Taming the Regulatory State: Politics and Ethics

Taming the Regulatory State

Taming the Regulatory State Politics and Ethics

Noralv Veggeland Professor of Social Science, Centre for Public Policy Innovation, Lillehammer University College, Norway and Former Director of the Nordic Regional Research Institute, Copenhagen/Stockholm

Edward Elgar Cheltenham, UK • Northampton, MA, USA

© Noralv Veggeland 2009 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical or photocopying, recording, or otherwise without the prior permission of the publisher. Published by Edward Elgar Publishing Limited The Lypiatts 15 Lansdown Road Cheltenham Glos GL50 2JA UK Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc. William Pratt House 9 Dewey Court Northampton Massachusetts 01060 USA

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Control Number: 2009921837

ISBN 978 1 84844 423 2 Printed and bound by MPG Books Group, UK

Contents List of figures List of tables Preface Acknowledgements

viii ix x xii

1.

The arrival of the regulatory state – and its exit? 1.1 Introduction 1.2 The regulatory state: risk and policy style 1.3 Majone’s concept of the regulatory state 1.4 Summary

1 1 8 11 15

2.

Political economy: the background of the regulatory state 2.1 Taming principles of the pre-Keynesian state 2.2 Contrasting a monetarist perspective: the political economy of the interventionist Keynesian state 2.3 In the shadow of the international stagflation crisis 2.4 Explanatory approaches to the crisis of Keynesian economics 2.5 The regulatory state and neo-Schumpeterianism

17 17

Post-stagflation management strategies 3.1 The ‘four Ms’ strategies 3.2 New social-institutional paradigms: ‘miniature governments’? 3.3 New social-institutional paradigm creates risks that require taming 3.4 OECD reports change in trends 3.5 The political economy of the independent regulatory agencies and authorities

43 43

Taming vulnerability and organizational dynamics 4.1 Internationalization, mutual dependence and vulnerability: ‘spillover’ processes 4.2 Dependence, vulnerability and sensitivity 4.3 The search for security and safety

60

3.

4.

v

22 26 34 37

47 51 54 58

60 65 68

vi

Taming the regulatory state

4.4 4.5 4.6

Welfare-state security and risks The European social-capital trade-offs European traditions of governance and trade-offs

71 74 76

The regulatory state: how democratic is it? 5.1 Administrative reform 5.2 The administrative reform of subsidiarity 5.3 Deliberate vagueness for political purposes 5.4 Two hypotheses 5.5 State formation and administrative traditions 5.6 The notions of distributed public governance within the framework of subsidiarity

80 80 80 82 85 87

6.

Social capital in the regulatory state: Nordic lessons 6.1 Flexicurity 6.2 Partnership, social capital and innovation 6.3 A comparison of social models 6.4 The value of collective action and three orders of change 6.5 Transcending social capital of the Nordic type 6.6 The threat of non-maintenance

99 99 99 101 104 106 108

7.

Regionalization in the regulatory state 7.1 Continental European regionalization 7.2 Anglo-Saxon European regionalization 7.3 Nordic European regionalization: the Norwegian case 7.4 Conclusions

110 110 112 114 117

8.

Cross-border regionalization in the regulatory states of the North 8.1 Cross-border issues do matter 8.2 Competition and cohesion 8.3 Other problems of governance 8.4 The regions of the EFTA countries 8.5 Understanding the Europeanization of regional policy 8.6 Regulating cross-border sustainability in the far North

121 121 122 125 126 129 131

5.

9.

A case of regulatory taming in Norway: from Government Petroleum Fund to Ethical Pension Fund – Global 9.1 The Norwegian petroleum sector 9.2 The regulatory order of the Norwegian petroleum sector 9.3 From Government Petroleum Fund to Government Pension Fund

91

139 139 142 145

Contents

9.4 9.5 9.6

Ethical guidelines for the Norwegian Government Pension Fund – Global Vulnerability and risk analysis of the Norwegian Pension Fund – Global Conclusions

References Appendix 1: Ethical guidelines Appendix 2: Top 25 global funds Index

vii

148 151 154 157 171 175 177

Figures 2.1 The structure of the Keynesian state 2.2 Rate of profit on capital in the company sector in the UK, 1955–71 2.3 Curves illustrating the development of crisis trade-offs affecting the Keynesian state 2.4 Demand-side, supply-side and monetarist policies constitute the regulatory state 2.5 The rate of interest with a dynamic central bank (CB) as the regulatory instrument of the monetarist economy 3.1 Trends in independent regulatory authorities in OECD countries, measured by percentage of civil servants working in independent agencies 3.2 A simplified version of Derek Gill’s illustration, specifying only institutional, legal and financial features that apply to the executive bodies involved 3.3 Scharpf’s Law illustrating exponential growth over time of transactional costs because of extensive coordination and control functions 5.1 Institutions of the new democracy 8.1 The growth pattern of transactional costs 8.2 The Euro-Arctic Barents Region includes the Barents Sea and its highly valuable natural resources 8.3 The counties of the Barents region 9.1 Net cash flow from Norwegian petroleum and pension expenditure (in per cent of GDP) 9.2 The Norwegian pension fund mechanisms

viii

24 28 28 30 32

48

49

57 94 126 131 133 141 142

Tables 1.1 Interventionist and regulatory modes of governance 5.1 Basic historical transformations of the term ‘democracy’ 6.1 The deviant Nordic model: public outlays, taxes and employment in the context of European social models 9.1 The Government Pension Fund – Global; key figures in billions 9.2 Companies considered to have violated the ethical regulations and consequently excluded from the investment universe, 2002–08

ix

16 91 103 141

152

Preface The current international financial crisis, characterized by national financial institutions being on shaky ground, is most likely to be followed by a global economic recession. This means decreasing investments, less trade, increasing unemployment and social imbalances. In the wake of the crisis Central Banks are specifying tax codes down to the last decimal point, and governments are again pumping tax payers’ money into private enterprises to save them from closing down. What we can observe are new political strategies and policy priorities breaking with the traditional concept of the contemporary regulatory state. This book looks into the background of these new developments. The contemporary regulatory state has developed as a result of political struggles that accompanied an increasingly globalized world and is a response to the serious international economic crisis that began in the 1970s. Recent analyses have focused on national and international regulatory measures like laws, partnerships, agreements and contracts as solutions to the challenge of taming risks and vulnerability caused by new global regimes. These measures are indeed important because of the necessities of regulating international market competition, of responding to institutional fragmentation caused by New Public Management reforms and of meeting global environmental challenges. However, in the wake of the implementations of these measures threats to democracy do arise. The interpretation of democracy as governance by the people has been overshadowed by the one of democracy as governance for the people. It is easily forgotten that the concept of governance by the people entails accountability and trust established by politics and ethics, which contribute to the stabilization of the polity as a whole. In this book, I try to demonstrate critically that the regulatory state is inherently vulnerable because of one-sided economic thinking and the dominance of steering by regulation. The technocratic implementation of policies dominates, and politics and ethics are not really part of the regulatory governance paradigm. From a historical perspective, I have found the roots both in classical economic theory and in institutional path-dependence, which to some extent, I believe, explains the present order. This book draws on many different theoretical and data resources. With respect to the latter, OECD data has been central for the comparative x

Preface

xi

analyses. I have also used the Norwegian Pension Fund (international Norwegian petroleum investment fund) as a case of an investment fund that adheres to ethical guidelines (Chapter 9). Data from the Norwegian government has also been essential.

Acknowledgements Over the years many people have contributed to my knowledge and thinking about the arrival of the contemporary regulatory state and its strengths and vulnerabilities from a political and ethical perspective. My stay as a visiting professor at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst, at the Center for Public Policy Administration (CPPA), in 2006 was particularly significant. There I profited greatly from the opportunity to study the principles of the regulatory state, both in theory and practice. My special thanks go to Professor Eric S. Einhorn at the CPPA for generously offering his time to discuss and advise on these issues. I should also like to express my gratitude to my colleagues at the University College of Lillehammer, Centre of Public Policy Innovation (CPPI). Further, I am obliged to the head of the University College’s library, Sigbjørn Hernes, and to D.Phil. candidate, Steven Connolley, for very important and helpful technical assistance. Last but not least, my deepest appreciation goes to my wife Unni for bearing with my use of spare time at home for the purposes of research so often.

Noralv Veggeland Lillehammer, August 2008

xii

1. 1.1

The arrival of the regulatory state – and its exit? INTRODUCTION

What does regulation mean with regard to the contemporary polity? Under the heading of ‘The Rise of the Regulatory State in Europe’, Giandomenico Majone has offered one succinct answer: ‘Privatisation and deregulation have created the conditions for the rise of the regulatory state to replace the dirigiste state of the past’ (1994: 77). He continued to explain that, ‘Reliance on regulation – rather than public ownership, planning or centralised administration – characterises the methods of the regulatory state’. Other scholars have formulated a wider definition with reference to societal values. Phillip Selznick has, for instance, provided an understanding of regulation that is of particular relevance to this book. He states that the central meaning of regulation ‘refers to sustained and focused control exercised by a public agency over activities that are valued by a community’ (Selznick 1985: 363). According to Selznick, the emphasis on valued communal activities is important because the regulatory effort helps to uphold public standards, ethics and norms. Thus, in its widest sense, we may define regulation as the totality of all mechanisms of social protection and control (Jordana and Levi-Faur 2004: 3). We may, however, differentiate these mechanisms. In our context, there are four explanatory conceptions of regulation that can be put forward (Baldwin et al. 1998): 1. 2. 3. 4.

Law-directed conception: regulation as authoritative rules. Economics-directed conception: regulation as efforts of state agencies to manage the economy. Politics-directed conception: regulation as mechanisms of steering and democratic control. Sustainability-directed conception: regulation as a mean to handle environment threats and the ‘risk society of the new modernity’ (Beck 1992).

1

2

Taming the regulatory state

These conceptions articulated by Baldwin et al. point to an evolution from a narrow, judicial notion of regulation to a much broader one that accounts, both in theory and practice, for values and agreed normative actions. In the regulatory state, the concepts of regulation as authoritative rules and agreed normative action lead to the important distinction between ‘hard regulation’ and ‘soft regulation’. Hard regulation requires legal actions and mechanisms of enforcement to bring about adherence and sanctions when there is a failure to comply (May 2002). On the other hand, the use of soft regulation is sometimes viewed as regulation through persuasion and deliberative discourse, with agreement being the preferred outcome (Streeck 1995; Amdam and Veggeland 1998). Soft regulation both turns to deliberative solutions (McGowan and Wallace 1996) and allows that commitments made between parties are not strictly legally binding, which give actors more leeway regarding how to achieve regulatory goals and development objectives (Mörth 2004). The soft-regulatory strand comprises guidelines with various forms of encouragements to achieve desired outcomes, but this approach means that the rules can be different, for example, across national borders, as long as it is possible to determine that the rules fulfil some common objectives that are agreed upon in a satisfactory way. This is deliberately agreement-based regulation, which the European Union has termed ‘the open method of coordination’ since the launching of the Lisbon Process in 2000. Shortly formulated, soft regulation connotes the following (Veggeland and Elvestad 2008): ● ● ● ● ●

Deliberative work on identifying both the ‘best solutions’ and the ‘best practices’. An approach based on the exchange of information and the sharing of development programmes. Mutual confidence and some sort of compatibility between regulatory systems. A high degree of institutional interaction between regulators.1 The foundation of the networking and partnership-building society (Castells 1996; Veggeland 2003).

The wider concept of regulation indicates two basic claims, namely, the organizational change of public institutions and the making of embracing agreements and control arrangements as the conditions for the rise of the regulatory state. Reliance on regulation – rather than on public ownership, planning or bureaucratic administration – indicates that the methods of this form of state bias the minimizing and/or marketizing of the public

The arrival of the regulatory state – and its exit?

3

sector that would then be followed by regulatory governance (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004). The latter indicates a shift of the traditional governmental apparatus to a variety of New Public Management (NPM) institutional and structural forms, which are often contextually bound to social models and administrative traditions that interpret regulatory measures differently (Knill 2001; Cassese 2003; Djelic 2006). Lastly, this wider concept indicates that there is an aspect of political economy to this regulatory state method, namely the institutionalreplacement element of this method, mentioned in the quotation by Majone above (1994). According to Selznick (1985) the goal of this method is to achieve what is ‘valued by a community’. However, if we are to be able to say whether or not institutional replacements and innovations have led to what is valued, we need certain criteria and guidelines by which we can assess success or failure. Besides, as we advance towards a new modernity, indications of general consequences from transformed social-institutional paradigms imply new social risks (Taylor-Gooby 2004). How might we avoid regulations that generate vulnerability and counteract the risks, that is, how to tame the regulatory state? What does a community value and what can a community consider to be either a success or a failure, or likewise ethically good or bad? This book aims to address these vital questions by employing an exploratory and critical perspective. Such an approach for the study of the arrival and the rise of the contemporary regulatory state should contain these six elements: ● ● ● ● ● ●

Basic conditions and an analysis of political economy. Methods and mechanisms. Social models and administrative traditions. Institutions and structural replacements. Basic institutional impacts. Efforts, criteria and guidelines, which help to tame the regulatory state and uphold public standards and good governance (Olsen 2005).

Certainly, the commencement of the regulatory state meant an embracing of institutional innovation in the Western world (Veggeland 1999, 2008). This book views innovation not only as the application of new institutional solutions to new international and national economic problems, which arose in the wake of the 1970s stagflation crisis, but also partly as new solutions to old problems, for example, overloaded public budgets and the hollowing-out of government (McCracken et al. 1977). Accordingly, regulatory innovation is here understood as sustained attempts by governmental institutions to alter the behaviour of others

4

Taming the regulatory state

indirectly through law, standards, goals, partnerships and contracts, and also through creating new implementing and controlling institutions and bodies. Contextually, we are here talking about the methods of regulatory governance, the use of the principles and measures of New Public Management (NPM), Market-Type Mechanisms (MTMs), arm’s-length bodies in the public sector and legal control (Lane 2000; OECD 2002). These mechanisms and bodies need either to be established by taking advantage of de-regulation or to be controlled and tamed by re-regulation. Innovations with regard to new institutions, which characterize the regulatory state order, are new benchmarking institutions, quality-securing and output-measuring systems, judiciary powers, surveillance agencies and not least the independent central bank. The last was organized as a governmental arm’s-length body in the framework of a non-Weberian bureaucratic and non-interventionist style (van Waarden 1995; Veggeland 2004). Another significant part of this style and of the regulatory state is the monetarist economic regime, which authorizes the independent central bank to regulate the flow of money in the macro-economy (Friedman 1962; Stewart 1972). The central bank regulates profits, investments and wages in a supply-side directed economy through decisions on interest rates and currency measures, with the view of balancing inflation and aggregated employment. The parliament sets the upper and lower limits for the inflation rate but is excluded from the implementation of its own decisions; the bank is responsible for their execution. The driving forces behind the methods of regulatory governance are the intentions to enhance the ability to compete more effectively in the global age, to produce tangible outcomes and to reduce risks – all of which involve mechanisms of standards-setting, information-gathering, benchmarking and behaviour-modification in an increasingly vulnerable society (Beck 1992; Black 2005). National implementations of the methods of the regulatory state neither necessarily create convergent developments nor necessarily reduce risks. The methods as organizational ideas in general become influenced by path-dependent interpretations and become diversified. This tendency occurs because of different European social models and administrative traditions, which change the contextual framework and thereby the ideas themselves (Røvik 2007). It is often said that changes of social-institutional paradigms always have backgrounds marked by crises. Crises in the techno-economic system affect especially deeply the institutional orders, just as the stagflation crisis of the 1970s did (March and Olsen 1989). We shall return to this crisis later, but I shall for now mention that, at this stage, new techno-economic crises seem to arise without our knowing much about their socio-institutional impact; such knowledge occurs first in the aftermath.

The arrival of the regulatory state – and its exit?

5

One actual coming crisis appears to be the sharp rise globally of food prices, in particular, the prices of rice, corn and grain, which have risen up to 50–100 per cent and more. People who are very dependent on such staple foods and live in poor countries tend to be deeply and adversely affected, and it is not at all surprising that these conditions lead to turbulence. Hence, we see extensive rioting and upheavals in many countries around the world these days. What has happened? We can find one main reason for the rising prices of food, and therewith the crisis, in certain changes within the actual techno-economic system. Around the world, cultivated land for food production has been transformed into land for the production of biofuels. The motivation behind this change in production has been the fear of an imminent global warming caused by the increase of atmospheric carbon dioxide due to the extensive use of fossil fuels. The economist Erik S. Reinert (2008) has recently introduced a noteworthy approach to the food crisis. He contextualizes the current food crisis by referring it to the simple exchange economy that exists among certain indigenous people living in the Pacific. Fish, vegetables, fruits and ordinary, everyday utilities were exchanged in a different system from the exchange system of prestigious items, like canoes or jewellery. Exchanges of the latter items were protected by ceremonies and could not, in fact, be obtained through the exchange of food. Until recently such a divide existed also in Western economies – food markets were divided from energy markets. But the global economy has broken this taboo of division: bio-fuels, destined for the rich part of the world and its relentless consumption of luxury, compete directly with the food resources of the poorest. It disturbs ethical values negatively and challenges politics. Altogether, what we are witnessing is a crisis arising out of technological replacement and thereby substantial changes in the system of economic exchange, and this in turn heavily influences the socio-institutional order worldwide. Further, in the first half of the year 2008, the contemporary regulatory state seems to have been threatened by a new type of international economic crisis that has come in the wake of neo-classical liberalism, a crisis involving especially the US but one with mounting and dire economic consequences across the globe. The US has based its economy on uncontrolled private consumption, matched with high military expenditures and a gigantic national economic deficit, resulting in an enormous increase in foreign debt. The stock markets are shaky, banks are withdrawing investments, and private-property owners are not managing to maintain their loan payments. This loan-driven domestic economy is out of order. And worse, these developments debilitate monetarist manoeuvres to regulate the economy, as Le Monde diplomatique pointed out (March 2008; Norwegian edition, quotations below translated into English by the author).

6

Taming the regulatory state

Frédéric Lordon, economist and the author of Et la vertu sauvera le monde Après la débâcle financière, le salut par l’« éthique »? (And virtue is going to save the world . . . After the financial catastrophe, the salvation by ‘ethics’?) (2003) gives this introduction to the character of the new crisis in the techno-economic system of the regulatory state, taking the US situation, where it initially started, into consideration (Lordon 2008: 1): It is a clear sign of the (new) economic crisis when news, normally promising, turn out to be understood as bad news. At the moment when what the news usually took for good was immediately taken to be bad, the gravity of the crisis was known. Did not the US Federal Reserve (The Fed) lower its interest rate several times? That is never enough. The Fed announced, on December 12th 2007, in co-operation with the other major central banks, an enlargement in its procedures for refinancing hitherto unheard of. That was because the situation was worse than one could imagine. On January 17th 2008, its chairman, Mr Ben Bernanke, spoke in favour of a budgetary increase for economic intervention – an unprecedented move. The Fed, having depleted its margins for manoeuvring, has thus asked the government to take over. And as the first act of a comedy, President George W. Bush announces and makes available a package reflecting Bernanke’s suggestion. When these two men stand together on the scene in the same play, it indicates that the problems we are faced with are alarming. And, as though it were nothing but the first act of a rather heavily orchestrated comedy, Mr George W. Bush then announced that from the next day there would be a stimulation package almost exactly fitting the ‘suggestions’ of the central bank – if those two have coordinated that sort of sketch, it is because the hour seems dark . . . That neo-classical economic measures do not work is the most clear and upsetting sign indicating that the economy is out of control. The economy reacts almost not at all on the monetarist policy manoeuvres (and when it at a certain point reacts it happens totally unconditionally).

Such a departure from the formulas of classical monetarist economy is the most spectacular sign of the depths of confusion over the economy, which no longer responds, or responds erratically, to guidance by monetarist policy. Lordon predicts a crack in purchasing power caused by deficit-budgeting policy, a feature of a loan-driven, supply-side, monetarist economy. He writes (Lordon 2008: 3): Actually, the mechanism is simple to understand. The liberal model flatters itself that it has the solutions to its own problems. For the shortcomings in the consumption intrinsic to a competitive wage–price regime, it is quite clearly evident what is recommended: debt! If purchasing power of households stagnates or regresses, but the investors clamour nonetheless for domestic markets, what is more logical than to extend credit in order to increase the capacity to spend beyond wages? One should not be surprised that in the US and the UK, which are more ‘advanced’ than France in this trend, the rate of household debt in relation to disposable income is 120 and 140 per cent respectively.

The arrival of the regulatory state – and its exit?

7

The prediction given by Lordon has in late 2008 become a reality and will most likely worsen in the near future. What should the counteracting governmental measures be, besides more national and international regulations? According to Lordon there is a need for a regulatory ethical approach in order to tame and rescue Western supply-side economics from a sizable recession. There is much to the notion of ethics viewed as part of economic policy and dynamics, even if it has for the most part been overlooked. Certainly, as we shall see below, ethics was neither part of the Keynesianinvestment and effective-demand policy nor part of the Schumpeterian, market-driven idea of ‘creative-destruction’ that spurs economic growth. But in the thinking about revitalizing modes of welfare-state economies since the 1970s, ethics in the sense of favouring social equality and security as basic for good economic governance, along with the fight against corruption, has come into much greater focus (Taylor-Gooby 2004; Iversen 2005; Veggeland 2007). In the petroleum-producing state of Norway, revenues from the production are put into a fund for investment abroad. In 2004, the government took action in order to regulate this investment fund, and the Storting (the Norwegian Parliament) adopted ethical guidelines to help ensure the integrity of the investments of the ‘Government Petroleum Fund’. Two years later, the government renamed this fund the ‘Government Pension Fund – Global’, reflecting a socio-institutional change guided with intentions. In Chapter 9 we shall review this case further. We are not going to elaborate further at this stage the ethical approach to international deficit and the loan-driven economic crisis. Let it suffice for now that the inclination towards crisis, which disturbs and threatens the balance of the international stock market, raises the inflation and unemployment rates in dominant OECD countries such as the US and the UK – a well-known phenomenon from the 1970s and 1980s once again, but this time under new techno-economic conditions (McCracken et al. 1977). It is understandable at this point, however, that there has not yet been much scholarly reflection regarding the eventual socio-institutional impacts and political aspects of this new crisis; predictions about such impacts are now for the most part absent. What we shall examine in this book are historical crises, changes and risks that have led to the arrival of this now threatened regulatory state and also the mechanisms and aspects constituting the challenges that this kind of state faces. We shall also analyse both which mechanisms threaten the socio-institutional balance and which are supposed to have taming or moderating effects (Iversen and Wren 1998; Held and Koening-Archibugi 2003; Veggeland 2004, 2007; Iversen 2005).

8

1.2

Taming the regulatory state

THE REGULATORY STATE: RISK AND POLICY STYLE

Let us first discuss the origins of the regulatory socio-institutional mode of state formation (Dyson 1980; Osborne and Gaebler 1993). Topdown national state intervention – that is, macroeconomic stabilization, income redistribution, market regulation and central public planning – characterized the dominant model of central planning in Western states during the first two decades after the Second World War. Institutions, which were organized hierarchically due to Weberian bureaucratic structure, implemented policies. Economic growth in the Western countries was strong, and their national economies were relatively closed. Bureaucratic control and public ownership were important elements of the state regulation. The power of the government was little disputed indeed (Majone 1996; Millward 2000). The international economic crisis beginning in the 1970s led to a demand for new forms of governance that would centralize planning and management. The new model of governance in the public domain that arose was dominated by neo-liberal ideas calling for increased competition in the market and in the public sector, welfare reforms and deregulation (Friedmann 1987; Majone 1997). Management by objectives replaced bureaucratic control, and frameworks of deregulation have been regarded as the most characteristic trait in this model. Paradoxically, this period also introduced an incredible increase in the number of new regulations and the extension of regulative policies, which also reached new areas. This expansion occurred both on national and European (EU) levels (Hooghe and Marks 2001; Moran 2003; Tranøy 2006). Yet, this paradox was no more than apparent: the traditional forms of regulation, planning, and control collapsed under the pressure of both new technological advances and new economic and ideological forces arising out of globalization. This process has been called deregulation, but the concept is used in such a manner that it creates the wrong impression. There has definitely not been any reduction in public regulation in the direction of laissez-faire. Instead, what has taken place is the implementation of policies based on a combination of deregulation and re-regulation on different levels of policies and management, with deregulation for the purpose of meeting the demands of the new market and reregulation for market-correcting objectives and the promotion of human, social and environmental rights (Scharpf 1999). In short, new forms of top-down planning and regulation have replaced the old ones. These new forms are also growing at a quicker rate than that of the removal of their predecessors (Majone 1997).

The arrival of the regulatory state – and its exit?

9

Generally regulation defines governmental or state interference with market and socio-cultural processes. However, we should do well at this stage to define more accurately the term ‘risk regulation’ because it is a part of a rather complex web of policy concepts. There are at least two approaches to the term: a risk approach (Beck 1992; ‘The Risk Society’) and an institutional style approach (Majone 1994; ‘The Regulatory State’). 1. The risk approach: For our purposes, the term may refer to two different policies: either a differentiated, technical, particular case-orientated policy aimed at the reduction of risk and problem-solving actions or an institutional change-orientated policy that inadvertently creates new risks and negative externalities (Taylor-Gooby 2004). Examples of the latter might be the increasing transactional costs as a repercussion of governmental fragmentation (Scharpf 1997) or increasing vulnerability because of expanding international interdependence and the network economy (Pierson 2001). 2. The institutional-style approach: This approach refers to the emergence of a state role as regulator, which has advanced rapidly since the 1970s (Majone 1997, 2003). The traditional roles of the state as direct employer, property owner and service producer have since then declined through privatization and arm’s-length agencies and bodies. The use of regulatory measures entails both indirect state governance and the creation of new regulatory institutions. The institutional style of the regulatory state as such consists of organizational policy, the creation of adaptive agencies and bodies, and legal surveillance and control policy – policies as a whole that aim to extend the regulatory state order of institutions and mechanisms (Beetham et al. 2002). This book takes a perspective on the regulatory state that excludes technical particularities, that is, case-orientated regulations, the type described and examined admirably by Hood et al. (2004: 37). To make clear what sort of risks are excluded in this analysis, let us quote nine risk cases (of course, we could have added other cases): 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

Attacks by dangerous dogs outside the home. Lung cancer caused by emissions of radon gas from the ground or building materials in the home and in the workplace. Cancer from emissions of benzene from vehicle exhaust or other sources and also from workplace exposures. Attacks on children from convicted paedophiles released from prison into community.

10

7. 8. 9.

Taming the regulatory state

Injuries and deaths from motor vehicles on local roads, in so far as these can be abstracted from road safety regulation more generally. Adverse health-effects from exposure to pesticide residues in food and in drinking water.

This book examines risks and how to moderate them in a political and ethical perspective, with those analytical partitions and the following as points of departure: A) B)

C)

D)

Institutional, change-orientated, regulatory policy of intention creates unintended new risks and negative externalities. Institutional style of the regulatory state comprises organizational change policy, the creation of adaptive arm’s-length agencies and bodies, and connected legal surveillance and control policy. Both the inclination towards institutional risk and policies that seek socio-economic security represent a combination that figures as a major driving force behind the regulatory growth, for example, in the development of the numerous EU regulations (Scharpf 1997; Veggeland 2007). A policy for taming the regulatory state generates a wide range of new regulations, ethical and ‘soft’ regulations as well as legal and ‘hard’ regulations.

Part of this framework for regulatory policy is the global network economy, which means increasing international competition (Castells 1996; Meyer 2000). In the wake of the arising network economy, at least two characteristic features have appeared that require regulation. A new organization of enterprises, often termed the ‘post-Fordist’ style, emerged in the 1970s and began to dominate the industrial sector. Smaller networking enterprise entities were made competitive through customized and flexible specialization (Storper and Scott 1992; Amin 1994). Trade with services across borders increased heavily and pulled public services into global markets. This pushed the latter sector towards organizational reforms that featured fragmentation and the principles of New Public Management, as well as the establishment of arm’s-length bodies in order to target competitiveness (Veggeland 2003; Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004). These two things created – and continue to create – on the one hand, an increasing need for international market enlargements through deregulation, and, on the other hand, the need to re-regulate for a host of different reasons, such as the correction of market imperfections, the steering of actors through regulatory means, agreements, contracts, regulatory consumer protection, sustainability, and so on.

The arrival of the regulatory state – and its exit?

11

The regulatory state enjoyed a high state of legitimacy in Europe towards the end of the twentieth century. It was visible, among other things, in the political changes in many European countries. In the 1990s, elected social-democratic governments replaced market-liberal governments of the 1980s, as in the UK and Scandinavia. Social-democratic parties have traditionally distanced themselves, both ideologically and politically, from the liberal and conservative parties, and have placed a greater emphasis on public planning and regulatory control (Giddens 1998).

1.3

MAJONE’S CONCEPT OF THE REGULATORY STATE

Giandomenico Majone has called the new institutional form of state, which appeared at the end of the 1970s and continues to expand to this day, ‘the regulatory state’. He considered the European Union a prime example of this form of state (Majone 1990, 2003). The form is characterized ideologically by neo-liberalism, institutionally by frenetic innovation inclination (Moran 2003; Black et al. 2005), and socially by anti-interventionism and liberal welfare reforms (Iversen 2005; Veggeland 2007). Characteristic traits of the new form of state include the deregulation of markets and the decentralization of steering capacity, together with ever more networking abilities and multi-level governance. Equally important for our purposes is Majone’s (1990) identification of the paradoxical development that has accompanied this period that features much talk about deregulation and a market orientation: there has been the dominant tendency towards the growth of a comprehensive policy of regulation and strategic planning on all tiers: the European, national and regional levels. On reflection, this is not so surprising. Traditional forms of regulation and control, inherited from the interventionist state, have broken down in the face of powerful technological, economic and ideological forces, that is, the techno-economic paradigm changed radically (Millward 2000). New forms of regulation and institutional planning paradigms needed to be developed in order to serve other and different political and social goals of control and management. The passing of laws and the publication of directives increased dramatically. Wide-reaching laws, regulations and legal agreements dominated. The new form of regulatory governance gained its legitimacy first and foremost from legality and goal attainment, and only very indirectly from decision-making institutions of representative democratic assemblies (Scharpf 1999; Schmitter 2000). Institutional benchmarking instruments prioritized the evaluation of results, which replaced bureaucratic

12

Taming the regulatory state

administration control. Strategic planning is part of this system, because the attainment of goals and the achievement of results require more and more extensive and thorough planning than reforms based on the standardized, patterned activities of the interventionist state. In this regulatory system, each individual social activity must be planned in a way that the setting of goals and the evaluation of results become practical possibilities (Veggeland 1999, 2004). Additionally, Europeanization processes brought about more of the same tendencies so that the EU as a complete regulatory state pushed member states in the same direction. For example, the French Conseil d’Etat has calculated that the national government issues only 20–25 per cent of all legal binding norms applicable in France without any prior consultation in Brussels. Presumably, an analogous situation prevails in all other member states (Lavenex and Wallace 2005). Also, in the Nordic EEA2 country, Norway, the same trend is visible; from 1995 to 2008 more than 5000 legally binding EU norms have become Norwegian laws and rules. A large part of EU laws and regulations are formulated as directives. These are then tailored to fit the laws and regulations in each of the member states. To a large degree, the laws devised to regulate the market for the free flow of goods, services, capital and labour make new demands on forms of market-orientated strategic planning on all administrative levels (Hayward and Menon 2003; Veggeland 2005). The concept of deregulation in the sense of eliminating rules, therefore, is misleading. As Majone (1997: 143) has noted, in the wake of deregulation new forms of re-regulation follow: What is observed in practice is never a dismantling of public regulation – a return to a situation of Laissez-faire which never existed in Europe – but rather a combination of deregulation and re-regulation, possibly at different levels of governance.

With reference to the regulatory state order, Thierstein (1997) has asserted that it is no longer adequate to focus only on formal political institutions such as elected bodies and the hierarchy of bureaucratic order in the framework of the classical Weberian type. The political system develops a network of hybrid institutions, which are part of the planning and decisionmaking process on different levels, but operates at arm’s-length from the hierarchy. These agencies must be recognized as an integrated part of a political system in the process of institutional change (Majone 1997). It has been argued that the concept of ‘governance’, understood as political steering practice based on regulatory agreements between public, semi-public,3 and private actors in political and planning arenas, captures this wider

The arrival of the regulatory state – and its exit?

13

perspective. Europe integrates through a combination of the efforts made by local, regional, national and supranational actors, and these actors can be either public or private (Thierstein 1997). This dimension represents an important starting point in the understanding of the transformation of the interventionist state. In the wake of agreement-based structures of governance, the notion of democratic deficit has emerged (Veggeland 2003; Chryssochoou 2004). Global market forces and international bodies of regulation and agreements such as the EU seem to undermine the power and influence of the national parliaments. The legitimacy of this state order appears, then, to be under threat (Beetham and Lord 1998). While both the critiques that the regulatory state suffers from democratic deficit and the explanations of its strengthening position may often lack an empirical basis, Majone (1997) has still insisted that this deficiency does not lessen the importance of the main issue. What remains at stake is the increasing number of voters who are convinced and willing to support a new model for the governing of their society, a model that includes the marketization of the public sector, increased competition in the economy along with the risk of failures, greater emphasis on developing the supplyside of the economy, and vast reforms of the welfare state (Beetham and Lord 1998; Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004). Such forms of regulation create the need for detailed knowledge about and active joint participation in processes of governance on all levels. Majone (1997) has also pointed out that this factor, in addition to giving market actors and lower tiers of the administrative hierarchy greater responsibility, has led to the establishment of specialized public and private partnerships and semi-public (hybrid) companies. Their tasks are connected with the collection of information, the development of objectives, the supervision of the implementation of project programmes, joint participation in the management and the evaluation of results. Such agencies and institutions operate outside the line of organization and outside the hierarchical control or supervision of the central authorities. Typical traits in the regulative form of state are, according to Majone, as follows (1997: 146): Administrative decentralisation and regionalisation; the breakdown of formerly monolithic entities into single-purpose units with their own budgets; delegation of responsibility for service delivery to private, for profit or not-for-profit, organisations, and to non-departmental bodies operating outside the normal executive branch framework; competitive tendering and other contractual or quasi-contractual arrangements whereby budgets and decision making powers are devolved to purchasers who, on behalf of their client group, buy services from the supplier offering the best value for money.

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Taming the regulatory state

What distinguishes the regulatory model from the traditional, bureaucratic model are the emphases on discretionary decision-making rather than rule-governed decision-making and the combination of expertise and independence with specialization within a relatively narrowly defined area of regulation and activity. The institutions operate at a distance from the central authorities and are only indirectly under democratic control; they are ‘unelected’ (Vibert 2007). Majone (1997) has argued as though this model were unconditionally superior to more traditional methods of making and implementing policy. There are numerous arguments against this view (Le Galès 2003; Veggeland 2003; Sachs 2006). Some argue that distributive policies, or policies with significant redistributive implications, for example, should remain under direct democratic control and Weberian bureaucratic executives. The regulatory model is most relevant in commercial sectors, public and private, where economic mechanisms and competition instruments are used, or as an organizing principle for administrative activities where expertise, flexibility and reputation are the key to greater effectiveness. The arm’s-length bodies and agencies of the regulatory state, committees and corporations are important because of their inherent specialized knowledge and the possibility of making credible policy commitments. Majone (1990) underlines, however, that the real comparative advantage of agencies is the combination of expertise and long-term commitment. Long-term policy commitment is notoriously difficult to achieve in a democracy, which is a form of government pro tempore. The time-limit imposed by the requirements to hold elections at regular intervals is a powerful constraint on the arbitrary use of the winners of the electoral contest of the powers entrusted to them by the voters. The segmentation of the democratic process into relatively short periods of time has serious consequences whenever the problems faced by society require long-term solutions. However, political principals can transfer power to their agents within limits set by law, but they cannot transfer legitimacy in the same way; the new institutions have to achieve their own legitimacy. McGowan and Wallace (1996) have asserted that the paradigm followed by the regulatory state based on management by objectives and independent arm’s-length agencies is expressed differently in institutional terms in Western countries. Their view agrees with the approach of forming pathdependence running from a diversity of social models and administrative traditions (Knill 2001; Pierson 2004). For that reason the regulatory state of the EU does not one-dimensionally create administrative convergence in Europe; more often the resulting outcome is divergence (Page and Wouters 1995). Let us consider some examples:

The arrival of the regulatory state – and its exit?

15

The comprehensive and deep-reaching planning required in steering by goals varies in dimensions from country to country. McGowan and Wallace have noted that in the US, with its traditional scepticism of planning, the ability to regulate has been developed and based on the judiciary and the use of courts to control the implementation and results of regulatory policies rather than independent agencies. In Japan, on the other hand, regulation has its basis on strategic planning. We must not equate the Japanese view of the planning paradigm in the sense of how it existed in the Communist planned economy. Instead, planning focuses on particular sectors to promote swift development and growth, to prepare the ground for foreign investment, to ensure state finance and to devise a suitable trade policy (Itoh 1992). In this regard, the social democracies in Nordic and Continental Europe seem closer to the Japanese approach, perhaps going even further in their enthusiasm for public-planning actions. The culture of the socialdemocracy states has been developed over a long period and favours planning on all levels and within all sectors. But this highlighting of differences does not mean that a convergence of the different models and paradigms will not occur in the long term (Veggeland 2007).

1.4

SUMMARY

Majone (1997: 148) has provided an overview of the key traits that distinguish the interventionist state from the regulatory state order. Table 1.1 is adapted from the argument presented above. According to the theory of regulation, the task of research is to present ‘small narratives’ of different institutional arrangements and the practice of governance. Alongside this approach, there is the view of networking theory that emphasizes the study of the ‘politics (of) how to catalyse coordination processes at different levels and how to construct appropriate institutions’ (Thierstein 1997: 13). The following chapters will discuss in depth the various aspects of Table 1.1. Thus, in what follows below, we shall attempt to analyse the conditions involved in the move from an interventionist state to a regulatory one. As Table 1.1 shows, the latter characterized by deregulation as well as reregulation, hard regulation as well as soft, agreement-based governance as well as democratic control, business-like management by objectives as well as bureaucratic management. In short, we shall examine more closely the constitutional and institutional forms of the regulatory state and its genesis from the interventionist state. The taming of the regulatory state issue will be essential to this endeavour.

16

Table 1.1

Taming the regulatory state

Interventionist and regulatory modes of governance The interventionist state

The regulatory state

Main function

Redistribution Macroeconomic stabilization

Means

Demand-side regulations Heavy taxation Distributive policies Bureaucratic control Allocation between budget posts and social redistribution Elected governments Public administration Public services National enterprises

Correcting market imperfections Increasing competitive ability Supply-side regulations Wide-reaching regulations Management by objectives Benchmarking results Market versus state authority and planning; creation of inequality Arm’s-length bodies and agencies; public and private partnership and hybrid organizations Post-Fordism Experts; market actors; hybrid agencies

Main area of political conflicts Typical institutions

Main actors

Political style

Political culture Political legitimacy

Political parties Civil servants Social partners Government Hierarchical administrative structure National two-level games Mono-centric Direct administrative control by elected governments

Governance; networking actors; multilevel games; regulating agreements and contracts Pluralistic Output and result measurement Legality and quantitative achievements

NOTES 1. See chapters 8 and 9 in this book that discuss how soft regulation is important in crossborder co-operation issues. 2. European Economic Agreement (EEA). Norway is a member of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) but is outside of the EU. EFTA negotiated forward the EEA with the EU in the early 1990s, which Norway signed and implemented in 1995. 3. Arm’s-length public bodies are run according to private law.

