve' of the least well-

they are to spend their entire lives. Given this high degree of uncertainty, we find that

off group could possibly be higher it is also possible

104

INDETERMINACY OF RAWLS'S DIFFERENCE PRINCIPLE

Rawls's collective asset argument fares rather well.

that inequality. The idea is that even after mutual

For example, the transition from the idea that no-

benefit is assured one should continue to use equal

body deserves their starting points to the idea that

shares (of primary goods) as a standing constraint on

people should use their natural endowments and

beneficial options, as a tiebreaker of sorts. Here,

their social origins (where these things are advanta-

among available options, that efficient and mutually

geous) in such a way that everybody benefits would

beneficial outcome which most reduces inequality is

surely go more smoothly behind the veil of ignorance

to be selected. To do otherwise would be to opt for a

than it would where people were already aware of

surplus of inequality, that is an inequality greater

their own and others' natural endowments and social

than is required to achieve compensating reciprocal

origins. This transition would certainly carry more

benefit. It would be unsuitable, given the commit-

conviction for the parties in the original position and

ment to equality (an initial benchmark and a con-

would, presumably, be emphatically endorsed by

tinuing

them there.

inequality unnecessarily.

concern),

to

perpetuate

or

increase

And, for a second example, the mutual benefit

It is precisely where fundamental equality in start-

part of the collective asset argument would gain

ing points is not fully and strictly achieved, or cannot

strong endorsement there, especially if we assumed

be, that concern for reducing the inequality of

a starting-point of strict equality. The argument

resultant outcomes is in order. Thus, efficiency con-

would go as follows: the parties would have no reason

strained by egalitarianism is a standard that each and

to give up this equality in their choice of principles

all could appeal to in the original position. None

unless there were benefits for each and all, or at least

would veto it. So the parties would endorse the

for some of them (and no losses).

18

principle that, where two or more feasible efficient

Let me make the same argument now in somewhat

schemes were available, that option should be se-

different words. In the original position a certain

lected which most reduced the difference (when

amount of role-playing is allowed, individuals are

measured in terms of income and wealth) between

allowed to assume certain standpoints and then to

the top-most and the bottom-most group.

20

consider how things would play out in the delibera-

In sum, I think the collective asset argument

tions of the parties. One could assume, for example,

would fare well in the original position construct.

that one was in a religious minority or in the least

And, since that construct is hypothetical and is

well-off economic class.

19

Under such an assumption

defined by a number of ideal features, it seems that

and behind the veil of ignorance, no one would

the simplifying assumptions mentioned earlier ± that

prefer disadvantageous deviations (from equal or even

we start from a position of strict equality and that a

from unequal shares) were they on the losing end,

certain regularity condition (the possibility of chain

and hence would veto such deviations. Thus, only

connection) holds good ± would be comfortably at

deviations advantageous to all would survive the

home there.

veto (that is, only such advantageous deviations could

It important to see that Rawls nowhere repudiates

achieve the unanimity required of conclusive delib-

the informal argument, the argument from collective

erations in the original position construct). But it

asset. Indeed Rawls refers to TJ, section 13 (the very

would be rational, in the eyes of each, to allow for

heart of the informal argument), as the one that

mutually beneficial changes, where there were more

defines

benefits for each and all (or at least for some) and no

prominent argument that we do find in TJ, chapter

losses.

3 (the chapter devoted to the original position), the

It follows, too, where persons have an equal status

the difference principle.

21

And the most

famous maximin argument, actually presupposes and

(as parties to the deliberation) and each has equal

builds on the argument from collective asset.

claim to shares of primary goods, that the parties

We can put the line of reasoning in this well-

would prefer a mutually beneficial outcome that

known argument quickly and intuitively as follows.

reduced the difference in income between the top-

Behind the veil of ignorance and given the high

most and bottom-most group over one that increased

degree of uncertainty there, each individual thinks

105

REX MARTIN

that, since they don't know how or where they might

the maximin argument then chooses between. It

end up, it behoves them all ± behoves each of them ±

follows that, in order for the maximin argument

to set things up (in the principles they select, each

to function at all, the principles which generate

one having a veto there) so that the worst control-

these characteristic outcomes must themselves be

lable outcome (for any one of them) is the best of a

independently formulated and established, for other-

bad lot (the best, that is, of the set of worst out-

wise they could not give these well-defined results.

comes).

Thus the maximin procedure must actually presup-

This line of reasoning, which has its home in

pose these outcome-giving principles, presuppose

rational choice theory (and can be found in eco-

them

nomic theory and political science) is, as I've already

well-established.

as

independent

and

presuppose

them

as

23

indicated, sometimes called maximin reasoning (that

The maximin argument provides no arguments for

is, reasoning literally on the principle of maximising

the two principles per se, either for the first principle

the minimum). The standard line of interpreting

(which we've merely taken for granted in this chap-

Rawls's difference principle (at what I have called

ter)

its goal or optimum outcome) has been that it was

have already canvassed). Accordingly, it adds noth-

supported justificatorily and was rationalised by max-

ing new to the already established argument for these

imin reasoning. This maximin line of reasoning was

principles. Rather, it is an argument for preferring the

attributed to Rawls by his initial expositors (and

two principles, already established on other grounds,

often, then, they severely criticised him for holding

over the most plausible of the utilitarian theories, the

to it) and more recent critics (such as Will Kymlicka,

principle of average utility (a principle already es-

Jonathan Wolff and Andrew Williams) have con-

tablished in Rawls's account, on its own grounds, at

tinued to view maximin as the standard pattern of

TJ, section 27).

justification intended by Rawls for the difference principle.

22

24

or for the second (the arguments for which we

It is Rawls's view that utilitarians and others,

This line has, in the view of most, been

especially in the setting afforded by the original

encouraged by Rawls himself (and can be found

position, would allow the sacrifice or attenuation

clearly enough, they think, in TJ and later works).

of some of the demands of justice, of the prior

But, contrary to what most of his interpreters and

demands especially, or would do so for some people

critics suppose, Rawls does not claim that his differ-

at least. Thus, the maximin argument doesn't even

ence principle is itself supported specifically by max-

focus on the second principle, let alone its difference

imin reasoning. At least, he makes no such claim in

principle part. Instead, it focuses on the loss of equal

his published writings. Rather, maximin reasoning

basic liberties of the sort enshrined in the first

seems to have a secondary role in his account, as

principle.

developed in TJ and thereafter. It is brought in only

ground, in Rawls's view, for preferring the two

after his principles of justice have been formulated

principles over the principle of average utility.

25

And it is this fact that marks the primary 26

and established on other grounds; it is then employed

So much, then, for the usual reading of the

by him to defend the whole set of these principles.

maximin argument. It is based on a sort of optical

Here, the main use of the maximin argument in

illusion: that maximin is the argument for the two

Rawls's hands is to rule out or to constrain utilitarian

principles, in particular for the difference principle.

alternatives to his preferred principles of justice.

On the contrary, the maximin argument is not an

We can see the force of the contention just made

argument for the two principles per se; it neither

by noting a simple fact, that the outcomes, which the

formulates nor establishes them. Rather, it presup-

maximin argument ranges over, must themselves be

poses the two principles and the results they char-

generated somehow. They are in fact generated by

acteristically give and argues that these results are

the competing principles under review ± by the two

preferable (under original position considerations,

principles, on the one hand, and by the principle of

where maximin reasoning is at home) to those

average utility, on the other. It is these particular

characteristically given by the principle of average

outcomes, two sets of characteristic outcomes, which

utility. Most especially, and for the same reasons, it is

106

INDETERMINACY OF RAWLS'S DIFFERENCE PRINCIPLE

not an argument for the difference principle in particular. That principle is hardly touched upon

Fig 8.1

at all in the maximin argument, as we find it in TJ, Chapter 3. Indeed, the difference principle as such doesn't have a face-off with the principle of average utility until TJ, Chapter 5, and there (in section 49) the argument has nothing to do with maximin. Thus, we must look elsewhere for Rawls's argument for the second principle, in particular the difference principle. In Rawls's theory, the argument specifically and peculiarly designed for the purpose of supporting the difference principle in particular is the one based on the idea of collective asset; it is an argument for reciprocal benefit of the sort that could be developed in the original position.

27

In the figure, x1 is the axis line that measures well-

It is this

being for the better-off group (in terms of units of

argument that Rawls later calls the `compelling' one

income, say) and x2 serves similarly as the axis for the

for the difference principle.

less well-off group. The dotted line (running at a 45 8

28

A natural reading of Rawls's difference principle,

angle) is the equality line; it represents the points of

along the lines set by collective asset, is that (assum-

strict equality between the two groups. The space on

ing throughout a continuing conscientious effort at

and below the curve 0P (correctly read as zero/P)

achieving `democratic' equality of opportunity) it

represents the available economic options in a par-

requires mutual improvement and that, where more

ticular society, given its resources, reasonable expec-

than one pattern of mutual improvement is possible,

tations of development and so on (and subject, of

society should select that one which minimises the

course, to the constraint of meeting the prior de-

difference in income and wealth between the top-

mands of justice). The darkened line on 0P is the

most and the bottom-most group. A consistent

Pareto-optimal `zone'; in it, no improvements for any

application of this principle would yield an optimum

group are possible without worsening the prospects of

or goal situation where the well-being of the least

at least one other group. The point a, on the 0P

well-off group (the bottom 20 per cent, say) was as

curve (and in the Pareto-optimal zone), is the point

great as it could possibly be.

of maximum well-being for x2 within the available

The `everybody benefits' principle (as qualified by

space.

the egalitarian constraint) is fully compatible ± in

Now let us suppose, first, that we were on or under

principle ± with the optimum or goal point of

the curve 0a. From any given point within this space,

maximising the well-being of the least well-off group.

the mutual-benefit egalitarian solution (if we assume

Indeed, that principle (through the specification and

certain regularity conditions) would intersect the 0P

use of a procedure of construction) constitutes the

curve at a (= the point of maximum benefit for the

principal argument for reaching that very goal point.

least well-off group, the Rawlsian goal or optimum

Accordingly, there is always a determinate directive

point).

that can be given to society by the Rawlsian differ-

However, suppose next that we were on or under

ence principle: structure things via policies and

the curve aP (but not at a or on the dotted line that

suchlike such that mutual improvement leading

runs perpendicular from a to the x1 axis). Suppose,

ultimately to the greatest well-being of the least

for example, that we were at point j on the ub line;

well-off group is achieved.

here, the mutual-benefit egalitarian solution could not intersect the 0P curve at a; rather, it would intersect that curve somewhere in the segment aP

IV

Now consider the problem, set forth in figure 8.1.

(but not at a). 29

The only way we could get to a, once we were to

107

REX MARTIN

the right of the perpendicular, is to move in such a

blem or as a practical one. Let us turn first to the

way as (at some point) to reduce the well-being of the

theoretical problem. I will address the practical one

members of the x1 class, thereby violating the re-

subsequently.

quirement of everyone's benefit. And this the mu-

Collective asset (which includes the idea of mu-

tual-benefit solution, as I have portrayed it, would

tual benefit) is the argument for the difference prin-

not allow. Thus, the whole area to the right of the

ciple, in either its improving or its maximising

perpendicular is a `forbidden zone' for that particular

version (as we find these versions in TJ at pp. 60

solution.

and 83 respectively). This means that it is the

Indeed, within that area no satisfactory result is

argument for the conclusion Rawls wants to draw

possible. There is no way the determinate directive

respecting the optimum or goal point, the ultimate

(described at the end of the previous section) could

end of the whole process, so to speak. In the situation

be satisfied. One would have to choose either to

we are here contemplating, the preferred conclusion

satisfy the mutual-benefit egalitarian solution or the

and the argument for it have come apart. They are

maximin one. The two are no longer compatible in

literally incompatible. This is a serious problem for a

principle and hence, to realise the one, we would

theoretical, or ideal, argument to be in.

have to give up on the other. Here we encounter the

There are, of course, ways to avoid this problem.

essential indeterminacy of Rawls's difference princi-

And we are familiar with them from earlier discus-

ple.

sion (in section II). Thus, we conduct the argument starting from a standpoint of strict equality and we

It is possible that a society could find itself in this zone (and to find itself there without prior injustice

assume that the possibility of chain connection (as

having occurred). Imagine, for example, that a so-

there defined) holds throughout. The so-called for-

ciety is following a mutual benefit path (for example,

bidden zone, then, merely specifies a case where this

the ub line in the figure). Such a society would be a

argument would not ± logically could not ± be

`thoroughly just' one, by Rawls's standards; its being

applicable. It identifies a case where the presupposi-

at j on that line would not be unjust, nor would it

tion behind chain connection fails to hold and thus

reflect past injustice.

identifies a zone in which the procedure of construc-

There are two rather obvious possible cases here.

tion could not operate to effect its assigned end,

First, a society could already be at j (on the ub line,

could not so operate because one of the essential

the line it had been following) when TJ is published

background assumptions for its proper use fails to

and the inhabitants (members of a thoroughly just

hold in that entire zone.

society up to then) start thinking things through in

There is, then, a `theoretical' solution of sorts to

the light of its arguments. Second, a society (again, a

the theoretical problem. We achieve it by carefully

thoroughly just one up to that point) wanders into

seeing to it that our argument conforms to certain

the `forbidden zone' through a typical and non-

background assumptions; by doing so we necessarily

culpable ignorance of its full set of economic options

avoid the problem posed.

(its own feasibility curve) at the time. It does so

The theoretical solution envisioned here is ulti-

while at the same time staying on the ub line (up to

mately a very pricey one. It requires us to make some

point j). And we assume that the configuration of

rather strong assumptions: (1) that we start from

the curve doesn't change significantly after that so as

strict equality; (2) that the background presupposi-

to redefine the `forbidden zone' in the case at hand.

tion (that chain connection is possible and thus

For any society in the situation just described, the

realisable) holds good; (3) that we can readily iden-

Rawlsian difference principle could not afford direc-

tify a society's feasibility curve and, on it, the point of

tion, could not specify a coherent goal for policy. In

the greatest benefit for the least well-off group and,

short, the difference principle, on Rawls's usual

thus, readily identify the zone where the presupposi-

understanding of it, is here inherently indeterminate.

tion (in (2)) holds and the zone where it doesn't ± so

We can put the problematic now before us in two

that we can stay out of the latter. These are, as I said,

distinct ways. We can view it as a theoretical pro-

strong assumptions. Even so, we might admit them.

108

INDETERMINACY OF RAWLS'S DIFFERENCE PRINCIPLE

any given society. Indeed, it could arise in fact for

But they may be more than mere assumptions. In

many societies in the real social world.

Rawls's account the `parties' in the `original position' are invited to reason with certain assumptions at

Following good policies (policies of mutual benefit

hand. And they are invited to reason in earnest. For

designed to ensure `thorough' justice), even follow-

people so to reason, I would suggest, they must

ing the best policies (policies of mutual benefit as

believe that these assumptions are applicable to their

constrained by egalitarianism, policies designed to

own case.

assure, under a procedure of construction, the max-

Now take the third of the assumptions. If people

imum benefit of the least well-off group), will not

reasoned in the original position, with such an

guarantee that a society will not wander off course.

assumption in place, then they could guarantee that

There is no guarantee that it will not, under real

by staying in the zone where the background assump-

conditions of uncertainty (and risk), enter a zone in

tion held good they could employ the procedure of

which the procedure of construction cannot operate

construction to reach the assigned end in view. But

to effect its assigned end. The problem, in short,

so to reason suggests that they know (or believe) the

could arise for a thoroughly just society.

30

society they are here constructing (or evaluating)

A society that found itself in such a situation ± for

itself occupies, or can occupy, precisely such a zone.

non-culpable reasons and without having committed

As a belief about social location this is, given the

injustice ± would discover that, so long as the

veil of ignorance, not the kind of belief that could be

situation could not be altered or could not realisti-

admitted into the original position. Clearly, if one

cally be expected to change in any significant way, it

were to call such a belief a matter of knowledge, it

could no longer follow a coherent set of policy

would be impermissible to entertain it in the original

directives (as based on Rawls's collective asset idea)

position.

for reaching Rawls's preferred goal point. It could

So we strike the offending belief out; we do not

only act arbitrarily here ± adhering either to the

allow it to operate at all. But then the parties are

premises of the argument or to its conclusion but

forced to reason about matters of justice (matters of

not both. For the conditions under which the proce-

justice for them) that may not even be applicable to

dure of construction could operate, so as to hold the

the society they inhabit, or may not be applicable to

governing considerations and the end irrevocably

its expected or allowable course of development

together, would not obtain here.

(allowable, that is, if a society is to be and remain

It is no longer possible, in such a situation, to

a thoroughly just one). Indeed, reasoning in this way

coordinate a mutual benefit-egalitarian solution with

(reasoning without a well-founded belief as to sui-

the maximin one. To realise the one, we would have

table social location) may prove to be wholly un-

to give up on the other.

realistic.

This incompatibility in available strategies would

By developing the principles of justice under ideal

be a serious practical problem for any justice-aspiring

assumptions we guarantee an impeccable theoretical

society to find itself in. There is no theoretical solu-

result. At the same time we guarantee, should the

tion for the problem available to it, given Rawls's

assumptions fail to hold in fact, that the so-called

argument or Rawls's text. And yet it is a problem that

theoretical solution is inapplicable there.

requires to be resolved in a principled way.

A certain set of working assumptions has become

This is the dilemma, the deep incoherence, that

locked into the original-position argument pattern.

Rawlsian theory necessarily leads to, or could lead to.

Where these assumptions cannot hold there must be,

It is a situation that Rawlsian theory has not con-

for a certain zone of the suboptimal space, no the-

templated, but one that we, as friends of justice and

oretical solution available, not even in principle. We

perhaps of Rawlsian theory, need to think hard

have, in fact, made it systematically impossible to

about.

solve the problem of what to do in that zone. There will always be such a zone. Thus, the situation envisioned could in principle arise for

109

REX MARTIN

critical of arguments I have given in my works cited

A Postscript on Sources

above, which I have found helpful in the develop-

and Acknowledgements

ment of the present chapter. These studies are

The present chapter draws on two main sources. First

Lamont (1994) and Williams (1995). I cannot claim

it is based upon my book Rawls and Rights (Martin

to have answered all the criticisms made, especially

(1985)), chapters 4, and 5 especially, and also chap-

by Willliams, but these two studies did lead me to

ter 8. Chapter 5 is, in turn, a longer version of certain

significant reformulations and to some new lines of

sections of Martin and Shenoy (1983). I owe to

thought, as sketched in the present chapter.

Prakash Shenoy both the idea for the efficiency-

Finally, for their assistance on the present chapter

cum-egalitarianism presentation of Rawls's differ-

(or on earlier versions of it), I want to thank Prakash

ence principle and much of the formalism developed

Shenoy (with whom I've been discussing, on and off

for it in the present chapter and in Martin (1985). In

since February 1994, the problem identified in sec-

particular, I owe to him the idea that chain con-

tion IV) and Ann Cudd (with whom I've discussed

nection (or, rather, something like it) must be

one of Williams's leading criticisms, that the effi-

assumed in society with n classes (where n > 2).

ciency-cum-egalitarianism presentation of Rawls's

And I owe to him the development of the egalitarian

difference principle fails to satisfy the standard of

matrix in which, in a situation of n classes, we

`contraction consistency' ± a criticism which I do not

minimise (reduce as much as possible) the difference

address in the present chapter and one which I do

between the top-most class x1 and the bottom-most

not credit, in the end). I have been helped too

class x2. (Rawls's own analysis on this very point, we

(especially in developing the argument of section

may recall, was wholly confined to a two-class situa-

IV) by students in my classes and by audiences, in

tion and did not take account of sub-optimal situa-

both the US and the UK, before whom I've pre-

tions). Finally, the important appendix in Martin

sented earlier versions of this chapter. The present

(1985) is entirely his work. Secondly, this chapter is

chapter is a shortened version of one I published in a

also based upon my paper `Economic Justice: Con-

volume of papers entitled Rights and Reason, edited by

tractarianism and Rawls's Difference Principle', in

Larry May and Marilyn Friedman for Kluwer (2000).

Boucher and Kelly (eds) (1994), pp. 245±66. Let me mention as well two recent studies, both

Notes

1. See Rawls (1972), pp. 60±1 for the Rawlsian `first

3. It is important to bear in mind throughout that the

statement' of the principles of justice, which I have

difference principle is an aggregative principle; it

tried to convey in the paragraph to which this note is

concerns groups (in the example given, the bottom

attached.

20 per cent of wage earners); it does not concern

2. See ibid., pp. 78±9, 319 for the distinction between

individuals per se, i.e. people readily known to us by

thoroughly/perfectly just. Rawls adds, in each of these

their proper names (ibid., p. 78). The same could be

discussions, the proviso that the income expectations

said of the other income groups (say, the top 20 per

of the various groups are to be understood as making a

cent and so on). Our focus is always on an ideal-type

positive functional contribution to one another, and

average individual within that particular group, not on

as doing so in some accredited setting ± in an open and

any given, single individual who happens to be there.

competitive market, say. Thus, in a `perfectly just'

4. Rawls makes clear that the account of distributive

situation the contribution is such that no further

shares that accords with the difference principle `be-

improving `changes in the expectations of those better

longs to strict compliance theory and so to the consideration of the ideal scheme' (ibid., p. 315).

off can improve the situation of those worse off' (ibid., p. 78). In a `thoroughly just' situation, on the other

5. See, for example, ibid., pp. 60, 83, 302±3.

hand, the key claim is that if the expectations of those

6. Rawls refers to this composite principle as his second

better off were somehow `decreased, the prospects of

principle of justice at, for example, ibid., section 12;

the least advantaged would likewise fall' from their

the first principle, of course, is his principle of equal

present point (ibid., p. 78).

basic liberties (ibid., pp. 60±1). And in his book there

110

INDETERMINACY OF RAWLS'S DIFFERENCE PRINCIPLE

is a strict priority, of the first principle over the second:

Sandu called a `logic game' in his paper `Games in

ibid., pp. 61, 302±3.

Logic', presented at the conference on Logic and Ontology at the University of the West, Timisoara,

7. Ibid., p. 78.

Romania, in May 1998.

8. The argument for this final thought, that we should manifest a continuing concern for minimising inequal-

14. For example at Rawls (1972), p. 83.

ity, is a simple and appealing one. We apply the same

15. Ibid., p. 80.

standard to end points (or outcomes) that we had

16. Ibid., pp. 81±3; see also Martin (1985), p. 199.

earlier applied, in the `democratic interpretation' of

17. See Rawls (1972), p. 82.

the second principle, to starting-points. That is, we

18. Here I paraphrase Lamont (1994), p. 318. And La-

begin by conscientiously reducing ± as we much as we

mont, in turn, was describing one argument, which he

can (all things considered) ± the difference in starting

thought successful, from Martin (1985) and my `Eco-

points that accrue to individuals from the two main

nomic Justice' in Boucher and Kelly (eds) (1994).

sources, from one's natural endowment and from one's

Rawls represents the reasoning of the parties in the

initial social position, and then we repeat the same

original position as `part of the theory of rational

procedure with respect to outcomes. The rationale for

choice' (Rawls, 1972, p. 172). The parties there are

doing this is that, since we can never reduce the initial

taken to be rational (ibid., p. 25) and to lack envy

differences to zero, it is permissible to reduce differ-

(ibid., p. 143). Thus, under the assumption that `more

ences in outcomes as well. The idea of reducing

is preferred over less', the parties are simply concerned

differences in outcomes between two or more feasible

to ensure a suitable ensemble of primary goods (for

options, available at a given time, is a natural com-

themselves individually and their descendants), in the

plement to the theme of equal opportunity with

social world they will inhabit, under a rule that they all

respect to starting points with which we began. In-

agree to and each could have vetoed (ibid., pp. 263, 270).

deed, it is one and the same idea applied to both starting points and outcomes. This thought, then, is a

19. Ibid., pp. 96±9 and section 33.

fitting completion to the pattern already established in

20. Some of Rawls's clearest statements of this line of

Rawls's first two thoughts. The egalitarian motif of

argument, stressing (as a consideration in the original

`reducing' ± ideally of minimising ± differences in

position) the continuing importance of the bench-

income between the top-most and bottom-most group

mark of equality in a condition of fundamental in-

is expressed most clearly in ibid., section 17 (esp. p.

equality in starting points, is found in his `A Kantian

104). See also Rawls's `Reply to Alexander and Mus-

Conception of Equality', Rawls (1999) at pp. 262±4;

grave', in Rawls (1999) at pp. 246±7, including n. 7;

`Reply to Alexander and Musgrave' in ibid., at pp.

and `Social Unity and Primary Goods' in ibid., at p.

246±7; `Some Reasons for the Maximin Criterion' in

374, n. 12.

ibid., at pp. 230±1; and `Distributive Justice: Some

9. Let me be a bit more precise here. Rawls calls the first

Addenda' in ibid., at p. 165. Thus I think Pat Shaw is

two ideas ± `democratic' equality of opportunity and

wrong to suggest that the difference principle is unconcerned with equality: Shaw (1992), p. 76.

everyone's continual benefit, when taken together in the way I have just described ± the idea of `collective

21. Rawls (1999), p. 594 n. 55.

asset'. The folding of the third idea, of minimising

22. For Kymlicka, see Kymlicka (1990), pp. 61±6. For

inequalities, into collective asset is, in my view, part of

Wolff, see Wolff (1996), pp. 168±87. See also Williams (1995), section III.

Rawls's overall account, though less explicitly so than the other two ideas. The development of, and main

23. A further point. Rawls says that certain considerations

argumentation for, the collective asset idea is found in

make the maximin argument appropriate and render it

Rawls (1972), pp. 72±5, 101±4 (see also pp. 179, 523).

usable. The three most important of these are given in

To this main argumentation should be added his paper

Rawls (1972), p. 154; the latter two could not be

`The Basic Structure as Subject', in Goldman and Kim

convincingly stated and invoked without relying upon

(eds.) (1978), pp. 47±71, at sections 5, 7 and 8. (This

background arguments, of the sort already familiar

paper is reprinted as Lecture VII in Rawls (1996).) See

from the present chapter. For example, one of the

also Rawls (1999), pp. 246±8. For further discussion of

considerations Rawls cites is that `the rejected alter-

the relationship of the collective asset idea to indivi-

natives have outcomes that one can hardly accept.'

dual desert, see Martin (1985), chapter 2, section 2.

But we could have no clear idea of what might be

10. Rawls (1972), pp. 83, 302.

acceptable (or not) without relying upon the very

11. For a proof of this contention, see the appendix in

arguments that would be made in favour of the two principles in the first place. Maximin, in sum, does not

Martin (1985), pp. 197±201.

provide the background argumentation. That argu-

12. See Rawls (1996), Lecture III and, for the quoted

mentation must, then, be developed elsewhere; it is,

phrase, p. 93.

specifically, in the argumentation for the two princi-

13. The procedure has many similarities to what Gabriel

111

REX MARTIN

total wealth (of all classes) would be closely compar-

ples, and in inferences from these arguments. Maximin

able with the result given by classical utility theory.

presupposes these arguments and could not work

27. Rawls is quite explicit on this point; see Rawls (1999),

without them. Thus, a `straight' maximin argument

pp. 165, 246±7.

for the second principle, by-passing the existing argument from collective asset, simply could not be devel-

28. See ibid., p. 230; see also p. 226.

oped.

29. This figure is an adaptation of figures Rawls himself uses; see Rawls (1972), pp. 76±7, 81. Rawls's justi-

24. See Rawls (1972), pp. 60±1 and 302. Rawls significantly recasts the first principle in his later writings ±

fication

see Rawls (1996), p. 291 (in a formulation that dates

position) presupposes that representative members

of

inequality

(in

from 1982) and p. 5 (in a formulation that dates from

of the least well-off group are better off (or at least,

1993).

no worse off) than they would be under a `hypotheinitial arrangement

income,

in

which

wealth,

all

the

social

25. Rawls (1972), pp. 156, 158±9; see also section 49.

tical

26. John Harsanyi, among others, has criticised Rawls's

primary goods are equally distributed', which would

social

argument here. His point is that the principle of

include that `income and wealth are evenly shared':

maximising average utility would fare as well as Raw-

ibid., p. 62. This standard is met by all points in the

ls's two principles under any sort of maximin test; see

so-called available space in the figure. If more than

Harsanyi (1975). D. W. Haslett has argued something

two classes were involved, we would have to repre-

similar with respect to the principle of total utility;

sent their situation in a more complex way. I pre-

specifically, he has argued that the principle of max-

sume, though, that no significant difficulty is posed

imising total utility would fare better under any sort of

on this particular score for my account of the figure drawn here.

maximin test than Rawls's difference principle, at least as regards the distribution of income and wealth ± see

30. One thing we mean when we say that Rawls's theory is

Haslett (1985). I do not find Haslett's argument

ideal is that it is strictly complied with. Its theoretical

convincing. Haslett fails to see that Rawls's main

strictures are fully met. Thus, we would have strict

focus, in the maximin test, is on liberties, not on

compliance if a strategy of everybody's benefit, as

income and wealth. Even on the latter point, Haslett

constrained by egalitarianism, was consistently fol-

fails to see that the judgement at each stage, as to

lowed. The stipulation here is not that the strategy

which to select, is made from a standpoint that

has been optimally followed (`in the best way' or with

incorporates results from the previous stages; Haslett,

the best result); rather, it is merely required that the

on the contrary, treats each sequential choice simply

strategy be completely followed in all cases. My point,

on its own, without regard to where things stand as the

then, is that even if this were done, a society could still

result of prior choices. Finally, in Haslett's own sample

end up in the forbidden zone. A strict compliance

matrix, if the scheme of selection were the one

strategy would not preclude this. A society that so

advocated in the present chapter, where everybody's

acted would not be unjust. Thus, even if the principles

cumulative benefit is constrained at each stage by

of justice are strictly complied with, a problem of

egalitarian considerations, then the worst-off class

essential indeterminacy could still arise. The proble-

would end with a higher index of income and wealth

matic I am describing, then, is a real one for Rawls's

than that afforded by total utility and the resultant

theory.

112

9

RAWLSIAN THEORY, CONTEMPORARY MARXISM AND THE DIFFERENCE PRINCIPLE Rodney G. Peffer

In this chapter, my overall goals are to put the case

politics, the full implications of that victory may

for a Marxist politics today and to proclaim the

still be very far from being recognised and worked

utility to that case of Rawlsian theory ± which is,

through. If an authentically Marxist politics can be

of course, contemporary liberalism's most influential

justified from a Rawlsian perspective, the idea of

contribution to the venerable debate about what

liberalism's `triumph' over Marxism is clearly pro-

`justice' requires. In the history of modern progressive

blematised.

at-

To illustrate this argument, I will first summarise

tacked liberalism for what they perceive to be serious

the key claims in my modified Rawlsian theory of

deficiencies in their theorising of justice. Contrary to

social justice. I shall then seek to rebut some of the

what many people appear to have concluded in the

major reasons why critics have thought that Raw-

wake of Soviet-block communism's collapse, I do not

lsian concepts and prescriptions are inadequate for

believe that the socialist challenge has been at all

`justice'. This section will necessarily be incomplete

discredited. Indeed, I continue to defend the overall

in its coverage; there is simply not the space for a full

Marxist position I first elaborated in my 1990 book

airing of the issues and we should not doubt that the

political

thought,

socialists

have

persistently

However, a

controversy over justice remains variegated and vig-

major theme of that work was that Rawls's theory

orous. But I hope at least to suggest how we might

of justice need only be modified to yield the position

construct a case for saying that Rawlsian theory still

I wished to defend. In other words, there need be no

stands up well in the debate about how `justice'

great moral gap between at least some versions of

should be characterised; it would be vastly premature

liberalism and the ostensibly much more radical

to proclaim the need for its supersession. Finally, I

politics inspired by Marxism. If valid, such a con-

shall offer defence of the claim that my theory really

clusion has at least two profound consequences. The

can count as Marxist. I shall attempt to situate it in

first is that, even when it is granted that arguments

the general school of thought made up of contem-

for socialist politics carry greater weight in the justice

porary liberal-egalitarians and what I shall call the

debate, it need not be necessary to abandon liberal

liberal-socialist egalitarians (among whom we find

theory (at least in its Rawlsian form) to make them.

certain contemporary variants of Marxism who reject

The second is that, in so far as Rawlsianism may be

the official hostility to morality of its `orthodox'

thought to give voice to the liberalism that is widely

version and with which my theory has sufficient

regarded as having won the `battle of ideas' in

affinity to adopt the label itself).

Marxism,

Morality

and

Social

Justice.

113

RODNEY G. PEFFER

of capitalism); and [3] attempts to defend the

Throughout this chapter, I shall leave aside questions of how to generate and justify principles of

Marxist's

justice; I am concerned only to apply intuitive and

The first of these positions is that socialism ±

basic

normative

political

positions.

analytical tests of the moral adequacy of those pro-

that is, democratic, self-managing socialism ± is

posed. Also, such is the enormousness of the various

morally preferable to any form of capitalism as

issues raised here that I can only outline positions

well as to any other form of (modern, mass,

and arguments, aiming to persuade readers to take

pluralistic) society possible under the conditions

them seriously enough to pursue further. The chap-

of moderate scarcity and moderate egoism. The

ter's success in this aim may be gauged by the extent

second is that social and/or political revolution, if

to which it shows how Rawlsianism, the staple diet of

necessary (and sufficient) to effect the appropriate

contemporary liberalism, can push us towards a

transformations, is prima facie morally justified.

1

radical politics that many assume to be completely anathema to the liberal project.

My strategy towards the end of creating such a theory has been to combine a slightly modified Rawlsian theory of social justice with a minimal set of Marxist

A Modified Rawlsian Theory

empirical assumptions to create a theory that ade-

of Social Justice

quately argues for the desirability of working toward a

Since my explicitly stated aim has been to create an

worldwide federation of democratic, self-managing

`adequate' Marxist moral and social theory, I should

market socialist societies. This outcome is not the

first explain what I mean by that phrase. As I noted

one envisaged by Marx, of course. But I ± along with

in the first paragraphs of my 1990 book:

many other thinkers who position themselves within the Marxist tradition today ± reject the feasibility of

By a `moral and social theory' I mean one that

Marx's `higher stage' of communism; the lower,

provides a set of moral principles or standards by

`socialist' stage of post-capitalist society can suffice

which to judge social arrangements and, by so

for Marxism's practical purposes. Furthermore, the

doing, provides criteria to decide between com-

`command economy' model for socialism in mass,

peting sets of historically possible social arrange-

industrial societies has been sufficiently discredited

ments. Such a theory must contain enough of an

for us to prefer a suitably regulated form of market

empirical, social-scientific theory to determine

economy as socialism's best vehicle.

2

which sets of social arrangements are real histor-

Although I wouldn't go so far as to call my theory

ical possibilities and ± of those that are possible ±

a marriage of Marx and Rawls (since this would

which best conform to the moral principles or

probably have to be a `shotgun wedding'), I am

standards

willing to call it an attempt to make Marx and Rawls

propounded

by

an

adequate

moral

theory . . .

seem `comfortable bedfellows'. As a first step in this

By an `adequate' moral and social theory I

direction, in the aforementioned work I surveyed

mean one that is based on a correct set of em-

numerous leftist or left-leaning objections made

pirical, social-scientific theories and on an ade-

against Rawls's theory, arguing that most of them

quate (i.e. correct) moral theory. By an `adequate'

were based on misunderstandings of his theory and/

or `correct moral theory I mean one that is most in

or on faulty reasoning. However, I agreed that there

wide reflective equilibrium with our considered

were four legitimate objections which, although not

moral judgements . . .

requiring a complete rejection of his theory, neces-

By a `Marxist' moral and social theory I mean

sitated some relatively minor modifications. These

one that [1] is informed by the spirit of Marx's

resulted in the following claims:

radical humanism and egalitarianism; [2] is based on the empirical theses centrally important to the

1. There must be a minimum floor of well-being

Marxist political perspective (particularly, Marx's

below which persons are not allowed to fall,

theory of classes and class struggle and his analysis

and observance of this principle must take

114

RAWLSIAN THEORY AND CONTEMPORARY MARXISM

precedence over any other principle of social

Now let us consider my modified Rawlsian theory

justice.

of social justice in full (the principles being listed in

2. There must be at least approximate equality in

order of lexical priority), which I believe captures

the worth of liberty as well as strict equality of

more clearly the sense of `justice' than Rawls's own

liberty per se.

two principles:

3. The difference principle must take the social basis of self-respect ± as well as material wealth

1. Everyone's basic security and subsistence rights

± as a good to be maximised for the least

are to be met (that is, everyone's physical

advantaged.

integrity is to be respected), and everyone is

4. Democracy must not be limited to the political

to be guaranteed a minimum level of material

realm but be implemented in the social and

well-being including basic needs (that is, those

economic realms as well, most especially in the

needs that must be met in order to remain a

workplace.

3

normally functioning human being and citizen).

One significant outcome of these arguments is that

2. There is to be a fully adequate scheme of equal

in his most recent book, Political Liberalism, Rawls

basic liberties, including:

has explicitly acknowledged three of the four mod-

a. freedom of speech and assembly, freedom of

ifications as being persuasive and, in effect, accepted

conscience and thought, freedom of move-

them. As remaining points of dispute between us,

ment and free choice of occupation, the

this leaves only my suggested modification in favour

right to hold (personal) property, freedom

of a principle of social and economic democracy

from arbitrary arrest and seizure as defined

(modification 4) and a disagreement over whether

by the concepts of due process and the rule

or not the difference principle governing fair dis-

of law;

tributions of material primary goods (income, wealth

b. the political liberties such as the right to

and leisure time) should be applied only within

vote and to run for (and hold) political

nations (Rawls's position) or internationally (my

office. These political liberties ± including

view as well as the view of many other writers

the rights to free political speech and as-

and theorists).

4

sembly ± are to be guaranteed their equal

However, part of our ongoing dis-

worth.

agreement over the former seems merely semantic in nature. Rawls's stated reason for rejecting it is that, as

3. There is to be fair equality of opportunity in

a first principle of social justice, it would automati-

the competition for social positions and offices.

cally require some form of socialism and thus illegitimately prejudge the practical project of selecting a

4. Social and economic inequalities are justified

suitable regime for justice given the contingencies of

if and only if they benefit the least advantaged,

the circumstances in question. I believe that this

consistent with the just savings principle, but

argument fails in so far as it is based on a non-

are not to exceed levels that will undermine

standard definition of socialism which obscures the

(a) (approximately) equal worth of the liber-

fact that a society which has some significant degree

ties required by due process, or (b) the good of self-respect.

of social and economic democracy need not be thought of as `socialist' by definition. It is also at

5. There is to be an equal right to participate in

least logically possible that a capitalist society could

decision-making processes within the social

be characterised as having a substantial amount of

and economic institutions of which one is a

social and economic democracy.

5

member.

Hence it is wrong

6

to think that the modification selects the best form of regime in advance of the evaluation of actual cir-

Let us call these principles (1) the Basic Rights

cumstances. (I shall return to the latter dispute

Principle; (2) the Equal Basic Liberties Principle;

shortly.)

(3) the Fair Equality of Opportunity Principle; (4)

115

RODNEY G. PEFFER

the Modified Difference Principle; and (5) the Social

(structured so as not to skew distribution according

and Economic Democracy Principle. As with any

to the unearned or otherwise undeserved possession

abstract theory, a number of caveats, clarifications

of certain attributes). Any theory that does not

and principles of application must be mentioned and

adequately take these points into account will not

I want to highlight a few that are important in the

be judged adequate within this tradition.

9

consolidation of my argument. One important gen-

Let us briefly highlight some features of my first,

eral point to remember is that Rawls's theory applies

second, third and fifth principles, saving the Mod-

specifically to a society's `basic structure' (the poli-

ified Difference Principle for a more extended ana-

tical constitution and the nature and structure of the

lysis in the next section. With respect to my first

economy, including the provision of public goods,

(Basic Rights) principle, it is evident that different

taxation and redistribution policies, and environ-

conditions in the physical and mental health of

mental regulation). Together with the fact that at

individuals will mean that the resources allocated

a micro-level, so to speak, many institutions, both

to meet people's basic needs will not be equal in

public and private, will have areas of activity ± such

amount; no crude `uniformitarian' equality is sought.

as competitions for positions, awards and prizes ±

Therefore, we must say that the equality in this

within which individual merit, effort or accomplish-

principle is cashed out in terms of everyone posses-

ment are legitimate criteria for awards, this point

sing an equal right to have their security and sub-

bears out the insistence by Michael Walzer (among

sistence rights met (or an equal right to be given the

others) that there are different spheres of justice

opportunity to meet their subsistence rights in the

which may have different criteria for just distribu-

case of able-bodied and able-minded people). More-

tions of benefits and burdens. Clearly, this thesis

over, when it proves not to be possible to meet

could be perfectly compatible with Rawls's theory,

everyone's basic needs (as when, say, there are not

deliberately restricted in its scope of application as it

enough hearts available to meet each need for a heart

7

is.

And even though we are to decide on more and

transplant), it could be consistent and perhaps ne-

more specific questions and issues at each subsequent

cessary to invoke notions from other traditional

stage of Rawls's four-stage decision-making sequence

canons of distributive justice to decide how distribu-

± in which, after the choice of basic principles of

tion ought to proceed in such suboptimal circum-

social justice in the initial original position, we have

stances. At a more general level, to operationalise

the constitutional, legislative and judicial stages ± all

this principle social and political theorists must turn

choices are to be made on the basis of these prin-

to social-scientific theory and research to determine

ciples of social justice and are applicable only to

how various types of societies (and governments)

public or publicly supported institutions.

8

under various historical conditions can be expected

It should also be mentioned that Rawlsian theories

to meet people's subsistence and security rights.

and indeed all other theories of social justice devel-

Moral and political theory shouldn't hubristically

oped within the contemporary liberal-egalitarian/

claim to settle all such questions in advance.

10

liberal-socialist tradition are motivated by a genuine

Discussion of my first principle is a good point at

concern for individual liberty/autonomy as well as for

which to stress the ambition of my theory to have

human well-being/flourishing. We should always

global applicability. I may be going against the

keep in view the point that we should not select a

normatively localising grain of much contemporary

conception of justice that overly compromises these

thinking about justice here, but one of the virtues of

considerations. One manifestation of this is that,

the Marxist account is that it forcefully illustrates the

when it comes to principles designed to govern

direct dependence of the achievement of justice in

and judge the distribution of material resources,

the developing world (surely, given the conditions

we are concerned to develop a theory that, to a

there, justice's most urgent priority) upon the beha-

relatively high degree, is both ambition-sensitive (cap-

viour of the developed world. Localised or relativised

able of rewarding autonomous initiative over indo-

accounts of justice (favoured by many communitar-

lent passivity, say) as well as endowment-insensitive

ians) are thus deeply irresponsible in failing both to

116

RAWLSIAN THEORY AND CONTEMPORARY MARXISM

recognise how a society's own behaviour and internal

These duties obviously require us to do what we can

make-up can profoundly affect the prospects for

± including getting our governments to do what they

justice in other societies and for refusing to include

can ± to try to make sure that everyone in the world

them

result.

is raised up out of absolute poverty and that no one

Although it might be tempting to think that I

has their security rights violated. (Or rather, it

diverge sharply from Rawls in terms of the theory's

requires us to do at least our fair share to accomplish

relevance to the developing world, this would be a

these goals.) However, one of the reasons that I

mistake. It may be the case that Rawls doesn't go as

believe my version of his theory has a greater degree

far as he should in applying certain aspects of his

of clarity is that my Basic Rights Principle explicitly

theory to the relationships between the developed

states that both people's subsistence and security

and developing parts of the world (governing the

rights (the correlates of his duties not to harm and

distribution of goods between rich and poor nations).

to aid the severely deprived) must be respected and

in

their

theorising

of

justice

as

a

Yet even an unmodified version of his theory has

protected and that this is the most important or basic

some important things to say about this issue. First,

principle of social justice which must thus take

his distinction between the general and the special

precedence over all others in the design of social

conception of justice as fairness is of the utmost

institutions, policies and programmes.

14

importance because the general conception (which

Let us turn now to the first part of principle 2, the

applies within developing societies) actually requires

Maximum Equal Basic Liberties Principle. To allay

the difference principle to be applied to all the social

socialist suspicions that Rawlsian theory is some kind

primary goods (liberties and opportunities, income

of bourgeois apologia, the nature of the property

and wealth, and the social bases of self-respect) as a

right as referring specifically to personal property must

package. Therefore, it allows trade-offs between

be stressed. We must keep in view the point that the

them. In contrast, the special conception (the more

right to own large-scale productive property ± which is

familiar two principles of justice, applying only to

here opposed to `personal property' ± is not taken as

well-developed societies) lists the principles govern-

one of the basic liberties. Whether there should be

ing these goods in order of lexical priority such that

such a right can only be answered at the second

any amount of increase in `lower-order' goods (such

(constitutional) stage of the Rawlsian four-step de-

as income and wealth for the least well-off) cannot

cision

be traded off for the least decrease in higher order

known about the effects that such a right would

goods (such as liberties or fair access to opportu-

have in terms of the realisation of the basic principles

nities).

11

procedure, after

more

empirical

facts

are

The reason that Rawls makes this distinc-

of social justice. This allows for the possibility of

tion is precisely because he doesn't want his theory to

socialism on Rawls's view (although a democratic

be committed to the absurdly heartless doctrine that

form of market socialism), as he makes abundantly

liberties and fair access to opportunities can never be

clear in his first book.

15

limited to any degree in any society, even if this were

Moving to the second part of this principle: as

necessary, say, to save people from starvation. And

Rawls argues, guaranteeing people (approximately)

he is genuinely concerned with `how the poorer and

equal worth of their political liberties would seem at

less technologically advanced societies of the world

a minimum to require full public financing of elec-

can attain historical and social conditions that allow

toral campaigns (at least in a society such as ours in

them to establish just and workable institutions.'

12

which wealthy individuals, corporations and interest

Although often forgotten in discussions of Rawls's

groups can disproportionately influence electoral

work, his theory of natural duties which posits,

outcomes) and perhaps other innovative electoral

among others, the duties not to harm and of mutual

modifications.

aid (that is, the duty to aid those whose basic needs

it advocates will clearly not sanction those distor-

are not being met) has always been taken by Rawls

tions due to unequal wealth that capitalist democ-

himself to apply between individuals no matter

racies (particularly the US) typically experience.

whether or not they belong to the same societies.

13

16

In short, the kind of democracy that

The primary moral thesis behind principle 3 ± the

117

RODNEY G. PEFFER

Fair Equality of Opportunity Principle ± is that

every institution in which they participate. Nor does

persons of (approximately) equal talents and abilities

it claim that there cannot be administrative hierar-

ought to have (approximately) equal chances of

chies in such institutions.

20

succeeding in life (whatever their idea of success

The essential distinction between socialism and

may be, within the constraints of justice already

capitalism, I maintain, is that in a socialist society

specified). In particular, such persons ought to have

the preponderance of large-scale productive enter-

(approximately) equal chances in the competition

prises (and investment capital) are socially owned

for desirable offices, jobs and positions.

17

In order to

and utilised primarily for the purposes of fulfilling

accomplish this goal at least two conditions must be

human needs and for the public good. In capitalism

met. First, there must be no discrimination based on

these enterprises (and capital) are largely owned

race, ethnicity, gender, sexual preference and so on.

privately and are geared to maximise the profit of

Second, everyone must be given an equal start `out of

their owners. Whether it is empirically possible or

the gate', so to speak, in the race for life's favourable

likely that socialism or capitalism can or will better

offices, jobs and positions or, more broadly, success.

facilitate social and economic democracy cannot be

And to accomplish this it is reasonable to think that

read off from these institutional ideals alone. Many

the minimum which must be done is that all children

theorists, I think, assume that socialism is more likely

are given equal access to high-quality education from

to allow for social and economic democracy, even if

a very young age. Assuming that there are no natural

some of them doubt that this would be a good thing

differences in general intelligence and suchlike be-

or suspect that it may not concomitantly allow

tween racial and ethnic groups (which we have every

increased political democracy. But whether or not

18

), there probably would be no

any society has (or will) meet the definitional criteria

need for compensatory or remedial measures such as

I have lain down for socialism is still a matter for

affirmative action programmes if these conditions

debate, as is whether or not human needs can be

were fulfilled since, presumably, there would be no

adequately fulfilled and the public good accommo-

statistical discrimination against any of the groups.

dated in various capitalist societies by trickle-down

However, in a society like ours in which such dis-

mechanisms and/or enlightened government poli-

crimination clearly exists, there are ± I submit ±

cies. Here, at the level of practical application, would

strong

seem to be the place at which substantive disputes

reason to assume

moral

arguments

for

such

remedial

grammes in the construction of a just society.

pro-

19

between liberals and socialists remain. Certainly, it is at this point that I would make my case for socialism.

Principle 5 ± the Social and Economic Democracy Principle ± is, admittedly, particularly vague as to

This concludes the summary of my modifications

what it requires given that regime selection is not to

to Rawls's theory, with the exception of the Modified

be made at the level of principle. Specifically, I do

Difference Principle (principle 4).

not take it in itself to be pre-emptively, definitionally endorsing socialism over capitalism, as we earlier saw

A Defence of

Rawls mistakenly believing my theory to be doing. I

the Modified Difference Principle

completely agree with his claim that a theory of social justice should not prejudge the choice of social

The question we now need to take up is whether the

system until we take into account empirical, social-

Modified Difference Principle is sufficiently robust to

scientific information about how they actually per-

take its place in a Marxist account. As space is

form or can be expected to perform under specified

limited, I will concentrate on some reasons to think

historical conditions. But I would submit that justice

that it is more ambition-sensitive and endowment-

requires members of institutions to have some right

insensitive than many critics, who have accordingly

to participate in social decision-making processes

formulated alternative accounts of justice, realise. I

concerning matters that affect them and the institu-

claim that this could form the core of a fuller

tion. However, it doesn't necessarily give everyone

argument that the Rawlsian approach should still

full voting rights with respect to every decision in

command our attention as an adequate characterisa-

118

RAWLSIAN THEORY AND CONTEMPORARY MARXISM

tion of justice. I bolster this idea with an argument

charge against Marxist accounts of egalitarian justice

which shows that supposedly more `orthodox' Marx-

and one which I agree would, if valid, discredit this

ist thinking on justice does not yield self-evidently

general approach). For one consequence of Rawls's

superior concepts for its own purposes.

demand that the difference principle be applied

We might suspect that one Marxist reservation

lexically is that it can deflect the charge that it does

about Rawlsian theory is that, because it is `liberal' in

not meet the Pareto optimality requirement and

origin, it is not sufficiently egalitarian in the relevant

must consequently be rejected. This requirement

way. So it is only fair to the difference principle to

holds that if someone or some group can be made

begin by reminding ourselves that Rawlsian theory

materially better off without anyone else (or any

demands (1) that the least well-off group be maxi-

other group) being made worse off, then this must be

mally benefited, not simply benefited (whatever that

done (or allowed). Without this requirement, it

would mean), and (2) that the difference principle

seems that the `only-if' clause of the difference

be applied lexically, that is after the life prospects of

principle's claim (holding that material inequalities

the least well-off group are maximised then the life

are to be allowed ± by the background institutions,

prospects of the next least well-off group are to be

policies and programmes ± if and only if they will

maximised and so on.

21

In the light of this, we can

maximally benefit the least well-off group) does not

already sense the oddity of the standard Marxist

allow inequalities that would benefit a group of

charge that Rawlsianism is merely a species of capi-

people which is materially more well-off than the

talist ideology; we must not underestimate its poten-

least well-off (poorest) social group even when, for

tial as a sanction for strongly egalitarian policies.

whatever reason, nothing further could be done to

My claim that The Modified Difference Principle

improve the life prospects of the latter. Now to deny

is (even) more egalitarian than Rawls's original

an improvement in material well-being for someone

version is generated from the point that, for mine,

if this won't prevent a benefit from accruing to

the allowable economic inequalities are not to ex-

anyone else ± specifically, in Rawls's view, to the

ceed levels that will (1) undermine (approximately)

least well-off ± does seem unjustifiable. And this is

equal worth of the liberties required by due process,

precisely what the lexical application of the differ-

or (2) undermine the good of self-respect. I have

ence principle is designed to prevent since it `goes all

previously noted that Rawls has recently accepted

the way to the top'. So, for example, if every income

these points and I think he is able to do so because

level group has had its life prospects maximised in

they are arguably already implicit in his own work.

lexical order (as described above) and it turns out

He thinks his difference principle compensates for

that something can still be done to improve the

any lesser worth of liberty among the `less advan-

material life prospects of the wealthiest group, then

taged' given that it would be worth even less if the

the background institutions must allow for it. Of

difference principle had not determined distribution.

course, it is not easy to envisage clear-cut, concrete

And self-respect, explicitly identified as a social

examples of this, certainly not any in which wide

primary good, depends in part upon mutual respect

gaps would remain between the least advantaged and

and social recognition, which may be less forthcom-

those above them. Although it is possible that the

ing where there are widespread and large-scale in-

lexical application of the principle would result in

equalities.

22

In this respect, my modifications do not

greater inequalities between upper and lower income

seem to be leading us in a direction that Rawls

groups, in most real-world scenarios it still seems

himself would never be prepared to take. (Under

likely that its effect will be significantly to reduce

what economic conditions people's self-respect may

inequalities. In any case, as a matter of principle this

be undermined is again an issue for the social and

part of Rawls's theory avoids the criticism that it

psychological sciences to decide.)

violates the Pareto optimality requirement.

Conversely, this direction should not be thought

Another charge against Rawlsian theory which

of as leading to the crudely ambition-insensitive

accuses it of ambition-insensitivity says that, by

policy

counting talents and capacities as socially useful

of

`levelling-down'

(the

standard

vulgar

119

RODNEY G. PEFFER

resources rather than as vehicles for individual gain,

dividuals on the grounds that they are producing

it leads to the `slavery of the talented'. This claim

benefits for a wider society (capitalists in particular

holds that it is unjust to reward gifted individuals for

typically cite this argument when justifying the large

the usage of their abilities only in so far as that would

pay rises they award themselves, implicitly conceding

maximise the position of the least advantaged; their

the inadequacy of any argument that says their

gifts are not being rewarded in their own right. It

talents demand such rewards regardless of the ben-

focuses upon the very heart of what might build the

efits they supposedly bring). And many complaints

bridge between Rawlsian and Marxist justice: Rawls's

about low rewards often proceed from the claim that

interpretation of that often-neglected liberal value of

the social benefit of the job in question is not being

`fraternity' as a conception of `democratic equality',

properly recognised. Even when people think they

in which people agree to `regard the distribution of

are judging the `intrinsic' rather than instrumental

natural talents as a common asset . . . [t]hose better

(social benefit) value of someone's talents, the cri-

circumstanced are willing to have their greater ad-

teria they use often still implicitly rely upon some

vantages only under a scheme in which this works

notion of those talents' social utility. How else, we

out for the benefit of the least advantaged.'

23

might wonder, could we ultimately judge what any

One interpretation of this position that may in-

talent is worth? Further, even what counts as a

advertently fuel the `slavery' critique holds that

`talent' rather than a mere `capacity' may be at least

Rawls rejects a crucial part of what G. A. Cohen

partly

calls the principle of self-ownership: `Because it is a

ideology, after all, the idea that the market rewards

matter of brute luck that people have the talents that

talented effort and achievement necessarily relies

they do, their talents do not, morally speaking,

upon the distinctly instrumentalist idea that what

belong to them, but are, properly regarded, resources

counts as `talented' ± rewardable ± contributions is

over which society as a whole may legitimately

determined by what other people in the marketplace

dispose.'

24

determined

by

social

utility;

in

capitalist

demand.

No great imagination is required to read

into this a sanctioning of some kind of forced-labour

Of course this is not to claim that people are

policy, which would be the grossest violation of the

therefore already thinking in terms of the difference

stipulation that justice should facilitate, not crush,

principle and I don't deny the fact that people also

autonomy. But Cohen's wording is unfortunately

ordinarily use rival notions of justice as well. But I am

misleading if this is the reading it prompts. Neither

saying that there is something in ordinary discourse

Rawls's theory nor my own deny people the right to

about justice upon which Rawlsianism can latch to

choose how they use their talents. Society is not said

develop its case. Such a case should stress that (in particular) anti-

to `own' them in the sense of having the right to tell people how and when they should be employed.

25

socialist criticisms of Rawlsianism usually assume (1)

Strictly speaking, what society is primarily laying

that individuals are garnering most of their material

claim to is the wealth used to compensate for and/

resources (income and wealth) by working (as either

or reward their employment. Rawlsian theory insists

an employee or their own boss); (2) that individuals

that people have no particular claim on this wealth

are usually materially rewarded due to their effort or

simply by virtue of the talents they have chosen to

socially useful contribution; and (3) that the level of

exercise; a socially determined concern for a com-

recompense is usually correlated with natural talents

mon good provides the distributive criterion instead.

and abilities, at least in a just or relatively just

This might still sound too radically egalitarian for

society. But in contemporary class societies these

some liberals, which once led Cohen to think that

assumptions are highly dubious. In capitalist socie-

26

But

ties, members of the highest income/wealth socio-

reflection on how people ordinarily think about

economic group ± that is the capitalist ruling class

justice can readily show that, on this score, Raw-

and its `hangers-on' ± often inherit the great pre-

lsianism may not be all that out of the ordinary to

ponderance of their wealth rather than garner it by

many. For people often justify high rewards to in-

their labour or effort. Moreover, the investment

perhaps Rawls was not a `proper' liberal at all.

120

RAWLSIAN THEORY AND CONTEMPORARY MARXISM

is able to command.

income they receive through rent, interest and di-

28

vidends (which normally dwarfs their salaried in-

Although Rawlsianism clearly poses a large chal-

comes, even if they are top corporate executives) is

lenge to capitalist thinking about justice, G. A.

not earned in any socially useful, morally significant

Cohen has claimed that socialists should still not

sense. As David Schweickart has argued, to allow

be satisfied with the difference principle for another

capital to be used is hardly a genuinely productive act

reason.

± since, at most, it requires signing some papers on

`incentive principle', sanctioning unequally large

the part of those who own it ± even if the capital

rewards to the talented rich on the grounds that

owner's permission is legally required for its deploy-

they will consequently have the incentive to work

ment within the socio-economic system in ques-

hard and thereby generate wealth which will `trickle

tion.

27

29

He notes its familiar presentation as an

And to claim that corporate executives,

down' to the least advantaged and benefit them more

bank presidents and suchlike really deserve what

than would any other arrangement. (This, of course,

they earn (because they are the only ones who

has been the staple justification of regressive taxation

can do the job or are really the best qualified) surely

policies since the Reagan/Thatcher days.) Leaving

strains the limits of credibility. In an interesting ploy

aside the debate as to whether the `trickle-down'

to disprove such widely accepted nonsense, the

thesis actually holds (for if it does not, such a policy

politically

Ben

would clearly not be sanctioned by the difference

and Jerry ± of the highly successful Ben & Jerry's

principle), Cohen claims that the `incentive' con-

ice cream parlours ± some years ago advertised the

struction of the difference principle's operation relies

position of president of their corporation to the

upon certain assumptions that are incompatible with

general public, requiring only a one-page letter of

the attitude towards one's talents that Rawls himself

interest initially and then follow-up interviews. They

believes is required by justice. Simply put, a talented

ended up selecting an African-American man in his

capitalist entrepreneur who is paid a particularly high

fifties who had only a high school education and had

salary as an incentive to create jobs which would not

been employed as a janitor most of his life, with

otherwise be created for the least advantaged is

absolutely no ill effects for the corporation.

typically not unable to do the same job for a lot less.

radical

American

entrepreneurs

One might agree that rewards at the `top end' of

Rather, he is unwilling to do so and he is effectively

capitalist society (including entertainers and sports

using his socially valuable talents as his own `bar-

stars as well as capitalists) far outstrip any plausible

gaining chips' to enhance his own personal gains at

assessment of their talent's worth, however this is

no extra benefit to the community. In other words,

assessed. But the claim that even individuals in the

he is not treating his talents as `common assets', for if

middle and lower classes usually get paid what they

he did he would not need incentives to work (in-

deserve

(on

deed, he probably does not `need' them at all, but is

grounds, for example, that people normally receive

nevertheless able to claim so as he holds the rest of

an income commensurate with the productive value

the community to ransom by threatening to with-

and relative scarcity of their work abilities and skills

hold his talents if he is not paid more).

for

their

work

in

market

societies

under equilibrium market conditions) is highly sus-

It is hardly clear that Rawls would wish to depart

picious because of the general impact that non-

from Cohen's claim that the `incentive' scenario

market factors such as social custom, political reg-

described above involved an unjust rejection of

ulation and the strength of organised labour (each of

community and its claims on the talents of its

which may be connected with the others) have on

members. As we have seen, his own notion of

the determination of remuneration by the `free mar-

democratic equality rests upon a specific understand-

ket'. In general, there are just too many counter-

ing of `community' whose members would reject such

vailing forces in the operation of the capitalist

a selfish attitude to their own talents. Thus, it would

market to make us happy with the idea that the

be misleading to think that the difference principle

social value of people's talents is appropriately re-

sanctions such an incentive payment as being itself

warded by the wage or salary that their labour-power

just. (Cohen would agree that if incentives were the

121

RODNEY G. PEFFER

only way to get the talented to work and that their

opportunities actually exist); (2) whether this is a

labours would indeed maximise the position of the

justified social policy (or principle of social justice)

least advantaged, then it would be justified. But this

regardless of what Rawls's theory says about it.

would be the application only of a principle to

Now I claim that (1) Rawls's theory does not

ameliorate injustice in an unjust world and not what

require such a policy; and (2) assuming that there

full justice itself would mandate.) Admittedly, a

are genuine opportunities for people to earn a living

Rawlsian might sanction incentives on the grounds

under decent conditions and with decent recom-

that they would be necessary to attract people to

pense, a social policy (or principle of justice) that

careers that are socially necessary but exceptionally

would allow such free-riders is not justified or at least

difficult or dangerous and hence unlikely to be

not required.

chosen without them. To this I have two brief

Rawlsians have split over both of these issues such

replies. One is to point out that this observation

that, for example, I have been scolded by certain of

does not serve many of today's incentive-claiming

Rawls's former students for both (supposedly) mis-

talented rich particularly well; they would doubtless

interpreting Rawls and for being too much of a

still have picked their chosen careers even if the

`puritan' in rejecting such a policy. I have also

material rewards were somewhat less because they are

encountered

not `dangerous' or particularly difficult. Indeed, in a

who have agreed with me on both points. Happily,

just society such incentives may be necessary to

Rawls is now on record as not requiring such a policy,

attract people to the kind of work which is very

since in his typescript `Justice as Fairness: A Restate-

often exceptionally low-paid in capitalist society.

ment' he writes:

30

Admittedly, both Rawlsians and non-

both

Rawlsians

and

non-Rawlsians

Secondly, my rendering of Rawlsianism as a socialist doctrine consolidates within its terms the ideal of

Particular distributions cannot be judged at all

people freely choosing to dispose of their talents in a

apart from the claims (entitlements) of indivi-

socially beneficial way. To be sure, some difficult and

duals earned by their efforts within the fair system of

dangerous tasks may still require incentive payments,

co-operation from which those distributions re-

if other ways are not found for allocating them. But,

sult. In contrast to utilitarianism, the concept of

in general, I don't conceive of people needing huge

allocative justice has no application. There is no

incentives to work in a socially beneficial rather than

criterion for a just distribution apart from back-

selfish way in the just socialist society, certainly not

ground institutions and the entitlements that

to the kind of inegalitarian degree supposedly re-

arise from actually working through the procedure

quired in capitalist society.

[emphasis added].

31

The `slavery of the talented' critique has probably had most bite in the rather different criticism that

It should be noted, however, that to prevent able-

since his difference principle and minimum floor

bodied people from being free-riders when there are

requirement seem to assure the least well-off ± in

opportunities available for them to earn a decent

fact, everyone ± a minimal income or set of material

living by their own efforts is neither an endorsement

resources, Rawls's theory is not sufficiently ambition-

of the kind of movement to have `workfare' replace

sensitive because it seems not to require anyone to do

`welfare' underway in the US (since the opportu-

anything in order to be entitled to this income or set

nities may not be well-paying enough once one

of resources; it encourages free-riding and hence

includes childcare and transportation expenses into

discourages the formation of the kind of community

the equation), nor an affirmation of the view that

just described above. There are actually two ques-

people must work if they are able-bodied (which I

tions that must be distinguished here: (1) whether

would regard as a genuinely puritan attitude). My

Rawls's theory requires that this minimum income

only claim is that able-bodied people should not be

simply be given to anyone whether or not they are

supported by the state or society in general if they

willing to do anything to earn it (assuming that they

refuse to do anything to earn a living (assuming,

are able-bodied and able-minded and that such

again, that decent opportunities exist for them to

122

RAWLSIAN THEORY AND CONTEMPORARY MARXISM

do so). If they can sponge off others while not doing

tical perspective that is inclined towards impatience

anything illegitimate to garner the material goods

with regards to some types of `armchair' reflection.

and services they need, the state or society has no

The nub of Rawls's argument is that social primary

business telling them that they can't live their lives

goods are all-purpose general resources in modern

this way, as far as I'm concerned . . . at least if

societies that can usually be utilised by individuals

requiring people to do socially useful work is not

who have them no matter what their life plans are.

absolutely necessary for society to meet the first

Because they constitute a specific, limited set of

(Basic Rights) principle of justice.

goods, they should be easier to track in the process

I now want briefly to reflect upon the objection

of distribution than the wider and more nebulous

that Rawls's notion of `social primary goods' mis-

categories of (opportunities for) resources, welfare or

identifies what theories of social justice should be

advantage. In other words, policies of social justice

concerned to distribute (such as welfare or utility, or

may be easier to operationalise with a concept of

material resources). Space does not allow a full

social primary goods as their currency. This claim is

discussion of all of Rawls's rivals, so I can only sketch

reinforced by Rawls's insistence that his theory is one

the case for retaining his approach. I will, though, say

of `pure procedural justice' in which an outcome is

a little more on `exploitation', a category which

judged to be just wholly in so far as it has arisen

many might think Marxism ought to prefer as the

through the operation of just procedures. He writes

key term in its account of justice.

that:

Richard Arneson helpfully distinguishes between four alternative principles of justice, based around

The great practical advantage of pure procedural

two different types of good to be distributed ± `wel-

justice is that it is no longer necessary in meeting

fare' and `resources' ± and two types of `end-state' ±

the demands of justice to keep track of the endless

based upon whether justice is concerned with the

variety of circumstances and the changing relative

amount possessed of each good or merely with the

positions of particular persons. One avoids the

opportunity to acquire them:

problem of defining principles to cope with the enormous complexities which would arise if such

1. the Equality of Welfare Principle;

details were relevant. It is a mistake to focus

2. the Equality of Resources Principle;

attention on the varying relative positions of

3. the Equal Opportunity for Welfare Principle;

individuals and to require that every change,

4. the Equal Opportunity for Resources

considered as a single transaction viewed in iso-

Principle.

32

lation, be in itself just. It is the arrangement of the basic structure which is to be judged, and judged

To this we might add a fifth, developed by Cohen

from a general point of view . . . Thus the ac-

and, because of his own political pedigree, one that

ceptance of the two principles constitutes an

may be of particular interest to socialists:

understanding to discard as irrelevant as a matter of social justice much of the information and

5. the Equality of Access to Advantage Principle.

33

many of the complications of everyday life.

34

All five have been much discussed in order to ascertain which one does the best job of capturing

This is not to say that institutions should never be

what justice intuitively requires. Typically, their

scrutinised for their justice-promoting abilities once

respective proponents all claim superiority over Raw-

they have been established. In his `Restatement',

ls's approach in this regard. Important issues are

Rawls talks of `pure adjusted procedural justice',

undoubtedly raised in this debate and I accept that

introducing the caveat that `certain rules for making

it would be premature to foreclose on it. But there

adjustments must be included in the basic structure

may be a case for thinking that it should not pre-

as a system of social co-operation so that this system

dominate in the discourse about justice in the way it

remains fair over time.'

has done recently, particularly from a radical poli-

35

These features are, I would argue, great strengths

123

RODNEY G. PEFFER

37

of his theory since they make it more readily applic-

in order to fulfil valuable human functionings.

able to the workings of actual societies and less

approach is not easily classifiable as either welfarist or

This

intrusive into people's individual lives. On Rawls's

resourcist as, strictly speaking, it seeks to equalise

approach, so long as people act within the confines

neither. But it has the advantage of carrying our

of justice and so long as what they are able to garner

moral view to a very deep level of what is really

for themselves is accumulated within the confines of

(intrinsically) valuable in human lives. It keeps us

the background institutions set up by the principles

focused on the fact that, due to differential natural

of social justice they ± and their legitimate material

talents and abilities, people differentially convert

holdings ± are not to be interfered with. This may

resources into valuable `functionings' (or capabilities

contrast with those theories of justice which do not

for such functionings) and that it is these with which

have such in-built delimitations, for they may inad-

theorists of justice should be primarily concerned.

vertently sanction a political `micro-management' of

However, Rawlsian theory is not blind to this point.

social and personal life that, apart from anything

It does not cease to be interested in how people stand

else, would conflict with the fundamental respect for

with reference to their primary goods once they have

individual autonomy and well-being identified ear-

been distributed. A crucial consideration in selecting

lier as central to justice's concerns.

the best form of social and political order for Raw-

To consolidate this part of the case for Rawlsian

lsian justice is precisely which of the alternatives best

theory, it is worth reflecting upon this claim of

allow people the chance to utilise these goods in

Arneson's, who, having surveyed numerous compet-

pursuit of their own life-plans. My own case for

ing theories of justice, concludes that their practical

socialism, indeed, would partly rest upon the claim

implications

that a socialist order is much more amenable to the process of converting `goods' into `functionings'.

may be hard to discern, and may not diverge

And once that is recognised, the advantages of Sen's

much in practice. Familiar information-gathering

approach diminish in so far as it is limited to covering

and information-using problems will make us

only basic capabilities. Once these are achieved, it

unwilling to authorise government agencies to

doesn't tell us how to govern any further distribu-

determine people's distributive shares on the basis

tions of resources above the levels necessary for these

of their preference satisfaction prospects, which

purposes. Indeed, `capacities' may simply cease to be

will often be unknowable for all practical pur-

useful beyond this basic level. As G. A. Cohen puts

poses. [So, for example], we may insist that gov-

it, `capacities beyond the basic (Can I run a mile?

ernments have regard to primary goods equality or

Can I impress Ukrainians with my impersonation of

resource equality as rough proxies for the welfarist

Russians? Can I sew more quickly than you?) seem

equality that we are unable to calculate.

36

quite irrelevant to measurement, deprivation, inequality or anything else of urgent concern from 38

If it is indeed fair to say that these rival theories will

the point of view of justice.'

tend to converge upon similar concerns and recom-

see that subsistence rights are cited as something that

mendations in practice, then the case for `social

must be fulfilled by my Basic Rights Principle, Sen's

primary goods' on the grounds of their theoretical

concerns with basic capabilities would already seem

parsimony is indeed strong. The substantive disputes

to be accommodated. No practical advantage over

about justice could then shift to the debate over

the `social primary goods' approach is gained.

which form of regime may best bear the concerns of

In any case, once we

Finally in this section we turn to `exploitation',

justice (more on this in the next section).

which many Marxists might wish to make central to

One noteworthy critic of Rawls who also opposes

any discussion of justice. Now there has been much

the `welfarist/resourcist' axis is Amartya Sen, who has

discussion as to how `exploitation' should be con-

defended a `basic capacities' approach, arguing that

ceptualised, led by John Roemer in particular, and

justice should seek to assure that people have the

there is no space here to enter this debate.

opportunity to exercise their basic human capacities

I simply want to offer one definition of the term ±

124

39

Instead,

RAWLSIAN THEORY AND CONTEMPORARY MARXISM

which I take to be much more `orthodox Marxist'

possibility, capitalist exploitation is all-things-con-

than Roemer's ± and then sketch an argument which

sidered unjustified.)

holds that `exploitation' could not substitute for

Further, I would also argue that not only does

anything like my Rawlsian account of social justice

`exploitation' need a fuller morality to supplement it,

in a plausible political morality.

it can also be replaced or subsumed by one such as my

I contend that, for Marx, `exploited labour' is (1)

Rawlsian theory. For the elements of `force', `robbery'

forced (because workers have no realistic choice but

and `loss of control' in exploitation proper can all

to sell their labour-power to capitalists); (2) unpaid in

also stand condemned by specific components of that

its yielding of surplus value or product (that is, the

theory. `Exploitation' adds nothing new or necessary

profit the individual capitalist accrues from the

to it.

commodities

produced

by

workers'

labour); also

(3): the product of the labour is lost to the producer ± it comes under the control of someone else.

40

`But Is This A Marxist Theory?'

The

question for theorists of justice here is what, exactly,

Now I should make clear why I say that my overall

is wrong with exploitation? We can answer this using

moral and social theory is a Marxist theory and what

a three-way distinction between types of exploita-

is contained in its minimal set of Marxist empirical

tion.

41

assumptions. To the first question, my answer is (as it

First, we have simple exploitation, denoting the

has previously been) that it is not a specifically

appropriation of surplus value, or the fact of the

Marxist moral theory. This should not be surprising.

direct producers not getting back the full value of

Not even Marx's implicit moral theory per se is a

what they produce. Note that there is no reference to

specifically Marxist theory. There is, in fact, no such

`force' here, so the Marxist notion does not come

thing as a specifically Marxist moral theory. There is,

under this heading. It highlights merely the transfer

however, such a thing as a specifically Marxist moral

of value from producers and it cannot be considered

and social theory, i.e. a theory which combines a

even prima facie wrong because this could come

moral theory with a set of empirical, social-scientific

about as the result of a genuinely free and fair

theses in order to judge alternative sets of social

agreement. Exploitation proper is forced, unpaid, sur-

arrangements, programmes and policies. In fact, any

plus labour, the product of which is not under the

moral and social theory that utilises a recognisably

control of the direct producers. This brings in the

Marxist set of empirical, social-scientific theses and

crucial element missing from simple exploitation and

supports a recognisably Marxist set of normative

I would say it is prima facie wrong. But it may not

political positions qualifies as a Marxist moral and

always be wrong. Imagine that the apologists for

social theory.

42

capitalism were correct in arguing that capitalism

However, since my 1990 book was published right

was necessary to promote the undoubted moral goods

at the time of the so-called `fall of communism' in the

of meeting people's basic needs, preserving their

Eastern Bloc ± causing even some who thought it

liberties and allowing for democracy. In this in-

succeeded in its stated goal of creating an adequate

stance, the moral harm suffered by exploited labour

(or, at least, more sophisticated) Marxist moral and

is outweighed by the moral benefits that only capit-

social theory to call it an excellent exemplar of

alism brings. So at the very least there must be more

Hegel's famous quip about the Owl of Minerva flying

to the morality of justice than the category of ex-

only at the end of the day ± I find myself, upon

ploitation if such judgements are to be made. This

occasion, having to defend the relevance of a the-

fuller morality would therefore allow us to identify

oretical project that still:

instances of all-things-considered unjustified exploitation, which is `exploitation proper' that is not justi-

1. takes a minimal set of Marxist empirical as-

fied by its promotion of some other weighty moral

sumptions ± in particular about the nature of

concern. (Contra the capitalist apology, my Marxist

capitalist society ± as plausible and relevant

theory naturally claims that, with socialism a real

(even though it is based on a slimmed-down

125

RODNEY G. PEFFER

Marxism which jettisons some of its orthodox

linist and post-Stalinist claims about how far

baggage);

Soviet-style communist regimes had actually

2. argues for a kind of socialism, albeit a demo-

progressed towards socialism and communism

cratic, self-managing form of socialism based

were complete travesties and misrepresenta-

on a regulated market economy rather than a

tions of Marxist theory and should not be

command

economy,

43

which, within

allowed to distort our understanding of what

well-

the theory sanctions in practice.

developed societies, would be committed to

4. The struggle to establish and preserve social-

protecting civil liberties as much as any bour-

ism in various countries may be somewhat

geois capitalist democracy; 3. defends socialist regimes and socialist revolu-

more likely to succeed in light of the theore-

tions in the developing world as the only way

tical work and institutional changes advocat-

to overcome the absolute poverty and extreme

ing and implementing market socialism as

subservience characteristic of such societies,

opposed

and forcibly confronts us with the possibility

(which, whatever its role in industrialising

that `parliamentary' politics may not be en-

the former Soviet Union and helping to defeat

ough even in developed nations to overcome

fascism in The Second World War ± for which

capitalist resistance to the requirements of

the world owes the former Soviet Union an

justice.

eternal debt of gratitude ± simply does not

to

command

economy

socialism

seem to be capable of adequately functioning in consumer-oriented, modern, mass socie-

Thus, I want to comment very briefly on the con-

ties).

tinued relevance of at least some components of Marxist empirical theory as well as on the continued

5. Even the dissolution of the Soviet Union and

relevance of some kind of socialism as a worthy goal

the `fall of communism' in the Eastern Bloc

or ideal.

44

does not necessarily herald the end of attempts

My response to the charge that Marxist

to establish post-capitalist, or nascent socialist,

Â is as follows. theory is now passe

societies or to preserve them where they still 1. So many of Marx's views have passed more

exist (such as in Cuba and China), especially

widely into the social sciences and our modern

in light of the fact that under the hegemonic

world-views that perhaps we tend no longer to

domination of international capitalism, the

appreciate the true significance and lasting

plight of the world's poor ± as well as the

legacy of his thought and work.

world's natural environment ± has continued to

2. As shown by continuing sophisticated developments of certain components of

worsen,

with

world

capitalism

showing

neither the ability nor the inclination to solve

Marx's

these problems.

economic, sociological and political theories by the Analytical Marxist tradition and others, it is only certain orthodox and dogmatic inter-

Of all these claims, it is most immediately important

pretations

to substantiate the first one and I shall do so by

of

Marxism

that

have

become

stating the minimal set of Marxist empirical assump-

otiose, not Marxist theory in general. 3. By Marx's own definition, no society on this

tions which, when combined with my modified

planet has ever become even a fully socialist

Rawlsian theory of justice, yield the appropriate

society ± that is, one which has fulfilled all of

Marxist political conclusion:

the requirements of Marx's so-called first stage of communism, which include full democratic

1. As a result of the logic of the maximisation of

rights ± let alone a full-fledged communist

profit, all capitalist societies ± developed or

society (in which, ex hypothesi, there would

developing ± exhibit and will continue to

be no political state as well as no social classes

exhibit certain economic and social problems

and no significant social conflict). Thus, Sta-

(inflation, depression, recession, unemploy-

126

RAWLSIAN THEORY AND CONTEMPORARY MARXISM

arms race.

ment, poverty, failure to regulate environmental pollution sufficiently, and so on) that

8. The bureaucracies of such post-capitalist so-

can be solved only by the institution of a

cieties genuinely want to reduce or eliminate

regulated, partially planned (but not neces-

arms expenditures in order better to satisfy

sarily command) socialist economy.

the consumer appetites of their own populations.

2. Even the mixed, welfare-state capitalist societies of the advanced, industrialised nations

9. Without the economic, diplomatic, and mili-

in the West exhibit severe social inequalities

tary pressure of the western capitalist powers

and ± if sufficiently threatened by mass work-

such

ing-class movements for social equality ± will

achieve

almost undoubtedly exhibit severe repression.

either evolutionary or revolutionary means).

(The possibly irreversible decline of the Key-

10. Socialist transformations can occur in the

post-capitalist significant

societies

may

democratisation

industrialised

countries

of

well (by

nesian welfare state is evidence of how capi-

advanced

talist societies will inevitably `resolve' the

West, and such transformations can lead to

the

tensions between social justice and the logic

democratic forms of socialism; thus a world-

of capital in favour of the latter.)

wide federation of democratic, self-managing, socialist societies is a genuine historical pos-

3. The world capitalist system causes in the

sibility.

Third World both extreme inequality and

45

suffering, on the one hand, and (often) extremely repressive regimes, on the other.

Although these theses were put forward just before

4. So long as it is dominant on an international

the fall of the Soviet Union, I don't think that this

scale, the capitalist system will not allow the

development or any since then has decisively falsi-

massive transfers of capital, technology and

fied any of them. The only one put into question at

knowledge

Third

all would seem to be the ninth thesis since, although

World's major social and economic problems.

significant democratisation has occurred in most of

5. Such conditions in the Third World make for

the former so-called communist countries, this has

perpetual social instability since those who

been conjoined with a movement ± by no means

are severely oppressed and/or deprived will

complete as of yet and certainly not completely

organise and, if necessary, fight to better their

successful ± toward capitalism. On the other hand,

condition.

it will be observed that the theses concerning the

6. The

necessary

predictable

to

response

solve

from

the

the

most

lack of ability of capitalism to solve the world's socio-

powerful nations at the capitalist `centre'

economic problems have tended to be strengthened

(primarily the United States now and for

rather than falsified, not least in many of the former

the foreseeable future) is first to install and/

so-called communist countries of the defunct Eastern

or aid those Third World regimes or military

Bloc, where the movement towards capitalism has

cliques that can best suppress these mass

resulted in substantial increases in unemployment,

movements for radical social change and,

poverty, social inequality, homelessness and lack of

second, if that strategy fails, to intervene

adequate health care accompanied by skyrocketing

either directly with its own military forces

corruption, crime and gangsterism. Moreover, the

or indirectly through proxy armies and `low-

theses concerning the potential ability of Third

intensity warfare'.

World socialist (or at least post-capitalist) societies

7. However else we may characterise contem-

to solve their basic social problems have also, I think,

porary post-capitalist societies such as Cuba,

continued to be borne out, even though under

it seems clear that they are not the primary

contemporary world circumstances, post-capitalist

cause of the many indigenous revolutionary

societies such as Cuba and China have had to resort

movements in the Third World and do not

to market mechanisms and even foreign capital

bear the primary responsibility for the nuclear

investment, usually in jointly owned enterprises.

127

RODNEY G. PEFFER

(But this, of course, is no mark against these socie-

political philosophy within this general tendency

ties, so far as I'm concerned, since I support market

are part of the Analytical Marxist tradition that

socialism to begin with.) And it is also arguable that

has developed over the past twenty years or so. As

such societies would be able to do even better

such, they have no problem operating within the

economically if the powerful capitalist nations ±

general analytic-philosophical paradigm that empha-

especially the US ± were not constantly attempting

sises conceptual clarity and logical rigour or within

to undermine them.

the general framework of liberal egalitarian theory

Note that this set of empirical assumptions does

developed by Rawls. In fact, Analytical Marxists are

not include dialectical materialism, orthodox or even

an integral part of the current discussions specifically

reconstructed versions of historical materialism, or

involving Rawls's theory and similar theories of

such lower-level empirical theses as the labour theory

social justice. There is little (if anything) to distin-

of value and the `collapse' theory of capitalism. This

guish them from the non-socialist liberal-egalitarians

is not to say that some of these theories ± at least in

who participate in these debates, save their greater

their more sophisticated forms ± are not plausible or

commitments to certain parts of Marxist empirical,

arguably true. But it is to claim that the truth of these

social-scientific theory and thus to the idea that

components of Marxist theory is not necessary in

morally defensible forms of socialism are genuine

order for the basic normative political positions to be

historical possibilities which should be advocated

justified. Most emphatically, this set of empirical

or at least discussed as genuine options. It should

theses does not entail the view that socialism and/

be stressed, of course, that these theorists are all

or communism are historically inevitable, or that

proponents of political democracy and civil liberties

genuine,

be

(which they believe can thrive in socialist societies

achieved within one or a few countries (in isolation

under favourable circumstances) and, thus, critics of

from the rest of the world). Nor does it imply that

the kind of Stalinist political organisation that so ill-

Marx's higher state of communism is historically

served the socialist cause. In addition, most are

possible (as opposed to a utopian impossibility that

advocates (if not always without reservation) of

should not even be seriously considered when doing

market socialism and opponents of command-econ-

social and political theory).

omy socialism.

full-fledged

socialist

societies

can

I recognise, of course, the prima facie oddity of

So let me assert again that what divides contem-

conjoining these theses with Rawlsian moral and

porary egalitarian liberals such as Rawls from liberal-

political theory. Yet that I should develop a theory

socialist egalitarians such as myself is not moral

which attempts to synthesise Rawls's theory of justice

theory but differences in empirical beliefs and prac-

and the salvageable components of the Marxist

tical political convictions. It would be difficult to

tradition should not, in fact, seem all that strange

isolate any normative moral thesis that was univer-

to anyone familiar with moral, social and political

sally agreed upon by those in one category and

philosophy over the past thirty years or so. From the

universally denied by those in the other. The first

last third of the twentieth century this realm's domi-

category is thus composed of theorists who don't

nant tendency in English-speaking societies, Scan-

explicitly advocate socialism, but who could admit

dinavia and the Netherlands has been composed of

that a democratic-liberal form of socialism would be

liberal-egalitarian

egalitarian

justified if certain empirical, social-scientific theses

theorists who, for the most part, take Rawls's theory

that Marxists put forward about capitalism and so-

or similar theories of social justice to be basically

cialism were true. This category includes not only

correct. Most of these theorists also respect much of

Rawls but such figures as Ronald Dworkin, T. M.

what Marx said and much of what he was trying to

Scanlon, Norman Daniels, Thomas Nagel, Amartya

accomplish and they accept some, although certainly

Sen, Martha Nussbaum, Brian Barry, Amy Gut-

not all, of Marxist empirical theory as true.

mann, Bruce Ackerman, Jeremy Waldron, Henry

and

liberal-socialist

Moreover, most contemporary Marxist theorists

Shue, Philippe Van Parijs, Samuel Scheffler and

involved in current debates in moral, social and

Susan Moller Okin. The second category ± the

128

RAWLSIAN THEORY AND CONTEMPORARY MARXISM

liberal-socialist egalitarians ± includes such figures as:

enterprises (from seed capital provided by large

G. A. Cohen, John Roemer, Jon Elster (at least until

socialist enterprises or the banks) and then sell them

recently), Kai Nielsen, Michael Walzer, David Mill-

off to the public sector after they reached a certain

er, William McBride, Roger Gottlieb, Jeffrey Reim-

level of productivity. But, as in Rawls's property-

an, David Schweickart, Nancy Holmstrom, Andrew

owning democracy, no one would be able to pass on

Levine, Alex Callinicos, Norman Geras, Mark Evans

significant levels of wealth to anyone else, although

and me.

46

There is also a category of philosophers

Roemer suggests they might be able to donate all or

within this tradition who speak more sympatheti-

much of their wealth to their choice of socially

cally than the liberal-egalitarians of certain aspects of

approved charitable or philanthropic causes.

Marxism and/or socialism, but don't explicitly or at

other important view worthy of further attention is

least very strongly advocate socialism, so it is difficult

represented by Phillipe Van Parijs, who, even though

to decide in which category they should be classified.

a close associate of the Analytical Marxists, actually

This would include, I think, Robert Paul Wolff,

advocates an extremely egalitarian version of social-

Joshua Cohen, Allen E. Buchanan, Thomas Pogge,

democratic, welfare-state capitalism.

48

An-

49

Richard Arneson, Will Kymlicka and Sharon Lloyd.

