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The Cambridge Handbook of Computational Psychology This book is a definitive reference source for the growing, increasingly important, and interdisciplinary field of computational cognitive modeling, that is, computational psychology. It combines breadth of coverage with definitive statements by leading scientists in this field. Research in computational cognitive modeling (or, simply, computational psychology) explores the essence of cognition and various cognitive functionalities through developing detailed, process-based understanding by specifying computational mechanisms, structures, and processes. Given the complexity of the human mind and its manifestation in behavioral flexibility, process-based computational models may be necessary to explicate and elucidate the intricate details of the mind. The key to understanding cognitive processes is often in fine details. Computational models provide algorithmic specificity: detailed, exactly specified, and carefully thought-out steps, arranged in precise yet flexible sequences. These models provide both conceptual clarity and precision at the same time. This book substantiates this approach through overviews and many examples. Ron Sun is professor of cognitive science at Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute. A well-known researcher in the field of cognitive science, Sun explores the fundamental structure of the human mind and aims for the synthesis of many interesting intellectual ideas into one coherent model of cognition. The goal is to form a generic cognitive architecture that captures a variety of cognitive processes in a unified way and, thus, to provide unified explanations for a wide range of cognitive data. To do so, for the last two decades, he has been advocating the use of hybrid connectionist-symbolic systems in developing cognitive models, and he has been developing theories of human skill learning and human everyday reasoning as the centerpieces of the cognitive architecture.
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The Cambridge Handbook of Computational Psychology
Edited by
RON SUN Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute
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CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS
Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town, Singapore, São Paulo Cambridge University Press The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge CB2 8RU, UK Published in the United States of America by Cambridge University Press, New York www.cambridge.org Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9780521857413 © Cambridge University Press 2008 This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the provision of relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take place without the written permission of Cambridge University Press. First published in print format 2008
ISBN-13
978-0-511-45534-6
eBook (EBL)
ISBN-13
978-0-521-85741-3
hardback
ISBN-13
978-0-521-67410-2
paperback
Cambridge University Press has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of urls for external or third-party internet websites referred to in this publication, and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate.
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Contents
Preface List of Contributors part i: introduction 1 Introduction to Computational Cognitive Modeling Ron Sun
page vii ix 1 3
part ii: cognitive modeling paradigms
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2 Connectionist Models of Cognition Michael S. C. Thomas and James L. McClelland
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3 Bayesian Models of Cognition Thomas L. Griffiths, Charles Kemp, and Joshua B. Tenenbaum
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4 Dynamical Systems Approaches to Cognition Gregor Sch¨oner
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5 Declarative/Logic-Based Cognitive Modeling Selmer Bringsjord
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6 Constraints in Cognitive Architectures Niels A. Taatgen and John R. Anderson
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part iii: computational modeling of various cognitive functionalities and domains 7 Computational Models of Episodic Memory Kenneth A. Norman, Greg Detre, and Sean M. Polyn
187 189
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contents
8 Computational Models of Semantic Memory Timothy T. Rogers
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9 Models of Categorization John K. Kruschke
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10 Micro-Process Models of Decision Making Jerome R. Busemeyer and Joseph G. Johnson
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11 Models of Inductive Reasoning Evan Heit
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12 Mental Logic, Mental Models, and Simulations of Human Deductive Reasoning Philip N. Johnson-Laird and Yingrui Yang
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13 Computational Models of Skill Acquisition Stellan Ohlsson
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14 Computational Models of Implicit Learning Axel Cleeremans and Zoltan ´ Dienes
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15 Computational Models of Attention and Cognitive Control Nicola De Pisapia, Grega Repovˇs, and Todd S. Braver
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16 Computational Models of Developmental Psychology Thomas R. Shultz and Sylvain Sirois
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17 Computational Models of Psycholinguistics Nick Chater and Morten H. Christiansen
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18 Computational Models in Personality and Social Psychology Stephen J. Read and Brian M. Monroe
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19 Cognitive Social Simulation Ron Sun
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20 Models of Scientific Explanation Paul Thagard and Abninder Litt
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21 Cognitive Modeling for Cognitive Engineering Wayne D. Gray
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22 Models of Animal Learning and Their Relations to Human Learning Francisco J. L´opez and David R. Shanks
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23 Computational Modeling of Visual Information Processing Pawan Sinha and Benjamin J. Balas
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24 Models of Motor Control Ferdinando A. Mussa-Ivaldi and Sara A. Solla
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part iv: concluding remarks
665
25 An Evaluation of Computational Modeling in Cognitive Science Margaret A. Boden
667
26 Putting the Pieces Together Again Aaron Sloman
684
Index
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Preface
The goal of the Cambridge Handbook of Computational Psychology is to provide a definitive reference source for the rapidly growing, increasingly important, and strongly interdisciplinary field of computational cognitive modeling – that is, computational (and theoretical) psychology. It is part of the Cambridge Handbook in Psychology series. This volume combines the breadth of coverage of the field with the authoritative statements by leading scientists in this discipline. It should thus appeal to researchers and advanced students working in this research field, as well as to researchers and advanced students working in cognitive science (in general), philosophy, experimental psychology, linguistics, anthropology, neuroscience, and artificial intelligence. For example, it could serve as a textbook for a course in a cognitive science program or, more generally, in social and behavioral sciences programs. This book could also be used by social science researchers, education researchers, intelligent systems engineers, and psychology and education software developers.
Models in cognitive science are often roughly divided into computational, mathematical, or verbal-conceptual models. Although each of these types of models has its role to play, in this volume, we are mainly concerned with computational modeling. The reason for this emphasis is that, at least at present, computational modeling appears to be the most promising approach in many ways and offers the flexibility and the expressive power that no other approaches can match. (Mathematical models may be viewed somehow as a subset of computational models, as they may lead readily to computational implementations.) A computational model may often be viewed as a theory of the phenomena it aims to capture and may be highly intellectually enlightening in this way. Each chapter in this volume introduces and explains basic concepts, techniques, and findings for a major topic area within the realm of computational cognitive modeling (e.g., computational models and theories of a particular cognitive domain or functionality); sketches its history; assesses its
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successes and failures; and evaluates the directions of current and future research. This handbook thus provides quick overviews for experts in each topic area and also for researchers in allied topic areas. However, equally important, the book provides an introduction to the field of computational cognitive modeling (computational psychology). It discusses the methodologies of computational cognitive modeling and justifies its use in cognitive science. It introduces influential approaches, describing in detail these approaches and providing ample examples. Thus, this volume provides an entry point into the field for the next generation of researchers by supplying a text for courses for graduate students and upperlevel undergraduate students and for selfstudy. I would like to thank all the contributing authors. Many of them not only contributed chapters, but also participated in mutual reviews of draft chapters, thus helping to ensure the quality of this book. I would like to thank all the reviewers of the chapters. The external reviewers include: Edward Wasserman, Gert Westermann, Frank Ritter, Robert Wray,
Robert French, Roger Levy, Jeff Schrager, Michael J. Frank, Sam Gilbert, Kostas Arkoudas, Brad Love, Emo Todorov, Russ Burnett, Chris Schunn, Ernest Davis, Robert West, Paul Bello, Michael Schoelles, Robert Port, Mike Byrne, John Spencer, David Peebles, Robert Jacobs, and Maximilian Riesenhuber. The internal reviewers include: Thomas Shultz, David Shank, Paul Thagard, Aaron Sloman, Stellan Ohlsson, Tim Rogers, Stephen Read, Evan Heit, Nick Chater, and Ken Norman. I would also like to thank the members of the advisory board, who contributed suggestions that made the volume more comprehensive and more interesting. The members of the advisory board include: Thomas Shultz, Wayne Gray, and Jay McClelland. Finally, I would like to thank Phil Laughlin for inviting me to put together this volume. It has been a pleasure working with Eric Schwartz, Phil Laughlin, Armi Macaballug, Peggy Rote, and others at Cambridge University Press in the process of developing this book. Ron Sun Troy, New York
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List of Contributors
John R. Anderson Department of Psychology Carnegie Mellon University 5000 Forbes Avenue Pittsburgh, PA 15213, USA
[email protected] http://act-r.psy.cmu.edu/people/ja/ Benjamin J. Balas Department of Brain and Cognitive Sciences Massachusetts Institute of Technology Cambridge, MA 02139, USA
[email protected] http://web.mit.edu/bcs/bjbalas/www/ Margaret A. Boden Centre for Cognitive Science, School of Science and Technology University of Sussex Brighton BN1 9QH, UK
[email protected] http://www.informatics.sussex.ac.uk/ users/maggieb Todd S. Braver Department of Psychology
Washington University St. Louis, MO 63139, USA
[email protected] http://ccpweb.wustl.edu/braver.html Selmer Bringsjord Department of Cognitive Science and Department of Computer Science Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute Troy, NY 12180, USA
[email protected] http://www.rpi.edu/∼brings Jerome R. Busemeyer Department of Psychological and Brain Sciences Indiana University Bloomington, IN 47405, USA
[email protected] http://mypage.iu.edu/∼jbusemey/ home.html Nick Chater Department of Psychology University College London Gower Street London, WC1E 6BT, UK ix
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[email protected] http://www.psychol.ucl.ac.uk/people/ profiles/chater nick.htm Morten H. Christiansen Department of Psychology Cornell University Ithaca, NY 14853, USA
[email protected] http://cnl.psych.cornell.edu/people/ morten.html Axel Cleeremans Department of Psychology Universite´ Libre de Bruxelles 50 avenue F. D. Roosevelt CP191, B1050 Bruxelles, Belgium
[email protected] http://srsc.ulb.ac.be/axcWWW/ axc.html Greg Detre Department of Psychology Princeton University Green Hall, Washington Road Princeton, NJ 08540, USA
[email protected] http://compmem.princeton.edu Zolt´an Dienes Department of Psychology University of Sussex Brighton, East Sussex BN1 9RH, UK
[email protected] http://www.lifesci.sussex.ac.uk/home/ Zoltan Dienes/ Wayne D. Gray Cognitive Science Department Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute Troy, NY 12180, USA
[email protected] http://www.rpi.edu/∼grayw Thomas L. Griffiths Department of Psychology University of California, Berkeley Berkeley, CA 94720, USA tom
[email protected] http://cocosci.berkeley.edu/tom/
Evan Heit Department of Psychology University of California, Merced Merced, CA 95344, USA
[email protected] http://faculty.ucmerced.edu/eheit/ index.html Joseph G. Johnson Department of Psychology Miami University Oxford, OH 45056, USA
[email protected] http://www.users.muohio.edu/johnsojg/ Philip N. Johnson-Laird Psychology Department Princeton University Princeton, NJ 08540, USA
[email protected] https://weblamp.princeton.edu/∼psych/ psychology/research/johnson laird Charles Kemp Department of Brain and Cognitive Sciences Massachusetts Institute of Technology Cambridge, MA 02139, USA
[email protected] http://www.mit.edu/∼ckemp/ John K. Kruschke Department of Psychological and Brain Sciences Indiana University 1101 East 10th Street Bloomington, IN 47405, USA
[email protected] http://www.indiana.edu/∼kruschke/ Abninder Litt Cheriton School of Computer Science University of Waterloo Waterloo, ON N2L3G1, Canada
[email protected] http://www.student.cs.uwaterloo.ca/∼alitt/ ´ Francisco J. Lopez Departamento de Psicologia Basica Universidad de Malaga Campus de Teatinos
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Malaga, Spain
[email protected] James L. McClelland Department of Psychology and Center for Mind, Brain and Computation Stanford University 344 Jordan Hall, Bldg 420, 450 Serra Mall Stanford, CA 94305, USA
[email protected] http://www-psych.stanford.edu/∼jlm/ Brian M. Monroe Department of Psychology University of Southern California Los Angeles, CA 90089, USA
[email protected] http://psychology.usc.edu/Monroe.php Ferdinando A. Mussa-Ivaldi Department of Physiology Northwestern University Chicago, IL 60611, USA
[email protected] http://www.northwestern.edu/nuin/fac/ mussa-ivaldi.htm Kenneth A. Norman Department of Psychology Princeton University Green Hall, Washington Road Princeton, NJ 08540, USA
[email protected] http://compmem.princeton.edu Stellan Ohlsson Department of Psychology University of Illinois at Chicago 1007 West Harrison Street Chicago, IL 60607, USA
[email protected] http://www.uic.edu/depts/psch/ ohlson-1.html Nicola De Pisapia Department of Psychology Washington University St. Louis, MO 63139, USA
[email protected] http://www.artsci.wustl.edu/∼ndepisap
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Sean M. Polyn Department of Psychology University of Pennsylvania 3401 Walnut Street Philadelphia, PA 19104, USA
[email protected] http://polyn.com/struct/researchindex.html Stephen J. Read Department of Psychology University of Southern California Los Angeles, CA 90089, USA
[email protected] http://www-rcf.usc.edu/∼read/ Grega Repovˇs Department of Psychology Washington University St. Louis, MO 63139, USA
[email protected] http://iac.wustl.edu/∼grepovs Timothy T. Rogers Department of Psychology 524 WJ Brogden Hall University of Wisconsin-Madison Madison, WI 53706, USA
[email protected] http://psych.wisc.edu/Rogers/ ¨ Gregor Schoner Institut fur ¨ Neuroinformatik Ruhr-Universit¨at Bochum 44780 Bochum, Germany
[email protected] http://www.neuroinformatik.rub.de/thbio/ members/profil/Schoener/index.html David R. Shanks Department of Psychology University College London Gower Street London WC1E 6BT, UK
[email protected] http://www.psychol.ucl.ac.uk/david.shanks/ Shanks.html Thomas R. Shultz Department of Psychology and School of Computer Science
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McGill University 1205 Penfield Avenue Montreal, Quebec H3A 1B1, Canada
[email protected] http://www.psych.mcgill.ca/perpg/fac/ shultz/personal/default.htm Pawan Sinha Department of Brain and Cognitive Sciences Massachusetts Institute of Technology Cambridge, MA 02139, USA
[email protected] http://web.mit.edu/bcs/sinha/ home.html Sylvain Sirois School of Psychological Sciences University of Manchester Oxford Road Manchester, M13 9PL, UK
[email protected] http://www.psych-sci.manchester .ac.uk/staff/SylvainSirois Aaron Sloman School of Computer Science University of Birmingham Birmingham B15 2TT, UK
[email protected] http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/∼axs/ Sara A. Solla Department of Physiology Northwestern University Chicago, IL 60611, USA
[email protected] http://dept-www.physio.northwestern.edu/ Secondlevel/Solla.html Ron Sun Cognitive Science Department Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute
Troy, NY 12180, USA
[email protected] http://www.cogsci.rpi.edu/∼rsun Niels A. Taatgen Department of Psychology Carnegie Mellon University 5000 Forbes Avenue Pittsburgh, PA 15213, USA
[email protected] http://www.ai.rug.nl/∼niels Joshua B. Tenenbaum Department of Brain and Cognitive Sciences Massachusetts Institute of Technology Cambridge, MA 02139, USA
[email protected] http://web.mit.edu/cocosci/josh.html Paul Thagard Philosophy Department University of Waterloo Waterloo, ON N2L3G1, Canada
[email protected] http://cogsci.uwaterloo.ca Michael S. C. Thomas Developmental Neurocognition Laboratory, School of Psychology Birkbeck College, University of London Malet Street London WC1E 7HX, UK
[email protected] http://www.bbk.ac.uk/psyc/staff/academic/ mthomas Yingrui Yang Cognitive Science Department Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute Troy, NY 12180, USA
[email protected] http://www.cogsci.rpi.edu/
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Part I
INTRODUCTION
This part provides a general introduction to the field of computational psychology and an overview of the book. It discusses the general methodology of computational cognitive modeling, and justifies its use in cognitive science and beyond.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction to Computational Cognitive Modeling
Instead going straight into dealing with specific approaches, issues, and domains of computational cognitive modeling, it is appropriate to first take some time to explore a few general questions that lie at the very core of cognitive science and computational cognitive modeling. What is computational cognitive modeling? What exactly can it contribute to cognitive science? What has it contributed thus far? Where is it going? Answering such questions may sound overly defensive to the insiders of computational cognitive modeling and may even seem so to some other cognitive scientists, but they are very much needed in a volume like this because they lie at the very foundation of this field. Many insiders and outsiders alike would like to take a balanced and rational look at these questions without indulging in excessive cheerleading, which, as one would expect, happens sometimes among computational modeling enthusiasts. However, given the large number of issues involved and the complexity of these issues, only a cursory discussion is possible in this introductory chapter.One may thus view this chapter as a set of pointers to the
existing literature rather than a full-scale discussion.
1. What Is Computational Cognitive Modeling? Research in computational cognitive modeling, or simply computational psychology, explores the essence of cognition (including motivation, emotion, perception, etc.) and various cognitive functionalities through developing detailed, process-based understanding by specifying corresponding computational models (in a broad sense) of representations, mechanisms, and processes. It embodies descriptions of cognition in computer algorithms and programs, based on computer science (Turing, 1950); that is, it imputes computational processes (in a broad sense) onto cognitive functions, and thereby it produces runnable computational models. Detailed simulations are then conducted based on the computational models (see, e.g., Newell, 1990; Rumelhart et al., 1986; Sun, 2002). Right from the beginning of the formal establishment of cognitive 3
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science around the late 1970s, computational modeling has been a mainstay of cognitive science.1 In general, models in cognitive science may be roughly categorized into computational, mathematical, or verbal-conceptual models (see, e.g., Bechtel & Graham, 1998). Computational models present process details using algorithmic descriptions. Mathematical models present relationships between variables using mathematical equations. Verbal-conceptual models describe entities, relations, and processes in rather informal natural languages. Each model, regardless of its genre, might as well be viewed as a theory of whatever phenomena it purports to capture (as argued before by, e.g., Newell, 1990; Sun, 2005). Although each of these types of models has its role to play, the discussion in this volume is mainly concerned with computational modeling, including models based on computational cognitive architectures. The reason for this emphasis is that, at least at present, computational modeling (in a broad sense) appears to be the most promising approach in many respects, and it offers the flexibility and expressive power that no other approach can match, as it provides a variety of modeling techniques and methodologies, and supports practical applications of cognitive theories (Pew & Mavor, 1998). In this regard, note that mathematical models may be viewed as a subset of computational models, as normally they can readily lead to computational implementations (although some of them may be sketchy and lack process details). Computational models are mostly process-based theories, that is, they are mostly directed at answering the question of how human performance comes about; by what psychological mechanisms, processes, 1 The roots of cognitive science can, of course, be traced back to much earlier times. For example, Newell and Simon’s early work in the 1960s and 1970s has been seminal (see, e.g., Newell & Simon, 1976). The work of Miller, Galanter, and Pribram (1960) has also been highly influential. See Chapter 25 in this volume for a more complete historical perspective (see also Boden, 2006).
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and knowledge structures; and in what ways exactly. In this regard, note that it is also possible to formulate theories of the same phenomena through so-called product theories, which provide an accurate functional account of the phenomena but do not commit to a particular psychological mechanism or process (Vicente & Wang, 1998). Product theories may also be called blackbox theories or input-output theories. Product theories do not make predictions about processes (even though they may constrain processes). Thus, product theories can be evaluated mainly by product measures. Process theories, in contrast, can be evaluated by using process measures when they are available and relevant (which are, relatively speaking, rare), such as eye movement and duration of pause in serial recall, or by using product measures, such as recall accuracy, recall speed, and so on. Evaluation of process theories using the latter type of measures can only be indirect, because process theories have to generate an output given an input based on the processes postulated by the theories (Vicente & Wang, 1998). Depending on the amount of process details specified, a computational model may lie somewhere along the continuum from pure product theories to pure process theories. There can be several different senses of “modeling” in this regard, as discussed in Sun and Ling (1998). The match of a model with human cognition may be, for example, qualitative (i.e., nonnumerical and relative) or quantitative (i.e., numerical and exact). There may even be looser “matches” based on abstracting general ideas from observations of human behaviors and then developing them into computational models. Although different senses of modeling or matching human behaviors have been used, the overall goal remains the same, which is to understand cognition (human cognition in particular) in a detailed (processoriented) way. This approach of utilizing computational cognitive models for understanding human cognition is relatively new. Although earlier precursors might be identified, the major
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developments of computational cognitive modeling have occurred since the 1960s. Computational cognitive modeling has since been nurtured by the Annual Conferences of the Cognitive Science Society (which began in the late 1970s), by the International Conferences on Cognitive Modeling (which began in the 1990s), as well as by the journals Cognitive Science (which began in the late 1970s), Cognitive Systems Research (which began in the 1990s), and so on. From Schank and Abelson (1977) to Minsky (1981), a variety of influential symbolic “cognitive” models were proposed in artificial intelligence. They were usually broad and capable of a significant amount of information processing. However, they were usually not rigorously matched against human data. Therefore, it was hard to establish the cognitive validity of many of these models. Psychologists have also been proposing computational cognitive models, which are usually narrower and more specific. They were usually more rigorously evaluated in relation to human data. (An early example is Anderson’s HAM (Anderson 1983)). Many such models were inspired by symbolic AI work at that time (Newell & Simon, 1976). The resurgence of neural network models in the 1980s brought another type of model into prominence in this field (see, e.g., Rumelhart et al., 1986; Grossberg, 1982). Instead of symbolic models that rely on a variety of complex data structures that store highly structured pieces of knowledge (such as Schank’s scripts or Minsky’s frames), simple, uniform, and often massively parallel numerical computation was used in these neural network models (Rumelhart et al., 1986). Many of these models were meant to be rigorous models of human cognitive processes, and they were often evaluated in relation to human data in a quantitative way (but see Massaro, 1988). Hybrid models that combine the strengths of neural networks and symbolic models emerged in the early 1990s (see, e.g., Sun & Bookman, 1994). Such models could be used to model a wider variety of cognitive phenomena because of their more diverse and thus more expressive
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representations (but see Regier, 2003, regarding constraints on models). They have been used to tackle a broad range of cognitive data, often (though not always) in a rigorous and quantitative way (see, e.g., Sun & Bookman, 1994; Sun, 1994; Anderson & Lebiere, 1998; Sun, 2002). For overviews of some currently existing software, tools, models, and systems for computational cognitive modeling, see the following Web sites: http://www.cogsci.rpi.edu/∼rsun/arch. html http://books.nap.edu/openbook.php? isbn= 0309060966 http://www.isle.org/symposia/cogarch/ archabs.html. The following Web sites for specific software, cognitive models, or cognitive architectures (e.g., Soar, ACT-R, and CLARION) may also be useful: http://psych.colorado.edu/∼oreilly/ PDP++ /PDP++.html http://www.cogsci.rpi.edu/∼rsun/clarion. html http://act-r.psy.cmu.edu/ http://sitemaker.umich.edu/soar/home http://www.eecs.umich.edu/∼kieras/epic. html.