2. 2.1

Political economy: the background of the regulatory state TAMING PRINCIPLES OF THE PREKEYNESIAN STATE

An Introductory Story In 2008, it has been 75 years since Franklin Delano Roosevelt (Democrat Party) became the thirty-second President of the US. The event took place in the worst phase of the Great Depression of the 1930s. The unemployment rate was 25 per cent. About two million people had become homeless. Pressed by high loans, the banks chased farmers from their land when the prices fell 60 per cent. Industrial production sank to half the volume before 1929. Capitalists ran away from Wall Street. On the inaugural day, banks in 31 of the 48 states, and in Washington DC, closed their doors and did not open the day after. In his inaugural speech, Roosevelt attacked financiers and bank managers: it was time for the first New Deal initiative (1933–34), the use of public money to increase the general demand in the economy, the Keynesian economic idea. His taming programme was the 3-Rs: Relief, Recovery and Reform, which he used to explain to the people through radio talks he frequently gave. The second New Deal (1935–36) paid attention to the farmers and the farming industries. It was not for nothing that Roosevelt was re-elected in 1936, 1940 and 1944. The interventionist state’s macroeconomic form of planning that developed just after World War II was a clear answer to the structural economic crisis of the inter-war period of the 1920s and 1930s. The legitimacy that this form of planning gave the state to intervene in the market is primarily associated with the ideas of John Maynard Keynes, the English economist. In The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money (1936), of which parts of the content had already been published elsewhere, Keynes elaborated a new foundation for the understanding of economic growth and its conditions in the market economy. This collection of studies examined the causes behind economic fluctuations and what determines the level of national income and employment. Even though Keynes was a liberal economist, he opposed the laissez-faire perspective and emphasized the 17

18

Taming the regulatory state

clear need for state intervention to tame the market and to escape and avoid economic crises. For these reasons, there has been talk of the ‘the Keynesian Revolution’. In this context Andrew Shonfield (1969: 3) put forward an essential question: What was it that converted capitalism from cataclysmic failure which it appeared to be in the 1930s into the great engine of prosperity of the post-war western World? There is no simple answer, which rests on a denial of the validity of the question itself. The economic order under which we now live and the social structure that goes with it are so different from what preceded them that it is misleading – so it is alleged – to use the word ‘capitalism’ to describe them.

Throughout his work, Shonfield (1969: 3–39) gives answers to the question of ‘conversion’, which could be summarized as follows: Keynes’s General Theory provided the rationale for state interventions, effective demand and spending to achieve recovery and full employment. It revolutionized business-cycle theory and established the framework for modern macroeconomic analysis, including growth economics. We may aptly call, Shonfield suggests, the effects of this work the ‘Keynesian Revolution’. As always happens with the histories of such ideas, they arise before the outbreak of a revolution that affects the evolution of socio-economic theories and political ideologies. This was also the case regarding the ideas, which shaped the ‘Keynesian Revolution’. There are a number of predecessors who laid the foundation for economic ideas in general and the idea of taming the market that led to Keynesianism. The ideas were all coloured by the social settings in which they were originally designed and also inspired by the political ideas and ideological approaches of the time, such as liberalism, utilitarianism and socialism. Let us look more closely at some of these ‘founding fathers’ (Schumpeter 1939; Stewart 1972). Adam Smith Economics goes back a long way under shifting political conditions. Adam Smith, who published The Wealth of Nations in 1776, is one of the founders of modern economics. Despite his concern with what we call conditions for ‘economic growth’, the book contains no real discussion of the factors involving the level of employment and how the market should be tamed and regulated. At the time, agriculture was still by far the most important activity, and in an agricultural society the notions of being employed and being unemployed were not really applicable: the whole family works but might be seasonally under-employed. Smith simply assumed that there was always full employment. Regarding regulation, he was in line with the liberal political thinking and classic economic theory of his time; he believed in the ‘invisible

Political economy: the background of the regulatory state

19

hand’ as the regulatory and taming principle of the market. He made one comment, however, that, of course, ‘landlords talk together’ and they make their decisions and agreements on prices when they inevitably meet now and then. He recognized this phenomenon as a negative externality, which might disturb the rule and efficiency of the ‘invisible hand’, and thereby jeopardize the balance of the economy. It represented a socio-economic risk that should be avoided. He never put forward the idea that such ‘decisions and agreements’ were indeed a humane way of taming the actual markets. Adam Smith adopted the idea that the economic sphere was a sort of natural phenomenon, and it was, therefore, stable and structured by ‘natural law’. He elaborated on this view on the basis of the contributions of the great founders of political liberalism – especially John Locke’s (1632–1704). For Locke, a state of nature existed before the occurrence of the social contract that introduced a form of political organization. In the state of nature, each individual faced nature and freely interacted with other individuals. They had to deal with work, the products and utility of the work, and property rights; therefore, each man was a Homo economicus. The social contract and the state control emerged only in reaction to threats to natural law and private property and the obligation to protect them. Adam Smith likewise took the idea of the ‘natural man’ as the ‘economic man’ and made it essential to his theory. He reaffirmed both the liberal view that the economic sphere should remain free and have historical and ideological precedence over other spheres of society. David Ricardo The next founder of economic thought of major importance is David Ricardo, who published the first edition of his Principles of Political Economy and Taxation (1817). Like many other nineteenth-century economists his main interest lay in the factors that direct the distribution of a nation’s income between the major social classes – landowners, capitalists and workers, that is, rent, profits and wages respectively. The capitalists must make large profits and accumulate money, he said, because they would invest them in new machinery, and this investment would create more employment and enable more to be produced. Ricardo operated in the optimism of the dawn of the industrial society. Typically, the issue of taming was not Ricardo’s focus but instead it was the liberation of potentiality and ability. Thomas Robert Malthus Thomas Robert Malthus, another economist at the time, is best known for his theory of population. According to him, there is tendency for

20

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the population to increase exponentially while the supply of food only increases linearly. This represented the first socio-economic risk, which Malthus reviewed. The theory had its background in the actual population explosion in Europe, and the occurrence of extensive waves of emigration to America. Ricardo did not disagree with this part of Malthus’s work. But there was another part he opposed. Against Ricardo’s theory of profits and investment in production machinery, Malthus argued on two levels. At one level he pointed out that there was a danger that the investment would raise the capacity for production at a faster rate than the ability of the society to consume. Of the wages received by the workers, only a part of it will be used to buy goods, which are produced because of investment. Investment increases the production, but the country will find itself with a ‘general glut of commodities’, which cannot be sold. Would this not lead to unemployment, he asked? This was another risk. And on the second level, he pointed to the large class of landowners and capitalists who certainly do not invest their money; they tend to save their money, producing nothing but consuming a great deal. This was the third risk Malthus insisted. Malthus pointed out calamities but offered no principles or means to avoid them or at least to tame them. Ricardo seems to some extent to have accepted the logic of Malthus’s thinking, but his answer was that an economy might suffer from shortage of what he called ‘effective demand’ now and again but not in the long run. He eliminated Malthus’s third identified risk. Actually, Ricardo was more or less right at the time when he elaborated his theory. During the early nineteenth century the only way most industrialists could finance the new buildings and machinery they needed to expand their business was out of their own profits. Keynes said later on that ‘Ricardo conquered England as completely as the Holy Inquisition conquered Spain’ (quotation from Stewart 1972: 27).1 His influence continues to be important today in the shadow of the regulatory state regime and its beliefs in supply-side economics, tax cuts and low interest rates in order to increase the rate of economic investment. This is relevant for the OECD Anglo-Saxon member states in particular (Sachs 2006). Karl Marx As an economist Karl Marx was clearly in the debt of Smith and Ricardo. He adopted much of this framework and gave it a wholly new interpretation. Marx published his main work, Das Kapital, in 1867. He was the first leading economist to notice that by the middle of the nineteenth century heavy unemployment was quite common in the developing industrial

Political economy: the background of the regulatory state

21

European states, and he tried to find the causes. He reasoned that competition forces capitalists to invest their profits in labour-saving machinery, for if they do not, their efficiency will fall, and they will be forced out of business. Out of self-interest they will continue to do so. But by this process, there will also be a fall in employment and unemployment will rise. For those who still have jobs, they have to accept lower wages forced on them by the capitalists. According to Marx, a fall in employment also means a fall in profits because only work creates economic value. As a result, contrary to what Ricardo had assumed, in the long run firms will have little incentive to invest their profits. And since only a small part of the capitalists’ profits can be spent on consumption, the general surplus of commodities that Malthus had feared would become a reality. Marx thus elaborated a theory of crisis: a crisis will occur as a result of the ever worsening unemployment because of the relentless fall of profits, which will lead before long to a general economic crisis. Marx identified an institutional risk inherent in the capitalist system but rejected any taming principles; he saw only revolution and the breakdown of the capitalist system as the ultimate solution. Certainly, Marxist theory was, on the one hand, coloured by the strong tensions between social classes in developing industrial societies in Europe at the time, between the repressed working class and the exploitive class of capitalists. On the other hand, a strong belief in technology, a belief in the liberating power due to the promising productivity of the new machinery and the ways of organizing it also suffused these ideas. These forces of production in the hands of the working class offered the ability to free them from the drudgery of wage-labour and would make them free, both economically and politically as two sides of the same coin. Nevertheless, in spite of the historical fact that his theory about the relentless fall of the profits, the impossibility of balancing the trade cycle, and the economic development in general have had limited validity, Marx remains a significant figure in the evolution of economic theory and indirectly inspired the taming principles of Keynes. As Michael Stewart writes (1972: 33): It was much more difficult, after he (Marx) had written, to believe that the capitalist economy, if left to itself, would necessarily function satisfactorily. In particular, it was more difficult to accept Ricardo’s view that profits were always invested in new machinery.

To be sure, Keynes learned from the Marxist lesson. But have the contemporary monetarist economists of the regulatory state learned from this lesson? And what about Ricardo’s effective-demand approach that denies the risk of limited investment disturbing the economies; was his thinking

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Taming the regulatory state

correct? We shall later consider these questions by exploring the occurrence of disturbances in later trade cycles.

2.2

CONTRASTING A MONETARIST PERSPECTIVE: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE INTERVENTIONIST KEYNESIAN STATE

Keynes’s great contribution to economics was both to demonstrate how the modern economy did not work in the way classical liberalists had supposed and to provide a new and completely convincing explanation of how it actually did work. With the inter-war economic crisis looming, he demonstrated innovatively that heavy unemployment was not a temporary deviation from the normal state of development but could represent a situation of equilibrium that could continue indefinitely. If full employment was the goal, it was no good to follow the recommendations proclaimed by classic liberal economic theory – the governments refraining from action and hoping for the best or laissez-faire policy. Instead, governments must ensure through interventions that there is enough effective demand in the national economy to create full employment. He established this theory for economic reasons, not really to help unemployed people back to work in a welfare and ethical perspective. Hence, ‘effective demand’ is a key notion in Keynesian theory. As already pointed out, this notion was essential also in the dispute between Malthus and Ricardo more than a hundred years earlier. Malthus suggested that an economy might suffer from disturbances, namely shortages of what he called ‘effective demand’, while Ricardo more or less denied this assumption. Michael Stewart (1972: 30) indicates that Keynes was perhaps reading too much into Malthus when he said, in his Essay on Malthus: One cannot rise from a perusal of this correspondence (between Malthus and Ricardo) without a feeling that the almost total obliteration of Malthus’ line of approach and the complete domination of Ricardo’s for a period of a hundred years has been a disaster to the progress of economics.

Nevertheless, reading too much or not into what Malthus had grasped rather intuitively, Keynes founded a ‘revolutionary’ theory on the disputed notion of effective demand. In contrast to a monetarist perspective, his theory of effective demand simply means ‘demand backed by money’ – in other words, actual expenditure. The crucial question is, then, what determines effective demand. In order to answer that, Keynes broke down aggregated effective demand into two components, consumption

Political economy: the background of the regulatory state

23

and investment, and claimed it was necessary to study each in turn and how they could interact in the economy for the purpose of creating full employment. Consumption Aggregated consumption in an economy relies on wages and income, with the latter representing purchasing power.2 Purchasing power may give variable expenditures as outputs depending on the size of the wages. Additionally, it depends much on how the national income is distributed, both socially and geographically. Consumption might be more then just private consumption; it might also be investment if the consumption is a part of running businesses. And further, buying a car might be an act of private consumption, but, used by the firm, it turns out to be an investment. Increasing consumption of any kind expands the effective demand in the economy. Investment Money spent on investment is determined by two things: the amount the investment will yield, that is, the profit, and the variable cost of borrowing the money needed to finance the investment. The cost is variable because of changing interest rates,3 though it seems fairly obvious. No one is going to borrow money in order to finance a factory machine or an accommodation facility if the interest payments exceed the profits eventually made by the factory and the facility.4 But conversely, if profits exceed the costs, investment will be made, resulting in an expansion of the effective demand at an aggregated level. Being an economist believing basically in liberal economic principles, Keynes faced the challenge of how to stabilize consumption and investment on a level of full employment. Full employment and full utilization of the production forces in general is essential in the theory, neither less nor more than full utilization. ‘More’ would mean pressure in the aggregated economy with rising prices and increasing inflation as a negative consequence. What, then, would be the proper measure to balance full employment and stable and low rate of inflation as a part of his effective-demand concepts of consumption and investment? Keynes did not agree with Ricardo’s view that profits were always invested in new machinery, nor did he believe in Marx’s thesis about the relentless fall of profits. In his theory, he introduced an idea that carried

24

Taming the regulatory state Market Aggregated effective demand Driven by

Legitimacy

Driven by Investment biased by Outcome biased by Profits and interest rate biased by Low inflation

Consumption biased by Purchasing power biased by Wages and distribution biased by Full employment

Central planning Politics of intervention

Politics of intervention Central government The Keynesian state order

Figure 2.1

The structure of the Keynesian state

with it the greatest of political implications: the advantage of state interventions in the market in order to balance employment and inflation through public consumption and investment as regulatory measures, and planning and centralized administration as steering instruments. This is what Majone (1994: 77) calls the ‘dirigiste state of the past’, which the regulatory state has replaced. The interventionist state as an instrument to counteract the risks of a market economy is a theoretical as well as a practical concept. But, according to Keynes, the interventions should only be temporary, only to overcome the international economic crisis of the 1930s, which was very much in keeping as the liberal economist he was. We know now how differently it turned out; it became the theoretical foundation of the permanent modern interventionist state – indeed, the post-war social democratic welfare state lasted well into the 1970s and 1980s (Flora et al. 1999; Veggeland 2007). Figure 2.1 is an illustration of some of the Keynesian principles according to formalizing structures. What is important here is the way Keynes provided the legitimacy for the central government to initiate basic central planning, to intervene and make adjustments of consumption and investment according to the national masterplan of economics and to sectoral plans. This meant regulating market mechanisms for the purpose of long-term effective demand in order to achieve full employment and low

Political economy: the background of the regulatory state

25

inflation. In return, the political domain also acquired legitimacy because of successes with economic stability and growth as results of these interventions. The advancement of the post-war welfare state in this framework might be said to have been the acme for convincing Keynesian policies with great legitimacy (Flora et al. 1999). Optimistically, some scholars even insisted that probably a new international economic crisis would never occur again because of the balancing effect of the interventionist state (Shonfield 1969). They were wrong. What were the measures that empowered the interventionist state? The Keynesian approach to macroeconomic crises created a new cluster of conceptual tools for economic policy and central planning by the central government. After the Second World War, these conceptual tools expanded to include sectoral planning, regional planning, environmental planning and connected extensive social and regional distributive policies. The success of this type of planning and governance rested on the assumption that the national economy was relatively closed and protected from external impacts. As a method and a basis for knowledge, this approach represented a topdown rational form of planning, that is, mean–ends strategies in making both growth developments and distributive policies work (Friedmann 1987; Amdam and Veggeland 1998: 26–7). Politically, this type of planning fitted the social-democratic ideology of the time and its insistence on market control, state ownership and monopolies and an active income and cost policy. State intervention and a planned society were considered desirable, as were a Weberian bureaucracy as the form of administrative executive. Majone (1997: 139–67) has argued that the interventionist state had three main tasks: macroeconomic stabilization, the distribution of income and the regulation of the market. The goal of macroeconomic intervention was to achieve economic growth and the principle of full employment. The instruments for this were financial and monetarist policy, together with active employment and industrial policy. Public monopolies dominated as executives of the infrastructure service policies. The policy of income distribution included the redistribution of resources from one social group, region and economic sector to another, as well as educational goods, supplementary benefits and health services. The goal was to level out inequalities not only for social reasons but also to secure full employment and economic growth (Veggeland 1998; Einhorn and Logue 2003). Lastly, the interventionist policy of regulation aimed to redress ‘market imperfections’, such as monopolies, unfair competitive advantages, incomplete market information and incomplete access to public goods. The state distribution policy and the regulation of aggregate demand in society are what have been called collectively the ‘social democratic welfare

26

Taming the regulatory state

state’, or even the ‘Keynesian welfare state’ (Ferrera and Rhodes 2000). Macroeconomic planning to sustain effective demand in the interventionist state was based on complex mathematical models developed by the Norwegian economist, Ragnar Frisch, who obtained the Nobel Prize. Models used have been known under the terms ‘Eco-Circ’, MSG and MODIS (Amdam and Veggeland 1998: 27). The mode of governance was democratic in the sense that the Western parliamentary system combined the monopolist position of legislator (the Parliament) with the monopolist position of executive of public policy (the Government), besides acting as a gatekeeper in international affairs. The state budget, the national accounts, sectoral policy, welfare policy, distributive policy and other areas became the object of parliamentary policy. The management output of the state institutions was technocratic and bureaucratic in the Weberian sense. Also, public-planning acts were democratic but only in the restricted sense that political top-down ‘hearings’ were arranged before the formulation of goals for the development of regions, municipalities and sectors. Politically, this form of state enjoyed the most popularity during the postwar period until the 1970s. During this decade, doubt crept into the socialdemocratic consensus concerning the advantages of the interventionist state mode of governance, that is, the monopoly held by the national state as economist, politician, planning actor, producer of infra-structural and social goods and services, and employer (Giddens 1998).

2.3

IN THE SHADOW OF THE INTERNATIONAL STAGFLATION CRISIS

In the 1970s the international economy entered a crisis, the so-called ‘stagflation’ crisis, and we must regard it as a fundamental causal factor in subsequent changes of the Keynesian state order (Veggeland 1998: 60–62). Unemployment in the Western industrial nations rose to 10–15 per cent and more alongside with inflation reaching dangerous levels. These conditions represented a fundamental break in the stable economic development that had formed on the basis of the Keynesian principles of state intervention. The intervention forms can be summarized as: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

Financial interventions. Direct control through laws and regulations. Institutional interventions. Sector interventions. State-run corporations (Østerud 1972: 30–31; Majone 1994).

Political economy: the background of the regulatory state

27

The stagflation also led to a crisis in the principles of central planning and acts of implementation that had developed under the aegis of interventionist state dominance. Actually, we may view the crisis as an appearance of globalization and its effects. These effects hit the national institutions of the interventionist state, which were too narrowly focused in the new setting and hampered the ability to govern effectively. There was, on the one hand, the need for more co-operation and regulatory tasks across borders, and, on the other hand, the need for more decentralized, competitive and task-orientated public planning. It became essential to prepare a new institutional framework that facilitated co-operation between several actors in market-defined, functional networks, both domestically and across international borders (Jessop 1994; Amin and Thrift 1995). This was the arrival of the post-national modes of planning and agreement-based multi-level governance (Hayward and Menon 2003). However, at the time, it was difficult to imagine that the balance in economic circulation would once again reach critical dimensions comparable with those of the inter-war Great Depression. Symptomatically, the English economist Andrew Shonfield, in his large work Modern Capitalism from 19655 that argued from a Keynesian perspective, wrote the following: The central thesis of this book is that there is no reason to suppose that the patterns (crises) of the past, which have been ingeniously unravelled by historians of trade cycles, will reassert themselves in the future (1969: 62).6

But the crisis arrived at the end of the 1960s and into the 1970s. The crisis expressed itself as a one of stagflation – stagnation and increasing unemployment combined with a corresponding increase in inflation. The rate of profit fell, in the Marxian sense so to speak. The curves in Figure 2.2 show the trend of the falling rate of profit in the UK, that is, the falling of the rate of profit on capital in the business sector until 1971, with the end of the 1960s as the beginning of the downturn. The profit rate fell both before tax and after deduction of tax and addition of capital transfers, especially investment grants. Using the disputed ‘Phillips-curve’ principle7 of the relation between inflation and unemployment, worked out under the Keynesian regime, as an adjusted point of departure, the phenomenon could also be illustrated by this simple diagram in Figure 2.3. In Figure 2.3 the rate of inflation is plotted on the vertical axis, the unemployment on the horizontal axis. The arrow illustrates the passing of time. The curves illustrate a development from a trade-cycle of balance in the 1960s with both low inflation and low unemployment (the Phillips curve) – actually, full employment in the view of Keynesian thinking. Then the economy entered a stage of imbalance at the end of the 1970s and 1980s, with increasing high inflation

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Taming the regulatory state

Per cent 30 x 25 x x 20

Before tax x

15 x x After deduction of tax and addition of capital transfers x x

10

5 1955

Source:

Years

1968 1970 1971

1964

Jones 1973: 17.

Figure 2.2 Rate of profit on capital in the company sector in the UK, 1955–71 Inflation rate n – – – – – – 5 4 3 2 1 0

Figure 2.3

Time: 1960s–1980s

5

10

15

Unemployment rate

Curves illustrating the development of crisis trade-offs affecting the Keynesian state

Political economy: the background of the regulatory state

29

and unemployment as a normal situation. The curves view the trade-offs between inflation and employment: reduced effective demand in order to lessen the pressure in the economy and thereby lower the inflation makes the unemployment rate rise. The opposite happens when the effective demand is increased; it creates an unwanted climb in the inflation rate (Cumes 1984). What happened at the time was that the old methods of dealing with the situation were no longer effective, or, to be more correct, they did not work as expected, as Figure 2.3 shows. Theories and models of state intervention built upon the Keynesian General Theory were now found wanting and ineffective in most OECD member states. Measures introduced by governments to reduce rising unemployment only resulted in the level of inflation spiralling upwards. If demand was reduced, production fell with increasing unemployment as a result. Indications of the confusion could be found among politicians and economic planners (Veggeland 1998). OECD reports written under the pretence of providing advice to governments were unable to conceal the bewilderment. They were equivocal about which remedies were most appropriate (McCracken et al. 1977). The quotation below (ibid.: 14) amply shows a picture of the confusion but also an indomitable belief in Keynesian measures, with the mentioning of ‘avoidable errors’ as highly indicative of their understanding of the crisis: To sum up, the immediate causes of the severe problems of 1971–75 can largely be understood in terms of conventional economic analysis. There have been underlying changes in behaviour patterns and in power relationships internationally and within countries. But our reading of recent history is that the most important feature was an unusual bunching of unfortunate disturbances unlikely to be repeated on the same scale, the impact of which was compounded by some avoidable errors in economic policy. The continuing legacy of 1971–75 makes for unusual difficulties in framing policies for the years immediately ahead. We reject, however, the view that existing market-oriented economic systems and democratic political institutions have failed. What is needed is better use of existing instruments of economic policy, and better functioning and management of existing market mechanisms.

In the 1980s and 1990s, the OECD moved away from its earlier mode of confusion. Now, the choice between low unemployment versus low inflation was recognized, with the recommendation that the latter should be given priority. Two measures were thought necessary: economic measures to keep the inflation rate low should be introduced nationally, and this should be followed by comprehensive reforms and modernizing tasks within the public sector to make it more competitive (OECD 2002, 2005). Great Britain and the United States began the inflation-fighting strategy early and reformed extensively the general economic policy from a

30

Taming the regulatory state

Demand-side Central Bank domain Executor of political Interest rate

I

Supply-side Supply of goods and services Central Bank domain Executor of knowledge-based Interest rate Demand of goods and services II

Demand regulating policy: Regulatory policies: Imposed by the Central Government

Figure 2.4

Demand-side, supply-side and monetarist policies constitute the regulatory state

Keynesian-inspired demand-side economic to a so-called supply-side economic policy of neo-liberalism (Storper and Scott 1992), with ‘Thatcherism’ and ‘Reaganism’ as the names for the reforms, after their political leaders at the time. Other Anglo-Saxon states followed the same new strategy to get out of the crisis but along with a steep rise of unemployment – normal unemployment rates 10–20 per cent – as a trade-off. Some OECD countries, such as Norway, had a source of income provided by oil and gas, and these revenues provided a cushion against high unemployment. Nevertheless, stagflation was also noticeable there and in the other Nordic countries in general. The economy represented a fertile ground for new thinking and transformations in the organization of economic production and the institutional function of the state and the public sector in general. Constitutionally, the ground was prepared for the institutionalization of the regulatory state that would partly replace the Keynesian, interventionist state. The general acceptance of regulatory dirigisme replacing the old Keynesian method balanced the implied commitment to a global free-market economy that stressed the virtues of competition and greater efficiencies through specialization and economies of scale (Egan 2004). Economically, the new regulatory state was founded on the change from a governmental, centrally planned demand-side economy to a marked-based, supply-side economy with the central government as the regulatory national principal. The national central bank serves the government as an independent arm’slength body for the implementation of interest rates and tax policies. Other arm’s-length bodies serve as agencies of legal surveillance. The two simple curves in Figure 2.4 illustrate this constitutional change.

Political economy: the background of the regulatory state

31

The demand-side curve and the supply-side curve cross each other. According to simple principles, when the aggregated demand exceeds the supply-side provisions, prices will increase and inflation could be an effect – side I, Figure 2.4, side II visualizes the opposite situation, with deflation a consequence. According to Keynes, the balance between the two sides should be maintained by demand-regulating intervention and fiscal policies, in this case by reducing the aggregated demand, in conjunction with the establishing of the politically decided interest rate. As an executor subordinate to the government, the central bank puts restrictions on loaning out and implements the politically based interest rate. In the regulatory state, however, regulatory policies dominate, and the central government imposes them in order to balance the two sides of the economy. The most basic and important instruments of the government are interest rate level, tax and currency regulations, and in our case with Figure 2.4, it is most likely that both interest and tax rates will decrease. However, in the regulatory state these instruments are placed in the hands of the arm’s-length body, the central bank. As executor, this body calculates the interest rate according to a set of indicators that account for the most likely achievement of economic goals given by the government. The government is only responsible for deciding the framework for the economic policy, while the central bank is responsible for the calculations and implementations for changing the knowledge-based interest rate. Being in such a position implies that the government has constitutional authorization for ‘steering without rowing’ at the macroeconomic level (Cassese 2003; Veggeland 2004). The authorized ‘rowing’ principal is the central bank. It works out this way: the government decides democratically the goals and frameworks for the economic policy; the central bank interprets and implements the regulations contextually. Hence, as shown in Figure 2.4, there are two main public domains at the top of the hierarchy, the political domain of the government and the technocratic professional domain of the central bank. Principally, there are two possible conditions of imbalance: economic stagnation and rising unemployment caused by too low effective demand and threatening inflation caused by too high effective demand. Under the former condition, the government was entitled to decide to lower the interest rate and taxes in order to stimulate investment in both the private and public sector and thereby the aggregated demand.8 Concurrently, and especially in the regulatory states of the Anglo-Saxon governance tradition, there has also been an increasing tendency to introduce deliberately more socially conscious regulation, such as high-consumption unemployment by regulations for work-sharing and early retirement (Lordon 2008). Accordingly, unemployment will decrease statistically (Koukiadis 2006).

32

Taming the regulatory state

Rate of interest (R)

M1

R3 R2

M2

M3

CB

CB CB

R1

CB Unemployment

Quantity of money (M)

Figure 2.5

The rate of interest with a dynamic central bank (CB) as the regulatory instrument of the monetarist economy

Under the latter condition of ominously growing inflation (Figure 2.4) the central bank (CB) is entitled to raise the interest rate and taxes in order to reduce the quantity of money in circulation in the economy, in accordance with monetarist theory (Friedman 1980), thereby reversing the trend towards increasing inflation, as we see in Figure 2.5 The rate of interest is plotted on the vertical axis, the amount of money on the horizontal axis. The unemployment curve shows how the unemployment rate varies with the rate of interest, a regulatory instrument used by the central bank to determine the preferred quantity of money (M1–M3) in the economy. The CB intends the rate of interest actually established (R1–R3) to be the rate at which the amount of money in circulation will balance the demand- and supply-side of the economy (see also Figure 2.4). The arrows in Figure 2.5 show contextually how the regulating changes in the rate of interest imposed by the central bank work, namely as upward or downward movements. A situation of a high interest rate (R3) is combined with high unemployment, stagnation and too little money in circulation, and this means that the central bank begins to counteract the high unemployment by reducing the interest rate from R3 to R2 or R1. One consequence of this regulating measure is that that quantity of money in circulation increases from M1 to M2 or M3, which in turn affects the effective demand (Silk 1976). More money in circulation tends to increase the inclination to consume and invest, which will stimulate the economy, with the preferred decreasing unemployment but increasing inflation as the

Political economy: the background of the regulatory state

33

result. In contrast, when the interest rate is low (R1) and so is unemployment, there is a high amount of money in circulation and therewith high effective demand, and these conditions put pressure on the supply side of the economy. In this situation, the inflation rate tends to rise rather quickly, and the central bank will counter with regulatory action by raising the rate of interest from R1 to R2 or R3. The consequence is that less money gets into circulation, from M3 to M2 or M1, causing less effective demand and investment, which in turn results in more unemployment but a preferred lower inflation rate. In our very brief introduction of monetarist principles and economic policy, little has been said regarding social conditions for growth of employment (Iversen 2005; Sachs 2006). There is a clear reason for this omission: in the monetarist concept, employment receives attention only indirectly, only as a consequence of regulatory policies and not as a reason for regulations. Certainly, but to a different extent, most of the OECD member states introduced monetarist principles in their economic policies to fight and overcome the stagflation crisis of the 1970s and 1980s. It meant fighting high inflation by holding the unemployment rate at a permanent high level (Figure 2.3). In the framework of monetarist economic thinking, regulatory means are needed to fight high inflation while growth in employment is believed to be a wanted consequence of low interest rates and tax cuts (Friedman 1980). The term ‘supply-side economics’ came into use in the 1970s and refers to the liberal policy package that was aimed at fighting stagflation. Chicagostyle monetarism and liberalism, fronted especially by Milton Friedman (1962), was the inspiration of supply-side economics. The point of departure was that economic growth depends on market efficiency in absolutely all sectors, in line with the classical Ricardoan thinking. The policy recommendation was to remove impediments to free markets and to reduce state involvement in particular. Translated into social-institutional change, it meant privatization, deregulation, scaling back the welfare sector, tax cuts and the withdrawal of governmental involvement in monetary issues – in short, the building of the new regulatory state. Supply-side economics also recommended global free trade as a way of benefiting competition (Bratton et al. 1996). In the Anglo-Saxon countries during the 1980s, the unemployment rate fell to an acceptable level through different workfare initiatives and a so-called high-consumption unemployment policy, proposing work sharing, low-wage jobs and early retirement (OECD 2005). The European Continental states introduced limited regulatory-state principles but adopted the monetarist instruments for the regulation of inflation. The long-term consequence has been permanently high unemployment in many

34

Taming the regulatory state

Continental countries. The Nordic countries have successfully developed a blend of the two administrative traditions and adopted the monetarist instrument policy accordingly (Veggeland 2007).

2.4

EXPLANATORY APPROACHES TO THE CRISIS OF KEYNESIAN ECONOMICS

It has been said by many that the Keynesian policies adopted by the advanced economies in the West carried within them the seeds for their own demise and created the basic conditions for the formation of the regulatory state (Friedman 1962; Cumes 1984). The period of the Keynesian state, 1945–1970s, as we have called the period, was an era of exceptionally persistent economic growth, stability and the building of the modern welfare state; the latter was, of course, built on the basis of different social models and administrative traditions (Knill 2001; Veggeland 2007). When the international economic crisis arrived, therefore, governments, believing it to be a short-term incident, applied the widely accepted and welltried Keynesian remedies and political instruments, which they had used in the 1950s and 1960s (McCracken et al. 1977). But as we have seen in Figure 2.1, those remedies and instruments did not work. When the governments found that their measures did not work, they initially assumed that the fault lay in their domestic management and in their handling of international trade, and not in the validity of the Keynesian economic principles. But as the problems continued to deepen, talk about a short-term fluctuation receded, and the crisis became increasingly recognized as a long-term, deep-rooted structural crisis, one that demanded new remedies. People began to say that Keynesian economics had ‘failed’. At this point, the monetarist Milton Friedman (1980) spoke out and said that Keynesian economics had been doomed from the start because it involved the market too little and the state too much. His view was that policies that restrict production, productivity, demand and employment have economically not worked, nor will they in the future. In social terms he sustained from ethical thinking regarding the role of state interventions. As elaborated earlier, governments were able to apply Keynesian policies with great success as long as they effectively had the capacity and political will to move consumption and investment up or down in order to control the aggregated effective demand. However, this capacity had expired around 1970. Actually, the capacity to move the economy up remained, that is, inflation and unemployment, but the capacity to move these factors down declined.

Political economy: the background of the regulatory state

35

Explanatory Approach 1 The capacity to calm the economy down, with arising inflation as a consequence (Figure 2.3) declined for a variety of reasons – consumption became relatively invariable. One of the main reasons was that the building of the welfare state had reached a mature level, and this meant that the transfer of money to welfare services and social arrangements could not, for political and economical reasons, be reduced. There could be no question of abolishing the allocation of money to social groups and individuals in need when governments introduced ‘deflationary’ policies. Consumption and investment in the service more than economic sector became fixed. Attitudes to welfare and social security – such as schools, health, social support, care for unemployed, elderly people, the disabled and others who could not look after themselves, and so on – had become too deeply embedded in the polity (Arter 1999). The capacity and political will to move the economy down vanished. Yet, inflation persisted. The impact on the economy of this tendency to hold up consumption expenditure while stagnation exceeded and unemployment increased was recognized, and this stimulated the cry for more market forces and less state intervention – the cry for the regulatory state. Explanatory Approach 2 Gender policy also influenced the capacity of the governments to move consumption and investment up or down. In large measure, women’s liberation was made possible by the economic progress of the post-war period. The entry of females into the labour market had two effects in our context (OECD 2005). First, the entry increased enormously the volume of available labour force for employment, but the labour market could not offer jobs to them all. The number of people employed might increase but statistically it also contributed to the increase in unemployment (Figure 2.2). Secondly, the entry of wives into the labour market meant that unemployment was less destructive of individual and family consumption levels than it had been previously. Saving or investment by family units might be reduced as economic activity turned down, but a certain level of consumption persisted nonetheless. If their incomes were relatively maintained, their consumption was maintained. It influenced the slowing of the economy through reducing the effective demand (Cumes 1984). It thus contributed to the failure of the Keynesian remedies. Explanatory Approach 3 Related to international trade, it is a fact that a high-valued currency, leading to high import exposure, is anti-inflationary and low-valued currency

36

Taming the regulatory state

increases the export exposure, which leads to greater inflation. During the post-war period, exposure of goods and services due to free trade dominated inter-governmental negotiations. The European Community (EC) was established, as was the European Free Trade Association (EFTA). In general, the globalization of economic transactions had begun, resulting in the opening up of national economies. One of the Keynesian remedies was to use the revaluation of national currency up or down in order to balance inflation and employment. In an open economy, and in the framework of the free-trade concept, the economic and political capacity to use this instrument declined (Bratton et al. 1996). It contributed little in helping to adjust the effective demand. Therefore, in Europe, the process of creating the Single European Market (SEM) began in the 1980s, as did the European Monetary Union (EMU) in the 1990s, which introduced supranational surveillance and rules for trade and monetary policy (Woolcock 1996). Actually, the regulatory state of the European Union (EU) was founded contextually in the wake of the Keynesian economics crisis. The goal was to ‘create markets’ but also to ‘correct markets’ across borders, and this included currency exchange, though this was limited to the euro zone (Scharpf 1999). Explanatory Approach 4 Lastly, there is an explanation that points to the change of technology, based on the work of the economist W.E.G. Salter, among others. He argued (1969) that an industry may be viewed as a number of plants embodying techniques, ranging from the most modern plants embodying the current best-practice technique to the oldest plants still in use that embody the best-practice technique of an earlier time and is now outmoded. The consequences of this competition between old techniques, which generate what he terms ‘extensive growth’ – growth that merely reproduces a given situation but eventually fails – and new techniques that generate ‘growth in depth’, the winning situation. Salter writes (1969: 65): The appearance of a best-practise technique has the following effects: first, the output of the industry is expanded until price falls to equality with the total costs of plants employing the new technique; secondly, some of the older existing plants are scrapped or replaced until the operating of the oldest plant (or plants) equal the new level of price and best-practise costs. A flow of new best-practise techniques leads to a series of such equilibria (which combine both short- and long-run elements) and so trace out the path over time of output, costs, prices and productivity.

In the 1970s, and especially in the 1980s, a new technological innovation affected economic production, in manufacturing industries and in

Political economy: the background of the regulatory state

37

service production, as well as in the polity in general: Information and Communication Technology (ICT). The supply-side economy viewed ICT as a new way to boost the Keynesian economy out of stagnation. In sector after sector and firm by firm, ICT replaced old technology and machinery. Investments went into this new sector, and the demand for highly skilled labour forces grew rapidly – and so did the wages and the consumption. Old industries lost their competitive capacity and were closed down. The combined impacts of the new and the old technologies had dire consequences for the Keynesian state economy. On one hand, the closing down of old industries contributed to massive unemployment in most of the Western countries in those years. On the other hand, the expansion and pressure created in the new industries based on ICT-required investments and highly skilled and paid workers and specialists contributed to high inflationary pressure (Cumes 1984). The technological trade-offs as an explanation for the fall of Keynesian remedies and instruments are shown clearly by Figure 2.2. As supply-side monetarists might express it: policies that restrict the market have never really worked. What is needed is well-managed and regulated market growth in order to stimulate investment, production, productivity and employment, as well as to encourage innovation and a rational use of new technology (Fagerberg et al. 2005). And the economy should be approached with the recognition of its disaggregated, multisectoral structure, and with the aim of steady growth at the microeconomic level, a postulation stemming from Joseph A. Schumpeter.

2.5

THE REGULATORY STATE AND NEOSCHUMPETERIANISM

Joseph A. Schumpeter (1883–1950), the German-American economist, had developed structural theories in his 1911 ((German version) and 1934 English version) classic The Theory of Economic Development, with his Business Cycles (1939), in which he reworked Kondratiev’s notion of ‘long waves’ in the development of capitalist economies, and again with his Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy ([1942] 1979). In this latter work he wrote ([1942] 1979: 83): The fundamental impulse that sets and keeps the capitalist engine in motion comes from the new consumers goods, the new methods of production or transportation, the new markets, the new forms of industrial organization that capitalist enterprise creates.