But despite these `second-stage' disagreements, I

(Hence my categories are useful terms of reference to

think it justified to propose that the most plausible

guide us in the debate, but not strict and exhaustive

moral, social and political philosophy/theory must lie

classifications.)

somewhere within the general confines that I think

Here, we should recognise the complication that

Rawlsian principles adequately map ± and it is, in

to rely simply on the categories of capitalism and

general form, liberal-egalitarian in moral theory and

socialism may not do justice ± so to speak ± to the

Marxist in political theory and action. What motivates

richness and complexity of the institutional arrange-

my Marxist convictions above all is this final claim: if

ments suggested by these two groups of theorists

we are genuinely concerned about justice, then we

when they propose how their recommended policies

should be firstly and profoundly concerned about the

might best be implemented. For example, Rawls

desperate plight of the vast majority of people in the

suggests that his theory of justice could be best

developing world in particular. And I think that

implemented in what he calls a `property-owning

contemporary liberal debate should increasingly focus

democracy', in which most large-scale productive

upon the liberal-egalitarians upon whom, if they ac-

enterprises would not be socially owned ± hence,

knowledge the huge gap between the reality of global

it is not a form of socialism ± but in which all citizens

injustice and their own standards of justice, it should be

would somehow own some productive property (pre-

incumbent to argue against what I take to be the fact

sumably in terms of stocks and/or bonds), and in

that such injustice can be fully rectified only by anti-

which significant wealth could be accumulated by

capitalist revolutions, and genuinely socialist property

one within one's own lifetime but which could not

relations and social policies, together with genuinely

be passed on to the next generation ± or anyone else,

fair relations between the developed and developing

for that matter ± due to strenuous inheritance and

worlds. Arguably, this may only occur with the trans-

gift taxes.

47

Somewhat similarly, in John Roemer's

formation of the major industrial societies of the North

model of market socialism room would be made in

into socialist societies ± a goal that the Marxist em-

the economy for entrepreneurs to make virtually

pirical theses would also indicate is necessary for the

unlimited amounts of money within their lifetimes

achievement of justice within them as well.

50

if they could organise a series of successful economic

Notes

1. Peffer (1990), p. 3.

3. Ibid, pp. 419±20.

2. See Peffer (1990), especially chapter 10, for substan-

4. Rawls (1996), pp. 7±8 n. 7, and Rawls (1999), pp.

tiation of these modifications.

558±9, Peffer (1994).

129

RODNEY G. PEFFER

Rawlsian theories in general ± including mine ± are

5. See Peffer (1994), pp. 261±2 for more on the defini-

relevant to the relations between the developed and

tion of `socialism'.

the developing world and thus provide at least a

6. Peffer (1990), pp. 418±20; Peffer (1994), pp. 264±5.

starting point to a case for international justice.

7. See Walzer (1983).

15. See Rawls (1972), pp. 270±4, 280±2.

8. See Rawls (1972), pp. 195±201 for discussion of the four-stage decision-making sequence. Of course, these

16. For philosophical perspectives on these issues see

restrictions upon the domain of Rawlsian justice do

Pateman (1970), Cohen and Rogers (1983), Green (1985), Cunningham (1987).

not deny that people's conduct even within private institutions and situations is still subject to criminal

17. Rawls (1972), pp. 72±108.

and civil law.

18. See Holmstrom (1994). 19. See, for example, Sher (1975).

9. These terms are coined by Dworkin (1981a), p. 311. See also G. A. Cohen (1989) and his `Equality of

20. See Peffer (1990), pp. 396±403.

What? On Welfare, Goods and Capabilities', in Nuss-

21. Rawls (1972), p. 83.

baum and Sen (eds) (1993), pp. 9±29, and Kymlicka

22. See Rawls (1972), pp. 204±5, 440±6; Peffer (1990), chapter 9; and Peffer (1994).

(1990), pp. 75±85.

23. Rawls (1972), pp. 101, 105.

10. Although this is far from being uncontroversial, I believe that a strong case can be made for the view

24. Cohen (1986), p. 79. His concern here is, in fact,

that, in the developing world, only certain socialist

primarily with the `right-wing liberal' or libertarian view espoused in Nozick (1974).

countries (such as Cuba and China) as well as the Indian province of Kerala (which has had a socialist

25. One might want to think or hope that genuinely

government since shortly after the Second World

`fraternal' (socialistic) individuals would choose to

War) have generally succeeded in fulfilling their

use their talents in whatever maximally socially ben-

populations' subsistence rights. It seems clear to me

eficial way they could. But it would surely be stretch-

that if one agrees that the empirical evidence shows

ing credibility to think that every individual in a

the only way for developing societies to ensure that

socialist society would always freely surrender all their

people's subsistence rights are met is to institute

talents to whatever task `society' allocated them.

socialism and if the empirical evidence shows ± as I

26. Cohen (1986), p. 79. He recognises the oddity of this

believe it does after having tracked Amnesty Inter-

thought, produced by the claim that liberals were

national reports for the past twenty years or so ± that

defined by acceptance of a full-blown principle of

under normal circumstances socialist regimes in the

self-ownership, and retracts his characterisation in Cohen (1995), p. 116 n. 1.

developing world generally do a better job of protecting their people's security rights than capitalist Third

27. Schweickart (1993), p. 17.

World countries, then one should seek to support

28. Even within a just society it would be dubious to

and promote such socialist regimes and movements

assume that there will be a watertight correlation

as a first duty of social justice, rather than attempting

between people's natural talents and abilities and their

to undermine and destroy them as the government of

ability to garner greater income and wealth under

the United States has so often been guilty of and

`unregulated' social and economic conditions. This

which, I'm ashamed to say, it is continuing to do with

is because, even if all children were to be guaranteed

respect to socialist Cuba.

equal access to high-quality education, quirks of their

11. See Rawls (1972), pp. 150±2.

personalities and/or accidents of family circumstances

12. Rawls (1999), p. 537.

(such as whether their parents or other family mem-

13. See Rawls (1972), pp. 114±18.

bers or close associates made them feel loved and

14. My continuing disappointment with Rawls's attitude

secure), and the operation of blind chance in general,

to global justice is due to the fact that in `The Law of

will affect whether or not particular individuals are

People', which he had actually intended to be an

successful. This is not to say that in presently existing

appendix to Political Liberalism, he has, for reasons I

societies there is no discernible correlation between

still do not understand, continued to refuse to apply

natural talents/abilities and success, nor to deny that

his difference principle internationally. Although he

the correlation should and could be made much higher

does call for `standards of fairness for trade and other

in a genuinely just society. It is only to say that the

co-operative arrangements' and for `certain provisions

assumption that `the talented' in even a perfectly just

for mutual assistance between peoples in times of

society will be able to parlay their talents into success

famine and drought' (Rawls, 1999, p. 541) there is

(however they come to define it) is, to some extent, unjustified.

the question as to why this should only apply to `reasonably developed liberal societies' and also why

29. See Cohen (1996).

the difference principle itself shouldn't be so applied.

30. For a defence of the opposite position, however, see Van Parijs (1991).

But, in any case, it seems clear that Rawls's theory and

130

RAWLSIAN THEORY AND CONTEMPORARY MARXISM

31. Rawls (1990), p. 42. I would like to thank John Rawls

operating on the ultimately self-refuting notion that

for giving me permission to quote from this typescript

there is no such thing as rationality, or with those who

in my work.

merely claim that Marxist theory is irrelevant and/or

32. See Arneson (1989). Dworkin (1981a) and (1981b)

illegitimate because it is (supposedly) based on grand

also discusses many of the ideas within these princi-

historical meta narratives, the claim that all aspects of

ples.

Marxism and all hope for socialism must be abandoned

33. See Cohen (1989).

just doesn't hold water. To say that Marxism and

34. Rawls (1972), pp. 87±8.

socialism are now irrelevant theoretical or practical

35. Rawls (1990), p. 42.

political traditions is absurd given the quantity and

36. Arneson (1988), p. 89.

quality of the theorising that they still inspire, which is

37. See Sen (1984), chapter 13, (1985),(1992), and

due to the insights they offer into humanity's most

`Capabilities and Well-Being' in Nussbaum and Sen

urgent political challenges. Given the popularity and

(eds) (1993), pp. 30±53; for commentary on Sen, see

influence of postmodernism within certain circles, it is vital to insist upon these points.

Crocker (1992).

45. Peffer (1990), pp. 458±9. In fact, this set of assumptions

38. Cohen (1994), p. 119.

is so minimal that, if they can indeed be adopted by non-

39. See Peffer (1990), pp. 137±65 for my analysis of this

Marxists/socialists, some would say that they are not

debate. 40. Ibid., pp. 142±6. The fact that Marx often called this

Marxist at all. But because they originate within the

an example of `theft' by capitalists is strong evidence

Marxist tradition and continue to animate it, I see no

that ± perhaps despite himself ± he did not think

good reason to withdraw the label from them ± parti-

morality could only ever be an ideological phenom-

cularly when, as in my case, they are used to energise a

enon relative to and supportive of a specific mode of

particular political position opposed to capitalism for which Marxism has long held the banner.

production, a `prop' which would become increasingly redundant in post-capitalist societies.

46. Notice that this list of socialist theorists (who are,

41. This section follows ibid., pp. 146±7.

broadly speaking, within the analytic-linguistic tradi-

42. Peffer (1990), pp. 433±4.

tion of philosophy) by no means exhausts the category

43. The notion of `regulated' market economy as an

of socialist or quasi-socialist theorists who participate

antonym for `capitalist economy' is pivotal here, but

in contemporary debates since it doesn't mention: the

would obviously need to be substantiated in a fuller

Yugoslav Praxis school of Marxian philosophers and

account, not least because no capitalist economy is

similar socialist humanists (such as Svetozar Stojono-

entirely unregulated and so cannot accurately be

Â, Mihaelo Markovic Â, Gajo Petrovic Â); critical thevic

defined as being in opposition to regulation. In gen-

orists (such as Ju È rgen Habermas, Karl-Otto Apel,

eral, what will distinguish the market socialist econ-

Albrecht Wellmer, Thomas McCarthy, Richard Bern-

omy in this regard is the degree of regulation and, most

stein, Nancy Fraser, Doug Kellner and Stephen Best);

signficantly, the ends to which it is put.

Hegelian Marxists (such as Shlomo Avineri and Ber-

44. Here, we should also confront the claim by various

tell Ollman); liberation philosophers (such as Enrique

postmodernists that it is no longer possible to take

Dussel and Horacio Cerruti); Cuban political philo-

Marxism to be a serious theoretical tradition or soci-

sophers (such as Thalia Fung, Olga Fernandez, and

alism to be a legitimate historical goal because they are

Pablo Guadarrama); other socialist philosophers from

based on so-called grand historical meta narratives.

the developing world (such as Francisco Miro Ques-

But the brief outline of the lower-level empirical

ada, Adolfo Sanchez Vazquez and Pablo Gonzalez

claims still taken seriously by the Analytical Marxists

Casanova); socialist feminists (such as Alison Jaggar,

and others given in this section should suffice to show

Ann Ferguson, Heidi Hartmann and Nancy Hart-

how utterly bogus this claim is. For the parts of Marx's

sock); socialist theorists who are primarily economists

theory still being utilised have nothing whatever to do

and only secondarily philosophers (such as Alec Nove,

with grand quasi-Hegelian claims about inevitable

Branko Horvat, Jaroslav Vanek, Thomas Weisskopf

movements in history. Indeed, they are quite the

and Robin Hahnel); world-systems theorists (such as

opposite: they are the more concrete empirical claims

Â Gunder Frank and Immanuel Wallerstein, Andre

that can be (and are) seriously discussed by social

Samir Amin) or theorists of development ethics (such

scientists, political thinkers and ordinary people inter-

as David Crocker, Denis Goulet and Luis Camacho);

ested in politics everywhere. To think politically we

radical sociological theorists (such as Claus Offe,

cannot avoid making certain assumptions about what

Ernesto Laclau, Alain Touraine); social-democratic

social,

pro-

theorists (such as Michael Harrington, Robert Heilbr-

grammes and policies will best accomplish given goals

oner and Cornell West); or the so-called Marxist

or support and promote certain values. So whether we

amoralist theorists who argued that Marxism is in-

are dealing with those postmodernist thinkers who are

compatible with morality in general or at least with

economic

and

political

institutions,

131

RODNEY G. PEFFER

justice in particular (such as Allen W. Wood, Richard

50. I would like to thank G. A. Cohen and David Miller

Miller, Anthony Skillen and Andrew Collier). This

for comments on a previous version of this paper given

last view is one that I spend over 100 pages critiquing

at Oxford University as well as Neil Harding for

and, I believe, decisively refuting in Peffer (1990).

comments on a version of it given at the University

47. See Krouse and McPherson (1988); Peffer (1994).

of Wales Swansea. I would especially like to thank

48. See Roemer (1994).

Mark Evans for his incisive comments and his editorial

49. Van Parijs (1992).

help and suggestions.

132

Part Four PROBLEMS OF LIBERAL JUSTIFICATION

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10

DISENCHANTMENT AND THE LIBERALISM OF FEAR Peter Lassman

The wars of this century with their extreme violence

One consequence is that this leads to what we

and increasing destructiveness, culminating in the

might call the `Weimar problem';

manic evil of the Holocaust, raise in an acute way the

3. that John Rawls's Political Liberalism, the most

question whether political relations must be gov-

systematic attempt to construct a liberal re-

erned by power and coercion alone. If a reasonably

sponse, fails in its attempt to provide a solution

just society that subordinates power to its aims is not

to

possible and people are largely amoral, if not incur-

ought instead to present itself in terms of

ably cynical and self-centred, one might ask with

Judith Shklar's idea of `the liberalism of fear'.

Kant whether it is worthwhile for human beings to

This humble, cautious liberalism is probably

live on the earth?

1

the

problem.

Contemporary

liberalism

the best that liberals can hope for in such a pluralistic social world. Fortunately, it is enough to save us from conceding the bleakly

I

negative possibility described in the opening quote.

The argument of this chapter is: 1. that pluralism, in the sense of `the wide di-

This chapter's epigraph, taken from the introduc-

versity and deep conflict among different con-

tion to the second edition of his Political Liberalism,

ceptions of ends prevalent in modern societies

can be read as a statement of the `esoteric doctrine' or

and different patterns of life and the institu-

`inner citadel' at the heart of John Rawls's political

tions that go with them', is the distinctive

philosophy.

problem which modern politics has to face;

2

3

It is what motivates his project and the

centrality of the discussion of Rawls's work in con-

2. that before this topic became of central con-

temporary political philosophy is a reflection of the

cern for current political theory Max Weber

insightful way in which it engages with the problem

had proposed an interpretation of the modern

which all contemporary political philosophies face in

world in terms of value pluralism and `the

light of the conditions of modernity first sketched by

disenchantment of the world' which provides

Max Weber. This claim, of course, appears to pre-

the (usually unacknowledged) foundation for

suppose that we accept Weber's sketch as true. What

most contemporary liberal debate. This ac-

I do think is true is that the picture of the modern

count, however, raises serious problems for

world which Weber painted has been highly influ-

our understanding of modern liberalism, de-

ential even, or especially, among those who deny its

mocracy and the legitimation of political rule.

relevance or who fail to mention it in their work. In

135

PETER LASSMAN

other words, it haunts much contemporary political

always, however, remain and limit the extent of

thinking despite the negative assessment many thin-

possible agreement.'

kers make of it.

4

6

Here, then, I simply want to stand

This limitation may explain why, in his more

by a recent statement made by Habermas: `I feel that

recent work, there are several hints that he is

Max Weber's question regarding the paradoxes of

troubled by the thought that his whole project

rationalisation is still the best key to a philosophi-

cannot possibly succeed, that conflict will always

cally and scientifically informed diagnosis of our

undermine the possibility of agreement. He accepts

time.'

5

We shall shortly see how, despite itself, the

that many will `regard it as obvious' that `a just and

Rawlsian viewpoint is shadowed by the Weberian

well-ordered democratic society is not possible'. But

sketch. Let us begin, though, by seeing how Rawls

this is a conclusion he thinks we must resist. One of

conceptualises his project of political philosophy as

the interesting reasons why Rawls feels that we can

the positive response to Kant's question.

resist this conclusion is bound up with his conception of the nature of political philosophy itself. In some of his remarks on this Rawls is responding to

II

critics such as Michael Walzer who have charged

In the concluding paragraphs of his introduction to

that his theory is too abstract, that it does not deal

the second (paperback) edition of Political Liberalism

with the real problems of contemporary politics, and

Rawls refers to three kinds of conflict in modern

that its philosophical structure displaces `genuine

societies, the confrontation with which is the main

politics' and is therefore entirely at odds with the

preoccupation of his political philosophy. The first

nature of democratic pluralist society.

derives from `citizens' conflicting comprehensive doctrines'

and political conflict are unlikely to find their

and goals by which people structure their lives);

resolution in his kind of abstractive philosophical

the second derives from citizens' `different status,

methodology. But Rawls himself has always expli-

class position, and occupation, or from their ethni-

citly argued the reverse. He states very clearly that in

city, gender, and race'; while the third is a result of

`political philosophy the work of abstraction is set in

what Rawls calls the `burdens of judgement' (the

motion by deep political conflicts.'

inevitable indeterminacies and consequent diver-

political philosophy when our `shared political un-

gent results of rational and reasonable normative

derstandings' break down and `equally when we are

deliberation in free societies). Rawls states that his

torn within ourselves'. Abstraction from that which

theory of political liberalism `mitigates but cannot

divides us is a way of finding grounds for ideas which

eliminate the first kind of conflict, since compre-

might unite us and that is where we find the basis for a

hensive doctrines are, politically speaking, unrec-

principled resolution of conflict.

and

organised

remain

sets

of

beliefs,

The thought here is that the problems of social

values

oncilable

(the

7

inconsistent

with

8

We turn to

one

The emphasis on possible unity shows that Raw-

another'. Nevertheless, Rawls argues that the prin-

lsian political philosophy is not in the business of

ciples of political liberalism, `the principles of justice

uncovering actual conflict-resolving consensus upon

of a reasonably just constitutional regime', are cap-

principles. Operating in the realm of the possible

able of reconciling the second kind of conflict.

obviously includes acknowledging the possibility of

Once we accept the principles of justice, preferably

failure, hence Rawls's disquiet. Yet we ought not to

those of his own theory, this kind of conflict `need

accept the sceptical argument against the possibility

no longer arise, or arise so forcefully'. It appears,

of a conflict-resolving (or at least a conflict-mana-

then, to be this kind of conflict whose non-resolu-

ging) and well-ordered liberal-democratic society, in

tion would plunge us into the amoral world of `pure'

Rawls's view, without first being clear about what the

power described in the opening quote. And it is the

consequences would be `for our view of the political

confidence that it can be transcended which stokes

world, and even the world as a whole.'

Rawls's optimism. Unfortunately though, he thinks

conception of the nature of political philosophy

conflicts `arising from the burdens of judgement

and, by implication, of the responsibility of the

136

9

Rawls's

DISENCHANTMENT AND THE LIBERALISM OF FEAR

political philosopher means that we must be aware

crucially impacts upon how we might develop pos-

that the answer we give to general and abstract

sibilities for the avoidance of the Weimar problem.

questions does have a bearing upon our `background thoughts and attitudes about the world as a whole.'

III

Thus, if we are convinced on abstract philosophical grounds that a just and stable democratic society is

The variety of ways in which liberal theorists have

not possible then this will have a great impact upon

responded to this problem is striking, indicating the

`the underlying attitudes of the public culture and

variety within the liberal tradition. There are those,

the conduct of politics.' It is at this point that Rawls

such as Rawls, Larmore, Nozick and Hayek, who

revealingly points to the case of the Weimar Repub-

have asserted the reality of moral pluralism while

lic and to one of its most outspoken critics, Carl

arguing, at the same time, for the possibility of a

Schmitt.

ranking of values so that one value, liberty, can take

Rawls presents the Weimar Republic as offering us

precedence. Others, such as Williams, Berlin and

a particularly dramatic example of exactly what he

Hampshire, have stressed the ineliminable and often

fears. One of the reasons for the fall of the Weimar

tragic character of value conflicts. For example,

Republic and its replacement by Nazi dictatorship

Hampshire has argued the case for a strong thesis

was that both the traditional elites and a large

that, on the basis of an analogy between moralities

section of the intellectuals were unwilling to support

and natural languages, `nature has so designed us

it on the grounds that they could no longer believe

that, taking humanity as a whole and the evidences

that any form of democratic and liberal society was

of history, we tend to have conflicting and divergent

possible. Given what we now know of the terrible

moralities imbedded in divergent ways of life, each

consequences

the product of specific historical memories and local

of

this

particular

political

failure,

Rawls urges that we

conditions.'

11

For him

must start with the assumption that a reasonably

the diversity in conceptions of the good is an

just political society is possible, and for it to be

irreducible diversity, not only because no suffi-

possible, human beings must have a moral nature,

cient reasons have been given, and could ever be

not of course a perfect such nature, yet one that

given, for taking one end, such as the general

can understand, act on, and be sufficiently moved

happiness or the exercise of reason, as the single

by a reasonable political conception of right and

supreme end; but also because the capacity to

justice to support a society guided by its ideals and

develop idiosyncrasies of style and of imagination,

principles.

10

and to form specific conceptions of the good, is the salient and peculiar capacity of human beings among other animals.

The vital moral and political need to believe in

12

the possibility of justice, however, should not lead theorists to a wilful blindness over the true nature of

However, this second group's acceptance of the

the pluralism which divides societies and puts the

reality (as they see it) of such conflicts has created

question of justice on the political agenda. Thus the

problems for the coherence and tenability of their

idea of moral and value pluralism has increasingly

own defence of the value of liberalism. If the ex-

become a central concern for political theorists,

istence of plural and conflicting values is accepted as

especially liberal theorists, working in both what

an unavoidable reality then it follows that the claims

can loosely be called the Anglo-American and Con-

made for any particular political theory must be at

tinental traditions of political thought. Pluralism is

best both severely limited and local in their applica-

therefore widely seen as a defining characteristic of

tion. But the first group of theorists, in accepting that

modernity and as the most significant challenge to

we are in some way faced with a pluralism of funda-

political philosophy's search for conflict-resolving

mental and conflicting values, are confronted by the

agreements. How it is to be conceptualised, then,

problem of explaining how their own theory's sup-

137

PETER LASSMAN

port for liberal principles is able to escape from

free and equal citizens profoundly divided by rea-

insoluble conflicts of value.

sonable though incompatible religious, philosophi-

From Rawls's earliest work it is possible to observe

cal, and moral doctrines?'

15

a concern with how we might get out of this parti-

There is some disagreement among advocates of

cular bind. In his first published paper `Outline of a

pluralism concerning its historical status. Hampshire,

Decision Procedure for Ethics' he asked if there

as we might ascertain from his quotation above, sees

existed

pluralism as not being either a peculiarly modern or democratic phenomenon or an unexplained general

a reasonable decision procedure which is suffi-

fact of human existence. Moral pluralism and moral

ciently strong, at least in some cases, to determine

conflict are, for him, an essential product of the

the manner in which competing interests could

imaginative powers of human beings in general. But

be adjudicated, and, in instances of conflict, one

the idea that an irreducible plurality of values has

interest

and,

transformed the way people think about how a

further, can the existence of this procedure, as

specifically modern politics should be conducted is

well as its reasonableness, be established by ra-

increasingly influential. Rawls makes this kind of

given

preference

tional methods of inquiry?

over

another;

13

interpretation of our moral history absolutely central for his account of `political liberalism'. He argues that

In his most recent writings Rawls is concerned to

`modern democratic political culture' itself is to be

work out his version of `political liberalism' with the

sharply distinguished from all that preceded it so that

same set of problems in mind. The central problem

its `special nature' accounts for, to a large extent, `the

which he now recognises as forcing him to modify

different problems of political philosophy in the

the account of stability put forward in Part Three of

modern as compared with the ancient world.'

16

his A Theory of Justice is what he terms `the fact of

Rawls cites both Weber and Isaiah Berlin as

reasonable pluralism'. Pluralism is `reasonable', he

offering important and influential accounts of the

says, because it is the outcome that we should expect

idea of the pluralism of values. These thinkers,

of people freely using their powers of moral reasoning

however, provide ways of challenging his own ac-

under liberal-democratic institutions; it is, as we

count of pluralism's nature and hence his ideal

have noted, the product of the burdens of judgement.

solution to the Weimar problem. Let us, then, look

In other words, such is the nature of human value

first at Berlin's ideas.

and value judgements in free societies that we should

Initially, Berlin appears to be equivocal on the

expect such conflict.

question of the historical character of pluralism. In

Crucially, Rawlsian `reasonable pluralism' is not

tracing the roots of the doctrine of pluralism to the

itself supposed to be a claim about the truth of

Cynics and the Sceptics he seems to be saying that

values (for that is something that can be reasonably

there is a perennial quality in the conflict between

contested between monists and pluralists), only

monism and pluralism in western political thought.

about the reasonableness of the disputes that con-

But, in pointing to the importance of Machiavelli as

stitute the fact that there are plural values.

14

It is

the `first person to indicate a conflict of real values',

not officially, then, conceding the truth of the

he also indicates the significance of a peculiarly

Weberian sketch of modernity (for that is just

modern quality to the recognition of pluralism.

one of potentially numerous incompatible world-

According to Berlin it was Machiavelli who was

17

views it is reasonable to affirm). Support for the claim that Rawls inadvertently leans in Weber's

the first to make it clear that the very idea of a

direction has yet to be adduced, but there is already

Christian commonwealth is a contradiction in

an initial, fleeting point of convergence: both wish

terms: one cannot be a Christian and an heroic

to accommodate, not suppress, pluralism. Rawls

Roman citizen at the same time. Christians must

poses the challenge thus: `How is it possible that

remain humble, to be trampled on at times; Ro-

there may exist over time a stable and just society of

mans resist this successfully. This implies an

138

DISENCHANTMENT AND THE LIBERALISM OF FEAR

irreconcilable dualism. One can choose one life or

all-embracing solution to all human problems

the other, but not both; and there is no over-

which, if there is too much resistance to it, might

arching criterion to determine the right choice;

need force to secure it, only tends to lead to

one chooses as one chooses, neither life can

bloodshed and the increase in human misery.

objectively be called superior to the other.

18

Berlin takes the idea of the pluralism of values to This prompts a significant insight according to

be central for his understanding of both the history of

Rawls, which goes a long way in distinguishing

political thought and of his own liberalism, not in

modern liberal from premodern political thought.

the sense that he has provided a general explanation

This is the claim `there is no social world without loss

for the existence of pluralism, but simply in the

± that is, no social world that does not exclude some

consequent necessity that we be reconciled with

ways of life that realise in special ways certain

the basic fact of life that `values can clash ± that

fundamental values. By virtue of its culture and

is why civilisations are incompatible.'

institutions, any society will prove uncongenial to

ism of values implies the `clash of values'. If the

some ways of life'. These values may be fully objec-

reality of plural and conflicting values is ineliminable

tive,

19

22

The plural-

then it follows that there is no `perfect world in

but the harsh fact of life is that their full range

which all good things can be harmonised in princi23

is too extensive to fit into any one social world; not

ple.'

only are they incompatible with one another,

search for perfection or utopia is both incoherent and

imposing conflicting requirements on institutions,

dangerous.

The implication of this is, for Berlin, that the

but there exists no family of workable institutions

This understanding of the pluralism of values

with sufficient space for them all. That there is no

coheres with Berlin's depiction of the good society.

social world without loss is rooted in the nature of

The good society is to be understood as one in which

values and the world, and much human tragedy

maximum space is allowed for those forms of life

reflects that; a just liberal society may have far more

which can be guided by a principle that competing

space than other social worlds, but still, it can never

values can be allowed to flourish within the terms of

accommodate all possible ways of life.

20

a shared social space. Berlin thinks that the form of society in which this is most likely to occur typically

For Berlin, as for Rawls, the reality of the pluralism

happens to be governed by the principles of liberal-

of values is tied to the possibility of political philo-

ism. The virtue of a liberal society resides in the fact

sophy itself. He argues that if

that, while the impossibility of realising all relevant values remains an impossibility, it ± more than any

we ask the Kantian question, `In what kind of

other kind of society ± is one which recognises and is

world is political philosophy ± the kind of dis-

strengthened by the pluralism of values. It is one of

cussion and argument in which it consists ± in

the marks of a liberal society that it tolerates or even

principle possible? the answer must be `Only in a

encourages value pluralism. It does not attempt to

world where ends collide.'

21

reduce the pluralism of values in the interests of any one particular value or set of values supported by the authority of the state.

But the Berlinian thesis of pluralism (the now much-discussed `inner fortress' of his thought) warns

Clearly, for Berlin, the recognition of the reality of

political philosophy that `the pursuit of a single,

the pluralism of values (his `objective pluralism') is

final, universal solution to human problems' is a

itself to understand a truth about the nature of

fundamental and dangerous error. It is essential to

values. This is the main point of departure from

recognise that there are

Rawls, who wants his political philosophy to abstain from such truth-statements about what he regards as

many ideals worth pursuing, some of them are

reasonably contested metaphysical and meta-ethical

incompatible with one another, but the idea of an

claims. Plainly, too, Berlin takes our awareness of the

139

PETER LASSMAN

existence of plural and competing values as being

be committed to the primacy of at least the value of

itself a good. He seems to take this understanding as

liberty. In other words,

itself constituting an argument for liberalism because a liberal society will express this understanding more than any other.

24

the mere fact that values are `plural' . . . tells us

As pluralism implies that `since it is

nothing about which of the vast range of values

possible that no final answers can be given to moral

known to us from human experience are the

and political questions, or indeed any questions

values we ought to choose for ourselves and

about value' then

our social institutions. Pluralism tells us that we must choose but not what to choose.

29

room must be made for a life in which some values may turn out to be incompatible, so that if

Furthermore, it is notable that Berlin (despite his

destructive conflict is to be avoided compromises

concern with the significance of Romantic and

have to be effected and a minimum degree of

Counter-Enlightenment thinkers) does not discuss

toleration, however reluctant, becomes indispen-

those

sable.

25

twentieth-century

theorists,

such

as

Carl

Schmitt, who having taken the argument for pluralism seriously saw it as the first step in the destruction

This suggests that those societies which respect

of liberalism as a substantive normative standpoint.

this truth are preferable to those which do not.

This may be explained by the fact that Berlin's

Furthermore, there seems to be an assumption here

pluralism ultimately stops short of being absolutely

that not all values possess an equal survival value

`total' in the sense that, after all he says, he still

within a society which allows maximum space for

balances it with a belief in a universal human nature.

value pluralism (those forms of life which are less

His conception of it is thin enough to underdeter-

tolerant of pluralism are perhaps more likely to be

mine any one substantive moral doctrine but it is still

`squeezed out', yet this may be cause for less regret

capable of yielding the basic principles of a universal

than if other forms of life were to wither).

26

`minimum morality'.

In this

30

This theoretically prevents

sense value pluralism itself cannot pretend to be

the concession of a total incommensurability of

neutral with regard to outcomes even if its philoso-

values and the relativising impossibility of critique

phical outlook and political intent is neutral with

levelled at any moral schema. Such a morality could

regard to the initial support, or lack of it, given to

further justify a liberal social order, and values/forms

ways of life supported by different values.

of life sympathetic to its principles, as an explanation

Nevertheless, the connection between liberalism

of the liberal bias in Berlin's view. But because this

and pluralism is not as cast-iron as one might expect.

morality does not constitute liberalism in its entirety,

Berlin insists that pluralism and liberalism are `not

it is in principle compatible with other forms of

the same or even overlapping concepts. There are

social order. The connection between liberalism

liberal theories which are not pluralistic.' While

and pluralism remains historically contingent; plur-

defending the value of both he is clear that there

alists need not be liberals.

31

is no logical connection between them. The con-

It is, of course, a profoundly contentious point as to

nection between pluralism and liberalism is one of

exactly how such a `minimum morality' position can

`elective affinity',

27

be defended from the kind of objective-pluralist per-

grounded as much as anything in 28

But it could be argued that

spective with which Berlin confronts us. An indica-

not only is there no logical connection between

tion of the difficulty is clearly signalled when he

liberalism and pluralism but that they are actually

equates the universal minimum-moral outlook with

incompatible. If pluralism is taken to mean that there

that of the less-than-global `western world'; as Perry

is no one particular value or set of values which,

Anderson says, `the universal shrinks with every step

when in conflict with other values, can always claim

back to the local.'

our allegiance then it must be incompatible with

that upon which the possibility of `justice' ± under-

liberalism. As a distinctive doctrine, the latter must

stood loosely as the peaceful, principled resolution of

historical experience.

32

140

If this outlook is supposed to be

DISENCHANTMENT AND THE LIBERALISM OF FEAR

conflict ± is to rest, perhaps it is one that political

more than just the expression of our preferences,

philosophy has to construct rather than just assume is

but who refuse to believe that it has its home in a

ready to hand. Here, then, is Rawls's main difference

harmonious cosmos (as Aristotle thought) or in

from Berlin and his distinctive characterisation of the

God's plan.

fact of pluralism is the key to the hope that the Rawlsian project will not founder on the same kind

For Larmore, liberalism too is very much a product of

of justificatory paradox that underpins Berlin's at-

this intellectual milieu. It has `distinguished itself

tempt to stand for a universal minimum morality.

from earlier political philosophies by its refusal, ever

At this point we need to ensure that we keep clear

more pronounced, to base the principles of associa-

the distinction between (1) pluralism as a doctrine

tion upon a vision of God's plan or of an ordered

about the nature of value (Berlin's position) and (2)

cosmos.'

the phenomenon of deep disagreement about the

of liberalism and pluralism have seemed so closely

nature of the good (Rawls's position, based upon `the

entwined. And even though the Rawls/Larmore

burdens of judgement'). This is a move urged by

project wants to distinguish the former, in its epis-

Larmore, who originally coined the term `political

temically abstinent `political' guise, from the latter as

liberalism'. The reasoning behind the latter is that

a doctrine about the objective nature of value,

pluralism, understood as a doctrine about the nature

Larmore concedes that both are `distinctively mod-

of the good, is itself a controversial doctrine. If this is

ern in that they have something to do with the

so then pluralism cannot possibly stand as a support

metaphysical-religious

for `political liberalism' which itself attempts to stand

world.'

clear of all controversial philosophical and religious

standpoint on the nature of value.

35

36

It is unsurprising, then, that the doctrines

disenchantment

of

the

And this is itself a particular metaphysical

doctrines in search of the agreement upon principles

The suggestion, then, is that some version of

which it posits as necessary for political resolution of

`doctrinal pluralism' is an idea that shadows moder-

the conflicts of value.

33

The idea that reasonable

nity and hence contemporary liberalism, even when

people will tend to disagree about significant ques-

the latter attempts to distinguish it from the separate

tions is not to be confused with either pluralism or

thesis of pluralism as reasonable disagreement. As we

scepticism. It is, according to Larmore, the fact of

saw with Berlin, it is this idea which makes the

reasonable disagreement rather than the `doctrine of

justification of liberalism so problematic. It is in the light of this suggestion that we can

pluralism' which lies at the heart of modern liberal

illuminate the problem of liberalism and pluralism by

political philosophy.

placing it into the context of Weber's thought.

Nevertheless, Larmore's idea of reasonable disagreement shares with Berlin's concept of pluralism the belief that they are both reflections of a pecu-

IV

liarly modern reality. Despite his criticism of Berlin's failure to distinguish pluralism from the persistence

Weber was probably the first to take seriously as a

of reasonable disagreement he sounds much like

basic feature of modernity the idea of a pluralism of

Berlin in his argument that we are now reversing

conflicting values in a way which has a direct bearing

the belief embedded in our `intellectual tradition'

on politics. Most of the themes concerning the

which `has been to a large and important extent

question

rationalist', that `reason is what brings us together.'

34

of

incommensurability,

disenchantment

and tragic choices which are discussed by Berlin, Larmore,

On this account pluralism is a

Williams,

Hampshire

and

others

were

raised in his work. Although I do not want to claim characteristically modern outlook. It is likely to

that Weber carried out a systematic and satisfactory

appear attractive only against the background of

analysis it is instructive to take a brief look at his

metaphysical

It

discussion of these topics because it starkly reveals

recommends itself to those who continue to

some of the problems and dangers involved. Weber is

believe that value can be objective, something

therefore interesting because his problems remain, in

and religious

disappointment.

141

PETER LASSMAN

my view, to a large extent our problems. Although

There are doubtless numerous ways of rendering

there is some controversy concerning the question of

vivid the idea that Weber somehow haunts con-

whether Weber can be classified as a liberal at all it

temporary liberalism, including political liberalism,

seems to me that he was, at least, `a Liberal of a

and why it is his pluralism ± as opposed perhaps to

strange kind'.

37

Berlin's ± that informs the most disturbing challenges

Weber's problem was that he wanted to defend

to it. But here are a few considerations that can

liberal values and institutions while, at the same

contribute to it. First, Larmore is right that the

time, his general philosophical outlook with its

peculiarly modern phenomenon of disenchantment

acceptance

as

has historically fuelled the politics of liberalism in so

our fate led to a radical scepticism concerning our

far as people have increasingly appreciated that

ability to produce, under modern conditions, a con-

politics in modern, diverse societies cannot rest upon

vincing theoretical justification for them. In other

any one `enchanted' doctrine; to avoid outright

words, in Weber's account we have a defence of

conflict, it must accommodate a plurality of such.

liberal institutions and values without the support of

Second, this concession to the existence of plural

of

disenchantment

and

pluralism

an explicit liberal political philosophy.

38

At the

values has a tendency (albeit not logically) to further

extremes this could be interpreted, for example, as

the subjectivist account of value which the supre-

either an early recognition of postmodern reality, the

mely disenchanted (`scientific') practices of instru-

inevitable contingency of any `defence' available to

mental rationality promote as they burgeon in social

liberalism, as Rorty would argue, or as an example of

life. Third, this renders increasingly irresistible a

the failure of the whole tradition, as Leo Strauss and

frankly Nietzschean view of politics, where subjec-

his followers seem to urge.

tive wills battle it out for power over each other with

Weber's account of the fate of politics in a world of

no grand metaphysical-moral story to be told by

plural and conflicting values is embedded in a `nar-

which to cloak the brute reality of the struggle.

rative of modernity'. According to him we live in an

Fourth (and this is arguably where Weber himself

increasingly secular, rationalised and `disenchanted'

ultimately stumbled), the case for liberalism ± or any

world in which we are confronted with an opposition

other political order ± rests only upon individuals'

between the seemingly unstoppable development of

decisions to support it, with nothing independent to

the `housing for the new serfdom' (the instrumen-

ground or validate them, a form of political existen-

tally rationalising bureaucratisation of social institu-

tialism in other words. And if accelerating disen-

tions and practices) and the need for the individual

chantment is deepening pluralism, the prospects of

to make choices between ultimately irreconcilable

conflict-managing agreements in decisions accord-

ultimate values, `the unending struggle between the

ingly recedes.

gods.'

39

On Rawls's analysis, here is a key point of

The problem with Weber's position looked at

difference between Weber and Berlin. Eschewing

from some liberal points of view is that he was only

any notion of objective pluralism, `Weber's view

able to offer two unacceptable solutions for the

rests on a form of value scepticism and voluntarism;

predicament of the individual under these condi-

political tragedy arises from the conflict of subjective

tions. One is a re-enchantment of the world, which

40

Rather than the

would mean a return to rule by what Rawls would

apparent reification of values through the language

call a fully comprehensive moral and philosophical

of `objectivity' (which also facilitates the notion of a

doctrine. As Anderson stresses, First World War

thin objective morality that we have argued pluralists

nationalism disturbingly seems to function in this

struggle consistently to defend), Weber's outlook

role for Weber.

strips `reality' right back to the bare fact of people's

decisionism propels the individual into a radical

different, clashing subjective opinions and wills.

fatalism; the accident of birth within a particular

Furthermore, the deeper the process of disenchant-

national community is our chance to escape the

ment the more intense the struggle between their

gloom of disenchantment, to embrace the destiny

contending viewpoints becomes.

of the nation as our own. The remaining sphere for

commitments and resolute wills.'

142

41

Here, the arbitrariness of his

DISENCHANTMENT AND THE LIBERALISM OF FEAR

freedom would be one in which the individual is

with democracy's claim to value and embody the

thrown back on his or her own resources (the

collective will of the people, making `liberal democ-

meagreness of which may encourage individuals to

racy' ultimately oxymoronic and ± particularly when

give up still more of their own `being' to the `nation's

popular will runs against liberal democracy ± doomed

cause').

to implosion.

43

)

The other solution perhaps lacks some of the

It is in the light of this that we can see why, for

ominous portent of the first, but is ultimately no

Rawls, it might seem to be `a great puzzle to me why

more satisfactory. In his later writings on political

political liberalism was not worked out much earlier:

affairs Weber came to argue that in a modern

it seems such a natural way to present the idea of

democratic state the only acceptable response would

liberalism, given the fact of reasonable pluralism in

be a mixture of charismatic rule backed up by a legal

political life.'

order as a form of rule. The problem here is that the

become political in the way in which he proposes

legitimacy of this form of state is based entirely upon

because, under conditions of pluralism, it cannot

its success in being successful. There are `no other

assume that liberal ideas are the non-controversial

criteria for success beyond success itself.'

42

44

For him, liberalism has been forced to

foundation of social and political life.

And if

45

It is, then, a

regimes resting upon such bases are not `successful' ±

direct development from the specifically modern

if, for example, they struggle to cope with social and

form of post-Reformation religious pluralism. `For

political conflict ± they have nothing upon which to

the moderns the good was known in their religion;

fall back to argue that they are nevertheless legit-

with their profound divisions, the essential condi-

imate. (Compare this with a regime whose citizens

tions of a viable and just society were not.'

widely accept its authority as being derived from

distinguishes the modern from the ancient world.

`God'. It, too, may experience functional inefficien-

`What the ancient world did not know was the clash

cies but its lack of success doesn't exhaust its legit-

between salvationist, credal, and expansionist reli-

imating grounds and hence it is likely to be more

gions.' Crucially, this

46

This

stable.) The problems and tensions in Weber's account of the problem of the legitimation of political

introduces into people's conceptions of their good

rule within a plural moral universe lead directly to

a transcendent element not admitting of compro-

the `Weimar problem', the crisis of justification

mise. This element forces either mortal conflict

which liberalism faces as soon as the implications

moderated only by circumstance and exhaustion,

of

or equal liberty of conscience and freedom of

pluralism

become

apparent

and

are

thought

through in a particularly radical direction.

thought. Except on the basis of these last, firmly

The `Weimar problem' which follows from We-

founded and publicly recognised, no reasonable

ber's diagnosis of the political crisis of our time is one

political conception of justice is possible. Political

in which the central debate concerns liberalism's

liberalism starts by taking to heart the absolute

ability to cope with pluralism. A common conclu-

depth of that irreconcilable latent conflict.

47

sion reached is that it could not. According to Carl Schmitt, for example, all political theories contain

Political liberalism's task is to seek self-justifica-

an element of `surplus value' of meaning. It is in their

tion in terms of ideas which, aside from those which

nature to claim a truth for themselves which they

reasonably divide them, all people qua citizens of

cannot possibly justify by rational means. In the eyes

constitutional democracies can nevertheless share.

of many, and Schmitt is the most well-known ex-

In other words, as the basis of political agreement,

ponent of this view, liberalism is bound to oscillate

liberalism must try not to take sides in the wider,

between a self-interpretation of impartiality, or neu-

plural comprehensive doctrines of value. Hence the

trality mixed with proceduralism and a commitment

great significance he attaches to the role of political

to the more substantive values which it peculiarly

philosophy and its abstract constructivist methodol-

embodies. (Schmitt's particular complaint was that

ogy: it is, with hindsight, the obvious as well as

liberalism's claims to be objectively valid conflicted

morally and politically necessary strategy to ward

143

PETER LASSMAN

off the Weimar problem. It helps us, too, to see that

doctrine of the very kind which he is attempting to

modernity need not treat pluralism as some kind of

exclude.

secular equivalent of the fall from grace. For Rawls,

This profoundly suggests the possibility that there

the pluralism of comprehensive doctrines is `not seen

is no one way of characterising pluralism, as a

as a disaster but rather as the natural outcome of the

grounding notion in any case for a liberal politics,

activities of human reason under enduring free in-

which could command universal agreement. It has

stitutions. To see reasonable pluralism as a disaster is

been frequently observed how, in other respects,

to see the exercise of reason under conditions of

Rawls's doctrine falls back upon the kind of com-

freedom itself as a disaster.'

48

prehensive liberalism he seeks to avoid in justificatory arguments.

At once humble in its attempt to avoid grand

51

What this argument suggests is

`metanarratives' and ambitious in its quest for poli-

that we should not be very surprised at this, because

tical agreement amidst reasonable pluralism, it is

the account of pluralism with which the whole

here ± in the account of pluralism that grounds it

project starts already begins to show `comprehensive'

± that we can begin to spot political liberalism's

biases.

problem. For, although Rawls does not see it this

The worry that we are doomed never to be able to

way, the above assessment of pluralism is itself a

deliver a form of theory which is not just `another

deeply controversial interpretation. After all one

controversial and partisan vision of the good life' and

could equally see this version of modern history as

which `will cease to be a plausible solution to one of

a story of `error and illusion, or at least as the

our most pressing moral and political problems' is at

intensification of tragic conflicts of value.'

49

Rawls,

the heart of modern liberalism's anxieties. Larmore

against the strictures of political liberalism, is already

has argued that if we are so condemned then political

favouring one version of history and one attitude

liberalism will `become just another part of the

towards pluralism. Would those who do not accept

problem'. The conviction that `we can agree on a

this version of history be included among `the rea-

core morality while continuing to disagree about

sonable', those who in principle may endorse the

what makes life worth living' may `turn out to be

principles of political liberalism?

50

baseless. Liberalism may necessarily be just one more partisan ideal'

52

± a fear which is most perturbingly

captured in the context of the Weberian picture.

V

The strong resemblance the problem has to that

The paradoxical nature of modern liberalism resides

which contributed to the intellectual and political

in the fact that it, more than other political the-

collapse of Weimar democracy dramatises this pro-

ories, takes pluralism, understood both in terms of

blem into much more than just a philosophical

an interpretation of the sources of value and as

curiosity.

reasonable disagreement, to be both a fundamental

What chance, then, do liberals have of warding off

feature of the modern world and as a problem which

the Weimar problem without engaging in self-delud-

it must cope with in order to establish its own

ingly reassuring `reassessments' of pluralism's proble-

legitimacy. One of the interesting features of Rawls's

matic significance? I want to suggest that Judith

attempt to construct a `political liberalism' is that he

Shklar's idea of the `liberalism of fear' indicates

sees pluralism as built into the nature of modern

the way forward. It has some interesting similarities

constitutional liberal democracy, the natural out-

to Weber's interpretation of the fate of liberal ideas

come of the `burdens of judgement'. However, to

under modern conditions and offers us a way of

take this example, Rawls fails to notice that in

thinking about the predicament of modern liberalism

defining one of the criteria of `the reasonable' in

which, while suitably pessimistic, is not unduly so. So

his account of pluralism and the constitutional-

if it has been valid to talk of the Weberian under-

democratic citizen's appropriate response to it as

current in contemporary liberalism, the extent to

the `willingness to accept the burdens of judgement'

which the liberalism of fear can speak to it is a clear

he is introducing into his theory a controversial

indication of its relevance. Further, Rawls approv-

144

DISENCHANTMENT AND THE LIBERALISM OF FEAR

ingly notes that the idea has certain similarities with political liberalism too.

53

lity in retreat or tries to calm the warring factions

However, it falls well short

around her, she must prefer a government that

of the full political-liberal strategy ± but herein may

does nothing to increase the prevailing levels of

lie its strength.

fanaticism and dogmatism. To that extent there is

Shklar argues that `the liberalism of fear' does not

a natural affinity between the liberal and the

rest upon a theory of moral pluralism of the kind

sceptic.

58

advocated by Berlin. It does not deny pluralism, though; rather, the point is that the case for liberal-

Those who may be swayed by sceptical arguments

ism does not need to rest upon such metaphysical

of the sort that Weber prompts are nevertheless

claims about the nature of value and suchlike.

54

Here

availed of a definite argument for liberal politics,

is the big difference between Rawls and Berlin on the

precisely because it tries to derive the latter from a

one hand, whose liberalisms start with specific ac-

mutual concern or impulse ± the avoidance of fear

counts of pluralism, and the liberalism of fear on the

and cruelty ± rather than a substantive (contested)

other: all that the latter really needs to begin with is

metaphysical/moral doctrine. But those who have

an account of the `summum malum, which all of us

not succumbed to scepticism, who continue to hold

know and would avoid if only we could. That evil is

other `comprehensive doctrines', can be equally im-

cruelty and the fear it inspires, and the very fear of

pressed by the case for liberalism because, again, it

55

So for Shklar the `deepest grounding' of

rests upon a concern that is shareable not in people's

liberalism as a distinct doctrine is to be found in the

philosophies but in their psychological motivations.

conviction `that cruelty is an absolute evil, an of-

Hence Shklar argues that to embrace the liberalism

fence against God or humanity. It is out of that

of fear is not to embrace any form of normative or

tradition that the political liberalism of fear arose and

cultural relativism. It makes a universal and cosmo-

continues amid the terror of our time to have

politan claim for liberalism while, at the same time,

fear itself.'

relevance.'

56

recognising its local origins and the infrequency of its

The fear which is to be prevented is

full realisation.

the fear created by arbitrary and unnecessary force

59

and by acts of torture and cruelty performed by states

A crucial element in the liberalism of fear is what

and their agents. Historical experience has shown us

some take to be the excessive modesty of its ends.

how such fears are not groundless nightmares; that

`Liberalism has only one overriding aim: to secure

self-same experience teaches us how liberal political

the political conditions that are necessary for the

practices and institutions have so often been the best

exercise of personal freedom.'

hope people have had to remove cruelty and fear

ence with the freedom of others is how liberal

from political life. It is thus historical memory, as

politics removes what sources of fear it can from

opposed to speculative metaphysics, with which the

people's lives; beyond that, `liberalism does not have

liberalism of fear should launch its case.

57

60

Prohibiting interfer-

any particular positive doctrines about how people are to conduct their lives or what personal choices

The case for seeing how the liberalism of fear may

61

address the fears raised by the Weberian picture of

they are to make.'

modernity and the Weimar problem is twofold. First,

unduly cautious, Shklar has more than just historical

having explicitly eschewed reliance upon a Berlinian

memory to make us see the liberalism of fear as both

account of pluralism, Shklar notes that there is a `real

judiciously prudent and no mean achievement in its

psychological connection' between liberalism and

own right. Some of us may nowadays be able to take

the kind of value-scepticism to which Weber gives

the security of the liberal order for granted and hope

paradigmatic expression:

for more adventurous and `imaginative' politics. But

If some might think this is

our foreign news should surely remind us of the scepticism is inclined toward toleration, since in

global prevalence of the most brutal illiberalisms.

its doubts it cannot choose among the competing

There may indeed be more morally `exhilarating'

beliefs that swirl around it, so often in murderous

liberalisms, but they are surely less urgent.

rage. Whether the sceptic seeks personal tranquil-

62

There is another way of expressing reservations

145

PETER LASSMAN

about the apparently limited nature of Shklar's lib-

the price of utopian ventures, least of all those

eralism. Those who are troubled by the Weberian

invented by other people.'

64

sketch of modernity may wonder whether, in its

Space has allowed only a brief sketch of the liberal-

refusal to theorise substantive `positive' goals for

ism of fear. But perhaps enough has already been said

the social and political order, it tacitly grants free

to suggest the attractiveness of its politics, which

rein for instrumental rationality to dominate in

admittedly may not be evident at first sight. We

modern society. But Shklar believes the liberalism

may also be able to appreciate the potential fruitful-

of fear has two powerful responses here. First, if

ness of its approach to justifying liberalism when the

`instrumental rationality' refers purely to political

fact of pluralism, itself so variably interpretable, had

practices which pursue only `efficiency' or `means±

apparently left all such ventures toppling into self-

end calculation', without questioning the rationality

contradiction. It concedes that we have to work from

or desirability of whatever end to which they are put,

our own traditions and experiences in order to arrive at

then it does not apply to the liberalism of fear. For it

a form of self-understanding for our political ideas,

has very definite, substantive ends in its desire to

even when we deliberate for universal ideals. This may

avoid the institutionalisation of fear and cruelty, and

make our political thought paradoxical but it does not

political practices are to be explicitly scrutinised with

make it incoherent.

these in view.

65

As a response to Kant's question, with which this

The second response has `instrumental rationality'

chapter began, the liberalism of fear suggests some-

describing a politics that places all its confidence in

thing very different in content to Rawlsian political

procedures, without adequate attention to the ra-

philosophy even though it shares with Rawls the

tionality of the conduct and discourse of those who

project of explaining what `should be the public

participate in and follow them. It trusts the mechan-

philosophy in a reasonably just constitutional re-

isms for creating consent and ensuring fairness, with-

gime.'

out any attention to the character of the individual

of argument in Shklar's favour. The exemplars of

citizens or to that of the society as a whole.

63

66

But the difference is what can tip the scales

philosophy examined here proved unable to con-

But Shklar, of course, wants the liberalism of fear

vince us that they could answer the question, that

to justify a liberal regime that may be little more than

they could avoid the Weimar problem. All that the

a modus vivendi, a political accommodation shared by

liberalism of fear needs, though, is the fear that

people of diverse natures, tastes and goals mutually

motivates the question ± which perhaps receives

motivated by a fear of political cruelty. To invest

its most acute expression with the Weberian sketch

politics with a more substantively rational goal, to

of modernity as its backdrop ± to begin the political

take sides in the pluralism of possible forms of life, is

argument for liberalism. Under the conditions of

to risk precisely the kind of totalitarian oppression

modern pluralism, this is probably the best we can

which provides part of the historical memory psy-

do. But the Weimar problem, and the existence of

chologically motivating the liberalism of fear. To

widespread cruelty still in the world, should leave us

think that this charge of `instrumentality' has any bite

with no doubt that this argument is still very much

is to show `disdain for those who do not want to pay

worth pursuing.

Notes

1. Rawls (1996), p. plxii.

of which the war is being waged ± will, as a rule, turn

2. Richardson (1994), p. 238.

out to be relatively simple and unsophisticated': Berlin (1969), pp. 200±1.

3. The idea of the `inner citadel' here is drawn from Berlin: `the deepest convictions of philosophers are

4. Weber's picture is one way of substantiating the

seldom contained in their formal arguments: funda-

notion of the `default' position in political theory,

mental beliefs, comprehensive views of life, are like

an idea suggested by Mark Evans in Chapter 11 of this volume.

citadels which must be guarded against the enemy . . .

5. Habermas (1998a), p. 60.

the inner fortress itself ± the vision of life for the sake

146

DISENCHANTMENT AND THE LIBERALISM OF FEAR

37. Hennis (1988). For the idea of a `strange liberal', see

6. Rawls (1996), p. lx.

Boesche (1987).

7. See Walzer (1983); cf. Griffin (1994).

38. See, for example, Eden (1982). Indeed, the uncer-

8. Rawls (1996), p. 44.

tainty about the classification merely reinforces the

9. Ibid., p. lxi.

claim that Weber poses problems for liberals.

10. Ibid., p. lxii.

39. Weber

11. Hampshire (1983), p. 162.

(1994)

p.

68;

Gerth

and

Wright

Mills

(eds.)(1991), p. 153.

12. Hampshire (1989), p. 118. 13. Rawls (1999), p. 1.

40. Rawls (1999), pp. 463 n. 24.

14. Rawls (1996), p. 55.

41. Anderson (1992), pp. 193±7.

15. Rawls (1996), p. xx.

42. See, on this point, Dyzenhaus (1997), p. 12.

16. Ibid., p. xxiii.

43. See Schmitt (1985); cf. Larmore (1996), chapter 8 for critical discussion.

17. Jahanbegloo (1993), p. 56. 18. Ibid., p. 45.

44. Rawls (1996), p. 374.

19. For the interpretation of Berlin as an objective plur-

45. Dyzenhaus (1997), p. 16.

alist, which sharply distinguishes him from Weber, see

46. Rawls (1996), p. xxvii.

Gray (1995b).

47. Ibid., p. xxviii.

20. Rawls (1999), pp. 463 n. 24; cf. ibid., pp. 462±3.

48. Ibid., pp. xxvi±vii.

21. Berlin (1978), p. 148.

49. Wenar (1995), p. 48.

22. Berlin (1991), p. 12. John Gray refers to Berlin's

50. Ibid. 51. For an example of such that Rawls himself concedes

`phenomenological certainties' in Gray (1995b), p. 62.

but which may be far more likely than he would hope,

23. Ibid.

see Rawls (1996), pp. 152; cf. Evans (1999).

24. See B. Williams, `Introduction', in Berlin (1978). 25. Jahanbegloo (1993), p. 44.

52. Larmore (1996), p. 151.

26. For a version of this argument, see Raz (1986), chapter

53. Rawls (1996), p. 374. 54. Shklar (1989), p. 29.

14.

55. Ibid.

27. This is a term used by Max Weber, taken from Goethe, to describe such relationships; see Gerth and Wright

56. Shklar (1989), p. 23.

Mills (eds) (1991), pp. 62±3.

57. Ibid., p. 27.

28. Berlin and Williams (1994), p. 309.

58. Ibid., p. 25.

29. Crowder (1994), p. 303.

59. Ibid., pp. 29, 34.

30. Berlin (1991), pp. 80, 203, 205.

60. Ibid., p. 21.

31. Kekes (1993), p. 199.

61. Ibid.

32. Anderson (1992), p. 245.

62. Ibid., p. 38.

33. Larmore (1996), chapter 7.

63. Ibid., p. 33.

34. Ibid., p. 174.

64. Ibid., p. 33.

35. Ibid., pp. 166±7.

65. See Michelman (1995) for discussion of this claim.

36. Ibid., p. 167.

66. Rawls (1999), p. 622.

147

11

PRAGMATIST LIBERALISM AND THE EVASION OF POLITICS Mark Evans

clear that the prominence of the `Rorty debate'

I

reflects a widespread belief that he has thrown down

Despite the hostility that much of it bears to its

an important challenge. After all, if he is right then

object, the extent of the response to Richard Rorty's

the very need for liberal moral and political theory

intervention in liberal political theory is testament

(or, indeed, any other kind) is clearly called into

to the significance that so many commentators

question.

attach to it. Rorty believes that liberal convictions

Thus, in a book devoted to mapping out new

are utterly contingent upon the preferences of those

research agendas for liberalism, Rorty's challenge can

in liberal cultures, that philosophy adds nothing

hardly be avoided. But as this chapter will contend,

useful to the holding and promotion of such con-

he has arguably not posed it in anything like the

victions and is probably best abandoned, and that

terms in which it could and should be presented. The

these considerations need not disrupt the way in

full consequences for liberal politics in particular are

which we `handle' such convictions. He wants us to

not teased out and so he does not give us the

treat these claims as profoundly liberating, in that

opportunity to appraise the whole effect of `contin-

they say liberals can be freed from thinking they need

gency' upon our thinking and our practice. One

(perpetually elusive) theoretical justifications ± in

purpose of this chapter, then, is to develop a `Ror-

particular the `foundationalist' claims that purport-

tyean view', a characterisation of aspects of his

edly establish their `truth' ± in order to entertain

thought that is fuller than he himself provides but

their principles. But, despite his constant reassurance

which does not depart in essence from his pragma-

to the contrary, the idea of `contingency' and its

tism. This view will allow us to depict and apprise

rejection of `foundationalism' strikes many liberals as

more

being fraught with danger, leaving us teetering on

liberal moral and political commitments, which

the brink of nihilism, sidestepping all manner of

Rorty believes can survive the abandonment of

issues in complacently claiming that `our' liberalism

the philosophical search for their foundations.

thoroughly the Rortyean

interpretation

of

can survive the embrace of contingency and the

The particular aspect of liberal commitment to

disengagement from philosophy intact. Some critics

which Rorty is obviously passionately attached is

have felt that Rorty is so insouciant that his ideas are

what he calls the `human rights culture' (hereafter:

not, ultimately, worth taking seriously. Yet, unless

`HRC').

(implausibly) the continued critical interest in him is

be very wary of overly homogenising our conception

merely the result of a popular desire among theorists

of `the' HRC, the chapter proceeds from the plau-

to engage with what they regard as an easy target, it is

sible assumption that many who hold its commit-

148

1

Now if we grant the point that we should

PRAGMATIST LIBERALISM AND THE EVASION OF POLITICS

ments do so in a foundationalist manner. That is to

him. If they did, he might well have obtained a

say that they believe human rights claims are `true',

deeper sense of what moral and political problems

for they think such rights are objectively valid

may open up, rather than disappear, with the aban-

despite whatever certain people may think or prac-

donment of foundationalism.

tise to the contrary. Paradigmatic of this approach to

What may strike one as paradoxical about this

rights is the American Declaration of Independen-

indifference is that the pragmatist approach to hu-

2

In

man rights is motivated by the idea that, because the

more recent documents, the notion of `objective

philosophical search for the `foundations' of rights

validity' is conveyed by the idea that codifications

has proved to be so inconclusive, it is actually of little

of rights (such as the Universal Declaration of Hu-

use in spreading acceptance of human rights around

man Rights) are designed to `recognise' and `observe'

the world and should no longer detain us. Rorty's

the rights, rather than to create them. In other words,

concern, then, is explicitly practical: he wants to do

such documents are posited as an acknowledgement

what will best promote the HRC globally. Yet there

of the independently grounded moral validity of

is no real engagement with those questions about the

ce's assertion that they are `self-evident' truths.

3

Such ideas, I suggest, are reflected in the

justifiability of the coercive rights-enforcing actions

way rights are popularly regarded by most of those

which often accompany the actual political pursuit

rights.

within the HRC.

4

of the human rights agenda. He seems to rest content

If, as I will hereafter assume, the HRC is pro-

with an idea that a liberal-pragmatist society `will get

foundly foundationalist in outlook, it is hardly clear

accustomed to the thought that social policy needs

that Rorty's pragmatist approach can allow it con-

no more authority than successful accommodation

sistently to stand in anything like its familiar form.

among individuals . . . It will be a society . . . that

The modified Rortyean view, then, will be designed

takes reflective equilibrium as the only method

to test just how conservative of the moral culture's

needed in discussing social policy.' This recommen-

self-understandings Rortyean pragmatism might al-

dation gives us no insight into how the genuinely

low us to be.

deep and persistent conflicts over human rights,

5

The centrepiece of this enquiry concerns not only

either within a state or internationally, are to be

what morality looks like from a Rortyean perspective

tackled when `accommodation' is impossible or un-

about those we call `rights-violators'. It also focuses

desirable. Two commentators, Guignon and Hiley,

upon what many who share the HRC believe is

have written that what is most admirable in Rorty's

politically sanctioned by the `truth of human rights',

work `is the courage, integrity and clear-sightedness

namely that violations of human rights constitute

with which he bites the bullet and draws out the

objective moral wrongs which, in at least some

inevitable consequences of anti-foundationalism for

circumstances, may be sufficiently bad to warrant,

moral and social thought.' Unfortunately, this cour-

for example, the `humanitarian intervention' by

age abruptly evaporates once the really tough ques-

certain states in the affairs of others. The founda-

tions of political justification are reached. In this

tionalist nature of human rights on the HRC view as

respect, we have a bullet which Rorty has barely

interpreted here gives rights a seemingly authorita-

nibbled.

6

tive basis which is sufficiently `weighty' to legitimise

The value of suggesting what account a suitably

the use of force in their support. Whether Rorty's

developed Rortyeanism may give of this problem is

anti-foundationalism can provide a suitable substi-

probably best grasped by thinking about the follow-

tute for the foundationalist rights-enforcing sanc-

ing suggestion as to why his work has attracted so

tion, or whether it should not be perturbed if it

much attention. I propose that the Rortyean view

cannot, are surely questions of considerable signifi-

articulates what might be thought of as a `default'

cance. But here is where a charge of complacency

position in moral and political theory. That is to say,

against Rorty has real bite, for such questions of

it represents the kind of philosophical outlook which

political justification ± seeking reasons to justify the

many contemporary thinkers fear would have to be

exercise of political power ± do not particularly vex

conceded if their alternative, opposed theories are

149

MARK EVANS

shown to be unsuccessful.

7

The worrying feature of

This might immediately suggest that nothing really

the `default position' lies in its apparent, complete

hangs upon the fact that the HRC tends to employ

reduction of fundamental moral values to a whimsi-

foundationalist moral concepts.

cal subjectivism that would destroy the point of

happy to leave these in place, simply because it

moral and political theory and, more importantly,

makes little difference one way or another to the

leave us just a `change-of-feeling' away from sanc-

HRC's promotion.

10

Rorty might be

tioning the embrace of completely abhorrent values.

This resolution of the possible conflict between

It is a horror at having to accept that this is all there

the commitments to pragmatist contingency and the

is to morality that so much philosophical labour is

HRC is too quick, however. For Rorty doesn't

devoted to contending that this is not the case.

abstain entirely from meta-ethical claims; he actually

The default position takes on a particularly sinister

adopts a provisionally non-cognitivist position, and

hue for many liberals in political thinking. As we

this crucially underpins his practical recommenda-

shall see, nowadays they often argue that the justi-

tions. This position is evident in the way he attacks

fication for imposing their principles with political

foundationalism, which he defines as a theory of

power rests upon some notion that the `receivers' of

moral knowledge holding that we draw values from

such power can, in some way, consent to those

non-moral premises: `to claim such knowledge is to

principles.

8

claim to know something which, though not itself a

I suggest that Rorty, given his remarks

11

on reflective equilibrium above, falls into this broad

moral intuition, can correct moral intuitions.'

camp. Now one might not be concerned about

rhetorically demands whether there is this kind of

imposing purely subjective and contingently held

knowledge and argues that the extent to which the

principles upon people if the latter could plausibly

philosophical search for it contributes little or noth-

agree to them in some way. Yet if, as implied by the

ing to the promotion of moral values is the extent to

role of coercion in spreading the HRC, we cannot

which we have reason to think there is no such

always rely upon such agreement in politics, where

knowledge.

does the default position leave the argument for such

the wide diversity of, and persistent disagreement

political imposition?

between, the myriad accounts of moral knowledge

12

He

This claim is defensible by pondering

Rorty's indifference to the questions raised thus far

and the related unpersuasiveness of any one of them

may make the `default' position in his hands rela-

to a significantly large number of rationally enquiring

tively easy to dismiss. I think it poses a more per-

minds. Obviously this is not enough in logic to

plexing challenge, not least because I argue that the

clinch Rorty's conclusion that there is no one `cor-

Rortyean view can be made to do a better job of

rect' morality at all (the phenomena of diversity and

defending some aspects of the HRC. This allows us

disagreement could be explicable in various ways).

to take fairer and fuller measure ± and hence to assess

But he is only really interested in offering enough

the limits ± of a theory whose conclusions may be

prima facie evidence in support of non-cognitivism to

profoundly unsettling for many liberal political the-

disarm those who think that continuing the search

orists.

for moral knowledge remains the best way of promoting moral values. Consequently, he urges the embrace of what is actually the classic non-cogniti-

II

vist approach to moral revision as the most effective

Rortyeanism asks us not to bother pursuing any

means to pursue this goal: the manipulation of

philosophical questions whose resolution has no

sentiments to change the way people feel about moral

significant bearing on the practical pursuit of our

matters.

13

goals (in this instance the spreading of the HRC's

It could be objected that a non-cognitivist ac-

acceptance). For Rorty, meta-ethics falls into this

count cannot be objectivist about moral value: how

category. `The difference between the moral realist

can a value be objective if it does not exist inde-

and the moral anti-realist', he writes, seems to be `a

pendently of people's attitudes? Given the objectivist

difference which makes no practical difference.'

9

quality typically assigned to `human rights' in the

150

PRAGMATIST LIBERALISM AND THE EVASION OF POLITICS

HRC, we may already have reached the point at

2. the reduction of moral judgement to a basis

which tensions surface between Rorty's philosophi-

which is at least potentially inconstant, ren-

cal commitments and the standpoint of the HRC.

dering the content of morality unstable, adap-

Certainly, if we adopt what can be called a trans-

table merely as our whims desire.

cendentalist conception of objectivity, which natu-

rally attaches to moral realism in holding that there

Rorty veers towards both in his provisional rejec-

is a realm of facts `out there', independent of our

tion of the HRC's foundationalist underpinnings and

attitudes, we could agree that `objectivity' should be

in his belief that a properly ironist view will always be

purged from a Rortyean view. But it can be recast in

disposed to treat our current moral vocabularies as

is

revisable. But here is where we can develop a

achieved in the agreed outcome of a discourse over

Rortyean view sympathetically in a way which mini-

values which has conformed to certain ideal condi-

mises the discrepancy with the HRC.

conversationalist

terms,

in

which

`objectivity'

tions of validity (without any implication that the

Rorty asks us to think of moral values as `we17

agreed outcome of moral conversation thereby iden-

intentions',

tifies

`independently

ments as to what should and should not be done

Successful moral arguments

within that community. Hence `the core meaning of

any

of

the

grounded' moral facts).

cognitivists' 14

summaries of a community's agree-

create, rather than discover, what is objective. This is

``immoral action'' is ``the sort of thing we don't

precisely in accord with Rorty's claim that for prag-

do'' ',

matists

didn't do. Moral understandings evolve over time

18

or, better, what we would rather people

in a community's practices as people work out for the desire for objectivity . . . is simply the desire

themselves commodious ways of living and, as Mar-

for

as

garet Macdonald (another non-cognitivist defender

possible . . . Insofar as pragmatists make a dis-

of rights) describes, they become `expressed in the

tinction between knowledge and opinion, it is

life of the society and constitute its ``quality''. They

simply the distinction between topics on which

are conveyed by its ``tone'' and atmosphere as well as

such agreement is relatively easy to get and topics

its laws.'

as

much

intersubjective

agreement

on which agreement is relatively hard to get.

15

19

A non-cognitivist could describe this in

terms of socialisation imparting specific moral attitudes to its subjects, furnishing them with an attitu-

Yet if `objectivity' in some form need not be

dinal moral perspective that reflects how those who

denied to the Rortyean view altogether, it might

share it feel about desirable and admirable forms of

still be feared from the standpoint of the HRC that

conduct and their obverse. Once developed, a moral

the conversationalist variant is a very pale imitation

perspective can quickly acquire the status of a set of

of `real' objectivity. The non-cognitivist underpin-

social facts, impressed upon people by what are

ning of the Rortyean view, so the fear runs, will

experienced as the external forces of socialisation

always conflict with the way in which the HRC

and passed on as purportedly self-standing rules.

conceptualises its moral commitments.

Hence people are confronted by morality as an

20

apparently supra-individual, `weighty' and hence at least apparently objective phenomenon. But in this

III

perspectivist analysis this feature is testament not to

This concern arises from the common belief that

the actual, external existence of moral facts but to

non-cognitivism is driven towards these positions:

the content and depth of people's socialisation into the conventions of morality.

1. the explanation of the virtually ubiquitous

Applying this account to describe the HRC, it can

realist terminology in moral discourse by an

be said that, in our socialisation into its perspective,

`error' theory, which says we mis-describe the

we acquire an outlook in which rights are attributed

nature of our moral commitments when we

to all: when we conceptualise `human being' we

express them in such a way;

16

conceptualise `rights-bearer'. `Rights' are the summa-

151

MARK EVANS

23

ries of our culture's ideals of how all humans should

action;

be treated. Rorty calls moral judgements `ethno-

validating them from a transcendental perspective.

he just denies that there is any useful way of

centric' to indicate their cultural particularity, drawing one's attention to the cultural specificity of such judgements and the beliefs that form them.

21

IV

As a

Thus far, we have seen how the Rortyean view could

`final vocabulary' he thinks the discourse of rights has 22

Any arguments

furnish itself with non-relativised moral prescriptions

in favour of them are going to be, in some way and at

and has at its disposal a sociological explanation of

some level, question-begging, only working by as-

why morality appears to have an objectivist, foun-

suming the validity of the very values that a dis-

dationalist quality. But the question remains as to

putant is throwing into doubt. But, in response to

whether a non-cognitivist should still recommend

concerns that this might be a deeply unsatisfactory

the replacement of the realist, objectivist language of

feature of a final vocabulary's justification, we might

morals, for the sake of `philosophical hygiene'. If so,

wonder whether other, if any, of our deep commit-

then the view still threatens to destroy the form of

ments (to family, friends, personal projects, organisa-

discourse typically employed in the HRC.

no non-circular means of defence.

tions) can ultimately be justified in non-question-

Simon Blackburn has argued that it is perfectly

begging ways. Is there, for example, necessarily a

legitimate to employ realist-seeming terms when

non-question-begging justification to explain why I

accounting for what are in fact only products of

love my wife and have committed my life to her?

attitudes. We can be what he calls `quasi-realist'

Furthermore, is it necessarily appropriate to think

in our moral judgements, projecting values on to

that I need a non-question-begging justification for

the world from one's moral perspective.

such a commitment? (Isn't the sheer fact that I love

shares a broadly similar account of the purpose of

her enough to justify my loving commitment to her?)

thinking about morality to Rorty's:

24

Blackburn

A Rortyean, therefore, may be able to argue that there is no deficiency in any final vocabulary's

we should not theorise about morality and ethics

circular defence.

as if they are in the business of describing aspects

As Rorty has frequently stressed, admitting to the

of the world . . . To enter a moral claim is . . . to

epistemological relativism of the `ethnocentric' ap-

take up an attitude or stance, and centrally it

proach does not necessarily entail a normatively

involves making an emotional response to con-

relativistic configuration of the values held within

templated events and states of affairs . . . Moral

any perspective. To see this point, it should be

and ethical vocabulary . . . enables us to share our

remembered that perspectives are unrankable with-

stances with others, to shape our sensibilities in

out adopting standards which are only available

light of opinion of others.

within a particular perspective. Outside of any moral perspective, from the morally vacuous standpoint of

In short, `the essence of ethics lies in its practical

the world `as it is', no moral evaluation of any kind ±

function' ± a natural ally, then, for the Rortyean

relativist or otherwise ± can be sanctioned. No

view.

grounds therefore present themselves from the per-

vism' suggests a way of describing human rights from

spectivist outlook per se as to why we must relati-

within an attitudinal moral perspective in terms that

vistically concede equal validity to all perspectives.

realists often think are reserved for themselves.

Any insistence upon normative relativism has to be

Projectivism is a complex philosophical position

based upon an essentially coherentist claim that it

and only some of its basic features can be outlined

would be internally inconsistent for the human

here; moreover, it is reasonable to assume that Rorty

rights perspective to be constructed

without it.

himself might part company with it at several key

Clearly, Rorty finds no such grounds for this posi-

points. Enough, though, can be said to illuminate the

tion. He thinks it proper that people should make

proposal for its partial incorporation into the Ror-

judgements about fundamental rules of human inter-

tyean view.

152

25

More pertinently still, Blackburn's `projecti-

PRAGMATIST LIBERALISM AND THE EVASION OF POLITICS

Although Blackburn does not believe that values

root of 144?' ± which would refer to how the con-

are intrinsically part of their objects, his key claim is

ventions within mathematics produce this result ±

that there is no bar to using the language of `percep-

with an external question `why do we say 12 is the

tion of the actual' in attributing moral properties to

square root of 144?', which would direct us towards

people because

the origins and nature of the conventions themselves. So P can legitimately answer `why is cruelty

we speak of the perception of every single cate-

wrong?' by referring to those features of cruel acts

gory of thing and fact that we ever communicate.

which make cruelty wrong from the moral perspec-

We speak of perception of numerical truths,

tive, rather than having to say that his attitudes to

truths about the future, truths about the past,

cruelty are what make it wrong. Within his moral

possibilities, other minds, theoretical entities of

perspective, it is actually the case that cruelty is

all kinds . . .

26

wrong and using realist language to express this is a coherent way of stating what is the case in his outlook.

± mind-dependent features, in short.

27

Further, he contends that realist language turns

Transferring this analysis to the projection of

out to be a proper way of expressing commitment to

human rights: if we ask the `outside' question `why

that which we deem to be valuable. One way of

do we say people have human rights?', the reply

grasping this claim is to see the realist-sounding

should focus upon the attitudes people have about

language of the projectivist as expressions of how

how they think humans should treat each other.

things indeed are from the standpoint of our perspective.

From within the perspective, though, rights are

Moral statements are properly statements from the

projected onto people first as an act of valuation,

`inside', internal to one's moral perspective. To

to follow a distinction made by David Wiggins,

believe that realist language ought to be abandoned

which identifies what is felt to be sufficiently im-

because our moralising has its origins in attitudes is to

portant about a human being to warrant a certain

step outside of the moral way of looking at things and

kind of morally obligatory respect, and then as a

confuses the language which is appropriate `intern-

directive judgement (which holds that `because X is

ally', within the moral outlook, with what is appro-

valued, Y ought to be done'), creating the rule

priate

from

embodied in the idea of people possessing a right

nowhere' that we conceptualise as lying beyond all

to expect a certain kind of treatment with respect to

perspectives. Blackburn's example of characterising

the valued attribute.

`externally'

from

the

moral

`view

28

29

cruelty illustrates this. If a projectivist, P, is asked

I suggest, then, that the Rortyean view's provi-

`why is cruelty wrong?', he is asked a moral question,

sional non-cognitivism need not force the abandon-

which is properly understood to enquire as to what

ment of the realist, objectivist discourse of the HRC.

judgements are made within a moral outlook. If he

Of course, like any other philosophical position,

were to answer `because it is not something I like' ±

projectivism has its critics and some would urge that

making cruelty wrong because of the responses he has

its usage of realist terms is too hollow to be accep-

to it ± a realist would swiftly point out the obvious

table (I expand upon some of these doubts in the

anti-realist character of the reply. But P's answer is

final section). This may be so ± but it requires

not the one he has to give to a moral question.

philosophical argument to prosecute such conten-

Answers in which attitudes figure are appropriate to

tions. And that is an activity which, it is now clear,

`external' questions about the nature of morality,

Rorty abandons too quickly. Here, we have had to

such as `why do we say cruelty is wrong?' But this

retrieve it on his behalf to tackle the problem of the

is a different kind of question from the one asked

HRC's foundationalist character. If the simple graft-

within the moral view and we should not give

ing of projectivism onto the Rortyean view is not

answers to questions which are raised from different

enough to satisfy the doubters, then this is all the

standpoints. A parallel would be to contrast an

more reason to keep philosophical enquiry alive.

internal mathematics question `why is 12 the square

153

MARK EVANS

type of action to propagate human rights among

V

others is to show coherentistically that the action

We now turn to the heart of Rorty's own practical

would conflict with other principles within the hu-

concerns: the business of promoting the HRC, most

man rights perspective to which a liberal ought to

of all among those who actively reject it. At this

accord primacy. And that perspective, of course, is

point, it is apposite to distinguish clearly between

held utterly contingently, the product of nothing

three types of justificatory argument:

other than our affirmation of the values of our culture.

1. Moral justification. With respect to beliefs, this

From a non-cognitivist position, the force of the

is generally concerned to offer arguments as to

idea that action in support of human rights can

why we should support certain moral princi-

trump other moral codes can only ultimately lie in

ples and not others. With respect to our ac-

the fact that the rights we embrace in the HRC

tions, moral justification asks whether morality

represent firm, settled and passionately held attitudes

gives us warrant for acting in a particular way.

as to how people should be treated. Some ± perhaps

It requires us to connect our actions to moral

many ± liberals may agree with the argument that

beliefs and assess their moral worth accord-

there

ingly.

merely

is

nothing possessing

philosophically universalistic

inconsistent moral

in

attitudes

2. Political justification. This question specifically

non-cognitivistically. Yet they could still be pro-

asks for a justification for the exercise of

foundly perturbed at the contention that it is per-

political power. When talking about the po-

missible politically to act upon these, to promote or

litical imposition of a moral principle, it may

even enforce any moral perspective among others

not be enough to justify that action via a moral

who do not share it when it can have no indepen-

justification of the principle alone. The prin-

dent warrant or authority beyond the contingent

ciple may indeed be morally valid, but that

commitment they happen to have formed to it. They

may not suffice to make its forcible imposition

may ask themselves whether it would be appropriate

justified. (It may be morally right, for example,

for them qua liberals to do this given the ethno-

to condemn adultery but many would not

centric provenance of their morality.

think that judgement sufficient to justify its

It is clearly important to think hard about coher-

criminalisation.) One consideration in the

ent plausible conclusions which could be drawn by

search for political justification may be the

liberals from the normatively anti-relativist insistence

third argument.

that all should respect human rights when made

3. The justification of political authority, the estab-

within such a contingent perspective. The liberal

lishment of the right of an institution (such as

schema of universal human rights can readily be

the state) to be the one to exercise power

grasped as definitive of liberalism's essence, expressing

(separable from (2) in so far as the question of

what it means to view humans as free and equal

who should exercise power is distinct from that

beings for whom cruelty is the worst thing that could

of which among our (moral and non-moral)

be suffered. `We liberals' can say that we feel so

ends can be promoted with political power).

strongly about them that we are convinced that all should respect rights, even if others do not see things

These are crucial distinctions yet Rorty's political

the same way. Thus, our primary commitment to

theory (if indeed it can be properly called that) has

rights rules out the possibility or need to admit the

little grasp of them. Once again, we must see how we

legitimacy and permissibility of any moral system

might construct his position to accommodate them.

which systematically denies them.

Instantly we should reiterate a point that helps to

Hence, liberals do not have to adopt a `live and let

frame the disquieting character of the Rortyean view

live' attitude of tolerance to rights-violating systems.

as a default position: the only way for non-cogniti-

Indeed, if they were to be this sensitive to the views

vism ultimately to preclude the acceptability of any

of other societies then they may well be abandoning

154

PRAGMATIST LIBERALISM AND THE EVASION OF POLITICS

much of their own fundamental commitment to

be a project of sentimental education would be the

human rights: what is the point, after all, of taking

effort to break down such discriminating divisions of

`human' rights seriously if they are going to be

humanity to forge an increasingly shared way of

prepared to acknowledge that some societies could

viewing and treating human beings. We can hope

quite acceptably ignore or violate them?

to encourage non-rights-respecters to make an ima-

One might hope that much of the concern about

ginative, sympathetic or empathetic identification

the promotion of the human rights perspective could

with the plight of those who, from our perspective,

be mitigated by adopting the essentially non-coer-

are having their fundamental rights brutally vio-

cive, persuasive or `conversational' approach to mor-

lated.

al conversion that Rorty obviously prefers. Even if it

consequences of rights-violations and to care that

is employed by bodies (states, quangos or interna-

such should henceforth be avoided. That, as much as

tional organisations) which wield political power it is

anything, is a powerful reason for keeping alive

arguable that no question of physical enforcement on

through historical narrative the memory of those

their part necessarily arises if they adopt this ap-

terrible atrocities which have made us now so con-

proach alone in HRC-supporting policies ± and of

cerned with human rights.

32

We can try to get others to see the awful

course the persuasive strategy need not be under-

Despite its status as a final vocabulary, the human

taken only by political institutions (or at all ± it

rights perspective need not shut out all opportunity

could be left to private individuals and organisations

for critical reflection on the HRC's present content.

such as churches and charities). If this is what Rorty

This may further placate liberal concerns that some

has in mind, the lack of a specifically political edge to

kind of cultural imperialism is being sanctioned here,

his theory might be more understandable.

for this point encourages an appreciation of the

Certainly, there are potentially wide resources to

potential for refinement, improvement or transfor-

pursue the persuasive-conversational strategy. We

mation of our commitments even when we currently

could start by noting that many of the world's

hold fast to them. Rorty warns us to be sensitive to

governments pay lip-service to international under-

how `redescription' often humiliates in undermining

standings of rights and can be charged with promise-

the existing self-understandings of those whose views

breaking, hypocrisy and illegality in international

we seek to convert. But if it is acknowledged that

law to the extent that they actually violate rights

redescription need not all be `one-way' ± that A

(urging coherence, or consistency, between pro-

might enrich her own moral sensibility from the

claimed and actual standards of behaviour). The

dialogue she has with B even when she hopes that

tendency of human rights to gain support in the

B may come to share her view ± the potential for

international community as agreed standards of mor-

humiliation on either part may be lessened.

al behaviour is a further crucial point which could be

However, the bottom line of the human rights

cited in favour of this perspective (`since so many

perspective must surely be that, though the moral

millions of people sincerely and fervently support

beliefs which supplement basic rights may be revi-

human rights, isn't this at least a good pro tanto

sable, there is probably little left open for debate as

reason for others to do so as well?').

far as the latter are concerned. Anyone whose views

Another part of the persuasive strategy for the

have to be redescribed in order to begin fostering a

liberal could be, in Rorty's rather playful phrase, the

respect for human rights may well deserve to be

telling of `long, sad, sentimental stories' designed to

humiliated, if that is how they feel when confronted

shape the feelings and evaluative dispositions of

by the viewpoint of the HRC.

those who do not (yet) share the rights perspective.

30

As Rorty has observed, the perpetrators of such deeds

VI

typically assume not that human beings are not the

So far, liberals may be happy enough with the

sorts of creature who have human rights, but that 31

Ob-

Rortyean view's approach to the HRC. But in the

viously, then, a decisive part of what would in effect

realm of conversational persuasion, of course, we

their victims are not really humans at all.

155

MARK EVANS

35

have gone no further than the activity of moral

through dialogue.

justification. The critical political problem in spread-

those who won't peacefully concur with the dialo-

ing the HRC is, of course, that conversation is likely

gical outcome (the issue of political justification)

to get us only so far towards this end in many cases.

and, if we are to turn to coercion, how to establish a

And at the point at which persuasion ceases to be

body's right to use power (the justification of poli-

effective Rorty falls silent, even though he is per-

tical authority) are not directly confronted.

fectly well aware that there will be those utterly

Mouffe's diagnosis of this feature identifies the ap-

unconvinced by our redescriptions alone. If there is

plication to politics of the specifically philosophical

nothing more that can be said to Nietzsche, Loyola

techniques of Kantian ethics, with their emphasis

or the committed, consistent Nazi, he throws up his

upon the securing of agreement in public reason, as

hands and dismisses them as `mad'.

33

Questions about what to do with

36

Part of

But what do we

the reason why fundamental conflict is not squarely

do about such people thereafter? Do we leave the

addressed. Rorty's parallel problems with politics may

genocidal maniacs of the world alone as much as

likewise come from the application of his implicit

possible, to carry out their own `ethnocentrically

meta-ethical Humeanism, with its emphasis upon

determined moralities'?

sentiment manipulation through story-telling and suchlike, to what Mouffe insists is the agonistic,

Although questions of rights enforcement can

conflictual realm of politics.

arise even within the boundaries of a liberal state (with respect, say, to a non-liberal minority), let us

Yet such political quietism should be available

focus here upon the issue of humanitarian interven-

least of all to Rorty, given his explicitly practical

tion when one or more states uses force to punish

conception of theory. One would surely have ex-

and/or halt rights violations by another state against

pected a pragmatist to have been dismissive of

its own citizens. Since the end of the Cold War in

traditional non-cognitivism's attitude to political

particular there has been a growing recognition that

questions and have been similarly critical of the

the `international community' has rights to act thus

neo-Kantian `evasion of politics' decried by Mouffe.

