THE ECONOMICS OF IMMIGRATION AND SOCIAL DIVERSITY
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RESEARCH IN LABOR ECONOMICS Series Editor: Solomon W. Polachek
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RESEARCH IN LABOR ECONOMICS VOLUME 24
THE ECONOMICS OF IMMIGRATION AND SOCIAL DIVERSITY EDITED BY
SOLOMON W. POLACHEK Department of Economics, State University of New York at Binghamton
CARMEL CHISWICK Department of Economics, University of Illinois at Chicago
HILLEL RAPOPORT Department of Economics, Bar-Ilan University
Amsterdam – Boston – Heidelberg – London – New York – Oxford Paris – San Diego – San Francisco – Singapore – Sydney – Tokyo iii
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CONTENTS LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS
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PREFACE Carmel Chiswick, Solomon W. Polachek and Hillel Rapoport
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PART I: IMMIGRATION AND THE ECONOMY IS IMMIGRATION GOOD OR BAD FOR THE ECONOMY? ANALYSIS OF ATTITUDINAL RESPONSES Christian Dustmann and Ian Preston
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THE EFFECTS OF INCOMPLETE EMPLOYEE WAGE INFORMATION: A CROSS-COUNTRY ANALYSIS Solomon W. Polachek and Jun (Jeff) Xiang
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THE IMPACT OF IMMIGRANT DYNASTIES ON WAGE INEQUALITY Michael Ben-Gad
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DOES IMMIGRATION AFFECT LABOR DEMAND? MODEL AND TEST O¨rn B. Bodvarsson and Hendrik Van den Berg
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LENIENT POLICY PROPOSAL FOR THE STRUGGLE AGAINST ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION Nava Kahana and Tikva Lecker
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PART II: GROUP DIFFERENCES AND ECONOMIC ACHIEVEMENT THE LINGUISTIC AND ECONOMIC ADJUSTMENT OF SOVIET JEWISH IMMIGRANTS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1980–2000 Barry R. Chiswick and Michael Wenz
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MULTI-GENERATION MODEL OF IMMIGRANT EARNINGS: THEORY AND APPLICATION Joseph Deutsch, Gil S. Epstein and Tikva Lecker
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ETHNIC ORIGIN AND MULTIDIMENSIONAL RELATIVE POVERTY IN ISRAEL: A STUDY BASED ON THE 1995 ISRAELI CENSUS Joseph Deutsch and Jacques Silber
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IMMIGRANTS IN THE ISRAELI HI-TECH INDUSTRY: COMPARISON TO NATIVES AND THE EFFECT OF TRAINING Sarit Cohen-Goldner
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WHAT DO WAGE DIFFERENTIALS TELL ABOUT LABOR MARKET DISCRIMINATION? June E. O’Neill and Dave M. O’Neill
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PART III: SOCIAL DIVERSITY AND INSTITUTIONS CULTURAL DIVERSITY, STATUS CONCERNS AND THE ORGANIZATION OF WORK Chaim Fershtman, Hans K. Hvide and Yoram Weiss
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ETHNIC DIVERSITY, MARKET STRUCTURE AND RISK SHARING IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES Mohamed Jellal and Yves Zenou
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ON THE LAW OF RETURN IN RURAL–URBAN INTERACTIONS: AN ECONOMIC APPROACH TO SOLIDARITY WITH RETURN MIGRANTS Carine Drapier, Hubert Jayet and Hillel Rapoport
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AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE ON RELIGIOUS EDUCATION: COMPLEMENTS AND SUBSTITUTES IN A HUMAN CAPITAL PORTFOLIO Carmel U. Chiswick
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LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS Michael Ben-Gad
Department of Economics, University of Haifa, Israel
O¨rn B. Bodvarsson
Department of Economics, St. Cloud State University, MN, USA
Barry R. Chiswick
Department of Economics, University of Illinois at Chicago, IL, USA IZA, Bonn, Germany
Carmel U. Chiswick
Department of Economics, University of Illinois at Chicago, IL, USA IZA, Bonn, Germany
Sarit Cohen-Goldner
Department of Economics, Bar-Ilan University, Israel
Joseph Deutsch
Department of Economics, Bar-Ilan University, Israel
Carine Drapier
CADRE, Universite´ de Lille, France
Christian Dustmann
Department of Economics and CReAM, University College London, UK IZA, Bonn, Germany
Gil S. Epstein
Department of Economics, Bar-Ilan University, Israel IZA, Bonn, Germany
Chaim Fershtman
The Eitan Berglas School of Economics, Tel-Aviv University, Israel
Hans K. Hvide
Norwegian School of Economics and Business, Bergen, Norway ix
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LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS
Hubert Jayet
MEDEE, Universite´ de Lille, France
Mohamed Jellal
CES, Universite´ Mohamed V, Morocco, ConseilsEco, Toulouse, France
Nava Kahana
Department of Economics, Bar-Ilan University, Israel
Tikva Lecker
Department of Economics, Bar-Ilan University, Israel
Dave M. O’Neill
Center for the Study of Business and Government, Zicklin School of Business, Baruch College, NY, USA
June E. O’Neill
Department of Economics and Finance, Baruch College, City University of New York, New York, USA
Solomon W. Polachek
Departments of Economics and Political Science, State University of New York at Binghamton, NY, USA IZA, Bonn, Germany
Ian Preston
Department of Economics and CReAM, University College London, UK Institute for Fiscal Studies, UK
Hillel Rapoport
Department of Economics, Bar-Ilan University, Israel CADRE, Universite´ de Lille, France
Jacques Silber
Department of Economics, Bar-Ilan University, Israel
Hendrik Van den Berg
Department of Economics, University of Nebraska, NE, USA
Yoram Weiss
The Eitan Berglas School of Economics, Tel-Aviv University, Israel
Michael Wenz
Department of Economics, University of Illinois at Chicago, IL, USA
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List of contributors
Jun (Jeff) Xiang
Department of Political Science, University of Rochester, NY, USA
Yves Zenou
IUI, Stockolm, Sweden GAINS, Universite´ du Maine, France
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PREFACE This volume is a collection of papers first presented at a conference held in June 2004 dedicated to the memory of the late Tikva Lecker, hosted by BarIlan University in Ramat Gan, Israel, and co-sponsored by the University of Illinois at Chicago. A warm and lively member of the Department of Economics at Bar Ilan University, Professor Lecker’s many interests included topics in labor economics, women and the economy, the economics of Judaism, the economics of migration, and every aspect of the economic experience of immigrants and their descendants. Each chapter in this volume honors the memory of Professor Lecker by presenting research on a topic in which she was especially interested. The papers in Part I: Immigration and the Economy look at immigration from the perspective of the receiving country. They include examples of both positive and normative economics, concerned with estimating the impacts of immigrants and also with the characteristics of an optimal immigration policy. Part II: Group Differences and Economic Achievement contains papers that look at various aspects of income distribution. Some of these compare the earnings and other socioeconomic characteristics of immigrants to the United States and Israel with that of natives in the same country, and others look at differences by race, ethnicity, national origin, and gender. The papers in Part III: Social Diversity and Institutions consider some economic aspects of ethnic pluralism and of institutions that help support various aspects of cultural diversity. The initial five chapters deal with the various channels through which immigration impacts the economy. In ‘‘Is Immigration Good or Bad for the Economy? Analysis of Attitudinal Responses,’’ Christian Dustmann and Ian Preston look at public attitudes toward immigrants. Although often overlooked in economics, attitudes are important because they often reveal how citizens vote, which in turn affects legislation. By examining the European Social Survey (ESS) in conjunction with a simple equilibrium model, they are able to assess public opinion in three areas: the labor market, the public burden, and overall economic efficiency. In general, they find self-interest to be important. Individuals who strongly benefit from migration have positive attitudes xiii
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toward migration. Thus former immigrants, their children, and the moreeducated view immigration as beneficial; whereas the unemployed and the less educated perceive migration as detrimental. Minorities fear economic losses, but perceive immigration to help fulfill the tax burden and fill jobs in areas where there are shortages. Polachek and Xiang take an econometric approach. In ‘‘The Effects of Incomplete Employee Wage Information: A Cross-Country Analysis,’’ they define a tractable procedure to measure worker incomplete information about available wages. Their procedure, which makes use of earnings distribution skewness, is based on frontier estimation techniques, and is consistent with search theory. They apply the technique to 11 countries over various years, and find that incomplete information leads workers to receive on an average about 30–35% less pay than they otherwise would have earned, had they information on what each firm paid. Generally, married men and women suffer less from incomplete information than the widowed or divorced; and singles suffer the most. Women suffer more from incomplete information than men. Schooling and labor market experience reduce these losses, but institutions within a country can reduce them, as well. For example, they find that workers in countries that strongly support unemployment insurance (UI) receive wages closer to their potential, so that doubling UI decreases incomplete information and results in 5% higher wages. Relating the technique to immigration, they find that foreign worker inflows increase incomplete information, and at the same time reduce average wage levels, at least in the short-run. In ‘‘The Impact of Immigrant Dynasties on Wage Inequality,’’ Michael Ben-Gad concentrates on migration of unskilled workers to the US. He notes there is a disproportionate share of unskilled workers among certain immigrant groups. The key question he asks is: Did these immigrants likely cause wage inequality to increase? His answer is no. To get there, Ben-Gad develops an overlapping dynasties optimal growth model. Changes in immigration affect wages directly but also alter rates of return, which as a consequence causes individuals to modify their own and future generations’ investments in human capital. Indeed, Ben-Gad finds that the native-born children and grandchildren of immigrants are often more likely to exceed educational levels of their parents. By using US Current Population Survey data, he demonstrates that the arrival of a disproportionate share of unskilled workers among certain immigrant groups did not cause wage inequality. Many current studies claim that immigration has small if any effects on the local economy, even when immigration flows are large. Paradoxically,
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instead of generating unemployment and driving down wages, these studies find the enhanced labor supply to have almost no detrimental effects on the local labor market. In ‘‘Does Immigration Affect Labor Demand? Model and Test,’’ O¨rn B. Bodvarsson and Hendrik Van den Berg cogently argue that these surprising results may occur because all current studies neglect an important macroeconomic consideration: migrants stimulate local labor markets via their own consumption. To test this hypothesis, Bodvarsson and Van den Berg examine a unique case study: a large export-driven meatpacking plant that attracted many Hispanic immigrants to Dawson County, Nebraska. These immigrants spent their earnings in the local economy, but language barriers precluded them from obtaining sales and retail jobs in the local labor market. As a result, wages in the retail sector rose and housing prices increased to the tune of 4–5%, confirming that immigration is capable of exerting significant effects on local labor demand. Policies that stimulate immigration can thus be effective in invigorating a local economy. Whereas there are benefits to legal migration, many believe the costs of illegal migration to be inordinate. As such, governments seek to deter illegal immigration. But how should a country go about preventing such illegal migration? The conventional wisdom is to raise the probability of apprehension by beefing up border patrols and increasing the punishment, thus reducing expected wages of undocumented workers. In the next chapter, Nava Kahana and Tikva Lecker suggest an alternative strategy. They argue in favor of supplementing border and domestic control with a more lenient approach to illegal immigrants who identify themselves to the immigration authority. Whereas such a policy would reduce the cost of apprehension to the immigrant thereby increasing the incentive for illegal immigration, it would on the other hand boost the number of self-reporting immigrants leaving voluntarily. Depending on the parameters of the expected utility model, the number of remaining illegal immigrants could actually decrease under this plan. Moreover, they argue that the self-reporting immigrants leaving the host countries would be predominantly from the relatively lower socioeconomic groups. The next five chapters deal with differences in economic success, viewed either as achievement in the labor force or as income and consumption, between different groups of the population. In ‘‘Immigrants in the Israeli Hi-Tech Industry: Comparison to Natives and the Effect of Training,’’ Sarit Cohen-Goldner observes that the arrival and assimilation in Israel of an exceptionally large wave of immigrants from the former Soviet Union (FSU) coincided with the growth of a new technologically based family of industries. She looks at whether there was a
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causal link between the two, i.e. whether rapid growth in the high-tech sector was a consequence of skills formed in the former Soviet Union. Her findings suggest not, although immigrants from the FSU clearly benefited from rapid economic growth, since their rate of participation in high-tech employment was similar to that of Israeli natives and depended on postmigration human capital investments provided by training programs in Israel. In ‘‘The Linguistic and Economic Adjustment of Soviet Jewish Immigrants in the United States, 1980 to 2000’’ Barry R. Chiswick and Michael Wenz investigate differences in language proficiency as well as the economic integration of immigrant men from different countries and regions. This paper focuses attention on the (mostly Jewish) immigrants from the former Soviet Union. Their findings based on the 2000 US Census of population are consistent with those found in Chiswick’s studies of earlier waves of Soviet immigrants. FSU immigrants arrive with lower English proficiency that improves more quickly over time and rapidly obtains parity with other immigrant groups, a pattern that is typical of refugee populations in general. FSU immigrants to the US also have lower initial earnings than other groups but more rapid improvement over time, reaching earnings parity with other European immigrants in a few years. As is the case for Jews born in the United States, the effect of schooling on earnings is somewhat larger for the Soviet Jews than it is for other immigrant groups, ceteris paribus. Thus despite their disadvantage as a refugee population, Soviet Jews have had a highly successful labor market adjustment in the United States. In ‘‘Multi-Generation Model of Immigrant Earnings: Theory and Application,’’ Joseph Deutsch, Gil Epstein, and Tickva Lecker use data from the 1995 Israeli Census to analyze differences in the schooling and earnings of first, second, and third-generation immigrant men relative to each other and to native-born Israelis. As expected, they find that the sons of immigrants have a higher level of schooling and earnings than their immigrant fathers. In contrast to previous studies that did not distinguish between the grandchildren of immigrants and other natives, this paper finds that the third generation does less well than their fathers and their counterparts with grandparents born in Israel. The paper develops a model that attributes this phenomenon to sons motivated by the difficulties faced by their immigrant fathers to achieve higher levels of schooling and economic success. The converse applies to the sons of the high-achieving second-generation, who are less motivated to work hard than either their fathers or grandfathers. Another approach to measuring the intergenerational absorption of immigrants is taken by Joseph Deutsch and Jacques Silber in ‘‘Ethnic Origin
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and Multidimensional Relative Poverty in Israel: A Study Based on the 1995 Israeli Census.’’ This paper uses living standards rather than work as the yardstick for economic integration, and measures success in terms of consumer durables rather than income. Several different indices of poverty are considered, and the results are used to compare the standard of living for households headed by immigrants from Asia and Africa with that of households headed by immigrants from Europe and North America, using households with Israeli-born heads as a benchmark. Because of the overwhelming importance of the foreign born in Israel’s population, the definition of immigrant generation is modified by treating people who arrived in Israel as young children as similar to native-born Israelis. ‘‘What do Wage Differentials Tell Us about Labor Market Discrimination’’ by June E. O’Neill and Dave M. O’Neill looks at earnings differences in the United States by gender, race, and ethnicity. They use the 2000 US Census of Population to look at differences for ethnic groups, estimating equations separately for men and for women. They also use data for persons aged 35–43 from the 2000 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY), which permits them to measure skill levels with Armed Forces Qualifying Test (AFQT) scores and lifetime work histories instead of the usual variables of schooling and age-related experience. The NLSY analysis compares earnings between African-Americans, Hispanics, and Non-Hispanic Whites as well as between men and women. As in studies from earlier data sets, controlling for the human capital determinants of earnings diminishes the size of the between-group earnings differentials. The differentials persist in the estimates from the Census data, which relies on the conventional variables, but virtually disappear in the NLSY analysis with its more sensitive controls for the human capital workers bring to the labor market. The last four papers of this volume focus on social diversity and institutions and are also strongly connected to migration and minorities issues. In their paper on ‘‘Cultural Diversity, Status Concern and the Organization of Work,’’ Chaim Fershtman, Hans K. Hvide, and Yoram Weiss investigate the impact of diversity in preferences for social status on the labor market equilibrium and the organization of work within the firm. In a model where workers’ effort is endogenous and there are only two types of workers (those who care about social status and those who don’t), they first find that mixing workers with different preferences and offering different contracts to different types of workers is optimal from the firm’s perspective. They then explore how diversity in status concern (measured by the degree of concern of those who care) affects a number of outcomes of interest such as wages, total output, and the distribution of effort, with more diversity
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generally bringing in more efficient outcomes as diversity acts as an effort extraction device. Finally, they apply their model to immigration, with particular reference to the recent experience of Israel. The discussion reinterprets the fall and rise of Russian immigrants’ socioeconomic status in the light of the theory. Among other things, the authors emphasize that their model contributes to explaining why as skilled immigrants start accessing better jobs, natives react by putting more effort into training and production activities, which in the end preserves the wage gap between natives and immigrants in spite of the latter assimilation and integration. In suggesting a new channel through which immigration can have a positive effect on wages, this also goes part of the way toward explaining why most empirical studies on the local labor market impact of immigration concluded a neutral or at the worst a weakly negative effect. Social interactions are also at the heart of Mohamed Jellal and Yves Zenou’s paper on ‘‘Ethnic Diversity, Market Structure and Risk Sharing in Developing Countries.’’ The paper – an extension of Salop’s model of spatial competition – explores how ethnic diversity impacts on rural labor markets in developing countries, an important yet neglected issue in the rural labor contracts literature. The model derives interesting predictions about the circumstances under which a fixed-wage or a piece rate contract is optimal (and thus likely to prevail) or, instead, under which circumstances the two types of contracts should (are likely to) coexist. It shows theoretically that in equilibrium ethnic diversity increases the piece-rate component of the contract while ethnic interaction costs increase the fixed-wage component, providing that there is coexistence between the two methods of pay. These and other results relating the type of contract to employers and employees degrees of risk-aversion are then shown to be supported by empirical evidence from selected empirical studies. In the same context of traditional agrarian societies, Carine Drapier, Huber Jayet, and Hillel Rapoport investigate the economic foundations of community solidarity with return migrants, an institution very common in the rural areas of developing countries. Their paper, entitled ‘‘On the Law of Return in Rural–Urban Interactions: An Economic Approach to Solidarity with Return Migrants,’’ first documents the phenomenon and then shows that in a context of decreasing marginal productivity of labor, such solidarity brings about efficiency gains beyond those of mutual insurance emphasized in previous literature. The authors then show that an equal sharing rule is Pareto-optimal but raises time-consistency problems that can be overcome in an intergenerational setting with parental altruism. Finally, they show that the degree of altruism required for cooperation to prevail is
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proportional to the optimal migration rate; in other words, changes that make migration socially more desirable also put at risk the institution of solidarity with return migrants. The last paper of this volume is Carmel Chiswick’s paper on ‘‘An Economic Perspective on Religious Education: Complements and Substitutes in a Human Capital Portfolio.’’ It builds on a simple model of investment in two forms of human capital (one specifically religious and the other general), with the degree of complementarity between the two determining whether individual choices will lead to polarization or integration within the religious community and between the religious community and the larger society. The model is applied to perceived hostility to religion in American public education and the coping strategies of fundamentalist Protestants and Jews, two religious groups with potentially large negative complementarities between the sacred and secular education. Some implications of educational choices of individuals for the religious community are also discussed, including its distinctiveness, its internal cohesion, and its success at intergenerational transmission of religious beliefs and behaviors. For insightful editorial advice in preparing this volume, we thank Gary Anderson, Heather Antecol, Emmanuelle Auriol, Eli Berman, Sarit CohenGoldner, Deborah Cobb-Clark, Augustin De Coulon, Carlo Devillanova, Don DeVoretz, Philippe Devreyer, Slobodan Djajic, Frederic Docquier, Christian Dustmann, Gil Epstein, Arthur Fishman, Ira Gang, Astrid Kunze, Sylvie Lambert, Anna Mayda, Prachi Mishra, Tobias Mu¨ller, Peter Norman, June O’Neill, Fabien Postel-Vinay, William Sander, Helena SkytNielsen, Ian Smith, Anne Winkler, and Madeline Zavodny. Beginning with the next volume the Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) will cosponsor Research in Labor Economics (RLE). At that time, Olivier Bargain will become co-editor, and the series will soon benefit from an electronic submission process available on the IZA website. In the meantime readers who have prepared manuscripts that meet the stringent standards of RLE are encouraged to submit them to Solomon Polachek or Olivier Bargain for possible inclusion in a future volume. Carmel Chiswick Solomon W. Polachek Hillel Rapoport
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PART I: IMMIGRATION AND THE ECONOMY
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IS IMMIGRATION GOOD OR BAD FOR THE ECONOMY? ANALYSIS OF ATTITUDINAL RESPONSES Christian Dustmann and Ian Preston ABSTRACT In this paper, we study attitudinal responses of host country residents towards further immigration that are triggered by economic considerations. We develop an economic model motivating the empirical work that takes a broader view on these issues than previous papers. We provide empirical analysis that is based on data more specific and better suited to pick up the many channels of economic interest through which benefits and costs of immigration may be felt. Results support previous literature in establishing strong associations between individual characteristics and a wide range of responses to questions relating to perceived impact of immigrants on economic outcomes. Our analysis points towards harmful effects of immigration on the economy being felt through immigration being a fiscal burden rather than having adverse effects on the labour market.
1. INTRODUCTION A large empirical literature in economics is concerned with identifying the effects of immigration on the economy. A particularly strong focus has been Research in Labor Economics: The Economics of Immigration and Social Diversity Research in Labor Economics, Volume 24, 3–34 Copyright r 2006 by Elsevier Ltd. All rights of reproduction in any form reserved ISSN: 0147-9121/doi:10.1016/S0147-9121(05)24001-3
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on the effect on wages and employment (see Borjas, 1994, 1999b; Friedberg & Hunt, 1995; Dustmann & Glitz, 2005 for overviews). Many of the papers in this literature fail to find large effects, although there is controversy about this (see recent papers by Borjas, 2003; Card, 2005). In any case, effects of labour market competition are frequently perceived to be one of the main driving forces determining public attitudes towards immigration. Those for whose skills immigrant labour is likely to be a substitute may oppose immigration whereas those for whose skills it is complementary may view immigration more sympathetically. Of course, immigration also has other economic aspects. Individuals may fear that immigrants burden public finances – either through using public services intensively or by contributing to costly social problems such as unemployment – or they may by contrast welcome the contributions made by immigrants to the public exchequer.1 Furthermore, immigrant inflows are frequently suggested as a solution to specific sorts of skill shortages. In political debate this is often used as an argument in support of more liberal migration policies (see, for instance, the debate in European member states on allowing for free movement of labour after EU enlargement as of May 1, 2004). Individuals taking a wider view may in addition appreciate the efficiency gains to be expected from free international movement of labour. Economic enquiry can contribute to arguments on all of these issues by attempting to extend knowledge of the nature and extent of any such economic gains and losses. Recently, a literature has evolved that addresses the formation of opinion and attitudes towards immigrants and immigration in a more direct way than papers that attempt to quantify the economic impact of immigration itself. These papers are based on empirical analysis of attitudinal responses towards immigration and immigrants (see, for example, recent papers by Scheve & Slaughter, 2001; Gang, Rivera-Batiz, & Yun, 2002; Mayda, 2004; Fertig & Schmidt, 2002; O’Rourke & Sinnott, 2003; Dustmann & Preston, 2004; Bauer, Lofstrom, & Zimmermann, 2000 among others).2 Typically, such papers relate responses about individual attitudes to further immigration to individual specific characteristics. Interpretation of the coefficient estimates in the economic part of this literature often relies on well-established economic theory, most prominently the Hecksher-Ohlin model (see, for example, Scheve & Slaughter, 2001), assigning particular interpretation to variables such as education and skills. Other researchers emphasise the importance of non-economic determinants of attitudes to immigration (see, for example, Espenshade & Hempstead, 1996). Dustmann and Preston (2004) developed a model, which allows for three factors in
Is Immigration Good or Bad for the Economy?
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determining anti-immigrant feelings: labour market considerations, welfare considerations, and racial attitudes. They find all three determinants to be important in affecting attitudes, but identify a dominant role for the race factor, in particular, for the lower educated. The plausibility of the conclusions reached in these papers about the nature and role of economic considerations is not helped by the need to rely on secondary analysis of responses to questionnaires, which are rarely explicit about economic issues. Most of the papers mentioned above rely on attitudes to further immigration as a measure for individual perception of harmful or beneficial effects of immigration in the host economy. The association of this response with skill or education of the respondent is then interpreted within a Hecksher—Ohlin-type framework, where differential responses across skill groups are compatible with differently perceived labour market competition from new immigrants. In this paper, we add to this literature in several ways. Firstly, we broaden the economic argument, by allowing for consideration not only of factors relating to labour market competition, but also to public burden and efficiency considerations. Secondly, we discuss the way such consideration may affect welfare of residents of different skill background in a simple general equilibrium framework. Thirdly, our empirical investigation is based on more specific survey responses than have been used previously. In particular, we not only study the association between economic opinion and demographic characteristics, but also, having conditioned on such effects, seek to structure the interrelation between overall opinions on whether immigration is good or bad for the economy and opinions on more specific economic effects. In our analysis, we allow this overall response to be related to three more specific concerns: labour market competition, public burden, and efficiency considerations. We identify these three response sets from specific survey questions that are directly related to each of these factors. We draw on new and informative data from the European Social Survey (ESS). This survey includes attitudinal information for some 22 European and associated countries, and has a specific module on migration and minorityrelated issues. This module not only provides information on the overall attitudinal response of individuals to further immigration, but also direct responses to a battery of questions concerning the effect on the economy. Our interpretation of the data follows structure imposed by economic theory. We first present a simplified theoretical model which describes the manner and the circumstances under which immigration may benefit or harm different groups in the population. This model is in its nature similar to standard equilibrium models in the literature, but, besides allowing analysis of
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labour market effects of immigration, allows, in addition, analysis of welfare effects of immigration through taxation and welfare payments. According to Borjas (1999a) these are the two main concerns people have when forming attitudes about migration. We also discuss generalisations to capture other possible dimensions of economic concern. It is not so important in the current context whether this model accurately reflects the working of the economy as whether it captures the way individuals might sensibly think about the gains or losses they will incur as a consequence of immigration. We then discuss the empirical implications of this model, and the way these may be reflected in the data we have available. Our empirical analysis has a descriptive part, where we relate responses to the overall evaluation of immigration as well as to demographic information of respondents. We then proceed to a more structural analysis, where we impose a factor structure on the responses concerning particular issues, and where we seek to distinguish between labour market concerns, public burden, and efficiency considerations. Each of these factors is related to a set of responses regarding particular implications of immigration, and we determine the way these factors, in turn, relate to the overall evaluation of whether immigration is good or bad for the economy. The structure of the paper is as follows. In the next section, we present the background theoretical model (Section 2). We then discuss briefly implications for empirical analysis (Section 3). We describe the data set which we use for our analysis in Section 4, and provide descriptive information in Section 5. We then explain our estimation method (Section 6) for the factor model and discuss results in Section 7. Finally, Section 8 concludes.
2. IMMIGRATION: WAGES, TAXES, AND GENERAL WELFARE EFFECTS Our prime interest in this paper is to understand the considerations lying behind individuals’ general opinions on whether immigration is harmful or beneficial for the economy. As we explain in the introduction, these drivers of opinion may relate to labour market competition, to the welfare and tax system as well as to distributional aspects of migration and general welfare considerations reaching beyond national borders. Economic theory is well suited to investigate all these aspects in simple equilibrium models. Even though it would be silly to believe individuals form judgements by working explicitly through models of this sort, individuals observe outcomes in the economies which they inhabit, and it is not
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Is Immigration Good or Bad for the Economy?
unreasonable to look to the basic mechanisms of such models for guidance as to the sort of beliefs it would be sensible to imagine people might form on the workings of the relevant economic processes. As a motivation for our empirical analysis below, to impose an economically motivated structure on these processes, and to help derive wellfounded empirical implications, we therefore commence by presenting a simple equilibrium model, which helps to structure the way individuals might think about the effect of immigration on the labour market and the welfare system. Although the model allows relatively straightforward derivation of the basic welfare and labour market effects of immigration, the complexity of extending it to general welfare considerations forbids formal development in this paper. While we use formal argumentation to cover wage, employment, and tax effects, we use intuitive argumentation to develop ideas about extensions to other aspects.
2.1. A Simple Equilibrium Model Our model distinguishes between two types of workers (skilled and unskilled) to emphasise the differences in opinion that may result from the different ways immigration can affect current residents in various skill categories. Suppose there are two labour types, skilled (S) and unskilled (U), earning wages wS and wU : The numbers of workers of the two types are given by xi ¼ fi N þ ci M;
i 2 I fS; Ug
where N is the total current population, M the total immigrant population, and fi and ci the skill group shares in the two groups. We consider below, the marginal effects of immigration at the current position where the ratio of immigrants to the current population is p ¼ M=N ¼ 0: Changes in skill group shares follow from d ln xi =dp ’ bi
i2I
where bi ¼ ðci =fi Þ is the relative skill share of immigrants, assumed constant. Capital is assumed elastically supplied at a return to capital, r, which is fixed on world markets. We consider two cases differing in the number of goods produced by the economy. Either the economy produces one good in quantity y0 or two goods in quantities y0 and y1 : We denote the set of goods by J which therefore equals f0g or f0; 1g: These goods are assumed traded and the economy is small, so that their prices p0 and p1 are set on world markets.
