Synthetic A Priori: Philosopical Interviews

synthetic a priori PHILOSOPHICAL INTERVIEWS

M.R.M. PARROTT rimric press

Synthetic A Priori Philosopical Interviews ©1999 M.R.M. Parrott Designed by M.R.M. Parrott Cover art: Proofs (Photographs by Gene Crediford) www.mrmparrott.com Published by rimric press October 2002 This file may be downloaded, read, shared, or hyperlinked, but not otherwise distributed All other rights reserved Produced in the United States of America by rimric design Distributed by rimric press ISBN 0-9662635-6-1 rimric(r) is a registered trademark of rimric corporation rimric | doing it differently(tm) 1600-806 Park Circle, Columbia, South Carolina 29201 www.rimric.com

Contents Overview

4

History of Philosophy

11

Epistemology

33

Metaphysics

50

Logic

71

Philosophy of Science

98

Ethics

126

Kant Studies

155

Against Objectivism

189

Synthetic A Priori

OVERVIEW

You call this book 'synthetic a priori', presumably from Kant. How did that come about?

Yes, it came about because at one time I wished to put up a website devoted to Kant's work, maybe including my own work on Kant. I had almost finished my book on Kant, The Pure Critique of Reason, which among other things, professes my facination with Kant and describes his effect on my work. I didn't proceed with the Kant website, but in my discussions with other thinkers, I felt the concept of synthetic a priori could use a more "ordinary" explanation. So, the project just clicked together for me. Everyone has a different definition of philosophy. What's yours?

It is what each of us engages in, to find or construct truth for our own lives. The range of philosophy which is available is a testament to the multifarious cultural, and personal, influences which we all use to construct our truth. Many believe that there is a single truth, out there, 4 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

which philosophy is supposed to find, but that is a cultural and personal definition, just like the one above. I am a Kantian, though I am influenced by Deleuze, Foucault, and many others in Kant's time, such as Berkeley and Spinoza. In my books, I'm all about trying to define what subjectivity is, and how it works to produce its truth. I do not believe in God, nor do I believe in "objectivity," finding these are only weapons, to be used in the suppression of other subjects. What is required to be a real philosopher? Do you have to be a philosophy major, or do you have to spend a lifetime in thought?

The latter. It is a rather personal thing, but at the same time it is a matter of an "apprenticeship" in thought. To be trained in philosophy, is to be educated, in the general sense, in the skills of debate, and the techniques of inquiry. Anyone can ask silly questions, and bat inane theories around, but "to know what questions may reasonably be asked, is already a indication of great sagacity and insight," as Kant said. One doesn't have to be a philosophy major, but it helps. I have a Master's, but the rest I've learned by doing, by writing my books, and by arguing my points. Why do philosophers always have to be right?

There is certainly nothing wrong with trying to be right about things. Since nearly all of our battles revolve

5 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

around linguistic concerns; the use of terms, and what they may mean; we are quite rational to engage in debate. Debate serves the double purpose of allowing us to clear up our terms and socialize at the same time. Internet newsgroups are a "reincarnation," so to say, of the ancient prediliction for public debate and discussion, which was lost through Christianity, and the University. Those of us who are following this group, and others, are fullfilling a real human need for social contact; it is only that technology has displaced us spatially, while also connecting us electrically. We actually have a dreadful need for philosophy in our time; in times past it was very common to study the thought of the greats. Philosophy is about questions, and about questions about questions. Most people will not be easily swayed by anything I have to say, but that is not my intention. It is the questioning process, not the hopeful conversion of the listener, which is important. The mark of the true philosopher would have to be language itself. What I mean is, the common person does not engage themselves within language(s), they only use it as a means to a commodity. A philosopher, no matter what the medium, is immersed within language. Philosophy is limited only by it's own ideas, it's own identity and application. If you had to vote for one philosopher who was a good representative, who would it be?

Nineteenth century philosophy is important because it

6 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

was then that the very "freewill" and individuality which we all take for granted was articulated in modern dress. But there has been much done in this now fading century which has yet to be explained fully. I vote for Gilles Deleuze as the representative contemporary thinker, though he died in 1993. If we have a goal for our efforts, do we need a plan?

Generally, Milton was onto something with his free press...Kant was onto something with the Kingdom of Ends(subjects)...Mill was onto something with his Epicurean Utility...Foucault with the denial of totalizing power...etc. Could you be a little more specific?

My view is that philosophy is more of an "attitude" than anything else. If we were to talk about, say, Berkeley; at what point would we be "doing" philosophy? When we stated what Berkeley had said in such and such book? When we questioned what he said? Or could it be, that we begin to do philosophy only at the moment when we begin to interpret Berkeley? It is when we begin to work him into our own theory, or out of it, as the case may be for some, that we engage ourselves with the history of ideas in such a way that we are contributing to it. For me, then, philosophy is the art of asking questions and making something out of them which could not have been seen before. It is creativity, then, which fuels the

7 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

philosophical enterprise, rather than cold inquiry. It is a need to express concepts which must become uppermost within the philosopher. Therefore, interpretation, as the expression of concepts which are questions about other concepts, is what philosophy is to me. Why is it important to discover truth?

It is important because the very status and "reality" of the subject is at stake. If, by some methods, I can confirm what things I think about myself and the "world," demonstrating what would otherwise be relegated to dreaming, then I can construct the edifice, over which the rest of my life is to rise. By delineating truth, I not only carve out the bread and butter of my dealings with other subjectivities, but also create the jelly, by which I construct my own, personal flourish on that truth. It is indespensible to discover truth, not only to distinguish falsity, but to provide power for the slightest tincture of creativity. Truth allows us to use language, both to utter, "the email was sent," as well as to pen, "a rose by any other name..." What about solipsism; how can it be used to argue against materialism?

It is used to mean that all of reality is my reality, or that an outer reality is merely an illusion, or some variant of those positions. In other words, everything but my consciousness is an illusion; only I am real. "Solipsism" is really one of those terms you learn early

8 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

on, which turns out to be pretty much useless, like "materialism," since no philosopher actually subscribes to it, and it can only be defended within a monologue. Also, it is mostly used as a straw man against someone who starts talking about subjective truth, which IS an interesting proposition, provided one doesn't deny the existence of the universe in the process {whatever the universe is}. "If truth is subjective, then you're a solipsist!!", they say, turning on their objectivist heel. As for using solipsism against materialism, I can only guess that one would have to deny an absolute materiality of the universe, favouring a spiritual inner nature of consciousness, which conflicts with the starting premise of solipsism, that there is no reality outside of me, by supposing that there is a spirit. Spiritual substances must be non-material, to be sure, but also not purely subjective, or limited to a particular body. But the solipsist can claim that their spirit, now, is the only reality, all the while forgetting that an argument is underway, with something which must be separate from that spirit. As such, none of the positions seem to be very interesting... If we believe truth is subjective, and that each of us percieves reality differently, what position is that?

Transcendental Idealism, a position very dear to me. Once, I was reproached by someone for propounding that truth was what the individual made of it, in the heat of the moment, reducing the object to a shadow.

9 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

"That's subjectivism!", he charged, as if it were some kind of insult. "Of course it is!", I replied, adding something like, "what do you think modern philosophy has worked so hard to prove?" My adversary did not sense the subtle, but crucial difference between subjectivism and solipsism; that the latter claims all reality is subjective, while the former claims only the interpretations of reality are subjective, and that there can be no truly objective interpretation, for in regard to interpretation, there is always a viewpoint, so there is always a subjectivity generating it. But these various labels are, many times, what sophomores use to argue their points, having no other basis. Mature thinkers naturally begin to move away from them, since in declaring so few possibilities, philosophical labels destroy any hope of complicity. It therefore becomes far more interesting to compare the multi-coloured insights of philosophers, rather than rely upon the confining illusions of straw men.

10 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY

Plato Let's talk about a few of your favorite philosophers. Plato's Crito, for example, is a popular topic; what is the meaning we might be able to glean from it?

Just focusing on the Crito, rather than on the vast whole of Plato's philosophy, let's consider it in the light of President Clinton's Impeachment problem. Let's assume Clinton was being wrongly charged; now as President, he should be able to simply have Starr "taken out" quietly, or effect some similar escape from his "cell," since it would be wrong for Starr to accuse him falsely. If he was wrongly accused, then maybe he is moral and does not abuse his power. So, to take Starr out, or tamper with procedure in a way which abuses his power, would be immoral and procedurally wrong. If his claim is that he is wrongly accused of immorality and abusive power, then he must stand his ground, and take what Congress may dish out, using only the tools which are legitimately at his disposal. 11 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

No, it would not be fair, if he were impeached under false pretense, but two wrongs do not make a right. Descartes In more modern times, we seem concerned with progress. In respect to Plato's thought, do you think modern philosophy is progress?

Compared to ancient thought, modern thought is nothing but a pure obsession with progress. We see this not only in the technology push since the Renaissance, but in the notions of historical progress which proliferate in modern thought. In the modern world, "history" itself is a machine which must be well oiled. One line of thought which runs through many, many thinkers in the modern world is the notion of historical progress, and temporal development. This was not without its precedent in the ancient world, for the whole notion of a dialectic comes from them, but since the Renaissance, we have been consumed with various instantiations of progress. Kant is central to this; from the dialectic of reason to a cosmopolitan universal history, Kant sits squarely in the middle of the ideas of progress which came before him, and the theories of dialectic which would follow. Descartes seems crucial to this notion of progress, but did he have anything to do with the subjectivism you talk about? What does the famous "cogito, ergo sum" mean, and how did it play into this progress?

12 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

What is interesting, is that Descartes emerged, in 1637 when he published La Discourse anonomously in French, saying it was written "in the language of my country... in the hope that those who avail themselves of their natural reason alone, may be better judges of my opinions than those who give heed only to the writings of the ancients." "Je pense, donc je suis," which literally translates to English as "I think, therefore I am," was the orginal form of the phrase in this book, as near as I can tell, and the Latin came seven years later, in 1644. We can blame Étienne de Courcelles, the translator, for the ambiguity of "cogito, ergo sum." In light of this, an exerpt from a letter Descartes wrote to Pollot in 1638 adds "3. When someone says 'I am breathing, therefore I am' if he wants to prove he exists from the fact that there cannot be breathing without existence, he proves nothing, because he would have to prove first that it it true that he is breathing, which is impossible unless he has also proved that he exists. But if he wants to prove his existence from the feeling or opinion that he has that he is breathing, so that he judges that even if the opinion was untrue he could not have it if he did not exist, then his proof is sound. For in such a case the thought of breathing is present to our mind before the thought of our existing, and we cannot doubt that we have it while we have it. To say 'I am breathing, therefore I am,' in this sense, is simply to say 'I am thinking, therefore I am.' "

13 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

According to Kant, though, it is not really a clear precession, you must understand, but it is the case that perception and thought are independent, in a sense. They are interdependent, or intertwined, more accurately. The faculty of intuition and the faculty of understanding need each other to complete their synthesis, and in this they utilize the principles of imagination. If perception is a separate thing from the "I," then how is it that there are two independent faculties which both represent the unique viewpoint of the individual? On the other hand, if perception and the "I" are the same thing, then how is it that there can be the possibility of a priori knowledge? Kant answered this dual problem with his theories, which I need not go into, at this point. It is enough to show the distinction between thought and perception. Does the "cogito" presume the existence of a logical system of inference? If so, what is this system? Is there a way to prove "I think therefore I am"?

I think the proof may not be so obvious. First, consider the famous phrase "I think therefore I am" is not an axiom, but an initial conclusion. The structure of the first and second Meditation basically demonstrates this, by starting with a "what I know comes from the senses or through them," then proceeds to "either this is a dream or is real," which leads to "in either case, I am thinking." "I am thinking" is therefore a conclusion, and not a freestanding edifice. It remains for us to look at his other writings, the Discourse, and his letters, to see other

14 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

details of this "Archimedean [pivot] point." What about Descartes sense of perception, then?

Descartes said that what makes the wax that which we call wax only exists in me, since he could melt it and it would change shape, and composition, but we would still consider it wax. There is certainly a matrix out there; really there is only one matrix and our subjectivity is a "fold" of it; but that matrix doesn't have an appearance at all; it is only "read" by the browser of the mind, as it were. Rousseau, Kant, Ficte Kant's notion of Duty seems to presuppose an external coercion, but because they are based upon the superior vs. inferior relationships of such coercion, we are left with something like Hegel's master-slave dialectic, or Marx's communal view. Does Rousseau's idea of a social contract solve this problem?

Well, you've brought together in this question several things, but there is something fishy about comparing Kant to Rousseau unfavourably, when he owed a great debt to him by his own admission; and then on the other hand, holding Kant to a different and later approach. Of course, Rousseau said it earlier, and probably better, by speaking of contracts, yet, Kant's view must be seen in that shadow. In short, to get Kant's views straight, one must view them in light of what came before; by what he was privy to, not by what comes after him; by the muddling thought of our century's analytics.

15 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

Otherwise, I like Rousseau's predated views of Master/Slave and Marx. I have long thought that the revolutionary thought which runs through Hegel, Marx and Nietzsche, really came from Rousseau, and to some extent Locke, while the contract theory clearly began with Hobbes. Kant's idea of enlightenment, and the escape from it, must certainly be seen by the wit of Rousseau and others, in this respect. It goes to show a point I usually try to make; the thought of the Eighteenth century is far more generative and rewarding than most people realize. All those who came after owe a huge debt to these thinkers; their attempts to distance themselves from, say, Berkeley and Kant, have been largely pathetic, as they have found themselves assuming wrong things about them and also winding up adopting their positions unknowingly. What effects did Kant have on those after him, such as Ficte?

While it is said that Fichte borrowed heavily from Kant, but modified some key issues, for me it is really Berkeley which he owes more debt. He did deny the 'ding an sich', but not the noumenal world; for he wanted to establish an absoluted ego, the world as a subject, which is a noumenon. All of this is curiously close to what I think Berkeley meant by "One mind." Anyway, to answer the question, Kant wanted to place limits on the subject, in regard to what it could possibly

16 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

experience, but not on what it could affirm, while Fichte wanted to universalize the subject to encompass all experience. The impact, then, on later philosophy was to remarry metaphysics back to a religiosity, and fuel the pernicious assumption, which we still cannot shake in some ways, that the subject has no limits. Kant's idea was to humble the subjective claims to truth, while allowing the free range of emotion and volition; Fichte helped to obsure this by appealing, as Hegel would, to the subjective truths as absolute, as objective truths. The impact is clear, then, that philosophy went "around" Kant, as the saying goes. We could blame Fichte for the long old misconceptions about Kant, as well as see him is a founder of the progression of German thought towards totalitarianism. It took Freud, Nietzsche, Bergson and others to begin to set things back into Kant's light. Our contemporaries have also done quite well with this, such as Lyotard, Derrida, Foucault, and Deleuze. Hegel What about Hegel's input on this absolute idealism?

For Hegel, Kant's 'ding an sich', or the basis for the division of knowable and unknowable, is incorrect. All of reality is knowable, and interconnected, but must be accessed in stages of the consciousness and spirit, such as perception, science, enlightenment, etc. Using this resulting dialectic, one encounters a thesis within these realms, then an antithesis, and then a synthesis resolves them. This helical passage of the spirit through system

17 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

leads ultimately to the absolute, rational, real idea, which, through the organicity of the whole, is the union of the subjective and objective, and becomes an absolute unity of an absolute spirit. But isn't it true that Hegel never said anything about thesis, antithesis, synthesis, and that is was a popularization by one of his students?

Well, how did his students arrive at those three words? In regard to consciousness, they had been an important part of the German philosophical debate at least since Kant's Antinomy of the World. Ficte, Schelling, Feurbach, Shopenhauer, Hegel, Kierkegaard, Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud were all influenced by these three terms. We can also see in the Preface of the "Phenomenology" "36. The immediate existence of Spirit, consciousness, contains the two moments of knowing and the objectivity negative to knowing. Since it is in this element [of consciousness] that Spirit develops itself and explicates its moments, these moments contain that antithesis, and they all appear as shapes of consciousness..." "37. ...What Spirit prepares for itself in it, is the element of [true] knowing. In this element the moments of Spirit now spread themselves out in that form of simplicity which knows its object as its own self. They no longer fall apart into the antithesis of being and knowing, but remain in the simple oneness of knowing; they are the True in the form of the True, and the difference is only the difference of content..."

18 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

...And he writes, in response to Kant's triad; "50. Of course, the triadic form must not be regarded as scientific when it is reduced to a lifeless schema, a mere shadow, and when scientific organization is degraded into a table of terms. Kant rediscovered this triadic form by instinct, but in his work it was still lifeless and uncomprehended; since then it has, however, been raised to its absolute significance, and with it the true form in its true content has been presented, so that the Notion of Science has emerged..." Now, the mere mention of "antithesis" implies a corresponding "thesis," and the reason he didn't come right out and say "synthesis," in 37, is because he profoundly disagreed with Kant's definition and use of the term, and simply refers to a "oneness," and in 50, a "triadic form," which harks to the general history of triads, rather than bow to Kant's work. In fact, it pulls on Ficte's Relational Ontology, more than on Kant's Antinomy. Kant uses "synthesis" in the active sense, as a form of "synthetic," and that what is synthetic is not real, except for the subject, and can never be verified of anything beyond the inner processes of that subject. For Hegel, there is no moment of consciousness which is not real, and not interconnected to the Absolute True. He uses the triadic form in an admixture sense, if you will, and "synthesis" would be the blend of the two antithetical moments of consciousness. In the sections numbered 788808, or "Absolute Knowing," Hegel cleverly avoided the 19 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

term "synthesis," but described the process as a "syllogism," a "transformation," and a "reconciliation," among other terms. He says that the process toward Absolute Knowing is one where the two previous moments of consciousness are "superceded." All of these terms are equivalent to the general use, by some philosophers, excluding Kant, but including Alexander, of "synthesis." Nietzsche What about Nietzsche; that serious, grave, misanthropic thinker?

Well, I wrote this in a message to someone ' This just in In a stunning display before a group of reporters, God has confessed to having been the ultimate cause of the great Nietzsche's untimely death. God told the press, "I simply reached the point where I no longer needed Nietzsche to live." ' But more seriously, I will give you an exerpt from my book on Deleuze and Nietzsche; ' The will to power is a part of Nietzsche's epistemology, which is vastly different from the eighteenth century styles. It is based upon an observance of pure becoming, where "force" and the will to power make up the "eternal return." "The eternal return is then a synthesis of becoming, a synthesis of diversity, a synthesis of temporal dimensions, and of the double affirmation of the

20 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

becoming of the being and of that which is becoming, which makes the eternal return the "will to power." This new, "victorious," concept of force is not completed, though, until it is given an inner will. Nietzsche' s idea of an inner will is the will to power, internal to force yet a complement of it. Force, which has an essential relation of other forces, and which constitutes a quantitative difference from those forces, uses the will to power as a genealogical issuer. "Force is what can, will to power is what wills," which means that the will to power is both a genealogical element of force and also a synthesis of force. So, synthesis is the edifice for the eternal return, which leads to a diversity within the synthesis. The will to power is then an interpretation which gives meaning to something, it is a determination of a force which will provide sense to a thing, and it is an evaluation which provides value for a thing." ' Nietzsche's moral view is also based upon the same Epicureanism that Mill's was based on; but the details are different. For Nietzsche, one must "transvalue" oneself by erupting orgies of feeling, by plunging oneself within the diversity of force inside the eternal return. One must overcome all that has been human, and go beyond man, or ubermensch. In long, Christianity is based upon what is for Nietzsche a "herd morality." Ever watch a school of fish, flock of birds, or a herd of cattle? That is what Nietzsche sees in Christian morality, in all morality. It is master and slave morality, herd morality. Nietzsche's point is not so much a negative one, like most believe, but a positive one; that 21 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

the meaning of your life is to engage yourself with the eternal return, to create your own morality, to transgress the herd, and allow yourself to erupt. You must create yourself anew, a self which is NOT based on what the minister tells you, but what you tell yourself. But isn't the attack of nihilism against truth, against any values?

No, this is to miss completely the fundamental point of Nietzsche's work. It is not that nihilism is against truth and value, but that it is against objective truth and value. Just as Marx was not against private property, but against bourgeois private property. There is a vast difference of philosophical scope which is utilized in these cases. Nietzsche was attacking the dominant German and Christian value system, which was based upon setting up truth and value as holy grails, as ways that the herd morality could achieve class supremacy. Nietzsche was all for the establishment of a subjective and historically based, or therefore relative, truth and value. In his view, science and morality created the disparity of class, and the war against individual transgression. Nietzsche was very interested in a new age, when man would give up these current modes of being, modes based upon racisms, and in this, he promoted a "transvaluation" of current values. It seems that Nietzsche wanted to persue a nihilistic denial of any intrinsic reality. Isn't this the basis philosophy of Will, and essentially irrational, anti-moral, valueless state which Kant would have liked?

22 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

Well, we could make a clearer affinity between Kant and Nietzsche. It is true that Nietzsche wanted to deny the distinction between subject and object, but just like Kant, it was the subject which wins out. True, there really is no object out there for these gentlemen, and no intrinsic reality which we can connect to with our minds. The subjectivity is the only reality which is capable of attributing value, through the functioning of the faculty of reason, for Kant, and through the eternal return to the multiplicity of forces, for Nietzsche. It is only through the affirmation of the differences within these forces, that one can realize their particular Will, and generate values, throught the transvaluation of all known "objective," or religious, values. What about Nietzsche's Super Man and his ideas on God?

The Super Man is that person, in the future, who will be beyond the petty pack-animal type of morality which characterizes all our "all too human" strivings. The Super Man is really an Over Man, or a Beyond Man, someone who will be beyond the racist, morally justified slave systems we have in place now. God is, for Nietzsche, the ideal which justifies the current herd divisions. God is the embodiment of all which we prop up about ourselves, our tribes, in attempts to push other tribes down. Instead of using this marginalizing power, we should return our subjectivity to the given, and affirm our being within the flow of the forces which are all around us. We should live within the moment, rather than beat others down with an idealized exteriority.

23 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

Foucault Foucault is related to this; is his analysis concerned with dandyism or a Platonic, universal soul?

I think in his early work, on the asylum and prison, he makes it clear the soul is merely an effect of the power systems which produce it. The soul is real, but not universal or Platonic, outside of the power systems. However, in his later work, he seemed to have shifted, on that particular point. Maybe he was moving into a view which split the difference between a straight platonism and a straight hegemonic relativism; or a modern redressing of platonism, such as the Kantian transcendental idealism. There is very little, but strong evidence for this possibility in his essay on Kant's enlightenment... Sadly, he died before his work could reflect the full shift in his thought. But with the dandy, or the sculptor, how does Foucault condone narcissim and personal admiration?

Well, he makes it clearer in the full length of "The Care of the Self," and especially in "What is Enlightenment?". It's not too far away from personal admiration, but closer to personal fulfillment. In that work he connects all of this with the ancient practice of keeping a personal notebook, a 'hyponemata,' which is more than a diary and address book; it's like a sketch book of life, with

24 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

notes about how to live a well-balanced existence. The Greeks sought to live a beautiful, individual life; they thought of their life as a work of art, one which had to be sculpted, maintained, and enjoyed. In that sense, he wanted us to recognize this ancient tendency within our modernity, connecting with Baudelaire, Nietzsche and Bataille, who all advocated a similar approach to life; Danydisme, Transvaluation, open sexuality. For Foucault, if we could put all of this together, we would have an "ethos" of modernity based upon a zen-like presence, rather than the kind of modernity described in " '68 thought terms," in his earlier work. In "What is Enlightenment?" he said our modern task was to refuse who we are, refuse the power by interrogating the present, and with that, I find the indication of how his work would have gone, if he had lived. I wrote all about this in my book, "The Ethos of Modernity," but the Miller biography of Foucault offers a really great, very wellrounded picture. Derrida What do you think of Derrida, such as his 'Signature, Event, Context?"