38

Taming the regulatory state

As this quotation indicates, Schumpeter viewed the capitalist economy as supply-side driven: the main engine of growth was the increase in factor supply. Besides this, he rediscovered Adam Smith’s concern with the market entrepreneurs as the innovators who encourage growth by efficiently combining resources, adopting new technologies and conducting the division of labour. According to Schumpeter, the constant innovative activity of the market transforms a state of stagnation into one of growth (Fagerberg et al. 2005). Stagnation occurs when new forms of market-effective technology, production and organization are created alongside the already existing structures. In a phase of growth, there is a type of harmony. But, after a time, intensified competition between the old and the new arises. Competition leads to instability in national economies, with closures of old industries and increasing unemployment. But it becomes more competitive, fortified by the market mechanism, and so the new enterprises and economic sectors gradually assume a position of superiority. Schumpeter used the term ‘creative destruction’ to describe the waning of old structures and the breaking through of new ones, thus reforming the sphere of production and once again letting growth occupy a determinant position (Schumpeter [1942] 1979). Examples normally quoted in connection to this cycle are the introduction of electricity and the petrol internal-combustion engine at the turn of the century, and their inclusion in the productive process in the 1930s and after World War II in the West. The pre-war crisis in the international economy occurred because of this change in the mode of production. Another example used to support the ideas of Schumpeter is the introduction of information technology and biotechnology during the post-war period, but it was not until the 1970s and 1980s that they made their breakthrough and were included in factor supply as one of the means of production. In our analysis of the stagflation crisis, we suggested that the result of this adoption of new technology contributed to the competitive advantages for some sectors but not for others. We noted that the result was a new transitional crisis in the international economy, the stagflation crisis. But that crisis occurred long after the works of Schumpeter. We may well ask whether Schumpeter really introduced a cyclical theory instead of a theory of growth. Schumpeter claimed that there were clustering effects of innovation so that entrepreneurial-driven occurrences of economic activity led to progressively higher level of productivity and wealth (Elam 1994). And there is no need in a long-term perspective to slow down; unlike Ricardo, Schumpeter claimed that there is no diminishing return to innovation and investment. There are only two reasons for why

Political economy: the background of the regulatory state

39

that might happen: either all entrepreneurs in a generation might already be ‘used up’ or there is a lack of credit. Concerning the latter, he argued that financial innovation was also an important factor for increasing and stabilizing growth (Fagerberg et al. 2005). A new direction in the fight against stagflation was found in a revision of the theories of Schumpeter. A wave of neo-Schumpeterianism appeared in theory and practice. Schumpeter’s ideas offered a microeconomic perspective on the driving forces in the market economy (Schumpeter [1942] 1979). His focus had been on enterprises, which ‘created new combinations’, and ‘entrepreneurs’ who created and founded new activities; these were source of innovations. What was desirable was the establishment of channels for their energy but regardless of their ethical attitude. This focus went against Keynesian theory. For Keynes, stable production and aggregate demand were central concerns, and the state was responsible for this stability. The Schumpeterian critique against Keynesian theory, which called for state intervention and top-down rational planning, was that in the longer term the economy would lose the potential to grow and would suffer from structural crises, resulting from a lack of renewal and necessary innovations and clusters of innovations (Porter 1998). The neo-Schumpeterian perspective supported the development of deregulation, decentralization, privatization and an increased orientation towards the market and market entrepreneurs. The state replied with wide-reaching deregulation and the development of forms of planning tasks and institutional reforms, which were designed to make goal attainment more effective, measured by scientific evaluations of output. Management by objectives replaced bureaucratic control. The ‘age of administrative reform’ (Cassese 2003) began and the regulatory state order was established (Majone 1994). In the interventionist state all planning and administrative procedure were rational and based on a formal institutional structure. A formal structure constitutes which actor is to be given the right or duty, or both, to participate in the decision-making process, and how planning issues are to be resolved. The institutional perspective assumes that the organizational structure plays a significant role in the implementation and the result of the policy and actions of the people (Egeberg 1984; Olsen 1988). From the 1970s, a change in planning behaviour is noticeable (Friedman 1987; Amdam and Veggeland 1998). With a renewed focus on the supplyside and microeconomic competition, along with the emphasis on market mechanisms on its side, the approach of macroeconomic planning declined. The formal structure was to be supplemented by an informal structure, comprising several centres of power, and national economies would also

40

Taming the regulatory state

become more open. An informal structure is not without ambiguity with regard to who has the right or duty, or both, to participate in the planning process, and, unlike rational planning, it does not state how the planning and strategic tasks are to be resolved. It is possible to say that the state exceeds its own boundaries by including private actors (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004). The communicative forms of planning, with planning through participation and negotiation, build on formal and informal kinds of organization (Streeck 1995; Healey 1997). Instead of what we have called ‘hard’ regulation, communicative forms of planning relate to the notion of ‘soft’ regulation. In the EU, the traditional ‘Community method of regulation’ belonging to the ‘hard’ type from then on would approach step by step the introduction of both ‘the open method of coordination’ as a planning concept and ‘soft’ regulation by ‘communication and persuasion’. EU member states are by now deeply involved in these new planning and regulation forms and make it part of their new social-institutional paradigm of the regulatory state (Williams 1996; Cini 2004; Pollack 2005). However, along with comprehensive deregulation, this creates uncertainty in the planning process, something that upsets the interventionist state’s social-institutional paradigm for unconditional demand for full control. In addition, the regulatory state’s pursuit of goals, management by objectives, strategic planning and evaluation and measurement of the policy outputs – principles taken from the private-business sector as responses – impinge on this interventionist paradigm as well (Neyer 2002; OECD 2002). Public planning has become more orientated towards competition in the wake of political demands for privatization and the marketing of public activity in general (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004). The following points provide an indication of the fundamental shifts that have taken place (Veggeland 1998: 8–9): ●

●

In opposition to the main traditional goals of rational public planning and macroeconomic stabilization, index regulation and distribution of welfare goods, competitive planning processes have focused on strategic action and the pursuit of goals. The new forms of public planning and administration are directed towards both the competitive ability of public and private actors in national and international markets and to augmentation of this ability (Friedman 1987). Contrary to the restriction of administrative boundaries and parliamentary control at different tiers characteristic of traditional planning, competitive-orientated planning breaks boundaries,

Political economy: the background of the regulatory state

●

●

●

●

41

relies on networks and is only under indirect parliamentary control (Rhodes 2000). The market is the ultimate judge in this type of planning. In opposition to traditional rational planning based on a topdown approach and with professionals and civil servants as the main actors, competitive-orientated planning rests on a bottom-up approach, where many actors, drawn from both private and public sectors, exert an influence through agreements and transactive behaviour (Friedman 1987; Healey 1997). In opposition to traditional rational planning fixed by law, implemented, bureaucratic, and under control of procedures and budgetary constraints, competitive-orientated planning rests on a wider set of rules and laws, with experts in special agencies evaluating the outputs and the results (Veggeland 2004). Other agencies make surveillance of the steering legality of the agreements and implementation acts. In opposition to traditional planning, which is formal and rational in its structure and methodology, competitive-orientated planning is co-operative and collaborative (Healey 1997). Output evaluations and the achievement of results play an important role. In opposition to the focus on spatial, social and distributional dimensions of traditional rational planning, competitive-orientated planning is one-dimensional in the sense of being dominated by instrumental and economic thinking (Lowi 1992).

It is not the case, however, that competition-orientated planning, with its organizational arrangements, is in the process of replacing traditional planning structures. As we shall see, what is actually increasingly happening is that the two modes of planning supplement each other as parts of the regulatory state’s management of the ever more fragmented society. However, with regard to the instruments of policy, they differ greatly: traditional rational planning rests on ex ante approval and control, and the process of implementation is basically democratically trusted; competitive planning rests on ex post approval and control and is evaluated according to achieved results. The movement from the former towards the latter mode of planning form as part of expanded regulation is driven by a lack of democratic trust (Beetham and Lord 1998). Diffuse democratic trust generates the need for openness and transparency in order to tame competitive planning, but planning activities of that type make precisely that approach difficult to accomplish. The promotion of the notion of ‘good governance’ in the regulatory state is an aspect of this risk of democratic distrust.

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Taming the regulatory state

NOTES 1. With regard to reference and the framework of contemporary neo-liberal economic theory and policies, we might say that the profit-investment logic of Ricardo at the end of the nineteenth century conquered the whole of the Western world. 2. That is, before consumption wages and income are needed. 3. For the monetarists, the interest rate is a steering instrument. 4. In the current, basically loan-driven international crisis, the borrowing behaviour deviates from this normal pattern. 5. Original edition 6. Second edition 7. Alban William Phillips, an economist, published in Economica in 1958 an article titled ‘The relationship between unemployment and the rate of change of money wages in the United Kingdom 1861–1957’. In this paper, Phillips describes how he observed an inverse relationship between money wage changes and unemployment in the British economy over the period examined. Similar patterns were later found in other countries in 1960. Phillips’ work made explicit the empirical link between inflation and unemployment: when inflation is high, unemployment is low, and vice-versa. But empirical relations do not necessarily indicate causality, and therefore a debate ensued. 8. Investment, in a Keynesian sense, is a strategy to increase the effective demand in the economy.

3. 3.1

Post-stagflation management strategies THE ‘FOUR Ms’ STRATEGIES

We have learned that, according to Joseph A. Schumpeter, innovative activity of the market transforms a state of stagnation into one of growth. But the economic process is very complex. It begins with the occurrence of new forms of market-effective technology, production and organization, which are created alongside already existing structures. However, after some time, intensified competition between the old and the new arises. As a critical stage of advancement is reached, competition leads to instability in national economies, with closures of old industries and increasing unemployment. Further, with the market mechanism on their side, the new enterprises and economic sectors gradually assume a position of superiority owing to their competitiveness (Salter 1969). Schumpeter used the now famous term ‘creative destruction’ to describe this process of old structures weakening and ultimately disappearing while new ones break through and reform the sphere of production (Schumpeter [1942] 1979). The systemic nature of the process gives rise to the notion of new ‘techno-economic paradigms’. In the wake of the 1970s stagflation crises, a new techno-economic paradigm ascended (Hayward and Menon 2003). The reform of the sphere of production builds on a completely new world with new standards of efficiency, new high growth of sectors, new location patterns, new models for management and organizational principles. The neo-Schumpeterian view is that the transition from one techno-economic paradigm to the next entails equally profound transformations of the institutional and social framework (Amin 1994). In this new paradigm, the ‘socio-institutional’ paradigm is clearly subordinate to the ‘technoeconomic’ and its structure strictly bounded. We must take this point into consideration when elaborating the origins of the ‘socio-institutional paradigm’, which has been formed within the framework of the new technoeconomic paradigm of the regulatory state (Djelic and Anderson 2006). Christopher Pollitt and Geert Bouckaert (2004) have made a very fruitful contribution to the conceptualization of the management side of the new socio-institutional paradigm of the regulatory state that has arisen out 43

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Taming the regulatory state

of the hollowed-out Keynesian interventionist state model. The authors have identified four M-strategies as paradigmatic notions of governments’ choices of action when struggling and seeking solutions to the pressure of the processes of ‘creative destruction’ in the economy, that is, the stagflation crisis (2004: 188): ● ● ● ●

maintain minimize marketize modernize

Maintain This governmental management strategy refers to the tightening-up of traditional controls. It is hardly part of the new socio-institutional paradigm, but rather the demand-side economics of the Keynesian state. The tactics include restricting expenditures, freezing new hiring, fighting waste and abundance and generally ‘squeezing’ the system of administration and legal regulation. Stabilizing inflation on a low level by management and measures related to effective demand was the goal and political economy of the maintaining strategy. It was typical at the time when the Continental model and administrative tradition were under strain (Veggeland 2007). Minimize According to Pollitt and Bouckaert (2004: 188), minimizing the administrative system was in political economic terms part of the new but pathdependent socio-institutional paradigm: handing over as many tasks as possible to the market sector directly through privatization and indirectly through contracting out, that is, outsourcing. It has been called the ‘hollowing-out’ of the state apparatus. It represents a socio-institutional arrangement in which social security and public services of all kinds, such as social and health services, physical infrastructure and even military services, are drastically reduced. The thinking of Schumpeter was clearly evident in this strategy: create economic growth by making a rigid state machine decline through the minimizing strategy and replace it with innovative market actors that are exposed to ‘creative destruction’ but still under regulatory control. Such actors intensified the direct contact between the political system and the market economy, unmediated by, as it was seen, rigid Weberian bureaucratic structures. Minimalists altogether reject the idea that governments can be made to act in the best interests of the economy and the public in

Post-stagflation management strategies

45

general. In Schumpeter’s world, rulers are judged ‘able’ because they win votes, not because they have governed or will govern well (Kuper 2004: 98). But the minimalists use the rulers in the regulatory-state sense. Policies for tax cuts and low interest rates targeting an increase in aggregated consumption and investment (in accordance to Ricardoan principles) accompanied the minimizing strategy. In sum, it represents the political economy of the strategy to minimize and was typically applied to the strained Anglo-Saxon model and administrative tradition (Veggeland 2007). Marketize The marketizing of the administrative system was a strategy for instituting as many market-type mechanisms (MTMs) as possible within the public sector. It implies a redefinition of the economic rules of the state but also a transformed perspective on states, regulation and their roles. Marketizing questions all forms of protective measures, rules and barriers, and consequently has an impact on social-institutional paradigms and legal policies (Djelic 2006). This form of new public management (NPM) approach basically created the so-called PLAs, public-law agencies, and the PLBs, privatelaw bodies, which were steered indirectly by law, regulation and financial means (OECD 2002). In a democratic framework they have been named ‘unelected bodies’ (Vibert 2007). Emphasis was placed on the achievement of result through the means of flexible organizational structures and competition. The approach follows Schumpeter’s idea that innovation only becomes beneficial through market competition in both the spheres of techno-economics and social-institutional; hence, public-sector organizations should likewise be made flexible and competitive. Besides, it would increase efficiency and user-responsiveness. Like the minimizing strategy, the marketizing strategy was followed up with policies for tax cuts and low interest rates (again following Ricardoan principles) that were supposed to effect an increase in the aggregated consumption and investment, and thereby economic growth. The marketizing strategy turns out to be very typical for the regulatory state – namely ‘steering without rowing’. With regard to political economy, it was extensively adopted by the Anglo-Saxon model and administrative tradition in the 1980s (Knill 2001; Veggeland 2007). Modernize The modernization of the administrative system, still in accordance with Pollitt’s and Bouckaert’s thinking, in reference to its political economy,

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aimed to introduce faster, more flexible ways of budgeting, managing and delivering services to the user. The choice was made within the framework of the new socio-institutional paradigm, bound by the new technoeconomic paradigm of the regulatory state. Arm’s-length bodies were organized and set into motion as market actors or pseudo-market actors. It was predicated on both the distinctiveness of public provision, on ‘services of general interest’, to distinguish between ‘non-commercial services’ – in-house services – and ‘commercial services’ – marketized services (EU Green Paper 2003) – and the need to strengthen the state rather than to dilute the state. But in order to reach the economic potential for growth in the Schumpeterian sense, innovation is necessary in both the techno-economic and the socio-institutional spheres, and innovation occurs when market actors compete. These new ways of operating were clearly borrowed from the market sector and meant the introduction of MTMs also into the public sector, but selectively. Instead of being minimal, MTMs became dominant in public services, both in the welfare sector and in the sector of physical infrastructure. Contextually, however, the bureaucratic structures remained as mediators in the Weberian sense, but they were partly changed into institutions and bodies serving the regulatory state; that is, new institutional innovations occurred (Black et al. 2005). We may call this new social and institutional paradigm a neo-Weberian order of bureaucracy. We may view the political economy of the modernizing strategy as a blended strategy of maintaining, but with much emphasis on result-orientated management, and of reducing and simplifying regulation with modest marketizing. It was a typical strategy for the strained Nordic model and administrative traditions (EPC Working paper 2005; Iversen 2005; Veggeland 2007). The ‘four Ms’ are not implemented in any particular order, ‘but’, Pollitt and Bouckaert note, ‘neither can they all be convincingly pursued simultaneously. Some countries have gone through the phase of distancing and blaming, but many have not. The Nordic countries tended to bypass that and aim for beneficial modernising’ (2004: 188–9). In contrast, Michael Moran (2003) has argued that the minimizing and marketizing strategies have obviously led to innovation and expansion of the regulatory state order, but in an uncontrolled, untamed way. He uses Britain’s state of ‘hyper-innovation’ as an example and states that it has encouraged a ‘fiasco’ because of the uncontrolled rise of transactional costs. What we have shown so far is that the ‘four-Ms’ strategies were reasonable responses to the 1970s international stagflation crisis, which changed the technoeconomic and social-institutional paradigms. There are questions that require answers: how and when is the success or the failure of the strategies to be measured, and what are the taming perspectives?

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What we have learned is that countries’ reforming experiences demonstrate that the same reforming strategies perform differently and produce very diverse results in different contextual social models and traditions (Knill 2001; Veggeland 2007). Accordingly, this variation in reforming experiences reflects the disparate institutional structures and environments that confront the reformers. A principal lesson to emerge from this review is that the establishment of a new social-institutional paradigm is contextually dependent (Røvik 2007). Reforming strategies need to be tailored to an individual country’s context, needs and traditions. These differences will be reflected in the social-institutional paradigm from which the reforms are launched, the nature of the problems faced and the most appropriate solution to apply. The OECD report (2005: 22) has made this statement: ‘Other issues that depend on context include how countries deal with accountability, control in public management, the involvement of the private and community sector in service delivery, the use of Market-Type Mechanisms (MTM), and the line between the public and private domains’. Let us look further into organizational change and contextual relations.

3.2

NEW SOCIAL-INSTITUTIONAL PARADIGMS: ‘MINIATURE GOVERNMENTS’?

The change of the social-institutional paradigm has forced governments to realize that managing from distance, through the organizational form of arm’s-length bodies, has created specific issues of responsibility, accountability and control (Beetham and Lord 1998). Repercussions of this organizational form, such as institutional fragmentation of government, lack of responsibility, and increasing transactional costs have gained attention. The following critical quotation below about the so-called ‘Next Steps Agencies’, or ‘regulatory innovations’ as defined by Julia Black (2005), a part of the marketizing strategy, is empirically related to the Anglo-Saxon situation in the UK (Beetham et al. 2002: 133): It has long been recognised that the doctrine of ministerial responsibility to Parliament is a fiction . . . But the sheer institutional diversity of government makes the doctrine obsolete and its complexity obscures who is accountable to whom for what. A whole host of official bodies and officials exercise a great variety of powers over the spectrum of government – executive agencies, quangos, public corporations, regulators, czars, ad hoc plenipotentiaries, and inspectors. Many of these are ‘miniature governments’ in their own sphere. The 138 executive agencies are still formally part of their parent governmental departments. There are 187 national executive quangos – semi-autonomous

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40 f

35 30

f

25

t

t e

% 20 15

f f

10

e

f 5

t e t

0 1971

e t 1980

e 1989 years

1998

2001 2003

Notes: f: Financial agencies e: Energy agencies t: Telecommunication agencies Source: OECD (2005: 114).

Figure 3.1 Trends in independent regulatory authorities in OECD countries, measured by percentage of civil servants working in independent agencies public bodies like the Housing Corporation and the Learning and Skills Council . . . There are 414 advisor quangos and over 300 task forces; some of these committees effectively make policy on the safety of drugs, foods, air pollution, etc.

With regard to the independent regulatory authorities in the OECD countries, the great increase of positions, indicating growth in numbers and organizational use, began in the late 1980s for financial, energy and telecommunication arm’s-length authorities and agencies (Figure 3.1). The financial sector had a lead in the 1970s and 1980s, but there is a converging trend. In general, taking also other sectors into consideration, we can see that the trend of extensive growth of all kinds of agencies and bodies has continued since then. To the diverse list of agencies, authorities and other governmental bodies in the UK, given in the quotation above, we can add more from a

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Executive Central Government Ministry Departments

Departmental Agencies

Indivisible from the state

Public-Law Administrations Partially or fully legally separated

Public-law bodies

Tax funding

Figure 3.2

Private-Law Bodies Legally separated entities Private-law bodies

Some fee, some sales, some tax

Sales revenue funded

A simplified version of Derek Gill’s illustration, specifying only institutional, legal and financial features that apply to the executive bodies involved

few other selected countries. The list below is taken from an OECD report (2002: 11). In Canada: Service agencies, Special Operating Agencies (SOAs), departmental service agencies and in some cases shared governance corporations. In New Zealand: Most Crown entities and semi-autonomous bodies. In Sweden: Expert boards and agencies. In the Netherlands: Independent administrative bodies (Zelfstandinge Bestuursorganen, ZBOs) and agencies (Agentschappen). In France: Public establishments (tablissements publics) and independent administrative authorities (Autorités administratives indépendantes). In Germany: Federal agencies (direct federal administration, unmittelbare Bundesverwaltung), bodies of public law (indirect federal administration, mittelbare Bundesverwaltung and some private-law administrative entities (Bundesverwaltung in Privatrechtsform). In Norway: Direct administration (direktorat) and public agencies and corporations, both private-law and public-law bodies.

Derek Gill (2002) has developed a typology of governmental organizational forms that combines both institutional and legal status with the characteristics of financial and management rules that apply to them. Figure 3.2 gives a simple version of his presentation in order to indicate where the traditional and the regulatory state’s social-institutional paradigms belong. Departmental Agencies Departmental agencies are part of the ministries as executives, and they do not have a separate legal identity from the state. They are embraced by

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public law and are funded by taxes (Figure 3.2). They are not necessarily attached to a governing board (although they might have management boards, as in Sweden and elsewhere), and their function is to deliver noncommercial services to citizens and socio-economic sectors of the state. Examples: New Zealand: Semi-autonomous bodies; Sweden: Boards; The Netherlands: Agencies; Germany: Direct federal administration; Norway: Direct administration. Public-Law Administrations (PLAs) PLAs are arm’s-length bodies of the government and the ministerial departments, institutional and legal foundations and fully or partially separated from the ministries. They have a governing board of experts, an advisory board or one-person administrative rule (managing director), and they report to their respective ministries, which have indirect control by virtue of being executors of laws. Financially, they receive some funding from the government, and they earn the rest from result-based fees or sales (Figure 3.2). As we have seen, the PLAs are essential in the reforming strategies that began in the shadow of the stagflation crisis of the 1970s, that is, marketizing and modernizing. Their functions have a wide range, from service delivery to typical regulatory and quasi-judicial functions. Examples: New Zealand: Crown entities and semi-autonomous bodies; Sweden: Agencies; France: Professional public establishments and independent administrative authorities; Germany: Indirect federal administration; UK: Many executive non-departmental public bodies; Norway: Public-law bodies. Private-Law Bodies (PLBs) Private-law bodies are arm’s-length bodies that are quasi-corporations and non-commercial private-law bodies and often organized as shareholdings, with the state as full or dominant shareholder (Figure 3.2). Hence, they are legally separate bodies, and a governing board under the indirect control of the minister structures their governance and control. Their budgets are separate from state allocation. Financially, they earn their income from sales revenues (Figure 3.2), and they are thus motivated by full profit objectives; that is, they have the function to reach service objectives while being obliged to restrain costs. Also the PLBs are essential in the reforming strategies, that is, marketizing and modernizing that shaped

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the regulatory state. They have a broad range of functions, including, of course, the provision of services but even some regulatory and quasijudicial functions. Examples: Sweden: Agencies; The Netherlands: Private-law ZBOs; France: Industrial and commercial establishments; Germany: Privatelaw administration entities; Norway: Agencies/corporations; UK: Many executive private bodies.

3.3

NEW SOCIAL-INSTITUTIONAL PARADIGM CREATES RISKS THAT REQUIRE TAMING

Frank Vibert (2007: 1) has called the growth of arm’s-length agencies ‘the rise of the unelected’. With regard to democracy, he argues (2007: 42–54) that this is a good development because it results in a new separation of public power. What he has overlooked, however, are the risk factors. Many scholars have reported the numerous risks that attend the organizational forms of the new social-institutional paradigm (Beetham 2002; OECD 2002; Moran 2003; Veggeland 2004). Summing them up, we find: ●

●

●

●

●

Lack of clarity generates risk: The lack of clarity concerning the differences between the various forms of agencies, authorities and other governmental bodies has as a repercussion and a consequence the lack of control. The numerical risk: Given that there are many ‘miniature governments’, a growing number of regulations have mounted in order to reduce the risks of failure. The risk of fragmentation: The lack of clarity regarding roles and accountability is a consequence of the fragmentation of the public sector and the distribution of governance. The transaction-cost risk: Transactional costs have swelled as a consequence of the fragmentation of executive functions and coordination endeavours, which have strained the funding of the core activities in the public sector and have reduced supply-side efficiency. The democratic risk: There has been a growing democratic deficit as a consequence of distributed governance and the dilution of the Weberian state apparatus.

Let us consider more closely the lack of clarity and numerical risk. After studies of nine OECD member states, the OECD has concluded that a consequence of the frenetic creation of governmental bodies during the 1980s

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and the 1990s has been both the dispersion of numerous entities and a lack of organizational clarity of the institutional system. The risk is that in all countries studied, there is variety of organizational and legal categories, as well as accountability arrangements, for the same types of autonomous entities. In many countries, the legal rules that apply to these entities are determined at best by both law and decree, creating a profusion of individual situations, rules of organization and accountability mechanisms (OECD 2002: 24).

Why do these types of risks seem to be inherent in the institutional paradigm of the regulatory state? From the perspective of policy, the OECD itself is partly the answer. During the 1980s and the 1990s, the OECD and its experts became important as international actors. The organization started looking across national borders in order to search for and to collect new ideas about and lessons on administrative practices; taking the new techno-economic paradigm in the global age for granted, the OECD thus produced numerous recommendations to its member states on how to modernize government in order to become more effective and competitive (OECD 2005). Many ideas spread extensively, and they were copied and translated into different national settings (Røvik 2007; Veggeland 2003, 2004). Studies taking a social-institutional paradigm perspective have shown, however, that states and global socio-economic regions operate selectively and translate differently when they adopt external ideas, decide policy strategies and implement institutional reforms (Knill 2001). The UK, belonging to the Anglo-Saxon identity, has, for example, made different kinds of choices than Germany and France, belonging to the Continental identity, or the Nordic countries, belonging to the Scandinavian identity. Besides, within these transnational regions, national identities also affect the decision-making processes. How can we explain this factor? Social-institutional paradigms seem to put their imprint on the translation and implementation of new ways of doing things that are learned from without (Pierre 2001). In other words, we are talking about embedded path-dependence, which constrains the formulating and the implementation of organizational change and renewal. The copying and creating of organizations, which tend towards convergence across borders, seem to be rare phenomena, even under the supranational regulatory regime of the EU. As documented by the OECD, institutional divergence seems to be the norm, and it is so because of path-dependent processes (Pierson 2004). The risks that require taming are the following. (1) Countries translating new organizational ideas tend to interpret and implement them out of context, and this practice creates a profusion of singular situations,

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organizational rules and mechanisms of accountability and thereby a general lack of clarity. (2) The determination of whether the best organizational forms have been chosen for the various functions of government is very unclear because comparisons of advantages out of context are difficult to measure. (3) The ability of the authorities to monitor and control these entities deteriorates because of the manifold legal and financial identities of these bodies. (4) The lack of transparency of the institutional system may undermine both the accountability and effective use of the technoeconomic system. (5) The numerical aspect of the new social-institutional paradigm implies fatal institutional fragmentation. Let us now turn to the risks of fragmentation and transactional costs. The creation of arm’s-length bodies for the purpose of ‘steering without rowing’ has proven successful for certain functions but obviously not for others; the welfare sector has especially been adversely affected (Iversen 2005). In other cases, we can see that new dangers have appeared, threatening their raison d’être because of institutional and management fragmentation along with rising transactional costs that tend to reduce the budgetary expenses for core policy tasks of the actual sector and democratic deficit due to the lack of representation and responsibility (Beetham and Lord 1998; Pierson 2001). To counteract the fragmentation and the trend of rising transactional costs, the concept of partnership has been introduced together with the EU-recommended principle of subsidiarity. We should really name this principle of subsidiarity in the plural, principles, because in the real policy world we find not only the occurrences of both downward and upward devolutions of power and authority to lower or higher layers of government but also the outward devolution of authority to the ‘miniature governments’, the arm’s-length bodies (OECD 2002). Public–private partnership establishments, thus including the outward distribution of governance, dominate in most of the policy arenas of the regulatory state. There are two reasons for this dominance. First, the central governments, especially in the unitary states, want neither the downward devolution of competence nor the distribution of public governance to lower layers of government. Obviously, the national state authorities want to keep their internal monopoly of territorial control. The model of ‘outward’ distribution of authority seems, then, to be the preferred one. Accordingly, the central state prefers rather to form partnerships, that is, sectoral ‘state–regional’ partnerships, with the independent agencies and authorities at the regional level (Higdem 2007). However, that strategy undermines the authority of the democratic institutions at the lower layers and threatens both the partnership loyalty and the option to voice regional concerns.

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Secondly, establishments of public–private partnerships, based on the principle of pooling resources and governance capability, are conceived as being an important measure for developing a competitive economy in the Western European countries and clearly not for democratic purposes. For in such partnerships, after agreements and contracts are signed, the elected democratic bodies abdicate, leaving the function of governance to independent boards, management teams and the market actors. A deficit of democracy and legitimacy is the consequence (Nuget and Paterson 2003; Veggeland 2003).

3.4

OECD REPORTS CHANGE IN TRENDS

The two trends described above, concerning democratic and administrative governance in the perspective of subsidiarity, now worry the Western European member state governments of the EU because of the threats to democracy and the loss of control. The 2002 OECD report ‘Distributed Public Governance: Agencies, authorities and other government bodies’ has documented these worries extensively. The study embraces nine national states, including five EU member states: France, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain and Sweden. The report also demonstrates the new policy strategies of these states that are intended to regain more democratic governmental control on all administrative tiers. The contributors to this OECD report (2002) have observed that, in the wake of the redefined concept of subsidiarity, Distributed Public Governance in the form of independent agencies and technocratic authorities have come to challenge the democratic order on all administrative levels – from the national down to the sub-national levels. It has happened in three ways: ●

●

Elected assemblies and governments at lower tiers have lost power politically, while executive technocratic authorities have gained greater dominance. Accordingly, the waning of representative political authorities creates a deficit of input democracy, accountability and legitimacy (Majone 1997; Scharpf 1999). Agreement-based governance and legal-partnership institutions have been replacing the institutions of representative government. Michael Keating (1998: 47) has epigrammatically summarized this worrying trend as follows: ‘governance is what exists when government is weak and fragmented’, meaning fragmented governance performed by independent authorities replaces holistic government.

Post-stagflation management strategies ●

55

Because policies acquire their legitimacy first and foremost from functionality and effectiveness – that is, from the output or outcome of executives and from comparative competitive advantages that benefit from ‘locked-in’ internal management – they challenge the democratic principles of openness, transparency and deliberation (Eriksen et al. 2002).

According to the OECD report, this political and administrative situation has undermined accountability from the citizens below, and central and sub-national governments have been losing legitimacy (Ferrera 2002). It also challenges the legitimacy of the EU. Therefore, it is in the interests of a wide range of actors that the OECD report concludes that there is a fundamental change of policies taking place: ‘from the drive to create agencies, authorities and other government bodies to the challenge of achieving good governance’ (2002: 21). Furthermore, ‘The creation of Specific Public Law agencies and administrations and their twins Private Law Bodies seems to have come to a stand-still in many countries’ (2002: 22). The OECD report also articulates some conclusions on taming actions. The following facts from the studied countries are issued: ●

●

●

●

In most countries, and in terms of the new democracy principles, priorities have moved away from the inclination to create new independent and separate bodies. Now the challenge seems to be finding the right balance between accountability, autonomy and management of the existing independent agencies and bodies through more openness and transparency, as well as by strengthening the steering capacity of governments (2002: 21). The new independent technocratic entities allow governments to avoid taking political decisions or to take decisions guided only by technical expertise on issues that require a political choice and are at the core of political responsibility (2002: 22). This worries the governments. The lack of clarity about the differences between the various types of public agencies, authorities and commercial institutions make it unclear whether the best organizational forms have been chosen for the various purposes of government (2002: 24). Therefore, standardization measures are now implemented. Governmental monitoring efforts and control of the independent public entities are becoming more difficult. Despite reporting procedures, and even though using neutral agencies for legal surveillance, the different types of relationships, and the different types of control and accountability mechanisms of the bodies, make accurate

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●

●

●

control almost impossible (2002: 25). The trends to ex post controls and managerial flexibility do not mean there is less control – in fact there are more varied controls. Up to 50 per cent of the work of external auditors is now performance audits (OECD 2005). Many more financial and non-financial reports are produced, and benchmarking takes time, likewise so does quantity and quality control. These issues are now counteracted with measures expanding the democratic control capacity of all administrative tiers. The need for clearer criteria for establishing different types of boards – advisory, management or governing boards and their respective responsibilities – are acknowledged. There has been criticism of lack of transparency surrounding the appointments of board members, their salaries and other benefits. Or the criticism has focused on the lack of representative function regarding the members in terms of gender, ethnic and local background (2002: 25). It is counteracted by means of regulations for more transparency and better balance concerning appointments. The independent bodies are seen as functioning outside the political debate with little oversight from ministers and ministries and weak accountability arrangements. The parliaments are neglected, and so are individuals and the institutions of the civil society. Conclusion: weak accountability mechanisms undermine the legitimacy of governments and parliaments (2002: 26). Measures for expanding the governance capacity of the parliaments on all administrative tiers are implemented. Finally: weak co-ordination mechanisms and coherence failure threaten effective public service production in terms of ‘best value’ to individuals, social groups and corporate interests, because of fragmented governance (2002: 26). Empowering of parliaments and holistic planning authorities on all administrative levels are recognized as counteracting measures.

To explain the last paragraph on weak co-ordination mechanisms we may refer to what has been called Scharpf’s Law (Hooghe and Marks 2001: 5): ‘As the number of affected parties increases . . . negotiated solutions incur exponentially rising and eventually prohibitive transaction costs’ (Scharpf 1997: 70). In the system of Distributed Public Governance, the problem of technical, communicative or legal co-ordination of the many actors and bodies escalates immensely with growing numbers and the transactional costs will ultimately be excessive, according to Scharpf’s Law (Figure 3.3). We may remark here that too many co-ordinating partnerships and controlling and participating bodies will in themselves make the number of

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Transactional costs

Critical limit

Number of arm’s-length bodies including partnerships

Figure 3.3

Scharpf’s Law illustrating exponential growth over time of transactional costs because of extensive coordination and control functions

actors grow and critically increase the transactional costs. They progress in the manner shown in Figure 3.3, and the steep part of the curve visualizes the risk generated by fragmentation of the public sector. In this perspective, the weak co-ordination mechanisms that these countries report are not a failure connected to the poor performance of public governance, but are instead a consequence of the Distributed Public Governance system itself (Veggeland 2003). Thus, according to the OECD report (2002), there is a growing focus on good governance and more coherent public services, that is, on solutions for policy and structural coherence, including having the autonomous bodies work on joint projects and in public–public partnerships. Hence, the focus of the involved states in the OECD study covers these taming policies: (a)

Administrative strategies that make the creation of new independent agencies, public corporations in the service sector and autonomous bodies unnecessary. (b) The greater involvement of civil society and the tier governments in multilevel governance. (c) Improving the parliamentary control over activities for the sake of more holistic responsibility.

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(d) And lastly, there is a growing political will to make the overall system more legible and accessible to people, and the mechanisms of accountability, activities and performance more easily controllable by parliaments, on all tiers and in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity. All in all, these new priorities imply the importance of making democracy work from below, involving the citizens and the civil society, and making sub-national governments and elected assemblies strong again – also in the context of the EU (Van Gerven 2005).

3.5

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE INDEPENDENT REGULATORY AGENCIES AND AUTHORITIES

Kjell Arne Røvik (2007) has elaborated the fact that ideas and institutions do not flow or homogenize instantly but that the ‘travel of ideas’ is an active social process of translation. This translation process transforms social-institutional paradigms, but administrative traditions represent contexts that influence the translation. Besides techno-economic and social-institutional paradigms belonging to dominant states of power will in an international context through hegemony influence the content of the translations. The UK and the US were two early pioneers in the political process of fragmentation and the idea of erecting independent regulatory agencies and authorities, starting in the 1970s under (perhaps oddly) Labour and Democrat governments. From those countries, the idea spread to other countries with the Anglo-Saxon model and further to countries both of the Nordic model and of the Continental model (Veggeland 2007). Five distinct developments in a political-economic perspective characterized this diffusion and its context (Djelic 2006). First, the stagflation crisis of the 1970s had a nearly global impact and revealed everywhere that Keynesian economic instruments had failed in the fight against increasing unemployment and inflation. Finding their steering instruments ineffective, governments were susceptible to influence from neo-liberal ideologies and recommendations about NPM and the use of MTMs. Second, the crisis increased the dependence of many countries on international financial institutions (Keohane and Nye 1977), such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) or the World Bank (WB). They promoted neo-liberal policies and strategies for privatizing (minimizing) and marketizing.

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Third, the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union implied the victory of capitalism and liberalism and extrapolated as a victory over socialism and state interventionism. The new Eastern Europe countries became heavily dependent on international financial institutions, the US, the EU and other rich Western countries. All market ideas were promoted together with radical forms of political and social liberalism (Olsen 1995). Fourth, the US was rising meanwhile to hegemonic power, or perhaps more accurately, an empire. Since 1945, the diffusion of ideas has been highly uniform. The flows of ideas, institutional reforms, rules of the game have gone predominantly one way – from the US to the rest of the Western world and not the other way round. Political and economic power is important when ideas travel and are translated (Rometsch and Wessels 1996). Fifth, in a knowledge-based society, borderless flows of ideas, principles, techniques, rules and frameworks are the norm. Academics, consultants, civil servants and managers all participate in transnational networks in the global age, and flows of dominant ideas tend to influence their thinking (Røvik 2007). Because US hegemony is both dominant and extensive not only in the sphere of politics but also in other areas, the Chicagomonetarist thinking is bound to the new techno-economic paradigm of the regulatory state, combined with the related social-institutional paradigm of neo-liberalism, and the use of market-type mechanisms has quickly spread worldwide.

