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The Cruel Legacy The HMAS Voyager Tragedy
Tom Frame
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First published in 2005 Copyright © Tom Frame, 2005 All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by any information storage and retrieval system, without prior permission in writing from the publisher. The Australian Copyright Act 1968 (the Act) allows a maximum of one chapter or 10% of this book, whichever is the greater, to be photocopied by any educational institution for its educational purposes provided that the educational institution (or body that adminsters it) has given a remuneration notice to Copyright Agency Limited (CAL) under the Act. Allen & Unwin 83 Alexander Street Crows Nest NSW 2065 Australia Phone (61 2) 8425 0100 Fax (61 2) 9906 2218 Email:
[email protected] Web: www.allenandunwin.com National Library of Australia Cataloguing-in-Publication entry: Frame, Tom. The cruel legacy: the HMAS Voyager tragedy. Includes index. ISBN 1 74114 421 3 1. Voyager (Destroyer: 1952–1964). 2. Marine accidents—Australian Capital Territory—Jervis Bay. 3. Navies—Australia. 4. Destroyers (Warships)—Australia—History. I. Title. 359.32540994 Diagrams by Ian Faulkner Index compiled by Helen Frame Typeset in 11/13.5pt Janson by Midland Typesetters, Maryborough Printed by Griffin Press, South Australia 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
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CONTENTS 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Death and valour The truth sinks in An inquiry or an intrusion? ‘Just tell the truth’ Confident uncertainty Balancing blame Scapegoats and martyrs Where to now? Political leadership and public advocacy ‘A ghastly campaign’ Relevance and reticence A volatile cocktail How did fate call? The Navy moves on In the wake
1 8 23 35 55 67 77 91 100 115 131 150 166 177 183
Notes
203
Bibliography Index
224 230
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Tactical plot, 1929–2056
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DEATH AND VALOUR The huge superstructure of the aircraft carrier HMAS Melbourne loomed overhead in the dark, minutes before it crashed through the destroyer HMAS Voyager. Sparks, flames and a deafening roar accompanied the impact at the after end of the destroyer’s bridge. Nineteen-year old Ordinary Seaman John Jersovs, standing watch amidships, remembers that ‘The deck bent up in front of me, the bridge seemed to collapse, rigging, pipes, the funnel and all sorts of gear seemed to be falling around me’. The pipe from the Bridge, ‘Hands to collision stations’, had given little warning of the disaster. Below decks in Voyager, tables, lockers, furniture and personal items were thrown across passageways and mess decks. Bedding and clothing went everywhere. Men were thrown from their bunks onto the cold, hard, steel deck. Some were crushed against bulkheads as a direct result of Melbourne’s almost clinical incision; others were pinned under fittings or equipment and drowned when the cold water surged in. In some compartments the emergency lighting failed to operate, the darkness adding to the disorientation and terror of those not killed outright. The smell and slickness of fuel oil on ladders and passageways made the task of escaping even more difficult. Everywhere was chaos and confusion as men struggled to find out what had happened and what they had to do to remain alive. As bulkheads began to crumple under the weight of water it appeared the bow section was going to sink, and many said prayers in anticipation of imminent death. The impact had pushed Voyager over on her starboard side for a few seconds, before she broke in half. Her forward boiler exploded, with the high-pressure steam, black smoke and flames emitted from the funnel marking Melbourne’s bow before they were extinguished by seawater. A pair of binoculars and the revolution table from Voyager’s bridge would later be found on Melbourne’s flight deck. Those in the carrier looked on in horror as the forward section of the destroyer passed down the
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carrier’s port side and the after section slid down the starboard side, collecting some of Melbourne’s extended antenna on the way. Melbourne slowed and then stopped dead in the water as the two sections of the severed destroyer could just be seen in the darkness half a mile away. It was just after 2100 hours. Some of the destroyer’s men saw the carrier’s stern lights and thought for a moment that Melbourne was not going to stop; that they were being left to their fate. As they scanned the horizon for other vessels and some explanation as to why they were in the water, some of the survivors began to realise that the 19 930-ton Melbourne had collided amidships with the 3550-ton Voyager and cut her in two. Although the sea was calm with a long slow swell, Voyager’s bow section was de-stabilised by the weight of her two forward 4.5-inch gun turrets. As it passed down Melbourne’s side, the bow rolled over as the turrets slid from their mounting and sank. Then the bow started to lift slowly towards the sky to expose the anchor cable and other forecastle rigging. It floated for a further five minutes, hovering above the surface like a coffin waiting to be lowered into its grave. A few of the survivors got out through holes in the ship’s side created by the collision or from compartments ripped open near the point of impact. Most headed for the escape hatches on the port side but found that some could not be easily opened, so quickly sought other means of escape. As the bow section began to ease itself below the surface under the weight of the incoming water, there were remarkable displays of courage and bravery. Chief Petty Officer Coxswain Jonathan ‘Buck’ Rogers was the most senior sailor in Voyager. He was also a large man, who realised there was little chance he could squeeze through an escape hatch. Radar Plotter Peter Low was part of a group of some 60 men in the forward cafeteria where Rogers was attempting to open an escape hatch. Low recalls that Rogers ‘was telling everyone not to panic and we would all get out if they came through one at a time. He seemed very calm. I think he was more intent on getting the younger chaps out first before going out himself. I think perhaps he might have known that he would never have got out’. Able Seaman ‘Blue’ Matthews recounted how he ‘could hear the coxswain Chief Petty Officer Rogers, in the forward cafe, organising the escape of all the young fellows on the ship. I could hear him telling them not to panic, and he led them in a prayer and a hymn. Later on I heard him say to Leading Seaman ‘Pedro’ Rich, “I can’t get out. You get all the young fellows out of the hatch”’. Leading Mechanical Engineer Patrick Ryan recalled, ‘the last thing that I can remember Coxswain Rogers saying was “Well, the water’s beaten us”’.
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Rogers demonstrated calm courage and self-sacrifice as he and those with him prepared to die. They did so with great dignity. Leading Radio Electrical Mechanic John Milliner was in the forward half of Voyager. I was totally disoriented. It was pitch black and the strange thing is that I cannot recall any noises. It was as though I was alone in absolute silence. The thoughts that ran through my mind at that moment, apart from praying, were ‘I wonder what it is like to die’ and very clearly thinking ‘my son and unborn baby will have no father’. I was a smoker at the time and reached into my shorts for my lighter. Without thinking of the consequences, I flicked it and saw that it gave just enough light to see some sailors opening a hatch which turned out to be in Number 1 Seamen Mess just forward of the cafe. I made my way towards the hatch and was so disoriented that I was not sure where it was leading. While waiting my turn as a queue had formed, some were screaming in panic and the others stood back and let them through. When it came to my turn. I poked my head through the opened hatch and experienced the most wonderful sensations—the clean smell of the ocean and the sky above. I was ecstatic to be out of that dark tomb and slid thankfully down the hull into the water. I swam away but when I turned round to look back the bow, which was protruding out of the water, started rolling towards me as it filled with water. I swam away from it in a panic and when exhausted, I looked again and saw the bow sink beneath the waves. This was the most horrific sight that I have ever witnessed.
As those who had escaped from the ship tried to stay afloat in the oilcovered water that made it difficult to see and hard to breathe, Leading Seaman Rich, the ship’s Physical Training Instructor, gathered a number of survivors around him in a circle before helping them into life-rafts. A strong swimmer and a capable leader, he saved the lives of at least three men who were not strong swimmers or were nearly overcome by swallowing seawater and oil. Rich had earlier helped a number of men trapped in the upturned ship to reach safety. One hundred and twenty-eight men managed to escape from the forward half of Voyager, from a ship’s company of 314. Some were clad in torn and bloody uniforms and overalls; others were in their pyjamas. A few were naked. They were all covered in oil. The after half of Voyager remained defiantly afloat as salvage efforts were started. After thirty minutes the watertight bulkhead immediately forward of the after boiler room collapsed and the stern started to rise
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out of the water. Only then was it decided to abandon all that remained of Voyager. The injured were lowered into liferafts; others jumped into the water as the order to ‘Abandon ship’ was given. A Navy Wessex helicopter had by then arrived on the scene and lowered a strop to lift men from the sea, but the rotor’s down-draft made the surface so turbulent that those in the water were blinded by the oily sea-spray. Only a handful of men, none of whom had received ‘wet-winch’ training, were recovered by helicopter. Midshipman Kerry Marien, one of Voyager’s most junior officers, was in the after section of the ship at the time of the collision. After jumping into the water and reaching the safety of an inflated liferaft, he decided to return to the water and help his shipmates in the forward half. Mechanical Engineer Graham Davis later said that ‘someone came swimming up to me and said “Do you need any help?” and I noticed it was Midshipman Marien. I said no, that I did not need any help, and he said, “I think there is someone up forward in the water. I will go up there and see if they need a hand”.’ Marien, who would have survived the collision had he remained with the liferaft, was not seen again. It is assumed that he entered the stricken forward half of the ship and went down with it. The survivors in the after section’s liferafts were later transferred to Melbourne’s boats or towed to scrambling nets rigged on the carrier’s side. A young sailor in one raft stood up and pointed before yelling ‘Shark, shark’. Those who were in the water and clinging to the side of the liferaft frantically tried to clamber on board as the sinister object followed ten metres behind. Calm only returned when another sailor noticed that the trailing object was nothing more dangerous than a canvas shroud from the liferaft. With most of the survivors safely on board Melbourne and receiving medical care, Voyager’s after section, still visible in the distance, steadily took on more water. Melbourne’s ship’s company had made desperate efforts to recover those in the water over the three hours since the collision. Within a minute of the impact, the order ‘Away all boats’ had been given. The duty motor cutter approached to within 20 yards of the forward section and rescued those with little or no support in the water. Within only fifteen minutes, the first survivors were safely embarked in Melbourne’s boats. The survivors were battered and bleeding with a vast array of injuries; nearly all were vomiting oily seawater. The carrier’s Wardroom and ‘C’ Hangar were quickly prepared to receive them. By 0130, all of the survivors had been received in Melbourne, with fourteen men considered to have sustained serious injuries. The
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average age was 25, and many of the survivors were young, raw recruits who were serving at sea for the first time. Their excitement on joining Voyager had quickly turned to horror. When the survivor list was finalised, 232 officers and men were listed. The extent of the tragedy now became clear: 82 men had been killed. The death toll comprised 14 officers, 67 sailors and 1 civilian dockyard employee. Only three bodies were recovered from the sea, those of the commanding officer Captain Duncan Stevens, the navigator Lieutenant Harry Cook and Able Seaman Bob Parker. Both Stevens and Cook had been on the destroyer’s bridge and were badly disfigured. Stevens’ rank insignia made him easy to identify but Harry Cook was initially identified as Lieutenant Jim Dowling until a notebook in his pocket disclosed his real name. Contrary to later claims, no decapitated heads, dismembered body parts or other remains were recovered. The three bodies were conveyed to the RAN College at Jervis Bay for forensic examination and autopsy. Immediately after the collision, Melbourne’s commanding officer, Captain John Robertson, had sent an emergency signal to the Flag Officer In Charge—East Australia, Rear Admiral Galfrey Gatacre, in Sydney. It read: ‘Have been in collision with Voyager in position 120 Point Perpendicular 19’. The collision had occurred nineteen nautical miles off Point Perpendicular, the northern headland of Jervis Bay, at a bearing of 120 degrees. At 2114, the Damage Control Officer in Melbourne, Lieutenant Commander George Halley, informed Robertson that the carrier’s bow and forward compartments had suffered major damage but the ship was in no danger of sinking. Fourteen minutes later, Robertson sent a second signal: ‘Voyager has lost her bows but is still floating. Am rescuing survivors. Sea Calm’. Robertson’s first two communications gave the staff at Fleet Headquarters in Sydney no inkling of the extent of the disaster. In fact, his third signal, sent nearly three quarters of an hour after the collision, read: ‘Voyager has settled by the bows. Waterline at forward end of torpedo tubes. She still has lights onboard. Further information will be signalled when available’. Robertson thought Voyager had lost only part of her bows and not the forward half of the vessel. The first signal from shore was sent at 2158, informing Melbourne that: 1. Snipe and Teal proceeding maximum speed to render assistance 2. Hawk, Ibis and Curlew being despatched
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3. SAR and helicopter despatched by Naval Air Station Nowra 4. Stuart being sailed as early as practicable. At the nearby Naval College, news was received that some sort of accident had occurred in the exercise area. There were five recently graduated members of the 1960 Term in the destroyer. Those sent to Voyager had been selected by alphabet: Midshipmen Lindsey, Marien, Maunder, Morgan and Perry. Only Midshipman Kingsley Perry survived. As survivors from the collision were being rescued from the water, first year cadets at the College were being put through their initiation ceremonies. They were being pelted with grease, tomato juice, marmalade, Brasso and sump oil; made to slide down greasy steps and to push a telegraph pole along the quarterdeck (parade ground) on their hands and knees. The final indignity was to be painted with waterproof paint and ordered to dive from the diving board above the swimming pool. It was during their frantic efforts to scrape off the paint that alarms sounded and the rescue craft left the boat harbour. The initiation ceremonies added to the unreality of the night as Search and Rescue (SAR) Craft No. 257 brought survivors from Voyager to the College. The 34 men onboard were wearing either wet underpants or pyjama trousers, or wrapped in blankets provided by the rescue craft. Those able to eat were given soup, toast and hot drinks, and supplied with towels and overalls from the Loan Clothing Store and soap and other personal items from the canteen stocks. A second SAR Craft, No. 256, arrived at 0120 with a further 36 survivors. At 2210, the Fleet Operations Officer, Commander Peter Doyle, contacted the duty engineering officer in HMAS Sydney, Lieutenant Peter Hugonnet. Sydney was then refitting in Captain Cook Graving Dock at Garden Island. Doyle instructed Hugonnet to prepare Sydney for immediate undocking as Voyager would be arriving in the morning for urgent repairs. Four minutes later, HMAS Kimbla was instructed to ‘Proceed at best available speed to position 120 Point Perpendicular Light 19 miles and prepare to tow Voyager’. Realising he had yet to report on the state of his ship, Robertson sent a signal to the Naval Board in Canberra with an information copy to Fleet Headquarters: ‘Number One and Two trimming tanks flooded to five deck. 4A ships company heads damaged and holed forward port and starboard. Cable locker may be holed. Ship watertight aft of 16 bulkhead. No personnel casualties’. The enormity of what had happened was beginning to become more apparent. At 2300, Robertson was informed that the Fleet
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Commander, Rear Admiral Humphrey Becher, had departed Canberra for the Naval Air Station and expected to arrive there at 0430. A helicopter would convey him to the carrier which had already commenced a slow passage back to Sydney. Just before midnight, Robertson again reported on the state of Voyager: ‘Voyager is floating stern in the air waterline at the after end of the torpedo tubes. Forward bulkhead of ‘B’ boiler room has held. ‘B’ boiler room has some water in it and is probably flooding further. Forward portion of ship has probably sunk’. Just after midnight, a pipe from Melbourne’s bridge announced that those who wished to see Voyager sink should make their way to the flight deck. A few survivors stood in the cool night air and bid a final farewell to what had been their home. The ship’s silhouette was visible in the starlight before she quietly slipped away. By 0017 it was all over. Robertson sent another signal. It was short and to the point: ‘Voyager has sunk’. Signal traffic stopped for the next 30 minutes as the immensity of Robertson’s signal set in. Nothing like this had ever happened to the RAN. At Garden Island, preparations for undocking Sydney came to a halt. Voyager was not coming back—ever. The awful finality of the disaster was yet to hit the Navy. Not only had the nation just sustained the worst peacetime naval disaster in its history, but the tragedy was to become one of Australia’s longest-running political controversies and legal battles. Voyager’s motto was ‘Where Fate Calls’. It was a destiny many others would share.
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THE TRUTH SINKS IN Monday, 10 February 1964, had been a long day for Melbourne’s captain, John Robertson. It had started before dawn as the carrier, in company with Voyager, commanded by Captain Duncan Stevens, sailed from Jervis Bay after a weekend of sport and recreation ashore. Both ships had recently emerged from extensive refits and were preparing for deployments to South East Asia. Throughout the day, Voyager had circled Melbourne and conducted a series of trials and exercises designed to refresh everyone in both ships with sea-going routines. The two ships had the opportunity for some problems discovered in the dockyard to be corrected. Melbourne had practised anti-aircraft (AA) tracking, conducted radio sea trials and exercised emergency stations. Voyager took part in the same AA exercise, as well as an anti-submarine (A/S) exercise with the British submarine Tabard and a shore bombardment. At 1800, Voyager had closed Melbourne for the first time that day for the transfer of mail by heaving line. With the transfer completed and the sun beginning to set, Voyager was stationed five miles ahead of the carrier as both ships waited for darkness to fall. There were busy hours of night flying exercises ahead of them. Melbourne would be working with Squadrons 816 and 805 from the Carrier Air Group (CAG), which was then at the Naval Air Station (NAS) at Nowra. The aircraft had been detached for the duration of Melbourne’s refit but were due to return permanently in a few days, after practising deck landings and take-offs. Three Gannet aircraft were expected between 2000 and 2030 and two Sea Venoms between 2030 and 2100. Voyager’s task was simply to remain out of the carrier’s way and keep to her assigned station. This was the first time either ship had been engaged in close quarters manoeuvring for nearly six months. At 1830, they were 20 miles to the south-east of Jervis Bay in water over 600 fathoms deep. There was a low easterly swell, smooth seas and light variable winds. Although there was no moon, the night was clear
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HMAS Melbourne—Operational and navigational lighting
with visibility estimated at 20 miles. Melbourne and Voyager were ‘darkened’ for the exercise with only operational lighting visible in either ship. This consisted of the green starboard and red port side navigation lights, a white stern or overtaking light, masthead lights and, in the case of Melbourne, experimental flight-deck floodlighting which was intended to be visible only from the port side, to avoid being mistaken as indicating the carrier’s port side. A check had been made while at anchor the previous weekend to ensure that none of this red lighting was visible from the carrier’s starboard side. The experimental lighting consisted of one light near the base of the bridge ‘island’ superstructure and a directional red floodlight on the Gun Direction Platform which gave a downward beam from near the top of the island. This light was being trained onto the angled flight deck until the senior Gannet pilot, Lieutenant
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HMAS Voyager—Operational and navigational lighting
Commander Toz Dadswell, who had been making ‘touch and go’ runs across the carrier’s deck, informed Flying Control in Melbourne by radio that the glare from the light was blinding him during approach. The light was then trained onto the carrier’s forward aircraft lift. The two navigational sidelights in the carrier were dimmed so that their visibility was around one nautical mile with the unassisted eye—without binoculars. Neither Voyager nor the aircraft operating in the vicinity had complained that Melbourne’s lights were too dim or in any way confusing. Voyager’s lights were burning at full brilliance. For just over an hour, Voyager maintained her station, five miles ahead of the carrier, while the two ships conducted radar calibration trials. Sunset was at 1945. Voyager was then ordered to rejoin Melbourne in preparation for night flying exercises. The destroyer altered course to the south and took up a position ahead of the carrier when Captain Robertson, as Officer in Tactical Command (OTC), signalled Voyager
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that the flying course (the course on which the carrier would proceed while operating with aircraft) was 180 degrees at a speed of 20 knots. On execution of the flying course signal, Voyager was to take ‘Planeguard Station No. 1’—a position 20 degrees on the port quarter of the carrier at a distance of between 1500 and 2000 yards. Voyager’s function as planeguard was to recover any aircraft that happened to ditch into the sea. The fundamental principle governing this sort of exercise is that the planeguard destroyer keeps well clear of the carrier while she operates aircraft. With Melbourne steaming to the north and the flying course being to the south, Voyager would be roughly in the correct position when the ships turned together to 180 degrees on the execution of the signal. At 1950 the ships turned together to the flying course and Voyager assumed her station. As the winds remained light and variable, Robertson would need to alter course and speed to get the maximum amount of headwind across the carrier’s flight-deck. He would do this by signalling small variations in course. At 1957 he ordered the course changed to 175 degrees and eight minutes later increased speed to 22 knots. The Sea Venoms arrived on time at 2030 to conduct the first ‘Touch and go’ exercises. Robertson again altered the flying course, this time to 190 degrees. Voyager maintained her correct station throughout these simple manoeuvres. With insufficient wind available for the exercise on a southerly course, Robertson signalled Voyager at 2040 that ‘flight operations will be delayed for about ten minutes’. At 2041, Robertson ordered a ‘turn together to course 020 degrees, ships turning to starboard’; a manoeuvre which placed Voyager ahead of the carrier. After steadying on the new course, at 2047 Robertson decided to compare the wind across the deck on the more easterly course of 060 degrees. On the new course of 060 degrees, Voyager should have been 30 degrees on Melbourne’s port bow. During the few minutes that the ships held this course, Robertson noticed that Voyager was ‘ahead’ of station, being to starboard of her correct position, although at a correct range of 2000 yards from the carrier. This was not excessive, however, given the turns that had been carried out. Darkness had now fallen and ship silhouettes were almost invisible although the navigational lights were clearly visible. At 2052, finding that the wind was better on the previous course, Robertson ordered a turn back to 020 degrees with ships ‘turning together to port’. This was done by voice circuit radio. Before Melbourne steadied on the new course and while the turn was still in progress, Robertson signalled
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to Voyager the immediate execution of a signal ordering ‘Flying course 020 speed 22 knots’. The destroyer acknowledged the signal. Voyager was to resume ‘Planeguard Station No. 1’ and position herself 20 degrees on Melbourne’s port quarter at a distance of 1500–2000 yards. The destroyer would then proceed with the carrier on the flying course of 020 degrees. The required manoeuvre was a familiar one: the destroyer would normally allow Melbourne to pass ahead before falling in astern. Robertson would have expected Voyager, now on the carrier’s starboard bow, to turn in a large circle away from the carrier until she was on the new course and roughly on the carrier’s beam. She would then turn towards the carrier and fall in astern to assume her correct station. Voyager initially turned to starboard and away from the carrier but then she unexpectedly steadied and turned to port. The situation rapidly began to
The usual method of taking planeguard, from forward of a carrier’s bow
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change. When Melbourne had gained her new course of 020 degrees, Voyager continued her port turn until she was 1100 yards from the carrier. Robertson maintained a constant watch on Voyager, believing she was conducting a ‘fishtail’—losing speed through a series of tight turns while Melbourne passed ahead. Although not the best manoeuvre, it presented no danger as Robertson expected the destroyer to alter course to starboard and away from the carrier at any time. While Voyager was turning to port and towards the carrier, Captain Stevens and his navigator, Lieutenant Harry Cook, were conferring with Communications Yeoman Kevin Cullen at the chart table covered by a canvas flap, situated in an alcove forward and below the bridge. It is most probable that they were discussing the Melbourne’s signals using ATP 1A Volume 1—Allied Naval Manoeuvring Instructions (ANMI) or ATP 1A Volume 2—Allied Naval Signal Book (ANSB) as the authoritative publications. Voyager’s Officer of the Watch (OOW), Lieutenant David Price RN, was responsible for keeping a close watch on Melbourne throughout the exercise. At 2055, Voyager was still altering course to port. She was broad on Melbourne’s starboard bow but the range was now 1000 yards. Over the next fifteen seconds the ships closed very quickly as Voyager persisted with her port turn. When they were 800 yards from each other, a collision was inevitable. Thirty seconds after 2055, with Voyager still turning to port, Melbourne’s navigator, Jim Kelly, looked up from the anemometer (which told him the wind speed) and exclaimed ‘What the hell is Voyager doing?’ He moved to the compass and took a bearing of the destroyer to assess her movement relative to the carrier. Voyager maintained her turn as Kelly ordered ‘half astern both engines’. This order was countermanded several seconds later by Robertson, who ordered ‘full astern both engines’ after coming onto the carrier’s bridge from the bridge-wing. The lookout on Voyager’s port bridge-wing, the side of the ship nearest to Melbourne, was Ordinary Seaman Brian Sumpter. Although at sea for the first time it was apparent even to him that something was very wrong. He shouted ‘Bridge!’ and turned around to see Lieutenant Price already looking through his binoculars. Price dropped the binoculars and stared at the approaching carrier, as if mesmerised. The lookout’s shout brought Captain Stevens back to the bridge. Stevens needed a few moments to regain his night vision. Thirty seconds after 2055 he ordered ‘Full ahead both engines. Hard a-starboard’. He then turned and said, ‘Quartermaster, this is an emergency. Pipe Collision Stations’. Price had the bridge microphone in his hand and relayed his
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Melbourne’s bridge. 1. Captain Robertson watching Voyager. 2. Captain Robertson orders ‘Full speed astern’. 3. Captain Robertson at broadcast. 4. Commander Kelly at anemometer, ‘looking for wind’. 5. Commander Kelly orders ‘Stop both, half speed astern’. 6. OOW. 7. Chief Yeoman. 8. Lookouts.
captain’s orders to the wheelhouse on the deck below while the quartermaster took the main broadcast microphone and said ‘Hands to Collision Stations. Hands to Collision Stations’. Stevens hoped that by applying hard starboard wheel Voyager would either pass ahead of Melbourne or turn inside her path. But it was all far too late. The ships were now only 300 yards apart. The possibility that Voyager was not aware of her position relative to Melbourne did not occur to Robertson. Thus, no sound signals or urgent messages were sent to warn Voyager that she was standing into danger. Melbourne had little chance of altering either her course or speed in the distance available. It would take at least six minutes for her to decrease her speed sufficiently and nearly two minutes to effect an appreciable change of course. When Voyager was just 80 yards away, Tactical
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Plan of Voyager’s bridge, showing the visual blind areas caused by the gun director, mast, funnel and other fittings
Operator Bob Everett, on the carrier’s bridge, voiced what was in everyone’s mind, ‘We are going to hit her.’ The collision occurred at 2056. Other than those on watchkeeping duties or stationed on the flight deck, most of the carrier’s 906 personnel thought that Melbourne had hit a whale but they were soon made aware that Melbourne’s slight rise in the water and steady stop was caused by her cutting Voyager in two. A long day was about to become much longer. It wasn’t long before rumours started to circulate among the press. At 2200, the head of the Canberra bureau of Australian United Press (AUP), John Farquharson, was the first to hear that an accident of some kind involving naval ships had occurred at sea. He was contacted by AUP’s Sydney office and asked to check with the Navy whether
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Possible avoiding action at 2055
there had been a collision. He rang the home number of the Coordinator of Navy Public Relations (CNPR), Tony Eggleton. Earlier in the evening Eggleton had been informed by the duty staff officer in language that reflected the lack of clarity in Robertson’s signals that ‘Voyager’s bow had been detached from her stern’. It was obvious to Eggleton that something serious had happened. At 2330, he issued a brief statement in an effort to give the press some information: ‘Melbourne and Voyager have been in collision twenty miles off Jervis Bay. Voyager is badly damaged. Melbourne has sustained some damage to her bows. Further details are awaited’. As the correspondents of The Age and the Canberra Times were the only ones aware of the tragedy before midnight, they were the only two newspapers to carry the story in the next day’s editions.
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After midnight, and with Voyager gone, Robertson sent the Naval Board a brief outline of the events leading to the collision. 1. Melbourne had been flying course 190 speed 22, Voyager planeguard station 1. Flying suspended due to lack of winds and ships turned together to starboard to 020 to search for wind. Further turn made together to 060 then back to 020. At this time Voyager bearing 040 degrees 1500 yards. Flying course was then altered by signal to 020. Voyager turned about 30 degrees to starboard and appeared to slow down then to port across Melbourne bows. At time of collision she was at approximately right angles to Melbourne who hit her abreast the after end of the bridge. Voyager did not appear to be doing more than about 15 knots. Melbourne had ordered full astern. 2. Voyager then passed stern first slowly down starboard side of Melbourne and came to rest just abaft the stern.
With Voyager’s survivors on board, and her badly damaged bow secured for sea, Robertson signalled Fleet Headquarters at 0100 that Melbourne was 30 miles off Jervis Bay. She was making 6.5 knots through the water with revolutions set for 8 knots. An estimated southerly set of 3 knots would slow her progress even further. Her arrival in Sydney was estimated at Wednesday morning; one and a half days after the collision. The Fleet Commander, Rear Admiral Becher, arrived by helicopter, earlier than expected at 0300. He met with Robertson, inspected the damage to Melbourne and spoke with survivors from Voyager. Becher sent a signal marked ‘Exclusive Confidential’ to the Chief of Naval Staff, Vice Admiral Sir Hastings Harrington. I hope to despatch to you personally by air through Nowra a copy of Robertson’s report to me. You might find this useful in preparing any preliminary statement by the Minister. Without prejudice, I believe Robertson’s report gives the true picture. Enclosed also in the envelope will be several copies of photos of Melbourne’s bow damage. I hope to get this before noon. Weather fine and Melbourne progressing nicely but I have instructed Robertson to play it cool.
A private letter to Harrington was more revealing and provided an insight into how the Navy’s senior officers viewed the disaster. As soon as possible I will convene a Board of Inquiry and I am thinking of asking FOICEA if he will lend me [Captain] Mesley—an ex-carrier captain—to preside. I will also try to get at least one recent destroyer captain on it. Melbourne is a mess up forward as you can see
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from the photos. We are making 8 knots through the water and making good about 4.5. Everything holding very firm and of course the collision bulkhead (No. 13 I think) is completely intact. We will attempt nothing more. This is not the happiest day in my life and heart is sad for a lot of wives and families. [Original emphasis]
By sunrise the next morning hope had all but faded of finding any more survivors. At 0650 Stuart had found no further survivors or bodies. She reported to Rear Admiral Gatacre (FOICEA) again at 0950: Three air searches by average sortie of four Gannets and four Wessex of area within 15 mile of Melbourne’s dan[buoy] have shown great deal of debris within 1 mile of dan. No bodies or survivors. Ships have searched through area round dan and back to geographical position of wreck about 15 miles to north but with no results. Consider probability area has received high coverage and possibility of recovery of survivors now slight.
By 1440, Stuart had reported that most of the debris had been recovered. At 1800, Stuart ended her search and, as dusk fell, RAAF Neptune aircraft ceased their searches as well. A final sweep through the area was conducted during daylight on Wednesday by naval aircraft. On Thursday and Friday a Gannet aircraft flew across the area to check that no bodies had risen to the surface. An oil slick was the only marker of Voyager’s watery grave. Four weeks later, part of Voyager’s main notice board would be found off the New South Wales coastal town of Kiama. On Wednesday 12 February, the Naval Board announced that ‘as a mark of respect for those who lost their lives in HMAS Voyager, colours are to be half-masted from 1200 to sunset’. On the same day, the Minister for the Navy, Dr Jim Forbes, and the Minister-Designate, Fred Chaney, along with Harrington and Eggleton, departed Canberra in a Dakota aircraft bound for Nowra. They then embarked in a Navy helicopter for the passage to Melbourne, slowly making her way up the New South Wales coast. By this time, Robertson had already completed his first formal report to the Naval Board on the circumstances leading to the collision. He had dictated it in the early hours of Wednesday morning and passed it to Becher, who provided copies to the Ministers and Harrington. It was a brief document limited to outlining ships’ movements and the associated signals. After speaking with Harrington and over 160 survivors
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who had been questioned systematically by interview teams made up of Melbourne’s officers, Robertson attached a two-page clarification to his first report. The second paragraph read: Although I was not aware of it at the time, Voyager was cut in two by Melbourne’s stem. The stern half behaved as stated, the bow half passed down the port side of Melbourne, turned over on its side and came to rest off the port quarter.
Voyager’s missing were to be presumed dead on 17 February, one week after the collision. Their dependants would receive full pay and allowances until that date. The funerals of the three men whose bodies were recovered were held on 14 February. After some difficulties with the Australian Capital Territory Coroner over the release of Captain Stevens’ body, a private funeral for Voyager’s commanding officer was held at the Northside Crematorium in Sydney. Those naval officers invited to attend were asked by the Stevens family to wear plain clothes. Able Seaman Bob Parker’s widow requested that her husband’s body be buried at sea. The wife of the single civilian lost in the ship, H.S. Parker, a dockyard technician, asked if she could visit the place where Voyager had gone down and lay a wreath. The Navy met both requests. A full naval funeral was held for Harry Cook who was buried at Rookwood cemetery after a service at HMAS Watson. His parents seemed to be almost the only ones with a consoling word for the Navy by the end of that dreadful week. They wrote to Becher that: This has been a grievous blow to us, making the first gap in a united family. At the same time, we feel proud that our son has given all for his country: from the time he entered [the RAN College] he was a dedicated man, and never once did he utter a single regret for the career he had adopted. So far as we are concerned, his passing was tantamount to falling in battle, and while it has left us sad and lonely we have no feeling of recrimination whatsoever.
A national day of mourning was scheduled for 21 February, with memorial services to be held throughout Australia. Attempts to ennoble the deaths of 82 men by acclamations of service for the country’s defence and security were hollow and forced. The dead were victims of a tragic accident caused by human error or negligence—a waste, not a sacrifice. The media were, as expected, very keen to talk with the survivors. By
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mid-morning on the day after the collision, Voyager’s ship’s company was scattered among a number of locations. Some had been flown to Balmoral Naval Hospital (HMAS Penguin), others were at the Naval Hospital at NAS Nowra, or at the Naval College. The Navy tried to accommodate media requests for access to survivors but there was an early element of caution, as the Navy’s proposed policy was for ‘uninjured survivors to be available to the press on arrival Sydney and the press to be told to confine questions to those concerning personal experiences’. Many were unwilling or unable to talk. Most of the survivors had cuts, bruises, lacerations and broken limbs. Those with the worst injuries were transferred from Melbourne to Balmoral although none was in a life-threatening condition. They had multiple abrasions and lacerations, amputated fingers, renal injuries and inhalation and ingestion of fuel oil with pneumonitis. Despite the criticisms that later would be directed at the Navy by the press and some of the survivors, the Navy’s treatment of the survivors was generous. Each man was immediately given seven days’ leave and duty travel warrants to allow him to spend time with next-of-kin at Commonwealth expense by ‘the quickest and most comfortable method of transport’. This was despite the lack of a laid-down regulation on survivors’ leave in peacetime. It was also unusual in that the Board did not grant survivors’ leave to any RAN aircrew which were involved in accidents. Each survivor was visited by a representative of the Navy on his arrival home. He was given replacement uniforms, pay in advance and advice on claiming compensation for personal items lost in the collision. The families of those lost in Voyager were not forgotten. Naval social workers visited all Voyager widows living in naval married quarters and informed them that they could continue to occupy their homes for three months, with the possibility of a further extension. Despite good intentions, it was a big undertaking and there were, not unexpectedly, some deficiencies and shortcomings in the arrangements made for the care of so many victims and their families in the weeks following the tragedy. The collision had left the Navy with two pressing problems. The first was repairing the damaged Melbourne and the disruption this would cause to the Australian Fleet’s commitments in the region. The second was finding a suitable replacement for Voyager. Both problems would be solved remarkably quickly and efficiently. The problem of what to do with the damaged Melbourne was given priority. The carrier was programmed to sail in company with HMAS Supply for Manus Island
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and South East Asia on 10 April and take part in the SEATO Maritime Exercise LIGTAS between 25 May and 10 June. Early estimates suggested the carrier would be out of action for three months with repairs to cost £100 000. If Melbourne could sail from Sydney by 4 May, however, the Naval Staff believed she could return to Jervis Bay for embarkation of the CAG and trials on the aircraft steam catapult before sailing to Subic Bay in the Philippines and participating in the second half of the exercise. After being alongside for four days at Garden Island, Melbourne was towed to Cockatoo Island for docking. But work could not begin right away. As Melbourne was an important source of evidence for the inquiry, the Attorney General’s approval was needed before work on fitting the new bow could begin. Melbourne’s repairs were slightly more costly than the Naval Board had estimated but she was able to sail in May as hoped. Melbourne’s deployment would provide an effective and versatile Australian presence in South East Asia as Indonesia continued to threaten a ‘confrontation’ with Malaysia. She was not programmed to return to Sydney until 1 September 1964. Progress was also made on the second problem—finding a suitable replacement for Voyager. On 18 February, the British Admiralty offered the destroyer Duchess to the Australian Government as a short-term replacement. The US Navy offered the near obsolete destroyers The Sullivans and Twining shortly afterwards. After making detailed comparisons, on 22 February 1964 the Naval Board advised Federal Cabinet that ‘from logistic, manpower and financial aspects, the choice . . . clearly points to the RN Daring Class destroyer HMS Duchess’. The Board recommended that Duchess serve on for a maximum of four years from June 1964 and be replaced by ‘modern construction escorts’. The cost of refitting Duchess (which was much older than Voyager and in need of a refit) and converting her for immediate RAN service was estimated at £295–305 000. The British offer was accepted on 24 February. The RAN had acquired a replacement for Voyager within two weeks of the collision. Harrington sent a short personal signal to the First Sea Lord at the Admiralty: ‘I am very happy that the Government has accepted your kind offer of Duchess. Thank you’. Despite the Board’s insistence that Duchess should be only an interim replacement for Voyager, she was eventually purchased and converted for duties as a training ship. She was finally decommissioned in 1977. A Navy press release dated 23 June 1964 announced that two frigates would be built as permanent replacements for HMAS Voyager. The new
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ships were to be of the River Class design—an improvement on the four Type 12 frigates already in service. HMAS Swan was commissioned in 1970, and her sistership, HMAS Torrens, the following year. In terms of operational capacity, the RAN actually did very well out of the loss of Voyager. A tired and ageing destroyer was replaced with three ships— another Daring and two River Class frigates. Repairing the damaged Melbourne and replacing the lost Voyager was one thing. Restoring public confidence in the Navy was quite another.
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AN INQUIRY OR AN INTRUSION? Few organisations are ever prepared for tragic accidents, and the Navy was no exception. Just before 2300 on the night of the collision Fred Chaney, the Minister-designate for the Navy, asked Sir John Bunting, the Secretary of the Prime Minister’s department, to inform the Prime Minister of the tragedy. Bunting was one of the few people to have the Prime Minister’s private telephone number at The Lodge and said he would inform Sir Robert Menzies immediately. After this initial call, Menzies received briefs directly from Harrington. A legend later developed that Menzies was not told of the collision. It was, in reality, a halftruth and seems to have originated with the press. In a leading story on Captain Robertson published on 26 August 1964, the Daily Mirror claimed Sir Robert Menzies, ‘it is reliably reported, first heard of the tragedy in a radio news broadcast’. This story had become wellestablished ‘fact’ by the time Sir James Killen’s autobiography appeared in 1985. Killen recounts the legend as a plausible explanation for Menzies’ subsequent decision to hold a Royal Commission. [T]he Prime Minister was not told of the collision and first heard of the news in an ABC broadcast . . . Menzies was rightly indignant. It is at times a neat point when a Minister should be told by his advisers as to a particular happening. And that is the case with advice being passed on to a Prime Minister. Clearly in the case of the Voyager tragedy the Prime Minister should have been told immediately.
Menzies was told immediately and was kept informed as news was available. But Sir Garfield Barwick recalled that early the next morning, Menzies was distressed to learn that the collision had been far worse than he had been led to believe, evidently by Harrington, who had been
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his only source of information. Menzies outlined the sequence of the previous night’s events to Barwick and expressed a fear that the Navy might close ranks and attempt a cover-up. To avoid this, Menzies wanted naval officers to be involved in the inquiry process. He and Barwick discussed possible courses of action, including placing a judge at the head of what he termed a Naval Court of Inquiry. Barwick was Minister for External Affairs, and Attorney-General (until 4 March 1964). Menzies discussed possible courses of action with several other callers that morning. The Naval Board, apparently unchastened by the recent public mauling it had received over its handling of the November 1963 disappearance of five junior officers from HMAS Sydney in a whaler off the Whitsundays, naturally assumed it would be investigating the matter. Becher, as Fleet Commander, believed the conduct of an investigation would be left to him and that a normal Naval Board of Inquiry would be the most effective means of determining what happened. Rear Admiral Victor Smith suggested that the Navy should use the timehonoured method of court-martialling the senior survivor from Voyager as a mechanism of inquiry. To agree on a course of action, a meeting of the Naval Board was convened at 0800 the morning after the collision. The minutes of this meeting record that: The First Naval Member outlined the circumstances as far as they were known . . . The regulations provided that a Board of Inquiry be held in such circumstances. It was a matter for consideration whether the Press should be admitted to the Inquiry and, in this regard, it was noted that they were permitted to attend the ‘whaler tragedy’ inquiry . . . The Secretary [Mr Sam Landau] pointed out that the loss of the ship could be considered a national calamity and, in the circumstances, the exclusion of the press from the Board of Inquiry would not be realistic. He considered, in addition, that in view of the nature of the mishap, consideration might also need to be given to the appointment by the Government of some outside authority to conduct the investigation, such as a judge, assisted by naval officers as expert professional advisers.
The Navy seems not to have appreciated that the loss of Voyager was a national matter and, as such, politicians not only had to be involved but would probably make the final decisions. Forbes arrived at Navy Office just as Harrington was informing the meeting that a Naval Board of Inquiry would be convened. Astounded, he told Harrington that, given the magnitude of the tragedy, the Naval Board could not decide the
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method of investigation. A message then arrived at Navy Office that Menzies wanted to see Forbes and Harrington immediately. Menzies and Barwick listened as Harrington explained that a Naval Board of Inquiry was the normal and, indeed, most appropriate practice in these situations. Menzies heard Harrington out, but said he had decided to modify the ‘normal’ practice by appointing a judge to head a ‘Court of Inquiry’, and to be responsible for its conduct and report. This came as a surprise to Harrington, but he made no comment. However, Chaney would say later that Harrington understood and accepted the need for external participation. Despite Menzies’ anger about not being fully briefed on the seriousness of the collision, this was not a malicious action on his part. He was too good a politician and too resolute a leader to be distracted by an emotional consideration. He had decided to depart from normal procedure because he could remember what had happened after an explosion in the Heavy Landing Ship, HMAS Tarakan, in January 1950. At that time Menzies had recently become Prime Minister and Josiah Francis was Minister for the Navy. As nine men lost their lives, Menzies wanted a Naval court presided over by a federal judge to investigate the matter along similar lines to that provided for Air Force Courts of Inquiry. However, there was then no statutory law or regulation in existence enabling such a Naval court to be convened. Menzies ordered the necessary regulations to be prepared and passed, in the event that such a court be needed in the future. But the uniformed members of the Naval Board were not convinced that these regulations were either necessary or desirable. The Second Naval Member, whose primary responsibilities were personnel matters, argued that the regulations were a vote of no confidence in the Minister for the Navy and the Naval Board. No court of inquiry such as is now proposed, has been found necessary in the Royal Navy, where they have had practically a decade of experience to each year of the RAN’s existence. Surely it is unusual to introduce a new law without some indication of the necessity for it or inadequacy of the existing regulations.
Arguing that these regulations would detract from the disciplinary authority of the Naval Board, the Second Naval Member strongly urged that the proposal be rejected. The Chief of Naval Staff, Vice Admiral Sir John Collins, the first Australian officer to hold the post, concurred.
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As Menzies did not pursue the matter further, the Naval Board allowed it to lapse and nothing was done. When Voyager was lost, Menzies recalled the Tarakan explosion and, under the impression that the regulation requested in 1950 had been promulgated, issued the following statement: It is a shocking disaster unparalleled in the peacetime history of Australia . . . I want to announce at once that there will be a prompt and thorough investigation into this tragedy. I have decided that the normal machinery for naval investigations is inadequate for the present purposes. There will therefore be a full public investigation conducted by a judge. I cannot, of course, yet say who the judge will be. I will also discuss with my colleagues whether he should be assisted by Naval experts acting as assessors. But the main thing I want to make clear at this early stage is that the investigation is to be prompt, thorough, public and conducted by a judge.
At some time between the issue of this statement at 1000 and mid-way through the afternoon when the relevant files in Navy Office were consulted, the Naval Staff realised the absence of any legislation or regulation to provide for the court Menzies had in mind. The Naval Board was then obliged to advise the Prime Minister that its predecessors had not carried out his instructions. One suspects this only compounded Menzies’ irritation with the Navy. Although the Board tried to keep the matter in confidence, Robertson would later comment: Rumour has it that the Prime Minister’s first idea was to have two naval assessors, presided over by a judge. However, he found that this was not possible without a special act of Parliament. Parliament was not sitting at the time and therefore he was forced to have the Royal Commission.
Passing a regulation to establish a naval court did not require the involvement of Parliament but it was affected by many other administrative difficulties and constraints, foremost among which was the shortage of draftsmen in the Attorney General’s Department and the well-known slowness of the Navy Department in drafting any regulations. Of course, the Prime Minister realised immediately what effect his public statement would have. To promulgate the Naval Court of Inquiry regulations would take much longer than Menzies was prepared to wait. He could not convene a Marine Court of Inquiry under the Commonwealth Navigation Act 1912 as it specifically excluded naval
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ships. Even the Commonwealth Royal Commissions Act 1902 would need to be altered to allow for the assessors Menzies had mentioned in his statement, an amendment which would require the recall of Parliament. The Prime Minister found himself in an administrative and political mess and, ultimately, had to settle for the Royal Commission he announced to the Press two days later, on 13 February. As the Royal Commissions Act did not allow for assessors and Menzies had no intention of adding to its provisions; the role of naval experts could only be informal and advisory. It was to be perhaps the only unintentional Royal Commission in Australia’s legal history. In a formal statement, Menzies said: We have decided that the investigation of the Voyager tragedy should be conducted by a Judicial Commissioner appointed under the Royal Commissions Act. The Commissioner will be the Hon. Sir John Spicer, the Chief Judge of the Industrial Court. There is no provision under the Royal Commissions Act for the appointment of assessors. The Commissioner will be assisted by Counsel who will, of course, be assisted in their turn by technical experts. The function of Counsel will be to help in the most thorough-going examination of all relevant circumstances.
The Royal Commission was directed to inquire into and report upon the cause or causes of the collision; the circumstances and factors leading up to the collision and, where relevant, the suitability and preparedness of both ships, their equipment and ship’s companies for the exercise; and, finally, the facts and circumstances relating to the rescue and treatment of survivors. From the wording of the Commission’s terms of reference, it was obvious Menzies and Barwick had framed them without consulting the Navy. Although he had appeared as counsel before Royal Commissions and as Attorney-General had been involved in setting them up, Barwick was not a great supporter of this form of inquiry. He is held to have said that ‘the only resemblance between a Royal Commission and a Court of Justice is the furniture in the courtroom’. However, there were advantages in holding a Royal Commission and, in some circumstances, it was the only appropriate course of action. As one of the Navy’s most fervent parliamentary supporters, former Navy Minister Sir John Gorton said he expected Menzies to hold a Royal Commission and that the Naval Board would have understood the inevitability of this action given the magnitude of the disaster. ‘Whatever the Navy had found through its investigation
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would have been labelled as a whitewash by the media and the public’. A barrister who was to play a large part in the inquiry, Ian Sheppard, commented: In my opinion, neither a Naval board of inquiry, nor a court martial would have provided a satisfactory solution. I have strong views of peers investigating members of their own profession. Internal medical, legal and police inquiries often come to grief. With all its imperfections, the public inquiry presided over by a judge is likely to result in much more public satisfaction than any other form of inquiry which can be devised.
The Navy and the nation were stuck with Voyager’s loss being investigated by a Royal Commission. The Federal Opposition praised the Government for its stand. The Labor Leader, Arthur Calwell, said it was imperative that the disaster be publicly investigated and that the terms of inquiry should be as wide as possible to include all questions of administration and methods that could have contributed to the collision: ‘Any other course would create public disquiet, particularly in view of other recent incidents causing damage to naval property and loss of life’. The Age greeted the announcement of a royal commission with approval. Yesterday’s prompt announcement by the Prime Minister that a judge will conduct a full public investigation into the sinking of the Voyager was necessary. The nature and magnitude of the disaster puts it beyond the scope of the normal naval court-martial in which a service in effect looks at itself and decides how far any shortcomings are exposed or concealed. It is important in a tragedy of this scale that a far-reaching public inquiry be held so that no doubt is left in the public mind about what happened and why. (The Age, 14 February 1964)
The press coverage of the collision and its investigation would play a major role in determining the course of the controversy. The Navy started at a disadvantage caused by the Naval Board’s refusal to be forthcoming with details about the accident during the night of the collision. The Press immediately sensed a cover-up and reacted accordingly. Robertson would later claim that the delay in informing the Press ‘was instrumental in putting the press against the Navy. Once again, it is not possible to blame anyone else but the Naval Board themselves’. There is some irony in Robertson making such a criticism, given that it was the very lack of clarity in his signals reporting the
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collision which led the Naval Board to delay issuing a press statement until more precise details were known. Robertson’s signals had created the impression at Fleet Headquarters that Voyager had merely lost her bows; something that would not normally have led to great loss of life. There were many in the Navy who felt that the Navy’s honour had been slighted and its admirals rubbished by the announcement of a Royal Commission. If the Navy could not be trusted by the Parliament and Australian people to investigate a matter within its responsibility then . . . what? The awful consequence, one that few were prepared to contemplate, was that the admirals should have resigned en masse. A retired commander spoke for many in the Navy and the ex-service community in a letter to the Sydney Morning Herald. Naval incidents should clearly be dealt with by Naval authorities and in this case the magnitude of the disaster in terms of loss of life or loss of ship should not be confused with the business of a straight-forward inquiry into a collision at sea. The tactical error which produced the collision remains the same error, whether Melbourne scraped paint from Voyager’s stern with no loss of life or sank her with all hands. With hysterical precision, the Government swept aside all the long standing and well tried naval procedures, implying immediately that its Naval Board of Admirals and its Flag Officer commanding the Fleet were incompetent to investigate the matter. There was no pause in which to gauge public opinion, only an immediate decision indicating complete distrust in the integrity of the officer corps of the RAN. (Sydney Morning Herald, 15 February 1964)
But what would the resignation of the Naval Board achieve? Would public opinion then gravitate towards a Naval Board of Inquiry? The truth is that the Board’s wholesale resignation would have achieved very little. It would certainly not have led the Government to abandon the Royal Commission while the public would have interpreted a mass resignation as the act of guilty men who had failed in the discharge of their responsibilities. Yet the problem of excluding the Navy and its expertise from the investigation was something that did concern Menzies. Not only was the Navy ideally placed to help the Commission make sense of the evidence and arguments presented to it, but Menzies wanted to make the Navy feel it had a role and a voice in how the inquiry was conducted. The Deputy Crown Solicitor wrote to the Fleet Commander on 18 February:
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It would be of great assistance and benefit to Counsel assisting the Royal Commission if a naval officer with appropriate experience could be made available to confer with and advise Counsel on matters relevant to the Royal Commission of Inquiry. The officer selected would need to have experience relevant to be in command of vessels such as HMAS Melbourne and HMAS Voyager. If no one officer has the relevant experience, it would be of assistance if two officers could be made available.
The Naval Board was very willing to accede to this request: Captain R.I. Peek, the captain of HMAS Melbourne until 5 January 1964 and Captain J.P. Stevenson, until 14 February 1964 captain of HMAS Vendetta, a sister ship of HMAS Voyager, have been made available to advise Counsel assisting the Royal Commission. Similarly, Captain J.S. Mesley, one time captain of HMAS Melbourne and Commander J.L.W. Merson, until 7 January 1964, in command of the Type 12 frigate HMAS Yarra and who thus possesses recent experience in Fleet Operations, have been made available to advise Counsel representing the Navy.
The RAN began preparing itself for the Commission while Chaney attempted to shield it from its critics and avoid the Commission’s terms of inquiry being expanded to examine the Navy’s operating techniques and procedures, training methods and systems of control and communication. The Federal Opposition and some sections of the press were contending that there was something basically wrong with the Navy for it to be so accident prone. In a letter sent to Menzies on 21 February, Chaney suggested that it would be unwise to extend the Commission’s terms, as doing so might inadvertently lead to criticism of the United States Navy and the Royal Navy, both of whom used the same techniques and procedures as the RAN. Whatever the concerns prompting public debate on widening the terms of inquiry were, it was for the Royal Commissioner to determine whether there was anything wrong with Naval administration. The Honourable Sir John Spicer had been the Attorney-General in Menzies’ Cabinet from 1949 to 1956, when he was appointed Chief Justice of the new Commonwealth Industrial Court. Although he could be firm, Spicer was not a strong personality but he was familiar with public administration and experienced in disaster investigations having recently presided over two separate inquiries into aircraft crashes. Despite later criticism of his appointment, he was virtually the automatic selection as Royal Commissioner. As the Commonwealth
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Navigation Act was part of the jurisdiction of the Industrial Court, it conducted Marine Courts of Inquiry and was known to be underutilised at the time of the collision. The Commissioner sat alone when the inquiry first convened on 25 February 1964 in a courtroom on the third floor of 119 Phillip Street in Sydney. There were five counsel at the bar table, each with his junior counsel. Opposite each pair of barristers, with their backs to the Commissioner, was a clerk or an assistant, who was sometimes joined by an instructing solicitor. There were seldom less than twenty people spread around the bar table, each jockeying for the most room and the greatest privacy. Behind counsel were the designated ‘naval assessors’ and an assortment of other naval officers. Between the bar table and Sir John Spicer were four Commission officials and two shorthand court recorders. Inside the court were a Commonwealth Police officer and an usher. Perhaps symbolising the precariousness of his position, Captain Robertson was initially seated, alone, at the bar table. His chair was adjacent to the public benches located behind the bar table and counsel. The press contingent consisted of four to six reporters who occupied a press box alongside the bar table and facing counsel. All told, over 70 people were present during the Commission’s sittings. It was cramped and uncomfortable for all involved; a situation which would only get worse as an enormous number of papers, charts, diagrams and maps would be tendered as evidence and distributed to counsel. Thankfully, the courtroom doors remained open and people were free to come and go as they pleased. There could be no denying it was going to be a full and public inquiry. Those appearing before the inquiry went about arranging and briefing their counsel. Counsel assisting the Commissioner was Jack Smyth QC with Ian Sheppard as his junior. The Crown Solicitor instructed them on behalf of the Commonwealth. Smyth was a leading member of the Sydney Bar with a reputation for devastating crossexamination. His job was to represent the public interest; to test the evidence presented, challenge every argument and explore every possible cause for the disaster. His aim was, simply, to find the truth. Sheppard had been admitted to the Bar in 1952 and, with Smyth, was a member of Wentworth Chambers at the time of the Commission. Sheppard had some experience with civil shipping cases having appeared in the Admiralty Division of the New South Wales Supreme Court on several occasions. Counsel for the Navy was Norman Jenkyn QC with Humfry Henchman as his junior. Jenkyn was familiar with Government briefs
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and had appeared for the Navy on previous occasions. Henchman had been involved in maritime cases before and was known to have a good grasp of technical details. The Naval Board had actually wanted Laurence Street QC and had requested his services through the Crown Solicitor, only to find the Stevens family had already engaged him. Street had just returned from appearing before the Privy Council when he was asked to accept the Stevens’ family brief. He had considerable experience appearing in the Admiralty Division of the New South Wales Supreme Court and possessed great knowledge of shipping cases. This was his first brief as a senior counsel. His junior, John Sinclair, was a former graduate of the RAN College. After joining the Navy in 1940, Sinclair served throughout World War II before resigning in 1950 to begin a legal career. He knew many of those involved in the tragedy personally. The instructing solicitor for the Stevens family, Fred Osborne, had held three portfolios in the Menzies Government until he lost his seat in the 1961 general election. Osborne had extensive naval experience: he had been commissioned into the RANVR in 1938 and eventually reached the rank of commander. During the war he was decorated for distinguished service in command of the RN ships Gentian, Vanquisher and Peacock. Appearing for Voyager’s Officer of the Watch (OOW), Lieutenant David Price RN, a British officer on secondment to Australia, were Leycester Meares QC with ‘Sandy’ Gregory as his junior. Meares had been a Lieutenant Colonel in the 2nd AIF while Gregory also had naval experience. Gregory saw their role as preventing counsel from pushing blame onto Price as a subordinate officer who could not defend himself. For reasons known best to himself and those from whom he sought personal advice, Robertson decided against engaging counsel and made no request for any costs to be borne by the Commonwealth. When Street had suggested to Robertson before the Commission began that he should have counsel and that they would need to meet and plan their tactics, Robertson said he would speak for himself. There was, he said, no need to agree on any ‘tactics’. He told Henchman and later Ray Reynolds QC that, given the circumstances of the collision and the correctness of his own actions, he had absolutely no need for representation. Robertson fully expected the Commission to exonerate Melbourne and thought engaging counsel on his behalf would only serve to convolute or prolong the inquiry.
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Robertson thought the Commission would be like the many Naval Boards of Inquiry in which he had played a part over more than 30 years. Perhaps he could also have felt that engaging separate counsel may have suggested a difference of opinion with the Naval Board where he considered none to exist. One wonders how much thought Robertson really gave to his decision. How was he going to lead evidence which only he could properly put before the Commission? He may have expected Jenkyn to ask the right leading questions on his behalf. His private papers reveal that he had no understanding of Royal Commission proceedings and had given almost no thought as to how he would defend his interests against the array of counsel intent on discrediting him. It also seems surprising that neither Commander Jim Kelly nor Melbourne’s OOW, Sub-Lieutenant Alex Bate, had separate counsel. Given the Attorney General’s readiness to have the Commonwealth accept the costs of counsel for Stevens and Price, who were both dead, there was little reason to believe that the same provision would not have been granted to them. Robertson’s refusal to engage counsel probably influenced Kelly and Bate, although there was an absolute dearth of legal advice available to any naval officer within the RAN at that time. With so many competing and conflicting personal interests, the Navy brief was likely to be unworkable. Hints to this effect were made to Jenkyn by other counsel but he resisted every effort to ‘split’ the Government brief. He believed that separate counsel for Robertson, Kelly and Bate would imply that the Navy was divided and, therefore, unsure of the collision’s causes and where blame might lie. At any rate, or so Henchman told Bate, the Navy brief would naturally cover his interests and those of Kelly. The only advice the young sub-lieutenant was given prior to the Royal Commission was simply ‘to tell the truth’ as he saw it. After a number of formalities, Smyth asked that proceedings be suspended to allow preparatory work to be completed. At that time, a number of those involved had still not given statements. Every officer and sailor in both ships was interviewed; 232 Voyager survivors and 906 men in Melbourne. After sitting for only twenty minutes, Spicer granted Smyth’s request and the Australian public were kept waiting for another three weeks. By the time the Royal Commission reconvened on 17 March, over five weeks had passed since the collision but there were still no answers to the many questions the parliament, press and public were asking.
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It appeared as though the reason for the collision could lie in any or all of five areas. First, that signals sent between the ships were either mistakenly sent, received or misinterpreted. Second, that Voyager had mistaken her position relative to Melbourne and had not recognised the danger of her final manoeuvre until too late. Third, that Voyager had assessed her position relative to the carrier correctly but miscalculated the area in which she had to manoeuvre. Fourth, that the state of training and readiness in either or both ships was poor and in some way contributed to the collision. Or fifth, that there was an equipment failure in either or both ships that went undetected and caused the collision. Over the following months, counsel assisting and appearing before the Commissioner would propose a range of theories, all of which put the cause in one or all of these areas.