2. What Is Computational Cognitive Modeling Good For? There are reasons to believe that the goal of understanding the human mind strictly from observations of human behavior is ultimately untenable, except for small and limited task domains. The rise and fall of behaviorism is a case in point. This point may also be argued on the basis of analogy with physical sciences (see Sun, Coward & Zenzen, 2005). The key point is that the processes and mechanisms of the mind cannot be understood purely on the basis of behavioral experiments, with tests that inevitably amount to probing only relatively superficial features of human behavior, which are
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further obscured by individual/group differences and contextual factors. It would be extremely hard to understand the human mind in this way, just like it would be extremely hard to understand a complex computer system purely on the basis of testing its behavior, if we do not have any a priori ideas about the nature, inner working, and theoretical underpinnings of that system (Sun, 2005). For a simple example, in any experiment involving the human mind, there is a very large number of parameters that could influence the results, and these parameters are either measured or left to chance. Given the large number of parameters, many have to be left to chance. The selection of which parameters to control and which to leave to chance is a decision made by the experimenter. This decision is made on the basis of which parameters the experimenter thinks are important. Therefore, clearly, theoretical development needs to go hand in hand with experimental tests of human behavior. Given the complexity of the human mind and its manifestation in behavioral flexibility, complex process-based theories, that is, computational models (in the broad sense of the term) are necessary to explicate the intricate details of the human mind. Without such complex process-based theories, experimentation may be blind – leading to the accumulation of a vast amount of data without any apparent purpose or any apparent hope of arriving at a succinct, precise, and meaningful understanding. It is true that even pure experimentalists may often be guided by their intuitive theories in designing experiments and in generating their hypotheses. It is reasonable to say, therefore, that they are in practice not completely blind. However, without detailed theories, most of the details of an intuitive (or verbalconceptual) theory are left out of consideration, and the intuitive theory may thus be somehow vacuous or internally inconsistent, or otherwise invalid. These problems of an intuitive theory may not be discovered until a detailed model is developed (Sun, Coward, & Zenzen, 2005; Sun, 2005). There are many reasons to believe that the key to understanding cognitive processes
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is often in the fine details, which only computational modeling can bring out (Newell, 1990; Sun, 2005). Computational models provide algorithmic specificity: detailed, exactly specified, and carefully thought-out steps, arranged in precise and yet flexible sequences. Therefore, they provide both conceptual clarity and precision. As related by Hintzman (1990), “The common strategy of trying to reason backward from behavior to underlying processes (analysis) has drawbacks that become painfully apparent to those who work with simulation models (synthesis). To have one’s hunches about how a simple combination of processes will behave repeatedly dashed by one’s own computer program is a humbling experience that no experimental psychologist should miss” (p. 111). One viewpoint concerning the theoretical status of computational modeling and simulation is that they, including those based on cognitive architectures, should not be taken as theories. A simulation/model is a generator of phenomena and data. Thus, it is a theory-building tool. Hintzman (1990) gave a positive assessment of the role of simulation/model in theory building: “a simple working system that displays some properties of human memory may suggest other properties that no one ever thought of testing for, may offer novel explanations for known phenomena, and may provide insight into which modifications that next generation of models should include” (p. 111). That is, computational models are useful media for thought experiments and hypothesis generation. In particular, one may use simulations for exploring various possibilities regarding details of a cognitive process. Thus, a simulation/model may serve as a theory-building tool for developing future theories. A related view is that computational modeling and simulation are suitable for facilitating the precise instantiation of a preexisting verbal-conceptual theory (e.g., through exploring various possible details in instantiating the theory) and consequently the careful evaluation of the theory against data. A radically different position (e.g., Newell, 1990; Sun, 2005) is that a
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simulation/model may provide a theory. It is not the case that a simulation/model is limited to being built on top of an existing theory, being applied for the sake of generating data, being applied for the sake of validating an existing theory, or being applied for the sake of building a future theory. To the contrary, according to this view, a simulation/model may be a theory by itself. In philosophy of science, constructive empiricism (van Fraasen, 1980) may make a sensible philosophical foundation for computational cognitive modeling, consistent with the view of models as theories (Sun, 2005). Computational models may be necessary for understanding a system as complex and as internally diverse as the human mind. Pure mathematics, developed to describe the physical universe, may not be sufficient for understanding a system as different and as complex as the human mind (cf. Luce, 1995; Coombs et al., 1970). Compared with scientific theories developed in other disciplines (e.g., in physics), computational cognitive modeling may be mathematically less elegant – but the point is that the human mind itself is likely to be less mathematically elegant compared with the physical universe (see, e.g., Minsky, 1985) and therefore an alternative form of theorizing is called for, a form that is more complex, more diverse, and more algorithmic in nature. Computational cognitive models provide a viable way of specifying complex and detailed theories of cognition. Consequently, they may provide detailed interpretations and insights that no other experimental or theoretical approach can provide. In particular, a cognitive architecture denotes a comprehensive, domain-generic computational cognitive model, capturing the essential structures, mechanisms, and processes of cognition. It is used for broad, multiple-level, multiple-domain analysis of cognition (Sun, 2004; Sun, Coward, & Zenzen, 2005, Sun, 2005, 2007). It deals with componential processes of cognition in a structurally and mechanistically well defined way (Sun, 2004). Its function is to provide an essential framework to facilitate more detailed modeling and under-
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standing of various components and processes of the mind. A cognitive architecture is useful because it provides a comprehensive initial framework for further exploration of many different cognitive domains and functionalities. The initial assumptions may be based on either available scientific data (e.g., psychological or biological data), philosophical thoughts and arguments, or ad hoc working hypotheses (including computationally inspired such hypotheses). A cognitive architecture helps to narrow down possibilities, provides scaffolding structures, and embodies fundamental theoretical postulates. The value of cognitive architectures has been argued many times before; see, for example, Newell (1990), Anderson and Lebiere (1998), Sun (2002), Anderson and Lebiere (2003), Sun (2004), Sun, Coward, and Zenzen (2005), and Sun (2005, 2007).2 As we all know, science in general often progresses from understanding to prediction and then to prescription (or control). Computational cognitive modeling potentially may contribute to all of these three phases of science. For instance, through process-based simulation, computational modeling may reveal dynamic aspects of cognition, which may not be revealed otherwise, and allows a detailed look at constituting elements and their interactions on the fly during performance. In turn, such understanding may lead to hypotheses concerning hitherto undiscovered or unknown aspects of cognition and may lead to predictions regarding cognition. The ability to make reasonably accurate predictions about cognition can further allow prescriptions or control, for example, by choosing appropriate environmental conditions for certain tasks or by choosing appropriate mental types for certain tasks or environmental conditions. In summary, the utility and the value of computational cognitive modeling (including cognitive architectures) can be
2 For information about different existing cognitive architectures, see, for example, http://www. cogsci.rpi.edu/∼rsun/arch.html. See also Sun (2006) for information on three major cognitive architectures.
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Table 1.1: A traditional hierarchy of levels (Marr, 1982) Level
Object of analysis
1 2 3
Computation Algorithms Implementations
argued in many different ways (see Newell, 1990; Sun, 2002; Anderson & Lebiere, 2003). These models in their totality are clearly more than just simulation tools or programming languages of some sorts. They are theoretically pertinent because they represent theories in a unique and indispensable way. Cognitive architectures, for example, are broad theories of cognition in fact.
3. Multiple Levels of Computational Cognitive Modeling A strategic decision that one has to make with respect to cognitive science is the level of analysis (i.e., level of abstraction) at which one models cognitive agents. Computational cognitive modeling can vary in terms of level of process details and granularity of input and output, and may be carried out at multiple levels. Let us look into this issue of multiple levels of computational cognitive modeling, drawing on the work of Sun, Coward, and Zenzen (2005). Traditional theories of multilevel analysis hold that there are various levels each of which involves a different amount of computational details (e.g., Marr, 1982). In Marr’s theory, first, there is the computational theory level, in which one is supposed to determine proper computation to be performed, its goals, and the logic of the strategies by which the computation is to be carried out. Second, there is the representation and algorithm level, in which one is supposed to be concerned with carrying out the computational theory determined at the first level and, in particular, the representation for the input and the output, and the algorithm for the transformation from the
input to the output. The third level is the hardware implementation level, in which one is supposed to physically realize the representation and algorithms determined at the second level. According to Marr, these three levels are only loosely coupled; that is, they are relatively independent. Thus, there are usually a wide array of choices at each level, independent of the other two. Some phenomena may be explained at only one or two levels. Marr (1982) emphasized the “critical” importance of formulation at the level of computational theory, that is, the level at which the goals and purposes of a cognitive process are specified and internal and external constraints that make the process possible are worked out and related to each other and to the goals of computation. His reason was that the nature of computation depended more on the computational problems to be solved than on the way the solutions were to be implemented. In his own words, “an algorithm is likely to be understood more readily by understanding the nature of the problem being solved than by examining the mechanism (and the hardware) in which it is embodied” (p. 27). Thus, he preferred a top-down approach – from a more abstract level to a more detailed level. See Table 1.1 for the three levels. It often appears that Marr’s theory centered too much on the relatively minor differences in computational abstractions (e.g., algorithms, programs, and implementations; see Sun, Coward, & Zenzen, 2005; Dayan, 2003; Dawson, 2002). It also appears that his theory represented an oversimplification of biological reality (e.g., ignoring the species-specific or motivationrelevant representations of the environment and the close relationship between low-level implementations and high-level computation) and as a result represented an overrationalization of cognition. Another variant is Newell and Simon’s three-level theory. Newell and Simon (1976) proposed the following three levels: (1) the knowledge level, in which why cognitive agents do certain things is explained by appealing to their goals and their knowledge, and by showing rational
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Table 1.2: Another hierarchy of four levels (Sun, Coward, & Zenzen, 2005) Level
Object of analysis
Type of analysis
Computational model
1 2 3 4
Inter-agent processes Agents Intra-agent processes Substrates
Social/cultural Psychological Componential Physiological
Collections of agents Individual agents Modular construction of agents Biological realization of modules
connections between them; (2) the symbol level, in which the knowledge and goals are encoded by symbolic structures, and the manipulation of these structures implements their connections; and (3) the physical level, in which the symbol structures and their manipulations are realized in some physical form. (Sometimes, this three-level organization was referred to as “the classical cognitive architecture” (Newell, 1990).) The point being emphasized here was very close to Marr’s view: What is important is the analysis at the knowledge level and then at the symbol level, that is, identifying the task and designing symbol structures and symbol manipulation procedures suitable for it. Once this analysis (at these two levels) is worked out, the analysis can be implemented in any available physical means. In contrast, according to Sun, Coward, and Zenzen (2005), the differences (borrowed from computer programming) among “computation,” algorithms, programs, and hardware realizations, and their variations, as have been the focus in Marr’s (1982) and Newell and Simon’s (1976) level theories, are relatively insignificant. This is because, first of all, the differences among them are usually small and subtle, compared with the differences among the processes to be modeled (that is, the differences among the sociological vs. the psychological vs. the intra-agent, etc.). Second, these different computational constructs are in reality closely tangled (especially in the biological world): One cannot specify algorithms without at least some considerations of possible implementations, and what is to be considered “computation” (i.e., what can be computed) relies on algorithms, especially
the notion of algorithmic complexity, and so on. Therefore, one often has to consider computation, algorithms, and implementation together somehow (especially in relation to cognition). Third, according to Sun, Coward, and Zenzen (2005), the separation of these computational details failed to produce any major useful insight in relation to cognition, but instead produced theoretical baggage. A reorientation toward a systematic examination of phenomena, instead of tools one uses for modeling them, is thus a step in the right direction. The viewpoint of Sun, Coward, and Zenzen (2005) focused attention on the very phenomena to be studied and on their scopes, scales, degrees of abstractness, and so on. Thus, the differences among levels of analysis can be roughly cast as the differences among disciplines, from the most macroscopic to the most microscopic. These levels of analysis include the sociological level, psychological level, componential level, and physiological level. See Table 1.2 for these levels. Different levels of modeling may be established in exact correspondence with different levels of analysis. First, there is the sociological level, which includes collective behavior of agents (Durkheim, 1895), inter-agent processes (Vygotsky, 1986), and sociocultural processes, as well as interaction between agents and their (physical and sociocultural) environments. Only recently, the field of cognitive science has come to grips with the fact that cognition is, at least in part, a social/cultural process (Lave, 1988; Vygotsky, 1986; Sun, 2006). To ignore the sociocultural process is to ignore a major underlying determinant of individual
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cognition. The lack of understanding of sociological processes may result in the lack of understanding of some major structures and constraints in cognition. Thus, any understanding of individual cognition can only be partial and incomplete when sociocultural processes are ignored or downplayed.3 The second level is the psychological level, which covers individual behaviors, beliefs, knowledge, concepts, and skills (as well as motivation, emotion, perception, and so on). In relation to the sociological level, one can investigate the relationship of individual beliefs, knowledge, concepts, and skills with those of the society and the culture, and the processes of change of these beliefs, knowledge, concepts, and skills, independent of or in relation to those of the society and the culture. At this level, one can examine human behavioral data and compare them with models and with insights from the sociological level and further details from the lower levels. The third level is the componential level. In computational cognitive modeling, the computational process of an agent is mostly specified in terms of components of the agent, that is, in terms of intra-agent processes. Thus, at this level, one may specify a cognitive architecture and components therein. In the process of analysis, one specifies essential computational processes of each component as well as essential connections among various components. Thus, analysis of capacity (functional analysis) and analysis of components (structural analysis) become one and the same at this level. However, at this level, unlike at the psychological level, work is more along the line of structural analysis than functional analysis (whereas the psychological level is mostly concerned with functional analysis). At this level, one models cognitive agents in terms of components, with the theoretical language of a particular paradigm, for example, symbolic computation or connectionist networks, or their combinations (Sun 3 See Sun (2001, 2006) for a more detailed argument of the relevance of sociocultural processes to cognition and vice versa.
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& Bookman, 1994); that is, one imputes a computational process onto a cognitive function. Ideas and data from the psychological level – the psychological constraints from above, which bear on the division of components and possible implementations of components, are among the most important considerations. This level may also incorporate biological/physiological observations regarding plausible divisions and implementations; that is, it can incorporate ideas from the next level down – the physiological level, which offers the biological constraints. This level results in cognitive mechanisms, although they are usually computational and abstract, compared with physiological-level specifications of details. Although this level is essentially in terms of intra-agent processes, computational models developed therein may also be used to model processes at higher levels, including the interaction at a sociological level where multiple individuals are involved. This can be accomplished, for example, by examining interactions of multiple copies of individual agents (Sun, 2006). The lowest level of analysis is the physiological level, that is, the biological substrate, or biological implementation, of computation (Dayan, 2003). This level is the focus of a range of disciplines, including physiology, biology, computational neuroscience, cognitive neuroscience, and so on. Although biological substrates are not among our major concerns here, they may nevertheless provide valuable input as to what kind of computation is likely employed and what a plausible architecture (at a higher level) should be like. The main utility of this level is to facilitate analysis at higher levels, that is, to use low-level information to narrow down, at higher levels, choices in selecting computational architectures and choices in implementing componential computation. Although computational cognitive modeling is often limited to within a particular level at a time (inter-agent, agent, intraagent, or substrate), this need not always be the case: Cross-level analysis and modeling could be intellectually highly enlightening
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and might be essential to the progress of computational cognitive modeling in the future (Sun, Coward, & Zenzen, 2005; Dayan, 2003). These levels described earlier do interact with each other (e.g., constraining each other) and may not be easily isolated and tackled alone. Moreover, their respective territories are often intermingled, without clear-cut boundaries. For instance, the cross-level link between the psychological and the neurophysiological level has been emphasized in recent years (in the form of cognitive neuroscience; see, e.g., LeDoux, 1992; Damasio, 1994; Milner & Goodale, 1995). For example, Wilson et al. (2000) presented a model of human subjects perceiving the orientation of the head of another person. They accounted for the empirical findings from psychological experiments with a model based on a population code of neurons in the visual cortex, and thus the underlying neural structures were used to explain a psychological phenomenon at a higher level. For another instance of cross-level research, the psychological and the social level may also be crossed in many ways to generate new insights into social phenomena on the basis of cognitive processes (e.g., Boyer & Ramble, 2001; Sun, 2006) and, conversely, to generate insights into cognitive phenomena on the basis of sociocultural processes (e.g., Hutchins, 1995; Nisbett et al., 2001). In all of these cases, shifting appropriately between levels when needed is a critical part of the work. Beyond cross-level analysis, there may be “mixed-level” analysis (Sun, Coward, Zenzen, 2005). The idea of mixed-level analysis may be illustrated by the research at the boundaries of quantum mechanics. In deriving theories, physicists often start working in a purely classical language that ignores quantum probabilities, wave functions, and so forth, and subsequently overlay quantum concepts on a classical framework (Greene, 1999; Coward & Sun, 2004). The very same idea applies to mixing cognitive modeling and social simulation as well. One may start with purely social descriptions but then substitute cognitive principles and cog-
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nitive process details for simpler descriptions of agents (e.g., Sun & Naveh, 2004). Relatedly, there has also been strong interplay between psychological models and neurophysiological models – for example, going from psychological descriptions to neurobiological details. Note that Rasmussen (1986) proposed something similar to the view described above on levels. His hierarchy was a more general framework but had a number of constraining properties (see also Vicente & Wang 1998): (1) all levels deal with the same system, with each level providing a different description of the system; (2) each level has its own terms, concepts, and principles; (3) the selection of levels may be dependent on the observer’s purpose, knowledge, and interest; (4) the description at any level may serve as constraints on the operation of lower levels, whereas changes at a higher level may be specified by the effects of the lower levels; (5) by moving up the hierarchy, one understands more the significance of some process details with regard to the purpose of the system; by moving down the hierarchy, one understands more how the system functions in terms of the process details; and (6) there is also a means–ends relationship between levels in a hierarchy. Note also Ohlsson and Jewett’s (1997) and Langley’s (1999) idea of abstract cognitive model, which is relevant here as well. To guard against overinterpretation of empirical evidence and to avoid the (usually large) gaps between evidence and fullblown computational models, Ohlsson and Jewett (1997) proposed “abstract computational models,” which were relatively abstract models that were designed to test a particular (high-level) hypothesis without taking a stand on all the (lower-level) details of a cognitive architecture. Similar ideas were also expressed by Langley (1999), who argued that the source of explanatory power of a model often lay at a higher level of abstraction. In summary, there have been various proposals regarding multiple levels of computational cognitive modeling. Although
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details vary, the notion of multiple levels of cognitive modeling appears to be useful. It can be expected to be of importance for the further development of this field.
4. Success Stories of the Past There have been quite a few success stories of computational cognitive modeling, in a practical or a theoretical sense. They include, among many others: • the various models of developmental psychology, including the connec tionist models of verb past-tense learning and the controversies stemming from such models; • the tutoring systems based on the ACT-R cognitive architecture; and • the model of implicit and explicit learning based on the CLARION cognitive architecture. For instance, computational models of child development have been successful in accounting for, and in explaining, finegrained developmental processes. In terms of widespread impact and associated theoretical interests and controversies, computational models of verb past-tense learning may be ranked as being at the top of all computational cognitive models (see, e.g., Rumelhart et al., 1986). Theoretically, successful development models have clarified a number of major issues. In developmental psychology, there is the dichotomy contrasting knowledge that the child acquires through interacting with the environment (nurture) with knowledge of phylogenic origin (nature). It was argued that mechanisms of gene expression and brain development did not allow for the detailed specification of neural networks in the brain as required by the nativist (nature) position. It has been argued that a more plausible role for innate knowledge is at the level of architectures and timing of development (see Chapter 16 in this volume). In this regard, neural network models have provided new ways of thinking about innateness. That is, instead of asking whether or not some-
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thing is innate, one should ask how evolution constrains the emergence of a brain function during individual development. This kind of theorizing has benefited from the use of neural networks (as detailed in Chapter 16). Developmental psychologists have also been debating the distinction between learning and development. A static neural network can only learn what is within its representational power. Thus, when static neural networks are used, it is assumed that the ultimate brain network topology has already been developed (even if initial weights are random). However, this assumption implies representational innateness, which has been argued to be implausible. An alternative is to use constructive neural network models that form their network topology as a result of their experience. Using constructive learning models also resolves the “paradox of development”: It was argued that if learning was done by proposing and testing hypotheses, it was not possible to learn anything that could not already be represented. This argument becomes irrelevant in light of constructive learning models where learning mechanisms that construct representations are separate from the representation of domain-specific knowledge. A constructive model builds representational power that it did not previously possess. Thus, computational modeling suggests that development is functionally distinct from learning (as argued in Chapter 16). Similarly, as another example, an interpretation of a broad range of skill learning data (including those from the implicit learning literature) was proposed based on the CLARION cognitive architecture (see Sun, Slusarz, & Terry, 2005; and Sun, 2002; see also Chapter 6 in this volume concerning cognitive architectures). At a theoretical level, this work explicates the interaction between implicit and explicit cognitive processes in skill learning, in contrast to the tendency of studying each type in isolation. It highlights the interaction between the two types of processes and its various effects on learning (including the so-called synergy effects; see Sun, 2002). At an empirical level, a model centered on such an interaction
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constructed based on CLARION was used to account for data in a variety of task domains: process control tasks, artificial grammar learning tasks, and serial reaction time tasks, as well as some much more complex task domains (such as Tower of Hanoi and Minefield Navigation). The model was able to explain data in these task domains, shedding light on some apparently contradictory findings (including some findings once considered as casting doubt on the theoretical status of implicit learning). Based on the data and the match between the CLARION architecture and the data, this work argues for an integrated theory/model of skill learning that takes into account both implicit and explicit processes, as the match pointed to the usefulness of incorporating both explicit and implicit processes in theorizing about cognition (Sun, Slusarz, & Terry, 2005). Moreover, it argues for a bottom-up approach (first learning implicit knowledge and then explicit knowledge on its basis) in an integrated theory/model of skill learning, which was radically different from the thenexisting models (see Sun, 2002; see also Chapter 13 in this volume). So, in this case, the application of the computational cognitive architecture CLARION to the skill learning data helped to achieve a level of theoretical integration and explanation beyond the previous theorizing (Sun, Slusarz, & Terry, 2005; Sun, 2002). For yet another example of using cognitive architectures to provide theoretical interpretation and integration, see Meyer and Kieras (1997). As a final example, a number of interesting tutoring systems have been constructed on the basis of the ACT-R cognitive architecture (Koedinger et al., 1997; see also Chapter 6 in this volume). These tutoring systems were based on the analysis of the task units that were necessary to achieve competence in a number of domains of mathematics and computer programming. These units were represented as production rules. A typical course involved on the order of 500 production rules. On the assumption that learning in these domains involved the acquisition of such production rules, it was possible to diagnose whether students had
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acquired such production rules and provide instructions to remedy any difficulties they might have with specific rules. This led to the design of tutoring systems that ran production rule models in parallel with a student and attempted to interpret the student behavior in terms of these rules. Such systems tried to find some sequence of production rules that produced the behavior exhibited by a student. The model-tracing process allowed the interpretation of student behavior, and in turn the interpretation controlled the tutorial interactions. Thus, such tutoring systems were predicated on the validity of the cognitive model and the validity of the attributions that the model-tracing process made about student learning. There have been a few assessments that established to some extent the effectiveness of these systems. The tutoring systems have been used to deliver instructions to more than 100,000 students thus far. They demonstrated the practical usefulness of computational cognitive modeling. Other examples of practical applications of computational cognitive modeling may be found in Pew and Mavor (1998), and many in the area of humancomputer interaction.
5. Directions for the Future Many accounts of the history and the current state of the art of computational cognitive modeling in different areas will be provided by the subsequent chapters in this volume. At this point, however, it may be worthwhile to speculate a little about future developments of computational cognitive modeling. First, some have claimed that grand scientific theorizing has become a thing of the past. What remains to be done is filling in details and refining some minor points. Fortunately, many cognitive scientists believe otherwise. Indeed, many of them are pursuing integrative principles that attempt to explain data in multiple domains and in multiple functionalities (Anderson & Lebiere, 1998; Sun, 2002). In cognitive science, as in many other scientific fields, significant
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advances may be made through discovering (hypothesizing and confirming) deep-level principles that unify superficial explanations across multiple domains, in a way somewhat analogous to Einstein’s theory that unified electromagnetic and gravitational forces, or String Theory, which aims to provide even further unifications (Green, 1999). Such theories are what cognitive science needs, currently and in the foreseeable future. Integrative computational cognitive modeling may serve in the future as an antidote to the increasing specialization of scientific research. In particular, cognitive architectures are clearly going against the trend of increasing specialization, and thus constitute an especially effective tool in this regard. Cognitive scientists are currently actively pursuing such approaches and, hopefully, will be increasingly doing so in the future. In many ways, the trend of overspecialization is harmful, and thus the reversal of this trend by the means of computational cognitive modeling is a logical (and necessary) next step toward advancing cognitive science (Sun et al., 1999). Second, although the importance of being able to reproduce the nuances of empirical data from specific psychological experiments is evident, broad functionality is also important (Newell, 1990). The human mind needs to deal with the full cycle that includes all of the followings: transducing signals, processing them, storing them, representing them, manipulating them, and generating motor actions based on them. In computational cognitive modeling, there is clearly a need to develop generic models of cognition that are capable of a wide range of cognitive functionalities, to avoid the myopia often resulting from narrowly scoped research (e.g., in psychology). In particular, cognitive architectures may incorporate all of the following cognitive functionalities: perception, categorization and concepts, memory, decision making, reasoning, planning, problem solving, motor control, learning, metacognition, motivation, emotion, and language and communication, among others. In the past, this issue often
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did not get the attention it deserved in cognitive science (Newell, 1990), and it remains a major challenge for cognitive science. However, it should be clearly recognized that overgenerality, beyond what is minimally necessary, is always a danger in computational cognitive modeling and in developing cognitive architectures (Sun, 2007). It is highly desirable to come up with a wellconstrained cognitive model with as few parameters as possible while accounting for as large a variety of empirical observations and phenomena as possible (Regier, 2003). This may be attempted by adopting a broad perspective – philosophical, psychological, and biological, as well as computational – and by adopting a multilevel framework going from sociological to psychological, to componential, and to physiological levels, as discussed before (and as argued in more detail in Sun, Coward, & Zenzen, 2005). Although some techniques have been developed to accomplish this, more work is needed (see, e.g., Sun & Ling, 1998; Regier, 2003; Sun, 2007). Third, in integrative computational cognitive modeling, especially in developing cognitive architectures with a broad range of functionalities, it is important to keep in mind a broad set of desiderata. For example, in Anderson and Lebiere (2003), a set of desiderata proposed by Newell (1990) was used to evaluate a cognitive architecture versus conventional connectionist models. These desiderata include flexible behavior, real-time performance, adaptive behavior, vast knowledge base, dynamic behavior, knowledge integration, natural language, learning, development, evolution, and brain realization (see Newell 1990 for detailed explanations). In Sun (2004), another, broader set of desiderata was proposed and used to evaluate a larger set of cognitive architectures. These desiderata include ecological realism, bioevolutionary realism, cognitive realism, and many others (see Sun, 2004, for details). The advantages of coming up with and applying these sets of desiderata in computational cognitive modeling include: (1) avoiding overly narrow models and (2) avoiding missing important
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functionalities. We can reasonably expect that this issue will provide impetus for further research in the field of computational cognitive modeling in the future. Fourth, the validation of process details of computational cognitive models has been a difficult, but extremely important, issue (Pew & Mavor, 1998). This is especially true for cognitive architectures, which often involve a great deal of intricate details that are almost impossible to disentangle. This issue needs to be better addressed in the future. There have been too many instances in the past of research communities rushing into some particular model or some particular approach toward modeling cognition and human intelligence without knowing exactly how much of the approach or the model was veridical or even useful. Theoretical (including mathematical) analysis often lagged behind. Thus, often without sufficient effort at validation and theoretical analysis, claims were boldly made about the promise of a certain model or a certain approach. Unfortunately, we have seen quite a few setbacks in the history of cognitive science as a result of this cavalier attitude toward the science of cognition. As in any other scientific field, painstakingly detailed work needs to be carried out in cognitive science before sweeping claims can be made. Not only is empirical validation necessary, theoretical analysis, including detailed mathematical and computational analysis, is also necessary to better understand models and modeling approaches before committing a large amount of resource (cf. Roberts & Pashler, 2000). In particular, sources of explanatory power need to be identified and analyzed (as called for in Sun & Ling, 1998). The issue of validation should be an important factor in directing future research in the field of computational cognitive modeling. Related to that, the “design” space of computational cognitive models needs to be more fully explored (as pointed out in Sun & Ling, 1998; and Sloman & Chrisley, 2005). While we explore the behavioral space, in the sense of identifying the range and variations of human behavior, we also need to ex-
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plore the design space (that is, all the possibilities for constructing computational models) that maps onto the behavioral space, so that we may gain a better understanding of the possibilities and the limitations of modeling methodologies, and thereby open up new avenues for better capturing cognitive processes. This is especially important for cognitive architectures, which are complex and in which many design decisions need to be made, often without the benefit of a clear understanding of their full implications in computational or behavioral terms. More systematic exploration of the design space of cognitive models is thus necessary. Future research in this field should increasingly address this issue (Sloman & Chrisley, 2005). Computational cognitive models may find both finer and broader applications, that is, both at lower levels and at higher levels, in the future. For example, some cognitive models found applications in large-scale simulations at a social and organizational level. For another example, some other cognitive models found applications in interpreting not only psychological data but also neuroimaging data (at a biological/ physiological level). A review commissioned by the National Research Council found that computational cognitive modeling had progressed to a degree that had made them useful in a number of application domains (Pew & Mavor, 1998). Another review (Ritter et al., 2003) pointed to similar conclusions. Both reviews provided interesting examples of applications of computational cognitive modeling. Inevitably, this issue will provide impetus for future research, not only in applied areas of computational cognitive modeling, but also in theoretical areas of computational cognitive modeling. In particular, cognitive modeling may be profitably applied to social simulation. An important recent development in the social sciences has been agent-based social simulation.4 So far, however, the two fields of 4 This approach consists of instantiating a population of agents, allowing the agents to run, and observing the interactions among them.