8
CHRISTIAN DUSTMANN AND IAN PRESTON
This distinction allows us to differentiate between the case where the economy adjusts to immigration through the output mix, and where the only channel of adjustment is through factor prices. Assuming constant returns to scale and excluding the possibility of joint production, we write the unit cost function for the jth output as cj ðwS ; wU ; rÞ; j 2 J: Letting cji ðwS ; wU ; rÞ denote the derivative @cj =@wi ; demand for the ith type of labour is therefore Sj2J yj cji by Shephard’s lemma. Wages and outputs are determined by two equilibrium conditions. Firstly, labour market equilibrium requires equality of demand and supply of labour, i.e. X yj cji ðwS ; wU ; rÞ xi ¼ 0 i 2 I (1) j2J
and second, firms earn zero profits and therefore ln cj ðwS ; wU ; rÞ ln pj ¼ 0
j2J
(2)
2.2. The Government Budget Constraint Both immigrants and those currently resident consume government services. However, since immigrants differ from current residents in their age, health, number of children, and so on, we should expect them to consume different amounts of government services than residents. We assume therefore that each current resident consumes G and each immigrant G of public services.3 Government spending is financed by a proportional tax on labour income4 at a rate t which is determined to secure government budget balance: X xi wi ¼ GN þ GM (3) t i2I
The welfare of currently resident workers depends on their after-tax wages W i ¼ ð1 tÞwi ; i 2 I so that d ln W i d ln wi t d ln t ¼ 1 t dp dp dp
i2I
(4)
In other words, the effect of migration on after-tax wages works through two channels by affecting before-tax wages and the tax rate. 2.2.1. Two Output Goods Consider first the case with two types of output. Reasoning only from (2) and noting that output prices are fixed by the small country assumption, we
Is Immigration Good or Bad for the Economy?
9
have y0S d ln wS þ y0U d ln wU ¼ 0 y1S d ln wS þ y1U d ln wU ¼ 0 where y0i ¼ @ ln c0 =@ ln wi denotes a factor share. From this it follows immediately that d ln wU =dp ¼ d ln wS =dp ¼ 0: This result, essentially similar to the factor price equalisation theorem (Samuelson, 1948), is what Leamer and Levinsohn (1995) call factor price insensitivity. Wages are determined solely by prices through the zero profit condition (2). Insensitivity extends to non-marginal changes Dp; provided that immigration is not so large as to take factor endowments out of the economy’s cone of diversification, in which case the economy would stop producing one of the two goods. Rather than impacting on wages, long-run effects of immigration are felt in the output mix. These responses can also be deduced and follow from (1) given unchanged factor prices: r0S d ln y0 þ ð1 r0S Þ d ln y1 ¼ bS dp r0U d ln y0 þ ð1 r0U Þ d ln y1 ¼ bU dp where rji ¼ yj cji =Sk2J yk cki denotes a sectoral share in a factor market. Therefore, d lnðy0 =y1 Þ bS bU ¼ 0 dp rS r0U and unskilled immigration leads to a relative expansion of the sector using unskilled labour relatively intensively, in line with the Rybczynski (1955) theorem. For fixed levels of output, equilibrium between cost-minimising factor demands and changed labour endowments would imply wage changes. However, these would lead to positive profits being earned in sectors using intensively labour types which become cheaper. Output in such sectors would be expected to expand, driving back up wages, and long-run equilibrium would not be restored until wages were driven back to their initial levels. Given the absence of wage effects, effects of immigration on the welfare of current workers of both types is dependent solely on the change in the tax rate required by government budget balance. From (3) follows: d ln t þ zS d ln xS þ zU d ln xU ¼ g dp where zi ¼ wi xi =Sk2I wk xk is a share in labour income and g ¼ G=G denotes relative publicly funded consumption of immigrants. Thus, noting
10
CHRISTIAN DUSTMANN AND IAN PRESTON
that zi ¼ twi fi =G; d ln t t ¼ g ðwS cS þ wU cU Þ dp G which simply says that immigration is beneficial to current workers if and only if immigrants contribute more in labour taxes than they take out in consumption of government services. Note that if g ¼ bS ¼ bU ¼ 1 so that immigrants are identical to the current population in both skill composition and public service consumption, then d ln t=dp ¼ 0 by simple substitution from the government budget constraint. However, if immigrants differ from the current population in either respect, then there may still be positive or negative welfare effects. For a given public service consumption G; the perceived gain or loss depends on the allocation of immigrants to skill groups. If immigration is mainly skilled, contributions to the welfare system will be larger and immigration more favourable. 2.2.2. One Output Good We now consider the case where the economy is not able to react to immigration that differs in skill composition from the current labour force by adjusting the output mix. The simplest model to reflect insufficient flexibility is the one output model. This model is often used in the labour literature to motivate the way immigration may affect employment and wages (see, for example, Altonji & Card, 1991; Borjas, 1994). In this model, there will be employment- and wage effects whenever the immigrant population differs in skill mix from the current population. In the one output good case, we obtain the following system of equations determining output, unskilled and skilled wage changes in response to immigration: d ln y0 þ 0SS d ln wS þ 0SU d ln wU ¼ d ln xS ¼ bS dp d ln y0 þ 0US d ln wS þ 0UU d ln wU ¼ d ln xU ¼ bU dp y0S d ln wS þ y0U d ln wU ¼ 0 where 0ij ¼ @ ln c0i =@ ln wj denotes a labour demand elasticity. Hence, by substitution, we obtain d ln wU b U bS ¼ y0 y0 dp 0 0 UU ðSU þ yU0 0US Þ þ 0SS yU0 S
S
(5)
Is Immigration Good or Bad for the Economy?
d ln wS y0 d ln wU ¼ U0 dp dp yS
11
(6)
It is immediately obvious from these two equations that, in the case where immigrants resemble in their skill composition the resident labour force, we should again expect no wage effects, as bU ¼ bS : Tax and welfare effects are therefore as in the two good case. If, however, the skill mix differs then we should expect changes in wages (and output mix). Negativity of the denominator in (5) follows from concavity of the cost function5 and therefore immigration should be expected to depress the wages of workers competing with the type relatively more abundant in immigrant labour and to raise the wages of the other labour type. For example, unskilled immigration therefore depresses unskilled wages and raises skilled wages. There are wage effects but they are not uniform and therefore also raise distributional issues. At the margin, immigrating labour is paid the value of its marginal product and therefore the total remuneration of the existing workforce is unaffected – gains to one labour type exactly offset the losses of the other. However, if we consider non-marginal immigration Dp; we need to appreciate that all immigrating labour is paid the marginal product of the last immigrant and the surplus thus generated on the labour of inframarginal immigrants accrues to owners of other factors (see Berry & Soligo, 1969; Johnson & Stafford, 1999). Total remuneration of workers already resident rises, albeit that some benefit and some lose – this is the so-called ‘‘immigration surplus’’. Returning to the government budget constraint, we can infer d ln t t X d ln wi ¼g wi ci þ fi dp G i2I dp so that effects on the tax rate now require that we recognise the consequences of changes in the wage structure of current workers for tax receipts. Effects on welfare of the workers of the two types then follow from (4) and require weighing up labour market and government budget effects.
2.3. Generalisations 2.3.1. Traded and Non-Traded Goods, Multiple Factors and Immigrants’ Skill Composition The nature of the solution in general depends upon a comparison between the numbers of goods produced and of labour types. The observations
12
CHRISTIAN DUSTMANN AND IAN PRESTON
above can be generalised beyond the case of only two labour types, and can also be extended to allow for non-traded goods.6 What is at issue is the ability of the economy to respond to immigration through flexibility in its output mix. With sufficient number of traded goods, there is no need for immigration to induce factor price changes – whatever the skill mix of immigrating labour – and welfare effects on current workers follow simply from a comparison of immigrants’ tax contributions and consumption of public services. The same is true, even with fewer output goods, if the skill mix in immigrant labour exactly matches that of the current workforce. However, if the skill mix of immigrant labour does differ, then a smaller number of traded goods means that there are insufficient degrees of freedom to accommodate changes in the skill mix through changes in the output mix, and wage changes are therefore nonzero even in the long run. In this case, workers of different types are likely to feel differently about the economic effects of immigration, and a full evaluation of welfare effects on current workers of any labour type require that we weigh up tax and wage effects. 2.3.2. Elastic Labour Supply In the analysis above, we have assumed that labour is completely inelastic. Hence, workers will supply labour at any wage, and immigration will not have employment effects. This, of course, can be extended by assuming that labour supply is elastic, so that some current workers will not be willing to work after immigration, as wages fall below their reservation wages. By this mechanism, reasoning about wage effects of migration can be supplemented with an analysis of voluntary employment responses in the already resident workforce. If unemployed workers can claim from the state then this might open up another mechanism through which tax rates could be affected by immigration. 2.3.3. Disequilibrium The analysis offered so far has been based on assumptions of labour market equilibrium. If we allow for mechanisms preventing factor prices from reaching equilibrium then the effects of immigration will clearly differ. In such cases, immigration may act as an alternative means of equilibration by increasing the relative supply of factors in excess demand (though it could also aggravate disequilibrium if tending to bring in factors in excess supply). Arguments about the benefits of migration as a means of, say, alleviating skill shortages could be conceptualised in this way.
Is Immigration Good or Bad for the Economy?
13
2.4. Effects on Migrants and Sending Countries Effects of migration are plainly not confined to the residents of the host country. There are welfare consequences for both the migrants themselves and residents of the country that they leave. To the extent that migration is voluntary and well informed, it has to be assumed that migrants are better off as a consequence, either economically or in some other way. In economic terms in a model such as that above, this could be in wage gains or in access to the public services of the host country. Effects on residents of the sending country can be analysed in ways that mirror the discussion of the host country above. If the sending country is small, produces both goods and trades at world prices then we should also expect no effect on wages from emigration. Analysis of general welfare effects requires that we make assumptions about sources of international wage differences. With no international technology differences and both goods produced, for example, trade in goods assures equalisation of factor prices without factor mobility whereas if productivity of different types of workers differs depending upon location then factor prices can differ internationally and labour movement will be correspondingly encouraged.7 However, if only one good is produced, wages abroad and at home can be affected by labour movement, and immigration creates an aggregate deficit in the sending country just as it creates a surplus in the receiving country. The impact on world welfare requires that we balance the loss in one country with the gain in the other and the gain to the migrants. If we assume that migrants move to the country where their labour type is better paid, then it can be shown that the overall gain is positive – the world as a whole benefits from movement of labour to locations where it is best remunerated (see Berry & Soligo, 1969; Ruffin, 1984).
3. EMPIRICAL IMPLICATIONS The analysis above provides some suggestions about the range of effects compatible with simple economic models. Individuals are likely to be aware of the overall patterns according to which economic processes determine effects of migration.8 Below, we focus attention on responses to a range of questions from the ESS that are concerned specifically with economic impact. To the extent that answers to these questions are rationalisable in terms consistent with such economic theory, the discussion above points to
14
CHRISTIAN DUSTMANN AND IAN PRESTON
the sort of considerations that might underlie responses. These considerations can be thought of as falling into three types.
3.1. Labour Market Competition Firstly, immigration has the potential to alter labour market outcomes if the skill mix among immigrants is expected to differ from that of the current workforce. In our model these effects could arise if the economy reacts to changes in the skill mix through wage adjustments. If there are effects on wages then these will differ across skill groups and we should therefore expect awareness of such effects to differ across different skill groups. In particular, low-skilled migration should be felt as threatening by low-skilled residents. As we point out, with elastic labour supply, adjustment through wages may also induce unemployment – again being harmful for those who are in competition with immigrant labour. Furthermore, as we point out above, although the unskilled may be harmed, skilled labour will generally benefit, thus creating distributional effects. We should therefore also expect to find such considerations manifested in concerns about effects on the income distribution.
3.2. Public Finance Burden Secondly, immigration can increase or alleviate tax burdens if immigrants are expected to differ from the current population either in skill mix or in propensity to consume public services. In particular, if immigrants are expected to consume more out of public services than residents, then this may be perceived as a possible disadvantage of the overall effects of migration. To the extent that the implied additional tax burdens fall more heavily on the rich, then this may again be a source of difference in opinion across skill groups and income classes. Furthermore, any expected impact on unemployment may also be expected to feed through into concerns about public tax and welfare burdens: If immigration creates unemployment, it will increase the tax burden, thus harming the economically active in the resident workforce.
3.3. Efficiency Thirdly, immigration may be felt to enhance efficiency domestically by alleviating disequilibrium in factor markets, as our discussion above suggests.
Is Immigration Good or Bad for the Economy?
15
Also, for those with a broader perspective, the beneficial impact on world allocation of factor resources may be felt as an international efficiency gain. Notice that efficiency gains of this sort should be of potential benefit to all residents collectively and can be less clearly related to individual circumstances.
4. THE EUROPEAN SOCIAL SURVEY The data we use for our empirical analysis come from the European Social Survey (ESS). The first wave of the ESS was conducted in fall 2002. The ESS interviews between 1,200 and 3,000 people in each of the 22 countries, including all the countries belonging to the EU, seven former Eastern European countries and Israel. Included in the first ESS is a topical module on attitudes towards immigrants and minorities. The module includes over 50 questions.9 A subset of these are specifically economic and address themselves to precisely the considerations alluded to in the theory above. We concentrate on seven questions and display means and standard deviations of these questions in Table 1.10 The first question is an overall question on whether immigration is considered to be good or bad for the economy (Overall). In our analysis below, we seek to explain this question by more specific underlying economic concerns as addressed by the latter six questions. These relate to the underlying issues identified above. The questions Wage and Jobs directly relate to concerns individuals may have about the labour market impact of migration – the first set of our empirical implications discussed above. The question Poor addresses directly distributional aspects and is also most plainly thought of in terms of labour market competition. As we have pointed out above immigration may harm some, but will benefit others, even though typically generating an overall surplus for the receiving economy. The question Tax directly addresses concerns individuals may have about the tax and public spending implications of immigration. Answers regarding Jobs and Poor, because relevant also to distributional impacts which may feed through into taxation and government spending, can also be thought relevant to public finance implications. Finally, the last two questions (Fill and Gain) are statements primarily relating to efficiency aspects of migration – also discussed above. Because the filling of labour market vacancies may also affect wages of other workers, the question Fill may in addition relate to the labour market aspects of immigration.
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CHRISTIAN DUSTMANN AND IAN PRESTON
Table 1. Variable Name
Overall
Wage
Poor
Jobs
Tax
Fill
Gain
Immigration questions in the European Social Survey.
Survey Question
Immigration is good or bad for country’s economy
Range of Responses
0: bad for the economy 10: good for the economy Average wages are 1: agree strongly generally brought down 5: disagree strongly by immigrants Immigrants harm 1: agree strongly 5: disagree strongly economic prospects of the poor more than the rich 0: take jobs away – Immigrants take jobs 10: create new jobs away in country or create new jobs Immigrants take out more 0: generally take out more in services more than they put in through 10: generally put in more taxes 1: disagree strongly Immigrants help to fill jobs where there are 5: agree strongly shortages of workers All countries benefit if 1: disagree strongly people can move where 5: agree strongly their skills are needed
Mean
Standard Deviation Total
Between country
4.98
2.37
0.65
2.95
1.13
0.41
2.69
1.09
0.34
4.54
2.24
0.81
4.24
2.23
0.50
3.50
1.01
0.23
3.73
0.90
0.14
The objective of the analysis below is to estimate a model that allows us to identify the relevance of these concerns to overall assessment of the impact of immigration on the economy as captured in responses to the first question. In order to do that, we impose a particular factor structure described below. We first describe the responses in more detail in the next section.
5. DESCRIPTIVE OVERVIEW In the following figures, we display the mean responses to the seven questions we use for our analysis. The graphs plot the means of responses by age- and education group. We distinguish between the four age groups (14–30, 31–45, 46–60, and above 60) and the three education groups (low, intermediate, and
17
Is Immigration Good or Bad for the Economy?
0: Bad for Economy 10: Good for Economy
high education). Fig. 1 displays group means for the general questions whether immigrants are good or bad for the economy. Responses differ clearly between education groups, with the low educated being less positive than the highly educated. There are only slight differences in responses across age groups. Fig. 2 displays responses to questions on wage- and employment effects. Again, the differences across educational categories are quite dramatic, with the low educated being much more inclined to assume negative wage- and employment effects than the highly educated. This is compatible with our model if immigration is perceived to be mainly unskilled. Fig. 3 displays responses to questions regarding the effects of immigration on taxes and services (left panel) and distributional effects. Regarding taxes and welfare receipts, it is again the lower educated who are more concerned about immigrants being net recipients of the public finance system. Quite interesting are also the relatively large differences between the young and the old, with older respondents tending to be more sceptical about immigrants making a positive contribution. Regarding distributional concerns, the differences in both age- and educational groups are clearly visible. The less educated seem to be more concerned about immigration imposing a larger burden on the poor – a view
Immigrants bad/good for economy 6
5.5
5
4.5
4 Low
Intermediate Education Age 20−30 Age 46−60
Fig. 1.
High
Age 31−45 Age > 60
Immigrants and the Economy. Source: European Social Survey, 2003.
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CHRISTIAN DUSTMANN AND IAN PRESTON
that is compatible with our model above in the case of unskilled immigration. While the three younger age groups seem to be quite similar in responses, it is the groups of the above 60-year- olds that is most concerned about more harmful effects on the poor. Fig. 4 displays responses to questions relating to efficiency aspects of migration. In the left panel, responses are displayed that relate to whether respondents believe that immigrants fill jobs where there are shortages – an argument that is often used as justification for more liberal migration policies. Responses differ again between educational categories, but there are also substantial differences across age groups, with older workers being more
Immigrants bring wages down
Immigrants take away jobs/create new jobs 5.5 0: Take away jobs 10: Create New Jobs
1: agree; 5: disagree
3.4 3.2 3 2.8
4.5
4
2.6 Low
Intermediate Education Age 20−30 Age 46−60
Fig. 2.
High
Low
Age 31− 45 Age > 60
Intermediate Education Age 20−30 Age 46−60
High Age 31−45 Age > 60
Wages and Jobs. Source: European Social Survey, 2003.
Immigrants and taxes/services
Immigrants harm poor more than rich 3.2
5 1: agree; 5: disagree
0: take out more 10: take out less
5
4.5
4
3 2.8 2.6 2.4
3.5 Low
Intermediate Education Age 20 − 30 Age 46−60
Fig. 3.
High Age 31−45 Age > 60
Low
Intermediate Education Age 20−30 Age 46−60
High Age 31− 45 Age > 60
Taxes and Distribution. Source: European Social Survey, 2003.
Is Immigration Good or Bad for the Economy?
Immigrants help to fill jobs
Benefit of free movement 3.9
3.7
1: disagree; 5: agree
1: disagree; 5: agree
3.8 3.6
3.5
3.7
3.6
3.4 3.5
Low
Intermediate Education Age 20-30 Age 46-60
Fig. 4.
High Age 31-45 Age > 60
Low
Intermediate Education Age 20-30 Age 46-60
High Age 31-45 Age > 60
Efficiency. Source: European Social Survey, 2003.
19
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CHRISTIAN DUSTMANN AND IAN PRESTON
in agreement with immigrants filling jobs where there are shortages.11 There is a clear ordering across age groups, with the youngest being most sceptical. The right panel in Fig. 4 relates to overall assessment of the benefits of allowing workers to move where their skills are needed. In terms of our model, this should be welfare enhancing, and the majority of respondents are in agreement with that. Furthermore, there are no strong education patterns, as we observed in the previous responses, and small age differentials, with the older ones being more in agreement with beneficial effects from free movement than the younger ones. Notice that the nature of our data (we only observe a cross section) does not allow us to distinguish between age- and cohort effects, so that the differences in responses across different age groups may be either an age effect, or a cohort effect, or both. In our analysis below, we will associate each of these responses to a set of additional individual characteristics, over and above age and education. The variables we use are displayed in Table 2.
6. THE ECONOMETRIC MODEL Our empirical analysis attempts to relate the overall judgement of whether immigration is harmful or beneficial to three distinct underlying factors: labour market concerns, welfare concerns, and efficiency considerations. We assume that each of these underlying factors is related to a specific subset of survey questions. We explain in this section how our estimation method works. Notice first that we consider all the outcomes we observe (denoted by yi ; zi and which are displayed in Table 1) as discrete responses which relate to underlying continuous and latent variables yni ; zni in the following way:
n
yn ¼ f L þ XA þ u
(7)
zn ¼ fM þ XB þ v
(8)
where y is an n 1 vector of latent attitudinal responses to the question on overall economic effect of immigration for n individuals (variable Overall), zn an n q matrix of latent attitudinal responses to the questions on specific economic effects, and X an n k matrix of observed characteristics. In our analysis, these refer to those characteristics that we display in Table 2. The matrix f is an n p matrix of factor scores capturing the p underlying dimensions to economic concerns, L a p 1 vector of loadings reflecting the
21
Is Immigration Good or Bad for the Economy?
Table 2. Variable Name
Variable Names and Descriptive Statistics. Proportion
Standard Deviation Total
Between countries
Labour market status Unemployed Inactive Retired House work Student
0.036 0.020 0.208 0.235 0.106
0.187 0.140 0.406 0.424 0.308
0.019 0.011 0.041 0.109 0.047
Education Secondary Higher
0.635 0.208
0.481 0.400
0.165 0.069
Immigrant status Immigrant Father immigrant Mother immigrant
0.092 0.136 0.132
0.289 0.343 0.339
0.080 0.145 0.139
Other Male Minority City Town
0.498 0.039 0.335 0.297
0.500 0.193 0.472 0.457
0.031 0.028 0.106 0.089
Variable Name
Age (in years)
Mean
45.60
Standard Deviation Total
Between countries
17.54
2.26
Note: The participating countries in the ESS that are included in our sample are: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and United Kingdom.
importance of these concerns to overall assessment of economic impact, and M a p q matrix which maps the factor scores into the opinions on specific effects. Following our discussion above, we take p ¼ 3 with factors corresponding to concerns about labour market competition, public finance burden, and efficiency. The n 1 vector u and n q matrix v contain disturbance terms assumed normally distributed and uncorrelated with either X or f or each other so that
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CHRISTIAN DUSTMANN AND IAN PRESTON
0 u N ; 0 v
Su
0
0
Sv
!!
(9)
with Sv diagonal. The factors are themselves allowed to be influenced by the regressors X : (10)
f ¼ XC þ w
where c is a k p matrix of coefficients in the underlying lower dimensional model. We assume that w Nð0; Sw Þ with w uncorrelated with u and v: Notice that we do not need to assume diagonality of Sw : This structure implies an estimable reduced form, which can easily be obtained by substitution. Let Y n denote the stacked vector of latent responses, n y n Y ¼ zn We then obtain Yn ¼ XG þ
(11)
where G¼C
L M
þ
A B
(12)
is the ð1 þ qÞ k matrix of reduced form coefficients and L u ¼w þ M v
(13)
Then Nð0; S Þ; where S ¼
Su þ L0 Sw L
L0 Sw M
M 0 Sw L
Sv þ M 0 Sw M
!
S11 S012
S12 S22
!
(14)
is the ðq þ 1Þ ðq þ 1Þ variance–covariance matrix of the reduced form residuals. In implementing this it is the restrictions placed on M which are crucial to identification. We could assume each factor to load solely on strict subsets of zn : In this we are guided by the core idea that the variables Wage and Poor are the most relevant for the labour market competition factor, it Jobs and Tax for the public burden factor, and Fill and Gain for the efficiency
Is Immigration Good or Bad for the Economy?
23
factor. We have estimated a specification allowing only for these loadings – which is to say with block diagonal M – but also other specifications allowing for a certain overlap. Results are qualitatively robust across these specifications. The results we present below are based on the following relatively permissive specification as suggested by the discussion in Section 4: the first factor, reflecting labour market competition, loads solely on the responses Wages, Poor, Jobs, and Fill; the second factor, reflecting public finance burden, loads solely on the responses Poor, Jobs, and Tax; the third factor, reflecting efficiency, loads solely on the responses Fill and Gain.
6.1. Estimation We proceed to estimate the model in several stages. First we estimate the reduced form parameters of the model in (11), consisting of the matrix G and the covariance matrix S ; without imposing the restrictions in (12) and (14). We estimate G by independent ordered probit estimation for the seven responses. We then estimate S by a series of pairwise bivariate ordered probits fixing the value of G at their estimated values. Results are reported in Tables 3 and A1 (the latter in the appendix), and we discuss them in Section 7. These unrestricted latent covariance estimates allow us to form unrestricted estimates of the implied regression coefficients linking the latent responses @Eðyn jzn ; X Þ=@zn ¼ S1 22 S12 : In other words, we derive the parameter estimates we would obtain, if we regressed the latent underlying variable of the overall assessment of whether migration is good or bad on the latent six other more specific responses, conditional on all the regressors included in the matrix X : These are reported in Table 4 and we discuss them in Section 7.2. We can now impose the additional restrictions in (14), implied by our factor structure on the model. We impose these restrictions by equally weighted minimum distance estimation on the reduced form parameters to identify the parameters in L; M and Sw : Tests of overidentifying restrictions are calculated using formulae from Newey (1985). The present results are given in Table 5 and discussed in Section 7.3.12
Variable
Overall
24
Table 3.
Perceived Economic Impact.
Wages
Poor
Jobs
Tax
t-ratio
Coeff
t-ratio
Coeff
t-ratio
Coeff
0.140 0.071 0.010 0.004 0.260
4.76 1.81 0.48 0.29 11.08
0.199 0.092 0.056 0.020 0.169
6.61 2.30 2.50 1.26 6.91
0.205 0.101 0.058 0.010 0.131
6.70 2.44 2.60 0.61 5.44
0.023 0.0661 0.005 0.002 0.193
0.224 0.349
15.96 21.39
0.194 0.341
13.25 20.25
0.176 0.288
11.90 17.38
0.159 0.264
11.42 15.73
0.124 0.232
8.79 14.16
2.40 8.27
0.030 0.019
1.95 1.14
0.281 0.114 0.181
11.52 4.50 6.91
0.077 0.074 0.104
2.83 2.70 3.74
0.142 0.061 0.147
5.17 2.23 5.20
0.320 0.060 0.184
13.30 2.36 7.07
0.260 0.139 0.134
10.34 0.114 4.09 5.41 0.020 0.71 5.07 0.132 4.68
0.074 0.096 0.009
2.57 3.45 0.31
0.074 3.68 0.067 3.22 0.006 2.98 0.007 3.21 0.137 11.35 0.054 4.29 0.170 2.56 0.105 3.59 0.125 8.68 0.023 1.57 0.059 3.99 0.033 2.20
0.024 0.001 0.005 0.049 0.004 0.020
1.15 0.24 0.40 1.68 0.27 1.31
0.000 0.000 0.019 0.001 0.055 0.014
t-ratio
Coeff
Gain
Coeff
t-ratio
Coeff
Fill t-ratio
Coeff
t-ratio
Labour market status 7.71 0.130 4.42 0.087 2.93 0.007 0.22 1.60 0.082 2.05 0.034 0.83 0.048 1.14 0.24 0.007 0.31 0.005 0.23 0.025 1.10 0.77 0.007 0.49 0.024 1.47 0.014 0.90 8.30 0.187 7.89 0.123 4.97 0.060 2.49 0.035 0.145
Immigrant status Immigrant Father immigrant Mother immigrant Other Age/10 Age2/100 Male Minority City Town Sample size
31,822
Note: All ordered probit estimates. Country dummies included in all cases.
0.01 0.008 0.40 0.09 0.001 0.37 1.60 0.027 2.20 0.03 0.051 1.81 3.79 0.069 4.80 0.95 0.055 3.71
0.026 0.001 0.018 0.072 0.056 0.014
1.23 0.040 1.88 0.36 0.002 1.02 1.44 0.015 1.20 2.46 0.069 2.29 3.68 0.034 2.22 0.90 0.039 2.54
CHRISTIAN DUSTMANN AND IAN PRESTON
Unemployed Inactive Retired House work Student Education Secondary Higher
25
Is Immigration Good or Bad for the Economy?
Table 4.
Implied Latent Regression Coefficients.
Variable
Coeff
t-ratio
Wage Poor Jobs Tax Fill Gain
0.0813 0.0810 0.2901 0.3336 0.1027 0.0605
12.70 12.12 44.03 54.36 21.81 13.04
Sample size
31,822
7. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 7.1. Unrestricted Ordered Probit Estimates In Table 3 we display results from the independent ordered probit models. We distinguish between four sets of regressors: The individual’s labour market status, education, immigrant status, and other variables, including age, gender, minority affiliation, and urbanisation. In all our regressions we condition on country dummies. The reference category is a native-born rural majority female in paid work without secondary education and with native parents. All responses are normalised in such a way that a positive number indicates a more optimistic view about a particular outcome. The first pair of columns shows results for the overall assessment of whether immigration is bad or good for the economy and respective t-ratios. The labour market status variables suggest that individuals in paid work or students have an overall more optimistic view about the impact of immigration than the unemployed. This is similar for questions relating to labour market competition and public burden, but the relationship seems unclear for some of the efficiency questions. Not surprisingly, immigrants have not only a more positive view about the overall effect of immigration than natives (immigrants are in the reference group), but evaluate also the impact of migration on other concerns more positively. Interestingly, an optimistic view seems to be stronger even among second-generation immigrants. The partial regression coefficients on the educational dummies are much in line with our descriptive graphs above. Higher education is associated with a more optimistic view on migration, and the coefficient estimates are highly significant. This interpretation extends to all the questions in the
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CHRISTIAN DUSTMANN AND IAN PRESTON
Table 5.
Three-Factor Model. M matrix
Variable
Wage Poor Jobs Tax Fill Gain
Labour Market Competition
Public Burden
Efficiency
Sv
Coeff
t-ratio
Coeff
t-ratio
Coeff
t-ratio
0.784 0.651 0.098 — 0.052 —
28.61 17.93 9.69 — 3.57 —
— 0.132 0.638 0.669 — —
— 4.43 75.62 120.23 — —
— — — — 0.579 0.334
— — — — 37.31 37.27
0.386 0.478 0.525 0.553 0.677 0.889
Lmatrix Variable
Overall
Variable
Labour market competition Public burden Efficiency
Labour Market Competition Coeff
t-ratio
0.021
1.89
Public Burden
Coeff
Efficiency
Su
t-ratio
Coeff
t-ratio
0.728 55.78 Sw matrix
0.080
6.70
Labour Market Competition
Public Burden
0.388
Efficiency
1.000
—
0.468
23.68
0.238
10.52
0.468 0.238
23.68 10.52
1.000 0.514
— 37.34
0.514 1.000
37.34 —
Note: Overidentifying restrictions: w25 ¼ 125:596:
table, with the weakest association between education and gains from free movement (last column) – as in the figures above. Age effects differ across responses. This again is in line with our descriptive charts in Section 5. Individuals in more densely populated areas have a more optimistic opinion about the overall effects of immigration throughout.