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‘JUST TELL THE TRUTH’ Despite the breadth of the Royal Commission’s terms of reference, it was principally concerned with the final movements of both Voyager and Melbourne. Notwithstanding political pressure, it had not been authorised to probe any underlying flaws in naval training or administration. Establishing what had occurred in Melbourne was relatively straightforward as every person on the bridge was available to give evidence. All but one junior member of Voyager’s bridge staff was dead. After ascertaining the causes of the collision, the Royal Commissioner was asked to apportion blame and responsibility. Naval regulations held the captain absolutely accountable and, therefore, totally responsible for his ship. There was, of course, an enormous difference between blame and responsibility. In most naval inquiries, the apportionment of responsibility tended to dominate the distribution of blame quite apart from distinguishing professional negligence from errors of judgement. The Commission’s proceedings were arranged around the terms of reference and, to some extent, the availability of naval witnesses. As counsel assisting the Commissioner, Smyth would open the proceedings and foreshadow the evidence he would present. His opening address would effectively set the tone for the entire inquiry. It would interpret the terms of reference and suggest the major issues and questions on which the Commissioner would have to make a judgment. The Naval Board did not expect what followed. After dispensing with the preliminaries, Smyth claimed the evidence he intended to present showed the provision of safety and lifesaving equipment in RAN ships, and the procedures for their use, to be totally inadequate. This was a direct attack on Naval administration and went well beyond the immediate circumstances of the collision. Smyth then alluded to suspicious variations in witness statements and alleged serious flaws in the manner in which the RAN conducted its operations. It was immediately apparent to Jenkyn that his prime task as counsel for the Naval Board was not to
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assist the Commission to ascertain the causes of the collision but to defend naval personnel and procedures. As these procedures were determined and promulgated by the Naval Board, this meant that Jenkyn’s brief was to protect the Navy’s senior leadership. Of course, as he received his instructions from the Naval Board (through the Deputy Crown Solicitor) he was already obliged to side with the Naval Board in any dispute or disagreement with a naval officer or sailor. The second day of the inquiry was taken up with the evidence of Rear Admiral Becher. In addition to being the first person called, Becher was the Fleet Commander and an experienced, and respected, destroyer and carrier captain. Although the Commission was in its early stages, Becher’s testimony suggested that at least one admiral had already formed a firm view about what had happened and who was to blame. Smyth may have placed the Navy in a defensive position, Becher did the same to Robertson. Becher gave his assessment of the circumstances leading to the collision and what he would have done had he been captain of both ships. His strongest statement was that Voyager’s movements did not constitute ‘a tidy manoeuvre’ and would have concerned him as OTC much earlier than they seemed to have concerned Robertson. The most valuable point he made was to stress that ‘every moment at sea could have an element of risk if the incorrect thing is done’. The press made much of Becher’s evidence and its implicit criticism of Robertson, and created certain expectations in the minds of politicians and ordinary people about what had caused the collision. By this time, the inquiry was being covered in every Australian masscirculation newspaper. Other than differences in headlines reflecting each newspaper’s overall character and readership, the reporting was very similar. It was descriptive rather than analytical. Editors appeared to suspend opinion until the Commission’s report was released. Transcript from each day’s hearing was either quoted or paraphrased in both the tabloids and the quality broadsheets. As expected, the tabloids—Sydney’s Daily Telegraph, the Sun and Daily Mirror; and Melbourne’s Herald and the Sun—led with dramatic headlines and the most ‘startling’ revelation from each day’s hearings. Unlike the broadsheets—the Sydney Morning Herald, The Age and the Australian—the tabloids also included charts and graphics to simplify technical points for their readers. While The Age and the Sydney Morning Herald maintained their traditional reserve, the newly-launched Murdoch broadsheet, the Australian, ran some of the more dramatic headlines and carried photographs of the main witnesses arriving at the inquiry.
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The first half of the third day was also taken up with Becher’s testimony. To add to the controversy, Becher admitted that Robertson had called on him the previous evening and ‘warned me of what he was likely to ask’. Smyth was incredulous that such senior naval officers would have discussed evidence before its presentation at the Commission. Was the Navy, even at this early stage, attempting to manage the information presented to the Commission? Robertson was beginning to experience the consequences of his decision to represent himself. To make things even more difficult for Melbourne’s captain, Becher led Spicer to believe that Robertson should have taken some early action to avoid the disaster. When asked what he would do if a ship under his tactical control was executing an unseamanlike manoeuvre, Becher unhesitatingly replied: ‘I would immediately challenge him and his movements’. He further agreed that if there were even the slightest risk from another ship, it would be his duty to intervene. In the sequence of events leading to the collision, this moment would have been when Voyager first altered course to port. Smyth pressed Becher as to exactly when the moment for intervention would have been in his mind. Becher replied, ‘When his turn to port was recognised as such’. This would have been at 2054, two minutes before the collision. Intervention would include, Becher agreed in answer to a question from Smyth, reaching for the radio-telephone and asking, ‘What on earth are you doing?’ Coming from a naval officer in his position and with his reputation, Becher’s evidence had a tremendous influence on both Spicer and Smyth. It suggested that Robertson should have become concerned by Voyager’s movements much earlier and that there was action he could have taken to avoid a dangerous situation developing. In effect, Robertson could have prevented the collision from occurring. Robertson failed to launch a counter-attack on Becher although he had ample grounds for doing so. Voyager was well ahead of the carrier and over two-thirds of a mile away at the moment Becher claimed he should have intervened. Robertson could also have referred Becher to an incident several days before the collision when Voyager was taking station on Melbourne for an entry into Jervis Bay. On that occasion, Voyager made a mess of manoeuvring into her station and had to reverse her turn in order to avoid Melbourne. Becher was on Melbourne’s bridge at that time and his only comment was, ‘He has discovered his mistake. There is no need to tell him’. Robertson’s reticence in questioning Becher can be explained by a natural reluctance to embarrass or criticise a senior officer, particularly in public. His counsel, if he had had one,
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would not have felt so constrained. Having heard Becher’s evidence and noting that Robertson’s reconstructions of the collision had changed several times over the preceding five weeks, Smyth then alleged that Robertson had been trying since the moment of the collision to provide an account which best served his own interests. This became Smyth’s basic premise when he questioned witnesses who had been on the carrier’s bridge during and after the collision. The first member of Melbourne’s bridge staff to enter the witness box, Leading Tactical Operator Bob Everett, was asked whether Robertson had told his officers ‘what he thought had happened’ on the morning after the collision and if anyone disagreed. Although Everett had disagreed with Robertson and outlined his version of what had happened, he was emphatic that Robertson had not pressured anyone to accept his version of events. The second set-back for Robertson was the evidence of Chief Communications Yeoman Barker who was questioned on the signals sent to Voyager. Barker was emphatic that all were sent correctly and that after Voyager altered back to port at 2053, someone on the bridge asked whether the destroyer had sought permission to cross Melbourne’s bows. After ascertaining that permission had neither been sought nor given, Barker looked towards the closing Voyager and saw that Kelly had noticed that her port sidelight was visible. At that moment, Barker said he heard someone on the carrier’s bridge say that Voyager’s range was 3.5 cables (700 yards). Kelly then ordered the engines half astern and Voyager appeared out of the dark. Barker said that if Voyager had been alerted immediately, she could have ‘got clear by clapping on speed, and going across the Melbourne’s bow’. The implication was that Kelly should have sent a warning to Voyager rather than worrying about Melbourne’s engines. Barker had been the Chief Yeoman in Voyager the previous year and this seemed to give his opinion added credence. When asked by Smyth why he made no effort to warn Voyager if he believed a collision was imminent, Barker said it was not within his authority to ‘get on the radio telephone to give her a warning’ as Smyth suggested. Yet he later conceded that this action would have averted the collision. As Robertson had the authority to issue such a warning, and the need for it was apparently obvious to Barker, this amounted to a criticism of Robertson by one of his own bridge staff. Jenkyn pointed out that Barker was an expert on communications, not shiphandling, but Robertson’s interests had taken a blow. Barker was to prove a valuable witness for counsel representing those
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in Voyager. Street took him through Melbourne’s log and pointed out that three messages sent in the hour prior to the collision had not been recorded as being acknowledged by Voyager. Although Barker said he was certain they had been acknowledged, there was no mention of this in his statement to the Commonwealth Solicitor after the collision. Street then showed Barker the signal sent from Melbourne to Voyager ordering a change of course to 190 degrees, which was transmitted without a time at the end of it. He asked whether this ‘would give you any uncertainty if you were receiving it?’. Barker replied: ‘I would know something had been missed. You always put the time at the end of a message’. However, Voyager had not queried the signal, which was, in fact, acted on at 2041. This led Street to believe that the most likely cause of the collision was a signalling error, although not necessarily in Melbourne. He would maintain this view throughout the Commission. It would emerge in later cross-examination that if an incorrect signal was involved it was almost certainly to have been incorrectly conveyed or misinterpreted by Voyager rather than the carrier. There were two reasons for this. First, there was no dispute about the signals sent from Melbourne or that the carrier complied with them. Second, the voice of the tactical operator was audible throughout the carrier’s bridge and Barker testified that he heard Everett send the correct signals. In subsequent testimony, Commander George Jude commented that Everett did speak rather loudly because he was conscious of his voice after he came on watch at 1950. Robertson said that he personally instructed Everett to speak loudly and to face the captain’s position when he was sending signals so he could be heard. If the signal had been incorrectly transmitted, Robertson, Kelly, Bate and Barker would have heard the error and cancelled the incorrect signal. Both Street and Meares pressed Barker on his recollection of a ‘discussion’—referred to by Street and Meares as a ‘conference’—held on Melbourne’s bridge the morning after the collision at Robertson’s behest. Although Barker could recall disagreeing with Robertson on the angle at which Voyager crossed Melbourne’s bows, he had no recollection of anything Robertson had said. Meares was particularly harsh: ‘May I suggest to you that this conference was a sort of round-table conference in which you were all trying to resolve any doubts about [the collision] or uncertainties in your minds?’. Barker’s agitation showed in his reply: ‘That is not true. Nobody was ever asked to resolve any uncertainties’. It appeared to others at the Bar table as though the naval witnesses were constrained by Robertson’s presence and giving answers that assisted
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Robertson’s case. Was there anything really sinister or corrupt about this? Robertson was very respected and well-liked by his officers and sailors. Witnesses such as Barker may have felt they had to be loyal to their captain, but they also seemed to recognise that their first duty was to tell the truth. By the end of the first week, neither the Naval Board nor John Robertson had fared well. The second week commenced in much the same way. Melbourne’s OOW, Alex Bate, took the stand and was forced to agree with Smyth’s contention that he ‘could not be described as a very experienced First OOW’. Bate explained that prior to the collision he was on the port side of the carrier’s bridge looking for merchant ships. Thirty seconds before the collision he heard Kelly say ‘What the hell is Voyager doing?’ and turned to see the blurred superstructure of the destroyer at a range of 700 yards. Unsure of what was happening, he and Kelly rushed to the bridge radar and saw that Voyager was now only 600 yards away. Smyth returned to what had already become a persistent theme. He suggested to Bate that if he believed a dangerous situation had developed he should have sounded the bridge siren, located eight feet from the radar. Failing that, he should have directed the tactical operator standing near the radio-telephone to have alerted Voyager. Bate replied that he was busy giving engine orders, but conceded that Voyager was much more manoeuvrable than Melbourne and, therefore, had a better chance of avoiding a collision. To make matters worse for Robertson, Bate was shown Robertson’s report which stated that Voyager had initially turned to starboard, but was then seen by those on the bridge, including Bate, to turn to port. Bate said he heard Robertson say Voyager had altered to port, but had only taken a quick glance. Street:
Bate:
. . . you put your signature to this form verifying something as correct when you had not the faintest idea what was in the document you were verifying? You have just proved this, yes.
On being challenged by Street as to why he signed a document that he could not substantiate from his own observations, Bate stated that he had been instructed to do so by Admiral Becher’s secretary. Worse still, he had signed the collision forms before Robertson had even completed them. After this admission, Bate said he was not now prepared to authenticate what Robertson had put forward. Robertson’s credibility and the authority of the Navy’s procedures were in tatters.
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By this time, Robertson’s situation had clearly become untenable. He was not performing well and his position was worsening every day. He could not defend his own reputation and was ineffectual in dealing with the submissions of other counsel. There was little alternative but for him to take the early advice he had been given and seek separate representation. The next morning Robertson spoke with Smyth who agreed to ask Spicer for a one-week adjournment to allow him to organise counsel. In putting Robertson’s request to the Commissioner, Smyth remarked that ‘We think it highly desirable that he should be given that opportunity’. After a morning session lasting only five minutes, Spicer agreed to adjourn the Commission. The Easter holiday meant that only one sitting day would be lost. On 26 March, Robertson received a further blow when the Deputy Crown Solicitor informed him that the Commonwealth would not pay for senior counsel. Given that other parties had been provided with senior counsel, Robertson was, rightly, stunned. For the next month, his request languished within the Attorney General’s Department. Finally, in answer to a formal question in Federal Parliament from Liberal backbencher John Jess, Attorney General Billy Snedden said on 6 May: ‘I have reconsidered this matter in the light of representations made by the honourable member’. The Commonwealth agreed to pay Robertson’s legal expenses. Snedden did not say why he had changed his mind. Jess claimed that Snedden had privately admitted wanting to see Robertson suffer for his earlier decision to represent himself. While Robertson was fighting the battle over his legal expenses, the Naval Board was deciding whether he should remain in command of Melbourne. Captain Peek had already informed Harrington that the Commission was not likely to complete its sittings until June or July. Robertson’s continuing responsibilities in the carrier had already affected his preparedness for the hearings. However, removing him prior to the Commission’s report being finalised would excite adverse comment from many quarters, including within the Navy. The Board was in a quandary but, on 26 March, announced that Robertson was being ‘temporarily relieved of his command’ with Becher informing the ship’s company an hour earlier of the decision. On 2 April Captain H. David Stevenson was appointed to Melbourne in temporary command from HMAS Sydney where he had been captain since November 1963. On 6 April Captain J. Philip Stevenson (no relation to David Stevenson) was appointed in temporary command of HMAS Sydney. The Naval Board’s decision was prompted by more than just a concern for
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Robertson’s involvement in the Commission. Throughout 1964 the fear that Australia might become involved in combat operations in waters off Indonesia and South Vietnam was growing. When the Royal Commission resumed on 1 April, David Hicks QC was given leave to appear with his junior, Peter Raine, to represent Captain Robertson. Sitting alongside the Bar table with Robertson was retired Rear Admiral Harold Farncomb. At this point, Robertson had to bear his own legal costs. During that morning’s proceedings, both Bate and Kelly were questioned on the disappearance of a page from Melbourne’s OOW notebook. This was the high point in Smyth’s aggressive attacks on the naval witnesses. A page had been removed from the notebook and a small part left at the seam of the book. The page itself had come into Smyth’s possession during the adjournment. Bate was forced to agree with Smyth that the ‘torn page’ showed an alteration of course at 1957 on the night of the collision, and that it could have been significant. The pages following the torn page were in Bate’s handwriting. When asked about its removal, Bate said he did not know why it had been removed, or by whom. Handwriting experts examined the book and Smyth continued to badger Bate about it. The tabloids ran another sensational headline—‘Page Torn from Ship’s Notebook’. The matter of the torn page would emerge again later in the Commission. Bate agreed that an entry for a ‘fix’ (of the ship’s navigational position) at 2100 had been crossed out in the notebook, but explained that this had been a reminder for him to take a new ‘fix’ at that time. As the collision occurred at 2056, the fix was never taken. Hicks then questioned Bate in an effort to show that Robertson had never pressurised Bate to sign the six copies of Form AS 232—Report of Grounding and Collision—that Robertson was required to submit to the Fleet Commander. Bate said there had been no pressure but he would do as his captain directed him. Hicks lost the point. It was apparent that Bate’s inexperience had led Kelly and Robertson to act, in some respects, as though they were alone on the bridge in the moments before the collision. As with Bate, Kelly had no idea of what to expect at the inquiry. Kelly agreed that although he was occupied with finding the wind, he should have watched Voyager, or at least ensured that Bate was closely observing her movements. He also admitted that he did not try to communicate with Voyager or to warn her of any impending danger. Kelly was vulnerable on other points. Smyth had noticed three incorrect reports of Melbourne’s position after the collision. The first was simple enough: the carrier’s communications staff had given Melbourne’s
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position as a range and bearing of Point Perpendicular lighthouse from the carrier whereas the bearing should have been the reciprocal—what Melbourne bore from the lighthouse. When the position was reported at the Naval Air Station, there was no confusion as they understood how the bearing had been reported; in any case, they knew where Melbourne was. Certainly, she was not twenty miles inland. Kelly then had to defend the variation in his view that Voyager had passed across Melbourne’s bows at something more than 290 degrees or at right angles. He also conceded that Voyager had not been told of Melbourne’s altered turning circles as a result of her recent refit. Although the alteration was very minor and produced a larger turning circle (in other words, a slower turn) and would have no real effect on the relative movement of the two ships prior to the collision, the admission allowed Smyth to discredit Kelly and suggest that Melbourne may not have reached the 020 course until much closer to the time of collision. Smyth then developed a related line of questioning that evidently impressed Spicer. In his various reconstructions of the collision, Smyth had Kelly concede that if Voyager had altered course to starboard even as late as 40 seconds prior to the collision, she could have avoided hitting Melbourne. Smyth then pointed out that according to one particular drawing prepared by Kelly as part of an earlier draft of Robertson’s report, this margin could even have been as little as 30 seconds. Smyth asked Kelly why this had not been included in Robertson’s final report to the collision. There was nothing sinister in the changes made to Robertson’s numerous reports to the Naval Board during their various drafts but Smyth’s line of questioning made it look as though Robertson had something to hide. Despite Smyth’s repeated criticisms, Robertson remained remarkably frank and open about his thinking in the few minutes prior to the collision and his subsequent reconstructions of events. Although Robertson sought to make the best use of all the information then available to him, and showed little interest in deception, the tone of his final report was more guarded than those drafted during the previous three weeks. He also wisely declined to include a theory to account for Voyager’s final movements. All the evidence suggests that Robertson acted on his own and without any direction or advice from the Naval Board in preparing his report, but he voluntarily subjected his reconstructions to the scrutiny of no less than three experienced RAN navigation specialists. Their comments revealed some minor differences of opinion on the relative motions of both ships and the reliability of available turning data, but all three supported Robertson’s conclusions.
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Captain Robertson’s reconstruction, 6 May 1964
Smyth persisted with this line of questioning, however, and returned to the first draft of Robertson’s report. When describing Voyager’s turn to port as the first part of a ‘fishtail’, Robertson had crossed out ‘unseamanlike’ and replaced it with ‘not the best practice but possible if tightly controlled’. Melbourne’s 2nd OOW, Sub-Lieutenant F.M. Jefferies, lowered Spicer’s view of the competence of Melbourne’s bridge staff even further when he admitted that he had not recorded Melbourne’s increase of speed from 20 to 22 knots at 2015. After being shown the OOW notebook, he also conceded that his previous statement that he had not written anything in the OOW’s notebook on the night of the collision was untrue. He was also unable to explain why, contrary to regulations, a page had been torn from the notebook. After releasing Melbourne’s personnel to enable them to rejoin their ship and sail for South East Asia, Smyth called the first of the Voyager
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witnesses. He also reminded the Commission that these witnesses’ evidence would be relevant to the Commission’s third term of reference relating to the treatment and rescue of survivors. The major impediment in arriving at a satisfactory explanation of the collision was, of course, the absence of personnel who were responsible for Voyager’s final movements in the two to three minutes prior to the collision. All four officers and the communications yeoman on the bridge at the time were dead. The only survivors from the bridge were Tactical Operator Gary Evans (the signalman at the communications desk) and Ordinary Seaman Brian Sumpter (the port lookout). The only man to survive from the wheelhouse was the port engine telegraph operator, Ordinary Seaman Alex Degenhardt, and the sole survivor from the operations room was Leading Seaman Michael Patterson, the radar operator. The first to be called was 19-year-old Sumpter, who had spent only one day at sea in HMAS Derwent prior to going to sea in Voyager. Sumpter commenced duty as port lookout a few minutes before the collision. After Melbourne continued to close the destroyer, Sumpter called out to the bridge. When there was no answer he turned and saw Price looking at Melbourne through his binoculars. Sumpter looked around to face the carrier again before hearing Price order the engines ‘full ahead’. This was crucial evidence. It appeared that Melbourne was broad on Voyager’s bow at the time Sumpter turned towards Price— more than one minute before the collision. On closer questioning Sumpter said that Price later looked through his binoculars. Robertson remarked in his private notes: ‘He would not have used glasses if he suddenly saw Melbourne in an unexpected position. Given that the final orders to avoid the collision were given at around 30 seconds before impact, it is possible that Voyager’s bridge might have taken as much as one minute to assess the situation, only acting when a collision was imminent’. Sumpter’s evidence effectively ruled out the possibility of port wheel having been inadvertently left on. Melbourne’s bearing was changing appreciably and was therefore observable. But too much was made of Sumpter’s evidence that none of Voyager’s bridge staff came near the port bridge-wing compass repeat to take a bearing of Melbourne. It was one thing to say that no-one took a bearing, it is quite another to state that no-one moved to a position where they could have observed Melbourne and the carrier’s movements. Voyager’s bridge was compact enough that Price could have moved away from the pelorus (gyro-compass) in the centre of the bridge towards the port side, observed Melbourne’s sidelights and noted her position and returned to
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the pelorus, all in the space of several seconds. If Sumpter had been looking towards Melbourne, this could have happened without his knowledge. However, Robertson was adamant that Sumpter’s evidence that he saw the OOW using the binoculars was: the most important piece of evidence we have heard yet. Whatever the relative bearing of Melbourne was when Price looked at her through binoculars one would infer that at least he thought he knew what he was doing. This fact combined with the rumour that Stevens may well have left the handling of his ship to Price would indicate that Price was confused about some fact rather than that Voyager was doing something which no-one on the bridge knew she was doing. This, of course, means that my original theory that whatever was happening Voyager was not looking at Melbourne, is completely wrong. [Original emphasis]
This was a highly significant concession that Robertson never made in public and which he never mentioned again, even in his private papers. Its importance will be described in detail later. Tactical Operator Gary Evans sat in front of the captain’s bridge chair and could remember Stevens being seated when the exercise began with the Signals Yeoman, Petty Officer Cullen, at his right hand. On the night of the collision Evans had been using a telephone style handset to receive and acknowledge signals from Melbourne. He stated that when the turning signal was received he reported it to Price within the hearing of both Stevens and Cullen. He did not report any of the signals received that night directly to Stevens. With the background noise associated with steaming at 20 knots it is possible that Stevens, Price and Cullen did not actually hear the signal over the tactical primary loudspeaker. In any event, the sound it projected was usually distorted. Price acknowledged both signals as they were relayed by the tactical operator. Evans stated that Voyager steadied on 020 degrees before receiving and acting on the flying course signal. Evans may have been the only member of the bridge staff to have heard Melbourne’s turning course and flying course signals. Although very young, Evans offered his own explanation for the collision. He believed the cause to be that Melbourne gave a final order to turn to port and either failed to turn herself or was slow to turn. It was a curious explanation for someone who had been on Voyager’s bridge and who had personally received all of Melbourne’s signals. In fairness to Evans, it should be stated that he did not want to be held to the accuracy of any of the courses he recalled prior to the collision.
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The next witness threw some doubt on Evans’ credibility. Tactical Operator Burdett spent two hours in the water after the collision and had some difficulty remembering events before the impact. Although his recollection was in error, he said he could recall a turn from 190 to 060 because Cullen had chastised Evans for not passing the order to Price quickly enough. But there was no discussion on Voyager’s bridge about Melbourne’s movements nor was there anything unusual. Burdett also thought that the bridge loudspeakers were badly distorting transmissions. Much was made of this by Street. During cross-examination, Burdett agreed with Street’s statement that ‘it was difficult to hear what was being said over the speaker’ because of the distortion—the product of a technical fault that had apparently been reported but not repaired. Street asked the only seaman officer to have survived the collision, Lieutenant John Conder RN, whether it was easy to hear signals coming through the loudspeaker when Voyager was steaming at 20 knots. He replied: ‘It depends on the volume of the loudspeaker. Generally speaking I would say it would be fairly difficult to listen to it at something like 20 knots’. Other concerns were raised about Voyager’s material state, especially in the evidence of the sole survivor of the destroyer’s operations room. At 2005 Leading Seaman Michael Patterson had commenced a plot of the exercise but he stopped plotting positions about four minutes before the collision because, he claimed, the ship was heeling from the turn and he was physically holding on to the plotting table in order to keep his balance. Several minutes later, Voyager’s Executive Officer (second-incommand), Lieutenant Commander Ian Macgregor, asked Patterson if he had either Melbourne or the submarine Tabard on his radar screen. Patterson looked at the radar screen but could see neither of them. This, he claimed, was because the carrier was in Voyager’s radar blind arcs. Patterson said he heard nothing about Voyager’s changes of course because the intercom between the operations room and the bridge was not working. He told the inquiry that it had not been working since he joined Voyager and that he had not seen Melbourne on his radar since the start of his watch more than an hour earlier. One very useful piece of evidence that Patterson did offer, if only inadvertently, was that he distinctly remembered Voyager heeling during her final turn to port. There could be no doubt the bridge staff would have felt the ship heel as it maintained port wheel. This further discounted the possibility that the final turn had continued without the bridge staff being aware of it. After giving his evidence on the twenty-first day of hearings, Patterson read a newspaper report covering Evans’ evidence. Patterson
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had expected Evans to give certain evidence but when this did not emerge, Patterson gave a statement to the Deputy Crown Solicitor. In essence, Patterson claimed to have heard a survivor in the water calling out hysterically in the darkness, ‘Melbourne told us to turn to 270 but she didn’t’. When recalled to the inquiry and asked by Smyth why he did not mention it in his evidence, Patterson replied: ‘I did not attach great importance to the matter at the time. When I came into court I had completely forgotten about it’. Although Patterson would not put a name to the voice, he believed it was that of Evans. He expected Evans to have recalled what he had said in the water at the inquiry. Both Evans and Burdett were recalled. Evans, choosing his words carefully, said that he did not hear the voice mentioned by Patterson. When asked by Smyth, ‘Do you say it did not happen?’, he replied, ‘I will not say that.’ He conceded that he might have been calling out and may have been heard by Patterson. When asked, Burdett said he had heard nothing at all. Evans and Burdett were close friends although another of the tactical operators serving in Voyager at the time, Bob Jocumsen, said that after the collision he sensed that Burdett bore some resentment towards Evans. After both Evans and Burdett had been re-examined, Smyth sought to question Patterson further. With his evidence taken in camera, Patterson said that after he had given his statement to the Deputy Crown Solicitor, he had a conversation on 27 April with both Burdett and another tactical operator from Voyager, O.D.E. Sparks. Patterson recalled that: ‘Sparks said that he saw Evans in Balmoral [Naval] Hospital and Evans had told him that Melbourne had told Voyager to turn. Evans also told TO Burdett something similar outside this court’. Although Patterson could not recall if either Sparks or Burdett had mentioned courses, he was under the clear impression that it was a course to the west and was definitely not the turning course of 020 degrees signalled by Melbourne at 2052. Patterson spoke with Evans about these matters on two occasions, but on neither occasion did Evans make any comment. Jenkyn attacked Patterson’s recollection on the grounds that he could not remember a course. It was obvious that the Navy’s counsel did not believe Patterson’s evidence brought great credit to the RAN as it inferred that both Evans and Burdett had not helped the inquiry to the full extent that they were able. He also thought that Patterson might have been attempting to find a cause for the collision that shifted blame on to Melbourne. With Patterson standing by his evidence, Jenkyn attempted to destroy his credibility by asking him about his injuries and his
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psychological state since the collision. This was grossly unfair to Patterson who had shown great discomfort and reluctance in offering his latest evidence. Two days later, three witnesses were produced who claimed that Patterson was intoxicated on the night of the collision. Having heard these allegations over commercial radio, Patterson asked for an opportunity to reply. When asked about the accusations that he had consumed four cans of beer, he said he had in fact had only three-quarters of a can and had never said otherwise. Sub-Lieutenant David Isles (an ex-sailor) was on duty in Melbourne’s operations room. He stated there was nothing to suggest that Patterson was in any way affected by alcohol either on the night of the collision or later. In fact, Isles spoke with Patterson during the first ten minutes of the voice communication exercise that was in progress when the collision occurred. One suspects that a subtle campaign to discredit Patterson had achieved its ends. Nonetheless Spicer seemed to believe that Patterson did hear a voice calling out from the water. The only other survivor to corroborate Patterson’s ‘voice in the water’, was Able Seaman ‘Blue’ Matthews who said he heard a voice call out, ‘Melbourne didn’t turn, Melbourne didn’t turn’. Matthews was not far from Patterson and obviously heard the same voice while another witness, who Patterson could not identify, stated one week after the collision when the survivors met at Watson after returning from leave that the mystery voice was that of Evans. The evidence of Ordinary Seaman Alex Degenhardt, the only survivor from the wheelhouse, should have changed the Commission’s view of Voyager’s final movements. In a statement given the morning after the collision to one of Melbourne’s officers, Degenhardt confirmed that the orders relayed to the wheelhouse from the bridge had been ‘starboard 15’, followed by ‘port 10’, and then the final orders given immediately before the collision. However, two weeks later he made another statement in which he claimed that after port wheel was applied, the bridge ordered the wheel amidships followed by a course to steer. He could not recall the course but thought it might have been 032. This evidence contradicted the statements of other witnesses but it did leave open the possibility that Voyager had steadied on a course prior to the collision. Robertson could not accept that Voyager was on a steady course and would later call Degenhardt ‘an odd sort of witness’. In Robertson’s view ‘the original statement of Degenhardt was correct and his subsequent evidence about going midships and steadying was pure imagination as a result of him thinking to himself about what must have happened’.
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The witness whose testimony could have altered the entire direction of the Commission was Ordinary Steward Barry Hyland. He stated that at 1930, less than 90 minutes before the collision, he had served Stevens with a triple brandy—three tots of brandy in a single glass. Although alcohol was not expressly forbidden by naval regulations, captains and watchkeepers in seagoing ships never drank at sea. Sailors were granted a daily beer issue although not on the ship’s first night at sea. The Naval Board, privately astonished by Hyland’s revelation, expected Smyth to seize on this evidence as a means of further discrediting the Navy. Smyth had previously elicited testimony that some watchkeeping personnel in Voyager had consumed alcohol, but no-one had expected to hear that Stevens had had anything to drink. Smyth asked Professor C.R.B. Blackburn of the University of Sydney to advise on the effect this amount of alcohol would have had on Stevens’ ability to command Voyager. As Blackburn concluded that it would not have impaired his performance in any way, Smyth informed the Commission that alcohol was not a factor. That was the end of the matter. Robertson knew little about Stevens but stood to gain from making the most of his fellow captain’s imprudent action in drinking at sea. Notwithstanding, Robertson refused to have Hyland questioned by Hicks. It was, he said, unnecessary and in bad taste. The matter went no further and Robertson must have been conscious of the opportunity he had let pass. For the second half of April and the early part of May 1964, the Commission heard detailed accounts of the escape of survivors from the sinking destroyer and their difficulties with emergency and life saving equipment. To familiarise himself with the equipment, Spicer was given a comprehensive demonstration of all items at Garden Island. He also inspected the rescue craft used on the night of the collision. There were indeed serious shortcomings in Voyager’s preparedness for an emergency: several escape hatches could not be opened, some emergency lighting had not functioned and lifejackets were stowed in an inaccessible location. The Commission heard evidence from survivors that they did not know how to operate life-saving equipment and that some could not even swim. Although the sensational evidence foreshadowed by Smyth dealing with these aspects of the collision did not in fact materialise, the Commission was presented with a number of accounts which implied that men lost their lives because Voyager was unfit for operations after her 1963 refit. The Commission had willingly strayed from the most contentious area of its terms of reference. It had yet to hear all the evidence concerning the
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causes of the collision and the star witness was undoubtedly Robertson. After briefing his counsel and preparing his arguments, Melbourne’s captain finally entered the witness box on 12 May, the thirty-second day of sitting. Robertson’s evidence took six days. His demeanour was still that of a man with nothing to fear. He said he had confidence in both Kelly and Bate and believed, despite having been in command for only five weeks, he had a good ship’s company. He described the events leading to the final turning and flying course signals. After the turning course signal was made, Voyager turned immediately to port and seemed to settle on 020 degrees. When this order was given, Voyager was very fine on Melbourne’s starboard bow and probably moved beyond 020 degrees to regain station. At around the time the flying course signal was sent, Voyager turned to starboard. His uncertainty was a crucial aspect. Voyager’s alteration to starboard at this time happened very soon after my signal was passed. It is possible that her alteration was a reaction to that signal. On the other hand it could well have been a movement [to regain correct station] ordered as the signal was coming through. At the time I though it was a prompt reaction to my signal.
It was this prompt and decisive reaction that made Robertson think the destroyer was probably responding to his signal. There is ample reason to believe that Voyager did move immediately in response to the flying course signal. Throughout their training, watchkeeping officers are told to do something as soon as a manoeuvre is executed. By taking action, the OTC is made aware that the signal has or has not been correctly understood. Once an action is initiated, it can be adjusted accordingly to achieve the desired result. The conventional wisdom also suggests that the change of station should be achieved with a single alteration of course or speed as required. After watching Voyager turn to starboard, Robertson went on to the carrier’s starboard bridge wing and saw her steady before altering to port. Robertson said he continued to watch Voyager from this position until he gave the order to reverse the carrier’s engines. His interpretation of Voyager’s final movements was crucial. He said that after she appeared to be on a parallel course, the destroyer was ‘sitting there, to my recollection, for some appreciable length of time— again I cannot estimate—it might be 20 seconds, it might be 30, it might be only 10. I just watched her sitting there’. It was during this period, when Voyager held her position relative to the carrier, that Robertson formed the view the destroyer was carrying out a fishtail. He then
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noticed that her continuing turn to port brought her on to a collision course with Melbourne. Robertson moved quickly from the bridge-wing on to the bridge and caught the end of Kelly’s order to bring the engines half astern. After ordering full astern, Robertson said he considered altering Melbourne’s course but realised that it would have had no effect. For the next 30 seconds, he watched the collision develop and felt powerless to do anything about it. Robertson believed there were two possible explanations for Voyager’s final movements. The first was that her final turn to port was the result of ‘port wheel’ being left on mistakenly. The second was that those on Voyager’s bridge believed their ship was on Melbourne’s port bow. They became confused and ‘lost’ the tactical picture. This confusion persisted until the collision was imminent. By this stage in the proceedings Robertson was inclined to disregard the first explanation. Thus, he was left with the contention that ‘Voyager was on a deliberate turn to port on the mistaken assumption that she was on Melbourne’s port bow’. In turning to port, the bridge staff mistakenly thought Voyager was turning away from the carrier. He preferred this view because he believed Voyager had altered to starboard after the flying course signal had been sent. This would mean that Stevens was personally to blame because he countermanded Price’s initial—correct—order to starboard by ordering the alteration to port. While keeping his criticism veiled in public, Robertson was openly critical of Stevens in private correspondence to his counsel. He mentioned the ‘stories that one has heard recently about Captain Stevens leaving a lot of the handling of his ship to his officers’. He was also critical of Stevens for being over the chart table during a manoeuvre and for earlier sitting in his bridge chair. If I had been on the bridge of Voyager as the captain with Voyager in station somewhere ahead of Melbourne, I would certainly not be in my chair. On these occasions one is very much on one’s toes. And so far as I am concerned, I would definitely be in a position where Melbourne can be continuously observed until we get into a comfortable station.
There were two central elements in Smyth’s hostile cross-examination of Robertson. Citing Becher as an authority, Smyth attempted to obtain certain concessions from Robertson about what he could have done to avoid the collision. He also made much of the fact that Robertson had only recently taken command of Melbourne. The second prong of his attack was on the speed of Robertson’s reactions when he realised a
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dangerous situation had developed. Once again, Smyth returned to his, by now, familiar theme that Robertson should have used the radio-telephone to give positive direction to Voyager. Faced with so many competing and conflicting arguments and views, the Commission made its progress very slowly. To improve their understanding of the circumstances in which the collision occurred, the Commissioner and counsel spent a night at sea in Melbourne on 19 May following the completion of her repairs at Cockatoo Island. Counsel had previously been to sea on 20 April to witness a brief demonstration of night manoeuvres with the destroyers Anzac and Vendetta in company. As Melbourne had started exercising at sea, the party was flown out to the ship from Mascot airport in two Navy helicopters to watch ‘touch and go’ exercises with Vendetta acting as planeguard. Vendetta conducted one change of station from the starboard bow of the carrier to Melbourne’s port bow but there was no re-enactment of Voyager’s fatal last manoeuvre. Neither was the party given an opportunity to see Melbourne from the bridge of a destroyer. The final major witness was Captain Peek. He gave short, precise answers and limited his comments to only those matters raised in Smyth’s examination. He might have even been described as a reluctant witness. If it could be said that the Naval Board had a view of why the collision occurred, Peek would have been in the position to make it known. Yet he was unwilling to commit himself firmly to any view. Jenkyn asked if he accepted Street’s suggestion that Voyager had misinterpreted Melbourne’s flying course signal as being a variation on 020, such as 200 or 220. Peek’s answer was evasive but nonetheless revealing: ‘No, I do not. On the assumption that the captain of Voyager was a competent captain, and this is I think borne out by his record, I cannot believe he would not watch Melbourne constantly during the turn together’. Peek was prepared to discount Street’s view solely on the basis that Stevens would not have failed to look at the carrier, notwithstanding the fact that a turn to the west would have put Voyager astern of the carrier. As ‘naval assessor’ to Smyth and Robertson’s predecessor in command of Melbourne, Peek’s views naturally carried great weight. He proposed three ‘most likely’ theories. The one he seemed to favour was based on a mistaken signal. Given that a turn together from 020 degrees to 220 degrees would have put Voyager near her planeguard station, Peek thought that if Voyager had received both the turning course and the flying course as 220 degrees, she could have continued under the equivalent tactical rudder and ended astern of Melbourne with only
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a slight station-keeping adjustment required. Peek contended that a better method may have been to reduce speed and increase rudder. But if only the flying course were taken as 220 degrees, and Voyager thought she needed to wait for another executive signal, Peek thought ‘Voyager would have to lose 30 degrees of bearing . . . she would have to drop 30 degrees off Melbourne’s bow to be in station on a flying course of 220 degrees’. In this case her turn to starboard might have been intended as a movement to lose bearing—it did achieve a bearing loss of 25 degrees. At this point, he surmised, port wheel was mistakenly left on. An alleged weakness in the theory that had Voyager moving to a mistaken westerly course somewhere between 220 degrees and 270 degrees is that the destroyer’s final movements would still have led to her being some distance out of station on completion of the mistaken change of course. But if one considers Voyager’s previous efforts at station-keeping, discounting the theory on these grounds alone is giving Voyager’s bridge staff more credit than they deserved. Voyager’s stationkeeping to this point had been adequate rather than good, while the radar blind arc prevented her from precisely assessing her range from the carrier. The fact that this was the first night fleetwork exercise after a lengthy refit should have counted for more when assessing the ability of Voyager’s bridge to sharpen their perceptive skills in exercising what is often called the ‘seaman’s eye’. But this was not something on which Captain Peek was prepared to comment. Meares’ final question to Peek was a loaded one, designed to obscure responsibility for the collision. Meares:
Peek:
May I put this to you now: that if it were your unfortunate task, having listened to the evidence, to reach any conclusion as to what happened in relation to Voyager, you would find yourself in the position, would you not, of saying: I simply cannot say. Should I be put in that unfortunate position I would say that the matter was inexplicable.
This was a significant admission. Peek was effectively agreeing that a Naval Board of Inquiry would be just as unlikely as a Royal Commission to find the cause of the collision. Of course, Peek could have said that the Commission had not heard the right evidence or enough of it, but he did not. For those who were later to claim that a naval inquiry would have found the answer, Peek had already destroyed their case. All that now remained was for counsel to put their final submissions to the Commissioner.
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CONFIDENT UNCERTAINTY The Commission had considered 44 days of evidence and argument. While there was some inconsistency and contradiction in the testimony, some of the matters on which Spicer would be expected to make a finding could not be known with any certainty. For instance, what did Captain Stevens actually do in the few minutes before the collision? Did it matter? Was it enough for Spicer simply to establish that Stevens, as Voyager’s commanding officer, was responsible for the collision? Was there enough evidence for Spicer to accept Robertson’s reconstruction of the collision? The onus fell on Smyth, as counsel assisting, to define the issues requiring a judgment. Smyth’s only motivation in the case was to serve the public interest, which meant establishing the facts of the collision and its causes—regardless of their consequences. Smyth began his summing up on 9 June 1964. He would speak for three days in an address taking up 260 pages of transcript. He considered the first and second terms of reference under three headings. The first was the experience of each individual concerned with the navigation of the two ships; the second, the experience of each bridge in working as a team; and, third, the experience of the two ships in manoeuvring together. He began with the Melbourne, and described Robertson as a very competent captain of destroyers and small craft. But he had never commanded a carrier, had not been to sea for the previous three years and had not previously worked with anyone on Melbourne’s bridge other than Kelly; nearly eight years before. Smyth also pointed out that Robertson had never been OTC of a carrier and a destroyer manoeuvring together. Kelly had not served at sea since very early 1963 and this was his first experience as navigator in a carrier. Bate, by his own admission, was a relatively inexperienced OOW while Jefferies, the 2nd OOW, had no prior experience in carriers. Everett, the tactical
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operators’ supervisor, had previously served in Melbourne but had not been assigned to the bridge until five days before the collision. The carrier’s starboard lookout, Ordinary Seaman Russell, had only six minutes’ experience as a lookout. Smyth said that a more experienced lookout would have alerted the OOW. He then pointed out that it was only by chance that Kelly had noticed Voyager’s movements and taken positive action. The only person on Melbourne’s bridge who Smyth spoke of positively, in terms of experience, was Barker, who had served in Voyager until 9 August 1963 when he was posted to the carrier. But this was practically the first time Barker had taken charge of Melbourne’s bridge communications during tactical manoeuvring. Smyth then tried to draw a contrast with the experience levels on Voyager’s bridge. He started with the only member of the bridge staff in whose experience he seemed to have had confidence: Stevens was a very competent destroyer captain and had considerable experience in operating with carriers as planeguard and in related manoeuvres. Macgregor was described as an experienced and competent seagoing officer, although Smyth neglected to mention he had not been to sea for four years. Price’s experience was limited to smaller vessels and he did not appear to have any prior experience in carrying out manoeuvres with carriers. In addition, he had not been to sea for over two years. Smyth concluded that inexperience did feature in the collision. Referring to the second element of the inquiry—the experience of each bridge in working as a team—Smyth said that in both cases it was limited to the previous five days. As to the third element—experience of manoeuvring together prior to the exercise in which the collision occurred—this was confined to manoeuvres between 6–10 February 1964 and there had been virtually no rehearsal of them prior to the collision. Smyth suggested that such manoeuvres, particularly those involving aircraft which tended to distract bridge staffs, should have been conducted at a later stage in the work-up program. As for Voyager’s final movements, Smyth argued that Melbourne was unlikely to have been on a course of 020 degrees for much more than 90 seconds prior to the collision. As the evidence showed that Voyager would have taken at least three minutes to have reached the point of collision from the time the turning signal was sent, and that Melbourne was on a steady course when she passed the flying course signal, it must have therefore been the earlier turning signal (020 degrees) rather than the flying course signal that induced Voyager’s final turn. Once she had altered to port, Smyth stated that Voyager held a steady course some-
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where between 270 and 290 degrees. As the time-keeping in Melbourne was shown to be inconsistent, Smyth contended that the reconstructions presented by Robertson to the Commission were not reliable. However, he was convinced that Voyager was assuming planeguard station in response to the turning signal of 020 degrees. Smyth submitted that the evidence warranted a finding that there was some misunderstanding between Voyager and Melbourne as to the course Voyager was ordered to steer. Such a finding would establish the crucial initiating cause of the collision. Smyth hinted at a possible reason for the misunderstanding. The naval system of acknowledging signals by use of the word ‘Roger’ was known to cause misunderstandings and Smyth recommended that it should be revised by each message being repeated back to the originator as received. The crucial factor, however, was the failure of anyone on Voyager’s bridge to realise they were standing into danger. Smyth could not believe that someone on Voyager’s bridge was not looking where the ship was headed. Whatever the initiating cause of the collision, Smyth did not dispute what had been known from the outset: Voyager may have mistaken or misinterpreted signals sent to her by Melbourne, but she was clearly at fault in failing to maintain a proper lookout and failing to keep out of Melbourne’s way. And what of Melbourne? According to the rules of manoeuvring at sea, she did all that was strictly required of her. But in terms of avoiding the development of a dangerous navigational situation and, ultimately, the collision, Smyth was critical of the carrier’s bridge staff. Robertson should have intervened at a point when the collision could still have been averted. His failure to do so was, Smyth contended, a contributing cause of the collision. Bate failed to keep a proper lookout himself and neglected to ensure that others were doing so. Smyth said that if he had kept a proper lookout, a collision might have been avoided—a conclusion that would have crushed any junior officer. Kelly was also implicated in Bate’s alleged failure to carry out his duty properly as OOW. Given his earlier attitude, Smyth was relatively charitable to the Navy in his remarks on the rescue of survivors and the state of Voyager’s equipment. He pointed out that of 23 escape hatches in Voyager, 11 were without wheel spanners while one had to have been closed with the aid of a length of pipe, to give added leverage to the wheel spanner. Some of the destroyer’s emergency lights failed to operate and lifejacket stowages were not in easily accessible locations throughout the ship.
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But in concluding his submission on this term of reference, and despite the shortcomings he detailed, Smyth was satisfied that procedures and equipment met reasonable expectations. It was a better result than the Naval Board had expected given the accusations foreshadowed in his opening statement. Jenkyn was the next to deliver his final address. He, too, spoke for three days. He began by confronting some of the general allegations that had been put to naval witnesses and by clarifying the nature of his brief, something he had failed to do at the start of the Commission. Jenkyn stressed that the Department of the Navy did not want to conceal anything that would throw light on the causes of the collision. As Counsel for the Navy, I have no special brief for either Melbourne or Voyager, but I have a very real interest in seeing as far as possible that the real facts are ascertained irrespective of whether they justified proper criticism of those in command of either vessel. In particular, I am concerned that principles on which responsibility rested were correctly placed and that responsibility for the collision should not be placed upon the shoulders of any officer, or officers unless that responsibility was on the evidence, and on the evidence alone, clearly established in accordance with those principles.
Jenkyn also emphasised that the Navy’s operating procedures, particularly those relating to signalling, had been ‘tempered by time and tested in the furnace of war. Any criticism of those practices and standards should be advanced with caution’. He began his version of the events leading to the collision by disputing Smyth’s view that Melbourne had steadied on 020 for only 90 seconds before the collision. According to Jenkyn, the evidence showed it was at least two-and-a-half to three minutes before the collision. Voyager should have proceeded to her planeguard station upon receipt of the flying course signal. Her actual movement, in turning initially to starboard, was upon receipt of that signal. Jenkyn rejected Smyth’s assertion that the signal had been misinterpreted on lack of proof, although, for his part, he could not actually prove that Voyager had received or interpreted the signal correctly. To say that she turned upon receipt of the signal did not prove that it had been correctly relayed by Evans, Cullen or Price. Jenkyn contended that a submission that Voyager’s final movements were induced by mistaking a signal to turn to 020 degrees for a signal to turn to 220 degrees:
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not only failed to get support from a single knowledgeable witness, but was positively rejected by the experts who had been called . . . The submission was not convincing because it necessitated a similar mistake in the flying course signal. If the turning signal, understood to be 220, was shortly afterwards followed by a flying course signal of 020, it would unquestionably call for an immediate verification.
Everett and Barker in Melbourne, and Evans in Voyager, discounted the possibility that the signal was incorrectly heard over the tactical voice net. Yet the Naval Board’s own counsel could not completely rule out the possibility of a mistake. We say it is possible a mistake could have been made in Voyager as to the flying course signal, but no finding could be made to that effect. It is pure conjecture. There could not be a finding that Tactical Operator Evans made any such mistake without a grave injustice being done to him. Evans was a very competent tactical operator and gave his evidence in a very commendable way. He must have created a very favourable impression in Your Honour’s mind. It is very unlikely that Lieutenant Price, Communications Yeoman Cullen and Captain Stevens would have misinterpreted any signal given by Evans.
After arguing that the Navy’s signalling procedures and personnel were beyond criticism, Jenkyn did not see that his concession, virtually in the next sentence, that ‘it is possible that upon receipt of the [flying course] signal, doubt was expressed by someone on the bridge of Voyager as to whether it was necessary to await a further signal’, constituted a lack of confidence in both. First, the procedures were not clear because they could have produced doubt. Second, if the bridge staff of Voyager were beyond criticism, why did he even admit the possibility that they may not have been familiar with signals previously described as straightforward? It appeared as though Jenkyn wanted the Commission to avoid coming to any definite findings. He agreed that Voyager did not appear to realise she was getting into a difficult position until the collision was virtually inevitable. The absence of survivors from Voyager to testify to what was in the minds of her bridge staff, he submitted, meant the Commission would be unable to reach a finding on some aspects. For this reason, he warned that it would be ‘quite unfair with regard to Melbourne to throw responsibility on that ship, because the people in Voyager were dead. It is wrong to say therefore there should be a shrinking away from finding one way, by an ease in finding another way’.
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This led Jenkyn to Robertson’s role. Given that the Naval Board and Robertson did not necessarily share a common cause, that Robertson had separate representation and that the Board could only gain by diverting criticism for the collision on to Robertson, Jenkyn’s submission was remarkably generous. Put simply, Robertson did not need to pay attention to Voyager’s movements because he had ‘complete faith in Captain Stevens’ ability to so control and manoeuvre his own destroyer that the possibility of a collision was unthinkable’. Thus, when Voyager turned to starboard and then altered back to port, before steadying on 020, this could have been interpreted by Robertson as Voyager being unsure as to whether she was required to move to planeguard station with this signal or on receipt of an additional signal. At this point Spicer interrupted, and returned to the crucial argument put by Smyth that Robertson should have given Voyager some warning. Spicer: Jenkyn: Spicer: Jenkyn: Spicer: Jenkyn:
The ‘incredible’ need not have taken place if at 45 seconds Melbourne had given five short blasts. To have given five short blasts would have taken 15 seconds. Well, use the telephone then. It has to be given, and while this is going on—is this in conjunction with the order ‘engines full astern’ or before ‘engines full astern’? I would have thought you could do both. He has an OOW there. Is that not further applying a standard of perfection to a person who is being put into a position of almost mortal agony at that particular stage by an incredible action?
Spicer did not seem convinced. Jenkyn went on to emphasise that whatever action Robertson took at that point would not have averted the collision because it was clear Voyager was unaware of her own position relative to Melbourne and would have needed to be alerted to this before taking any remedial action. Jenkyn defended Robertson vigorously in arguing that he did not fail in any part of his duty. As for the other two officers from Melbourne, who were now Jenkyn’s special responsibilities, the Navy’s counsel stressed that they too did what was required of them and expert opinion confirmed that this was so. During the critical few minutes after 2052, Bate was conning the ship around from 060 to 020 degrees and
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had taken a bearing and range of Voyager to ascertain her position. As Kelly had a number of other duties to perform, Jenkyn said it bordered on the absurd to suggest he should have been keeping a constant watch. It was sensible that Street, representing the Stevens family, should follow Jenkyn and thus have the opportunity to answer criticisms of his deceased client. The crux of his submission was the lack of any disagreement among Voyager’s bridge staff as to her actions prior to the collision. Street argued that this suggested they knew, or thought they knew, their position in relation to the carrier. He emphasised that ‘somewhere in the passing of a signal from Melbourne to Voyager distortion had occurred which resulted in Voyager turning into a collision course’. The system did not permit the repeating back of messages, so unless a signal was queried, Melbourne had no way of knowing if it was correctly received and relayed within Voyager. The signalman was the only link between two ships moving at high speed. Evans had said he received the turning course signal as 020 degrees. Street asked the all-important question: did Evans actually say 020 when relaying the signal to Stevens and Price? Again, to avoid a challenge from Jenkyn, Street said he did not question the truthfulness of Evans, although he had mixed up callsigns during cross-examination, but asked whether Evans could possibly know that he had said the wrong course. Street suggested that ‘the difficulty, of course, lies in the human problem that those who mistakenly transpose figures are not even themselves aware of their mistake and thus there was no positive evidence to support my theory’. But this did not necessarily weaken it. Street emphasised that he made no imputation of blame against any tactical operator, but he suggested that the responsibility of passing verbal messages was too heavy to be placed on a man of junior rank. In asserting that there could be no criticism of Stevens’ actions before the collision, Street dismissed the claim that Stevens had become disoriented. In addition to pointing out that for this to be true it would also need to apply to all those who were on the bridge—Price, Cook, Macgregor and Cullen—Street was right to question the ease with which Stevens could have become disoriented. There were only two ships involved in the exercise. The previous manoeuvres were straightforward and the ships had executed only one major course change. There was one more compelling factor that Street should have mentioned. At every point in her final manoeuvre, Voyager was able to see Melbourne’s starboard sidelight. It was the only green light displayed by Melbourne and a number of witnesses claimed it was visible
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from Voyager even at a range of 2000 yards. Thus, Voyager was constantly in a position to observe she was on Melbourne’s starboard side. Taking the position that Voyager was on a steady course prior to the collision, Street argued that this must have been between 270 and 290 degrees. This was a weakness in his argument. It would have been more convincing if the course was a combination of the numerals 2 and 0, such as 200, 202 or 220 as neither the turning or flying course signals contained the numerals 7 or 9. Unchallenged, Street stated that none of the preceding counsel ‘has thought it permissible from all the evidence to seek to ascribe any specific aspect of fault against Voyager or her captain’. This was too much to claim, but it was allowed to stand because Jenkyn had concentrated on rebutting any suggestion that the Navy’s signalling methods were flawed. In his final submission, Meares naturally commended Street’s arguments which served to reduce the overall culpability of Voyager’s bridge staff. He submitted there was no evidence that Voyager’s officers had been distracted and the failure to see Melbourne was, therefore, the fault of every person on the destroyer’s bridge. Meares also argued that Voyager’s final turn was the result of a corrupted signal although he suggested a different error: that Evans passed the signal to Price having transposed the first two words. If ‘foxtrot corpen 020’ was reported as ‘corpen foxtrot 020’, Meares suggested, it would have been a turning signal. In addition, there was the possibility that Evans had jumbled the numerals and given a course around 200 degrees although Meares was unable to counter the evidence, as it was then accepted, that Voyager had been on a steady course to the west, or to the north of west. Meares said Voyager’s initial starboard turn was to her planeguard station and was initiated before the flying course signal was sent. Thus, Robertson’s view that it was initiated subsequently could not be accepted. As expected, Meares argued that because no adverse finding could be brought against Stevens, no blame could be attributed to Price or anyone else on Voyager’s bridge. By this point Gregory thought the best his clients could hope for was a finding that the collision was inexplicable. The end of Meares’ address brought Hicks to his feet and a change of pace for the Commission. Hicks’ long preamble described Robertson’s position before the Commission. He said Robertson was a witness like any other who had been called to help ascertain the facts relating to the collision. Hicks attacked Smyth on both the evidence he had put before the Commission and the way in which it had been led, claiming that Smyth’s examination of witnesses made it appear as though there was a
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case being put against Robertson, in the first instance, and the bridge staff of Melbourne in the second. Hicks argued that Robertson had been put in a defensive position from the day the Commission started. He then attacked the conduct of the Royal Commission itself: ‘We would say that we trust this is not a situation where you will get a trial by Royal Commission, because that is opposed to every basic tenet of justice and would be unfair and would involve a miscarriage of justice’. Robertson’s case had much in common with that presented for the Naval Board. Hicks agreed with Jenkyn’s conclusion that Voyager was at fault in failing to keep out of the carrier’s way, but that the reasons for this specific lapse and, ultimately, the causes of the collision could not be determined. However, realising that the case put by Street and Meares for Voyager left too much ‘in the air’ and allowed too much scope for criticism of Robertson, Hicks attacked Meares’ submission that the signal was corrupted on two grounds. First, that it could not happen, and second, that it ran contrary to all the evidence. Hicks also had to rebut the argument that Robertson should have acted earlier and differently so as to avoid the collision. Hicks warned the Commission not to make the mistake of viewing the situation before the collision with hindsight, or to use an accepted legal standard in determining when Robertson should have acted. This brought something approaching an apology from Spicer. This troubles me more than anything else. All I am saying is that does not a point of time come, and maybe it is too late, when he says this turn to port is more than an ordinary alteration of course, it is going on too long? I know it is all in a small space of time. It does come but the whole point is when should it have come.
It was becoming obvious that Spicer had to be convinced that this moment of time was very close to when Robertson actually acted. Hicks argued: ‘Captain Robertson decided to take action at a point which could not be precisely fixed, but which was probably about half to three quarters of a minute before the collision. That was when he went to the pelorus platform to give “full astern”’. Spicer was still not convinced. He remarked: ‘I think we can take that as being a bit after the time when he first had doubts. I am wondering when he first had the doubts, whether he should have done something by way of warning’. Hicks’ reply had little chance of convicting a sceptical Commissioner: ‘Captain Robertson has told the Commission that he cannot tell at what time he had doubts, but it could not have been a long period of time’.
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Realising that the various theories being proposed did not strengthen his position, Hicks kept to things that could be established. He submitted that either Voyager was on a continuous turn to port and that her final manoeuvre was initiated by the flying course signal or that her starboard turn was contemporaneous with the flying course signal or so close to it as to give that appearance to Robertson. Hicks’ strongest argument was that even if Robertson had warned Voyager or taken earlier evasive action, there was little he could do to avoid a collision. Therefore, Robertson was distanced from any blame. Robertson also wanted Hicks to shield Kelly and Bate from criticism. In private notes prepared for Hicks, he stated: I personally would completely exonerate Bate from any implication at all in the causes of the collision. By regulation he has the safety of the ship on his shoulders. However, I was there, I was watching, and I was in command. I should like to make it abundantly clear in the [final] address that I do not blame Bate in any way.
Having a right of reply, Smyth defended his submissions throughout the Commission. He started by claiming an injustice had been done to Evans whom he described as a ‘very fine young man’. He said there was no evidence to support the view put by Street and Meares that Evans had erred while Evans himself had never ceased to claim he had interpreted the signal correctly. But this had never been disputed. It was suggested that Evans may have relayed the order incorrectly. There was never a suggestion that he interpreted it incorrectly. Smyth restated his view that Voyager was turning in accordance with the turning signal rather than a flying course signal and that there must have been some misunderstanding on Voyager’s bridge as to what the destroyer had to do. Spicer seemed persuaded by Smyth’s arguments although he was attracted by the argument put by Street and Meares. If the view is accepted that messages were transmitted from Melbourne and received in Voyager, then obviously if the messages had been obeyed the collision would not have occurred. So something must have happened in Voyager, some mistake which was the initial cause of the collision. What it was, was not known.
With this sombre reflection, the Commissioner retired to prepare his report and the inquiry ended its public sittings at 1445 on 25 June after the recording of 4380 pages of transcript. The Commission had cost taxpayers in excess of £150 000. Spicer was now on his own, although Sheppard would later reveal that he drafted much of the final report.
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What the Commissioner thought of Robertson’s actions loomed as the most potentially contentious aspect of his findings. It would be far from true to suggest that all naval officers believed Robertson to be completely blameless. Some felt that Robertson would have been better served by turning the ships in succession, rather than together at 2041. A retired RAN admiral commented that: ‘The Commission failed to pursue why Melbourne, in the initiation of windchasing, did not adopt the simpler, prudent, seamanlike option of tucking Voyager in astern and altering course by corpen. Such action would have obviated any chance of collision’. Admiral Sir Victor Smith believed that Robertson should have stationed Voyager in ‘Formation 1’ —directly astern of Melbourne. This would have relieved Robertson of any concern about the destroyer’s whereabouts while he was searching for the wind. Another retired admiral who had commanded Melbourne during his career said: It could also be postulated that the first mistake might have been the signalling of a new flying course of 020 degrees whilst both ships were still completing a turn together to a new course. If (and here is the wisdom of hindsight) both ships had been allowed to settle on the new course of 020 degrees, Voyager may have been less disoriented during the assumption of her planeguard station, if that is in fact what happened.
In notes later issued by the RAN Navigation School at HMAS Watson, there were several points of guidance which supported these views. • • • •
Do not execute the next manoeuvre before all ships have completed the current one. Do not alter course or speed whilst a manoeuvre is being executed. Keep an eye on the navigational safety of all ships. Watch the positions of all ships relative to their correct stations and delay executing the next signal if necessary.
It was not that Robertson did anything wrong, but he could have acted differently and done better. The challenge for Spicer was to arrive at a finding that accounted for the collision. This would not be easy. Apart from Smyth, every interested party represented at the Commission had argued that the collision was inexplicable. If the causes of the collision could not be found, it was
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impossible to apportion blame. Spicer had to decide whether he had been presented with enough evidence, given that none of the officers on Voyager’s bridge had survived, to form conclusions on which to base findings. Public feelings were running high and Spicer was aware that a finding of ‘inexplicability’ would not be popular.