Derrida questions on what basis written communication conveys the presence of the author. If you think about it, I am not present to the reader as they read this work. So, there is an unavoidable absence of me within the context,

25 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

and that absence carves out the very possibility of there being a writing to convey that presence. That is, because I am absent, writing has to convey me, as an entity, or collection of ideas, to the reader, but in doing so, I am still absent. The problem is, that historically, we have always assumed that writing was somehow directly communicative of ideas, and Derrida cites several thinkers in this light. But what writing actually communicates, is not the idea, or not "merely" the idea, but the historical hierarchy of concepts which comes along with the inherent absence within writing. Communication "holds" in view the very absence within which it operates, and this function can be determined in an historical manner; such as racism, anti-feminism, etc. The way we write and talk, is a direct consequence of the moral and political choices we make, as well as the technical and philosphical ones. This historically determined writing, then is created in the "death" of its author, and in the establishment of an authority of certain types of discourse. It is a process which justifies particular types of thinking, and behaving by continuing to work even without the presence of its author(s). The push for literacy, for example, is to exlude and marginalize the lack of it, but it is the "illiterate" parts of us that writing is supposed to convey. It is not that communication doesn't do its job, but that it doesn't do so without carrying along all manner of other types of messages. This extra communication is endlessly 26 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

deferred, so that a complete deciphering of truth is not possible. The only way we can identify some of these processes, is to "deconstruct" the historical and metaphysical opposition on which they are based. Ironically, this will have to be done through writing. "Signed", M.R.M. Parrott Contemporary Thought Scientists seem to agree with one another frequently. Philosophers rarely agree. Why?

Both statements are inaccurate and misleading. In both science and philosophy, there are "schools" of thought, and in both, when there is compelling proof of a particular notion, it is generally accepted, until someone finds a way to refute it. Let us also note that only recently has it been taught that science and philosophy are separate subjects; until now, science was a part of philosophy. The problem with philosophers, is that we all seem to talk about the history of ideas on a relatively level playing field, compared to scientists, who seem to focus only upon the latest discoveries, shunning the history a bit. In philosophy, there is much more of a discussion element, as well, so you might catch us talking about Plato, whose ontological views have all but been rejected. We talk about them because there is value in discussing them, unlike scientists, who are much more peremptory.

27 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

Then it would seem that philosophers should move forward, rather than running in circles.

Even though it surely doesn't seem like it, there has been incredible forward progress in philosophy "proper" in the 'modern' period. We have established many facets of human cognition. Many of the circles which we encounter, are due to philosophers of different schools, who have studied different periods, and who also understand things on different levels, are arguing different points. Scientists seem to have a smaller numbers of schools, and there is less discussion, where philosophers keep all schools seemingly alive, and do so by argumentation with each other. It depends upon the course one is taking, but the philosophy department in a college is supposed to teach students all of these schools of thought, the lines of attack, and the way one thinker builds upon another. Even though there has been progress, every philosopher who is mentioned today has had something to contribute to the debate. Scientists seem to forget how they got where they are, including forgeting that philosophers gave birth to science, and in so doing, don't value each historical scientist's contribution. In science certain facts are accepted as true, but not in philosophy.

28 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

Well, it is true of philosophers, at least the more advanced. Logic is used to reduce statements to their forms, so that agreement can be reached, or so that refutations of falsities can occur. Philosophy is really a collection of many disciplines, since it "gave birth" to them. Psychologists owe their very existence to philosophers like Descartes and Kant, for example. Philosophy is confusing because there is so of it much out there. Science is a part of philosophy, and as such, is only concerned with matters of fact about observations. Other parts of philosophy are more concerned with speculation, such as religion, and still others are concerned with the critique of both science and religion, in the name of epistemology and metaphysics, among other concerns. So, it is no weakness to discuss issues so widely, since it gives rise to divisions which can specialize more acutely on certain elements. We discuss issues to learn more about our world, and the success of science contributes to the success of philosophy. Is there progress in philosophy?

Yes. There has been tremendous progress in logic, epistemology, and ethics, not to mention the creation of new major fields, such as philosophy of language, philosophy of science, etc. I can't detail all of this, of course, but one example is the transition from a complete lack of "self" in the middle ages, to the Cartesian cogito, to the Kantian transcendental subject. Another is the

29 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

realism of universals in the middle ages, to the projection of coordinates in the renaissance, to the constructivism of our century. There are many examples. People forget this, since, as I said, nearly all the philosophers are still discussed, and by people who have widely varying skill levels with respect to those philosophers. As we move into more and more sophisticated theories, the older ones, barring utter falsehood, are not thrown out, as one might do so with scientific theories. Philosophers respect their history. Further, there is a cultural bias which says, in effect, "only science progresses, since it is the only field concerned with the 'truth.'" Most people who think this way are not going to understand that the parent discipline of science, philosophy, is the driving force behind that discovery of 'truth.' It seems philosophy is dominated by those who are concerned with tenure. Why are there no great thinkers in our time?

Most contemporary philosophers are so in name only, as they spend more time with political backstabbing, like other "professionals." I have no interest in really talking about them, and as a result. I'm talking about the real philosophers, the ones of insight. Indeed, there are philosophers of insight who are alive and well, or at least only dead recently. There's Foucault and Deleuze, who died in '84 and '93;

30 of 206

Synthetic

A

Priori

both ground-breaking, influential thinkers. There's of course Derrida, who is still alive, and who has had a profound impact. There's Eco, Hartman, Latour, Kuhn, Lyotard, Habermas, Baudrillard, Davidson, Stich, Rorty, Chomsky, Searle, Barthes, and I think Quine is still alive. There are probably others as well, and don't forget, there are real philosophers with insight who have not reached fame yet. I count myself in this group, of course. These are not academic losers with nothing but papers to grade and useless general statements to utter about the 'philosophers of insight.' The people I've named above, ALL had a great influence on the contemporary debate, they all had insights, and they all have made a name for themselves outside academia proper, either here or abroad. Do professional philosophers stifle progress, classifying those who communicate clearly unworthy of respect?

Talent shines through, no matter what the setting. Perhaps they should be able to declare what areas of philosophy are worth exploring?

I think the answer to that lies directly in the fact that they so often disagree. If things were as simple as a club of professors make it out, there would be no reason to continue searching for solutions which work. Look at the better discussions; they are evidence to the fact that some problems, particularly the ethical ones, are not so easily dissolved. Philosophy is all about discussion and

31

of

206

Synthetic A Priori

arguments. Are philosophers saying anything worth hearing?

I believe we are. I'm doing my bit to submit rational discussions. If one comes away empty handed, it falls upon us all to do a better job of contributing to the field. The fact that we are all here communicating our thoughts must mean something, in the lack of other forums and arenas. So, since we are all trying to communicate and do philosophy, my advice is to get to it.

32 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

EPISTEMOLOGY

Expression You talk about Expression in your work. What do you mean by Expression? Is that from Deleuze?

Yes, my reading of Deleuze is based upon his reading of Spinoza, which is in turn based upon a subjectivist view, one which describes consciousness as the "reading" of substance. There is no object, there is only a subjectivity reading and displaying to itself an object from the substratum of a quantum "reality." Very loosely, if we believe in relations and substance, and by separated identities, we could mean a subjective reading of substance into an object, then expression is the fruit of the tree. The trouble is, however, that we may have a tendency to take this, and reverse it, in order to show that this reading goes on outside subjectivity, or that objectivity reads these things in a like manner to what I'm describing. Is that because subjectivity, in the "act" of seperating itself from the rest of reality, confirms that there is an

33 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

objecivity? Is this affirmation from the interaction between subjectivity and objectivity?

This affirmation is an affirmation of an outer reality, it is only an affirmation of what subjectivity takes to be that outer reality. It is an interaction between what subjectivity takes as itself, and what it takes as objectivity. Does that mean that when you die, I will disappear when you do?

You will most certainly disappear when I do, because you only exist as an appearance for me. You see, you will not disappear, but what you are within my subjectivity will. Otherwise, who's objectivity do you want me to affirm, besides my own? What IS this objectivity; is it everything which is not myself? That's is not objectivity, it's force and substance. Where is this objective viewpoint everyone appeals to? How can you see with any other eye's than your own? Have you have already made your mind up that objectivity is all fake?

It is not that there are no objects beyond me, but that I can never know them in themselves; I will always be representing them to myself, which is itself a representation. If there is an objectivity, and it is connected to me, then my freedom can only be an illusion, because the order of the universe would extend to my every whim. How can we even talk then?

34 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

We are talking through a series of learned meanings which are housed completely within us. Since you deny objectivity, can we call that relation between us real?

A relation is not real, but rather "virtual." For example, have you ever seen a word? Ever seen a number? But you are not reality, right, aren't you only part of it?

This sounds like objectivistism, or collectivistism more generally. "I" am the only reality I will ever know, and the same goes for you. I dare you to prove to me or anyone that you can know something other than yourself; that you can do anything else besides represent quantum forces to yourself as objects; that you could show what God is thinking (which if you can connect to objectivity, then you can connect to God, and you would have access to his thoughts); where is this objectivity? How do you know about it? At what precious point have we connected with anything besides our own subjective desires? Does this plunge us into absolute subjectivity?

It is not that subjectivity is absolute apart from me, since my reality cannot reign over everyone else's, but that for me, my subjectivity is absolute, but only to me. Yours is absolute for you. This view is not a lonely, solipsistic one; it is an affirmative one which recognizes that the beauty of the world is my beauty. A sunset is lovely only because of the point of view I have; three thousand miles 35 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

away from me, toward the setting sun, it hasn't even happened yet. An acceptance of this definition of subjectivity leads not to despair, but to a joy, because it is on the same level that I can understand that you have the same beauty, and that you have the same incredible moments as I. What makes us human is our capacity to represent, and to feel, and when we sympathize with this in others, we have let ourselves become comfortable with the kaliedescope of our perception, rather than continually hoping to describe that, which by the admission of most, can't be described. Subjectivity can not be the same as the whole of reality, though, right?

I did not say that my subjectivity is the same as the whole of reality, nor did I say that all subjectivity is the whole of reality. I did not say that it wasn't either. In short, because we are subjective, we cannot know anything but that subjectivity. There may be a great and wonderous realm of objectivity out there, but we can NEVER know about it! All our attempts to describe it only betray our subjective base. This means; 1) I can only represent my own processes. The effect is the soul. Any representation of an outer reality is based upon the desires of such a soul, 2) My subjectivity is the only reality I will ever know. As such, there is a barrier to my knowledge. What lies beyond that barrier, beyond my possbile experience, is just what I cannot represent, call it whatever you wish.

36 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

But is this kind of subjectivism a decadent cultural phenomena?

This sounds like Ayn Rand, or at least someone from her fan club. The very fact that you have a viewpoint at all means that you had better learn to defend subjective freedom as staunchly as I do, for the popular alternative is an intellectual totalitarianism. Every subject in the universe could agree that, yes, the moon is made of green cheese. It by no means follows that an objectivity has been established. It means that there has been subjective concurrence on an erroneous, but shared, explanation of observed phenomena. Does it make sense for one to elimenate subjective freedom, then preach to a crowd that you, and you alone, have figured it all out? Does it make sense to affirm an objectivity, and assert that a subject merely downloads this objectivity, when wecan't even give a shred of perception of it? Does it make sense to declare to a group of philosophers, that we have been doing it all wrong, and that our view contributes to a decline of culture, when the alternative is an Orwellian nightmare which strikes dead the very beauty of individuality? I think no. It makes no sense to say these things, and I hope I have not mischaracterized the view, but if I have, it only proves that a plan to demonstrate objectivity is only a dream. Could we say this has nothing to do with freedom? Is it merely slavery?

37 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

What is slavery, is being bound by notions of objectivity. This is because, if there is an objective truth, an objective reality, then, based upon how that is commonly defined, no subjective creature could be free from its throwes. No artist would have any colors, not poet any words, because things would have all been decided, and set into motion by the eternal creator. This objectivity is then a prison, but one which claims to be freedom; it is a religion, and can never have any value except as a power matrix. To make one's own choices in life depends upon the very freedom which is destroyed by the assumption of objective truth and the worship of gods. It seems there is a struggle going on with what is seen as the boundaries of human capabilities, then. Such struggles can go one way or another, but it sounds like you're motivated to end the struggle.

Yes, the only struggle is that which comes about from attempting to get ourselves to understand our own constant assumptions of dualistic realities. It is a struggle to be caught within our notion of objectivity; it is a struggle to be continually placed into a relation with something which cannot be shown, and which effects a judgements; but it is no struggle to be subjective; it is no struggle to reel from the representation of forces, to delight and wonder at the marvels which arise from the kaliedescope of perception. The beauty of the world is my beauty, and as such can never be touched by dreams of political power.

38 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

Our thought , when politically motivated, leads directly into the very panoptic regime which subjectivity must avoid; but it does not avoid it by blinding its eyes. It is avoided by tapping into the very root of its illusion, by seeing the ideas which can never have objects under them; by demonstrating that an assumtion of objective truth, is the death-nell of freedom; objectivity is, therefore, the only real basis of slavery. Perception Given your views on Subjectivity, how can we understand perception?

Our normal philosophical position is to first place the subject inside a box, if you will, of perception, then to say that since, for all intents and purposes, it seems we are separate from "reality," then it's okay to say we ARE; but the question of the reality of an identity here is meaningless, since we've placed ourselves in a box of perception in the first place. In much of our contemporary philosophical tradition, dominated by groups such as the Logical Positivists, philosophers thought there was a reality outside of human perception and language; not a transcendental reality, but some kind of objectivity; it was their task to "logicize" language to uncover both the truth and falsity which is buried by our perception. Of course, the programme didn't work anyway, since it turned out that Hume and Kant were on to something...this fueled a "back to Kant" movement in the fifties, sixties, etc. Even Wittgenstien

39 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

jumped ship, and talked about language games, a move which lead up to Derrida, but as you can see, I have a tendency to historicize these things. But, even with all of changes in tradition, isn't it true that we perceive some "thing"?

Exactly, isn't that the most obvious truth?; but how do we know there is any meaningfulness outside of perception? Even Popper couldn't quite get around this one with his verification principle. If we are giving up on the ontological claim of reality, or "isness," by reverting to a meaning which only exists within a lingual argument, then where is the object, which that language calls for? It seems that the claim that there is no meaning outside perception is also meaningless, due to its own assumption. The logical formalization of language was one of their purposes, but wasn't it also, for them, truth and falsehood as defined by perception?

Does this mean that there is no truth outside of what perception makes, or does it mean that there is a connection between the fact outside us and our perception of it? This is why I brought up Hume and Kant; is our view going to be an empiricism, or a sollipsism? Both of these thinkers were the former. There was a prominent move away from Kant, beginning in his own day. Hegel and Marx, as well as Nietzsche took the spotlight, until more recently. I am speaking more about the European tradition here, rather than the Anglo-Analytic tradition. For the English and American thinkers of the analytic bent, there was no shift, since they tend to brush aside the 40 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

history of ideas anyway. Current science becomes the lens for them. For example, they speak of Einstein as if the relativity theory came out of nowhere; they are too quick to ignore the fact that Descartes, Berkeley, Newton, Liebniz, Kant and Shelling all spoke of relativity, and this is how the idea developed. Anyway I don't mean to lecture about history. The relativity of space has been around, but Einstein's contribution was to postulate time is also relative to a frame of reference, which was a totally new step, right?

Kant actually said it before Einstein. So, are you defending the idea that some truth about the world can be known without referencing perceptual data?

No, but I am questioning how we could be so sure about this. If, by our own lights, we can show we cannot appeal to an outer truth, then how can we appeal to its absence? Kant had already said this. It is what I meant by the claim of meaninglessness is itself meaningless. Since there is no meaning outside of perception or language, there likewise, to sound silly, is no meaninglessness either. Meaninglessness is only an idea for us. This leads us straight back into the sollipsism we would want to avoid. You must forgive me, because I am writing a book on Kant, so it can be no secret that I am highly influenced by him. Then, does a word describe a set of perceived properties, a certain shape or physiology perhaps, so that the object is that which possesses the properties we describe, and

41 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

that which can only be known through those properties?

How can we even talk about an object having qualities in and of itself? That already presupposes the very distinction which is specious, that there is a duality of substances, or two states, subjective and objective. By saying that something has no meaning outside me, I am saying that I can't know what its true attributes are, because I am saying that what ever meaning it might have, it is at least meaningless to me. But this does not mean that I can say IT is meaningless, since I just said that it could have no meaning for me, and meaningless is itself an assignment of meaning. I can only say that my representation is not able to attribute meaning, or nonmeaning to the said class, or object, or whatever. The reason that this leads us back to sollipsism is because I have just declared that I can attribute neither meaning or non-meaning to anything outside me. So, my subjective meaning is the only meaning for me. If a man has no sense of smell, does the rose lose its sweetness?

But this is still assuming the rose first of all is an "it," and second, that it has qualities in itself, which we either perceive or not. The rose never has smell "in" it, which we take up, but rather, the smell we experience is a projection of the quality into the rose. I know that sounds like mush, but that's because it's hard to describe within the language.

42 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

But this is a severe limitation of subjectivism; the position that"I cannot empirically know that which is outside of my field of perception." Is that a resignation?

It is no resignation, but a vast opening for the poetry of the moment. Besides, can we truly point to something which is outside our perception of it? Isn't this, by definition, presumption?

Not sure, but instead of trying to disprove that there is only one realm, try to prove that there are two, and let me know how you fair. My point is that any attempt on our part to prove the "existence" of another realm is itself a subjective projection. This sounds separate and dismal.

It is not dismal, the very act of creativity depends upon our subjectivities to be separate in this way; for if we were "connected" to an "outer" realm, there would be no freedom of thought; every law of nature would extend into your most subconcious dreams, and we would be left as automatons. So, matter is only interpretation?

Philosophy, science, and art can only be interpretations. We might agree vastly on certain interpretations, but that by no means proves that there was anything else going on. We can all agree that the sky is blue, but that does not prove that it is blue in itself.

43 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

Perhaps it is not the destination, but the journey which matters?

Yes. I cannot empirically know that which is outside of my field of perception, but that means I can neither prove it exists or not. I can readily stumble on a rock which I can neither prove nor disprove the existence of. It is therefore a necessity that I construct these appearances by which to operate, to live, dream and feel. It doesn't matter, then, whether there is an outer world just as I represent it or not, but only that I express myself in those ways. Quantum theory tells me that there is no "object" which corresponds to my representation of a rose, but that doesn't mean that it can't exist, just that it may not exist as I want it to exist; that its very nature may be quite beyond the way my understanding constructs the very notion of nature, and that my representation is poetry itself, but subjectivity is not a prison. No one pretends that there never existed the rose we speak of. It is only that everything we think we know about it, is itself a representation. Just like the tree falling, when we "hear" "it" fall, we attribute the sound to the thing in question, when the sound was only a representation of the impact of forces upon each other, which was transmitted across other forces in a patterned way, to our ears. This roughly corresponds with contemporary "systems theory" and seems to bridge the gap between hardcore Quantum theory and traditional subject object distinctions. I use it only as a similar bridge, to show

44 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

theorizing on two levels. If subjectivity is the only reality, then how can we all except the laws of nature in the same way?

Because we all have the same perceptory functions, in theory, and so represent nature in similar ways because we all "experience" it in similar ways. We accept these laws of nature, but we cannot let them extend into our innermost consciousness, for we would never have the least bit of freedom. So, does stumbling on a rock prove its existence within your reality?

Yes, the rock exists for me, and I can kick "it" over and over, assuring myself that it exists outside of me. However, we know from Quantum theory that there is nothing there; that is, nothing as we take it to be; there are only electro-magnetic forces which are stronger as bonds than the bonds which make up the nothing of my foot. Why do you say it exists, if there is no outer world?

Because of the pragmatic "fact" of the rock which ruined my toes. I must then use these mentations to build a world-view which corresponds with my experience of the rock, as well as other things. But there is still that initial object which was the cause before the event of your perception?

Yes, agreed, some set of forces is there; I cannot resist

45 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

them; but even this is a representation! It would be better for my theory to state that there is only one substance, only one set of forces, and that it is perception itself which separates it, divides it, individuates it, and categorizes it into objects. I realize that even this is a world-view, a theory, but it corresponds to my experience; and experience is not wholly passive... I can't help but think of Star Trek for a moment. Imagine Odo in his primitive state(DS9), then imagine him slowly coming into his human shape. He is reading his substance into an object of a particular set of qualities. He is expressing his substance with certain attributes, to use Spinoza. Since anything can be perceived, and that perception has the same effect on many people, or various realities, seems to indicate more then just similar perceptory functions; would it not also imply similar stimuli?

Very good. A fabric does indeed reflect light the same way "toward" each of us, but not "for" each of us, given the same light source. Consider the color-blind; does not such a perceptory function express different attributes of the same substance? The color of the fabric was not to be found in the fabric itself, but was an individual perception of the same stimulus. But the unspoken question here is, if we cannot perceive objective reality, what is this "something" we are perceiving? Are we creating our perception ex nihilo, or from a group consensus, or from some kind of genetic impression?

46 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

There is no objective reality, not in that way. What we are percieving is the stimulus, you are right, but that stimulus is usually a pattern of disturbance in the array of forces. I know that sounds like Obiwan Kenobi talking, but we then take our representation, this perception, and use it to build a structure of the outer world AS an outer world. So, we don't create these things ex nihilo, because there really is a stimulus; we don't create them by consensus, because we can only do this individually, and later concur with someone through language; a genetic impression would be the closest alternative, but it is very general. Do you believe dreams are real, substantial, or materially effectual?

They are ideas, and as such are as real as your perception of your own hand. Actually, that is a good subject, because that is a good way to describe this perception; we are always dreaming, it is just that sometimes there is a possible object underlying the dream image. Even in the most sober moment, when looking at a brick, for example, we are dreaming, in a sense; there are stimuli, but we can only represent that brick by means of our own internal imagery; we dream the brick. So, you don't pretend there is no outer world with laws of nature, just that there is no way the reach it...unless you stub your toe?

Very funny, but this brings up a distinction; as our body is a part of the world, it is bound up with the laws of nature, but as our mind has the ability to generate representations which, either have no object, or have no 47 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

grounding, we are completely free. Now this is no sophmoric dualism, but a trite description of the Liebnizian "folding of matter." Yes, but to you, I am only an appearance. I accept this as a recognition of objective existence.

It is not that there can be no objective existence, but it is our knowledge of objective existence which is in serious question. That there are bodies beyond us, no one could doubt; but that we can be connected to them is the opinion of fools. It seems there are two ways to define objective truth, then. One, is "that which is true of everything," and the other is "that which is outside me." However, one collapses into the other if applied correctly. That which is true of everything is true regardless of who sees it and therefore it is true independently of the perceiver.

Very good. I never wanted to claim that there weren't things independent of me, but they don't appear as they do within me. Further, there are 6 billion subjectivities out there representing these things. Of course the ground exists which is below my feet, but it certainly isn't, in itself, the same as my representation of it. That's all I'm on about. There is no truth about the ground, other than the quanta, or qualia, as we may say. Statements about those qualia exist and are true only within the subjectivities which generate them as statements. Yes, but that "out there-ness" has to stop it all from being completely subjective, right?

48 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

Stops what from being purely subjective?; the experience or the quantum forces? Of course the forces are not subjective. The forces of magnetism, for example, are not a subjective dream in my view, nor are they objective either, since we cannot be talking about a separate "realm." They just are, to be silly. Our experience of those forces, as represented by our sensation, and cognition, is purely subjective, which again, is not a realm, but a fold. Representation is nothing but the effect of the folding of forces upon themselves, and the selfreflexive moment.

49 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

METAPHYSICS

Ontology What is Metaphysics?

It is concerned with defining being qua being, and in this active definition, it occurs that some thinkers define it as material and immaterial. This does not imply that there really is such a being, nor that it has such a dual nature. Being/non-being is another one of those pairs of opposing terms which come up within reason, and which reason assumes to be evident in the things themselves. However, reason is never in a position to verify these claims, for if it were, I don't find that we would be discussing it after so many centuries of thought. Metaphysics is, then, an interpretation, which it so desperately wants to avoid, since it purports to be the ontology of the real and true; but metaphysics, as an interpretation, is necessary to us, allowing us to define our world as we experience it. Curiously, this is Kant's point; we must allow that metaphysics can make use of

50 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

synthetic a priori knowledge, in order for it to proceed along the secure path of a science. Science, using synthetic a priori judgements, was only on that basis offering any degree of certainty. Because we cannot affirm being as an actually present entity out there, it therefore shames the pretensions of metaphysics, but if we assume that this assertion applies only to our representations, and experience, of what may be out there, then we have the secure path we needed. Are you rejecting objective truth or that there can be an objective truth?

