The American Expeditionary Forces in World War I (Battle Orders 6)

The American Expeditionary Fqrces in World War I

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Lieutenant Colonel JOHN F VOTAW (US Army, Retired) is the Executive Director of the Cantigny First Division Foundation, Wheaton, Illinois. He is a graduate of the US Military Academy (1961), commanded US Army cavalry and armored units through the battalion level and served in Vietnam in 1966-67. He completed graduate studies in history at the University of California, Davis (MA, 1969), and Temple University (PhD, 1991). 'He is currently Adjunct Associate Professor of History at Dominican University, River Forest, Illinois.

O SPREY

Battle Orders · 6

PUBLISHING

The American Expeditionary Forces in World War I

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Series editors Marcus Cow per and Nikolai Bogda novic

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Acknowledgments

First published in 2005 by O sprey Publishing.

Midland House,West Way, Botle y, Ox ford OX2 OPH, UK 443 Park Avenue South, Ne w York. NY 100 16. U SA

I have believed for some time that the history of the American Expeditiona ry Forces in World War I was the st o ry of a rem arkable achievement of intellect. o rganizational skill. and raw determ ination on the part of the Ame rican military establ ishment. Although blunders in execution and bureaucratic snaggling took some of the luste r off that achievement, the work of General John J. Pershing st ill sta nds as an impo rta nt instructive chapter in Ame rican military histo ry.The scholarship of others has made it possible for me to make this small contribution of illuminat ing the AEF for the large. non -academic group of reader s. Professors Edward M. Coffman, Russell F.Weigley.Allan R. Millett and others have blazed a well-marked trail th rough the literature of World Wa r I. Dr.Timothy K. Nenninger and his colleague Mitchell Yockelson at the College Park. Maryland, facility of the National Archives have provided immeasurable help in understanding the documentary reco rds of the AEF in their custody. My family and friends have patiently, though anxiously watched the hatching of this small book. My museum and library colleagues at the First Division Museum at Cantigny and its collocated Colonel Robert R. McCormick Research Center, particularly Eric Gillespie and Andrew Woods' have helped find relevant materials in their very useful archival and photograph collections. Finally. to my AEF friend Private Max Ottenfeld, a signal wireman of the 18th Infantry Regiment now gone to his reward, well done good and faithful soldier. To all. thank you. The remaining infelicities of expression and any errors of fact and interpretation are mine alone

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Contents Introduction

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Mission

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Preparation for war

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Training in the US • Training in France' Schools in France

Command, control, communication, and intelligence

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Command and control' Communication' Intelligence

Organization

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The AEF General Headquarters and staff' The First Army· I Co rps The division' The division infantry brigade' The division artillery brigade' The Air Service The Tank Corps' The Services of Supply (SOS) • The engineers' Medical services American Expeditionary Forces, North Russia;American Expeditionary Forces , Siberia; American Forces in France;American Forces in Germany

Tactics

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Cantigny: a regimental attack supported by the division Soissons : a divisional attack as part of a French corps The tactics of aerial ccrnbat - Tank tactics

Weapons and equipment

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Equipment· Individual weapons' Automatic weapons' Artillery Armored fighting vehicles' Rail and truck transport > Aircraft

Armistice, occupation, recovery, and demobilization

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Retrospective

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Chronology

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Bibliography

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Source notes

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Index

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Introduction Unlike th e British, French, an d Ger man armies prior to 1917, th e United Stat es Army did n ot h ave a perman en t field army organization or an operational staff to suppo rt it . Th ere were no com bat divisions, army corps, or armies-only regimen ts. This is partl y a conse que n ce of the infrequenc y of US involvement in fore ign wars req uiring an expeditionary army and the n avy to carry it to the theater of operations. It is also a resu lt of the way th at th e American armed forces developed afte r the creat ion of th e Republic at the end of the 18th century. Through out it s his tory th e army, and to a lesser degree the n avy, deve loped with two strong eleme nts : a sma ll but capable standing, professional force, and a "n at ion in arms" citizen force that mobilized as threats developed. Of the two, th e latter force was more consi stent with the values of a democratic "

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republic, but it also was harder to maintain professional competence within an exclusi vely conscripted or volunteer army. At the end of the Civil War in the United States, advocates for both approaches to maintaining an armed force argued their positions. Emory Upton, a veteran Union Army officer, wrote of a military policy for the United States th at relied on a small, professional standing army that could be expanded in times of emergency. Others, notably John McAuley Palmer who was to serve in World War I, believed that the citizen army, or militia, could effectively protect th e nation . The war with Mexico in 1846-48, the Civil War (1861- 65), and the Spanish-American War (1898 ) were waged with mostly volun teer regiments. In 1887 Til e Volullteer Soldier ill America by Major Gen eral John Logan , an Illin ois veteran of th e Civil War, argued against a standi n g regular arm y in favor of the volunteer citizen-soldier as the m ain line of defense for Ameri ca. Alth ough the wars waged by the United States in the 19th century were bloody an d involved large field armies , it was not until World War I that the United States was confronted by modern technology combined with mass armies in an extremely large theater of operations. In 1917 most Ame rican men of military age had not traveled far beyond th e homes wh ere th ey were raised. Many soldiers came fro m rur al comm un ities and had atta ined som e seconda ry education . Th ey cert ainly were not wo rldly or even cosmo po litan in their outlook. In many instances, th eir service in the army was th eir first group experien ce. African -Americans served in signifi cant numb ers, but their service was clouded partly by the prevailing racial discrimination of the era. Some recent histories have argued that th e arriva l of two million largely untr ained and untested American doughboys in Fran ce at th e very tim e that European armies, including the German ene my, were on th e wane , tipp ed th e balance of victory to the Allies. Thi s is on ly partly tru e, as no sing le factor produced Allied victory. It ma y also be said th at the enor mo us sacrifices of the British and Fren ch field armies prevented a German victory before th e sprin g of 1918. This hyper-national way of viewing the largest military involvement of nati ons in mod ern h istory up to that point does n ot explain the success of either th e Allied nation s or th e Ame rican Exped itionary Forces. Th is sh or t book presents th e eleme n ts of the AEF that permitted rapid organi zati on and trainin g th at ultimately led to its making a signi fican t con tribution to Allied victory in World War I. There are four distinct but interrelated phases in the dev elopment of th e AEF as an effective fighting force. First, the successful mobilization an d movement of units to the debarkation ports so that they could be transported to France efficien tly was essen tial. Second, the reception at th e French ports of arrival and smooth movement to th e training areas in n ortheast ern France had to be accomplished with minimal disruption to on goin g Allied operations. Th ird, the AEF had to be trained quickly and made read y for combat operations compatible with the needs of the Allied high command. And finally, the AEF had to develop increasingly effective systems of com mand, control, and support as its strength increased from divisions to armies. Throughout this progressive devel opment, th e high command of the AEF had to find ways to integrate its efforts with those of the othe r Allies while remaining politi cally independent and faithful to th e intent of th e Ame rican president, th e US Cong ress, and th e Americ an people. All of this was achi eved in a remarkably short time with minimum shortfalls. If the AEF did not win the war in France for the Allies, it certain ly had a m ajor part in making that victory possible.

Officers of the 26th French Division. Chasseurs Alpins. who instructed the 1st Division at Gondrecourt, France. in t he fall of 1917. (US Signal Co rps . 80066)

Portrait ofGeneral John J. Pershing by John Doctoroff, oil on canvas. 30 by 24in.. 1938. in the collections of the 1st Division Museum at Ca ntigny. Wheaton. Illinois. (FD M)

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ABOVE General Pershing reading telegram at Issoudun aviation field, February 1918. (US Signal Corps. 7840) Born in Missouri in 1860. John Joseph Pershing. first captain of his West Point class of 1886, was not the most apparent choice to command the AEF in France , but he was the best choice. Captain Pershing. a cavalry officer on duty in Japan as a military attache, had been advanced to the rank of brigadier general in 1906 over many other more sen ior officers in the army. His father- in-law,Senator Francis Warren of Wyoming, assisted in bringing his son-in-Iaw's name to the attention of those who could help him, then the chairman of the Senate Military Affairs Committee shepherded the appointment through the government bureaucracy. Pershing's assignment to command the 8th Infantry Brigade, first at the Presidio of San Francisco then in Texas in April 19 14, was attended by the tragedy that forever changed his personal life. In August 1915. his family had been trapped and killed in a quarters fire at the Presidio . Only his six-year-old son Warren had survived . In 1916 he was appointed to head a punitive expedition into Mexico to find and capture Francisco "Pancho" Villa.In September 1916, President Woodrow Wilson promoted Pershing to major general. By this time the tall, good-humored "Sparta n" general had made his mark with his superiors and the American public.The audience he had to persuade, however. were the Allied nations fighting in Europe .

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The story of the AEF is mostly the story of the progressive development of a large field army and its many supporting organizations. Part of the story is the contribution of airpower and another part is the role of the US Navy in moving men and materiel to France. The former will be addressed in this book, but the latter is at the periphery, with the exception of the 4th Brigade, 2d Division (the Marine Brigade). The essence of an effective field army is the sum of trained and motivated soldiers, flexible and, resilient organization, inspired and competent leadership, appropriate doctrine and functional logistics. When the AEF landed in France not one of those elements was fully developed. The American field army was unprepared for combat. "Black Jack" Pershing dominated that situation as commander-in-chief of the AEF and imposed h is personality, style and, some would say, his stubbornness, as he shaped and prepared his fighting forces to take their place in the line and in history. He was the forceful opponent of sloth, age, infirmity, and obstinacy. Pershing would accept no interference in his command prerogatives, and, as a result, some judged him as aloof and uncaring. The instrument he fashioned to bring the weight of the American nation to bear in France was powerful, potentially lethal, and often unwieldy. But one thing was absolutely certain: the AEF was General Pershing's army. Since no effective staff system for the control of field operations and training of a large force existed in 1917 , Pershing and his "coterie" created one from whole cloth. Most of those officers were graduates of the School of the Line and/or the Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas . The AEF staff controlled all American military activities in the theater of operations, except the work of the military attaches and others assigned to various missions and embassies. Intelligence staff work was a "stovepipe," or vertical system whereby the Military Intelligence Division of the War Department General Staff (WDGS) had a direct lin e to the G-2 (intelligence staff section) of the AEF, for matters of h igher intelligence. Tactical intelligence that was immediately useful for continuing combat operations remained the purview of the field commanders. Dentistry, medicine, and nursing, although organized activities of the AEF, were handled in an ancillary way for most of the war in cooperative efforts with the French and British . The achievement of this imperfect system was all the more remarkable in that it worked, even if in a flawed way. All American divisions, with the exception of the Air Service, in France were infantry divisions of roughly 28,000 men and 6,600 animals each. A staff officer at General Headquarters AEF and operations units at army, corps, and division level repr esented the American Air Service. Armies usually fight as they have trained. In most instances the armies of the World War I era had a solid base of doctrine that governed training and combat. In the case of the AEF, that tactical-operational doctrine was inchoate and largely untested in 1917 . General Pershing wanted his army to fight in "open warfar e" style. He knew what that meant and his major subordinate commanders and staff officers professed to know what he meant, but in action the AEF divisions fought mostly as their French, and in some cases British, trainers had taught them. The American soldiers, however, were imbued with an offensive spirit that often carried them forward in the face of withering fire from enemy machine guns, mortars, and artillery. Beginning with Cantigny in May 1918, Belleau Wood in June, Soissons in July, St. Mihi el in September, and the Meuse-Argonne from late September to mid-November, the fighting divisions of the AEF sustained in creasing casualties. By the time of the final campaign of the war, those divisions were infused with replacements to such an extent that the character of the original divisions had been changed. Many junior officers and noncommissioned officers had been killed , wounded, or promoted, leaving the AEF with a new training problem right in the m idst of its sternest combat test . Pershing and others expected that the war would last well into 1919 before the Allies would finally pre vail.

Mission At the time President Woodrow Wilson asked the United States Congress to declare war on Germany and the other Central Powers on April 6, 1917, the US Army was a small provincial force recently engaged in coastal defense and field operations against Mexican irregulars. In May 1916 the army consisted of 65 regiments of infantry, 25 of cavalry, and 21 of artillery, with a total strength of 108,399 officers and men. The National Defense Act of 1916 had authorized a regular army of 175,000 soldiers in peacetime to be expanded to 286,000 in wartime. The National Guard was to be built up to 400,000 men and be supervised federally. The following year, on the threshold of America's entry into the war, the army had expanded by nearly four times, but still numbered und er 500,000 men. This was the instrument to be wielded by the United States in forming its expeditionary forces for service in France. A new Secretary of War, Ohio lawyer and politician Newton D. Baker, and 19 officers to man the department's general staff seemed woefully inadequate to wage modern war. When Major General John Pershing's forces were withdrawn from Mexico in February 1917, they had learned important lessons in transportation, logistics, and aviation, despite their failure to defeat Pancho Villa. At the moment of declaration of war, it was not clear that the United States intended to send a mass army to Europe. Some thought that the limited affront of the resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare by Germany might be met with a limited response rather than commitment to general war. Clearly the United States was initiating measures to prepare for war, not implementing existing plans and policies. President Wilson and Secretary Baker knew full well that volunteering of the sort used to deal with the emergencies of the 19th century would not suffice in France. When the United States severed diplomatic relations with Germany in February, the president quietly told Baker to prepare a conscription bill for Congress . The resulting Selective Service Act of May 18, 1917, recommended volunteering to raise a million men for the duration of the war, but authorized conscription to accomplish it if there were shortfalls in recruiting.

President Woodrow Wilson photographed in the East Room of the White House on June 3. 1918. by Lt. E. DeBerri of the Signal Corps. (US Signal Corps. 12078)

Secretary of War Newton D. Baker with members of his inspection party and members of the AEF staff at the Hotel Crillon , Paris. in April 1918. Front row. left to right, General Pershing. Secretary Baker. US Ambassador to France W illiam G. Sharp. and Major General William M. Black. chief of engineers. (US Signal Co rps. 7555)

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Major General Hugh L. Sco tt, chief-of-staff, United Stat es Army. November 16. 1916. to Sept ember 2 1. 1917. General Scott accompani ed for mer Secretary of Wa r Elihu Root o n an inspect io n tour of Russia in 1917. This pho to was ta ken at Camp Dix, New Jer sey.when Scott comman ded the post in 1918. (US Signal Corps. 84778 )

When Majo r General Hugh Scott , the ch ief-of-staff of the army from Novem ber 16,1914, to September 21,1917, notified General Pershing on May 2, 1917, that he was to orga n ize four regim ents of in fan try and one of artill ery from forces th at he had commanded in the Southwest, he added that "if plans are carried ou t, you will be in command of the entire force." Pershing took that to mean a provisional division; the War Department meant t he entire expeditionary army! There was only a rudimentary set of organizational documents and the effort was largely personal and ad hoc. On May 26 Secretary Baker forw arde d Persh ing a note containing the following instructions: 1. The Presid ent designates you to command all the land forces of the United States op erating in Continental Europe and in the United Kin gdom of Great Britain and Ireland, induding any part of the Marine Corps wh ich ma y be detached for service there with the Army . From yo ur com ma n d are exce pted the Military Attaches and others of the Army who ma y be on duty directly with our several embassies.

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In add ition to the usual administrative instructions, Pershing was to cooperate with the other countries operating against the Germans, with the "underlying idea" that th e US forces "are a separate and distinct component of the combined forces, the identity of which must be preserved." Clearly, General Pershing was to organize, train, and employ hi s forces in the general effort to defeat the Central Powers. Exactly how he was to do that was left up to him. Pershing judged that his instructions were "both admirable examples of th e powers that should be invested in a comm ander in the field an d were never changed or amplified in any essential."

Preparati on for war Everyaspect of preparation was uphill for the AEF following the declaration of war. Rudimentary planning had been underway at the War Department since Pershing's punitive expedition was operating in the Southwest and Mexico in 1916, but no decisions regarding how the expeditionary field army was to be organized and equipped, nor about the tactical doctrine that was to govern its employmen t, had been taken. The AEF would be built stone by stone based on the experience of a few general staff officers, the accumulated "lessons" of earlier field operations of the US Army and Navy in the war with Spain, and the advice of military missions from France and Great Britain. Additionally, a US military mission headed by Colonel Ch au ncey B. Baker, Quartermaster Co rps, traveled to Belgium, France , and Great Britain in June and July 1917 to visit "training camps and other military establishments, both in the zone of the interior and the zone of operations." It is hard to avoid the image of an ad hoc process of mobilization, training, and deployment of an American field army to France, but the few professionals who had experienced earlier mobilizations were makin g reasonable efforts in 1917 . It is a commonplace, however, that the United States was dramatically unprepared for entry into a major land war against European nations hardened by two-and-a-half years of grinding trench warfare . In notes prepared after the war, Brigadier General Fox Conner, the G-3 (operations officer) of the AEF, observed that on the threshold of US entry into the war German morale was high and an air of defeatism haunted the French. The Italians, as well as the Russians, might very well have been forced out of the war in 1917. Both England and France had spent their "best blood" and had their backs to the wall. "Black, indeed, were the Allied prospeets-except for America!" General Pershing had noted in his final report to the Secretary of War in 1919, that "Prior to our entrance into the war, the regiments of our small army were very much scattered, and we had no organized units , even approximating a division, that could be sent overseas prepared to take the field." The preparedness movement had by the fall of 1915, "become a popular fad and a craze, riding the progressive currents of nati on al efficiency and individual duty. " But the preparedness movement was not to "get the United States ready to intervene in World War I;" rather it "was almost purely defensive. Its thrust was isolationist, not interventionist." It began as an effort by Leonard Wood and like-minded colleagues to reform the army and by the end of 1916 had "evolved into a drive for a universal military training which had previously been unthinkable," But, without doubt, the crusade that America launched across the Atlantic in the summer of 1917 was inchoate, a patchwork quilt of enthusiastic raw-boned youths, untrained but strong in numbers. Pershing arrived in London with a small staff on June 9, 1917, and in France on June 13. The 1st Expeditionary Division was created from existing infantry, artillery, and engineer regiments and shipped to France, where their organization and training would take place near the field of battle. The 1st Division was Pershing's point of the spear and the base upon which he would build his army. He believed he would need a force of about one million men in order to achieve a "complete, well-balanced, and independent fighting organization"

General Pershing (left) and General Tom Bridges, British Army, inspe cting the Gua rd of Honor upon Pershing's arrival at Liverpool, England, in June 1917. Bridges was a member of the British Mission to the United States. (US Signal Corps, 95567)

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Brigadier Ge ne ral Paul B. Malone. "Follow Me" Malone wa s t he initial AEF training chief. He later commanded a regim ent and a brigade in the 5th Division . (US Signal Corps, 40 143)

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to conduct offensive operations in 1918; the future, he noted, might require three times that number. It is clear that the new commander-in-chief understood that there was more to effective emp loyment of his AEF than doctrine and training. He also needed, amongst other things, motivated officers at all levels, an experienced GHQ staff, and a functioning logistic system. Major General Hanson Ely, whose 28th Infantry Regiment made the successful attack on Cantigny, noted, "Many of our soldiers had received but little training before going into battle, a fact which swelled our casualties. Most of them were still, in a large measure, untrained when the war ended." Pershing believed that American doctrine, that is the standard procedure for how American combat units would train and fight, should be based on the principle that "the rifle and the bayonet remain the supreme weapons of the infantry soldier and that the ultimate success of the army depends on their proper use in open warfare ." The "how we should fight" doctrine was published in two key documents: Infantry Drill Regulations, 1911 and Field Service Regulations, 1914 . The Infantry Drill Regulations explained how infantry units from platoon to brigade should train and fight, while the Field Service Regulations provlded similar guidance for divisions and larger units . Both manuals were revised several times to keep pace with organizational changes and the tactical lessons from battlefield experience. Based on his own observations, and those of his staff, of the French and British, Pershing knew that he needed to establish a formal system of training schools to impart this basic concept to newly inducted officers, noncommissioned officers, and soldiers. The training was to be based on the experience of the 1st Division in a progressive, three-stage program . The exigencies of the war, however, were to thwart this orderly plan. The 1st Division barely completed the program and none of the following divisions came close to being fully prepared for battle. Secretary of War Baker and his War Department General Staff of 19 officers faced an enormous task in April 1917. The February 14, 1903, act of Congress created th e general staff but did not cancel the very powerful service department bureaus. The nation, with its robust manufacturing capabilities, had been supporting Britain and France but at the expense of building up the American armed forces. When Baker took over from acting Secretary of War Major General Hugh Scott on March 9, 1916, there was no plan to send American forces to France . President Wilson had been angry when he learned in the fall of 1915 that the general staff had been doing some contingency planning for a war with Germany, bu t he clearly misunderstood the nature of that speculative th inking by his military profess ionals. Prior to the declaration of war in April 1917, the president was consistently looking for ways to avoid American involvement in the European war. Given the unsettled nature of political and diplomatic activity in the months prior to April 1917, it is not surprising that the army did little to prepare for overseas service. Wilson was acutely aware of the preparedness advocates and the domestic political danger posed by their criticism. The officer training camps established at Plattsburg, New York, and several other places were initiatives of these political adversaries . There was no formal training structure for a large mass army in existence at the point of American entry into the war. It all had to be created at the same time as the first contingent-the 1st Expeditionary Division-was pulled together from the Texas-Mexico border area and literally assembled aboard ship on the east coast . The 2d Division was formed by adding to units already organized and in transit to France. The 5th Marine Regiment was attached to the 1st Division for movement, but attached to the 4th Brigade, 2d Division, in France. The 3d Infantry Brigade, with the 9th and 23d Infantry Regiments, was also moving toward the theater of war. What remained was to gather up the units to make up the 4th Infantry Brigade at Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, but the War and Navy Departments decided to form a Marine Brigade instead. The 2d Division headquarters opened

at Bourmont in the Department of Haute Marne on October 26, 1917. Brigadier General Charles A. Doyen, USMC, assumed temporary command until Major General Omar Bundy, US Army, relieved him on November 8. And so it went as units were knitted together into fighting divisions. Private Herbert 1. McHenry, later assigned as a machine gunner in the 16th Infantry Regiment, recalled his arrival for basic training at Camp Lee, Virginia, on May 29, 1918. Sixty-two percent of the inductees in McHenry's cohort were rejected for physical reasons. The new soldiers received their Enfield rifles after about ten days of drill and other processing activities. McHenry and his fellow soldiers destined for France left Camp Lee on July 17 and marched to City Point, Virginia, to board a river boat for Newport News where they boarded the Czatitza, an old Russian passenger ship . The 5,000 soldiers arrived at Brest, France, on July 29. After a ride in a "Forty and Eight" boxcar to Tours, the logistical headquarters of the AEF, McHenry traded his Enfield for a Springfield rifle and received some bayonet drill. After several more days of marching and train riding, the new 1st Division men reached their destination. lt was probably that way for most of the American boys joining the AEF.

Training in the US Lieutenant Joseph Dorst Patch was in the 26th Infantry Regiment stationed at Texas City, then a part of the 2d Division commanded by Major General J. Franklin Bell. He remembered that training consisted of "marksmanship (rifle and pistol), drill (close and extended order) and long hard marches in heavy marching order." Patch's battalion sailed on the Momus, late of the United Fruit Line, on June 14, where the machine gunners were issued the troublesome Benet-Mercie machine guns, "complicated pieces of air-cooled mechanisms, which almost required a jeweler to strip and assemble." The troops had never seen or fired those guns and fortunately received "better guns overseas." While the units of the Regular Army and the National Guard in federal servicewere available within the four continental departments, Hawaii and the Philippines, the total of 9,693 officers and 203,864 enlisted men would provide only seven divisions if every soldier was mobilized for overseas service . The Selective Service system brought more than 2.8 million men to the training camps during America's period of belligerency, most co-located with army posts. Additional housing had to be constructed at the existing camps and an additional 32 camps-16 each for the National Guard and the Regular Armywere built . Many of the new camps were built in the South or the Southeast, mostly because of the favorable weather and training conditions. Each camp was designed for about 40,000 trainees, but General Pershing's reorganization proposal of July 10, 1918, raised the strength of infantry companies from 150 to 250 soldiers, and so the barracks were too small! But it was not the barracks problem that slowed the commencement of training until September 1917. The culprits were the slow and somewhat cumbersome induction process and the shortages of equipment and supplies. Nonetheless, the temporary camps sufficed to gain the necessary momentum to raise, equip, and train the initial troop cohorts of the army. The acquisition and training of officers was a bit more complicated. The National Defense Act of 1916 made provisions for reserve forces for the regular establishment and the National Guard. However, the nation never came close to recruiting those numbers that were authorized. On the day that the United States entered World War I, 5,960 officers were present for duty; but this was 1,292 officers short of authorized strength. Moreover, reports from France showed that attrition within the infantry units required additional manpower above authorized strength to absorb what the British called "wastage." Ultimately General Pershing decided to designate a handful of arriving divisions in France as support or "depot" divisions. The 41st Division fulfilled this role in General Hunter Liggett's I Corps, mostly because Colonel

Brigad ier General Harold B. Fiske fo llowed Malone as AEF training chief. Fiske was responsible for developing and implementing the AEF traini ng program in France. (US Signal Corps. 24 359)

II

Dougla s Mac.u tbur, the ch ief-of-staff of the newly ar rived 42d Division (Rainbow), argued strenuo usly that his division sho uld not be pa rceled o ut as rep lacement s for o the r divi sion s. At th e Armistice on Novem ber II , 191H, th ere were 203 ,786 officers in a total force of 3,685,45 8 or about 5.5 percen t. Th e first 16 traini ng cam ps for officers ope ned on May 15,1 91 7, patt ern ed o n th e Platt sburg mod el. Platt sburg Barracks (NY), Fort Benj am in Harr ison (IN), and Fort Sheridan (lL) eac h hos ted two cam ps, and ten o the r army posts eac h suppo rted o ne ca m p. The first train ing cycle ended o n August 11, with 27,3 4 1 men com miss ion ed. Th ree more cycles , the last end ing in February 191 9, produced mor e office rs whil e training was first decentralized to div isions , th en re-centralized to ta ke th e bur den off deploying d ivisio ns. A training cam p for African-Am erican officers was in o peration at Fort Des Moines (lA) from June 18 to Octo ber 18, 1918, resulting in 639 comm issio ned office rs from an ad m itt ed group of 1,250 candida tes . Several other speci al office r-trai ning cam ps were cond ucted in 1918. Th e tot al number of officers co mmissio ned from all cam ps was 80 ,568, with 48,968 of th ose in th e infantry and 20,29 1 in th e arti llery. In o rde r to susta in div isions th at had mob ilized an d ' v'ere beginn ing to deploy in th e last ha lf of 191 7, th e United States acce pted the offers of Fran ce and Britain to supply officers and non commission ed officers to tra in Amer ican soldiers in th e US cam ps. In Sept ember 191 7, th e Third Bureau of th e French Gene ral Staff commented o n the substa nce of th e training program and noted th at it sho wed onl y a battalion sector and greatly sim plified the com plex tasks of organi zing the position of an infantry division for trench warfare. 111e relation ship between realistic traini ng and actual combat was em phasized by the idea that in organi zing positions "Bloody losses [will bel sustained by ign orance. error, or laziness." Althou gh th is depende nce o n foreign trainers relieved the strain o n deplo ying divis ions and those already in France who did no t have to suppl y stay-behind deta ch ments of officers and no ncommi ssioned office rs, th e French an d British traine rs had th eir ow n agenda . Ins tead of ad heri ng to the US doc trine based on op en warfare and rifle ma rksman ship , the tra ini ng pro gram was based on fighti ng from tren ch es. The two foreig n missio ns persuaded the US wa r Department that the approach was sou nd , which im mediately put the program in the Unit e,-' State s in conflict wit h General Pershin g's th ree-ph ase training program in Fran ce. In realit y, Fren ch ins tructors steeped in the do ctrine of tren ch warfar e a lso dominated th e program in France. Persh ing did reali ze that he must depend o n the host trainers. at least in th e early stages of preparing soldiers a nd un its up to batt alion st rength, to toughen th e tro op s to th e rigors of warfa re o n th e w ester» Front.

Training in France

/2

The 1st Division led th e first group of American div isions into th e th eat er of war. As the troop unit s were a rrivi ng, th e AEF sta ff began o pe ratio ns in Pari s before moving to th e new Gene ral Headquarters (GHQ) at Chaumo nt o n Septe mbe r I, 191 7. It co m prised 1,342 officers, clerk s, and en listed men . The training sectio n had been added to th e staff o n Augu st 11. Lieutenant Co lo nel Paul B. Malone head ed th e AEF training sect io n (G-5). Wh en he was tran sferr ed to th e 3d Division in February 1918 to co m ma nd a brigade, hi s assistan t, Co lo ne l Haro ld B. Fiske, wh o remain ed th e chie f AEF train er until th e en d of th e war, repl aced him . Malon e and Fiske shaped th e J\ EF training and ed uca tio n programs. Like all th e primary staff, Pershing handpi cked th em . Clus te red in French villages a round Cha umont, th e arriving divi sions , less th eir artill ery brigades. whic h were sen t to Valdah on in th e so ut he ast of Franc e, took up the routi ne of training th eir sold iers and th eir unit s up through battali ons.

The Ist Division estab lishe d the training pattern . Harold Fiske had begun hi s service in th e 16th In fan try Regiment sh ortly before it arrived in France wit h the l st Division. He recall ed in a m em o adter the war that : 1\ large part of the com pa ny officers had been recen tly .. . co mm issio ned;

many had on ly just fin ished the thr ee mon ths co urse at [Forti Leavenworth. DivisionalTr ain ing Ar eas. AEF t

DivislonaI Training AleaNo.1

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Genefal Headquarters. AEf

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21

Thismap depicts the divisional train ing areas assigned to the AEF in northeastern Fra nce .Also shownare the areas of operation fo r First Army (organi zed August 10. 1918) and Second Army (crganaed October 10,19 18) and the Armistice line of November II. 1918 .AEF GHQ is shown in OII~ 20 at Chaumont. The lst Division HQ is in area I at Gondrecourt , the 2d Division HQ is in area 9 0!It ChateauviliOllin and the 42d Division was assigned to th e Sth training area at vaucculeurs. Not all numbers coincide with division s of th e same numbers.The 21 tra ining are as wer e princ ipally infantry tr.lining areas.The field art illery t rained at Le Valdahcn to t he so utheast near the Swiss border.

" I

"

II

"

13

A thousand recruits had been received a day or two before my arrival, and others were continually arriving in the effort of the War Department to bring the regiment to its new strength. None of these recruits seemed to have had any instruction ... No machine guns were at hand .. . The Infantry of the 1st Division sailed for France about June 12th. As usual no arrangements for overstrength [that is, to include first replacements] had been made; so that each company sailed from six to 15 men short of its complement. I think the experience of the 16th Infantry can be taken as in every way like that of each of the other infantry regiments . The 1st Division received no training in the United States. Its time in th United States was one of reorganization, re-armament, change and confusion. A memorandum governing divisional training was issued by Fiske's office on July 18, 1917. It described "fundamental principles" of training for th e 1st Division and other divisions th at were to follow into the theater of opera tions. It confirmed that the principles of "discipline, command and combat" set forth in the Drill, Small Arms and Field Service regulations "remain unchanged," that is rifle marksmanship and open warfare remained at the core of training guidanc e for American division s. It also confirmed th at offensive, not defensive (meaning tren ch) warfare was "the basis of instruction." Three months would be devoted to "Preliminary" train ing, th at is ind ividual and small unit training. This would be followed by one month of "Divisional" training that emphasized "th e perfection of team work in actua l fighting." Thus , Pershing and his training staff believed that American divisions could be readied for effective combat operations in four months. The (Colonel Chauncey) Baker board reported its findings on July 11,191 7. One of the recommendations stated "That the United States make no essenti al change in its system of physical training, close order and disciplinary drills and musketry." Closely associated with the progressive training of divisions as they arrived in France was the establishment of professional schools, both for the AEF at large, but also within corps and divisions to continue the education of officers and noncommissioned officers. It is clear that Pershing anticipated that he would need to replace the French and British trainers, both in France and in the camps in the United States, as soon as practicable so that the Americans

14

Li eutenant Colo ne l George S. Patton, Jr., co mmande r of t he Amer ican tank traini ng school and center at Bo urg, France. He is standing in fro nt of a Renault light tank. (US Signal Co rps. 17592)

could take charge of their own training and impart the "American style " of combat rather than the defensive, trench warfare doctrine favored by the French and to, a degree, by the British.