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BALANCING BLAME The Commissioner’s Report was made public on 26 August, when it was tabled by Prime Minister Menzies in Federal Parliament and it produced a range of public reactions. The tabloid Daily Mirror told its readers to expect ‘the most important document in the history of Australia’s armed forces . . .The report is expected to produce the most searching examination ever conducted of an Australian fighting service, in which efficiency, organisation and procedure will be highlighted’. The Mirror’s readers would be disappointed. Press analysis of the Report was generally superficial with most space being devoted to extracts. The headlines were consistent. The Sun led with ‘Judge Puts Blame on Voyager’; the Australian with ‘Voyager to Blame’. The Age finally brought down its verdict on 1 September, after its correspondents in the Parliamentary Press Gallery had had time to assess the reaction of government ministers. It revealed that: Ministers are frankly disappointed in the report . . . No one questions Sir John’s finding that a turn by Voyager beyond the course set by Melbourne was the primary cause of the collision. But Sir John also noted, as possible contributory causes, what to Ministers seem to be serious departures from the standards of efficiency expected of the Navy. What worries ministers is that Sir John suggested neither reasons nor remedies for these apparent shortcomings . . . Ministers feel Sir John’s report has raised too many doubts about naval efficiency for the Government to take no action, but they are uncertain about the action to be taken.
Most commentators agreed that the RAN had emerged relatively unscathed. The Age reported that: ‘At Navy headquarters the general reaction to the Royal Commissioner’s report was a feeling of relief. Sir John Spicer had not been nearly so critical as some people had feared’. The Spicer Report runs to 51 foolscap pages. The Royal Commissioner obviously had tried to keep his Report brief while using very
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straightforward non-technical language. That being said, however, the narrative is disjointed and confusing. The Report alternates without warning between Spicer’s own view and that of counsel who appeared before him, and he consistently neglects to cite the evidence and the argument on which his conclusions and findings are based. The Report is neither convincing nor persuasive. Certainly, no-one was prepared to say it was a good report. It was apparent that Spicer had not grasped the significance of much of the evidence put before him as his Report is characterised by gentle speculation and tentative assertion. The Report is structured along roughly the lines of the terms of reference. Spicer opens by describing the two ships, the officers responsible for their safe operation, the collision and the damage to both vessels. Then follows a narrative of the signals and movements prior to the collision and Spicer’s conclusion that some confusion may have been created by the existence of several conflicting interpretations of Melbourne’s signals. Spicer’s first controversial finding is that Voyager had steadied on a course of 270 degrees prior to the collision. After pointing out the degree of uncertainty created by inconsistently recorded times for Melbourne’s signals, Spicer ‘inclines to the view’ rather than a ‘firm conclusion’ that Voyager’s final movements were induced by the turning course signal; which he accepted was sent at 2052. Spicer neglects to say what effect the flying course signal, which he says was sent at 2054 or 2055, had on Voyager’s bridge staff. His explanation for the short starboard turn is lame. He sees it as the result of some initial misunderstanding of the turning course signal. As a purported finding of fact, this is highly dubious. The Royal Commissioner then attempts to justify his finding that Voyager was on a steady course, but the only firm evidence he cites is that of Lieutenant Commander Dadswell who was flying above. ‘I attach considerable importance to this evidence of an independent observer as indicating the nature of the tracks of the two vessels immediately before the collision’. This infers that he was unable to accept Robertson’s evidence primarily because he was an interested party at the Commission. Spicer also found that Melbourne steadied on 020 degrees at 2055, just as the flying course was being signalled, rather than at 2053 (or slightly before) as Robertson contended. Yet his explanation for these findings is far from adequate: Dadswell was flying overhead at nearly 200 knots, in pitch black skies, and was not prepared to say he was absolutely certain that Voyager was on a steady course for at least a minute, as Spicer concludes; Degenhardt could not remember the course the helmsman was supposedly given to steer after the starboard
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and port alterations of course; and the voice in the water shouting a westerly course did not necessarily mean the ship had reached or steadied on that course by the time of the collision. The evidence simply did not support Spicer’s conclusions. If Voyager steadied on 270 degrees at 21 knots for more than one minute prior to the collision, her bearing from Melbourne at 2053 would have been about 060 degrees at a range of 1700 yards. The collision must then have occurred at 2057. However, as it was generally agreed that the collision occurred at 2056, by 2057 Melbourne would have gained more than 700 yards and Voyager would have passed safely astern. In other words, Voyager was either making good a speed of 27 knots during her final manoeuvre (which is unlikely) or Spicer’s finding is a physical impossibility. It also plainly contradicts another of his findings; that Melbourne had settled on course 020 degrees for more than a minute, despite a firm body of evidence that it had been more like three minutes. In the section headed ‘Primary Cause of Collision’, Spicer covers the various theories put forward by counsel at the Commission. The cause of the collision, he concludes, was the failure of Voyager’s bridge to maintain an effective lookout. This was, of course, obvious from the start. But he does not allocate individual blame. Having decided that the destroyer was at fault, Spicer seeks to establish whether Melbourne contributed to the cause of the collision. This covers eight pages of the Report. Then come Spicer’s most controversial findings. Whereas he passes no remark about the individual conduct of Voyager’s officers, he makes direct comment on the actions of the three officers on Melbourne’s bridge. He deals with Robertson first. After indicating that he could not criticise Robertson for the timing of ordering the carrier’s engines astern, the Commissioner states: In my opinion it should have been indicated by three short blasts but the failure to give that signal did not, in my opinion, contribute to the disaster save to the extent that even the first blast at an appropriate stage may have served as a warning and been sufficient to alert Voyager to a danger of which those in control of her may not have been aware.
Spicer then considers whether Robertson should have queried Voyager’s movements when she altered course back to port. The moment Voyager turned to port forward of the beam her action should, as it seems to me, have created some doubt at least in Captain Robertson’s mind as to what her intentions were, and the moment
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the movement to port passed beyond such as would have brought her back on course, it seems to me that Captain Robertson should have made some enquiry or passed some signal, whether by whistle or otherwise, to Voyager. Whether action of this kind would have avoided the collision I am unable to say, but I feel that the chances of a collision occurring might have been lessened if some such action as I have indicated had been taken by Captain Robertson.
Then it was Kelly’s turn. Noting that Sub-Lieutenant Bate possessed only limited experience, the criticism was short and to the point: ‘I think in all the circumstances Commander Kelly should himself have paid more regard to Voyager’s movements than he did’. As for Bate himself: ‘In these circumstances I think he failed to exercise sufficient care as officer of the watch to protect his own vessel from collision. He did not himself maintain sufficient watch over Voyager at a time when he was unaware whether any other watch was being maintained on the bridge’. He also criticises Bate for not giving some warning to Voyager. How harsh were Spicer’s remarks on the performance of Melbourne’s officers, especially Robertson? Did they constitute a criticism or were they merely a comment? If the former, was Spicer saying that Robertson had been negligent and, therefore, at fault? If Robertson were at fault, it would involve both ‘causative potency and blameworthiness’. This, in the words of Lord Viscount Maughm, constituted: a failure to exercise that degree of the skill and care which are ordinarily to be found in a competent seaman . . . It is negligent not to take all reasonable steps to avoid danger in navigation, and the nature of those steps must of course depend on the surrounding circumstances, and they may call for the utmost possible precautions.
Notwithstanding the reluctance of his expression, the substance of Spicer’s remarks, which were unconditional and admitting of no mitigating circumstances, constitutes a criticism of Robertson so severe that it implies he was at fault and, therefore, partly to blame for the collision. Adopting Viscount Maughm’s description of negligence by a mariner, Spicer concludes that Robertson did not take all reasonable steps to avoid danger, and was therefore negligent. Spicer did not seem to realise the manner in which his assessment of Robertson’s performance would be received by Robertson, or any other naval officer. Conversely, Robertson would not have been aware that it was very rare that one ship be exonerated completely from blame in the vast majority of collisions at sea involving merchant ships. While it is
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one thing to apportion blame for the specific purpose of deciding damages in a civil action, it is very difficult for any party involved in a collision to be completely absolved from some contributory role. There is great wisdom in the old nautical adage that: ‘A superior seaman uses his superior judgement to keep out of situations requiring his superior skills’. The Report also covers the rescue and treatment of survivors. Spicer finds that the Navy responded effectively and efficiently to Melbourne’s signals and that he cannot criticise Robertson’s decision not to send a distress signal to all ships. As for the recovery of survivors, the Commissioner praises the operation, which showed ‘a considerable absence of panic among men’. He is also satisfied that sufficient survival and lifepreserving equipment was available and is full of praise for the handling of survivors and their subsequent treatment. Anticipating the release of the Spicer Report, Harrington had asked for expert legal advice. The Board’s sole uniformed legal adviser, the Chief Naval Judge Advocate (CNJA), Commander Larry Winch, delivered his advice on 31 July. Taking his lead from Smyth’s final address, Winch thought the Report might be critical of Robertson, Kelly and Bate and find that they were negligent in failing to perform their duties properly. If this was the case, the Board had two choices: to determine whether or not the evidence put forward at the Commission had produced a prima facie case against them; or to ignore the Commission and set up a Naval Board of Inquiry under Regulations and Instructions to the RAN (article 2301) with the possibility of a subsequent court martial. Winch strongly recommended against the second course because: the transcript of the Royal Commission contains a full account of all witnesses who could throw any light on the tragedy. The evidence adduced at the Royal Commission can be used as the basis for an application for trial by court-martial but the evidence cannot be used at such a trial in support of the charge. Such charge must be supported by evidence given afresh and under oath by witnesses called for the purpose.
A problem could arise, however, if one of the officers criticised by Spicer asked to be court martialled in order to restore their reputation. The Naval Discipline Act 1910 did not give any officer the right to insist on trial by court martial, other than during war service. However, a convening authority could grant a request for court martial if it was
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satisfied first, that the charges to be laid were correct and sufficient; second, that they were properly framed and carefully drawn up; and third, that the evidence, if unchallenged, would probably suffice to ensure a conviction. If these three conditions could not be fulfilled, a court martial would be, as Winch concluded, ‘a mockery and give the appearance of a whitewashing which, it is submitted, is just what the Naval Board wish to avoid’. As to the Board’s public attitude towards the three Melbourne officers, Winch recommended that the Navy adopt the final submissions of its counsel as its official view of the collision. As Jenkyn had argued strongly that no blame was attributable to any of them and that each was carrying out his duties adequately, such should be the opinion of the Board. Winch concluded that there was no prima facie case of negligence against Kelly or Bate. He made a separate conclusion concerning Robertson. If anything can be said against Captain Robertson, it can only be that it took him 2 to 5 seconds to react when the situation suddenly became, in his opinion, dangerous. Although it may be said that there is some opinion evidence that he reacted too late, this is in the main, hindsight, and does not constitute a prima facie case of negligence. Any court who could convict Captain Robertson of negligence would, I submit, have their tongues well and truly in their cheeks.
The Board had been very well advised. At its meeting on 7 August 1964, the Board decided that Winch’s report ‘should be used as an “aidememoire” when the findings of the Royal Commission are made available’. Cabinet asked the Naval Board to prepare its response to the Commissioner’s Report, concentrating on those passages critical of Melbourne’s officers. Not knowing at that time whether its response to the Spicer Report would be made public, the Naval Board produced a very bland and circumspect submission. It skirted around most of the matters in which one would have expected a definite response. It was most specific when explaining the Naval Board’s behaviour or rebutting the Commissioner, but offered no all-embracing theory for the collision and appeared determined not to comment on any specific cause or causes. However, it conceded there were some ambiguities in some tactical signalling procedures, which would be resolved after consultation with the RAN’s operating partners. The Board agreed with the Commissioner’s finding that it was not possible to identify those who had actually made an error, but this was of lesser importance as responsibility always rested with the captain. Harrington was most annoyed that Stevens had not been watching Melbourne and a handwritten note tucked
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into his personal copy of the Spicer Report asks: ‘What could the matter of grave importance [which had him at the chart table] be?’. As for the suggestion that Stevens was unsure as to the action he should take, the Naval Board did not agree that this uncertainty should have distracted a captain to the extent that he would neglect the safety of his ship. What the Naval Board thought of Robertson’s actions would become a highly controversial matter. The fact that the Board avoided expressing publicly any view did not mean that the Board did not have a view. In fact, there were two views; that expressed privately by Board members and that offered to Cabinet. In all its official submissions the Board insisted that Voyager was to blame and that ultimate responsibility rested with Captain Stevens. It defied every attempt to shift any responsibility for the collision on to Robertson. The Board did believe, however, that Robertson could have given positive direction to Voyager to take station when her actions appeared indecisive but conceded that ‘the movement to port beyond such as would have brought Voyager back on course would not have been apparent to Captain Robertson for an appreciable time’. The Board did not believe, even privately, that Robertson’s failure to make a signal to Voyager either contributed to the collision or was negligent conduct. As for Spicer’s statement that Robertson should have queried Voyager’s movements when she started back to port, the Board said it was difficult to give an opinion because inconsistencies in the time-keeping made any reconstruction of the final movements unreliable. On other occasions, and in other places, Board members were not so restrained in their comments on Robertson. They thought he both could and should have done better. What the Board never mentioned in Robertson’s defence were the doubts it now had about navigational lighting in RAN ships. In the May 1965 edition of the Deputy Chief of Naval Staff’s newsletter, issued twice yearly and classified ‘secret’, there was the admission that ‘the navigational lighting fitted in HMA Ships may be ambiguous and inadequate for ship safety when ships are manoeuvring at close range ahead of the beam of a consort, both for normal navigational purposes and for night flying’. The newsletter seemed to accept that Melbourne would have had great difficulty in assessing the full extent of Voyager’s relative movement. Two-and-a-half minutes before impact Voyager bore 054 degrees from Melbourne. One minute prior to the collision her bearing was 057 degrees and yet her heading had changed considerably. Other shortcomings in equipment and procedures demonstrated by the collision and the Commission were acknowledged but never cited in
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Robertson’s defence. Rear Admiral Alan McNicoll, who had been a member of the Naval Board during the first half of 1964, would later claim it was Harrington’s personal conviction that Robertson had been ‘overconfident and slow to react’ during Voyager’s final turn toward Melbourne. Although McNicoll maliciously overstated the case against Robertson, whom he gradually came to dislike personally, there is some support for McNicoll’s recollection in comments written by Harrington on his personal copy of the Spicer Report: ‘Kelly, who had been watching the anemometer saw the danger at a glance and ordered half astern before Robertson, who had been intently watching the whole tragedy occur from its very inception’ (Original emphasis). Harrington was a great believer in the existence of luck: an unlucky officer was considered a liability. Although luck was a fickle commodity which lacked any sense of justice, Harrington thought that Robertson was unlucky. This was unfortunate for Robertson but the fact remained. The Board was completely satisfied that both Kelly and Bate had performed their duties properly: the conduct of neither contributed materially to the collision; nor was there any negligence on their part. On the basis of all the opinion it had received, Cabinet was informed that ‘the Naval Board considered that there was no justification for disciplinary action against any of the three officers concerned’. Winch’s advice that the Board was unable to initiate action against any of the three, had it even wished to do so, was supported by the AttorneyGeneral’s Department, which had also been asked to examine the matter. As for Voyager’s operational state, the Board made the surprising concession that ‘there can be no doubt that something was very wrong on the bridge of Voyager on the night of 10 February’. It went on to concede that evidence concerning wheel spanners and defective radars indicated ‘that Voyager had not reached an acceptable standard of efficiency’ and undertook to revise procedures for thoroughly inspecting ships on completion of refit and prior to work-up. After detailing its response to Spicer’s comments, conclusions and findings, the Naval Board was determined to highlight the fact that the RAN had made great progress in the few years prior to the tragedy; achievements which should not be overlooked in the rush to criticise the Navy. The Board ended on a foreboding note. So far as discipline and morale are concerned, the Board believes that this is currently at a high level. It is believed, however, that morale
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will inevitably suffer if such attacks as have been made during the past few months that are shown to be unjustified continue unanswered.
The Board asked the Cabinet to rebut publicly the false accusations that had been made and reaffirm its confidence in the Navy and pride in its people. For all the criticism naval people had heaped on the Royal Commission, it was able to highlight at least a dozen areas of inadequacy in existing instructions for fleet operations. Allied instructions for tactical manoeuvring and signalling were amended. The location and operation of bridge and operations rooms loudspeakers was reviewed, together with the placement and briefing of bridge lookouts. Voyager’s loss prompted a host of other changes particularly in the use of life-saving and safety equipment. Naval training was reviewed to ensure a greater familiarity with the operation of liferafts and helicopter winching, and a higher standard of proficiency in swimming. In fact, new instructions were devised for swimming after consultation with the Royal Life Saving Association. A new mechanism which did not require the use of wheel spanners to open scuttles was devised by the Naval Technical Services Branch and produced in the Naval Dockyards. This would be fitted in all ships with these openings in the ship’s side, while the use of iridescent paint on hatches and all damage control markings was to be trialled. A new policy for lifejacket stowages was also introduced. Lifejackets would in future be located in areas adjacent to escape and access openings while the operation of liferafts would be demonstrated as part of every ship’s work-up. There was one area of revision not prompted by the Commissioner’s Report. Instructions regarding the issue of alcohol were quietly re-promulgated to prohibit a ‘beer issue’ when ships are engaged in planeguard duties or while flying operations are in progress or imminent. The Naval Board also pointed out that ‘Officers have the privilege of buying alcoholic liquor for drinking in their mess at lunchtime and in the evening. An officer is required to be temperate at all times in his drinking. It is most unusual for any watchkeeping officer to drink any alcohol whenever his ship is at sea’. In answer to its press critics, traditionalism and professional arrogance did not inhibit the Board’s reception of suggestions for doing things differently, and better than they had been done before. Although some senior officers attempted to portray this change as being
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coincidental with the collision and its aftermath, the Naval Board was striving to show the press and the people that it was anything but a hidebound organisation incapable of self-initiated reform. Whether or not it was sufficiently persuasive was yet to be seen.
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7
SCAPEGOATS AND MARTYRS Federal Cabinet discussed both the Commissioner’s Report and the Naval Board’s response on 4 and 10 September 1964. The first meeting outlined the theme of the Government’s response. [T]he central subject should be the nationally important matter of the efficiency of the Navy. The atmosphere to be established and maintained is that the Navy’s real efficiency is to be rated as very high, that the Voyager incident has been, and is, most seriously regarded, and that the Government and the Navy will together build upon lessons derived from the experience for the future greater safety and efficiency of the Navy.
It also decided that the question of courts martial of the three Melbourne officers had been disposed of by legal advice received by the Naval Board. These Cabinet deliberations had two outcomes: first, a Naval Accidents Investigating Committee would be established, similar to that operating within the RAAF; and second, a Cabinet Committee would be formed ‘in order to examine methods of training and organisation of the Navy with a view to recommending any improvements that appear to be necessary’. Robertson was given a temporary billet and directed to undertake a study of naval training procedures. Notwithstanding the Commission’s findings, he fully expected to be restored to command of Melbourne some time during September when the carrier returned from her deployment to South East Asia. Many others shared his view. Surgeon Commander Brian Treloar, the Fleet Medical Officer in Melbourne, wrote to Robertson on 11 July 1964: ‘We are all thinking of you this waiting period and are sincerely hoping that commonsense will prevail over sensationalism. We are all looking forward to your speedy return
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to the team’. But on 30 June, Federal Liberal backbencher John Jess had heard a rumour that Robertson might not be returning to Melbourne but be posted in command of the naval training establishment, HMAS Watson. Jess told Chaney that Robertson would not accept the appointment because it was usually filled by a junior captain, or even an acting captain, and would widely be considered a demotion. Robertson’s next posting—which was indeed to Watson—was confirmed in a letter he received from Harrington on 27 August, one day after the Spicer Report was tabled in Parliament. In Harrington’s view, Robertson was a naval officer and would go wherever he was sent—dutifully, without discussion and without argument. It seems that of all the appointments he could have been given, being posted to Watson was the source of Robertson’s greatest dissatisfaction. In private conversations with other senior officers, Harrington hoped that Robertson would submit a redress of grievance to the Naval Board which would give the Navy a chance to conduct some form of inquiry or major review of its own. The Naval Board had every good intention in trying to do what it thought was genuinely best for Robertson, given that its members never thought he would resign. There was every chance that Robertson could have been promoted if he had remained in the service—Captain Bill Dovers had not been barred from promotion over the HMAS Sydney ‘Whaler’ tragedy and eventually gained Flag rank. Robertson received the letter advising him of his new posting with dozens of other letters, telegrams and cards congratulating him on the findings of the Spicer Report. Nearly every letter believed Spicer had cleared him of any blame. This correspondence evidently sat uneasily with Robertson and the only letter to receive a reply was Harrington’s. I fully understand the reasons which have prompted you to make this decision and I do not quarrel with it. I only wish I were capable of explaining to you the damage you are doing to the RAN in general. You must, of course, realise that as a matter of principle, I shall have to resign my commission. How and when I shall do this I have not yet decided. In the meantime it would be helpful if some thought could be given to my pension entitlements in view of the special circumstances of the case.
By this time, the admirals had met to discuss the new crisis. They decided it was not possible to send Robertson back to Melbourne—ever. The ship was fully operational under Captain David Stevenson and there was every likelihood that Australia would soon be involved in a war with Indonesia, which would necessitate the use of substantial naval
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power, but the extent to which the Naval Board was motivated by operational concerns was completely disregarded by both Robertson and the press. Of course, for security reasons, the Board was not in a position to make public the grounds on which Robertson could not return to Melbourne. It was a justifiable decision which showed courage and conviction. After receiving official notice of his posting on 8 September, Robertson submitted his formal letter of resignation on two days later. McNicoll, as his administrative authority and, at that time, the admiral closest personally to Robertson, asked to see him on 13 September. He tried to persuade Robertson at least to delay his resignation until he had taken up his appointment at Watson. McNicoll believed Robertson was acting too hastily and that he might regret his decision, given the strain and anguish he was under. But Robertson was resolute. His resignation added to the unfolding political drama. Voyager’s loss was debated in Parliament with the opening address presented by the Prime Minister. Menzies covered the matters raised by Spicer and his principal findings, including his criticism of the three Melbourne officers. He announced that no action could or would be taken against the officers because of the legal advice he had received. The Navy emerged well from the Prime Minister’s address and he made the point that the Naval Board would have most wanted him to make: [L]ife at sea has its hazards, and that this is plainly true in the case of the Navy, which must prepare itself to fight by day or by night in all sorts of circumstances and weather and whose preparations can be effective only by practising by day or by night every sort of manoeuvre which may be needed in war.
His verdict on the way ahead was positive and constructive. There was nothing fundamentally wrong with the RAN: ‘we have a fine Navy, with a gallant and devoted company of officers and men. It is the task of all of us in authority to remove any discoverable impediments to its full effectiveness’. The Opposition had an opportunity to attack the Government but wanted to avoid harming the Navy. Deputy Opposition leader Gough Whitlam, as a war-time ex-serviceman, believed it was bad form to criticise servicemen and women in Parliament. The member for the Melbourne bayside seat of Batman, Sam Benson, seemed to be the logical choice to lead the debate for the Opposition, despite the fact that he was a mere backbencher and the Spicer Report had been tabled personally by
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the Prime Minister. Benson was a merchant marine captain who had spent some time with the RAN Reserve during the war. He subsequently considered himself an expert on naval operations, although his knowledge of the RAN was both superficial and narrow while his experience was limited and dated. However, this did not stop him making allegations that had been dealt with and dismissed long before the Spicer Report entered Parliament. Benson argued that Admiral Becher should have been in Melbourne while the ship was working up and hinted that the ‘Admiral’s presence could have prevented this accident’. He went on to make much of Robertson’s alleged lack of experience and stated that Bate was too young and inexperienced to be the carrier’s OOW. He went as far as saying that Bridge Watchkeeping Certificates were ‘not worth the paper they are written on’ and that the stationing of planeguard destroyers 1000 yards astern of the carrier was nonsensical. Benson had no experience on which to base his poorly considered remarks and, quite apart from matters of opinion, was unable to itemise matters of detail correctly. For instance, he stated that Melbourne’s displacement was 29 000 tons, when it was 19 000 tons. As might be expected, given his background, he claimed that the scandalous standards of professionalism which allegedly afflicted the RAN ‘do not obtain in the Merchant Navy’. He even called for naval captains to sit for pilotage exemptions as their ships usually ‘blundered into Australian ports’. Benson concluded that the Navy was fundamentally deficient: It is obvious that the Navy is not aware of its shortcomings. Therefore, the Government must set in motion the necessary machinery to re-organise the Navy. The Navy appears to be too aloof and unrealistic in these things. It is remote, it is out of station and for its own good must be quickly brought into line.
The next day, Benson’s speech attracted favourable comment in all the major metropolitan newspapers. Political correspondent Alan Reid remarked that Benson ‘contributed a thoughtful, balanced speech which simultaneously revealed his commonsense and deep feeling for the Navy’. It is said that ‘in a nation of the blind, the one-eyed is king’. This was one such kingdom. But his front bench was not so pleased. Clyde Cameron believed the Opposition’s position had been compromised in the debate ‘by the apologetic contribution of our leading spokesman, Captain Sam Benson’. It was a pity that no-one knew enough about either the Navy or the tactical manoeuvring of ships at sea to have dismissed the super-
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ficial and inaccurate views put by Benson as the Parliament’s purported ‘authority’ on naval matters. The Navy much regretted the electoral defeat of the Government front-bencher Fred Osborne, a decorated wartime destroyer captain, in the 1961 general election. Although the Opposition would have accused him of bias, Osborne would have at least spoken with greater personal authority about naval command and operations at sea. As the Navy Minister, Chaney responded to Benson’s address and spoke very passionately. In fact, so emphatic were Chaney’s rejections of Opposition jibes about the Navy that he was taunted by Cameron, Dr Jim Cairns and Fred Daly for ‘getting so excited’. He covered the points raised by Benson, criticised the staleness of his experience and reiterated a number of the points made by Menzies. Newspaper reporting of the debate was less than convinced by Menzies’ reasoning that the Naval Board’s formal response to Spicer ought not to be made public. The Age remarked in its editorial, ‘Surely he could have revealed more of the Board’s general assessment of naval standards’. The Melbourne Herald was unimpressed by the Prime Minister’s proposals for the future: ‘It is not enough to announce that the Minister for the Navy and the Naval Board will set their own committee system to look into service administration and investigate future accidents. Only an obviously impartial and independent review of service procedures can now restore full confidence’. The Navy could, however, be thankful that the Australian was still not persuaded that there was something fundamentally wrong with the Navy. The Government, it seems, does not realise what the public is really seeking from the Voyager case. The need is for an assurance, in practical terms, that in the RAN tradition does not crush initiative; that evolutionary change is not considered radicalism; and that original thinking and practical decision-making are not the close preserve of the top echelon. In short, that the Royal Australian Navy is not a hidebound anachronism in a world of highly progressive defence thinking.
On 17 September, the Naval Board met to consider Robertson’s position and decided to accept his resignation; to take effect on 28 September 1964. Roberston would be asked to travel to Navy Office the following day to ascertain whether he wanted any special representations to be made on his behalf for the granting of a pension, and whether he was willing to contribute an additional lump sum for a pension to be granted. After further consideration, the Minister informed Robertson that technically he was not entitled to a pension
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under the Defence Force Retirement Benefits (DFRB) Act 1948 but, in order for a pension to be granted, the Board was prepared to state that Robertson was being retired in the interest of the Navy. Chaney agonised over the matter for several days before deciding to overrule the Board. Cabinet discussed Robertson’s resignation on 22 September 1964 and considered a special ‘act of grace’ payment, but concluded that ‘no payment should be made other than those for which the law provides’. Robertson’s name and face was now on the front page of every metropolitan newspaper. He had become not only a celebrity but an apparently innocent victim of a faceless and cowering bureaucracy. The Sunday Mirror led with an article entitled, ‘The Ordeal of Captain Scapegoat’. The Daily Mirror headed its editorial on 18 September ‘What a Raw Deal!’. Captain Robertson is the Naval Board and the Navy Department’s scapegoat. His axing, thinly disguised as a shore posting, is a disgraceful under-handed move by the Government. The case of Captain Robertson is of grave concern to the public.
Robertson’s resignation, which had not been confirmed, dominated the newspapers and the Parliamentary debate. For over two weeks the press followed the tortuous progress of his resignation and request for a pension: riding on a wave of public support, Robertson was receiving hundreds of letters; all of which were highly sympathetic to him and violently critical of the Naval Board. But what would his resignation achieve? Robertson’s personal correspondence suggests that his decision to resign was, purely and simply, a matter of principle. He took Spicer’s criticisms as a censure on him, personally, and sought to have it either lifted by an additional inquiry or negated by his return to the command of Melbourne. There was nothing vindictive about his decision nor was it a protest. Although Robertson vowed to ‘clear his name’, he seems to have given no thought as to how, as a civilian, he might do this. Kelly and Bate both considered resigning but expected, given the national furore Robertson’s resignation had caused, that their applications would be refused. Neither was ever informed of the Naval Board’s attitude towards Spicer’s criticisms or of its assessment of their performance on the night of the collision. Kelly later commanded a destroyer and retired as a captain in 1979. Bate was later promoted to commander and commanded a frigate. He transferred to the RAN
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Emergency Reserve with that rank in 1987. In many ways, Kelly and Bate were the forgotten men of the Voyager affair. They continued to suffer in silence. When the Parliamentary debate reopened on 24 September after an adjournment, Calwell moved a censure motion against the Government ‘for the succession of naval disasters for which it is primarily responsible’. The Leader of the Opposition returned to his theme: ‘the Voyager case is the latest and most convincing proof of that all is not well, and has not been well for some considerable time now, in the Royal Australian Navy’. He went on to argue that the succession of naval accidents after 1956 was the responsibility of the Government; claiming that the accidents were avoidable and ‘their frequency is sufficient to draw the conclusion that a pattern of inefficiency exists’. And if this inefficiency existed, did it reflect a flaw in the system of naval administration? Calwell’s speech covered most of the ground of the first debate as part of a general attack on the state of the RAN. In replying to the censure motion, Menzies argued that the Naval Board acknowledged that there were defects in the way in which things were done because it had accepted the need for change as a result of the accidents. The appointment of a Cabinet committee to review the Naval system of administration was designed to identify any ‘improvement to be made’. Despite the rhetoric, Menzies was conceding that there was something wrong with the Navy but that it would take outsiders to identify what it was and how it might be put right. Speaking in favour of the censure motion, Gough Whitlam said that while there was nothing wrong with asking the United States Navy or the Royal Navy to review Australian naval practices, it was an insult to the Minister for the Navy to have a ministerial committee appointed to assist him. However, the debate about Voyager was becoming bogged down. The entry of John Jess into the fray completely altered its tone. He held that the debate had revealed ‘some right on both sides of the chamber’ and that had the motion been ‘against the Government because of the conduct of the Royal Commission and the events flowing from it, I would, without hesitation, have voted with them’. Jess was openly critical of the Government’s handling of the tragedy. He said the Royal Commission should not have taken place and that the process had been abused: ‘I think there should have been a naval inquiry and I think that when its findings were complete they should have gone to a courtmartial which should have been held in public’. Jess went on to criticise the appointment of judges from the Parliament, and their appointment
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to head inquiries in which the Government had an interest. This was the first and only time Spicer had been criticised during the Parliamentary debate. As for the three officers criticised by the Commissioner, Jess took Jenkyn’s submission that they were not guilty of any negligence to be the view of the Naval Board. Of the speakers that followed, Dr Jim Cairns made the valid point that in the previous ten years there had been ten different Ministers for the Navy, one of whom ( John Gorton) had served for over five years. The others, therefore, had served for an average of six months. He criticised the Government’s handling of the portfolio in this respect and there was little that could be said in its defence. After three-and-a-half hours of debate, the motion was defeated along party lines. But this was far from the end of Voyager as a political problem for the Government. The next day’s newspaper editorials predictably criticised the Government for failing to order, in the Australian’s words, ‘a thorough overhaul of Navy leadership and procedures’. Chaney was chastised for being ‘singularly sensitive to criticism of his portfolio and pronouncedly hostile to critics. Certainly he is not the man to prescribe the ills of the Navy’. The most vigorous defence of the Navy would have to wait until the matter was debated in the Senate on 23 September 1964. The debate in the upper house was opened by Senator Nicholas McKenna, Opposition Leader in the Senate. He clearly had very little experience of naval matters or the sea, as his turns of phrase and expressions showed. After describing the conditions at the time of the collision he concluded: ‘I say with great deliberation that the fact that there was a collision at all under those conditions is, on the face of it, the result of plain gross negligence. There are no other terms in which to describe it’. The Senator turned next to the question of blame and believed that Spicer had been rather diffident in apportioning it. McKenna implied that blame extended beyond Voyager and repeated Spicer’s criticism of Robertson for not warning Voyager of the impending collision. His comments were almost comical: ‘I have heard the noise that these large vessels make when they give these blasts and they are rather world shattering events. They pervade the whole atmosphere and they could have been an element of warning’. He was goaded by Senator Cormack who attempted to correct McKenna by pointing out that, ‘One short blast means “I am turning to port”’. Unfortunately, one short blast actually means an alteration to starboard. The remainder of McKenna’s speech was a poor paraphrase of the Spicer Report and some criticisms of the former Navy Minister, Senator Gorton.
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Throughout the year Gorton’s name had not been linked with Voyager, although he was the minister responsible for the tragedy if it reflected any long-standing deficiencies as the collision had occurred just six weeks after he left the portfolio he had held for over five years. That Gorton did feel in some way responsible was demonstrated by his speech to the Senate. He began by telling the Senate, ‘I believe that in these circumstances all honest criticism of the events of that night, or of the other matters which have been raised against the Navy, should be regarded as constructive criticism’. After remarking that the opinion of a Royal Commissioner was but one among many, he gave a spirited defence of Kelly and Bate and said that ‘I am certain that the entire volume of naval professional opinion virtually unanimously would reject the view that either Sub-Lieutenant Bate or Commander Kelly had in fact been guilty of any negligence in the performance of their duties’. In turning to the Spicer Report, Gorton accepted the spirit of the Commissioner’s criticisms about the rescue and the provision of lifesaving and emergency apparatus. He was however, concerned about impressions of the Navy created during the Commission, particularly by Jack Smyth, which continued to affect public confidence in the service. Gorton concluded by rejecting the suggestion that there was something fundamentally wrong with the Navy and arguing that there was much in the RAN for which the nation ought to be proud. The final speaker was Senator Douglas McClelland who focused on Gorton’s attack on Smyth. He suggested that if Smyth had acted improperly, it was the duty of Counsel for the Navy to have brought it to the Commissioner’s attention. In what was a telling argument, McClelland also pointed out that Gorton had defended Kelly and Bate but ‘deliberately excluded any reference to Captain Robertson. Do I understand from that that the Minister was thereby saying that he felt that the Captain was negligent in the incidents that occurred that night?’. The debate was adjourned before Gorton was given an opportunity to respond. A leading article in the next day’s Australian claimed that ‘The Government won a technical victory as expected. But not since the debates of early 1962 has the Government taken such a mauling on such an important subject’. Alan Reid, writing in the Bulletin, expressed a similar view but with a little more realism. ‘The Government took a bad beating . . . It had to be beaten, even if only because no semantics could possibly transform a collision at sea . . . into a triumph of Australian arms’. The press had had its say.
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Meanwhile, Smyth referred Gorton’s speech to the New South Wales Bar Council, which agreed to hold a special meeting the same day to consider the Senator’s remarks. The President of the Bar Association, J.R. (later Sir John) Kerr, publicly supported Smyth and openly criticised Gorton. Smyth declined to comment until the Bar Council had made its ruling. Two days later, Smyth obtained permission from the Bar Council to issue a statement. He had not ‘made unsubstantiated statements at the Commission’ and Gorton’s allegations were ‘without foundation’. On 29 September the Attorney-General, Billy Snedden, defended Smyth in Parliament, saying he had acted ‘according to his professional duties’. When pressed on whether Gorton’s view was that of the Government, Menzies avoided the question by commenting that Gorton had the right to ‘express any view on a matter which concerns proceedings which related to events while he was Minister for the Navy’. The RAN had not emerged well from the Senate debate—even the performance of those who had spoken in its defence was variable. The Navy was the subject of numerous editorials and more adverse publicity than it could have hoped to counter. Admiral Becher’s September Report of Proceedings for the Australian Fleet was more hopeful than truthful: September has seen a continuation of publicity surrounding the Voyager incident arising from the Parliamentary debate on the subject. I have noted that the ratings of the Fleet have followed this with particular interest. I am happy to be able to report that despite all the criticism that has been levelled at the Navy it has had absolutely no visible adverse effect on morale. It is my impression that if anything, morale and loyalty have increased as a result of this criticism, much of which the ratings recognise to be both uninformed and unjust. It will be a happy day for the Navy when critics get off our backs.
But the happy day was a way off yet. With his resignation finally taking effect at midnight on 28 September 1964, Robertson was free to comment publicly for the first time. Early on 29 September, he gave a press conference on the lawn of his Neutral Bay home. A reporter at the Daily Mirror remarked, For the Press, it was the biggest day since the Beatles. Precisely forty of us—reporters, photographers, radiomen, TV interviewers and their crews—gathered in the morning sun . . . At 0855, he glanced at
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his watch and marched to his position in front of the cameras and microphones. In his best bridge voice, loud and clear, he announced: ‘I will now read my statement. You may then ask any questions’.
The press conference lasted for two hours and marked the start of Robertson’s campaign against the Naval Board, which he held principally responsible for what had happened to him. He criticised the Board, particularly Harrington and Becher, for the way in which it had handled the affair. Robertson lamented not being asked for his version of events by the Naval Board, but said he did not think he was, or was ever meant to become, a scapegoat. The thing that seemed to disappoint him most was being denied a chance to discuss his next posting with the Naval Board. That being said, however, he remained firm in the belief that he should have been sent back to Melbourne. While the tabloids were quick to take up Robertson’s cause, the editorial writers at the major metropolitan newspapers seemed less sympathetic. The Sydney Morning Herald was the only newspaper to adopt an openly hostile attitude to Robertson. A naval officer of his long experience could not have reasonably expected, in all circumstances, that he would be re-appointed to command HMAS Melbourne. Nor was there any reason why the Naval Board should, as some of its critics suggest, have ‘given him a hearing’ . . . That he chose not to serve in the same rank in another capacity is his own affair.
It is impossible to know what the Naval Board imagined Robertson would do after he had left the RAN. By resigning, he had shown himself, as far as the Board was concerned, to be unpredictable and irrational. Any sympathy Board members may have felt for him ended when he published five major feature articles in the Australian. Although it was not made public, Robertson was assisted by two journalists; one from the Australian and one from the Daily Mirror. He could have been vengeful and bitter in these articles, but most of his comments were fair and echoed many of the sentiments he had expressed on various earlier occasions. The Australian’s circulation swelled, as more people became aware of the articles and there were many letters to the editor supporting Robertson and condemning the Naval Board. Despite their admirable restraint, the controversial articles were widely discussed in naval and government circles. Never before had the RAN been so openly or so stridently criticised. That such comments came from a former senior serving officer made them all the more readily accepted by those who read them.
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The Naval Board must have hoped this ‘martyr’ would soon be forgotten. There was no mention of Robertson’s resignation in Navy News, nor any further mention of Voyager. The Naval Board tried to counter public criticism with a subtle campaign mounted in Navy News, signals and Fleet memoranda. The 2 October 1964 edition of Navy News carried a front page pictorial story headed ‘Life onboard Melbourne’. It showed an array of smiling faces engaged in all sorts of activity, much of it domestic and recreational, as if to emphasise that life was continuing as normal in the RAN. The best way to counter public criticism was to press on with ‘business as usual’. Fortunately for the Naval Board, on 10 November 1964 Menzies announced a record program of defence expenditure. This diverted public attention away from criticisms of the Navy prompted by the collision, the Royal Commission and Robertson’s resignation. The next day’s editorial in the Sydney Morning Herald explained that ‘the basic message to the nation of the Prime Minister’s historic defence review last night was there was a “real risk of war with Indonesia”. It is evident that the Government considers that this risk has suddenly and steeply increased’. The three-year program scheduled to commence in July 1965 would increase defence spending by £212 million. This was a rise of 57 per cent on the previous program. The Navy’s personnel strength would increase from 12 900 to 16 700 while the Fleet was to be augmented with ten new ships. The Fleet Air Arm would be bolstered by fourteen Grumman S2-E Tracker Anti-submarine aircraft and Melbourne would be extensively modernised at a cost of £10 million. The two older Type 12 frigates, Yarra and Parramatta, would be equipped with the Ikara anti-submarine missile system; two Ton Class minesweepers would be added to those already in service; a coastal security force for Papua New Guinea comprising five patrol boats would be created from within the RAN; a missile firing range would be developed at Jervis Bay; and an operational base for the RAN submarine squadron being built at Greenock in Scotland would be established at Neutral Bay. The public was, nonetheless, still concerned about safety within the Navy and the Voyager tragedy had an adverse affect on recruiting. The DCNS Newsletter for November 1964 described the Navy’s recruiting performance for that year. As forecast in the last newsletter, recruiting has proved extremely difficult. After an initial increase in applications following the
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Voyager disaster, the number of applications fell appreciably during the period of the Royal Commission, and until after the findings were published. The continued adverse and often ill-informed press comment is believed to have contributed to the fall, as both the other Services showed a slight improvement in the same period. The application rate has now recovered and is at about the same level as 1963.
In response to Parliamentary concerns, Menzies’ ‘Ministerial Committee for Review of Naval Organisation, Procedures and Methods’ was appointed and met for the first time on 8 October 1964. The Naval Board was asked to supply an enormous amount of material on the history of the RAN’s organisation, administrative procedures and personnel management and training, but the Naval Board’s minutes contain no hint of hesitation in providing the Committee with such a vast amount of information as it was bound to keep the Committee occupied, if not distracted, for many months. As directed by the Prime Minister on 15 September the Naval Board also considered the creation of a Standing Naval Committee of Investigation, but the lack of enthusiasm for this initiative was obvious. The Second Naval Member was asked to prepare a paper on the subject. To provide some evidence of intent, the Board decided to appoint a Director of Accidents Investigation responsible to DCNS. In addition to accident investigation, he would process the findings of boards of inquiry, establish a safety education program and visit ships and establishments to advise on safety and accident prevention. His title was soon altered to Co-ordinator of Naval Safety on the suggestion of the Ministerial Committee reviewing naval affairs. When, on 1 April 1965, Calwell asked Chaney in Parliament about the Committee’s activities, he could only say: ‘The Committee has held a series of meetings since its inception. It has under continuing consideration a wide range of matters affecting naval administration’. In other words, it had yet to achieve anything. The Committee’s sole achievement—from the Navy’s perspective—was to soothe Parliamentary concerns about safety at sea. By Christmas 1964, the Naval Board had hoped that Voyager would be a thing of the past. Yet, a part of the Navy’s culture had been deeply affected by the tragedy. Rear Admiral Andrew Robertson, a commander at the time of the collision, commented that: Voyager was a watershed for the RAN. The old navy with its absolute supremacy over its own affairs had died. A huge gulf had opened
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between those serving at sea and the Naval Board with the confidence and respect of the navy to its leadership never really restored.
Commanding officers felt a certain loneliness after the Royal Commission. According to one senior officer who served as a frigate captain in 1965: Conservative structures are underpinned by loyalties—up and down. Voyager for me dispelled that myth. As I endured my near misses and the like . . . I was acutely conscious that should my actions become a matter of public scrutiny, those in the Navy who were passing judgement could be easily affected by other influences. In other words, it was better not to get into a position that put ‘the system’ to the test.
It seems that morale was most affected through the lieutenant to commander rank, where there was a perceived crisis of loyalty caused by Becher’s alleged failure to stand by Robertson. The Sun Herald described the Navy’s plight most aptly in its editorial of 30 August 1964: ‘Blame for the sinking of Voyager has been apportioned, six months after the disaster. It will take much longer than that for the public’s confidence in the Navy to be restored’.
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WHERE TO NOW? On the first anniversary of Voyager’s loss, naval memorial services were held around the nation. The Naval Board, not unexpectedly, wanted these events to be low-key. Two chaplains from NAS Nowra, the Reverend Walter Wheeldon and Father Frank Lyons, conducted a memorial service from a Navy Wessex helicopter over the site of the collision and cast a wreath into the sea. These were to be the first and the last commemorations. The Board decided that Voyager would not be specially remembered but numbered among all other RAN ships lost at sea. Archdeacon John Were conducted a service in Melbourne, and 500 attended this voluntary ‘stand up’ commemoration at 0815 on the carrier’s flight deck. Most of the Naval Board were confident about handling the collision’s legacy both inside and outside the Service—the matter would be over when public interest faded. Chaney, however, believed the Board was too hasty in its efforts to drop the subject of the Royal Commission. He thought the main problem was ‘that naval officers had no idea of how low their public image had fallen and the low public esteem in which the Navy was held’. One key indicator of this was recruiting: the hoped for improvement in November 1964 still had not been achieved by May 1965. Applications for adult male entry, junior recruits and artificer apprentices were all down. The likely reason was outlined in the DCNS Newsletter. It is apparent from letters received both at Navy Office and in Recruiting Centres that the Voyager Royal Commission with its attendant adverse publicity is having a continued detrimental effect on these young age group entries and the following extract from a mother’s letter exemplifies this, ‘There have been too many accidents in the Navy in recent years for any mother to want her son to join’.
The re-engagement of serving personnel, a useful measure of the prevailing mood among sailors, also declined. When Gorton became
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Minister in 1958, the re-engagement rate was 8 per cent, rising dramatically to nearly 50 per cent in early 1963. The rate fell from its precollision level of 39 per cent (notably after the Sydney whaler incident) to 18 per cent after the collision. Twelve months later, it had risen only slightly to 20 per cent. Improvement would come—eventually. By 1967 it would surpass the pre-collision rate and average over 60 per cent. The introduction of computer and missile technology and RAN involvement in the Vietnam conflict would be credited with this sustained high level. Of course, a change of personalities also cleared the air and refreshed higher naval administration: Rear Admiral Alan McNicoll succeeded Harrington as Chief of Naval Staff. There was little newspaper coverage of Voyager on that first anniversary. The Press believed that, politically, the issue was past its use-by date. Despite the absence of public interest, private efforts aimed at helping Robertson gathered momentum. An effective form of pressure was protest letters written to a number of senior Cabinet ministers. Within the Government, Jess continued to press Robertson’s right to a pension or an alternative payment in lieu. If there was to be a political resolution, Jess was Robertson’s only hope. Direct political action rather than indirect public advocacy offered Robertson his best chance of settling his grievances. John Jess was a physically imposing man. He was tall and solidly built with an aggressive and forthright personality. He had defeated a much more favoured candidate for Liberal pre-selection in the Victorian seat of La Trobe in Don Chipp, and was elected to Federal Parliament in 1961. Robertson had known Jess for some time. His wife Bettine was related to Jess by marriage and a friendship had sprung up between the two men before the events of 1964. From the time Robertson’s intention to resign was known, Jess had been trying to persuade Menzies that some compensatory payment should be made to Robertson. Jess had his first interview with Menzies on the subject in September 1964 after the Commission’s report was debated in Parliament. Shortly afterwards, Robertson spoke with retired Lieutenant Commander Peter Cabban, Voyager’s executive officer until four weeks before the collision, who recounted his experiences with Captain Stevens in 1963. Cabban claimed that Stevens frequently drank to excess while Voyager was in harbour although he never drank at sea. Robertson had passed on the substance of this discussion to Jess who considered it was relevant to the causes of the collision. Menzies did not consider this evidence sufficiently compelling to re-open the inquiry. It seemed the only way
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of getting ‘justice’ for Robertson was to establish some new ground upon which the matter should be re-opened. Cabban’s allegations appeared to offer greatest hope. In New Zealand, Vice Admiral Harold Hickling, a Royal Navy officer who had retired some fifteen years earlier, had followed the events of the Voyager Royal Commission with more than a passing interest. Hickling obtained a copy of the Spicer Report, read Robertson’s articles in the Australian, and immediately felt sympathetic towards him. Having written two books on his own naval career, and in the belief that Robertson had suffered unfairly, Hickling decided to produce and publish his account of the collision. On 18 November 1964 Hickling wrote to Robertson, outlining his project and asking for assistance. Having little to lose, Robertson agreed to help Hickling in return for a fishing trip in New Zealand. Robertson travelled across the Tasman on 8 January 1965 and the two started working on a book to be published at the end of 1965. It would be called One Minute of Time. Hickling was something of a ‘terrier’; small, aggressive and given to sniping. Although over seventy, he abounded in enthusiasm and energy. He was a thoroughly opinionated old man and an unadulterated snob who felt that his own naval career amply qualified him to write a book about the collision and the Commission. He had experienced a collision at sea when in command of HMS Glasgow when it collided with and sank HMS Imogen during the Second World War. So boundless was his confidence that Hickling failed to appreciate his own limitations. He had served in another era and in another hemisphere, and would consistently assume that the Royal Navy, the Admiralty and the United Kingdom were synonymous and interchangeable with the RAN, the Naval Board and Commonwealth of Australia. While the similarities in the two Services were considerable, Hickling knew just enough about Australia and its system of public administration to base most of his comparisons and contrasts on imperfect knowledge and misunderstandings. Hickling had never served or lived in Australia, nor had he worked closely with the RAN or Australians. Hickling also brought to his book a deep resentment of any civilian involvement in naval affairs. He still saw the Navy in terms of ‘us’ and ‘them’, with ‘them’ being the civilians at the Admiralty. Of course, none of this means that he was not a good seaman or a very professional naval officer who deserved to be promoted to flag rank. It does imply, however, that he was not the amply qualified and unbiased observer he claimed to be.
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In the course of collecting material for his book, Robertson explained to Hickling that he had spoken to Cabban, who might be able to provide some background information on Captain Stevens. What sort of information, or why it would be relevant to the collision, was not made clear. On his return to Australia, Robertson invited Cabban and his wife to dinner at his home and suggested to Cabban that his knowledge would be of value to Hickling in preparing a character profile of Stevens. He then offered to loan Cabban his reel-to-reel tape recorder for the purpose of making a confidential statement that would be forwarded to Hickling. That same night, Cabban sat at the end of his bed and dictated a 45-minute statement, without any notes or references. He recounted a series of incidents ashore in which Stevens was overcome by the effects of alcohol and several occasions when he was unable to exercise command when Voyager returned to sea. Robertson had the statement transcribed and then asked Cabban to read it and to sign it as being correct. Cabban did so and the document was then sent to Hickling. There was little doubt that both Robertson and Hickling were persuaded by Cabban’s evidence and, one assumes, its relevance to the causes of the collision. It was political dynamite. But the problem faced by Hickling, Robertson and the publishers was whether or not to mention Cabban by name. Realising the import of Cabban’s statement and the inference that vital evidence had been withheld at the Royal Commission, it was finally decided not to mention Cabban by name or even identify him as an ex-naval officer. Robertson was still not entirely comfortable about using Stevens’ drinking habits as a lever for gaining a new inquiry, as his comments on one of Hickling’s early drafts reveals. My initial reactions regarding the triple brandy are that references to it in the text of the story may well give the wrong impression. It certainly hits you in the face when you read it—but perhaps I am too sensitive. I wonder whether a completely separate chapter pointing to the gaps in the evidence on this subject and inferring that there was some kind of collusion to suppress the rest may not be a better way. After all, no-one knows, nor will they ever find out, whether or not the drink question had any bearing on the collision. But we do know that much of the evidence on this subject was suppressed and also that some at least of the character evidence given for Stevens was incomplete to put it mildly.
Despite his reticence about using this evidence, an anxiety he would later abandon, Robertson’s personal view of Stevens had obviously
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undergone something of a transformation since the Spicer Commission. Robertson then showed Cabban’s statement to Jess, who remembers that: It took me many days of argument and persuasion to get Robertson to agree that Cabban’s evidence might be relevant. Involved in this was his deep concern that the Navy would be harmed, and this he would not be party to. Cabban considered that his experiences in Voyager with her captain should be examined and considered, but also stressed this should be in confidence. He stated his willingness to be examined and to give his information to the Prime Minister or anyone nominated by him. Both were adamant at all times that publicity should be avoided both in fairness to the Stevens family and the Navy. After my first interview with Sir Robert Menzies I advised them that the Prime Minister was unwilling to see Cabban or investigate the matter further. Eventually they consented to let me have what is now known as the ‘Cabban Statement’, provided that it be shown only to the Prime Minister and Cabinet.
With a signed copy of the Cabban Statement in his possession, Jess sought another interview with the Prime Minister in mid-1965. On this occasion he received a more sympathetic reaction. Menzies remarked that even if only half of the statement were factual, he would find it difficult to believe a man such as Stevens could command a warship. Time passed and Jess heard nothing further from Menzies. Fearing the Prime Minister was going to ignore the allegations, Jess indicated that he would raise the matter in the Party room. A week later he saw Menzies for a third time. By this stage a copy of the Statement had finally been passed to the Department of the Navy which had made some superficial inquiries of its own. In a minute to Chaney dated 23 August 1965, Landau stated that Smyth had been contacted and confirmed that, in his opinion, Stevens’ drinking was of no relevance. Smyth and Sheppard formed the ‘impression that Cabban seemed to bear an underlying grudge against the Navy and Captain Stevens’. The Naval Board had also asserted that Stevens was a competent destroyer captain and that it had no reason to doubt that he was anything less than fit to command on the night of the collision. The minute mentioned that Vice Admiral McNicoll, Rear Admiral Tom Morrison and Captain Jim Willis could testify to Stevens’ capabilities and character. The final paragraph revealed the Navy’s hand: ‘It has not been possible to make a close factual check of the various statements made in Cabban’s document, as this would involve
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extensive consultation with numerous officers and reference to records. This would be undesirable’. This was a rather candid confession. None of the factual details in the statement had actually been checked with those serving in Voyager during 1963. How, then, could the Naval Board say that Cabban’s allegations were either untrue or irrelevant to the causes of the collision? McNicoll did not want to be pressed on Stevens’ professional ability. He said he was ‘an officer of average intelligence, completely engrossed in the Service, but not more than an able, experienced, run-of-the-mill destroyer captain. I could not in any way describe him as outstanding’. Chaney forwarded Landau’s minute to Menzies the following day. The Prime Minister offered to have the matter investigated further but was not convinced that anything useful would come from formally re-opening the case. What Jess did not know was that Menzies shortly afterwards spoke with Gorton about the allegations and remarked that he was considering a new inquiry. Gorton informed Menzies that if another inquiry were held he, as minister responsible for the Navy during the year to which the allegations related, would be forced to resign. Jess was not privy to this discussion and the Prime Minister was able to deflect any further pressure until he retired on 20 January 1966. His successor, Harold Holt, would find Voyager hidden away in a bottom drawer of the prime ministerial desk. It was something he would wish Menzies had either dealt with or taken away. But by the end of 1965, Voyager was still a dead issue politically. Something was needed to return the disaster and Robertson’s fate to public prominence—that something was Hickling’s book. One Minute of Time was launched with a flurry of publicity. Hickling made much of his independence but this was a fiction. Robertson provided most of the factual material and commentary, and had extensively redrafted the narrative. The publishers had to try to blend together Robertson’s analysis and pleadings with Hickling’s irrelevant ramblings and reminiscences. Hickling gave a news conference which Robertson attended. Melbourne’s captain agreed to be interviewed and it seemed Voyager might have another life. The book was released just as the Navy’s media profile was beginning to improve. The 13 November 1965 edition of the Bulletin carried a very positive lead story about the rejuvenation of the Navy. The article, by respected defence writer Tom Millar, was headed ‘The Navy after years of neglect: will the new policy last?’. Millar made only passing mention of Voyager: ‘Twelve months ago the Navy and the nation were
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still recovering from the shock of the Voyager disaster and the apparent (largely unproven) implications of inefficiency in the Service’. One Minute of Time was generously reviewed in all metropolitan newspapers. Former CNS, Vice Admiral Sir John Collins, praised Hickling’s effort although one suspects this was because he was in agreement with the author. Collins accepted most of Hickling’s criticisms of the Government and the Royal Commission, referring to the Commission’s hearings as ‘inept meetings’. He also suggested that Hickling’s distance from the action was a qualification rather than a disqualification for authorship. A critique in the English Naval Review, which did not appear until April 1967, also concentrated on the form of inquiry. Citing a recent article in The Times on Royal Commissions, the reviewer lamented that Australia had learned nothing from Britain about the failings of this form of inquiry. The writer asserted that their main drawback was their duration, which was prolonged by irrelevancies. John Yeomans of the Melbourne Herald was so impressed by Hickling’s credentials as a ‘decoration-encrusted’ retired admiral and the veteran of a collision involving naval ships that he accepted all of Hickling’s arguments and assertions without question but neglected to ask Hickling what he thought his account might achieve for Robertson—or anyone else. What reviewers and other commentators did not notice was Hickling’s insinuation at several press meetings that Stevens was unfit to command Voyager at the time of the collision. Hickling told The Age that Stevens: must have been in great pain with stomach ulcers just before the collision. This was why he drank a triple brandy when he never usually drank at sea. Something must have been worrying him for him to break a life-long habit. He may have been tired—and when we get tired we get a sort of premature satisfaction.
In spite of the book’s many serious shortcomings, the interest in Voyager was so great that the first edition of 18 000 copies was sold within two weeks of release. But the question remained: what would it achieve? The key to a new inquiry was Hickling’s remark that several witnesses with the capacity to comment on the collision and its causes were told they would testify but were not called. Whitlam questioned Chaney about this in Parliament on 9 December 1965: ‘Will the Minister state the names and qualifications of those witnesses, the nature of the evidence they would have been able to give, and the reason
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for not calling them?’. Chaney replied that he had read the book and remembered the passages to which Whitlam referred. However, he was not ‘in a position to say who were the witnesses referred to by Admiral Hickling’. There was really only one witness—Cabban. Soon after Menzies retired Jess arranged an interview with the new Prime Minister, Harold Holt, and presented him with a full copy of the Cabban Statement. Holt, whose own experience of uniformed life was minimal, was at a loss to know what to do with it, particularly when Jess informed him that Cabban and Robertson did not want the document to become public knowledge. When Holt asked Jess what he expected him to do, Jess replied: ‘That, Sir, is hardly for me to say’. It was a ridiculous situation. If there was a new inquiry, the statement would have to be made public. Sooner or later, its existence would be leaked to the press. If the Cabban Statement were to be the basis of any new finding, whether or not it altered Robertson’s situation, it had to be made public. What Jess, Robertson and Cabban were trying to avoid was the charge that they were impugning the character of a man who could not defend himself. Whatever their intentions, it would be an accusation not readily dismissed. Given that the Statement was not to be made public, Holt seems to have done little other than hoping that Jess would lose interest in the matter, but there was almost no chance of this. Throughout 1966, Jess gathered supporters within the parliamentary Liberal Party but failed to have the matter re-opened. With little to lose he stepped up his campaign. In a letter dated 11 August 1966 Jess informed Holt that Voyager was of ‘considerable importance to the Government and the Liberal Party’ and that Cabban himself was considering going public. This was, in fact, misrepresenting Cabban but it helped to force Holt’s hand. Jess said that a number of questions needed to be answered: the effect, if any, of Captain Stevens’ drinking habits on the safe navigation of Voyager; whether the Naval Board knew of Stevens’ reputation for drinking; and if the fact that the Royal Commissioner and the instructing solicitor for the Stevens family (Fred Osborne) were both former Federal ministers had allowed rumours about Stevens’ drinking to be kept quiet. The Naval Board was becoming tired of Jess’ insistence on a new inquiry, and annoyed that he was now suggesting the Royal Commission had been a whitewash to which Spicer was party. What did Robertson and Jess want? As Cabban himself had said that Stevens never drank at sea, how did his allegations help to explain the causes of the collision?
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On 23 August, McNicoll wrote to Chaney suggesting ways of dealing with the Statement: while the document could be checked with Stevens’ subordinate officers at that time, McNicoll said it had already been shown to Captain Jim Willis, whom McNicoll described as a ‘most responsible and reliable witness on the events of the final six months’ operations preceding Captain Stevens’ death’. Willis said that Cabban’s recollections were unreliable and inaccurate. Chaney relayed the contents of McNicoll’s minute to Holt the next day. But things again came to a halt as Jess agreed not to persist with the matter in the leadup to the November 1966 Federal Election in which the Government was returned with an increased majority. Holt announced his new Ministry on 13 December 1966. There were three new ministers—Bert Kelly, Don Chipp and Nigel Bowen QC. One of his former ministerial colleagues remarked that Chaney ‘had not handled the Voyager debate well’. He was replaced by Chipp. Twelve months after Hickling’s book had brought Voyager back to public prominence, Robertson and Jess were still no closer to ‘justice’ for Robertson or another inquiry. While his parliamentary colleagues hoped he would tire of the matter, Jess ended 1966 more determined than ever to achieve what had so far eluded him.
