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EDITED BY At-rnnr\r HAKr( Th is is t he f ir s t d i c ti o n a ry d e d i c a te d to th e ' w ork of Gi l l es D el euze. It provides an in-depth and lucid introduction to one of the most influential figuresin coniinentalphilosophy. The dictionary defines and contextualisesmore than 150 ter-rnsthat relate to Deleuzel philosophy including concepts such as 'becoming','body without organs','decerritorializatiqn','differenre','repetition','rhizome' and 'schizoanalysis'. The clear explanationsalso-addressthe main intellectualinfluenceson Deleuze as well as tl're influence Deleuze has had on suDiects such as feminism, cinema, postcolonial theory, geographyand cultural studies.Those unfamiliar with Deleuze will find the dictionary a user-friendlytool equippingthem with definitions and interpretations both as a study and/or a teaching aid. The entries are written by some of the rnost prominent Deleuze scholars inciudingRosi Braidotti,Claire Colebrook,Tom Conley,EugeneHollarrdand Paul Patton.Thesecontributors bring their expert knowledgeand critical opinion to bear on the entries and provide an enrichingtheoretical context for anyone interestedin Deleuze. Adrian Parr is Professor of contemporary art and designat the SavannahCollege of Art and Design. She is the editor, with lan Buchanan,of Deleuze ond the Contemporory World, f orthcom i ng from Edinburgh U n iversity Press.
IS SBN 0-7 186-1899-6
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Th e D e l e u ze Dicti onarv Editedby Adrian Parr
EdinburghUniversity Press
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C ontents
@ in this edition, Edinburgh University Press,2005 @ in the individual contributions is retained by the authors Edinburgh University PressLtd 22 George Squarg Edinburgh Typeset in Ehrhardt by Servis Filmsetting Ltd, Longsight, Manchester,and printed and bound in Great Britain by Antony Rowe Ltd, Chippenham, Wilts A CIP record for this book is availablefrom the British Library ISBN 0 7486 18988 (hardback) ISBN 0 7486 18996 (paperback) The right of the contributors to be identified as authors of this work has been asserted in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and PatentsAct 1988.
Acknowledgements
vl
Introduction Claire Colebrooh Entries A-Z Bibliography
308
Notes on Contributors
315
Intr oduc ti on
A ckn o w l e d g e ments
First I would like to thank all rhe authorswho contributedto this proiect. Without you this dictionary would never have come into existence. Everyonewho hasentriesincludedhereand my editor,JackieJones,have beentremendouslycooperativeand helpful in more waysthan one.I would like also to thank Keith Ansell-Pearson,Ronald Bogue, Paul Patton and all of which havecerJamesWilliamsfor their commentsand suggesgions, tainly strengthenedthe theoreticalrigour of this dictionary; any shortcomingsareentirelymy own. I am very gratefulto MonashUniversityand SavannahCollegeof Art and Design for their continuingsupport.Lastly, the strongintellectand generosityof Ian Buchananand Claire Colebrook havebeena wonderfulsourceof inspirationfor me and I would iust like to extend my warmestthanksto you both; this project would neverhaveseen the light of day without your continuingencouragement and support. Adrian Parr
Claire Colebrook Why a Deleuzedictionary?It might seema particularly craven,disrespectful,literal-mindedand reactiveprojectto form a Deleuzedictionary. Not only did Deleuze strategicallychangehis lexicon to avoid the notion that his texts consistedof terms that might simply name extra-textual truths, he alsorejectedthe idea that art, scienceor philosophycould be understoodwithout a senseof their quite specificcreativeproblem. A philosopher's concepts produce connections and styles of thinking. Conceptsareintensive:they do not gathertogetheran alreadyexistingset of things (extension);they allow for movementsand connection.(The conceptof 'structure' in the twentieth century, for example,could not be isolatedfrom the problem of explaining the categoriesof thinking and the imageof an impersonalsocialsubjectwho is the effect of a conceptual system;similarly, the concept of the 'cogito' relatesthe mind to a movement of doubt, to a world of mathematicallymeasurablematter,and to a distinctionbetweenthought and the body.)To translatea term or to define any point in a philosopher'scorpus involvesan understandingof a more generalorientation, problem or milieu. This does not mean that one reducesa philosophyto its context- say,explainingDeleuze's'nomadism' asa reactionagainsta rigid structuralismor linguistics.On the contrary,to understanda philosophy as the creation of a plane,or as a way of creating someorientation by establishingpoints and relations,meansthat any philosophyis more than its manifestterms, more than its context. In addition to the producedtexts and terms, and in addition to the explicit historical presuppositions, thereis an unthoughtor outside- the problem,desireor life of a philosophy.For Deleuze,then, reading a philosopherrequires going beyond his or her produced lexicon to the deeper logic of production from which the relationsor senseof the text emerge.This senseitself canneverbe said;in repeatingor recreatingthe milieu of a philosopherall we can do is produce another sense,another said. Even so, it is this striving for sensethat is the creativedrive of readinga philosopher.Sq when l)eleuzereadsBergsonhe allowseachterm and moveof Bergson'sphilosophy to revolvearound a problem: the problem of intuition, of how the humanobservercan think from beyondits own constituted,habituated rrndall ttxl humanworld,
I NTRO DUCTI O N
It would seem,then, that offering definitions of terms in the form of a dictionary- as though a word could be detachedfrom its philosophicallife andproblem- would not only be at oddswith the creativerole of philosophy; it would alsosustainan illusion that the philosophicaltext is nothing more thanits 'said'andthat becoming-Deleuzian wouldbe nothingmorethanthe adoptionof a certainvocabulary. Do we,in systematising Deleuze'sthought, reducean eventand untimelyprovocationto onemore doxa? If Deleuze'swritings aredifficult and resistantthis cannotbe dismissed asstylistically unfortunate, asthough he really oughtto havejust sat down and told us in so many words what 'difference in itself' or 'immanence' really meant.Why the difficulty of style and vocabularyif there is more to Deleuzethan a way of speaking?A preliminary answerlies in the nexusof conceptsof 'life', 'immanence'and 'desire'. The one distinction that Deleuzeinsistsupon, both when he speaksin his own voicein Dffirence and,Repetitiozand when he createshis senseof the history of philosophy, is the 'imageof thought'. Philosophybeginsfrom an imageof what it is to think, whetherthat be the graspof ideal forms, the orderly receptionof senseimpressions,or the social construction of the world through language.The concepts of a philosophy both build, and build upon, that image. But if the history of philosophy is a gallery of such images of thought - from the conversing Socratesand mathematicalPlatq to the doubting Descartesand logical Russell- some philosophershave done , more than stroll through this galleryto add their own image.Somehave, in 'schizo' fashion, refused to add one more proper relation between thinker and truth, and havepulled thinking apart. One no longer makes one more step within thought - tidying up a definition, or correctinga seemingcontradiction.Only when this happensdoesphilosophyrealiseits power or potential. Philosophyis neither correct nor incorrect in relation to what currently countsas thinking; it createsnew modesor stylesof thinking. But if all philosophyis creation,rather than endorsement,of an imageof thought, somephilosophershavetried to givea senseor conceptto this creationof thinking: not one more imageof thought but 'thought without an image'. Deleuze's celebratedphilosophersof univocity confront the genesis, rupture or violenceof thinking: not man who thinks, but a life or unthought within which thinking might happen.When Spinozaimaginesone expressive substance,when Nietzsche imagines one will or desire, and when Bergsoncreatesthe conceptof life, they go someway to towardsreally askingaboutthe emergence of thinking.This is no longerthe emergence of thc thinker,or one who thinks, but the emergenceof somethinglike a minintrrlrclation,cvcntor pcrocptionof thinking,fronrwhich'thinkcrs'arc thcn cll'cctctl.'l'his nlcrulsthrrtthc rcrrlhistoryof'plrikrsophy rcquircs
IN TR OD U C TION
understanding the way philosophersproducesingularpoints,or the orientations within which subjects,objects,perceiversand imagesare ordered. Any assemblage such as a philosophicalvocabulary(or an artistic style, or a set of scientific functions) facesin two directions. It both givessome sort of order or consistencyto a life which bearsa much greatercomplexity and dynamism,but it alsoenables- from that order - the creationof further and more elaborateorderings.A philosophicalvocabularysuch as Deleuze'sgivessenseor orientationto our world, but it alsoallowsus to producefurther differencesand further worlds. On the one hand, then, a Deleuzianconcept such as the 'plane of immanence'or 'life' or 'desire' cstablishesa possiblerelation betweenthinker and what is to be thought, giving us somesort of logic or order. On the other hand, by coupling this conceptwith other concepts,such as taffectt'concept'and tfunctiont,or and 'imageof thought',we canthink not just about 'planeof transcendence' life or the planeof immanencebut alsoof how the brain imagines,relates to, styles,pictures,representsand ordersthat plane.This is the problemof how life differsfrom itself,in itself.The role of a dictionaryis only one side of a philosophy.It looks at the way a philosophy stratifiesor distinguishes its world, but once we haveseenhow 'a' philosophythinks and movesthis should then allow us to look to other philosophiesand other worlds. There is then a necessary fidelity and infidelity,not only in any dictionirry or any reading,but also in any experienceor any life. Life is both cffectedthrough relations,suchthat thereis no individual or text in itself; rrtthe sametime, life is not reducibleto effectedor actualrelations.There rre singularitiesor'powersto relate'thatexceedwhat is alreadygiven.This is the senseor the singularityof a text. Senseis not what is manifestlysaid rrr denoted;it is what is openedthroughdenotation.Sq we might saythat we needto understandthe meaningof Deleuze'sterminology- how 'territorialisation' is defined alongside 'deterritorialisation','assemblage', 'llody without Organs' and so on - and then how thesedenotedterms cxpresswhat Deleuzewantsto say,the intention of the Deleuziancorpus. llut this shouldultimately then leadus to the sense of Deleuze,which can only be giventhrough the productionof anothertext. 1 can say,here,that the senseof Deleuze'sworksis the problemof how thinking emergesfrom life, and how life is not a being that is given but a power to give various scnsesof itself (what Deleuzerefersto as'?being').But in sayingthis I have producedanothersense.Each definition of eachterm is a different path from a text, a different productionof sensethat itself opensfurther paths lirr definition.So, far from definitionsor dictionariesreducingthe forceof itn iruthoror a philosophy,they createfurther distinctions. 'l'his clocsr.rotmcfln, as ccrtirin popular vcrsionsof Frcnch poststructuralismmight irrclicrrtc, thilt tcxtshuvclro nrcanings rnd thrt onc ctn
I NTRO DUCTI O N
make anything mean what one wants it to mean.On the contrary, the life or problem of Deleuze's philosophy lay in the event: both the event of philosophicaltextsand the eventof worksof art. The eventis a disruption, violenceor dislocationof thinking.To readis not to recreateoneself,using the text asa mirror or medium through which one repeatsalreadyhabitual orientations.Just as life can only be lived by risking connectionswith other powers or potentials,so thinking can only occur if there is an encounterwith relations,potentialsand powersnot our own. If we take Deleuze'sdefinition of life seriously- that it is not a given whole with potentials that necessarilyunfold through time, but is t airtual power to createpotentialsthrough contingentand productiveencounters- then this will relatedirectlyto an ethicsof reading.We cannotreada thinker in order to find what he is saying'tous', asthoughtextswerevehiclesfor exchanging information from one being to another.A text is immanent to life; it createsnew connections,new stylesfor thinking and new imagesand ways of seeing.To read a text is to understandthe problem that motivated its The more faithful we are to a text - not the text's ultimate assemblage. messagebut its construction,or the way in which it producesrelations among concepts,images,affects,neologismsand alreadyexisting vocabularies - the more we will havean experienceof a style of thought not our own, an experienceof the powerto think in creativestylesassuch. One of the most consistentand productivecontributionsof Deleuze's thought is his theory and practiceof reading,both of which are grounded in a specificqonceptionof life. If there is one understandingof philosophy anddoxa,which wouldreturn andgoodreadingasgroundedin consistency logicandallowthoughtto remainthe same,Deleuze a text to an assimilable placeshimself in a counter-traditionof distinctionand paradox.Neither philosophynor thinking flowsinevitablyand continuouslyfrom life; reason is not the actualisationof what life in its potentialwasalwaysstriving to be, More than any other thinker of his time Deleuzeworksagainstvitalismor the idea that reason,thinking and conceptssomehowservea function or purposeof life, a life that is nothing more than changeor alteration for the sakeof efficiencyor self-furthering. If there is a conceptof life in Deleuze it is a life at oddswith itself, a potential or power to createdivergentpotentials.Admittedly,it is possibleto imaginethinking, with its concepts,dictionariesand organon,as shoring 'man' againstthe forcesof chaosand dissolution,but we can also- when we extendthis potential- seethinking asa confrontationwith chaos,asallowingmore of what is nrt ourselvesto transformwhat we takeourselvesto be.In this sensethought has'majoriboth a movementtowardsreducing tarian' and 'minoritarian'tendencies, and a tendcncytowards chnoticdiffcrcnccto uniformity and samencss I)clcuzc' opcninglhoscsrmcuniticsto n'stttttcring'orinconrprchcnsion,
IN TR OD U C TION
far from believingthat one might return thought to life and overcomethe submissionto system,recognisesthat the creation of a systemis the only way one canreally live non-systemically.One createsa minimal or dynamic order,both to avoidabsolutedeterritorialisation on the one hand and reactive repetitionof the already-ordered on the other.In this sense,Deleuzeis a child of the Enlightenment. Not only does he inhabit the performative self-contradiction, 'Live in such a way that one's life diverges from any givenprinciple,'healsodeducesthis 'principlethat is not one' from life. If one is to lioe, theremust both be a minimal connectionor exposureto the outsidealongsidea creationor perceptionof that outside,with perception being a difference. Deleuze'sontology- that relationsareexternalto terms- is a commitment to perceivinglife; life is connectionand relation,but the outcomeor eventof thoserelationsis not determinedin advanceby intrinsic properties. Life is not, therefore,the ground or foundation differentiatedby a set of ternls, such that a dictionary might provide us with one schemaof order amongothers.The productionor creationof a systemis both an exposure to thosepowersof differencenot alreadyconstitutedasproper categories of recognising'man' and a radical enlightenment.Enlightenment is, defined dutifully, freedom from imposed tutelage - the destruction of masters.Deleuze'sdestructionof masteryis an eternal,rather than perpetual, paradox. Rather than defining thought and liberation against anothersystem,with a continualcreationand subsequentdestruction,the challengeof Deleuze's thought is to createa systemthat containsits own aleatoryor paradoxicalelements,elementsthat are both inside and outside, orderingand disordering.This is just what Deleuze'sgreatconceptsserve to dol life is both that which requires some form of order and system (giving itself through differencesrhar are perceivedand synthesised)and, that which also opens the system,for life is just rhat power to d.ifferfrom which conceptsemergebut that can neverbe includedin the extensionof any concept. We canonly begin to think and live when we losefaith in the world, when weno longerexpecta world to answerto and mirror ourselvesandour already constituteddesires.Thinking is paradox,nor becauseit is simple disobedienceor negationof orthodoxy,but because if thinking hasany forceor distinction it hasto work againstinertia.If a body wereonly to connectwith whatallowedit to remainrelativelystableand self contained- in imageof the autopoieticsystemthat takesonly what it can masterand assimilate- then the very powerof life for changeand creationwould be stalledor exhausted by self-involved life formsthat livedin orderto remainthe same.Despitefirst appearances a dictionarycanbe the openingof a self-enclosed system.If we nrc faithfulto thc lifc of Dclcuzc'sthought- rccognising it as n crcation
I NTRO DUCTI O N
rather than destinedeffectof life - then we canrelive the production of this systemand this responseasan imageof production in general. (I must createa systemor be enslavedby anotherman's'- so declares Blake'sidealpoet in the highly contestedand chaoticagonisticsof his great poemJerusalem.Blake's aphorismswereindebtedto an enlightenmentlibitself in a seeminglyparadoxicalstructure. If we are erationismthat found condemnedto live in someform of systemthenwe caneitherinhabitit passivelyand reactively,or we canembraceour seemingsubmissionto a system Blake'searlyresponseproof relationsnot our own and respondcreatively. of the categoricalimperative the inescapability to vided an alternative which still hauntsus today:if I am to speakand act asa moral beingthen I can neither saynor do what is particular or contingent for me; living with othersdemandsthat I decidewhat to do from the point of view of 'humanity in general'.To speakor to live is alreadyto be other than oneself,and so recognitionof an initial submission.Such morality demandsa necessary a final consensusor intersubjectivity may neverarrive, but it hauntsall life and eternalaffirmationof nevertheless. By contrast,Deleuze'sparadoxical of a minimal system- to perceive inescapability begins from the creation or live is alreadyto be connected,to be other - but far from this requiring a striving for a systemof consensusor ideal closure,this producesan infinite opening.It might seemthat the Enlightenmentimperative- abandon all externalauthority - comesto function asyet one more authority, and it might alsoseemthat a fidelity to Deleuzeis a crime againstthe thinker of from difference.But the problemof Deleuze'sthought is iust this passage contradiction to paradox. To not be oneselfis contradictory if one must be eitherthis or that, if life must decideor stabiliseitself (form a harrative or imageof itself). 'Becoming-imperceptible',by contrast,is an enablingand productive paradox.One connectsor perceivesin order to live, in order to be,but this very tendencyis alsoat the sametime a becoming-other:not a nonbeingbut a?being.A Deleuziandictionarycomesinto beingonly in its use,only when the thoughts that it enablesopen the systemof thought to the very outsideand life that madeit possible.
ACTIVE/REACTIVE Lee Spinks The distinction between active and reactive forces was developed by Friedrich Nietzsche in his Oz the Genealogyof Morality and rhe notes posthumouslycollectedas The Will to Power.In his seminalreadingof Nietzsche,Deleuzeseizedupon this distinction (and what it madepossible) and placedit at the very heartof the Nietzscheanrevaluationof values.For Nietzsche,the distinction betweenactiveand reactiveforce enabledhim to present'being' asa processrather than 'substance'. The world of substantial being,he argued,is producedby the recombinationof multiple effectsof forceinto discreteideas,imagesand identities.There is no essential'truth' of being;nor is there an independent'reality' beforeand beyondthe flux of appearances; everyaspectof the realis alreadyconstitutedby quantitiesand combinationsof force. Within this economy of becoming,every force is relatedto otherforcesand is definedin its characterby whetherit obeysor commands.What we call a body (whether understoodas political, social, chemicalor biological)is determinedby this relationbetweendominating and dominated forces.Meanwhile Deleuze maintains that any two forces constitutea bodyassoonastheyenterinro relationship.Within this bodythe superior or dominant forcesare describedas 'active'; the inferior or dominatedforcesaredescribedas'reactive'.Thesequalitiesofactiveandreactive forceare theoriginal qualitiesthat definethe relationshipof forcewith force. If forcesare defined by the relative differencein their quality or power, the notion of quality is itself determinedby the differencein quantity betweenthe two forces that come into relationship. The characterof any relation,that is, is producedthrough forces.There are no intrinsic properties that dctcrmine how forccs will relate:a masterbecomesa master throughthe act
ACTI VE, / REACTI V E
force receivesthe quality that correspondsto its quantity. Forces are dominant,or dominated,dependingupon their relativedifferencein quantity; but they manifest themselvesas active or reactiveaccordingto their the quality of differencein quality.Once the relationhasbeenestablished forces- dominant or dominated- producesan activepower (that commandsthe relation) and a reactiyepower (definedby the relation).The differencebetweenforcesdefined accordingto their quantity as active or reactiveis describedin terms of a hierarchy.An activeforce is the stronger are domiterm and goesto the limit of what it can do. Its characteristics nating,possessing, subjugatingand commanding.The expressionof activity is the expressionof what is necessarilyunconscious;all consciousness doesis expressthe relation ofcertain reactiveforcesto the activeforcesthat dominatethem. Active force affirmsits differencefrom everythingthat is weakerthan and inferior to itself; meanwhilereactiveforce seeksto limit activeforce,imposerestrictionsupon it, and to recastit in the spirit of the negative.Crucially reactiveforcecannottransformitself into a fully active force; nor can a collection of reactiveforces amalgamatethemselvesinto somethinggreaterthanactiveforce.A slavewho gainspower,or who bonds with other slaves,will remain a slaveand can only be freed from slaveryby abandoningconsciousness. Consciousnessremains what it is, and is unlike and recognises the active force of difference. Consciousnessrepresents activeforces,therebyseparatingactivity from what it cando. Suchseparation constitutesa subtractionor division of activeforce by making it work against the power of its own affirmation. The remarkablefeature of the becoming-reactive of activeforceis that historicallyit hasmanagedto form the basisof an entire vision of life. This vision embodiesthe principle of 'ressentiment':a movementin which a reactiveand resentfuldenial of higher life begins to createits own moral systemand account of human experience.The reactivetriumph expressedin movementsof consciousnesslike ressentiment,bad consciousness and the asceticideal depends upon a mystification and reversalof activeforce: at the core of thesenew interpretations of life reactive force simulatesactive force and turns it againstitself.It is at preciselythe historicalmomentwhen the slavebegins to triumph over the master who has stoppedbeing the spectreof law, virtue, morality and religion. An active force becomesreactive when a reactive force managesto separateit from what it can do. The historicaldevelopmentof reactive forcesis itself predicatedupon the affinity betweenreactionand negation, an affinity which is itself a weakform of the Will to Powerin so far asit is of nihilismor thc will to nothingncss. Thc will to asceticism an cxprcssion rlr wrlrld-rcnunciittionis, lftcr rrll, still itn cxprcssionof rpil/. 'fhus, whilc rcnctivclirrccsrtrc wcnkcrthnn rctivc firrccs,thcy rlso posscssil
AC TU AL ITY
potentiallysublimeelementin as much as they are ableto advancea new interpretation of life (the world of moral ideas, for example) and they supplyus with an original,althoughnihilistic,versionof the Will to Power. By inventinga transcendentideaof life in orderto judgelife, reactiveforces separateus from our power to createvalues;but they alsoteachus new feelings and new waysof being affected.What needsro be understoodis that there is a variation or internal difference in the disposition of reactive forces;theseforceschangetheir characterand their meaningaccordingto the extentto which they developtheir affinity for the will to nothingness. Consequentlyoneof the greatproblemsposedto interpretationis to determine the degreeof developmentreactiveforceshavereachedin relationto negationand the will to nothingness;similarlywe needalwaysto attendro the nuanceor relativedispositionof activeforce in terms of its development of the relationbetweenactionand affirmation. Connectives Bergson Genealogy Nietzsche Will to Power
ACTUALITY Claire Colebrook It might seemthat Deleuze'sphilosophyis dominatedby an affirmarionof the virtual and is highly critical of a wesrerntradition that hasprivileged arctuality. To a certainextent this is true, and this privilegecan be seenin the way philosophyhastraditionallydealtwith difference.First, rhereare deemedto be actualterms,termswhich areextendedin time- havingcontinuity - and possiblyalsoextendedin space.Theseterms arethen related to eachother, so differenceis somethingpossible for an alreadyactualised entity. Difference is betweenactual terms, such as the differencebetween consciousness and its world, or is a differencegroundedupon actuality, such as somethingactualbearingthe capacityfor possiblechanges.This understandingof actualityis thereforeried to the conceptof possibility. Possibilityis somethingthat can be predicatedof, or attributedto, a being which rcmains the same.Now againstthis understandingof actuality, l)clcuzcsctsr diffcrentcouplc:actuality/potenriality. If thereis something rctualit is not bccirr.rsc it trrkcsup timc,nor bccausc timc is that whichlinks
l0
AFFEC T
ACTUALI TY
from or containsthe changesof actualbeings;rather,actualityis unfold'ed' change and that from which actual not as see the potentiality. We should potentiality. differencetake place,but asthat which hasbeeneffectedfrom Time is not the synthesisor continuity of actualterms, as in phenomenconstitutestime by linking the past with the ology where consciousness is the potential for variouslines of actualRather, time presentand future. ity. From any actual or unfolded term it should be possible (and, for Deleuze,desirable)to intuit the richer potentiality from which it has emerged. As an avowedempiricistDeleuzeseemsto be committedto the primacy of the actual:one should remain attentiveto what appears,to what is, without invoking or imagining some condition outside experience. However,while it is true that Deleuze'sempiricismaffirmslife and experience,he refusesto restrict life to the actual.In this respecthe overturnsa history of western metaphysicsthat defines the potential and virtual accordingto alreadypresentactualities.We should not, Deleuzeinsists, define what somethingis accordingto alreadyactualisedforms. So we shouldnot, for example,establishwhat it is to think on the basisof what is usually,generallyor actuallythought.Nor shouldwe think that the virtual is merely the possible:those things that, from the point of view of the actualworld, may or may not happen.On the contrary,Deleuze'sempiriof the Idea to actualiseitself. cism is that of the Idea,and it is the essence There is, therefore,an Idea of thinking, the potentialor power to think, which is then actualisedin any singlethought. We can only fully understandand appreciatethe actualif we intuit its virtual condition, which is alsoa real condition.That is, real conditionsarenot thosewhich must be presupposedby the actual- such as assumingthat for any thought there must be a subjectwho thinks- rather,realconditionsare,for Deleuze,the potentialsof life from which conditionssuchas the brain, subiectivityor mind emerge. For example,if we want to understanda text historicallywe needto go beyondits actualelements- not iust what it saysbut alsobeyondits manFor ifestcontext- to the virtual problemfrom which anytext is actualised. instance,we should not readJohn Milton's ParadiseLost (1667)as a historical documentrespondingto the English revolution,a revolutionthat century. we might understandby readingmore textsfrom the seventeenth Rather,we needto think of the potentialor Ideaof revolutionassuch:how Milton's text is a specificactualisation,fully different,of the problemof how we might bc free,of how powermightrealiscitscl[,of how individuals Any lctu:rltcxt or cvcnt scrvituclc. tirlm imposccl rrrightrclclscthcmsclvcs il powcrto cxprcss rcrrlityhrrsl virtuitldintcttsion, orrlybccirusc is p
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rcvolution,the Russianrevolution,are specificand differentonly because rrctualityis the expressionof an Ideaof revolutionwhich can repeatitself infinitely. Connective Virtual/Virtuality
AFFECT Felicity J. Colman Watchme: affectionis the intensityof colour in a sunseton a dry and cold autumnevening.Kiss me: affectis that audible,visualand tactiletransformation producedin reactionto a certain situation, event or thing. Run irwayfrom me: affectedare the bodiesof spectreswhen their spaceis disturbed. In all thesesituations,affectis an independentthing; somerimes describedin terms of the expressionof an emotionor physiologicaleffect, but all the while trans-historical, trans-temporal, trans-spatial and autonomous. Affect is the change,or variation,that occurs when bodiescollide, or come into contact. As a body, affect is the knowable product of an cncounter,specificin its ethicaland lived dimensionsand yet it is alsoas indefiniteas the experienceof a sunset,transformation,or ghost. In its largestsense,affect is part of the Deleuzianproject of trying-to-understand,andcomprehend,andexpressall of the incredible,wondrous,tragic, painful and destructiveconfigurationsof things and bodiesastemporally mediated,continuouseyents.Deleuzeusesthe term'affection'to refer to the additiveprocess€s, forces,powersand expressions of change. Affectcanproducea sensoryor abstractresultand is physicallyand temporally produced.It is determinedby chanceand organisationand it consistsof a variety of factorsthat include geography,biology,meteorology, :rstronomy,ecologyand culture. Reactionis a vital part of the Deleuzian concept of affectivechange.For instance,describingBaruch Spinoza's study of the transformationof a body,a thing, or a group of things over a period of spaceand time, Deleuze and Guattari write in A Thousand Plu,teaus: iA.ffectsare becomings'(D&G 1987:256).Affect expresses the modificationof experiences asindependentthings of existence,when one produccsor rccognisesthe consequences of movementand time for (corporcirl,spiritual,:rnimirl,ntincral,vcgctlblcand or c
t2
A R B OR E S C E N T