7.2. Latent Response Regressions In Table 4, we display estimates of the implied regression coefficients as calculated from the estimated residual covariance matrix. These are
Is Immigration Good or Bad for the Economy?
27
unrestricted estimates of the derivative of the conditional expectation Eðyn jzn ; X Þ with respect to the latent variables in zn : Notice that normalisation of the variances in the first step estimation implies that estimates are interpretable as the impact of a one standard error change in the respective latent regressor on the latent overall assessment of whether immigration is good or bad, itself expressed in standard errors.13 All coefficient estimates are significant. The results suggest that tax and job concerns have the largest impact on the overall assessment of immigration, while the wage and distributional aspects are considerably weaker as are perceptions about general welfare gains of immigration.
7.3. Three-Factor Model We now turn to analysis where we structure the pattern of responses according to the three-factor model outlined above, each factor being allowed to be associated with the variable Overall. In Table 5, we report estimated loadings of the factors on the indicator questions (M matrix) and the vector of factor loadings on the overall assessment question (L vector) which we obtain by imposing the restrictions in (14), on our estimated reduced form coefficients. Estimates in this table are obtained without imposing any restrictions on the Sw matrix which determines the correlation between the factors. Results on the M matrix (displayed in the upper panel of the table) show well-determined coefficients in all parts of the matrix. Three of the variables are allowed to enter into more than one factor – namely the Poor, Jobs, and Fill variables. While there is evidence in each case of loading on more than one factor, the association is in each case much stronger with a particular one of them. The estimates on L are displayed in the second panel of the table. They appear to suggest the strongest role for fears about public finance burden, and a lower, but still significant role for efficiency considerations. There seems to be no evidence of importance for labour market competition. This may seem strange, given that the estimates in Table 4 in Section 7.2 do suggest a strong association. Notice, however, that we allow in our specification the different factors to be correlated, and our estimates suggest strong well-determined positive correlations across factors (as seen in the Sw matrix). The results therefore suggest that the variation in the public burden factor absorbs most of the variation in the labour market factor in explaining the overall assessment of whether migration is good or bad.
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CHRISTIAN DUSTMANN AND IAN PRESTON
This is an interesting result. In the strict interpretation of the model we have sketched above and to the extent that our identification of factors is plausible, this tends to suggest that the perception of possible harmful effects of immigration may be less associated with labour market competition than with worries about immigrants being a fiscal burden on the overall economic system. This is to some extent compatible with apparently contradictory results of previous empirical studies who, although establishing a strong link between education and general opposition to further immigration, did not find evidence for tense local labour markets (represented by local unemployment) being significantly associated with such responses. We should note that the overidentifying restrictions imposed by the model are rejected by the data, as clearly evidenced by the w25 value of 125.596. However, the model may not be badly misspecified when we consider the very large sample size and the possibly questionable auxiliary assumptions of linearity and normality. The uniqueness statistic of 0.388 in the Su column shows that the factor structure is capable of accounting for over 60 per cent of the variation in the overall opinion. If we estimate a model which does not permit correlation between the three factors, restricting the off diagonal elements of Sw to be zero, we do find a much stronger association between the overall evaluation and the labour market competition factor. Results of that model are displayed in Table A2 in the appendix. However, the massive increase in the w2 statistic suggests strong reason to reject the implied orthogonalisation of the factor structure. One conclusion to be drawn from this analysis is that strict interpretation of attitudinal responses within a labour competition context may be misleading and that there are other economic concerns that may be more prominently determining an overall opinion about the costs and benefits of immigration.
8. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS In this paper, we provide analysis of individual perceptions about the effects of immigration on the host country’s economy. Our paper contributes to a large and growing literature that tries to understand the particular concerns that drive residents’ attitudes towards immigration. We contribute to this literature by broadening the economic argument, allowing for consideration not only of factors relating to labour market competition, but also of factors relating to public burden and efficiency considerations. We provide a
Is Immigration Good or Bad for the Economy?
29
theoretical discussion that takes a broader view on the channels of welfare effects than much of the previous literature. We present empirical investigation based on more specific survey responses than have been used previously, studying the response to whether immigration is considered as good or bad for the economy as being determined by three more specific concerns: labour market competition, public burden, and efficiency considerations. Identification of these responses is based on specific survey questions that are directly related to each of these factors. Our analysis yields a set of interesting results. First, our theoretical model suggests that economic self-interest points to an assessment of the benefits and costs from immigration that encompasses not only labour market competition, but also taxes and public burden, as well as general welfare effects determined by efficiency considerations. Interpretations that focus solely on the competition aspect seem therefore quite narrow. Our empirical analysis supports findings in much of the previous literature of a strong relationship between education and more positive attitudes towards various issues relating to migration. We also find that the particular questions that focus on very particular concerns are all strongly related to the overall assessment of migration. When we impose a particular factor structure on the data, we find that concerns regarding economic competition are largely represented by overall concerns regarding public burden. This is an interesting finding which does not dispute the importance of economic concern in the determination and formation of attitudes and opinion about benefits and costs of migration, but the narrow interpretation within a labour market competition framework. By no means do we wish to imply that we have exploited the entire range of factors that affect assessment of costs and benefits of migration. We have concentrated here on some factors that are rationalisable within economic models, broadening the perspective of such analysis. However, we strongly believe that opinions on cultural effects and racial tolerance may be equally germane to responses on the overall desirability of immigration. Evidence provided by Dustmann and Preston (2004) supports this conjecture which we are exploring in greater depth using ESS data. We believe that research into this area is important and that the recent effort undertaken by economists in understanding various attitudes related to immigration and immigrants is most welcome. However, we also believe that the complexity of the processes that contribute to attitude formation requires approaches over and above sole economic argument. We have only just started to understand data regularities and evidence in this important area of research.
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CHRISTIAN DUSTMANN AND IAN PRESTON
NOTES 1. Research for the British Home Office (Gott & Johnston, 2002) recently suggested, for example, that immigrants to the UK make a positive net contribution to British public finances. 2. Related issues come up also in the literature on preferences on trade policies – see, for instance, papers by Mayda and Rodrik (2001), Scheve and Slaughter (2001), and O’Rourke and Sinnott (2001). 3. We could allow these amounts to depend also on the levels of wages and the skill compositions of the two groups. However, this would complicate the model without adding any appreciable insight. 4. We exclude, for convenience, the possibility that capital income is also taxed domestically. Since, we have assumed capital to be elastically supplied at a fixed (posttax) return, labour inflows should also lead to inflows of capital. To the extent that the returns to that capital attract domestic tax liabilities, this should soften the impact of immigration on public finances. However, since the owners of capital may reside abroad, it is not obvious how their income would be taxed. 5. Note that ! " 0 2 # 0 y0U 0 wU 0 c0U 0 c 0 0 0 yU UU SU þ 0 US þ SS 0 ¼ 0 cUU 2 0 cSU þ U0 c0SS c cS c yS yS U S which is a positive multiple of a quadratic form in the second derivatives of the cost function and therefore negative. 6. The relevant algebra can be drawn from trade theory models – see Ethier (1984), and Woodland (1982). 7. Trefler (1998) discusses welfare effects in such a model, and other cases, drawing attention to terms of trade effects that will occur where the economies are large. 8. Of course, evaluation of the benefits and costs of immigration may also be motivated by considerations which are non-economic (see Dustmann & Preston, 2004 for analysis of racial aspects to attitudes towards immigration). 9. See Card, Dustmann, and Preston (2006) for a more detailed description of the survey’s immigration module. 10. The variable names are chosen by us to reflect the earlier economic discussion rather than taken from the coding. We have reordered responses, so that higher values indicate a more positive response to immigration for each question. 11. As pointed out by a referee, one reason for this may be that immigrants are often employed in jobs related to care for the elderly. 12. For full details of how we calculate standard errors and test statistics, we refer the reader to Dustmann and Preston (2004). We draw on the work of Muthe´n (1984). Note though that identification of parameters in this particular model is subtler than in that paper – in particular the parameters of M are not identified in the current context solely from restrictions on S22 although all parameters of L; M; and Sw are identified from imposition of restrictions jointly on S12 and S22 : 13. The residual correlation matrix on which these results are based is presented in the appendix (Table A1).
Is Immigration Good or Bad for the Economy?
31
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS We are grateful to Maria Demousis for research assistance, to David Card for discussion, and to the Nuffield Foundation for financial support. Parts of this paper were written by Dustmann who visited the Research School of Social Sciences at the Australian National University. He is grateful for the hospitality.
REFERENCES Altonji, J. G., & Card, D. (1991). The effects of immigration on the labor market outcomes of less-skilled natives. In: J. M. Abowd & R. B. Freeman (Eds), Immigration, trade and labor. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Bauer, T., Lofstrom, M., & Zimmermann, K. F. (2000). Immigration policy, assimilation of immigrants and natives’ sentiments towards immigrants: Evidence from 12 OECDCountries. Swedish Economic Policy Review, 7, 11–53. Berry, R. A., & Soligo, R. (1969). Some welfare effects of international migration. Journal of Political Economy, 77, 778–794. Borjas, G. J. (1994). The economics of immigration. Journal of Economic Literature, 32(4), 1667–1717. Borjas, G. J. (1999a). Heaven’s door. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Borjas, G. J. (1999b). The economic analysis of immigration. In: O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (Eds), Handbook of labor economics, (Vol. 3A, pp. 1697–1760). Amsterdam: Elsevier. Borjas, G. J. (2003). The labor demand curve is downward sloping: Reexamining the impact of immigration on the labor market. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118, 1335–1374. Card, D. (2005). Is the new immigration really so bad? CReAM Discussion Paper 02/04; forthcoming Economic Journal Features. Card, D., Dustmann, C., & Preston, I. (2006). Understanding attitudes to immigration and national exclusiveness: The migration and minority module of the first European Social Survey. In: R. Jowell, C. Roberts, R. Fitzgerald & G. Eva (Eds), Measuring attitudes cross-nationally – lessons from the European Social Survey. Sage Publications. Dustmann, C., & Preston, I. (2004). Racial and economic factors in attitudes towards immigration. CReAM Discussion Paper no. 1. Dustmann, C., & Glitz, A. (2005). Immigration, jobs and wages: Theory, evidence and opinion. Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR), London, May. Espenshade, T. J., & Hempstead, K. (1996). Contemporary American attitudes towards U.S. immigration. International Migration Review, 30, 535–570. Ethier, W.J. (1984). Higher dimensional issues in trade theory. In: R.W. Jones, & P.B. Kenen (Eds.), Handbook of international economics, (Vol I), Amsterdam: Elsevier Science. Fertig, M., & Schmidt, C.M. (2002). The perception of foreigners and jews in Germany – a structural analysis of a large opinion survey. IZA Discussion Paper No. 431. Friedberg, R. M., & Hunt, J. (1995). The impact of immigration on host country wages, employment and growth. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 9, 23–44.
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Gang, I., Rivera-Batiz, F. & Yun, M.-S. (2002). Economic strain, ethnic concentration and attitudes towards foreigners in the European Union. Working Paper no. 2002–2014. Rutgers University Department of Economics. Gott, C., & Johnston, K. (2002). The migrant population in the UK: Fiscal effects. Home Office, RDS Occasional Paper no. 77. Johnson, G., & Stafford, F. (1999). The labour market implications of international trade. In: O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (Eds), Handbook of labor economics, (Vol. 3B, pp. 1697–1760). Amsterdam: Elsevier. Leamer, E. E., & Levinsohn, J. (1995). International trade theory: The evidence. In: G. Grossman & K. Rogoff (Eds), Handbook of international economics, Vol III (pp. 1339–1394). Amsterdam: Elsevier Science. Mayda, A.M. (2004). Who is against migration? A cross-country investigation of attitudes towards immigrants. IZA Discussion Paper No. 1115. Mayda, A.M., & Rodrik, D. (2001). Why are some people (and countries) more protectionist than others? NBER Working Paper no. 8461. Muthe´n, B. O. (1984). A general structural equation model with dichotomous, ordered categorical and continuous latent variable indicators. Psychometrica, 49, 115–132. Newey, W. K. (1985). Generalized method of moments specification testing. Journal of Econometrics, 29, 229–256. O’Rourke, K. H., & Sinnott, R. (2001). What determines attitudes towards protection? Some cross-country evidence. In: S. M. Collins & D. Rodrik (Eds), Brooking trade forum 2001 (pp. 157–206). Washington, DC: Brookings Institute Press. O’Rourke, K.H. & Sinnott, R. (2003). Migration flows: Political economy of migration and the empirical challenges. Trinity College Dublin Economic Papers 20036, Trinity College Dublin Economics Department. Ruffin, R. J. (1984). International factor movements. In: R. W. Jones & P. B. Kenen (Eds), Handbook of international economics, Vol. I. Amsterdam: Elsevier Science (Chapter 5). Rybczynski, T. M. (1955). Factor endowments and relative commodity prices. Economica, 22, 336–341. Samuelson, P. (1948). Internationalization of trade and the equalization of factor prices. Economic Journal, 48, 163–184. Scheve, K. F., & Slaughter, M. J. (2001). Labor market competition and individual preferences over immigration policy. Review of Economics and Statistics, 83, 133–145. Trefler, D. (1998). Immigrants and natives in general equilibrium trade models. In: J. P. Smith (Ed.), The immigration debate: Studies on the economic, demographic, and fiscal effects of immigration (pp. 206–238). Washington, DC: National Academy Press. Woodland, A. (1982). International trade and resource allocation. North Holland: Amsterdam.
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APPENDIX The residual correlation matrix and the three-factor model estimation for the case of diagonal Sw are given in Tables A1 and A2. Table A1. Residual Correlation Matrix. Variable
Overall
Wage
Poor
Jobs
Tax
Fill
Gain
Overall Wage Poor Jobs Tax Fill Gain
1.000 0.306 0.342 0.524 0.532 0.242 0.160
0.306 1.000 0.559 0.310 0.237 0.065 0.069
0.342 0.559 1.000 0.352 0.301 0.091 0.065
0.524 0.3061.0 0.352 1.000 0.455 0.207 0.125
0.532 0.237 0.301 0.455 1.000 0.165 0.099
0.242 0.065 0.091 0.207 0.165 1.000 0.189
0.160 0.069 0.065 0.125 0.099 0.189 1.000
Sample size
31,822
Note: Pairwise bivariate ordered probit estimates. Country dummies included in all cases.
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CHRISTIAN DUSTMANN AND IAN PRESTON
Table A2.
Three-Factor Model. M matrix
Variable
Wage Poor Jobs Tax Fill Gain
Labour Market Competition
Public Burden
Coeff
t-ratio
Coeff
0.939 0.573 0.350 — 0.139 —
61.79 65.16 48.34 — 22.67 —
— 0.307 0.577 0.818 — —
t-ratio
45.56 93.87 94.86
Efficiency
Sv
Coeff
t-ratio
— — — — 0.484 0.391
— — — — 42.20 38.20
0.119 0.578 0.544 0.332 0.747 0.847
L matrix Variable
Overall
Labour Market Competition
Public Burden
Efficiency
Coeff
t-ratio
Coeff
t-ratio
Coeff
t-ratio
0.313
43.18
0.661
98.71
0.410
40.96
Su
0.297
Sw matrix Variable
Labour Market Competition
Labour market competition Public Burden Efficiency
1.000
—
— —
Note: Overidentifying restrictions: w28 ¼ 3998:698
Public Burden — 1.000 —
Efficiency —
—
— 1.000
—
THE EFFECTS OF INCOMPLETE EMPLOYEE WAGE INFORMATION: A CROSS-COUNTRY ANALYSIS Solomon W. Polachek and Jun (Jeff) Xiang ABSTRACT In this paper, we define a tractable procedure to measure worker incomplete information in the labor market. The procedure, which makes use of earnings distribution skewness, is based on econometric frontier estimation techniques, and is consistent with search theory. We apply the technique to 11 countries over various years, and find that incomplete information leads workers to receive on average about 30–35% less pay than they otherwise would have earned, had they information on what each firm paid. Generally, married men and women suffer less from incomplete information than the widowed or divorced; and singles suffer the most. Women suffer more from incomplete information than men. Schooling and labor market experience reduce these losses, but institutions within a country can reduce them, as well. For example, we find that workers in countries that strongly support unemployment insurance (UI) receive wages closer to their potential, so doubling UI decreases incomplete information and results in 5% higher wages. A more dense population reduces search costs leading to less incomplete information. A more industrial economy disseminates wage information better, so workers exhibit less incomplete information and higher wages. Finally, we find that Research in Labor Economics: The Economics of Immigration and Social Diversity Research in Labor Economics, Volume 24, 35–75 Copyright r 2006 by Elsevier Ltd. All rights of reproduction in any form reserved ISSN: 0147-9121/doi:10.1016/S0147-9121(05)24002-5
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SOLOMON W. POLACHEK AND JUN (JEFF) XIANG
foreign worker inflows increase incomplete information, and at the same time reduce average wage levels, at least in the short run.
INTRODUCTION Tikva Lecker’s main research centers on two issues. First, she concentrated on earnings – particularly earnings of migrants including the Arabs in Israel. Second, she worked on policies affecting legal and illegal immigrant flows. As will be explained, this paper marries these two topics: immigration and earnings. It does so in a unique way. The paper goes back to George Stigler’s (1961, 1962) path breaking seminal work on incomplete information and applies earnings function concepts along with frontier estimation techniques to devise a measure of incomplete information, which we parameterize as the degree employees end up receiving wages less than their potential, given their skills. Then, once we estimate incomplete information, we explore how institutional factors, such as unemployment insurance and foreign worker inflows, affect incomplete information across eleven countries. Incomplete information leads workers to accept wages below what they could have attained had they full information about each potential employer’s pay.1 Workers could improve their wage by prolonging job search, but information about available jobs is costly. To find a job, workers search the market, but normally terminate their search before discovering the very highest paying job available. As explained by Nelson (1970); Mortensen (1970); McCall (1970) and others, individuals set a reservation wage and search until offered a job at least equal to this reservation wage. On average, the higher the reservation wage the longer the search, but invariably the accepted wage is almost always less than the best possible market wage available for a person of their skill level. Receiving a wage less than the maximum possible wage (given one’s skill) is an important phenomenon because it illustrates an effect of incomplete information that arises from costly search. Collectively, over the whole economy, it reflects foregone gross national product, since so many within the economy are similarly receiving less than they could potentially earn. Therefore in the aggregate, this wage gap reflects incomplete information’s cost to the economy. Measuring the effects of incomplete information is significant for at least two reasons. First, as just noted, one can gauge the overall economic losses associated with costly information. Second, by
The Effects of Incomplete Employee Wage Information
37
having a measure of these losses, one can assess appropriate policies needed to reduce search costs, thereby increasing efficiency within the economy. One result regarding policy seems pretty much universal in past literature: Unemployment insurance (measured by the replacement rate) subsidizes employee search, which lengthens unemployment duration (e.g., Moffitt & Nicholson, 1982; Meyer, 1990). The resulting extra search enables workers to obtain more information and higher wages (e.g., Ehrenberg & Oaxaca, 1976). A gigantic body of literature corroborates these findings regarding UI, both for the US and other countries (e.g., Jurajda & Tannery, 2003; Fougere, Pradel, & Roger 1998; Van den Berg & van der Klaauw, 2001; Micklwright & Nagy, 1995; Card & Levine, 1998; Beach & Kaliski, 1983; Ham & Rea, 1987; Arellano, Bentolila, & Bover, 1998; Belzil, 1995; Gonzalo, 2002). This paper differs from past empirical research in three ways. First, rather than concentrating on unemployment duration, it examines worker wages. It focuses on the extent to which workers receive a wage less than what they could be paid on the basis of their skill level. This focus enables the paper to get a metric defining the monetary effect (and indeed a measure of) incomplete information. Second, the paper examines incomplete information from an international perspective. Rather than examining incomplete information for one single country, it obtains measures for 11 countries over several time-periods. Third, by looking across countries, the paper is able to explain how inter-country institutional differences affect incomplete information. In testing our model, we first corroborate past findings on unemployment insurance. We show that an employee’s incomplete information is smaller where UI is a larger proportion of GDP. Then second, we test whether institutional factors lead to differences in incomplete employee information. In this context, we show that geographic considerations as well as industrial structure likely affect search costs, and hence incomplete information. Third, given Tikva Lecker’s interest in immigration, the paper culminates by examining how foreign migrant workers affect overall employee incomplete information. In this context, we determine that an influx of foreign workers into an economy decreases the effectiveness of search, thereby increasing the degree of incomplete information within the labor market.2
BACKGROUND A country’s distribution of wages defines the benefits of job search. The more dispersed the wages, the greater the gains from the search. Higher
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SOLOMON W. POLACHEK AND JUN (JEFF) XIANG
search gains lead to relatively higher reservation wages, which in turn leads to more search. But as a consequence, earnings dispersion narrows, and the degree of incomplete information diminishes. At the same time, the amount of search is related to search costs. Individual characteristics, such as a worker’s location vis-a`-vis jobs or a worker’s opportunity costs (which would be higher for those already at work) affect search costs. Higher search costs diminish search, leading to wider earnings dispersion. The whole search process provides job seekers with wage (and amenity) information, but clearly information remains imperfect because search is costly.3 Creating an index of the degree of incomplete information is important because, as already mentioned, incomplete information leads to lost opportunities and diminished GNP. But in addition, the level of incomplete information is an indicator of market competition. Whereas prices collapse to a unique single equilibrium in purely competitive full-information markets, this is not the case in imperfect competition where there are multiple prices. But even markets for homogeneous easily transferable commodities contain price variability when there is imperfect information. The amount of market imperfection can also be related to institutional factors. These institutions might include information networks, such as nationally based bargaining units (e.g., Germany) and the availability of unemployment insurance (most developed countries); they also could include other institutions, such as inflows of foreign workers (who might have little information) into an economy. There is much research on how migrants affect the labor market. These analyses include the effect of immigrants on wages. Some of this research looks at how quickly (in terms of number of generations) migrants achieve success equal to natives (Chiswick, 1978). Other of this research examines how this rate of assimilation depends on migrant quality, particularly concentrating on the skills migrants possess upon entering a country (Borjas, 1985). However, almost no research assesses workers’ overall knowledge of wage offer distributions. Similarly, almost no research assesses the effects of foreign workers on incomplete information within a particular labor market. This paper examines both. It develops a metric defining the effects of incomplete information. It assesses the impact of institutional factors including unemployment insurance and population density. Then, in memory of Tikva Lecker, it assesses how in-migration of foreign workers affects the amount of information workers have regarding the labor market. All this is done with international labor market data on 11 countries obtained from the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS).
The Effects of Incomplete Employee Wage Information
39
INCOMPLETE INFORMATION There is a vast literature on the theory of equilibrium prices. Most is theoretical and concerns defining the conditions under which there is an equilibrium price distribution (e.g., Reinganum, 1979; Burdett & Judd, 1983; Bester, 1986; Arnold, 2000; Kamiya & Sato, 2004). There is also a small but growing body of literature that is empirical. That literature relies on overall price variation to measure the degree of incomplete information (e.g., Stigler, 1961; Stigler & Kindahl, 1970; van Hoomissen, 1988; Lach & Tsiddon, 1992; Sorensen, 2000). As recognized by Stigler and others, there is a major drawback of merely using price (or wage) dispersion as a measure of incomplete information. Price dispersion can vary for many reasons other than incomplete information. These include differences in worker quality and differences in worker-firm bargaining power such as through unions; they also can result from noisy data. Dispersion measures do not get at these considerations because they do not net out these effects. Regression models suffer the same biases because the dispersion measures they use as the dependent variable do not net out random price variations, nor do they distinguish between a worker’s (seller’s) and a firm’s (buyer’s) incomplete information. Thus, these past more traditional measures do not reflect accurate estimates of incomplete information. One technique to get at incomplete information that can net out worker quality as well as pure measurement error, yet get a measure of the effect of incomplete employee information, is given in Hofler and Polachek (1985) and Polachek and Yoon (1987). The technique is relatively simple to implement. Basically, it measures worker incomplete information as a parameter obtained from estimating an earnings function using frontier estimation techniques. Essentially, this parameter depicts the degree workers receive wages that are less than they could obtain, had they known the specific firms paying the highest wages. Hofler and Murphy (1992) employ this technique to compute the average worker shortfall using the 1983 US Current Population Survey (CPS). Gaynor and Polachek (1994) apply the technique to compute incomplete information about physician prices. Daneshvary, Herzog, Hofler, and Schlottmann (1992) use the technique to get at assimilation of foreign workers in the US, and Lang (2004) uses it to get at assimilation of German immigrants. Groot and Oosterbeek (1994) corroborate the validity of the approach using a 1985 Dutch national sample of employees. Finally, Polachek and Robst (1998) confirm the technique’s power by showing how the technique’s incomplete information
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SOLOMON W. POLACHEK AND JUN (JEFF) XIANG
measures match those independently obtained from the World of Work test administered to a group of workers in the 1966 US National Longitudinal Survey of Young Men (NLSYM). But to date, no one has systematically studied how the degree of incomplete information differs across countries. Part of the problem is the paucity of data for enough countries to be able to draw valid conclusions. Comparative cross-country micro-data were simply not available. However, new data are now obtainable from the LIS for a sufficient number of countries to get meaningful results. This paper applies the techniques mentioned above to estimate the amount of employee incomplete information. It then looks at different institutional factors across countries to determine how these institutional factors affect incomplete information.
APPROACH We use LIS data to examine incomplete information by country.4 The LIS is a collection of household data compiled from ongoing statistical surveys in approximately 29 countries widely spread across Europe, America, Asia, and Oceania. The data are standardized in order to facilitate comparative research. The LIS began in 1983 and is now jointly sponsored by the Luxembourg government and the Centre for Population, Poverty and Policy Studies (CEPS), the Centre Universitaire (CU) de Luxembourg. Data include country-specific labor force surveys over various labor market structures. These data provide demographic, income and expenditure information on three different levels: household, person and child. We concentrate on extracting earnings, education and age data from the LIS person files for 10 OECD countries. In addition, we include Israel, given that this is the location of the conference honoring Tikva Lecker. For each country, we use an econometric frontier estimation technique developed by Aigner, Lovell, and Schmidt (1977) and Meeusen and van den Broeck (1977), which is described more fully in Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000). This technique was originally employed by Hofler and Polachek (1985) to estimate a numeric index of incomplete worker information. Next, we look at institutional factors within countries to establish which of these institutions affect incomplete information. First standard institutions such as UI are considered. Then, we concentrate on population density, the proportion of rural employment, the proportion of industrial employment, and finally, the influx of foreign workers into an economy.
The Effects of Incomplete Employee Wage Information
41
MODELING INCOMPLETE INFORMATION Assume a labor market with a wage offer distribution such that wages for a worker of given skill vary from a low of wmin to a maximum of wmax.5 A worker entering this job arena is motivated to seek a job at the firm paying the highest possible wage. The only problem is that the worker does not know which firms pay high wages. Indeed, given that firm heterogeneity is not uniform across jobs (i.e., some firms may pay high wages for one particular skill, but low wages for another), wages vary across firms in uneasy to detect ways, a priori. Given this incomplete information, the worker must search. To do this, the worker sets a reservation wage wR i , which is the minimum wage the worker will accept when searching. This reservation wage is based on perceived costs and benefits of search. On average, a worker searches more the higher the reservation wage, and less the lower the reservation wage. The greater the search, the more likely the worker achieves a wage closer to the maximum wmax. Suppose that worker i finds a job paying a wage wi0, such that wmax 0 0 wi wR i ; The gap between wmax and wi will vary across individuals, depending upon relative success in the worker’s job search. The greater one’s knowledge of the labor market, the more likely the chance w0i is closer to, wmax barring the impact of luck (which we will talk about shortly). Let ui be the (logarithmic) gap between wmax and the wage one actually receives (w0i ). This gap represents the proportion by which one could enhance one’s current wage through continued search for the highest possible wage. The variable ui can be expressed as ui ¼ ln wmax
ln w0i þ oi
(1)
and reflects the cost to a worker of incomplete information. In (1), oi reflects luck, which for the sake of assumption can be normally distributed with zero mean. The average u ¼ Si ui =N; over all workers (N) in the market, depicts the mean effect of worker incomplete information. Note that since E ðoi Þ ¼ 0; luck cancels out when computing average incomplete information for all workers. Using similar logic, a firm pays more than necessary to the ith worker, since it pays w0i despite the worker’s willingness to work at wR i . The gap (ln w0i – ln wR ) 0 reflects the effect of the firm’s incomplete information i regarding worker i (neglecting luck). But, in reality, worker i need not be the lowest reservation waged worker, so the true effect of the firm’s incomplete information is Zi ¼ ln w0i – ln wmin, where wmin is the minimum reservation
42
SOLOMON W. POLACHEK AND JUN (JEFF) XIANG
wage for all comparable workers who satisfy the job’s requirements. The average Z ¼ Si Zi =N; across all workers (N), depicts the mean effect of firm incomplete information. Polachek and Yoon (1987) tested search theory’s implications by computing average u and Z for various groups of workers. They used the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) for the US in 1981 and found smaller u values for workers who received UI benefits before their current job. This finding illustrated the efficiency UI brings about through enhanced worker search. Similarly, using the January 1983 Current Populations Survey (CPS), Hofler and Murphy (1992, p. 516) found that workers in areas paying relatively higher unemployment benefits exhibit a smaller u. Groot and Oosterbeek (1994) found that ‘‘males have more labor market information than females [which is] probably caused by the greater market attachment of males, which makes the opportunity costs of ignorance [i.e., incomplete information] greater for males than females (p. 388).’’ They also found that ‘‘employees in the public sector possess more market information than workers in the private sector y probably due to the fact that wage policies in the private sector are in general less public knowledge and more individually based (p. 388).’’ Polachek and Robst (1998) found that workers scoring high on World of Work tests had more information than those with lower World of Work scores. Finally Gaynor and Polachek (1994) applied the technique to the medical profession, and there too found that ‘‘measured incomplete information is higher when y search costs are higher (p. 830).’’ But to date no one has done a comprehensive study across more than one country. Nor have they examined whether in-migration affects incomplete information.