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POLITICAL LEADERSHIP AND PUBLIC ADVOCACY The new Navy Minister, the youthful Don Chipp, was also Minister in Charge of Tourist Activity and was preoccupied in the early months of 1967 with the creation of a tourist commission. Although known as a backbencher for occasional outspoken criticisms of his parliamentary colleagues, Chipp accepted without alteration the policy the Naval Board had devised for Chaney on the handling of the Cabban Statement. Chipp reviewed the Navy’s files and ‘tended to agree with the view which the Department and the Admirals were putting to me— that Cabban’s allegations were basically untrue and largely a figment of his imagination’. Despite this setback to his cause, Jess found a forceful ally in the newly elected member for the safe New South Wales Liberal seat of Warringah, Ted St John QC, who took an immediate interest in the case. On 9 March, Jess and another concerned backbencher, the Reverend Dr Malcolm Mackay, met with Holt to discuss re-opening the case. Jess wrote to Holt again on 23 March to ensure the Prime Minister realised that the matter would soon come to a head. Another delegation of Government backbenchers, consisting of Sir Wilfrid Kent Hughes, Billy Wentworth and E.M. Fox also met with Holt on the subject. Of the 89 members of the House of Representatives in 1966 who were not Ministers, Opposition Executive or the Speaker, 55 had served in the armed forces and retained an interest in military affairs. When he found out that the Prime Minister had only just read his letter of 23 March on the eve of the 12 April party meeting which listed Voyager as an agenda item, Jess again agreed to have the discussion deferred. Holt told Jess that the letter must have been mislaid. Billy McMahon, a former Minister for the Navy and Coalition parlia-
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mentary tactician, spoke to Jess on 11 April and relayed the contents of their discussion to Holt. Jess told McMahon he wanted parts of the Royal Commission re-opened as the proceedings had not been just and fair to all concerned; that he wanted Stevens’ alleged drunkenness examined; and that the ‘wrong’ decision made by the Commissioner on the conduct of Robertson, Kelly and Bate needed to ‘be corrected’. Around the same time Jess told Chipp that if these three conditions were not met, he would raise the matter in the Party Room. Furthermore, if the Party did not then support him, he would consider three possible courses of action: resigning from the Liberal Party; resigning his seat in Parliament; or raising the matter on the floor of the Parliament. Chipp was still firmly opposed to the case being reopened or an ex gratia payment being made to Robertson. The new minister had little sympathy for Robertson and said that his counsel had the right to call whatever witnesses he wished at the Commission. He felt Robertson should have called and questioned Cabban if his evidence was sufficiently compelling. Support for Jess was growing slowly and now included Fox, Wentworth, Kent Hughes, Harry Turner and Senator Reg Wright who questioned the adequacy and efficiency of the Commission itself. There were two courses open to Holt: either to continue refusing to re-open the case or to have the matter re-opened by Cabinet on a submission from the Defence Department. McMahon strongly advised Holt against giving Robertson any payment. The Prime Minister decided to put the matter to Cabinet for its consideration. Chipp and the Minister for Defence, Allen Fairhall, prepared a joint submission for Cabinet consideration on 27 April 1967. They assumed that Jess was concerned about Cabban’s allegations only inasmuch as they served to assist Robertson’s case. The great difficulty was that no-one seemed to know what Jess, Robertson or Cabban actually wanted from another inquiry. The executive summary attached to the submission stated that there was no miscarriage of justice to Robertson at the 1964 Commission and that no ‘real case existed for an ex gratia payment’ to be made to him. In fact, the decision to offer some payment: would be counter-productive. It would mean that Cabinet’s original decision had been wrong, and that the Government had delayed nearly three years in correcting an injustice. It is extremely doubtful, moreover, whether this would satisfy those who, on the basis of
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Cabban’s statement, are querying the propriety of the Royal Commission hearings and findings. The more likely result would be to strengthen their doubts.
As for the allegations contained in the Cabban Statement, the submission concluded: For our part, we believe there is sufficient evidence available, as indicated in this paper, to discredit the statement, and that those who wish to pursue this matter should be given the opportunity to do so at an early date, within the Party Room. We hold this view despite the risk that versions may leak out publicly, to the embarrassment of the Government, to the detriment of the Navy and, more particularly, to the further distress of Captain Stevens’ family, and to all the relatives of the other 82 dead. In our opinion avoidance of the subject is no longer desirable, and the sooner it is aired and put into proper perspective, the better.
On 2 May, Holt informed Jess that Cabinet had considered the submission prepared by Fairhall and Chipp and would not re-open the case or grant any compensation to Robertson. Cabinet had agreed that ‘no new material or factor which has come to light since then would, either on the score of justice or of equity, warrant a re-consideration of that decision’. Jess now had only one option; he had to take the matter to the Party Room and, from there, to Parliament. The dispute between Jess and the Naval Board had become bogged down on the characters of Stevens and Cabban; the Navy painting Stevens as a competent naval officer who deserved respect while ruthlessly dismissing Cabban as an unbalanced and scheming miscreant. Having tied the Navy’s fortunes to Duncan Stevens’ reputation, Admiral McNicoll compiled a series of extracts from Stevens’ final four confidential reports which covered his time at the Admiralty in London and in command of Voyager. These extracts were freely circulated to parliamentarians and, later, the press. They depicted Stevens as an experienced and competent officer—he was good, but not outstanding. The matter was referred to the Liberal Parliamentary Party Room on 3 May 1967. It was a very tense meeting that brought to the surface the depth of feeling surrounding the collision and its aftermath. Peter Howson, a junior member of the Ministry, believed that the information Jess presented was not relevant to the cause of the collision.
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It’s only going to cause a lot of unhappiness to the relatives of those who were killed, and really will not do anything but wash a lot of dirty linen in public. Nothing said this morning can persuade John, even though it was clearly demonstrated that only about half a dozen people are supporting him in the party room.
When the vote was taken on a motion calling for the case to be reopened, the count was more than ten to one against. Rumours of backbench pressure for another Voyager inquiry reached the newspapers on 4 May although there was no indication of the nature of the evidence Jess claimed the 1964 Commission had failed to consider. The Australian led the way in supporting Jess in its 5 May editorial headed ‘Voyager: the truth must out’. If there is an untold story about the sinking of the Voyager it should be told immediately. The claim by Mr John Jess MP that essential evidence was not placed before the Royal Commission which investigated the disaster, demands, at the very least, a public statement by the Prime Minister; and if the evidence is as serious as reports hint, he should re-open the inquiry. Mr Holt is wrong to think that by refusing either course he can shut off all public uneasiness about the collision off Jervis Bay. The claims have been given too much publicity for this tactic to succeed . . . There is also the reputation and morale of the Navy as a whole to be considered. If any allegations are being made against it, the service will be harmed less if they are not secreted behind party doors. Mr Holt would do much better to clear up the whole business once and for all, in the open.
Jess also appeared on ABC television and said he planned to make his allegations public during the following week from the floor of the Parliament, and was prepared to risk his political future in doing so. It was not until 8 May that explicit references to Cabban started to appear in the newspapers. Alan Ramsey, writing for the Australian, referred to an ex-naval officer who wanted to tell his story, which included ‘some grave allegations against a key figure in the tragedy; allegations which, if true, shed new light on how Australia’s worst peacetime naval disaster came to happen’. Ramsey quotes Jess as saying he ( Jess) wanted another inquiry to prove that ‘this thing could never happen again’. The inevitable letters to the editor followed, all supported Jess’ call for another inquiry and all basing their support on seeking justice for Robertson. This was a remarkable show of support given that Jess had not disclosed whether this new evidence might have helped Robertson’s case.
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After the Party Room discussion, St John accepted Chipp’s offer to allow Government members to examine several documents relating to Voyager, including the Cabban Statement. As an experienced jurist and vigorous campaigner for the victimised, it was not surprising that St John became interested in the Voyager collision. Moreover, he approached it as a public interest advocate rather than as a politician aspiring to a ministerial portfolio. Six Government members were given access to the papers. One member leaked some of Cabban’s allegations to the Press. Although Chipp suspected St John, there was no proof. Chipp would later suggest he was having ‘some residual worries about this sordid business’ but there is no record of this apparent weakening resolve. Chipp then suggested that St John contact Smyth and Sheppard to ask for their opinions. Although both barristers knew St John, they refused to discuss the matter with him, which served to make him more suspicious. St John then interviewed Robertson and asked for his opinion of the Cabban Statement. Robertson was now becoming less concerned about Stevens’ reputation and said he had ‘no doubt that Cabban’s Statement represents substantially the truth of the matter’. Mackay and St John then arranged to see Cabban and were thoroughly convinced that he was telling the truth. They also came to suspect that Spicer or Smyth may have withheld vital information at the Royal Commission. They questioned Professor Blackburn’s expert opinion on the effects of alcohol on performance and insinuated that Blackburn had been chosen because he was well disposed to the Stevens family’s interests. At this point St John and Mackay saw any injustice to Robertson as ‘of minor importance compared with the broader issues’ of naval operations and public administration. The Press was now heavily involved. Rumours of Cabban’s allegations were floating around Parliament House, but they were unconfirmed. It took a Melbourne-based tabloid press journalist in Canberra on other business, Richard L’Estrange of The Truth, to break the story which he pieced together from two members of the Parliamentary press gallery, the secretary to a senator and a Liberal parliamentarian who was neither Jess, Mackay or St John. The story appeared on 9 May 1967 with the heading ‘Voyager scandal—this is what it’s all about. DRUNKEN DUNCAN. Captain with triple brandy’ and caused a national sensation. Holt was under siege. Whitlam, the new Labor leader, had by now learned that the Liberal Party was tearing itself apart from within over
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Voyager. On 9 May, Whitlam again asked Holt the question he had put to Chaney nearly eighteen months before: whether witnesses with vital information were not called to testify before the Royal Commission. Holt refused to answer directly, determined to avoid a parliamentary confrontation. But Jess decided that enough was enough. He gave notice on 10 May that during General Business when Parliament next sat he would move that a select committee be appointed to investigate whether any evidence relevant to the collision was not heard at the Royal Commission and whether a ‘further Commission should be issued to three judges or some other tribunal to consider the findings, report and recommendations which ought to have been made in the light of such further evidence’. On the same day Holt announced that the motion would be debated on 16 May 1967. His decision surprised some political commentators who believed he could have further delayed the matter in the hope that backbench resolve would weaken. He was quoted by the newspapers as saying, ‘I am not shutting out the possibility of a select committee if there is a residual belief in Parliament that there should be one after this debate. We are not trying to cover anything up. We want to see the right thing done’. Holt’s aim was clearly to retain the initiative. The crucial factor continued to be the Senate where the Government did not have the numbers. The Government had 30 Senators, Labor 27, the Democratic Labor Party 2, with one independent. Everyone went away to prepare their arguments. The Press was divided. The Sydney Morning Herald’s editorial on 12 May was headed ‘To What Purpose?’ and questioned the cost and the value of another inquiry. The Age saw things differently. It was ‘the Government’s responsibility, having committed itself to its present course, to satisfy the public it is pursuing, rather than obscuring, justice and truth’. The Naval Board continued with its tactic of rubbishing Cabban rather than conducting its own investigation of the allegations. McNicoll said that Cabban had resented Stevens and felt nothing but contempt and antipathy for him. This, he argued, coloured his judgement and his statement. Later, he alleged that Cabban had attempted to perpetrate deliberate falsehoods and that these statements could be refuted by other observers, ‘men of far steadier character than Cabban himself’. However, McNicoll conceded privately that the fact Stevens had a brandy at all at that time is astonishing . . . One feels that there must have been some special reason which caused
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Stevens to do so at that time . . . I think it is more likely that Stevens’ ulcer was paining him acutely and that he adopted his usual remedy in order to help him get through the exercise. If he had been an alcoholic he would have had a bottle concealed in his cabin and would not have called for a drink openly from the steward. It seems to me far more likely, too, that what distracted his attention in the few minutes before the collision was not alcohol but pain.
15 May 1967 was a crucial day. The Naval Board prepared a long letter for the Prime Minister, which contained another scathing attack on Cabban. The Board suggested that Cabban was obviously lying, given that it had collected numerous refutations of his statement. Also attached was a minute outlining Stevens’ medical history prepared by Surgeon Rear Admiral R.M. Coplans, the Naval Medical DirectorGeneral. Coplans said there was nothing wrong with Stevens at the time of the collision and there was no record that he was suffering pain from his duodenal ulcer at any time in 1963. Coplans also felt, having seen a copy of The Truth, that he should make his own personal statement on Captain Stevens’ character: ‘I do not believe that Captain Stevens, with his history of dyspepsia and peptic ulceration, would knowingly suffer the pain, and the risk of possible complications, of aggravation by over indulgence in alcohol’. When Parliament met on 16 May, Voyager was the major item for debate. Jess put his motion calling for the appointment of a select committee to inquire into the tragedy. At the same time, the Tasmanian Liberal senator, Reg Wright, introduced a similar motion into the Senate. The Senate motion was more threatening to the Government and it was quite possible that it would be passed. Rather than considering Jess’ motion, the parliamentary debate was focused on a ministerial statement from the first speaker, the Attorney-General, Nigel Bowen. He repeated the essence of the Navy’s opposition to re-opening the matter before tabling a selection of statements gathered by the Naval Board. They were later published as a Parliamentary Paper entitled Loss of HMAS Voyager and contained a copy of Cabban’s record of interview with Police Sergeant Turner, a copy of the Cabban Statement and sixteen refutations. These counter-statements were responses to a letter sent to selected naval officers by the Secretary of the Navy Department, Sam Landau, on 19 April 1967. James Willis was in Britain although he had already commented upon the statement. Richard Peek was then commanding the Fleet, Scott Griffith was First Lieutenant of HMAS Parramatta while
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Bruce Loxton was commanding HMAS Yarra. Willis, Peek, Griffith and Loxton all either denied having any recollection of the incidents described in Cabban’s statement; stated that what Cabban had described was highly improbable if not impossible; or assigned a different significance to that attributed to certain events by Cabban. Loxton went as far as stating that Cabban was lying. Cabban alleged Loxton told him that Stevens had consumed a bottle of brandy on his return from Sydney to Williamstown Naval Dockyard following the court martial of Captain Dovers after the HMAS Sydney whaler incident. In reply Loxton said: The statements of Lt Cdr Cabban are generally inaccurate. In particular, it is not true that, on the occasion he refers to, Captain Stevens drank a bottle of brandy, nor was he in any way affected adversely by alcohol. Further, I have never told Lt Cdr Cabban otherwise.
Comments were also sought from Captain Alan Willis, the younger brother of James Willis, and former Surgeon Lieutenant Michael Tiller, the latter having left the Navy to study at the Royal College of Surgeons in Britain. On 4 May, Chipp had asked his Department whether he could mention these responses in Parliament. He was advised that those from the serving officers could be used but that the permission of Tiller, who was now a civilian, would need to be sought. Hoping to avoid the inclusion of Tiller’s very damaging statement in the papers the Navy Minister wanted to cite in Parliament, Chipp asked Landau to contact Tiller by telephone and discuss with him the possibility that his statement would be made public. This contact was finally made at 7.45pm on 9 May. Tiller said that he had not been given any background information about the extracts which ‘seemed to come from nowhere’; nor had he been given much time to consider his words. When informed that his comments would be made public and that they might be cited in an inquiry, Landau records that Tiller said: he had been thinking about the extracts and wasn’t completely happy about his comments on them in their present form because of the haste in which they had been made, and the insistence on brevity. He wouldn’t like them used in public. He said that if this matter were going to be brought out in public he thought it would be reasonable for him to spend a little more time and thought before replying. In these circumstances he wanted them destroyed.
Accordingly, a second letter, creating further delay, asked Tiller for a fresh set of comments. Chipp, Landau and McNicoll were later to claim that Tiller’s original statement was garbled and incomprehensible,
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largely because of its brevity, and that Tiller wanted it destroyed. This appears to have been done. In a later statement made in 1967, Tiller said that after signing his first statement: I received a telephone call which I think was from Mr Landau in Canberra. He asked if I would like to withdraw my comments. I agreed and he asked further if I would mind if my comments were destroyed. I also agreed to this as I felt that I did not wish to be involved in this matter in any way. I got the feeling at the time that Mr Landau was keen for me to consent to destruction of my answers. It was quite a long conversation.
He also commented that during night exercises in Voyager in 1963, I formed the habit of sleeping on a stretcher on deck. This was because I heard of a couple of near collisions which took place and I wanted to be in a position to get off the ship quickly if that was necessary. The Captain often shouted at other officers and I felt the ship was perhaps not run as smoothly as it might be.
Given these sentiments, it was not surprising that the Naval Board were concerned about Tiller’s evidence. Landau had succeeded in alarming Tiller enough to prevent him from making a public statement. If the Naval Board had nothing to fear and nothing to hide, it was a strange way to behave. The Naval Board’s determination to resist another inquiry was understandable. The Cabban Statement, although unsworn and substantially untested, contained many damning allegations about personal and professional standards of conduct within the RAN. There was little doubt that if it was to be publicly dissected, it would be a grubby affair and no doubt produce a great deal of spite and vindictiveness. Worst of all, the Navy would be dragged through the mire of an inquiry examining the consumption of alcohol and the extent to which drinking and indiscipline were the norm. If Stevens and his conduct were condemned there would be many other officers just as worthy of the same censure. The day-to-day running of the Navy would be opened to challenge and possible ridicule by people the Naval Board did not believe would understand the practicalities of seagoing service. There was also the possibility of the Navy having to turn against Robertson who remained a very popular figure among his former colleagues and who was still viewed as a martyr by the community. This would only alienate the Naval Board even further from officers and
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sailors. The Board also doubted whether another inquiry would find anything new relating to the actual causes of the collision. There was a real possibility that the exercise would be completely pointless but terribly damaging. These fears combined to prompt a subtle pattern of deception starting with the inconsistent and unconvincing statements solicited by the Board to discredit Cabban. Rather than ending public disquiet, Landau’s method of procuring these statements had only served to create further suspicion—even the affectation of honesty and openness had been abandoned. While the best course of action was to investigate the allegations thoroughly and accept whatever was revealed, the Naval Board flatly refused to believe that anything in the Cabban Statement was true. Yet this refusual resulted not in a genuine effort to obtain reliable contrary evidence but a determination to prevent anything further from coming to light. This being so, the Statement would not be investigated, information would be suppressed and witnesses would be reminded of their duty to do what was in the ‘best interests of the Service’. But now that the matter had spilled over onto the floor of Parliament, the Naval Board would have to defend not only Captain Stevens but its own actions in trying to prevent another inquiry. The Parliamentary debate was, therefore, a test of the Board as well as Captain Stevens and notably, Attorney-General Bowen had not attempted to defend the Naval Board or its actions. Although Bowen referred to extracts from the Cabban Statement, Cabinet had earlier decided that the document would not be tabled. Jess followed Bowen in the debate. After reminding the House that Bowen was not a member of Parliament during the debate of the Royal Commission, Jess spoke for well over an hour about the 1964 inquiry and its failings, the injustice done to Captain Robertson, the essence of Cabban’s statement and the Navy’s efforts to refute it. It was a strident attack on the Government and his own Party. Today I stand in this House confronting my own Government . . . I am still loyal to the Liberal Party. I support it and I support the Government. The Prime Minister said last week that members of this House and of his party had the right to bring before the House matters which they felt should be raised, and I am exercising that right today.
However, the speech was far too long, including as it did an unnecessarily lengthy critique of Bowen’s address. It also suffered from repeated
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apologies for his own stand on the issue, coupled with constant affirmations of his loyalty to the Liberal Party. Chipp was furious with Jess. The man who had earlier defeated him for parliamentary pre-selection had delivered a damning indictment of his department. In reply, Chipp argued that the Cabban Statement was unreliable and grossly inaccurate. He outlined the manner in which refutations of Cabban’s allegations had been collected and stressed their import. Chipp’s approach was straightforward. Once I had formed my own conclusions about the Cabban allegations, it was my duty to defend with vigour and conviction the charges made about Stevens, the Navy generally and its officers and men, because under the Australian-British system of government, public servants and people serving in the armed forces are unable to defend themselves publicly.
Chipp’s closing plea was to ‘ask honourable members to judge where the weight of evidence is and to come to a fair and logical conclusion’. The Minister for the Navy ruined any possibility of compromise or negotiation by emphasising that there were no shades of virtue in the dispute, and hence no need for an inquiry. He gave no ground and was given none in return. The next to speak was St John. This, as the Acting Speaker advised the House as he approached the Despatch Box, was his maiden speech and because maiden speeches were, by convention, non-controversial they were never interrupted. Very few people could have anticipated the tone St John would adopt. I rise to make my maiden speech conscious of my loyalty to the party of which I am proud to be a member and of my duty to the electors of Warringah who have done me the honour to elect me to represent them in this House, but conscious above all of my sovereign obligation to speak the truth as I see it in the interests of the people of this, my country.
The front bench had every right to fear the worst given St John’s opening. After explaining his interest in the case and stating that he was ‘not concerned with any possible injustice to Captain Robertson’, St John proceeded to outline how and why the truth about Voyager might have been either lost or obscured. In spite of the efforts of Bowen and Chipp to discredit Cabban, who sat in the public gallery throughout the debate, St John argued that he was a truthful and honest man—because this was his own judgement of Cabban’s character.
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I believe this man is telling the truth. I would not care if the Minister for the Navy, with all due respect to him, brought along a stack of statements from serving officers saying that they could not remember or could not corroborate.
At this point, Chipp had to be restrained in his seat by Snedden, such was his anger at St John’s caustic remark. After the dinner adjournment, St John launched a savage attack on the Navy’s argument that much of Cabban’s statement was irrelevant to the causes of the collision. St John said that if it was true, and he firmly believed it was, that Stevens was perpetually drunk or recuperating from excessive drinking, how could it possibly be irrelevant? Is not this one of the facts and circumstances leading up to the Voyager disaster? Or have I lost the meaning of the word ‘irrelevant’? Are we playing a battle of semantics? What is the meaning of the word ‘irrelevant’?
Holt could not contain himself any longer and broke the convention he had honoured and observed for so long, interjecting, ‘What is the meaning of the word “evidence”?’. St John lacerated Holt with his reply. I did not expect to be interrupted by the Prime Minister. We all have been invited to debate what comes to us second hand. The Prime Minister’s interruption demonstrates better than anything else that this kind of matter can be sifted only by a proper judicial committee.
The undoubted winner was St John. Holt had been embarrassed and everyone knew so, including the Press who were relishing the proceedings. Bowen, who was sitting next to Holt, placed his hand on Holt’s arm to calm the outraged Prime Minister. By showing genuine feeling, Holt had opened himself to persuasion on emotional rather than logical grounds. But St John overstepped the mark and lost support when he asserted that if the allegations were true, Stevens was ‘a chronic drunkard’. Cabban had only ever alleged that Stevens ‘frequently drank to excess’ and St John was interrupted for a second time, on this occasion by Chipp. After 45 minutes of anguish for the Government, St John resumed his seat. The speech was described as ‘a parliamentary tour de force’ and received widespread acclamation. According to the Adelaide News: ‘Few could remember a more courageous and impressive maiden speech . . . the most forceful case for a new inquiry’. There have been few occasions when pure oratory had forced an Australian Prime Minister to change his mind—and this was one of them. Bowen would
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later regard St John’s speech as the point at which the Press abandoned their reticence about supporting Jess’ campaign. The Prime Minister’s resolve began to give way. Harry Turner followed St John. He was the member for Bradfield, the safest Liberal seat in the Federal Parliament. Turner asked whether those who refuted the statement were to be believed over Cabban simply because they outranked him, and whether a different standard of proof was being applied to Cabban? The next speaker, Jim Killen, argued that the amount of alcohol consumed by Stevens on the night of the collision would have had no effect on either his judgement or mental capacity. Other than Jess’ insistence that Robertson had been the victim of injustice, there had been little mention of him at all in the debate although Turner talked about the personal tragedy the collision had become for Melbourne’s captain. The final speaker for the evening was Les Irwin, who attempted to amend the motion to include either Robertson’s reinstatement to naval service or the provision of a suitable ex gratia payment to him. The amendment was not even seconded. In fact, both St John and Mackay had indicated to Holt that such an outcome was neither sought nor wanted. The debate was adjourned until the following day. It had been a disastrous night for the Government. When it met before the next sitting of Parliament, Cabinet adopted a ‘wait-and-see’ attitude. The former Minister for the Navy, Fred Chaney, was the first to speak when debate resumed the following day. He expressed amazement that St John was persuaded by allegations which seemed beyond belief. As the former Minister, Chaney remarked that naval officers could—and should—be trusted when they gave their word. Except, one presumes, Cabban. Chaney argued that re-opening the case would affect the morale of the Navy and, by implication, national security. He conceded that morale had fallen during the first Commission but that the Navy had overcome this to perform admirably during the ‘Confrontation’ and in waters off South Vietnam. The only member from the Opposition benches to make an impact on the debate was Clyde Cameron, who had followed the matter closely. He had also interviewed Cabban and ‘gained the impression that he was perhaps slightly pro-Liberal; or maybe apolitical. At any rate, he gave no clear indication to me that he was either for or against the Labor Party’. Cameron discussed the Naval Board’s knowledge of Stevens’ condition and the onus on the Board to be certain an officer was fit for command. He also picked up some of the inconsistencies contained in the refuta-
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tions of Cabban’s statement. For instance, he pointed out that while Voyager’s former navigator could recall his ship glancing Vampire during Stevens’ first and only attempt at bringing the ship alongside, Captain Jim Willis, who had previously been held up as a reliable witness said ‘I have no recollection of the alleged collision’. He did not say the incident did not happen but that he could not remember it. Cameron voiced his opinion that the Government could not resist the demand for an inquiry ‘without laying itself open to the charge that it fears the result’. He closed by calling upon the Government to hold another inquiry. William McMahon, another former Minister for the Navy, was next to speak. He asked the House how it hoped a new inquiry could improve upon Sir John Spicer’s finding that Voyager was culpable. He then proceeded to attack St John for his remark that Stevens was a ‘chronic drunkard’ and for challenging Professor Blackburn’s honesty and integrity. McMahon ended the debate by informing the Parliament that ‘the Government has not closed its options. The Prime Minister after considering all the points that have been raised will take the matter back to the party room and then decide exactly what is to be done’. The House adjourned for dinner while the Government went off to lick its wounds. Cabban states that, during the adjournment, political journalist Alan Reid told him, Jess and others that Sir Frank Packer, owner of Australian Consolidated Press, had told Holt that his newspapers could no longer support the Government’s refusal to reopen the matter. Cabinet met briefly before the evening sitting and decided a new inquiry was now unavoidable. After dinner, Holt delivered what he termed a ‘ground clearing’ operation, opening and covering the principal matters in dispute. He said that his predecessor had earnestly sought an explanation for the loss of Voyager and that he himself would not be party to any campaign to obscure the truth. Holt delayed bringing the debate to its conclusion by calling for a vote on the motion. He said it was ‘for the House to judge what course we should adopt’. As to the avenues of inquiry, he mentioned a select committee but spoke strongly against it. ‘There is the possibility of another judicial inquiry’, although he again queried what such an inquiry would prove. After another dreadful day, the Liberal party would again consider the matter in the Party Room. By now, even the usually unflappable Holt had conceded that enough was enough. The Government had suffered at and by its own hands and Holt was unwilling to let the debate continue any longer. There was little hope of restraining the ‘rebel’ backbenchers while the newspapers and the public were pressing for another inquiry.
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On 18 May 1967 it was, finally, over. In a statement made to the House, Holt said that a select committee to investigate Voyager was not appropriate. Then came the moment the Navy had been dreading for over two years: ‘So the Government has concluded that there should be a further inquiry and that it should be a judicial inquiry conducted probably by three judges’. The next day, Holt confirmed that the inquiry would be a Royal Commission. Holt decided this without consulting his Attorney-General, who would have advised against it, and against a body of opinion in Cabinet which continued to oppose any new inquiry. Bowen felt that Holt had over-reacted to the political and media pressure, but Jess had achieved his objective. It remained to be seen whether it was justified.
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‘A GHASTLY CAMPAIGN’ Cabinet still could not see the value of another inquiry. This was partly reflected in the Royal Commission’s terms of reference, which were deliberately framed to exploit the weaknesses apparent in the case put by Jess and others. The Commissioners were to investigate: 1. Whether any of the allegations made by Lieutenant Commander P.T. Cabban in the document attached to the Letters Patent regarding the drinking habits and seamanship of Captain D.H. Stevens were true and being true established that Captain Stevens was unfit to retain command of HMAS Voyager? 2. If it is found in answer to Question 1 that Captain Stevens was unfit to retain command of HMAS Voyager: a) Did the Naval Board know or ought they to have known of such unfitness to retain command and were they at fault in failing to relieve him of command? b) Should the findings made in the report of the Royal Commission relating to the loss of HMAS Voyager be varied, and if so, in what respects? 3. Whether the allegations in the document disclosed evidence which was available to counsel assisting the Royal Commission and was improperly withheld from the Commission? The selection of the three Commissioners was vital to the conduct and success of the inquiry. They were Sir Stanley Burbury, the Chief Justice of Tasmania, Justice Ken Asprey of the New South Wales Supreme Court and Justice George Lucas of the Queensland Supreme Court. Burbury was the chairman. There was universal press support for the new inquiry. The Australian’s editorial of 19 May 1967 applauded the Prime Minister’s decision.
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The Government’s agreement to a further inquiry into the latest aspects of the Voyager affair is wise and proper in the circumstances, however regrettable and distasteful in some respects the results might be. It was unfortunate that the decision was not taken early enough to prevent the impression of an unwilling executive yielding only when it judged it had no alternative.
The Opposition seemed content with the outcome. Only the Labor member for Oxley, Bill Hayden, felt the need to comment: ‘It will not be another whitewash, will it?’. As expected, the Naval Board was unimpressed. Australian warships were engaged in combat operations off South Vietnam and men would soon be lost in action. The inquiry was first mentioned in Navy News on 9 June 1967: a small note listing the names of the Commissioners and Counsel Assisting. The remainder of the page featured a major story headed ‘Hobart’s Efficiency in Vietnam Praised’. Other than authorised summaries sent to every RAN ship after each day of the Commission’s sitting, there would be no other mention of the inquiry in Navy News. Robertson had assumed a very low profile throughout the Parliamentary debate although he was delighted to have an opportunity to challenge Spicer’s findings. The Stevens family was naturally distressed by the prospect of another inquiry from which they stood to gain nothing. They were genuinely shocked by Cabban’s allegations believing them to be totally inconsistent with their own knowledge of Duncan. Stevens’ widow, Beatrice, and his father both issued public statements. Mrs Stevens said: I have been sickened and upset during the past few days by allegations made about my husband Duncan. He lost his life in Voyager. He has never therefore been able to speak for himself . . . My faith in my husband is unshaken. I welcome the PM’s decision to have a judicial inquiry which will restore his name. I only hope the legal procedures will be quick.
Sir Jack Stevens took a different, and perhaps safer, line, saying his son ‘was not a paragon of all virtues but he was a decent Australian, a dedicated naval officer, a good all-round athlete and a wonderful son’. Among the many ‘sympathy’ letters the Stevens family received were two from serving flag officers, Rear Admirals Morrison and Smith. Morrison said he was ‘extremely pleased and very lucky to have [Stevens] as my Commander while I was in the Melbourne’. Smith remarked that he had ‘always especially admired his integrity, cheerfulness, willingness
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to help others and his enthusiasm. As you know we were together in the Frigate Squadron and there I was able to appreciate fully his many fine qualities’. There was contact between naval personnel and the Stevens family after the second inquiry was announced, but there was no collusion. On 23 June 1967, Commodore Dacre Smyth wrote from London to Beatrice Stevens: ‘Jim Willis and I have often talked together in my office and he just can’t wait to get at Cabban. But even if Cabban does get his just desserts, nothing can make up to you for the nightmare of this ghastly campaign’. The ‘ghastly campaign’ attracted an impressive array of lawyers. The all-important position of Counsel Assisting the Commissioners had gone to Frank Burt QC, a Perth barrister. Burt’s junior was Philip Jeffrey. The other government brief—that for the Navy—was taken by Peter Murphy QC, a Melbourne barrister who had extensive experience of Royal Commissions. Humfry Henchman, Jenkyn’s junior at the 1964 Commission, was again junior counsel. Briefs for parties claiming an interest in the proceedings were a mixture of faces from the 1964 Commission and several newcomers. Appearing for the Stevens family was Bill Ash QC, assisted by John Sinclair, with Fred Osborne as the Instructing Solicitor. Laurence Street had been elevated to the New South Wales Supreme Court Bench. David Hicks, counsel for Robertson in 1964, was now on the New South Wales District Court Bench. Robertson was represented by Ray Reynolds QC, with Peter Raine acting as junior counsel. Appearing for Cabban were Jack Hiatt QC and Chester Porter, while Sandy Gregory would act for the interests of the Price family. The sensation that the Voyager tragedy was going around again was heightened by the use of the same courtroom as in 1964: Commonwealth Industrial Court No. 3. It was an inquiry that made history. Never before had a matter been the subject of two Royal Commissions. The Commission’s formal opening on 13 June 1967 lasted just 33 minutes. It covered a range of preliminaries, including an application from Burt that the Cabban Statement be suppressed until evidence was finally given, but of most significance was Burt’s explanation of the terms of reference and the matters on which the Commission would need to hear argument and make findings. He emphasised that ‘this Commission is not what has so often been referred to as the second Voyager inquiry. To call it that would really be to miss the central point of the present inquiry’. Burt stressed that the Commission did not call for the re-hearing of any evidence that related to the events immediately
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preceding the collision. In an attempt to prevent the Commission becoming a bottomless pit, he also tried to limit the scope of the inquiry to those matters relating specifically to Stevens’ fitness to command and the extent to which, if at all, Spicer’s finding ought to be altered on that basis. The Commission then adjourned until 18 July 1967 to allow counsel to gather evidence and prepare submissions. Burt’s clear direction that the Commission ought not to hear navigational evidence must have made it obvious to Robertson that he would have to use Cabban and his allegations about Stevens if he were to gain anything. When the Commission resumed, Burt continued to define the scope of the inquiry: ‘[W]e are not really concerned with the happenings of the night of the collision, or not specifically concerned; perhaps it lies on the periphery of this inquiry, but that is the highest status one can give it’. He later suggested that even if Stevens had suffered a violent heart attack on the bridge of Voyager ‘it would not seem to me to throw any light upon or indeed be relevant to the behaviour of the officers on the bridge of Melbourne’. The one situation he was prepared to accept was that Stevens be proved incompetent, something vastly different from illness, although at that stage of the Commission he saw no grounds for such a view. Burt then outlined the circumstances surrounding Cabban’s involvement, taking pains to reduce the significance of his statement in terms of the Commission’s subsequent proceedings. The origins of the document, it seems to us, is to a very high degree reflected in its structure. It is not a pleading. Nor is it an indictment. It is really a conversation piece. It is made, so to speak, off the cuff by a man who had no idea that it would ever see the light of day.
After noting those incidents in the Statement that could be dated and proved, and rearranging the Statement into a proper chronological sequence, Burt asked the Commissioners to bear in mind two things: first, that although Stevens was dead and unable to defend himself, if the facts sustained any conclusion about his conduct then such conclusions ought to be fearlessly drawn; and, second, given the nature of the inquiry, notions such as onus of proof and beyond reasonable doubt were unrealistic. As for Stevens’ drinking habits, Burt stressed that the Commission’s interest in them should only be inasmuch as they related to his fitness to command a warship. Burt criticised St John’s description of Stevens as a ‘chronic alcoholic’, going as far as to say that the evidence showed that this was not true. As to whether the Naval Board
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ought to have known about Stevens’ condition, Burt left the matter entirely open although he suggested that many situations could develop which would prevent the Naval Board from knowing things it ought to know—in spite of procedures established to ensure it was kept informed. The third, and perhaps the most political, term of reference—whether any information was ‘improperly withheld’ from the 1964 Commission—was one Burt appeared to dismiss from the outset. He argued that the conduct of Smyth and Sheppard was entirely within the professional conduct expected of a barrister. Burt now laid down the way in which he intended to organise the proceedings. Starting with Cabban, who would be called both to give evidence and to be examined on his Statement, witnesses would be called to give evidence on the origins of the Statement, the reasons for Cabban not being called at the 1964 inquiry and the handling of the Statement since its coming into existence. This would serve both to answer the third term of reference and get it out of the way immediately. Following Cabban, the Commission would examine Stevens’ medical record, before hearing matters relating to alcohol consumption and blood alcohol levels. Only then would Burt call any witness to corroborate or dispute the truthfulness of the Cabban Statement. Cabban was, therefore, the first witness to take the stand on the third day of sitting. After displaying some nervousness, he appeared to relax and stood for the duration of his evidence. Burt systematically took him through his naval career and the circumstances relating to his appointment as Voyager’s Executive Officer. The character of the accuser appeared to be as relevant as that of the accused. Peter Thomas Cabban was born at Newcastle in 1928. He joined the RAN College in 1942 and made steady progress during his training. Promoted Acting Sub-lieutenant in 1947, Cabban was considered to be an officer of average ability and promotion prospects. Awarded his bridge watchkeeping certificate in 1949, he commenced training as a pilot in February the following year. Over the next six years, Cabban served as a naval aviator in various postings. In June 1955 he trained to become a maintenance test pilot and served until November 1956 in that capacity at HMAS Albatross. After the crash of a Gannet training aircraft in which he was one of the pilots, Cabban was permanently grounded as ‘temperamentally unsuited to operational flying’. In an effort to shape a new career in general service, Cabban was posted to HMAS Warramunga in January 1957 as a watchkeeping officer. After a year in that ship, he had served the mandatory period as a lieutenant.
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Cabban was promoted to Lieutenant Commander and sent to the Jervis Bay Naval Airfield as Officer-in-Charge. Having failed in several attempts to have his grounding as a pilot overturned, Cabban submitted his resignation. It was not accepted and Cabban continued to serve at Jervis Bay. In January 1959, he was selected to undertake a course in Work Study in Britain when the Naval Board decided it would form a team to commence this activity within the RAN. Two years later, Cabban was appointed Executive Officer of the carrier HMAS Sydney which was then undergoing conversion for subsequent service as a fast transport and troopship. After a year mostly spent with the ship alongside, Cabban was posted to Voyager in September 1962 as Executive Officer. Cabban and Stevens were professionally and personally poles apart; ill-suited even to have served closely together. Stevens respected Cabban but did not like him. Cabban liked Stevens but did not respect him. Cabban was a most extraordinary man, possessed of a complex and contradictory character. Most peculiar was his ability to recall the most minor details of a seemingly inconsequential event. In matters that had no connection with Voyager, he was able to remember with incredible accuracy names, dates, places and conversations—all of which were independently confirmed. Throughout a naval career spanning two decades, Cabban had been a difficult and sometimes obstinate individual. He abounded in self-confidence and ambition but showed little restraint in disagreeing with his seniors, whatever the cost to his own promotion prospects. It was not surprising that his performance reports were evenly divided: some were very good, some were dreadful. Almost every senior officer with whom he served regarded him either very highly or very poorly. Cabban saw much of what happened in life as either black or white but he was not a moralist. His judgements of others, including those he passed on Duncan Stevens, were those of a man with a firm sense of duty and a well-defined appreciation of responsibility. Believing his duty was to implement and see observed all of the Navy’s rules and regulations, his rigid personality led him to be authoritarian and even petty at times. A dour man, his leadership was consciously conventional and lacked the originality and imagination that would have made his style more tolerable. Although Cabban was a stiff disciplinarian, something which made him invariably unpopular with sections of Voyager’s ship’s company, he longed to be liked and had a need to know that others understood his attitudes and actions.
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Cabban considered himself a coward for having resigned in late 1963. He had fled from Stevens, whom he feared, and the threats he had made, which Cabban believed were real. Cabban also chided himself for not acting on the conviction he formed in mid-1963 that Voyager would be lost if Stevens remained in command. Cabban was deeply shocked when he heard of Voyager’s loss and carried feelings of guilt, believing that he should have done more to prevent the circumstances which led to the tragedy. Cabban conceded that between 1964 and 1967 he was acting more out of emotion, as a consequence of his desperate psychological state, than from logic and sound reason. He was also aware that he was suffering from hysterical amnesia; a psychological state induced by deep shock in which particular incidents are put beyond conscious recall. Cabban hoped the new inquiry would clear him of responsibility for the collision. Cabban believed that his psychological state led him into acting naively and being drawn into a second Voyager inquiry. He considered neither the full consequences of his involvement nor the personal cost. In spite of having been out of the Navy for twelve months when he made his by now infamous Statement, Cabban felt as though he was still part of the Navy system. Accordingly, he found it difficult to resist the imposing Robertson, who acted towards him as a Captain would treat a Lieutenant Commander, although both were civilians. Cabban, foolishly or otherwise, accepted Robertson’s instructions as orders which he ought not to question. Of all Cabban’s personality quirks, his attitude towards the consumption of alcohol by officers serving in RAN ships was considered in most detail. The seeds of discontent within the wardroom had emerged soon after his arrival in the ship when he placed restrictions on wardroom bar hours. The picture that was being painted was of a man who tended towards pettiness and who usually made too much of matters that could have been either ignored or dealt with less abrasively. It was remarkable, then, that Burt was able to take Cabban through his entire statement with only two objections from counsel, both relating to the admissibility of hearsay evidence. On both occasions the Commissioners declined to make a ruling on hearsay evidence other than to ask that it be avoided until its significance with respect to possible findings was established. This was no doubt going to be a continuing problem for the Commission as large parts of Cabban’s allegations were based entirely on hearsay. However, Burt tried to ignore the Cabban Statement as much as he could in an effort to downplay its importance. From the outset it
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was apparent that Cabban wanted to moderate his views and opinions and it was this more considered evidence that Burt, realising the flaws in the Statement, hoped to use as the basis for subsequent argument. It was a hope he entertained for the two days he kept Cabban in the witness box. On day four, Cabban was led through the events which culminated in him not testifying at the 1964 Commission. His conduct appeared curious to say the least. After being interviewed by Sergeant Turner, Cabban was asked by the police to see Smyth. He told Smyth that he had heard rumours about Stevens being drunk at the time of the collision, rumours he had heard from Voyager survivors at HMAS Penguin, but that he could vouch for Stevens’ strong discipline in never drinking at sea. Although Smyth was given a description of Stevens’ alcoholinduced incapacity at other times, he would have found Cabban’s probably excessive insistence that Stevens never drank at sea a little strange. Apparently concerned for Stevens’ reputation, Cabban sought legal advice before approaching the Stevens family with his evidence. He subsequently consulted Osborne, who took him to see Sinclair. Street did not want to speak with him. Cabban said his intention was to prevent evidence relating to alcohol being brought up at the Commission. Strangely, after he heard Hyland’s evidence that Stevens had consumed a triple brandy, Cabban rang Robertson and offered him his ‘knowledge of Captain Stevens as far as alcohol was concerned’. Robertson declined the offer. In early April 1964, Smyth informed Cabban that he was not required to give evidence. Cabban told Burt he was ‘pleased’ he did not have to give evidence. Burt then took Cabban through the sequence of events that led to his Statement being made. After two days in the witness box, Ash began his cross-examination, intent on destroying Cabban’s reliability as a witness. Ash attacked Cabban on a number of fronts including his inexperience in an operational warship, having been an aviator and work study specialist for a number of years, the sheer unlikelihood of his alleged incidents having taken place without Stevens’ conduct being widely known (this was based on Ash’s contention that destroyer captains have little or no privacy), gaps or failures in his recollection, exaggerations or inaccuracies in his evidence and the impossibility of him being able to vouch for Stevens’ movements. The assault was sustained and relentless, but Ash was unable to find a sinister motive for Cabban’s allegations. At the end of two hours’ questioning, Cabban’s Statement was still largely intact. An interesting fact that did emerge was the limited contact that
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Stevens had with Captain Jim Willis in 1963. This conflicted with the Naval Board’s insistence that Willis was able to refute much of the Cabban Statement. The following day, with Cabban still in the witness box, Ash tried to suggest to him that as Stevens had plenty of work to do and was known to have carried out his duties satisfactorily, there was little opportunity for him to be as incapacitated as frequently as Cabban claimed. He went on to criticise Cabban’s overly rigorous attitude towards alcohol consumption by officers and to use Cabban’s uncertainty about events to minimise Stevens’ consumption of alcohol to what could be positively ascertained. Ash tried to chip away at the period covered by Cabban’s allegations although he was unable to show any one instance where Cabban was either grossly inaccurate or deliberately misleading. The turning point came late that morning, when Ash started to question Cabban on Voyager’s visit to Japan. In his Statement, Cabban described the period ‘as more than trying, it was quite desperate’. When asked if he was exaggerating in describing the situation as desperate, Cabban denied the suggestion and claimed that it was not the events which were desperate but his ‘state of mind’; ‘I thought I was in a situation rather similar to that in The Caine Mutiny’. This comment reflected Cabban’s occasional tendency to be melodramatic. Remembering that Lieutenant Maryk, Herman Wouk’s fictitious Executive Officer of the destroyer USS Caine, had landed himself in trouble by keeping a log of the captain’s actions, Cabban said he had avoided any reference to Stevens in either his letters or the audio tapes which he sent to his wife. Ash was happy to let Cabban describe his mental desperation. I had no certain pattern or guide as to where I should turn or what I should do under these circumstances. I did not know if a continuation of this situation would adversely affect the safety of the ship. I felt that if I were to report my feelings in this way and I were wrong, I would be committing both the captain unfairly and myself to an extent that was not going to help. If I did not report it and anything happened, I did not know where I would stand then. I felt that the situation was close to being out of hand but I just could not see how I would explain what I saw so intimately to senior authorities.
This explained much of Cabban’s behaviour at that time. He was portraying himself as the central character in a dramatic ordeal, with normality unravelling around him. Ash realised that his best chance of discrediting Cabban was to concentrate on exaggerations in his Statement and the extreme nature of some, if not all, of Cabban’s
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personal judgements. He was relentless in pointing out contradictions between Cabban’s assertion that the situation had become desperate and lengthy passages of time and behaviour which did not seem to support such a claim. By the end of the fifth day, and the first week, Cabban’s reliability had been effectively challenged. The irrefutable evidence and argument which the Commissioners needed to bring an adverse finding against Stevens was clearly lacking. Ash was right to press Cabban on his reasons for providing information to Admiral Hickling which Ash claimed was inaccurate, incorrect or largely irrelevant to Hickling’s book. The effect of this crossexamination, based to some degree on the Cabban Statement, was to prove that the document was indeed no more than a conversation piece and was not even reliable. This was why Burt had always suggested the Statement be used only as a point of departure. However, Ash could have made much more of the Statement in as much as it was the basis of the terms of reference. His failure to do so was fortunate for Cabban. To compound his mishandling of the brief further, Ash unwittingly added to the case against Stevens by probing other incidents that Cabban had not mentioned in his statement. Whereas Ash was trying to cast doubt on Cabban’s power of recollection, he only managed to bring to light allegations that he would subsequently need to rebuff. Cabban’s evidence relating to Stevens’ temperament was a particular strain on his credibility. The incidents cited to show that Stevens had an unpredictable temperament were unconvincing. Rather than showing that Stevens was prone to rash outbursts, they hinted at a degree of over-sensitivity on Cabban’s part. Even Cabban’s objection to Steven’s occasional use of bad language was rejected by the Commissioners who regarded it as part of the ‘hurly burly’ of life at sea. The subsequent line of cross-examination aimed to show that, in addition to being factually incorrect, Cabban’s portrayal of Stevens was obviously misleading. It was becoming clear that Ash wanted to show that the sole motivation behind the Commission was to ease public outrage at Cabban’s allegations. If the Statement could be shown to have created a false impression, the matters under review would need no further examination. In other words, Ash was looking for a way to have the Commissioners discharge their duties without conducting an exhaustive inquiry. By demonstrating public concerns to be quite unfounded, the Commission could be wound up and the matter closed. Ash also criticised Cabban for retreating from the form of his Statement but leaving its inference. In response, Cabban implied, albeit
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obliquely, that he would not have commented as he did had he known his Statement was to become a public document. This suggestion would have brought him little sympathy from the Commissioners who were already predisposed towards protecting Stevens’ reputation. After all, he was dead and had no right of reply. Having demonstrated the inaccuracies in Cabban’s Statement, Ash began the eighth day’s proceedings by suggesting that Cabban was critical of Stevens as a consequence of his work study training and experience, and as an officer who sat in apparent judgement of his superior. Drawing on the fact that Stevens had an ulcer, and that this condition was seriously exacerbated by worry and stress, Ash argued that Stevens was increasingly affected by Cabban’s demeanour and critical attitude. Ash also suggested to Cabban that he was, in effect, keeping a mental file on his captain’s behaviour. After being questioned further by the Commissioners on the origins of his Statement and whether he had believed it would be used for a purpose other than as background for Hickling’s book, Ash ended his cross-examination. He was followed by Peter Murphy, senior counsel for the Navy. The Naval Board had already made clear its attitude towards Cabban and his allegations. From the outset, Murphy referred to him as ‘Mr Cabban’ rather than ‘Commander Cabban’—a subtle, yet effective means of diminishing the impact of his Statement. Murphy began by establishing that Cabban felt Robertson had suffered an injustice because of the collision and that this injustice was partly the product of the 1964 inquiry’s refusal to let him testify. Cabban saw his contribution as helping to reverse the injustice suffered by Robertson although he could not give details as to how this would be achieved. Murphy then turned to Cabban’s career in the Fleet Air Arm to argue that the real motivation behind Cabban’s actions was the grudge he held against the Navy. Throughout the Commission, Cabban had attempted to portray himself as a highly competent and professional naval officer—in all respects. His career in the Fleet Air Arm showed him to be, at the very least on occasion, a less than adequate naval aviator. Murphy took Cabban through the remainder of his naval career, which lacked continuity or purpose, in preparing him for future employment and promotion. Cabban was often involved in disputes with other officers; inclined to comment on the performance of his seniors; and stuck rigidly to rules and regulations. As a Lieutenant-Commander, Cabban still seemed to rely on policies and procedures for his survival and promotion prospects rather than his performance and its assessment by others.
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Cabban was untroubled that his contemporaries did not think highly of him—either their judgement was poor or they stood to gain by their negative assessment of him. Murphy ended his cross-examination by asking Cabban whether his Statement could be misconstrued. Cabban agreed that it could but only to the extent that he had already conceded in his evidence. The right to cross-examination then passed to Ray Reynolds, counsel for Captain Robertson. He stood and simply said, ‘I have no questions’. Cabban’s own counsel, Jack Hiatt, re-directed his testimony. Hiatt’s questions elicited little that was new, although he was able to have Cabban express in more detail the mental processes leading to some of his conclusions concerning Stevens and his behaviour. The most significant passage dealt with Cabban’s decision to lift his requirement for his Statement to remain confidential. When asked by Justice Asprey whether it was Robertson or Jess who had sought Cabban’s permission to have the Statement shown to the Prime Minister and Cabinet, Cabban said he could not recall. His next admission, which related to what he thought disclosing the Statement would achieve, exposed his greatest vulnerability. I just understood that if the Prime Minister were to read this document—and perhaps the Cabinet—they would feel that perhaps there was some other inference that could be placed on the conditions described on the night, and perhaps in so doing they might decide that the circumstances which prompted this might perhaps be reviewed to see that the security of the Navy was established.
When asked whether he thought his Statement could assist Captain Robertson, he rather lamely replied: ‘I was prepared to accept the word of people more experienced than I in these areas’. In Burt’s re-examination, Cabban went further, saying that if Robertson had known more about Stevens’ competence as a destroyer commanding officer, he would have: had every reason to think that the destroyer [was] doing something he did not recognise, but [as Voyager] had been commanded in the Far East for 12 months by the same man, [she] must be under good control, but he just did not understand what was going to happen next. He certainly did not expect what did, or have any reason to.
Cabban assumed that Stevens was under the influence of alcohol at the time of the collision and this effectively rendered him unfit to command, with such unfitness manifesting itself in the manoeuvre which led to the collision.
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At this point, Burt began to show some suspicions about the documentary evidence that had been tabled in support of Stevens. As counsel assisting, he had neither attacked nor supported Cabban although he was obviously persuaded by some of Cabban’s explanations for his behaviour and thoughts. Burt appears to have well understood Cabban’s personality and character traits, an empathy that went further than the even-handedness required of him as counsel assisting, partly because he was able to separate the significance of the Cabban Statement and Stevens’ fitness to command, from the physical circumstances and causes of the collision. Burt had shown no interest in arguing that the two were related, although the terms of reference justified him in doing so. His approach was technically correct and avoided any pre-emptive conclusions. In fact, Burt seems to have interpreted the terms of reference better than Burbury and Asprey who sought repeatedly to establish the link between the Cabban Statement and the collision. By the end of the ninth day, Cabban’s position had improved if only because his counsel could see that Burt was not hostile to Cabban or his evidence. Cabban was asked several questions on the tenth morning and then, after eight days in the witness box, he was permitted to step down. Cabban’s evidence had been used to a lay a broad basis for the Commission’s inquiries. By this stage there were also clear indications of how each of the parties saw and understood their briefs. Of the Commissioners, Burbury had exerted some restraint but had allowed examination and cross-examination to proceed freely. He had questioned the relevance of evidence and argument sparingly, and avoided committing himself to any firm views relating to facts or findings. Asprey frequently broke into cross-examination and had shown a readiness to engage in argument with counsel. Although not a bully, Asprey seemed to have some fixed ideas and to be less than impressed by Cabban. Lucas’ approach was very different. He was quietly spoken, seldom interjected with questions of his own and appeared to want the Commission’s proceedings to continue with the minimum of restrictions or interruptions. Lucas gave the impression of being most concerned by the gravity of the Cabban Statement and seemed most positively disposed towards Cabban. The Cabban Statement had not fared well although the author’s performance in defending a very difficult opening position had been creditable. Ash had led Cabban to make numerous concessions. His Statement was in places inaccurate, exaggerated, misleading and easily misconstrued. However, Cabban stood by the spirit of his Statement
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and he had Burt’s support. Notwithstanding, Cabban desperately needed corroboration for his Statement. It contained a great deal of hearsay and detail that Cabban could neither adequately confirm nor definitely remember. This is not to imply that Cabban lied either in his Statement or in his evidence. There had been no suggestion that he had lied. Rather, as Ash argued, Cabban had overstated much of what he had seen or heard, and placed sinister constructs on matters that more readily yielded an innocent explanation. The next phase of evidence related to Stevens’ physical fitness and health, and covered matters largely independent of the Cabban Statement. The principal witness was Surgeon Commander Roger McNeill, who was then on the Emergency Reserve and in private medical practice in suburban Melbourne. Burt took McNeill through his naval career and the occasions on which he had worked alongside Stevens. They first served together and became friends in 1954, while serving at HMAS Tarangau on Manus Island. During this time Stevens had complained of indigestion which McNeill diagnosed as a preulcerous condition to be treated with an antacid preparation, amphogel, and a strict diet. McNeill had not reported or recorded either the diagnosis or the prescribed treatment. It appears that Stevens was then diagnosed with an active duodenal ulcer in 1959 while serving in HMAS Melbourne, and that this was known to McNeill. When Melbourne and Voyager were together in Hong Kong during 1963, McNeill, being the Fleet Medical Officer embarked in the flagship, saw Stevens on three or four occasions which he described as ‘social’ but not ‘professional’ in the normal understanding of the term. He said that Stevens complained of suffering from severe stomach pain but that he (McNeill) did not think the ulcer was active at this time. As he believed the problem was not serious, he prescribed an increased dose of amphogel. McNeill stated that he did not subsequently mention this to Tiller, Voyager’s medical officer, nor did he submit any official report, believing this to be a matter within his discretion. Burt did little to hide his incredulity at McNeill’s actions. Burt believed that Stevens’ condition was demonstrably serious and, given that the circumstances in which Stevens lived and worked were likely to worsen his condition, hinted that Stevens had attempted to conceal the extent of his condition by seeking out McNeill for treatment. McNeill’s only explanation was that Stevens’ condition did not appear to him to be that serious. It was likely that he communicated this opinion to Stevens who would have adopted the same view. But Burt
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still could not understand why McNeill had not taken steps to inform the Naval Board of Stevens’ condition, or to upgrade the prescribed treatment. Having received no convincing explanation from McNeill, Burt was entitled to conclude that Stevens had sought to conceal his condition, with McNeill’s help. McNeill demonstrably failed to perform his duties by not making the necessary report that Stevens’ condition warranted. McNeill’s credibility continued to deteriorate. The condition he had described earlier as not being serious, was now deemed serious. The day ended with Stevens’ medical condition unexpectedly providing the strongest evidence that he may not have been fit to command Voyager. Burt re-examined McNeill the following morning, returning to the non-disclosure of Stevens’ ulcer condition. McNeill had stated the previous day that he had never conducted an annual medical examination of Stevens. Burt now produced documentary evidence to show that McNeill had done so not only in 1954, but again in 1956. After reminding McNeill that he had earlier stated the appropriate time to record any disorder was on an officer’s annual medical report, Burt asked him why he had not made some reference to the ulcer condition he plainly knew existed. He claimed not to have mentioned Stevens’ ulcer in his 1954 report because this was made soon after McNeill’s arrival at Tarangau and before Stevens mentioned his dyspepsia. However, he could give no explanation as to why he had not mentioned the ulcer in 1956. Burt was clearly concerned by McNeill’s answers while Murphy made no attempt to defend McNeill’s position or his actions. Sir William Morrow had conducted a medical examination of Stevens during September 1963 and found that he was fit and well although diffident in describing how he felt. Surgeon Rear Admiral Coplans would not have approved this consultation as all naval personnel were strongly discouraged from seeking civilian medical attention. Morrow noted on his consultation record that the patient ‘Drinks too much on shore’. However, he stated that this did not mean that Stevens drank to excess; it was meant to imply he drank too much given his ulcer condition. Morrow concluded that Stevens’ ulcer was not active at the time of his examination but he did concede that it could change and become active virtually overnight. Ash asked Morrow why he suggested to Stevens that he drink diluted brandy. Morrow explained it was largely psychosomatic and that many ulcer sufferers held ‘a belief that diluted spirit, not necessarily whisky but brandy too, does give them relief of pain . . . but we know it really exacerbates the ulcer in the end’.
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To complete this passage of evidence, Admiral Coplans was asked for his opinion on McNeill’s actions. After outlining the details of medical administration in the Navy, Coplans stated that it was an offence for any officer or sailor to conceal or feign a medical condition. Further, McNeill should have arranged an interim medical survey and, if necessary, recommended a down-grading of Stevens’ medical fitness category. As for his opinion on whether Stevens had concealed his condition, Coplans suggested that most people who suffered from ulcers learned to live with their condition and, while it was not incumbent on them to report any symptoms, it would be prudent to do so. When asked by Hiatt what would have happened to Stevens had McNeill convened the interim medical survey and found that his ulcer was active, Coplans said Stevens would have been removed from the ship, admitted to hospital for six weeks, been medically down-graded and given a shore-posting for twelve months. In other words, as an officer in command Stevens would be posted elsewhere. An officer who was in the midst of experiencing his ultimate ambition, and who placed his hopes for future preferment on his seagoing ability, would have a clear motive for concealing the true state of his condition and trying desperately to avoid a medical survey. After sixteen days, the case against Stevens was complete. He seemed to have been a straightforward man who enjoyed life and emphasised the importance of having fun. On occasions throughout his career he lacked drive, commitment and perseverance. He worried about the challenges he needed to face, and was angered when things did not go his way. He was a son with feelings of insecurity, a man who lacked strength of character and an officer whose ability did not match his ambition. By 1963, it was alleged that Stevens was unfit to command on two separate grounds—although the charitable would have said the causes were related—excessive consumption of alcohol and a debilitating medical condition. For the next 50 days of hearings, a succession of witnesses would be called to give evidence on Stevens’ actions over the fourteen months from the time he assumed command of Voyager until the collision.