4. 4.1

Taming vulnerability and organizational dynamics INTERNATIONALIZATION, MUTUAL DEPENDENCE AND VULNERABILITY: ‘SPILLOVER’ PROCESSES

The study of international policy in traditional political science in the years following World War II had the tendency to use theories that explain integration in relation to the development of institutions and the regulation of the relationships through agreements between sovereign states (Rosamond 2000). The development of Western welfare states in the 1950s and 1960s until the mid 1970s took place under highly favourable circumstances, aided by continuous growth in the economies, and governments were able to manage national budgetary control (Tinbergen 1965). Political economic analyses, therefore, characteristically emphasized a national, state-centred perspective bound both to the techno-economic paradigm rooted in Keynesian state intervention and principles of effective-demand and to the socio-institutional paradigm of the Weberian bureaucracy (Olsen 2005). This is particularly true of the realist school (Cini 2004a). Realism claims that international politics is about the interaction of self-interested states in an anarchic environment, where no supranational authority is capable of securing order and reducing risks. According to Neil Nuget (1999: 509), the theory ‘is centred on the view that nation states are the key actors in international affairs and the key political relations between states are channelled primarily via national governments’. Thus, realists have focused exclusively on governmental institutions and actors and their taming roles in internationalization and transnational co-operation. The same is true for the inter-governmentalists. They point out that there is significant evidence of inter-governmental bargaining and consensus-building techniques as dominant modes of policy-making in many areas (Moravcsik 1993, 1998). They understand that, despite an anarchical environment, there is some potential for order on the basis of international co-operation. It is especially true when governments enter negotiations and bargaining processes and reach legally binding agreements, and these 60

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establish order and favourable co-operative networks. The EU states are an example of such co-operation (Hoffmann 1966; Moravcsik 1998). This is the traditional community method of integration based on hard regulation; the method depends on bargaining processes and consensusbuilding, with member state governments as actors. The output takes the forms of laws and regulations, and ever more authority gravitates to the supranational regime of the EU, which also becomes an independent actor of defined political areas in continuing bargaining processes. Intergovernmentalism is not only of relevance to EU politics; it also refers to a type of decision-making and partnership-building that occurs within all international network organizations. These theories of realism and inter-governmentalism, however, ignore central functional national actors, such as financial agencies, regulatory arm’s-length administrations and other governmental bodies, private businesses and NGOs, which act in trans-border networks. Also subnational political administrative actors are ignored, such as municipalities and regions (Anderson 1994). In the global age, these extra-governmental actors take advantage of their beneficiaries’ networking abilities and thereby transfer their demand, expectations and their loyalties from central government to a new centre (March and Olsen 2005; Veggeland 2005). Cross-border and transnational initiatives are taken, and agreements are settled out of the remit of the central government. Consequently the neo-functionalism strand, another dominant school of understanding integration and the development of network organizations, has extended the non-governmental perspective and recognized that political goals can only be realized if strategic thinking includes ‘beyondgovernment’ actors, that is, socio-economic sectors, interest groups and acting individuals (Haas 1958; Nye 1971). Beyond governments, such actors co-operate in networks and develop themselves through the advancement of agreements and contracts, ones not rooted in trust but in mistrust.1 This advancement both of functional and benefit-making network extensions and of pressure for further integration of other sectors and interest groups is termed ‘functional spillover’ processes. The occurrence of ‘spillover’ processes and the concomitant increase of mutual dependence between an increasing number of actors become predominant (Strøby Jensen 2004). The option actors have for exiting partnerships, moreover, exacerbates these conditions of vulnerability. These conditions reflect the vulnerability of the decision-making processes of European Community, which is ‘spilling-over’ in the direction of an ever-closer Union. As elaborated by Ernst Haas and other scholars (Haas 1958; Wallace et al. 2005), the European integration commenced with an initial decision by six governments to place a certain sector, in this case

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coal and steel, under the authority of a common central authority, the institutions of the Coal and Steel Union. There was enormous pressure to extend the authority of these institutions into neighbouring areas of policy, which ended up with the Treaty of Rome as a part of a first round. Thus, neo-functionalists had predicted the expansion and deepening of European integration with an increasing number of member states and involving many other issues, such as monetary policy and service industries. Despite legal binding treaties and regulations, the neo-functional school understood that organizational dynamics entail vulnerability in the sense that the processes by themselves generate unforeseen consequences, which may well not be acceptable for member states and extra-governmental actors. In a taming perspective, the threat of the exit option may deliberately change the development path, though (Neyer 2002; Veggeland 2004). Neo-functionalists think from the perspective of economic-base theory and typically link politics and social-institutional paradigms as a functional spillover from economics, that is, techno-economic paradigms. Functional economies tend to adopt functional institutions, and, obversely, dysfunctional economies tend to adopt dysfunctional institutions. Using this neofunctional conceptualization, we might identify the regulatory state order of institutions to be a functional spillover from monetarist and supply-side economics. If the international economic system of this kind becomes disordered, the regulatory institutional system will accordingly be put under immediate pressure for change (Sandholtz 1996). Joseph S. Nye (1971) defines functional spillover, therefore, as a way of re-establishing the balance after an imbalance has arisen between political organization and functional power connected with economic market forces. Functional spillover takes place when inadequate state organization undermines the effectiveness of politics and planning in the different social sectors, just as the Keynesian state did in the 1970s. We may consider what is termed deregulation and re-regulation as consequences of functional spillover from market-making and market-correcting policies (Scharpf 1999). Political spillover occurs when national, sub-national and supranational arm’s-length bodies, interest groups and other bodies create additional pressure for the further extension of mutual networks of cooperation; if these demands are not fulfilled, then co-operation dissolves. The latter outcome is an indication of partnership vulnerability, rooted either in rational choices or in mistrust and conflict. Another outcome might realistically be the establishment of new regulatory bodies in order to provide necessary services, to control the rules of the game of co-operation or to correct the market through re-regulation. However, this latter solution should make governments and other stakeholders at

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all levels of decision-making think critically about necessity taking into consideration the already existing numerous arm’s-length bodies (OECD 2002; Veggeland 2004). We have already encountered this phenomenon in the different forms of institutional modes of the regulatory state (Majone 1996: 9–28). The neo-functionalists have a pluralistic, but somewhat deterministic, view on network development and the attempts that participating actors make to regulate corporations, bargaining processes and agreement settlements. Probably because of the neo-functionalist tendency to regard spillover processes deterministically, what is underemphasized is the vulnerability of those spillover processes. What is missing here is the intergovernmentalist view that recognizes that governments undertake certain activities that may cause friction or totally undermine further network developments and expansions (Pollack 2005). Further, neo-functionalists are also guilty of neglecting the spillover of regional and local political structures. In contrast, the liberal strand of inter-governmentalism, which includes a liberal theory of national bottom-up preference formation, recognizes this phenomenon (Moravcsik 1998). In our analysis above, we have tried to show how the state apparatus together with numerous other actors participate at national and transnational network arenas, creating agreement-based structures of governance as part of the regulatory state order. Public–public and public–private partnerships operate also in these arenas: they progress but at the cost of generating vulnerability. This susceptibility partly reflects the increasing ‘hollowing-out’ of traditional sovereignty of the European national state. At a high political level, the pooling of national sovereignty in the EU is essential. However, equally important is the parallel movement at the national level, namely the pooling of state authority in partnerships and arm’s-length governmental bodies and agencies. The neo-functionalists have noted – and this is the essential point in a pluralistic perspective – that new industrial forms of organization and arenas for regulation have been created as a consequence of functional and political spillover effects in the building of new economies. The new forms in the industrial sector reflect in some sense the function of fragmentations in the public sector. There has been a change in the market forms of production; the character of production has changed from Fordism to post-Fordism (Amin 1994). Fordism was intimately bound to Keynesian economy and the need for balance between an interventionist state and the business sector. Compacted, hierarchical organized businesses of massproduction confronted a monopoly-based hierarchical state, in a policy framework of scale. At the time the form represented a stable mode of macroeconomic growth.

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The transformation of this market form of production to Schumpeterinspired post-Fordism occurred in the 1970s; the compact hierarchy structure was split into small, flexible, consumer-adapted business units. It is commonly accepted that three theoretical approaches together, each offering a somewhat different perspective, capture the essential characteristics of this post-Fordist political economy (Amin 1994; Sabel 1994). These are: 1.

The regulation approach understands the transformation to postFordism as a somewhat parallel process of industrial fragmentation to the establishment of arm’s-length bodies and agencies in the public sector. The reconstruction of the mother company into smaller branch firms inhered a belief in the principle of ‘steering without rowing’ in the economic interest of more effective indirect management by means of the distant regulation of subsidiaries. 2. The flexible specialization and customer-adapted approach understands this transformation as a fix for the demand for fast changes in production, technology and internal organization in order to satisfy customers. All of these are aimed at making the business more productive and competitive. 3. The neo-Schumpeterian approach understands the transformation as an adjustment of the ‘socio-institutional paradigm’ in the business sector to the new ‘techno-economic paradigm’ of the regulatory state. Aside from competition in the market, a diversity of smaller units delivering items and services to the mother company could encourage ‘creative destruction’ and industrial innovation. 4. Creative destruction and innovation in the business sector indicates risky but beneficial undertakings and dynamics in growing economies. The vulnerability is attached to economic recessions in the sense of threatening overall destruction. 5. Smaller units delivering items and services to the mother company have their basis in the principle of ‘just-in-time’ delivery in order to be effective organizations. Such a principle is by definition vulnerable. For example, a strike at one firm or an infrastructure failure at another will for a period of time disrupt the whole production cycle of the company. A strike at one unit will negatively affect other workers’ conditions elsewhere in the production chain, which raises ethical considerations. 6. Vulnerability of this kind creates a need for wide-reaching regulations and measurements of goal achievement. Post-Fordism biases, therefore, the building of the regulatory state.

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DEPENDENCE, VULNERABILITY AND SENSITIVITY

We may take those neo-functionalist network theories that do not allocate to the state a central position, as is the case with realists, as a starting point. Several scholars have elaborated the social-institutional paradigm of the weakened national state with regard to both dependence and interdependence effects, caused by network mechanisms. As early as in 1971, Joseph S. Nye published the article ‘Comparing Common Markets: A Revised Neo-Functional Model’. Later, Nye together with Robert O. Keohane published Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition (1977). Their theories are well-suited for throwing new and better light upon the development of forms of interaction in networks, which have occupied a dominant position in the 1980s and 1990s. They assert that the state acts in a sovereign manner neither in relation to international and domestic actors in the market nor in relation to political and administrative actors that have clearly acquired a position of relative autonomy within the state system. Two important concepts in this respect are ‘interdependence’ and ‘network integration’ in regard to partnership formations like the EU (Veggeland 2004). Dependence means that one actor is unilaterally influenced by the actions of other actors. Interdependence refers to a situation of mutual dependence, as is the case in national and international arenas of network governance. Interdependence does not presume likeness between the parties; instead, partnership formations based on bargaining will mean that power connected to political and knowledge-based resources favours one of the parties. The concept of interdependence is usually defined descriptively, without an evaluation of its desirability. But, interdependence may result in economic and social inequality, what EU-language calls a ‘lack of economic and social cohesion’ – belonging – between states, regions and social groups (Keating and Loughlin 1997). This also applies to the issue of social-institutional standards. With reference to interdependence, Keohane and Nye (1977) proposed sensitivity and vulnerability as two dimensions of interaction, both of which need to be tamed. Nye has later elaborated this notion further and has suggested a ‘three-dimensional chess model’ as a basic term of reference to high politics (2004). In the first dimension, strategic military concepts of power are developed, and in the middle, second dimension, technoeconomic concepts define the competitive strength of the state. Lastly, in the third dimension, supranational networks of worldwide-web transactions expand the transmission of things like money transfers, information and messages; there are also computer hackers and terrorist groups as well

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as the presence of corruption, unethical investments and pandemic and environmental threats. States play more or less successfully on all the three arenas of this chess model, but nevertheless a high degree of vulnerability and sensitivity dominates the game. As a case in point, Nye critically puts the contemporary US into this game and makes an evaluation according to the framework of the threedimensional chess model. The US dominates the military play dimension as a superpower of the world. Concerning the second area of play, other economic players like Europe or the EU, China, Japan and Russia, compete well and put pressure on the US economy. Furthermore, the contemporary US loan-driven economy makes this play-dimension vulnerable for reasons embedded in its own monetary system (a statement supported by Lordon 2008). However, as a player in the bottom arena, the US is really in trouble and has turned out to become especially vulnerable, and we need only to mention the presence of international terrorist networks in this arena. According to Nye, the US has not been playing this game well. The US has basically first and foremost played internationally and has tried to tame the top arena, that is, the dimension of military strength and forces. This had to turn out as a strategy of failure; military power serves the chess player little in winning games related to the two other dimensions of the model, and especially not at the lowest dimension. Dependence, interdependence and spillover effects in the unbalanced chess games the contemporary US has been playing for years increase its vulnerability. According to Nye, environmental problems belong to the dimension of the worldwide arena and respect no order. These problems pay no attention to national and administrative boundaries. They are human-made but the disorder they create is connected to vulnerable natural ecosystems of interdependent elements, and ecosystems are complex and have their own boundaries – ranging from the local to the global scales. This is the physical side of environmental problems, but there is also a regulatory side. The problems have arisen partly as a result of many national and local political decisions and interventions without any overall planning and coordination and partly as a consequence of the many decisions taken by actors competing in the market, the middle dimension of the chess model. The environmental problems, which are created by both the private and the public activity, therefore, appear as a mixed-dimensional problem. Dependence on natural goods and resources in relation to human existence and economy leads to regulatory interdependence between states, regions, organizations and businesses. The effects of the ecosystem create vulnerability where regulatory authorities, whose efforts are indispensible for a multi-dimensional winning game, are lacking. Without a rational

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overview of networks and mechanisms, environmental problems will expand and decreasing efficiency in the economic dimension will follow, thus further disturbing the international balance (if there happens to be any) in the defence and security dimension. Damage caused by slippages of environmental waste management often crosses boundaries but can often be treated one-dimensionally. But regulation and planning for sustainable development is not an issue that only affects the relationship between states; a pluralistic multi-dimensional perspective is necessary here, and it involves not just integrated co-operation between governments and economic actors; political actions and ethical behaviour are required at all levels – from the global to the local. The EU principle of subsidiarity, that is, devolution of decision-making competence to the lowest possible level but high enough to be effective, formulated in the Maastricht Treaty of 1992, offers guidance to the multi-dimensional perspective. Consciousness of global environmental problems, along with processes of internationalization in general, increases awareness of the complex, interdependent bonds and structures that exist between an indefinite number of global, national and local actors, and thereby a keener awareness of the sensitivity and vulnerability inherent in these connective formations. As is commonly known, the complex economic enterprises of postFordism barely heed national and administrative boundaries in their market transactions (Amin 1994). A municipality, a region and a state are sensitive to the types of interdependence created in the system of enterprises established on the basis of flexible specialization and new technology. But, because of the high level of dependence, the post-Fordist system of production turns out to be vulnerable. And vulnerability concerns not only the economic dimension and its relationships but also the operations between states, regions and private actors in the growing global market, acknowledged by that European co-operative network, the EU. Interdependence and vulnerability create a need for wide-reaching agreements and regulations. Regulatory measurement assumes coordinated political arenas of decision-making and implementation at all levels. The general framework of national and international laws, special laws, the use of management by objectives, benchmarking and the evaluation and comparison of output are all important. This applies to the sustainable development of modern communication and transport, the exploitation of both sea and land resources, industrial spillage and technological development in general. It narrows the ‘free room’ which each state, region, municipality and enterprise have when exercising their sovereignty. Usually, pluralists do not operate with any clear distinction between domestic and foreign policy (Dahl-Eriksen 1997). On the contrary, the

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assertion is made that the division between inner and outer sovereignty is increasingly difficult to maintain in the light of processes of internationalization. For planning and targeting sustainable development, this means that domestic planning must be integrated with international planning actions (Veggeland 1996; Williams 1996). Correspondingly, while authorities with the legitimate power can sanction those who break agreements, these sanctions must be enforced on the different levels as an administrative consequence of political spillover effects. A fundamental characteristic of the theories of interdependence is that they do not, in principle, regard the international system as a set of different national and regional economic and social systems. This view means giving up the belief in an anarchistic international system, where co-operation and institutional development only involve questions of security. The latter understanding of the processes of internationalization represents a natural development of the position advocated by realists and rationalists in political science, which asserts both that it is not possible to break with the principle of state sovereignty and that no global authority is capable of taming conflicts of interest and securing order (Cini 2004). Intervening in the domestic interests of the national state is forbidden by international law. Globalization and interdependence in the sense of the networked society (Castells 1996) provides a foundation for changing these laws. New forms of regulation, based on the EU, can support this change without abandoning pluralistic and democratic forms of state. Further, new modes of interacting, cross-border planning and governance must be developed to match the new situation and the liabilities of sensitivity and vulnerability (Krasner 1983).

4.3

THE SEARCH FOR SECURITY AND SAFETY

Through the history and different phases of European integration, at least three general models have been the foundations for matching socialinstitutional paradigms together with new structures in order to counteract repercussions of socio-institutional sensitivity, vulnerability and risks: the Continental, Anglo-Saxon and Nordic models, with their different administrative traditions (Knill 2001; Veggeland 2007). From the launching of the European integration process and the adoption of the Treaty of Rome in the 1950s, and with the inner six Continental states, Germany, France, Italy and the three Benelux countries, as founder states, the Continental model naturally was dominant, and this administrative tradition created path-dependence of state-focused con-federalism and interventionism as a reflection of the Keynesian state (Millward 2000).

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From the Continental tradition came the policy inspiration to embrace European social partners, the European umbrella trade union (ETUC) and the private and public employers’ interest organizations, respectively Unice (now Businesseurope) and CEEP, to the negotiation table (de Buck 2004). The goal was taming and correcting the integration process by putting social concerns on the agenda. A sort of a Continental corporatist style was the result. The Maastricht Treaty from 1992 introduced the ‘Social dimension’ of the Community, with the expressed goal to create arenas for deliberative talks, and thereby to reach consensus instead of conflict on social and labour-market issues. The Anglo-Saxon state, the UK, was exempted from the EU social dimension, and in 2008 the UK still remains outside this facet of EU policy. The dominance of the Continental tradition lasted until the end of the 1980s (Urwin 1996). The adoption of the Single European Act in 1987 and the introduction of the Single European Market process one year later marked a fundamental contextual change (Austvik 2002; Wallace et al. 2005). The strategies of minimizing the state and marketizing the public sector, of Anglo-Saxon origin, became dominant policies (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004). Further, the member states decided to deregulate – and re-regulate – to create a territorially wider, borderless, single European market. The new regulatory state order of the EU took over. We might say that this caused the transformation of the social-institutional paradigm, much in accordance with the Anglo-Saxon social model and marketorientated administrative tradition. How did such a transformation occur? When the United Kingdom had joined the European Community (EC) in 1972 as a major member state, the global recessions, inflation, unemployment and stagflation had reached all the member states’ shores. The crises biased and pressed forward change, or at least modification, of the techno-economic and socio-institutional paradigms. The Anglo-Saxon model and the tradition of organizing governance became dominant and changed the Community’s method away from state-focused con-federalism and interventionism and moved in the direction of the regulatory-state paradigm based on market-centred policies, modes of New Public Management and supply-side economics. The concept of the social dimension and the involvement of social partners in negotiations, along with sensitive issues like work conditions and social and labour-market reforms, were temporarily taken off the record (Koukiadis 2006). During the 1990s, both the failure of the EU to compete in the global economy and the democratic and legitimacy deficit became central issues, threatening the core identity of the Union (Hayward and Menon 2003). And when the Soviet Union collapsed, the political situation in Europe

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changed radically. The poor Eastern Europe states wanted membership status in the ‘rich men’s club’, and the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997 opened the door to them (Glenn 2004). Ten new states joined the Union in 2004, and two more in 2007, bringing with them heavy social and economic burdens that were expected and immediately felt. Reforms were necessary, and they were formulated, agreed on and implemented as socioinstitutional changes. In our context of studying the social model, the Lisbon Process, launched in 2000, was to be a crossroad (Janssen 2005). The Lisbon Process was targeting the ambitious goal of making the EU the most competitive region globally. Hence, there were at least at two important events during the spring of 2006. European political and administrative leaders discussed modes of competitiveness and robust governance in relation to such models. Their explicit focus was on the Nordic welfare-state model and its regulatory approach to social security and on whether such a successful model that offered low socio-economic risk and vulnerability could be applied to other member states, especially those in distress2 (EU program 2006). This idea motivated scholars to revisit the Nordic state-focused social model and participatory administrative tradition in a comparative perspective, to find out the essential characteristics of the paths of development coming from this model and to determine why the model is considered successful ‘in the global age’ (Timonen 2004; EPC 2005; Veggeland 2007). As mentioned, the EU search for an innovative social model commenced when the European Council held its meeting on 23–24 March 2000 in Lisbon and agreed to set out a new ten-year strategic goal for the European Union. The goal was to make the Union, the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion.3

The Lisbon Process was launched. But right from the start critical voices made themselves heard, like ‘Lisbon’s single size does not fit all’ (Mayhew 2005), meaning that the Lisbon Process from the beginning was far too fixated on economic conditions for competitiveness and taming externalities at the expense of considerations of social security and welfare. In short, the Nordic model seems to offer more than a ‘single-size’ method in the pursuit of competitiveness (O’Sullivan 2005). The model seems to offer everything that European decision-makers are looking for: highly competitive economies in conjunction with less social inequalities and the institutionalized taming of risks and regulations for job protection (Kuhnle 2000; EPC 2005). In the 2000s, this rather expensive welfare-state

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model appears to represent a multi-dimensional method with the potential to generate a successful road for the development of the future EU and for (some of) its member states. Of course, all these things are extremely complicated. We need Europeanwide multi-disciplinary comparative research to enhance the knowledge of what happens when social models travel across borders.

4.4

WELFARE-STATE SECURITY AND RISKS

As elaborated above, we may view innovation in the public sector not as accidental changes but as contextual changes. In the European context, it means that path-dependence, owing to different territorial social models, strongly influences such changes (Veggeland 2007). In close connection, another issue arises regarding innovation. New ways of making such changes, and transcending them, also occur when European social models interact across borders and trigger interpretations of new ideas that bias policy and institutional change. Interpretation theory makes explicit that there are at least two basic perspectives involved (Røvik 2007: 22–3): the interpretation may be either contextual or out of context. In the former case, innovation is linked to already existing social models and traditions; path-dependence thus determines the norms, principles and values (Knill 2001). In the latter case, there is the simple copying and imitating of first- or second-order changes without taking account of domestic values, management ethics and steering traditions. In general, regulatory innovation4 includes strategies for improving the management of risk and the pursuit of state legitimacy in the ‘risk society’ (Beck 1992). Innovations in the way risk is moderated include threats to welfare, social security, labour market, social and human capital, gender discrimination or otherwise, environment, economy, national security, and so on (see Taylor-Gooby 2004). Re-regulation, a term for new regulation aiming for the reduction of risk and taming purposes is a term often used to express regulatory innovation, for example, providing social capital through market correction or the partnership approach (Scharpf 1999). Some researchers have pointed out that the welfare state does not have its basis on ‘politics against the markets’, as is commonly assumed in the neo-liberal Anglo-Saxon tradition, but rather on the social-democratic mixed-economy approach, that is, ‘politics with markets’ (Iversen 2005: 73). We may add to this the postulation of ‘politics by the market’ if we take into consideration how the principles of new public management (NPM) and market-type mechanisms (MTMs) have penetrated the traditional Scandinavian welfare-state model and administrative tradition (Pollitt

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and Bouckaert 2004; Veggeland 2004) and constituted the current Nordic social model (Veggeland 2007). This change has innovatively formed and adapted social capital to a new stage of welfare-state performance. The three postulations seem reasonable, but we should qualify them with an answer to this question: which changes to the welfare state provide greater social capital to its citizens than others? Although, it is popular to point out that the market, including global markets, interferes with the welfare state and vice versa, it is obvious that this interference occurs along different paths, depending on the actual social model of the states (Beetham et al. 2002). As mentioned in previous chapters, we have at least three general welfare state models in Europe, which link correspondingly to the three administrative and political traditions. Let us elaborate these somewhat further. ●

●

●

The Continental welfare-state model, which is dominated by strong trade unions, is said to be of a corporatist type with a heavily regulated labour market. As discussed earlier, high job security and protection through industrial relations plays a key role (Koukiadis 2006). For this and other reasons, the corporatist welfare states are, in many ways, based on politics against markets more than other European states. Administrative rigidity and the slow process of renewing social capital hamper the corporatist Continental welfarestate model. These features are not accidental but due to traditions and developments of institutional path-dependence (Knill 1999). The Anglo-Saxon welfare-state model, which is dominated by the adoption of market-centred policies, is said to be of a liberal type. The liberal welfare states use MTMs and independent agencies to provide welfare services. The labour market is sparsely regulated and has low job security and protection (EPC 2005). This welfare-state model more than others qualifies for the notion of politics by markets. With regard to innovation of social capital, the model is restricted by ideological resistance to changes from the first and second levels to the transcending third level, which concern the basic values and principles of neo-liberalism. Again, this occurs not accidentally but is a result of biases historically rooted in the liberal model, and we may best view it as an institutional path-dependent development. The Scandinavian/Nordic universal welfare-state model, which is dominated by state-centred policies and high welfare expenses, is of the universal type. The universal welfare states offer universal social security and job-protection arrangements. Further, it is a governmental responsibility to prioritize such labour-market tasks as lifelong learning and the development of skills. From another point of view, also

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elaborated in other chapters, the Nordic post-war labour market has become rather liberalized and the market-type mechanism (MTM) of outsourcing is often put to use for the provision of welfare services (OECD 2005; Veggeland 2007). This makes the universal welfarestate model qualified for the notion of politics with markets.5 The public sector has selectively learned lessons especially from the Anglo-Saxon model, and in some parts of society the third level of changes is reached, that is, innovative changes. This achievement concerns the concept of social capital, which has been renewed in the contemporary Nordic model. One example is how welfare politics has become connected to labour-market politics in an innovative way. The outcome has been the great social capital of ‘flexicurity’, that is, interactive co-play between social security and active labourmarket policies, which brings flexibility to the labour market and therewith competitive advantages in the global age (EPC 2005). As with the other models, the contemporary universal Nordic model of the welfare state has also taken its form owing to its historical welfare-state roots and institutional path-dependence (Olsen 2004). One main reason why the Nordic model has been receiving renewed EU attention under the auspices of the Lisbon Process since 2000 is the belief in the social capital of flexicurity and other universal welfare state arrangements of the model (Europe’s World 2005). In a time when states and regions are more than ever competing globally and are intensively engaged in political and economical measures to maintain a high employment rate while trying to keep inflation and public expenses low, it is understandable that they are looking for innovative solutions (EPC 2005; Iversen 2005). Records of public budgets confirm over the years, however, that the Nordic welfare and social-security costs consequently represent a high burden on the public budget. Why, then, is this model so attractive? The answer may be very simple: Social capital in the Nordic welfare-state model creates a high level of labour productivity. The labour productivity is generated through a high degree of national employment, which means more than just ‘full employment’ in the Keynesian sense. It means work, training or education for everybody irrespective of social groups, gender, ages and individual differences. The pay-off of this is ability to afford expensive social security, which in turn results in the taming of social inequality that facilitates the renewal of the social capital of flexicurity in an ascending innovative circle (summed up from Iversen 2005: 246–76).

The empirically based thesis is that universal job protection and social security shape the incentives workers have both for investing in particular

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market-attractive skills and lifelong learning and for changing work and workplaces without personal risk. Labour market flexibility is the innovative outcome of the Nordic active labour-market policies: education, lifelong learning, kindergartens that help women’s access to the labour market, and so on. Firms benefit from such flexibility and access to skills because they are critical for competitive advantage in knowledge-intensive economies. ‘Firms do not develop competitive advantages in spite of systems of social protection but because of it’ (ibid.: 74).

4.5

THE EUROPEAN SOCIAL-CAPITAL TRADEOFFS

The welfare goals of a state need, of course, to be paid for if they are to be realized; social capital is an instrument to accomplish that realization. Analytically, a neo-liberal perspective may view the building of social capital in modern states as basically directed by three goals: low inequality, low unemployment and low public expenses. These socio-economic goals are linked to three distinct policy choices that are characterized by a ‘trilemma’. This trilemma occurs because it is difficult to pursue successfully all three goals simultaneously as long as there are trade-offs between them (Wren 2000). At this point, and before elaborating this statement further, there is a need to define and distinguish the notions of trilemma and trade-offs. For these purposes, I shall follow the work of Pollitt and Bouckaert (2004: 162). Trade-offs: where there is more than one desideratum or more than one problem to be alleviated, there will inevitably be the failure to attain other desiderata or the worsening of different problems. This is a situation, therefore, where decision-makers are obliged to balance between different things that they very much wish to achieve but cannot possibly have all at the same time – indeed, having more of one desirable thing entails having less of another. In the political world, appropriate choices often are those that essentially make the best out these unavoidable, constrained conditions with the guidance of good governance grounded on a pragmatic approach. Yet, norms, values and traditions will affect these choices by making one set of options more preferable than the other. Governments thus tend to compromise the goal that is least ideologically important to them (Weaver 1986) in order to maximize the others in their struggle to retain their position of political superiority. We may take the following as an example. According to the perspective of historical institutionalism (Cini 2004), if decision-makers were to engineer the use of social capital as short-term instrumental capital, then the long-term perspectives aiming for

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sustainability and the supremacy of good governance values will often be insufficiently communicated. Torben Iversen (2005: 146–7) has highlighted this ideological aspect of the trilemma arising from the challenges of the global age of keeping unemployment, inequalities and public expenses in check, in short, the ideological aspect involved in social-capital tradeoffs. One strategy was to deregulate labour markets to reduce the power of employee unions and to increase wage flexibility. The governments of the Anglo-Saxon tradition, the US, the UK, New Zealand and Australia during the 1980s exemplified these neo-liberal policies. Another strategy was both to accept the consequences for employment resulting from a compressed wage structure and to seek to limit the disruptive effects by discouraging the entry of women into and by facilitating the exiting from the labour market, the latter primarily affecting older workers through early retirement. This is the typical pattern of choice we find in some Continental European countries. The final option was to accept the slow growth of employment in private-service sectors but simultaneously to pursue an expansive employment strategy through expansion of public-sector services in order to balance the effective demand in the framework of Keynes. This strategy also strove to improve the educational resources for younger people as a policy approach towards building social capital. The social-democratic governments in the Nordic countries, where the ideological tenor favoured the financing of higher public expenses by full employment and by high tax rates, often chose this option. As we observe in this process of compromising goals and policies, social models, administrative traditions and path-dependency play essential roles for what decision-makers consider to be appropriate choices and how they implement their strategic thinking on social capital (Sverdrup 2007). We may argue that the trade-offs involved in European socialcapital policy have this following inconsistency: on the one hand, creating jobs and employment in the private-service sector is a positive strategy in that it does not disturb the budgetary balance; however, this strategy has certain trade-offs: lower wages, higher non-wage costs and the inducing of negative inequality in the sense of lowering the degree of employment in the population and thereby reducing work productivity. On the other hand, the strategy of generating service jobs in the public sector also has trade-offs; the strategy indeed pushes the limits of already constrained and overloaded budgets (OECD 2005). Politicians in charge do have the obligation to make decisions. Concerning social capital, they look for a European model to minimize the trade-offs, that is, to find a model for flexible job creation, for social equality and for welfare, but all within a sustainable economy (Janssen 2005; Rasmussen

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Nyrup 2005). The overall goal was and is to make Europe the most competitive region in the world, as was announced at the Lisbon summit meeting in 2000,6 but the trade-offs in social capital certainly challenge this goal.

4.6

EUROPEAN TRADITIONS OF GOVERNANCE AND TRADE-OFFS

In our context, we may briefly describe the trade-offs of equality–employment and public expenses of the European welfare-state models and paths in the framework of innovative social capital as the following (Veggeland 2007): 1.

2.

The trade-offs in the liberal welfare-state model: As pointed out before, the Anglo-Saxon administrative tradition weighs market solutions and regulatory measures and has the lessening of state intervention as an explicitly expressed objective for the service sector. Universal welfare and health coverage are not guaranteed. The employer provides the workers’ health and social insurance, while the government covers the health expenses for the poor and the elderly who fall outside this insurance system. ● In this tradition, the response to the equality–employment tradeoffs was to give job creation and labour-market flexibility priority while it reduced job protection and social security. The use of contracting workers reduced the power of unions and increased wage inequality during the 1980s. The politicians and economists believed in a flexible labour market that would make full the use of economic capacity and promote job creation, innovation and growth through a flexible labour market without fixed tariffs and expensive welfare services; the engineering of short-term social capital was part of this belief. For neo-liberal economists, market flexibility is the ultimate precondition and solution for increasing productivity and revitalizing the European economy in a globally competitive world. The trade-offs in the corporatist welfare state: The Continental administrative tradition depends on corporative solutions and stateinterventionist measures. Health and social insurance are guaranteed, although the latter is a mixture of public and private institutional arrangements. Traditional welfare services are kept in the public domain as ‘services of general interest’. Trade unions are strong, but the problem is that there are too few jobs created. Reaching Hall’s thirdlevel institutional change did not, then, come through fast enough.

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In this tradition, the response to the equality–employment tradeoffs was to accept the employment consequences of a formal wage structure and hierarchical and rigid system of professionals, the latter of which also dominated the bargaining area. The labour market remained inflexible and the unemployment rate relatively high. Policies for social-capital building did not stand up to solutions that obstinately remained ‘policies against the market’. 3. The trade-offs in the universal welfare state: The Nordic administrative tradition relies on public institutional solutions with regard to social equality, interventionist measures, universal welfare services and public health and social insurance arrangements as goals and means for the building of social capital. Institutional changes at Hall’s three levels have created public innovations. Owing to the use of MTM in the public sector, like outsourcing and contracting out arrangements and the selective reorganization of public administration to publiclaw agencies (PLAs) and private-law bodies (PLBs), indirect governance by regulation has become common, and trade-union power has diminished since the 1980s (OECD 2002; Veggeland 2004, 2007). ● In this tradition, the response to the equality–employment trade-offs was to accept sluggish employment growth in private services while expanding the public-service sector and public expenses, resulting in high taxes. The influence of professionals in the main bargaining arena was limited because Nordic unions, unlike unions in countries such as Germany and France, were sharply divided between blue- and white-collar workers. In addition, the governments took anticipatory measures for building human capital, such as lifelong learning, adult education and continuous training in order to adjust skills to the changing needs in both the private and public sectors. Close to 20 per cent of all adults (those between the ages of 25 and 65) participate in some kind of adult education every year, compared with an average of around 8 per cent for the EU as a whole. A rather flexible labour market has developed as a result of the implementation of this concept of social capital. The pay-off from the universal welfare state facilitates the general acceptance of the relatively high tax level. The Nordic countries have a long shared history and have experienced similar social and economic developments. The most common feature of their systems is a well-developed welfare state characterized by its universalism, which means both that all citizens are entitled to basic social benefits and job protection and that there is high social spending, ●

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high taxes and a large public sector. They have succeeded in achieving a high degree of labour-market flexibility and are close to fulfilling one of the goals of the Lisbon Process of an overall employment rate of 70 per cent. Employment policies lie at the heart of the Nordic countries’ labourmarket policy, just as social-security policies lie at the heart of their welfare-state policy (Jensen and Neergaard Larsen 2005). The framework of the two policies is innovation and long-term social-capital building, such as flexicurity. Obviously, these policies pay off only when they are associated with low inequality and high public-welfare expenses and employment. Even if they did not initiate the Lisbon Strategy, the Nordic EU member countries are very much comfortable with it – particularly its initial triple focus on the labour market, employment and social inclusion in a knowledge-based economy and under regulatory governance (Europe’s World 2005). Actually, the similarity between the priorities of the Lisbon Process and the past and current actions of social-capital building in the Nordic countries might lead us to interpret the Lisbon reform agenda as simply an ambitious attempt by these countries to put their welfare state policy in line ‘with the market’, and the flexicurity model has been firmly imprinted onto Europe’s economic and social model (Janssen 2005). This interpretation is unlikely the case. The launching of the process of comprehensive renewal by the participants in Lisbon in 2000 represented a collective recognition of the challenges the EU faces and the need for a common response that would be able to draw on the best elements and paths of each member state’s social and economic models and administrative traditions. This means a consensus across different models, rather than the imposition of one single approach on all the others. Indeed, some feared that the Lisbon reforms would represent the introduction of a divisive Anglo-Saxon model, far from a Scandinavian one, and would then be only partially successful. This fear led to unjustified concerns that the actual agenda for growth and jobs would disastrously lead to high inequality, that is, less social protection and the undermining of the role of the state. There was also the fear that the same standards were not always being applied to the large countries in the same way as the smaller ones.

NOTES 1. Mistrust, in this context, means in the sense of a calculated risk option for withdrawal from the interest-based partnership co-operation.

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2. Eastern Europe member states. 3. The launch of the Lisbon Process might be seen as an economic preparation for the coming enlargements. 4. Regulatory innovation is a dynamic part of the ‘regulatory state’, see Majone’s (1996, 1997) elaboration about the latter term. 5. Torben Iversen (2005: 73) discusses the notion of politics with markets, but explicitly does not link it to the Scandinavian welfare state. He probably also includes the Anglo-Saxon model or perhaps makes it a general notion. If so, I disagree. 6. The Lisbon summit meeting announcement; also the conditions for participation in the European Monetary Union require economic sustainability of the member states.

5. 5.1

The regulatory state: how democratic is it? ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM

Administrative reform programmes of the regulatory state have received such epithets as ‘festivals of visions’ and ‘marketing devices’. There have often been complaints of ‘reform euphoria’ that offer opportunities for grand announcements which are then followed by less than glorious implementations. Most administrative reforms do disappoint. They start off with much fanfare and promise so much (too much, of course) that they are bound to disappoint when the realities set in (Hayward and Menon 2003: 137). But what is public-administrative reform? We can, of course, answer that question in a number of different ways. We could tentatively say that reform of public administration in general comprises functional or deliberate changes to the structures, processes and regulations of publicsector organizations with the objective of improving (in some sense) their efficiency (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004: 8). But this does not always occur, and we can refer to Michael Moran’s (2003) thesis for why. The innovative administrative changes have been a ‘fiasco’ over the last 30 years because of exponential growth in the number of changes, an era of ‘hyper-innovation’ and frenetic adopting of new institutional modes.

5.2

THE ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM OF SUBSIDIARITY

We can recognize the principle of subsidiarity in the Treaty of Lisbon in 2007, or the ‘Reform Treaty’ (which should not be confused with the Lisbon Process of 2000), which member states had signed and intended to ratify in 2008.1 The Reform Treaty pursues the statement of this principle in the Treaty of Maastricht. In the Treaty of Lisbon, the principle of subsidiarity is supposed to become legal in the sense that member states may appeal the decisions of the European Commission to the European Court of Justice if they find reasons for there having been a violation of this principle. This 80

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treaty is certainly, in its context, an administrative reform endorsed by the EU, and promoted within the framework of the regulatory state. The principle of subsidiarity was formally introduced as a principle of intention in the 1991 Treaty of Maastricht that recognized the devolution of competence, that is, ‘decision-making to be performed at the lowest possible effective administrative level’ in the European multi-level system of governance. The rhetoric deployed on behalf of the principle of subsidiarity elaborated it and strongly suggested that it was, as it were, a principle of ‘nearness’, implying a more bottom-up form of governance and a more democratic means of voicing opinions (Weiler 1999). But in what kind of framework should ‘nearness’ take place? Should it take place within the framework of the devolution of competence to elected national assemblies and the emancipation of constituencies? Or should it be applied within the framework of distributed governance that makes use of national arm’s-length agencies and other governmental bodies? Or could it be that nearness should really be in the framework of private-sector business actors meaning more free economic competition in the Single European Market? Actually, the Maastricht Treaty did not precisely define the status of the principle of subsidiarity. It is clear enough, however, that the principle was not announced as a regulation endowed with judicial status. Despite this, political plaudits and promising panegyrics attended the announcement of this principle, a principle of administrative governance intended to champion the advancement of democracy by authorizing national levels and tiers (Veggeland 1995; Commission of the European Communities 1997). However, this latter goal was not at all clear given the Treaty has only an evasive answer to the question of in which framework is ‘nearness’ supposed to flourish. Does subsidiarity really indicate the commonly believed ‘downwards’ devolution of authority to national parliaments and to locally and regionally elected councils? If so, then it clearly indicates an intention to promote democratic practices in the EU through the administrative reform of subsidiarity. Or does the intended administrative reform simply indicate an ‘outwards’ distribution of public-governance authority? An ‘outwards’ distribution, as defined by the OECD (2002), is one that confers governance to independently organized public agencies, authorities and other regulatory governmental bodies and is a sign of democratic deficit because they are only under indirect democratic control. Another possibility is it that the only intention of the Maastricht Treaty was to make subsidiarity a regulative idea for how decision-making processes in the EU ought to function, and thus its status is really not one of administrative reform in an institutional sense (Weiler 1995). The

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introduction of this principle could have been, as we shall see, a response to the need to accommodate conflicting administrative traditions, like the Continental and the Anglo-Saxon traditions; the role of subsidiarity was to prevent the wearing away of the diversified administrative practices within the EU. Consequently, the idea of subsidiarity had to be defined in an equivocal and vague manner. Inter-governmentalists would probably claim that this intended obscurity was aimed at avoiding conflict, while neo-functionalists would perhaps interpret this vagueness as a way of letting spillover effects determine the progress of the idea in actual practice (Rosamond 2000).

