THE BODY SOCIAL
The body is not only a biological phenomenon, it is also a social creation of immense complexity. It i...
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THE BODY SOCIAL
The body is not only a biological phenomenon, it is also a social creation of immense complexity. It is not so much a ‘given’ as a social category, with different meanings, composed, imposed and developed in each age by each individual. The attributes, functions and specific organs of the body and the senses are likewise highly controversial. The Body Social explores the history of thinking about the body and the senses, paying special attention to shifts in ways of thinking about the body over time, and to the clash of different approaches to the body today. How people think and feel about their bodies influences how they live their lives and die their deaths. This study is an invaluable contribution to our understanding of how the body is conceptualized and lived. It avoids abstract discussion in favour of a down-to-earth approach to the body. The author examines particular parts of the body, including the face and hair, and particular body senses; touch, smell and sight. He also provides an up-todate and reliable survey of the literature. Written with real distinction, and displaying immense erudition The Body Social is destined to become essential reading for anyone studying the meaning of the body. Anthony Synnott is Associate Professor in the Department of Sociology and Anthropology at Concordia University, Montreal.
THE BODY SOCIAL Symbolism, Self and Society
Anthony Synnott
London and New York
First published in 1993 by Routledge 11 New Fetter Lane, London EC4P 4EE Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 29 West 35th Street, New York, NY 10001 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2002. © 1993 Anthony Synnott All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Synnott, Anthony, 1940– The body social/Anthony Synnott. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references (p. 275) and index. 1. Body, Human—Social aspects. I. Title. GN298.S94 1993 391´.6–dc20 92–40461 CI P ISBN 0-203-20154-X Master e-book IS BN
ISBN 0-203-20157-4 (Adobe eReader Format) IS BN 0-415-06296-9 0-415-10359-2 (pbk)
For John-Jaspar and Nicholas
CONTENTS
Acknowledgements Introduction
ix 1
1
BODY
7
2
GENDER
38
3
BEAUTY AND THE FACE
73
4
HAIR
103
5
THE SENSES
128
6
TOUCH
156
7
SMELL
182
8
SIGHT
206
9
BODIES AND SENSES
228
Notes Bibliography Name index Subject index
265 275 296 302
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
At last I can thank so many people who have helped me in so many ways—Gabriel Bar-Haim, Constance Classen, Elaine Comartin, Harvie Ferguson, Jacquie Gauntlett, Janusz Kaczorowski, Sarah O’Brien-Twohig and Michael Sullivan. Concordia has been very good to me in providing institutional support, and I would like to thank especially Charles Bertrand, Gail Valaskakis and Pieter de Vries, and also my students over the years in my courses on the body, whom I have very much enjoyed working with. Thanks also to Sharon Byer and Carole Robertson who did the typing and retyping, seemingly for ever, with such care and cheerfulness. I would also like to thank the Social Science and Humanities Research Council of Canada, and the Fragrance Research Fund for their grants, which made so much research possible, and especially Annette Green of the Fragrance Research Fund for her help and encouragement. I am particularly grateful to David Howes and Joseph Smucker in our department for all their support over the years. Friends and family have been terrific, so thank you to my brothers Timothy and Hilary, and to Jim and Daphne Hill and Suzanne Vallet, Frank and Hélène Edmonds and James and Zosha Aynsley. Special thanks to Justin Dyer, Anne Gee and Christina Tebbit, and all at Routledge, and especially my editor Chris Rojek, who made all this possible. Finally, Kathleen Murphy has been a constant source of inspiration and insight, and I want to thank her for all that and more; and Sarah and Aaron too. Last, but not least, special thanks to John Jaspar and Nicholas who have supported this project from the beginning. Several of these Chapters have been published previously in various versions: Chapters 1, 3 and 4 in The British Journal of Sociology, 1992, 43:1; 1990, 40:4; 1991, 41:1 and 1988, 38:3; part of Chapter 5 in David Howes (ed.) The Variety of Sensory Experience Toronto: University ix
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of Toronto Press, (1991); Chapter 6 in The Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology, 1991, 28:4; Chapter 8 in The International Journal of Politics, Culture and Sociology, 1992, 5:4. I would like to thank the publishers for their permission to reprint this work.
x
INTRODUCTION
Breasts, thighs, lips, eyes, heart, belly, navel, hair, penis, nipples, anus, brain, guts and balls. Body parts: but also much more. We have imposed layers of ideas, images, meanings and associations on these biological systems which together operate and maintain our physical bodies. Our bodies and body parts are loaded with cultural symbolism, public and private, positive and negative, political and economic, sexual, moral and often controversial; and so are the attributes, functions and states of the body, and the senses. Height and weight, eating and drinking, making love, gestures and body language, even various diseases, colds or AIDS, are not simply physical phenomena; they are also social. The body is not just skin and bones, an assemblage of parts, a medical marvel…The body is also, and primarily, the self. We are all embodied. Obvious though this may be, what it means in practice is not always so obvious. Controversies rage about the ownership of the body, the boundaries, its meaning, its value, the criteria of life and death, and how it should be lived, and loved. The thesis of this book is that the body and the senses are socially constructed, in various ways by different populations, as are the various organs, processes and attributes of the body. The problem is to demonstrate how the body is constructed, and why, and also why these constructions vary and change. The body is not a ‘given’, but a social category with different meanings imposed and developed by every age, and by different sectors of the population. As such it is therefore sponge-like in its ability to absorb meanings, but also highly political. Like the organs and parts of the body, the attributes of the body are eminently social. Our age, gender and colour roles are principal determinants of our lives and our social identities, the focal point 1
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of our self-concepts and group-concepts. Similarly, our unique attributes of beauty or unattractiveness, height and weight, physical handicaps, if any, not only affect social responses to the self, they also affect our life chances. The body, therefore, is the prime symbol of the self, and the prime determinant of the self. People probably think about, and worry about, the body more than any other single ‘thing’, and all the time. The alphabet of possible worries runs from AIDS, through beauty, colds, deafness and death, to face and fat and hair, to pain, sex, weight and zits. Despite the hyper-intellectualism of the Western cultural tradition, which has historically privileged mind over body, the body is irrefutably there, needing and demanding attention—but not only physical attention, sociological attention too, I suggest. As we age no doubt our somatic concerns change: we may worry more about loss of hair or sight, fertility or potency; and such losses are hardly compensated for by gains in weight and girth and the increased risk of heart attacks. Death approaches, and the self changes as, and because, the body changes; yet the body remains a central concern of the embodied self: an object to the subject, yet also constitutive of the subject. The identity of body and self is perhaps most clearly illustrated by body-change. Self-concepts change, often dramatically, at puberty, pregnancy and menopause. Body changes change the self. This selfchange is particularly evident if the body-change is sudden and unexpected: a heart attack, stroke, or mastectomy, or an accident which results in the loss of a limb, or facial scarring—for the face is a prime symbol of the self. Cosmetic surgery can work wonders on the body, but also on the mind, and the sense of self. The sense of who one is is highly dependent on the body—a point often not fully appreciated until the body changes or, of course, dies. Indeed, in the end, this identity of body and self is total: we cannot say ‘he is fine, but his body is in absolute agony’. Nor, ‘she died recently, but, apart from that, she’s in great shape!’ A second thesis of this book, therefore, is to restore the body to its central place in personal and social life. Mainstream sociology, and also history and psychology, I would add, have largely ignored the body, as many have noted; and philosophers have tended to deprecate their bodies in favour of their brilliant minds, while many theologians have described the body as an enemy to the soul. Yet, in practice, no one lasts long by ignoring their bodies. Sociology, 2
I NTRODUCTION
like other disciplines, also needs to pay as much professional attention to the body as its practitioners probably do in their personal lives. The body is strange, therefore; capable of carrying a wide range of ever-changing meanings. It is the prime constituent of personal and social identity; yet also the deepest prejudices and discriminations, for and against, accrue to the body. Bodies are highly polarized in moral terms: male/female, old/young, beautiful/ ugly, fat/thin, black/ white/red/yellow, and so on, with valences depending upon personal and cultural values. Furthermore, the body is also internally polarized, between public parts like the face and private parts like the genitals— a polarization that coincides with other conventional dichotomies: higher and lower, and in the Western tradition, to a degree, good and bad. Other cultures, however, have other values. Controversy extends not only to the evaluation of different bodies, body attributes, parts and functions, but also to ownership of the body. To whom does the body belong? Whose body is it? The individual’s or the state’s? Or both? But if both, what are the limits of ownership? The apparently conflicting rights of individual and state over the body are particularly evident in the controversies over abortion, suicide, euthanasia and prostitution, but also blood transfusion. The ‘therapeutic’ state intervenes in the body, even in the bedroom. Capital punishment: does the state have the right to take away life? Under what circumstances? There is little agreement. Some people believe that contraceptives are immoral, that masturbation is immoral, that blood transfusions are immoral, that pre-marital sex is immoral, or that extra-marital sex is not immoral…the controversies are endless. And the new reproductive technologies and advances in medical technology seem to be racing far ahead of our ethical capacities. Children today may have five parents; what rights, and duties, does each have? And when does human life begin? With conception? Or later? If later, then when? There is confusion at the other end of the life span also, for when is a person dead? Brain-dead people may be kept alive on machines, but does the state have the right to ‘cannibalize’ them for spare parts? And to sell the parts? AIDS patients: how are their rights balanced against the rights of others? There is little consensus on an ethics of the body. The body, therefore with all its organs, attributes, functions, states and senses, is not so much a biological given as a social creation of immense complexity, and almost limitless variability, richness and power. The creation and learning of the body as a social 3
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phenomenon varies from culture to culture, however; and even within ‘our own’ culture, which we can perhaps broadly describe as GraecoRoman and Judaeo-Christian, many different creations persist. Our task here is to explore this body social in some of its many variations and dynamics. The body social is many things: the prime symbol of the self, but also of the society; it is something we have, yet also what we are; it is both subject and object at the same time; it is individual and personal, as unique as a fingerprint or odourplume, yet it is also common to all humanity with all its systems, and taught in schools. The body is both an individual creation, physically and phenomenologically, and a cultural product; it is personal, and also state property. Yet, despite the personal and social salience of the body, the body has not been a central concern of sociology. Certain attributes of the body have been studied, particularly colour in race relations, gender in sex roles, and age in gerontology; but the common denominator of these three substantive areas, namely the body itself, has been largely ignored, at least until recently. Bryan Turner’s The Body and Society, which inaugurated the sociology of the body, was not published until 1984. None the less, we can, I think, usefully reconsider the body at the heart of sociology, rather than peripheral to the discipline, and more importantly at the heart of our social lives and our sense of self. This book is divided roughly into two parts: the first part on the body and the second on the senses. We begin with an overview of how people think and have thought about embodiment, noting the principal paradigms over the centuries, but very briefly, and consider how and why they have changed. The dynamics of paradigm shifts are critical to any understanding of the body social, and it does make a difference to our lives if one thinks of the body as a tomb (Plato), a temple (Saint Paul), an enemy (Teresa of Avila), a machine (Descartes), or the self (Sartre). Yet ‘the body’, in practice, is only a specific body in time and space, male or female, old or young, and so on. Perhaps the main somatic variable for most people for most of their lives is gender; this therefore is the subject of chapter 2. What does male or female embodiment mean? We discuss the most ancient construction of all, the two sexes as opposite, and examine men’s and women’s constructions of each other, in all their complexity over the years, how they, and we, have symbolized these differences, and finally the difficulties of dualism. 4
I NTRODUCTION
Focussing more narrowly on the body we go on to consider the social significance of beauty and the face, and hair. These few parts (face and hair) and attributes (beauty/ugliness, male/female) of the body must suffice for so many other parts and attributes. To study everything all at once is simply not possible. The second part, on the senses, begins with an overview of the history and philosophy of the senses, paralleling chapter 1 on the body, and indicates the various and changing constructions of the senses, and the importance of these constructions for lifestyles. We also examine the contribution of anthropology for our understanding of how ‘sensitive’ humans are. This is followed by case studies on three of the senses—space limitations prevent considerations of all five. We therefore discuss ‘the first sense’, touch, whose physical, psychological and social importance has been particularly underrated, and which is so strangely taboo in the Northern European— North American sensorium. In chapter 7 we discuss smell, the most despised and neglected of the five senses. We conclude the senses with sight, ‘the noblest sense’, as Aristotle called it, and the noblest organ of the body, the eye: the mirror of the soul, the I. Each of these senses plays important, and often unrecognized, roles in social interaction; it is time we attended to so vital a part of our social life, and ‘came to our senses’. Theorizing the body is no easy task, despite (or because of ) the 6 billion bodies on the planet, not least because anthropologists and sociologists have theorized the body so differently. The book concludes with a discussion on theories of the body up to the present. The multiplicity of theories, perspectives, concerns and interests does not even begin to exhaust the richness of the topic, nor of course its importance. An appreciation of this polyvalence of the body is one of the values of this theorizing. Two themes have struck me particularly and permeate the entire corpus. They may serve to integrate the wide range of topics. The first is how the body social negates the body physical: many of our somatic cultural norms are dangerous, physically unhealthy and self-destructive. Some are discussed below, but most are not, yet they include such behaviours as smoking and alcohol abuse, which contribute substantially to morbidity and mortality rates. Body abuse is virtually institutionalized in our culture: our eating and drinking habits have little to do with nutrition and more to do with beautification, especially slimming, celebration, being macho, self-gratification and a range of other values. Expensive and 5
TH E BODY SOCIAL
dangerous major surgery is employed for cosmetic purposes. Steroids are swallowed for bigger, stronger and faster bodies. Hair dyes are carcinogenic, and sex can be lethal. Indeed most of the principal causes of death are lifestyle-related. In this sense, our cultural norms tend to subvert our biological needs: culture and biology become opposed. The second theme is the degree to which men and women, defined since the early Greek philosophers as opposite sexes, structure their/ our lives in dualistic terms. Women and men are only one chromosome away from being men and women; yet this single chromosome divides the corporeal world like a scalpel. Almost all our symbolic and ritual somatic and sensory behaviour is different for the two sexes, and so are many somatic meanings: beauty, hair, body, touch and so on. This cultural dimorphism is discussed more fully in chapter 2, but it does weave through the entire text. Even working towards equity, we none the less institutionalize symbolic differentiation (and conflict) in our somatic behaviour. Finally, of necessity, we must be selective rather than encyclopedic. We cannot consider everything about the body social; there is neither time nor space to study all the organs, all the functions, all the attributes, all the senses, and all the possibilities. Most of the organs, and significant attributes like age, colour, height, health, and two of the senses, taste and hearing, are not discussed here; but they have often been reviewed by others, as will be apparent. The sociology of the body and the senses is a relatively new field in sociology—but it is more than that, it is also a new way of ‘looking’ at sociology and doing sociology and experiencing sociology personally; beyond that it is a new way of exploring our embodied selves and our relations with others in society. As such it is highly political and, like the body itself, very sensitive.
6
1 BODY Tomb, temple, machine and self
The body is the tomb of the soul. Plato
Your body is the temple of the Holy Spirit. Saint Paul The human body may be considered as a machine. Descartes The body is what I immediately am…I am my body. Sartr e What is the body? Opinions have differed dramatically, as the quotations above indicate. The body has been regarded as a tomb of the soul, a temple, a machine, and the self, and much more; and it has also been treated accordingly. Bodies may be caressed or indeed killed, they may be loved or hated, and thought beautiful or ugly, sacred or profane. Ideas about what the body is, what it means, its moral value and the values of its constituent parts, the limits of the body, its social utility and symbolic value, in sum, how the body is defined both physically and socially, vary widely from person to person, and have changed dramatically over time. The one word, body, may therefore signify very different realities and perceptions of reality. Our task here is to explore the range of these meanings, and to indicate how and why these meanings change. The Oxford English Dictionary defines the body as: ‘The physical or material frame or structure of man or of any other animal; the whole material organism viewed as an organic entity’. Yet even this spare definition raises questions. What constitutes, and who defines, ‘the whole’? Opinions differ. Some would include hair and nail-clippings, spilled blood and faeces, defining them as the body 7
TH E BODY SOCIAL
in another place; and some include the shadow; others would not Sartre denies that the body simply is the ‘frame or structure’ of ‘man’ or animal; for him, and for others, the body is the self. And is the body wholly physical? For Descartes, yes, it is a machine; for Saint Paul, no, it is also and even primarily spiritual. Above all, the body, defined as tomb or temple, machine or self, is normative. Here we will explore some of the principal themes in the thinking about the body from the Greeks and the Romans to Judaeo-Christian thought and practice, through the Renaissance to the present. We conclude with a discussion on the range of modern constructions. GREEK PHILOSOPHY: THE BODY AS PLEASURE OR TOMB?
The Greeks glorified the body. Their sculptors, painters and potters celebrated the beauty of the naked human form in stone and paint and clay. The Olympic Games, which were held every four years from 776 BC to AD 394, celebrated the power and strength of the male body, on the sacred slopes of Mount Olympus. They seem to have held relaxed attitudes to sex, at least in Athens, to judge by Lysistrata. And the Greeks were the first to develop theories of beauty (Carritt, 1962; Eco, 1986). Although Greek culture was body-centred, there was no philosophical consensus on the body. Several theories prevailed. Hedonism was asserted by Aristippus (c. 435–366 BC), the founder of the Cyrenaic school, and a friend of Socrates, who insisted that ‘bodily pleasures are far better than mental pleasures’. He practised what he preached and lived a luxurious life (in Laertius, vol. 1, 1972:219). Countervailing this philosophy were the Epicureans. Epicurus (341–270 BC), the founder of this school, stated clearly: ‘we call pleasure the alpha and omega of a blessed life. Pleasure is our first and kindred good’ (in Laertius, vol. 2, 1972:655). But they believed mental pleasures were superior to those of the body. For the Cyrenaics, the mind is fine, but the body is better; for the Epicureans, the body is good, but the mind is better. Neither philosophy challenged the Greek lifestyle. The third stream of Greek thought, Orphism, which began to emerge in about the fourth century BC, was radically different. It was said to have been founded by Orpheus, one of the Greek heroes and an Argonaut. According to Orphic belief, Dionysus, the son of Zeus, was killed and eaten by the Titans, the wicked sons of 8
BODY
Earth. Zeus destroyed them, but from their ashes rose the human race with a dual nature, part earthly (the Titans) and part heavenly (Dionysus, the son of Zeus). The Orphic life consisted of the cultivation of the divine nature by asceticism: abstention from meat, wine and sexual intercourse. The body was regarded as the tomb of the soul. This soma-sema (body=tomb) philosophy was most unpopular; but it did influence such leading philosophers as Pythagoras, Socrates and Plato, and hence Neoplatonism and Christianity. Socrates (466–399 BC) described the soul as a ‘helpless prisoner, chained hand and foot in the body, compelled to view reality not directly but only through its prison bars’. He insists that the body is a ‘hindrance’ to the soul, an ‘impediment’ and an ‘imperfection, constantly interrupting, disturbing, distracting and preventing us from getting a glimpse of the truth’. It enslaves us and shackles us (Plato, 1963:66, 47–50). Indeed the body is ‘the grave [tomb] of the soul’ (1963:437). Body and soul are not only separate but opposed and unequal. Plato (c. 427–348 BC) maintained this dualism in his last work, stating that ‘soul is utterly superior to body …the body is no more than a shadow which keeps us company’ (1963:1503). Only in death is ‘the soul…liberated from the desires and evils of the body’ (1963:441; emphasis added).1 The conflict between body and soul is therefore built-in, permanent and total. The logical consequence of this body-negative dualism is, Plato explained, ‘purification’ and the pursuit of philosophy, but, he explains, ‘the philosopher’s occupation consists precisely in the freeing and separation of soul from body’ (1963:50); i.e. asceticism, the way to wisdom, goodness and truth. Socrates was not afraid to die; and in rejecting his bodily life, he welcomed immortal life. Even in his death, his philosophy scandalized his contemporaries. None the less, Plato was not entirely body-negative and bodydenying. He also explained that a beautiful body is the first step on the way to Absolute Beauty and God. In The Symposium, Plato suggests that there is a scale of perfection ranging from the love of physical beauty to a love of beautiful souls up ‘the heavenly ladder’ to the love of beautiful thoughts and ideas to, finally, the love of God who is Absolute Beauty (1963:561–3; see chapter 3). Thus for Plato, the body may lead to God or away from God; the beautiful body may inspire the philosopher, or hinder, contaminate, disturb, enslave and shackle the same philosopher. 9
TH E BODY SOCIAL
Aristotle (384–322 BC), a former student of Plato’s, and a keen naturalist, was enormously interested in the body; he also promptly rejected Plato’s dualism and his body-negativism. He defined the soul as ‘the principle of life’ and described it as ‘the form of the particular living body’. There cannot be one without the other. In his treatise On the Soul, he states: ‘we can dismiss as unnecessary the question whether the soul and body are one: it is as though we were to ask whether the wax and its shape are one’ (1984:657). Hence Aristotle’s materialism. None the less, he did agree with Plato that the soul is superior to, and rules, the body, and there are elements of dualism (although without the body-negativism) in his remarks that we must take care of the body ‘for the sake of the soul’, and that ‘intellect more than anything else is man’ (1984:1989–90, 2117, 1862; his emphasis). 2 A.N.Whitehead has suggested that the history of European philosophy consists of a series of footnotes to Plato. Certainly this would seem to be correct with respect to the philosophy of the body; for-these two competing views of the body—dualist versus monist, idealist versus materialist, negative and positive—have persisted in Western philosophy. Each viewpoint has been developed, in time, to its logical extremes. The Stoics developed out of Plato’s dualism and idealism, and Christian asceticism also. Dualism influenced such diverse thinkers as Augustine and Descartes, and still characterizes contemporary bio-medicine; and materialism has persisted from hedonism and Epicureanism through Marxism to contemporary existentialism. THE ROMANS: THE BODY AS CLAY, CORRU PTION AND CORPSE
Stoicism was the dominant philosophy in the Roman Empire at the turn of the millennium and exerted a strong influence over Christian thought during its formative years. Seneca (d. 65 BC) was very clear: ‘a high-minded and sensible man divorces soul from body, and dwells much with the better or divine part, and only as far as he must with this complaining and frail portion’. And again: ‘nature has surrounded our soul with the body as its cloak’ (1953, Vol. 2:187, 455). The dualism and the superiority of the soul reflect Plato, although Seneca is not so body-negative: a cloak is not a tomb or a prison, indeed it protects from the elements; but nor is it as important as the wearer of the cloak. He advised his friend 10
BODY
in words that would not go down too well with contemporary athletes and body-builders: It is indeed foolish, my dear Lucilius, and very unsuitable for a cultivated man, to work hard over developing the muscles and broadening the shoulders and strengthening the lungs. For…you can never be a match, either in strength or in weight, for a first-class bull…whatever you do, come back soon from body to mind. (1953, Vol. 1:97–9) Epictetus (1st century) was more emphatic: both more dualistic and more negative. He says of humanity: ‘There are two elements mingled in our birth, the body which we share with the animals, and the reason and mind which we share with the gods.’ He described the body as ‘a slave to fever, gout, ophthalmia, dysentery, the tyrant, fire, sword, [and] everything stronger than itself’. He added: ‘You must treat your whole body like a poor ass, with its burden on its back, going with you just as far as it may’ (1968:11, 182, 221). And in an epigrammatic comment he states that ‘Man is a poor soul burdened with a corpse’ (Aurelius, 1964:73). Marcus Aurelius spoke in similar terms in his Meditations, describing the body as ‘but clay and corrup- tion’. He described death as ‘a release from impressions of sense, from twitchings of appetite, from excursions of thought and from service to the flesh’ (1964:55, 97). Most Romans, it may be well to remember, were not Stoic philosophers and probably did not regard their bodies as a poor ass, a little corpse, clay and corruption. Indeed many Romans, including Ptolemy and other astronomers, were firm believers in astrology, and thought of the body as cosmic.3 Also Ovid’s poems, particularly The Art of Loving, show a jaunty enjoyment of the physical body in general, and sex in particular, which perhaps began (philosophically) with the Cyrenaics, but certainly counterbalanced the Stoics. Each age seems to have a love-hate relationship with the body, from the Greeks and Romans to the Christians. THE CHRISTIANS: THE BODY AS TEMPLE OR ENEMY?