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11
RELEVANCE AND RETICENCE While the press and the public were generally concerned that a man of Captain Stevens’ alleged condition could be placed in command of a naval ship, the paramount issue was whether Stevens’ inability to command contributed to the collision. Regardless of whether Cabban, Jess or St John had actually demonstrated the relevance of Stevens’ drinking to the causes of the collision, the newspaper editorials assumed a connection. Consequently, if Stevens was unable to exercise command of Voyager, the collision might not have occurred, or would not have occurred for the reasons it did, and Robertson’s responsibility would need to be revised. The ‘logic’ applied assumed the situation to be far more straightforward than it was. Yet, there was a strong belief that if Cabban’s allegations were shown to be true, Spicer’s criticisms of Robertson would have to be reviewed. The challenge for Robertson was to show that Cabban’s allegations warranted a reconsideration of the navigational evidence presented at the first inquiry; in conjunction with new submissions that Robertson would put to the Commission demonstrating that Spicer’s findings were wrong. If there was a case to be made that Spicer would have reached different findings had he heard Cabban’s evidence, it first needed to overcome the reasons for his evidence not being heard in 1964. This was the Commission’s second term of reference. Was relevant evidence improperly withheld from the Spicer Commission? This is a question that can be asked of most inquiries of this nature after the event. The greatest difficulty faced by counsel assisting at a Royal Commission is to determine what, if anything, from a vast amount of available evidence is relevant. Robertson believed that the general attitude of the Spicer Commission, which was hostile to him, would have been completely different if Cabban had been heard.
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At this stage Robertson wisely declined to comment on how Spicer’s report might have differed but strongly contended that it would have. However, he stated that if Cabban were honest and his allegations were true, Stevens was a man ‘whose sense of responsibility had been so eroded he was not sufficiently reliable to be left in command of a mano-war’. Robertson also suggested that ‘this situation was known to naval authorities before the collision took place’. With these few words, Robertson ended any possibility of support from Navy counsel. Robertson’s change of attitude was nothing more than another step in his increasing readiness to criticise the Board. On each occasion that Robertson’s situation had become desperate over the last three years, he was prepared to do whatever was necessary to pursue his interests. His former values and principles had become liabilities if he was to achieve the vindication he sought from the second Commission. But the Commissioners had yet to be convinced that Cabban’s allegations affected Spicer’s findings. Burbury could not understand why Cabban was relevant now when he had not been during the Spicer Commission. He was not alone. Justice Lucas commented: ‘I know my fellow Commissioners are very anxious that it should be made very clear what your point is. I must confess at the moment I am still not clear in my mind about it’. The Commissioners were surprised that Robertson was unable to articulate clearly Cabban’s relevance when he had aided and abetted those who sought another inquiry solely based on Cabban’s evidence. The Commissioners decided to digress into Robertson’s disagreements with the Spicer Report before returning to the issue of whether or not Cabban was relevant to proceedings. Having heard a brief account of why Robertson believed Spicer was wrong, with emphasis on his finding that Voyager had steadied for a ‘minute or so’ before the collision, Asprey returned Robertson to the Cabban Statement and affirmed that they could only alter Spicer’s findings on the basis of that statement. Robertson’s main problem was his continuing refusal to state that Stevens was not a competent captain. But the time was fast approaching when Robertson had to attack Stevens and prepare himself for criticism from Ash, and probably Murphy as well. At the end of his examination by Philip Jeffrey, Robertson had said only that Spicer had rejected his theories about why the collision occurred because he assumed that Stevens was a competent captain. Robertson had failed to demonstrate the specific relevance of the Cabban Statement, relying on a general inference that obviously did not convince the Commissioners. When
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Smyth was examined by Reynolds and asked whether Cabban’s evidence would have altered the entire course of the 1964 inquiry, Smyth replied: ‘I do not think so’. Trying to establish the reason for his confidence, Reynolds asked, ‘Let us not mince words. Did you think he was a psychiatric case?’ Smyth replied, ‘To tell you the honest truth, I did. But I would prefer not to say it. I do not claim any psychiatric knowledge, but I have struck that sort of witness before. I could be quite wrong, but that is what I thought’. By the end of Smyth’s re-examination, Robertson’s position had not improved. When the thirteenth day of hearings began, Burbury took the initiative with respect to Robertson’s position and intervened with a series of questions for his counsel. The Commissioners were still anxious ‘to know how it is claimed that if the Cabban Statement were accepted in substance, some variations in findings adverse to Captain Robertson ought to be made’. Burbury then summarised his understanding of the basic submission being put by Reynolds. The last of the three propositions contained the vital element. If Sir John Spicer had believed that Captain Stevens was a man of the type that Cabban paints him in the Cabban Statement, he might have been prepared to give Captain Stevens the kind of margin of error which . . . he felt unable to attribute to him, and therefore led him to reject Captain Robertson’s reconstruction.
Burbury invited Reynolds ‘at a convenient time this week to make what I would call a short opening statement of how it is claimed that the findings of Sir John Spicer adverse to your client should be varied’. At the end of day sixteen of the inquiry, Reynolds handed the Commissioners an eighteen-page statement putting the case for a variation of Spicer’s findings where they related to Captain Robertson. It was not until the thirty-ninth day of the inquiry that attention returned to Robertson’s interest in the proceedings. This was prompted by the calling of Rear Admiral Peek as a witness and continuing objections from Ash to the consideration of navigational evidence relating to the collision. Ash wanted the Commission to limit its inquiries to the period covered by Cabban’s Statement ending on 8 January 1964. Despite pointing out that this was ‘literally speaking’ the extent of the Commission’s charter, Burt was of the view that this ‘did not seem to be a desirable point at which to terminate the inquiry and it would be satisfactory to carry it forward, not perhaps in great detail, but at least until the date of the collision’. But Burbury added:
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‘there must be some nexus between the drinking habits and seamanship of Captain Stevens and possible variation in the finding [of Spicer]’. Reynolds’ strategy was to have the Commission accept his evidence and argument which would hopefully establish a connection between Cabban’s evidence and Spicer’s findings, before making a ruling on its admissibility. The only form of resistance Ash could offer was a threat to prolong the inquiry by seeking a reconsideration of all the evidence presented to Spicer. Both Burt and Ash were concerned about Peek’s evidence, although for different reasons. Burbury realised that Peek’s examination could not proceed without Reynolds providing a statement of the navigational matters he wanted to cover. Reynolds advised that they would be limited to the theories explaining Voyager’s final movements before the collision. The Commissioners were clearly unsure as to whether to allow Reynolds his questions, in that they seemed unrelated to Cabban’s evidence. Burbury was, however, prepared to be indulgent but gave Reynolds what could be fairly described as a warning: ‘If it appears that matters are being opened up which have no fairly arguable relevance to term of reference 2(b), then we may have to intervene’. Reynolds began his examination of Peek by having him agree that the standards of performance expected of a captain in the Fleet were very high. Reynolds then described a series of hypothetical situations drawn from the Cabban Statement. He asked Peek what he would have done had he been aware of these situations as they occurred. As expected, Peek said that if the substance of the Cabban Statement were accepted he would have decided that Stevens lacked responsibility, was unfit to command on medical grounds and should have been courtmartialled. Reynolds then attempted to connect this view with the navigational aspects raised at the 1964 Commission. The difficulty Reynolds faced was having to rely on Peek to establish the connection, as the Commission’s terms of reference did not allow Reynolds to do so himself. Peek was quite prepared to disagree with Smyth’s theory that Voyager’s final movement was in response to the flying course signal. He was also prepared to say that Voyager was manoeuvring in accordance with the flying course signal, which gave Stevens the discretion to determine how he would assume the proper station. But as for demonstrating the relevance of Cabban to any of this, Peek was useless. It was not until ten days later that Reynolds made what could properly be termed an opening address which he ultimately hoped to
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develop on Robertson’s behalf. Reynolds openly acknowledged that his submission depended on the Commissioners finding that Stevens was unfit to command. He also attempted to persuade the Commissioners that their decision on whether to amend Spicer’s findings should not rest merely on whether Stevens was unfit to command. If additional evidence was presented then it ought to be heard. Asprey suggested that what Reynolds really wanted was certain aspects of the first inquiry to be reheard, rather than its findings appealed. As this gave Reynolds an opportunity to be heard, he readily agreed. Reynolds said that Spicer’s findings were clearly predicated on the assumption that Stevens was a highly competent destroyer captain and the rejection of inferences that Robertson was an inexperienced aircraft carrier captain. Had Spicer known of Cabban’s evidence and questioned Stevens’ competence, Reynolds argued, he would not have rejected Robertson’s submission that Voyager mistook her position relative to Melbourne. But Reynolds’ submission failed to satisfy the Commissioners’ requirement for the relevance of Stevens’ unfitness to command to be demonstrated. While they were naturally reluctant to overturn Spicer too readily, to do so at all would create the impression that Stevens’ drinking—which had a higher importance in Reynolds’ submission than his ulcer condition—was a contributory factor in the collision. Burbury was still cautious about allowing Reynolds to proceed. His understanding of the terms of reference only required the Commissioners to express an opinion on the collision rather than considering a re-determination of the facts. Murphy suggested to the Commissioners that it was necessary for unfitness to command to be proved as a continuing state, not only at some point in time prior to the collision. Furthermore, it had to be shown that such unfitness was an operative factor on the night of the collision and therefore pertinent to its causes. This was a tall order which the evidence had not gone anywhere near filling. Burt provided the most damaging objection to Reynolds’ submission when he pointed out that Spicer’s criticism of Robertson was that he did not warn Voyager that she was standing into danger and that this criticism would remain valid whatever Voyager’s course prior to the collision, straight or turning. Attacking Reynolds’ concession that Robertson relied upon a finding that Stevens was unfit to command, Burt questioned how this finding could affect Spicer’s conclusion that Voyager was on a steady course? This was where Robertson was vulnerable. For Spicer’s criticism of Robertson to be displaced, the steady course conclusion had to be rejected. In strictly observing the construction of
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the terms of reference, the Commissioners were not entitled to overturn Spicer on this matter. Robertson’s position was again desperate. The Commissioners decided to defer ruling on the various submissions until the next day. The fifty-third day of hearings appeared to mark the end for any chance Robertson may have had to argue his case. Burbury announced the Commission’s ruling on Reynolds’ submission: It is not part of the function of this Royal Commission to hear new evidence or to re-hear any of the old evidence as to the immediate circumstances of the collision or the navigational aspects of it. This Commission does not sit as a General Court of Appeal against the findings of Sir John Spicer. The Commission as we see it, must take Sir John Spicer’s findings as they appear in his report, and consider only whether in the event of the Commission finding that the late Captain Stevens was unfit to retain command, that finding requires any variation in Sir John Spicer’s findings, and if so in what respect . . . Therefore, for these reasons we will exclude all evidence as to the navigational aspects of the collision . . . It follows that we reject the application by Mr Reynolds to call expert evidence from Captain Robertson as to the navigational aspects of the collision, because although this would not be factual evidence it would nevertheless be fresh evidence as to the collision itself.
Burbury also pointed out that this ruling was based on the assumption that Stevens was found to be unfit, a matter on which the Commission had yet to adopt a view. There seemed to be little more that Robertson could do. The Commissioners would not accept his evidence or hear his arguments. Reynolds seems to have realised the finality of the Commission’s ruling. When hearings commenced the next morning, he addressed the Commission and said that if Burt’s submission was accepted, as it seemed it already had been, Robertson could get nothing from the inquiry. This being the situation, Reynolds stated that there were strong grounds for having the Government widen the terms of reference to allow Robertson to put his case—and that he would seek permission to do that. This seemed to have had the desired effect as the door was left slightly open. Burbury stated that: if ultimately you could persuade us that Sir John Spicer’s line of reasoning in making the finding he did as to the course of Voyager was vitiated by an erroneous assumption of fact as to the late Captain Stevens’ complete competency, alertness and concentration, then I
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would think that would mean that we would have to examine his finding in relation to Captain Robertson and the course of Voyager critically and consider whether we ought not to substitute some other inference for ourselves than that adopted by Sir John Spicer.
But this improved Robertson’s situation only marginally, as it related to submissions he would find difficult to prove and which he had tried to avoid to that time. There was, nevertheless, still a belief in Parliament and the Press that the primary purpose of the Royal Commission was to seek ‘justice’ for Robertson. Yet the likelihood of him gaining anything from the inquiry was not strong. Just one week before his final submission was to have been presented, Reynolds was invited to join the Bench of the New South Wales Supreme Court. As Robertson insisted that he accept the appointment, Reynolds arranged for his brief to pass to Gordon Samuels QC. Samuels had not previously appeared in a Royal Commission but had acted for the British Aircraft Corporation at inquiries into the crashes of two Viscount airliners around Australia. Spicer had presided over the inquiry into one of these disasters. Taking over Robertson’s brief just at the moment it seemed doomed to fail was an enormous undertaking for Samuels. A short recess was called, to allow Samuels to familiarise himself with the proceedings and report of the first Commission, the events between the Commissions and the progress of the second Commission which had been sitting for four months. Samuels was also expected to persuade the Commissioners to hear Robertson’s arguments on the navigational aspects, when Reynolds had previously been unsuccessful. Samuels’ arrival marked a change for the Commission. Samuels was clearly pleased to have the brief: ‘The inquiry was, I think, one of the most exciting matters I had at the Bar, principally because it involved a field previously quite unfamiliar and because we started well behind’. There was another change in personnel. On 10 November 1967, Burbury announced that Lucas was unable to continue sitting because of ill-health. This was a major blow to Cabban’s position because Lucas appeared most positively disposed towards him and his evidence. Lucas had been suffering severe headaches for two weeks before his eventual departure from the Commission, headaches which culminated in his collapse from an aneurysm on 9 November. He spent the next month in hospital and did not hear any cases until the new sitting period in 1968. There was another change to come. Without warning, Henchman informed Murphy that he had been appointed a judge of the New South Wales District Court.
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Burbury announced on the sixty-first day that the order of the final addresses would be Burt, Hiatt, Ash, Murphy and Samuels. Burt would present the closing submission as was his right as counsel assisting the Commissioners. When he began the first of his two addresses on the sixty-seventh day, Burt stated that his approach to the first term of reference, Stevens’ fitness to command, would be to isolate the specific allegations which formed the basis for dispute and to relate these to the evidence. Burt appears to have accepted Cabban’s description of ‘numerous events’ during Voyager’s Far East cruise in 1963, although he did not consider them as significant as Cabban. By emphasising only what was known of Stevens’ condition, Burt left it open to the Commissioners to decide the cause. They could choose an active ulcer, unwise and/or excessive drinking, or a combination of both. Burt argued that the evidence supported the sense of the Cabban Statement although it was in places clearly exaggerated. For instance, Stevens was alleged to have returned onboard Voyager heavily under the influence of alcohol every morning while the ship was in Sydney after the Far East cruise. Burt claimed that evidence showed this to be not true and that Cabban had a tendency to exaggerate. There were, of course, other matters in which the Commissioners had either to accept or reject Cabban’s word over that of another witness. As an allied submission, Burt said the Commissioners also had to determine whether naval documents had been doctored. If, as Cabban claimed, they had, this reflected directly on Stevens’ fitness to command. In sum, the first term of reference was largely based on the Commissioners either accepting Cabban as a truthful witness or rejecting him as a malicious liar. As for the second term of reference, whether the Naval Board should have known of Stevens’ condition and acted to terminate his command, Burt stated that there was no evidence that any member of the Board was aware that Stevens was not fit to continue in Voyager. Several individuals should have made reports to the Naval Board concerning his fitness but none did so. On the matter of Spicer’s findings, Burt reiterated his previous submission. Robertson’s difficulty was showing that a finding of Stevens’ unfitness to command could overturn Spicer’s view that Voyager was on a steady course prior to the collision. Furthermore, regardless of whether Voyager was on a steady course or turning, the criticism of Robertson was not invalid. Burt disposed of the third term of reference, whether Cabban’s evidence had been improperly withheld, very quickly by saying that Cabban and his evidence had been available but Smyth had decided against putting him into the witness box. The
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evidence had not been withheld and Smyth had not acted improperly. Cabban and the Naval Board emerged well from Burt’s address, Stevens and Robertson did not. In his final submission, Hiatt launched a scathing attack on the Naval Board. He claimed the Board had felt threatened by Cabban and had hindered the Commission’s inquiries by discouraging witnesses and defaming Cabban. Hiatt also claimed that the Board had used its control over documentary evidence to support Stevens and discredit Cabban while pressuring naval witnesses to ensure their testimony reflected the Board’s views. He pointed out that the strongest corroboration for Cabban came from non-naval witnesses. In effect, Hiatt accused the Naval Board of a very subtle cover-up. It had been partly successful in demeaning Cabban but failed to destroy his credibility. When the Commissioners asked him to substantiate his allegation that naval witnesses had been intimidated, Hiatt said he could not prove the point but argued that the inference had to be drawn. Given the gravity of the allegation, this was not nearly good enough for the Commissioners who directed Hiatt to consider his position overnight. The following morning he withdrew his remarks. The Cabban Statement, Hiatt said, had been corroborated from the most unlikely of sources and was innocent of exaggeration. He conceded that the Statement had been inaccurate in several places but explained that Cabban had been giving a statement of his general impressions. Cabban had made his Statement and given his evidence entirely from memory and had remained consistent to his testimony throughout the eight days of his examination and cross-examination. This went substantially to his credit as a witness. As to the specific incidents mentioned in the Statement, Hiatt said they were generally corroborated. Where they were not, Hiatt alleged that there had been attempts at falsifying records and offering deliberately misleading evidence. Hiatt even alleged that both Commodore A.N. Dollard and Commander Bruce Loxton had been less than completely truthful in giving their evidence. Hiatt described his client’s statement as an honest attempt to record his experiences while in Voyager. He said that Cabban had not only resisted the efforts of others to have the Statement made public, but avoided publicity and rejected any form of personal gain. Hiatt did not address his remarks specifically to any of the terms of reference, although he sought an affirmation from the Commissioners that Cabban was a truthful and reliable witness, and that his statement was for the greatest part an accurate description of Voyager’s 1963 Far
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East cruise. As expected, Hiatt made no mention of Robertson’s position nor did he allude to any connection between Cabban’s evidence and the causes of the collision. Ash began his reply by examining the flawed assumption that Cabban’s allegations were relevant to the cause of the collision. He pointed out that there was serious doubt as to whether Stevens actually consumed the triple brandy on the night of the collision. At any rate, Stevens was described as being in very good health throughout the three days prior to the collision. Ash attacked Robertson for using Cabban as a lever to force another inquiry and criticised Cabban for never attempting to restrict the use of his Statement. Ash limited his attack to the inaccuracies, exaggerations and misleading inferences in the Cabban Statement. He referred to his own cross-examination of Cabban, in which he had consistently reduced the period of Stevens’ incapacity as originally claimed by Cabban. By way of contrast, he pointed to the evidence of Stevens being a fit and active man who loved sport and physical activity in all its forms. On the second day of his final submission, Ash argued that Cabban was an unreliable witness and that his opinions and judgements were greatly dissimilar to those of other reliable witnesses. Consequently, he asked the Commissioners to reject Cabban’s submissions where they related to the truthfulness of other witnesses and the integrity of naval records. Ash then attempted to discredit Hiatt’s allegation that naval witnesses were partial to Stevens while asserting that the recollections of many witnesses had been impaired by the passing of time. Wisely, Ash did not comment on the reasons for Stevens’ conduct as a way of avoiding making any concessions relating to Stevens’ ulcer or drinking habits. However, the evidence presented in relation to one particular incident—Stevens’ erratic behaviour during a birthday mess dinner held for him on board the ship in Singapore—was so overwhelming that he had to offer some explanation. Ash, understating the import of the whole incident, said Stevens’ behaviour was either due to illness, or a combination of illness and drink, but it did not affect morale, the efficient running of the ship or Stevens’ fitness to retain command. This was the only concession to Cabban in his whole address. As for Stevens’ medical history, Ash argued that Stevens was in perfect health, and that both McNeill (at Hong Kong) and subsequently Tiller had confirmed this fact. Further, Ash claimed that Stevens had never sought to conceal his ulcer condition or any other ill-health. Consequently, Ash implored the Commissioners to give a negative reply
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to the first term of reference. Ash had largely ignored Robertson’s submissions during the inquiry. After retracting some fairly strong criticisms he had made of Robertson on the second day of his address, Ash made no effort to attack Robertson’s use of Cabban’s evidence to gain another inquiry. Ash could have exploited Burt’s argument that Cabban’s evidence did not alter Robertson’s position or Spicer’s criticisms. Whatever his reasons, Ash effectively weakened his own position by not attacking Robertson. Anything that Robertson gained from the Commission would be at Stevens’ expense. Murphy decided to take a different line in arguing for a finding of ‘no’ to the first term of reference. Given the corroboration the Cabban Statement had received from a range of witnesses, he chose not to attack its truthfulness but its alleged unreliability, exaggerations and distortions. Murphy’s approach was to demonstrate how damning Cabban’s criticisms were when properly assessed and understood, and how much his portrayal varied from the picture that had emerged of Stevens throughout the second Commission. In trying to show that Cabban and his counsel had retreated from Cabban’s initial Statement, Murphy hoped to reduce the value placed on the Statement as a means of discrediting its author. It was a subtle tactic that made much of the circumstances in which the Statement was originally conceived, while avoiding much of the evidence and argument that had served as corroboration. It is also noteworthy that Murphy now committed himself to interpreting Stevens’ actions as the result of ‘ill health’ rather than alcohol abuse. Having entered the Commission defending its view of Stevens’ performance while commanding Voyager, the Naval Board had little choice but to persist with this view throughout. This led Murphy to frame his submission in terms of answering whether any of the allegations were true. After contending that they were not, he conceded that Stevens had an ulcer, was periodically sick and tired, and delegated command to his Executive Officer when necessary. Murphy stated that there was nothing unusual in this and by doing so Stevens had acted responsibly. As for Cabban, Murphy said he was motivated by residual ill-will after his grounding as a pilot in 1956, and his attitude towards the 1964 inquiry and its alleged injustice to Captain Robertson. He described Cabban as a man who was ‘willing to wound and yet afraid to strike’ and his allegations as those of a man who ‘is careless with the truth or whose capacity to make rational judgements had been completely lost because of his prior bias or his preconceived ideas’. As such, his judgement was ‘warped, unbalanced and cannot be relied upon’.
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Murphy then turned to the submissions made by Robertson’s counsel. It was at this point that the Naval Board most clearly revealed its intentions towards the man it had attempted to support in 1964. At first, Murphy accepted Spicer’s finding that Voyager had been on a steady course prior to the collision. He outlined Spicer’s reasons for coming to such a view without any reservation, before suggesting that Robertson should have been aware of the danger of the situation and, as OTC, should taken appropriate action as soon as Voyager had passed beyond a heading of 020 degrees when forward of Melbourne’s beam. This was almost a complete about-turn on the view the Board had expressed throughout 1964 and it certainly took Robertson by surprise. The Commissioners decided that before Murphy proceeded further on navigational aspects, Samuels would put his submission. Samuels’ challenge was to have the Commissioners hear the new evidence while exploring the relationship between Stevens’ behaviour and the navigation case he sought to present. The Commissioners’ attitude had altered slightly with the commencement of final submissions. Burt argued that they should not hear navigational evidence. Hiatt made no comment. Murphy said there was no justification, fearing the Commissioners would overturn Spicer if Robertson were heard. In response to Murphy’s submissions limiting the evidence to be covered, Justice Asprey remarked: ‘for myself I would not like to leave any stone unturned, I want to fully appreciate what is being submitted on Captain Robertson’s behalf’. Burbury was of like mind. He advised Murphy that the Commission needed to hear Robertson’s submissions in the event that it did find that Stevens was unfit to retain command. What prompted this remark, something Burbury could have said four months earlier, is unknown. It certainly would have saved Reynolds a great deal of argument. This was the opportunity that Samuels had been waiting for. His fulsome opening remarks made it difficult for the Commissioners not to hear his entire submission: ‘we think we can establish as a fact once and for all how the collision happened . . . and that we can present a most compelling inference as to why it happened’. Having noted that there was some space in which he could develop an argument, Samuels did not immediately take up the matter of Stevens’ health or drinking to avoid appearing hostile to other counsel. Instead, he began by exploiting the obvious change in the Naval Board’s attitude towards Spicer’s criticism of Robertson. Whereas Jenkyn had rejected Smyth’s system of building the times and manoeuvres from 2042, Murphy raised no
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objection. Conversely, where Jenkyn was prepared to accept the evidence of Tactical Operator Evans that Voyager steadied on a course of 020 degrees after the turning signal, Murphy now objected. To confuse matters even further, Murphy agreed with Smyth concerning matters on which the Naval Board had previously disagreed. Samuels’ argument was to a large extent the same as that put by Jenkyn—Voyager had been turning in response to the flying course signal which allowed her to manoeuvre with discretion. Consequently, Samuels argued that Spicer was wrong in three major respects: finding that Voyager was on a steady course; finding that she was manoeuvring in response to the turning course signal; and attributing any blame to Robertson. But where was the connection between these matters and Stevens’ unfitness to command? Samuels said that Spicer believed Stevens was a competent captain who knew what he was doing on the night of the collision. By implication, Spicer asserted that a competent captain would be more likely to have put Voyager on a steady course. By ascribing a deliberate intention to Voyager’s final movements and deciding that Stevens alone was responsible for the port turn (it being inconceivable that Price would have countermanded his own order), Spicer rejected the possibility that the destroyer had been turning and discounted many of the errors and failures implicit in such a finding. Samuels argued that if Spicer had been aware of Cabban’s evidence he would have been prepared to accept a wider margin of error on Stevens’ part and, one assumes, to have admitted the possibility or even the probability that Voyager was on a continuous turn prior to the collision. Robertson’s notes for Reynolds had already discounted theories based on either wheel having been left on or confusion over who was manoeuvring the destroyer. Robertson was now convinced that Voyager’s turn to port was intentional. Why? Stevens was clearly unfit to command, through incompetence rather than incapacity, although this was inferred rather than asserted in Robertson’s notes. Further testing the waters, Samuels remarked that he felt reluctant to attack Spicer’s findings. Burbury responded: ‘I do not see why you should. I am very used to Courts of Appeal making most trenchant criticisms of my judgments and I have never regarded myself as having a vested right in them. Please do not feel inhibited’. The door was now wide open for Robertson’s submissions to be heard. Although previously ignored, Cabban was now important to Samuels’ submission which still required a finding of ‘yes’ to the first term of reference that Stevens was unfit to command. Samuels’ arguments in support of this finding were
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tentative in the extreme yet he had overruled Robertson, who continued to resist his counsel making mention of Cabban’s evidence. At any rate, Samuels did not need to say much because the finding of unfitness depended largely on the submissions of both Burt and Hiatt. Samuels asserted that Stevens’ self-discipline had been eroded and this was on no occasion more apparent than in drinking a triple brandy on the night of the collision. The triple brandy was the key to showing that Stevens was ‘unfit’ on the night of the collision. Samuels argued that Stevens drank the brandy either because he was an alcoholic or to ease ulcer pain. He suggested it was probably the latter, in the hope that describing the triple brandy as a medicinal drink would reduce the Navy’s objections to his submission. Stevens must therefore have been in some physical distress and ‘was not in a condition to exercise complete concentration and judgement which the duties of his command required’. Consequently, Stevens was unfit to retain command of Voyager at the time of the collision. This was still a very loose and subjective submission. What Samuels needed to show, but could not, was that Stevens’ behaviour either followed a pattern or was so fundamentally and continually inadequate that it existed at the time of the collision. The conclusion that Stevens was unfit was left ‘hanging’ while Samuels turned to navigation. He said that the prime difference between the actions required by a turning signal and a flying signal was that in the former, Voyager had no discretion in manoeuvring whereas in the latter, Voyager had complete discretion. If it were the latter, Robertson was not obliged to challenge her movements, which were acceptable within the bounds of her prerogative. If this was the case, no blame could be attributed to Robertson and Spicer’s findings should be overturned. Samuels’ task was to prove that Voyager had not steadied on a course prior to the collision but was still turning. Robertson believed the most readily demonstrated weakness in Spicer’s findings was in the chronology of events: ‘His logic and approach to the problem are to say the least childish, and his arithmetic is wrong’. This was Robertson’s last chance. As it was a final submission, new evidence could not be called. Samuels had to convince the Commissioners purely on the strength of arguments based on the existing evidence, having ultimately failed to establish a direct and demonstrable causal link between his submissions and Cabban’s evidence. The strategy devised by Samuels and Robertson was to give the Commissioners small pieces of paper with coloured ships drawn on them. Samuels also supplied each Commissioner with a set of ‘models’
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and a mooring board, which he used to reconstruct the collision and a series of overlays. Both Burbury and Asprey appeared to gather very quickly the issues in dispute and the essence of Robertson’s submission. Samuels took the Commissioners through the signals and the manoeuvres that preceded the collision, leading them to his contention that Stevens may have ‘lost the tactical picture’. Samuels then attacked Spicer’s reconstruction of the collision on the basis of the times he had accepted for various events. Working back from the point of the collision, Samuels was quickly able to demonstrate that Voyager could not have steadied on a course for a minute before the collision. This appeared to impress Burbury who had made no attempt to limit Samuels’ submission: ‘This [submission] seems to involve a proposition that once you discover that Sir John Spicer’s line of reasoning is vitiated by a material error as to any matter, it then becomes our duty to go on and to consider almost all of his findings’. Pointing to evidence heard by Spicer that contradicted his own findings, Samuels started to build a replacement theory. He questioned the basis on which Spicer had found that Voyager was on a steady course by casting great doubt on the reliability of Dadswell’s observations, taken while flying overhead. With the aid of several pieces of string placed on the mooring boards, Samuels was able to demonstrate that by combining the accepted parameters of Voyager’s speed and turning data, and the known positions of the destroyer during the four minutes preceding the collision, there could be only one valid reconstruction of the collision. Voyager must have been turning in the period prior to the collision and, by a process of deduction and reduction, this turn was induced by the flying course signal and not the signal to turn. This was the same reconstruction that Robertson had presented to the first inquiry on 6 May 1964. On the basis of this reconstruction, Robertson was able to prove that Spicer’s version of the collision was manifestly wrong. So why did the collision occur? Stevens evidently had lost the tactical picture and mistakenly believed he was on Melbourne’s port bow. He turned to port thinking it was safe to do so and the collision resulted. The primary and initiating cause of the tragedy, therefore, was that Stevens had become confused. Samuels suggested, very tentatively, that this confusion was related to Stevens’ alleged unfitness to command. The assertion was, in reality, little more than an inference. However, he suggested that his version involved less criticism of Stevens than Spicer’s. This seemed to appeal to Burbury: ‘you are not attributing such a gross margin of error to the late Captain Stevens as Sir John
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Spicer implicitly imputed by his finding’. Samuels readily and happily agreed. Consequently, when Voyager turned first to starboard and then back to port, manoeuvring in a manner considered unseamanlike, those on Melbourne’s bridge were entitled to believe that she was competently commanded and would not continue with her turn to port because of the risk of a collision. Given the situation confronting Robertson as Voyager steamed into danger, Samuels argued that Melbourne’s captain did the only proper thing the circumstances demanded: he ordered the engines full astern. Samuels closed by saying: ‘On the basis of the solution we submit also that the criticism made in the [Spicer] report of Captain Robertson, Kelly and Bate is totally unjustified’. After a brilliant marathon address lasting five days, Samuels had exposed the flaws in Spicer’s logic and effectively destroyed his navigational findings. Finally, Robertson had made the most of the opportunity presented to him, largely through the efforts of his leading counsel. Murphy could not have relished the prospect of responding to Samuels’ submission. On the one hand he was obliged to acknowledge Jenkyn’s 1964 submission on behalf of the Board; on the other, he could not support Robertson. While assuring the Commission that the Naval Board was determined to assist it in ascertaining the causes of the collision, his submission was, ultimately, obstructive and largely uncooperative. Murphy argued that as it was difficult to establish absolutely the facts leading to the collision, a number of theories were possible. He conceded that Robertson’s latest theory was possible but it did not discount others which could be considered equally plausible. Murphy argued that reconstructions of the collision had to be tentative by virtue of what was either not known or could not be adequately proved. Robertson’s reconstructions were helpful, but not conclusive. Knowing that he had to discredit Robertson, Murphy surveyed the many explanations, opinions and theories Robertson had offered since the collision and noted the many real inconsistencies that existed between them. This was a good argument. Robertson had indeed changed his mind about what he thought had happened and Murphy exploited this by asking the Commissioners to accept his latest theory for what it was—a theory rather than a factual explanation. As for the need to vary Spicer’s findings, Murphy asked the Commissioners to retain them as they were not demonstrably wrong. At any rate, a finding that Stevens was unfit would not change the facts and circumstances of Voyager’s final movements. Murphy reminded the
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Commissioners that the view of the Naval Board had never been that Melbourne was the prime cause of the collision. Murphy again suggested that Robertson, as OTC, should have taken action as soon as he was in doubt as to Voyager’s movements. Whether or not this imposed a duty on Robertson against which he could be held responsible, and whether any failure to act was tantamount to blame for the collision, was not made clear. But Murphy did agree that Stevens had a clear and definite responsibility for the safety of his ship and that this was inescapable. As for Kelly and Bate, the Board did change its view. Although Cabinet had been told in 1964 that no blame was attributable to either officer, Murphy now said the Board did not agree with Spicer’s criticism of Kelly but believed the criticism of Bate should stand. The extent to which the Naval Board had changed its view would not be obvious because only Murphy had seen the Board’s original submission to Cabinet. Robertson and Bate had every right to feel betrayed. They had been. Curiously, Ash prepared a speech he did not use although a working draft survives. Noting that the Commissioners saw themselves as an appellate court, Ash concentrated more on objections to an overturned finding than answering allegations against his client. He realised, as most did, that for Robertson to succeed the Commissioners had to overturn Spicer on the matter of Voyager being on a steady course. This led him to attack the weakest part of the case against his client; the connection between Cabban’s allegations and the causes of the collision: ‘It was not the aim of the Parliament in setting up the Commission that ‘unfitness to command’ should be used to ‘open the door’ for Captain Robertson ‘to have a second bite at the cherry’ on navigational matters’. Ash correctly pointed out that for Robertson’s navigational evidence to be heard, Samuels needed to find a way of introducing it before the Commission. In the attempt to cite Stevens’ duodenal ulcer as a reason for unfitness, Samuels was forced to retreat to a notional date of 31 December 1963 as evidence presented to the Commission revealed the ulcer was not active in the few days before, or on the night of, the collision. While conceding five exacerbations of the ulcer during 1963, described as ‘several innocent mis-assessments by an enthusiastic man’, Ash argued that the ulcer was inactive by the time Stevens consulted Sir William Morrow on 23 September 1963, and that evidence from those who saw Stevens on the night of the collision confirmed that there was ‘no sudden rush of ulcerated duodenal pain’.
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Stevens’ unfitness was not a cause, or a contributing cause of the collision. Not only was it not a causa causans; it was not even a cause sine qua non, because it was not a cause at all . . . We submit in short that a finding of unfitness as at 31 December is not open at all unless it can be causally connected with the collision.
Ash claimed that each incident was independent of the others and that when they subsided, Stevens was ‘restored to that latent condition which was as such acceptable to the [Naval] Board’. As for his drinking, Ash claimed it was only excessive when considered in relation to his medical condition. In concluding this draft address, Ash asked for a clear finding of ‘No’ to the first term of reference; and for a complete vindication of Stevens on all the incidents referred to by Cabban, except for the birthday mess dinner and the ‘mis-assessment of himself at Tokyo’. Thus, if the Commissioners were silent on any incident in their report, it would be taken by his clients as reflecting adversely on Captain Stevens. Why Ash did not put most of these arguments to the Commission remains a mystery. His instructing solicitor, Fred Osborne, was adamant that Ash should fully oppose Robertson on navigational matters, and was angered by Ash’s refusal to make strong submissions in this area. This had been the great strength of counsel appearing for the Stevens family at the 1964 Commission. The Stevens family had nothing to lose and everything to gain from opposing Robertson but Ash remained reluctant to join the battle, possibly because his understanding of navigation and fleetwork was only ever superficial. Ash told the Commissioners on several occasions he had not come prepared to dispute navigational matters, and he may have believed that he would have only weakened his clients’ position by putting submissions he imperfectly understood. But by failing to challenge Samuels he lost the tactical initiative and an opportunity to use the strengths of the arguments put by Street three years earlier. After a short address in reply by Samuels in which he alleged the Naval Board had attacked Robertson’s credibility, deliberately misinterpreted his theory and reconstructions and abandoned its previous position because it was favourable to Robertson, Samuels again asked the Commissioners to overturn Spicer’s criticism of Kelly, Bate and Robertson. In his final address, Burt commented on all the submissions put by counsel. He ended on navigational matters and repeated the view he had put forward at the start of the Commission: this was not a ‘second
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Voyager inquiry’, nor a court of appeal sitting in judgement over Sir John Spicer. Burt argued strongly that it was not possible for any finding based on fact in 1964 to be displaced by a finding that Stevens was unfit. Spicer had made a finding as to the final movements of both ships and it was impossible to displace this finding without rewriting the Spicer Report. In addition, the terms of reference for the Commission did not allow it to do so. Burt was plainly sympathetic to Robertson’s position but reiterated that the question to be answered by the Commissioners was whether the criticisms of Robertson were fair on the basis of what Spicer found rather than on the basis of Robertson’s own version of the events. This left the possibility open for Spicer’s criticism of Robertson to be removed if the Commissioners were prepared to accept Robertson’s explanation of the collision and Samuels’ defence of his conduct. After 85 days, the hearings were adjourned and the Commissioners retired to write their report. Lucas had already started writing some sections of the final report during an adjournment in October and passed these to Burbury and Asprey when he took leave. The Commissioners’ concern that Stevens could not answer the allegations being made against him would significantly temper their findings and the tone of their report. It is difficult to know what perception the public had gained of the matters in dispute from the press coverage of the inquiry. Consequently, it is impossible to say what the public or the Press expected to read in the Commission’s report. For their part, the Commissioners were aware of the media coverage and the public attention their deliberations were receiving. As senior judicial officers they were not unfamiliar with this kind of scrutiny but they seemed largely unconcerned by the press reports and did not refer to them during the course of the inquiry. Yet, as their report would make abundantly clear, they were mindful of the public’s main interest in the case.
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A VOLATILE COCKTAIL The Commissioners had been given the unenviable task of determining whether Captain Stevens’ general well-being during 1963 was primarily affected by an active duodenal ulcer, or the effects of excessive consumption of alcohol, or both. Or were there other factors which were never disclosed and never discussed? Whatever the finding, it would invariably have some bearing on Stevens’ likely physical condition on the night of the collision and could also provide a probable reason for Stevens drinking a triple brandy. If he did consume alcohol, what need did it meet? Was it because he was an alcoholic and craved a drink or because he sought relief from debilitating stomach pain? Either finding would allow Robertson to infer that Stevens was unfit to be in command of Voyager. But if it were shown that Stevens did not consume a triple brandy, he would have suffered a grave injustice and all the suspicions about his conduct and his health immediately before the collision were groundless. The only evidence that he drank any alcohol on the night of the collision was the post-mortem conducted on his body, and the testimony of the captain’s steward, Barry Hyland. Little was made of alcohol during the 1964 inquiry. When Professor Blackburn claimed that Stevens’ blood alcohol level would have had no bearing on his performance, Smyth did not pursue the matter further. Hyland’s evidence was received without thorough cross-examination although his testimony conflicted with an earlier statement. He stated shortly after the collision that he had served the captain a brandy; in his testimony, it had become a triple brandy. Nothing more was made of this difference. The focus of the 1967 inquiry was similar but not identical. The primary concern was to prove incontrovertibly whether or not Stevens drank any alcohol. If he did, the issue was not the extent to which a triple brandy might have impaired his performance, but his reasons for drinking at all. There were two ways to approach these issues: the first was to re-examine Hyland; the second was to review the
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circumstances, conduct and report of the post-mortem. If nothing else was achieved, it might cast doubt where previously there was none. In fairness to the medical experts who were asked to comment on the post-mortem report, there were many variables influencing any comment or judgement. Stevens’ body had been in the water for more than four hours when recovered. It was not refrigerated, although the post-mortem was not conducted until 60 hours after death by a suburban general practitioner with limited experience. At that time it was not a legal requirement for post-mortems to be performed by pathologists. To prove Stevens actually drank a triple brandy before the collision, four pieces of evidence had to match up. The blood sample taken from Stevens’ body contained a blood alcohol level of 0.025 per cent. Three ounces of brandy were ‘needed’ to produce this level of blood alcohol. A man of Stevens’ age and physical condition would break down alcohol at the rate of approximately 0.02 per cent per hour. Hyland said he had served Stevens, at most, 2.475 ounces of brandy 90 minutes before the collision. Therefore, the recorded blood alcohol level was too high for the amount Stevens is alleged to have drunk. Could some of the alcohol found in the sample have been derived from another source? This conclusion was supported by expert opinion. Dr Vern Plueckhahn was an eminent pathologist and an authority on the matters presented to the inquiry. On reviewing the evidence, Plueckhahn concluded that: ‘It is very much more probable than not that contamination and bacterial growth in the sample of blood taken have contributed to produce the alcohol concentration of 0.025 per cent’. Possible, yes, even probable, but not a matter of certainty. However, there was a definite possibility that some or even all of the alcohol in the blood sample could have been due to contamination or post-mortem changes in body chemistry. But Plueckhahn shared Professor Blackburn’s conclusion about the effects of alcohol on Stevens’ performance. In his opinion, Stevens was ‘not affected by alcohol at the time of his death and that the effects of alcohol on the capabilities of Captain Stevens can be excluded as a possible cause of the collision’. This was not a view shared by other experts in the field. Dr James Rankin from St Vincent’s Hospital in Sydney, Victorian police surgeon Dr John Birrell, and Dr Norman McCallum, Head of the Victoria Police Forensic Science Laboratory, were approached by Jess during the Commission and expressed their willingness to offer opinions. The Commissioners, principally at Asprey’s insistence, were only prepared to hear Birrell who pointed out that Plueckhahn was a
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pathologist and had no experience in the qualitative assessment of alcohol’s effect on mental and physical performance. Birrell conceded that 0.025 per cent was not a significant level but, if taken in conjunction with undigested alcohol in the stomach, it could have been a factor. If, however, Stevens did not drink any alcohol on the night of the collision, the allegations of alcohol dependence collapsed. This is why the Commissioners concentrated on the strength of the evidence that Stevens did consume a triple brandy. But their main difficulty with the evidence of Steward Barry Hyland was that Hyland could recall two occasions when he served Stevens with brandy. The first (one week before the collision) was in the captain’s day cabin, and the second (allegedly the night of the collision) in his sea cabin situated one deck higher in the ship. In spite of Hyland’s insistence that his recollections of the night of the collision were clear, he knowingly contradicted his statement of 1964 with additional detail that suggested he had confused the two nights. The confusion and the contradiction were most easily resolved by shifting the events described by Hyland to the previous evening (Sunday 9 February 1964) when Voyager was at anchor in Jervis Bay. After watching some sport at HMAS Creswell, Stevens went to Captain Dacre Smyth’s residence where he had two brandies followed by milk before returning to his ship at around 1900. It is likely that shortly after he returned to Voyager, he ate his evening meal in the day cabin. Soon after this, he asked Hyland to serve him a brandy, which he drank. There is sufficient similarity between the two nights for them to have been confused by Hyland, who admitted that he had undergone a terrible experience on the night of the collision. In fairness to Stevens and to Harry Cook—in whose blood sample alcohol was also detected—the taint of misconduct implicit in the allegation that they drank on the night of the collision has not been proved. The evidence in relation to Stevens is very weak, while there is no evidence that Cook consumed any alcohol. On balance, it is probable that neither drank any alcohol on the night of 10 February. And even if they did, expert opinion (even that of Birrell) suggested that their recorded blood alcohol levels would not have impaired their performance. Jack Smyth had been correct in concluding that the consumption of alcohol played no part in the causes of the collision. This is not to say that Stevens did not suffer from a degree of alcohol dependence, but this would not set him apart from many other naval officers of his day. Stevens drank too much, too often and his drinking was frequently undisciplined and unwise. According to Cabban,
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alcohol greatly diminished his sense of responsibility and severely affected his ability to exercise command. This does not make him a drunkard or an alcoholic but it does suggest he had some problems with his drinking, problems that were either ignored or went unnoticed during 1963. But what of his physical condition? For a considerable part of 1963 Stevens was unable to perform his duties either partially or completely. In addition to periods of illness, the Commissioners could refer to a number of other incidents that shed light on Stevens’ health, well-being and self-discipline. These covered the interaction of alcohol and ill-health later attributed to ulcer pain. Notably, there was an occasion in mid-January 1964 when Captain ‘Nobby’ Clarke, commanding the destroyer HMAS Anzac, stated he saw Stevens bending over a guardrail, obviously in great pain. Ash described this evidence as being ‘in any event equivocal’ and dismissed the incident as possibly the product of some other ailment. It was a very weak position but a necessary one, given he had earlier argued that there was no recorded incident or pattern of ulcer pain after 31 December 1963. The question still remained: to what extent did Stevens’ ulcer condition affect his performance during 1963? The best judge of this was Stevens himself. On several occasions during the year he was clearly concerned that his condition was so grave that it could terminate his command. Had he not have been worried, he would not have gone to the lengths he did to conceal the extent of his condition. If Stevens’ own actions are a guide and a measure, there is little doubt that his ulcer was almost continuously active throughout 1963 and that its effects were debilitating at times. Consequently, there would have been few periods in 1963 when he was actually fit to command Voyager. Yet, Stevens had a remarkable ability to recover rapidly from illness when the occasion demanded. It was as if he could control his condition, but no-one could offer an explanation for this to the Commission. One would come to light a decade later. Don Chipp dealt extensively with Voyager in his autobiography, The Third Man, published in 1978. Most startling is the revelation that the Royal Commissioners held an off-the-record session of the Commission in which a doctor offered to give evidence, provided it did not find itself on the official record. The evidence was that he was secretly prescribing amphetamines for the captain. The drug, amphetamine sulphate—now rarely prescribed—served as a relief from pain and gave the recipient a ‘mild high’ . . . To some people it could be quite euphoric. This
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explains the contradictions in the evidence of the captain being miserable, low, sick, in pain, and an hour later being bright, charming, witty and the life of the party, with no pain.
Chipp stated that some time in late 1967 or early 1968 he asked a distinguished Melbourne physician to describe the likely effect of amphetamines on Stevens’ health and behaviour. The description accurately depicted what several witnesses had observed. This was the first public indication that drugs had been a factor in the loss of Voyager, although it must be stressed that amphetamines were not illegal in 1963. Chipp’s statements constituted very grave allegations against the Royal Commissioners, several of the counsel involved in the inquiry, Captain Stevens and the unnamed doctor (whom anyone familar with the case would have been able to identify as Surgeon Commander Roger McNeill). In effect, Chipp is alleging that the Commissioners deliberately concealed relevant evidence with the probable connivance of Burt; that they failed to cite this evidence although it related to Stevens’ behaviour and possibly to the causes of the collision; and that Stevens was taking drugs to mask his unwise drinking—drugs supplied by a naval medical officer (McNeill) who had concealed this fact for three years. The lack of a statement to the contrary from Chipp infers that Stevens might have been taking this drug at the time of the collision. Drugs were first mentioned during the cross-examination of Lieutenant Commander Alan Kyd, a naval dentist, who took passage in Voyager from Singapore to Hong Kong. He suspected Stevens might have been affected by some substance. There was no further mention of drugs until the forty-fourth day of the inquiry when Hiatt cross-examined Don McDonald, one of Voyager’s sick berth attendants, who had left the Navy after the collision. McDonald said he could not recall whether amphetamines were held in Voyager or whether they had been prescribed for Stevens. In fact, amphetamines were held in RAN ships although prescription records were routinely destroyed after twelve months. By the time of the second Commission in 1967, Voyager’s records for 1963 were long gone but the specific form of amphetamine supplied throughout the RAN during this period and found in liferafts fitted to all seagoing vessels was an amphetamine sulphate; the same type mentioned by Chipp. Although this does not definitely establish that the drugs taken by Stevens (assuming he did take them) were obtained from a naval source, the possibility remains open.
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Drugs played no part in Burt’s summing up or the Commissioners’ report, although they had been brought to Burt’s attention outside the Commission. In a statement dated 11 August 1967, Tiller stated that on the morning the Pakistan Shield was presented to Voyager: Captain Stevens entered the sickbay and ordered all the sailors out. When he and I were alone, he asked me to give him a stimulant because he felt that he needed to boost himself up for the presentation of the trophy. He looked unwell as I have described and said that he was tired. I told him that I was sorry but did not agree with giving stimulants for those reasons. He left without much comment.
Although Stevens had evidently taken the ‘stimulants’ before and would probably have taken them later, Burt decided against pursuing this line of inquiry because he did not want to embark on a ‘wild goose chase’ in searching for evidence that would not be easy to find. In any case, whether or not Stevens was unfit to command could be decided without raising the matter of amphetamines. John Wilson, Voyager’s Leading Sick Berth Attendant, separately corroborated the discussion between Stevens and Tiller. He stated that Stevens entered Voyager’s sickbay between 0800 and 0900 and directed other patients to leave. As Tiller was not then in the sickbay, Stevens told Wilson he had a ‘presentation to endure’ and that he needed to be ‘on the ball’. He asked Wilson if he had any amphetamines to get him through. In reply, Wilson said that Tiller had the keys to the medical chest where such drugs were stored. Stevens left the sickbay. Shortly afterwards, Tiller arrived and Stevens returned. Wilson recalled that after a ‘somewhat heated discussion’, Stevens went away empty-handed. All three Royal Commissioners have denied there was a secret or offthe-record session of the Commission. In fact, all three were appalled by Chipp’s allegations. Burbury stated: I am astounded at the assertion that there was a secret session of the Commission. It is a complete fabrication without the slightest foundation. It is a grave slur on the integrity of my two brother judges and myself. Indeed, had I known of it earlier I would have contemplated asking the Attorney General to institute proceedings for contempt of the Commission.
Burt also stated that he had no recollection of any such session of the Commission and put the view strongly that it was virtually impossible for it to have taken place without his knowledge.
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When interviewed in 1990, Chipp stood by his statements. When asked about the source of the amphetamines, he commented that the ‘unnamed’ doctor came to ‘us’—the Naval Board—and spoke about amphetamines. This is consistent with Jess’s recollection that Chipp told him after the Commission that Stevens had been taking amphetamines and that he had known this for some time. Another possibility is that Stevens was taking not amphetamines but atropine sulphate, as this was a very common treatment for peptic and duodenal ulceration in the 1960s. Atropine sulphate’s side-effects include an inability to see objects up close and, at higher doses, restlessness, fatigue, flushed skin, mental confusion and drowsiness. There is, however, no firm evidence that Stevens took amphetamines or atropine regularly or that he was taking any medicines in February 1964. But it continues to be a matter of concern. Even if we put drugs to one side the question remains: what was the dominant factor in Stevens’ incapacity during 1963? Was it alcohol, an active ulcer, or the effects of alcohol on an active ulcer? The most reasonable conclusion is that Stevens did have a duodenal ulcer that was readily exacerbated either by stress or alcohol. It seems he did not have a great capacity for alcohol and this made his ‘hangovers’ more debilitating. Yet, the occasions when he was ill for several days cannot be accounted for merely by over-consumption of alcohol, as a ‘hangover’ generally lasts around 24 hours or until the alcohol has been completely digested. Given that Stevens never engaged in prolonged drinking bouts, it is more likely that alcohol, coupled with the stress of commanding a warship in an operational zone, were directly responsible for exacerbating his ulcer condition. After the ship departed Tokyo and Stevens stopped drinking, he had not a single day’s illness. He would also have been less anxious at that time because it was towards the end of Voyager’s deployment to the Strategic Reserve and he could look forward to returning to Sydney and a less demanding period during the ship’s refit. But was Stevens unwell, and therefore unfit to command, at the time of the collision? Other than the evidence of Captain Clarke, there is nothing to suggest that Stevens was not in good health throughout January and February 1964 or that on any occasion in the six weeks prior to the collision he had too much to drink. Lieutenant (later Rear Admiral) Peter Sinclair, who saw Stevens at various times during early February 1964, stated that at no time did Stevens smell of alcohol or give the appearance of having had anything to drink. The great weight of evidence shows that just before the collision Stevens was probably in
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better health than at any time since taking command of Voyager. The succession of witnesses who saw Stevens and spoke with him during the weekend before the collision said he looked fit and well. Those who had survived the collision and had seen Stevens during the day said he looked perfectly healthy. No evidence was produced to demonstrate that Stevens was unfit to command Voyager on 10 February 1964 through ill health. Of course, this is not to judge his competence to command a destroyer during fleetwork exercises. But if Stevens was not an alcoholic, his ulcer was not active and he did not take any amphetamine, the collision was clearly the result of navigational factors and had nothing to do with Stevens’ health or him being in any way unfit to command Voyager. The Commissioners’ report was released on 25 February 1968 with the title Report of Royal Commissioners on the Statement of LieutenantCommander Cabban and Matters Incidental Thereto and proved to be as cumbersome as its title. Its release coincided with a reshuffle of the Ministry after John Gorton became Prime Minister following the disappearance and suspected drowning of Harold Holt on 17 December 1967. Although Chipp had been criticised for his handling of Voyager, especially by Gorton who retained a deep affection for the Navy, the main reason he was dropped from the Ministry was for supporting Snedden as a rival candidate in the ballot for the Liberal Party leadership. The new Minister for the Navy was Bert Kelly from South Australia. The report—the Burbury Report—was a document of 231 closely typed pages and 38 pages of appendixes. After some preliminary material the Commissioners set out the origins of the Cabban Statement and what its creation and subsequent circulation was meant to achieve. Then followed the first of a series of evaluations. [T]he conclusion is inescapable that [the Cabban Statement] was the product of the mind of a man who had become a partisan to a cause [that of Robertson] and was influenced by his partisan attitude to paint a highly coloured picture of Captain Stevens . . . The picture of Captain Stevens given by Cabban in his evidence is therefore vastly different from the picture which he gave in the tape-recording . . . Cabban’s sworn evidence fell far short of supporting what he dictated . . . We add neither the ‘Cabban Statement’ nor his evidence was coloured by any dishonest motive or by any malice towards the late Captain Stevens.
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Of all Cabban’s allegations, those of a general nature relating to Stevens’ behaviour during periods when Voyager was in harbour were found to be untrue. However, the Commissioners were prepared to accept his evidence on most points. They accepted that Stevens was periodically confined to his cabin through illness, however, Stevens ‘was not a drunkard nor an alcoholic. Nor did he periodically become intoxicated when Voyager was in port’. Having made a finding on the Cabban Statement, the Commissioners also made a finding on its author. We regard Cabban as an unreliable witness but not as a dishonest witness. When we say he is an unreliable witness we refer rather to those parts of his evidence which involve his assessment of Captain Stevens’ behaviour and condition or his judgement of a situation rather than to those parts of his evidence relating to specific incidents. In many instances indeed he emerged as an entirely reliable witness on detailed objective facts . . . we do not believe that Cabban at any point of his evidence deliberately invented incidents which did not take place.
Burt was disappointed that the Royal Commission took a low view of Cabban’s reliability as a witness given that his Statement was largely accurate. He also believed it was unfair to disregard Cabban’s evidence on some matters simply because no corroboration was available. Following these preliminaries, the Commissioners gave their answer to the first term of reference. The conclusion is inescapable that (answering the question as at 31 December 1963) the late Captain Stevens was then unfit to retain command of Voyager because his physical condition did not conform to the very high standard of fitness required of a Captain holding that appointment . . . It is not possible to say for how long after 31 December 1963 the late Captain Stevens would have been likely to have remained unfit to retain command of Voyager.
The cause of the unfitness was ‘intermittent recurrences of his duodenal ulcer trouble between January 1963 and December 1963 (to which his drinking habits contributed) . . . We think this conclusion must follow even if at that particular point of time his ulcer was not clinically fully reactivated’. This was a far more adverse finding than most would have expected. When properly understood, it went well beyond Cabban’s evidence. Neither Cabban nor his counsel had ever gone as far as alleging that Stevens was unfit to command. If it were found that Stevens was unfit
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through drinking, it could be argued that when he was at sea, he was sober, and therefore fit to command when it mattered most. However, if he were unwell, he would be in this condition wherever he was. Burt considered that this was a more serious matter and a greater indictment of the Navy and its administration. Consequently, he was surprised when Murphy’s submissions gave the impression that this was the Navy’s preferred finding. Whether or not the Naval Board knew or ought to have known of Cabban’s allegations was dealt with quickly. The Commissioners concluded that Surgeon Commander McNeill should have made a report of Stevens’ ill-health, that Tiller ought to have done so and that Wilson might have made a report had the circumstances been different. As none of these individuals made any report on Stevens, notwithstanding that they would have had some justification in doing so, and that McNicoll was embarked in the Flagship then in company with Voyager and nothing had come to his attention, the Commissioners concluded that the Naval Board were not aware of anything contained in the Cabban Statement. As for Stevens, ‘[he] cannot altogether escape moral censure for failing to disclose what he must have known was a recurring condition of some seriousness’. As the first term of reference had been answered in the affirmative, the Commissioners had now to decide whether Stevens’ unfitness for command justified overturning Spicer. In this regard they saw themselves ‘as having the full authority of an appellate Court in reviewing the finding of facts of a trial judge sitting without a jury’. Given the public interest in the case, ‘we are satisfied that a substantial link is established between our finding of Captain Stevens’ unfitness to retain command and Sir John Spicer’s findings’. What, then, was the substantive connection between their finding and Spicer’s? It was relayed so quickly and in such vague terms that it almost escapes detection. Spicer assumed that ‘the late Captain Stevens must necessarily have been completely fit and alert and incapable of the kind of error of judgment which certain inferences which the evidence suggested were reasonably open, would impute to him’. The Commissioners felt the plausibility and persuasiveness of Samuels’ submissions justified them in overlooking the need to establish and maintain the connection between Stevens’ unfitness to command and the causes of the collision in the public interest. Had they adhered strictly to the terms of reference and the logical construction that led from one to another, Robertson would not have been heard and the Commission would have produced a report of little practical value
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or utility. In terms of the public interest in the case, it would have been useless. Having found the ‘door’ to re-examining Spicer’s findings, the Commissioners varied most of his principal findings relating to navigation and the ships’ final movements. Briefly, the new findings were that: •
•
• • •
•
• •
Voyager’s initial turn to starboard and her subsequent turn to port were induced by the flying course signal and not by the turning signal; Voyager’s final turn to port was in the form of a continuous curve under 10 degrees of rudder until about 20 seconds before the collision and not one of a steady course for a ‘minute or less’; the sole cause of the collision lay with Voyager and the criticism of Robertson was not justified; similarly, no blame could be attached to either Kelly or Bate; the action of Voyager in continuing her turn to port across Melbourne’s bows was due to the mistaken belief held by officers on her bridge that Voyager was on the carrier’s port bow until 20 seconds prior to the collision; Voyager’s belief that she was on the port bow of Melbourne in the final stage of her port turn was induced by mistaken inclination and personal circumstances peculiar to Stevens; Voyager’s final turn to port was not induced by either a corruption or misunderstanding of a signal from the carrier; Stevens was an experienced and competent destroyer captain, well versed in the manoeuvres ordered by Melbourne but at the time of the collision was unfit to command Voyager as a result of ill health.