Where is the colour? Where is a word? Where is love? Where is identity? It seems that there are two ways to say "objective truth." One, is that which is true of everything, the other is that which is outside me, as a subjectivity. To claim that there is no truth outside subjectivity, and to add that there is nothing whatsoever, beyond quanta, outside subjectivity, in no way implies that there is nothing which is true of everything. The truth of the colour of my shirt is wholly within me, and there is not a scrap of truth to be found elsewhere, for there is no colour outside my perception and use of it. Sure there is a quantum system of forces "out there," but where is truth in that? The correspondant dream of concurrence with the object is never to be realized, because there is no object to be found in experience. "Man is a dream of shadows," and his world cannot be

51 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

affirmed as experienced; it is only an expression of the substance. This substance, a simple thought, would be "One." In thinking of the universe as one substance, nothing is separated or related, but all is rolled into a single ball of being. So, not only are the consequences falsified, but the bases are given scrutiny as such. They become themselves subsets, though large ones of thinking, rather than that which thinking is based upon. The closest thing to a compound of human thinking would have to be perception itself. By percieving, though I am both relating/separating, and, not relating/separating. The "not" is primary, though, because the sense data is just that; data. It comes later under the eye of discrimination. But does this separate the subject from reality?

It seems to me the "I" which thinks, the cogito, finds itself with a problem; that there is no way to prove an "outer" reality. If we talk about phenomena, as the experience of subjectivity, then we are talking about what is for the subject a set of facts. However, these facts cannot be proven of any "reality" which is taken to exist separately. Now, getting back to the "One," if we remember our Parmenides and Plotinus, there can't be a "non"-being. What is not, can't be, and what can't be, is not. So by thinking of the One as a unity of substance, on the cosmic scale, rather than on the subjective, one cannot be conducting an act of separating, because there is nothing

52 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

BUT being, there is nothing else to compare with it. All human thinking is therefore merely the perception of this unity of substance, and at that level, it doesn't have to involve discrimination of sense data. It can involve discrimination of an "inner sense," to borrow from Kant. Once again, the only way to think is to perceive; all those neurotransmitters are transmitting our perceptions about things. Of course there are functions of the brain which involve more mundane processes, but this is not thought. Thought can even be an inner reflection upon the processes of our indentity, but even this is always a perception. In thought, the mind creates an inner mirror of what it takes to be itself, just like the Liebnizian Monad. Thousands of tiny mirrors. So, there is no way we can show there is even a "reality" present outside of perception, that is outside of a uniquely human perception. It does not matter whether there is or is not an objective reality, if there is a God. Even if there were, we could never know about it, for we are subjects, based purely upon our own perceptions. So, you find a barrier between experience and reality?

In a matter of speaking. Let us presume, since I mentioned God, that it is possible I could experience God. The trouble is, not that I haven't yet experienceed him, but that I could never have an object in my experience with which to represent him. This is because we attribute God with the characteristic of totality; I can't have a relation present in perception with respect to a

53 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

totality in the way which is required for me to understand God. Then this does set subjectivity apart from reality.

No. I have just defined what reality can ever mean for me. Besides, where is reality? Is the subject absolute?

In my view, the subject is not abolute, but "absoluting," if I can make up a verb. The subject makes itself an absolute presence to itself, and as such, defines its own identity and subjectivity. What does this have to do with non-being, then?

Regarding my statements on non-being, I am really serious that non being doesn't exist. That means in order for something to not exist, it would have to exist, and in order for it to exist, it would have to not exist. The reference to Parmenides only shows how old this problem is; as he said, what is not, cannot be. It was the "way of opinion." The reason it is important is because it has to do with the possibility of phenomena; Parmenides' point was that the "way of truth" led us to the idea that we can only express what "is." Following the way of opinion keeps us from getting that right. So, we go about assuming that because we can think something, it must exist outside ourselves as well, like Santa, and God. The weird thing is we refer to the very

54 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

problem of consciousness. Just because I can think nonbeing, it by no means follows that it even exists within me, for we have taken "existing" to refer to physical space; and my point was that there cannot be an object existing which doesn't exist. If we shift ground and apply "existing" to even the trace of an idea, then we have gained nothing, for we still cannot that this non-being has another existence outside of our thoughts. What is common to all non-being is that none of it exists, by definition. Does this lead to metaphysical confusion?

For my part, it seems that it is a questioning of the One. There are at least two meanings of "One" the number and unity. By thinking unity I am never thinking less than one, or more than one. I am thinking that which includes all that exists; and that which cannot not exist, can't exist for me to include it, so it can't be included in my unity of the One. This is about the unity of all which exists. If we can't get that straight ontologically, how can we be right about all which follows from it? How does this apply to our notions of reality?

Well, if we allow that it's okay to say we don't need to prove the outer reality of non-being, then we likewise do not need to prove the outer reality of being. So we can't explain what thinking and outer reality have in common, or how one is transmitted to the other. The discussion of "where" non-being is becomes more relevant than ever in this light. If uur thinking is related to the reality of the

55 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

universe, then we have to deal with that part of thinking which comes up with such ideas as non-being. How willing we are to dismiss non-being as a concept which we could not know as outside ourselves; we must see how this dismissal must also apply to being. There is, then, a questionable connection between "reality" and thought. Perception will be the key to any such an intent we have. Perception will also be the downfall, since perception is the real basis for all thought, and there is never a moment where we can say that we are not percieving, so like Kant said, "we always run into the dear self, which is always turning up..." Spellbinding, but does that mean that a speeding train hitting you is not connected to your experience?

The very impact of a speeding train on my body is no proof that my experience of that collection of phenomena was directly connected to it. My experience of a phenomena is a doubling of my subjectivity against the supposed object of experience; but showing how this double is constructed, and how perception could be a straight path from incidence to impression, is still no proof of the outer reality of anything, for I still am representing. This was Locke's oversight, which Berkeley cleared up. All of this is not to give a "low" status to thinking; not in the least. It is to show that there is nothing for us BUT thinking/percieving, and that we have to realize that through our perception we affirm the world, as it were,

56 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

we express the substance, we unfold matter, as I learned from Deleuze about Spinoza and Liebniz. There is no negative circle at work here, it is an affirmative, positive expression by which we invent ourselves, by which we construct the world, by which we "aetheticize" our condition. Some of the details of how this theory works are all in my book, "The Empiricism of Subjectivity." This is what philosophy is about, right, the study of thought processes, even though intuitive and beyond the empirical?

Yes, but even in its role as philosophy, this inquiry cannot be mistaken for truth with a capital "T". This study must be a subjective cataloguing of that which is produced by subjectivity. It is an examination and critique of the icon itself, because the icon represents a quest which has no object in thought. It seems there is a real lack of a vocabulary for this. It is the thinking of something we cannot think, or something we can't establish through language.

I like the way that sounds, but I don't know if there is a difference, as Wittgenstein suggested, between "cannot think," and "cannot say." Now, I am taking "say" in the largest sense, which means that I am including any type of language, not just linguistic utterances. It would be equivalent to propose that the ideal represents an image for which the artist has no model. Is it possible to discuss anything objectively without recognizing an objective standard of it? If there is no

57 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

objective standard, is any knowledge of it subjective?

Is it first possible to discuss anything objectively? Isn't it more like, talk is the construct of things as objective, and as such, thereby creates an "objective standard"? In other words, I first do not assume a dualism of subject/object, but then much of the force of subjectivity allows me to construct this dualism, which is so pernicious, that it tricks me, constantly, into beleiving, that there really IS another realm besides subjectivity? I do not mean that there is no matter, or force, but that there is not another realm. There is only one realm, and that is matter itself, or existence, as some would say it. Liebniz taught us that this matter sometimes "folds in on itself" and this creates subjectivity; the process of reflexive knowledge construction. It is a short step to realize that this fold of matter can project the outer of its inner. So in all this we describe the human condition. We spend our time describing to others our processes which we have only partly uncovered ourselves. We only halfway know ourselves and find it necessary to communicate the whole to others, as if it could be taken as a whole. Now these processses are all there are to describe, for there are no facts to speak of; no facts, I mean to say, in the way we want there to be. We want to describe to each other the objectivity of facthood, and wind up describing the half-truth of subjectivity. Again, this is not a negative condition, but an artistic one, if I can say that, and is based upon, as I have said elsewhere, a kaliedescope of perception. 58 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

Is this a postmodern denial of absolute truth, which becomes subjectivism?

My position is very close to this, but I have to add that it really is impossible for there to be an objectivity apart from subjectivity; this is because, if we suppose that "objectivity" is a viewpoint, then it is another subjectivity. If we suppose that it is the lack of a viewpoint, then "it" is nothing at all. Further, even if there is some kind of objective realm apart from subjectivity, one cannot know about it in itself, because a subject always subjectifies. How can you know there is only one realm?

For the reasons above, and that I can't know in the a priori sense, but in the synthetic a priori sense. To question the knowledge of a singular realm is to assume the same pernicious dualism from before(not to be combative). So, if I accept that a subject is that which has reflexive knowledge, and that an objective viewpoint would have to do the same, or that no objectivity could possibly do the same, and take that with the idea of a synthetic basis for physical law, I have certain synthetic knowledge that there can be only one realm; which admittedly is only my realm, and therefore is no realm, for there are 6 billion subjective realms. What I am left with is a more complete and even more pure empiricism. But since this is all subjective, how can we trust it?

59 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

Only by relegating it to the proper shere of "interpretation," which is all we have been doing. Keep in mind that there is no way that reason can itself settle these big question in the sense of absolute rock solid knowledge; but it can in both the regulative and practical senses. In other words, I often hear the charge that it is a requirement of philosophy that its theories produce a model of reason which has connection to reality qua reality and a method of generating knowledge of that reality. This is the holy grail of science and philosophy which no amount of discussion can dissuade. In order for a subjectivity to connect with the whole of reality and produce knowledge of it, in the scientific sense, that subjectivity would have to stop being a subjectivity; and this being done, there would be nothing at all, but force and substance. This is because the very act of matter folding upon itself carries along with it the assumption of an inner and an outer. It is this which allows for almost all of the difficulties of thought. The adoption of the method of interpretation which I am detailing offers the resolution of such difficulties because it abandons the basis for that assumption of duality. What about the relationship of matter to energy? When we speak in these ways, what has happened to time and change?

The relationships of energies and forces give rise to the occasions which allow subjectivity to represent those energies and forces. We represent them as matter changing within a dimension of time and a field of space.

60 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

This doesn't show that matter, time or space actually exist in a verifiable and unique way, but that we experience these relationships in such and such ways. Do you find that energy is a force?

Yes, this notion of force is an electro-magnetic, or Quantum, energy. The force of the universe is really the collection of all forces; not a being, and not a separate force. It is the famous "cement" of the universe, if you will, which binds all particles. The modes of our perception "read" these forces and particles to create the basis for our inner reality. The force of the universe, therefore cannot be a creationary force, or a personal God; it would have to be a subjectivity for that, and it would have to be a part of our reality. This view does not lead to a despair over moral issues, nor does it lead to an arrogance about human consciousness. It leads to the notion that we are small and insignifigant in this universe, BUT we are precious and spectacular in the very nature of our inner reality. But there certainly is some kind of "stuff" out there, right?

Yeah, I can agree. On my view, that 'stuff' is the quantum electro-dynamic field I have mentioned. I have not been such an idiot to suggest the solipsistic view "nothing exists outside our subjectivity." I have only tried to show that the things of our experience do not exist outside our subjectivity, or at least, they cannot be verified to be outside it.

61 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

This is a hard topic on which to get to brass tacks. It was made so by Shaftsbury's complete muddling of Berkeley's theory of perception, and so we've had this spector of solipsism to contend with ever since. It is an erroneous position, though, and one which I can find held by no single philosopher. Which brings us back to the existence of the "I". Is it something which governs all thoughts. This form of the "I", which goes back at least to Descartes, is not something which eighteenth and nineteenth century philosophers said existed in a separate way from the individuality of thoughts, nor as some kind of totality in a vague transcendental realm. What Descartes, Hume, and Kant were on to was the development of a language which could describe this "I" as something which is virtual, something which exists only within the very thoughts which it seems to represent, by being a thought like the others. Descartes called it the cogito, Hume called it a "subjective effect", and Kant called it synthetic unity. All would agree it is not something which truly "exists" such as an apple exists, but something which exists as a mechanism within subjectivity. Incidentally, the reason this is so easily demonstrated by "I think, therefore I am", is because the very definition of "I" is something which thinks, something which, when thinking, cannot be doubted to be, but nevertheless cannot be shown to us as an object....however, there must 62 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

be something which exists, in that virtual sense above, which allows the the very thought of "I". Does Descartes take subjectivity as a bounded entity that has a "within" in opposition to a "without?"

That sounds like a bit of Foucault , but I wonder if we give little bit of leeway to Descartes, certainly in regard to his language, we could see Berkeley, Spinoza, Leibniz, Hume, Kant, and others, to clean up this original opening wihtin the philosophsical language, and introduce the transcendental meanings we now would take as granted. Foucault's "interior of the exterior" type of interpretation is a rich addition to this tradition of interpretation. But doesn't physicality have an absolute existence? Is the ego supreme within human behaviour, creating the illusion of its own absolute existence?

If you can prove that the absolute existence of an ego can be doubted, then the idea of physical existence as absolute must as well be doubted. Doesn't the mind have a basis in physical existence, as a human brain, which can create illusions?

Using the same logic above, if you have denied the absolute existence of an individual ego, by that same token, the mind must not have physical existence either. The brain, though does exist as an object of our possible intuition, at least someone else's brain, to which we attribute physical existence.

63 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

If we wish to establish the premise of subjective illusions, we are in no way protected from the corollary and direct result, that the idea of physical existence is just as illusory and untenable, since it is subjective stuctures which house the very idea of it. This does not mean that a universe in some capacity does not allow for our representations of it, but for it to exist the way we represent it, it is necessary to deny the very possibility of such illusions. Some philosophers tell us that physical existence does exist.

But is there some method by which we could demonstrate and verify the existence of existence itself, as an object? We are not in a position, nor will we ever be, to show the least particle of such existence. We would have to suppose that, since we experience trees as objects, there is an existence which floats around out there which houses these trees. The only possibility of such an existence do this, is within the depths of the very subjectivity we would have to claim is illusory to complete the reasoning. Could we say "I am, therefore I think?"

To do so, it would have to be admitted that thought is a logical consequence of existence. This cannot be so in every case. Also, if this reversal is to hold, we must also attribute thoughts to the physical existence we are supposing. So, we must therefore believe in the subjectivity of existence, which leads to an inversion of the claim we wished to lodge.

64 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

So, we all make certain assumptions through which we can commmunicate.

Right. It is those assumptions which I we can refute through Parmenides' "way of truth," but the very need for them illustrates my point, that "existence" itself can only be a concept applied to experience, never an object which can be verified independently. That "I" is the center of the controversy. By allowing that subjectivity has the power of construction, we have also to allow there is an inherent problem in how that construction could possibly apply to things as they are, or the universe in its own nature. Through that construction, the "I" makes its own way in every respect; it creates the ego, and it also creates the object before itself. There is cerainly a 'substratum' which supports our perception, but there is no way to show that a tree exists as an object separate from the ground, and far less proof of a quantity of "existence" for such a propose object to reside. These are self-imposed limits, but this is the result of selfimposed knowledge. The arguments, then, that there is something which is beyond reason, are not ones I endorse; my position is that reason itself posits that there is something beyond it's powers. What about a computer program which might stimulate our brain in a "tree simulation" manner?

This simulation would be based upon a "reason-like"

65 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

representation of tree-ness, and is therefore still subject to the "bounds of reason" position. It is not that there is an inner nature which is missed by reason, but that there is no inner nature whatsoever. An inner nature cannot exist at all without the projection of its existence by reason as a noumenal ideal. Having attained what it desires, reason then assumes that there is something else which is outside of it, but it is already a representation, and is never derived purely from experience. Reason is a great and beautiful flower, extending its petals toward the light, creating "spaces" between and around them, yet within these petals and spaces, the flower does not realize that there was never anything present in them but what was already contained within the stem. "The Pleats of Matter" Peter Schuttevaar (Netherlands), M.R.M. Parrott (USA) Posted to alt.philosophy on 16 April, 1998 Dear philosophers, This posting is an united effort of M.R.M. Parrott and Peter Schuttevaar. We will describe the folding of matter as it goes about within reality and ask all readers to respond to the best of their abilities. We are picking up on numerous threads which have proliferated within alt.philosophy lately. To start out, let us briefly describe the process by which subjectivity comes into being. Imagine the universe, including subjectivity, not as an objective viewpoint, or a Godlike position, but as a single substance, made up of forces. These forces react to each other in various ways,

66 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

and this corresponds to what we have learned from chemistry and Quantum theory. What happens is that it comes about, through the extension of biology, that this substance, or matter, can sometimes "fold" on itself, produce a self-reflexive position, and generate subjectivity. This subject then has the ability to concieve of itself as an identity, and concieve of itself as related to an "outer" world, an objective viewpoint, which it wholly creates. Through temporality, and the complications of multi-interpretations, it can come about that this subject has many "pleats" within its initial fold of matter. Let us show, how the substance of Universe pleats. Now, even though the subject may not be able to fully comprehend what is outside of itself, it is still able to affirm to itself the existence of an outer reality, and can be called "objectivity" by the subject. The subject is therefore able to "affirm" that there are identities within this objectivity. The subject can do so, without even knowing what the true "nature" of the identities outside of it are, or what there mutual relation is constructed of precisely. This is how the subject is able to look upon "objectivity". Just as it works with "objectivity", the subject is also able to affirm identities within itself, as, for example, its own representation of two people seated near inside a restaurant. It is also able to affirm a relation among identities within itself. Again, the subject can do so, without even knowing what the true "nature" of these identities are within itself, or what there mutual relations are constructed of precisely. This is the how the folding of matter comes about as described in the introduction as a process. Let us look at three identities within the single substance of universe and call them "type #" identities. There are relations between each of them. For an ordinary identity, such as a stone,

67 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

the Sun, or whatever, the very organization of itself as a systematic "object" would be the only relation to be found of it. Imagine, though, the human subject; there is also a relation of itself to "itself" and a further relation between other identities. The subject incorporates other identities within itself as identities of itself (type I). As the subject is able to relate to these relations, it incorporates the relation it takes to be between outside identities as an identity(type II) within itself as well. Now the subject makes another "crucial" step. It perceives the relations between the identities that it created inside of itself and decides to incorporate these relations as identities (type III) within itself. From here on, the subject is able to construct tremendous amounts of new identities of type III within itself and relate these with other identities. And so on, and so on... From this exquisite ability of the subject, the "self reflecting conscious subjectivity" is constructed. This is the endless folding, or "pleating" of matter.

Selected responses by M.R.M. Parrott Do you then create the 'outer' world of which you concieve?

"Create" only in the sense of an appearance. The world is there, but subjectivity can only have knowledge about its appearance. Why ask your conjured world to respond to you?

In order to bridge the gap with something called emotion, with morality, with desire and respect. Just because one cannot connect epistemologically with "the outer of the 68 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

inner", this by no means that there is no use in trying other routes to complicity, love and beauty. How do disipative structures, like tornados, "emerge" from the background processes of matter and energy?

I like this too, the emergence. A system is made up of the same physical elements as its own substrate, for that is what substrate means, but it acts like another dimension, in that the same forces are being applied in another vector, as it were. A set of firing neurons is all which makes up the physical "reality" of selfhood, yet we are prepared to say much more about it. This is because, in folding, the patterns which are generated by these firing impulses create a reflexive identity in the cortex, and allow subjectivity to emerge. No artificial construction is required. They are natural manifestations of the laws of nature.

Ah, but isn't this one tricky? If subjectivity arises from the folding of matter, and the emergence of system from a substrate, then where is the freedom we all depend on? We simply cannot allow these wonderful arguments destroy freewill by extending the laws of nature into our dreams and wishes. Maybe, it is the case that the self, and social structures are wholly artificial, as suns and stars cannot be reckoned with. Could it be that beyond our cool substrate, which we have derived from physics, there must be an artificial purpose, which arises completely in determination with volition itself, and is thus nowhere to be found in physics?

69 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

Of course, I do not mean to propose yet another dualism of substance, but of purpose. Somehow, it must be possible for subjectivity, which at first is no other than perception, to create its own desire out of "thin air." I will leave you, and others, to think about it. On the debate of continued existence after death, there's very compelling and convincing evidence from both sides.

Very interesting subject; and that is what my response involves; subjectivity. For me, what is happening is that the we as subjects cannot represent non-existence, for we have an underlying base assumption of existence. This comes from the very fact of our subjectivity and how it "folds" on itself, if you will. The subject is only the "effect" of the act of reflexive identity; after death, there will be no bodily support for brain functions, so there will be no identity, no reflexive knowledge, and hence, no consciousness. I don't mean to sound clinical and gloomy, for it only underscores the importance of getting off the couch while we are here and savouring every moment of breath. Instead of pining for an afterlife, we should be squeezing beauty out of what we have to work with.

70 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

LOGIC

Philosophy of Language As in other discussions, we come back to the same place, on whether there is anything real.

Right. We have to pierce through the veil of the dualism, and discover that our language necessarily confuses us, because it construes our experience in terms of subject and predicate. The problem is that if nothing is real, then what about the chair underneath me?; if everything is real, then what about Santa Claus? Such is the prison house of language. But the problem with prison is not the walls, but the separation, right?

Very apt. It is a separation from "what is". A great philosopher, who is still living, Denis O'Brien, who lives and works in Paris, said "it has been the business of the history of philosophy to get it wrong, and then get it right again." What he was referring to is the ancient problem of what is not. Philosophy, early on, was allowed to let us

71 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

utter statements about what is not, and take them to be true; then over the centuries, we learned to get it right again by destroying the dualism of existence and nonexistence from our bag of tricks. Philosophers from Parmenides to Derrida talk about this property of language to "mess it up." It tends to go in cycles, and the most current one, since the renaissance, centers upon the objectivity/subjectivity debate, the science/art thing and subject/predicate topics. The premise is that through our prison house of language, as Jameson called it, we mess things up by confusing our experience "into" two realms; it is only through very careful study that we can slice through the dualisms which corrupt our speech. It still is a hard matter to communicate, and thus the prison walls are hard to topple. So, what is language, then?

Language is a construct we use to communicate our thoughts. We are all conscious beings, but we are not connected by a mental umbilical. We are all separate, individual, self-contained consciousness. Therefore, language being a construct, we make use of it, many of us in differing ways, to communicate with other conscious subjects. It is all still part of language, or even language "games." There is no more a direct soul-to-soul connection through poems, than with political speeches. The effect is due to the relaxation of the restraint we normally associate with language constructs. So, we feel better empathized with the artist, or poet, than the logican or scientist, but it is

72 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

due to our own method of falling into ourselves, rather than an effect of the communication itself. How do we go about getting it right in our time?

First, what has to happen to the traditional notions of truth and knowledge, is that they effectively disappear. Science, in keeping with the latest research, has to be rebuilt with notions which allow truth to be localized and site-specific. Epistemology has to give up the dream of constructing a perfect system of "rationality" which would make every man fit it; instead, philosophers have to make do with the most bare of structures and allow these local truths to be derivable, as it were. So, maybe this is just a long-winded way of saying we must allow a plethora of "self-interested acts of interpretation." The upshot is in the moral and political sphere; if our "Truth" has given way to "truths", then how do we guard against the Timothy McVey's of this world? How do we regulate the internet in order to keep the pornsters out? How do we institute our morality so that the school child follows the rules? My answer, is that all of this is a dream of power; an imagined felicity with Reason which justifies social control. The real discomfort, in my view, that people have with allowing that we have no direct access to reality in itself, is that they would have no method by which to justify, administer and dispense their power regimes. "Relativism!", they cry, all in the name of a kind of national pride; "we must teach others what is right and what is wrong," they say.