The early Christians entertained several different paradigms of the body. They distinguished between the body as physical, as spiritual and as mystical; their attitudes to the body as physical were ambiguous, however, in tension between positive and negative. At 11
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the same time, the body was a pervasive allegory of the hierarchies of society: church and family, and then state (cf. O’Neill, 1985). The Incarnation transformed the ancient philosophical debates. ‘The Word was made flesh’ (John 1:14). God became Man. Divinity was humanized, but conversely humanity, in all its fleshiness, was divinized. Christ formulated the doctrine of the mystical body in the parable of the vine and the branches: ‘I am the vine, and you are the branches’ (John 15:5). And later at the Passover meal: Jesus took a piece of bread, gave a prayer of thanks, broke it, and gave it to his disciples. ‘Take and eat it,’ he said, ‘this is my body.’ Then he took a cup, gave thanks to God, and gave it to them. ‘Drink it, all of you,’ he said, ‘this is my blood.’ (Matthew 26:26–7) This last supper is re-enacted ritually and sacramentally in the Mass and the Liturgy. The Christian therefore participates in the body of Christ, as Christ lives in the Christian. For the believer, therefore, the body participates in an order other than the purely corporeal: holy, sacramental and mystical, and also personal, loved and loving. Teilhard de Chardin (1964:125) suggests that ‘the sacramental action of Christ…sanctifies matter’. Saint Paul developed this doctrine further: Christ is like a single body, which has many parts; it is still one body, even though it is made up of different parts. In the same way, all of us, whether Jews or Gentiles, whether slaves or free, have been baptized into the one body by the same Spirit, and we have all been given the one Spirit to drink. (I Corinthians 12:12–13) He insisted: ‘You know that your bodies are parts of the body of Christ…Don’t you know that your body is the temple of the Holy Spirit, who lives in you and was given to you by God? You do not belong to yourselves but to God; He bought you for a price. So use your bodies for God’s glory’ (I Corinthians 6:15, 19–20). This view of the body as a temple, and as part of Christ, is a far cry from the Orphic view of the body as a ‘tomb’ or the Stoic belief in the body as a ‘corpse’, an ‘ass’, or ‘clay and corruption’. Saint Paul also clearly distinguished between the body as physical and as spiritual. The doctrine of the resurrection of the body had been lived by Christ in his own resurrection—‘I am the resurrection and the life’ (John 11:25)—and pre-figured in the raising of Lazarus 12
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and Jairus’ daughter from the dead. Paul explains this idea to the Corinthians as follows: This is how it will be when the dead are raised to life. When the body is buried, it is mortal; when raised it will be immortal. When buried, it is ugly and weak; when raised it will be beautiful and strong. When buried it is a physical body; when raised it will be a spiritual body. There is, of course, a physical body, so there has to be a spiritual body. (I Corinthians 15:35–6, 42–4) In Christ’s teaching, the care of the physical body figures prominently. The Lord’s Prayer, the only prayer Christ gave to his disciples, requests: ‘Give us this day our daily bread’ (Matthew 6:11). Furthermore, Christ instructed his disciples that on the last day the Son of Man will separate the sheep from the goats and he will say to the former: Come, you that are blessed by my Father! Come and possess the Kingdom which has been prepared for you ever since the creation of the world. I was hungry and you fed me, thirsty and you gave me a drink; I was a stranger and you received me in your homes, naked and you clothed me; I was sick and you took care of me, in prison and you visited me. (Matthew 25:34–6) Again, Christ’s miracles attest to the importance he attached to the body; most of them were concerned with healing people or feeding them: the curing of the leper, the healing of the paralysed man, the feeding of the five thousand, the turning of water into wine. Such attention to the body has been, and still is, taken to legitimate liberation theology. None the less, there is a balance. The body is important, but it is not everything. Christ’s teaching is uncompromising on this point: If your hand or your foot makes you lose your faith, cut it off and throw it away. It is better for you to enter life without a hand or a foot than to keep both hands and both feet and be thrown into the eternal fire. And if your eye makes you lose your faith, take it out and throw it away! It is better for you to enter life with only one eye than to keep both eyes and be thrown into the fire of hell. (Matthew 18:8–9) 13
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Origen (c. 185–254) interpreted this doctrine literally, and castrated himself rather than risk being thrown into the fires, as did others; but the practice of self-mutilation was later condemned by various Councils, and a limit was therefore set to the ascetic construction of the body as enemy. None the less, throughout his ministry Christ emphasized the necessity of self-denial, fasting, watchfulness, renunciation, poverty, and even chastity; indeed he gave up his own life for his flock. Paul, too, was very aware of the danger of the body; he described his inner conflict as follows: My inner being delights in the law of God. But I see a different law at work in my body—a law that fights against the law which my mind approves of. It makes me a prisoner to the law of sin which is at work in my body. What an unhappy man I am! Who will rescue me from this body that is taking me to my death? (Romans 7:21–4) This conflict between God and sin, mind and body, may reflect Platonist or Stoic philosophy; but his resolution of this conflict is within neither tradition. He assured the Corinthians: ‘I bruise my body and make it know its master, for fear that after preaching to others, I should find myself rejected’ (1 Corinthians 9:27). Again: ‘They that are Christ’s have crucified the flesh with the affections and lusts’ (Galatians 5:24). Finally: ‘each one of you must learn to gain mastery over his body, to hallow and honour it’ (1 Thessalonians 4:4). Paul did not equate the body with sins and evil, nor sin with the body—as the Manicheans were to do later; yet it is one of the complex aspects of Pauline teachings that the body should be bruised, but honoured; mastered, but hallowed; crucified, but glorified; it is an enemy, but also a temple and a member of Christ. This ‘double message’ in the teachings of Christ and Paul caused a split in the early church between the ascetics and the moderates: a split which has continued through the centuries, and is strikingly evident in the deep ambivalence towards the body in general and sexuality in particular.4 In the first centuries of the church, asceticism was expressed particularly in the ideals of martyrdom, virginity and celibacy, regarded as the total dedication of the self to God. When the persecutions finished, and particularly after the Peace of Constantine 14
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in 313, asceticism took new directions. Origen’s direction had been repudiated by various Councils; but many Christians ‘left the world’, i.e. society, either to live in the new monastic communities or as hermits and stylites (pillar ascetics). Anthony the Great (c. 251–356), known as the Father of Monks, initiated the movement in the Eastern church; and Simeon Stylites (c. 390– 459) was one of the first of the pillar ascetics, living on the top of a pillar for years. These ascetics developed ingenious ways to mortify themselves: Alipius spent 53 years on his pillar, then, having lost the use of his feet, lay on his side for the next 14 years. Another spent 10 years in a tub hanging in mid-air. Still another never turned his face to the West. Their sayings and deeds were collected and distributed to inspire further heroic holiness (Ward, 1975). Attitudes to the body were distinctly negative in these movements, and followed a Pauline dualism. They were perhaps not typical; certainly only a minority of Christians were martyrs, monks, celibates or stylites. But dualism was widely assumed. John Chrysostom (c. 347–407), Archbishop of Constantinople, distinguished clearly between body and soul: ‘There is soul and body: they are two substances; there is a beauty of body and there is a beauty of soul…When thou hearest the word beauty, think not of eye, or nose, or mouth or neck, but of piety, faith, love, things which are within.’ The body is relatively unimportant: ‘The man ought to be praised and admired, not for his dress…not even for his bodily form, but for his soul.’ Indeed, ‘if you consider what is stored up inside those beautiful eyes, and that straight nose, and the mouth and the cheeks, you will affirm the well-shaped body to be nothing else than a whited sepulchre’. On the other hand, Chrysostom also praised the body, ‘leading us on by its beauty to admiration of Him who framed it’ (1956:264–5, 466, 104, 413). Here he reflects Plato’s view of ‘the heavenly ladder’ of beauty in The Symposium. Augustine (354–430) clarified this Pauline dualism, emphasizing the will rather than ‘the flesh’ in the making of moral choices. Insisting that Paul used the term flesh to mean ‘human nature’ and ‘old ways’ rather than the body itself, he argued that ‘the flesh, in its own kind and order, is good’. Generally he is more positive, even enthusiastic, about the physical body: ‘The human body is a revelation of the goodness of God and of the providence of the body’s Creator.’ He praises its ‘rhythm, poise, symmetry, and beauty’ and concludes that: ‘The whole body, inside and out, 15
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can be looked upon as a kind of organ with a music all its own’ (1958:302, 508). None the less, the soul remains superior to the body. Basil the Great (c. 329–79), founder of Eastern monasticism, is very clear on this: The soul is as far superior to the body as heaven is above the earth and heavenly things above those of earth’ (1970:28). In the second millennium of Christianity, asceticism took new directions again. First, there was the founding of the great monastic orders of the West. The Benedictines had already been founded (c. 529), but the Carthusians (1084), Cistercians (1098), Franciscans (1209) and the Dominicans (1216) were founded in swift succession. All the members of these orders took vows of poverty, chastity and obedience, and some, in the contemplative orders, took vows of silence. In this sense asceticism was institutionalized. The second change in asceticism, concomitant with the growing devotion to the humanity of Christ, especially in his Passion, was a new type of practice: the deliberate infliction of pain. Hitherto asceticism had involved, generally, the acceptance of physical sufferings imposed by others (e.g. the persecutions) or asceticism by omission (e.g. denying the physical needs of the body, for sleep, sex, talk, etc.); the new asceticism demanded self-denial and pain by commission. The reasons, however, remained the same: the expiation of sin, self-conquest, the intercession for divine graces and favours, and the imitation of Christ. All these are logical consequences of the belief in both the evil of the body in a dualistic philosophy, and the holiness of the physical body in the Mystical Body of Christ. Francis of Assisi (c. 1182–1226) was very straightforward in one of his letters: ‘We must hate our bodies with [their] vices and sins.’ His biographer states: ‘He used to call his body Brother Ass for he felt it should be subjected to heavy labour, beaten frequently with whips, and fed with the poorest food’ (Bonaventure, 1978:70, 222). He practised what he preached. Brother Giles, one of his first followers, was equally emphatic: ‘Our flesh is like a hog that runs eagerly into the mud and enjoys being in the mud’ (Brown, 1958:273). Many Christians felt as he did. After various outbreaks of the plague in the twelfth century arose the Flagellants: groups of Christians who practised public flagellation as a penance. The practice was prohibited by various popes, but revived particularly during the Black Death (1346–9) and continued sporadically into the 16
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fifteenth century. The practice is particularly significant as demonstrating the close spiritual relation between the physical body and the body politic, in the public realm. Health and happiness on this earth are perceived not only as individual matters within Divine Providence, but also as social and corporate. Not only can Christians reach God directly through pain-infliction, and save their own souls, but they can also save others. The body mediates.5 A certain distrust rather than hatred, of the body is evident in the medieval lyric poem Piers the Ploughman by William Langland (c. 1332–c. 1399); a lovely lady representing Holy Church explains a dream Piers has had, but warns him: Put no trust in your body, for its promptings come from the World, and the World is a liar out to betray you. And the flesh and the devil are in league to pursue your soul, and speak evil things to your heart (1959:71) In Thomas Aquinas (1225–74), however, the leading theologian of the age, there is no such hatred or distrust of the body. He rejected both Plato’s dualism and Aristotle’s materialism, and developed a new synthesis: asserting the unity of body and soul, matter and form (the theory of hylomorphism, taken from Aristotle), as well as the immortality of the soul (from Plato), and the resurrection of the body. He insisted: ‘my soul is not I; and if only souls are saved, I am not saved, nor is any man’ (Spicker, 1970:10). The body therefore has intrinsic moral value; he insisted that ‘divine goodness is the good of everything corporeal’ (Aquinas, Summa Theologiae 1:65, 3; 1981, vol. 10:13). Thus the body in scholastic philosophy is neither tomb, nor prison, nor enemy. His fellow Dominican Meister Eckhart (c. 1260–c. 1328) was less enthusiastic about things corporeal, however, stating firmly: ‘There is no physical or fleshly pleasure without some spiritual harm’ (Davis, 1976:35). The ascetic tradition was reinforced by Thomas à Kempis (1380– 1471), whose spiritual classic, The Imitation of Christ, was enormously influential, and indeed still is. He echoed Plato and Saint Paul when he advised that: to eat and drink, to wake and sleep, to rest and labour, and to be subject to all the necessities of nature is a great trouble and affliction to the devout man, who would rather be released
17
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and set free from all sin…The inner life of man is greatly hindered in this life by the needs of the body. (1952:55) Not all the medievals lived such ascetic lives, however, nor held such ascetic views. The troubadours indeed praised a secular love; and The Art of Courtly Love, written in the late twelfth century, described the service of the King and Queen of Love, and the virtue of ‘the work of Venus’ (Capellanus, 1959). The rules of love were enumerated, parodying the Ten Commandments, and capsizing Christian morality. Indeed the title, and the text, were strongly influenced by Ovid’s The Art of Love. Similarly the stories of Boccaccio (1313–75) in Decameron and Chaucer (c. 1340–1400) in The Canterbury Tales show men and women thoroughly enjoying each other’s bodies. This frank admission of sensuality ran counter to the Christian tradition. Nature, i.e. Love, was opposed to reason, law and morality, in this view; and Chaucer’s nun epitomized the contradiction with her enigmatic legend ‘Amor vincit omnia’. Both Boccaccio and Machiavelli reversed the Christian tradition in their assertion of the primacy of new values: sexual love and political power. The body was more lusted after than distrusted. Attitudes towards the body varied considerably during the Middle Ages, and so did the treatment of the body, but the ascetics were presumably a minority. Indeed, popular attitudes towards the body may well have been precisely the opposite of what the ascetics and religious described. THE RENAISSANCE: THE BODY AS SECULAR AND PRIVATE
The Renaissance, beginning in Italy in the fourteenth century, rediscovered the body, and transformed attitudes towards it. Artists like Botticelli, Leonardo da Vinci, Michelangelo, Raphael and Titian painted the body as beautiful and in glowing colours. Cellini gave new poise to sculpture. Philosophers like Castiglione (1517/1983:330– 2) praised beauty as a ‘sacred thing’ and ‘a true sign of inner goodness’; ‘the good and the beautiful are identical, especially in the human body’. This integration of body and soul, and physical and moral beauty, would have upset John Chrysostom and others; clearly beauty was being appreciated for its own, purely secular sake, not simply as a rung on the ladder to God. The secularization of the body is indicated by Erasmus’s (1530/ 1985) treatise De civilitate morum puerilium. He discussed the social 18
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control of such bodily functions as eating and drinking, spitting, blowing the nose and so on, far more frankly than they are discussed in contemporary etiquette books. Elias (1982) has shown that as standards of refinement rose, so more and more areas of ‘instinctive’ or ‘natural’ behaviour came to be judged as indelicate and unmannerly. New notions of civility began to privatize the body. Increasingly people distanced themselves from bodily functions and indeed from the body itself, both their own and other people’s, not only ideologically but also with implements of various sorts: table cutlery, handkerchiefs, commodes, nightwear, spittoons, etc. Little had been hidden in the past, or could be hidden. Now a ‘conspiracy of silence’ begins to descend upon sexual matters, and what might be called a ‘conspiracy of invisibility’ descends upon the ‘private’ parts of the body. Elias attributed these changes in the discourse on, and the living of, the body to the rise of individualism at the Renaissance and, more specifically, to the breakdown of group identities in feudalism and in the church. Increasing social and geographical mobility and technological change facilitated the development of an egocentric universe. Other factors would later accelerate this process, notably the rise of Calvinism and Puritanism, urbanization, industrialization, and the privatization of the family; but increasingly after the Renaissance everyone is an island—which is what Descartes implied and Donne protested against. Indeed only 100 years after Erasmus’s book, the new realities of the individual as alone (divided from others), secular (divided from God) and dual (internally divided) are succinctly expressed in the Cartesian ‘Cogito, ergo sum’. The Renaissance therefore witnessed the beginning of the end of the ascetic idea of the body as enemy, and the strengthening of the idea of the body as beautiful, good, personal and private. This movement should not be over-emphasized, however. For the leper— and leprosy was endemic in Europe in the early Middle Ages—the disfigured body was a public symbol of sin, and was a visitation from God. Thus the body remained an instrument of God’s will, public or private, beautiful or leprous, friend or enemy. The Renaissance did not displace traditional ascetic ideas totally. Teresa of Avila (1515–82), echoed Paul, Francis and Thomas à Kempis when she advised the sisters of her order: The first thing we have to do, and that at once, is to rid ourselves of love for this body of ours…[By] the grace of the 19
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Lord we shall gain dominion over the body. To conquer such an enemy is a great achievement in the battle of life. (1964:90, 97; emphasis added) The theme is Pauline. Having conquered the body by exterior (bodily) mortification, the sisters were expected to subdue the will by interior mortification. This required going against one’s ‘natural’ emotional desires and needs; in Ignatius Loyola’s phrase: ‘agere contra’. This is necessary for the ‘overcoming of self’. Some examples of such ascetic behaviour: Margaret-Mary Alacoque (1647–90) filled her mouth with the diarrhoea of a sick man, and she cleaned up the vomit of another with her tongue; Angela of Fuligno described how she drank the dirty water with which she had just been washing the hands and feet of lepers: The beverage flooded us with such sweetness that the joy followed us home. Never had I drunk with such pleasure. In my throat was lodged a piece of scaly skin from the lepers’ sores. Instead of getting rid of it, I made a great effort to swallow it and I succeeded. I shall never be able to express the delight that inundated me. (In Beauvoir, 1953:676) This may seem gross, disgusting, masochistic and neurotic to some; to others it has seemed the peak of holy asceticism. Ignatius Loyola (1491–1536), the founder of the Society of Jesus, emphasized in his Spiritual Exercises that ‘we need to train ourselves to be impartial in our attitudes towards all created reality’, including the body; this is a typically Stoic idea, in a different context. And he gave clear instructions on penance, recommending that the retreatant cut down on food and sleep, and ‘chastise the body by inflicting actual pain on it. This is done by wearing hairshirts or cords or iron chains, by scourging or beating ourselves and by other kinds of harsh treatments’ (1963:22, 39–40). Contemporary Jesuits, and no doubt members of other religious orders, still practise the traditional ‘mortification of the flesh’ as Ignatius had recommended. For Ignatius, as for Paul, salvation is achieved, at least in part, by conquest of the body; for Augustine it was more a matter of the will. Loyola’s contemporary, Martin Luther (1483–1546), had a very different attitude towards the body. He enjoyed his food and drink and once remarked: ‘If our Lord is permitted to create nice, large 20
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pike and good Rhine wine, presumably I may be allowed to eat and drink’ (Friedenthal, 1970:445). And he argued persistently against the traditional clerical views of celibacy, and praised marriage. Rabelais (1494–1553) was also a contemporary of both Loyola and Luther, with very different ideas about the body. The ‘grotesque body’ which he described in Gargantua and Pantagruel is the body of the medieval folk-culture, carnivals, Hallowe’ens, comedy and satire. Bakhtin (1968:319) notes: The body that figures in all the expressions of the unofficial speech of the people is the body that fecundates and is fecundated, that gives birth and is born, devours and is devoured, drinks, defecates, is sick and dying. In all languages there is a great number of expressions related to the genital organs, the anus and buttocks, the belly, the mouth and nose. But there are few expressions for the other parts of the body: arms and legs, face, and eyes. Boccaccio had described the ribald, fun, wild, uncivilized body before him, and Shakespeare and Cervantes would do so later; but Rabelais was hyper-realistic. ‘The essential principle of grotesque realism’, says Bakhtin (1968:19–20), ‘is degradation, that is, the lowering of all that is high, spiritual, ideal, abstract; it is a transfer to the material level, to the sphere of earth and body in literature.’ At the time, therefore, the grotesque body was (and indeed still is) the exact reversal of the ‘ascetic body’ of Loyola, the ‘body beautiful’ of Castiglione, and the private and secular and civilized body of the high Renaissance. The Christian body of the Renaissance and the Reformation is therefore fluid and multiple. Since Vatican II, however, modern Christians have constructed a gentler and friendlier body. A Franciscan work on spirituality advises that: The modern mortification is to start taking care of our health once more out of reverence for who we are: temples of the Spirit of God…Our mortification…does not involve punishing the body, or depriving ourselves of food and drink. It involves the dull task of eating and drinking what is healthy and lifegiving; it involves the decision to stop killing ourselves and to start loving ourselves. And moderation is the key. (Bodo, 1984:133–4) 21
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Modern theologians increasingly stress that the body is not an ‘enemy’, nor a ‘poor ass’. Thomas Merton states: ‘What is important is not liberation from the body but liberation from the mind. We are not entangled in our own body but entangled in our own mind’ (1973:90). This seems, on the face of it, to be a complete reversal of the attitudes of some of the Desert Fathers and Doctors of the Church. Indeed contemporary theologians are far more positive about the body: The Christian’s body is a redeemed body. It has been transferred to another master; it has passed from evil to good, it has returned to God’s ownership, it is no longer profane but sacred, and this change of ownership is precisely a consecration. (Mouroux, 1961:62) None the less, asceticism is not dead. Warriors, athletes, dancers, weight-lifters and others still train; and their slogan, ‘No pain, no gain’, expresses a secular asceticism. Where Christians trained to save their souls, others now train to improve their bodies. And the modern body has now come full circle back to the ancient Greek ideal of the beautiful body, an ideal symbolized by the re-opening of the Olympic Games in 1896. DESCARTES TO THE MODERNS: THE BODY AS MACHINE
René Descartes (1596–1650) has often been described as the founder of modern philosophy, and Cartesianism, specifically mechanism, has been the philosophy which has underpinned the achievements of modern science. In his Discourse on Method (1637) he formulated the first principle of his philosophy: ‘Cogito, ergo sum’—I think, therefore I am; and he went on to say that ‘this “I”, that is to say, the mind, by which I am what I am, is entirely distinct from the body’ (1968:53–4). And what was this body? Descartes replied: ‘I considered myself, firstly, as having a face, hands, arms, and the whole machine made up of flesh and bones, such as it appears in a corpse and which I designated by the name of body’. He also compared the body to a clock, which works without a mind (1968:104, 163; cf. 1972:1–5). Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) agreed with Descartes on this, and in Leviathan (1651) he asks: ‘What is the heart, but a spring; and 22
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the nerves but so many strings; and the joints but so many wheels, giving motion to the whole body, such as was intended by the artificer?’ (1960:5). It is ironic that Hobbes, and others, used the inorganic metaphor of machines to explain the body, and the organic metaphor of the body to explain politics. Descartes had suggested that ‘the rules of mechanics’ are ‘the rules of nature’ (1968:72); and many agreed, including Giorgio Baglivi (1668–1706), Professor of Anatomy at Rome: Whoever examines the bodily organism with attention will certainly not fail to discern pincers in the jaws and teeth; a container in the stomach; watermains in the veins, the arteries and other ducts; a piston in the heart; sieves or filters in the bowels; in the lungs, bellows; in the muscles, the force of the lever; in the corner of the eye, a pulley, and so on. (Moravia, 1978:48) One point should be clarified, however; very few people regarded the self as only a machine. Both Descartes and Hobbes tried to explain that people were not merely machines, although animals were. Descartes (1968:74–6) said it was because animals do not and machines cannot conduct conversations, or reason; Hobbes (1960:13, 69) argued from reason also, and from religion. Bishop Butler (1950:9) announced in one of his sermons in 1726 that ‘A machine is inanimate and passive, but we are agents.’ And others argued that mechanism could not explain life, energy, growth and movement (Moravia, 1978). Descartes’ division of homo sapiens into soul and body effectively allocated the soul to the church and the body to science in a clear ‘separation of powers’. The division within the self coincided with and reflected the division within society. One of the first to attack Descartes was Benedict Spinoza, who flatly denied the Cartesian premise. ‘Descartes starts from mind,’ he wrote to Liebniz, ‘I start from God’ (1959:v). And he began his most famous work, Ethics (1677), published after his death, with the first chapter on God. ‘Whatever is, is in God, and nothing can exist or be conceived without God’ (Pt 1, 15; 1959:11). Furthermore, ‘man consists of mind and body’, and ‘the human mind is united to the body’ (Pt 2, 13; 1959:47); but neither is subordinate to the other, they are merely two facets of the one reality of God. Indeed, mind and body are not separate, as Descartes had insisted; Spinoza argues that: ‘the order and connection of ideas 23
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is the same as the order and connection of things’ (Pt 2, 7; 1959:41). Yet while Spinoza’s theory of hylozoism did avoid the Cartesian problem of the interaction of the mind and the body, his philosophy did not convince his contemporaries. The French philosopher La Mettrie also rejected Cartesian dualism, but from a materialist, not a spiritualist, perspective. In his L’Homme Machine (1748), he argued that Man is a machine, just like any other animal. ‘The human body is a watch,’ he said, ‘a machine which winds its own springs’, and he described the alleged soul as a ‘chimera’, an ‘empty word’ (1961:141–2, 93, 128). During the nineteenth century, the philosophy and science of the body were in a ferment; and major contributions to the discussions were made by Feuerbach, Marx, Darwin, Nietzsche and Freud in their different fields. Ludwig Feuerbach interrupted these debates about body and mind, machines and souls, and insisted on the material base of humanity: ‘The individual is an individual only in this, his corporeal life’ (1980:87). He rejected the Christian notion of immortality, ‘the belief that splits humans into an otherworldly, inconceivable, shapeless soul, which is hostile to both form and nature, and into a crude spiritless body, which is hostile to the soul’ (1980:7). Yet Feuerbach remained a philosopher, rather than an activist, and for all his interest in the body and the senses (chapter 5), he did not investigate corporeal life in practice. Marx did, and so did Engels (see chapters 5 and 9), and they both researched the destruction, mechanization and animalization of the bodies of the workers. Not only are human and animal labour interchangeable, as Marx noted in Capital. Vol. 1 (1867) but the worker ‘becomes an appendage of the machine’ in a sense never intended by Descartes (Marx and Engels, 1967:87). ‘Since the worker has sunk to the level of a machine, he can be confronted by the machine as a competitor.’ And ‘the inevitable result for the worker is overwork and premature death’ (Marx, 1964:69, 68). Bodies are disposable assets. Charles Darwin, born 100 years after La Mettrie, was also concerned about humans as animals, but from a biological rather than a social perspective. In the concluding chapter of The Descent of Man. Vol. 2 (1871) Darwin stated bluntly that: ‘man is descended from a hairy quadruped, furnished with a tail and pointed ears, probably arboreal in its habits, and an inhabitant of the Old World’ (1981:389). Darwin delightedly informed a friend: ‘Our ancestor was an animal who breathed water, had a swim bladder, a great 24