ESTIMATION PROCEDURE The LIS data require all computations be done on the Luxembourg computer. At this time limitations on canned STATA and SAS software preclude estimating both employer and employee information simultaneously. However, Groot and Oosterbeek (1994) find employer incomplete information to be relatively constant across economic sectors, as does Polachek and Yoon (1987). This result means that incomplete employee information varies far more than incomplete employer information. So, because incomplete employer information varies little with institutional characteristics, we concentrate solely on incomplete worker information (ui).
43
The Effects of Incomplete Employee Wage Information
To put meat on the discussion, we now derive the econometric specification. However, first a word regarding the underpinnings of an individual’s maximum possible wage, wmax(x) defined earlier in note 5. Various models can describe the underlying factors of an individual’s wage potential. For example, the human capital model argues that a worker’s wage potential is determined by human capital acquisition. Productivity enhancing contract models suggest contracts whereby a worker’s ability to supply effort affects wage. Finally, collective bargaining implies that union power is important when negotiating a viable contract. Each of these underpinnings can be represented by a vector of an employee’s own individual and his or her firm’s characteristics, which we denote as vector xi.6 As such, a worker’s maximum potential wage (wpi ) is related to xi, plus measurement error.7 In logarithmic form, ln wmax jxi ¼ ln wpi ¼ gðxi Þ þ vi
(2)
Taking a linear model for g(xi), ln wpi ¼ xi b þ vi ,
(3)
where the dependent variable represents the individual’s maximum potential wage offer, xi denotes a vector of individual characteristics defining worker i ’s skill level, and vi is a disturbance distributed as N 0; s2v : With perfect information regarding what each firm pays, a worker would be able to locate the firm paying his or her maximum potential wage wpi : However, in a world of incomplete information, where search is costly, the typical worker defines a reservation wage wR i below his or her potential wage. As indicated above, the offer wage one accepts is w0i ZwR i : Combining (1) and (2), a worker’s observed wage can be represented as ln w0i ¼ ln wpi
(4)
ui
where ui Z 0. This one-sided residual ui represents the extent incomplete information causes one to accept a wage lower than the market’s potential wage. It reflects a monetary measure of incomplete information. Substituting (3) into (4) yields ln w0i ¼ xi b þ i
(5)
0; s2v 8
: We also assume that wherei ¼ vi ui : As already indicated, viN uiN mmi ; s2mi ; as is typical in frontier estimation. On the basis of the above assumptions, the composite error ( ¼ v u) must be rightward skewed for the approach to be valid. Therefore before proceeding, we test for skewness in : To do this, we follow Schmidt and Lin
44
SOLOMON W. POLACHEK AND JUN (JEFF) XIANG
(1984) to obtain residuals from OLS regressions of (5) for each country and year. The specific test9 we adopt was developed by Royston (1991) and is a test for normality, which combines two tests, one based on skewness and another based on kurtosis, into an overall test statistic. In no country or year do the test results support the normality assumption (with p-value less than 0.1%). Therefore, our hypothesis about the skewness of the residuals is strongly upheld justifying that we can proceed with estimation of (5) using frontier techniques to disentangle ui and vi. To do this, we adopt the maximum likelihood approach to estimate (5) that incorporates a composed error term first proposed by Aigner, Lovell, and Schmidt (1977) and Meeusen and van den Broeck (1977). It assumes a non-negative one-sided error term, ui, in addition to the traditional normally distributed error term, vi. To understand the approach rewrite (5) as w0i
w0i ¼ gðxi Þ expf ui þ vi g,
(6)
where is the actual observed earnings, as already defined and g(xi) the potential maximum earnings achievable barring random errors vi. Actual earnings (w0i ) are less than potential maximum earnings (g(xi)) by the proportion (1-exp{ ui}). In other words, (1-exp{ ui}) is the effect of incomplete information. As is standard in the literature, we specify the xi vector to adhere to typical earnings functions.10 On the basis of the current literature regarding functional form of earnings equations (Mincer, 1974; Heckman & Polachek, 1974; Murphy & Welch, 1990), we express an individual’s potential wage as gðxi Þ ¼ exp a0 þ a1 Si þ a2 ti þ a3 t2i þ a4 F i (7)
where Si is the individual worker i’s completed highest schooling level, ti the individual worker i’s potential working experience, t2i the quadratic term of i’s experience level, and Fi the individual worker i’s gender dummy, 1 for female and 0 otherwise. The above equation (7) gives a worker’s potential wage in the absence of the incomplete information. In reality, because of the limits of finite search, a worker receives less than his or her potential maximum wage, and gets an observed wage w0i : To incorporate incomplete information, substitute (7) into (6) to obtain w0i ¼ gðxi Þ expf ui þ vi g ¼ exp a0 þ a1 Si þ a2 ti þ a3 t2i þ a4 F i expð ui þ vi Þ (8)
45
The Effects of Incomplete Employee Wage Information
After taking the logarithm, it becomes ln w0i ¼ a0 þ a1 S i þ a2 ti þ a3 t2i þ a4 F i
ui þ v i
(9)
The common approach is to estimate (9) using the (ln) likelihood function: pffiffiffi N X 0 2 2 ln½1 F ði ls 1 Þ ln L wi x; b; l; s ¼ N ln pffiffiffiffi þ N ln s 1 þ P i¼1 N 1 X 2 2s2 i¼1 i
ð10Þ
proposed by Aigner, Lovell, and Schmidt (1977) and Meeusen and van den Broeck (1977), where s2 ¼ s2u þ s2v l¼
su sv
and f and F are, respectively, the standard normal density and distribution functions.11 The expected value of the composite error is pffiffiffi 2 E ðÞ ¼ E ðuÞ ¼ pffiffiffiffi su (11) P
the mean of the one-sided error term. A problem with the above approach is that it assumes ui to be unrelated to any of the independent variables. So, following Wang’s (2002) strategy, we take account of how the independent variables can influence incomplete information by parameterizing ui to be a function of gender, marital status, race, schooling and experience, because each of these variables affects a worker’s opportunity costs of search. Thus, we assume ui N þ mui ; s2ui (12) mui ¼ d0 þ d1 F i þ d2 M 1i þ d3 M 2i þ d4 Ri þ d5 S i þ d6 ti
(13)
s2ui ¼ expfg0 þ g1 F i þ g2 M 1i þ g3 M 2i þ g4 Ri þ g5 Si þ g6 ti g
(14)
vi N 0; s2v
(15)
where ui is truncated normally distributed with mean mui and variance s2ui ; M 1i is the individual worker i’s marital status, 1 for married and 0 otherwise, M 2i the individual worker i’s marital status, 1 for divorced, widowed,
46
SOLOMON W. POLACHEK AND JUN (JEFF) XIANG
separated and 0 otherwise, and Ri the individual worker i’s race, 1 for white and 0 otherwise. (For countries other than US, 1 for the majority ethnic group and 0 otherwise.) The empirical estimate of ui is obtained through its conditional expectation on the total error term i ; which is defined as i ¼
ui þ v i .
(16)
As noted by a referee, our choice of independent variables in (9), (13) and (14) is an important issue. Omitting key earnings determinants from (9) that are included in (13) and (14) can bias our estimates of incomplete information (m). Let us take an example. Suppose that education affects earnings positively. Then, including education in equation (9) implies lower potential earnings for the less educated and higher potential earnings for the more educated. On the other hand, omitting education from equation (9) implies a single potential earnings measure for all. But given the frontier estimation adopted in likelihood function (10), potential earnings in this latter case are those of the most educated group. As a result, the gap between the potential wage and the actual wage is smaller for the more educated and larger for the less educated. Thus, incorporating education in (13) but not in (9) would imply a smaller m for the most educated workers (hence less incomplete information) simply because the gap between the potential wage and the actual wage is smaller for the more educated when in reality frontier wages for the less educated should be lower than frontier wages for the more educated. In this paper, we adopt the Mincer earnings specification for (9). Here education, experience, and experience-squared identify potential earnings. In addition, we incorporate gender because gender is known to affect wage level. On the other hand, we include marital status and race in (13) and (14) but not in (9) because marital status does not affect wage uniformly. For women marital status appears to lower earnings, whereas for men it appears to raise earnings. Similarly, we incorporate race in (13) and (14) but not in (9). The LIS data (which we will describe later) includes majority ethnic group rather than race. For the US, this ethnicity variable denotes race, but not for the other countries. Blacks in the US are earning less than white people. However, there is no strong evidence outside the US that minority ethnic groups earn less than the majority ethnicity groups. Thus, we hesitate to include this ethnicity variable in the wage equation. As for the incomplete information equation, marriage and race are included because married, widowed/divorced, and majority ethnicity groups are assumed to have different search behaviors. We expect these groups to search more not only because their marginal gains for an additional search are higher, but also
The Effects of Incomplete Employee Wage Information
47
because their search costs are lower. The determinants of search do not always perfectly match those of earning patterns and therefore, the variables in the two equations are not required to be the same. We admit some biases can creep in because of difficulty in specifying the variables that affect m but not w, and vice versa. Mostly for this reason, later in the paper, we adopt an additional approach to identify country institutional factors that affect m. In this latter approach (comparable to differences-in-differences), the above type errors cancel out as long as they are uniform across countries. Maximum likelihood is used to estimate equation (17), given assumptions (12) to (16) (see Stevenson, 1980). The log-likelihood function for a sample of N workers is X X X m m i li ln L w0i jb; l; s ¼ C ln F ui ln si ln F ui þ sui si li si i i i 2 1 X i þ mui ð17Þ 2 i si where
1=2 si ¼ s2ui þ s2v li ¼ sui =sv
(18) (19)
As discussed above, we use 1–E ðexpf ui gji Þ as a measure of a worker’s incomplete information. The advantage of this measure is that it is bounded by (0,1), which is easily interpreted as the proportion of the potential maximum wage a worker gives up due to the incomplete information. So, the bigger the 1 E ðexpf ui gji Þ; the more incomplete one’s knowledge of available wages. The formula to obtain each worker’s incomplete information is
1 F si ðm~ i =si Þ 1 2 (20) 1 E ðexpf ui gji Þ ¼ 1 exp ð mi Þ þ si 2 1 F m~ i =si
where
s2ni ¼ s2ui s2v =s2i
mi ¼
s2ui i þ mui s2v =s2i
(21) (22)
The estimate of incomplete information is the average of all workers’ incomplete information. So each country year’s incomplete information is
48
SOLOMON W. POLACHEK AND JUN (JEFF) XIANG N
mj ¼
j 1 X ½1 N j i¼1
E ðexpf ui gji Þ
(23)
where Nj is the country’s total number of workers in year j.
THE DATA Our first task is to compute each worker’s incomplete information defined in equation (20), using the maximum likelihood estimation formulated in equation (17). In the LIS data, there are three data files for each country and year. We use the personal file, which has information on work status, personal income, education as well as other basic individual characteristics. For each of the 29 countries, the number of available years differs, ranging from one year for Estonia to nine years for Canada and the United States. For two reasons we use only part of the available countries for the analysis. First, our final goal is to understand how institutional differences explain variations in incomplete information across countries. However, crucial variables to test hypotheses related to institutional perspectives are not available for all LIS countries and years. Generally, LIS has sufficient data for many, but not all OECD countries. So for this reason we first restrict our analysis to the OECD countries and years, which contain the full complement of demographic information that we need for analysis. (As mentioned before, we also include Israel – our only non-OECD country – because LIS contains the relevant information, and because Israel is the site of the Tikva Lecker conference.) Second, we only include countries and years for which the nonlinear maximum likelihood estimation of equation (17) converged. Of the 23 potential OECD countries (and Israel), this left 11 countries for which we have sufficient data. They are the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, Germany, Sweden, Finland, Ireland, Norway, Netherlands, Czech Republic and finally Israel. They span North America and all parts of Europe.
WITHIN COUNTRY REGRESSION RESULTS The summary statistics are provided in Table 1. For most countries and years, the average schooling is around 11–12 years, and the average potential experience is between 20 and 25 years. So, across these OECD countries,
49
The Effects of Incomplete Employee Wage Information
Table 1.
Variable Means from the Individual Country-Year Regressions.
Potential Majority Divorced Country Year School Experience Female Ethnicity Married Widowed CAN CAN CAN CAN CAN CAN CAN CZECH CZECH FIN FIN FIN FIN GER GER GER GER IRE IRE IRE IS IS NL NL NL NL NL NW NW NW SW SW SW UK UK UK UK US US US US US
1981 1987 1991 1994 1997 1998 2000 1992 1996 1987 1991 1995 2000 1984 1989 1994 2000 1994 1995 1996 1992 1997 1983 1987 1991 1994 1999 1991 1995 2000 1992 1995 2000 1986 1991 1994 1995 1969 1974 1979 1986 1991
11.117 10.822 11.646 11.984 12.066 12.492 13.288 11.804 10.413 9.351 9.706 11.145 11.693 7.638 8.483 8.780 12.607 9.481 9.471 9.492 12.531 12.019 9.881 9.417 11.615 10.868 12.693 11.485 11.804 12.734 11.144 10.740 12.207 10.482 10.744 10.283 11.094 11.491 11.327 12.804 12.227 12.429
21.813 24.353 25.152 25.164 26.507 25.488 18.450 20.900 23.784 22.222 22.374 21.195 22.208 29.046 28.992 29.558 27.399 29.716 30.007 29.905 19.813 22.691 22.597 20.573 17.760 26.795 19.441 19.930 21.152 20.755 25.180 24.248 22.140 21.153 21.295 31.504 22.043 20.311 23.539 20.336 23.362 24.408
0.172 0.519 0.517 0.521 0.513 0.513 0.487 0.471 0.466 0.474 0.486 0.493 0.491 0.511 0.504 0.519 0.516 0.500 0.501 0.495 0.452 0.514 0.102 0.361 0.396 0.526 0.463 0.470 0.479 0.486 0.492 0.495 0.491 0.429 0.478 0.528 0.504 0.421 0.535 0.472 0.535 0.532
0.124 0.126 0.135 0.130 0.229 0.201 0.103 0.108 0.073
0.939 0.965 0.973 0.961
0.618 0.636 0.619 0.646 0.487 0.529 0.733 0.694 0.614 0.629 0.586 0.584 0.638 0.634 0.649 0.629 0.628 0.621 0.611 0.755 0.602 0.793 0.677 0.64 0.648 0.612 0.554 0.571 0.551 0.802 0.765 0.501
0.885 0.815
0.659 0.615 0.649 0.658 0.610
0.140 0.225 0.180 0.099 0.151
0.785 0.745
0.554 0.540
0.175 0.195
0.992 0.933 0.939 0.948 0.942 0.821 0.804 0.813 0.937 0.997 0.993 0.995 0.473 0.431
0.106 0.082 0.125 0.132 0.135 0.196 0.105 0.108 0.116 0.058 0.108 0.053 0.046 0.048 0.113 0.071 0.061 0.074 0.082
0.084
Wage
Sample Size
10.452 12.131 15.110 16.020 14.716 15.256 16.080 518.575 1140.721 63344.97 85465.26 88175.4 112289.7 19.146 25.493 34.482 24.574 5.035 5.217 5.239 38082.47 64932.53 21.685 41329.14 40200.91 26.229 29.216 115304.8 150085.6 209902.6 145644.9 157548.8 189576 8121.4 6.277 7.295 7.474 5566.403 4.650 6.703 9.737 10.467
9063 11976 20514 39635 33052 36566 32548 18910 31435 18793 17444 12822 14137 4844 3914 5849 5537 2762 2396 2327 5429 5817 2162 3054 3828 4707 5110 12786 13538 19214 15623 16828 17235 6251 6398 21659 5472 15715 12087 15470 13048 19636
50
SOLOMON W. POLACHEK AND JUN (JEFF) XIANG
Table 1. (Continued ) Potential Majority Divorced Country Year School Experience Female Ethnicity Married Widowed US US US
1994 12.598 1997 12.675 2000 12.818
24.130 25.060 25.219
0.531 0.532 0.521
0.733 0.719 0.701
0.517 0.549 0.581
0.203 0.194 0.158
Wage
Sample Size
11.962 79323 13.795 64369 15.320 63890
Note: Variable definitions: School is average years of schooling; Potential experience is average years of working experience, calculated by age-school-6; Female is a gender dummy, 1 for female and 0 otherwise; Majority ethnicity is ethnicity dummy, 1 for majority ethnic group and 0 otherwise; Married is marital status dummy, 1 for married and 0 otherwise; Divorced/ widowed is a marital status dummy, 1 for divorced/widowed and 0 otherwise; Wage is average wage, either specified as hourly wage or annual earnings. Source: Luxembourg Income Study. Denotes countries with hourly wage; otherwise with annual wage data are given. The mean is based on those in the population with positive wages (earnings). Missing variables are denoted as blanks.
most workers have relatively comparable educational backgrounds, and are similar in age. Also, female workers constitute about half of the population interviewed. (Though, not shown in the table, a greater proportion of women did not work for pay.) The ethnicity variable depicts the proportion of the population constituting a country’s majority racial or ethnic group. In the US, this is the proportion of whites. Married workers are around 60% of the population, and divorced or widowed workers are in the 5–20% range. Mean wages are contained in the last column and are defined either as hourly wages or annual earnings, depending on the available data. We expect more variation in annual earnings because hourly wages fluctuate less as work hours vary. In the statistical analysis to follow, we add a dummy categorical variable to signify country-years with hourly wage data. Table 2 contains the regression results of equation (9). Columns (1) and (2) give the country and year; columns (3)–(6) give the coefficient values for schooling, potential experience, potential experience-squared, and gender; and finally column (7) gives estimates of the extent of incomplete information obtained from equation (23). We begin by explaining columns (3)–(6), since they reflect earnings function parameters typically obtained when estimating Mincer earnings functions. The schooling variable coefficient depicts the average rate of return for an additional year of school. For more than half of the countries, this rate of return is increasing over time. (Only a few counties have decreasing rates of return.) This pattern is consistent with other data sets as well as with
51
The Effects of Incomplete Employee Wage Information
Table 2. Within Country Regression Results. Country
Year
School
CAN CAN CAN CAN CAN CAN CAN CZECH CZECH FIN FIN FIN FIN GER GER GER GER IRE IRE IRE IS IS NL NL NL NL NL NW NW NW SW SW SW UK UK UK UK US US US US US US
1981 1987 1991 1994 1997 1998 2000 1992 1996 1987 1991 1995 2000 1984 1989 1994 2000 1994 1995 1996 1992 1997 1983 1987 1991 1994 1999 1991 1995 2000 1992 1995 2000 1986 1991 1994 1995 1969 1974 1979 1986 1991 1994
0.050 0.066 0.067 0.070 0.080 0.103 0.098 0.077 0.093 0.082 0.083 0.067 0.065 0.089 0.073 0.067 0.105 0.098 0.087 0.091 0.105 0.128 0.083 0.084 0.064 0.060 0.065 0.074 0.069 0.073 0.068 0.076 0.092 0.093 0.141 0.156 0.161 0.087 0.076 0.074 0.092 0.098 0.113
Potential Experience 0.024 0.031 0.021 0.024 0.024 0.036 0.006 0.023 0.020 0.066 0.056 0.043 0.043 0.030 0.021 0.013 0.020 0.041 0.038 0.038 0.048 0.042 0.048 0.061 0.038 0.025 0.026 0.042 0.046 0.046 0.037 0.041 0.036 0.046 0.028 0.028 0.018 0.028 0.028 0.018 0.035 0.030 0.035
Experience Square
Female
0.0003 0.0004 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0004 0.0002 0.0004 0.0003 0.0009 0.0007 0.0005 0.0005 0.0004 0.0002 0.0001 0.0002 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 0.0006 0.0005 0.0006 0.0008 0.0005 0.0002 0.0003 0.0007 0.0007 0.0008 0.0005 0.0006 0.0005 0.0007 0.0004 0.0003 0.0001 0.0004 0.0004 0.0002 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004
0.276 0.205 0.211 0.202 0.204 0.322 0.314 0.324 0.321 0.413 0.383 0.381 0.421 0.243 0.169 0.151 0.187 0.116 0.128 0.110 0.486 0.514 0.081 0.172 0.239 0.046 0.058 0.416 0.436 0.460 0.437 0.443 0.392 0.396 0.405 0.390 0.368 0.533 0.390 0.476 0.292 0.275 0.257
Incomplete Information 0.281 0.377 0.347 0.348 0.347 0.251 0.340 0.259 0.274 0.535 0.536 0.563 0.563 0.252 0.267 0.281 0.357 0.324 0.312 0.353 0.320 0.341 0.156 0.256 0.398 0.275 0.297 0.581 0.527 0.484 0.445 0.469 0.471 0.304 0.187 0.207 0.204 0.495 0.345 0.288 0.365 0.405 0.396
52
SOLOMON W. POLACHEK AND JUN (JEFF) XIANG
Table 2. (Continued ) Country
Year
School
US US
1997 2000
0.118 0.116
Potential Experience 0.034 0.027
Experience Square 0.0004 0.0003
Female 0.301 0.307
Incomplete Information 0.384 0.384
Note: Variable definitions: School denotes the rate of return to an additional year of schooling in equation (9); Potential experience is experience coefficient in equation (9); Experience square is experience square coefficient in equation (9); Female is the female dummy variable coefficient in equation (9), 1 for female and 0 otherwise; As computed from equation (23), incomplete information is expressed as a percentage of potential maximum wages. Source: Luxembourg Income Study. The dependent variable is hourly wage; otherwise the dependent variable is annual earnings. Coefficients are not statistically significant at 5% p-value level; otherwise are statistically significant at least 5% p-value level.
technological change. It implies that the more educated absorb advanced technology easily, and that their rate of pay per year of schooling is increasing secularly.12 The experience coefficients yield concave earning profiles, shown by the consistently negative squared-term. The female dummy variable is uniformly negative, suggesting that in all the countries (that we consider), women earn less than men, given adjustments for schooling and experience. Overall, these earnings function parameters are typical of those found in the literature. Estimates of incomplete information, based on equation (23), are given in Column 7. They range from 0.16 to 0.58, but average about 0.3. This means that incomplete information causes the average worker to get about 30% less than his or her potential. An examination of the values indicates strong consistency within countries, since these values differ more country-tocountry than within countries. Within countries, incomplete information measures do not reveal any apparent time pattern. Incomplete information seems to be increasing in Sweden, Czechoslovakia, Finland, Germany, Netherlands and Israel, while in Norway it is decreasing. On the other hand, time trends are relatively flat for the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada and Ireland. Usually technological improvements mirror time trends. The lack of a time trend might suggest that technological improvements are not necessarily associated with decreasing incomplete information, as common sense might have implied.13 What factors affect the level and distribution of incomplete information within each country? To answer this question, we adopt Wang’s (2002)
The Effects of Incomplete Employee Wage Information
53
method to compute marginal effects of mui ’s covariates listed in equation (13) (Table 3) and s2ui ’s covariates given in equation (14) (Table 4).14 Beginning with Table 3, we see a number of trends. For example, the mostly negative marginal effects of school indicate that additional schooling reduces a worker’s incomplete information. This finding is consistent with Stephenson’s (1976) argument that workers with more education gather more wage information by searching more efficiently. Similarly, about threequarters of the cases show married workers, and two-thirds of the cases show that widowed and divorced workers, have more information than singles. This result is consistent with higher married and widowed labor force participation rates (Taubman, 1976), which leads to larger marginal gains from search. Further, as hypothesized (McCall, 1973), blacks exhibit lower labor force participation and possibly higher search costs, so they might acquire less information than whites. In our international data, we show that on average, minority ethnic groups have less complete information than majority groups, which is an extension of McCall’s argument. Also, from Table 3, potential experience reduces workers’ incomplete information in over 80% of the observations. Finally, incomplete information is larger among female workers than among male workers, again consistent with less lifetime female labor force participation. Another observation regarding these marginal effects in Table 3 is that the patterns are more consistent within a specific country, than across countries. As such, any covariate’s marginal effect is likely to have a uniform sign within a particular country, but not necessarily across countries. This uniformity within countries underscores the importance of using crosscountry institutional differences to explain how incomplete information differs from country-to-country. Recall from equation (5) that s2ui depicts the dispersion of incomplete information. How individual characteristics affect this dispersion is parameterized in equation (15). The impacts of these characteristics on s2ui are given in Table 4. They indicate the degree an incomplete information fluctuates across socioeconomic groups. As an example, take race. From Table 3, incomplete information is smaller for whites than for blacks. But, the negative ethnicity coefficient in Table 4 implies that whites exhibit smaller dispersion in incomplete information than blacks. This implies a relatively wider range in incomplete information for blacks than whites. Thus the variance of incomplete information is greater for blacks than whites. Similarly, though on average females garner less information, in total, they exhibit greater variance in the amount of information they gather,
54
SOLOMON W. POLACHEK AND JUN (JEFF) XIANG
Table 3.
Marginal Effect of Covariates on E(U) by Country and Year.
Country
Year
Female
CAN CAN CAN CAN CAN CAN CAN CZECH CZECH FIN FIN FIN FIN GER GER GER GER IRE IRE IRE IS IS NL NL NL NL NL NW NW NW SW SW SW UK UK UK UK US US US US US
1981 1987 1991 1994 1997 1998 2000 1992 1996 1987 1991 1995 2000 1984 1989 1994 2000 1994 1995 1996 1992 1997 1983 1987 1991 1994 1999 1991 1995 2000 1992 1995 2000 1986 1991 1994 1995 1969 1974 1979 1986 1991
0.139 0.100 0.135 0.093 0.120 0.049 0.059 0.034 0.073 0.262 0.236 0.142 0.173 0.095 0.165 0.083 0.089 0.219 0.170 0.256 0.132 0.040 0.069 0.198 0.486 0.227 0.141 0.230 0.170 0.119 0.003 0.019 0.086 0.247 0.107 0.023 0.058 0.452 0.154 0.015 0.136 0.175
Married
Divorced/ Widowed
0.107 0.143 0.021 0.098 0.060 0.022 0.004 0.006 0.245
Majority Ethnicity
0.162 0.077 0.088 0.076 0.057 0.077 0.004 0.026 0.038 0.081 0.097 0.134 0.132 0.045 0.053 0.032 0.267 0.270 0.276 0.042 0.156 0.236 0.162 0.958 0.713 0.577 0.031 0.065 0.011 0.086 0.112 0.031
0.119
0.152 0.184 0.389 0.336
0.042 0.071 0.020 0.200 0.147
0.049 0.079 0.005 0.183 0.080
0.228 0.072
0.201 0.128
0.183 0.006
0.069 0.088
0.032 0.067 0.344 0.142 0.032 0.067 0.198 0.041 0.068 0.005 0.088 0.389 0.107 0.804 0.930 0.196 0.429 0.350 0.067
0.119 0.016 0.018 0.032 0.040 0.059 0.059 0.138 0.035 0.298 0.258 0.063 0.162 0.215
School 0.005 0.106 0.016 0.012 0.007 0.027 0.012 0.002 0.004 0.081 0.076 0.059 0.061 0.010 0.014 0.008 0.006 0.008 0.008 0.007 0.034 0.035 0.012 0.015 0.044 0.014 0.021 0.055 0.054 0.049 0.025 0.034 0.003 0.014 0.034 0.050 0.048 0.046 0.006 0.005 0.013 0.017
Potential Experience 0.002 0.006 0.008 0.010 0.011 0.009 0.012 0.015 0.010 0.016 0.034 0.044 0.036 0.042 0.039 0.027 0.019 0.003 0.001 0.007 0.001 0.018 0.006 0.009 0.055 0.013 0.028 0.043 0.050 0.031 0.006 0.034 0.058 0.006 0.001 0.004 0.001 0.056 0.028 0.002 0.021 0.020
55
The Effects of Incomplete Employee Wage Information
Table 3. (Continued ) Country
Year
Female
Married
US US US
1994 1997 2000
0.134 0.093 0.073
0.134 0.128 0.157
Divorced/ Widowed 0.005 0.015 0.035
Majority Ethnicity 0.067 0.067 0.069
School
Potential Experience
0.012 0.008 0.012
0.020 0.020 0.020
Note: Definitions of variables: Female is the gender dummy variable in equation (13), 1 for female and 0 otherwise; Married is the marital status dummy variable in equation (13), 1 for married and 0 otherwise; Divorced/widowed is the marital status dummy variable in equation (13), 1 for divorced/widowed and 0 otherwise; Majority ethnicity is the race/ethnicity dummy in equation (13 ), 1 for majority ethnic group and 0 otherwise; School is the years of schooling variable in equation (13); Potential experience is the years of working experience in equation (13), calculated as age–school–6. Source: Luxembourg Income Study. Denotes computations based on hourly wage; otherwise computation based on with annual earnings. Marginal effect for each country year is the average marginal effect of individual workers within that country year.
as well. For the most part being older (having more potential experience) reduces this dispersion, as does being married or widowed, and as does having more education (except for the United Kingdom, Germany, The Netherlands and Israel).
WHY INCOMPLETE INFORMATION DIFFERS ACROSS COUNTRIES? AN EXAMINATION OF INSTITUTIONAL FACTORS So far we have estimated incomplete information and examined how it varies within countries. We have seen that an employee’s characteristics, especially those characteristics affecting one’s incentive to search, influence the amount of wage related information one acquires. However, a country’s institutions may also be important, but identifying the impact of these institutions is difficult to discern with a limited number of cross-sections for a given country. For this reason, we now do a comparative analysis by contrasting institutional differences across each of the 11 countries to explain inter-country differences in incomplete information.
56
SOLOMON W. POLACHEK AND JUN (JEFF) XIANG
Table 4.
Marginal Effect of Covariates on V(U) by Country and Year.