AFFECT
it cancompelsystemsof knowledge,history, assuch,asDeleuzedescribes, power. memoryand circuitsof Deleuze'sconceptionof affectdevelopsthrough his entire oeuvre.In his study of David Hume in Ernpiricismand,SubjectiaityDeleuzediscussesthe linkagesbetweenideas,habitsofthought, ethics,patterns,and repetitions of systems;all the while describingthe relationshipbetweenaffect and differencein terms of temporally specificsubjectivesituations.Empiricism and,SubjectioityalsosignalsDeleuze'sinterest in Henri Bergson,a key thinker in the Deleuziandevelopmentof a theoryof affect.Bergson'sbook Matter and,Memory addressesthe corporeal condition of what he terms the 'affection'inrelationto perception(D 1988a:l7). Deleuzealsoengages work of Spinozaand the latter'saddressof affectionsand affectin termsof a modality of 'taking on' somethingin the Ethics(1677).In his essay'On the Superiorityof Anglo-AmericanLiterature', Deleuzedescribesaffect as verbs becoming events- naming affectsas perceivableforces,actions, and activities. In relation to art in What is Philosophy?he and Guattari describeaffectsasmore than sensateexperienceor cognition. Through art, we can recognisethat affectscanbe detachedfrom their temporal and geographicoriginsand becomeindependententities. In accounting for experiencein a non-interpretive manner, Deleuze's conceptionof affectexposedthe limits of semioticsthat tendsto structure emotional responsesto aestheticand physicalexperiences.Undeniably a romantic conceptwithin his discussionof the regulation and production of desire and energy within a socialfield, Deleuze'swritings of affect enablea material,and thereforepolitical, critique of capital nevertheless its and operations. Within a Deleuzian framework, affect operates as to manipulatemeaningand relaa dynamicof desirewithin an assemblage tions, inform and fabricate desire, and generateintensity - yielding different affectsin any given situation or event.Perceptionis a non-passive continual moulding, driven and given by affect. Closelylinkedto Deleuzeand Guattari'sconceptsof 'multiplicity','expein rience'and 'rhizomatics',the conceptof 'affect'shouldalsobe considered offlight'. Situatedaspart relationto theconceptsof'arborescence'and'lines of the Deleuzian'and'of becoming,the molecularthresholdsof bodiesand thingsaseventsaredescribedby Deleuzein terms of affectivehappenings; occasionswherethings and bodiesare altered.To this end, affectdescribes the forcesbehindall formsof socialproductionin the contemporaryworld, and theseaffectiveforces'ethical,ontological,cognitive,and physiological work with Guattari,affective powers.In Deleuze'ssingularandcollaborative firrccsarcclcpictedasreactiveor activc(followingFriedrichNietzsche),tacit or pcrfrlrmccl.As l)clcuzc portrtys it, nffcctivcpowcr cirnbe utilisedto limbrrrccrrtc, cotttroltnd crcntivity, rrbility,'rruthrlrity, cnrrhlc
S C H E MA
13
Connectives Active/Reactive Arborescentschema Becoming Experience Hume Lines of flight Multiplicity Rhizome
ARBORESCENT SCHEMA CIiffStagoll The arboreal schemais one of Deleuze's many potent and prominent biologicaland organicimages.His criticism,and his useof the schema,is to philosscatteredacrosshis corpus,at varioustimestargetingapproaches ophy psychiatry literature, science,theoretical criticism and even everyday living. The notion of an arborescentor tree-likeschemais Deleuze's counterpointto his model of the rhizome,which he usesto challengetendenciesin thinking and to suggestwaysof rehabilitating 'thought' asa creativeand dynamicenterprise. Deleuze'smodel of the tree-likestructure appearsto be quite simple. Typically, at its top, is some immutable concept given prominence either by transcendentaltheorising or unthinking presumption. In Deleuze's works on epistemologyand ontology, he identifies Plato's Forms, the modelsof the subjectespousedby Ren6Descartesand ImmanuelKant, as well as the 'Absolute Spirit' of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel as cxamples.All other conceptsor particularsare organisedverticallyunder this conceptin a tree/trtnk/root arrangement.The ordering is strictly hierarchical, from superior to subordinate,or transcendentto particular, suchthat the individual or particularelementis conceivedaslessimportrrnt,powerful,productive,creativeor interestingthan the transcendent. The subordinate elements, once so arranged, are unable to 'move' lrorizontallyin such a way as to establishcreativeand productiveinterlclationshipswith other concepts,particularsor models. Rather, their position is final, accordingto an organisingprinciple implied or deterrnincd by the superiorconcept. lfurthermorc, thc trcc is a self-containedtotality or closedsystemthat is cqual just to tlrc sum of its parts.Rclationsbctwccnclcmcntsof the
t4
ARBO RESCENT
SCHEMA
systemare interior to and inherent within the model. They are stableor even essentialin so far as, first, the superior concept is the all-powerful definingforcethat dictatesthe positionor meaningof all elsein the system and, second,the tendency is to think of the systemeither as complete in itself or elseunconnectedto othersystemsin anymeaningfulway.The tree is 'fixed to the spot' and static. Any remaining movementis minimal and internal to the systemrather than exploratory or connective.Becausethe creativepotential of disorder and inter-connectivityis precluded, the potentialinherentin conceptualisingand thinking in this manneris very limited. Deleuze'smodelcallsto mind the porphyriantree,a deviceusedby the philosopher Porphyry to show how reality and our conceptsare ordered and how logicalcategorisationproceeds.The conceptof'Substance'can be placedat the top of the tree,and dichotomousbranchingat eachlevel obtainedby addinga specificdifferencesuchthat, at the lowestlevel,some individual canbe identifiedasa sub-setof 'Substance'. This versionof the arborealmodel alsohighlights somethingof its complexity and ontologicalimportancefor Deleuze.The differenceevident betweenparticularsis subsumedby the similarity that definesthem in terms of superior concepts in general and the transcendent concept (Substance)in particular.Rather than deriving conceptsfrom individual particulars(or interactionsbetweenthem), an abstractconceptis usedto organiseindividuals and determine their meaning relative just to the organisationalhierarchy.Differencehasto be addedbackto eachelement in order to define it asa particular,rather than having individual elements In contrast,Deleuzeholds serveasthe startingpoint for conceptualisation. that lived experiencecomprisesparticularity and uniquenessin each moment, experienceand individual, the inherent differencesof which ought always to be acknowledged.By positing the concept over the particular, thinking of the arborealkind abstractsfrom lived experiencein its very structure. For Deleuze,thinking in such a way stiflescreativity,leavessuperior conceptsrelatively immune to criticism and tends to closeone's mind to the dynamism,particularityand changethat is evidentin lived experience. Not only is suchthinking necessarily abstract,it alsoservesto protectthe status quo and relieve dominant conceptsand positions from productive critique. Conncctives Rhizomc Sullsllncc
ART
l5
ART Felicity J. Colman Deleuze'sdescriptionsof art remind us that it is one of the primary mediums with which humans learn to communicateand respond to the world. Art excitedDeleuzefor its ability to createthe domainsthat he saw,felt, tasted,touched,heard,thought, imaginedand desired.Besides publishing bookson singular writers and artists,including making specific manifestostylestatementsconcerningart asa categoryof criticalanalysis, Deleuze'sspecificactivitiesin respectto art extendedto writing short cxhibition catalogueessaysfor artists (for exampleon the French painter music(with RichardPinhas). G6rardFromanger),andmakingexperimental a range Deleuze'spreferredart works for his discussionsencompassed of mediums, including music and sounds (birdsong), cinema, photography,the plastic arts (sculpture,painting and drawing), literature and lrchitecture. Deleuze's philosophical interests also led him to discussa numberof performativeand theatricalworks,usingexamplesfrom anthropologyto makecultural and philosophicaldistinctions.Deleuzeaddresses the visual,aestheticand perceptualterms of art through distinctive polemical methodologiesdrawn from the sciences,such as biologicalevolution, geologicalformationsand concepts,and mathematics. Deleuzeleansupon a critical assortmentof art history critics, film critics, literarycritics,architecturalcriticsandmusicalcriticsthroughouthis philosophicalpractice: Wilhelm Worringer, Alois Riegl, Paul Claudel, Clement Greenberg,LawrenceGowing,GeorgesDuthuit, GregoryBateson,Andr6 llazin,ChistianMetz, and Umberto Eco.As a writer,Deleuze'sliterarypreclccessors figure prominently (seework in EssaysCritical and'Clinical). His cognitiveapproachtowardart comesfrom his adoptedphilosophicalfathers including Immanuel Kant, Baruch Spinozaand Friedrich Nietzsche.In Nietzsche and.Philosophy,Deleuzeemploys'art' asa categoryof 'Critique', but trrkingon Nietzsche'sobservationthat the world is emotiveandsensory, rrny analysisof this world is bound by epistemologicalstructures. For l)cleuze,the descriptivenature of art lies with art's ability not merely to rcdescribe;rather art has a material capacityto evokeand to question throughnon-mimeticmeans,by producingdifferentaffects. l)eleuze treatsplastic art movementsincluding Byzantine,the Gothic, and Art Brut, t hc Baroque,Romanticism,Classicism,Primitive,Japanese, rrstrans-historicalconceptsthat contributeto the field of art through their virri
l6
ART
Henri-Beyle Stendhal, Samuel Beckett, Antonin Artaud, William S. Burroughs,Lewis Carroll,Leopoldvon Sacher-Masoch, FranzKafka,and Alain Robbe-Grillet are critically absorbedby Deleuze in terms of their respectiveenquiriesinto the creationof art forms that translate,illustrate and perform the forces of the world (such as desire), by making them visible. Deleuze mentions in passingan enormous range of artists of variousmediumsto makea point or an observation- from Igor Stravinsky to Patti Smith, from Diego Vel6squezto Carl Andre. The means and methodsby which art is ableto transformmaterialinto sensoryexperience is of course part of the modernist contribution to art in the twentieth century.In his discussions concerningart, Deleuzeis thus a contributorto the twentieth-centurymodernistcanon. The methodologyof art forms the core of Deleuze'sstudy of Marcel Proust's work A lo recherche du tempsperdu (1913-27), a book that examinesaspectsof temporality desireand memory.As in his bookco-authored with Guattari on KaJba,in Proust,Deleuzeunderstandsart asbeing much more than a medium of expression. Deleuze'sbook FrancisBacon: TheLogicoJ'Sensation works through the complicatedconnectionsof Deleuzeand Guattari'sBody without Organs (BwO) and English painter FrancisBacon'streatmenrof the power and rhythms of the human body, to a discussionof the differencesfrom and similaritiesto the work of French painter Clzanneof Bacon'sown work. In this book,Deleuzeprivilegespaintingasan art form that affordsa concreteapprehensionofthe forcesthat rendera body. In Deleuze'sfinal work co-authoredwith Guattari, What is Philosophy? 'art' is accordeda privilegedpositionin their triad of philosophy,art and science.Art is an integral componentof their three level operationsof the cerebralqualityof things(thebrain-becoming-subject). In this book,'art' as a categoryhasdevelopedinto the meansby which Deleuzeand Guattari can operateaffect, temporality,emotion, mortality, perception and becoming. The active, compounding creativity of artists' work are described as 'percepts'- independentaggregates of sensation that live beyondtheir creators.DeleuzeandGuattarisignificantlycommentthat theinspirationfor art is givenby sensations; the affectof methods,materials,memoriesandobjects: and write with sensations'(D&G1994:166). 'We paint,sculpt,compose, Connectives Affcct llacon l')xpcricncc Knlkrr
AXIOM ATIC
T7
ARTAUD, ANTONIN (1895-1948)- refer to the entries on 'art', 'becoming* performanceart', 'Bergson','Body without Organs','ethics', 'feminism'r'Foucault* fold','hysteria','Lacan'and'linesof flight f art * politics'.
AXIOMATIC Alberto Toscano Plateaus'axiomatic'is Proposedby Deleuzeand Guattari in A Thousand, usedto definethe operationof contemporarycapitalismwithin universal history and generalsemiology.Originatingin the discourseof scienceand mathematicalset theory in particular, 'axiomatic' denotesa method that neednot providedefinitionsof the terms it workswith, but rather orders a givendomainwith the adjunctionor subtractionof particularnorms or commands(axioms).Axioms thus operateon elementsand relationswhose natureneednot be specified.They areindifferentto the propertiesor qualities of their domain of application and treat their obiectsas purely functional, rather than as qualitatively differentiated by some intrinsic by theorems,or modelsof realcharacter.Axiomsarein turn accompanied isation,which apply them to certainempiricalor materialsituations. An axiomaticsystemdiffers from systemsof codingand overcodingby its capacityto operatedirectlyon decodedflows.In thisrespect,whilstit implies a form of capture,its degreeof immanenceand ubiquity is far greaterthan thatof codingsystems, all of whichrequireaninstanceof externalityor transcendence.That is why Deleuze and Guattari defend the thesis of a formations:the latter differencein kind betweencapitalistand pre-capitalist without while the former operates coding. Within universal code flows, history the immanentaxiomaticof capitalismis activatedwith the passingof at the momentwhen, foll thresholdof decodingand deterritorialisation, klwing Karl Marx, we areconfrontedby barelabourand independentcapital. The axiomaticmethod,asinstantiatedby contemporarycapitalismand royal science,can be juxtaposedto schizoidpractice,which is capableof combiningdecodedflowswithout the insertionof axioms,aswell asto the problematicmethod in the sciences,which is concernedwith eventsand singularpoints rather than systemicconsistency. One of the bolderclaims mlde by Deleuzeand Guattari is that we shouldnot think of the axiomatic irsir notion analogicallyexportedfrom scienceto illustratepolitics.On the contrary,within scienceitself the axiomaticis deemedto collaboratewith thc Statc in thc fixation of unruly flows, diagrams and variations. rgcncythat subordinatcs the lisscntinllyit is rrstrrrtifyingor scmioticising
t8
transversalcommunicationsand conjunctionsof flowsto a systemof fixed pointsand constantrelations. As Deleuze and Guattari indicate,the unity of an axiomatic system and of capitalismin particular,is itself very difficult to pin down, since the opportunisticcharacterof the adjunction and subtractionof axioms opensup the question of the saturationof the systemand of the independenceof the axioms from one another. Moreover, though their dependenceon the axiomsmakesmodelsof realisationisomorphic (for exampleall statesin one way or anothersatisfythe axiom of production for the market),thesemodelscan demonstrateconsiderableamountsof heterogeneityand variation (suchassocialist,imperialist,authoritarian, social-democratic,or 'failed' states).The axiomaticsystemis therefore not a closed dialectical totality, since it also generates'undecidable propositions' that demand either new axioms or the overhaul of the system,and it is interrupted by entities(for examplenon-denumerable infinite sets)whosepower is greaterthan that of the system,and which thus open breachesto an outside. It is the capacityto conjugate and control flows without the introduction of a transcendent agency (a totaliser) that makes the capitalist axiomatic the most formidable apparatusof domination. Deleuzeand Guattariinsistthe capitalistaxiomaticestablishes relations and connectionsbetweendecodedflows,that are otherwiseincommensurableand unrelated,and subordinatestheseflowsto a generalisomorphy, such as the subjectwho must producefor the market.In this sensetoo, Deleuzeand Guattaridiscernthat the capitalistaxiomaticpointsto a resurgenceof machinicenslavement, onethat is all the morecruel because of its impersonality(its beyondforms of citizenship,sovereigntyand legitimation). In as much as its mode of operationcan entirely bypasssubjective belief or the codingof humanbehaviour,suchan axiomaticmovesus from a societyof disciplineto a societyof control,wherepoweractsdirectly on Deleuzeand Guattariarecareful a decodeddividualmatter.Nevertheless, to note,it is not simplythe casethat flowscontinueto evadeand evenoverpowerthe axiomatic,but that the globaland non-qualifiedsubjectivityof and is alwaysaccompacapitalneverattainsabsolutedeterritorialisation, nied by forms of socialsubjection,in the guise of nation-states,and a panoplyof territorialisations at the levelof its modesof realisation. Conncctives ( lrrpitrrlisrl Mirrx ,Sr'lt izortrtrrlv sis
BAcoN,
AXIOM AT IC
FRANcr s
( t gog- gz)
t9
BACON, FRANCTS (t909-92) John Marks Deleuze'saim in FrancisBacon:TheLogicofSensation,as with all his other work on art, is to producephilosophicalconceptsthat correspondto the 'sensibleaggregates'that the artist hasproduced.The 'logic of sensation' that Deleuzeconstructsshowshow FrancisBaconuses'Figures' to paint sensations that aim to act directlyon the nervoussystem.'Sensation',here, refers to a pre-individual, impersonal plane of intensities.It is also, Deleuzeclaims,the oppositeof the facileor the clich6sof representation. It is at one and the sametime the human subjectand alsothe impersonal event.It is directedtowardsthe sensiblerather than the intelligible. In developingthe use of the 'Figure', Bacon pursuesa middle path betweenthe abstractand the figural, betweenthe purely optical spacesof abstractart and the purely 'manual'spacesof abstractexpressionism. The 'Figure' retainselementsthat arerecognisably human;it is not a representationalform, but rather an attempt to paint forces.For Deleuze,the vocation of all non-representational art is to make visible forcesthat would otherwiseremaininvisible.It is for this reasonthat Bacon'sfiguresappear to be deformedor contorted,sometimespassingthrough objectssuch as washbasins or umbrellas:the body seeksto escapefrom itself. There are cven somepaintingsin which the 'Figure' is little more than a shadow within a 'scrambledwhole', as if it has been replacedentirely by forces. ln short, Bacon'spaintingscan be consideredas an artistic expressionof l)eleuzeand Guattari'sconceptof the Body without Organs. Generallyin his work, Deleuzeseeksto contradictthe receivedwisdom that artistssuchasBaconor FranzKafka arein somewayexpressinga deep tcrror of life in their art. For this reason,he is at pains to point out that llacon hasa greatlove of life, and that his paintingevincesan extraordinrrryvitality.Baconis optimistic to the extentthat he'believes'in the world, but it is a very particularsort of optimism. Baconhimself saysthat he is ccrebrallypessimistic- in that he paintsthe horrors of the world - but ar thc sametime nervouslyoptimistic. Bacon'swork may be imbued with irll sorts of violence,but he managesto paint the 'scream'and not the 'lrrlrror'- thc violcnceof the sensation ratherthantheviolenceof thespeclitclc- rnd hc rcpro:rchcs himsclf whcn hc feelsthat he haspaintedtoo tttttclrhorrot'.'l'hc filrccstlut cirusctlrcscrcirnr shouldnot bc confirscdwith
20
BA C o N ,
F R AN c Is
(tgog-gz)
The screamcapturesinvisbeforewhich one screams. the visiblespectacle becausethey lie beyondpain and ible forces,which cannotbe represented, feeling. So, cerebrally,this may lead to pessimism,since these invisible forcesare even more overwhelming than the worst spectaclethat can be represented.However,Deleuzeclaimsthat, in making the decisionto paint the scream,Bacon is like a wrestler confronting the 'powers of the invisible', establishinga combat that wasnot previouslypossible.He makesthe activedecisionto amrm the possibilityof triumphing overtheseforces.He allows life to screamat death, by confronting terror, and entering into combatwith it, ratherthan representingit. The 'spectacle'of violence,on the other hand,allowstheseforcesto remaininvisible,and divertsus, renderingus passivebeforethis horror. It is for these reasonsthat Deleuze talks at some length about the importanceof 'meat' in Bacon'spaintings.For Deleuze,Baconis a great painterof 'heads'rather than 'faces'.Baconseeksto dismantlethe structured spatialorganisationof the facein order to make the head emerge. Similarly, Baconsometimesmakesa shadowemergefrom the body asif it werean animal that the body wassheltering.In this way,Baconconstructs betweenman and animal, but rather azoneof not formal correspondences indiscernibility. The bonesare the spatialorganisationof the body,but the flesh in Bacon's paintings ceasesto be supported by the bones.Deleuze remarksupon Bacon'spreferencefor prone'Figures'with raisedlimbs, from which the drowsyfleshseemsto descend.This flesh,or meat,constitutesthe zone of indiscernibilitybetweenman and animal.The head, then, constituteswhat Deleuzecallsthe 'animalspirit' of man.Bacondoes not askus to pity the fate of animals(althoughthis could well be one effect of his paintings),but rather to recognisethat every human being who suffersis a pieceof meat.In short, the man that suffersis an animal,and the animal that suffersis a man. Deleuzetalks of this in terms of a 'religious'aspectin Bacon'spaintings,but a religiousdimensionthat relatesto the brutal realityof the butcher'sshop.The understandingthat we areall meat is not a moment of recognition or of revelation, but rather, for Deleuze,a moment of true becoming.The separationbetweenthe spectator and the spectacleis broken down in favour of the 'deep identity' of becoming. Connectives Art Becoming Intcnsity Scnsitlion
BEC OM IN G
BECKETI
2l
SAMUEL (190G89)- refer to the entries on 'art',
tspace'. 'minoritarian * cinema' and
BECOMING CliffStagoll 'logether with 'difference', 'becoming' is the key theme of Deleuze's corpus.In so far as Deleuzechampionsa particular ontology,thesetwo conceptsareits cornerstones,servingasantidotesto what he considersto be the western tradition's predominant and unjustifiable focus upon beingand identity.This focusis replicated,Deleuzeargues,in our everyday thinking, such that the extent of the variety and changeof the experienced world has been diluted by a limited conception of difference: difference-from-the-same.Deleuze works at two levels to rectify such habitual thinking. Philosophically,he developstheories of difference, rcpetition and becoming. For the world of practice, he provides challcnging writings designedto upset our thinking, together with a range of 'tools' for conceivingthe world anew.At both levels,becoming is critical, fbr if the primacy of identity is what defines a world of re-presentation (presenting the same world once again), then becoming (by which l)eleuze means 'becoming different') defines a world of presentation rlnew. Taking his lead from Friedrich Nietzsche'searly notes,Deleuzeuses thc term 'becoming' (deoenir)to describethe continual production (or 'rcturn') of difference immanent within the constitution of events, whetherphysicalor otherwise.Becomingis the pure movementevidentin changesbetween particularevents.This is not to saythat becomingreprescntsa phasebetweentwo states,or a range of terms or statesthrough which somethingmight passon its journey to anotherstate.Ratherthan a product, final or interim, becomingis the very dynamism of change,siturtlcd betweenheterogeneousterms and tending towardsno particular goal rlr cnd-state. llecoming is most often conceivedby comparing a start-point and an crrd-pointand deducingthe setof differencesbetweenthem. On Deleuze's irccount,this approachmeansfirst subtractingmovementfrom the field of rrctionor thinking in which the statesare conceived,and then somehow rcintroducingit as the meansby which anotherstaticstatehas 'become'. l'irr l)cleuze,this approachis an abstractexercisethat detractsfrom the liclrncssof our cxperiences. For him, bccomingis neither merely an rttlrillutcofl nor tn intcrmcditrybctwccncvcnts,but ir charirctcristic of thc
22
BEC OM IN G
BECO M I NG
very productionof events.It is not that the time of changeexistsbetween one eventand another,but that every eventis but a unique instant of production in a continualflow of changesevident in the cosmos.The only thing 'shared'by eventsis their havingbecomedifferent in the courseof their production. The continualproductionof uniqueeventsentailsa specialkind of continuity: they are unified in their very becoming.It is not that becoming 'envelops'them (since their production is wholly immanent) but that becoming'movesthrough' everyevent,such that eachis simultaneously start-point,end-point and mid-point of an ongoingcycleof production. Deleuze theorisesthis productive cycle using Nietzsche'sconcept of 'eternalreturn'. If eachmomentrepresentsa uniqueconfluenceof forces, and if the nature of the cosmosis to move continually through states without headingtowardsany particularoutcome,then becomingmight be conceivedasthe eternal,productivereturn of difference. Deleuzebelievesthat eachchangeor becominghasits own duration, a measureof the relativestability of the construct,and the relationship between forces at work in defining it. Becoming must be conceived neither in terms of a 'deeper' or transcendentaltime, nor as a kind of 'temporalbackdrop'againstwhich changeoccurs.Becoming-differentls itsown time, the real time in which changesoccur.This time which does not changebut in which all changesunfold is not a Kantian a priori form Rather dependingupon attributesof a particularkind of consciousness. it is the time of production,foundedin differenceand becomingand consequent to relations between internal'and external differences.For Deleuze,the presentis merely the productivemoment of becoming,the moment correlatingto the productivethresholdof forces.As such,it representsthe disiunction betweena past in which forces have had some effect and a future in which new arrangementsof forceswill constitute new events.In other words,becomingper seis Deleuze'sversionof pure and empty time. Such a view of the world hasimportant implicationsfor conceptstraditionally consideredcentralto philosophy.It undercutsanyPlatonictheory that privilegesbeing, originality and essence.For Deleuze,there is no asit were.Insteadof beingabouttransitions world 'behind appearances', that somethinginitiates or goes throggh, Deleuze'stheory holds that things and states are prod'uctsof becoming.The human subiect, for example,ought not to be conceivedasa stable,rationalindividual' experiencing changesbut remaining,principally,the sameperson.Rather,for l)eleuzc,one'sself mustbe conceivedasa constantlychangingassemblage of' lilrccs, rn cpiphcnomcnonarising from chanceconfluencesof lanlitwsitnclstl tln. cxpcctrttitlns, rlrgrtnisms, socictics, Hurl11c$,
+
M U SIC
23
Connectives l)uration Nietzsche
B E CO MI NG + M U S I C Marcel Swibod,a 'Becoming' and 'music' are two terms that can be brought together such that a becoming is capable of proceeding through music, for example through the musical operation known as 'counterpoint', or the interweaving of several different melodic lines horizontally where the harmony is produced through linear combinations rather than using a vertical chordal structure or setting. Counterpoint might most usually constitute a specifically 'musical' case in that when one speaksof musical counterpoint the ilssertions made regarding the term usually refer back to a given musical cxample: in short, counterpoint is something that we normally hear. However, when counterpoint describes the interweaving of different lines rs something other than what we can hear, then it opens up to a different function, a function that frees the term from a direct relation to properly musical content. Consider the work of the ethologistJakob von Uexkiill on the relationship between animal behaviour among certain speciesand the cnvironments inhabited by these speciesthat led him to propound a theory of this relationship based on a conception of counterpoint. To this extent, nature - in the very ways in which it can be figured through the interrction of different lines of movement, between animals and their environments, or between and across different species of animals - can be tunderstoodas constituting a counterpoint in a sensethat extends beyond rrstrictly metaphorical deployment of the term. From the perspective outlined here, music enters into a relation of proximity to nature where music hccomes nature. If the term 'nature' is somewhat problematic as a rule in cultural theory, it is to the extent that it cannot be unquestioningly presupposed as having rrny objective existence beyond the terms which define it, terms which are often loaded. In the present case,the term aims at neither an objective conccption nor a discursive one. Rather, this description attempts to restore to 'nilture' a material dimension that extends beyond the confines of discoLfrse,to the extent that discourse implies material processesthat cannot lrc rcduccd to intcrpretation or the status of fixed objects.To im-ply, in this irrstirncc,is to cn-{irld, whcrcby langurgc can in somc instrnccsbc dcploycd
24
BECO M I NG
+
PERFO R M A N C E
ART
in waysthat foregroundits enfoldingof materialprocesses. Implicationin this senseis illustratedby the useof the term 'counterpoint',a term which haslargely beenretainedby Deleuzeand Guattari in A Thousand, Plateaus becauseit is highly amenableto a thinking orientedtowardsprocess. As was mentionedearlier,the term is mostoftenusedin a musicalcontextto figure the (harmonic)interactionsof melodiclines.As such it doesnot describe a fixed object and the term's linguistic or semanticsenseis insufficient to accountfor whatactuallyhappens when counterpoint takesplaceasit draws its contingentconnectionsbetweendifferentmelodiclines. This characteristicof the term makesit amenableto the task of constructing a different conception of nature, in that it is detachablefrom its strictly musicalcontext in such a way that it still retains its capacityboth to describeand at thesametimeto imply, or enfold process.This capacity is what allowsus to usethe term to describenon-musicalaswell asmusical interactions,wherethe ideaof the melodic line, strictly speaking,givesway to an expandedconceptionoflinear interactions,suchasthosetakingplace betweenthe bodies of different animals,animal species,their environments)and oneanother.This expandedsenseof the term permitsthe construction of a renewedconceptionof nature that puts it in proximity to music, where na,turebecomes music.hn example of this proximity is embodiedin the work of the French composerOlivier Messiaenwho famouslytranscribedthe songsof differentbird speciesbeforeincorporating them into his musicalcompositions.The territorial codingsbetween and acrosscertain bird speciesand their environments(transcodings)are carriedover into the music in the useof birdsong,such that therecan no longerbe a binary or hierarchicaldistinctiondrawn betweenthe productions of tculturetand thoseof 'naturet. Music becomes na,tureand naturebecomes musicand their resulting indiscernibility is the product of a philosophicallabour: to selecttermsbestsuited prlcess.Counterpoint is such a term to the tash of thinhing and,d,escribing becauseit is capableof putting music and nature into proximity and describingthe material implications that orient thought towardsprocess.