5.3

DELIBERATE VAGUENESS FOR POLITICAL PURPOSES

Anyway, during the 1990s the EU member states acknowledged the principle of subsidiarity as an official term, which most likely occurred merely because of the diffuse status of the principle. However, in the new EU regional policy framed by the Maastricht Treaty, and seemingly without any connection to the principle of subsidiarity, the member states were forced to institutionalize and authorize an independent sub-national tier between the state and the local level (Williams 1996). The introduction of this new tier was secured through dictates that made this sub-national involvement in development initiatives a compulsory condition for member states’ receiving money allocated by the EU’s Structural Funds. This was not really a conflicting reform issue, because there was no talk about the devolution of democratic authority downwards to an elected assembly; it was simply a supranational assertion to participate in the regional administrations. We have indicated that the member states had different understandings of the policy implications of subsidiarity, but they also had conflicting conceptions about regional institutions and administrations, owing to the competing ideas of federalism versus inter-governmentalism, nationalism versus regionalism and governance by governments versus governance by arm’s-length bodies. However, they all shared a common interest in making the increasing supranational EU competence more palatable and more legitimate for their respective populaces. Subsidiarity as a marketing device linked the notion to a political agenda focusing bottom-up governance together with the strengthening of governmental agencies and bodies but also with the administrations for regional development. In the signed Treaty of Lisbon, the status of subsidiarity in relation to the future regulatory governance of the EU continues to elude a concrete

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definition, despite its upgraded status to that of a legal regulation. There is only a suggestion of a new, diffuse mechanism to monitor acts of subsidiarity, accompanied with the stronger encouragement for citizens to bring forward new policy proposals and a clearer categorization of tier competences. What follows is ‘a glance’, provided by the EU, of these competencies: ●

●

●

●

A strengthened role for the European Parliament: the European Parliament, directly elected by EU citizens, will see important new powers emerge over the EU legislation, the EU budget and international agreements. A greater involvement of national parliaments: national parliaments will have greater opportunities to be involved in the work of the EU, in particular thanks to a new mechanism to monitor that the Union only acts where results can be better attained at EU level (subsidiarity). Together with the strengthened role for the European Parliament, it will enhance democracy and increase legitimacy in the functioning of the Union. A stronger voice for citizens: thanks to the Citizens’ Initiative, one million citizens from a number of Member States will have the possibility to call on the Commission to bring forward new policy proposals. Who does what: the relationship between the Member States and the European Union will become clearer with the categorisation of competences. (www.europa.eu/lisbon_treaty/glance/index_en.htm – the italics are the author’s).

Probably for the same reasons as was the case regarding the Treaty of Maastricht, we may interpret this vagueness as stemming from different national administrative traditions and fundamental policy disagreements over the issue. Accordingly, the Treaty of Lisbon continues this trend. Thus, the implications of the EU principle of subsidiarity for democratic and administrative organization at the national level are unclear, while related measures, arrangements and organizational forms for reducing the EU deficits of democracy and legitimacy are heavily biased subjects (see quotation above). Yet, organizational adjustments of national governance to new administrative conditions in the EU are left as an area of competence for each member state to decide. Moreover, if member states are to be able to determine whether or not subsidiarity is practiced properly, that is, whether a practice has ‘successfully’ promoted democracy and legitimacy or has been a ‘fiasco’ resulting in less efficiency and transparency (Scharpf 1999; Veggeland 2004), say, in relation to the monitoring mechanism, then there is a need for criteria against which they can assess whether a practice has been legal or illegal, successful or deficient, ethically acceptable or unacceptable. Or will these criteria be formed and implemented through ad hoc decisions made by the EU Court of Justice on Law and new regulations? The answer may very

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well be yes, for it would be a style in keeping with regulatory regimes like the EU, a style marked by democratic deficit (Kuper 2006). From another point of view, it may seem incredible that the Treaty of Lisbon neither focuses on nor issues any statements on the national conditions for sub-national, bottom-up democracy, if we consider the fact that in this context it is almost impossible to make a clear distinction between member states’ internal hierarchical systems and the EU multi-level system of governance (Veggeland 2003). The distinction is so unclear as to make the distinction between a country’s central-state governance and subnational governance difficult. Structures of governance at the tiers reflect each other in one or another way because of democratic and administrative traditions and networking games, which create institutional multi-level coherence with many of the actors’ networks, though they are influenced by administrative traditions (Veggeland 2003). Fritz Scharpf (1999) calls this ‘Politikverflechtung’. In the context of subsidiarity, let us explore two democratic and administrative traditions, the Continental and the British traditions, in two EU member countries, the former tradition exemplified by France and the latter by Great Britain. The Continental European democratic tradition, with France as an example, gives credence to the idea of the state as an abstract identity, as something different from society, bearing the inherent responsibility for the performance of public functions or being the collective actor representing the society as a whole. Further, in this perspective of being a collective actor, even the representative democratic state could preserve its exclusive responsibility for the common best only by introducing certain constitutional modifications. The state’s intervening into societal developments ‘from above’ should, however, be constrained by the safeguarding laws and regulations of subsidiarity, and first and foremost by a written national constitution (in German ‘Rechtsstaat’). In this context the British tradition is different and closely related to the historical evolution of state identity, which is said to reflect ‘an aberrant case’ (Dyson 1980: 36). Rather than ideologically looking upon the state as a top-down authority responsible for the common best, this tradition conceives it as an instrument of mediating between politics and societal interests, for instance, market forces in a bottom-up order of subsidiarity (Knill 2001). The mediating function of the state probably explains why the unitary state of the United Kingdom lacks a written constitution; political institutions and civil society are instead perceived as the constraining elements, concretely and continuously correcting the state through bargaining processes.

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85

TWO HYPOTHESES

Thus, the first hypothesis might be that different state administrative traditions have profound organizational effects on related sub-national institutional order owing to path-dependence (Pierson 2004). The second hypothesis might be that the implementation of subsidiarity in the Continental administrative tradition manifests as a downwards devolution of competence to elected assemblies; in the Anglo-Saxon tradition it translates into distributed public governance in the form of the outward transfer of competence to arm’s-length public administrations and other governmental bodies. This hypothesis seems to be confirmed to some extent by the following two cases. In France, the administrative reform of 1982 fused 100 central statecontrolled ‘prefectures’ into 22 regions (plus four overseas units). The new regions were organized democratically, with elected assemblies in superior political positions, in accordance with the Continental administrative tradition. They became formally responsible for regional economic development and were accorded the necessary legal status to negotiate partnership with state representatives. Their regional governments attained the function of governance and administrative capacity anchored in mutual public–public partnership, with the central state as the partner. Each regional partnership was regulated by an arrangement of ‘contrats de plan Etat-Régions’ defining the devolution of authority and budgetary allocations from the central state (Balme and Bonnet 1995). The regional authorities in this regulatory foundation attained and still maintain the political status as principal democratic authorities controlling their own territorial affairs and the state subsidiaries, the arm’s-length state agencies. This case of French reform illustrates the implementation of the principle of subsidiarity in practice as the downward devolution of authority and power to the sub-national tier. As a case, it indicates so far a confirmation of our hypothesis on the administrative reform of subsidiarity and mode of sharing competence. The UK reads and translates the principle of subsidiarity differently. The UK is a liberal democratic state where democracy is exercised in the context of the sovereignty of parliament, but there is no ‘state’ equivalent of the French état. It is not based on the sharing of power in a hierarchical tier-system of elected assemblies, but is based on the liberal concept of the primacy of the individual, conceived as someone in possession of a bundle of interest and rights, in particular the right to conduct its business of maintaining the security of the realm and international order. The central state has a sort of a mediating constitutional status in the establishment of private–public partnerships. We can clearly recognize this status in the authorization of the state

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subsidiaries of the UK, in the form of the fragmented arm’s-length administrations and bodies, which emerged with the ‘Next-Step Reform’ of the 1980s, as sub-national principal authorities. Following the Anglo-Saxon administrative tradition, these subsidiaries received a mediating function in development policies and in negotiating forward sub-national, public– private partnerships (Loughlin 2004). Elected sub-national assemblies are in this context non-existent. The British reform case demonstrates the implementation of the principle of subsidiarity in practice as an outward devolution of authority and power and follows the path of democratic deficit entrenched in the regulatory state. Also this case indicates a confirmation of our hypothesis on diversity regarding the administrative reform of subsidiarity and the mode of distributing governance at sub-national levels (ibid.). The first confirmation is that, like all modernizing reform activity, the administrative reform of subsidiarity is also dependent on context. The OECD, therefore, states (2005: 22) that ‘OECD countries’ reform demonstrates that the same reform performs differently and produce very diverse results in different country contexts’. This leads to the second hypothesis. The second confirmation is that state administrative traditions explain to some extent different problems of democratic governance, such as deficits of democracy, legitimacy, accountability and inefficiency as well as increasing transactional costs, connected to both outward and downward administrative reforms of subsidiarity. ‘Many governments’, as one OECD report states (2002: 10), ‘now realize that managing from distance has created specific accountability and democratic control issues, and have started focusing on improving the governance of these bodies’. The OECD report of 2002 also confirms that only in the Continental countries of the nine member states analysed is the outward form of subsidiarity really considered problematic, and, therefore, these countries have, to a certain degree, avoided implementing them. The OECD report of 2005 goes further and gives the following statement: Nevertheless, the reality of reform has not lived up to the rhetoric. In many cases, the changes made to rules, structures and processes have not resulted in the intended changes in behaviour and culture. Indeed, in some cases reforms have produced unintended or perverse consequences, and have negatively affected underlying public sector and democratic governance values.

Counteracting measures are put into play in relation to creating new policies that grant greater steering capacity to the governments and for making the arm’s-length independent agencies more transparent and coherent. In the UK it has long been recognized that the doctrine of parliamentary responsibility and steering ability has become a fiction. As mentioned in

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a previous chapter, some British scholars have concluded that ‘the sheer institutional diversity of government makes the doctrine obsolete and its complexity obscures who is accountable to whom for what?’ (Beetham et al. 2002: 133). Good governance in the framework of subsidiarity depends on bottomup arrangements, which create the space for governmental planning and action, the involvement of the civil society, the arenas for public discourses on politics and ethics, and institutions of accountability in order to make democracy work. The Treaty of Lisbon barely mentions this bottom-up issue in the context of subsidiarity, and we know the issue is a conflicting one because of the diversity of national administrative traditions and paths (Veggeland 2007). Therefore, the Treaty still seems to be exploring good governance, democratic governance and subsidiarity as effective administrative reform as both ‘downward’ and ‘outward’ devolutions of competence to both public and market actors and thereby making it a ruling social-institutional paradigm, ‘negatively affect(ing) underlying public sector and democratic governance values’.

5.5

STATE FORMATION AND ADMINISTRATIVE TRADITIONS

The national state in Europe was created at the end of the seventeenth century when the traditional state system was established; the Westphalian order (Krasner 1983). In France, the Revolution of 1789 reversed the absolutist dominance of society by the state order. The state did not lose its monopoly of coercion, but society itself determined the use of state power (Knill 2001). Also the notion of state and the notion of democracy were first expressly linked ideologically. National representative assembly Parliament, the elected representation of society, built the linkage between the citizens and the common interests, that is, the state, and constituted the input democratic legitimacy (Veggeland 2003). To Europe, this new epoch meant the emancipation of the people and a new way of governing a bounded territory with its citizens democratically (Rogowski and Turner 2006). The ‘people’ (demos) of a defined national society became the only appropriate foundation for democracy, and the national state comprising governmental institutions became the only principal authority with internal sovereignty, with power on behalf of the ‘people’. We should, however, note two different conceptualizations of the state function. We have already seen that the Continental European democratic tradition gives primacy to the idea of the state as an abstract authority, as something

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different from the society. The state, including its subsidiaries, bears responsibility for the performance of the functions of the welfare state and is a collective actor representing the society as a whole. Being responsible for the common weal, the state authorities receive their legitimacy from the parliament whose power is only restricted by certain modifications laid down in the national state constitution. The parliament receives its legitimacy from the ‘people’, who represent the market of voters and whom politicians must entice. In this context, the UK democratic tradition is different and somewhat related to the historical evolution of the regulatory state (Loughlin and Mazey 1995; Loughlin 2004). Rather than constitutionally looking upon the state as something different from the society, an authority responsible for the common good, it was conceived as a part of society and as such an instrument of regulating interests, for instance private and public actors competing in the market. State subsidiaries of the arm’s-length type have, on one hand, a mediating responsibility, but on the other hand, they are also regulated as public-law administrations (PLAs) or private-law bodies (PLBs). The conception of the traditional Continental states, and the Scandinavian states via their historical connections to this tradition (Gidlund 2000), is shaped by layers, which in part counterbalance each other. As pointed out by Christoph Knill (2001: 62), the ideological conception of a state authority’s viewing the democratic state institutions as superior to society has a social-model background. Today, several organizational aspects, rooted in the historical development of statehood and society, are identified as context-dependent. Both constitutional unitary and federal states belong to the concept (Pindar 1993). Organized as administrative hierarchies with sub-national local and regional levels, and normally with elected councils governing on behalf of central authorities, ‘the unitary territorial state’ became a notion standing for a fully ‘complete’ and finalized nationbuilding process (Rokkan and Urwin 1983). There was only one central state power ruling one nation; the competence of the sub-national elected councils was circumscribed to only deciding roadmaps for implementation of state policies. In contrast, in the federal state, the power was shared with the members of the federation as national associates. For that reason, from a unitary-state perspective, the federal nation-building process was perceived and given a status as ‘incomplete’ because of this lack of unity (Baldersheim 2000). We may see, in this context, the EU principle of subsidiarity as a pursuit of the federal idea that layers should counterbalance each other (Keating 1998; Hooghe and Marks 2001). In accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, the devolution of competence upwards to the

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supranational European tier through agreements is recommended when greatest policy outcome and effectiveness is expected on that level. This is a federal idea. Similarly, the downward devolution of competence to regional and local authorities as a consequence of subsidiarity is also a federal idea of sharing power and authority between tiers (Wallace 1998; Veggeland 2000). Actually, we may view the concept of the French regional reform in 1982 made by a unitary state, the aforementioned ‘Contrat de plan EtatRégions’ in this context. In section 5.4 we analysed the reform as a contractual and regulatory sharing of competence between tiers. Seeing the reform as context-dependent, we may see the idea as rooted in the federal tradition of counterbalancing level authorities. There is in this modern case of reform the conceptualization of subsidiarity, performed through bargaining processes and consensus-making and legalized as an order of binding regional contracts (Balme and Bonnet 1995). Often, the performance of the OECD-defined ‘Distributed Public Governance’ of the Western Europe states of today gets its legitimacy from the EU-defined principle of subsidiarity. The ideological reference is the value of sharing competences between a plurality of public authorities and institutions as an alternative to a hierarchical order of governance (Neyer 2002; Veggeland 2003). However, in reality, it concerns the protection of public interests from both the increasingly wide variety of public organizational forms and a deficit of democracy (OECD 2002; Habermas 2006). Democratic institutions and their channels of communication and their function to protect political, social and civil rights, stand against the new (more output effective?) technocratic or quasi-technocratic executive authorities that provide public services (Majone 1997; Weiler 1999). What institutions, then, serve the public interests best? In the Continental European tradition, it was economic backwardness and the idea of more fair social and regional distribution of the common weal that led to the creation of a democratic but strong state as a part of the welfare-state building processes (Flora et al. 1999). Today, institutions of ‘distributed public governance’ mean a restructured state hierarchy and public sector in general and reflect policies for exposing public services to more market competition. In some cases, it even means organizational reforms whereby public-service institutions are not regulated by public law but instead by private law as enterprises. Even so, the Continental (and the Scandinavian) thinking of the role of the democratic state still seems to emphasize the view that market functionality and competition do not automatically achieve social and regional fairness (Badie and Birnbaum 1983; OECD 2002). There is a widespread concern on the topic; ‘distributed state governance’, anchored in agencies

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and other authority bodies at arm’s-length from parliamentary control, on all levels creates a democratic deficit if not counteracted (Veggeland 2001; Eriksen et al. 2002). Therefore, in relation to subsidiarity, the redistribution of state governance to independent tier agencies and other new public management (NPM) authorities is normally delimited in Continental countries. The distribution tends to be more in accordance with a model emphasizing the supremacy of representative democratic assemblies as lawmakers and regulatory authorities, including at all sub-national levels of governance, in relation to technocratic agencies and public enterprises (Majone 1997; Schmitter 2000; OECD 2002). The UK tends to be different. The country is described, as we have seen, as a ‘stateless society’ in a restricted sense, or ‘government by civil society’ (Badie and Birnbaum 1983: 121). Here ‘it was the very rapid growth of capitalism and the market that resulted in the backwardness of the state, with civil society maintaining its position of dominance . . . the market reigns supreme, not the state’ (ibid.: 123–4). The term ‘state’ was and still is only referred to at the level of international relations or as the ‘welfare state’. ‘Government’, ‘country’ and ‘nation’ became interchangeable terms. Consequently, when the public sector became restructured in the 1980s, ‘the Next-Step Reform’, terms such as ‘output governance’, ‘result measuring and financing’, ‘institutional competitiveness’, ‘benchmarking’, ‘institutional capacity’, ‘public–private partnerships’ dominated the thinking on reform, reflecting the wish to achieve market advantages. Subsidiarity as a form of downward devolution of political power from the central government to sub-national tiers and supreme democratic assemblies was not on the political agenda (Jessop 1994; Amin and Thrift 1995a; Veggeland 2003). Also, the original view of the state as a mediator dictated British thinking on administrative reform. Here the distributed public governance style acquired its legitimacy from a constitutional model that emphasizes functionality more than parliamentary legitimacy. Thus, with regard to subsidiarity, the growing number of independent arm’s-length state agencies appear as mediators on all sub-national levels of governance, conceptualized as the institution of functional ‘public– private partnership’ (Amin 1994). Bob Jessop has, therefore, concluded about the UK that ‘in this sense we can talk of a shift from local government to local governance. Thus local unions, local chambers of commerce, local venture capital, local education bodies, local research centres and local states may enter into arrangements to regenerate the local economy’ (Jessop 1994: 272). But since then, the number of local partnerships has been growing to an undesirable critical number with regard to fragmentation and to making democratic control feasible and governance effective. In the separate

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territorial unit of England, distributed public governance in the form of partnership institutions now are exacerbating the trend of democratic deficit, raising transactional costs and actually worsening ineffectiveness because: The (central) government has sponsored a bewildering known total of over 2375 multi-agency partnerships . . . at the local level in England – for example, on education, regeneration, neighbourhood renewal, community safety, older people, crime, town centre, management, health, cultural activities, etc. Another 400 local strategic partnerships are being set up to play a key role in local governance, bringing together local councils, local agencies, police and health authorities, etc. (Beetham et al. 2002: 270)

5.6

THE NOTIONS OF DISTRIBUTED PUBLIC GOVERNANCE WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF SUBSIDIARITY

Ideologically, the year of 1992 symbolizes the anticipated death of the state in Europe and traditional national democracy (Figure 5.1), or at least a decisive moment in on their road to expected transcendence (Brubaker 1999). Chosen by the former EU Commission president Jacques Delors as the target date for the completion of the Single Market, ideologically, 1992 came to stand for the abolition of national frontiers and the manifestation of a ‘borderless’ Europe in relation to networking institutions, firms and trade markets. Table 5.1 connects historical periods with territorial size of predominant regimes and illustrates the actual forms of democracy as occurrences related to the latter, the territorial size of the polity. In the small Greek city societies of the ancient world, it was feasible to have direct representation Table 5.1

Basic historical transformations of the term ‘democracy’

Periods of time – regimes

Territorial size

Democracy forms

Ancient Greek

Small urban societies

Roman and Middle Ages

Large empires

Westphalian order 1648–1992 European Union

(Nation) states

Direct representative democracy Downwards devolution; subsidiarity Indirect representative democracy Downwards and outwards devolution; subsidiarity

Borderless Europe

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(of free men) in the democratic assemblies. But when the Roman Empire and later other empires during the Middle Ages took over as the hegemonic entities of Europe, the downwards devolution of framed regulatory authority to dukes, vassals and other subsidiaries took over as part of a democratic system of delegation, while the direct democracy ceased. It was rather like what we have elaborated as outward subsidiarity, because elected assemblies were missing. With the introduction of the Westphalian order of 1648 until 1992, which symbolized the anticipated death of the state, middle-range territorial polity units ascended that were too large for practising direct democracy and thus indirect representative forms of democracy became the solution. Later on, this indirect form of democracy became to some extent identical with the concept of the national state. The European Union, regulating a borderless Europe, represents a territorial unit of size making the state-level democracy unrealistic. Therefore, the new focus on subsidiarity in the EU has arisen as a strategy for the development of a participatory democracy of Europe. However, as pointed out, this time subsidiarity in the sense of both downward and outward distribution of government and regulatory governance began, and bottom-up capability and responsibility for domestic development were built (Wallace 2005). Not surprisingly, with reference to Table 5.1, when the Treaty of Maastricht introduced the principle of subsidiarity in 1992, scholars commented on the term and related it to the parallel concept of the Middle Ages, in particular as a concept of delegation of authority used by the borderless, universal Roman Catholic Church. 1992 came also to stand for the emergence of European citizenship and – with the signing of the Maastricht Treaty in 1991 – the erection of the ‘Committee of Regions’ and the introduction of the ‘principle of subsidiarity’. Together with economic and political theories on growth and the democratic advantages of the coming new European regionalism in the wake of globalization, the Maastricht Treaty enforced the prospect of an arising ‘Europe of regions’ (Anderson 1994; Keating 1996; Veggeland 2000). It came to be the wide range of institutions of distributed public governance that featured and issued this complex prospect during the 1990s. However, the idea was to make distributed public governance work effectively and democratically by bringing to the fore subsidiarity as the regulative principle for organizing and strengthening the democratic capacity of the political, economic and cultural regions of Europe (Keating and Loughlin 1997; Keating 1998). So far, the main issue in European integration had been the devolution of decision-making competence through negotiations and bargaining processes among member

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states upwards to the EU. The Maastricht Treaty not only challenged the member states by introducing more supranational competence but also by challenging the state to perform downward devolution to the regions (Neyer 2002). Of course, for Jacques Delors, the French regional contract model for devolution and decentralization, as he knew very well as former minister of finance in France, represented both an option and a concept for redistribution of public governance, institutionalized as public–public partnership (Loughlin and Mazey 1995). It concerned the establishment of an agreement-based multi-level system of governance functioning in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity. The model conceptualized a sub-national tier with agreement-based political competence, with the necessary capacity to function in the EU intended multi-level system of governance featured by subsidiarity. From that point of time, the Union required an organized level with regional authorities and effective executives as actors and responsible negotiators in partnership with other authorities working out development programmes. Without such authorities, the regions and the states were excluded from benefiting from the Structural Funds and other EU Commission regional policies. The EU was not, however, given any supranational competence to regulate how the member states ought to organize and institutionalize distributed public governance and to practise democratic government at regional levels. The choice of organizational style remained a national state matter of responsibility (Veggeland 2002). Consequently, organizational and administrative traditions and paths came to influence the restructuring processes in the member states when public governance was distributed downwards and new institutions were built. Recent studies show that what the OECD (2002) designed as ‘distributed public governance’ has become an immense issue because of the wide variety of state authority organizational forms at the regional level, such as agencies, service enterprises, partnership and other governmental bodies. Besides these institutions’ relations to regional democratic assemblies are very complex in the Continental western countries where such assemblies still exist in accordance with their administrative tradition (Scharpf 1999; Veggeland 2007). The contributors of the OECD report (2002) have observed that institutions of distributed public governance challenge the democratic order on all administrative levels in three ways (2002): ●

Elected tier assemblies and governments have become politically weakened, while technocratic executive authorities have gained more power. Accordingly, the abdication of representative political

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Taming the regulatory state INPUT DEMOCRACY Providing representatives

A. Government: the will of the people through voice

B. Constitution constraining government through fundamental rights

Legitimacy THE NEW DEMOCRACY Legitimacy

C. Distributed public governance: arm’s-length agencies, bodies, partnerships

D.Regulations for rights, for public openness, transparency, ethics, deliberative discourses

Providing results OUTPUT DEMOCRACY

Figure 5.1

●

●

Institutions of the new democracy

authorities creates a deficit of input democracy, accountability and legitimacy (see also Scharpf 1999). The regulatory state agreement-based contract governance and partnership institutions are replacing representative governmental institutions. As Michael Keating (1998: 47) has negatively and pithily commented, ‘governance is what exists when government is weak and fragmented’, meaning fragmented governance performed by independent authorities replaces holistic government. Policies acquire their legitimacy first and foremost from functionality, output efficiency and benchmarking reports, that is from the output or outcome of executives, and from comparative competitive advantages, which benefit from ‘locked-in’ and non-transparent management. That challenges the liberal democratic principles of openness, transparency and deliberation (see also Eriksen et al. 2002). Let us look at a figure illustrating the principles of both input and output democratic challenges (Veggeland 2003).

Figure 5.1, with its four basic institutions illustrates the democracy of the regulatory state, with input-side legitimacy still heavily weighted in the Continental tradition, while output-side legitimacy dominates the Anglo-

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Saxon tradition – and the Nordic tradition as a blend of the two former traditions (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004). According to the OECD report (2002), democracy is threatened from two sides. The first is the distributed public governance that features independent arm’s-length institutions and thereof growing indifference and decreasing participation of the people in elections (Loughlin 2004) that undermines the input-side democracy. The second is ‘locked-in’ management that undermines the liberal principles of openness, transparency and deliberative discourses, that is, output-side democracy. On the one hand, elected bodies and governments tend to abdicate from governance and transfer authority to institutions of type C and, accordingly, the constituencies become indifferent to the elective process. On the other hand, the technocratic executives, as actors competing in the market like private-business actors, will tend to favour lock-in management and thereby worsen the deficit of transparency and public scrutiny into their agendas and managerial procedures. Obviously, the specific reasons for this threatening deficit of democracy are countless, but we may altogether link this to globalization processes, the organization ideas of the regulatory state, and the specific competition policies of each of the Western countries (Habermas 2006; Kuper 2006). The EU was in the process of establishing a Constitution Treaty in 2004 but failed. The member states seemed to be very well aware of the challenge of meeting the threat of the democratic deficit by constitutional reforms and restructuring actions (Van Gerven 2005). Even though there are historical traditions of state governance that are fundamentally different in their origins – the state as superior to the society (Continental tradition) or more functional as a societal mediator (British tradition) – the finding of appropriate solutions is imperative. A new trial of compromise has been made in the signed Treaty of Lisbon, in which more both inputside and output-side democracy stands as pressing issues high up on the agenda. Not strangely at all, with the collapse of the Constitution Treaty as the background and the research from the OECD, we already have commented about changing priorities. The OECD report (2002) observed nine countries, including the EU member states France, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain and Sweden on reforms of distributed public governance. It is of wide-ranging interest when it concludes that there is a change of policies occurring, which the later report of 2005 confirmed: ‘from the drive to create agencies, authorities and other government bodies to the challenge of achieving good governance’ (2005: 21). Further, as previously concluded, the creation of specific public-law administrations (PLAs) and their twins, private-law bodies (PBLs), seems to have come to a standstill in

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many countries. That also implicates a change of the subsidiarity concept, from outward devolution to more downward devolution of administrative authority in the EU member states. This is the new trend in Europe that the Treaty of Lisbon seems to build upon. To repeat the essentials from the OECD report (2002: 21–6), in order to draw attention to the following facts from the nine studied countries and thereby taking the current financial crisis into consideration: ●

●

●

●

The OECD: ‘In most countries, and in terms of the new democracy principles, priorities have moved away from the inclination to create new arm’s-length and separate bodies. Now the challenge seems to be finding the right balance between accountability, autonomy and management of the existing independent agencies and bodies through more openness and transparency, as well as by strengthening the steering capacity of governments’ (OECD 2002: 21). My example is this: governments in the OECD area are now intervening in the financial sector and the market with all kinds of beneficial economic packages to make a way out of the current financial crisis. The OECD: ‘The new independent technocratic entities allow governments to avoid taking political decisions or to take decisions guided only by technical expertise on issues that require a political choice and are at the core of political responsibility’ (ibid: 22). My comment: evidently, at this stage, the current financial crisis has brought political choices and political responsibility again into the core of taming the regulatory state. The OECD: ‘The lack of clarity about the differences between the various types of public agencies, authorities, institutions, make it unclear whether the best organizational forms have been chosen for the various purposes of government. Standardization measures are implemented’ (ibid: 24). My comment: the current financial crisis has sent a clear message – government is needed to steer the market not only by regulations but also by interventions in the Keynesian sense. The OECD: ‘Governmental monitoring efforts and control of the independent public entities have become more difficult. Despite reporting procedures, and even though using neutral agencies for legal surveillance, the different types of relationships, and the different types of control and accountability mechanisms of the bodies, make accurate control almost impossible’ (ibid: 25). My comment: the current crisis makes evident the noted impossibility of control; the financial system has run out of order.

The regulatory state: how democratic is it? ●

●

●

●

97

The OECD: ‘The lack of clarity of the institutional system potentially undermines citizens’ trust in the system’s functions’ (ibid: 25). My comment: the citizen’s trust has dwindled to zero in many states as a repercussion of the current crisis, just to mention the situation in small states like Iceland, Latvia, and likewise in great states like the UK and the USA. The OECD: ‘The need for clearer criteria for establishing different types of boards – advisory, management or governing boards, and their respective responsibilities – is acknowledged. There has been criticism of lack of transparency surrounding the appointments of board members, their salaries and other benefits. Or the criticism has focused on the lack of representative order regarding the members in terms of gender, ethnic and local background’ (ibid: 25). My comment: I see this notion of the OECD coming up very evidently in the current financial crisis, embodied in the struggle to find who is responsible. The OECD: ‘The independent bodies are seen as functioning outside the political debate with little oversight from ministers and ministries and weak accountability arrangements. The parliaments are neglected, and so are individuals and the institutions of the civil society. Conclusion: Weak accountability mechanisms undermine the legitimacy of governments and parliaments’ (ibid: 26). My comment: perhaps, in the current crisis, governments and parliaments are taking back their traditional positions at centre stage and are working to restore their legitimacy. The OECD: Finally: ‘Weak co-ordination mechanisms and coherence failure are threatening effective public service production in terms of “best value” to individuals, social groups and corporate interests, because of fragmented governance’ (ibid: 26). My comment: the current financial crisis and recession to be found worldwide provides extensive evidence for this last OECD proposition.

In the unelected system of distributed public governance, the problems of technical, communicative or legal co-ordination of the many actors and bodies escalate immensely with the growing numbers, and transactional costs will ultimately become excessive according to Scharpf’s Law (see Figure 3.3). True, the rise of the ‘unelected bodies’ implies a new separation of public powers, which could theoretically have been advantageous, as argued by Frank Vibert (2007). Empirically it turns out differently, however. The costly and weak co-ordination mechanisms of the reporting OECD countries are not a failure directly related to the poor performance of public governance, but they are a consequence of the system of

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distributed public governance and the unelected bodies of the regulatory state itself (Veggeland 2008). Accordingly, there is a growing focus in all OECD member states on bringing governments and administrations closer to the people, and people closer to the state in the sense that they are unintentionally being managed more than being active and participatory citizens (Loughlin and Seiler 2004). Further, there is focus on good governance, ethics and more coherent public services, that is, on policy and solutions for structural coherence, including making the autonomous bodies work on joint projects and stimulate more public–public instead of public–private partnership building, just as we now see happening as a consequence of the financial crisis and recession. Moreover, the focus endeavours: (a)

To avoid the creation of adding new independent arm’s-length agencies, public-service enterprises and autonomous bodies. (b) To involve civil society and the governments more in governance on all tiers of the European multi-level system of governance. (c) To improve parliamentary control over activities for the sake of more holistic responsibility. (d) Finally, there is a growing political will to make the overall system more legible, accessible and participatory to people, and the accountability mechanisms, activities and performance made more easily controllable by parliaments, on all tiers and in accordance with the proper democratic administrative style according to the principle of subsidiarity, that is, the downward devolution of power and authority.

NOTE 1. The Irish referendum, which came out with a No to the Treaty, has created problems for the final ratification.

6. 6.1

Social capital in the regulatory state: Nordic lessons FLEXICURITY

How do Nordic states conduct policies in order to bring people closer to the socio-economic realm, in the sense that they, being social capital, tend to be integrated as active and participatory citizens? How do the interventionist and expensive Nordic welfare states survive in the global age, with demanding and ever changing claims to international competitiveness? This chapter addresses these questions. Social capital and partnership building are introduced as terms and policy concepts in order to find answers in the framework of intended or unintended strategic taming endeavours. As a critical approach claims a contextual conceptualization, we shall here view different European social models and administrative traditions in relation to comparative basic contexts in order to arrive at analytical answers. Leaning especially on the Anglo-Saxon model, the traditional Scandinavian universal welfare-state model of the post-war Keynesian order has gradually been transformed into the contemporary Nordic model (Veggeland 2007). Contextual regulatory innovations and path-dependent processes have generated the survival of universal welfare state arrangements and collective action but with the mixed use of market-type mechanisms (MTM) in the public sector of Anglo-Saxon origin. In summary, this blending of policies has resulted in the advantageous social capital of what is called flexicurity, social security combined with a flexible participatory labour market. We shall discuss both flexicurity policy and participatory subsidiarity defined downwards as contributions to an explanation of why the expensive welfare states of the Nordic type have not only so far been doing well but have also sustained both democratic and output-side legitimacy (OECD statistics 2005).

6.2

PARTNERSHIP, SOCIAL CAPITAL AND INNOVATION

Europe is looking for ideas and concepts of social capital that might constitute and give the integrated global region an impetus to more sustainable 99

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economic activity, employment and welfare, through collective action and renewed endogenous development, both inside countries and across national borders (Hayward and Menon 2003; Cini 2004). Partnershipbuilding that connects private and public actors as well as public actors to other public actors has the intention of strengthening existing social capital (Putnam 1993) and raising new social (and human) capital as strategic concepts for promoting economic renewal and sustainable welfare (Szreter and Woolcock 2004). The concepts draw upon the belief that pooling actors in micro or macro networks (clusters according to Porter 1998) and organized ‘institutional thickness’ (Amin and Thrift 1995a) in the form of collective action are basic policy strategies when the target of the polity is to achieve and increase competitive development capacity. The strategy goes for organizing existing or new public and private actors for collective actions through contracts and partnership formations, both nationally and locally, as we know is recommended by European development programmes. Additionally, partnership institutions fit into the mode of arm’s-length steering, which characterizes the regulatory state (Keating 1998). The beneficial outcome is the advantages that come with the building of extensive social capital. We may, however, view social capital as a diversified notion. The concept of social capital was introduced by James C. Coleman (Sørensen and Spilerman 1993) with Robert D. Putnam’s (2002) version in the US in the 1980s. It was part of a major political change that took place in those years in the Anglo-Saxon US and the UK and had wideranging consequences. The neo-liberal economic discourse and NPM organizational changes entered the global scene. Social capital became an imperative economic notion. A critical expression became resonant: social capital, social but still capital (Navarro 2002, 2004). A past president of the American Political Science Association, Theodore Lowi, indicated that ‘economic language is the dominant language in social science discourse today . . . we are witnessing the de-politicization of politics’ (1992: 86). In other words, it implies that social capital building has become a narrow concept based only on economic values. Contrary to this reductive notion, there also exists a wider concept of social capital that accounts for additional social and sustainable ethical values. The term ‘social capital’ reflects not only the understanding that government needs capital but that individuals need capital in order to compete or survive better in the competitive and microeconomic world as well. As capital, investment in building social capital creates, therefore, expectations first and foremost of economic revenues derived from the social realm and expectations about business growth; if these do not happen, the investment is deemed a failure. We may express this notion in the following

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way. Building social capital within this framework of economics tends to become an art of social and human engineering (Beetham et al. 2002; Moran 2003). The target of this art is the creation of competitive micropartnership formations and joined-up initiatives, but such targets are often based on short-term market thinking and changes, and thereof the frequent shifting of partner alliances.

6.3

A COMPARISON OF SOCIAL MODELS

Michael Moran’s thesis (2003) is that social capital in the sense of engineered micro-partnerships and institutional changes has been a ‘fiasco’ with the consequence of generating more innovation in an ever ascending, or more accurately, descending, spiral. He argues that in the Anglo-Saxon UK, the last 30 years have been an era of ‘hyper-innovation’, displaying ‘the frenetic selection of new institutional modes like partnerships and arm’s length bodies, and their equally frenetic replacement by alternatives’ (2003: 26). Other scholars have supported this thesis (Scharpf 1999; Veggeland 2004; Higdem 2007). The implication of Moran’s thesis is that partnership-building of this kind encourages collaborative governance and collective action at the micro-level because of ‘spillover’ effects. It becomes a strategy for taming fragmentation, inefficiency and increasing transactional costs. Further, its unexpected spillover effects will manifest as unpredictable actions and sudden dilutions of partnerships, which demand replacements. Individualized interest conflicts and social inequality among the partners devastate partnerships and cause the ‘frenetic replacement by alternatives’. Increasing transactional costs becomes another threat because of this ‘ascending, or descending, innovation spiral’. We should, however, understand this properly. Of course, the partnership concept as collective action and social capital of the engineered, economically valued variety also, in general, encourages good governance. Theodore Lowi and Vincent Navarro have, however, identified the problem: the narrow and economically valued concept of social capital does not only lead to the depoliticization of politics but may contextually, depending on social models, be a barrier for building wider-valued social capital at the societal macro level. With this in mind, let us study some lessons from Scandinavia. With regard to the prospect of good governance within the framework of national macro-partnership for collective action, for example, Simon Szreter and Michael Woolcock (2004) have concluded that the Swedish welfare state provides social capital of the wider-valued type to its citizens better and more innovatively than do other social models. How have these

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scholars supported such a statement? Let us test their suggestion in a wider Nordic framework. Taking Szreter and Woolcock’s statement seriously, we must say that they made such an assertion based on a consideration of what is good or deficient social capital. In other words, they must have drawn the conclusion on the grounds of preferable Swedish welfare norms, social ethics and valued results, which the actual social model fulfils. They conclude indirectly that social science should be able to say whether or not social capital building has led to ‘successes’ along a scale of goal achievement. It means we need criteria against which to assess and measure success or failure. Neither Szreter and Woolcock nor Moran with his ‘fiasco’ statement indicates such criteria. Actually, reviewing the issue of ‘good–bad’ governance critically from a normative point of view is all too rarely done (Black 2005). What we do know though is that social models and administrative traditions, which naturally have come into being in a socio-economic framework of values and experiences, do influence the quality and practical outcome of institutional change (March and Olsen 1989; Pedersen 2008), and consequently also the formation of partnership and the provision of social capital. Let us review the Swedish case a little further. Szreter and Woolcock’s observations warrant a serious consideration of the Swedish welfare-state model as a major point of reference in order to determine macro social capital in a wider normative framework than the instrumental approach to the concept does. In what follows, we shall take that approach, but we shall view the Swedish model within the framework of the major Scandinavian-Nordic model, in which the former model represents the core (Veggeland 2007). Szreter and Woolcock refer to ‘other societies’ in their statement but do not point out which ones. Here we shall address this oversight by making a comparison of macro social capital formation and policy belonging to the Nordic model and its constituent countries, which are also influenced normatively with social-capital policy from the Anglo-Saxon model and the Continental model. Regarding the former model, the focus will be on the social-democratic tradition responsible for the promotion of social capital based on universal welfare and social security, an active labour-market policy and an interventionist and comparatively expensive state. Contemporary focus on the building of social capital through various partnership formations is a key part of the debate on both ‘reinventing government’ (Osborne and Gaebler 1993) and ‘rediscovering institutions’ (March and Olsen 1989). As such, the focus reflects the pandemic search for ideas of institutional change and innovation in the global age (Cassese 2003). However, the search for and the adoption of ideas do not happen randomly

Social capital in the regulatory state: Nordic lessons

Table 6.1

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The deviant Nordic model: public outlays, taxes and employment in the context of European social models

Indicators

Government outlays as % of nominal GDP Taxes as % of GDP (2003) Unemployment rates (2004)

Social models Anglo-Saxon*

Nordic**

Continental***

43–45

481–58

47–54

31–37 4.4–4.7

45–51 5.4–8.82

42–46 9.5–9.7

Notes: *** Represented by Ireland and UK, and Germany. *** The five Nordic countries, (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden). *** Represented by France. 1. Finland’s 48 per cent makes an acceptance because of lasting repercussions after the collapse of the Soviet Union. 2. Finland 8.8 per cent, see previous footnote explanation. Source:

OECD (2005).

but are linked to contextual ‘interpretation’ of values and substance (Røvik 2007). Accordingly, this implies that social models and administrative traditions affect the interpretation of concepts of social capital and their attendant policy, which results in diversified implementation (Veggeland 2007). With references to the issue of reinventing government and the debate on public innovation and its framework, the term and concept of social capital is related to this debate and reviewed in its framework. In a comparative perspective, there are a number of ways to demonstrate the deviant position of the Nordic-model countries. One way is to look at the size of the public sector measured as general, total governmental outlays as a percentage of the nominal GDP and as total taxes as a percentage of the GDP (Table 6.1). This indicates the degree to which governments and countries’ citizens are willing to spend money on collective rather than individual goods in society. Welfare and social security issues are part of the collective approach. The figures in Table 6.1 show that this willingness is lowest in the Anglo-Saxon tradition and highest in the Nordic tradition but with the Continental tradition nearby. This is not so strange when we account for the historical roots and framework of the Scandinavian welfare-state model having its origins in the Prussian collective thinking of the late nineteenth century and the performance of the Weberian neutral bureaucracy (Kuhnle 2000). The unemployment rate is on a low level (even lower in 2007 – 3–5 per cent) but slightly higher than what the Anglo-Saxon model provides. The question is what legitimates a high tax level among

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people, and what role does social capital play regarding the social-model figures presented in Table 6.1?