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swimming tail, an imperfect skull, and undoubtedly was an hermaphrodite! Here is a pleasant genealogy for mankind’ (1887, vol. 2:266). Humans, therefore, are not only animals bodily evolved from other animals, but their/our bodies are still evolving. Darwin had very effectively capsized Victorian values, for now mind was dependent on body, as with other animals, and humans were not ‘lords of creation’ over animals but descended from these animals, and bearing their animal origins in their bodies for all to see. The ancient dichotomies of mind/body, human/animal, superior/inferior, asserted from Plato to Descartes, were here not only denied, but in some senses reversed. Where Marx had described the progressive reduction of the worker to animal to body and finally to machine, his contemporary, Walt Whitman, born in the same year, rhapsodized in ‘Starting from Paumanok’ about the human body as including the soul and indeed as divine: Behold, the body includes and is the meaning, the main concern, and includes and is the soul; Whoever you are, how superb and divine is your body, or any part of it. Another of his poems is entitled ‘I Sing the Body Electric’: a sizzling break with the Orphic-Stoic-Pauline-ascetic tradition. Friedrich Nietzsche also sang the body, in his own way, and rejected Christianity and the ideology of the body which he identified with Christianity, namely asceticism and negativism. In Thus Spake Zarathustra (1883), he takes to task these ‘despisers of the body’. He himself praised the body: ‘Behind your thoughts and feelings, my brother, stands a mighty commander, an unknown sage—he is called Self. He lives in your body, he is your body.’ In this removal of the self from the brain and from ‘thoughts and feelings’ and in the location and identification of the Self in and with the body, Nietzsche anticipated Sartre. He added: ‘There is more reason in your body than in your best wisdom’ (1969:62); this sentence not only reflects one of Pascal’s more well-known aphorisms, but it also reverses the traditional definition of the superiority of the mind over the body. Reason is now defined as pertaining more to the body than to the mind, perhaps in the sense of instinct and intuition; thus the distinctive feature of homo sapiens is no longer mind but body. Meanwhile Sigmund Freud demonstrated in his Studies on Hysteria (1895), with Breuer, that psychological phenomena can be converted 25
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into physical phenomena, and that hysterical symptoms are psychogenic. Thus body and mind are one. In his first case history ‘Dora’ (1905), he asserted that the symptoms of hysteria are both psychical and somatic in origin. Once the psychic material is analysed, the somatic symptoms disappear (1977b:73). Freud’s theory of ‘conversion’, as he called it, from mind to body seemed to be validated by the success of his therapy; but his theory also seemed to call into question traditional Cartesian dualism, and the separation of mind and body. Indeed, he was a pioneer of psycho-somatic ‘medicine’. Simultaneously, developments in medicine also initiated a reconstruction of the body. Vaccinations had been developed by Jenner in 1795 and had proved to be so effective in combating smallpox that in 1853 Parliament passed legislation making smallpox vaccinations compulsory for all children. The body politic had increased its power over the body physical. The individual body therefore now became, to a degree, state property. The year 1853 therefore marks a turning-point in the political anatomy of the body in England: i.e. in the relation between the body physical and the body politic. During the previous decades the state had slowly expanded its authority and powers over more and more sectors of the population, both public and private. Parliament had introduced legislation affecting mine and factory owners which governed the hours and conditions of labour; parish and town councils were instructed about sewage disposal, garbage tips and cemeteries; the quality of food and water became matters of law; and the reformers insisted on the close relation between the environment and health, and between the health of the population and the health of the state (Porter, 1987:55–8). ‘Filth, misery, vice, and crime are inseparably connected’, wrote one reformer in 1851 (Williams, 1965:202). The elimination of the two physical ills would, it was thought, eliminate the two moral and political ills. Physiology, politics and morality are all one. The body was therefore the last bastion to fall before the new, modern, intrusive government. There were precedents for this conquest, however. The state had always exercised the right to take away life, to inflict pain, to remove parts of the body, to tattoo or brand the body; to quarantine individuals, houses, ships and even towns in times of plague; to imprison people or banish them; and both church and state had traditionally forbidden many physical activities, as in matters of sexual intercourse, masturbation, self26
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mutilation, abortion and suicide (see Foucault, 1979). The body had never been entirely private or autonomous; it had always been under some surveillance and some control; but such control had been individual, specific and localized in time and space. The 1853 legislation was qualitatively and quantitatively different precisely because it had universal and compulsory applicability and was prescriptive for the future. Furthermore, it was legitimized by the Utilitarian doctrine of ‘the greatest good’. Also, it was the thin edge of the wedge. The Contagious Diseases Act (1866) required the compulsory examination of prostitutes, and the Vaccination Act (1871) extended the duty of vaccination to the entire population (Porter, 1987). With this new legislation, the instruments of the state now injected directly into the bloodstream of every citizen. THE TWENTIETH CENTURY: THE MECHANICAL BODY
The death of Queen Victoria (1901) ended an era. The new century introduced King Edward VII and his numerous liaisons, the Castles and the Gibson girls, Isadora Duncan and the Ballet Russe, Picasso’s blue period, the tango, a cure for syphilis (1910), Sons and Lovers (1913), the Jim Crow laws in the Southern United States, Boas’ attacks on biological determinism, and demonstrations for women’s rights. Constructions of the body, particularly in the matters of morality and gender and race, were in flux. Old certainties and meanings were no longer secure. After the war came the ‘Roaring Twenties’, with jazz and the blues, the flappers, nudism and sunbathing, Josephine Baker in Paris and the ‘Ziegfield Follies’, the ‘Miss America’ Contest (1921), latex condoms and Charles Atlas (1922); Johnny Weismuller, winner of Olympic honours in 1924, became a Hollywood Tarzan in 1930, and women won the right to vote in the United States, the United Kingdom and Canada. Havelock Ellis (1897–1929) finished his sevenvolume Studies in the Psychology of Sex (1919/1928), and Bronislaw Malinowski wrote two books, startling at the time, on the anthropology of sex; both authors had been deeply influenced by Freud. At the same time Hollywood was packaging beautiful women and handsome men for mass visual consumption. The body beautiful was being institutionalized; and both the meaning and the reality of the body were changing. 27
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Co-existing with the new body-positive constructions of the body, mechanism remained the dominant paradigm in biomedicine. Indeed the rapid advances in medical science and practice confirmed the utility of the scientific perspective. The principal killers of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries—smallpox, typhoid and cholera—had been largely eliminated by social reforms, and improved standards of living. But two initiatives, the ‘cell’ theory of Rudolf Virchow and the ‘germ’ theory of Louis Pasteur, transformed medicine from an art into a science. The development of vaccines, anaesthetics, sterilization, the sulfa drugs and antibiotics contributed also to further lowering the death-rates. The body, therefore, became not ‘something’ to be feared, potentially dangerous, to be watched all the time, but something to be enjoyed; it can even be abused, and then ‘cured’ by a ‘magic bullet’. These medical advances have contributed to more relaxed and positive attitudes towards the body. They have also accelerated the trend from sacred to profane attitudes: the magic bullets work better and quicker than prayer. Cartesian mechanism persisted in psychology as in biology. John B.Watson, the founder of Behaviourism in 1924, asserted that ‘the human body…is not a treasure house of mystery but a very commonsense kind of organic machine’ (1966:49). Indeed Watson dismissed dualism, and dismissed the soul: ‘No one has ever touched a soul, or seen one in a test tube, or has in any way come into relationship with it as he has with other objects of his daily experience’ (1966:3). The positivist philosophers had ‘dismissed’ the soul some years before; A.J.Ayer by his principle of verifiability, and Bertrand Russell by his materialism. Thus by the early twentieth century, biology, medicine, psychology and philosophy were largely agreed in their materialism: the body is all. This mechanistic construction of the body was congruent with the mechanization of society. The first Model T Fords were produced in 1908; and the automobile transformed thinking about the body. Watson indeed referred to the individual as a body, the body as a machine, and the machine as a car: Let us try to think of man as an assembled organic machine ready to run. We mean nothing very difficult by this. Take four wheels with tires, axles, differentials, gas engine, body; put them together and we have an automobile of a sort. (1966:269) 28
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This threefold reduction, man to body to machine to car, however, lost the ‘organic’ in the process. Mechanism became so powerful a philosophy that it was applied not only to the body but also to children and industrial workers. A popular work on child-care published in the United States in 1921 advised: It is quite possible to train the baby to be an efficient little machine, and the more nearly perfect we make the running of this machine, the more wonderful will be the results achieved and the less trouble it will be for the mother. (In Synnott, 1983:87; emphasis added) This was entirely congruent with the view of the worker as machine developed by Frederick Taylor, founder of the ‘scientific management’ school and of the time-and-motion study. Workers become part of the machinery of production, cogs in the wheel, numbers and units of production, scientifically studied and managed. Charlie Chaplin caricatured this reality in Modern Times. Ultimately Taylorism generated the ‘human relations’ school of Elton Mayo and others, but the contrasting orientations to workers are still reflected in corporate structures. Corporations have production departments to harness men and machines, and personnel departments to ‘unharness’ them, i.e. to inhibit or ameliorate the negative consequences of the mechanization of workers. B.F.Skinner later summarized the Behaviourist position on the body concisely, in terms that reflect existentialist philosophy: ‘The picture which emerges from a scientific analysis is not of a body with a person inside, but of a body which is a person’ (1971:199). Buckminster Fuller’s magnificent description of the body-machine in 1938 indicates the rapid pace of technological change: A self balancing, 28-jointed adapter-based biped; an electrochemical reduction plant, with segregated stowages of special energy extract in storage batteries for…thousands of hydraulic and pneumatic pumps with motors attached; 62,000 miles of capillaries…the whole extraordinary complex mechanism guided with exquisite precision from a turret in which are located telescopic and microscopic self-registering and recording range finders, a spectroscope, etc., the turret control being closely allied with an air conditioning intakeand-exhaust, a main fuel intake [etc.]. (Barnard, 1981:8) 29
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On a practical level, as Dr Jonathan Miller (1980) has noted, each new advance in science and technology has contributed to advances in medical science. This, however, has tended to reinforce the mechanistic, dualistic and reductionist constructions of the body. Even Dr. Christiaan Barnard, pioneer of the heart transplant, adopts a mechanistic perspective in his book entitled, typically, The Body Machine (1981). The book has chapters on the different ‘systems’ (reproductive, nervous, endocrine, immune, respiratory, digestive and renal) with one chapter on ‘The Chassis’, and sections entitled ‘On the Road’, ‘Body Maintenance’ and ‘In the Workshop’. Evidently how we perceive the body is a function of our level of technology; but it is also a function of how we value technology: there are, as we have seen, other values. Certainly the value of the automobile is reflected in a recent letter: My model is a 1924, and it has had the necessary periodontal work; the varicose veins have been stripped; the windshields have been replaced with bifocal models and upgraded. The paint is still the original, but the soft top has thinned, revealing the excellent hard top below. I don’t race in the Indy, but I don’t ride in the slow lane either.6 (New York Times Magazine, 19.2.84:94) Not only are physical problems seen in mechanistic terms, so also are psychological problems. The poet Robert Lowell described his manic depression as ‘some flaw in the machine’ (Time 8.10.84). The logical consequence of this instrumental view of the body as machine is the comparison of the efficiency of the human machine with other machines; and a recent study reports that: The average human body is between 16 and 27% efficient— which compares badly with several products of the human mind. But by regular exercise the body’s efficiency can be raised to 56%, which is better than many machines. (Diagram Group, 1980:183) 7 Normally, an electric motor is extremely efficient at 80%; far more efficient than even the fittest human machine; steam turbines and petrol motors are also normally more efficient, but steam engines are less efficient.
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NAZISM: THE ARYAN BODY
If mechanism has been the dominant medical paradigm of the body, the dominant political paradigm was Nazism. Having combined Darwin and Nietzsche in a strange stew of Social Darwinism and Superman, Hitler had convinced himself and others of the biological, cultural and spiritual superiority of the blond Aryan Master Race. This politicization of the body was not new; indeed it had been institutionalized previously in slavery and colonialism, sexism and racism. Nazism was simply the latest ideology of the body, an ideology based on blood as well as colour. Blood has a long history in somatology. For the Greeks, blood determined temperament: hot-blooded and cold-blooded. By the nineteenth century blood also described class. British aristocrats were ‘blue-blooded’ as distinct from the rest of us ‘red-blooded’ peasants. This dichotomy may have reference to the aristocratic propensity for being true-blue Tories, or more likely to the blue of the veins, standing out starkly against the milk-white of their delicate hands, in contrast to the scarred, tanned and dirty hands of the commoners. None the less, the term suggests a biological distinction between ‘the two nations’, as Disraeli described the nineteenth-century British class structure. Blood, or the ideology of blood, also differentiated the American race structure. Georgia defined a White: ‘White persons are only persons of the white or Caucasian race who have no ascertainable trace of either negro, African, West Indian, Mongolian, Japanese or Chinese blood in their veins’. Similarly, Alabama defined a Black as ‘any person who has in his or her veins any negro blood whatsoever’ (Montagu, 1965:421). One drop, a trace, defines the social reality. The ideology of blood is therefore linked to the politics and economics of class and race; and in the twentieth century was most clearly articulated by Hitler, and institutionalized in the concentration camps. In Mein Kampf (1924), Hitler wrote his autobiography and his political platform, beginning with his belief in the supremacy of the Aryan race: ‘he represents the archetype of what we understand by the term: MAN. He is the Prometheus of mankind, from whose shining brow the divine spark has at all times flashed forth’ (1942:164). Blood constitutes the state: ‘The state is a racial organism, and not an economic organization’ (1942:93). This one Volk, one
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Reich, one blood must fulfil its biological and sacred duty, which is world conquest, and is historically inevitable. The only threat to this future, in Hitler’s view, was miscegenation. History proves this: ‘All the great civilizations of the past became decadent because the originally creative race died out, as a result of contamination of the blood.’ Hitler returned to this theme again: ‘The adulteration of the blood and racial deterioration conditioned [by racial mixing] are the only causes that account for the decline of ancient civilizations’ (1942:163, 167). ‘The sin against blood and race is the hereditary sin in this world’ (1942:142). This ideology of blood-purity spilled rivers of blood, with about 40 million dead, and many nations ruined, including Germany. Ultimately Nazism was countered, not so much by another ideology as by the very violence which Hitler had lauded as ‘the will of Nature’ (1942:161) and by, in Churchill’s immortal words, ‘blood, toil, tears and sweat’. Where Hitler had seen the body as the basis of the state, Sartre described the body as the self; for one, the body is a political tool, for the other it is life. EXISTENTIALISM: THE BODY AS SELF
Tombs and temples, clocks and cars—all these metaphors imply a distance between the body and the self. In Being and Nothingness (1943), however, Sartre insisted that the body is the self, and that the self is the body: ‘I live my body…The body is what I immediately am …I am my body to the extent that I am’ (Sartre, 1966:428– 60). Sartre’s monism contrasts sharply with Descartes’s dualism; furthermore his materialism capsizes Cartesian idealism, for where Descartes had referred to ‘the mind, by which I am what I am’ (1971:54), Sartre insisted that the ‘body is what I immediately am’. The new philosophies of the body developed by Nietzsche and Sartre were major reconstructions: from self as mind to self as body; from body as enemy or as ‘despised’ to body as self; from mind as spiritual to mind as material. Mind and body have changed places in the popular scale of values. None the less traditional Christian values still do persist; and not everyone subscribes to the new materialist existentialism.8 Furthermore, those with stigmatized bodies, to borrow Goffman’s phrase, are fully aware that the body is political, central to personal identity and life chances. People judged by their 32
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bodies do not take them for granted, and may love or hate their bodies—not for philosophical but for political and very practical reasons, whether they are judged by their physical handicaps, age, colour, gender, or aesthetics (Goffman, 1963; Murphy, 1987). Malcolm X explained: [The Whites] very skilfully make you and me hate our African identity, our African characteristics. You know yourself that we have been a people who hated our African characteristics. We hated our heads, we hated the shape of our nose, we wanted one of those long dog-like noses, you know; we hated the color of our skin, hated the blood of Africa that was in our veins. And in hating our features and our skin and our blood, why, we ended up hating ourselves. And we hated ourselves. (1966:169) This body hatred and self-hatred began to end, said Malcolm X, with African nationalism and independence movements, and Black nationalism in the United States, and culminated in the new pride in ‘Black is Beautiful’. Blacks blame Whites, and women blame men. Germaine Greer points out that women are ‘brain washed about the physical image they should have’. She insists that: The universal sway of the feminine stereotype is the single most important factor in male and female woman-hatred… Women are reputed never to be disgusted. The sad fact is that they often are, but not with men: following the lead of men, they are often most disgusted with themselves. (1971:261–2) Attitudes to the body, individual and collective, persist even after death; and indicate how powerful these attitudes are. In every culture, the dead body is treated with respect and with ceremony; and the body remains the symbol of the self. Indeed people have rights in their bodies after death (Feinberg, 1985). Medical students are particularly traumatized when they first have to dissect cadavers: this becomes a rite of passage into the profession (Lella and Pawluch, 1988). Perhaps the Irish essayist Robert Lynd best illustrated the close connections between the body and the self: ‘I know a man who said that he would hate to be buried in a certain graveyard 33
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because it was “very damp”. But then he was subject to rheumatism’ (1951:258). RECENT PARADIGMS: THE BODY AS PLASTIC, BIONIC, HOLISTIC…
Political and philosophical constructions of the body co-exist with scientific constructions, and recent advances in medical science have reinforced mechanistic and materialist constructions of the body. Plastic and Reconstructive Surgery is one of the fastest growing specialties in medicine in the United States, with over two million operations performed annually. The body is no longer ‘given’ (meaning, traditionally, a gift of God); it is plastic, to be moulded and selected at need or whim. For mechanists, no problem; but Christian fundamentalists argue that such surgery desecrates the temple of the Holy Spirit: a clash of constructions. The body is not only plastic, it is also bionic, with cardiac pace-makers, valves, titanium hips, polymer blood vessels, electronic eye and ear implants, collagen fibre and silicon rubber skins, and even polyurethane hearts. Furthermore, we are increasingly dependent upon machines: diagnostic machines of various sorts, CAT scans, heart monitors, ultra-sound; and even for our lives: incubators soon after birth, dialysis machines and iron lungs, and respirators and life-support systems towards the end. Finally, the humans/ machines may be ‘unplugged’ or ‘switched off’. The line between human and machine is blurred, so is the fine line between life and death. The braindead can be kept ‘alive’. The body is also communal and interchangeable in its parts. Hearts, livers, pancreas, kidneys, corneas and bone marrows are all transplanted, alone or in various combinations. Xenografts, or transplants between different species, are routine. Baby Fae lived for 20 days with the heart of a baboon. The mechanistic implications are clear: just as cars are cannibalized for spare parts, so now humans and animals are also being ‘cannibalized’. The ethical implications are not so clear. Recently in the United States a baby was conceived solely to be the purveyor of bone marrow to her big sister, afflicted with chronic leukaemia: a ‘biological re-supply vehicle’. A Time poll asked if this was morally acceptable: 47 per cent of Americans said yes; 37 per cent said no (Time, 17.6.91). 9 Increasingly the body is engineered. The first trials in gene therapy in humans have already been launched in the United States; and 34
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as the genetic code is further deciphered the health benefits for those suffering, or potentially suffering, from the 3,000 or so diseases with a genetic base are obviously high. Again, however, is the body just a machine? Ethicists have raised concerns about ‘designer babies’, made to order; about the dangers of tinkering with the reproductive or germ-line cells and human cloning—mice and cows have already been cloned; and about the dangers of invasion of privacy from genetic testing, and the creation of a genetic ‘under-class’ of ‘inferior’ humans. The body may also be chosen, selected from a wide range of possibilities in sperm and ovum bank catalogues. The new reproductive technologies, including in vitro fertilization, artificial insemination, surrogate motherhood, embryo freezing, the research into artificial wombs and embryo implantation in men are raising a host of ethical problems about the body, and humanity. Children may now have five parents: a sperm donor, an ovum donor, a surrogate mother (a rented womb) and two social parents, quite apart from additional parents acquired by fostering, adoption and re-marriages. Children’s rights to know their genetic parents are in question, women are being commodified as gene or ovum producers or embryo-carriers; there are possibilities of ‘harvesting’ babies from petri dishes; embryo experimentation is increasing…the ethics of the body remains critical (Corea, 1985, 1987; McDaniel, 1989). While the benefits of the bio-medical model of the human body have been clearly appreciated over the last 350 years, increasingly the limitations of the model are now being perceived for three types of reasons. First, the effectiveness of placebos and hypnosis seems to indicate the role of mind over body. Second, a deeper appreciation of non-Western medical approaches to, and paradigms of, the body has developed. And third, disease is known to be related to emotional and mental states, particularly stress. Society, mind and body are all linked in ways that are still being discovered. The very phrase ‘psycho-somatic illness’ implies that the etiology of illness is, or often is, both psychological and physical—sometimes one more than the other. The medical profession has increasingly come to appreciate the utility of yoga, bio-feedback, acupuncture, relaxation techniques, macrobiotic diets, meditation, massage, aerobic fitness, visualization techniques and other health phenomena, which have traditionally been largely ignored by Western medical science; and research has indicated the therapeutic value of plants, pets, music, colour, views 35
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from windows and even laughter, and especially tender loving care, positive attitudes and the will to live. Holistic thinkers, as those who emphasize the total context in the etiology of disease are sometimes known, have expressed concern that in Western societies mind and body are so compartmentalized as to be treated by different, disciplines: psychology and psychiatry for the mind, medicine for the body. Furthermore, the American Medical Association now recognizes 24 distinct specializations within the profession. Thus the illness is increasingly ‘removed’, first by dualism and then by specialization, from the individuals who are ill, and from the physical, psychological, social and environmental contexts in which they become ill. Such reductionism, it is often argued, has created a flawed medical science, based on a false model of health, and may result in the treatment of symptoms rather than the person. These concerns need not be overstated, perhaps. Westerners on average have never lived so long, nor in such good health. The prevalence of holistic thought is indicated by one survey which found that 87 per cent of the 25,000 people surveyed agreed that ‘most problems of the body are strongly influenced by problems of the mind’. And some expressed beliefs as dualistic as ever, but with reversed poles, i.e. disease is perceived as primarily emotional or mental, not physical, in etiology. A 41-year-old cancer patient stated: ‘I accept the responsibility of getting cancer—I’ve had a lot of stress in the past few years—and I also accept the responsibility of curing myself.’ In these views, ‘it’s all in the mind’; the body merely reflects the symptoms of the mind (Rubinstein, 1982:36). Thus victims ‘blame’ themselves. This is precisely the opposite of the ancient Western tradition, and a quite different construction of the body. The body is not a problem for the mind, as Plato had argued; the mind is a problem for the body…or either may be a solution for the other in the new mind/body medicine (Moyers, 1993). CONCLU SION
Despite centuries of debate about the meaning of the body, there are no signs of universal agreement. Each new age seems to create and re-construct the body in its own image and likeness; yet at any given time there are likely to be many paradigms of the body: 36
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competing, complementary, or contradictory. And no doubt the redefinitions of corporeality will continue in the twenty-first century. Mary Douglas’ dictum that ‘the social body constrains the way the physical body is perceived’ (1973:93) is particularly apposite, for both the social body and the perceptions of the physical body are constantly changing, and are infinitely various. However, the perceptions presented here have been, almost exclusively, male. Women have often defined the body differently, as we consider in the next chapter. Similarly, other cultures have ‘other bodies’, as the anthropologists have shown (see chapter 9). The physical body therefore is eminently social. In sum, the body has been, and still is, constructed in almost as many ways as there are individuals; it seems to be all things to all people. Thus the body is defined as good or bad; tomb or temple; machine or garden; cloak or prison; sacred or secular; friend or enemy; cosmic or mystical; one with mind and soul or separate; private or public; personal or the property of the state; clock or car; to varying degrees plastic, bionic, communal; selected from a catalogue or engineered; material or spiritual; a corpse or the self. Any construction of the body, however, is also a construction of the self as embodied; and, as such, influences not only how the body is treated but also how life is lived. Some love the body, some hate it; some hide it, some flaunt it; some ‘bruise’ it (Paul) and others pamper it with ‘nice, large pike and good Rhine wine’ (Luther). One may be a libertine or a puritan or a mechanic. Indeed the implications are immense, affecting virtually all areas of one’s life. At present, there is no consensus on the meaning of the body and, in a pluralistic society, no consensus can be expected. Constructions reflect the values not only of the culture, but also of the sub-culture, and of the specific individuals, and they are everchanging. Thus the discourse continues, debating whether and to what degree, and in what ways, the body is tomb or temple, loved or hated, personal or state property, machine or self.