(grounded in international law) when basic rights ±

So once again `the Rortyean view' has to be

usually, the specific right to life ± are being violated

developed out of Rorty's own position to ascertain

on a systematic, widespread scale. This recognition,

the character of a Rortyean politics that aims to cope

therefore, is undoubtedly part of the HRC's self-

with political conflicts beyond the illusion that

understandings ± but it is strikingly absent from

persuasion and consensus is all we need. To focus

Rorty's own account of it.

upon the most disturbing aspect of this as a default

In fact it would be unfair to single out Rorty for

position, I propose to pass fairly briefly over the

avoiding questions of the political justification of

question of how political authority is constituted.

coercion. Non-cognitivist moral and political theory

Let us assume that, qua liberal, Rortyeans would

has always tended to dodge such questions. Because it

argue that consent is the key: institutions that right-

treats questions of value as questions of attitude, it

fully exercise power must in some meaningful way

typically holds that `theory' has no specially privi-

have gained the consent of their subjects to do so.

leged insight into what attitudes should be held and

This idea may already do considerable work in

has consequently left the determination of what

justifying

should be done to the actual business of political

pointed out in many instances that rights-violating

life.

34

humanitarian

intervention.

It

can

be

states have freely joined the United Nations and

Moreover, many contemporary liberalisms from

officially support the documents of international law

other traditions are also vulnerable to the charge

that require observance of human rights. Hence, it

of evading the `challenge of the political'. Chantal

could be said that their free adherence to the inter-

Mouffe, for example, has argued that Kantian poli-

national community implies acceptance of its right

tical theory (typified by John Rawls) seems to reduce

to force them to act according to its standards, or at

the resolution of political conflicts to an ultimately

least to punish them when they fail to do so.

consensual

process

of

agreement

formulation

37

But let us concentrate upon the idea of a `rogue

156

PRAGMATIST LIBERALISM AND THE EVASION OF POLITICS

state' which has consciously broken with the stan-

sense that there is no independent consideration to

dards of international law and has effectively `with-

mandate such a policy ± fails because, from the

drawn

political

Rortyean standpoint, all moral positions ± including

authorities. This state has embarked upon systematic

that of non-intervention ± are `arbitrary'. The case

violations of human rights (a policy of genocide, say,

for saying that, despite the lack of full political

against a certain group of the population). What are

authority, there is sufficient political justification

the pragmatically minded Rortyeans to do and what

for intervention rests upon the idea that, from the

account can be given of what they do?

Rortyean liberal perspective, rights matter so much

its

consent'

from

supra-national

The bald fact of the matter is that the only reason

and express such deep-seated convictions about how

available to them for not advocating the use of force

people should be treated, based upon our reactions to

even in the absence of what they judge to be full

the horrendous cruelty that has been inflicted upon

political authority to do so (that is, the consent of

millions throughout history, that objections and

the `rogue state' to suffer the consequences of breach-

reservations about intervention can be outweighed.

ing international law) would seem to be that it is

Even if this is `cultural imperialism', no alternative

prohibited according to the specifications of the

rights-violating culture necessarily has to be toler-

values within their attitudinal perspective. And

ated by liberals on their own terms.

there is no compelling `internal' reason why these

It needs to be stressed that a belief that it is

values cannot be configured within this perspective

politically justifiable to impose certain human rights

to sanction a coercive strategy.

upon societies failing to respect them will not necessarily lead those of a liberal sensibility straight to

This is the point, the crux of the default position, at which many liberals (and others) will throw their

the conclusion that they must do so. The claim that

hands up in horror. How, they will want to know,

force is permissible where persuasion fails (and, qua

can a liberal argue for the acceptability of such

liberal, we can assume that Rortyeans will exhaust

coercion when it is openly claimed that the princi-

the possibility of persuasion before turning to force)

ples in question are held purely contingently, of

need not be configured to yield a conviction that

`ethnocentric' origin and supported by nothing more

force is obligatory. It might be that the moral costs of a

than arbitrary attitudinal conviction? At least with

justifiable enforcement would outweigh the moral

the liberal account of political authority, even if we

gains. Nor does this claim entail that such interven-

accept the idea of `consent' as a contingently held

tion should necessarily be a regular feature of a liberal

moral commitment, the fact that it sanctions coer-

state's behaviour. We may admit to valid, non-moral

cion only with some notion of agreement from the

reasons for not enforcing rights; it may be too

coerced suggests a less troubling, less imperialistic

difficult or otherwise impractical to force a rogue

scenario. But how could the contingent liberal sin-

state into respecting them.

cerely, consistently make this claim about our atti-

tially liberal sensibility will prevent liberals from

tude to the rogue state? Surely, we are now in the

blithely neglecting the concerns of imperialism al-

realms of `might is right', with a liberal `will-to-

together. Their sensitivity to diversity can still lead

power' seeking to stamp its image upon others in

them to tolerate some forms of social life even when

a world that is, in itself, morally meaningless.

they find them unfitting for humans as they con-

Now the point of the default position is that this

38

Further, a quintessen-

ceptualise them, and they will not treat all aspects of

last proposition is indeed, in essence, the view with

their own culture as fit to be embraced by others.

which it seeks to reconcile us. `Outside' of the liberal

All this notwithstanding, we still have the crucial

moral perspective, this is how we must conclude

point

things are. Yet the claim to be urged here is that this

forced to rest content in principle with a persuasive

gives liberals no necessary reason within their moral

strategy. This is just as well because, whatever re-

perspectives to back away from such policies as

servations they may have about particular instances

humanitarian intervention against rogue states. For

of possible intervention, most who share the HRC

a start, a charge that this is purely `arbitrary' ± in the

are probably not prepared to rule it out in principle

157

that

Rortyean

liberals are

not necessarily

MARK EVANS

always and everywhere. The moral mathematics or

that they could be acceptable to the targets of their

pragmatic costs may not always come out against

policy, such reason-giving `justification' is in fact

coercion and ± to take up another familiar reserva-

`self-explication'. Liberals can think it admirable

tion about intervention ± it is hardly clear that a

and probably necessary on their own terms to render

state cannot act against another to prevent, for

their considerations clear and transparent to them-

example, `ethnic cleansing' or genocide just because

selves and others, sincerely and rigorously. This,

of its own dubious moral past. It may be more

though, is as far as `justification' can extend in this

vulnerable to charges of hypocrisy if it fails to live

case.

up to its own moral standards, but this vulnerability need not constitute a reason for arguing against the

VIII

appropriateness of an interventionist strategy. One does not have to deny that the United States (to take

Thus far, it has not been the concern of the chapter

one example of a potential `rights-enforcing' state) is

to uphold this view against its rivals, merely to

very deeply flawed on such counts and that it is

elaborate it as sympathetically as possible. But it is

desirable to be vigilant over, and suspicious of, its

appropriate to conclude by reflecting on whether

actions (for liberals should be aware of disingenuous

there is much point in taking this view seriously. If it

uses of the human rights banner) in order to agree

is indeed a `default' position, how urgent is the need

that these factors do not constitute decisive bars

to try to escape it?

against its ever rightfully using its power genuinely

One important reservation about it is this: because

to prevent genocidal violations of human rights.

it cannot ultimately help but explain human rights in

This is particularly so if it turns out to be the only

terms of being reified, ethnocentric attitudes that

power capable of doing so.

39

one (albeit very large) group of people wishes to

What, though, does `justification' really signify

impose on others, it is just too brazenly advocatory of

here? From the Rortyean viewpoint it is clear that

the imposition of the powerful's preferred standards

it can only ever be a question of the consistency of a

upon others for liberals ever to feel comfortable with

principle and/or its practical consequences with the

it. The projectivist account of the HRC's moral

overall attitudinal moral perspective. (The notion of

discourse, according to this reservation, is ultimately

`wide reflective equilibrium', in which the perspec-

too flimsy to reconcile liberals to this point; the

tive's convictions, their consequences and relevant

`conversationalist' idea of objectivity, for example,

background considerations are brought into a coher-

patently fails to accommodate those who haven't

ent balance, illuminates how `justification' might

agreed with the results of, or even participated in, the

40

) In the absence of any independent cri-

relevant `conversation'. It provides an all-too-fragile

teria (objective moral truths), the liberalism of the

drape, easily blown away to reveal the realities of

view may always turn to persuasion first, hoping that

unadorned, shameless power.

proceed.

its moral and political cases can be based upon

A deeper worry is that liberals may thus lose

reasons that the others in question can accept.

confidence in their own moral rectitude if they posit

But this commitment to giving reasons acceptable

their belief-system as just one among many of the

to others is now not, as it appears with Rorty himself,

`warring gods' in a disenchanted world. Incapable in

something with which we should rest content. Nor is

principle of giving reasons why their morality is

it, as it appears to be in Kantian `public-justificatory'

superior to others, liberals shrink from the battle

liberalisms, a necessary precondition of all successful

to impose their views ± and perhaps cede the ground

41

It is at best an

to, say, a fascist doctrine whose very point is to

aspiration, which may be consistently pushed aside

impose order and leadership in a fragmented social

when certain moral considerations pertain. In in-

milieu.

stances such as humanitarian intervention, even

foundationalists, who would urge that foundational-

liberals of the Rortyean hue will continue to give

ism is the only internally tenable form liberalism

reasons for their actions. But without the assumption

(and perhaps any other doctrine) could take.

or legitimate political justifications.

158

42

This picture may be gleefully painted by

PRAGMATIST LIBERALISM AND THE EVASION OF POLITICS

I believe that liberalism is indeed in trouble if it

making a pragmatic or provisional prior commitment

makes `public acceptability' a precondition of its

to their values. Put bluntly, they are committed to

political legitimacy in such a divided and hostile

them in the first instance because they are desirable;

world (as with Rawlsians and more authentic neo-

that they correspond to some independent moral

Kantians), or if it does not push beyond Rorty's own

reality is accepted on faith and, as such, the Rortyean

apparent evasion of politics. But the Rortyean view

can say, is incidental to the commitment ± and

has

therefore dispensable.

deliberately

abandoned

these

approaches.

43

Hence, its ability to avoid the deliquescence of

So the Rortyean view beguilingly contends that

liberalism in the tides of contingency rests upon

the kinds of moral commitment we are all entitled to

its propensity to maintain its convictions that respect

make depend rather less upon the nature of one's

for principles such as rights would make the world a

meta-ethical beliefs than foundationalists in parti-

much better place, even if there is nothing outside of

cular often urge. It can say to the foundationalist

such convictions to `ground' them.

human-rights supporter `given that we share the

To conclude, I suggest that there may be a smaller

same goals, the same language of rights, what profit

gap in this regard between the foundationalist and

is to be gained by continuing the dispute about the

the Rortyean than the former might presume. For it

nature of values? We should be allies and not

can be argued that a foundationalist has great diffi-

enemies.' Thus, a case can be made to take the

culty in supporting principles in a way which avoids

Rortyean view as seriously as other intellectual ap-

the kind of non-foundationalist commitment held by

proaches to the spreading of the HRC around the

anti-foundationalists. A foundationalist who affirms

world. As a `default' position, its increased theore-

the existence of human rights and the rectitude of

tical strength may make it either a tougher target for

whatever action may be appropriate in their pursuit

critics or, perhaps, a less troubling prospect for those

must be convinced that he has indeed discovered the

who fear that those critics may not be able to argue

appropriate truths to justify the conviction. Some

convincingly against it. Of course it remains afflicted

foundationalists are this confident, of course. But

by serious doubts and we might eventually decide

there are pitifully few who agree with any one of the

that the Rortyean view would be insufficiently cap-

particular foundationalist philosophies on offer; de-

able of handling its problems for us to persevere with

bate rages on, apparently interminably. One could

it. But then, which of the rival views can credibly

use this observation to urge that the foundationalist's

claim to be free of similarly extensive problems?

moral commitments persist without the compelling

Moral and political theory could well have a

evidence that the facts indeed support them. (`Given

dangerous potential to frustrate or preclude moral

the criticisms of any one foundationalist position,' so

and political action if we believe we must disen-

this critique runs, `does one still not need a good deal

tangle all such problems before our morality's call to

of faith to hold fast to one's values?')

arms can be answered. If it does nothing else, the

In the absence of secure proof, then, a founda-

Rortyean view suggests that this fear is, mercifully,

tionalist might say that the search for `the truth' has

misplaced: we can be foundationalist or anti-foun-

simply yet to be completed. But this again embodies

dationalist and still affirm human rights in the way

a faith that there is such moral truth to be discov-

they are held in the HRC. Who needs philosophy

ered, which is hardly obvious given the wreckage of

to ground the conviction that a world where there is

previous unsuccessful philosophical searches. More-

no genocide is better than one where there is, and

over, few ± if any ± foundationalists who continue

that we ought to use whatever means we can to

the search believe that they must suspend all their

secure the former? What matter most of all, we

moral commitments prior to the moral discovery

might finally be able to agree, are the urgent moral

they seek to verify. Yet, given that they typically

and political demands of those who suffer so dread-

do not regard themselves as morally impotent in the

fully when the idea of human rights is contemp-

absence of secure knowledge, they must end up

tuously cast aside.

159

44

MARK EVANS

Notes

14. D'Agostino (1993). The `conditions of acceptability'

1. Rorty (1998), p. 170. 2. See Peterson (ed.) (1977), p. 235.

typically include requirements that the agreement be

3. See, for example, Brownlie (ed.) (1981), p. 143.

reached freely and fairly, and be based upon `consid-

4. Space does not permit a full substantiation of this

ered and critical reflection', not instantaneous opinio-

claim and I do not wish to deny that different accounts

natedness.

may be given of how at least some people regard the

regarded as purely contingent criteria from the Ror-

Of

course,

these

must

themselves

be

tyean perspective.

notion of human rights. But I am more interested here in the specific question of how well Rorty's thought

15. Rorty (1985), p. 5.

can support this particular general account, rather

16. A view famously adopted on behalf of non-cognitivism by Mackie (1977), chapter 1, especially pp. 48±9.

than the separate issue of how widely accepted the latter is. (I think it is sufficiently familiar not to deny

17. Rorty (1989), chapter 3, especially pp. 59±60.

its presence in the HRC.)

18. Ibid., p. 59. 19. M. Macdonald, `Natural Rights', in Waldron (ed.)

5. R. Rorty, `The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy',

(1984), pp. 21±40, at p. 36.

in Malachowski (ed.) (1990), pp. 279±302, at p. 286.

20. For the concept of `social fact', see Durkheim (1982),

6. C. Guignon and D. Hiley, `Biting the Bullet: Rorty on

especially chapter 1.

Public and Private Morality', in Malachowski (ed.)

21. Rorty (1985), p. 13.

(1990), pp. 339±64, at p. 343.

22. The notion of `final vocabulary' is discussed at Rorty

7. I am not claiming that all theorists regard this as the

(1989), p. 73.

only `default' position lurking in the wings and waiting for our philosophies to fail. I suspect, though, that this

23. See Rorty (1998), p. 170 for his conviction that a

specific position frequently haunts much philosophi-

`human rights' perspective constitutes a morally superior way of viewing and treating people.

cal debate.

24. Blackburn (1984), chapter 6, and (1993), especially

8. For example Rawls (1996), p. 136: `Our exercise of

chapters 8±9.

political power is fully proper only when it is exercised in accordance with a constitution the essen-

25. Blackburn (1996), pp. 82±100.

tials of which all citizens as free and equal may

26. Blackburn (1993), p. 161.

reasonably be expected to endorse in the light of

27. Ibid., chapter 9, especially pp. 172±5.

principles and ideals acceptable to their common

28. Wiggins (1988), pp. 133±4.

human reason.'

29. One potential problem with this interpretation of projectivism is that Blackburn has recently contended

9. Rorty (1998), p. 172. 10. At ibid., p. 171, Rorty defines `foundationalism' as a

that `non-cognitivism' is actually an inappropriate

type of moral doctrine which tries to find indepen-

term to characterise it (Blackburn, 1996, p. 82). He

dently verifiable truths (usually about human nature)

claims it is compatible with a notion of `best moral

from which our moral intuitions may be directly

sensibility', derivable thus: conceptualise one's current

inferred. Although constructivism affirms the idea

moral perspective and all possible rival perspectives as

of `moral knowledge as well, it is clear that moral

akin to the structure of a tree in the following way.

realism is really what is signified here; cf. the reference

The `trunk' contains all of those features that we

at n. 11.

would think any acceptable moral perspective would

11. Ibid., p. 172.

have to hold. It is this that provides the content of

12. Ibid., pp. 171±3.

what he says we can legitimately claim to know as

13. Ibid., p. 176 and passim. It is possible to argue that

moral truth. Thereafter, the trunk branches out, in so

Rorty need not have gone as far as he does in

far as we conceptualise the perspectives diverging in

provisionally adopting non-cognitivism because his

their attitudes from this shared core. Blackburn thinks

sentimentalist approach to moral conversion is com-

it is possible to remove the possibility of branching: if

patible with the form of realism, defended by John

my perspective branches out because I believe that A

McDowell, which holds that, although moral proper-

is better than B while I acknowledge the possibility of

ties inhere in their objects independently of our

a perspective that says B is better than A, I have the

attitudes, they can only be perceived when one is

following choices: I can stick to my current belief, in

suitably disposed attitudinally. See, for example, his

which case the alternative disappears from my `tree' as

`Values and Secondary Qualities' and `Projection and

a candidate for a suitable sensibility; or I concede its

Truth in Ethics', in McDowell (1998), pp. 131±50 and

validity, in which case my branch should disappear.

pp. 151±66, respectively.

Alternatively, I concede the merits of both cases, in

160

PRAGMATIST LIBERALISM AND THE EVASION OF POLITICS

which case I should improve upon my current belief

sion of Kuwait and not China for its occupation of

that A is better than B: again, this branch should

Tibet? We need hardly be ignorant of the cynicism

disappear. Now it must be a matter of considerable

that doubtless enters into the politics of intervention

doubt as to whether this could plausibly yield a single

to query which moral direction this point is supposed

set of moral truths, or whether the label of `truth' is

to take us. If the argument is that we should never

simply being used rhetorically to affirm a suitably

sanction humanitarian intervention unless we consis-

refined set of attitudes. For this reason, we leave this

tently apply the same moral considerations in every

issue aside in the present analysis.

other like instance, one must wonder whether the

30. Rorty (1998), p. 185.

proper object of moral concern hasn't been entirely

31. Ibid., pp. 167±9.

misplaced here. Would the Kosovar Albanians or the

32. Martha Nussbaum is arguably the most prominent

East Timorese thank us for leaving them entirely alone

exponent of literature's value in shaping people's

to their fate, appreciating that we are primarily con-

moral sentiments; see Nussbaum (1995).

cerned that our own precious moral consistency might be impugned if we intervened on their behalf while

33. Rorty, `The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy' in

continuing to tolerate the rights violations of the

Malachowski (ed.) (1990), p. 288.

Chinese state?

34. In practice non-cognitivism has usually been aligned

40. See Daniels (1996), chapter 2 for the concept of wide

with some version of the liberal view that the consent

reflective equilibrium.

of those subject to power legitimises its exercise.

41. I criticise the concept of public-justificatory liberalism

35. Mouffe (1993), chapters 3, 9.

in Evans (1999).

36. In a much-debated passage, Rawls concedes that imposition of fundamental liberal values upon a steadfast

42. Carl Schmitt famously offers a version of this critique,

anti-liberal (a violent religious fundamentalist, for

claiming that liberalism's claims to embody objective

example) may be necessary if the latter is incapable

moral truths conflicts with democracy's claim that

of accepting the principles (Rawls, 1996, p. 152).

legitimacy is based upon the collective will of the

Although it is significant that Rawls's theory does

people, thus making `liberal democracy' philosophi-

not recoil from the advocacy of coercion, this case

cally oxymoronic and, in a fractured social world,

appears to be sufficiently marginal and exceptional in

practically

Rawls's mind not to need systematic analysis and

(1996), chapter 8. 43. Isaiah

justification (or so he thinks). My suggestion here is

unworkable.

Berlin

observes

For that

analysis, `the

see

very

Larmore

desire

for

that politics may be a lot more agonistic and antag-

guarantees that our values are eternal and secure

onistic than he presumes, and the coercive (as opposed

in some objective heaven is perhaps only a craving

to consensual) resolution of political conflict is far

for the certainties of childhood, or the absolute

more central to everyday politics than Rawls believes.

values

See, in this regard, Rawls (1999), pp. 529±64, where

172. If this is so, then the need for foundationalist

he sketches the possibility of an internationalist `law of

belief may not be dispensable, though some anti-

peoples', including a scheme of basic human rights.

foundationalists would put this down to an inability

Although applicable to all humans, Rawls recognises

to

that perhaps not all societies could agree to affirm such

manner. Certainly, a purely evaluative conviction

a law; in their case, he says, there is in principle no

may be vulnerable to dissolution through the waning

peaceful solution except a modus vivendi, `the domina-

of attitudes, but yet again there is not quite the

tion of one side or the peace of exhaustion' (ibid., p.

unfavourable contrast with realist convictions that

564). At this point, perhaps, we have nothing other

one might think. Crises of faith (sometimes term-

than Rorty-type contingent attitudes by which to

inal) in examples of the latter are, after all, familiar

orientate political responses to such societies.

enough to challenge the foundationalists' argument

live

of

our

primitive

without

holding

past':

values

Berlin

in

an

(1969),

p.

erroneous

that their form of moral conviction is that much

37. This, of course, simplifies and glosses over a lot of

more insulated from doubt.

issues. I merely sketch the outline of a possible argu-

44. I would like to thank John Torrance and Roger Crisp

ment, to allow swift passage to the particular problem I

for comments on a distant ancestor of this chapter

wish to address. 38. See Parekh (1997) and Mu È llerson (1997), pp. 164±5

which helped to shape its current form. Thanks are

for some possible conditions for justifiable interven-

owed as well to the participants at the 1999 University

tion.

of Wales Swansea political theory conference at Gregynog, and in particular Bruce Haddock, for valuable

39. A familiar criticism of interventionist actions by wes-

discussion.

tern powers is that realpolitik produces hypocritical selectivity: for example, why attack Iraq for its inva-

161

12

LIBERALISM AND CONTINGENCY Bruce Haddock

Liberals, or at least theorists concerned to defend

(purely contingent) national tradition. Liberals may

liberal political positions, have in the last decade

express their loyalty in terms of doctrinal commit-

seemed peculiarly diffident about the foundational

ments. But once they recognise the fragility of the

arguments which were once the stock-in-trade of

assumptions they have made (regarding progress,

liberal theory. Rawls's defection from foundational-

rationality, personal autonomy and so on), they

ism in Political Liberalism is the most celebrated (and

are bound to accept that the sources of their attach-

arresting) case of a phenomenon which is wider and

ment are cultural rather than philosophical. There

deeper, going to the heart of what we might mean by

may well be decisive practical reasons for endorsing

normative political philosophy.

1

Rawls continues to

liberal institutions and practices as the best means of

espouse a comprehensive liberal doctrine, but he is

preserving and developing the advantages which

anxious to show that terms of political cooperation

accrue from flourishing civil societies. But such a

can be defended independently of the particular

defence could never be more than conditional and

comprehensive doctrine he happens to endorse.

certainly could not assume the guise of a deontological theory.

Other theorists (Rorty and Gray have been prominent here) defend the institutions and values of

Closer inspection, however, reveals that these

the liberal communities they happen to have grown

retreats from foundational argument are far from

2

Rorty's

clear-cut. Rawls is the most interesting case, since

liberal ironist can delight in the cultural diversity

he accepts that the resources of comprehensive

which confronts him, enriching the heritage through

doctrines can be used to defend a liberal political

complex description rather than analysis. Sentimen-

consensus. His concern is to ensure that a particular

tal stories may be said to enhance possibilities for

political consensus should not be identified with any

self-understanding. They do not furnish rules to live

particular comprehensive doctrine. Clearly he is

by. Rules which purport to be theoretically defen-

trying to walk a fine line here. As Leif Wenar has

sible are in fact simply arbitrary conventions which

recently pointed out, a (supposedly) non-conten-

facilitate mutual enjoyment. But they do not facil-

tious notion of reasonableness is being asked to do

itate everybody's enjoyment. The pretence that ar-

a great deal of work.

bitrary conventions are necessary conditions for a

distinguish theoretically between reasonable and

just society is one of the principal foundational

unreasonable pluralisms, though in practice crude

illusions that the liberal ironist is concerned to

political judgements about what should or should

dispel.

not be tolerated are made all the time. Similar

up in, but for purely contingent reasons.

3

It is extremely difficult to

Gray's position (at least in his more recent writ-

problems arise when we try to distinguish reasonable

ings) is more straightforward. He simply asserts that

from unreasonable comprehensive doctrines. Is it

attachment to liberalism is a function of loyalty to a

simply the case that any comprehensive doctrine

162

LIBERALISM AND CONTINGENCY

9

which endorses a reasonable political consensus (for

tent of natural law' for support.

whatever reasons) is to be adjudged reasonable? Or is

allow, however, is that this `universal minimum

there something about the comprehensive doctrines

content of morality' (whatever it might comprise)

themselves which distinguishes them as reasonable?

should be specifiable in theoretical terms which

Wenar argues that the conception of political rea-

could serve as a normative foundation for a variety

sonableness Rawls invokes is comprehensive (Kan-

of political settlements.

tian)

that value incommensurability is an irreducible fea-

rather

than

limited,

excluding

not

only

10

What he cannot

Following Berlin, he insists

11

fundamentalists and fanatics from a reasonable prin-

ture of pluralist societies.

cipled consensus but also Catholics, Hobbesians and

what we confront in the last resort is existential

Humeans.

4

In this scheme of things,

Wenar's solution is to make the concep-

choice unaided by practical reason. The appeal to a

tion of political reasonableness even more limited,

`minimum content of natural law' or a `universal

thus making it non-contentious from the perspective

minimum content of morality' does no normative

of comprehensive doctrines. But in that situation it is

work here.

unlikely that comprehensive doctrines would gen-

Rorty makes fewer concessions to even a residual

erate the kind of principled support for a political

foundationalism. But it is worth noting in passing

consensus which would transform a modus vivendi

that when he claims that (for liberals) `cruelty is the

into a principled agreement. It would also make

worst thing we do', he is invoking an evaluative

Rawls even more vulnerable to critics who argue

criterion which is far from clear in its meaning and

that political liberalism requires more rather than less

scope.

foundational support.

5

12

Mill scholars have always recognised that

the relevant sense of `harm' for liberal theory needs

What is clear is that Rawls

13

himself insists that some sort of bridge between a

to be specified carefully.

political consensus and reasonable comprehensive

Kekes has argued that priority can only be accorded

doctrines is indispensable to his position, citing

to the claims of cruelty at the cost of undermining

Hart's notion of `the minimum content of natural

the specifically liberal character of a state.

law' as an example of the kind of argument he has in

point to insist on here is that assertion of the

mind.

6

And more recently John

14

The

significance of cruelty in liberal doctrine needs to be supported by argument. It is vacuous as a simple

Gray's position is ambivalent in precisely the same

description of liberal sensibilities.

way. He feels free to equate `a commitment to the

What we see emerging here is a series of more or

preservation of civil society' with `a commitment to 7

And though he

less reluctant adjustments to a minimal foundation-

accepts that association on these terms `may be only

alism, couched often in such broad terms that the

one of the diverse forms of flourishing our species has

idea of a foundation serves no normative function.

achieved', he nevertheless defends a form of civil

This in itself is philosophically interesting, even if it

society as not only `the best in our cultural inheri-

impinges hardly at all on the more immediate prac-

tance' but also `the best that the species can presently

tical concerns of political theorists. It is surely sig-

the maintenance of civilisation.'

8

Having withdrawn from lib-

nificant that allusions to Hart's `minimum content of

eral universalism, then, he continues to defend a

natural law' are often made in passing, as if discussion

position which is far broader than the discrete

at the most general level could have no implications

traditions which have sustained modern western

for the claim that liberal values are contingent. And

political culture. Certainly civil society can be en-

it must be said that the way Hart presents his case

dorsed from within these traditions but cannot be

rather encourages that view. The `minimum content

identified with them. And to specify even in the

of natural law' is not a contentious conclusion to an

broadest formal terms what human beings as a species

elaborate argument, but a series of `simple truisms'

might `reasonably hope for' surely takes us beyond

which afford reasons for adopting legal and moral

the contingent theoretical resources of particular

practices.

cultures.

viability of any legal system, rather than with the

reasonably hope for.'

Like Rawls, Gray turns to Hart's `minimum con-

15

Hart's concern in this section is with the

desirability of a liberal system or any other variant. In

163

BRUCE HADDOCK

The Concept of Law Hart treats (almost exclusively)

We may say, at the very least, that recognition of

liberal discussions of law within the broader context

mutual vulnerability commits us to the adoption of

of legal order as such. My concern in this chapter is

some rules of social cooperation. These rules may be

to reverse the direction of the argument in order to

many and varied and may in substance be wholly

develop the normative implications of a formal legal

arbitrary. But that there should be some rules may be

framework. My claim is that reflection on the idea of

said to be a defining characteristic of a society. Given

a formal legal framework furnishes grounds for pre-

that societies with (necessarily) limited understand-

ferring certain forms of political or legal order to

ing and scarce resources will have to make hard

others. I do not claim that only liberal political

choices, we must assume that they will have author-

orders are defensible, or that all forms of liberal order

itative procedures for allocating resources. Govern-

are

philosophical

ment of some kind will have to be carried on, even if

grounds for preferring to manage public affairs in a

a formal specification of institutional roles is not

context of liberal institutions and practices.

developed. But, of course, to recognise the necessity

desirable,

only

that

there

are

What Hart focuses on in the brief passage on natural

of government in certain circumstances is not to

law which has been cited so frequently is the con-

endorse any particular kind of government. Hart is

tingent predicament in which all societies find them-

concerned to do no more in his discussion of the

selves. Adapting arguments from Hobbes and Hume,

minimum content of natural law than to set before

he depicts a context which must inform the moral and

his readers the general predicament to which all legal

legal reflection of all communities, anywhere. Indi-

and moral schemes must respond; he is interested in

vidual vulnerability to personal attack, relative equal-

questions of viability rather than desirability. And

ity (such that even the weak can threaten the strong

even Hume, whose discussion of justice has the

through stealth), limited altruism, limited resources,

conveniences of commercial society in mind, offers

limited understanding and suchlike put clear con-

generic principles which all viable societies will have

straints on the kinds of institutions and practices

to endorse. On the face of it, little follows from the

which could (in principle) be devised to sustain social

`three fundamental laws of nature' which constitute

life. We can imagine situations in which these restric-

justice for Hume.

tions would not apply. We can fantasise about heaven

must sustain `stability of possession' without specify-

on earth, where both resources and goodwill are

ing precise terms on which property might be en-

superabundant. But whatever arrangements people

joyed.

in that happy situation might devise for their delight,

`transference by consent' is simply to insist that there

we can assume that distributive and coercive proce-

should be some procedural rules, not that any specific

dures would not be among them. Politics as we know it

rules should be deemed to be appropriate.

would simply not be necessary. At the other extreme,

third dimension of justice (`the performance of pro-

as Hume argued, absolute scarcity renders conven-

mises') is more fruitful.

tional institutions and practices redundant. Where

stress the utility of promise-keeping, but reflection

starvation is a likely prospect, we cannot assume that

on the constitutive role of truthfulness in any con-

the law of property would be greatly respected. As

ception of agency extends the discussion to the

Hume expressed the point, in a dire emergency `the

necessary requirements of intelligible agency.

19

18

Similarly,

We can grant that all societies

to

21

move

from

possession

20

to

The

Hume himself may want to

strict laws of justice are suspended . . . and give place

The key issue here is not how particular practices

to the stronger motives of necessity and self-preserva-

(like promising) might be justified but what makes

tion.'

16

practices

In the ordinary way of things, of course, we are

possible.

Following

Wittgenstein

and

not faced with such stark dilemmas, except in cases

Winch, we have come to accept a capacity for rule

where regimes actually break down. What Hart asks us

following as a constitutive feature of human con-

to consider is the normative impact of truths that are

duct.

`contingent on human beings and the world they live

course of their lives and that we can make reasonable

in retaining the salient characteristics which they

predictions about what people might do from a basis

have.'

22

17

We know that things happen to people in the

of crude generalisation. But doing things involves

164

LIBERALISM AND CONTINGENCY

applying criteria, and these criteria consist of (more

speak. We also acquire a rudimentary understanding

or less formally acknowledged) social rules. It is

of how we should respond to other speakers. The use

important to stress that we do not need to be able

of a language is thus a social engagement which

to specify the rules we are following in order to be

commits us to much more than a basic set of

said to be following rules. Wittgenstein classically

grammatical rules.

focuses on the grammar of a language as a framework

Lyotard, among others, has stressed the insepar24

of rules which enable us to speak. Children can use a

ability of speaking and listening.

language before they can analyse sentences. And we

societies devise complex ways (ritually and profes-

can imagine languages which have never been ana-

sionally) of limiting rights to speak about certain

lysed by anyone. The users of such languages can

matters. If someone were systematically denied the

nevertheless be said to be following rules even if the

right to speak on any occasion, however, they would

rules have not been formally specified. If they juxta-

effectively have been reduced to the status of a non-

pose sounds in a wholly arbitrary way they will not be

person, irrespective of whatever else might happen to

understood. Children acquiring the language will be

them. In this sense, some basic rights accompany

corrected by adults, though the adults may not be

language use. Rights can, of course, be forfeited

able to specify the linguistic rule which had been

through wrongdoing. But recognition of a prima facie

wrongly applied. We may expect the range of prac-

case to be heard can be justified simply by focusing

tical usage to be wide in a language which is wholly

on the logic of conversation. It would be absurd to

informal. But informal rules remain rules, specifiable

claim that everyone had a right to take part in any

in principle even if they have not been specified in

conversation, even in principle. I simply do not

practice. We simply cannot conceive of a language

know enough about brain surgery or football to insist

which is not (in some sense) rule-bound. It is surely

that my voice should be heard. Yet to be denied the

significant that we assume that anyone could (in

right to participate in any conversation would be

principle) learn any language. They may not be

tantamount to being excluded from all human com-

taught rules but they know how to carry on making

munity. Such things may be thought desirable in

meaningful sounds.

exceptional circumstances, but they would always

The framework of rules implicit in any language

have to be justified in terms of some conception of

may appear to be entirely neutral. Yet, as Winch has

human flourishing.

argued, a presupposition of truthfulness is a basic requirement of any language.

23

We know that

Just how far this sort of reflection can take us is a

People tell lies and

much-disputed question. Few modern philosophers

deceive one another because it can be assumed that

would want to follow Hegel's attempt in the Philo-

(on the whole) they mean what they say. He stresses,

sophy of Right to defend the necessity of a specific

too, that using a language is a practical engagement

institutional framework from a series of reflections on

in which commitments are made to other people.

the character of human agency. Yet it may well be

When children are taught a language they are at the

that what we should be worried about in Hegel is not

same time inducted into the ways of a form of life.

so much the ambition of the project as the detailed

The rules which constitute the form of life could not

development of the argument. Modern readers tend

be specified in abstract fashion. What we have,

not to find the elaborate deductive structure of the

instead, is a series of overlapping practices, not all

Philosophy of Right helpful. It should be clear, how-

of them mutually supportive, which yield a sense of

ever, that when he asks us in the compressed in-

how to carry on, how to respond to other people,

troduction to reflect on what we might mean by

what to expect of oneself.

agency, what we presuppose about human conduct

Language is instructive to us here as an illustration

when we make choices, how we should regard

of a natural practice. We do not choose to learn our

ourselves in relation to the cultures that sustain

first language, we may have little or no understand-

us, he is raising questions which any political phi-

ing of the grammatical rules implicit in that lan-

losophy must respond to.

guage, and yet we learn to correct ourselves as we

course, that these issues are always treated self-con-

165

25

It does not follow, of

BRUCE HADDOCK

sciously. For the most part, many basic presupposi-

repudiate all rules and conventions without ceasing

tions will simply be taken for granted in order to

to make sense, even to ourselves.

26

proceed with more specific and practically compel-

The intelligibility of our own conduct thus de-

ling questions. But it remains the case that presup-

pends upon the social dimension of the practices we

positions are made which have different implications

are inducted into. We can envisage an esoteric

for practice.

practice, but it is clearly parasitic on the fact that

Our concern, then, before we consider the institu-

we have been inducted into other practices naturally,

tions and policies we might happen to desire, is to

much as our ability to construct private languages is

explore the necessary requirements which enable

parasitic on the fact that we already know what

practices to flourish. We must assume that these

languages are.

requirements will be very general indeed since we

to be authoritative in some sense that we can be said

know from ordinary experience that different cul-

to engage in intelligible activity. And this applies

tures pursue all manner of ends in a variety of ways.

even if our concern is to revise radically the way a

Our focus should be on what people need to ac-

practice is carried on. The focus again is on how

knowledge in order to attain any satisfaction at all

things are done, not on the specific goals that are

rather than on the things they happen to want. We

pursued.

27

It is only because practices are held

have accepted (following Hobbes, Hume and Hart)

The conception of rules defended here does not

that recognition of mutual vulnerability commits us

depend upon the self-conscious adoption of rules of

to establishing terms of social cooperation. If you do

conduct in particular communities. Our concern is

not accept this point, you can have no interest in

rather with the necessary conditions of intelligible

normative political philosophy.

action. If we are to conceive of societies at all we

The point may be put more strongly. If you regard

must think in terms of rules which constitute prac-

social cooperation as optional or irrelevant, you will

tices. Of course, societies cannot be conceived in

have fundamentally misconceived the idea of human

purely procedural terms. Cultures and subcultures

agency. When we do things we apply and adapt rules

will endorse different conceptions of a worthwhile

and procedures, and these rules and procedures have

life, often pursuing ends which are strictly incom-

a public (social) life even if they are not formally

mensurable. And if we focus on these different ends,

acknowledged. To say or do things deliberately is to

it may be that we will have to accept that certain

apply criteria such that we might wonder whether or

ways of life are incompatible. We may not be able to

not we had said or done the right thing. Following a

find any common ground between deeply held be-

practice necessarily involves the possibility of mak-

liefs. No matter what we might say, however, about

ing a mistake. But it would make no sense to say that

the constitutive values of particular communities, we

it was entirely arbitrary whether or not a mistake had

still have to regard the practices within these com-

been made.

munities as instances of rule-following, even if it has

Practices are thus to be understood in terms of

never occurred to agents to describe their conduct in

rules and conventions which are more or less ade-

this light. They may think of themselves as marion-

quately observed. In relation to any specific engage-

ettes in a display of divine virtuosity, and we must

ment, the rules and conventions are regarded as

refer to these beliefs when we reconstruct their

authoritative. Sometimes (as in a game) the engage-

conduct. But what they are actually doing is making

ment is constituted by specific endorsement of a

decisions, appraising one another's conduct in terms

formal set of rules. You cannot play chess and

of assumptions and standards, correcting each other

repudiate the rules at the same time. The overlap-

when they make mistakes, arguing, reproaching or

ping (and largely informal) rules of social life are

punishing one another for failure to observe appro-

much more difficult to discern. In this case it makes

priate rules and procedures. The things they do can

perfect sense to suspend judgement about certain

be done well or ill, with more or less good faith. But

conventions while continuing to engage in coopera-

simply to say that they are doing something commits

tive projects more or less normally. But we could not

us to certain ways of conceiving of conduct.

166

LIBERALISM AND CONTINGENCY

Oakeshott focuses on the quality of active engage-

understood within liberal theory. The point to focus

ment in his characterisation of a practice as `a

on is that philosophical reflection on the necessity of

prudential or an authoritative adverbial qualification

a minimal foundation may furnish grounds for pre-

of choices and preferences, more or less complicated,

ferring certain political options to others.

in which conduct is understood in terms of a procedure.'

28

Hart himself offers us some help along these lines

The terms of reference here are so broad

in the opening arguments of The Concept of Law. His

that it may be thought that nothing is ruled out. The

modification of the received version of legal positi-

conceptual clarification of what it means to carry on

vism depended largely on his adoption of a rule-

may seem to have no implications whatever for what

following model of law as a practice. Following

we should actually do. But this formal distinction

Wittgenstein and Winch, he sought to highlight

only holds while a practice is conducted within the

the rules (formal or tacit) which enable agents to

recognisable terms of reference of rule following. To

set themselves standards in the conduct of their

behave impulsively or wholly erratically is not to

business. An agent can only ask herself what she

engage in a practice at all, even though observation

ought to do (whether as a judge, a lawyer or a

of such behaviour may generate reasonably accurate

litigant) within the context of a practice constituted

generalisations. And Oakeshott himself, notably in

by procedural rules.

Rationalism in Politics, highlights the ruinous conse-

view (endorsed variously by Hobbes, Bentham, Aus-

quences which follow from misconceptions of hu-

tin and others) of law as an authoritative command

man agency.

29

31

This is not to say that the older

To suppose that all right-thinking

backed by coercive power is wholly redundant. This

people will necessarily endorse the same collective

may well be how law is regarded by people who do

goals, or that we can somehow stand outside all

not acknowledge the authority of a legal system or

practices in order to assess the rationality or desir-

who see themselves as free-riders prepared to exploit

ability of a particular practice, or that liberation from

the passive obedience of others, but it certainly does

the constraints of all conventions or traditions will

not help us to explain what makes conduct within a

somehow set us free, is to conceive of human life as it

legal practice intelligible.

could not possibly be lived. Philosophy, in this

Hart clearly expects his distinction between inter-

scheme of things, can specify the conceptual limits

nal and external perspectives (or rule-following and

of practical life, without telling us how we should

habitual behaviour) to do a great deal of work for

actually live.

him, but he is very cautious about drawing out

The stress on procedural rules should not be

normative implications. This is perfectly intelligible

misunderstood. The claim is not that a minimal

given the overall thrust of his argument. He is

framework is sufficient to sustain a polity, rather

interested in law as such, and not any particular

that the framework provides a basis for different

variety of law which may have emerged in a given

modes of political flourishing. Following Oakeshott,

context. A theory of law that simply reflected the

the framework may be described as `the minimum

culture and values of a particular community would

condition of any settled association among indivi-

(in his terms) be no theory at all. His modification of

30

But no polity actually flourishes on the basis

legal positivism thus involved only a minimal retreat

of minimal conditions alone. What is built upon this

from the moral neutrality which was central to that

minimal (or `weak') foundation will depend upon

theory. His conception of a `minimum content of

the specific (and contingent) features of a given

natural law' is conceived principally as a response to

political culture. The point, however, is that the

the contingent circumstances in which human life is

contingent values of particular cultures may distort

lived. He avoids reference to substantive concep-

or constrain practices which can be shown to be

tions of the good life which had been the stock-in-

constitutive of a flourishing political life. The terms

trade of the traditional theory of natural law. He

of reference here are still very broad indeed. We are

accepts that a formally viable legal system may be

dealing with the possibility of human flourishing

morally reprehensible. The fact that legal rules are

rather than preferences as these have often been

always grafted on to a moral context has (for Hart)

duals.'

167

BRUCE HADDOCK

no implications for the specification of the formal

The crucial distinction at work here is between

requirements of a legal system.

`primary' and `secondary' rules of obligation.

36

It is

Hart makes the point emphatically in his insis-

perfectly possible to envisage a community in which

tence that `the question what the criteria of legal

dealings between people would be regulated exclu-

validity in any legal system are is a question of fact',

sively in terms of customary rules. Social ostracism

stemming from the `rule of recognition' which hap-

clearly constitutes a powerful coercive constraint in

pens to be endorsed in the particular system.

32

A rule

contexts where alternative lifestyles are not avail-

of recognition may be complex (as in an elaborate

able. In a purely customary society one is not faced

juridical culture such as the United States) or for-

with choices between options but with more or less

mally straightforward (whatever the Queen in Par-

reluctant compliance. But, as Hart makes clear, such

liament enacts will be recognised as law in the

arrangements of unofficial rules can only work in `a

United Kingdom) or simplistic (the tyrant's will,

small community closely knit by ties of kinship,

Rex I in Hart's example,

common sentiment, and belief, and placed in a stable

law).

33

will be taken

to be

environment.'

Hart's point is that we can make sense of

37

Customary rules are simply given.

each of these legal systems in terms of criteria

As soon as we start wondering about their desir-

furnished by a rule of recognition, though in each

ability, we introduce hypothetical considerations

case the rule of recognition may be arbitrary. `Its

which may be contentious. The need to accommo-

existence', Hart insists, `is a matter of fact.'

34

date change of any kind obliges us to make judge-

What I

want to suggest, however, is that it makes the world

ments.

of difference that what we are talking about here is a

rudimentary level of social organisation. The point

Our

concern

here

is

with

the

most

rule. To be sure, the whim of Rex I constitutes a rule

to stress is simply that a (hypothetical) customary

only in the most primitive sense. But recognising

society ceases to function effectively when alterna-

that it is the existence of a rule which makes public

tive possibilities are made available. Disputes about

cooperation possible gives us grounds, all other

ends have to be settled somehow (through fighting,

things being equal, to prefer a rule which is more

ritual manipulation, social pressure or whatever). But

predictable in its operation rather than less.

it soon becomes evident that ordinary business re-

Hart's description of his work in the preface of The

quires authoritative procedures. Practical judgements

Concept of Law as `an essay in descriptive sociology' is

cannot be made in chronically uncertain situations.

35

It is better seen as an

The introduction of these authoritative procedures

exercise in normative theory extending beyond the

(or `secondary rules') constitutes, for Hart, `a step

normal confines of ideological dispute. Indeed the

from the pre-legal into the legal world'.

thus seriously misleading.

38

tension which some commentators have seen in

Note that the transition to a `legal world' is not a

Hart's work between his conceptions of critical

choice in any ordinary sense. We may regard dif-

morality and analytical jurisprudence can be easily

ferent legal rules as more or less useful or desirable,

resolved if the normative dimension of analytical

but we cannot reject the idea of legal rules without

jurisprudence is acknowledged. The point to insist

undermining our capacity to function as agents in

on is simply that the minimal criteria which enable

complex contexts. The notion of returning to a

us to identify a legal system will be more or less

`pre-legal' situation is no more than a nostalgic

effectively embodied in actual legal systems. Quite

fantasy. In an unfashionable speculative sense, we

how far this could take us in the critical amendment

may be said to have crossed a divide between kinds

of legal or constitutional practices is an open (and

of civilisation. The assumptions which enable cul-

contentious) question. But if it is accepted that

tures to function at this level are not choices or

predictability and transparency are essential to the

preferences. They are, rather, the `presuppositions'

furtherance of cooperative pursuits among autono-

or `hinges' without which we simply could not carry

mous strangers, then it is clear that we do have

on.

grounds for preferring certain institutional proce-

39

The claim that philosophical reflection on the

dures to others.

necessity of a legal framework is at the same time a

168

LIBERALISM AND CONTINGENCY

justification of legal order should not itself be con-

Nor is there any suggestion that `true fictions' are

tentious. We can easily appreciate that a pure theory

unchanging. What needs to be presupposed in order

of legal order would not loom large in a society that

to make sense of ordinary experience will change

happened to display an overwhelming consensus

with the variety of circumstances, but not as a matter

around a substantive conception of the good. But

of taste or fashion and some very basic assumptions

it clearly would not follow that legal order depended

may be more or less invariable. The point, however,

upon such a substantive consensus. In practical

is that we cannot specify what will be assumed to be

terms, we simply have to accept a plurality of de-

invariable before critical enquiry begins. It would be

fensible values as a starting point for our reflections.

very odd if someone (other than a mischievous

Recognition of the contingency of values at this

philosopher) were to deny that things happen at

level, however, does not rule out the possibility that

some time in some place. And while we can conceive

more binding philosophical reasons might be ad-

of a human world in which moral choices were

vanced in defence of a political order which made

somehow unreal, we would nevertheless be surprised

diversity manageable.

(as a matter of fact) to learn that languages existed

Examples of the kind of argument I have in mind

without an imperative mood. At some level we

will be familiar to everyone from the canon of

picture human association as a matter of agents

`classics' of political philosophy. To be sure, the

making choices which affect others, even if a capa-

usual suspects among the classics constitute a motley

city for making autonomous choices is not greatly

crew. We find arguments ranging from the most

prized within a particular culture.

abstract accounts of conditions of theoretical intel-

The significance of agency for an understanding of

ligibility to detailed moral and political prescriptions

morality can be easily granted. What this concession

for proper conduct in everyday life, informed by

may commit us to at the political or institutional

personal obsessions which are (in some cases) laugh-

level is much less clear. At the very least, we must

able or contemptible. But this is just to recognise that

accept that intelligible agency depends upon stability

classics of political philosophy operate at many

of expectations. Stability, of course, can be attained

different levels, and that matters of philosophical

in all sorts of ways. There are stable expectations in

interest are sometimes concealed in the most un-

prisons and monasteries, yet it would be odd to

likely places. Whatever else might be going on in

regard either as models of social and political life.

such texts, we nevertheless find attempts to specify

Leviathan also secures stability, but at a price modern

what would need to be true about human beings

liberals have been reluctant to pay. If we supposed,

living in communities if the ordinary things they

however, with Hobbes, that an anarchic and un-

take for granted are to make any sense at all. This, of

predictable state of nature was the only alternative to

course, is not necessarily what political philosophers

authoritarian government, then we may accept that

always suppose they are doing, especially in cultures

authorising a sovereign to lay down binding rules was

untroubled by the `burdens of judgement'.

40

a small price to pay for a measure of `commodious

But we

living'.

go back to them as philosophers precisely because certain sorts of problems necessarily arise when we

In the ordinary way of things, we are not con-

take the justification of terms of social cooperation

fronting Hobbes's dilemma. We are faced with more

seriously. Oakeshott put the point nicely in a cele-

or less desirable options in viable political circum-

brated discussion of Hobbes. He defined philosophy

stances. What may be lost from sight is that stress on

as `the establishment by reasoning of true fictions.'

41

what is chosen may obscure the significance of an

Given the things we accept, there are certain notions

institutional context which makes choice possible. It

which simply have to be held to be true. The point is

is a paradox, as Oakeshott has pointed out, that

not that we can give a list of these indubitable truths,

`Hobbes, without being himself a liberal, had in him

rather that critical thinking depends upon presup-

more of the philosophy of liberalism than most of its

positions which can and (at times) must be exam-

professed defenders.'

ined.

significance of stability in contexts in which agree-

169

42

Recognition of the overriding

BRUCE HADDOCK

ment about ends cannot be expected does not

inappropriate or meaningless would surely cripple

commit us to Hobbesian measures. Stability of ex-

our critical endeavours.

pectations may also be achieved in legal orders which guarantee basic rights.

43

The implications of this view are wide-ranging

Philosophical interest fo-

and cannot be developed in any detail here. Even

cuses on the fact that we should have rights, not

if the radical contingency of liberal values and

simply on the specific rights we happen to value.

institutions is granted, we are still left with the

It remains the case, of course, that urgent and

problem of explaining what it means to make hard

contentious theoretical issues are raised when we

choices in contexts where binding decisions have

consider the sorts of rights that should be enshrined

to be made. For the most part, we can accept that

in a modern legal system. And at the policy level,

reasons which are regarded as compelling within a

too, it is by no means clear how a foundational

tradition may have little purchase beyond it. But

commitment to agency should be translated into

traditions are no more self-contained than lan-

concrete proposals for educational and health provi-

guage-games or forms of life. It is precisely when

sion, taxation and so on. Even theorists who share a

terms of reference are challenged that more basic

broadly neo-Kantian approach to these questions

forms of justification are called for. In these cases,

will diverge widely in their views on the role of

we have to give reasons for our choices which

44

Philosophical agreement

extend beyond the values we happen to have. We

is thus much more likely on the priority of liberty

do not have to presuppose that stark moral or

than (say) the difference principle.

theoretical dilemmas can always be resolved satis-

the state in specific areas.

factorily, only that we have to appeal to (some-

What I am defending here is the idea of a philosophy

thing like) practical reason whenever we are asked

through ideology to policy questions, rather than

to give a public justification of our preferences.

a categorial distinction between philosophy and

What makes liberalism distinctive is not so much

other modes of theoretical concern. Relations of

the rationalism that critics have often focused on as

entailment

spectrum;

the institutional procedures which have been de-

rather, we are dealing with compatibility in relation

vised to facilitate agreement in pluralist contexts.

spectrum

which

do

runs

not

from

obtain

political

along

the 45

The signifi-

My claim, then, is that a logic of practical reason is

cance of political philosophy at the level of policy is

at work whenever hard choices are made. Where

unlikely

to what Rawls terms `lexical order'.

political

liberal theory goes astray is in treating the strong

cultures. But contentious issues (such as abortion

version of practical reason that has emerged in

in the United States or welfare in Britain) cannot

pluralist societies as the ideal form for the resolution

be adequately handled without confronting (what

of public disputes in any context. If my argument is

still might properly be called) foundational ques-

correct a weak foundationalism, drawn from reflec-

tions. If we ask ourselves how the citizen should

tion on the necessary formal requirements for viable

stand in relation to the state in a modern polity, we

agency, can be seen to be at work in the positions of

are inviting reflection at a number of different

sceptical liberals even when they are reluctant to

levels. We could be concerned with the obligation

acknowledge the fact. To be sure, the idea of a

of parents to ensure that their children are educated

philosophical foundation invoked here is very gen-

and law-abiding or the obligation of the state to

eral indeed. Most regularian polities could be de-

provide support for the destitute or wider questions

fended along these lines. And, of course, no polity is

of shared responsibility for the conduct of public

merely regularian. My contention, however, is that

life. It would be too much to expect a seamless web

awareness of the necessary conditions for any polity

of doctrine to run through these questions. But the

to flourish does provide grounds for tempering more

claim that philosophical discussion is irrelevant,

narrowly ideological preferences.

to

be

intrusive

in

consensual

170

LIBERALISM AND CONTINGENCY

Notes

1. Rawls (1996).

17. Hart (1961), p. 195.

2. See Rorty (1989); Gray (1995a) and (1997).

18. Hume (1969), p. 578.

3. See Wenar (1995).

19. Ibid.

4. See ibid., pp. 60±1.

20. Ibid.

5. See Bellamy and Hollis (1995).

21. Ibid.

6. See Rawls (1996), pp. 109, 161, and Hart (1961), pp.

22. See Wittgenstein (1968) and Winch (1958). 23. See Winch (1972), especially pp. 61±3.

189±195. 7. Gray (1993), p. 328.

24. See Lyotard (1993), pp. 135±47.

8. Ibid., p. 328.

25. See Hegel (1991). For further discussion see Haddock (1993) and my `Hegel's Critique of the Theory of

9. Gray (1995a), p. 81.

Social Contract', in Boucher and Kelly (eds) (1994),

10. Ibid., p. 81.

pp. 147±63.

11. See Gray (1995b). Whether Gray is right to portray Berlin precisely as he does is, of course, another ques-

26. See Wittgenstein (1969).

tion. He draws attention (ibid., p. 14) to Berlin's claim

27. See `Can There Be a Private Language?', in Rhees (1970), pp. 55±70.

that `our conscious idea of man . . . involves the use of some among the basic categories in terms of which we

28. Oakeshott (1975a), p. 55.

perceive and order and interpret data.' And he is clear

29. See Oakeshott (1962) and, for discussion, Haddock (1996).

that these `basic categories' are neither empirical nor formal in any straightforward sense. Gray is happy to

30. Oakeshott (1975b), p. 62.

describe this as `a sort of quasi-Kantian transcendental

31. See Hart (1961), pp. 54±60.

deduction' (ibid., p. 14), without dwelling on the

32. Ibid., pp. 107, 245.

implications this might have for radical value pluralism.

33. See ibid., pp. 97±8.

In `Does Political Theory Still Exist?', however, Berlin

34. Ibid., p. 107.

also describes these `basic categories' as `universal ± or

35. Ibid., p. vii.

almost universal ± values'. See Berlin (1978), p. 166.

36. See ibid., pp. 77±96.

And in all his later writings he was careful to distinguish

37. Ibid., p. 89.

pluralism from relativism. See his `Alleged Relativism

38. Ibid., p. 91.

in Eighteenth-Century European Thought', in Berlin

39. The terminology here is drawn from Collingwood (1940), pp. 3±77, and Wittgenstein (1969), p. 44.

(1991), pp. 70±90. Berlin's sympathy for the variety of modes of human flourishing was always coupled with

40. See Rawls (1996), pp. 54±8.

recognition of the appalling cost of political folly,

41. Oakeshott (1975b), p. 25.

especially in the twentieth century. And he never

42. Ibid., p. 63.

wavered from the view that it was the responsibility

43. See Martin (1993).

of the political philosopher to specify the normative

44. Consider, for example, the contrasting positions of Rawls (1996), O'Neill (1996), Nozick (1974) and

limits of a defensible pluralism.

Hayek (1960).

12. Rorty (1989), p. 146.

45. Rawls (1972), pp. 42±8. A useful distinction between

13. See Rees (1985). 14. See Kekes (1996).

the philosophy and ideology of liberalism is also

15. Hart (1961), p. 189.

mooted but not defended in detail in Croce (1973),

16. Hume (1966), p. 186.

pp. 235±43 and 263±7.

171

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Part Five LIBERALISM VERSUS REPUBLICANISM?

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13

BACK TO THE FUTURE: PLURALISM AND THE REPUBLICAN ALTERNATIVE TO LIBERALISM Richard Bellamy

Contemporary societies are irreducibly pluralist.

1

general laws which constrains and provides the basis

Their growing differentiation and complexity gen-

for the operations of democratic institutions and the

erate a variety of interests, ideals, cultures and values.

economic market. However, if different liberties em-

This pluralism manifests itself in the wide range of

body incommensurable views of human flourishing,

ethnic, religious, ideological, occupational and other

as pluralists believe, then a clash of liberties will place

allegiances of citizens. The resulting diversity creates

this doctrine in trouble. No metric will be available to

potential conflicts between groups of people holding

adjudicate between different sets of liberties and show

different views and within single individuals. For

which combination most maximises freedom. Earlier

differing ends, outlooks and evaluations may prove

liberals avoided this problem by holding to a histori-

logically or practically incompatible and involve

cist faith in the progress of society. A view still held

incommensurable types of moral claim.

2

4

These ten-

implicitly and occasionally explicitly by many liberals

sions are the lifeblood of current democratic politics

today, this thesis assumes pluralism fosters autonomy

and its greatest challenge. Clashes of opinion and

and that an invisible hand reconciles the various

interest provide the rationale for democracy, yet

heterogeneous ends pursued by individuals in mu-

taken to extremes can make it totally unworkable.

tually supportive ways. Today's complex and diverse

5

Liberalism presents itself as the appropriate poli-

societies render such solutions sociologically unten6

tical form for such conditions. After all, its origins lie

able as well as theoretically debatable.

in the religious conflicts of early modern Europe and

spheres of life and world-views generate competing

the class struggles of the centuries that followed.

and conflicting ethical codes, goals and commit-

Liberalism tries to accommodate difference by pro-

ments. Worse, the very principles of liberalism can

tecting each person's capacity to pursue his own good

collide and are themselves subject to a plurality of

in his own way to the extent that is compatible with

incommensurable evaluations and interpretations.

the similar pursuits of others. According to the

Witness the debates over issues such as abortion,

standard liberal formula, this proposal involves seek-

freedom of information and social rights between

ing the maximal set of equal liberty rights capable of

rival factions within the liberal camp. Consequently,

3

being held by all.

Different

liberalism cannot hold the ring for such disputes. It is

These rights are usually to be

within, not above, the fray.

secured by a constitutional framework of universal,

175

RICHARD BELLAMY

To accommodate plurality requires an alternative

contract designed to legitimate the state's monopoly

approach, one I dub democratic liberalism. Of re-

of violence. According to this argument, free and

publican inspiration, it eschews a pre-political con-

equal citizens would only consensually submit to a

sensus on basic liberties for political negotiation

polity that removed the uncertainties of the state of

aimed at a fair compromise. Instead of relegating

nature while preserving the most extensive set of

the differences that accompany pluralism to the

equal natural liberties. Interference by the state or

private and civil spheres, it gives them public re-

law is only justified to reduce the mutual interfer-

cognition. Republicans view liberty as a civic rather

ences attendant upon social life so as to produce a

than a natural condition. Freedom only exists within

greater liberty over all. The separation of powers

a republican polity where self-government removes

supposedly fosters this aim by preventing any one

the possibility of domination by others through

from being judge in his or her own cause, thereby

allowing citizens to ensure the laws respond to their

constraining the arbitrary and partial framing and

7

various concerns and values. Within pluralist socie-

interpretation of legislation. The rule of men is

ties, these deliberations entail negotiating fair com-

replaced by the rule of universal and equally applic-

promises between the different ideals and interests in

able general laws.

10

play. Such reciprocal decision-making produces laws

Two features of these arrangements are worth

that recognise and reconcile the members of a

highlighting. First, as James Tully has observed,

pluralist polity, enabling them to live on an equitable

the normative consensus assumed by the `modern'

basis with others. Though republicanism and liberal-

liberal conception of constitutionalism hypothesises

ism are historically entwined, with elements of both

a degree of uniformity among the constitutive peo-

present in the political systems of most western

ple.

democracies,

8

11

It assumes that behind different beliefs and

coexistence should not be taken for

customs lies a common human nature, a natural

complementarity or overlap. As I shall argue below,

equality of status, and shared forms of reasoning

republican justifications and conceptions of liberty,

sufficient to generate agreement on constitutional

rights and the rule of law differ from the liberal's in

essentials. What divergences remain are supposedly

important respects ± most especially in relation to

eroded as historical progress leads to more homo-

9

Republicanism

geneous and less stratified societies that conform to a

issues in a democratic liberalism, where liberty and

similar pattern of social and political organisation,

rights are intrinsic to and only achievable through

and stand in contrast to the ranked societies and

democracy, not preconditions for the political pro-

cultural particularisms of the past. Nation-building

cess as liberal democrats contend.

further strengthens this process. As co-nationals, the

the role and nature of democracy.

people share a corporate identity as equal citizens of

The argument proceeds as follows. The next sec-

the polity.

tion analyses the weaknesses of liberal democracy

12

within complex and plural societies, while the suc-

Second, the rights-based approach goes together

ceeding section presents the democratic liberal alter-

with a conception of freedom as non-interference

native. I then present a defence of this proposed

and of the state as a neutral ringmaster, unconcerned

return to the liberties of the ancients against the

with upholding any particular set of values.

charges that it is now both impractical and undesir-

understanding of the constitution encourages in its

able.

turn a purely preference-based picture of the econ-

13

This

omy and an interest-based account of democracy. In each case, what matters is the degree outcomes

Liberal Democracy

correspond to the uncoerced choices and express

Liberal democracy rests on a distinction between the

desires of those concerned. The conditions of pro-

state and civil society. Liberals standardly see con-

duction and the protection of public goods enter

stitutionalism as a normative framework that sets

with difficulty into this view of the economy. The

limits on and goals for the exercise of state power.

first are assumed to be the result of voluntary con-

Traditionally, its principles are grounded in a social

tracts, the latter left up to an invisible hand. Like-

176

BACK TO THE FUTURE

wise, politics becomes a competitive market within

technical, less amenable to general regulations, and

which rival interest groups bargain with each other,

hence harder to control through centralised demo-

and involves no or little attempt to evaluate the

cratic mechanisms. The range and scale of decisions

interests concerned. Its purpose is largely instrumen-

handled by unaccountable specialised bureaucracies,

tal: to protect against incompetent or tyrannous

and involving considerable technocratic discretion,

rulers by allowing their removal, and to aggregate

expands.

individual preferences through majoritarian or con-

As the various areas of social life operate with

sensus voting and encourage politicians to pursue

increasingly distinct and largely self-validating cri-

policies that conform to them.

14

teria, so they become more conflictual. They become

Liberals accept that economy and democracy need

ever more taken up with their own concerns and

regulating when they threaten the constitutional

tend to interpret the world from their own perspec-

structure. However, identifying when such threats

tive, generating incommensurable and incompatible

occur and who possesses the authority to remedy

claims.

them proves problematic. Because the economy

horse-trading proves highly problematic. Clashes

forms part of the private sphere, there are difficulties

of interests appear more zero-sum, and their aggrega-

about whether the requisite interference is either

tion harder to legitimate and enforce because their

legitimate or perpetrates an even greater intrusion

relation to any given collectivity is unclear. Making

into people's lives than those it prevents. Such

and sustaining collective decisions is further com-

decisions cannot necessarily be left up to democratic

plicated by the spread of multiculturalism as im-

governments, since interest groups may use the

proved

state's coercive power to further their personal goals.

pluriethnic as well. Differences of beliefs and iden-

This dilemma raises a further source of tension

tities prove even less amenable to democratic bar-

between the hypothetical consent underlying the

gaining

constitution and the express will of the people.

majorities than economic and social interests. As

Liberals try to avoid this crux by treating the con-

a result, the likelihood of conflict or the oppression

stitution as a `higher' law that provides the precondi-

of minorities rises.

tions

the `normal'

legislation

arising

out

social

and

such

mobility

the

clashes

by

renders

formation

of

democratic

states

stable

and

more

fair

of

Liberals have responded to these failings of de-

democratic politics. They see judicial review by a

mocracy as an instrument for interest aggregation

court buttressed by a bill of rights as the best bulwark

and accountability by advocating the enhanced jur-

against the democratic subversion of the constitu-

idification of politics.

tion.

for

Reconciling

15

18

Worried by the destabilising

effects of pluralism, they look to a legal constitution

Pluralism erodes this liberal settlement. The social

grounded in a consensus on rights and principles of

and economic complexity of advanced societies, and

justice to guarantee the polity stays just. Contem-

the consequent multiplicity of interests and values

porary liberals suggest citizens can trim their diver-

within them, render majoritarian decision-making

gent substantive beliefs on the good to arrive at

more problematic, increase the difficulty of regulat-

agreement on what is politically right.

ing the unaccountable power located in civil society

distinction proves elusive. How and when rights to

and subvert the rights consensus upon which liberal-

privacy and to freedom of speech clash, for example,

ism rests.

16

19

But this

Increased functional differentiation re-

involve invoking notions of the presence and ab-

sults in a proliferation of autonomous centres of

sence of constraints which may be normatively and

17

These centres are capable of making deci-

empirically evaluated from a range of reasonably

sions according to a variety of criteria specific to their

different perspectives, giving divergent answers in

respective domains, with unpredictable knock-on

each case. In pluralist societies, the basic liberties and

effects for other parts of the social and economic

their interpretation become contested matters. In

system. Citizens find themselves locked into a variety

practice, therefore, liberal trimming entails the im-

of these spheres, and get pulled in opposite directions

position of a particular reading of liberalism and the

by the inner logic of each. Problems become more

judicial exclusion of dissident voices. Moreover,

power.

177

RICHARD BELLAMY

without democratic support the constitution and the

agents or agencies with considerable power over

courts risk appearing self-validating and being either

others. For example, attempts to reduce the arbitrary

practically impotent or obliged to adopt coercive

hold men have traditionally exerted over women in

measures. It remains to be seen if a more inclusive

marriage have been challenged on the grounds that

and political strategy is available.

they are too intrusive and themselves involve a greater degree of interference. Similar arguments have been used against laws to protect employees

Democratic Liberalism

from unscrupulous employers. Even social liberals,

Democratic liberalism harks back to a pre-liberal

such as L. T. Hobhouse, accept that the onus of proof

conception of constitutionalism that identified the

rests on the proponents of state intervention to show

constitution with the social composition and form of

that less interference is thereby created overall.

government of the polity.

20

22

Much as we associate a

Republicans by contrast, see debate about the legiti-

person's physical health with his or her bodily con-

macy of interference per se as misconceived. They

stitution and regard a fit individual as someone with

concentrate on providing a non-dominating envir-

a balanced diet and regimen, so a healthy body

onment where citizens can lead secure lives, plan

politic was attributed to a political system capable

ahead and live on a basis of mutual respect ± con-

of bringing its various constituent social groups into

ditions which may require intervention.

23

equilibrium with each other. The aim was to disperse

This view of liberty shapes the republicans' dis-

power so as to encourage a process of controlled

tinctive linkage of the rule of law with the distribu-

political conflict and deliberation that ensured the

tion

various social classes both checked and ultimately

constitution being a precondition for politics, poli-

cooperated with each other, moving them thereby to

tical debate becomes the medium through which a

construct and pursue the public good rather than

polity constitutes itself. This occurs not just in

narrow sectional interests.

exceptional, founding constitutional moments, as

As

Quentin

shown,

21

Skinner

and

Philip

Pettit

have

of

power

and

some liberals grant,

democracy.

24

Instead

of

the

but continuously as part of

the heart of the republican approach lies

an evolving process of mutual recognition. Domina-

in a different conception of freedom to the liberal's.

tion and arbitrary power involve more than an

As I noted, liberty is a civic achievement rather than

infringement of the formal rule of law espoused by

a natural attribute. It results from preventing arbi-

liberals. It is entirely possible to promote general

trary domination rather than an absence of inter-

rules based on whim or self-interest and that entail a

ference tout court. Domination denotes a capacity to

gross curtailment of people's freedom of action. The

intentionally control and diminish an agent's realm

generality and universality requirements can also

of choice, either overtly through various explicit

seem themselves arbitrary if employed to disqualify

forms of restraint or obstruction, or covertly by more

special rules that refer to properties that apply to only

subtle forms of manipulation and influence. Arbi-

some groups ± as when maternity leave for women or

trariness rests in the power to exert domination at

affirmative action policies are accused of being dis-

whim, and without reference to the interests or ideas

criminatory, or when such considerations are used to

of those over whom it is exercised. Pettit notes that

block any form of regulation which might seek to

an absence of interference can be consistent with the

focus on particular contexts or outcomes.

presence of domination. Those with such power may

formal

simply choose not to wield it. Social relations will be

tackling structural forms of domination, where dis-

adversely affected nonetheless. A good king may

crimination and selective blindness have been built

leave his subjects alone but they remain his subjects

into the institutions, norms, social and economic

and will treat him with deference for that reason

relations, and procedures within which the rules are

alone, regardless of whatever merit or demerit he may

framed.

criteria

appear

particularly

25

Such

inadequate

at

possess. Likewise, seeking to reduce interference may

Contemporary liberal jurists try to get around

in given contexts be compatible with leaving certain

these difficulties by adopting a more substantive

178

BACK TO THE FUTURE

view of the rule of law, identifying it with the upholding of rights by an independent judiciary.

to take the form of constructing a distinctive position

26

through argument that seeks to accommodate at

As I noted, this approach proves problematic. A

some level or another the various claims, values

political constitutionalism takes a different tack.

and interests at stake.

Justice becomes identified with the process of poli-

How such compromises are to be achieved will

tics. Political mechanisms not only ensure all are

vary according to the nature of the case. Thus, a

subject to the laws and that no one can be judge in

compromise might take the form of a composite

their own case ± the traditional tasks of the separa-

agreement in which each party gets some but not

tion of powers ± but also that the laws connect with

all of what it wants. This strategy usually proves

the understandings and activities of those to whom

easier when more than one policy is involved.

they are to apply ± the side benefit of dispersing

Because groups often have rather different priorities

power so that more people have a say in its enact-

with regard to a range of policies, it frequently proves

ment. Audi alteram partem forms the watchword of

possible for them to concede on issues they do not

legal fairness, not the formal or substantive properties

feel strongly about but others do in order to obtain

liberals associate with the law.

27

similar concessions from them or other allies on the

`Hearing the other side' within a pluralist polity

matters they regard as most important. Such pro-

implies respecting that people can be reasonably led

cesses are crucial to the log-rolling and coalition-

to incommensurable and incompatible understand-

building practised by political parties. This practice

ings of values and interests, and seeing the need to

does not entail that all views are reducible to inter-

engage with them in terms they can accept. This

ests, as is sometimes assumed. In fact, these sorts of

criterion places constraints on both the procedures

deals are more like bartering than normal bargaining.

and the outcomes of the political process.

28

It obliges

Indeed, they generally occur precisely because people

people to drop purely self-referential or self-inter-

hold a plurality of moral positions that lead them to

ested reasoning and to look for considerations others

evaluate goods and even what constitutes a matter of

can find compelling, thereby ruling out arguments

morality differently ± much as beads can be ex-

that fail to treat all as of equal moral worth. Political

changed for gold when one group's worthless shiny

actors must strive for common ground through mu-

substance is another's valuable commodity. The

tually acceptable modifications. Because the clashes

exchange entails incommensurability, since it might

of principle and preferences associated with plural-

well not have taken place had it been conceived in

ism preclude substantive consensual agreement, po-

standard `more or less' terms, with all goods trans-

litical compromise takes the place of a pre-political

lated into a single common currency. It also proves

consensus.

29

more responsive to intensity of feeling than a simple

The type of compromise, and the style of politics

bargaining model. However, it will only work if those

needed to achieve it, depends on the issue and the

involved can avoid judging particular issues on their

character of the groups involved. Compromise is

merits.

most familiar to us in `more or less' contexts where

When a compromise has to be reached on a single

we can `split the difference' so as to converge on an

issue, such trade-offs cannot be achieved. Moreover,

agreed decision through incremental mutual conces-

a mutual adaptation of views may be highly unsa-

30

Haggling over the price of a commodity such

tisfactory, producing a result that nobody wants

as a house or wage bargaining are typical examples.

rather than something for everyone ± precisely the

Such conflicts, however, are usually along a single

situation critics who accuse compromise of incoher-

dimension and involve a common denominator. As

ence most abhor. One way out of this dilemma,

such, this procedure is unsuited to the conflicts

recently proposed by Robert Goodin, is an agree-

associated with pluralism since it assumes commen-

ment on a second best.

suration. Compromises in `either-or' situations in-

economics, the basic idea is that modifications to

volving plural and competing values and interests

one's preferred option may be less desirable than

prove more exacting but not impossible. They have

obtaining one's next best or an even lower ranked

sions.

179

31

A notion adapted from

RICHARD BELLAMY

choice. A cheap sports car that pretends to be an

presented and the degree of autonomy particular

expensive one may have less appeal than an unpre-

bodies or sections of the community may claim.

tentious family estate, for example. Indeed, indivi-

They are integral to a political constitutionalism,

duals or groups with conflicting first preferences may

with its intimate linking of justice, the rule of law

have shared second preferences. A compromise on

and the democratic dispersal and division of power.

an agreed second best may prove a more coherent

In the ancient ideal of mixed government, the

and acceptable decision, therefore, than an attempt

favoured mechanism was to assign particular govern-

to combine first preferences in ways that transform

mental functions to different social classes. In con-

them out of all recognition or involve inconsisten-

temporary societies, the answer lies in multiplying

cies of various kinds.

the forms of representation and the sites of decision-

When a group makes a claim that involves special

making power.

treatment or imposing burdens on others, they may

As I noted, the key lies in ensuring all sides get a

have to compromise more unilaterally by appealing

hearing so that decisions can be justified to and

either to some norm of equity that the others also

accepted by all citizens. A notion linked to an ideal

share, or to ideals or interests that their interlocutors

of equality of concern and respect, the aim is not

can identify with through appeals to precedent, use

only to render inputs more equitable, but also out-

of analogy or a fortiori arguments.

32

Thus, a religious

comes.

34

On the whole, this goal is more demanding

group seeking public recognition for its beliefs, say in

than simply guaranteeing that everyone has their say

state support for its schools, will be unlikely to get

or gets a piece of the action, important though these

very far if it desires to set up a theocratic state. But

may be in attaining it. When the desired end is

they may be able to invoke a norm of equal treat-

simply to `split the difference', then the proportion-

ment by pointing to the existence of other publicly

ate weighting of interests or preferences may be all

funded religious schools. Or, where state education

that is required. But the character of compromise is

has hitherto been secular, the claim might involve

different in matters of principle, and equalising

drawing a parallel with state support for some hu-

representation in this way may be either too much

manist analogue to religious belief, such as the arts,

or not enough. Here the object will be to ensure

in which the cultural aspect of religion is empha-

equal consideration of the content and intrinsic

sised.

importance of different values for particular groups

Nonetheless, sometimes no compromise on sub-

of people, so that they seek solutions that are ac-

stance proves possible. This dilemma often arises for

ceptable to a variety of different points of view.

purely practical reasons to do with the nature of the

Instead of bargaining, participants in this sort of

decision rather than because of any lack of good will

dispute must negotiate and argue. In the case of

among those making it ± such as a choice between

bargained compromises, preferences can be taken

two somewhat different but equally good candidates

as exogenous to the system and democracy seen in

for a post, for each of whom a sound case might be

largely instrumental terms. A negotiated compromise

made. Only one can be chosen, and a compromise

involves a more deliberative model of democracy

candidate does not always make sense. In such

that leads to preferences being shaped and ranked

circumstances the compromise might have to be

endogenously through the democratic process itself

on accepting the outcome of a fair procedure, such

as otherwise inaccessible information regarding the

as tossing a coin. Within purely procedural versions

range and intensity of the moral and material claims

of democracy, the majoritarian principle can be seen

involved comes to light. Achieving this result re-

as a compromise of this sort.

33

quires that groups reach a sufficient threshold to

Constitutional design has the task of shaping the

have a voice that people take seriously. With very

political system so as to foster the form of democratic

small groups, that may involve more than propor-

debate appropriate to the requisite kind of fair

tionate voting power; with others somewhat less will

compromise. These considerations guide where de-

suffice.

cisions are to be made, how groups should be re-

35

Within a more complex and differentiated social

180

BACK TO THE FUTURE

context centralised and hierarchical ways of distri-

power remains with the people or their representa-

buting power will be inadequate. Territorially based

tives.

representation has to be supplemented by functional

acknowledgement of the standard liberal set of in-

and cultural forms within particular sectors. Social

dividual rights to freedom of expression, association,

and cultural interests are often territorially dispersed

bodily integrity and the like. Indeed, it compels

or located below any specific territorial unit. Em-

recognition of them.

powering certain groups may require their represen-

cratic balancing of their relative weight in relation to

tation within a specific location, or across a given

both each other and to additional values and inter-

sector, or in the case of vertical cleavages according

ests according to the issue and the people involved.

to segment. Workplace democracy and parent gov-

Diversity in the ethical reasoning of agents and of the

ernors at schools are examples of the first, corporatist

moral relevance of given factors is naturally to be

representation of unions, employer organisations and

expected within pluralist and complex societies.

professional associations of the second, consocia-

Dispersing power helps both the appropriate mix

tional representation for given ethnic, linguistic,

of voices to be heard and the peculiar circumstances

religious and cultural groups of the third.

36

39

That position remains consistent with the

40

Yet it also allows the demo-

Such

of particular contexts to be taken into account. Not

mechanisms allow minority opinions to have both a

only can general rules be tailored to a wide variety of

degree of autonomy within their own sphere com-

objects and concerns, and their implementation and

bined with a say in collective decision-making. On

monitoring enacted to meet the special requirements

the one hand, all groups (those asking for special

of a given situation and constituency, but also ± and

consideration included) are obliged to consult the

often more importantly ± specific norms can be

broader interests and concerns of society as a whole.

established to meet special circumstances and rele-

On the other, these same mechanisms operate as

vant

checks and balances on the purely self-interested or

minishes

partial exercise of power.

constitution to frame democracy. Judicial review

differences. for

a

In

consequence,

judicially

the

monitored

need

di-

principled

Democracy plays a central role in this system,

can track whether reasoned debate occurs, but need

protecting against arbitrary rule and enabling edu-

not substitute for an absence of such deliberation. As

37

Decisions may be

in a trial, the judge may advise on points of existing

contested and the rationale behind them tried.

law and ensure debate is conducted in a procedurally

Interests are not simply advanced and aggregated,

correct matter, but like a jury the demos or its

as in liberal accounts of the democratic process. They

representatives will make the decision for themselves

get related and subjected to the criticism of reasons,

and may even overturn established precedent if the

cative engagement with others.

transforming politics into a forum of principle.

38

circumstances warrant it and make new law.

41

Positions can shift and common views emerge. De-

This politicised account of justice suits a concern

mocracy also operates within civil society as well as

with domination and the fact of pluralism. Domina-

the state, acknowledging the power exercised by

tion most commonly manifests itself through inhi-

private bodies and the need to publicise them ± a

biting or preventing groups or individuals from

point liberal democrats tend to overlook by making

having a voice in the decisions governing their lives.

too sharp a public/private distinction. Power is not

When this occurs they are far more likely to find

simply devolved down in a hierarchical manner to

themselves oppressed by social structures that stunt

lesser levels of the state, as in a standard federal

or prevent their capacity to employ and develop

system. It is dispersed among semi-autonomous yet

their capacities or lead lives expressive of their beliefs

publicised private bodies. In this way, politics shapes

and culture.

rather than being simply shaped by social demands.

certain groups' ability to influence both the issues

42

For if political institutions constrain

Paradoxically from a liberal perspective, a demo-

that get discussed and how those that do get decided,

cratic liberalism contends that the rule of law de-

they will lose status and standing, and become

pends upon the rule of men. The only guard against

marginalised and ultimately exploited. Typically,

arbitrary and dominating rule is if the law-making

oppression has manifested itself indirectly through

181

RICHARD BELLAMY

the mechanisms of hegemony. At the extreme,

their aim not so much a unified as a mixed polity. It

however, exclusion from politics may eventually lead

was the insistence on the need for politics to con-

oppressed groups to resort to extra-political means to

front the social reality of class and ideological strug-

put their case ± a move that often lends legitimacy,

gles that attracted the writers of the Federalist Papers,

albeit of a spurious nature, to the employment of

who adapted republicanism to the needs of a modern

outright force against them. Such has been the fate of

large-scale

indigenous peoples in colonial societies, of many

modern heir Max Weber appreciated, this feature

ghettoised immigrant communities, of workers de-

also makes it suited to tackling the problems of

nied the vote either in general elections or in the

pluralism.

workplace, to name but a few well-known examples

the two standard criticisms of it prove misdirected. I

of this phenomenon.

shall take each in turn.

45

commercial

society.

As

Machiavelli's

When republicanism is so conceived,

As these cases indicate, such domination involves

Critics of republicanism's practicality assume that

not just an oppression of human beings but of a

the complexity of large-scale societies can only be

diversity of ways of life, values, interests and alle-

handled by the market or a centralised bureaucratic

giances. In other words, it is linked to the denial of

state or ± more usually ± some combination of the

pluralism. Since these diverse attitudes and concerns

two, with both social democrats and moderate lib-

are often related in their turn to different concep-

ertarians falling into this last camp. However, de-

tions of the right and the good, the injustice their

volved and more deliberative decision-making, far

suppression entails is not fully captured by reference

from being obsolete, has many advantages over these

to a particular conception of justice that may ±

alternatives. Pluralism and complexity usually go

perhaps unwittingly ± itself embody aspects of the

together in the sense that what makes a problem

dominant position. Justice can only be done, there-

complex is not simply its scale and the sheer number

fore, by being seen to be done within a non-dom-

of factors involved, but the fact that it can be

inating political structure that allows the various

conceived and evaluated in numerous different ways.

conceptions to confront each other so that their

As such, complex problems resist decomposition into

conflicts can be resolved through free negotiation.

their component elements so that priorities can be hierarchically ordered. Different actors and observers may not agree on what these are let alone on what, or

Two Criticisms

whether, they can be ranked on any given scale.

Two criticisms are often ranged against schemes of

It is precisely this kind of complexity that markets

the sort proposed. Modern complex societies are said

and bureaucracies often handle badly. Take the

to render a more participatory and deliberative pol-

example of environmental issues, which typically

itics together with any notion of agreement on

display

common policies not only impractical but also un-

how best to handle acid rain, for instance, experts

desirable. A political constitutionalism is said to be

dispute both its causes and consequences. It has been

suited only to the small-scale and homogeneous

traced to a number of natural and humanly produced

communities that originally gave birth to the idea.

emissions and associated with various sorts of damage

Such criticisms are historically and substantively

to a wide range of objects and entities. Yet the extent

mistaken. They gain credibility from certain com-

to which particular damage can be attributed to any

munitarian views of republicanism. These latter tend

given cause is far from clear. Additionally, the hu-

to stress the supposed ethical and social unity of the

man actors involved as both potential contributors

ancient polity.

43

these

characteristics.

46

When

discussing

However, the key issue for repub-

to and victims of pollution are similarly varied ± from

lican theorists from Aristotle to Machiavelli was

private motorists and consumers, to a whole host of

class conflict and the difficulties of balancing the

industrial and agricultural producers of one sort or

44

Their

another. Their concerns will be similarly diverse, and

view of politics was consequently less idealised and

it is highly likely that each may be to some degree

more realist than many communitarians appreciate,

both polluter and polluted. Since they will almost

various interests of different social groups.

182

BACK TO THE FUTURE

certainly hold differing beliefs and values, how even

in such decision-making negotiate a collective policy

members of a given group appraise their interests is

rather than engage in pluralist interest-group bar-

going to vary greatly.

gaining if they are to arrive at a full perspective on

We have here two basic aspects of political disagreement:

namely

cognitive

indeterminacy

the dimensions of the problem and prevent stalemate

and

or distorted solutions, such as prisoners' dilemmas.

Bureaucratic

The way institutions operate will be crucial to

management will be highly inefficient and reductive

achieving this, as we have seen. However, this

in such instances. For there will be no clearly

feature gives rise to the second set of criticisms of

demarcated ends or interests to be served, and the

republicanism. Some critics worry that this sort of

relationships between the multifarious actors in-

institutional design amounts to social engineering

volved cannot be tracked. As Hayek noted, admin-

and is driven by a misguided pursuit of an unobtain-

istrators would have to be omniscient, omnipotent

able agreement on an elusive common good that can

and unwaveringly angelic to carry out such a task.

only be attained through manipulation and covert

Markets sometimes fare better in offering a system of

coercion. The deliberative ideal is charged with

dispersed knowledge, but not when public goods or

assuming unity to be a prior condition of reasonable

bads are concerned for the well known reason that

discussion, and with having consensus as its goal.

conceptual essential contestability.

47

49

the externalities involved are non-excludable. The

With regard to the first part of the charge, certain

price mechanism and the view that all values are

theorists have argued that a deliberative democracy

mere subjective preferences are also insensitive to

assumes a demos bound by a common fate and shared

conviction-based or cultural difference. Moreover,

understandings.

market exchanges are rarely solely among individual

tlements motivated by this ideal ± notably the Uni-

consumers and entrepreneurs, but between private

ted

institutions that are themselves bureaucratically or-

exercises in nation-building. Critics, however, point

ganised and suffer from the self-same managerial

out the often exclusionary consequences of these

defects libertarians level at the state.

projects, and in particular the marginalisation of

States

50

They note how constitutional set-

Constitution

±

were

simultaneously

By contrast, a political constitutionalism attempts

those deemed not capable of joining in the conver-

to confront this complexity head on by bringing

sation ± such as women workers, and members of

together the actors concerned in an effort at mutual

non-western cultures. If a people are to subject

understanding and accommodation. Devolved and

themselves to often onerous burdens to generate

deliberative

appropriate

collective benefits for others, then they will have

ends and means to be fixed on by fostering coopera-

to feel bound to them in some significant way. How

tion and coordination by multiple actors across a

far such bonds must rely on a common culture as

host of domains. Both the norms to be applied and

opposed to mere functional interdependence and

their enforcement arise out of discussion, and could

territorial contiguity is difficult to say. States display

not be fixed in advance without introducing biases

a bafflingly wide variety of mixes of these and other

and oversimplifications of the problem with poten-

elements. Historical contingency probably plays the

tially disastrous knock-on effects. Dryzek cites the

major factor. While starting from the status quo is

resolution of a dispute over the construction of a dam

inevitable, a political constitutionalism is not tied to

and water supply system near Denver, Colorado as a

any particular definition of the demos or the polity.

decision-making

enables

successful instance of this approach.