73 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

In this light, it is no mystery why the merchant class has begun to dominate the globe. They do their business without respect nodded to the traditional notions of truth and knowledge; their success has come right on the heels of the destruction of "Truth" by those scientists who most want to revive it. In short, morality is not something which can be easily legislated, instituted, justified and doled out, without the very crucial assumption that there is a definite, verifiable Truth "out there" which any rightminded citizen could see with their own two eyes. What is the role of logic within language, or vice versa?

It has, perhaps, been sufficiently described in recent years; hammered out in such detail that many are quite satisfied with what it can be used to achieve in programming and artificial intelligence. But what about the epistemological question? Is logic the "end of wisdom", or just a tool to be used, along with other forms of truth? For my part, I find that, in my years of reading, studying and teaching logic, what has come about in my head about this matter is that logic is a paradigm; nothing more. Logic is a system model, which we use to approximate our meanderings in the "real" world. To recall a Kantian reading, logic is the a priori element of reason which is applied to the manifold of intuition. This by no means implies that it is the only element which is applied. The actual thoughts we have in our head are as connotative, poetic, and fallible as they ever are logical.

74 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

But the airtight system which can be achieved using logic crumbles instantly at the assailing power of emotions, love, art and similar pursuits. It is my belief that if the programmers and straight logicians of the world were to succeed in reducing our mentation to this paradigm, then we would have little use for it. Why do I say this? Because we are human; it is our business to get emotional, and to feel our way through the world; we perceive our surroundings, we appercieve ourselves. Could it be that logic and reasoning are coterminous? The firing of neurons, even if taken in established patterns which instantiate various constellations of memory and systems within the cortex, could never be contained by the solid state technology which we attribute to our logical systems. So, what part does logic play in the larger scope of reasoning?

If someone wants to define a language in terms of its analycity, sweeping away all other forms of communication, then what does that imply, in terms of epistemology? If an artist wants to define reasoning in terms of emotional responses and forego the rigour of analysis, what does that imply about the system which is at work? That the meaning of a word is the use of it?

Yes, I quite agree with both you and Wittgenstein here, but could only add that the subject makes this use, and so

75 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

a word's use may change from user to user. In some cases, not much, but in others, there is a drastic discrepancy in the user's usage and the prevailing opinion; we could call that user's discrepancy, poetry. You mentioned emotion. What part does that play?

I don't mean to grudgingly call on the emotional part of mentation; I really should have added that it is just not binary, analytic, or tautological. Our thought is riddled with individual tastes about truth, and personal desires; it is more accurate, in my view, to propose that we feel our subjectivity, rather than think it. If I get into an argument with you over a specific topic, I find that I am involving myself on a more emotional level than pure computation. I don't mean I'm teary eyed; not that kind of emotional; I mean my stake in the argument is based upon my psychology much more than if it were a raw spreadsheet of terms, premises, and assertions. It seems to me that I use logic to "achieve" the ideal of reason and make myself project the concept of this rational system which I appeal to. Just as if, in an entirely other situation, we were discussing one of the latest film releases, and I were using a different, perhaps overlapping, but different set of processes to idealize my reason. But are emotions reliable ways to model reality? Aren't they too subjective and sollipsistic?

I'm claiming two things. One, that emotions are as valid a basis for a model as computation, and two, that even computation is performed emotionally. Think about it in

76 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

terms of a stimulus-response-perception thing, and think of that not as a correspondent truth, but a connotative, or coherentist "truth." I don't think that a subjective truth leads straightaway to sollipsism, for through the various means of synthetic a priori, one can realize that there are indeed other subjects besides oneself out there. It is just that each individual subject is affirming a denotation each time, and we must allow for at least the possibility that each one could be personalized; cohering within the individual's web of belief. Incidentally, "sollipsism" is one of those sophomoric words, like "relativism", which are used as weapons against someone, but have no real challenge in them. No serious philosopher, to my knowledge, not even Berkeley, has been a sollipsist. But if we involve ourselves on a more emotional level than pure computation, how rational is it?

It doesn't matter whether it's rational or not, for logic and rationality are only paradigms, and not the originators. So, something is rational only to the extent that two people agree on it. Like if I conclude that I'm going to try to go to law school, and someone agrees with my reasons, they say, "that's rational." But if they disagree they say it isn't rational; something I believe is that it is only irrational because the beholder is working with different premises, or evidence, or experience, or whatever.

77 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

Our involvement within this is based upon more than computation; it took more than computation for you to ask the question. You might use computation in order to formulate a specific statement or disagreement, but I'm saying that the over-arching reason you and I are here is for an personal reason. I probably chose a bad word from the start in "emotion." I didn't mean to necessarily evoke for you a view of thought as irrational, but as personal, specific, local, instantiated, etc. So, logic is applied after the theory emerges? Do we set out to prove what we already believe?

No, but more likely we apply logic and our intuition at one and the same moment, in a way which is hard separate out; just like when we decide we like or dislike a poem, a painting, or a song. We are applying our own personal aesthetic rule system to the manifold at hand, and at the same instant working on an intuitive level specific to that set of inputs. So, the larger processes of personal involvement, or subjective truth are what drive us to employ various truth-making systems in the quest for a decision about the item, or situation in question. But can we allow for certain theories to emerge as a result of contemplation?

Yes. Thought is a very adaptive system itself, overseen by the identity of the self which is directing the thought. It happens that there is a lot of redundancy with this from subject to subject, but there is also a lot of freeplay; and to try to define thought in terms of binary, or analytical

78 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

operations only, is to destroy this freeplay. We need that freeplay; we in fact have it, but it seems to be a far richer theory to allow the subjective truth; for what is gained is the artistic moment, but nothing is lost, except political power in the name of "objectivity." This necessarily opens the door to relativism.

When I was coming up; and I'm still coming up, but I mean when I was in college and grad school; I read, just as everyone, philosophers from both sides of the pond. It quickly became apparent to me that there was a bit of a difference between the anglo-american anaylitics and the euro social and historical process theorists. Over time, you might guess who won out for me; I hardly ever read an anglo-american thinker from this century. I find them too terribly caught up on the notion that things should be defined in such a way as to eliminate relative discrepancies. They frequently charge someone who proposes subjective truth as a relativist; and they mean that as a dirty word. I find that relativism is itself a trivially true concept, if you buy everything I have said. It is not a problem for an epistemology, as the analytics fear, for us to allow that each individual makes his own truth in his own ways, for many, many, many people follow the same patterns, just as Nietzsche had said. My real "contemporaries" and tradition, instead of leaving Hume and jumping to Pierce, and moving along that vein, are drawn straight from Berkeley, Spinoza, Kant, and straight through all the continental thinkers toward Foucault, Derrida, and most especially Deleuze.

79 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

This means for me that relativism is not a bad word, but a straw man; since I define human epistemology as being driven by all the quantifiable forces of a social "habitus", while also being generated at whim by internal and psychological factors. I'm sorry to be nitpicky about this one thing, but it is important to me. How can the act of computation be emotional?

It certainly is not digital. Neurons fire; they fire in patterns; the patterns are both learned and created by the thinker. I guess we can give up that they are emotional per se, but they are not machine like. Of course the actual firing of the cell is quite like an electric pulse, but the cause of it is a grand conceptual apparatus which directs the brain to perform certain funtions; in short an emotion, but maybe "mentation." Isn't a paradigm of truth desirable?

I don't imagine it is easy to agree with my statement. It is certainly "relativistic" to propose that even rationality is in the eye of the beholder, but I guess a better way of saying it is this; I have no quarrel with the rules of deduction, but as you know, if you take away certain assumptions, or add them, you can derive different statements and components. Many times, we make decisions using premises that others around us are not aware of, because they are personal, or we haven't vocalized them. We think our decision rational, but sometimes; many times; they don't think so. I think we

80 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

all have basically the same basic rationality functions, but that we seem to use them differently, because we all have differing base assumptions to work with. Art thought and truth two different things?

Truth is, in my view, the creation and ideal of thought. The red shirt I might wear is not red in itself, but the truth of its redness in wholly within me. A theory of truth which begins with defining the redness as a property of the shirt, rather than a property of the perceiver, in my view, instantly destroys art, and destroys individuality. But isn't art non-rigourous, as artists are lovers of sights and sounds, and are not interested in scientific theories?

Well, for that, we have to show how the colour of the shirt can be rigourously put into the shirt, and pulled out of the sollipsist. The reason I'm focusing on the colour question is that it plays into the nature of perception and subjectivity; which is ignored when math formulas and technical jargon are relied upon. Also, I don't care what seems to set apart art and science, as if they really were different, but want to define consciousness; language and logic are only tools which are used by the mind to achieve it's identity. Communication Theory What about, say, TV signals that are sent out. They must demonstrate some notion of objectivity.

Yes, the signal travels out; just like the waves of 81 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

vibrating air when a tree falls in the forest and nobody is there to hear it. The signals are not the cowboys and indians of the TV show, but the cowboys and indians will exist only in that subjectivity which can decode the signal; or from a box which decodes it into tv pictures. So the storing of ideas doesn't happen at one specific place?

Yes, isn't it facinating! It is still a bit of a mystery to some types of scientists how the self even arises out of the brain; but it is easy to see from a certain philosophical perspective. But some knowledge is stored in books and other archives. Doesn't this subjectivization of language centralize it?

It seems though, that what is in print and in signals, and on the internet, is just like the radio and tv waves above; they are signs, but they are not language. I don't mean to be difficult about this, but it's part of communication theory; there must be a sender, a "medium," and a reciever in order for communication to take place. If I hand you one of my written books, and you read it, then we have communicated, but the language was within us; the english wording would be absolute gibberish to someone who doesn't know english. Then there are two dialogues. How do we again escape the pitfall of solipsism?

It is a collection of dialogues, one for each speaker/listener. The pitfall of sollipsism is easily

82

of

206

Synthetic A Priori

avoided, as if it were really a problem in the first place, by the claim that there are indeed "things." These things DO exist outside of me, but only as parts of the quantum force of the universe. In other words, sollipsism only arises if we claim that all existence is merely subjective; there is a huge difference. I say all truth which we can talk about is subjective, but there are obviously things and other subjects which exist apart from me; a sollipsist says that there is nothing whatsoever beyond his awareness. So, language is a pattern of events happening between subjects?

When a tree falls in the forest and you are there to hear it crunch and grind and slap its way to the ground and then hit with a deep thud, where was all of that sound? It was not in the tree, even though the tree caused it; it was not in the air, even though the air "carried" it; it had to exist only in the subjectivity which took up the vibrations in the air and paired them with the visual elements which were concurrent; the subjectivity "tricked" itself into believing that the sound "came from the tree." Communication is possible through the transmission of signals from a sender to a potential reciever, as we have said. The reciever is free to interpret the signal, just like an audiofile quality stereo sounds differently than a portable radio. That there would be two versions of a dialogue is not problem, nor that one would matter most; it is because yours matters most only to you, and mine to me; we hammer our versions out, many times, and come

83 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

to a kind of complicity. There is nothing sollipsistic about this. Is is possible to hold two conflicting opinions in the mind at once?

Of course, and with no inherent irrationality about it. The reason it can, and in fact does, happen, is due to the ways we can organize information. We can assign "true" to a statement 'p' in one situation, and in another situation, assign it "false". Is abortion wrong in every single, possible case? Is murder justifiable in every possible instance? Do we always hate a certain kind of music in every mood? So, it is rather like the files on our computers; you cannot have two files with exactly the same name, unless you have them in different folders. Presumably, we cannot, at some given instant, think opposing propositions, except when we change the deduction, or situation, or conditions, which affect the truth value of the proposition in question, as well as those around it. We seem to do this alot. This indeterminacy is not a problem, but for when we assume that our minds have to work a monotonic way; when we assume that our human modes of processing have to behave like our computational models. It is quite sophomoric to hope that the totality of our reasoning would be monotonic, for we could never get out of the house, trying to deduce every single proposition. Further, it is not accurate for someone to claim that logic is based

84 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

merely upon the monotonic, for Quine, Harmon and many others allowed for indeterminacy in their constructions. This relates to the suspension of judgement as well. We do not have to form solid opinions immediately.

Basically, we do form immediate opinions on things, but these opinions are capable of very minute adjustments, revisions, and deletions. What I've eluded to is that most people have a very, very limited and dinky notion of how we learn and "know" things. The way it can work is far more complicated, and sophisticated than many thinkers will admit. That said, yes, we can have an immediate anchor on an opinion, then with the slightest input, revise that opinion to meet the new criteria; we rarely realize that this is happening. Philosophy of Logic What if we take the following Nothing physical is eternal, the universe is physical, therefore, the universe is not eternal. What is the role of logic in our thought?

This syllogism, or "silly-gism," as I call them, succeeds because of the form it uses. Even though the first statement is not proven, the mere form of the whole makes it a valid syllogism, which in this case, proceeds from an unconditioned premise. This is why logic has moved away from these forms; beyond their simple appeal, they do not prove things with any rigor. It does depend upon the forms of logic which are used, though. Syllogisms really prove little, since they rely on 85

of

206

Synthetic A Priori

antiquated forms of reasoning, which can be easily swept away. But using first and second order predicate logic, set theory, and meta-logic.....well, it really is a whole new, very detailed, ballgame. Basically, instead of relying upon a syllogism, which is nothing more than a trope, we need to, and in fact do, use a system which defines meaning, and does so within a language. Given that, detail can be added by appealing to quantifiers, sets, computations, modalities and temporalities. In this way, a simple statement, like "physical things are not eternal," can be unpacked into reames of specification. Pick up any advanced logic book, and one can see what I mean. If we throw away syllogisms, what about Metalogic, for example, what is that?

I didn't mean to imply that we should jettison syllogisms, but to relegate them to the collection of tools at our disposal. Metalogic is the system which defines how logic and language are going to work. It is usually more textual, and less symbolic, and is used most often to prove things like completeness and soundness. If, for example, you wish to prove that A > B = ~A v B, and are not satisfied with the truth table, you resort to metalogic to show precisely how these statements are equivalent, and in both directions, through a pointed definition of each symbol, and each function. How would metalogic differ from metaphysics, then?

86 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

Like water and wine, as it were. Metalogic is concerned with very detailed linguistic proofs of logical principles. Metaphysics is concerned with discussions of objects which are beyond our normal experience. Even though they share the common prefix "meta," they differ in their employment. Syllogisms seem to be a linguistic tool?

Right, they are linguistic word plays, if you will, based upon a swapping of terms, such as; all Y's are Z's, X is a Y, X is a Z. Any premises fitting this, and other related, forms, are valid syllogisms, but not necessarily factual, or accurate. We also have Metalanguages, which would seem include their object language in addition to the world it describes.

By necessity, they don't. For example, what is a colour? We can, using Russell's work, replace the term "class contains," with "language describes." Languages do not describe themselves. However, consider a language, which describes all the languages which do not describe themselves. Does the resulting "meta" language describe itself? The paradox which arises, does not imply that all languages are self-referential, but that there is no way to guard against the possibility of one which does. To sidestep this, we can consider that there is some kind of a fallacy of scope involved, and that the metalanguage really refers to a different "type" of meaning, when describing those other languages, which dissolves the

87 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

paradox. However, this said, it just so happens that there is no way to close this "gap of meaning," and that an infinite regress is possible, which means that our system of meaning, is incomplete. So, the paradox arises again, and at every level imaginable. Does this mean there is no meaning?

This does not mean that there is no meaning, but that there is no way to guard against certain self-referential loops, and gaps within our system of meanings. So, let me get this straight. Logic must depend on rules, and logic includes syllogisms, and they are dependent on LEM or non-contradiction, but syllogisms can contain false premises. If we wish to appeal to logic as a harbinger of truth, then we cannot claim that a part of it is incapable of showing us such truth, and that all the parts are equivalent, but then contradict that with a different notion of proof. It is the problem of syllogisms, NOT that they are necessarily false or stupid, but that they do not guard us against counterfactual conclusions, or the possibility of a false premise supporting an argument. In order to sidestep this, we dig down into the analysis of each component of a syllogism, using newer techniques, to find out on what grounds it may be true. The syllogism we mentioned above is valid, as a syllogism, but is not a satisfactory proof, given our more recent attempts to establish detailed analysis. If we say logic is not self-sufficient to prove anything we

88 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

want to prove, but also use logic to do so, what have we proven, then? We would claim logic is insufficient, yet appeal to it quite directly, adding no other components, which would sidestep its lack of sufficiency. We seem to want to be logical about telling ourselves that logic is illogical. So, logic is part of a larger system of deductive analysis?

Yes. Logic is more than syllogisms and simple truth tables these days, including all manner of technically rich metalogical, semantic, syntactic, computational, temporal, modal, epistemic, deontic, set-theoretic and quantificational operators. Logic has really come to absorb the whole of scientific discourse. What interests me, is the application of this conclusion to the very field of subjectivity, and all of its endeavours. We are always on Neurath's boat, it seems, rebuilding our vessel, plank by plank, while forever afloat and pointed at the horizon. As the temporalization of logic was incorporated over the years, using Quinean temporal modifiers, we have only recently come to accept this kind of notion. Please define "Quinean temporal modifiers" for us?

Basically, it means that, given a certain truth schema, a statement could be true at a certain time, say T1, and not at another, say T2. A divergent or contradictory statement against the original one could be true at T2, and thus present no contradiction within the system, since they do

89 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

not conflict at the same time. However, this is NOT a caveat which can be used to get out from under a pin on the mat, during an argument. It is only applicable, if the truth schema, which has to be agreed to, warrants the application. For example, let's consider the truth schema of situations I would like to drink beer. If I consider the statement "I like beer" to be true at T1 (Friday night), and the statement "I don't like beer" to be true at T2 (Saturday morning), then we have a simple demonstration of these temporal modifiers, since the very notion of the original schema has the temporal dimension added in as a guiding principle. If this temporal logic modifies the classical modes, as does deontic, intuitionist, modal, and others, then we have a much richer, but more complicated language available. This applies directly into epistemological structures, and the notion of how we change our minds, by describing moreaccurately our ways of reasoning, without throwing systematization out the window. Is logic the ultimate test of ideas, or another belief system? What makes logic more desirable than mere intuition?

It is only ultimate to the degree that we consider it to be; logic is taught as ultimate, but it is only a subjective tool to project a representation of the world. It's worship is very religious in some circles, but as a method of making

90 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

our thoughts coherent, there is nothing better, because logic should be used to manipulate concepts, rather than to simply attack other opinions. If what you mean by intuition is a way of grasping a concept and understanding it, then it is really the same as logic, and I define logic widely, rather than simply focusing on the rules. Logic is a tool, but it is perhaps the most basic of our tools, and as such forms an edifice for knowledge; but as I have said, all of this is subjective mentation; for there is no logic floating "out there," or any application out there which would benefit from logic. It is a tool which is used internally only; a union of semantics, set theory, truth-functionality and wit; most especially the later. What about things like the Liar's Paradox and Incompleteness Theorem? How do they affect the falibility of logic in general?

They attempt to instruct one to avoid a very specific kind of utterance, because its truth cannot be possible. I don't think that anyone believes that it leads to the fallibility of logic, but to the fallibility of a certain kind of liar; to the problematic, but humorous, kind of self reference which is involved. A similar situation is to consider that set which contains all of the sets which do not contain themselves as members. GÖdel's theorem shows that there are certain true statements which cannot be proven within the system of arithmetic logic, which threw a wrench in the logicist programme, since Frege. This did not point to the fallibility of logic, but to the fact that was always feared, that logic and arithmetic involve, at some point, assertions which cannot be supported. This is to say that

91 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

logic could not be considered a separate structure from the mind, but bound up with it. Regarding a sentence, what is it stating or asserting?

It is asserting a set of functions which are not characterized in our English book. I pulled a fast one here and moved into metatheory, to show how a statement asserts something of the stater, and some set of functors within language and epistemology; generally communication. A statement doesn't have to be a truthfunctional compound. It can be a question, a grunt, a yell. A statement always asserts the position of the stater within what is taken to be the large world. Therefore, any infallibility is purely subjective, and would never apply beyond our own noses; and further, this would be no infallibility at all, but the blind illusion of reason. Are name-calling and personal insults valid reasoning?

Neither valid, nor invalid reasoning; not reasoning at all, in the sense of deductive logic. A true ad hominem only occurs when the truth of someone's position is challenged soley on basis of their personal characteristics. To insult someone, and not claim that they are wrong, is not a fallacy. It is also not part of the debate per se; it is a statement which is vacuous and useless in regard to the debate at hand; it is a flourish, an added scroll on a font; an excess of language.

92 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

Therefore, it is a personal play of language to insult someone as a separate statement within a debate; it is also a fruitless, and the mark of an untrained thinker, to accuse the propounder of a fallacy, when none was committed. All which is accomplished is the very goal of the insult; to make the opposing party angry; perhaps to trick them into unconsidered statements; but this is just as true of those who claim that this tactic was fallacious. In short, it is just another level on which to conduct the "battle" of wits, but not one on which the actual battle will be need to be fought. What about set theory and infinity?

Basic set theory, mathematical and quantificational logic are quite useful. If a set of integers is taken, this is a set which has no end; it is an infinite set, but each number can be computed. This is so because we can compute, through an algorythm, the sequence from one to two, etc. The set, as enumerable, is then called "denumerably infinite," because it can be listed, but it would take an infinitely long time. An infinite set which cannot be "counted" in such a way, or enumerated, is called "nondenumerable." Concerning logic, a set can be quantified, even if infinite, because the elements which make it up can be separated from other elements through predication. We may not be able to list all of the members of such a quantity, but it nonetheless is a quantity, and therefore, quantifiable in terms of logic.

93 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

But something like 2+2=4 must be an example of objective truth.

2+2 is equivalent to 4, and no other single digit, but this doesn't imply that there is an "objecthood" to truth. Less still does it imply that the truths about things within our perceptions isn't relative, since it is our perception which creates the truths about most things. To call 4 a "true" answer to 2+2 is quite admissible in the context of mathematics, but to assume the property of truth which was contextually assigned to the "answer" is itself some kind of force, is naive and sophomoric in philosophy. Does any truth exist indepently of human perception?

Where could this truth exist outside of us? Where have we seen it floating around? Do law, science, and religion support and depend upon "one" truth?

You're right, these fields strongly depend upon the notion of One, fixed truth, which supercedes all others. They use this notion to provide stability and control to the populace, but it doesn't follow that there really is one single truth which exists independently of perception. Then, is there no truth, making everything in our existence pointless and meaningless? Is the fabric of the universe a mere shambles?

No. The idea of relative truth, or no truth, doesn't impact anything at all but the knavish pretension of those who

94 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

claim to know such a truth must exist. Our existence is not even helped along by adopting the assumption of an absolute truth-object, since we still are unable to answer those questions which knowledge of such truth would make evident. Life is not meaningless in either case, since that meaning comes from within ourselves, which is the harbour of relative truths. The so called fabric of the universe is itself a linguistic problem, but if we think of the fabric as an EM field, the notion of truth is just that, a human notion and idea applied to experience; a human God, if you will. The human comprenhension and logic you mention do not apply to areas which are outside their scope. So, your comprehension is unaffected by the adoption of absolute truth as a force, or the deletion of it, in a justified peal of laughter. Logic is only a set of rules for transforming some statements into others, much like those which allow us to transform 2+2 into 4. "Truth" is quite a holy grail. Can truth be a force, in some sense, so that it would exist outside of human perception?

Truth is not a "being," or force. Let's reason through this; 1) the notion of a truth outside of perception has yet to be shown. 2) Without this, there is only "the truth as perceived or represented". 3) If we allow that this "relative" truth can be "wrong" then 4) it can only be wrong for someone other than the original perceiver. 5) This is because the wrongness is also a matter of individual perception.

95 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

The challenge is to show how truth can be proven to exist outside of our perception, when you and I only operate by means of perception, and naturally cannot perceive that which is outside of perception. We can't say we meet with this "absolute truth" in a non-perceptory way, since we cannot allow that such a thing as objective truth could be transmitted by a "spirit" world, and we have already said truth is not a being or entity of any kind. We would also have to establish that a subjective creature can detect and comprehend an absolute anything. So, we really don't have any evidence of an absolute truth, and we can so easily deconstruct our 2+2=4 example. We therefore only have a mystical belief that there is absolute truth. How can we show we're not deluded about the very possibility, then? But there has to be some kind of truth indepent of me.