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social simulation and cognitive modeling have been developed largely separately from each other (with some exceptions). Most of the work in social simulation assumed rudimentary cognition on the part of the agents. As has been argued before (e.g., Sun & Naveh, 2004; Sun, 2001, 2006; Zerubavel, 1997), social processes ultimately rest on the decisions of individuals, and thus understanding the mechanisms of individual cognition can lead to better theories of social processes. At the same time, by integrating social simulation and cognitive modeling, we may arrive at a better understanding of individual cognition. By modeling cognitive agents in a social context (as in cognitive social simulation), we may learn more about how sociocultural processes influence individual cognition. (See Chapter 19 in this volume regarding cognitive social simulation.) Cross-level and mixed-level work integrating the psychological and the neurophysiological level, as discussed before, will certainly be an important direction for future research. Increasingly, researchers are exploring constraints from both psychological and neurobiological data. In so doing, the hope is that more realistic and better constrained computational cognitive models may be developed. (see, e.g., Chapter 7 in this volume for some such models.) Finally, will this field eventually become a full-fledged discipline – computational psychology? This is an interesting but difficult issue. There are a number of open questions in this regard. For example, how independent can this field be from closely allied fields such as experimental psychology (and cognitive psychology in particular)? What will the relationship be between data generation and modeling? How useful or illuminating can this field be in shedding new light on cognition per se (as opposed to leading up to building intelligent systems)? And so on and so forth. These are the questions that will determine the future status of this field. So far, the answers to these questions are by no means clear-cut. They will have to be worked out in the future through the collective effort of the researchers of this field.
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6. About This Book The present volume, the Cambridge Handbook of Computational Psychology, is part of the Cambridge Handbook in Psychology series. This volume is aimed to be a definitive reference source for the growing field of computational cognitive modeling. Written by leading experts in various areas of this field, it is meant to combine breadth of coverage with depth of critical details. This volume aims to appeal to researchers and advanced students in the computational cognitive modeling community, as well as to researchers and advanced students in cognitive science (in general), philosophy, experimental psychology, linguistics, cognitive anthropology, neuroscience, artificial intelligence, and so on. For example, it could serve well as a textbook for courses in social, cognitive, and behavioral sciences programs. In addition, this volume might also be useful to social sciences researchers, education researchers, intelligent systems engineers, psychology and education software developers, and so on. Although this field draws on many humanity and social sciences disciplines and on computer science, the core of the approach is based on psychology, and this is a constant focus in this volume. At the same time, this volume is also distinguished by its incorporation of one contemporary theme in scientific research: how technology (namely computing technology) affects our understanding of the subject matter – cognition and its associated issues. This volume contains 26 chapters, organized into 4 parts. The first part (containing the present chapter) provides a general introduction to the field of computational cognitive modeling. The second part, Cognitive Modeling Paradigms, introduces the reader to broadly influential approaches in cognitive modeling. These chapters have been written by some of those influential scholars who helped to define the field. The third part, Computational Modeling of Various Cognitive Functionalities and Domains, describes a range of computational modeling efforts that researchers in this field
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have undertaken regarding major cognitive functionalities and domains. The interdisciplinary combination of cognitive modeling, experimental psychology, linguistics, artificial intelligence, and software engineering in this field has required researchers to develop a novel set of research methodologies. This part surveys and explains computational modeling research, in terms of detailed computational mechanisms and processes, on memory, concepts, learning, reasoning, decision making, skills, vision, motor control, language, development, scientific explanation, social interaction, and so on. It contains case studies of projects, as well as details of significant models, in the computational cognitive modeling field. These chapters have been written by some of the best experts in these areas. The final part, Concluding Remarks, explores a range of issues associated with computational cognitive modeling and cognitive architectures, and provides some perspectives, evaluations, and assessments. Although the goal has been to be as comprehensive as possible, the coverage of this volume is, by necessity, selective. The selectivity is made necessary by the length limitation, as well as by the amount of activities in various topic areas – areas with large amounts of scholarly activities need to be covered, inevitably at the cost of less active areas. Given the wide-ranging and often fastpaced research activities in computational cognitive modeling, it has never been hard to find interesting topics to include, but some less active topics had to be sacrificed. As research in this field has developed at an exciting pace in recent years, the field is ready for an up-to-date reference to the best and latest work. What has been missing in this field is a true handbook. Such a handbook should bring together top researchers to work on chapters each of which summarizes and explains the basic concepts, techniques, and findings of a major topic area, sketching its history, assessing its successes and failures, and outlining the directions in which it is going. A handbook should also provide quick overviews for experts as well as provide an entry point into the field
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for the next generation of researchers. The present volume has indeed been conceived with these broad and ambitious goals in mind.
7. Conclusions It is clear that highly significant progress has been made in recent decades in advancing research on computational cognitive modeling (i.e., computational psychology). However, it appears that there is still a long way to go before we fully understand the computational processes of the human mind. Many examples of computational cognitive modeling are presented in this volume. However, it is necessary to explore and study more fully various possibilities in computational cognitive modeling to further advance the state of the art in understanding the human mind through computational means. In particular, it would be necessary to build integrative cognitive models with a wide variety of functionalities, that is, to build cognitive architectures so that they can exhibit and explain the full range of human behaviors (as discussed earlier). Many challenges and issues need to be addressed, including those stemming from designing cognitive architectures, from validation of cognitive models, and from the applications of cognitive models to various domains. It should be reasonable to expect that the field of computational cognitive modeling will have a profound impact on cognitive science, as well as on other related fields, such as linguistics, philosophy, experimental psychology, and artificial intelligence, both in terms of better understanding cognition and in terms of developing better (more intelligent) computational systems. As such, it should be considered a crucial field of scientific research, lying at the intersection of a number of other important fields. Through the collective effort of this research community, significant advances can be achieved, especially in better understanding the human mind.
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Acknowledgments This work was carried out while the author was supported in part by ARI grants DASW01-00-K-0012 and W74V8H-05-K0002 (to Ron Sun and Bob Mathews). Thanks are due to Aaron Sloman and Frank Ritter for their comments on the draft.
References Anderson, J. R. (1983). The architecture of cognition. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Anderson, J. R., & Lebiere, C. (1998). The atomic components of thought. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. Anderson, J. R., & Lebiere, C. (2003). The Newell Test for a theory of cognition. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 26, 587–640. Bechtel, W., & Graham, G. (Eds.). (1998). A companion to cognitive science.Cambridge, UK: Blackwell. Boden, M. (2006). Mind as machine: A history of cognitive science. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. Boyer, P., & Ramble, C. (2001). Congitive templates for religious concepts: Cross-cultural evidence for recall of counter-intuitive representations. Cognitive Scicence, 25, 535–564. Coombs, C., Dawes, R., & Tversky, A. (1970). Mathematical psychology. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. Coward, L., & Sun, R. (2004). Criteria for an effective theory of consciousness and some preliminary attempts. Consciousness and cognition, 13, 268–301. Damasio, A. (1994). Descartes’ error: Emotion, reason and the human brain. New York: Grosset/Putnam. Dawson, M. (2002). Computer modeling of cognition: Levels of analysis. In L. Nadel (Ed.), Encyclopedia of cognitive science (pp. 635–638). London: Macmillan. Dayan, P. (2003). Levels of analysis in neural modeling. In L. Nadel (Ed.), Encyclopedia of cognitive science. London: Macmillan. Durkheim, W. (1895/1962). The rules of the sociological method. Glencoe, IL: Free Press. Greene, G. (1999). The elegant universe. New York: Norton. Grossberg, S. (1982). Studies of mind and brain: Neural principles of learning, perception, devel-
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sun opment, cognition, and motor control. Norwell, MA: Kluwer Academic Publishers. Hintzman, D. (1990). Human learning and memory: Connections and dissociations. In Annual review of psychology (vol. 41, pp. 109– 139). Palo Alto, CA: Annual Reviews. Hutchins, E. (1995). How a cockpit remembers its speeds. Cognitive Science, 19, 265–288. Koedinger K., Anderson, J. R., Hadley, W. H., & Mark, M. (1997). Intelligent tutoring goes to school in the big city. International Journal of Artificial Intelligence in Education, 8, 30–43. Langley, P. (1999). Concrete and abstract models of category learning. In Proceedings of the 21st Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. Lave, J. (1988). Cognition in practice. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. LeDoux, J.(1992). Brain mechanisms of emotion and emotional learning. Current Opinion in Neurobiology, 2(2), 191–197. Luce, R. D. (1995). Four tensions concerning mathematical modeling in psychology. Annual Review of Psychology, 46, 1–26. Marr, D. (1982). Vision. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Massaro, D. (1988). Some criticisms of connectionist models of human performance. Journal of Memory and Language, 27, 213–234. Meyer, D., & Kieras, D. (1997). A computational theory of executive cognitive processes and human multiple-task performance: Part 1, basic mechanisms. Psychological Review, 104(1), 3–65. Miller, G., Galanter, E., & Pribram, K. (1960). Plans and the structure of behavior. New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston. Milner, D., & Goodale, N. (1995). The visual brain in action. New York: Oxford University Press. Minsky, M. (1981). A framework for representing knowledge. In J. Haugeland (Ed.), Mind design (pp. 95–128). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Minsky, M. (1985). The society of mind. New York: Simon and Schuster. Newell, A. (1990). Unified theories of cognition. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Newell, A., & Simon, H. (1976). Computer science as empirical inquiry: Symbols and search. Communication of ACM, 19, 113–126. Nisbett, R., Peng, K. Choi, I., & Norenzayan, A. (2001). Culture and systems of thought: Holistic versus analytic cognition. Psychological Review, 108(2), 291–310.
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introduction to computational cognitive modeling Ohlsson S., & Jewett, J. (1997). Simulation models and the power law of learning. In Proceedings of the 19th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. Pew, R. W., & Mavor, A. S. (Eds). (1998). Modeling human and organizational Behavior: Application to military simulations. Washington, DC: National Academy Press. Rasmussen, J. (1986). Information processing and human-machine interaction: An approach to cognitive engineering. Amsterdam: NorthHolland. Regier, T. (2003). Constraining computational models of cognition. In L. Nadel (Ed.), Encyclopedia of cognitive science (pp. 611–615). London: Macmillan. Ritter, F. E., Shadbolt, N., Elliman, D., Young, R., Gobet, F., & Baxter, G. (2003). Techniques for modeling human performance in synthetic environments: A supplementary review. Dayton, OH: Human Systems Information Analysis Center, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base. Roberts, S., & Pashler, H. (2000). How persuasive is a good fit? A comment on theory testing. Psychological Review, 107(2), 358– 367. Rumelhart, D., McClelland J., & the PDP Research Group. (1986). Parallel distributed processing: Explorations in the microstructures of cognition. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Schank, R., & Abelson, R. (1977). Scripts, plans, goals, and understanding: An inquiry into human knowledge structures. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. Sloman, A., & Chrisley, R. (2005). More things than are dreamt of in your biology: Information processing in biologically-inspired robots. Cognitive Systems Research, 6(2), 145–174. Sun, R. (1994). Integrating rules and connectionism for robust commonsense reasoning. New York: John Wiley. Sun, R. (2001). Cognitive science meets multiagent systems: A prolegomenon. Philosophical Psychology, 14(1), 5–28. Sun, R. (2002). Duality of the mind. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. Sun, R. (2004). Desiderata for cognitive architectures. Philosophical Psychology, 17(3), 341– 373.
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Sun, R. (2005). Theoretical status of computational cognitive modeling. Troy, NY: Technical report, Cognitive Science Department, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute. Sun, R. (Ed.). (2006). Cognition and multi-agent interaction: From cognitive modeling to social simulation. New York: Cambridge University Press. Sun, R. (2007). The importance of cognitive architectures: An analysis based on CLARION. Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Artificial Intelligence, 19(2), 159–193. Sun, R., & Bookman, L. (Eds.). (1994). Computational architectures integrating Neural and symbolic processes. Boston, MA: Kluwer Academic Publishers. Sun, R., Coward, A., & Zenzen, M. (2005). On levels of cognitive modeling. Philosophical Psychology, 18(5), 613–637. Sun, R., Honavar, V., & Oden, G. (1999). Integration of cognitive systems across disciplinary boundaries. Cognitive Systems Research, 1(1), 1–3. Sun, R., & Ling, C. (1998). Computational cognitive modeling, the source of power and other related issues. AI Magazine, 19(2), 113–120. Sun, R., & Naveh, I. (2004). Simulating organizational decision-making using a cognitively realistic agent model. Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, 7(3). June, 2004, http://jasss.soc.surrey.ac.uk/7/3/5.html Sun, R., Slusarz, P., & Terry, C. (2005). The interaction of the explicit and the implicit in skill learning: A dual-process approach. Psychological Review, 112(1). 159–192. Turing, A. M. (1950). Computing machinery and intelligence. Mind, 59(236), 433–460. van Fraasen, B. (1980). The scientific image. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. Vicente, K., & Wang, J. (1998). An ecological theory of expertise effects in memory recall. Psychological Review, 105(1), 33–57. Vygotsky, L. (1986). Mind in society. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. Wilson, H., Wilkinson, F., Lin, L., & Castilo, M. (2000). Perception of head orientation. Vision Research, 10, 459–472. Zerubavel, E. (1997). Social mindscape: An invitation to cognitive sociology. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
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Part II
COGNITIVE MODELING PARADIGMS
The chapters in Part II introduce the reader to broadly influential and foundational approaches to computational cognitive modeling. Each of these chapters describes in detail one particular approach and provides examples of its use in computational cognitive modeling.
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CHAPTER 2
Connectionist Models of Cognition
1. Introduction In this chapter, computer models of cognition that have focused on the use of neural networks are reviewed. These architectures were inspired by research into how computation works in the brain and subsequent work has produced models of cognition with a distinctive flavor. Processing is characterized by patterns of activation across simple processing units connected together into complex networks. Knowledge is stored in the strength of the connections between units. It is for this reason that this approach to understanding cognition has gained the name of connectionism.
2. Background Over the last twenty years, connectionist modeling has formed an influential approach to the computational study of cognition. It is distinguished by its appeal to principles of neural computation to inspire the primitives that are included in its cognitive level models. Also known as artifi-
cial neural network (ANN) or parallel distributed processing (PDP) models, connectionism has been applied to a diverse range of cognitive abilities, including models of memory, attention, perception, action, language, concept formation, and reasoning (see, e.g., Houghton, 2005). Although many of these models seek to capture adult function, connectionism places an emphasis on learning internal representations. This has led to an increasing focus on developmental phenomena and the origins of knowledge. Although, at its heart, connectionism comprises a set of computational formalisms, it has spurred vigorous theoretical debate regarding the nature of cognition. Some theorists have reacted by dismissing connectionism as mere implementation of preexisting verbal theories of cognition, whereas others have viewed it as a candidate to replace the Classical Computational Theory of Mind and as carrying profound implications for the way human knowledge is acquired and represented; still others have viewed connectionism as a subclass of statistical models involved in universal function approximation and data clustering. 23
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This chapter begins by placing connectionism in its historical context, leading up to its formalization in Rumelhart and McClelland’s two-volume Parallel Distributed Processing (1986), written in combination with members of the Parallel Distributed Processing Research Group. Then, three important early models that illustrate some of the key properties of connectionist systems are discussed, as well as how the novel theoretical contributions of these models arose from their key computational properties. These three models are the Interactive Activation model of letter recognition (McClelland & Rumelhart, 1981; Rumelhart and McClelland, 1982), Rumelhart and McClelland’s (1986) model of the acquisition of the English past tense, and Elman’s (1991) simple recurrent network for finding structure in time. Finally, the chapter considers how twenty-five years of connectionist modeling has influenced wider theories of cognition. 2.1. Historical Context Connectionist models draw inspiration from the notion that the information-processing properties of neural systems should influence our theories of cognition. The possible role of neurons in generating the mind was first considered not long after the existence of the nerve cell was accepted in the latter half of the nineteenth century (Aizawa, 2004). Early neural network theorizing can therefore be found in some of the associationist theories of mental processes prevalent at the time (e.g., Freud, 1895; James, 1890; Meynert, 1884; Spencer, 1872). However, this line of theorizing was quelled when Lashley presented data appearing to show that the performance of the brain degraded gracefully depending only on the quantity of damage. This argued against the specific involvement of neurons in particular cognitive processes (see, e.g., Lashley, 1929). In the 1930s and 1940s, there was a resurgence of interest in using mathematical techniques to characterize the behavior of networks of nerve cells (e.g., Rashevksy, 1935). This culminated in the work of Mc-
Culloch and Pitts (1943) who characterized the function of simple networks of binary threshold neurons in terms of logical operations. In his 1949 book The Organization of Behavior, Donald Hebb proposed a cell assembly theory of cognition, including the idea that specific synaptic changes might underlie psychological principles of learning. A decade later, Rosenblatt (1958, 1962) formulated a learning rule for two-layered neural networks, demonstrating mathematically that the perceptron convergence rule could adjust the weights connecting an input layer and an output layer of simple neurons to allow the network to associate arbitrary binary patterns. With this rule, learning converged on the set of connection values necessary to acquire any two-layercomputable function relating a set of inputoutput patterns. Unfortunately, Minsky and Papert (1969, 1988) demonstrated that the set of two-layer computable functions was somewhat limited – that is, these simple artificial neural networks were not particularly powerful devices. While more computationally powerful networks could be described, there was no algorithm to learn the connection weights of these systems. Such networks required the postulation of additional internal, or “hidden,” processing units, which could adopt intermediate representational states in the mapping between input and output patterns. An algorithm (backpropagation) able to learn these states was discovered independently several times. A key paper by Rumelhart, Hinton, and Williams (1986) demonstrated the usefulness of networks trained using backpropagation for addressing key computational and cognitive challenges facing neural networks. In the 1970s, serial processing and the Von Neumann computer metaphor dominated cognitive psychology. Nevertheless, a number of researchers continued to work on the computational properties of neural systems. Some of the key themes identified by these researchers included the role of competition in processing and learning (e.g., Grossberg, 1976; Kohonen, 1984), the properties of distributed representations (e.g., Anderson, 1977; Hinton & Anderson, 1981), and the possibility of
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connectionist models of cognition Simple Neural Networks (logical operations)
(Theoretical) Logogen/ Pandemonium
2-Layer Feedforward Networks (trained with delta rule) – Perceptron
(Hand-wired) Constraint Satisfaction Networks (e.g., IA, IAC – Jets & Sharks, Necker Cube, Stereopsis)
Competitive Networks unsupervised learning (e.g., Kohonen, Grossberg) 3-Layer Feedforward Networks (trained with backpropagation algorithm)
Cascade Rule (e.g., Stroop model)
Attractor Networks
Recurrent Networks
Jordan Networks
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Hopfield Nets (binary)
Boltzmann Machine (simulated annealing metaphor)
Cascade correlation (Fahlman & Lebiere)
Elman Networks (SRN)
Figure 2.1. A simplified schematic showing the historical evolution of neural network architectures. Simple binary networks (McCulloch & Pitts, 1943) are followed by two-layer feedforward networks (perceptrons; Rosenblatt, 1958). Three subtypes then emerge: three-layer feedforward networks (Rumelhart & McClelland, 1986), competitive or self-organizing networks (e.g., Grossberg, 1976; Kohonen, 1984), and interactive networks (Hopfield, 1982; Hinton & Sejnowksi, 1986). Adaptive interactive networks have precursors in detector theories of perception (Logogen: Morton, 1969; Pandemonium: Selfridge, 1959) and in handwired interactive models (interactive activation: McClelland & Rumelhart, 1981; interactive activation and competition: McClelland, 1981; Stereopsis: Marr & Poggio, 1976; Necker cube: Feldman, 1981, Rumelhart et al., 1986). Feedforward pattern associators have produced multiple subtypes: for capturing temporally extended activation states, cascade networks in which states monotonically asymptote (e.g., Cohen, Dunbar, & McClelland, 1990), and attractor networks in which states cycle into stable configurations (e.g., Plaut & McClelland, 1993); for processing sequential information, recurrent networks (Jordan, 1986; Elman, 1991); and for systems that alter their structure as part of learning, constructivist networks (e.g., cascade correlation: Fahlman & Lebiere, 1990; Shultz, 2003). SRN = simple recurrent network.
content addressable memory in networks with attractor states, formalized using the mathematics of statistical physics (Hopfield, 1982). A fuller characterization of the many historical influences in the development
of connectionism can be found in Rumelhart and McClelland (1986, Chapter 1), Bechtel and Abrahamsen (1991), McLeod, Plunkett, and Rolls (1998), and O’Reilly and Munakata (2000). Figure 2.1 depicts a
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selective schematic of this history and demonstrates the multiple types of neural network systems that have latterly come to be used in building models of cognition. Although diverse, they are unified on the one hand by the proposal that cognition comprises processes of constraint satisfaction, energy minimization, and pattern recognition, and on the other hand that adaptive processes construct the microstructure of these systems, primarily by adjusting the strengths of connections among the neuron-like processing units involved in a computation. 2.2. Key Properties of Connectionist Models Connectionism starts with the following inspiration from neural systems: Computations will be carried out by a set of simple processing units operating in parallel and affecting each others’ activation states via a network of weighted connections. Rumelhart, Hinton, and McClelland (1986) identified seven key features that would define a general framework for connectionist processing. The first feature is the set of processing units ui . In a cognitive model, these may be intended to represent individual concepts (such as letters or words), or they may simply be abstract elements over which meaningful patterns can be defined. Processing units are often distinguished into input, output, and hidden units. In associative networks, input and output units have states that are defined by the task being modeled (at least during training), whereas hidden units are free parameters whose states may be determined as necessary by the learning algorithm. The second feature is a state of activation (a) at a given time (t). The state of a set of units is usually represented by a vector of real numbers a(t). These may be binary or continuous numbers, bounded or unbounded. A frequent assumption is that the activation level of simple processing units will vary continuously between the values 0 and 1.