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2 GENDER Dualism and the opposite sex
We define men and women not simply as biologically different, but as ‘opposite’ sexes; we even refer on occasion to ‘the battle of the sexes’. Men and women are polarized in our culture, as opposite, unequal, and at war in a classic example of dual symbolic classification. This is an old theory, rooted in Graeco-Roman and Judaeo-Christian culture, and was clearly formulated by Aristotle and re-formulated by Aquinas. Plato, however, argued that the sexes are different, but complementary, and (relatively) equal, and framed an egalitarian tradition which has persisted, and connects with, the egalitarian tradition in Christianity. The debates about theorizing gender have sharpened recently as liberal feminists have argued that women are equal, are due equal rights, and are not opposite but identical, save for one chromosome. Dualism is denied. Radical feminists, however, have sometimes asserted dualism, insisting that women are superior to men, by various criteria. Thus traditional dualism is reversed in the attack on patriarchy. The fifth and final theory of gender is biological. Each human body cell contains 46 chromosomes in 23 pairs. One chromosome of each pair is contributed by the mother and the other by the father. Females have a pair of XX chromosomes, males an XY pair. The mother contributes the X chromosome, the father either an X or a Y. So only one chromosome out of 46 determines gender. This amounts to a 2.17 per cent chromosome differentiation (Oakley, 1981; Miles, 1991:17–19). Biologically, therefore, men and women are 98 per cent chromosomally identical. We are one chromosome away from being of the ‘opposite’ sex.
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How did this virtual biological identity become converted into dualism, opposition and battle? The answers take us back to the ancient creation myths. ADAM, EVE AND PANDORA
Durkheim and Mauss have insisted that: ‘Every mythology is a classification’ (1963:77); and the Genesis myth of creation is an ideology of gender. The story is too well known to need re-telling; but the salient points for our purposes are that Adam was created first, also Eve was created from him, rather than vice versa, so Adam was, in a sense, the creator of Eve; then again Eve was created ‘to help him’, so he was the social superior, the boss. Also Adam was morally superior, for Eve sinned first—thus Eve is the origin of evil, and the reason for the Fall and the expulsion from Eden. Finally, in cursing Eve, God commanded her to be ‘subject’ to Adam— and reprimanded Adam for listening to Eve (Genesis 2 and 3). Bluntly, therefore, the creation myth has legitimized Christian patriarchalism and even misogyny, male dominance and the subjection of women. Unhappy with this traditional interpretation of the politics of Eden, many theologians now insist that the myth should not be interpreted literally, that it only reflected contemporary ideas of the time and should not be translated into contemporary practice, and that the creation myth in Genesis 1 refers to the simultaneous creation of male and female in the image or likeness of God (Daly, 1975; Ruether, 1983; Pagels, 1988). Thus the two genders are equal. Furthermore, Lilith, who played a prominent role in Jewish and Gnostic creation stories, was a tough character who eventually left Adam; and evil does not originate with woman in the Jewish tradition (Phillips, 1984; Daly, 1978:86). None the less, the gender ideology of Eden was reinforced in both the Jewish and the Christian traditions by the masculinity of the Lord God. The commanding figures of Jewish history are male: Adam, Noah, Moses, Solomon, Abraham, David, Isaiah. And the Messiah in the Christian tradition, Jesus Christ, is male. The traditional interpretations of the creation and temptation myths have proved immensely powerful in the construction of gender—all the more so since they have been congruent with the Greek tradition. In the beginning, according to Hesiod, there were only males, relatively weak and powerless compared to the other well-armed 39
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and armoured animals of creation. To help them, one of the Titans stole fire, the property of the gods, from the sun. Zeus, bitterly offended, decided to punish mankind i.e. males, and so created an ‘evil’, ‘the lovely curse’, ‘the hopeless trap, deadly to men’, the first woman: Pandora. Pandora was beautiful, with ‘a face like an immortal goddess’, but she opened the cask in which all the troubles, pains and evils of the world had been stored; only hope remained. Zeus was revenged. She was the ‘ruin of mankind’ (Hesiod and Theognis, 1973:41–2). The similarities between the two myths are apparent. Eve and Pandora are both created by male gods; they are both created for men, one to help, the other to ruin them; and both are the origin of evil in the world. And the myth-makers were both male. The ideological ground was now ready for Greek philosophers and Christian theologians. DUALISM AND EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY
The dualist notion of opposites has been a central theme in Greek philosophy. First proposed by Anaximander, the theory was that the conflict between the four opposite elements, hot and cold, wet and dry, was the driving natural force of the cosmos. Later theorists debated the details, but retained the theory of binary conflict. Pythagoras, however, and then Parmenides and to a degree Aristotle, institutionalized the theory of the two sexes as opposite. Pythagoras and his school declared, according to Aristotle, that ‘there are ten principles, which they arrange in two columns of cognates’, as in Table 2.1. The most important points about Table 2.1, for our purposes, are that for the first time male and female are explicitly defined, not just as different, but as opposite. Furthermore, they are opposite not only in the matter of gender, but in all the other dimensions also. The notion that male is good and female is bad reflects the Pandora myth of the Hesiod tradition (as well as the Eve myth); but the identification of male with good, right, light and one (which is a metaphor for God), and that of female with bad, left, darkness and plurality (which is an absence of unity), create a powerful symbolic equation, for the meanings overlap. Also the reverse equations apply: good is male, right is male, light is male, and so on. Parmenides’ table of opposites was in many ways very 40
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Table 2.1 The Pythagorean table of opposites
similar (Guthrie, 1965:77–80). Gender, therefore, is not simply a matter of biology, but is entangled with notions of cosmology, number, unity, direction, mobility, state, colour, morality and shape. Gender connects to everything, and everything is gendered. Plato, however, was more complicated. Some of his personal views seem fairly stereotypical. He believed that men are ‘wiser’ than women, and that the female sex ‘is generally predisposed by its weakness to undue secrecy and craft’. The masculine is ‘the majestic and whatever tends to valour’, while the feminine is ‘order and purity’ (Cratylus 392; Laws 6:781; 7:802; 1963:430, 1356, 1374). The great theoretical advances over the ideas of his predecessors are, however, first the fracturing of the binary mould; he concedes that: ‘Many women, it is true, are better than many men in many things’ (Republic 5:455; 1963:694). The genders overlap; therefore, they are not opposite. And second, his radical recommendations for a common education system and a common military training for women and men, and the admission of women’s right to stand as guardians of the state. His recommendations are all the more surprising given the patriarchal society he lived in, and his overall inegalitarianism in a rigidly stratified republic (see especially Bks 3 and 9). Plato also told two creation stories; an egalitarian one in the Symposium, and a notoriously sexist one in Timaeus. In the beginning, according to the Symposium, humans were originally of three sexes: male, female and mixed, descended from, respectively, the sun, the earth and the moon; they were globular in shape, with four arms 41
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and four legs, two faces on the one head, and two sets of genitals, and so powerful and arrogant that they tried ‘to scale the heights of heaven and set upon the gods’. Zeus decided to cut them down to size, literally, and sliced them in half. This bisection left each half with a desperate yearning for the other, and they ran together and flung their arms around each other’s necks, and asked for nothing better than to be rolled into one…we are all like pieces of the coins that children break in half for keepsakes…and each of us is seeking for the half that will tally with [complete, complement] himself. (1963:543–4) Love, in this myth, is the search for that ‘primeval unity’ which we once had, but lost for our sins, the sins of revolt against the gods. But the salient feature of this myth is that the two sexes love each other, men and women are equal, and complete and complement each other. Furthermore, both homosexual and heterosexual love are explained. The story in Timaeus is different. Plato explains that initially only males were created. (This of course is compatible with Genesis 2 and Hesiod.) How were women created? Plato suggested that if the man lived a good life, after death he would ‘dwell in his native star, and there he would have a blessed and congenial existence’. But if he lived an evil life he would be changed into a woman in the second generation or rebirth. A woman is therefore an evil man who has died. And if that woman still lived an evil life, she would be changed into a ‘brute’ (Timaeus 42, and cf. 90; 1963:1171). Woman is therefore intermediate between man and animal in the scale of being; and woman is the reincarnation of an evil man, as the brute is the reincarnation of an evil woman. Plato’s writing about gender is therefore mixed: both egalitarian and patriarchal; but on the whole it is his philosophy of education and politics in the Republic, rather than the creation myth in Timaeus (which is contradicted by the message in the Symposium anyway, and in which the gender-theory is peripheral poetry rather than his creed) which seems more significant. Aristotle, on the other hand, was relatively egalitarian with regard to society, but patriarchal with regard to gender. He defined men and women as ‘contrary’, but not as different species: they differ in body (form) but not in substance (Metaphysics 1058; 1984:1672). In his Politics, however, it becomes clear that these 42
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body differences have substantial implications. After a long discussion of slavery Aristotle concludes that: The male is by nature superior and the female inferior; and the one rules and the other is ruled; this principle, of necessity, applies to all mankind’ (1984:1989–90). The equations of the Aristotelian table of opposites are simple and clear, the nature of male to female is that of superior to inferior, ruler to ruled, soul to body, mind to passion, humans to animals and free to slave. Females are ‘marked out for subjection’, in his words, from the hour of their birth, which, coincidentally or not, is precisely the same message as in Genesis. (Presumably it is not a coincidence: simply the same ideology of patriarchy.) Aristotle returned to gender in Economics (1:1343–4), affirming a series of binary oppositions: men are stronger, women weaker; men courageous, women cautious; men acquire possessions outside, women preserve them inside the house; one sex is adapted for outdoor activities, the other for a sedentary life; and although both share in the procreation of children, women serve by nurturing, and men by educating them (1984:2131). These oppositions in politics and economics reflect biology. Men, not women, are the creators of life, according to Aristotle, for ‘the principle of soul’ is emitted in and with the semen. In several celebrated passages Aristotle explained that ‘the woman is as it were an impotent male’, and that ‘females are weaker and colder in nature, and we must look upon the female character as being a sort of natural deficiency’ (Generation of Animals 728, 737, 775; 1984:1130, 1144, 1199). Impotent, mutilated, weaker, colder, deficient from the norm of male perfection, Aristotle’s theory of women deeply influenced the Christian tradition, particularly Aquinas. Evidently while Socrates and Plato wore polarizing lenses for soul-body, Aristotle wore them for male-female. DUALISM AND EARLY CHRISTIANITY
Christianity, like many other faiths, has been and still is, a religion of dualism: God-Devil, heaven-hell, good-bad, life-death, lightdarkness, truth-falsity, freedom-slavery, right-left…to name just a few of the more well-known polarities.1 But two points should be noted. First, the close identity between the Pythagorean and the Christian tables of opposites. The Christian and the Greek traditions 43
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therefore reinforce each other. Second, despite the similarities, there is one major difference: the absence of a male-female opposition. Christ did not define males and females as opposite, still less as superior-inferior, good-bad. Indeed various theologians have commented on Christ’s rejection of the traditional patriarchy of his time, citing his friendships with women and his behaviour towards women, both of which were revolutionary for his time and place (Daly, 1975; Ruether, 1983). None the less, Christianity has been described as patriarchal, both in its theology (God the Father, God the Son), its social structure (male papacy, episcopacy and priesthood), and in much of its misogynistic teaching (including Paul, Tertullian and Aquinas). Men and women worship a male God, ‘Our Father’, in a male-dominated church which has taught the Eve myth for centuries. 2 Christ taught about women by example, Paul taught by precept; and his teaching is quite explicit: I want you to understand that Christ is supreme over every man, the husband is supreme over his wife, and God is supreme over Christ…A man has no need to cover his head, because he reflects the image and glory of God. But woman reflects the glory of man; for man was not created from woman, but woman from man. Nor was man created for woman’s sake, but woman was created for man’s sake. (I Corinthians 11:3, 7–9) A Pauline ‘table of opposites’ suggests that man’s supremacy over woman is like a husband’s over his wife, Christ’s over every man, and God’s over Christ. Peter reiterated the same message: ‘You wives must submit to your husbands’, and he instructed husbands to understand that their wives are ‘the weaker sex’ (I Peter 3:1, 7). The traditional teaching of the church is therefore clear. Yet two points must be noted. First, recent scholarship suggests that many or all of the passages in the Epistles in which Paul insisted on the submission and silence of women may not in fact be genuine (Phillips, 1984:121–6). Also, there were other traditions extant at the time, with positive evaluations of woman, in Islam, Jewish mysticism and Gnosticism (Phillips, 1984:148–69; Pagels, 1988). Second, there is a countervailing egalitarian theme in Paul’s teaching, in the doctrine of the Mystical Body: ‘There is no difference between Jews and Gentiles, between slaves and free men, between men and women; 44
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you are all one in Christ Jesus’ (Galatians 3:28). But this unity has often been interpreted in a spiritual rather than a secular sense. Dualism and male hegemony were therefore built into some of the earliest teachings of the church; this sometimes became misogyny. Tertullian (c. 160–230) was perhaps the most misogynistic of the early Church Fathers. In this sermon he addressed women: Do you not know that you are Eve? God’s sentence hangs still over all your sex and His punishment weighs down upon you. You are the devil’s gateway; you are she who first violated the forbidden tree and broke the law of God. (In O’Faolain and Martines, 1973:132) John Chrysostom (c. 347–407), Archbishop of Constantinople, was equally hostile to women: ‘What else is woman but a foe to friendship, an inescapable punishment, a necessary evil, a natural temptation, a desirable calamity, a domestic danger, a delectable detriment, an evil nature, painted with fair colors?’ (in Phillips, 1984:22). Augustine reminded his flock that it was ‘by a woman that the first sin was committed, the one which brought death to us all’ (The City of God, Bk 15:20; 1958:359). The Christian husband therefore is almost schizoid: ‘He loves the fact that she is human, and hates the fact that she is a woman’ (in Ranke-Heinemann, 1990:96). A very difficult love-hate balancing act! Albert the Great, a Father of the Church, and the teacher of Thomas Aquinas, was even more venomous towards women: Woman is less qualified [than man] for moral behaviour… Woman knows nothing of fidelity…Woman is a misbegotten man and has a faulty and defective nature in comparison with his…one must be on one’s guard with every woman, as if she were a poisonous snake and the horned devil…Her feelings drive woman towards every evil, just as reason impels man toward all good. (In Ranke-Heinemann, 1990:178–9) The last word on the Christian construction of gender goes to Thomas Aquinas (1225–74), who was named the official theologian of the Catholic church by Pope Leo XIII in 1879. His teaching on gender was extremely influential over the centuries, and still influences debates on abortion, contraception, the priesthood, the family and so on. His fundamental problem was to synthesize the 45
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Aristotelian tradition of women as misbegotten with the Genesis tradition of women as created by God and therefore good. He achieved this synthesis by distinguishing between the ‘individual nature’ and ‘universal human nature’. As regards the individual nature, woman is defective and misbegotten, for the active force in the male seed tends to the production of a perfect likeness in the masculine sex…, [but] as regards universal human nature, woman is not misbegotten, but is included in nature’s intention as directed to the work of generation. (Summa Theologiae, 1:92, in O’Faolain and Martines, 1973:131)) The Angelic Doctor was by no means egalitarian; and in the next question he asserts that ‘the image of God is found in man, and not in woman: for man is the beginning and the end of woman; as God is the beginning and end of every creature’ (Summa Theologiae, 1:93, 4; 1981, vol. 13:60). The Angelic Doctor was well-named; for him, sex is bestial: ‘In sexual intercourse the human being becomes similar to the beast’ (Summa Theologiae 1:98, 2; 1981, vol. 13:156). This statement is congruent with a long tradition in Christian thought, again going back to Paul, (or the traditional interpretation of Paul), developed by both Augustine and Pope Gregory the Great. Gregory declared that: ‘Sexual pleasure can never be without sin’ (in Ranke-Heinemann, 1990:141). These long-standing traditions of women as sinful and sexual pleasure as sinful provide the preconditions for the persecution of the witches in Europe and North America from the fifteenth to the eighteenth centuries. The witches were not the only populations persecuted in the second millennium: the list includes the Arabs, the Moors, the Jews, the Cathars and the Albigensians, and later the Huguenots, the Hussites and, of course, the Catholics and Protestants.3 The witches, however, had this distinctive characteristic: that they were almost all women (Trevor-Roper, 1969). The hunt began with the ‘Witches Bull’ of 1484 when Pope Innocent VI II appointed two Dominicans as inquisitors, Jakob Sprenger and Heinrich Institoris. They published Malleus Maleficarum, the Hammer of Witches, literally evil-doers, in 1486, which set out their rules for finding witches. In one chapter they address the question of why most witches are women. There are 46
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many reasons, and the inquisitors explained that ‘since women are feebler both in mind and body, it is not surprising that they should come under the spell of witchcraft’; and ‘the natural reason is that she is more carnal than a man, as is clear from her many carnal abominations’; furthermore, ‘a wicked woman is by her nature quicker to waver in her faith, and consequently to abjure the faith, which is the root of witchcraft’. A woman is a ‘liar by nature’, ‘a wheedling and secret enemy’ and ‘more bitter than death’. Finally they conclude: ‘All witchcraft comes from carnal lust, which is in women insatiable…. Wherefore for the sake of fulfilling their lusts they consort even with devils.’ And reflecting a tradition going back through Chrysostom to Eve and Pandora, she is ‘beautiful to look upon, contaminating to the touch, and deadly to keep’ (1970:44–7). This misogyny is ‘supported’ by analyses of the women of the Old Testament and history, for their wickedness. The book was the bible of the zealous witch-hunters, went through 30 editions in the next 200 years, and seemed to many to justify the torture, burning and hanging of thousands of people, the vast majority of them women, before the movement died out in the early eighteenth century.4 Some have described this ‘war against women’ as gynocide and linked it with violence against women around the world: Chinese foot-binding, Hindu suttee, Asian female infanticide, wife-burning in India, genital mutilation in parts of Africa and the Near East, the restrictions of women’s rights in fundamentalist Islam, the tolerance of male ‘crimes of passion’ in defence of their ‘honour’ in Brazil, American gynaecology and the physical violence against women in Europe, North America and elsewhere. Some see this long list as basically one phenomenon of misogyny (see Millett, 1971:64; Daly, 1978:221; French, 1992); others, however, separate the issues. During the Reformation, the scholastic definition of woman as imperfect man was challenged. Luther emphatically rejected it, describing the proponents of the doctrine as ‘monsters and the sons of monsters’ (not the happiest of phrasing!); but he seems to have believed it himself: [Although] Eve was a most noble creation, like Adam, as regards the image of God, that is, in justice, wisdom and salvation, she was none the less a woman. For as the sun is more splendid than the moon (although the moon is also a most splendid 47
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body), so also woman, although the most beautiful handiwork of God, does not equal the dignity and glory of the male. (In MacLean, 1980:9–10) He comments confidently on the politics of gender: The rule remains with the husband, and the wife is compelled to obey him by God’s command. He rules the home and the state, wages wars, defends his possessions, tills the soil, builds, plants, etc. The woman, on the other hand, is like a nail driven into the wall. She sits at home…Just as the snail carries its household with it, so the wife should stay at home and look after the affairs of the household. (In Phillips, 1984:105) The point I am trying to establish is not simply the patriarchalism and even misogyny of some early Christians, but the polarized and dualistic structure of thought; and how easily it meshed with Greek thought to create an enormously powerful ideology of male supremacy, while purporting to be the quest for salvation and divine love on the one hand, and truth and wisdom on the other. Both systems ‘camouflaged’ what many today perceive to be the oppression of women, but what then was considered to be divine ordination, in the case of Christianity, and nature, in the case of the Greeks. There were, however, egalitarian counter-traditions in both Greek and Christian thought, which must be mentioned. These traditions include the Proverbs/ Solomon tradition in the Old Testament, Platonism, the Pauline doctrine of the Mystical Body, also Mariology (Warner, 1976) and some aspects of courtly love (Capellanus, 1959). They did not redress the balance, but they perhaps alleviated the totalitarianism. Finally, the secular literature of the Christian era—Dante, Chaucer, Shakespeare, Boccaccio, Cervantes and Rabelais—seems to show a far more harmonious, sometimes loving, sometimes wild, but always highly variable, relation between the two sexes than the dualistic and occasionally misogynistic literature of so many philosophers, theologians and ecclesiastics. Without wishing to polarize secular and religious authorities, the latter should probably be taken in the context of the former, as the former with the latter. Also, there were great queens as well as great kings—Isabella of Spain, Elizabeth of England—and saints, founders of religious orders, mystics and generals (Boadicea, Joan of Arc)…although it remained 48
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largely a man’s world, and a woman’s home. These separate spheres of power perhaps counterbalanced patriarchy, to a degree. Furthermore, the gender structure was always cross-cut by the class structure. The gender picture therefore has been a mite too complicated to fit into simple dualisms; none the less, dualism persisted.5 THE MODERNS
Modern thinkers have built on the foundations of the Greek and Judaeo-Christian traditions. While we cannot consider everyone, we can select some highlights, before we consider the attack on these constructions of gender. Milton, the Puritan, was one of the last to insist on the old unequal Christian ideals: ‘He for God only, she for God in him’ (Paradise Lost, Bk 4, 259). Eve eventually understands this: ‘Unargu’d I obey; so God ordains. God is thy law, thou mine: to know no more is woman’s happiest knowledge and her praise’ (Paradise Lost, Bk 8, 232–3). Wish fulfilment, perhaps, but Milton was unhappily married. Two hundred years later, Byron is more secular and captured gender dualism in two famous lines in Don Juan: Man’s love is of man’s life, a thing apart, ’Tis woman’s whole existence. A poem by Tennyson, ‘The Princess’, echoes the thought of Aristotle and Paul: Man for the field and woman for the hearth: Man for the sword and for the needle she: Man with the head and woman with the heart: Man to command and woman to obey; All else confusion. Rousseau, perhaps surprisingly, echoed these sentiments. The ideologue of the French Revolution, he began The Social Contract (1762) with the famous words: ‘Man is born free; and everywhere he is in chains.’ Yet some chains are apparently natural, for in Emile Rousseau believed that ‘the law of nature bids the woman obey the man’ (1984:370). He argued that: A woman’s education must therefore be planned in relation to man. To be pleasing in his sight, to win his respect and 49
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love, to train him in childhood, to tend him in manhood, to counsel and console, to make his life pleasant and happy, these are the duties of woman for all time, and this is what she should be taught while she is young. (1984:328) Hegel was deeply influenced by Rousseau, and he too expresses the consensus from Aristotle through Paul to Rousseau, with multiple dimensions of polarity: [Man] is powerful and enterprising, [woman] passive and subjective. Hence man has his essential life in the state, in learning, and in the like, as well as in work and struggle with the outside world and with himself…[W]ithin the family, is where woman has her true definition…Men and women differ much as do animals and plants. Men and animals correspond, just as woman and plants do, for women develop more placidity and retain the principle of an indeterminate unity of feeling or sentiment. When women stand at the head of government, the state is immediately plunged into danger because they conduct affairs not by the standard of universality but in accordance with random opinions and inclinations. Women acquire learning—we know not how—almost as if by breathing ideas, more by living really than by actually taking hold of knowledge. Man, on the other hand, achieves his distinction only by means of advancing thought and much skilled exertion. (In O’Faolain and Martines, 1973:290) The conventional wisdom is reiterated by John Ruskin in his essay ‘Of Queen’s Gardens’: Now their separate characters are briefly these. The man’s power is active, progressive, defensive. He is eminently the doer, the creator, the discoverer, the defender. His intellect is for speculation and invention; his energy for adventure, for war and conquest…But the woman’s power is for rule, not for battle, and her intellect is not for invention or recreation, but sweet ordering, arrangement and decision…By her office, and place, she is protected from all danger and temptation. The man, in his rough work in the open world, must encounter all peril and trial—to him therefore the failure, the offence, the inevitable error; often he must be wounded or subdued, 50
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often misled, and always hardened. But he guards the woman from all this. (Ruskin, 1871:84–5) The queens have their gardens, and the kings ‘the open world’. None the less, Ruskin did insist that neither sex is superior to the other, simply complementary and opposite: ‘Each has what the other has not: each completes and is completed by the other: they are in nothing alike’ (1871:84). Ruskin’s chivalry is in sharp contrast to John Stuart Mills’ feminism (The Subjection of Women was published in 1869), and also to Schopenhauer’s abusiveness. In his essay ‘On Women’ (1870), Schopenhauer described women as: ‘that undersized, narrowshouldered, broad-hipped and short-legged race… Instead of calling them beautiful, there would be more warrant for describing women as the unaesthetic sex.’ Furthermore ‘the whole sex have never managed to produce a single achievement in the fine arts that is really great, genuine, and original, or given to the world any work of permanent value in any sphere’. Women are ‘childish, frivolous and short-sighted; in a word they are big children all their life long— a kind of intermediate stage between the child and the full-grown man’. Shades of Aristotle! Also, the list continues, women have ‘no sense of justice’, they are ‘defective in the powers of reasoning’, crafty and cunning, and this ‘gives rise to falsity, faithlessness, treachery, ingratitude, and so on’. ‘[W]omen exist in the main solely for the propagation of the species.’ Schopenhauer concluded that: [Women] form the sexus sequior—the second sex, inferior in every respect to the first…When nature made two divisions of the human race, she did not draw the line exactly through the middle. These divisions are polar and opposed to each other, it is true; but the difference between them is not qualitative merely, it is also quantitative. (1935:434–47) So Schopenhauer did not like women. Nietzsche was even more vituperative in Thus Spoke Zarathustra (1883). A series of epigrams: Everything about woman is a riddle, and everything about woman has one solution: it is called pregnancy… The true man wants two things: danger and play. For that reason he wants woman as the most dangerous plaything. 51
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Man should be trained for war and woman for the recreation of the warrior: all else is folly… The man’s happiness is: I will. The woman’s happiness is: He will. Are you visiting women? Do not forget your whip! (1969:91–2) Charming! Such invective tells us more about Schopenhauer and Nietzsche than about women, no doubt; but not all philosophers expressed the same negative opinions. Feuerbach described ‘the superiority of the woman’ in an epigram: ‘The man must sweat to attain what he should be/But the woman already is by nature what she should be’ (1980:249). The four principal paradigms on gender are therefore all apparent in these few years: equal but opposite and complementary in the chivalry of Ruskin; equal and the same in the feminism of John Stuart Mill; opposite and female-inferior in the invectives of Schopenhauer and Nietzsche; and the superiority of women in Feuerbach. Anthropology also entered these equations. Paul Broca, a French surgeon and founder of the anthropological society of Paris, determined that male brains weighed, on average, more than female ones. He commented: But we must not forget that women are, on the average, a little less intelligent than men…We are therefore permitted to suppose that the relatively small size of the female brain depends in part upon her physical inferiority and in part upon her intellectual inferiority. (In Gould, 1981:104) Gustave Le Bon, an otherwise distinguished sociologist and author of a well-known text, The Crowd (1896), fully agreed: All psychologists who have studied the intelligence of women, as well as poets and novelists, recognize today that they represent the most inferior forms of human evolution and that they are closer to children and savages than to an adult, civilized man. They excel in fickleness, inconstancy, absence of thought and logic, and incapacity to reason. Without doubt there exist some distinguished women, very superior to the average man, but they are as exceptional as the birth of any 52
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monstrosity, as, for example, of a gorilla with two heads; consequently we may neglect them entirely. (In Gould, 1981:104–5) Two-headed gorillas might well be entirely neglected, but to compare ‘distinguished women’ with such monstrosities was hardly scientific, and not very polite either. The point is that the body is highly political, and so is science, and despite scientific advances over 2,000 years, Le Bon’s sociology did not differ much from Aristotle’s philosophy. The numbers game can be played by both ‘sides’, however, and what is obvious to one is simply silly to another. Maria Montessori, impressed by research which seemed to suggest that differences in brain weight were less than differences in size would seem to warrant, concluded that women, not men, were the intellectually superior sex, as they were also morally superior: ‘Perhaps…the reign of women is approaching, when the enigma of her anthropological superiority will be deciphered. Woman was always the custodian of human sentiment, morality and honor’ (in Gould, 1981:107; emphasis added). Montessori was one of the first women to reverse the values of the traditional dualism, and to assert the superiority of women. Others would develop this view further. In The Descent of Man (1871, ch. 19), Charles Darwin suggested that: The chief distinction in the intellectual powers of the two sexes is shown by man attaining to a higher eminence, in whatever he takes up, than women can attain…We may also infer…that if men are capable of decided eminence over women in many subjects, the average standard of mental power in man must be above that of woman. (1981:327) We are talking averages here, which is quite different from the polar dualism of some of Darwin’s contemporaries, notably Nietzsche; plus Darwin concedes a ‘greater tenderness and less selfishness’ to women. Darwin and many others may have mistaken cause for effect; women were first prevented from achieving eminence, and then described as intellectually deficient for their ‘failure’: classic examples of Catch-22 and blaming the victim.