On what basis, might I ask? Truth itself is not a separate "thing," even though it may be used as a linguistic "property" of statements within a working system contained in subjectivity. Those who insist on believing in a separate "thinghood" of truth might deserve to be mocked. Deserve to be mocked [laughing]? How many great philosophers held that belief?

Yes, deserve to be mocked, just as Socrates, Plato, Plotinus, Hobbes, Descartes, Berkeley, Kant, Hegel, Nietzsche, Russell, Foucault, Baudrillard, and others,

96 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

have believed that those they were talking to, whose arguments were washed out, and whose proofs were nonexistent, deserved to be mocked. The most famous example is with Socrates, who continually put the Sophists to shame. One doesn't deserve to be mocked because they're wrong, you see. One deserves it because they came into a forum professing how right they were, how they've got it all figured out, but when they provide no evidence, and no valid arguments. When I respond to them with evidence and detailed arguments, they merely say, "you're wrong." That's not logic.

97 of 206

Synthetic

A

Priori

PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

Quantum Philosophy How does quantum theory and science work into your philosophy?

Good question. If I am wearing a red shirt, many of us understand that the shirt is really not red, and that there really is no object named shirt waiting around for me to wear it. These are fictions I make use of in order to get through the day and have beautiful experiences. Instead of thinking of red light reflecting off of, or out of, the matrix of atoms, instead of thinking of a continous substance which has been manipulated, but exists within a continuous matrix of atoms and systems of atoms; we just say "I'm wearing a red shirt." It doesn't mean that we are logical, but it is a necessary fiction. Just like the similar fictions of soul, God, logic, etc... I choose the "Atomic" implementation model, the Quantum model which interprets even the atomic as a collection of forces. Any other "higher" level

98

of

206

Synthetic A Priori

interpretation is human. There is NOT a shirt, or an object called shirt, or an object anywhere. There are forces, and we "read" them, just like a browser with an HTML file. Any talk of an object is only talk. I shouldn't have used the word "fiction," since it implies that I mean that there is nothing at all there; there certainly is something "out there," but "it" is one great big substance, the universe. We read it INTO parts and objects due to our method of perception. What did Einstein's theory of relativity and quantum physics reveal to you which changed the nature of philosophy?

I may require some patience on your part, because, there really is no simple way to say that "THIS IS" philosophy, and that it speaks for the whole. If we talk about the history of formal logic, for example, then one could remember those syllogisms from the ancient world, and then those sentence connectives with truth values, more recently. One could say that Quantum mechanics changed symbolic logic by forcing it to give up on the Aristotelian law of non contradiction. Quantum "logicians," as they are called, came up with "logics" which had more than two truth values, and which had other interpretations of negation. On the other hand, the development of this multi-valency and the bi-valent truth table type logic developed concurrently. Wittgenstein invented the truth table well after Relativity theory had become known. The intense formalization we take for granted with logic nowadays, came right along with the Quantum "attacks" on the status of scientific knowledge.

99 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

In the area of large scale Epistemology, Quantum theory seems to upshoot to the making of knowledge, and the notion that the process is subjective, and that there really is no object "out there" which we can touch; rather there are forces, or atoms, or substances, or what-have-you, and the human "reads" this, and thereby creates knowledge about "it." But, you ask, is this new? No. From Democritus and Parmenides, to Plato, to Plotinus, to Aquinas, to Spinoza, Berkeley and Liebniz, to Kant, Hegel, Marx and Nietzsche, to Bergson, Whitehead and Wittgenstein, and finally, to Levi-Strauss, Foucault, Derrida and Deleuze; what has been a constant thread running through these and other thinkers is there common insistence on perception, that, as Spinoza put it, perception "expresses" substance. The thread has, as its very base, the idea that knowledge is subjective, and not to be found in "nature." So, my thought is, not that philosophy has been impacted by Quantum theory, but that Quantum theory is one of the modern means of doing philosophy; that it is a contemporary development of philosophy itself. Science is not something separate from philosophy, but is integral with it; they are the same thing, in many ways. Don't let anyone tell you that Einstein wasn't a philosopher. Or Bohr. Likewise, don't let anyone tell you that Picasso, or Stravinsky weren't philosophers. There is altogether too great a tendency in our time to "compartmentalize" knowledge, as if there were no relation between what is taught in the philosophy department, what is taught in the physics department, and what is taught in the art 100

of

206

Synthetic A Priori

department. Could you explain what a "quantum logician" is?

The desire for a three-valued logic came right along with the "science" of Quantum theory. Because of the uncertainty and unpredictability of the composition and location of electrons as they were being observed, many mathematicians thought that there was an uncertainty about the numbers, and logicians thought that there was a corresponding problem with classical logic. So, that is why I said they were "Quantum logicians." There was also a huge movement, from Frege to Russell and Whitehead, to relate maths and logic; to show how each was possible, and that maths were a development of logic, rather than the other way 'round. Since logic also related, in their view, to the workings of the mind, then it was thought that the adoption of a non-standard logic would solve the problems raised by Quantum mechanics and thus reconstitute our faith in human knowledge. Reichenbach was the most prominent early logician to do this, Putnam the latter. It took guys like Quine and Dummett to show how these and other approaches didn't work as well as promised, and that all we had to do was to get even more formal about classical logic, so mathematical, temporal, deontic and modal "logics" were slowly accepted and added to the classical formula; used when needed to explain certain things, like computability, time mechanics, epistemic belief and necessity. They all used a few simple axioms added to the classical, LEM type axioms. So, we can now account for a change in

101 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

view in ways Aristotle could not have anticipated; we can also account for a change in position of an electron at the logical level. In short, it was due to some help from all of this and more, that Relativity theory took off and became so popular. If the shirt stimulates the same subjective impression of red in all who perceive the shirt, could we say it is subjective and objective?

Never objective, just "very agreed upon" by all the subjectivities; an experience of a red shirt becomes an artistic one when the experience diverges so sharply from the concurrence that, to represent the experience on canvas, for example, is to create an entirely singular interpretation of the shirt. How does someone like Kuhn figure into this, regarding the damage he does to paradigms and structures of scientific truth?

Science is so much like a file cabinet; by organizing data into sequences, and arranging it into spaces, it creates the ideal of a system which can be relied upon, while forgetting that it was based upon the illusion of a matrix. My point is not that it is silly to use a file cabinet; I have one right beside me, but that it is not any closer to Truth than a cubist rendering of the same data. The dream of objectivity is founded on a herd agreement; this is not to say that these aggreements are not necessary; not at all. I only want to pave the way for a freedom of expression; rather than cover the ground with a concrete slab.

102 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

There are absolutely wonderful things done by scientists, and I use their theories on a daily basis; I frequently refer to quantum mechanics, and atomic theory. My point has never been that these are frauds and that it is all based upon an illusion. There really is a red shirt in my closet, and I cannot deny that there is something beyond my eyes; but that shirt is a sub-organization of the single substance of the universe, and as a kind of file cabinet, I'm fooled into thinking that it really is an "it"; that "it" is red; that "it" is separate from the skin of my body it is touching. Science, in a supreme achievement, allows me to "project" the most useful of representations of my experience, so that I might navigate what I take to be a world, and live a happy existence in the process. But to make it even better, I use the projections which are drawn with more freedom, such as poetry, art and music, to richen that existence even further. In fact, I could go so far as to say that it takes a bit of an artist to see the beauty of quantum theory, and it takes a poet to really understand how linguistics works. I guess I'm interested in breaking down the mythic distinctions between art and science; not that they aren't somewhat different; but that they have in common the projections of representations. Infinity Let's talk about the creation of the universe. Do you think it is infinite or finite?

There are two positions, both of which run aground.

103 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

One; the universe itself is finite both in time and space, and that outside of these boundaries is a being which created, or steered, the universe into existence. This is ridiculous, because there is no time and there is no space, qua time and space, and the supposition that there is a being which is outside of these conditions but which can create something apart from them is silly, so the universe must be infinite. Two; the universe is itself infinite both in time and space and there is no end in any direction or dimension. This is ridiculous, because there is no time or space, and there is no infinity, in this sense. It is inconcievable that there could be a substance which is infinitely extended, such that a line would never come to its end, so the universe must be finite. Human reason is not, and will never be, in a position to firmly decide this matter. Its own use of logic runs aground, and even religion cannot save the day. That which is a subject, and lives only by its own perception of quanta, can never know the entire totality of the universe, and thus only constructs the idea of it as an ideal. If we put a face on this ideal we have the notion of God. To attempt to go beyond this, is an attempt to transcend the very nature of subjectivity. We could think of the earth's surface as never ending, but why is it so hard to think of time and space in the same way?

104 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

When we think of the earth's surface as infinite, we are presupposing that there is another space around it, apart from it. But when we think of time in the same manner, we find it hard because we wish to discharge the presupposition. You can easily concieve of time as we know it as a round object, but what is outside of this roundness? I think that the issues of the nature of the universe will keep us going around and around, bouncing from one problem to another. We don't like the idea that there is a finite space and time, for what is outside of it, and so on, to infinity; however we don't like an infinite space and time, because there must be some boundary, or definition, to the space and time. In other words, we cannot concieve of an infinity, even though our reasoning continually pushes us toward accepting infinite space and time. So what gives? It seems that the way we are conditioned to think has conditioned WHAT we think. Our insistence on causal chains has put us into the quandary, and our way out is not satisfactory. It is something we are not equipped to settle. But the search for an answer cannot be given up! This is the "Humean" condition from which we can never escape. How can we get away from this problem?

The only way to harmoniously get out of the jams caused by these issues, as I see it right now, is to embrace the infinity which reason constructs, even though reason cannot make sense of it. Go ahead a say, "yeah, the universe is infinite in time and space, and I'm okay with

105 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

it, since I can't possibly say anything else which makes anymore sense." All the other alternatives are just a losing battle with the constraints of reason itself. It would, then, be quite a religious view to accept the unfathomable infinity. So let's say a religious person admits the universe is infinite, where would their God be?

I think that if they accept the infinitude, then they can either look at it in view of its potential substance, or its set of forces, sorta like a scientist, or they can infuse this infinity mentally with an idea of spirit, or God, sorta like a Christian. This "infusion" would then mean that the universe, in its infinite totality, IS God; which would be in keeping with what I was told growing up, that God is all around us. I think the problems with people talking about the creator's creator, and so forth, stem from supposing a separate being which is God, separate from the totality which would BE the God. Of course, this does lead to problems, because it wouldn't be a totality if there were one more item which was separate from it. Beyond this, I do not get any more religious, as I am one of those "card carrying" atheists. Well, not really, because that implies that I have a chip on my shoulder about it; I don't, I don't even think about it, unless someone else brings it up... So, I guess I'm still leaving a problem. Is God a being which is separate from the universe, or could God be the universe itself? Perhaps, God is the reflexive identity of the universe, just as the self is the reflexive identity of the

106 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

body? I admit that this takes all of the wind out of the sails of religion, but it aims at destroying the pernicious dualism of mind and body which is based on substance, since the analogous substance dualism is between God and universe. My view is definitely physicalist, but I firmly believe that one must have some kind of passion. One might be in a spirit, or God; my passion is in subjectivity. Time and Time Travel Given your other thoughts, do you think of time as a construction of conscious life?

Yes, and further, that the very notion of "time" is fraught with such constructs. Any talk of alternate timelines, time travel, etc, is only an extension far beyond any possible application of the basic construct. Do we carry the "present" with us?

The present is all which is, in any real way, both for the subject and for the continuous substance of the universe. To suppose that there is a realm which is time, and that we connect to, or are somehow affected directly by it, is ludicrous; just as ludicrous as supposing that there is a great being which watches over us. It is our freedom which makes it possible to bring up our own "past," and for us to project even a reasonable "future." But do our brains interpret space through our sensory system?

107 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

In my view, we don't "detect" space, for there is no space "out there." Quantum theoretians have shown this, Kant said it too; there is no space which is observable, and no time either. They are both the very conditions which we use to order our intuitions. We do interpret space and time, though, but it is an active interpretation, which literally carves out within our consciousness the assumptions which we all seem to take for granted, that there are such "things" as space and time. Aren't we fundamentally aware of the phenomenon of space, subconsciously linked to the phenomenon of space?

Again, subconsciously linked to what? Where is it? They are not to be found in experience, and therefore cannot be shown to exist independently of the mind which wants them to be "there." We are, indeed, fundamentally linked to the phenomenal experience we have of space and time, but it by no means follows that the two actually exist beyond that experience. So, space and time are only in the mind, or are products of the way our minds work?

Yes, and this relates directly to Kant. There is no time "out there," but only in the conditions which make it possible to be a subjectivity. time and space are assumptions for us, which we utilize to order our representations, and intuitions. Time is the sense we have of our experience as inner, while space is the sense as outer. This is straight Kant, right from the Aesthetic section of the first Critique.

108 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

This view is based in the denial of an absolute space and time. It works this way We are assuming that time is a substance which inheres outside our perception and intellectualization. If so, then it is an absolute quality of the universe itself. In order to actually proceed from the proposition that space and time are not absolute, it is necessary to posit that there is no such entity as space, and none such as time, in short, it is necessary to stop absolutizing them. Since they are not absolute, they are relative, and quite human, values which are ascribed to theoretical frames of reference to help us cognize certain events. Thus the predictions of relativity as pertaining to frames of reference in no way imply that there actually is a substance to time and space which can be affected in any manner, but only that from a certain viewpoint, it is a relative matter of perception. This may be easy to understand regarding time, but about space?

Yes. Space, as a substance itself, does not exist outside our representations of objects floating "within" it. Of course, most will agree that it is not a substance, but if the positivistic conception of space is to hold, we necessarily have to say that we find space itself to be a substance, which somehow contains all other substances. Just as our notion of time has to be given substance status in order to be referenced to a frame so that "it" can dilate within that frame. Since our best arguments lead to the dependence upon space and time as separate substances from the matter which is within them, they fail, since we

109

of

206

Synthetic A Priori

immediately realize the problem; how could we percieve them, since we only mentate through direct perception? It seems that every photon, every fundamental particle is individualistic, on your view.

Yes, I think we are on the same wavelength. I'm wondering, though, if I could somehow travel back two hours, or two days or whatever, I would need, then, a kind of technology which would transport me, much like in Star Trek. This means that I would be doubled in that target time, assuming there were a physical basis for the "movement" at all. Of course, the easiest "travel" to the future, which would be a one way ticket, is to go into a cryogenic sleep for what period of time was wished for. But I'm interested in a controllable, and programmable system which could be employed at will. So, if we had a machine which could copy our makeup perfectly, then that duplicate would have to be transported; then upon return, it would be quietly destroyed, or "overwritten" onto the original, like saving changes in a file. If this could be so, then how, and through what, do you imagine we would transport this copy? I would like to construct a plausible explanation. I think the future is easy enough, but it's always the past which has us scratching our heads. Isn't it so that relative time travel is possible due to the dilation when approaching the speed of light?

110 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

One would think so, since Einstein pushed that line, but I find that because the force for a particular atom to vibrate with energy grows to such an extent that it slows the vibration down. So, the clock on the ship would slow down because it would take an incredible amount of energy for it to move properly. But, what you seem to be missing is that a human body on this ship would not be immune to the same increase of force. It would take an incredible amount of energy for the heart to pumb blood, for the digestives to absorb food, for the lungs to contract. Unlike the clock, which could just as well run slower, the body cannot do this, and would die. Therefore, speeds even approaching half-light would kill us, and that is so even if the famous arguments for relativity are valid and true. We could use a vacuumed cyclotron around the circumference of the earth to achieve the speed.

But to avoid the same g-forces of acceleration in approaching light, the rate would be dreadfully slow, and since Einstein said that even a constant speed near light would require near infinite energy to maintain, then it would be very hard to isolate the body from this same energy; even sealed in some kind of bubble inside the cyclotron, we would not be immune, although it's worth considering. They did something like this in movie "Contact." Relativity only tells us what reference frames would report, but not what a human body would experience. As you know, there is really no separate substance called "time" to go slower in the first place.

111 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

Perhaps wormholes would be the answer, since the relative speed could be rather slow inside wormhole. This is why, I have given in to needing a transport mechanism, which would copy, or "save", the body in it's current state, and move it, or "write" to the new time, or frame. The problem still remains, though, about how we are going to distort "time", or travel through it, or do what ever it would take in order to go to the past? Actually, I have deep problems with the very notion of time travel. I also have problems with the way relativity is understood. I started thinking about it in order to smoke out some theorizing on how it could be potentially possible to go to the past, but until the question is better framed and answered, I will still have my doubts. I think the transport issue is the only way it could happen, and so it was good that it came up, but still; what is time to travel through? I am a firm Kantian, believing that there is no space, and no time. There is no separate substance of space from what "fills" it, and no separate dimension of time from what endures and changes. I have had very little reason to challenge these assumptions philosophically. Why should the speed obstruct the vibration of the particles?

It's in the very arguments for relativity; it takes more and more energy to produce movement at higher and higher speeds.

112 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

But how does this relate to the human body?

You would die, unless sealed from the forces which are acting on the ship and the air around you. In an airplane, we feel relatively the same as on the ground, because the cabin is sealing us from the forces which would be acting on us otherwise at that altitude and speed/acceleration. Now near the speed of light, it would take a near infinite amount of energy to do the same job. Relativity, as a theory, only refers to theoretical frames of reference, not the real biological problems of super-speed. By vibration, do you mean heat vibration?

Close. Relativity tells us that near light speed requires near infinite energy. That means that the very atom itself would require a near infinite amount of energy to vibrate, since that's what they do. If you could somehow travel at .99999999 C, you would be unable to move, your heart would not be able to pump blood, because the blood moving toward the forward acceleration would have to travel at the speed of light or faster. A bit like the aging process.

The slowing during the aging and dying process is miniscule to the scale we are talking about; it doesn't even register. At even half the speed of light, your body would stop in its tracks and become completely inanimate; a rock. Since it would not be frozen, in the temperature sense, but frozen in the motive sense, it could not be revived. Therefore, what is needed is a complete

113 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

seal of the body from the speed, somehow. But outer space is a vacuum, right?

Space is not a true vacuum. There are particles all over the place, and dust, and planets. If you accelerate your car up to 100mph, then take away all of the energy, it will slow back down to zero. A spaceship has a similar problem, but on a different scale. People have reacted to you harshly on this matter, saying you insist you're right and Einstein was wrong.

Why some people are so defensive about a couple of examples, which even Einstein said were silly analogies for the common man, is quite frustrating. It is not a matter of his being wrong, but about his being right in his theory, but mispoken in his examples, and that every halfbaked conversation since then has depended upon the examples rather than the theory. My disagreement is with how science fictionists cling to those misunderstandings, as if they were hard science, then when challenged, claim the iconoclast doesn't know anything about hard science. It's really laughable. Perhaps, your ideas for theoretical time travel are independent of the speed of light. Perhaps something more metaphysical is going on during each event of subatomic chronometric frequency?

Yes. This can easily be conceived in terms of the body itself, such that a transport mechanism, or some other type of quantum-biological machine, could copy the body

114 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

and place it in another "place." What is still a huge mystery and controversy to me, though, is how this could be done to a localized area other than a body. How can we have it that the area only surounding my body would be subject to these transports. The problem even lies within the famous concorde airplane experiment, where twin clocks, one on the ground and one flying in the air, proved the dilation of time at even slow speeds. I believe that the airbound clock slowed due to the energy which is required for the thing to tick at all, even though it was an atomic clock. Energy most certainly acts upon it, regardless of the frame of reference we are talking about. I maintain that it took more energy for that clock to tick than the twin clock on the ground. Let me be clear about this part of my theory; even though the clock was motionless relative to its seat on the aircraft, based upon a basic frame of reference model, it was still emersed within a larger energy system, and therefore subject to a higher loading. This would mean, in agreement with my views on time and space, that there was no dilation of time whatsoever. There was only evidence that the airborne clock wasn't able to stay in sync. So, the clock's slower speed was purely mechanical, not even related to time?

If I think of a faster speed, I think of a higher "energy drain", or what-have-you, and I posit that the body would not be able to take it after a certain point, since it would, in my opinion come to a biological halt. Therefore, what

115 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

is needed is either an incredible sealing mechanism to allow the body to somehow truly be relative to the ship, or that there would need be some kind of transport mechanism on the ground to transmit the body to another time. These two ideas have not been adequately explored and so everyone has gotten caught up in refuting me, when, as I have said above, I believe that I am not disagreeing with Einstein, but with you all. In 1905, Einstein wrote "the same laws of electrodynamics and optics will be valid for all frames of reference for which the equations of mechanics hold good." I suppose I am calling into question the assumption on the part of the audience, that this statement automatically implies that there is an infinitude of frames which are all separate on a physical basis. I therefore interpret it to mean that there is no way to escape the laws of electrodynamics and optics by a frame of reference model alone, and that, in effect, there is a single substance and energy system, which even given various frames, will not admit of faster than light speeds, no matter what the frame of reference. Based upon this conclusion, I posit that a ship which travels at .75c inside another special tube ship travelling at .75c is an impossibility, because even though there is a frame of reference model at work with respect to the second ship, it still is bound by the same laws of physics, laws which do not under any circumstances become doubled, and then enclosed within the bubble of the first ship. In short, there is only one universe, and all the theoretical frames of reference we can come up with will 116 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

not imply that a frame of reference contains its own separate version of the universe. How about a bullet shot from a gun on a fast train?

A bullet shot from the rear of a bullet train to the front, really is, on my model, travelling at that compound speed; the speed of the train plus the speed of the projectile; it is just that at those slow speeds, it really doesn't seem important; the bullet would. When I sit on a jet plane travelling at 450 miles per hour relative to the ground below, I really am travelling at that speed plus the other speeds of the moving earth and solar system, but the added speed of the jet is miniscule compared to the thousands of miles per hour at which I am already travelling. The speed change is so slow and quite within my range of biological viability, that it doesn't matter. The energy system I speak of would be, on my view, far less forgiving, if my body where being hurled through space at even half light speed. Therefore, it would take much, much more energy for that smaller ship to travel at 1.5c, even though everyone seems to think that its speed only relates to the larger ship. What I mean is that, it doesn't matter how you measure out the frames of reference, they are misleading, and therefore the smaller ship is travelling at 1.5 times the speed of light. So, our notion of time mistakenly leads us to believe we can travel "through" it?

117 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

When you say that space itself contracts and time itself dilates, you are actually buying into an absolute view of time and space. What is relative is that fact that it depends greatly upon from what point you are viewing the change in the object. What is relative is the relationship that object has with its own mass, and its speed in proportion to lightspeed. That's what relativity says; that as the barrier of lightspeed approaches, it becomes increasingly more difficult to accelerate, or even to maintain a speed; at the point of lightspeed, the energy required would be so incredibly great, that the object being hurled would become light itself. It is due to this approaching barrier, that when the speed increases, it gives the effect of an inertial frame of reference, and it appears that time has slowed down, when all that has happened is that the object cannot function in the same manner as before. This is where everybody's theory gets rough, since we obviously haven't pushed spaceships fast enough to get any dramatic time and space dilation effects; like years and meters. That's pretty controversial, at least in your experience on usenet, right?

I've asked myself; why is this so controversial? This how relativity was explained to me, and how I have understood Einstein's work. He was thoroughly Kantian, I think, in denying the absolute and objective reality of time and space, and in putting forth a theory which explains and predicts how the effects of these speeds can

118 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

be less of a suprise, when looked at as relating to theoretical frames of reference. A friend and physicist, Jerry Grushow, came to my rescue during all of this; I just have to quote a few of his remarks here. He said, regarding the vibration of atoms and energy levels I talked about "As photon energy is added to an object, its speed increases. It energy increases as well as per the formula in classical physics while it s mass increases as per the Einsteinian formula. There is a difference because photons are unsyncyronized to the gravitational field and appear massless while a block of iron is synchronized to the local grav field and appear as weight. The addition of photons produce partial synchronization as per Dot theory equations. Einstein is partially correct but does not present the entire picture. That is an experimental fact when you move an electron very close to the speed of light that it will radiate energy. And you will have to keep putting energy into the system to keep it at the light speed. Once you stop the energy input, photons will flow out of it. On the other hand, it is possible to slightly exceed the speed of light and move' into a superconducting state. Thus several things are possible. An electron or proton moving near the speed of light and passing a star will lose energy and photons due to grav field interaction. Half light is not so fast since many particles do reach nearly the speed of light. Half light would be terrible for a space ship since the distortions involved would destroy the ship. Light speed is for small particles and not space ships. Neutron stars could spin at close to light speed but these are primary particles. A spaceship would explode.