BECOMING + PERFORMANCE ART Ad,rian Parr The early era of performanceart from the mid-1960sand through the 1970s includcd such figures as Allan Kaprow, Vito Acconci, Bruce Nirunrirn,(lhris llurdcn, Adrian Pipcr, Lauric Anderson,Lacy lnd anclAnirMcndictrrin thc | ,lhowitz,I lannrrltWilkc,( llrolcc Schnccnrirnn,
BEC OM IN G
+
PER FOR M AN C E
AR T
25
United States;JosephBeuys,Marina and Ulay, Valie Export, Hermann Nitsch and the Vienna Actionismusin West Europe;Jan Mlcoch, Petr Stembera,Milan Knizak, Gabor Attalai, TamasSzentjobyin EastEurope; Stuart Brisley,and Gilbert and Georgein England;and Jill Orr, Stelarc and Mike Parr in Australia.More recentlyperformancehasbecomea significant, if not primary, ingredient of many artistic practices.Examples include but are not restricted to: Coco Fuscq Guillermo G6mez-Pefra, Ricardo Dominguez, Santiago Sierra, Franco B., VanessaBeecroft, Matthew Barney,TehchingHsieh, and AndreaFraser. Stronglyinfluencedby Antonin Artaud, Dada,the Situationists,Fluxus and Conceptual Art, performance art in its early days tended to define itself as the antithesisof theatre,in so far as the event wasnever repeated the sameway twice and did not havea linear structurewith a clearbeginning,middleandend.More importantly though,all performanceart interrogatesthe clarity of subjectivity,disarrangingthe clear and distinct positions that the artist, artwork, vieweq art institution and art market occupy. Trying to articulatethe changedrelationshipbetweenartist, artwork rnd viewer that performanceart inauguratedcan at times be difficult but the Deleuzian concept of 'becoming' is especiallyuseful here in that it allowsus to considerart in terms of a transformativeexperienceaswell as conceptualisethe processof subjectificationperformanceart sustains. 'Becoming'points to a non-linear dynamic processof changeand when usedto assistus with problems of an aestheticnature we are encouraged not just to reconfigurethe apparentstability of the art object as 'object' definedin contradistinctionto a fully coherent'subject' or an extension of that 'subject' but rather the conceptof art's becomingis a fourfold bccoming-minor of the artist, viewer, artwork and milieu. It is in this rcgardthat performancepromptsus to considerthe productionandappreciation of art away from the classicalsubject/object distinction that prcvailedby and largeup until the 1960s. A good example of this would have to be Acconci's Following Piece (1969)that beganwith a propositionrandomly to follow peoplein New Yrrrk.The ideawasthat the performancewould independentlyarriveat a krgicalendpoint,regardlessof the artist'sintention and despitethe 'goal' ot'the work beingachieved.Instead,it wasthe personbeingfollowedwho lrrought the work to its final conclusion,such as when she enteredher irl)ilrtmentor got into her car and droveoff. In this instancethe work was grrovisionally structuredby a proposition,'to follow anotherperson',but tlrc cvcntualform the work took wasstructuredby the movementsof the l)crsonbcing firllowcd.In fact, hcre the art can be consideredasa process scnsitivcto its own trrnsfilrmation;asthc artistwaslcd lround thc city at
26
BE R Gs o N ,
H E N R I ( r 859-
rg4r)
the whim of someoneelse.There is a propositionto do 'X' then the activity of doing 'X' activatesnew previously unforeseenorganisationsto take place;the art is in the 'becomingof art' that is in itself social.Art of this kind may be bestarticulatedas 'art without guarantees'; this is becauseit existsentirelyin durationand amidstthe playof divergentforcesthat typifiesDeleuze'sunderstandingof 'becoming'. What is more,with performanceart artisticvalueis producedsocially;it is not an abstractvalue that is imposedoutside the creativeprocessitself. Hence,what we find is that this kind of artisticpracticeconcomitantlyprovidesa radicalchallengeagainstthe wholeconceptof labourin a capitalist context.Valueis not decidedaccordingto profit marginsand the market, rather it is a particular kind of socialorganisation.For example,when Beuysarrivedat the Ren6Block Galleryin New York (May 1974)wherehe lived with a wild coyotefor sevendaysin the gallery,the art wasin how the two slowly developeda senseof trust in the other to the point wherethey eventuallysleptcurled up together.The meaningthat emergedout of the piecewas not universal,nor was it absolutelyrelative;as an a-signifying processthis wasan art practiceoccurringat the limits of signification. In the examplesgiven,the art wasboth sociallyproducedand conceived in terms of 'social formation', one that convergeddifferencesin their mutual becoming.Hence,what this demonstrates is that performanceart turns its backon the opticalemphasisthat oncegovernedart. Instead,such practicesaim at producing an encounteror event, not in the simplistic sensethat it'happened' at a particularmomentin time, but in so far asit aspiresto bring a variety of elementsand forces into relation with one another.Ultimately, performanceart involvesa multiplicity of durations, eachof which is implied in the art work asa whole. The crucialpoint is that performanceart cannotbedescribedwithin traditional aestheticparametersthat reinforcethe validity of subject/object distinctions,consequentlythe conceptualapparatus'becoming'offersus is descriptive. It helps us describe the processof change indicative of performanceart; an event that in its singularity concomitantlyexpressesa multiplicity of relations,forces,affectsand percepts.
BERGSON, HENRI ( 1859-1941) Felicity J. Colman I )clcuzchm bccncrcditedwith restoringFrenchphilosopherHenri Bergson Io lhc crrnonof'kcy thinkcrsof'his gcncration, and Bergson's work continrucsl0 irnprirct irllon disciplincsconccrncdwith timc, movcmcnt,nlcnlory
BERG SoN, HnNnr
( r 859- r g4r )
27
andperception.Along with the thoughtsof GottfriedWilhelm von Leibniz, Baruch Spinoza,Friedrich Nietzsche,David Hume, Antonin Artaud, Guattari and Lucretius, DeleuzeengagesBergson'sempiricism as a challengeto the rigidity of philosophy,especially in its useof transcendental elements,phenomenological assumptions, and the questfor 'knowledge'and 'truth'. Deleuze'sphilosophicalinterestin Bergsonis manifoldand central to his entire oeuvre.Although neglectedin philosophicalcanonsof the secondhalf of the twentieth century,in the early decadesof that century, Bergson'swork was well known and widely discussedin many artistic and literaryarenas,from the FrenchCubiststo the Englishwriter T E. Hulme. In BergsonDeleuzefinds an intellectualpartner for someof his core philosophicalpursuits: conceptsand ideasof temporality,the affective nature of movementand duration, the political implicationsof multiplicity and difference,the morphologicalmovementof genetics,and the temporal causalityof eventsashabitualand associated series.Deleuzesignals his interest in Bergsonin his essayon Hume, Empiricismand Subjectiaity. Then, in 1966,Deleuzepublishedhis book Bergsonism, in which he called for 'a return to Bergson',through an extendedconsiderationof what he sawasBergson'sthree key concepts:intuition asmethod,the demandfor an inventionand utilisationof a metaphysicalorientationof science,and a logicalmethodand theoryof multiplicities.Bergsonnot only questionsthe logisticsof existencein terms of movement,but his writing indicateshis genuinefascinationwith the subjectsand objectsof life - appealingto Deleuze'sown propositionsconcerningvitalism. Bergson'sconceptsare influentialfor Deleuze'swork in Dffirence and Repetition,where Deleuze developsideas of differenceand repetition, memoryand repetition,the intensiveand extensiveforms of time, and the physicalmovementsof time; all of which are indebtedto Bergson'sdiscussionof the paradoxicalmodalitiesof time in his book, Matter and MemorylMatiire etMimoirel (1896).Bergsonproposesa movingmodelof duration - a conceptof duration that is not spatiallypredeterminedbut continually alters its past through cognitive movement.Then, later in CreatioeEoolutionBergson incorporatesthe cinematic model into his philosophical expression,noting the cinematographicalcharacter of irncientphilosophyin its apprehensionof the thought of ordinary knowlcdge(B 19l 1: 331-33).From this model(andthe Kantiannotionof time, rrndHegelianconceptionof thought and movement)Deleuzedevelopshis cxplicationof how the perceptualrecognitionof moving imagesof the cincmaticscreenoperatesnot through the apprehension of that movement, br.rtthrough specificmoments of sound and optical registration.This f )clcuzcdiscusscs at lcngthin his two bookson the cinema,CinemaI : The trtt tttcrnutl-imageitncl()inL'ma2:'l'hc'l'irnc-I inuga.
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HO L E
Memory is conceivedof by Bergsonasa temporalblendingof perceptual in his discuscentralto Deleuze'shypothesis imageryandthis ideabecomes sion of the philosophicalimportanceof cinema.In his secondbook on cinema, The Time-lmage,Deleuze draws from Bergson'sinterest in the different types of possiblememory states- dreams,amnesia,d6ji-vu, and death.To theseDeleuzeaddsa breadthof memoryfunctions:fantasy,halluwhere we make a cinations,Nietzsche'sconceptof 'promise-behaviour' memoryof thepresentfor the futureuseof thepresent(nowaspast),theatre, Alain Robbe-Grillet'sconceptof the 'recognition'processwherethe portrayalof memoryis throughinventionandelimination,andnumerousothers. FollowingBergson,Deleuzedescribeshow the perceptualandcognitive abilitiesof the dreamor wakefulreceptorof memoryeventsor imageryare dependentupon a complexnetwork of factors.As Bergsondiscussesin Matter andMemory,systemsof perceptualattentionare contingentupon the 'automatic'or 'habitual'recognitionof things.Thesedifferentmodes of rememberingare further temperedthrough the degreeof attention givenin the perceptionof things,affectingnot only the descriptionof the object, but the featuresof the object itself. From Bergson,Deleuze's mature conceptionof duration and the movementsand multiplicitiesof time aredeveloped. Connectives Cinema Difference Duration Hume Memory Multiplicity
BLACK HOLE Kylie Message DeleuzeandGuattaribelievethatthe roleof philosophyis to inventnewconceptsthat challenge the waythat philosophyitselfis written andformulated. Because of this, they draw both from new ideasand from thoseof a multiplicity ofalreadyexistingdisciplines,includingbiologicalandearthsciences, coverage is designed to maketheirphiloandphysics. This interdisciplinary (n
BL AC K
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29
contribute to; philosophical or otherwise. These engagementsare at times fleeting and at times more sustained,and contribute to their strategy of preventing their position from stabilising inro an ideology, merhod, or single metaphor. In other words, they encouragephilosophy to occupy the spaceof slippage that exists between disciplinary boundaries, and to question how things are made, rather than simply analysing or interpreting the takenfor-granted final result or image. This provides the foundation for the work presentedin I nti-oed'ipusandA TkousandPlateaus,andthe seriesof renewed terms proposed by these texts (including schizoanalysis,rhizomatics, pragmatics, diagrammatism, cartography,and micropolitics). Appearing predominantly in A Thousand, Plateaus,the term .black hole, has been sourced from contemporary physics. Referring to spaces that cannot be escapedfrom once drawn into, Deleuze and Guattari describe the black hole as a star that has collapsed into itself. while although this term exists literally rather than as a metaphor (becauseit maintains an effect that is fully actualised, affective and real), it has been relocated away from its original source in scientific discourse.As with many of the terms appropriated by A ThousandPlareaus,it is presented as being engaged in its own processof deterritorialisation that is independent from the text that it has been woven into; these concepts do not exist for the newly bricolagedtogether text, but happen to come into contact with it or move through it as l condition or processof their own moving trajectory or line of flight. In the context of A Thousand.Pleteeus, the black hole is presented as being one - unwanted but necessary- outcome for a failed line of flight. l)eterritorialising movement strays away from the concept and state of molar identity and aims to force splinters to crack open into giant ruptures rrnd cause the subsequent obliteration of the subject as he becomes cnsconcedwithin a processof becoming-multiple. Engaged in this process, the subject is deconstituted, and becomes a new kind of assemblagethat occupies what Deleuze and Guattari call the 'plane of consistency', which is a spaceof creativity and desire. However, becausethis plane is also that of death and destruction, traps are scattered throughout this process. l')xisting as micro-fascisms across this plane, black holes threaten selfconscious acts of transcendence and self-destruction alike, which is why l)cleuze and Guattari advise nomads to exercise caution as they disorganise themselvesaway from the molar organisations of the State. So, in sirlple terms, the black hole is one possible outcome of an ill-conceived (which oftcn equates to overly self-conscious) attempt at deterritorialisation thirt is cirused by a threshold crossed too quickly or an intensity lrcconrcdangcrousbcciruscit is no longer bcarable. Arrotlrcrway of'thirrking lbout thc blrrckholc is in tcrms of how Deleuze i ttttl (i ttl tl ti tt' i r cwr it c lhc r clit t iot t shipphilosophyir nclpsychoir r r alysis hir s
30
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with desire and subjectivity. If the black hole is one possibleoutcome faced by the overly convulsive, self-consumed desiring subject, then it works to illustrate their contention that every strong emotion - such as consciousness or love - pursues its own end. As a potential outcome for both paths of transcendenceand destruction, the lure of the black hole indicates the subject's attraction toward an absolute (lack) of signification. This expressesthe absolute impossibility of representation at the same time as it actively works to show how grand narrative statementscontinually intertwine subjectivity and signification. In appealing to a deterritorialising activity, Deleuze and Guattari problematise the processof subjectification which, they claim, results either in self-annihilation (a black hole), or re-engagement with different planes of becoming. In addition to presenting the black hole as a possibleend-point to certain acts of deterritorialisation, Deleuze and Guattari use it as a way of further conceptualising their notion of faciality. In this context, black holes exist as the binary co-requisite of the flat white surface, wall or landscapethat nominally symbolises the generic white face of Christ. In order to break through the dominating white face,or wall of the signifier, and avoid being swallowed by the black hole, one must renounce the face by becoming imperceptible. However, Deleuze and Guattari advise caution when embarking on such a line of flight. Indeed, they claim madnessto be a definite danger associatedwith attempts to break out of the signifying system represented by the face.We must not, they warn, entirely reject our organising boundaries becauseto do so can result in the complete rejection of subjectivity. Recalling the slogan of schizoanalysis,they tell us not to turn our backs on our boundaries, but to keep them in sight so that we can dismantle them with systematiccaution.
Connectives Molar Schizoanalysis Space
BODY Bruce Baugh of parts,wherethese itsirnywholccomposed 'liocly'tirr l)clcuzcis clcfinccl lilr onc rlnothcr, rtncl hrs r citpacitv sl:rrrtl rclirtiorr to irr sorrrc tlc(irritc llrrlls Irt'in g:rlli't'tt'rl lr v ot lr c l lr or lic s . ' l' lr t ' lt t t r t t r t r t l l r x l v i s j t t s l o t t c c x i t t t t g l l t 'o l '
BOD Y
3l
such a body; the animal body is another, but a body can also be a body of work, a social body or collectivity, a linguistic corpus, a political party, or even an idea. A body is not defined by either simple materiality, by its occupying space('extension'), or by organic structure. It is defined by the relations of its parts (relations of relative motion and rest, speedand slowness), and by its actions and reactions with respect both to its environment or milieu and to its internal milieu. The parts of a body vary depending on the kind of body: for a simple material object, such as a rock, its parts are minute particles of matter; for a social body, its parts are human individuals who stand in a certain relation to each other. The relations and interactions of the parts compound to form a dominant relation, expressing the 'essence'or a power of existing of that body, a degree of physical intensity that is identical to its power of being affected. A body exists when, for whatever reason, a number of parts enter into the characteristic relation that defines it, and which corresponds to its essenceor power of existing. Since nature as a whole contains all elements and relations, nature as a whole is a body, a system of relations among its parts, expressing the whole order of causal relations in all its combinations. Deleuze is fond of quoting Baruch Spinoza'sdictum that'no one knows what a body can do'. The more power a thing has, or the greater its power of existence,the greater number of ways in which it can be affected. Bodies are affected by different things, and in different ways, each type of body being characterised by minimum and maximum thresholds for being affected by other bodies: what can and what cannot affect it, and to what degree. Certain external bodies may prove insufficient to produce a reaction in a body, or fail to pass the minimum threshold, whereas in other cases,the body being affected may reach a maximum threshold, such that it is incapableof being affected any further, as in a tick that dies of engorgement. A body being affected by another, such that the relations of its parts are the effect of other bodies acting on it, is a passivedetermination of the body, or passion. If an external body is combined or 'composed' with a body in a way that increasesthe affected body's power of being affected, this transition to a higher state of activity is experienced as joy; if the combination decreasesthe affected body's power of being affected, this is the irffect of sadness.It is impossible to know in advance which bodies will compose with others in a way that is consonant with a body's characterist ic relation or ratio of its parts, or which bodies will decompose a body by c:rr.rsingits parts to enter into experimental relations. Whcther the effect is to increaseor decreasea body's power of acting and bcing 1ll'cctccl,onc body affecting;anothcr, or producing effectsin it, is in rcrrlityrrcrlnrbinirrgirnclrr mixing of thc tw
llI 1
l
i
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W I THO UT
ORGANS
(as when food is alteredin being assimilated,or when a poison destroys a body's vital parts); sometimesit altersboth and producesa composite relationof partsthat dominatesthe relationsof both components(aswhen chyleand lymph mix to form blood,which is of a differentnaturefrom its components);andsometimesit preservesthe relationof partsamongthem both, in which casethe two bodiesform parts of a whole. The characteristic relationthat resultsfrom harmoniouslycombiningthe relationsof the two componentbodiesinto a'higher individual'or'collectiveperson',such as a community or an association,correspondsto a collectivepower of beingaffected,and resultsin collectiveor communalaffects. Since a body is a relation of parts correspondingto an essence,or a degreeof physical intensity, a body need not have the hierarchical and dominatingorganisationof organswe call an 'organism'.It is rather an intensivereality,differentiatedby the maximumand minimum thresholds of its powerof beingaffected. Connectives Body without Organs Power Space Spinoza
BODY WITHOUT
ORGANS
Kylie Message A phraseinitially takenfrom Antonin Artaud, the Body without Organs (BwO) refersto a substratethat is alsoidentifiedasthe planeof consistency (as a non-formed, non-organised,non-stratifiedor destratifiedbody or term). The term first emergedin Deleuze'sTheLogic of Sense,and was further refined with Guattari in Anti-Oedipusand A ThousandPlateaus. The BwO is proposedasa meansof escapingwhat Deleuzeand Guattari perceiveas the shortcomingsof traditional(Freudian,Lacanian)psychoanalysis.Rather than arguing that desireis basedon Oedipal lack, they claim desireis a productive-machine that is multiple and in a stateof constant flux. And whereaspsychoanalysis proclaimsclosureand interprettrtion, their critique of the three terms (organism, significanceand sr.rbjcctiticrrtion) that organiseand bind us most effectivelysuggeststhe possibilityof'opcnings nndsp:rccs ftrrthc crcationof ncw modesof cxpcricrtcc'.l{itlhcr tltiin llrrrcccdingdircctly to invcrt rlr dcc
BOD Y
WITH OU T
OR GAN S
aa
JJ
dominant in the production of identity and consciousness, they suggest that implicit within, between,and all around theseare other - possibly more affective- fieldsof immanenceand statesof being. Attention is refocusedawayfrom the subjectivity(a term which they feel is too often mistakenfor the term 'consciousness') traditionallyprivileged by psychoanalysisas Deleuze and Guattari challenge the world of the articulating,self-definingand enclosedsubject.The BwO is the proposed antidote(aswell asprecedent,antecedentandevencorrelate)to this articulate and organisedorganism;indeed,they claim that the BwO hasno need for interpretation.The BwO doesnot exist in oppositionto the organism or notionsof subjectivity,and it is nevercompletelyfree of the stratified exigenciesof proper language,the State, family, or other institutions. However, it is, despite this, both everywhereand nowhere,disparateand homogeneous. In terms of this, there are two main points to note: firstly, that the BwO existswithin stratifiedfieldsof organisationat the sametime as it offers an alternative mode of being or experience(becoming); secondlgthe BwO doesnot equateliterally to an organ-lessbody. In referenceto the first point, Deleuze and Guattari explain that althoughthe BwO is a processthat is directedtoward a courseof continual becoming,it cannotbreak awayentirely from the systemthat it desires escapefrom. While it seeksa mode of articulation that is free from the binding tropesof subjectificationand signification,it must play a delicate gameof maintainingsomereferenceto thesesystemsof stratification,or elserisk obliterationor reterritorialisationbackinto thesesystems.In other process.Instead,it is continuwords,suchsubversionis a never-completed ous and oriented only towardsits processor moyementrather than toward any teleologicalpoint of completion.Consistentwith this, and in order to be affective(or to have affect)it must exist - more or less- within the systemthat it aimsto subvert. Deleuzeand Guattari take Miss X as their role model. A hypochondriac, sheclaimsto be without stomach,brain, or internal organs,and is left with only skin and bonesto give structureto her otherwisedisorganisedbody.Through this example,they explainthat the BwO doesnot refer literally to an organ-lessbody. It is not produced as the enemy of the organs,but is opposedto the organisationof the organs.In other words, the BwO is opposedto the organisingprinciplesthat structure,defineand speakon behalf of the collectiveassemblage of organs,experiencesor privileges'lack' as the singular statesof being. Whereaspsychoanalysis lnd productiveforce that maintainsdesire,Deleuzeand Guattari claim that by binding and judging desirein this way,our understandingand rclati
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Elaboratingfurther on the natureof the BwO, Deleuzealsoinvokesthe German biologist,August Weismann,and his 'theory of the germplasm' (1885,published1893)to contendthat - like the germplasm- the BwO is alwayscontemporarywith and yet independentof its host organism. Weismannbelievedthat at eachgeneration,the embryo that developsfrom the zygotenot only setsasidesomegermplasmfor the next generation(the inheritanceof acquiredfeatures)but it also producesthe cells that will developinto the soma- or body - of the organism.In Weismann'sview, the somaplasmsimply providesthe housingfor the germplasm,to ensure that it is protected,nourishedand conveyedto the germplasmof the opposite sex in order to createthe next generation.What comesfirst, the chickenor the egg?Weismannwould insistthe chickenis simply oneegg's device for laying another egg. Similarly, Deleuzepresentsthe BwO as equivalentto the egg;like the egg,the BwO doesnot exist beforeor prior' to the organism,but is adjacentto it and continuouslyin the processof constructingitself. Insteadof slotting everythinginto polarisedfields of the norm and its antithesis,Deleuze and Guattari encourageus to remove the poles of organisationbut maintain a mode of articulation.They advisethat in seekingto makeourselvesa BwO, we needto maintaina mode of expression, but rid languageof the central role it has in arbitrating truth and reality againstmadnessand the pre*symbolicreal.Relocatingdesireaway from a dichotomouslinguistictrajectory,Deleuzeand Guattari presentit as being contextualisedby the field of immanenceoffered by the BwO rather than by the conclusivefield of language.As such, desireis always alreadyengagedin a continuousprocessof becoming.However,despite occupying(and in somecasesembodying)a field of immanenceor a plane ofconsistencywhich areoften describedasbeingdestratified,decodedand deterritorialised,the BwO hasits own modeof organisation(whoseprinciples are primarily derived from Baruch Spinoza).Rather than being a specificform, the body is morecorrectlydescribedasuncontainedmatter parts. or a collectionof heterogeneous
Connectives Becoming Body Desirc Lacirn l)sychorrnrrlysis Spinozit
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BREUER, JOSEPH (I8+2-I925) - refer to the entrieson 'hysteria'and tfeminismt.