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While Broca and Le Bon argued the inferiority of women from cranial capacity, and Darwin and Nietzsche from ‘eminence’, others argued from the womb. The womb was not only the source of disease, but also, because of its connection to the brain, the cause of feminine insanity. Dr. Direx, author of Women’s Complete Guide to Health (1869), stated authoritatively: Women are treated for diseases of the stomach, liver, kidneys, heart, lungs, etc.; yet in most instances, these diseases will be found on due investigation, to be, in reality, no diseases at all, but merely the sympathetic reactions or the symptoms of one disease, namely a disease of the womb. (In Ussher, 1989:3–4) Such beliefs must have simplified medical practice; but contemporaries believed that the womb caused not only physical diseases, but also mental illness. G.Blandford, the author of Insanity and its Treatments (1871), asserted: Women become insane during pregnancy, after parturition, during lactation; at the age when catamenia (menstruation) first appear and when they disappear…The sympathetic connection between the brain and the uterus is plainly seen by the most casual observer. (In Ussher, 1989:4–5) Such frequent insanity would plainly disqualify women from eminence, from the suffrage and from access to higher education. Biological science ‘reinforced’ medical science; in 1890 the English biologist Patrick Geddes explained that males were dominated by active, energetic, katabolic cellular functions, and females by conservative, passive, anabolic functions; thus ‘males are more active, energetic, passionate and variable; the females more passive, conservative, sluggish and stable’ (in Martin, 1989:33). This conclusion is almost identical with Aristotle’s over 2,000 years earlier, although the rationale is different. It is noteworthy that each discipline, philosophy, theology, poetry, anthropology, sociology, psychology, medicine and biology, managed both to describe and to explain female inferiority.
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THE TWENTIETH CENTU RY
Freud was one of the first to attack the notion of dualism, and to insist on the anatomical and psychological bisexuality of the genders. In ‘Civilization and Its Discontents’ (1930), Freud suggests: Man is an animal organism with (like others) an unmistakably bisexual disposition. The individual corresponds to a fusion of two symmetrical halves…We are accustomed to say that every human being displays both male and female impulses, needs and attributes…[and] each individual seeks to satisfy both male and female wishes in his [a Freudian slip!] sexual life. (1985:295–6) Yet Freud remained not only a dualist but also a believer in male superiority. Women are, in his view, castrated males, and suffer from penis envy. Furthermore, ‘women have made few contributions to the discoveries and inventions in the history of civilization’, except perhaps plaiting and weaving; and they have little sense of justice but are dominated by envy. Such are women: a ‘riddle’, an ‘enigma’ and a ‘problem’, even to themselves—as men are not (Freud, 1973:45– 69). Freud once said: ‘The great question that has never been answered and which I have not yet been able to answer despite my thirty years of research into the feminine soul, is ‘What does a woman want?’ (in Jones, 1954:468). A strange question, given its implicit assumptions that someone only wants one thing, and that different people might not want different things; but it is even stranger in that for 30 years he had argued persistently and consistently that women wanted a penis! But perhaps the question reflects what his disciple and biographer called his ‘obstinate dualism’ (Jones, 1954:469–70). 6 This dualism is particularly apparent in his proclamation that ‘Anatomy is destiny’, which seemed to give scientific legitimation to the restriction of women for all eternity to ‘children, kitchen and church’—and to reinforce gender stratification. Freud’s dualism (but not his hierarchism, I think) was echoed by his former disciple, Carl Jung: The conscious attitude of woman is in general far more exclusively personal than that of man. Her world is made up of fathers and mothers, brothers and sisters, husbands and 55
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children…. The man’s world is the nation, the state, business concerns, etc. His family is simply a means to an end, one of the foundations of the state, and his wife is not necessarily the woman for him (at any rate not as the woman means it when she says ‘my man’). The general means more to him than the personal; his world consists of a multitude of coordinated factors, whereas her world, outside her husband, terminates in a sort of cosmic mist. (Jung, 1966:209–10) Cosmic mist? His wife might have accused him of being in a cosmic mist about people, and especially herself; or, since this is Switzerland in the twenties, just laughed and agreed that she knew nothing about politics and economics. Jung’s contemporary, Nobel Prize winner Jean-Paul Sartre, was openly contemptuous of women, womanizer though he was: The obscenity of the feminine sex is that of everything which ‘gapes open’. It is an appeal to being as all holes are…Beyond any doubt her sex is a mouth and a voracious mouth which devours the penis—a fact which can easily lead to the idea of castration. The amorous act is the castration of the man; but this is above all because sex is a hole. (Sartre, 1966:782) Freud and Sartre seem to agree that someone is castrated, but one said women, the other said men. Perhaps it was neither. Gender dualism, and sometimes misogyny, persists in novels, with probably a broader impact. Kate Millett (1971) has made this point brilliantly with her analysis of the novels of Henry Miller, Norman Mailer, Jean Genet, D.H.Lawrence and others. Her point is that these novels are sexual politics, and that sex equates with male power and dominance over women. The beginnings of gender dualism, and the socialization process itself, can be seen in the pink and blue blankets and name-tags in the hospital nurseries; and dualism continues with nursery rhymes: What are little boys made of? Frogs and snails and puppy dogs’ tails. What are little girls made of? Sugar and spice and all things nice. 56
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‘Vive la différence!’ say the French—perhaps in the happy conviction that the two sexes are complementary and need and love each other, as Plato had suggested in the myth of creation in the Symposium. Opposites attract. But by now it is clear that this slogan, and this ideology, also have the latent function of legitimating male supremacism, patriarchy and even misogyny, and of camouflaging the oppression of women. The slogan also legitimizes the norm of heterosexuality: a practice which is increasingly challenged by homosexuals and bisexuals, as well as some libertarians. This male-female dualism is intersected by another male-created female-female dualism; not only are there two types of people, men and women, it is said, there are also only two types of women, good and bad. This virgin/whore dichotomy is symbolized by the two paradigmatic figures of the Christian tradition, Mary and Eve, or, in a different metaphor, the woman in white and the Scarlet Woman. Adrienne Rich has commented that: Two ideas flow side by side: one, that the female body is impure, corrupt, the site of discharges, bleedings, dangerous to masculinity, a source of moral and physical contaminations, ‘the devil’s gateway’. On the other hand, as mother, the woman is beneficent, sacred, pure, asexual, nourishing; and the physical potential for motherhood—that same body with its bleedings and mysteries—is her single destiny and justification in life. (In Ussher, 1989:15) Similarly, in English teenage male slang, girls are polarized into two categories: ‘the slags who’d go with anyone and everyone (they were alright for a quick screw, but you’d never get serious about it) and the drags who didn’t, but whom you might one day think about going steady with’ (in Ussher, 1989:26–7). In sum, in much of men’s thinking about women there is first a polarization of women from men, and second, a further polarization of good from bad, slags and drags. Yet even the drags are a drag. Damned if you do; damned if you don’t. Attitudes and gender thinking are not totally divorced from behaviour. Thoughts determine action. And the battle of the sexes is not only evident in poetry and philosophy, novels, economic and political inequalities, attitudes and the struggle for equity; it is also physical. 57
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Even today our newspapers are spattered with stories of serialkillers, mass-murderers, and other men who prey on women. The long list of men who have killed only women includes Jack the Ripper, still unidentified, who killed six women in London in 1888; the Boston Strangler, Albert De Salvo, who strangled 13 women in the Boston area between 1962 and 1964; Richard Speck, who killed eight student nurses in Chicago in 1966; Ted Bundy, who killed perhaps dozens of women in the seventies; the Yorkshire Ripper, Peter Sutcliffe, who killed 12 women in 1980; and Christopher Wilder who murdered between 10 and 13 women across the United States in 1984. Furthermore, in the Green River killings, over 40 women have been murdered since 1981 from Seattle north to British Columbia, and in 1989 in Montreal, Marc Lépine killed 14 women, and wounded 12 more and two men before killing himself, in the largest mass shooting in Canada and the first to target only women.7 TH E WOMEN’S MOVEMENT
Mary Wollstonecraft’s A Vindication of the Rights of Woman was published in 1792. Kate Millett described it as ‘the first document asserting the full humanity of women and insisting upon its recognition’ (1971:65). Wollstonecraft demanded JUSTICE for one-half of the human race’ (1985:89). She summarily dismissed the ancient opinion that woman was created for men as a ‘poetical story’ (1985:109), and proceeded to apply the doctrine of inalienable human rights developed by Rousseau and Paine to women. ‘I love man as my fellow; but his sceptre, real or usurped, extends not to me’ (1985:121). She deplored the state of women, and offered a radical critique with passion, humour and a clear eye. On beauty: ‘Taught from their infancy that beauty is women’s sceptre, the mind shapes itself to the body, and roaming round its gilt cage, only seeks to adore its prison’ (1985:131). On men: ‘[Woman] was not created to be the solace of man’, but for perfection, truth, reason and God; yet man is ‘ever placed between her and reason’ (1985:142–3). Women, however, are the ‘slaves of power’ and the ‘slaves of injustice’ (1985:282, 313). She described ‘the tyranny of man’, but looked forward to the day when women will be ‘free in a physical, moral and civil sense’ (1985:318–19). Meanwhile in France the Constituent Assembly had proclaimed the Rights of Man in 1789. Two years later Olympe des Gouges 58
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published a Declaration of the Rights of Woman: ‘Woman is born free and her rights are the same as those of man.’ The Declaration demanded equality before the law and in the making of law; equal eligibility for all public offices, positions and jobs; freedom of speech; and the vote.’ [Women]…have the right to go to the scaffold; they must also have the right to go to parliament’ (in O’Faolain and Martines, 1973:307). She was guillotined two years later. In the United States the beginnings of the movement are usually ascribed to the first Women’s Rights Convention held at Seneca Falls in 1848. Their Declaration of Sentiments reflected the Declaration of Independence: We hold these truths to be self-evident; that all men and women are created equal…The history of mankind is a history of repeated injuries and usurpations on the part of man towards woman, having in direct object the establishment of absolute tyranny over her. The document went on to list a series of grievances and to demand the franchise. A few men also joined in what Wollstonecraft had described as ‘the state of warfare which subsists between the sexes’ (1985:285), on the side of women’s rights. Karl Marx, most well known for his analysis of class warfare and the battle between capital and labour, also criticized the exploitation of women by capital and by men: a double jeopardy of capitalism and patriarchy. In The Origin of the Family (1884), Engels deprecated the inequality in the family, which others had thought so natural: ‘The modern individual family is founded on the open or concealed domestic slavery of the wife…Within the family he [the husband] is the bourgeois and his wife represents the proletariat’ (1985:105). And John Stuart Mill published The Subjection of Women in 1869 calling for equality of rights. Women increasingly organized themselves during the second half of the century, with some success. In the United States the suffrage was granted first in Wyoming on its inception as a state in 1889, and after that the suffrage was extended in other states. In the United Kingdom, Emmeline Pankhurst and the Suffragettes overcame initial resistance by pioneering non-violent protests, which generated widespread publicity. Finally the suffrage was extended to women after the end of the First World War in the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada, Russia and Germany; it was extended later 59
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in France (1944) and Italy (1945), and later still in Switzerland (1971). The acquisition of the vote ended the first phase of the movement; but women soon realized that the vote did not guarantee equality, justice or liberty. The women’s movement accordingly adopted new and broader goals of reform and societal transformation in the second half of the century. The second stage of the women’s movement began with the 1968 protest against the ‘Miss America’ Beauty Pageant, the first largescale public demonstration against the objectification of women, as the pageant was defined, and more broadly against the roles and relations of women in North America. This coincided roughly with a series of consciousness-raising books by women, particularly Simone de Beauvoir’s The Second Sex (1953), Betty Friedan’s The Feminine Mystique (1963), Kate Millett’s Sexual Politics (1971) and Germaine Greer’s The Female Eunuch (1971). In 1966 Friedan cofounded the National Organization for Women (NOW); and feminism had its first modern organizational base. Since then feminist organizations and ideologies have multiplied, with various political, economic and social agendas (see Walby, 1990). Today these goals include economic parity, equal pay for work of equal value, legislative reform, the provision of shelters, increased political representation; in sum, the total transformation of patriarchal society. Tactics include self-defence courses, consciousness-raising groups, assertiveness training seminars, the development of women’s networks, media watch groups, the formation of women’s publishing houses and journals, women’s studies programmes, the use of the courts, and so on. Humour has also played a role. Just as sexist jokes define women, so do feminist counter-sexist jokes define men, and women too. Bumper stickers are particularly adept at laughing at men: ‘A woman needs a man like a fish needs a bicycle’; ‘Women who want to excel over men lack ambition’; ‘I suffer from PMS: Putting up with Men’s Shit’; ‘When God created man she was only kidding’; and, more direct, ‘Men are like diapers, always on my ass and full of shit.’ In sum, men are unnecessary, inept, a joke and full! Nicole Hollander’s cartoon has been widely distributed: ‘Ma, can I be a feminist and still like men? Sure…just like you can be a vegetarian and like fried chicken!’ Over the years feminists have effectively challenged the male definitions of women as inferior and unequal over the last two 60
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millennia, and they have rejected the legitimacy of patriarchy. Feminists have also systematically detailed the oppression and exploitation of women, the objectification, infantilization, degradation, trivialization, fragmentation, victimization and violation of women, and discrimination and prejudice against women; and they have also protested the idealization, glamourizing, romanticization and ‘pedestalization’ of women. Similarly women have reconstructed men. The ancient paradigm of man as the image of God, and the apex of creation, has been summarily dismissed; and its consequence and expression, patriarchy, has been declared illegitimate. A two thousand year old tradition has been exploded in two hundred years. Germaine Greer was one of the first to ‘identify the enemy’: ‘Women have very little idea of how much men hate them…Men do not themselves know the depth of their hatred’ (1971:249, 271). At the same time Kate Millett (1971) condemned the patriarchal family in a patriarchal state, maintained by a patriarchal faith, and a lurid misogynistic literature. Indeed men are now being defined as ‘the problem’. Newsweek (28.5.90:62) recently expressed this reversed dualism: Women, after all, are not a big problem. Our society does not suffer from burdensome amounts of empathy and altruism, or a plague of nurturance. The problem is men—or, more accurately, maleness. More specifically, the problem is male violence, and especially male violence against women. Rosalind Miles has discussed this violence in her hard-hitting work The Rites of Man (1991). She refers to men as ‘the death sex’, a term coined originally by a man, and she added firmly: ‘To explain violence is to explain the male. The reverse is also true’ (1991:8, 12). From this fairly explicit statement about the moral inferiority of men she moved on to ‘what biologists acknowledge to be “the natural superiority of women”. She cites one authority who states that males begin life ‘at a biological disadvantage’, for the Y chromosome provides little genetic and hereditary protection against disease. So biology really is destiny; Freud was right, but for the wrong reasons and in the wrong polarity. Another expert comments that ‘you can think of maleness as a type of birth defect’ (1991:18–19). So Aristotle and Aquinas were wrong; it is men, not women, who are defective. 61
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The old gender ranking is now being reversed. Paul Theroux affirms: I have always disliked being a man. The whole idea of manhood in America is pitiful…Even the expression ‘Be a man!’ strikes me as insulting and abusive. It means: Be stupid, be unfeeling, obedient and soldierly, and stop thinking. (In Miles, 1991:100) Glenn Close spoke in similar terms: Men have always been at the mercy of women, and still are. We are emotionally and spiritually stronger than men, and more ruthless: men are more vulnerable (In Miles, 1991:131) There seems to be a groundswell of opinion that women are, or may be, biologically, emotionally and spiritually superior to ‘pitiful’, ‘stupid’, ‘violent’ (and other such epithets) men. Miles’ final chapter is entitled ‘Killer Male’, in which she asks: ‘What remedy for men, maleness, masculinity, manhood?’ (1991:234). Death, presumably. Not only are men the problem, so are the patriarchal societies they have created, according to some. Mary O’Brien (1989:299; cf. 25) affirms: Patriarchy is not healthy. It legitimates violent solutions to historical problems in ways which casually destroy whole species, the natural environment and the well-being of individuals; it is pre-occupied with death and infatuated with power; it claims to transcend contingent nature while it invents sexism, racism, and genocide. In the past women were, and indeed still are, negatively defined. In the present the pendulum is swinging and the sexes are polarizing as men are negatively defined by women. Marilyn French’s latest book The War against Women (1992) documents male physical, legal, political, marital etc…atrocities. Susan Faludi’s book, Backlash, is subtitled ‘The Undeclared War against American Women’ (1992). In Canada the Standing Committee of the Department of Health and Welfare presented its report entitled The War against Women (Canada 1991). The war is not only physical but also economic, legal, political, cultural, in the media, medicine, business… 62
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But not all women agree, about men, patriarchy, capitalism and the definition of the problems and the solutions. Camille Paglia argues: One of feminism’s irritating reflexes is its fashionable disdain for ‘patriarchal society’, to which nothing good is ever attributed. But it is patriarchal society that has freed me as a woman. It is capitalism that has given me the leisure to sit at this desk writing this book. Let us stop being small-minded about men and freely acknowledge what treasures their obsessiveness has poured into culture. We could make an epic catalog of male achievements, from paved roads, indoor plumbing, and washing machines to eyeglasses, antibiotics, and disposable diapers. We enjoy fresh, safe milk and meat, and vegetables and tropical fruits heaped in snowbound cities. When I cross the George Washington Bridge or any of America’s great bridges, I think: men have done this. Construction is a sublime poetry…If civilization had been left in female hands, we would still be living in grass huts. (1991:37–8) The only solution, according to the women’s movement, is feminism and the transformation of society. Thus the polarities of dualism have been reversed. Adam, not Eve, is the problem; and Eve, not Adam, is the solution. THE MEN’S MOVEMENT
‘What do men really want?’ This was the title of the lead article in a recent issue of Newsweek (24.6.91). How times change! The question simply reversed Freud’s famous question of 60 years earlier. The men’s movement began, according to Newsweek, in 1990 with the airing of Bill Moyers’ documentary on the poet Robert Bly and the publication of his book Iron John. It is still too early to see what the effects of the movement have been, or may be in the future. Suffice it to say that Bly rejects the negative definition of masculinity: ‘It is important to be able to say the word masculine without imagining that we are saying a sexist word’ (1990:234); and he describes American men as ‘soft’: nice, gentle and sensitive, but unhappy, anguished and lacking in vitality. This he attributes to the absence 63
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of fathers, absent by work, death, divorce or separation; so the mothers socialize their sons into their male roles. Other spokesmen have been more concerned about male destructiveness and self-destructiveness. Some men may dominate the pinnacles of power; but others (sometimes the same ones) also dominate the prison populations. Men also commit suicide about three times more often than women, although women attempt suicide more often than men. Despite the attention paid to male violence against women, men are much more likely to be murdered than women. Violence is much more of a problem for men than for women. Furthermore, men die more often in traffic accidents, industrial accidents, domestic accidents and others than women. Alcoholism rates are much higher for men than for women, and so are drug abuse rates. For all the leading causes of death, male death rates are higher in North America and the United Kingdom. Their mortality rate is about 40 per cent higher than women’s, which translates into about eight years of the lifespan. Some have called this mortality pattern ‘androcide’, and portray men (rather than women) as victims of culture and/ or biology. Miles and many others argue that men must learn from women. Bly suggests that men learn from men. LIVES AND DEATH S
The debates continue. Are we all one? Or are we at war? Are we equal? Or is one sex superior to the other? If so, which? And by what criteria? Or are we complementary? The United Nations Declaration on Human Rights (1967) states that: ‘All human beings are born free and equal’, and lists a series of rights. Admirable though this declaration is as a statement of moral principle—and it is a major conceptual advance over patriarchal definitions from Aristotle to the French Revolution and beyond— it is not a statement of empirical fact. The structural inequality of women and the paramount salience of gender has been extensively demonstrated in North America, Europe and elsewhere. This raises the obvious questions: Are boys and girls born different? Are women and men biologically programmed for different lives and deaths? Or are all the differences cultural? The nature-nurture debate is old and bitter, and the consensus seems to be vague: it is not clear exactly what the behavioural 64
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differences are between the two genders; nor is it clear whether such differences as do seem to exist are due to biology or culture. Natural scientists tend to argue that biological differences—genetic, hormonal and/or brain laterality—determine gender differences in behaviour, thinking, aggression, sexual patterns—virtually all human activity (Wilson, 1979; Moir and Jessel, 1991; Kimura, 1992). From the side of the womb to the side of the brain in 2,500 years: the more things change! Social scientists have usually stressed gender similarities, believing that the differences are caused by socialization, starting with pinks and blues in the nursery. Boys learn to be masculine and girls to be feminine (however these attributes are defined in different cultures or eras) from many sources: parents, schools, peers, media, advertising, churches, and from toys and birthday cards to fairy tales, movies and video games. The two points most experts seem to agree on are, first, that such average differences as do exist are the result of the interaction between biological and social factors; and second, that the range of variations within each gender is far greater than the range between them. Yet we are not merely passive victims of biology or society. We also choose our identities from a wide range of possibilities and options. Neither biology nor culture determines Madonna, Boadicea, Curie, Thatcher and Mother Teresa. Despite the range of possibilities, women and men still live out lives in conventional dualistic styles, in almost every domain. We express and reinforce the very dualism which so many have found oppressive, and inaccurate. Gender norms still permeate the universe, and the universe is still gendered, as it was for the Pythagoreans. In dress and colour, make-up and hair-styles, the hands and the feet, cosmetic surgery and body-builds, we symbolize our opposite sexes. The rituals of the body are also gender-specific. We eat and drink different products, very often, and in different styles: the steak versus the light salad, the large scotch or pint of bitter versus the glass of white wine or lager and lime, the gobble or the nibble, the chug or the sip. All these patterns, and others, typically and stereotypically symbolize masculine and feminine. We even smoke differently. Women do not usually smoke cigars or pipes; and specific brands of cigarettes are often targeted to one gender: Virginia Slims versus Marlboro. Techniques of smoking also vary: James Dean’s style was not Marilyn Monroe’s. 65