Country
Year
Female
CAN CAN CAN CAN CAN CAN CAN CZECH CZECH FIN FIN FIN FIN GER GER GER GER IRE IRE IRE IS IS NL NL NL NL NL NW NW NW SW SW SW UK UK UK UK US US US US US
1981 1987 1991 1994 1997 1998 2000 1992 1996 1987 1991 1995 2000 1984 1989 1994 2000 1994 1995 1996 1992 1997 1983 1987 1991 1994 1999 1991 1995 2000 1992 1995 2000 1986 1991 1994 1995 1969 1974 1979 1986 1991
0.119 0.074 0.190 0.115 0.159 0.004 0.001 0.023 0.062 0.741 0.653 0.380 0.475 0.128 0.174 0.099 0.116 0.364 0.324 0.545 0.148 0.163 0.031 0.539 0.978 0.332 0.130 0.527 0.352 0.199 0.003 0.041 0.188 0.511 0.001 0.015 0.002 0.986 0.210 0.012 0.177 0.429
Married
Divorced/ Widowed
0.208 0.209 0.030 0.155 0.067 0.001 0.001 0.004 0.485
Majority Ethnicity
0.338 0.117 0.145 0.117 0.076 0.009 0.012 0.005 0.230 0.319 0.197 0.420 0.011 0.060 0.093 0.171 0.365 0.308 0.450 0.043 0.122 0.081 0.110 0.343 0.360 0.448 0.567 0.071 0.074 0.167 0.219 0.090
0.042
0.281 0.393 0.761 0.600
0.008 0.079 0.012 0.008 0.206
0.008 0.080 0.002 0.046 0.112
0.402 0.099
0.493 0.213
0.424 0.018
0.133 0.146
0.112 0.015 0.048 0.097 0.097 0.145 0.263 0.052 0.097 0.006 0.216 0.142 0.125 0.211 0.480 0.144 0.946 0.278 0.030
0.107 0.005 0.000 0.010 0.236 0.051 0.051 0.130 0.047 0.444 0.400 0.148 0.179 0.381
School 0.004 0.029 0.025 0.022 0.016 0.013 0.007 0.002 0.002 0.138 0.127 0.002 0.003 0.023 0.014 0.016 0.003 0.012 0.010 0.012 0.038 0.063 0.005 0.020 0.032 0.007 0.017 0.056 0.053 0.058 0.057 0.048 0.013 0.020 0.014 0.038 0.022 0.013 0.009 0.004 0.039 0.006
Potential Experience 0.002 0.014 0.015 0.022 0.026 0.005 0.003 0.020 0.017 0.031 0.006 0.051 0.050 0.006 0.006 0.001 0.001 0.007 0.010 0.019 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.014 0.022 0.002 0.022 0.001 0.024 0.021 0.025 0.041 0.052 0.013 0.002 0.009 0.006 0.012 0.039 0.001 0.057 0.001
57
The Effects of Incomplete Employee Wage Information
Table 4. (Continued ) Country
Year
Female
Married
US US US
1994 1997 2000
0.287 0.188 0.154
0.224 0.224 0.244
Divorced/ Widowed 0.039 0.044 0.085
Majority Ethnicity 0.109 0.120 0.109
School 0.001 0.005 0.004
Potential Experience 0.012 0.024 0.011
Note: Definitions of variables: Female is the gender dummy variable in equation (14): 1 for female and 0 otherwise; Married is the marital status dummy variable in equation (14): 1 for married and 0 otherwise; Divorced/widowed is marital status dummy variable in equation (14): 1 for divorced/widowed and 0 otherwise; Majority ethnicity is race/ethnicity dummy variable in equation (14): 1 for majority ethnic group and 0 otherwise; School is the years of schooling in equation (14): Potential experience is the years of working experience in equation (14), calculated by age-school-6. Source: Luxembourg Income Study. Denotes computations based on hourly wage; otherwise computation based on with annual earnings. Marginal effect for each country year is the average marginal effect of individual workers within that country year.
UI and Incomplete Information Perhaps UI is the most studied institution regarding information and search. Ehrenberg and Oaxaca (1976), Jurajda and Tannery (2003), and numerous other studies find that UI increases unemployment duration, job search and post-unemployment wage. Hofler and Polachek (1985), Polachek and Yoon (1987) and Hofler & Murphy (1992) corroborate this result using one of the frontier estimation techniques described above. They find that having received UI leads to less incomplete information. As already mentioned, this finding is consistent with search theory explanations that UI subsidizes search costs leading to longer search, better wages, and more information (less incomplete information). Whereas these studies test this proposition with US data, to the best of our knowledge, none examine other countries; nor do any do comparative analysis across countries. In what follows, we perform a comparative analysis using the eleven countries mentioned above. We test whether variations in UI are related to worker incomplete information. To achieve this goal, we need UI information for these countries. One measure, found in the ‘‘OECD Employment Outlook,’’ is a country’s public expenditure as a percentage of GDP. The advantage of this measurement is that we have each country’s actual expenditures on UI, instead of some
58
SOLOMON W. POLACHEK AND JUN (JEFF) XIANG
nominal benefit measure that might not be implemented exactly for each worker. The disadvantage is that this measure might reflect a country’s business cycle rather than how it subsides an individual’s search. Because UI (as a proportion of GDP) is narrowly distributed (most of the UI expenditures are less than 2% of countries’ GDP, with a few over 3%), we convert the UI variable into a logarithm. This assumption is consistent with UI’s impact being nonlinear. A logarithmic specification implies a larger impact when UI is initially small, which is what we expect.
Other Institutional Factors Besides UI, we examine several other institutional factors that might contribute to the explanation of workers’ incomplete information. These variables are population density, proportion of employment in industry, rural population and the inflow of foreign workers.15 Information on each of these is obtained from World Bank data. The first three variables get at how information is concentrated among the population. As such they reflect the costs of search, since we presume that search costs rise when information is dispersed more widely and harder to find. So, for example, a more dense population implies quicker access to information networks. Also, a more dense population probably means that jobs are closer in proximity. A large rural population implies the opposite, namely sparse harder to find information, with jobs spread over wider distances. Sandell (1980) suggests that geographically concentrated opportunities lowers search costs, which prolongs search, and reduces incomplete information. In contrast to urban areas, rural regions are less concentrated with job opportunities, and therefore likely result in more incomplete information. Unionization rates rise as a country’s industrial employment increases (Polachek, 2004). Also unions provide information to employers and employees regarding wages and jobs (Polachek & Yoon, 1987) and unions compress wage distributions (Freeman, 1980). Thus, because industrialized countries are more unionized, we expect workers in more industrial countries to be more informed and have less incomplete information. Finally, in honor of Tikva Lecker, we examine the inflow of foreign workers. A considerable body of research examines the relative success of immigrants. For example, past studies of US immigration note that wages of newly arrived immigrants lag behind native wages (Chiswick, 1978), but that the assimilation process can cause earnings of the foreign born to eventually
The Effects of Incomplete Employee Wage Information
59
overtake US natives (Chiswick, 1986), though there remains some debate on the issue (Borjas, 1985). In any case, the whole assimilation process involves increased acquisition of information on domestic labor markets, and the use of this information in the search process (Daneshvary, Herzog, Hofler, & Schlottmann, 1992). Further, new lower waged foreign workers, who come to a country with less initial knowledge of wage structures, can affect the overall distribution of wages. Since generally, having less information implies that immigrant workers receive lower wages than natives, wage dispersion increases, as does skewness. Thus the effect of foreign workers is likely to be a more left-skewed earnings distribution, resulting from incomplete information (holding skills constant). But this result is not always found. A study of German immigrants, using data from 2000, finds natives and immigrants at about the same distance from the frontier (Lang, 2004). For this reason, the effect of foreign in-migration on incomplete information is still an open question. Table 5 gives a detailed summary of these variables. Column (1) contains the variable name and definition. Column (2) contains the number of country-year cells for which data are available. Columns (3)–(6) contain summary statistics. Rows (1)–(7) contain statistics for each of the institutional variables just mentioned. Generally, data are available for most of the time periods and countries. The exceptions are for UI (which is missing 8 of 45 observations) and foreign worker inflows (which is missing 24 observations). This latter restriction necessitates running separate analysis of foreign worker inflow effects. Row (8) gives estimates of the incomplete information variable (obtained from Table 2). Because the effects of incomplete information are affected by using annual instead of hourly wages, we normalize those 18 observations that were based on annual instead of hourly wages. This normalization unifies the incomplete information measurement to make it consistent across counties so that inter-country comparisons can be made. These values are given in row (10).16
Cross-Country Analysis Cross-country regression results are given in Table 6. Country (and year) specific incomplete information measures derived from (23) are the dependent variables, and the country-specific institutional variables just described serve as independent variables.17 We present five models that explain incomplete information as a function of these institutional factors. Model (1) concentrates on UI. Model (2) concentrates on the population density and
60
Table 5.
Statistic Summary of the Variables from the Cross Country Regressions.
Unemployment insurance (expenditure as a percentage of GDP) Log of unemployment insurance Population density (people per sq km) Industrial employment (% of total employment) Rural population (% of total population) Inflow of foreign worker (in 1000s) Inflow of foreign worker (% of total population) Incomplete information Hourly wage dummy (1 for hourly Wage) Adjusted incomplete information
Number of Observations
Mean
Standard deviation
Minimum
Maximum
37 37 45 42 45 21 21 45 45 45
1.779 0.352 28.542 27.764 22.107 77.700 0.161 0.359 0.600 0.309
1.181 0.722 147.464 5.644 9.822 184.707 0.108 0.108 0.495 0.088
0.26 1.347 2.7000 21.5 8.841 3.8 0.033 0.156 0 0.130
5.6 1.723 466.499 45.1 42.283 742.3 0.412 0.581 1 0.455
Note: Industry includes mining and quarrying (including oil production), manufacturing, electricity, gas and water, and construction, corresponding to major divisions 2-5 (ISIC revision 2) or tabulation categories C-F (ISIC revision 3). Source: Incomplete information is from Table 2; UI is from OECD Employment Outlook; the remaining variables are from World Bank data. Median
SOLOMON W. POLACHEK AND JUN (JEFF) XIANG
Variable
Regression Results of Country Attributes on Country Workers’ Average Incomplete Information (Robust Standard Errors Used; t-Values in Parentheses). Model 1
Constant Wage definition dummy Log of UI
Population density
Rural population
Industrial employment
Inflow of foreign workers(in thousands)
Inflow of foreign workers (proportion of total population)
0.487 (20.62) 0.161 ( 5.82) 0.050 ( 3.82) [ .036] { .048}
Model 2 0.570 (8.94) 0.128 ( 6.86)
Model 3
Model 4
Model 5
0.287 (17.01)
0.279 (10.23)
0.414 (12.00) 0.138 ( 7.12) 0.022 ( 1.99) [ .016] { .021} 0.0002 ( 1.70) [ .028] { .015} 0.003 (3.05) [.031] {.180}
0.0002 ( 2.63) [ .030] { .016} 0.003 (2.65) [.030] {.184} 0.006 ( 2.64) [ .034] { .464}
The Effects of Incomplete Employee Wage Information
Table 6.
0.0002 (3.30) [.037] {.049}
61
0.226 (2.03) [.023] {.116}
N R-squared Probability4F
62
Table 6. (Continued ) Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Model 5
37 0.5185 0.0000
42 0.7301 0.0000
21 0.2922 0.0038
21 0.1391 0.0561
37 0.7787 0.0000
SOLOMON W. POLACHEK AND JUN (JEFF) XIANG
Note: [ ] contains the marginal effect of a standard deviation change in the variable. { }contains the elasticity defined as: Elasticity ¼ @y=¯y ; where y¯ and x¯ are the means (or medians indicated by ) of the dependent variable and @x=x¯ the independent variable respectively.
The Effects of Incomplete Employee Wage Information
63
industrial structure variables. Models (3) and (4) concentrate on the inflow of foreign workers. Finally, Model (5) integrates most of the institutional factors into one model.18 We present four parameters for each independent variable. The first is the simple OLS coefficient. The second is the t-statistic based on the robust standard error. The third is the marginal effect caused by a one standard deviation change in the independent variable. Finally, the fourth is an elasticity measure describing the percent change in incomplete information caused by a one percent change in the independent institutional characteristic. To distinguish between incomplete information variables derived from annual versus incomplete information measures derived from hourly wage data, we adjust for hours of work.19 The first model focuses on how UI impacts incomplete information. A one-unit increase in the logarithm of a country’s UI expenditures (relative to GDP) reduces incomplete information by 0.05. This means that a one extra logarithm unit of UI spending (relative to GDP) induces workers to get 5% closer to their maximum attainable wage. The –0.036 coefficient implies that a one standard deviation increase in a country’s logarithm of UI (relative to GDP) causes workers to get 3.6% closer to their potential wage. Finally, the –0.048 elasticity measure indicates that a doubling of the logarithm of UI spending (from its mean value) leads to 4.8% decrease in worker incomplete information (from its mean value). Most important, these coefficients substantiate search theory. Increasing UI reduces search costs. Lower search costs increase search leading to more worker information on the wage structure. The second model focuses on population density, rural population, and industrial employment. If, as we postulate, each of these influences search costs, then we should expect these variables to have an effect on worker incomplete information. Indeed, this is precisely what we find. Both a more dense population and a high level of industrial employment provide information networks, and thus decrease incomplete information. A large rural population increases distances, thereby increasing information costs. This leads to decreases in employee information, and hence a greater level of employee incomplete information. The marginal effect of a one standard deviation change in each of these three variables is very similar in magnitude (0.03). This means that a one standard deviation increase in either population density or industrial employment decreases a country’s incomplete information by about 10%.20 Analogously, one could look at this in another way: Incomplete information of about 0.30 (the mean reported in Table 5) implies that employees on average earn about 70% of their maximum possible wage. A one standard
64
SOLOMON W. POLACHEK AND JUN (JEFF) XIANG
deviation increase in population density raises employee information (lowers employee incomplete information) by about 10%. Thus, workers in (a one standard deviation) denser area get wages 3% closer to their maximum. Though this analysis is performed across countries, it is well known that urban areas pay higher wages, and often for unexplainable reasons. Perhaps one reason is that better information networks lead to less employee incomplete information.21 Models (3) and (4) incorporate the inflow of foreign workers. Both these models show that a growing foreign workforce decreases worker information. A standard deviation increase in inflow of foreign workers yields a 3.7% wage loss in model (3) and a 2.4% loss in model (4). The elasticity measurements for these two models are 0.049 and 0.116, respectively. Thus doubling the inflow of foreign workers induces a 4.9% increase in incomplete information in model (3), and a 11.6% increase in model (4).22 Thus, despite major contributions, foreign workers probably contribute to a host country’s economic development, they also affect the wage distribution, which becomes more skewed to the left. As such, the average worker receives a wage proportionally lower than the maximum available wage. These lower wages are consistent with an increase in incomplete information. Combining all variables (Model (5)) does not alter the results.23 Again, UI is associated with significantly increased worker wages, relative to potential wages. This is consistent with increased worker information. Also, a more dispersed population is associated with wages being lower, relative to potential wages. In contrast with UI, this is consistent with less employee information. From a policy perspective, these results show that a country can reduce its incomplete information through governmental efforts, such as spending more on UI. Also, from a policy perspective, the results are consistent with information dissemination being linked to economic development. As a country develops, its geographical structure often changes, so that rural (relative to urban) population is reduced. From the above coefficients, relative rural population reductions are associated with more worker information. In making these claims, it is important to note that information rises because the overall wage distribution becomes more left-skewed, not because wages simply rise equally across the whole distribution. Thus, we are not making a trivial statement regarding development and wage levels. While it is very well known that economic development raises a society’s wages, a rising overall wage does not constitute increasing information. By our original
65
The Effects of Incomplete Employee Wage Information
definition, incomplete information is based on changes in wage distribution skewness, and not on the distribution’s overall mean wage level. Thus our proclaimed result goes beyond traditional development economics.
A Graphical Depiction To get another view of the above results, we graph incomplete information against each of these explanatory variables (Figs. 1–6). Every observation is labeled by country name. Also, the graphs contain a fitted line mirroring each of the above model’s predictions. As easily seen, the cross-country predictions blatantly stand out. Nations with greater UI benefits (Fig. 1) have less incomplete information (more employee information). Workers in more densely populated nations have less incomplete information (Fig. 2). Nations with greater rural populations have more incomplete worker information (Fig. 3). Industrialized nations have less incomplete information (Fig. 4). Finally, nations with a greater influx of foreign workers have more incomplete information (Figs. 5 and 6). Fitted values
adjusted_incomplete_information NW
0.419992 US
US
FI FI US
NW
GE CN CN
CN
CN
FI CN FI
US US
IE IE
NW IE SW NL
SW SW
GE
NL
GE GE
CN
UK UK UK
IS IS UK
NL
0.094879 -1.34707
1.72277 lnui
Fig. 1.
Adjusted Incomplete Information Versus Logarithm of UI.
66
SOLOMON W. POLACHEK AND JUN (JEFF) XIANG adjusted_incomplete_information
0.457992
Fitted values
NW FI FI NWUS US US US US NWUS CN SW SW CN US
CN
GE
IE IE IE
SW
NL US
CN
GE GE
NLNL
GE
CN
IS UK UK IS UK UK NL
CZ CZ
0.132879
NL
2.70037
466.499 population_density
Adjusted Incomplete Information Versus Population Density.
Fig. 2.
Fitted values
adjusted_incomplete_information NW
0.462992
FI
NW
US US CN USUS
FI FI
FI
US
NW US
GE
SW SW
CNCNCN CN
IE
US
SW
IE IE
NL NL NL
CN
GE
US
GE GE
CN
IS UK IS UK UK UK NL NL
0.137879
CZ CZ
8.841
42.2834 rural_population
Fig. 3.
Adjusted Incomplete Information Versus Rural Population.
67
The Effects of Incomplete Employee Wage Information adjusted_incomplete_information
Fitted values
NW
0.446992
FIFI US
FI
NWUS US US CN
FI
US IE
NW CN CN CN CN
SW
GE
SW IE IE
SW NL
CN
NL
US
GE GE
NL CN
IS UK UK IS
UK UK
NL CZ CZ
NL
0.121879 21.5
45.1 industrial_employment
Adjusted Incomplete Information Versus Industrial Employment.
Fig. 4.
adjusted_incomplete_information
Fitted values
0.437136 US US US
US
US GE
IE
CN CN CN CN
IE IE
GE GE GE
CN
UK UK
0.178782
UK UK
742.3
3.8 inflow_foreign_workers_number
Fig. 5. Adjusted Incomplete Information Versus Inflow of Foreign Workers.
68
SOLOMON W. POLACHEK AND JUN (JEFF) XIANG Fitted values
adjusted_incomplete_information US
0.404516
US US
US
US GE
IE
CN CN
CN CN
IE IE
GE GE GE
CN
UK UK UK
0.178782
UK
0.411507
0.032892 inflow_foreign_workers_prop
Fig. 6.
Adjusted Incomplete Information Versus Proportional Inflow of Foreign Workers.
One interesting observation is noted from these graphs. Within-country results are not always as strong as the between country results. Take incomplete information versus the logarithm of UI (Fig. 1). Whereas greater UI decreases incomplete information in the US, Canada, the UK, Israel, the Netherlands, Ireland and Sweden, it does not in Norway, Finland and Germany.24 Rather, these latter within-country patterns seem to indicate rising incomplete information as UI increases. These few counter examples imply that UI alone does not explain all changes of the within country incomplete information. Perhaps, UI must be examined in conjunction with welfare policies, given the preponderance of Scandinavian countries among this latter group. Probably because a country’s population density and rural population change very slowly over short time periods, we observe similarly anomalous results for within-country comparisons in Figs. 2 and 3. As a result, we observe almost no within-country relationship in these figures, even though the between country relation is significant. On the other hand, the within country observations follow the crosscountry trends in Figs. 4, 5 and 6. Incomplete information decreases within
The Effects of Incomplete Employee Wage Information
69
a country when its industrial employment increases (Fig. 4). Incomplete information tends to rise with inflows of foreign workers (Figs. 5 and 6).
CONCLUSION In this paper, we define a tractable procedure to measure incomplete information in the labor market. The procedure is based on econometric frontier estimation techniques, and is consistent with search theory. It is an improvement over past measures because it holds individual characteristics constant and nets out random effects. We apply the technique to 11 countries over various years. We find that incomplete information leads workers to receive on average about 30–35% less pay than they otherwise would have earned, had they information on what each firm paid. Generally married men and women suffer less from incomplete information than the widowed or divorced, and singles suffer the most. Women suffer more than men do. Schooling and labor market experience reduce these losses. But institutions within a country matter, as well. For example, we find that workers in countries that strongly support unemployment insurance (UI) receive wages closer to their potential. Doubling UI decreases incomplete information and results in 5% higher wages. A more dense population reduces search costs leading to less incomplete information and higher wages. A more industrial economy disseminates wage information better, so workers exhibit less incomplete information. Finally, in memory of Tikva Lecker, we examined the effect of foreign worker inflows on incomplete information. Data within countries, as well as data from a cross-country comparison, yield comparable results. Foreign worker inflows skew wages to the left. In the short-run they increase incomplete information, and at the same time they reduce average wage levels. In reaching these conclusions, it is important to note that we achieve our estimates of incomplete information based on the skewness of the wage distribution and not on wage levels. Thus, whereas we find that individual characteristics such as race, gender, and work experience lead to higher wage levels in their own right (i.e., these variables have a direct effect), they also do so through their effects on incomplete information. Similarly whereas we find that a country’s institutional characteristics such as commitment to UI, sanctions against foreign workers, or a more developed industrial structure directly raise wages, these country characteristics also do so through their effects on incomplete information. These latter effects
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SOLOMON W. POLACHEK AND JUN (JEFF) XIANG
of incomplete information on wage level are obtained from wage distribution skewness, and not from symmetric movements in the entire wage distribution.
NOTES 1. Katz and Ziderman (1986) argue that incomplete information also affects the complete wage package including non-wage benefits. Given unobserved worker characteristics, employers provide specific non-wage amenities to attract workers with desired but unobserved characteristics, thereby affecting the equilibrium wage. Unfortunately, we do not have sufficient data to consider non-wage fringes. 2. How institutional characteristics affect employer (as opposed to employee) incomplete information is beyond the scope of this paper. To answer this latter question, one would need to adopt a two-tier estimation technique (Polachek & Yoon, 1987). However, at this point, the two-tier algorithm is not available to use with LIS data, since all statistical analysis must be done on the LIS computer with standard statistical software (SAS, SPSS, and STATA). 3. At this point we are abstracting from life cycle considerations, particularly training and other opportunities available on the job. As will be illustrated later, the estimation procedure accounts for these factors by including life cycle variables. Differences in information between ‘‘inside’’ and ‘‘outside’’ employees may also be a consideration, but getting at these is more difficult. Not all ‘‘inside’’ information is acted upon, and hence it is more difficult to measure. For example, the perspicacious peregrinator (Polachek & Horvath, 1977) searches on-the-job for more beneficial opportunities. The information he/she gathers is unobservable until acted upon, which does not occur until the perspicacious peregrinator actually moves. 4. We do not use ISSP data partially because the earnings are reported in categories in many country-years. This earnings smoothing is likely to distort information regarding incomplete information. However, future work can include those country-years that do not report earnings in categories to extend our current study sample. 5. Wage level w is dependent on the worker’s skill level x and a variable y that will be defined shortly, so that w ¼ w(x,y). This wage can vary somewhat because companies differ in how they use comparably skilled workers. Some, perhaps with good management and/or higher physical capital (both indexed by y) pay more, while other less efficient companies pay lower amount for comparable workers. This results in a distribution of potential wages, for example W Nðw; ¯ yÞ; given the firms’ heterogeneity of utilization of workers of given quality x. Accordingly, there are high wage firms, the maximum wage being wmax ðxÞ; and low wage firms, the minimum being wmin ðxÞ: For now, since we are talking about a worker of a particular skill level, we suppress the vector of worker characteristics (x), defining these available wages as wmin and wmax : 6. The LIS data do not contain employer characteristics. Thus, such information is omitted from xi : To the extent these omitted variables influence ui ; our worker
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incomplete information estimates may be biased. However, differences in these measures across countries are unaffected by this bias. These differences are akin to serially correlated errors in fixed-effects panel estimates being better than crosssectional estimates (see Bound & Krueger, 1991). Economy-wide institutional variables are included later in the analysis when comparing incomplete information across countries. 7. This is the measurement error omitted from past studies of incomplete information that simply use wage (or price) dispersion measures to get at incomplete information. 8. It is not necessary to assume ui N þ ðmmi ; s2mi Þ: Other common distributions used in this context include the exponential, the Gamma, and lognormal. However, past studies found little qualitative difference between results using these different distributions. See Olson, Schmidt, and Waldman (1980) and Gong and Sickles (1992). 9. The skewness and kurtosis test for normality (sktest) is described in the STATA Corporation (2001) reference manual, pp. 226–228. 10. As already noted, data on employers were not available, and hence omitted. However, in the latter cross-country analysis, the effect of these omitted variables are smaller, the more uniformly distributed these variables are across countries. Also, without data on tenure it is impossible to examine incomplete information differences between insider and outsider workers. However, if tenure data were available, one could compare information measures of recently hired workers to workers with longer tenure to ascertain the role on-the-job search of ‘‘insiders’’ within the firm. Preliminary evidence on this solely for the U.S. (Polachek & Yoon, 1987, Table 2) indicates that tenured employees have less incomplete information. Similarly, if enough panel data were available, one could employ the techniques utilized by Polachek and Yoon (1996) to net out person-specific heterogeneity. 11. Note that according to Weinstein the likelihood function is based on (1964), the ei distribution being f ðÞ ¼ 2=s f =s 1 F ðls 1 Þ: 12. As schooling levels rise, the wage distribution becomes wider. Although a wider earnings distribution increases search gains, it need not imply more information since search costs also rise. Perhaps this is the reason we see no time trends regarding incomplete information. 13. Whereas technological improvement provides the opportunity for more search, the whole search process can become more overwhelming, making the job choice decision more complicated. For instance, by intensively searching through the Internet, individuals decrease search costs. These decreased search costs might imply more search but less real information if, for example, wages are not posted. Thus, technology could leave workers with less real information. 14. For the details, see Eqs (9) and (10) in Wang’s paper. 15. Refer to Table 5 for definitions of these variables. 16. We adjust the 18 incomplete information estimates by the hourly wage dummy coefficient in a regression of incomplete information on the hourly wage dummy variable. 17. It is argued that our estimates could be biased by unadjusted time-invariant country effects when these effects are correlated with the independent variables. However, the small sample sizes of our regressions – between 21 and 42 observations – prevent us from using country dummies: we will lose about 10 degrees of freedom
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after country dummies are implemented, which would make our regression results much weaker. 18. Foreign worker inflows cannot be integrated because the limited number of observations on this variable precludes sufficient degrees of freedom. In addition, we eliminated the industrial employment variable because it becomes insignificant. 19. This adjustment is omitted from Models (3) and (4), because each of the 21 observations contains incomplete information measures derived solely from hourly wage data. 20. According to Table 5, average adjusted employee incomplete information is about 0.30. A 0.03 change is about 10%. 21. The large industrial employment and rural population elasticities (Table 6) at first surprised us. However, an examination of the means (or median for population density) and standard deviations of these variables reveals values, respectively, five times the size and twice the size of their standard deviations. So these two elasticity measures are really very consistent with the marginal effects. 22. More specifically, a doubling of foreign workers (i.e., a new inflow of 77,700 foreign workers for a country already with 77,700 (median value from Table 5) foreign workers and incomplete information of 0.359) will increase incomplete information by 0.018 units, which is 4.9% of 0.359. Similarly, increasing the proportion of foreign workers from 0.161 to 0.322% yields an increase in incomplete information by 0.142, which is 11.6% of 0.359. 23. As noted in note 13, an insufficient number of observations precludes including the foreign worker inflow. The industrial employment variable has the correct sign, is statistically insignificant. Thus we also eliminate this variable in model (5). 24. Missing UI data preclude plotting Czechoslovakia in the Firgure.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS We are especially indebted to Hung-Jen Wang for providing a STATA version of the frontier estimation program, and to Subal Kumbhakar, to participants of the Bar-Ilan Conference in Honor of Tikva Lecker, as well as to two anonymous referees for valuable comments and suggestions. All remaining errors are our own.
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Jurajda, Sˇ., & Tannery, F. J. (2003). Unemployment durations and extended unemployment benefits in local labor markets. Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 56(2), 324–348. Kamiya, K., & Sato, T. (2004). Equilibrium price dispersion in a matching model with divisible money. International Economic Review, 45(2), 413–430. Katz, E., & Ziderman, A. (1986). Incomplete information, non-wage benefits and desirableworker self selection. Australian Economic Papers, 25(47), 252–256. Kumbhakar, S., & Lovell, C. A. K. (2000). Stochastic frontier analysis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Lach, S., & Tsiddon, D. (1992). The behavior of prices and information: An empirical analysis of dissaggregated price data. Journal of Political Economy, 100(2), 349–389. Lang, G. (2004) How different are wages from wage potentials? Analyzing the earnings disadvantage of immigrants in Germany. Institute for Economics Discussion Paper #256, Universitaet Augsburg. Luxembourg Income Study. http://www.lisproject.org/. McCall, J. (1970). Economics of Information and Job Search. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 84, 113–126. McCall, J. (1973). Income mobility, racial discrimination and economic growth. Lexington: D.C. Health. Meeusen, W., & van den Broeck, J. (1977). Efficiency Estimation form Cobb–Douglas production functions and composed errors. International Economic Review, 18(2), 434–444. Meyer, B. (1990). Unemployment insurance and unemployment spells. Econometrica, 58(4), 757–782. Micklwright, J., & Nagy, G. (1995). Unemployment insurance and incentives in Hungary. C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, CEPR Discussion Papers: 1118. Mincer, J. (1974). Schooling, experience and earnings. New York: Columbia University Press for the NBER. Moffitt, R., & Nicholson, W. (1982). The effect of unemployment insurance on unemployment: The case of federal supplemental benefits. Review of Economics and Statistics, 64(1), 1–11. Mortenson, D. (1970). Job search, the duration of unemployment, and the Phillips curve. American Economic Review, 60(5), 847–862. Murphy, K., & Welch, F. (1990). Empirical age-earnings profiles. Journal of Labor Economics, 8(2), 202–229. Nelson, P. (1970). Information and consumer behavior. Journal of Political Economy, 78, 311–329. Olson, J., Schmidt, P., & Waldman, D. (1980). A Monte Carlo study of estimators of stochastic frontier production functions. Journal of Econometrics, 13(1), 67–82. Polachek, S. (2004). What can we learn about the decline in union membership from international data? In: P. Wunnava (Ed.), Changing roles of unions: New forms of representation (pp. 362–377). Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe. Polachek, S., & Horvath, F. (1977). A life cycle approach to migration: Analysis of the perspicacious peregrinator. Research in Labor Economics, 1, 103–149. Polachek, S., & Robst, J. (1998). Employee labor market information: Comparing direct world of work measures of workers’ knowledge to stochastic frontier estimates. Labour Economics, 5(2), 231–242. Polachek, S., & Yoon, B. J. (1987). A two-tiered earnings frontier estimation of employer and employee information in the labor market. Review of Economics and Statistics, 69(2), 296–302.