6.4

THE VALUE OF COLLECTIVE ACTION AND THREE ORDERS OF CHANGE

Social constructions, like engineered partnership as social capital, are precarious, tending to erode and dissolve over time, especially when shortterm economic revenues are expected (Veggeland 2003). These aspects concern the survival of social models and administrative traditions. In contrast, building long-term social capital presupposes basically the existence of values found in local networks, identity, mutual consent, social equality and community life, besides public and private funding access. Some social models may be good fits for these values and comparatively better than others (Knill 2001; Iversen 2005). Accordingly, these social models tend to benefit from administrative traditions that contribute to social equality, universal welfare and social security (Veggeland 2007), in addition to the stable networking of local and regional communities. Robert D. Putnam (1993) has stressed the latter in his study of the developmental success in Northern Italian communities in the 1980s. Tight collective networking communities provided long-term, ‘great’ social capital. In our knowledge-based economy, we are constantly looking for networking partnership and collaborative governance principles, that is, models of collective action. This search aims to find outstanding and innovative policy ideas that organize those socio-economic bodies that make collaborative developments work. Network bodies should involve the public sector and private partners in innovative clusters across all sectors and areas of the polity, among others, Michael Porter says (1998). As such, we find public innovation measured in the context of a geographical area (state, regions of different scale), or a particular policy domain (welfare, labour market, environment), or some other unit of analysis (an organization, individual), or some combination of the two (social regulation or labour marked in Scandinavia) (see, for example, Pedersen 2008). Actually, public innovation is about intervention and co-ordination of joint activities aimed at social capital through network and partnership formations by territory, by function or even by transcending national and transnational policies. Public innovation defines in the knowledge-based society the building and performance of new accountable and beneficial collective skills and knowledge capabilities, through social as well as human capital, and through fixed strategic processes in order to achieve and realize this capability (van Waarden 1995).

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Accordingly, public innovation in networks and matters of strategic policy imply, on the one hand, transcending fiscal and regulatory interventions and the territorial and functional creation of new organizations like partnerships, either as public–private or public–public partnerships. On the other hand, such innovations also dispose change in norms, rules, standards and operating procedures; these changes influence the conceptualization of the reform processes. Basically, path-dependence created by social models and an administrative tradition that makes the changes contextually impacted and deep-rooted circumscribes such interventions (Pierson 2004; Veggeland 2007). Simply put, public innovation means the use of new solutions to address old problems, or old solutions to address ‘new’ problems of development. Generally, we may see institutional innovation as the pursuit of the modern, all-embracing project of change with regard to rationalization, systematization and ordering, but this change does not take place in a political and ideological vacuum (Meyer 2000). Yet, if all innovations are change, are all changes innovations? The latter, converse statement cannot be an appropriate and reasonable conclusion. We should approach network innovation contextually and view it as the application of new solutions to old problems, or new solutions to newly ‘constructed’ problems. This idea has inspired studies that have attempted to determine the criteria for differentiating superficial and shortterm policy changes from deep-rooted and long-term innovations. Hall’s typology of policy change is germane here (1993: 278–9). He has identified three forms of changes: ●

●

●

The first order of change is instrumental, defining changes to the levels and settings of basic instruments like technology and budgetary restrain. Hall does not regard instrumental changes as innovative. Second-order changes are those that refer to modifications in the use and administration of the instruments in relation to current organizational processes. But the art of engineering changes neither the overall goals of policy, norms and values nor the understanding on which the changes are based. Because these second-based changes occur within existing social models and traditional frameworks of values and norms without disturbing them, they may serve to reinforce the path-dependence of the models. Paradoxically, they may counteract reformatory change and thereof deep-rooted and long-term innovations. The instrumental concept of social capital represents such a second-based change, as we shall see below. The third-order changes are transformations of the overall goals of the policy, changes in the cognitive and normative framework of the networking regulatory regime on which it is based, accompanied by

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first- and second-order changes. These changes might lead to deeprooted and long-term public innovations, for example, moves that remain path-dependent and also aspire to reinvent the state and to rediscover institutions in new settings. We shall see below that the traditional Scandinavian model of the welfare state has undergone such a move and, as a result, has become known as the contemporary Nordic model. This model has combined universal social security and active labour-market policies innovatively, and this combination constitutes a deep-rooted and long-term, path-dependent social capital. This social capital may be objectively experienced by individuals and collectives and is suitable for studies that employ empirical, statistical measurements. Third-order social capital represents substantial public innovation.

6.5

TRANSCENDING SOCIAL CAPITAL OF THE NORDIC TYPE

In a transnational perspective, we may view social capital in the Nordic countries as a transformation of the traditional Scandinavian welfare-state capacity to what now is named the contemporary social capital of the Nordic model (Veggeland 2007). The aforementioned term of ‘Nordic flexicurity policy’ represents contextually collective action and a long-term social capital embracing both economic and social aspects. The driving force is a path-dependent political will to sustain a national partnership between the regulatory authorities, the unions of employees and the employers, and the people. The goal is good governance in the forms of universal social security, institutional stability and economic and competitive advantages. Universal social security lays the foundation for the development of flexible labour markets that all the partners benefit from in different ways, including benefits irreducible to economic factors. The Nordic Active Labour Market Policy (ALMP) is another expensive public contribution to the social capital of the grand partnership and the flexicurity concept. ALMP is an important part of the state authorities’ responsibility for planning, building, restoring and protecting human capital and for making human resources the basic element of partnerships and social-capital building. ALMPs compel by regulatory innovations a range of public means and measures in order to function together, and the execution of these means and measures must take place within the framework of the universal welfare-state model.

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The mechanisms behind the Nordic flexicurity are as follows: ●

●

●

Universal welfare and social security allow employees to feel free to move and change job and partners – safety and equal access to welfare rule independently of geography, position, employer and network attachment. ALMP performs collaborative governance by complex partnership policies (social capital) and by education, individual training and lifelong learning (human capital). The performance involves not only the public sector but also partners across all sectors – from public services to private actors to NGOs. Nordic flexicurity is a nationally implemented policy concept but is basic for partnership-building and regional development capacities domestically and across borders. Flexicurity reproduces long-term partnership arrangements, an effective labour market, high labour productivity, a high employment rate and a high level of social and human capital.

All together, Nordic flexicurity as an important part of the social capital concept is indeed expensive and imposes a high tax burden on the citizens, but even so the policy sustains its legitimacy from its double efficiency with regard to returning economic revenues and social security. Comparative figures suggestive of the OECD data were made available in the 2004 World Economic Forum report on the Lisbon Agenda. In a European perspective, these figures revealingly showed that if the Anglo-Saxon USA were, for comparative purposes, an EU member state, it would rank fourth behind three existing member states on an overall assessment of economic competitiveness. Remarkably, the top countries – Denmark, Sweden, Finland and Norway – were all Nordic states. The consistent performance of the Nordic social capital is striking across a range of indicators: ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●

Economic growth; Labour productivity; Active Labour Market Policy (ALMP); Labour-market flexibility but social security, called ‘flexicurity’; Regional and local development policy; Research and development investment; Performance in the high-tech and telecom sectors; Rates of employment (including among women and older workers).

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In this context, social capital as flexicurity turns out to be not only ‘capital’ but also ‘social’. Szreter and Woolcock (2004) were indeed right in their statement about Sweden; countries in the region ‘(provide) greater social capital to its citizens than do other countries’.

6.6

THE THREAT OF NON-MAINTENANCE

Basically, social-capital building may promote good governance and longterm positive consequences in one polity context, but in another context it may turn out very differently. From the analysis of this chapter, we learn that social models and administrative tradition do influence the quality and practical outcome of partnership formations. Professor Vicente Navarro of Johns Hopkins University asks (2004: 2) in a critical commentary: ‘Is capital the solution or the problem?’ In a response to Theodore Lowi’s statement, his answer is that in dominant neo-liberal discourse in social science as a consequence of the 1980s, we have seen the appearance of concepts such as social capital and human capital. He writes: This dominance by an economic discourse was heralded as an indicator of the supposed triumph of capitalism – which had closed any debate about the type of society and economic system we might want and refocused the debate on how to manage the only system we have. Consequently, the purpose of all social actions is reduced to accumulation of capital so that the individual can compete better. The capital might be physical, monetary, human, or social, but it is capital nevertheless.

Thus, as ‘social capital’ has become an economic term in the era of neo-liberalism, it seems that flexicurity will likewise be threatened by the same shift of connotation away from a policy for national collective action. In the political debate, even in the Nordic countries, the economic connotation is given superiority as a policy for increasing European and national competitiveness and economic growth rather than for keeping the policy as a steady path to good welfare policy in the global age. The flexicurity policy faces serious challenges today by the embracing of labour immigration from Europe and other, more remote regions. The focus tends to change from the social connotation to the economic. The Nordic model is in drift; the maintenance of path-dependence is threatened (Taylor-Gooby 2004; Timonen 2004; Veggeland 2004, 2007; Olsen 2005; Tranøy 2006). Flexicurity policy as social-capital building should remain a path for collective action and for solidarity, for reasons of democracy, social security

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and welfare and for keeping the labour market flexible. As academics, we are not really responsible for policy performance, but we do have another responsibility. We are responsible for the definition of the terms and thereby the language in use. With reference to Navarro’s statement above, there is a need in social science today to break the trend that supports the dominance of economic language and the considerable reductionism and myopia this dominance generates.

7. 7.1

Regionalization in the regulatory state CONTINENTAL EUROPEAN REGIONALIZATION

Continental European political regionalization in its beginning may be said to be vertically organized with the central state as the superior power. Regions were first and foremost subject to the policies of the state. However, as we have seen elsewhere, under the aegis of the new regulatory regime of the EU, an extended process of devolution of national state competence to regions commenced in the 1980s in several member states. It happened in accordance with the ambiguity we have uncovered in the principle of subsidiarity. Along with the principle, state power was not only distributed to regional governments, but, in keeping with the Anglo-Saxon tradition, even more was distributed to independent arm’s-length administrations and other governmental bodies, which the OECD report has documented (Veggeland 2001, 2003; OECD 2002). It was in regional policies, however, that subsidiarity particularly manifested itself performances and forms (Gidlund and Jerneck 2000). The structural order of subsidiarity, specifically the downward process of devolution, did not occur as a coincidence in the EU. The former French minister, Jacques Delors, now from his new position in the 1980s as president of the EU Commission, initiated the system of multi-level governance. He did it in the spirit of Continental subsidiarity and in the context of the idea of an arising new regionalism in Europe (Keating 1998; Veggeland 2000). The administrative method was the contractualization of tier agreements on the basis of shared competence, responsibility and financial obligations between region, central state and the EU in partnerships (Balme and Bonnet 1995). Building and taking advantage of regional social and economic capital was the leading idea and the goal. The background model was the French planning bill, adopted on 29 July 1982. The bill erected a representative regional assembly, in accordance with the French constitutional tradition, as a superior authority in selected areas of competence (Loughlin and Mazey 1995). The regional government became the legal basis for contracting support from independent 110

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public and private actors when they were needed in regional development programmes. The bill asserted that the vocation of the region especially was to formulate holistic regional plans and to coordinate public establishments (Etablissements publics) and independent administrative authorities (Autorités administratives indépendantes) through state-region partnership (OECD 2002). The reform was founded on the new regional institution of the ‘Contrat de plan Etat-Régions’ (Balme and Bonnet 1995), which was the introduction of a new regulatory regime in the French constitutional order. The reform created a new style of politics based on negotiations and mutual responsibility between regional and central democratic authorities but still contract regulated. The consequences of decentralization due to the reform formally changed the status of the regions. The regional governmental institutions created opportunities to voice concerns and the institution of public–public partnership, the ‘Contrat de plan’, eased the challenges involved in the co-ordination and reduced the transactional costs (Scharpf 1997). Additionally, instead of being an extended instrument of planning and implementation of national policies for the central state, the region became a legally defined territory with voice options and self-regulatory competence anchored in the negotiated state–region partnership. Thus, the reform restructured co-operative arrangements between the state and regional or local authorities and readjusted their contributions to more effective sector policies. Planning contracts established through the two-tier bargaining process defined common objectives and programmes and secured financial co-operation on a plural-annual and legal basis. It may stand as an example of how the principle of subsidiarity was embodied in the regulatory manner but in accordance with French democratic and administrative traditions belonging to the Continental social model (Loughlin and Mazey 1995). However, during the 1990s the democratic ‘Contrat de plan’ regional institution has undergone a metamorphosis. The purpose of the national ‘inter-governmental’ contractualization of state–region relations was all too clearly ambiguous. This uncertainty may be not too strange; studies show that the emphasis has steadily moved from regional politics to contracting as an institutional technique targeting the implementation of national sector policies and competition policies (Balme and Bonnet 1995: 69). State governance linked to the many unelected independent agencies and other service and development bodies undermine the steering capacity of the regional governments and tend to bring the central state back into a position of control. Although the French central state no longer holds the dominant and monopolistic position of the past in the politicaladministration system, it nevertheless retains regulatory power, which is

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superior to the contract-bound regions as political units (Loughlin and Seiler 2004). The partnership institution, the ‘Contrat de plan’, tends to become a governance measure for mobilizing the political regions behind policies of the decentralized unelected state authorities rather than a mechanism to provide support for autonomous regional policies, democratic selfgovernment and the voicing of local concerns and interests. Yet, the OECD report (2002: 71–97) indicates that in France there is now the political will to counteract these trends from the 1990s that not only wishes to make regional governments superior to the arm’s-length state institutions and other governmental bodies, but also aims to strengthen the steering capacity of the representative elected regional assemblies. There has been a real transfer of power to regional governments, thus enhancing the regions’ authority. With reference to networking decision-makers and regulatory governance, Loughlin and Seiler (2004: 208) have written that this authority has been extended across borders and that the ‘nature of policy-making has also changed from a vertical and hierarchical approach to operating across administrative boundaries’. Moreover, to meet the obstacles presented by the regulatory state, France has taken action to create policy and organizational coherence regarding the structure of the public arm’s-length agencies and other unelected bodies. The objective is to make them more transparent, legible and accessible for regional planning authorities and the civil society, in short, more democratic (Veggeland 2003).

7.2

ANGLO-SAXON EUROPEAN REGIONALIZATION

The practices of contractualization and regional partnership formations constitute a new institutional mechanism designed to ensure the collective action and co-operation of a wide variety of public and private actors. After all, the main policy aim of the regional partnership formations and the purpose of subsidiarity are to achieve social and economic capital in order to create competitive regions and to spur economic growth. These objectives imply the measures and political endeavours for building strong regional networks and governance structures to actuate techno-economic and social-institutional innovation rooted in endogenous regional development and mobilization (Cappellin and Baytey 1993; Keating and Loughlin 1997; Veggeland 2001). In line with this fact, in the UK, with its mediating state tradition, independent arm’s-length state agencies (Next Steps Agencies) and unelected

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development bodies, often in public–private partnership, have dominated the configuration of regional authority (OECD 2002: 209–41). Instead of thinking of subsidiarity in the sense of the devolution of authority and power to regional assemblies, the regional agenda has been ‘what matters is what works’. The consequence has been a clear democratic deficit at the regional and local levels (Loughlin 2004: 37–69). The regional agenda emerged through a complex agenda involving many different determinants (Webb and Collis 2000). During the 1980s, in the wake of market-liberal ideologies, the region was perceived as the most appropriate level for economic development and, therefore, for new regulatory policies. The question of local democracy and local accountability appeared as something of an afterthought. Mainly, the rise of a ‘me too’ regionalist movement in the UK came in response to the perceived success of dedicated development agencies in both Scotland and Wales. Additionally, drawing inspiration from success stories, such as those of the Third Italy and Baden-Würtemberg regions, a general consensus emerged that the best organization for the economic restructuring processes would revolve around strategic public–private partnerships and market effective, decentralized Regional Development Agencies (RDAs) of the arm’s-length bodies of the state (Webb and Collis 2000). Elected regional assemblies were perceived to be redundant. The RDAs’ role as actors in engineered public–private partnerships and as the institutional base for programming and contracting has been criticized on two principle grounds. The first criticism relates to the issue of accountability. Despite the obtaining of independence through state subsidiaries, the central state retains too much power and authority. Negotiations and bargaining processes between central state and decentralized state agencies imply agreements and contracts, which primarily promote national development interests rather than local ones (Healey 1997). The second criticism relates to the overwhelming short-term businessled interest that permeates the government’s regional agenda for social and economic capital building. Success stories have, however, failed to appear at the regional level in the UK. The fragmented regional state authorities as mediators in development programmes and the absence of holistic governmental responsibility may be the reasons for the conspicuous lack of success. The underlined fear expressed is that the narrowly conceived political focus on fragmented technocratic agencies as instruments for promoting competitiveness will not most likely achieve economic success. Besides the organizational form undermines and threatens holistic decision-making and democratic legitimacy. The performance of policies seems to suffer from coordination failures, large transactional costs and the

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absence of local mobilization of human capital and economic innovation (Scharpf 1997; Gibbs 1998; Veggeland 2003). All these problems typically belong to the regulatory state order. The central government, probably as a political consequence of the Third Way (Giddens 1998), has been alone in raising the problem of democratic deficit, which this criticism identifies as the lack of regional government and holistic planning authorities. According to the OECD report (2002) and other studies (Loughlin 2004), there are now signs of organizational changes occurring in the UK, and a regional tier of government may be under way. Most likely, the latter will materialize in accordance, of course, with the democratic and administrative tradition of the Anglo-Saxon type and thus end the anomalous position of the UK as the only large state in the European Union (almost) without a regional tier of government.

7.3

NORDIC EUROPEAN REGIONALIZATION: THE NORWEGIAN CASE

The Nordic state of Norway is not a member country of the EU, although it is a member of the European Economic Area (EEA) and a signatory country of the Schengen Agreement. The state of Norway belongs historically to the Continental democratic and administrative tradition (Gidlund 2000). Both the process of fragmentation of the national state hierarchy and the shaping of arm’s-length administrations and other governmental bodies commenced quite late compared to other OECD countries. There are a few examples of special public-law administrations (PLAs) and private-law bodies (PLBs) from 1992, but it was at the end of the decade the number drastically increased, about 40 in total in 2002 and 60 in 2007 (organizational form narrowly defined) according to ministry (AAD) calculations. Some of the bodies are regionally organized with a territorial dimension but they are ‘unelected’ in the sense that they are only indirectly under control of regional authorities and elected assemblies (Veggeland 2003; Vibert 2007). Well-known examples of the latter type are certain service institutions. One example found in the health sector is the ‘Regional Health Enterprises’ that organize and run the Norwegian hospitals; another in the labour-market sector, the Aetat, provides vocational help and the mediation of jobs; yet another is the postal service. We may also find them in the different infrastructure sectors, such as roads, railways and electricity and in the regional-policy sector in the form of unelected arm’s-length development agencies, such as IN and SIVA.1 The reasons for the establishment

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of these bodies are well known and described in the OECD report (2002) as policies implemented in order to improve the efficiency, flexibility and effectiveness of specialized state functions and services. The policies aim to improve the legitimacy through increased output or outcome from invested taxpayers’ money in public services (output legitimacy). The measures are the organizational mode of independent institutions exposed to competition. Specialists, experts and other technocrats have expanded their competence and their steering capacity but at the cost of parliamentary governance. In line with other EU states, Norway has come to face the democratic deficit problem (Veggeland 2003, 2004a). Our point of departure is that the institutions of new public management in the form of PLAs and PLBs, that is, unelected bodies, threaten the democratic order. Therefore, as the OECD report (2002) has described, many governments now realize that managing from a distance has created specific problems of accountability and control, and these governments have thus started to focus on improving the governance of these bodies, demanding more coherence, openness and transparency. In this chapter, we have studied some sub-national cases and elaborated how the challenge for greater democracy has been met at the regional level, that is, how the principle of subsidiarity has been implemented in this context. What are the principal features of the restructuring processes at the sub-national level in Norway? In Norway, the devolution and distribution of public governance seems to be in process, and this implies the weakening of the competence of the existing democratic regional units, the 19 sub-national fylkeskommunene or ‘county-municipalities’, or even their dismantlement (Veggeland 2000, 2003, pp. 175–6). Since the 1990s the county-municipality has been criticized on two principal grounds. The first relates to a welfare perspective that this regional unit is redundant, that the state and the municipalities might very well take over its welfare-producing functions and its public management responsibilities. Accordingly, in 2001 the county-municipality lost its responsibility for running the hospital sector to the aforementioned Regional Health Enterprises, with the central state as the formal owner. The second criticism relates to inefficiency, to the sub-national tier’s role and function as the principal and responsible authority for regional planning and development. The central government perceives unelected regional agencies, service enterprises and other governmental bodies to be in a better position to take over as regional state authorities. A new role for the democratic regional tier has been conceived. The role is to become one of a wide range of other regional-development actors in a fragmented configuration of specialized independent development agencies, service enterprises and other governmental bodies.

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Partnership-building is highly recommended and has become the chief organizational principle at the regional level (Gjertsen 2002; Higdem 2007). Political responsibility and holistic concerns should be retained by the central authorities, and in the long run, the elected regional assemblies should become redundant. The government perceives these governance structures as the new structure of regional authority for the future (White Paper No. 19, 2001–2002). Certainly, it is in accordance with the EU formal demand for a regional level in order to obtain financial support from its Structural Funds and Interreg policy measures, but the thinking deviates from the organizational and regionalization features of the Continental states. Instead, what has happened in Norway is in line with what has happened in the UK, where the unelected state bodies and the establishment of public–private partnership institutions dominate the restructuring processes. It results in the de-connecting of the region’s development and holistic planning responsibility from the regional democratic assembly (fylkestinget) and the placing of authority into the hands of independent bodies and their local partnership institutions (Hallin and Lindstrøm 1998). As we have learned from both the UK and France, this direction will certainly lead to the dominance of national development goals and reducing planning into a narrow sectoral act. Actually, the empowerment of the regional state technocracy without a holistic responsible and regulating regional governmental authority most likely will result in less efficiency and fewer effective outcomes of invested taxpayers’ money. Collective action will cease and be replaced by short-term partnership establishments, and an absence of social capital may occur (Veggeland 2003). As we know from other countries, the failure of co-ordination and the problem of increasing transactional costs will reduce economic competitiveness and the advantages of the new regionalism (Veggeland 2000; OECD 2002). It may seem remarkable, but the Norwegian fragmented authority model for exercising Distributed Public Governance, separating power (Vibert 2007) and implementing regional development policies clearly follows ideas and strategies picked up from the Anglo-Saxon British model. The state authorities on all levels function more as mediators than principal and holistic decision-makers. The dominant ideology that privileges market liberal competition seems to have determined the choice of regional governance structure not rooted in the Scandinavian (and Continental) democratic and administrative tradition. Formally, we may identify the principle of subsidiarity as the devolution of democratic governance. However, the devolution of competence happens more as an outward transfer of authority to independent arm’s-length institutions and other market actors than as a downward principle associated with mutual

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transactions between domestic governments. This fact features the general deficit of democracy in the Norwegian polity (OECD 2002; Veggeland 2003). Norway belongs historically to the Continental administrative tradition and mode of organizing national multi-tier governance. During the 2000s the political debate became strongly focused on, with support from scholars (Veggeland 2003) and ideas from the French regional democratic reform of 1982 (Loughlin and Mazey 1995). Merging the 19 small and weakening county-municipalities to five to eight politicaleconomic regional units was one option considered. The other option was to make those larger units and state–region contracts the principal authorities for exercising democratic control over the unelected arm’slength bodies of the state, and further given financially measures to act as important providers of infrastructure. Of course, the scheme laid down the principle of representative regional governments, recognizing the superiority of the democratic regional tier authorities. The idea was opposed by Anglo-Saxon-model-inspired opponents. They deployed the thinking of new public management about efficiency and development as arguments. In 2007 the Norwegian Government took a stand in the debate about which model to follow for regionalization reform. White Paper no. 12 (2007–2008) made the decision and closed the political debate: there would be no future merging of the county-municipalities, and only minimal changes regarding the existing distribution of power and sharing of tasks between the tiers would take place.

7.4

CONCLUSIONS

We may view the EU principle of subsidiarity introduced by the Maastricht Treaty in 1991 as a pursuit of the historical democratic state idea that territorial layers and authorities should counterbalance each other. Accordingly, the EU has recommended the devolution of competence and steering capacity upwards to the supranational European tier by agreements when the greatest policy outcome and effectiveness are expected on that level. Similarly, downward devolution to regional and local authorities and partnership ought to be implemented when most effective policy arrangements for regenerating local and regional economy are the expected outcomes at the lower levels (Majone 1997; Wallace 1998; Veggeland 2000). The regulatory state of the EU constitutes an agreement-based multi-level system of governance. In order that the regions and states achieve benefits from the structural policies of the EU, the EU requires a level with regional

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authorities as responsible negotiators and actors in partnerships and as effective executives of development programmes. The implementation of the principle of subsidiarity does not demand a specific organizational form of the concept distributed public governance. The latter was defined by the OECD report (2002) as a process of devolution that dominates today and is featured by a wide variety of independent authorities, in the form of state agencies, service enterprises and other governmental bodies. This created a new style of politics and subsidiarity: outward more than downward devolution of competence. According to the OECD report, this new style of politics is under reconsideration in European countries because ‘governments now realize that managing from distance has created specific accountability and control issues’ (2002: 10). Especially at the sub-national levels, elected tier assemblies and governments have become weakened while technocratic executives authorities have gain more principal power. That creates a deficit of parliamentary democracy, legitimacy and accountability. The new type of policies gains its legitimacy first and foremost from output or outcome from functionality, effectiveness and competitive advantages, while also suffering from the lacunae of democratic principles of openness, transparency and deliberative discourses. However, the new style of politics is not uniform because it is anchored, at least in principle, in two different historical conceptualizations of the state function in Western European states (Knill 2001). The Continental European democratic tradition gives credence to the idea of the state as an abstract identity, something distinct from the society, bearing an inherent responsibility for the performance of public functions or as a collective actor representing the society as a whole. The Anglo-Saxon British tradition is closely related to the historical evolution of a state identity, which is said to reflect ‘an aberrant case’ (Dyson 1980: 36). Rather than ideologically looking upon the state as a top-down authority responsible for the common good, it was conceived as an instrument of mediating between politics and societal interests, like market forces, for instance (Knill 2001). This difference concerning democratic and administrative traditions is especially pronounced when it comes to the institutional forms of distributed public governance arrangements at sub-national levels. The French 1982 regional reform introduced the model ‘Contrat de plan Etat-Région’. The model conceptualized contractual sharing of competence between central and regional governments. The model seems to be anchored in the Continental tradition (Balme and Bonnet 1995). Despite structural policies organizing unelected state bodies and

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technocratic authorities, the steering capacity of regional government and parliament institutions were expanded. The objective was to counteract the problem of democratic deficit, and the public–public partnership institution was meant to ease the problem of co-ordination and reduce the transactional costs that mount from the presence of many actors (Scharpf 1997). The British arrangement is different and obviously reflects this country’s tradition. Here, the style of distributed state governance acquires its legitimacy from a constitutional model that stresses functionality more than parliamentary legitimacy. Thus, in relation to subsidiarity, the growing number of unelected state agencies appears as the growing number of mediators on all sub-national levels of governance, conceptualized as partners of functional ‘public–private partnership’. In line with this fact, in the UK, with its mediating state tradition, arm’s-length agencies (Next Steps Agencies) and ‘non-departmental public bodies’, often in public–private partnership, have dominated the configuration of regional authority and development (OECD 2002: 209–41). For historical reasons, the Norwegian model of the Nordic type has its roots in the Continental administrative tradition and style. However, in Norway, as in Scandinavia in general, the Anglo-Saxon style of politics on the regional level regarding governance has taken over and has consequently led to a departure from the Continental style (Veggeland 2007). The model for exercising regional development policies in Scandinavia reflects the British model of sub-national bodies as mediating authorities. The principle of subsidiarity is accordingly interpreted politically as the outward distribution of public governance to unelected bodies and technocratic authorities, while downward devolution of the steering capacity of the regional assemblies is greatly weakened. Regional development measures and strategies have become the output of national policies, which displace regional and local polities out of deliberative processes and innovative initiatives. The distribution of public governance to unelected regional agencies, service enterprises and other bodies has accordingly created deficits of coordination and local democracy, the lack of institutional coherence and control, and no counteracting measures based on regional interests (OECD 2002; Veggeland 2003). In contrast to what the OECD report (2002) has reported and the pronouncements of White Paper No. 12 (2007–2008), the Nordic central governments seem not yet to have discovered or appreciated the specific challenges to democracy, accountability and control when public governance is distributed to unelected agencies, technocratic authorities and other public bodies (Timonen 2004). The governmental policy seems to be lagging behind compared to trends in other Western European states, if

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the OECD report (2002) conclusions are chosen as the basis for empirical comparison.

NOTE 1. IN stands for Innovasjon Norge (Innovation Norway). SIVA stands for Statens industrivekstanlegg (The Industrial Development Corporation of Norway).

8.

Cross-border regionalization in the regulatory states of the North

Certainly, there is agreement that the word region refers to space, but the notion of space itself can take various meanings; territorial space; political space and space of social relationships; economic space: functional space. (Michael Keating 1996: 17)

8.1

CROSS-BORDER ISSUES DO MATTER

Closely linked to the development of renewed local and regional governance are the growing links between regions across national borders. Increasingly through the 1980s to the 2000s, one of the most interesting political developments in Europe has been the movement of ever more regional authorities taking a deeper interest in transnational relationships, instead of identifying their role solely within their respective countries, along with subsidiarity and regulated through partnership contracts (Cappellin and Batey 1993; Treuner and Foucher 1995; Veggeland 2000, 2001; Kramsch and Hooper 2004). In Northern Europe, there are well-known instances of transnational, regulatory co-operation, the Barents Euro-Arctic Region, the Baltic Sea Region and the North Sea Region, all of which have become familiar regionalization concepts. Environmental issues are central matters in those co-operative regions, which take ecological preservation as an arena for cross-border actions seriously. In fact, cross-border regionalization is about to become an essential part of the European process of integration in general, because of the promotion of the idea of a borderless Europe. More specifically, cross-border regional partnership regimes fit very well into the regulatory state order of the EU governance. These types of partnership regimes also match the EU’s endeavours to create economic and social capital for the sake of competitiveness and to promote the ethical conservation and safeguarding of areas of natural and cultural heritage for the attainment of sustainable development (Bourne 2004; Scott 2004; Lenschow 2005). 121

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In short, regional co-operation, alliances and cross-border partnerships may fulfil the need for coherent socio-economic developments, social security and rights, as well as regulatory undertakings in order to meet global threats. Furthermore, the role of cross-border regional governance in the process of integration will put regions in a stronger position to control decision-making procedures as a concomitant of the growing importance of the principle of subsidiarity, a legacy of the 2007 EU Treaty of Lisbon. Cross-border regimes are also important in the promotion of cultural exchange and common socio-economic development programmes. What is lacking, though, and not least in the Nordic context because of environmentally vulnerable Arctic regions, is a more precise spatial perspective within the cross-border regions on the importance of according the exploitation of natural resources with ethical conservation. In this respect, the extension of exploitation of vulnerable ecosystems should be adjusted to the principle of ecological balance to make them sustainable. The acts of taming and adjusting are political and regulatory issues, while the issue of sustainability belongs mainly to the domain of natural science. This latter aspect will be elaborated further in section 8.6.

8.2

COMPETITION AND COHESION

Ever since the creation of the European Single Market in 1988–92 and the introduction of the term ‘competitive regions of Europe’, there has been an ongoing struggle to increase the efficiency of the regional policies in the new Europe (Anderson 1994; Keating 1998; Veggeland 2001). This endeavour is in line with the Lisbon strategy and processes that target increased competitiveness, cohesion and sustainable development, with heavy emphasis on regional development. There are particular measures to realize these goals. ●

●

In 2004 the European Commission re-arranged the categories of expenditure for the EU budgets. Now the main budgetary priorities are sustainable growth, subdivided into competitiveness for growth and cohesion for growth and employment, and preservation and management of natural resources, subdivided into agricultural payments and other natural resources. Broadly speaking, most of what was previously ‘structural policies’ now appear under the heading of ‘sustainable growth’. The budget as a whole is supposed to increase by around 30 per cent over the period 2007–13, with spending for cohesion policy mirroring this growth. This budgetary increase indicates that it is

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a significant priority. Funds available for regional development in its widest sense are €336bn for 2007–13 compared to €257bn for the period 2000–06. As we have already seen what is typical for regulatory governance, the EU cohesion policy is also threatened by administrative fragmentation. It hinders development initiatives, which become divided and incoherent, and this can have negative repercussions for the EU integration process as a whole. The fragmentation is counteracted by certain regulatory conditions set for receiving financial allocations from the structural funds. We must keep in mind the 1988 reforms and the introduction of the Single European Market as the background for the setting of these regulations as conditions for financial allocation (Williams 1996; Allen 2005). There are four of these regulatory conditions: 1. Programming actions: the allocation of financial support goes to programmes rather than to individual projects. 2. Concentration of efforts: there must be consistent territorial and functional criteria imposed on the management of the funds. 3. Additionality in financial matters: the state and regional and local authorities must supplement the allocation from the Commission to development programmes. 4. Partnership establishment: this is the involvement of national tier authorities in the planning of programmes, decision-making and implementation of the structural funds. Tripartite partnerships regulated by contracts and agreements1 on development issues are reflections of the actual claim (Perkmann 1999; Veggeland 2000). A specific framework of contracting regulations was forwarded in 2002 (COM 2002).

●

In the EU cohesion policy, the regional development programmes are financially bound to the Structural Funds. Of particular interest to cross-border regional policies is the Initiative programme (Williams 1996). The actual Initiative programme of the period 2007–13 includes the Interreg programmes of Interreg IV/A, embracing mostly smaller border regions, Interreg IV/B, extensive bordering national regions, and Interreg IV/C, non-bordering regions of the European Economic Area.

The cross-border partnerships of the EU Interreg programmes, which benefit countries and regions, represent co-operative institutions embracing a diversity of public and private actors. They are similar to the

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arm’s-length NPM administrations and agencies but differently anchored in contracts and agreements; also these partnerships act independently as unelected legal persons when acting as initiators and executives. However, in the wake of the 2002 framework of regulations by contracts in conjunction with cross-border regional partnership formations, the EU Commission initiated pilot projects that are testing ‘target-based tripartite contracts and agreements between the Community, the States and Regional and Local authorities’ (COM 2002: 709). The Commission’s White Paper on European Governance in 2001 proposed the idea of such contracts. The document (COM 2002: 709) outlines the Commission’s views. It distinguishes between regulatory tripartite contracts and agreements as follows: ● ●

Contracts could be concluded in direct application of binding secondary Community law (regulations, directives or decisions); while Agreements could be drawn up outside a binding Community framework.

Basically, we may interpret this contractual approach to mean institutional legality in the sense that binding EU secondary law integrates tripartite contract-based partnership in its regulatory universe. This particular type of partnership is empowered to act as a regulatory body through contracts on the behalf of their founders. Thus, we talk about the tripartite pooling of authority to an extra stakeholder, the partnership, which implies additional governance ability in the regional-policy sector. What is elaborated here is more or less an innovative mode of regulatory governance in an extended cross-border regional setting. The introduction of the contract-based partnership even implies the application of supranational Community law in European cross-border co-operations of this kind. The EU Committee of the regions supports this application. This Committee’s comments on the Constitution Treaty included arguments for more institutional power both for themselves as an advisory central body with direct representation from the member-state regions and for the cross-border and inter-regional partnerships. Contract legality as a new basis for the authorization of tripartite partnerships is supported as an extension of regulatory governance. Certainly, the tripartite contract partnerships challenge the participation of the EFTA countries and regions in the Interreg programmes, and the EEA Agreement of the EFTA does not cover supranational arrangements of this type. Not being members of the Community, the national sovereignty of the EFTA states is neither to be pooled nor to be shared because protecting this sovereignty is the core reason for the choice of remaining outside. Hence, the remaining regulatory option for the EEA countries and what is practised as Interreg policy are agreement-based settlements drawn up outside a binding Community framework in accordance with COM 2002: 709.

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OTHER PROBLEMS OF GOVERNANCE

In the network society of Europe, the regional cross-border partnerships take advantage of organizing interacting ‘spaces of action flows’, with regard to coordinating and governing the many facets of regional development initiatives (Castells 1996: 376). The many development and governance institutions are transferring ‘loose’ co-operation concepts that feature free-exit options for the parties to long-term and committed partnership collaboration concepts (Veggeland 2004a). The regulatory state of the EU has a vertical separation of power in which the executive and development roles of governance are distinct. The executive function is separated along a hierarchical line from the Commission and the member states’ tier apparatus and (in some areas) unelected arm’s-length regulatory agencies (Vibert 2007). On the other hand, the development function is organized horizontally and in line with the EU’s ‘open method of coordination’, formulated by the Lisbon Summit 2000. Cross-border partnerships, together with numerous other types of partnerships, are clearly such territorially and horizontally organized executors of the EU, bounded by agreements and contracts fashioned to realize functionally the manifold development programmes. This separation of vertical powers and horizontal development functions reflects the extraordinary attention that has been paid to network theory on transactional issues, especially that of rising transactional costs connected to partnership configurations. In Europe, the establishment of functional and territorial partnerships, a departure from governments and agencies, has steadily become a more common response to increasing problems of transactional cost. On the one hand, the fragmentation of the national public sector causes the transactional costs because of the NPM style of organization and fragmented, executors-orientated regional policy schemes. On the other hand, because partnerships increase over time in number together with extended interregional co-operation across European borders, partnership schemes also come to suffer from rising transactional costs. The latter case is indeed an unintended consequence because the partnership concept targets coherence and collaborative actions, and as such is viewed as a proper remedy to the problem of transactional costs. Partnership institutions should, in principle, facilitate collaboration and thereby avoid reaching the critical limit of transactional costs, as Figure 8.1 indicates. Yet, the very building of various partnership configurations itself contributes to the increase of the number of development agencies, and thereby exacerbates the transactional costs. As has been pointed out earlier, in England alone for the year 2001, the government sponsored a

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Number of partnerships and cross-border regional schemes Note:

dashed line: critical limit for functional and territorial efficiency.