The third feature is a pattern of connectivity. The strength of the connection between any two units will determine the extent to which the activation state of one unit can affect the activation state of another unit at a subsequent time point. The strength of the connections between unit i and unit j can be represented by a matrix W of weight values wi j . Multiple matrices may be specified for a given network if there are connections of different types. For example, one matrix may specify excitatory connections between units and a second may specify inhibitory connections. Potentially, the weight matrix allows every unit to be connected to every other unit in the network. Typically, units are arranged into layers (e.g., input, hidden, output), and layers of units are fully connected to each other. For example, in a three-layer feedforward architecture where activation passes in a single direction from input to output, the input layer would be fully connected to the hidden layer and the hidden layer would be fully connected to the output layer. The fourth feature is a rule for propagating activation states throughout the network. This rule takes the vector a(t) of output values for the processing units sending activation and combines it with the connectivity matrix W to produce a summed or net input into each receiving unit. The net input to a receiving unit is produced by multiplying the vector and matrix together, so that neti = W × a(t) =
wi j a j .
(2.1)
j
The fifth feature is an activation rule to specify how the net inputs to a given unit are combined to produce its new activation state. The function F derives the new activation state ai (t + 1) = F (neti (t)).
(2.2)
For example, F might be a threshold so that the unit becomes active only if the net input exceeds a given value. Other possibilities include linear, Gaussian, and sigmoid
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functions, depending on the network type. Sigmoid is perhaps the most common, operating as a smoothed threshold function that is also differentiable. It is often important that the activation function be differentiable because learning seeks to improve a performance metric that is assessed via the activation state whereas learning itself can only operate on the connection weights. The effect of weight changes on the performance metric therefore depends to some extent on the activation function. The learning algorithm encodes this fact by including the derivative of that function (see the following discussion). The sixth key feature of connectionist models is the algorithm for modifying the patterns of connectivity as a function of experience. Virtually all learning rules for PDP models can be considered a variant of the Hebbian learning rule (Hebb, 1949). The essential idea is that a weight between two units should be altered in proportion to the units’ correlated activity. For example, if a unit ui receives input from another unit u j , then if both are highly active, the weight wi j from u j to ui should be strengthened. In its simplest version, the rule is wi j = η ai a j
(2.3)
where η is the constant of proportionality known as the learning rate. Where an external target activation ti (t) is available for a unit i at time t, this algorithm is modified by replacing ai with a term depicting the disparity of unit ui ’s current activation state ai (t) from its desired activation state ti (t) at time t, so forming the delta rule: wi j = η (ti (t) − ai (t)) a j .
(2.4)
However, when hidden units are included in networks, no target activation is available for these internal parameters. The weights to such units may be modified by variants of the Hebbian learning algorithm (e.g., Contrastive Hebbian; Hinton, 1989; see Xie & Seung, 2003) or by the backpropagation of error signals from the output layer.
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Backpropagation makes it possible to determine, for each connection weight in the network, what effect a change in its value would have on the overall network error. The policy for changing the strengths of connections is simply to adjust each weight in the direction (up or down) that would tend to reduce the error, and change it by an amount proportional to the size of the effect the adjustment will have. If there are multiple layers of hidden units remote from the output layer, this process can be followed iteratively: First, error derivatives are computed for the hidden layer nearest the output layer; from these, derivatives are computed for the next deepest layer into the network, and so forth. On this basis, the backpropagation algorithm serves to modify the pattern of weights in powerful multilayer networks. It alters the weights to each deeper layer of units in such a way as to reduce the error on the output units (see Rumelhart, Hinton, et al., 1986, for the derivation). We can formulate the weight change algorithm by analogy to the delta rule shown in equation 2.4. For each deeper layer in the network, we modify the central term that represents the disparity between the actual and target activation of the units. Assuming ui , uh , and uo are input, hidden, and output units in a three-layer feedforward network, the algorithm for changing the weight from hidden to output unit is: woh = η (to − ao ) F (neto ) ah
(2.5)
where F (net) is the derivative of the activation function of the units (e.g., for the sigmoid activation function,F (neto ) = ao (1 − ao )). The term (to − ao ) is proportional to the negative of the partial derivative of the network’s overall error with respect to the activation of the output unit, where the error E is given by E = (t − ao )2 . In this and the following o o equations, time t has been omitted for clarity. The derived error term for a unit at the hidden layer is a product of three components: the derivative of the hidden unit’s activation function multiplied by the sum
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across all the connections from that hidden unit to the output later of the error term on each output unit weighted by the derivative of the output unit’s activation function (to − ao ) F (neto ) multiplied by the weight connecting the hidden unit to the output unit: F (neth )
o
(to − ao )F (neto )woh . (2.6)
The algorithm for changing the weights from the input to the hidden layer is therefore: whi = η F (neth )
(to − ao )
o
× F (neto )woh ai .
(2.7)
It is interesting that the previous computation can be construed as a backward pass through the network, similar in spirit to the forward pass that computes activations. This is because it involves propagation of signals across weighted connections, this time from the output layer back toward the input. The backward pass, however, involves the propagation of error derivatives rather than activations. It should be emphasized that a very wide range of variants and extensions of Hebbian and error-correcting algorithms have been introduced in the connectionist learning literature. Most importantly, several variants of backpropagation have been developed for training recurrent networks (Williams & Zipser, 1995); and several algorithms (including the Contrastive Hebbian Learning algorithm and O’Reilly’s 1998 LEABRA algorithm) have addressed some of the concerns that have been raised regarding the biological plausibility of backpropagation construed in its most literal form (O’Reilly & Munakata, 2000). The last general feature of connectionist networks is a representation of the environment with respect to the system. This is assumed to consist of a set of externally provided events or a function for generating such events. An event may be a single pattern, such as a visual input; an ensemble of related patterns, such as the spelling
of a word and its corresponding sound or meaning; or a sequence of inputs, such as the words in a sentence. A number of policies have been used for specifying the order of presentation of the patterns. These range from sweeping through the full set to random sampling with replacement. The selection of patterns to present may vary over the course of training but is often fixed. Where a target output is linked to each input, this is usually assumed to be simultaneously available. Two points are of note in the translation between PDP network and cognitive model. First, a representational scheme must be defined to map between the cognitive domain of interest and a set of vectors depicting the relevant informational states or mappings for that domain. Second, in many cases, connectionist models are addressed to aspects of higher-level cognition, where it is assumed that the information of relevance is more abstract than sensory or motor codes. This has meant that the models often leave out details of the transduction of sensory and motor signals, using input and output representations that are already somewhat abstract. We hold the view that the same principles at work in higher-level cognition are also at work in perceptual and motor systems, and indeed there is also considerable connectionist work addressing issues of perception and action, although these will not be the focus of the present chapter. 2.3. Neural Plausibility It is a historical fact that most connectionist modelers have drawn their inspiration from the computational properties of neural systems. However, it has become a point of controversy whether these “brain-like” systems are indeed neurally plausible. If they are not, should they instead be viewed as a class of statistical function approximators? And if so, shouldn’t the ability of these models to simulate patterns of human behavior be assessed in the context of the large number of free parameters they contain (e.g., in the weight matrix; Green, 1998)? Neural plausibility should not be the primary focus for a consideration of connec-
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tionism. The advantage of connectionism, according to its proponents, is that it provides better theories of cognition. Nevertheless, we will deal briefly with this issue because it pertains to the origins of connectionist cognitive theory. In this area, two sorts of criticism have been leveled at connectionist models. The first is to maintain that many connectionist models either include properties that are not neurally plausible or omit other properties that neural systems appear to have. Some connectionist researchers have responded to this first criticism by endeavoring to show how features of connectionist systems might in fact be realized in the neural machinery of the brain. For example, the backward propagation of error across the same connections that carry activation signals is generally viewed as biologically implausible. However, a number of authors have shown that the difference between activations computed using standard feedforward connections and those computed using standard return connections can be used to derive the crucial error derivatives required by backpropagation (Hinton & McClelland, 1988; O’Reilly, 1996). It is widely held that connections run bidirectionally in the brain, as required for this scheme to work. Under this view, backpropagation may be shorthand for a Hebbian-based algorithm that uses bidirectional connections to spread error signals throughout a network (Xie & Seung, 2003). Other connectionist researchers have responded to the first criticism by stressing the cognitive nature of current connectionist models. Most of the work in developmental neuroscience addresses behavior at levels no higher than cellular and local networks, whereas cognitive models must make contact with the human behavior studied in psychology. Some simplification is therefore warranted, with neural plausibility compromised under the working assumption that the simplified models share the same flavor of computation as actual neural systems. Connectionist models have succeeded in stimulating a great deal of progress in cognitive theory – and have sometimes generated radically different pro-
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posals to the previously prevailing symbolic theory – just given the set of basic computational features outlined in the preceding section. The second type of criticism leveled at connectionism questions why, as Davies (2005) puts it, connectionist models should be reckoned any more plausible as putative descriptions of cognitive processes just because they are “brain-like.” Under this view, there is independence between levels of description because a given cognitive level theory might be implemented in multiple ways in different hardware. Therefore, the details of the hardware (in this case, the brain) need not concern the cognitive theory. This functionalist approach, most clearly stated in Marr’s three levels of description (computational, algorithmic, and implementational; see Marr, 1982) has been repeatedly challenged (see, e.g., Rumelhart & McClelland, 1985; Mareschal et al., 2007). The challenge to Marr goes as follows. Although, according to computational theory, there may be a principled independence between a computer program and the particular substrate on which it is implemented, in practical terms, different sorts of computation are easier or harder to implement on a given substrate. Because computations have to be delivered in real time as the individual reacts with his or her environment, in the first instance, cognitive level theories should be constrained by the computational primitives that are most easily implemented on the available hardware; human cognition should be shaped by the processes that work best in the brain. The relation of connectionist models to symbolic models has also proved controversial. A full consideration of this issue is beyond the scope of the current chapter. Suffice to say that because the connectionist approach now includes a diverse family of models, there is no single answer to this question. Smolensky (1988) argued that connectionist models exist at a lower (but still cognitive) level of description than symbolic cognitive theories, a level that he called the subsymbolic. Connectionist models have sometimes been put forward as a way to implement symbolic
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production systems on neural architectures (e.g., Touretzky & Hinton, 1988). At other times, connectionist researchers have argued that their models represent a qualitatively different form of computation: Whereas under certain circumstances, connectionist models might produce behavior approximating symbolic processes, it is held that human behavior, too, only approximates the characteristics of symbolic systems rather than directly implementing them. Furthermore, connectionist systems incorporate additional properties characteristic of human cognition, such as content-addressable memory, context-sensitive processing, and graceful degradation under damage or noise. Under this view, symbolic theories are approximate descriptions rather than actual characterizations of human cognition. Connectionist theories should replace them both because they capture subtle differences between human behavior and symbolic characterizations, and because they provide a specification of the underlying causal mechanisms (van Gelder, 1991). This strong position has prompted criticisms that in their current form, connectionist models are insufficiently powerful to account for certain aspects of human cognition – in particular, those areas best characterized by symbolic, syntactically driven computations (Fodor & Pylyshyn, 1988; Marcus, 2001). Again, however, the characterization of human cognition in such terms is highly controversial; close scrutiny of relevant aspects of language – the ground on which the dispute has largely been focused – lends support to the view that the systematicity assumed by proponents of symbolic approaches is overstated and that the actual characteristics of language are well matched to the characteristics of connectionist systems (Bybee & McClelland, 2005; McClelland et al., 2003). In the end, it may be difficult to make principled distinctions between symbolic and connectionist models. At a fine scale, one might argue that two units in a network represent variables, and the connection between them specifies a symbolic rule linking these variables. One might also argue that a production system in which rules are allowed to fire probabilistically and
in parallel begins to approximate a connectionist system. 2.4. The Relationship between Connectionist Models and Bayesian Inference Since the early 1980s, it has been apparent that there are strong links between the calculations carried out in connectionist models and key elements of Bayesian calculations (see Chapter 3 in this volume on Bayesian models of cognition). The state of the early literature on this point was reviewed in McClelland (1998). There it was noted, first of all, that units can be viewed as playing the role of probabilistic hypotheses; that weights and biases play the role of conditional probability relations between hypotheses and prior probabilities, respectively; and that if connection weights and biases have the correct values, the logistic activation function sets the activation of a unit to its posterior probability given the evidence represented on its inputs. A second and more important observation is that, in stochastic neural networks (Boltzmann machines and Continuous Diffusion Networks; Hinton & Sejnowski, 1986; Movellan & McClelland, 1993), a network’s state over all of its units can represent a constellation of hypotheses about an input, and (if the weights and the biases are set correctly) that the probability of finding the network in a particular state is monotonically related to the probability that the state is the correct interpretation of the input. The exact nature of the relation depends on a parameter called temperature; if set to one, the probability that the network will be found in a particular state exactly matches its posterior probability. When temperature is gradually reduced to zero, the network will end up in the most probable state, thus performing optimal perceptual inference (Hinton & Sejnowski, 1983). It is also known that backpropagation can learn weights that allow Bayes-optimal estimation of outputs given inputs (MacKay, 1992) and that the Boltzmann machine learning algorithm (Ackley, Hinton, & Sejnowski, 1985; Movellan & McClelland,
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1993) can learn to produce correct conditional distributions of outputs given inputs. The algorithm is slow but there has been recent progress producing substantial speedups that achieve outstanding performance on benchmark data sets (Hinton & Salakhutdinov, 2006).
3. Three Illustrative Models In this section, we outline three of the landmark models in the emergence of connectionist theories of cognition. The models serve to illustrate the key principles of connectionism and demonstrate how these principles are relevant to explaining behavior in ways that were different from other prior approaches. The contribution of these models was twofold: they were better suited than alternative approaches to capturing the actual characteristics of human cognition, usually on the basis of their context sensitive processing properties; and compared to existing accounts, they offered a sharper set of tools to drive theoretical progress and to stimulate empirical data collection. Each of these models significantly advanced its field. 3.1. An Interactive Activation Model of Context Effects in Letter Perception (McClelland & Rumelhart, 1981, Rumelhart & McClelland, 1982) The interactive activation model of letter perception illustrates two interrelated ideas. The first is that connectionist models naturally capture a graded constraint satisfaction process in which the influences of many different types of information are simultaneously integrated in determining, for example, the identity of a letter in a word. The second idea is that the computation of a perceptual representation of the current input (in this case, a word) involves the simultaneous and mutual influence of representations at multiple levels of abstraction – this is a core idea of parallel distributed processing. The interactive activation model addressed a puzzle in word recognition. By
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the late 1970s, it had long been known that people were better at recognizing letters presented in words than letters presented in random letter sequences. Reicher (1969) demonstrated that this was not the result of tending to guess letters that would make letter strings into words. He presented target letters in words, in unpronounceable nonwords, or on their own. The stimuli were then followed by a pattern mask, after which participants were presented with a forced choice between two letters in a given position. Importantly, both alternatives were equally plausible. Thus, the participant might be presented with WOOD and asked whether the third letter was O or R. As expected, forced-choice performance was more accurate for letters in words than for letters in nonwords or letters presented on their own. Moreover, the benefit of surrounding context was also conferred by pronounceable pseudowords (e.g., recognizing the P in SPET) compared with random letter strings, suggesting that subjects were able to bring to bear rules regarding the orthographic legality of letter strings during recognition. Rumelhart and McClelland (Rumelhart & McClelland, 1981; Rumelhart & McClelland, 1982) took the contextual advantage of words and pseudowords on letter recognition to indicate the operation of top-down processing. Previous theories had put forward the idea that letter and word recognition might be construed in terms of detectors that collect evidence consistent with the presence of their assigned letter or word in the input (Morton, 1969; Selfridge, 1959). Influenced by these theories, Rumelhart and McClelland built a computational simulation in which the perception of letters resulted from excitatory and inhibitory interactions of detectors for visual features. Importantly, the detectors were organized into different layers for letter features, letters and words, and detectors could influence each other both in a bottom-up and a top-down manner. Figure 2.2 illustrates the structure of the Interactive Activation (IA) model, both at the macro level (left) and for a small section of the model at a finer level (right).
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WORD LEVEL
SEED
WEED FEED
LETTER LEVEL
W S F
FEATURE LEVEL
VISUAL INPUT
Figure 2.2. Interactive Activation model of context effects in letter recognition (McClelland & Rumelhart, 1981, 1982). Pointed arrows are excitatory connections, circular headed arrows are inhibitory connections. Left: macro view (connections in gray were set to zero in implemented model). Right: micro view for the connections from the feature level to the first letter position for the letters S, W, and F (only excitatory connections shown) and from the first letter position to the word units SEED, WEED, and FEED (all connections shown).
The explicit motivation for the structure of the IA was neural: “[We] have adopted the approach of formulating the model in terms similar to the way in which such a process might actually be carried out in a neural or neural-like system” (McClelland & Rumelhart, 1981, p. 387). There were three main assumptions of the IA model: (1) Perceptual processing takes place in a system in which there are several levels of processing, each of which forms a representation of the input at a different level of abstraction; (2) visual perception involves parallel processing, both of the four letters in each word and of all levels of abstraction simultaneously; and (3) perception is an interactive process in which conceptually driven and data driven processing provide multiple, simultaneously acting constraints that combine to determine what is perceived. The activation states of the system were simulated by a sequence of discrete time steps. Each unit combined its activation on the previous time step, its excitatory influences, its inhibitory influences, and a decay factor to determine its activation on the next
time step. Connectivity was set at unitary values and along the following principles. In each layer, mutually exclusive alternatives should inhibit each other. Each unit in a layer excited all units with which it was consistent and inhibited all those with which it was inconsistent in the layer immediately above. Thus, in Figure 2.2, the first-position W letter unit has an excitatory connection to the WEED word unit but an inhibitory connection to the SEED and FEED word units. Similarly, a unit excited all units with which it was consistent and inhibited all those with which it was inconsistent in the layer immediately below. However, in the final implementation, top-down word-to-letter inhibition and within-layer letter-to-letter inhibition were set to zero (gray arrows, Figure 2.2). The model was constructed to recognize letters in four-letter strings. The full set of possible letters was duplicated for each letter position, and a set of 1,179 word units was created to represent the corpus of fourletter words. Word units were given base rate activation states at the beginning of processing to reflect their different frequencies.
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A trial began by clamping the feature units to the appropriate states to represent a letter string and then observing the dynamic change in activation through the network. Conditions were included to allow the simulation of stimulus masking and degraded stimulus quality. Finally, a probabilistic response mechanism was added to generate responses from the letter level, based on the relative activation states of the letter pool in each position. The model successfully captured the greater accuracy of letter detection for letters appearing in words and pseudowords compared with random strings or in isolation. Moreover, it simulated a variety of empirical findings on the effect of masking and stimulus quality, and of changing the timing of the availability of context. The results on the contextual effects of pseudowords are particularly interesting, because the model only contains word units and letter units and has no explicit representation of orthographic rules. Let us say on a given trial, the subject is required to recognize the second letter in the string SPET. In this case, the string will produce bottom-up excitation of the word units for SPAT, SPIT, and SPOT, which each share three letters. In turn, the word units will propagate topdown activation, reinforcing activation of the letter P and so facilitating its recognition. Were this letter to be presented in the string XPQJ, no word units could offer similar top-down activation, hence the relative facilitation of the pseudoword. Interestingly, although these top-down “gang” effects produced facilitation of letters contained in orthographically legal nonword strings, the model demonstrated that they also produced facilitation in orthographically illegal, unpronounceable letter strings, such as SPCT. Here, the same gang of SPAT, SPIT, and SPOT produce top-down support. Rumelhart and McClelland (1982) reported empirical support for this novel prediction. Therefore, although the model behaved as if it contained orthographic rules influencing recognition, it did not in fact do so because continued contextual facilitation could be demonstrated for strings that had
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gang support but violated the orthographic rules. There are two specific points to note regarding the IA model. First, this early connectionist model was not adaptive – connectivity was set by hand. Although the model’s behavior was shaped by the statistical properties of the language it processed, these properties were built into the structure of the system in terms of the frequency of occurrence of letters and letter combinations in the words. Second, the idea of bottom-up excitation followed by competition among mutually exclusive possibilities is a strategy familiar in Bayesian approaches to cognition. In that sense, the IA bears similarity to more recent probability theory based approaches to perception (see Chapter 3 in this volume).
3.1.1. what happened next? Subsequent work saw the principles of the IA model extended to the recognition of spoken words (the TRACE model: McClelland & Elman, 1986) and more recently to bilingual speakers, where two languages must be incorporated in a single representational system (see Thomas & van Heuven, 2005, for review). The architecture was applied to other domains where multiple constraints were thought to operate during perception, for example, in face recognition (Burton, Bruce, & Johnston, 1990). Within language, more complex architectures have tried to recast the principles of the IA model in developmental settings, such as Plaut and Kello’s (1999) model of the emergence of phonology from the interplay of speech comprehension and production. The more general lesson to draw from the interactive activation model is the demonstration of multiple influences (feature, letter, and word-level knowledge) working simultaneously and in parallel to shape the response of the system, as well as the somewhat surprising finding that a massively parallel constraint satisfaction process of this form can appear to behave as if it contains rules (in this case, orthographic) when no such rules are included in the processing structure. At the time, the model brought
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into question whether it was necessary to postulate rules as processing structures to explain regularities in human behavior. This skepticism was brought into sharper focus by our next example. 3.2. On Learning the Past Tense of English Verbs (Rumelhart & McClelland, 1986) Rumelhart and McClelland’s (1986) model of English past tense formation marked the real emergence of the PDP framework. Where the IA model used localist coding, the past tense model employed distributed coding. Where the IA model had handwired connection weights, the past tense model learned its weights via repeated exposure to a problem domain. However, the models share two common themes. Once more, the behavior of the past tense model will be driven by the statistics of the problem domain, albeit these will be carved into the model by training rather than sculpted by the modelers. Perhaps more importantly, we see a return to the idea that a connectionist system can exhibit rule-following behavior without containing rules as causal processing structures; but in this case, the rulefollowing behavior will be the product of learning and will accommodate a proportion of exception patterns that do not follow the general rule. The key point that the past tense model illustrates is how (approximate) conformity to the regularities of language – and even a tendency to produce new regular forms (e.g., regularizations like “thinked” or past tenses for novel verbs like “wugged”) – can arise in a connectionist network without an explicit representation of a linguistic rule. The English past tense is characterized by a predominant regularity in which the majority of verbs form their past tenses by the addition of one of three allomorphs of the “-ed” suffix to the base stem (walk/ walked, end/ended, chase/chased). However, there is a small but significant group of verbs that form their past tense in different ways, including changing internal vowels (swim/ swam), changing word final consonants (build/built), changing both internal vowels
and final consonants (think/ thought), and an arbitrary relation of stem to past tense (go/went), as well as verbs that have a past tense form identical to the stem (hit/hit). These so-called irregular verbs often come in small groups sharing a family resemblance (sleep/slept, creep/crept, leap/leapt) and usually have high token frequencies (see Pinker, 1999, for further details). During the acquisition of the English past tense, children show a characteristic U-shaped developmental profile at different times for individual irregular verbs. Initially, they use the correct past tense of a small number of high-frequency regular and irregular verbs. Later, they sometimes produce “overregularized” past tense forms for a small fraction of their irregular verbs (e.g., thinked; Marcus et al., 1992), along with other, less frequent errors (Xu & Pinker, 1995). They are also able to extend the past tense “rule” to novel verbs (e.g., wugwugged). Finally, in older children, performance approaches ceiling on both regular and irregular verbs (Berko, 1958; Ervin, 1964; Kuczaj, 1977). In the early 1980s, it was held that this pattern of behavior represented the operation of two developmental mechanisms (Pinker, 1984). One of these was symbolic and served to learn the regular past tense rule, whereas the other was associative and served to learn the exceptions to the rule. The extended phase of overregularization errors corresponded to difficulties in integrating the two mechanisms, specifically, a failure of the associative mechanism to block the function of the symbolic mechanism. That the child comes to the language acquisition situation armed with these two mechanisms (one of them full of blank rules) was an a priori commitment of the developmental theory. By contrast, Rumelhart and McClelland (1986) proposed that a single network that does not distinguish between regular and irregular past tenses is sufficient to learn past tense formation. The architecture of their model is shown in Figure 2.3. A phonemebased representation of the verb root was recoded into a more distributed, coarser
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Phonological representation of past tense
Decoding
Coarse coded, distributed Wickelfeature representation of past tense
2-layer network trained with the delta rule Coarse coded, distributed Wickelfeature representation of root
Recoding
Phonological representation of verb root
Figure 2.3. Two-layer network for learning the mapping between the verb roots and past tense forms of English verbs (Rumelhart & McClelland, 1986). Phonological representations of verbs are initially encoded into a coarse, distributed “Wickelfeature” representation. Past tenses are decoded from the Wickelfeature representation back to the phonological form. Later connectionist models replaced the dotted area with a three-layer feedforward backpropagation network (e.g., Plunkett & Marchman, 1991, 1993).