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Dancing, too, socializes women differently from men. Ballroom dancing again reflects the opposing gender ideals. The male fittingly ‘leads’ the female, who walks backwards into the future. She is entirely dependent on the male’s vision of the path ahead (Okely, 1978:569). Furthermore, it is usually the man (taller and stronger) who flips and swings his partner, whether in rock and roll, ice-skating or ballet Sports and hobbies often are also gender-polarized, but not totally. Body contact sports and high-risk leisure activities are usually the male domain: rugby, car-racing, hang-gliding, horse-racing, parachuting…although there are female mountaineers, jockeys, bodybuilders and round-the-world yacht racers. Both sexes may play tennis, paint in oils, ski and enjoy gardening or walking, but few men do needlepoint or crochet. One may emphasize the similarities or the differences. Magazines, books, TV shows and films—they are all as gendered as the sports, hobbies, lifestyles and values they reflect. Women and men tend to have different preferences—indeed magazine stores are often divided like the old Berlin into different sectors: women, men, children, general. Cosmopolitan, Vogue and Ms in one, GQ, Playboy, Angling Times in another. Books are similarly gendered: westerns and war books as against Harlequin romances and Danielle Steel— not all books, of course, but enough to make the point The Rambo, Terminator, Bruce Willis and Bruce Lee films are usually preferred by men, and such as Thelma and Louise, The Sound of Music and Gone With the Wind by women. TV too: the game—soccer, baseball, almost any game as long as there is beer—versus the soaps. The points are sufficiently obvious not to require statistical quantification, I hope; but, generalizations though they may be, they are not trivial in their cumulative impact. Men and women even speak differently. We speak different ‘genderlects’, says Deborah Tannen, we have different conversational styles and goals; and failure to understand this results in endless confusion, anger, pain, and misunderstandings (1990, 1986). This stems in part from our different values and needs: Though all humans need both intimacy and independence, women tend to focus on the first and men on the second. It is as if their life-blood ran in different directions.’ A vivid enough biological metaphor. Men see the individual in a hierarchical world order: ‘Life, then, is a contest, a struggle to preserve independence and avoid failure.’ Women, however, tend to see themselves ‘as an individual in a network of 66
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connections…Life, then, is a community, a struggle to preserve intimacy and avoid isolation’ (1990:24–26). So men and women tend to talk at cross-purposes: the same language with different meta-messages, and different intents. They deal with problems differently: women tend to seek empathy and reassurance, Tannen notes, while men tend to want solutions; again, men tend to talk more in public, women in private, which Tannen describes as reporttalk and rapport-talk, and they have very different ideas of what is important. Men’s silence in the home is as notorious as women’s chattiness, which women regard as connecting. Furthermore, since it is conversational styles and goals which differ, it is very difficult to solve these communication problems by talking! The solution, insofar as there is one, lies in recognizing that the two genders do indeed speak in different genderlects. Gloria Steinem, however, has a number of practical suggestions for challenging ‘the politics of talking, and listening’ (1983a:176–90). Do women and men even think differently? The question is highly political, and opinions vary. Men used to believe they were complimenting women in saying, ‘You think like a man’; which suggests that many men believed that they thought differently from women: men think logically, women are emotional and can’t think ‘straight’. This conservative view was challenged in practice by the rise to political power of such women as Golda Meir, Margaret Thatcher and Indira Gandhi, and the numerous Nobel Prizes won by women, from the two won by Marie Curie in 1903 and 1911, in two different disciplines—physics and chemistry. The monistic theory of the sixties, that the two sexes think the same, as members of the same species, was soon itself challenged. Some feminists suggested not only that men and women did think differently, but that women thought ‘better’. ‘Masculinist’ thinking is characterized as linear (straight), role-oriented, impersonal, cold, dominant, competitive—compared to the lateral, holistic, personal, warm, contextual and connected thinking of women, caring and nurturing rather than oppressive (see Chodorow, 1978; Gilligan, 1982; Fee, 1983; Ruddick 1989). Even in bed, men and women are, supposedly, different and more or less problematic. ‘Are men uninformed about your sexual desires and your body?’ ‘Yes’, most men are, replied 69 per cent of the respondents in The Hite Report; ‘No’, said only 15 per cent, with another 16 per cent giving mixed responses (Hite, 1976:620). Hite did not ask quite the same questions of both sexes, but she 67
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reported that most men said that women do not want sex often enough: only 11 per cent were fully satisfied with the frequency of sex (Hite, 1981:599). Evidently all is not well in the bedroom: men are uninformed, and women are unwilling—a vicious circle. According to one journalist, in a classic dualistic statement: ‘Men compartmentalize their feelings. They can be casual about their sex lives. For women it’s more of a bonding experience. Men use intimacy to get sex. Women use sex to get intimacy’ (Time 9.4.84:91). Of course women can also be casual and men can want intimacy. But there is a consensus on what one might describe as ‘gendered sex’. Ann Oakley asserts: …the basic issue is this: that sex doesn’t have the same meaning for women as it does for men; women don’t have the same meaning for men as they do for women; men don’t understand gender—or sex. Sex doesn’t have the same meaning for men as it does for women, because personal relationships don’t have the same value for the two sexes, and this lack of parity in turn proceeds from the early differentiation of the two sexes into the two genders within the family. (1992:200–1) Or this lack of parity may proceed, according to anthropologist Helen Fisher, from differential bio-chemistry, a heritage of our genetic background and human evolution. Men sleep around ‘for variety’, which spreads their genes, in Fisher’s Darwinian view, while women sleep around ‘for goods and services’, which protects their genetic future—but ‘both men and women seem to exhibit a mixed reproductive strategy: monogamy and adultery are our fare’ (1992:95). Publicizing this work of Fisher and others in its ‘Happy St Valentines Day’ issue, Time’s cover story on the ‘Chemistry of Love’ argued that ‘romance is a biological affair’ with each sex often wanting different things in sex, love and marriage (15.2.93). After the sex and the loving, the issue of birth arises. The abortion issue sharply divides men and women in North America, the United Kingdom, and elsewhere; also controversial are the new reproductive technologies, home birthing, Caesarians and the utility of episiotomies. 68
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And after the birth, there is the naming of the baby; and this too is political. As Gloria Steinem says: ‘It is political that women bear men’s names and children bear men’s names…The power of naming is a very political power’ (1983a:17–18). Furthermore, the selection of particular names may themselves socialize into gender-polarity. Most names may not carry emotional or moral overtones, but women are far more likely to be named after pretty and fragrant flowers, virtues, precious gems and the warm months of the year: Daisy, Rose and Violet; Charity, Chastity and Prudence; Pearl and Ruby; April to Julie (but not dandelion, lust, granite or February). Although friendly diminutives can be found in both sexes—Kathy and Tony—women’s names socialize differently from such monosyllabic noises as Nick, Dick and Rick; Bill, Will and Phil; Tim and Jim; Jack and Jock; Don and Ron and John. Individually, all these polarized gender differentials may not seem to amount to much. What’s in a name? It can always be changed. And there are always exceptions and overlaps; the compartments are not watertight. Women do eat steak, and men do sip white wine; and both drink Perrier; and to polarize high heels and workboots as gender-attributes may seem to smack of the stereotypical rather than the proverbial ‘insightful generalization’. Cumulatively, however, the total packages of these symbols and rituals of the body, over the entire life span, in virtually every social domain constitute very different lives. Names, colours, beautification, dress, eating and drinking, smoking, dancing, walking and talking, and hawking too, sitting, shaking hands or kissing them, hairstyles and finger-nails, eyes and size, sex, preferred reading, films and television, sports, hobbies and leisure time activities, not to mention occupational apartheid and income differentials… they all say male or female, opposite. Not surprisingly, the studies of gender stereotypes show major differences between men and women and express, by definition, common-sense ideas about gender. Archer and Lloyd have summarized these stereotypes in their ‘gender table of opposites’ (see Table 2.2). The significant features of this table are not only the oppositions but also how similar the stereotypes are to Aristotle’s descriptions of gender 2,500 years ago! This may of course reflect the similarity of gender status in society: the stereotypes have not changed because gender roles have not changed, much. 69
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Table 2.2 A gender table of opposites: contemporary stereotypes of men and women
Finally, we die of different things at different times all through the life cycle. Men in all age groups are much more likely to die from accidents, including car accidents, as well as from homicide and suicide. Such mortality is caused by lifestyle or is lifestyle related. Some male vulnerability seems to have a genetic base, however. About 130 male embryos are conceived for every 100 female embryos, but due to differential rates of spontaneous abortion and still-births, only about 106 of these are born; and once born only 95 baby boys leave the hospital for every 100 baby girls. Then in their first year of life, the usual infectious diseases of childhood kill about one-third more boys than girls (Miles, 1991:18–19). Finally, in old age, men also have higher mortality rates for almost all the degenerative diseases: strokes, heart attacks, cancers, respiratory diseases, cirrhosis of the liver, etc. The cumulative consequences of all these differential mortality rates in infancy, and in youth through to old age, is that women tend to have a higher life expectancy than men: they live about eight to ten years longer than men, on average. 70
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Men and women, therefore, live very different lives, die rather different deaths, and are not only socially defined as ‘opposite’, in defiance of biology, but also create themselves in symbols and rituals, and ideologically, in opposition to each other. There are two traditions in Greek thought about opposites: the Platonist one in the Symposium that opposites attract and are mutually complementary, and the majority tradition, rooted in Greek cosmology and humoural science, that opposites battle. Given the gender inequality, we might expect conflict to prevail, particularly since the emergence of the women’s movement, and its challenge to patriarchy and male power and culture. We might be right Attitudes seem to have hardened in recent years, although the data are incomplete. A recent Roper poll of women’s attitudes to men in the United States found that only half of the 3,000 women surveyed agreed that ‘most men are basically kind, gentle, and thoughtful’: down from two-thirds in 1970. And 42 per cent described men as ‘basically selfish and self-centered’ (Globe and Mail, 26.4.90). CONCLU SION
Gender, then, is not just a biological given but a struggle for power. We have seen that what people believe to be male and female has varied over the centuries, ranging from positive to negative, equal to unequal, opposite to complementary. What is a man? What is a woman? We can see that the answers are historically relative; and we know from anthropologists, particularly Margaret Mead, that the answers are culturally relative; but whatever they are, the contemporary women’s and men’s movements seem to be polarizing the two genders, but with opposite valences. Symbolic and ritual dualism seems to be as strong as ever; structural and economic dualism appears to be declining, slowly, as economic differentials are reduced, and as occupations are integrated; but attitudes are hardening and may become more antagonistic as both sexes compete for scarce resources. Men have justified their hegemony and women’s inequality, in numerous ways and in every discipline. But times change, and so do societies. Now men are being defined as the problem: killers, rapists, racists, imperialists, death-oriented and genetically deficient The battle is not only verbal, however, it is also physical and structural. 71
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Dualism, as a confining and dichotomizing ideology, is itself problematic. It has both ‘legitimated’ male dominance, and, more recently ‘legitimated’ the women’s movement. In the past it used to be considered part of the problem perhaps; now, some consider it to be part of the solution—a necessary ideology, until structures are equalized and humanized. Gender remains therefore a critical attribute of the body politic, like colour and age, and also like beauty.
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3 BEAUTY AND THE FACE Truth and goodness, mirrors and masks
What is the face? The face, as unique, physical, malleable and public, is the prime symbol of the self. It is unique, for no two faces are identical, and it is in the face that we recognize each other, and identify ourselves. Our faces are pictured in our passports and identification papers. The face is physical, and therefore personal, yet it is also ‘made up’, ‘put on’ and subject to fashion. It is public, but also intensely private and intimate. And it is malleable; with its 80 mimetic muscles, the face is capable of over 7,000 expressions. Furthermore, the face indicates the age, gender and race of the self with varying degrees of accuracy; also our health and socioeconomic status, our moods and emotions, even perhaps our character and personality. The face is the location both of four of our five senses—sight, taste, smell and hearing—and for our intakes of food, drink and air. It is also the source of verbal communication, and an important source for non-verbal communication. Gloria Swanson once said: ‘We didn’t need dialogue. We had faces.’ Moreover the face is also the principal determinant in the perception of our individual beauty or ugliness, and all that these perceptions imply for self-esteem and life chances. The face indeed symbolizes the self, and signifies many different facets of the self. More than any other part of the body, we identify the face as me or you. Nothing indicates the significance of the face more than the failure to recognize faces and facial expressions. Dr Sacks has described one such person, a victim of Korsakov’s syndrome, who, during the medical examination, apparently mistook his wife for a hat, and, literally, tried to pick her up to put on his head; not surprisingly, he could not recognize facial expressions either. Yet another patient, horrifyingly, could not recognize his own face in a mirror (1987:11– 13, 21). 73
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Even more horrifying was Tommy, afflicted with amniotic band syndrome, who had no face: no eyes, no nose, three horns protruding from his head, and a ‘gaping hole’ for a mouth; he also had no higher cortical functions (Marion, 1990:92–3). The immense and increasing social significance of beauty in general and the face in particular can be seen in economic terms. In the United States sales of beauty aids increased from $40 million in 1914 to $18.5 billion in 1990 (Raines, 1974; Standard and Poor, 1992: H40). The economics of cosmetics and toiletries are probably proportionately similar in the United Kingdom and Canada (cf. Coleman with Coleman, 1981; Canada, 1989). But this represents only a small fraction of the appearance and beauty industry. Many, perhaps most, purchases require aesthetic considerations for the presentation of the self as a physical and a social phenomenon. The beauty industry impinges particularly on the clothing industry, the hairdressing industry, cosmetic surgery, the food industry, the fitness business, and certainly the media and the advertising industries. Virtually every sector of the economy, except perhaps the defence industry, is affected to a greater or lesser degree by aesthetics. The power of beauty, and ugliness, in society is indicated clearly in the research data. One major study reported that: ‘Students thought good looking persons were generally more sensitive, kind, interesting, strong, poised, modest, sociable, outgoing and exciting than less attractive persons. Students also agreed that beautiful persons are sexually more responsive than unattractive persons’ (Berscheid and Walster, 1972:46, 74). This ‘halo effect’ which the researchers described has its corollary, the ‘horns effect’ of ugliness. The impact of physical appearance is pervasive. Attractive children are more popular in school and achieve higher grades; parents and teachers have higher expectations of attractive people, and more positive evaluations of their personality. The more unattractive the individuals, the greater the probability of their being perceived as mentally ill or disturbed; and the less favourable their prognosis once diagnosed. In simulated court cases, the more attractive accused were usually recommended the more lenient sentences. Again, attractiveness elicits more and speedier helping behaviours in experiments in subways, highways, on the street (when allegedly bitten by a rat) and in hospitals. Attractiveness is the prime predictor of romantic attachment for dating; and attractiveness opens doors for jobs, for higher salaries in jobs, and for higher evaluations of 74
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work done. And so on. These effects apply not only in attitudinal and behavioural terms, but also in psychological terms, for the ‘effects’, positive or negative, are likely to be internalized by the target populations through the self-fulfilling prophecy, with consequences for self-esteem and happiness, in a virtuous or vicious circle (Patzer, 1985). Patzer, who has written the definitive review of the research, concludes: The picture is not pretty. Physical attractiveness touches practically every corner of human existence and it does so with great impact The research thoroughly documents the advantages of higher physical attractiveness and the disadvantages of lower physical attractiveness’ (1985:255). And he describes the degree of discrimination and prejudice against the unattractive as an ‘atrocity’ (1985:5). This aesthetic discrimination, parallel to the more well-known gender, class and race discrimination, is so widespread as to be a cultural norm; yet it is so taken-for-granted as to be almost invisible. The beauty mystique may not be fair, but it does explain the vast investment of time, money, energy and pain in beauty.1 Beauty is more important for women than for men. One indication of this is cosmetic surgery. About 664,000 cosmetic surgery procedures were performed in the United States in 1990, the latest year for which statistics are available, and about one and a quarter million reconstructive procedures. This is a 70 per cent increase over 1981, making plastic surgery one of the fastest growing specialities in medicine in the United States. The vast majority (87 per cent) of aesthetic procedures were performed on women, and the proportion has remained constant over the last 10 years. Men are having more operations, and new types of surgery, including calf implants and pectoral implants, but women still outnumber men 7 to 1. The most frequent cosmetic procedures for women are, in order, liposuction, breast augmentation and collagen injections; for men they are nose reshaping, eyelid surgery and liposuction. The face would seem to be relatively more important to men, and women are more concerned about more areas of the body: hips and thighs, and breasts, as well as the face. These figures understate the true number of procedures, since they include only those performed by registered members of the American Society of Plastic and Reconstructive Surgeons (1992). The figures do give some rough indication, however, in quantitative terms, of the relative salience of beauty by gender, and of the increasing importance of beauty. 75
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Two surveys provide additional evidence of this increasing power of appearance, and indicate dramatically increased levels of dissatisfaction with the body from 1972 to 1987. For example, 13 per cent of men and women were dissatisfied with their height in 1972, but this rose to 20 per cent and 17 per cent respectively in 1987; about 10 per cent were dissatisfied with their face, but this doubled to 20 per cent in 1987. Weight was even more problematic: 35 and 48 per cent of men and women were unhappy about it in 1972, but this increased to 41 and 55 per cent in 1987. These are high levels of dissatisfaction with the self. ‘We’ve become a nation of appearance junkies’, says Rodin (1992a); and increasingly unhappy ones at that. The emotional power of the beauty mystique (and its negative consequences) therefore seems to be accelerating. The first modern beauty contest, apart from the judgement of Paris in Greek mythology, was conducted by Phineas T.Barnum in the USA in 1854, with the people as judges.2 The ‘Miss America’ contest was staged in 1921 and was followed by ‘Miss World’ (1951) and ‘Miss Universe’ (1952). Quite apart from the thousands of local competitions, in municipalities, universities, football teams, etc., the national pageants in the USA now include ‘Miss Black America’, ‘Miss Teen USA’, ‘Little Miss America’, ‘Mrs America’, ‘Miss Wheelchair America’, ‘Miss Pork Queen’ (sponsored by the Pork Industry), ‘Miss Nude World’, the ‘World’s Most Beautiful Tattooed Lady’, and ‘Miss Man Made’ (for transsexuals). There are relatively few competitions for men, but these include ‘Mr Olympia’, won by Arnold Schwarzenegger seven times, and ‘Mr Gay America’ (Banner, 1983:249–70; Russell, 1986:20, 168; Burwell and Bowles, 1987:3–14). In the United Kingdom, the competitions include the ‘Face of the Eighties’, ‘Miss Lovely Legs’, ‘Long and Lovely’ (for hair), ‘English Rose’ and ‘Miss Pears’ (soap). In 1983 Poland was the first Eastern bloc country to send a contestant to the ‘Miss World’ competition. In 1985 the first beauty contests were held in Hungary and China. And in 1988, under the auspices of glasnost, Moscow had its first beauty contest. Only Muslim countries do not hold such contests. Thus the beauty mystique is increasingly being institutionalized around the world, particularly for women. Beauty none the less remains controversial. In 1984 it was expected that one-third of the population of the USA would watch the ‘Miss America’ beauty contest on television; but in the same year in the Old World, the BBC decided to stop televising beauty 76
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contests, deeming them ‘anachronistic and almost offensive’ (New York Times, 11.9.84; 25.11.84). And in 1992 the ‘Miss Canada’ pageant was cancelled as sponsors withdrew their support (Globe and Mail, 4.1.92). The most conclusive evidence of the socio-economic significance of beauty and ugliness is presented by Kaczorowski (1989), in his elegant study of the Canadian Quality of Life panel survey of 4,000 full-time workers conducted by York University in 1977, 1979 and 1981. The researchers requested the interviewers to do two things not usual in surveys: to assess the sincerity of the respondents, and to assess their physical attractiveness on a scale from one to four: homely, average, good looking and striking. This was therefore the first national survey on aesthetics ever conducted. Kaczorowski has demonstrated that physical attractiveness has a positive and substantial effect on socio-economic achievement, with respect both to income and to occupational prestige. Thus 37 per cent of those considered attractive (the top two categories) had high incomes compared to only 27 per cent of the ‘homely’. In economic terms, the good looking (about one-third of the sample) earned 75 per cent more, on average, than the unattractive; and the unattractive (or ugly) earned on average 57 per cent of the incomes of the good looking. The average looking were evenly distributed through the income range. These income differentials are not drastically different from male-female income differentials in the United Kingdom and North America, nor from White-Black income differentials in the United States. The semiotics of appearance begin to seem as economically significant as the semiotics of gender and colour. Furthermore, the good looking were almost twice as likely as the ugly to be in high-status occupations, and almost half as likely to be in low-status ones. The average looking were, again, evenly distributed across the range. Canada, therefore, is an aesthetic stratification system. But this raises some obvious questions. Are they wealthy because they are good looking, or good looking because they are wealthy? Are they poor because they are ugly, or ugly because they are poor? The answer, one might suppose, is a bit of both. But it isn’t. Since this was a longitudinal survey, Kaczorowski was able to show, using regression analyses, that the degree of attractiveness is the cause of differentials of wealth and status. How? One explanation is precisely the halo and horns effects demonstrated by earlier researchers. The good looking were far more likely to be judged 77
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‘sincere’ than the ugly; 81 per cent of the good looking were said to be sincere compared to only 59 per cent of the ugly; and 41 per cent of the ugly were thought insincere compared to only 19 per cent of the attractive—more than twice as many. Obviously, given these judgements, the ugly are less likely to be upwardly mobile (Kaczorowski, 1989). Looks do matter. And what is inside may not count quite as much as we had thought. Although there has been some research on the socio-economic and legal dimensions of such related areas as height (Keyes, 1980; Miller, 1987), obesity (Millman, 1981; Baker, 1982), and physical handicaps (Murphy, 1987), clearly far more research is needed on aesthetics in the United Kingdom and the United States. Are there also aesthetic stratification systems? But why is appearance so important? Where does the halo effect come from? Should aesthetics be so significant in social interaction? And why is the face the symbol of the self? For answers we have to turn to our roots. THE GOOD: PLATO AND BEAUTY