48

A plethora of

On the contrary, both are explicitly seen as political

federal and local agencies and groups were involved

artefacts fashioned by the people themselves. More-

and produced an appropriate fair compromise in

over, it operates with a dynamic of inclusiveness that

which the dam was built but substantial mitigating

places the burden of proof on those wanting to

measures were instituted. The success of this `Foot-

exclude others or, via secession, themselves. They

hills' decision led to the institution of a Metropolitan

must show such choices to be consistent with a norm

Water Roundtable to mediate future cases.

of equal worth and mutual acceptance, and that they do not cause even more damage to others than

It is of paramount importance that those involved

183

RICHARD BELLAMY

benefits to themselves. But that leaves ample scope

one's particular practices, however, is perfectly con-

for the renegotiation of the terms by which citizen-

sistent with a universal principle of equal moral

ship is defined and political structures operate. In-

worth, and particular rules may be applied in as

deed, once it is understood that the reconstitution of

consistent and unbiased a manner as general ones.

a polity is an ongoing process, then there can be

Universality and impartiality in these senses protect

considerable openness and flexibility in how the

particularity by insisting that any case for special

constituent groups might relate to each other.

consideration must avoid subjecting others to dom-

With regard to the second part of the charge, I

ination. Arguments, such as those of sexists or racists

argued above that consensus need not and often

that assert that certain people's views or interests

could not be the goal of discussion, as certain

count for less than those of others will be treated as

theorists of deliberative democracy claim. They look

prima facie unacceptable, for example. A claim by a

for a `republic of reasons' in which the most compel-

religious minority for public funding of its own

ling arguments prevail.

51

However, pluralism renders

schools will probably not be, since it asks for equal

such reasoning problematic, since more than one

recognition rather than denying it.

rationally compelling argument may be in play. That

A political constitutionalism also allows for dif-

makes compromise necessary. Achieving a fair com-

ferent styles of argumentation and suggests that as

promise also entails a change in the character of

much attention should be paid to the different

politics, but of a slightly different nature to one

cultures of negotiation as to differences in the sub-

oriented towards consensus. It requires a move from

stance of what is negotiated.

a purely individualistic and instrumental politics to a

been recognised by students of diplomacy looking at

more interactive and problem-solving model. Rather

international negotiations across cultures.

than viewing other people's interests and values as

tional pluralism means that domestic politics must

mere constraints on getting one's own way to which

also take such factors into account. Here too a

minimal concessions should be made, this approach

problem-solving approach seems the most appropri-

leads to the search for solutions that attempt to

ate, with symbolism and honour counting for as

integrate the various concerns of the parties in-

much as argument and strategic gains.

volved. This possibility need not rely on transcendent

criteria,

however,

merely

a

53

This need has long 54

Infrana-

Nevertheless, it is doubtful that any process of

reciprocal

negotiation would be possible unless people saw the

understanding of the frameworks of other actors,

political norms framing the discussion as generating

the ability to engage with them and to seek agree-

some form of common good. Civic freedom operates

ment on what is desirable even if this is based on

in this context as what Joseph Raz has called an

differing views of why it might be.

`inherent public good'.

55

That is a good the benefits

At its heart, this conception of politics has an

of which are under the sole control of each potential

attachment to civic liberty, the guiding principles of

beneficiary and which by their nature could not be

which are non-domination, mutual acceptance and

voluntarily controlled and distributed by any single

accommodation. What these conditions all point to

agency. For one cannot create such an environment

is a vision of society in which all enjoy equal status.

except through the active collaboration with others,

This implies universality and impartiality, in the

nor control the beneficial externalities that it gen-

sense that all persons must be treated as of equal

erates so as to channel them only to certain others,

moral worth and claims based on self-serving bias or

though one could cut oneself off from them through

prejudice should be ruled out. But that does not

one's own anti-social and intolerant actions. Put

mean that all citizens must be regarded as having

another way, the condition of living as equals has

identical needs or the same values ± quite the

to be desired in and for itself ± as an intrinsic aspect

reverse. This supposition appears to arise from the

of a certain kind of society ± rather than instrumen-

belief that only general rules can meet these criteria,

tally, since that would allow selective domination to

and that these will be blind to people's particular

acquire personal advantage. To the extent pluralist

concerns or convictions.

52

conflicts are rightly characterised as struggles for

A claim for respect for

184

BACK TO THE FUTURE

recognition, then this goal should appeal to the

not). Secession or conscientious objection may still

parties concerned.

have to be options for groups or individuals whose

Though this argument goes beyond the purely

values and convictions prove totally incompatible

formal proceduralism advocated by thinkers like

with those of the majority. Their reasons could not

Habermas, who offer an entirely circular case for

be, however, claims to superiority ± that their values

constitutional norms via the self-validating character

and interests are worth more than those of others ± as

of democratic discourse,

56

it does not imply agree-

was effectively argued by advocates of apartheid, for

ment on substantive ends. Indeed at times it may be

example. Rather, the case must be that such drastic

possible to do no more than agree to disagree and

measures are necessary to ensure equal worth and

accept the authority of the democratic procedure

that otherwise their cultures and concerns might be

itself. In these cases the majority principle acts as a

totally eroded, as indigenous peoples seeking protec-

means for resolving conflict in an authoritative

tion against a dominant post-colonial community

manner when a compromise on substance cannot

have contended. Even here alternative solutions,

be achieved. Authority here rests on neither claims

such as greater autonomy or special rights, might

to superior reason nor coercion but the simple

be available to keep them within the polity.

acceptance of the procedure as authoritative (in the sense of being `in' authority) for the disputing

Conclusion

parties. Here the authority of law rests on the legitimacy of the political system which generates

I have argued that to meet the challenges of the new

it. Parties acknowledge that in some cases there may

millennium, liberalism needs to take a step back to

not be any `correct' or `most just' way of resolving a

the future and draw on the resources of the repub-

clash between incommensurable plural values, but

lican tradition. The resulting democratic liberalism

that the ways of ending the dispute are acceptable.

employs the notion of a political constitution based

The procedural fairness of the process of justice can

around the dispersal of power and the mixing and

be more important than the favourability of, or

balancing of social classes. It incorporates the liberal

consensus about, the outcome.

57

concern with freedom and justice into the demo-

A more political constitutionalism does not turn

crat's desire to ensure that citizens have an equal say

on the existence of a homogeneous community,

in influencing and holding to account the rules and

therefore, as some communitarian theorists maintain

rulers governing them. As such, it offers a means of

and certain critics complain. The political system

both recognising and reconciling differences through

can operate as a public good for a plurality of social

negotiation of fair compromises that embody mutual

groups, without assuming they share other values

acceptance and accommodation.

(indeed, perhaps for the very reason that they do

Notes

1. Much of this chapter's argument emerged from an

VI, para. 57; the French Declaration of the Rights of

ESRC research project on `Sovereignty and Citizen-

Man and the Citizen of 1789, especially Articles 1, 2,

ship in a Mixed Polity' (R000222446) undertaken

4, 6, 14 and 16; I. Kant, `On the Common Saying:

with Dario Castiglione of Exeter University. I am

``This May be True in Theory, But It Does Not Apply

grateful for his comments, those of the editor and

in Practice'', in Kant (1991), p. 73; J.S. Mill, `On

the participants at the Swansea `Liberalism at the

Liberty', in Mill (1972), p. 75; and Rawls (1972), p. 60.

Millennium II' conference, to Richard Dagger and

4. On this problem, see O'Neill (1979) and Gray (1989),

others at a seminar at All Souls College, Oxford, and

especially chapter 9.

to Cecile Laborde. I have also drawn on my Liberalism and Pluralism (Bellamy, (1999), especially chapter 5.

5. The locus classicus of this view is of course Adam

2. See Bellamy (1999), `Introduction', and Kekes (1993)

Smith: Smith (1976), p. 456. But the thesis is far from being confined to economic liberals. See, for example,

for a discussion of this problem.

Mill (1972), pp. 73±4; Raz (1986), pp. 369±70, 394.

3. For example, Locke (1991), Second Treatise, chapter

185

RICHARD BELLAMY

23. See Sunstein (1993), pp. 3±4.

6. I explore the breakdown of this social thesis and the related philosophical thesis in late nineteenth- and

24. For example, Ackerman (1991).

early twentieth-century thought in Bellamy (1992).

25. See Hayek (1960), pp. 153±4. 26. For example, Dworkin (1985), p. 2.

7. In employing this formula, I am referring to the neo-

27. Pettit (1997), p. 189. See too Hampshire (1991), pp.

Roman version of republicanism identified by Skinner

20±1.

(1998) and Pettit (1997), rather than the more loosely defined republicanism espoused by communitarians

28. See Gutmann and Thompson (1996), p. 57 and J.

such as Michael Sandel, for example in Sandel (1996).

Cohen, `Procedure and Substance in Deliberative Democracy', in Benhabib (ed.) (1996), pp. 95±119,

8. See Isaac (1988).

at pp. 100±1.

9. My main dissent from Dagger (1997) arises from his

29. What follows draws on R. Bellamy and M. Hollis,

underplaying these differences. 10. See the references cited in note 3.

`Consensus, Neutrality and Compromise', in Bellamy

11. Tully (1995), chapter 3.

and Hollis (eds) (1999), chapter 5, and Bellamy (1999), chapter 4.

12. For example, see Locke (1991), Second Treatise,

30. I owe the distinction between `either/or' and `more or

chapters II and VIII; Mill (1972), pp. 188±98; and

less' conflicts to Hirschman (1994), pp. 203±18.

R. Dworkin's `Liberalism', in Dworkin (1985), pp.

31. Goodin (1995).

181±204.

32. See Manin (1987), p. 353.

13. Once again the examples cited in note 3 provide

33. Singer (1974), p. 32 sees it as `a paradigm of a fair

exemplary instances of this mode of thinking.

compromise'.

14. For an analysis of historical and contemporary models of liberal democracy, see Held (1996), chapters 3, 5, 6

34. Beitz (1989), p. 155.

and 7.

35. See Kymlicka (1995), chapter 7.

15. For examples from the left and right of the liberal

36. For examples of each of these mechanisms see, respec-

spectrum, see Dworkin (1985), p. 197 and Hayek

tively, Hirst (1994), Dahl (1985) and Lijphart (1968).

(1976), pp. 62±3.

I review the merits and weaknesses of these forms of pluralist politics in Bellamy (2000).

16. These processes are naturally exacerbated by globalisation. Many liberal theorists believe this challenge

37. Pettit (1997), p. 30 and Skinner (1998), p. 74 n. 38

can be met by extending liberal democracy in a

stress the first benefit but regard the second as a civic

cosmopolitan direction, for example Held (1995).

humanist rather than a neo-Roman concern, which

However, the forces supposed to underpin this exten-

smacks dangerously of `positive' liberty. Putting history

sion of liberalism have in reality given rise to the very

to one side, substantively I do not believe a weak

kinds of diversity that make liberal democracy hard to

`positive' appreciation of the virtues of participation can be totally excised from republicanism.

sustain. For the same processes that drive globalisation have

augmented

functional

differentiation

38. See Sunstein (1991), pp. 3±34 for discussion of these

in the

points.

economy and society and fostered multiculturalism.

39. See Skinner (1998), pp. 74±6 for the history of this

I have criticised the cosmopolitan liberal thesis, and

insight.

provided an indication of how democratic liberalism can be extended to transnational political commu-

40. See J. Cohen, in Benhabib (ed.) (1996), pp. 102±5.

nities in Bellamy and Castiglione (1998). Despite

41. As Jeremy Waldron has recently insisted, we are sadly

global pressures, however, the state remains the pri-

lacking a model of jurisprudence which takes legislation

mary locus of political authority and this chapter

as seriously as judicial reasoning. Republicanism supports his plea for such an account. See Waldron (1999).

addresses that context.

42. I'm here following Young's distinction between dom-

17. The analysis that follows draws on Luhmann (1981)

ination and oppression, and the relation between the

and Zolo (1992).

two; see Young (1990), pp. 37±8 and chapter 2.

18. For example Dworkin (1995), pp. 2±11 and Rawls's identification of public reason with judicial reasoning

43. For example Taylor (1995), pp. 141, 191±2, 302 n. 15.

in Rawls (1996), Lecture VI.

44. See Bellamy, `The Political Form of the Constitution', in Bellamy and Castiglione (eds) (1996).

19. Rawls (1996) offers the most sophisticated example of this approach. See Bellamy (1999), chapter 2 for a

45. Bellamy (1992), chapter 4.

detailed critique.

46. I owe this example and much of the argument that follows to Dryzek (1990), chapter 3. I have also drawn

20. For a brief history, see my `The Political Form of the

on Cohen and Rogers (1995).

Constitution: The Separation of Powers, Rights and Representative Democracy', in Bellamy and Casti-

47. See Mason (1992), chapters 1 and 2.

glione (eds) (1996), pp. 436±56.

48. Dryzek (1990), pp. 73±4.

21. Skinner (1998), Pettit (1997).

49. See, for example Young (1990), chapter 4.

22. Hobhouse (1964), p. 71.

50. For example, Miller (1995), pp. 150±2.

186

BACK TO THE FUTURE

51. Sunstein (1993), chapter 1.

54. For example, Cohen (1991).

52. See, for example, Young (1990), chapter 4.

55. Raz (1986), pp. 198±9.

53. Young, `Communication and the Other: Beyond De-

56. Habermas (1979), p. 90. 57. See Lind and Tyler (1988) for empirical evidence to

liberative Democracy', in Benhabib (ed.) (1996), pp.

this effect.

120±35, at pp. 128±32.

187

14

ACCOMMODATING REPUBLICANISM David Rasmussen

Presently, there is a debate raging in political theory

In the following I want to turn to that portion of

over two approaches to theorising justice: the deonto-

the 1995 debate between Rawls and Habermas

logical, which holds that justice can be achieved by the

which focuses on the Ancients and the Moderns

establishment of specific principles and procedures as

in order to clarify what is at stake in what I have

opposed to the achievement of a substantive common

called `accommodating republicanism'. Such is the

good as a goal or `end-state', and the teleological, which

significance of these two thinkers in modern political

conceptualises the achievement of justice as end ± or

theory that it is useful to set out the `liberal ±

goal-oriented, justifying whatever principles and pro-

republican' debate at least partly in the terms sug-

cedures may be necessary as means to the realisation of

gested by their exchange. We will see how `law' turns

that specific end. No doubt, both Ju È rgen Habermas

out to be at the centre of this controversy, whether

and John Rawls would want to see themselves on the

one wants to see it in the form of Rawls's constitu-

deontological side of this debate. In their own ways,

tionalism or Habermas's co-originality thesis. It will

they present their theories as proceeding from the

become clear that the question of the distinctiveness

acceptance of certain assumptions about the need to

between the two may rest upon whether Rawlsian

respect wide value-pluralism. These assumptions are

constitutionalism provides a genuine alternative to

held to be incompatible with the teleological ap-

the co-originality thesis. This will be a crucial test of

proach, whose specified end ± however characterised

Rawlsian liberalism's conceptual strength, if we grant

± is in some way reasonable to contest and disavow in

that accommodating the republican insight is a

the light of them. However, each accuses the other of a

necessary move for it to make. We will then be in

kind of latent Aristotelianism, which is one way of

a position to identify an important issue that should

1

characterising `teleology'. The source of that accusa-

be placed on the liberal ± republican research agen-

tion is clearly to be found in both thinkers' attempts to

da.

accommodate the influential critique of liberalism by republicanism. They both want to acknowledge the

Rawls and Habermas:

connections between public political life and `private'

`Ancient versus Modern'?

liberty upon which the critique insists, but without sacrificing an essential respect for individual liberty

The battle between Rawls's `interpretative construc-

and diversity that liberalism aspires to typify. The

tivism' and Habermas's `argumentative constructi-

accusation by one implies that the other has somehow

vism' comes to the fore over Benjamin Constant's

failed in the attempted synthesis of liberalism and

distinction between the liberties of the moderns and

republicanism.

the liberties of the ancients, and the claim that these

188

ACCOMMODATING REPUBLICANISM

should be nourished by the same root. Constant

private rights? Given that, as we shall see, Haber-

claims that `modern' liberty ± the liberties of private

mas's response involves a radical conceptual and

individuals ± is best directed towards self-develop-

practical extension of democracy, we may go on

ment which, in his view, is most effectively achieved

to ask how one might realise the substantive mor-

through free, collective political participation. (This

al/political goal of justice as fairness while assuring

is the exercise of `ancient' liberty, the ideal which

the liberal goal of impartiality in a political process

particularly

that is comprehensively democratic.

attracts

contemporary

republicans.)

Hence Constant calls for an efficacious combination of the two types of liberty.

Habermas's solution is based on a notion of re-

2

ciprocity derived from the procedure of argumenta-

Habermas's point connects ancient and modern

tion. He stresses how language, with which people

liberty much more tightly than what, in Constant's

reason and communicate with each other, is essen-

approach, is still an instrumental linkage of the two.

tially intersubjective. He urges that we must there-

He argues simply that what he calls `public' and

fore think of `justified' norms as being those which

`private'

and

would emerge from free and equal discourse. The

`modern' respectively) are `co-original'; neither is

Habermasian thesis is that justice as fairness can only

prior to the other in any plausible conceptual sense.

be achieved through an adequate notion of recipro-

He thinks that Rawls finds himself defending the

city. In turn, such a notion can only be gained from

quintessentially liberal position of prejudicing the

the procedure of argumentation in which the actors

liberties of the moderns, the private rights of private

in the political process mutually recognise the claims

individuals, over those of the ancients, the political

and counter-claims of one another. Here, we en-

rights of public individuals, or `citizens'. This is

counter the centrality to Habermasian political the-

because the Rawlsian `political' sphere, from which

ory of public will-formation ± by which is meant

are drawn the shared ideas used to justify liberal

democratic procedure ± which can be reconstructed

politics (and which for Rawls, of course, prioritise

as a public and intersubjective process derived from

individual liberties in the lexically primary first

the procedure of argumentation. The emerging thesis

principle of justice), is already `given' in his theory.

postulates the assumption that the norms of private,

It just appears, so to speak: a ready-made domain

individual rights can only be derived from the pro-

demarcating the sphere in which constitutional de-

cess of public will-formation; they are not prior to it.

mocratic politics thereafter takes place and from

It follows from this that private and public autonomy

which reasons to provide public justifications for

are co-original, the consequence of which being that

autonomy

(analogues

such politics are drawn.

for

`ancient'

3

rights are democratically grounded from the outset.

Now the republican critique says about liberalism

The point of this argument is the claim that for

the very thing that Habermas is here saying about

Rawls rights are not democratically grounded. Ha-

Rawls, namely that liberalism functions to justify

bermas believes the upshot is as follows: if Rawls had

private rights above all else and, indeed, tends just to

accepted his critique, which epistemically associates

assume

`ready-to-hand.'

the reasonable and the true with the consequence

Among other complaints, republicanism believes

that consensus and validity are linked from the

that this

outset,

them,

as

leaves

being

simply

liberalism

fatally

inattentive

to

4

then he wouldn't have had to use the

how a society can establish and maintain the public

original position as a device of representation. This

conditions necessary for the kind of liberty-promot-

is because he would have found that `the moral point

ing politics it favours. Given that republicans do not

of view' is implicit in the socio-ontological constitu-

want to reject wholesale liberalism's general ideals of

tion

just governance, we can conceptualise the heart of

Further, Rawls would not have had to make the

the liberal ± republican debate as posing this ques-

second step in his theory, that is the step to over-

tion: how does one retain the basic framework of

lapping consensus, because the public practice of

liberalism while at the same time accommodating

argumentation requires the `complex relations of

the republican critique of liberalism's prioritisation of

mutual recognition that participants in rational dis-

189

of

the

public

practice

of

argumentation.'

5

DAVID RASMUSSEN

course ``must'' accept (in the weak sense of transcendental necessity).'

6

democratic life of a political community. In other

In other words, Rawls should

words, given such a scenario legal regulation would

have built consensus fully into the first stage of the

determine the distinction between the public and

theory (the original position in which rationally

private in a democratic way in the sense that those

choosing agents choose under reasonable procedural

under the law would be its own authors. The reigning

constraints) rather than adding it on in the second

question would then be: `which rights must free and

stage (the step to overlapping consensus as the

equal persons mutually accord one another if they

achievement by justice as fairness ± the outcome

wish to regulate their existence by the legitimate

of original-position deliberation ± of the right kind of

means of positive and coercive law?'

stable public support). This would have enabled his

put the question that way it would follow that

political liberalism to escape both the arbitrariness of

Rawls's characterisation of a private domain, which

the second stage (for here `the philosopher can at

contains the realm of the comprehensive as distin-

most attempt to anticipate in reflection the direction

guished from a public realm that characterises `the

of real discourses as they would probably unfold

political', would be a lot less necessary than his

7

11

If one were to

under conditions of a pluralistic society' ) as well

political liberalism would have us think. Habermas

as the implicit monological perspective of the first

would therefore shift the Rawlsian distinction be-

stage (for Rawls `imposes a common perspective on

tween the private and the public, or the compre-

the parties in the original position through informa-

hensive and the political, to the domain of the

tional constraints and thereby neutralises the multi-

procedure of legal regulation which would accord

plicity of particular interpretive perspectives from

the right to equal `actionable subjective liberties' as

8

well as the public autonomy of its citizens.

the outset' ). In the Habermasian alternative, with its `speech-act' view based on the nature of perfor-

In brief, Habermas holds that legal procedure

matives from which one derives a certain intersub-

presupposes the subjective autonomy of its citizens,

jective necessity, intersubjectivity ± and its notion of

what Rawls would call the domain of private right.

reciprocity to guarantee impartiality ± is written into

At the same time legal procedure in a democratic

the theory from the outset. In this sense, practical

society cannot be legitimate without the public

reason is actualised through mutual recognition: `we

exercise of democratic law-making. So private and

could say that precisely those principles are valid

public autonomy presuppose each other. Hence, one

which meet with uncoerced intersubjective recogni-

would infer from the argument that Rawls should

tion under conditions of rational discourse.'

9

have concentrated on the procedure of democratic

`Con-

12

sensus' need not be an afterthought, following in the

law-making.

wake of the construction of principles of justice.

without moving beyond the bounds of the procedur-

He could have done this, it seems,

From Habermas's point of view Rawls's distinction

al towards teleology because Habermas's democratic

between the private and the public, which underlies

law-making entrusts even more responsibility in

his distinction between the political and the com-

formulating norms than Rawls does to that political

prehensive, is not only unnecessary but leads to

procedure.

13

undesired consequences, particularly when one fo-

In his `Reply', Rawls sets out a rigorously con-

cuses on liberties and rights. It runs against the

structed rebuttal of Habermas's characterisation and

historical insight that the `boundary' demarcating

critique of his project. He contends that if one pays

the relative spheres is always shifting, due to the

careful attention to the actual practice of designing a

basic shifts in political will-formation (Habermas's

constitution in relationship to the process of govern-

example is that of the welfare state's development,

ment it can be seen that private autonomy cannot be

which turned formerly private matters of welfare into

regarded as pre-political at all. The public political

public political concerns).

10

From this perspective,

culture which grounds it is not just `given', for there is

Habermas thinks that Rawls would be better off

a real, founding constitutional convention that se-

subsuming this distinction under that of `legal reg-

lects a constitution with its Bill of Rights and this

ulation' which would in turn be determined by the

`restricts majority legislation in how it may burden

190

ACCOMMODATING REPUBLICANISM

such basic liberties as liberty of conscience and freedom of speech and thought.'

14

at stake, we may ask if the question of the co-relation

To be sure, then,

of the liberty of the ancients and the liberty of the

rights `trump' popular sovereignty, but only as pop-

moderns, of private right and popular sovereignty,

ular sovereignty is expressed in the legislature in-

can be resolved independently of a contingent con-

asmuch as those very rights are derived from a

stitutional history. In Rawls's view it could be that

democratic

foundation.

`Habermas may have no objection to justice as fair-

Hence, basic liberties are `incorporated into the

ness but may reject the constitution to which he

constitution and protected as constitutional rights

thinks it leads, and which I think may secure both

on the basis of citizens' deliberations and judgements over

the ancient and modern liberties.'

process

of

time' (emphasis added).

constitutional

15

20

Fair enough.

In other words, and this is

Rawls is willing to concede that `he and I are not,

a distinctly American view, popular sovereignty is to

however, debating the justice of the United States'

be distinguished from `parliamentary supremacy'.

constitution as it is; but whether justice as fairness

Following Locke's dualist idea of a constitutional

allows and is consistent with the popular sovereignty

democracy Rawls contrasts ordinary law-making by a

he cherishes.'

21

legislature and the `people's constituent power to

However, Rawls is clearly sensitive to the inter-

form, ratify and amend a constitution' in order to

pretation, and thus the critique, that Habermas gives

clarify the distinction. A parallel distinction is then

of the liberalism he articulates. Hence, in support of

drawn between `higher law of the people' and the

his argument that individual rights are not pre-

`ordinary law of legislative bodies'.

16

It is important

political, and to some extent in support of his

that the example which illuminates Rawls's argu-

own more interpretative view, he cites an argument

ment is historical, not abstractly conceptual. Follow-

which Habermas uses against Charles Larmore. Lar-

17

he cites the three most

more has argued that one right has to proceed and

significant, decisive innovations in American con-

constrain democratic will-formation: `no one should

stitutional history: the founding and initial develop-

be forcibly compelled to submit to norms whose

ment of the constitution during the period 1787±91,

validity cannot be made evident to reason.'

the post-Civil War Reconstruction, and the New

bermas interprets this as a denial of co-originality,

Deal under President Franklin D. Roosevelt in the

meaning the establishment of a pre-political right

mid±1930s. Rawls observes that in these periods it

against the state which is perceived under the cate-

was the electorate which `confirmed or motivated

gory of violence. Against this view Habermas pre-

the constitutional changes that were proposed and

sents a two-stage model which begins with the

ing Bruce Ackerman,

finally accepted.'

18

22

Ha-

`horizontal sociation of citizens who, recognising

Of course, Rawls's case, derived from historical

one another as equals, mutually accord rights to

interpretation and not purely from philosophical

one another. Only then does one advance to the

argumentation (hence the contrast between inter-

constitutional taming of power presupposed with the

pretative and argumentative constructivism), is pre-

medium of law.'

23

sented as reliant upon the development of the

Now Rawls believes that his own construction can

constitutional history of the United States. As such,

be viewed in a similar way. Hence, he arrives at two

he argues this reference proves that justice as fairness

conclusions, namely that Habermas's position is not

is a political notion rather than one derived from

that different from his own,

pre-political natural law. He insists that for him `the

mistakenly unleashes a critique in his interpretation

liberties of the moderns do not impose the prior

of

restrictions on the people's constituent will'

19

liberalism.

25

Habermas

24

and that Habermas

thinks

that

liberalism

± and

founders on the dilemma generated by the conflict

to that extent he, too, thinks he can accommodate

between these two propositions: `no moral law can

the republican critique.

be externally imposed on a sovereign democratic people' and `the sovereign people may not justly

But does Rawls's argument prove anything beyond

26

something which is peculiar to the constitutional

. . . enact any law violating these rights.'

history of the United States? Or, to rephrase the issue

Rawls there is no true dilemma here: both proposi-

191

But for

DAVID RASMUSSEN

tions are correct and `simply express the risk for

Rawls, not everybody need pursue the good embo-

political justice of all government, democratic or

died in the politics of old as an intrinsic element of

otherwise; for there is no human institution ± poli-

the good life today ± but Habermas's theory seems

tical or social, judicial or ecclesiastical ± that can

implicitly to curtail this possibility.

guarantee that legitimate (or just) laws are always enacted and just rights always respected.'

27

It is quite

The Persistence

conceivable that a single person could stand alone

of The `Teleological Question'

and be right to say that law and government are unjust. `No special doctrine of the co-originality and

So Rawls's reply to Habermas raises a very interesting

equal weight of the two forms of autonomy is needed

point to which, to my knowledge, Habermas has yet

to explain this fact,' Rawls writes. `It is hard to

to reply. I would contend that it can be used to

believe that all major liberal and civic republican

formulate an urgent issue for the liberal/republican

writers did not understand this. It bears on the age-

research agenda. His critique can be formulated as

old question of how best to unite power with law and

follows: if one asserts the co-originality thesis in the

justice.'

28

way that Habermas does, with its implicit assumption

At this point, we see Rawls making no attempt to

about the primacy of the political in the ancient as

do anything other than defend his position against

opposed to the modern sense, then one buys into a

the presumption of a liberal bias for private rights.

teleology which can only be justified through a

But clearly he doubts that Habermas's theoretical

comprehensive philosophical framework.

construction, such as the co-originality thesis, will

it suggests that Habermas may have gone too far in

guarantee the proper exercise of law and justice in

his attempt to accommodate the claims of repub-

practice. Equally, he questions the emphasis on the

licanism; a crucial modern insight about the plur-

political in Habermas's apparent claim that `the

alistic nature of the good has gone unrespected.

internal relation between the two forms of autonomy

Rawls claims to get by his interpretative constructi-

depends upon ``the normative content of the mode of

vism what he contends Habermas does not get by his

exercising political autonomy.'' '

29

30

If valid,

Rawls wants to

alternative argumentative constructivism. As I un-

know how we might justify the idea that it is

derstand it, Rawls claims to be able to assert a merely

incumbent specifically upon the political realm to

political and non-comprehensive notion of demo-

provide the basis for private autonomy, given that

cratic procedure through his use of the claims of a

activity in the institutions and practices of civil

certain form of constitutional legal theory. It would

society could also provide a sufficient basis for it.

be equally interesting to know if Habermas believes

He speculates that the origin of Habermas's prior-

that Rawls, by relying on American constitutional-

itisation of political activity is found in civic human-

ism, could successfully avoid a similar dilemma ±

ism (by which it is reasonable to assume that he

namely, the assertion of the teleological primacy of

means Aristotelianism). The crucially relevant fea-

the public on grounds which depend too specifically

ture here is that for civic humanism the greatest good

(`comprehensively') on the particularities of Amer-

is conceived of as active participation in political life,

ican historical experience.

31

a paradigm of the teleological approach. For Rawls,

Either way, the republican insight into the rela-

this notion is really derived from a comprehensive

tionship between the public and the private may

doctrine. I take his critique of Habermas to be based

seem to be one that must be coherently adopted by

upon the idea that it is reasonable that not everybody

any theory sharing the broad moral and political

pursues the good defined specifically in terms of

purposes of Rawls and Habermas. But, as their ex-

political life and activity. Non-political public pro-

change shows, it is as yet far from clear that it can be

jects and private interests and pursuits are equally

accommodated without reliance upon the kind of

reasonable. From the point of view of political

teleological assumptions from which many contem-

liberalism, then, it would be inappropriate to assert

porary political theorists ± Rawls and Habermas

one comprehensive view over others. Hence, for

included ± emphatically wish to distance themselves.

192

ACCOMMODATING REPUBLICANISM

Notes

1. The appropriateness of the term `Aristotelianism' may

concept of law has been clarified in this way, it

be questionable. I presume that its spirit is what

becomes clear that the normative substance of basic

Habermas invokes when he associates Rawls with a

liberal rights is already contained in the indispensable

classical theory which legitimates its theory of justice

medium for the legal institutionalisation of the public use of reason of sovereign citizens'; ibid., p. 130.

by assuming the actuality of just institutions in chapter 2 of Habermas (1996). He also thinks that the fact

13. Ibid., p. 131.

that `the issue of principles of justice can arise only in

14. Rawls (1996), pp. 404±5.

the guise of the question of the just distribution of the

15. Ibid., p. 405.

primary goods' is more consistent with `Aristotelian or

16. Ibid., pp. 405±6; cf. ibid., pp. 231±40.

utilitarian approaches than with a theory of rights,

17. Ackerman (1991), chapters 3±6.

such as [Rawls's] own, that proceeds from the concept

18. Rawls (1996), p. 406; cf. ibid., pp. 233±5.

of autonomy' (Habermas, 1995, p. 114). Further, I

19. Ibid., pp. 406±7.

assume that the term captures what Rawls means when

20. Ibid., p. 407.

he associates Habermas with civic humanism, which

21. Ibid.

he does at Rawls (1996), p. 420.

22. Cited in Habermas (1996), p. 456. 23. Ibid.

2. See B. Constant, `The Liberty of the Ancients Compared with that of the Moderns', in Constant (1988),

24. Rawls (1996), p. 407.

pp. 308±28, at p. 327; cf. Habermas (1995), p. 129.

25. Ibid., p. 412.

3. Habermas (1995), esp. pp. 126±9.

26. Ibid., pp. 411, 416.

4. Ibid., pp. 119±26, especially p. 122.

27. Ibid., p. 416.

5. Ibid., p. 127.

28. Ibid.

6. Ibid.

29. Ibid., p. 419.

7. Ibid., p. 121.

30. Ibid., p. 420; cf. pp. 376±80.

8. Ibid., p. 117.

31. Habermas has recently had more to say about the

9. Ibid., p. 127.

distinction between the reasonable and the true in

10. Ibid., p. 129; cf. Benhabib (1992), pp. 89±120.

Rawls's work. However, at the time of writing there

11. Habermas (1995), p. 130.

remains much more mileage in their exchange; see

12. Ibid., pp. 130±1. Habermas believes that `once the

Habermas (1998b), pp. 75±101.

193

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Part Six THE `AUTONOMOUS INDIVIDUAL': FEMINIST CRITIQUES AND LIBERAL REPLIES

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15

LIBERALISM, FEMINISM, ENLIGHTENMENT Kate Soper

women appeared a barbaric anachronism. For them,

I

parity of treatment for the sexes was viewed as

Like many other intimate relationships, that of

essential to bringing political practice into confor-

feminism and liberalism has from the outset been

mity with liberal philosophy ± and this view has been

troubled by contention, but it has also proved to be

shared by all those who have subsequently carried

very resistant to any final severance. By common

forward the `equal opportunities' campaign for an

consent, the modern feminist movement has its roots

end to female subordination.

in the philosophical liberalism of the Enlightenment,

What is essentially at issue for all such critics is the

but it has also since its origins constituted itself at

arbitrary and unjustifiable exclusion of women as

least in part through an immanent critique of the

proper

partialities and hypocrisies of its humanist and ega-

claimed to be due to humanity at large: a line of

litarian claims. Yet it has belonged within, even as it

objection which has in recent times been focused on

has conducted a continuous polemic against, the

the extent to which liberal humanist discourse has

framework of liberal-Enlightenment thinking. This

functioned historically as a cover under which both

is so in two senses: firstly, in the sense that although

gender and racial difference can be safely ignored and

they were highly critical of the patriarchal culture of

the particular interests of a white, male and bourgeois

the liberal Enlightenment, most of those arguing for

elite be the better secured.

candidates

for

the

freedoms

and

rights

female emancipation from the end of the eighteenth

But feminism has also been viewed as rooted in

century until relatively recently have viewed that

liberal-Enlightenment values in the further and re-

project as not only consistent with liberal principles

lated sense that in developing this immanent cri-

but as requisite to their full implementation. For

tique, it was doing no more than observing the self-

Wollstonecraft, it seemed only rational that a Lock-

critical, constantly revisionist spirit of those values

ean-liberal

citizenship

themselves. To point this out, however, is clearly to

should extend to women on the same grounds and

beg the question as to how self-critical this spirit can

in equal measure as it did to men, even though in

become before it turns heretical. At what point does

demanding that it should be, she was asking for an

feminist criticism of liberalism cease to be immanent

extension of rights and franchise that was totally

to it and become outright dissidence?

conception

of

rights

and

1

unacceptable to the political culture of her time.

One possible answer might be at the point when it

From the perspective of the form of liberalism de-

casts doubt on the capacity of liberal-democratic

fended by John Stuart Mill and Harriet Taylor in the

institutions and political process to deliver the `free-

nineteenth century, the continued subjection of

dom and equality' for all individuals that liberalism

197

KATE SOPER

abstractly professes to uphold and seek to advance. It

tedly not all of it) between liberal and socialist

is always debatable, however, at what point exactly

feminists would seem to be over means rather than

this may be said to occur in any feminist critique of

ends: what is at issue is the capacity of liberal forms of

liberalism. Virginia Sapiro, to take but one example,

polity to deliver on the emancipatory agenda rather

has presented Wollstonecraft as challenging not just

than the agenda itself.

the masculinity of the liberal conception of citizen-

inist critique remains ultimately consistent with the

ship but also ± and even more radically for her times

commitment to liberal goals and values even as it

± its rigid distinction between `public' and private'

rejects the liberal conception of the procedures

spheres. But Sapiro nonetheless seems to view such

through which they might be realised.

4

In this sense socialist-fem-

demands as capable of accommodation, at least in

If this is right, then one might claim that the point

principle, within the existing framework of a liberal

of final rupture with the immanent feminist critique

politics. Thus she writes that Wollstonecraft's argu-

of liberalism has come only more recently in the form

ment on democracy offered a `means of stretching

of the postmodernist rejection of the `foundational-

the liberal temperament to incorporate into political

ist' metaphysics and universal humanist commit-

thinking explicit concern for the quality of personal

ments of liberalism. For we are talking here of an

relations and day-to-day conditions of the lives of

attack on liberalism not for its political shortcomings

2

citizens.' On the other hand, one might be inclined

in realising its professed Enlightenment commit-

to argue in the converse sense, that if Wollstonecraft

ments, but of an attack directed against liberalism's

can indeed be interpreted as launching an early

Enlightenment pedigree itself. Nor is it any accident

`feminist' assault on the private-public division, then

that much of this critique has been formulated in

she is not so much `stretching' as directly contesting

terms of liberalism's unfortunate inheritance of, and

3

liberal sentiment. In other words, what seems raised

continued reliance upon, a so-called `Enlightenment

here is how far liberalism, not only in Wollstone-

subject'.

craft's time but also since then, is consistent with the

In effect, there are two aspects of this critique

dissolving or transcending of the public-private di-

corresponding to two related, but distinguishable,

vide that is called for in this form of feminist critique,

constructions to be placed upon the notion of the

or tolerant of its insistence on such a `politicising' of

`Enlightenment subject'. In a first and more histor-

the `personal'.

ical understanding, the idea refers us to the ideals of

But whether one reads Wollstonecraft as pushing

human subjectivity first promoted in the late seven-

the limits of liberal politics or as more radically

teenth century and more fully elaborated in the

breaking through these, there is little doubt that

historical period that we know of as `Enlighten-

in the later argument of the socialist feminists, it is

ment.'

liberal political institutions themselves that are un-

of `autonomy': the liberated or Enlightened indivi-

der attack. In arguing that without the overthrow of

dual is one who, in Kant's phrase, `dares to know',

capitalist exploitations and its class-based forms of

who is no longer in thrall to received ideas and

oppression, female emancipation will always be par-

externally imposed rules of comportment but thinks

tial, more formal than real and tend always to be

and acts in accordance with self-ordained principles

restricted to the more affluent and educationally

± who prescribes the law unto the self. Self-mastery,

privileged, socialist feminism would seem clearly at

independence, freedom from superstition and un-

odds with liberal reformism. Even so, given that it

thinking subservience to religious dictates, the ex-

clearly retains a commitment to some of the key

ercise of reason in pursuit of self-chosen ends: these

emancipatory goals of the liberal Enlightenment (to

are the recommended qualities of the subject as first

those of freedom, parity of treatment, self-realisation

promoted in the writings of the Enlighteners. The

and so on), one may still question whether socialist

subject in this conception is central to a normative

feminism really constitutes a decisive break with the

theory about what it is to be a fully realised, auton-

immanent critique of liberalism's essential mode of

omous human person, and in an important sense it is

reasoning. After all, much of the dispute (if admit-

a historical category, referring us to one who comes to

198

5

Most prominent among these is the idea

LIBERALISM, FEMINISM, ENLIGHTENMENT

as a consequence of the new rationality and

`autonomous' individual as a delusion of the bour-

scientific understanding illuminating the period of

geois epoch itself. The objection here is not so much

the Enlightenment. One might note, in this con-

that this conception of the self as `sovereign being'

nection, the contrasts which scholars have drawn

validated forms of independence whose enjoyment

between conceptions of reason in the seventeenth

was systematically denied to women, but that it

and eighteenth centuries. Cassirer, for example,

promoted a misguided ideology of personal autono-

argues that, for the later century, `it is no longer

my through which all individuals were encouraged to

the sum total of ``innate ideas'' given prior to all

overlook their actual ties of dependency on others,

experience which reveals the absolute essence of

and men, in particular, were enabled to justify their

things. Reason is now looked upon as rather an

detachment from the sphere of domesticity and

be

acquisition than a heritage.'

6

reproduction. Individuals are not only culturally

In a second and more abstract conception, on the

embedded and embodied to an extent and depth

other hand, the `Enlightenment subject' refers us to a

that liberal humanist ideals of selfhood utterly fail to

rather different theoretical entity, namely that ab-

appreciate; they are, in virtue of being so, fragmented

stracted individual who underpins the cosmopolitan

selves: the unified subject of the liberal-Enlighten-

and humanist aspirations of the liberal-Enlighten-

ment is a fiction as well as a masculine fetish.

ment project. This is the subject stripped of the

Postmodernist criticism of the Enlightenment sub-

accretion of culture, the bare-forked creature, the

ject in the `abstract' sense, on the other hand, is

human being conceived (in Wollstonecraft's phrase)

directed not at the discounting or downgrading of

as `naked human nature': the subject who is invoked,

specifically

either implicitly or explicitly, as the ground of the

against what is said to be a mistakenly universalist

project to unify the various tribes and nations of

and essentialist conception of humanity which lies at

man. It invokes that `common humanity' through

the heart of the Enlightenment and liberal-humanist

which, or on the basis of which, it alone makes sense

projects. The problem is not (as a feminist such as

to aspire to liberal forms of solidarity and the realisa-

Wollstonecraft supposed) that women have been

tion of universal values within the human commu-

irrationally and hypocritically excluded from the

nity.

claims that are made about the human subject,

feminine

values

and

attributes,

but

Even if these two conceptions of subjectivity are

but rather that this notion is itself a dangerous

linked in the sense that it was thought that everyone,

fiction: to invoke the idea of a universal humanity,

by virtue of possessing those attributes which are

so it is said, is to be guilty of a certain imperialism, to

definitive of human nature, could in principle realise

lend oneself to an anti-democratic impulse to over-

the ideal of autonomy, they are clearly distinguish-

look cultural and personal difference.

able inflections, and corresponding to them, as sug-

Going together with this feminist critique of the

gested, we find differing emphases in the feminist

Enlightenment conceptual legacy there has also been

polemic.

a tendency for feminist historians of the eighteenth

In their critical engagement with the `historical'

century to portray the ferments of the French Re-

sense of Enlightenment subjectivity, feminist the-

volution in a very negative light, and to deny they

ories have delivered a series of powerful arguments

had any positive role to play in the advance of female

against the idealisation of autonomy, objecting that

emancipation. In the argument of Joan Landes, the

it makes a fetish of masculine attributes (or at any

period is associated with the opening-up of the

rate of those associated with male performance in

exclusively `masculine' space of the `public' and

patriarchal culture). They have relatedly claimed

the dominion of a `reason' which is again viewed

that this devalues other ± `feminine' or culturally

as the exclusive attribute of the male.

coded `feminine' ± attributes which can contribute as

are led to believe, had little or nothing to gain from

much if not more to civilised culture and are there-

the process of liberalisation, and those of them who

fore just as worthy of advancement. Most damningly

were calling for women to be included within the

of all, they have dismissed the very idea of the

remit of the so-called `rights of man' tend to be

199

7

Women, we

KATE SOPER

dismissed as colluding in the maintenance of patriarchal culture.

8

relativism within feminism has been stated with

Modernist feminists from de Beau-

sufficient potency for it to be rather pointless for

voir onwards have been similarly charged by the

me to add much further to it here. Those who have

postmodernists

`Enlighten-

not been so convinced to date are unlikely to have

ment' ± and hence, so it is implied, inherently

their thinking on these issues altered by further

with

perpetuating

an

9

`masculine' ± cultural perspective. As Pauline John-

restatements of the realist argument.

son has pointed out, such feminists have presumed

But there is a somewhat different line of response,

that the critique of the claims of transcendent reason

which has received less attention, and which I

has `established modern feminism on the path of

propose to develop in more detail here. In essence,

counter-Enlightenment' and that feminism now re-

what I shall be arguing is that critics of liberalism

quires a `fundamental break from the Enlightenment

who see this as shamed or deeply flawed by virtue of

cause of reason and truth, which is exposed as

its Enlightenment origins and conceptual sources are

nothing more than a distorted and disguised will-

basing their argument on an extremely partial con-

to-power.'

10

In some cases, in fact, the Enlighten-

ception of this theoretical and cultural legacy. In

ment and liberal humanism by association have been

other words, the postmodernist feminist critique of

treated as if they were more or less synonymous with

liberalism is itself flawed to the extent that it is

everything white, male, middle class and heterosex-

reliant on a distorted and caricaturised version of

ual, and we have been invited to revile them accord-

liberal-Enlightenment thinking on gender issues.

14

ingly. Now, for the most part, where feminists have

II

countered the postmodernist positions on the Enlightenment subject, they have focused on the in-

In this context any attempt to offer a corrective to

consistencies

argument.

this version will necessarily have to be rather brief

They have sought to reveal the incoherence of

and synoptic. But a first point to be made is that the

denying any existential unity and autonomy at the

feminist dismissal of the liberal-Enlightenment is

level of subjectivity while seeking to expose cultural

often based on an overly homogeneous conception

norms and `constructions' as having negative con-

of its thought and culture. As recent scholars of the

sequences for female emancipation and self-fulfil-

period have been insisting, the scope and quality of

ment.

11

of

their

anti-essentialist

They have pointed out that it makes little

Enlightenment thinking even within a single nation

sense to advocate the politics of `identity' while

± let alone across Europe (and into America) ± is a

theoretically denying subjects any powers over their

good deal more varied, complex and uneven in its

self-formation. They have insisted on the incompat-

development than is allowed for by this feminist

ibility of a democratic politics of a kind purportedly

rhetoric. In recognition of this, Dorinda Outram

being defended in postmodernist argument with

proposes in her recent study what she terms a

respect for an indefinite plurality of cultural values

`capsule' conception of Enlightenment as containing

and aspirations. They have, relatedly, taken issue

sets of debates, stresses and concerns rather than

with the extremely reactionary forms of traditional-

representing a single, unified value system.

ism and fundamentalism that they see as licensed by

Enlightenment, according to Outram, presented it-

the postmodernist refusal to recognise any essential-

self as a series of processes and problems to those, like

ist or universalist position on human nature.

12

15

The

Even

Kant and Mendelssohn, who attempted to define it.

Derrida, Spivak and other figures associated with the

It was not so much a `modern paganism' as a quest for

deconstructionist position have, in the light of this

a `rational Christianity'.

ethical problem, made some gestural moves towards

with cultural difference, of continuous questioning

acknowledging the necessity of a minimalist essenti-

and relativisation of European `civilisation', and of

alism.

13

16

It was a period obsessed

Although I shall have a word more to say on

critique of colonialism. Most contemporary com-

these arguments in my concluding section, I believe

mentators also emphasise the disparate and uneven

the case against the incoherence of postmodernist

development of the `pockets' of Enlightenment con-

200

LIBERALISM, FEMINISM, ENLIGHTENMENT

cern in the different countries of Europe and their

ment's gains is open to the charge that it too readily

emergence in non-European locations during the

abstracts from gender-blind or patriarchalist dimen-

eighteenth

America.

sions of Habermas's social theory. Indeed, my own

Where once the Enlightenment was viewed as con-

position would be that you can endorse a broadly

fined to the argument of a few French philosophes

Habermasian

towards the close of the century, the contemporary

being a good deal more critical of Habermas's general

assessment favours a very long and geographically

neglect of gender issues along lines discussed by

extensive Enlightenment, by no means local to

Nancy Fraser and others. (Fraser has suggested that

Europe, and stretching temporally from the mid-

Habermas is guilty of a certain gender-blindness in

seventeenth right up to our own times ± and even

failing to see how close a critique of the commodi-

beyond. As Habermas has famously pronounced, the

fication of the cherished `symbolic' realm of child-

task of Enlightenment has still to be completed if we

rearing and nursing can come to rationalising female

are to be enabled to act as human beings.

domesticity.

century,

most

notably

in

22

position

on

Enlightenment

while

) All the same, I certainly think Jacob

It is also important that those relying on the anti-

is right to remind the postmodernist feminist histor-

Enlightenment rhetoric recognise that there is ex-

ians of the reactionary quality of the politics they risk

tensive debate today about the role that women

endorsing in their dismissive position on the Enlight-

played in Enlightenment and the gains they derived

enment legacy. I think they should acknowledge,

from it. Margaret Jacob and other recent historians of

too, how problematic their own position looks in

Enlightenment have challenged accounts of its un-

relation to the arguments of those seeking to advance

remittingly patriarchal character, insisting on its

female emancipation in the age of Enlightenment

overall positive impact for the feminist cause, and

itself.

arguing that it represented a very significant advance

One might briefly illustrate this point by reference

on the oppression of the Church-dominated and

to one of its better-known disputes ± that between

Absolutist political orders which it supplanted.

17

Wollstonecraft and Burke. From Burke's perspective,

To deny that, Jacob suggests, is implicitly to align

Wollstonecraft is indeed an abstractor from cultural

oneself with the position of the eighteenth-century

difference bent on denuding society of those distinc-

enemies of the revolution and with a long tradition

tions which are of its essence and which endow it

18

She acknowl-

with cultural richness. Thus, he professes, he cannot

edges that participation in the `public sphere' re-

relate to `human actions and concerns, in a simple

quired one to be both literate and in possession of

view of the object, as it stands stripped of every

adequate funds for club membership, theatre atten-

relation, in all the nakedness and solitude of meta-

dance and so forth, and that this restricted it to the

physical abstraction.'

of right-wing rejection of its legacy.

better-off among women.

19

23

For Burke, it is what distin-

But she denies that there

guished man from beast, culture from nature, that

was any increasing `masculinisation' of the `public

humanity is differentiated, its culture functioning as

sphere' in any of the main centres of Enlighten-

the sanctum of such difference:

ment,

20

and rejects the currently fashionable view of All the pleasing illusions, which made power

the French Revolution as a defeat for women. Rather than imagining the French movement

gentle, and obedience liberal, which harmonised

towards egalitarianism, leading to the contestations

the different shades of life, and which, by a bland

of the 1790s, as the signal of women's first defeat in

assimilation, incorporated into politics the senti-

modern democratic politics, the evidence, when seen

ments which beautify and soften private society,

comparatively,

The

are to be dissolved by this new conquering of light

emergence of the public sphere put women's rights

and reason. All the decent drapery of life is to be

on the western agenda just as it augured all the other

rudely torn off. All the super-added ideas, furn-

struggles about the meaning and truthfulness of

ished from the wardrobe of moral imagination,

suggests

quite

the

opposite.

democratic politics with which we still live.

21

which the heart owns, and the understanding ratifies, as necessary to cover the defects of our

Jacob's Habermasian defence of the Enlighten-

201

KATE SOPER

naked shivering nature, and to raise it to dignity

the Enlightenment, (to the distress of the more

in our own estimation, are to be exploded as

feminist-minded) was in reality a period obsessed

ridiculous, absurd, and antiquated fashion. On

with the topic of sexual difference: its origin, nature

this scheme of things, a king is but a man; a

and social implications. Indeed, it has been main-

queen is but a woman; a woman is but an animal;

tained that it is only in the period of Enlightenment

and an animal not of the highest order.

24

that the issue of feminine difference ± both corporeal and mental ± begins in any serious sense to be

For her part, Wollstonecraft was happy to plead

addressed, and hence only in the Enlightenment,

guilty to these charges in a polemic against the

when women are recognised as possessed of a quite

`gorgeous drapery' in which Burke had `enwrapped

separate and sui generis sexuality, that the sex-gender

his tyrannic principles': a polemic through which she

distinction, with its acknowledgement of the differ-

seeks both to expose the principles themselves and to

ence between what is given by nature and what is

denude them of their rhetorical garb. For Wollstone-

socially cultivated, is seen as having application. `No

craft, Burke's eloquence masks a profound irration-

longer would those who think about such matters',

alism, a defence of bigotry in the name of reverence

writes Thomas Laquer of the eighteenth century,

for

implication

`regard women as a lesser version of man along a

would be that slavery ought never to have been

vertical axis of infinite gradations, but rather as an

abolished. The Burkean doctrine would have us

altogether different creature along a horizontal axis

submit to this `inhuman custom' simpy because it

whose middle ground was largely empty.'

was the creation of `our ignorant forefathers', who,

tively he argues that it was only then that sex was

`not understanding the native dignity of man, sanc-

invented, that `science fleshed out, in terms presen-

tioned a traffic that outrages every suggestion of

table to the new epistemology, the categories ``male''

cultural

tradition,

reason and religion.'

whose

logical

25

26

Correla-

and ``female'' as opposite and incommensurable bio-

No doubt some will object to this association of

logical sexes', and hence only then that the speci-

the conservative Burke with contemporary defen-

ficity of the female body was fully recognised with all

dants of cultural relativism, given the difference in

its various discursive implications.

their motivations: Burke's to preserve aristocratic

tion he notes the influence on the eighteenth cen-

privilege, the latter's to check the normalising power

tury of Poulain de La Barre, who had challenged the

of western discourse. But the comparison certainly

notion of the inferiority of women on the ground

serves to dramatise the tensions, and potentially

that since sex difference was solely a matter of the

reactionary implications, of these positions which

body, there could be no social grounds to maintain

we have been invited to view as a wholly positive

it.

rupture with humanist thinking. Moreover, the fact

there were many voices ± most famously Diderot and

that certain parallels can be drawn here should give

Condorcet ± who argued for political and legal

pause for thought to all those who would sponta-

equality for both sexes, and deplored the neglect

neously acclaim Wollstonecraft's contribution to

of the education of women. Condorcet even went so

feminist and democratic theory while subscribing

far as to deny that natural differences between the

to theoretical positions very much at odds with hers.

sexes had any bearing on their rights of citizenship:

In this connection, one might note how paradox-

why deny to women on the grounds of their suscept-

ical it is, in view of the current emphasis on `differ-

ibility to pregnancy what no one dreamt of denying

ence', that it tended to be the more progressive, and,

to men cooped up for half the year with the gout?

28

27

In this connec-

Among the philosophes themselves, of course,

if one could call them so, `feminist' elements in the

Of course, as Joan Scott has pointed out, Con-

eighteenth century who were most resistant to re-

dorcet was in something of a minority in pursuing

cognising any major natural, as opposed to culturally

this line on the issue of equality and natural differ-

induced, divergences between the sexes. The con-

ence,

verse side of this paradox is that so far from obscuring

numerous

or abstracting from the specific conditions of women,

which were prejudicial and in many cases deeply

202

29

and I am not disputing the existence of the other

discourses

on

female

difference

LIBERALISM, FEMINISM, ENLIGHTENMENT

offensive in their suggestions about female limita-

effeminacy, and regarded women as a threat to a

tions and deficiencies. The point is, rather, that there

`natural'

was a much wider and more varied spectrum of

might note, Tomaselli has questioned the tendency

arguments about gender and subjectivity than is

of much feminist theory to represent women as

recognised by the contemporary dismissive refer-

having been thought closer to nature. At least in

ences to the Enlightenment subject. One might cite

the period of Enlightenment, she suggests, culture ±

as one example here the extremely crenellated de-

the move away from nature ± is represented as a

bate on the extent to which women had gained from

(variously benign or malignant) emasculation.

the process of civilisation.

30

masculinity.

33

In

this

connection,

one

The more conventional Enlightenment emphasis

There was some general agreement even among

on the difference of the sexes went together, of

those critical of the contemporary treatment of

course, with the genderisation of mental faculties.

women that the latter had only benefited in the

Reason, presented in Kantian philosophy as the

progress out of savagery. For Catherine Macaulay,

distinctive attribute of personhood, was viewed as

woman `in the barbarous stages of mankind' had

a pre-eminently masculine possession, and in the

been reduced to a state of abject slavery; for Diderot,

writings of a number of eighteenth-century thinkers

`the unhappy woman in the cities is far unhappier

± notably Rousseau and Kant ± women are depicted

31

and he, William

as by nature more capricious and emotional creatures

Alexander and John Millar all thought that the

incapable of attaining to a fully rational autonomy.

degree of civility gained could be judged by the

But even Kant implies this is a deficit brought about

manner in which women were treated. Alexander

by lack of education and inappropriate patronage.

additionally presented women as having ± through

Kant has often been rebuked by feminists for his

their cultivation of beauty ± also stimulated men to

condescension. But when he remarks ironically in his

experience a romantic affection for a particular in-

essay on Enlightenment that `those guardians who

dividual, a personalisation of attachments through

have so kindly assumed superintendence over them'

which they had spared themselves the misery and

will soon see to it `that the step to competence is held

barbarism of anonymous sexual relations. Such con-

to be very dangerous by the far greater portion of

ceptions, however, did not sit easily alongside the

mankind (and the entire fair sex)'

recognition by these thinkers of the continued en-

perfectly consistent with the sort of claims made

slavement of women in their society ± especially

by Wollstonecraft and others concerned in the per-

where this went together (as it did very notably in

iod with improving female autonomy.

still in the midst of the forests';

34

his point is

the case of Diderot) with a critique of the corruption

But more importantly, perhaps, one must note

and decadence of civilisation and a call `to return to

how much there is in the culture and argument of

nature'. Diderot tends to forget (or is necessarily

the period which runs counter to any simplistic

forced to abstract from) his negative assessment of

presentation of the liberal-Enlightenment as the site

the condition of women in primitive society, in his

or time of the privileging of the type of reason which

praise of primitivism. `Ask civilised man whether he

modern critics refer to as `masculine', meaning by

is happy. Ask the savage whether he is unhappy,' he

that a narrowly instrumental, overly logical and

writes. `If both reply ``No'' the dispute is settled.' But,

abstracted mode of cognition. We have only to

as Tomaselli points out, `to have asked a woman the

consider the attention paid by theorists from the

same set of questions would have yielded, judging by

late seventeenth century onwards to the role of

Diderot's own account, both a ``no'' and a ``yes''.'

32

sensory experience, to the imagination, to the pos-

Rousseau, on the other hand, viewed the turn to

session and development of what was termed `sen-

`Romantic' love not as a source of commendable

sibility'

civility and liberation from barbarism, but as the

judgement, to the aesthetic as mediator between

enslavement of men. Though agreeing to the role of

reason and the sense, to realise how much more

women in cultivating luxury and beauty, he saw the

there was to the Enlightenment discourses of the

advance of culture as a progression in a deplorable

self.

203

35

to

the

analysis

of

taste

and

aesthetic

The Age of Reason `distrusted Reason,' argues

KATE SOPER

E. L. Tuveson, `as it had been understood for many

Addison's or Carter's is better interpreted as belong-

centuries ± far more deeply than did any preceding

ing to a proto-Romantic reaction to the liberal-

period.'

36

Enlightenment rather than as contributing to its

Another commentator goes on to claim:

stock of ideas. Yet if we follow the contemporary It would be mistaken to think of reason as the

disposition to think in terms of a `long' Enlight-

rallying cry of the Enlightenment thinkers except

enment, then we must view it as encompassing much

in so far as it was opposed to faith, and the Age of

pre-Romantic and Romantic argument on the self,

Reason as opposed to the Age of Superstition. If

directly opposed though such argument was to scien-

one's gaze shifts away from the battles with l'In-

tific positivism, mechanistic conceptions of nature

Ã me, then the `Age of Sentiments', `Sentimenfa

and the dogmatic pursuit of reason. Or, to put the

tality', `Feelings', `Passions', `Pleasure', `Love' or

point otherwise, Romanticism, which retains the

`Imagination' are apter titles for the movement of

core Enlightenment idea of a unitary subject pos-

ideas in the eighteenth century.

37

sessed of autonomous agency ± and which, after all, owes a great deal to the influence of two figures,

This is surely to overstate the case against reason,

Rousseau and Kant, usually deemed to belong un-

which remained the sovereign court of appeal, and

controvertibly to the Enlightenment ± can be viewed

was viewed by Condorcet, Voltaire and Diderot and

itself as part of the unfolding process of Enlight-

most key thinkers of the age as of critical importance

enment self-criticism. One might argue, too, that

to controlling the flights of fancy and excesses of the

there

imagination. But we certainly need to recognise the

mediated Enlightenment rationality still at work

force of the point made earlier regarding the im-

in John Stuart Mill's liberalism and that this gives

portance of distinguishing between a typically se-

a particular inflection to his argument on a range of

venteenth-century view of reason as `sum total of

topics, including that of female subjection.

is

something

of

this

same

Romantically-

innate ideas' and the more characteristically eighteenth-century Kantian ± and liberal ± view of it as

III

committed to an unprejudicial `critique' of `pure' reason, and to sceptical investigation of the knowl-

I have tried to show here that Enlightenment culture

edge claimed on the authority of `innate ideas'. We

was a good deal more complex, and in a number of

should recognise, too, that the tendency of some

ways more sensitive to the limitations of its own

contemporary feminist criticism to equate Enlight-

universalising and rationalising claims, than glib

enment with the exercise of a narrowly conceived

postmodernist dismissals often allow. I have tried

`masculine reason' is to abstract from the many

to show, too, that one rejects the period of Enlight-

nuanced discourses that went into its intellectual

enment and its legacy as radically unfriendly to the

ferment. It is also to ignore the voices of those (such

advancement of feminist demands only at the risk of

as Hume, Addison, Hutcheson, Shaftesbury, Burke,

appearing to opt for a theoretical perspective that

Smith) who in the period itself did challenge the

shares more with Burke's patrician defence of culture

exclusive endorsement of reason. Among the women

and custom than with Wollstonecraft's attempts to

who did was Elizabeth Carter, acclaimed by Johnson

strip away the veils of patriarchal privilege. It would,

as the best Greek scholar in the kingdom, who

of course, be quite mistaken to present either Woll-

followed Addison in her scepticism about science

stonecraft in particular, or the voices of liberal-En-

and argued (as did Addison and Adam Smith) for

lightenment in general, as offering the last word on

the indispensability of the imagination as a source of

female emancipation. My plea here is only that they

empathy with others and the need to strengthen

should be acknowledged as an important first step in

what Hutcheson called the `sympathetick sense'. It is

the right direction, and that when feminists de-

not reason, she argued, but imagination which dis-

nounce liberalism simply in virtue of its Enlight-

tinguishes us from the beast.

enment `rationalism' or `humanism' or conceptions of subjectivity, they are making use of an easy

Admittedly, it may be argued that a voice such as

204

LIBERALISM, FEMINISM, ENLIGHTENMENT

rhetoric rather than engaging in serious and discri-

denial of this that has licensed some of the most

minating critique.

callous political neglect of the miseries and oppressions of others.

They are also, as suggested earlier in my brief remarks on the inconsistencies of the postmodernist

Postmodernist feminists should therefore accept

defence of `difference', frequently arguing in ways

that in the end their critiques of liberal humanism

which are covertly reliant on liberal-democratic

make better sense and retain more internal coher-

values themselves. What sense, for example, can

ence if presented as a continuation of the immanent

we ultimately make of postmodern feminist critiques

critique of Enlightenment first sounded in the dis-

of the conflationist and Eurocentric tendencies of

course of Wollstonecraft and other proto-feminist

liberal humanism if not in terms of its failure to

liberal critics. Or if they do not agree to this, they

advance a more genuinely universal conception of

should at least be ready to accept the full implica-

the human community? How do we understand the

tions of their value-relativism and anti-realism, and

charge that liberal approaches to emancipation are

thus accept that there are ultimately no objective

`ethnocentric' or less than `democratic' in the respect

criteria of female emancipation, and no grounds

extended to `otherness' or `difference', if we do not

therefore on which to defend any projected vision

presuppose a commitment to some minimally essen-

of this as more or less `progressive'. To deny that

tialist and universalist conception of human nature:

there is any link between the discourses of `power'

unless, that is, we hypothesise a common suscept-

and `oppression' and specific extra-discursive condi-

ibility to pain and humiliation in the absence of

tions of existence and forms of human experience, is

certain forms of respect and recognition? Liberalism

to disown the political teleology associated with the

in general, and liberal feminism in particular, are

feminist movement, whether this be given a more

indeed open to the charge of having taken class-

liberal or more socialist interpretation. A postmo-

biased and culturally partial views of what is suppo-

dernist position can, in other words, escape the

sedly common to everyone. But it is one thing to

charges of being inconsistent in its treatment of

expose this bias and partiality; it is quite another to

liberal-democratic values, but only at the cost of

condemn liberal thinking for its invocation of a

licensing an indefinite and uncontrollable play of

shared structure of cognition, need and affectivity,

meaning such that any and every treatment of

since little sense can be made of the request for

women might count, under some discursive regime

greater tolerance of other viewpoints and more

or within a particular political context, as a further-

recognition of specific identities and constituencies,

ance of feminist goals. The question then is: can this

unless some commonality of cognitive and emotional

still count as a distinctively `feminist' theoretical

response to the world is presupposed. Indeed, it is the

offering at all?

Notes

1. As Peter Hulme and Ludmilla Jordanova claim of the

other. But I think there is enough shared commitment

Enlightenment period, since this was `in many of its

to these formal principles for the point to have some validity.

aspects, highly critical, it was inevitable that, even as

5. I put the point in these terms in order to leave open

its identity emerged, it was subverted.' Hulme and

the question of the periodisation of Enlightenment,

Jordanova (eds) (1990), p. 2. 2. Sapiro (1992), p. xiv.

which it is not my intention to address in this chapter.

3. Cf. my own discussion of Sapiro's position in Soper

Suffice it to note that there is still considerable dispute on both the temporality and the definition of Enlight-

(1997). 4. Obviously, this is a rather bald claim as it stands and

enment. As Hulme and Jordanova point out, there are

much could be said in qualification of it. I would not

basically two approaches to the issue, the first con-

want to deny that liberal and socialist feminists will

fining it more narrowly to the ideas of a group of

differ on the `order' of the agenda and the relative

(mainly French) intellectuals during the period dating

priority to be given to the items on it ± especially those

from the death of Louis XIV (1715) to the events of

of freedoms, on the one hand, and equality, on the

the French Revolution (1789±94); the second ap-

205

KATE SOPER

proach, which is altogether broader, would emphasise

17. Ibid., pp. 95±113; see also the studies by Jacob, Phyllis

the origins of Enlightenment in the work of Bacon,

Mack, Ruth Perry and Margaret Hunt in Women in the

Newton and Locke in the seventeenth century and

Enlightenment, in Women and History, 9 (1984) (rep-

argue for a much longer Enlightenment ± at least into

rinted in book form by the Institute for Historical Research and the Haworth Press, 1984).

the early decades of the nineteenth century, and even beyond: Hulme and Jordanova (eds) (1990), pp. 1±15.

18. Jacob (1994), p. 98 f.

Although the recent Blackwell Companion to the En-

19. Ibid., p. 100f.

lightenment focuses on the years 1720±80 (Yolton, et

20. As Jacob points out, most historians now accept the

al. (eds), 1991), historians of the period today increas-

importance for understanding of the eighteenth cen-

ingly favour the idea of a `long' Enlightenment. For a

tury of the category of the `public sphere' (by which is

brief guide to the recent history of Enlightenment

intended the universe of `public opinion formation,

interpretation, see Outram (1995), chapter 1.

informal sociability, intellectual interaction and net-

6. Cassirer (1951), p. 13; cf. Pauline Johnson's discussion

working beyond the family and outside the formal

(and illustration of this difference in respect of the

institutions of the state), as they do the role of

concepts of reason employed respectively by Mary

Habermas's work in drawing attention to it, notably

Anstell

and

Mary

Wollstonecraft)

in

Habermas (1992).

Johnson

21. Jacob (1994), pp. 106±7.

(1993), pp. 3±12.

22. The Habermasian framework tends both to obscure

7. Landes (1988). 8. See Jardine (1985); cf. also the dispute between

the very material character of much child-rearing

Timothy Reiss and Frances Ferguson in Kauffman

activity and the extensive permeation of family life

(ed.) (1989) (where Ferguson defends Wollstonecraft

by the systemic forces of power and money. Feminists

against Reiss's claim that her assertion of the rights of

have also accused him of failing to appreciate the

women was bound to prove ineffective because it was

dualised

so immersed in the dominant discourse of Enlight-

(which may reduce female dependency on the male

enment). See also Johnson (1993).

breadwinner, but only at the cost of exposing women

and

gendered

nature

of

welfare

systems

9. See, for example, Evans (1985); Lloyd (1984), chapter

to a patriarchal and androcentric state bureaucracy).

6. Toril Moi discusses and defends de Beauvoir against

See Fraser's `What's Critical About Critical Theory?',

similar charges in Moi (1992). For a brief survey, see

in Benhabib and Cornell (eds) (1987); cf. also the

again Johnson (1993), pp. 3±4.

article by Linda Nicholson in the same volume. (Of course this type of feminist criticism is itself caught in a

10. Johnson (1993), p. 3.

certain tension since it is reliant on a privileging of the

11. See Fuss (1989); Kate Soper, `Feminism, Humanism, Subjectivity

`symbolic', feminine-associated values and forms of

and the Question of Value', in Soper (1990), pp.

human interaction in its overall critique of patriarchy,

228±45; and Squires (ed.) (1993), pp. 17±30 respec-

even as it is critical of Habermas's failure to draw out

tively; also Lovibond (1989) and (1994).

the implications of his normative schema for feminist

Postmodernism'

and

`Postmodernism,

12. Soper (1990), and `Postmodernism. Subjectivity and

theory and practice.)

the Question of Value', in Squires (ed.) (1993); see

23. Burke (1961), p. 19.

also Nussbaum (1992).

24. Ibid., p. 90. 25. `A Vindication of the Rights of Men, in a Letter to the

13. See, for example, Derrida (1989), esp. p. 56f.; Spivak

Right Honourable Edmund Burke', in Wollstonecraft

(1991) and the essays in Spivak (1993).

(1989), p. 14.

14. In this respect I am pursuing the general line of response already opened up by Johnson (1993). I

26. Laquer (1990), p. 148. Cf. Outram (1995), chapter 5,

see my own survey here as offering further support

which also stresses the concern with female difference

for her claim that contemporary feminism is working

± and its contradictory implications in view of the

within a distorted and partial version of Enlighten-

Enlightenment emphasis on a universal human nature

ment and its commitment to reason.

and human history, both validated by the possession of

15. Outram (1995), p. 12.

a single human form of rationality. See also the

16. See ibid., chapter 3; cf. Margaret Jacob's argument that

discussion of the concept of the `individual' in Scott (1996), pp. 5±14.

the `two extremes of Spinozism, pantheism and materialism, lurked in the underground on both Protes-

27. Laquer (1990), pp. 149±50.

tant sides of the Channel, but from Samuel Clarke to

28. Ibid., p. 155±6.

Johannes Stinstra, Betje Wolff, and Aagje Deken,

29. Scott (1996), pp. 7±8.

godly Enlightenment ± born out of their reading of

30. As discussed in Tomaselli (1985).

the new science ± seemed a sufficient antidote to

31. Both cited in ibid., p. 109.

dogmatism,

32. Ibid., p. 117.

enthusiasm,

or

absolutism'.

Jacob

33. Ibid., pp. 118±20. Cf. Outram (1995), pp. 88±9.

(1994), p. 98.

206

LIBERALISM, FEMINISM, ENLIGHTENMENT

which threatens them if they try to go alone'. Kant

34. Kant (1963a), p. 3 (a more cutting translation of Kant

(1963a), p. 3.

(1991), p. 54). Kant continues: `After the guardians

35. See, for example, Tuveson (1960); Engell (1982); Taylor

have first made their domestic animals dumb and have

(1989), parts III and IV; Eagleton (1990), chapters 2±4.

made sure that these placid creatures will not dare take a single step without the harness of the cart to which

36. Tuveson (1960), p. 24.

they are tethered, the guardians show them the danger

37. Yolton, et al. (eds) (1991), p. 446.

207

16

FEMINISM AND WOMEN'S AUTONOMY: THE CHALLENGE OF FEMALE GENITAL CUTTING Diana Tietjens Meyers

Terminology for the multiform phenomenon I shall

euphemistic because the analogy with male circum-

discuss is itself a matter of vexed controversy. Some

cision suggests a relatively risk-free, minor procedure

scholars prefer the expression `female circumcision'

that

on the grounds that this is the expression preferred

Although one form of the female procedure is aptly

by women who are now subject to the practice. To

analogised to male circumcision, most are not.

does

not

interfere

with

sexual

pleasure.

adopt any other language, they maintain, would be

On the other hand, the morally condemnatory

to show disrespect for these women and their cultures

language, `female genital mutilation', prejudices the

and perhaps to engage in cultural imperialism. Other

Á -vis this practice. question of women's autonomy vis-a

scholars opt for medicalised terminology ± either

Since there is a presumption that a person who

`female genital surgery' or `female genital operations'.

chooses to be mutilated does not choose autono-

Still other scholars prefer the expression `female

mously, this language is question-begging in the

genital mutilation' on the grounds that no other

context of my present topic. Moreover, I suspect

language expresses the suffering inflicted by this

that Euro-Americans are attracted to this language

practice and that other labels implicitly condone a

largely because they do not imagine that women like

cruel practice that sustains male dominance by tor-

themselves have in the past consented to such

menting women.

`mutilation' and that mothers in their own society

I have adopted the expression `female genital

today continue to authorise comparable procedures

cutting' in order to address several concerns. On

on their daughters. Consequently they fail to em-

the one hand, I see the medicalised terminology and

pathise with contemporary women in other societies

the culturally relative terminology as euphemistic.

who make similar choices. Thus, I have sought

Although

expressions accurately

terminology designed to avoid denying the pain

represent the hygienic conditions of the hospitals

and impairment often associated with female genital

in which some Euro-American and African female

cutting but also to avoid presuming that women

genital cutting is performed, they give the false

involved in the practice have no autonomy.

the medicalised

impression that female genital cutting is usually a

Many Euro-Americans might doubt that there is

sanitary procedure performed with anaesthesia. Un-

any basis for ascribing autonomy to women whose

fortunately, the procedure is seldom performed under

cultures mandate female genital cutting. Yet, the

safe conditions, and it never improves women's

feminist literature on female genital cutting provides

health. The culturally relative terminology is also

ample evidence that many women exercise effective

208

FEMINISM AND WOMEN'S AUTONOMY

agency with respect to this practice. One striking

programmes may not be the most effective way to

finding is that autonomy is to be found among its

eradicate female genital cutting, they have proved

accommodators as well as resisters, and that neither

to be the most effective way to promote women's

group can be presumed to enjoy greater autonomy

autonomous control over their sexuality and health.

than the other. If this is so, one cannot identify

Finally, I consider how the cultural imperative of

autonomy or lack of it simply by looking at what

self-perpetuation entails both support for and lim-

people choose or refuse. Autonomy must dwell in the

itation of autonomy. If cultures are to meet the need

process of deciding, not in the nature of the action

for change in response to historical contingencies,

decided upon. Moreover, students of female genital

they must ensure that cultural initiates have auton-

cutting regard it as essential to avoid the trap of

omy skills that enable them to adjust their tradi-

conceding that resisters are western dupes and, as

tions. Yet, if cultures are to survive, they must

cultural outsiders, have no right to press for change,

channel exercise of these autonomy skills into

whereas accommodators are more authentically re-

constructive critique framed by cultural allegiance,

presentative of their culture of origin and, as female

and

insiders, confirm the legitimacy of the practice. To

autonomy skills which heighten discontent and

overcome this dilemma, one must resist the tempta-

precipitate defection. I argue that autonomy-aug-

tion to explain greater autonomy as a function of the

menting educational programmes succeed by devel-

reduced influence of cultures that mandate female

oping

genital cutting. Culture cannot be cast as the villain

systematically,

that paralyses some women's autonomy, nor can it be

ceived as the exercise of self-discovery, self-defini-

cast as the hero that frees women into autonomous

tion

lives. Still, in acknowledging that some social con-

culture is not only intelligible, it is a morally

texts are more conducive to autonomy than others,

defensible

students of female genital cutting spotlight the am-

autonomy for an era of global feminism.

they

must

discourage

autonomy

and

but

skills

skills,

politically

development

that

needlessly,

self-direction and

the

cultures suppressed.

of

have Con-

autonomy-within-

viable

conception

of

biguous role of culture with respect to the question of women's autonomy.

Cultural Contexts

My project is to explore the implications of these

and Female Genital Cutting

understandings of the relation between culture, female genital cutting and women's agency for

Among Euro-Americans, misapprehensions about

autonomy theory. I begin by surveying the reasons

culture and female genital cutting abound. For ex-

different cultures give for female genital cutting and

ample, many people associate female genital cutting

the different types of female genital cutting. My

with a single region, usually sub-Saharan Africa. But

purpose in exhibiting the enormous variation in

the practice is also found indigenously in North

this practice and in women's responses to it is to

America, Asia and the Middle East, and immigrants

undercut simplistic dismissals of women's autonomy

have spread their practices far and wide.

with respect to female genital cutting that rely on

misconception is that female genital cutting is rooted

attention-grabbing horror stories and generalised

in a single culture, but this is far from the case. A

theories of patriarchal domination. I then examine

highly diverse array of cultures furnish a variety of

two kinds of autonomy theory ± latitudinarian,

rationales for female genital cutting.

1

A related

value-neutral accounts and restrictive, value-satu-

Many people are astonished to learn that, among

rated accounts ± and I argue that neither approach

middle-class white Americans in the late nineteenth

adequately addresses the phenomena of women's

century and continuing into the early twentieth

autonomy

To

century, clitoridectomy was a popular and medically

bring these phenomena into focus, it is useful to

certified `cure' for hysteria, nymphomania, lesbian-

review a number of strategies for augmenting wo-

ism

men's autonomy regarding female genital cutting. I

though, there are cultural groups that practice female

urge that, although culturally anchored educational

genital cutting today for the opposite reason: they

regarding

female

genital

cutting.

209

and

`excessive'

masturbation.

2

Curiously,

DIANA TIETJENS MEYERS

believe that female genital cutting enhances women's sexual desire.

3

fies the individual and enhances her fertility, for they

More typical, though, are ra-

believe that the clitoris can kill a man if it touches

tionales similar to those formerly current in the US:

his penis or that it will kill the baby during child-

many cultural groups maintain that female genital

birth.

cutting reduces women's sexual appetite, enforces

cessary to morally appropriate fertility, and morally

norms of chastity and thereby protects family hon-

sanctioned fertility may be thought necessary to

our.

4

10

Female genital cutting may be thought ne-

producing socially and morally viable children.

11

Repressing women's sexuality is by no means the

In one Sudanese community, `son of an uncircum-

only, nor even the most frequent, reason given for

cised mother' is among the most derogatory epithets

female genital cutting. Gender regimentation is a

one can utter.

prevalent rationale, as well. From this perspective,

aesthetic standards as well as moral standards, and

the purpose of female genital cutting is to ensure that

aesthetic considerations sometimes dictate female

the individuals assigned to dichotomous gender ca-

genital cutting. A woman who belongs to a culture

tegories have anatomically suitable genitals.

that considers gaping orifices, including the mouth,

In the USA today, female genital cutting is a

12

Gender norms are associated with

distasteful asks, `which is better, an ugly opening or a 13

routine, though increasingly contested, medical in-

dignified closure?'

tervention when a condition called `ambiguous gen-

is pivotal. Some cultural groups believe that Islam

5

In some cases, religious doctrine

italia' is diagnosed. Physicians and parents generally

mandates female genital cutting and that Allah will

presume that left `untreated' an elongated clitoris

not hear a woman's prayers if she has not been cut.

will have deleterious effects on a girl's psychological development and will prove socially disabling.

6

14

Another cluster of reasons concerns intercultural

To

political relations. Within a local framework, cultur-

the extent that this negative prognosis is warranted,

al identification is sometimes cited: whether wo-

it is because contemporary US culture insists that

men's genitals are cut or not and, if they are cut,

there are only two kinds of people ± males and

how they are cut may be an important way in which

females ± and because this particular culture pre-

cultural groups inhabiting the same geographical

scribes genitalia conforming to restrictive norms for

region are differentiated.

7

15

From a global perspective,

each category. Without `corrective' demasculinising

loyalty to one's cultural roots and repudiation of

surgery, it is thought that a genetic female endowed

western influence are sometimes cited: female genital

with `ambiguous' genitalia will be unable to attain a

cutting was often seen as testifying to opposition to

feminine identity. The theme of demasculinisation is

colonialism and more recently as affirming indigen-

also found in some non-western cultures. Anticipat-

ous tradition in the face of western contempt for

ing Freud, those cultures view the clitoris as a mascu-

non-western cultures and western economic and

line organ and therefore regard excision as necessary

cultural penetration.

to achieving a feminine gender identity.

8

16

World-

Although cultural rationales for female genital

wide, it seems, people believe that babies can be born

cutting can be classified according to the broad

with `unnatural', though not sexually or reproduc-

themes of sexual repression, gender identity, and

tively dysfunctional, genitalia.

group cohesion, there is no uniformity whatsoever

Whereas American culture currently mandates

in the specifics. This heterogeneity is echoed in the

female genital cutting as a corrective for what it

variety of forms that female genital cutting takes.

deems `abnormal' genitalia, members of many other

Many Euro-Americans believe that female genital

cultural groups regard female genital cutting as an

cutting is a single procedure, but this is not true. In

indispensable rite of passage through which all girls

addition to western cosmetic procedures designed to

must pass in order to attain the identity and the

`feminise' ostensibly male genitalia, practices range

status of women. Some see female genital cutting as a

from sunna ± that is removal of the clitoral prepuce ±

test of courage and endurance that prepares the

to infibulation ± that is excision of the clitoris, the

individual for labour pains and birthing.

9

Others

labia minora and the labia majora and suturing the

contend that female genital cutting physically puri-

remaining tissue together to create a minuscule

210

FEMINISM AND WOMEN'S AUTONOMY

orifice.

17

Correlated with this spectrum of outcomes

Á -vis female genital cutting cannot rest on my vis-a

is a spectrum of health risks in the immediate after-

generalisations about the severity of the outcome, for

math of the procedure and a spectrum of long-term

the medical and psychosexual consequences vary

consequences for women's sexuality, physical health,

substantially. Women's autonomy with respect to

and psychological well-being. Moreover, different

female genital cutting cannot be ruled out on the

groups perform the cutting procedure at different

grounds that no one could freely choose the endan-

ages ± some on infants or very young girls, some on

germent and impairment resulting from these pro-

adolescents. Adult women participate in this prac-

cedures, for the consequences are not always grave.

tice not only by authorising and/or carrying out the

Nor can one assume that the reasons women have for

procedure but also, in groups where infibulation is

either accommodating or resisting female genital

the rule, by agreeing to reinfibulation after child-

cutting are consistent across cultural groups. So a

birth. It is a mistake, then, to suppose that female

theory of women's autonomy that is applicable to

genital cutting has the same impact on all affected

societies in which female genital cutting is practiced

women's lives.

cannot rely on ascriptions of particular reasons to the

Finally, it is necessary to dispel some prevalent

women who are subject to this practise. The content

misconceptions about culture. The misconception

of women's deliberations cannot settle the question

that most incenses non-western women is the `other-

of their autonomy, for the reasons they invoke are

ing' of the very idea of culture ± that is the supposi-

not uniform.

tion that culture itself is a non-western phenomenon

It is clear that some cultural groups pre-empt girls'

and that westerners are not themselves enculturated.

autonomy by cutting their genitals when they are

Alternatively,

that

young and helpless. However, female genital cutting

everyone is enculturated yet assume that, unlike

westerners

is part of an adolescent initiation rite in many

western cultures in which dissent is tolerated and

cultural groups. Although it is troubling that these

cultural change is ongoing, non-western cultures are

girls may have little experience of their own genital

homogeneous and static.

18

may

acknowledge

Nothing could be farther

eroticism and presumably have no experience of the

from the case. Members of a cultural group do not

interpersonal intimacies that this sexual responsive-

think and live in lockstep. Within cultural groups,

ness makes possible, it is doubtful that girls of this age

interpretations of cultural beliefs vary, and so do

altogether lack autonomy.

interpretations of cultural practices. Drawing on the

participate in this practice as midwife practitioners,

countless beliefs and practices that constitute a

as mothers who arrange female genital cutting for

culture ± beliefs and practices that are in some

their daughters and as postpartum mothers who

respects in tension with one another ± and accenting

request reinfibulation. It is important to bear in

and linking some of these beliefs and practices while

mind, as well, that during the nineteenth century

de-emphasising or isolating others, people individua-

many adult Euro-American women anxiously sought

lise their cultural heritage. As a result, traditionalists

relief from psychopathology or sexual deviance and

often coexist, albeit uneasily, with nonconformists.

willingly underwent clitoridectomy. Whatever one

Moreover, the survival of cultures depends on their

may think of juvenile agency, these women's agency

capacity to modify their beliefs and practices to meet

must be analysed on its own merits.

20

Likewise, adult women

new contingencies, and their capacity to adjust

It is wrong, moreover, to assume that all female

depends in part on the internal variegation I have

members of cultural groups that practice female

described.

19

genital cutting collaborate with this practice. Wo-

A seamless, timeless culture is a dead

men are not in the grip of totalising, internalised

culture. This brief survey of the anthropological back-

cultures which drive them to comply with a female

ground of female genital cutting is sufficient to

genital cutting imperative. There are many instances

demonstrate the daunting complexity of analysing

of individual women persuading their families not to

women's agentic position with respect to this prac-

uphold the practice, and instances of women orga-

tice. Evidently, judgements about women's autono-

nising against female genital cutting are on the rise.