BURROUGHS,WILLIAM (1914-97) - refer'to the entries on tart' * politics'. and'post-structuralism
CANGUILHEM, phrenia'.
GEORGES (1904-95)-referto theentryon'schizo-
CAPITALISM Jonathan Roffe In the periodbeforehis death,Deleuzeannouncedin an interviewthat he would like to composea work which would be called TheGrand.eur of Marx. positiveattitudetowardsthe philosoThis fact clearlyindicatesDeleuze?s phy of Karl Marx, which he neverabandoneddespitealteringmanyof its fundamentalelements.Certainlythe most important of theseelementsis capitalism.The Marxism of-Deleuzecomesfrom his insistencethat all politicalthought must take its bearingsfrom the capitalistcontextwe live in. While mentioningcapitalismin passingin a number of places,it is the two volumesof Caphalismand Schizophreniawhich contain the most sustainedand radicaltreatmentof this theme. Deleuze and Guattari insist any given social formation restricts or structuresmovementsor flows. They claim that theseflows are not just the flows of money and commoditiesfamiliar to economists,but can be seenat a variety of levels:the movementof peopleand traffic in a city, the flows of words that are bound up in a language,the flows of genetic code betweengenerationsof plants, and even the flow of matter itself (the movementof the ocean,electronsmoving in metals,and so forth). Thus, Deleuze and Guattari's political ,thought begins with the prcmissthat nature itself, the Whole of existence,is at once a matter of fkrws,and that tny s
36
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pre-capitalist- on DeleuzeandGuattari'saccount,havesucha restriction of flows astheir basicprinciple. Deleuzeand Guattari call this processof restriction, or structuring, 'coding'. They conceivecoding as at once restrictive and necessary. Societies,as regimesof coding,aim to bring about certainfixed waysof existing(living, talking,working,relating)while denyingother more malleable ways. However, without some structure - our own coherent individuality and agencyfor example,which Deleuzeand Guattari considerspecificto eachsocialformationand alwaysoppressive - therewould be no basisupon which to challengeand attemptto alter the givencoding regime.Both Anti-Oed,ipusandA Thousand, Plateausinclude lengthy analysesof differentkinds of societiesand the waysin which they codeflows. Capitalismis the radicalexceptionto this basiccentralunderstandingof the nature of society.There are four featuresto this exceptionalstatusof capitalismfor Deleuzeand Guattari. First, insteadof working by coding flows,capitalismis a regimeof decoding.Second,and in tandemwith this, the recodingthat would takeplacein non-capitalistsocietiesto recapture decodedflows is replacedby the processof axiomatisation.For example, the coding of sexualrelationsthrough marriage,the church, moralsand popularculture - which in different societieslocatethe practiceof sexin certaincontexts,whetherthat is marriage,prostitutionor youth culturehasbeendecodedin capitalistsocieties. This is first of all, for Deleuzeand Guattari, a good thing, making possiblenew kinds of relations that were excludedby the codingregimesin question.In capitalism,however,a correlativeaxiomatisationhas takenplacemaking possiblethe saleof sex as a product (what Karl Marx called a 'commodity'). Axioms operate,in short, by emptyingflows of their specificmeaningin their codedcontext (sexasthe act of marriage,the mealasthe centreof family life, and so on) and imposing a law of generalequivalencein the form of monetary value. Theseflowsremaindecodedin sofar asthey arefluid partsof the economy. They cannot,ascommodities,be bound to a certainstateof affairsto have value - for food to be a product it must be possibleto eat it in a context other than the family home,or tribe. The third important aspectof capitalismfor Deleuzeand Guattari drawingon Marx - is that this processof decoding,/axiomatisation hasno real limit. Given that all such limits would be codes,this movement effectivelyand voraciouslyerodesall such limits. This accountsfor the sensein capitalistsocietiesof perpetual novelty and innovation, since codcd flows are continuallybeing turned into commoditiesthrough this proccss,furthcr cxtcnclingthe realmof monetaryequivalence. I krwcvcr,suclrir proccsscoulclncvcr bc total.Thus, fourthly,thc fact thrrtcrrllitirlisl srrcicty;rrocccds in this waycklcsnot mcanfor I)clctrzcrrnd
C A P ITA LIS M
*
U N IV E R S A L
H IS TOR Y
JI
Guattari that codedelementsof socialformation are entirely absent.It is rather the casethat certain fragmentsof Statesociety(in particular) are put to work in the serviceof capitalism.Obviously,structureslike the governmentand the family still exist in capitalism.As they note, there could be no total decodedsociety- an oxymoronicphrase.Governments and monarchiesremain,while having their real juridical power substantially reduced,asregulativemechanismsstabilisingthe growth of decoding/ axiomatisation.The nuclear family in particular, the kind of coded entity that one might imagine would be dissolved by the decoding/ axiomatisingmovementof capitalism,is for Deleuzeand Guattari the site of a surprisingminiaturisationof Statesociety,where the father takesthe position (structurally speaking)of the despoticand all-seeingruler. None of thesepoints, howeveqmakesfor a celebrationof the liberatory effectsof capitalism.Deleuze and Guattari remain Marxists in so far as.they consider real freedom to be unavailablein the world of monetaryequivalenceenactedby capitalism.While imitating the decoding that makespossiblethe freeing up of flows and new ways of existing, capitalist society only produces a different, more insidious, kind of unfreedom. Connectives Freedom Marx Oedipalisation
CAPITALISM
+ UNIVERSAL HISTORY
EugeneHolland DeleuzeandGuattariarealoneamongpost-structuralists to resuscitate the notion of universalhistory. But by drawing on Karl Marx rather than GeorgWilhelm FriedrichHegel,they insistthat this is an'ironic'universal history,for three reasons:it is retrospective, singularand critical. [t is retrospectivein that the perspectiveof schizophreniaonly becomesavailable toward the end of history,under capitalism;yet at the sametime, capitalism doesnot representthetelosofhistory, but rather a contingentproduct of fortuitous circumstance.This confirms the singularity of capitalist socicty:it is not somehiddensimilaritybetweencapitalismand previous s
il
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UNIVERSAL
exposesthe sourceofvalue that previoussocietieskept hidden.And hence capitalismoffers the key to universalhistory becausewith capitalism, societycan finally becomeself-critical. Capitalistmodernity representsthe key turning point in this view of universalhistory,for a crucial discoveryis madein a number of different fields:by Martin Luther; by Adam Smith and David Ricardo;somewhat laterby SigmundFreud,who will thereforebe considered'theLuther and the Adam Smith of psychiatry'.The key discoveryis that valuedoesnot inhere in objects but rather gets invested in them by human activity, whether that activity is religious devotion, physicallabour or libidinal desire.In this fundamentalreversalof perspective,objectsturn out to be merely the support for subjectivevalue-givingactivity.Yet in eachof the threefields,the discoveryofthe internal,subjectivenatureofvalue-giving activity is accompaniedby a resubordination of that activity to another externaldetermination:in the caseof Luther, subjectivefaith freed from subordinationto the CatholicChurch is nevertheless resubordinated to the authority of Scripture; in Smith and Ricardo,wage-labourfreed from feudal obligationsis resubordinatedto private capital accumulation;in Freud, the free-form desireof polymorphouslibido is resubordinatedto heterosexualreproduction in the privatised nuclear family and the Oedipuscomplex.To free human activity from theselast externaldeterminationsis the task of world-historicalcritique: Marx providesthe critique of political economy to free wage-labourfrom private capital; Friedrich Nietzscheprovidesthe critique of religionand moralismto free Will to Power from nihilism; Deleuzeand Guattari provide the critique of psychoanalysisto free libido from the private nuclear family and the Oedipuscomplex. If capitalismmakeshistory universal,this is ultimately becauseit promotes multiple differences,becausethe capitalistmarket operatesas a For Marx, the key human universalwas production: 'difference-engine'. the species-beingof humanity was defined in terms of its ever-growing ability to produceits own meansof life rather than simply consumewhat nature offered.For Deleuzeand Guattari, the key universalis not just production(not evenin the very broadsensethey grant that term inAntiOedipus), but specificallythe production of differencefree from codification and representation. The marketfostersan increasinglydifferentiated network of socialrelationsby expandingthe socialisationof production alongwith the divisionof labour,eventhough capitalextractsits surplus from thc differentialflowsenabledby this network,by meansof exploitati
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So while the capitalist market inauguratesthe potential for universal history in its productionof difference,it is the eliminationof capitalfrom the market that will multiply differenceand realisethe freedom inherent in universalhistory.
CAPTURE Alberto Toscano The conceptof 'capture'is usedby Deleuzeand Guattari to dealwith two problemsof relationality:first, how to conceiveof the connectionbetween the State,the war machineand capitalismwithin a universalhistory of politicallife; and second,how to formulatea non-representational account of the interaction of different beings and their territories, such as to ground a thinking of becoming.In the first instance,capturedefinesthe operation whereby the State (or Urstaat) binds or encaststhe war machinb,therebyturning it into an objectthat canbe madeto work for the State, to bolster and expand its sovereignty.Apparatusesof capture constitutethe machinicprocesses specificto Statesocieties.They can be conceivedas being primarily a matter of signs;whencethe figure of the One-EyedEmperor who binds and fixes signs,complementedby a OneArmed Priest or jurist who codifiesthesesignsin treaties,contractsand laws.Capturecanbe understoodasconstitutinga control of signs,accompanying the other paradigmatic dimension of the State, the control of tools.The principalontologicaland methologicalissuerelatedto this conceptionof capturehasto do with the type of relationbetweencaptureand the captured (namely in the caseof the war machine as the privileged correlateof the apparatus). Deleuzeand Guattari'snotion of universalhistory evadesany explanation by strict causality or chronological sequence.Rather, it turns to notionsdrawn from catastrophetheory and the sciencesof complexityto revivethe Hegelianintuition that the Statehasalwaysbeenthere- not as an idea or a concept,but as a thresholdendowedwith a kind of virtual efficacy,evenwhen the Stateas a complexof institutionsand as a system of control is not yet actual.The logic of captureis such that what is captured is simultaneouslypresupposedand generatedby the act of capture, appropriatedand produced.Deleuzeand Guattari return to many of the key notions in Karl Marx's critique of political economyto bolster the thcsis of a constructivecharacterof capture,arguing, for instance,that surpluslabourcanbc unclcrst<xrd to cngcndcrlabourpropcr(th
40
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flight from labour). Capture is thus both an introjection and determination of an outside and the engendering of the outside as outside of the apparatus. It is in this regard that capture is made to correspond to the Marxian concept of primitive accumulation, interpreted as a kind of originary violence imposed by the State to prepare for the functioning of capital. Here Deleuze and Guattari are sensitive to the juridical aspectsof the question, such that State capture defines a domain of legitimate violence, in as much as it always accompaniescapture with the affirmation of a right to capture. In its intimate link to the notion of machinic enslavement,the apparatus of capture is proper to both the initial imperial figure of the State and to fullblown global or axiomatic capitalism, rather than to the intermediary stage represented by the bourgeois nation-state and its forms of disciplinary subjectivation. The notion of capture can also be accorded a different inflection, this time linked to the privileging of ethological models of intelligibility within a philosophy of immanence. Here the emphasis is no longer on the expropriation and appropriation of an outside by an instance of control, but on the process of convergence and assemblagebetween heterogeneous series, on the emergence of blocs of becoming, such as the one of the wasp and the orchid. What we have here is properly speaking a double capture or inter-capture, an encounter that transforms the disparate entities that enter into a joint becoming. In Deleuze and Guattari's KaJha, such a process is linked to a renewal of the theory of relation, and specifically to a reconsideration of the status of mimesis, now reframed as a type of symbiosis. Under the heading of capture we thus encounter two opposite but entangled actions, both of which can be regarded as schemata alternative to a dominant hylomorphic mode of explaining relation: the first, understood as the political control of signs, translates a co-existence of becomings (as manifested by the war machine) into a historical succession, making the State pass from an attractor which virtually impinges upon non-State actors to an institutional and temporal reality; the second defines a co-existence and articulation of becomings in terms of the assemblage of heterogeneous entities and the formation of territories. What is paramount in both instancesis the affirmation of the event-bound and transformative character of relationality (or interaction), such that capture, whether understood as control or assemblage,is always an ontologically constructive operation and can never be reduced to models of unilateral causation.
Connective ( lrrpit rrlisnr
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CAPTURE + POLITICS Paul Patton Deleuzeand Guattari deny that the Stateis an apparatuswhich emerged asthe resultof prior conditionssuchasthe accumulationof surplusor the emergence of privateproperty.Instead,they arguethat Stateshavealways existedand that they are in essencealwaysmechanismsof capture.The earliestforms of Stateinvolvedthe captureof agricultural communities, the constitution of a milieu of interiority and the exerciseof sovereign power. The ruler became'the sole and transcendentpublic-property owner,the masterof the surplusor stock,the organiserof large-scale works (surpluslabour),the sourceof public functionsand bureaucracy'(D&G 1987:428).Historically the most important mechanismsof capturehave beenthoseexercisedupon land and its products,upon labourand money. Thesecorrespondto Karl Marx's 'holy trinity' of the modern sourcesof capitalaccumulation,namely ground rent, profit and taxes,but they have long existedin other forms.In all cases, we find the sametwo key elements: general the constitutionof a spaceof comparisonand the establishment of a centre of appropriation.Together,these define the abstractmachine which is expressedin the different forms of State,but also in non-state mechanismsof capture such asthe captureof corporealrepresentationby faciality,or the captureof political reasonby public opinion. Consider first the capture of human activity in the form of labour. Deleuzeand Guattari arguethat 'labour (in the strict sense)beginsonly with what is calledsurpluslabour' (D&G 1987:490).Contraryto the widespreadcolonial presumption that indigenouspeopleswere unsuited for labour,they point out that 'so-calledprimitive societiesarenot societiesof shortageor subsistence due to an absenceof work, but on the contraryare societiesof freeactionand smoothspacethat haveno usefor a work-factor, anymorethan they constitutea stock'(D&G 1987:491).Inthesesocieties, productiveactivity proceedsunder a regimeof 'free action' or activity in continuousvariation.Such activity only becomeslabour once a standard of comparisonis imposed,in the form of a definitequantityto be produced or a time to be worked.The obligationto providetaxes,tribute or surplus labourimposessuchstandardsof comparison,therebyeffectingthe transformationof freeaction into labour. The sametwo elementsare presentin the conditionswhich enablethe extractionof ground rent, which Deleuzeand Guattari describeas 'the vcry modcl of an apparatusof capture' (D&G 1987:441).From an economicpoint of vicw,thc cxtrtrctionof grounclrcnt prcsllpposcs r mcansof thc prtlcluctivity ol'dill'crcntprlrtirlnsof' llrrrcl conrpirrirrg sinrrrltirrrcorrsly
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exploited,or of comparingthe productivity of the sameportion successively exploited. The measurementof productivity provides a general spaceof comparison;a measureof qualitativedifferences betweenportions of the earth'ssurfacewhich is absentfrom the territorial assemblage of hunter-gatherersociety.Thus, 'labour and surpluslabourare the apparatus of captureof activityjust asthe comparisonof landsand the appropriation of land are the apparatusof captureof territory' (D&G 1987:442). One further condition is necessaryin order for ground rent to be in productivitymustbelinkedto a landowner(D&G extracted:thedifference 1987: 441). In other words, from a legal point of view, the extraction of ground rent is 'inseparablefrom a processof relative deterritorialization' because'insteadof peoplebeingdistributedin an itinerantterritory,pieces of landaredistributedamongpeopleaccordingto a commonquantitativecriterion' (D&G 1987:441).The conversionof portionsof the earthinhabited by so-calledprimitivepeoplesinto an appropriable and exploitableresourte juridical of a centreof appropriation. thereforerequiresthe establishment The centreestablishes a monopolyover what has now becomeland and assigns to itselfthe right to allocateownershipof portionsof unclaimedland. This centreis the legalsovereignand the monopolyis the assertionof sovereigntyover the territoriesin question.That is why the fundamental jurisprudentialproblemof colonisationis the mannerin which the territoriesof the originalinhabitantsbecometransformedinto a uniform space of landedproperty.In thosecolonieswhich wereacquiredand governedin accordancewith British common law, the sovereignright of the Crown meantthat it hadthe powerboth to createandextinguishprivaterightsand interestsin land. In this sense,Crown land amountsto a uniform expanse of potentialreal property which coversthe earth to the extentof the sovereignterritory.It followsthat, within thesecommon-lawjurisdictions,the legalimpositionof sovereigntyconstitutesan apparatusof capturein the precisesensewhich Deleuzeand Guattari give to this term. The imposition ofsovereigntyeffectsan instantaneous deterritorialisation ofindigenous territoriesand their reterritorialisationas a uniform spaceof Crown land centredupon the figureof the sovereign.
CARROLL, LEWIS (1832-98)- referto the entrieson'art'and 'incorporeal'.
(lt'lZANNIi, PAUL (ltl39-1906)- rcfcr to rhc cnrricson 'irrr', 'sclrs:rt c:ittcrttlt'. liort',trtd 'scttsltlioit L
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CHAOS Alberto Toscano This term canbe saidto receivetwo maintreatmentsin the work of Deleuze and Guattari,one intra-philosophical,the other non-philosophical.In the first acceptation,chaos designatesthe type of virtual totality that the philosophyof differenceopposesto the foundationaland self-referential totalities proposedby the philosophiesof representation.In polemical juxtapositionto those systemsof thought that lie beyond the powersof representation, this Deleuzianchaos,in which all intensivedifferencesare contained- 'complicated'but not 'explicated'- is equivalentto the ontologicallyproductiveaffirmationof the divergenceof series.Put differently, chaosenvelopsanddistributes,without identifying,the heterogeneities that makeup the world. In other words,Deleuzianchaosis formlessbut not undifferentiated.Deleuze thus opposesthis Joyceanand Nietzschean chaosmos,in which the eternal return selectssimulacrafor their divergence)to the chaosthat Platoattributesto the sophist,which is a privative asthe chaosof non-participation.Moreover,he considerssucha chaosmos principal antidoteto the trinity sustainingall philosophiesof representation and transcendence: world, God and subject(man). In A Thousand, Plateaus,having moved away from the structuralistinspiredterminologyof series(which chaoswasseento affirm), Deleuze and Guattari provide a critique of both chaosmosand eternal return as an insufficientbulwark againsta (negative)return of 'the One' and of representation.Against this they proposethe conceptsof 'rhizome' and 'plane of immanence'.When chaosmakesits reappearancein What is Philosophy? it is asthe sharedcorrelateof the threedimensionsof thought (or of the brain), alsodesignatedas chaoids;science,art and philosophy. In this context,chaosis not definedsimply by the mannerin which it contains (or complicates)differences,but by its infinite speed,such that the particles,forms and entities that populate it emergeonly to disappear immediately,leavingbehind no consistency, referenceor any determinate consequences. Chaosis thus definednot by its disorderbut by its fugacity.It is then the taskof philosophy,throughthe drawingof planesof immanence,invention to of conceptualpersonaeand compositionof concepts,to giveconsistency chaoswhilst maintainingits speedand productivity.Chaosis thus both the intimatethreatand the sourceof philosophicalcreation,understoodasthe for examplea conimpositiononto the virtual of its own typeof consistency, or percepts. Phiklsophy can sistcncyothcrthrn thoscprovidcclby frrnctir)ns thusbc tccirstit1tcrtrtsof'iln cthicsof'chiuls,it pitrticularwrtyof'livirrgwith
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chaos- and againstthe sterile clich6sof opinion (doxa)- by creating conceptualformscapableof sustainingthe infinitespeedof chaoswhilst not succumbingto the stupidity,thoughtlessness or folly of the indeterminate. Philosophicalcreationis thus poisedbetween,on the one hand,the subjection of the planeof immanenceto somevarietyof transcendence that would guaranteeits uniquenessand, on the other, the surging up of a chaosthat would dissolveanyconsistency, any durabledifferenceor structure. Chaosand opinion thus provide the two sourcesof inconsistencyfor thought, the one determinedby an excessof speed,the other by a surfeit of redundancy.Though chaosis a vital resourcefor thought,it is alsoclear that the struggleis twofold through and through, in as much as it is the inconsistencyor idiocy of a chaotic thought that often grounds the recourse to the safety and identity of opinions. In the later work with Guattari it is essentialto the definition of philosophicalpracticeand its demarcationfrom and interferencewith the other chaoids,that chaosnot be consideredsimply synonymouswith ontologicalunivocity,but that it is accordeda suigeneris statusasthe non-philosophicaldimensiondemanded by philosophicalthought. Connectives Plato Representation Thought
CINEMA Constantine Verezsis Following his work on A ThousandPlateaus,Deleuze'sCinemabooksCinemal: The mooement-image and Cinema2: The tirne-image- understand film as a multiplicity, a phenomenon simultaneouslyoriented toward a network of reproductive forces, which make it a-signifying totality (a 'being-One'), and equally toward a network of productiae forces, that facilitate the connection and creation of an encounter (a 'becoming-Other').The first interpretation of film finds its clearesr expressionin two Breatmechanismsof cinematicovercoding- historical poeticsand textualanalysis- that havedominatedanglophone,academiciscclfilm intcrprctationsincethe mid-1970s.Eachof theseapproaches turrdcrstrrncls rcpctitionas a kind of rcdundirncy, one that contril'rutcs to lhc. huhiluul rccttgttitioltof'tlrc sllnlc: ilr.rindustrirl rcprcscrrtirtiorrirl
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model, a symbolic blockage. Within these totalising and homogenising approaches to film, repetition (redundancy) functions as a principle of unification, limiting - but never totally arresting - cinema's potentially active and creative lines of flight. In place of these nomalising - informational and/ or symbolic - accounts of cinema, another approach develops an experimental-creative understanding of film in which an attentive misrecognition abandons representation (and subjectification) to sketch circuits - and . . . and . . . and - between a series of images. The latter describes Deleuze's 'crystalline regime', an intensive system which resists a hierarchical principle of identity in the former present, and a rule of resemblance in the present present, to establish a communication betweentwo presents (the former and the present) which co-exist in relation to a virtual object - the absolutely different. This direct presentation of time - a becoming-in-the-world - brings cinema into a relation not with an ideal of Truth, but with powers of the false: opening, in the place of representation, a sensation of the present presence of the moment, acreative stammering (and . . . and . . . and). These two critical interpretations of film correspond to, yet cut across' the separateaspectsof cinema dealt with in each of the Cinema books. In Cinema 1, Deleuze identifies the classical or 'movement-image' as that which gives rise to a 'sensory-motor whole' (a unity of movement and its interval) and grounds narration (representation) in the image. This movement-image, which relates principally to pre-World War II cinema, contributes to the realism of the 'action-image', and produces the global domination of the American cinema. In Cinema 2, Delguze describes a post-war crisis in the movement-image, a break-up of the sensory-motor link that gives rise to a new situation - a neo-realism - that is not drawn out directly into action, but is 'primarily optical and of sound, invested by the senses'(D 1989: 4). As Deleuze describesit, even though this opticalsound image implies a beyond of movement, movement does not strictly stop but is now grasped by way of connections which are no longer sensory-motor and which bring the sensesinto direct relation with time and thought. That is, where the movement-image and its sensory-motor signs are in a relationship only with an indirect image of time, the pure optical and sound image - its 'opsigns' and 'sonsigns' - are directly connected to a time-im age- a 'chronosign' - that has subordinated movement. Appealing to Henri Bergson's schemataon time, Deleuze describesa situation in which the optical-sound perception enters into a relation with genuinely airtualelements. This is the large circuit of the dream-image ('onirosign'), a type of intensive system in which a virtual image (the 'diffcrcnciittor') bccomes actual not directly, but by actualising a different i nri tgc,w hi ch it sclf plays t hc r r llc of t hc vir t uit l im agc bcing r t ct ualiscdin
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another, and so on. Although the optical-sound image appears to find its proper equivalent in this infinitely dilated circuit of the dream-image, for Deleuze the opsign (and sonsign) finds its true genetic element only when the actual image crystallises with its own virtual image on a small circuit. The time-image is a direct representation of time, a crystal-imagethat consists in the indivisible unity of an actual image and its own virtual image so that the two are indiscernible, actual and,virtual at the same time. Deleuze says:'what we seein the crystal is time itself, a bit of time in the pure state'
(D 1989:82). In a brief example, Chinatown(1973) is a perfectly realised(neoclassical)Hollywood genrefilm bur one that exhibitsan ability to exceed itself. Chinatzwncanbeunderstoodasa representationaland symbolictext - a detectivefilm and an Oedipaldrama.But its subtlepatterningof repetitions- the motifsof waterand eye- while contributingto the film's narrative economysketch the complementarypanoramicvision of a large circuitindifferentto the conditionsof meaningand truth. Additionally,the film's final repetition- a woman'sdeathin Chinatown- brings the detective Gittes'pastandpresenttogetherwith hallucinatoryexactitudeto form a smallcircuit in which the virtual correspondsto the actual.The final act gesturestowardneithera diegeticnor oneirictemporality,but a crystalline temporality. Connectives Crystal Lines of flight Time imase
CINEMA + WERNERHERZOG Alberto Toscano Deleuze's affinity with WernerHerzog exceedsthe explicit references to the German filmmaker in the Cinema volumes. Herzog's films and documentaries of the 1970sare unmatched as contemporary representativesof a heterodox fidelity to romanticism, separating the latter from its Kantian presuppositions and Hegelian consequencesin order to discover a dimension in which materiality and ideality, nature and production, become irrdisccrniblc.'l'his is thc kincl of romanticism which, in the referenceto lf rrclrrrcrirt thc vcry ot.ltscrt ol' ,'lnti-Octlipus,is a progcrritorof thc schiz
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This thinking of the impersonal, of an earth beyond man, is given remarkable,albeit divergent expression in films such as Fitzcarraldo (1982) or Stroszek(1977), where it is accompaniedby the depiction of figures that approximate what Deleuze called structuralist heroes: pure individuals or larval subjects capableof sustaining their habitation by pre-individual singularities and deformation by spatio-temporal dynamisms, attaining a point of non-distinction between man and nature. Herzog immerses the viewer in the (micro- and macro-) cosmosof sensationborne by beings of remarkable fragility (akin to Bartleby) and great hallucinating, doomed visionaries.The cinematic ideasextracted from the work of Herzog intervene at two very significant moments in Deleuze's confrontation with cinema, first in terms of the large form and the small form of the action-image in Cinerna 1, then in Cinema2 with the momentous introduction of the crystal image. Herzog's 'action films' provide two extreme realisationsof those cinematic schematapreoccupied with the transformative interaction of action and situation. In the idea (or vision) of the large form (SAS'), a situation (S) poses a problem to a character requiring an action (A) whereby the initial situation (and the character herself) will be transformed (S'). Herzog's variation on this schemaentails the staging of actions whose delirium is to try to transform situations that does not make any such requirement on the character. These are in turn split between a sublime or hallucinatory aspectthat seeksto equal an unlimited nature, and a heroic or hypnotic one, which tries to confront, through an excessiveproject, the limits imposed by nature. What Deleuze isolatesin Herzog is thus a pure idea of the large, staged as a mad attempt to delve into the abyssof nature by linking man and landscapein the creation of a sublime situation. While Herzog operateson the large form by excess,making the two situations (S and S') incommensurable, he transforms the small form (ASA ) by weakening it to the extreme, such that the actions and the characters bearing them are stripped oftheir use, reduced to entirely inoperative and defencelessintensities (whether in Kinski's foetal figure in Nosferatu (1979) or in the films starring the schizophrenic actor Bruno S.). Sublimity and a kind of bare life are the metaphysical foci of Herzog's implementation of the action image, which reaches its most accomplished moments precisely when it stages their reversibility (the sublimity of bare life in Kaspar Hauser (1975), the destitution of visionary greatnessin Aguirre (1972)). The metaphysical import of Herzog's work is even more prominent in Cinema 2, where he is accorded the rare praise of having best realised the crystal image: the smallest possible circuit joining, in a kind of perpetual oscillation irnd indiscernibility, the actual and the virtual. This point of irrdisccrnibility signrrls il purc cxpcriencc of timc (indisccrnible from ctcrni t.y) i rr r d ol' c: r cr r t ion( indiscclr r iblc lir r r r t lhc int p: t ssivc) .I I cr z. og's
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Heart of Glass(1976) is the key locus for the cinematic manifestation of this exquisitelymetaphysicaltype of image.Following on from an intuition of Gilbert Simondon,Deleuzeunderstandsthis film in terms of the relation betweena germ capableof crystallisationand a milieu of application which is qualified as actually amorphous.But this amorphousnessis not that of a mere prime matter,sincefrom anotherperspectiveit is a virtually differentiatedstructure; and the germ, initially qualified a virtual image,is understoodasactual.Thus, thoughactualand virtual are ultimately indiscernible,they can be distinguishedby the perspecive taken on the relation at hand (for example germ/milieu). Heart of Glass is, in Deleuze'seyes,a kind of alchemicaladventure,haunted by the uncertainty of the crystal, in which what is at stake is the encounter betweenthe red crystalglassand the world, suchthat the former canpass from virtual to actualimageand effectthe passageof the latter from actual amorphousnessto virtual and infinite differentiation. We can thus see how the crystalimageis not simply a matter of a certainkind of intuition, but involvesthe construction of scenarioswith their own very special kinds of actions, revealing Herzog's genius for joining the most deprived and infinitesimal of creatures with the most cosmic and grandioseof projects,an inspiration that can perhapsbe tracked elsewhere in Deleuze'soeuvre.