(more blurred) format, which they called “Wickelfeatures.” The stated aim of this recoding was to produce a representation that (a) permitted differentiation of all of the root forms of English and their past tenses, and (b) provided a natural basis for generalizations to emerge about what aspects of a present tense correspond to what aspects of a past tense. This format involved representing verbs over 460 processing units. A two-layer network was used to associate the Wickelfeature representations of the verb root and past tense form. A final decoding network was then used to derive the closest phoneme-based rendition of the past tense form and reveal the model’s response (the decoding part of the model was somewhat restricted by computer processing limitations of the machines available at the time). The connection weights in the two-layer network were initially randomized. The model was then trained in three phases, in each case using the delta rule to update the connection weights after each verb root/past tense pair was presented (see Sec-
tion 2.2, and Equation 4). In Phase 1, the network was trained on ten high-frequency verbs, two regular and eight irregular, in line with the greater proportion of irregular verbs among the most frequent verbs in English. Phase 1 lasted for ten presentations of the full training set (or “epochs”). In Phase 2, the network was trained on 410 medium frequency verbs, 334 regular and 76 irregular, for a further 190 epochs. In Phase 3, no further training took place, but 86 lower-frequency verbs were presented to the network to test its ability to generalize its knowledge of the past tense domain to novel verbs. There were four key results for this model. First, it succeeded in learning both regular and irregular past tense mappings in a single network that made no reference to the distinction between regular and irregular verbs. Second, it captured the overall pattern of faster acquisition for regular verbs than irregular verbs, a predominant feature of children’s past tense acquisition. Third, the model captured the U-shaped profile
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of development: an early phase of accurate performance on a small set of regular and irregular verbs, followed by a phase of overregularization of the irregular forms, and finally recovery for the irregular verbs and performance approaching ceiling on both verb types. Fourth, when the model was presented with the low-frequency verbs on which it had not been trained, it was able to generalize the past tense rule to a substantial proportion of them, as if it had indeed learned a rule. Additionally, the model captured more fine-grained developmental patterns for subsets of regular and irregular verbs, and generated several novel predictions. Rumelhart and McClelland explained the generalization abilities of the network in terms of the superpositional memory of the two-layer network. All the associations between the distributed encodings of verb root and past tense forms must be stored across the single matrix of connection weights. As a result, similar patterns blend into one another and reinforce each other. Generalization is contingent on the similarity of verbs at input. Were the verbs to be presented using an orthogonal, localist scheme (e.g., 420 units, 1 per verb), then there would be no similarity between the verbs, no blending of mappings, no generalization, and therefore no regularization of novel verbs. As the authors state, “It is the statistical relationships among the base forms themselves that determine the pattern of responding. The network merely reflects the statistics of the featural representations of the verb forms” (Rumelhart & McClelland, 1986, p. 267). Based on the model’s successful simulation of the profile of language development in this domain and, compared with the dual mechanism model, its more parsimonious a priori commitments, Rumelhart and McClelland viewed their work on past tense morphology as a step toward a revised understanding of language knowledge, language acquisition, and linguistic information processing in general. The past tense model stimulated a great deal of subsequent debate, not least because of its profound implications for the-
ories of language development (no rules!). The model was initially subjected to concentrated criticism. Some of this was overstated – for instance, the use of domaingeneral learning principles (such as distributed representation, parallel processing, and the delta rule) to acquire the past tense in a single network was interpreted as a claim that all of language acquisition could be captured by the operation of a single domaingeneral learning mechanism. Such an absurd claim could be summarily dismissed. As it stood, the model made no such claim: Its generality was in the processing principles. The model itself represented a domainspecific system dedicated to learning a small part of language. Nevertheless, a number of the criticisms were more telling: The Wickelfeature representational format was not psycholinguistically realistic; the generalization performance of the model was relatively poor; the U-shaped developmental profile appeared to be a result of abrupt changes in the composition of the training set; and the actual response of the model was hard to discern because of problems in decoding the Wickelfeature output into a phoneme string (Pinker & Prince, 1988). The criticisms and following rejoinders were interesting in a number of ways. First, there was a stark contrast between the precise, computationally implemented connectionist model of past tense formation and the verbally specified dual-mechanism theory (e.g., Marcus et al., 1992). The implementation made simplifications but was readily evaluated against quantitative behavioral evidence; it made predictions and it could be falsified. The verbal theory by contrast was vague – it was hard to know how or whether it would work or exactly what behaviors it predicted (see Thomas, Forrester, & Richardson, 2006, for discussion). Therefore, it could only be evaluated on loose qualitative grounds. Second, the model stimulated a great deal of new multidisciplinary research in the area. Today, inflectional morphology (of which past tense is a part) is one of the most studied aspects of language processing in children, in adults, in second language learners, in adults
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with acquired brain damage, in children and adults with neurogenetic disorders, and in children with language impairments, using psycholinguistic methods, event-related potential measures of brain activity, functional magnetic resonance imaging, and behavioral genetics. This rush of science illustrates the essential role of computational modeling in driving forward theories of human cognition. Third, further modifications and improvements to the past tense model have highlighted how researchers go about the difficult task of understanding which parts of their model represent the key theoretical claims and which are implementational details. Simplification is inherent in modeling, but successful modeling relies on making the right simplifications to focus on the process of interest. For example, in subsequent models, (1) the Wickelfeature representation was replaced by more plausible phonemic representations based on articulatory features; (2) the recoding/two-layer network/decoding component of the network (the dotted rectangle in Figure 2.3) that was trained with the delta rule was replaced by a three-layer feedforward network trained with the backpropagation algorithm; and the (3) U-shaped developmental profile was demonstrated in connectionist networks trained with a smoothly growing training set of verbs or even with a fixed set of verbs (see, e.g., Plunkett & Marchman, 1991, 1993, 1996).
3.2.1. what happened next? The English past tense model prompted further work within inflectional morphology in other languages (e.g., pluralization in German: Goebel & Indefrey, 2000; pluralization in Arabic: Plunkett & Nakisa, 1997), as well as models that explored the possible causes of deficits in acquired and developmental disorders, such as aphasia, Specific Language Impairment and Williams syndrome (e.g., Hoeffner & McClelland, 1993; Joanisse & Seidenberg, 1999; Thomas & Karmiloff-Smith, 2003b; Thomas, 2005). The idea that rule-following behavior could emerge in a developing system that also had to accommodate exceptions to the rules was
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also successfully pursued via connectionist modeling in the domain of reading (e.g., Plaut, et al., 1996). This led to work that also considered various forms of acquired and developmental dyslexia. For the past tense itself, there remains much interest in the topic as a crucible to test theories of language development. However, in some senses the debate between connectionist and dualmechanism accounts has ground to a halt. There is much evidence from child development, adult cognitive neuropsychology, developmental neuropsychology, and functional brain imaging to suggest partial dissociations between performance on regular and irregular inflection under various conditions. Both connectionist and dualmechanism models have been modified: the connectionist model to include the influence of lexical-semantics as well as verb root phonology in driving the production of the past tense form (Joanisse & Seidenberg, 1999; Thomas & Karmiloff-Smith, 2003b); the dual-mechanism model to suppose that regular verbs might also be stored in the associative mechanism, thereby introducing partial redundancy of function (Pinker, 1999). Both approaches now accept that performance on regular and irregular past tenses partly indexes different things – in the connectionist account, different underlying knowledge, in the dualmechanism account, different underlying processes. In the connectionist theory, performance on regular verbs indexes reliance on knowledge about phonological regularities, whereas performance on irregular verbs indexes reliance on lexical-semantic knowledge. In the dual-mechanism theory, performance on regular verbs indexes a dedicated symbolic processing mechanism implementing the regular rule, whereas performance on irregular verbs indexes an associative memory device storing information about the past tense forms of specific verbs. Both approaches claim to account for the available empirical evidence. However, to date, the dual-mechanism account remains unimplemented, so its claim is weaker.
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How does one distinguish between two theories that (a) both claim to explain the data but (b) contain different representational assumptions? Putting aside the different level of detail of the two theories, the answer is that it depends on one’s preference for consistency with other disciplines. The dual-mechanism theory declares consistency with linguistics – if rules are required to characterize other aspects of language performance (such as syntax), then one might as well include them in a model of past tense formation. The connectionist theory declares consistency with neuroscience – if the language system is going to be implemented in the brain, then one might as well employ a computational formulism based on how neural networks function. Finally, we return to the more general connectionist principle illustrated by the past tense model. So long as there are regularities in the statistical structure of a problem domain, a massively parallel constraint satisfaction system can learn these regularities and extend them to novel situations. Moreover, as with humans, the behavior of the system is flexible and context sensitive – it can accommodate regularities and exceptions within a single processing structure. 3.3. Finding Structure in Time (Elman, 1990) In this section, the notion of the simple recurrent network and its application to language are introduced. As with past tense, the key point of the model will be to show how conformity to regularities of language can arise without an explicit representation of a linguistic rule. Moreover, the following simulations will demonstrate how learning can lead to the discovery of useful internal representations that capture conceptual and linguistic structure on the basis of the cooccurrences of words in sentences. The IA model exemplified connectionism’s commitment to parallelism: All of the letters of the word presented to the network were recognized in parallel, and processing occurred simultaneously at different levels of abstraction. But not all processing can be carried out in this way. Some hu-
man behaviors intrinsically revolve around temporal sequences. Language, action planning, goal-directed behavior, and reasoning about causality are examples of domains that rely on events occurring in sequences. How has connectionism addressed the processing of temporally unfolding events? One solution was offered in the TRACE model of spoken word recognition (McClelland & Elman, 1986), where a word was specified as a sequence of phonemes. In that case, the architecture of the system was duplicated for each time-slice and the duplicates wired together. This allowed constraints to operate over items in the sequence to influence recognition. In other models, a related approach was used to convert a temporally extended representation into a spatially extended one. For example, in the past tense model, all the phonemes of a verb were presented across the input layer. This could be viewed as a sequence if one assumed that the representation of the first phoneme represents time slice t, the representation of the second phoneme represents time slice t + 1, and so on. As part of a comprehension system, this approach assumes a buffer that can take sequences and convert them to a spatial vector. However, this solution is fairly limited, as it necessarily pre-commits to the size of the sequences that can be processed at once (i.e., the size of the input layer). Elman (1990, 1991) offered an alternative and more flexible approach to processing sequences, proposing an architecture that has been extremely influential and much used since. Elman drew on the work of Jordan (1986) who had proposed a model that could learn to associate a “plan” (i.e., a single input vector) with a series of “actions” (i.e., a sequence of output vectors). Jordan’s model contained recurrent connections permitting the hidden units to “see” the network’s previous output (via a set of “state” input units that are given a copy of the previous output). The facility for the network to shape its next output according to its previous response constitutes a kind of memory. Elman’s innovation was to build a recurrent facility into the internal units of the network, allowing it to compute statistical relationships across sequences of inputs
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Output units Fixed 1-to-1 weights copy activation of hidden layer to context units Hidden units
HU activations at time (t+1)
Input units
Context units
HU activations at time (t)
Figure 2.4. Elman’s simple recurrent network architecture for finding structure in time (Elman, 1991, 1993). Connections between input and hidden, context and hidden, and hidden and output layers are trainable. Sequences are applied to the network element by element in discrete time steps; the context layer contains a copy of the hidden unit (HU) activations on the previous time step transmitted by fixed, 1-to-1 connections.
and outputs. To achieve this, first time is discretized into a number of slices. On time step t, an input is presented to the network and causes a pattern of activation on hidden and output layers. On time step t + 1, the next input in the sequence of events is presented to the network. However, crucially, a copy of the activation of the hidden units on time step t is transmitted to a set of internal “context” units. This activation vector is also fed to the hidden units on time step t + 1. Figure 2.4 shows the architecture, known as the simple recurrent network (SRN). It is usually trained with the backpropagation algorithm (see Section 2.3) as a multilayer feedforward network, ignoring the origin of the information on the context layer. Each input to the SRN is therefore processed in the context of what came before, but in a way subtly more powerful than the Jordan network. The input at t + 1 is processed in the context of the activity produced on the hidden units by the input at time t. Now consider the next time step. The input at time t + 2 will be processed along with activity from the context layer that is shaped by two influences: (the input at t + 1 (shaped by the input at t)).
The input at time t + 3 will be processed along with activity from the context layer that is shaped by three influences: (the input at t + 2 (shaped by the input at t + 1 (shaped by the input at t))). The recursive flavor of the information contained in the context layer means that each new input is processed in the context of the full history of previous inputs. This permits the network to learn statistical relationships across sequences of inputs or, in other words, to find structure in time. In his original 1990 article, Elman demonstrated the powerful properties of the SRN with two examples. In the first, the network was presented with a sequence of letters made up of concatenated words, for example: MANYYEARSAGOABOYANDGIRLLIVEDBYTHESEATHEYPLAYEDHAPPILY
Each letter was represented by a distributed binary code over five input units. The network was trained to predict the next letter in the sentence for 200 sentences constructed from a lexicon of fifteen words. There were 1,270 words and 4,963 letters. Because each word appeared in many sentences,
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the network was not particularly successful at predicting the next letter when it got to the end of each word, but within a word it was able to predict the sequences of letters. Using the accuracy of prediction as a measure, one could therefore identify which sequences in the letter string were words: They were the sequences of good prediction bounded by high prediction errors. The ability to extract words was of course subject to the ambiguities inherent in the training set (e.g., for the and they, there is ambiguity after the third letter). Elman suggested that if the letter strings are taken to be analogous to the speech sounds available to the infant, the SRN demonstrates a possible mechanism to extract words from the continuous stream of sound that is present in infant-directed speech. Elman’s work has contributed to the increasing interest in the statistical learning abilities of young children in language and cognitive development (see, e.g., Saffran, Newport, & Aslin, 1996). In the second example, Elman (1990) created a set of 10,000 sentences by combining a lexicon of 29 words and a set of short sentence frames (noun + [transitive] verb + noun; noun + [intransitive] verb). There was a separate input and output unit for each word, and the SRN was trained to predict the next word in the sentence. During training, the network’s output came to approximate the transitional probabilities between the words in the sentences, that is, it could predict the next word in the sentences as much as this was possible. Following the first noun, the verb units would be more active as the possible next word, and verbs that tended to be associated with this particular noun would be more active than those that did not. At this point, Elman examined the similarity structure of the internal representations to discover how the network was achieving its prediction ability. He found that the internal representations were sensitive to the difference between nouns and verbs, and within verbs, to the difference between transitive and intransitive verbs. Moreover, the network was also sensitive to a range of semantic distinctions:
Not only were the internal states induced by nouns split into animate and inanimate, but the pattern for “woman” was most similar to “girl,” and that for “man” was most similar to “boy.” The network had learned to structure its internal representations according to a mix of syntactic and semantic information because these information states were the best way to predict how sentences would unfold. Elman concluded that the representations induced by connectionist networks need not be flat but could include hierarchical encodings of category structure. Based on his finding, Elman also argued that the SRN was able to induce representations of entities that varied according to their context of use. This contrasts with classical symbolic representations that retain their identity regardless of the combinations into which they are put, a property called “compositionality.” This claim is perhaps better illustrated by a second article Elman (1993) published two years later, called “Learning and Development in Neural Networks: The importance of Starting Small.” In this later article, Elman explored whether rule-based mechanisms are required to explain certain aspects of language performance, such as syntax. He focused on “long-range dependencies,” which are links between words that depend only on their syntactic relationship in the sentence and, importantly, not on their separation in a sequence of words. For example, in English, the subject and main verb of a sentence must agree in number. If the noun is singular, so must be the verb; if the noun is plural, so must be the verb. Thus, in the sentence “The boy chases the cat,” boy and chases must both be singular. But this is also true in the sentence “The boy whom the boys chase chases the cat.” In the second sentence, the subject and verb are further apart in the sequence of words but their relationship is the same; moreover, the words are now separated by plural tokens of the same lexical items. Rule-based representations of syntax were thought to be necessary to encode these long-distance relationships because, through the recursive nature of syntax, the words that have to agree in a sentence can be arbitrarily far apart.
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(a)
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(b)
who2
boy6
boys3 chase4 boys3
chase5
boy6
chases5 chase4
boys1
boy1
START
Principal Component #11
Principal Component #2
who2 boy6 boy9 END who7 who4
boy3 chases2
chases8
START boy1 chases5
Time step
END
Principal Component #1
Figure 2.5. Trajectory of internal activation states as the simple recurrent network (SRN) processes sentences (Elman, 1993). The data show positions according to the dimensions of a principal components analysis (PCA) carried out on hidden unit activations for the whole training set. Words are indexed by their position in the sequence but represent activation of the same input unit for each word. (a) PCA values for the second principal component as the SRN processes two sentences, “Boy who boys chase chases boy” or “Boys who boys chase chase boy;” (b) PCA values for the first and eleventh principal components as the SRN processes “Boy chases boy who chases boy who chases boy.”
Using an SRN trained on the same prediction task as that previously outlined but now with more complex sentences, Elman (1993) demonstrated that the network was able to learn these long-range dependencies even across the separation of multiple phrases. If boy was the subject of the sentence, when the network came to predict the main verb chase as the next word, it predicted that it should be in the singular. The method by which the network achieved this ability is of particular interest. Once more, Elman explored the similarity structure in the hidden unit representations, using principal component analyses to identify the salient dimensions of similarity across which activation states were varying. This enabled him to reduce the high dimensionality of the internal states (150 hidden units were used) to a manageable number to visualize processing. Elman was then able to plot the trajectories of activation as the network altered its internal state in response to each subsequent input. Figure 2.5 depicts these trajectories as the network processes differ-
ent multi-phrase sentences, plotted with reference to particular dimensions of principal component space. This figure demonstrates that the network adopted similar states in response to particular lexical items (e.g., tokens of boy, who, chases), but that it modified the pattern slightly according to the grammatical status of the word. In Figure 2.5a, the second principal component appears to encode singularity/plurality. Figure 2.5b traces the network’s state as it processes two embedded relative clauses containing iterations of the same words. Each clause exhibits a related but slightly shifted triangular trajectory to encode its role in the syntactic structure. The importance of this model is that it prompts a different way to understand the processing of sentences. Previously, one would view symbols as possessing fixed identities and as being bound into particular grammatical roles via a syntactic construction. In the connectionist system, sentences are represented by trajectories through activation space in which the activation
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pattern for each word is subtly shifted according to the context of its usage. The implication is that the property of compositionality at the heart of the classical symbolic computational approach may not be necessary to process language. Elman (1993) also used this model to investigate a possible advantage to learning that could be gained by initially restricting the complexity of the training set. At the start of training, the network had its memory reset (its context layer wiped) after every third or fourth word. This window was then increased in stages up to six to seven words across training. The manipulation was intended to capture maturational changes in working memory in children. Elman (1993) reported that starting small enhanced learning by allowing the network to build simpler internal representations that were later useful for unpacking the structure of more complex sentences (see Rohde & Plaut, 1999, for discussion and further simulations). This idea resonated with developmental psychologists in its demonstration of the way in which learning and maturation might interact in constructing cognition. It is an idea that could turn out to be a key principle in the organization of cognitive development (Elman et al., 1996).
3.3.1. what happened next? Elman’s simulations with the SRN and the prediction task produced striking results. The ability of the network to induce structured representations containing grammatical and semantic information from word sequences prompted the view that associative statistical learning mechanisms might play a much more central role in language acquisition. This innovation was especially welcome given that symbolic theories of sentence processing do not offer a ready account of language development. Indeed, they are largely identified with the nativist view that little in syntax develops. However, one limitation of the prior simulations is that the prediction task does not learn any categorizations over the input set. Although the simulations demonstrate that information important for language comprehension and
production can be induced from word sequences, neither task is actually performed. The learned distinction between nouns and verbs apparent in the hidden unit representations is tied up with carrying out the prediction task. But to perform comprehension, for example, the SRN would need to learn categorizations from the word sequences, such as deciding which noun was the agent and which noun was the patient in a sentence, regardless of whether the sentence was presented in the active (“the dog chases the cat”) or passive voice (“the cat is chased by the dog”). These types of computations are more complex and the network’s solutions typically more impenetrable. Although SRNs have borne the promise of an inherently developmental connectionist theory of parsing, progress on a full model has been slow (see Christiansen & Chater, 2001; and chapter 17 of this volume). Parsing is a complex problem – it is not even clear what the output should be for a model of sentence comprehension. Should it be some intermediate depiction of agent–patient role assignments, some compound representation of roles and semantics, or a constantly updating mental model that processes each sentence in the context of the emerging discourse? Connectionist models of parsing await greater constraints from psycholinguistic evidence. Nevertheless, some interesting preliminary findings have emerged. For example, some of the grammatical sentences that the SRN finds the hardest to predict are also the sentences that humans find the hardest to understand (e.g., center embedded structures like “the mouse the cat the dog bit chased ate the cheese”) (Weckerly & Elman, 1992). These are sequences that place maximal load on encoding information in the network’s internal recurrent loop, suggesting that recurrence may be a key computational primitive in language processing. Moreover, when the prediction task is replaced by a comprehension task (such as predicting the agent/patient status of the nouns in the sentence), the results are again suggestive. Rather than building a syntactic structure for the whole sentence as a
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symbolic parser might, the network focuses on the predictability of lexical cues for identifying various syntactic structures (consistent with Bates and MacWhinney’s [1989] Competition model of language development. The salience of lexical cues that each syntactic structure exploits and the processing load that each structure places on the recurrent loop makes them differentially vulnerable under damage. Here, neuropsychological findings from language breakdown and developmental language disorders have tended to follow the predictions of the connectionist account in the relative impairments that each syntactic construction should show (Dick et al., 2001; 2004; Thomas & Redington, 2004). For more recent work and discussion of the use of SRNs in syntax processing, see Mayberry, Crocker, and Knoeferle (2005), Miikkulainen and Mayberry (1999), Morris, Cottrell, and Elman (2000), Rohde (2002), and Sharkey, Sharkey, and Jackson (2000). Lastly, the impact of SRNs has not been restricted to language. These models have been usefully applied to other areas of cognition where sequential information is important. For example, Botvinick and Plaut (2004) have shown how this architecture can capture the control of routine sequences of actions without the need for schema hierarchies, and Cleeremans and Dienes (chapter 14 in this volume) show how SRNs have been applied to implicit learning. In sum, then, Elman’s work demonstrates how simple connectionist architectures can learn statistical regularities over temporal sequences. These systems may indeed be sufficient to produce many of the behaviors that linguists have described with grammatical rules. However, in the connectionist system, the underlying primitives are context-sensitive representations of words and trajectories of activation through recurrent circuits.