Figure 8.1

The growth pattern of transactional costs

total of nearly 2500 multi-agency partnerships, action zones, action teams, cross-sector committees and cross-border schemes. And more than 400 local strategic partnerships were being set up to play a key role in local governance (Beetham et al. 2002). These figures reveal the situation in an Anglo-Saxon country and may be be unsurprising. But other studies have recognized the same phenomenon in Nordic and Continental countries, which makes the rising transactional costs problem understandable (Perkmann 1999; Scharpf 1999; Veggeland 2000, 2007). With this problem in mind, we may ask the following: would the introduction of politically and economically stronger sub-national authorities be a solution to the problem of transactional costs? This solution would entail taking the principle of subsidiarity seriously because it would involve the allocation of more power to the sub-national level as a way of making the partnership strategy more effective. Let us try to furnish an answer.

8.4

THE REGIONS OF THE EFTA COUNTRIES

The crucial question is how the steering capacity of the sub-national governments can be strengthened? Let us go to the four EFTA member countries, and particularly the EEA countries of Norway, Iceland and Lichtenstein, to see if the activation of new regulatory channels of influence

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does make the regions more able to tame the transactional costs and to make cross-border partnerships more effective. The EFTA countries acknowledge that the new regionalism embracing agreement-based and contract-based partnerships conceptualizes the region as a beneficial spatial networking arena for building innovation systems and economic growth. Cross-border co-operation for the sake of increased national competitiveness through subsidiarity and accountability is part of this scheme (Keating 1998; Veggeland 2000). The fact that the EU demands, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, an institutionalized regional tier in order for member states to obtain support from the Interreg programmes does influence the regional thinking of the EFTA countries (Veggeland 2000). However, as elaborated earlier, the term ‘subsidiarity’ is equivocal; one consequence is that the term may not necessarily imply the downward devolution of competence to elected regional assemblies but instead the outward devolution to organizational arm’slength state bodies like the PLAs, PLBs, partnerships, and, importantly, also to EEA regulatory institutions (Veggeland 2004). The latter outcome gives substance to the OECD term ‘distributed public governance’. Under certain circumstances the separation of powers produces a democratic deficit on the sub-national tier level and undermines that tier’s ability as democratic executors (Scharpf 1999; OECD 2002; Vibert 2007). Because of the ambiguous concept of ‘nearness’ in connection with regional policies in the EU and EFTA member states, designed to enhance or adapt the principle of the new regionalism, implementations of the concept have many shapes and forms. With regard to the Continental administrative tradition, the EFTA countries should aim for larger geographical units by fusing together smaller counties, just as the French reform of 1982 did. Elected assemblies were supposed to rule these politically created regions (Loughlin and Mazey 1995; Webb and Collis 2000). Further, driven by the demand both for regional competitiveness and for integration in European Interreg partnership and governance schemes, the EFTA’s EEA states and regions suffer owing to the lack of access to channels of participation and decision-making arenas within the EU. When these states attempt to model a new role for the institutions at the sub-national level, they should be aware both of their excluded position and of the need for openness and transparency in order to be able to tame transactional costs and to hear where the development opportunity knocks contextually. As a result of certain policies of the central governments, the EEA countries have, to some extent, adjusted their regional policies since the 1990s through regulatory measures reflecting the structural policies of the EU, even though regional issues are not part of the EEA Agreement of 1994.

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These governments ‘distributed’ both public-service functions and steering capacity to partnership institutions as well as to regionalized, territorially unelected public-law agencies (PLAs) and private-law bodies (PLBs). The regulatory-state order has been followed up by adjusted policies and organizational measures. This distribution of public governance has gradually hollowed out the democratic steering capacity of the regional democratic assemblies. Despite this, as in Anglo-Saxon countries, the strategy of distributed and separated governance continues to weigh down partnership arrangements’ development ability heavily, both domestically and across borders. One difference is, however, that, in keeping with their administrative tradition, regulatory public–public partnerships outnumber public–private partnerships (Higdem 2007). The intention is to counteract the consequences of the growing number of fragmented regional configurations in the public sector that lead to problems of coordination and the growth of transactional costs, which contribute to inefficient development (Östhol and Svensson 2002). Since the 1990s, the central government in the EEA member state of Norway has prioritized the strategy of distribution and separation of governance in its regional policy. Accordingly, there has been the establishment of a great variety of domestic and cross-border regional and local partnerships, that is, county–county, county–municipality, EU Interreg partnership schemes and to some extent public–private partnerships. Officially, White Paper no. 19 (2001–2002) on regional policy and governance recommended the strategy. Basically, the strategy was implemented by the regions’ authorities designed as test reforms with governmental support, and this is typical of the Nordic constitutional approach to regional reform. Both the EU and the EFTA countries seem to consider decentralization based on the distribution of steering capacity to regional partnership institutions as a prerequisite for reshaping the benefits of the regulatory state’s marketizing strategy of the public sector (OECD 2002: 46, Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004). However, this form of distributing public governance in accordance with the outwards devolution principle of subsidiarity leads to several deficits related to the regional regulatory approaches. Instead of more downward devolution of power to sub-national governments, the regulatory strategy of outward distribution undermines the building of local social capital and thereby endogenous development. This effect is due to the lack of incentives for local mobilization in the local economy and network building (Amin and Thrift 1995a). Additionally, the fragmentation of governance strain county and municipality budgets owing to increasing transactional costs (Figure 8.1). The deficits normally pointed out by scholars in evaluation reports are the deficits of local and regional

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democracy, institutional transparency, local ownership of task actions and local ability of democratic control (Hallin and Lindstrøm 1998). The steering capacity of local and regional governmental administrations tends to diminish and be replaced by multilevel-based agencies and secretariats executing technocratic governance remotely from the people living in the local communities. A recently published PhD dissertation report (Higdem 2007) has described and concluded the critical points elaborated above as the dilemmas of regulatory governance in regional policy.

8.5

UNDERSTANDING THE EUROPEANIZATION OF REGIONAL POLICY

Of course, what constitutes the driving force behind the trend of erecting unelected regulatory development bodies together with partnershipbuilding at the regional level in Europe is complex. Obviously, the organizational and structural forms are inspired by theories of new public management. But there are also globalization and free-market liberalism, the exposure of public services – and regions – to competition, the implementation of European multi-level governance and the building of crossborder Euro-regions; these have altogether led to the introduction of the various forms of distributed and separated public governance (Amin and Thrift 1995). Obviously, on the one hand, the EFTA/EEA countries were inspired by the early European regulatory governance in regional policy, which spread as a part of a general process of Europeanization. The reasons are manifold. Naturally, one is that they share a background with the EU countries through binding commitments, for instance, the EEA and cross-border regional policy programmes. Therefore, on the other hand, Europeanization means the penetration of European-level institutions into national and sub-national systems, thereby also into regional policy and organizational design (Olsen 2004: 334). To a large extent, this perspective explains why the EFTA countries have adjusted their regional policy institutions to European institutional standards. They have done so without being obliged to be subordinated to the EU framework of regional policy. But this explanation is not complete. Since the 1990s, the national departments of regional affairs of the EFTA/EEA countries have been criticized on two principal grounds. The first relates to the performance of services pertaining to general interest, that is, public-service contributions. Inspired by Anglo-Saxon, NPM thinking, it was declared that actual service production anchored politically and economically at the level of regional government would run ineffectively without the stimulation of

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competition. We are already familiar with this alternative that leads to the establishment of arm’s-length state agencies and bodies, the PLAs and the PLBs. This path of regulatory innovation does not stop at the regionalization of these agencies and bodies but also goes so far as to organize them as territorially overlapping units. The boards of the units were assembled neither from the region nor connected to regional representative assemblies but were appointed by the central government as professionals (Veggeland 2003). In 2002, for instance, the sub-nationally owned and run hospitals of the 19 Norwegian counties were organized as five (four from 2007) regionalized PLAs, and their ownerships were transferred to the central state, supplemented by an independent professional board. The second and more politically neutral criticism relates to the general criticisms against the interventionist state since the 1970s, in this case to the inefficiency of the role and function of the sub-national level as the principal political authority responsible for regional planning and development initiatives. During its establishment in the 1970s, this role of the regional government was performed ambiguously yet successfully. The expectation that the regions would expand their role was during the post-war period of industrial expansion in the Western European countries. Then this expansion failed in the 1980s. Since then, the functional emphasis of executing active regional policies along with control over its own measures and means has been transformed. Gradually, the regional authority has become a weak regional planning executive without the proper institutional apparatus and financial instruments. The political debate over the separation of powers no longer takes place between tier assemblies but instead between the government and unelected subsidiaries, and this shift of interlocutors has occurred in both the EU and the EEA countries (Loughlin 2004). What is not disputed is that sub-national governments, which cooperate in partnerships across borders, can assist the safeguarding of ecological and cultural sustainability in a region. Although international co-operation and state measures can solve many urgent problems, there is nevertheless the political acknowledgment that the regional level is another basis for future planning and co-operation (Östhol 1996). It is accepted strategically that the mobilization of regional capacities may compensate for the lack of environmental cohesion at the state level. The upcoming formations of new Euro-regions along the border zone between EU and the new democracies in Eastern and Central Europe are some of the examples of recent European cross-border national regionalization endeavours. On the macro level the Northern states are currently involved in the transnational Baltic Sea Region co-operation, the North Sea Region co-operation and in the Euro-Arctic Barents Region cooperation, which involves Russia; the last covers areas that are extremely

Cross-border regionalization in the regulatory states of the North

Figure 8.2

131

The Euro-Arctic Barents Region includes the Barents Sea and its highly valuable natural resources

vulnerable from an ecological perspective (Figure 8.2) (Schram Stokke and Tunander 1994; Kramsch and Hooper 2004). The Barents Sea represents the access to the huge circumpolar Arctic areas, which include Iceland, Greenland, Canada, Alaska and Siberia. Besides the Nordic areas, the Russian Kola Peninsula is an essential part of the Barents Region together with other parts of north-western Russia. Indeed, the region can easily be defined as a tightly connected ecological system, which requires cross-border co-operation, institutions and protective regulations.

8.6

REGULATING CROSS-BORDER SUSTAINABILITY IN THE FAR NORTH

Barents Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC) The Barents Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC) is the forum for intergovernmental cross-border co-operation on issues concerning the Barents

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Region. The BEAC holds meetings with foreign ministers in the country with the chairmanship at the end of term of office. The chairmanship rotates every second year, between Norway, Finland, Russia and Sweden, successively. The Russian Federation assumed the chair from Finland in November 2007 for the period 2008–09 and Sweden in 2010–12 and Norway in 2013–15 will follow. Members of the Barents Euro-Arctic Council Denmark Finland Iceland Norway Russia Sweden European Commission Observer states Canada France Germany Italy Japan Netherlands Poland United Kingdom United States of America The BEAC was established in 1993 to support and promote regional cooperation in the northernmost parts of Sweden, Norway, Finland and north-west Russia. The foreign ministers of the Nordic countries, the Russian Federation and a representative of the European Commission formalized the inter-governmental co-operation in the Euro-Arctic Barents Region by signing a declaration that created the BEAC in Kirkenes, Norway. The primary goal of the BEAC is to maintain sustainability in a vulnerable natural area and further to promote the economic and social development in the region, thus contributing to peaceful development in the northernmost part of Europe (Schram Stokke and Tunander 1994). Barents Regional Council The Barents Regional Council comprises 13 member counties representatives plus one representative of the indigenous peoples living in the

Cross-border regionalization in the regulatory states of the North

Source:

133

Barentsinfo.org

Figure 8.3

The counties of the Barents region

northernmost parts of Finland, Norway, Sweden and north-west Russia. At the same time as the BEAC was established by the signing of the Kirkenes Declaration in 1993, the regional representatives, together with the indigenous peoples, signed a co-operation protocol that established the Regional Council for the Barents Euro-Arctic Region with the same objectives as the BEAC – to support and promote co-operation and sustainable development in the Barents Region. The protocol determines the structure and the general aims of the regional co-operation. In this case, it refers to sub-national co-operation for the promotion of development in the Barents Region. The Barents Region includes the following counties (Figure 8.3): Finland: Kainuu, Lapland and Oulu Region Norway: Finnmark, Nordland and Troms Russia: Arkhangelsk, Karelia, Komi, Murmansk and Nenets Sweden: Norrbotten and Västerbotten The establishment of a separate forum for the inter-regional Barents co-operation is an acknowledgement of the importance of local knowledge about sustainability and the exploitation of natural resources, for at this level there is the ability to identify the most urgent priorities and the

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capacity to carry out implementations of policy in the Region. The size is approximately 1.75 mill sq. km and has almost 6 million inhabitants. The Chairmanship of the Barents Regional Council rotates between its 13 member counties every second year. The Regional Council meets two times a year. The Regional Council’s meetings are prepared by the Regional Committee, which consists of civil servants from the member county administrations. The Barents Programme has many strands and represents the framework for co-operation where priorities are identified. In 2003 the ‘Barents 2010’ Interreg programme was allocated financial support. Guided by the goal of sustainability, the project is in the process of identifying and financing key, strategic development activities for the coming years. In 2008 there are six thematic working groups within the following areas: Information Technology, Communications, Culture, Environment, Youth issues, and Investments and economic co-operation. Together with the Working Group of Indigenous Peoples, which has an advisory role to the Regional Council and to the BEAC as well as four joint BEAC/BRC working groups (Health and related Social issues; Education and Research; Petroleum and Pollution; Information and Data co-operation), there are altogether 11 Working Groups reporting to the Barents Regional Council. Northern Dimension Policy Framework Document The Northern Dimension is a European Union regulatory policy and financial programme adopted in 1999 under the Finnish Presidency. Geographically, the Northern Dimension covers a broad area from the European Arctic and Sub-Arctic areas to the southern shores of the Baltic Sea, including the countries in its vicinity and from north-west Russia in the east to Iceland and Greenland in the west. The extensive Arctic and Subarctic areas, including the Barents Region, are areas of priority for the Northern Dimension policy, as well as the Interreg IV/B Baltic Sea Region. The Northern Dimension partners are the European Union Northern member states, plus Iceland, Norway and the Russian Federation. Other participants are: ● ● ● ●

The Barents Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC), The Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS), The Nordic Council of Ministers (NCM), The Arctic Council (AC)

The Northern Dimension policy aims at providing a common regulatory framework for the promotion of concrete co-operation, stability and

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intensifying economic cooperation by fostering economic integration and competitiveness and sustainable development in Northern Europe. The policy enhances regional cross-border co-operation and aims to avoid overlapping regulatory and development institutions. The Northern Dimension policy framework has its focus on areas of co-operation where regional and sub-regional emphases can bring added value. This policy gives priority to result-orientated proposals that seek support from the European Union and national financing instruments, as well as from international and financial institutions from the private sector. National and regional development programmes are respected and promoted; any new initiatives must complement the efforts deployed by national and regional authorities in the relevant areas. In line with paragraph 14, the following sectors of priority of the Northern Dimension clearly reveal an approach aimed at natural and social sustainability, and in that sense supports the actions of the BEAC in the far North: ● ● ● ● ● ● ●

Economic co-operation. Freedom, security and justice, including the facilitation of cultural contacts. External security: civil protection. Research, education and culture, including increased co-operation in research and education. Visibility of regional and local cultural identity and heritage. Social welfare and health care, including the promotion of cooperation between health and social services. Environment, nuclear safety and natural resources, including reduction of the risk of nuclear and other pollutions, maritime safety, the protection of the marine environment in the Baltic and Barents Seas, biodiversity, forests, fish stocks and the protection of Arctic ecosystems.

The international financing institutions active in the North are the EU Structural Funds, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the European Investment Bank (EIB), the Nordic Investment Bank (NIB) and the World Bank (IBRD), all of which contribute to supporting the policy and any other international financing institution that may in the future implement programmes in the area. Further, we find participating institutions and bodies like the regional and subregional organizations and Commissions in the Baltic and Barents area, the sub-national and local authorities, non-governmental organizations and the like from civil society (including notably indigenous peoples’

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organizations), universities and research centres, business and trade-union communities, and so on. In an institutional perspective, the interaction between these diverse and complex partners tends to contribute to some extent towards making the many partnerships and regulatory bodies non-transparent. This effect occurs despite the explicit goal of a policy that insists on transparency and openness towards all its actors and takes due regard of the subsidiarity principle. The ethics of the policy has its basis on internationally recognized principles, such as good governance, transparency and participation, sustainable development, gender equality, the rights of persons belonging to minorities, cultural diversity, social cohesion, fair working conditions and corporate social responsibility, non-discrimination, the protection of indigenous peoples and the further strengthening of civil society and democratic institutions. Why has there been this intensive building of cross-border partnership, networking institutions, economic development, natural resource capital and regulatory bodies up in the far North since the early 1990s? Why has this focus on security and sustainability policies, cultural contact across borders and natural resource management materialized? The answer, of course, is the expectation of huge reserves of petroleum (some of which have already been found and are even being drilled) in the Barents Sea, both in the Norwegian and Russian zones. Hence, strong interests regarding energy access and available capital are in play in an area that, from an ecological point of view, is most vulnerable because of its Arctic quality. Furthermore, there are disagreements between Norway and Russia regarding some borders, overlapping claims and regulatory authority positions (Austvik 2003). Additionally, some of the world’s most productive fisheries are in the Barents Sea. Norway has been a large producer of oil and gas for many years. However, there are still large unexplored areas on the Norwegian Continental Shelf (NCS). One third of mainland Norway lies north of the Arctic Circle. Norway also has the responsibility for managing offshore resources six times the size of its mainland territory. Some estimates indicate that the Arctic regions might contain as much as 25 per cent of undiscovered global petroleum reserves. The Barents Sea is one of the most prospective regions of the Arctic and is still largely a frontier area. Estimates of undiscovered resources in the Norwegian part of the Barents Sea add up to more than the equivalent of 6 billion barrels of oil – with a large ration of upside potential. In the northern parts of the Barents Sea, knowledge of the geology is only slight, but the potential is there. The area of overlapping claims is, of course, geologically very much unknown.

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The Arctic regions are environmentally sensitive. It is crucial that exploration and development of the energy resources and cross-border cooperation in these waters have a focus on the goal of sustainability. Let us take an example. The Norwegian Government recently presented an Integrated Management Plan for the area from the northernmost coast of mainland Norway to the Barents Sea. The plan is a pioneering effort to achieve an ecosystem-based management of the oceans surrounding Norway. The Barents Sea environment is currently in a satisfactory state, but it is predicted that increased activity in the area will disturb the ecological balance if extraordinary measures are not taken now. To preserve the environment in its current state, the Government has imposed some regulatory restrictions on petroleum activity in the management plan area. But other issues also require a management plan. As already stressed in this chapter, the Barents Region is an exceptionally sensitive area. Waste and pollution exist as an unfortunate heritage from another era. Serious threats of pollution threaten the region and might in the future lead to extended disorder outside the region itself (Veggeland 1993b). On the Russian side, old and highly polluting nickel industries are causing damage to the environment and little has been done to effect a change to cleaner technology. But even more disastrous is the fact that huge amounts of nuclear waste have been stored on land or dumped in the Barents Sea during the Soviet period. There is an urgent need for international action in the region in order to clean up and to remove or secure the nuclear waste and to restructure the heavy polluting industries. If nothing is done, one likely scenario is that the nuclear waste stored might in time cause ecological catastrophes of global dimensions. In a European regulatory and development perspective on sustainability, the Barents Region should be also monitored for the sake of controlling pollution. Strong Norwegian interests in the Barents Region make it important for several reasons for the Government to strengthen the long-standing cooperation with Russia. Russia and Norway are both significant producers of oil and gas. The two countries are neighbours in the North and share the responsibility of managing the vast Barents Sea. Of course, as elaborated earlier it is more than a dual responsibility. The European Union and its member states and also other countries and actors are partners in the cross-border development of the far North. It is in the interest of them all to develop ever-closer co-operation in order both to ensure sustainable management of the natural resources in the Barents Sea and to secure longterm access to petroleum in a part of the world that is so far peaceful and politically stable. For Norway and Russia, the economic interests and development potential connected to the Barents Region are gigantic. Economically, the two

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states’ comparative advantages of competition are greatly linked to identified and expected reserves of natural-resource capital, sustained energy demand, stable political environments and long-term social capital building and have materialized in the wide range of cross-border regulations, institutional arrangements and partnership agreements. From a security and economic perspective, we may argue that the competition of the Barents region can best be broken down into four different forms: (a) competition for position in the international energy market; (b) competition for security, control and command functions (financial and administrative powers in particular); (c) competition for governmental regulatory contribution; (d) competition for ecological and social sustainability. Therefore, a likely scenario for the evolution of developments in the Barents Euro-Arctic Region is that the region will continue to be built along a special regulatory ecological mode and will play a greater role within the political, economic and cultural arena. But the concept of the ‘region’ needs to be redefined (Loughlin 2004). Since the 1980s a twodimensional concept of the new regionalism has gained strength in the European discussion. One scholar has pointed out that there exists a notion of a ‘Europe of Regions’ alongside another one of a ‘Europe with Regions’ (Bourne 2004). In the case of the Barents Region, it is the latter notion that is appropriate. National governments show no signs of retreating through the empowerment of the transnational and cross-border apparatus described. The state authorities are no doubt the most powerful actors in the new system of Arctic governance, as planning, controlling, financing and regulatory rulers. But since the 1990s, the development of non-hierarchical relationships based on the partnership between international, national and regional institutions in joint programmes has been taking place. We can see the discovery and revival of cross-border historical, social and cultural ties and the endeavours to overcome environmental problems and to preserve vulnerable Arctic ecosystems through trans-border regulatory actions.

NOTE 1. This tripartite partnership comprises the EU Commission, state actors, and regional and local development actors.

9.

A case of regulatory taming in Norway: from Government Petroleum Fund to Ethical Pension Fund – Global

9.1 THE NORWEGIAN PETROLEUM SECTOR1 Petroleum was discovered in the North Sea in 1969. Production began in June 1971, and in the following years a number of major offshore petroleum discoveries were made all the way up along the economic zone to the Barents Sea. Today, there are more than 50 fields in production on the Norwegian continental shelf. But this development began earlier than that. In 1962, Philips Petroleum sent an application to the Norwegian government in order to explore oil opportunities in the North Sea. The international company asked for a license for the part of the North Sea that could possibly be included in the Norwegian shelf. The offer was for USD 160 000 per month (www.regjeringen.no). The government interpreted the offer as the company’s attempt to secure exclusive rights and thus it did not accept. It was out of the question for the authorities, then, to allow a single company to monopolize the shelf. A regulatory policy was formulated; if the areas were to be opened for exploration, then more companies had to be involved. Moreover, Norway was at that time confronted with two main challenges: the lack of test seismic and drilling competence and capacity and the lack of international recognition of its ownership. In May 1963, the government proclaimed sovereignty on the Norwegian continental shelf. New regulations determined both that the Norwegian State was the sole owner of any natural resources and that only the government is authorized to allocate licenses for exploration and production. Soon afterwards, companies were given the opportunity to test the potential for exploration. The licenses only included the rights to perform seismic surveys but not drilling. International agreements on dividing the continental shelf according to the median-line principle were reached in 1965. The first well was drilled in the summer of 1966, 139

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but nothing was found. Then, with the discovery of the Ekofisk oil field in 1969, the Norwegian petroleum adventure really began economically. An adjusted regulatory petroleum regime was properly established and has ever since been crucial for developments and taming processes of a vulnerable sector. Norway ranks as the world’s third largest oil exporter and the eighth largest oil producer. In 2004, Norway was the third largest gas exporter and the seventh largest gas producer. Saudi Arabia and Russia are at the top of the lists of exporters and producers.2 The Ministry of Petroleum and Energy (MPE) has from the very beginning strongly regulated the production, transport and sale of oil and gas. Despite the fact that the European market in this economic field has become liberalized in the wake of the Single Market and several EU directives, and Norway as an EEA country has been a part of this liberalization, the MPE has still maintained extensive control (Austvik 2003). It is the responsibility and duty of the MPE to submit concessions and to appoint delivery fields bound by contracts, as well as to approve commercial agreements. Although the political authorities – the government and the parliament (Stortinget) – make the decisions, the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy together with the Ministry of Finance are required to give expert advice before decisions are made and executed. The regulatory body of the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (Oljedirektoratet) is not really a proper arm’s-length governmental agency but an external administration with extended authorization. It is easy to understand that petroleum revenues have contributed significantly both to the economic growth in a small country like Norway and to the financing of an expensive welfare state of the Nordic type of universal social benefits (Veggeland 2007). In 30 years of operation, the petroleum industry has created values of about USD 1.3 billion, now probably worth much more due to quickly rising oil and gas prices in 2008. In 2006, the petroleum sector accounted for 25 per cent of value creation in the country. This is twice the value creation of the domestic manufacturing industry. The large petroleum revenues have resulted in substantial financial assets in what is now called the Government Pension Fund. The purpose of the Government Pension Fund is both to facilitate the governmental savings necessary to meet the rapid rise in public pension expenditures (Figure 9.1), because of an increasing rate of ageing people in the coming years and to make the long-term management of petroleum revenues effective for Norwegian interests. Figure 9.1 graphs the growth of revenues from the Norwegian petroleum industries as net cash flow in per cent of the GDP, reaching 25 per

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Per cent of GDP 25

15

Pension expenditure

9

6 Net cash flow from petroleum

0 1970

Source:

80

90

10 20 Prognoses

30

40

50 Years

Government of Norway, Long-Term Programme, 2002–05, simplified figure.

Figure 9.1

Table 9.1

Net cash flow from Norwegian petroleum and pension expenditure (in per cent of GDP) The Government Pension Fund – Global; key figures in billions

Years Size in NOK bn Size in USD bn Total return in % Net real return in % Source:

2000

2005

2006

2007

1399 207 11.1 8.5

1784 285 7.9 5.6

2019 373 4.3 1.1

Norwegian Ministry of Finance (2008).

cent in 2006. According to prognoses, owing to the aging population and rising pension expenditures, this net cash flow as a per cent of the GDP is supposed to fall sharply after 2010. What, then, is the size of the Fund? In fact, according to the Norwegian Ministry of Finance (National Budget 2008), the Pension Fund – Global is among the largest and fastest growing funds in the world, rising from the value of USD 373 billion in 2007 (Table 9.1), to about USD 400 bn in 2008, and is expected to be USD 800 bn in 2011.

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THE REGULATORY ORDER OF THE NORWEGIAN PETROLEUM SECTOR

Figure 9.1 also reveals another fact: the fall of the net cash flow from petroleum in the beginning of the 1990s. Norway has employed Keynesian instruments to implement a policy of general government surplus. Heavy governmental budgets and the short-term recession of the early 1980s created a deficit in the fiscal budget for a period, which is reflected by the net cash flow curve of Figure 9.1. Actually, the years it lasted were the only years since World War II when Norway had budget deficits on a general basis (Report No. 38 to the Storting (2001–2002)). By the end of the 1990s, surpluses on the central state budgets were statistically predicted to grow substantially owing to increasing petroleum revenues. This prediction convinced the government that some sort of formal fiscal guidelines were needed to regulate effective demand and in order to restore control over inflation and employment (Ministry of Finance Report 2006–2007). Large surpluses in public finances made the government and parliament raise the demand-side of the economy, for example, the welfare or infrastructure sectors. A taming regulatory regime solution was chosen (see Figure 9.2). The following fiscal guidelines were introduced in 2001 (Eriksen 2006: 9): ●

● ●

The use of petroleum revenues over the Government budget should be gradually phased into the economy approximately in pace with an estimated 4 per cent real return on the assets in the Pension Fund – Global. The actual regulatory implementation of fiscal policy, should, however, also take into account business cycle fluctuations. The automatic stabilizers should have room to work. Petroleum revenues and return on investments

Non-petroleum revenues

Petroleum revenues

Expenditures Transfer to finance non-petroleum budgetary deficit Regulation Norwegian Central Bank

Source:

Management Ministry of Finance

www.regjeringen/pensjonsfondet.no

Figure 9.2

The Norwegian pension fund mechanisms

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These fiscal guidelines were followed up with formal monetary policy rules targeting stability in the domestic and international economic market. A new regulation for monetary policy was established in 2001 in a white paper to the parliament (Report No. 29 (2000–2001)). The Norwegian Central Bank, which implements the operational monetary policy, was instructed to aim for: Low and stable inflation, defined as an annual increase in consumer prices that remain close to 2 1/2 per cent over time.

The Government Pension Fund was formally established in 2006 and consists of two parts: ‘The Government Pension Fund – Global’, which is a continuation of the Petroleum Fund, and ‘The Government Pension Fund – Norway’, which was previously known as the National Insurance Scheme Fund. The Ministry of Finance is responsible for the management of the Government Pension Fund. The Norwegian Central Bank carries out the operational management of the Pension Fund – Global. The Bank is an arm’s-length agency regulated by the government and invests the Fund’s capital in bonds and equities outside of Norway in accordance with guidelines issued by the Ministry (Figure 9.2). The operational management of the Pension Fund – Norway is carried out by ‘Folketrygdfondet’ as part of the system of social security. Figure 9.2 shows the relations and mechanisms integrating the petroleum revenues and the ordinary budget of Norwegian Government, and the separation of governance in a regulatory state order. The Ministry of Finance is ‘steering without rowing’; the arm’s-length regulatory bodies do the ‘rowing’. In fact, in 1994, with Norwegian approval of the European Economic Agreement (EEA) that gave access to the Single European Market, the state’s participation in the petroleum operation began to take place in the deregulated European petroleum market. In 1997, the EU introduced the principle of ‘Third Party Access’ (TPA) to the transmission pipelines, splitting companies’ functions as transporters and wholesalers (Austvik 2003). The TPA directive (often called the ‘Gas Directive’) was approved for implementation in 2000. Norway as a participant of the Single Market had to reorganize the petroleum apparatus in a regulatory direction that is, conforming to directives to split companies, extending the exposure to competition and establishing a wide range of arm’s-length control bodies as part of the regulatory regime. Accordingly, the involvement of the state in the petroleum industry was already split into two arm’s-length bodies as private-law bodies (PLBs):

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Statoil ASA, the exploration and production corporation controlled by the state as the main shareholder, and the State’s Direct Financial Interest (SDFI). The SDFI arrangement was established in 1985 and requires the State to pay a share of all investments and operating costs in projects on the Norwegian continental shelf, which corresponds to its direct financial interest (Austvik 2007). In the other direction, the government receives accordingly a share of revenues from the sale of production and other income sources. The cash flow from the SDFI will continue to account for a significant proportion of the state’s revenues from petroleum activities in the years ahead. One significant consequence of the EU’s TPA directive (the Gas Directive) was the establishment of a number of the state-owned arm’s-length, ‘unelected’ bodies. One of those was Petoro Ltd., established in 2001 to serve as an independent manager for the SDFI portfolio. Petoro Ltd has since managed SDFI on behalf of the state. Petoro is the licensee for production and those pipelines and land-based plants in which the state has a direct interest at any time. Petoro is not the owner of the SDFI shares on the Norwegian continental shelf, however. The value of the SDFI in 2006 was estimated at approximately USD 150 billion. There are other arm’s-length regulatory agencies. One of these is Gassco Ltd., a state-owned corporation responsible for the transportation of natural gas from the Norwegian continental shelf. Gassnova Ltd., an administrative agency responsible for promoting and supporting innovation and development of environmentally friendly gas power technology, is another. In 2007, Statoil ASA was fused with the limited state controlled corporation Norwegian Hydro, and Statoil ASA changed its name to StatoilHydro ASA, which is now by far the dominant actor on the Norwegian continental shelf but also a significant international actor in the petroleum sector. The state share of StatoilHydro organized as a private-law body diminished because of the merger, but the state is still the major and controlling shareholder. StatoilHydro is listed on both the Oslo and the New York stock exchanges. As mentioned earlier, The Norwegian Petroleum Directorate is not an arm’s-length body but a part of the government and as such reflects a petroleum sector with mixed ordinary and marketized administration. The Directorate plays a major role in the management of the petroleum resources and is an important advisory body for the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy. It has the authority to issue regulations and control and to make decisions according to the rules and regulations for the petroleum industry. The supervisory body of the competition system with regard to organizational matters and the surveillance of the liberalized European petroleum market is the regulatory EFTA Surveillance Authority (ESA). This

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authority functions in accordance with the EEA agreement between Norway and the EU. ESA is a general operating agency of the regulatory state order, mandated to perform the surveillance of legality regarding market competition, including in the petroleum sector.

9.3

FROM GOVERNMENT PETROLEUM FUND TO GOVERNMENT PENSION FUND

Many of the facts about the Government Pension Fund, its organizational features and the policy itself, presented here for descriptive purposes, are to be found in the Report No. 24 (2006–2007) to the parliament (Stortinget) ‘On the Management of the Government Pension Fund in 2006’. But first let us briefly look back to the history of the Norwegian petroleum sector and summarize some important stages in the development of the regulatory Norwegian petroleum regime. History 1969: Petroleum discovered in the North Sea (Ekofisk), production started in 1971. 1990: Parliament passed the Government Petroleum Fund law. 1996: First net transfer to the Fund. Invested as Central Bank currency reserves. 1998: Investment in equities introduced in the benchmark (40 per cent allocation). 2000: Five emerging market countries added to the equity benchmark. 2001: Fiscal guidelines for the domestic use of petroleum revenues, 4 per cent real return. 2002: Non-governmental bonds added to the fixed income benchmark. 2004: New ethical guidelines. 2006: ‘The Government Petroleum Fund’ was renamed ‘the Government Pension Fund – Global’. ‘The Government Pension Fund – Norway’ was previously known as ‘the National Insurance Scheme Fund’. 2007: Strategic equity allocation increased to 60 per cent. 2008: Unusually high international oil market prices, a good deal more than USD 100 per barrel. Purpose The Petroleum Fund was established in 1990 as a tool of fiscal policy in order to support the long-term regulatory management of the petroleum

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revenues. Typical for the regulatory state mode of governance, the Ministry of Finance is responsible for the management of the Government Pension Fund but has authorized the arm’s-length Norwegian Central Bank to be responsible for the operational management of the Pension Fund – Global. The Central Bank is accordingly organized as an independent governmental agency, which in this context invests the fund’s capital in bonds and equities. Renaming the Petroleum Fund to the Pension Fund – Global in 2006 was actually part of a broader regulatory pension reform highlighting also the Fund’s role in facilitating the governmental savings necessary to meet the expected rapid rise in public pension expenditures in the coming years (see Figure 9.1). The goal of this broader reform has been to slow down the rising expenditures by making it more profitable for people to stay longer in the workforce after reaching ordinary retirement age. This is called the ‘work line reform’. The Pension Fund is not earmarked for pension expenditures but is politically devoted to this social security objective. Politically, the Norwegian welfare state of the Nordic type, with universal social rights, is put into play in the global age, and future economies determine the rules of this game (Veggeland 2007). Certainly, there exist risks of losing the game. However, to make goals about social equity and equality and expensive welfare arrangement realistic at all, the Pension Fund – Global constitutes a necessary and believed guarantee. The Pension Fund is fully integrated into the budget of the national government. It functions as a tool to strengthen the budgetary process and builds on existing institutions. The Fund is only invested abroad in financial assets in order to bring the accumulated effective demand and inflation in the national economy under regulatory control. Investing abroad also ensures risk diversification in order to increase the chances of good financial returns and helps to protect the domestic non-petroleum economy. The political intention of maintaining a high degree of transparency and disclosure of information through evaluation reports and public debate is not always realized (Reinersen 2008). Nevertheless, this openness to some extent helps to build public support and accountability that encourage the wise management of the petroleum revenues and reduce the risks of poor governance that can result in failing investments and of corruption when huge sums of money are in play. Key Design Features The Pension Fund’s inflow consists of all state petroleum revenues, the net financial transactions related to petroleum activities and the return

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on the Fund’s investments (Skancke 2008). The outflow from the Fund is the sum needed to cover the deficit of the non-petroleum governmental budget. The net cash flow from the petroleum revenues comprises the total inflow minus the outflow, including pension expenditures, from the Fund (see Figure 9.1). This means that the Fund is fully integrated into the state budget and that net allocations to the Fund reflect the total budget surplus (including petroleum revenues). Fiscal policy, which regulates the outflow from the Fund, adheres to the guideline that the non-petroleum budgetary deficit should eventually correspond to a limited return from the Fund, estimated at 4 per cent. It is a responsibility of the Parliament to adopt budgets that do not exceed this limit. We have already noted that the Ministry of Finance is responsible for the management of the Fund, and in line with the regulatory state mode of steering activities, the Norwegian Central Bank carries out the operational management. The Bank is obliged to invest innovatively and selectively the Fund money in accordance with the guidelines issued by the Ministry, and, as we shall elaborate later, in accordance with ethical guidelines. The Fund might now be named the Ethical Pension Fund. All key changes to the investment guidelines are presented to parliament before implemented. The Ministry receives advice on the investment guidelines from the Norwegian Central Bank, the Ministry’s advisory council on investment strategy and external consultants. The Ministry also uses external consultants for the independent evaluation of performance and the benchmarking of performance and costs (Eriksen 2006). Investment Guidelines The investment strategy is to achieve high financial returns subject to moderate risk. The Pension Fund is only invested abroad in financial instruments. The Fund is a financial investor with a diversified portfolio of numerous investments in a range of companies. The Fund’s financial results are primarily assessed in the terms of international currency in order to measure the development in the Fund’s international purchasing power. Equities account for 60 per cent of the Fund’s strategic benchmark portfolio, comprising equities listed on exchanges in Europe (50 per cent), America and Africa (35 per cent) and Asia/Oceania (15 per cent). Fixed income instruments account for 40 per cent of the strategic benchmark portfolio, consisting of fixed income instruments issued in currencies from Europe (60 per cent), America/Africa (35 per cent) and Asia/Oceania (5 per cent) (Report No. 24 (2006–2007) to the Storting).

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Transparency The management of petroleum revenues in general and the Fund in particular is characterized, as already pointed out, by transparency and disclosure of information. These features are necessary because a high degree of transparency and openness is essential to be able to build accountability and support for the Government’s management of the petroleum wealth. Large budgetary surpluses and substantial and very visible financial assets are in play, and this ‘play’ is also in need of taming under democratic control, besides being under regulatory control (Austvick 2006). The Ministry reports to the Parliament on all important matters relating to the Fund, such as the size of petroleum revenues and the Fund, the outlook for fiscal sustainability, changes to the investment strategy, and the Fund’s performance in relation to risk and costs. The Ministry also publishes advice and reports received from the Norwegian Central Bank, the Strategy Council, and external consultants. Further, it publishes quarterly reports on the management of the Fund, as well as an annual report and an annual listing of all investments.

9.4

ETHICAL GUIDELINES FOR THE NORWEGIAN GOVERNMENT PENSION FUND – GLOBAL

A Regulatory Approach We have seen earlier in this book references to the economist Frédéric Lordon (2003) and his statements regarding the actual financial crisis and an anxious stock market. The title of his book is appropriately provocative: And virtue is going to save the world. . .After the financial catastrophe, the salvation by ‘ethics’? This idea may perhaps also have struck Norwegian politicians and social scientists. Whatever the case may be, in the framework of the regulatory state, the Government Pension Fund gives the option to pursue ethical taming in practical politics. The Norwegian ethical guidelines were issued in December 2005, and, in accordance with the regulations on the Management of the Government Pension Fund – Global, formal regulations on the Management of the Government Petroleum Fund were issued in 2004. The recommendations of the Graver Commission (NOU 2003: 22) form the basis for the guidelines for the Fund. Hans Petter Graver, the leader of the Commission, is not by chance a professor in law and an expert in EU regulations.

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Basis The ethical guidelines for the Government Pension Fund – Global are based on two official basic premises in a political and economic regulatory taming perspective: Economic ethical premise The Government Pension Fund – Global is an instrument for ensuring that a reasonable portion of the country’s petroleum wealth benefits future generations. The financial wealth must be managed so as to generate a sound return of revenues in the long term, which is contingent on sound and sustainable development in the economic, environmental, and social sense. The financial interests of the Fund shall be strengthened by using the Fund’s ownership interests to promote such sustainable development.