COGITO James Williams
t"
Deleuze'scritical approachto the cogito of Ren6Descartes;the 'I think, thereforeI am' from the Discourse onMethodor the 'I think, I am' from the Meditations,can be divided into a critique of the Cartesiananalytic method, a critique of the self-evidenceof the cogitoand an extensionof the Cartesianview of the subject. Descartes'foundationalmethod is the rationalist construction of a systemof analytictruths. That is, he believesthat certainpropositionsare true independentlyof any others and that thereforethey can stand as a ground for the deductionof further truths accordingto reason.Deleuze's synthetic and dialectical method, developedin Dffirence and,Repetition, dependson the view that all knowledgeis partial and opento revision. Thus, any relativetruth is open to extensionthrough syntheseswith further discoveriesand through further experiments.The relation bctwccnthcsctruths is dialectical rathcrthananalytical and foundational, 'fhcrc is r rcciprtrcirlproccssof rcvisionand changcbctwccnthcm, as
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opposedto Cartesianmovesfrom secureand inviolable basesout into the unknown.Where Descartessituatesreasonat the heart of his method,as shownby the role of thinking in the cogito,Deleuzeemphasises sensation. Sensationis resistantto identity in representation.Thought must be responsiveto sensationsthat go beyond its capacityto representthem. Thesepoint to a realmof virtual conditionsdefinedasintensitiesand Ideas (the capitalindicatesthat thesearenot ideasto be thought of asernpirical things in the mind, rather they are like Kantian Ideasof reason). Deleuzeholdsthat no thought is freeof sensation.The cogitocannotbe self-evident,becausesensationalwaysextendsto a multiplicity of further conditionsand causes. The Cartesianhope of defeatingsystematicdoubt through the certaintyof the cogitomust thereforefail. Deleuzeoften turns to dramatisationsfrom art, literature and cinemato convinceus of the insufficiency of the cogito. Wherever we presume to have found pure thought,or pure representations, the expressivityofthe artspointsto sensationsand deeperldeas. A thought, such as the cogito,is thereforeinseparablefrom sensations that themselves bring a seriesof intensitiesandIdeasto bearon the subject. The 'I' is thereforenot independentbut carriesall intensitiesand all Ideas with it. These are related to any singularthought in the way it implies differentarrangements of intensitiesand differentrelationsof clarity and obscuritybetweenIdeas. You do not think without feeling.Feelingdefinesyou as an individual. That singulardefinition brings someintensitiesto the fore while hiding others(morehating,lessanger,greatercaring,lessjealousy).In turn, these intensitieslight up Ideas in different ways making somerelationsmore obscureand others more distinct (The Idea of love for humanity took centre stage,after their sacrifice). The subjectis thereforeextendedthrough the sensationsof singular individualsinto virtual intensitiesand Ideas.Unlike the Cartesiancogito, which is positedon the activity of the thinking subject,Deleuze'sindividual has an all-important passiveside.We cannot directly chooseour sensations, we are thereforepassivewith respectto our virtual 'dark precursorst. Deleuze'sphilosophydependson Descartes'rationalistcritics,notably BaruchSpinoza,for the syntheticmethodandfor the oppositionto the free activity of the subject, and Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz, for the extensionof the subjector monad to the whole of reality.Deleuzeis not simply anti-Cartesian;rather, he extendsthe activesubjectthrough passivity and through the conditionsfor sensation.The cogitois an important moment in philosophy,but it requirescompletingthrough synthesesthat bclic its indcpcndcncc,
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Connectives Kant Sensation
CONCEPTS CliffStagoll Deleuzeunderstandsphilosophyas being the art of inventingor creating concepts,or putting conceptsto work in new ways.He doesnot considerit to be very useful or productive,however,when it createsand usesconceprs in themannerthathethinkshastypifiedmuchof westernphilosophyto date. Too often, Deleuzeargues,philosophyhas used real experiencemerely as a sourcefor extractingor deducingabstractconceptualmeansfor categorising phenomena. [t hastendedthen to employthesesameconceptseitherto determineor expressthe essence of phenomena,or elseto order and rank them in termsof the concept.An exampleis Plato'sconceptof Forms,the absoluteand changeless objectsand standardsof knowledgeagainstwhich all humanknowledgeis but an inferior copy.Sucha conceptdoesnot help us appreciateor contributeto the richnessof lived experience,Deleuze argues,but only to order,labelandmeasureindividualsrelativeto anabstract norm. It is true, he argues,that conceptshelp us in our everydaylives to organiseand representour thoughtsto others,makingcommunicationand opinion-formationsimpler; but Deleuzeinsists such simplicity detracts from the varietyand uniqueness evidentin our experiences of the world. For Deleuzeand Guattari, conceptsought to be meansby which we movebeyondwhat we experienceso that we canthink of new possibilities. Ratherthan bringing things rogetherunder a concept,he is interestedin relatingvariablesaccordingto newconceptssoasto createproductiveconnections.Conceptsought to expressstatesof affairsin terms of the contingent circumstances and dynamicsthat leadto and follow from them, so that eachconceptis relatedto particularvariablesthat changeor ,mutate' it. A conceptis createdor thought anew in relation to every particular event,insight, experienceor problem,therebyincorporatinga notion of the contingencyof the circumstances of eachevent.On sucha view,conceptscannotbe thoughtapartfrom the circumstances of their production, and so cannotbe hypotheticalor conceiveda priori. l)clcuzc'stheoryof conceptsis part of a potentcriticismof much philosophyto drrtc.Hc is arguingthilt iuryphikrsophyfrrilingto rcspcctthc partictrlitlilyol' coltsc-iottsncss irr lirvoulol' broirdcorrccpluirl skctchcsis
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subject to metaphysicalillusion. The application of abstractconcepts merely gatherstogether discrete particulars despitetheir differences,and privilegesconceptsover what is supposedto be explained.For example, one might understandthings as instancesof Being or usefulness,thereby privilegefor the conceptof presupposingan ontologicalor epistemological 'Being' or 'utility' that is not evidentin immediateexperience.By bearing in mind that the conceptat work relatesjust to this being or this useful thing, hereand now,suchillusionsareavoided. In Deleuze'swork, conceptsbecomethe meansby which we move beyond experienceso as to be able to think anew.Rather than 'standing apart' from experience,a concept is defined just by the unity that it elements.In other words,conceptsmust expresses amongstheterogeneous descriptiveor simbe creativeor activerather than merelyrepresentative, plifying. For this reason,in his work on David Hume, Deleuzegoesto somelengthsto showhow causationis a truly creativeconceptby explaining how it brings us to expectand anticipateoutcomesbeforethey occur, and evenoutcomesthat we don't observeat all. In suchcases,anticipatory creationis so powerfulthat it becomesa normal part of life, and causation is a conceptthat representsthe creationof other conceptswithout the requirementfor senseperceptionsto ground them. Moving from a reiterativehistory of philosophyto the practiceof philosophymeansengagingwith inherited conceptsin new ways.This means for Deleuzethat philosophersought to engagein new linesof thinking and new connectionsbetweenparticularideas,argumentsand fieldsof specialisation.Only then doesphilosophytakeon a positivepower to transform numerous our waysof thinking. In his own work, Deleuzereappropriates conceptsinheritedfrom the greatphilosophersof the pastin termsof new problems,uses,terms and theories.Henri Bergson'sconceptsof duration and intuition, Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz's monad,Hume's associationism, and numerousconceptsfrom literature,film, criticism, science and evenmathematicsare reworkedand put to work in new and creative ways. The apparent inconsistencyof their meaningsand uses,whilst a challengefor his reader,is a sign of Deleuze'srefusalto giveany concept a single purpose or referent. By cutting routinely acrossdisciplinary boundaries,Deleuzeabidesby his proposalthat concept-creationbe an 'open ended'exercise,such that philosophycreatesconceptsthat are as accessible and usefulto artistsand scientistsasto philosophers. Connectives llcrgson |)urrtion
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Hume Plato
CONCEPTS + UTOPIA EugeneHolland, The centralactivityof philosophyfor Deleuzeis the creationof concepts, and it is an activity forcedupon rather than initiated by the philosopher. What is it that befallsphilosophersthat forcesthem to think?In the course of his career,Deleuzehasgiventhreekindsof answerto this question.In his early works,it is paradoxthat provokesthought; here,the provocationto thoughtis internalto thoughtitself.In the latercollaborations with Guattari (and perhapsbecauseof that collaboration),the locus of the stimulusto thought shifts steadilyoutsideof thought, and eventuallyevenoutsideof philosophy.The secondkind of provocationconsistsof topicsor problems within philosophy(no longerlimited to logicalcontradictionsor paradoxes) that, in the estimationof a creativephilosopher, havebeenpoorlyconceived and hencedemandto be reconceived. The third kind of provocationarises from the connectionbetweenphilosophy and its socio-historicalcontext; herethe problemsare not strictly speakingor originallyphilosophical,but provokephilosophical theynonetheless thoughtto furnishsolutionstq or at leastnewand improvedarticulationsof, thoseproblems- solutionsor articulationsthat areindeedphilosophical. Here,philosophydoesnot respondto problemsof its own', but to problemspresentedto it or forcedupon it by its real-worldmilieu. And it is this kind of connection,betweenphilosophy and socio-historical context that Deleuzeand Guattari will call utopian: 'utopiais what links philosophywith its own epoch'(D&G 1994:99). One of Deleuzeand Guattari'smain concernsis to distinguisha properly philosophicalrelationbetweenconceptand context from the betterknown scientific(or socialscientific)relation basedon 'representation'. Unlike the socialand natural sciences,philosophyis creative,servingas a kind of relaybetweenone practicalorientationto the world and another, new and improvedone.Philosophyrespondsto problemsthat arisewhen a givenmodeof existenceor practicalorientationno longersuffices.Such problemsarerealenough,but they arenot reducibleto reality.The purpose of philosophyis not to representthe world, but to createconcepts,and thcscconccptsservenot to replicateaccuratelyin discoursespecificsegrrcntsof thc w
C ON TR OL
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So the connectionbetweenphilosophyand its socio-historicalmilieu is essentiallydiagnosticratherthan representative-scientific. Sciencesaim to graspstatesof affairsasthey are;the point is to get reality right, to settle on a correctunderstandingof the world. Philosophyaimsneverto settle, but on the contraryalwaysto unsettleand to transformour understanding of certainproblems,becausethey arethought to havebeenbadly posed,or not posedat all, by previousthinkers,and/or becausethe problemsarehistoricallynew or havechangedso radicallyover time asto renderprevious responses inadequate.HenceDeleuzeand Guattari insist that philosophy for them 'doesnot consistin knowingand is not inspiredby truth. Rather it is categorieslike Interesting,Remarkable,or Important that determine [its] successor failure' (D&G 1994:82).The creationof conceptsis thus cruciallyselectiveaswell as(or aspart ofbeing) diagnostic,and in extracting a philosophicalconceptfrom a historicalstateofaffairs, philosophical thoughtidentifiescertainaspectsof that stateof affairsasproblemsrequiring new solutions.The utopianvocationof concept-creation thus consists in proposingsolutionsto the pressingproblemsof the time; in this way, philosophybecomespoliticaland 'takesthe criticismof its own time to the highest level' (D&G 1994:99).
CONTROL SOCIETY John Marks Deleuzedevelopshis notion of the 'control society'at the beginningof the 1990s.In the 1970sMichel Foucaultshowedhow, during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, a d,isciplinarysociety had developedthat was based on strategiesof confinement.As Deleuze points out, Foucault carriedout this historicalwork in order to showwhat we had inheritedof the disciplinarymodel,and not simply in orderto claim that contemporary societyis disciplinary.This is the senseof the actualin Foucault'swork, in the senseof what we are in the processof differing from. Deleuzeuses Foucault'sinsightsasa startingpoint to claim that we aremoving towards controlsocietiesin which confinementis no longerthe main strategy. Deleuze reminds us that disciplinary societiessucceeded'sovereign' societies,and that they concentratedon the organisationof life and production rather than the exerciseof arbitrary entitlementsin relation to thesetwo domains.Disciplinarysocietiesdevelopeda networkof sitesand institutions - prisons,hospitals,factories,schools,the family - within which indiviclualswcrc locatcd, traincd ancl/
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observable,measurableobject, which is susceptibleto various forms of manipulation.Essentially, the disciplinarysystemis one of contiguity:the individual movesfrom site to site,beginningagaineachtime. In contrast to this, societiesof control - which emerge particularly after World War II - are continuousin form. The variousforms of control constitute a network of inseparablevariations.The individual, in a disciplinary society,is placedin various'moulds' at differenttimes,whereasthe individual in a contemporarycontrol societyis in a constantstateof mod,ulation. Deleuze uses as an examplethe world of work and production. The factory functioned accordingto somesort of equilibrium betweenthe highest possibleproduction and the lowest possiblewages.Just as the worker was a componentin a regulatedsystemof massproduction, so unions could mobilisemassresistance.In control societies,on the other hand,the dominantmodel is that of the business,in which it is more frequently the task of the individual to engagein forms of competitionand continuingeducationin order to attain a certainlevelof salary.There is a deeperlevel of modulation, a constantvariation, in the wagespaid to workers.In generalterms) the duality of massand individual is being brokendown.The individualis becominga'dividual',whilst the massis reconfiguredin terms of data,samplesand markets.Whereasdisciplinary individualsproducedquantifiableand discreteamountsof energy,'dividuals' are caught up in a processof constantmodulation.In the caseof medicine,which claimsto be movingtowardsa system'withoutdoctorsor patients',this meansthat the figurein the individualis replacedby a dividual segmentof codedmatter to be controlled. Although he is in no way suggestingthat we shouldreturn to disciplinary institutions, Deleuze clearly finds the prospectof the new control societyalarming.In the domainsof prison,education,hospitalsand business,the old institutionsare breakingdown and, althoughthesechanges may be presentedasbeingmore closelytailored to the needsof individuals, Deleuzeseeslittle more than a new systemof domination.It may evenbe the case,he suggests, that we may cometo view the harshconfinementsof disciplinarysocietieswith somenostalgia.One reasonfor this is obviously that techniquesof control threatento be isolatingand individualising. We may regret the lossof previoussolidarities.Another reasonwould be that we areconstantlycoercedinto forms of 'communication'.This means that we aredeniedthe privilegeof havingnothing to say,of cultivatingthe particularkind of creativesolitudethat Deleuzevalues.It appearsthat we will incrcasinglylack a spacefor creative'resistance'. He suggeststhat the movc towarclscontinuous:lsscssmcnt in schoolsis bcing cxtendedto socictyirt gcncral,with thc cll'cctthat muchof lif'ctrrkcson thc tcxturc
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The critiqueof contemporarysocietiesthat the notion of controlsociety entailsmight in somewaysbe unexpectedin Deleuze'swork, giventhat it sometimeslooks like a conventionaldefenceof the individual threatened by the alienatingforcesof globalcapitalism.One might expectDeleuzeto be in favourof a movetowardssocietieswhich do awaywith the constraints of individuality.However,it is the preciseway in which control societies dismantlethe individual that alarms Deleuze.Rather than encouraging a real socialengagementwith the pre-personal,they turn the individual no capacityto 'fold' the line of modinto an objectthat hasno resistance, of what ulation.Although the Body without Organslacksthe discreteness we conventionallyknow asan individual that is not to sayit doesnot have resistance. On the contrary,it is a zoneof intensity.It may be traversedby forces,but it is not simply a relay for those forces. Connectives Body without Organs Fold Foucault Intensity
CONTROL SOCIETY + STATE THEORY Kenneth Surin says In his shortbut prescientessay'Postscript on ControlSocieties'Deleuze (as the disciplinary sociof control opposedto that in the ageof the societies etiesof the previousepochfamouslyanalysedby Michel Foucault),capital hasbecomea vast'internationalecumenicalorganisation'that is ableto hareventhe most disparateforms moniseinto a singleoverarchingassemblage (commercial,religious,artistic,and so forth) and entities.In this new dispensation,productivelabour,dominatednow by the myriad forms of intellectuallabourandserviceprovision,hasexpandedto covereverysegmentof society:the exponentiallyextendedscopeof capitalis coterminouswith the Human conconstantavailabilityof everythingthat createssurplus-value. sciousness, leisure,play,andsoon, areno longerleft to'private' domainsbut The by the latestregimesof accumulation. areinsteaddirectlyencompassed boundarybetweenhome and workplacebecomesincreasinglyblurred, as doesthe demrrcationbetween'regular'work and'casual'labour.Capitalism teloshx cvcnasit bccomcsubiquitous.()apitalism's bccomcsinfilrmrrliscd, of irnccon
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STATE
with the State,and in its current phasethis teloshasbecomemore palpably visible.WhereDeleuzeis concerned,this development doesnot requirethe Stateandits appurtenances to beabolished. Rather,thetraditionalseparation betweenStateandsocietyis nowno longersustainable. SocietyandStatenow form one all-embracing matrix, in which all capitalhasbecometranslatable into socialcapital,and so the productionof socialcooperation,undertaken primarily by the serviceand informationalindustriesin the advanced economies,hasbecomea crucial one for capitalism. This needto maintainconstantcontrol overthe forms of socialcooperation in turn requiresthat education,training, business,never end: the businesstime-scaleis now '2+/7'so that the Tokyo stockexchangeopens when the one in New York closes,in an unendingcycle;training is'on the job' as opposedto being basedon the traditional apprenticeshipmodel (itself a holdover from feudalism); and education becomes'continuing education', that is, something that continues throughout life, and is not confined to those aged six to twenry-rwo. This essentially dispersive propensity is reflected in the present regime of capitalist accumulation, whereproduction is now meta-production,that is, no longer focusedin the advancedeconomieson the useof raw materialsto producefinished goods, but rather the sale of services(especiallyin the domain of finance and credit) and already finished products. Social control is no longer left to schoolsand police forces,but is now a branch of marketing, asevenpolitics hasbecome'retail politics', in which politicians seekdesperatelyfor an imageof themselvesto market to the electorate,and when public relations consultants are more important to prime ministers and presidentsthan goodand wisecivil servants.Recording,whetherin administration or business,is no longer basedon the written document kept in the appropriate box of files, but on bar-codingand other forms of electronictagging. The implicationsof the above-mentioned developments for statetheory are momentous. The state itself has become fragmented and compartmentalised,and has accruedmore power to itself in somesphereswhile totally relinquishingpowerin others.However,if the Statehasmutatedin the era of control societies,it retainsthe function of regulating,in conjunction with capital,the 'accords'thatchannelsocialand politicalpower. In his book on Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz, Deleuzemaintainsthat stateand non-stateformationsare constitutedon the basisof such 'concerts' or 'accords'.These 'accords'are organisingprincipleswhich make possiblethe grouping into particular configurationsof whole rangesof events,personages, processes, institutions,movements)and so forth, such that the resultingconfigurationsbecomeintegratedformations.As a setof rtcc
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of accumulation,capital is situatedat the crossing-pointof all kinds of formations,and thus hasthe capacityto integrateand recomposecapitalist and non-capitalistsectorsor modesof production.Capital,the 'accord phenomena, can bring togetherheterogeneous of accords'par excellence, and makethem expressthe sameworld, that of capitalistaccumulation. Accordsareconstitutedby selectioncriteria,which specifywhat is to be includedor excludedby the termsof the accordin question.Thesecriteria also determinewith which other possibleor actual accordsa particular accord will be consonant(or dissonant).The criteria that constitute accordsare usually defined and describedby narratives governed by a certainnormativevision of truth, goodnessand beauty(reminiscentof the so-calledmediaevaltranscendentals,albeit translatedwhere necessary into the appropriatecontemporary vernacular).A lessportentous way of making this point would be to say that accordsare inherently axiological, value-laden.What seemsto be happening today, and this is a generalisation that is tendentious, is that these superimposednarratives and the selectioncriteria they sanction,criteria which may or may not be explicitly formulated or entertained, are being weakenedor qualified in ways that deprive them of their force. Such selectioncriteria, policed by the State, tend to function by assigningprivileges of rank and order to the objects they subsume ('Le Pen is more French than Zidane', 'Turks are not Europeans',and so on), asthe lossor attenuationof the customaryforce of such accords makes dissonancesand contradictions difficult or even impossibleto resolve,and, correlatively,makesdivergenceseasierto affirm. Events, objects and personagescan now be assignedto severaldivergent and even incompossibleseries.The functioning of capital in the control societiesrequiresthat the Statebecomeinternally pluralised.