Schoo ls in France Training schools, both at the level of the AEF and within divisions and corps, were essential to disseminate doctrine and to raise the skill levels of officers and noncommissioned officers. General Pershing pulled Brigadier General Robert L. Bullard from command of th e 2d Brigade of the 1st Division in July 1917 and assigned him as commanding general, AEF schools. Bullard's task was to train infantry officers for combat. Pershing was well acquainted with Bullard's capabilities as a trainer, having known him at West Point and in Texas before the war. His confidence was not misplaced and by November Bullard had his infantry school staffed and operating. The bugaboo that plagued the AEF schools was the necessity to detach officers from line divisions to attend as students and to serve as faculty -all at the expense of the fighting power of the line divisions. It was a left pocket, right pocket decision as to where experienced officers and noncommissioned officers were needed most. This was one of the several most important choices that Pershing made in organizing, training, and fighting his AEF in France . American officers, officer candidates, and noncommissioned officers were sent to existing British and French schools as the Americans brought their own fad lities up to speed. In addition to AEF level schools, Fiske anticipated that schooling would have to occur at army, corps, and division levels in order to sustain the movement of experienced personnel into the combat divisions, the tip of the fighting machine. During the transition from British/French schoo ls to AEF schools, the Americans depended upon the British for expert instruction in the Stokes mortar, sniping, scouting, use of the bayonet, and musketry (marksmanship). The French instructors tutored their American pupils in tactics, grenades, automatic rifles, 37mm guns, machine guns, and field fortifications. The courses varied from two to seven weeks in lengt h. While the schools were centralized to make the best use of meager resources, training was based on the division. The critically important relationship between educated leaders and the combat effectiveness of the divisions was proved in the fighting of the spring and fall of 1918.The center for AEF schools was established at Langres, an old fortress town with plentiful barracks situated 22 miles southeast of the AEF headquarters at Chaumont; Colonel James A. McAndrew was appointed commandant on October 10, 1917, and Brigadier General Alfred W. Bjornstad served as the first directorof the staff college. Forty-two officers, of a class of 75, graduated from the first three-month course and were qualified for staff duty with divisions and corps. Afull array of schools, patterned on the school system in the United States, came into operation in the fall of 1917. Artillery, aviation, military police, engineering, machine gunner y, intelligence, gas operations, and even musicians and dentists had their own schools. Fiske intended to have the various corps headquarters supervise their own schools, but soon discovered that those organizations were on the move too frequently. He placed the corps schools under AEF control. Most of the instruction at the corps schools was of four weeks' duration. In May 1918, the aviation sections of the corps schools were consolidated in the II Corps area. As noted earlier, the only division to complete its intended four-month training cycle was the 1st Division. General Pershing relied heavily on the training ofthe 1st Division to set the framework for the training of all AEF divisions as they arrived in France. On October 4, 1917, he wrote to Secretary Baker and reported "A tentativesystem of instruction and training has been outlined, based upon the best information obta inable, and schools of instruction have been organized to provide instructors. The French have helped us train the 1st Division, while the British are taking as many young officers as they can accommodate in their schools." He continued to explain his ideas of offensive warfare and his policy of

15

rejecting senior officers who were ph ysically unfit or not in accord with his philosoph y o f com ma nd in co mbat. li e closed by asking th e support of the War Departm ent in recogn izin g h is o fficers with prom oti o ns. The co m mander-i n-c hief was pleased with th e progress of the 1st Division and judged it to be efficient and "later to becom e fam ou s amo ng th e armies Oil the Western Front. "

Strate gic features influ encing sel ection of the Lorrain e front for th e Am erican Army

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This map shows some of the strategic consi derations fo r locati ng th e AEF in northeastern Pra nce. As a late arrival to the theater of o perations th e AEF had to be accommodated in an area where it would not interfere with the o perations of the British in the north and French in the center of the We stern Fro nt. There had to be adequate training space to rec eive, o rganize and tra in the Americans in a relatively quiet sec to r.The northeast was a terminus for the AEF line of communication from the arri val ports in western France and so uth of Paris. The rail lines doser to the fro nt wer e all fully occupied. The coun tr yside could provide food and dra ft animals to suppo rt the training.

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Major General \Villiam L. Sibert, \·..h o h ad deployed the 1st Division to France, comma nded th em du ring th is period of intensive train in g. ,\ s was to be expected, General Persh in g closely observed the division 's progress and occasionally provided corrections . Lieute nant Colonel George C. Marshall, the division operations officer, reco u n ted th at "Like an only child, we suffered from too much attention, and fo und o urse lves often irr itated hy the frequent visits of investigators, ins pec tors and others fro m th e h igh er co mm and." During the period o f tra inin g in early Sep tem be r 191 7 n ear Go nd reco ur t, Georges Cleme nce au, soo n to be Prem ier o f Fran ce, visited th e 1st Division, After watch ing a boxing match at th e 26 th Infantry Regime nt's Field Day, h e was. imp ressed by the o ffensive sp irit and "rugged fight ing q ua lities" disp layed by the regimen t. Clemenceau. unable to me..-et with General Pers hing, returned with General Noe l Marie Joseph Edward de Curte res de Castelnau, his chief-ofstaff, to discuss the en try of the l st Division into the line in a quiet sector in about ten days. Sibert demurred and explained that only Ge neral Pershing could make tha t decision. Clemenceau, spea king in English, argued that th e time for actio n was at h an d. The Frenc h army, he said , "was exhausted " and it was imperativ e th at traini ng sched ules m ust be su bord ina ted to th e overa ll needs of th e war. Ge ne ral Sibert, accordin g to Marsh a ll, tactfull y b ut force fully explained that to co m m it th e 1st Division before it was p rop erly tra ined "would be takin g a ve ry grave risk, t he unfo rtun at e results o f which wo u ld react as heavily again st the Fren ch and Eng lish" as aga ins t th e Americans. Th e lst Division, assu med by man y to be th e "pick of th e Regu lar Army," was in fact "an entirel y new o rga nization and its ran ks wer e filled with recruit s." To risk a defeat would "have a calamitous effect on the morale of the Ameri can soldier and on th e Allies as well. " The 1st Division , n o net h eless, mo ved ahead with its training and in mid-October was occupyi ng positions on the Lorraine fron t between Luneville and Nancy. This sector of rolling coun trys ide h ad been q uie t since 191 5. Th e first battalions of th e four in fant ry regiments of th e d ivision (16, IS, 26, 2~J,

School ofAv iar.ion arVineuil. 1917,

by Henr i Fa-re. Ther e are twO villages in France that bear the name Vineul that could have been the site of Pan-e's painting.The first is near the classification center (or the AEF at Blois (where failed commanders were sent) .The more likely location. however. is 28km west and slightly south of the major AEF flying field at Issoudun. near Chateauroux. Farre was a well-know painter of aviation scenes. ( Ist Divisio n Museu m)

17

eac h wi th a m ach ine-gun co m pa ny, and det ach me n ts of engi ne ers an d signa' troops, jo ined the lSth Fre n ch In fant ry Divisio n in the line. On e batta lion each from th e three a rtille ry regime nts of the di vision left thei r tra in in g site al Valda hon a nd join ed t he ir fello w do ughboys during th e n igh t of Oct ob er 22 Th e next morn in g, C Ba tte ry, 6t h Field Artille ry fired "t he first shot from an Ameri ca n -m anned gun ." Du ring th e n ight of No ve mber 2-3, the Ge nna ro co nd ucted it tren ch ra id o n th e po sit io n s of F Com pa n y, 16th Inf a n t ry, and within m in ut es three do ughboys were lyin g d ead in th e t renc h bottom and 11 ot he rs wer e bein g march ed in to ca ptiv ity. Trai ning was evo lvin g in to co m bat Alth ough co m bining th e gen e ral staff fu nc tions of o pera tions a nd t rai ni ng in to a single section su per vised by o ne chief would he lp ensure tha t troop! wou ld be trai n ed " in accordance with the sa me doctrine to be used in fig h t in~ the m," Ge ne ral Pershi ng decid ed to est ablish t h e two fu nctions in to se pa rate staff sect ions beca use o f spa n o f co n trol and th e pr im acy of both fun ctiorn for success in co mb at. Ge ne ra l Fiske in itia lly thought se par ate sections were 3 bad idea , bu t as th e AEF sta ff de velo ped he saw the wisd om of h is ch ien decisio n . In or de r to tra in co ntinua lly w hil e hattie rage d , the AEF need ed an ovcrst reng tb of at least 50 percen t in o ffice rs and men . A corps was det erm ined to need six d ivisio ns, two o f wh ich wou ld be depo t or replacem en t d ivisions. One of th ese feede r d ivision s wou ld be located im medi ately to t h e rear of th e four com bat di vision s to "hold a nd train rep lace me n ts in officers and m en all the way from the div ision co m mander to th e priva te soldier." The ot her div ision was locat ed n ea r the por ts o f en tr y in to Fra nce to rece ive n ew men from th e Un ited Stat es, give t hem so me in d ivid ua l tra ining to incl ud e ma rksm an ship, th en to pass th ese men for wa rd to th e repl acem e n t di vision in the zone of operat ions for the rest of th eir prepar at io n . Ult im ate ly the port-sta tioned divis io n ide a was aba ndone d in favor o f la rger troop adm ln istra tlve cen ters . The n atur e o f the replaceme n t process, Fiske poi nt ed out, governed t he ent ire sc hool system for th e AEF. As co m ba t o pera tions began in t h e sp ring of 1918, "o ur wasta ge in officers was enorm ou s fro m the begi nn in g a nd beyo nd all of OUi a n ticipat ions." Bu t the dema nd s of officers an d nonco m missione d office rs for th e schools a n d for service in the rap id ly ex pa ndi ng logistics org a niz a tio n , the 50 S, also prod uced " wastag e" fro m th e line d ivisions an d from t h e availab le pool o f n ew men arrivi ng from the Uni te d States. Nea rly 11,000 new offi cers emerged fro m the can d idate schools in th e va rio us ar ms up to th e ti me of the Arm istice, In th e Un ited States , the class ificat io n syste m was sh unting th e ve ry best officer prosp ect s into the Air Service a nd t h e othe r specia lty arms at th e very ti me that in fa n try leaders were n eed ed in th e lin e d ivisio ns . "Th is co mbing of d ivisions robbed th em of office r ma teria l a nd grea tly delayed th eir p repara tio n for ba tt le." Mo bilizatio n an d training co n tin ued to p rop el the eng ine o f t he AEF from the rea r. In Franc e find ing a way to accommoda te Fren ch trai ning m et h od s and do ctrine, find ing en ough Frenc h-speakin g doughboys, a nd securing adeq uate billets an d transport con tin ua lly challen ged the AfF staff. Th e win te r of 19 17- 18 p resented ar d uo us trai n ing co ndi tions, inclu d ing in ade q uate col d wea ther clo t hi ng and eq uipme n t for th e troops. After th e war a nd the ret urn o f the AU to th e Uni ted States, Ma jor Genera l Jam es "V. ~v1cA n d rew, form er ch ief-of-staff of th e AEF, wrote of th e mi lita ry lesson s of the \Vorld War. lie sa id that :

18

If unp repa red whe n war co mes , it tak es more than a year to ca ll out , orga ni ze , eq ui p, and t rai n a rmies to mee t th e trai n ed sol diery o f o ur ene mies ... we kn ow t h at t h e tra ini n g o f th e officers to or gan ize, ins t ruc t, su pply and lead ou r co mb at u nit s in battl e is a matter not of weeks or of mont h s, but of yea rs .. , th a t hi gh er leaders in wa r and th e sta ff o ffice rs to w h om must fall th e ha rd est problems to so lve , m ust be t h e prod ucts of a lifc-t tm c stu dy o f t he ir professio n ... t he fact re ma ins t ha t .. . it was 14 m ont h s af te r o u r en t ry into th e wa r befo re th e America n Army bec a me a rea l fact o r in the st ruggle.

Command, control, communication, and intelligence The raising and support of a field army and its effective battl e employme n t are related, but qui te different. Th e form er is based on recruiting and per sonnel policies, tables of orga n ization and eq ui pme n t, and logist ical orga n izatio n . The latter is very mu ch a matt er o f doctrine, trainin g. and lead ersh ip. In this rega rd General Pershing's AEF in Fran ce and the \Var Dep ar tm ent in w ash ington were often at odds abo ut matt ers of co m mand and co n trol.

Secretar y of Wa r Newton D. Baker and his party view ing actio n at the fron t in March 19 18.T hey used a railway flat car as an o bservation

platfor m. (7776)

lEFr Secretary of War Newton D. Baker wi th Major Gen eral Jame s G. Harbord at HQ. Services of Supply. Tours. reviewing Quart ermaster t roops. (US Signal Co rp s, 23779)

ABOVE Secretary of W ar Newton D. Baker and Private Ca rlisle Babcoc k. ld Division, March 20, 1918, taken .....hlle Baker and Gene ral Persh ing were making an inspectio n of the lines o f Communication . (US Signal Corps, 8-1 S3) On March 6, 1917, Presid ent Wo odrow Wilson selected the former mayor o f Cleveland to succeed UndJey M. Garrison as secretary of war. Newton D. Baker was desc ribe d by his biogra pher as"a slim little man with a fight ing jaw

and a whim sical eye ." Major General John Persh ing called o n the new secretary of war in Wa shingto n in May 1917."1 was sur prised t o find him much younge r and co nsiderably smaller than I had ex pected :' The soon to be co m mande r-in-c hief of th e AEF quickly changed his impressio n after Baker explained why he selected Pershing ahead of a number of mo re se nior officers t o comma nd in France ." He was courteous and pleasant," recalled Pershing."and impressed me as being frank, fair.and business- like." Still under the impre ssion that he was to com mand a division. Pershing returned to Secretary Baker's office seve ral days later and learned th at he was to com mand the entire AEF.

Newton D. Baker was a strong supporte r of War De partment reform and of General Peyto n C. March. the army's chief-of-staff. Baker was able to st eer a course between the animos ities and jealo usies that sprouted in both the War Depa rtment General Staff and in the AEF Gen eral Staff, Moreover. President Wils on had confidence in his judgment and manage rial skills. Not just an office warrior, Mr. Baker traveled to the theater of war in France tw ice. He arri ved in Septembe r 1918 in time to view the attack against the St. Mihiel salient by the new ly esta blishe d Ame rican First Army.Accompanied by Count de Chambrun, re lated to Lafayett e, Baker walked th ro ugh the streets of the city t hat was the home of bo th the marqu is and the pres ident of France. Raymond Po incare.Acco rding t o his biograp he r. the diminutive secretary o f war had a goo d lo o k at America's army at war.

19

Newton D. Baker had replaced Lind ley M. Ga rriso n at the \ Va TDepartment h el m o n March 9 , 19 16, after a short careta ker period u nd er th e di rect io n of Ma jo r Ge ne ral Hugh L. Scott, chief-of-staff of the army. Baker ha d wa n ted Ma jor Gene ral Peyto n C. March fo r ar m y ch ief after Scott ste pped do wn in Septe mber 191 7 an d Major Gene ra l Tasker H. Bliss left for France an d service with th e Sup reme War Co unc il in May 19 18 . General Persh ing in stead sen t his frien d Ma jor Ge neral John Biddl e to \Vashi n gt on where till' co m pe ting in te rests, both civ ilia n a nd m ilitary, qu ickly ove rwhelmed h im . March replaced h im and arr ived fro m f rance to take u p h is du ties o n May 19, 1 91 ~ , giving Baker a you nger, m or e vigo rou s leader o f th e army who set to making h is new ju risd iction m ore efficie nt. It is impo rta n t to note th is civil- m ilita ry arrangement because it lies at th e h eart o f th e Amer ica n system o f co mmand and cont ro l of the armed forces. A major disp ute as to who com ma nded the a rmy- the civilian sec reta ry o r the senior u niformed officer-had bee n sett led in 1903 wi th the passage o f th e General Staff legis latio n. The Overma n Act ( ~ 1ay 20, 1918 ) confirmed till' p reside nt 'S au thori ty to act in emergencies and solidified the pr im acy of th e executi ve bra nch of th e go vernment in d irecting the na tion's war time efforts.

Command and control Field co m ma n d of the army in France was th e excl usive responsi bili ty of Ge ne ral Persh in g, an d Secreta ry Baker co n firme d that o n seve ral occasions. Persh in g exercised co nt ro l of th e army by ca reful selectio n of hi s su bo rdi nate com man de rs an d staf f office rs. Th e evo lutio n o f th e Ge ne ral Headq uart ers, ;\ EF, at Cha umo n t solid ified th at co n tro l. But the ch allenges were larger an d more num erou s th an mer ely creati ng a general h eadq uarters and staff. Th ere were co rps and di visions, and even tually two field arm ies, whi ch had to be organized and trai ned at the same time. Persh ing relied aga in o n tru sted subor d ina tes for thi s work, no tabl y Majo r Generals j ames G. Harb o rd , Robert L. Bu llard, james W. McAnd rew, Hunt er l.lggett , jo sep h T. Dickman , an d Brigadier Gene rals Ha ro ld B. Fiske, Paul H. Malone an d, importan tly, Fox Co n n er. Persh ing 's style o f co m mand was d irect, personal, and o ften in trusive. The re was no q uestion as to wh o the bos s was and wha t h e wa nt ed in th e ' ...'ay of perform ance and efficiency. Co lonel Geo rge C. Ma rsha ll, durin g the dar ker day s o f the Meu se-Argonn e cam paign, no ted that the com mand er-In -chief "ca rried him self wit h an ai r of relent less de term ina tio n to pu sh the o peration to a decisive

Organization of the W a r D e pa rtm e n t . A p r il 6, 1911

I

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ASSISTANT SECRETARY

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I

ADJUTANT GENEJIAl.

CH iEf Of COAST ARnWRY

,

, IOUARTERMAS'TtR, I GENERAl I

I

GH'EFOF

ORDNANCE

I I ras ARMY

20

INSPECTOR GENERAL

, SURGEON GENERAL

II

I I

JUDGE ADVOCATt GENERAL

CHIEFOF ENGINEERS

II

I I

CHIEF SIGNAL OfFICER

BUREAU OF INSULAR AFFAIRS

II

, PAHAMA CANAl

I

I

Side view of the same railway flat car as seen on page 19. (US Signal Corps , 7777)

victory. ' His bearing and demeanor "inspired co nfide nce" hut mad e clear that he would truck no slacking o r "weak-hearted" efforts. Major Gene ral Hunt er liggett, perhaps Pershin g's favorit e cor ps, and later army. comma nder said of his senior, "General Pershing had absolute authority, and his sta ndards were dra stic, to the great good fortune of th e American Army: ' Regarding his abil ities to work with those over whom he had no authority. Major General Jam es G. Harb ord . hismost trusted chie f-of-staff. said o n th e occasio n of th e American s' visit to th e Baker Board in London in early Ju ly 1917. "Gene ral Pershing sho wed mu ch tact and patience" in dealin g with a group of offi cers that had expressed disagreement with his views. He won them over and Influenced th eir report to Washington regarding policies to govern the AEF. Charles 1'. Summerall, who had been a mem ber of the Raker Board. assumed command of the 1st Divisio n o n Ju ly IS. 19 18, at th e o utset of the Sotssons campaign to redu ce th e Marn e salient. He was an extraordinary com bat leader. Late in life he wrote a n autobiog rap hical "diary" of his m ilita ry caree r. Speaki ng of the challenges to leade rsh ip in th e Soissons cam paign , he co mm ented o n the stress of combat: At anoth er tim e. the divi sion was to attack by orders of the Fren ch Corps at 4:30pm. At 4:25pm th e colo nel of a regiment called m e and

ABOVE General Tasker H. Bliss YlSlting II Corp HQ at Fruges.July 19. 191 8.( USSignal Co rps. 17226)

GeneralTasker Howa rd Bliss was viewed as a competitor by Pers hing, but the fo rmer army chief-of-staff was the ideal choice to re pres ent the United States on the Supreme War Counci l forme d at the Rapallc Confe re nce in November 1917. Bliss had been acting chief-of-staff of the army while General Hugh Seen accompanied the Root Mission to Russia in 1917. Uke Pershing and March, Bliss had been a military attache. His serv ice in Madrid during the Spanish-Am erican war was uneventful. mosdy because o f the secretive behavior of his hosts and the sho rt perio d of hostilities. but Bliss learned the ways o f the diplo mat that were to ser ve him well in France. Bliss enjoyed the co nfidence of both Secretary of War Newton Baker and pres idential envoy

"Colonel" Edward House. the political re prese ntative of the United States at the Supreme War Council. When General Pershing found himself at odds with the othe r senior commanders in France over issues that were part military and part political, such as the amalgamation controv e rsy, it was General Bliss who provided the iron hand in the velvet glove at the Supreme War Council to preserv e his field commander's prer ogatives and independence of action. Per shing respected Bliss and welco med his suppor t dur ing diffi cult times. Bliss occasionally was frustra ted by Pershing's htgh-handed behavio r with his peers but believed that the comman der-in-chief must be suppo rted. It was a good partnership.

21

said tha i h e co u ld n o t obey th e order a n d wou ld n o t atta ck . I told him as calm ly as po ssible tha i h e mu st not say an ything to h is ba ttalion command ers wh om I kn ew would attack. He sho wed himself un suited to be a co m bat reg im ental co m m an d er. Th e batta lion com man ders led t h ei r troops to ta ke th eir object ives. I fo u n d that th e co lo n el's co n n ectio ns wer e suc h that it wou ld be best n ot to relieve h im, but aft er the ba ttl e h e \,.....as t ran sfe rred o u t o f the division . Th us, th e two co lo n els in a brigad e stated they cou ld not obey a n atta ck ord er a nd the br iga de co m m an d er wa s too worn a nd m en tall y co nf use d to fo rce th e attac k. Suc h wa s the terri b le ordea l of batt le on offi cer s.

Ge neral Pershing with Marshal Hen ri Petain. commander of the French Army and hero of the epic fighting at Verdun in 1916. at Chaumon t. january 14. 1919. (US Signal Corps. 39676)

22

Officer s of the G·2 (intelligence) section of the 5th Division general staff studying the battle maps in the Bois de Tuilerie near Momfaucon duri ng the Meuse-Argonne campaign. (US Signal Corps. 283 14)

Gen eral Sum me rall's philo soph y of co mba t leadership was di rect and to the point. In stead of pu ni shing officers and so ld iers for cowa rd ice, he dea lt with what he called "cases of neurosis" by appealing to th e sh irker's sense of duty. "The great m ass of officers and men \.. -ill overcome th eir fears and the further th ey are to th e fro nt the less th ey fea r." When th e "Division Judge" presented h im with ch arges for co ward ice, Sum merall said "I told h im to destroy th e ch arges and sen d the men to th ei r co lonels who wou ld at o nce place th em in the fro nt line s where their fears v.. 'ould disappear or the other men wou ld take GHe of them . The difficulty disappeared as th e men h ad more experience in battle." Gen eral Sum merall believed that failure in combat is att rib utable more to "a state of mi nd of officers and men wh ich depr ives th em of a desire to fight " than to "the resista nce of the ene my." Leaders m ust "by person al contact and assura n ce incu lcate and maintain a will to win in every member of his comma nd ," he said. "I nev er tried a man for cowa rdice." Later in the war, General Summerall's own judgm en t was called into question wh en h is vague or ders to hi s beloved Ist Division, th en com mand ed by Brigadier General Frank Parker. to seize Sedan caused a n ear disaster as the 1st mar ch ed acro ss th e fronts of th e 77th and 42d Divisio ns, "captur ing" Brigadier Gen eral Douglas Mac/trthu r and several o f his officers. As it turn ed out, Su m me rall's understan ding of the m ission fro m General Persh ing, and the desire of both to have th e Americans in at the finish, led to tilt' pro blem . George Marsh all recalled th at th e First Army's chief-of-Staff, Brigadier General Hugh Dru m, a pprov ed the d raft prepared by Ma rshall to carry ou t the commander-inch ief's desire that th e First Arm )' be the first Allied troo ps to en ter Sedan . Drum inserted the co n troversial sen tence "Bou nda ries will not be co nside red b ind ing." Hunter Liggett said of Parker's handling o f the mi ssion that he "marched the div ision in seven colu mns-hand ling 2S,(X)() men like a battalion- right thro ugh th e First Arm y Corps upon Sedan ." Persh ing, perh aps recogni zing hi s own mistak e, sh rugged th e incident off, but Gen erals Dickman, th en com m and ing I Cor ps, and Su m me rall, V Cor ps com ma nder, carried th e grudge well in to the postwa r years.

ABOVE General (4-scar) Peyton Conway March. chief-of-staff. US Army. (US Signal Corps . 31190) Peyton Conway March. Lafayette College class of 1884 and West Point class of 1888. was in many respects similar to John J. Pershing-a "grim countenance."

straight milicary bear ing and a "stnct disciplinarian but a fair one ." An artillery officer. Major March served in the Philippines as aide-decamp to Major General Arthur MacArthur and on the First Army general scaffin that theater. Brigadier General March deployed to France in June 19 17 in co mmand of the arti llery brigade of the 42d Divisio n. was prom oted to major general . and. late r in November. was assigned to co mmand the AEF artillery at vafdabcn.!n February 1918. Major Gen eral March was selected by Secretary o fWar Newton D. Baker to become chief·of-scaffof the army. His prom oti on to four-star rank in May 1918 placed him. along with former army

chief. General Tasker H. Bliss. in that small group of officers of equivalent ra nk and often competing o bjectives. In Wash ington. Baker and March overhauled the creak ingWar Department administration and endeavored to improve its efficiency. Realignment of the genera l staff along functional lines supplanted many traditional bureau respo nsibilities and created the Chemical Warfare Service. the Air Service. th e Tank Corps. and severa l supply branches. He abolished the three categories of Regular Army. Nationa l Guard . and National Army in favor of a single unified army.John Pershing believed that March was dismand ing army traditi ons .

LEFT Major Ge nera l Jose ph T. Dickman with Brigadier Ge nera l Matin Cra ig and Co lone l A.C.Voris. O ctober 23. 1918. (US Signal Corps. 28332)

regiment. More schoo ling and service with the War Depart ment General Staff prepa red him for his appo intm ent to the rank of general officer in 1917. He took co mmand of the regular 3d Division and deployed with them to France in April and May 1918. In ear fyJune General Dickman deployed his division south o f the Marne River near Chateau·Thierry and blunted the German drive in the Aisne-Marne salient. The 3d Division earned its nickname. "Rock of the Mar ne ," during that operation. O n Oc to ber 12. Dickman took over command of I Co rps fro m Major General Hunter Liggett,and. on November 15. he was promoted to comm and Third Army.

Majo r General Joseph T. Dickman commanded consecutively the 3d Division. IV Co rps and. after the Armsitice. Third Army. He was one of the most effective officers in the AEF.A West Point grad uate. class of 1881. he began his caree r in the cavalry with service on the western frontier and in army schoo ls unt il 1898. In the Spanish-American war he se rved on Majo r General Jo e Wheeler's scaff in Cuba . then in the Philippines commanding an infanuy

The point is th at in h igh co m mand, persona lity an d style always matt er. Virtually all of the senio r co m manders of th e AEF were gradua tes of the relevan t amI)' schoo ls and kne w each o the r reason ably well. As Timoth y Nenninge r pointed out , however, it \\'35 not so mu ch th e co m ma nde rs th em selves. hu t rather "the process of co m mand" that had been lea rned and cod ified in the AEF that mat tered . Here was a ma jor vu lnerab ility of the expan di ng AEF- it was untested up unt il th e serious fighting in the Alsne-Mame salient in Jul y and August 19 18. This is probably explained by th e ra pid mobili zation, organization, train ing. a nd em plo yme n t of the American comba t and logistical uni ts up to th at po int.

Sergeant W B. Prince o f the G·2 (intelligence) topographical section plotting the fro nt lines of the 5th Division between Cuisy and Mo ntfauco n during the Me use- Argonne fight ing. (US Signal Cor ps. 28295)

Communicat ion Critical to com ma nd of th e ar m)' and its units in combat was control from top to bott om and reporting from bottom to top . Again, th e fledgling American field army was learn ing wha t worked and what d id not in the schoo l of trial and erro r. At th e co m pany and battalion levels, where th e action changed rapidl y o n the battlefield. con trol often de pe nded o n th e strength

23

Fiel d Sign al Battal io n

0

... ••

bd

15

I

~ 21

OUTPOST

17

I

••

..

••

res

..

WIRE

I

.

••

EB"

78

I

••

..

AEF Fiel d S ignal Battali o ns (Based on TO &Eof June 26. 1918)

Personn el Uni t/Secti on

26 Jun '18

Battalion HQ

Strength 15

Supply Section

17

Radio Company

78

W ire Company Outpost Compan y

78 285

Total C omba tants

473

Medical Dept.

15

Battalion Aggre gate

488

Outpost Company Headquarte rs Outpost Company Section Compa ny Aggregate

21 4

66 ea

285

Ani m a ls Draft Horses

12

Riding Ho rses

14 [incl. 5 with Outpost Co .]

Total Horse s

26

Major Eq uip m ent It e m s Esco rt Wagons (2-horse) Water Carts

2

Reel Carts (2-horse )

6

Ration Carts

2

Roll ing Kitchens

2

Combat Trucks ( 11IJ_ton. -t-wheel drive]

5 [incl. , with Outpost Co.]

SupplyTrucks ( I Ill-to n. -l-wheel drive)

5

Motor Cars 24

4 [incl. I with Outpost Co .]

(continued on page 25)

/

78

Motorcycles with Sidecar Motorcycles withou t Sidecar Pistols

IS rind. 2 with Medical Detach. & 5 with Outpost Co.] 6 [incl. I with Outpost Co.] 473 rind. 285 with Outpost Co.]

Source: United States Army InThe World War 1917-1 919 .Volume I: Organ ization of the American Expeditionary Forces (Washington: Historical Division, Deportment of the Anny, 1948)

of character and intuit ive ability of th e jun ior officers an d no ncommiss ioned officers. Orders prior to battl e were routine ly com munica ted in writ ing by th e five-paragraph field ord er learn ed in th e arm y schools and detailed in th e army 's few manuals. Often tim e interven ed , or the en emy did, and writt en ord ers were overtaken by verbal inst ructio ns from batta lion to co mpany co mmanders in person. There were no effective, reliable tactical radto s. bu t th ere was wire and lots of it. Wire worked well in defensive positions, but not i ll the att ack. Moving forward amidst th e din of artillery, machine-gun , and morta r fire meant th at platoon and company leaders had to rely o n hand and arm signa ls, an d runners. On the modern battl efield th at tech niqu e could soo n collapse, and did. For example, the operatio ns officer of the AEF, Brigadier General Fox Co n ner, reported at the end of the wa r th at as a result of the 1st Division 's operatio ns in the Sotssons coun tero ffen sive of July 19 18, 60 percen t of the division's in fantry officers were killed or woun ded . This sort of disrup tio n to the cha in of command had a far-reach ing effect o n the capabil ity of infant ry un its to receive andexecute combat orders simp ly because of th e loss of experienced perso nnel. Training does not compensa te for th at sort of trauma. Replacements, even wh en immediately available. requi re time to absorb th e sta nda rd o perating procedures of their new unit. In th e mean time , th e un it suffers degradat ion in combat effectiveness. Above th e company and battalion , th e com ma nders and staffs did their best to gather useful int elligen ce, formu late clear ord ers, and provid e th e necessary support to en sure success in battl e. They freq uen tly fell short of th e mark due to inexp erience and incom plete traini ng. Co mmunicatio n depended on wire supplemented by pigeon co uriers and visual signaling wit h flares, flags, and lights. George Marshall recounted in his memoirs tha t during th e final phase of o perations in th e Meuse-Argon ne, several of h is capta ins and lieutenants in the First Army operations sect ion of GHQ wanted a cha nce to see

Sergeant Swanker of the Signal Corps pigeon sec ucn ho lding the

first bird to carry a message during an attac k near Co rnieville, France . May 2. 191B. (US Signal Corps, 1200 I)

I S' "', D"I'" ,

-e.... ~ m iJ:/If,-S In ". :':"r<.; (>s • ..

Recru iting pos ters for the Signal Corps Pigeo n Service . (US Signal

CO"" . 67598)

25

some actio n. Marshall dispatched four of the m as liaison officers and ha d the chief signa l officer instruct th em o n how to sen d messages by pigeon courier. Each had an orderly with six pigeons and ins tr uctio ns to sen d messages at 0700l1rs and 090011 rs, 1200h rs, and ISOOhrs on Novem ber 1, then agai n at 0900 l1 r5 and 1300h rs o n Novem ber 2. As the hatt ie un fo lded, the sta lwart pigeons Winged the ir way to First Army GHQ at Souilly with status repor ts and sketches. Marshall was able to turn thi s information aro und to the corps and d ivision HQ hy air plane d rop before th e repo rts ha d made t he ir way from the fron t lines co ming from lower to h igh er HQ! Duri ng this last ph ase of the fighting, "battle com m un ication between Army Headq uarters an d the corps and div isio ns was difficu lt to manage, d ue to the rapid ity of the ad vance," said Marshall. It too k mo torcycle messengers four to five hour s to make thei r way forw ard over congested, to rn-u p roa ds. Wire co mmu nic ations had been dis rupted dur in g the co urse of the batt le and th e signal corps troo ps co uld not replace poles and lint's q uickly enough .