119 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

Of course a space ship from a light speed 1024C universe would have no trouble traveling at 10C which would be 1/100 of their light speed. Thus space ships traveling at incredible speeds do exist in our universe. But we are limited to much less than 0.5C. The amount of added photons would destroy bodily functions. Everyone would die. People will probably die before the space craft explodes. But if you accelerate fast enough, the ship might explode prior to the human body breaking down. The clock [in the concorde experiment] is moving slower [not time in-itself]. The clock operates at a higher energy level. The whole system operates at a higher energy level. And the arms of the clock [or electrons within the clock] move greater distances than a similar clock on the ground."

So, it may not be as Gene Roddenbury would have us believe?

The dilation of time, for example on the concorde, is only the way we explain the less swashbuckling reality that the "ticks", or occilations, of the clock have to travel greater distances, and need greater energy to do so, and therefore the clock slows down, having to "work harder" rather than there being a substance of time surrounding the clock; therefore it is the effect that time slowed, and only by assuming a theoretical frame of reference by which to compare the ground based clock. The less than glamourous truth is that the same laws are acting upon both clocks.

120 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

Let me restate, there is no substance of, or to, time which is affected by the speed and thus dilated, for how does the clock "connect" to this substance? What is it about this substance which automatically "affects" the clock? Simply due to the fact that the clock slowed down, it by no means follows that time itself dilated, for that would imply an absolute notion of time, which has been rejected by all, and has to be held in view while we assume that there is a curious doubling, or selective application, of that time within the frame of reference, inside the aircraft. Since, on my view, there is no absolute existence of time, there can be no absolute reference point, and thus, we are forever emersed within a series of relativities in regard to "multiple times," because we insist upon the use of the inertial frames model. In effect, we trick ourselves with the model of inertial frames, and we constantly analyze time in "earth" terms. In these contentions, I feel that I have remained consistent with the good Einstein, or at least, that I have kept well within the spirit of the subject. Didn't your audience persist in getting this reversed; implying you said there would be two sets of physical laws?

Yes, Einstein said that the same laws of physics hold for all frames; I interpret that to mean that there can be no separate application of them to any frame. In other words, the frame of reference is only an idea, and cannot be what amounts to a separate universe, since there is no absolute space and time, we would be constrained to explain how

121 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

that space and time came to be re-applied at a different frame. It may seem, at this point, that I am saying that there is One time and One space, refering to that "single universe" above. I'm not. I'm saying that there is one set of physical laws which, as far as we can tell, can only be applied in one way, and I'm denying the objective reality of ANY space or time. So, ANY speed brings us under the effect of the relationship of our mass and our energy and light, meaning that we can never escape the effects of these relationships by a frame of reference, which is only an illusion. So, when we say the concorde clock slowed because time was dilated, what we really should say is that it was as if time had dilated, because all we can verify is that the clock had in fact slowed from its normal rate of operation. If there is no absolute time, then there is no bubble of referential time to dilate, so the clock slowed for some other reason than an interaction with time. Most found your theory interesting, but continued to feel you were challenging Einstein; and nobody does that.

This is true, my ideas agree more with Albert Einstein than with the "official dogma" which comes from the "Einstein department" at University. I came up with these ideas long ago, along with some friends, and then, as a brash, twenty-two year old philosophy major, you can imagine the resistance I encountered by just mentioning them. As a result, I simply buried them in my head, until

122 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

they surfaced recently in response to my wish to write a novel involving them. But we could ask; ff time is only mental, how can it turn out to have properties like dilation?

A clock is a completely mechanical and boring set of gears and springs, at least the traditional variety, and I find it ludicrous that those elements are connected to some kind of fourth dimension, something which, by the way, has never been shown to be extant. I find it silly that just by throwing this clock through the heavens, that this fourth dimension suddenly responds by dilating locally, or that it dilates locally and then forces the clock to measure that dilation. I therefore am agreeing with the mathematical prediction of relativity functors, but not with the conceptual apparatus which everyone assumes to go along with it. Relativity theory, and contemporary Doppler mass theory, both state that mass, in effect, does transform in this manner. The faster you go, the more energy it takes just to keep you going, to keep you together, and at some point, it takes photonic energy itself just to maintain any speed. There is MUCH more going on in the universe electrodynamically than the simple theory of inertial time frames would reveal. The theory of temporal frames of reference is, essentially, a monkey's version of Shakespeare. Could you explain how a body would die from metabolic slowdown?

123 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

I guess metabolic is a good word, which leads us to the idea that the electromagnetic system, or field, at work on the body has to do with it. Cellular functions would be impaired, not by the speed per se, but by the increased relative mass, which is brought on by the increased "resistance," shall we say, of the field against the cell, the added distance the cell is covering, and the added energy which it is both giving off and having to accept. If this be so, then as the cell's functions slow down, the cell ceases to be able to continue its viability. Tissues lose their ability to fulfill their functions, then systems, and so on. The blood itself would be like lead in the veins, which would be as hard as diamond; and so on and so on. I admit to a bit of drama, and the biologists out there can come in and help me work out the details, but the basic idea of metabolic slowdown at near light speed is compelling, given the denial of time and space, and the proposition of electrodynamic forces. And it doesn't matter that the concorde clock was atomic, not mechanical?

An atomic clock is still subject to the same universal electrical field as a mechanical clock; but a great experiment would be to put both kinds of clocks on a concorde, to see if they slowed at the same rate, since the masses would differ. Would the speed show any difference between an atomic clock and a mickey mouse special? How did things turn out with the debate?

124 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

Well, I posted a notice to everyone, letting them know that I was officially out of the discussion, even though I started it. I posted the first part of the thread in June '98, and I posted the exit message in July. When I looked again in December, they were still discussing it in the same thread! I guess that's fame on the internet. "In regards to relativity itself, my thoughts have not been adequately challenged, and so I am even more in the belief that the way the theory is described is not in every case in keeping with the theory itself. This is especially so, when even the specialists, scientists and mathematicians who have participated can only repeat, in unison it seems, "you don't understand, Parrott," offering little or no support for their own positions. In short, I thankyou for your suggestions, both for and against, and I appreciate the time all of you put into your responses and explanations. Some of you are quite brilliant and have helped me tremendously, both with the finer points of my theories, and with understanding where you are coming from. I hope you all realize that debate is like war, and in the context of a war, it is difficult to appear as a nice guy when disagreements can be so volatile. But when the dust settles, it is clear to me that we all had a good time, and engaged our minds, which is what we are all trained to do."

And so it was...

125 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

ETHICS

Ethical Basis When thinking of ethics, we assume some basic underlying propositions.

The problem, generally, is the establishment of these assumptions is contained within the premises and conclusion. We may implicitly assume there is some sort of "objective," supra-subjective, realm, and that if moral bases were to be found, they would necessarily be found within this objective realm. In the premises, we argue our moral decisions could not be merely subjective, since there would be no objective standard by which to judge such decisions. We often conclude, morality is objectively based. It may not have seemed so when think of it, but at a metalogical level, this is quite a circular process of reasoning; vacuously so, I think. I don't mean to strike a nerve with any of us, but many of our moral systems are devoid of simple reasoning.

126 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

Do you find there MUST be an ontological basis for morality? If not, how can we justify or condem anything?

In the light above, we must first establish there to be such an ontological realm, outside subjectivity, which contains morality That's a tough one. We must also show such justifications or condemnations which may result from this proposed realm are not themselves subject to the criticism, based in the anti-relativism upon which we would inherently rest. That's doubly tough. So, you are arguing for a subjectivie standard, but if morality boils down to subjective moral standard what right could you or I have to say Hitler, for example, was evil or that what he did was fundamentally wrong? Do we have any moral ethical basis if morality is subjective?

That people agree there should be some standards of moral judgement is by no means proof there is an objective realm through which such standards are used. Likewise, just because we use such "standards" in a cultural way, it doesn't follow there is anything more than a social, subjective basis for them. Also, the involvement of even an infinite number of individuals in some consistent moral decision or behaviour does not imply the decision or behaviour was based upon anything but individually subjective concurrences and mutual agreements. Even I wish there were some "bird's eye" perspective which justified our best actions and condemned the worst in others. However, the anthropomorphic myth which propogates this cultural desire is no more than a social 127 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

construct, communicated from one subjectivity to another, across multiple "platforms" and "transmissions." We all can do our part to better the globe, but it ushers from ourselves. Do you think the reason we say that there must be an objective basis for morality is that without it, we are not justified in making laws, condeming slavery, condeming genocide, or any other thing that modern citizens would normally condem?

We should not presume there is only one way such a justification could arise. Is it possible there could be some other kind of basis for how we make these decisions? Instead of a vague objective realm which we cannot demonstrate, I think it could such a basis resides within subjectivity. But most people agree morals are necessary for a peaceful and good life. How do they come from subjectivity?

This is the key to discovering the basis for morality. But let us keep in mind that establishing a cultural standard will necessarily marginalize some other cultural standard. We want to keep human freedom in our formulation, while also demonstrating the basis for morality... ...but we must come to terms with whether there is any reason to believe, instead of justifying such beliefs with "I just feel that is true"...

Right.

128 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

I think it is clear morality is based within ourselves. It is a decision which is made, keeping our behaviour in line with our community. The reasons for this are as follows. You want to justify your beliefs, yet you must realize that your beliefs are based upon the rites of a particular community. If you travel to other cultures, you will find quite different standards of many behaviours. If you are a kind person, and not an imperialist, you will realize that all of these cultures are valid, even though they may not agree with each other. So, taking this diversity into mind, yet also wishing to justify the moral decision itself, we have to conclude that if morality is to be found in an objective realm, there would be no basis for the diversity, nor would there be any basis for human freedom. We cannot accept a lack of freedom, yet we want to justify our moral decisions, even in the face of differing cultural standards. This will lead us to posit morality as a socially transmitted value system, to be sure, but we must be careful not to let this become that vague objective realm. We transmit our moral standards from subjective individual to subjective individual through communication systems. In each subjective individual, there is a reasoning process which allows that individual to make a moral choice which is in line with their particular community. They choose this way to be a part of the community, but this choice also infuses them with humanity in general. If I help an elderly lady carry her groceries into her house, as I did the other day, I am 129 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

participating in the mutual humanity which she has, and I have. If I were to push someone into the path of a city bus, I would not participate, but act against such humanity; it would be violating the community, and acting in a purely selfish way. It would actually be acting against my own humanity to do such a thing. I would be treating others as mere objects, and I would be no more than an ape. So, the basis for morality, firmly set within subjectivity, is acting in accordance with the other people around us. This doesn't mean every action, or even a significant number of them, are morally justified or condemned actions. Most actions are of a free character; most actions are not regulated by such a moral concern. We act in a moral way when we interact with others directly in such ways that both their and our humanity is preserved and infused. What makes us good people is the very fact that we choose to do such and such good things for someone else's welfare, which leads to our own welfare. We are not made good for any other reason; morality is a subjective choice to contribute to humanity, to preserve the good, to have peace, and to live fruitfully. All that, and freedom too, is what comes from understanding the subjective nature of morality. Freedom What about freedom? How can it exist if there is no objective basis for morality?

Instead of thinking of freedom as something "out there,"

130 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

something which we are a part of in spirit only, we should think of freedom, which is very real, as an idea; a regulating idea, which, as part of the hardwiring of our brains, literally makes us the free spirits we all assume we are by giving us a very complicated set of perceptory preferences; these relay us to our choices. Instead of wasting breath on refutations of each other's superiority claims, we should bow to the physicalism we all seem to agree with, and give up the spiritual claims which none but the most ignorant could defend. I do not believe that freewill is an illusion, nor do I believe that it is a substance, per se. It is an effect of the way we think, in short it is the result of the very fact of our identity. In other words, your personal identity and your freewill are coterminous, the same. Is is possible for God to control us, or to know what we are going to do?

No being could take into account ALL of the forces of the universe, for that being would not be a subjectivity, but an objectivity. This means that this being would BE the universe itself, including all of the subjective will. Also this objectivity, even if it could "exist," could not be communicated to a subject who only percieves by means of its own representation. Even if such a being could do this, we could never know about it. So, if an omnipotent being commands us to discuss this topic, are we really compelled by a mysterious force, or can we choose to disobey, talking about some other topic, or not talk at all? Can there be any pre-determination of reality or though?

131 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

The notion of "pre-determined" universe is rather new. Newton's thought that, given enough information, he could "predict" the time and place of a particle. This was Liebniz's point too. Neither of them thought of this as "pre-determined," since it was not possible to know all information about a particular particle. Both of them came up with calculus, and both of them thought of a geometical calculus which would explain, and thus unite, the cosmos. But they were not determinists, per se. Time has not been kind to their views, and they have been characterized as "pre-determinists." For example, the Liebnizian monad could be predicted in time and space, but in itself, it remained infinite and elusive; a soul. Even if there were such a being, who could know all that there was to the universe, and this is a big if, how could you know about it, since this being would be a subject, and you can't know any subject but your own, if even that. I know that I said such a being would be an objectivity; it would have to be; it would have to be the universe itself, since no subject could know any object. The "if" is AS if a subject could know all the universe, it would still be a perceptory creature, and thus could only communicate with you using the same conventions we are using. The point is not that there is a dualism of subject and object; not at all; but that there IS NOT any object anywhere. There are only forces and perceptions of forces. Is this related to your views on Subjectivity?

132 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

Absolutely. We must understand that the One is our starting point. The phenomena we experience are our own products, and we all want there to be a subjective freewill at the end of the day. So, if I accept that there is only one substance, and that my subjective experience involves creating phenomena, then where have I arrived? I believe it is at the point that it is within this phenomenal experience that all my problems lie; not in God, or THE substance, or in the Bohrean atom. It is also within this experience that all of my "beauty"(not to sound fluffy) lies. In short, the only reality which I can speak of is subjective, because I create that reality and fool myself with it. It is the task of my life to first get this wrong, then to get it right. To be more blunt, it is because I trust language, that I will always screw up and divide the single substance of the universe into subject and object, determined and free; as well as other binary oppositions, such as existence and non-existence. But later, after much reflection, I realize that language has been my downfall, and that I have understood nothing. I trusted the pastor, and I trusted the scientist. I should have been watching the artist, listening to the musician and leaving language out of the equations. I then find the "way of truth," like Parmenides and can understand what it all means. So we can have morality without religion or God?

Yes. I don't practice religion, but I will tell you a religious joke.

133 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

The young student travels up the high mountain to where the zen master lives. He says "Please, zen master, teach me; I want to learn from you; I only want to absorb your wisdom." The zen master says, "Look around you, son, what do you see?" He looks around, "I see white clouds in a blue sky, a great mountain, a large valley, and a raging river." The zen master says, "You are a fool, son; go away until you know better!" Twenty years later, the student returns to the mountain; he says "Please, zen master, teach me; I want to learn from you; I only want to absorb your wisdom." The zen master says, "Look around you, son, what do you see?" He looks around, "I see nothing; it is all an illusion; it is Maya." The zen master says, "You are a fool, son; go away until you know better!" Twenty years after this, the student returns to the mountain; he says "Please, zen master, teach me; I want to learn from you; I only want to absorb your wisdom." The zen master says, "Look around you, son, what do you see?" He looks around, "I see white clouds in a blue sky, a great mountain, a large valley, and a raging river." The zen master says, "You are correct." I don't know who came up with that originally; I heard it from one of my professors. I'm not sure I got it. What does the joke mean?

The key word, the one word which makes it all bearable, the word which is so important that it cannot be forgotten,

134 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

is process. Just say it to yourself, "process." Does it not imply that there is a movement, a graceful stride from one point to another? Doesn't it give you the sense of a gentle, yet complex, collection of moments, all of which cohere to create a life? This is the point; it takes a complete life, or at least a good many years, to fully search and find that which answers our questions. The passage the student went through was not based upon choice, but time. The mistake; a mistake which must be made, by the way; is to assume that we know the answer, first because it is in front of our eyes, and second, because we have done a thought experiment to find it. The student could never really see the sky, clouds, mountain, valley and river, without first denying them, but before this, they must be taken as given. Most people believe that things are as they seem (some never give this up). Then they learn a little science. They eventually believe that everything is an illusion and that there is no meaning. Then they reach the point (and some never do) when they can truly see how it is that the river flows through the valley, as it were. They really can understand that it was the process that was important, not the fact, or the theory, or even the belief. Furthermore, they begin to understand that no theory was worth its salt without having come from the slow empathy of time. What is my message? It is very tempting to try to answer everything with just a tincture of philosophy. We get a little in college, enough to think our point of view is paramount. Then we get a little more, maybe even to the point of grasping various Quantum theories, then we 135 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

begin to question everything around our lives to the point of concluding that none of it has meaning. But then, after a little more time, we can see how this process works to reveal the minute details of our experience. We finally learn how to see the meaning that was already there, the meaning which we only took as granted before, then questioned. Philosophy is a lifelong pursuit; I certainly don't claim to know it all; I've just had some very good teachers. None of them were from grad school, though (except one), if you know what I mean. Having said that, I think that you are overintellectualizing the story. There are no ontological claims, even though it seems that way, because it is really a different kind of language. The story really is based upon a moral argument, and as such makes a moral, but not necessarily moralizing, claim about the status of knowledge. The zen master is not concerned with the "reality" of the clouds or the mountain he is standing on; it is on this level that you are not getting the joke; it is the student who is so concerned with the outer reality, seeking the wisdom of the zen master. But the master knows that his overzealous attempt at finding the basis of reality (hint, hint), is foolish by itself. The student must temporalize the search, which is the only way that a settled feeling comes about. Thus it is a moral fable and not a logical, or scientific description. Do you think that in a free society we are accountable for our actions? Neo-Marxists may say we are wage-slaves in a non-free society, but should we adhere to an ethics of responsibility as you've outlined?

136 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

I wonder about this Neo-Marx thing. I believe Marx's point was that we were enslaved, not by the system as such, but by the very local struggle of owner/worker, which was made possible by the bourgeios system. We all would be enslaved only because a system allows the kind of class antagonism which profits off of economic slavery. As long as a system is in place which eliminated a specific kind of bourgeois property leading to economic slavery, then we could all be free. I also wonder about the accountability issue. For example, in the case of a mafia hit, where the boss orders a kill, and the maul acts it out, why not consider them both liable for their acts? I think that most of us who even lightly consider moral problems have realized that there is altogether to much passing of the blame, but that doesn't mean that we are left with an either/or situation. In other words, I feel that we have drawn our two tendencies into great opposites, and produced a dilemma which is itself a bit unrealistic. Let us also remember that the laws we all live by are not coterminous with what we call morality, and that few philosophers have been so bold as to presume that the state should be set up in such a way as to be nothing more, or less, than a church. I think the laws are adequately in place to take care of the problem you see, but it is certainly lacking in the morality in some cases. My question is, why should our concern be so great in that direction, the direction of fretting over what the Jone's morality is? All we can ask of government is to give us the system which is necessary to settle such disputes, like J.S. Mill thought, and to provide 137 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

protection from attackers. Of course there are sticky areas, but they are fairly well debated in the context of the very law within which they apply. Why belabour what is beyond that scope? Government Speaking of government, and given the above, what is a government's moral directive? What does government accomplish?

As I see it, the goal of government must be the exploration of ways and means, which will promote the free individuality of all its members, while assuring that no one's freedom impinge upon another's. In taking a rather legal stance on social rules, government succeeds in avoiding the moralization, which religion cannot. One must look at the structure of government, not as a model for morality, but as a model for logistics. One must look at morality, not as a model for behavior in every call, but only in those actions which directly affect others. It has been the great failure of the modern world, in its effort to displace faith in the church, with emphasis on a higher being, to only replace it with faith in government, with emphasis on higher power. The displacement was good, in my opinion, but did not need a replacement, or at least, not an external replacement. This strays off the subject though. In short, government provides a system which should not be worshiped, or hated and lamented, but embraced only in its regulatory employment. Every other fashion of our

138 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

lives has the stamp of individuality on it, and thus, cannot be questioned on basis of such a system, or morality. But what about the much maligned evils they seem to do to us?

The moral goal for government is not to do evil to us. By focusing in on only issues which make headlines, and only ones which are a bit controversial, one really misses the big picture. There are many more wonderful things which have happened in the world of politics which have brought us together as a nation, and many of them we have never heard about on TV. Just because some politicians have made poor choices; and we rarely know all the forces on such a decision; does not mean that all government is to be judged by their, obviously short, yardstick. For example, here in South Carolina, video poker is a big deal. Many people whine about the moral problem of such a game; that it is addictive; and in this state, they take the lack of mental health VERY seriously; they say that some people have neglected their children and jobs just to play the game. The issue here is personal freedom the government is in no position to jeopardize our freedom, unless abosolutely necessary. The fact that some woman played the game for hours while her infant baby died in the car, is not the fault of the gas station, the video game, the baby, the mother's parents, or the government; it is the fault of the woman herself; it is her moral failure to have treated her child like an object, far distant from her habit. Just because someone does that, it by no means

139 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

follows that government should legislate morality and decide for another that video poker is a bad thing in itself. The role of government is, thus, to promote our personal freedom, bounded only by the impingement of another's freedom. Some rejoin, that the baby's freedom was impinged and thus a ban is justified. Well, the baby had no freedom to begin with, she was an infant, and the act really had little to do with poker. Do you think morality can be a tool of power, used by politicians? What about the hypocrisy of the Clinton impeachment process?

I, for one among many, many of my fellow Americans, have a sense of frustration about this kind of thing. It is a frustration which is based upon the recent weaving of morality into politics, as the only tactic available by a congressional majority to cripple a President they could not defeat by legitimate means. It is a frustration at this illegitimate method by which the one man who has brought our country together in many years, has been tainted by those weak forces of divisiveness and bitter partisanship, which, in its inevitable workings, has actively told the people what is to be considered moral, in the midst of a country which has a legal separation of church and state. It is a frustration which, even in the present shocking moments, is based upon the full indication that our republican government officials will do what they please, regardless of our efforts to direct them. It is a frustration which has been tempered by several decades of attempted demonstrations and public

140 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

displays, all of which have been largely ignored by a government of talkers; all leading to a vote which does not count toward a stronger government, since when faced with the choice between two candidates, the task is to find the one who is less plastic. It is then, a rather silent frustration. Religion If you cannot know any reality but your own, aren't you taking things on faith? Where is the line drawn between philosophy and religion, and do we need some kind of God figure?

In the context, I think one does need a god-figure. Let's say the two alternatives are a theory, and a god. I interpret the belief in a god as the lack of a theory. Theorizing is based upon a critical distance, and an eventual acceptance of a certain tenet, which might just as well be considered an act of faith. The difference is in the criticism, the evaluation, the consideration, which is put into theorizing, which believing, perhaps blindly in some cases, lacks to the same degree. The reason "believers," in this narrow context, should be frowned upon is that they are not engaging themselves with any kind of discussion, or argumentation; there is no process of discovery, but only a flat concurrence with tradition. I may be exaggerating their case, but I feel that philosophy is about asking specific questions of problems, and coming up with answers which are

141

of

206

Synthetic A Priori

appropriate in scope; religion is about pat, repetitive and general answers to specific questions. But have we lost touch with Nature?

We should not assume that "nature" and culture are two separate things; that nature has some kind of serenity apart from a human's perception of it. There was a time when there were no tools or fire, and men lived in damp cold places, fully at the mercy of the elements; the very fact that we are here to complain about progress, is proof that progress, to some extent, works. What we have gained is the power to affect our own survival. If any of us wish to return to the elusive state of nature, then can go into the bush; but we should not pretend that at one moment, we will not be persuaded by necessity to fashion ourselves a weapon, or some kind of tool to feed or protect ourselves. At that moment we are constrained to persuade ourselves we are not interested in progress and technology. Nobody is forcing us to live in the cities, drive to work and sell products under flourescent lighting. Inversely, we do not have the authority to dictate what the nature of the whole would be for the rest of us, or to assume that everyone who lives in modernity is living dishonestly, or living against that very nature which they define on their own terms. Is it contradictory to speak about what morality is and also be an atheist?