CREATIVE TRANSFORMATION Ad,rian Parr In developingthe idea of 'creative transformation' Deleuze draws on a variety of philosophicalsources.Initially in his work on Henri Bergson he picks up on the philosopher'sconceptof 'creativeevolution'and 'duration', revampingthesein Dffirence and,Repetitioninto a discussionof the productiveunderstandingof repetition,all the while embracinga concept of differencethat beliesthe negativestructureof a 'differenceto or from' in favourof 'differencein itself'. Keen to expandupon the generativeand dynamicimplicationsof Bergsoniancreativeevolutionhe turns to Baruch Spinoza'sEthic's,in particularthe conceptionof bodiesthat Bergsonand
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Spinozashare:a body is constitutedon an immanent plane. The next philosophicalinfluencein Deleuze'suseof creativetransformationwould haveto be Friedrich Nietzsche'sconceptof the 'eternalreturn'. Then, in his collaborationwith Guattari, creative transformation takes a turn through biophilosophy,bypassingboth the human condition and teleological theoriesof evolution characteristicof Jean-BaptisteLamarck in favourof a transhumantheoryof heredity. The questionof 'life', namelythe force that persistsover time and the changesthat ensue,is addressedby Deleuzeasan experimental,spontaneous, and open processof transformation. As it was articulated in Dffirence and Repetitiozl, evolutionis construedasa processof repetition that is inherently creative:it is productiveof difference.In the handsof Deleuze(remember,like Michel Foucault,conceptsaretools for Deleuze), creativetransformationbecomesa systemof involutionwheretransversal movementsengagematerialforcesand affects. In both his 1956 essayon Bergson and his 1966 book Bergsontsm (D 1988a)Deleuzeutilisesthe idea of 'evolution'proposedby Bergsonin terms of transmission.Expandingon this a little more,Deleuzeshiftsthe focusof inheritanceawayfrom determinationandthe continuance of a fixed to bring essence that is passedon overtime.Like Bergson,Deleuzechooses to our attentionthe creativedimensioninherentin evolution.It is the force of life that persists,thus,through change,the vitality of life and difference are affirmed.Accordingto this schemacreativetransformationis immanent, taking placeon a planeof consistencythat precedesunivocalBeing. In BergsonDeleuzefindsthe possibilityfor a philosophythat graspslife in termsof durationandthe inhuman.The temporalityof durationis not conceivedof chronologically,wherebythe end of onemomentmarksthe beginning of the next; nor is it a measurabletime, that is broken down into seconds,minutes,hours,days,months,or years.Put differently,Deleuzian durationneedsto be construedasthe flow of time; it is intensiveasmuchas it is creativein so far as it is the movementof time that marks the force of life. Hence,durationmaintainslife in an openstateof indeterminacy. The theory of creativeinheritanceand the emphasisplacedon nonorganiclife is then given a makeoverand turned into the conceptof the 'rhizome' in his collaboration with Guattari. Early on in A Thousand, PlateausDeleuze and Guattaricharacterise a rhizomeasindeterminateand interpretexperimental.Steeringthe emphasisawayfrom representational ative frameworks,they clearly state that a rhizome is a map not a trace. Explaining this distinction they write that what 'distinguishesthe map from thc tracingis that it is entirelyorientedtowardan experimentationin contlrctwith thc rcal' (D&G 1987:12).'l'hc rhizomcis conccivcclof asan o;rcnnrultiplicity,rrndrrlllifb is r rlrizonrlticnrrxlco1'clungcwithoutfirm
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and fixed boundariesthat proceeds'from the middle, through the middle, comingand goingratherthan startingand finishing'(D&G 1987:25).It is, however,importantto notethat their useof 'open' hereis not conceivedof negatively,which is to sayit is not the antithesisof being 'closed';rather, the machinic character of a rhizome arises out of the virtual and the dynamicboundariesthat constituteit. In A Thousand, Plateausthe force of life is describedby Deleuze and Guattari asinherently innovative and social.Inheritance is not articulated within an essentialistframeworkthat placesthe emphasison species,genes andorganisms,because Deleuzeand Guattarirecognisethat it is the power of affect that is creative- to produce affectsand being open to being affected.Here creativity is taken to be a machinic mode of evolution that is productivein and of itself. The whole question of transformationis clearlysituatedby both Deleuzeand Guattari in an experimentalmilieu and the creativityof this milieu is necessarily social. Connectives Bergson Difference Representation Spinoza
CRYSTAL Felicitjt J. Colm.an The multifacetednatureof a geologicallyproducedcrystalform fascinated Deleuze.Initially he co-joinsexistingscientificand artisticconceptionsof the formal properties and concepts of a crystal to work through the Platonic conceptionof a real image and its counterpoint:virtual image. The crystalthen becomesa conceptthat Deleuzemethodologicallyusesin his considerationof thought, time and differencesin becoming.The conceptof the 'crystal' is engagedby Deleuzein his book Cinerna2: The Time-Image asthe'crystallinesign'or'hyalosign',the'crystal-image',and the 'crystallinestate'.Thesevaryingconceptsareenmeshedwith the idea that the figure of the crystal is representativeof specificstatesof temporality, as discerned through images.The crystal is configured through Deleuze'samalgamationof writers, philosophersand filmmakerswhose workscrcatcdfigurcsof time-spacc.T'hescincludeHenri Bcrgson'svitalism; Mauricc Mcrlclu-Ponty'scxpcrimcntswith thc lrticulirtionof' thc
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perceptionof things; Friedrich Niezsche's suspicionof linguistic phenomenology; Gaston Bachelard'sstudy of reciprocal, affective imagery; and Alain Robbe-Grillet and Alain Resnais'play with socialfolds of time, contextand form. Deleuzedescribesa crystallinestructureas a processand placeof the 'exchange'thatis enactedbetweenthe actualand virtual (D 1989:69).This processis from Bergson'sconceptof'reflective perception',describedin his 1896bookMatter and.Memory (B 1994:105)that Deleuzereworksin his second book on cinema: The Time-Irnage(D 1989: 289). Deleuze describesthat the exchangestructureof virtual-actualrelationsmeansthat the crystal-image is an amalgamatedform of virtual and actual in its various stagestoward infinity. In The Time-Image,where examplesof the crystal-imageand the conceptof 'crystallinenarration' are discussedat length, Deleuzeequatesthe crystallinestructureof the cinemawith the nature of its self-reflexivity and the temporal medium. A crystal-image involves a multilayered and infinite register of montaged 'realities'. As Deleuzedescribesit, cinema'stechniqueof acknowledgement and experimentationwith the crystal-image's medium achieves divergentmodalities of the image. Dependent upon the component layers of time-space montage,the resultant crystal-imagein turn producesan external representationof an imageof thought.The crystalis thusa philosophicalmechanism that is illustrative of concept production, and in relation to the image,the crystalconceptis the productionand apprehensionof time. In TheTime-Image,Deleuze describesa threefoldsystemfor the crystal's variationsof past-present-futuretime. This systemis from St Augustine's understandingof temporalrelations,and Deleuzeutilisesit to describean image'sconfigurationof a memory,or recollectionof an event.Together with the Bergsonianconceptof time as a 'thought-image',Augustine's system enablesDeleuze to discuss the crystal-image as a modality of knowing time and its possibleconstitution. Over time, the effectsof time alter the molecularstructureof things (includingcinematicinformation), and the crystal-imageis employedby Deleuzeto encompass vastshifts in meaningcausedthrough the exchangesbetweenpast, presentand future images,in their variousstatesof virtual and real.Through thesethree variationsof the crystal-image, Deleuzedescribesthe cognitiveand physical apprehension of time asperceptual'affectation'and 'modification'. Configuringthe crystalasa temporalconceptwith affectiveproperties enablesDeleuze to addressthe associatedimplications for relationships generatedby movement,time, memory, perception and affect - each within a particular circuit of meaning,medium or surround. Deleuze's 'crystal' sccks to dcscribc a cognitivc processwhcrcby the temporal rcgistrltiono1'fhcmovcnrcrrts irnd firrnrsof lffcct lrc cxprcsscd, and put
D EATH
6T
into effect. Affection may not be instantaneous;affectiveexperiencesmay be delayedin their consciousor corporeal acknowledgement,perception and utilisation. The crystal'sspecificstatesof formation, mutation and of time. transformationarethus effectsof differentprocesses Connectives Actuality Affect Bergson Time-image Virtual/Virtuality
DEATH Bruce Baugh Death is many things: a state of affairs,when a body's parts, through external causes,enter into a relation that is incompatiblewith that body's continued existence;an impersonal event of dying, expressedthrough an infinitive verb (mourir,to die); the experienceof zero 'intensity' that is implicit in a body's feelingor experienceof an increaseor decreasein its forceof existence;a 'model' of immobility and of energythat is not organisedand put to work; and finally the 'deathinstinct', capitalism'sdestruction of surplusvaluethrough war,unempleyment,famineand disease. the sinA body existswhen its parts composea relationthat expresses gular forceof existenceor 'essence'of that body,and ceases to be when its parts are determined by outside causesto enter into a relation that is incompatiblewith its own. Death in this sensealwayscomesfrom outside and deterand assuchis both fortuitousand inevitable:it is the necessary mined resultof a body'schanceencounterswith otherbodies,governedby purely mechanicallawsof causeand effect.Sinceeverybody interactswith other bodies,it is inevitablethat at somepoint it will encounterbodiesthat 'decompose'the vital relation of its parts,and causethoseparts to enter into new relations,characteristicof other bodies. Dcath, as thc dccompositionof a body's characteristicrclation, forms thc brrsis of thc pcrsonal:rndprcscntclcathof thc Sclf or cgo.'lir thisclcath,
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asfoundedin the personalself and the body,Deleuzecontraststhe 'event' of dying, which is impersonaland incorporeal,expressedin the infinitive verb 'to die' and in the predicatemortal. Dying is not a processthat takes placein things,nor is 'mortal' a quality that inheresin things or subjects. Rather,the verb and the predicateexpressmeaningsthat extendover the past and future, but which are never physicallypresentin bodies and or actualises this dying. things,eventhoughthe deathof a body effectuates or finishesdying.The In impersonaldying,'one'dies,but oneneverceases to die and is actuallydead:when deathof the Self or 'I' is when it ceases or powerof existenceis its vital relationsaredecomposed, and its essence instant, impersonal dying makes reducedto zerointensity.Yet,at this very deathloseitself in itself,asthe decompositionof one living body is simultaneouslythe compositionof a new singularlife, the subsumptionof the deadbody'sparts under a new relation. bodiesexperienceincreases or diminutionsof their During its existence, poweror forceof existing.Other bodiescancombinewith a body either in a way that agreeswith the body's constitutiverelation,that resultsin an increasein the body'spowerfelt asjoy,or in a waythat is incompatiblewith Poweris that relation,resultingin a diminution of power felt as sadness. physicalenergy,a degreeof intensity,so that everyincreaseor decrease in poweris an increaseor decrease in intensity.When the body dies,and the Self or the egowith it, they are returnedto the zero intensityfrom which existenceemerges.Every transitionfrom a greaterto a lesserintensity,or from a lesserto a greater,involvesand envelopsthe zero intensity with Death its powerasincreasingor decreasing. respectto which it experiences is thus felt in everyfeeling,experienced'in life and for life'. It is in that sensethat the life instincts and appetitesarise from the emptinessor zero intensity of death. The 'model' of zero intensity is thus the Body without Organs(BwO), the body that is not organisedinto organswith specificfunctions performing specifictasks,the energy of which is not put to work, but is availablefor investment,what Deleuze calls death in its speculativeform (taking 'speculative'in the senseof financialspeculation).Sincethe BwO doesnot perform any labour,it is immobile and catatonic.ln TheLogicof Sense,the catatonicBwO arises from within the depthsof the instincts,asa deathinstinct, an emptiness disguisedby everyappetite.In Anti-Oedipus,Deleuzeretainshis definienergyavailablefor investment, tion of the deathinstinct asdesexualised and as the source of the destructivenessof drives and instincts, but arguesthat ratherthan a principle,the deathinstinctis a productof the sociallyclctcrmincclrclationsof procluctionin thc capitalistsystcm. | )crrtlrbccomcsrn instinct,a cliflirscdirndimnrirncntttnction of thc c:rpot'llrc surplusvirltrc crr;ritrrlisrrt's itbsorptiorr itrrlistsystcrrr. spccilicirlly,
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it producesthrough anti-production or the production of lack, such as war, unemployment,and the selectionof certain populationsfor starvation and disease.The death instinct is thus historical and political, not natural. Connectives Body Body without Organs
- referto theentrieson'becoming* DERRIDA, JACqUES (1930-2004) and'virtual/virtuality'. cinema','nonbeing'
- referto theentrieson 'arborescent DESCARTES, RENf (1596-1650) tplanet,'Spinozat tcogito','Hume',timmanence', and'thought'. schemat,
DESIRE Alison Ross 'Desire' is one of the central terms in Deleuze'sphilosophicallexicon. In his work with Guattari, Deleuzedevelopsa definition of desireaspositive and productive that supports the conception of life as material flows.In eachof the featuresusedto definethis conceptionof desire,an alternativeconception of desire as premised on 'lack' or regulated by 'law' is contested.The psychoanalyticconceptionof desire as an insatiable lack regulatedby Oedipal law is one of the main inaccuraciesof desire that Deleuze tries to correct. Instead of desire being externally organisedin relation to prohibitions that give it a constitutiverelation to 'lack', for Deleuzedesireis definedasa processof experimentationon a plane of immanence.Added to this conceptionof desireas productive, is the conceptionof desireaspositive.Whereasin psychoanalytictheory desireis locatedwithin the individual as an impotent force,the positive and productive dimension Deleuze ascribesto desire makesit a social Thus rcinterpretcd,desireis vicwcdnot iust as an cxperimental, flrrrcc. procluctivcfirrcc, but also as :r f
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used to distinguish the experimentationof desire from any variant of naturalism; and Deleuze defines desire accordingly in his work with Guattari as assembledor machined. This conception of desire works across a number of themes in Deleuze's writing with Guattari. Productive and positive desire works in their writing as an operative vocabularythrough which they explain fascismin politics as the desire for the repressionof desire,and they advancea new ethics of'schizoanalysis' whose task is the differentiation between active and reactive desires, all the while explaining simple activities such as sleeping walking or writing as desires. Desire is alsoa crucial elementin Deleuze'scritique of philosophical dualism.Such dualism,whetherin ImmanuelKant or psychoanalysis, is ableto submit desireto a iuridical systemof regulationpreciselybecause it first distinguishes the domain of existencefrom those transcendent valuesthat arrangeit in relation to ordering principles.In the caseof psychoanalysis this exerciseof transcendentregulationerroneouslycontainsdesireto the field of the subject'ssexualityandturns it into a problem of interpretation.Against psychoanalysis, Deleuzetries to de-sexualise and de-individualisedesire.Sexualityis one flow that entersinto coniunction with others in an assemblage.It is not a privileged infrastructure within desiringassemblages, nor an energyableto be transformed,or sublimatedinto other flows(D 1993b:140). Deleuzeis particularlycriticalof thealliancebetweendesire-pleasure-lack in which desireis misunderstood aseitheran insatiable internallack,or asa processwhosegoalis dissolutionin pleasure.Whetherdesireis relatedto the law of lack or the norm of pleasureit is misunderstoodasregulatedby lack or discharge. Againstthis allianceDeleuzedescribes desireasthe construction of a planeof immanence in which desireis continuous. Insteadof a regulationof desireby pleasureor lackin whichdesireis extractedfrom its plane of immanence, desireis a processin which anythingis permissible. Desireis accordinglydistinguishedfrom that which 'would come and break up the integralprocessof desire'(D 1993b:140).This integralprocessis described inA Thousand, Plateaus asthe constructionof assemblages. The term, which is developed in response to the subjectivistmisinterpretation of the desiringmachinesof Anti-Oedipus,underlinesthe view that desireis experimental and relatedto an outside.It is this relationto an outsidethat underpinsthe social dimension given to desire in Deleuze'sthought. Understood as an assemblage, desire in Deleuze'svocabularyis irreducible to a distinction between naturalism/artificeor spontaneity/law.For this reason when Deleuzearguesagainstthe dualismthat prohibitsor intcrruptsdesircfrom thc cxtcrnd pointsof lackrlr plcirsurc, hc alsomakcsasccsis an important conditiorrfilr thc proccsscs thirtc
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Connectives Immanence Kant Lacan Oedipalisation Psychoanalysis Schizoanalysis
DESIRE + SOCIAL-PRODUCTION EugeneHolland, Schizoanalysis usesthe pivotalterm 'desiring-production',in tandemwith to link SigmundFreud and Karl Marx: the term con'social-production', joinslibido andlabour-powerasdistinctinstances of production-in-general. of economic Justasbourgeoispoliticaleconomydiscoveredthat the essence value doesnot inhere in objectsbut is investedin them by subjectiveactivity in the form of labour-power,bourgeoispsychiatry discoveredthat the essence of eroticvaluedoesnot inherein objectsbut is investedin them by subjectiveactivityin the form of libidinal cathexis.Schizoanalysis addsthe discoverythat labour-powerand libido arein essence two sidesof the same coin,eventhoughthey areseparated by capitalismin its historicallyunique segregation ofreproductionfrom productionat largevia the privatisationof reproduction in the nuclearfamily. The conceptof desiring-productionpreventsdesirefrom beingunderstoodin terms of 'lack' (asit hasbeenin westernmetaphysicsfrom Plato to Freud): desiring-productionactually produces what we take to be reality (in the sensethat a lawyerproducesevidence)through the investment of psychicalenergy (libido), just associal-productionproduceswhat we take to be reality through the investmentof corporeal energy (labourpower).Desireis thus not a fantasyof what we lack:it is first and foremost the psychicaland corporealproduction of what we want - eventhough under certainconditionswhat we want subsequentlygetstakenawayfrom us by the repressivefigure of a castratingfatheror the oppressivefigureof an exploitativeboss(amongothers).By restoringthe link betweendesiring-production and social-production,schizoanalysisdeprives psychoanalysisof its excusefor and justification of repression;that psychic repressionis somehowautonomousfrom social oppression,and exists independentof socialconditions.Schizoanalysis insistson thc contrary thrt 'sucill-productionis purcly nnd simply dcsiring-prrrcluction itsclf
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under determinateconditions'(D&G 1983:29),and that psychicrepression therefore derives from social oppression: transform those social conditions,and you transformthe degreeand form of psychicrepression aswell. There are two basicforms of desiring-production:schizophrenia,the free form of desire promoted half-heartedly by capitalism and wholeheartedlyby schizoanalysis; and paranoia,the fixed form of desiresubjected to socially-authorised belief (in God, the father, the boss, the teacher,theleader,and soon). There arethreemodesof social-production, eachof which oppresses,/represses desiring-productionin a specificway. Of the three,capitalismis the mostpromising,because it at leastis ambivalent: it activelyfostersboth forms of desiring-production,whereasits predecessors alwaysdid their utmost to crush the one in favourof the other. Capitalism frees desiring-productionfrom capture and repressionby codes and representations,while at the same time it recapturesand represses desiring-productionin mostly temporarycodesand representations,but alsoin the moreenduringforms of State-sponsored nationalism, the Oedipuscomplexand the nuclearfamily. It is becauseschizoanalysis insiststhat social-productionalwaysprovidesthe determinateconditionsunder which desiring-productiontakes shapethat it can hold the mode of social-productionresponsiblefor that shape;that is, schizoanalysis evaluates a modeof social-production according to the form of desiring-productionit makespossible.The valueof capitalism as a mode of social-productionis not only the extraordinary materialproductivity so admiredby Marx, but evenmore its propensity for generatingschizophreniaas the radically free form of desiringproduction.And the correspondingchallengeto schizoanalysis asa revolutionarypsychiatryis to eliminatethe countervailingforcesthat recapture free desire and subject it to paranoiaand belief, forcesoperating in institutions ranging from the nuclearfamily and Oedipal psychoanalysis, to the bureaucracyof private enterprise,all the way up to and including the State.
DETERRITORIALISATION
/ RETERRITORIALISATION
Adrian Parr There are a variety of ways in which Deleuze and Guattari describe thc proccss
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(D&G 1987:88).In their book on the novelistFranzKafka, they describe a Kafkaesqueliterary deterritorialisationthat mutates content, forcing enunciationsand expressionsto 'disarticulate'(D&G 1986:86). In their -Deleuze and Guattari posit that final collaboration- What isPhilosophy? deterritorialisationcan be physical,mental or spiritual (D&G 1994:68). Given this seemingly broad spectrum of descriptions two questions emerge.First, how doesthe processof deterritorialisationwork?Second, how is deterritorialisationconnected to reterritorialisation?Perhaps deterritorialisationcan best be understood as a movement producing change.In so far as it operatesas a line of flight, deterritorialisation indicatesthe creativepotential of an assemblage. So, to deterritorialiseis to free up the fixed relationsthat contain a body all the while exposingit to new organisations. It is important to rememberthat Deleuze,as well as Guattari, is concerned with overcomingthe dualistic frameworkunderpinning western philosophy(Being/nonbeing,original/copyand soon). In this regard,the relationshipdeterritorialisationhasto reterritorialisationmust not be construednegatively;it is not the polar oppositeof territorialisationor reterritorialisation(when a territory is establishedonce more). In fact, in the way that Deleuzeand Guattari describeand usethe concept,deterritorialisationinheresin a territory asits transformativevector;hence,it is tied to the very possibilityof changeimmanentto a giventerritory. Qralitatively speakingthere are two different deterritorialisingmovements:absoluteand relative.Philosophyis an exampleof absolutedeterritorialisationand capital is an exampleof relative deterritorialisation. Absolutedeterritorialisationis a way of moving and assuchit hasnothing to do with how fast or slow deterritorialisingmovementsare; such movementsare immanent, differentiatedand ontologicallyprior to the movementsof relative deterritorialisation.Relative deterritorialisation movestowardsfixity and as such it occursnot on a molecularbut molar plane as an actual movement.Put succinctly,absolutedeterritorialising movementsare virtual, moving through relativedeterritorialisingmovementsthat areactual. There are severaldifferent theoretical contexts Deleuze and Guattari discussandusedeterritorialisationin. Theseinclude:art, music,literature, philosophyand politics.For instance,in the westernvisualarts,facesand landscapesare deterritorialised.Meanwhile in philosophy,thought is deterritorialisedby all that is outsideof thought.In this regard,it is not the questionthat is deterritorialisingbut the problem,becausethe question sccksan answcr,whcreasthe problcm positsall that is unrccognisable or 'l'hcy suggcsttlrlt whirt is dctcrriturialisccl unknowrrblc. irr music rrrc frtrnrrrrr voiccsirnd thc rcli'nirr(ritournrllt).A hclplirlcxirrrrplc hcrc would
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be the composerOlivier Messiaenwho, from around 1955on, usedbirdsongin his compositions.[n theseworkshe did not iust imitate the songs of birds; rather he brought birdsong into relation with the piano in a mannerthat transformedthe territory of the musicalinstrument (piano) and the birdsongitself Here the distinctiverone, timbre and tempo of birdsongswere fundamentallychangedthe moment theseelementsconnected with musical organisation.Similarly Messiaen'scompositional style alsochangedwhen it enteredinto a relationwith birdsong,whereby thesecompositionscould be describedin rermsof a becoming-bird. Yet asthe bird singsits songis it simply beingrerritorial?Here we may considerthe way in which the bird refrainis a territorial sign.Deleuzeand. Guattari usethe biologicalunderstandingof 'territoriality' asdiscussedin the studiesof birds conductedduring the earlyto mid-twentiethcentury; however,they push this work in a different direction. Bernard Altum, Henry Eliot Howard and Konrad Lorenz all suggested malebirds aggressively defenda particular territory as a way of sociallyorganisingthemselves.These studies of bird activiry undersrood territoriality as a biological drive pitched towards the preservationof species.Instead, Deleuzeand Guattari addressterritoriality from the position of what is produced by the biologicalfunction of mating hunting, earing and so forth, arguing that territoriality actually organisesthe functions. The problemthey havewith Lorenz, for example,is that he makes,aggressivenessthe basisof the territory'(D&G 1987:315).They claim functions, suchasmating,areorganised'because they areterritorialised'(D&G 1987: 3 I 6). In this wag they usethe undersrandingof territory advancedby the ethologistJakobvon Uexkiill, to help shift the focusawayfrom a mechanistic understandingof life onto an expressive one. Von Uexkiill proposed thar there is no meaning outside of a milieu (Umweh).For him a 'territory' refers to a specificmilieu that cannotbe separatedfrom the living thing occupyingand creatingthe milieu, so that the meaningof a milieu for Von Uexkiill is affective.This is important when we cometo considerthe supposedslippagebetweendeterritorialisation and decodingthat happensin Anti-Oedipusbutnot in A Thousand, Plateaus.To decode,in the waythat Deleuzeand Guattariintend it, means to strike out at the selfsamecodesthat producerigid meaningsasopposed to translatingmeaning.Rather than understandingdeterritorialisationas destabilisingthat which produces meaning, in A ThousandPlateaus Deleuzeand Guattariregardit asa transversalprocessthat definesthe creativity of an assemblage: a nonlinearand nonfiliativesystemof relations. Apart from biologythc tcrm'tcrritk Piltrfuutlutlltsc 'f crrilrrrirtf tt 'l'rtnstttrytlit(.llcra.