In telligence

Soldier demon strating the use of the field signal project o r lamp. August 27.19 17. (US Signal Corps. I7258)

26

Telegraph tra iler at First Army headquarte rs. So uilly. France. being moved out of danger from incoming fire durin g the Meuse-Argonne campaign. October 30. 19 18. (US Signal Co rps. 284 13)

Intelligcnce is th e processed product of informatio n analyzed by expe rienced staff officers and non comm issio ned officers. Int ell igence ope ratio ns of the AEf were of two types. The first was tac tical, or batt lefield, int elligence. This was admi nistered by glea ning in form ation from th e Allied headqu a rters by means of military attac hes a nd liaiso n officers. It usually W
Organ izat io n The principal eleme n t in the American Exped ition ary Forces was the d ivision. Major Gene ral Joh n Pershing noted that in May of 1Y17 "no such un it then existed in our Army." It was an infantry fighting unit made more potent with th e addit ion of artill ery, machine-gun, and other combat suppor t un its. Th e organiza tio n of th e armyas authorized by th e Natio na l Defen se Act of 191 6 had been publish ed in tables of orga niza tion and equipment (fO&E) on xtay 3, 191 7, but no div ision s had yet been organ ized . The \ Var Co llege Division of the War Departm en t Gen era l Staff prepa red a provisio nal orga nization for an expedit ionary div ision for service in Fr.IIKl..', using the TONE of May 3, 1917. After consultatio ns with the French and British mi litary missions that were in th e Un ited States shortly after America entered th e war as an associat ed power, and discussion s with Pershing, it was understood that the provt sio nal organiza tio n "mulct requ ire mod ification once the d ivision arrived in Fran ce. Organizin g, mobi lizing, traini ng, deployin g, a nd figh ting of eac h di vision would have to occ ur seq ue ntially in a co m pressed tim etable of eve nts. Th e pressures to rut co rne rs and field fight in g o rganizatio ns before th ey were ready wouldbe enormous. To counter thi s, General Pershi ng and h is AEF staff, whi ch was also being orga nized and trained at the same ti me, deve loped a logical, phased progra m to rece ive co m hat d ivisions and thei r su pport unit s in France. At the same tim e, with the help o f General Tasker H. Bliss, the US m ilitar y representative on the Supreme war Co uncil aft er Novem ber 19 17, Persh ing was arguing for a separate mission with a sepa rate zone of actio n for his AEF. The orga niza tio n, mobilizatio n, and dep loym ent \v o uld be in th e ha nds of the War Depar tment Gene ral Staff in w ashingto n. DC, but as was q uic kly discovered, precious litt le train ing was to occ ur before depl oym ent.

Entrance to the GHQ.AEF.in Cha umon t. France . Building B beyond th e fence housed the staff offices.The GHQ was located in the regimenta l barracks at Caseme de Damre rnom. (US Signal Co rps. 8644 6)

The AEF Gene ral Headquarters and staff The General Headquart ers of th e AEF began its wor k in Paris. From that location o n Ju ne 2 1, 191 7, Lieuten ant Colo ne l Joh n Mca ul ey Palmer, th e AEF operatio ns officer, a nd th ree ot her officers left to co nd uct a reco n naissance in the east to loo k for a ho me for the America n staff a nd arriving di visio ns. The 1st Division 's a rriva l th at same mo nth requ ired accele ra ted staff work so that the AEF did not fall prey to th e Fren ch Army's int ention of orga n izing and train ing it acco rd ing to Fren ch d octrine. On Sep tember 1, 191 7, Gene ral Pershing orde red his sta ff to Cha umont in th e Haut e-Marn e regio n, 72km south of Bar-Le-Du c "to be with in easy reach of American train in g areas." The area chosen for th e AEF was in Lorrai ne in th e no rt heas te rn par t of France. Chaumo nt is situated o n th e heights wh ere th e feudal regions of Lorraine, Burgundy, and Cham pagne meet. Napo leo n began his cam paign of ISH from the city, and his co nq uerors met to sign the pea ce there before march ing o n to Paris. The Caserne de Dam remo nt, a French regimental barracks, becam e th e nerve ( ent er of th e AEF d urin g the act ive hosti lit ies and later u nt il July I I, 19 19, when the Amer icans bega n th e dep loyment back 10 Par is and o n to th e United States. \Vhen Persh ing saw th e barracks he kn ew at o nce it was wh at he was looking for. His office was to be in th e cente r of building "B."

27

General John J. Pershing wit h principal AEF general staff officers (May 25. 1919). Left to right: Brig. Ge n. Fiske , G-5; Brig. Gen.Andrews. P.M.G.; Maj. Gen . McAndrew. Ch iefof-Staff Brig. Gen. Eltinge. Deputy Chief-of-Staff; Ge n. Pershing; Brig. Gen . Nolan. G· 2; Brig. Gen . Conner. Go]; Brig. Gen . Davis. A.D.C.; Brig. Gen . Mo seley. G-"''' Photo taken at AEF GHQ at Chaumont. (US Signal Corps. 159233)

28

US flying field at lsscudvn. April 1918. Ground crewmen are assembling an aircraft, Issoudun was about 1SO miles south of Paris within the SOS Intermediate geographic section.The aviation instruction center wit h 12 flying fields. t he intermedia te quarter maste r and ammunition depots and a prisoner of war enclosure wer e lo cated there. (US Signal Corps, 10311)

There were sufficien t othe r butld tngs fo r the staff and for billets. The French commander was not overjoyed about the arriva l of the Ame rican headquarters, but th e mayor certain ly was . The AEF staff \.. ·as organized foIJO\v-tng the patt ern that exis ted in the British Army and , genera lly, within the Amer ican m ilita ry esta blishmen t since the reorg an isatio n of th e army in 190 3. Repo rting dir ectly to Gene ral Pershi ng, the co mma nde r-In-chi ef was his chief-of-staff wh o coord ina ted th e acti vities of th e "G Staff," th at is the officers who di rected the various fun ctional divi sions of person nel (G· .), intelligence (G-2), o perations (G -3), su pply (G--U, and training (G-S). At corps and division levels below the AEF, the sta ff fun ctions of G-3 were co m bined with those of G-S, and those of G-l were co m bined with G-4 . The commanding gen eral of the Services of Supply (50 S) also repo rted th roug h the AEF chief-of-staff. Specialist staff officers inclu ded the adj uta nt ge neral , the inspector general, th e judge advoca te, the chief of artillery, th e ch ief of the tank cor ps, and the headquar ters co mma nda nt , who was respo ns ible for the smooth and efficient op erati on of th e headq uarters office. Reporting to General Persh ing through Major General Ja mes G. Harbord, co m ma nde r of the 50S from July 29 , 19 18, to the end of the wa r, were the ch ief quarte rmaster, the chi ef surgeon , th e chief engineer, th e chief ordnance officer, the chief signal officer, the chief of th e Air Service, th e general purchasing agent , the chief of the gas service, th e director gen eral of transpo rta tion , th e Provost Marshal Gene ral, and th e d irector of the motor tran sport corps. General Harbord pointed out that in an army of two million soldiers a certain num ber of men "wit h cr imi na l records" was unavoidable. Accordin gly, the military po lice and milit ary law structure of the AEF/SOS was a critica l element in t he maintenance of o rder an d d iscip lin e in Prance. Harbo rd d rew on officers with su bstan tial civilian ex perience in both law en forceme n t anti law to staff th ose departmen ts. Another import ant logistical func tio n req uiring staff att ent ion at both AEF and 50S levels was purchasi ng and co ntracti ng . Pershing appointed Charles G. Dawes of Ch icago to the post of Gene ral Purchasing Agent. Millions of ton s of shipping were saved by local purchasing throughout th e th eat er of o perations . At th e end of ho stilities the reverse situation became an administra tive task of gigantic proportions---dispmal of accum ulated stores in France. The AEF gen eral staff organization wen t t hrough prog ressive cha nges as the AEF orga nization matur ed and expa nded, but th e basic com mand and staff relat ionships rem ained stable for th e rema ind er of the war.

Organization of Ge ne ra l Headqu art ers, AEf, July 5, 1917 COMMAJrtOING GENERAl,.

Personalstan

CHIEf·Of·STAFf

I

s.."Cretary 10 (lenStan

I GENERALSTAFf

Administrative Polley sec tion

Inlelllgenee

secncn

Training Policy

Optlfalions $e{:tion

secucn

Coordinallon

secucn

AOMINISTRATM: ANn TECHNICAL STAFf

t I I

Adjutant ~ral tAG)

Chiel Signal Officer(CSOl

Inspector GeneralJIG)

Chief of Air ~ (CAS)

Ju6ge AcNouta (JAl

General PurctIasi"9Agen1 (GPA)

ChiefOuartermaster (COMj

Chief of Gas SerYite (w)

Chiel Surgeon (OSI

DirectorGeneral of Transportation (OGT)

Chiel Engineer Oflie M (CEDI

Commanding Glln eral-ll nes 01Communication (CG,l of Cl

Chiel Ordnance Onie M (COOl

cmet 01Red Cross IC01RC)

Commandant (Hal

Provost Marshal General(FMG)

, I

The First Army It was John Pershi ng 's dream to create an in dependent field ar my with US

commanders, operat ing in its own sector of responsibility in France . Some actions had act ua lly preceded the forma tion of th e army itself. Brigadier General Ed ward F. McGlachlin, Jr. had been desig na ted as chief of artillery of Hrst Army o n April 29, 1918 , and Brigad ier Genera l Ben jamin D. Fou lo is had been appointed as chief of First Arm y Air Serv ice o n xtay 29, 1918 . The American First Army was created o n the heels of t he successful Atsn c-x tamc operation to beco me effective on August 10, 1918. I and 111 Co rps to ok respo nsibility for sectors alo ng th e vesle River from two French corp s on Augus t 4 and 5, 19 18. It was the first time tha t two American corps were on lin e, adja cent to each o ther in an act ive batt le zo ne d ur ing the war. Field Orde rs No. 1 co n firmed that th e American First Army was in command o n the Vesle, but Persh ing decided that it was not a suitable area to build up th e new army. Instead , he, r etain , and Foch ag reed at a co nference o n August 9 th at th e Americans should be sh ifted to th e St. Mih iel front. The First Army was to co ns ist of three US corps co n tro lling 14 di visio ns and the French II Colonia) Co rps of three divi sion s. The first battle actio n of th e new America n field army was th e reduction of th e St. Mihi el salien t. which had been created during the initial inva sion in August 1914 .

29

First Army

xxxx

B

Organization lor Aisne-Mame andSI. Mihiel operations 30 August-16 September1918 (Table 01organization June27, 1918)

I

10-------

XX

1"'::71

1, 2, 5, 35, 78,82 ,90~

1,2,3,6,37,42,78,~

IV OXXX

79,82,89,90,91, 92 ~ XXX

V

O O

xx

3,4 ,26,33,80, ~ - - - - FR 2 Cav (dismounted) FR 15 Colonial

xxx

II FRColonial

xx

-

6,26,33,35,79,80(.),81 ,~ FR 10 Colonial, FR 15 Colonial, FR 26, FR 39, FR 2 Cav(dismounted)

Note: Commanders changeduring period 01 reorganization oftheAEF and dueto reiief. Oivisions move among army corps astacticalsituationchange, hence divisions appear morethan once. Likewise, III, VI,VII, FR XVII andFR XXXIII CorpsjoinFirst Army forthe Meuse-Argonne campaign, September 26-November 11, 1918

Not shown areHO andHO units, Ordnance, Military andTraffic Police, Registration Unit301 , various repair shops andTrains units. Units within thevariousarms andservices change frequently.

In his final report, General Pershing noted that his forecast in the Jul y 10, 1917, general organization project prepared for the War Department, "that a force of about 1,000 ,000 is the smallest unit which in modern war will be a complete, well-balanced, and independent fighting organi zation" proved to be accurate. At the Armistice the AEF had grown to nearly two mill ion soldiers organized in to two field armies. A third field army was activated in mi d-November 19 18.

I Corps

30

Th e next large hea dq uar ters below the army and abo ve the division was the corps . Army corps had been part of Americ an field army organization since the Civil War, during which th ey were the standard maneuver unit. Regiments, the basic recruiting and figh ting organi zation, were assigned to brigades and "divisions" within the corps , but those divisions were neither independent nor interchangeable among corps. There were no tables of organization and equipment (TO&E) until July 17, 1862, when Congress directed a corps organization for the army. The standard corps had three divisions "aggregating about 45 regiments of infantry an d nine batteries of artillery." During the Spanish-American war of 1898, seven army corp s were authorized, bu t their strengths varied Widely from a low of about 8,000 to a high of nearly 57,000 and they were not un iformly structure d. The organ ization of corps was similar to that in th e Civil War, with th ree regiments in a brigade, three brigades per division an d three divisions in the corps. In World War I, corps and armies were not uniform TO&E organizations, apart from their headquarters un its, each being tailored to the task at hand. The corps would contain from two to six divisions , which were TO&E organizations . I Army Corps, usually shortened to I Corps, was organ ized on January 15, 1918, at the direction of the GHQ, AEF. The corps headquarters was situated at Neufchateau in the Vosges Mountains, 37km south and a bit west from Tou!. On January 20, Major General Hunter Liggett assumed command. Liggett was one of the best officers in the army, and certainly in the top eche lon of corps and army commanders in the AEF. Despite h is unmilitary appearance, somewhat pudgy and disheveled, h is capacity for command and his int elligence caused Pershing to rely on him. While commanding the 41st Division tha t was still in the US awaiting dep loyment, he an d his chi ef-of-staff, Lieutenant Colon el (later Brigadier General) Malin Craig, "enrolled as students" in order to soak up as much information from th e British

as possible dur ing a visit to th e British Fifth Army in the fall of 1917. Liggett's I Corps consisted of his headquarters, a pione er infantry regiment, two cavalry regiments , an artillery brigade with two h eavy gun or howitzer regiments as well as a 240mm trench mortar battalion, an antiaircraft mach ine-gun batt alion , an observation and sound ranging section, an d a corps artillery park. Corps engi neer uni ts included a regiment, an engineer train , and a pontoon train . Other un its of th e corps troops organization included a field signa l battalion, a telegraph battalion , a mete orological section , a sanitary train, a mobile veterinary hospital, a military police company, a supply train, a troop transport train, and a remo unt depot. The total strength of the corps troops organization as specified by the November 1, 1918, B Series TO&E was 21,239, no t including the attached comba t and depot divisions. The divisions of I Corps du ring the Meuse-Argonne cam paign are shown in th e chart immediately below. Altho ugh a corps usually ha d four comb at and two depot or replacem ent divisions, it had 12 US divisions and a French division during th e last cam paign-a tot al of abo ut 200,000 soldiers . The battle historyof I Corps incl uded the Aisne-Mame campaign, the St. Mihiel campaign and the Meuse-Argonne campaign, where it played a decisive role. Nine US corps were organized during the war, but on ly the first six sequentially had service prior to the armistice . Thr ee French corps-the II Colonial, the XVII and th e XXXIII- served with th e AEF in 1918.

Soldier stand ing ato p a Renault light ta nk to show t he relative size of th is small fighting machine.T his machine mounted the 37 mm gun. O thers we re armed wit h th e Hotchkiss 8mm machine gun.Th is photo was taken at the USTank Corps School at Bourg near Langres. France. in July 1918. Ame rican-bu ilt 6-to n tanks based on t he Renault design did not reach France in t ime to ente r co mbat . (US Signal Corps. 17546)

I Corps

I

I

1~

XX

6~ 28~

~~ ~~ 42~

78C8J EJ I 80C8J EB 82C8J 91C8J 92C8J XX

xx

Notshown areare smaller support units. Varioussupporting arms units changeaccordingto demands of thetacticalsituation.

XX

XX

XX

FR5cav ~

n~ Note:Not alldivisions attached at same time.

31

The di visio n Three categories of infantry divisions were formed by the War Department, each identified by the sources of its soldiers. The Regular Army divi sions of the AEF were numbered from 1 to 8, th e National Guard divisions from 26 to 42 and the National Army divisions from 76 to 93 . Forty-two divisions, not including the 93d, which did no t serve as a division (its regiments served with th e French Army), arrived for service in France. Thirteen of those divisions were designated as "replacement," or "depot" divisions, initially allocated two per army corps, but later reduced to one. The depot divisions were pools of replacements for the combat divisions. Europe an armies, notably the German Army, had "depot" units integral to th e organization of divisions and army corps. In this way, the early and therefore the most unsettli ng casualties could be replaced right from within the depleted combat unit itself. American staff planners, quite aware of developments of this sort in Europe, knew that the same dynamic would begin to diminish the combat power, that is the "fighting rifle strength," of US infantry divisions as soon as they entered th e lin e. The American line division was an infantry organization. Its composition changed from the first Tables of Organization and Equipment (TO&E) of August 8, 1917, with a strength of 27,123 men, right up to June 26, 1918 , with 28,059 soldiers . The US division was fully twice the size of any other European division, which suggested some problems of control, movement (the road space to march the division was over 50km), and support. Moreover, the very large division seemed to be the very antithesis of General Pershing's concept of "open " warfare, where maneuver and rifle fire, supported by artillery, was the formula for success in battle. Both the British and French missions that were advising th e Americans on matters of organization and procedure believed that the US division was too large and unwieldy. They also were certain that there were far too many soldiers in proportion to the artillery and machine-gun

xx

191 8 Infantry Division, TO&E, June 26, 19 18

X

G

~. 1 245 I III

~ 3'832

28,059

III

~8'469

I

c:><J

I

II

II 1

LSJI488

, ,697

I: MGJ 393

I

0 1 ~ II

757

I

~ HO& HOCo.

,055 Detachments

I

EB I • Detachments include: Medical Chaplains Ordnance Veterinary

32

DETs'

3,243

I HO&MPI

I

I

r-W-1:. ~ 8L~.J III . •.. •

75mm

I

I

I I Sanitary

I

75mm

155mm

Trench

Mortar

AEF Divisions [Based on TO&E o f August 8. 19 17. and June 26 . 1918] Pe rs onn el Un itJS ect ion

8Aug 1917

Division HQ

S t r ength

26 Jun 1918

Str en gth

164

1

245

Infantry Brigades

2

8. 134ea

2

8.469 ea

Infant r y Regime nts

4

3.699 ea

4

3.832 ea

Infantry Battalio ns

12

1.026 ea

12

1.0 27 ea

570

2

757 ea

Regt'l MG Companie s

4

178 ea

4

178 ea

Regt'l Supply Companies

4

140 ea

4

160 ea

48

156 ea

48

256 ea

58

I

63

2

1.479 ea

2

1.518 ea

Infantry Brigade MG Bn

Regt'l Rifle Companies f ield Arty Bde HQ 3in. (75mm) Gun Regts

1.766

I

1.618

Trench Morta r Batte ry

184

I

177

Brigade Me dical/C hap lain

123 ea

127 ea

Brigade O rdnance D ept.

20 ea

20 ea

6io. (15Smm) How Regt.

0

4 ea

Field Arty Medical/C hap lain

102

96

Field Arty Ordnance Dept.

37

49

FieldArty Veterinary De pt.

0

16

754

384

14

7

Brigade Veterinary D ept.

Divison MG Battal io n Division MG Bn Med ical Division MG Bn Ordnan ce Engineer Regime nt Engineer Medical/C hap lain Engineer Ordnan ce Field Signal Bat ta lio n Divisio n A ggre g a t e ( -T r a in s) Train HQ and Milita ry Po lice Ammunition Tra in SupplyTrain Engineer Train Sanitary Tra in Division Tra ins t o ta l Division A ggre gate ( in cl .Tra in s )

4

2

1.634

1.660

32

31

6

6

262

488

24 ,243

24 ,816

16

374

1.033

1.333

472

501

84 949

95 1

2.880

3.243

2 7 ,1 23

28 ,059

Note: Strength figures are not mutually exclusive. egoregimental strengths are included in brigade SErengths. An im al s Draft Ho rse s

1.854

Riding Horses

2.082

Draft Mules

2.565

I Pack Mule s

55

Icontinued on page 34)

33

82

Riding Mules Tota l Horses and Mules

6,638

Major Equipment Items

Rolling Kitche ns (4-mule)

104

Water Carts (I -mule)

101 13

Ambulances (4-mu le) Combat Ca rts ( I- mule)

300 14

Arty Batte ry Wagons (6-horse) Combat Wagons (4-mule/horse)

174

Ration & BaggageWagons (4-mule)

202

Bicycles

238 41

Ambu lances (Motor) Moto r Cars

122

Mot o rcycles with Sidecar

3 19 64

Tract o rs, 2'/, and 5-ton Trucks, all types

577

Artillery Caissons

2 16

Rifle G renade Discharge rs

1,560 50

Guns, 3in. or 75 mm Guns, lib

12

Machine Gu ns,A nt iairc raft

36

Machine Guns , Heavy

224 24

Howitze rs, 6in. o r 155mm Trench Knives

1,920 36

Mo rtars,Trench Pistols

11,9 13

Rifles

17,666

Rifles,Automatic

768

Sources: Historical Section, ArmyWar College, Order of Battle of The United States Land Forces in t he World War, Ameri can Expeditionary Forces, Divisions (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 193 /),446-4 7; United States Army In The Wo rld Wa r 19 17- 19 19.Vo lume I: O rgan ization of the American Exped ition ary Forces (Washington: Historical Division, Department ofthe Army, /948 )

strengths. As it turned out, the large divisions helped to sustain th e heavy casualties im posed by fighting str aigh t ahead in the Fren ch style. The 29 AEF divis ions that eventually participated in combat operations in France consi sted of Regulars , National Guardsmen, and National Army soldiers. In 1918 General Peyton C. March, the army's chief-of-staff, eliminated the distinction between these th ree types .

34

The 1st Division (Regular) Th e 1st Division was formed en passant by directing units that had served in the Punitive Expeditio n in 1916 to assemble and move to the east coast for shipment to France. It consisted of the 1st and 2d Infantry Brigades and the 1st Artillery Brigade (5th , 6th, and 7th Artillery Regiments) . The 16th and 18th In fan try Regiments were assign ed to the 1st Brigade, and th e 26th and

The 1st Division (Regular Army Infantry Division) (interim appointments not shown) Commanding Generals June 8,1917

Brig. Gen.William L. Sibert (Maj. Gen. after June 27)

December 14, 1917

Maj. Gen. Robert L. Bullard

July IS, 1918

Maj. Gen. Charles P. Summerall

October 18, 1918

Brig. Gen. Frank Parker

November 21 , 1918

Maj. Gen. Edward F. McGlachlin,Jr.

Chiefs-of-Staff June8, 1917

Col. Frank W Coe

September 3, 19 17

Col. Hanson E. Ely

January 7, 1918

Lt. Col. Campbell King (Col. after June 7)

September 23, 1918

Lt. Col. John N. Greely (Col. after October 17)

November 7, 1918

Col. Stephen O. Fuqua

Commanders, I st Infantry Brigade 16th and 18th Infantry Regiments; 2d Machine-Gun Battalion June 9,1917

Col. Omar Bundy (Brig. Gen. after June 28)

September 3, 1917

Brig. Gen. George B. Duncan

May 5,1918

Brig. Gen.John L. Hines

August 27, 1918

Brig. Gen. Frank Parker

Commanders,2d Infantry Brigade 26th and 28th Infantry Regiments; 3d Machine-Gun Battalion June 7, 19 17

Col. Robert L. Bullard (Brig. Gen. after June 28)

September 4, 1917

Brig. Gen. Beaumont B.Buck

August 27, 1918

Brig. Gen. Frank E. Bamford

October 17,1918

Brig. Gen . George C. Barnhardt

October 26, 1918

Brig. Gen. Francis C. Marshall

Commanders, I st Field Artillery Brigade 5th (155mm), 6th (75mm) and 7th (75mm) Field Art illery Regiments; lst Trench Mortar Battery August 16, 1917

Brig. Gen. Peyton C. March (Maj. Gen. after September 3)

October 12, 19 17

Brig. Gen. Charles H. McKinstry

December 23, 1917

Brig. Gen. Charles P. Summerall

August 16, 1918

Col. Henry W Butner (Brig. Gen. after October 2 1)

Divisional Troops I st Machine-Gun Battalion; I st Engineer Regiment; 2d Field Signal Battalion; Headquarters Troop

Trains Ist Train Headquarte rs and Military Police; 1st Ammunition Train; Ist SupplyTrain; Ist Engineer Train; I st Sanitary Train (Ambulance Companies and Field Hospitals 2, 3, 12, and 13)

(continued on page 36)

35

Assigned To June 26.19 17

GHQ.AEF

October 14.1917

French Eighth Army

January 5. 1918

French First Ar my

March 27. 19 18 ..

French Eighth Army .

Ap rilS, 19 18

French Fifth Ar my

April 17. 19 18

. Fre nch First Army

July II. 19 18

Frenc hTenth Army

July 30. 19 18

French Eighth Army

August 24. 19 18

US First Army

Nove mber 17. 1918

US Th ird Army

July 2. 19 19

US Armed Forces in Germa ny (AFG)

August 5.1 9 19

US Services of Supply (SOS)

September. 1919

Division demobilizes at Ca mp Meade . MD; Headquarters to Ca mp Taylor. KY fo r stat ioning

So urce: Historical Section, ArmyWar College. O rder of Battle of Th e United States Land Forces in t he World W ar.Ame rican ... Expe dition ar y Forces. Divisions (Washington, DC:Government Printing Office, /93/), /- / 9.

28th to the 2d Brigade. Th e new divisional commander, Major General William Sibert , and the operations officer, Major George C. Marshall, saw each other and their men for the first time on the docks at Hob oken, New Jersey. With nearly 1,000 officers and more than 27,000 enlisted soldiers at maximu m strength, the 1st Division was formidable, if not efficient. General Sibert oversaw the ini tial training of th e 1st Division, but was rem oved by General Pershing in December 1917 in favor of Major General Robert L. Bullard, one of Pershing's favorites . Bullard had bee n the com m ander of the 16th Infantry Regiment during the Punitive Expedi tion, and the 2d Infantry Brigade upon arriv al in France with the 1st Division, but Pershing soon reassigned him to take charge of the AEF schools. Throughout the formative period in France, the 1st Division was held up as the mo del for other divisions to emulate as they prepared for combat. When the emergency of the German spring offensives of March-April 1918 occur red, Persh ing was asked by Foch to provtde help. His immediate response was to send the 1st, 2d, and 3d Divisions, all regulars. Major General Robert L. Bullard. commander of the Ist Division; Co lonel Campbell King, chief-ofstaff; and Lieutenant Guy Shirey. aide-de-camp.June 30. 1918. at Tartigny in t he Cantigny sector. (US Signal Corps. 15832)

36

The 26th "Yankee" Division (N ational Guard) The 26th Division, th e "Yankee Division," was a National Guard division that arrived progressively in France in September and October 1917. It was comprised of soldiers from the New England states and organized for deployment at Fan Devens , Massachusetts. The 51st Infan try Brigade (101st and 102d Infantry Regiments) an d the 52d Infantry Brigade (103d and 104th Infantry Regiments) were supported by the division's 51st Artillery Brigade (101st, 102d, and l03d Artillery Regiment s). Its commander, Major General Clarenc e Edwards, wasa prominent and warm friend of influential New Englanders, despite the fact that he was a regular officer. He graduated from West Point in 1883, three years before his commander-in-ch ief, John Pershing. As a field grade officer he served in the Philippines on the staff of Major General Henry W. Lawton . In 1906 he received his first star and successive appointments to command two infantry brigades, one on the Mexican border and an other in Hawaii. At the entry of the United State in to the World War he was commanding the Northeastern Department of the army and was promoted in August to major genera l. Major General James McAnd rew, the AEF's chief-of-staff, Major Genera Hu n ter Liggett, the commander of I Corps, and other regular officers disliked

The 26th Division (National Guard Infantry Division) (interim appointments not shown) Commanding Generals August 22, 1917

Maj. Gen. Clarence R. Edwards

October 25. 1918

Brig. Gen. Frank E. Bamford

Novembe r 19,1918

Maj. Gen. Harry C. Hale

Chiefs-of-Staff August22, 1917

Lt. Col. George H. Shelton

January 3, 1918

Lt. Col. Cassius M. Dowell

April 18.1918

Lt. Col. Duncan K. Major, Jr. (Col. after August 12)

Commanders, 51 st Infantry Brigade 10 Ist and 102d Infantry Regiments; 102d Machine-Gun Battalion August 19. 1917

Brig. Gen. Peter E.Traub (Maj. Gen. after July 12. 1918)

July 16. 1918

Brig. Gen. George H. Shelton

November 9, 1918

Col. Hiram I. Bearss. USMC

November 24. 1918

Brig. Gen. Lucius L. Durfee

December 7. 1918

Brig. Gen . George H. Shelton

Commanders;52d Infantry Brigade 103d and 104th Infantry Regiments; 103d Machine-Gun Battalion August 20. 1917

Brig. Gen. Charles H. Cole

November 8, 1918

Brig. Gen. George H. Shelton

December 7. 1918

Brig. Gen. Charles H. Cole

Commanders, 51 st Field Artillery Brigade 103d (155mm). 101st (75mm) and . 102d (75mm) Field Artillery Regiments; 101 st Trench Mortar Battery October 20. 1917

Brig. Gen.W illiam Lassiter

May 9.1918

Brig. Gen. Dwight E.Aultman

August 19, 1918

Col. Otho W. B. Farr

October 21, 1918

Brig. Gen. Pelham D. Glassford

October 30. 1918

Col. Otho W. B. Farr

November 28, 1918

Brig. Gen. Pelham D. Glassford

Divisional Troops 101st Machine-Gun Battal ion; 10 Ist Engineer Regiment; 10 1st Field Signal Battalion; Headquarters Troop

Trains 10 Ist Train Headquarters and Military Police; I0 I st Ammunition Train; 10 Ist Supp lyTrain; 10 I st Enginee r Train; IOl st Sanitary Train (Ambulance Companies and Field Hospitals 101-104)

Assigned To October 23, 1917

GHQ.AEF

February 3, 1918

French Sixth Army

March 18. 1918

GHQ.AEF

March 28, 1918

French Eighth Army

June 29.1918

Fre nch Sixth Army

(continued on page 38)

37

August 13, 1918

GHQ.AEF

August 18. 19 18

US First Army

Januar y 25. 1919

US Services of Supply (SOS)

May 3. 1919

Division demobilizes at Camp Devens, MA

Source: Historical Section. ArmyWar College. O rder of Battle of th e Un ited States Land Forces in the Wo rld W ar. Am erican Expeditionary Fo rces. Divisions (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1931), 113-29.

Major General Clarenc e Edwards, commander of the 26th Division. with Major General Hunter Liggett, commander of I Co rps at Toul, May 13. 1918. Edwards, a popular New Englander. was relieved of co mmand by General Pershing during t he Meuse-Argonne campaign. (US Signal Corps, 14608)

38

Edwards who was in turn adored by hi s guardsmen. General Edwards was regarded by some as a complainer and excuse-maker. Robert L. Bullard said that he "was so fault-finding and officially crit ical of our shortcomings" when his 26th Division, "n ot quite so experienced as ourselves, " relieved the l st Division in the Toul sector on April 1. 1918 . As Edward Coffman noted in his history of the American experience in World War I, there was some friction between Regular Army and National Guard officers , th e latter being judged by the former as ama teurs in uniform. During the St. Mihiel operation, near the end of the first day, the Yankee Division was ordered to pus h hard to meet the 1st Division attack at Vigneulles. It met its timetable and showed its flexibility and figh tin g power. When the commander-in-chief relieved Edwar ds on October 22, 1918, during the Meuse-Argonne campaign , th e New England media cried fou l. Edwards was not the only division commander fired by Pershing, only the most voca l and po litical. The Yankee Division was a good outfit that served in all major campaigns and stood n ear the top of the list of units that cap tured Germans and sustained ba tt le casualties. As might be expected th e unit histories of the 26th had a different take on th e division's relationship with GHQ. War correspondent Bert Ford who accompanied the divis ion to France, noted that "th e rank and file of National Guardsmen in France accused the regular army officers of exercising a 'milita ry autocracy every bit as severe as anything in vogue in Germany.:" When Pershing removed Edwards at "th e he ight of operations ... it caus ed a hur ricane of sur prise an d regret." Ford repeated the familiar epithet that it was all because th e Regular Army he ld a "grudge" against the National Guard. Ford pointed out that sort of talk was com mon place among the troops and even "inc reased tr em endously after th e armistice" wh en there was time to "th in k and find fault and when open critici sm was not likely to affect the success of the cause.' Th e soldiers of the Yankee Division, whether newest recruit or most grizzled vete ran, praised their commanding general to the point of worship. "Ths senti men t was not exaggerated. I talked with the men," said Ford, "and I know ... Th ose were dark day s for the 26th. " The commanders of the 101st and 103d Infantry Regiments and th e 52d Infantry Brigade were also relieved in the follow ing weeks . General Pershing subsequen tly reinstated all three. The 77th "Metropolitan" (or "Liberty") Di v isi o n (National Army) Th e 77th Division consisted of soldiers from New York City and was organized at Camp Upton, New York, for overseas service. It arr ived in France in April and May 1918, the first National Army division in the theater of operations. The division comprised the 153d Infantry Brigade (30Sth and 306th Infantry Regim ents), the 154th Infantry Brigade (30 7th and 308th Infantry Regim ents) and the 152nd Artillery Brigad e (304th, 30Sth and 306th Artillery Regiments). Major General Robert Alexander tool command on Augu st 27, 1918, following others who had organized and trained the National Army division . It was General Alexander's task to roOl out the Germans from the tangled and lethal defensive positions of the Argo n ne For est in October, after hi s division had undergone training with the British army and h ad seen active service in Lorraine in Jul y and alon g the Vesle an d Aisn e rivers in August.