4. Related Models Before considering the wider impact of connectionism on theories of cognition, we
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should note a number of other related approaches. 4.1. Cascade-Correlation and Incremental Neural Network Algorithms Backpropagation networks specify input and output representations, whereas in selforganizing networks, only the inputs are specified. These networks therefore include some number of internal processing units whose activation states are determined by the learning algorithm. The number of internal units and their organization (e.g., into layers) plays an important role in determining the complexity of the problems or categories that the network can learn. In pattern associator networks, too few units and the network will fail to learn; in self-organizing networks, too few output units and the network will fail to provide good discrimination between the categories in the training set. How does the modeler select in advance the appropriate number of internal units? Indeed, for a cognitive model, should this be a decision that the modeler gets to make? For pattern associator networks, the cascade correlation algorithm (Fahlman & Lebiere, 1990) addresses this problem by starting with a network that has no hidden units and then adding in these resources during learning as it becomes necessary to carry on improving on the task. New hidden units are added with weights from the input layer tailored so that the unit’s activation correlates with network error, that is, the new unit responds to parts of the problem on which the network is currently doing poorly. New hidden units can also take input from existing hidden units, thereby creating detectors for higher order features in the problem space. The cascade correlation algorithm has been widely used for studying cognitive development (Mareschal & Shultz, 1996; Shultz, 2003; Westermann, 1998), for example, in simulating children’s performance in Piagetian reasoning tasks (see Section 5.2). The algorithm makes links with the constructivist approach to development (Quartz, 1993; Quartz & Sejnowski, 1997),
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which argues that increases in the complexity of children’s cognitive abilities are best explained by the recruitment of additional neurocomputational resources with age and experience. Related models that also use this “incremental” approach to building network architectures can be found in the work of Carpenter and Grossberg (Adaptive Resonance Theory; e.g., Carpenter & Grossberg, 1987a, 1987b) and in the work of Love and colleagues (e.g., Love, Medin, & Gureckis, 2004). 4.2. Mixture-of-Experts-Models The preceding sections assume that only a single architecture is available to learn each problem. However, it may be that multiple architectures are available to learn a given problem, each with different computational properties. Which architecture will end up learning the problem? Moreover, what if a cognitive domain can be broken down into different parts, for example, in the way that the English past tense problem comprises regular and irregular verbs – could different computational components end up learning the different parts of the problem? The mixture-of-experts approach considers ways in which learning could take place in just such a system with multiple components available (Jacobs et al., 1991). In these models, functionally specialized structures can emerge as a result of learning, in the circumstance where the computational properties of the different components happen to line up with the demands presented by different parts of the problem domain (so-called structure-function correspondences). During learning, mixture-of-experts algorithms typically permit the multiple components to compete with each other to deliver the correct output for each input pattern. The best performer is then assigned the pattern and allowed to learn it. The involvement of each component during functioning is controlled by a gating mechanism. Mixture-of-experts models are one of several approaches that seek to explain the origin of functionally specialized processing components in the cognitive system (see Elman et al., 1996; Jacobs, 1999; Thomas &
Richardson, 2006, for discussion). An example of the application of mixture of experts can be found in a developmental model of face and object recognition, where different “expert” mechanisms come to specialize in processing visual inputs that correspond to faces and those that correspond to objects (Dailey & Cottrell, 1999). The emergence of this functional specialization can be demonstrated by damaging each expert in turn and showing a double dissociation between face and object recognition in the two components of the model (see Section 5.3). Similarly, Thomas and KarmiloffSmith 2002a showed how a mixture-ofexperts model of English past tense could produce emergent specialization of separate mechanisms to regular and irregular verbs, respectively (see also Westermann, 1998, for related work with a constructivist network). 4.3. Hybrid Models The success of mixture-of-experts models suggests that when two or more components are combined within a model, it can be advantageous for the computational properties of the components to differ. Where the properties of the components are radically different, for example, involving the combination of symbolic (rule-based) and connectionist (associative, similarity-based) architectures, the models are sometimes referred to as “hybrid.” The use of hybrid models is inspired by the observation that some aspects of human cognition seem better described by rules (e.g., syntax, reasoning), whereas some seem better described by similarity (e.g., perception, memory). We have previously encountered the debate between symbolic and connectionist approaches (see Section 2.3) and the proposal that connectionist architectures may serve to implement symbolic processes (e.g., Touretzky & Hinton, 1988). The hybrid systems approach takes the alternative view that connectionist and symbolic processing principles should be combined within the same model, taking advantage of the strengths of each computational formalism. A discussion of this approach can be found in
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Sun (2002a, 2002b). Example models include CONSYDERR (Sun, 1995), CLARION (Sun & Peterson, 1998), and ACT-R (Anderson & Lebiere, 1998). An alternative to a truly hybrid approach is to develop a multi-part connectionist architecture that has components that employ different representational formats. Such a system may be described as having “heterogeneous” computational components. For example, in a purely connectionist system, one component might employ distributed representations that permit different degrees of similarity between activation patterns, whereas a second component employs localist representations in which there is no similarity between different representations. Behavior is then driven by the interplay between two associative components that employ different similarity structures. One example of a heterogeneous, multiplecomponent architecture is the complementary learning systems model of McClelland, McNaughton, and O’Reilly (1995), which employs localist representations to encode individual episodic memories but distributed representations to encode general semantic memories. Heterogeneous developmental models may offer new ways to conceive of the acquisition of concepts. For example, the cognitive domain of number may be viewed as heterogeneous in the sense that it combines three systems: the similarity-based representations of quantity, the localist representations of number facts (such as the order of number labels in counting), and a system for object individuation. Carey and Sarnecka (2006) argue that a heterogeneous multiple component system of this nature could acquire the concept of positive integers even though such a concept could not be acquired by any single component of the system on its own. 4.4. Bayesian Graphical Models The use of Bayesian methods of inference in graphical models, including causal graphical models, has recently been embraced by a number of cognitive scientists (Chater, Tenenbaum, & Yuille, 2006; Gopnik et al., 2004; see Chapter 3 in this volume). This
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approach stresses how it may be possible to combine prior knowledge in the form of a set of explicit alternative graph structures and constraints on the complexity of such structures with Bayesian methods of inference to select the best type of representation of a particular data set (e.g., lists of facts about many different animals); and within that, to select the best specific instantiation of a representation of that type (Tenenbaum, Griffiths, & Kemp, 2006). These models are useful contributions to our understanding, particularly because they allow explicit exploration of the role of prior knowledge in the selection of a representation of the structure present in each data set. It should be recognized, however, that such models are offered as characterizations of learning at Marr’s (1982) “Computational Level” and as such they do not specify the representations and processes that are actually employed when people learn. However, these models do present a challenge for the connectionist research focused on answering such questions. Specifically, the work provides a benchmark against which connectionist approaches might be tested for their success in learning to represent the structure from a data set and in using such a structure to make inferences consistent with optimal performance according to a Bayesian approach within a graphical model framework. More substantively, the work raises questions about whether or not optimization depends on the explicit representation of alternative structured representations or whether an approximation to such structured representations can arise without their prespecification. For an initial examination of these issues as they arise in the context of causal inference, see McClelland and Thompson (2007).
5. Connectionist Influences on Cognitive Theory Connectionism offers an explanation of human cognition because instances of behavior in particular cognitive domains can be explained with respect to set of general principles (parallel distributed processing) and
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the conditions of the specific domains. However, from the accumulation of successful models, it is also possible to discern a wider influence of connectionism on the nature of theorizing about cognition, and this is perhaps a truer reflection of its impact. How has connectionism made us think differently about cognition? 5.1. Knowledge Versus Processing One area where connectionism has changed the basic nature of theorizing is memory. According to the old model of memory based on the classical computational metaphor, the information in long-term memory (e.g., on the hard disk) has to be moved into working memory (the central processing unit, or CPU) for it to be operated on, and the long-term memories are laid down via a domain-general buffer of short-term memory (random access memory, or RAM). In this type of system, it is relatively easy to shift informational content between different systems, back and forth between central processing and short and long-term stores. Computation is predicated on variables: the same binary string can readily be instantiated in different memory registers or encoded onto a permanent medium. By contrast, knowledge is hard to move about in connectionist networks because it is encoded in the weights. For example, in the past-tense model, knowledge of the past tense rule “add -ed” is distributed across the weight matrix of the connections between input and output layers. The difficulty in portability of knowledge is inherent in the principles of connectionism – Hebbian learning alters connection strengths to reinforce desirable activation states in connected units, tying knowledge to structure. If we start from the premise that knowledge will be very difficult to move about in our information processing system, what kind of cognitive architecture do we end up with? There are four main themes. First, we need to distinguish between two different ways in which knowledge can be encoded: active and latent representa-
tions (Munakata & McClelland, 2003). Latent knowledge corresponds to the information stored in the connection weights from accumulated experience. By contrast, active knowledge is information contained in the current activation states of the system. Clearly, the two are related because the activation states are constrained by the connection weights. But, particularly in recurrent networks, there can be subtle differences. Active states contain a trace of recent events (how things are at the moment), whereas latent knowledge represents a history of experience (how things tend to be). Differences in the ability to maintain the active states (e.g., in the strength of recurrent circuits) can produce errors in behavior where the system lapses into more typical ways of behaving (Munakata, 1998; Morton & Munakata, 2002). Second, if information does need to be moved around the system, for example, from a more instance-based (episodic) system to a more general (semantic) system, this will require special structures and special (potentially time-consuming) processes. Thus McClelland, McNaughton, and O’Reilly (1995) proposed a dialogue between separate stores in the hippocampus and neocortex to gradually transfer knowledge from episodic to semantic memory. French, Ans, and Rousset (2001) proposed a special method to transfer knowledge between two memory systems: internally generated noise produces “pseudopatterns” from one system that contain the central tendencies of its knowledge; the second memory system is then trained with this extracted knowledge to effect the transfer. Chapters 7 and 8 in the current volume offer a wider consideration of models of episodic and semantic memory, respectively. Third, information will be processed in the same substrate where it is stored. Therefore, long-term memories will be active structures and will perform computations on content. An external strategic control system plays the role of differentially activating the knowledge in this long-term system that is relevant to the current context. In anatomical terms, this distinction broadly
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corresponds to frontal/anterior (strategic control) and posterior (long-term) cortex. The design means, somewhat counterintuitively, that the control system has no content. Rather, the control system contains placeholders that serve to activate different regions of the long-term system. The control system may contain plans (sequences of placeholders). It may be involved in learning abstract concepts (using a placeholder to temporarily coactivate previously unrelated portions of long-term knowledge while Hebbian learning builds a new association between them), but it does not contain content in the sense of a domain-general working memory. The study of frontal systems then becomes an exploration of the activation dynamics of these placeholders and their involvement in learning (see, e.g., work by Davelaar & Usher, 2002; Haarmann & Usher, 2001; O’Reilly, Braver, & Cohen, 1999; Usher & McClelland, 2001). Similarly, connectionist research has explored how activity in the control system can be used to modulate the efficiency of processing elsewhere in the system, for instance, to implemented selective attention. For example, Cohen et al., (1990) demonstrated how task units could be used to differentially modulate word-naming and colornaming processing channels in a model of the color-word Stroop task. In this model, latent knowledge interacted with the operation of task control, so that it was harder to selectively attend to color-naming and ignore information from the more practiced word-naming channel than vice versa. This work was later extended to demonstrate how deficits in the strategic control system (prefrontal cortex) could lead to problems in selective attention in disorders such as schizophrenia (Cohen & Servan-Schreiber, 1992). Chapter 15 in this volume contains a wider consideration of computational models of attention and cognitive control. Lastly, the connectionist perspective on memory alters how we conceive of domain generality in processing systems. It is unlikely that there are any domain-general processing systems that serve as a “Jack-ofall-trades,” that is, that can move between
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representing the content of multiple domains. However, there may be domaingeneral systems that are involved in modulating many disparate processes without taking on the content of those systems, what we might call a system with “a finger in every pie.” Meanwhile, short-term or working memory (as exemplified by the active representations contained in the recurrent loop of a network) is likely to exist as a devolved panoply of discrete systems, each with its own content-specific loop. For example, research in the neuropsychology of language now tends to support the existence of separate working memories for phonological, semantic, and syntactic information (see MacDonald & Christiansen, 2002, for a discussion of these arguments). 5.2. Cognitive Development A key feature of PDP models is the use of a learning algorithm for modifying the patterns of connectivity as a function of experience. Compared with symbolic, rule-based computational models, this has made them a more sympathetic formalism for studying cognitive development (Elman et al., 1996). The combination of domain-general processing principles, domain-specific architectural constraints, and structured training environments has enabled connectionist models to give accounts of a range of developmental phenomena. These include infant category development, language acquisition and reasoning in children (see Mareschal & Thomas, 2007, for a recent review and chapter 16 in this volume). Connectionism has become aligned with a resurgence of interest in statistical learning and a more careful consideration of the information available in the child’s environment that may feed his or her cognitive development. One central debate revolves around how children can become “cleverer” as they get older, appearing to progress through qualitatively different stages of reasoning. Connectionist modeling of the development of children’s reasoning was able to demonstrate that continuous incremental changes in the weight matrix driven by
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algorithms such as backpropagation can result in nonlinear changes in surface behavior, suggesting that the stages apparent in behavior may not necessarily be reflected in changes in the underlying mechanism (e.g., McClelland, 1989). Other connectionists have argued that algorithms able to supplement the computational resources of the network as part of learning may also provide an explanation for the emergence of more complex forms of behavior with age (e.g., cascade correlation; see Shultz, 2003). The key contribution of connectionist models in the area of developmental psychology has been to specify detailed, implemented models of transition mechanisms that demonstrate how the child can move between producing different patterns of behavior. This was a crucial addition to a field that has accumulated vast amounts of empirical data cataloging what children are able to do at different ages. The specification of mechanism is also important to counter some strongly empiricist views that simply identifying statistical information in the environment suffices as an explanation of development; instead, it is necessary to show how a mechanism could use this statistical information to acquire some cognitive capacity. Moreover, when connectionist models are applied to development, it often becomes apparent that passive statistical structure is not the key factor; rather, the relevant statistics are in the transformation of the statistical structure of the environment to the output or the behavior that is relevant to the child, thereby appealing to notions like the regularity, consistency, and frequency of input-output mappings. Recent connectionist approaches to development have begun to explore how the computational formalisms may change our understanding of the nature of the knowledge that children acquire. For example, Mareschal et al. (2007) argue that many mental representations of knowledge are partial (i.e., capture only some task-relevant dimensions); the existence of explicit language may blind us to the fact that there could be a limited role for truly abstract knowledge in the normal operation of the
cognitive system (see Westermann et al., 2007). Current work also explores the computational basis of critical or sensitive periods in development, uncovering the mechanisms by which the ability to learn appears to reduce with age (e.g., McClelland et al., 1999; Thomas & Johnson, 2006). 5.3. The Study of Acquired Disorders in Cognitive Neuropsychology Traditional cognitive neuropsychology of the 1980s was predicated on the assumption of underlying modular structure, that is, that the cognitive system comprises a set of independently functioning components. Patterns of selective cognitive impairment after acquired brain damage could then be used to construct models of normal cognitive function. The traditional models comprised boxand-arrow diagrams that sketched out rough versions of cognitive architecture, informed both by the patterns of possible selective deficit (which bits can fail independently) and by a task analysis of what the cognitive system probably has to do. In the initial formulation of cognitive neuropsychology, caution was advised in attempting to infer cognitive architecture from behavioral deficits, since a given pattern of deficits might be consistent with a number of underlying architectures (Shallice, 1988). It is in this capacity that connectionist models have been extremely useful. They have both forced more detailed specification of proposed cognitive models via implementation and also permitted assessment of the range of deficits that can be generated by damaging these models in various ways. For example, models of reading have demonstrated that the ability to decode written words into spoken words and recover their meanings can be learned in a connectionist network; and when this network is damaged by, say, lesioning connection weights or removing hidden units, various patterns of acquired dyslexia can be simulated (e.g., Plaut et al., 1996; Plaut & Shallice, 1993). Connectionist models of acquired deficits have grown to be an influential aspect of cognitive neuropsychology and
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have been applied to domains such as language, memory, semantics, and vision (see Cohen, Johnstone, & Plunkett, 2000, for examples). Several ideas have gained their first or clearest grounding via connectionist modeling. One of these ideas is that patterns of breakdown can arise from the statistics of the problem space (i.e., the mapping between input and output) rather than from structural distinctions in the processing system. In particular, connectionist models have shed light on a principal inferential tool of cognitive neuropsychology, the double dissociation. The line of reasoning argues that if in one patient, ability A can be lost while ability B is intact, and in a second patient, ability B can be lost while ability A is intact, then the two abilities might be generated by independent underlying mechanisms. In a connectionist model of categoryspecific impairments of semantic memory, Devlin et al. (1997) demonstrated that a single undifferentiated network trained to produce two behaviors could show a double dissociation between them simply as a consequence of different levels of damage. This can arise because the mappings associated with the two behaviors lead them to have different sensitivity to damage. For a small level of damage, performance on A may fall off quickly, whereas performance on B declines more slowly; for a high level of damage, A may be more robust than B. The reverse pattern of relative deficits implies nothing about structure. Connectionist researchers have often set out to demonstrate that, more generally, double dissociation methodology is a flawed form of inference, on the grounds that such dissociations arise relatively easily from parallel distributed architectures where function is spread across the whole mechanism (e.g., Plunkett & Bandelow, 2006; Juola & Plunkett, 2000). However, on the whole, when connectionist models show robust double dissociations between two behaviors (for equivalent levels of damage applied to various parts of the network and over many replications), it does tend to be because different internal processing structures (units
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or layers or weights) or different parts of the input layer or different parts of the output layer are differentially important for driving the two behaviors – that is, there is specialization of function. Connectionism models of breakdown have, therefore, tended to support the traditional inferences. Crucially, however, connectionist models have greatly improved our understanding of what modularity might look like in a neurocomputational system: a partial rather than an absolute property; a property that is the consequence of a developmental process where emergent specialization is driven by structure-function correspondences (the ability of certain parts of a computational structure to learn certain kinds of computation better than other kinds; see Section 4.2); and a property that must now be complemented by concepts such as division of labor, degeneracy, interactivity, and redundancy (see Thomas & Karmiloff-Smith, 2002a; Thomas et al., 2006, for discussion). 5.4. The Origins of Individual Variability and Developmental Disorders In addition to their role in studying acquired disorders, the fact that many connectionist models learn their cognitive abilities makes them an ideal framework within which to study developmental disorders, such as autism, dyslexia, and specific language impairment (Joanisse & Seidenberg, 2003; Mareschal et al., 2007; Thomas & KarmiloffSmith, 2002b, 2003a, 2005). Where models of normal cognitive development seek to study the “average” child, models of atypical development explore how developmental profiles may be disrupted. Connectionist models contain a number of constraints (architecture, activation dynamics, input and output representations, learning algorithm, training regimen) that determine the efficiency and outcome of learning. Manipulations to these constraints produce candidate explanations for impairments found in developmental disorders or for the impairments caused by exposure to atypical environments, such as in cases of deprivation.
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In the 1980s and 1990s, many theories of developmental deficits employed the same explanatory framework as adult cognitive neuropsychology. There was a search for specific developmental deficits or dissociations, which were then explained in terms of the failure of individual modules to development. However, as Karmiloff-Smith (1998) and Bishop (1997) pointed out, most of the developmental deficits were actually being explained with reference to nondevelopmental, static, and sometimes adult models of normal cognitive structure. KarmiloffSmith (1998) argued that the causes of developmental deficits of a genetic origin will lie in changes to low-level neurocomputational properties that only exert their influence on cognition via an extended atypical developmental process (see also Elman et al., 1996). Connectionist models provide the ideal forum to explore the thesis that an understanding of the constraints on the developmental process is essential for generating accounts of developmental deficits. The study of atypical variability also prompts a consideration of what causes variability within the normal range, otherwise known as individual differences or intelligence. Are differences in intelligence caused by variation in the same computational parameters that can cause disorders? Are some developmental disorders just the extreme lower end of the normal distribution or are they qualitatively different conditions? What computational parameter settings are able to produce above-average performance or giftedness? Connectionism has begun to take advantage of the accumulated body of models of normal development to consider the wider question of cognitive variation in parameterized computational models (Thomas & Karmiloff-Smith, 2003a). 5.5. Future Directions The preceding sections indicate the range and depth of influence of connectionism on contemporary theories of cognition. Where will connectionism go next? Necessarily, connectionism began with simple models of individual cognitive processes, focusing on those domains of particular theoretical in-
terest. This piecemeal approach generated explanations of individual cognitive abilities using bespoke networks, each containing its own predetermined representations and architecture. In the future, one avenue to pursue is how these models fit together in the larger cognitive system – for example, to explain how the past tense network described in Section 3.2 might link up with the sentence processing model described in Section 3.3 to process past tenses as they arise in sentences. A further issue is to address the developmental origin of the architectures that are postulated. What processes specify the parts of the cognitive system to perform the various functions and how do these subsystems talk to each other, both across development and in the adult state? Improvements in computational power will aid more complex modeling endeavors. Nevertheless, it is worth bearing in mind that increasing complexity creates a tension with the primary goals of modeling – simplification and understanding. It is essential that we understand why more complicated models function as they do or they will merely become interesting artifacts (see Elman, 2005; Thomas, 2004, for further discussion). In terms of its relation with other disciplines, a number of future influences on connectionism are discernible. Connectionism will be affected by the increasing appeal to Bayesian probability theory in human reasoning. In Bayesian theory, new data are used to update existing estimates of the most likely model of the world. Work has already begun to relate connectionist and Bayesian accounts, for example, in the domain of causal reasoning in children (McClelland & Thompson, 2007). In some cases, connectionism may offer alternative explanations of the same behavior; in others it may be viewed as an implementation of a Bayesian account (see Section 3.1). Connectionism will continue to have a close relation to neuroscience, perhaps seeking to build more neural constraints into its computational assumptions (O’Reilly & Munakata, 2000). Many of the new findings in cognitive neuroscience are influenced by functional brain imaging techniques. It will be important, therefore, for connectionism to
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make contact with these data, either via systems-level modeling of the interaction between subnetworks in task performance or in exploring the implications of the subtraction methodology as a tool for assessing the behavior of distributed interactive systems. The increasing influence of brain imaging foregrounds the relation of cognition to the neural substrate; it depends on how seriously one takes the neural plausibility of connectionist models as to whether an increased focus on the substrate will have particular implications for connectionism over and above any other theory of cognition. Connectionist approaches to individual differences and developmental disorders suggest that this modeling approach has more to offer in considering the computational causes of variability. Research in behavioral genetics argues that a significant proportion of behavioral variability is genetic in origin (Bishop, 2006; Plomin, Owen & McGuffin, 1994). However, the neurodevelopmental mechanisms by which genes produce such variation are largely unknown. Although connectionist cognitive models are not neural, the fact that they incorporate neurally inspired properties may allow them to build links between behavior (where variability is measured) and the substrate on which genetic effects act. In the future, connectionism may therefore help to rectify a major shortcoming in our attempts to understand the relation of the human genome to human behavior – the omission of cognition from current explanations.
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microstructure of these models. The core connectionist themes include the following: (1) that processing is simultaneously influenced by multiple sources of information at different levels of abstraction, operating via soft constraint satisfaction; (2) that representations are spread across multiple simple processing units operating in parallel; (3) that representations are graded, contextsensitive, and the emergent product of adaptive processes; and (4) that computation is similarity-based and driven by the statistical structure of problem domains, but it can nevertheless produce rule-following behavior. We illustrated the connectionist approach via three landmarks models, the Interactive Activation model of letter perception (McClelland & Rumelhart, 1981), the past tense model (Rumelhart & McClelland, 1986), and simple recurrent networks for finding structure in time (Elman, 1990). Apart from its body of successful individual models, connectionist theory has had a widespread influence on cognitive theorizing, and this influence was illustrated by considering connectionist contributions to our understanding of memory, cognitive development, acquired cognitive impairments, and developmental deficits. Finally, we peeked into the future of connectionism, arguing that its relationships with other fields in the cognitive sciences are likely to guide its future contribution to understanding the mechanistic basis of thought.
Acknowledgments 6. Conclusions In this chapter, we have considered the contribution of connectionist modeling to our understanding of cognition. Connectionism was placed in the historical context of nineteenth-century associative theories of mental processes and twentieth-century attempts to understand the computations carried out by networks of neurons. The key properties of connectionist networks were then reviewed, and particular emphasis was placed on the use of learning to build the
This work was supported by British Academy Grant SG–40400 and UK Medical Research Council Grant G0300188 to Michael Thomas, and National Institute of Mental Health Centre Grant P50 MH64445, James L. McClelland, Director.