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it wasthe French psychoanalyst JacquesLacan who influencedGuattari. For Lacan, 'territorialisation'refers to the way in which the body of an infant is organisedaround and determined by erogenouszones and the connectionsit forms with part-objects.This organisationalprocessis one of libidinal investment.As the infant undergoesa processof territorialisationits orificesand organsareconjugated.In the psychoanalyticsense, to deterritorialiseis to free desirefrom libidinal investment.This freeing up of desire includes setting desire free from Oedipal investment (desire-as-lack). Accordingly,the upshotof Deleuzeand Guattari'sreconfiguration of Lacanian'territorialisation'is that the subjectis exposedto new organisations;the principal insight being: deterritorialisationshatters the subject. antecedents for the In additionto the bioethologicaland psychoanalytic concepts of deterritorialisationand reterritorialisation,Deleuze and Guattari extend a political use to them. Leaning upon Karl Marx, they posit that labour-poweris deterritorialisedthe momentit is freedfrom the meansof production. That selfsamelabour-powercan be describedas beingreterritorialisedwhen it is then connectedto anothermeansof production. Eugene Holland explains, when the English Enclosure Acts (1709-1869)enclosedcommon land for purposesof sheep-grazing,the peasants wereconcomitantlybanished(or 'freed') from one meansof production only to havetheir labour-powerreterritorialisedonto other means of production, such as when they becamefactory workers in the textile industry (H 1999: 19-20). During the early phasesof industrialisation when capitalismwas really gaining momentum, a systemof deterritorialising flows prevailed:markets were expanding,social activities were undergoingradicalchanges,and populationsmoved from rural to urban environments.In one sense rural labour-power was deterritorialised (peasantand landowner) but in another senseit was reterritorialised (factory worker and industrial capitalist).Commenting on capitalism, Deleuzeand Guattari insistthat deterritorialisedflowsof codearereterritorialisedinto the axiomaticof capitalismand it is this connectionbetween the two processes that constitutesthe capitalistsocialmachine. Connectives Becoming Lacan Lines of flight Nomadicism PirrtirlObjcct Ithizonrc
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POLITICS
DETERRITORIALISATION + POLITICS Paul Patton The concept of deterritorialisationlies at the heart of Deleuze and Guattari'smaturepoliticalphilosophy.Processes of deterritorialisationare the movementswhich definea givenassemblage sincethey determinethe presenceandthe qualityof 'linesof flight' (D&G 1987:508).Lines of flight in turn define the form of creativity specific to that assemblage,the particular waysin which it can effect transformation in other assemblages or in itself (D&G 1987:531).From the point of view of socialor political change,everythinghingeson the kinds of deterritorialisationpresent. Deleuzeand Guattari define deterritorialisationas the movementby which somethingescapesor departsfrom a given territory (D&G 1987: 508).The processes of territory formation, deterritorialisationand reterritorialisationare inextricablyentangledin any given social field: 'The merchantbuys in a territory,deterritorialisesproductsinto commodities, and is reterritorialised on commercial circuits' (D&G 1994: 68). Deterritorialisationis alwaysa complexprocessinvolvingat leasta deterritorialisingelementand a territory which is being left behind or reconstituted. Karl Marx's account of primitive accumulation in Capital illustratesthe operationof'vectors of deterritorialisation'in a socialand economicterritory: the developmentof commodity marketsdeterritorialisesthe socio-economicterritory of feudal agricultureand leadsto the emergenceof large-scale commercialproduction. Deterritorialisationis alwaysbound up with correlativeprocessesof reterritorialisation,which doesnot mean returning to the original territory but rather the ways in which deterritorialisedelementsrecombine and enter into new relations. Reterritorialisationis itself a complex processwhich takesdifferent forms dependingupon the characterof the processesof deterritorialisationwithin which it occurs. Deleuze and Guattari distinguishbetweenthe 'connection'of deterritorialisedflows. which refersto the waysin which distinct deterritorialisations can interact to accelerate one another,and the 'conjugation'of distinct flowswhich refers to the ways in which one may incorporateor 'overcode'another thereby effectinga relativeblockageof its movemenr(D&G 1987:220). Marx's accountof primitive accumulationshowshow the conjugationof the streamof displacedlabour with the flow of deterritorialisedmoney capital provided the conditions under which capitalist industry could dcvelop.In this casc,thc reterritorialisationof thc flows of capital and hbour lclclst
D IA GR A M
7l
When Deleuzeand Guattari suggestthat societiesare definedby their lines of flight or by their deterritorialisation,they meanthat fundamental socialchangehappensall the time, evenasthe societyreproducesitself on other levels.Sometimeschangeoccurs by degrees,as with the steady erosionof myths aboutsexualdifferenceand its role in socialand political institutions. Sometimes,changeoccurs through the eruption of events which breakwith the pastand inauguratea new field of social,politicalor legal possibilities.The rioting of May 1968 was an event of this kind, 'a becomingbreakingthroughinto history' (D 1995:153).Other examples include the suddencollapseof EasternEuropeancommunismor the dismantling of apartheidin South Africa. These are all turning points in history after which somethings will neverbe the sameasbefore.The key question,however,is not whetherchangeis slowor suddenbut whetheror not it is animatedby a positiveforceof absolutedeterritorialisation. Deleuzeand Guattaridistinguishfour typesof deterritorialisationalong the twin axesof absoluteand relative,positiveand negative(D&G 1987: 508-10).Deterritorialisationis relativein so far asit concernsonly movements within the actual order of things. Relativedeterritorialisationis negatiyewhen the deterritorialisedelementis immediatelysubjectedto forms of reterritorialisationwhich encloseor obstructits line of flight. It is positivewhenthe line of flight prevailsoversecondaryreterritorialisations, eventhoughit may still fail to connectwith otherdeterritorialisedelements Deterritorialisationis absolutein so far as or enter into a new assemblage. it concernsthe virtual orderof things,the stateof 'unformedmatteron the planeof consistency'(D&G 1987:55-6). Absolutedeterritorialisationis not a further stagethat comesafter relativedeterritorialisationbut rather its internal dynamic, since there is 'a perpetualimmanenceof absolute deterritorialisationwithin relative deterritorialisation'(D&G 1987:56). The differencebetweenpositiveand negativeforms of absolutedeterritorialisation correspondsto the differencebetweenthe connection and the conjugationof deterritorialisedflows.Absolutedeterritorialisationis positive when it leadsto the creationof a new earth and new people:'when it connectslinesof flight, raisesthem to the powerof an abstractvital line or drawsa planeof consistency'(D&G 1987:510).Sincereal transformation requiresthe recombinationof deterritorialisedelementsin mutually supportiveways,socialor politicalprocesses aretruly revolutionaryonly when of connectionratherthan conjugation. they involveassemblages
DIAGRAM - rcfcr to thc cntries on 'axiomatic'.'black hole'. 'fold'. * t'old','plirtciru','scntiotics'irncl'virtuitl/virturlity'. '[,'ouctrult
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DIF F ERENCE
DIFFERENCE CliffStagoll Deleuzeis often labelledas a 'philosopherof difference',an assessment that highlightsthe criticalplaceof 'difference'in his work. He is concerned to overturn the primacy accordedidentity and representationin western rationality by theorising differenceas it is experienced.In doing so, Deleuze challengestwo critical presuppositions:the privilege accorded Being and the representational model of thought. He considersboth to haveimportantand undesirablepolitical,aestheticandethicalimplications that a disruptionof traditionalphilosophycanhelp to surmount.Deleuze useshis notion of empiricaland non-conceptual'difference in itself in the serviceof sucha disruption. Differenceis usuallyunderstoodeither as'differencefrom the same'or differenceof the sameover time. In either case,it refers to a net variation betweentwo states.Sucha conceptionassumes that statesarecomparable, and that thereis at basea sameness againstwhich variationcanbe observed or deduced.As such, differencebecomesmerely a relative measureof sameness and, being the product of a comparison,it concernsexternal relationsbetweenthings. To think about such relationstypically means groupinglike with like, and then drawingdistinctionsberweenthe groups. Furthermore,overand abovesuchgroupingsmight be positeda uniztersal grouping, such as Being, a conceptionof presencethat alonemakesthe groups wholly consistentand meaningful.It is becauseGeorg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel drew a comprehensive and cohesiveworld of Being that madehim sucha significanttargetfor Deleuze'scritique. On such an account, difference is subordinatedto sameness,and becomesan objectof representationin relationto someidentity.As such, it is never conceivedin terms of 'difference-in-itself',the uniqueness implicit in the particularity of things and the momenrsof their conception and perception.Rather,differenceis understoodin terms of resemblance,identity, opposition and analogy,the kinds of relations used to determine groupings of things. Yet this rendencyto think in terms of samenessdetracts from the specificity of concreteexperience,instead simplifying phenomenaso that they might 'fit' within the dominant model of unity. Deleuze's'liberation' of differerrcefrom sucha model has two parts.First, he developsa conceptofdifferencethat doesnot rely on a relationshipwith sameness and,second,he challcngcs the philosophyof rcprcscntirti
D IFFER EN C E
1a
IJ
every asp€ctof reality evidencesdifference,and there is nothing 'behind' suchdifference;differenceis not groundedin anythingelse.Deleuzedoes not mean to refer, however,to differencesof degree,by which he means distinctionsamongstitemsthat areconsideredidenticalor in anysensethe same.Instead,he meansthe particularityor'singularity'of eachindividual thing, moment,perceptionor conception.Such differenceis internalto a thing or event,implicit in its beingthat particular.Evenif thingsmight be conceivedashavingsharedattributesallowingthem to be labelledasbeing of the samekind, Deleuze'sconceptionof differenceseeksto privilegethe individual differencesbetweenthem. Such individuality is, for Deleuze,the primary philosophicalfact, so that, rather than theorisinghow individualsmight be grouped,it is more importantto explorethe specificand uniquedevelopmentor'becoming'of eachindividual. The genealogyof an individual lies not in generalityor commonality,but in a processof individuationdeterminedby actualand specificdifferences,multitudinous influencesand chanceinteractions. Deleuze'sdifference-in-itselfreleasesdifferencefrom domination by Indeed, on this account,identity must alwaysbe identity and sameness. referredto the differenceinherentin the particularsbeing'sweptup'in the processof constructinga relationshipbetweenthem. To realisethis is to meetDeleuze'schallengeof developinga new perspectivein orderto resist However,to do so routinely is not easy.Only by destabilistranscendence. ing our thinking, disrupting our facultiesand freeing our sensesfrom tendenciesmight we uncoverthe differenceevidentin the lived established world, and realisethe uniquenessof eachmoment and thing. Deleuze'stheory of differencealso challengesthe traditional theory of representation,by which we tend to consider each individual as re-presenting('presentingagain')somethingas iust anotherinstanceof a categoryor original.On sucha view,differenceis somethingthat might be predicated of a concept, and so logically subordinated to it, whilst the conceptcan be applied to an infinite number of particular instances.To think in terms of difference-in-itselfmeansto set the conceptasideand of its producfocusinsteadon the singular,and the unique circumstances meansthat the notion of tion. Awarenessof such specificcircumstances some'thing in general'canbe setasidein favourof one'sexperienceof this thing, hereand now. Connectives Crcativetransformation T'ltcrnirlrcturn llcpctition
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DIFFERENCE + POLITICS Paul Patton Deleuze'sontologicalconceptionof a world of free differencessuggestsa defenceof the particularagainstall forms of universalisation or representation. Every time there is representation, he argues,there is an 'unrepresentedsingularity' which does not recogniseitself in the representant (D 1994:52).However,neither this critique of representationnor rhe onrologicalpriority of differenceestablishes a politics of difference.Identities presupposedifferencesand are inhabited by them, iust as differences inevitablypresuppose andareinhabitedby identities.A politicsof difference requiresthe specification of politicallyrelevantkindsof difference. Deleuze and Guattari's concept of minority and their support for minoritarian politics provides a novel understandingof the kind of differencewhich is relevantfor democraticpolitical change.They define minority in oppositionto majority,but insist that the differenceberween them is not quantitativesincesocialminoritiescanbe morenumerousthan the so-calledmajority.Both minority and majorityinvolvethe relationship of a group to the largercollectivityof which it is a part. Supposerhereare only two groups and supposethat there is a standardor ideal type of member of the larger collectivity: the majority is defined as the group which most closely approximatesthe standard,while the minority is defined by the gap which separatesits membersfrom that standard.In a socialcollectivity,majority cantakemany simultaneousforms: Let ussuppose thattheconstant or standard istheaverage adult-white-heterosexualEuropean-male speaking a standard language . . . It is obvious that'man'holdsthe majority, evenif heislessnumerous thanmosquitoes, children, women, peasblacks, ants,homosexuals, etc.That is because he appears twice,oncein the constantand againin thevariablefrom whichtheconstantis extracted. Majorityassumes a state of poweranddomination, nottheotherwayaround.(D&G 1987:105,cf.291) A liberal politics of differencewould simply defend the right of the minoritiesto be includedin the majority.In other words,it would seekto broadenthe standardsothat it becomesmaleor female- Europeanor nonEuropean- hetero or homosexualand so on. Social minorities are here conceivedas outcastsbut potentially able to be included among the majority.Deleuzeand Guattari insist upon the importanceof suchpiecemcll changcsto thc [
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levelof the axiomsis without importance;on the contrary,it is determining (at the most diverselevels:women)sstrugglefor the vote,for abortion, for jobs;the struggleof the regionsfor autonomy;the struggleof the Third World . . .'(D&G 1987:470-l). At the sametime, however,in order to draw attentionto the sensein which the reconfigurationof the majority is dependentupon a prior processof differentiation,they introducea third term in addition to the pair majority-minority,namely'becoming-minor' or 'minoritarian',by which they meanthe creativeprocessof becomingdifferent or diverging from the maiority. This processof becoming-minor,which subjectsthe standardto a processof continuousvariationor deterritorialisation(D&G 1987:106),is the real focus of Deleuze and Guattari's approach to the politics of difference.They do not denythe importanceof the installationof newconstantsor the attainmentof maiority status,but they stressthe importance of the minoritarian-becomingof everyone,including the recognised bearersof minority statuswithin a given maiority. They insist that the powerof minorities'is not measuredby their capacityto enter and make themselvesfelt within the majority system,nor evento reversethe necessarilytautologicalcriterion of the majority,but to bring to bearthe forceof the non-denumerablesets, however small they may be, against the denumerablesets. . .' (D&G 1987:471).By this they meanthat the limits of the potentialfor transformationarenot determinedby the normalising power of the majority but by the transformative potential of becomingThey do not mean to suggestthat minor, or becoming-revolutionary. produce effectsupon the majority. minoritiesdo not enter into and Their insistenceon the transformativepotentialof minoritarianbecomingsdoesnot imply a refusalof democraticpolitics.Thoseexcludedfrom the majority as definedby a given set of axioms,no lessthan thoseincluded within it, arethepotentialbearersof thepowerto transformthat set,whether in the directionof a new setof axiomsor an altogethernewaxiomatic(D&G 1987:471).Everyonemay attain the creativepowerof minority-becoming that carrieswith it the potentialfor new earthsand new peoples.
DIFFERENTIATION/DIFFERENCIATION Adrian Parr The conceptsof 'differentiation'and 'differenciation'are primarily elucidatcd by Dcleuzc in Bergsonism(D 1988a: 9G8) and Dffirence and (l) 1994:20tt-14)rnd the distinctionhe formsbetweenthe two Rcpctition is ln imporfiultinFrc(licntof'his dill'crcntialontrtkrgy.'ftr bcgin with hc
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appealsto the mathematicalconceptof differentiationin order to unlock his understandingof the Whole asa unified system,preferring insteadto think of openwholesthat continuallyproducenew directionsand connections. In effect, what are differentiated are intensitiesand heterogeneous qualities and this is what makesthe virtual real but not actual. In short, differentiationin the way Deleuzeintendsit happensonly in the virtual realm. Continually dividing and combining, differentiation can be likened to a zone of divergenceand as such it is fundamentally a creativemovement, or flow,that conditionsa wholein all its provisionalconsistency. Meanwhile,what is differenciatedis the heterogeneous seriesof virtual pointsout that differenciationis an differentiation.ln BergsonisrnDeleuze actualisationof the virtual. Actualisationcan be either conceptualor material such as an 'eye' which Deleuze describesin Dffirence and Repetition asa'differenciatedorgan'(D 1994:21l).The problemthis poses, given that Deleuze is not a representationalthinker, is how difference differenciates without itself turning into a systemof representation? That is to say,if differenciationis the processof actualisingthe virtual how does this avoidthe representational trap of similitude and identity?Why isn't differenciationsimilar to, or a version o( the virtual it differenciates? For Deleuze,the actualiseddifferencesof differenciationdo not enioy a privileged point of view over the differencesmaking up the flow of differentiation,nor is differenciationa processthat unifies heterogeneous qualities; rather it simply affirms these qualities and intensities without completelyhalting the flow in its tracks.The actualisationthat differenciationproducesis not'like'differentiation, as this would imply that the differentiationit is like is in itself a fixed subjectmore than an intensivesystemcontinually undergoingchange.Put simply, what this meansis that the processof differenciationis a questionof variationmore than identity and resemblance becauseDeleuzeprefersto think of it as a dynamicmovementthat bringsdifferencesinto relationwith oneanother. Overall,Deleuzeconsidersactualisationin termsof creativitll whereby the processdoesnot simply mark a changeinto what waspossiblein the first instance.To be truly creative,differenciationneedsto be understood assomethingnew insteadof somethingthat resembles virtuality.Carrying on from here he outlines that the virtual differenciatesitself; without this the virtual could not be actualisedbecausethere would be no lines of differenciationthat could enableactualisationto happen(D 1988a:97). Connectives Acturrlity Irrdivirlurrt ion
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Representation Virtual/Virtuality
DISJUNCTIVE SYNTHESIS Claire Colebrook At its most general,the disjunctivesynthesisis the production of a series of differences. The significanceof the conceptof disjunctionin Deleuze's work is threefold.First, whereasstructuralismconceivesdifferencenegatively,suchthat an undifferentiatedor formlessworld is then differentiated by a structure.Deleuzeregardsdifferencepositively,so disjunction is a mode of production.There is a potentialin life to produceseries:a desire can attachto this, or this or this; a vibration of light can be perceivedas this, or this, or this. Second,the differencesofdisjunction aretransversal. There is not one point or term (suchas consciousness or language)from which differencesare unfolded or connected;consciousnesscan connect with a language,a machine,a colour, a sound, a body, and this meansthat seriesmay traverseand connect different potentials.Sexual desire,for example,might leavethe seriesof body parts- breast,or mouth, or anus, or phallus - and invest different territories - the desire for sounds,for colour,for movements.Finally, disjunctionis not binary.Life should not be reducedto the miserablelogic of contradictionor excludedmiddle eitheryou wantliberalismor you don't; eitheryou'remaleor female;either you're for the war or for terrorism - for disjunction is open and plural: neitherliberalismnor terrorism,but a further extensionof the series. The conceptof synthesisis centralto both Dffirence andRepetitionand Anti-Oedipus. ln Dffirence and, Repetition Deleuze rewrites Immanuel Kant's three syntheses(from the Critique of Pure Reason).For Kant, our experiencedworld of time and spaceis possibleonly becausethere is a subject who experiencesand who connects (or synthesises)received impressionsinto a coherentorder. For Deleuze,by contrast,there is not a subject who synthesises.Rather, there are synthesesfrom which subjects are formed; thesesubjectsare not personsbut points of relativestability resultingfrom connection,what Deleuzerefersto as 'larval subjects'.In Anti-Oed,ipu.r Deleuze and Guattari expand the concept of the three synthesesinto political terms: association,disjunction and conjunction. Association is thc connection, not justof data(asin Kant'sphilosophy), but alsoof'bodicsor tcrmsinto somcmanifillclrlr cxpcricnccd thing,an'asscmblitgc'.l)isjunclion,llrc sccorrcl possibiliry syrrtlrcsis, is lhc subscr;ucnt ot'
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( DUR E E )
relationsbetweenor among such assembledpoints of relative stability, while conjunctionor the third synthesisis the referralof thesetermsto the ground or planeacrosswhich they range. The disjunctivesynthesisis important for two reasons.First, Deleuze (or waysof thinking aboutthe world) havelegitarguesthat all syntheses imate and illegitimateuses,or an immanent and transcendentemployment. Synthesesare immanent when we recognisethat there are not subjectswho synthesisethe world; there is not a transcendentor external point beyond the world from which synthesisemerges.Rather, there are (desires)from which pointsor terms areeffected. connections,syntheses, No point or term canbe setoutsidean eventof synthesisasits transcendent ground,sotherecanbe no transcendental subjectasthere synthesising wasfor Kant. Second,the subjectionof modernthought liesin the illegitimate use of the disjunctivesynthesis.From relationsor syntheses(passions,sympathies)among bodiescertain terms are formed, such as the mother,fatherand child of the modern family.We should,then,.seemalefemalerelationsor genderasa production,asa way in which bodieshave beensynthesised or assembled. One canbe maleor female. The Oedipuscomplexis the disjunctivesynthesisin its transcendent and illegitimateform: eitheryou identify with your fatherand becomea subject (thinking'man') 0r yottdesireyour mother and remainother than human. An immanentuseof the synthesiswould refusethisexclusioe disjunctionof 'one mustbe this or that, maleor female'.Insteadof insistingthat onemust line up beneaththe signifierof man or womanand submit to the systemof sexualdifference,Deleuzeand Guattariopenthe disjunctivesynthesis:one can be this or this or this, and this and,this and,this: neither mother nor fatherbut a becoming-girl,becoming-animal or becomingimperceptible. Connectives Becoming Desire Kant Oedipalisation
DURATTON(DURir) CliffStagoll I lcrrrillcrgsonintcrcstsl)clcuzcbccrtusc of'hisrrrdicrrl dcparturcfiom philrr )unrtion solrfty's rlrlltockrxy. | kcy iclcirs Qlurttt)is orrcol'scvclirlol' llcrgs
D U R ATIo N
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adoptedby Deleuzewhen developinghis philosophyof difference.Typical of Deleuze'susualapproachto Bergson,his interpretationand use of the conceptis at oncealmostentirelysympatheticbut strikinglyidiosyncratic. Accordingto Deleuze,one canonly comprehendthe notion of duration by using Bergson'smethod of philosophicalintuition (intuitionphilor ophique),a deliberatereflectiveawarenessor willed self-consciousness. (or, more generally,mental life) to be essenIntuition revealsconsciousness activity that constitutes,in its dynamism mental tially temporal; ongoing and the mutual interpenetrationof its states,a time internal to one'sself. anddurationis the immeMental life is, then,a kind of flowingexperience, diateawareness of this flow Bergsonbelievesthat intuition's findingsare bestexpressedin images, and soexplainsduration by usinganalogieswith music.Mental statesflow togetheras if parts of a melody,with previousnoteslingering and future onesanticipatedin the unity of a piece,the permeationof eachnote by of their interconnection.To try and othersrevealingthe extremecloseness graspthis flow asa completeset of notesis pointless,becausethe musicis alwayson the vergeof endingand alwaysalteredby the addition of a new systemis as a comprehensive note. To speakof 'mind' or tconsciousness' to ignore an analogousattribute of duration: it is alwaysflowing, overtaking what might be calledthe 'not yet' and passingawayin the 'already'. Bergsonconsidersquantificationof duration to be inconsistentwith its immediate,lived reality.It can be contrastedwith 'clock time', the time of time by situatingelemental physicsandpracticallife, which eitherspatialises grid or usesthe digitsof a time-pieceas instantsend-to-endon a referential with these a crassandimprecisephysicalimage.Whenarrangedin accordance is'situated' inst4nts,consciousness models,timebecomes a seriesof separable andmovementis conmentalstates, in time asa seriesof temporallydisparate positions. In other words,clock ceivedin terms of relationsbetweenstatic time abstractsfrom the notion of duration by distorting its continuity. But constitutiveintegrationof momentsof duration must not be overis not emphasised.Bergson'sintuition confirms also that consciousness mental states that 'one long thought', asit were,but a flowing togetherof are different from one anotherin important ways.Bergsoncontendsthat differencesbetweenmentalstatesallow us to mark one kind of thought or one particular thought from another,whilst constituting simultaneously As such,dura singularflow,a mergingof thoughtsasone consciousness. of the flow of changesthat simultaneously ation is the immediateawareness constitutedifferencesand,relationshipsbetweenparticulars. of durationarecriticalfor Deleuze.In his early Scvcralcharacteristics workson DrrvidHumc, l)clcuzcusccldurationasan cxplicatoryt<xrl,rcno1'hrbit,itssociittion lncl tintc.Subscqucntly, dcringlncw I lunrc'sirccounts
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Deleuzeadoptsit asa meansfor exploringdifferenceand becomingaskey elementsof life. If duration 'includes',as it were,all of the qualitative ('differences differences of kind') of one'slived experience, Deleuzeargues, then it also emphasisesthe productive, liberating potenrial of these differences.Even in the continuity of one'sconsciousness, there is a disconnectionbetweeneventsthat allowscreativityandrenewal.For example, one is ableto call upon new conceptsto reinterpretone'smemoriesor perceivesomevistaanewin the light of one'sexposureto a work of art. Deleuze usesduration to make some important philosophicalpoints abouttime and difference.For philosopherssuchasImmanuelKant, time is both a form ofreceptiveexperienceaboutthe world and a necessary condition for any human experienceat all. As such, for Kant, time is not an empiricalconceptbut an a priori necessityunderlyingall possibleexperience.Furthermore,he considerstime to comprisea homogeneous seriesof successive instants,standingin needof synthesis. In contrast,durationis alwayspresentin the'givenness'ofone'sexperience.It doesnot transcendexperience, andneithermustit be derivedphilosophically.Furthermore,duration, unlike matter,cannotbe divided into elementswhich, when dividedor reconstituted,remainthe samein aggregateas their unified form. Duration, as lived experience,brings together both unity and differencein a flow of interconnections. For Deleuze,these contrastsrepresentthe differencebetweena dictatorialphilosophythat creates'superior'conceptsthat subsumeand order the multiplicitiesand creativityof life and one that createsopportunitiesfor changeand variety. Connectives Bergson Intuition Kant
EARTH/LAND
(rrRR.E)
John Proteai As prrrt
EARTH,/LINo (rnnnn)
8l
'territory' (territoire) expressmanners of occupying terrestrial spaceby differentsocialmachines:the nomadwar machine,the territorial tribe, the overcodingState.Earth can also mean the virtual realm or Body without Organs(BwO), while 'a new earth' (unenouaelleterre),called,for at points in A Thousand, Plateausand madea focal point of What is Philosophy?, entails potentials new human relationshipsto the creative of material systemsto form consistencies, war machines,or rhizomesfrom a varietyof means. ln A Thousand, Plateau.s, Brian Massumi usestwo English words to translatethe French terrerwhichcanmeanboth'earth'in the astronomical senseofour planetand'land' in the geographical senseofa cultivatedarea. There is no consistencyin Deleuzeand Guattari'suseof the majusculein the French text; both Terre and,terre are used in the senseof 'earth' and 'land'. The anglophonereadershouldkeepin mind the closeproximity of terre('earth' and 'land') with territoire('territory'). First, 'earth'is equivalentto the BwO, otherwiseunderstoodby Deleuze and Guattari as the virtual plane of consistencyupon which strata are imposed(D&G 1987: 40). Second,'earth' is part of the earth-territory (terre-territoire)systemof romanticism,the becoming-intensive of strata. Hence 'earth' is the gathering point, outside all territories, of all selforderingforces('forcesof the earth') for intensiveterritorial assemblages (the virtual seenfrom the point of view of territorialisingmachinicassemblages).Third, the 'new earth' (nouaelleterre)is the becoming-virtualof intensive material. Put differently, the 'new earth' is the correlate of absolutedeterritorialisation(the leavingof all intensiveterritorial assemblagesto attainthe planeof consistency); it is the tappingof 'cosmicforces' (the virtual seenfrom the point of view of the abstractmachinescomposing it, not the machinicassemblages that actualisea selectionof singularities). Hence, it marks new potentials for creation (D&G 1987: 423; 509-10).In this sense,it is unfortunatethat Brian Massumi translateszae nouaelleterreas'a new land' (D&G 1987:509). Land,(terre)is constitutedby the overcodingof territoriesunderthe signifying regimeand the Stateapparatus(D&G 1987:440-l). Land refers exclusivelyto striatedspace,and is that terrain that canbe owned,held as stock, distributed, rented, made to produce and taxed. Land can be gridded, distributed,classifiedand categorisedwithout evenbeing physically experienced,and a striking exampleof this is the township-andrangesystemof the US that imparted striatedspaceto a vast part of the North Americancontinentaheadof actualsettleroccupation.The system of stockpilingterritories and overcodingthem as land for the Statedoes not stop at thc firrm or evcn thc ranch,but extendsto the forestlands(as 'nrttionrl'fbrcsts)irnd to thc unusablcspacesthat becomenltional parks, bi
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RETU R N
subiectswho seekto escapefrom private property to find some sort of becoming-earthcommons. ln What is Philosophy?,'a new earth' becomesthe rallying cry in the 'geophilosophy'of Deleuze and Guattari, in which 'stratification' is the processwherebythe implantationof codesand territoriesform dominating bodies.This is opposedto the constructionof a 'new earth' that entails new human relationshipsto the creativepotentialsof material systemsto form consistencies, war machines,or rhizomesfrom a varietyof means.In the constructionof the new earth, caremust be takennot to confusethe structural differenceof strata and consistencywith an a priori moral categorisation,but ratheralwaysto retainthe pragmaticand empiricalnature of Deleuzeand Guattari'swork and perform the ethicalevaluationof the life-affirming or life-denying characterof assemblages. Strata,along with codesand territories,are alwaysneeded,if only in providingrestingpointsfor further experimentsin forming war machines. Strataare in fact 'beneficialin manyregards'(D&G 1987:40),though we must be carefulnot to laud the stabilityof strataasinstantiatingthe moral virtue of unchangingself-identityespousedby Platonism.The mere fact that an assemblage or body politic is flexibleand resilient,however,does not guaranteeits ethical choice-worthiness,for what Deleuzeand Guattari call 'micro-fascism'is not rigid at all but rather a suppleand free-floating body politic.Eveniffascistsarereterritorialisedon the'blackhole'oftheir subjectivity:'thereis fascismwhen a war machineis installedin eachhole, in everyniche' (D&G 1987: 214)and not only thosepracticesthat 'intend' to producea life-affirmingassemblage will resultin such. Connectives Body without Organs Blackhole Deterritorialisation Plato Space Virtual/Virtuality