The 77th Division (N ational Army Infantry Div ision) (interim appointments not shown) Co mm anding G en erals August 18. 1917

Maj . Gen . J. Franklin Bell

May 8.1918

Maj. Gen. George B. Duncan

August 27. 19 18

Maj. Gen. Robert Alexander

Chiefs-of-Staff August 20. 1917

Lt, Col. Ewing E. Booth (Col. after Narch 26. 1918)

July II. 19 18

Col. john R. R. Hannay

October II . 191 8

Col. Clarence O. Sherrill

December 5.1 918

Lt, Col. John J. Burleigh

Commanders, 15ld Infantry Bri gad e 305th and 306th Infantry Regiments; 30Sth Machine-Gun Batta lion August 27. 1917

Brig. Gen . Edmund Wittenmyer

October 26.19 18

Brig. Gen .Witliam R. Smedberg. jr.

November 4. 1918

Brig. Gen . Michael j.lenihan

Comm and e rs, 154th Infantry Brigad e 307th and 308th Infantry Regiments; 306th Machine-Gun Battalion August 27.1917

Brig. Gen . Evan M.jo hnso n

September 9. 1918

Brig.Gen . Edmund Wittenmyer

September 25. 1918

Brig. Gen . Evan M. johnson

October 30. 1918

Brig. Gen . Harriso n J. Price

Commanders, IS2d Field Artillery Br igad e 306th ( IS5mm). 304th (75mm) and 305th (7Smm) Field Artillery Regi ments; 302d Trench Mo rta r Batte ry October 16. 1917

Brig. Gen .john D. Barrett e

February 7. 19 18

Brig. Gen .Thomas H. Rees

August 5. 1918

Col. Manus McCloskey (Brig. Gen. after December 8. 191 8)

Divisional Tro o ps 304m Machine-Gun Battalion; 302d Engineer Regiment; 302d Field Signal Battalion; Headquarters Troop Trains 302nd Train Headquarters and Military Police: 302d Ammunition Train: 302d SupplyTrain: 302d Engineer Train; 302dSanitary Train (Ambulance Companies and Field Hospitals 305-308 Assign ed To Apd112.1918

GHQ.AEF

April 15. 1918

British Second Army

May 14. 19 18

British Third Army

June 6. 19 ' 8

French Eighth Army

August 6. 19 18

French Sixth Army

September 8. 1918

French Fifth Army

September 17. 19 18

French Second Army

September 22. 1918

US First Army

February 12. 1919

US Services of Supply (SOS)

May 9.1919

Division demobilizes at Camp Upton . NY (long Island)

Source: Historical Section. ArmyWar College, Order of Battle of the United States land Forces in the World War. American Expeditionary Forces. Divisio ns (Washington, DC:Government Printing Office. '93').196-307.

39

26t h Division troops in tru cks near Menil-la-Tour.April I. t9 lB.The Yankee Division was one of the

early divisions deployed to France. (US Signal C orp s. I2007 )

Perh ap s th e bes t-known act ion of the d ivision was in the Argonne Forest. The 77th , alo ng with the 28 th and the 35 th Natio na l Gua rd di visio n s, was part of Ma jor General Hunter Liggett's I Co rps. The 92d Division was in corps rese rve at the o utse t o f the ~..reu se-Argonn e ca m pa ign on Septe mber 26, 1918. Th e 77 th h ad ab out 6 .Skm of ru gged , fores ted terrain in its l one. A composite ba ttali on-stzcd gro up o f sold iers from two battalions of the 308th In fan try Regim ent and 1'.. ·0 co m pan ies o f th e 30 6t l1 Mach in e-Gun Battalion were cut o ff and isolat ed for five day s n ear Cha rlcvaux Mill. Major Cha rles Wh itt lesey, commander of th e 1st Batta lion, 308 th In fan try Regiment, was the senior o ffice r. Gene ral Alexa nd er, in h is account in th e di visio n's unit hi stor y, stated that he realized th e "e xtrem ely critica l" sit ua tion faced by h is tro op s. Efforts to resupply and ma intai n co m m u n ication with th e detach men t were foiled by "the d ensity of the un dergrowth " and the un certai nt y of its exact locat io n in the forest. Two airpla n es and th eir pilot s we re lost in the efforts. The relief forces from the division reac he d th e little band on th e nigh t of Oc to be r 7 and discov ered that th ere we re o nly abo ut 35 percent effectives from th e original gro up of 55 4 men. Gene ral Alexa nde r, perhap s not th e most o bjective observe r, d id assess the train in g o f hi s ju nior o fficers and noncommissio n ed o fficers as th ey left th e vesle River fron t for th e Argonn e as leaving "m uch to be desi red ." In part icul ar, their abil ity to "combine moveme n t with fire" was deficien t. He att ribu ted thi s to a "lac k o f tim e" to train prop erly for open warfare . Alexander also found fault with th e co m plex o rganization of the in fantry regim ent- "m o re com plicated than the abilities of the a n~ rage co lone l pe rmit h im to use effectively." He also favored placin g severa l light art illery pieces wit h the regim en t to blast o ut enemy machi ne-gu n pos itio ns, and believed tha t th e m ed ium 155mm arti llery should be moto rized to improve mobility and flexibility of fire plan n ing . Sim ilarly, he argued for "fo ur or five planes" to be added to the divi sio n orga n ization to facilit ate con tinual trai n ing with the gro und troo ps. Partly beca use the 77th was given such a ' v'ide frontage to dea l w ith in the Argo n ne, Ge n era l Alexander concluded th at th e three brigades o f th ree infa nt ry regim en ts each th at were tht core of th e "fighti ng rifle streng th " of the in itial divis ion TO&E in 191 7 should be restored . Clea rly th e 77th, formed from Ame rica n cit izen levies in th e historic spirit of th e m ilit ia of the Un ited States, fough t bravely an d well in France .

40

St a ti sti cal co m p a riso n Th e three d ivi sio n s highlight ed in thi s ch ap ter we re co m ba t infantry divisions The l st began to arrive o n Ju n e 26, 191 7, th en serve d 12 7 days in qu iet secton

and 93 days in ac tive secto rs, the longest time of an y of the 29 co m bat divisions . Th e 26th arrived sequentially in France in September and Octobe r 1917, after receivi ng a "transfusion" of 900 so ld iers fro m th e 76th Division. The Yankee Division served 148 days in q u iet sectors and 45 in act in.' secto rs. The 77th Division organ ized at Ca mp Upton, New Yor k, where it bot h received soldiers from an d provided so ld iers to o ther div isions. Th e d ivision began deployme nt in Murch 19 1H and closed in Fran ce o n May U . Th e Metr o pol itan Il.iberty) Divisio n served 4 7 d ays in quiet sectors and 66 days in active sector s. The 77th Division mad e the greatest advance against the enemy-7 1.5km , followed by the lst at 5 1kill and th e 26th with 37km. The l st captured 6,469 Germans, the 26th took 3, 14M, and the 77th got 750. The lst Division had 4,4 11 men killed in action and 17,201 wounded (to tal 2 1,612', the 26th had 2, 135 sold iers killed and 11,325 wounded (total 13,460J, and the 77th accumulated 1,992 killed and X,505 wou nded ( 1O,497 tot al). Those three d ivisions were in the to p nine of th e 29 co m bat divisions in Fran ce. The grand total for the AEF W35 50 ,2XO battle deat hs and 205 ,690 wounded. An addi tio na l 46 men were missing and 4,4HO were taken prisoner. As expected . the infan try and machine-gun units took most of the casualties, between 50 and HO pe rcent . Of the 14belligerent s that suffered casualties, only Greece and Portugal lost fewer men than the United States .

The division infantry brigade The combat sol d iers of th e American d ivision were org aniz ed in to t wo in fan try brigades of 8,-169 men each . Th e brigade co nsis ted o f two infant ry regim ents. each with 3,768 so ldier ..., a brigade headqua rter s of 25 so ld iers, a machine-gun battalion of 75 7 sold iers and supporting medical, ordnance, and veterinary field units. along with a group of chaplains. Th e four in fan try regtmcnts of th e

Infa n try Brig a d e

x

[ZIS'469 I

I

"'

X

2S

~'7681"

MG

'"

~

127

VET

-

·f''jj-~ :'! ', '-..' ~

\,

1

' I

•

A USMC sentry stands guar d during a gas attack at the POSt of Command (PC) of the 4th Brigade. 2d Divisio n, east of Verdun. t-tarch 27. 1918. Note the mule-drawn water trailer ("water buffalo"], which m",y have been contaminated by the gas.The Sth Mar ines occupied the sector named "Moscow" by t he French. (US Signal Corps, 12163)

41

AEF Infantry Brigad es (Base d on TO &E of June 26. 1918)

Personnel Unit/Secti on

26 Jun 1918

Brigade HQ

25

Infantry Regiments

2

t-tachine-Gun Battalion

I

Total Combatants Medical Dept. & C haplains Ordnance De pt.

Strength

3.768 ea 757 8,318 127 20

Veterina ry Field Unit

4

Bri gade A ggregate

8,469

Note: Strength figu res are not mutually exclusive. e.g. regimental strengths ore included in brigade strengths. Animal s Draft Mules

B2 1

Riding Horses

185

Riding Mules

Total H orses a n d Mul e s

33 1,039

Maj or Equipment It ems Ro lling Kitche ns (4-mule)

36

Water Carts ( I-mule)

34

Combat Ca rts ( I-mule) Me dical Carts (I-mule)

7

Ration Carts (2-mule)

37

Combat Wagons (4-mule/horse)

46

Ration & Baggage W ago ns (4-m ule)

50

Bicycles

94

Motor Cars

3

Motorcycles with Sidecar

8

Rifle Grenade Discharg ers

Guns. lib Machine Guns. Heavy Tren ch Knives Mo rta rs. 3in. Stokes

780 6 96 960 12

Pisto ls

3.183

Rifles

6.457

Rifles.Automatic

42

150

384

Note: There are some discrepandes between this brigade list and the brigade section of the division list 80th lists ore part of the same TO&£ of 26 June 1918. Sources ." United Sta tes Arm y In T he W orld War 19 17-1 9 I9.Volume I: O rga nization o f the American Expe ditio nary Fo rce s (Washington: Historical Division, Depa rtment of the Army. 1948)

Infantry Regim ent

II I

1Z1

3 832 •

I I

~ 349

"

~ " 027/"

[]}

I

AEF Infantry Re gim ents (Based on TO&E of June 26. 19 18) Personn el

Un it/S ectio n

26 Jun 19 18

Regimental HQ & HQ Co. Infantry Battalions

Strength 349

3

1,027 ea

Machine-Gun Company

178

Supply Company

160

Total Combatants Medical Dept. & Chaplains

Ordnance Dept. Regim ent A ggregat e

3,768 56

8 3,8 32

Animals Draft Mules

315

RidingH orses

65

Riding Mules

10

Total Horse s and Mule s

390

Major Equipment Items RollingKitchens (4· mule)

16

Water Carts ( I -mule)

15

Combat Carts ( I-mule)

27

Medical Carts ( I -mule)

3

Ration Car ts (2-m ule)

16

CombatWagons (4-mule)

19

Ration & Baggage Wagons (4-mule)

22

Bicycles

42

Motor Cars

Motorcycles with Sidecar

Rifle Grenade Dischargers Guns. lib

Machine Guns. Heavy Trench Knives Mortars. 3in. Stokes

(continued on page 44)

I

2 390 3 16 480 6 43

Rifles

-

3.200

Rifles. Automatic

-

192

Pistols

1.200

Note:There are some discrepancies between dlis regimental/ist and die brigade and division lists.Allare part of the same TO&£ a(June 26. /9/8. Source: United States Army In The Wo rld War 19 17- 19 19.Volume I: O rganization of the Ameri can Expeditionar y Fo rces (Washington: Historical Division, Department of the Army, 1948)

Infantry Battal ion

" rfl7 (Zlt'

I

I

I I

IZJ".

0 ' I

C8J". I •••

I

•••

cg] S9

El" I

t=}6

I

cg] S9 I

I

••

••

1.C8J

2dC8J

12 11and bombers

9 rt11e gretladiers

4 rifle companies, each with 4 rifle platoons of59 soldiers

i

I

I

I

C8J". I

I

IXI ". I

• ••

cg] S9

•••

cg] S9 I

I

••

••

3dC8J

4~ C8J

17 rttIernen

15 autom.ltic liflemen

AEF Infant ry Rifle Companie s (Based on TO &E of 26 June 19 18) Personn el 26 Jun 1918

UnitlSection

Strength

Company HQ

I

20

Infantry Platoo n

4

59 ea

Total Co m b a t ants

-

Platoon HQ

4

6 e.

l st 5ection-Hand Bombers

4

12 ea

2d Section-Rifle Grenadiers

4

9 e.

3d Section-Riflemen

4

17 ea

4th Section -Automatic Riflemen

4

IS ea

Plato on Aggregate

4

S9 ea

-

IS'

256

An ima ls Draft. Mules

*Mu/es furnished on order, not organic

[0

company.

Major Equ ip m ent It ems Rolling Kitchens (4-mule)

-

I [fro m supply company ]

Water Carts {l-mule}

-

I [fro m supply company]

Ration Carts (2-mule)

44

continued on poge 45

I [fro m supp ly company]

I

Co mbat Wagons (4.mule)

[from supply company]

Ration & Baggage W ago ns (4 ·mule)

[fro m supply company}

Rifle Gren ad e D ischa rgers

30

Trench Knive s

40

Pistols

73

Rifles

235

Rifles.Aut omatic

16 [8 in plat o o ns. 8 co . rese rve]

Note:There are some discrepancies between rhis companyfp/a[oon list and odler Iim.AlI are port of die same TO&f. ofJune 26. '918. Sou rces: United Sta tes Army In The World War 19 17-1 9 19.Vo lume I: O rgan ization of the American Exped itio nary Forces (VVoshington: Historical Division. Department of the Army. 1948)

division, eac h co mprising 3,832 soldiers (64 med ical, chapl ain, and ord nance troops att ached from briga de assets to the 3.768 base streng th ), included a headquarters and headquarters co mpa ny of 349 soldiers, three in fantry battalions of 1.02 7 sold iers each, a mach ine-gun co mpany of 178 soldiers, and a supply company of 160 men . Th e three in fantry battalions of eac h in fantry regiment co nsis ted of 1.027 men orga nize d int o a headqua rters compan y and four rifle co mpanies. The infant ry battalion was a pur e fighti ng inf antry unit. All of th e su pporting fires from arti llery, mach ine gu ns, and mor tars came from other unit s above th e battalio n. Eac h rifle co mpa ny consis ted of a head qu arters section of 20 soldie rs an d four rifle platoons, each \...ith 59 soldiers. The rifle platoo n had a headquart ers sectio n of six men and four sectio ns , each with a slightly different function . Th e 1st sectio n consisted of 12 hand bombers; th e 2d section had nine rifle grenadie rs; th e 3d sectio n had 17 riflem en ; and th e 4th section had IS auto mat ic riflem en.

The division artillery brigade Combat power within the division was generated by "fighting rifle" strengt h and supporting fires from light and heavy artillery regim en ts, machine-gun battalions and companies and trench mortar batt eries. The field artillery brigade of th e division was a robust organization . The main firepower was delivered by the two lightartillery regiments, each consisting of 1,518 soldiers and 24 7Smm guns. The heavy artillery regiment cons isted of 1,618 men and 2-1- ISSmm howitzers. Both the light and hea vy gun s were of Fren ch manufactur e. The ma jor organ izationa l difference between the light and heavy regiments was the number of batt alions and batteries withi n each 1)1)(' of regiment. The 7SmJ11-gun light regiments each had two battali on s of three four-gun batt eries. The ISSmm howitzer regiment had

French children watch American soldie rs draw a 155mm gun into position at the AEFTractor and Artiller y School. St. Maur, Paris. May 9. 1918. (US Signal Corp s. 11980)

45

Field Artill ery Brigade

x

8

I

I

I

III

II I

8

ITj"

I

8

1'518/ea 24 guns/ea

15mm

5 055 •

I

8

1,618

155mm

24 1'1owitlers

I tn

I

MEDICAl& CIW'LAlNS

96

,

,

,

II

8

~ 209

599fea

I

I

I

8

bd

111

r

1M£DCAL& 1 27 ''''''~

I

[ill ..

[ 3 J 4fea

:

8

~2

,

199

4 1luns

199

4 guns

,

~ 261

I

~2

,

8

I

I

I

~ =..

I, 8

[ill "

210

4 howlbers

8

,

bd

,I

I MfDICAl.&1 38 """~ 91

210

4 I'IowlbllB

' 99 NoIe: Redundancy from 110. MedicllJ, Chaptams, 0n1nance, & VI!lerinary perscllIlel

4 guns

Pe rs onne l Un it/ Section

26jun 19 18

Strength

Brigade HQ

I

6J

3in. Gun Regiments

2

1,5 18 ea

6in. Howize r Regime nt

I

1,618

Trench Mo rtar Battery

I

177

Total combatants

-

4,894

Medical Dept. & Chaplains

96

Veterinary Field Unit

-

Brigad e Aggregate

I

5,0 55

O rdnance Dep t.

49 16

Note: Strength figures are not mutually exclusive, e.g. regimental strengths are inc/uded in brigade strengths. Anim als Draft Ho rses Riding Horses Riding Mules Draft Mules Total Horses a nd Mu le s

-

1.45B

-

2,7 17

925 16 J IB

Ma jor Equipm ent It e ms Rolling Kitche ns (4-mu le & Tra il)

continued on page 47

I

II

AEF Field Artille r y Bri ga d e s (Base d o n TO E of 26 June 1918)

46

ill}

EJ16

12 6ln. trench mortars

I ,

I

-

25

Water Carts ( I-mule)

-

16

Battery Reel Carts (2-horse)

-

12

RegtlBn Ree l Carts

-

II

Medical Carts ( I-mule)

-

4

Ration Carts (2-mule)

-

17

Battery Wagons (6-horse)

-

12

Comb. Store/Bey Wagons (6-horse)

-

2

Ration & Baggage Wagons (4-mule)

-

48

Spring Wagons (2-ho rse)

-

4

StoreWagons (6-horse)

-

12

Bicycles

-

26

MotorAmbulance

-

3

Motor Cars

-

28

Reconnaissance Cars

-

6

Motorcycles with Sidecar

-

11 7

Ordnance Tracto rs (2.5-ton)

-

4

Ordnance Tracto rs (5-ton)

-

60

Trucks. Cargo

-

18

Trucks.Am muniti o n

-

104

Trucks.Artille ry Repair

-

3

Trucks, Reel & Fire Control

-

6

Truck. Ught Repa ir

-

I

Trucks. Supply

-

14

Trucks. Tank

-

3

Trucks.Telephone

-

4

Trucks. Wireless

-

3

Caissons

-

180

Guns (3in. o r 75mm)

-

48

Howitzers (6in. or 155mm)

-

24

Machine Guns.Antiaircraft

-

36

Trench Mo rtars (6in.)

-

12

Pistols

-

3,620

Rifles

-

1,339

~ Sources: United States Army In The Wo rld War 1917-1919.Volume I: Organization of the Ameri can Expeditio nary Forces (Washington: Historical Division. Department of the Army. /94 8)

47

Field Artill ery Regim ent (Li ght)

III

I • I

I

c;J_..

~209 I

I

I

I

I

II

I

1,·565

~ 1I1

31n. or 75mm guns

I

1 ~1 27

I

~~

I

.

I Q I"

I

~}~ G~}~ 8 1~

~2

4 1luns

41luns

4 11uns

I

AEF Field Artill ery Light Re gime nts (Based on TO &E of 26 June 191 8) Pe rs onn el Uni t/Section

26 Jun 1918

Regimental H Q

I

Battalio n HQ

2

Regimenta l HQ Co mp any

I

205

Regime nta l Supply Com pany

I

III

Firing Batte ries

6

199 ea

Total Combatants

-

1,518

Med ical Dept . & C haplains

Ordnance Dept .

-

12

Veter inary Field Unit

2

Regim ent Aggr egate

1

1,565

Draft Hor ses

-

726

Riding Horses

-

407

Riding Mules

-

8

D raft Mules

-

152

Total H orse s a nd Mul e s

-

1,293

Strength 4 2 ••

27

4 ea

Animals

Maj or Equipm ent It em s Rolling Kitch ens (4-mule)

-

8

Water Carts {l-mule)

-

8

-

6

Batt ery Reel Carts

(2~ h orse)

Regtl Bn Re el Ca rts Medical Carts ( I-mule)

Ration Carts (2-mule) Battery Wagons (6-horse)

48

(contInued

on page

49 )

J 2

8 6

I

Comb. Store/BeyW ago ns (e-hc rse) Ration & Baggage Wa go ns (4·mule)

23

SpringWagons (2·horse)

2

Store Wagons (e-hcrse)

6

Bicycles

12

Motor Car Motorcy cles w ith Sidecar

J

Truck,Teleph o ne

I

Truck,Wi re less Caissons (6· ho rse)

72

Guns (lin. o r 7Smm)[6.ho rs e]

24

Machine Gu ns.Antia ircraft

12

Pistols

1.451

Rifles

87

Note: Regimental totals may not agree with field artillery brigade list numbers because some units/personnel are listed separately rather than with the regiments. Ught regiments comprised 2 battalions (3, 4-gun batteries each). Source: United State s Ar my In The W orld Wa r 19 17- 1919.Vo lume I: Organizatio n of the Amer ican Expedition ary Force s (Washington: Historical Divis ion, Department of the Army, 1948)

Field A r t ille ry Re g im e nt (Hea vy) Sin. or 155mmhowitzers

I I

~ 261

I

" ~ 4W"

r----I-----.

I

I

8

.. howitzers

I

210

8

210

.. howitzllfS

This is the train ing that the French children were o bser ving. (US Signal CO"" . 11 981)

49

AEF Field A .-till e ry H e avy Re giments (Based on TO&E of June 26, 1918) Personn el Uni tJS e cti on

26 Jun 1918

Stren gth

Regimental H Q

Battalion HQ

4

3

Regimental HQ Company

e.

257

91

Regimental Supply Company

Firing Batte ries

2

6

Tota l C ombatants

210 ea

1,61 8

Medical De pt. & Chaplains

38

Ordnance Dept.

24

Regi m ent A ggr e gate

1,6 80

Major Equipm e nt It em s Rolling Kitchens (Trail)

8

Ambulances. motor

3

Tractors. O rdnance 2.5-ton

4

RegtlBn Ree l Car ts

4

Tracto rs, O rdnance 5-to n

60

Trucks. Cargo

16

Trucks ,Ammunition

95

Trucks.Art ille ry Repair

3

Trucks. Re el and Fire Co ntrol

6

Tr uck. Repair; Light

Trucks. Supply

13

Trucks.Tank Cars. Mo to r. all types Mo to rcycles with Sidecar

3

29 108

Truck.Telephone

Truck,Wireless

Caissons

36

Howitzers (6in. o r 15Smm)

24

Guns , t- lachlne.Antf-Aircraft

12

Pistols Rifles

597 {incl 14 fro m attached units}

1.045

Note: The heavy field artillery regiments comprised three baualions (two batteries each),whereas the

light field artillery regiments comprised two battalions (three batteries each). Source: United States Army In T he World Wa r 19 17- 19 19.Vo lume I: Organization of t he

50

Ame rican Expedi tion ary Fo rces (Washington:Historical Division, Department

ofthe Army, f 948)

Trench Mo rt a r Ba tte r y Sin. Newton trenchmortars

I

•••

•••

118 46

ITJ·

I

I

•••

2d 846

3d

8 46

.----L---,

8

The spec:iaI detailS detadlmentcan field 3 teams, tach WI!ll 2 cbserYers. 2 le\epIlOnJS!S and 1 agent detlChment l'ladsupeMSOI'S 10'ctlst!rv3!lCt1 teams andammo carrymg cerees.

rre

25

2 mortars

three battalions o f two fou r-gu n batt eries. Thi s provid ed 72 artillery pieces withi n the divisional artillery th at th e d ivisio n com ma nde r co uld use to weigh t the battle. A tren ch mortar batt ery of 177 men and 12 6in. m ortars was also "organic" to the artillery brigade . In add itio n to th is im mediately available firepo wer, th e division co m ma nde r could call upon add itio na l artillery sup por t from corps and

army,

The Air Servic e Aviation with troops had its begin nin g in the Sign al Cor ps o f th e arm y, Eigh t training airpl anes h ad acco m pa n ied Hrigadier Ge ne ral Per sh ing 's pu n it ive expeditio n in to Mexico in 191 6. bu t they soo n were in operative with no m ean s to repa ir o r maint ain th em in th e field. As the AEF was fo rmed provision was made o n Septe mber 3. 191 7, for a chief of the Air Service, independent of the Signal Cor ps, in th e GHQ orga n izat ion , In accorda nce wi th a m a jor reorgani zation o f the GHQ in Feb ruary 19 18, all th e technical ser vice'S were moved u nd er the co n tro l o f the Services of Su pp ly {50 S) at Tours. Th e ch ief of the Air Service main tained a staff positio n at Ch aumo n t to ad vise th e comma n der-ln -ch ief o n th e gene ra l em p loy me nt o f air asset s ,v-htle the admin istra tion and logisti cs fo r the ser vice were h an dl ed from Tours, eventua lly u nd er an assis tant chief of the Air Service . Lieutena nt Colonel wtlliam "Billy" Mit ch ell. wh o served as ch ief in Ju ne to August 191 7. was followed by Brigad ier Ge nera l Ben jam in D. Fo u lois from th e fall of 191 7 to the spring of 19 18 wh en h e turn ed hi s offi ce over to Brigad ier Ge ne ral Maso n M. Patrick, a West Po in t clas sm ate o f Persh ing. \..\'110 co n tro lled air o pe ratio ns un til the end of th e war, Foulo is was an early pioneer of mi litary aviat io n, but Patr ick was an abl e sta ff ad m in istrato r who m Persh in g used in ma n y ca pac ities, which was im po rta n t as the air ar m of th e AEF grew large r. The Air Servin' staff coordina ted closely with the Engineer Division of Construction and Forestry to select an d develo p th e ai rfie lds ser ving th e AEE By Augus t 1918 th e Air Service Army Air Se r vice 749 airplanes, various types 15 balloons

I C><) 1 11,268

--,

,

,

,

X

x

l UllCO' 12.112

, I~ ~MEp~,,~1

1 97

[][] S71

1=1 2.

0

10

~ 38 ~

51

AEF Army Air Services (Based o n TO&E of Septem ber 8. 1918) Personn el U n it/S e ctio n

Number

Headquarters

I

Air Parks (airfields)

2

Army Obs ervat ion Wings

2

Strength 31 162 ea 2.306 ea

Balloon Wing

2,8 12

Mono place Pursuit W ing *

2.0 I0

Day Bombardment Gro up

66 1

Ai,. Service Combatants

10,450

Med. Dept. & Chaplains

J

Ordnance Dept.

57 1

97

Art illery

12

Intelligence

38

Ai,. Service Aggre gate

11,268

• Monoplace Pursurt airaafi are single-seat. pghter planes.Ahhough the word "monopJace" appears to be a misspeNing of "monoplane," the TO&E and other references use monoploce and bt-ploce to describe the two bosic types of oircro(t. i.e. one-seat and two-sect, Ma jor Equ ip m ent Ite m s Ambulances. Mot or Motor Cars Mot or Cars. light

30

Motorcycles with Sidecars

423

Mot orcycles

36 318

Mot o r Trucks

( 3~ to n )

Mot or Trucks (3-ton. -t-wheel drive)

90

Mot or Trucks. Repair

68

Motor Trucks (I I/J-ton) Mot or Trucks. lighting

382 7

Moto r Trucks. Photo

8

Motor trucks. Radio

10

Moto r Trucks.W inch

IS

Motor Trucks.Tender

IS

Trailer s

(3 ~ton )

135

Trailer s (11/2_ton)

204

Trailers ( I-ton)

220

Trailers. Rolling Kitchen

30

Trailers. Phot o

8

Trailers. Radio

10

Trailer s.Water Tank

IS

Airplanes

749

Balloons

IS

Pistols

52

10 167

(continued on page 53)

2.929

I

Rifles

-

8.136

Rifles. Automatic

-

15

-

90

-

1.578

Machine

G u n s . AA ~M ou n t

Machine Guns. Synchronized Machine Guns. Flex ible

1.1 02

Source: Unit ed States Army In The World War 19 17- 1919.Volume I: Organization of the American Expeditionary Fo rces (Washington: Historical Division, Department of the Army, 1948)

t Pursuit ( Fighte r) Sq u ad ro n

II

1(><)1

24 monoplace (single seat) airplanes

212

1

~9

I

I

~ 25 1

~1

I

I

1

0

1

I

I

~4V" 8

33

p l ~rteslea

I

1

1

I

I

I

ISE~ I ~ ISE:~ I seen..

1

I I

[]I} .

I

1

I

I

@J I ~ """"

SE:mN

I

AEF Pu rsuit [F ighte r] Squ ad ro n, Air Se rv ice (Based on TO&E of Septem ber 8. 1918) Pers onnel Unit/Section

I

St re ngth

1

9

Supply & Trans. (2d section)

1

25

Engineering (3d section)

1

33

Flights

3

42 ea

Air Sections (6 per flight)

~ Total Co m b a t a n t s

I

Nu m b e r

Headquarte rs ( Ist section)

Ordnance Dept.

18

126 tota l

-

193

-

2

19

Squad ron A ggregate 2 12 No[e: Some duplication in figures, e.g. oir section numbers and flight numbers not mutuallyexclusive.The pursuit wing coosisted of three groups. each with three squadrons.TheAU Air Service had one pursuit wing.As the AU expanded, theAir Service units increased. Major Equipm ent Items Motor Cars Motor Car, Light Motorcycles with Side ca rs

~l Motorcycles (continued on page 54)

1 7 I

53

-

7

Motor Trucks. Repair Motor Tru cks (/ '/1-ton)

-

9

Trailers (3-t on)

4

Trailers ( Il/J-ton)

-

Trailers ( I-to n)

-

9

Trailer. Rolling Kitchen

-

1

Airplanes

-

25

Pistol s

-

63

Rifles

-

149

Machine G uns. Synchroni ze d

-

52

Motor Trucks (3-(o n)

2

3

Source: United Sta tes Army In The World War 1917-1919.Volu me I: Organ ization of the American Exped itio nary Fo rc es (Washington:Historical Divis ion, Dep artment of the Army. 1948)

Observa t ion Squadron

1

~.

II

8I

1 I

m

24 bl-plane (two seater) alrpaines

I

[~}

00" 1

~,

1

1

I

I

~ 411U 8 planes/ l a

1

1

1

I

I

I

Sl:cnON

SECTION

SECTION

II

I .0 I"

1

1

I

I

~ ~ ~ I SE~T~OH I I SE~~OH ~ ~ 5{ClJON

I I

AEF Observat ion Squa dron, Air Service (Based on TO&E of September 8. 19 18)

Personn e l Uni t/Se ctio n

Number

Str ength

Headquarters ( Ist sect ion)

1

9

Supply & Trans . (2d section)

1

27

Engineering (3d section)

1

33

Flights

3

47 ea

To tal C o mba t ant s

-

210

O rdn ance Dept.

-

19

Sq u ad ro n A ggr e gate

-

229

Note: Some duplication in figures. e.g. air section numbers and flight numbers not mutually exclusive.

Ma jor Eq u ip m ent It e m s

54

Motor Cars

-

4

Motor Ca r. Light

-

1

Moto rcycles with Sidecars

-

10

(continued on page 55)

I

Mot orcycle Motor Truc ks (3-(0 0)

7

Motor Trucks. Repair

2

Motor Tru cks (" /l-ton)

9

Trailers (3-too)

4

Trailers ( I '/:-ton)

3

Trailers (I -ton)

9

Trailer. Rolling Kitchen Airplanes

24

Pistols

75

Rifles

154

Machine guns. Synchronized

50

Mach ine guns.Flexible

50

Sou rce : United Slates Army In The W o rld War 1917-1919 .Volume I: Organization of the American Expedition ary Fo rce s (Washington: Historical Division, Department of the Army. 1948)

strength in 50S had risen to nearly 56, 000. The Air Service assets with th e arm y consisted of 11,268 sol d iers and 749 ai rplanes , orga n ized int o two ai r pa rks (fields), two observa tion wings , one bal loo n wing, on e mo nopl an e purs uit wing, and a day bomba rdm ent group. " wing co nsisted of three groups, a group had three (so me sources say four) sq uad rons. An air park , whi ch was relatively small (162 personnel), had t he essential technician s a nd food service personnel for the Air Service unit s. Th e air asset s with army co rps were 1,725 personne l and 76 airplanes. An observation group (69-1 men and 73 airplanes) was comprised of three (some sources say four) squadro ns . A balloo n group of 932 soldiers an d five ba lloo ns also supported th e corps.