The beauty mystique, in its simplest form, is the belief that the beautiful is good, and the ugly is evil; and conversely that the morally good is physically beautiful (or ‘good looking’) and the evil is ugly. Thus the physical and the metaphysical, body and soul, appearance and reality, inner and outer, are one. Each mirrors the other. The belief is most ancient. In The Iliad, Homer equated evil and ugliness in his description of the loathed Therstis: He was the ugliest man that had come to Ilium. He had a game foot and was bandy-legged. His rounded shoulders almost met across his chest; and above them rose an egg-shaped head, which sprouted a few short hairs. (Bk 2; 1983:45) He looked like the villain he was, and not unlike an Ian Fleming villain. Similarly in The Odyssey, the only villain, apart from Penelope’s suitors, was the one-eyed giant, Cyclops. Odysseus, on the other hand, was ‘radiant with comeliness and grace’ (1981:108). These are the first indications of the identification of the good and the beautiful, the evil and the ugly. Plato, however, established the beauty mystique on a metaphysical base which is now an intrinsic part of Western culture. In the 78
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Symposium (211) Plato develops the theory that there is a scale of perfection ranging from individual human beauty up the ‘heavenly ladder’ to absolute Beauty, which is Love: Starting from individual beauties, the quest for the universal beauty must find [the candidate] ever mounting the heavenly ladder, stepping from rung to rung—that is from one to two, and from two to every lovely body, from bodily beauty to the beauty of institutions, from institutions to learning, and from learning in general to the special lore that pertains to nothing but the beautiful itself—until at last he comes to know what beauty is. (1963:562–3) Socrates adds that ‘all my life I shall pay the power and the might of Love such homage as I can’ (Symposium 211–12; 1963:562–3). Beauty therefore is not only primarily physical—it is also identical with Good and Love, and with happiness, wisdom and truth and knowledge. Indeed beauty, like the body, is a central theme in Plato’s philosophy. Conversely, ugliness equates with the opposite qualities in another table of opposites: evil, ignorance, lies and hate, unhappiness, waste and destruction (1963:373, 493–5, 670, 1549). Beauty and ugliness are not merely physical, but metaphysical; and here lie the philosophical origins of the halo and horns effects. The Greeks loved beauty, as their architecture, statuary, pottery, coins and mosaics show; and they loved the beauty and power of the male body competing, nude, in the Olympic Games for a thousand years. Aristotle even said that beauty is ‘the gift of God’ (Laertius, 1972:461), which surely implies that ugliness is, or may be, a punishment from God. If the one is positive, the other is negative. Yet many Greeks were sceptical about beauty. Theophrastus, who succeeded Aristotle at the Peripatetic school, described beauty as ‘a mute deception’; and Theocritus said it was ‘an evil in an ivory setting’ (Laertius, 1972, vol. 1:463). Euripides, often a critic of his society, spoke strongly against beauty in Orestes (lines 126–7) (408 BC), when Electra blames the beautiful Helen for all the deaths in the Trojan War: Oh, what a vileness human beauty is, Corroding, corrupting everything it touches. 79
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THE FACE AS MIRROR: ARISTOTLE AND PHYSIOGNOMICS
Aristotle did not develop Plato’s theory of beauty as goodness, indeed he distinguished between them, for goodness ‘implies conduct as its subject, while the beautiful is found also in motionless things’; but he did define beauty: The chief forms of beauty are order and symmetry and definiteness’, or proportion in other translations (Metaphysics 1078; 1984:1705). 3 The idea of beauty as proportion inspired not only the Greek sculptors, notably Praxiteles, but also Vitruvius, Leonardo da Vinci, Dürer and Le Corbusier. Francis Bacon (1561–1626), however, perhaps finding this definition a trifle mathematical, insisted that: There is no excellent beauty that hath not some strangeness in the proportion’ (1985:189). Faces, rather than beauty, were what fascinated Aristotle; and his treatise Physiognomics established physiognomy as a science, although it was probably written by one of his followers at the Peripatetic school after his death. Aristotle argued that the face is a ‘particularly suitable’ part of the body to indicate ‘mental character’ (1984:1250). One example will suffice: The face, when fleshy, indicates laziness, as in cattle; if gaunt, assiduity, and if bony, cowardice, on the analogy of asses and deer. A small face marks a small soul, as in the cat and the ape; a large face means lethargy, as in asses and cattle. So the face must be neither large nor little: an intermediate size is therefore best. (1984:1246) With ‘beautyism’ firmly established by Plato, and ‘facism’ by Aristotle, the beautiful face is semiotically linked to God, Love, the self and the soul; it is far more than simply physical. During the Renaissance, the rise of astrology added new power to the face, as astrologers described faces according to the seven planetary types, as they had described bodies also. Face-reading, like chiromancy or palm-reading, was popular, often according to the physiognomic principles developed by Aristotle. Metaposcopy, the reading of the lines and marking of the forehead, was a specialized discipline pioneered by Jerome Cardan and enjoyed a brief vogue in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Even the moles, warts and wrinkles on the face were plotted on portraits, and ‘divined’ for their cosmic significance. In the medieval view, everything had 80
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meaning, all was one; all corresponded. Past, present and future were written in the face, if only it could be divined (Magli, 1989; Finkelstein, 1992). The decline of astrology, with the rise of science, rationalism and mechanism, did not destroy physiognomy, however, but merely transformed it from a predictive, cosmic mode back to the traditional Aristotelian descriptive mode. Indeed physiognomy as a ‘science’ remained very popular throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Johann Lavater’s classic work On Physiognomy, which ran through 18 editions in many languages from its first publication in 1775 to 1885, was dedicated to the proposition: ‘If you would know men’s hearts look in their faces.’ Lavater also formulated ‘A Hundred Rules of Physiognomy’. The effectiveness of Lavater’s physiognomics is indicated by the reluctance of the Captain of HMS Beagle to allow Darwin on the expedition to South America. According to Darwin’s account, the Captain ‘was an ardent disciple of Lavater…and he doubted whether anyone with my nose could possess sufficient energy and determination for the voyage’ (1887, vol. 1:59–60). Lavater’s influence is also evident in the corpus of nineteenth-century European literature (Tytler, 1982). Later specialized works were published on noses (Warwick, 1848), ears (Cherry and Cherry, 1900) and resemblances between humans and animals (Redfield, 1852)—ideas that had lasted 2,000 years. Interest in physiognomics declined again in the second half of the nineteenth century, perhaps in part because of the vigorous attack against it by Hegel in The Phenomenology of Mind (1807/ 1961:342–8), but also due to the rise of phrenology—dismissed by Hegel also: ‘Bumps and hollows, there is room for selection!’ (1961:361). The rise and fall of phrenology was relatively rapid, but the ‘science’ persists among some New Age believers with the reprinting of old classics (Fowler and Fowler, 1835/1969; Wells, 1871/1971) and new work by a self-styled witch (Leek, 1970). Physiognomics enjoyed a brief renaissance in business circles in the early 1900s, under the leadership of one Dr Holmes Whittier Merton (Brandt, 1980:95–6); and re-appeared as ‘characterology’ in later decades (e.g. McCormick, 1920). Indeed physiognomics is still popular in some circles, and trade books are numerous (Baker and Bellack, 1981), including works on Chinese physiognomics (Mar, 1975; Kushi, 1981; Young, 1984). Studies on body language and face language promise to reveal the truths about moods and feelings, 81
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as well as character (Fast, 1971; Hall, 1973; Nierenberg and Calero, 1973; Davis, 1976). Perhaps the most presumptuous physiognomist of the century, however, is Kahlil Gibran: ‘Show me your mother’s face; I will tell you who you are’ (1962: n.p.). Aristotle and the science that he founded are therefore alive and well in our culture. Yet, while the themes of beauty and the face can be distinguished conceptually in their origins in Plato and Aristotle respectively, in fact they blend and merge with each other in Christian and indeed in contemporary thought. Here we examine the convergence between the face and beauty as symbols of the self. VAIN, DUNG AND GOD: CHRISTIANITY AND BEAUTY
Beauty has been controversial in Judaeo-Christian thought. The Bible warns against beauty; according to Proverbs (31:30) ‘beauty is vain’.4 Isaiah (28:1) said that ‘beauty is a fading flower’, Jeremiah inveighed against beauty (4:30), and the ascetics ignored the conventional beauty and dress norms, from Samson to John the Baptist This philosophy is entirely compatible with the early Greek ascetic tradition expressed in Plato’s Orphism. On the other hand, in the Song of Solomon, the bride and the King praise each other’s beauty and goodness in earthy and physical rather than metaphysical terms. Early Christianity did not impinge directly on this discussion of the face and beauty. The teaching of Christ and Paul on the body emphasized, as we have seen, both its intrinsic goodness and its dangerousness. Beauty had its place, but secondary to the search for the Kingdom; but anyone who can refer to the ‘glory’ of a woman’s long hair (I Corinthians 11:15) is not totally insensitive to beauty. The Christian love of beauty is evident in Christian creations: the Gothic cathedrals and the stained glass, the Gregorian chant, illuminated manuscripts, the religious statuary and the paintings. Yet always there is tension; for on the other hand, all creation and all beauty may be dismissed: ‘All is vanity’ (Ecclesiastes 1:14), or, in Saint Peter’s words: ‘All flesh is as grass, and all the glory of man as the flower of grass’ (I Peter 1:24). Some Christians emphasized the ascetic side, some the transcendent side; Plotinus (c. 203–62 BC) emphasized body82
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negativism. In his development of Plato’s aesthetics and metaphysics, he retained Plato’s idea of the ladder of beauty (I:6; 1956:56–64); and Beauty, together with the One and the Good, are the names of the Absolute: the One is ‘beauty above beauty’ (VI:7, 32). He also maintained Plato’s dualism, polarizing Matter and Soul, evil and good, ugly and beautiful: ‘A Soul becomes ugly …by sinking itself into the alien, by a fall, a descent into body, into Matter’ (I:6, 5; 1956:60). He seems to have experienced this dualism personally, for Porphyry, his friend and biographer, records that he ‘seemed ashamed of being in the body’, and refused to sit for his portrait (1956:1). Indeed he dismissed beauties of the body as ‘copies, vestiges, shadows’ of Beauty, and not to be pursued. What should be pursued, he said, is beauty of the soul: ‘We ourselves possess beauty when we are true to our own being; our ugliness is in going over to another order; our self-knowledge, that is to say, is our beauty; in self-ignorance we are ugly’ (V:8; 1956:433). And he advised his readers: ‘let each become godlike and each beautiful who cares to see God and Beauty’ (I:6; 1956:64). This equation of God and Beauty is reiterated by Augustine in his famous prayer. But for Augustine matter is not evil and ugly, nor is physical beauty a shadow; matter is good, and beauty reflects God, for God is Beauty, and Beauty is God: ‘I have learnt to love you late, Beauty at once so ancient and so new! I have learnt to love you late!’ But Beauty is also Good: ‘It was you, then, O Lord, who made [earth and the heavens], you who are beautiful, for they too are beautiful; you who are good for they too are good; you who ARE, for they too are. But they are not beautiful and good as you are beautiful and good’ (Confessions, Bks 10, 27; 11, 4; 1961:231–2, 256–7). Jerome (345–420), a contemporary of Augustine’s, was less preoccupied by beauty but observed the face; indeed his is a classic statement of facism, echoing Cicero: The face is the mirror of the mind, and eyes without speaking confess the secrets of the heart’ (Letter 54; 1975:251). Boethius (c. 475–525), continued the mainstream of thinking about beauty from Plato to Augustine. Indeed God is described as the ‘height of beauty’ (1969:97). Yet Philosophy, in the person of a lady, warns Boethius against (physical) beauty: ‘The sleek looks of beauty are fleeting and transitory, more ephemeral than the blossom in spring’ (1969:92). Bernard of Clairvaux, who inspired the Second Crusade, echoed Plotinus when he said that: ‘Interior 83
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beauty is more comely than external ornament, more even than the pomp of kings.’ Indeed he declared bluntly that (physical) beauty is ‘dung’: We who have turned aside from society, relinquishing for Christ’s sake all the precious and beautiful things in the world, its wondrous light and colour, its sweet sounds and odours, the pleasures of tastes and touch, for us all bodily delights are nothing but dung. (In Eco, 1986:9, 7) Yet Bernard also believed that ‘the body is an image of the mind’. Beauties may be dung (Bernard), shadows (Plotinus), or ephemeral (Boethius), but bodily beauty was still symbolic, as Gilbert of Hoyt advised: have regard also for the bodily countenance whose grace can be seen in its abundant beauty; for the exterior face can refresh the spirit of those who look upon it, and nourish us with the grace of the interior to which it witnesses. (In Eco, 1986:10) The body, in this view, may be inferior to the immortal soul, but the body and the face reflect light and grace and beauty. They mirror the soul. Thomas Aquinas, however, did not believe that ‘inner’ and ‘outer’ were connected, that physical beauty mirrored spiritual beauty. Indeed, following Aristotle, he distinguished clearly between them: ‘Beauty of body consists in shapely limbs and features having a certain proper glow of colour. So also beauty of spirit consists in conversations and actions that are wellinformed and suffused with intelligence’ (Summa Theologiae 2– 2:145, 2; 1981, Vol. 35:75). Furthermore, we share the former with the ‘lower order’ of being, and the latter with angelic and infinite being (Hart, 1959:394). Aquinas defined beauty as ‘that which pleases’, and insisted that ‘the beautiful and the good are identical in reality; it is only the mind that makes a distinction between them’ (Summa Theologiae 1–2:27, 1; 1981, vol. 19:76; cf. Summa Theologiae 1:5, 4, 1). Furthermore, ‘beauty goes with (conveniat) every virtue’ (Summa Theologiae 2–2:141, 2; 1981, vol. 43:11). Indeed beauty is one of the transcendentals, the attributes of being, which are unity, truth and goodness. Beauty is also one of the attributes of God, for God as Existence is 84
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Infinite Goodness and Infinite Beauty. Aquinas reflects not only Plato’s ancient philosophy of beauty, but also Augustine’s prayer to Beauty (Hart, 1959:351, 386–93). Beauty is therefore of supreme value in Thomistic metaphysics; and he revived the Platonist equation of Beauty as Truth and Goodness. Beauty has been complex in Christian thinking; but beautification has been almost unanimously condemned as vain. Jeremiah (4:30) condemned beautification long ago: ‘And you, O desolate one, what do you mean that you dress in scarlet, that you deck yourselves with ornaments of gold, that you enlarge your eyes with paint? In vain you beautify yourself.’ Clement of Alexandria forbade women to dye their hair, to pierce the ears and to ‘smear their faces with the ensnaring devices of worldly cunning’; ‘love of display is not for a lady but a courtesan’, and ‘cosmetics and dyes indicate that the soul is deeply diseased’. He advised (and here he is reminiscent of Plotinus) that ‘the man, who would be beautiful, must adorn that which is the most beautiful thing in man, his mind’. Why? ‘“For it is monstrous for those who are made “in the image and likeness of God” to dishonour the archetype by assuming a foreign ornament’ (1956:273–87). Jerome (345–420) was even more caustic: ‘What have rouge and white lead to do on a Christian woman’s face? …They are fires to influence young men, stimulants of lustful desire, plain evidence of an unchaste mind’ (1975:241; cf. 163). The critique continued for a thousand years. Thomas à Kempis, the Augustinian monk and mystic, also warned about beauty: ‘Do not be vain about your beauty or strength of body, which a little sickness can mar and disfigure’ (Bk 1, ch. 7; 1952:34). Cosmetics did not come into general use in England until the reign of Queen Elizabeth; and the Puritans reiterated the traditional view that make-up is sinful. One divine, Phillip Stubbes, stated emphatically in 1583 that ‘whosoever do colour their faces or their hair with any unnatural colour, they begin to prognosticate of what colour they shall be in hell’ (Stubbes, 1973: n.p.). This was a somewhat tactless remark, since his queen’s hair was both red and coloured; but he was citing Ciprian. The Christian attack on beauty and beautification declined after the Renaissance, except for the Puritans. Now the Avon Beauty Guide says: ‘Make-up is fun. Make-up looks like you, only better’ (Griffin, 1979:16). 85
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FACISM AND TH E BEAUTY MYSTIQUE
During the Renaissance both physical beauty and the face were of divine and mystical significance. Beauty because in Platonist and Augustinian philosophy it led to God and, by reversal, reflected God; and in Thomistic philosophy Beauty is one of the attributes of God. The face because individual characters were inscribed there, and future fortunes could be read there by trained ‘diviners’. Also, the face was, and is, the prime focus of beauty. All these themes permeate The Divine Comedy of Dante (1265– 1321). The contrasts between beauty/ugliness, good/evil, love/ hate, joy/horror, light/darkness, God/Satan, permeate the work. The ugliness, horror and evil of the three-headed Satan, weeping from his six eyes, devouring sinners, with ‘runnels of tears and slaver’ dripping from his triple chin, is in sharp contrast with the former Lucifer, Light-Bearer, ‘once as fair as now he’s foul’ (1955, Vol. 1, Canto 34). Yet Dante cannot describe the beauty of Beatrice, transformed after their vision of the angelic circles (Vol. 3, Canto 30); it is the same when Saint Bernard bids Dante to gaze at the Virgin Mary, Mother of God: ‘Now to that face which most resembles Christ Lift up thy gaze; its radiance alone Can grant to thee the power to look on Christ’. I looked, and on that countenance there shone Such bliss… That nothing I had looked on heretofore Had held me breathless in such wonderment, Or unto God so close a likeness bore. (Vol. 3, Canto 32) For Dante, beauty is a reflection of the glory of God; and the face is the expression not only of the individual, but also of God. Even the structure of the face, the medievals believed, is witness to God. Dante reads ‘OMO in man’s countenance’ (Vol. 2, Canto 22, 1.32). This refers to the words ‘[H]OMO DEI: man is of God’ inscribed on the face. The two eyes represent the two Os, the lines of the eyebrows form the M, and the ears form the D, while the E and I, horizontally, are formed by the nostrils and the mouth (1955, Vol. 2:248, 251). Perhaps the finest exposition of the medieval idea of beauty, which closely followed Plato’s, was offered by the courtier Baldesar Castiglione (1478–1529): 86
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beauty is a sacred thing…[it] springs from God and is like a circle, the centre of which is goodness. And so just as one cannot have a circle without a centre, so one cannot have beauty without goodness. In consequence, only rarely does an evil soul dwell in a beautiful body, and so outward beauty is a true sign of inner goodness… Therefore for the most part the ugly are also evil, and the beautiful good. And it can be said that beauty is the pleasant, gay, charming and desirable face of the good, and that ugliness is the dark, disagreeable, unpleasant and sorry face of evil…it can be said that in some manner the good and the beautiful are identical, especially in the human body. And the proximate cause of physical beauty is, in my opinion, the beauty of the soul. (1984:330–2; emphasis added) This belief that physical beauty is caused by spiritual beauty is characteristic of the Renaissance; but Castiglione went on to suggest that the lover of physical beauty may grow to love intellectual and spiritual beauty, and may grow from the love of particular beauties to the love of universal beauty and ultimately God (1984:340–1). Castiglione not only reflected Plato, Augustine and Aquinas but also justified secular and sensual delight in beauty: a superb synthesis of ‘biology’ and theology, the profane and the sacred, sex and God. Castiglione’s concerns with the meanings and causes of physical beauty followed the Platonist and Neoplatonist traditions, but another sixteenth-century Italian, Firenzuola, seems essentially modern in his long description of ideal feminine beauty. He described the hair, forehead, skin, eyebrows, eyes, ears, temples, nose, mouth, teeth, chin, hands and so on in great detail (in Burkhardt, 1981:209–11). Two points are instructive, however. First, beauty is purely physical; there is no suggestion that beauty is a symbol of virtue or leads up a ladder to God. Beauty is not metaphysical. Second, Firenzuola marks a literary turning-point in that the feminine is the paradigm of beauty now, rather than the male as in the Greek tradition; the change is evident also in the paintings of da Vinci, Botticelli and Raphael. Despite these paradigmatic shifts, old ideas were not completely displaced. Francis Bacon followed Castiglione and Platonism in his aphorisms: ‘Virtue is nothing but inward beauty; beauty is 87
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nothing but outward virtue’ (1884:156). Conversely, in his essay on deformity, he states: ‘Deformed persons are commonly even with nature, for as nature hath done ill by them, so do they by nature; being for the most part (as the Scripture saith) void of natural affection; and so they have their revenge of nature’ (1985:191–2; Bacon’s emphasis). Bacon’s contemporary in France, the essayist Montaigne (1553– 92), was a strong adherent of the beauty mystique, and a great admirer of beauty. He found it ‘incongruous’ that Socrates, with the ‘beauty of his soul’, was so ugly as they said; for ‘there is nothing more likely than the conformity and relation of the body to the spirit’. He added: ‘I cannot say how much I consider beauty a powerful and advantageous quality…I consider it as within two fingers’ breadth of goodness’ (1965:809–10). The equation of beauty and goodness, the conformity of body and soul, the value of the face—the central themes are sketched very clearly. Miranda also subscribed to the beauty mystique. In The Tempest (Act I, Scene ii) she identified physical and moral beauty on first seeing Ferdinand: I might call him A thing divine, for nothing natural I ever saw so noble… There’s nothing ill can dwell in such a temple. For Miranda, the man is good looking therefore ‘a thing divine’ and therefore good. Caliban, on the other hand, is both evil and ugly—a monster both literally and figuratively; Prospero calls him ‘A devil, a born devil…and…with age his body uglier grows’ (Act IV, Scene ii). The conflict between good and evil is also a conflict between beautiful and ugly. Miranda was not alone in her beliefs. Thomas Walkington (1607) was equally moved: ‘When I doe gaze with a longing looke on the comelinesse of the feature without, I am more than halfe persuaded of the admirable decencie within’ (in Camden, 1941:401). And Thomas Browne in Religio Medici (1642) asserted that: ‘there are mystically in our faces certaines characters which carry in them the motto of our Soules wherein he that cannot read A.B.C. may read our natures’ (1964:57). Milton (1608–74) also subscribed to the beauty mystique. Adam and Eve are beautiful in Paradise before the Fall, reflecting God: 88
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for in their looks divine The image of their glorious Maker shone, Truth, wisdom, sanctitude severe and pure— (Paradise Lost, Bk 4:288ff.) Even Satan, newly expelled from heaven, is at first still glorious and majestic (Bk 1:59ff.; Bk 2:302ff.); but as his evil intent develops he appears ‘squat like a toad’ (Bk 4:800); and then ‘mixed with bestial slime’, a serpent (Bk 9:165). Finally, after the Fall, he and all the devils are punished by God and transformed permanently into ‘a crowd of ugly serpents!’ (Bk 10:538–9). Where Dante had written, till words failed, of the increasing beauty of goodness and love in his ascent into heaven, Milton stressed the increasing ugliness of sin. But the equations of the beauty mystique were identical for both. The Romantic poets of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries were captivated by beauty, natural beauty in particular, but human beauty also, and even the idea of beauty. Wordsworth wrote about a little girl in ‘We are Seven’, and captures the essence of the beauty mystique: ‘Her eyes were fair, and very fair;/Her beauty made me glad’. William Blake in his satirical ‘Proverbs of Hell’ includes a classic facist proverb: ‘He whose face gives no light, shall never become a star.’ Another proverb states that ‘Exuberance is Beauty’. Coleridge, like so many others, was impressed by the beauty of Lord Byron: ‘so beautiful a countenance, I scarcely ever saw…his eyes the open portals of the sun—things of light and for light’ (in Abrams, 1968:1457). Certainly Coleridge did not consider the notorious rake virtuous, even if beautiful; yet he equated beauty with sun and light, both familiar analogues of God. Byron himself wrote a famous poem that begins: ‘She walks in beauty, like the night/Of cloudless climes and starry skies’; and concludes in the by now familiar strains of the beauty mystique, equating beauty and goodness: The smiles that win, the tints that glow,/But tell of days in goodness spent,/A mind at peace with all below./A heart whose love is innocent.’ Shelley composed ‘A Hymn to Intellectual Beauty’, in which he states: ‘I vowed that I would dedicate my powers/To thee and thine—have I not kept the vow?’ (Socrates had made a similar promise to Love, as we have seen). Yet it was John Keats, dead at 26, who summarized the Romantics’ view in ‘Endymion’: A thing of beauty is a joy forever: Its loveliness increases; it will never Pass into nothingness. 89