211

DIANA TIETJENS MEYERS

Although data about the prevalence of female geni-

what their capacities and limitations actually are,

tal cutting is disputable, it is quite possible that

and so forth ± and they enact this introspective

adherence to the practice is waning. Accordingly,

understanding of their `true' selves in their lives.

to declare women who belong to cultural groups that

There is a good fit between their identity, their

practice female genital cutting devoid of autonomy

attitudes toward themselves and their conduct. Col-

would be to deny existing opportunities for choice

loquial expressions, such as `I feel at one with myself'

and to erase the real, sometimes courageous, choices

and `I feel right in my skin' voice this sense of

women have actually made.

integration. As these idioms suggest, living autono-

Women exercise agency, then, both by complying

mously is satisfying, sometimes exhilarating. Subjec-

with and by resisting female genital cutting. A theory

tively, then, the value of autonomy stems from the

of women's autonomy must take these realities into

fascination of self-discovery and the gratification of

account, but it must also ask whether women have as

self-determination. Objectively, it rests on the dig-

much autonomy as they should have with respect to

nity of the distinctive individual and the wondrous

female genital cutting.

diversity of the lives individuals may fashion for themselves. A second aim an account of autonomy should

Female Genital Cutting's

fulfil is to explicate the nature of the personal and

Challenge to Autonomy Theory

social costs of suppressing autonomy. Individuals

The phenomenon of female genital cutting presents

experience lack of autonomy as a sense of being

two opposed temptations for autonomy theory. On

out of control or being under the control of others ±

the one hand, latitudinarian, value-neutral accounts

whether other identifiable individuals or anonymous

of autonomy ± whether rational choice models or

societal powers. At odds with themselves, at odds

hierarchical identification models ± are attractive

with their behaviour, or both, non-autonomous in-

because they do not withhold respect from women

dividuals often feel anxious about their choices,

who accommodate female genital cutting by impugn-

contemptuous of themselves and disappointed with

ing these women's ability to make their own judge-

their lives. Alternatively, they may simply feel hol-

ments and choices. On the other hand, restrictive,

low, for they may feel they have been made into

value-saturated accounts of autonomy that deny that

vehicles for projects that they do not disavow but

people can be both oppressed and autonomous are

that are not their own. In one way or another, non-

attractive because, in claiming that false conscious-

autonomous individuals suffer from alienation from

ness blocks the self-determination of women in

self. I would add, moreover, that societies that are

cultures that mandate female genital cutting, they

not conducive to autonomy incur a moral loss since

highlight the harsh personal cost of living under such

they thwart (or try to thwart) insightful social cri-

oppressive

tique. When a society discourages self-exploration

social

regimes.

Neither

of

these

ap-

and self-expression, it discourages attention to symp-

proaches is ultimately convincing, however. Preliminary to characterising the weaknesses of

toms of discontent and shields social ideologies and

these approaches, it is useful to review what an

institutions from probing examination and opposi-

account of autonomy should accomplish. An ac-

tional activism. Autonomy exposes the need for

count of autonomy aims principally to explicate

social change and equips people to pursue it.

an especially valuable mode of living. That mode

I shall not linger long over latitudinarian, value-

of living is captured in a number of familiar expres-

neutral views for their weaknesses have been diag-

sions: `she lives by her own lights'; `he is his own

nosed and elaborated elsewhere. Briefly, rational

man'; `she's always been true to herself'; and the like.

choice views take people's desires, values and goals

Autonomous individuals are not mere conformists.

for granted and identify autonomy with devising

They need not be eccentric, but they do rely on their

plans

own judgement. They know who they are ± what

identification

really matters to them, who they deeply care about,

scrutiny in light of second-order volitions and link

212

that

maximise

satisfaction.

21

Hierarchical

views subject first-order

desires

to

FEMINISM AND WOMEN'S AUTONOMY

autonomy to reconciling the two levels to achieve a harmonious whole.

22

Babbitt is correct to say that the categories of Mister's

Both types of theory neglect

ideology provide no direct, authoritative way for

the possibility that an oppressive social context

Celie to assert her moral status, but it is evident

could subvert people's autonomy by imparting detri-

that Celie is able to give her knowledge a proposi-

mental desires, values and goals or warping people's

tional form and to encode her knowledge in intel-

second-order volitions. Such theories make no ade-

ligible speech.

quate provision for `authenticating' the concepts and

Oppression deprives Celie of conventions ± read-

commitments that structure one's interpretations

ily available, generally accepted discursive formulae

and propel one's deliberations and choices. In con-

± through which she can articulate her convictions,

trast, restrictive, value-saturated accounts of auton-

protests and aspirations.

omy, such as Susan Babbitt's and Paul Benson's,

knowledge, oppressed people must resort to circum-

insist on the need to distinguish real from apparent

locution, devise figures of speech and work to re-

desires and authentic values from spurious ones, and

define

they draw these distinctions by placing constraints

understanding, interpersonal relations and moral

on what people can autonomously choose.

reflection. Thus, they must summon extraordinary

the

terms

28

To articulate their self-

that

frame

intrapersonal

According to Susan Babbitt, ideological oppres-

imaginative and linguistic powers if they are to gain a

sion instils preferences and desires that do not ade-

rich understanding of who they are and why their

quately reflect an interest in one's own flourishing

needs and desires deserve respect. Nevertheless, in

and that prevent one from pursuing one's `objective

light of her defiant self-recognition and her poignant

interests' even when one is aware that one has an

self-assertion, it seems doubtful that Celie lacks an

option to pursue them.

23

The problem, claims Bab-

`adequate' sense of self. I see no reason, then, not to

bitt, is the individual's `not possessing a sense of self

trust her to sort out her own values and goals and

that would support a full sense of flourishing' ± that is

conduct her own life. Still, it is undeniable that Celie's social context is

one has been deprived of a precondition for wanting 24

Although the

doing everything possible to stifle her autonomy and

oppressed have non-propositional knowledge ± that

to defeat her. Likewise, women who demand reinfi-

is, knowledge in the form of intuitions, attitudes,

bulation because it is beautiful, because it is a pre-

ways of behaving and so on ± that adumbrates their

condition for womanly virtue, because it is `our way'

objective interests, this knowledge is inexpressible

or because the World Health Organisation is trying

within the existing ideological regime and is not

to force us to stop doing it hardly enjoy cultural

to pursue one's objective interests.

25

Mute and

environments that encourage them to do what they

subjugated, the agency of these individuals can only

think is best for themselves. For this reason, I expect,

be

Paul Benson would argue that attributing autonomy

translatable into autonomous action. salvaged

through

`transformative

experiences'

that, as it were, upgrade their selfhood.

26

to these women betokens a `Pollyanaish' confidence in their agentic capabilities.

I doubt that oppression renders people's non-

According to Benson, `certain forms of socialisa-

propositional knowledge inexpressible. In fact, I

29

think one of Babbitt's examples amply demonstrates

tion are oppressive and clearly lessen autonomy.'

my point. Commenting on Alice Walker's novel

There are two forms that oppressive socialisation

about domestic violence, The Color Purple, Babbitt

takes: (1) coercive socialisation that inflicts penalties

claims that Celie's knowledge that she is a morally

for noncompliance with unjustifiable norms; and (2)

worthy person is non-propositional and inexpressi-

socialisation that instils false beliefs which prevent

ble. I would argue that Celie's knowledge indeed

people from discerning genuine reasons for acting.

stems from non-propositional sources, her feelings,

Autonomous people are `competent criticisers' who

attitudes and perhaps her intuitions. But, as Babbitt

can `detect and appreciate the reasons there are to

reports, when taunted by Mister ± `You nothing at

act in various ways.'

all' ± Celie trenchantly replies, `I'm pore, I'm black, I

systematically obviates and obfuscates victims' rea-

may be ugly and can't cook . . . but I'm here.'

27

31

30

But oppressive socialisation

sons for acting. As Benson puts it, oppressive socia-

213

DIANA TIETJENS MEYERS

each of these groups who have experienced compar-

lisation limits in `well-organised ways what sorts of 32

More-

ably oppressive socialisation. Undeniably, they have

over, bi-directional integration ± that is, mutual

more to overcome in order to attain autonomy than

adjustment and reconciliation of first-order desires

some other women, for they must mobilise extra-

and second-order volitions about first-order desires ±

ordinary introspective and volitional powers to figure

is no guarantee of autonomy, for oppressive sociali-

out what they really want and to act on their own

sation could implant such deficient values that a

desires. But it is hard to believe that none of them

person could have degraded first-order desires that

chooses autonomously.

reasons to act people are able to recognise.'

would

by second-order

The fact is that we are all immersed in a culture at

Internalised oppressive socialisation, it

a historical moment. How do we know that some of

nonetheless be endorsed

volitions.

33

us have attained adequate selfhood and thus have

seems, can `shanghai' a person's entire life. Presumably, Benson would conclude that, because

the epistemic perspective needed to grasp what full

of their socialisation, the many women who do not

flourishing is like? How do we know that some of us

repudiate female genital cutting have defective rea-

have highly developed, acutely sensitive reason-de-

son-detection faculties ± defective at least in so far as

tection faculties and thus have the epistemic skills

they are oblivious to the `decisive' force of the

needed to determine what cannot be a good reason

reasons against this practice ± and thus that they

to act or what is a dispositive reason to act? It seems

have been deprived of autonomy at least with respect

to me that we would need far more consensus than

34

But I would urge that Benson's grim

we presently have (or are likely to get) about human

assessment of the sinister potency of oppressive

nature and social justice before we could conclude

socialisation exaggerates the impact of socialisation

that women who opt for compliance with female

generally. It just isn't true that oppressive socialisa-

genital cutting norms never do so autonomously. We

tion always decreases autonomy. Some people be-

would have to be persuaded, in other words, that all

come

them

women's interests are such that this decision could

flourish in that role. In cases of firebrand, adven-

not accord with any woman's authentic values and

ture-loving resisters, one suspects they would have

desires under any circumstances. If we are prepared to

had a hard time fitting in and living autonomously if

acknowledge that a woman who has undergone

they had been born into a just society during peace-

oppressive socialisation but who rebels against its

time. Other people carve out lives that enact `in-

dictates may be accessing her authentic values and

appropriate'

the

desires and acting autonomously, it seems to me that

constraints that society imposes. They find pockets

we cannot rule out a priori the possibility that a

of lapsed surveillance or permissiveness within op-

similarly socialised woman who chooses otherwise

pressive regimes and devise ways to express their

may be autonomous, too.

to this choice.

oppositional

values

activists,

in

the

and

some

interstices

of

of

those

In sum, restrictive, value-saturated accounts of

spaces. Still others endorse at least some of the values

autonomy are troubling because they homogenise

upon which oppressive constraints are based and on

authentic selves and autonomous lives. The para-

balance accept the constraints and conform their

doxical effect of ahistorically, acontextually foreor-

lives to them. We find all of these possibilities

daining

represented in connection with female genital cut-

autonomously choose is to deindividualise autonomy.

ting ± women fleeing their homeland and seeking

Yet, latitudinarian, value-neutral accounts of auton-

asylum to avoid having their genitals cut or to

omy are troubling, too. On this view, failures of

protect their daughters from cutting, women orga-

autonomy are failures to obtain and take into ac-

nising locally and nationally to modify or eradicate

count relevant information, or they are failures to

female genital cutting, women concluding that cul-

integrate one's values, desires and the like into a

tural tradition and cohesion or getting married and

coherent outlook and a feasible course of action. The

bearing children are more important than bodily

paradoxical effect of neglecting the possibility that a

integrity. I would venture that there are women in

well integrated, smoothly functioning self could be in

unorthodox

values

and

commitments

in

214

what

individuals

can

and

cannot

FEMINISM AND WOMEN'S AUTONOMY

need of rigorous scrutiny and drastic overhaul is to

and their awareness of their own sexual impairment.

abandon the individual to the influence of a culture's

Likewise, health education can kindle cognitive

prevailing beliefs and practices. Such a view over-

dissonance by highlighting potential conflicts be-

simplifies self-alienation and blunts autonomy's po-

tween women's desire to bear children and their

tential to spur social critique. Neither of these

commitment to female genital cutting, which can

approaches offers a compelling theory of individua-

reduce fertility.

lised autonomous living.

quiry into the symbolic meanings that one's culture

38

Programmes designed to elicit en-

attaches to female genital cutting have proved effective, too.

Autonomy-Augmenting Programmes

39

An international organisation called

Women Living Under Muslim Laws has developed

and Female Genital Cutting

educational

strategies

that

encourage

women

to

Feminist students of female genital cutting have

analyse and reconstruct their own identities within

analysed a number of programmes that have en-

their cultures. Through education, this organisation

hanced women's autonomy in regard to this practice.

seeks to debunk the myth of one universal Muslim

Moreover, they have proposed legal reforms, and

identity and to offer women the opportunity to read

they have documented the effects of social trends

and interpret Islam's sacred texts for themselves.

on female genital cutting. I shall briefly survey this

discovering how differently women live under dif-

literature with the aim of using it as a springboard for

ferent Islamic regimes and how weak the tie between

developing an account of women's autonomy-with-

Islamic scripture and current religious doctrines re-

in-culture.

quiring female genital cutting actually is, many

40

In

My reading of this literature suggests that educa-

women realise that they could modify their beliefs

tion is the least controversial and most effective

regarding female genital cutting without sacrificing

approach to augmenting women's autonomy regard-

their religious beliefs. Intellectual and emotional

ing female genital cutting, but the success of this

space hospitable to envisaging a different conception

approach depends on the nature of the educational

of the ethics and aesthetics of womanhood is thus

programme. Again and again, scholars stress the need

opened.

for grassroots participation in conceiving the aims of

Sometimes women become convinced that they

educational initiatives, in formulating educational

can flourish as women with their genitals intact.

agendas and in devising educational presentations

Kenyan women and their families have created

and materials. Phrases like `education for critical

`circumcision through words' rituals in which cultur-

consciousness' and `emancipatory education' imply

al teachings about womanhood are transmitted and

the need for institutionalising self-determination at

girls' entrance into womanhood is celebrated, but the

the founding and throughout the implementation of

traditional cutting is eliminated.

education programmes.

35

41

Sometimes wo-

This imperative has been

men remain convinced that female genital cutting is

put in practice through dialogic programme planning

necessary, but they alter the practice either by re-

and dialogic `classrooms' and also by adopting cul-

ducing it to a symbolic pricking or by medicalising

turally familiar media for `instruction'.

36

it.

Songs, plays

42

Sometimes they insist on upholding tradition.

and puppet shows followed by exploratory discussion

Hofriyati women whose husbands have returned

sessions often replace lectures and rote learning.

from working in Saudi Arabia convinced that in-

Experience shows that many women are receptive

fibulation is contrary to Islam and that sunna is the

to information about the health risks associated with

religiously sanctioned form of female genital cutting

female genital cutting.

37

have resisted the ensuing pressure to adopt the less

Successful educational pro-

43

grammes often capitalise on women's dissonant ex-

extreme practice.

perience

For

ritual surrounding female genital cutting not only

example, health education can juxtapose women's

confers the status of womanhood on the initiate but

commitment to female genital cutting with their

also creates lifelong social bonds among the girls who

awareness of traumatic outcomes (sometimes deaths)

undergo the ritual together. Thus another important

Á -vis vis-a

female

genital

cutting.

215

In some cultural groups, the

DIANA TIETJENS MEYERS

task of educational programmes has been to create

point out that these two strategies are not necessarily

substitutes for the `age groups' established by female

compatible with cultural perpetuation, and they do

genital cutting. In central Kenya, the social benefits

not necessarily ensure increased autonomy for wo-

formerly delivered by age groups ± solidarity among

men. Endowing women with the right to penalise

women and consolidation of women's social author-

female genital cutting practitioners pits women from

ity ± are now secured by women's self-help economic

the same cultural group against one another and pre-

organisations.

44

empts the possibility of their working together to

In addition to such culturally attuned, participa-

transform cultural norms and obtain economically

tory education, we also find more coercive legal and

viable employment. Some women may gain auton-

social forces at work. Female genital cutting is pro-

omy. But their gains may be made at the expense of

hibited in a number of countries where the practice

other women's autonomy, and relying on the na-

has been common. However, the history of crim-

tional judiciary to make these gains may short-circuit

inalising female genital cutting and disseminating

cultural processes through which womanhood might

information about women's legal rights does not

be redefined without shattering all continuity with

inspire confidence in this approach. Either these

traditional conceptions of womanhood. While some

measures have had little impact or they have in-

women's autonomy may be enhanced, their auton-

tensified reactionary traditionalism.

45

But legal sanc-

omy may be dissociated from their culture of origin.

tions could take a different form. One scholar, Asma

More obviously, social and economic mobility

Mohammed A'Haleem, proposes that laws be passed

gained through geographic mobility often dissolves

giving adult women the right to sue the practitioners

networks of mutual recognition and shared beliefs

who cut their genitals when they were children.

46

As

and practices that are necessary to sustain cultures.

a precedent for her proposal, she points to the

Migration

passage of parallel laws protecting women from

norms in one's new place of residence and work.

compulsory marriage. Women who were adequately

Assimilation weakens, if it does not sever, one's ties

informed of these laws frequently went to court and

to one's culture of origin. Some women who move to

sued to enforce their rights.

47

often

leads

to

assimilating

prevalent

Perhaps women would

urban areas and marry into families with different

also avail themselves of rights to seek compensation

cultural backgrounds gain greater autonomy by aban-

from female genital cutting practitioners, which

doning their own culture and becoming integrated

would discourage women from entering this trade

into a more congenial cultural milieu. Others suffer a

and encourage practitioners to find other sources of

loss of autonomy. They find their cherished beliefs

income. It seems clear, however, that whereas legal

denigrated or derided; they experience a sense of

measures produce mixed results, urbanisation and

dislocation and disorientation, and they are blocked

industrialisation predictably curtail female genital

from enacting values they consider authentically

cutting. In Nigeria, for example, one report shows

their own.

how the rise of western-style education has led to a

What these observations show, I would urge, is

marked decline in female genital cutting. Busy with

how important it is to bear in mind the difference

book-learning and preoccupied by extracurricular

between eradicating the practice of female genital

activities, girls have no time at puberty for lengthy

cutting and augmenting women's autonomy with

seclusion periods and ceremonies.

48

respect to female genital cutting.

As education,

50

Ceasing to be

employment, and marriage increasingly take place

subject to a cultural imperative mandating female

away from girls' communities of origin, the power of

genital cutting does not in itself constitute increased

cultural tradition wanes and the incidence of female

autonomy. The educational programmes I described

genital cutting plummets.

49

may well try the patience of feminists who are (in my

I do not object to social and economic mobility

opinion, justifiably) appalled at the harm inflicted by

provided that individuals welcome it and benefit

female genital cutting. Yet, these programmes have a

from it, nor do I object to using law to bring about

distinct advantage from the standpoint of autonomy,

ameliorative social change. Still, it is important to

for they are designed to engage women's autonomy

216

FEMINISM AND WOMEN'S AUTONOMY

skills without exposing them to autonomy-disabling

practices. Thus, serviceable cultures nurture those

cultural alienation. In short, these programmes pro-

autonomy skills that people need to get along within

mote autonomy-within-culture.

their existing cultural framework and those that they need to improvise adjustments when circumstances render long-standing cultural beliefs and practices

Autonomy-within-Culture

untenable. However, in so far as cultures perpetuate

Michelle Moody-Adams points out that successful

injustice by selectively suppressing autonomy skills, I

cultures must preserve people's capacities for the ex-

would insist that they are not merely regulating

ercise of judgement and discretion.

51

people's capacity for judgement and discretion, but

`Any culture that

rather that they are impairing it.

worked to impair these capacities', she adds, `would be 52

I agree

It seems to me that cultures do this in two main

that a viable culture cannot turn its adherents into

ways. First, cultures furnish repertories of concepts

indoctrinated automatons who cannot question cul-

and interpretive schemas that focus perception and

tural beliefs and practices and who cannot instigate

shape reflection. Thus, cultures lead people to notice

creating the conditions for its own demise.'

53

cultural change.

some phenomena and overlook others, and they lead

Still, I find Moody-Adams' view of

people to ascribe certain meanings to their experi-

autonomy-within-culture overly sanguine. A thriving culture must evolve, but it must persist

ence and to disregard other possible meanings. Sec-

as well. If cultures are self-perpetuating systems, they

ond, cultures valorise some autonomy skills over

must have in-built mechanisms that shield their

others. Hence they commend child-rearing practices

beliefs and practices from criticism so zealous and

that nurture these skills and establish social struc-

damning that it triggers cultural decline or foments

tures that reward individuals who have them, and

mass defection. The slightest acquaintance with hu-

they let other autonomy skills languish. The fa-

man history confirms that cultures need not depend

voured autonomy skills are skills that enable people

on the justice of their beliefs and practices to secure

to function well in their cultural context, and the

the loyalty of their adherents. Indeed, cultures, in-

repertories of concepts and interpretive schemas

cluding the most unjust ones, may have a willing co-

provide input for these deliberation skills that is

conspirator in human psychology. People commonly

pre-selected and pre-processed in culturally conge-

exhibit a conservative bent ± preferring the known

nial ways. The disfavoured autonomy skills are skills

over the unknown, even preferring the security of

that might lead people to question the adequacy of

having more or less mastered coping with a known

the culturally approved repertory of concepts and

evil over the risk of being thrown off balance by

interpretive schemas and, perhaps, to condemn their

whatever might succeed it. Still, this conservative

cultural heritage.

culturally

For example, middle-class Euro-American culture

abetted. Cultures ward off the perils of internal

prizes means/ends rationality and vigorously culti-

dissension and disruption by circumscribing adher-

vates the skills needed to pick goals with high

ents' exercise of autonomy skills. Adroitly channel-

satisfaction yields and to plot successful goal-directed

ling exercise of these skills where they are needed

campaigns. In this culture, however, valorised auton-

while limiting the scope of their application enables

omy skills are gendered. Although child-rearing

cultures to evolve and endure.

practices and reward structures do not extinguish

disposition

is

to

a

significant

degree

Moody-Adams might reply that what I have de-

means/ends rationality in middle-class Euro-Amer-

scribed is not impairment of capacities for judgement

ican girls, their interpersonal skills are accentuated. I

and discretion. On the contrary, she might say,

confess I do not know which autonomy skills are

cultures guide and modulate the exercise of auton-

valorised in the innumerable cultures that practise

omy skills, and rightly so. To some extent, I would

female genital cutting. But I believe it is possible to

not take exception to this rejoinder. No doubt,

infer which autonomy skills they devalue in women

cultures exist because people cannot lead fulfilling

by examining the education programmes that aug-

lives without stable systems of shared beliefs and

ment women's autonomy.

217

DIANA TIETJENS MEYERS

Successful educational programmes mobilise wo-

and vividly apprehend the American mother's dis-

men's introspection, empathy and imagination skills.

tress about her daughter's purportedly unnatural

One programme invited women to explore their

condition and her worries about the problems she

feelings about their sexuality ± their sufferings, their

expects her daughter will encounter if her `patholo-

frustrations, and their disappointments, as well as

gical' genitals are left untreated. It is easy, then, to

their pleasures ± and to sift through the possible

understand her decision to authorise surgery. Indeed,

54

In effect, this pro-

many middle-class Euro-Americans might find with-

gramme encourages women to acknowledge the

holding permission to operate incomprehensible or

complexity of their emotional lives and to take their

irresponsible.

meanings of these stirrings.

own subjectivity seriously. Another programme ca-

Sometimes when I start a conversation with a

pitalised on situations in which local girls and wo-

middle-class Euro-American acquaintance by elicit-

men

and invited

ing empathy along the lines I have just sketched and

women to empathise with the suffering of the in-

by eliciting reflection on the reasons for the ease of

fected individuals and the grief of the families of girls

this empathy, it proves possible for my acquaintance

and women who died. Instead of rationalising the

to transfer this understanding to the larger issue of

pain and dismissing the sorrow as passing, women

female genital cutting. Sensitised to the role that

were freed to regard such suffering as significant and

western gender norms are playing in one's empathy

had become

55

infected

or

died

Some programmes invite women to

for the American mother, one now appreciates how

imagine the lives of women whose cultures are

potent culturally specific feminine bodily norms are,

different but whose religion is the same as their

and one can sympathetically reconstruct how a

avoidable.

56

Sharing a religion builds a bridge to empathy

vastly different set of norms could figure in an

with these cultural strangers and provides a link that

African mother's feelings and decision about infibu-

legitimates using empathic understanding of these

lation. Thus empathy with a fellow cultural initiate

other women's lives to reflect critically on one's own

and introspective reflection on how culture facil-

experience and culture.

itates one's empathy for this individual make it

own.

I suspect that these educational programmes owe

possible to empathise with a woman from a different

their success to synergy among introspection, em-

culture and to interpret her subjectivity and choices

pathy and imagination. Empathy with others can

charitably.

embolden one to confront and enrich one's inter-

Narrow categories and prejudicial values often

pretation of one's own experience, and insightful

distort or block introspection and empathy. Yet,

introspection can facilitate empathy with other peo-

opportunities to examine one's subjective experience

ple's experience and equip one to interpret their

with supportive associates, to discover hidden simi-

experience sympathetically and respectfully. As evi-

larities between others' experience and one's own,

dence, let me offer a sequence I have observed.

and to talk about unorthodox ideas in a safe envir-

Most middle-class Euro-Americans initially find it

onment can correct and deepen both self-knowledge

virtually impossible to empathise with an African

and insight into others. Introspection and empathy

mother who consents to and actively participates in

can expand one's repertoire of concepts and inter-

the infibulation of her daughter. Yet these indivi-

pretive schemas beyond the culturally furnished

duals typically find it easy to empathise with an

stock. The educational programmes I have described

American mother who consents to reconstructive

suggest that this struggle for introspective and em-

surgery on a daughter whose genitals are considered

pathic access and for language that adequately ex-

ambiguous. Not only does one assume that surgery in

presses

the US will be performed under sterile conditions

undertaken as an open-ended, collective endea-

and that anaesthesia will be used, but also one is

vour.

oneself imbued with the same image of an appro-

individuals to novel viewpoints that may never have

priately gendered female body that is guiding the

occurred to each of them separately, but also the

American mother's decision. Thus one can readily

sharing of conclusions and the process of reaching

57

218

one's

new-found

knowledge

is

best

Not only does interaction with others expose

FEMINISM AND WOMEN'S AUTONOMY

them infuses these dissident views with an authority

omy that alienation from one's culture and isolation

they might otherwise lack. It seems, in sum, that

from other members of one's cultural group can

women who participate in these educational pro-

inflict. Still, I would be remiss if I did not acknowl-

grammes gain intellectual tools and self-confidence,

edge that Babbitt and Benson bring out important

and that they license themselves to recirculate their

dimensions of women's autonomy with respect to

discoveries and use them to refurbish or jettison

female genital cutting, and these insights into wo-

traditional beliefs and practices. Introspection and

men's autonomy lend support to a skills-based, pro-

empathy thus emancipate their imaginations. Beliefs

cessual account of autonomy.

and practices that once seemed degraded and abhor-

Benson's chief contribution to a theory of wo-

rent can now be pictured as constituting an honour-

men's autonomy over female genital cutting rests on

able and fulfilling way of life.

his observation that oppressive socialisation compartmentalises critical skills and receptivity to rea-

The capacity for imagination is complex, for it

58

recruits subsidiary skills and orchestrates them. In-

sons.

trospection and empathy can spark imagination, as

competence with respect to her education but not

can dialogic and consensus-building skills. More-

with respect to her appearance.

over, imagination depends on the concepts one

seen that cultures place female genital cutting be-

has at one's disposal and the meanings one associates

yond the purview of women's introspection, empathy

with phenomena. Prescriptive norms shape imagina-

and imagination skills, yet they rely on women to

tion. Thus, cultures can limit imagination by furnish-

exercise these very skills in other areas of life such as

ing an impoverished repertoire of concepts and

child-rearing. Although the importance of introspec-

interpretive schemas, by stunting the development

tion, empathy and imagination for gaining autonomy

of skills that contribute to imagination, or by deva-

over female genital cutting suggests that it would be a

luing imagination itself. My hypothesis, then, is that

mistake to confine autonomy skills to critical reason-

cultures that mandate female genital cutting either

ing and the need for cultures to deflect exercise of

altogether devalue imagination in women or else

autonomy skills away from culturally destructive uses

value imagination in women only when it is serving

suggests that it would also be a mistake to suppose

specific approved purposes. In the latter case, cul-

that only oppressive enculturation compartmenta-

tures may foster the subsidiary skills that imagination

lises autonomy skills, it is true that cultures' self-

enlists only in so far as these skills promote the

protective

condoned forms of imaginative activity.

and that these devices can have deleterious effects

His example is a woman who exercises critical

devices

include

59

Similarly, we have

compartmentalisation

A culture's ultimate defensive weapon is to make

on autonomy. Indeed, it seems to me that the success

alternative ways of life unimaginable or imaginable

of the educational programmes I discussed is due in

only as bizarre or loathsome specimens. There is no

part to their effectiveness in decompartmentalising

more effective way to galvanise cultural allegiance

and redirecting autonomy skills that women already

than to suppress people's ability to imagine a pro-

have.

foundly different life as a life they might gladly lead.

Babbitt claims that altered settings can prompt

There is no better evidence, I would add, that

transformative experiences that enhance autonomy,

cultures typically perpetuate themselves by impairing

and this view is borne out to some extent by the line

empathy with cultural outsiders and thwarting ima-

of thought I have presented. I would take issue with

gination of cultural alternatives than the fact that

her, though, when she allows that foisting a new set

ethnocentricity and xenophobia are as rampant and

of opportunities on people is an ethical and effica-

virulent as they are.

cious way to increase their autonomy.

60

That legal

Whereas I am convinced that Moody-Adams

reforms and social or economic upheaval produce

overestimates the autonomy proficiency that viable

mixed results for women's autonomy over female

cultures must secure, I am convinced that the two

genital cutting raises doubts about the defensibility

restrictive, value-saturated theories of autonomy I

of manipulating the context of women's choices.

discussed earlier underestimate the damage to auton-

Since

219

autonomy-augmenting

educational

pro-

DIANA TIETJENS MEYERS

grammes are typically developed by cultural initiates

their values and commitments before they partici-

who rely on traditional modes of expression and

pate in such programmes. Understanding autonomy

appeal to traditional values, it is reasonable to sur-

as I have proposed, then, makes sense of the claim

mise that autonomy is best extended by avoiding

that women

cultural alienation and by building on women's

cutting are not without autonomy. But this under-

61

who

are

subject to

female

genital

Still, I agree with Babbitt

standing of autonomy entails neither endorsement

that women's participation in these educational

of female genital cutting nor resignation to its

programmes can be transformative, for breaking

persistence. Since cultures that practise female gen-

through the barriers erected by a culturally trans-

ital cutting may have selectively nurtured and stifled

mitted cognitive system can radically reconfigure

women's autonomy skills, and since these cultures

perception and open previously unthinkable vistas

may shield the issue of female genital cutting from

of reflection and choice.

exercise of autonomy skills, developing and coordi-

existing autonomy skills.

nating women's autonomy skills and extending the

Successful educational programmes embody four

range

assumptions about autonomy:

of

application

of

these

skills

are

key

to

augmenting their autonomy. Individuals may identify

1. Autonomy is best understood as socially situ-

points

of

self-estrangement

±

doubts

about

ated ± that is, as autonomy-within-culture.

values or tensions between private feelings and

2. Autonomy couples self-discovery and avowal

conduct ± and decide to revise their convictions and openly oppose tradition. They may find them-

with choice and self-redefinition.

selves unconflicted about their cultural heritage and

3. Gaining autonomy consists of exercising a

renew their traditionalist convictions from a broader

complex set of skills. 4. One's authentic values and real desires are

perspective. Or they may pursue some nuanced,

those that emerge as one exercises autonomy

intermediate path, embarking upon a process of

skills.

renegotiating

and

revitalising

cultural

traditions.

Although no uniform outcome is guaranteed, the From their inception, autonomy-augmenting pro-

trend when the scope of women's autonomy is

grammes regard women in cultures that practise

expanded has been towards erosion of the practice

female genital cutting as self-determining indivi-

of female genital cutting. This skills-based, proces-

duals. Since it is obvious that these women have

sual view of autonomy insists on respecting people

some degree of proficiency with respect to auton-

as self-determining agents and refuses to prejudge

omy

empathy,

what values and practices autonomous people can

before these programmes ever become available, it

endorse. Nevertheless, this view does not collapse

is clear that they have some understanding of what

into indifference to values or cynicism about social

matters to them and how best to proceed in light of

reform.

skills,

such

as

introspection

and

62

Notes

1. Toubia (1995), p. 21; Obiora (1997), p. 298.

nises are considered too small or who lack testicles. It is

2. Gifford (1994), pp. 334, 361; James (1998), p. 1037.

worth noting, though, that gender symmetry is not

3. Ogbu (1997), p. 414.

necessarily the rule. Just as some cultures practise female

4. Obiora (1997), p. 298; Kouba and Muasher (1985), p.

genital cutting but not male genital cutting, others cut boys' genitals to bring about a masculine identity (some-

104; Ogbu (1997), p. 414.

times the cutting is as radical as infibulation) but do not

5. Diamond and Kipnis (1998); Fausto-Sterling (2000),

cut girls' genitals; see James (1998), pp. 1041±3.

chapters 3 and 4.

8. Kouba and Muasher (1985), p. 103; Obiora (1997), p.

6. For documentation and critique of these attitudes, see

297.

Diamond and Kipnis (1998).

9. Obiora (1997), p. 296.

7. In the US today, we find gender parity where ambiguous

10. Ogbu (1997), p. 415; Kouba and Muasher (1985), p.

genitalia are concerned. Cosmetic surgery is also routi-

103.

nely performed on genetically male infants whose pe-

220

FEMINISM AND WOMEN'S AUTONOMY

11. Boddy (1989), pp. 57, 60.

custom' and as keeping girls' sexuality under control

12. Sussman (1998), p. 21.

until marriage, but they also asserted that it was `bad'

13. Boddy (1989), p. 52.

because it was illegal and unchristian (Walley, 1997,

14. Kouba and Muasher (1985), p. 104.

p. 411). One student who had `enthusiastically in-

15. Obiora (1997), p. 297; Ogbu (1997), p. 415; James

vited' Walley to her sister's genital cutting nevertheless declared that it was another way of `destroying'

(1998), pp. 1041±3.

women's bodies (ibid.). As Walley observes, the stu-

16. Toubia (1995), p. 37. 17. Obiora

(1997),

pp.

288±9;

Kouba

and

dents' arguments in favour of female genital cutting

Muasher

parrot local authorities' pronouncements on cultural

(1985), p. 96.

propriety, while their critiques parrot doctrines taught

18. Walley (1997), pp. 408, 420; Narayan (1997), pp. 14±

in the official Social Education curriculum (ibid.). I

17.

suspect that they saw the writing assignment as an

19. Meyers (1993), pp. 16±19; Moody-Adams (1994), pp.

academic exercise which called upon them to recite

305±7. 20. An interesting complication concerns the potential

what they had learned, rather than as an opportunity

for dramatic development of the individual's erotic

to reflect and reveal what they personally thought. If

responsiveness over the course of time. In this con-

such exercises contribute to their autonomy, it is only

nection, it is worth noting that throughout our lives

in virtue of maintaining their consciousness of dis-

we are obliged to make choices that, for better or

parate views of female genital cutting. Perhaps they

worse, cut off other possibilities. Alas, we cannot

appropriate and individualise some of the ideas they

always foresee what options we are eliminating, nor

have been exposed to in their private conversations

can we always appreciate just how desirable foresee-

and kvetching sessions.

able, forgone options really are. Rational choice the-

37. Obiora (1997), p. 361.

ory's requirement that choosers have full knowledge of

38. Ibid., p. 362.

the consequences of their choices is an ideal that

39. Ibid., p. 361.

usually cannot be approximated very well. Thus, a

40. Shaheed (1994), pp. 1009, 1011; Shaheed (1995), pp. 80, 86.

realistic theory of autonomy must work within the

41. James (1998), p. 1046. This cultural change highlights

limits of human prescience.

the importance of bringing men into the educational

21. For development of this critique, see Babbit (1993)

and cultural reconstruction processes. When and how

and Meyers (1989), pp. 77±8.

women choose to do this varies greatly from cultural

22. For critique, see Meyers (1989), pp. 33±41 and (2000),

group to cultural group.

pp. 169±72; Benson (1991), pp. 391±4.

42. Obiora (1997), pp. 368, 371±3; Gunning (1997), pp.

23. Babbit (1993), pp. 246±7.

455±6.

24. Ibid., p. 248. 25. Ibid., pp. 252±4.

43. Boddy (1989), pp. 52, 319.

26. Ibid., pp. 252±3.

44. Robertson (1996), pp. 616, 631.

27. Ibid., p. 253; emphasis added.

45. Obiora (1997), p. 357; Kouba and Muasher (1985), pp. 104±5.

28. Walker (1998), pp. 125±8. 29. Benson (1991), p. 385.

46. A'Haleem (1992), p. 155.

30. Ibid., pp. 388±9.

47. Ibid.

31. Ibid., pp. 396±7.

48. Ogbu (1997), p. 420.

32. Ibid., p. 396.

49. Ibid., pp. 420±1.

33. Ibid., p. 395.

50. It might be argued that eradicating female genital

34. I want to acknowledge that Benson realises that

cutting is objectively in the best interests of the

oppressive socialisation does not necessarily rule out

cultural groups that practise it, for repudiating the

autonomy in all aspects of the victim's life. He dis-

practice would decrease disease and increase fertility.

cusses the possibility that a person's critical compe-

Although this may be so, I believe that social change

tence can be compartmentalised ± that is, one can

that is disconnected from individual autonomy is, as

exercise critical capabilities in one arena but be unable

often as not, counterproductive. It often proves cul-

to exercise these capabilities in another; ibid., p. 397.

turally destructive, for it alienates members of the

35. Kouba and Muasher (1985), p. 108; Obiora (1997), p.

group. But when it is culturally advantageous, it often sacrifices some members of the group and their inter-

361; Mugo (1997), p. 467. educational

ests to the interests of the larger social collectivity.

methods do not seem particularly fruitful. In her role

Individual autonomy may not always be the most

as English teacher, for example, Kathleen Walley gave

efficient way to promote cultural interests, but I am

her pupils the option of writing an essay about female

convinced that it is the most humane way to advance

genital cutting. Many students defended it as `our

this goal.

36. Mugo

(1997),

p.

467.

Conventional

221

DIANA TIETJENS MEYERS

3; `Outliving Oneself: Trauma, Memory and Personal

51. Moody-Adams (1994), p. 307.

Identity', in Meyers (ed.) (1997).

52. Ibid. 53. See Meyers (1993), p. 17.

58. Benson (1991), p. 397.

54. For discussion of the need to pay attention to sub-

59. Ibid.

jectivity, see Gifford (1994), p. 338, and Meyers

60. Babbit (1993), p. 256±7.

(1989), pp. 79±89. For related discussion of `outlaw'

61. More generally, I would urge that transformative experiences that do not engage autonomy skills are

emotions, see Jaggar (1997). 55. For related discussion of empowerment, see Okin

extremely hazardous. Cults specialise in transformative

(1998), p. 47; for related discussion of empathy, see

experiences, and some people who undergo transfor-

S. Bartky, `Sympathy and Solidarity: On a Tightrope

mative experiences get converted into neo-Nazis in-

with Scheler', in Meyers (ed.) (1997) and Meyers

stead of feminists. Although there is no way to

(1994). In an intriguing aside, Walley wonders whether

immunise people against such ill-fated transforma-

incidents in which girls reveal `cowardice' ± in one

tions, autonomy skills are the best protection there is.

cultural parlance, they `cry the knife' ± could be enlisted

62. I would like to thank Ken Kipnis for a pre-publication

to reconstruct values (Walley, 1997, pp. 418±19).

copy of the Diamond and Kipnis paper I have cited

Might this ostensible cowardice be reinterpreted as

and for his helpful comments on an earlier draft of this

resistance?

chapter. I am also grateful to Berel Lang and Sara Ruddick for their suggestions.

56. Shaheed (1994), pp. 1009±10. 57. For relevant discussion, see Scheman (1993), chapter

222

Part Seven LIBERALISM BEYOND THE NATION-STATE

This page intentionally left blank

17

CIVIL ASSOCIATION: THE EUROPEAN UNION AS A SUPRANATIONAL LIBERAL LEGAL ORDER Robert Bideleux

It is widely recognised that the integration theories

democracy was preceded and made possible by sev-

which have hitherto dominated studies of the Eur-

eral decades of limited government, liberal consti-

opean Union have failed to shed much light on the

tutionalism, the rule of law, and the separation of

nature of the nascent supranational polity, as distinct

public and private as well as political and economic

from the processes that brought it about. Such

spheres. The liberal institutions, procedures, prac-

theorising has latterly been going round in circles

tices and patterns of conduct which paved the way

and repeating itself, without getting us much closer

for liberal democracy have subsequently helped to

to a satisfactory conceptualisation of the order that is

safeguard most western democracies against the perils

emerging in Europe. In order to gain a surer under-

of

standing of the new political order, it is necessary to

point is that liberty is safeguarded not so much by

draw upon and creatively adapt elements of main-

democracy as such as by liberalism, limited govern-

stream political theory. This chapter attempts to

ment and the rule of law, which long antedated and

develop a different way of discussing and thinking

did not depend upon the existence of democracy. It

about the emerging European order, using a language

might be objected that, when democrats and theor-

which owes rather more to the writings of two

ists of democracy and democratisation talk about

eminent liberal thinkers, Friedrich Hayek and Mi-

`democracy', they are merely using that word as a

chael Oakeshott, than to integration theory.

1

unconstrained

majoritarianism.

The

essential

They

form of shorthand and take it for granted that

would perhaps have been surprised, but I hope not

democracy must be buttressed by liberalism, limited

too displeased, at the ways in which their ideas and

government and the rule of law, without which a

concepts have been deployed.

system based upon freely contested multi-party elections and a broad suffrage is unlikely to function well or survive for long. However, this shorthand is

Democracy and the Liberal Legal Order

misleading, in that it appears to suggest that the

It has always been imprudent to treat the `liberal' and

crucial safeguards of liberty are the specifically de-

the `democratic' components of liberal democracy as

mocratic components ± procedural democracy (pri-

if they were two halves of the same walnut. In most

marily the holding of regular elections), the political

western states, as is well known, the advent of liberal

mobilisation of the demos and some form of repre-

225

ROBERT BIDELEUX

sentative and/or participatory government ± rather

The European Union as a Liberal

than the liberal elements. In fact, inasmuch as

Rather Than a Democratic Project

democracy has an in-built tendency towards unlimited government, because majorities (however tem-

The European Union, crucially, is a liberal project

porary) generally hope and expect to get their own

rather than a democratic one. It rests upon a

way and often resent any obstruction of their will by

supranational system of rules, regulations and laws

law courts, second chambers, heads of state and other

engendered by judicial and quasi-judicial processes

checks and balances, democracy as such not infre-

as well as by highly consensual negotiation-cum-

quently poses major threats to the liberties which are

horse-trading between liberal democratic states.

in practice upheld by liberalism, limited government

Liberalism, rather than democratic theory, is the

2

and the rule of law. `Liberalism' here refers not only

key to understanding what the European Union is

to the classic liberal political and economic doc-

and how it works. Admittedly, European federalists

trines, but also to the belief that societies ± in the

in the mould of Altiero Spinelli and Mario Alber-

broad sense ± should primarily be based upon and

tini wanted European unification to assume the form

held together by impersonal law, interests, calcula-

of a supranational European democracy structured

tion and contractual relations of a Lockean kind,

as a federal European state,

rather than by `primordial' ties of religion, race,

always been rejected by both public opinion and the

ethnicity and kinship. It will be contended that

powers that be. The constitutive treaties of the

religious and ethnic collectivism are fundamentally

European Communities and the European Union

at odds with the cosmopolitan, supranational liberal

have been ratified by the parliaments (and in some

legal order which is being constructed by the Eur-

cases the electorates) of each of the member states,

opean Union.

while successive treaties have acquired the status of

3

but such a path has

These distinctions are of crucial importance. They

a constitution or fundamental legal charter. Never-

enable us to see more clearly that the political

theless, the Union does not rest upon direct demo-

performance and EU membership prospects of states

cratic legitimation at a supranational all-Union

such as Serbia, Croatia, Albania, Romania and

level. The Union has a telos, but there is no nascent

Bulgaria are being impaired not so much by a lack

European demos standing above the separate demoi

of democracy (they actually have executives and

of the constituent member states, nor is there a

legislatures which have been more or less freely

transnational EU `public opinion'. There is very

and fairly elected by universal suffrage in multi-party

little articulation and aggregation of interests at a

contests) as by insufficient respect for minorities and

supranational level ± only business interests are well

for the rule of law, by inadequate constraints on the

organised in this respect.

exercise of power by the state and its officers, and by

ion-wide' political parties fighting EU elections on

the weakness or shallow roots of liberal doctrine and

transnational `European' platforms and issues. Elec-

sentiment. Conversely, what has placed countries

tions to the European Parliament are characterised

such as Hungary, the Czech Republic and Poland at

by low and steadily declining turnouts and minimal

the front of the queue for membership of the EU is

public

not a greater commitment to democracy as such, but

from `national' programmes, policies, personalities

rather their stronger commitment to the rule of law,

and issues. Moreover, the Union's institutional

their greater respect for the liberties of individuals,

design

engagement

4

with

There are no truly `Un-

`European'

as

distinct

their stronger constraints on the power of the state, and their fuller understanding of the requirements of

does not conform to the traditional separation of

liberal governance. These same qualities also explain

powers between legislative, executive and judicial

the greater success of their transitions to market

branches of government. Rather, decisions evolve

economies.

from intense bargaining within and across the policy-making institutions . . . The Union is not a traditional hierarchy with a clearly defined

226

CIVIL ASSOCIATION AND EUROPE

centre of political authority . . . As a result,

not they are democracies.' Thus it is not whether a

Europe's citizens have difficulty in identifying

polity `is a liberal democracy that most fundamen-

`who governs' in the Union and cannot . . .

tally determines its legitimacy; it is how well it

5

dismiss them at elections.

secures its citizens against the worst evils.' Post

facto

7

popular approval of what has been

Increased `openness' and `transparency' may be de-

achieved has been a bonus rather than a precondi-

sirable in their own rights but they do not of

tion for the success and the legitimacy of an elite-

themselves reduce the so-called `democratic deficit'

driven integration project which has contributed so

of the European Union. They skirt round rather than

strongly to the peace and prosperity of Western

tackle the problem head on.

6

Europe since the 1950s. The latter stands in marked

As a polity, the European Union and its policy-

contrast to the devastating and debilitating conflicts

making processes have been based upon mutual

which resulted at least in part from the democratic

accommodation of elites, rather than on specifically

mobilisation of ideological mass movements during

democratic procedures. It has been constructed, not

the first half of the twentieth century. West Eur-

by democratic mobilisation of peoples in support of

opean elites have in effect succeeded in putting the

`ever closer union' and the `idea of Europe', but

destructive genies of mass politics back into their

rather by consensual negotiation and horse-trading

bottles, thereby making Western Europe a much

between European governments and officials. There

freer, safer and more prosperous place than it had

have been no great waves of popular support for a

been earlier in the twentieth century, and than

united Europe ± certainly none that are even remo-

south-eastern Europe and the former Soviet Repub-

tely comparable to the periodic populist backlashes

lics still were at the end of it.

against the idea. From the outset, the construction of

The frameworks of EU law and regulation which

the European Communities and the EU has been the

increasingly govern the Single Market, environmen-

work of cosmopolitan elites pursuing their own elite

tal policies, health and safety provisions, the terms

agendas, rather than a response to popular demands

and conditions of employment, monetary policy,

for European integration. However, this elitism has

industrial policies, regional policies and agricultural

been not a weakness, as many critics complain, but

policies have transformed the EU into a multi-tiered

one of the Union's strengths. If it had been necessary

`regulatory federation' which increasingly defines

to wait for its peoples to voice demands for `ever

and upholds the rights and obligations of its citizens.

closer union', Western European integration would

The state-like institutional skeleton of the EU has

not have advanced nearly so far as it has done in so

fostered growing expectations that it should behave

short a time. The crucial point is that European

and grow `like a state'. Relative to other multi-tiered

states would have had to devise ways and means of

federal systems of governance, however, `the Eur-

coexisting more peacefully and harmoniously, no

opean framework has strikingly modest resources of

matter what the subjective preferences, prejudices,

its own. Consequently, there are major constraints

bugbears or grievances of their citizens, in order to

upon the nature of the activity that can be pursued.'

avert any potential return to the destructive inter-

In particular, there is very limited scope for redis-

and intra-state conflicts and beggar-my-neighbour

tributive measures, which in turn virtually imposes

protectionism

the emphasis on regulatory governance.

of

Europe's

`Second

Thirty

Years

9

8

The EU is

War' (1914±45). These matters were too important

emerging as a legal federation, as an economic

to be submitted to the vagaries of public opinion. In

federation, and as a regulatory federation, but it lacks

any case, as argued by John Gray, the current shrill

either the design or the wherewithal to discharge the

and single-minded insistence on democratic legiti-

classic Hobbesian and Weberian functions of a state

macy is somewhat over the top. In practice, forms of

± especially the monopoly of organised violence ±

governance `are legitimate in so far as they meet the

and it can and should be prevented from acquiring

needs of their citizens. Those that fail in this will be

them.

judged by their citizens to be illegitimate whether or

Within the European Union, political and civil

227

ROBERT BIDELEUX

rights and liberties are being ever more deeply em-

and Pacific countries, the Europe Agreements with

bedded in a strong supranational legal and constitu-

former Communist states, the Euro-Med Partnership,

tional framework, albeit one which in the last resort

international cooperation on environmental regula-

can only be upheld by national law courts and national

tion and the inchoate Common Foreign and Secur-

police forces ± as the EU has no national-level courts

ity

or police of its own. This supranational legal order

mechanisms and procedures through which the ex-

helps to safeguard rights and liberties against poten-

ternal economic and (increasingly) non-economic

tial violation by various powerful actors, including

relations of EU member states can be continuously

the governments of member states which still control

and intensively coordinated. Indeed, on most mat-

national armed forces, police forces, law-courts, na-

ters pertaining to external economic relations (espe-

tionwide bureaucracies and other legitimate instru-

cially foreign access to the Single Market), the EU

ments of enforcement and surveillance at that level.

Commission is empowered to act and to negotiate

Contrary to the fears and alarmism of the Euro-

agreements on behalf of the member states. More-

phobes, the EU does not itself control or possess

over, as Michael Smith has emphasised, `the see-

any such forces with which it could conceivably

mingly ``domestic'' concerns of market regulation,

coerce those citizens, enterprises and member states

standards setting and competition policy' have in-

who occasionally violate its rules and laws, although

creasingly become `the stuff of international poli-

it has generated ever-growing political and economic

tics'.

incentives for compliance as well as penalties for

regulatory matters in international relations and in

non-compliance.

The

only

conceivable

Policy:

11

all

have

involved

the

creation

of

The mounting importance of economic and

direct

regional security, together with the launching of the

threats to liberty within the European Union come

Single Market programme, has steadily increased the

from states, large companies, organised crime, terror-

number and importance of the areas within which

ists and private security forces rather than from the

EU institutions have supranational competence to

European Union as such. The European nation-state

act on behalf of the member states. Even before the

has lost some functions while gaining others `in what

end of the Cold War, the security of the EU and its

had previously been more private and local spheres',

member states was becoming less and less concerned

but overall `the bars of the cage have not changed

with traditional questions of war and peace and

very much. Citizens still need to deploy most of their

military capabilities, and increasingly to do with

vigilance at the national level.'

10

economic security, market access, fishing rights, en-

So long as the

British and the Scandinavians continue to hold out

vironmental

against the aspirations of some member states to

rights, immigration issues, drug trafficking and inter-

regulation,

human

rights,

minority

create a strong supranational European army or a

national crime. As argued by Michael Mann, during

supranational European police force with a strong

the 1990s Western Europe gained `the geopolitical

capacity for electronic surveillance of (and data

security it has always wanted, as well as client states

banks on) EU citizens, the possibility of the EU

and even supplicant states between itself and any

becoming an Orwellian `big brother' superstate will

threat coming out of the East.' So long as such

remain nothing more than a figment of the `black

conditions continued to pertain (and here both

propaganda' put about by prominent British `Euro-

Mann and the EU were in danger of complacency),

phobes' such as Margaret Thatcher, Norman La-

the EU would have `little need for efficient geopo-

mont, William Hague and John Redwood.

litical decision-making'. The EU represents a `Lock-

Even the external relations of the European Un-

eian heartland' of civil association and contractual

ion have become increasingly enmeshed in a supra-

relations, although not far beyond its southern and

national framework of rules and regulation. The

eastern borders (for example, in the Maghreb, Egypt,

Common Commercial Policy, the Common Exter-

Bosnia,

nal Tariff, the Common Agricultural Policy, the

comes into more `Hobbesian' terrain.

Common

Fisheries

Agreements

with

Policy,

the

successive

and

south-eastern

Turkey)

one

12

Â Lome

The mere existence of the EU has helped to

Caribbean

transform the very nature of European external

successive

African,

Kosovo

228

CIVIL ASSOCIATION AND EUROPE

relations. Much of what used to be regarded as foreign

transnational capitalism and information/communi-

policy or international relations (especially the often

cations technologies can in many ways help to

bellicose relations between European states in the

promote the geographical diffusion of the rule of

past) has been `domesticated' and `civilianised' ±

law, liberal values and liberal democratic forms of

becoming part of the civil order and internal relations

governance. But it should be pointed out that they

of the EU, dealt with by institutions and mechanisms

also give rise to market forces and concentrations of

formerly associated with `domestic' matters. The EU

power which are increasingly beyond the control of

comprises a complex mesh of institutions, rules and

the individual states or groups of states which remain

laws which structure both the internal and external

the principal sites of democratic accountability. This

dealings of the EU as a whole and its individual

growing democratic deficit afflicts states which are

member states, as a result of which there is `a

not members of the EU every bit as much as (and

constant rule-governed process of negotiation be-

often more than) those within it, and therefore should

tween actors which produces policy positions and

not be simplistically or demagogically `blamed' upon

13

The scathing pub-

the EU. Indeed, during the 1990s the economies of

licity given to the Union's inability to project im-

many non-EU states were even more severely buf-

perialistic military might in the manner of the

feted than those of EU states by global market forces

United States has diverted public attention from

over which their political and monetary authorities

the large areas of consensus and joint activity in

have little control. Public allegiance to the European

the Union's external relations, and from the fact that

nation-state persists, but this is increasingly out of

the EU as a vast and economically powerful `civil

kilter with the actual locus of economic and military

association' exerts enormous influence and `magnetic

power and decision-making, which has to a large

pull' on the states and peoples lying to the south and

extent shifted to higher levels (not just to the EU,

east of its current borders.

but to NATO, the WTO, the IMF, other interna-

international policy outcomes.'

tional agencies and giant transnational corporations).

From `Democratic Deficits'

Moreover,

inasmuch

as

the

`national'

governments of the member states of the EU con-

to `Cosmopolitan Democracy'?

trolled 52 per cent of GDP (on average) in 1993,

Many critics of the European Union regard the fact

whereas the institutions of the EU controlled a mere

that it is a supranational liberal legal order, rather

1.3 per cent of their combined GDP, `democratic

than a form of democracy, as a woeful deficiency. Yet

deficits' actually pose much more of a problem at the

in reality that is its greatest virtue. Critics decry the

national than at the EU level.

EU's so-called `democratic deficit', as if either its

Even though there has been a lot of influential

present constitution or even the very existence of the

wishful thinking about supranational forms of `cos-

European Union were the intrinsic source of the said

mopolitan democracy', much of it by eminent poli-

deficit. In fact, it is the development of mighty global

tical

market forces and global information and commu-

demonstrated any way in which it might be possible

nications networks, rather than the increasingly

to establish direct democratic accountability and

federal character of the European Union, that pose

control over governance at the supranational level.

the greatest threats to `sovereignty' and democratic

An important body of supranational `cosmopolitan

control and accountability. This is so, not only at the

law' has already emerged (most notably in the form

national level, but also indirectly at the EU level.

of European Union law), but `cosmopolitan democ-

Globalisation and the diminishing capacity of either

racy' remains a mirage. It is likely that any thorough-

national or EU parliamentary and executive institu-

going

tions effectively to control and hold to account the

decisions, policies and regulations directly to detailed

forces of global capitalism and global information

scrutiny and control by `sovereign' national parlia-

and communications networks have created demo-

ments would induce political paralysis or deadlock,

cratic deficits at all levels. This is not to deny that

while attempts to subordinate them to `sovereign'

229

theorists,

attempt

14

to

no

one

subordinate

has

all

convincingly

supranational

ROBERT BIDELEUX

supranational elected bodies could lead to excessive

that increasingly govern their lives. The citizens of

centralisation of power and to a real possibility of the

small and medium-sized states in other parts of the

Orwellian `superstate' so feared and berated by Brit-

world have no such means at their disposal.

15

Thus:

ish `Europhobes'. Although the overriding aim of European federalists in the tradition of Altiero Spi-

except for the European Union, the prospects for

nelli and Mario Albertini was to transcend the perils

even

and defects of the European states system, the crea-

transnational political associations are poor. Even

tion of a European superstate would merely repro-

if

duce many of those self-same defects (and others

strengthened, for a long time to come decisions

moderately

transnational

`democratic' political

governments

systems

are

of

greatly

besides) on an even larger scale than before. That

are likely to be made by the delegates appointed

would be to jump out of the frying-pan into the fire.

by national governments. Thus the link between

In a European `superstate', whether unitary or fed-

the delegates and the citizens will remain weak;

eral, the police forces, the bureaucracies and the

and the democratic process will be even more

military forces holding sway over Europe would be

attenuated.

even larger and even harder to subordinate at all times to democratic control and accountability than

Dahl suggests that disgusted democrats should seek

are their present-day `national' counterparts. Thus,

solace in enhanced participation and deliberation in

although the European Union and its member states

the national and subnational democratic processes

do indeed suffer from democratic deficit, these would

and institutions which could indeed exercise `what-

not be significantly reduced either by creating a

ever democratic control may be possible over the

European `superstate' or by reasserting full national

authority delegated to transnational decision makers'

sovereignty and autonomy ± even if either of these

and thus help to sustain a `healthy democratic

options were to be politically feasible.

political life within the large sphere of relative

The European Union as presently constituted, far

autonomy that democratic countries will still pos-

from being the intrinsic source of Western Europe's

sess', including increased local control over such

democratic deficit, is the most promising means of

matters as education, town and city planning, public

limiting and mitigating the potential negative conse-

amenities, and social and health services.

quences of the democratic deficits caused by the

loaf is better than none. It is mainly at these lower

expansion of transnational capitalism, communica-

levels that more `radical' conceptions of democratic

tions networks, bureaucratic `big government' and

participation and control, including `electronic de-

transnational military bureaucracies beyond demo-

mocracy' or `cyberdemocracy', are most relevant and

cratic control. As the doyen of American democratic

realisable.

theorists has emphasised:

opment of electronic democracy offers a means of

17

16

Half a

It is sometimes claimed that the devel-

overcoming the EU's so-called democratic deficit by The boundaries of a country, even one as large as

creating a `wired-up Europe' (or, through the next

the United States, have become much smaller

generation of information technology, a `wireless

than the boundaries of the decisions that signifi-

Europe'), by connecting the European Union's citi-

cantly affect the fundamental interests of its

zens directly to the EU institutions and one another,

citizens . . . Thus the citizens of a country cannot

by-passing national governments. However, it is

employ their national government, and much less

more likely that the new technologies will merely

their local governments, to exercise direct control

reinforce elite dominance and magnify the inequal-

over external actors whose decisions bear criti-

ities of power and influence even further, because it

cally upon their lives.

is Europe's elites that have the greatest resources for doing this and that are most adept and assiduous at

The European Union, in Robert Dahl's view, affords

deploying them to their own advantage.

its citizens some mechanisms of indirect political and legal monitoring, regulation and control over the forces

230

CIVIL ASSOCIATION AND EUROPE

described as `the most crucial problem of political

The EU Legal Order

organisation, namely how to limit the ``popular will''

and Limited Government

without placing another ``will'' above it'.

21

The

The French legal scholar L. Cohen-Tanugi has

exigencies of accommodating the ever-increasing

argued that two conceptions of democracy currently

political, economic and cultural diversity of the

coexist in Western Europe: the Jacobin tradition of

membership of a steadily expanding EU further

`elective democracy founded solely on universal

ensure that it will have to remain a polity based

suffrage', and that of the constitutional state

on limited government, consensual negotiation and the rule of law ± indeed, unless it is held together by

founded on higher principles of law, equity and

an iron frame of law, it could burst apart at the seams.

procedure . . . Like other organisations of a fed-

Of course, even this might not be enough. Never-

eral type, the Community is building itself by

theless, the national and/or religious ties on which

law . . . European integration has promoted the

nation-states (whether liberal democratic or other-

`return of law' and the promotion of a democratic

wise) have hitherto implicitly relied to foster the

ideal which does not draw its legitimacy solely

active commitment and loyalty of citizens to their

from the law of the majority, but also from

polities are being steadily loosened and eroded by

fundamental principles ± those of the European

globalisation, regional integration, multiculturalism,

Convention of Human Rights, for example ± and

acceptance of difference and the growing fragmenta-

from a system of judicial recourse largely open to

tion of political and cultural identities.

citizens against national states.

18

Squeezed

between a globalised economy and

aggressively

In the words of J. Temple-Lang, each member of the EU

introverted

cultures,

the

political

space is fragmenting and democracy is being now has two constitutions: its national constitu-

debased ± reduced, at best, to a relatively open

tion and the Community constitution, which it

political marketplace, which no one troubles to

shares with other member states. Member states'

defend because it is not the object of any intel-

legislative, executive and judicial powers under

lectual or affective investment . . . The danger

their national constitutions can be exercised only

here is that [multi]culturalism, in the name of

within the framework and limits imposed by

respect for differences, will encourage the forma-

Community law.

19

tion of localised power that will impose an antidemocratic

authority

within

particular

communities. Should that happen, political so-

Ian Loveland, another legal scholar, contends that

ciety will become no more than a marketplace EC Treaties stand in marked contrast to our own

where communities locked into an obsession with

domestic law-making process. They are not the

their identities and internal homogeneity enter

product of majoritarian or even super-majoritar-

into loosely regulated transactions.

22

ian law-making. Their every provision has been arrived

negotiatory

So far, however, global capitalism and regional in-

process . . . The prospect of EC law being nar-

at

through

a

consensual

tegration have seemed incapable of fostering feelings

rowly majoritarian, and hence oppressive or irra-

of belonging and allegiance to replace those which

tional, has been reduced almost to vanishing

they are helping to dilute and disempower at the

point. In that sense, it is a `higher' form of law

level of the nation-state. In such circumstances,

than can be produced by any of the EC's member

political order can only be maintained within the

states within their own legal systems.

20

broader framework of a large and consensual polity whose laws are impartial in the specific sense of being

The European Union thus represents an original

incapable of being merely the expression of the

and constructive solution to what Friedrich Hayek

interests and/or wishes of a dominant majority group

231

ROBERT BIDELEUX

and whose function is not to promote agreement on

extension of uniform rules, regulations and laws

substantive goals and projects but rather to allow a

which all the participants can live with and the

great diversity of persons and states the maximum

placing of the EU's policies, functions and activities

scope for defining and pursuing their diverse goals

on an increasingly law-governed footing.

and projects while minimising the scope for friction and mutual interference.

The European Union

Significantly, in an article published in 1939,

as an Oakeshottian `Civil Association'

Hayek argued that `the abrogation of national sovereignties and the creation of an effective international

According to the British philosopher Michael Oa-

order of law is a necessary complement and the

keshott, the proper business of government is `to try

logical consummation of the liberal programme', if

to keep its subjects at peace with one another in the

only because `an essentially liberal economic regime

activities in which they have chosen to seek their

is a necessary condition for the success of any inter-

happiness.' Therefore:

state federation.'

23

Indeed, since the citizens of such

a federation `will be reluctant to submit to any

the only appropriate manner of ruling is by mak-

interference in their daily affairs when the govern-

ing and enforcing rules of conduct . . . which, in

ment is composed of people of different nationalities

the circumstances, are least likely to result in a

and different traditions', it follows that `the govern-

collision of interests . . . Thus governing is re-

ment in a federation composed of many different

cognised as a specific and limited activity; not the

peoples will have to be restricted in scope.' Since the

management of an enterprise, but the rule of

full realisation of the potential economic benefits of

those engaged in a great diversity of self-chosen

such an entity would in Hayek's view entail eco-

enterprises.'

25

nomic and monetary union, there would have to be `less government all round' if such a federation was to

The rule of law is, in Oakeshott's view, `a method of

be practicable. Economic policy would then `have to

government remarkably economical in its use of

take the form of providing a rational permanent

power' and, `while losing nothing in strength, is

framework within which individual initiative will

itself the emblem of that diffusion of power which

have the largest possible scope.'

24

it exists to promote'. It is `the greatest single condi-

Hayek's linking of

tion of our freedom'.

inter-state federation to limited government and

26

projects for economic and monetary union pres-

Oakeshott's conception of civil association was

ciently anticipated what were to become the most

put forward in contradistinction to `enterprise asso-

distinctive features of European Union governance.

ciation', in which the state is perceived as an orga-

Of course, the European Union is far from being a

nisation for the attainment of prescribed ends which

perfect embodiment of liberal governance. Its ten-

are incumbent upon its citizens (as in the Thatch-

dencies towards corporatism, clientelism, corruption

erite project to transform the UK into UK plc, of

and a `fortress Europe' increasingly concerned with

which we were all to have become compliant em-

keeping out unwanted `aliens' compromise its liberal-

ployees, as well as in the more overtly teleological

ism. Nevertheless, its central emphases on the rule of

`planned

law, the uniform adoption and enforcement of stable

summed up Oakeshott's conception of a civil asso-

and predictable rules and the creation of an extended

ciation as `an association of persons who, having no

spontaneous legal order are bedrocks of liberalism on

ends or purposes held necessarily in common, never-

which a more completely liberal and cosmopolitan

theless coexist in peace under the rule of law. On this

order is gradually being built. The horse-trading,

account, the office of law is not typically to impose

deals and manoeuvres which take place at or prior

any particular duty or goal on men, but instead seeks

to meetings of the European Council and the Coun-

principally to facilitate their dealings with one an-

cil of Ministers often appear unseemly and cynical.

other'.

Yet they are intrinsic to the consensual adoption or

concept of civil association is that `the rules which

232

27

economies').

John

Gray

has

incisively

The distinctive feature of the Oakeshottian

CIVIL ASSOCIATION AND EUROPE

constitute it are non-instrumental: they do not em-

Hence values such as legality, morality and justice

body any specific project, but instead act as condi-

are `best regarded not as ends but as values embodied

tions whereby individuals and groups pursue their

in the constraints governing all action . . . Even

own several and diverse projects. In its moral aspect,

peace is better regarded as a constraint than as a

civil association is

purpose', since it requires not the avoidance of all uses of force but rather an acceptance that `force is to 30

that mode of association which exemplifies in-

be used only in authorised ways'.

dividuality ± the condition in which human

associations are constituted by the ends they serve or

beings accept and celebrate their autonomy . . .

pursue, whereas practical associations are based upon

In its political dimension, civil association is

the forms of conduct which they either authorise or

characterised by the diffusion of power through-

prohibit. In these terms, international society and by

out society ± by a complex structure of counter-

implication most forms of international association

vailing institutions of precisely the sort that is

cannot be `purposive' (even though they are often

threatened by contemporary collectivist projects

seen as such), on account of the great diversity of

(of the Right and Left) of transforming govern-

goals and aspirations that exists among states.

ment into an enterprise association.

28

Thus purposive

31

`International society' is best conceived as an inclusive `practical association' geared to the main-

Terry Nardin has drawn upon Oakeshott's distinc-

tenance and observance of certain practices and rules

tion between civil and enterprise associations to

of conduct designed to minimise the risks of armed

fashion a similarly useful distinction between `prac-

conflict and to maximise the scope for peaceful

tical' and `purposive' conceptions of international

coexistence between states engaged in the pursuit

society and of international associations:

of widely differing goals, values, beliefs and projects.

Practical association is a relationship among those

Some international associations are purposive;

who are engaged in the pursuit of different and

they exist for the sake of pursuing various shared

possibly incompatible purposes, and who are as-

purposes; the rules they adopt and the ethic they

sociated with one another . . . only in respecting

foster are instrumental to the achievement of the

certain restrictions on how each may pursue his

purposes for which they were created. But inter-

own purposes . . . Purposive association is a

national society as such ± that inclusive society of

relationship among those who co-operate for

states, or community of communities, within

the purpose of securing certain shared beliefs,

which all international association takes place

values and interests, who adopt certain practices

± is not a purposive association constituted by

as a means to that end, and who regard such

a joint wish on the part of all states to pursue

practices as worthy of respect only to the extent

certain ends in concert. It is, rather, an associa-

that they are useful instruments of the common

tion of independent and diverse political com-

purpose'.

29

munities, each devoted to its own conception of the good . . . The common good of this inclusive

Admittedly, any association is created to serve a

community resides not in the ends that some, or

purpose and is in that sense purposive but:

at times even most, of its members may wish collectively to pursue but in the values of justice,

The purposes of practical association, however,

peace, security and coexistence, which may be

are of an altogether different order from those

enjoyed through participation in a common body

served by purposive association . . . The values of

of authoritative practices.

32

practical association . . . are those appropriate to the relations among persons who are not neces-

In Nardin's view, international society has to take a

sarily engaged in any common pursuit but who

form that is capable of accommodating culturally and

nevertheless have to get along with one another.

ideologically heterogeneous states. This kind of in-

233

ROBERT BIDELEUX

ternational society first emerged in Europe following

international associations such as the EU, most of his

the sixteenth- and seventeenth-century wars of re-

insights can be applied to Europe as well. In practice,

ligion, when it became necessary

the participants in the EU are united not so much by engagement in common endeavours (however much

to work out principles of coexistence among

they say they are!) as by their acceptance that they

individuals and groups committed to different

are members of an association defined by a common

conceptions of truth and the good . . . Thus

set of rules and laws designed to allow each of them

the kind of legal order that developed in Europe

to pursue their own goals and ambitions with the

was shaped by the gradual discovery that, in the

minimum of friction and mutual impairment.

absence of agreement on ends, agreement on procedures is required if destructive conflict is to be avoided.'

Given the existence . . . of significant differences

33

of belief, value and interest, the expectation of . . . unity on the basis of shared purposes is

Therefore, it is also necessary to

sure to be disappointed. The basis of international association lies in deference to practices that

reject all extreme claims that shared purposes [or

embody recognition of the fact that we must

values or beliefs] are a necessary condition of

coexist . . . with others with whom we some-

international order . . . International law, and

times share little beyond a common predica-

especially customary international law, embodies

ment.

36

the minimum principles of mutual accommodation required for the coexistence not only of

The fact that the European Union lacks a single

separate states but of different kinds of states . . .

centre of power, decision-making and authority but

It is through the experience of international

instead has a multiplicity of such centres has been

association defined and directed by this common

conducive to the dispersal of power, authority and

law that an appropriate international culture

functions which Oakeshott regarded as the chief

bridging other cultural differences is created.

34

safeguards of liberty. Further, the fact that the European Union's budget has not been allowed to

Part of the attraction of the terms of reference

exceed 1.27 per cent of the combined GDP of its

employed by Oakeshott, Hayek and Nardin is that

member states has in effect forced it to remain an

they eschew the impersonal pseudo-scientific abstrac-

Oakeshottian `civil association', even though some

tions involved in analyses of behaviour, forces, pro-

observers consider that it harbours (in my view

cesses, variables and correlations, and speak instead of

unrealisable) ambitions to become an `enterprise

conduct, society, law and individuals as moral agents

association' in certain sectors. The Single Market

who deliberate and make reasoned judgements and

programme, the EU's growing social and environ-

choices. As Nardin puts it, his concern is

mental regulation responsibilities and the project for Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) are major extensions of the law-governed regulatory federation

not with international relations understood as a system of causally or functionally related variables

and civil association characteristics of the EU, rather

but with the arrangements of an international

than great leaps towards the creation of `big govern-

society constituted by the actions of thinking

ment' at the supranational level. Indeed, the Eur-

agents who must take each other into account

opean Union is governed by impersonal rules and

in making decisions . . . and whose acts are

laws to a far greater extent than any `really existing'

understood as being shaped and guided by rules

democracy. Contrary to the claims of British Euro-

of conduct rather than laws of behaviour.

35

phobes, EMU is governed by stringent rules and a regulatory committee of bankers rather than by an

Although Nardin focuses on relations between

emergent European superstate with major redistribu-

states in the world at large rather than on regional

tive capabilities. The EU corruption scandals of 1998

234

CIVIL ASSOCIATION AND EUROPE

and 1999 highlighted how little (rather than how

common purpose. The observance of rules by all

much) power is wielded by individual commissioners

will be important for each because the achieve-

and other officials. It is not only power that corrupts,

ment of his purposes depends on it, but the

so does powerlessness.

respective purposes of different persons may be

The main virtue of the creation of a supranational

wholly different.

38

liberal legal order which functions in the manner of an Oakeshottian `civil association' rather than a

This is the way in which the European Union has

more purposive, redistributive and potentially coer-

accommodated a diversity of states and peoples,

cive `enterprise association' is that it erects a strong

assisting them to pursue their own very diverse

supranational framework of rules and laws (a form of

purposes within a common framework of rules and

`governance without government') which can reg-

laws which has maximised peace and prosperity and

ulate political and economic activities and power

minimised the scope for friction and conflict be-

without fostering a European `superstate' with more

tween them. This has much more to do with the rule

obviously Hobbesian, Weberian or Orwellian fea-

of law, consensual negotiation of mutually accepta-

tures and potential. Another of the virtues of such a

ble rules and laws, negotiated accommodation of

civil association is its ability to maximise the cer-

differences and `judicious' interpretation of rules

tainty, equity and transparency of the rules govern-

and laws by the (European) Court of Justice than

ing economic, social and environmental matters,

with democracy as such. As Hayek remarked, `the

above all through the equal application of its rules

ideal of individual liberty seems to have flourished

and laws to all. Rule certainty and stability of ex-

chiefly among people where, at least for long periods,

pectations lie at the heart of the Single Market

judge-made law predominated'.

programme and Economic and Monetary Union,

judicial or quasi-judicial rulings, the task of the

from which Europe's hitherto inflation-prone and

judges and of the EU Commission is not to ascertain,

relatively unstable less developed peripheries poten-

reflect or uphold the wishes of a demos or even of the

39

In making their

tially have much more to gain than do the already

fifteen separate demoi, but to endeavour to maximise

stable and disciplined `core' states, which have been

the internal consistency and viability of the EU legal

enjoying low levels of inflation and correspondingly

order and to minimise the scope for friction, conflict,

low `risk premia' on their interest rates for decades.

37

malfunction and acrimony. The major political safe-

In this situation, the case for redistribution of income

guard is not a democratic one involving the submis-

from the `rich core' to `poor peripheries' and for an

sion of the decisions reached and policies adopted

expansion of the European Union's redistributive

after protracted and tortuous negotiation to various

capabilities is correspondingly diminished.

forms of popular and/or parliamentary approval or ratification. Rather, it is the fact those decisions and

As emphasised by Hayek, the aim of the rules

policies can rarely go forward without gaining acmust be to facilitate that matching or tallying of

ceptance (often reluctantly and only after a great

the expectations on which the plans of the in-

deal of horse-trading) from fifteen separate states.

dividuals depend for their success . . . But all rules

One of the major implications of all this is that the

can achieve in this respect is to make it easier for

current `eastern' applicants for EU membership need

people to find together and to form that match;

neither expect nor be required to undergo major

abstract rules cannot actually secure that this will

extensions of democracy as such. Indeed, procedu-

always happen . . . Indeed, the superiority of

rally, in most cases their parliaments and govern-

certain rules will become evident largely in the

ments are as freely and fairly elected as their Western

fact that they will create an effective order not

European counterparts. Rather, what they have to

only within a closed group but also between

accept and adjust to is working within a political and

people who meet accidentally and do not know

economic environment which is much more exten-

each other personally. They will thus . . . create

sively and exactingly regulated by consensually ne-

an order even among people who do not pursue a

gotiated

235

and/or

judge-made

supranational

rules,

ROBERT BIDELEUX

regulations and laws ± most obviously those govern-

over, government itself is `increasingly contracted

ing the Single Market, but also those now pervading

out through various forms of privatisation and semi-

almost every aspect of the EU's operations.

40

Eur-

privatisation'.

44

These momentous changes are in

opean states which do not uphold liberal democracy,

turn blurring the distinctions between what is public

basic individual rights and liberties, market princi-

and what is private, between state and non-state,

ples and the rule of law exclude themselves from

between internal and external, between what is

potential membership of the European Union be-

military and what is civil, and even between war

cause of their consequent incapacity to discharge in

and peace.

full the essential requirements of EU membership.

rise of limited constitutional government, civil so-

This is no longer merely a matter of choice or

ciety and liberal democracy in the West, and the

preference on the part of the current member states,

blurring of such distinctions is potentially a very

but rather a sine qua non for the long-term survival

ominous

and effective functioning of the European Union.

now arise mainly within and across rather than

Ian Ward has rightly pointed to `the role that law

between states, as the emergence of new privatised

plays in determining who is ``European'' in the new

and transnationalised forms of organised violence

Europe, and who is not.'

41

45

Such distinctions were crucial to the

development.

Indeed,

armed

conflicts

erodes and in some cases completely disintegrates states. Thus the growing `privatisation of organised violence' in the Balkans, Transcausasia, Africa and

Power and Governance

parts of Asia and the Middle East is a reversal of the

in a Metamorphosing World

process by which states emerged and, if allowed to

The erosion of state power and autonomy, to which

continue unchecked, could bring about similar re-

the emerging western neoliberal policy consensus of

sults in the West.

46

the 1980s and 1990s most powerfully contributed,

However, it would be more appropriate to see this

has by no means been confined to the economic

`privatisation of organised violence' as just part of the

domain and the growth of transnational information

more pervasive `privatisation of power'

and communications networks. Mary Kaldor has

been in full flood since the neoliberal counter-re-

highlighted the degree to which the state has lost

volution in economic policy and governance during

its former near-monopoly of the means of coercion,

the 1980s. Privatisation, economic liberalisation and

which has been `eroded from above by the transna-

the unfettered development of transnational capit-

tionalisation of military forces' through membership

alism and global communications has engendered

of security organisations such as NATO and the

autonomous market forces and concentrations of

former Warsaw Pact,) and `eroded from below by

private economic power and influence whose com-

the privatisation of organised violence' as a result of

bined strength far exceeds that of any elected gov-

the often interlinked emergence of private security

ernment. The vast daily financial flows on the

services, paramilitary forces, mercenary armies, large-

world's currency and stock markets periodically set

scale gangsterism and arms/drug-dealing mafias, and

in motion tidal waves which could even overwhelm

the widespread disintegration and/or demobbing of

the US authorities and their Federal Reserve Board

regular armed forces engendered by proliferating

or the EU authorities and their European Central

instances of `state failure' as well as by the end the

Bank. `Over $1 trillion flows across the world's

Cold War (for example, in parts of Africa and the

foreign exchange markets every day; over 50 times

former Soviet and Yugoslav federations).

42

47

which has

The pri-

the size of world trade and dwarfing the collective

vatisation of organised violence is assuming less

foreign exchange reserves of the world's richest

blatant forms in Western Europe and in the USA,

states.'

where private security guards now outnumber the

been released from their old `national power-con-

police by two to one, but Kaldor warns that it is

tainers', which were much more amenable to na-

nevertheless taking place and that the West should

tional-democratic control than are the new global

beware of complacency in these matters.

43

48

The genies of transnational capitalism have

forces and regional power blocs. Yet any attempt by

More-

236

CIVIL ASSOCIATION AND EUROPE

democrats to put them back into `national power-

anarchic) brave new world which has already ar-

containers' would precipitate a collapse of global

rived. The study of these great bodies of thought and

capitalist trade, production and economic confi-

policy prescription might remain a valuable intellec-

dence even worse than the one that occurred be-

tual exercise and of interest to historians, but it will

tween 1929 and 1931. Quite simply, liberalised

offer precious little guidance either as to what is

transnational capitalism has attained levels of eco-

happening or to what policies might be effective in

nomic activity, specialisation, innovation and dyna-

the future.

mism which would be unsustainable in a world

In these changed circumstances, the quest for

which attempted to reassert `democratic' control

increased democratic control ± whether national,

over supranational economic forces, especially if that

supranational or `cosmopolitan' ± is the pursuit of

control

nation-states.

a mirage. Demands that supranational regulatory

Whereas it was still possible to reassert national

bodies and rule-making organisations should be sub-

control of economies and thereby promote various

jected to democratic control and accountability, as

nationalist and etatist forms of autarkic or semi-

well as the anxieties arising from the fact that they

autarkic

early

are not, often stem from mistaken assumptions con-

1930s to the 1970s, these have ceased to viable

cerning the origin of most laws at the national level.

options since the late 1970s. Thatcherites rant in

As a result the so-called democratic deficit at the EU

vain against the erosion of `national sovereignty' and

supranational level is misleadingly contrasted with

state autonomy which they have misleadingly attrib-

supposedly `democratic' processes at the national

uted to the development of the European Union but

level. In fact, the executive branches of western

which was mainly a consequence of the neoliberal

governments have come to exercise inordinate con-

counter-revolution in economic policy and the ram-

trol over the legislatures, with the result that parlia-

pant globalisation which they themselves helped to

ments have become less and less effective as checks

unleash. The most that Europe can hope to do for

on the power of the executive.

now is to regulate, constrain and channel the liberated

small fraction of the huge volume of government

global market forces and the privatisation of power,

business comes under the direct control and scrutiny

both through the elaboration of supranational rules

of the elected parliaments in most western liberal

regimes of the sort maintained by the UN and the

democracies, especially under the secretive and oli-

World Trade Organisation and through the suprana-

garchic British system of `elective dictatorship' (as

tional legal order created by the EU. The Single

Lord Hailsham so aptly described it). Every four or

Market programme and the project of Economic and

five years electorates have a fleeting opportunity to

Monetary Union are therefore designed to promote

vote in a new `dictator' for the next few years ± that is

`more Europe' as well as `more market' ± more

the realistic extent of democracy in most western

effective regulation at the EU level to compensate

countries most of the time. What has made such

for the diminishing efficacy of regulation at the level

systems of government more bearable and effective

of the nation-state.

than any alternative system yet devised is not their

were

to

be

economic

exercised

development

by

from

the

49

Moreover, only a

(actually rather limited) elements of democracy. It is the very considerable heritage of liberal constitu-

Ways of Coping with

tionalism, limited government, accommodation of

Uncertainty and Friction

cultural diversity and rule of law which has safe-

Europe has now entered wholly uncharted waters.

guarded western liberties whose origins long predated

Several centuries of Western political and economic

democracy as such and have usually helped to pro-

thought and prescription premised upon the exis-

tect western democracies against the worst dangers of

tence of polities which are capable of exercising

majoritarian tyranny.

more-or-less effective jurisdiction over `their own'

Fundamentally,

as

argued

by

Hayek

(among

bounded territories, economies, citizenries, societies

others), few of the legal frameworks and other rules

and cultures have very little relevance to the (more

that regulate human conduct have ever been con-

237

ROBERT BIDELEUX

sciously and deliberately devised, laid down or or-

advance what will be successful and what will not,

dained by particular (far-seeing) parliaments, judici-

what will meet the paramount needs of the future

aries, governments or individual rulers. Rather, they

and what will not, or even to specify in advance what

have emerged `through a gradual process of trial and

those needs will be, as those who suffered several

error', to which the experiences and learning pro-

decades of Communist economic planning learned

cesses of successive generations have contributed.

to their great cost. It will be safer to base the EU on

Many rules have come into being because, in certain

the experimental, empirical liberalism of Hayek and

types of situation, friction is likely to arise among

Oakeshott than on the more controlling and pre-

individual actors about what each is entitled to do,

scriptive rationalist versions of liberalism. Explicitly

which can be prevented only if there are rules to tell

encouraging the EU to develop along more Oake-

each clearly what their respective rights and obliga-

shottian lines, as a civil rather than an enterprise

tions are. The gradual, piecemeal, iterative elabora-

association, ought to be Britain's distinctive contri-

tion of such rules is one of the means by which

bution.

51

mankind has learned to cope with the inherently incomplete, fragmented and dispersed nature of all

The Blessings of `Cosmopolitan Law'

human knowledge. Rules do not just restrict; they also empower and facilitate by fostering increased

Supranational European Union law has a particular

certainty, stability and security. For the most part

advantage over the `democratic' laws of liberal de-

our `actually existing' rules, regulations and laws

mocratic states with multi-ethnic, multi-racial or

have emerged, not as the results of conscious gov-

multi-denominational populations (that is, all of

ernmental or parliamentary decisions, but as the

Europe's liberal democracies, with the possible ex-

outcome of endless mutual adjustment of human be-

ception of Iceland). No matter how liberal and

haviour, without the deliberate intervention of an

democratic a liberal democracy might become, its

ultimate arbiter ± not unlike the continuous mutual

laws are still likely to embody (or at least to be seen as

adjustment of the spontaneous activities of indivi-

embodying) the interests and preferences of the

dual actors in market economies.

50

dominant national, ethnic or religious group(s),

In an increasingly `globalised' and `regionalised'

and to place (or at least to be seen as placing) various

world, laws, rules and regulatory regimes will increas-

minority groups in disadvantageous positions. Spe-

ingly have to deputise or substitute for the ever-

cial protection of the group rights of ethnic and

diminishing scope for democratic control and ac-

religious minorities rarely solves such problems, and

countability as the (supposedly) standard means of

more often than not entrenches divisions, conflict

safeguarding civil and political liberties and/or eco-

and perceptions of difference in ways that are coun-

nomic prosperity. Hayek's emphasis on the limits of

ter-productive.

our knowledge about the present (let alone the

EU laws and regulations is that they do not reflect,

future) is even more appropriate to the new circum-

nor are they based upon, the interests and aspirations

stances in which we now find ourselves. The best we

of any ethnic, religious or national majority. It is

can hope for is trial-and-error improvisation and

arithmetically impossible for any single ethnic, na-

adaptation of rules that can continue to allow us

tional or religious group to dominate the law-making

to live, work and trade together with the minimum

and governance of the European Union. The largest

of friction and the maximum of mutual benefit in a

single nation/ethnic group makes up no more than

shrinking and increasingly dangerous world. These

one-quarter of the population and it is greatly under-

`discovery processes' are iterative and pragmatic rather

represented in the EU Commission, the Council of

than democratic. Indeed, one must be on one's guard

Ministers and the European Parliament due to the

against nationalists, socialists, populists, neo-fascists

significant weighting in favour of small nations.

and even some well-meaning democrats who pedal

Roman Catholicism, the European Union's largest

preconceived blueprints and panaceas for the future,

single religious denomination, does not enjoy special

because it is simply not possible to identify in

favour. Indeed, EU law-making and governance are

238

52

By contrast, a major advantage of

CIVIL ASSOCIATION AND EUROPE

in no way directed against the national, ethnic and

monic ethnic and/or religious majorities. Such pro-

religious minorities `native' to Western Europe, even

blems can only be resolved within a larger framework

though few (if any) of the member states can wholly

in which no one group can establish a privileged or

escape accusations of racism and/or religious intol-

hegemonic position, because every group has become

erance towards various categories of immigrants of

a small minority. Thus Timothy Garton Ash is right

non-EU origin. There are indeed mounting tensions

to characterise the EU as a non-hegemonic liberal

between the European Union's liberal-cosmopolitan

order, although (like so many Anglo-Saxon com-

aspirations and founding ideals and its increasingly

mentators) he seriously misunderstands the political

exclusionary and intolerant stance towards immi-

implications of EMU and misconstrues it as a threat

grants from outside the EU, laying it open to charges

to ± rather than as an extension and reinforcement of

of malfeasance and hypocrisy. Its main line of de-

± this supranational liberal legal order.