The Tank Corps The organization of th e American tan k forces in world war I was largely an ad hoc affai r. The armored fighting vehicl e was an invention co ntem poraneo us with the Great War. Tactical systems govern ing its employment in battle had to be formulated on the battl efields of th e $OI11 I11C by trial and erro r. Although the Holt tractor with its caterpillar track suspensio n hat! been ada pted by the British I AEFTank C orps, Sept-Nov 191 8

IC) 1

752 Offi 11,2n enlisted """ men

Actual

Planned 1

r------r- I----,-

":10 1

~$~I C) I

10 brig-

PATTON

---,

1t:lCe-. EW!IltUaIy ead'l11eId ¥my WCU3 ha'le a tank ~ Innng center. a heavy artlIIerY eeeee mobilerepal" • . and lIwt Iri. Mgades. TherurUr d Ii'nl.S Inlnts Vlfledwrthavalabity

344th It (326trl)

I " I 345thUI " I C)

" ";:;1<=) I WlBrilistI

PUlllJj

1

I

~

1

I x

x

x

I0 I

1

1

(327"'1

C)

I I mHG erR

VINER

,

~

•

Note". Streogtrl planned at 10 heavy and 20 lqJt baltalials but on5ept 12 anty1 heavy (WlBrJtlShI n2 ight battailons wet! mulallIe fa llCtlon. OnSept 12 tile two I9lt /:laltaliOnS were resqo:ateCI 344trl and 3t5ltt The 1st ana 3d brigades became toe 304mana 306th

55

Brigadier General Samue l D. Rockenbach commanded the Tank Corps in the AEF fro m December 1917 until the Arm ist ice . Prior to his return t o the US in June 1919. he briefly co mman ded Base Sectio n 1 of the SO S in St . Nazai re , France . Photo taken April 25, 19 19. in his HQ. (US Signal Corps, 160 132)

56

sold ier-inventor Sir Ernest Swinton and others to the problems of mechanized warfare, it was yet to be worked out whether th e tank was best suited as an independent arm or an infantry support unit. . The American Tank Service (later renamed Tank Corps) was established by the War Department in January 1918 with Colonel Ira C. Wellborn in command. In France, General Pershing appointed Colon el Samuel D. Rockenbach chief of the AEF Tank Corps in December 1917. The AEF Tank Corps operated independently from the USTank Service throughout World War 1. Captain George S. Patton, who was serving as Headquarters Troop commander at GHQ in Chaumont in the fall of 1917, was assigned to Rockenbach's command at the school center at Langres in December 1917. Patton and his main assistant, Lieutenant Elgin Brame, were charged with the organization of the new school for light tank tac tics at Bourg, just a few kilometers from Langres. Training for heavy tanks was to be centered in the US and at Bevington in England. Shortly after taking office the n ew army chief-of-staff, Ma jor General Peyton C. March acted decisively to stimulate the growth of the Tank Corps and moved to solve several other difficult organizational issues that had been puzzling the War Department General Staff for months. The original impetus, however, had come from General Persh ing, who paid attention to the reports of Major Frank Parker, who had observed French ta nk operations in the spri ng of 1917. On July 11, Pershing approved his General Organization Project (GOP) for the AEF and sent the recommendation to the War Department. He had avoided a conflict between the Chauncey Baker Board , sent by the War Department to study British and French equipment and me t hods, and his own AEF General Staff by convening a conference in Paris to work out the differences and to "exchang e ideas ." Organization of a Tank Corps in the AEF had not been addressed in the GOP, except for a recommendation that one of the five companies in the div isional mach ine-gun battalion "be eq uipped as a tank company." The proposal submitted by Pershing on September 23, 1917, was based on an AEF strength of 20 combat and 10 depot/replacement divisions. The schedule included 30 light tank companies wit h divis ions and 30 with field army troops. An additional 15 companies of heavy tanks were allocated to the army troops. In the rear area 10 training and replacement companies and seven depot companies were provided for repair and salvage of tank s. The total personnel strength of the AEF Tank Corps, based on the 30 divisions, was 14,827. As with most plans, many changes ensued as the Tank Corps in France began to take shape. At Camp Colt, Pennsylvania, near Gettysburg, the US Army h ad esta blished a tank training center. Dwight Eisenhower served at Camp Co lt un til the end of the war, finishing as a lieutenant colonel. In addition to Camp Colt, armored training was conducted at four other sites, two in Pennsylvania and two in North Caro lina. Most recruits destined to serve in the Tank Corps in France received their initial training at those facilities. There was a shortage of tanks for training. Fewer than 1,000 light tanks on the Renault model were manufactured in the United States, bu t none participated in combat with the US Tank Corps-all the machines used by the Americans in France were of French and British manufacture. Looking to the future, the US Ordnance Department stationed an officer in France to facilitate the assembly of heavy tanks using

US Tank Battalion

II ) 1 18 officers

1(

331 enlisted

ntanks

I

••

m

I,p ~ I

5 officers 96enlisted per company

2 tanks

25 tanks/co.

parts manufactured elsewhere . The Liberty engine developed for aircraft provided the power plant for the joint US-British designed heavy tank, th e Mark VIII "Liberty." The story was the same as for the light tank-no tank of this design made it into action. There was bureaucratic friction between US manufacturers anxious to produce tanks an d the AEF staff officers who were trying their best to procure tanks in France. Major James A. Drain served as the US representative on the Inte r-allied Tank Commission "to coordinate production efforts." Additionally, the British and Americans had agreed in January 1918 to establish a factory to prod uce the Mark VIII tanks in France with a target of "fifteen hundred tanks during the year 1918." When General Rockenbach arr ived at Langres he found a very small but energetic staff. He directed the organization of a light tank school at Bourg, procured tanks from the French and began recru iting men for th e crews. By the summer of 1918 , when th e American First Army was being organized during the Aisne-Marne counter-offen sive in Jul y and August, the Tan k Corps was firmly established. Modifications in the organization to accommodate the increasing size of the AEF were reported to the War Department in August 1918. Tank troops would be part of the GHQ, AEF, and "belong to the strategical reserve" in sufficient numbers to support a group of field armies of 80divisions sche duled to be on han d by mi d-summer 1919 . Two tank brigades , with all of the combat and combat support units nec essary for operations, were planned so that two armies could be supported. The energy of a few determined American tank officers had produced a mixed force of US crewed French Renaults supported by heavy tanks from the French army sufficient to provide combat assault vehicle s for two arm y corps in the 51. Mihiel operation that began on September 12, 1918. Patton had managed to organize two battalions of light tanks at the school at Bourg in time for the operation. Lt . Colonel Patton commanded the US 1st Tank Brigade and Lt. Colonel Daniel Pullen commanded the 3d Tank Brigade, which consisted only of his head quarters, but it was capab le of providing coordination between the American and French tank units. It was patchwork organization, but adeq uate . The story of the Tank Corps in the battle phases from mid -September through the Armistice on November 11 was one of improvisation, disciplined leadership and heroic field maintenance. Keeping enough tanks in action to make a difference in battle challenged Patton and his colleagues to th e limit of their resources . Th e AEF Tank Cor ps made a significant contribution to American battle h istory.

Th e Services of Supply (50S) Field Service Regulations provided for a Line of Communications (LOC) organization "to relieve the combatant forces from every consideration except that of defeating the enemy." The LOC for the AEF gradually evolved into th e robust supp ly, service, and transportation organization known as the Services of Supply (SOS) by March 13, 1918. Major General James Harbord, AEF chief-ofstaff, noted that GHQ at Chaumon t looked like a "deserted village" when the train pulled out to take the SOS staff to its new headquarters in Tours. With the

57

division of the staff between GHQ at Cha umont and 50S at Tours, the AEF had begun the process of "growing" into a fully developed theater army organization. All tech n ical staff departments wen t to Tours, but the Adjutant General, the Inspector General, and the Judge Advocate General, who provided command services, remained in Chaumont. Added were the chiefs of the Artillery and the Tank Corps . Geographically, the 50S included all of France and Great Britain but was divided into seven base sections , an in termediate section, an adva nce section an d independen t districts at Paris and Tours, the latt er being the Headquarters. Near the en d of the war, severa l other base sections were established to accommodate forces in Italy an d in 1919 for the occupation zone along the Rhine River. The 50S was a small army within an army. Services of Supply of the AEF 3

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MEDI TERRANEAN SEA

This map shows the logistical organization of t he Se rvices of Supply (50 S) of the AEF. Previously know n as the Line of Co mmunicatio ns and the Service of the Rear, t he 50S co ordinat ed the tr ansportation , supply and communic ation requireme nts of t he AEF fro m its Headquarters at To urs.The numbers designate th e seven (ultimately nine) base secti ons, the major subordinate units of the 50S.The AEF used t he po rts of Brest. St. Nazaire and severa l farther sout h, thus reservi ng the nort her n Fre nch po rts for t he British and French armies

A

Services of Supply, July 12, 1918

I

I

I

I t

I

Oepuly c-er-s

I

I

~L

AdjutantGeneral, SOS

~l

InspectorGeneral, SOS

~I

JudgeAdvocate, SOS

~l

Provost MarshalGeneral

-1 : -I -I -]

~

WarRiskSection I .......L .A...",

c

$.

Chemical Warfare Service

General Purchasing Agent

AsstChiefsof Air Service

t l

1

,

~

t

Secretary, General Staff

I

I Asst c-er-s, G-2

I

I

I

:

I

Asst c-er-s, G-4

1-

ChiefEngineer

-1 - I

OivMil Engineering andEngr Supplies

l

l

e-I

OeptLl Rys andRoads

t

I I

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COMMANDING GENERAL SERVICES Of SUPPLY

OeptConslT andforestry

,

Oirector, Motor TransportCorps

Chief Signal Officer

Chief Ordnance Officer

t

1'[t-

Chief Surgeon

f-

Chief Quartermaster

l-

OirectorGeneral of Transportation

J-

,

On July 29, 1918, General Pershing appointed Harbord, his forme r ch ief-ofstaff, then later commander of th e 2d Division during the figh ting in the Marne salient, to replace Major Gene ral Francis]. Kernan as the commanding general of the Services of Supp ly. Pershi ng took this decision to preserve his freedom of action and h is com ma nd prerogatives in th e AEF. The War Department had indicated th at it was consi dering the assignment to France of Major General George W. Goethals, an eng ineer of considerable reputation who in retire ment was directing supply activities for th e army in Washington. The notion to place Goetha ls in charge of th e 50 S, wh ich th en woul d provi de service to the AEF but report directly to the War Department, seems to have originated with General Peyton C. March, the army chi ef-of-staff. The re was some intrigue and rumor accompanying th e change of 50S command, but Secretary Baker and General Pershing handled the event professiona lly. Goet hals did no t com e to France ,

59

other than to visit Pershing at Chaumont in early July 1918. Harbord, with his extensive staff experie nce and his brief division command understood the need for effective logistical operations if the AEF were to succeed. As supplies and services moved from the rear to the front a smooth handoff from SOS to the "G staff" of the AEF, GHQ, was essentia l. The St. Mihiel campaign was the first test of th is logistical system. Lieutenant Colonel George C. Marshall has been given widespread credit for planning the com plex operational transition from the St. Mihi el campaign to th e Meuse-Argo nne campaign in mid -September 1918, and rightfully so. But even George Marshall could not have accomplished that feat without the smooth functioning logistical organization under the command of James Harbord .

The engineers Fighting on top of th e earth required she lter under the nap of the earth so that troops about to engage in close action would be protected from direc t and indirect fires as well as the ever-present possibility of attacks with chemical weapons-gas and flame . In order to provide protection, engineers prepared elaborate systems of trenches of both the fighting variety and also communications pathways. All of this earth moving and the associated trades such as mining and quarrying fell to a hardy group of soldiers called eng ineers in the American service. The heavy dem and of trench warfare required units specifically charged to prepare gun em placemen ts and underground shel ters, in addition to the more common tasks of road and bridge repair in the combat zone. Regiments of pioneer infantry were organized to provide th is service. The pio neer infantrymen were less skilled tha n engineer soldiers. The ot her major arm ies in France used these types of soldiers to augment the engineer units. In the AEF, the pioneer infantry regiments were assigned to corps and armies. African-American soldiers manned about half of the 37 regiments raised for service in France. Each combat division had a regiment of engineers that was organic, meaning standard, to th e organizati on. In add ition to the field engineering tasks , the American eng ineers built port facilities, developed large-scale lumbering operations to feed the demand for construction timber, and built both standard and narrow-gauge railwa ys. Th e 11th Engineer Regiment soldiers served in th e British zon e of operations and were amo ng th e first Americans in combat in France . Behind th e lines the engineers built the depots and covered storage needed to supply the rapidly expanding combat un its of the AEF. The

Major General Mason N. Pat r ick. former co mmander of th e Ist Engineer Regiment. Appo int ed to succeed Brig. Gen . Benjamin D. Foulois as Ch ief of th e Air Service o n May 29, 1918. Promoted to major genera l on July I I, 1918. Pe rshing se lect ed his West Point classmat e to eliminate rivalries in th e Air Service command structu re. He was an e ngineer, not a flying offi cer, du ring t he war. In the 1920s he again led the Air Service and learned t o fly. (US Signal Co rps, 735 14)

Engineer Regiment

III

0 ,,697 I

I

I

II

I

~

~120

nO/ea

I

0 60

I

I

I

256

0

I

256

0

256

AEF En gine er Re gim ents (Based o n TO& E o r June 26 . 19 18) Personnel Uni t/S ection

26 Jun 1918

Strength

120

Regimental HQ & HQ C o. Engine er Batta lio ns

2

770 ea

Battalion HQ

2

2 0a

Enginee r Company

6

To tal C omba t an ts Medical Dept. & Chaplains Ordnance Dept. Re gi m ent A g gre g a t e

256 ea

1,660 31 6

1,69 7

An im al s Draft Horses

108

Riding Ho rse s

94

Draft Mules

104

Pack Mules

48

Total H orse s and Mul e s

354

Major Equipm ent It e ms Rolling Kitchens (4-mule)

7

Wat er Carts ( I-mute)

6

Medical Carts [l -m ule]

2

Ration & Baggage Carts (2-mule)

6

Com bat Too l Wagon s (4.hors e)

24

Comb at Tool Wagons (e-mute)

6

Ration & Baggage W agon s (4-mure) Bicycles

7

24

Motor Cars Moto rcycles with Sid eca r Pisto ls Rifles

16 179 1,487

Source: Unit ed Sta te s Army In The World War 19 17- 19 19.Vo lume I: Organization or the American Exped itiona ry Forces (Washington: Hisrorical Division. Department of the Army. 1948)

air parks (airfields ), bar racks, food sto rage facilitie s, and mappin g need ed to keep th e two milli on so ld iers of th e AEF in action wer e all p rovided by th e enginee rs. Oft en the impact o f logisti cs o n co m ba t o pe rations is ove rloo ked , but in Worl d War I it was qu ite evid en t. The seco ndary mi ssio n of eng ineer units is to figh t as infantry whe n circu ms tances required . Duri ng th e reducti on of the Alsne-Marnc salien t in Jul y and Augu st 1918. the 2d Division's engi neers foug h t bravely and to ok significant cas ualties. In the fighti ng between th e Meuse River a nd the Argo n ne Forest in Octob er 19 18, Sergea nt Wilbur Col yer of th e 1st Engineer Regimen t attacked Ge rm an m achine-gun em place me n ts and was awarde d th e Medal o f Honor. o ne o f five received by 1st Division soldiers in world \ Var I. Th at medal is o n di splay in the Ist Division ~111SC U Ill at Cantign y in wheaton. Illino is.

61

had been the commanding officer of the Colored Officers Training Camp at Des Moines. Iowa. but his own attitude Was that African-American soldiers should not be in combat. He was finally removed from his post near the end of the wa r; and reverted to the rank of colonel aher demobilization of the AEF. The 92d comprised the 18Jd and l84th Infantry Bri&,des. and the I67th Reid Artillery Brigade. was assi~ to Uggett's I Corps during the Meuse-Argonne campaign. The 93d division. although estabhshed on November 23. 19 17. with me

I85th and 186th Infantry Bri&,des of

ABOVE Major General Hunter Uggett reviews FirstArmy's"famous colored banQ' atVadney. north of Chalons.December 18. 191 8.(USSi~

Co
92d ·'Bufb.lo·· Division was established on October 24. 1917. with inductees from all over the nation makingup the units. General and field officers.plus officers

above the grade of Ist lieutenant in the Bbck American soldiers volunteered for service in France in large numbers. many more than the USWar Department was willing to induct.Two divisions.the 92d and the 93d. were organized in 19f 7.The

teehnical branchesand the arti llery were white . On October 26. Brevet Major

General Charles C. Ballo u.West Point classmate of Jo hn Pershing. took co mmand

of the 92d at Camp Upton.LongIsland. He

A frican-American soldiers . but no ani llery brigade. never se tv ed in combat as a division .The four regiments of the division . 369th. 37Oth. 371st, and 372d had been brought into federal service from the N ationa l Guard and served under the provi sional command of Bri gadier General Roy Hoffman unti l May 15. 1918. when three of the regiments were placed under th e operational control of the Fourth Fr ench Army.Th ey were reorganized to con fo rm to me French infantry organization.The 370th Infantry Regiment was assigned to me Seventh French Arrrrt.

Medical services Medicine and n ursing wit h the AEF were ext en sion s of the War Department Staff. Like engi neer ing and ot her tech nical branc hes o f th e army, medical services ,..'ere both an organ izational respo nsibility and a "sto ve-pipe" vertical st ructur e of technica l services. Th e respo nsibility of provlding med ical and n ursing services to th e AEF was shared by th e GHQ staff and the 50S. As arr ivals of American troops in the sum me r of 1918 sur ged, th ere was a shortage of adeq uate medi cal sta ff and facilities. Th e hea lth of th e AEF was, according to Harbo rd, "remarkably goo d" co ns iderin g the incidence of diphtheria, measles, mumps, diar rh ea, influen za, and pneumonia as causes leading to non- effective so ld iers. Intluen za and accompanying pn eumoni a were a more serious problem for th e army in th e Un ited States tha n in th e AEF by a factor of ten to one. Venereal disease, du e to th e personal intervention of Pershing in setting prioriti es for hi s Surgeon Gene ral, was sign ificantly lower than was common in large armies . By the time th e in flue nza epide m ic peaked in October 1918, simulta neously with the increase in casualt ies from th e Meuse-Argonne cam paign, hospital beds we re mor e th an sufficient to mee t the demand, Gene ral Har bor d credi ted th e fleets of ligh t ambulances serving th e front areas and the creatio n of large hospital cen te rs, suc h as th ose in the vicinity of Toul. as two significant ad vances in medical support to th e army.

American Expeditionary Forces , North Russia; American Expeditionary Forces Siberia; American Forces in France ; American Forces in Germany 62

Th ese orga n izatio n s were created to provide command, co ntro l, and support to forces o perating in Russia and forces cond ucti ng th e occ upatio n in France and Germany during th e post-h osttltncs peri od of dem obili zati on.

Tactics In the 19th cen tury. tact ics for th e United States Army was syno ny mous with parade-ground drill . Drill was govern ed for unit s of regim ental size and sma ller by a series of manuals, usually adapted from the Fren ch vcrston s. lllfimt r)' Drill RtXll /ll lio flS 1911 was in use, with m in or updat es, in 191 7 as the United Sta tes prepa red to send forces to France. Doctrine for brigades and division s was com m unicated by Field Service Rcgtl/atiom. The ed itio n of 1914, updat ed frequ ently th rough out the war, provided th e gu idan ce from th e w ar Department to th e field unit s. General Pershin g had a speci fic idea as to how his AEF shou ld fight in Fra nce. The French. and to a lesser degree th e British . believed th at fight ing from trenc hes usi ng clos e-co m bat weapon s. notably th e bayon et . tren ch mortars, and grenades , was th e most effective tact ic derived from severa l years of fightin g th e Ger mans o n the w estern Fron t. The object ive of tre nch fighting was to attack and seize th e ene my's tren ch es. The Amer ican Arm y, said Pershing, sho uld figh t in "o pen wa rfare" style, th at is \.....ith K o uts in th e van , irregular for ma tion s and timetables, reliance o n the fire of in fantr y weap on s in the assault , th e use of terrain featu res and cove r, brief orders and a reliance o n the ini tlatlve of indi vid ual sold iers to o utma ne uver and defea t th e ene my. Allied soldie rs were trained to fight from th e trenches that had spread from th e English Chan nel to the Swiss frontier on ce the war of movement in 191-1 had spent itself. Using th e tools of min ers to burrow into th e ea rth and th e weapons ofclose co m bat, such as clubs, kn ives, and han d grenades. the infant ry scur ried fro m she ll hol e to she ll hole across th e ruptured ea rt h of no man's lan d to grapple wit h their enemy. It was not th e war of movement that the America n cornman de r-ln-ch lef had visua lized. Whil e Per shing was argui ng with his \ Var Departm ent tha t dou gh boys training in the US be train ed to fire th eir rifles accura te ly u p to 600 yards, French army trainers who had been sent to prepa re American soldie rs fo r warfare "taugh t trench , not op en, warfare, and th e \Var Depa rt ment deferred to their experie nce ." The re is scan t evide nce of "open warfare " in US doct rinal records. Alth ough th e co nc ept seemed logical and Pershing and h is AEF staff often referred to it in train ing literature and critiq ue s of traini ng, neit her Field

Pershing and A £ F. Generals. WorldWar I, , 923-25. artist G. 8. Matthews.

o il on canvas. 11 8 by 216in.. US Army Art Co llection. (Permission of US Army Center of Military Histor y for use of image)

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Service Rcglflatirm s no r tac tical man ual s had much to say abou t th e deta ils of

Major General George W. Read. commander of II Corps, comprising the 27t h and 30th Divisions. Photo taken on October 5, 19 18, at Assevrlters. France, on the Somme River.The co rps headquarters was at Ham. (US Signal Corps. 2648 8)

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how open warfare wa s to be co nd uc ted at t he m aneuver u nit, i.e. regi m ent and br igade level. Th is co ncep t of figh ting was not effectively co m m u nicated to thos e wh o had to execu te it in battl e-the junior officer s, no ncomm issioned officers, and soldi ers . Ro bert Bullard, who commanded u n its from regim ent th rough field army, explained tha t eve ry "war o f consequence b rings its new th ings in traini ng and me thods " and World War I was no exc eption. But, "before o ur declaration of war," he said , "the determined pacifi sm of our government had effectua lly prevent ed an y study by o ur arm y o f these changes." Bulla rd, writing in 1925, cr iticized the Allied h igh co m m and for not recogn izing that tren ch warfare was J step in the process towa rd open warfare, not an end in itself. He said that the American train ers stuck to their gu ns and th e "cor rectness o f thei r view" th at "offense, open warfare, became the guidin g prin cipl e of Am erican train ing in Fran ce." It is no t su rp rising that Bullard resonated the Persh in g philosophy of tra ining and fighting because Pershing had moved Bull ard from co m mand of a brigade in the 1st Division shor t ly after arrival in Fran ce and made h im chief o f AEF schoo ls. Lieu tenan t Gene ra l Hun ter Liggett wro te in 1928 that very shortly afte r his arriva l in Fran ce, Pershi ng "m ade up h is m ind to a num ber of thi ngs." Among these precepts were (1) th e imm edia te need for one m illion doughboys, and ultimately three m illion; (2) th e mi ssion of the AEF m ust be offens ive, not defensive : tha t traini ng wo uld be "p rim arily in o ffensive tacti cs and open warfare .. . that the \v ar wou ld be decided in the open ;" (3) th e Ame rican Army wo uld no t be ama lgam ated; it wo uld fight in its own sector un der its ow n o fficers. In an ea rlier boo k, Gene ral Liggett ex plai ned his introduction to th e Western Front and British and French tr aining me thods in th e fall of 1917. Because his div ision , th e 41st, was en route to France , Liggett rema ined at Chau mo n t aft er h is o bservatio n ass ign me nt in t he British sector. By mid-january he was in co m m and of I Corps , newly organi zed at Neufchateau. Bu t even Liggett , of whom Pershi ng had spo ken criti call y ea rly in the war, seem ed co nv inced th at the Ame rican Arm y in Franc e was training correctly and effective ly "u nde r open wa rfare co nd itions. " Th ese do ctri nal differences in tactical perfo rm ance were m o re than illusory. On May 1, 191H, Gene ral Henri Petain , Frenc h co mm ander o f the Armies of the Nor th and No rtheast, issued a long memo on trai n ing th e Ameri can s. It noted that "Ameri can u nits arrivi ng in Pran ce have o nl y had, u p to the presen t, very inco m plete instructions," wh ich we re lim ited to "gym nastic exercises, close-o rder dr ill, rifle fire and d rill in field warfare, whi ch consi sted too mu ch of sma ll operations , havin g but litt le relat io n to actual war fare: ' He went o n to say that "Americans d ream of o perating in open cou n try, after having broken through th e fron t. Th is result s in too m uc h atten tio n being d evoted to t his form of operation s, wh ich the Ame ricans conside r as super ior, and in which, our Allies so metime s seem to th in k, we Me inca pable o f offering them the same ass istance wh ich they expe ct from us in trenc h wa rfare." He ord ere d hi s arm ies "To tak e d iscreet measur es to cou n teract the idea that we are in experien ced in o pen warfa re" and "To di rect in to proper cha n ne ls ... the excellent leani ng toward open warfare, and to ins truct the m on this subject for th e pu rpo se of in stilling an unde rstanding of ma ss warfare." Petai n concluded with the wise o bservation that "The main pur po se of our co llaho ration in the ins truct ion o f Amer ican troops is to give o ur Allies the be ne fit o f our dearly bo ught experience ... Co nstan t patience and extrem e tact, toge th er with ap plication will serve to overco m e all obstacles." But the act ua l resu lt of t his training approa ch was t hat the Ameri cans fought in th eir early en gagem en ts fro m May into Augu st 1918 at Can tign y, Belleau wood , along the Marne, and sou th of Sot ssons . just as they had been trained by th e Frenc h, wit h straig ht -ahead assau lts supported by plen ty of artillery and mortar fire. Th e attendant casua lties were staggering. Part o f the expla nation

for thi s unha pp y result is th at American divisions were figh ting as part of French co rps and field armies and th erefor e sub ject to Fren ch doctrine in battle formatio ns, exce pt in th e British sector wh ere th e 27th and 30t h Division s were controlled by II Co rps. Th ose 1\ \ ' 0 divi sio ns had trained with th e British, along with eigh t others that were subseq uen tly reassigned to th e ;\EF. Another part of the answer lies in the incom plete ness of the train ing of American divisions. The l st Division was the only on e to complete its th reephase cycle of battle prepa ration. All th e o thers had so methi ng less. Finally, th e demands of terrain and th e actions of th e Germ ans in man y instances preclud ed any approa ch o ther th an straigh t-ahea d fighting; th ere were no nanksstrategic, operatio na l or taetical-on the Western Front, exce pt th ose mad e by a penetration of th e enemy lin es or an Irregul ar ad vance of fightin g units in th e attack. As Timothy Nen ninger noted in a recent articl e in th e lcurnat of Military Hi.story, "The term 'doct rine' was not used m uch in the US Army during World War I." When we rem emb er that the Un ited States had been a belligerent for only 19 months and th e AEF had been a part icipant in active co m bat o peratio ns for only five months at th e tim e of th e Armistice, it is rem arkable tha t any tactical co he rence was ach ieved , not th at it was ina deq uate. Infantry co m pa nies, bat talion s, and regim ents sup po rted by mach ine guns, morta rs, and artill ery, carried th e burden of th e fightin g. Tanks, airplanes , and additional artillery made th e battlefield a grisly arena with th e ter rain ruptured by th e con tin ual bo m bard men t and laced with poison gas. Th e bar bed-wi re entanglements, em placed by bo th Allies and Ger mans, slowed movement through no man 's land and thereb y presented vulnerabl e targ ets for the machine guns and rifles o n bo th sides. As Allan Millett not ed in hi s stud y of the Can tigny battle at th e end of May 1918 , th e Ger ma n Arm y h ad no t yet perfected its offens ive infiltrati on tact ics, but "it had already de velo ped a system of flexibl e defen se th at co nfounded th e Allies." Th e Ger ma n defensive positio ns were co ns truc ted in great depth, lightly held by stro ng po ints strengthe ned by machine gu ns in th e forwa rd area, and inc reasi ngly resilient in the ma in batt le area . For a German regime nt, on ly one of its batt alio ns occupied th e forward po sitions and the mai n batt le area, wh ich was abo ut 1krn wide and perhaps 2km deep . The o the r batta lion s had mis sion s of su pport (counteratt ack) and reserve well outside th e ran ge of Allied artillery. This flex ible organ izatio n of th e ene my defen ses left few attack o ptio ns to th e American infantry.