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And he concluded his ‘Ode on a Grecian Urn’ with the muchquoted lines: Beauty is truth, truth beauty—that is all Ye know on earth, and all ye need to know. The consensus within European cultural history has been impressive. Beauty is objective, related to goodness and to God, and moral and physical beauty are related; it is located primarily in the face, which also reflects character and the soul and perhaps the future. And beauty as physically attractive not only reflects Divine beauty, and inner moral beauty, but also inspires physical desire, i.e. is sexy. None the less, there were some who objected, and observed the relativity of beauty. Montaigne, who, as we have seen, was an adherent of the beauty mystique, was also the first to offer an early anthropology of beauty: We imagine its forms to suit our fancy…The Indies paint it black and dusky, with large swollen lips and a wide flat nose. And they load the cartilage between the nostrils with big gold rings, to make it hang down to the mouth…In Peru, the biggest ears are the fairest, and they stretch them artificially as much as they can…Elsewhere there are nations that blacken their teeth with great care, and scorn to see white ones; elsewhere they stain them red. (1965:355–6) Voltaire (1694–1778), likewise, was more impressed by the relativity than the objectivity of beauty; for him, beauty is in the culture of the beholder, not in the philosophy of Plato: ‘Ask a toad what beauty is, absolute beauty, the to kalon? He will answer that it is his female, with two large round eyes sticking out of her little head, a large and flat snout, a yellow belly, a brown back’ (1972:53). The philosophical implications of such relativism were drawn by David Hume (1711–76). In his essay ‘Of the Standard of Taste’, he remarks: Beauty is no quality in things themselves: it exists merely in the mind which contemplates them; and each mind perceives a different beauty. One person may even perceive deformity, where another is sensible of beauty…To seek the real beauty, or real deformity, is as fruitless an inquiry, as to pretend to ascertain the real sweet or real bitter. (1965:6) 90
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Yet Hume was also a traditionalist, and in his most famous work, A Treatise of Human Nature (1739–40:2, 1, 8) he restated Aquinas’ definition of beauty (that which pleases), adding a corollary on ugliness or deformity: beauty is such an order and construction of parts, as…is fitted to give a pleasure and satisfaction to the soul. This is the distinguishing character of beauty, and forms all the difference betwixt it and deformity, whose natural tendency is to produce uneasiness. Pleasure and pain, therefore, are not only necessary attendants of beauty and deformity, but constitute their very essence. (1985:350) The addition of pleasure and pain to the ancient Platonist equation contributed another dimension to the beauty-ugliness mystique. Kant rejected Hume’s empiricism and subjectivism. In his Critique of Judgement (1790) he returned to a Platonist-type idealism: ‘the beautiful is the symbol of the morally good’ (1951:198). Schiller was more lyrical; ‘Beauty alone makes the whole world happy, and each and every being forgets its limitations while under its spell’ (1967:217; letter 27). Hegel was equally captivated by beauty. In his Aesthetics (1835) Hegel states that ‘everything beautiful is truly beautiful as sharing in this higher sphere [of the spirit] and generated by it’ (1975:2). And in his Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, he says: the beautiful is essentially the spiritual that expresses itself sensibly…in such a way that the sensible does not have being on its own account, but only has complete significance within the spiritual and through the spiritual, and is the sign of the spiritual. (1987:585; cf. 477) In Hegel’s view the human sensory form is determined by the spirit, the exterior by the interior, thus we create ourselves physically as well as spiritually: The external human form is alone capable of revealing the spiritual in a sensuous way. The human expression in face, eyes, posture, and air is material…but within this corporeality itself the human exterior is not only living and natural, as the animal is, but is the bodily presence which in itself mirrors 91
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the spirit. Through the eyes we look into a man’s soul, just as his spiritual character is expressed by his whole demeanour in general.5 (1975:433–4) Hegel insists that the body, especially the face, manifests the soul: ‘the face has a…centre in which the soulful and spiritual relation to things is manifested’. Indeed, a man’s ‘glance is what is most full of his soul, the concentration of his inmost personality and feeling’ (1975:729). Despite his materialism, Feuerbach echoed his former professor. In a brief passage on beauty he suggests: ‘The beautiful is the sensible in its transition to the spiritual’ (1980:89). The mystique of beauty, the face and the eyes is deeply rooted in European thought: for this takes us back to Homer and Plato. Schopenhauer (1788–1860) agreed with Hegel about the spirituality of the face, but, unlike Hegel, was a convinced physiognomist. He wrote: ‘That the outer man is a picture of the inner, and the face an expression and revelation of the whole character, is a presumption likely enough in itself, and therefore a safe one to go by.’ His facism is clearer in the emphatic statement that ‘the face of a man is the exact expression of what he is, and if he deceives us, that is our fault, not his’ (n.d.: 250, 254). Hence he recommended physiognomics: it is the study of truth. Beauty fascinated not only poets and philosophers but also naturalists. In The Descent of Man, Vol. 2 (1871), Darwin discussed the variations in, and functions of, animal beauty and the differences in cultural definitions of beauty; he concluded that: ‘It is certainly not true that there is in the mind of man any universal standard of beauty with respect of the human body’ (1981, Vol. 2:353). None the less, in his view, beauty was immensely significant in the evolutionary scheme of things, contributing to sexual selection (1981, Vol. 2:369). THE FACE, BEAUTY AND UGLINESS
In the twentieth century, the twin beliefs that the face (and the body) mirror the soul, and that beauty and goodness are one, and are reflected in the face, still persist as they did in the past. In a well-known passage Wittgenstein stated that ‘the human body is the best picture of the human soul’ (1968:178). One cannot help observing that Wittgenstein himself did not have a notoriously 92
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beautiful body. Also, the implications for the physically handicapped are clearly negative. Georg Simmel was fascinated by the face and declared bluntly in his essay ‘The Aesthetic Significance of the Face’ (1901) that ‘in the features of the face the soul finds its clearest expression’; and again: ‘the face strikes us as the symbol, not only of the spirit, but also of an unmistakable personality’ (1965:276, 278).6 The face tells the truth. Emerson, the American philosopher and poet, often wrote about beauty. In one essay, ‘Beauty’ (1901/1968), he says, echoing Bacon and Castiglione, that ‘Beauty is the mark God sets upon virtue’; and adds, in Platonist mode, that ‘Beauty, in its largest and profoundest sense, is one expression for the universe. God is the all-fair. Truth, and goodness, and beauty are all but different faces of the same all’ (1968, Vol. 1:19, 24). ‘Beauty is the virtue of the body, as virtue is the beauty of the soul.’ Indeed: ‘a beautiful person is sent into the world as an image of the divine beauty, not to provoke but to purify the sensual into an intellectual and divine love’. Furthermore, ‘perfect beauty and perfect goodness are one’ (1968, Vol. 12:240, 217). Continuing on this theme he asserts that: ‘Beauty is its own excuse for being’ (1968, Vol. 9:38); and is ‘welcome as the sun wherever it pleases to shine, which pleases everybody with it and with themselves, seems sufficient to itself… Her existence makes the world rich’ (1968, Vol. 2:178). These are classic statements of the beauty mystique. Thorstein Veblen in 1899 offered the first sociological theory of beauty, suggesting that ‘the utility of articles valued for their beauty depends closely upon the expensiveness of the article’ (1953:94); beginning with spoons, he then discussed the aesthetic values of parks and lawns, cats and dogs, and finally dress, of men and particularly of women. Of the ideal feminine beauty, he observed: The ideal requires delicate and diminutive hands and feet and a slender waist. These features…go to show that the person so affected is incapable of useful effort and must therefore be supported in idleness by her owner. She is useless and expensive, and she is consequently valuable as evidence of pecuniary strength. (1953:107) The beautiful woman is therefore a status symbol; she not only does not work, but cannot work; long hair, corsets, high heels, 93
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long dresses, and so on, are intended to indicate this: they too are status symbols; and the decoration of the woman with jewellery, making her an expensive ornament, reinforces this process, as does the attention to fashion and ‘the alleged beauty, or “loveliness” of the styles in vogue at any given time’ (1953:121, 125–6). Freud argued somewhat differently: ‘There is to my mind no doubt that the concept of “beautiful” has its roots in sexual excitation and that its original meaning was “sexually stimulating” (1977a:69n2). Indeed Freud seemed mildly perplexed by beauty: ‘Beauty has no obvious use; nor is there any clear cultural necessity for it. Yet civilization could not do without it’, apparently because the enjoyment of beauty can compensate for the threat of suffering. He suggests that: ‘The love of beauty seems a perfect example of an impulse inhibited in its aim’ (1985:270–1). Yet Freud’s theory of beauty originating in ‘sexual excitation’ neatly complements Darwin’s theory of sexual selection, quite apart from any compensation roles it may play. Rollo May is reminiscent of Socrates and Shelley in the title of his autobiography, My Quest for Beauty (1985). This reflects Kahlil Gibran (1883–1931): ‘We live only to discover beauty’ (1968:27). Edward O.Wilson, the founder of sociobiology and surely closer to Darwin than to Freud, also eulogizes beauty, the beauty of science.7 He quotes Hermann Weyl, the perfecter of quantum and relativity theory: ‘My work always tried to unite the true with the beautiful; but when I had to choose one or the other, I usually chose the beautiful’ (1984:6). There is an echo of Keats here; but for Keats beauty and truth could not clash. Wilson himself suggested that beauty may lie ‘in the genes of the beholder’ (1984:109), i.e. much that we perceive as beautiful is determined by some sort of genetic memory of mankind’s earliest and optimal environments in the savannah, on hills and by water. Here, of course, Wilson is referring to natural rather than to facial beauty; but the idea is intriguing. Our daily language indicates the prevalence of the beauty mystique. We might say that someone ‘looks good’, ‘looks divine’, or is ‘divinely beautiful’: phrases which neatly equate beauty, goodness and God. Conversely, the phrases ‘as ugly as sin’ or ‘looks like hell’ equally neatly equate ugliness, evil and the Devil. To be attractive is, by definition, to attract. To be lovely is to be lovable and, by implication, to be loved. Conversely, to be unlovely is to be unlovable and unloved; and to be ugly is to be repulsive and 94
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to repel. Beauty and ugliness are evaluated linguistically therefore, not only as physical opposites but also as moral opposites. On the other hand our proverbs and folk wisdom warn insistently against taking beauty at face value: ‘Beauty is only skin deep’, ‘Appearances are deceptive’, ‘All that glitters is not gold’, ‘Handsome is as handsome does’, and ‘Never judge a book by its cover’.8 In practice, however, the beauty mystique reigns and the folk wisdom is largely ignored. Ugliness and physical deformities, particularly facial deformities, are stigmatized (Goffman, 1963; Kampling, 1981). Birth-marks, as well as burns and scarring, or overweight, may traumatize the individuals concerned and those with whom they interact. Such conditions, whether congenital or accidental, may be changed by cosmetic surgery; but the psychic and social significance of ugliness is immense (Stallings, 1980; Kaczorowski, 1989). Indeed discrimination against the ugly was institutionalized in the so-called ‘ugly laws’ in some American cities, whereby those of ‘unsightly’ appearance in public places were liable to arrest (Note, 1987:2035). There is a second dimension to ugliness. Just as physical beauty is believed to symbolize inner moral or spiritual beauty or goodness, so too physical ugliness is believed to symbolize an inner ugliness or evil (as with Therstis, Cyclops, Lucifer, Caliban, as we have seen). The equation is also reversible. Semiotically, the ugly are evil, and the evil are ugly. Villains, at least in fiction, are portrayed as ugly, and often as physically deformed or handicapped (Captain Hook, Long John Silver, Richard III—villainous in Shakespeare’s play, if not in historical fact). It is not surprising, therefore, that the physically handicapped and/or the ugly are perceived as villains (e.g. by Bacon). Furthermore, those who are perceived as evil—i.e. enemies of one sort of another: military, ethnic, racial, political, etc.—are ‘uglified’—portrayed as ugly: propaganda includes ‘uglification’. In Germany, for instance, Hitler presented the Jews as both physically ugly and morally ugly in Mein Kampf (1924); the Aryans, on the other hand, were physically and morally beautiful, and biologically and spiritually superior. Riefenstahl’s film The Will to Power showed the Nazis as beautiful, blonde, noble and strong. Similarly, in Ireland and England during the Fenian crisis, cartoonists from each side showed the other as ugly: as apes, Yahoos, Frankensteins, vampires, and generally unpleasant (Curtis, 1971). Again, in the United States 95
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from the earliest days of contact, Blacks were stigmatized by Whites. The linguistic opposition of white and black connoted life and death, ‘purity and filthiness, virginity and sin, virtue and baseness, beauty and ugliness, beneficence and evil, God and the devil’ (Jordan, 1969:7; emphasis added). Centuries later Black nationalists responded with ‘Black is beautiful!’—by implication, white, its opposite, is ugly; and Malcolm X added that the white man is the Devil and the enemy (1965:212–13, 251, 266). The issues remained polarized, but the moral poles were reversed; now Blacks were beautiful and good; and Whites were evil and ugly. As in ethnic relations, so in crime. Cesare Lombroso, the Italian criminologist, concluded not only that ‘born’ criminals were atavistic throwbacks and moral imbeciles but also that a physical ‘criminal type’ existed, distinguished in their bodies by prehensile feet, lefthandedness and hernias, and in their faces by ‘outstanding ears, abundant hair, a sparse beard, enormous frontal sinuses’, prognathism, broad cheekbones, a low and retreating forehead, oblique eyes, a small skull and, in women, a masculine face (1911/ 1968:xviii, 369–72). It was therefore often possible to distinguish born criminals from the rest of the population: they were extremely ugly. The face is the clue to the criminal self. Lombrosian ideas still persist. In The Secret Adversary, first published in 1922 and still in print, Agatha Christie describes villains as looking villainous; one was ‘A villainous looking man with close-cropped hair’; a second had ‘a weak, unpleasant face…his shoulders cringed a little as he talked, and his eyes, small and crafty, shifted unceasingly’; and a third was still more obvious: ‘He was obviously of the very dregs of the society. The low, beetling brows, and the criminal jaw, the bestiality of the whole countenance’ (1987:51, 48, 53). He was, in sum, Neanderthal. This is perhaps less description than invective; but the process by which the evil, however defined, are portrayed as ugly, and the good are shown as good looking, both express and reinforce facist beliefs and the beauty mystique. Appearance symbolizes ‘reality’. The beauty mystique is rooted not only in physiognomy and philosophy, linguistics, ethnic relations, war and criminology, but also in our literary heritage. Our fairy stories imbue children with the mystique. In the Brothers Grimm’s story ‘Cinderella’, it is the remarkably beautiful and amazingly good Cinderella who wins the heart of the prince. In ‘Beauty and the Beast’, Beauty, who is both good and intelligent enough to see through ugliness, breaks the 96
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spell over the beast, who promptly turns into a handsome prince. The moral of the stories is not only that virtue triumphs, but so does beauty. Hans Christian Andersen’s story, ‘The Ugly Duckling’, tells how the poor duckling was loathed and persecuted by his brothers and sisters, and everyone else. Even his mother wished he had never been born. His problems are resolved only when he becomes a beautiful swan. All three of these stories exemplify the beauty mystique, and socialize children into the cosmic value and practical utility of beauty; and ‘Sleeping Beauty’ and ‘Snow White’ transmit the same morals. Adult literature emphasizes the same themes. In Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein (1817), the monster was so monstrous that even his creator rejected him and fled; yet he was intrinsically ‘benevolent and good’, in accord with Rousseau’s view of humanity. Society, however, rejected him for his ugliness—even young children, the monster learned, were prejudiced, and abhorred deformity. He explained: ‘Once I falsely hoped to meet with beings who, pardoning my outward form would love me for the excellent qualities which I was capable of unfolding.’ But he found no Beauty for his Beast. Spurned by all, shot at, hated, lonely and miserable, ‘I declared everlasting war against the species.’ He kills, again and again, but is filled with remorse. He and his victims were destroyed by the beauty mystique: the hatred and fear of ugliness. A more recent application of the same theme is in Ian Fleming’s James Bond novels, (not the films) where the villains are hideous (Synnott, 1990). Truth is often as strange as fiction, as the case of John Merrick, the so-called ‘Elephant Man’, exemplifies. He was so ugly, so deformed, that people paid to see him; and when travelling he had to wear a bag over his face. Dr. Treves, his very experienced physician, admitted that on the basis of his looks and his inability to articulate ‘I supposed that Merrick was imbecile and had been from birth.’ But he found out that he was wrong. The man was ‘highly intelligent…possessed an acute sensibility and—worse than all—a romantic imagination’ (Montagu, 1979b:17–18). In Robert Louis Stevenson’s The Strange Case of Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde (1886), the good doctor not only becomes the evil Mr Hyde, but he also becomes ugly—his face is transformed and his body is deformed: ‘Even as good shone upon the countenance of the one, evil was written broadly and plainly on the face of the other. Evil besides…had left on that body an imprint of deformity and decay’ (Stevenson, 1984:84). 97
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And in Oscar Wilde’s story The Picture of Dorian Gray (1891), the enigma was how Gray could be so evil, and yet still be so good looking; only the picture could resolve the contradiction. The same idea that the face is the mirror of the person is conveyed in George Orwell’s well-known dictum that ‘At 50 everyone has the face he deserves’ (1970:579). The same point was made in an American Catholic high school text of the early sixties: The faces of the pure, even those who otherwise lack natural beauty, are usually clear-eyed, noble, strong, open, innocent, appealing. But the faces of the impure, whether beautiful or homely, in proportion to their depravity often become hardeyed, coarse, weal, callous, naughty, brazen, sensuous, repellent. Yes, impurity leaves its ugly marks. (Elwell, 1961:566) A recent children’s book insists on the primacy of moral over physical beauty: If a person has ugly thoughts, it begins to show on the face. And when that person has ugly thoughts every day, every week, every year, the face gets uglier and uglier until it gets so ugly you can hardly bear to look at it. A person who has good thoughts cannot ever be ugly. You can have a wonky nose and a crooked mouth and a double chin and stick-out teeth, but if you have good thoughts they will shine out of your face like sunbeams and you will always look lovely. (Dahl, 1982:9) The nastier people become, the uglier they look; this view repeats Milton’s description of Satan; but the corollary is that ugly people are nasty! Conversely the morally good person ‘will always look lovely’. Essentially the same point is made by the theologian Charles Davis: The bodily beauty of men and women, the beauty that shines forth physically, is not purely physical. Everyone will admit this in regard to the human face. Facial beauty insofar as it comes from perfect physical proportions, firm flesh, and finely textured skin, can of itself be dead and unattractive. Indeed, such features may be the basis of an ugly countenance, expressing a selfish or hateful personality. But a face can have a quite extraordinary beauty in the mobile expressiveness with 98
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which it presents a rich, lovable personality, despite features in themselves physically ugly. The same is true of the body as a whole. Its living beauty is never exclusively physical. (1976:38) Facism and the beauty mystique are primarily visual; and they are most apparent in films and television programmes, advertising and comics (Longmore, 1985; Bogdan et al., 1982). Recent films illustrate the beauty mystique with particular vividness. In Batman, the evil Joker is hideous after his immersion in a tank of toxic waste; and the sequel, Batman Returns (1992), features the hideous and evil Penguin. In 1992 also Superman was finally killed by the again, ugly and evil Doomsday. In Dick Tracy, the bad guys are ugly: Flattop, Pruneface and Mumbles. The heroes, Michael Keaton and Warren Beatty, are supposedly reasonably attractive. Freddie Krueger, Darth Vader, Jabba the Hut and the Klingons are archetypally ugly and horribly villainous. In the Western mythology there is no distinction between the two. This mystique, however, has costs as well as benefits. Discrimination and prejudice against the ugly persist. Not everyone agrees that virtue shines through physical ugliness. One 32-yearold man states: I was an ugly child, I was an ugly teenager, and now I’m an ugly adult. I get angry when I hear some-one say that looks don’t matter. It isn’t true. Most people won’t give me a chance because of how I look. (Cash et al., 1986:32) This is precisely the point made by Mary Shelley, consolidated by the ‘Elephant Man’ and asserted by others defined as ugly or deformed. Tolstoy insists: ‘It is amazing how complete is the delusion that beauty is goodness’ (1978:538). Perhaps the most lyrical writer on beauty today is the poet and philosopher Kahlil Gibran. In his bestseller The Prophet (1923) he writes: beauty is…an ecstasy …a heart enflamed and a soul enchanted. …an image you see though you close your eyes and a song you hear though you shut your ears. …a garden for ever in bloom and a flock of angels ever in flight. 99
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People of Orphalese, beauty is life when life unveils her holy face. But you are life and you are the veil. Beauty is eternity gazing at itself in a mirror. But you are eternity and you are the mirror. (1985:82–3) Poets and artists, philosophers and theologians, politicians and criminolog ists, novelists and dramatists, naturalists and scientists, psychologists and cosmeticians…people in all walks of life have adored beauty, even where they have perceived it and defined it differently, and equated beauty with goodness and virtues of all sorts, and rewarded this beauty. Attractiveness does attract. Yet the unattractive protest that they are neither evil nor vicious. CONCLU SION
Beautyism, and its attendant, facism, the prejudice and discrimination in favour of the beautiful and attractive (however defined) and against the ugly and less attractive, are virtually institutionalized in our society, and they are the last major bastion of inequity. The United Nations Declaration of Human Rights states in Article 2: Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. There is no specific mention of physical appearance or handicap (except in so far as ‘race, colour, sex’ apply) and no awareness of the multi-dimensional impact of aesthetic prejudice and discrimination. Racism, sexism, ageism and class prejudice and discrimination have all been ‘exposed’, discussed and researched by sociologists, politicians, journalists, teachers, clergy and students for decades. Not that all these social problems have been solved, but they have been recognized. The pursuit of beauty, on the other hand, is widely regarded as an excellent investment with sub- stantial psychic, social and economic returns, and, for these reasons, it is increasing in salience in Europe, North America and around the world. 100
B EAUTY AN D TH E FACE
Beautyism and its converse, uglyism (to coin an ugly word), persist in all areas of our social lives, often in subtle and elusive ways, in small things and in big. Aesthetic relations are perhaps as significant as class, gender or ethnic relations as determinants of life chances; and aesthetic stratification as powerful as class, gender or ethnic stratification. The power of aesthetic relations derives, at least in part, from its polyvalence. Each age seems to construct the meaning and value of beauty differently, and indeed although people echo each other, each individual seems to perceive beauty somewhat differently. Beauty is many things to many people. On the one hand, beauty is perceived positively, but variously, as goodness, and a symbol of goodness; as fun and as good for the psyche; as truth, a status symbol and sexual excitation; as subjective, objective and as culturally relative; physical and metaphysical; a gift from God; earned and learned; as life and eternity. Furthermore, facism and the beauty mystique are institutionalized through the work of such novelists as Shelley, Wilde, Christie, Stevenson and Fleming; they are expressed in fairy stories and children’s stories, as we have seen; and in films and television programmes, advertising and comics, propaganda, ethnic relations and criminology. Hence their power. The beauty mystique has also been attacked by the ancient Jewish prophets and Christian ascetics, and occasionally by philosophers (Theophrastus, Theocritus) and writers (Euripides, Tolstoy); more recently health workers have warned of the dangers of beautification (Goldwyn, 1984; Nader, 1986), and animal rights activists have criticized the cosmetics industry and their research methods as destructive of animal life and welfare (Singer, 1977, 1985). The most powerful critique of the beauty mystique comes from the women’s movement, beginning effectively with Simone de Beauvoir’s The Second Sex (1953). In her view women’s interests in beautification are a contributing factor in the oppression of women. Make-up is a symbol of this oppression. Beauvoir argued that ‘woman’s narcissism impoverishes her instead of enriching her; by dint of doing nothing but contemplate herself, she annihilates herself’ (1953:707). Beauty is no substitute for h