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Polachek, S., & Yoon, B. J. (1996). Panel estimates of a two-tiered earnings frontier. Journal of Applied Econometrics, 11(2), 169–178. Reinganum, J. F. (1979). A simple model of equilibrium price dispersion. Journal of Political Economy, 87(4), 851–858. Royston, P. (1991). Comment on sg.3 and an improved D’Agostino test. Stata Technical Bulletin, 3, 23–24. Sandell, S. (1980). Job search by unemployed women: Determinants of the asking wage. Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 33, 368–378. Schmidt, P., & Lin, T. (1984). Simple tests of alternative specifications in stochastic frontier models. Journal of Econometrics, 24(3), 349–361. Sorensen, A. T. (2000). Equilibrium price dispersion in retail markets for prescription drugs. Journal of Political Economy, 108(4), 833–850. Stata Corporation (2001) Stata Statistical Software: Release 7.0. Reference Annual (College Station: Texas), pp 226–228. Stephenson, S. P. (1976). The economics of youth job search behavior. Review of Economics and Statistics, 58(1), 104–111. Stevenson, R. E. (1980). Likelihood functions for generalized stochastic frontier estimation. Journal of Econometrics, 13(1), 57–66. Stigler, G. (1961). The economics of information. Journal of Political Economy, 69(3), 213–225. Stigler, G. (1962). Information in the labor market. Journal of Political Economy, 70(5, Part 2), S94–S105. Stigler, G., & Kindahl, J. (1970). The behavior of industrial prices. New York: Columbia University Press. Taubman, P. (1976). The determinants of earnings: Genetics, family, and other environments: A study of white male twins. American Economic Review, 66(5), 858–870. van Hoomissen, T. (1988). Price dispersion and inflation: Evidence from Israel. Journal of Political Economy, 96(6), 1303–1314. van den Berg, Gerard, J., & van der Klaauw, B. (2001). Counselling and monitoring of unemployed workers: Theory and evidence from a controlled social experiment. C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, CEPR Discussion Paper # 2986. Wang, H.-J. (2002). Heteroscedasticity and non-monotonic efficiency effects of a stochastic frontier model. Journal of Productivity Analysis, 18(3), 241–253. Weinstein, M. A. (1964). The Sum of Values of A Normal and A Truncated Normal Distribution. Technometrics, 6, 104–105.
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THE IMPACT OF IMMIGRANT DYNASTIES ON WAGE INEQUALITY Michael Ben-Gad ABSTRACT I construct a set of dynamic macroeconomic models to analyze the effect of unskilled immigration on wage inequality. The immigrants or their descendants do not remain unskilled – over time they may approach or exceed the general level of educational attainment. In the baseline model, the economy’s capital supply is determined endogenously by the savings behavior of infinite-lived dynasties, and I also consider models in which the supply of capital is perfectly elastic, or exogenously determined. I derive a simple formula that determines the time discounted value of the skill premium enjoyed by college-educated workers following a change in the rate of immigration for unskilled workers, or a change in the degree or rate at which unskilled immigrants become skilled. I compare the calculations of the skill premiums to data from the US Current Population Survey to determine the long-run effect of different immigrant groups on wage inequality in the United States.
Research in Labor Economics: The Economics of Immigration and Social Diversity Research in Labor Economics, Volume 24, 77–134 Copyright r 2006 by Elsevier Ltd. All rights of reproduction in any form reserved ISSN: 0147-9121/doi:10.1016/S0147-9121(05)24003-7
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1. INTRODUCTION In this paper I construct a set of macroeconomic models to analyze how increases in the number of unskilled immigrants may affect wage inequality over time. In these models, a change in the number of such immigrants does not necessarily alter the composition of the workforce permanently. Rather than remaining unskilled forever, a portion of the additional immigrants, or their descendants, join the ranks of skilled workers. Indeed, as is the case for some immigrant groups in the United States, the native-born children or grandchildren of immigrants with low levels of education may not merely assimilate by matching the general level of educational attainment, but exceed it. For the baseline model, I adopt the Weil (1989) overlapping dynasties optimal growth framework. Changes in immigration policy not only affect wages directly by altering the size and composition of the labor force, but also alter the rate of return to capital, inducing changes in savings behavior that gradually affect the size of the capital stock. These changes to the size of the capital stock indirectly affect wages as well. I derive a simple reduced form that encapsulates all these different effects on one measure of wage inequality – the ratio between the discounted values of skilled and unskilled wages. The effect of a change in immigration policy on wages is neither constant nor immediate. A change in immigration policy generates changes in the size and composition of the population that accumulate over time. The effect of these changes on factor returns may or may not be permanent, depending on whether the labor supplied by the immigrants or their descendents perfectly substitutes for the pre-existing labor supply. Therefore by examining the ratio between the discounted value of the two different wages, I can determine to what degree, in the long run, high educational attainment by the descendants of unskilled immigrants either ameliorates or reverses their short-run impact on wage inequality. In my baseline model, capital is endogenously determined but adjusts slowly. Borjas (1999) analyzes the impact of immigration in static models under two alternative assumptions – capital supply is either completely elastic, or fixed. To better understand the sensitivity of my measure of wage inequality to different assumptions about the supply of capital, I compare the behavior of my model to one in which the stock of capital adjusts immediately to policy changes, but where the rate of return is exogenously determined. In addition, I also consider the case where the size of the capital stock grows at a fixed exogenous rate.
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In Section 2, I briefly review recent U.S. immigration policy. I present data from the U.S. Census Current Population Survey that demonstrates the vast differences in educational attainment among different immigrant groups – differences that span at least two generations. These data also highlight the higher degree of intergenerational mobility between the immigrant generation and the second generation, when compared to the analogous native populations. I present in Section 3 the dynamic optimal growth model with overlapping dynasties, developed by Weil (1989). Ben-Gad (2004) used the model to examine the behavior of an economy that is absorbing immigrant dynasties over time. In this paper, I distinguish between two types of households: households with skilled workers (college-educated adults), with unskilled workers (adults without college degrees). Section 4 describes the dynamic system and the general perturbations method I use to simulate its behavior. I also derive the formula used to calculate the discounted skill premium (the percentage gap between the present value of wages for college and non-college educated workers) in the baseline model. I also present the explicit reduced form for the special case where the elasticities of substitution between the factors of production are all identical. Section 5 briefly describes two alternative assumptions about the elasticity of the capital supply. I demonstrate that for the special case in which all the elasticities of substitution between the inputs are identical, the ratio between the two wages at any moment in time is identical, regardless of what mechanism governs the dynamic behavior of the capital stock. Nonetheless, even in this case, the discounted premium to education is sensitive to the model we choose. In Section 6, I present my procedure for modeling the effect of immigration policy on the composition of the labor force over time. There is first, a direct effect as the ratio of skilled to unskilled workers among the extra new arrivals seldom matches the veteran population. There is a second effect because I permit the descendants of these immigrants to switch between the two categories during the periods after they arrive. One serious limitation to this approach is that membership in either category is determined exogenously – I am modeling the impact of observed changes in educational attainment but make no attempt to explain them. Section 7 explains the choice of parameters I use to calibrate the model. In Section 8, I consider the impact of a 20-year surge in the immigration of unskilled workers on wages and wage inequality, within the context of three different assumptions for the elasticity of capital supply, and three different
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specifications of the production function. I consider three different scenarios. First, what if the immigrants and their descendants remain permanently unskilled? No one ever attends college, and their arrival permanently lowers the share of unskilled workers within the economy. This scenario is a crude approximation of perhaps the most pessimistic outcome for immigration: the creation of a permanent unskilled under class. In the second scenario, the immigrants are initially unskilled, but over time, they or their descendents gradually attain the levels of college education prevalent in the general population. This process of immigrant ‘assimilation’ ultimately restores the distribution of college-educated and non-college educated people in the workforce to its initial level. In the third scenario, all the immigrants or their descendents eventually attend college. This last case is perhaps the least likely, yet paradoxically the most informative. Finally, I compare the results to those obtained for an identically sized influx of college-educated immigrants. Finally, in Section 9, I consider more realistic examples, where not all immigrants are skilled or unskilled and neither are all their descendants. I relate the results for the discounted skill premium to the data on college attainment for the different immigrant groups in the Current Population Survey. In this paper I do not presume to explain the decisions made by households to immigrate. Because legal migration from the developing world to the developed world is regulated by the rationing of visas, and illegal migration by the resources invested in interdiction, or the harshness of penalties imposed on those violating immigration laws, I believe it is possible to treat modest changes in rates of immigration for unskilled workers as exogenous policy decisions.1 More importantly, this paper ignores the decisions made by immigrants or their descendants to acquire education. Instead, I focus on the long-run implications of differential educational attainment among immigrants and their descendents for wage inequality.
2. U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY AND EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT AMONG IMMIGRANT GROUPS 2.1. The Rate of Net International Migration The share of foreign-born within the population of the United States declined steadily between 1910 and 1970, from 14.7 to 4.7%. Since then it
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has climbed swiftly, reaching 11.7% by the end of 2003. What has generated such a dramatic rise in just over three decades? The official rate of immigration presented in Fig. 1 Panel (a), features the data tabulated by the U.S. Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services. These numbers show immigration rising steadily from a rate of 1.5 per thousand in 1960 to 2.6 per thousand in 1988, then rising much more steeply, reaching 7.1 per thousand in 1991, and then declining to 2.3 per thousand in 1999. The rate at which people arrived in the United States did indeed rise between 1960 and 1991, but not by nearly so much, nor was the rate nearly so volatile. The official rate of immigration in Panel (a) of Fig. 1 does not show the date at which foreigners arrive in the United States or join its workforce, but merely captures the number who attain the official status of immigrant. Hence, there was no massive influx of immigrants in 1991, but rather a large number of people, many living and working illegally in the United States for a decade or more, who took advantage of the amnesty provisions in the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA), to register as legal immigrants. Net international migration (NIM) in Fig. 1 Panel (b), measures the physical movement of people between the United States and the rest of the world. The rise in the NIM was far less dramatic than either the changes in the official rate of immigration or the steep decline in the rate of natural population growth in Panel (b) of Fig. 1.2 Between 1960 and 1999 the birth rate in the United States dropped from 23.8 to 14.4 per thousand, causing the steep decline in the rate of natural population growth. The sharp decline in the birth rate combined with the gradual increase in net migration between 1970 and 2000 to generate the large increase in the share of the foreign born within the U.S. population over the same period.
2.2. U.S. Immigration Policy Since passage of the Immigrant and Nationality Act of 1965, most legal immigrants have arrived in the United States through some form of family sponsorship. Immediate relatives of United States citizens may enter without limit; during the 1990s about a quarter of a million arrived each year. Other relatives of U.S. citizens are admitted as family sponsored preference immigrants – the Immigration Act of 1990 set the limit for all family sponsored immigrants as either 226,000, or 480,000 minus the number of people admitted under the category of immediate relatives during
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14 13 12 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 1960 1963 1966 1969 1972 1975 1978 1981 1984 1987 1990 1993 1996 1999 (a) 14 13 12 11 10 9 8 7
Natural Pop. Growth
6 5 4 3 2 1
Net International Migration
1960 1963 1966 1969 1972 1975 1978 1981 1984 1987 1990 1993 1996 1999 (b)
Fig. 1. Annual Rates Per Thousand, of Legal Immigration and Components of Population Growth in the United States, 1960–1999. Natural Population Growth is Number of Births, Less Deaths. NIM from 1960 to 1984 Includes Migration by U.S. Civillians, but Excludes Military Personnel, NIM from 1985 to 1994 Excludes both U.S. Civillians and Military Personnel, and 1995–1999 NIM Excludes both U.S. Civillians and Military Personnel. Note: The Dashed Gray Lines Correspond to Decade Averages for NIM. Sources: U.S. Census Bureau (2004), Population Division and Housing and Household Economic Statistics Division and U.S. Census Bureau. a) Legal Immigration to the United States 1960–1999; b) Components of Population Change in the United States 1960–1999.
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the previous year, whichever is larger. The United States also allocates 140,000 employment-based preference visas for workers with special skills or training (as well as investors), and an additional 55,000 visas are allocated by lottery under the diversity program. Finally, the United States admits refugees and asylum seekers (refugees are admitted from abroad on the basis of a yearly quota set annually by the president). After a year, refugees and asylees are eligible for permanent residence – between 1991 and 2000, just over one million gained admission. In addition to immigration visas, in 1992 the United States began granting 65,000 H-1B visas to temporary workers with special skills – nearly all recipients have college or advanced degrees.3 To ameliorate a perceived shortage of qualified workers in the information technology sector, Congress passed the American Competitiveness in the Workforce Act of 1998, temporarily increasing the number of H-1B visas to 115,000 per year in 1999 and 2000, and 107,500 in 2001. The American Competitiveness in the Twenty-First Century Act of 2000 (AC21) added an extra 347,500 visas by raising the cap to 195,000 for each of the years 2001, 2002, and 2003, for a total of 585,000 H-1B visas over three years. The cap for 2004 and beyond is once again 65,000. Finally, the gross inflow of illegal immigrants is about 350,000 per year.4 The net increment to the population from this source is smaller – 80% of those who leave the United States are foreign born, and a substantial fraction of these are illegal aliens returning home. In the year 2000, there were approximately seven million people living in the United States illegally, of whom 1.5 million arrived between 1991 and 2000 – a net inflow of 150,000 per year.5
2.3. College Attainment and Immigrant Groups Clearly, any government considering a serious change in its immigration policy should be concerned not only with the skills immigrants bring to their new country, but also with the levels of education attained by their children – the members of the second generation. In the two graphs in Fig. 2, I pool data from the Current Population Survey of the U.S. Census for the years 2001, 2002, and 2003. The horizontal axes correspond to the share of people aged 45–64 with four-year Bachelor’s degrees by place of birth. I sample only those immigrants who arrived prior to 1975. So as to focus on people who have immigrated to the United States near the beginning of their working lives, and at about the time they are establishing a household.
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By restricting the sample, I exclude older people whose immigration was perhaps sponsored by their adult children – themselves immigrants to the United States. Examining immigrants by country of origin reveals an enormous degree of heterogeneity in the shares of people with college degrees. By this measure, male immigrants from India are the best educated – nearly 83% have college degrees, followed by male immigrants from China with 63%. By contrast, the average share of college educated U.S.-born males within the same age group is only 31%. Among all the males in this sample, the least educated are Mexican immigrants, of whom just under 7% have completed college, followed by Puerto Ricans (I treat respondents who report Puerto Rico as their birthplace as immigrants rather than natives even though they are U.S. citizens by birth). Although formal education does not completely encompass all labor market skills or perfectly predict labor market outcomes, it is not hard to imagine the direct impact of these immigrants from Mexico or Puerto Rico on the wages of unskilled workers in the United States. Indeed, Borjas (2003) estimates the overall wage elasticity within skill groups to be 0.4 (there are four levels of educational attainment in his model, and he also controls for labor force experience). By contrast the arrival of highly educated immigrants from India or China is likely to depress the wages of skilled workers. Abstracting from the overall level of wages, further immigration from India or China is likely to lower the wage premium enjoyed by male college graduates, whereas immigration from Mexico and Puerto Rico is likely to enhance it. Furthermore, the impact of each particular group of immigrants on the composition of the labor force and wage inequality is likely to last long after the immigrants themselves retire. To understand what this means, consider the vertical axes of the graphs in Fig. 2. These measure the rate of college completion among U.S.-born individuals aged 25–44, according to the birthplace of their fathers (for men) or mothers (for women). These are members of a second generation, counterparts to the immigrant generation whose rates of college education are measured on the horizontal axis. Notice that in the upper panel of Fig. 2, the points representing Mexico, Puerto Rico, and India are above, but fairly close to the solid gray 451 line through the origin, and the point representing China is not too far from it either. If we treat the younger people in our sample, represented on the vertical axes as surrogates for the children of the immigrant cohort on the horizontal axes, we can conclude that the impact of each immigrant group
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US born men aged 25-44 by father's place of birth
India
80
China
y=16.07+0.82x R2 = 0.68 Poland
60
UK Germany Colombia
USSR Ireland
Greece Philippines
40
Italy
Portugal
Canada Cuba
Dom. Rep.
US
20 Puerto Rico
Mexico
0
0
20 40 60 80 Men aged 45−64 born in US or arrived before 1975 by place of birth
100
100
US born women aged 25-44 by mother's place of birth
China
India
80
y=31.34+0.59x Poland
R2=0.30
Greece
60 Ireland USSR Colombia Italy
40
Dom. Rep.
Germany Cuba Canada
UK
Portugal
Philippines
US
20 Puerto Rico Mexico
0 0
20 40 60 80 Women aged 45−64 born in US or arrived before 1975 by place of birth
100
Fig. 2. Percentage of the U.S. Population with Four-Year College Degrees by Age, Sex, Birthplace, and Parent’s Birthplace. Data for the U.S.S.R. Includes all Respondents from any of the Former Republics in the Sample, the Data for the U.K. Includes Respondents from Northern Ireland, and Data for Portugal Includes Respondents from the Azores. Note: Pooled Data for 2001, 2002, and 2003 from the U.S. Census, Current Population Survey. Source: King, Ruggles, and Sobek (2003).
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MICHAEL BEN-GAD
on the share of college educated within the population is fairly constant over the course of at least two generations. This does not mean that their quantitative impact on wages is constant – the overall level of wages, and under some circumstances the ratio between wages for skilled and unskilled workers, is very dependent on the rate of adjustment of the capital stock to any surge in immigration. Nonetheless, qualitatively, we can confidently predict the impact on wage inequality generated by each of these four immigrant groups across at least two generations and probably more.6 This confidence quickly dissipates when we consider some of the other groups represented in Fig. 2, or worse still, when we attempt to compare between them. Among male immigrants from Poland in our sample, only 21% have college degrees – well below the average for the population as a whole. Yet the levels of college graduation among young American-born sons of Polish-born fathers are immediately below the high levels attained by their Indian and Chinese counterparts – 59% in the sample completed college. How do we compare the impact of male immigrants from places like Poland, with their high levels of intergenerational upward mobility, with the impact of better-educated immigrants from Colombia, Cuba, Germany, Ireland, Italy, or the United Kingdom? How much does it matter that the children of these more-educated immigrants seem to experience relatively little upward mobility, and graduate from college at lower rates than men whose fathers are from Poland? Indeed, what about immigrants from Canada, the Philippines, or the former U.S.S.R? There we see a slight drop across the two generations in the share who report completing college. Chiswick (1978) found that controlling for various factors, including age, and schooling, immigrants to the United States earn more than their native counterparts provided they have worked in the U.S. for a long enough period of time. If we interpret this finding as a measure of motivation, it would seem that some of this motivation spills over to the next generation or is expressed in a greater effort by immigrant parents to provide a college education for their children. Among males, the Polish immigrant group presents the most obvious example of this phenomenon. However, nearly all the points in Fig. 2 cluster along a regression line (R2 ¼ 0:68) above the 451 line.7 The intergenerational outcomes for the women among these same immigrant groups in the lower panel of Fig. 2 are far less predictable. Consider female immigrants from Greece. In terms of college completion, they are as a group, the second least educated people in our sample. Less than 4% of this group have college degrees, while among the American-born women between the ages of 45 and 64 in our sample, the rate of college
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The Impact of Immigrant Dynasties on Wage Inequality
completion is 25%. Indeed, only women born in Portugal have lower rates of college completion (0.5%). Yet the point in the lower panel of Fig. 2 corresponding to Greece is well above the 451 line. This is because just under 60% of second generation American born women aged 25–44 who report having Greek-born mothers completed college, twice the rate of daughters of American-born women in the same age group, and behind only women with mothers from China, India, and Poland. What does the arrival of immigrants like these women from Greece mean for wage inequality in the U.S. over time? Which dominates, the low levels of education in the first, or the high levels of education in the second generation and perhaps beyond?
3. IMMIGRATION IN A MODEL WITH ENDOGENOUS CAPITAL ACCUMULATION Suppose there are only two types of workers in the economy, either skilled or unskilled, and each supplies a distinct labor input. These workers are members of infinite-lived households that grow in size at a constant rate, and the number of these households is constantly augmented by immigration. To model an economy with both natural population growth and immigration, we treat each resident as a member of an infinite-lived immigrant dynasty. In the absence of uncertainty, the behavior of each new immigrant of type i 2 fU; Sg; unskilled or skilled, and all of his or her descendants, can be characterized as the maximization of the dynasties’ infinite horizon discounted utility function beginning at time s: Z 1 max eðr nÞðs tÞ ln ci ðs; tÞ dt; i 2 fU; Sg, (1) ci
s
subject to a time t budget constraint: k_i ðs; tÞ ¼ wi ðtÞl i þ ðrðtÞ
nÞki ðs; tÞ
ci ðs; tÞ;
8s; t;
i 2 fU; Sg
(2)
where ci(s,t) and ki(s,t) represent the time t consumption and holdings of capital of the members of a type i dynasty with arrival date s; wi(t) and r(t) represent their time t wages and the rate of return of capital; r is the subjective discount rate; and n the rate of natural population increase – the rate of growth of the dynasties themselves. The consumption rule for dynasty s at time t is: ci ðs; tÞ ¼ ðr
nÞ½oi ðtÞ þ ki ðs; tÞ;
8s; t;
i 2 fU; Sg
(3)
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MICHAEL BEN-GAD
R 1 R u rðvÞdv where oi ðtÞ ¼ t e t wi ðuÞl i du is the present discounted value of all future income from labor of type i from time t forward. Immigrant households of type i enter the economy at time t at a rate of mi(t), and we assume that all immigrants arrive in their new homeland. Aggregate consumption and capital evolve according to: C_ i ðtÞ ¼ ðr
nÞ½rðtÞðOi ðtÞ þ K i ðtÞÞ
C i ðtÞ þ Pi ðtÞmi ðtÞoi ðtÞ;
K_ i ðtÞ ¼ wi ðtÞLi ðtÞ þ rðtÞK i ðtÞ
i 2 fU; Sg (4) (5)
C i ðtÞ
where C i ðtÞ; K i ðtÞ; and Oi ðtÞ are, respectively, the time t consumption, physical capital holdings, and the present value of future earnings aggregated overall the households with skill-level i; M i ðsÞ is the number of households with skill-level i, that have accumulated by time s; and Pi ðsÞ ¼ enðt bÞ M i ðsÞ represents the overall size of each portion of the population.8 The total labor input supplied by a household of type i 2 fU; Sg at time t is li, and the total supply of each type is Li ðtÞ ¼ Pi ðtÞl i ; i 2 fU; Sg: The production function F : R3 ! R has constant returns to scale in both types of labor and aggregate capital. Factors receive their marginal products: rðtÞ ¼ F K ðkU ðtÞ þ ZðtÞkS ðtÞ; l U ; ZðtÞl S Þ
d,
wi ðtÞ ¼ F H i ðkU ðtÞ þ ZðtÞkS ðtÞ; l U ; ZðtÞl S Þ,
(6) (7)
where ZðtÞ ¼ PS ðtÞ=PU ðtÞ is the ratio of households with skilled workers to unskilled workers in the economy at time t, and d is the rate of depreciation for physical capital. The behavior of the economy is determined by four laws of motion for per-capita consumption ci ðtÞ ¼ C i ðtÞ=Pi ðtÞ and capital ki ðtÞ ¼ K i ðtÞ=Pi ðtÞ: c_i ðtÞ ¼ ðrðtÞ
rÞci ðtÞ
k_i ðtÞ ¼ wi ðtÞl i þ ðrðtÞ
ðr n
nÞki ðtÞmi ðtÞki ðtÞ
mi ðtÞki ðtÞÞki ðtÞ
i 2 fU; Sg
ci ðtÞ i 2 fU; Sg
(8) (9)
where ki ðtÞ ¼ ðki ðtÞ ki ðt; tÞÞ=ki ðtÞ is the fractional difference between percapita capital holdings and the capital immigrants bring with them. In our simulations, we analyze the model using a family of production functions whose most general expression is the nested constant elasticity of
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The Impact of Immigrant Dynasties on Wage Inequality
substitution (nested CES) aggregate production function with constant returns to scale developed by Sato (1967): h i1 W W (10) F ðKðtÞ; LU ðtÞ; LS ðtÞÞ ¼ ð1 aÞLU ðtÞW þ aðbKðtÞu þ ð1 bÞLS ðtÞu Þ u where KðtÞ ¼ K U ðtÞ þ K S ðtÞ is the total stock of capital.9
4. THE DYNAMIC SYSTEM, AND THE DISCOUNTED SKILL PREMIUM The sets of Eqs. (8) and (9) for each skill-type are very similar, as the savings and consumption decisions of each type of household in the economy are not very different from each other. Finding a sufficiently precise approximation of the saddle path that corresponds to this dynamic system is very difficult because the condition number of the Jacobian matrix of the linearized system is very high. To overcome this problem, we define the variables aU ðtÞ ¼ ln c~U ðtÞ and wðtÞ ¼ oS ðtÞ=oU ðtÞ; which equals ½cS ðtÞ ðr nÞkS ðtÞ=½cU ðtÞ ðr nÞkU ðtÞ; and replace the two laws of motion for consumption (8) with: a_ U ðtÞ ¼ rðtÞ
r
ðr
w_ ðtÞ ¼ ðr
nÞ
k_U ðtÞ ¼ wU ðtÞ þ ðrðtÞ
nÞe
aU ðtÞ
kU ðtÞmU ðtÞkU ðtÞ
wðtÞwU ðtÞ wS ðtÞ ðr nÞkU ðtÞ
(12)
eaU ðtÞ n
mU ðtÞkU ðtÞÞkU ðtÞ
k_S ðtÞ ¼ wS ðtÞ þ ðrðtÞ r þ ðr nÞkU ðtÞ
(11)
eaU ðtÞ
mS ðtÞkS ðtÞÞkS ðtÞ eaU ðtÞ wðtÞ
(13)
ð14Þ
Redefining the variables of the system has an additional benefit. The variable wðtÞ directly expresses the ratio between the discounted values of all the future skilled and unskilled wages. In steady state, rates of immigration for skilled and unskilled must be equal – we employ perturbation methods (see Judd, 1998) to study the dynamic behavior of the model following temporary changes in the flow of
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MICHAEL BEN-GAD
skilled or unskilled immigrants.10 Define m as the initial steady state rate of immigration, and replace mi(t) in (11)–(14) with m þ pi ðtÞ; where pi ðtÞ is a bounded dynamic perturbation to the rate of migration by type-i workers, and e a small positive number that regulates its magnitude. Similarly, we define Z as the steady-state ratio of skilled to unskilled workers and replace the terms s(t) with Z þ xðtÞ; where xðtÞ is a bounded dynamic perturbation to the skill ratio. Defining pðtÞ ¼ fpS ðtÞ; pU ðtÞg1 t¼0 ; consumption and capital for each skilltype are all functions of p, x, and e.11 We differentiate (8), (9) with respect to e at the point ¼ 0: 2
@ _ @ aU ðt; ; p; xÞ
3
2
3 @ @ aU ðt; ; p; xÞ
2
ðr
7 6 @ 7 6 6 @ 6 w_ ðt; ; p; xÞ 7 6 @ wðt; ; p; xÞ 7 6 7 6 @ 7 6 6 7 6 7 6 6 @ k_ ðt; ; p; xÞ 7 ¼ J6 @ 7 6 6 k ðt; ; p; xÞ U U 7 6 @ @ 5 4 4 5 4 @ @ _ k ðt; ; p; xÞ @ U @ k S ðt; ; p; xÞ 3 2 OK 6 ðr nÞðwl U OU l S OS Þ 7 7 6 eaU ðr nÞk U 7 6 7xðtÞ, 6 6 kU OK þ l U OU 7 5 4 kS OK þ l S OS
nÞe
aU
kU kU pU ðtÞ
0 kU kU pU ðtÞ kS kS pS ðtÞ
3 7 7 7 7 7 5 ð15Þ
where J is a 4 4 Jacobian matrix; aU ; w; kU ; and kS are the initial steady state values of log consumption, the ratio between the present values of skilled and unskilled wages, and capital; and OK ¼ l S @2 F =@LS @K þ kS @2 F =@K@K; OU ¼ l S @2 F =@LS @LU þ kS @2 F =@K@LU ; OS ¼ l S @2 F =@LS @LS þ kS @2 F =@K@LS : To better understand how immigration affects the behavior of the model, I divide the shocks in (15) between two separate vectors that operate autonomously. The first contains the terms kU and kS, and if positive (negative) reflects the effects of capital dilution (enhancement) generated by the arrival of capital-poor (rich) immigrants, as described by Borjas (1995) in his static model and Ben-Gad (2004) in a dynamic setting. The terms OK ; OU ; and OS in the second shock vector, capture those changes in the returns to capital, unskilled wages, and skilled wages respectively, that result from the change in the composition of the labor force, i.e., x(t).