ETERNAL RETURN Lee Sltinks 'l'hc conccptof''ctcrn:rlrcturn', which l)clcuzcclrirwsfrom lfricdrich Nictzschc,is crucirll lo tltc rrrdicrtlcxlcrtsiot't ol'tlrc llhikrsollhyof'
ETER N AL
R ETU R N
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immanenceand univocity. In Dffirence and RepetitionDeletzearguesthat Duns Scotus,Baruch Spinozaand Nietzscheaffirmedunivocalbeing.It is only with Nietzsche,accordingto Deleuze,that the joyful ideaof univocity is thought adequately,and this is becauseNietzsche imaginesa world of 'pre-personalsingularities'.That is, there is not a 'who' or 'what' that then has variousproperties;nor is there someoneor somethingthat ri. Each differenceis a power to differ, with no event of differencebeing the ground or causeof any other. By going through this affirmation of difference,and by abandoningany ground or being before or beyond difference, both Nietzsche and Deleuze arrive at the eternal return. If differenceoccurredin order to arriveat someproperend - if therewere a purposeor properend to life - then the processof becomingwould have some ideal end point (even if this were only imagined or ideal). But differenceis an event that is joyful in itself; it is not the differenceo/this beingor for this end.With eacheventof differencelife is transformed;life becomesother than itself becauselife is difference.Consequently, the only 'thing' that 'is' is difference,with each repetition of differencebeing Time is what different.Only differencereturns, and it returns eterna,lly. followsfrom difference(time is difference);differencecannotbe locatedin time. Eternalreturn is thereforethe ultimateidea. This difficult and enigmatic idea, developedmost concertedly in Nietzsche'sThus Spake Zarathustra,has proved controversialin philosophicalcircleswhere it has generallybeeninterpreted aseither an existentialor inhumanvision of existence. Accordingto the existentialreading, the thought of eternalreturn compelsus to considerhow we ought properly to live. This thought can be expressedin the following way: were we suddenlyto recognisethat everyaspectofour lives,both painfulandjoyous, was fated to return in the guiseof a potentiallyinfinite repetition,how would we needto live to justify the recurrenceof eventhe most terrible and painful events?Conversely,the inhuman or cosmologicalreadingunderstandsNietzsche'spropositionasthe fundamentalaxiomof a philosophyof forces in which active force separatesitself from and supplants reactive forceand ultimatelylocatesitself asthe motor principleof becoming. Deleuze'ssignalcontribution to the post-warphilosophicalrevisionof Nietzschewas to establishthis secondreadingof eternal return as the return and selectionof forcesat the heart of modern theoriesof power.He explicitly repudiatesthe naivereadingof Nietzschethat envisages eternal return asa doctrineproclaimingthe infinite recurrenceof everyhistorical moment in exactlythe sameorder throughouteternity.The perversityof this naivcreading,Deleuzeargues,is that it convertsNietzsche'svision of bcingasthc cndlcssbccomingof clifl'crcntial furccsinto a simplcprinciplc ot'idcntity.Yctwc firilto undcrstirnd ot'it tlrcctcrnirlrcturnif'wc conccivc
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as the ceaselessreturn of the same; instead, eternal return inscribes differenceand becomingat the very heart of being.For it is not being that recurs in the eternal return; the principle of return constitutes the one thing sharedby diversity and multiplicity. What is at stakeis not rhe repetition of a universalsameness but the movementthat produceseverything that d,ffirs. Eternal return is thereforeproperly understoodasa synthesis of becomingand the being that is affirmed in becoming.It appearsasrhe fundamental ontological principle of the differenceand repetition of forces that will bear the nameof Will to Power. To think the eternal return is to think the becoming-activeof forces. The return selectsforcesaccording to the quantity of Will to Power that they express.Deleuze characterisesthis processas a d,oubleselectionby the activity of force and the affirmation of the will. In accordancewith the principle that whateverwe will, we must will it in such a way rhat we also will its eternal recurrence, the eternal return eliminates reactive statesfrom the becoming of being. This first selectioneliminates ali but the most powerfully reactive forces - those which go to rhe active limit of what they can do and form the basisof the nihilistic impulse and the will to nothingness.Thesestrongreactiveforcesaresubsequendyincorporatedinto the eternal return in order to effect the overcoming of negation and the transformation of reactive into active force. Such revaluationtakesplace becausethe eternal return brings the nihilistic will to completion:the absolutespirit of negationinvolvesa negationof reactive forces themselves.Within this negation of negation reactive forces deny and suppress themselves in the name of a paradoxical affirmation: by destroying the reactive in themselves, the strongest spirits come to embody the becoming-active of reactive force. This movement of affirmation constitutesthe secondor doubled selection undertaken by the eternal return: the transvaluationofreactive forcesby meansof an affirmation of negation itself. This secondselectiontransforms a selectionof thought into a selectionof being: somethingnewis now brought into being which appearsasthe effectof the revaluationof forces.The eternal return 'is' this movemeRtof transvaluation: according to its double selectiononly action and affirmation return while the negativeis willed out of being.The return eliminateseveryreactiveforce that resistsit; iu so doing it affirms both the being of becomingand the becoming-activeof forces. Connectives Active/reactive Ilccoming
E TH IC S
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Difference Kant Multiplicity Nietzsche
ETHICS John Marhs Throughout his work, Deleuzedraws a clear distinction betweenethics and morality.Morality is a setof constrainingrules that judgeactionsand intentionsin relationto transcendentvaluesof good and evil. Morality is a way of judging life, whereasethicsis a way of assessing what we do in terms of waysof existingin the world. Ethics involvesa creativecommitment to maximising connections,and of maximising the powers that will expand the possibilitiesof life. In this way, ethics for Deleuze is inextricably linked with the notion of becoming.Morality implies that we judge ourselvesand others on the basisof what we are and should,be, whereasethicsimplies that we do not yet know what we might become. For Deleuze,there are no transcendentvaluesagainstwhich we should measurelife. It is rather 'Life' itself that constitutes,itsown immanent ethics.An ethicalapproachis, in this way,essentiallypragmatic,and it is no surprise that Deleuze admiresthe American pragmatist model that substitutesexperimentationfor salvation.Deleuzesetsthe ideal of this pragmatism- a world which is 'fn process'- againstthe 'Europeanmorality' of salvationand charity.It rejectsthe searchfor moral consensusand the construction of transcendentvalues,and it conceivesof societyas experiment rather than contract: a community of inquirers with an experimentalspirit. FriedrichNietzscheand BaruchSpinozaarethe two main influenceson Deleuze'snotion of ethics.From them, he takesthe idea that ethicsis a form of affirmation and evaluation.Such an ethics applies the acceptancethat the world is, asDeleuzeputs it, neithertrue nor real,but'living'. To affirm is to evaluatelife in order to set free what lives. Rather than weighingdown life with the burden of higher values,it seeksto makelife light and active,and to createnew values.Both thinkers reorientatephilosophyby callinginto questionthe wayin which morality conceives of the relationshipbetweenmind and body.For the systemof morality,mind as consciousness dominatesthe passionsof the body.Spinoza,however,proposesan ethicalroute that is lator takenup by Nietzsche,by rejectingthe supcriorityof mind ovcr body.It i$ not r cirscof giving ficc rcign to thc
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ET HICS
passionsof the body,sincethis would be nothing more than a reversal,a licenceto act thoughtlessly. Rather in claimingthat there is a parallelism betweenmind andbody,Spinozasuggests a new,morecreativewayof conceivingof thought. For Deleuze,Spinozais the greatethicalthinker who breakswith the Judeo-Christiantradition, and who is followed by four 'disciples'who developthis ethical approach:Nietzsche,D. H. Lawrence,Franz Kafka and Antonin Artaud. They areall opposedto the psychologyof the priest, and Nietzschein particularshowshow judgementsubjectsmanto an infinite debt that he cannotpay.This meansthat the doctrineof judgementis only apparentlymore moderatethan a systemof 'cruelty' accordingto which debt is measuredin blood and inscribeddirectly on the body,since it condemnsus to infinite restitution and servitude.Deleuzegoesfurther to showhow thesefour 'disciples'elaboratea wholesystemof 'cruelty' that is opposedto judgement,and which constitutesthe basicsfor an ethics. The dominationof the body in favourof consciousness leadsto an impoverishmentof our knowledgeof the body.We do not fully explorethe capacitiesof the body, and in the sam€ way that the body surpassesthe knowledgewe haveof it, so thought also surpassesthe consciousness we have of it. Once we can begin to explore thesenew dimensions- the unbnownof the body and the unconscious of thought- we arein the domain of ethics.The transcendent categories of Good and Evil canbe abandoned in favour of 'good' and 'bad'. A 'good' individual seeksto makeconnections that increaseher powerto act, whilst at the sametime not diminishing similar powersin others.The 'bad' individual doesnot organiseher encountersin this way and either falls backinto guilt and resentment,or relieson guile and violence. Deleuze'scommitment to ethicsis closelyconnectedto the conceptof becoming,and in particular that of becoming-animal.The ethical drive for the 'great health' that allows life to flourish is all too often channelled into serving the petty 'human' ends of self-consolidation and selfaggrandisement.One way of going beyondthis calculationof profit and lossis to'become'animal. The drive for justice,for example,must overcome itself by learning from the lion who, as Nietzschesays,refusesto rage againstthe ticks and flies that seekshelterand nourishmenton its body. In a more generalpolitical sense,it is a question of maintaining our 'belief-in-the-world'. We do this by creatingforms of resistanceto what we are becoming (Michel Foucault's 'actual') and not simply to what we are in the present. Rather than judging, we need to makc s
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Connectives Becoming Nietzsche Spinoza
EVENT CliffStasoU Deleuzeintroduced the conceptof the 'event' in The Logic of Senseto describe instantaneousproductions intrinsic to interactions between variouskinds of forces.Eventsare changesimmanentto a confluenceof partsor elements,subsistingaspure virtualities(that is, real inherentpossibilities)and distinguishingthemselvesonly in the courseof their actualisation in somebody or state.Loosely,eventsmight be characterised(as Deleuzedoes)in termsconsonantwith the Stoicconceptof lekta:asincorporeal transformationsthat subsistover and abovethe spatio-temporal world, but areexpressiblein languagenonetheless. As the prod,uctof the synthesisof forces,eventssignify the internal dynamic of their interactions.As such, on Deleuze'sinterpretation,an eventis not a particularstateor happeningitselflbut somethingmadeactual in the Stateor happening.In other words,an eventis the potentialimmanent within a particularconfluenceof forces.Take as an examplea tree's changingcolourin the spring.On Deleuze'saccount,the eventis not what evidentlyoccurs(the tree becomesgreen)becausethis is merelya passing surfaceeffector expression ofan event'sactualisation, andthus ofa particular confluenceof bodiesand other events(such as weatherpatterns,soil conditions, pigmentation effects and the circumstancesof the original planting).Thereforewe oughtnot to say'thetreebecamegreen'or'the tree is now green'(both of which imply a changein the tree's 'essence'), but rather'the tree greens'.By using the infinitive form'to green',we makea dynamicattribution of the predicate,an incorporealitydistinct from both the tree and green-nesswhich capturesnonetheless the dynamismof the event'sactualisation.The event is not a disruption of some continuous state,but ratherthe stateis constitutedby events'underlying'it that, when actualised, mark everymomentof the stateasa transformation. Deleuze'spositionpresentsan alternativeto traditionalphilosophiesof substance,challengingthe notion that reality ought to be understoodin
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terms of the determinatestatesof things. This notion was expressed clearlyby Platq who established a contrastbetweenfixed and determinate statesof things definingthe identity of an objecton the one hand and, on the other,temporalseriesof causesand effectshavingan impact uponthe object.Deleuzewould saythat thereis no distinct,particularthing without the eventsthat define it as that particular,constituting its potential for changeand rate of change.Instead,an eyentis unrelatedto any material content,being without fixed structure,position,temporalityor property, and without beginningor end. Deleuze'seventis a sign or indicator of its genesis,and the expression of the productivepotentialof the forcesfrom which it arose.As such, it highlights the momentaryuniquenessof the nexusof forces(whetheror not to someobviouseffect)whilst preservinga placefor discontinuity in terms of someparticular conceptor planeof consistency.Three characteristics highlighted in Deleuze's texts point to this distinctiveness. First, no event is ever constituted by a preliminary or precedentunity betweenthe forcesof its production, being insteadthe primitive effect or changegeneratedat the moment of their interaction.Second,events are produced neither in the image of somemodel nor as representative copiesor likenessesof a more fundamentalreality,being insteadwholly immanent, original and creativeproductions.Third, as pure effect, an eventhasno goal. Deleuzeis careful to preservedynamismin his concept.An event is neither a beginningnor an end point, but rather always'in the middle'. Eventsthemselves haveno beginning-or end-point,and their relationship with Deleuze'snotion of dynamicchange- 'becoming'- is neitherone of 'joining momentstogether'nor one in which an eventis the 'end' of one productiveprocess,to be supplantedor supplementedby the next.Rather, becoming'moves through' an event, with the event representingiust a momentaryproductiveintensity. In his theoryof the event,Deleuzeis not interestedjust in the machinationsof production,but alsoin the productivepotentialinherentin forces of all kinds.Eventscarry no determinateoutcome,but only new possibilities,representinga momentat which new forcesmight be broughtto bear. Specificallyin terms of his model of thinking, he doesnot meanjust that 'one thinks and thus creates'butthat thinking and creatingareconstituted simultaneously. As such,his generaltheoryof the eventprovidesa means for theorisingthe immanentcreativityof thifking, challengingus to think differcntlyand to considerthingsanew.This is not to saythat he meansto chrrffcngcurito think in termsof cvcnts,but rathcrt
EXPER IEN C E
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Connectives Becoming Plato
EXPERIENCE Inna Semetsky Deleuzeconsideredhimself an empiricist,yet not in the reductive,tabula rasa-like,passivesense.Experienceis that milieu which provides the capacity to affect and be affected;it is a-subjectiveand impersonal. Experienceis not an individual property;rathersubjectsareconstitutedin relationswithin experienceitself, that is, by meansof individuation via haecceity. The exteriorityof relationspresents'a vital protestagainstprinciples'(D 1987:55).Experienceis renderedmeaningfurnot by grounding empirical particulars in abstract universals but by experimentation. somethingin the experientialworld forcesus to rhink. This somethingis an object not of recognitionbut a fundamentalencounterthat can be 'graspedin a rangeofaffectiverones'(D 1994:139).In fact,novelconcepts are to be inventedor createdin order to makesenseout of singular experiencesand, ultimately,to affirm this sense. Experienceis qualitative,multidimensional,and inclusive;it includes 'a draft, a wind, a day,a time of day,a stream,a place,a battle, an illness' (D 1995:l4l): yet, an experientialeventis subjectless. we are madeup of relations,saysDeleuze(2000),and experiencemakessenseto us only if we understandthe relationsin practicebetweenconflicting schemesof the said experience. The difference embedded in real experience makes thought encountera shockor crisis,which is embeddedin the objective structureof an eventper se,therebytranscendingthe facultiesof perception beyondthe 'given' data of sense-impressions. Differenceis an ontological category,'the noumenonclosestto phenomenon'(D 1994:2zz), which, however,is neverbeyondexperiencebecauseeveryphenomenonis in fact conditioned by difference.Transcendentalempiricism is what Deleuzecalledhis philosophicalmethod:thinking is not a naturalexercise but alwaysa secondpowerof thought,born under the constraintof experienceasa materialpower,a force.The intensityof differenceis a function of desire,the latter embeddedin experiencebecauseits objectis .the entire surroundingl which it traverses' (D&G 1987:30). If rclati
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relationallogic is the logic of experimentationnot 'subordinateto the verb to be' (D 1987: 57). This logic is inspired by empiricism because'only empiricism knows how to transcend the experiential dimension of the visible'(D 1990:20) without recourseto Ideas,moral universals,or value judgements.The experientialworld is folded,the fold being'the insideo/ the outside'(D 1988a:96),wherethe outsideis virtual yet realby virtue of its pragmatics.It unfolds in an unpredictablemanner,and it is impossibleto know aheadof time what the body (both physicaland mental) can do. Becausethe body, acting within experience,is defined by its affective capacity,it is equally impossibleto know 'the affectsone is capableof' (D 1988b:125):life becomesan experimentaland experientialaffair that requires,for Deleuze,practicalwisdom in a Spinoziansenseby meansof immanent evaluationsof experience,or modesof existence.As affective, experienceis as yet a-conceptual,and Deleuzeemphasisesthe passionate quality of such an experience:'perhapspassion,the State of passion,is actuallywhat folding the line outside,making it endurable. . . is about' (D 1995:116). The Deleuzianobjectof experience, beingun-thought,is presentedonly in its tendencyto exist, or rather to subsist,in a virtual, sub-representative state. It actualisesitself through multiple different/ciations. Deleuze's method,compatiblewith Henri Bergson'sintuition, enablesthe readingof the signs,symbolsand symptomsthat lay down the dynamicalstructureof Experience,in contrastto analyticphilosophy,is not limited to experience. what is immediatelyperceived:the line of flight or becomingis realevenif 'we don't seeit, becauseit's the leastperceptibleof things' (D 1995:45). Thinking enriched with desire,is experimentaland experiential:experiencethereforeis future-oriented,lengthenedand enfolded,representingan experimentwith what is new,or cominginto being.Experienceconstitutes a complexplace,and our experimentationon ourselvesis, for Deleuzerthe like a only reality.By virtue of experimentation,philosophy-becoming, witch's flight, escapesthe old frame of referencewithin which this flight seemslike an immaterialvanishingthrough someimaginaryevent-horizon, and createsits own terms of actualisationtherebyleadingto the 'intensificationof life' (D&G 1994:74)by revaluatingexperience. Connectives Difference Force Power Spinoza 'llnnsccnclcntnl cmpiricisnr
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EXPERIMENTATION Bruce Baugh In French,the word expirience meansboth 'experience'and 'experiment'. To experimentis to try new actions,methods,techniquesand combinations, 'without aim or end' (D&G 1983:371).We experimentwhen we do not know what the result will be and haveno preconceptionsconcerningwhat it shouldbe. As an open-endedprocessthat exploreswhat'snew and what's cominginto beingrather than somethingalreadyexperiencedand known, experimentation is inseparable from innovationanddiscovery. The elements with which we experimentare desires,forces,powers and their combinations,not only to 'seewhat happens',but to determinewhat different entities (bodies,languages, socialgroupings,environmentsand soon) arecapableof. Deleuzeholdsthat'existence itself is a kind of test',an experiment,'like that wherebyworkmentestthe quality of somematerial'(D 1992:317).In literature, politics, painting, cinema,music and living, Deleuzevalorisesan 'experimentation that is without interpretation or significanceand restsonly on tests of experience'(D&G 1986:7), the crucial experiencebeing the affectiveone- whether a procedureor combinationproducesan increasein one'spowerof acting(ioy) or a diminution (sadness). Experimentationcanbe an investigativeprocedurethat seeksto explain how assemblages function by analysingthe elementsthat composethem and the links betweenthoseelements;an'assemblage'being anycompound in which the parts interact with each other to produce a certain effect. However, experimentation is also a practical dismantling of assemblages and the creativeproduction of new combinationsof elements;evenwhen experimentationconcernsthoughtsor concepts,it is nevermerely theoretical. Experimentationdoes not interpret what something,such as a text, an idea or a desire,'means',but seeksto discoverhow it works or functions by uncovering an order of causes,namely, the characteristic relations among the parts of an assemblage- their structures, flows and connections - and the resulting tendencies.Effects are demystified by being related to their causesthat explain the functions and usesof an assemblage, 'what it doesand what is done with it' (D&G 1983:180). Experimentationis necessary to reveal'what a body or mind can do, in a given encounter', arrangementor combination of the affects a body is capableof (D 1988c: 125);and alsoto revealthe effectsof combinationsof different bodiesand elements,and especiallywhetherthesecombinations or encounterswill increasethe powersof actingof the elementscombined into a grcatcrwhole,or whcthcrthe combinationwill destroyor'decomposc'onc or nlorc of thc clcmcnts.'l'hc conrpttibilityor incompntihility
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of differentelementsand bodies,and the effectof their combination,can only be ascertained through experience;we haveno a priori knowledgeof them through principlesor axioms.An experimentalmethodof discovery through the experienceof new combinationsof things encounteringeach other is contrary to any axiomatic-deductivesystemor any system of judgement using transcendentalcriteria. Becauseoutcomescannot be known or predicted in advance,experimentationrequires patienceand prudence,ascertaincombinationsmay be destructiveto the experimenter and to others.On the other hand, the knowledgegainedthrough experimentationwith differentconjunctionsand combinationsallowsfor an art (social, of organising'good encounters',or of constructingassemblages political, artistic) in which powers of acting and the active affects that follow from them are increased. Life-experimentation, through a set of practiceseffectingnew combinations and relations and forming powers, is biological and political, and often involvesexperientiallydiscoveringhow to dissolvethe boundariesof the ego or self in order to open flows of intensity, 'continuums and coniunctions of affect' (D&G 1987: 162). Active experimentation involves trying new procedures,combinations and their unpredictable effects to producea 'Body without Organs' (BwO) or a 'field of immanence'or 'plane of consistency',in which desires,intensities,movementsand flows pass unimpeded by the repressivemechanismsof judgement and interpretation. Experimental constructions proceed bit by bit and flow by flow, using different techniquesand materials in different circumstancesand under different conditions, without any pre-establishedor set rules or procedures,as similar effects(for example,intoxication) can be produced by different means(ingesting peyote or 'getting sousedon water'). 'One neverknowsin advance'(D 1987:47), and,if one did, it would not be an experiment.Experimentationby its nature breaksfree of the past and dis(socialformations,the Self),and constructslines mantlesold assemblages of flight or movementsof deterritorialisationby effecting new and previously untried combinations of persons, forces and things, 'the new, remarkable,and interesting'(D&G 1994:lll). In literature,politics,and in life, experimentsarepracticesthat discoverand dismantleassemblages, and which look for the linesof flight of individualsor groups,the dangers on theselines,andnewcombinationsthat will thwart predictionsandallow the new to emerge. Connectives Body withoutOrgans I)csirc
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Immanence Lines of flight
EXPRESSION Claire Colebrook 'Expression' is one of Deleuze's most intense concepts.If we take Deleuze'sdefinition of a concept- that it is a philosophicalcreationthat producesan intensivesetofordinates- then expressioncanbe understood astruly conceptual.Indeed,the conceptof expressionis tied to Deleuze's understandingof conceptuality.It is not that we havea world of set terms and relations, which thought would then have to structure, organiseor name- producing organisedsetsof what exists.Rather, life is an expressive and open whole, nothing more than the possibility for the creation of new relations;and soa concept,or the thought of this life, must try to grasp movementsand potential, rather than collectionsof generalities.A structure is a set of coordinates,a fixed set of points that one might then move among to establishrelations, and is extensive,with its points alreadylaid out or set apart from eachother. So a simple mechanismtakesthe form of a structure; if we read a poem as a set of words that might be linked in meaning,with the meaninggoverning the proper relation and order of the words, then we are governed by a structure. If however,we approach a poem asexpressive,we seethe words as having unfolded from a potential, a potentialthat will producefurther relations- all the readingsor thoughts producedby the poem. Thus, expressionis tied to a commitmentto the creationof concepts;for expressionis the power of life to unfold itself differently, and one would create a concept in trying to grasp these differentunfoldings. Conceptsarenot structuresbecausealthoughthey establishdifferences, the differencesareintensive.An extensiveterm - suchas'all the catsin the world that areblack'- is a closedset,whereasan intensiveconceptis infinite in its possiblemovements.In the caseof expression,this conceptcovers the potentialfor movements;it is not that therearepoints or potentialsin life which thenundergoan expression.Rather,thereare expressions, with the unfolding of life in all its differencebeingexceededby expressiveand potential.The conceptof expressionthereforerefersto intensity, excessive for it allowsus to think a type of relationbut not anyconcludedsetof relations,And it is an ordinatefield,establishinga temporalityratherthana set of terms.Thc conccptof cxpression is a styleor possibilityof thinking.We cannotundcrstrnclthis conccptof cxprcssionwithout bringingin a ncw
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approachto what it is for somethingto be, and what it isto thinb that being. - that which With expression,we no longerimaginea world of substance remainsin itself, remainsthe same,and then haspredicatesaddedto it accidentally.There is not a substancethat then expressesitself in various different styles.Rather, there are stylistic variations or expressions,and With substanceis the thought of the open whole of all theseexpressions. the conceptof expressionwe begin with a relation, rather than a being that then relates,but the relation is also external: nothing determinesin advancehow potentiality will be expressed,for it is the nature of expressive substanceto unfold itself infinitely, in an open seriesof productive relations. In his conclusionto his book on Baruch Spinoza,a book which is in philosophy,Deleuzedistinguishes avowedlydedicatedto expressionism the expressionism of Spinozafromthat of Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz. or perceivedby sepFor Leibniz thereis not a world that is then expressed arate subjects.Rather, the world is made up of monadsor points of perception. A being is just its specificperceptionof the world, and each perceivingmonad is an expressionof one being. God is the only being who perceivesthe world perfectlyand completely;eachfinite beinggrasps infinite being only dimly. For Spinoza, a more radical and immanent expressionis possible,one which allows Deleuze to imagine divergent expressionsor planesof life. While there is still not a self-presentworld that precedesexpression,Spinoza'simmanenceprecludesany point of perfect expressionthat would ground particular expressions.A being iust is its expression,its powerto act. The world is not an objectto be known, observedor represented,so much asa planeof powersto unfold or express differentpotentialsof life. Connectives Spinoza
EXTERIORITY/INTERIORITY Jonathan Rofe One of the underlying themesof Deleuze'sphilosophyis a reiection of the valueof interiority in its varioustheoreticalguises.In fact, he goesso far asto connectthe sentimentof 'the hatredof interiority' to his philosophy. On the other hand, tcrms likc 'outside' and 'cxtcriority' play a ccntrnlrolc.
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Deleuze'suse of the term 'interiority' refers to the thought, dominant in westernphilosophysince Plato, that things exist independently,and that their actions derive from the unfolding or embodying of this essential unity. The Cartesianegocogitowould be the most familiar exampleof this thought, whereby the human mind - indivisible and immortal forms the interior of the self,and where the body and the physicalworld in general form a contingent exterior. [n other words, 'interiority' is a word indexedto transcendentunities,things that haveno necessaryconnection to anything else,and which transcendthe external world around them. Deleuze'sphilosophy is rigorously critical of all forms of transcendence.FIe wants to come to grips with the world as a generalised exteriority. In his first book on David Hume (Empiricismand Subjectahy,1953), Deleuzeinsiststhat for Hume, there is no natural interiority (conscious willing, for example)involved in human subjectivity. Rather, the subiect is formed from pre-subjectiveparts which are held together by a network of relations.This is part of the Humean philosophythat strikesDeleuze as particularly important, and he comes back to it a number of times. DeleuzeconsidersHume to be the first to insistthat relationsareexternal to their terms - and this presagesmuch of Deleuze's mature philosophy. In other words,in order to understandany stateof affairs,we must not look to the internal or intrinsic 'meaning','structure' or 'life' of the terms involved(whetherthey be people,a personand an animal,elementsin a biological system, and so on). This will not provide anything relevant, sinceit is in the relationsbetween(or externalto) things that their nature is decided. Likewise,in his bookson Baruch Spinoza,he demonstratesthat organised beings are not the embodiment of an essenceor an idea, but are the resultof enormousnumbersof relationsbetweenpartswhich haveno significanceon their own. In other words, specificbeingsare produced from within a generalised milieu of exterioritywithout referenceto any guiding interiority. So, rather than being a philosophyconcernedwith showing how the interior reasonor structure of things is brought about in the world - the interior consciousintentions of a human speaker,or the kernel of social structure hidden within all of its expressions- Deleuze insists on three points. First, that there is no natural interiority whatsoever:the whole philosophical tradition beginning with Plato that wanted to explain things in referenceto their essenceis mistaken.Second,this meansthat the interior/exterior division lacksany substantialmeaning,and Deleuze somctimescaststhc distinctionasidc