Although the Commissioners removed all blame from Robertson, Kelly and Bate, their justification was difficult to understand. They concluded that Spicer’s findings were predicated on the view that Voyager’s final movements were induced by the turning signal and that this situation would have demanded a much closer watch being maintained on the destroyer. The Commissioners failed to say why this was so. Although this was the result Robertson had sought, it was a hollow victory. The Commissioners ‘found’ that Voyager was on a continuous turn prior to the collision but then discredited much of the evidence and argument used to establish this proposition during both inquiries. Whatever the reasoning and justification for overturning Spicer’s findings,
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the Commissioners did arrive at a new set of findings which were generally considered to be much fairer to Robertson, Kelly and Bate, and which provided a more plausible explanation for the causes of the collision. While not all of the Commissioners’ assumptions, assertions and conclusions were completely convincing, there was little in them of a speculative or controversial nature. The third term of reference, whether Cabban’s evidence was improperly withheld at the first Commission, was something of an anticlimax. The Commissioners accepted the statements of all witnesses and found that: ‘The evidence was not in any way properly withheld from the Royal Commission’. The Commissioners concluded their report with some general observations and comments on existing naval regulations and procedures relating to medical examinations of officers, duties imposed on commanding officers in foreign ports and the availability of alcohol in RAN ships. The Naval Board could take little solace from the report. The Navy’s public image and standing had been further damaged. Officers and sailors serving in the Fleet would now better understand why the Board had striven so hard to prevent another Voyager inquiry. Newspaper headlines following the report’s release focused on two matters: the Commission’s finding that Stevens had been unfit to command, and that Robertson had been cleared of any blame. The Australian led with ‘Voyager Judges Clear Robertson’, the Sun with ‘Robertson is Cleared’ and the West Australian with ‘New Voyager Finding Clears Robertson’. The Australian spoke for many in its editorial of 26 February 1968 headed, ‘Voyager—Justice At Last’. It said that the Commission’s report had vindicated those who had sought another inquiry and deplored the situation in which the first Commission had apparently been able to err so badly. By this time Jess and St John had also publicly stated their expectation that Robertson would receive either a pension or some form of compensation. With Prime Minister Gorton’s announcement that Cabinet would consider the Commission’s report without delay, speculation about Robertson’s compensation dominated the newspapers on 27 February 1968. The Daily Telegraph said the amount would need to be $100 000 and ‘for its own sake the Government should think hard before it takes the risk of appearing niggardly or ungenerous in recompensing Captain Robertson with less than he merits’. Cabinet first considered the matter on 28–29 February 1968 and again on 12 March. The possibility of Robertson’s reinstatement was not an option. The Cabinet still felt uneasy about the situation but knew
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it had to give Robertson something or Jess would resume his attack on the Government. The resolution of this uneasiness was lame in the extreme. The Cabinet noted that Captain Robertson had made a voluntary decision to resign and it did not accept that the Government had been responsible for any injustice to him. However, it agreed lest it be held in the light of the findings of the Second Royal Commission that Robertson had wrongly suffered, that recompense ought to be made to him.
The question now was whether he would receive a pension or compensation. The Treasurer, the Attorney-General and the Minister for the Navy recommended a lump sum payment with ‘the basis of the calculation being not disclosed’. This recommendation was accepted. On 13 March 1968 the Prime Minister announced that Robertson would receive an ex gratia payment of $60,000. Although most of the newspapers had called for a larger amount, they were not critical of the Government for offering a lesser sum, which Robertson accepted graciously. The Burbury Report was not tabled in Parliament until 2 April 1968. The Leader of the Opposition opened the debate speaking against the motion that Parliament should simply ‘note’ the Commission’s report, and set about establishing the Parliament’s right to debate the findings and to level criticisms at the Naval Board. Whitlam’s speech was aimed at the Commissioners’ criticisms on the Government’s handling of the Navy portfolio. His first point was a telling one. The finding that Stevens was physically unfit to be in command of Voyager, Whitlam said, ‘seems to me to be an infinitely more serious finding than if the Commission had found, for instance, that drink had contributed directly to the disaster’. In reply, Gorton stated: ‘There would not have been a second Royal Commission if it had not been for what were found to be misleading accusations’. The inference being made was that the case for having Spicer’s findings reviewed did not justify another Royal Commission, as the findings of the Burbury Report has demonstrated. Deputy Opposition Leader Lance Barnard highlighted the significance of the new findings for Robertson, Kelly and Bate but, in the absence of some declarative statement with respect to Stevens, attempted to fill some of the gaps he believed existed in the Commission’s report. He asserted that there was a direct link between Stevens’ ill-health and the cause of the collision, a line the Commissioners were not prepared to draw.
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The extrapolation of the Commissioners’ findings continued. In spite of being the prime mover for the second Commission, Jess stated that: ‘No matter what the Commissioners have said in their report, I retain the right to disagree with their decisions’. His reiterated the purpose for which he had sought a review of the first Commission. The [second] Commission was never necessary. It only needed one person to hear one man and perhaps to check what he had to say and not leave the matter to two men who were concerned and who, in fact, I think even recommended compensation for the man who was victimised, Captain Robertson.
The debate adjourned following Jess’ speech and resumed the following afternoon with Fred Chaney defending the Commissioners although questioning the efficacy of holding inquiries of this kind into such matters. Another of the principal supporters of the second Commission, Harry Turner, also commented on the limitations of royal commissions. [E]ven royal commissions can err, as, indeed, we should note from the fact that Mr Justice Spicer’s Royal Commission erred according to the second Royal Commissions. Both were not right and therefore it is possible for a royal commission—whichever it was—to err. In other words, the decision of a royal commission is not the voice of God.
With the Opposition waiving its right of reply, St John was given his chance to speak. He asserted that ‘the Commissioners have recognised that they were justified in varying the findings of Sir John Spicer only because they found that Captain Stevens was unfit’ but he failed to consider the large amount of navigational evidence and argument that the Commissioners also heard. It was Samuels’ argument that Voyager could not possibly have been on a steady course prior to the collision which led the Commissioners to overturn Spicer’s findings. This point seems to have been overlooked by every speaker during the long debate. The Attorney-General, Nigel Bowen, was compelled to defend the Commission he had instituted so reluctantly. He began with several points of clarification. First, the Commissioners found that Stevens’ ulcer was not active on the night of the collision. Second, in rebuttal of St John’s argument and support of the Commissioners’ right to overturn Spicer’s findings, Bowen said that the Commissioners had examined the same evidence that was before Spicer but arrived at a
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different conclusion. This was what had led them to exonerate Robertson. Gordon Bryant, a Victorian Labor backbencher, in what was probably the most constructive speech of the debate, returned to the shortcomings of the royal commission procedure. How did we get a report such as the first report, which was challenged two or three years later, then re-sifted and then thrown out? Why did the Government appoint the type of people that it did to examine such a matter? I believe that the important task here tonight is to establish the principles upon which this Parliament will work in instances such as this because we are the continuing trustees of a parliamentary democracy and we are a court of last resort. Any citizen should be able to put his case before us knowing that we will raise it on his behalf.
The final speaker was the Minister for the Navy, Bert Kelly. He said that there had been no criticism of the Commissioners when they were appointed. But now that the report is before us we find that a lot of people are dissatisfied with it . . . Really, I do not think this is good enough. It is no good appointing umpires and then accepting their decisions, except the ones you do not like. This is so if you have agreed to their appointment in the first place.
Just after 11pm, debate was adjourned and the motion, with an Opposition amendment, was put to the House. Four Government members, Jess, St John, Turner and Richard Cleaver, abstained. It was defeated by 64 votes to 37. The Parliamentary debate did not greatly add to an understanding of what the Commissioners had found. If anything, the lack of clarity in the report’s prose allowed a variety of interpretations of some key findings. The course of the debate was also influenced by some strange political alignments: the conventional parliamentary arrangement of the Opposition challenging the Government was altered when a number of Government backbenchers joined the Labor Opposition’s attack on the Government frontbench. The lawyers in parliament were also debating the role of the judiciary in inquiries ordered by the Parliament. Despite the existence of numerous discrete agendas, several points relating to the conduct of naval administration did emerge. If nothing else, the debate demonstrated that there were shortcomings in the way the Navy operated. The part of the motion expressing the Parliament’s confidence in the Navy could not obscure the continuing disquiet felt on
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both sides of the House about the state of the Senior Service. There was still much work to be done. Whatever might have been said publicly, the second Commission did lead to substantial changes in naval administration, which began even before the Commission concluded its hearings. On 5 October 1967 the Naval Board had received a progress report on the legality of some of its powers, policies and practices. Within six weeks the Navy had altered procedures for the medical examination of captains, reviewed instructions for medical officers and provided new aide memoires, and amended its principal administrative manual, Regulations and Instructions to the RAN, which dealt with reporting collisions, the submission of punishment returns and the exercise of command at sea. This represented major cultural change and was an acknowledgement that existing instructions were clearly inadequate or poorly expressed. Indeed, in a minute to Sam Landau on 27 October 1967, Captain Jeff Britton said that if a Royal Commission were appointed to inquire into other areas of naval administration such as pay, accounting and engineering, ‘there would be as many if not more anomalies in the instructions as have been highlighted in the present Royal Commission’. For an organisation seeking to have an established set of procedures for every situation and occurrence, this was a clear recognition of a marked deficiency in its method of administration. Voyager had been a public relations nightmare with which the Navy was ill-prepared to deal. The Navy had rejoiced in being known as the ‘Silent Service’. Before each ship had her own motto, the most common epithet to be inscribed on some prominent place in a ship was ‘Silence’ or ‘Deeds, Not Words’. In 1967, however, silence betokened suspicion; it did nothing to instil confidence. The reserve of public goodwill on which the Navy had drawn since the Second World War had dried up. If the Navy wanted a good public image, it would have to create it. After four years of drama and controversy, the Naval Board was entitled to believe that Voyager was finally dead and gone. But all was not yet well. Voyager would continue to plague the RAN: on the one hand were the Voyager survivors whose injuries of body, mind and spirit had yet to heal; on the other, continuing doubts about whether the second Commission had heard all of the evidence and whether what it did hear was completely truthful. In April 1968, The Australian headed an editorial, ‘Voyager—Still Too Many Doubts’. Of course, the causes of the collision had still not been explained adequately and, as long as this uncertainty persisted, it was unlikely that Voyager would ever disappear entirely from naval or national interest.
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HOW DID FATE CALL? After, and in spite of, all the evidence that was presented to the two Royal Commissions, is there one convincing explanation as to why the ships collided? From the start, it appeared as though the reason for the collision could lie in one or all of five areas: first, that signals sent between the ships did not reflect the intentions of the originator; second, that Voyager had mistaken her position relative to Melbourne; third, that Voyager had correctly assessed her position relative to the carrier but miscalculated the area in which she had to manoeuvre; fourth, that the state of training and readiness in either or both ships was poor; and fifth, that there was an equipment failure in either or both ships that went undetected. Both inquiries rejected the latter three. Robertson proposed the first of the two remaining theories—that Voyager’s bridge staff became confused and believed they were on the port side of Melbourne rather than the starboard; and Street the second—that a mistaken signal was involved. The first theory can be reduced even further to a matter of whether Voyager correctly assessed her position relative to Melbourne when ordered to execute the flying course of 020 degrees. If she did, her final movements were intentional and need to be investigated because the reason behind them will be the initiating cause of the collision. Alternatively, if Voyager did mistake her position, the reasons for this error will contain the answer. The primary objective is to find the elusive initiating cause. There is no doubt that the collision occurred because Voyager failed to keep a proper lookout. Had the carrier been kept under closer observation any error in either perception or signals would have been noticed earlier and a collision averted. There can be no dispute that Stevens and Price were responsible, but that does not tell us why the collision occurred. The main obstacle in the way of accepting the ‘mistaken bow’ theory is that Melbourne’s green starboard sidelight, located towards her bow, was visible from Voyager throughout her turn to port from 060 to 020
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degrees. This light should have left Voyager in no doubt that she was on Melbourne’s starboard bow. It is an obstacle that Robertson does not even acknowledge let alone attempt to counter. Instead, he deliberately draws attention away from this factor by suggesting that the difficulty inherent in assessing the apparent inclination of Melbourne’s silhouette was the cause of Voyager’s actions. While his emphasis on inclination was correct for exercises undertaken without navigation lights, it rang hollow for an exercise where navigation lights were burning brightly. Voyager’s officers did not need to study the appearance of Melbourne’s silhouette to know that they were on the starboard side of the carrier and that an alteration to port would have brought them towards Melbourne, had she been on a steady course. There is no reason to believe that every individual on Voyager’s bridge failed to notice the carrier’s plainly visible starboard sidelight. The only basis on which Robertson asserts that Voyager thought she was on the port bow was that her movements seemed to be consistent with such an error, and that Stevens would not pass ahead of the carrier’s bows without permission. This was a superficial and unconvincing argument. Robertson is correct when he says that Stevens would not cross Melbourne’s bows without permission. But to say that Stevens either thought he was on Melbourne’s port bow or ‘lost the tactical picture’ is to strain the credibility of his argument. The suggestion that Stevens might have been confused by the experimental red flight-deck floodlighting showing on the starboard side also has little substance. Robertson knew that this had been checked and found not to be the case 24 hours before the collision. To avoid any possible confusion Robertson himself directed that Voyager be informed that Melbourne was conducting trials with these lights. There can be little doubt that the destroyer knew of these lights and how they were arranged. As a result, even greater vigilance on Voyager’s bridge should have been exercised to guard against any possible confusion. It needs to be stressed that Voyager reported no difficulty with the lights prior to the collision. If those on Voyager’s bridge were able to see some red light on the starboard side from the upper experimental floodlight (the lower being obscured by the carrier’s bridge ‘island’), the location of the light—very near to the masthead obstruction lights high on Melbourne’s superstructure—would have made it obvious it was not a navigational sidelight. Robertson was right when he noted the importance of Sumpter’s evidence that Price was looking through his binoculars one minute before the collision. He would not look at Melbourne through
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binoculars if the carrier was not where he expected it to be. The most reasonable explanation for him doing so was to confirm that Melbourne was doing what he expected her to do. If he was looking at Melbourne through binoculars, he could not have failed to see the starboard sidelight. The other aspect of Robertson’s theory that requires comment relates to the performance of Voyager’s bridge staff. Samuels explained so capably what was required of both ships during the manoeuvres that he effectively made the action required by Voyager seem so simple that the errors he later ascribes to the destroyer’s bridge staff are almost unimaginable. By the end of the second inquiry, Robertson was prepared to ascribe an appalling lack of confidence and capability to Voyager’s captain and officers. Their training, experience and competency demand they be given more credit than this. Although not an outstanding bridge team, they were more able than Robertson needed them to be to have his theory accepted. In sum, Robertson’s theory is not only inconsistent with the evidence but it lacks any positive corroboration and depends upon a set of circumstances far too improbable for his theory to be accepted. The remaining possibility to be considered is that the signals from Melbourne were either incorrectly relayed or misinterpreted on Voyager’s bridge. Street, Meares and Peek all proposed variations of this theory while Spicer seemed to favour such a conclusion. There were several ways this could have occurred, all of which revolve around Tactical Operator Gary Evans. Following the impact of the collision, Evans was thrown into the water. He told the 1964 inquiry that he was unconscious for a period and sustained serious injuries. In a statement made on 4 March 1964, Evans recalled that the final signal received by Voyager before the collision was corpen foxtrot rather than foxtrot corpen. Reversing the words in the transmission would require a vastly different reaction from Voyager. The signal Robertson had sent to Voyager, foxtrot corpen—‘Estimated course for flying operations’—was an information signal advising Voyager that flying operations would be conducted on the ordered course—in this case 020. On receiving the signal, Voyager was to take planeguard station on Melbourne’s port quarter. If, however, the two words were reversed to become corpen foxtrot—‘Turn to the flying course’—Voyager would understand this to be an executive signal requiring her to turn to the ordered course. The reversal of the two words in Evans’ statement of 4 March 1964 was examined first by Street during an in camera session of the first inquiry, and then by Meares.
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Meares:
Evans: Meares:
Evans: Meares:
Evans: Meares: Evans:
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Now I do not suppose that your mind has changed for this reason: that you have suddenly appreciated or at some time appreciated that if the course was 020 on the signal before [the turning signal] and 020 on the final signal and order, that if you were right about that then you could not have received a corpen foxtrot? Yes. So may I suggest to you that first thinking it was corpen foxtrot, then you have said to yourself: but wait a minute, I received 020 twice, therefore it must have been a foxtrot corpen. That is how you would have done your best to work this thing out? Yes. And the reason you think now that the final signal was a foxtrot corpen is because you appreciate that if you had understood the course as being 020 twice, then the second signal could not have been a corpen foxtrot? Yes. And this is why you have changed your mind is it not? Yes.
Alternatively, and this is something Meares did not cover, Evans may have heard the flying course as something other than 020. Indeed, it is more likely that Evans received the flying course signal from Melbourne but jumbled the digits. Having realised that the signal foxtrot corpen and the turning course signal should have been to the same course, Evans consciously decided that he must have heard corpen foxtrot. This would have made sense of his unconscious error. However, Evans said he felt sure it was foxtrot corpen because he ‘had to look it up in the signal book’. But this begs a vital question: why would he have looked up this signal when he had earlier received the same signal? It is much more likely that he looked up corpen foxtrot just before the collision because this signal had not been transmitted previously that evening. Evans, during Smyth’s examination, stated: ‘My impression of the cause of the accident is that Melbourne gave the final order to turn to port and failed to turn herself’. Could the voice in the water have been that of Evans? In notes for counsel, Robertson remarked that if Patterson’s evidence ‘has any basis of truth in it, then it would seem that his statement that he heard somebody yelling out “Melbourne told us to turn to 270 and she didn’t” was probably a misrepresentation of something said by Evans’. Patterson was in no doubt that the voice was that of Evans. He told me that after realising that he could identify the voice,
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he mentioned the matter on three subsequent occasions to Evans. Patterson said that on all three occasions Evans was aware of what he was referring to but would not comment. For this to be a possible initiating cause it has to fit the known facts of the collision. If the signal was relayed as corpen foxtrot and a course to the west, why did Voyager initially turn to starboard? The most likely explanation is that Price believed the signal was ordering Voyager to take planeguard station on Melbourne which would be turning to the west. Stevens countermanded the order believing that the signal required Voyager to turn together with Melbourne to the new westerly course. As corpen foxtrot was a turning signal, Voyager would maintain true bearing and range (030 degrees at 1000–1500 yards) from Melbourne. On achieving the westerly course, Voyager would then be ordered into planeguard station. After countermanding Price’s wheel order, Stevens stepped down into the chart table well (located below the compass platform) and examined what was most likely to have been the tactical signalling manual. If Evans had relayed the signal as corpen foxtrot, there would have been several reasons for thinking the signal was, or could have been, incomplete. Stevens could, for instance, have sought clarification from the signal book to show Cook, the Navigator, or Cullen, the Communications Yeoman, that the correct interpretation of the signal did not involve the assumption of planeguard. Had Evans relayed the signal incorrectly, the existence of ‘22’ at the end of the signal (‘22’ being the advised speed at which Melbourne would conduct flying operations) should have caused concern because turning course signals are not sent with an ordered speed. Evans volunteered the opinion that had he relayed the signal incorrectly, the ‘22’ may have been taken as a time for the execution of the signal. If the signal had been relayed incorrectly there would have been reason for Stevens, Cook and Price to consult the signal book as Evans’ evidence suggests they did. If there was confusion or uncertainty about any of the signals transmitted from Melbourne, Stevens should have asked Melbourne for verification. The reason why he did not can be found in Stevens’ character. It has been shown that Stevens was not an over-confident officer and relied on his subordinates more than most. Whereas Robertson was a communications specialist, Stevens had not concentrated on any area of operations. As the signals sent prior to the collision were straightforward, and Voyager’s concern was not prompted by the quality of signal reception, Stevens may have been reluctant to query Robertson’s
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signals. He may have been prepared to comply with a signal simply on the basis that Robertson was unlikely to have made such a mistake. Although there is no evidence that this was his attitude, it remains a possible reason for his decision not to verify a signal that had led him to refer to the signal book. After she decided to turn to a westerly course, Voyager would need to make up for the range and bearing lost through Price’s short starboard turn. The use of 10 degrees of wheel is more consistent with a turn than a station-keeping manoeuvre. Indeed, Price’s use of 15 degrees of wheel and its subsequent countermanding to 10 degrees by Stevens, strengthens the argument that Price initially misinterpreted the signal (believing that it required Voyager to move to planeguard station) and that Stevens corrected his action by executing a turn together to the mistaken westerly course. This was partly conceded by Robertson as Spicer
The ‘mistaken signal’ theory—a possible explanation for Lieutenant Price’s wheel order (based on a mistaken course of 270°)
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noted: ‘Captain Robertson thought that Port 10 in these circumstances would be an odd sort of wheel order to carry out the manoeuvre’, if Voyager was assuming planeguard. The incorrectly relayed signal would have led Voyager’s bridge to believe their correct station would still have been 030 degrees at 1000–1500 yards from Melbourne. With a port turn in progress from 30 seconds after 2052, Price would have noticed that Voyager was gaining bearing while maintaining a correct range from Melbourne. This is what he would expect to happen. He would also see Melbourne’s starboard sidelight, confirming the correctness of the bearings he could have taken. One minute prior to the collision, Voyager’s bearing and range from Melbourne was 056 degrees at 1020 yards. This was what Voyager’s bridge would have expected as they altered course to the west, although they still may not have appreciated that Melbourne had maintained a course of 020 degrees. Over the next twenty seconds, as a collision became imminent, Voyager’s bridge staff realised that Melbourne had not turned. The first hint of this was Macgregor’s question to Patterson about Melbourne’s range; an inquiry which possibly should have alerted the other bridge staff that something was wrong. Yet, it took another twenty seconds for Stevens and Price to react. Voyager continued to gain bearing from 056 degrees at one minute prior to the collision to 049 degrees at thirty seconds before impact. As the carrier’s range and inclination were difficult to assess, and given that the bridge radar in Voyager may not have been working properly, Stevens and Price may not have been aware of Melbourne’s actual distance from Voyager until the two ships were in extremis. Stevens’ final wheel and engine orders were a desperate attempt to avoid the collision but one which was far too late. Voyager’s turn effectively masked the fact that Melbourne had settled on a course of 020 degrees. Thus, Robertson and Voyager’s bridge realised a dangerous situation had developed at almost the same moment. In terms of the criticism to be levelled at either ship, if Robertson’s defence about expecting the unexpected is accepted, the same allowance should be made for Voyager, notwithstanding the destroyer’s duty to remain clear of the carrier. If Robertson did not realise that a collision was imminent until 40 seconds before it occurred, it would be difficult to be more critical of the reaction on Voyager’s bridge. If the foxtrot corpen signal had been relayed as corpen foxtrot with a course other than 020 degrees, Voyager’s bridge staff would have thought they were in a different position with respect to Melbourne than
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was actually the case. Without committing the theory to unnecessary specifics, this explanation contends that Voyager’s bridge believed, for whatever reason, that the flying course was to be westerly rather than northerly, and that on execution, the ships would turn to that course with Voyager remaining in her former station—on a bearing of 030 degrees at a distance 1000–1500 yards from the carrier. It was unlikely that the Naval Board would ever publicly allow the possibility of a mistaken signal, because it implied a criticism of the signalling system and communications procedures. The proposed changes to the Allied Naval Signal Book suggest the Board may have privately conceded the possibility. Indeed, as a consequence of the collision the Board accepted the need for modifications to the tactical signal manual and consulted its Allied partners, the Royal Navy and the United States Navy, on several amendments. There is another hurdle for this theory to overcome: the ‘voice in the water’ stated that Melbourne signalled a course of 270 degrees, but this is not a likely corruption of the flying signal which consisted of zeros and twos. It is possible, as Spicer suggested, that Melbourne’s radio call sign that night—07—may have become a part of the signal transmission resulting in the 270 degrees course. However, Patterson concedes that the numbers he heard could have been different. Other than on Patterson’s evidence, the precise direction of the mistaken course is left wide open. There are several possible ways in which the numbers could have been incorrectly transposed. For instance they could simply have become jumbled in Evans’ haste to relay them after being reprimanded by Cullen a little earlier for being too slow. Alternatively, when a turning signal is passed from the tactical operator to the OOW, the words used are ‘ships turning together to port to 020’. There is always the possibility that the second ‘to’ may be heard as ‘two’ and become part of the course, so that 020 degrees becomes 220, 202, or 200. Rather than there being three numerals to confuse there are actually four. Why was the mistaken signal not detected in Voyager? It is likely that Evans was the only person on Voyager’s bridge to have heard the final two signals. Although the bridge was fitted with two loudspeakers for the benefit of bridge staff, Evans stated that they were never very effective. They were built more to withstand the elements than for clarity of reception. Mention has already been made of Burdett’s evidence that one of the speakers was not working on the night of the collision while the other was not in a position to emit clear sound. Lieutenant Conder, one of Voyager’s bridge watchkeeping officers, also said that it was very
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difficult to hear signals over this speaker at any time because of ambient bridge noise. There was obviously something in this observation as after the first inquiry the Navy Board directed that these speakers be relocated in all other escort ships. The presence on the bridge of the First Lieutenant, Ian Macgregor, was almost ignored during both Royal Commissions. There is evidence that he was there two minutes before the collision when Voyager had reversed her wheel to port and that he was aware of the manoeuvre taking place. Leading Seaman Patterson who was on duty in the Operations Room immediately prior to the collision, says that about two minutes before the impact Lt Cdr Macgregor called down in an anxious voice and asked whether Patterson had Melbourne or Tabard [a British submarine] on radar? Patterson said he had a quick look at the radar, he could not see them and he reported this to the bridge.
It is unclear why Macgregor would ask for this information and why he should do so ‘in an anxious voice’. It is also strange that he should ask about Tabard which was then twenty miles to the north. A likely explanation, and one consistent with this theory, is that Macgregor had doubts about the developing situation sometime prior to the collision. The time cited by Spicer is not definite: at one point in his evidence Patterson stated that it could have been three minutes, at another, one minute. One suspects Macgregor may have become concerned that Melbourne might not have turned to the west as expected. If this happened closer to one minute before the collision rather than two, Macgregor may have been the first to realise that Melbourne had not turned. The wheel orders used in the final manoeuvre suggest there was some difference of opinion between Stevens and Price (and possibly Cook and Cullen as well) about Voyager’s new station. The first order, involving 15 degrees of wheel, was probably initiated by Price. Degenhardt, in the wheelhouse at the time, gave evidence it was Price who relayed the order. Price responded promptly to the signal conveyed by Evans and used more wheel than Stevens was known to use in station-keeping. The evidence suggests it took as long as 40 seconds for Stevens and Price to determine that their ship was standing into danger. Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that they were neither confused nor overly concerned by their perceptions of the relative movement of the two ships. Had they felt at all uncertain of Voyager’s relative position, the weight of
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their training would have been to take immediate avoiding action. As Melbourne’s navigation lights were consistent with what they expected to see, there was little to prompt any corrective action other than an awareness of closing range. As Voyager was still turning to port and had a heading of around 250 degrees twenty seconds before the collision, and given that the intention of the bridge was to continue in this direction she might have been turning to a course of at least twenty to 30 degrees further to the south, i.e., 210 or 220 degrees. If she was turning at the rate of 30 degrees every 22 seconds under ten degrees of wheel at 21 knots, it is likely that at the very moment when Voyager expected to put the wheel amidships, the ships were already in extremis. But it was not for as much as another twenty seconds that the destroyer’s bridge realised that a collision was imminent. The lack of activity for such a long period suggests a lack of alarm rather than conscious confusion. It should also be remembered that Voyager had executed turns together of this magnitude earlier in the evening. In fact, the turn together Voyager thought she was undertaking closely resembled those at 1950 (180 degrees) and 2042, (190 degrees), when Voyager had shown no hesitation or difficulty in executing the required manoeuvres. And as the most likely mistaken courses were between 200 and 220, not far from the 190 course they had steered for over an hour earlier in the night, a flying course slightly more to the west would not have been entirely unexpected. The mistaken signal theory becomes more convincing through this process of elimination. There is strong evidentiary support and none of the improbability of Robertson’s theory that Stevens had ‘lost the tactical picture’. In the wake of the second inquiry, which clearly established that Voyager was on a continuous turn prior to the collision, the arguments of Street and Meares have added strength and persuasiveness. Given that Evans’ evidence taken in closed session clearly suggests that he did confuse one of the final signals and Evans is now prepared to admit that the voice in the water could have been his; that other survivors have told me they were called to the first inquiry to testify to what they had heard Evans say after the collision; that Patterson is certain that the voice he heard in the water was that of Evans; and that a number of other survivors have revealed that either Evans or Patterson talked about the voice in the water well before the first inquiry, the most compelling conclusion to be drawn is that there was an incorrectly relayed signal and that this was the primary cause of the series of events which led, ultimately, to the collision.
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The exact nature of the mistake or how such a mistake was made, will never be known. It is most likely to have been either an error in the numerals of the turning course signal or the first two words of the flying course signal. Robertson’s reconstructions fit either scenario, but the origins of the mistaken signal are of secondary importance. That Voyager’s bridge believed that they had been ordered onto a westerly course is sufficient to identify the primary cause of the tragedy but, of course, the fact remains that Voyager should have kept clear of Melbourne. It did not need two Royal Commissions to prove the wisdom of that principle.
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THE NAVY MOVES ON Within twelve months of the second Royal Commission, Admiral Hickling published Postscript to Voyager. This sequel was conceived with the same intentions as the first book: to restate Robertson’s case, to assert that he and his supporters had been vindicated and to record that justice had been done. Again, the second book was written quickly while the inquiry was still topical and consequently suffers from the same defects as the first, although this time they are far more pronounced. By now, Hickling was approaching his eightieth birthday. The second book was shorter than the first and contained little discussion or analysis. Half of the text consisted of either quotations or long extracts from the Commission Reports, transcript, newspaper stories or Hansard. It neglected vital areas of the second inquiry and its findings where they related to matters other than those directly affecting Robertson. Not unexpectedly, it virtually avoided all of Cabban’s allegations and skirted the difficult subject of Stevens’ behaviour during 1963. It would have seemed to most of Hickling’s readers that the Royal Commission was about John Robertson and not the state of the RAN. Thus, there is no comment on the effect of the tragedy on serving officers or sailors or the wider issues that became apparent during the six-month inquiry. As most of Hickling’s opinions and judgements had been heard before, and the Voyager case was now clearly closed, Postscript to Voyager was something of an anti-climax. Thankfully for the Naval Board there were plenty of things to distract the public’s attention by the time the Parliamentary debate on the Burbury Report was concluded in early April. New ships, submarines and aircraft were entering service. RAN destroyers, helicopters and mine clearance divers were engaged on operations in waters off South Vietnam. Sydney was ferrying troops and supplies to the war zone. For most of 1968 Melbourne was undergoing an extensive refit and modernisation at Garden Island Dockyard. On 14 February 1969 she was
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recommissioned and began a work-up off Jervis Bay before departing for South East Asia on 5 May 1969. Although Voyager was no longer mentioned on bridges and in wardroom conversations, captains of RAN ships engaged in fleet operations remained cautious and extra-vigilant. There was to be no repeat of the Voyager collision or anything like it. This was even made clear to the foreign navies with which the RAN was exercising in the South East Asian region. On the night of 2–3 June, Melbourne was exercising in the South China Sea with a combined naval force. Exercise ‘Sea Spirit’ consisted of Melbourne operating her aircraft with five escorts; three American ships—Keys, Larson and Frank E. Evans; the New Zealand frigate Blackpool and the British frigate Cleopatra. Shortly after 0300, Melbourne’s commanding officer, Captain J. Philip Stevenson, ordered Evans, which was ahead of the carrier, to take up planeguard station astern. Having witnessed all that had happened to Robertson five years earlier, Stevenson and the Fleet Commander, Rear Admiral John Crabb, had repeatedly warned all of Melbourne’s consorts never to turn towards the carrier when taking station. Using voice radio, Evans was informed that Melbourne’s course was 260 degrees. The carrier’s navigation lights were then turned to full brilliance. Unlike Voyager, Evans was not working up and had performed the manoeuvre four times already that night. For 30 seconds after receiving the signal, Evans neither altered course or speed and was some 3600 yards ahead of the carrier on her port bow. The destroyer’s first alteration of course was to starboard— towards the carrier. When she continued in this direction, Stevenson took immediate action to warn the destroyer over the voice radio that she was standing into danger: ‘Watch it, you are on a collision course’. At the same time, he directed Melbourne’s operations room to ‘watch Evans. She appears to be on a steady bearing’. Stevenson did everything that Robertson was criticised for not doing. On board Frank E. Evans, her captain, Commander Albert McLemore USN, was asleep in his bunk with two very inexperienced watchkeeping officers, Lieutenants R. Ramsey and J. Hopson, on the bridge. Ramsey was 24 and not a qualified watchkeeper. Hopson, four years older than Ramsey, was at sea for the first time as an officer. With Evans now on a steady course and heading towards the carrier at a relative closing speed of over 40 knots, Melbourne expected the American destroyer to take action on the warning signal which she had acknowledged. When Evans maintained her course, a collision seemed inevitable and Stevenson took action to best protect his ship. As putting
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Melbourne’s engines astern would not achieve anything, Stevenson altered the carrier’s course to port, signalling with two blasts on Melbourne’s siren that her rudder was hard to port. For a moment it appeared as though the carrier’s turn would allow Evans to pass narrowly ahead of her. But still at her stationing speed of 22 knots the destroyer reversed her wheel to starboard and proceeded under the carrier’s bows. For the second time in five years, the hapless Melbourne cut another planeguard destroyer in half. Evans’ bow section sank very quickly, although the stern remained afloat for some days having been secured to the carrier after the collision. The ship’s company numbered 273. Of the 74 American sailors lost in the collision, almost all of them were in the forward half of the ship. The Australian press featured headlines with the ‘Here we go again’ theme. Melbourne was tagged the ‘jinx’ ship while reporters alleged a strange hoo-doo surrounded her every move. A Joint USN–RAN Board of Inquiry was established comprising, representatives of the two navies. The president was Rear Admiral Jerome King USN. The five other members were Rear Admiral David Stevenson RAN, Captain Ken Shands RAN, Captain John Davidson RAN and two USN captains. The inquiry was certainly not what the Naval Board expected. In what was one of the most shameful incidents in the history of naval and national relations between Australia and the United States, every attempt was made to reduce the culpability of Commander McLemore. Lieutenant Anthony Vincent RANR, who was sent to the inquiry to assist the RAN’s legal adviser, Commander Harold Glass QC RANR, later said of Admiral King’s performance: ‘I hope that if any Australian officer conducted a Board of Inquiry in this fashion his conduct would be described as disgraceful’. When Stevenson returned to Australia, the Naval Board considered the report of the Joint Board of Inquiry ‘should be forwarded to FOCAF [Admiral Crabb] for necessary action’. Crabb informed Stevenson that as the report was critical of his conduct, he (Crabb) had to decide what course of action to take. Having provided Stevenson with a copy of the report—excluding an Australian opinion about responsibility for the collision—Crabb informed him that charges would be framed with a view to his court-martial. This was the reappearance of the traditional role of the court-martial as a means of preserving or restoring an officer’s reputation. The fact that this had been denied to Robertson had always been the chief cause of his unhappiness. Although the evidence could not really sustain the charge framed, namely that
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Stevenson failed to transmit to Evans a ‘positive direction to correct course after he had determined that the destroyer was on a collision course’, it was considered a means whereby the RAN could distance itself, positively, from the Subic Bay inquiry. There was some political opposition to the decision among those who did not understand the benefits of the court-martial. Liberal backbencher Tom Hughes, later Commonwealth Attorney-General, argued against a court-martial because he believed it would be ‘contrary to justice’ given the absence of an RAN inquiry that provided the basis for any charge to be laid. Most of the newspapers saw the court-martial as a travesty although the Australian was a little more charitable in its editorial: After the Voyager tragedy, Captain Robertson did not have the opportunity to clear his name in immediate court-martial proceedings . . . In Captain Stevenson’s case the lesson appeared to have been learned when the Navy initiated early court action.
At his court-martial, Stevenson pleaded ‘not guilty’ and submitted that he had no case to answer. This was accepted and the trial, which ran from 20–25 August 1969, acquitted him of both charges. However, Stevenson gained no pleasure from the outcome. He felt hurt that the court-martial had been thought necessary and believed the Naval Board had made him a scapegoat. From this point, the matter quickly developed into another controversy over personalities as Stevenson was appointed to a position he felt amounted to a demotion. Although he would later try to deny any prior knowledge of his next posting, Stevenson knew as early as 21 April 1969 that he would be posted ashore in December 1969. Three weeks after the collision, Stevenson was advised that his replacement in command of Melbourne would be Captain Geoffrey Gladstone and that he would be posted within the Sydney area. On 29 July, Vice Admiral Sir Victor Smith informed Stevenson that his next posting would be as Chief of Staff to FOICEA with effect from January 1970. On 21 October, Stevenson told Admiral Smith’s secretary that he could not accept the appointment as a matter of principle and intended to retire. The positions of Chief of Staff to FOCAF and FOICEA were formally raised to commodore status on 24 November 1969. When Stevenson’s request to retire was received in Navy Office, Smith offered him a number of shore and seagoing postings and a personal interview should he want to represent his views directly. Stevenson did not reply to this invitation. On 24 December the Naval Board refused Stevenson’s request to retire as the Navy could not
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satisfy the DFRB Board that his retirement met ‘the needs of the Service’ in accordance with the DFRB Act. Having decided to leave the Navy notwithstanding the effect this would have on his pension entitlements, Stevenson again submitted his resignation on 30 December 1969 and requested that it take effect on 3 April 1970. Two days later, the Board approved his application for leave and furlough and recommended to the Governor-General that his resignation be accepted. It was obvious that the Board had learned a great deal from the loss of Voyager and Robertson’s resignation. There was never any suggestion after the collision, the Joint Board of Inquiry or his court-martial, that Stevenson be removed from command. He was given an opportunity to clear his name through a court-martial and enjoyed the full confidence of the Naval Board. Whereas Robertson was kept at arm’s length, Stevenson was offered a number of alternative appointments from command of the Naval Air Station to command of the destroyer tender HMAS Stalwart. In fact, Smith offered him the latter appointment to highlight the confidence he had in Stevenson’s ability as a seagoing captain. But Smith was not prepared to grant what Stevenson really wanted, a posting to the Imperial Defence College in London. The clearest thing to emerge from the sinking of Evans was that Stevenson’s situation demonstrated serious problems in the Naval pension scheme, a situation that had not been addressed after Robertson’s resignation. The Navy’s refusal to allow officers voluntarily to retire and draw a pension after decades of service was criticised by Professor Tom Millar in an article published in the Canberra Times before Stevenson had actually left the Service. Millar argued that ‘no officer should be bound for service longer than 20 years’. It was with this in mind that John Jess headed a parliamentary committee to review the existing pension, superannuation and death entitlements for servicemen. It recommended that minimum pensionable service be reduced to 20 years and the odious requirement for officers to be retired ‘in the interests of the Service’ be removed. There was little in the Frank E. Evans case for Jess to use politically. Parliamentary and press interest in the story had subsided by 8 January 1970 when Stevenson relinquished command of the carrier and began his three months’ leave. In deciding to let Stevenson go the Naval Board had saved itself a great deal of turmoil and embarrassment. The loss of Frank E. Evans did not trigger renewed calls for another review of naval training and operations because it was abundantly clear that the collision was caused by the appalling incompetence of the American
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destroyer’s officers. Even the frequently merciless Australian press appeared to understand that all of the blame rested with the Americans. Compared to Voyager, the loss of Evans was almost a source of vindication for the RAN. The Naval Board had again been the subject of criticism but on this occasion there was some genuine sympathy for the Board from within the Government. Captain Stevenson forewent his pension, entered civilian employment and took no further action with respect to the collision or his subsequent treatment. Two major points emerged from the sinking of Frank E. Evans. The first was that aircraft carrier operations were especially dangerous and required special vigilance if collisions were to be averted. The second was that professional men should not always assume that their peers will be more understanding of their conduct than laymen. While the Navy greeted 1970 and a new decade without Voyager, there were some unable to move beyond 10 February 1964.
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15
IN THE WAKE There was nothing particularly remarkable about the ship’s company of HMAS Voyager when she sailed from Jervis Bay for the East Australia Naval Exercise Area on the morning of Monday 10 February 1964. By the end of that day, the lives of the 232 survivors had been irrevocably changed. Australian naval personnel serving in previous decades had endured the loss of their ship and their shipmates in wartime through enemy action, but very few had been involved in a fatal peacetime accident; none in one of this magnitude. It was without precedent or parallel. Naturally there was a great deal of sympathy for the survivors and bereaved next of kin. At its meeting on 18 February 1964, the Cabinet noted ‘the assurance of the Minister for the Navy that compensation, DFRB [Defence Force Retirement Benefits] and other payments in respect of the disaster were being settled expeditiously’. On 21 February, in answer to a question from Senator J.A. Cooke, the Minister stressed that all claims will be handled speedily and sympathetically. As all personnel on the Voyager were on duty for the purposes of the Act at the time of the collision, fully dependent next-of-kin will be virtually automatically entitled to the maximum payout under the [Commonwealth Employees’ Compensation] Act of £3000 plus £100 for each dependent child under 16 years. In the circumstances, there should be no necessity for persons to be represented at the Royal Commission inquiry for the purpose of establishing claims under the Act.
The first payment to a dependant of a deceased victim was made within three days of the collision. Most claims were finalised inside six weeks, with a total sum of £105 000 being paid. Problems began to arise when some of the uniformed survivors sought compensation for their personal effects, such as cameras and tape recorders, lost when Voyager sank. The Commonwealth decided to defer assessing these claims until
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its liability was determined. The Naval Board did not take any action on these matters until the contents of the Spicer Report had been made public. Then, on the first anniversary of the collision, the Board announced that ‘liability had now been accepted, and steps had been taken to assess the full extent of the claims, and to determine payments that would have to be made’. As the Deputy Crown Solicitor had been instructed to process the claims, the Board hoped that all outstanding applications would be finalised quickly. Cabinet had discussed compensation for uniformed survivors on 21 October 1964—Trafalgar Day. It seemed unfair that servicemen and civilians, and their families, should be dealt with differently although both sailors and dockyard workers were Commonwealth employees. Compensation for the relatives of peacetime military accident victims had already been under review for a number of years, but one of the problems to be overcome was the absence of legislation governing the liability of servicemen for acts committed against other servicemen. The Naval Board stated: ‘the practice is not to disallow any claims for this reason and this practice will continue’. The Commonwealth had tended to adopt a generous attitude towards claims and, in Voyager’s case, all the claims were treated as ‘exceptional’ although, until new legislation was passed, the Commonwealth would not admit liability and would deny liability when it believed that ‘the facts do not establish negligence’. Cabinet considered the matter again the following day and accepted the Attorney-General’s recommendations that: a) the Commonwealth does not deny the liability of the Commonwealth in respect of acts of servicemen in any action now current or which may arise out of the collision between Melbourne and Voyager; b) it endeavour to settle all Voyager actions on terms satisfactory to it; and, c) where such settlement cannot be effected it facilitates the assessment of damages by the Court but opposes any action for the grant of a jury in such cases.
Peter Howson recorded in his diary: ‘Problems of compensation for Voyager victims. We agreed not to press this in court; and to apply similarly to the “Red Sales” dependants. But to draft new legislation to cover cases in the future’. The only case for damages to be heard by the courts in 1964 was that brought by the widow of H.S. Parker, the dockyard technician killed in the collision. Mrs Evelyn Parker successfully sued the Commonwealth for
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negligence on 30 March 1965. The Commonwealth admitted liability. She received £11300 and her daughter £600. In a long judgment, Justice Windeyer made the point that although he accepted the right of a civilian to claim damages: Nevertheless I feel bound to say that, as I see the matter at present, the law does not enable a serving member of any of Her Majesty’s forces to recover damages from a fellow member because acts done by him in the course of his duty were negligently done. And if the negligent person is not himself liable, the Commonwealth in my opinion cannot be liable.
He added: The courts of England have for nearly 200 years said, and rightly in my opinion, that to allow a member of the forces to bring an action against another member for an act done in the course of duty would be destructive of morale, discipline and efficiency of the Service, and that for that reason the common law does not give a remedy even if the conduct complained of were malicious . . . The immunity of a member of the forces from action by a fellow member . . . arises from their common relationship to the Crown and from the special nature of their service. It is not that members have no duty to be careful. They have, for they are liable to punishment by court-martial for neglect of duty . . . But that a man may be punished for carelessness does not mean that he had a common law duty of care, neglect of which could give rise to a civil action for damages.
The Australian’s Special Defence Correspondent, Captain John Robertson, argued for the rights of dependants of the uniformed personnel lost in Voyager. It is necessary for these dependants, left with little or no support, to undertake expensive litigation in an endeavour to obtain the suitable compensation which should be available to them as a matter of normal administrative procedure: and it is surely an indictment of the administration that such procedures have not been established for use in peace even though the defect does not exist in time of war.
Cabinet considered payments to survivors exactly twelve months after it first dealt with the matter. The only progress was that ‘the Attorney General and the Defence and Service Departments were in the process of developing proposals for new legislation dealing with the Crown’s liability in cases of injury to servicemen’.
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While little progress was being made in the matter of compensation, signs were beginning to emerge that all was not well among those from Voyager who had the good fortune to survive. Within weeks of the collision, the Navy was confronted by growing concerns about the physical health and mental well-being of the Voyager survivors. On 18 May 1964 Admiral Harrington explained to all naval administrative authorities how he wanted the survivors to be treated. The following is the situation with regard to the Voyager survivors: 163 already returned to sea, 4 on draft to sea, 57 ashore. Some of these men could possibly suffer certain psychological upset consequent upon the loss of their ship. These effects may be difficult to detect or determine. Moreover, it is not possible to say when these effects may be expected to disappear. I have discussed this with the Second Naval Member and the Minister and we have decided that occasions could occur when it might be unwise to deal with these men by the conventional application of the regulations. Administrative authorities are therefore enjoined to be particularly careful in handling the affairs of these men and should there be any doubt as to the course of action which should be followed, immediate reference is to be made to the Naval Board indicating that the man is a Voyager survivor. This is not intended in any way to mean that these men are not always subject to all the ordinary rules and regulations appertaining to the conduct of naval affairs. Nevertheless it could occur that in a few cases there will be a mental trauma consequent upon the loss of HMAS Voyager and especially careful action will therefore be appropriate.
Two survivors had been treated already for what was described as neurosis and psychosis. Another was still to be medically examined. A further two survivors were awaiting discharge as permanently unfit for Naval service while nine were still not medical Category A owing to their injuries. Of all the ships and establishments to receive this communication, only the commanding officer of HMAS Sydney queried the Admiral’s instructions. In a signal to the Fleet Commander and the Naval Board, Captain Philip Stevenson stated: ‘In view of the number of psychiatric cases ex-Voyager, request psychological assessment of ex-Voyager ratings borne in Sydney may be undertaken prior to sailing’. Harrington made three notes on his copy: ‘i) Why Sydney’s only? ii) Induce psychotic symptoms, iii) Deal with as they arise’. His attitude was generally representative of the Naval Board: several of the admirals had served in ships
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that had been sunk during the Second World War; all had served with officers and men who had been in ships lost through enemy action. The Second Naval Member, Rear Admiral Victor Smith, had been ‘sunk’ twice. Harrington personally drafted a reply to Sydney’s signal. It is significant in illuminating the Naval Board’s estimation of the average Australian sailor then serving in the Fleet and the psychological impact of the collision. The Naval Board believe that the majority of sailors are sufficiently stable and temperamentally robust to be mentally unaffected by their experiences in HMAS Voyager, and therefore they may not wish to be subjected to psychological assessment. To treat all the survivors as potential psychiatric cases might well implant ideas of such disabilities in minds hitherto free of them and it is therefore not intended to carry out psychological assessment of survivors who are serving in HMAS Sydney, or elsewhere.
The Naval Board’s attitude toward the Voyager survivors was reminiscent of that often shown to those who fall from a horse or bicycle—the best thing to do was to pick yourself up and get back on again. In fact, the Board directed that as many of the survivors as possible be posted to seagoing ships. Although a small number remained ashore, most were sent to one of the remaining two Australian Daring Class destroyers (Vampire or Vendetta), or Voyager’s replacement, HMS Duchess. A small number went to HMAS Sydney and the frigate Quiberon. Many of the men sent to the Darings found they had been allocated the same mess and even the same bunk space they had occupied in Voyager, which made the collision doubly hard to forget, and was too much for some. Survivors were suffering nightmares and anxiety attacks. On 28 June 1964, the Navy Minister visited Sydney to ‘particularly discuss the reaction of ex-Voyager ratings. [He was] told of one shipwright who is under psychiatric investigation and two junior rates who have shown some signs of anxiety. [He] seemed primarily interested in whether cases were genuine or merely a means of avoiding service’. There were moments when compassion seemed incompatible with discipline. A number of survivors serving around the Fleet were charged with insubordination, striking superior officers, drunkenness on duty, unlawful abstention and desertion. Had the Navy kept statistics on the number of survivors being disciplined and the seriousness of the charges, it would have realised these men were not coping well. The additional stresses associated with deployments to South Vietnam after
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May 1965 led some survivors to discharge themselves from the Navy. They were simply unable face the prospect of their ship being attacked by an unseen enemy and possibly sinking. The naval community seemed surprisingly ill-prepared to help those traumatised by the collision, perhaps because it had happened in peacetime. There were few Voyager survivors still serving after Australian involvement in the Vietnam War ended in late 1972. While some showed no obvious or outward signs of anxiety, many could not cope with seagoing service and disappeared into the civilian community to get on with life as best they could. As some survivors continued to suffer depression and anxiety and Australian society generally became more litigious, those who could not recover from the trauma of the collision felt entitled to compensation and decided to approach the Commonwealth Government. Their biggest hurdle was the High Court’s ruling in 1965 that service personnel could not sue for damages, but more than six years had passed since the collision and the Commonwealth also could rely on various Statutes of Limitation to defend the claims. Put simply: it was now too late to start legal action. After the 1982 High Court decision in Groves v The Commonwealth and the Court’s observation that a legal defence based on the absence of a duty of care might not be good law, several Voyager survivors thought about taking action against the Commonwealth despite the obvious legal and administrative impediments. In a spirit of genuine compassion, on 21 November 1983 the Deputy Crown Solicitor advised the solicitors for retired Chief Coxswain ‘Blue’ Palmer (both orally and in writing) that the Commonwealth would not rely on the Limitations of Actions Act 1958 (Victoria) in defending Palmer’s claim nor would the Commonwealth argue that it did not have a duty of care. Palmer’s solicitors then wrote to the Department of Defence on behalf of former Leading Electrical Mechanic Bernard Verwayen and another four survivors, asking that the Commonwealth adopt a similar approach to the legal action they were intending to commence. The Commonwealth agreed. The Victorian Supreme Court awarded Palmer damages in the vicinity of $220 000 but, by the time Verwayen’s case came to court, the Commonwealth had had a change of heart. It decided to invoke the Statute of Limitation and deny the existence of a duty of care. It also argued that the Voyager survivors had not been injured nor had they suffered loss or damage as a result of the collision. Justice O’Bryan found that the Commonwealth did have a duty of care but that it had not waived its right to claim the Statute in its defence. He also
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accepted the argument that the collision had occurred during ‘combat action’. This meant that claims for damages could not succeed. A majority of the full bench of the Victorian Supreme Court upheld Verwayen’s appeal. In a 2–1 ruling, Justices Kaye and Marks said the Commonwealth was obliged to honour its original promise not to claim the statute and, in effect, to pay any damages assessed by the court. In their ruling, the judges said: ‘There can be little doubt . . . that the promise by the respondent [the Commonwealth] to admit the claim and not plead the Statute was made deliberately and with the knowledge and intention that [Verwayen] pursue his claim and have his damages assessed’. The ruling also noted that Voyager had not been engaged in military operations at the time of the collision but that it resulted from ‘sheer carelessness in the control and navigation of the two vessels or in one of them’. The Commonwealth appealed to the High Court, arguing that the court erred in its finding that Voyager had not been engaged in ‘activities of a purely military character, or in operations which could be described as training for battle’. It also claimed that the full court should have found that Verwayen was required to show that he had suffered material disadvantage as a result of the accident. The High Court published its decision in February 1990. In a 4–3 ruling, the Commonwealth’s appeal was dismissed. Justices Deane, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron dismissed the appeal; Chief Justice Mason and Justices Brennan and McHugh argued that paying Verwayen’s legal costs would remedy the ‘detriment’ he had suffered by the Commonwealth’s subsequent decision to claim the Statute in its defence. In his judgment, Justice Deane stated that the Commonwealth’s original stance had had the undoubted advantage that it avoided the public impression ‘of a mean-spirited and technical approach to those injured in the performance of their duties as members of their country’s defence forces’. Justice Dawson said the Commonwealth’s abrupt change of mind from its previous ‘humane’ approach, was a breach of the firm assurance it had deliberately given on a number of occasions. The absence of any attempt on the Commonwealth’s part to justify its actions, other than to say it was legally entitled to do so, led to the inevitable conclusion that in conscience it was unable to justify them. The Commonwealth was also ordered to pay Verwayen’s legal costs and to settle his claim. As Verwayen was a Queenslander, the Brisbane Courier Mail followed the case and commented on the High Court’s decision in an editorial on 7 September 1990. It was headed ‘Justice at Last’.
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The view that the Commonwealth has behaved with deplorable bureaucratic self-interest in the Voyager case would result in very little argument in the general community . . . The ruling means that the Commonwealth as the employer of people paid to defend the country cannot claim exemptions from civil compensation if they come to harm in the course of normal duties. This is an important precedent. It is also elementary justice.
When the Attorney-General, Michael Lavarch, announced in midFebruary 1992 that the Commonwealth would not continue to contest damages claims from any Voyager survivor, a settlement scheme was established to mediate all claims lodged by the end of 1995. This decision was made just one week after the release of my book, Where Fate Calls: The HMAS Voyager Tragedy, had generated a wave of media interest in the collision that appeared to reflect widespread community support for those seeking compensation. As a serving naval officer, I found myself in a difficult position. Some of my colleagues accused me of harming the Navy and its reputation by ‘hanging out its dirty laundry’ in public. Others felt it was high time that this rotting corpse in the Navy’s cupboard was taken down and buried. In explaining my motives for writing the book and defending my actions in speaking with the media about my conclusions, I pointed out that the Navy had supported the primary research for the doctoral dissertation on which the book was based. In fact, I commenced the project in mid-1989 while I was serving as the Research Officer to the Chief of Naval Staff, Vice Admiral Michael Hudson, and enjoyed his full personal support. I was fortunate to be granted complete access to Cabinet papers and all official naval documents, including the private documents held in the office of the Chief of Naval Staff. I also gained access to the private papers of Captains Robertson and Stevens. I conducted interviews with a number of key individuals including former Prime Ministers Sir John Gorton and Gough Whitlam, former Chief Justices Sir Garfield Barwick and Sir Nigel Bowen, and former senior naval officers including Admiral Sir Victor Smith and Vice Admiral Sir James Willis. The only two participants in the events described in this book who were unwilling to speak with me were Justice Barry O’Keefe, who had been Dr Tiller’s legal counsel in 1967, and Vice Admiral Sir Richard Peek. I also spoke at length with more than 50 members of Voyager’s surviving ship’s company and was privileged to meet and befriend many of them during a wreath-laying on board HMAS Swan on 10 February 1990 and afterwards at a public
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memorial service that was held in Voyager Memorial Park at Huskisson on the shores of Jervis Bay. But the trouble started when some of the senior staff at Navy Office learned that my dissertation was to be revised and published as a book and that this book—Where Fate Calls—was to serve as the basis for a ‘Four Corners’ documentary on ABC Television to be screened on the same day the book was launched (10 February 1992). There was further unease when the Navy learned that the now retired Admiral Hudson was going to launch it at the Defence Force Academy in Canberra. Channel Nine’s ‘A Current Affair’ had also decided to feature the book’s release in a major report on the collision and its aftermath with the Sydney Morning Herald’s ‘Good Weekend’ magazine securing serialisation rights. Several officers were worried about a renewed public controversy. Some voiced concerns that the book would assist the Voyager survivors in their claims for compensation; others feared that my remarks would offend serving or ex-serving personnel and their families. During an extended and at times acrimonious discussion of these matters, I submitted my resignation from the Navy. I was unwilling to accept some of the directions I had been given, principally the termination of a contract to publish Where Fate Calls, and felt unable to remain in the Navy in such circumstances. For a week I assumed my naval career was over although my resignation had yet to be accepted by the Chief of Naval Staff. I was then summoned to Navy Office and instructed to withdraw my resignation. I was told to submit the manuscript for Where Fate Calls to the Director of Naval Legal Services for ‘assessment’. While I was not directed to make any specific changes to the text, I was advised that the Navy would distance itself from me as the book’s author and would not support the book or its conclusions at the time of its publication. These were conditions I could live with. After all, I was committed to producing an independent and critical account of the whole affair. As many had predicted, the publication of Where Fate Calls and the enormous media attention it attracted appeared to influence the prevailing political climate and assist the claims of the Voyager survivors, although the Attorney-General’s change of heart was completely unexpected. I was not, however, pleased with some aspects of the book’s treatment at the hands of the newspapers. Two reports in particular troubled me greatly. The first appeared in the Brisbane Courier Mail and broke an embargo on reproducing material from the book when it decided to lead with sensational claims about Captain Stevens’ ‘drug abuse’. Its principal
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target, however, was Don Chipp, whom it accused of orchestrating an official cover-up. This was neither suggested nor implied in my book. I was anxious to avoid such claims because Chipp had earlier warned me of his readiness to take legal action should certain inferences be made. I was unimpressed by the newspaper’s decision to ignore the embargo and disappointed with its shallow treatment of the subject matter. The second troubling report was in the Sydney Morning Herald. It featured the book’s release and carried the front-page headline ‘How Sir David Martin covered for his mates’. The thrust of the story was that Rear Admiral Sir David Martin, who had served in Voyager during 1963 and had recently died while Governor of New South Wales from an asbestosrelated illness contracted during his naval career, had confessed to perjuring himself at the second Royal Commission during an interview I conducted with him just before his death in July 1991. This was neither a fair nor accurate report of either Sir David’s comments or my depiction of them and I was saddened by the hurt this caused the Martin family. Despite my best efforts, there were, of course, some errors and omissions in Where Fate Calls. The publishers and I were chastised vigorously for the lack of an index. An index had been prepared but had to be shelved when fears of legal action led to 27 separate passages of the book being deleted or amended a few days before it was to be printed. The resulting pagination changes made the index obsolete and there simply was not enough time to produce a replacement. My explanation of the collision was also challenged. Some of my colleagues, together with several serving and retired naval officers, identified what they believed were inaccuracies in the narrative or inconsistencies in my argument. I expected this to happen and was pleased with the debate that followed. There were other positive outcomes from the book’s publication and some valuable new information came to hand. This book is the beneficiary of these comments and criticism, and a number of amendments and additions. By 1995 I felt my personal involvement with Voyager was over. I had resigned from the Navy at the end of 1992 to continue the private theological studies I had commenced in the 1980s which led to my ordination to the priesthood in the Anglican Church. There did not seem to me to be much more that could (or should) be said or done about the collision or its consequences. When I was asked to conduct the thirtieth anniversary service for the Voyager survivors at Jervis Bay in February 1994, I decided this event would definitely mark the end of my connection with the tragedy. This decision was a little premature.
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In late February 1996, I was contacted by Andrew Smith, a reporter at the Fremantle Herald, seeking information about Dr Michael Tiller’s role in the second Royal Commission. I was surprised to receive his call as it was well after the anniversary of the ship’s loss. Smith was most interested in Dr Tiller’s inability to recall details of events that took place on board Voyager during 1963 and his admission that by 1967 he was unable to remember anything of some of the incidents Cabban described in his Statement. At the end of our conversation I learned the reason for Smith’s interest in this aspect of the inquiry. As the endorsed Liberal Party candidate for the Federal seat of Fremantle, Dr Tiller had publicly criticised Dr Carmen Lawrence, the sitting Labor member, for her inability to remember particular conversations and to recall the contents of certain meetings that were of interest to a Royal Commission that had recently been held into the death by suicide of a Perth woman, Penny Easton. I then telephoned Dr Tiller and offered my personal apologies, explaining that I had not intended to influence his campaign or the election outcome. In any event, Dr Lawrence retained her seat with a comfortable margin. It would appear that the ripples caused by the collision had not yet dissipated. By the mid-1990s, the government had made considerable progress in settling Voyager claims and appears not to have expected similar action to be mounted by those serving in Melbourne at the time of the collision. (Claims relating to personnel who were serving in Melbourne had been initiated in the 1980s, with several such cases mistakenly being dealt with under the Voyager settlement scheme.) The government was wrong. Although their ship had not been sunk and they had not been physically injured or spent time in the water waiting to be rescued, some of those serving in Melbourne on 10 February 1964 were apparently suffering psychologically. In the period between the collision and the publication of the Spicer Report on 26 August 1964, many serving in Melbourne claimed to have been shunned by other naval personnel and vilified by the civilian community for ‘causing’ the loss of Voyager. Some even claimed to have been assaulted because their cap tally-bands bore the carrier’s name. Melbourne was allegedly referred to as the ‘killer ship’. One member of the ship’s company later said he ‘felt saddened, depressed, ashamed and guilty’ by the treatment he received. The prevailing mood within the Navy and across the nation towards Melbourne’s personnel was apparently not improved when the Spicer Report criticised Robertson, Kelly and Bate for not acting earlier to prevent the disaster. As has been shown, the second inquiry held in 1967
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overturned these criticisms and, in any event, no-one on board Melbourne was ever blamed for the loss of Voyager or the 82 men who perished with her. Nonetheless, according to several would-be plaintiffs, the ‘injury’ suffered by those serving in Melbourne had already been inflicted and purportedly went deep into their souls. At no time during the 1960s did the Navy have any reason to consider an examination of the collision’s effect on Melbourne’s personnel or to believe that officers and sailors serving in the carrier might have been adversely affected by the collision or that they were (or might have been) rendered unfit for future sea-going service. Indeed, no evidence was ever brought to the Board’s attention that anyone serving in Melbourne could have been affected psychologically in any way by the collision or its aftermath. As no-one serving in Melbourne claimed to have suffered psychologically as a result of the collision, a formal statement on the nature of any injuries suffered by Melbourne’s crew was never offered because it was never needed. But those who served in the carrier were about to argue that they had suffered and now they wanted compensation. In 1996, former sailor William McLean claimed his experience in Melbourne on the night of the collision had caused him to suffer Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). This was to become the essence of all subsequent claims. The Australian Centre for Post-traumatic Mental Health describes PTSD as ‘a serious psychological reaction that develops in some people following experience of overwhelmingly frightening or traumatic events . . . especially those which threaten life and those of human design’. The American Psychiatric Association defines the diagnostic criteria for the disorder as exposure to an event in which ‘the person experienced, witnessed, or was confronted with an event or events that involved actual or threatened death or serious injury, or a threat to the physical integrity of self or others’ and where ‘the person’s response involved intense fear, helplessness or horror’. The traumatic event is re-experienced in: recurrent and intrusive distressing recollections of the event, including images, thoughts and perceptions; recurrent distressing dreams of the event, acting or feeling as if the traumatic event were recurring; intense psychological distress at exposure to internal or external clues that symbolize or resemble an aspect of the traumatic event; psychological reactivity on exposure to internal or external clues that symbolize or resemble an aspect of the traumatic event.