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The Impact of Immigrant Dynasties on Wage Inequality
The portion of a policy change that operates through the channel represented by the first vector are completely transitory if the shocks have bounded support. Even permanent changes in the rate of immigration produce few changes in factor returns, or in the welfare of the native population. By contrast, the second vector can generate permanent changes in the economy even if the policy changes it represents are transitory. Small differences in the rate of immigration between the two types of immigrants accumulate over time, and permanently affect the composition of the labor force. Only if the value of all the perturbations operating through the second vector is zero in the limit – as will be the case if immigrant dynasties gradually assimilate until they replicate the overall skill distribution – do all the variables in the economy return to their original steady-state values. We solve (15) using Laplace Transforms: 2
Lu
@
3
@ aU ðt; ; p; xÞ
7 6 6 Lu @@ wðt; ; p; xÞ 7 6 7 7 ¼ ðuI 6 6 Lu @@ kU ðt; ; p; xÞ 7 4 5 Lu @@ kU ðt; ; p; xÞ
02
@ @ aU ð0; ; p; xÞ
B6 @ wð0; ; p; xÞ 1 B6 @ B6
2 6 6 6 6 6 4
JÞ B6 B6 @4
ðr
nÞe
0 0
aU
3 7 7 7 7 7 5
kU kU Lu ½pU 0
kU kU Lu ½pU
kS kS Lu ½pS 1 3 OK C 6 ðr nÞðwl U OU l S OS Þ 7 7 C 6 eaU ðr nÞk U 7 C 6 7Lu ½xC 6 C 6 kU OK þ l U OU 7 5 A 4 kS OK þ l S OS 2
3 7 7 7 7 7 5 ð16Þ
where @=@ aU ð0; ; p; xÞ and @=@ wð0; ; p; xÞ are the initial changes in the values of the two control variables.12 The matrix J has four eigenvalues, two negative and two positive. Define the two positive eigenvalues as m1 and m2. Each element of the left-hand vector must be bounded for any positive value v, including the eigenvalues m1 and m2, and yet the determinants jmh I Jj;
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MICHAEL BEN-GAD
h 2 f1; 2g; are zero by definition. The only way for (16) to be bounded when v ¼ mh ; h 2 f1; 2g; is for the numerator, the adjoint of mh I J; h 2 f1; 2g; multiplied by the term in parentheses, to be equal to zero:
adj ½mh I
02
B6 B6 B6 JB6 B6 @4 2
@ @ aU ð0; ; p; xÞ @ @ wð0; ; p; xÞ
0 0
3 7 7 7 7 7 5
2 6 6 6 6 6 4
ðr
nÞe
aU
kU kU Lmh ½pU 0
kU kU Lmh ½pU 3
kS kS Lmh ½pS 1
OK 7 6 C 6 r nðwl U OU l S OS Þ 7 C C 7 6 C 6 eaU ðr nÞkU 7 7Lmh ½xC ¼ 0; h 2 f1; 2g 6 7 C 6 7 C 6 kU OK þ l U OU 5 A 4 kS OK þ l S OS
3 7 7 7 7 7 5
ð17Þ
both of which can then be solved for the values of @=@ aU ð0; ; p; xÞ and @=@ wð0; ; p; xÞ: Whereas the evolution of wðtÞ; the ratio between the present discounted value of skilled and unskilled wages, is not of particular interest, (19) – the change in its value at time t ¼ 0 – gives us all the relevant information for determining how a change in immigration affects discounted wage inequality over time – without explicitly calculating the impulse responses for wages or the rate of return to capital following a policy announcement. The discounted skill (or college) premium SP is the percentage difference between the present discounted value of skilled and unskilled wages: @ S ¼ w þ wð0; ; p; xÞ @ P
1 100
(18)
where w is once again the initial steady-state value of w(t). The first element in the second row of matrix J is zero. The third and fourth are zero as well, if the elasticities of substitution between the various inputs in the production function are equal – if u ¼ W in (10), only the diagonal element J22 of the second row of matrix J is non-zero, which is one
93
The Impact of Immigrant Dynasties on Wage Inequality
of the two positive eigenvalues. Hence, the value of @=@ wð0; ; p; xÞ is the second element in the third vector in (17), where the eigenvalue is J22 ¼ r n: @ wð0; ; p; xÞ ¼ @
ðr
nÞðwl U OU l S OS Þ eaU ðr nÞkU
Z
1
e
ðr nÞt
xðtÞdt
(19)
0
Result 1. If the elasticities of substitution between all the inputs are equal, the discounted skill premium is not a function of capital dilution kU and kS . Result 1 tells us that even though the rate of return to capital is affected by changes in immigration policy, for the special case of Cobb–Douglas or CES production, capital dilution itself has no effect on the discounted wage gap. A surge in immigration of type i certainly lowers the wages of all the workers of type i in the economy as long as the values of kU and kS are not negative. The wages of type jai may either rise or fall depending on whether the relative scarcity of this type of labor has a stronger effect than the decline in per-capita capital. Either way, as long as the elasticity of substitution between the inputs is constant, we can separate the analysis of the discounted skill premium from the effects on the economy generated by the dilution of the capital stock. If F is CRS and all the inputs are complementary in production, F ij 40 for all iaj then OU 40 and OS o0: Furthermore ðr nÞ=½eaU ðr nÞkU ¼ 1=oU ðtÞ; the inverse value of the per-capita present value of unskilled wages. Result 2. If the elasticities of substitution between all the inputs are equal, the production function is CRS and all the inputs are complementary in production, the college premium increases [decreases] if the present value of the shock xðtÞ; discounted by r n; is negative [positive]. From Result 2 we know how skilled and unskilled workers fare relative to each other, but we do not know what happens to the overall level of wages in the economy. To calculate the dynamic behavior of the wage levels we need to know the evolution of capital over time. We apply the inverse
94
MICHAEL BEN-GAD
Laplace transforms to (16): 3 3 2@ 2@ @ aU ðt; ; p; xÞ @ aU ð0; ; p; xÞ 7 6 @ 6 @ 7 6 wð0; ; p; xÞ 7 6 @ wðt; ; p; xÞ 7 7 6 7 Jt 6 @ 7 7¼e 6 6@ 7 6 6 @ kU ðt; ; p; xÞ 7 0 5 5 4 4 @ k ðt; ; p; xÞ 0 @ U 3 2 ðr nÞe aU kU kU pU ðqÞ 7 6 Z t 7 6 0 7 Jðt qÞ 6 e 7dq 6 7 6 k k p ð q Þ 0 U U U 5 4 kS kS pS ðqÞ 3 2 OK xðqÞ 7 6 ðr nÞðwl U OU l S OS Þ Z t 6 eaU ðr nÞk xðqÞ 7 U 7 Jðt qÞ 6 e 7dq. 6 7 6 ðk O þ l O ÞxðqÞ 0 U K U U 5 4 ðkS OK þ l S OS ÞxðqÞ
ð20Þ
The time path of capital is approximated by ki ðt; ; p; xÞ ki þ @=@ ki ðt; ; p; xÞ; i 2 fU; Sg; and to determine the time path of each wage in isolation, as well as the rate of return to capital, we insert ki ðt; ; p; xÞ together with the time path of Z(t) into (6)–(7).
5. INELASTIC AND PERFECTLY ELASTIC CAPITAL SUPPLY In the literature on immigration, capital supply is usually treated in one of two ways (see Borjas, 1999). One approach is to assume that changes in the supply of labor do not induce changes in the stock of capital – i.e., the capital stock is fixed. The other approach is to assume that capital flows freely between countries, and the capital stock adjusts immediately to accommodate the arrival of new immigrants. If capital is fixed, or in the case of this model, constrained to grow at the constant baseline rate of population growth m þ n; the wage responses to changes in immigration will generally be very strong, and changes in the rate of return to capital will be large and permanent. By contrast, if capital adjustment is instantaneous, the rate of return to capital is fixed exogenously, and if labor is completely
The Impact of Immigrant Dynasties on Wage Inequality
95
homogenous, immigration does not affect wages either. Of course, in models with heterogenous labor, a surge in immigration that upsets the composition of the labor force will alter wages. The model developed in Sections 3 and 4 stakes out a middle position between these two extremes. Capital is neither fixed, nor does it adjust immediately. Instead it accumulates gradually through the savings decisions of the agents in the economy. In the long run, the rate of return to capital is fixed as in the open economy – a function of time preference. In the short run, the rate of return to capital does respond to changes in the flow of immigration, and these changes induce changes in savings behavior and the accumulation of capital. To better understand the different implications of what we assume about the capital supply, set u ¼ W in (10). The result is a CES production function, where a and b control the relative shares of the three inputs, and the elasticity of substitution between each pair of inputs is sUSsUK ¼ sSK ¼ 1/1 W: From (7), factors receive their marginal products and the wages under CES production reduce to: w0S ðtÞ ¼ Wað1
bÞLS ðtÞW 1 =Y ðtÞ
(21)
w0U ðtÞ ¼ Wð1
aÞLU ðtÞW 1 =Y ðtÞ
(22)
where Y(t) is total output. Dividing (21) by (22), the ratio of the two wages, the instantaneous college premium, is identical regardless of what we assume about the supply of capital. Result 3. If the production function is CES, shocks x(t) and p(t) induce the same changes in the instantaneous college premium if capital is fixed, perfectly elastic, or endogenously supplied. Does this mean that the endogeneity of the capital supply is only relevant for determining the wage level or the discounted college premium SP if the elasticities of substitution between the inputs are not equal? No. First, the total levels of output Y(t) in (21) and (22) will differ depending on what we assume about the nature of the capital supply. Hence, even if wage ratios are identical, wage levels are not. Second, the rate at which we discount the evolution of each wage over time, the rate of return to capital less the natural rate of population growth, is sensitive to what we assume about the supply elasticity of capital. What we assume about capital supply does not affect the ratio between the two wages, but does affect the ratio between their discounted values. Nonetheless, the ratio between the present values of each stream of wages is
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MICHAEL BEN-GAD
likely to be close to each other when the elasticity of substitution is constant, even if neither the levels of these wages nor the rate at which each is discounted is the same. Indeed, the lower the elasticity of substitution, the smaller the gap between the rate of return to capital under free capital flows and endogenous capital supply, and the smaller the difference in the discounted college premium.
6. MODELING THE IMPACT OF IMMIGRATION AND EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT OVER TIME Most of the empirical work that measures the performance of immigrants and their families focuses on labor market outcomes – either the wages they command when they work, or their rates of employment. Work by Chiswick (1978, 1986), Borjas (1985, 1987, 1992), Smith and Edmonston (1997) and Card, DiNardo, and Estes (2000) document the earnings of immigrants to the United States and work by Altonji and Card (1991), Borjas, Freeman, and Katz (1997) and Johannsson, Weiler, and Shulman (2003) focus on employment. My focus here is on educational attainment as a proxy for labor market skills (see Jasso, Rosenzweig, & Smith, 2000 for a discussion). Wages in the model derive directly from that. In addition, I am interested in the educational attainment not only of the immigrants themselves, but of their descendants. Recent empirical work on assimilation, and more particularly on educational attainment in the second generation, includes Gang and Zimmerman (2001), Riphahn (2003) (both study Germany), and van Ours and Veenman (2003) (who study the Netherlands). My focus here is on unskilled immigrants and their children. Immigrants with baccalaureate degrees remain educated to the end of their lives, while only a small number of uneducated people who arrive in North America, Australia, or Western Europe as adults, subsequently complete college. From Fig. 2 we see that most of the points are above the 451 line, suggesting that at least some of the children of unskilled immigrants do attend college. Indeed, comparing the educational outcomes of the different immigrant groups to the most convenient reference point – the older generation of U.S. natives and the children of U.S. natives – there seems to be far more upward mobility among the immigrants. Bauer and Riphahn (2004) observe a similar pattern when comparing educational attainment among the native Swiss population with that of second-generation immigrants to Switzerland, using micro-level data that includes direct measurement of parental education.
The Impact of Immigrant Dynasties on Wage Inequality
97
The immigration flows of each type and the relative size of the two types of the population, are clearly related, and yet we distinguish throughout between the two. In an economy without assimilation, a surge of immigration, even if temporary, can permanently alter the distribution between the two skill-types. By treating changes in the rates of immigration and changes in the shares of the two skill types as distinct and separate shocks in (15), I distinguish between the immediate impact of an immigrant group’s arrival, and its long-run affect on the economy as the group’s members and their families either assimilate, or exceed the general population’s rate of college completion. To simplify the analysis, I will assume that changes in the rates of immigration begin at time zero, last T years and are constant over the entire period. The change in the overall rate of immigration is defined as e, and the increase in the overall population that results from the new policy is eT 1: The share of skilled workers within the immigration surge is PS ðTÞ; and the share of unskilled workers in the immigration surge is PU ðTÞ ¼ 1 PS ðTÞ: Beginning at time Q, some of these workers, or their descendants, shift between the two categories. By time V, the share of skilled workers within this population stabilizes at PS ðV Þ; and the share of unskilled workers is PU ðV Þ ¼ 1 PS ðV Þ: Define a set of dynamic perturbations: 1 ðeT 1ÞPi ðjÞ ln 1 þ pi ðx; jÞ ¼ UðT xÞ; i 2 fU; Sg; j 2 fT; V g T Pi ð0Þ (23) where the unit step indicator function U : R ! f0; 1g returns the value of one for all numbers greater than, or equal to zero, and the value zero for all numbers less than zero. The perturbations directly affect the ratio of skilled to unskilled workers in the economy: R Zð0Þ t ðpS ðx; jÞ pU ðx; jÞÞdx 0 lðt; jÞ ¼ e 1 ; j 2 fT; V g (24) The perturbation to the ratio of skilled to unskilled workers Z(t) is the sum of two components: ðt QÞUðt QÞ ðt V ÞUðt V Þ xðtÞ ¼ lðt; TÞ þ ðl ðV ; V Þ l ðT; TÞÞ Q V (25) We replace the perturbations pi ðtÞ; i 2 fU; Sg in (15)–(20) with pi ðt; TÞ; i 2 fU; Sg: These represent the actual perturbations to the rates
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MICHAEL BEN-GAD
of immigration, whereas the terms pi ðx; V Þ; i 2 fU; Sg correspond to a counterfactual policy under which the shares of skilled and unskilled households within the population of additional immigrants are PS ðV Þ and PU ðV Þ; in the short run and not merely in the long run. The first component in (25), lðt; TÞ; expresses the direct cumulative effect of the actual changes in immigration flows, and lðV ; V Þ expresses the long-run effect of the additional immigration, after they have completed their shift from the initial rate of college attainment Pi ðTÞ to the final rate Pi ðV Þ; i 2 fU; Sg: The first component of xðtÞ; lðt; TÞ; expresses the initial, direct effect of the immigration surge on the composition of the work force from the moment the new immigration policy is announced till time T, when the immigration surge has concluded. If lðT; TÞ40; then the share of skilled workers among the additional immigrants is higher than in the local population, and the immigrants initially raise the value of Z(t). If lðT; TÞo0; the share of skilled workers is lower, and the immigrants initially lower the value of Z(t). The second component in (25) expresses movements of the immigrants between the two skill categories and their effect on the overall labor force composition between the periods Q and V. A few examples of possible time paths for Z(t) will help illustrate the behavior of the model. The left-hand panels of Fig. 3 illustrate the evolution of Z(t) following a surge in unskilled immigration only, and the right-hand panels of Fig. 3 illustrate the evolution of Z(t) following a surge in skilled immigration. The black curves represent the behavior of Z(t) if there is no assimilation, the dark gray curves represent the behavior of Z(t) if all the immigrants assimilate, and the light gray curves correspond to instances where the shares of skilled and unskilled workers within the immigrant population reverse over time. Suppose the skill composition of the workers in the immigration surge does not match the prevailing composition of the host country, but neither the immigrants nor their descendants switch between the two categories after they arrive. In this case Pi ðV Þ ¼ Pi ðTÞ; i 2 fU; Sg; which implies lðV ; V Þ ¼ lðT; TÞ: The second term in (25) is zero, the behavior of x(t) is determined by lðt; TÞ; and Z(t) either declines or increases until period T, and then remains fixed at its new steady state value. Each set of black curves in Fig. 3 corresponds to the extreme sub-cases in which an immigration surge is uniformly composed of either unskilled (left-hand side of Fig. 3) or skilled (right-hand side of Fig. 3) workers. Note that in each column the black curves are identical for different values of Q and V, and serve as points of reference.
99
The Impact of Immigrant Dynasties on Wage Inequality
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)
(g)
(h)
Fig. 3. The Time Paths of Z(t), the Ratio of Skilled to Unskilled Workers, for Different Degrees of AssimilationFollowing Different Influxes of Skilled and Unskilled Immigrants. a) k(T, T)o0, Q ¼ 0, V4T; b) k(T, T)o0, Q ¼ 0, V4T; c) k(T, T)o0, Q ¼ 0, V44T; d) k(T, T)40, Q ¼ 0, V44T; e) k(T, T)o0, T4Q; f) k(T, T)40, T4Q; g) k(T, T)o0, ToQ; h) k(T, T)40, ToQ.
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Suppose the surge of additional immigrants initially upsets the balance between skilled and unskilled workers in the labor force, but gradually, over the time period between Q and V, these immigrants assimilate until the shares of skilled and unskilled workers exactly mimics that of the general population. Under this scenario Pi ðV Þ ¼ Pi ðTÞ ¼ Pi ð0Þ; i 2 fU; Sg and therefore lðV ; V Þ ¼ 0: Consider a surge in unskilled immigration. If the process of assimilation begins immediately and ends soon after the last of the additional immigrants arrive (Panel (a) of Fig. 3), the dark gray curve barely declines below its initial value. In Panel (c) assimilation begins immediately, but the process lasts longer and the decline in Z(t) is steeper. Immigrants, or more likely their descendants, may not merely assimilate. As we see in Fig. 2, few of the women among Greek immigrants to the United States have college degrees, but a disproportionate fraction of second-generation Greek-American women do. Similarly, the value of Z(t) may first decline because of a surge of unskilled immigration, but rise above its initial value by time V. Similarly it is possible (though a good deal less likely) that a surge in immigration may initially raise, but ultimately lower the value of Z(t). If the value of Q is set above T, then the value of Z(t) first behaves according to lðt; TÞ; before beginning its ascent (the light gray curves in Panel (g) of Fig. 3) or descent (the light gray curves in Panel (h) of Fig. 3). However, if the value of V is no longer zero, but below T, then the reversal in the direction of Z(t) begins at time Q (the light gray curves in Panel (e) or Panel (f) of Fig. 3). If Q ¼ 0; then as in Panels (a–c) the direction of Z(t) may be completely determined by the value of Pi ðV Þ:
7. PARAMETERIZING THE MODEL Between 1990 and 1999 the net rate of migration to the United States was just under 3.2 per thousand. Although a much larger fraction of immigrants have less than nine years of schooling, the percentage of the foreign-born with baccalaureate degrees closely matches that of the general population – 25.8% of foreign-born people in the United States over the age of 25 have college degrees, as compared to 25.6% of the total U.S. population. For the initial stock of skilled and unskilled workers we set PS ð0Þ ¼ 0:256 and PU ð0Þ ¼ 0:744; and set the steady state rates of immigration for both skill types to mS ¼ mU ¼ 0:0032:13 If the rates of legal and illegal immigration to the United States during the decade of the 1990s
The Impact of Immigrant Dynasties on Wage Inequality
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carry forward, and the rate of out migration continues to hold steady at one per thousand, foreign migration will augment the U.S. population with close to 10 million additional people over the course of this decade. There is no readily available data on the financial assets or physical capital that new immigrants to the United States bring. Given the large gap in income between sending countries and the United States, and the relative youth of most immigrants when they arrive, it is unlikely that capital holdings for the typical immigrant, skilled or unskilled, approaches U.S. per-capita capital holdings for either skill type. I set kS ¼ kU ¼ 1; which implies that after financing their move to the United States and setting up a household, immigrants have exhausted their savings. I also assume that both types of workers supply the same amounts of labor and set l U ¼ l S ¼ 1: The ratios of mean earnings and income for households, as well as individuals, with bachelor’s degrees to those without, range from 2.13 to 2.71, as measured by the U.S. Census. The 1998 Survey of Consumer Finances reports on net wealth as well as income and earnings. The ratio of mean earnings is 2.35, that of income is 2.3 while net wealth is 3.3. The gap between median earnings and wealth is smaller – 2.4 versus 3.06. In steady state, the ratio of capital held by skilled and unskilled agents must be equal to the ratio of their wages. I choose an intermediate number 2.7, and combine this with the 1991–2000 average share of capital in national income, 28.3%, to set the values of the parameters in the production function for different elasticities of substitution. Both the cross-country estimations of the nested CES production function (10) by Fallon and Layard (1975) and Duffy, Papageorgiou, and PerzSebastian (2004) and the time-series estimations using U.S. data by Krusell, Ohanian, Rı´ os-Rull, and Violante (2000) and Swedish data by Lindquist (2003), find that the difference between the values of the parameters W and u in (10) is statistically significant – implying the existence of the capital skill complementarities first postulated by Griliches (1969). I simulate the baseline model setting W ¼ 0:401 and u ¼ 0:495 in (10) to match the estimates by Krusell et al. (2000) (their distinction between skilled and unskilled workers based on college education matches my own). These parameter values correspond to elasticities of substitution between capital and unskilled labor sUK, and between skilled and unskilled labor sUS, that are equal to 1=1 W ¼ 1:67; and an elasticity of substitution between capital and skilled labor sSK equal to 1=1 u ¼ 0:67:14 When W is set equal to u, the production function (10) becomes the standard CES function with three inputs, and when both approach the value of one in the limit we have the Cobb–Douglas function (Table 1).
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Table 1.
Parameterization of Baseline Model.
Preferences, Technology and Factor Shares r ¼ 0:0495 d ¼ 0:061 a ¼ 0:283 b ¼ 0:482
Matches average rate of return of capital of 5% Average rate of depreciation on capital: 1991–2000a Average U.S. capital’s share of national income: 1991–2000a Matches ratio of initial earningsa,b,c
Population n ¼ 0:0067 mS ¼ mU ¼ 0:0034 kS ¼ kU ¼ 1 PS ð0Þ ¼ 0:256 d ¼ 2:7
Average U.S. natural rate of population growth: 1991–2000b Average U.S. rate of net migration: 1991–2000b Immigrants arrive without physical capital Population with college degreesb Ratio of initial earnings and wealth for households with/without college degreesb,c
a
Bureau of Economic Analysis (2004); U.S. Census Bureau c 1998 Survey of Consumer Finances. b
8. A 20-YEAR SURGE IN IMMIGRATION 8.1. Wage Levels Comparing the period 1980–1989, and the period 1990–1999 in Fig. 1, Panel (b) the rate of NIM rose by just over 0.3 per thousand. In the next two sections I consider the implications of an additional rise of a similar magnitude that lasts for two decades. To begin with, let us suppose that all the additional immigrants are people without college degrees. The overall rate of immigration rises from 3.2 to 3.5, per thousand and the rate of immigration by the unskilled rises to just over 3.6 per thousand. How many additional people does such a rise in immigration imply? If present trends continue, the United States will absorb about 20 million legal and illegal immigrants over the course of two decades, and 15 million of them will not have Baccalaureate degrees. The change considered here need not entail an increase in the number of legal immigrants alone. A slight curtailment in enforcement efforts along the border could easily cause the number of unskilled immigrants to rise by the additional 75,000 people per year (one million-and-three-quarters over the course of 20 years) that we are considering here.
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The Impact of Immigrant Dynasties on Wage Inequality
Consider first the effect of the policy change on each type of wages when assimilation does not occur. Setting PS ðTÞ ¼ PS ðV Þ ¼ 0; and the elasticities of substitution in the production function (10) sSK ¼ 0:67 and sUK ¼ 1:67; the surge of unskilled immigration produces a permanent change in the skill composition of the work force, and generates the changes in the wages of unskilled workers shown in the upper left-hand corner of Fig. 4. The dotted lines represent the impulse response in an economy with an inelastic supply of capital. Here, because of the permanent dilution of the capital stock, the long-run response of unskilled wages, a drop of just above 0.35% for the Nested CES production function, is 20% higher than the long-run decline in wages if capital is either completely elastic or endogenously determined. By contrast, the rise in skilled wages of over three-tenths of a percent if capital
ΠS (T )=0, ΠS (V )=PS(0) 0.008
0.006
0.006 ∆wU(t)/wU
∆wU(t)/wU
ΠS(T )=0, ΠS (V )=0 0.008
0.004 0.002 10
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40
0.004 0.002
50
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10
20
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40
50
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−0.004 t
t
ΠS(T )=0, ΠS (V )=1
ΠS(T )=1, ΠS (V )=1
0.008
0.008
0.006
0.006
0.004
0.004
∆wU(t)/wU
∆wU(t)/wU
30
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0.002 10
20
30
−0.002
40
0.002
50
10
20
30
−0.002
−0.004
−0.004 t
t
Fig. 4. Nested CES Production Function sSK ¼ 0:67; and sUK ¼ sUS ¼ 1:67: Impulse Response for Unskilled Wages Following a 20 Year Surge in the Rate of Immigration from 3.2 to 3.5 Per Thousand, Q ¼ 25 and V ¼ 45: Note: The Solid, Dashed, and Dotted Curves Represent Respectively, the Impulse Responses Generated by the Model with Capital Supply that is Elastic, Completely Elastic, and Inelastic.
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MICHAEL BEN-GAD ΠS(T ) = 0, ΠS (V ) = 0
ΠS(T ) = 0, ΠS (V ) = PS (0)
0.005
0.005
∆wS(t)/wS
10
20
30
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10
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−0.005
−0.01
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−0.02
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20
−0.025
t
30
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ΠS(T )=0, ΠS (V )=1
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10
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−0.01
−0.01
− 0.015
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− 0.02
−0.02
− 0.025
−0.025 t
20
30
t
Fig. 5. Nested CES Production Function sSK ¼ 0:67; and sUK ¼ sUS ¼ 1:67: Impulse Response for Skilled Wages Following a 20 Year Surge in the Rate of Immigration from 3.2 to 3.5 Per Thousand, Q ¼ 25 and V ¼ 45: Note: The Solid, Dashed, and Dotted Curves Represent Respectively, the Impulse Responses Generated by the Model with Capital Supply that is Elastic, Completely Elastic, and Inelastic.
is elastic, in the upper left-hand corner of Fig. 5, is well over twice the rise in skilled wages if capital is fixed. The impulse responses in Figs. 4 and 5 are all relatively modest because they were calculated for an economy in which the elasticity of substitution between the two types of labor is high. If the elasticity of substitution between all the inputs is lower, the effect of immigration on both skilled and unskilled wages is larger. Setting all the elasticities of substitution to twothirds, the long-run drop in unskilled wages is close to nearly nine-tenths of a percent if capital is fixed, and nearly sixth-tenths of a percent if capital is elastic. The long-run rise in skilled wages is one-third of a percent if capital is fixed, and nearly twice that amount if capital is elastic (see Figs. A1 and A2 in the appendix).
The Impact of Immigrant Dynasties on Wage Inequality
105
Whether or not there is free movement of capital, or if capital is elastically supplied but only from internal savings, the long-run effect on wages is always the same. The difference in the responses of wages is only a shortterm phenomenon, and for the case of unskilled immigration, this difference is very small. In general, the response of wages if capital is endogenously determined falls between two extremes, i.e., between the case where the capital supply grows at an exogenous rate, and that where capital is perfectly elastic – but is much closer to the latter than the former. Of course it must be emphasized that in the overlapping dynasties model there is no representative consumer. Ensuring aggregability requires a logarithmic utility function, and hence a relatively high degree of intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption. If the elasticity of substitution were lower, the accumulation of capital would be slower, and the short-term response of wages in the case of endogenously supplied capital would not be quite so close to the responses generated by the model with perfectly elastic capital. The upper right-hand graphs in Figs. 4 and 5 illustrate the response of wages if PS ðTÞ ¼ 0 but PS ðV Þ ¼ PS ð0Þ and PS ð0Þ ¼ 0:256: In the 25th year (Q ¼ 25), five years after the immigration surge has ended, the descendants of these additional unskilled immigrants enter the labor force. Of these new workers 25.6% are skilled, exactly mirroring the proportion of skilled workers within the larger population. By year 45 (V ¼ 25) this additional population has completely assimilated. The arrival of these additional workers dilutes capital and causes both skilled and unskilled wages to drop in the short run, but will not affect long-run wages unless capital is inelastic. If capital supply is inelastic, unskilled wages drop by between a third of a percent by year 20 (as in Fig. 4), or just under nine-tenths of a percent (as in the appendix), depending on the elasticity of substitution. The drop is caused by the combined effect of an increase in the relative share of unskilled workers in the labor force, and the overall rise in the size of the labor force itself. In the long run, as the descendants of immigrants assimilate, only the latter of these two effects remain, and the unskilled wage recovers approximately half its short-term loss. Wages for skilled workers initially climb, as the additional immigrants upset the balance between skilled and unskilled workers. In each case, this change in the composition of the labor force initially dominates the effects of capital dilution. If capital supply is completely elastic or endogenous, the skilled wage also returns to its initial level, once the immigrants or their descendants completely assimilate. If capital is in fixed supply, the skilled wage initially rises but ultimately declines. If sSK ¼ 0:67 and sUK ¼ 1:67; the wage is one-tenth of a percent
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MICHAEL BEN-GAD
higher by year 20, but then begins to gradually decline, until it is half a percent below where it was before the new policy was initiated. If both elasticities of substitution are two-thirds, the wage initially rises by one third but is ultimately four-tenths of a percent lower, and if both elasticities are one the wage first rises by two-tenths of a percent and then by half a percent, until it is three-tenths of a percent below its initial level (see Figs. A1 and A2 in the appendix). The greater the complementarity between skill and capital, the more capital dilution mitigates the initial rise in skilled wages generated by the change in the composition of the labor force. In every case, the permanent dilution of the capital stock guarantees a lower skilled wage in the long run. The lower left-hand graphs in Figs. 4 and 5 are perhaps the most interesting – they show the behavior of wages when PS ðTÞ ¼ 0 and PS ðV Þ ¼ 1: A surge of immigrants, all unskilled, enter the country over the course of 20 years. Starting in year 25 they or their descendants begin a remarkable transformation. Rather than merely assimilating as in the previous experiment, this group crosses in its entirety from the skilled to the unskilled category during the course of 20 years. Wages for unskilled workers initially decline, and wages for skilled workers rise as these immigrants arrive and join the workforce. Starting in year 20, if capital is endogenous, or in year 25 if capital is either inelastic or completely elastic, unskilled wages begin to rise and skilled wages to decline. If the capital supply is completely elastic, both sets of wages pass through their original levels before continuing to rise or decline, at precisely the same time – year 30. If the supply of capital is endogenous, the remaining effects of capital dilution will cause unskilled wages to begin to decline below their original level during the second half of the 29th year – approximately half a year before skilled wages have completely recovered. If capital supply is exogenous, the gap between the point when skilled wages reach their initial level and the moment when unskilled wages have completely recovered will be much larger – the former occurs between year 26 or 27 (depending on the elasticities of substitution), and the latter at year 35. This gap of a few years, when both wages are below their initial levels, directly results from capital dilution. In the long run, wages in the lower left-hand sides of Figs. 4 and 5 are identical to the long-run wages in the lower right-hand sides. The latter represent the behavior of wages when all the immigrants arrive as skilled workers. The long-run changes in wages are the same for a completely elastic and an endogenously determined capital supply – capital dilution affects the former not at all, and the latter only in the short-run. Indeed, the
The Impact of Immigrant Dynasties on Wage Inequality
107
long-run drops in skilled wages and increases in unskilled wages are nearly symmetric in this particular example, ranging from nine-tenths of a percent when the elasticity of substitution between the two types of labor is at its highest value, to approximately 1.8% when the elasticity of substitution is lowest. If the supply of capital is fixed or grows at a fixed rate, capital dilution is permanent. As long as all the elasticities of substitution are identical (as in Figs. A1 and A2 in the appendix), capital dilution’s effect on skilled and unskilled wages is the same: each drops by one half or three-quarters of a percent, depending on whether the elasticity of substitution is one or 0.67. If the elasticity of substitution between capital and unskilled labor is raised to 1.67, capital dilution generates a much larger drop in both the short and long-run wages of skilled workers, as their labor complements the capital that is now relatively more scarce. Hence, the permanent rise in wages for unskilled workers is only four-tenths of a percent, while the drop in the wages of skilled workers is 2.3%.