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Tenenbaum, J. B., Griffiths, T. L., & Kemp, C. (2006). Theory-based Bayesian models of inductive learning and reasoning. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 10(7), 309–318. Thomas, M. S. C. (2004). The state of connectionism in 2004. Parallaxis, 8, 43–61. Thomas, M. S. C. (2005). Characterising compensation. Cortex, 41(3), 434–442. Thomas, M. S. C., Forrester, N. A., & Richardson, F. M. (2006). What is modularity good for? In R. Sun & N. Miyake (Eds.). Proceedings of the 28th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society (pp. 2240–2245). Vancouver, Canada: Cognitive Science Society. Thomas, M. S. C., & Johnson, M. H. (2006). The computational modelling of sensitive periods. Developmental Psychobiology, 48(4), 337– 344. Thomas, M. S. C., & Karmiloff-Smith, A. (2002a). Are developmental disorders like cases of adult brain damage? Implications from connectionist modelling. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 25(6), 727–788. Thomas, M. S. C., & Karmiloff-Smith, A. (2002b). Modelling typical and atypical cognitive development. In U. Goswami (Ed.), Handbook of childhood development (pp. 575– 599). Oxford, UK: Blackwells. Thomas, M. S. C., & Karmiloff-Smith, A. (2003a). Connectionist models of development, developmental disorders and individual differences. In R. J. Sternberg, J. Lautrey, & T. Lubart (Eds.), Models of intelligence: International perspectives (pp. 133–150). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association. Thomas, M. S. C., & Karmiloff-Smith, A. (2003b). Modeling language acquisition in atypical phenotypes. Psychological Review, 110(4), 647–682. Thomas, M. S. C., & Karmiloff-Smith, A. (2005). Can developmental disorders reveal the component parts of the human language faculty? Language Learning and Development, 1(1), 65– 92. Thomas, M. S. C., & Redington, M. (2004). Modelling atypical syntax processing. In W. Sakas (Ed.), Proceedings of the first workshop on psycho-computational models of human language acquisition at the 20th International Conference on Computational Linguistics (pp. 85– 92). Thomas, M. S. C., & Richardson, F. (2006). Atypical representational change: Conditions for the emergence of atypical modularity. In
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Y. Munakata & M. H. Johnson (Eds.), Processes of change in brain and cognitive development: Attention and Performance XXI, (pp. 315–347). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. Thomas, M. S. C., & van Heuven, W. (2005). Computational models of bilingual comprehension. In J. F. Kroll & A. M. B. De Groot (Eds.), Handbook of bilingualism: Psycholinguistic approaches (pp. 202–225). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. Touretzky, D. S., & Hinton, G. E. (1988). A distributed connectionist production system. Cognitive Science, 12, 423–466. Usher, M., & McClelland, J. L. (2001). On the time course of perceptual choice: The leaky competing accumulator model. Psychological Review, 108, 550–592. van Gelder, T. (1991). Classical questions, radical answers: Connectionism and the structure of mental representations. In T. Horgan & J. Tienson (Eds.), Connectionism and the philosophy of mind. (pp. 355–381). Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic. Weckerly, J., & Elman, J. L. (1992). A PDP approach to processing center-embedded sen-
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II C O G N I T I V E MODELING PARADIGMS 2 connectionist models of cognition 1 Introduction 2 Background
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2.1 Historical Context 2.2 Key Properties of Connectionist Models 2.3 Neural Plausibility 2.4 The Relationship between Connectionist Models and Bayesian Inference Three Illustrative Models 3.1 An Interactive Activation Model of Context Effects in Letter Perception (McClelland &
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Rumelhart, 1981, Rumelhart & McClelland, 1982) 3.2 On Learning the Past Tense of English Verbs (Rumelhart & McClelland, 1986) 3.3 Finding Structure in Time (Elman, 1990) Related Models 4.1 CascadeCorrelation and Incremental Neural Network Algorithms 4.2 Mixture-ofExperts-Models 4.3 Hybrid Models 4.4 Bayesian Graphical Models Connectionist Influences on Cognitive Theory 5.1 Knowledge Versus Processing 5.2 Cognitive Development 5.3 The Study of Acquired Disorders in Cognitive Neuropsychology 5.4 The Origins of Individual Variability and Developmental Disorders 5.5 Future Directions Conclusions
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CHAPTER 3
Bayesian Models of Cognition
1. Introduction For over 200 years, philosophers and mathematicians have been using probability theory to describe human cognition. Although the theory of probabilities was first developed as a means of analyzing games of chance, it quickly took on a larger and deeper significance as a formal account of how rational agents should reason in situations of uncertainty (Gigerenzer et al., 1989; Hacking, 1975). The goal of this chapter is to illustrate the kinds of computational models of cognition that we can build if we assume that human learning and inference approximately follow the principles of Bayesian probabilistic inference and to explain some of the mathematical ideas and techniques underlying those models. Bayesian models are becoming increasingly prominent across a broad spectrum of the cognitive sciences. Just in the last few years, Bayesian models have addressed animal learning (Courville, Daw, & Touretzky, 2006), human inductive learning and generalization (Tenenbaum, Griffiths, & Kemp, 2006), visual scene percep-
tion (Yuille & Kersten, 2006), motor control (Kording & Wolpert, 2006), semantic memory (Steyvers, Griffiths, & Dennis, 2006), language processing and acquisition (Chater & Manning, 2006; Xu & Tenenbaum, 2007), symbolic reasoning (Oaksford & Chater, 2001), causal learning and inference (Steyvers et al., 2003; Griffiths & Tenenbaum, 2005, 2007a), and social cognition (Baker, Tenenbaum, & Saxe, 2007), among other topics. Behind these different research programs is a shared sense of which are the most compelling computational questions that we can ask about the human mind. To us, the big question is this: How does the human mind go beyond the data of experience? In other words, how does the mind build rich, abstract, veridical models of the world given only the sparse and noisy data that we observe through our senses? This is by no means the only computationally interesting aspect of cognition that we can study, but it is surely one of the most central and also one of the most challenging. It is a version of the classic problem of induction, which is as old as recorded Western thought and is the source of many deep 59
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problems and debates in modern philosophy of knowledge and philosophy of science. It is also at the heart of the difficulty in building machines with anything resembling humanlike intelligence. The Bayesian framework for probabilistic inference provides a general approach to understanding how problems of induction can be solved in principle and perhaps how they might be solved in the human mind. Let us give a few examples. Vision researchers are interested in how the mind infers the intrinsic properties of a object (e.g., its color or shape) as well as its role in a visual scene (e.g., its spatial relation to other objects or its trajectory of motion). These features are severely underdetermined by the available image data. For instance, the spectrum of light wavelengths reflected from an object’s surface into the observer’s eye is a product of two unknown spectra: the surface’s color spectrum and the spectrum of the light illuminating the scene. Solving the problem of “color constancy” – inferring the object’s color given only the light reflected from it, under any conditions of illumination – is akin to solving the equation y = a × b for a given y, without knowing b. No deductive or certain inference is possible. At best, we can make a reasonable guess, based on some expectations about which values of a and b are more likely a priori. This inference can be formalized in a Bayesian framework (Brainard & Freeman, 1997), and it can be solved reasonably well given prior probability distributions for natural surface reflectances and illumination spectra. The problems of core interest in other areas of cognitive science may seem very different from the problem of color constancy in vision, and they are different in important ways, but they are also deeply similar. For instance, language researchers want to understand how people recognize words so quickly and so accurately from noisy speech, how we parse a sequence of words into a hierarchical representation of the utterance’s syntactic phrase structure, or how a child infers the rules of grammar – an infinite generative system – from observing only a finite
and rather limited set of grammatical sentences, mixed with more than a few incomplete or ungrammatical utterances. In each of these cases, the available data severely underconstrain the inferences that people make, and the best the mind can do is to make a good guess, guided – from a Bayesian standpoint – by prior probabilities about which world structures are most likely a priori. Knowledge of a language – its lexicon, its syntax, and its pragmatic tendencies of use – provides probabilistic constraints and preferences on which words are most likely to be heard in a given context or which syntactic parse trees a listener should consider in processing a sequence of spoken words. More abstract knowledge, in a sense, what linguists have referred to as “universal grammar” (Chomsky, 1988), can generate priors on possible rules of grammar that guide a child in solving the problem of induction in language acquisition. Chater and Manning (2006) survey Bayesian models of language from this perspective. The focus of this chapter will be on problems in higher-level cognition: inferring causal structure from patterns of statistical correlation, learning about categories and hidden properties of objects, and learning the meanings of words. This focus is partly a pragmatic choice, as these topics are the subject of our own research and hence we know them best. But there are also deeper reasons for this choice. Learning about causal relations, category structures, or the properties or names of objects are problems that are very close to the classic problems of induction that have been much discussed and puzzled over in the Western philosophical tradition. Showing how Bayesian methods can apply to these problems thus illustrates clearly their importance in understanding phenomena of induction more generally. These are also cases where the important mathematical principles and techniques of Bayesian statistics can be applied in a relatively straightforward way. They thus provide an ideal training ground for readers new to Bayesian modeling. Beyond their value as a general framework for solving problems of induction,
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Bayesian approaches can make several contributions to the enterprise of modeling human cognition. First, they provide a link between human cognition and the normative prescriptions of a theory of rational inductive inference. This connection eliminates many of the degrees of freedom from a cognitive model: Bayesian principles dictate how rational agents should update their beliefs in light of new data, based on a set of assumptions about the nature of the problem at hand and the prior knowledge possessed by the agents. Bayesian models are typically formulated at Marr’s (1982) level of “computational theory,” rather than the algorithmic or process level that characterizes more traditional cognitive modeling paradigms, as described in other chapters of this volume: connectionist networks (see Chapter 2), exemplar-based models (see Chapter 9), production systems and other cognitive architectures (see Chapter 6), or dynamical systems (see Chapter 4). Algorithmic or process accounts may be more satisfying in mechanistic terms, but they may also require assumptions about human processing mechanisms that are no longer needed when we assume that cognition is an approximately optimal response to the uncertainty and structure present in natural tasks and environments (Anderson, 1990). Finding effective computational models of human cognition then becomes a process of considering how best to characterize the computational problems that people face and the logic by which those computations can be carried out (Marr, 1982). This focus implies certain limits on the phenomena that are valuable to study within a Bayesian paradigm. Some phenomena will surely be more satisfying to address at an algorithmic or neurocomputational level. For example, that a certain behavior takes people an average of 450 milliseconds to produce, measured from the onset of a visual stimulus, or that this reaction time increases when the stimulus is moved to a different part of the visual field or decreases when the same information content is presented auditorily, are not facts that a rational computational theory is likely to predict. Moreover,
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not all computational-level models of cognition may have a place for Bayesian analysis. Only problems of inductive inference, or problems that contain an inductive component, are naturally expressed in Bayesian terms. Deductive reasoning, planning, or problem solving, for instance, are not traditionally thought of in this way. However, Bayesian principles are increasingly coming to be seen as relevant to many cognitive capacities, even those not traditionally seen in statistical terms (Anderson, 1990; Oaksford & Chater, 2001), because of the need for people to make inherently underconstrained inferences from impoverished data in an uncertain world. A second key contribution of probabilistic models of cognition is the opportunity for greater communication with other fields studying computational principles of learning and inference. These connections make it a uniquely exciting time to be exploring probabilistic models of the mind. The fields of statistics, machine learning, and artificial intelligence have recently developed powerful tools for defining and working with complex probabilistic models that go far beyond the simple scenarios studied in classical probability theory; we present a taste of both the simplest models and more complex frameworks here. The more complex methods can support multiple hierarchically organized layers of inference, structured representations of abstract knowledge, and approximate methods of evaluation that can be applied efficiently to data sets with many thousands of entities. For the first time, we now have practical methods for developing computational models of human cognition that are based on sound probabilistic principles and that can also capture something of the richness and complexity of everyday thinking, reasoning, and learning. We can also exploit fertile analogies between specific learning and inference problems in the study of human cognition and in these other disciplines to develop new cognitive models or new tools for working with existing models. We discuss some of these relationships in this chapter, but there are many other cases. For example,
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prototype and exemplar models of categorization (Reed, 1972; Medin & Schaffer, 1978; Nosofsky, 1986) can both be seen as rational solutions to a standard classification task in statistical pattern recognition: An object is generated from one of several probability distributions (or “categories”) over the space of possible objects, and the goal is to infer which distribution is most likely to have generated that object (Duda, Hart, & Stork, 2000). In rational probabilistic terms, these methods differ only in how these category-specific probability distributions are represented and estimated (Ashby & Alfonso-Reese, 1995; Nosofsky, 1998). Finally, probabilistic models can be used to advance and perhaps resolve some of the great theoretical debates that divide traditional approaches to cognitive science. The history of computational models of cognition exhibits an enduring tension between models that emphasize symbolic representations and deductive inference, such as first-order logic or phrase structure grammars, and models that emphasize continuous representations and statistical learning, such as connectionist networks or other associative systems. Probabilistic models can be defined with either symbolic or continuous representations, or hybrids of both, and help to illustrate how statistical learning can be combined with symbolic structure. More generally, we think that the most promising routes to understanding human intelligence in computational terms will involve deep interactions between these two traditionally opposing approaches, with sophisticated statistical inference machinery operating over structured symbolic knowledge representations. Contemporary probabilistic methods give us the first general-purpose set of tools for building such structured statistical models, and we will see several simple examples of these models in this chapter. The tension between symbols and statistics is perhaps only exceeded by the tension between accounts that focus on the importance of innate, domain-specific knowledge in explaining human cognition and accounts that focus on domain-general learning mechanisms. Again, probabilistic models
provide a middle ground where both approaches can productively meet, and they suggest various routes to resolving the tensions between these approaches by combining the important insights of both. Probabilistic models highlight the role of prior knowledge in accounting for how people learn as much as they do from limited observed data and provide a framework for explaining precisely how prior knowledge interacts with data in guiding generalization and action. They also provide a tool for exploring the kinds of knowledge that people bring to learning and reasoning tasks, allowing us to work forwards from rational analyses of tasks and environments to predictions about behavior and to work backwards from subjects’ observed behavior to viable assumptions about the knowledge they could bring to the task. Crucially, these models do not require that the prior knowledge be innate. Bayesian inference in hierarchical probabilistic models can explain how abstract prior knowledge may itself be learned from data and then put to use to guide learning in subsequent tasks and new environments. This chapter discusses both the basic principles that underlie Bayesian models of cognition and several advanced techniques for probabilistic modeling and inference that have come out of recent work in computer science and statistics. The first step is to summarize the logic of Bayesian inference, which is at the heart of many probabilistic models. A discussion is then provided of three recent innovations that make it easier to define and use probabilistic models of complex domains: graphical models, hierarchical Bayesian models, and Markov chain Monte Carlo. The central ideas behind each of these techniques is illustrated by considering a detailed cognitive modeling application, drawn from causal learning, property induction, and language modeling, respectively.
2. The Basics of Bayesian Inference Many aspects of cognition can be formulated as solutions to problems of induction. Given
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some observed data about the world, the mind draws conclusions about the underlying process or structure that gave rise to these data and then uses that knowledge to make predictive judgments about new cases. Bayesian inference is a rational engine for solving such problems within a probabilistic framework and consequently is the heart of most probabilistic models of cognition. 2.1. Bayes’ Rule Bayesian inference grows out of a simple formula known as Bayes’ rule (Bayes, 1763/1958). When stated in terms of abstract random variables, Bayes’ rule is no more than an elementary result of probability theory. Assume we have two random variables, A and B.1 One of the principles of probability theory (sometimes called the chain rule) allows us to write the joint probability of these two variables taking on particular values a and b, P (a, b), as the product of the conditional probability that A will take on value a given B takes on value b, P (a | b), and the marginal probability that B takes on value b, P (b). Thus, we have P (a, b) = P (a | b)P (b).
(3.1)
There was nothing special about the choice of A rather than B in factorizing the joint probability in this way, so we can also write P (a, b) = P (b | a)P (a).
(3.2)
It follows from Equations 3.1 and 3.2 that P (a | b)P (b) = P (b | a)P (a), which can be rearranged to give P (b | a) =
P (a | b)P (b) . P (a)
(3.3)
1 We will use uppercase letters to indicate random variables and matching lowercase variables to indicate the values those variables take on. When defining probability distributions, the random variables will remain implicit. For example, P (a) refers to the probability that the variable A takes on the value a, which could also be written P (A = a). We will write joint probabilities in the form P (a, b). Other notations for joint probabilities include P (a&b) and P (a ∩ b).
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This expression is Bayes’ rule, which indicates how we can compute the conditional probability of b given a from the conditional probability of a given b. Although Equation 3.3 seems relatively innocuous, Bayes’ rule gets its strength, and its notoriety, when we make some assumptions about the variables we are considering and the meaning of probability. Assume that we have an agent who is attempting to infer the process that was responsible for generating some data, d. Let h be a hypothesis about this process. We will assume that the agent uses probabilities to represent degrees of belief in h and various alternative hypotheses h . Let P (h) indicate the probability that the agent ascribes to h being the true generating process, prior to (or independent of) seeing the data d. This quantity is known as the prior probability. How should that agent change his or her beliefs in light of the evidence provided by d? To answer this question, we need a procedure for computing the posterior probability, P (h | d), or the degree of belief in h conditioned on the observation of d. Bayes’ rule provides just such a procedure, if we treat both the hypotheses that agents entertain and the data that they observe as random variables, so that the rules of probabilistic inference can be applied to relate them. Replacing a with d and b with h in Equation 3.3 gives P (h | d) =
P (d | h)P (h) , P (d)
(3.4)
the form in which Bayes’ rule is most commonly presented in analyses of learning or induction. The posterior probability is proportional to the product of the prior probability and another term P (d | h), the probability of the data given the hypothesis, commonly known as the likelihood. Likelihoods are the critical bridge from priors to posteriors, reweighting each hypothesis by how well it predicts the observed data. In addition to telling us how to compute with conditional probabilities, probability theory allows us to compute the probability distribution associated with a single variable (known as the marginal probability) by
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summing over other variables in a joint distribution: for example, P (b) = a P (a, b). This is known as marginalization. Using this principle, we can rewrite Equation 3.4 as P (h | d) =
P (d | h)P (h) , h ∈H P (d | h )P (h )
higher than the posteriors for the competing alternative hypotheses – each of which is less likely for a different sort of reason. 2.2. Comparing Hypotheses
(3.5)
where H is the set of all hypotheses considered by the agent, sometimes referred to as the hypothesis space. This formulation of Bayes’ rule makes it clear that the posterior probability of h is directly proportional to the product of its prior probability and likelihood, relative to the sum of these same scores – products of priors and likelihoods – for all alternative hypotheses under consideration. The sum in the denominator of Equation 3.5 ensures that the resulting posterior probabilities are normalized to sum to one. A simple example may help to illustrate the interaction between priors and likelihoods in determining posterior probabilities. Consider three possible medical conditions that could be posited to explain why a friend is coughing (the observed data d): h1 = “cold,” h2 = “lung cancer,” h3 = “stomach flu.” The first hypothesis seems intuitively to be the best of the three, for reasons that Bayes’ rule makes clear. The probability of coughing given that one has lung cancer, P (d | h2 ), is high, but the prior probability of having lung cancer, P (h2 ), is low. Hence, the posterior probability of lung cancer, P (h2 | d), is low, because it is proportional to the product of these two terms. Conversely, the prior probability of having stomach flu, P (h3 ), is relatively high (as medical conditions go), but its likelihood, P (d | h3 ), the probability of coughing given that one has stomach flu, is relatively low. So again, the posterior probability of stomach flu, P (h3 | d), will be relatively low. Only for hypothesis h1 are both the prior P (h1 ) and the likelihood P (d | h1 ) relatively high: Colds are fairly common medical conditions, and coughing is a symptom frequently found in people who have colds. Hence, the posterior probability P (h1 | d) of having a cold given that one is coughing is substantially
The mathematics of Bayesian inference is most easily introduced in the context of comparing two simple hypotheses. For example, imagine that you are told that a box contains two coins: one that produces heads 50% of the time and one that produces heads 90% of the time. You choose a coin, and then flip it ten times, producing the sequence HHHHHHHHHH. Which coin did you pick? How would your beliefs change if you had obtained HHTHTHTTHT instead? To formalize this problem in Bayesian terms, we need to identify the hypothesis space, H, the prior probability of each hypothesis, P (h), and the probability of the data under each hypothesis, P (d | h). We have two coins, and thus two hypotheses. If we use θ to denote the probability that a coin produces heads, then h0 is the hypothesis that θ = 0.5, and h1 is the hypothesis that θ = 0.9. Because we have no reason to believe that one coin is more likely to be picked than the other, it is reasonable to assume equal prior probabilities: P (h0 ) = P (h1 ) = 0.5. The probability of a particular sequence of coin flips containing NH heads and NT tails being generated by a coin that produces heads with probability θ is P (d | θ ) = θ NH (1 − θ ) NT .
(3.6)
Formally, this expression follows from assuming that each flip is drawn independently from a Bernoulli distribution with parameter θ ; less formally, that heads occurs with probability θ and tails with probability 1 − θ on each flip. The likelihoods associated with h0 and h1 can thus be obtained by substituting the appropriate value of θ into Equation 3.6. We can take the priors and likelihoods defined in the previous paragraph and plug them directly into Equation 3.5 to compute the posterior probabilities for both
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hypotheses, P (h0 | d) and P (h1 | d). However, when we have just two hypotheses, it is often easier to work with the posterior odds, or the ratio of these two posterior probabilities. The posterior odds in favor of h1 is P (d | h1 ) P (h1 ) P (h1 | d) = , P (h0 | d) P (d | h0 ) P (h0 )
(3.7)
where we have used the fact that the denominator of Equation 3.4 or 3.5 is constant over all hypotheses. The first and second terms on the right-hand side are called the likelihood ratio and the prior odds, respectively. We can use Equation 3.7 (and the priors and likelihoods defined previously) to compute the posterior odds of our two hypotheses for any observed sequence of heads and tails: For the sequence HHHHHHHHHH, the odds are approximately 357:1 in favor of h1 ; for the sequence HHTHTHTTHT, approximately 165:1 in favor of h0 . The form of Equation 3.7 helps to clarify how prior knowledge and new data are combined in Bayesian inference. The two terms on the right-hand side each express the influence of one of these factors: The prior odds are determined entirely by the prior beliefs of the agent, whereas the likelihood ratio expresses how these odds should be modified in light of the data d. This relationship is made even more transparent if we examine the expression for the log posterior odds, log
P (d | h1 ) P (h1 ) P (h1 | d) = log + log P (h0 | d) P (d | h0 ) P (h0 ) (3.8)
in which the extent to which one should favor h1 over h0 reduces to an additive combination of a term reflecting prior beliefs (the log prior odds) and a term reflecting the contribution of the data (the log likelihood ratio). Based on this decomposition, the log likelihood ratio in favor of h1 is often used as a measure of the evidence that d provides for h1 . 2.3. Parameter Estimation The analysis outlined earlier for two simple hypotheses generalizes naturally to any
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finite set, although posterior odds may be less useful when there are multiple alternatives to be considered. Bayesian inference can also be applied in contexts where there are (uncountably) infinitely many hypotheses to evaluate – a situation that arises often. For example, instead of choosing between just two possible values for the probability θ that a coin produces heads, we could consider any real value of θ between 0 and 1. What, then, should we infer about the value of θ from a sequence such as HHHHHHHHHH? Under one classical approach, inferring θ is treated as a problem of estimating a fixed parameter of a probabilistic model, to which the standard solution is maximumlikelihood estimation (see, e.g., Rice, 1995). Maximum-likelihood estimation is simple and often sensible, but can also be problematic, particularly as a way to think about human inference. Our coin-flipping example illustrates some of these problems. The maximum-likelihood estimate of θ is the value θˆ that maximizes the probability of the data as given in Equation 3.6. It is H , straightforward to show that θˆ = NHN+N T ˆ which gives θ = 1.0 for the sequence HHHHHHHHHH. It should be immediately clear that the single value of θ , which maximizes the probability of the data, might not provide the best basis for making predictions about future data. Inferring that θ is exactly 1 after seeing the sequence HHHHHHHHHH implies that we should predict that the coin will never produce tails. This might seem reasonable after observing a long sequence consisting solely of heads, but the same conclusion follows for an all-heads sequence of any H is length (because NT is always 0, so NHN+N T always 1). Would you really predict that a coin would produce only heads after seeing it produce a head on just one or two flips? A second problem with maximumlikelihood estimation is that it does not take into account other knowledge that we might have about θ . This is largely by design: maximum-likelihood estimation and other classical statistical techniques have historically been promoted as “objective” procedures that do not require prior probabilities,
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which were seen as inherently and irremediably subjective. Although such a goal of objectivity might be desirable in certain scientific contexts, cognitive agents typically do have access to relevant and powerful prior knowledge, and they use that knowledge to make stronger inferences from sparse and ambiguous data than could be rationally supported by the data alone. For example, given the sequence HHH produced by flipping an apparently normal, randomly chosen coin, many people would say that the coin’s probability of producing heads is nonetheless around 0.5, perhaps because we have strong prior expectations that most coins are nearly fair. Both of these problems are addressed by a Bayesian approach to inferring θ . If we assume that θ is a random variable, then we can apply Bayes’ rule to obtain P (d | θ ) p(θ ) , P (d)
p(θ | d) =
(3.9)
where P (d) =
0
1
P (d | θ ) p(θ ) dθ.
(MAP) estimation: choosing the value of θ that maximizes the posterior probability, as given by Equation 3.9. The second method is computing the posterior mean of the quantity in question: a weighted average of all possible values of the quantity, where the weights are given by the posterior distribution. For example, the posterior mean value of the coin weight θ is computed as follows: θ¯ =
1 0
θ p(θ | d) dθ.