55

fence must be the morally lame one that `political

The resultant shift of emphasis from unfettered

communities endure because they are exclusive, and

sovereignty and democracy to a supranational liberal

most establish their peculiar identities by accentuat-

legal order that drastically circumscribes national

ing the differences between outsiders and aliens.'

53

sovereignty and `unlimited' democracy, far from sig-

The EU has often been likened to the Austro-

nifying some huge `sacrifice' or `retrograde step' (as

Hungarian Empire, which was similarly held together

many `Europhobes' and the more blinkered demo-

by a supranational rule of law, and within which no

crats would have us believe), is actually the major

single ethnic group held an absolute majority. Never-

benefit that the EU can confer on its member states.

theless, the cosmopolitan universalism of the EU is a

The alternatives foregone are only illusions of na-

vast improvement on the ethnic particularism, paro-

tional sovereignty and democracy, mere fig leaves

chial narrow-mindedness and widespread religious

which barely conceal the reality of inescapable de-

bigotry and segregation which many Central Eur-

mocratic deficits at all levels, since national democ-

opeans have acknowledged as central characteristics

racies

of the Habsburg domains, which did have dominant

branch control of the legislature and the media while

(albeit non-majoritarian) ethnic groups with ethnic-

Europe as a whole is falling increasingly under the

collectivist mindsets and a strongly collectivist domi-

sway of global capitalism, global information and

nant religion. EU law, which has acquired `supre-

communications networks, and an expanding trans-

macy' and `direct effect' in the member states, is

national security alliance (NATO). The emerging

probably the only `actually existing' legal framework

supranational EU legal order cannot make good

in the world within which `cosmopolitan law-en-

Europe's growing democratic deficits, but it can

forcement' could be rendered fully operational.

54

have

succumbed

to

increasing

executive

mitigate the consequences and confer major com-

This supranational system of `cosmopolitan law',

pensating benefits which would be unattainable

rather than utopian conceptions of `cosmopolitan

within a more fragmented and fractious Europe of

democracy', offers the basis on which the EU can

nation-states. My pessimism concerning the pro-

best help to defuse Europe's potentially explosive

spects for liberal democracy is combined with a

`minority problems'. The essential point is that

considerable optimism that this particular cloud

`minority problems' can never be fully resolved with

has a very substantial silver lining.

a framework of nation-states which contain hege-

Notes

to Terry Nardin's use of Oakeshott's distinction be-

1. I was first drawn to Hayek through my earlier work on

tween civil and enterprise associations.

centrally planned economies and to Oakeshott by Samuel Brittan's columns in The Financial Times,

2. Hayek (1993), volume 1, pp. 1±3.

but my understanding of both has been enhanced

3. See Spinelli (1957) and Albertini (1999), passim.

by several years of fruitful discussion with Bruce

4. Merkel (1994), p. 38.

Haddock. He and Noel O'Sullivan drew my attention

5. Laffan (1999), p. 336.

239

ROBERT BIDELEUX

6. Lodge (1994), pp. 364±5.

32. Ibid., pp. 18±19.

7. Gray (1998), pp. 149±50.

33. Ibid., p. 318.

8. Majone (1992), pp. 77±101.

34. Ibid., pp. 222±3.

9. Bulmer (1993), pp. 375±6.

35. Ibid., p. 32.

10. Mann (1993), p. 130.

36. Ibid., p. 324.

11. Smith (1996), p. 253.

37. Gros and Steinherr (1994), p. 76.

12. Mann (1993), pp. 131, 135.

38. Hayek (1993), volume 1, pp. 98±9.

13. Smith (1996), p. 259.

39. Ibid., p. 94.

14. For example, Held (1995) and (1996).

40. This argument is presented at greater length in Bideleux (1999b).

15. This is a major reason why other regional blocs, most notably in Latin America, are seeking to emulate the

41. Ward (1997), p. 79.

European Union's success.

42. Kaldor (1999), pp. 4, 5, 28, 91±6, 140.

16. Dahl (1994), pp. 26, 32±3.

43. Ibid., p. 11.

17. This is the main theme of Tsagarousianou, Tambini

44. Ibid., p. 74. 45. Ibid., pp. 2, 29.

and Bryan (eds) (1998). 18. Quoted by Ladrech (1994), pp. 78±9.

46. Ibid., pp. 4, 5, 11.

19. Temple-Lang (1996), p. 126.

47. This apt phrase may have been coined by Bruce Haddock, from whom I first heard it.

20. Loveland (1996), pp. 534±5. 21. Hayek (1993), volume 1, p. 6.

48. McGrew (1997), p. 6.

22. Touraine (1997), pp. 2, 4.

49. Hayek (1993), volume 3, chapter 13.

23. Hayek (1939), p. 146.

50. Hayek (1960), pp. 157±9.

24. Hayek (1939), pp. 141±3.

51. Bideleux (1999a), pp. 116±18.

25. Oakeshott (1962), p. 189.

52. This is argued in more detail in Bideleux (1996), pp. 288±90, and in Bideleux and Jeffries (1998), pp. 407±

26. Ibid., pp. 40±1.

34 and 460±6.

27. Gray (1989), p. 207. 28. Ibid., p. 210.

53. Linklater (1998), p. 1.

29. Nardin (1983), pp. 9, 14.

54. Kaldor (1999), pp. 124±31, uses this in a more military and intergovernmental sense.

30. Ibid., pp. 12±13.

55. Garton Ash (1998), pp. 59±64.

31. Ibid., pp. 14, 24.

240

18

THE IDEA OF A LIBERALDEMOCRATIC PEACE Howard Williams

An impressive literature has developed in recent

deciding what the argument looks like from Kant's,

years dealing with the topic of a `liberal-democratic

or a Kantian, perspective. In the literature on demo-

peace'. Indeed, a debate has raged in American

cratic peace, Kant has been much referred to: it is

political science journals such as International Secur-

true to say that he has become an emblem of the

ity and Comparative Political Studies about the validity

thesis. This is so to such an extent that authors need

of the hypothesis that the growth in the number of

only cite Kant in their title to show that they are

states with liberal-democratic polities will lead to a

engaging with the debate. Others make play with

more stable and harmonious international order.

Kant's name to demonstrate their topicality, such as

The debate is conducted in a most civil and fair

Christopher Layne's title to his article on `Kant or

way, with a great deal of emphasis being given to the

Cant: The Myth of the Democratic Peace'.

1

empirical evidence for the truth or otherwise of the

The treatment of Kant in such articles tends to be

hypothesis. Nonetheless, lines have been drawn:

quite cursory and the emphasis generally turns very

some stand on the side of optimism and a whole-

quickly to the evidence. Here I want to alter this

hearted endorsement of the thesis, while others are

emphasis by attempting to measure the democratic

more lukewarm and await more evidence. Yet others

peace thesis by Kant's standards. We will find that

are entirely sceptical, doubting whether liberal in-

there are intriguing differences of emphasis between

stitutions bring peace and whether or not interna-

current international peace theorists and Kant's

tional peace is possible at all. It looks as though the

original argument, which tells us a lot about the

debate is set to run and run as more evidence is

priorities of liberal internationalism now, and Kant's

gathered and greater subtlety is shown in the inter-

contrasting objectives for practical philosophy and

pretation of regimes and liberal theory itself.

humanity in general.

My object is neither to add to nor query the relevance of this interesting literature. I think the

Michael Doyle

debate is most welcome, particularly as it demonstrates the relevance of political theory to issues of

The debate on the democratic peace has its origins in

international politics and security. My object is

a resurgence of interest in Kant's political philosophy

rather to examine the philosophical basis of this

and international relations which occurred in the

discussion. I want to travel down the path of demo-

early 1980s. One of the writers who most effectively

cratic peace, not with the present preoccupation in

caught on to this trend was Michael Doyle, who in

mind of deciding whether or not such a democratic

two 1983 articles in Philosophy and Public Affairs

peace is on its way, but rather with the intention of

highlighted Kant's legacy to liberalism and interna-

241

HOWARD WILLIAMS

tionalism; these were distilled into the one key 1986

states may have been prone to be `trigger-happy',

article `Liberalism and World Politics' in the Amer-

contrary to Kant's pacific recommendations. Where

ican Political Science Review.

2

Although in the latter

liberal-democratic states have become involved in

Kant is cited along with Machiavelli and Schump-

wars to defend liberal causes this has often turned out

eter it is clear that Kant forms the centrepiece of

badly. In so far as western democratic states have

Doyle's argument. For Doyle Kant's views on politics

found liberal grounds for aggression Doyle thinks

not only have a valuable policy component in that

they have strayed from Kant's conceptions.

they show how American foreign relations ought best to be framed but they also have a significant

Francis Fukuyama

empirical relevance in that Kant is `a liberal republican whose theory of internationalism best accounts

Further credence has been given to the democratic

for what we are.' In contrast Machiavelli is `a classi-

peace thesis by Francis Fukuyama's writing on the

cal republican whose glory is an imperialism we often

End of History. Fukuyama is perhaps better known for

practice.'

3

Doyle's object, then, is to put forward

the Hegelian connections of his thinking, especially

Kant's political theory as a model of good practice for

the striking claim that there are no major progressive

liberal-democratic states to follow.

political developments yet to come in human his-

Doyle's thesis has a moral and an empirical side to

tory, but nonetheless he does draw very heavily upon

it. The moral side is naturally that policy-makers

Kant and the idea of a pacific union. However,

should be informed by Kant's liberal international-

Fukuyama gets to democratic peace via a very dif-

ism and the empirical side shows that where policy-

ferent route from Doyle. He is particularly struck by

makers have been informed by Kant's principles they

the notion of a struggle for recognition that occurs in

have, in terms of promoting peace, turned out to be

human history, borrowing this from Hegel's philo-

quite successful. In this liberal-democratic thesis,

sophy (the idea of such a struggle figures quite

then, the behaviour of states that conform as near

prominently in the Phenomenology of Spirit and the

as possible to Kant's model of a republic comes under

earlier

close scrutiny. The number of wars they have been

(1804±6)).

engaged in, their nature and their length are docu-

gle for recognition ± a struggle which affects all

mented accurately and the results weighed very

human individuals ± as a means of dismissing all

carefully. This meticulous research is a feature of

but the democratic republic as a legitimate form of

Doyle's work. The 1986 article has a three-page

government. According to him, the difficulty with

appendix where all the liberal regimes which have

all non-democratic forms of government is that they

existed from 1700 to 1982 are listed and all the

prevent the struggle for recognition, which always

international wars since 1817 are given chronologi-

occurs between free human individuals, from work-

cally. Doyle rests some of his conclusions upon this

ing itself out in a non-destructive form. The beauty

evidence. As he states in the article's abstract, `liberal

about the democratic mode of government is that it

states are different. They are indeed peaceful.' But

allows everyone to follow their own paths in a

the evidence is that they are not always inclined to

competitive way without preventing others from

peace: `they are also prone to make war. Liberal states

doing the same. Earlier, more authoritarian forms

have created a separate peace, as Kant argued they

of government stand in the way of such an equal

would.'

4

unpublished 5

work

from

his

Jena

period

Fukuyama uses the notion of the strug-

The evidence is therefore mixed but in no

form of recognition. They are based upon forms of

sense refutes the position Doyle believes Kant and

recognition which elevate one individual or a group

other liberals to hold. Living by the rules outlined by

of individuals above the rest. Fukuyama believes that

Kant in his Definitive Articles to Perpetual Peace can

societies which are properly democratic are non-

pay in terms of the avoidance of war. Indeed Doyle

antagonistic within themselves and therefore are

seems to believe that even closer attention to Kant's

also likely to be non-antagonistic towards each

arguments might have paid off because he fears that

other. Like Doyle, Fukuyama provides his own list of

in some respects the rulers of liberal-democratic

242

THE IDEA OF A LIBERAL-DEMOCRATIC PEACE

6

democratic states in his writings. He sees the spread

way of their seeking mutual recognition in the world.

of democracies as part of the universal history of

But Fukuyama believes that the growth of modern

mankind which is leading to the worldwide recogni-

science and the technological improvement which

tion of all individuals as equals. Fukuyama is highly

follows from it means that human desire and human

optimistic about this course of events. In his view,

reason point in the same direction. Economic effi-

`the growth of liberal democracy, together with its

ciency flows from the adoption of liberal-democratic

companion, economic liberalism, has been the most

practices and rules. No state can afford to go it alone

remarkable macropolitical phenomenon of the last

in the modern world economy. To flourish, states

four hundred years.'

7

In liberal democratic states no

have to open their markets and encourage both trade

adults are in general excluded from the political

and investment. In this respect, Fukuyama envisages

process. They all equally are given the right to vote

a kind of economic determinacy which forces people

and can themselves usually stand for office if they

towards greater democracy and the opportunity of

wish to do so. This widening of participation in the

peace. This argument seems very similar to the

political process takes the edge off the natural com-

`guarantee' of eternal peace which nature provides

petition for preference among individuals. The com-

that Kant puts forward in the first supplement to

petition does not disappear but is channelled in a

Perpetual Peace.

civil direction. States that allow full democratic civil

mism about the applicability of his own peace thesis

competition fall outside history and those who fail to

we can take the following: `In fact, such a Kantian

allow it are regarded as still within history. They

liberal international order had come into being

have yet to make the step to the condition wholly

willy-nilly during the Cold War under the protective

appropriate to human life. `The post-historical world

umbrella of organisations like NATO, the European

is one in which the desire for comfortable self-pre-

Community,

servation has been elevated over the desire to risk

GATT.'

one's life in battle for pure prestige, and in which

theory ceases to be a hypothesis and becomes instead

universal and rational recognition has replaced the

a reality.

struggle for domination.'

11

10

the

As evidence of Fukuyama's opti-

OECD,

the

Group

of

Seven,

With Fukuyama the democratic peace

8

Fukuyama believes that Kant foresaw such a con-

`Liberalism and World Politics'

dition of universal peace in his political philosophy and therefore provided the basis for the development

Clearly, the empirical tone of the debate is most

of a convincing liberal interpretation of this phe-

marked in both Fukuyama and Doyle, focusing upon

nomenon. So although it is Hegel who inspires his

the factual reality or otherwise of Kant's outline for

vision of the universal homogeneous state Fukuyama

perpetual peace. This is very flattering for Kant's

gains the idea of a democratic world peace from

argument but I am not sure at all that it is the kind of

Kant. He is well aware that many of the liberal

reception he had in mind. At the general philoso-

internationalist movements inspired by Kant, such

phical level it should be borne in mind that Kant is

as the League of Nations, have ended in failure. But

more often regarded as a transcendental idealist

he argues that `what many people have not under-

rather than a straightforward defender of empiricism.

stood, however, is that the actual incarnations of the

Kant was very impressed by the empiricist philoso-

Kantian idea have been seriously flawed from the

phies of Locke and Hume but ultimately wished to

start by not following Kant's own precepts.'

9

differ with them about the importance of observation

Broadly speaking, Fukuyama believes the move-

in the construction of human knowledge. Kant

ment towards peace and democracy represents an

wanted to emphasise in his critical philosophy the

irreversible process. This does not mean that he

active human part played in the production of

thinks it is an inevitable outcome at any point in

knowledge as well as the passive part played by

time. The leaders of states may make poor choices or

the absorption of data. This brings us to the most

fail properly to see the road ahead. Their desire for

striking overall difference between the Doyle/Fu-

power and prestige may momentarily stand in the

kuyama approach to the growth of a peaceful world

243

HOWARD WILLIAMS

order and Kant's. In many respects Doyle and Fu-

essay by themselves, and more than half when taken

kuyama play the role of passive spectators in obser-

with the preliminary articles, this is a striking omission.

ving the role of liberal republican regimes in bringing

Doyle does have a strong justification in that the three

about peace whereas Kant's main emphasis is on the

definitive articles represent the main positive points

role that the leaders of states and an enlightened

that Kant wished to highlight in his essay. These

public can play in realising the goal. Kant's Perpetual

stipulate the requirements for (1) a republican form

Peace represents the most explicit kind of moral

of government; (2) a federation of free states; (3)

advocacy in which facts are cited to demonstrate

cosmopolitan law to be limited to the right of universal

that the author's goals are not wholly unrealistic,

hospitality. These three definitive laws provide the

whereas Doyle and Fukuyama's work is directed more

backbone for Doyle's argument and the first two are

to showing the empirical feasibility of the goal of a

also highlighted by Fukuyama.

democratic peace and thereafter its possible moral

analyses in sufficient detail the `guarantee' for perpe-

desirability. For Doyle and Fukuyama the lure of the

tual peace which Kant presents in the first supplement

democratic peace thesis lies mainly in its apparent

to his essay which would seem, dealing as it does with

present empirical validity whereas for Kant the allure

the course of history upon the development of peace, to

of his thesis stands independently of particular pre-

have an important bearing on their arguments. Over-

sent facts. For him, we ought to aim for a world made

looked also are Kant's views on the role of the philo-

up of free, republican states because this is the right

sopher, his discussions of morality and politics, and his

thing to do even if present circumstances do not

reflections on the role of publicity in politics.

13

Arguably, neither

indicate with total clarity that this will bring lasting

Doyle's account of Kant is therefore a highly

peace. Kant thinks that we have to work on the

selective one. But in those matters he chooses to

assumption that the thesis can be shown both mo-

discuss he is persuasive. Indeed, in very many re-

rally as well as empirically to be correct.

spects both he and Fukuyama get Kant right. Doyle

Doyle's position is therefore not at odds with

in particular provides a highly accurate report of the

Kant's argument for peace. The criticism that might

kind of internal social and political structure it is

legitimately be levelled at Doyle and Fukuyama is

important to have in order to ensure the most rapid

that they tell only part of the story. The part they tell

progress towards peace, and his discussion of Kant's

is the one which is empirically reassuring. As Doyle

cosmopolitanism

eloquently puts it:

Although Doyle's Kantian argument has been called

is

illuminating

and

valuable.

the `democratic' peace theory, he himself sensibly Beginning in the eighteenth century and slowly

stresses that Kant's main emphasis is upon the re-

growing since then, a zone of peace, which Kant

publican nature of the ideal form of government. In

called the `pacific federation' or `pacific union',

fact we can add that in his original account of the

has begun to be established among liberal socie-

kind of rule most suitable for bringing international

ties. More than 40 liberal states currently make up

harmony in Perpetual Peace Kant is quite hostile to

the union. Most are in Europe and North Amer-

the democratic form. As he puts it:

ica, but they can be found on every continent.

12

Democracy, in the truest sense of the word, is It is interesting to note that Doyle draws his argu-

necessarily a despotism, because it establishes an

ment primarily from one section only of Perpetual

executive power through which all the citizens

Peace: this is the section in which Kant outlines the

may make decisions about (and indeed against)

three definitive articles for a lasting peace. Doyle

the single individual without his consent, so that

makes little use of the earlier section containing the

decisions are made by all the people and yet not

three preliminary articles and hardly touches at all

by all the people.

14

upon the various supplements and appendices which follow upon the definitive articles. As the supplements

Kant's republican ideal is intended to prevent all

and appendices constitute more than a third of the

kinds of despotism, not only the despotism of one

244

THE IDEA OF A LIBERAL-DEMOCRATIC PEACE

individual who rules arbitrarily from the top but also

sion that Kant rules out democracy as a possible form

the despotism of a group of people who might seek to

of viable government. Kant thinks there are essen-

rule arbitrarily from the bottom. In a republic, as

tially only two forms of government: the despotic or

Kant understands it, there has to be a proper separa-

the republican.

tion of powers between the executive, legislature and

critique, Kant has in mind a more radical kind of

judiciary. Not only are the rulers not allowed to

direct democracy than is now usual in western states.

make the law, they are also not allowed to interfere

Yet still, I would argue, there are elements of Kant's

in the adjudication of infringements to the law. Law-

objections to democracy which have a bearing on

makers should not also be in a position to affect the

the current practices of western democracies and on

actions of rulers in the execution of the laws, nor can

the application of Kant's peace theory. Although

they seek to influence members of the judiciary in

Kant's advocacy of the republican form of govern-

the decisions they make. Equally, members of the

ment can be read as favouring the kind of represen-

judiciary are not under any circumstances to interfere

tative democracy to be found in countries such as the

in the work of the legislature and executive.

United States, Germany and France it can also be

17

It might be argued here that, in his

read as a warning against tendencies towards a majoritarian style of democracy which, from time,

The First Definitive Article

to time, influence the government of these countries.

This very strict separation of powers rules out direct

Like Mill and Tocqueville, Kant fears the tyranny of

democracy as an ideal of government for Kant.

the majority and believes a genuinely rational form

Certainly, he is very much in favour of citizens

of government has to be properly structured to

developing

their

prevent it occurring. For example, it is difficult to

views be known. He thinks that every citizen is as

see how his republicanism might wholly embrace the

valuable as the next. He does not take an elitist view

kind of party politics now prevalent in western states.

of politics, believing that political decision-making

It is conceivable that Kant's guidelines are compa-

should be confined to those `in the know'. But he has

tible with parties competing for representation with-

a logical or technical objection to the idea of every-

in legislatures and so with their success putting

one trying to have a hand in running a state. As he

forward a certain legislative programme. However,

sees it, the people as a whole cannot rule themselves.

it is difficult to see how Kant's principles might be

No one should be allowed to be a judge in their own

used to endorse parties competing for sole executive

cases. And where each branch of the polity is under

authority,

the control of the people as a whole this can easily

matched by an equal dominance in the legislature.

occur. Just as it would not be right if one individual

Where a party uses executive authority to press

sought to control each branch of government so also

through its own programme, and this programme

it has to be wrong if the people as a body seeks to

is willed by a certain section of the population and

control the executive, legislature and judiciary. We

not all, then the government must, according to

have to be ruled by our representatives. As Kant puts

Kant, tend towards despotism. It is true that most

it, `any form of government which is not represen-

parties in western states are not monolithic structures

political

awareness

tative is essentially an anomaly.'

and

15

letting

particularly

if

that

dominance

were

If we expect rules

and have their own internal representative features

to be fairly administered then those who are subject

which mitigate the problem. But where such parties

to them should not also at the same time be respon-

tend towards unity or uniformity the danger of

sible for making them.

straying towards despotism (as Kant understands

Although Doyle stresses this claim of Kant's,

16

it) must exist. Thus, peculiarly, from Kant's stand-

there is a large gap in his presentation of Kant's thesis

point the more diverse, open, representative and

in relation to democracy. While making no attempt

pluralist a party, the more it will conform to his

to suggest that Kant is an enthusiast for democracy,

ideal

he does not bring out the objections Kant has to it.

power.

of

government

should

it

gain

executive

The fact that Kant's prescription for the ideal

We cannot, for instance, glean from Doyle's discus-

245

HOWARD WILLIAMS

polity requires majoritarian tendencies to be kept in

possibility of a democratic peace. He thinks that

check has important implications for his peace the-

such independent individuals who form a republic

sis. Kant would regard states whose representative

will be unlikely to seek war with other states, first

systems were liable to factional control as possibly

because through their representatives they would be

more inclined to belligerence than other states where

making decisions on their own behalf and, second,

the republican model he outlines is more rigidly

if there were costs to be borne, they themselves

adhered to. Democratic states which allowed one

would have to bear them.

party to control both the legislature and executive

In this respect Doyle believes that `the apparent

might be more prone to war than others, just as

absence of war between liberal states, whether ad-

democratic states which allowed one set of opinions

jacent or not, for almost 200 years thus may have

to predominate at the expense of others through

significance.' In states where the Kantian features of

inadequate public debate might be seen as less peace-

a separation of powers, representative government

able. Doyle and Fukuyama's optimistic approach to

and some form of adult suffrage have been absent

Kant's thinking seems to overlook these possibilities

there seems not to have been the same restraint

which surely would have exercised Kant. It is very

shown in relation with other states. `Feudal, fascist,

important for Kant that all citizens should regard the

communist, authoritarian forms of rule' do not,

rulers as acting on their behalf, and with their

according to Doyle, have such a good record.

authority, even if in many respects they disagree

he finds particularly striking is the behaviour of

with the policies being pursued. Should political

liberal states (which best approximate to the Kantian

structures within a state systematically exclude one

model) when major wars actually occur. Not only do

section of the population (which might be seen as

such states not fight wars with each other, they also

occurring where some discriminatory political prin-

tend, when forced, to concur in their view as to

ciples are taken to their extreme) then they cannot

which constitutes the `bad' side. As Doyle puts it,

be fully regarded as co-citizens. Subjects who are

`when states are forced to decide on which side of an

alienated in this way from their states are more liable

impending world war they will fight, liberal states all

to be indifferent to possible aggressive foreign poli-

wind up on the same side despite the complexity of

cies and are possibly more likely to be used as

the paths that take them there.'

19

What

20

`cannon-fodder' in any war. Thus Kant's liberal

Doyle is correct to emphasise how the behaviour

republicanism needs emphasising if the `democratic

of non-despotic states tends to point in the same

peace' thesis is to be true to its origins.

direction. But it is doubtful that Kant would see this as proof of his contention. This is because even if the leaders of a republican state were to take the `wrong

The Second Definitive Article

side' in a world war (which Finland is alleged to have

What Doyle also perhaps glosses over in his writ-

done at the time of the Second World War in some

ings, and the liberal treatment of Kant in general

of the literature calling the democratic peace theory

has to deal with carefully, is Kant's attitude to the

into doubt

role of women as citizens. Essentially, Kant excludes

states from the duty of trying to hold to the project of

all women from active citizenship, as he does all

perpetual peace in all their future actions. It is

dependants including wage-workers, servants and the jobless.

18

21

) this would not absolve the leaders of all

interesting that in Perpetual Peace Kant does not

Far from being unfortunate prejudice

cite the behaviour of republican states to demon-

which is readily dispensable in his overall account,

strate the truth of his plan; rather, he refers to such

he makes this stipulation on the grounds that to be

states from the standpoint of the example they might

in a proper position to have an enlightened and

set to other states. He makes this clear in his com-

disinterested view of the rules that bind together a

ments upon the Second Definitive Article where he

society you have to owe your existence to no one

states: `If by good fortune one powerful and enligh-

other than yourself. Such people, he thought, could

tened nation can form a republic (which by its nature

not. This is absolutely pivotal in his account of the

is inclined to seek perpetual peace) this will provide

246

THE IDEA OF A LIBERAL-DEMOCRATIC PEACE

a focal point for federal association among other states.'

the unrestricted sovereignty of states. The recom-

22

mendation that a pacific federation of free states be

A great deal of the discussion in the democratic

formed is one that flows from this initial objection.

peace debate has focused on the extent to which

Kant holds that very little progress can be attained in

states with Kantian-style constitutions form a pacific

international politics if the leaders of states behave as

union. Enthusiasts for the proposition have discov-

rulers of entirely self-contained and wilfully inde-

ered that states with liberal constitutions tend to

pendent territories who can declare war wherever

keep the peace in relation to each other and those

they see fit upon any other sovereign entities. The

who question the peace theory suggest that there is a

very conception of an international politics based

great deal of evidence that states with such consti-

upon such wholly unrestricted sovereignty carries the

tutions are still liable to war. Doyle's thesis is that

seeds of its own destruction. As Kant sees it.

`liberal republics will progressively establish peace among themselves by means of the pacific federation

the concept of a law of nations becomes mean-

(foedus pacificium) described in Kant's Second Defi-

ingless if interpreted as the right to go to war. For

nitive Article.'

23

In his view, `most liberal theorists

this would make it a right to determine what is

have offered inadequate guidance in understanding

lawful not by means of generally valid external

the exceptional nature of liberal pacification.' Where

law, but by means of one-sided maxims backed up

many fall down, he thinks, is in their inability to

by physical force.

27

explain the way in which some liberal states tend also to get embroiled in war. In this respect, he claims that `Immanuel Kant offers the best guidance.'

Doyle is highly conscious of the federative aspect

24

of Kant's peace plan but does not bring out this

Kant is able to understand the tendency of liberal

indictment of the traditional notions of state sover-

states to form with each other islands of peace and

eignty which underlie Kant's critique of interna-

their tendency to be less at home with non-liberal

tional law. He notes that Kant's

states. Doyle understands Kant to be recommending in

pacific union is not a single peace treaty ending

his Second Definitive Article neither a formal fed-

one war, a world state, nor a state of nations. Kant

eration nor any institutionalised form of cooperation.

finds the first insufficient. The second and third

Mainly, he is emphasising a disposition of states with

are impossible or potentially tyrannical. National

republican constitutions not to attack each other

sovereignty precludes reliable subservience to a

militarily. But Doyle does go a bit further to suggest

state of nations; a world state destroys the civic

that Kant `appears to have in mind a mutual non-

freedom on which the development of human

aggression pact, perhaps a collective security agree-

capacities rests.

ment.'

25

28

This seems very close to what Kant suggests

when he proposes that the `law of nations should be based on a federalism of free states.'

26

Now although it is indeed true that Kant rules out for

But care is

the foreseeable future a world state resting upon a

necessary here before we endorse Doyle's interpreta-

worldwide civil society, this is not because the pur-

tion in its entirety. Particularly important in the way

suit of such a condition is morally wrong. In his view

in which Kant formulates the Second Definitive

we ought to give up the total and arbitrary indepen-

Article is its markedly counterfactual nature. He is

dence of our national state and seek to approximate to

not speaking directly of any empirical state of affairs,

a world state. Our present condition is not one of

present or future, in the Article itself. He has in mind

which we can be proud. What prevents us from

much more the intellectual presuppositions which

attaining the condition of world statehood which

form the basis for an effective international law.

reason prescribes is the sheer physical difficulty of

Indeed, I think the main thrust of the Article for

coordinating government against the entrenched

perpetual peace is a criticism of prevailing concep-

habits of the leaders of sovereign states, and over

tions of international law which ground that law in

huge tracts of territory, some of which are not

247

HOWARD WILLIAMS

developed (in Kant's day this was of course a much

direct recognition of the kind of mutation of state

greater problem than it is now). In Kant's view the

sovereignty this might involve. In the kind of world

former point poses the greatest difficulty. There is an

Kant envisages no one state can prevail over an-

irrational immaturity in the attitude of states' leaders.

other; each has always to accommodate itself to the

They are prepared to drive humanity to destruction

next as though they were neighbouring citizens

to retain their own standing as unrestricted sover-

within a civil society and state. But Fukuyama and

eigns. The attainment of state sovereignty is indeed a

Doyle both realise that in a peaceful condition of the

great step forward in the development of the human

Kantian variety state sovereignty cannot play the

race, but it is not an absolutely valid arrangement. As

role it once did. Without clearly stating it both imply

Kant sees it, state sovereignty attains its proper

that the kind of unrestricted state sovereignty that

validity when it merges over into a wider interna-

once prevailed in international society has had its

tional sovereignty of free states. The splendid ma-

day.

31

jesty of the absolutely unrestricted sovereign state is an obstacle to world peace:

The Third Definitive Article

We look with profound contempt upon the way

One of the great virtues of democratic peace theory is

in which savages cling to their lawless freedom.

its moral egalitarianism. Each human individual for

They would rather engage in incessant strife than

the proponent of a democratic peace counts for as

submit to a legal constraint which they might

much as every other. Each individual, wherever they

impose upon themselves, for they prefer the free-

might live, is deserving of representation and of the

dom of folly to the freedom of reason. We regard

right to elect that representative. With Fukuyama

this as barbarism, coarseness, and brutish debase-

this moral egalitarianism is evident in his emphasis

ment of humanity. We might thus expect that

upon what he calls isothymia. Fukuyama defines the

civilised peoples, each united with itself as a state,

term in relation to its opposite megalothymia. This is

would hasten to abandon so degrading a condi-

the `desire to be recognised as superior to other

tion as soon as possible. But instead of doing so,

people', whereas `its opposite is isothymia, the desire

each state sees its own majesty (for it would be

to be recognised as the equal of other people.'

absurd to speak of the majesty of a people) pre-

thesis is that the world must change, and is changing,

cisely in not having to submit to any external

to a situation where each person lives under a system

32

His

legal constraint, and the glory of its ruler consists

of rule which fosters isothymia or equal recognition.

in his power to order thousands of people to

He sees this happening, however, mainly within

immolate themselves for a cause which does

states. As what he calls `the universal homogeneous

not truly concern them, while he need himself

state' becomes more widespread where such equal

not incur any danger whatsoever.

29

recognition is found this will have a beneficial effect upon peace and security amongst states. In drawing

Fukuyama also does not realise the extent to

this picture of extending worldwide equality Fukuya-

which Kant's Second Definitive Article implies a

ma's inspiration is Hegel who, in his conception of

critique of the traditional notions of state sovereignty

the state, properly develops the idea of mutual

and international law. Kant wants to rewrite the

democratic recognition.

rules of international society in a rational form

This is not incompatible with the Kantian per-

whereas Fukuyama is more concerned to point out

spective. However, it is important to bear in mind

how international society has already taken on a

that for Kant there is a moral equality which both

rational form. He tends as a consequence to cham-

historically and geographically extends beyond the

pion the changes Kant wants without fully realising

state. By definition human individuals, who are the

how difficult they might be to achieve. In keeping

only rational animals, are equal. It is an offence

with Kant, Fukuyama argues that `international law

against our dignity to treat another human indivi-

is merely domestic law writ large,'

30

dual or group as inherently unequal to us. In this

yet there is no

248

THE IDEA OF A LIBERAL-DEMOCRATIC PEACE

respect Doyle captures the spirit of Kant's philosophy

their own powers. They cannot extend their sover-

well. He sees that Kant's cosmopolitanism leads to a

eignty in such a way. Rather, they should look to the

different style of international politics from that to

host country to guarantee the property of their

which we are now accustomed. Kant's doctrine of

nationals while they are resident in those territories.

right would provide no grounds for the western

The civil order of a foreign state is primarily its own

imperial project of the modern world, or for any

responsibility. All other states can ask is that the

missionary intention forcefully to `civilise' non-wes-

liberty of their subjects should not be arbitrarily

tern countries. Kant rules out a patriarchal approach

limited.

to government both internally and externally.

33

The

development of societies outside Europe must possess

The Guarantee of Perpetual Peace

a voluntary dimension. Natives have to play a part themselves in drawing towards civilisation. The most

In one of the most interesting supplements to Per-

that European visitors can ask of the inhabitants of

petual Peace Kant outlines what he describes as a

territories they arrive in is that they not be treated

guarantee provided by `the great artist nature her-

with hostility. This point comes out in Doyle's

self'.

interpretation of the Third Definitive Article to

course of historical development tends in the direc-

Perpetual Peace. `Hospitality', says Doyle, `does not

tion of human improvement, often against our will.

require extending to foreigners either the right to

He cites a number of mechanisms that help to bring

citizenship or the right to settlement, unless the

this about such as our competitiveness, self-inter-

foreign visitors would perish if they were expelled.

ested pursuit of trade, the rivalry among nations and

Foreign conquest and plunder also find no justifica-

even war itself. Even when against our will, these

tion under this right.' Imperialism of any kind is ruled

forces can oblige us to enter into more peaceful

out. `Hospitality does appear to include the right of

relations with one another.

36

Here, he argues that the apparently unguided

access and the obligation of maintaining the oppor-

Both Doyle and Fukuyama cite this mechanism of

tunity for citizens to exchange goods and ideas with-

nature with approval. They commend Kant's guar-

out imposing the obligation to trade (a voluntary act

antee because it highlights an empirical process

in all cases under liberal constitutions).'

34

which can help underpin the liberal-democratic

Doyle argues that liberal states, despite their inter-

peace. For Doyle the guarantee works not because

nal liberal structures, have been prone to war with

we are politically moral beings but through our less

non-liberal societies. As he puts it, `the historical

agreeable side. Our desire for advantage over others

liberal legacy is laden with popular wars fought to

makes us into `asocial-sociable beings' who are just as

promote freedom, to protect private property, or to

much inclined to rivalry as cooperation with them.

support liberal allies against non-liberal enemies.'

35

Our paradoxical aim is to succeed in the eyes of

He suggests that Kant's position would be at odds

others but also at their expense. However, we learn

with this outcome. Partly, these wars have occurred

through sad experience that this is not the proper

because the leaders of liberal states have demanded

way to conduct human affairs. Under the pressure of

more than hospitality for their citizens and subjects

insecurity and actual war we learn the advantages of

in their relations with other states. In seeking to

republican government.

promote the freedom and advantage of visitors to

tory both through our good and our bad side. Doyle is

foreign territories they often have asked not simply

not quite sure how to handle this dialectical process.

for safe passage but that a certain form of life be

Whereas it might be argued that Kant is quite happy

respected which is contrary to native traditions. Kant

to see human short-sightedness and downright evil

believes we ought not to venture beyond peaceful

inadvertently playing a progressive role and this

persuasion in trying to advance the condition of

conflicting with the moral spirit within us, Doyle

other nationals in their own states. Similarly, liberal

wants us to unify the two moral forces. Those who

states are in no position to guarantee the property of

are entirely focused on their selfish interests are also

their nationals abroad simply through the exertion of

playing a moral role. With Doyle the `hidden plan' of

249

37

Progress can occur in his-

HOWARD WILLIAMS

38

However,

justify us from a moral standpoint pursuing progres-

with Kant the hidden plan steps in only where we

sive policies. Nature may help us some of the way but

fail in our moral duty. For him, the plan is not right

ultimately we have to choose to improve. Doyle and

in itself; rather it provides us with an incentive to do

Fukuyama tend to overlook the voluntary side of

what is right.

human progress which forms the essential part of

nature complements our moral duty.

This is a significant point. Kant argues that we

Kant's guarantee. Both Doyle and Fukuyama are

cannot depend on the guarantee from a theoretical

enthusiastic about the natural mechanism, especially

standpoint. In other words, if we view the guarantee

Fukuyama who devotes several passages in his writ-

as a scientific prediction we cannot expect it to come

ings to the economic, social and political forces that

true. As Kant puts it, `we cannot actually observe

drive us willy-nilly towards cooperation.

such an agency in the artifices of nature, nor can we

material acquisition under a free-market system re-

even infer its existence from them.'

39

40

Successful

However, the

quires long-term peace and security. According to

thesis possesses sufficient reality for us to entertain it

Fukuyama, a preoccupation with acquiring more

from a practical standpoint: from the moral point of

consumer goods diverts people away from aggressive

view we can assume it to make sense, at least

foreign policies and war. In keeping with Doyle and

sufficient sense for us to persist with a foreign policy

Fukuyama's interest in the determinist side of Kant's

based upon morality.

`hidden plan' the literature on democratic peace concentrates heavily on the empirical verifiability

We can rightly suppose that there are natural

41

mechanisms at work which promote the aim of

of the perpetual peace thesis.

lasting peace. Despite the expressed aims of less

entirely off the Kantian track, since the more em-

scrupulous political leaders and their subjects, we

pirical evidence for the thesis which exists the fewer

can discern over the longer term underlying trends

excuses there can be for refusing to seek progress in

which appear to be taking the human race forward.

external policy. However, in the light of Kant's

Perversely, war itself might further these trends by

priorities the emphasis is still a little one-sided.

bringing home to people the doleful effects of war-

His main purpose is to bring morality and politics

fare. Societies who engage in this aggressive beha-

into accord; only then will perpetual peace be

viour are forced to modernise quickly in order to

achieved. The actual past course of events naturally

employ the most modern means for engaging in war.

plays a key role in conditioning the present, but so

But this modernisation takes place with a concomi-

also must the intentions of policy-makers and those

tant growth in the potential and demand for freedom

they represent.

This may not take us

within the state. Self-interest is, above all, what brings the progressive mechanisms of war into play.

Conclusion

The hard-nosed pursuit of economic gain may have peaceful consequences. Although primarily moti-

What does our examination of the liberal-demo-

vated by the pursuit of profit those professionally

cratic peace thesis advanced by Doyle and Fukuyama

engaged in trade and commerce come to dislike the

from the standpoint of Kant's original peace theory

disruption caused by wars. Over the long term Kant

tell us? Our first conclusion might justifiably be that

thinks that business prefers peace to war.

there is more to Kant's original view than the

Kant realises that such projections about the

democratic peace theorists convey. There are ele-

progressive mechanism of history are not subject

ments in Kant's argument, such as his powerful

to clear empirical proof. There are countless events

objections to forcible intervention in the affairs of

which may tell in the opposite direction, but again

other states, his views on property rights and the use

no one can offer conclusive proof that the human

of national debt to finance war, which are not fully

race is bound not to improve. Kant's object is not to

considered. Just as Doyle and Fukuyama's new inter-

create sufficient certainty from a scientific stand-

pretations of Kant's thinking have uncovered many

point but rather sufficient certainty from a moral

valuable ideas we might legitimately claim that there

standpoint. He thinks there is enough evidence to

is even more to be discovered which might not only

250

THE IDEA OF A LIBERAL-DEMOCRATIC PEACE

add to the democratic peace thesis but also provide

Although Doyle stresses once again the peaceful

insights in other connected areas of politics. Classical

impetus brought about by overlapping economic

political theory, such as Kant's essay on Perpetual

interests,

Peace, provides a permanent source of new insight

be weighed against the ambiguous, if not entirely

into current national and international issues.

contrary, empirical evidence. It is true to say that

43

the optimistic Kantian picture has to

But such sources have always to be treated criti-

Kant was not depending on the world economic

cally. Kant would have himself emphasised that we

system automatically to bring about peace. His whole

have to judge what constitutes knowledge and un-

philosophy implies that there has to be an effort of

derstanding ourselves. There are no wholly reliable

will to overcome our previous bad habits. His point is

external authorities. Kant's political writings should

that the long-term contract ± upon which trade and

of course be treated with respect, but not slavishly

commerce rest ± cannot function without trust and a

followed. Doyle and Fukuyama are, each in their

sense of community. From an intelligible or logical

own way, critically receptive. I am not sure they go

standpoint war and trade are plainly at odds. But

far enough. For a second conclusion that we might

maybe Kant was not sufficiently alert to the way in

draw from our engagement with present and Kantian

which, in the short term, trade can in fact reinforce

peace theory is that just as where Kant seems correct

our bad habits. Empirically, the case for the moral

and affords insight so also where he seems mistaken

worth of unrestricted commerce is not a strong one.

he may equally lead us to think carefully and judge

There is an irony here in that contemporary

problems afresh. Two particular issues stand out as

democratic peace theory has strongly emphasised

obviously problematic in his account: (1) the exclu-

the empirical dimension of Kant's thinking. Above

sion of women from politically relevant roles; (2) his

all, the literature has concentrated on analysing the

apparently optimistic view of the role finance and

behaviour of states with constitutions approximating

trade (operating through self-interest) can play in

to the one recommended by Kant. Their conclusion

the forging of international peace.

is that in relation to each other such states behave

In terms of the first, it is clearly fair to say that,

well, but they do not tell us it is because of the

empirically, the facts run against Kant's position. We

convergence of economic interests of these states or

can say this not only in the sense that since the end

the peaceful intentions of their rulers. From a Kan-

of the eighteenth century most democratic republics

tian perspective, the main gap in the contemporary

of the Kantian variety have extended the franchise

literature is its tendency to under-emphasise the

to include women, but also in the more interesting

moral side of Kant's argument. Kant's allusion to

sense that the involvement of women in politics has

empirical developments is intended primarily to

tended to add to the peaceful tendencies of poli-

strengthen his moral argument rather than to pro-

ties.

42

Evidence seems to suggest that women are less

vide a knock-down proof. Those who require knock-

likely than men are to condone the use of violence to

down proof of the viability of the peace project

resolve international disputes. In terms of the sec-

before signing up to it are precisely those Kant

ond, it might be argued that the extension of trade

was not aiming to attract to his argument. His `pitch'

and financial interests in the international sphere

for perpetual peace is made to those who already

has seemingly had as many drawbacks as advantages.

have moral intentions in politics. The primary pre-

Nineteenth-century imperialism, which was some-

mise for the success of his argument is goodwill. The

times violent and rapacious, seems to have ridden on

liberal-democratic peace will work only for those

the back of financial and trade interests just as much

who aim to live in a morally regulated peace with

as it was restrained by them. The seeds of wars seem

others.

often to lie in conflicts of economic interests. There

Not surprisingly our comparison of peace theory

seems to be no shortage of interpretations of twen-

then and now leads us to the conclusion that there is

tieth-century armed conflicts which provide grounds

more to be said ± and much more in international

for hostilities in disputes over economic spheres of

politics itself that can be done ± to engender this

influence, markets and sources of raw materials.

goodwill, the basis of peace as theory and practice.

251

HOWARD WILLIAMS

Notes

1. Layne (1994).

27. Kant (1991), p. 105.

2. Doyle (1983a), (1983b), (1986).

28. Doyle (1986), p. 1158.

3. Doyle (1986), p. 1151.

29. Kant (1991), pp. 102±3.

4. Ibid.

30. Fukuyama (1992), p. 281.

5. See Hegel (1969), pp. 213±17 and also Avineri

31. This is a fairly striking example from Fukuyama

(1972), chapters 3, 4. Jonathan Seglow's chapter in

(1992), p. 283: `The United States and other liberal

the present volume also explores the notion of `re-

democracies will have to come to grips with the fact

cognition' as a concern for liberal political theory.

that, with the collapse of the communist world, the

6. Fukuyama (1992), pp. 49±50.

world in which we live is less and less the old one of

7. Ibid., p. 48.

geopolitics, and that the rules and methods of the

8. Ibid., p. 283.

historical world are not appropriate to life in the post-

9. Ibid., p. 281.

historical one. For the latter, the major issues will be

10. Kant (1991), pp. 108±14.

economic ones like promoting competitiveness and

11. Fukuyama (1992), p. 283.

innovation, managing internal and external deficits,

12. Doyle (1986), p. 1156.

maintaining full employment, dealing co-operatively

13. Fukuyama (1992), p. 281.

with grave environmental politics, and the like.'

14. Kant (1991), p. 101.

What might be said from a Kantian perspective is

15. Ibid., p. 101.

that rulers should have attempted to overcome geo-

16. `By republican Kant means a political society that has

politics just as much before the collapse of communism as after it.

solved the problem of combining moral autonomy, individualism and social order. A private property and

32. Fukuyama (1992), p. 182.

market-oriented economy partially addressed that di-

33. Cf. Williams (1983), pp. 129±37.

lemma in the private sphere. The public, or political

34. Doyle (1986), p. 1158.

sphere was more troubling. His answer was a republic

35. Ibid., p. 1160.

that preserved juridical freedom ± the legal equality of

36. Kant (1991), p. 108.

citizens as subjects ± on the basis of a representative

37. Doyle (1983a), p. 225.

government with a separation of powers. Juridical

38. Doyle (1986), p. 1159.

freedom is preserved because the morally autonomous

39. Kant (1991), p. 109. Contrary to Doyle's view the

individual is by means of representation a self-legis-

supposition of progress in history is primarily a kind of

lator making laws that apply to all citizens equally,

heuristic device (Doyle, 1986, p. 1159) ± but a

including himself or herself. Tyranny is avoided be-

heuristic device with a practical rather than theoretical importance.

cause the individual is subject to laws he or she does

40. Fukuyama (1992), especially chapters 1, 5 and 6.

not also administer.' Doyle (1986), p. 1158.

41. Cf. Oneal and Ray (1997) and Mansfield and Snyder

17. Kant (1991), p. 101. 18. Cf. Saage (1973), pp. 83±93; Kersting (1993), p. 382.

(1995). Note the conclusion of the second article: `In

19. Doyle (1986), p. 1156.

the long run, the enlargement of the zone of stable

20. Ibid., p. 1156.

democracy will probably enhance the prospects for

21. See Russett (1995), p. 168.

peace. But in the short run, there is a lot to be done to

22. Kant (1991), p. 104.

minimise the dangers of the turbulent transition' (p. 38).

23. Doyle (1986), p. 1158. Cf. Doyle (1983a), p. 226.

42. Lisa Brandes, Public Opinion, International Security and

24. Doyle (1983a), p. 225. 25. Ibid., p. 227.

Gender: The United States and Britain Since 1945, Yale

26. This is my own translation; cf. Kant (1991), p. 102:

University PhD dissertation, 1994. Cited in Russett (1995), p. 167f.

`The Right of Nations shall be based upon a Federa-

43. Doyle (1986), p. 1161.

tion of Free States.'

252

19

CONSTRUCTING INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY: LIBERAL THEORY, DEVELOPMENTAL COMMUNITARIANISM AND INTERNATIONAL ETHICS Peter Sutch

That these currents are present in liberal interna-

Introduction

tional theory is highlighted in the recent critical 1

This chapter offers a reading of liberalism's normative

work on John Rawls's contribution to the debate.

theory of international politics. As the ideology of the

Rawls's international relations theory is often viewed

dominant powers in the recent history of interna-

as falling between a rock and a hard place. He is

tional politics and as the theoretical substructure that

either a failed liberal universalist who dilutes human

underpins the claim that human rights should be the

rights in order to accommodate statism or a failed

guiding force in the future development of interna-

communitarian who relies upon covert liberal as-

tional relations, liberalism undeniably forms a vital

sumptions in order to make international politics

part of the world order. In trying to determine whether

and justice compatible. One of the principal sources

the expansion and (to use a very popular liberal

of this interpretation is mainstream liberal interna-

characterisation of the process) ultimate universalisa-

tional relations theory;

tion of a liberal human rights culture really is a move

part, the hostile reaction to (or, more often, the

towards international justice as liberals claim, an

sheer unwillingness to engage with) Rawls's ideas or

exploration of the way in which this process is justified

with the ideas of those thinkers who take a similar

in contemporary theory offers some very interesting

approach to questions of international justice.

2

perhaps this explains, in

insights. In particular, in this chapter it becomes clear

In exploring contemporary liberal international

that there are two distinct traditions in contemporary

relations theory, this chapter falls into two parts.

liberal international theory: the cosmopolitan strand

First, I want to suggest that the dominant liberal

which has been traditionally attributed to liberalism

response to developments in world politics and

and a more particularistic norm-governed approach

international relations theory does not adequately

which is derived from liberalism's often hidden, non-

show why international justice must be cosmopolitan

Kantian (occasionally ex-Kantian) ancestry.

in character.

253

3

My principal concern is that the

PETER SUTCH

constructivist move from the requirement that prin-

account of the way it constructs or portrays inter-

ciples of ethics be universalisable to the requirement

national community. In doing so it must relinquish

that principles of ethics be cosmopolitan is incom-

or radically reconstruct some of liberalism's most

plete. What is missing is an appropriate conception

prized goals. My reasons for making this argument

of international community. I will then propose that

stem from several sources: firstly, a belief that the

the more cautious reaction of what I will term (in

justifications that liberals are obliged to construct for

order to make a clear distinction between the types

their theory are not strong enough to ignore the facts

of liberal theory on offer) the constructivist and

of pluralism in international politics; secondly, an

developmental communitarianism of thinkers such

uneasiness with the cosmopolitan-liberal assumption

as Frost,

4

5

offers the invaluable

that sovereignty ± one of the political cornerstones of

link between international politics and constructi-

international relations ± is antithetical or irrelevant

vist liberal theory that the liberal tradition needs if it

to justice; and thirdly, my belief that the assumption

is to take account of the problems and possibilities

that sovereignty is hostile to concepts such as human

Rawls and Walzer

posed to it by the extension of its concerns into the

rights which are thought by definition both universal

international

of

and cosmopolitan in character is obscuring a very

Frost, the communitarian liberalism of Walzer and

fruitful seam in liberal international relations theory.

arena.

The

Hegelian

liberalism

the political liberalism of Rawls promise a genuine

One of the most theoretically complete examples

alternative to cosmopolitanism by (as Brown writing

of constructivist cosmopolitanism is to be found in

about the position of Frost notes) `starting from the

the work of Onora O'Neill.

position that the value that people and states quite

latest and arguably the most sustainable form of

clearly do assign to sovereignty cannot simply be

theoretical

dismissed as the product of defective powers of

Her insistence that approaches such as those of

reasoning or some kind of persisting mass hallucina-

Walzer and Rawls are neither liberal nor just gives

tion.'

6

justification

7

for

It comprises both the international

justice.

my choice of her work as the example of liberal international relations theory particular pertinence. Here I intend to outline the three main claims

Constructivist Cosmopolitanism:

motivating O'Neill's argument to highlight construc-

Contemporary Liberal Internationalism

tivist cosmopolitanism's basic position. While this

Contemporary liberal international relations theory

cannot do justice to its sophistication, this exercise is

can best be described as `constructivist cosmopoli-

useful because it shows how the cosmopolitan out-

tanism'. Theoretically it is constructivist, showing

look can be maintained within a constructivist jus-

the influence of liberalism's engagement with con-

tificatory strategy. The claims are as follows:

temporary debates in political philosophy. Politically it is cosmopolitan in that it maintains that the projects it has inherited from its Kantian origins still

1. The basis of any theory of international pol-

represent the only practical liberal solution to the

itics must be relevant to all parties concerned;

moral problems of international politics. There is

that is, the premises of international relations

nothing particularly surprising about this opening

theory must be universalisable across the re-

statement. The extension of liberal values and prac-

levant domain.

8

tices to international relations is rarely regarded as

2. The actual circumstances of justice and injus-

anything other than an absolute good, yet there is

tice in the modern world (understood by

nothing in constructivist liberal political theory that

looking at the assumptions that agents make

requires or necessarily underwrites cosmopolitan in-

when acting) are more-or-less cosmopolitan in

ternational relations theory. In this chapter I suggest

scope.

9

that a successful constructivist liberalism (hereafter

3. Those theories that acknowledge the theore-

simply `liberalism'), if it is to produce a political

tical relevance of borders (sovereign, commu-

theory suited to world politics, must take proper

nal or moral) are inadequate.

254

10

CONSTRUCTING INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

From these, O'Neill concludes that constructivist

responsibilities to non-citizens cannot automatically 13

cosmopolitanism is the only valid option. Now in

outweigh an appeal to justice.'

the cause of brevity `cosmopolitanism' as a political

O'Neill call the legitimacy of such boundaries into

theory can be usefully explained via Thomas Pogge's

question? Essentially, she does so by suggesting that

description of its core elements. He thinks that three

the requirement that practical reason be universali-

elements are shared by all cosmopolitan positions:

sable plus the fact that we are connected to all other

But how does

agents on a more-or-less cosmopolitan scale requires First, individualism: the ultimate units of concern

a cosmopolitan approach to international politics.

are human beings, or persons ± rather than, say,

The `either-justice-or-sovereignty'

argument has

family lines, tribes, ethnic, cultural or religious

been one of the principal reasons why liberal ideal-

communities, nations or states. The latter may be

ism (as it is often termed) now has little support in

units of concern only indirectly, in virtue of their

the study and practice of international politics. The

individual members or citizens. Second, univers-

alternative form of liberal international relations

ality: the status of ultimate unit of concern at-

theory that I wish to outline is, I shall argue, appro-

taches

to

every

living

human

being

priately universalist but not cosmopolitan ± and, as

universally . . . Third, generality: this special

such, seems to make more sense of both our actual

status has global force. Persons are ultimate units

commitments in world politics and the liberal drive

of concern for everyone ± not only for their fellow

for justice.

compatriots, fellow religionists, or such like.

11

Universalisability and Cosmopolitanism

This quotation is particularly interesting because of the description of universality that Pogge offers. It is

The flip-side of my position is that, of O'Neill's three

not simply a depiction of formal universality. The

claims, only the first is truly stable. Its stability comes

individualism

from its constructivist methodological basis and, to

and generality are incorporated into the description

advance the overall argument, we should now grasp

of moral universalism. This (sleight of hand?) is char-

the meaning of `constructivism', a vital part of con-

acteristic of much liberal international relations the-

temporary liberalism's armour, in this context. To

ory. My concern here is to ensure that this fact does not

construct a political theory is to avoid reliance upon

go unnoticed and to examine the pattern of argument

discredited metaphysics, or contested truth-claims,

that allows (or purports to allow) cosmopolitan the-

or the revealed word of one culture's prophets, and

orists to link the formal criterion of moral universali-

thus to avoid the criticisms of foundationalist reason-

sability with the liberal-cosmopolitan political project.

ing that many fear threatened the paralysis of justi-

What is instructive about O'Neill's theory is that its

ficatory

goal is to lay out fully the predicates of her thesis and to

simple case for theoretical constructivism in ethics

show the validity of her reasoning in so doing.

is that the reasons we give for selecting principles of

substantive

liberal

commitments

to

political

philosophy.

O'Neill's

elegantly

international ethics must be relevant to all con-

So let me state my reading of O'Neill's work

cerned parties. For her:

boldly. My principal contention is that claims two and three in her argument, which are not (in my 12

illicitly `construct' the con-

Constructivism in ethics . . . is not a novel

ception of international community which allows

philosophical method or procedure. To construct

O'Neill to suggest that principles of practical reason

is only to reason with all possible solidity from

must be universalisable and cosmopolitan. The po-

available beginnings, using available and followable

litical core of O'Neill's cosmopolitanism (and that of

methods to reach attainable and sustainable con-

liberal international relations theory more generally)

clusions for relevant audiences.

opinion) defensible,

14

is the claim that `once the legitimacy of treating actual state boundaries has been called into question,

The key to understanding O'Neill's work is the idea

an appeal to sovereignty or to assumed lack of

that principles of ethics must be accessible to the

255

PETER SUTCH

`relevant audiences'. O'Neill's case, put simply, is

allowed to pretend that all the world is a liberal

that any stretch of reason that cannot appeal to all

utopia but neither are we allowed to pretend that

relevant agents and is therefore not universal in its

there are no ethical and political issues that we

domain cannot be called `reasoned'. She goes on to

genuinely share and that constitute the context of

show that, of the various conceptions of practical

our actions. So to generate genuinely shared reason-

reasoning offered by many universalist and particu-

ing, one must operate with premises that are based

larist thinkers, most do not meet even this basic

upon considerations abstracted from agents' actual

standard. Arguments that employ `end-oriented' rea-

situations, accessible to all because they really do

soning, such as that used by `platonist' thinkers who

apply to all.

provide a conception of a specific, independently

The question now is whether constructivism sup-

specified good `end' as being ultimately the purpose

ports cosmopolitan universalism. There are, O'Neill

of agents' actions, will appear arbitrary unless the

claims, two senses in which principles may be for-

appropriate metaphysics is universally validated (ex-

mally universal. The most elementary is if a principle

tremely implausible in the light of the apparent

`applies to or holds for all rather than merely for some

diversity of human ends). Instrumental reasoning

cases in its domain.' The second sense is where `the

(again end-oriented) will appear `barefacedly' arbi-

range of beings is seen as extensive: the scope of

trary to those who do not share its contestably

principles is inclusive, perhaps (more-or-less) cosmo-

subjective

politan.'

conception

of

practical

reason's goal.

16

Even `act-oriented' reasoning (theorising the re-

Of these senses of universalism, the first definition

quirements of action without reference to any spe-

is relevant to O'Neill's case that all those agents

cific end towards which it may be directed) of the

concerned must (potentially) be able to agree that

particularist variety (communitarian norm-oriented)

the principles of practical reason adopted are rele-

would appear incomprehensible to `outsiders' (those

vant to them in their shared condition. This, it must

alien to the particular context) even when those

be noted, does not tell us which agents are concerned

`outsiders' fall within the relevant sphere of action.

15

by what problem in any particular domain. The

Remember that all O'Neill is claiming here is that

second feature is yet to be proven relevant, relying

principles have to meet the requirement that they

upon a heavily contested empirical and theoretical

could be universalised to cover all relevant others.

notion of how agents are meaningfully connected to

Her blanket rejection of all end-oriented and source-

one another across the globe. Indeed, it appears to

derived conceptions of practical reason does not (on

rely upon a liberal individualist conception of agency

the strength of arguments made thus far) have to be

that does not actually derive (and cannot be derived)

accepted, but the requirement that they have to be

from O'Neill's constructivism. This can be shown, I

accessible to all concerned does. O'Neill argues that it

believe, by applying J. L. Mackie's questions con-

is vital that we develop intelligible and abstract

cerning the status of ethics and universality to

principles of action that can avoid the problems of

O'Neill's argument.

17

relativism and idealisation. Here, `relativism' and

Taking issue with the philosophical requirement

`idealisation' are key notions in understanding the

that practical reason be universalisable, it is clear

failure of much international and political theory.

that O'Neill is suggesting we must focus upon what is

The main conclusions from her brief survey of con-

morally relevant and discount those aspects of our

temporary thought are that particularistic relativism

lives that are `arbitrary' in some way. For her, local

cannot adequately provide for the modern circum-

and bounded traditions and practices are examples of

stances of justice and that much universalist writing

such arbitrariness and fall far short of the require-

appears arbitrary in that it relies upon idealised

ment of practical reason because they do not and

starting points. The simple case being made here

cannot take adequate account of all relevant and

is that, in accepting that foundational universalism

connected others (the links between agents across

idealises (makes up) its ethical starting point, we are

such particularised contexts). This follows, she main-

not required to endorse relativism. We are not

tains, from the logical structure of moral reasoning

256

CONSTRUCTING INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

itself and not from some substantive, idealising lib-

structure of ethics. Rather, she is insisting that

eral-cosmopolitan standpoint. I do not believe that

accounts of ethics that do not give ethical priority

this is the case. Following Mackie's seminal line of

to individuals are subordinate to her cosmopolitan

reasoning here is particularly enlightening. He be-

conception of ethics which clearly does. This is not a

gins by posing the same question as O'Neill (albeit in

justifiable

a different form), but when he explores the logical

O'Neill's claim is that particularist practices, value

structure of moral reasoning he comes to a very

systems and politics are morally irrelevant, that the

different conclusion.

treatment of (for example) non-Muslims in a funda-

position

for

a

constructivist

to

hold.

mentalist Muslim state and in a liberal state are Do the desires and especially the sufferings of

relevantly similar. This argument employs all three

other people, if known to me, constitute a reason

stages of universalisation and, while it may be in-

for me to do something, if I can, or try to do

tuitively powerful it is, as Mackie points out, a

something to satisfy those desires or to relieve

peculiarly liberal stance.

21

those sufferings? It would be natural to say that

The crucial point to note here is that what is

they constitute some reason; how strong a reason,

hidden by the phrase `relevantly similar' is the con-

how easily over-ruled by other considerations,

struction or portrayal of the international political

may be a matter of dispute.

18

arena. O'Neill does not make enough of her recognition that `connection will peter out at differing boundaries for different agents and in activities of

For Mackie, moral judgements are universalisable:

22

any truly moral statement concerning an action is

differing sorts in different circumstances.'

nonsensical if it cannot hold for any relevantly similar

in order to underpin her cosmopolitanism O'Neill

action. As he notes, the key to understanding the logic

claims that neither particularism nor Rawlsian lib-

of morality is the idea of `relevantly similar';

19

Rather,

he goes

eralism can provide principles relevant to the mod-

on to argue convincingly that there are three stages of

ern circumstances of justice. Her principal claim is

universalisation that attempt to account for it. It is

that the modes of existence they privilege are not

worth quoting him at some length here:

accessible, and cannot adapt to become accessible, to all relevant agents in world politics. For O'Neill,

There are . . . different kinds or stages of uni-

anything less than an individual-centred, cosmopo-

versalisation. In each of them a moral judgement

litan conception of agency would be so restrictive

is taken to carry with it a similar view about any

that it simply could not generate principles of ethics

relevantly similar case. But the first stage rules out

that relate to the world as we know it. This critique

as irrelevant only the numerical difference be-

of non-cosmopolitan reasoning relies upon her argu-

tween one individual and another; the second

ment that we can abstract from all the contingencies

stage rules out generic differences which one is

and detail of political pluralism to a core of shared

tempted to regard as morally relevant only be-

reasoning.

cause of one's particular mental or physical qua-

are in fact connected to all other human individuals

lities or condition, one's social status or resources;

as individuals (and not as, say, citizens of a state) are,

the third stage rules out differences which answer

though, highly contestable.

23

Both this claim and the claim that we

to particular tastes, preferences, values and ideals.

For O'Neill, the constructivist projects (that she

It is at most the first stage . . . that is built into

convincingly shows to be necessary) share a common

the meaning of moral language: the correspond-

aim. It is `in the end no more, but also no less, than

ing logical thesis about the second stage is more

an attempt to work towards a result that is neither

controversial, while that about the third stage

unattainable for those whose lives are both led using

would be plainly false.

20

the categories and norms of restricted milieu and connected to those of others with differing categories and norms, nor unsustainable for what they could

If this argument holds, and I believe it does, then

become.'

O'Neill is not merely outlining the necessary logical

257

24

However, I believe that the more limited

PETER SUTCH

projects of developmental communitarianism take

having chosen the term. The `communitarian/norm-

more than satisfactory account of this aim. In doing

oriented method' of these thinkers is not an argu-

so, they can avoid O'Neill's criticism of particularism

ment about the essential primacy of community over

and build a bridge between the Westphalian, state-

the individual but of the justice or injustice of the

centric system of international politics and liberal

dominance of certain principles of international

international relations theory, thus making the latter

politics. Their disagreement with liberal-cosmopoli-

consistent with the realities of international politics

tanism does not focus upon the notion of universa-

and its development.

lisability but on the idea of the `relevantly similar'. In this regard, denying the reality of claims to sovereignty, self-determination or human rights does not

Introducing Developmental

make sense of international politics. To argue, for

Communitarianism: Constructing

example, that sovereign borders and the rights of

an International Community

citizenship hinder the cause of international justice

I now wish to present three examples of the devel-

assumes that we are justified in including a strong

opmental communitarian method in international

notion of transnational community in our theory.

relations theory. One of the principal advantages of

The strong abstraction necessary to make this argu-

developmental communitarianisms is that they begin

ment is not thought to be warranted. Rather, argue

their constructivist projects by attempting to con-

the developmental communitarians, we may abstract

struct a viable image of international community ± of

to the existent plurality of political communities and

the `relevantly similar'. Although I cannot provide a

to the consensus upon principles of international

full account of the conclusions of Frost, Walzer and

justice implicit in the actions and norms they share.

Rawls, I do want to demonstrate some of the reason-

We can go on to show how important the norms of

ing behind their positions. Not only do they offer a

human rights and other liberal principles are to the

construction of ethical principles, they also provide

existence of international politics only if this fact is

an account of how these principles become valued by

clearly an uncontested assumption of world politics.

the actors in world politics. This second task is a vital

This distinction makes a significant difference to

aspect of their constructivist project because it re-

claims to have legitimately reached broadly liberal

fuses to assume that the first principles of practical

principles of international justice. Indeed, as earlier

reason have moral and political validity regardless of

demonstrated, it is hard to see how O'Neill's theory

all other considerations yet it still maintains (con-

can reach the cosmopolitan conclusions she does

trary to O'Neill's opinion) the theoretical where-

without the aid of some strong liberal assumptions.

withal to condemn injustice in world politics.

The limited conclusions of the developmental com-

I have chosen to label Frost, Walzer and Rawls as

munitarians seem more suited to the realities of the

`developmental communitarians' for two primary

pluralistic-yet-connected world. The liberalism of

reasons. Firstly, I wish to stress how far removed

Walzer, Rawls and, to a more limited extent, Frost

are the justifications of their liberal ideas from those

is a conclusion rather than an assumption and it is

of liberal cosmopolitanism. Cosmopolitan liberals

this fact, one that results from their general method,

believe, as noted in the previous section, that the

that marks them off from traditional liberal and

first principles of liberalism should apply to all in-

cosmopolitan theory.

dividuals irrespective of their historical and political situation. For the developmental communitarians,

Frost: Social Norms and Human Rights

however, the justifications of the first principles of liberalism are themselves contingent upon history,

The basic tension in contemporary liberal interna-

upon consensus or the shared development of a

tional relations theory is portrayed with appealing

background justification for the principles of inter-

clarity in Frost's Ethics in International Relations,

national politics. This I believe to be a vital point,

which charts the development of the norms of

and one which feeds into the second reason for my

sovereignty,

258

human

rights

and

democratisation.

CONSTRUCTING INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

For Frost, the starting point for an analysis of inter-

eral theorists are right to suggest that `it may be

national politics is the `modern state domain of

argued that the primary question for a normative

discourse', an image of contemporary practices that

theory of international relations is whether the system

makes a realistic attempt to construct international

of sovereign states is a justifiable way of organising

community by recognising the tensions between the

the government of the world.' Yet he recognises that:

remnants of the Westphalian order and a postWestphalian system.

25

He explains these tensions

On reflection, what is striking about the foregoing

by referring to the settled norms that are shared within

list is the primacy of the first two items on the list.

this practice. He lists those norms that he considers

Most of the other settled goods are in some way

within the modern state domain of discourse under

derivatives of them . . . Thus any satisfactory

the subheadings `sovereignty' norms (S), `interna-

background theory will have to justify the settled

tional law' norms (L), `modernisation' norms (M)

belief that the preservation of a system of sover-

and `domestic' norms (D). Summarising them, Frost

eign states is a good.

28

claims that that the following goods have the status of `settled':

Frost's general approach to the philosophy of international ethics, one that coheres with the cen-

S1. The preservation of the society of states.

tral tensions of contemporary international relations

S2. State sovereignty.

theory outlined above, really gets to the heart of the

S3. Anti-imperialism.

matter. He recognises that in order to follow the

S4. The balance of power.

cosmopolitan line of reasoning one must question

S5. Patriotism.

the settled status of S1 ± and for Frost so much in

S6. Protecting the interests of a state's citizens.

international politics only makes sense in relation to

S7. Non-intervention.

S1 that to reject its importance would be to radically

S8. Self-determination.

misunderstand

L1. International law.

tions.

L2. Ius ad bellum.

the

nature

of

international

rela-

29

The central point of Frost's position could easily

L3. Ius in bello.

be misread as pleading a conservative case with the

L4. Collective security.

correlative argument that it is never going to be

L5. Economic sanctions (under specified circum-

possible to challenge the settled status of S1. How-

stances).

ever, a more generous reading ± and one that Frost's

L6. The diplomatic system.

more recent articulations of his theory appears to

M1. Modernisation.

endorse

M2. Economic cooperation.

making any theoretical transition of norms justified

D1. Democratic institutions within states.

in reference to S1 to a system of norms justified (for

D2. Human rights.

26

30

± would argue that it is more a case of

example) in reference to D2 compatible with a practical (and just) transition from a world organised

The first step in Frost's procedure for looking into the

around S1 to a world organised around D2. Captur-

background for the modern state domain of discourse

ing this transition, rather than defining and defend-

is to start with what everybody knows. Essentially,

ing the old international order or the potential

this process leads to the creation of the above list of

transnational order, would seem to be a vital task,

settled norms. It is important to remember that this

vital because it would be inappropriate to build an

seemingly comprehensive list is (or could be) made

ethical theory suited only to an imagined or inde-

up of some strikingly different conceptions of what

fensible theory of international politics.

each of the norms calls for. It is also quite clear that

The resources within the developmental commu-

there is a certain `tension' between those goods that

nitarian tradition of liberal theory are well suited to

concern sovereignty and those that concern the

this task. The work of thinkers such as Walzer and

rights of individual persons.

27

Rawls has advantages over much cosmopolitan and

Frost argues that lib-

259

PETER SUTCH

communitarian writing. Their work is constructivist

cerned to explore precisely those problems faced by

in that it attempts to avoid the difficulties of philo-

international relations theory today. The liberalism

sophical foundationalism while actively combating

that Rawls transplants from his Political Liberalism is a

the ethical scepticism that is often seen as a con-

political mechanism for dealing with the question of

sequence of foundationalism's crisis in theoretical

pluralism in international politics and examines the

justification. It therefore attempts to theorise inter-

guiding concepts of international relations theory,

national politics on premises that are both philoso-

testing their legitimacy in the face of prevailing

phically secure and able to be the object of some kind

conditions of world politics. Similarly, the perceived

of consensus among the plurality of international

difficulties in Walzer's work have led to an insuffi-

actors. Such an approach, combined with a focus on

cient examination of some very interesting ideas.

the competing claims of sovereignty and universal

Walzer's work is either viewed as statist, commu-

rights, would suggest that their ideas really should

nitarian and therefore relativist, or as failing even

demand the close attention of international relations

these standards and relying on covert and illegiti-

theory.

mate liberal principles. His use of `universal rights to life and liberty' has attracted more than their fair

Rather than pursue Frost's reading of contemporary international relations theory here,

31

share of criticism.

I wish to

32

However, his reworking of his

turn to a brief examination of the work of Rawls and

`minimalist morality' and its subsequent portrayal as

Walzer which, I maintain, follows a similar theore-

`reiterative universalism' as opposed to `covering law

tical pattern to Frost's. For Rawls, this theoretical

universalism' gets right to the heart of contemporary

and political process would, over time, lead the

international relations theory.

actors in the international sphere to realise indepen-

son why Rawls and Walzer are treated variously as

dently that toleration of reasonable pluralism is the

failed universalists or failed particularists is because

chief virtue in international ethics. This realisation

the aim of reconciling political life within an inter-

(in the most optimistic interpretation of Rawls's `Law

national system with an emerging global politics is

of Peoples') would lead to the move from the modus

inadequately conceptualised.

33

The principal rea-

vivendi of international law to a fully overlapping

Interestingly, O'Neill herself criticises non-cosmo-

consensus on the value of toleration and thus to a

politan liberal theory ± and particularly that of Rawls

new understanding of human rights suited to liberal-

and Walzer ± on many points. The most important

ism at the turn of the millennium. In Walzer's less

here are her claim that Rawls can only make his law

confident brand of developmental communitarian-

of peoples attack crucial problems in world politics

ism this process would lead (at the very best) to a

by relying (covertly) upon idealised liberal assump-

shared understanding (and, more optimistically, a

tions about human agency and the suggestion (aimed

shared articulation) of a `moral minimum' which

at Walzer and MacIntyre) that any contemporary

could again equip liberalism with a normative stand-

international political theory that takes account of

point capable of tackling contemporary global chal-

pluralism when constructing an account of ethical

lenges.

universality is doomed to inaccessibility and thus political irrelevance. The idea, common to liberal literature, is that only a cosmopolitan account of

Rawls and Walzer:

universality provides principles of international jus-

Consensus and Reiteration

tice. However, the developmental communitarian

Rawls's Amnesty lecture `The Law of Peoples' (here-

account of universality offered by Walzer and Rawls

after: LOP) is often taken as an incomplete expres-

is not rendered ineffectual by its reliance upon norm-

sion of ideas that have their roots firmly in liberal

governed rather than a priori Kantian principles of

political culture. It is therefore viewed as tangential

practical reason and it does not rely upon concealed

to the needs of international relations. Nothing

liberal assumptions to construct a useful theory of

could be further from the truth. Originally entitled

international justice. In particular Rawls, in moving

`Constructivism and Universality' the essay is con-

towards the communitarian camp in an attempt to

260

CONSTRUCTING INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

construct a conception of the relevantly similar and

shift towards a communitarian position. For Rawls,

in modifying his Kantian predicates to make the

even though

liberal criterion of universality a realistic require-

politics is characterised by a plurality of reasonable

ment in political theory, avoids both these criticisms

yet incompatible social systems (what he terms the

and develops a redefined liberal international rela-

`fact' of reasonable pluralism), human rights, or a

tions theory.

version of that doctrine, can ± and should ± be

(or perhaps because) international

O'Neill's case against Rawls is that his famous use

supported by any legitimate state. We must remem-

of the modifier `reasonable' in relation to the fact of

ber that Rawls believes that the background condi-

pluralism illegitimately assists the work of his theory

tions are central to the construction of any principles

of justice. This, however, is not the case. At the most

of justice. The spur, if any, to greater cooperation or

basic level in Rawlsian constructivism there is a

to justice in world politics must be seen to stem from

division between the Kantian and communitarian

world politics itself and not from Rawls's liberal

elements of his thought. For example, the regulative

position. For this reason, he reconstructs the idea

role of what Rawls calls Kant's theory of `constitutive

of human rights and its role in liberal international

autonomy' is abandoned in favour of the political

relations theory.

value of a shared public life.

34

In separating his

For Rawls,

constructivism from Kant's `deeper', comprehensive approach, Rawls notes that `the full significance of a

The fact of reasonable pluralism is not an un-

constructivist political conception lies in its connec-

fortunate condition of human life, as we might say

tion with the fact of reasonable pluralism.'

35

A

of pluralism as such, allowing for doctrines that

recognition of the importance of this `fact' means

are not only irrational but mad and aggressive. In

that the in-built cosmopolitan universalism of con-

framing a political conception of justice so it can

stitutive autonomy is replaced by the notion of what

gain an overlapping consensus, we are not bend-

Rawls calls `doctrinal autonomy, a conception that

ing it to existing unreason, but to the fact of

gives full weight to the autonomy of all `appropriate

reasonable pluralism, itself the outcome of the

conceptions of society and the person.'

36

free exercise of human reason under conditions of

Here,

liberty.

Rawls rejects the notion that constructivism should

39

provide universality (for which read cosmopolitanism) from the start.

37

The analytic idea of the

The idea implicit in the emerging political culture of

reasonable links a very thin conception of practical

international society is that societies capable of

reason with the idea of the relevantly similar, and

international cooperation are already contributing,

tells us how and why peoples may enter into the

and will continue to develop a workable system of

political process in international politics. For Rawls

human rights. The recognition that a plurality of

an appropriate account of practical reason allied to a

states, some comprehensively liberal, some politi-

norm-governed framework (the construction of the

cally so, and some non-liberal or hierarchical can

relevantly similar) provides `both the form that

(and do) share political principles informs the inter-

practical reason requires for its application . . .

national ethics of Rawls and Walzer.

[and] the context in which practical questions and

them believes that there exists an international

problems arise.'

38

40

Neither of

The idea of the reasonable ensures

consensus sufficiently robust to ground a cosmopo-

that the conception of agency we use in our con-

litan or egalitarian human rights project. Neverthe-

struction is accessible to all in the relevant domain.

less both thinkers agree that a `minimal' conception

It is precisely because Rawls must take account of all

of universal rights plays an important role in world

appropriate accounts of agency that he believes the

politics. In trying to reconcile human rights and

cosmopolitan project to be insecure and he thus

pluralism, Rawls argues in favour of the develop-

focuses upon peoples as politically organised rather

mental potential of a constitutional (political) con-

than as individual agents. This move towards a

sensus and Walzer for a minimalist morality formed

particularist stance is indicative of Rawls's general

out of repeated encounters with international pro-

261

PETER SUTCH

blems. For Walzer `the value of minimalism lies in

the institutions of justice. Beyond modus vivendi exist

the encounters it facilitates, of which it is also a

conditions of society which, if the forms of consensus

product. But these encounters are not ± not now at

(constitutional or ideally overlapping) occur, offer

least ± sufficiently sustained to produce a thick

the possibility of a greater transnational interaction.

morality.'

41

Similarly for Rawls the value of inter-

It is interesting to see how Rawls cashes out the

national justice stems from a consensus on a need to

relationship between the idea of stability and the

fix the political situation and put issues of justice

differing forms of consensus in his international

beyond particularist interest, not upon any consensus

relations theory. Human rights, in Rawls's ideal

strong enough to underwrite cosmopolitanism.

portrayal of a liberal international society, represent

For Rawls the basic principles of the law of peoples

a `thick' conception of rights founded upon speci-

that have evolved historically as a modus vivendi are

fically liberal ideas. They signify that each person is

unsurprisingly traditional. But the key to Rawls's

`assigned a certain status, the status of members of

project in LOP lies in his reworking of his seventh

some society who possess rights as human persons.'

principle,

human

Yet human rights in the fully extended law of

The empirical claim that since The Second

peoples represent a `minimum standard of well-

World War human rights have been on the agenda

ordered political institutions for all peoples who

of international relations theory is supplemented by a

belong, as members in good standing, to a just

justification of their prominence, as for Rawls the

political society of peoples.'

existence of liberal/cosmopolitan human rights is

that much of international society does not hold a

unstable in the sense that it lacks the normative

western individualist conception of the person and

justification

therefore assigns rights differently, and this fact

rights.'

42

sphere.

43

that

`peoples

are

appropriate

to

to

honour

46

the

international

alters

The idea of justification that Rawls applies

his

discussion

of

47

Rawls is acutely aware

stability

and

consensus.

to international relations is modelled on that found

The form of consensus reached between liberal

in Lecture IV of his Political Liberalism and he

and non-liberal states is likely to be analogous to

completes his sketch of a law of peoples by arguing

the

for two further conditions that lend normative and

Liberalism where

idea

of

constitutional

consensus

in

Political

practical stability to his project. The first of these two conditions is that the international order should be

a constitution satisfying certain basic principles

stable `in the right way'; that is, they pursue stability

establishes . . . procedures for moderating poli-

for reasons of justice rather than of mere accommo-

tical rivalry within society . . . Where there is

44

The second condition is

agreement on certain basic political rights and

that the law of peoples should ideally be the object of

liberties . . . there is disagreement . . . as to the

an

more exact content and boundaries of these

dation (modus vivendi). overlapping

consensus:

people

would

ideally

rights.

come to affirm the moral value of the law of peoples.

45

48

The conditions of stability and consensus

represent the philosophical justification of the se-

Constitutional consensus arises, argues Rawls, as

ven-point law of peoples that Rawls argues is con-

the only workable solution to endless destruction

sistent with both liberal and non-liberal perspectives.

and strife, and can be thought of as the product of

Elements of international law that are controversial

what Rawls calls the `dramatic shift' in international

(peculiarly liberal) in character (human rights for

law since the Second World War.

example) are likely to receive whatever justification

of this stage in Rawls's theory is both its historicity

they get from a variety of incompatible philosophical

and its dynamism, its potential. For him:

49

The importance

or doctrinal sources. It is here that the relationship between stability and consensus shows us the source

At the first stage of constitutional consensus the

and potential of Rawls's theory. Stability is the goal

liberal principles of justice, initially accepted

of society, a condition in which we know that those

reluctantly as modus vivendi . . . tend to shift

with whom we share political space will comply with

citizens' comprehensive doctrines so that they

262

CONSTRUCTING INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

at least accept the principles of a liberal constitu-

perhaps even helps to explain the appeal of moral

tion. To this extent the [state's principles] are

particularism.

52

reasonable if they were not before: simple pluralism moves towards reasonable pluralism and constitutional consensus is reached.

In making his case Walzer contrasts `covering-law

50

universalism' with `reiterative universalism'. The central difference between

them is neatly sum-

marised by Miller, who writes that

Let us just look at the three requirements Rawls places upon international society, his construction of international community, and see whether it seems

`covering-law universalism' affirms the rightness

reasonable to use these ideas to support a construc-

of a particular way of life, and sees one nation as

tivist theory of international justice. The image of

the bearer of that way of life . . . `Reiterative

international politics that Rawls presents is one

universalism' . . . recognises that, subject to cer-

where:

tain minimal constraints imposed on all, there are a number of radically different and valuable forms of life which flourish in different places.

1. the fact of reasonable pluralism must lead to

53

consensus upon the need to fix the political situation and put such issues beyond particu-

Our main focus here is on the content of those

larist interest;

`minimal constraints' and upon their construction.

2. the application of principles of justice pays

For Walzer we cannot use an inaccessible account of

heed to the guidelines of public reason. These

agency to ground a `thick' covering-law universal-

guidelines and rules must be specified in re-

ism.

ference to forms of reasoning available to all;

something much weaker, on `overlapping expecta-

3. (dependent on 1 and 2) those involved believe

Rather,

reiterative

universalism

tions' about the behaviour of others.

the principles are just and thus the consensus works effectively.

54

55

relies

on

Walzer's

`rights to life and liberty' stem from reiterated claims

51

made by significantly different agents over time and in response to specific problems in international politics.

Rawls's use of the `reasonable', it would seem, is itself a move to ensure the accessibility of principles of

One reason why Rawls and Walzer are often

international justice to those whose autonomy does

sidelined in liberal international relations theory is

not rely upon a politically western and ethically

that what they believe they are obliged to allow to

Kantian heritage.

stand as legitimate domestic arrangements can take

The aims of Walzer's moral theory also explicitly

many forms, some of which may not appeal to our

engage with the problems of how we may link

liberal conception of legitimacy. As Walzer observes,

theories of international ethics with an appropriate

`by democratic standards, most states throughout

conception of international society. His approach

human history have been oppressive and illegiti-

sums up much of what Frost and Rawls can be seen to

mate, but those are not necessarily or even usually

be engaged in:

the standards by which they are judged by their own people.'

56

Given this, plus the contestability of the

Advocates of liberal enlightenment confront ad-

foundational assumptions of liberal human rights

vocates of communal tradition; those who aspire

theory, Walzer (and Rawls) want to promote inter-

to global reach confront those who yearn for local

national interaction while guarding against the uni-

intensity. We all know one another's lines . . . I

versal imposition of what Walzer calls an `alien

want to argue from within what I, and many

maximalist morality'.

others, have taken to be the opposing camp; I

principle that expresses moral minimalism in inter-

want to take my stand among the universalists

national affairs is self-determination, a concept ab-

and suggest that there is another universalism, a

stracted from its many reiterations or occurrences to

non-standard variety, which encompasses and

signify the protection of the political liberty of

263

57

To this end, his primary

PETER SUTCH

members of a plurality of communities.

58

From here

we would wish a theory of human rights to do. This

the rights to life and liberty develop to be repeated

charge is drawn from the long history of human

and reiterated at times of international and domestic

rights theory that insists that it is possible to develop

tyranny. They do not (yet?) form a transnational

a conception of international justice from outside

moral Esperanto,

59

but the political consequences of

the practice of international politics. But to do so is

recognising such values are genuinely progressive.

to ignore the constitution of the international com-

For Rawls, as for Walzer, the central idea is that the

munity and thus of the philosophical notion of the

benefits of true stability only derive from a fair

`relevantly similar', thereby risking the alienation of

construction of principles of justice among consent-

liberalism from the real world of international rela-

ing and dependable parties. The rights this process

tions. The power of human rights discourse is sig-

makes explicit, argues Rawls, are politically neutral

nificantly weakened if its justification belongs to one

in the sense that they are not specific to western

particular culture, even more so when it appears to

liberal culture.

60

foster the desires of the established hegemonic block. The liberalism of the developmental communitarians offers a way beyond this problem. If the outline

Conclusion

of this developing liberal discourse does fulfil the

There is a lot that liberals do not like about the

requirements of constructivism in ethics, then it is

international relations theory of Frost, Walzer and

certainly time to admit the non-Kantian liberalism of

Rawls. Prime among these dislikes are the limitations

Frost, Walzer and Rawls into mainstream interna-

that these thinkers have to place upon the role of

tional relations theory. As for the practice: limited

international justice. For example, it may appear that

and progressive liberalisation of international poli-

the human rights that non-cosmopolitan liberals

tics may not be all we can hope for, but it may be all

develop have no teeth: they cannot do the work

that we are justified in demanding.

Notes

13. O. O'Neill (1994), `Justice and Boundaries', in Brown

1. See, in particular, Rawls (1996) and (1999), chapters

(ed.) (1994), pp. 69±88, at p. 85.

24 and 25.

14. O'Neill (1996), p. 63.

2. See, for example, Beitz (1979); P. Jones, `International Human Rights: Philosophical or Political?', in Caney,

15. Ibid., p. 51.

George and Jones (eds) (1996); Moellendorf (1996);

16. Ibid., p. 74.

Paden (1997); and Pogge (1994).