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Those diagnosed with the condition are said to avoid anything that reminds them of the traumatic event, to detach themselves from everyday living and from human contact and intimacy, and to be disinterested in life. PTSD is believed to manifest itself in sleeping disorders, irritability and outbursts of anger, difficulty in concentrating, hypervigilance and an exaggerated startle response. Over the last fifteen years it has become the common label for conditions previously known separately as shell shock, battle fatigue, accident neurosis and rape trauma. It is said to affect people of any age, culture or gender. McLean claimed that PTSD caused him to drink excessively and to smoke heavily. By the time he launched legal proceedings against the Commonwealth, he was suffering from terminal throat cancer. In a case that generated substantial media interest, McLean said to journalists outside the New South Wales Supreme Court: ‘Take a good look . . . this is what they’ve done to me. They’ve devastated me and my family’. In August 1996, a jury awarded McLean damages and interest totalling $1.7 million. After the trial, McLean said: ‘It’s been Voyager, Voyager, Voyager. What about the Melbourne crew? Same navy, same night, same collision. Why are they segregating us? Answer that’. There are plenty of answers that could have been offered to highlight the very different experiences of the two ships’ companies. The Commonwealth successfully appealed on the grounds that it should have been allowed by the judge to argue during the trial that McLean had contributed to his injuries by ignoring warnings about his over-consumption of alcohol and addiction to cigarettes. The New South Wales Court of Appeal agreed that Justice Harold Sperling had made a number of errors and a new trial was ordered. Although McLean’s recollections of what he allegedly observed after the collision were not consistent with what actually occurred or indeed could have been observed from where he was in Melbourne at the time of the collision, they were allowed to stand. The Commonwealth remained defiant. The Defence Minister, Ian McLachlan, issued a press release on 5 February 1998: The Government continues to believe that the circumstances of the HMAS Melbourne crew were not sufficiently exceptional to warrant the establishment of a settlement scheme for their claims. In particular, unlike crew members of the HMAS Voyager which sank as a result of the collision, HMAS Melbourne crew members suffered no physical injury or death. We note that this view was also shared by the previous government.
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The Commonwealth would contest every new ‘Melbourne claim’ vigorously. On 14 May 1998, another former sailor, Barry Blunden, initiated an action in the ACT Supreme Court to override the Statue of Limitations in order to bring a case before the court for damages sustained as result of serving in Melbourne at the time of the collision. He claimed to have suffered PTSD, a depressive disorder and other psychological injuries. Blunden’s action was unsuccessful. He then successfully appealed to the full court of the Federal Court. The Commonwealth appealed to the High Court. The Commonwealth argued that any legal action had to be brought in the ACT which, it asserted, was the ‘seat’ of the Naval Board, rather than in the legal jurisdiction where the plaintiff’s claim would have the greatest chance of success and attract the largest damages pay-out. In December 2003, the High Court ruled that Blunden should take action in the ACT and that ACT law applied. It also ruled that actions could be brought in any jurisdiction because for more than a century the Federal Government had failed to clarify where legal action against the Commonwealth, and the Naval Board in particular, could be lodged. This obliged Blunden to return to the ACT Supreme Court to seek an extension. At the time of writing, the Commonwealth had filed a special leave application in the High Court, appealing the appeal upheld by the full court of the Federal Court. In 1999 I gave evidence as a naval historian and expert witness in the Victorian Supreme Court for ex-Ordinary Seaman Robin Russell. During and after the collision, Russell was stationed as a lookout on Melbourne’s starboard bridge wing. Russell claimed the events of that night had caused him to suffer PTSD. On 12 November 1999, Justice Cummins in the Victorian Supreme Court found that the ‘negligence of the defendant [the Commonwealth Government] directly caused the plaintiff to suffer PTSD, with secondary alcohol abuse’. The collision and the subsequent Royal Commission has ‘caused the plaintiff to abandon his long held ambition of life in the Navy and caused the plaintiff substantial private pain and grief over decades’. Justice Cummins awarded Russell damages of $633 000 (including pre-judgment interest) in addition to costs, and hoped that ‘at last having faced his ghosts, the plaintiff now is on the road to recovery’. This was the first and only case in which I appeared in person and gave evidence. I have refused all subsequent requests to appear in trials or to assist with any claim against the Commonwealth. My reasons are many and varied. Foremost is my belief that those bringing the actions would be hindered as much as
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helped by court proceedings. I have also destroyed all of the papers relating to the collision remaining in my possession so I cannot be compelled to provide documents or to give evidence in any future trial. At the time of writing (February 2004), those on board Melbourne at the time of the collision had lodged 202 claims: 60 had been concluded by negotiation; 8 were upheld by the courts and 9 were dismissed. The remainder have yet to be settled. In addition to the members of Melbourne’s ship’s company, naval personnel who were in neither ship at the time of the collision have also made claims in a number of jurisdictions with respect to the collision. Only two of these need be mentioned here. A former junior sailor serving in the minesweeper HMAS Hawk at the time of the collision initiated proceedings before the Administrative Appeals Tribunal in March 2000. He claimed that when Hawk arrived at the site of the collision, ‘he dived in and pulled bodies out of the sea’ including that of Captain Stevens. While the stern section was afloat, ‘he could still hear people crying out for help’. He claimed none of those ‘crying out got rescued’ before the ship sank. This statement of claim was inaccurate in a number of places. One of the three bodies recovered from the sea was retrieved by personnel from Hawk, but the minesweeper’s ‘Report of Proceedings’ does not include any reference to sailors diving into the water to recover Captain Stevens’ body. And as I explained in Chapter 1, no-one was trapped in the after section of Voyager following the collision and the ship was abandoned within an hour of impact. This was well before Hawk arrived in the area. It was simply not possible for the plaintiff to have heard any screams or cries for help. His claim was rejected. The second claim was striking in that the claimant was not even at sea on the night of the collision. In an affidavit sworn in May 2000, the plaintiff (a former Leading Mechanical Engineer) said he transferred from Voyager to Vampire at the end of 1963 although he claimed to have been in Melbourne at the time of the collision. It was subsequently shown that he was actually ashore recuperating after a motor vehicle accident near Camden, west of Sydney, and was informed of the collision by his wife the following day. He also claimed that he was on board Vampire when the ship conducted a burial at sea for Able Seaman Parker whose body was one of the three recovered after the collision. The plaintiff claimed that his involvement in the Voyager tragedy had caused him to become an alcoholic. When he saw a psychiatrist in 1997, he learned for the first time that he was suffering from PTSD and that it was derived from his experiences in 1964. His claim was also rejected.
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As someone familiar with the collision’s aftermath and acquainted with the legal proceedings it has prompted, I would offer five general observations. First, naval service is frequently arduous and confronting, especially in wartime, and those who serve must accept the possibility of distress and hardship as an inherent component of uniformed life. It is for this reason that naval personnel receive medals, decorations and public respect; that they are entitled to medical care at public expense; and enjoy conditions of service not extended to civilian public servants. This acceptance includes accidents and misadventure during training and exercises. The loss of Voyager, although it could have been avoided, is an instance of the risks and hazards associated with preparing warships for combat. While the Government is obliged to ensure that naval personnel are not subjected to unnecessary risk and to minimise any long-term ill-effects from seagoing service, every officer and sailor has, by virtue of their initial decision to join the Navy and their continuing willingness to draw their pay, tacitly agreed to place themselves in harm’s way and to face personal danger. As service in the RAN has never been compulsory (in contrast to the Army), those individuals who are unable or unwilling to accept these conditions and their consequences ought not to join the Navy. Were it to be otherwise, one wonders whether the Commonwealth could afford to maintain and operate a Defence Force. As claims for compensation arising from uniformed service are rapidly escalating, there is a real need for urgent legislative reform to shield the Commonwealth from unreasonable liability. Second, as PTSD is a scientifically contested condition, its diagnosis among the majority of Voyager survivors might not be altogether helpful and could be yet another example of the medicalisation of a social problem. There is a continuing debate among psychiatrists and psychologists about whether or not the condition actually exists as a discrete clinical state, what causes and perpetuates the condition, what behaviours manifest its existence and how it might be treated in both the short and long term. In an article published in the British Medical Journal in 2001, Dr Derek Summerfield, Honorary Senior Lecturer at the United Kingdom’s Institute of Psychiatry, argued that ‘the story of PTSD is a telling example of the role of society and politics in the process of invention rather than discovery’. Summerfield claimed that PTSD was invented by opponents of American involvement in the Vietnam War who were ‘angry that military psychiatry was being used to serve the interests of the military rather than those of soldier-patients’. He
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concluded that a diagnosis of PTSD ‘legitimised their “victimhood”; gave them moral exculpation; and guaranteed them a disability pension because the diagnosis could be attested to by a doctor’. What is worse, PTSD has ‘become the means by which people seek victim status—and its associated moral high ground—in pursuit of recognition and compensation’. An editorial in the American Journal of Psychiatry said that PTSD was practically the only psychiatric diagnosis that people liked to have. The single greatest objection to PTSD is proving a causal link between past involvement in some traumatic event and present behaviour or emotions that adequately excludes any other possible factors, and then establishing the extent of the causation in the light of these other factors. There is no doubt in my mind that many of those who served in Voyager were adversely and seriously affected by the collision, but this is some way from blaming the collision or its aftermath for every misfortune and anxiety or instance of aberrant behaviour among those serving in either ship, or any other RAN unit at that time. Third, how close did an individual need to have been to the collision before PTSD could be reasonably attributed to the events of 10 February 1964? Had the courts upheld the claims for damages from personnel who were in neither ship, there might have been grounds for every member of the ship’s company of every RAN unit and aircraft involved in the rescue to seek compensation, and for those who knew someone on board Voyager or who subsequently cared for a survivor to claim damages. As Melbourne continued to conduct flying operations until 1982 and the duties of planeguard destroyer were performed by most RAN destroyers and frigates, one presumes that those officers and sailors serving in Melbourne and other major fleet units in the years immediately after the collision might have felt justified in seeking compensation given the possibility that the collision might have made them anxious. As someone familiar with the collision, and a taxpayer, I am concerned at the number of highly speculative claims arising from the collision and the potential for every person who served in the Navy between 1964 and 1969 (when Melbourne collided with Frank E. Evans) to claim damages from the public purse. There needs to be a more precise definition of PTSD in relation to an incident such as the loss of Voyager (perhaps following continuing research into its causes and symptoms), and conditions placed on the occasions in which it can be cited as the basis for a damages claim. Fourth, over the last fifteen years I have watched those who have ‘fought’ the Commonwealth for compensation become steadily
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embittered with the Government for ‘opposing’ their claims and hostile to the Navy because of the way in which they were treated after the collision. Many do not realise that it is right and proper for the Government to contest all claims being made on the public purse. After all, the Government has a responsibility to spend taxpayers’ money wisely and in accordance with the law. Some of the actions arising from the collision have relied on statements of claim that have been shown to be either inaccurate or misleading. By way of example, one of Voyager’s junior sailors was injured on the Saturday night prior to the collision and transferred to Melbourne for medical attention. He was in the sickbay on board the carrier at the time of the collision although he would later claim that he was in Voyager and was pulled from the water. Although the Commonwealth agreed to an out-ofcourt settlement, because the plaintiff was found to have been in Melbourne at the time of the collision, the amount he received was a fraction of the damages that would have been awarded had he indeed been in Voyager. As for the Navy’s treatment of the survivors, some have failed to realise that their grievance is really against individuals rather than the institution. Those who led the Navy and served at sea and ashore during 1964 and thereafter are responsible for their own actions and any deleterious effect their conduct may have had on the Voyager survivors. In many ways, they were creatures of their time and most did what they thought was right. Time has proved that they erred. These individuals—from senior officers down to junior shipmates—failed in their duty of care. As an institution, I believe the Navy has made every effort over the last fifteen years to extend a hand of friendship and compassion to those who served in Voyager. The commanding officer of the RAN College, Captain Tony Aldred, and the staff at Jervis Bay offered a generous welcome to the survivors when they gathered for a commemorative service to mark the fortieth anniversary of the tragedy in February 2004. The Navy Systems Commander, Commodore Russ Crane CSM, represented the Chief of Navy and made plain the Navy’s esteem for those who survived the collision. I was privileged to participate and to offer a final reflection, in which it seemed important to remind those attending that bitterness is not a helpful state of mind. It is a fertile field in which hate grows. Sadly, the person who hates is usually harmed more than the person who is hated. Fifth, and finally, there are those within the legal profession and among the ex-service community who have portrayed financial
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compensation as a panacea for every stress and strain suffered by those involved in the collision. While there have been cases in which compensation has been awarded to survivors and payments made by the Commonwealth to fund continuing counselling, money cannot heal the wounds of survivors and it is fanciful—if not insulting—to suggest that it can. I have heard survivors claim their lives would be restored to them and their sufferings vindicated by the award of damages. That they are victims of an awful accident is not disputed; that they are survivors of a terrible tragedy must be affirmed. But there have been a number of Voyager survivors whose sufferings have been made worse by their squandering the very large amounts of money awarded them by the courts as compensation. Much greater than money is the need for the survivors to be valued and esteemed as men who have faced death and lived to see a new day. They are also in need of the grace to forgive those who harmed and wronged them, and the courage to forgive those they might have inadvertently hurt or injured as they struggled to be understood. Healing or wholeness can never come from legal action or money. To suggest that the Voyager survivors’ need for recognition and redemption can be quantified in an amount of money in a damages claim is to trivialise their experiences and cheapen human living—both theirs and ours. I continue to believe that neither the adversarial legal process nor the money gained by the survivors will meet the deepest needs of those whose lives were devasted by the events of 10 February 1964. The loss of Voyager changed the Navy in many ways. It was a powerful reminder that preparing ships and training people for operational service at sea demands competence and diligence. Working-up a destroyer for battle bears no resemblance to the English novelist Kenneth Grahame’s great love for ‘messing about in boats’. Practising high-speed manoeuvres at close quarters leaves little or no margin for error. That being said, the tragic truth is that collisions at sea have occurred in all the major navies and have caused death and destruction. Of course, the loss of Voyager could, and should, have been avoided but human beings, capable of error, make mistakes. The Voyager tragedy reinforced the continuing importance of naval education and sea training. When standards slip at initial entry training establishments such as HMAS Creswell or HMAS Cerberus; when officers or sailors think that no-one is watching or, much worse, that no-one cares about what they do; and when professionalism and expertise no longer matter, then mistakes will be made and people will be hurt.
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Those serving today in the Royal Australian Navy as trainers or as trainees can, in part, redeem the loss of Voyager and the 82 men who perished with her from being an utter waste if, and only if, they draw from the lessons to be learned from 10 February 1964 and insist that what is difficult need not become dangerous. After more than 40 years, this is Voyager’s cruel but crucial legacy.
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NOTES Chapter 1 ‘I was totally disoriented . . .’ (p. 3) Personal communication from A.J. Milliner to author, 17 July 1991. ‘Have been in collision . . .’ (p. 5) Signal Date-Time-Group (hereafter DTG) 101100Z Feb 64 from Melbourne to the Flag Officer in Charge East Australian Area (FOICEA). The first two numbers denote the day of the month; the next four Greenwich Mean Time (GMT) or Z time (International Time Zone ‘Zulu’) by the 24-hour clock and refer to the time the signal was electronically transmitted. ‘At 2114, the Damage Control . . .’ (p. 5) Interview with Commander G. Halley, 21 December 1989. ‘Voyager has lost her bows . . .’ (p. 5) Signal DTG 101114Z Feb 64 from Melbourne to FOICEA, info Australian Commonwealth Naval Board (ACNB), Flag Officer Commanding the Australian Fleet (FOCAF), Naval Officer in Charge—Jervis Bay (NOICJB), Naval Air Station (NAS) Nowra. ‘Voyager has settled . . .’ (p. 5) Signal DTG 101140Z Feb 64 from Melbourne to addressees as per previous signal. ‘The first signal from shore . . .’ (p. 6) Signal DTG 101158Z Feb 64 from FOICEA to Melbourne, info ACNB, NOICJB, NAS Nowra, 16 M[inesweeping] S[quadron]. ‘Proceed at best available speed . . .’ (p. 6) Signal DTG 101214Z Feb 64 from FOICEA to Kimbla, info addressees as per previous signal. ‘Realising he had yet to report . . .’ (p. 6) The absence of a damage report from Melbourne prompted FOICEA to ask, in signal DTG 101236Z Feb 64, ‘What is condition Melbourne?’. ‘Number One and Two . . .’ (pp. 6–7) Signal DTG 101216Z Feb 64 from Melbourne to ACNB, info FOICEA. ‘At 2300, Robertson was informed . . .’ (p. 7) Admiral Becher’s movements are detailed in signal DTG 101300Z Feb 64 from FOCAF to Melbourne. ‘Voyager is floating stern . . .’ (p. 7) Signal DTG 101355Z Feb 64 from Melbourne to ACNB, info FOICEA. ‘Voyager has sunk . . .’ (p. 7) Signal DTG 101418Z from Melbourne to ACNB, info FOCAF and FOICEA.
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Chapter 2 ‘A check had been made . . .’ (p. 9) Interview with Captain J.M. Kelly, 9 May 1991. ‘This light was being trained . . .’ (p. 9) Interview with Commodore T.A. Dadswell, 21 April 1991. ‘At 2200, the head of the Canberra bureau . . .’ (p. 15) Interview with J. Farquharson, 1 February 1989. ‘Earlier in the evening . . .’ (p. 16) Record of a conversation between R. Hyslop and A. Eggleton, 1988, p. 12. ‘At 2330, he issued a brief statement . . .’ (p. 16) The text of this press statement was provided to all naval area commanders by signal DTG 101515Z Feb 64 from ACNB. ‘a brief outline of the events . . .’ (pp. 16–17) Signal DTG 101356Z Feb 64 from Melbourne to ACNB, FOICEA and FOCAF. ‘Her arrival in Sydney . . .’ (p. 17) Melbourne’s intentions were conveyed by signal DTG 101900Z Feb 64 to FOICEA, info ACNB, NAS Nowra and NOICJB. ‘Becher sent a signal . . .’ (p. 17) Signal DTG 110110Z Feb 64 from FOCAF to ACNB. ‘A private letter to Harrington . . .’ (pp. 17–18) Letter from Rear Admiral Becher to Chief of Naval Staff (CNS) dated ‘Tuesday morning at sea’. Original contained in unnumbered Navy file, ‘Loss of HMAS Voyager’. ‘At 0650 Stuart had found . . .’ (p. 18) Signal DTG 102050Z Feb 64 from Stuart to FOICEA, info ACNB, NAS Nowra, FOCAF and Melbourne. ‘She reported to Rear Admiral . . .’ (p. 18) Signal DTG 102350 from Stuart to addressees as per previous signal. ‘By 1440, Stuart had reported . . .’ (p. 18) Signal DTG 102050Z Feb 64 from Stuart to FOICEA and ACNB dated 11 February 1964. ‘At 1800, Stuart ended her search . . .’ (p. 18) Signal DTG 110635Z Feb 64 from FOICEA to Stuart, NAS Nowra and NOICJB, info ACNB, FOCAF and Melbourne. ‘A final sweep . . .’ (p. 18) Signal from ACNB to FOICEA dated 12 February 1964 confirmed in signal from FOICEA to ACNB and FOCAF dated 13 February. ‘On Thursday and Friday . . .’ (p. 18) Signal DTG 121055Z Feb 64 from ACNB to FOICEA, info FOCAF, 16MS, NAS Nowra. ‘Four weeks later . . .’ (p. 18) Signal DTG 160734Z Mar 64 from ACNB to FOICEA refers. ‘On Wednesday the Naval Board . . .’ (p. 18) Signal DTG 110133Z Feb 64 from ACNB to all ships and shore establishments. ‘On the same day . . .’ (p. 18) Signal DTG 110419Z Feb 64 from ACNB to FOCAF and NAS Nowra, info FOICEA and Melbourne. ‘It was a brief document . . .’ (p. 18) Melbourne letter No. 01–13 dated 11 February 1964.
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‘Although I was not aware of it . . .’ (p. 19) Official letter from CO, HMAS Melbourne to FOCAF dated 11 February 1964. (Original copy in Robertson papers.) ‘Voyager’s missing . . .’ (p. 19) Secretary of the Department of Navy (hereafter SecNav) minute dated 14 February 1964 to Naval Board members and signal DTG 140452Z Feb 64 from ACNB to FOCAF, FOICEA, Naval Area Commanders and the Admiralty (London). ‘They wrote to Becher . . .’ (p. 19) Letter from R.W. Cook to FOCAF dated 28 February 1965. Copy contained in unnumbered Navy file, ‘Loss of HMAS Voyager’. ‘The Navy tried to accommodate . . .’ (pp. 19–20) Signal DTG 102300Z Feb 64 from FOCAF to ACNB, info FOICEA, Melbourne, Watson, Penguin, NAS Nowra, Creswell and Sydney. ‘Each man was immediately . . .’ (p. 20) Signal DTG 130714Z Feb 64 from ACNB to FOICEA, Melbourne and Watson refers. ‘It was also unusual . . .’ (p. 20) ‘Report on the treatment of survivors of ExHMAS Voyager’, Appendix D. Enclosure to minute prepared by Director of Personnel Services and Head of ‘P’ Branch for Second Naval Member (hereafter 2NM), dated 22 February 1964. Copy contained in unnumbered CNS branch file ‘HMAS Voyager Royal Commission’. ‘Early estimates suggested . . .’ (p. 20) Signal DTG 210603Z Feb 64 from FOICEA to ACNB. ‘As Melbourne was an important . . .’ (p. 21) Signal DTG 130736Z Feb 64 from ACNB to FOICEA refers. ‘The cost of refitting . . .’ (p. 21) Cabinet submission on a replacement for Voyager dated 22 February 1964. ‘The British offer . . .’ (p. 21) Cabinet minute dated 24 February 1964 (Decision No. 58). ‘Harrington sent a short . . .’ (p. 21) Signal from Naval Board to Admiralty (London) dated 26 February 1964. ‘A Navy press release . . .’ (p. 21) Navy Press release 588/81 dated 23 June 1964.
Chapter 3 ‘In a leading story . . .’ (p. 23) Daily Mirror, 26 August 1964. ‘Killen recounts the legend . . .’ (p. 23) In Sir James Killen, Inside Australian Politics, Methuen, Sydney, 1985, p. 82. ‘But Sir Garfield Barwick recalled . . .’ (p. 23) Interview with Sir Garfield Barwick, 21 September 1989. ‘Menzies discussed possible courses . . .’ (p. 24) Interview with Sir Garfield Barwick. ‘The minutes of this meeting record . . .’ (p. 24) Minute of ACNB meeting 10/1964 dated 11 February 1964. See Navy Office file 1288/201/12. ‘Nine men lost their lives . . .’ (p. 25) Letter from Assistant Parliamentary
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Draftsman to SecNav 50/455 dated 15 February 1950. Navy Office file 584/201/881. ‘Menzies ordered the necessary . . .’ (p. 25) This detail is recorded in the CNS branch file ‘HMAS Tarakan’ in a file note prepared by the Naval Registrar, Ira Menear, dated 14 February 1964. ‘The Second Naval Member . . .’ (p. 25) Comment on the ‘Regulations to provide for a naval court of inquiry’ by 2NM dated 17 February 1950, p. 1. Penscript reads ‘Concurred by First Naval Member [hereafter 1NM]’. ‘When Voyager was lost . . .’ (p. 26) This is confirmed by Menear in his file note cited above. ‘It is a shocking disaster . . .’ (p. 26) Prime Ministerial Press Statement No. 10/1964 dated 11 February 1964. ‘Robertson would later comment . . .’ (p. 26) Comments by Captain Robertson dated 23 May 1965 on draft Chapter 6 of Harold Hickling’s One Moment in Time, Reed, Auckland (Robertson Papers). ‘The Prime Minister found himself . . .’ (p. 27) Prime Ministerial Press Statement No. 12/1964, ‘Naval Disaster’, dated 13 February 1964. ‘In a formal statement . . .’ (p. 27) Prime Ministerial Press Statement No. 13/1964, ‘Royal Commission on Naval Disaster’, dated 13 February 1964. ‘The Royal Commission was directed . . .’ (p. 27) Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates (hereafter CPD)—House of Representatives (hereafter Reps), 25 February 1964, p. 30. ‘Whatever the Navy had found . . .’ (p. 27) Interview with Sir John Gorton, 2 August 1990. ‘A barrister who was to play . . .’ (p. 28) Personal communication from Justice Ian Sheppard to author, 24 August 1990. ‘Any other course . . .’ (p. 28) CPD (Reps), 25 February 1964, p. 30. ‘Robertson would later claim . . .’ (p. 28) Comments by Captain Robertson on draft Chapter 6 of One Minute of Time, undated but probably written in May 1965 (Robertson papers). ‘The Deputy Crown Solicitor . . .’ (pp. 29–30) Deputy Crown Solicitor (hereafter DCS) to FOCAF (undated). ‘The Naval Board was very willing . . .’ (p. 30) SecNav to DCS (undated), Navy file 1288/201/13. ‘During the war he was decorated . . .’ (p. 32) Interviews with Commander the Hon. F.M. Osborne, 18 July 1989 and 29 August 1990; Who’s Who in Australia, Herald & Weekly Times, Melbourne, 1988. ‘Gregory saw their role . . .’ (p. 32) Interview with W.H. Gregory QC, 18 July 1989. ‘The only advice . . .’ (p. 33) Interview with Commander J.A. Bate, 23 November 1989.
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Chapter 4 ‘Smyth then alluded to . . .’ (p. 35) Smyth’s opening address covers 32 pages of transcript. Royal Commission (hereafter RC) transcript, Day 2, pp. 10–42. ‘His strongest statement was . . .’ (p. 36) RC transcript, Day 2, pp. 77–8 ‘The most valuable point . . .’ (p. 36) RC transcript, Day 2, p. 47. ‘To add to the controversy . . .’ (p. 37) RC transcript, Day 3, p. 110. ‘Intervention would include . . .’ (p. 37) Ibid. ‘Becher was on Melbourne’s bridge . . .’ (p. 37) An incident described by Robertson in his private notes (Robertson papers). ‘Although Everett had . . .’ (p. 38) RC transcript, Day 4, p. 269. ‘Barker had been . . .’ (p. 38) This part of Barker’s evidence is covered in RC transcript, Day 6, pp. 305–7. ‘When asked by Smyth . . .’ (p. 38) RC transcript, Day 6, p. 307. ‘Jenkyn pointed out . . .’ (p. 38) RC transcript, Day 6, p. 310. ‘Street took him through . . .’ (p. 39) RC transcript, Day 6, pp. 321–6. ‘Barker replied . . .’ (p. 39) RC transcript, Day 6, p. 333. ‘There were two reasons for this . . .’ (p. 39) RC transcript, Day 6, p. 311. ‘In subsequent testimony . . .’ (p. 39) RC transcript, Day 24, p. 1779. ‘Barker’s agitation showed . . .’ (p. 39) RC transcript, Day 6, p. 368. ‘Melbourne’s OOW, Alex Bate, . . .’ (p. 40) RC transcript, Day 7, p. 384. ‘Bate explained that . . .’ (p. 40) RC transcript, Day 7, p. 406. ‘Unsure of what was happening . . .’ (p. 40) RC transcript, Day 7, p. 397. ‘Bate replied that he . . .’ (p. 40) RC transcript, Day 7, pp. 398A–400. ‘Bate said he heard . . .’ (p. 40) RC transcript, Day 7, p. 441. ‘In putting Robertson’s request . . .’ (p. 41) RC transcript, Day 8, p. 459. ‘Finally, in answer to a formal . . .’ (p. 41) CPD (Reps), 6 May 1964, p. 1559. ‘Captain Peek had already informed . . .’ (p. 41) Minute dated 28 February 1964 from DCNS to CNS and SecNav, filed in ‘Loss of HMAS Voyager’. ‘The Board was in a . . .’ (p. 41) Unnumbered Navy Press Statement dated 26 March 1964. Penscript notes ‘For release 10.00am EST 26 March— FOCAF to inform Melbourne complement at about 9–9.30am’. ‘On 6 April Captain Philip . . .’ (p. 41) Signal DTG 260403Z Mar 64 from ACNB to FOCAF, and info Melbourne, Sydney, Penguin, Kuttabul. ‘During that morning’s proceedings . . .’ (p. 42) RC transcript, Day 9, pp. 468–72. ‘When asked about its removal . . .’ (p. 42) RC transcript, Day 9, p. 468. ‘Bates agreed that . . .’ (p. 42) RC transcript, Day 9, p. 497. ‘Kelly agreed that . . .’ (p. 42) RC transcript, Day 9, pp. 514–17, 533–4. ‘Kelly then had to defend . . .’ (p. 43) RC transcript, Day 11, pp. 643–4. ‘Smyth had Kelly concede . . .’ (p. 43) RC transcript, Day 11, pp. 631–3. ‘Melbourne’s 2nd OOW . . .’ (p. 44) RC transcript, Day 13, pp. 783, 785–8. ‘Sumpter looked around . . .’ (p. 45) RC transcript, Day 14, pp. 856–7, 864. ‘Robertson remarked in his private . . .’ (p. 45) From 1964–68 Captain
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Robertson accumulated a vast body of personal papers relating to the collision, including copies of official documents, transcript, items of evidence and his own personal commentaries on the proceedings. These were made available to me by his sons, Malcolm and Brian. ‘If Sumpter had been looking . . .’ (p. 46) This was partly conceded by Sumpter, RC transcript, Day 14, p. 876. ‘However, Robertson was adamant . . .’ (p. 46) (Robertson papers). ‘Tactical Operator Gary Evans . . .’ (p. 46) RC transcript, Day 14, p. 884. ‘He did not report . . .’ (p. 46) Ibid. ‘Evans stated that . . .’ (p. 46) RC transcript, Day 14, p. 903. ‘It was a curious explanation . . .’ (p. 46) RC transcript, Day 14, p. 905. ‘In fairness to Evans . . .’ (p. 46) RC transcript, Day 14, p. 885. ‘Although his recollection . . .’ (p. 47) RC transcript, Day 15, p. 964. ‘But there was no discussion . . .’ (p. 47) RC transcript, Day 15, p. 972. ‘During cross-examination . . .’ (p. 47) RC transcript, Day 16, p. 983. ‘This, he claimed, . . .’ (p. 47) RC transcript, Day 21, p. 1465. ‘Patterson said he heard . . .’ (p. 47) RC transcript, Day 21, p. 1467. ‘When recalled to the inquiry . . .’ (p. 48) This evidence was heard in camera, RC transcript, Day 24, p. 1697. ‘Although Patterson would not . . .’ (p. 48) RC transcript, Day 24, p. 1698. ‘He conceded that he might . . .’ (p. 48) RC transcript, Day 24, p. 1701. ‘Evans and Burdett were . . .’ (p. 48) Interview with R.N. Jocumsen, 30 June 1991. ‘Patterson recalled that . . .’ (p. 48) RC transcript, Day 28, p. 2037. ‘Patterson spoke with Evans . . .’ (p. 48) RC transcript, Day 28, p. 2082. ‘He also thought . . .’ (p. 48) RC transcript, Day 30, p. 2070. ‘With Patterson standing by . . .’ (p. 48) RC transcript, Day 28, pp. 2049ff. ‘Sub-Lieutenant David Isles . . .’ (p. 49) RC transcript, Day 31, p. 2335. ‘Matthews was not far from . . .’ (p. 49) RC transcript, Day 30, p. 2081. ‘He could not recall the course . . .’ (p. 49) RC transcript, Day 17, p. 1153. ‘an odd sort of witness . . .’ (p. 49) Robertson offered this description of Degenhardt in notes made for his counsel during the Commission (Robertson papers). ‘In Robertson’s view . . .’ (p. 49) Expressed in an enclosure to a letter from Robertson to Vice Admiral Harold Hickling, dated 25 February 1965 (Robertson papers). ‘The witness whose testimony . . .’ (p. 50) RC transcript, Day 38, p. 2856. ‘That was the end of the matter . . .’ (p. 50) RC transcript, Day 38, p. 2868. ‘The matter went no further . . .’ (p. 50) Ibid. ‘Robertson’s evidence took . . .’ (p. 51) RC transcript, Day 32, p. 2395. ‘Voyager’s alteration to starboard . . .’ (p. 51) Notes prepared by Captain Robertson for Admiral Hickling and dated 25 November 1964 (Robertson papers). ‘It was this prompt . . .’ (p. 51) RC transcript, Day 33, p. 2439.
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‘Robertson said he continued . . .’ (p. 51) RC transcript, Day 33, p. 2440. ‘His interpretation . . .’ (p. 51) RC transcript, Day 33, p. 2443. ‘It was during this period . . .’ (p. 51) Ibid., p. 2445. ‘By this stage . . .’ (p. 52) This statement is contained in notes prepared by Robertson for his counsel (Robertson papers). ‘If I had been on the bridge . . .’ (p. 52) Notes prepared by Robertson for his counsel, p. 65. The notes are undated, yet were prepared before the final address was given (Robertson papers). ‘To improve their understanding . . .’ (p. 53) Signal DTG 180451Z May 64 from FOICEA to ACNB, info FOCAF, NAS Nowra and Melbourne. ‘Counsel had previously . . .’ (p. 53) Signal DTG 162258Z Apr 64 from FOCAF to CTG 327.3. The two ships proceeded some 20 miles to sea. Robertson was embarked in Anzac. The press were not permitted to attend. Interview with Rear Admiral A.A. Willis, 24 May 1991. ‘Peek’s answer was evasive . . .’ (p. 53) RC transcript, Day 44, p. 3433. ‘Peek was prepared to discount . . .’ (p. 53) Ibid. ‘He proposed three . . .’ (p. 53) RC transcript, Day 44, pp. 3434–8. ‘Meares’ final question . . .’ (p. 54) RC transcript, Day 44, p. 3450.
Chapter 5 ‘Smyth began his summing up . . .’ (p. 55) Smyth’s final address is covered in RC transcript, Days 45–7, pp. 3469–697. ‘Jenkyn was the next . . .’ (p. 58) Jenkyn’s final address is covered in RC transcript, Days 48–50, pp. 3699–968. ‘It was sensible that Street . . .’ (p. 61) Street’s final address is covered in RC transcript, Day 51, pp. 3969–4048. ‘Street suggested that . . .’ (p. 61) Personal communication from Sir Laurence Street to the author, 23 August 1989. ‘In his final submission . . .’ (p. 62) Meares’ final address is covered in RC transcript, Days 51–2, pp. 4048–4105. ‘By this point . . .’ (p. 62) Interview with W.H. Gregory QC, 18 July 1989. ‘The end of Meares’ address . . .’ (p. 62) Hicks’ final address is covered in RC transcript, Days 52–4, pp. 4105–246. ‘Robertson also wanted Hicks . . .’ (p. 64) Undated notes prepared by Robertson for D.S. Hicks QC. ‘Having a right of reply . . .’ (p. 64) Smyth’s closing address is covered in RC transcript, Days 54–5, pp. 4292–377. ‘A retired RAN admiral . . .’ (p. 65) Letter to the author, dated 5 June 1991. ‘Admiral Sir Victor Smith . . .’ (p. 65) Interview with Admiral Sir Victor Smith, 22 June 1990. ‘Another retired admiral . . .’ (p. 65) Letter to the author, dated 21 May 1991.
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Chapter 6 ‘The tabloid Daily Mirror . . .’ (p. 67) Daily Mirror, 26 August 1964. ‘The Age finally brought down . . .’ (p. 67) The Age, 1 September 1964. ‘The Age reported that . . .’ (p. 67) The Age, 27 August 1964. ‘The Royal Commissioner then attempts . . .’ (p. 68) Report of the Royal Commission on the Loss of HMAS Voyager (hereafter Spicer Report), Commonwealth Government Printer, Melbourne, 1964, p. 10. ‘How harsh were Spicer’s . . .’ (p. 70) The concept of fault in relation to maritime collisions is discussed in S. Mankabady, Collisions at Sea: A Guide to their Legal Consequences, North Holland, New York, 1978, pp. 9–18. ‘a failure to exercise that . . .’ (p. 70) Lord Maughm in the Llanover (1945) Lloyds Law Reports, No. 78, p. 461. ‘the transcript of the Royal Commission . . .’ (p. 71) Opinion provided to the Naval Board by Commander L.F. Winch, Chief Naval Judge Advocate, 31 July 1964. ‘If these three conditions . . .’ (p. 72) Winch Opinion, p. 3. ‘As to the Board’s public attitude . . .’ (p. 72) Winch Opinion, p. 13. ‘If anything can be said against . . .’ (p. 72) Ibid. ‘At its meeting on 7 August . . .’ (p. 72) ACNB minute 90/1964 dated 7 August 1964. ACNB minute 80/1964 is also relevant. ‘Cabinet asked the Naval Board . . .’ (p. 72) Cabinet Decision Numbers 418 and 422, dated 25 and 26 August 1964, give direction to the Naval Board. At its meeting on 27 August, the Board endorsed the Navy’s submission to Cabinet on the Royal Commission Report. See ACNB minute 97/1964 dated 27 August. ‘Not knowing at that time . . .’ (p. 72) Minute from Navy Minister to Cabinet, dated 2 September 1964. ‘However, it conceded . . .’ (p. 72) ‘Summary of Main Points in the Report and Naval Board Comments’, contained in unnumbered Navy file. ‘Matters Arising from the Royal Commission’, pp. 3–4. ‘The Board agreed with . . .’ (p. 72) ‘Summary of Main Points’, pp. 4–9. ‘The Board did believe, however . . .’ (p. 73) ‘Summary of Main Points’, p. 3. ‘In the May 1965 edition . . .’ (p. 73) DCNS Newsletter dated May 1965, Section B, paragraph B33. ‘Kelly, who had been watching . . .’ (p. 74) Harrington wrote this comment on a sheet of personalised notepaper which he placed inside the advance copy (No. 3) he received of the Spicer Report. ‘As for Voyager’s operational state . . .’ (p. 74) Naval Board submission to Cabinet on the Spicer Report, 1 September 1964, p. 3. ‘The Board ended on . . .’ (pp. 74–5) Naval Board submission on the Spicer Report, 1 September 1964, pp. 27–35. ‘For all the criticism . . .’ (p. 75) ‘Suitability of layout of loudspeakers on the
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bridge of escorts’ see Navy file 1211/252/37; ‘Lookout placement in HMA ships’ see Navy file 1211/51/452; the new policy of greater familiarity with the operation of liferafts was promulgated in Commonwealth Naval Order (CNO) 557/64; CNO 331/64 extended ‘wet winch’ training to all naval personnel, not just aircrew; the need for a higher standard of proficiency in swimming is contained in the 2NM minute ‘Matters Arising from the Royal Commission into the Sinking of HMAS Voyager’ to all Naval Board members, 29 July 1964; Navy file 177/40 contains the response to a parliamentary question on swimming tests in the RAN; the matter of escape scuttles is covered in Navy file 177/1/40 (‘Parliamentary Questions re: escape scuttles’) and Navy file 1288/201/13 (‘Notes for Counsel on lifesaving equipment etc.’), also Navy file 1215/51/158, ‘Review of Escape Scuttles, HMA Ships Vampire and Vendetta’; Navy file 518/251/56, ‘Life Jacket Stowages in HMA Ships’, contains a memo to FOCAF advising changes to the RAN’s policy on lifejackets. The number of lifejackets would be increased to 125 per cent of war complement and not stowed below 2 Deck; additional liferafts were requested from training establishments for demonstration purposes, see Navy file 512/58/156. ‘There was one area of revision . . .’ (p. 75) See Navy file 400/201/160.
Chapter 7 ‘Federal Cabinet discussed . . .’ (p. 77) Bunting provided Landau with a draft Cabinet decision from the 4 September meeting as an enclosure to a letter dated 7 September 1964. ‘[T]he central subject should be . . .’ (p. 77) Draft Cabinet minute dated 4 September 1964. No decision number appended. ‘It also decided that . . .’ (p. 77) Draft Cabinet minute dated 4 September 1964, p. 2. ‘Surgeon Commander Brian Treloar . . .’ (p. 77) Letter from Surgeon Commander Brian Treloar to Robertson, dated 11 July 1964 (Robertson papers). ‘They decided it was not possible . . .’ (p. 78) Interview with Admiral Sir Victor Smith, 22 June 1990. ‘Menzies covered the matters . . .’ (p. 79) CPD (Reps), 26 August 1964, pp. 1074, 1080. ‘Benson argued that Admiral Becher . . .’ (p. 80) CPD (Reps), 15 September 1964, pp. 1088, 1082, 1083. ‘As might be expected . . .’ (p. 80) CPD (Reps), 15 September 1964, p. 1082. ‘It is obvious that the Navy . . .’ (p. 80) CPD (Reps), 15 September 1964, p. 1086. ‘The next day, . . .’ (p. 80) The Bulletin, 26 September 1964, p. 21. ‘Clyde Cameron believed . . .’ (p. 80) Personal communication from Clyde Cameron to the author, 15 May 1991.
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‘As the Navy Minister . . .’ (p. 81) CPD (Reps), 15 September 1964, p. 1090. ‘Newspaper reporting of the debate . . .’ (p. 81) The Age, 17 September 1964; the Herald, 16 September 1964. ‘He would be asked . . .’ (p. 81) See ACNB minute 103/1964 dated 17 September 1964 and Navy Office file 351/219/191. ‘Cabinet discussed Robertson’s resignation . . .’ (p. 82) Cabinet minute dated 22 September 1964 (Decision No. 489). ‘The Sunday Mirror led . . .’ (p. 82) Sunday Mirror, 20 September 1964. ‘The Daily Mirror headed . . .’ (p. 82) Daily Mirror, 18 September 1964. ‘When the Parliamentary debate . . .’ (p. 83) CPD (Reps), 24 September 1964, pp. 1473, 1475. ‘The appointment of a Cabinet committee . . .’ (p. 83) CPD (Reps), 24 September 1964, p. 1475. ‘Speaking in favour . . .’ (p. 83) CPD (Reps), 24 September 1964, p. 1485. ‘The entry of John Jess . . .’ (p. 83) CPD (Reps), 24 September 1964, pp. 1488, 1490, 1491. ‘Of the speakers that followed . . .’ (p. 84) CPD (Reps), 24 September 1964, p. 1501. ‘The next day’s newspaper . . .’ (p. 84) The Australian, 25 September 1964. ‘The debate in the upper house . . .’ (p. 84) CPD (Senate), 23 September 1964, p. 680. ‘He was goaded by . . .’ (p. 84) CPD (Senate), 23 September 1964, p. 683. ‘That Gorton did feel in some way . . .’ (p. 85) CPD (Senate), 23 September 1964, pp. 688–96. ‘In what was a telling argument . . .’ (p. 85) CPD (Senate), 23 September 1964, p. 697. ‘A leading article . . .’ (p. 85) Dominic Nagle, the Australian, 25 September 1964, p. 697. ‘Alan Reid, writing in . . .’ (p. 85) The Bulletin, 26 September 1964, p. 19. ‘Two days later . . .’ (p. 86) The Australian, 26 September 1964. ‘September has seen a continuation . . .’ (p. 86) Extract from FOCAF Report of Proceedings for September 1964. Navy file 18/206/205. ‘For the Press, it was the biggest . . .’ (p. 86–7) Daily Mirror, 30 September 1964. ‘A naval officer of his . . .’ (p. 87) The Sydney Morning Herald, 23 September 1964. ‘The next day’s editorial . . .’ (p. 88) The Sydney Morning Herald, 11 November, 1964. ‘As forecast in the last newsletter . . .’ (pp. 88–9) DCNS Newsletter dated November 1964, Section B, paragraph B56. ‘It was bound to keep . . .’ (p. 89) ACNB minute 108/64 dated 9 October 1964 and Navy file 8/2/35. ‘To provide some evidence . . .’ (p. 89) ACNB minute 110/64 dated 13 October 1964.
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‘His title was soon altered . . .’ (p. 89) ACNB minute 112/64 dated 30 October 1964 and Navy file 8/2/34. ‘The Committee has held a series . . .’ (p. 89) CPD (Reps), 1 April 1965, p. 2125. ‘Voyager was a watershed . . .’ (p. 89–90) Interview with Rear Admiral A.J. Robertson, 4 July 1990. ‘Conservative structures are underpinned . . .’ (p. 90) Letter to the author from a retired RAN rear admiral, dated 2 December 1990. ‘Blame for the sinking . . .’ (p. 90) The Sun-Herald, 30 August 1964.
Chapter 8 ‘On the first anniversary . . .’ (p. 91) Navy file 12/1/31 deals with Voyager commemoration services; see also Navy News, February 1965, p. 3. ‘Chaney, however, believed . . .’ (p. 91) Interview with Sir Frederick Chaney, 27 July 1990. ‘It is apparent from letters . . .’ (p. 91) DCNS Newsletter dated May 1965, Section B, paragraph B62. ‘On 18 November 1964 . . .’ (p. 93) Letter from Hickling to Captain Robertson dated 18 November 1964 (Robertson papers). ‘Hickling had never served . . .’ (p. 93) Hickling served for a brief period during the First World War in the light cruiser HMAS Melbourne. At that time the ship was in European waters, with a ship’s company that was predominantly British. ‘He then offered to loan . . .’ (p. 94) This dinner took place on 29 January 1965. ‘Realising the import of . . .’ (p. 94) Letter from Ray Richards (Reed) to Robertson, dated 24 June 1965 (Robertson papers). ‘My initial reactions . . .’ (p. 94) Letter from Robertson to Hickling, dated 23 February 1965 (Robertson papers). ‘It took me many days . . . ’ (p. 95) quoted in Hickling, Postscript to Voyager, p. 32. ‘Smyth and Sheppard formed . . .’ (p. 95) SecNav minute to Minister (Chaney) dated 23 August 1965; Navy file 1288/201/44, ‘Allegations of former Lt Cdr Cabban’. ‘The final paragraph . . .’ (pp. 95–6) SecNav minute to Minister (Chaney) dated 23 August 1965. ‘Chaney forwarded . . .’ (p. 96) Chaney to Menzies, 24 August 1965; Navy file 1288/201/44, folio 5. ‘Gorton informed Menzies . . .’ (p. 96) Interview with Sir John Gorton, 2 August 1990. ‘Millar made only passing . . .’ (pp. 96–7) The Bulletin, 13 November 1965, pp. 19–24. ‘One Minute of Time was generously . . .’ (p. 97) ‘An Admiral Speaks His Mind’, The Age, 8 December 1965. Robertson had been Collins’ Flag Lieutenant during the Second World War. In a letter to Robertson dated
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17 June 1965, Collins wrote, ‘You will know that, together with every thinking person in Australia, I am most distressed at the way the inquiry has been handled and feel deeply for you’ (Robertson papers); see also the review of One Minute of Time in the Naval Review, vol. 40, no. 2, April 1967, pp. 169–71; ‘Voyager: A new look at tragedy’, Herald, 4 December 1965. ‘Hickling told the Age . . .’ (p. 97) Quoted in The Age, 23 October 1965. ‘Whitlam questioned Chaney . . .’ (pp. 97–8) CPD (Reps), 9 December 1965, p. 3814. ‘In a letter dated 11 August . . .’ (p. 98) Letter from Jess to Holt, dated 11 August 1966. A copy was forwarded to the Department of the Navy and placed on file AA 1288/201/44, folio 14. ‘On 23 August, McNicoll . . .’ (p. 99) Minute from McNicoll to Chaney dated 23 August 1966, Navy file AA 1288/201/44, folio 16. ‘Chaney relayed the contents . . .’ (p. 99) Letter from Chaney to Menzies, dated 24 August 1965 with enclosures, Navy file AA 1288/201/44. ‘One of his former . . .’ (p. 99) Peter Howson, The Howson Diaries, Viking, Melbourne, 1984, footnote to entry for 13 December 1966, p. 254.
Chapter 9 ‘Despite this setback . . .’ (p. 100) St John’s involvement is set out in detail in his book, A Time to Speak, Sun, Melbourne, 1969, pp. 80–115. ‘Of the 89 members . . .’ (p. 100) Noted in ‘Backbenchers’, Current Affairs Bulletin, vol. 37, no. 11, 18 April 1966, p. 165. ‘Jess told McMahon . . .’ (p. 101) Letter from McMahon to Holt, dated 12 April 1967, copy in Navy file 1299/201/44, folio 33. ‘The executive summary . . .’ (p. 101) Cabinet submission, ‘Royal Commission on Loss of HMAS Voyager, 1964 and treatment of Captain R.J. Robertson’, dated 27 April 1967, p. 2. ‘In fact, the decision . . .’ (p. 101–2) Cabinet submission, p. 13. ‘For our part, . . .’ (p. 102) Cabinet submission, pp. 13–14. ‘Cabinet had agreed that . . .’ (p. 102) Cabinet minute dated 2 May 1967 (decision No. 296) and interview with Sir Nigel Bowen, 8 August 1991. ‘Having tied the Navy’s fortunes . . .’ (p. 102) Memorandum dated 28 April 1967, prepared for Chipp by McNicoll, Navy file 1288/201/44, folio 42. ‘It’s only going to cause . . .’ (p. 103) Howson, The Howson Diaries, entry for 3 May 1967, p. 293. ‘If there is an untold story . . .’ (p. 103) The Australian, 5 May 1967. ‘some grave allegations . . .’ (p. 103) The Australian, 8 May 1967. ‘Ramsey quotes Jess . . .’ (p. 103) Cabban told me that this was his, rather than Jess’, attitude in wanting another inquiry. Conversation between Cabban and the author, 5 June 1991. ‘Chipp would later suggest . . .’ (p. 104) Don Chipp and John Larkin, The Third Man, Rigby, Melbourne, 1978, p. 74.
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‘Mackay and St John then arranged . . .’ (p. 104) This meeting took place in St John’s home on 7 May 1967. See St John, A Time to Speak, p. 83. ‘He gave notice on 10 May that . . .’ (p. 105) Motion moved by Jess and seconded by Turner, Navy file 1288/201/44, folio 52. ‘He was quoted by . . .’ (p. 106) The Australian, 12 May 1967. ‘However, McNicoll conceded . . .’ (pp. 105–06) ‘Memorandum on aspects of the Voyager Debate’, prepared by McNicoll and forwarded to Chipp, Navy file 1288/201/44, folio 57, p. 2. ‘The Naval Board prepared . . .’ (p. 106) Letter from Chipp to Holt dated 15 May 1967. McNicoll’s memorandum and a minute for Surgeon Rear Admiral Coplans were included as enclosures, Navy file 1288/201/44, folio 58. ‘Also attached was a minute . . .’ (p. 106) Minute from Coplans through Landau to Chipp, dated 15 May 1967. The original document was tabled in Parliament on 17 May 1967 and subsequently printed in the parliamentary paper ‘Loss of HMAS Voyager’. ‘Coplans also felt . . .’ (p. 106) Minute from Coplans through Landau to Chipp, dated 15 May 1967. The original is contained in Navy file 1288/201/44, folio 64. ‘They were later published . . .’ (p. 106) Parliamentary Paper No. 50, 17 May 1967. ‘These counterstatements . . .’ (p. 106) Letter from Landau to G.J. Willis, dated 19 April 1967, Navy file 1288/201/44, folio 17. ‘He was advised that . . .’ (p. 107) The details of the following narrative are taken from a ‘Note for File’ prepared by Landau and signed and dated 9 May 1967, Navy file 1288/201/44, folio 37. ‘Landau records that . . .’ (p. 107) ‘Note for File’ prepared by Landau. ‘This appears to have been done . . .’ (p. 108) It was subsequently reconstructed by Tiller. ‘In a later statement . . .’ (p. 108) Statement by M.C. Tiller taken at Perth by Burt and Neal in the presence of George Sadlier, Solicitor, Friday 11 August, 1967, p. 10. ‘He also commented that . . .’ (p. 108) Tiller Statement, p. 8. ‘Cabinet had earlier decided . . .’ (p. 109) Cabinet minute dated 16 May 1967 (Decision No. 332). ‘It was a strident attack . . .’ (p. 109) CPD (Reps), 16 May 1967, p. 2149. ‘Chipp’s approach was straightforward . . .’ (p. 110) Chipp, The Third Man, p. 76. Chipp’s closing plea . . .’ (p. 110) CPD (Reps), 16 May 1967, pp. 2165–6. ‘I rise to make my . . .’ (p. 110) CPD (Reps), 16 May 1967, p. 2167. ‘After explaining his interest . . .’ (p. 110) Ibid. ‘I believe this man . . .’ (p. 111) CPD (Reps), 16 May 1967, p. 2169. ‘Is not this one . . .’ (p. 111) Ibid. ‘I did not expect . . .’ (p. 111) Ibid. ‘Holt had been embarrassed . . .’ (p. 111) Interview with Sir Nigel Bowen, 8 August 1991.
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‘But St John overstepped . . .’ (p. 111) CPD (Reps), 16 May 1967, p. 2171. ‘Cabban had only ever . . .’ (p. 111) CPD (Reps), 16 May 1967, pp. 2146, 2172. ‘According to the Adelaide . . .’ (p. 111) Adelaide News, 18 May 1967. ‘The next speaker . . .’ (p. 112) CPD (Reps), 16 May 1967, pp. 2176–7. ‘The final speaker . . .’ (p. 112) CPD (Reps), 16 May 1967, pp. 2178–9. ‘As the former Minister . . .’ (p. 112) CPD (Reps), 17 May 1967, p. 2245. ‘Chaney argued that . . .’ (p. 112) Ibid. ‘He had also interviewed . . .’ (p. 112) Letter to author from the Hon. C.R. Cameron, 15 May 1991. ‘Cameron discussed . . .’ (p. 112) CPD (Reps), 17 May 1967, p. 2250. ‘For instance, he pointed out . . . (p. 113) CPD (Reps) 1967, p. 2253. ‘Cameron voiced his opinion . . .’ (p. 113) Ibid. ‘He asked the House . . .’ (p. 113) CPD (Reps), 17 May 1967, pp. 2256–7, 2259. ‘After dinner . . .’ (p. 113) CPD (Reps), 17 May 1967, pp. 2272, 2279. ‘Then came the moment . . .’ (p. 114) CPD (Reps), 18 May 1967, p. 2309. ‘Holt decided this . . .’ (p. 114) Interview with Sir Nigel Bowen, 8 August 1991. ‘Bowen felt that . . .’ (p. 114) Interview with Sir Nigel Bowen.
Chapter 10 ‘The Opposition seemed content . . .’ (p. 116) CPD (Reps), 19 May 1967, p. 2439. ‘I have been sickened . . .’ (p. 116) Statement issued to the press by Mrs B.L. Stevens, dated 18 May 1967. The original is in the Stevens papers. ‘Sir Jack Stevens took . . .’ (p. 116) Statement issued to the press by Major General Sir Jack Stevens, dated 18 May 1967. The original is in the Stevens papers. ‘Among the many sympathy . . .’ (pp. 116–17) Letters from T.K. Morrison and V.A. Smith to Beatrice Stevens, both dated 12 February 1964; letter from D.H.D. Smyth to Beatrice Stevens dated 23 June 1967 (Stevens papers). ‘The Commission’s formal opening . . .’ (p. 117) ‘Cabban’ Royal Commission (hereafter RC II) transcript, Day 1, pp. 1–10. ‘He emphasised that . . .’ (p. 117) RC II transcript, Day 1, p. 6. ‘The Commission then adjourned . . .’ (p. 118) RC II transcript, Day 1, p. 10. ‘Burt continued to define . . .’ (p. 118) RC II transcript, Day 2, p. 14. ‘He later suggested that . . .’ (p. 118) RC II transcript, Day 2, p. 53. ‘the circumstances surrounding Cabban’s . . .’ (p. 118) RC II transcript, Day 2, pp. 19–26. ‘The origins of the document . . .’ (p. 118) RC II transcript, Day 2, p. 27. ‘Burt asked the Commissioners . . .’ (p. 118) RC II transcript, Day 2, p. 43. ‘As for Stevens’ drinking . . .’ (p. 118) RC II transcript, Day 2, p. 45. ‘Burt criticised St John’s . . .’ (p. 118) RC II transcript, Day 2, p. 47. ‘As to whether the Naval Board . . .’ (pp. 118–19) RC II transcript, Day 2, pp. 48–9.
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‘The third, and perhaps the most . . .’ (p. 119) RC II transcript, Day 2, pp. 57–9. ‘This would serve both . . .’ (p. 119) Burt’s outline of the organisation of the Commission’s proceedings can be found at RC II transcript, Day 3, pp. 61–5. ‘After a year . . .’ (p. 120) RC II transcript, Day 3, pp. 68–77. ‘The seeds of discontent . . .’ (p. 121) RC II transcript, Day 3, pp. 78–83. ‘It was remarkable, then . . .’ (p. 121) The first occasion on which the problem of hearsay evidence was discussed in detail was on Day 3. RC II transcript, pp. 95–7. ‘It was a hope . . .’ (p. 122) Cabban was examined by Burt on the third and fourth days of the hearing. ‘He told Smyth that . . .’ (p. 122) RC II transcript, Day 4, pp. 151–9. ‘Ash attacked Cabban on a number . . .’ (p. 122) RC II transcript, Day 4, pp. 172–8. ‘The following day . . .’ (p. 123) The passage of cross-examination in RC II transcript, Day 5, pp. 212–14, 215–16, illustrates Ash’s general approach. ‘The turning point came . . .’ (p. 123) RC II transcript, Day 5, pp. 239–41. ‘Ash was happy to let Cabban . . .’ (p. 123) RC II transcript, Day 5, p. 240. ‘The incidents cited . . .’ (p. 124) RC II transcript, Day 5, pp. 348–9. ‘It was becoming clear . . .’ (p. 124) RC II transcript, Day 7, pp. 380, 382, 384–9. ‘Ash also criticised Cabban . . .’ (p. 124) RC II transcript, Day 7, p. 385. ‘Having demonstrated the inaccuracies . . .’ (p. 125) RC II transcript, Day 8, pp. 460–1, 464–5. ‘Cabban saw his contribution . . .’ (p. 125) RC II transcript, Day 8, p. 493–4. ‘Murphy then turned’ (p. 125) RC II transcript, Day 8, p. 498. ‘Throughout the Commission . . .’ (p. 125) RC II transcript, Day 8, p. 500. ‘Cabban was often . . .’ (p. 125) RC II transcript, Day 8, pp. 519–22. ‘Murphy ended . . .’ (p. 126) RC II transcript, Day 9, pp. 548–9. ‘The right to cross-examination . . .’ (p. 126) RC II transcript, Day 8, pp. 548–9. ‘The most significant passage . . .’ (p. 126) RC II transcript, Day 9, p. 563. ‘When asked by Justice Asprey . . .’ (p. 126) Ibid. ‘His next admission . . .’ (p. 126) RC II transcript, Day 9, p. 563. ‘When asked whether . . .’ (p. 126) RC II transcript, Day 9, pp. 564–5. ‘In Burt’s re-examination . . .’ (p. 126) RC II transcript, Day 9, p. 589. ‘By the end of the ninth . . .’ (p. 127) RC II transcript, Day 11, p. 611. ‘The principal witness . . .’ (p. 128) RC II transcript, Day 14, pp. 926–8, 934, 937–42. ‘Burt did little to hide . . .’ (p. 128) RC II transcript, Day 14, pp. 943–5. ‘McNeill’s only explanation . . .’ (p. 128) RC II transcript, Day 14, pp. 947–9. ‘Burt re-examined McNeill . . .’ (p. 129) RC II transcript, Day 15, pp. 1008–9, 1016–17. ‘Sir William Morrow had conducted . . .’ (p. 129) Interview with Rear Admiral B.T. Treloar, 21 March 1991.