(3.11)
In the case of coin flipping, the posterior mean also corresponds to the posterior predictive distribution: the probability that the next toss of the coin will produce heads, given the observed sequence of previous flips. Different choices of the prior, p(θ ), will lead to different inferences about the value of θ . A first step might be to assume a uniform prior over θ , with p(θ ) being equal for all values of θ between 0 and 1 (more formally, p(θ ) = 1 for θ ∈ [0, 1]). With this choice of p(θ ) and the Bernoulli likelihood from Equation 3.6, Equation 3.9 becomes
(3.10)
The key difference from Bayesian inference with finitely many hypotheses is that our beliefs about the hypotheses (both priors and posteriors) are now characterized by probability densities (notated by a lowercase “p”) rather than probabilities strictly speaking, and the sum over hypotheses becomes an integral. The posterior distribution over θ contains more information than a single point estimate: It indicates not just which values of θ are probable, but also how much uncertainty there is about those values. Collapsing this distribution down to a single number discards information, so Bayesians prefer to maintain distributions wherever possible (this attitude is similar to Marr’s [1982, p. 106] “principle of least commitment”). However, there are two methods that are commonly used to obtain a point estimate from a posterior distribution. The first method is maximum a posteriori
p(θ ). = 1 0
θ NH (1 − θ ) NT θ NH (1 − θ ) NT dθ
(3.12)
where the denominator is just the integral from Equation 3.10. Using a little calculus to compute this integral, the posterior distribution over θ produced by a sequence d with NH heads and NT tails is p(θ | d) =
(NH + NT + 1)! NH θ (1 − θ ) NT . NH ! NT ! (3.13)
This is actually a distribution of a wellknown form: a beta distribution with parameters NH + 1 and NT + 1, denoted Beta(NH + 1, NT + 1) (e.g., Pitman, 1993). Using this prior, the MAP estimate for θ is the same as the maximum-likelihood esH , but the posterior mean is timate, NHN+N T H +1 slightly different, NHN+N . Thus, the posT +2 terior mean is sensitive to the consideration
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that we might not want to put as much evidential weight on seeing a single head as on a sequence of ten heads in a row: On seeing a single head, the posterior mean predicts that the next toss will produce a head with probability 23 , whereas a sequence of ten heads leads to the prediction that the next toss will . produce a head with probability 11 12 We can also use priors that encode stronger beliefs about the value of θ . For example, we can take a Beta(VH + 1, VT + 1) distribution for p(θ ), where VH and VT are positive integers. This distribution gives p(θ ) =
(VH + VT + 1)! VH θ (1 − θ )VT VH !VT ! (3.14)
H +1 having a mean at VHV+V , and gradually T +2 becoming more concentrated around that mean as VH + VT becomes large. For instance, taking VH = VT = 1,000 would give a distribution that strongly favors values of θ close to 0.5. Using such a prior with the Bernoulli likelihood from Equation 3.6 and applying the same kind of calculations as described earlier, we obtain the posterior distribution
p(θ | d) =
(NH + NT + VH + VT + 1)! (NH + VH )! (NT + VT )! × θ NH +VH (1 − θ ) NT +VT ,
(3.15)
which is Beta(NH + VH + 1, NT + VT + 1). Under this posterior distribution, the MAP NH +VH , and the posteestimate of θ is NH +N T +VH +VT NH +VH +1 rior mean is NH +NT +VH +VT +2 . Thus, if VH = VT = 1,000, seeing a sequence of ten heads in a row would induce a posterior distribu≈ 0.5025. In tion over θ with a mean of 1,011 2,012 this case, the observed data matter hardly at all. A prior that is much weaker but still biased towards approximately fair coins might take VH = VT = 5. Then an observation of ten heads in a row would lead to a poste≈ .727, significantly tilted rior mean of 16 22 toward heads but still closer to a fair coin than the observed data would suggest on their own. We can say that such a prior
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acts to “smooth” or “regularize” the observed data, damping out what might be misleading fluctuations when the data are far from the learner’s initial expectations. On a larger scale, these principles of Bayesian parameter estimation with informative “smoothing” priors have been applied to a number of cognitively interesting machine-learning problems, such as Bayesian learning in neural networks (Mackay, 2003). Our analysis of coin flipping with informative priors has two features of more general interest. First, the prior and posterior are specified using distributions of the same form (both being beta distributions). Second, the parameters of the prior, VH and VT , act as “virtual examples” of heads and tails, which are simply pooled with the real examples tallied in NH and NT to produce the posterior, as if both the real and virtual examples had been observed in the same data set. These two properties are not accidental: They are characteristic of a class of priors called conjugate priors (e.g., Bernardo & Smith, 1994). The likelihood determines whether a conjugate prior exists for a given problem and the form that the prior will take. The results we have given in this section exploit the fact that the beta distribution is the conjugate prior for the Bernoulli or binomial likelihood (Equation 3.6) – the uniform distribution on [0, 1] is also a beta distribution, being Beta(1, 1). Conjugate priors exist for many of the distributions commonly used in probabilistic models, such as Gaussian, Poisson, and multinomial distributions, and greatly simplify many Bayesian calculations. Using conjugate priors, posterior distributions can be computed analytically, and the interpretation of the prior as contributing virtual examples is intuitive. Although conjugate priors are elegant and practical to work with, there are also important forms of prior knowledge that they cannot express. For example, they can capture the notion of smoothness in simple linear predictive systems but not in more complex nonlinear predictors, such as multilayer neural networks. Crucially, for modelers interested in higher-level cognition, conjugate
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priors cannot capture knowledge that the causal process generating the observed data could take on one of several qualitatively different forms. Still, they can sometimes be used to address questions of selecting models of different complexity, as we do in the next section, when the different models under consideration have the same qualitative form. A major area of current research in Bayesian statistics and machine learning focuses on building more complex models that maintain the benefits of working with conjugate priors, building on the techniques for model selection that we discuss next (e.g., Neal, 1992, 1998; Blei et al., 2004; Griffiths & Ghahramani, 2005). 2.4. Model Selection Whether there were a finite number or not, the hypotheses that we have considered so far were relatively homogeneous, each offering a single value for the parameter θ characterizing our coin. However, many problems require comparing hypotheses that differ in their complexity. For example, the problem of inferring whether a coin is fair or biased based on an observed sequence of heads and tails requires comparing a hypothesis that gives a single value for θ – if the coin is fair, then θ = 0.5 – with a hypothesis that allows θ to take on any value between 0 and 1. Using observed data to choose between two probabilistic models that differ in their complexity is often called the problem of model selection (Myung & Pitt, 1997; Myung, Forster, & Browne, 2000). One familiar statistical approach to this problem is via hypothesis testing, but this approach is often complex and counterintuitive. In contrast, the Bayesian approach to model selection is a seamless application of the methods discussed so far. Hypotheses that differ in their complexity can be compared directly using Bayes’ rule, once they are reduced to probability distributions over the observable data (see Kass & Raftery, 1995). To illustrate this principle, assume that we have two hypotheses: h0 is the hypothesis that θ = 0.5, and h1 is the hypothesis that θ takes a value drawn from a uni-
form distribution on [0, 1]. If we have no a priori reason to favor one hypothesis over the other, we can take P (h0 ) = P (h1 ) = 0.5. The probability of the data under h0 is straightforward to compute, using Equation 3.6, giving P (d | h0 ) = 0.5 NH +NT . But how should we compute the likelihood of the data under h1 , which does not make a commitment to a single value of θ ? The solution to this problem is to compute the marginal probability of the data under h1 . As discussed earlier given a joint distribution over a set of variables, we can always sum out variables until we obtain a distribution over just the variables that interest us. In this case, we define the joint distribution over d and θ given h1 , and then integrate over θ to obtain P (d | h1 ) =
0
1
P (d | θ, h1 ) p(θ | h1 ) dθ (3.16)
where p(θ | h1 ) is the distribution over θ assumed under h1 – in this case, a uniform distribution over [0, 1]. This does not require any new concepts – it is exactly the same kind of computation as we needed to perform to compute the denominator for the posterior distribution over θ (Equation 3.10). Performing this computation, we obH ! NT ! , where again the tain P (d | h1 ) = (NN H +NT +1)! fact that we have a conjugate prior provides us with a neat analytic result. Having computed this likelihood, we can apply Bayes’ rule just as we did for two simple hypotheses. Figure 3.1a shows how the log posterior odds in favor of h1 change as NH and NT vary for sequences of length 10. The ease with which hypotheses differing in complexity can be compared using Bayes’ rule conceals the fact that this is actually a very challenging problem. Complex hypotheses have more degrees of freedom that can be adapted to the data and can thus always be made to fit the data better than simple hypotheses. For example, for any sequence of heads and tails, we can always find a value of θ that would give higher probability to that sequence than
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Log posterior odds in favor of h1
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5 4 3 2 1 0 –1
(b)
Probability
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3 2 1 0
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
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Figure 3.1. Comparing hypotheses about the weight of a coin. (a) The vertical axis shows log posterior odds in favor of h1 , the hypothesis that the probability of heads (θ) is drawn from a uniform distribution on [0, 1], over h0 , the hypothesis that the probability of heads is 0.5. The horizontal axis shows the number of heads, NH , in a sequence of 10 flips. As NH deviates from 5, the posterior odds in favor of h1 increase. (b) The posterior odds shown in (a) are computed by averaging over the values of θ with respect to the prior, p(θ ), which in this case is the uniform distribution on [0, 1]. This averaging takes into account the fact that hypotheses with greater flexibility – such as the free-ranging θ parameter in h1 – can produce both better and worse predictions, implementing an automatic “Bayesian Occam’s razor.” The solid line shows the probability of the sequence HHTHTTHHHT for different values of θ , whereas the dotted line is the probability of any sequence of length 10 under h0 (equivalent to θ = 0.5). Although there are some values of θ that result in a higher probability for the sequence, on average, the greater flexibility of h1 results in lower probabilities. Consequently, h0 is favored over h1 (this sequence has NH = 6). In contrast, a wide range of values of θ result in higher probability for for the sequence HHTHHHTHHH, as shown by the dashed line. Consequently, h1 is favored over h0 (this sequence has NH = 8). Reproduced with permission from Griffiths and Yuille (2006).
does the hypothesis that θ = 0.5. It seems like a complex hypothesis would thus have an inherent unfair advantage over a simple hypothesis. The Bayesian solution to the problem of comparing hypotheses that differ in their complexity takes this into account. More degrees of freedom provide the opportunity to find a better fit to the data, but this greater flexibility also makes a worse
fit possible. For example, for d consisting of the sequence HHTHTTHHHT, P (d | θ, h1 ) is greater than P (d | h0 ) for θ ∈ (0.5, 0.694], but is less than P (d | h0 ) outside that range. Marginalizing over θ averages these gains and losses: A more complex hypothesis will be favored only if its greater complexity consistently provides a better account of the data. To phrase this principle another way,
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a Bayesian learner judges the fit of a parameterized model not by how well it fits using the best parameter values, but by how well it fits using randomly selected parameters, where the parameters are drawn from a prior specified by the model ( p(θ | h1 ) in Equation 3.16) (Ghahramani, 2004). This penalization of more complex models is known as the “Bayesian Occam’s razor” (Jeffreys & Berger, 1992; Mackay, 2003), and is illustrated in Figure 3.1b. 2.5. Summary Bayesian inference stipulates how rational learners should update their beliefs in the light of evidence. The principles behind Bayesian inference can be applied whenever we are making inferences from data, whether the hypotheses involved are discrete or continuous, or have one or more unspecified free parameters. However, developing probabilistic models that can capture the richness and complexity of human cognition requires going beyond these basic ideas. The remainder of the chapter summarizes several recent tools that have been developed in computer science and statistics for defining and using complex probabilistic models, and provides examples of how they can be used in modeling human cognition.
3. Graphical Models The previous discussion of Bayesian inference was formulated in the language of “hypotheses” and “data.” However, the principles of Bayesian inference, and the idea of using probabilistic models, extend to much richer settings. In its most general form, a probabilistic model simply defines the joint distribution for a system of random variables. Representing and computing with these joint distributions becomes challenging as the number of variables grows, and their properties can be difficult to understand. Graphical models provide an efficient and intuitive framework for working with high-dimensional probability distributions, which is applicable when these distributions
can be viewed as the product of smaller components defined over local subsets of variables. A graphical model associates a probability distribution with a graph. The nodes of the graph represent the variables on which the distribution is defined, the edges between the nodes reflect their probabilistic dependencies, and a set of functions relating nodes and their neighbors in the graph are used to define a joint distribution over all of the variables based on those dependencies. There are two kinds of graphical models, differing in the nature of the edges that connect the nodes. If the edges simply indicate a dependency between variables, without specifying a direction, then the result is an undirected graphical model. Undirected graphical models have long been used in statistical physics, and many probabilistic neural network models, such as Boltzmann machines (Ackley, Hinton, & Sejnowski, 1985), can be interpreted as models of this kind. If the edges indicate the direction of a dependency, the result is a directed graphical model. Our focus here will be on directed graphical models, which are also known as Bayesian networks or Bayes nets (Pearl, 1988). Bayesian networks can often be given a causal interpretation, where an edge between two nodes indicates that one node is a direct cause of the other, which makes them particularly appealing for modeling higher-level cognition. 3.1. Bayesian Networks A Bayesian network represents the probabilistic dependencies relating a set of variables. If an edge exists from node A to node B, then A is referred to as a “parent” of B, and B is a “child” of A. This genealogical relation is often extended to identify the “ancestors” and “descendants” of a node. The directed graph used in a Bayesian network has one node for each random variable in the associated probability distribution and is constrained to be acyclic: One can never return to the same node by following a sequence of directed edges. The edges express the probabilistic dependencies
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between the variables in a fashion consistent with the Markov condition: Conditioned on its parents, each variable is independent of all other variables except its descendants (Pearl, 1988; Spirtes, Glymour, & Schienes, 1993). As a consequence of the Markov condition, any Bayesian network specifies a canonical factorization of a full joint probability distribution into the product of local conditional distributions, one for each variable conditioned on its parents. That is, , . . . , XN, we can for a set of variables X1 , X2 write P (x1 , x2 , . . . , xN) = i P (xi | Pa(Xi )) where Pa(Xi ) is the set of parents of Xi . Bayesian networks provide an intuitive representation for the structure of many probabilistic models. For example, in the previous section, we discussed the problem of estimating the weight of a coin, θ . One detail that we left implicit in that discussion was the assumption that successive coin flips are independent, given a value for θ . This conditional independence assumption is expressed in the graphical model shown in Figure 3.2a, where x1 , x2 , . . . , xN are the outcomes (heads or tails) of N successive tosses. Applying the Markov condition, this structure represents the probability distribution P (x1 , x2 , . . . , xN, θ ) = p(θ )
N
P (xi | θ )
i=1
(3.17) in which the xi are independent given the value of θ . Other dependency structures are possible. For example, the flips could be generated in a Markov chain, a sequence of random variables in which each variable is independent of all of its predecessors given the variable that immediately precedes it (e.g., Norris, 1997). Using a Markov chain structure, we could represent a hypothesis space of coins that are particularly biased toward alternating or maintaining their last outcomes, letting the parameter θ be the probability that the outcome xi takes the same value as xi−1 (and assuming that x1 is heads with probability 0.5). This distribution would corre-
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(a)
θ
x1
x2
x3
x4
x3
x4
θ
(b)
x1
x2 θ
(c)
z1
z2
z3
z4
x1
x2
x3
x4
φ
Figure 3.2. Graphical models showing different kinds of processes that could generate a sequence of coin flips. (a) Independent flips, with parameters θ determining the probability of heads. (b) A Markov chain, where the probability of heads depends on the result of the previous flip. Here, the parameters θ define the probability of heads after a head and after a tail. (c) A hidden Markov model, in which the probability of heads depends on a latent state variable zi . Transitions between values of the latent state are set by parameters θ, whereas other parameters φ determine the probability of heads for each value of the latent state. This kind of model is commonly used in computational linguistics, where the xi might be the sequence of words in a document and the zi the syntactic classes from which they are generated.
spond to the graphical model shown in Figure 3.2b. Applying the Markov condition, this structure represents the probability distribution P (x1 , x2 , . . . , xN, θ ) = p(θ )P (x1 )
N
P (xi | xi−1 θ ),
(3.18)
i=2
in which each xi depends only on xi−1 , given θ . More elaborate structures are also
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possible: any directed acyclic graph on x1 , x2 , . . . , xN and θ corresponds to a valid set of assumptions about the dependencies among these variables. When introducing the basic ideas behind Bayesian inference, we emphasized the fact that hypotheses correspond to different assumptions about the process that could have generated some observed data. Bayesian networks help to make this idea transparent. Every Bayesian network indicates a sequence of steps that one could follow to generate samples from the joint distribution over the random variables in the network. First, one samples the values of all variables with no parents in the graph. Then, one samples the variables with parents taking known values, one after another. For example, in the structure shown in Figure 3.2b, we would sample θ from the distribution p(θ ), then sample x1 from the distribution P (x1 | θ ), then successively sample xi from P (xi | xi−1 , θ ) for i = 2, . . . , N. A set of probabilistic steps that can be followed to generate the values of a set of random variables is known as a generative model, and the directed graph associated with a probability distribution provides an intuitive representation for the steps that are involved in such a model. For the generative models represented by Figure 3.2a or 3.2b, we have assumed that all variables except θ are observed in each sample from the model, or each data point. More generally, generative models can include a number of steps that make reference to unobserved or latent variables. Introducing latent variables can lead to apparently complicated dependency structures among the observable variables. For example, in the graphical model shown in Figure 3.2c, a sequence of latent variables z1 , z2 , . . . , z N influences the probability that each respective coin flip in a sequence x1 , x2 , . . . , xN comes up heads (in conjunction with a set of parameters φ). The latent variables form a Markov chain, with the value of zi depending only on the value of zi−1 (in conjunction with the parameters θ ). This model, called a hidden Markov model, is widely used in computational linguistics, where zi
might be the syntactic class (such as noun or verb) of a word, θ encodes the probability that a word of one class will appear after another (capturing simple syntactic constraints on the structure of sentences), and φ encodes the probability that each word will be generated from a particular syntactic class (e.g., Charniak, 1993; Jurafsky & Martin, 2000; Manning & Schutze, 1999). ¨ The dependencies among the latent variables induce dependencies among the observed variables – in the case of language, the constraints on transitions between syntactic classes impose constraints on which words can follow one another. 3.2. Representing Probability Distributions over Propositions The treatment of graphical models in the previous section – as representations of the dependency structure among variables in generative models for data – follows their standard uses in the fields of statistics and machine learning. Graphical models can take on a different interpretation in artificial intelligence, when the variables of interest represent the truth value of certain propositions (Russell & Norvig, 2002). For example, imagine that a friend of yours claims to possess psychic powers, in particular, the power of psychokinesis. He proposes to demonstrate these powers by flipping a coin and influencing the outcome to produce heads. You suggest that a better test might be to see if he can levitate a pencil because the coin producing heads could also be explained by some kind of sleight of hand, such as substituting a two-headed coin. We can express all possible outcomes of the proposed tests, as well as their causes, using the binary random variables X1 , X2 , X3 , and X4 to represent (respectively) the truth of the coin being flipped and producing heads, the pencil levitating, your friend having psychic powers, and the use of a twoheaded coin. Any set of beliefs about these outcomes can be encoded in a joint probability distribution, P (x1 , x2 , x3 , x4 ). For example, the probability that the coin comes up heads (x1 = 1) should be higher if your
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friend has psychic powers
x4
x3
x1
x2
coin produces heads
pencil levitates
Figure 3.3. Directed graphical model (Bayesian network) showing the dependencies among variables in the “psychic friend” example discussed in the text. Reproduced with permission from Griffiths and Yuille (2006).
friend actually does have psychic powers (x3 = 1). Figure 3.3 shows a Bayesian network expressing a possible pattern of dependencies among these variables. For example, X1 and X2 are assumed to be independent given X3 , indicating that once it was known whether or not your friend was psychic, the outcomes of the coin flip and the levitation experiments would be completely unrelated. By the Markov condition, we can write P (x1 , x2 , x3 , x4 ) = P (x1 | x3 , x4 ) P (x2 | x3 )P (x3 )P (x4 ). In addition to clarifying the dependency structure of a set of random variables, Bayesian networks provide an efficient way to represent and compute with probability distributions. In general, a joint probability distribution on N binary variables requires 2 N − 1 numbers to specify (one for each set of joint values taken by the variables, minus one because of the constraint that probability distributions sum to 1). In the case of the psychic friend example, where there are four variables, this would be 24 − 1 = 15 numbers. However, the factorization of the joint distribution over these variables allows us to use fewer numbers in specifying the distribution over these four variables. We only need one number for each variable conditioned on each possible set of values its parents can take, or 2|Pa(Xi )| numbers for each variable Xi (where | Pa(Xi ) | is the size of the parent set of Xi ). For our “psychic friend” network, this adds up to 8 numbers rather than 15, because X3 and X4 have no parents (contributing one number each),
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X2 has one parent (contributing two numbers), and X1 has two parents (contributing four numbers). Recognizing the structure in this probability distribution can also greatly simplify the computations we want to perform. When variables are independent or conditionally independent of others, it reduces the number of terms that appear in sums over subsets of variables necessary to compute marginal beliefs about a variable or conditional beliefs about a variable given the values of one or more other variables. A variety of algorithms have been developed to perform these probabilistic inferences efficiently on complex models, by recognizing and exploiting conditional independence structures in Bayesian networks (Pearl, 1988; Mackay, 2003). These algorithms form the heart of many modern artificial intelligence systems, making it possible to reason efficiently under uncertainty (Korb & Nicholson, 2003; Russell & Norvig, 2002). 3.3. Causal Graphical Models In a standard Bayesian network, edges between variables indicate only statistical dependencies between them. However, recent work has explored the consequences of augmenting directed graphical models with a stronger assumption about the relationships indicated by edges: that they indicate direct causal relationships (Pearl, 2000; Spirtes et al., 1993). This assumption allows causal graphical models to represent not just the probabilities of events that one might observe, but also the probabilities of events that one can produce through intervening on a system. The inferential implications of an event can differ strongly, depending on whether it was observed passively or under conditions of intervention. For example, observing that nothing happens when your friend attempts to levitate a pencil would provide evidence against his claim of having psychic powers; but secretly intervening to hold the pencil down while your friend attempts to levitate it would make the pencil’s nonlevitation unsurprising and uninformative about his powers.
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In causal graphical models, the consequences of intervening on a particular variable can be assessed by removing all incoming edges to that variable and performing probabilistic inference in the resulting “mutilated” model (Pearl, 2000). This procedure produces results that align with our intuitions in the psychic powers example: Intervening on X2 breaks its connection with X3 , rendering the two variables independent. As a consequence, X2 cannot provide evidence about the value of X3 . Several recent papers have investigated whether people are sensitive to the consequences of intervention, generally finding that people differentiate between observational and interventional evidence appropriately (Hagmayer et al., in press; Lagnado & Sloman, 2004; Steyvers et al., 2003). Introductions to causal graphical models that consider applications to human cognition are provided by Glymour (2001) and Sloman (2005). The prospect of using graphical models to express the probabilistic consequences of causal relationships has led researchers in several fields to ask whether these models could serve as the basis for learning causal relationships from data. Every introductory class in statistics teaches that “correlation does not imply causation,” but the opposite is true: Patterns of causation do imply patterns of correlation. A Bayesian learner should thus be able to work backward from observed patterns of correlation (or statistical dependency) to make probabilistic inferences about the underlying causal structures likely to have generated those observed data. We can use the same basic principles of Bayesian inference developed in the previous section, where now the data are samples from an unknown causal graphical model and the hypotheses to be evaluated are different candidate graphical models. For technical introductions to the methods and challenges of learning causal graphical models, see Heckerman (1998) and Glymour and Cooper (1999). As in the previous section, it is valuable to distinguish between the problems of parameter estimation and model selection. In the context of causal learning, model selec-
Table 3.1: Contingency table representation used in elemental causal induction
Cause present (c + ) Cause absent (c − )
Effect present (e + )
Effect absent (e − )
N(e + , c + ) N(e + , c − )
N(e − , c + ) N(e − , c − )
tion becomes the problem of determining the graph structure of the causal model – which causal relationships exist – and parameter estimation becomes the problem of determining the strength and polarity of the causal relations specified by a given graph structure. We will illustrate the differences between these two aspects of causal learning and how graphical models can be brought into contact with empirical data on human causal learning, with a task that has been extensively studied in the cognitive psychology literature: judging the status of a single causal relationship between two variables based on contingency data. 3.4. Example: Causal Induction from Contingency Data Much psychological research on causal induction has focused on this simple causal learning problem: given a candidate cause, C, and a candidate effect, E , people are asked to give a numerical rating assessing the degree to which C causes E .2 We refer to tasks of this sort as “elemental causal induction” tasks. The exact wording of the judgment question varies and until recently was not the subject of much attention, although as we will see later, it is potentially quite important. Most studies present information corresponding to the entries in a 2 × 2 contingency table, as in Table 3.1. People are given information about the frequency 2 As elsewhere in this chapter, we will represent variables such as C, E with capital letters and their instantiations with lowercase letters, with c + , e + indicating that the cause or effect is present and c − , e − indicating that the cause or effect is absent.
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with which the effect occurs in the presence and absence of the cause, represented by the numbers N(e + , c + ), N(e − , c − ), and so forth. In a standard example, C might be injecting a chemical into a mouse and E the expression of a particular gene. N(e + , c + ) would be the number of injected mice expressing the gene, whereas N(e − , c − ) would be the number of uninjected mice not expressing the gene. The leading psychological models of elemental causal induction are measures of association that can be computed from simple combinations of the frequencies in Table 3.1. A classic model first suggested by Jenkins and Ward (1965) asserts that the degree of causation is best measured by the quantity P =
N(e + , c + ) N(e + , c + ) + N(e − , c + ) −
N(e + , c − ) N(e + , c − ) + N(e − , c − )
= P (e + | c + ) − P (e + | c − ),
(3.19)
where P (e + | c + ) is the empirical conditional probability of the effect given the presence of the cause, estimated from the contingency table counts N(·). P thus reflects the change in the probability of the effect occurring as a consequence of the occurrence of the cause. More recently, Cheng (1997) has suggested that people’s judgments are better captured by a measure called