Majo r General Beaumont B. Buck. Genera l Buck comm anded the 2d Infantr y Brigade. Ist Divisio n. as a brigadier (o ne-su r) general during t he Cantigny and Scisso ns operations. On August 27. 1918. he too k command of the 3d Division until he was relieved by General Persh ing dur ing the Meuse-Argonne campaign in mid-O ctober 19 18. (US Signal Corps. 24372)

Cantigny: a regimental attack supported by the division The German spring offen sives of 1918 presen ted a cri sis for the Allies. Mars hal Ferdinand Foch was chose n at Doullens on March 26 to coord inate Allied strategy, and at Beauvais o n April 3 th e govern me nts of Great Britain, France, and the Un ited States cha rged him with "the strategic dir ection of military operatio ns." Pershing im med iately made available his four co mbat-read y divisions. Th e first place chosen was in Picardy near the farming Village of Cantigny. On April 25 th e 1st Division made the first appearance of Amer ican fighters in a co mbat action . Wilen th e 1st atta cked and seized the heights and the village of Can tlgny "with splend id da sh" o n May 28, Persh ing was am ong the group of o bservers. "The desperat e efforts of th e Germans," said Pershing "gave th e fightin g at Cantigny a seemi ng tactical imp ort an ce entirely out of proport ion to th e numbers invol ved." Lieutena nt Colonel Geor ge C. Marshall, the d ivision operatio ns officer, un derstood that th e att ack was of "limi ted o bjective " and as such the 28th Infant ry Regim en t would not pen etrate far eno ugh beyond Canugny to take th e German artill ery out of acti on . Th is was to be a regim ental attack co nd ucted by the ent ire d ivisio n. Marshall, and Itrlgadler Gen eral Charles p, Summ erall, comma nder of the l st Artillery Brigade, plann ed the en tire

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Lieut enant Col onel Clarence Ralph Huebn er. co mmander in succ ession

G Co mpany. 2d Battalion. 28th Infant r y Regimen t. th e n the batta lion and the regiment as casual ties pro duc ed vacancie s. Hue bner en tered the army as a private and was promo ted quickly due to co mpetence. (MRC)

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o peratio n. Brigad ier General Beaum on t r. Buck, commander of the 2d In fantry Brigade, and Colo n el Han so n E. Ely, co m ma nd er of the 28t h In fan try Regimen t, who were th e maneuver un it co m ma nders for th e upcom ing batt le, were responsible for pre pa ring th eir sold iers for the fight, bu t had little in put to the d esign o f th e atta ck. Th e 28th rehearse d the attac k o n May 2-l on similar gro und abo ut 12 m iles to th e rear. Twelve French Sch neide r tan ks an d "a section o f flame tighten were assigned to th e regimen t." Ely's troops rehe arsed for two da ys whi le the 18th Infant ry Regim ent relieved th em in the lin e and co mp leted work on the fo rward trench es. As th e day of att ack ap proached, th at fickle att endant of all bat t les, chance, in terve ned, A detachment led hy an en gineer lieu ten an t was moving h eavy entrenching tools forward to the jump-off trench es dur ing the dark n igh t of May 26 . Th e group stum bled in to th e Germa n trench es. After takin g fire fro m the Ge rm an s, and from the ir ow n fron t lin es, the gro up was led back by the in fantry o ffice r accompan yin g the 50 men . However, the eng ine er lieute na nt was missing, alo ng with his ma p th at pro bably revealed the locatio n of the American trenches and su pply du m ps. If that was no t en ough, the sacks of en trenching too ls left beh ind probably mad e the German in telligen ce o fficer's task easy. The afternoon of that same day, Lieut en ant Colo nel Marshall's horse slipped and fell o n h im wit h his left ankl e "remain ing in the stirru p and sustai ning tal painful fractu re." The doctor ta ped it up an d th e o peratio ns ch ief contin ued with his du ties-for about it wee k! After th e Armis tice, the bod y of the lost eng ineer was d iscovered in a grave no rth o f Can tigny. The en tire regim en t was pu t into th e assau lt line, wit h on ly o ne co m pany in rese rve. Marsh all d esign ated two co m pa n ies of the 18th In fan try Regiment as a rese rve for th e 2d In fan try Brigade because th e o the r reg ime n t of that b rigad e- the 26 th- was fu lly co m m it ted in anot h er sector of th e battlefield. Support from Fren ch cor ps and a rmy arti lle ry tr ipled the number of guns ava ilable for th e as sau lt. Two part ici pan ts in the battle, Cap tain Clarence R. Hu eb n er, co mm ander o f G Co m pany and lat er co m man der o f th e 2d Batt alio n , 28th Infan try Regim ent, and Co lo ne l Ely, th e regim en tal com m ander, eac h report ed on the resu lts of th e cap tu re o f Ca n tign y. Huebn er h ad succeeded to battalion co m m an d wh en Lieu ten ant Colo nel Robert J. Ma xey was m ortall y wou nded. Th e batta lio n occ up ied the ce n te r o f th e regi me n tal attac k for mat ion, with each co m pany in t h e bat tali o n di sp osed with two p la toons in th e first line of two waves separated by 20 ya rds, an d , 150 ya rds to th e rea r, two pla toons in the second lin e, also of two waves. There was o ne mach ine gu n on each flank of t h e seco n d li ne o f t h e co m pany, an d the su p por t co m pany was po sitioned farth er to t he rea r. Duri ng the n igh t, Hu eb ner rela ted in h is rep o rt o n June 2, th e batt ali o n was in posi tio n at h a lf pas t m idn igh t bu t co u ld n ot mov e unt il 0330l1 r5 because Ge rma n arti ller y fires h ad blo wn up th e regi menta l dump, thereb y d elayin g the m ov em en t of sup plies for wa rd . Th e batt alio n attacked wit h th e regi m en t at 06 ~Sh rs "and enco u n tered ve ry litt le resistan ce until CANTIGN Y was passe d a n d [the] ene my's second po sition" was tak en . After a short, sha rp fight the batt ali on dug in a nd em placed barb ed wire, which was brou gh t forward by the fifth (train in g and rep lacem en t ) plat o ons of each co m pa ny. The first Ge rma n co un te rattack ca me about noon a n d a seco nd at ab out 1900 h rs o n Ma y 2R. Th e enemy n ev er reach ed th e battalion wire d urin g the several attac ks ove r th e n ext three d ays. Duri n g th e n igh t of May 29 - :W , water, foo d , an d o t he r su pplies we re b ro ught forw ar d . " Discipline du ring the en tire engage me n t," Hueb n er repo rte d , "was exce llen t as a whole. In a few isolated cases a few m en we re ha rd to co n trol , bu t t h is was qu ickly ov erco me ." Th e batt alio n lost five o ffice rs a nd 75 en list ed me n killed, six officers an d 179 en listed men wo u nded , a nd one o ffice r and six en listed men m issin g, m ostly " to art ill ery fire aft er co nsolidat io n, and to m achi n e-gun fire durin g co nsolida tion. "

In hi s afte r-act io n rep ort , Ma jor George F. Rozelle, jr., who co m ma nded the 28th Infantr y's 1st Batt a lio n on the right of th e regim ental atta ck line , no ted that " It was a lso rep orted that t he enem y at first seem ed to expose him self in a reckless ma nner abou t 200 meters in fro n t o f Batta lio n A 11 -28 Inf.) , and we were led to believe th at h e was unaccustom ed to receiving effec tive rifle fire at that range. A12I B· I-28 InLI and An [0 - 1-28 Inf. 1repo rte d th at our rifle fire was very effectiv e at that ra nge an d caused the enemy ma ny casua lties," Li eutenan t Colone l J. ~l . Cull iso n, co m mand ing th e 3d Batt alion of th e 28th o n th e far left of the regim ental line , reported th at th e att ack on Ca ntigny wen t forwa rd promptly with ou t co nfus ion becau se "every d etail had bee n wo rked o ut, and possible con tingenc ies foreseen ." Ho weve r. the goblin o f un certainty struc k th e battalio n while it W ,l S co nso lida ting its objec tive line o n the nor th side o f the villa ge. A specio us order to withd raw to "o ur front tren ch lin e" caused th e men of L an d K Co mpa nies o n th e left o f th e batt alion lin e to wit hd raw "in an orde rly manner by eche lon." Culliso n reacted q uick ly by o rde ring hi s o wn I Com pa ny and G Co m pan y of the l Sth In fantr y that ,..'as in reserve to reoccup y th e vacat ed po siti on s. Had th e Germans reacted qui ckly agains t the 3d Batt alio n, whi ch was with out its tr en ch mortar s and 37 mm gu ns, Cu lliso n did not have th e fire sup por t necessar y to retake the posi tions, }'l Co m pany had held fast and allowed th e batt alion to reco ver from its mistake. As a result, the rcgtm en ral com ma nd er, Ely, ord ered that false withd rawa l orders were to be dealt with SWiftly and seve rely, eve n if it was necessary to fire o n their own troops to prevent th e movem ent to th e rea r. Colo ne l Ely filed a ve ry de tailed rep ort o f th e attack o n Can tigny. He noted that th e infantry unit s had been "broug h t up in tru cks" and unloaded at about 2300l1 rs o n May 27. They proceed ed for ward alo ng " routes previo usly recon no ite red, avoiding she lled are as." After the objec tive line was taken, patro ls a nd au to ma tic rifles were pu sh ed forward "to cover th e co nsoli da tio n ." The "rolling barrage was extremely accu rate, enabling th e infa n try to foll ow at less than 50 yards," Within 90 mi nut es of seizing th e o b jective "t he line of resista nce was practica lly co n t in uo us" with entren ched so ld iers an d wire. Three stro ngpoln ts were established by th e th ird wave as soo n as it closed th e objective line . Each stro ng po in t co nsis ted o f "a plato on of infant ry with two US auto. rifl es, fo ur mach in e guns and o ne captu red Germa n mach in e gu n. Trenches we re built in for m o f cross to face in any di rect ion ." The di visiona l engineers and the att ached French tan ks and flameth rower unit were \'ery effec tive. Regard ing th e reh earsal befo re the battl e, Ely said, "If a longer period co uld have been used for thi s prelim in ar y prepar ation a few roug h edges co uld have been better smoothed off." Co nce rn ing casualties he said, "Each tim e th e co u n ter-batte ry [artill ery) work ceased , heav y losses hega n." During the first cou n te ratt ack at ab out 1200 l1 rs o n May 28 , eight German airplanes strafed th e American position s from aho ut 300 to 600 yards altitude, ' firing in to our lin es and co rrecting th e artillery u nt il they ha d th e exact ran ge." About o ne-third o f th e regimen t's casualties were from ene my machine-gun fire and the rest from art illery. A certa in measure o f tactical sur pri...c ha d been achieved becau se th e Germans believed th at th e artillery fires that preced ed th e infantry attack were sim ply a fire raid o n th eir lines in retaliation for a Germa n raid on the nigh t of May 26-27. "The attack was a co m plete sur prise, and d ose following of th e barra ge by our troops enabled th em to capture and clean up all enemy troo ps in CANT IGNY wit h almos t no Iossos." Based o n in telligence and operatio ns repo rts, Ely said that tot al Germ an casualties we re "fro m 1,900 to 2,200" not in cludin g casualties far in th e enemy rear caused by friend ly ar tillery. The l st Divi sion 's artill ery br igad e co m ma nde r was ex pe rience d in th e organizatio n of artill ery fo r co m bat, hav in g served in Ch ina at th e turn o f the cen tur y a nd later in the Ph n tppt n cs where h e dtsungutshcd h im self repeated ly, But th e diff eren ce at Can tigny wa s that thi s was a ha tti e tha t requi red th e int egrat ion of th e fires o f th e three arti llery regim en ts a nd the

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At 064Shrs on May 28. 19 18. the 28th Infantry Regiment. Isr Division. attacked two German regiments holding the Montdidier salient outside of Cantigny.The regiment attacked with three battalions on the line that were

accompanied by tanks and flamethrowers. Cantigny was in American hands in the morning. but the Germans counterattacked twice during the afternoon and were repulsed each time .The fighting continued for two

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more days when the 28th Infantry was relieved by another regiment of the Ist Division. the 16th Infantry.

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trench mo rtar battalion "organic" to th e divisi on with the support ing fires from french units a t cor ps and a rm y level. The degree of sophis tic at ion requ ired of Ge ne ral Sum me rall and h is staff cha lle nge d th eir collec t ive expe riences, How d id ar tillery regimen ts co nd uct th e firesuppo rt battle? Th e 5th Field Artill ery, eq uip ped with Frenc h Schneider 155111m how itzers, alo ng with th e support ing Fren ch artiller y unit s, provided th e preattack conce ntratio ns and de structive fires targeted 011 knov...n German positi on s and loca tions like cross roads when' the flow of reinforcemen ts co uld be im peded. This was acco m plishe d by detailed fire planning tha t was lime-pha sed to th e an ticipated pro gress of the Infant ry assau lt. Map overlays were prep ared so tha t th e infan tr y and su ppor ting un it co m manders would know wha t to expect. Cantigny was a fairly sim ple , straightforwa rd attac k bu t th e po tential for mistakes in the coordination of fires and the ground assault was sign ificant. Also, the com mand and co ntrol measures available to make ad justm ents to fire durin g th e battle we re not flexible o r eve n reliable. 2d Lieutenan t E. E. Hills, a 5th Field Artillery liaison officer with th e 26th Infantry Regim ent on ~ l a y 27, 1918 , during a Ger man raid, no ted:

Guidon of A Company. I st Engineer Regiment. The guidon was carri ed in battle at Cantigny on May 28-31 . 1918, and shows the damage. prob ably from host ile fire. (FD M)

To m y mimi th e weak link exists fro m th e front line to th e Inf. Bn. Th e repor ts (that } ca me in at the ti me of the o peratio n were great ly exagge rated due to undue exci tem ent. ,\ m inute detailed report from the Infantry has never been made to my kno wledge. I feel th at th e for ward orga n ization s sh ould be required to render an exact report when barrages or fires are called for and more informat ion shou ld be given in regard to the parti cular o peration in vol ved , The Infantry Com mander arra nged fo r this at o ne tim e hu t co m plianc e is not evide n t. In th e past it has been hard for th e ar tillery liaiso n officer to render co m plete, in telligent repor ts due to lack of in for mation from fron t lin e co m mande rs. At the ba tta lion and co m pany level very basic mean s such as co lored flares we're used to start, shift, and sto p suppor ting fires, On on e occasio n the pyrotec hnic signals used by th e fron t-lin e infantry to sh ift fires from a Fren ch batte ry were co m pro rnised wh en an Amer ican soldie r deser ted . This sold ier knew th e pyro technic signa l codes for "barrage, " "lengthe n fire: ' and "gas." When the American infa nt ry sub seq uen tly used those signals, the Germans immed iately replied with the same flare signals in a n effort to cause erratic firing. The lesson , of course, was freque nt cha ngi ng of the pyrotech nic signal codes. The AEF depended almost exclusively on wire, mea ning teleph o nes, to transmi t in formatio n between th e infa ntry and the artillery, although the wire was frequ ent ly brok en by shcl lflre. Wireless co m m un icatio ns, mean in g rad ios, did exist but were bul ky and heavy, However, th e batt alion co m ma nde r of th e 1st Batt alio n , 6th Field Artillery, Lieutenant Co lo nel Jo h n W. DOWJll'r, did conclude in his repor t to hi s regim ental co m ma nder o nl une 2, 1918, th at "the best mea ns of com m un ication are ( I) wtrercss ( 2) Runners ( 3 ) Rocket s. No difficulties of liaison were encoun te red durin g the attack." The o ther two regim ents, the 6t h a nd 7t h Field Artillery. were equipped with French Sch nei de r 75m m light artill ery ptcccs. Th e 75m1l1 was a rapid -firin g gun suitable for laying down th e rolling bar rages. l st Lieutenan t \VI11 , O. Co lema n, liaison officer from the 6th Field Artill ery to the l Sth Infant ry Regime nt , recom mended in hi s report of June 1, 1918, that "the T.P.S. and the T.ES. [variatio ns of the ground- retu rn teleph on e an d telegraph systems! he used more tha n heret ofore and th at at th e same time th e tele phones be kept runn ing , with a d ou ble lin e to all posts of im port an ce."

69

•

Persh in g did not have the time he need ed to train the AEF units in a p rogressive a nd or de rly m an ner. Pro fessionali sm req uired fo r effec tive infantry- artillery coope ratio n was lacking. Du ring th e pos twar period work all cen tralized fire di recti on and co n trol meth od s, to include fo rward obse rvation using rad io, was o ne of th e lesso ns of co m bat in w orld war I. "The heigh ts o f Cnu tlgn y were o f no strategic import ance, and of sm all tactical value," said Georg e Marshall. "The issue was a moral o ne." Had the Americans been Visibly and roundly d efeated at Cantig ny, th e Ger ma ns as well as the other Allies would have concl uded th at th e doughbo ys \.. -erc not up to the task. But the att ack was successful, as were the th ree days of defen se tha t followed . -we held Ca n tlgny, Th e Germa ns never afte rwards reoccupied the vi llage."

Soissons: a divisional attack as part of a French corps

Colonel Frank Parker. commander. 18th Infantr y Regiment, in from of his PC (post of command). Januar y 1918. Durin g th e latte r stage of t he Meuse-Argonne campaign. Parker commanded me I st D ivision when it marched acro ss the front of several other Am er ican division s in an atte mpt t o seize the city of Sedan. (US Signal Corp s. 6129)

70

Majo r Ge nera l C ha rles P. Su m m era ll, p rom o ted fro m hi s po st o f d ivi sion al a rti lle ry b riga d e co m m a nde r, co m m a nd ed th e 1st Division from July I S to Oc to ber 12, 19l H, wh en h e took o ve r th e V Co rps . His m ajor o pe ra tions wer e th e Atsn c- Marn e ca m pa ign (Sotsso n s) a nd t he sho rt St. Mthi el attack in mi d-September. Su m me rall took co m ma nd of the 1st Division three d ays p rior to its attack in the Soisso ns ope ration . He wa s q uit e famil iar wit h the di vision , its staff, and its brigad e a nd regimental co m m an de rs. Th e m ovem ent from the Can tigny- Mo n td id ier sector to th e west of .sOiSSOllS was ardu ous. To rrential ra in fell o n the nigh t of Jul y 17, clo ggin g the lim ited road n et vvro rk for th e ap p roac h march . Th e di visio n was assign ed to the XX (Fre nc h) Corps IBerdou latl . part o f the Tenth Fren ch Army (Man gin ), alo ng with the 2<.1 (US) [Harbo rd] and 1st Moroccan (Daugan ) Divisions for the attac k from west to eas t agai ns t the west face o f th e Germa n sa lient. Th e salien t, created as part of the grea t Ge rma n att ac ks o f the spring o f 19 1H, stre tc hed from Sotssons to Reims alo ng th e Aisn e and Vesle rivers at its sho uld ers, and sou th to ChateauTh ierry at its nose. Major Josep h Dorst Patch was tran sferred from the 26t h Infan try Regiment to take co m mand of the 15t Battalion, txtb Infan tr y Regim en t, in early May 19 18. His batt alion had been in reserve at Roq uen court during th e Ca ntigny fight whe re he di scovered th at he had "rea lly in he rited a fine batt alion." By the time of th e Soi ssons att ack. Pat ch was an ex pe rienced batt alion co m mander in the reg im ent co m manded by Co lo nel Frank Parker. The l st Divisio n was the left u nit o f the XX Co rps, the Mo roccans were in th e cen ter and the 2d Divisio n was o n th e righ t. Th e di vision had bo th infantry brigad es up o n line, th e 2d Brigad e (Brig. Gen . Buck) in th e no rth, or left, and the 1st Brigade (Brig. Gen. Hin es) in the sou th, or righ t. The fo ur inf a ntry regim ent s were aligned from north to sou th : 28 th, 26th. 16th, and 18th. Th e d ivisio n's mi ssion was to figh t to t he eas t and cut the Sotsso ns to Paris roa d an d rail road , whi ch lay abo u t 9km away. It took four d ays of ha rd fight in g to get there. Th e l Sth had mo ved forward to the eas te rn edge o f th e Corn ptegne Fo rest to a bivouac site near Lon gave sne using French lorries. Patch was p rovid ed wit h a m o to rcycle with a side seat and d river so th at he co uld recon no iter th e approach rou te . The jump-o ff point was abou t l km cast o f the village o f Laverslne. Th e 1st Brigad e PC (post of co m m and) was locat ed in a large cave near Coe uvres a nd Co lo ne l Parker's 18th Infan try Regime nt PC was in anot he r cave o n th e eas te rn side of Coeuvres. Patch and h is co m pa n y co m m ande rs spe n t J uly 17 ma king a reco n na issance o f th eir zone of action . He had th e help o f Frenc h gu ides and was able to meet the co m m ander o f th e Fren ch For eign Legion ba tta lion that wa s to be o n h is ba tt alion 's right. Th e march to the lin e o f de pa rtu re o n th e n ight of Jul y 17 was a nigh tmare. The road s wer e co nges ted with "eve ry kind o f ma n, an imal, and vehicle

struggling to get through ." Torrential rain brok e just as th e ma rch had begun, but the battalion reach ed th e 18th PC cave by 0100hrs on july IS , two hours late. The fr ench guide s were no t th e same men wh o had assisted wit h th e reconnaissan ce; none had eve r been forwa rd of the PC! The n ight was so dark that sold iers had to put th eir han ds on the shoulde rs of th ose in front of th em to keep from breaking the co lum n as th e battalion mov ed to rvvard toward th e line of departure, a rriving at abo ut 0300hrs. Th e attack was sched uled for 0435 h rs, but Patch sti ll had not received hi s att ack o rder from regime nta l HQ. The attack order arr ived by runn er at O:H5hrs, all 17 paragraph s of it. Pat ch had alread y briefed hi s co m pan y co m manders wit h the sketch }' in forma tion he had at han d and sen t th em back to th eir co m pan ies, barely escaping a German artillery co ncentra tion that fell on the batta lio n's position. The Ist Division's barrage landed just to th e fro nt of th e battalion righ t o n sched ule. "The she lls screami ng abo ve us was swee t mu sic, and off we started. " Pat ch had ap poi nted the battalion intelligence officer, 1st Lieutenant joh n R. Graha m, to be the gutdc as the battalion moved forward. He had ru nn ers from each of th e companies who were to be used to send infor mat ion rearward. Graham was killed by mach ine-gu n fire in th e whea t field s duri ng the adv ance. Patch 's battalio n advanced wit h i\ and B Co m pan ies in th e van and C and D Compa nies foll o win g in reserve. Each compan y typ ically wo uld deploy two platoo ns forw ard o n a fron t of about 100m, with skirm ishers to the fron t. The other two plat oon s, also abreas t, wou ld be abo ut 100m to th e rear. The com pany com mander wou ld be in th e interval betw een th e fron t and rea r platoo ns, with hi s ClI I111l'rs. Th e ma chi ne-gu n co m pa n y foll o wed t he battali o n . It co ns isted o f th ree platoons, eac h with four squads. Each of th e 12 squads mann ed o ne machine gun . Th e rolling barrage adva nce d in fro nt of the battali on at th e rate of 100m every tw o minut es till it reach ed th e first ob jective lin e Zkm away along th e roa d th at ran northeast from th e villa ge o f Dommiers. The re the ba rrag e paused fo r 20 minut es, th en adv an ced at th e sa me rate to the seco nd ob ject ive, a line betw ee n Cruva nco n Farm to the ea ste rn ('dg e o f till' xftssy-aux-uots rav in e. The barrage again halt ed for 40 min ut es, th en advance d at 100m pe r four minut es to th e th ird and fin al o b jecti ve for th e first da y's attac k, a nor th to so uth lin e 500 m eas t of th e village of Chaud un. The pauses were to a llo w th e troop s to close up o n th e objec tive lin es, reorg an ize a bit, and th en co nti n ue th e att ac k. The d ou ghboys reac he d th e first ob ject ive lin e o n sched ule at 05]OIus and co nt in ued the atta ck. Germ an machin e guns an d ar tiller y in cr eased th eir fire, ca rving large swa thes in the America n infan try fo rm at ions. j ust bef or e th e third obj ective lin e had been reache d, Pat ch reali zed th at th e 16th In fan try o n the left and th e French on the right we re far behin d his own ba tta lio n . Fire was po uri ng in to hi s positio n from both flanks. At that mom ent he wa s wounded a nd una ble to com ma nd. "There fo re, I wa s o n ly in o ur bigge st battle for ab o ut four hours." Com ma nd passed to Captain Albert Nat h ness of A Co m pa n y, but he too wa s wounded a shor t t ime late r. Th e I Ht h Regiment secured C haud un a fter so me han d-to-ha nd figh tin g. Ge rman airpla nes had been ac t ive all da y o n j uly 18, bom bing a nd machine-gunnin g th e ad va nc in g d o ughbo ys. Th e batt eries o f the l st Division 's 6t h and 7th Field Artill ery Regim ents (fou r Fren ch 75m m guns per bat ter y) leap -fro gged forward to ex te nd th eir firing ra nge througho ut the day. The l st Division had ad vanced about 6km that first day of th e offen sive. Th e Ge rmans quick ly rein forced th e ar ea, fea ring t hat thei r advan ced po sit ions in the nose of th e sa lient to th e so uth were in danger o f being cut off by th e Allied att ack so uth o f Sotssons. Th e ease ".... ith wh ich the Ameri can s had ad va nce d at Can tigny in late Stay 191 H com pa red with the difficulties th ey expe rience d in th e Sci ssons ca m pa ign is representative of the "o n -t he- job t rain ing" th at all Ame rican divi sions ex pe rie nce d in com ba t up to Augu st 191 8.

Portrait of Major General Charles P. Summer all from a family album in th e coll ectio ns of the McCorm ick Research Center in Wheaton. Illinois. Summerall went to France as a member of the Baker Board. then joined the In Division as commander of the artillery bri gade. On July 18. 1918. he to ok command of the l st Divi sion at t he outset of th e Scisson s campaign. (MRC)

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On July 18. the Ist Division in the no rth and the 2d D ivisio n in the south, su ppo rted by a Moroccan division,atta cke d between Scissons and C hatea u-ThferryAhhc ugh fight ing was fie rce an d casualties were high. the American s to ok 3.800 Ge rman prisoners and CUt the Sorssons-Chsteau-Threr ry roa d and seized the heights of Buuncy.The Germans then abandoned their Mam e salient and retired to defensive positions at the Vesle River.

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The tactics of aerial combat Like' the grou nd for ces o f th e AEF. aviation per son nel a nd units lea rned th eir tact ics from th e Fren ch and British . Initially the com bat task s were obse rvation a nd recon naissa nce, wh ich gradually gave way to o ne-on one ae rial combat. Th e avia tio n unit s trai ne d as the y wou ld fight , [uvt ;]5 th e gro un d forces d id . In 1918 th e Air Ser vice of the AEf devel oped an o pe rational bombing ca pability. Th e strength o f th e US Air Serv ice h ad in crea sed to nearly 200 ,000 o fficers a nd men \..i th several thou sand aircraft by th e time of the Armist ice in November 1918. T he pursuit (or flghter! pil ot o f 19 18 wa s the knight. I st Division PC in a cave near Coeuvres during the Soissons campaign.The lone of advance of the America n divisio ns was covered with caves and ravines. which the Germans effectively defended . (MRC)

Grave of lieutenant Quentin Roosevelt. youngest son of President Theo dore Roosevelt. near Chamery west of Reims. Roosevelt. a member o f the 95th Aero Squadron based near Paris. was shot dow n by the Ger mans o n Bastille Day,July 14. 1918. Following the gentlemen's cod e of the time. the German pilot landed and scratched Roosevelt's name on the propeller. The reputed engine cowling and propeller are on display in ChateauThierr y. (US Signal Corps, 18907)

th e air pla n e was h is cha rger, a nd co mbat in th e air was close a n d pe rsonal. Unlik e thei r hall oon-ridi ng coll eagues, Ameri can pilot s of heavier-than-air craft wor e no parachut es. Grad ually successful air co mbat tactics we re learned and refin ed . Americans began their co mbat flying as part of the Escad rille Lafayett e (Lafaye tte Squa dron ]. a unit co m ma nded by fr en ch aviation o fficers. Nin ety Am erican flying o fficers tran sferr ed from Frenc h units in th e fall o f 191 7. a mo ng them m en who would command American groups and squadrons and instru ct the ncvv ly commts-aon cd US Air Service pilots. Turn in g th e ai rcraft into a weapon was a tech nolog ical challenge. Bo th the Lewis a nd Hotc h kiss mach ine guns we re adapted to aeria l warfa re, but from the obse rve r's cockpit beh in d the p ilot or a ll th e top wing. Aligning th e gun with th e fusela ge o f the plane required some means to fire " throug h" th e ro ta ting propell er. Th e Fren ch pilot , Rol and Ga rros, devi sed defl ector plat es for the propell er, but th is so lu tion wa s not pra ct ica l. Anth o n y Fokker, th e Dut ch aircraft d esign er, introduced in 191 5 a gu n synchroni zed with the propeller so that firing wou ld occ u r o n ly when th e propell er was clea r of th e path of the bullets. The co m bat pilo t could the n a im h is wea pon by aiming th e air plane. Squad ro ns b y mid·1 9 1H \.. .'e re o rgan ized in to three sect ions (fligh ts) of six ai rplanes each. Groups co mprised three to five sq uadrons, n o rmally four . The next level of o rgan iza tio n was the wing that co ns isted o f a variable number of gro ups. Tactically, o bse rvatio n and recon naissa nce m ethods developed first, foll owed by pursuit (figh te r) m ethods by lat e 191 5, and lon g-dt stan ce bombardmen t and d ay bombardment by 191 8. Nigh t reconnaissan ce did not devel op until the sprin g o f 191 8. Liaison with inf antry untts wa s th e slowest to develop and was not perfected by th e tim e o f the Arm istice. During the 51. Mlh lel a nd Meuse-A rgo nne cam paig ns , m or e tha n I ,non a ircraft of m an y types wer e de ployed for recon nai ssan ce, obser vation , and ad justme nt of ar ti llery fire and bomba rdment. Aviation a'> an independent co m bat a rm was close at han d.

Tank tactics

74

Ta n ks, like artill ery, were infantry sup po rt units in the \Vorld \Var. In th e French tank forces, a rtillery nomenclature wa s u sed to ident ify the h eavy tank un it s- grollpcmt'l1t in stead of co mpa ny and group instead o f battalio n . In bo th early batt les at Can tigny (May 191 H) and Solsso ns (luly 19tH). Fren ch tan ks with Frenc h crew s su ppor ted th e Ameri can o pera tions. AI Ca n ng n y th e 5th Grou p (batta lion) o f 12 Sch neider h eavy tanks, orga n ized in to three " ba tte ries" (,groupc",,,,,t o r company-sized u nl rsj of -l tanks each. attacked from west to east o n th e left (n or th) of the American infan try lin e. The ir advance wa s o n either side o f th e Village cem etery 011 the nor th side of Ca n tigny. In thi s ea rly act ion the French tanks were an

appe n d age to the infantry format ion s, n ot integ rated with th em. "The American In fan try furnis h ed 12 men to eac h Battery for Liaiso n . These men perform ed th eir duti es pcrtect ty-c-z wou nd ed ." The co m man der of th e Fren ch g rolll'CI/ /Cll t was an officer n am ed For san z. He reported th at the artil lery and the tan ks were mutua lly su pport tng . bu t the tanks had ext reme co n t ro l difficulti es wh en ope rati ng in low ligh t level s. Mo reov er th e approach march to th e line of departure "cou ld no t he co m pletely masked from observa tio n" by th e ene my, Th e ea rly morning fog rising from a creek plus the d ust raised by th e sh elling did give th e tanks som e conceal men t. Fora nz observ ed th at " th e American In fan try showed a remarkab le kn ovvledge of how to usc Tank assistance, following th em closely without allowing th emselves to be held up by the m, and sticking close to th eir barr age." Experime nts du ring the battle with a ta n k-towed fue l traile r and periscopes showed th at m ore wor k was needed to make th e techni qu es fully success ful. Lat er, in th e St. Mih iel and xt cu sc-A rgo nn c fight in g, th e American tank format ions were more closely coordi nat ed with the in fant ry assau lt. The tech n iqu e wo rked ou t was to USt' heavy ta nk s in th e van to crush the ene my wire, crea te lan es for th e in fa n try, and de stroy e ne my me ctun c-gun emplace me n ts. Th e tank s mov ed closel y be hi nd a ro lling barrage, hut th en waited for the infa n try and light tanks to co me forwa rd before co ntinui ng th e advance. At 51. xt tht ct (Sep te mbe r 12- 16, 191 8) th e Ame ricans di sco vered t he difference bet ween tra in ing a nd com bat. Th e resu lts we re d isap po inti ng. In order to be effecti ve, th e tanks m ust be ab le to maneuve r. Hea vy rains began to fall in th e o peratio na l are a the wed: p rior to til l' jump-of f da te crea ting a Stt-dcc p gela tino us slime in places. Sma ll streams we re over th ei r banks . Addit iona lly, th e Ge rman tren ches we re wide r than the 6ft span ca pa bi lity o f the Renau lts. The well- coord inated att ack tha t Patt on h ad p lan ne d soon broke down into sma ll fight s in volvi n g o ne or two tanks and very det erm in ed crewmcm bcrs. At thi s poin t, l' atto n 's emphasis on tra ining for his jun ior officers and non commissioned o ffice rs paid off. The American soldie r was at his best whe n im pro vising o n th e battl efield in th e face o f cha ngi ng cond itio ns. In add it ion to maneuverabilit y, tan k, relied o n the firep ower o f their ca n n o n a nd mach in e guns wit h th e crew pro tected by th e armor plate. The tank s st ill in ac tio n we re ru n n in g out of fuel and am m un ition, necessitat ing so m e m or e battlefield inn ov atio n to brin g th e supplies for ward . Commu n icatio n between tan ks a nd in fan try so ld iers was lin e of sigh t, all hampe red by th e smoke and noi se o f battle. In th e evening of Sep te m ber 14, t he Tank Corps was a ler ted for redeployme n t to th e Mouse-A rgonn e a rea to the n orth, part o f Colonel George Marshall's ma st erful realignment o f First Arm y from o ne battl e area to ano ther while still enga ged. Losses to enemy act io n were ligh t. Three tan ks h ad bee n destroyed by enemy artille ry fire, bu t -to we re stu ck in th e mu d or b roken down . Th e Germans had begun a ge nera l wit hd rawal from th e St. Mih icl sa lient at the beginnin g of th e Amer ican att ac k so a test o f th e tanks in the face of determi ned ene my resista nce still lay ahea d in th e diffi cu lt terra in between th e heights o f th e xt eu se River and th e Argonn e Forest. At the e nd of the wa r Ma jor General Ja mes ~l cAndr e w. AEF chid of staff, argue d that th e tan k forces must "train wit h t he infa nt ry and becom e part o f the inf an tr y" in o rder to assist the infantry with that mos t dif ficu lt ta sk of "actual closin g with the ene my a nd th e occu patio n o f the enem y's posit io n ." Rockenba ch , Patton, and their fellow tankers had made a good start.

Three stalwart flying officers of the Amer ican Air Service. Left to right.: ISt Lieut enant E.V. Rickenbacker; I st Lieutenant Do uglas Campbell (the first American ace) and Capta in Kenneth Marr. Photo taken near Tour, France , o n June 14, J 918 . (US Signal Co rp s. 158 19)

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z-C:: Attacking the high ground east of the Meuse Riyer and the densely wooded Argonne Forest. the

Americans launched their final offensive of the WOlf on September 26 against the formidable obstacles of t- tcnrtaucc n. Cunel. and Barricourt, The initial assault was slow and incurr ed many casualties .After a week . the Americans re -grouped and the high ground o nce held by the Ge rmans was in Alli ed hands by N ovember 5.