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‘Ash asked Morrow to explain . . .’ (p. 129) RC II transcript, Day 15, pp. 1063–4. ‘To complete this passage . . .’ (p. 130) RC II transcript, Day 15, p. 1077; Day 16, pp. 1078, 1083, 1092. ‘When asked by Hiatt . . .’ (p. 130) RC II transcript, Day 16, pp. 1132–3.
Chapter 11 ‘At this stage . . .’ (p. 132) Undated notes for counsel (Robertson papers). ‘However, he stated . . .’ (p. 132) Undated notes for counsel (Robertson papers). ‘He was not alone . . .’ (p. 132) RC II transcript, Day 11, p. 685. ‘When Smyth was examined . . .’ (pp. 132–3) RC II transcript, Day 11, p. 799. ‘Trying to establish . . .’ (p. 133) RC II transcript, Day 12, p. 802. ‘When the thirteenth day . . .’ (p. 133) RC II transcript, Day 13, pp. 842–3. ‘If Sir John Spicer . . .’ (p. 133) RC II transcript, Day 13, p. 843. ‘Burbury invited Reynolds . . .’ (p. 133) Ibid. ‘Despite pointing out . . .’ (p. 113) RC II transcript, Day 39, p. 2847. ‘But Burbury added . . .’ (pp. 133–4) Ibid. ‘The only form of resistance . . .’ (p. 134) RC II transcript, Day 39, p. 2850. ‘Reynolds advised that they . . .’ (p. 134) RC II transcript, Day 39, p. 2858. ‘Burbury was, however . . .’ (p. 134) RC II transcript, Day 40, p. 2863. ‘As expected, Peek said . . .’ (p. 134) RC II transcript, Day 40, pp. 2866–8. ‘Peek was quite prepared . . .’ (p. 134) RC II transcript, Day 40, pp. 2871–71A, 2873–6. ‘It was not until . . .’ (p. 134) RC II transcript, Day 50, p. 3578ff. ‘As this gave Reynolds an opportunity . . .’ (p. 135) RC II transcript, Day 50, p. 3584. ‘Murphy suggested to the . . .’ (p. 135) RC II transcript, Day 52, pp. 3704–7. ‘Burt provided the most damaging . . .’ (p. 135) RC II transcript, Day 52, pp. 3712–17. ‘It is not part of the function . . .’ (p. 136) RC II transcript, Day 53, pp. 3775–6. ‘Burbury also pointed out . . .’ (p. 136) RC II transcript, Day 53, p. 3776. ‘There seemed to be . . .’ (p. 136) RC II transcript, Day 54, p. 3848. ‘This being the situation . . .’ (p. 136) RC II transcript, Day 54, p. 3849. ‘if ultimately you could persuade . . .’ (pp. 136–7) RC II transcript, Day 54, p. 3849. ‘Samuels’ arrival marked a change . . .’ (p. 137) Letter to the author from Justice G.J. Samuels AC, 19 September 1990. ‘When he began . . .’ (p. 138) Burt’s closing address is covered in RC II transcript, Days 67 and 68, pp. 4676–776. ‘Burt claimed that . . .’ (p. 138) RC II transcript, Day 68, pp. 4724–6. ‘As an allied submission . . .’ (p. 138) RC II transcript, Day 68, p. 4741. ‘If, as Cabban claimed . . .’ (p. 138) RC II transcript, Day 68, p. 4743.
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‘Several individuals should have . . .’ (p. 138) RC II transcript, Day 68, pp. 4758–9. ‘Furthermore, regardless of . . .’ (p. 138) RC II transcript, Day 68, pp. 4766–70. ‘The evidence had not been withheld . . .’ (pp. 138–9) RC II transcript, Day 68, pp. 4775–6. ‘In his final submission . . .’ (p. 139) Hiatt’s final submission is covered in RC II transcript, Days 69–71, pp. 4776–916. ‘He claimed the Board . . .’ (p. 139) RC II transcript, Day 69, p. 4786. ‘Hiatt also claimed that . . .’ (p. 139) RC II transcript, Day 69, pp. 4793, 4796. ‘Given the gravity . . .’ (p. 139) RC II transcript, Day 69, p. 4847. ‘The following morning . . .’ (p. 139) RC II transcript, Day 70, p. 4852. ‘The Cabban Statement . . .’ (p. 139) RC II transcript, Day 69, pp. 4800, 4802–3, 4810. Hiatt even alleged . . .’ (p. 139) RC II transcript, Day 70, pp. 4869, 4903–4. ‘Hiatt described his . . .’ (pp.139–40) RC II transcript, Day 71, pp. 4912, 4913, 4916. ‘Ash began his reply . . .’ (p. 140) Ash’s final submission is covered in RC II transcript, Days 71–4, pp. 4917–5207. ‘On the second day . . .’ (p. 140) RC II transcript, Day 72, p. 5001. ‘Consequently, he asked . . .’ (p. 140) RC II transcript, Day 72, pp. 5064, 5071. ‘Ash then attempted . . .’ (p. 140) RC II transcript, Day 73, pp. 5098–9. ‘Wisely, Ash did not comment . . .’ (p. 140) RC II transcript, Day 73, pp. 5100–1; Day 74, pp. 5150–4. ‘As for Stevens’ medical . . .’ (p. 140) RC II transcript, Day 74, pp. 5177–9, 5207. ‘Murphy’s approach was . . .’ (p. 141) RC II transcript, Day 75, pp. 5234–5. ‘It is also noteworthy . . .’ (p. 141) Interview with Justice Peter Murphy, 5 September 1989. ‘This led Murphy . . .’ (p. 141) RC II transcript, Day 75, pp. 5238–9, 5245. ‘As for Cabban . . .’ (p. 141) RC II transcript, Day 75, pp. 5258–9, 5262–3. ‘At first, Murphy supported . . .’ (p. 142) RC II transcript, Day 75, pp. 5289–90. ‘The Commissioners decided . . .’ (p. 142) Interview with Justice Murphy, 5 September 1989. ‘In response to Murphy’s . . .’ (p. 142) RC II transcript, Day 75, p. 5287. ‘Burbury was of like mind . . .’ (p. 142) RC II transcript, Day 76, p. 5297. ‘This was the opportunity . . .’ (p. 142) RC II transcript, Day 76, p. 5311. ‘Instead, he began . . .’ (p. 142) Samuels’ final submission is covered in RC II transcript, Days 76–80, pp. 5297–5614. ‘To confuse matters even further . . .’ (p. 143) RC II transcript, Day 76, p. 5308. ‘Consequently, Samuels argued . . .’ (p. 143) RC II transcript, Day 76, p. 5309. ‘By ascribing a deliberate . . .’ (p. 143) RC II transcript, Day 76, 5317. ‘Burbury responded: . . .’ (p. 143) RC II transcript, Day 76, p. 5321. ‘Samuels asserted that . . .’ (p. 144) RC II transcript, Day 76, pp. 5355–6. ‘Stevens must therefore have been . . .’ (p. 144) RC II transcript, Day 76, p. 5357.
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Consequently, Stevens was unfit . . .’ (p. 144) RC II transcript, Day 76, pp. 5360, 5363. ‘If it were the latter . . .’ (p. 144) RC II transcript, Day 77, pp. 5381–2. ‘Samuels’ task was to prove . . .’ (p. 144) RC II transcript, Day 77, pp. 5386–7. ‘Robertson believed the most . . .’ (p. 144) Penscript on notes for submission to counsel (probably Samuels). ‘This appeared to impress . . .’ (p. 145) RC II transcript, Day 77, p. 5430. ‘This seemed to appeal . . .’ (pp. 145–6) RC II transcript, Day 77, p. 5478. ‘Samuels closed by saying . . .’ (p. 146) RC II transcript, Day 80, p. 5614. ‘Murphy could not have relished . . .’ (p. 146) RC II transcript, Day 81, pp. 5660, 5672, 5681–8. ‘As for the need to vary . . .’ (p. 146) RC II transcript, Day 82, pp. 5741–2. ‘Murphy reminded the Commissioners . . .’ (pp. 146–7) RC II transcript, Day 82, pp. 5744, 5764. ‘Whether or not this imposed . . .’ (p. 147) RC II transcript, Day 82, p. 5766. ‘Murphy now said the Board . . .’ (p. 147) RC II transcript, Day 82, pp. 5765–6. ‘While conceding five . . .’ (p. 147) The five occasions were: the birthday dinner in Singapore; a dinner in HMS Rothesay; and three occasions in Tokyo. Ash said he accepted ‘moral blame’ for the birthday dinner and the Tokyo instances. ‘Stevens’ unfitness was not . . .’ (p. 148) ‘Notes for final submission, Counsel for Captain Stevens’ (Stevens papers). ‘His instructing solicitor . . .’ (p. 148) Interview with Commander the Hon. Fred Osborne, 29 August 1990. ‘After a short address . . .’ (p. 148) RC II transcript, Day 83, pp. 5810, 5832, 5836, 5868–9. ‘In his final address . . .’ (p. 148) RC II transcript, Day 84, pp. 5907–11; Day 85, pp. 5916–17, 5925.
Chapter 12 ‘Dr Vern Plueckhahn . . .’ (p. 151) Dr Vern Plueckhahn, ‘Report to Royal Commission’, 7 November 1967 (RC II exhibit 60A). ‘In his opinion, Stevens was . . .’ (p. 151) Dr Vern Plueckhahn, ‘Report to Royal Commission’. ‘The Commissioners . . .’ (pp. 151–2) This was Birrell’s area of special interest in his work with the Victoria Police Force, where he studied the effects of alcohol consumption on motor vehicle driving performance. ‘Birrell conceded that . . .’ (p. 152) It is noteworthy that Birrell’s opinions were not as conclusive or offered with as much conviction as St John suggested. While Birrell may have told St John outside the commission that he thought Stevens was an alcoholic, he was circumspect on this issue in his testimony. RC II transcript, Day 56, p. 4541. ‘In spite of Hyland’s insistence . . .’ (p. 152) Hyland’s evidence is covered in RC
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II transcript, Day 56, pp. 3880–98A. ‘In addition to periods of illness . . .’ (p. 153) Clarke was Stevens’ Naval College term mate. See RC II transcript, Day 41, p. 3009 and ‘Notes for final submission—Counsel for Captain Stevens’ (Stevens papers). ‘Most startling is the revelation . . .’ (pp. 153–4) Don Chipp and John Larkin, The Third Man, Rigby, Melbourne, 1978, p. 82. ‘Captain Stevens entered the sickbay . . .’ (p. 155) Statement by Dr Michael Tiller, taken at Perth by Burt and Neil in the presence of George Sadlier, Solicitor, on 11 August 1967, p. 9. Copy provided to the author by Dr Tiller. ‘Although Stevens had evidently . . .’ (p. 155) Interview with Sir Francis Burt, 25 July 1990. ‘John Wilson . . .’ (p. 155) The words in quotation marks are Wilson’s recollection of what Stevens said to him. John Wilson to the author, 2 June 1991. ‘All three Royal Commissioners . . .’ (p. 155) Interviews with Asprey (29 August 1989), Burbury (24 May 1991) and Lucas (24 May 1991). ‘I am astounded . . .’ (p. 155) Hon. Sir Stanley Burbury to the author, 29 September 1990. ‘When interviewed in 1990 . . .’ (p. 156) Interview with the Hon. Don Chipp, 5 September 1989. When the substance of Chipp’s remarks was relayed to Justice Peter Murphy, he stated: ‘I have not read the book to which you refer . . . The several assertions that you make in your letter [the evidence of the unnamed doctor relating to amphetamines] can find no support from me, and I remember nothing that would suggest to me that they have any substance in them’. Hon. Justice Peter Murphy to author, 14 August 1990; see also interview with John Jess, 4 September 1989. ‘Atropine sulphate’s side effects . . .’ (p. 156) I am grateful to Dr John Kemp for bringing this possibility to my attention, in a letter dated 6 August 1998. See Joan Heller Brown, ‘Atropine, scopolamine and related antimuscarinic drugs’, Chapter 8 in J.G. Harman, L.E. Limbird and A.G. Gilman (eds) Goodman and Gilman’s Pharmacological Basis of Therapeutics, 8th edition, McGraw Hill, New York, 1989. ‘But was Stevens unwell . . .’ (p. 156) Interview with Rear Admiral Peter Sinclair, 21 May 1991. ‘They accepted that . . .’ (p. 158) Report of Royal Commissions on the Statement of Lieutenant Commander Cabban and Matters Incidental Thereto (hereafter Burbury Report), Commonwealth Government Printer, Canberra, 1968, p. 223. ‘Burt was disappointed . . .’ (p. 158) Interview with Sir Francis Burt, 25 July 1990. ‘The conclusion is inescapable . . .’ (p. 158) Burbury Report, p. 158. ‘The cause of the unfitness . . .’ (p. 158) Burbury Report, p. 224. ‘As none of these individuals . . .’ (p. 159) Burbury Report, p. 225. ‘As for Stevens . . .’ (p. 159) Burbury Report, p. 175. ‘In this regard . . .’ (p. 159) Burbury Report, p. 177 ‘Given the public interest . . .’ (p. 159) Burbury Report, pp. 176–7.
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‘Spicer assumed that . . .’ (p. 159) Burbury Report, p. 179. ‘Briefly, the new findings . . .’ (p. 160) Burbury Report, pp. 226–8. ‘The third term . . .’ (p. 161) Burbury Report, pp. 228–9. ‘The Commissioners concluded . . .’ (p. 161) Burbury Report, pp. 218–21. ‘The Daily Telegraph . . .’ (p. 161) The Daily Telegraph, 8 March 1968. ‘The resolution of this . . .’ (p. 162) Cabinet minute dated 12 March 1968 (Decision No. 62). ‘The Treasurer, the Attorney-General . . .’ (p. 162) Ibid. ‘On 13 March 1968 . . .’ (p. 162) CPD (Reps), 13 March 1968, p. 32. ‘The finding that Stevens . . .’ (p. 162) CPD (Reps), 13 March 1968, p. 670. ‘In reply, Gorton stated . . .’ (p. 162) CPD (Reps), 13 March 1968, pp. 682–3. ‘He asserted that there was . . .’ (p. 162) CPD (Reps), 13 March 1968, p. 683. ‘In spite of being the prime . . .’ (p. 163) CPD (Reps), 13 March 1968, p. 699. ‘He reiterated the purpose . . .’ (p. 163) CPD (Reps), 13 March 1968, p. 702. ‘Another of the principal . . .’ (p. 163) CPD (Reps), 13 March 1968, p. 731. ‘With the Opposition waiving . . .’ (p. 163) CPD (Reps), 13 March 1968, p. 743. ‘The Attorney-General . . .’ (p. 163) CPD (Reps), 13 March 1968, p. 747. ‘This was what had led them’. (p. 164) Ibid. ‘How did we get a report . . .’ (p. 164) CPD (Reps), 13 March 1968, pp. 764–5. ‘On 5 October 1967 . . .’ (p. 165) Minute from Secretary to CNS (Captain John Davidson) to SecNav dated 5 October 1967, for submission to the Board. Filed with Naval Board minutes. ‘Within six weeks . . .’ (p. 165) Minute from the Secretary to CNS to the SecNav, dated 16 November 1967. This minute was referred to the Navy Board. ‘Indeed, in a minute . . . (p. 165) Minute from DFSD (Britton) to SecNav dated 27 October 1967. Filed with Naval Board minutes.
Chapter 14 ‘In what was one . . .’ (p. 179) A. Vincent, ‘Collision! The Subic Bay inquiry’, Quadrant, October 1975, pp. 12–21, p. 18 cited. ‘When Stevenson returned . . .’ (p. 179) Naval Board minute 94/1969. ‘Most of the newspapers . . .’ (p. 180) The Australian, 6 January 1970.
Chapter 15 ‘Naturally there was a great deal . . .’ (p. 183) Cabinet minute dated 18 February 1964, Decision No. 46. ‘all claims will be handled . . .’ (p. 183) Telegram from Forbes to Cooke, dated 21 February 1964. ‘Then, on the first anniversary . . .’ (p. 184) Signal DTG 090115Z Feb 65 from ACNB to FOICEA and all Naval Area Commanders. Also Navy file
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125/1/109, ‘Payment for loss of personal effects by survivors of HMAS Voyager collision’. ‘As the Deputy Crown Solicitor . . .’ (p. 184) ‘Payment for loss of personal effects by survivors of HMAS Voyager collision’. ‘The Naval Board . . .’ (p. 184) SecNav letter to RNZN Liaison Officer C05191, 26 November 1965, Navy file 1215/255/65, p. 9. ‘Cabinet considered the matter . . .’ (p. 184) Cabinet minute dated 22 October 1964 (Decision No. 548). The Attorney-General was ‘authorised to give a public indication that the High Court is the appropriate place in which actions against the Commonwealth should be brought’. See Navy file 125/1/133 on handling of claims by the Commonwealth. ‘A junior member of the Ministry . . .’ (p. 184) The ‘Red Sales’ were the RAAF’s precision aerobatic team, all of whom perished in an accident in August 1962; see also Peter Howson, The Howson Diaries, entry for 22 October 1964, p. 11. ‘It is necessary for those dependents . . .’ (p. 185) The Australian, 10 May 1965. ‘The only progress was . . .’ (p. 185) Cabinet decision No. 1324, dated 21 October 1965. ‘The following is the situation . . .’ (p. 186) Letter from CNS to All Administrative Authorities, dated 18 May 1964, in unnumbered Navy file, ‘Loss of HMAS Voyager’; see also Navy file 333/201/139, dealing with psychological surveying of survivors. ‘Two survivors had been treated . . .’ (p. 186) Minute from DCNP to CNS, dated 18 May 1964. ‘In a signal to the Fleet Commander . . .’ (p. 186) HMAS Sydney signal DTG 182316Z May 64 to Naval Board, Navy Office file 333/201/139. ‘Harrington made three notes . . .’ (p. 186) Navy Office file 333/201/139. ‘Harrington personally drafted a reply . . .’ (p. 187) NOL dated 22 May 1964, Navy Office file 333/201/139. ‘On 28 June 1964 . . .’ (p. 187) Signal DTG 281239Z Feb 64 from Sydney to ACNB marked ‘Exclusive secret’. ‘The Victorian Supreme Court . . .’ (p. 188) This was the amount reported by the Canberra Times on 27 March 1985. ‘As Verwayen was a Queenslander . . .’ (pp. 189–90) Courier Mail, 7 September 1990. ‘The Australian Centre . . .’ (p. 194) www.acpmh.unimelb.edu.au/mentalhealth/whatIsPTSD.html ‘The American Psychiatric Association . . .’ (p. 194) The American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, third edition, American Psychiatric Association, Washington, 1987, pp. 247–51. ‘In an article published . . .’ (p. 198) Derek Summerfield, ‘The invention of PTSD and the social usefulness of a psychiatric category’, British Medical Journal, 13 January 2001, no. 322, pp. 95–8. ‘An editorial in the . . .’ (p. 199) N.C. Andreasen, ‘PTSD: Psychology, biology and the Manichaean warfare between false dichotomies’, American Journal of Psychiatry, vol. 152, no. 963, 1995, p. 5.
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BIBLIOGRAPHY Primary Sources Official reports Report of the Royal Commissioner into the Loss of HMAS Voyager, Commonwealth Government Printer, Melbourne, 1964 Report of the Royal Commission on the Statement of Lieutenant Commander Cabban and Matters Incidental Thereto, Commonwealth Government Printer, Canberra, 1968
Official printed papers Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates (CPD) (Representatives) Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates (CPD) (Senate) Commonwealth Parliamentary Papers 1964–68, vol. XIII, pp. 289–341 Commonwealth Parliamentary Papers 1968, vol. I, pp. 967–1245
Official printed sources, Navy Office, Canberra Allied Tactical Publications (ATPs) Australian Commonwealth Naval Board, Minutes of meetings and agenda papers Australian Fleet Orders Commonwealth Naval Orders DCNS Newsletters (1957–1968) Queen’s Regulations and Admiralty Instructions ‘Record of Service’ cards (officers) Regulations and Instructions for the RAN Signal logs (Classified and Unclassified)
Archival holdings Australian Archives A 1255 A 1256 A 1257 A 1258 A 1529
1964 Voyager Royal Commission—Transcripts of evidence 1964 Voyager Royal Commission—Exhibits 1964 Voyager Royal Commission—Secretary’s correspondence files 1964 Voyager Royal Commission—Secretary’s notes on evidence 1964 Voyager Royal Commission—Documents presented as evidence
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225
Papers dealing with the loss of HMAS Voyager, and the inquiry into the Statement of Lieutenant Commander Cabban Papers relating to the Royal Commission into Cockatoo Island Dockyard (1921) Papers relating to the Royal Commission into Naval and Defence Administration (1917–19) Papers relating to the Royal Commission of Inquiry into the circumstances associated with the retirement of Lieutenant Commander Alan Dermot Casey from the RAN (1934) Australian Commonwealth Naval Board Minute Books (1905–76) Alphabetical index to Australian Commonwealth Naval Board Minute Books (1922–76) 1964 Voyager Royal Commission—Transcripts, statements and miscellaneous papers (27 boxes) HMAS Voyager Ship’s Log (Bundle 782) Records and transcripts of the Royal Commission on the sinking of Voyager and the Royal Commission into the allegations of Lieutenant Commander Cabban Copies of statements, reports, exhibits from 1967 Cabban Royal Commission
Australian War Memorial AWM 178 AWM 179
1964 Voyager Royal Commission (13 boxes) 1967 Voyager Royal Commission (15 boxes)
State Library of New South Wales ML MSS 2676 1964 Voyager Royal Commission—Papers of L.W. Street QC
Non-archival Official Holdings Unnumbered Chief of Naval Staff Branch Files ‘Loss of HMAS Voyager’ ‘Voyager—Sympathy notes’ ‘HMAS Voyager Royal Commission’ ‘Answers to likely questions’ ‘Naval Board Cabinet submission—Spicer Report’ ‘Matters Arising from the Royal Commission into the loss of HMAS Voyager’ ‘Royal Navy Replacement for HMAS Voyager’ ‘Long-term Replacement for HMAS Voyager’ ‘Royal Commission—Fleet Bulletins’ (1967)
Navy Office Files 2/204/24 2/204/81 12/1/31
Operational readiness and sea training Naval Public Relations Programme consequent on a) Voyager inquiry b) W.D. Scott report on recruiting (1967) ‘Voyager Lament’ by Wilmot James
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16/201/72 18/6/198 18/201/33 18/206/33 20/1/13 38/201/20 43/1/38 62/40/12 125/1/109 165/1/70 177/1/40 202/3/44 202/201/22 203/4/65 333/201/139 343/201/5 518/251/56 519/252/35 1205/251/4 1211/51/158 1211/51/452 1211/252/37 1215/251/226 1215/259/52 1288/1/21 1288/1/22 1288/1/56 1288/1/63 1288/1/88 1288/201/12 1288/201/13 1288/201/14 1288/201/17
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Communications—points arising from the Voyager inquiry HMAS Voyager—request for reason for delay of proceedings for Nov. 1963 Collision complaint RE: conducting of Royal Commission and treatment of Captain Robertson Report of inspection—HMAS Voyager RAN Escort Vessels Loss of HMAS Voyager—recommendations for awards for acts of gallantry (1964) Regional Strategic Assessments Parliamentary questions re—Voyager witnesses Payment for loss of personal effects by survivors of HMAS Voyager collision Public relations—Post Voyager assessment and proposed measures to lessen the effect of unfavourable publicity (1964) Parliamentary question re: escape shuttles Navy Estimates—1963/4 Estimates of expenditure—1962/3 HMAS Voyager—repair and refit allocation 1963/4 Psychological assessment of survivors of HMAS Voyager collision HMAS Voyager—Loss of after collision with HMAS Melbourne survivors, casualties and notification of NOK burial arrangements Lifejacket stowages in HMA Ships Clocks in HMA Ships Construction, Modernisation and Conversion programme for the RAN Review of escape scuttles, HMA Ships Vampire and Vendetta Lookout Placement in HMA Ships RAN Escort vessels—suitability of present layout of loudspeakers on bridges of vessels (1964) HMAS Voyager—two year refit cycle HMAS Voyager—extension of refit Theories of interaction between ships on parallel course HMAS Voyager disaster—inquiry by S.J. Benson MP on the correctness of the order passed to Voyager to ‘turn together’ more than 90 degrees (1964) HMAS Voyager—Royal Commission 1967—Expenditure involved HMAS Voyager—Royal Commission 1967—Distribution of Report Messages of Condolence HMAS Voyager—Loss by sinking after collision with HMAS Melbourne off Jervis Bay (1964) Security problems involved in presentation of evidence Royal Commission into sinking of HMAS Voyager—Matters Arising From (1964) HMAS Melbourne/Voyager—Royal Commission Report and subsequent events arising from report (1964) (Parts 1 & 2)
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HMAS Melbourne/Voyager—Allegations by former Lt Cmdr Cabban Voyager Inquiry 1967—Royal Commission Royal Commission into Allegations of HMAS Melbourne/HMAS Voyager collision by Lt Cmdr Cabban—List of deficiencies and/or weaknesses on the present Navy Procedures, Regulations, Instructions or Organisation—Policy
Primary published sources Chipp, D.L. and Larkin, J. (1978) The Third Man, Rigby, Melbourne Gatacre, G. (1982) Reports of Proceedings, Nautical Press, Manly Howson, P. (1984) The Howson Diaries, Viking, Melbourne Killen, J. (1985) Inside Australian Politics, Methuen, Sydney St John, E.H. (1969) A Time to Speak, Sun, Sydney
Secondary published sources Beattie, J.H. (1962) ‘Marine collision’, USNI Proceedings, June Beddie, B.D. (1987) ‘The Australian Navy and Imperial legislation’, War and Society, vol. 8, no. 2, September Brown, D. (1990) Warship Losses of World War II, Arms and Armour Press, London Cahill, R.A. (1983) Collisions and Their Causes, Fairplay, London Callender, G. and Hinsley, F.H. (1952) The British Side of Naval History, Christophers, London Cockcroft, A.N. and Lameijer, J. (1982) A Guide to the Collision Avoidance Rules, 3rd edition, Stanford Maritime Press, London Cunningham, I.J. (1988) Work Hard, Play Hard, AGPS, Canberra Downs, I. (1986) The Last Mountain, University of Queensland Press, St Lucia Eldridge, F.B. (1949) History of the Royal Australian Naval College, Georgian House, Melbourne Frame, T. (1989) ‘The Voyager disaster: 25 years on, a new perspective’, Canberra Times, 4 February Frede, E. (1964) ‘A sinking stirs up memories’, Virginian Pilot, 12 February Gray, E. (1986) Few Survived: A Comprehensive Survey of Submarine Accidents and Disasters, Leo Cooper, London Grove, E.J. (1987) Vanguard to Trident, US Naval Institute Press, Maryland Hall, T. (1982) HMAS Melbourne, Allen & Unwin, Sydney Hallet, L.A. (1982) Royal Commissions, Select Committees and Boards of Inquiry, Law Book Co., Melbourne ——(1987) ‘Judges as Royal Commissioners’, Law Institute Journal ( Vic.), 61 (8), August Hickling, H. (1965) One Minute of Time, Reed, Auckland ——(1969) Postscript to Voyager, Reed, Auckland Higgins, T. (1987) ‘Royal Commissions’, in P. Grabosky (ed.) Government Illegality, Proceedings of a seminar held by the Australian Institute of Criminology, Canberra
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Hyslop, R. (1990) Aye Aye, Minister: Australian Naval Administration 1939–59, AGPS, Canberra Macandie, G. (1949) The Genesis of the RAN, Commonwealth Government Printer, Melbourne Mankabady, S. (1978) Collisions at Sea: A Guide to Their Legal Consequences, North-Holland, London Marriott, J. (1987) Disaster at Sea, Arrow, London Marsden, R.G. (n.d.) Documents Relating to the Law and Custom of the Sea, Navy Records Society, vols 49, 50 McGovern, T. (1960) ‘Radar and the rule of the road’, Shipping and Shipbuilding Record, no. 25, January McGuffie, K.C. (1961) Marsden: The Law of Collisions at Sea, 11th edition, Stevens & Sons, London McNicoll, A.W. (1974) ‘The Voyager story’, Sydney Morning Herald, 4 February Millar, T.B. (1963) ‘Disaster compounded’, Bulletin, 20 November ——(1965) ‘The Navy after years of decline’, Bulletin, 13 November Moscow, A. (1959) Collision Course, Pan, London Nyman, T. (1986) ‘Royal Commissions: A time for pause’, Law Society Journal, February Ogilvie, A.G. (1979) ‘Courts of marine inquiry in Australia’, Australian Law Journal, no. 53 Padfield, P. (1966) An Agony of Collisions, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London Rintoul, S. (1989) ‘The Voyager outcasts’, the Weekend Australian, 4 February Robertson, R.J. (1964a) ‘The Voyager disaster’, the Australian, 1 October ——(1964b) ‘Collision course’, the Australian, 2 October ——(1964c) ‘Why I resigned from the Navy’, the Australian, 3 October ——(1964d) ‘The two voices of the Naval Board’, the Australian, 5 October ——(1964e) ‘What’s wrong with the Navy?’, the Australian, 6 October Smith, H.A. (1959) The Law and Custom of the Sea, Stevens & Sons, London Stevenson, J. (1971) No Case to Answer, Alpha Books, Sydney Vincent, A. (1975) ‘Collision! The Subic Bay Inquiry’, Quadrant, October Whitton, E. (1974) ‘Voyager: Operation Cover-up’, National Times, 4 February Winterton, G. (1987) ‘Judges as Royal Commissioners’, UNSW Law Journal, Vol. 10, no. 1 Wouk, H. (1951) The Caine Mutiny, Jonathan Cape, London Wylie, F.J. (1963) ‘Rules of the road’, Shipping and Shipbuilding Record, 17 October Young, P.J. (1984) ‘Collision that caused an outcry and left a mystery’, the Australian, 10 February
In addition to the above sources, I was privileged to interview the following: The Hon. K.W. Asprey, the Rt Hon. Sir Garfield Barwick, Commander J.A. Bate, Commodore W.S.G. Bateman, Commodore H.P. Berger, Dr J.H.W. Birrell, the Hon. Sir Nigel Bowen, Commodore I.W. Broben, Sir John Bunting, the Hon. Sir Stanley Burbury, Commodore I.M. Burnside, the Hon. Sir Francis Burt, Lieutenant Commander P.T. Cabban, the Hon. Dr J.F. Cairns, the Hon. C. Cameron, the Hon. Sir John Carrick, Captain I.H.S. Cartwright, the Hon. Sir
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Frederick Chaney, the Hon. D.L. Chipp, Miss H. Craig, Commodore T.A. Dadswell, Rear Admiral P.H. Doyle, Petty Officer Signals Yeoman G.W. Evans, the Hon. Dr A.J. Forbes, the Rt Hon. Sir John Gorton, Rear Admiral W.H.D. Graham, Commodore K.D. Gray, W.H. Gregory, Lieutenant Commander S.B. Griffith, W.A.E. Hagerty, Commander G. Halley, J. Hannay, Sir Clarrie Harders, Lady Janet Harrington, H.J.H. Henchman, R.J. Herd, C.J. Hill, Captain P. Hugonnet, R. Hyslop, J.D. Jess, Warrant Officer Signals Yeoman R.N. Jocumsen, Captain J.M. Kelly, Mrs B.L. Legoe (formerly Stevens), Rear Admiral Sir David Martin, the Hon. C.L.D. Meares, Dame Pattie Menzies, Commodore J.L.W. Merson, the Hon. Justice P. Murphy, Commander the Hon. F.M. Osborne, Leading Seaman Radar Plotter M.J. Patterson, T.S. Philpott, C.A. Porter, A.N. Preston, the Hon. R.G. Reynolds, Rear Admiral A.J. Robertson, Captain B.D. Robertson, Mrs B. Robertson, M. Robertson, the Hon. Justice G.J. Samuels, Rear Admiral P.R. Sinclair, Commodore D.H.D. Smyth, Commodore J.B. Snow, O.D.E. Sparks, D.E. Stevens, Rear Admiral J.D. Stevens, the Hon. Sir Laurence Street, E.H. St John, Dr M.C. Tiller, Captain A.A. Townsend, Surgeon Rear Admiral B.T. Treloar, Leading Electrical Mechanic B.L. Verwayen, Rear Admiral R.A.K. Walls, the Hon. E.G. Whitlam, Rear Admiral A.A. Willis, Chief Petty Officer Medical J.ER. Wilson, Commander W.G. Wright.
I also exchanged correspondence with the following: Dr D.C. Allard, the Hon. K.W. Asprey, the Rt Hon. Sir Garfield Barwick, Dr J.H.W. Birrell, Dr J. Boutilier, the Hon. Sir Nigel Bowen, Sir Stanley Burbury, Commodore I.M. Burnside, Dr J.F. Cairns, the Hon. C.R. Cameron, the Hon. Sir Frederick Chaney, Commander W.A.B. Douglas, Lieutenant W. (CF) Glover, Lieutenant Commander J.V.P. Goldrick, the Rt Hon. Sir John Gorton, Dr K.J. Goulston, Professor K. Hagan, Commander G. Halley, D.J. Heath, Mrs W. Henderson, H.J.H. Henchman, R.J. Herd, Admiral M.W. Hudson, J.D. Jess, Mrs B.L. Legoe (formerly Stevens), the Hon. G.A.G. Lucas, Dr A.W. Martin, J. McCausland, Lieutenant Commander E. McDonald, I. McGibbon, the Hon. C.L.D. Meares, Dame Pattie Menzies, Commodore J.L.W. Merson, A.J. Milliner, Captain J.O. Morrice, the Hon. Justice P. Murphy, B.S.J. O’Keefe QC, Commander the Hon. F.M. Osborne, M.J. Patterson, Vice Admiral Sir Richard Peek, Rear Admiral A.J. Robertson, the Hon. Justice G.J. Samuels, the Hon. Justice I.F. Sheppard, Commodore J.B. Snow, Rear Admiral J.D. Stevens, the Hon. Sir Laurence Street, E.H. St John, C.H.S. Thomason, Dr M.C. Tiller, B.L. Verwayen, M.W.D. White QC, E. Whitton, Rear Admiral A.A. Willis, J.R. Wilson, Commander W.G. Wright.
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INDEX accidents 23 ‘whaler incident’ 24, 78, 92, 107 Adelaide News 111 Age, The 16, 28, 36, 67, 81, 105 Air Force Courts of Inquiry 25, 77 Albatross, HMAS (Naval Air Station (NAS) Nowra) 7, 8, 18, 20, 43, 91, 119, 181 alcohol 49, 50, 75, 105–8, 112, 119, 121–3, 126, 130, 141, 150, 152, 156–7, 161, 195, 196 Aldred, Captain A. 200 American Journal of Psychiatry 199 Anzac, HMAS 53 Ash, W.P. 117, 122–5, 127, 129, 132–4, 138, 140–1, 147, 148 Australian, the 36, 67, 81, 84–5, 87, 93, 103, 115, 161, 165, 180, 185 Australian United Press (AUP) 15 Asprey, K.W. 115, 126–7, 132, 135, 142, 145, 149, 151 Balmoral Naval Hospital see Penguin, HMAS Barker, Chief Petty Officer R.W. 38–40, 56, 59 Barnard, L.H. 162 Barwick, Sir Garfield 23–5, 27, 190 Bate, Sub-Lieutenant J.A. 33, 39–40, 42, 51, 57, 60, 64, 70–1, 74, 80, 82–3, 85, 101, 146–8, 160–2, 193 Becher, Rear Admiral O.H. 7, 17–19, 24, 36–8, 40–1, 52, 80, 86–7, 90 Benson, S.J. 79–80 Birrell, Dr J.H.W. 151 Blackburn, Professor C.R.B. 50, 104, 113, 150–1 Blackpool, HMS 178 blame, apportioning of 35, 48, 57, 61–2, 64, 66–7, 69, 71, 84, 90 Blunden, B. 196 Board of Inquiry, joint USN–RAN 179–81 Bowen, N.H. 99, 106, 109–11, 114, 163, 190 Brennan, Sir Gerard 189 Britton, Captain J. 165 Bryant, G.M. 164 Bulletin, the 85, 96 Bunting, Sir John 23
Burbury, Sir Stanley 115, 127, 132–5, 137–8, 142–3, 145, 149, 155 Burbury Report 157, 162, 177 Burdett, Tactical Operator R.J. 47, 48, 173 Burt, F.T.P. 117–19, 121–2, 124, 126–9, 135–6, 138, 141–2, 144, 148–9, 154, 155 Cabban, Lieutenant Commander P.T. 92, 94, 98–9, 101, 117, 120–1, 126, 177 career 119–20 counsel for 117, 158 cross-examination by Ash 122–6 discredited by Bowen 110 evidence before the Royal Commission 115, 119-28, 133, 137-8, 140, 143, 147, 158, 161 initial statement for Hickling 94, 124 Naval Board 96, 102, 105–6, 109, 122, 125, 139 McNicoll’s opinion of 105 Parliament 106, 110, 112–13 and Captain Robertson 104, 118, 121–2, 125–6, 132, 141, 143, 157 Statement 93–5, 98, 100, 102, 104, 106–10, 113, 115, 117, 122, 124–5, 127–8, 132, 134, 139, 141, 157–8, 193 and Captain Stevens 92, 94, 105, 120–6, 131, 152, 157–8 Caine Mutiny, The 123 Cairns, Dr J.F. 81, 84 Calwell, A.A. 28, 83, 89 Cameron, C.R. 80–1, 112 Canberra Times 16, 181 Carrier Air Group (CAG) 8 Cerberus, HMAS 201 Chaney, F.C. 18, 23, 25, 30, 78, 81–2, 84, 89, 91, 95–100, 105, 112, 163 Chipp, D.L. 92, 99–102, 104, 107, 110–11, 153–4, 156–7, 192 Clarke, Captain D.A.H. 156 Cleaver, R. 164 Cleopatra, HMS 178 Cockatoo Island 21, 53 Collins, Vice Admiral Sir John 97
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The Cruel Legacy collisions, at sea 1, 15, 29, 70, 108, 113 compensation 101–2, 112, 161–3, 183, 184, 186, 188, 191, 198–9, 201 Commonwealth liability 184–5 Conder, Lieutenant J.K. 47, 173 ‘Confrontation’ (Malaysia) 21, 112 Cook, Lieutenant H.D. 5, 13, 19, 61, 152, 170, 174 Cooke, J.A. 183 Coplans, Surgeon Rear Admiral R.M. 106, 129, 130 Cormack, M.C. 84 Courier Mail (Brisbane) 189, 191 court martial 24, 28, 77, 83, 107, 134, 179–81 Crabb, Rear Admiral G.J. 178–9 Crane, Commodore R. 200 Creswell, HMAS 5, 6, 19, 32, 152, 200–1 Cullen, Communications Yeoman K.B. 13, 46–7, 59, 61, 170, 173–4 Cummins, Justice 196 Curlew, HMAS 5 Dadswell, Lieutenant Commander T.A. 10, 68, 145 Daily Mirror (Sydney) 36, 67, 82, 86, 87 Daily Telegraph (Sydney) 36, 161 Daly, F.M. 81 Davidson, Captain J. 179 Davis, Engineering Mechanic G.L. 4 Dawson, Sir Daryl 189 Deane, Sir William 189 Defence Force Retirement Benefits (DFRB) 82, 181, 183 Degenhardt, Ordinary Seaman W.A.E. 45, 49, 68, 174 Department of Defence 101, 185, 188 expenditure 88 Department of the Navy 58, 95, 110 deployments South East Asia 8 ‘Sea Spirit’ 178 Deputy Crown Solicitor 29, 36, 41, 48, 184, 188 Derwent, HMAS 45 Dollard, Commodore A.N. 139 Dovers, Captain W.J. 78, 107 Dowling, Lieutenant J. 5 Doyle, Commander P.H. 6 drugs, 155 amphetamines 153–7 amphogel 128 atrophine sulphate 156 Duchess, HMAS 21, 187 dyspepsia 129 Eggleton, A. 16, 18 Evans, Tactical Operator G. 45–9, 59, 61, 64, 143, 168–70, 173–5 Everett, Leading Tactical Operator R. 15, 38, 39, 55, 59
231 Fairhall, A. 101–2 Farncomb, Rear Admiral H.B. 42 Farquharson, J. 15 Fleet Air Arm 88, 125 flying course 11, 46, 51–4, 56, 58–9, 61, 64, 68, 134, 143–5, 160, 166, 168–9, 173, 175–6 Forbes, Dr A.J. 18, 24–5 Fox, E.M.C. 100–1 Francis, Josiah 25 Frank E. Evans, USS 178–82, 199 Fremantle Herald 193 Garden Island 6, 7, 21, 50, 177 Gatacre, Rear Admiral G.G.O. 5, 17, 18 Gaudron, Justice M.G. 189 Gladstone, Captain G.V. 180 Glasgow, HMS 93 Glass, Commander H.H. 179 Gorton, J.G. 27, 84–6, 91, 157, 190 Gregory, W.H. (Sandy) 32, 62, 117 Griffith, Lieutenant Commander S.B. 106–7 Groves v The Commonwealth 188 Halley, Lieutenant Commander G. 5 Harrington, Vice Admiral Sir Hastings 17–18, 21, 23–5, 41, 71–2, 74, 78, 87, 92, 186–7 Hawk, HMAS 5, 197 Hayden, W.G. 116 Henchman, H.J.H. 31–2, 117, 137 Herald (Melbourne) 36, 81, 97 Hiatt, J.T. 117, 126, 138–41, 144 Hickling, Vice Admiral H. 93–4, 96–9, 124–5, 177 Hicks, D.S. 42, 50, 62–4, 11 helicopters 7, 17–18, 53 rescue 4, 6 wet winch 4, 75 Hobart, HMAS 116 Holt, H.E. 96, 98–102, 105, 111, 113, 157 Hopson, Lieutenant J. 178 Howson, P. 102, 184 Hudson, Vice Admiral M.W. 190–1 Hughes, T. 180 Hughes, Sir Wilfrid Kent 100–1 Hugonnet, Lieutenant P.J. 6 Hyland, Ordinary Steward B.J. 50, 122, 150, 152 Ibis, HMAS 5 Iles, Sub-Lieutenant D.H. 49 Imogen, HMS 93 Imperial Defence College (London) 181 Indonesia 42, 78, 88 Industrial Court 27, 30-1 inquiry, form of 23–9, 113 Irwin, L.H. 112 Jeffries, Sub-Lieutenant F.M. 44, 55
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Jeffrey, P. 117, 132 Jenkyn, N.A. 31, 35–7, 48, 53, 58–61, 63, 84, 142–3, 146 Jersovs, Ordinary Seaman J. 1 Jervis Bay 8, 16–17, 21, 37, 88, 103, 120, 152, 178, 183, 191–2, 200 Jess, J.D. 41, 78, 83–4, 92, 94, 98–9, 101–3, 105–6, 110, 112–15, 126, 131, 151, 161–4, 181 Jocumsen, Tactical Operator R.N. 48 Jude, Commander G. 39 Kaye, W. 189 Kelly, C.R. 99, 157, 164 Kelly, Captain J.M. 13, 33, 38–40, 42–3, 51, 55–7, 61, 64, 70–1, 74, 82–3, 85, 101, 146–8, 160–2, 193 Kerr, J.R. 86 Keys, USS 178 Kiama 18 Killen, J. 23, 112 Kimbla, HMAS 6 King, Rear Admiral J. 179 Kyd, Lieutenant Commander A. 154 Landau, S. 24, 95–6, 106–9, 165 Larson, USS 178 Lavarch, M. 190 Lawrence, Dr C. 193 L’Estrange, Richard 104 lifesaving equipment 35, 50, 57, 71, 75, 85 Lindsey, Midshipman B.C.L. 6 Low, Radar Plotter P.R. 2 Loxton, Captain B.L. 106, 139 Lucas, Justice G.A.G. 115, 127, 132, 137, 149 Lyons, Father Frank 91 Macgregor, Lieutenant Commander I.A.G. 47, 56, 61, 172, 174 Mackay, Rev. Dr M.G. 100, 104, 112 McCallum, Dr N. 151 McClelland, D. 85 McClemore, Commander A. 178–9 McHugh, Justice M.H. 189 McKenna, N.E. 84 McLachlan, I. 195 McLean, W. 194–5 McMahon, W. 100–1, 113 McNeil, Surgeon Commander J.R. 128–30, 140, 154, 159 McNicoll, Rear Admiral A.W.R. 74, 79, 92, 95–6, 99, 102, 105, 107, 159 Manus Island 128 Marien, Midshipman K.F. 4, 6 Marks, Justice K.H. 189 Marine Court of Inquiry 26, 31 Martin, Lieutenant Commander D.J. 192 Mason, Sir Anthony 189 Matthews, Able Seaman A.B. 2, 49
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Maughm, Lord Viscount 70 Maunder, Midshipman R.W. 6 Meares, C.L.D. 32, 39, 54, 61, 63–4, 168–9, 175 Melbourne, HMAS after 11 February 1964 21, 41, 44, 53, 77, 91, 177, 193–7 before 10 February 1964 30, 128 on 10 February 1964 1, 2, 4, 5–15 on 11 February 1964 17, 19, 20 collision with Frank E. Evans 178–9, 199 inexperience of bridge officers 56, 60, 80, 135 log book 39 memorial services 91, 191–2, 200 navigational sidelights 9, 10, 45, 61, 166–7, 175, 178 OOW 33, 40, 44, 55–7, 60, 80 OOW’s notebook 42, 44 repairs 21 Menzies, Sir Robert 23–7, 29, 67, 79, 81, 83, 86, 88–9, 92, 95–6, 98 Merson, Commander J.L.W. 30 Mesley, Captain J.S. 17, 30 Millar, T.B. 96, 181 Milliner, Leading Electrical Mechanic A.J. 3 Morgan, Midshipman F.J. 6 Morrison, Rear Admiral T.K. 95, 116 Morrow, Sir William 129, 147 Murphy, P. 117, 125–6, 129, 132, 135, 137–8, 141–3, 146–7, 159 Naval Board administration 35–6, 81, 83, 130, 138, 159, 164 appointment of Co-ordinator of Naval Safety 89 Board of Inquiry 54, 71, 83, 89, 179, 181 and the Cabban Statement 96, 100, 108–10, 122, 159 and Cabinet 72, 75, 77, 82, 147 claims for compensation 183–4, 188 Counsel for 59, 60, 72, 85, 125, 146 court martial 24, 71, 77, 83, 179–80 and drugs 156 forms of inquiry 17, 24–6, 54 justification for disciplinary action 74 legal advisor (CNJA) 71 liability 184, 196 members 26, 74, 89, 186 and Parliament 28, 79, 84, 86, 106, 109, 162, 165, 177, 182 and the public 24, 72, 75, 88, 91 reforms 75, 76, 165, 173 replacement of Voyager 20–1, 27 and Captain Robertson 17, 28, 41, 43, 60, 65, 72–4, 78–9, 81–2, 87, 108, 132, 142, 146–8 Royal Commission 1964 21–2, 40, 50, 53, 58, 63, 65, 81–2, 84, 91, 142
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The Cruel Legacy Royal Commission 1967 115–16, 138, 141, 143, 146–7, 161, 164, 177 and Captain Stevens 95-6, 98, 102, 109, 112, 115, 118–19, 38, 141, 147–8, 159 and Stevenson, Captain J.P. 30, 178–81 and Surgeon Lieutenant M. Tiller 107–8 and Voyager disaster 17–18, 24, 90, 165, 173 legacy 91 survivors 20, 186–7 Naval Air Station (NAS) Nowra see Albatross, HMAS naval accidents 83, 91 Accidents Investigating Committee 77 Discipline Act 1910 71 ethos 24, 29 justice 24 procedures 40, 58, 72, 73, 75, 80, 84 training 77 Naval Review (UK) 97 Navigation Act 1912 26, 31 navigational sidelights 9, 10, 38, 45, 61, 73, 166–7, 175, 178 Navy News 88, 116 Navy Office 81, 180 New Zealand 93 night flying 8, 73 officer in tactical command (OTC) 10, 36, 51, 55, 142, 147 officer of the watch (OOW) 13, 32, 40, 44, 46, 55–7, 80, 173 officers and alcohol 75, 121, 123, 152 training of 75, 77 views 91, 106, 178 O’Keefe, B.S.J. 190 One Minute of Time 93, 96–7 operations 35, 178 Osborne, F.M. 32, 81, 98, 117, 122, 148 Packer, Sir Frank 113 Palmer, Chief Coxswain R. 188 Papua New Guinea 88 Parker, Able Seaman R.W. 5, 19, 197 Parker, Mrs E. 184–5 Parker, H.S. 19, 184 Parliament 79–83, 97, 103, 105–7, 109–14, 137, 147, 162, 164, 177 Press Gallery 67, 104 Parramatta, HMAS 88, 106 Patterson, Leading Seaman M.J. 45, 47–9, 169, 172–5 Peek, Captain R.I. 30, 41, 53–4, 106–7, 133–4, 168, 190 Penguin, HMAS 20, 48, 122 Perry, Midshipman K.J. 5 planeguard 11–12, 53, 56, 58, 60, 62, 75, 80, 168, 170–2, 178 Pleuckhahn, Dr V.D. 151
233 Point Perpendicular 5, 66, 43 Porter, C.A. 117 Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) 194–9 Postscript to Voyager 177 Press, the and the Cabban Statement 103–4 Frank E. Evans 180, 182 government 81, 84–5, 111–12 Naval Board 24, 75 and Captain Robertson 23, 28, 36, 79, 82, 86–8, 137 RAN 20, 30, 80, 81, 87, 88 Royal Commission 1964 28, 33, 36, 42, 67, 92 Royal Commission 1967 105, 115, 131, 149 Price, Lieutenant D.H.M. 13, 32–3, 45–6, 52, 56, 59, 61–2, 117, 143, 166–7, 170–2, 174 Privy Council 32 Quiberon, HMAS 187 Raine, E.P.T. 42, 117 Ramsay, Alan 103 Ramsey, Lieutenant R. 178 RAN College see Creswell, HMAS Rankin, Dr J.G. 151 reconstruction of Voyager disaster author 168–76 Naval Board 72–4, 173 and Captain Robertson 38, 46, 49, 51–2, 57, 132–3, 135, 143, 148, 166–9, 171–2, 175–6 Royal Commission 1964 hearing 53–4, 56–7, 64–5 Royal Commission 1964 report 67, 69, 70–3, 134–5, 137, 145, 163 Royal Commission 1967 hearing 134, 142–6 Royal Commission 1967 report 160 Reid, Alan 80, 85, 113 Report of Grounding and Collision (Form) AS 232 42 rescue 45, 50, 57, 71 resignation Captain Robertson 78, 79, 81, 82 Captain Stevenson 180 responsibilities 35, 58–9, 61 Reynolds, R.G. 32, 117, 126, 133–7, 143 Rich, Leading Seaman ‘Pedro’ 2, 3 River Class 22 Robertson, Rear Admiral A.J. 89 Robertson, Mrs B. 92 Robertson, Captain R.J. 55, 63, 77, 80, 84, 177 on 10 February 1964 5, 6, 8, 10–4 on 11 February 1964 19 collision 17, 52, 57, 69, 70 comments 26, 28, 33, 49 compensation 101–2, 112, 161–3 counsel 32–3,41–2, 50, 64, 117, 126, 142–4, 146, 148
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and the Naval Board 74, 79, 87, 132, 147 pension 78, 81, 92, 161–2 post-Navy 87, 92, 94, 96–9, 108, 132, 185 posting after Melbourne 41, 78–9, 87 and the Press 23, 82, 86–7 reconstructions of the collision 38,51–2, 55, 57, 64, 166–9, 171–2, 175–6 representations 36–7, 41, 60, 68, 103, 145 resignation 78–9, 81–2, 86 Royal Commission 1964 26, 31, 36–8, 41–6, 49–51, 55, 63, 69–71, 101, 131–2, 193 Royal Commission 1967 116, 121, 133, 136–7, 139–41, 143–7, 159–63 and Captain Stevens 52, 94, 104, 132, 138, 141, 150 Rogers, Chief Coxswain J. 2, 3 Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) 23, 77 Royal Australian Navy (RAN) 29–30, 33, 35, 48, 67, 72, 83, 85–9, 93, 110, 116, 177, 201 Australian Fleet 20 recruiting 88–91 Reserves 32, 80, 83, 128 Royal Commission on Voyager 1964 35–64 passim assessors 27, 53 counsel appearing 30–2, 68, 85 evidence submitted 57, 66, 69, 94, 103, 115, 131 naval advisers 29 procedure 63, 92 proceedings 32–3, 35–54 passim, 97, 101, 105, 148 Report 64, 67–72, 74, 77–80, 92–3, 102, 113, 116, 132, 135, 177 terms of reference 27, 35, 45, 50, 55, 58, 68 Royal Commission on Voyager 1967 appellate court 147, 159 counsel appearing 131, 134 proceedings 119–49 passim, 154 public interest 149, 160, 165 Report 157–8, 164, 177 and Captain Stevens 123, 125, 127–8, 149, 157–8 terms of reference 115, 117, 119, 124, 127, 131, 135–6, 138, 141, 143, 148–9, 158–9, 161 Royal Navy (RN) 21, 30, 83, 93, 173 Russell, Ordinary Seaman P.A. 56 Russell, Ordinary Seaman R. 196 Ryan, Leading Mechanical Engineer P. 2 St John, E.H. 100, 104, 110–13, 118, 131, 161, 163–4 Samuels, G.J. 137–8, 142–6, 148-–9, 159, 163, 168 Search & Rescue (SAR) 6, 50, 71 craft No. 256 6
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craft No. 257 6 Shands, Captain K.W. 179 Sheppard, I.F. 28, 31, 64, 95, 104 Sinclair, J.B. 32, 117, 122 Sinclair, Lieutenant P.R. 156 signals after collision 5–7, 17, 29 before collision 10–12, 34, 38–9, 46, 48, 51, 53, 58–9, 61–3, 145, 160, 166, 168, 170–3, 175 Smith, A. 193 Smith, Rear Admiral V.A. 24, 116, 180, 187, 190 Smyth, Commodore D.H.D. 117, 152 Smyth, J.W. 31, 33, 36–8, 40–4, 48, 50, 52–3, 55–6, 60, 62, 64–5, 71, 85–6, 95, 104, 122, 133–4, 138–9, 142–3, 150, 152, 169 Squadrons (Fleet Air Arm) 805 6 816 6 Snedden, B.M. 41, 86, 111, 157 Snipe, HMAS 5 South East Asia 44, 77, 178 SEATO 21 Sparks, Tactical Operator O.D.E. 48 Sperling, Justice H. 195 Spicer, Sir John 27, 30–1, 33, 37, 41, 43, 49–50, 55, 60, 63–5, 67–8, 82, 84, 98, 113, 116, 118, 131, 133, 135–7, 141–3, 146–7, 149, 159, 163, 168, 171, 173 Spicer Report 67–72, 74, 77–80, 84–5, 93–4, 116, 132, 135, 144, 149, 184, 193 Stalwart, HMAS 81 Statutes of Limitations 188, 196 Stevens, B.L. (Mrs) 116–17 Stevens, Captain D.H. and alcohol 50, 92, 94–5, 97–8, 101, 104–7, 111–13, 118–19, 122, 126, 129–30, 134–5, 138, 140–2, 144, 148, 150, 152–4, 156–8, 191 before 10 February 1964 123 on 10 February 1964 5, 8, 13–14, 46, 59, 73, 170–1, 174, 197 and Lieutenant Commander Cabban 105, 110, 120–6, 153, 157 counsel 32–3 family 19, 32, 61, 95, 98, 102, 104, 116–17, 122, 148 fitness to command 56, 97, 115, 118, 126–7, 129–32, 134–6, 138, 142–6, 148–50, 153, 155, 157–8, 160–1, 163 health 119, 128–30, 135, 138, 140–2, 144, 147, 150, 153–8, 160, 163 Naval Board 95–6, 98, 102, 109, 112, 118–19, 138, 147, 159 post mortem results 151 responsibility 55, 73, 132, 134, 147, 166 Royal Commission 1964 133
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The Cruel Legacy Royal Commission 1967 115, 122, 127, 139–42, 149, 163 ulcer 128–9, 135, 138, 140, 144, 147, 150, 153, 156–8, 163 Stevens, Sir Jack 116 Stevenson, Captain H.D. 41, 78, 179 Stevenson, Captain J.P. 30, 41, 178–82, 186 Street, Sir Laurence 32, 39–40, 47, 53, 61–4, 117, 148, 166, 168, 175 Stuart, HMAS 18 Subic Bay Inquiry 179–81 Summerfield, Dr D. 198 Sumpter, Ordinary Seaman B.W. 13, 45, 167 Sun (Melbourne) 36, 67, 161 Sun-Herald (Sydney) 36, 90 Sunday Mirror 82 Supply, HMAS 20 Swan, HMAS 22, 190 Sydney, HMAS 6, 7, 24, 41, 78, 92, 107, 120, 177, 186 ‘whaler’ incident 24, 78, 92, 107 Sydney Morning Herald 28, 36, 87, 88, 105, 191–2 Tabard, HM Submarine 8, 47, 174 Tarakan, HMAS 25–6 Tarangau, HMAS 128–9 Teal, HMAS 5 The Sullivans, USS 21 The Third Man 153 Times (London) 97 Tiller, Surgeon Lieutenant M.C. 107–8, 128, 140, 155, 159, 190, 193 Toohey, Justice B.M.J. 189 Torrens, HMAS 22 Treloar, Surgeon Commander B.T. 77 Truth (Melbourne) 104–5 Turner, H.B. 101, 112, 163–5 turning course 51, 53 signal 46, 48, 56–7, 59, 62, 64, 68, 144–5, 160, 169–70, 176 Twining, USS 21 United States Navy (USN) 21, 30, 83, 173 Vampire, HMAS 113, 187, 197 Vendetta, HMAS 30, 53, 187
235 Verwayen, Leading Electrical Engineer B.L. 188–9 Vietnam 42, 92, 112, 116, 177, 188, 198 Vincent, Lieutenant A. 179 ‘voice in the water’ 48–9, 69, 169, 173, 175 Voyager, HMAS after 10 February 1964 18 before 10 February 1964 47, 108, 113, 123, 128, 139–40, 154–6 on 10 February 1964 1–15 passim, 19, 183 culpability 61, 113 final exercise 8, 10, 11–16, 45–7 materiel, state of 47, 50, 57, 74 memorial services 91 personnel 56 public concern about disaster 23 register of drugs 155 station keeping 54, 168 survivors 2, 4–7, 17, 19–20, 27, 33, 45, 49, 57, 59, 71, 102, 122, 165, 175, 183, 185–90, 192, 195, 197, 199–201 claims 183, 190–1, 199, 200 compensation 183–4, 186–8, 191, 201 sidelights 9, 10, 38, 167 war 78, 88 Warramunga, HMAS 119 Watson, HMAS 19, 49, 65, 78, 79 Wentworth, W.C. 100–1 Were, Archdeacon J. 91 West Australian (Perth) 161 wheel spanners 57, 74 Wheeldon, Chaplain W. 91 Where Fate Calls 190–2 Whitlam, E.G. 79, 83, 97–8, 104–5, 162, 190 Williamstown Naval Dockyad 107 Willis, Captain A.A. 107 Willis, Captain G.J. 95, 99, 106–7, 113, 117, 123, 190 Wilson, Leading Sick Bay Attendant J.R. 155, 159 Winch, Commander L.F. 71, 74 Windeyer, Sir Victor 185 Wright, R.J. 101, 106 Yarra, HMAS 30, 88, 106
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