142 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

I feel what is deemed immoral by a majority is an act which violates some principle of humanity, rather than that act being immoral due to some dictate of God. So, to be an atheist is not in conflict with having a moral theory, since that theory would be based upon a consideration for humanity in general. Now, this might be in contradiction with a fundamentalist, but that would be part of the denial of God in the first place. To be an atheist, is to deny the entire ontology, epistemology and morality which has been delivered by the minister, and while Atheism may be in conflict with these staid values, it certainly is not in conflict with itself. Atheists can be morally responsible members of society too. Wouldn't these principles of responsibility be mere opinion?

How are we going to establish anything but someone's opinion? If we go with the religious view, isn't that just an opinion as well, which is popularized through various means? But would it be strange to require people should act within your opinion of what is wrong or right?

Great question. This is why we have to develop a notion of this principle of humanity, such that it does not define any particular action, but only guards against direct violation of rights. Kant and Mill both had systems like this. So, instead of letting just any opinion of a moral action prevail in some situation, which only leads to wars, we have to narrow the sphere of what can be called

143 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

moral, by talking about humanity, and not by talking about actions. This is how an atheist can go about defining a "morality," by eliminating the "normalizing judgement" which comes from the socialization of the church, and focusing upon what few actions would be for, or against, humanity due to the categorical imperative. This leaves a huge class of actions free for the individual to define, particular to his or her cause, without the judgement of God bearing down. If we leave it up to the church leaders, with their judgements, we will have to regard actions like eating chocolate, eating pork, and premarital sex as fundamentally immoral, when in truth, they are neither moral, nor immoral, but marks of individuality. Some would wish to believe their morals are not opinions, but acts of faith pertaining to the greater good, right?

Of course, they would believe that; but how are they going to prove it? I mean, we are talking about a moral theory, the type of thing which can never be anything but a guide for action and thought. The fact that we can neither prove, nor disprove, the existence of God, seems to imply that we cannot prove or disprove the realism of a moral law beyond our own subjective aspirations. Does this morality of humanity include animals?

I'm not sure about that, since it leads to problems. I don't mean to imply by the term "humanity" that there is some exalted status for us, which, if we include our dogs and cats in this status, we run into some problems with the way the food chain has worked. Were the cavemen

144 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

immoral to eat bison? If so, then how could they have known it, without a priest to tell them so? If we take the caveman as less than human, then how do we include our pets into our exalted humanity? Now, if you're a creationist, then how are you going to show the facticity of it, when there is so much evidence to the contrary, at least in terms of our earth history? I don't really like the term humanity, even though I use it, since it implies that exalted status. So, I'm not sure how to solve the problem, unless we think of ourselves as part of the grand environment, part of the food chain, and just live with it. If someone wants to avoid meat, then let them, since that is part of their individuality, rather than a "moral" action. The only actions which are immoral, or really "not-moral," are those which contradict the instinct of self-preservation we all have. By saving someone's life you are acting on behalf of their instinct, while when killing someone, you are acting against it. I don't know how to work animals into this without bringing into the picture the very problems we want to avoid...what do you think? Athiest morality; it sounds like a contradiction in terms.

Why? Because you think that without God there can be no morality? How is it that these morals are "downloaded" from God in the first place? Isn't it the same as atheism, in that a group of people are precribing a behaviour based upon a theory, rather than on a fact? Then why would an atheist choose to be moral at all?

145 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

What is the purpose, if the goal of life is to survive, why live righteously?

To either help others realize their goal of staying alive, or at least to do nothing which would prevent them from doing so. Staying alive does not automatically imply killing others, using others, or raping villages, etc. It is only the theists who use this as a straw man against the non-theists. Perhaps you should call it something other than morality?

It is morality just the same, since morality is a theory which takes into consideration other people. There again, morality is not a word which has to be tied to theism and nothing else. This doesn't mean we cannot have a "greater good" principle; just that it should not be exclusively connected with a God. Utilitarianism and other moral theories are, after all, not religious theories. What is more important; the good of the one or the many?

In regard to this particular element, they are one and the same; self-preservation. Each individual wants to survive, and must recognize the equal right of others to the same luxury; so the moral action is one which furthers another's goal to survival. An immoral action is one which is in direct violation of this. With this, we have exhausted my interest in moral theory, since it should be no more complicated than the above; of course there will be hard cases with grey areas, but no

146 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

single moral theory will ever erase that. What is the advantage of being an Atheist, then?

Your question is an excellent one. What would the advantages be, when it is assumed that it is advantageous to believe in God? I suppose one has to challenge the notion of an inherent advantage within religion, and look at the question in light of the individual, and the individual's wishes. The reaction by many atheists is not against a moral code, that is, a method of treating others as one would be treated, but against a denial of the very spark of individuality. It is thought, by atheists, or at least by myself, that religion chokes creativity, by effecting an "outer" moral code, rather than an "inner" one. Furthermore, even in the face of the claim that one should develop a "personal relationship" with God, it is the belief in a being of supremity which signals this deathnell of individuality; if I have to consider everything I am to do against what I feel God wants me to do, then at what point am I morally free to make choices? At what point am I free to even make a moral choice, when God has it worked out for me before time? Therefore, it is due to the movement of philosophy toward subjectivity, which has lead us toward a valuation of individuality, over and above service to any being. In this light, it is actually the lack of belief in God, which becomes the advantage; the unconsidered belief in God, becomes, then, the scandal of subjectivity, killing before

147 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

it begins, any true individuality within. What is the advantage of individuality? Is individuality possible?

Individuality is not only possible, but unavoidable, given the very nature of subjectivity. Because we are all human subjects, unable to know any "reality" but our own, we are by default individuals. It is only through the socialization process that we ignore this, and attempt to folow patterns. It then becomes a matter of postmodernism, that some of us seem to have grown up on these patterns, which include the "individuation" of ourselves. An example of this is with pop culture; it is all about individuation, but rarely about individuality. The advantage of individuality lies in the keeping with the spirit of our nature. By cultivating individuality, we are true to ourselves, in that way, and in that, our individual experience and expression is advantageous to us. There really is no advantage to religion, if individuality is the goal; if herd morality is the goal, then there is no advantage to atheism, or individuality, for that matter. What about an afterlife?

I think about that quite a bit. It has nothing to do with God, but with the electrical, psychical energy which somehow resides within us. We just don't know enough, through the auspices of science, to say what happens; but we seem to have an overwhelming feeling that there must be something to an afterlife, through other auspices...

148 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

Common Culture What do you think about common culture, like the mind numbing influence of television?

Well, I do watch television, we do have a choice whether to sit and watch. I say, if it is a big problem for you, sell your television - yes, that's right - get rid of it; don't watch it. You could also put it in storage. What few programs you really must see can be seen by other means. You have friends and family, so plan a weekly "party" on that special night, where you all sit around and drink beer, or whatever, and watch your favourite shows. The rest of your life is free to spend on much more productive matters. What you will find is that, since you are watching far less, you will get much more out of what you do watch, and it will contribute to your life, rather than being "the next show that's coming on," which you only complain about. We shouldn't blame the culture of the common man for not giving us what we want out of life. Common culture has never, and will never, provide everything for everybody. We have to seek out our own culture, and utilize small parts of the common and esoteric, so that we reach our own goals. Television is not meant to be a surrogate for living a well-rounded and full life. It is merely a small slice of what we should properly call entertainment. All of the postmodern claptrap about the evils of television will go away, when we get our heads out of the

149 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

tube, and into ourselves; I know from firsthand experience, even though I now have a tv set. Let the masses enjoy their full-time crutch; that's why they are called common men. But doesn't television waste our time on commercialism?

This seems to me only a matter of perception. If you believe that TV controls the mind, then it does; if you don't, it doesn't. If one insists I am deluding myself, then that someone falls down the slippery slope, and has to allow that all mass entertainment controls, numbs, and opiates the mind, even the good stuff. I'm listening to Brahms from a CDR, right now; does that mean that I'm being controlled by the crass commercialism of how Classical music is being distributed today? I read books, but does that mean that I'm being controlled by the way books are mass produced and marketed? I beg to differ. It is certainly possible to enjoy something a certain medium delivers, like the photography, the characterization, or the plot of a TV show, without being yoked by the neck to the postmodern interpretation of everything. Believe me, I used to preach this gook myself, since as an American, I grew up watching TV, and as a budding young intellectual in college, I reacted negatively to it. The problem is, it doesn't go anywhere, this interpretation. It does lead, though, to the conclusion that life is itself meaningless and absurd. If life is itself meaningless, then why do the postmodernists waste so much breath on telling us about it? They should just kill themselves, or go to the jungle, or just get over it. In

150 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

reality, they don't believe such, but have the opportunity to base an academic career on such ironic criticism alone. But mass entertainment is nothing new or modern, and to say such things about TV, means that we have to regard the theatre, the music hall, the gallery, and any other aesthetic grouping by the same light. The theatre goers in the 19th century would have to be considered as mindnumbed, the Medievals during the musical festivals, and so on, would all have to be thought of as opiated. This postmodern debate over TV, due to the slippery slope, necessarily puts one in the position of claiming that all aesthetic stimulation is mind-numbing; that any entertainment, by a group, or to a group, as a part of culture, is itself an evil form of power. A better position, is to realize that the medium is not the control, but due to the technically "eased" lifestyle we all seem to live in North America, we have much more free time. Our resulting boredom has to be replaced, which leads us to television, which, since it quite nicely provides a neverending, role-playing outlet for the mind, and keeps it occupied while time passes, it is easy to become addicted to its charms, and for postmodernists to claim that mind is "controlled." The challenge, then, is to use other means to enrich life, using a true "multi-media" approach. See plays, hear the symphony, read books, and yes, watch some TV, and surf the net, but also to participate in these and other activities, rather than merely watching others do it on the tube. The aesthetic experience, gleaned from television 151 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

and other mass mediums, will be far richer if allowed to enhance one's own existence, as opposed to being used as an infernally vicarious life from afar. Is it not true that all those people who are mesmerized by television will affect your life, your politics and human conditions?

I used to go on and on about how people should do "this," or not do "that," but that's not really getting much living done, now is it? I don't mean to sound completely selfcentered, but I cannot live out my existence worried to tears because other people might be watching too much TV, regardless of the choices they make. The problem is appealing to too much social determism, while also appealing to the lack of the same. What I mean is that, by assuming all the myriad of choices others make may pin me into a bit of a determined existence, but on the other hand exert the freedom necessary to preach to them about how television creates a social determinism, means that the fundamental viewpoint in this matter must not have been determined by that social environment, which means I don't need to preach to them. Now, one may find this all too subjectivist, and isolated. One might think, in Aristotelean or Objectivist fashion, that the collective of society is more important than my paltry existence. You may think I have to be concerned with this collective, and how it operates. I have to care about how that collective spends its time, because the general happiness within the collective is paramount. I

152 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

say to this, along with Kant and Mill; I do care about it, and I do concern myself with it, but only in this way The collective, by definition, can only be made of individuals. I am an individual, and so I could not do the collective any good whatsoever, by neglecting to live my existence in the most happy and productive manner possible for me. Since I can only contribute my individuality to the collective, that collective must implicitly accept my individuality. I cannot live by a generalized mold of what the average citizen may be like. I have to do my own thing. Only then, can the collective have any meaning as a good and happy society, right? Therefore, the argument that, "since someone may watch bad TV, get drunk and shoot someone I love, therefore I should be fired up about banning TV," is hardly compelling as a call to action for me to preach the evils of TV, and is more a call to point out that the individual who may do those things, has utterly failed to achieve his own tacit goal of humanity. Also, I owe it to society to live as an example, and in that, cannot live outside of myself. Do you think industrial and post industrial society has created a loss of community and alienation, as opposed to rural communities where people know everything about each other? Does this alienation cause mental diseases? Shouldn't we persue religious ideals to bring community back?

I agree with the premise, that our infrastructure has caused us to become distant from those close to us, and that this has called for the creation of alternate groups. Curiously, I find that it is that same infrastructure which 153 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

has provided the tools necessary for us to connect ourselves to those groups, to those people who would not be close to us in proximity, but close in protasis, if you will. It is with ultra modern technology, that we are better able to seek out and find those with whom we may have the most generous and fruitful discourse. The internet is a prime example of such a use. As to the mental and community questions, I believe the lack of involvement with others does lead to certain types of mental disease, and the resulting pain leads some to answers through the re-involvement in various groups. However, I do not find fault with technology, since I feel it also provides for the resulting escape. It is not technology which is to blame for our problems, but people. We are in a transitional period in human history, and it is due to our fast development into the technological realm which has produced the alienation; it has also produced the means by which we will set ourselves free from alienation. We are both the cause and answer of our own problem.

154 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

KANT STUDIES

Synthetic A Priori For those who don't know, what is synthetic a priori? Is sounds like a man made idea coming before experience.

It is exactly that. Reason constructs principles upon which it operates by applying them to new and possible experience. The whole thrust of Kant's thought is to show how we do this every second of every day. For example, you can drive a car. Then you can park that car and get into another; the fact that you know how to operate that second vehicle is evidence of synthetic a priori at work; you apply principles you have learned to the new experience of a car you haven't encountered before. For Kant, just about everything works this way; morals, mathematics, aesthetics, and epistemology. Does this have to do with imagination? How is that related to understanding and sensibility?

Imagination is not a part of sensibility, but its application is to sensibility; it is that "Mother wit", which is the same

155 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

as the faculty of judgement. It is the part of reason which makes use of the analytic of principles. The schematic of temporal relations, namely the Axioms, Anticipations, Analogies, and Postulates, are used by our imagination to marry our concepts with our intuitions, or the manifold. Is Kant's system outdated? Did empirical science contribute to a fall of idealism?

Actually, empirical science is not an isolated modern event, and transcendental idealism is far from dead. Now maybe in the halls of the American and British Universities, the analytic folks think these things, but that is their spin, and there is a whole continental tradition of thinkers who not only haven't forgotten Kant, but actually understand him. Analytic thinkers can have a bias toward the new, errantly missing that philosophy is not dated in the same way as a newspaper article, and that there are many recent thinkers who say very similar things to the basic Kantian position of transcendental idealism; among them, Bergson, Bataille, Merlou-Ponty, Riceour, Althuser, Deleuze, Foucault, Derrida and Baudrillard. Now these guys are not the same as Kant, of course, but the thrust of Kant's thought has not been avoided or actively misunderstood by them. The anglo-americans have quite faulty claims about any deaths of idealism, when they themselves argue for a sense of reason which does not come from experience.

156 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

So, Kant's position is based upon an elementary content which constitutes that which one knows?

Yes, his whole point is that there are a priori forms of intuition which condition the given, and literally make it into the objects of experience. These concepts and intuitions are used to generate the scope and order of the inner life of subjectivity, which is quite based upon the multiple layers of time sequences. Analytic and Synthetic Regarding the distinction between analytic and synthetic, is it true that analytic truths are those which can be derived formally from their subject, while synthetic truths are those which are semantic, or coherentist?

An analytic truth is such "All bachelors are unmarried men." An analytic truth is one in which the predicate is contained in the subject, in short, they are boring truths. A synthetic truth is that which, as a predicate, cannot be contained within the subject. So, analytic truth is something like '2+2=4,' while a synthetic truth would be something like 'sky is blue?'

Actually, Kant said that 2+2=4 is synthetic, because the subject '2' does not contain '4,' or vice versa in the sense of concepts. The function which is used to add two '2's comes from something else, and that is human reason. So, synthetic a priori is a rule which is fashioned within reason, before experience, about a predicate prior to experiencing that predicate. We do it all day long. For

157 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

example, if we are reading one of my messages on alt.philosophy and we turn off our computer, then go somewhere else, to someone else's computer. We open a newsreader program and pull up alt.philosophy, we click on my message and continue reading it. There is nothing in the "subject" of your computer to allow you to derive the "predicate" of another one. You must first make other rules and assumptions, which are perfectly legitimate. Additionally, this temporalizes the subject, through synthesis. With 2+2=4 we cannot say that the the '+' and '=' are semantically contained within the components '2' and '4.' The computer example is apt because we presumably have experienced only the one computer, not the other one. We experience our machine, and this is certainly a posteriori, but then we are faced with another, "something," and we have to make sense of this new thing based upon certain ideas and principles which we have made in our head, based upon our experience of our first machine. The synthetic part is what we have created, the a priori part is the fact that we created it before our experience of the second computer. Putting them together results in a surety about how that second something is supposed to behave. But isn't pure reasoning necessarily analytic?

From Kant's view, even 1+1=2 is synthetic. There is nothing in the subject, "1" which necessarily leads to the predicate "2", and so must be supplemented by reason's bag of concepts, such as "+" and "=", among others,

158 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

which have been learned from experience. The "a priori" doesn't refer to something which happense before all of my experiences, but before the experience in question in which I have to compute what equals 1+1. The subject constructs everything which is at its disposal, using a priori elements, or rules. Then why does 1 equal itself?

This is not an example of an analytic truth. First, there is no subject and predicate, but also because one has to refer to the definition of equality. The example of "all circles are round" is great, because it asserts something of the subject within the predicate, which only amplifies, but doesn't add to what is implied by the subject. If all thought is restricted to this kind of function, then we would hardly make it out of bed in the mornings, or out the door, or down to the pub; for we would not be able to hypothesize that there is a floor below us, a doorway to allow us out, or a bar to lean on, without having been ourselves the floor, doorway and bar themselves. In short, it is quite impossible for all conceptualization to be analytic. What if I still don't have a good enough understanding of this?

When I was first studying Kant, I found his examples of little help. It took a lot of time and patience to figure out what he meant by synthetic a priori knowledge. He says mathematical formulations are all of this type; that '7+5=12' is synthetic, since there is nothing in the

159 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

concepts of '7' and '5' which should lead directly to the concept of '12'. The concept of '+' is needed in addition, and even then, the equivalency only travels from left to right, since the concept of '12' doesn't lead directly to those of '7' and '5'. Kant foresaw the constructivist mathematicians of our century, in all of this. Now, you might think, since all of our math teachers drilled it into us, that '7+5=12' is self evident, because of the rules of equivalency and addition. But I snicker everytime I hear this, because those rules have to be learned; they are not part of what is given with the numbers themselves. Kant's point was that, since we have to rely heavily upon our experience to complete some thoughts which we later take to be evident, we have constructed knowledge synthetically, which is applied to later experiences. Keep that in mind... So, a much better example, one which I used when taught Kant, is this. I asked all my students to turn to a certain page in their books, say 150. Then I asked them all to give their book to someone else in the class, and take a book from someone, so that nobody had their own book. I then asked them to turn to page 150 in the book which they held. Then they would look at me. Some would realize it, some wouldn't, but after a moment's reflection, it was obvious the reason they could turn to a certain page in a book they never laid hands on was due to synthetic a priori knowledge, which they had secretly constructed in previous experiences. 160 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

Hume taught us that there is no necessity involved in each book having the same construction. Kant goes further to teach us that the connection from the students' own textbooks, to the alternate copies, was synthetic, because they mentally constructed the necessity of one copy being just like another. It was a priori, since what was learned about their own textbooks was applied in an active way to the alternate from their neighbor. Some people will disagree with this example, but I will challenge any of them to come up with a better one, and their opinion will only show they don't fully understand what Kant was talking about. Kant didn't intend synthetic a priori knowledge to be any more complicated than this exhange of textbooks. Certainly, there are more complicated uses for it, such as our construction of "objects," and even "God," but they are all based upon this simple manouvre. His point was that we do this kind of thing all day long, everyday, and all through our lives. If this kind of mentation is not possible, then there can be no possibility of freedom itself. Human liberty and aesthetic choices depend upon this kind of synthetic construction, otherwise we would only have pure analytic truths, like 'every X is an X,' and pure a posteriori experience from our five senses. Freedom is not based in analytics or sense experience, but in synthesis. We use synthetic structures to order our world. So, is Kant telling us we are born with an innate sense of

161 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

things whic bear no such relation to the world?

No, not at all. He was telling us that we have pure a priori forms of sensibility, one as outer, and one as inner, and that from these sources, all synthetic a priori knowledge may follow. He doesn't claim that we were born with them, nor that we learned them. His point in avoiding this, is that we do not have the ability to "see" a primal cause of these forms of sense; they are just there. He rather prefigures the phenomenologists, the existentialists, and the Quineans, in this, to be general. Futher, the forms of sense do bear a relation to the world, but it is the experience of the world, which also comes under question, in the antinomies. The world, is within us, and we can never affirm a singular object of experience which corresponds neatly to our concept of World." Most of us have a terrible time getting our heads around the idea of 'think-in-itself. Can you explain it?

It is that which is unknowable to the mind, because the mind cannot represent it as an appearance of any object. Since, for example, we cannot directly understand what it is like to be a tree, we correspondingly cannot become a tree and experience it as it would be, if we could be a tree. That experience we cannot have is what the tree-initself is, or really, what the mind projects that it would be, since it cannot be represented through intuition. Is 'subjective' the best term to describe this, since there is

162 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

some amount of agreement between speakers?

I feel that the users which make up the social fabric of the language in question completely house that language within each of them. They, in a sense, "affirm" that language with each use of a syllable. Yes language is communicated, but it is not through any other medium but consciousness itself. If you tell me about what a particular word means, when I agree, it is because I have placed that definition into my own constellation of meaning. Therefore, I wonder if any of us actually means the same thing by each word. Such meanings cannot reside outside subjectivity, since the only place where identities occur is within subjectivity, and never in the matrix of quantum forces which make up even the substance of that subjectivity. This is not a dualism, but a folding of a single substance on itself to create reflexive knowledge. So, Kantian doctrine tells us that reality is the mental representation of the inner and outer senses, or space and time?

I think he would say that sense, as inner and outer, conditions the representations which are united in a synthetic manner. These representations are the appearances of the things in themselves, and so, reality as it is, or may be, cannot be known, but only as we condition, represent, unite and project it. Phenomena and Noumena

163 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

Are phenomena and experience merely reprersentations of things?

Right, a phenomena and a representation are the same. We can have absolute knowledge about our phenomena, but never any knowledge about the noumena, the things in themselves, which give occasion to them. If looking at a tree, we can have clear and distinct knowledge about the phenomenal aspects of the tree, but never about how the tree is in itself. In short, we cannot be the tree. We, as selves, only exist as a unity of apperception, a reflexive "folding" of matter, if you will. As such, that is a phenomena, and the noumena of what we are, the quanta, can never be known in themselves. But the common view is that objects of experience are perceived just as they are and sensation copies them as they are.

This is similar to the Lockean and Humean positions which Kant modifies. The problem Kant saw, is that if the laws of the physical world are correct, and therefore determined, then if sensation merely downloads the objects as they are, this determism would extend to our every fantasy; there would be no freewill. He therefore proposes that the object as it really is cannot be connected to our sensation, but only our constructed appearance; there are no objects, in effect, and we read quantum substance into separate objects. We can only project that the tree would have a governing noumenon, but cannot prove so, since we are continually caught up in our own phenomena about such a projected noumena. Simply put;

164 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

I can see you, shake your hand, and so on, but I can never know what it is like to be you, because I do not have access to the noumenal, self-reflexive identity which you are in yourself. Something like time is not something which could exist outside of our perception and understanding. It is a condition of experience because we use it, within our intuition and understanding, to order our representations, presenting them to the unity of the manifold, where they can be guided by the faculty of reason. The same holds for space. So, there is no separate substance of space or time, which contain everything else; they are merely ideas within our mentation which we use to represent reality as an outer one. So, all which remains is noumena?

This is close to the Cartesian, Berkelian and Liebnizian positions which Kant refutes and modifies. With this position, it would be impossible to explain how we have identity, since the noumenal realm would not allow for the separation of each subjectivity. It would be to idealize the greatest possible illusion, as he said. Are noumena particles like electrons or quarks?

Kant is only saying that the electron as a separate object can never be verified in the manner we assume, thus undercutting the revered scientific method. We can know all about our attempts to represent it, to explain it, and control it, but it really cannot be known in itself, and may

165 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

not even be an "it." It may be the case that there is only one single substance, as Spinoza said, which is infinitely attributed. All we can say is that all of our representations cohere to a certain model; the ideas of our reason itself. How do we know anything about phenomena and noumena we don't know about?