77

Weapons and equipment Equipment

Two doughboy s of t he 28th Infant ry Regiment unde rgoing trench warfare trai ning near Gcn dreccur t. France. in July 19 17. Not e t he heavy load s carried by each soldier. (US Signal Corps. 80 I r 4)

"Delousing" at the Army Sanitary Schools. Langres. France . Live steam was the best way to clea n clot hing and bedding. but it often left unifo rms severa l sizes smaller as a res ult. Soldiers needed to be care ful not to do n the clean gear tOO soon after emergi ng fro m the cleaning tra iler. (US Signal Corps. 49562)

Duri ng th e St. Mih iel ope ration in mid-Sep tem ber 1918, Herbert Mclfe nry's mach in e-gun co m pa n y carried o n ly their battl e packs con tai ning a razor, co mb, too thb rush , to wel, soap, mess kit, and two da ys' ratio ns. The co mba t rations were "four tins of hardtack co nta ini ng four o unces each of hardt ack, an d two pound s of can ned cor ne d beef." Addit iona lly, eac h man ca rried a bo lo and a shovel or pick. Th e American soldie r, in most instan ces, was suita bly equi pped for infantry rom bat in France. although the winter-service \\'001 oliv e-drab uni fo rm \ \'3 S stiff and heavy whe n wet, an d unu sable whe n do used with gas. The unifor m co nsisted of a campa ign or service hat (later rep laced by the British tin helmet of 19 J 6 design), a service coat or sweate r, service breeches. olive-drab flan nel sh irt, canvas o r leather leggings (replacing the puttee legging \\'faps, six millio n of which were ordered in the spring of 1918), russet leather shoes, ident ificatio n tag, and, in cold weather, a pair of olive-drab woo len gloves. Th e so ld ier's serv ice kit included a field kit and a sur pl us kit. The field kit included perso na l clo thing, arms and eq uip me nt co ns isting of a first-aid packet in a pou ch , a can teen wit h cu p and cover, a baco n can , a co nd im en t can, a pad carrier, and a haversack, exce pt if moun ted. There also was a meat can, ute nsils, a nd half of a tent with o ne po le and five tent pins. Fina lly the re was o ne identifica tion tag wit h ta pe. If the sold ier was ar med with a rifle he h ad a bayo net wit h scabbard, a rifle sling , and a cartridge bel l. If a rme d with a pistol, he woul d have had a ho lster for the side a rm, a do ub le-poc ket ma gazine pou ch, two extra magazines, an d a pisto l belt. The mount ed en listed so ldier had addi tio na l ho rse eq uipme nt, more personal items, spurs, a scab bard for h is rifle and 90 to 100 roun ds of ball am m un ition , reserve ratio ns, o ne "ho usewife" (a mend ing kit) pe r sq uad, ami some hand too ls. The sur plus kit had extra clot h ing and a foldi ng rifle-clea ni ng rod in a case . These kits were packed in bags, o ne for eac h squad, o ne for sergeants, and one for cooks and bu glers. Th e 19 17 Mn nu cl [or Non cunu niss icned O(fi cas an d Priva tes of !I/fillltrr of the Ami}' tlte Uni ted Stutes was a model pr imer writt en with great clar ity in instructio nal style. It cov ered a host of to pics in rema rkable det ail i ll only 350 small-for mat pages. Even an Eng lish- French vocabulary list an d a blank last will and testa men t form were included .

or

Individual weapons

78

The basic arm for the soldiers of t he AEF was the bo lt-act io n, magazin e-fed Springfield rifle mo del 1901 It weighed 9.691b with th e 16in. bayo net affixed. The so ld ier carried a basic "load" of 60 round s of 3D- caL ball ammu nitio n . The cartridges were packed five to a Cli p, 12 clips per cloth ban doli er, weig hi ng just under -llb. Nea rly 600 ,000 Spr tngttclds . enoug h to eq uip a field army of one millio n m ~I1 , were o n ha nd in 19 17. The problem was that nearly four mi llion so ld iers would be called to arms. Th e ava ilable rifles were used to ou tfit the ea rly o rgan izing Reg-ular Army and Nat ional Guard divi sions. About 200 ,000 Krag-jorgen sen Norw egianmade rifles, the standard rifle of the US Arm y from IX93 to 1903. were o n hand. A British-desig ned Enfield

rifle, chambered for th e US .30-cal. round, was put in to produ ctio n in August 191 7 to take ad vantage of the existing man ufacturing facilit ies th at had bee n turning out En flelds for th e British Army. Some units exchanged their issued rifles for an other mod el upon arrival in France. Some sold iers and all officers carried the US semi-auto ma tic pisto l, Co lt .45-cal. model 191 1. Th is sidea rm ha d bee n de veloped in response to th e experiences in th e Phili pp in es wh ere "k nock-do wn " po wer was needed to dea l with the head lo ng charges of the Moros. Th e Co lt A S deliver ed the goods.

Automatic weapons Heavy machine guns used by th e AEF were of American design but usua lly of foreign manu facture. All the ma jor inve ntors of mach ine gu ns- Hiram Maxim, Benjamin Ho tchkiss, Isaac Lewis, and John Browning-were Amer ican s, some of who m had taken th eir wa res to Europe to seek a market prior to w orl d war I. The early ma chine gun of American manufacture, th e Bl>n ct ·~1 (' rci (> , did not com pare favorably with t he very good guns manufa ctured by Maxi m, Hot chki ss, and Browning. At 30 lb it was sim ply too heavy for infantry usc. Lewis and Hot chki ss guns v..'ere successfu lly adapted for use in airc raft d urin g the war. As not ed in th e Cha pter o n orga nizati o n, mach ine-gun unit s were und errepresent ed in th e TO&E o f th e American d ivision prior to j une 19 17, with on ly four guns aut horized for the infantry regim en t. Becau se of the repor ts of the Baker Board and o the r o bse rve rs in Grea t Britain and France, th e AEF quick ly augm en ted its organi zatio n with more mac hine guns. By war' s end the allocation of machine guns to th e regiment had risen to :U 6 . At th e o utset of US in volvement in the war the machine gun was desc ribed as a weapon normally th ou ght of as a defen sive arm am ent becau se of its weight, high consum ptio n of ammun ition, an d th e need for a large num ber of so ld iers to service the gun. By th e tim e of th e Scisso ns o pe ratio n in j uly 19 1H, however. the value of machine gu ns pro perly em ployed in th e attack was clea r. Initially th e American infantry units were eq uipped with th e Fren ch Chauchat light machi ne gun, usually identified as an auto matic rifle. Th e Chaucha t v..-as not th e favo rite weap on of th e dou ghboy. Its 191b weight and rapidl y overheating barrels were its two main dr av.. -backs. The C ha ucha t had a distinctive "banana-shaped " curved magazin e that fed its 20 rounds of Lebe l 8rnm a mmuniti on from the bottom of the gu n. joseph Dorst Patch said of th e Chauchat th at it sim ply was "no good ." On th e othe r ha nd , the Hot ch kiss heavy machine gun "turne d out to he th e best machine gun of the war." Herbert Mcl-lenry was a Hot ch kiss gu n new ma n in th e 16th In fantr y Regim ent 's ma chine-gun co m pan y. Th e co m pany co m prised three platoons, each with four sq uads of o ne mach in e gu n per squ ad. Two-thir ds of the com pa ny stre ngth of 96 men had been put o ut of actio n in th e Sotsso ns operat ion and Mcf Ienry was a replacemen t. The co m pany had 12 gun carts and

Troops from the 18th Infantry Regiment firing Hotchkiss 8mm machine guns in practice firing at Gcndreccurt.August 20. 1917. (US Signal Corps. 800 14)

79

Private R. E. Brenton , 4th Infantry Regiment. 3d Division . tr ies to discharge a captured Germ an machine gun near Mo unt St. Pere northeast of Chateau- Thierry during the Aisne-Marne campaign,July 22, 19 18. (US Signal Corps. 17478)

12 ammunition carts, each drawn by o ne small mule. There were two caissons and two escor t wago ns , also dr awn by mu les, to haul the rest of th e com pany 's equi pment and forage for the an imals. McHenry rem ember ed that th ere were 49 mul es and five hor ses in th e company. His sq uad had eight men at full streng th . During th e St . Mihi el o pera tion Mcf-lenry was a n ammunition carrier. He "to ted" two bo xes of Hot chkiss am munitio n, eac h with 288 round s weighing abo ut 301b. In his sq uad th ere were five am m un ition ca rriers . The co rporal carried th e spare par ts kit, th e gunner carried th e gu n, and hi s load er carried the tripod , each weigh ing about 601b.

Artillery The three artillery regimen ts of th e infantry division 's artillery brigade consisted of two regiments of "light" Schneider 75m m guns (24 per regiment) and one regiment of "heavy" Sch neider 155mm howit zers (24 pieces). A tren ch mortar batt ery of 12 tubes rounded out th e artill ery brigade co mma nder's "org anic" fire suppo rt. Heavier calibers of artillery were placed in th e operational control of division artillery or suppo rted by grouping uni ts from cor ps an d army artillery un its with the American regiments.

80

A Schneider ISSmm howitzer of Battery C. 121sr Artillery, at the II Co rps School during arti llery practice firing on the road near Latrecey so uthwest of Cha umont (photo taken May 24,1918) . The 121 st Artillery Regiment was the heavy artillery of the 32d Division's artillery brigade. (US Signal Corps, 13975)

The Frenc h 75m rn model 1H9 7 was a revolutionary field gu n. It wa s qui rk firing u stng fixed ammunition wit h a h ydro-p neu matic recoil sys tem ;1I1d a trail spade to sta bi lize th e gu n durin g firin g. It fired a 17.51h shell to a ma xim um range o f 10,600 yards at a ra te o f fire of IS to 20 ro u nds pe r minute. Th e regirnc ru s a rm ed with th e 7Snu Tl n ormally fired th e ro lling barrages because o f their high rat e o f fire. The medium a rti llery regiment of the in fa n tr y division would h ave been equipped with th e US-manuf act ure d -l.Ztn. a n d 6i n . gu ns but there wer e n o t enoug h o f these gu ns to issue to de ploy ing div ision s. US facto ries prod uced only 2,766 7Sm m gun s and -tcz l SSm m gun s. with the majority coming o ff prod uc tion lin es in 1919 after the Armi stic e. Accordingl y the ,\ EF eq uipped its artillery unit s arriving in Fran ce with Fren ch gu ns a nd Fren ch a m m u n it io n. Heavie r art iller y, to in clude naval guns mounted on railwa y ca rs, supported combat o peratio ns. Sin . h o witzers of Brit ish d esig n v-e ere m a nufa ctured a t the Mid vale Steel a n d Or d na nce Co m pany in Nicc town . Pen n sylva n ia, a nd 123 Hritish gun s were received in Fran ce from th e Vickers Com pa ny. Th e Sin. howitzer co uld throw a 200l b projectil e nearly seve n mil es. Larger -caliber howit zers were planned . but the war ended before th ey co uld be brought to the field. In \Vorld war I most be lligere nt s we re ab le to field a sma ll number of naval -sty le gu ns . bu t t heir u tilit y de pe nd ed up on th e ab ility o f th e ar mi es to build rail spurs in ord er to move th e gu ns wit hin rang e o f thei r targets. Th e US Ordnance Department made n earl y :U)O rail way gu ns, but few were read)' by the time o f th e Arm istice . Un like th e German " Hig Bertha " that she lled Paris from 70 miles away, th e US Navy 's Jol in. railroad gu ns cou ld b e fired from their ca rs wit hi n te n m in utes of c rrtvt ng in po sit ion. Th e America n guns co u ld fire a 1,-IOOI b shell at a range of -1 5,00 0 yar ds . One loco mo tive a n d 13 ca rs were neede d to put o n e gun into acti on. Five of these unit .. wer e locat ed at cor ps and arm y levels and wer e ready for acti on by mid -September 191 to) in th e xtcusc-Argonnc ca m pa ign.

Armored fighting vehicles As has been mention ed p reviously. tanks of Ame rican manufacture did not make it to Franc e in time to participate in combat operations. Manufacturing sche d u les were point ed toward delivering light and medium tanks of Fren ch and Bnttsh design for the 19 1Y campaign year. Approx imat ely 1, 100 5- and IO-ton tractor s. used to tow m edi um a nd hea vy a rtill er y pieces. had bee n shipped to Fran ce hy November I , 19 t H, and a smalle r nu mbe r of la rge r tract o rs had bee n secured from British and Frenc h so urc es.

Rail and truck transport Railroad s in th e Un ited States were crit ical to th e war effor t. Movemen t of ma teriel a nd troops from fact or ies a n d e nc am pme nts to the ports req u ired cen tral co n tro l. Preside n t w i lson ap poin ted hi s so n -in -law, \Villia m !\.lcf\ doo, to be dir ector gen era l of th e US Railroad Administration to provide organizat ion an d dir ecti on to th e effor t. O versea s, locomotives. and rolling stoc k o f sta nd ard gauge we re n eeded in and around th e port areas . but the French in tercity rail system was suffi cient to move men a n d su pplies fro m the ports to th e fron t. The army cngt nccrs ma naged th e cons tru ction of rail lin es an d the o peration o f the port rail faciliti es. Spec ial e n ginee r regi ments bu ilt n arrow-gauge ra il SyStl'I11S to con nect the French railheads with th e rear service area s of th e theaters of o pera tion. In addition to moving tro ops a nd equipment , ammunition a nd food . the light rail syste m s were u sed to evacua te wound ed soldiers. Nea rly 125 miles of light rail lin es em p loyed -106 locomot ives an d 2,3MS ca rs. The Assistan t Ch ief-o f-Staff, G-ol. I\ EF, and tilt' Co m ma nd ing General, Services o f Supply, were the staff planner and operator respectively for th e AEF's transport needs. At GHQ AEF. Brigadier Gene ral Geo rge Van Horn xto sctey served as th e G-ol . A Director General of Transportation and a Director of Motor Tran sportation

81

served as special staff officers to oversee the important fun ction that kept the supply and maintenance of the army flowing effectively, The motor vehicle may have been the most im portant piece of eq uipmen t co nt ributing to the Allied victory in France. As with aircraft, the army learn ed im po rtant lesso ns about trucks from their experiences in 19 16 during th e Mexican punitive exped ition. The Quart erma ster Cor ps understood that standard izatio n was im po rtant, hut the de ma nds of the war could not wait for that development. Several hundred makes of motor vehicles were pressed into service. Reliabilit y and ma int ainability were critical. Trucks, ambulances, mot orcycles, and hicycles of all sorts were procured from th e Fren ch and British, in add itio n to the approximately 33,O(Xl trucks from J!.H on to 5·to n capacity tha t arrived from th e US. Nearly 10,000 Standard Btrucks of 3- 5-to n capacity were prod uced in the US before the Armistice. Most of the ma jor American co m panies-Ford, Dodge, Cadillac, General Moto rs, and Wh iteprodu ced tru cks. "In 19 17 an d 19 18 near ly 100,000 trucks and chassis, about 15,000 ambulances and 1}),OOO passen ger cars, 65,000 mot orcycles with side cars, an d 68,000 bicycles were delivered to th e Army." Each infantry division had abo ut 650 truck s integral to its organ iza tio n . Rails, wheels, and hooves prop elled th e AEF in to battle.

A irc raft

Ge nera lTasker H. Bliss and Major Ge neral James G. Harbord with John D. Ryan. Directo r of Aircraft Productio n, o n the ste ps o f General Harbord's quarters in Tours. (US Signal Corps. 23817)

82

Aviatio n began as a very sma ll enterprise in th e US mili tary system . In the army, a hand ful of air planes pu rch ased fro m th e wn glu brot he rs were man aged by th e Signa l Cor ps. On th e eve of th e depar ture of the AEF for Euro pe, the French W('f C flying 1,700 co mb at aircraft at th e battle front. Just as with artillery, th e America n aviatio n un its, as th ey were for med , started o perations with French and British aircraft. A full year prior to the entry of the United States as an "associated power" with the Allied coa lition, American vol unteer pilo ts were flyin g French Nieuports and Spads. But US industrial capabilities d id not match the dr eams and plan s of th e War Depa rtm ent. By July 191 7 fewer th an 100 plan es had rolled off the facto ry lin es. Bureaucratic inefficiencies and lack of central co n tro l over design and resources preven ted rap id progress in buildin g th e Ame rican a ir fleet. In June 191 7 Majo r Raynal C. Bolling led a lar ge team of tech ni cal evaluators to Europ e to pick out the best model s so that th ey co uld be manu factur ed in the United Stat es. He chose the British Bristo l and th e French Spad, bot h figh ters, the British De Havilland DH-4 for observa tio n and day bombardment , and th e Italia n Capro n i for night bo m ba rd men t. On ly th e 0 11·4 sur vived the tangle of co m peting agen cies and interests. By May 19 11:{ better co ntrol over aviatio n matt ers came wit h the creat ion of th e Bureau of Aircraft Prod uction wit h cop per en treprene ur John D. Ryan at its head . Thi s agency, along with a Bureau of Militar y Aerona utics headed by Ma jor General William L. Ken ly, promi sed to give the war Depa rtm ent the ad ministra tive capability it had lacked . But in practice, coord inatio n just never happen ed before t he Armistice ended hostilities. Prior to April 19 17 th e Un ited States bui lt perhaps 800 airplanes for foreign co ntracts, all for training no t co m bat. By th e end of hostilities, 1:{,567 train ing ai rcraft (of a tot al of 11,754 ) ha d been produced in Amer ican fact ories . For pilot basic ins tructio n the Curtiss I N-4 and the Standard Aero Cor po ratio n j-I \....ere used . The I N-4 was the su perio r aircraft for train ing purpo ses. Becau se of th e co ncen tration o n the trai n ing machi nes where the natio n 's facto ries had produ ct ion ex peri ence and becau se the US lacked

expertise in th e design and co ns truc tio n of co m bat, or service, plan es, the fighti ng aircraft had to be pro cured abroa d ,.. ·h ile t he manufacturing base caugh t up . By the tim e th e first American-built D H~4s reached th e fron t in August 19l H, they were al ready ob so lete. Th e locatio n of the fuel tank in the center of the fuselage between th e pilo t and th e ob serve r led to some in-Ilight fires and th e unatt ract ive nicknam e of "flying or flam in g coffin." just over 400 of the DH-4s were flown as observati on and da y bo m ba rd me nt sq uadrons of the Air Service . Th e Ame rican Libert y eng ine h ad bett er success . Although raw materials preven ted th e efficien t producti o n of airframes, engines we re a di fferent enginee ring chal lenge, with ' veight per horsepower bein g the hardest to solve. Most Europe an -design aircraft eng ines, no tably th e Ro lls-Ro yce prod ucts , were evo lving q uickly with man y design changes. Th e US had to get ou t in front of th e normal produ ction lead time of over a year with a stab le, inn ovative des ign . Wh at becam e kno wn as the "Liberty" eng ine was des igned in late May 19 17 in guest roo ms at the Willard Hot el in Wash in gt o n, DC, in a matt er of days. By early j une th e Aircraft Product ion Board approved t he desig n and on j uly 4 t he first s -cyun de r engi ne arri ved in the nati o n 's capita l, bu t it was soo n eviden t tha t t he 12-cylinder engine ap proac hing 400 ho rsep ower was to be the stan dard. Th e Packa rd Motor Car Co m pan y an d Ford Motor Co m pany prod uce d mo st of th e engines. Ext rao rdinary coo peratio n among riva l man ufact ur in g co m pan ies and the decision of th e US gove rn ment to poo l all the relevant de sign features and un der write royalties were ma jor featu res o f the prod uction process. At th e time of the Armistice, ISO engi nes a day were pourin g off th e prod uction lines. The engi nes weren' t cheap-abo ut $7,000 each, IS t imes th e cost of an autom ob ile.

A top view of t he A merican-built D e Havilland D -H4 " flying coffin" airp lane.This image offers a good view of the Uberty engine. (US Signal Co rps. 8476)

83

Armistice , occupation, recovery, and demobilization

Officers of the 15t Di vision

obser ve the 26th Infantry Regiment cr o ssing th e Armistice

line at Etain. No vem ber 17. 19 18. Left to right: Brigadier Gen eral Frank Park er, Brigadier G e neral Franci s C. Ma rshall. Lieu t e nan t Colonel The odore Roosevel t. Jr.. Captain M. H. Lane, and Majo r T.

R. Gowenlock. (US Signal Corps. 35055 )

Officers of the 15t Division at Boppard. Germany. on t he Rhine River, Dece mber 10. 19 18. Majo r

General Edw ar d F. McGlachlin. Jr.• com mander Ist Division at left with cigar. Lie ut e nan t C ol on el Ted

B4

Rooseveh.j r. at right with cane. (US Signal Co rps. 39638 )

Monday, Nove mber 11, 1918, was a da y that all America n do ughhoys remem bered. They could recall exactly what they \vere do ing and where they were when they learned abo ut the end of the war. Max Ottenfeld, a "professional" private in the 18th In fant ry, had been released from the hospital where he was being treated for gas in juries earlier that day. As he marched forward to find h is un it, head q uarters, an d headqu arters compa ny, he began to sec French soldiers in a hig h state of excitemen t. AU were shou ting about the end of th e war. Max finally got a ride forward an d even tually fou nd his unit, which would soo n be in the Coblenz occu pation sector of Germany. But the Armistice, a tempo rary suspe ns ion of hostilities, was no t victory. Th e Centra l Powers had no t been defeat ed by the anni h ilation, captu re, or su rre nde r o f t he ir field armi es. Peacem akin g proceeded fro m t he formal surrende r at Co mp tegne as the be lligeren t po wers gathe red at Versailles. The Amer ica ns, while rep resented at the Supre me W af Council by Co lonel Edwa rd Ho use and Ge neral Tasker H. Bliss, were no t at the ta ble in Marshal Foch's railroad car in the grove of trees northeast of Paris. Ge neral Pershing and selected members of h is sta ff had met wit h Marshal l'och at his head qua rters at Sculls o n Octobe r 2X. Persh ing: ex pressed the view that sur render of th e Ger ma n a rmies, no t all armistice, should be the goal. I'et aiu, o n til t, other ha nd , believed th at th e best way 10 ren der th e Ger ma n field armies im potent was to dep rive them of th eir materiel. Rolling stoc k, guns, and

am m u ni tion were to be left beh in d as th e armies withdrew beyond th e Rhi ne. Ge nera l Harb ord at hi s SOS h eadquart ers received wor d o f th e cessatio n o f hos tilities at abo u t 0900hrs an d sen t th e band o f th e 13th Ma rin e Regimen t to th e qu art er s of the Fren ch prefec t and tilt.' Frenc h regio nal com mander to p lay "the patriotic air s of th e Allied Nations, and th e best and gayest mu sic th at it kne w." As president of an associated pow er in th e war effort, Presid ent Wilso n desi red to rem ain aloof fro m the en tanglements o f pol itica l negotia tions u nde rwa y at th e en d of the fight ing. At Versaill es, how ever, he was t he o n ly h ead of state to take an activ e part in th e formulati on o f th e treaties th at en ded the war. The Third US Arm y under th e co m mand of Majer Ge n eral Dickman , lat er to b e rc-d esjgnat cct th e American For ces in Ge rm any, march ed int o th e Gra nd Duchy o f Luxemburg o n No vember 17 and across th e Rh ine River into th e Rhine land on December I. 1918 . The process o f occu pa tion . de moh ilization , and dispo sal of stored materiel had beg u n . Occupa tio n of Ger man y by Ame rican for ces lasted un tiljuly 2, 1919 , when Third Army \V3 S d tscontt n uc d . with rema ini ng small for ces transferred to AFG or 50 S. Th e lH G to nk o ver occ upat ion duties on Ju ly 3, 191 9, with Stator Gene ral ~l c Gl a chlin , Jr., fo rm er com mande r of the l st Divivinn at th e en d of hostilities, then Ma jo r Ge ne ral Henry T. Allen . for me r co m ma nder o f th e 90th Division , in co m mand . The AFG term ina ted occ upation d ut ies on Janu ary I I, 192 3, a nd left Coble nz o n Janu ary 2-1 . Ge ne ra l Allen turned o pe ratio ns over to Ge ne ral Mart y of th e Fren ch Army o n January 2 7. The grea t leap o verseas tha t had begun in Ju ne 19 17 had drawn to a close. Ge neral Persh in g, desp ite pressure fro m t he other Allied n atio n s, no tabl y Fran ce, had fixed th e size of th e occ u pying forces at I S divi sions on April 1, 1919, with redu ct ion to ten hy xtay I. The Fren ch ports o f Brest, St. Nazaire, and Bo rd eau x that ha d been used to receive th e AEF ac ted in reverse fash ion to embark the American s for the trip h ome. ,\ major ou t-processin g cen ter \\' .15 establishe d at Le xtans because the facilit ies at Brest a nd St. Nazai re were in ad equate. Th e troops referr ed to thi s process as go ing th ro ugh "the mill. " Harbord put a co m pe te nt o ffice r in ch arge at Brest , Mari n e Co lo ne l Sme d ley D. Butler, kn ow n as "Ge neral Duck hoard" to th e de parting troops bec au se h e liberat ed HO,OOO sec tio ns o f duc kbuard fro m Ameri can quartermasters who

Von Hindenburg, the first Ameri can horse to drink from the Rhine River near Boppa rd. Germany. December 10. 1918.The rider is Capta in M.W. Lanham. 2d Infantry Brigade. 1st Divisio n. (US Signal Corps. 39639)

I st Divisio n o n para de in W ashington. DC . Septe mber 11. 1919.Wounded veterans mo ving to their seats in the grand stan d . The Big Red One had paraded dow n Fifth Avenue in Ne w York City o n September 10. (US Signal Corps. 63698)

85

I~

Bethincourt

$ .....>.>,....

I'

......

By November I I the Amer ican fo rces had penetrated the Antwe rp-Neuse line. t he German t hird and last line of defense. MoS[ of the Amer ican divisio ns had cro ssed the Meuse River. and tw o. the lsr and 42d. had reached Sedan and were in th e process of taking t he city before being orde red to withd raw in order to give t he Fren ch the right of way. When halted by th e Armistice t he 5th 86

Division was with in artillery range of the German Lines of Co mmunicatio n.

were saving th em for m e at th e bo ttom of tren ch es, orga n ized th e facilities at Brest, go t th e troops u p ou t of th e m ud, and used th e reso urces o f his reg iment to care for troops afflic ted wit h in flue nza. Th e last di vision to lea ve the Co b lenz sector for the Un ited Sta tes was the l st Divislon-c-the same d ivision th at was th e first into ac tio n o n M ay 28. 1918, at Can ug ny. On Augu st 8, 1919, th e l st . minus some o f its sm all unit s that remained with th e AFG, was tr an sferr ed to Gene ral Harbo rd' s 50S, It embarked o n the SS Orizll ba at Brest o n August 22 ami arrived at th e po rt o f Hobo ken, New Je rsey. on August 30 . In Sep tember, to sh ow th e AI1ll'riGIIl people th eir fightin g d ivision, the 1st par ad ed in hoth Washingto n and New York City. Th e o pe ratio n s or de r for th e New York City parade was co nside rab ly longer tha n th at wh ich put th e d ivisio n in to acti on at Can tig ny! Peace h ad b roke n out.

Smiling do ughboy with his mess kit and canteen cup at Gond recourt. The o riginal Signal Corps caption said "O ne of 'Uncle Sam's' well fed soldiers:' (US Signal Corps. 80 108)

Toast to the Allies at PC M 0 5CO U. France,A pr il 16. 191B.The American dou ghboy and th e French poilu symbo lized the Allied coalition. (US Signal Co rp s. 12 145)

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I

/ /";

Private Max O ttenfeld. signal wireman. 18th Infant ry Regiment, I st Division. (MRC)

87

Retrospective

Two views of the reun ion of the I st Division at Camp Dix. New Jersey, Novem ber I I, InO.The Cantign y "for t" and the Sc issons "arch." (MRC)

1 •

88

¥

Lesso ns subsu me recog nitio n . analysis, and im plementat io n. Lesso ns from th e American participatio n in World \Var 1 had bo th positiv e and negative influen ces on the interwa r ar m y in the Un ited State s. The most effect ive lessons were ad mi nistrative and logistical; th e least effective were organiza tio nal, doct rinal. and tact ical. America 's great citize n-soldie r army had made its mark in France , but the ma rk was o ne of Yankee de te rmi na tion, grim resolu tion , and indi vidual co rnba ttvcncss. Organ iza tio ns wit hi n th e AEF had developed, changed. matured , and in some cases prov ed less th an effective. The record of combat an d administrati ve leade rsh ip was a good o ne overall. The Meu se-A rgonne cam paign had cha lleng ed th e Ame rican arm y and its ,\ EF to its elastic limits. It was wit hou t qu estio n th e largest an d most co m plex milit ary o peration in the history of the Ame rican a rmy since its Civil War. Gen era l Persh in g and h is staff skilfu lly dea lt with new dim en sion s such as tox ic gas wa rfare, aerial and tan k co m bat, and coalitio n war fare. Follow ing the te rm ina t ion of hostiliti es in 191H until his death in 19-18, john j . Pershi ng presided over a small gro u p of prot eges- j o hn 1.. Hines, Cha rles P. Sum me rall, Malin C raig, an d George C. Marsh all , all des tined to be chiefs-o f-staff of th e US Arm y. A larger group of contemporaries an d junior officers shaped the ar my of th e in terwar yea rs so tha t when th e eme rgency that beca me \Vorld war II a rrived the army was able to mob ilize, organize, de ploy and fight. Th rougho ut that per iod Joh n Pershi ng rem ain ed an adv isor to presid ent s and \Var Depa rt me nt officials. It can be said witho ut fear of much exaggeration that til t' :iO year s following Wor ld War I in the Un ited States were the years of Joh n j . Persh ing as m uch as th ose of any sing le America n. Th e losses of life and property in the World War were staggering. The United States suffered 50,3 00 men killed in batt le co m pa red with 1,700,000 Russians, 1.600 ,OOO Germans, a nd 1,385,000 Fren ch . Of th e major bel ligerent nations, o n ly Greece and Po rtu gal lost fewe r soldie rs th an th e American s. The in fant ry bore more than half of all th e batt le deaths, foll owed hy th e signal corps, cngtnce rs. artillery, and ta n k crewme n. Amon g officers. the in fant ry co unted 80 percent of the losses. followed by flyin g officers. w o unded sold iers always outn umbe r th ose killed outrigh t in ba tt le. Death from wou nd s co m prised alm ost 30 percen t of th e tot al hatt ie death s, hut tile woun ded were four time s t he dead . Th e total American batt le casualties in all categor ies were 260,496. Co m parable v-eith hatti e losses, however, were the losses to disease, including th e great influenza pandemic th at swept th e ran ks of all armi es in 1918. Pneumon ia caused 40,000 deaths, 25,000 asso ciated wit h th e flu pandemi c in both th e ca m ps sta tes ide and in the AEE From mid-Sept ember 19 1H to the armis tice nea rly 370,000 cases of influen za and pn eum on ia struck do wn troops in the Un ited States. Disease cau sed SO percent of t he to tal dead from all causes in th e American Arm y and Navy, but thi s was the first wa r "tha t sho wed a lower dea th rate from disease th an from hatti e." Th e enti re army was vaccinat ed agains t typh oid fever plus med ical a nd san ita ry services were vastly im pro ved fro m previou s wars. The eco no mic co nseq ue nces of the wa r were su bsta nt ial for the Uni ted Stat es. The cost of mai n ta in in g an arme d forces of more than four m illio n was mare tha n one milli o n dollar s per hour fo r 25 mon ths-a bo ut 2 1.H5 billion do llars att ribu tab le to the war. Th e army acco unt ed for about tv.. -o-t hirds of th at to ta l. Fo rty-fou r cen ts of every dollar spent by the a rmy wen t for qu ar term aster

item s, 29 cen ts for gun s and ammun ition, 6 cents for th e Air Service an d 13 cents for so ld iers' pay. Another S.XS billion dollars were ad vanced as loans to til t' va rio us Allied nations. Of course th e '·..ar and the US army co ul d no t sto p on th e dime o n ce h o stilities ceased . The re were hu ge stoc ks o f su pplies, munitio ns , and eq u ip me n t in bo th Fra nce and th e Uni ted States th at had to he dealt with. There were ou tstan d ing co n tracts tha t h ad to be cancelled or diverted to o the r ends. Airpl an es, Libert y engi nes, tanks, trucks , artille ry ptcccs. rifles, ma chine gu ns, and a host o f o the r m at eriel were o n han d, Th is had th e downs ide effect o f creatin g a n aura of military secur ity an d a di sin centive to contin ue to develop and produce m ilita ry hardware. Nearly 1,000 e-ton tanks of th e Renault light tank de sign had been man ufactu red . but no t o ne made it into action in France prio r to th e Armisti ce. The Nat io nal Defen se Act of 1920 allocated tho se ta nk s to th e infantry bran ch of th e arm y, leavi ng the ta nk cor ps withou t m ission or eq uip m en t. Geo rge Patt o n W'I S so discouraged that h e returned to the cav alry bran ch ill the interwar period . Wit hou t qu esti o n, th e real heroes o f th e AEF in Prance were the American service personne l. While in stitutions, po licies, and strategi es were in flu x, till' infan try sold ier and marin e did what was ex pected o f him, despite accelerated and oft en inadequ at e trainin g, de spit e oft en mediocre lead ership at th e lowe st levelv, an d devpite sh or tages o f eq ui p me n t. Th e Uni ted States joined th e wa r in progress at th e m o m ent of th e Allit's' greates t n eed . Amer icans. Briti sh , an d Fren ch so ldiers ca rried the burd en of combat from May 28 , 191 R, forwa rd to t he Armi stice o n No vember II , 191 X, together . Brig.lltier Ge neral Fox Co n n er. th e o pera t io ns o ffice r of th e AEf, concl ude d h is report of Jul y 2, 1919 , by remindi n g us that th e o ne gre at lesson o f th e war was "the unprepared n ati on is h elpl ess in a g reat war unl ess it ca n d ep end upon ot he r n ati ons to shield it whil e it prepar es." He was not co n fide n t that th e nati o n would lon g rem ember it. Th e lesson o f succes sfu l coa ttu o n war fare is perha ps the mo st sig n ifica n t o u tco m e o f th e war for t he Un ite d Sta tes.