Political ethical premise The Government Pension Fund – Global should not make investments which constitute an unacceptable risk that the Fund may contribute to unethical acts or omissions, such as violations of fundamental humanitarian principles, serious violations of social and human rights, gross corruption or severe environmental damages.

Mechanisms The ethical basis for the Government Pension Fund – Global is to be promoted through the following three measures: ●

●

●

Exercise of ownership rights in order to make sustainable investments globally, involving the diversification and dispersion of the investments both geographically and industrially to reduce risks and to secure stable revenues in the pursuit of long-term financial returns. Promotion of sustainability in every sense should be a goal in itself. Negative screening of companies from the investment universe that either themselves or through the firms they control violate fundamental social, humanitarian and environmental principles. Exclusion of companies from the investment universe when either there have been violations of the aforementioned ethical principles or a risk is deemed unacceptable for the political and economic premises of the Pension Fund.

The overall objective of Norwegian Central Bank’s exercise of ownership rights for the Government Pension Fund – Global is to safeguard the Fund’s financial interests, because these interests represent the necessary

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conditions for revenues. And that is how the ownership rights should be exercised, as mentioned: a long-term horizon for the Fund’s investments and a broad diversification of investments in the markets that are included in the investment universe. What about the ethical aspect of this regulatory petroleum regime through the perspective of governance? The exercise of ownership rights The exercise of ownership rights is decidedly strongly bound to the UN’s Global Compact and the OECD Guidelines for Corporate Governance and for Multinational Enterprises. The Central Bank’s internal guidelines for the exercise of ownership rights indicate how these principles should be integrated in the ownership strategy (Austvik 2007). Further, these regulatory bodies are supposed to be in charge of enforcing ethical conduct. Negative screening and exclusion Based on recommendations given by the Council on Ethics for the Government Pension Fund – Global, the Ministry of Finance is the authority responsible for making decisions on negative screening and exclusion of companies from the investment universe. The recommendations and decisions are to be made public. The Ministry may, in certain cases, postpone the timing of public disclosure if this is deemed necessary in order to ensure a financially sustainable implementation of the exclusion of the company concerned. The Council on Ethics for the Government Pension Fund – Global comprises five members; in 2008 these are two professors of law, one professor of philosophy and two managing directors. The Council has its own secretariat. The Council submits an annual report on its activities to the Ministry of Finance. Both the Ministry’s decisions and the Council’s recommendations are made publicly available on the Council on Ethics website. Upon request of the Ministry of Finance, the Council issues recommendations on whether or not an investment may constitute a violation of Norway’s obligations under international law and may be in conflict with the ethical regulations. The Council is obliged to issue recommendations for negative screening of one or several companies in cases where the production of weapons through their normal use may violate fundamental humanitarian principles. The Council issues recommendations on the exclusion of one or several companies from the investment universe because of acts or omissions that constitute an unacceptable risk to the Fund (www.regjeringen. no):

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Indicators: ●

● ● ● ●

Serious or systematic human rights violations, such as murder, torture, deprivation of liberty, forced labour, the worst forms of child labour and other forms of child exploitation. Serious violations of individuals’ rights in situations of war or conflict. Severe environmental damages. Gross corruption. Other particularly serious violations of fundamental ethical norms.

The Council on Ethics is authorized to raise issues under these indicators on its own initiative or at the request of the Ministry of Finance. Accordingly, the Council gathers all necessary information in order to ensure that the matter is documented as fully as possible before making a recommendation of negative screening or exclusion from the investment universe. This is, of course, a very complicated act and produces failures first and foremost because information often comes up more or less haphazardly (Reinersen 2008). The Council may request the Norwegian Central Bank to help provide information on how specific companies are dealt with in the exercise of ownership rights. Enquiries to such companies are channelled through the Norwegian Central Bank. If the Council is considering the recommendation of exclusion of a company, the company in question will receive the draft recommendation and the reasons for it in order to comment on it. The Council has the duty to review on a regular basis whether the reasons for exclusion still apply and may recommend that the Ministry of Finance revoke a decision to exclude a company if new relevant information is uncovered. The Norwegian Central Bank is the regulatory agency that receives immediate notification of the decisions made by the Ministry of Finance in connection with the Council’s recommendations. The Ministry of Finance may request that the Norwegian Central Bank inform the companies concerned of the decisions taken by the Ministry and the reasons for the decision. Table 9.2 presents the results from the screening work done by the Council on Ethics for the Government Pension Fund – Global.

9.5

VULNERABILITY AND RISK ANALYSIS OF THE NORWEGIAN PENSION FUND – GLOBAL

The vulnerabilities and risks in a political and economic perspective are manifold. Funding a pension system in the absence of a domestic budgetary

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Table 9.2

11.01.2008

09.11.2007

11.04.2007 06.12.2006 06.06.2006

05.01.2006

31.08.2005

06.06.2005 01.09.2006 22.03.2002 Source:

Companies considered to have violated the ethical regulations and consequently excluded from the investment universe, 2002–08 Hanwha Corporation Serco Group Plc. GenCorp Inc. Vedanta Resources Plc. Sterlite Industries Ltd. Madras Aluminium Company Ltd. DRD Gold Limited Poongsan Corporation Wal-Mart Stores Inc. Wal-Mart de Mexico SA de CV Freeport McMoRan Copper & Gold Inc. BAE Systems Plc. Boeing Co. Finmeccanica Sp. A. Honeywell International Inc. Northrop Grumman Corp. United Technologies Corp. Safran SA Alliant Techsystems Inc. EADS Co (European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company) EADS Finance BV General Dynamics Corporation L3 Communications Holdings Inc. Lockheed Martin Corp. Raytheon Co. Thales SA. Kerr-McGee Corporation Exclusion of Kerr-McGee reversed Singapore Technologies Engineering

www.regjeringen.no

surplus certainly has implications of political and economic risk, which is the case with the Norwegian Pension Fund. One implication is that more legal protection set by regulations is given to future pension payments than to other priorities and public outlays. This presents a challenging game in regard to short-term political legitimacy and politicians’ re-election cycles. Future pension payments are set against instant investments in roads, schools, hospital services, and so on, all of which are vital utilities that have to be set as lower priorities as a result. This downgrading of important

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investments occurs because the pension-funding regime defines the rules of the game, and these rules count until they eventually get changed – and that is a risk. The Norwegian Pension Fund is also vulnerable in another sense. If future economic growth and governmental revenues turn out to be lower than expected, the negative consequences will fall primarily on public consumption, in accordance with the actual regulatory measures. As pointed out, the Pension Fund is not earmarked for any specific purpose; the intentions are only politically formulated, and the risk is that these might be changed. ‘Politics of blame avoidance’ (Weaver 1986) may be the outcome for governments when coping with the effects of unexpected decreases in future revenues. Or the governments may feel the political pressure to prioritize greater domestic investment in the cost of the inflow in the Pension Fund or may change the arrangement by letting the petroleum revenues pass into the private sector, away from the goals of universal welfare and collective action. Another line of argument is bound to the regulatory state’s thinking on legitimacy. The funding of the Pension Fund and the use of petroleum revenues according to laws and regulations, outside direct democratic control and not exposed to short-term political decision-making, is meant to increase the legitimacy and long-term protection of the Fund’s assets. An often given example is the high public support for the protection of the assets in the Alaska Permanent Fund. Here, real money from the Fund is handed out directly to the citizens of Alaska. This policy does not, however, reduce vulnerability because it is a short-term perspective that has overrun enduring, long-term considerations regarding welfare and social security (Skancke 2003). We have previously reviewed the three taming measures that constitute the Norwegian Ethical Pension Fund. These are the exercise of ownership rights in order to make sustainable investments globally, diversifying and dispersing the investments geographically, industrially and financially to reduce risks and secure stable revenues; the negative screening of companies from the global investment universe that either themselves or through the corporations they control violate fundamental social, humanitarian and environmental principles; and the exclusion of companies when violations of the principles above have been revealed or when a company is considered to be an unacceptable risk to the political and economic premises for the Pension Fund. First, there is the exercise of ownership and the strategic measures to reduce investment risks and to secure stable petroleum revenues. Obviously, the strategy of diversity and spreading investments geographically, industrially and financially is an appropriate strategy. Technically,

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the Norwegian Central Bank can quite easily implement the strategy. Yet, this strategy does not remove vulnerability and risk (Reinersen 2008). The whole scheme depends on an international economy and a balanced and growing business cycle. Short-term sectoral problems and trade disturbances are normal and acceptable, but an international economy undergoing a deep structural crisis is certainly not. But the history of economics tells us that such crises always have occurred from time to time, with the stagflation crisis from the 1970s and a looming international financial crisis in 2008 as the latest examples. As elaborated in Chapter 1 of this book, such crises have been a main subject for most of the classical economists – from Malthus and Marx to Keynes and Schumpeter. A future international structural crisis would probably be a catastrophe for the Norwegian Pension Fund. Secondly, it is questionable whether the negative screening and exclusion of companies violating the ethical guidelines for Pension Fund investments is sufficiently feasible to affect policy? The list of excluded corporations in Table 9.2 shows that implementation of the ethical guidelines and regulations are feasible. The problem is, however, that a fair and accountable screening of corporations in this context is very unreliable, perhaps with a high risk for overlooking the worst cases (Reinersen 2008). Globally, the transparency of economic networks is very low. Enormous human and technical resources have to be reserved for the task of penetrating these networks and looking for grounds for ethical disqualification regarding investments. One has to be aware that such use of resources from the Norwegian Pension Fund – Global is not a reality today. In the future, we may assume that the Norwegian Pension Fund will face huge challenges connected to international agreements on environmental issues, that is, regulations that intend to restore ecological systems and to secure sustainable development. This is good from a human and ethical development perspective, but it might reduce the expected high revenues from the petroleum industry. Certainly, global agreements on environmental issues imply strong regulations on the exploration, production and refining of petroleum in the future. In conclusion, the Norwegian Pension Fund is also vulnerable in that environmental threats challenge the petroleum revenues and therefore also the predicted high net inflow of money into the future Fund.

9.6

CONCLUSIONS

The systematic risk of the type found in the Norwegian Pension Fund is discussed at length in the financial literature. It has over time become

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common to relate systematic vulnerability and risk to a long range of factors that might cause imbalance and failure. Ulrich Beck (1992) postulates that risks today have a different significance for everyday life from the risks that applied to previous historical eras. He claims that human activity and technology in advanced political and economic modernity produce as a side-effect risks that demand specialized expertise to access and recognize them and are collective, global and irreversible in their impact. The Norwegian petroleum activity under regulatory management and control is an example of that. The Government Report No. 24 (2006–2007) to the Parliament (Stortinget), ‘On the Management of the Government Pension Fund’, has presented a very optimistic view on the risks involved. Taking as a point of departure that the risk–return profile of the Pension Fund is largely determined by the governmental investment guidelines, the report continues this way: ‘The risk assumed in active management has only to a limited degree increased the actual market risk of the Fund’ (Government Report No. 24 (2006–2007): 82). There is, however, no simple way of conceiving risk-regulation regimes. No one has ever seen a risk-regulation regime embracing a totality of effects – and side-effects – along all dimensions. Against this background, Hood et al. have stated (2004: 179) that, ‘“principles” that have been advanced for regulatory assessment typically comprise some mix of “economic rationalist” cost-effectiveness criteria together with rule-of-law criteria – such as proportionality and transparency – and policy evaluation to identify regulatory impacts and alternatives’. We can recognize the meaning of this quotation in the Norwegian Petroleum industry and the establishment of the Pension Fund. With regard to the optimistic view on risk occurrence and the Pension Fund cited from the Government, as we have seen, there are good reasons to doubt this low assessment of the market risk of the Pension Fund. We should ignore neither the regular cycle of global economic crises nor the connection between global warming and CO2 emissions from petroleum activities, which is kept outside risk assessments. The notion of ‘actual market risks’ with regard to the future of the Ethical Pension Fund is far too narrow for a sufficient evaluation in the service of the common good. In a political and ethical perspective, the Pension Fund – Global should not, by definition, unlike other ordinary international investment funds, represent risk capital in the terms of neo-classical liberal economic thinking. Substantial regulations by law and ethics deviate from regulations by the market.

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NOTES 1. Most of the data used in this chapter is from official Norwegian Government sources www.regjeringen/pensionfund/no 2. In 2007, 52 fields were in production on the Norwegian continental shelf. In 2006, these fields produced 2.8 million barrels of oil per day, and 88 billion standard cubic metres of gas.

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Appendix 1: Ethical guidelines (This translation is for information purposes only. Legal authenticity remains with the original Norwegian version.)

THE NORWEGIAN GOVERNMENT PENSION FUND – GLOBAL Issued 22 December 2005 pursuant to regulation on the Management of the Government Pension Fund – Global, former regulation on the Management of the Government Petroleum Fund issued 19 November 2004. 1.

Basis

The ethical guidelines for the Government Pension Fund – Global are based on two premises: ●

●

2.

The Government Pension Fund – Global is an instrument for ensuring that a reasonable portion of the country’s petroleum wealth benefits future generations. The financial wealth must be managed so as to generate a sound return in the long term, which is contingent on sustainable development in the economic, environmental and social sense. The financial interests of the Fund shall be strengthened by using the Fund’s ownership interests to promote such sustainable development. The Government Pension Fund – Global should not make investments which constitute an unacceptable risk that the Fund may contribute to unethical acts or omissions, such as violations of fundamental humanitarian principles, serious violations of human rights, gross corruption or severe environmental damages. Mechanisms

The ethical basis for the Government Pension Fund – Global shall be promoted through the following three measures: 171

172 ●

●

●

3.

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Exercise of ownership rights in order to promote long-term financial returns, based on the UN Global Compact and the OECD Guidelines for Corporate Governance and for Multinational Enterprises. Negative screening of companies from the investment universe that either themselves, or through entities they control, produce weapons that through normal use may violate fundamental humanitarian principles. Exclusion of companies from the investment universe where there is considered to be an unacceptable risk of contributing to: – Serious or systematic human rights violations, such as murder, torture, deprivation of liberty, forced labour, the worst forms of child labour and other child exploitation – Serious violations of individuals’ rights in situations of war or conflict – Severe environmental damages – Gross corruption – Other particularly serious violations of fundamental ethical norms. The Exercise of Ownership Rights

3.1 The overall objective of Norwegian Central Bank’s exercise of ownership rights for the Government Pension Fund – Global is to safeguard the Fund’s financial interests. The exercise of ownership rights shall be based on a long-term horizon for the Fund’s investments and broad investment diversification in the markets that are included in the investment universe. The exercise of ownership rights shall mainly be based on the UN’s Global Compact and the OECD Guidelines for Corporate Governance and for Multinational Enterprises. Norwegian Central Bank’s internal guidelines for the exercise of ownership rights shall stipulate how these principles are integrated in the ownership strategy. 3.2 Norwegian Central Bank shall report on its exercise of ownership rights in connection with its ordinary annual reporting. An account shall be provided of how the Bank has acted as owner representative – including a description of the work to promote special interests relating to the long-term horizon and diversification of investments in accordance with Section 3.1. 3.3 Norwegian Central Bank may delegate the exercise of ownership rights pursuant to these guidelines to external managers.

Appendix 1

4.

173

Negative Screening and Exclusion

4.1 The Ministry of Finance shall, based on recommendations of the Council on Ethics for the Government Pension Fund – Global, make decisions on negative screening and exclusion of companies from the investment universe. The recommendations and decisions shall be made public. The Ministry may, in certain cases, postpone the time of public disclosure if this is deemed necessary in order to ensure a financially sound implementation of the exclusion of the company concerned. 4.2 The Council on Ethics for the Government Pension Fund – Global shall consist of five members. The Council shall have its own secretariat. The Council shall submit an annual report on its activities to the Ministry of Finance. 4.3 Upon request of the Ministry of Finance, the Council issues recommendations on whether an investment may constitute a violation of Norway’s obligations under international law. 4.4 The Council shall issue recommendations on negative screening of one or several companies on the basis of production of weapons that through their normal use may violate fundamental humanitarian principles. The Council shall issue recommendations on the exclusion of one or several companies from the investment universe because of acts or omissions that constitute an unacceptable risk of the Fund contributing to: ●

● ● ● ●

Serious or systematic human rights violations, such as murder, torture, deprivation of liberty, forced labour, the worst forms of child labour and other forms of child exploitation Serious violations of individuals’ rights in situations of war or conflict Severe environmental damages Gross corruption Other particularly serious violations of fundamental ethical norms

The Council shall raise issues under this provision on its own initiative or at the request of the Ministry of Finance.

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4.5 The Council shall gather all necessary information at its own discretion and shall ensure that the matter is documented as fully as possible before making a recommendation regarding negative screening or exclusion from the investment universe. The Council may request Norwegian Central Bank to provide information as to how specific companies are dealt with in the exercise of ownership rights. Enquiries to such companies shall be channelled through Norwegian Central Bank. If the Council is considering recommending exclusion of a company, the company in question shall receive the draft recommendation and the reasons for it, for comment. 4.6 The Council shall review on a regular basis whether the reasons for exclusion still apply and may against the background of new information recommend that the Ministry of Finance revoke a decision to exclude a company. 4.7 Norwegian Central Bank shall receive immediate notification of the decisions made by the Ministry of Finance in connection with the Council’s recommendations. The Ministry of Finance may request that Norwegian Central Bank inform the companies concerned of the decisions taken by the Ministry and the reasons for the decision.

Appendix 2: Top 25 global funds Fund Name

Country

1 Government Pension Investment Fund – GPIF 2 Government Pension Fund – Global 3 ABP 4 California Public Employees’ Retirement Systems 5 Philips 6 Federal Retirement Thrift Investment Board 7 New York State Common Retirement Fund 8 California State Teachers Retirement System 9 Government Pension Fund – Norway 10 ATP – Arbejdsmarkedets Tillaegspension 11 Florida State Board of Administration 12 PGGM 13 New York City Employees Retirement Systems 14 General Motors Corporation 15 Teacher Retirement System of Texas 16 Government of Singapore Investment Corporation 17 Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan Board 18 New York State Teachers Retirement System 19 CPP Investment Board 20 New Jersey Division of Investment 21 Afore ING 22 Wisconsin Investment Board 23 British Telecommunications plc 24 IBM Retirement Funds 25 GE Asset Management

Japan

995 854.50

Norway Netherlands USA

218 239.61 201 000.00 165 911.68

Netherlands USA USA USA Norway Denmark USA Netherlands USA

145 000.00 134 755.34 107 699.82 103 879.71 100 000.00 99 900.00 90 107.87 90 000.00 80 662.44

Source:

Wikipedia (2008).

175

2007 Values € million

USA USA Singapore

78 532.30 77 534.28 73 767.00

Canada USA

70 627.70 67 865.64

Canada USA Mexico USA UK USA USA

61 820.43 60 996.46 59 241.14 56 369.05 55 636.36 55 610.73 54 606.81

Index accountability 51–3, 96, 118 arms-length control 47, 54–6, 96–7, 115 regionalization policies 113 adult education 77 Alaska Permanent Fund 153 Anglo-Saxon governance model democracy 90–91, 94–5 fragmentation in 58, 113–14 inflation, policies regulating 31, 33 minimization/marketization strategies 44–5, 47–8, 58 national identity 52–3, 118–19 regionalization 112–14 role in EU 69 social capital 76–7, 103–4 socially conscious regulation 31, 33 subsidiarity 84–6, 118–19 Arctic see Barents Sea region Arctic Council (AC) 134 arms-length control 4, 9–10, 14, 16 accountability 47, 54–6, 96–7, 115 democracy, risks from 51–4 growth of 56–7 ‘miniature governments’ 47–53 private-law bodies (PLBs) and public-law agencies (PLAs) 45, 50–51 public–private partnerships 53–4, 63, 90, 104–6, 113 regionalization 111–12 Baldwin, Robert 1–2 Baltic Sea Region 121, 130 banks see central banks Barents Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC) 131–2 Barents Regional Council 132–4 Barents Sea Region 121, 130–38 administrative bodies governing 131–4 Continental Shelf 136, 139

environmental issues 136–8 international financing 135–6 Northern Dimension Policy Framework 134–6 Beck, Ulrich 155 benchmarking 4, 11–12, 16, 56, 94 Bernanke, Ben 6 biofuels 5 Black, Julia 47 bottom-up approaches 40–41, 57–8, 63, 81–4, 87 see also subsidiarity Bouckaert, Geert 43–7, 74–8 Bush, George W. 6 Business cycles 37 Canada 49 Capitalism, socialism and democracy 37–8 central banks Norwegian Central Bank 143, 146–7, 151, 154, 172–4 role of 4, 30–33 ‘chess model’ 65–6 Coleman, James C. 100 collective action, and social capital 99–101, 104–6 competition 89–90 and innovation 38, 45–6 public planning, focus on 40–41 Constitution Treaty (EU) 95 consumption, impact on economy 23 Continental governance model democracy 89–90, 94–5, 118–19 dominance in early EU 68–9 fragmentation in 58 inflation, policies regulating 33–4 national identity, impact on reform choices 52–3 regionalization 110–20 social capital 76–7, 103–4 state, concept of 87–8 subsidiarity 84–6, 88–9, 116–19

177

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Continental Shelf 136 Norwegian sovereignty over 139 ‘Contrat de plan Etat-Régions’ (France) 85, 89, 111–12, 118–19 Council of Ethics for the Government Pension Fund–Global (Norway) 150–51 Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS) 134 ‘creative-destruction’ 7, 38, 43–5, 64 management strategies for 43–7 crises, economic food price increases (2000s) 5 Great Depression (1930s) 17 Marx’s theory on 21 role in regulatory change 4–5 stagflation (1970s) 4, 8, 26–30, 46, 58–9 and state intervention 25 techno-economic (2000s) 4–5, 7 US/global financial (2008) 6–7, 96–7 cross-border policies 59 in EU 124–6 and regionalization 121–2 and regulation, impact on 10, 36 transactional costs 125–6 Das Kapital 20 deficit-budgeting 6–7 Delors, Jacques 91, 93, 110 demand-side economic policies 30–34 democracy arms-length control 51–4 challenges to 54–5, 95–8, 114–15 distributed public governance 93–5, 97 forms of bottom-up approach to 40–41, 57–8, 63, 81–4, 87 development of 91–2 Greek/Roman 91–2 input and output democracy 94–5 in Middle Ages 91–2 top-down approach to 8, 25–6, 39, 84, 118 Westphalian 91–2 limitations on regulation 14–15

and subsidiarity 81–2, 91–3 in Anglo-Saxon governance models 84–7, 90–91, 94–5, 118–19 in Continental/Nordic governance models 84–6, 88–90, 94–5, 116–19 fragmentation 90–91 and ‘the state’ 87–8 and unelected agencies 14, 45, 51, 97, 111–12, 114–17 democratic deficit 13, 54, 89–91, 118– 19, 128–9 departmental agencies 49–50 dependence 65–6 deregulation 1, 4, 8 with re-regulation 8, 10, 12 Schumpeterianism 39 spillover, functional/political 62–3 devolution see regionalization; subsidiarity ‘Distributed governance: agencies, authorities and other government bodies’ (OECD) 54–8 distributed public governance 56–7 democracy, challenges to 93–5, 97 ‘distributed state governance’ 89–90 and European Union 89–93, 127–8 in Norway 116–17 Eco-Circ 26 ecosystems, and national/ administrative boundaries 66–7 effective-demand theory 7, 31, 44, 75 in Keynesian economic theory 18, 20–26, 29, 35–6, 60 and unemployment and inflation 33–4, 75, 142 Ekofisk oil field 140, 145 employment see also unemployment and adult education 77 full, importance of 23–5 socially conscious regulatory developments 31 women in workplace 35 environmental issues 155 Barents region 136–8 and national/administrative boundaries 66–7

Index ethics focus on 97 in Government Pension Fund– Global (Norway) 146–51, 153–4, 171–4 regulatory state, role in 7 Euro-Arctic Barents region 121, 130–38 European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) 135 European Coal and Steel Union 62 European Economic Area (EEA) 114, 124 European regionalization 126–31 criticisms of 129–31 European Free Trade Agreement (EFTA) 124 cross-border agreements 126–38 EFTA Surveillance Authority (ESA) 144–5 European regionalism 126–9 Europeanization 129–31 European Investment Bank (EIB) 135 European Monetary Union 36 European Union Constitution Treaty 95 cross-border policies 124–6 democratic basis for 91–2 distributed public governance 89–93, 127–8 formation and expansion 68–9 governance models, changing focus of 68–9 Initiative Programme 123 Interreg Programmes 123–4 Lisbon Process (2000) 2, 70, 77–8, 125–6 and national sovereignty 63, 93 public governance principle 92–3 regionalization 122–3, 126–31 Single Market 36, 69, 91, 122–3 Structural Funds 82, 93, 116, 123 subsidiarity, principle of 67, 80–81, 117–18, 127 Treaty of Lisbon 2007 82–4, 87, 122 Treaty of Maastricht 1992 67, 81–2, 92–3 sustainable growth 122–3

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Third Party Access (TPA) ‘Gas Directive’ 143–4 Europeanization 12–13, 129–31 federal concept of governance 87–9 Federal Reserve (US) 6 Finland 132–4 flexicurity 73, 78, 99, 106–9 food price increase crisis 5 Fordism 63 fragmentation 47–51, 58, 90–91, 113–14, 128–9 France arm’s length agencies in 111–12 ‘Contrat de plan Etat-Régions’ 85, 89, 111–12, 118–19 Europeanization 12 institutional fragmentation in 49–51 regionalization 85, 89, 110–12 subsidiarity 84–5, 110–12 free trade, and inflation 35–6 Friedman, Milton 33–4 Frisch, Ragnar 26 fylkestinget (Norwegian regional assembly) 116 Gassco Ltd 144 Gassnova Ltd 144 gender policy, impact on economic stability 35 General theory of employment, interest and money, The 17–18, 29 Germany 49–51 Gill, Derek 49–51 globalization 10, 61, 66–8 see also cross-border policies ‘good governance’ 41, 97 Government Pension Fund – Global (Norway) 7, 171–4 establishment and growth 140–43, 145 ethical investment guidelines 147–51, 171–4 excluded companies 152 negative screening and exclusion 150–51, 153–4, 173–4 ownership rights 149–50, 153–4, 172 purpose 145–7 risk analysis 151–5

180

Taming the regulatory state

Government Pension Fund – Norway 143 Government Petroleum Fund (Norway) 7, 145–6 Graver, Hans Petter 148 Greek, Ancient, democratic form 91–2 Haas, Ernst 61–2 Hall, Peter A. 76–7, 105–6 hard regulation 2, 40 Hood, Christopher 155 Iceland 134 income, distribution of 25 inflation 75, 142 controlling role of central banks 4, 30–33 role of parliaments 4 and free trade 35–6 Phillips curve principle 27–34 during stagflation crisis (1970s) 27–9, 31–4 US/UK reforms 29–30 Initiative Programme (EU) 123 innovation, public 18–19, 37–9 market competition 38, 45–6 risk moderation 71 social networking 104–6 institutions, regulatory 2–3, 30–34 benchmarking 4, 11–12, 16, 56, 94 governmental fragmentation 47–51, 58, 113–14 inter-governmentalism 60–61 interaction, dimensions of 65–6 interdependence, theories of 65–8 interest rates, and inflation/ unemployment 30–33 International Monetary Fund (IMF) 58 Interreg Programmes (EU) 123–4, 127–8 interventionism 13 characteristics of 16, 25–6, 39–40 in Keynesian policy 17–18, 24–6 unfair competitive advantage 25–6 investments ethical investment guidelines excluded companies (Government Pension Fund – Global, Norway) 152

negative screening and exclusion 150–51, 173–4 impact on economy 23 top 25 global investment funds 175 Iversen, Torben 75 Japan 15 Jessop, Bob 90 Keating, Michael 54, 94, 121 Keohane, Robert O. 65–6 Keynes, John Maynard 17–18, 21–3 Keynesian economic theories demand-side/supply-side economic policies 30–34, 36–7 effective demand theory 18, 20–26, 29, 35–6, 60 ethics 7 and European monetary union 36 failure of, explanations for 29, 34–7 interventionism 17–18, 24–6 Keynesian state economic basis for 34 structure of 24–5, 43–7 and macroeconomic crises 25–6 OECD moves away from 29–30 stagflation crisis (1970s) 26–30, 34–7 technology, role of 36–7 welfare state, impact on 35 Kirkenees Declaration 132–3 Knill, Christopher 88 Lisbon Process (2000)(EU) 2, 70 cross-border policies 125–6 and Nordic social/welfare state model 77–8 Locke, John 19 ‘locked-in management’ 55, 94–5 Lordon, Frédéric 6–7, 148 Lowi, Theodore 100–101, 108 McGowan, Francis 14–15 maintenance, of administrative systems 44 Majone, Giandemonico 1, 3, 11–16, 24–6 Malthus, Thomas Robert 19–20, 22 market-driven theory 7, 38, 43–7, 64 Market-Type Mechanisms (MTMs) 4, 45–7, 71, 77

Index marketization, of administrative systems 44–5, 58 markets, stagnation of 37–8 Marx, Karl 20–23 Middle Ages, democratic form in 91–2 minimization, of administrative systems 44–5, 58 Ministry of Petroleum and Energy (Norway) 140 Modern capitalism 27 modernization, of administrative systems 44–5 Moran, Michael 46, 80, 101–2 natural law 19 natural resources 66–7 see also oil; petroleum industry Navarro, Vincent 101, 108–9 neo-functionalism 61–3 neo-Schumpeterian perspective 39, 64 Netherlands 49–51 networking, of social capital 104–6 New Deal Initiatives (US) 17 New Public Management (NPM) structural forms 3–4, 10, 45, 71, 129 New Zealand 49–50 Next Steps Agencies (UK) 47, 86, 90, 112–13, 119 Nordic Active Labour Market Policy (ALMP) 106–7 Nordic Council of Ministers (NCM) 134 Nordic governance model basis of 15 and democracy 89–90, 95 development of 99 employment policies 77–8 and EU Lisbon Process 70–71, 77–8 flexicurity 73, 78, 99, 106–9 fragmentation 58 inflation, policies regulating 33–4 national identity, impact on reform choices 52–3 regionalization 114–17 social capital 73–7, 101–4, 106–8 stagflation management approaches 46 state, concept of 88

181

subsidiarity 116–17, 119 welfare state 70–78, 146 Nordic Investment Bank (NIB) 135 North Sea Region 121, 130 see also Barents Sea Region petroleum exploration, licenses for 139 Northern Dimension Policy Framework 134–6 Norway Barents region 132–4, 136–8 Integrated Management Plan 137 distributed public governance 116–17 Europeanization 12 Government Pension Fund – Global 7 establishment and growth 140–43, 145 ethical investment guidelines 146–51, 171–4 excluded companies 152 negative screening and exclusion 150–51, 153–4, 173–4 ownership rights 149–50, 153–4, 172 purpose 145–7 risk analysis 151–5 institutional fragmentation in 49–51, 128–9 petroleum estimated reserves 136 exploration, regulation of 139–40 global rankings for production/ exportation 140 investment fund/economic policies 7 regionalization 114–17, 128–9 criticism of 115–16 Norwegian Central Bank 143, 146–7, 151, 154, 172–4 Norwegian Continental Shelf 136, 139 Norwegian Hydro 144 Norwegian Petroleum Directorate 144 Nuget, Neil 60 Nye, Joseph S. 62, 65–6 OECD on administrative reform, relevance of context in 52–3, 86

182

Taming the regulatory state

advice on modernization of government, impact of 52 on democracy and subsidiarity 118–20 threats to 96–8 on distributed public governance 93–5 independent regulatory authorities in 48–51 moves away from Keynesian theories 29–30 reporting change in trends 54–8 taming actions indicated 55–8 oil global rankings for production/ exportation 140 Oljedirektoratet (Norwegian Petroleum Directorate) 140 output governance 90 outwards distribution of authority 81, 87, 128–9 partnership-building 116 see also crossborder policies and social capital 99–102 transactional costs 125–6 Petoro Ltd 144 petroleum industry in Norway 139–40, 145 Third Party Access (EU Gas Directive) 143–4 Philips Petroleum 139 Phillips curve principle 27–9 pluralism 16, 63, 67–8 Pollitt, Christopher 43–7, 74–8 population, theory of 19–20 Porter, Michael 100, 104 post-Fordism 10, 16, 63–4, 67 Power and interdependence: world politics in transition 65 Principles of political economy and taxation 19 private-law bodies (PLBs) 45, 50–51, 55, 77, 95–6 in Norway 114–15 privatization 1, 9, 33, 39–40, 44 public-law agencies (PLAs) 45, 50, 77, 95–6

public ownership New Public Management (NPM) 3–4, 10, 45, 71, 129 public–private partnerships 53–4, 63, 90, 104–6, 113 public–public partnerships 63, 104–6 and the regulatory state 2–3, 8 public–private partnerships 53–4, 63, 90, 104–6, 113 public–public partnerships 63, 104–6 public sector, marketization of 13, 58 Putnam, Robert D. 100, 104 re-regulation 4 with deregulation 8, 10, 12 risk moderation 71 spillover, functional/political 62–3 realist theory 60–61, 68 Reform Treaty see Treaty of Lisbon Regional Development Agencies (RDAs) (UK) 113–14 Regional Health Enterprises (Norway) 114 regionalization 110–20 Anglo-Saxon governance model 112–14 arms-length control 111–12 cross-border policies 121–2 European Union 122–3, 126–31 Nordic governance model 114–17 regulation approaches to 9–10 changes in, impact of 4–5, 105–6 claims of making control arrangements 2–3 organizational change in public institutions 2–3 concepts of 105–6 direction of focus 1–2 economic theories 17–22 crises, role in regulatory change 4–5 cross-border policies, impact on 10, 36 defining 2–3, 9, 40 democracy, limitations on 14–15 hard 2, 40 institutional-style approach 9 policies out of context 52–3 and political time-limits 14–15, 113–14

Index post-Fordist style 10 risk approach 9 sensitivity and vulnerability 65–7 socially conscious 31, 33 soft 2, 40 regulatory state defining 1–3, 13–16 demand-side/supply-side economic policies 30–34, 36–7 and democracy 87–8 development of 8–11 Europeanization 12 Weberian bureaucratic structures 8, 12–14 and ethics 7 institutionalization of 2–3, 30–34 public ownership 2–3, 8 (see also New Public Management; public–private partnerships; public–public partnerships) regionalization 110–20 rise of, reasons for 3–4, 105–6 Reinert, Erik S. 5 Ricardo, David 19–23, 38, 45 risk 9–10 democratic risk 51 of fragmentation 51, 53–4 and lack of clarity 51–2 moderation and innovation 71 numerical risk 51–2 and transactional costs 51, 53–4 Roman, Ancient, democratic form 91–2 Roosevelt, Franklin Delano 17 Røvik, Kjell Arne 58 Russia 140 Barents Sea region 132–4, 137–8 collapse of Soviet Union 59, 69–70 Salter, W.E.G. 36 Saudi Arabia 140 Scandinavian see Nordic; Norway Scharpf, Fritz 84 Scharpf’s Law 56–7, 97 Schengen Agreement 114 Schonfield, Andrew 18, 27 Schumpeter, Joseph A. 37–9 ‘creative-destruction’ 7, 38, 43–5, 64 strategies for managing 43–7

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neo-Schumpeterian perspective 39, 43, 64 Seiler, Daniel L. 112 Selznick, Phillip 1, 3 sensitivity, and vulnerability 65–7 Single Market 69, 91, 122–3, 143 and Keynesian economic policy 36 Smith, Adam 18–19, 38 social capital development of concept 99–101 flexicurity 73, 78, 99, 106–9 networking/collective action 104–6 partnership-building 99–102 trade-offs Anglo-Saxon/Continental welfare state models 76–7, 103–4 Nordic welfare state model 73–7, 103–4 socio-institutional paradigm 43–7, 69 dependence and interdependence 65–6 and ‘miniature governments’ 47–53 neo-functionalism 62 and techno-economic paradigm 60, 64 soft regulation 2, 40 sovereignty 63, 93 and interdependence 68 spillover functional 61–2, 82 and partnership-building 101 political 62–3 and vulnerability 62–3 stagflation crisis (1970s) 4, 8 impact of 58–9 inflation and unemployment 26–9, 31–4 US/UK reforms 29–30 market strategies for dealing with 43–7 regulatory developments resulting from 30–39 and Schumpterianism 39 State’s Direct Financial Interest (SDFI) (Norway) 144 Statoil ASA 143–4 StatoilHydro ASA 144 Stewart, Michael 21–2

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Taming the regulatory state

Structural Funds (EU) 82, 93, 116, 123, 135 sub-national governments 85–6, 88, 130 see also regionalization; subsidiarity accountability 55, 58 outwards distribution of authority 81, 87, 128–9 subsidiarity, principle of 53 in Anglo-Saxon governance model 84–7, 90–91, 118–19 in Contintental governance model 84–6, 88–9 defining 81–4 as ‘fiasco’ 80, 83, 102 and democracy 81–2, 91–3, 96 in European Union 117–18, 127 introduction of 67, 81 legality of 80–81 Treaty of Lisbon 2007 82–4, 87, 122 Treaty of Maastricht 1992 67, 81–2, 92–3 in France 84–5, 110–12 in Nordic governance model 116–17, 119 as outwards distribution of authority 81, 87, 128–9 and unelected agencies 118–20 supply-side economic policies 30–34, 36–7 sustainable development 67 regional/cross-border policies 121–2 Sweden 49–51, 101–2, 132–4 Szreter, Simon 101–2 taxation social capital trade-offs 75, 77 in Nordic model 103–4 techno-economic crisis (2000s) 4–5, 7 techno-economic paradigm 60, 64 technology and Keynesian economic policies 36–7 Theory of economic development, The 37 Thierstein, Alain 12–13 Third Party Access (TPA)(EU Gas Directive) 143–4

top-down planning 8, 25–6, 39, 84, 118 trade unions 69, 76 transactional costs of cross-border policies 125–6 increase in 46 relevance of 9 risks of 51, 53–4 Scharpf’s Law 56–7 transparency 53, 55–6, 94, 96, 148, 154 need for 41, 127 Treaty of Amsterdam 1997 70 Treaty of Lisbon 2007 80–81, 95 and subsidiarity principle 82–4, 87, 122 Treaty of Maastricht 1992 and EU social dimension 69 and subsidiarity 67, 81–2, 92–3 Treaty of Rome 62, 68 unelected agencies 14, 45, 51, 97, 129 power of 111–12, 114–17 and subsidiarity 118–20 unemployment 75, 142 during Great Depression 17 and national/industrial development 20, 22 Phillips curve principle 26–34 and population 20 social capital trade-offs 103–4 during stagflation crisis (1970s) 26–9, 31–4 US/UK reforms 29–30 women in workplace 35 United Kingdom democratic tradition 88, 90–91, 118–19 institutional fragmentation in 47–51, 58, 113–14 joining European Community 69 ministerial responsibility, doctrine of 47–8 Next Steps Agencies 47, 86, 90, 112–13, 119 Regional Development Agencies (RDAs)(UK) 113–14 regionalization 112–14 subsidiarity 84–7, 90–91, 118–19 United States 5–7, 15, 17, 59, 66

Index Vibert, Frank 51, 97 vulnerability 9 neo-functionalism 62, 64 and sensitivity 65–7 spillover, functional/political 62–3 Wallace, Helen 14–15 Wealth of nations, The 18 Weberian bureaucratic structures 8, 12–14, 25–6, 46 welfare state Continental/Anglo-Saxon models 71–2, 76–7 corporatist type 71–2, 76–7 development 60

flexicurity 73, 78, 99, 106–9 impact on Keynesian economics 35 liberal type 71–2, 76 Nordic model 73–8, 146 politics against/by markets 71–3, 76–7 risk moderation 71–2 social capital trade-offs 76–7 transactional costs of 53 universal type 72–4 Westphalian democratic form 91–2 women, in workplace 35 Woolcock, Michael 101–2 World Bank 58, 135

185