17. As discussed in Mackie (1977).

3. Cosmopolitanism is a well-defined and well-under-

18. Ibid., p. 78.

stood tradition. For the purposes of this chapter,

19. Ibid., p. 83.

Brown's analysis stands as a perfect example of what

20. Ibid., pp. 97±8.

I have in mind: Brown (1992), pp. 23±51.

21. Ibid., p. 98.

4. Frost (1996).

22. O'Neill (1996), p. 117.

5. See, particularly, Walzer (1977) and (1994).

23. See, for example, O'Neill (1988).

6. Brown (1992), p. 120.

24. O'Neill (1996), p. 64.

7. O'Neill (1996).

25. Frost (1996), p. 79.

8. Ibid., especially chapters 2 and 3.

26. Ibid., pp. 111±12.

9. Ibid., especially chapter 4.

27. Ibid., p. 137. 28. Ibid., p. 112.

10. Ibid., chapters 1 and 2. 11. T. Pogge, `Cosmopolitanism

and Sovereignty',

29. Ibid., p. 112 n. 7, pp. 229±30.

in

30. Frost (1997a), (1997b).

Brown (ed.) (1994), pp. 89±122, at p. 48.

31. This task is completed in Sutch (2000), forthcoming.

12. These points must be considered subject to all the controversy surrounding the empirical and theoretical

32. See, for example, Doppelt (1980), Luban (1980).

debates over such issues as interdependence and glo-

33. Walzer (1994); see also Walzer (1990), p. 509.

balisation, and to the philosophical and political

34. Rawls (1996), pp. 98±100.

debates concerning the constitution of a moral com-

35. Ibid., p. 90.

munity.

36. Ibid., p. 98.

264

CONSTRUCTING INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

37. Cf. Rawls (1999), p. 532.

level of consensus would play a role in international

38. Rawls (1996), p. 110.

relations, but as a vital element of Rawls's conceptual

39. Ibid., p. 144; see also p. xxiv.

mechanism (and if appropriately modified) I think it is fascinating at least to attempt the transition.

40. The language is, of course, Rawls's but the ideas are implicit in Walzer's communitarianism and in early

49. Ibid.; see also Rawls (1999), p. 535.

stages of Frost's work.

50. Rawls (1996), pp. 163±4.

41. Walzer (1994), pp. 18±19.

51. Ibid., pp. 161±2.

42. Rawls (1999), p. 540.

52. Walzer (1990), p. 509.

43. Ibid., p. 542.

53. Miller (1995), p. 10.

44. Ibid.

54. Walzer (1990), pp. 522±3.

45. Ibid., p. 543. For a fuller account of stability and

55. Ibid. 56. Walzer (1980), p. 128.

consensus, see Rawls (1996), Lecture IV, section 2. 46. Ibid., p. 566.

57. Ibid., pp. 519±20.

47. Ibid., p. 552.

58. Walzer (1994), pp. 67±8.

48. Rawls (1996), pp. 158±9. I am aware that there is no

59. Ibid., p. 7. 60. Rawls (1999), p. 552.

textual evidence to support the claim that this middle

265

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Part Eight NEW DIRECTIONS FOR LIBERAL THINKING

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20

LIBERALISM AND POSTCOMMUNISM Richard Sakwa

priate for each specific country? And how can

Introduction

liberalism be established from scratch?

The last hundred years have been a troubled time

The post-communist transitions have raised the

for liberalism. An idea whose prospects seemed so

most profound questions, not only about the current

Á cle was drowned in the bright in the last fin de sie

status of liberalism, democracy and economic mod-

blood of the First World War and the left and right

ernisation, but also by forcing old issues once again to

authoritarianisms that emerged out of that conflict.

the fore. In a way post-communist transformation is a

This has now all changed. `Suddenly', Ernest Gell-

replay of the struggle for liberalism in Europe from

ner notes, `the century of troubles and tribulations

the late seventeenth to the nineteenth centuries.

of

often

Similar fears about the dangers of excessive state

looked as if it were to witness liberalism's demise,

power have been voiced, while the establishment of

in fact documents its almost embarassed triumph. It

secure property rights was at the centre of the

liberalism

is

all

over.

A

century

that

does not quite know what to do with it.'

1

This

European and post-communist social revolutions.

Francis

Indeed, post-communism forces us to rethink the

Fukuyama in his thesis on `the end of history',

relationship between the two faces of liberalism:

arguing that with the fall of communism there was

political democracy and the market economy. Emer-

no longer any sustained programmatic universal

ging out of the command economy it is understand-

victory

was

given

intellectual

2

form

by

There has always been

able that the predominant belief at the fall of

a type of liberal historicism that favoured the view

communism was that without economic freedom

of an evolution through stages in human affairs,

all other freedoms, civil and political, are threatened.

rejecting cyclical theories (Spengler, Toynbee), or

It was soon realised, however, that freedom (espe-

those that

cially if confined to the economic sphere) is not the

alternative to liberalism.

thought in terms of stasis

and self-

sum of liberalism.

perpetuating order of a Chinese sort. Yet many impeccable liberals (like Dahrendorf) found Fu-

Â Merquior, we can consider liberalFollowing Jose

kuyama's radical restatement of a liberal historicism

ism as ideally comprising the following four elements:

profoundly offensive and ± unliberal. Some sort of

`(1) the (negative) freedom of not being subjected to

victory for liberalism was, however, recorded with

arbitrary interferences; (2) the (positive) freedom of

the fall of communism. The question was not only

participating in public affairs; (3) the (interior) free-

what to do with this victory, but for the post-

dom of conscience and beliefs; and (4) the (personal)

communist countries the problem remained: how to

freedom of self-development for each individual.'

do it? Which liberal tradition is the most appro-

This is a full-bodied liberalism drawing on all five

269

3

RICHARD SAKWA

of the liberal traditions identified by Jaguaribe (classical, conservative, social, sociological and neo),

leading liberals, the mistake had been to ally with the

4

democrats from the old Communist Party of the 10

whereas the liberalism prevalent under post-commun-

Soviet Union (CPSU) in the late 1980s.

ism is predominantly of the neo-liberal type. The

1995 he had become convinced that there was no

ideologists of neo-liberalism are Von Mises, Hayek,

basis for a liberal democratic society in Russia. The

Nozick and Milton Friedman, all condemning state

problem was no longer the power of selfish ruling

regulation in favour of the unrestrained operation of

elites, but the conservative people, above all the

market forces and a radical individualism: prioritising

patriarchal-minded mass of peasants.

(1) and underplaying (2)±(4).

of contemptuous attitude towards their own people

11

By

It is this sort

While it is easy to condemn the excesses of neo-

that has characterised Russian liberalism. Sogrin

liberalism, especially in a post-Thatcher/Reagan era,

takes a more balanced view, arguing that while there

it is more difficult to sustain a defence of the

were the preconditions for liberal democracy in

rationality of the market and the enterprise as the

Russia, the objective reasons for the failures and

most efficient allocater of resources while simulta-

shortcomings of liberalism can be found in the

neously condemning the neo-liberal demonisation of

specific liberal democratic model that was adopted

the state and the attempt to impose `the law of the

and imposed by Russian liberals.

jungle on societies whose stability was obtained

was drawn between liberalism and democracy, and

thanks to the healthy effects of the welfare state.'

5

12

No distinction

only from around 1990 did liberalism begin to 13

These predicaments will be examined on the basis of

emerge as an autonomous political tendency.

developments in the post-communist world, primar-

then, the liberal trend failed to develop into a

ily in Russia and Poland.

genuinely popular movement and source of mass political action.

Even

14

Jerzy Szacki, a professor of sociology at Warsaw

From the Wreckage of Communism

University, argues that while the philosophy of

The emergence of political liberalism in Russia under

economic liberalism as such appealed only to a

Gorbachev in 1987±88 during `perestroika' (`restruc-

minority of dissidents, the political value of what

turing') was as a distinctive addition to socialism; only

he calls `protoliberalism' as an alternative `neglected

later did it emerge as an autonomous force in its own

path of anti-communism' actually increased.

right to triumph between 1991 and 1992.

6

15

He

This

argues that liberalism was a phenomenon of the

triumph, however, was ambivalent. Nodari Simonia

western world with few roots in Eastern Europe,

notes that `the defeat of the attempted coup in

and that communism, far from suppressing indigen-

August 1991 was no victory for democracy. Political

ous liberal development, artificially fostered it as its

democracy was the dominant tendency, but there

alternative political vision. As David Ost puts it,

was neither the social nor the economic base neces-

`when the enemy became the state, the opposition

sary for the establishment of democracy. A civil

became liberals.'

society had not yet been created.'

7

16

The fall of communism would

He goes on to

allow the anti-liberalism of Catholicism, in Szacki's

argue that `while the remnants of the ideological

view, to reassert itself (or, perhaps, any one of the

nomenklatura waged rearguard battles against Russian

numerous anti-liberal traditions of the area). He fails

democracy, an economic nomenklatura moved into

to realise that in modern pluralist societies even

8

It is for this

intrinsically authoritarian faiths can, if freely adopted

reason, according to Jerry Hough, that the end of

by its members and when part of a broader patch-

communism in the USSR, although no less of a

work of equally autonomous interests, strengthen the

revolution than the events of 1917 that had brought

liberal heterogeneity of society.

position to attain political power.'

the Bolsheviks to power, was relatively bloodless.

9

The argument, nevertheless, is an important one.

Within a year organised liberalism appeared to

Liberalism appeared less a systemic necessity and

have exhausted itself, and since then has been at a

outgrowth of the society than an instrument with

low ebb. According to Lev Timofeev, one of Russia's

which to assault the party-state. Many have argued

270

LIBERALISM AND POST-COMMUNISM

itself into a political danger zone, where the risks

that the social basis for liberal democracy was, quite simply, lacking in Poland,

17

were far greater than ever before.'

and if that was the case,

20

The liberal

then in Russia it stood no chance whatsoever. In

`party' in the anti-communist revolutions of 1989±

Russia it was Andrei Sakharov who became the

91 took the form of an inchoate social movement

symbol of the liberal opposition to the regime, yet

whose leadership was amorphous and its policies

paradoxically it was Solzhenitsyn, usually charac-

limited to the negative programme of opposition

terised as an authoritarian patriot, who advocated

to the decaying communist regime. Its positive pro-

a gradualist strategy of self-liberation from commun-

gramme was a transformative one that assaulted the

ism

18

while the `liberal' Sakharov espoused a more

society from which it sought to draw its democratic

revolutionary break with the past. It is out of para-

legitimacy: transformative legitimacy ran counter to

doxes such as these that post-communist liberalism

democratic legitimacy.

was born. In Hungary by 1998 the Prime Minister,

This was particularly the case in Russia. The main

Victor Orban, even went so far as to argue that

liberal `party' in the December 1993 State Duma

certain elements of West European liberalism could

elections,

not be `simply transferred' to Central Europe, and the

Russia (DVR), won 15.51 per cent of the party list

attempt to do so might often do `more harm than

vote, coming second to the 22.92 per cent for

19

Yegor Gaidar's

Democratic

Choice

of

Faced by rising crime rates the response is

Vladimir Zhirinovskii's Liberal Democratic Party

understandable, but his argument that the ruling

of Russia (LDPR) (which of course is not a liberal

Federation of Young Democrats-Hungarian Civic

party). Rather than organising as an autonomous

Party was now `much more than a liberal party'

force, liberals relied on the benevolence of President

suggested a deeper unease with liberalism itself.

Boris Yeltsin and sought to use the state to promote

We should thus examine liberalism as a transforma-

their policies. They thus became the first `party of

tive challenge, a set of ideas and a complex of

power', until losing out in political intrigues and

institutions.

defeat at the polls. Indeed, it appeared that there

good'.

were more liberals in the entourage of the relatively authoritarian Yeltsin presidency than in the parlia-

Liberalism and Capitalist Transformation

ment itself.

The central contradiction of post-communist liberal-

For liberals like Gaidar, it was fear of losing power

ism is that as an economic philosophy it was pre-

in 1994 rather than attempts to institutionalise their

dominant, and its political ideals of civil rights,

dominance that led them to activise their attempts

political pluralism, the separation of powers, toler-

to create a party to support their programme. The so-

ance and advocacy of non-militaristic solutions to

called democratic movement and the liberals asso-

domestic and foreign problems became the main

ciated with the Yabloko party fared dismally in the

currency of debate, but as an organised force it

regional elections between September 1996 and into

has tended to be weak.

early 1997, not winning a single governorship.

21

Federal party politics counted for very little in these elections in the regions, and even less in the repub-

Politically Organised Liberalism

lics, especially where titular ethnic elites dominated

The relationship between liberalism and mass de-

political life. Regime-type systems have proliferated

mocracy is at the best of times problematic, but in

in the regions and republics where more often than

post-communist countries it has fallen prey to the

not both liberalism and democracy have been com-

technocratic temptation. In 1991 the liberal concept

promised.

of a parliamentary constitutional state prevailed over

In the December 1995 elections the combined

residual notions of a socialist alternative. But, as in

liberal vote was only 16.2 per cent. Yet, as Steven

Germany in 1919, `politically organised Liberalism,

Fish has argued, the reason for the liberals' crushing

the Liberal parties, played no part at all in this

defeat lies not in any profound anti-liberalism of the

victory; and the victory drew Liberal democracy

Russian people as such, nor in the institutional

271

RICHARD SAKWA

framework, the electoral system, lack of resources or

right thinking, it is unclear what remains of a dis-

disunity among the liberal parties. Rather, he argues,

tinctively liberal agenda.

the answer lies in the deficiencies of the liberals

Economic liberalism became the guiding principle

themselves, and in particular their poor organisation

of post-communist transformations. The reasoning

(consistently

of

behind `shock therapy' was outlined by Leszek Bal-

miscon-

cerowicz, arguing against any evolutionary exit out of

ceived campaigns, and the legacy of the behaviour

the old state-planned system in favour of a complete

party

underestimating

organisation),

of liberals in power.

the

unprofessional 22

importance and

Organised liberalism in the

and radical institutional break with the past.

25

The

December 1999 parliamentary elections was even

issue of sequencing was crucial for him, insisting that

more fragmented and disorganised, grouped around a

systemic market-oriented reforms had to be achieved

number of leading personalities whose alliances were

during the period of `extraordinary politics' of high

as fragile as the differences between them were

political mobilisation early on in the process. An

minimal. The Right Cause (Pravoe Delo) grouping

even more robust defence of economic liberalism

brought together some of Russia's leading liberals,

came from Vaclav Klaus, Prime Minister of the

including Boris Nemtsov, Anatolii Chubais and

Czech Republic from 1991 to 1997, where he praised

Boris Fedorov, together with `the right-wing liberal'

the virtues of the untrammelled market and con-

Yegor Gaidar, `the odious architect of the attempts to

servative liberal principles,

implement ``shock therapy''.'

23

26

although in practice he

According to Buzga-

presided over a semi-reformed system that allowed its

lin, the author of the just-quoted sentiments, Right

own type of crony capitalism to emerge. Szacki's

Cause was dangerous for Russia because of the

warnings in this context about the shallowness of

`communist fanaticism' with which they sought to

true political liberalism in the region need to be

implement their plans. Few in Russia would forget

taken seriously. The balance drawn between eco-

the role that some of the members of Right Cause

nomic liberalism, liberal political ideas, the collec-

played in creating the system of oligarchical capit-

tive rights of the nation and the persistent support for

alism, accompanied by the immiseration of large

many features of the old state socialist welfare system

sectors of society. All of this is true, yet the trajectory

differed between states, but throughout the region

of post-communist liberalism has a more profound

none could avoid the dilemmas posed by these issues.

meaning. Transformative Liberalism Marketisation and Liberalism

These problems were particularly acute in Russia

Like the communist regimes that they replaced, the

where, according to Sogrin, a `radical liberal' ten-

liberalism that emerged in the post-communist states

dency predominated, characterised by a utopianism

was forced to create the grounds for its social ex-

that ignored the character of Russian society and

istence by a massive act of economic transformation.

civilisation.

Broader humanistic concerns were thus subverted by

Gaidar, Chubais and Fedorov dominated the Russian

the economism implicit in this transformative mis-

government. From 2 January 1992 they launched a

sion. Bellamy has noted the shift from ethical to

`shock therapy' economic reform with the liberal-

economic theories of liberal democracy,

24

27

From November 1991 liberals like

but under

isation of some prices. The economic legacy of this

post-communism this has taken extreme forms. Pol-

period is still debated, but the immediate result was

itics has been subordinated to the alleged economic

near-hyper inflation, a slump in production and a

imperative of social transformation. Old tensions

record deterioration in standards of living. More

within the liberal tradition, above all between social

positively, queues disappeared and market principles

liberalism, with its more positive view of liberty and

began to be introduced in the economy. By the end

state activism, and neo-classical liberalism, stressing

of the year Yeltsin had sacrificed the liberal refor-

the redemptive powers of the market, have burst out

mers, and from December 1992 Victor Chernomyr-

once again. Torn between social democracy and new

din took over as Prime Minister. Andrei Kozyrev, the

272

LIBERALISM AND POST-COMMUNISM

liberal foreign minister, stayed on until the Decem-

While there is no doubt that Nemtsov is an

ber 1995 parliamentary elections saw the commu-

economic liberal, in politics he is more of a national

nists become the largest grouping in the Duma, but

liberal with a statist bent. An admirer of Peter the

in the economic sphere only Chubais survived to

Great, he noted in an interview in February 1997:

mastermind the privatisation of the economy. This is one of the most spectacular shifts in ownership

I'm a liberal economist and support the idea of a

relations in history; today, less than a quarter of

strong state in politics. Yegor Gaidar, for instance,

the national economy is in state hands. Mass redis-

is a liberal in economics and a liberal in politics,

tribution of ownership was accompanied by equally

in the bad sense of this word. In Russia, such

spectacular corruption.

liberalism is ruinous.

31

Chubais was appointed head of the presidential administration

in

He advocated using Russia's financial resources to

June±July 1996, and was made a First Deputy Prime

following

buy up the city and naval base of Sevastopol. `His-

Minister in March 1997. This time, together with

torical justice should be restored by capitalist meth-

the other First Deputy Prime Minister, Nemtsov, he

ods,' he suggested. As Peter Rutland notes, `Nemtsov

sought to end the domination of the `old economic

may be a liberal, but he is a liberal with a Russian

nomenklatura', to break up the huge natural mono-

face.'

polies and the utilities, and to pursue housing and

Prime Minister from April to August 1998, when he

pensions reform.

28

Yeltsin's

re-election

32

The same could be said of Sergei Kirienko,

Although yoked together, Chu-

struggled to transform oligarchical capitalism into a

bais and Nemtsov represent two very different trends

more open version. His failure to deal with the legacy

in Russian liberalism. Chubais is a radical liberal,

of nearly a decade of mismanagement led to the

whereas Nemtsov represents a tendency dubbed by

partial default of 17 August 1998, and his own

Sogrin as `national liberalism' ± although it is un-

dismissal six days later.

likely that a direct reference is intended to Germany's National Liberal party established in 1867, and

The `Sin of Constructivism'

whose left wing seceded in 1880. While respecting traditional liberal values of private property, the

To achieve the desired socio-economic results and to

market, pluralism and political democracy, Russian

generate market-oriented behaviour by economic

national liberals sought to replace abstract or Wes-

actors, the post-communist state intervened on a

tern liberal models with one more suited to Russian

massive scale in the early years of the transition, thus

conditions. Disenchanted with Western democracy,

compromising, both politically and economically,

national liberals began to favour authoritarian gov-

many of the principles of the new `liberal' order.

ernment to democracy. They regarded the social

This `sin of constructivism', in the words of Szacki,

liberal idea of a universal welfare state as inappropri-

is reminiscent in an inverted form, not surprisingly,

ate for Russia, favouring instead a carefully targeted

of earlier `grand designs' of the communist sort. The

social policy. A national liberal economic model

Polish sociologist Radzislawa Gortat also referred to

equally rejects the monetarism of the radical liberals

`liberalism as constructivism',

and favours a more active role for the state in

eralism in Poland was born in a way that contra-

national economic development and a degree of

dicted its nature. Thus in its struggle to create

protection for national production.

29

34

33

describing how lib-

A representa-

capitalist institutions the Tadeusz Mazowiecki gov-

tive of this tendency was Alexander Lebed, who

ernment relied on the authority of the state to

sought to free the state from bureaucratic, nomenk-

achieve the desired results. The liberal reforms,

and criminal dominance, forces that had

lacking a social interest to act on its behalf, relied

usurped the fruits of reform by distorting the mar-

on an external agency to articulate an inevitably

latura

30

National liberalism represented the adaptation

synthetic and derivative version of the social ideal.

of liberalism with a social conscience to Russian

In the absence of social interests to articulate and

conditions.

promote the programme, the Balcerowicz plan of late

ket.

273

RICHARD SAKWA

1989, and the Gaidar model of social transformation

Kolodko's `Strategy for Poland' document of 1994.

in Russia from late 1991, could only be the creation

The Balcerowicz group, it argued, had an ideological

of the state.

35

commitment to liberal doctrine, pursuing its pro-

It is well-known that Hayek condemned Keynes's

gramme in a centralised, technocratic manner that

advocacy of government intervention in the econ-

treated the public as passive objects of transition.

omy to correct the market as presumptious `con-

This was, according to Jerzy Hausner, an `imperative'

structivism'. As Bellamy puts it (following John

method of post-communist change, that gave way

Gray), Hayek distinguishes `between the notion of

later to the `interactive' approach favoured by Ko-

society as a spontaneous order embodying evolution-

lodko. The `interactive' approach sought to ground

ary reason, on the one hand, and constructivist

ongoing processes of social change in a continuing

rationalist theories of society, on the other.'

36

In

discursive relationship between the authorities and

his Road to Serfdom of 1944, Hayek had condemned

the public. Rejecting the view that there was `no

western governments for subverting the law and

alternative' to the transition to an Anglo-Saxon style

replacing it with legislation. But what spontaneous

economy, the `interactive' approach recognised a

order could there be in post-communist conditions?

variety of capitalisms and that the role of the state

Liberals were forced to adopt the guise of revolu-

would be subject to negotiation rather than a priori

tionaries and act not as the defenders of a sponta-

rejected.

38

neously generated social order, but as a small sect of

It was this more interactive approach that was

priests who claimed a privileged understanding of the

favoured by the liberal opposition in Russia, and in

laws of history and social development. Solutions

particular Grigorii Yavlinskii's `social liberal' Yablo-

were imposed upon society and not derived from

ko party. However, there appeared to be no devel-

society.

oped alternative to radical liberal economic policies.

This should be placed in context, and the notion

Attempts to devise alternatives, even by the `demo39

of post-communist neo-liberal reformers as `Bolshe-

cratic opposition' in Yabloko, in practice failed.

viks of the market' should not be taken too far. In

These social liberals emphasised the social basis of

form, content and methods the differences are so

any viable political or economic order, while at the

large as to render analogies almost meaningless. As

same time insisting that it had to be rooted in the

Andrzej Walicki notes:

national interest. They took the universals of liberalism and sought to present them in a patriotic idiom.

One of the most conspicuous characteristics of

The behaviour of the radical liberals in power in

post-communist Poland is the omnipresent con-

Russia was characterised not only by constructivism

tradiction between the radical, uncompromisingly

but also by corruption, the denigration of patriotism,

anti-communist ideology and the principle of

the rupture of relations with the former Soviet states,

compromise that has enabled a smooth, peaceful

and by a narrow dogmatism that appeared to regard

transfer of power.

37

the dismantling of state capacity as the pinnacle of the liberal project. The social liberals promised to

The new authorities were revolutionary in their

continue the reforms but in a more socially oriented

actions but liberal in their methods. Yet the charge

way. They would remain tempted, however, by the

of constructivism is accurate, and one that tainted

sin of constructivism.

post-communist liberalism (above all in Russia) with the stamp of illiberality, if not authoritarianism and

Constrained Liberalism

hypocrisy. After the radical phase a reaction set in marked by

Kryzstof Bielecki, the liberal Polish Prime Minister in

a return to the politics of gradualism and a reconsi-

1991, has talked in terms of `constrained liberal-

deration of the social values of reform. In Poland this

ism'.

took the form of the Finance and Deputy Prime

`blockages' in legitimation `which stem from the

Minister (from May 1994 to February 1997) Grzegorz

elite's usage of outdated symbols and discourses in

40

274

Andrzej Rychard refers to what he calls

LIBERALISM AND POST-COMMUNISM

the construction of liberal democracy', failing above

to `fasten' identities to fixed, naturalised subject

all to negotiate with, and often even to explain to,

positions inevitably disciplines those subjects and

the populace over the strategies for reform. It instead

limits possibilities for political action. Further-

struck hard during the breathing space offered by the

more, discourses that seek to attain totality, even

period of `extraordinary politics' to impose ready-

a democratic totality, do so by covering over

made solutions, often imported from abroad.

41

He

discursive instabilities, by mistaking a unified

notes that `the communist order existed but was

subject for a fluid ensemble of subject positions.

47

[indiscriminately] rejected while the post-communist order has not been shaped but is [naively] accepted'.

42

Thus the liberal citizen was to be grounded in

The Mazowiecki government's liberal-

economic liberty, specifically private property as

minded Industry Minister's statement during his

the basis for civil society and the emancipatory

confirmation hearings before the Sejm in September

potential of economic empowerment. Post-commu-

1989 is instructive: `I represent subjects that do not

nist liberals thus appeared to be more Lockean than

43

The absence of any organised social force

Locke himself, `in implying not only that liberty will

to carry out the liberal reforms translated into what

be achieved by acting on the right to property, but

Jadwiga Staniszkis called a `revolution from above' in

through property itself'.

which the state promoted the (temporary) demobi-

achieved in what had previously united Solidarity,

lisation of society in order to achieve the economic

the combination of social power and individual

conditions that would allow greater public inclu-

rights. In Poland and elsewhere social power was

yet exist.'

sion.

44

48

A radical disjuncture was

consigned to some non-liberal limbo, together with

Constrained liberalism has yet another and per-

state activism in its entirety, while the liberal subject

haps more profound meaning. Janine Holc has ar-

was constrained by an eviscerated model of what the

gued that

citizen of this liberal utopia was to look like.

liberal

discourse

is

itself

part

of

the

construction of a very specific type of democratic subject in post-communism.

45

As she notes, `all

Liberalism and Post-communist Democracy

states ± indeed, all communities ± are based on

Philippe Schmitter has noted that:

assumptions about who properly belongs in them', and in Poland between 1990 and 1993 a very specific `liberal' narrative became dominant that explicitly

Liberalism, either as a conception of political

linked `private property, individual rights, and the

liberty, or as a doctrine about economic policy,

``shock therapy'' of the free market, and it implicitly

may have coincided with the rise of democracy.

constructed an ideal and quite fixed ``citizen'' of the

But it has never been immutably or unambigu-

new Polish democracy.'

46

ously linked to its practice.

Bielecki himself, as Prime

49

Minister in 1991, was the most radical of these liberal `identity-builders'. Not only was the state being

This question is particularly acute in post-communist

rebuilt, but the notion of what made up the citizen

countries, where the very `givenness' of a structured

was being reconstructed. Holc seeks to break away

society is in question. Implicit in many discussions is

from traditional institution-centred discussions of

the `Kirkpatrick principle', the view that in the

transition to examine the change in subjectivities

transition from authoritarianism to democracy, so-

involved. She sums up her argument as follows:

ciety can spring back into shape, whereas in the transition from totalitarianism, society is destroyed to

The rise and fall of the Liberal movement in

such a degree that it has to become an object of the

Poland illustrates the manner in which a vision

transition process itself.

or philosophy of government that assigns indivi-

The fate of liberalism in the post-communist

dual civil and economic rights to its citizens is not

world is dependent on the ability of democracy itself

inherently liberating or democratic for those sub-

to survive. This is nowhere more evident than in the

jects. Rather, any discourse of authority that seeks

sphere of party formation. Throughout the post-

275

RICHARD SAKWA

communist world the emergence of this quintessen-

financial crash of August 1998 effectively wiped out

tial aspect of a modern liberal democracy was a more

the nascent middle class. As Kagarlitskii puts it:

protracted, fragmented and tenuous process than in the other `third wave' democratising states in Latin

the retreat from communist ideology was accom-

America and Southern Europe. It might be noted

panied by the centralisation of power in the hands

that in America and elsewhere parties by no means

of the local bosses. The organs of local self-

developed at the same time as parliamentarianism

government, already very weak, were quite simply

and democracy. According to Kagarlitskii, the `plur-

abolished until revived as part of the centre's

alism of elites' allowed capitalism in its `primary

attempts to outflank the powerful regional bosses.

accumulation of capital' phase to preserve liberal

In conditions of economic crisis enterprise admin-

political institutions while keeping the people away

istrations strengthened their control over work-

from decision-making:

ers.

52

The interaction of a harsh and authoritarian

How can we explain this and in what terms can we

structure of executive power with a parliamentary

describe it? There are three substantive approaches

elite was an ideal recipe for oligarchical rule,

to the issue.

characteristic for the liberal-market capitalism of the nineteenth century.

50

1. Illiberal democracy

It was this sort of system, marked by a large number of

In a recent article Fareed Zakaria has implicitly taken

`independent' politicians elected largely due to their

up Raymond Aron's view that the concept of `con-

financial resources, that was created by what Kagar-

stitutional pluralism' is in many ways more accurate

litskii calls the `liberal-authoritarian' regime in Rus-

than the formula of `liberal democracy'. Zakaria

sia, a system that was ideal for the needs of the

distinguishes between liberal democracy, defined as

corrupted Russian bureaucracy, striving to gain for-

`a political system marked not only by free and fair

mer state property, and for western elites who sought

elections, but also by the rule of law, a separation of

a power strong enough to suppress any popular

powers and the protection of basic liberties of speech,

resistance to the `reforms' while avoiding the open

assembly, religion and property', which he calls

authoritarianism typical of Latin America. The sys-

constitutional liberalism, and illiberal democracy.

tem also corresponded to national traditions, where

In the latter `democratically elected regimes, often

nascent liberal institutions were always grafted on to

ones that have been re-elected or reaffirmed through

the authoritarian Russian state, whether this was in

referenda, are routinely ignoring constitutional limits

the late Tsarist period or in the late Soviet epoch,

on their power and depriving their citizens of basic

and acted as no more than a supplement to funda-

rights and freedoms'.

mentally non-democratic systems.

51

53

For Zakaria, the regular sta-

ging of relatively fair, competitive, multi-party elec-

In Russia this tension has taken extreme forms.

tions might make a country democratic, but it does

`Perestroika' was a battleground between the liberal

not ensure good governance. For him, constitutional

part of the nomenklatura and the nascent civil so-

liberalism

ciety. If `perestroika' was accompanied by the emergence of `civil society' movements dealing with local,

is not about the procedures for selecting govern-

environmental and civil rights issues, the triumph of

ment, but rather government's goals. It refers to

the liberal nomenklatura and intelligentsia in August

the tradition, deep in Western history, that seeks

1991 was followed very quickly by the stifling of this

to protect an individual's autonomy and dignity

social insurgency. In addition, throughout the 1990s

against coercion, whatever ± state, church, or

the status and material position of the liberal profes-

society . . . It is liberal because it draws on the

sions and intellectual life in general declined sharply,

philosophical strain, beginning with the Greeks,

damaging the core supporters of liberalism, while the

that emphasises individual liberty. It is constitu-

276

LIBERALISM AND POST-COMMUNISM

tional because it rests on the tradition, beginning

with the Romans, of the rule of law.

formalised but strongly operative practices ± clien-

54

telism,

patrimonialism,

and

corruption.'

58

The

notion of delegative democracy has clear applications to Russia, and has been used fruitfully in

In practice, even relatively free elections in coun-

59

tries like Kazakhstan `have resulted in strong execu-

analysing regional politics.

tives, weak legislatures and judiciaries, and few civil

has clear limitations when applied to Russia, ignor-

and economic liberties.'

55

However, the concept

Zakaria argues that while

ing precisely the political consequences of imposing

constitutional liberalism can lead to democracy,

a capitalist economic system. It is the combination of

democracy does not necessarily lead to constitutional

political reform and economic transformation that

liberalism. Thus the government of Hong Kong

allowed the whole process to be hijacked by sectoral

under British rule was epitomised by constitutional

and other special interests, not the flaws in the

liberalism, protecting the rights of citizens and the

democratic method as such.

rule of law, but it was far from democratic. The Central European post-communist states are nego-

3. Regime democracy

tiating the passage to democracy more successfully than the former Soviet states, it is argued, because

As Merquior noted of Brazil, the concentration of

they went through a long phase of liberalisation

economic power `is a freedom-killing exercise',

without democracy in the nineteenth century that

observation that is equally true of Russia and other

grounded the rule of law and property rights into

post-communist countries. These countries do not

social practices. The problem with this approach is

lack freedom; they lack liberalism. The new freedom

that it assumes that history is destiny and provides no

has allowed an oligarchical, corporate and corrupt

mechanism for a society to break out of `path de-

capitalism to emerge.

60

an

pendency'. It appears that if a country misses the bus

Regime-type politics are characteristic of all the

of constitutional liberalism it has little chance of

post-communist states of the former USSR (but not

getting on the bus called democracy.

Central Europe). This covers not only features like enhanced powers for the executive, the prevalence of personalised leadership where the personality

2. Delegative democracy

defines the contours of the political system, the

In a similar vein, Giullermo O'Donnell has argued

manipulation of parliaments, weak judicial over-

that in weakly established democracies a leader can

sight, seamless links between the political and new-

become so strong that he or she can ignore those who

ly-enriched

they are meant to represent. O'Donnell characterises

distinction between public and private posts, and

these countries as having `delegative' rather than

above all the lack of accountability of elected lea-

representative democracy, with the electorate alleg-

ders. The very nature of post-communism in this

edly having delegated to the executive the right to

region has taken on the colouring of what postmo-

do what it sees fit, `constrained only by the hard facts

dernists call a `decentred' politics. Although the

of existing power relations and by a constitutionally

powers of the executive everywhere have been en-

limited term of office'.

56

socio-economic

elites,

the

lack

of

Thus a government emerges

hanced, these are not classical presidentialist regimes

that is `inherently hostile to the patterns of repre-

of the Latin American type. Politics is too unstruc-

sentation normal in established democracies' by

tured, institutions too fluid and the personages too

`depoliticising the population except for brief mo-

constrained by the emerging class system and ethnic

ments in which it demands its plebiscitary support.'

57

contradictions to allow the emergence of a defined

This sort of democracy is, according to O'Donnell,

balance of powers. Instead regime politics is defined

underinstitutionalised,

re-

by flux within the parameters of the exigencies of the

stricted scope, the weakness, and the low density

transitional process itself: they are not arbitrary but

of whatever political institutions exist. The place of

neither are they ordered as part of a structured

well-functioning institutions is taken by other non-

political order (Ordnungspolitik). Its codes are not

`characterised

by

the

277

RICHARD SAKWA

formalised but they are recognised. The legitimacy

problematic, for Russia (and some other post-Soviet

inherent in the electoral process comes into contra-

states) post-communism has once again raised the

diction with the functionality of the transformative

question that has racked the country for at least the

impulse. In short, the political process in Russia and

last three hundred years: is Russia part of Europe or a

elsewhere lacks a subject, focused neither on person-

separate and distinct civilisation sufficient unto itself?

alities nor institutions but on fluid but ritualised

All of these countries, moreover, have been faced by

relations between universally objectified processes

the `Nuremberg question', the degree to which the

of transition.

perpetrators of the crimes of the old regime can be brought to book.

63

Whether there is a distinctively

`liberal' approach to this aspect of universalism is

Universalism and Post-communism

unclear, other than a commitment to the rule of law.

Although the domestic sources of liberalism may be

Too often decommunisation became an aspect of the

relatively weak in most post-communist countries,

partisan persecution of political opponents.

the international context is increasingly dominated

More broadly, the question is often posed whether

by the political counterpart of globalisation, what we

any universal agenda of human and liberal rights is

might call `universalisation'. It is under this nominal

no more than a covert form of imposing Western

rubric that the most important questions of our day

values on other societies. Some post-communist

are discussed. This is the question of the extent to

leaders have explicitly argued that liberalism is not

which the universal norms, as formulated above all

suitable for their societies at this stage of develop-

in the 1948 United Nations Universal Declaration of

ment. Familiar arguments about distinctive paths

Human Rights, are applicable to all countries, irre-

and `third ways' are being mobilised by post-com-

spective of their specific traditions. From this per-

munist leaders (for example, President Islam Kari-

spective globalisation can be challenged not so much

mov in Uzbekistan and the Mayor of Moscow, Yurii

from a `left' perspective as from a universal one, in

Luzhkov) and leaders of the developing countries

which a rich array of international and national

(for example, Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammed

organisations established in the postwar years can

of Malaysia). Both the `East' and the `South' are now

be mobilised to establish a set of international norms.

joined by a series of common dilemmas that trans-

In the European context the main instruments of this

cend issues of globalisation and focus on the cultural

universalism are the Council of Europe (CE) and the

and political identity of the nations themselves. The

Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe

former Second and Third Worlds are still far from

(OSCE). Russia joined the CE in February 1996, and

one, but when it comes to civilisational issues and

on 20 February 1998 the Duma voted to ratify the

developmental trajectories they do face some com-

European Convention on Human Rights, allowing

mon problems.

Russian citizens to file appeals to the European Court. By that time there were already 800 com-

Post-communist Liberalism

plaints from Russian citizens pending with the European Commission on Human Rights, the body that refers cases to the European Court.

Liberalism is an extended meditation on the legit-

61

imate sphere of state activism and the proper scope

Universalism has reforged a link between moder-

for public authority. As with any living idea, answers

nisation and development. While some Asian coun-

are always in the process of being rethought. Liberal-

tries, as Huntington has noted, have been able to

ism under post-communism becomes post-commu-

separate

nist liberalism.

modernisation

from

westernisation,

by

adopting western techniques but not capitulating to western culture in its entirety,

62

for post-commu-

Liberalism and the Post-communist State

nist countries this question is particularly acute. Although for most Eastern European countries the

The opening of John Stuart Mill's On Liberty has in

`return to Europe' is not perceived as particularly

effect become the slogan of the post-communist

278

LIBERALISM AND POST-COMMUNISM

revolutions: as countries become democratic, he

minimalism, reducing the legitimate scope of state

noted, people believed that `too much importance

activity. In the post-communist world the anti-statist

has been attached to the limitation of power itself.

strain in liberalism became an over-determined as-

That (it might seem) was a resource against rulers

sault on the very existence of purposive state action,

whose interests were habitually opposed to those of

something that China managed to avoid because of

the people.' With the people in charge, there was

its distinctive traditions and refusal to accept the

allegedly no need for such caution: `The nation did

agenda of `transition' and liberal democracy.

not need to be protected against its own will. There was no fear of tyrannising over itself.'

64

Gottfried Dietze has distinguished between `liber-

Mill of course

alism proper', defined as `liberty without restriction',

goes on to argue that

and `proper liberalism', a balance between personal liberties and social restrictions that allows the en-

the limitation . . . of the power of government

joyment of the one with the public order of the

over individuals loses none of its importance

other.

when the holders of power are regularly accoun-

has exerted a profound influence in post-communist

table to the community, that is, to the strongest

Russia accompanied by the weakening of law en-

party therein.

65

69

Clearly, it is a vulgar `liberalism proper' that

forcement, the privatisation of security (for those who can afford it) and lawlessness. There is a pre66

The

valent sense of lack of order and bespredel (absence of

peoples emerging from communism had learnt the

limits) that gives rise, as Fish notes, to the absence of

bitter lesson that it is precisely the attempt to fulfil

rights (bespravie) ± `albeit a very different form of

the entire potential of democracy that leads to

bespravie than existed under the Soviet regime,'

absolute servitude. Since the French revolution de-

an absence that in many ways is more substantive

mocracy has been associated with undivided popular

than earlier since it is experienced at the level of

sovereignty, forgetting Tocqueville's warning of the

daily life in a personal way. The denigration of the

`tyranny of the majority'. These lessons are now

state that had accompanied the assault against the

taken to heart, but there are other processes that

communist order was perpetuated in a simplified

undermine the emergence of clear conclusions.

`liberalism proper' that disregarded problems of pub-

Zakaria quotes this argument approvingly.

70

but

As we know, the advance of democracy led to the

lic order and personal security. Post-communist lib-

emergence of a state that is far from minimal and a

erals discovered that the threat to individual liberty

liberalism that embraced interventionism. While

could come as much from an anarchic society as from

Hayek's The Road to Serfdom, with its anti-construc-

an overweaning state or a sovereign people. The

tivist thesis that any state activism in the social

emergence of national liberalism was a response to

sphere provides scope for the development of tota-

this, but more common was support for neo-com-

litarianism, became popular reading in post-commu-

munist, nationalist and other quasi-authoritaran so-

nist countries, the experience of postwar democracy

lutions.

in Japan and the West demonstrated that `planned capitalism and the welfare state helped to avoid

Liberalism and Post-communist Social Democracy

totalitarianism because they contributed decisively to the neutralisation of political movements that carry a model of totalitarian socialism.'

67

Under post-communism the focus has been on re-

Under

storing the elements of classical constitutional lib-

takes

eralism, the critique of political power and the

on an extreme, virulent form at times, in which

attempt to impose restraints on despotism. With

antistatism ± one of the most lucid positions ± turns

equal force post-communist liberalism has had to

into a generalised statephobia, often accompanied by

face the question of the social sources of despotism,

post-communism

`economic

liberalism

68

still

The post-communist

the `tyranny of the majority' and of the masses on the

transitions coincided with the predominance of the

individual. In this context the social liberalism

globalisation

espoused by T. H. Green and his successors ± an

antidemocratic sentiments.' paradigm,

itself

a

recipe

for

state

279

RICHARD SAKWA

evolution that in the United States has redefined the

for this reason that he insisted that the ideology of

very meaning of liberalism to denote interventionist

Russia's modernisation could not be liberalism but

welfare state policies ± has been largely absent.

social democracy.

Sogrin notes that at the basis of the reformist policies

cogent exponent of the view that social democracy

of Russian radicals `lay a simplified Western liberal-

was the only way forward for Russia, remaining loyal

ism, stripped off practically all the humanistic for-

to a modified version of convergence theory, a

mulae of the twentieth century.'

71

76

Dzarasov emerged as the most

The insouciance

compromise (synthesis) of capitalism and socialism,

of the majority of post-communist liberals in the face

Marxism and liberalism. Russian liberalism, in his

of the social traumas of an almost unprecedented

view, was sustained by its ability to convince people

scale in peacetime did much to discredit the liberal

that all evil had arisen from communism, and that all

idea in its entirety.

things good came from the example and the recommendation of the West.

Irving Kristol may well be right to argue that `a conservative is but a liberal attacked by reality'

72

77

A turn away from the

West, however, thus ran the risk of a rejection of

but

liberalism in its entirety.

we can with equal force argue that a liberal is but a conservative attacked by conscience. The problem

It was only after successive electoral defeats and

under post-communism, however, is that this con-

political marginalisation, according to Sogrin, that

science is not well-developed. What liberalism there

social liberalism from 1994 became prominent.

is tends to emerge out of an abstract intellectualism

The social liberals, in sharp contrast to the radical

rather than the commitment to the broad range of

liberals, began to stress issues of social order, became

liberal values. The reconciliation between the so-

supporters of `civilised nationalism' and sought to

cialist striving for social justice and the liberal con-

bridge the gulf that had opened between liberalism

cern

and democracy.

with

individual

liberty

has

not

yet

been

79

78

The problem, however, is deeper

achieved, weakening both in the process. The very

than this. While classical liberalism may well have

notion of equality, which in a sense could be re-

advanced an individualistic view of society, today

garded as the ground for both socialism and sub-

the main actors in advanced democracies are col-

stantive (social) liberalism, has been delegitimated

lective: parties, trade unions, churches, lobby groups

by the experience of Soviet socialism. A `radical

and the government itself. In Russia these collectives

liberal'

considered

have not yet become `interest groups' on the western

any attempt to achieve substantive equality of out-

model; their identity is still Soviet, focused on the

comes, rather than simply `equal starting possibili-

internal management of their affairs rather than on

ties',

the external advancement of their interests. The

approach

as

an

predominated

outbreak

of

that

neo-Soviet

`equality-

73

mongering' (uravnilovka).

constituency for social liberalism remains passive and ideologised, rather than advocatory and struc-

As far as Dzarasov was concerned, a group of `anarcho-liberals' had come to power in Russia.

74

tured.

While extreme liberals in economic affairs, they were

Benedetto Croce is the arch-exponent of a liberal

at the same time destructive of the integrity of the

historicism, reabsorbing the thinking of Giambattista

state.

artificially

Vico into mainstream liberalism, but he is also

foisted on Russia, and that the population does

notable for his attempt to `re-moralise' liberalism,

not recognise the legitimacy of property acquired

endowing it with an ethical charge that was lacking

He

argued

that

capitalism

was

in the course of `mafia-nomenklatura privatisation'.

75

in economic utilitarian approaches. Croce is `Fu-

He insisted that Russia lacked the preconditions for a

kuyama with a conscience'. This trend is important

purely capitalist type of development. The Russian

in Russia, although lacking sustained formal expres-

bourgeoisie in his view was never concerned with the

sion. The conscience of liberalism remains abstract,

good of the country, and that the backbone of the

while the transformative challenge is immediate and

country was represented by hired labour (workers

urgent; the liberal historicist tendency has triumphed

and employees in the trade unions), `honest' entre-

at the expense of its ethical content. Neo-liberalism

preneurs and scientific-technical intelligentsia. It is

has predominated over ethical liberalism.

280

LIBERALISM AND POST-COMMUNISM

with a viable state. This is a harder task than might

Liberalism, the Nation-State and Nationalism

appear at first sight; how is it possible to reconcile

For Roland Axtmann, the only serious basis for

liberal individualism with the collectivism that is an

liberal democracy is the nation-state, but at the same

intrinsic part of nationalist discourse? In Russia the

time, it was enlightenment and liberal values that

issue takes on particular force since the collectivist

sustained the nation-state.

80

Liberalism is the most

ethos is the core of tradition, of history and of

universal of ideologies yet, paradoxically, it is the

politics.

most national in form ± a feature recognised by John

For Will Kymlicka there is not such a stark con-

Stuart Mill, Jules Michelet and Giuseppe Mazzini as

trast between the two principles as some of liberal-

they became the intellectual proponents of liberal

ism's critics have suggested,

nationalism.

81

84

but finding a balance

An appropriate combination of lib-

between collective traditions and individual rights

eralism and nationalism, however, is far from easy, as

remains a problem in many communities. In Dage-

the Frankfurt Assembly in March 1849 discovered to

stan, for example, the enormous burden (both fi-

its cost. After the collapse of the Assembly the link

nancial and emotional) of traditional rituals marking

between liberalism and nationalism in Germany was

the passage of each stage of life has led many to

severed, opening the way to the horrors that fol-

escape into the relative simplicity of the Wahhabi

82

Liberalism's relationship with authority in

form of Islam. Throughout Russia the struggle be-

pre-revolutionary Russia was equally ambivalent,

tween the abstract liberal principles embodied in the

espousing a progressivistic view of history while

constitution of December 1993 and myriad forms of

suspicious of the radical populism and socialism that

inherited collectivist communities (both Soviet and

sought to make historical progress their own. No-

pre-Soviet) represents a profound reorientation of

where were these tensions more apparent than in the

the culture. The tension between the two principles

person of Paul Milyukov, the effective leader of

cannot be wished away, but at the same time it

organised Russian liberalism in the form of the

should not be exaggerated. As the burgeoning lit-

Constitutional Democratic Party (Kadets). Liberal-

erature on identity formation suggests, cultures (like

ism in Russia, it appeared, was subverted even before

identities) are not stable unchanging entities but are

it had begun, unable to sustain itself as an indepen-

in a constant process of adaptation and renegotiation

dent political force or to reconcile the democratic

with the challenges of modernity.

and liberal impulses. Ironically, it was Milyukov's

has made the same point with regard to the mut-

pragmatic application of liberalism to Russian cir-

ability of political culture.

cumstances that brought him down when in 1917 he

communitarian

embraced `state consciousness (gosudarstvennost) and

cannot be reduced

sent off his ill-fated Note reasserting imperial war

and that communities can make enhanced claims

lowed.

aims.

83

thinking

86

85

Stephen Welch

The very resurgence of

suggests

that

to the sovereign

liberalism individual,

More broadly, the democratic revolution in

on an individual without infringing the principles of

Russia was shorn entirely of liberal coloration and

liberal individualism. The problem, of course, is: at

took an extreme Jacobin form. The tension between

what point does communitarianism become collec-

liberalism and democracy was to persist into the post-

tivism (in the negative sense of the term, that is

communist era.

when the community makes demands that undermine individual autonomy in threatening ways)? At

Liberalism requires home grown liberals to proto

what point do the rights of the collective and the

thrive, national cultures to be sustained, and char-

principle of collective rights lead to an anti-liberal

acteristic institutions and individuals to practise it.

collectivism?

mote

it,

specific

socio-economic

conditions

There is clearly a need for a new synthesis of liberal-

The rich vein of post-communist paradoxes does

ism and nationalism under post-communism; if lib-

not end here. While few would now defend the

eralism remains too internationalist, it will fail to

concept of empire (and for early post-communist

find a domestic constituency whose bonds of alle-

liberals it was clear that democracy and empire in the

giance would forge a new synthesis of a free society

old USSR were incompatible), the disintegration of

281

RICHARD SAKWA

the empire was not a sufficient, through probably a

The market, moreover, even in the best of times is

necessary, condition for the emergence of democ-

not a source of loyalty and allegiance (except perhaps

racy. Only the republics appeared to be an appro-

for the most rabid neo-liberals) but the source of

priate vessel in which democratic institutions could

enrichment (for some); people do not die for the

be constructed. As Dankwart Rustow argued, stable

market but they do for the state.

borders are a prerequisite for democracy.

87

Thus out

The attempt to combine patriotism and liberal

of the detritus of empire nation-states were to be

values gave rise to the national liberal tendency, yet

born ± this was one side of the liberal project ± but no

no adequate synthesis occurred, leaving the field

concessions were to be made to nation-state nation-

open to radical rejectionists of the whole new order.

alism ± the other side of liberalism. Even though

Alexander Prokhanov is one of the most eloquent of

Carlton Hayes had long ago argued that liberalism

those who condemn Russia's renewed westernisa-

and nationalism were far from antithetical, oeuvring between these two positions

88

man-

tion. He insists that `today's Westernisers in Russia

provoked

are the liberals and radicals. They are criminals; they 92

many painful contortions. The commitment to de-

are destroying Russia.'

mocracy was an intrinsic part of the formal move-

vanced by Alexander Tarasov when he details the

ment for national rebirth in Russia, and this perhaps

deaths resulting from the events of 3±4 October

made the democratic project rather more resistant to

1993. `This', he argues, `is what liberalism looks like

both nation-state nationalism and ethnic national-

in action.'

ism than in some other post-communist countries.

nationalist intellectuals who `viewed liberalism as

Yet the susceptibility was there, as evidenced for

too individualistic and horribly bourgeois, while

example by the nationalist turn taken by the Russian

democracy encouraged mediocrity and corruption'

Christian Democratic Movement despite its commit-

is shared by many citizens of the post-communist

ment to `enlightened patriotism'. Another example

world. Many, while not rejecting liberalism as such,

is that of the Jews in Russia, traditionally associated

have adopted anti-western, and in particular anti-

with the country's liberal and (especially in the pre-

American, views; modernisation based on Western

revolutionary era) radical movements, who gradually

models has lost its attractiveness.

associated more with Russian patriotic ideas. Ac-

communist years the neo-liberal economic reformers

cording to Dmitry Shlapentokh, `the emergence of

systematically dismantled Russia's ties with its former

this strange and unknown political species, red-to-

partner republics, and the language of national in-

brown Jews, was indicative not so much of a trend

terests was alien to them as they pursued a globalising

among Jews as of a deep crisis in Russian pro-Wes-

agenda. Nevertheless, liberals gradually came to

tern liberalism.'

89

93

A similar viewpoint is ad-

The sentiment of pre-fascist Italian

95

94

In the early post-

appreciate the importance of national identity in

Some key questions remain unanswered. Above

the state-building endeavour. A de-ethnicised de-

all, can an effective Russian state of whatever type be

mocracy did not necessarily mean a denationalised

constructed in the absence of agreement on Russia's

one. It remains to be seen what liberalism with a

historical border, and can a liberal Russia be estab-

Russian face will really look like.

lished if the country retains imperial pretensions outside Russia itself? These are the questions faced

Individualism and Civil Society

by the national liberals in the most acute form possible, perhaps trying to reconcile the irreconcil-

The shift in post-communism is from the aspiration

able. The powers given up by the communist state, to

to achieve an organic collectivist society to an

paraphrase Hoffmann's argument about the Eur-

individualist `civil society'. Civil society was the

opean Union, `have gone not to the new central

slogan of the anti-communist revolution, of course,

90

The liberalism that

and its central features at that time were the ad-

was successful in reducing the state's power, `has

vancement of negative liberty for the individual and

institutions, but to the market.'

91

char-

a public sphere where these individuals organised in

acterised by the eruption of crime and corruption.

civil associations could gather to influence policy.

created a formidable anonymous new power',

282

LIBERALISM AND POST-COMMUNISM

Neither has yet been entirely achieved, and indeed

consumerist version of citizenship has analogously

the

has

withdrawn the subject from the full-blooded political

tended to take on some of the features of Hobbes's

community, but this time it is post-political. The

`war of all against all', a state of nature of pre-liberal

social sphere vacated by the communist state has

and pre-contract societies. There is no guarantee

been filled not by political emancipation but by the

that the free market on its own leads to a free politics.

tyranny of a corrupted neoliberal market.

terrain

of

post-communist

civil

society

From the liberal perspective more broadly the relationship between the individual and the collec-

Conclusion:

tive, the personality (lichnost) and the community,

Systemic or Asystemic Liberalism

is not resolved in general, let alone in Russia. As David Ost puts it in the Polish context, `liberalism is

Does liberalism lack profound roots in the societies

no friend of community', and he goes on to argue

themselves? Is liberalism a systemic prerequisite of

that liberals `are in crisis everywhere in Eastern

post-communist societies, or was it imposed simply as

Europe. It is not so much economic as political

a byproduct of the anti-communist struggle and as a

96

`Negative liberty

function of aspirations to join the international

demands the creation of a social space in which

system? If the former, then despite many tribulations

the choices, preferences and will of each individual

it is here to stay, but if the latter, it is fragile and

liberalism that is in danger.'

97

The `political right to do wrong' is

liable to be swept away by more militant rejectionist

not yet entirely conceded, either from the national

nationalist agendas. Was Szacki indeed right to argue

or the ideological perspective. The agreement to

that liberalism was a specific western phenomenon

disagree was the basis of the modern liberalism

sustained only by the role it played in the anti-

emerging out of the Reformation and Counter-

communist struggle? He probably exaggerates the

Reformation, and the necessity of the principle

argument, especially since he fails to define what

has been amply confirmed by the ideological wars

he means by liberalism, preferring instead to stress its

of the twentieth century. The balance between

situational character. Even in Russia liberalism has a

individual

power

long history, going back at least to Herzen and

and social responsibility is far from having been

sustaining a vigorous literature over legal and local

achieved in post-communist societies.

government reform, and under communism it was far

are sovereign.'

civil

and

human

rights,

state

There is another aspect to post-communist indi-

more than an instrumental ideology to be discarded

viduation, discussed above in the context of con-

at the first opportunity. He is right to argue that

strained liberalism. The process has sometimes been

political liberalism can accommodate various types

described as the transformation of the individual

of property rights, but underestimated the problems

from `comrade' to `citizen'. This is indeed part of

facing

the truth, but an equally profound parallel transfor-

although this is not to say that neoliberal economic

mation is taking place: from `comrade' to `customer',

reforms were the only way forwards. Attempts to

in certain cases missing out the citizenship stage

devise `third path' strategies, however, like those of

altogether, and certainly everywhere undermining

Gay and Alekseeva have not been convincing.

the full political entitlements denoted by the con-

not at all clear whether more gradualist and organic ±

cept of citizenship. The will of the customer takes

indeed, more liberal ± methods would in the long run

priority over the will of the planner, production takes

have secured the future for liberalism as well as the

the place of distribution, and interdependence is

`illiberal' methods actually implemented.

placed above independence ± but where is the

economic

reformers

Post-communist

liberalism

in

marketisation

has,

98

±

It is

paradoxically,

emancipation of which Merquior spoke? While re-

used the power of the state to implement its eco-

ligions hold that there is a natural subject situated

nomic programme ± indeed, as Szacki would argue,

within the religious community itself and indepen-

hardly a demonstration of the triumph of liberalism.

dent of the particularities of the state-society rela-

Political

tionship (i.e. that this subject is pre-political), the

glected: the `universalist' principles of the post-com-

283

liberalism,

however,

has

not

been

ne-

RICHARD SAKWA

munist international community have been rein-

power communism of Gennadii Zyuganov and the

forced by the attempts by all Eastern European states

Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF).

(including Russia) to return to Europe and the world.

As Sogrin puts it:

However, their implementation has often fallen far short of declarations, giving rise to an illiberal and

Radical liberalism was able to destroy the supports

constrained democracy of the regime system. The

of

democratisation of liberalism has yet to be secured.

breakthrough into market relations. But it became

At the same time, the basic principles of liberalism ±

increasingly clear that the radical liberal approach

individualism, tolerance, private property, pluralism,

to reconstructing Russia on the classical Western

restraints on state power ± have gained broader

model is nothing less than a utopia, and that in

support than people like Szacki and others who insist

Russian conditions radical liberalism leads to the

on a primordial collectivism and authoritarianism in

socio-economic polarisation of society and the

Poland or Russia would concede. The communist

poverty of the majority and enshrines the power

regimes did not simply perpetuate traditional pat-

of bureaucratic nomenklatura capitalism.

communism and helped

Russia

achieve

a

99

terns of authoritarianism; communist authoritativeness was based on thoroughly modern principles.

In its place a social liberalism emerged, but what was

Indeed, in yet another of those paradoxes that mark

really required according to him was a national

the post-communist world, in the social sphere the

liberalism. The challenge perhaps is even greater

communist period helped clear the way for liberalism

than this: to combine the political constitution of

by destroying the old aristocratic ethos of the old

liberty, the social basis for equal citizenship, the

Russian and Polish ruling classes.

patriotic consensus for national integration, and

However weak post-communist liberalism might

the developmental basis to allow the conversion

be, in Poland it was able to force the adaptation of

of constrained transformative liberalism into a gen-

the post-communist communists to its programme,

uine emancipatory liberalism.

while in Russia it has defeated (so far) the great

Notes

13. Ibid., p. 15.

1. Gellner, `Introduction', in Gellner and Cansino (eds)

14. This is examined by Pantin (1997).

(1996), pp. 1±4, at p. 3. 2. Fukuyama (1989), (1992).

15. Szacki (1995), chapter 5.

3. Helio Jaguaribe, `Merquior and Liberalism', in Gellner

16. Ost (1991), p. 91.

and Cansino (eds) (1996), pp. 21±36, at p. 24; in the

17. See ibid.

same volume see also Roberto Campos, `Merquior the

18. Solzhenitsyn (1974).

Liberalist', pp. 65±76, at p. 72.

19. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, `Newsline', 10 August 1998.

4. Ibid., pp. 21±36. 5. Ibid., p. 32.

20. Schieder (1962), p. 39.

6. V. V. Sogrin, `Liberalizm v Rossii: peripetii i perspek-

21. See Russia Briefing, 12 February 1997, pp. 6±7.

tivy', Obshchestvennyie nauki i sovremmenosti, 1, 1997,

22. Fish (1997).

p. 13.

23. Aleksandr Buzgalin, `Right Cause: You Are Not Right, Gentlemen', Jamestown Foundation Prism, vol. V

7. Nodari A. Simonia, `Priorities of Russian Foreign

(14), part 6, 16 July 1999.

Policy and the Way It Works', in Dawisha and

24. Bellamy (1992).

Dawisha (eds) (1995), p. 17. 8. Ibid., p. 18.

25. Balcerowicz (1995).

9. Hough (1997), pp. 1±2 and passim.

26. Klaus (1997). 27. Sogrin, `Liberalizm v Rossii' p. 17 (see note 6 above).

10. Lev Timofeev, `Bol'shaya rastrata, in Izvestiya, 26

28. Rustam Narzikulov, Nezavisimaya gazeta, 11 March

February 1993.

1997.

11. Lev Timofeev, `Vse russko pechal'no', in Izvestiya, 31

29. Sogrin, `Liberalizm v Rossii' p. 21 (see note 6 above).

October 1995.

30. Lebed's ideas are outlined in Izvestiya, 24, 31 May

12. Sogrin, `Liberalizm v Rossii', p. 14 (see note 6 above).

284

LIBERALISM AND POST-COMMUNISM

1996 and Za derzhavu obidnu (Moscow: Moskovskaya

58. O'Donnell (1994), p. 59.

pravda, 1985). An analysis of his views is Vladimir

59. For example, Vladimir Gel'man, `Regional'nye rezhi-

Polushin, General Lebed ± zagadka Rossii (Moscow,

my: zavershenie transformatsii?', Svobodnaya mysl', 9,

1996).

1996, pp. 13±22; `Stanovlenie regional'nykh rezhimov v Rossii', NG-stsenarii, 19 September 1996, p.

31. Cited in Institute for East±West Studies, Russian

5.

Regional Report, vol. 2 (11), 20 March 1997.

60. As put by Roberto Campos in Gellner and Cansino

32. Ibid.

(eds) (1996), p. 73.

33. Szacki (1995), p. 150.

61. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, `Newsline', 20 Feb-

34. Radzislawa Gortat, `Liberalizm jako Konstruktywizm',

ruary 1998.

in Przegland Spoleczny 6, 1992, cited in Szacki (1995),

62. Huntington (1993) and his later book (1996).

p. 154.

63. See, above all, Borneman (1997); Kritz (ed.) (1995);

35. This is above all the argument of David Ost, `Shaping a New Politics in Poland: Interests and Politics

Pogany (1998).

in Post-Communist Europe', Programme on Central

64. Mill (1972), p. 71.

and

65. Ibid., pp. 72±3.

East

Europe

Working

Paper

8

(Centre

for

European Studies, Harvard University, 1991), pp.

66. Cited in Zakaria (1997), p. 30.

4±5.

Â Merquior, `A Panoramic View on the Renais67. Jose sance of Liberalisms', in Gellner and Cansino (eds)

36. Bellamy (1994), p. 420. For John Gray's view, see

(1996), pp. 7±20, at pp. 11±12.

Gray (1986), chapter 1. And for Hayek's own sum-

68. Ibid., p. 9.

mary of his position, see Hayek (1993), volume 1, p. 5.

69. Dietze (1985), p. 1; Fish, (1997), pp. 208±9, draws on

37. Walicki (1991), p. 106.

Dietze to make the same point.

38. Jerzy Hausner and Jacek Kuron, Strategia Negocjacyjina w Procesie Transformacji Gospodarki (Warsaw:

70. Fish (1997), p. 208.

Stefan Batory Foundation, 1994), p. 26. I am grate-

71. Vladimir Sogrin, `Zapadnyi liberalizm i Rossiiskie reformy', Svobodnaya mysl', 1, 1996, p. 43.

ful to Nick Spiro for drawing my attention to this

72. Quoted by Merquior, `A Panoramic View on the

debate.

Renaissance of Liberalisms', in Gellner and Cansino

39. Andrei Kolesnikov, `Liberalizm umer, da zdravstvuet

(eds) (1996), p. 7.

liberaliz!', Novoe vremya, 12 (1997), p. 15, cites the case of St Petersburg when Vladimir Yakovlev re-

73. Sogrin, `Liberalizm v Rossii', p. 16 (see note 6 above).

placed the `liberal' Anatolii Sobchak as mayor but

74. Soltan Dzarasov, `Liberalizm ili sotsial-demokratizm?', in Svobodnaya mysl', 4, 1996, p. 28.

was soon forced to pursue similar policies.

75. Ibid., p. 26.

40. Jan Krzysztof Bielecki interviewed by Nick Spiro,

76. Ibid., p. 31.

London, 2 August 1996.

77. Ibid., p. 31.

41. This theme is explored in the doctoral dissertation by Nick Spiro, The Politics of Economic Transition: Shock

78. Sogrin, `Liberalizm v Rossii', p. 18 (see note 6 above).

Therapy in Poland, 1990±1991, University of Kent at

79. Ibid., p. 19.

Canterbury, June 1998.

80. Axtmann (1996).

42. Rychard (1992), p. 144.

81. See Hoffmann (1995), p. 162.

43. Cited by Jadwiga Staniszkis in Staniskis (1991), p.

82. The point is made by Robert Taylor, `Springtime for Hitler?', in Prospect, March 1998, p. 13.

184. 44. Ibid.

83. Stockdale (1996).

45. Holc (1997).

84. Kymlicka (1989).

46. Ibid., p. 402.

85. For a particularly rich debate of the issue, see Rajchman (1995).

47. Ibid., p. 427. 48. Ibid., p. 416.

86. Welch (1993).

49. Zakaria (1997), p. 23.

87. Rustow (1970).

50. Boris Kagarlitskii, `Levye v Rossii: nadezhdy, neuda-

88. Hayes (1949). 89. Dmitry Shlapentokh, ` ``Red-to-Brown'' Jews and Rus-

chi, bor'ba', in Svobodnaya mys', 11, 1994, p. 33.

sian Liberal Reform', in The Washington Quarterly,

51. Ibid.

21(4), Autumn 1998, p. 112.

52. Boris Kagarlitskii, `Vremya neopravdavshikhsy na-

90. See Hoffmann (1995), p. 165.

dezhd', Svobodnaya mysl', 3, 1997, p. 10. 53. Zakaria (1997), p. 22.

91. Ibid., p. 175.

54. Ibid., pp. 25±26.

92. Alexander Prokhanov interviewed, `Western Values Âs', in Transitions, August 1997, p. 77. are Cliche

55. Ibid., p. 28.

93. Aleksandr Tarasov, `Striptiz liberalov', in Svobodnaya

56. O'Donnell (1994), p. 59.

mysl', 10, 1997, pp. 106±114, at p. 110.

57. O'Donnell (1993), p. 1367.

285

RICHARD SAKWA

97. Gregory R. Johnson, `Modernity and Postmodernity in

94. Richard Bellamy, `How Not to Make Italians', in

Â Merquior', in Gellner and Canthe Thought of Jose

Times Literary Supplement, 22 December 1995, p. 12.

sino (eds) (1996), pp. 37±63, at p. 55.

95. Sogrin, `Zapadnyi liberalizm i Rossiiskie reformy, pp.

98. Gay and Alekseeva (1996).

32±3 (see note 71 above).

99. Sogrin, `Liberalizm v Rossii', p. 20 (see note 6 above).

96. Ost (1991), p. 85.

286

21

LIBERALISM, ECOCENTRISM AND PERSONS Brian Baxter

the call of liberals for the neutrality of the state with

I

respect to substantive views of the good life. Indi-

Throughout its long history liberalism has been

vidual persons are to be allowed, as far as is compa-

concerned almost exclusively with matters of human

tible with their all being allowed to do so, to pursue

well-being in so far as these are affected by social,

their own distinctive view of the good life. Each

economic and political arrangements. Until very

individual counts equally with all others, and no

recently virtually nothing has been said by liberals

one's view of the good life is to be accorded greater

about the issue to which Green political theorising so

weight than those of other individuals. For the

vehemently directs our attention, namely that of

liberal, the heart of morality is this impartiality

human relations with the natural context within

between persons.

1

The reason

Different individuals will have different value

for this neglect does not seem hard to find. It appears

commitments. Certainly, some may seek to attribute

to stem from the fact that the fundamental value of

non-instrumental value to the non-human, natural

liberalism is that of the pursuit by individuals of

world, and to seek to live lives in which the im-

personal projects which they have freely chosen for

plications of such valuing are worked out. But some

themselves.

may deny any such value, and seek to treat the non-

which all human action takes place.

Although on this planet these individuals com-

human world purely on the basis of what conduces to

prise solely members of the human species, in fact for

human well-being. For liberalism, such arguments

liberalism it is specifically personhood, in whichever

about which values should command our allegiance

species that is to be found, which is the crucial

are, of course, to be allowed and encouraged, and the

element. Persons are, by definition, entities able to

possibility of persuading others to our view of things

exercise certain kinds of choice over the pursuit of

must always be left open (with some tricky issues

their life-plans, and it is persons with which liberal-

about toleration's limits remaining an ongoing mat-

ism has exclusively concerned itself. Non-human

ter of debate). De facto universal agreement on

creatures and entities are noticed by liberalism pri-

substantive values is, thus, compatible with liberal-

marily as resources for human persons. At most the

ism provided the possibility of disagreement breaking

capacity for suffering which some of them possess has

out is always left open by, for example, the main-

been regarded as a source of certain kinds of limita-

tenance of free speech, freedom of conscience and

tions upon how precisely persons may put them to

the rest.

use ± limitations we call, revealingly, `humaneness'.

The view of values which is operating here is one

From this person-centred standpoint has emerged

which sees them as anthropogenic, originating in

287

BRIAN BAXTER

human (person) acts of valuing, and as anthropo-

clearly needed in order to establish for individual

centric, with human well-being as the fundamental

human beings some compelling sense that acting in

touchstone of what is good. Thus, even individuals

accordance with E will achieve for them, and the

who attribute intrinsic value to nature are inter-

individuals about whom they care most, a form of

preted as really finding a kind of `higher' (aesthetic,

human life which will be satisfying and fulfilling.

spiritual, non-practical) instrumental value for hu-

Without some such claim ecocentrists will lack a

man beings in the natural world.

connection between their fundamental value-postulate E and what Thomas Nagel has identified as the

On this view, then, liberalism treats environmen-

2

tal concerns in the way it treats any other substan-

`personal' standpoint,

tive value positions: they are located within the

the consciousness of self-aware beings such as our-

structures of individual preference and left to the

selves.

processes of liberal democratic politics for resolution.

Whether

they

should

lead

to

which always characterises

Liberalism, by contrast, makes this connection

wholesale

quite straightforwardly, for its basic value postulate

changes in human practices is a matter upon which

amounts to an endorsement of the importance of

liberalism, as such, has no view, save in one regard:

precisely that standpoint. It is true that, as liberalism

it is committed to opposing any changes which

also contends, we can, and must, also adopt the

threaten its fundamental value of individual choice

`impersonal' or universal standpoint, which is what

of life-project. Only when such changes are neces-

we do when we enunciate for general acceptance

sary to avert clear danger to the very survival of

liberalism's own fundamental value postulate. But for

human beings (persons) would liberalism permit

much of the time such impersonal conceptions are

them, temporarily and reluctantly, until the danger

weak sources of human motivation and always run

is past.

the risk of being trumped by the requirements of the

At least some Green political theorists will be

`personal' standpoint.

3

unhappy with this standpoint, for it appears to

The difficulty for the ecocentrist, of course, is that

accord no fundamental value to the non-human

on the face of it principle E sets out precisely to

world of nature. In particular, the position known

eschew the `personal' standpoint entirely and to bid

as ecocentrism, to which many Green thinkers have

people to adopt a point of view with respect to non-

given their allegiance, directly contradicts the liberal

human nature which completely leaves behind hu-

fundamental value postulate, for it enunciates the

man interests and concerns, including their personal

following rival basic proposition:

ones. Ecocentrism, then, needs a way of fusing the

[E] The non-human natural world has intrinsic

personal and impersonal standpoints. The view to

value, independent of its instrumental impor-

be defended below is that the key to this lies in

tance for human well-being.

developing the concept, whose importance to liberalism has already been noted, of personhood and

In other words, ecocentrism rejects the liberal inter-

relating it to non-human nature. In the course of

pretation of the attribution of intrinsic value to

doing this, however, we discover that the apparently

nature as really being the attribution to it of various

clear-cut distinction between anthropocentric (or

`higher'

personcentric) and ecocentric positions disappears,

forms

of

instrumental

value

for

human

beings.

and that reasons can be found within the liberal

However, ecocentrism is not the only possible

perspective for endorsing at a fundamental level the

basis for the development of a Green political theory.

kinds of value which Green theorists have so ar-

This is just as well, for ecocentrism faces rather severe

dently brought to political theorists' attentions. The

difficulties which I will try to explore. These centre

aims of liberalism and Green political theory turn out

on the problem of establishing an intrinsic connec-

not to be so completely at odds as appeared to be the

tion between principle E above and a conception of

case at first sight, provided that Greens accept the

human well-being or flourishing. This connection is

abandonment of pure ecocentrism, and liberals ac-

288

LIBERALISM, ECOCENTRISM AND PERSONS

cept Green arguments for a revised formulation of

dividually or as a species (domestic animals in factory

personhood.

farms, for example). Also, the kind of interconnectedness between ourselves and non-human life-forms is important

II

when we are considering our attitudes to non-human

Before developing this position, however, we need

nature. The science of ecology suggests the connec-

first to consider some arguments explored by Robyn

tions are physical and biological, via `energy path-

Eckersley,

4

which seek to elucidate and defend the

ways' for example. However, it is arguable that

ecocentric position in a rather different way, one

ecocentrists really need to establish interconnected-

which might be seen as reinterpreting such key

ness between human beings and non-human nature

liberal values as autonomy by finding ecocentric

at the level of value or meaning. The focus should

versions of them. It is a feature of the suggestions

thus be on the kinds of meaning ± moral, aesthetic,

she explores that they operate in such a way that the

religious, and so on ± which non-human nature can

intrinsic value of non-human nature is directly con-

have for people. Only thus is it going to be possible to

nected to human flourishing. Hence, if such argu-

establish the right kind of connection between prin-

ments work, then the above-noted difficulties faced

ciple E and the concept of human flourishing, which is

by ecocentrism ought to disappear. As will now be

value-laden and permeated with a concern with

contended, these arguments do not succeed and thus

meaning. One suggestion along these lines which Eckersley

a different mode of reconciling the personal and

explores is the ecofeminist claim that at least be-

impersonal standpoints will be required. Eckersley's discussion begins with the observation

tween one group of human beings ± women ± and

that ecocentrism takes its cue from the ecologically

non-human nature there is a connection of mean-

informed philosophy of the internal relatedness of

ing.

life forms within ecosystems, according to which

giving natures, are more `in tune' than men are with

`there are no absolutely discrete entities and no

natural processes. Thus they will find the caring and

absolute dividing lines between the living and the

nurturing attitude to non-human nature required by

non-living.'

5

6

Women, with their nurturing, caring and life-

the full recognition of E to be congenial and con-

Acceptance of this viewpoint in turn

ducive to their own fulfilment as women.

leads to an ethic of general emancipation, according

There may be truth in the claim that human

to which all beings should be permitted to fulfil themselves in accordance with their natures ± a

beings

principle which will apply both to human beings

and nurturing will find the forms of life enjoined

whose

self-understanding

involves

caring

and to non-human nature. We should note that such

by ecocentrists to be congenial in this way. But it is

a principle clearly chimes with the liberal concern

clear that this is a contingent fact about them, if it is

for human self-development embodied in its funda-

a fact at all. There seems to be no incoherence in the

mental postulate even though, as we have seen,

idea of a being whose caring and nurturing instincts

liberalism restricts its concerns in this regard solely

are directed only to its own kind, as is true of nearly

to human beings.

all non-human forms of life, for example. And in the

However, the ecological principle of intercon-

human case it is at least arguable that caring and

nectedness appealed to by Eckersley does not seem

nurturing comes most naturally, for both males and

to be straightforwardly related to the principle of

females, though on occasion for neither, with respect

general emancipation which is supposed to unite

to their own offspring and relations.

7

human and non-human flourishing. For all that

A more general kind of approach to the problem is

`interconnectedness' shows, it seems possible for

explored by Eckersley via direct consideration of the

the flourishing of some beings to require that others

concept, hotly debated between liberals and socia-

do not flourish (parasites, for example); or for the

lists, of autonomy. According to her, the key move is

flourishing of some beings to require only that others

to expand the concept of the `self' whose autonomy

exist, but not that they should flourish, either in-

is characterised in the classic Kantian terms as `living

289

BRIAN BAXTER

in accordance with self-imposed principle.'

8

What

autonomy as an exercise of rationality.

12

This may

this expansion seems to mean is, in effect, accepting

not be the only possible concept of rationality, but it

that non-human nature has its own capacity for

is one which excludes the attribution of autonomy to

autonomy. Non-human life-forms have their own

creatures believed to be devoid of the requisite kinds

ways of living and modes of being. Respect for

of rationality. Kant's argument is that since we must

autonomy in general thus requires respect for the

value our own rationality, as a condition of the

modes of living of such beings and underpins the

meaningfulness of our own existence, and since

project of `general emancipation' already alluded to

rationality is a matter of consistency ± not making

above.

a distinction without a difference ± we cannot value

The focus on autonomy, and the expansion of its

our own rationality without thereby committing

application mooted by Eckersley, allow her to estab-

ourselves to valuing the rationality of others, for

lish a link between principle E and human flourish-

to fail to do that would be making a distinction

ing. She argues that since ecocentrism is committed,

without a difference, and thus failing to value ra-

by its acceptance of E and the expanded concept of

tionality.

13

autonomy, to the project of general emancipation for

There is a problem about trying to rework this

all creatures, it necessarily also supports the condi-

argument if we do not understand autonomy as an

tions conducive to the exercise by humans of their

exercise of rationality, but instead regard it as synon-

autonomy. Giving this concept in turn what is in

ymous with the concept of self-renewal/production.

effect a socialist gloss, she then suggests that this

Certainly one can intelligibly claim that we must

commits ecocentrists to the pursuit of social justice in

each value our own self-renewing capacities, for we

human societies.

9

cannot have meaningful lives if we go out of ex-

Now these ideas are not pursued very far by

istence. However, this in no way commits us to the

Eckersley and it is, of course, a serious problem with

valuation of the self-renewing capacities of other

the suggestion she makes that it is not entirely clear

entities. We may, of course, value their self-renewing

what is meant by extending the Kantian sense of

capacities for instrumental reasons of our own, but that

autonomy (the `following of self-imposed principle')

does not amount to viewing them as possessing

to creatures which do not seem able to impose

intrinsic values, and in any case is a value-attribution

principles upon themselves in any sense.

exercise which requires us to consider each case on its

Another attempt at elucidating how one might

own (instrumental) merits. We are not committed to

reasonably arrive at an extension of the concept of

a blanket valuing of all self-renewing entities by our

autonomy to non-humans, thus motivating accep-

instrumental valuation of the self-renewing capacities

tance of the general emancipation principle, is via

of some of them. Thus Kant's argument works, if it

what Eckersley refers to as `Autopoietic Intrinsic

does, because of the peculiar logic of the concept of

10

In her account of it, the

rationality. It is plain that this concept is not in-

key claim of AIV is that non-human nature is

volved in the idea of self-renewing/producing beings

capable of being self-renewing and that self-renewing

and so it is hard to see how we can be argued into

entities are `ends-in-themselves'. This is another of

accepting the intrinsic value of entities just in so far as

Kant's

they instantiate this concept.

Value' (AIV) theory.

classical

characterisations

of

autonomous

beings ± beings which possess intrinsic, or noninstrumental,

value.

11

Hence

we

should

14

A further view, labelled `transpersonal ecology' by Eckersley,

extend

15

does not aim at argument to convince us

the concept of autonomy to non-human nature,

to accept E, she tells us, but rather attempts to

even to entities such as ecosystems, for they too

produce psychological conversion to the ecocentrist

possess self-producing or renewing capacities.

viewpoint. It does this by developing an extended

However, Kant's argument to persuade autono-

`sense of self'. That is, in the manner adumbrated by

mous agents to value the autonomy of others begins

Arne Naess, transpersonal ecologists seek to encou-

with the demonstration of the importance of one's

rage us to identify with non-human nature so that its

own autonomy, and then turns on the view of

flourishing and ours become one and the same.

290

16

LIBERALISM, ECOCENTRISM AND PERSONS

There are some obvious problems with this idea,

the key ideas is not the only one available. This may

especially given that it is supposed to lead us to

not seem possible at first because we appear to be

identify not just with aspects of non-human nature

faced with two contradictory requirements:

which possess a mentality and resemble us in various 1. that we `make over' the world so that it

respects, such as primates and higher mammals, but also with entities which we can only grasp via the

expresses ourselves to ourselves and to others;

possession of quite sophisticated theory and which

2. that we respect non-human nature by maintaining its processes intact as far as possible.

(on most views of the matter) are devoid of mentality, such as species and ecosystems. One can certainly care about such things: seek to preserve

Here, (a) seems to imply that we countenance

them, respecting and marvelling at them. But how

wholesale

feasible is it to identify with them, to regard them as

whereas (b) seems to imply that this be kept to a

in some sense part of ourselves?

minimum. However, it is arguable that in the con-

interference

with

non-human

nature,

There is one way in which this might be con-

text of our present world, (b) is to be regarded as

ceived to happen which I will now outline, although

being as much a manifestation of human making and

it is a way with which ecocentrists may not be

self-expression as would be the effort to convert the

entirely happy. It is possible to undergo an extension

whole of non-human nature into a global garden

of the sense of self with respect to at least some

city.

entities devoid of mentality. People, for example,

This is because, on any account, wilderness will

often seem to experience this with respect to their

not continue to exist, species will not survive, the

automobiles. However, it appears to be a condition

atmosphere and oceans will not remain unpolluted

of this happening that (1) there should be physical

unless human beings make strenuous and protracted

control of the entity concerned via the human body

efforts to secure these aims. If we do successfully

(the automobile is experienced as an extension of

achieve

the human body); (2) the external appearance of the

count as manifestations of praxis. And, as is inherent

entity needs to be regarded as a direct expression of

in the very idea of praxis, we will have remade

the human self in question (it `makes a statement'

ourselves in the course of this `making over' of our

about the owner).

world. It is perhaps not too strained to suggest that it

them,

then

they

can

unproblematically

If one were to generalise this idea to the relations

will be precisely a sense of our identity with non-

between the human self and non-human nature then

human nature, whose (continued) existence will

it implies (1) that we identify with non-human

then be in a clear sense our achievement and an

nature in so far as it is viewed as an extension of

expression of our values, which will then be attained.

our physical selves via our manipulation of it, which

In a nutshell, a world which shows as few obvious

suggests in turn the necessity for artefactuality; (2)

effects of human artefactuality as possible will, in

that we need to convert it into a symbolic expression

modern conditions, be the largest artefact we can

of our personal psychology, again requiring that it be

achieve. Such an artefact will be conceivable by us as

`made over' by us. These ideas are, of course, central

an extension of our (collective) personality and as

to the Hegelian/Marxist theme of the overcoming of

something which reflects that personality back to us.

alienation by praxis.

Non-human nature and the human world will then have been totally fused.

On the face of it, these suggestions are unwelcome to the ecocentrist position because they look to be a

There are, however, various problems with this

version of the Enlightenment theme of rendering

hypothesis. From the ecocentric point of view it

non-human nature entirely subservient to human

perhaps still looks too anthropocentric, as if it in-

purposes and needs when what is needed, according

volved the claim that the only way in which we can

to ecocentrists, is respect for non-human nature

be brought to recognise the value of non-human

because of its intrinsic value. But it may be feasible

nature is by making it an instrument of our human

to argue that the Enlightenment interpretation of

personality. Also, the hypothesis posits an enlarged

291

BRIAN BAXTER

sense of self as the result of the implementation of the

tionary thought that the `ecological' concept of the

Green project. But it does nothing to show people

person ought to be developed out of existing con-

why they should now embark upon such a protracted

cepts of the person with which people are reasonably

and difficult project in a situation where large num-

familiar.

bers of them do not have such a wider sense of self.

existing concepts is unlikely to have the appeal

18

A concept which makes no contact with

One point must be made at this juncture, now that

necessary to motivate action. The second is the

we have surveyed various suggestions for establishing

question of how persons, as opposed to the animal

the connection between principle E and human

species Homo sapiens, are to be shown to be part of

flourishing. We have looked at ecofeminist argu-

nature. As members of that animal species we are

ments, autopoietic intrinsic value theory and trans-

interconnected with non-human nature. But what is

personal ecology. I have indicated why they should

the significance of that fact for the persons which we

be regarded as not adequate to do the job required.

also are?

However, it should be noted that they all seek to

To answer this question we need to say rather

establish a connection between principle E and hu-

more about what a person is. The following char-

man flourishing by seeking to effect an identity,

acterisation, drawn from the European tradition of

partial or whole, between human beings and non-

philosophical and social-scientific thought to be

human nature. This suggests that the ecocentric/

found in thinkers such as Hobbes, Kant, Rousseau,

anthropocentric distinction has ceased to have any

Hegel and Marx, picks out the features essential to

real meaning. The defence of principle E turns out

personhood. Some of them are of direct relevance to

always to involve appeal to something of prime

our problem:

importance for human beings too, so that the idea of non-human nature's having intrinsic value, irre-

A person is a self-conscious being, with the

spective of human concerns, has become very un-

following abilities all being implicit in the posses-

clear. When we put non-human nature at the centre

sion of self-consciousness:

we find that we put ourselves there too. The real issue, therefore, is which of the ideological rivals has

1. to formulate intentions and determine how to

the most adequate conception of humanity, not

carry them out efficiently;

whether ecocentrism is superior to anthropocentrism

2. to develop a concept of self-interest and to

or personcentrism. As will shortly emerge, this also

pursue self-interest so conceived;

suggests a way in which the fundamental liberal

3. to commit itself to values and to criticise itself

value postulate may be interpreted so as to recognise

in the light of failure to realise those values to

and absorb the point of the ecocentric endeavour.

which it has committed itself;

However, before we reach that point we still need

4. to differentiate between itself and others of its

an argument to establish the connection between E

kind;

and the concept of human flourishing which can

5. to participate with others of its kind in creating

give people the motivation to undertake the Green

a culture of shared values and the associated

form of praxis. In the next section I will try to find

customs, traditions and institutions which em-

such an argument.

body those values.

19

It is a corollary of these features of personhood that

III

the prime focus of interest for persons is other persons

The point made at the end of the last section is

of the same kind. For it is from them that the values,

recognised in effect by Eckersley when she suggests

principles and conceptions come in the light of

that what is required is a new, ecological concept of

which the individual person formulates its projects,

the self, in which persons are related to, not set apart

criticises and assesses itself.

from, non-human nature.

17

20

Thus it is natural for persons to regard the nonperson context within which they are embedded as

Two points immediately arise. One is the cau-

292

LIBERALISM, ECOCENTRISM AND PERSONS

primarily, or essentially, vehicles for interpersonal

On the face of it this looks to be a highly im-

interaction. Hence one might well argue that it is not

plausible claim. Imagine that our world was made

anthropocentrism, conceived of as a viewpoint with

completely over into an entirely urbanised form,

its roots in Judeo-Christian and Enlightenment-phi-

with monocultural agriculture to sustain it, with

losophical modes of thought, which is the main cause

wilderness and wildlife existing only in zoos, genetic

of human persons' attitude of domination towards

banks, on film and in virtual-reality theatres. This

nature. Rather, if the above characterisation of

surely would be a description of a world in which

persons is correct, then persons of whatever species,

human culture had become all-pervasive, rather than

wherever they live in space and time, will tend to

one in which it had become impossible.

have that attitude towards the non-person world.