The New York City parade of the lst Division. September 10. 19 19. (MRC)

89

Chronology 1903 14 February

Army General Staff Co rps created by ace of Congress

1916 7 M arch

Newt o n D. Bake r rep laces Lindley M. Garrison as Secretary of War

9 Ma rch I S March J Ju n e

Pancho V illa raids Columbus. New Mex ico. killing 17

7 N ov embe r

Brigadier General John J. Persh ing heads a " punitive expedition" to catch Villa Natio nal Defense Act expands Regular Army. authorizes National Guard. creates ROTC. and strengthens industrial preparedn ess Woodrow Wilson elected to a second term the on slogan "he kept us out of war"

1917 6April 18 May 26 May 13 Jun e 26- 30 Jun e 4 Ju ly 5 July I l lu ly I Sept em ber 1 Nov emb er

US declares war o n Germany Selecti ve Service Act Majo r General Pershing appoin te d comma nde r-in-chief.AEF Majo r General Pershing ar rives in Paris and sets up AEF Headquarters Ist Divisio n arrives at St. Nazatre 2d Battalion. 16th Infantry Regiment, parades down Champs Elysees in Paris General Suff.A EF. created by General O rders No .8 General Pershing approves the General Organization Pro ject for the AEF General Headquart ers (GHQ).A EF. moves to Chaumont F Company, 2d Batta lio n. 16th Infantry Regiment, loses first three soldiers in trench raid

19 18 4 March March-April 28-31 May 17 1u ly 18-22 Ju ly 3 11uly 6 Au gust 10 Au gu st I S Au gu st

90

12-16 Se ptember 26 September 5 November II Nove m b e r I Dece mber

Peyto n C. March beco mes acti ng chief-of-sta ff. US Army Ger man spring offensives on the Wes ter n Front Batt le of Cantigny. first American offensive action of th e war President Wilson authorizes US fo rces to join Allied No rth Russian Expeditio n Soissons ope ratio n of the Aisne-Marne counter-offensive Genera l Orders No . I. First Army. designates Pershing as commander Aisne-Marne salient cleared of Germans Field Order No. I. First Army. takes control of sec tor along vesle River 27th Infantry Regiment ar rives Vladivostok. Siberia. and o rganizes AEF Siberia HQ . 3 1st Infant ry Regiment arrives within a week St. Mihiel operation of First Army Meuse-Argo nne oper atio n of First Army Republicans gain co ntrol of both Ho uses of Cong ress Armistice Third Army enters Germany for occupation duty

1919 3 July 22 Au gu st 22 Au gust 10 September 17 September

Amer ican Fo rces in Germany (AFG) replaces Third Army on occupation duty American Fo rces in Fra nce (AFF) crea ted to replace GH Q .AEF ISt Division embarks on the SS Orizoba at Brest for re turn home Ist Division parades in New York City Ist Division parades in Was hingto n. DC

1923 24 Ja nu ary 27 Jan uary

AFG departs Coblenz. Germany. for home Majo r General Henry T Allen turns command of American zone of occupation over to French

Bibliography Th e bibliograp hy th at to ltocv5 is not co m preh ens ive, onl y rep resent ative of th e variety of works in English that are read ily ava ilabl e, eit he r by pur ch ase o r loa n fro m good lib raries. Th e best ge neral so urce o n th e h isto ry of th e US Army is th at of the lat e Russell F. w etgtcy, Th e best specialized so u rce on the Ame rica n Expeditionary Forces is Edward

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Co ff m an 's Til e U'ar To f ilii All lVars. For th e

logi sti ca l story. Jam es Ha rbord 's memoi r, Tilt' Amaic,m Ar m)' 111 France, 191 7- 191 9, clearly is th e best. Th e best first-person so urce is that o f Geor ge C. Marsh all. Memoirs. of My Services ;11 ti lt' World \\ ~" 19 17-1 9 18. The remaining titles fill in the stor y \...lth detail and explan atio n. Americall Arm ies /lull Battlefields in Europe. wash ington. DC: Cen ter of Military Histo ry, Un ite d Sta tes Arm y, 199 2 [1927 , 1938 by Ame rican Batt le Mon umen ts Co m m issio n ]. Ayers, Leo n ard P. The tV" r with Gvnnany: A Statisti cal Sum m ary, 2nd editio n. was hi ngto n. DC: Governm ent Prin tin g Office, 191 9 . Barbeau, Arth u r E., and Henr i, Florette. Tile Unknown Soldiers: Africun-American Troops ill lVorltll\'ar I. New York: Da Capo Press, 1996 . Braim, Paul F. The Test Of Battle: Tile Amainm Expeditionary Forces i" tile .\ lelise- ArSOIUle Campatgn. Newark: Un iversity of Delaware Press, 19B 7. Bruce, Robert B. A Fraternity of Anm: America & Frana ill tile Great U ~". Lawrence, KS: The Un iversity Press o f Kansas , 2003. Buck, Beaumon t H. Memories of Peace lind l\ ~ lr. San Anto nio, TX: The Naylor Co m pan y, t 92 5. Bu llard , Robert Lee. t'ersonatittcs ,/lId RC/ll i "LK(' / ICf'S of the lVar. Garde n City, NY: Do ub led ay, Page, 19 25 . Co ffm an, Edwa rd M . Tilt' IVar End A ll \\~-IH : TIl e tl maicclu Milit" ry Experience in IVvrld U'ar I. New York: Oxford Un iversity Press, 1968 . Cro well, Benedict and w ttso n . Robert Forrest. How America \\'t'llt to \Var. 6 volumes. New Haven , C l: Yale Un iversity Press, 192 1. Dickman, joseph Th eodore. Th e Gm u Crusade: A Nurruti vr of th e l\'or/d \\'lIr. New York: D. Appleton and Co m pan y, 1927 . Eisenhower, john S. D. Yanks: The Epic Story o(llll' Amerin l1l Ann}' ill \\'orld l\'ar I. New York: The Free Press, 200 1. Evan s, Ma rti n M. Retreat Hell! \Ve lusr Got Here': Tile A meri ctlll Expl'diticmary Force ;1/ France, 191 7- 19 18 . Oxfo rd: Ospr ey Publi sh ing, 1998Fleming, Tho mas. TIlt' l//USi UI1 of Victory: A ma;ccl ill H '<Jrld \V", I . New York: Basic Boo ks, 20m . Gre enwood, Paul. Till' Second Batt1£' of the Marne 19/ 8 . Sh rewsbury, Englan d: Airlife Publish ing Ltd ., 1998 . Hallas , james H. Dougllboy \Vm: Till' Ameri can Expeditionary Force in tVorid l\ ~ " I. Boulder, CO &. London: Lynn e Rienner Publishers, 2000. _ _ _. Squandered Vict ory: The Amaic'l/I First Army at St. Mihiel, w estport, CT: Praeger, 1995. Harbor d , Ma je r General james G. Leaves from II lVar Diary. New York: Dodd, Mead & Co m pa ny, 19 25. Tile American Army ill Frana' 19/ 7-191 9. Bosto n : Litt le, Brov....n, An d Co m pany, 193 6 . Harries, Meir ion and Sus ie, Tile L(I.~ t Days III /lOCt'lIce: A maica at \Vi" 19/ 7-1 918. Nevv· York: Rand om Ho use, 199 7.

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Johnson, Dou gla s V. II a nd Hillm an , Rolf e L., Jr. SO ;SSO/H 1918 . Co llege Stati on. TX: Texas A& ~ f Uni versi ty Press, 1999 . Keene. Jenn ifer D. Doughboys, ti lt' Great Wtlf, IIlJd the Rt'l1Ii1kiuS ofA merh-il . Balti mor e &. Lo nd o n: The Joh ns Ho p kin s Unt versny Press, 200 1. Kenn ett. Lee. Th e First Air l\'l", 191 -1-1918 . New Yor k: The Free Press. 1981. Liggett. Hu nt er. A.E. F. New York: Dod d . Mead &. Co m pa ny, 1928. _ _ _. Con n nanding all A",ericall A rmy: Recollections uf the l \'orld War . Bosto n : Hou gh to n Mifflin Co m pany. 1925. M arch , Gene ral Peyton C. The Na tion A I \\1m. Garden City, New York: Doubleday, Doran &. Co m pany, Inc., 1932. Marshall . Geo rge C. .\ 1('111Oir... of 1\.ly Services ill the l \ 'orltJ War 19/ 7-1 91H. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co m pa ny. 19 76. Mead , Ga ry. Th e D oughboys: A",erica uml thc First Wor ld lVar. woodstock & New York Th e Overlook Press, 2000. Millett, Alla n R. Th e General: Robert L. Ullllilrd mzd Olfkership in th e United Stut es A rmy, 1881 -1 925. w estport . 0: Green wood Press, 19 75. Millett, Allan R. an d Murra y, \Villiam son, cds . .\ lilitllry E!Tt'cti \·em'.,,_'i: Volt /me I: Til!' First won.t l\'ar. Bost on : Un win Ilym an , 19R9 (paper ed it ion) . Mosier, Jo h n . Til e Mrlll ti't' Great l\'tlr: t\ Ne w Military History I,Vvrld Htlr I. New York: HarperCo llin s Pub lishe rs, 200 1. Nen ni n ger. Timoth y K. Til e Leavenworth SclIOOI.'i uml ti ll' Old Arm)': Educution, J'rofi'.ss ionulis m, lind ti ll' Ofl icl'f Cor!,s of til t' Unit ed Stutes Army, 18H1-1 918 . westport, CT: Greenwoo d Press, 1978. Sheffield , Ga ry. Forgoltt'tl Vict ory: Till' Fir st I,Vorld \t'ar: .\ /)'1115 tlud Realities, Lo n do n: Head lin e Book Pub lish in g, 2(XH . Tile Uni ted Stales Annvin U hr/dl,Var I. A co llec tion of primary documen ts in CO -RO~ f forma t. w avh m gton, DC: Cen ter Of Militar y Histo ry, Un ited Stat es Arm y, 1998 . Th om as, Shi pley. Til l' l/htmy of tile A .E.F. Nas h ville: The Batt ery Press, 2000 11920 1· Trask, David F. Tile AEF Imd Coalition l Van ll aki l1S, 19 17-/ 9 18 . Lawr en ce, KS: Un ivers ity Press o f Kansas, 199J . ____. TI/(' United States in tilt' Supreme W"r Coun cil: A I1Il'fiCl I1l I,VlIr A ims tilld Itltt'f-Allied Stmk.\". 191 7-1 918. Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1961. \VeigJey. Russell F., History ottne United Stutes A rmy , en larged edition. Bloomin gton : Un ive rsity of Indi an a Press, 1934.

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or

wil son . [late E. Trm t 'Em Rough! The Birth o(A mt'ficaJl A rmor, 191 7-2U. No vato , CA: Presid io Press, 1989. Zieger, Robert H. Amt'fiell '.<; Greut U'ltr: l \'orJd I,\'ar l aml tile ,1merin lll Experience, Lanh am , Ml) : Rowman & Littl efield Puhli sh ers, In c., 200 0.

92

Source Notes The text for th is book, Th e AfF ill World Wi n 1. was prepa red wit h Iootuot cv to document the SOU Tees of quotations and idea s from o thers. Space has not pcnntucd the iuclustcn of the full se t of footnotes. although the)' are on fill' w ith th e publisher. In thi s short section the author Ib ts th e SOUKes of quoted materia) and "elected Interpreta uons 01 other schola rs. a.. well 01 so me of th e archival sources relied upon . By means of th is sect io n and the bibliography. l'ver)' effort has been made. co ns tstc nt w ith the publisher's poli cies. 10 reveal th e refe rence to the published work of o t hers . An)' oversig hts are unin ten tio na l a nd en tirely the res po nstbtltty of the author. Introduction . Professor I. B. Holley. "The Chaumont Coterie," in Callti:\u y lit Seventy-Five (w heat o n. II.: Th e Ca n tlgn y Firvt Division Foundation, 1973); Timo thy K. Ncnntnger. '''U n ~ys t e m a t ic as a Mod e of Co mmand ': Co mma nders and the ProCl"SS of Co m ma nd in the American Expednionarv Forces. 191 7- 19 18 ," Tht' / Oltrl lll i of ."" mtll ry Hhtor)', 6-1 (July 2000, (herea fter TK.\1 ; John J. Pershing..\ ( 1-' Experiences ill tile World l\~If, 2 vols . (New York: Fred er ick A. Sto kes Co m pan y, 193 1) [herea fte r //1'.\1] and Persh ing 's F;I ILII Report to the S('Cretar,. of 1VI/r, Sep tember 1, 19 18 [herea fte r /II'FR). ~fiss ion . Russell F. \\'l'i~ Il'Y, fl h tor)' of tilt' United Stolt's Arm)', en large d ed . (Bloom ingto n. Ii\:: Indi an a University Press 19M·!) (he rea fte r R n \~\rI1lY] ; /11',\1. Prepa ruuon for war. Vllitl'll St" tl'.~ .-1r", .\' iu tilt' wo rtd H ~ " 19 17- 19 19, 17 vols . (w ashingto n, DC: Histori ca l Div ision , De pa rt men t 01 th e Arm y, 19-1M ) [he rea fte r US.-1W 1\·1; Na tio nal Archives a nd Record s Ad mi n istrat io n, ARCH II, College I'ark . MD (Recor d Crou ps 120, 16:; N 200) ; /II'FR; Joh n Patric k Fin nega n, ASlIim t till' Specter II {)rasOl /: nit' Cm "flil i.~ 1/ tilr AlI/ak ll l1 .\fi/i rar,. Prt'pll n'l lfl t'S.S, 191-1-19 / 7 twcstpo rt. CT N Lond o n: Greenwood Press, 19 74}; Da le Vall Ever )', Til l' A.f. E ill Il ,/u k (New York "" Lo nd on : D. Ap plet o n and Co m pa ny, 19 28 ); An ne Ci pria no Ven zon . cd. 'In c Vl/i ll'lf S lll ll'.~ ill tlt e First lVorld U ',u : ,1 /1 /:I/()'(/ opt',liil (New York &. Lo nd on : Garland I' ll h li s h i n ~ , ln c., 19<J 5 ) [he rea fte r , lC F EI/()' .]; Marv in A. Krcidberg a nd xtc rton G. Hen ry, 1/h torr .\tWlllr)' ,\10bi1iZlIticlIl ill li lt' Un itl'll Stutes Army 17 75- 19-l5I DA Pamph let 20-2 121 (\Vashi n).;to ll, DC: Dep ar tm ent 01 till' Arm y, Nov . 1955) [h erea fter K&Hj; RF\ \-j.\rm ,l'; Frederick Pal mer. ,\ 'c'\\,t/ll/ 1>. Hilkt'f: Amt'ril"II ,II 1\'(/r, 2 vol s. (New York: Dod d , Mea d & Co m pany, 19:i 1) [h ereafter )\,D 8 ); Colo nel Oliver Lym an Spauld ing a nd Colonel Jo hn Womack Wright , Til e .~('cO/ Ii I Divisi on American £.\/w, l ilicmarr Force [sic) i11 FfIl lICC 19 17-1 91 9 (N(· \ v· Yor k: The Hillma n Press. Inc. lo r till' Htsto rtca l Co mm ittee, Secon d Divi sion Assoctauo n . 19:1 7) (he reaf te r 2/ llJi"j ; Herbe rt 1.. Mcjl enry, As II Pri "II It' Sill\' l t: .\lr .\ lcmor;('5 of tllc' Firs t Division Worl d UO m 1 (Ind iana , Pi\: The ,\. G. Hal ld in Pub livhing Co mpany, 19H8) [hereaf te r .\ td /m r)'); Maj or General joseph Dors t Patch , U.S. ,\ rm )' Retd . A Soldiff :~ a~lf: TIll' Finl It/fill/trT Divis ion, A.£.F. (191 7·1918' (Co rpus Ch risti. TX: vtlsslo n Press. 1966 ) [hereafter I'll1e/1) ; Benedict Crowell and Robert Forrest Wilso n, HoU' A"'a k a l\'('IIt to W"" 6 vols. (New Have n . CT: Yale Un iversity Press, 192 1J [hereafter Crowell & Wi1.'iOII); Histor ical Section. Arm y War

or

or

College. OrdeT o( Battle of th e United Slillej LII"d Fotces ill tlit' l\'orfll l\ ~ If: Aml'fit"",l

EXpt'l/itiolllll)' Forces, muln-vol . tw a..htngton. DC : US Govern ment Printing Office, 1937)

[herea fter OBUS); Allan R. Mil lett , nit' General: Raben L. HIIII",d I lIlit Oflia'nhip ir til", Ullited Ar",y Ili81 -1925 (westpo rt. CT: Gree n wood Press, 19 75 l !hereafte r Ht//l"rdl ; George C. Marsha ll, .\ lm win of.\ 'r S
Std tt'.~

93

Organization . /lPM; },mR ; Frank E. Vandiver, Bll1(k Itlck : The Uft' 11,111 TImt'S of 101m I. I'as/ling , 2 vols . (College Station. TX &. London : Texas A&M University Press, 1977) (he reafter BliU"k lark) ; K&1l; Irving B. Holley, jr.. Gcneral ionn ,\ f. Palmer, C itiz en SoW a s, awl tilt' Armyota Democracy twes tport. cr &. London: Greenwood Press, 1982) ; ORUS;Jamcs G. Harbord , TIlt' Alllt'now AmI)' in France 1917-/919 (Boston : tittle, Brown , and Co mpany, 1936) (hereafter Harbord) ; USA"' \\'; AC \ 'E,,'),; RFl \'i\ml)'; u't'';t'tt A.E.f. ; TIlt' Genesis ot tt« American First Army (Washi ngto n, DC: Histor ical Section, Army War Co llege, 1938, [hereafte r First A rm)' J; /lPfR ; Edward M. Coffma n, 11", l\j" To End All Wan : 111t' American ;\1i{ifllry Experi ence ill H 'tJrM H 'lIr t (Madison, WI: The Uni versity of Wisco nsin Press, 19( 8) [he reafte r COfftllllll ]; Robert Lee Bullard, Personattues dlld Reminiscences oft/n' H'", (Garden City, NY: Doub leday, Page N Company, 1925) [he reafter RLHI; Bert Ford, 111t' Fishti"s \ im kees Ol't'm'
94

Index Aircraft Prod uction Board 83 Aisne·Mar ne ampaign 70-71. 74 inItial plan of arrack 72 o perations of I st and 2d Divisions 3 1. 73 A lexander, Majo r Ge nera l Roben 38, 40 AIlC!n. Majo r Gene ral H enry T. 85

American C ivilWar 30 American Expeditio nary Fo rce s (AEF) Air Service 5 I. 5 1. 5 2-5 3, SS ace s 7S aircraft 82-8] Dc Havilland DH ·"I 92.83. 83 O bservation Squad ron 54-55 Pursuit (Fighter) Squadron 53 -54 Army Sanitary Schools. Langre s 78 arti ller y 80-81 black soldiers 12. 62 casualnes 6. 25. 41, 88 command 20-23 communication 23-26

''''P' I Corps

11, 29. 30-31, 3 1.40

III Corps 29

V Corps 70 demobilizatio n 85, 87

development 5-6 divisions 32. 32. 33- 3 4.3"1 1st 12. 13- 14, IS. 17. 21.22. 25. H . 35-36, 36.40-4 1.65,66-70, 84. 8S. 87, 89 Ist Expeditio nar y Divisio n 9- 10. 10 26th "Yanke e" 36, ]7-38. 38, 4().-41. 40 41st 30 42d 22 77th " Metropolitan" 22.38, 39,40. ' ()-41 92d " Buffalo" 40.62 93d 62 depot 32 imporunce of 27 statistical comparisons between 4()-4 1 engineer regJments 60-61 . 60, 6 1 guidons 69 field artille ry brigades 45. 46-41 . 51 1st 34.65 51u 36 152d 38 field artillery regiments (heavy) 45, 49. 50, 51.80 field artillery regime nts (light) 45. 48-49. 51,69,80 field signal battalio ns 24-25 First Army 22. 29-30. 30 "fa mo us co lored band" 62 " G Staff" 28. 60 G-2 intelligence secncn 6. 22, 23,26 Ge neral Headquarter s. Chaumont 12, 20, 21. 51- 58 organization 27-28, 29 inb ntry battal ions 4 4 infantry brigades 4 1. 4 1. 42,45 1st 34

2d 34. 36,66 51st 36 52d 36 153d 38 154th 38 infantry regimen ts 43-44 16th 17- 18, 34. 36, 70 18th 17- 18. 34, 66, 67. 70, 7 1.79 26th 17- 18, 34, 66, 70 28th 10, 17- 18, 35, 65-66, 67, 70. 78 infantry rifle co mpanies 44-45 inte lligence 6, 22. 23,26 Marine Co rps 41 medical services 62 North Russia 62 officers 11- 12.1 5.1 8 rail and truck transport 81-82 Servic es of Supply (50S) 28.5 1.S7-60, 58. 59. 8 1 Siberia 62 tactics 63-65 aeria l combat 74 tank combat 7+-7 5 tank batta lions 57 Tank Corps 55-57. 55 theat er of operations 16 Tractor and Art illery School, St. t-taur, Par is

'5

training 10 artillery 45 .49 divisional tr aining areas I) in France 12- 15 inco mple te ness of 65 Petain on 64 schools in France 15- 18 in the US 11- 12 trench mortar batt erie s 5 1 weapons and equ ipment armored fighting vehicles 8 1 automanc weapons 79--80 Hotchkiss 8mm machine guns 78-79,

79 Schneide r 155mm howitzers 80-8 1. 8 0 Springfield rifles 78 uniforms and service kit 78 American Fo rces in France 62 Amer ican Fo rces in Germany 62.85 Andrews, Brigadier General 28 Argonne Forest 38,40.75 Armistice (November I I. 19 [8) 8+-85 Ame rican positio ns at 86 Babcock, Private Carlisle 19 Baker. Colonel Chauncey B. 9,14.56 Baker, Newt o n D. 7, 1.10. 19. 2 1 care er 19 Baker Board 21, 56, 79 Ballou. Brevet Majo r General Charl es C. 62 Bell, Major General J. Fra nklin I I BelleauWood 64 Bener- t-lercie mach ine guns 79

Biddle, Major Gene ral John 20 Bjo rnstad. Brigadie r Ge neral Alfred W. 15 Black. Majo r Ge neral William M. 1 Bliss, General Tasker Howa rd 20, 2 1, 27, 8 2.

8' career 21 Bolling. Majo r Raynal C. 82 Bo urg 56.57 Bevington , England 56 Braine. li eutenant Elgi n 56 Brenton , Private R.E. 80 Br idges, Gene ral To m 9 Browning. Joh n 79 Buck. Major Ge neral Beaumo nt B. 65, 66, 70 Bullard. Major General Robe rt LIS, 20. 36. 36 . 38. 64 Bundy. Major Gene ral O mar II Bure au of Aircraft Prod uctio n 82 Bure au of Military Aeronautics 82 Butler. Colone l Smedley D. 8 5 Camp Colt, Pennsylvania 56 Camp Dix. New Jersey 88 Camp Lee.Virginia I I Camp Upton , New York 38. 4 1.62 Camp bell. I st li eut enant Douglas 15 Cantigny. batt le of (May 28, 1918) 64. 65-70. 68 . 7+- 75 Case rne de Damremon r 27 C astcln au. Gene ral Noel Marie Joseph Edward de Cueiere s de 17 Char levaux Mill 40 Chateau- Thierry 70 Cbaucbat light machine guns 79 Chaudun 7 1 Cte me nceau. Georges 17 Coeuvres 70. 14 Coffman. Edward 38 Coleman. Ist Lieutenant Wm . O . 69 Colored Officers Tra ining Camp. Des Moines

62 Colt .45 pistols 79 Colyer. Sergeant Wilbur 6 1 Compiegne Fo rest 70 Co nne r. Brigadier Gene ral Fo x 9.20.25. 28. 89 Cra ig. Brigadier Gen eral MOllin 23 , )0, 88 Cravant;o n Farm 7 1 Cullison. Lieutenant Colone l j.M. 67 Cu rtiss IN-4 tra ining aircraft 82 Davis. Brigadier Ge nera l 28 Dawes. Charles G. 28 Dickman, Majo r Ge neral joseph T. 20.22.23. 85 career 23 Downer; Lieutenant Colonel john W. 69 Doye n. Brigadier Genera l Charles A II Dra in. Majo r jame s A 57 DrIll Small Arms and Field Service 14 Drum . Brigadier Genera l Hugh 22

95

Edwards. Major General Cla ren ce 36, 38. 38 Eisenhower, Lieutenant Colonel Dw ight S6 Eltinge . Brigadier General 28 Ely. Maior General Hanso n 10. 66. 67 Enfie ld rifles 78-79 Escadr ille Lafayette 74

Field Service Regulations, / 914 10, 63, 64 field signal projecto r lamp 26 Fiske, Brigadier Ge neral Haro ld B. I I. 12. 13-1 4, IS. 18. 20.28 Foch, Marshal Fer d inand 29.36, 6S. 84 Fokker,Anthony 74 Fo rd, Bert 38 Fo rd Moto r Co mpany 8 3 Fo rt Benjamin Ha rr iso n. Ind iana 12 Fo rt De s Mo ines. Iow a 12 Fort Devens , Massachusetts 36 Fo rt Leavenworth. Kansas 6 Fo rt Sheridan. Illino is 12 Fe r-sam (Fren ch commander) 75 Fo ulois. Brigadier General Benjam in D. 29. 51 French Army XX Corps 70 26th French Divisio n, Chasseurs Alpins 5 t rainingofA EF 12-1 5 Garrison . Lindley M. 19.20 Garros, Ro land 74 General O rganizat io n Pro ject (GOP) 56 Germany. occupation of by U5 fo rce s 85 Goethals. Major General George W. 59-60 Gcwentc ck. Major T.R. 84 Graham, Ist Lieutenant Jo hn R. 7 1 Har bo rd. Majo r G eneral James G . 19. 20. 21. 28.57.59.60. 62. 82. 85 Hills. 2d Lieutenant E.E. 69 Hines. Brigadier G eneral Joh n L 70,88 Ho ffman, Brigadier General Roy 62 Hotchkiss, Be njam in 79 Ho use. Colonel Edward 84 howitzers 8o-B I. 80 Huebner. Lieutenant Colon el Claren ce Ralph 66. 66 In(awy 0 ,,11 Regulations, 19 / 1 10, 63 influenza epid emic (19 18) 88 Issoudun flying field 28

Kenly. Major Genera l William L. 82 Kernan. Majo r Ge neral Francis J. 59 King. Colonel Campbell 36 Krag-jorgensen rifles 78

96

Lane, Captain M.H. 84 Langres 15,56, 57 lanham, Captai n M.W. 85 Laversine 70 Lawton. Majo r Ge neral Henry W. 36 l ewis. Isaac 79 "Ubert y" engines 83 Liggett.. Majo r General Hunte r I I. 20. 21. 22. 30. ) 6. 38 . 40. 62 . 64 Line of C ommunicat io ns (LOC) 57 Logan. Major Gen era l John 5 l ongavesne 70 l orraine front 16. 17

McAdo o,W illiam 81 McAnd rew. Colonel James A. 15 McA ndrew. Majo r General James W. 18, 20. 28 . 36. 75 MacA rth ur. Colonel Douglas 11-12, 22 McGlachlin. Majo r Gen eral Edwa rd F. 29, 84 , 85 McHenry. Private He rbert l. 11, 78,79. 80 machine guns 79. 19 Malo ne. Br igadie r General Paul B. 10 . 12, 20 March. General Peyto n Co nway 20. 23 . 34,56.

59 career 23 Marr. Captain Kenne th 75 Marshall. Brigadie r General Fra ncis C. 84 Marshall, Lieu t enant C o lo nel George C. 17. 20.22. 25- 26. 36.60. 65.66. 70. 75. 88 Marty. General (French Army ) 85 Maxey. Lieute nant Colonel Rober t J. 66 Maxim. H ira m 79 Meuse -A rgo nne camp aign co mmun icatio ns 25--26 US offensive on (September 26. 1918) 40, 60. 11 use o f tanks 75 Midvale Ste el and Ordnance Company 8 1 Mjfle tt..Allan 65 Missy-aux-Bo is ravine 7 1 Mitche ll, Lie ut enant C o lo nel William " Billy" 5 1 Mo seley, Brigadier G ene ral G eorge Van Ho rn 28 . 81 Nath ncss, Captain Albe rt 71 Nat io nal Defe nse Act ( 19 16) 7. I I. 27 Natio nal Defense Act (1920) 89 Natio nal Guard 11,3 2,36.38 Ne nninge r.Timot hy 23,65 N eufchat eau )0 N ew York parade (September 10,19 19) 89 Nolan . Brigadier General 28 "o pen warfare " 63-64 Onenfeld. Private Max 84. 8 7 O verman Act ( 1918) 20 Packa rd Motor Car C om pa ny 83 Palmer, lieutenant Colonel Jo hn McAuley 5.

27 Par ker. Brigadier General Frank 22.5 6.70. 70.

84 Patch, Major Jose ph Do rst I I . 70. 7 1. 79 Patr ick. Majo r G en eral Maso n N. 5 1. 6 0 Patt o n. Lieute nant Colonel George S. 14 , 56, 57. 75. 89 Pershing. General John J. S. 6 , 7. 9. 2 2. 2 8.

63 and the armistice 84 at Cantigny 65 career 6 character 6, 20-2 1 as commander-in-chief o f AEF 8.20-21 on prepa rations for war 9 reputat io n 88 tactics 63-64 on tanks 56 on t raining 10, 14- 15. 15-16. 18, 63 Peta in, Mar shal Hen ri 22 , 29. 64. 84 pigeon co uriers 25-26 Platts burg Barracks, Ne w Yo rk 12 Pr ince . Sergea nt W.B. 23

Pullen. Lieutenant Colonel Daniel 57 Punitive Expedit io n ( 19 16) 34,36,82 Read. Majo r General George W. 64 rec ruiting posters 25 Rickenbackcr; l st Lieutenant E.v. 7S Rockenbach. Brigadier General Samuel D. 56. 56 . 57, 75 Roos evelt, li e ute nant Q uent in: grave of 74 Ro osevelt Jr., lieutenant Colonel Theo do re 84 Roque nco urt 70 Rozelle , Majo r George F. 67 Ryan.j ohn D. 82. 82 St. Mihie l campaign 29. 3 1, 60 26 th D ivisio n at 38 Patton's use of ar mor at 57,75, 76 School o(A viation atVineuil (Henri Farre) 17 School o f the line 6 SCOtt. Majo r General Hugh L 8, 8. 10. 20 Sedan 22 Selective Serv ice Act ( 19 17) 7. I I Sharp. W illiam G . 1 Shirey. Lieutenant Guy 36 Sibert, Maior General William l. 17,3 6 Scissons campaign 2 1-22,25, 70-71. 74 Span ish--American War ( 1898) 30 Staff C o llege, Fo rt l eavenwo rt h 6 Standard Aero Corporation J- I training aircraft

82 Summ er all, Majo r General Ch arles P. 21- 22. 65-66. 69.70. 1 1. 88 Suprem e War Council 27.84 Swanker, Sergeant 25 Swinton. Sir Ernest 56 tables of crganiaatio n and equipment (TO &E)

27 ta nks Mark VIII" Libert y" 57 Renault light 14 . 3 1, 56 te legr aph trailers 26 Tours 57-58 trench w arfare 63-64 Upto n. Emo ry 5 US Army le ssons learned from the war 88-89 na ture of 4-5. 7 regulars 11. 32 tactics 6 ) US Railroad Admin istra tion 8 1 Valdahon 12. 18 ve sle River 29. 38. 40.70 Vickers Company 81 VigneulJes 38 The Volunteer Soldier in America (Log
Command. deployme nt, o rganizat ion and evolut ion o f forces in battle. de scribing e lements of doctrine, t raining, t act ics and equipmen t

The American Expeditio nary Forces in World War I Upon th e entry of th e United States int o World War I, th e

-0 - - '001

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X X X

•

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American Expeditionary Forces (AEF) were created by th e War

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existi ng units, filled up with men

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from the training camps and deployed with only their personal Organizational diagrams

Photographs

weapons and equipme nt. The US Army was not prepared for combat in France, and th e remarkable achi evem ent of th e AEF's commanding officer, John

J. Pershing, was the creation of an American field army , built and nurtured from the bott om up . This book detail s th e organi zat ion al structure , training and doctrine of th e AEF, and illustrates how it cam to make a significant co ntribution

Detailed color maps

OSPREY PUB LISHI NG www .o sprc ypuhl i sh in g .c ol11

Illustrations

to Allied victory in World War I.

ISBN 1- 8 4 17 6 - 6 22 -4

III II IIII

9 7818 4 1 766 225