8.2. The Discounted College Premium As we have seen, a change in the rate of immigration does not change the wage structure overnight. A shift in policy means a change in the flow of immigrants that gradually alters the size and composition of the workforce. In addition, the economy does not necessarily adjust immediately to these changes. Unless the amount of capital adjusts immediately or is permanently fixed, a surge of immigration will generate an initial shock to the savings rate, followed by the gradual convergence of the size of the capital stock to its new steady-state level. Finally, immigrants themselves, or at least their descendants, may not permanently remain within their initial skill categories, generating further disturbances to wages long after the surge in immigration has subsided. The impact of immigration on wage inequality must reflect the behavior of wages over time. Encapsulating this behavior into a number requires us to discount by the rate of return available to these workers, and this rate of return is just as sensitive to immigration policy as the wages themselves, unless we assume from the outset that the capital supply is perfectly elastic and that its rate of return is determined exogenously. The need to take into account the endogeneity of the discount rate is apparent if we compare the time paths of wages in Figs. 4 and 5 to the behavior of the discounted college premium in Table 2. The time paths of
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MICHAEL BEN-GAD
Table 2. The Values of the Discounted Skill Premium SP, Following a Rise in the Rate of Immigration from 3.2 to 3.5 Per Thousand During the Course of Two Decades. PS ðTÞ ¼ PS ðV Þ ¼ 0 PS ðTÞ ¼ PS ðV Þ ¼ PS ð0Þ PS ðTÞ ¼ PS ðV Þ ¼ 1 Cobb–Douglas: sUK ¼ sUS ¼ sSK ¼ 1 Fixed capital Completely elastic capital Endogenous capital
171.45 171.45 171.45
170.00 170.00 170.00
165.89 165.86 165.76
CES: sUK ¼ sUS ¼ sSK ¼ 0:67 Fixed capital Completely elastic capital Endogenous capital
172.16 172.17 172.16
170.00 170.00 170.00
163.91 163.85 163.67
Nested CES: sUK ¼ sUS ¼ 1:67; sSK ¼ 0:67 Fixed capital Completely elastic capital Endogenous capital
170.87 171.08 171.05
169.38 170.00 169.89
165.20 166.88 166.52
Note: The baseline value of SP is 170%.
wages when capital supply is endogenously determined, fall between the two extreme cases of completely elastic or inelastic capital supply, and closer to the former than the latter. By contrast, the effect of immigration on the discounted college premium does not necessarily follow this pattern. The first column of Table 2 illustrates the effect of the immigration surge on the discounted college premium, if all the additional immigrants are and remain unskilled workers. The new policy implies that the premium will rise from an initial value of 170% to anywhere from 170.87 to 172.17%, depending on what we assume about the elasticity of capital supply and, more importantly, about the elasticity of substitution between the factors of production. Changes in inequality of this magnitude might appear small, but considering the magnitude of the change in policy – a rise in the immigration rate of a mere 3 per 10,000 during 20 years – even the smallest of these changes are quite impressive. Even more impressive is the effect of the immigration surge when it is comprised wholly of skilled workers, as in the last column of Table 2. The small rise in the number of skilled immigrants over the course of 20 years has the potential to lower the value of SP from 170 to 166.52% if capital is supplied endogenously, and capital and skill are relative complements.
The Impact of Immigrant Dynasties on Wage Inequality
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The drop in the discounted skill premium is even larger under nearly all the other scenarios in Table 2. It is important to keep in mind that the number of additional skilled immigrants who arrive under the policy considered here is approximately 75,000 per year. This number is similar to the 65,000 visas available under the H1-B visa program through most of the years of its existence, and gives us some idea of what that program’s impact on wage inequality might be. How robust are these results? The impact of a surge of skilled immigration of this magnitude might cause a much smaller drop in the value of SP – perhaps from 170 to 169% – but only if the elasticities of substitution between the different inputs are very high (in this model close to five). In the middle column of Table 2 – PS ðTÞ ¼ PS ðV Þ ¼ PS ð0Þ – the distribution of skills among the immigrants exactly replicates that of the general population. As long as the cross elasticities of substitution are equal across the different inputs, such an influx of immigration has no effect on the college premium. Even if the supply of capital is not perfectly elastic, capital dilution causes both types of wages to drop by the same proportion. Only if the elasticities are not equal and capital supply is not completely elastic can a surge in immigration of this type lead to a change in the discounted skill premium. The third to last row of Table 2, in the middle column, combines the nested CES production function and fixed capital supply for a surge of immigration whose rates of college attainment match those of the general public. This entry isolates the effect of capital dilution on the discounted college premium – at most a drop from 170 to 169.38%. A rise in immigration lowers wages for everyone because everyone’s labor complements capital. However, the higher degree of complementarity between skilled labor and the factor of production that is being diluted ensures that their wages decline more, and the wage premium declines. If capital is endogenously determined, capital dilution is transitory and the effect of the immigration surge is smaller – the discounted wage premium is 169.89%.
8.3. Assessing the Impact of Skill Acquisition The results in Table 2 reveal that a relatively small influx of unskilled immigrants substantially raises the discounted college premium if these immigrants and their descendants remain permanently unskilled. A similar sized influx of skilled immigrants produces an opposite and much larger change. How might these results change if the immigrants, or at least their
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descendants, switch between the two skill categories? More specifically, how much can college attainment by immigrants subsequent to their arrival in the United States as unskilled workers mitigate or reverse their initial impact on wage inequality? How much does future college attainment among the members of the second generation affect the discounted college premium? Suppose once again that the additional immigrants arrive initially as unskilled workers, PS ðTÞ ¼ 0; but over time a fraction of these immigrants or their children join the ranks of the skilled, until ultimately the distribution between skilled and unskilled within this additional population matches that of the general population – PS ðV Þ ¼ PS ð0Þ: As in the second columns of Figs. 4 and 5, we are again modeling a process of assimilation, at least in terms of educational attainment. Table 3 illustrates the implications of this process on the discounted skill premium for the nested CES specification of the production function, sUK ¼ sUS ¼ 1:67; sSK ¼ 0:67: The same calculations, with all the elasticities of substitution set equal to each other, are presented in Tables A1 and A2 in the appendix. As should be expected, the values in Table 3 fall somewhere between the corresponding entries in the first two columns of Table 2 (last three rows). The lower the values of Q and V – the earlier the date at which the process of assimilation begins, and the earlier the date at which it is completed – the closer the values of the discounted college premium are to the values in the second column of Table 2. Higher values of Q and V correspond to delayed and extended periods of assimilation, and are closer to the higher values in the first column. As in the second column of graphs in Figs. 4 and 5, unskilled wages rise and skilled wages decline starting in period Q. Even if Q is large, implying that only members of the second generation attend college, assimilation mitigates in the long run, the initial rise in inequality. Compare the discounted college premium in Table 2 for the values PS ðTÞ ¼ 0 and PS ðV Þ ¼ 0; and the nested CES production function with their corresponding values in Table 3. If Q ¼ 20 and V ¼ 40; the discounted college premium in Table 3 is 170.26% if the supply of capital is exogenously determined, and 170.64% if capital supply is perfectly elastic. The corresponding values in Table 2 are 170.87% and 171.08%. The less elastic the supply of capital, the higher the rate at which changes in wages that take place after time Q are discounted, and yet when capital supply is inelastic it seems that the relative impact on the discounted college premium is larger. Hence, we conclude that the disproportional downward pressure on skill wages induced by capital dilution dominates the higher discount rate.
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The Impact of Immigrant Dynasties on Wage Inequality
Table 3. V
Nested CES Specification of the Production Function: sUK ¼ sUS ¼ 1:67; sSK ¼ 0:67.
Q ¼ 0
Q ¼ 10
Q ¼ 20
Q ¼ 30
Q ¼ 40
Q ¼ 50
169.71 169.92 170.08 170.20 170.30
— 170.13 170.26 170.37 170.45
— — 170.40 170.49 170.55
— — — 170.57 170.63
— — — — 170.69
170.24 170.39 170.50 170.59 170.67
— 170.54 170.64 170.71 170.77
— — 170.74 170.80 170.85
— — — 170.87 170.91
— — — — 170.95
170.18 170.34 170.45 170.54 170.61
— 170.49 170.59 170.67 170.72
— — 170.69 170.75 170.80
— — — 170.82 170.86
— — — — 170.90
Inelastic capital 20 30 40 50 60
169.38 169.63 169.82 169.97 170.09
Completely elastic capital 20 30 40 50 60
170.00 170.18 170.32 170.43 170.52
Endogenous capital 20 30 40 50 60
169.93 170.11 170.26 170.37 170.46
Note: The values of the discounted skill premium SP, following a rise in the rate of immigration from 3.2 to 3.5 per thousand during the course of two decades, for different values of V and Q. The immigrants are initially unskilled PS ðTÞ ¼ 0; but beginning at time Q, some of these immigrants, or their descendants, become skilled workers. By time V the share of skilled workers within this population stabilizes at PS ðV Þ ¼ PS ð0Þ where PS ð0Þ ¼ 0:256 is the prevailing share of skilled workers within the general population. The baseline value of SP is 170%.
The arrival of a small number of unskilled immigrants generates a significant rise in inequality in Table 2, regardless of how the production function is specified, or the nature of the capital supply. By contrast, an immigration surge that replicates the existing distribution of skills in the general population, and the underlying immigration flow, slightly lowers the discounted college premium if capital and skill are relative complements and the supply of capital is not completely elastic. Hence, a surge of immigration need not raise inequality, even if the immigrants and their descendants merely match the skill distribution decades in the future, and in the meantime increase the relative size of the unskilled workforce. Of course,
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only if as in the top part of Table 3, the supply of capital is inelastic, and the process of assimilation begins soon after these immigrants begin to arrive. Otherwise assimilation mitigates the effects of immigration on the value of SP, but cannot reverse it. The values of the discounted college premium in Table 3 are far more sensitive to the value of Q than to the value of V. The point at which the share of college-educated people has returned to its initial value of PS(0) is not as important as how quickly the first immigrants begin their transformation into skilled workers. This difference becomes even more obvious if we consider a more radical degree of transformation on the part of the new immigrants. What if unskilled immigrants, or their children, do not merely match the general level of educational attainment but far surpass it? Again, consider the most extreme scenario: the immigrants arrive initially as unskilled workers, PS ðTÞ ¼ 0; but over time they or their children all join the ranks of the skilled, PS ðV Þ ¼ 1: In nearly every case the values of the discounted skill premium in Table 4 (calculated for nested CES specification of the production function, sUK ¼ sUS ¼ 1:67; sSK ¼ 0:67) fall well below 170%. The same is true if the elasticities of substitution are identical, as in Tables A3 and A4. Consider the following scenario: a man and woman arrive in the United States at age 25, at the very beginning of the immigration surge, meet and start a family. Neither is college educated and both spend the next 40 years employed as unskilled workers. These parents place a high value on education and all their American-born children complete college. The first child graduates and joins the labor force perhaps 25 years after the parents’ arrival. Such a high level of college attainment among the second generation does not merely mitigate the negative effect on wage inequality of their immigrant parents’ decades of participation in the labor force, but completely reverses it. Hence, admitting these two people into the United States raises the college premium for 30 years, but seen from the perspective of several generations, discounted by the economy’s prevailing rate of return, the arrival of this family has lowered overall wage inequality.
9. IMMIGRANT GROUPS AND WAGE INEQUALITY The simple examples of immigration surges in Section 8 are completely hypothetical and hardly match the heterogeneity of the bi-generational patterns of educational attainment for the different U.S. immigrant groups
113
The Impact of Immigrant Dynasties on Wage Inequality
Table 4. V
Nested CES Specification of the Production Function: sUK ¼ sUS ¼ 1:67; sSK ¼ 0:67.
Q ¼ 0
Q ¼ 10
Q ¼ 20
Q ¼ 30
Q ¼ 40
Q ¼ 50
166.46 167.26 167.87 168.34 168.70
— 168.08 168.59 168.98 169.28
— — 169.12 169.45 169.99
— — — 169.79 169.99
— — — — 170.21
167.79 168.37 168.83 169.18 169.45
— 168.97 169.35 169.65 169.88
— — 169.74 169.99 170.18
— — — 170.24 170.40
— — — — 170.57
167.63 168.24 168.71 169.06 169.34
— 168.86 169.25 169.54 169.77
— — 169.63 169.88 170.07
— — — 170.13 170.29
— — — — 170.46
Inelastic capital 20 30 40 50 60
165.20 166.14 166.87 167.44 167.90
Completely elastic capital 20 30 40 50 60
166.88 167.57 168.11 168.53 168.87
Endogenous capital 20 30 40 50 60
166.64 167.38 167.94 168.38 168.73
Note: The values of the discounted skill premium SP, following a rise in the rate of immigration from 3.2 to 3.5 per thousand during the course of two decades, for different values of V and Q. The immigrants are initially unskilled PS ðTÞ ¼ 0; but beginning at time Q, all these immigrants, or their descendants, become skilled workers. By time V the share of skilled workers within this population stabilizes at PS ðVÞ ¼ 1: The baseline value of SP is 170%.
in Fig. 2. Compare for example, the shares of college-educated male immigrants to the United States from Poland and the Philippines, and their corresponding second generations. A relatively small share of male immigrants from Poland aged 45–64 have college degrees – 21.3 versus 25.6% for the overall U.S. population. However, a very large fraction of American-born sons aged 25–44 with Polish-born fathers have college degrees – 64.1%. Admitting Polish immigrants prior to 1975 raised the gap between the wages of skilled and unskilled workers, but a generation later, the high levels of educational attainment achieved by the second generation have had the opposite effect on the skill premium. Indeed, compare the experience of Polish immigrants over the course of two generations with immigrants from the Philippines. The share of male
114
MICHAEL BEN-GAD
immigrants from the Philippines aged 45–64 with college degrees is much higher – 45.8% – but among second generation Americans aged 25–44 with Philippine-born fathers, the share completing college is significantly lower than for their Polish-American counterparts – only 42.3% (indeed, there is even some reversion to the mean, as members of the second generation are less educated than members of the first). How do we compare the impact of the entire experience of Philippine immigration, including subsequent generations, with immigration from Poland? Once again PS(0) is the initial steady-state share of college-educated people in the economy prior to the change in policy. The initial share of college educated among the additional immigrants is PS ðTÞ; and PS ðV Þ is the share of college educated among these same immigrants or their descendants at time V. Starting at time Q, the share of skilled workers among these additional dynasties begins changing (linearly) until the share of skilled workers among these same additional immigrants or their descendants is PS ðV Þ: I focus on the case of endogenously determined capital supply, and once again set ¼ 0:0003; the value of T equal to 20, the value of Q to 25, and the value of V to 45, in (23). I insert the resulting values of the perturbations into (24), and use these to calculate the value of x in (25). Setting (19) to different values of SP yields an implicit function in the values PS ðTÞ and PS ðV Þ: These implicit functions are represented as iso-curves in Figs. 6 and 7, corresponding to the Nested CES specification, with the initial steady state discount rate set at 0.05 and 0.03 respectively (the Cobb–Douglas and CES production functions appear respectively in Figs. A3 and A4 in the appendix). These curves are superimposed on the points representing the intergenerational rates of college completion for different immigrant groups in Fig. 2. What do we learn from Figs. 6 and 7? First, though the function SP is a complicated non-linear function, it appears nearly linear on the PS ðTÞ and PS ðV Þ plane. Second, the distances between the iso-curves appear constant – changing the values of either PS ðTÞ or PS ðV Þ generates nearly linear changes in the value of the discounted college premium. Each iso-curve that correspond to S P ¼ 170% bisects a plane between two regions – immigrant groups with values of PS ðTÞ and PS ðV Þ that fall to the right of the curve lower the discounted college premium, while those with values to the left of the curve raise it. In Figs. 6 and 7 the curve corresponding to SP ¼ 170% passes to the left of the point (25.6,25.6). Therefore even if both the immigrant and second generation fall below the general levels of educational attainment, the discounted college premium
China
USSR Ireland
Greece
US
(25.6, 25.6)
20
USSR
40
Canada
Portugal
US
(25.6,25.6)
20
Puerto Rico
68%
P =1
S
%
169
5% 68.
P =1
S
P=
S
5% 69.
P =1
S
0
70%
0 100
P =1
5% 70.
68%
P =1
Mexico
S
P =1
S
S
5% 68.
P =1
20 40 60 80 Men aged 45−64 born in US or arrived before 1975 by place of birth
Philippines
UK
S
91%
P=6
S
5% 69.
P =1
S
70%
P =1
.5%
0
S
70
P =1
S
0
Cuba
Dom. Rep.
Puerto Rico
Mexico
Germany
5% 67.
Dom. Rep.
Cuba
Ireland Colombia Italy
P =1
5% 67.
Canada
Poland Greece
60
S
Philippines
Italy
P =1
Portugal
S
40
61%
UK Germany Colombia
P=7
67%
P =1
Poland
60
India
80
S
China
US born women aged 25−44 by mother's place of birth
80
S
US born men aged 25−44 by father's place of birth
India
20 40 60 80 Women aged 45−64 born in US or arrived before 1975 by place of birth
The Impact of Immigrant Dynasties on Wage Inequality
100
100
100
Fig. 6. Nested CES Production Function: sUK ¼ sUS ¼ 1:67; sSK ¼ 0:67: Iso-Curves for the Values of SP Following a 20 Year 25% Rise in the Rate of Immigration. Note: The Baseline Rate of Return of Capital is Set to 0.05, and Q ¼ 25 and V ¼ 45: Points Represent the Percentage of the U.S. Population with Four-Year College Degrees by Age, Sex, Birthplace, and Parent’s Birthplace from Fig. 2. 115
116
100
100
=1 % 68
US born women aged 25−44 by mother's place of birth
P
S
% 68
20
P
P
. 68 =1
100
Women aged 45−64 born in US or arrived before 1975 by place of birth
Fig. 7. Nested CES Production Function: sUK ¼ sUS ¼ 1:67; sSK ¼ 0:67: Iso-Curves for the Values of SP Following a 20 Year 25% Rise in the Rate of Immigration. Note: The Baseline Rate of Return of Capital is Set to 0.03, and Q ¼ 25 and V ¼ 45: Points Represent the Percentage of the U.S. Population with Four-Year College Degrees by Age, Sex, Birthplace, and Parent’s Birthplace from Fig. 2.
MICHAEL BEN-GAD
80
5%
60
% 69 =1
5%
40
S
. 69 =1
20
S
P
% 70 =1
S
P
S
0
5%
0
. 70 =1
% 71 =1
% .5 68
100
P
P
S
=1
%
80
Men aged 45−64 born in US or arrived before 1975 by place of birth
S
P
69 =1
60
Mexico
S
P
% .5 69
40
=1
%
% .5 70
70 =1
=1
20
S
P
S
P
S
P
% 71 =1
0
US
Puerto Rico
S
P
S
0
Philippines
(25.6,25.6)
Puerto Rico
Mexico
Canada
UK
% .5
=1
US born men aged 25−44 by father's place of birth
5%
Dom. Rep. Portugal
67
P
S
20
40
Cuba
=1
US
(25.6,25.6)
USSR Germany P
Cuba
Dom. Rep.
Ireland Colombia Italy
S
5%
Canada
% 67 =1
Italy
Portugal
. 67 =1
Philippines
60
P
P
40
S
Greece
Poland Greece
S
Ireland
. 66
% 67 =1
Colombia
=1
P
S
USSR
P
5%
UK Germany
India
80
S
. 66 =1
Poland
60
% 66 =1
P
S
China
China
% 66 =1
80
P
P
S
S India
The Impact of Immigrant Dynasties on Wage Inequality
117
may still decline because when capital and skill are relative complements, capital dilution harms the wages of skilled workers more than it harms the wages of the unskilled.15 A group of immigrants with a low value of PS ðTÞ but a high value of PS ðV Þ raise the ratio between skilled and unskilled wages in the short run, but cause it to drop in the long run. The short-run effect of PS ðTÞ is temporary, whereas the long-run effect of PS ðV Þ in this model lasts forever. On the other the long run is discounted at a rate of return that varies (in response to immigration policy) around 5%. The discounting dominates and the angles measured between the iso-curves and the horizontal axis in Fig. 6 (and Figs. A3 and A4) – are above 451. Consider the effect of Greek immigrants on the values of SP in Fig 6. Among members of the second generation, the rate of college completion is 59.60% for women against 42.91% for men. Nonetheless, the very low levels of education among the women of the immigrant generation, 3.62%, means that the combined effect of the mother–daughter pair on the value of SP is positive – they raise inequality, if only slightly. The male immigrant from Greece is more likely to have a college degree (18.34%), though less likely than members of the population at large. Combined with a higher-thanaverage rate of college attainment in the second generation, the father–son pairs fall to the right of the SP ¼ 170 iso-curve. Hence males as a group lower inequality, and the combined effect of all Greek immigrants, male and female, on the value of the discounted college premium is close to neutral. Indeed, women (and their daughters) from Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Greece, and Portugal, together with men from the Dominican Republic, all raise the value of SP even though members of the second generation are better educated than the general population. Female immigrants from Cuba and Ireland, and male immigrants from Greece, Italy, Poland, and Portugal have lower rates of college completion than the general population, but the high rates of college attainment for corresponding members of the second generation mean their overall effect on SP is negative. The best-educated group in our sample are Indian men. For the immigrant generation 82.62% have college degrees, and for members of the second generation this rises to 87.26%. An additional 87,000 visas per year to members of this group over the course of 20 years profoundly lowers the value of SP, to 167.24%. The next group, Chinese men, lowers the value of SP to 168.03%. Among the people in the sample born in the United States, the least educated are those whose parents were born in Mexico or Puerto Rico. Only 6.68% of immigrant men from Mexico have college degrees, and for
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MICHAEL BEN-GAD
American-born sons of Mexican-born fathers, the share with college degrees is only 10.23%. These values generate a value of 170.7% for SP. The corresponding figures for women, 3.98 and 12.21%, produce an SP of 170.8%. Overall, the values of SP for men rise in the following order: India, China, U.S.S.R., U.K., Germany, Philippines, Ireland, Canada, Colombia, Poland, Cuba, U.S., Italy, Greece, Portugal, Dominican Republic, Puerto Rico, and Mexico. For women the order is China, India, U.S.S.R., Philippines, Poland, Canada, Germany, Cuba, Ireland, U.S., Italy, U.K., Colombia, Greece, Dominican Republic, Puerto Rico, Portugal, and Mexico. If the production function is Cobb–Douglas or CES all the iso-curves shift outward, including the curve corresponding to 170%. Women from the U.K., and Italy now fall to the left of the curve; they now lower inequality in and economy without capital-skill complementarities (Figs. A3 and A4 in the appendix). More generally, the specification of the production function employed in Fig. 6 implies a high rate of substitution between the two types of labor. The lower the elasticity of substitution the closer together are the iso-curves and the more sensitive is the value of SP to different immigration surges. Consider, setting all the elasticities of substitution to 0.67 (Fig. A4 in the appendix). Raising the number of male immigrants by 75,000 per year for two decades lowers the value of SP to 165.02%. At the other end of the ordinal ranking, the arrival of the same number of Mexican women to the United States raises the value of SP to 171.50%. Changing the initial discount rate to 0.03 changes the shapes and not merely the placement of the iso-curves in Fig. 7. The angles measured between the iso-curves and the horizontal axis drops below 451, because the rate of educational attainment in the future designated by PS ðV Þ; is no longer as heavily discounted. This creates a new ranking for some of the immigrant groups. The values of SP for men rise starting with India, and moving through China, U.S.S.R., U.K., Germany, Ireland, Philippines, Poland, Colombia, Canada, Italy, Cuba, Greece, Portugal, U.S., Dominican Republic, Puerto Rico, and Mexico. For women the order is: China, India, U.S.S.R., Poland, Philippines, Germany, Ireland, Canada, Greece, Cuba, Italy, Colombia, U.K., U.S., Dominican Republic, Portugal, Puerto Rico, and Mexico. Comparing these two lists to those obtained under the higher discount rate for men, the order of the first five, India, China, U.S.S.R., U.K., and Germany, does not change; nor does the order of the last three, Dominican Republic, Puerto Rico, and Mexico. Ireland and Philippines switch places at positions six and seven – the rates of college attainment for secondgeneration members of the Irish community displace the higher rates of
The Impact of Immigrant Dynasties on Wage Inequality
119
college attainment of Philippine immigrants. Colombia remains in ninth place, but eighth-placed Canada switches with 10th-placed Poland. Of the remaining countries, Italy jumps two places to number 11, and Greece and Portugal each rise by one place, to 13 and 14 respectively. Cuba drops by one place to number 12, and the U.S. drops three places to 15. The shifts between the different countries are more pronounced for the women in the sample – only six, India, China, U.S.S.R., at the beginning, Italy and Dominican Republic in the middle, and Mexico at the end of the list maintain their positions. The lowering of the discount rate has a particularly large impact on the position of Greek women – they rise from 14th to 9th place. Furthermore, they no longer raise the value of SP even slightly; with the lower discount rate these women lower the value of SP. In summary, those immigrant groups with stable intergenerational rates of college attainment (those closest to the 451) have the same effect on the discounted college premium, regardless of which discount rate is employed in the calibration of the model. However, for the immigrant groups that experience large changes between the immigrant and second generations, the discount rate is an important factor in determining their overall impact. There are four important caveats. First, in this model there are only two skill types. Although educational attainment is by necessity a discrete variable in empirical studies, ordinarily there are more than just two categories. Second, in order to keep the model tractable, I do not treat educational attainment as a choice made by either the immigrants or the other individuals in the economy. Third, I abstract from the important distinction Chiswick (1978) found for the effect of additional schooling prior to immigration and after immigration for immigrant men’s earnings in the United States. Here, a college degree from China is equivalent to a college degree attained in the United States. Finally, I assume that once immigrant groups have achieved a level of college education at time V, this remains their permanent level from there on in. This means not only that a disproportionate number of immigrants from India and China arrive with college degrees, and that the rates of college graduation among members of the second generations are even higher, but also that subsequent generations do not ‘assimilate’ by lowering their educational performance.
10. CONCLUSION Countries throughout the developed world find themselves grappling with the question of immigration. The combination of declining birth rates and
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MICHAEL BEN-GAD
increased life span is already raising the average age of citizens throughout the west, and increasing substantially the share of pensioners within the population. The ability of governments to maintain generous systems of oldage pensions is now in serious doubt. Some see more liberal immigration policies as a possible alternative to raising minimum retirement ages, slashing benefits, or raising the tax burden on the dwindling population of native younger workers (see Auerbach & Oreopoulos, 1999; Storesletten, 2000; Fehr, Jokisch, & Kotlikoff, 2004). This paper abstracts from the motivations for higher rates of immigration, instead focusing on its consequences for wage inequality, both in the short and long term. The traditional immigration-absorbing countries, the United States, Canada, and Australia, presently implement programs that grant residence to carefully selected foreigners with at least a Baccalaureate degree and a marketable skill. Increasingly other countries, including Germany and the United Kingdom, are also considering programs that target highly skilled engineers and scientists. At the same time, as traditional source countries, particularly in Asia, develop and opportunities there grow, perhaps fewer engineers and scientists will choose to permanently leave their homelands. Although there is still a vast pool of well-educated people willing to move to the West, competition between Western countries to attract them may intensify in the future. By contrast, the supply of unskilled immigrants – from the most impoverished and unstable countries in the world, and even from those portions of the world experiencing rapid growth – is enormous and may even grow during the next few decades. First, the cost of long-distance travel is likely to continue to decline. Second, the wages paid to unskilled workers in the poorest countries are not likely to move anywhere near the wages available in the developed world for the foreseeable future.