At this point, however, the possibility arises of

Thus, if any attitude is the problem here it is the

formulating what one might call the transcendental

attitude referred to at the start of this discussion as

deduction of the category of culture.

`personcentrism'.

here is that the resources for human culture (the

21

The key claim

If this charge is correct, then the question ob-

culture of a particular group of persons) must be non-

viously arises as to whether persons can ever avoid

human (non-personal). This is because it is impos-

personcentrism. It might be the case, for example,

sible for there to be a source of culture which was

that members of the human species could only avoid

entirely person-based. A world consisting only of

personcentrism by seeking to avoid being persons

persons would have no wherewithal to formulate

entirely, perhaps by trying to become purely `natural'

values, principles or purposes. This in turn is because,

beings, like non-human animals, locked into some

as the analysis at the start of this section indicates,

suitable ecological niche, living only for the moment

`personhood' can only be formulated in purely formal

and at the level of instinct. The cost of doing so

terms. If, per impossibile, a group of persons were to

would appear to be the destruction of the kind of

exist who were only persons, and not embodied in

mental life essential to personhood. However, as

some animal species located in some ecosystem on

long as the above-noted abilities remain intact the

some planet, they could not generate culture because

suppression of their exercise will be a very tall order.

they could not generate anything. Persons require to

The question which needs to be addressed, then, is

be embodied to become determinate enough to

whether it is possible for persons intelligibly to

develop the self-consciousness, intentionality, value

conceive of the non-person world as something more

and cultures which give them substantial existence.

22

than a mere vehicle for interpersonal interaction. It

The content and meaning of their purposes and

would clearly be very helpful for the ecocentric case

values then comes from their embodiment in a

if it were possible to establish a link between non-

context of extra-personal nature. The categories

human nature and personhood which was intrinsic

which human beings have used to establish their

to and ± at least in part ± determining of the very

particular aims and values are thus necessarily drawn

nature of personhood. Further, this should ideally be

from the animalian predicament of embodied per-

an intrinsic connection whose recognition by per-

sons inhabiting a non-human natural context ±

sons would lead naturally to humility before non-

`mighty hunter, feeder of my people'; `great builder';

human nature and a compassionate concern for its

scientist (`tamer of nature'); artist and priest (inter-

existence and well-being.

preters of nature's meanings). Non-human nature,

The beginnings of an answer may well be found in

then, has to be viewed as a concrete matrix of

ability (5) in the characterisation of persons noted

opportunity and opposition to give specific content

above. Persons are essentially culture-creators. Is it

to human values and purposes, and to furnish the

possible to argue that non-human nature is essen-

essential context within which human persons can

tially that out of which culture is created? If it were

`crystallise out' a sense of what they are, derived from

so, then if non-human nature were to be removed

their joint construction of a culture of artefacts and

there would be no person-created culture, and with

symbols, necessarily using their

no culture there would be no persons at all.

interpretations of non-human nature to do so.

293

experiences and

BRIAN BAXTER

This is the theme of `praxis overcoming aliena-

have an interest in as wide a range of species and

tion' again, but with the additional claim now

habitats continuing to exist as possible to provide

emerging that it is essential to culture and to person-

objects of study, sources of data and arenas for the

hood that what is alien should never be `made over'

testing of theories. Arguably it is from many of the

in its entirety, for then the material out of which

disciplines

culture, and hence personhood, is made disappears

which directly study non-human nature that we

and when that happens culture and personhood

are obtaining insights into our own nature as embo-

disappear too.

died persons. Many forms of art, too, need non-

and

subdisciplines

in

those

sciences

However, isn't this claim overblown? Even if the

human nature as a source of subject-matter and of

above argument is successful, does it not show only

design ideas, even in the practical design of artefacts.

that persons need non-human nature to get culture

Obviously, this applies to landscape painting, but it is

under way? Surely, however, once cultural creation is

essential to the development of any art with a strong

initiated then there is no essential need for non-

visual component, including architecture and dance.

human nature to remain as a sustainer of culture?

The endless variety of nature is essential here, as a

Why should not the cultural life of persons achieved

continuing source of forms, designs and motifs.

in the maximally person-transformed world outlined

The example of the art of painting may help to

above simply continue for as long as there are human

elucidate and support this claim. Can paintings be

beings in existence?

made entirely out of the experience of other paint-

We need to try to show, then, that human cultures

ings? It is certainly arguable that painters initially

cannot be sustained purely from cultural materials by

acquire the idea of what painting is from their

means of one, or both, of the following two processes:

encounters

with

existing

paintings,

encounters

which they can then use as launching-pads for their own works.

1. reflection, exploration and experimentation internal to a culture;

23

But it is clear that the painter needs to

return unfailingly to non-human nature in order to

2. encounters with other cultures: dialectical in-

replenish the wellsprings of painting. Even the de-

terplay; absorption; collage.

velopment of new schemata and new artistic vocabularies requires the painter to have encounters with

A culture is a more-or-less dynamic complex of

non-human nature in order to provide the elements

interrelated elements encompassing the following

experienced under the schemata, and this is no less

categories: language, art, religion and philosophy,

true of non-representational painting.

science and technology, economic and political

In reply to these considerations the point might be

systems, customs and traditions. (More rudimentary

made that such aspects of our own culture as appear

cultures will not have developed under science, but

to need direct confrontation with non-human nature

all cultures develop the other categories to a degree.)

conceived as such are by no means universal: not

The first point to make is that many cultural

everyone is interested in them. Also, there are plenty

activities under these headings do require a context

of ingredients in our culture ± many games, for

of non-human nature directly in order to exist at all

example ± which do not appear to need the con-

or to be fully intelligible. Within our own culture, for

tinued flourishing of non-human nature to provide

example, such widely popular activities as rambling,

them with meaning and purpose. So are not these

hill-walking,

and

points too weak to establish the necessity for human

hunting need non-human nature (albeit a nature

culture of the existence of non-human nature? Surely

which is often extensively made over by human

activities such as those mentioned may fade away

hands) to be feasible. Some scientific disciplines ±

without there being any significant diminution in

biology, ecology, ornithology, zoology and botany,

the cultural possibilities left to us?

mountaineering,

bird-watching

for example ± take non-human nature as their direct

However, the existence of such cultural activities

object of study. It is clear from the very idea of `sites

alerts us to the possibility of a Rawlsian-style defence

of special scientific interest' that such disciplines

of non-human nature,

294

24

and thus takes us in the

LIBERALISM, ECOCENTRISM AND PERSONS

direction of the absorption by liberalism of the main

exploring all the ways in which one may lead a truly

thrust of the ecocentrist argument. It is possible to

human life. Even if some such experiments in living

argue that activities such as those mentioned are

have their pernicious aspects, they add to the sum

clearly part of the self-understanding and flourishing

total of our self-knowledge and may contain redeem-

of those who take part in them. None of us can know

ing aspects for human culture which would be

for certain that they might not become part of our

otherwise unobtainable (for example, consider the

own conditions for flourishing, even if they are not

way in which blues and jazz emerged out of the slave

so at the moment. Also, such people as find them

experience in the USA).

essential to their sense of self are not members of a

The obverse of this point is that no single cultural

separate group of human beings. They are inter-

formation can be entirely adequate to all the sides of

spersed among the general population and are the

our human personality. This is, of course, a central

objects of caring feeling as children, spouses, parents

liberal theme but one which can be turned to good

and so on. Thus, even if these activities in our

account by Green theorists concerned to defend the

culture carry no meaning for a given individual, that

integrity and variety of non-human nature.

individual may find himself caring for others for

The second reason is that any single culture

whom they are extremely important.

which does not periodically, or continuously, re-

So we all have an interest in maintaining the non-

plenish itself by the second process noted above ±

human natural context within which such cultural

namely, encounter with other cultures ± runs the

activities are to be carried on. Rawlsian persons in

serious risk of becoming `played out'. The possibi-

the `original position' would undoubtedly want to

lities of purely internal development are probably

preserve as varied a natural context as possible to

limited. A culture which does not receive jolts from

permit the possibility of engaging in such meaning-

either direct contact with non-human nature or

conferring activities, for themselves or for those for

from contact with other cultures faces the strong

whom they might care. More generally, many com-

possibility of decay. A single, homogeneous world

plete forms of life, such as those centred on hunting

culture which we may be in the process of creating

and fishing, need the specific contexts and oppor-

would, on this view, be a disaster for human cultural

tunities provided by non-human nature in order to

development as a whole. Hence, we need to sustain

exist. The customs, traditions, art-forms, social ar-

as many diverse experiments in living as this tiny

rangements and religious beliefs associated with such

planet will allow, including those which require

lifestyles depend, therefore, derivatively on such a

healthy non-human natural environments within

context. Across the world, the spread of western

which alone they can develop.

cultural forms, the degradation of the natural envir-

In a nutshell, then, the personcentric argument for

onment and the sheer increase in human numbers

the maximum diversity of non-human nature is that

are attacking the underpinning in non-human nat-

it is needed for the maximum diversity of human

ure of such diverse `experiments in living'.

culture. The latter in turn is essential to the con-

However, it might be claimed that no human

tinued health of human cultural development. Re-

cultural form has to exist to secure human well-being

cognition of these points by liberalism requires no

and that diminution in the range of cultural forms is

more than an interpretation of traditional liberal

not necessarily a problem. For, after all, people are

defences of the diversity of human cultures and

adaptable and within a generation or so the grand-

subcultures via grasp of the implications of the

children of fisherfolk can happily exist as urban

necessarily embodied nature of persons. It is the

sophisticates.

25

latter which the defenders of Green political theory,

Why, then, should there be as wide a variety of

such as ecocentrists, have securely grasped. Accep-

human cultures as possible, including those directly

tance of it by liberalism enables the importance of

dependent on specific contexts of non-human nat-

the non-human world to be grasped from within the

ure? Two reasons may be given. The first is that the

liberal tradition in a way which enables an argument

variety is needed in order to allow the possibility of

to be mounted for the defence of the multiplicity of

295

BRIAN BAXTER

that world. Pure ecocentrism is rejected in this

the first round of arguments in the previous section

version of liberalism, but a fusion of the personal

be turned against such theories so as to argue for the

and impersonal standpoints is achieved in a way

possibility of, for example, patterns of urban organi-

which maintains the strong motivational impetus

sation within which very unecological modes of life

which is liberalism's strong point. Further, non-hu-

may be sustained (for at least some of our loved ones

man nature ± on this interpretation of liberalism ± is

may find these to be terribly important for their self-

at least as central a concern as the human (person)

understanding)? Clearly, what is needed at this stage by the

well-being with which it is inextricably entwined.

proponent of the personcentric argument for respecting the variety of non-human nature's world is a

IV

principle to deal with this objection. This principle

It has, of course, long been a liberal theme that only

will require that the maximum variety of human

within an economically dynamic capitalist system is

cultures is to be allowed compatible with the pre-

human diversity properly catered for. The trouble

servation of that diversity of non-human nature

with this view of that diversity is that it is concep-

which is needed to underpin cultures. That is, any

tualised too individualistically. Individual flourishing

culture which requires the eradication of the variety

only occurs within cultural formations. Diversity of

of nature is to be ruled out.

modes of flourishing, therefore, requires diversity of

Obviously, some cultures permitted under this

cultures and, as we have seen, that in turn needs

principle will have features which are morally objec-

diversity of non-human nature within which experi-

tionable on other grounds. However, the above

ments in living can take place. On this view a single,

principle at least allows the possibility of experiments

homogeneous

which

in living which require a specific context of non-

Green theorists fear that liberal-supported capitalism

human nature within which to operate, even if not

is setting in train, is an impoverished environment

all such experiments may be ones with which it

for persons, however materially well-off they may be.

would be in the moral interest of human beings to

This line of argument suggests that the personcentric

persist. To put the point in another way, the person-

version of liberalism developed above may be used to

centric argument for the variety of human cultures

formulate liberal reasons for moving away from un-

does not preclude moral criticism, and attempted

trammelled capitalism. In this respect, however, this

termination, of some of the experiments in living

version of liberalism has honourable antecedents

which natural variety makes possible.

technosphere,

of

the

kind

within the liberal tradition for many liberal theorists,

Thus from ecocentrism liberalism is able to ex-

from Mill to Rawls, have cast doubt upon the

tract an argument for claiming that human persons

necessary connection between the basic value pos-

would do well to maintain non-human nature in as

tulate of liberalism and the capitalist system.

rich and varied a form as possible, so as to provide

There is, however, a point critical of Green po-

the largest set of possibilities for contexts within

litical theory in general, and the `greened' person-

which human culture can find its significance and

centric version of liberalism in particular, which

resources. Since human culture as it has recently

emerges from these arguments for the diversity of

been developing has been extensively destroying

environments within non-human nature and the

non-person nature, human persons need to learn

diversity of cultures which they underpin. Such

to restrain their cultural acts so as not to cut off the

political theories, it may be claimed, seem them-

branch on which they are sitting. Human culture

selves to be aiming for a single, stable, ecologically

must limit itself so as to preserve itself, for only then

defensible cultural formation. Do not such theories,

can human persons guarantee their continued flour-

like all totalising ideologies, foreclose on certain

ishing as persons, which is the fundamental liberal

possibilities of human cultural development? Cannot

aim.

296

26

LIBERALISM, ECOCENTRISM AND PERSONS

Notes

1. Brian Barry (1995) and Marcel Wissenburg (1998) are

13. This, at least, is my understanding of what Kant is

the two contemporary liberal theorists who have most

saying in a notoriously difficult, though penetrating, discussion.

clearly shown an awareness of, and willingness to

14. It has been argued by, for example, Regan (1988) that

engage with, the arguments of Green political theor-

at least some non-human animals may be devoid of

ists. 2. See, for example, Nagel (1991), pp. 4±5: `The im-

rationality and thus autonomy, in the Kantian sense,

personal standpoint in each of us produces . . . a

and yet still be worthy of moral consideration. He

powerful demand for universal impartiality and equal-

argues that those animals which are `subjects of a life'

ity, while the personal standpoint gives rise to indi-

possess rights of the same sort and to the same degree

vidualistic motives and requirements which present

as do human beings. The concept of `preference

obstacles to the pursuit and realisation of ideals . . .

autonomy' applies to such creatures. Whatever the

My claim is that the problem of designing institutions

merits of this case it is clear, as Regan himself recog-

that do justice to the equal importance of all persons,

nises, that it extends the scope of human moral

without making unacceptable demands on indivi-

concern to only a relatively few members of the

duals, has not been solved ± and that this is so is

non-human realm. It also rests upon a concept of a

partly because for our world the problem of the right

`subject of a life' whose meaning and moral weight are

relation between the personal and impersonal stand-

likely to be highly controversial. Many may find it

points has not been solved.' The problem identified by

persuasive but it would be preferable if a concept of

Nagel is here supposed by him to arise with respect to

autonomy could be found which is applicable to non-

traditional political theories, but it plainly arises also

humans and which did not lend itself to being morally

for ecocentrism.

trumped by the Kantian concept of autonomy, involving rationality, which applies only to human beings

3. John O'Neill (1993, p. 159) offers an Aristotelian/

(as far as we know).

Marxist argument to connect individual human wellbeing and our capacity to appreciate disinterestedly

15. Eckersley (1992), pp. 61±3.

the intrinsic value of the natural world (as in scientific

16. See Naess (1989).

study of it, for example). The latter is claimed, cor-

17. Ibid., p. 54.

rectly I think, to be our characteristically human

18. I am here endorsing the general immanentist position

capacity and thus in exercising it we are at our most

in moral and political debate espoused, for example, by Walzer (1983), p. xiv.

fully and satisfyingly human. The argument, however, is open to the objection that, as Nagel has claimed, our

19. Different philosophers have stressed some of these

ability to ascend to the level at which we can view the

elements more than others. Self-interest and means-

world from the impersonal standpoint of morality and

end rationality (points (1) and (2)) were of particular

science is, for most of us, a fitful and fragile business.

importance to Hobbes and he gave a very specific

The arguments developed later in this chapter might

account of how (5) is possible and why it is necessary.

be seen as an attempt to connect the appreciation of

Self-consciousness and the differentiation of oneself

the intrinsic value of non-human nature with indivi-

from others were of great concern to Kant. Point (5)

dual human well-being in a more robust way, via the

was given a non-individualistic basis in Rousseau, a

conception of oneself as embedded in a culture. They

theme developed by Hegel and Marx and taken

are, therefore, intended as complementary to the

further in more recent socialist and conservative thinking.

Aristotelian/Marxist positions.

20. This is a theme at least as old as Rousseau's Discourse

4. Eckersley (1992), chapter 3. 5. Ibid., p. 49.

on the Origins of Inequality and has been the focus of

6. Ibid., pp. 63±71.

much of the discussion among recent communitarian theorists.

7. As one of the commentators on an earlier version of this chapter noted, Eckersley is herself critical of the

21. The allusion here is, of course, to Kant's attempt to

proposition that women are more `in tune' with

establish what is necessary for there to be the possi-

natural processes than men.

bility of experience. Here I try to establish what is necessary for there to be the possibility of culture.

8. Eckersley (1992), p. 54.

22. These claims may gain plausibility from the arguments

9. Ibid., p. 56. 10. Ibid., pp. 60±1.

put forward by P. F. Strawson to establish the logically

11. This point is attributed to Fox (1990), p. 172.

primitive nature of the concept of a person, in which a

12. Kant (1948), p. 91.

person is essentially conceived of as an entity to which

297

BRIAN BAXTER

both mental and physical attributes are to be ascribed.

tions, even though we cannot say in advance of an

See Strawson (1959).

analysis of a human community's mode of life (especially

23. This is the theme of Sir Ernst Gombrich's account of

the material culture) what those conditions will be (p.

the history of western visual art in terms of `schema-

174). Further, he makes a claim for the idea of an

and-correction', presented in Gombrich (1977).

environmental right to preserve the `ecological integrity

24. Rawls (1972), chapter 3.

of a sufficient geographical terrain for the living of that

25. Ted Benton has considered the claim that habitat

social life' (p. 175). These arguments are complementary

protection, while it may be necessary to preserve the

to my own, which might be regarded as furnishing

well-being of non-human animals, is not important in

reasons why even people who are not themselves mem-

the human case because the direct relations of causal

bers of a community whose culture is under threat may

dependency which link habitat conditions, patterns of

view such a threat as being directed towards them too.

social life and individual well-being in the case of non-

26. I would like to acknowledge the very helpful sugges-

human animals simply do not apply to humans (Benton,

tions made by Mark Evans concerning the revision of

1993, p. 174). He replies that human adaptability is

this chapter for the present volume. Any faults which

neither limitless nor devoid of definite causal condi-

remain are, of course, my own.

298

22

PROLEGOMENON TO A LIBERAL THEORY OF THE GOOD LIFE Mark Evans

in the basic principles to which anti-perfectionists

I

would restrict their concerns. He argues that being

The possibility and desirability of a perfectionist

autonomous is not sufficient to make a life good, for

liberalism, which encourages a liberal state to favour

autonomy must be exercised in pursuit of valuable

one or more conceptions of the `good' or `good life'

1

projects for it to have value. Believing that the

over others, has been much debated in contemporary

options from which people autonomously choose

political thought ever since John Rawls popularised

their projects are, in general, socially defined and

the opposing idea of liberalism as an essentially anti-

determined, Raz urges that to promote autonomy as a

perfectionist doctrine. Sometimes, the perfectionist

good, the liberal state may support those which are

case rests upon the claim that liberalism's funda-

indeed valuable.

mental political principles cannot be plausibly con-

responsibility, his theory has significantly challenged

ceptualised in abstraction from specific conceptions

anti-perfectionist liberalism's efforts to equate itself

about how it is good for people to live.

2

4

By offering liberal politics this

with liberalism in toto.

Alone, the

`conceptual inevitability' argument may not be en-

What is striking, though, about much of the

ough to win the day. Anti-perfectionists can admit

interest Raz has renewed in the idea of perfectionist

that liberal political principles unavoidably lean

liberalism is that the acceptance of engagement in

towards certain ideas of the good and away from

practice with certain conceptions of the good has not

others. But they view this bias with regret, as some-

been matched with a parallel examination of them in

thing to be avoided as far as possible when promoting

theory. He himself says little about which ideals a

3

Hence anti-perfec-

perfectionist liberal state might be inclined to fa-

tionism can be recast as a politics governed not by an

vour. Another liberal critique of anti-perfectionism,

liberalism's fundamental values.

5

implausible commitment to `total neutrality' but a

William Galston's Liberal Purposes, also strives to

tendency towards neutrality, going no further in fa-

restrict itself to a `minimal perfectionism', hardly

vouring particular good-life conceptions than is ne-

venturing

cessary to secure the basic liberal political values.

the good that anti-perfectionists might concede they

Perfectionist liberalism need not be so readily

beyond

need to make.

6

the

modal

assumptions

about

George Sher's Beyond Neutrality

rolled over, though. Joseph Raz, one of its most

develops an account of the good centred upon the

prominent followers, rejects `abstinence-where-pos-

pursuit and achievement of `near-universal and near-

sible' from good-life bias. He contends that a liberal

unavoidable goals' but it is noticeably reluctant to

state can and sometimes should actively promote

discuss in detail the possible content of these goals

certain good-life conceptions beyond those implicit

and their political ramifications. Peter Digeser's Our

7

299

MARK EVANS

Politics, Our Selves? puts forward a Raz-type case for

from it. It is hardly obvious, after all, that the mere

the liberal state actively supporting certain concep-

fact that liberals used to indulge thus is a compelling

tions of the ideal self to aid individuals' `self-crafting'

reason for their descendants to do so today.

but once more provides little clue as to which of such

Contemporary perfectionist liberals are likely to

conceptions might be worthy of the liberal state's

share with anti-perfectionists a much deeper sensi-

support.

8

tivity to human diversity than we find among their

It is almost as if an extreme caution in deliberating

predecessors, who typically operated with detailed

upon the nature of the good life as a political

metaphysical beliefs about human nature which

concern, which is turned into a regulatory political

enabled such confident talk about the good life's

principle by anti-perfectionists, also overcomes per-

composition. Given this sensitivity, such determi-

fectionist liberal theorising. The oddity of this char-

nate and prescriptive beliefs are now much more

acteristic can be more fully appreciated when one

difficult to entertain. Perfectionists don't go as far as

looks back at earlier liberals such as John Stuart Mill,

anti-perfectionists in using `diversity' as a reason for

T. H. Green, Leonard Hobhouse or John Dewey.

avoiding `good-life favouritism' in politics. But they

These thinkers offered substantive views on how it

might nevertheless be reluctant to theorise concep-

was good to lead one's life which they freely inter-

tions of the good because of a doubt that any theory

wove with their political reflections. The sharp

could meaningfully identify specific ideals in abstrac-

disjunction between political thinking and reflec-

tion from the myriad options that are actually avail-

tions upon ideals of personal conduct, which char-

able in society. Perhaps the good life is something

acterises so much contemporary liberal theory, is

that is pluralistic in content, or heavily determined

noticeably absent in many of its forebears.

by particular social context and hence capable of

Although it will be suggested that they should

formulation only by those to whom it applies as they

decline to follow such precedents to the letter, this

reflect upon their own circumstances. On this view,

chapter urges that today's perfectionist liberals can

there would be little for philosophers to say about the

and should seek to retrieve something of this tradi-

good life which would carry any weight over and

tion's spirit (thus it grants the perfectionist case as its

above the citizenry's deliberations. This might lead

starting point). It hopes to encourage a conversation

perfectionists towards what can be called a formal or

about the good as something that liberals shouldn't

`open-textured' perfectionism, which is deliberately

be afraid to join for fear of being thought `illiberal',

not given much content a priori. Instead, it specifies

`arbitrary', `authoritarian' or worse. It proposes some

the form of the good in highly abstract, generalised

elements of a perfectionist ideal that they could

terms alone, rendering it compatible with highly

support, defending their liberal credentials and in-

diverse substantive embodiments which individuals

dicating the role that liberal politics might play in

or groups must formulate for themselves. Those who

promoting them. As a prolegomenon, the chapter

adopt this approach may therefore insist that their

can do no more than indicate some of the possibi-

distinction from anti-perfectionism largely comes in

lities here (hence no irony should be read into the

their practice, not the content of their theories. For

skimpiness of what is proposed!). But if its sugges-

the diversity-sensitive open-textured perfectionist,

tions seem fruitful, it can perhaps energise a more

the most naturally liberal option could then be a

complete and rigorous discussion of the type that has

`democratic perfectionism' which would leave the

unfortunately and unnecessarily become alien to

deliberation over, and choice of, the perfectionist

contemporary liberalism.

ideal's content to the political arena itself. As Raz notes,

9

it is not difficult to appreciate how

liberals might be swayed by these intuitions. But they

II

are not strong enough to render it inappropriate for

Before explaining how to rehabilitate good-life the-

liberal political theory to formulate and examine

orising in liberalism, we should reflect upon the

candidates for perfectionist promotion. Even if we

possible reasons why perfectionist liberals shy away

accept (as this chapter does) that the choice of

300

PROLEGOMENON TO A LIBERAL THEORY OF THE GOOD LIFE

whether to pursue perfectionist policies, and which

ceptions that all in the relevant domain could

ones, if so, should be left to a democratic process, it is

accept. Now, as indicated above, PL often contends

only when political theory is thought to be solely in

that principles of liberal justice are not obtainable

the business of identifying what principles must be

from anything other than a substantively, distinc-

adopted by the state that the case for abstinence from

tively liberal conception of the good. However, it is

perfectionist enquiries seems compelling. Yet not

still possible and certainly desirable for it to preserve

even theorists of justice, the staple diet of all liberal

some morally and politically relevant distinction

political thought, necessarily view the fruits of their

between `justice' and `the good' in the following

deliberations as claiming to be compulsory. Some of

sense. Principles of liberal justice have the specific

them, at least, also restrict themselves to theorising

function of organising basic social and political

what principles of justice might be adopted by a

institutions and if they unavoidably express certain

liberal-democratic

that

assumptions about how it is good to live, these

there could be reasonable alternatives which might

nevertheless pertain to what are deemed to be

citizenry.

They 10

recognise

They do not

people's `essential' interests (and it is the business

think that their function is to prejudge, and circum-

of a theory of justice to propose what these may be).

vent the need for, citizens' own choices.

Because they are `essential' the principles that these

be embraced with equal validity.

So in the way that theorists of justice use political

interests prompt have first claim on the state's

theory to articulate and analyse the candidate con-

attentions. Familiarly, liberals generally assume that

ceptions of justice to be offered up for approval or

people's primary interest lies at least partly in being

rejection by citizens themselves, I contend that

equally free and hence they prioritise a scheme of

perfectionist liberal political theory can also propose

basic liberties. But they regard these principles as

and scrutinise the possible candidate conceptions of

providing only a framework of rules rather than what

the good which might be presented as political

Rawls calls a `comprehensive doctrine' which orien-

options. To sketch one such candidate we need to

tates activity in many more, if not all, aspects of

clarify the main concepts it will employ. We must

individual and social life.

then attempt to characterise its possible content in a fashion

which

has

substantive

implications

11

The `gaps' in the framework can be filled by

(i.e.

conceptions of the good, which may be thought of

leading to both a theory and a practice which is

as those ideals of how an individual might conduct

bolder on good-life questions than anti-perfection-

her life, which projects to adopt and/or character-

ism and the cautious perfectionisms described ear-

istics/virtues to acquire within the boundaries of

lier) but yet performs the delicate balancing act of

justice. Qua liberal, PL will not prioritise its favour-

remaining faithful to the liberal ethos.

itism in good-life ideals over the need to secure justice. But it rejects the idea that the politics of liberal justice automatically rules out all perfectionist

III

concerns.

One way of thinking about the structure of a perfec-

We now need to consider what kind of perfection-

tionist liberalism (hereafter: `PL') is to reflect upon

ism a liberal might consistently adopt. Here, it helps

how it might diverge from anti-perfectionist liberal-

to think about how a liberal might understand

ism (`APL'). APL is typically constructed by sharply

`perfectionism'. The term has been used in confus-

distinguishing `conceptions of the good' and what we

ingly vague and varied ways. It can be `tightly'

can call the `principles of liberal justice', those

defined as a doctrine which holds the pursuit of

fundamental values that a liberal state is centrally

human perfection or excellence (however that may

concerned to enforce. This distinction relies upon

be understood) to be the object of morality. A

some version of the belief that the moral basis of the

slightly slacker definition drops the exacting notion

latter can be intelligibly described as being drawn not

of perfection and describes the goal to be the devel-

from any particular conception of the good alone but

opment of human beings' potentials and capacities to

from something impartial with respect to such con-

a full and flourishing degree (again variously under-

301

MARK EVANS

12

Contemporary liberal debate has tended to

other social influences already and inevitably exer-

use the term more loosely still to denote a doctrine

cised upon it. Consequently, a view of power which

which simply advocates the promotion of a specific

admits that its effects can be `constitutive' and not

ideal, or set of ideals, of how it is good to live (with

just `repressive' would seem to be an invaluable

no necessary reference to either `perfection' or `flour-

conceptual tool for this type of theory.

ishing').

to remove the automatic link between the exercise of

stood).

14

It helps

Although we are proceeding with the assumption

power in the application of perfectionist policy and

that PL will have more to say about the good than

the idea that it is necessarily an act of repression, a

the potentially vacuous notion of an `open-textured'

link which might otherwise make liberals altogether

perfectionism, to retain its liberal identity it still has

more suspicious of the perfectionist case.

to be in some way organised around a respect for human diversity. We shouldn't expect it to be overly

IV

detailed in its prescriptions and thus the loose definition is probably the most appropriate (although, as

My candidate PL initially divides its concerns into

I will later suggest, ideas of `flourishing' are not

two. I call them `self-pertaining' and `other-pertain-

necessarily absent). PL's ideals are also likely only

ing' issues, distinguishing them from the terminology

to be `partially comprehensive' (again following

of `self-regarding' and `other-regarding' acts which is

Rawls

13

popularly used to explicate Mill's famous harm prin-

), declining to provide a complete, rigorously

15

specific blueprint for all areas of life but focusing

ciple.

instead only upon certain aspects raised in the

potential concern to the state, whereas the politics of

question of how to live well.

PL has an interest in both self-pertaining and other-

The latter isolates what is and what is not of

Two final points before sketching a candidate PL.

pertaining acts. By `pertaining', then, I do not mean

A potential misapprehension concerning the perfec-

to identify aspects of life which in some way are

tionist project is that it necessarily posits a universal

either `of (political) concern' only to `self' or of

ideal of the good, which is said to hold true invar-

`others' too. Rather, a question about a `self-pertain-

iantly and without regard to time or place. It will be

ing' aspect of life relates to how one is living one's life

clear, though, that many of my examples of PL's

regardless of its effect on others. That's not to say a

concerns look very culturally specific. I suggest, then,

self-pertaining aspect of life doesn't affect others and

that even if we wish to retain universalist application

nor does it mean that others may not raise legitimate

for principles of liberal justice (which not all liberals

concerns about its effect upon them. If I ask the

wish to do anyway) it would seem appropriate to

question `is X a good thing to do?' part of the answer

make any perfectionist elements of a liberal doctrine

may well rest upon the effect that X has on others.

much more context-sensitive and localised.

But part of it can also refer simply to what good it

Secondly, recognition of cultural variability plus

does to the self alone ± and this is the self-pertaining

an acknowledgement of the role that socialisation

dimension.

plays in the adoption of lifestyles strongly indicates

This aspect can be illustrated by thinking about

that PL rests upon a theory of the self that stresses its

the following: whether to work hard to gain quali-

malleability, or plasticity, over any intrinsic or es-

fications and get a good job or reject hard work for a

sential features. Instead, the self can be seen as much

life of indolent pleasure; whether to produce and/or

less determinately constituted in its intrinsic nature,

consume great poetry or pornography in the privacy

awaiting instead the imprint of a culture for identity-

of your own home; whether physically to live health-

formation. PL therefore assumes that politics has

ily rather than unhealthily; whether to be a well-

some legitimate interest in influencing the forces

informed citizen willing and able to exercise one's

of socialisation that shape the self. Political inter-

political rights competently, or know nothing about

vention to encourage alternative influences upon the

politics and care even less; whether to live in squalor

construction of one's character need not be seen as

or cleanliness; whether to lead a life that is harmo-

qualitatively distinct in any significant way from the

niously and happily balanced between work and play

302

PROLEGOMENON TO A LIBERAL THEORY OF THE GOOD LIFE

or in which work is so onerous that life is constantly

activities which do not fundamentally harm those

stressful; whether to regard sex as an activity to be

who `witness' them in a way that would make them

engaged in freely and lovingly or as a commodity to

matters for justice. In these instances people suffer no

be bought and sold; whether to live a life of drug-

physical injury and their own ability to choose their

induced stupor or alert and lively mental sobriety.

own conception of the good need not be fundamen-

Although all of these pairings may display other-

tally impugned, for example. Instead, they suffer

pertaining aspects, particularly when questions of

`offence', `embarrassment', `revulsion' or otherwise

justice are involved (for example if the pornography

experience such activities as unwelcome nuisances.

in question is paedophiliac), PL can also reflect upon

PL proposes that what effect they do have may

them as questions about the intrinsic quality of how

nevertheless warrant state intervention.

16

one's life is conducted, regardless of the effect upon

Perhaps under the influence of the general ten-

others, when justice is no longer at issue (unlike

dency to neutrality, the `other-pertaining' category

APL, whose political concern ceases at this point).

has been drastically under-theorised in much recent

PL is concerned first to specify those respects in

liberalism and it might therefore immediately strike

which politics may legitimately influence the life-

some liberals as too counter-intuitive to be some-

styles that people live from the self-pertaining per-

thing with which they should engage. But quite apart

spective, and then to propose some principles by

from the fact that this category is present in some

which the value of various ways of life might be

extremely influential members of the wider liberal

determined.

tradition,

17

I think that its neglect is extraordinarily

`Other-pertaining' aspects of life are identified

blinkered in another way. For it is a category that is

solely with the effect that they have on others. PL

familiarly operationalised as law in actual liberal-

identifies which ones may rightfully become matters

democratic states. Whatever is or is not tolerated in

of political concern, again proposing standards by

purely private conduct, all such states will regulate

which to evaluate the effects to determine whether

non-harmful conduct in public spheres and spaces to

they should be permitted, regulated or prevented

a greater degree. To take one simple example: what-

where possible. As we shall see, the kinds of beha-

ever sexual conduct is permissible in private, nearly

viour which might pertain to others are not simply

all of it is prohibited as a public performance. And I

what might `harm' them, which is the criterion for

think most liberals (including, if they are honest,

Mill's `other-regarding' acts. Let us assume that these

anti-perfectionists) would regard the existence of

are largely covered by the principles of justice. PL

some such restrictions as a good thing.

proposes that there are other respects in which

I am not invoking the crass argument that what-

people might justifiably expect or require certain

ever is actually done by liberal-democratic states

forms of behaviour from each other and in which

must therefore be permitted by liberals' political

PL may grant politics a stake.

theory (plenty of such states' activities are unsanc-

To illustrate this second aspect, think of the

tioned and indeed condemned by the theory). But I

following: drunken and foul-mouthed behaviour in

am arguing that the fact that we have this category in

the streets; public billboards displaying hard-core

political practice is a very strong prima facie reason for

pornography; playing music very loudly at the ex-

thinking that liberals can and should embrace it

pense of neighbourhood peace and quiet; advertising

theoretically. I suggest most liberals believe that

work in the sex industry as a career opportunity in

there are certain things which can be said and done

job centres and school career offices; running a

in private which, even though they do not `harm'

workshop in your own garage which generates un-

anyone, are rightfully prohibited in public. They

pleasant though not noxious or toxic smells that

don't want the state to forbid your viewing of ob-

nevertheless disgust your neighbours; engaging in

scene material in your front room, your nudist pro-

sexual intercourse on the upper deck of a crowded

clivities in the kitchen and your boorish, foul-

bus.

mouthed drunkenness when you're at a friend's

Let us grant that there are instances of such

house. But they do want it to forbid you from putting

303

MARK EVANS

your obscene photos on a public billboard, from

informed yet have not been willing to change their

walking naked up and down the high street or from

unhealthy ways.

being

drunkenly

foul-mouthed

at

the

bus

stop.

Transferring these activities into the public realm

2. A conception of psychological well-being

is what makes these acts of rightful concern to others. PL can therefore articulate a theory of `acceptable

Whereas it may be relatively easy to identify how it is

public conduct' (very generally understood) to help

good to live in terms of physical health given the

identify what should fall into this category.

availability of objective information on the subject,

Overall, then, PL seeks to support ways of life

it may be more difficult to do so with regard to some

that are `dignified' or `decent', `worthwhile' or `ful-

questions

filling'. The ideal to inform this commitment could

might agree that there are certain psychological

take one or both of the following forms: (a) a

disorders which can be diagnosed, the broader no-

conception of what is good for people, specifically

tion of the `ideal state of mind' is likely to be

to encourage its adoption; (b) a conception of what

altogether more nebulous and variable than `ideal

is bad in people's conduct of their lives (`undigni-

physical condition' is for any one individual. I do not

fied', `shameful', `worthless', `unfulfilling') to discou-

therefore envisage PL being too prescriptive in this

pursuit.

This

obviously

implies

psychological

health.

Although

we

by

regard (avoiding such banalities as `everyone should

counterposition some notion of what is good for

be happy and carefree!' It would be absurd to have a

people, but it could be compatible with various

state that campaigned against sullenness in the same

conceptions of the good life and is thus perhaps

way it campaigned against poor diet). However,

not as tightly prescriptive as (a).

there is some opportunity for it to posit certain

rage

its

of

psychological conditions which it is not good for people to experience and which its policies may

V

sensibly address.

It is now time to begin delivering on the promise to

Here is just one example to illustrate this possi-

sketch some definite content for PL. Here are three

bility. A wearily familiar refrain of many free-market

possible components.

libertarians in particular over recent years has been that the culture of competition in contemporary capitalist society, which has left people increasingly

1. The conception of physical well-being

insecure in their jobs and often having to work ever

Liberal justice may invoke an obligation to provide

harder to try to keep them, is nevertheless a good

adequate health care for all regardless of circum-

thing. They argue that such pressure increases pro-

stances, but it does not demand that the state make

ductive efficiency and hence brings material benefits

everyone healthy. Nevertheless, the liberal state can

to the economy. On this view it is good for employ-

(and often does) campaign to promote physical well-

ees in the sense that they are compelled to become

being, even though many people's conceptions of the

more `effective' in their work.

good life (smoking, drinking, prolonged sunbathing,

Leaving aside the arguments that such employ-

unprotected promiscuous sex, sloth) may be (some-

ment trends do not unambiguously increase produc-

times knowingly) to their physical detriment. PL can

tive

affirm that people ought to be free to determine how

questions about the quality of life are raised in these

to manage their own health, but it proposes that the

practices regardless of their material effectiveness. It

state has a legitimate interest in informing people of

could conceptualise some elements of ideal psycho-

the desirability of physically healthy lifestyles.

18

efficiency,

PL

could

maintain

that

serious

The

logical well-being to identify as undesirable certain

state may judge that ignorance over health matters

levels of stress which, for example, exacerbate feel-

leads too many people to misjudge what is good for

ings of alienation and distress, and destroy the

them. PL allows it to propagandise for healthy life-

capacity for a well-balanced personality to flourish

styles even with respect to people who are adequately

(not least if longer working hours in such a stressful

304

PROLEGOMENON TO A LIBERAL THEORY OF THE GOOD LIFE

environment disable a person from properly experi-

Pupils are not only educated in certain academic

encing life's other facets). Thus, (2) could be in-

disciplines; they are also schooled (if often only

voked as at least part of the justification for policies

indirectly) in specific norms of conduct. Well-man-

which attempt to regulate working practices against

nered,

the interests of `economic efficiency.'

authority . . . a whole set of virtues and vices are

cooperative,

trustworthy,

respectful

of

assumed in the ways they are expected to behave. When we focus on the increasingly popular notion of

3. The ethical character-ideal

civic education in particular,

This is the third and most broad category, which

19

we can see this

project coalescing around a character-ideal of `good

specifies ethical standards by which it is thought

citizen' as being the intended end-product.

good for people to live. This can be subdivided into

Now APL can reconcile itself to the idea of en-

at least five (interlinkable) categories:

couraging such characteristics in so far as they are valuable for strictly political ends alone. It might also

1. the virtues and skills which facilitate the re-

reluctantly admit that fitting people for liberal politics

quirements of good citizenship;

could have knock-on or overspill effects upon other

2. the virtues and skills which facilitate autono-

spheres of life.

20

Thus teaching tolerance and equality

of respect for the political arena might introduce the

my;

3. the qualities which comprise an appropriately

exercise of such virtues in people's private relation-

fulfilling life for humans to lead;

ships. On my conception, PL might not do much more

4. the virtues which constitute admirable character

than APL to promote good citizenship but it may not

and the qualities which constitute a dignified

have the same degree of reluctance about its overspill.

life (`a life fit for a person to lead');

It could regard it as good and justifiable for a politically

5. The requirements that constitute socially ac-

mandated programme of civic education to encourage

ceptable conduct.

the development not just of good (tolerant, fairminded and reasonable) citizens but good people in

I treat (2) ± (4) as largely self-pertaining matters; (1)

general, who display the virtues of good citizenship in

and (5) identify other-pertaining issues, though both

all their dealings with others.

draw upon, and have consequences for, the self-

Of course, it would be desperately naive to expect

pertaining too.

education to yield exactly the same type of good

The first two categories might be thought of as

citizen/person in all children. Nor, in all probability,

those which primarily constitute the kind of char-

should PL even want it to or regret that it does not.

acter-ideal which is most directly favoured by liberal

We might be pleased at the fact that no such method

principles of justice (the conception of the good from

of socialisation is going to avoid the production of

which perfectionists might argue such principles are

highly diverse characters, some of whom will be rude,

necessarily drawn). Category (1) specifies the virtues

dishonest, ruthless, uncooperative and so on. It is a

± the ideal dispositions and characteristics ± that are

good thing that we don't have a society in which all

required by citizens to discharge the social role of

such vices have been knocked out in one's youth

citizenship well: civility, toleration, fair-mindedness,

(quite apart from the value of variety, maybe many

cooperativeness, among others. PL may hold that, in

necessary and great things can only be done by

its ideal of politics, public affairs should always be

people who display what we would ordinarily think

conducted with such virtues to the fore (and its ethic

of as unwelcome characteristics: ruthlessness, say).

can be the basis for attacking political conduct which

But still, this does not mean there is no moral worth

fails to exhibit them). But the liberal state would

or practical point in schools seeking to set such

have the largest scope for directly promoting virtue-

examples. There is no paradox in attempting to

based forms of conduct in the kind of education it

impart some character-ideals generally even when

provides for its children and it is on this matter that I

it is not necessarily to be regretted that some will not

shall restrict my comments regarding this category.

live by them.

305

MARK EVANS

Promoting autonomy (Category (2)) requires the

PL to take up such options. If people want to live

encouragement of both the taste and the aptitude for

lazy, slovenly lives passively consuming vast quan-

autonomous choosing, and the provision of a social

tities of lager whilst watching pornographic videos,

environment which facilitates it. PL could accept

the state cannot forbid them to do so (it need not

that the perfectionist liberal state should tolerate

subsidise them, though; if people have no source of

some ways of life which are not grounded in auton-

income but welfare payments, the liberal state may

omy and, in the name of providing a variety of

require them actively to look for work, or undertake

options, even allow it actively to sponsor some of

training programmes, to qualify for such benefits).

them (for we mustn't assume that the state cannot

One

equally support mutually incompatible forms of life for individuals

21

consideration

in

identifying

what

might

count as a valuable option is provided by Category

). But its preference for autonomy

(3). This retrieves from many prominent currents in

implies the possibility that it views these as less good

the liberal tradition the idea that the good life for

ways of living (note this is crucially distinct from

humans is one spent developing their potentials and

viewing them as bad, even though it does not adopt a

capacities. PL could favour activities that are devel-

relativist or sceptical approach to how lifestyles

opmental (creative, intellectual, physically demand-

might

ing)

be

evaluated).

Non-autonomous

lifestyles

rather

than

enervating.

Once

again,

it

is

may have a harder battle to survive than their

primarily in education that the perfectionist liberal

autonomous counterparts in a perfectionist liberal

state is most likely to be able to act in support of this

society where people are encouraged to choose for

ideal. It could, for example, attempt to gear a curri-

themselves. But this is not something that PL ne-

culum towards the development of a wide range of

cessarily regrets.

22

intellectual, creative, aesthetic, emotional and phy-

Realistically, PL must recognise that autonomy is

sical capacities well beyond the functional require-

always `bounded' in numerous ways: choices are

ments

inescapably limited by one's context. For example,

transferable skills'), the kind of economic imperative

in societies where one generally has to get a job to

that may come to inform education if the state does

live a minimally decent life, employment opportu-

not take care otherwise. Category (3) may also

nities are often severely restricted in particular loca-

facilitate a critique of the wider social and cultural

tions and contexts (if they are available at all).

environment to ascertain whether it is encouraging

Practical limitations may mean that an autonomous

or frustrating the development of individuals in

good life is always going to be a matter of degree and/

desirable directions. It may thus provide the grounds

or

mean,

for a radical condemnation of a culture that, say,

though, that one must always accept whatever lim-

fosters banality and stifles creativity and fulfilment.

episodic

in

character.

That

does

not

of

a

`flexible

labour

market'

(`personal

itations happen to pertain. Some of the restrictions upon people's choices may be intolerable and PL's

VI

theory could therefore provide a guide to identify situations in which autonomy has become unaccep-

Category (4) has close links to Category (1), in

tably restricted. I discuss an example of this in

which it was argued that PL would welcome the

section VII.

overspill of the good-citizenship virtues into people's

An important corollary of this function is that PL

characters

more

generally.

The

notion

of

what

can strive to widen and secure a range of valuable

counts as an `admirable character' could, then, sim-

options from which people may choose their auton-

ply build upon what is implicit in the citizenship

omous projects. This is the policy made familiar to us

character-ideal. It is potentially very wide, ranging

by Raz, whose perfectionism largely concentrates on

across large sets of ideal dispositions and character-

the possibility that the state can subsidise various

istics. To specify its content PL could, for example,

kinds of activity and lifestyle deemed to be worthy of

follow Joel Feinberg in drawing upon Hume's four-

people's support (particularly when they may struggle

fold categorisation of features which are (a) pleasing

to survive without such help).

23

to us; (b) pleasing to others; (c) useful to us; (d)

No one is forced by

306

PROLEGOMENON TO A LIBERAL THEORY OF THE GOOD LIFE

useful to others (inverting each to obtain the set of

he conducted himself in these self-pertaining matters

vices which could be discouraged). PL would then

was widely thought to have been a poor example to

think it, on balance, good for people to be, say, clean

set to the nation and that the public had a right to

rather than dirty ((a)); tactful and tolerant rather

expect his behaviour, qua the leading public official,

than rude and insensitive ((b)); prudent and moti-

to be better. His adultery, lying to his family and the

vated to better oneself rather than reckless or in-

American people, the inappropriateness of the re-

dolent ((c)); trustworthy and cooperative rather

lationship with a very junior employee barely older

than deceitful and unreliable ((d)) ± the list could

than his own daughter: these are not illegal activ-

go on.

24

ities, but a certain widely shared conception of the

Now as ideals for conduct in spheres of life

good nevertheless condemned them, and deemed

stretching well beyond the political, these features

them particularly improper for the leading figure

may appear to be of no possible concern to any

in public life.

liberal politics ± beyond, again, the kinds of char-

We might have been similarly condemnatory of

acteristics that state-sponsored education may try to

such behaviour if Clinton had been the chief ex-

inculcate in children. Certainly, liberals would find

ecutive of a burger bar company. But it is not clear

ridiculous the idea of a state enforcing rules requiring

that citizens have the same legitimate expectation of

any such behaviour. But it is far from clear that an

ethical conduct from someone who does not hold

ethic governing such matters is and/or ought to be

public office. Of course it is true that people are

wholly absent from liberalism's political morality. To

nowadays very cynical about politicians' motiva-

explain just one possible reason why, we can add a

tions, suspecting (sometimes rightly) some hypocri-

sub-category to (4): (4a) The ethical standards of public

tical Machiavellianism behind their protestations of

officials.

virtue. Also, too much genuine moral sincerity from

This issue has received practically no attention in

their mouths can eventually sound just tiresomely

contemporary liberalism, but it points to what I take

sanctimonious and PL can recognise that the realities

to be a familiar way in which liberal politics may

of political life may well make it no place for moral

serve to promote substantive ethical character-ideals.

saints. But the very fact that there is a widespread

It entails the identification of standards of conduct

cynicism about the moral quality of political life

which, though their opposites are not to be legally

seems to imply some wish that it should really be

proscribed, it is right for citizens to expect their

more virtuous, and PL could give voice to that wish.

public officials in particular to exhibit. These func-

If it is therefore thought right that political repre-

tionaries have a responsibility, if not a duty, to

sentatives should display certain forms of conduct

support these ideals. If they fail to live up to them,

and avoid others to set suitable ethical examples in a

they set inappropriate examples of self-pertaining

way that would not be so publicly expected of the

behaviour to those whom they serve. The facts that

boss of McClinton's, then political theory may have

they can be condemned for doing so and that citizens

a legitimately vested interest in scrutinising this

have some legitimate expectation that they should

specifically political concern. PL can posit possible

not behave thus give credence to the idea of a self-

ideals to inform these expectations of conduct.

pertaining morality being a proper object of political concern.

To conclude this section, I offer just a few remarks

25

on the concept of a `dignified' life which was in-

Popular reactions to the revelations concerning

cluded in Category (4). I treat this as distinguishable

President Clinton's relationship with Monica Le-

from the notion of having an admirable character

winsky illustrate this claim well. It is doubtless true

and, again, it would be surprising if liberals of any

that the charge of perjury, which led to Clinton's

hue ± if they reflected hard on their ethical commit-

impeachment and which is primarily a matter of

ments ± would want to resist adopting some such

criminal justice, is what concerned people upper-

notion to put to political work. PL merely embraces

most.

26

this commitment openly and seeks to articulate it

Many people thought that his personal life

fully.

did not affect his ability to govern. But still, the way

307

MARK EVANS

It is best illustrated by an example of Sher's: that of

typically sexual ± that are other-pertaining even

drug addicts, living from fix to fix in excrement-

when no one else directly witnesses it (they think

stained squalor, hopelessly dependent upon their

it permissible legally to prohibit certain kinds of

dealers who ruthlessly take sexual advantage of

consensual sexual activity even when done in the

them.

27

privacy of one's own home because society's moral

Of course there may be questions of severe

fabric is supposedly damaged by them

injustice in this situation which take priority in its

28

).

condemnation. PL could also attack it for the loss of

In its self-pertaining deliberations, we have seen

autonomy and opportunities for leading a genuinely

that PL offers some recommendations as to how

fulfilled life. But on top of all this (if we are talking

politics might encourage or discourage people to live

about rich addicts who continually affirm an auton-

privately in certain ways. But questions of legal

omous desire both to take drugs and experience all

prohibition have not here been broached. Only

that their effects entail), it could also judge such a life

when certain activities move into the public realm

to be simply too degrading, undignified and unfit for

are they raised ± and this is a crucial part of what

humans to live. And, in self-pertaining judgements,

makes this a liberal conception. In so far as other-

it could employ this distinctive ethic of dignity in

pertaining judgements inform permissible restric-

campaigns against its adoption.

tions and prohibitions, it is largely informed by a conception of how it is bad to live and act in the public realm. Sometimes this draws upon self-per-

VII

taining judgements about how it is good and bad to

Finally, Category (5). Here we should recall that

live for oneself. At other times, it is only the location

other-pertaining judgements refer to phenomena

of the activity in the public realm that generates any

which become political concerns because of how

negative evaluation of it. Given that sexual conduct

they affect other people in terms other than the harm

is a significant topic in PL's morality, we can use

they may cause them. Often, their effect is sufficient

some examples of such to illustrate this point.

to justify legal restraint of the activity in question.

With one important potential exception to be

We have already rehearsed the argument that it is

explained shortly I take it that PL would, in general,

consistent and desirable for PL to address other-

have nothing to say about any form of private

pertaining questions, but is there a distinctively

consensual adult sexual activity that did not pose

liberal way of isolating which issues they may ad-

physical dangers to anyone else. But questions of

dress? In other words, can PL identify them in a way

public offence are clearly raised as far as sex in public

that would distinguish the liberal from non-liberal

is concerned. Thus, part of PL's concern in Category

approaches?

(5) is to identify those types of activity which,

Here is an inadequately brief reply which hope-

although all well and good in private, are wholly

fully is enough to suggest a distinctively liberal slant

inappropriate in public such that their public per-

to this issue. Although it has been the subject of

formance may rightfully be punished.

much conceptual attack, the classical distinction

The important exception provides an example

between public and private realms of life can remain

where a self-pertaining judgement is made about

operational for liberals in a very obvious way. Activ-

an act which directly contributes towards the for-

ities done without the presence of non-participating

mulation of an other-pertaining judgement about

others (in one's own home, paradigmatically) are

that act when publicly performed. This is when

private in the way that the same activities done in

sex is treated as a commodity, engaged in not for

the high street ± publicly ± are not. On this con-

love or pleasure but for money: prostitution and

ception, PL holds that other-pertaining activities

pornographic modelling. Let us leave aside the very

have to be public: they really can or do physically

real problems of injustice in the plight of the (often

confront other people who otherwise have no part in

very poor) women in the sex industry, which PL

them. This is distinguished from those conservative

could happily admit removes any grounds for con-

views which argue that there are private activities ±

demning the women. But this is not to say it cannot

308

PROLEGOMENON TO A LIBERAL THEORY OF THE GOOD LIFE

condemn the kind of work they do and this is where

against whom some might take offence. I may be as

a self-pertaining judgement drawn from an ethic of

disgusted at the sight of people wearing orange flared

dignity, as suggested in (4), might be made.

trousers and open-toed sandals as others are at the

Consider a woman who is forced by economic

sight of explicit sexual imagery, but PL's ethic is what

circumstance into prostitution. Aside from the jus-

identifies my sartorial tastes as inappropriate for the

tice questions, the `dignity' issue can feature in the

legally controllable category of public offence.

following way. Most of us basically have to sell our labour-power to live and many may have little

VIII

meaningful choice as to what kind of job can be taken. This is an important way in which autonomy

Of course, all of this ± and particularly, I suspect,

is always constrained, as observed in section V. Yet if

some of the suggestions in the previous section ± is

the only option for an unemployed woman in a job

eminently contestable. And it is right that it should

market is to become a secretary or a clerk, we might

be so. It should be recalled, after all, that this theory

regret the lack of choice but not consider that any

was not designed to settle questions that are in fact

truly damaging harm has been done to her dignity as

only properly decidable in the political realm itself.

a human being. However, if the only option left was

But this chapter has been designed to show that it is

to fall into prostitution, then a liberal is much more

appropriate for perfectionist liberals not only to raise

likely to judge that her life choices had become

these questions but to venture some answers, elabor-

unacceptably limited and that there was something

ating the assumptions upon which they are offered

wrong with the socio-economic system that had left

and attempting to structure them into a coherent

her with such dismal prospects. This is where the

ethical outlook. In so doing, it has hopefully forced

ethic of dignity informs an ethically and politically

liberals to think harder about some of the ways in

crucial evaluation.

which ethical judgements of this kind are made in practice and to evaluate for themselves whether ±

Now for the way in which this self-pertaining judgement feeds into other-concerned legal restric-

despite

tions on the sex industry. Imagine that PL follows

prompt them to think ± it is in fact desirable for

what

the

tendency

to

neutrality

might

many liberals in thinking it desirable more fully to

liberals to preserve them in their theorising.

decriminalise prostitution and pornography for prag-

Still, it would be naive not to admit that serious

matic reasons. In such instances, it would still hardly

reservations may remain about the whole project.

require liberals to think it now acceptable to have

There is no space to address them all, but I conclude

explicitly pornographic advertising billboards, broth-

with a few remarks in PL's defence. I have not

els in any part of a town (next to an infant school or

claimed that my version of PL is the only way of

old people's home?) and advertisements for the sex

characterising a liberal theory of the good life, so the

industry in school careers centre advice packs and

conversation I advocate might well lead away from

Job Centre vacancy boards. For PL, there may re-

some of the elements I have proposed. For example, I

main something in the ethical quality of prostitution

can well envisage an argument holding that the gist

and pornography, marking them out as less than fully

of the comments concerning the sex industry reflect

dignified, which justifies their exclusion from the

an unnecessarily ± illiberal? ± `prudish' attitude,

immediate, unavoidable public realm in which we all

unfairly denigrating its work. I am happy to concede

necessarily move. That lack of ethical quality gen-

the conversation on this matter is far from over.

erates sufficient offence for many to desire not to

But one might also object that part of liberalism's

have to encounter it against their wishes in public. It

very point has been to try to reduce the state's

is this perfectionist liberal ethic that says it is right for

interest in such apparently paternalist matters and

the law to try to spare us all (not just children and old

that PL threatens a dangerously reactionary reversal

ladies) the sight of streetwalkers, kerb crawlers and

of this trend. Of course it is true that liberalism has

images of explicit sex on billboards or prime-time

mounted frontal assaults on many of the taboos and

television, but not other types of person and activity

conformist norms that permeated western cultures

309

MARK EVANS

until fairly recently. Yet it is wrong to conclude from

justify APL. Of course PL could be abused but then

this that liberalism, as many of its enemies often

so can, for example, the democratic ideal itself. Many

charge, is necessarily committed to abolishing all

dictatorships have co-opted `democracy' to `justify'

such standards and expectations of behaviour. Lib-

the most terrible tyranny, but we don't regard this as

eralism is certainly a politics of toleration ± but one is

sufficient reason to abandon the ideal, only to be

usually said to tolerate when one puts up with some-

more vigilant about its operation. And the dangers of

thing that one doesn't much like. This therefore

PL's abuse can be lessened precisely through the

assumes a standard of evaluation in itself, which PL

careful theorisation of conceptions of the good,

can articulate. And I have argued that liberalism

rather than abandoning the matter in its entirety

need not be (and in practice is not) open-endedly

to whatever instant, perhaps vulgarly prejudicial,

tolerant; there are limits. Such perfectionist judge-

opinions might be thrown into democratic debate.

ments are familiarly operationalised in political prac-

A properly thought-through PL, examined thor-

tice and, again, I insist that there is simply no

oughly and its moral positions exactingly contested

compelling reason to think that, by reflecting upon

both by professional political theorists and by a

this fact, liberals would wish to abandon such prac-

democratic citizenry in the political arena, would

tice altogether (they may want to alter some of its

seem to be the best guarantee we could hope for to

content, but that is a different matter).

avoid such tyranny.

It is also incorrect to think that, by permitting in

It may ultimately be the case that a liberal polity

principle the possibility of perfectionist politics, one

would decide against an active perfectionist agenda,

would inadvertently open the door again to the kind

in which case the articulation of such an ethic would

of bigotry that liberalism has worked so hard to

appear not to be necessary. But because liberal-

undermine. This claim usually proceeds with a `slip-

democratic states in practice do wander into perfec-

pery-slope' argument: `legislating against public of-

tionist territory, it is surely more incumbent upon

fence

encourage

APL to say why it is not good for states to do so

legislation against Y and it would be wrong to

(without caricaturising PL by raising the spectre of

legislate against Y.' This argument implies that an

some patently hideous Orwellian totalitarianism as

anti-X policy in itself has no serious drawback (if it

their reason). To add a final, brief remark to hint at

did have such, then we wouldn't need to condemn it

PL's possibilities (and to suggest as-yet uncharted

for the consequences it may have; its intrinsic flaws

future paths for research into it): it may be that the

would suffice). In principle, though, this argument

better-off denizens of the rich, capitalist west may be

fails if one can show that we need not necessarily

ultimately unable to sustain their kind of materia-

slide down the slope at all. And if anti-X has much to

listic lifestyles for two reasons. One is that the

commend it, then the argument in its favour could

demands of redistributive global justice will become

easily outweigh the slippery-slope argument.

so overwhelming that cosseted indifference will no

X

is

wrong

because

it

would

Given that we are to leave the final decisions

longer be possible. The second is that the need to

about perfectionist ideals to democratic deliberation,

avoid environmental catastrophe will require noth-

there is always a danger that PL's politics would

ing short of a profound change in the resource-

simply legitimise the enforcement of existing illiberal

ravaging lifestyles of the rich nations. Both points

majoritarian prejudices. There is a lurking worry

suggest the need to rethink fundamentally the ma-

about the tyranny of the majority here and perhaps

terially extravagant conceptions of human flourish-

a prudent (or, in Judith Shklar's sense, a `fearful'

29

)

ing encouraged in such societies. And to the extent

liberalism, designed to reduce the opportunities for

that political means may be required to facilitate

such unwelcome uses of power, would argue that,

these ethical changes, the attempted indifference of

attractive though PL sounds in theory, we cannot

APL will clearly have to be abandoned. So it is obvious that PL has been pushed by the

trust those who exercise power to do so wisely

tendency to neutrality onto the defensive far too

enough to encourage it in practice.

much. It would infinitely profit liberalism for it to

It is unclear, though, that this fear is enough to

310

PROLEGOMENON TO A LIBERAL THEORY OF THE GOOD LIFE

become more emboldened, and to think harder and

contribute to what is already that most challenging

more openly about the way in which politics might

of projects: leading a good life in the modern world.

Notes

1. I use the terms `good' and `good life' loosely and

include `offence' does not remove any problems over

somewhat interchangeably here. Sher (1997), pp.

arguing about the proscribability of offence; it just shifts them.

37±44 discusses some of the vagaries of `conception

17. Mill (1972), p. 167; Hart (1963), p. 47; Feinberg

of the good.'

(1985).

2. For example Galston (1991), part II.

18. In one sense, this might be an other-concerned activ-

3. See, for example, Rawls (1996), pp. 152, 199±200.

ity where the state (that is the taxpayer) shoulders the

4. Raz (1986), chapter 14 develops most of the points

cost of treating illness. But it is primarily self-con-

summarised here.

cerned in that it is left up to individuals to decide

5. Raz talks of values being grounded in `concrete social

whether they wish to lead healthy lifestyles.

forms', suggesting a rather conventionalist account of perfectionism's content. Even if this conservative bent

19. A familiar feature of American school life, civic

satisfies liberals ± and I will suggest it may not ± this is

education is now being incorporated into Britain's

still too insubstantial a formulation for us to have

national curriculum as well.

much idea of where Raz's perfectionism could lead us.

20. Rawls (1996), pp. 199±200.

6. Galston (1991), p. 177.

21. Raz (1986), pp. 161±2, 425.

7. Sher (1997).

22. For an argument urging liberals to reconcile them-

8. Digeser (1995).

selves to the fact that their doctrine will unavoidably

9. Raz (1986), p. 162.

discriminate heavily against certain kinds of cultures in modern society, see Fitzmaurice (1993).

10. See, for example, Rawls (1999), pp. 581±3. Rawls defends `justice as fairness' as a morality for political

23. Raz (1986), pp. 417±18.

fundamentals, but here recognises that it is only one of

24. Feinberg (1988), pp. 277±81.

many `reasonable' conceptions that might be adopted.

25. If it is posited that immoral conduct by its public

11. Rawls (1996), pp. 13, 175.

officials diminishes the polity as a whole, rather than

12. See Hurka (1993), pp. 3±4.

just simply sets bad examples to individuals, then such

13. Rawls (1996), pp. 13, 175.

behaviour arguably becomes other-pertaining too. On

14. This quasi-Foucauldian approach to power as consti-

this account, we would all be directly tarnished ethi-

tutively disciplinary of the self is discussed in Digeser

cally by the antics of our elected representatives, as a citizenry.

(1995), chapters 1 and 4. Space permits no more than a mention of this conceptual possibility; its articula-

26. Note, though, that certain forms of lie ± such as

tion and analysis is, though, a highly promising can-

perjury ± are criminalised even though it is not clear

didate for perfectionist liberalism's research agenda.

that people are always and necessarily `harmed' (in a

15. Although this specific terminology is F. H. Bradley's

classic liberal sense) by them. The wrongfulness of

rather than his own, Mill's distinction is implicit in his

lying might therefore be derived at least in part from a

On Liberty, Mill (1972), p. 78.

substantive ethical character-ideal which is separate

16. It might be argued that, for consistency's sake, liberal-

from the `harm' considerations that are primary in

ism needs to reconceptualise `harm' in order to justify

grounding principles of justice. If it is right that types

to itself the idea that these are proscribable offences.

of lying remain criminalised (as with perjury), then

The problem with this is that it threatens to stretch

perhaps we should admit that this is another example of perfectionist considerations in politics.

the concept of `harm' to breaking point. Quite apart from the fact that it is hardly clear that the coercive

27. Sher (1997), p.179.

repression of something becomes permissible simply by

28. Famously argued by Devlin (1965), chapter 1.

dint of redefining a concept, expanding `harm' to

29. Shklar (1989).

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322

INDEX

abstraction, 76±7, 80, 199, 201, 256

Baumeister, A., 11±12

Ackerman, B., 54, 61, 128

Baxter, B., 13, 16

Addison, J., 204

Beitz, C., 53

A' Haleem, A. M., 216

Bellamy, R., 12, 272, 274

Albertini, M., 226, 230

Benson, P., 213, 219, 221n34

Alekseeva, T. A., 283

Bentham, J., 167

Alexander, W., 203

Benton, T., 298n25

alienation, 212, 291

Berlin, I., 57, 69, 137±42, 145, 146n3, 147n19, 161n43, 163, 170n11

Anderson, P., 140, 142 anti-essentialism, 75, 78±82, 200

Bideleux, R., 13

anti-foundationalism, 147±59, 162±3

Bielecki, K., 274±5

anti-perfectionism, 6, 8, 299±301, 303, 305, 310

Blackburn, S., 152±3 Brown, C., 254

see also impartiality; neutrality

Appiah, K. A., 97

Brubaker, R., 59±60

Aristotelianism, 56, 188, 192, 193n1, 297n3

Buchanan, A., 129

Aristotle, 56, 141, 182

bureaucracy, 177, 182±3, 284

Arneson, R., 124, 129

Burke, E., 201±2, 204

Aron, R., 276

Buzgalin, A., 272

Augustine, Saint, 52 Austin, J., 167

Callinicos, A., 129

authenticity, 95±8, 213±14, 220

Canovan, M., 11

authority, 154±6, 160n8, 167±8, 185

capitalism, 8, 17±18, 114±15, 117±18, 120±1, 125±9, 131n40, 134n43, 229±31, 236, 272±5,

autonomy, 13, 24, 28±9, 31, 32n42, 32n51, 54, 84,

280, 283±4, 296

90±1, 116, 162, 180, 185, 189±90, 192, 198± 9, 200, 204, 208±20, 221n50, 222n61, 233,

Carens, J., 44

261, 276±7, 289±90, 297n14, 299, 305±6, 308

Carter, E., 204 Cassirer, E., 199

Axtmann, R., 281

categorical imperative, 83 Babbit, S., 213, 219±20

Chernomyrdin, V., 272±3

Bader, V., 61

Chubais, A., 272±3

Balcerowicz, L., 272±4

Cicero, 67

Barber, B., 71

citizenship, 10±11, 37±8, 41, 51±61, 61n3, 75±84, 197±8, 202, 227, 231, 283±4, 305, 306

Barry, B., 128, 297n1

323

INDEX

civil association, 13, 63±4, 167, 225±39

186n16, 189±90, 197±8, 200±1, 205, 225±39,

civil society, 8, 25, 37, 162±3, 177, 192, 236, 247,

243±5, 263, 269±70, 272±3, 275±7, 280±1, 300, 303

282±3 Clinton, B., 307

deontology, 188

Cohen, G. A., 8, 120±2, 124, 129

Derrida, J., 200

Cohen, J., 129

Dewey, J., 54, 300

Cohen-Tanugi, L., 231

dialogue, 98±9, 155±6

communism, 49n21, 66±7, 113, 125±8, 238,

Diderot, D., 202±3 Dietze, G., 279

252n31, 269±84

difference, ethics/politics of, 11, 46, 75, 77, 79,

communitarianism, 9±10, 16, 22, 30, 94, 100n5,

80±1, 115±16, 205, 206n26

116±17, 182, 253±64, 281, 297n20

difference principle, 12, 101±10, 110n3, 115±16,

Condorcet, M. J. A. N., 202

118±23, 130n14

consensus, 10, 28, 67±8, 71±2, 95, 98, 156, 162± 3, 169, 176±7, 179, 184, 189±90, 214, 231,

Digeser, P., 299±300

258, 261±2, 265n45, 265n48

Dinnerstein, D., 78 Doyle, M., 241±51

conservatism, 32n38, 66, 68, 73n22, 94, 297n19,

Dryzek, J., 183

308 Constant, B., 56±7, 65, 188±9

Dworkin, R., 5, 25, 31, 54, 90, 128

constitutionalism, 49n31, 57, 179, 182±5, 188±92,

Dzarasov, S., 280

225, 237, 262, 276±7 Eckersley, R., 289±90, 292, 297n7

see also constitution(s)

ecocentrism, 13, 288±93, 295±6

constitution(s), 44±5, 168, 175, 177, 180±1, 185,

ecologism (`Green' theory), 13, 16, 182±3, 287±96

247, 262

education, 38, 40±1, 53, 76, 89, 96, 180, 215,

see also constitutionalism

217±19, 221n36, 305±7, 311n19

constructivism

egalitarianism, 101±9, 112n30, 113±16, 119±20,

as meta-ethical theory, 103±4, 107, 141, 188±

128±9

92, 253±7, 260±1, 264

see also equality

as form of political doctrine, 273±4 contractarianism, 9, 29, 104

Eisenberg, A., 40

cosmopolitanism, 11, 51±3, 55, 60±1, 61±2n3, 71,

Elshtain, J. B., 78

226, 229, 232, 239, 244, 248, 253±7, 260±2,

Elster, J., 129

264n3

Engels, F., 15 Enlightenment, 6, 10±12, 76, 197±205, 205n1,

counter-Enlightenment, 12±13, 140, 200

205±6n1, 206n14, 263, 291, 293

Croce, B., 25±6, 29, 280

equality, 6, 30, 35, 68, 71, 75±7, 80±1, 83±4, 94,

Cudd, A., 110

101±10, 111n9, 115, 117±18, 121, 123, 183±

culture, 8, 18±19, 35±47, 47n5, 49n24, 93±9, 138,

4, 198, 248±9, 280

162, 165±6, 183, 185, 199, 203, 208±20,

see also egalitarianism

293±6, 306

essentialism, 78±9, 200, 205 Dahl, R., 230

ethnocentrism, 78, 152, 157±8, 205

Dahrendorf, R., 57, 269

eurocentrism, 35, 47, 49n33

Daniels, N., 128

European Union, 13, 225±39, 240n15

de Beauvoir, S., 200

Evans, M., 12, 129, 146n4

deconstruction, 200

exploitation, 123±5

de la Barre, P., 202 democracy, 7, 15, 16±17, 39±40, 42, 67, 82, 99,

Fedorov, B., 272

115±18, 126±7, 136±7, 143±4, 175±85,

Feinberg, J., 306

324

INDEX

feminism, 11±12, 75±84, 197±205, 289

Hallowell, J., 27±9

Ferrara, A., 100n15

Hampshire, S., 137±8, 141

Fish, S., 271±2, 279

Harris, A., 75, 78±9, 111n8

Flax, J., 75, 78

Hart, H. L. A., 162±3, 166±8

foundationalism, 27, 29, 148±51, 153, 158±9,

Hartz, L., 26, 28 Haslett, D. W., 112

160n10, 162±3, 167, 170, 198, 255, 260 Fraser, N., 99, 201

Hausner, J., 274

fraternity, 120, 130n25

Hayek, F., 9, 65, 72n4, 73n22, 73n27, 137, 183, 225, 231±2, 234±5, 237±8, 239n1, 270, 274,

Freeden, M., 6, 11

279, 285n36

freedom, 6, 7, 23, 27, 35, 72, 76, 89, 93, 97, 145,

Hayes, C., 282

184, 198, 247±9, 269±70, 287

Hegel, G. W. F., 26, 125, 165, 242±3, 248, 292,

see also liberty/liberties

293n19

French Revolution, 70, 201, 279 Freud, S., 210

Held, D., 17

Friedman, M., 270

Herder, A., 95

Frost, M., 254, 258±9, 263±4

Herman, B., 83

Fukuyama, F., 6, 14, 18, 242±4, 246, 248±51, 269,

Herzen, A., 283 Hiley, C., 149

280 fundamentalism (religious), 15, 161n36, 200, 257

history, theory(ies) of, 14±15, 22±3, 25±7, 242±3,

Gaidar, Y., 271±3

Hobbes, T., 164, 166±7, 169, 283, 292, 297n19

Galston, W., 299

Hobhouse, L. T., 22±7, 29±30, 178, 300

Garton Ash, T., 239

Hobson, J. A., 23, 28, 30

Gay, W., 283

Hoffmann, S., 282

Gellner, E., 269

Holc, J., 275

genital cutting, 208±20, 221n50

Holmstrom, N., 129

Geras, N., 129

Honneth, A., 91±3, 97

Gilligan, C., 85n15

Hont, I., 70

globalisation, 16±17, 186n16, 229, 231, 238, 279

hooks, b., 75, 78

Goodin, R., 73n46, 179

Hough, J., 270

Gorbachev, M., 270

human rights, 7, 35±47, 49n24, 49n33, 51±3, 57±

249±50, 269

9, 63, 65, 69±70, 148±59, 160n23, 231, 253,

Gortat, R., 273

258±62, 264

Gottlieb, R., 129

see also group rights; minority rights; rights

Gray, J., 3, 4, 8, 13, 61, 66±7, 69, 73n39, 162±3,

humanitarian intervention, 70±1, 149, 156±7,

170n11, 227, 232, 274, 285n36

161n39

Green, T. H., 57, 280, 300 group representation, 10, 75, 81±2, 181, 185

Hume, D., 164, 166, 204, 243, 306

group rights, 11, 34±47, 49n24, 49n33, 55, 238

Humeanism, 156 Huntington, S., 278

see also human rights; minority rights; rights

Hutcheson, F., 204

Guignon, D., 149 Gutmann, A., 128

identity, 8, 66, 75, 81±4, 89±99, 200, 205, 231, 291, 302

Habermas, J., 53, 76, 82±4, 85n50, 135±6, 185,

Ignatieff, M., 69

188±92, 201, 206n22

impartiality, 10, 24, 26, 68, 76±7, 80, 82±3, 90,

Haddock, B., 12, 73n35, 240n47

184, 288, 297n2

Hague, W., 228

see also anti-perfectionism; neutrality

Hailsham, Lord, 237

325

INDEX

law/legal system(s), 43, 156, 164, 167±8, 176±81,

imperfect duty/obligation, 76, 82±3

185, 186n41, 190±2, 193n12, 225±6, 231±9,

individualism, 7, 10, 35, 38, 52, 184, 255, 281,

245, 248, 260±2, 303

282±3 individuality, 8, 16, 18±19

Layne, C., 241

Islam, 210, 215, 281

Lebed, A., 273 legitimation crisis, 17, 274±5

Jacob, M., 201

Lenin, V. I., 69

Joad, C. E. M., 27

Levine, A., 129

Johnson, P., 200

libertarianism, 7, 9

judicial review, 177, 181

liberty/liberties, 23, 26, 57, 67, 71, 101, 115±17, 119, 175±8, 186n37, 188±91, 225±6, 228,

see also Supreme Court

236±7, 263±4, 280, 282±3

justice, 7±9, 16, 22, 24, 29, 30±1, 35±47, 47n5,

see also freedom

76, 80, 82, 90±9, 101±9, 110n1, 110n2, 110± 11n6, 113±31, 135±8, 141, 143, 179±82, 185,

Linklater, A., 53

188±9, 233, 253±4, 257, 262, 264, 280, 301,

Lloyd, S., 129

311n10

Locke, J., 29±30, 32n54, 191, 243 Loveland, I., 231

justification, 11±12, 29, 94±5, 143, 154, 156, 158,

Luzhkov, Y., 278

164, 189, 262

Lyotard, J.-F., 165 Kagarlitskii, B., 276 Kaldor, M., 236, 240n54

McBride, W., 129

Kant, I., 51, 54, 61n2, 75, 83±4, 135, 146, 198,

Macaulay, C., 76, 203

200, 203±4, 207n34, 241±51, 252n16, 261,

MacDonald, J. A., 38

290, 292, 297n13

MacDonald, M., 151 McDowell, J., 160n13

see also Kantianism

Machiavelli, N., 138, 182, 242

Kantianism, 4, 6, 28, 53, 75, 82, 83±4, 139, 156, 158, 163, 170, 203, 252n31, 253±4, 260±1,

MacIntyre, A., 260

263, 289±90, 297n14, 297n19, 297n21

Mackie, J. L., 160n16, 256±7 Mann, M., 228

see also Kant, I.

market(s), 57, 120, 128±9, 175±7, 182±3, 229,

Karimov, I., 278

236±7, 243, 250, 269, 272±5, 282±2

Kekes, J., 163 Keynes, J. M., 274

Marshall, T. H., 58

Kirienko, S., 273

Martin, R., 12, 110

Klaus, V., 272

Marx, K., 15, 292, 297n19

Kolodko, G., 274

Marxism, 12, 26, 69, 113±32, 280, 297n3

Kozyrev, A., 273

maximin reasoning, 103, 106±9, 111n23, 119

Kristol, I., 280

Mazowiecki, T., 273, 275

Kymlicka, W., 10±11, 55, 95, 99n2, 106, 129, 281

Mazzini, G., 281 Mendelssohn, M., 200

Lamont, J., 110, 111n11

Mendus, S., 77

Lamont, N., 228

Merquior, J., 269, 277, 283

Landes, J., 199

Meyers, D. T., 13

language, 38, 40±1, 48n20, 93, 96, 165

Michelet, J., 281

Laquer, T., 202

Mill, J. S., 30, 35, 55, 69, 93, 163, 197, 204, 245, 278±9, 281, 296, 300, 302, 311n15

Larmore, C., 137, 141±2, 144, 191 Laski, H., 24, 32n60

Millar, J., 203

Lassman, P., 12

Miller, D., 100n30, 129, 263

326

INDEX

Milyukov, P., 281

Pettit, P., 178

minimum morality, 140±1, 163, 167, 260, 262±3

Phillips, A., 80

minority rights, 35±47, 48n6, 48n20, 99n2

Plato, 18 pluralism, 8, 12, 26, 82, 93, 99, 135, 136±44, 162,

see also group rights; human rights; rights

170n11, 175±85, 189±90, 200, 257

Mises, L. von, 270

`reasonable', 138±9, 141, 144, 162, 261, 263

Mohammad, M., 278 Montesquieu, C., 65

Pogge, T., 52±3, 61n3, 129, 255

Moody-Adams, M., 217, 219

political liberalism, 10, 29, 30, 31, 32n51, 135±8, 141, 143±4, 162±3, 188±92

Mouffe, C., 156

political philosophy/theory, 3±6, 13, 19, 19n1, 22,

multiculturalism, 10±11, 26, 35±47, 53, 177,

116, 135±6, 139, 149±50, 159, 162, 169, 241,

186n16, 231

255±6, 259 politics, conception(s) of, 30, 57, 63±4, 69, 75,

Naess, A., 290

139, 142, 156, 164

Nagel, T., 5, 128, 288, 297n2, 297n3 Nardin, T., 233±4, 239n1

Popper, K., 29

nationalism, 11, 15, 24, 28, 51±61, 63±72, 142,

post-communism, 13, 269±84 postmodernism, 130n44, 198±201, 205

280±4

practical reason, 12, 170, 255±6, 260±1

nationality, 11, 35±47, 51±61, 62n20, 63±72, 176

see also public reason; rationality; reason

Nemtsov, B., 272±3

pragmatism, 12, 27, 148±59

neutrality, 6, 31, 287, 299

praxis, 291±2, 294

see also anti-perfectionism; impartiality

progress, 13±14, 23±7, 29±30, 76, 162, 175, 249±

Nielsen, K., 129

50

Nietzsche, F., 156

progressivism, 6, 18, 32n38

non-cognitivism, 150±3, 156, 159, 160n16, 160±

projectivism, 152±3, 158

1n29, 161n34 Nozick, R., 9, 130n24, 137, 270

Prokhanov, A., 282

Nussbaum, M., 53, 75, 80, 85n14, 128, 161n32

public/private distinction, 28, 75, 78, 97, 181,

Oakeshott, M., 63±7, 72, 73n22, 167, 169, 225,

public reason, 6, 28, 30, 263

188±92, 198, 225, 302±3 see also practical reason; rationality; reason

232±4, 238, 239n1 objectivity, moral, 150±1, 158 O'Donnell, G., 277

Rasmussen, D., 12

Okin, S. M., 75, 80, 129

rational choice theory, 111n18, 212±13, 221n20

O'Neill, O., 83, 254±8, 260±1

rationality, 11, 28, 146, 162, 204, 290 see also practical reason; public reason; reason

Orban, V., 271

Rawls, J., 3, 5±6, 8±10, 12±13, 20n18, 23, 25, 28±

original position, 104±5, 109, 189, 295 Ost, D., 270, 283, 285n35

31, 36, 54, 90, 101±10, 110n1, 110n2,

Outram, D., 200, 206n26

110n4, 110±11n6, 111n8, 111n9, 111n18, 111n20, 111n23, 112n24, 112n26, 110n29,

Parekh, B., 68, 73n49

112n30, 113±29, 130n14, 135±9, 141±6,

Pareto optimality, 107, 119

147n51, 156, 160n8, 161n36, 162±3, 170, 188±92, 253±4, 258±64, 296, 299, 311n10

Pateman, C., 75±7 Peffer, R. G., 12

Raz, J., 6, 184, 299±300, 306, 311n4, 311n5

perfect duty/obligation, 76, 82±3

realism, moral, 150, 152±3, 160n13

perfectionism, 13, 16, 64, 299±311, 311n5

reason, 12, 24, 26±7, 76, 199±200, 203±4, 206n14 see also practical reason; public reason;

personcentrism, 13, 287±8, 292±3, 295±6

rationality

personhood, 287±8, 292±4, 297n19, 297±9n22

327

INDEX

Â aume, D., 47 Re

Shklar, J., 12, 65, 72n16, 135, 144±6, 310

recognition, 12, 89±99, 100n2, 100n3, 180, 205,

Shlapentokh, D., 282 Shue, H., 128

242, 248 Redwood, J., 228

Ás, Abbe Â, 56 Sieye

Rees, J. C., 35

Simonia, N., 270

Regan, T., 297n14

Simpson, O. J., 68

Reiman, J., 129

Skinner, Q., 178

relativism, 9, 116±17, 152, 171, 202, 205

Smith, A., 185n5, 204

republicanism, 12, 18, 175±85, 186n7, 188±92,

Smith, M., 228 socialisation, 91, 151, 213±14, 221n34, 302, 305

244±6, 249

socialism, 7, 16, 18, 113±15, 117±18, 122, 124±9,

rights, 7, 92, 94, 115±17, 123, 126, 165, 175±7,

131n46, 198, 279±80, 297n19

181, 185, 189±91, 197, 216, 236, 275, 278,

Sogrin, V., 272±3, 280, 284

283, 297n25

Solzhenitsyn, A., 271

see also group rights; human rights; minority

Soper, K., 11±12

rights Rights of Man, 1789 Declaration, 59, 64±5, 70

Spelman, E. V., 75, 78±9

Roemer, J., 124±5, 129

Spinelli, A., 226, 230

romanticism, 18±19, 24, 140, 204

Spivak, G., 200

Roosevelt, F. D., 191

Staniskis, J., 275

Rorty, R., 7, 12, 142, 148±59, 160n4, 160n10,

state, 68±70, 227, 231, 247±8 Stoicism, 52±3

160n13, 160n23, 162±3 Rousseau, J.-J., 67, 203±4, 292, 297n19, 297n20

Strauss, L., 30, 142

Ruddick, S., 78

Strawson, P., 297±8n22

Ruggiero, G. de, 23±9, 54

Supreme Court, 28, 43±4, 45 see also judicial review

Rustow, D., 282 Rutland, P., 273

Sutch, P., 13

Rychard, A., 274±5

Szacki, J., 270, 272±3, 283±4

Sakharov, A., 271

Tarasov, A., 282

Sakwa, R., 13

Taylor, C., 20n27, 23, 54±5, 91, 95±8, 100n3, 100n15, 100n19, 100n21, 100n23, 100n30

Sandel, M., 9 Sapiro, V., 198

Taylor, H., 197

Scanlon, T., 5, 128

teleology, 188±90, 205

Schaar, J., 70±1

Temple-Lang, J., 231

Scheffler, S., 128

Thatcher, M., 228

Schmitt, C., 137, 140, 143, 161n42

Tickell, T., 70

Schmitter, P., 275

Timofeev, L., 270

Schumpeter, J., 57, 242

Tocqueville, A. de, 18, 65, 245, 279

Schweickart, D., 121, 129

toleration, 145, 154±5

Scott, J., 202

Tomaselli, S., 203

Seglow, J., 11±12

Tully, J., 176

self-esteem, 91±4, 100n9

Tuveson, E. L., 204

self-respect, 92, 100n2, 100n9, 115, 119 Sen, A. K., 9, 124, 128

United Nations, 36±8, 53±4, 65, 68, 80, 156

Shaftesbury, Third Earl of, 204

Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 35, 37, 65, 149, 278

Shenoy, P., 110

universalisability, 254±7

Sher, G., 299, 308

328

INDEX

Wenar, L., 162±3

universalism, 52, 59, 61, 71, 75±84, 140, 199±200,

Wiggins, D., 153

239, 253±7, 260±1, 263, 278

Williams, A., 106, 110

utilitarianism, 55, 106, 112n26, 163, 193n1

Williams, B., 137, 141 Van Parijs, P., 128±9

Williams, H., 13

Vico, G., 280

Winch, P., 164±5, 167

Vincent, A., 11

Wissenberg, M., 297n1

Voltaire, 204

Wittgenstein, L., 164±5, 167 Wolff, J., 106

Waldron, J., 128

Wolff, R. P., 129

Walicki, A., 274

Wollstonecraft, M., 76, 197±9, 201±2, 204±5, 206n6, 206n8

Walker, A., 213 Walker, G., 49n31 Walley, K., 221n36

Yavlinskii, G., 274

Walzer, M., 9, 54, 116, 129, 136, 254, 258±64,

Yeltsin, B., 271±3 Young, I. M., 10, 55, 75±7, 80±3, 85n23, 85n42,

297n18

100n11

Ward, I., 236 Warnke, G., 85n50

Zakaria, F., 276±7, 279

Weber, M., 17, 135±6, 138, 141±5, 146n4,

Zhirinovskii, V., 271

147n19, 147n27, 147n38, 182

Zyuganov, G., 284

Weimar `Problem', 135, 137±8, 143±4, 146 Welch, S., 281

329