Actually, we can know the phenomena, and through the unity of all phenomena relating to a particular moment of possible experience, we can apply that our perceptions refer to a transcendental object which is not sensible, and therefore intelligible. We therefore project that there would be a noumenal component to the phenomena we experience, and this is a product of our modes of understanding. The noumena is itself determined by our understanding, and is itself a representation. We can have knowledge about representations, but since the one in question cannot be directly applied to a possible experience, we cannot know the noumenal. Kant says, at A256/B311, that there is no positive employment of the concepts of phenomena and noumena. This means that he is not saying that there are such things, but only that we concoct them to order our representations. We use the concept of noumena to project that there is something about an object which we cannot know; its objecthood which goes along with our phenomenal representation of the object as an object. Both phenomena and noumena are appearances; it is just that we can have no employment of the categories to that which we call noumenal, and therefore, the effect is that

166 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

there is an unknown something out there. But if there is no time, there is no causality, and therefore no freedom.

It is not that freedom and determism coexist in the phenomenal world, but that freedom is an ideal, which is a determination of reason. Reason self-determines its own application to the representations at hand. Reason is free because, while it legislates representation through the concepts of time and space, it determines the synthesis, and thus tailors the synthesis to the unity, or person, in question. Some would say the "unknowable element" leads to logical incoherence.

Yes, and you're right to think that. I have done a bad job of explaining how the unknowable part is itself part of the dialectical illusion, just as the analytic appearance is part of the strongarming of the schematized categories.... It's like it's supposed to be incoherent, so that we will have a mystical component of the apple to go along with our boring perceptions of it. But it is all of it representation; a series of representation of something we know not; or it is representation of the single substance of space as separated out into a manifold of objects. Hence, if we are to account for electrons, the knowledge must be related to possible appearances?

Yes, what is happening is that the basis for the noumenal

167 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

existence of the electron, or what-have-you, is tied in with the unity of appearance, and thus represented as something which is unknowable. He himself says that the division of phenomena/noumena is misleading and not to be employed in the positive sense, since what is to be taken as noumenal cannot be described, but suggested. So, the noumena is something mysterious that gives rise to the phenomena?

Yes, but they give rise to each other; or they are combined into a transcendental object. It is something mysterious because we make it that way; we generate the noumenon, it is from our head, and is not out there beyond us. It is, he said, and ideal which is further removed than the perceptions themselves. In this, he descibes how the transcendental ideal is like a mirror, resulting in an image which is completely virtual, and sits at double the distance from the thing represented. (A644/B672) It seems so incredibly mysterious, the thing-in-itself.

You're right to call it mysterious. It is very difficult to speak of, because most people are not quite onto what Kant was saying about it. They put forth that there really is some noumenon out there which cannot be known; that to look at an apple, there is something about the apple itself which cannot be described. Let me try to be clear; the noumenon is as much a product of reason as the phenomenon is. In considering

168 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

the apple in my hand, I am representing all of the sense data, as conditioned by the concepts of space and time, and focusing those representations toward a single solitary object in my awareness. I then project that these representations refer to this object, but realize that they do not lead me into what that object is. They are appearances only, and so I construct the idea that there must be a "whatness" about the apple which is not sensible, and therefore intelligible. I therefore think that there is a way of understanding the object within the intelligible world, which is similar to the ideal form of the object. So, it is the situation of reason, then, to present its sense data as a separated object in space and time, and to construct an appearance of it, but since this appearance is not satisfying, I construct a noumenal representation of it, thus doubling both the illusion, as well as the supposed object's ontology, if you will. I have, however, never really encountered the object in all of this, and never will, because there is not an object to be found; there are only quanta and forces associated with them. Reason divides the One into Many, and situates them within its own notions of time and space. So, there are two things going on in Kant. The idea that the object is an effect of our modes of understanding through the categories, and that we construct an appearance of this effect, and then posit that there is an unknowable element of it beyond our sensual experience. Therefore, there is no noumenon "out there", but only as an idea of reason which corresponds with the phenomenal 169 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

representation. The above explanation is also of the process of freewill. I mean that in our representation of the apple as a separate object from ourselves, and then our postulate that it has a uniqueness which cannot be known, Kant is saying that this is our freedom; that we have the volition and synthetic power to create a viewpoint which is unique to our frame of reference. This is just one way Relativity theory came out of the German AufklÄrung, among other sources. Contemporary Quantum Theory owes a great debt to Kant, as well as Berkeley, Spinoza and Liebniz, since Kant made clear, or at least tried to make clear, the shift away from an absolutism of human perception, toward the view of a basic quantum molecularity which is then represented, or expressed, by reason. Curiously he calls his philosophy "Transcendental Idealism" because in philosophy, which is human, we idealize our attempts to transcend our ability to represent our experience of the quanta; we attempt to go beyond our experience, to establish the ontological reality of a Self, World/object and a God, and in this, our reason is guided by the greatest of ideals. How did Kant promote this shift towards 'the view of a basic quantum molecularity?'

Yes, Berkeley says in #90 of the Principles, "Ideas imprinted on the senses are real things, or do really exist; this we do not deny; but we deny that they can subsist

170 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

without the minds which perceive them..." #5 In truth, the object and sensation are the same thing, and cannot therefore be abstracted from each other. In the first of three dialogues, he says "...all the colours we see with our naked eyes are only apparent as those on the clouds, since they vanish upon a more close and accurate inspection which is afforded us by a microscope...I ask you whether the real and natural state of an object is better discovered by a very sharp and piercing sight, or by one which is less sharp?" I know that this is primitive, but it clearly indicates an interest in the molecular nature of things, and how we have the illusion of objects. Spinoza talked about it when he talked about the subject "expressing" the single substance; Liebniz got into it with his plurality of tiny inner mirrors which create the windowless monad, and Kant took it up in many places in the Critique. Of course, it was a concern in the ancient world too, since Parmenides talked about all things being One, and that we confused ourselves by thinking about Many, Heraclitus talked of the flow of the river, and Plotinus talked about leaving the intellect behind, since it only confuses itself into talking about things it cannot know. The idea that relativity and quantum theory are anything at all new and modern is wholly naive, then. So Kant does not think that there are objects?

Kant takes, a bit like Spinoza, that what we experience, is not de facto the same as what may be "out there," since

171 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

we represent what is out there, for Spinoza, our body expresses matter. With Kant, I cannot say there is no chair underneath me; but I can say that whether the chair is in itself, the same as I experience it, is forever beyond my subjective position. No amount of speculation can get me around this fact that I have knowledge only of the appearances of things, and never the things-in-themselves. It is not that there are phenomena floating out there for us to take up, but that what is, inasmuch as we can talk about it, is noumenal, and our attempt to represent it, is what produces the phenomenal. All that we can know, then, is the phenomenal, and the processes of how we order those phenomena systematically. Kant was not an empirical realist, but challenged this Lockean position rather doggedly, in various places in the Critique. Kant disagreed with Locke, Hume, and Newton, in this realism, since for him, it destroys the very hope of any freewill, since the determinism of nature would extend to our every dream. Where is the world, then; what is the origin of what is really there?

There is, for Kant, no way to speak of any origin of the world, which is the whole basis of the antinomy of pure reason. Yes, the world as we experience it, is a product of the forms of intuition, and the application of the categories to these forms by means of the principles, but the confirmation of this process to the object itself, is what produces the amphiboly in Kant's system. We cannot verify that the properties of our experience are a

172 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

direct result of nature itself. All which can be verified, is that this process of thought is merely true of the appearances we produce of nature. This leads to a world which is not inter-subjective, nor accessible by any creature but the subjectivity in question. This is the whole point of Kant's system, which at first seems rather depressing, that we live wholly in a world of appearances, and can never find solace in the things themselves. We cannot even connect to our own "soul," for we would always be representing it as an object of experience. However, this view is necessary, in order so to show that we can and do in fact have freewill, for if the appearances were the things in themselves, then freedom cannot be saved, he says in the solution to the antinomy. Is the phenomenal world really there?

No, the phenomenal "world" is empirically real only within subjectivity, for it is only possible through that subjectivity. Remember, that in the aesthetic, Kant removes what is empirical from the Lockean correspondence theory, from the very first sentence. If Kant were alive today, he would say that all which can be verified of an "outer" world are atoms, photons, and the like. The empirical "reality" we assume, of tables and chairs, is nothing more than the product of the intuition, which is subjective. Berkeley said very much the same thing in the "Theory of Vision" and "Three Dialogues". So, transcendental and empirical reality, as such, are both subjective. The empirical is that which can have an object of possible experience, and the transcendental is that

173 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

which cannot. But, if noumena exist, would they not exist in space, since space should be the necessary condition for them?

Space is one of the forms which conditions our intuition, and it is within this space that a noumenal element is thought to "exist." However, this space is not an absolute, "outer" space, but an inner, subjective space. There can be no basis for a belief in a true outer and absolute space, because we have no way to abstract beyond our modes of experience, which presume space, in order to represent objects. So, yes, noumenal elements must exist in space, but the space in which they exist is purely mental, and is wholly a mode of representation. The noumenal is a transcendental thing, 'X,' which does not have a corresponding sensible intuition within the manifold of intuition, but it is necessary to the unity of apperception. If we take away this noumena, then, the phenomena will be lost as well, for the understanding would have no "box" to put all of the sensations in, regarding that object, be it a chair, or a tree, or whatever. Therefore, the noumena is represented in space, but only subjectively. We project that there is an object out there, such as a tree, and within this "folder," we place our manifold of intuitions. The result is a transcendental object which is ideal within us, rather than real outside us, or if it is real, we are in no position to verify it. Particles and forces are bound up with these concepts, and space and time are just as real as them. The point is

174 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

that they are all noumenal. The consensus of our perceptual systems in no way demonstrates the least thing about what is beyond us. We all see a blue sky above us during the daytime; the same colour is recorded on film and tape; but where is the sky? What colour is "it"? The particles and forces are bound up with space and time, and vice versa. They are all just as real as the other, but this "reality" is fully within subjectivity, and can never be demanded of some kind of "objective realm." Space and time are, for Kant, the conditions for our sense data, and particles and forces are projected noumena, or ideas, of which an object of possible experience can never be found. This is not in conflict with science at all. Kant is not questioning the utility of believing that there are real objects beyond our perceptions, he is questioning the dogmatic assertion that we can know the least thing about them in themselves, as they may be. The reason he does this, is to counter the prevailing wind of determinism, and secure a bit of freedom for the subject, which is the basis for knowledge, ethics, and beauty. If the objects are connected to us, I say in an odd way, then freedom cannot be saved. But could this be seen as a restatement of Patonic idealism?

Kant's dualism is purely synthetic, and arises from the way in which consciousness represents "moments of thought." The old dualisms were ontological, proposing that there were two realms, or two types of substance. Kant notes that we cannot speak of substance, but to

175 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

understand his point, it is like All, as one, is a collection of quanta, but that when Being represents this collection, it literally creates the dualism of self and world; inner and outer, etc. Also, the dichotomy you mention, which presumably your professors "related" is inaccurate. Both the noumenal and the phaenomenal are perceptible; it is just that one can be met with an object of experience, and one is purely transcendental. How can we discern between an objective experience of the world, and a subjective experience of world and mind?

The only discernment which is possible, by this light, is due to the influence of the very ideals of reason, which operate on itself to produce such distinctions. There is no objective experience of anything, but only subjective. For there to be an "objective" type of experience, we would have to grant that such experience comes about through a "viewpoint." This viewpoint would not be an objectivity, but another subjectivity. Through the regulative ideas of reason, namely the paralogism of the soul, the antinomy of the world, and the ideal of reason, we make the subjective representations that there is an "I", that there is a world, and that there is a supreme being, or cause, at work in all of this. These are the focal points of the synthetic series, which begin with the pure forms of intuition. "Experience," then, is that reflexive process of representing our own modes of consciousness, our own intuitions, and ideals. Truly, there is some kind of

176 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

substance, or some kind of force, or quantum reality, which occasions our experiences, but the assumption that there are objects of experience, such as trees and apples, is wholly subjective, and a product of the ways that we represent ourselves and our experience as objects. On this point, Kant borrows from Parminedes, Democritus, Plotinus, Berkeley, Spinoza, and Liebniz. The thread running through these thinkers is there concern with the way that subjectivity "reads" the raw code, if you will, it encounters, and "renders" it into a full colour environment. Few philosphers have had the perception to realize that this resulting environment was not present outside of subjectivity, or at least, could not be verified to be so. Trees, as it were, do not "give off" phenomena which are then absorbed by the senses, as the straight empiricists would have us believe. Rather, it is a much more complicated process, as we all know, in which we produce our own representations, based upon what is given through the raw senses. The "reality" we thus experience, is of our own production, and is the very edifice of subjectivity... But, it is impossible to talk about a reality external to our consciousness which doesn't fall into the context of our internal modes of representation, either within language, or any other means of representation. In short, "reality" is that quality we ascribe to our own intuitions of the given. Transcendental idealism is that theory which says that our modes of consciousness are the very basis for what we 177 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

assume to be the "outer." We cannot talk about what is not part of our experience as it is in itself, but we also make a transcendental effort to idealize that which we cannot talk about as something noumenal, or something spiritual, or something "other." If we could talk about that which is outside of subjectivity, we would have a quite boring discourse. Many philosophers, at least from Descartes up, contend that the mental, the subjective, is really a mechanical effect, a reflexive process, or a set of modes of consciousness. So, Reason sets itself up, in a way. It posits that there is a quality to the object which is beyond what is directly experienced, but this directness is itself already a postulate, and so the phenomenal experience and the noumenal ideal lay over one another within the subjective determinations of the object. All the while there was never the slightest trace of either phenomenal or noumenal in the object, for there was never an object in the first place, but merely a system of forces within the quantum field. Therefore, we cannot have access to the noumenon because our subjectivity posits that it is something which cannot be accessed, and it thereby is an ideal by which we render the multiplicity of objects, from our phenomenal representation of the singularity of the quantum field. Kant says the same thing, interestingly, about the soul, the world, and God; they are all ideals which can never have a corresponding object of experience, but they nevertheless exist, for us, as necessary and regulative principles; they are thus, 178

of

206

Synthetic

A

Priori

because we make them so. Also, there is no objective time for photons to be subject to, but also, they are not to be separated from the electro-dynamic system of which they are a part. How did Kant establish any reliability of reason, given the representation?

Actually, this was the reason for his transcendental idealism in the first place. He thought that, if our cognition conforms to objects, then our Reason cannot operate with a priori certainty, but if the objects of our experience conform to our way of representing the given forces, then we can have both a priori, and synthetic a priori reasoning, and we can have absolute certainty about the workings of our mind. This not circular, since the position does not also try to define what that collection of forces could be; it is beyond Reason to do this. That is why Reason is so creative, so to speak, and why Kant supports individuality, freedom and aestheticism. Kant made relatively clear, in the Paralogisms and Antinomies, that the dualism, if we must use that sophomoric word, resides within reason itself. Not that it is a limiting split, but a necessary split. Reason uses this distinction between experience and the unknowable to generate notions of a self and a world; it wraps all of this up into a notion of the sum total of possibility, a God. So, without the distinction between phaenomena/noumena, reason would be unable to

179

of

206

Synthetic A Priori

represent within the manifold a subsistent "self" or an outside "world." He never said there really are noumena out there, beyond our grasp, but that they are a mental representation of the very notion of the unknowable, which is already mental itself. Let me share a little dialogue an online friend and I came up with Kantian: Time merely appears to us within our perception of the world. We cannot escape our subjective perception, so we cannot think time is real. Physicist: But we can escape those perceptions by using instrumentation to record what we cannot represent. Kantian: That's irrelevant, since time is a property of how we subjectively organize our perception. We construct time sequences because our mind is simply made that way. Physicist: But we can conceptualize "non-temporal" universes. These universes don't match our data , so time is real. Logician: On the contrary, time has not been measured in the same way as infrared, so it is not an evasion of perception to merely assume it exists. Also, regardless of how a model universe fits the data, time is not established as an existent, independent property simply on basis of model data. Kantian: Therefore, we cannot allow that time or space exist as separate entities, when they have never been observed. Even if time and space were to be detectable as objects, we could only experience them by means of appearances.

Morality and Duty On to Morality. Didn't Kant feel we should always tell the truth?

180 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

He made a distinction between "public" and "private" uses of reason. To use reason publicly was to engage in a freedom of speech, and licencing of books. To be bound by a private reason was to bite one's tongue in certain situations. You are using private reason at your job, when you don't agree with certain practices, but you keep quiet. At home, or with friends, you are reasoning publicly, and should be able to speak freely. He did say that if a criminal appeared at your door, asking for a friend, that you were bound to tell his whereabouts; but that was only an example in a "monkey" explanation of the categorical imperative.....my belief is that he really thought otherwise. One has to remember the high political and moral value which was placed upon honesty at the time, as opposed to now, and that to say something about how to find and kill your friend is not really an indication of the quality of the entire Kantian perspective. What is meant by 'Kingdom of Ends?'

It is Kant's term for humanity, or the blend of society and humanity. He wasn't interested in a political boundary, a state of nationalists, but a collection of us who chose to be a part of the kingdom by doing the most "human" thing at all times. For example, if an elderly woman is about to be hit by a city bus, and you have the power to get her out of harm's way, then in order to be in, or remain in, the kingdom, is to help her; if you do not, you are not even human. This is because you have a self-preservation instinct, and you

181 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

must realize that she does too; you thereby "connect" with her on a level which is neither physical or spiritual, but decidedly human. Through freedom, using our will, we have the choice to apply our rules and understanding to new experiences. Is this a situational ethics?

It is not exactly clear that Kant recognized this, but I generally give him the doubt on it. I usually say that he realized the situational, but needed to construct a method by which we could have freedom and morality at the same time. So, he wanted to construct a guide, or an ideal, fully realizing the situational complications at times; it is quite naive to want a moral theory to answer every single and possible situation, but reasonable to expect some kind of general guide, like the Kingdom of Ends. It becomes necessary to consider that very few actions are moral ones, and that the rest are free; much like Mill's notion of an Epicurean utility. Does it sound like spiritual elitism to you?

Kant's theories are not about elitism, nor are they about spirituality. It is not about viewing others from the high road, but about the very lack of the same. The categorical imperative is simply a litmus test for any particular action, but it is not without its difficulties. If one were to consider murdering someone, could we say that murder should be justified universally? Since the answer is no, it is not an action which is sanctioned by the categorical imperative, and is therefore not a moral behaviour. Note,

182 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

that it is not an immoral behaviour, but a behaviour which is "not moral." Since Kant had separated subjectivity so cleanly from the noumenal, in the first critique, in the Groundwork, he had to show how a subjectivity could be "connected" to all others. The only way, is by extending the grace we give ourselves to another person, realizing that they are a subjectivity as well, and that they deserve the same respect which we would afford ourselves. Thus, we have the Kingdom of Ends, or what we call "humanity." An action which promotes this humanity is moral, one which does not, is not moral. There is no talk in Kant's work about elitism, and since he was basically against the technical connection of the noumenal aspects of things in themselves, there is no spirituality. What about the categorical imperative? Does it logically follow from these premises?

The imperative logically depends upon the premise that all rational subjects are equal. If there were inequity, it would be obvious that treating people as means, is justified. Kant definitely wanted to avoid this. People must be equal, so that the treatment of them as ends-inthemselves is alone justified. A moral action should spring from the will. Kant doesn't have a prescriptive ethics, in the normal sense, but uses a technical definition. If an action is something that can be universally justified, then it is moral, and it promotes the Kingdom of Ends. If an action cannot be justified in that manner, then it simply is not an action which can

183 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

properly be called moral. It isn't necessarily immoral, either. So, we have to want to be moral, since reason doesn't force us to be moral?

Yes, that was Kant's point. Reason literally chooses to do actions which promote the Kingdom of Ends, which is based upon the instinct of self-preservation. Reason chooses because it is free, and in it's choice, it legislates that freedom for itself and others, but ONLY in regard to those universally justified actions. The rest of action is personal, private, and not to be harmed my ethical discourse, regardless of how a bystander interprets it. We have to avoid the temptation to read philosophers through some pre-defined, and newer, ethical constructs. If so, you will certainly miss out on what Kant offers, since his theory is highly idiosyncratic, and doesn't set out a table of good and bad actions. He only classes the one type of moral behaviour, and all else is left out from moral discourse. If the consequences of a particular action are neither positive nor negative why should one follow duty?

Because, by doing action which is in conflict with the motive of duty, you are not participating in your own humanity. Since this is in conflict with the Kingdom of Ends, you would be behaving in a rather non-human way, for Kant. You would be treating yourself as an appearance only, and not taking your relation to the

184 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

intelligible world into account at all. You must treat me as an end in myself, but it doesn't mean that you absolutely have to do so. You have the choice, and that is what the moral theory depends upon. Further, even though Reason legislates the freedom which characterizes the will, the choice is still there for the individual, for there will always be grey cases. The whole point is the choice of the will, not mandation from some form of authority. Does subjective desire lead to a feeling of worth?

The worth of happiness doesn't just arise from any old subjective desire. Kant was very much in favour of the individual; for the subjective freedom of all people, BUT, he says that the connection we have with others is that bridge which allows us to realize that another human being is a subjectivity as well; that other person deserves the same consideration as I would give myself. This means that murder is a crime against the subjectivity of another person, and since it severs the connection we have with that person, it is rather like treating them as an object, rather than as a subject; or a means rather than as an end. So, to do so is to really cease being human, and this puts oneself outside of the Kingdom of Ends, which means that the purely subjective happiness which may come from murder is not justified as a categorical imperative, nor is it a basis for the "worth." Furthermore, this kind of onesided happiness is not really possible, he says, since the hard-wired method of our

185 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

personhood is to recognize others as equals, and makes it difficult to be secure merely within the subject; we strive to connect with others, in other words. This does not mean that we cannot make our own choices, or that we cannot have our own style, but it does mean that we should not treat others MERELY as means to our own end; we MUST treat others, even when simply "using" them, as ends in themselves. This promotes the Kingdom, or humanity, and is the true basis for happiness within a cosmopolitan society. Given this, was Kant a moral absolutist or relativist?

Neither; it's a false dichotomy. Kant does offer an absolutizing theory, or really, a universalization of what the individual is about to do, only in some cases. What he means is that any action we would consider to be morally justified, must be something we would have everybody do; that's what would make it moral. Kant was not an absolutist, and perhaps was closer to a relativist, saying that each of us has a will, a volition, which has to choose to do the moral thing, in the right situation. It's not right to lie to a murderer about your friend's whereabouts, because that would justify lying as a universally right act. It cannot be a moral action, then, and is not a categorical imperative. Let me be clear The categorical imperative is NOT a classification of all actions we could ever do; it is a

186 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

limited class of a small number of actions; all other actions are merely not of the moral/immoral type. So, if you are using a Windows computer, that is not a moral type of action, no matter what the Mac people say about Bill Gates. You can use the computer all day long, and never commit a crime against humanity, simply on basis of what kind of computer it is. But if you push an elderly lady into the path of a city bus; commit suicide; kill someone, or lie to someone; you are committing an action against humanity itself; against your own humanity, or against the class of imperatives; for in that moment, you have ceased to be a human. At that point, you treat others, and even yourself, as an object, not as a willing subject. This kind of action is therefore not categorically justified in the moral sphere. That's what categorical means here; there is only one way to classify these actions; they have to be thought of in a "categorical" way. To act morally, in the right situation, but not every situation of life, one has to imagine that what they are about to do could be made a universal action for all of us. If it can, then it is justifiable; if not, then it is either anti-moral, or not a moral type of action in the first place. Through the moral class of action, we connect to the humanity of others, and are able to treat them as subjective ends-in-themselves, rather than objects, and means to our end. But what if pushing old ladies in front of buses makes me happy?

On his view, you might be happy pushing these old ladies

187 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

out to meet their deaths, but you have not participated in their humanity by doing it; further still, by destroying their humanity, you destroy your own, and thus become a mere animal, if even that. It is not enough, for Kant, to simply be happy, because in order for that happiness to be human, it must not interfere with another's humanity. This doesn't mean we should avoid unpopular behaviour, this is not what he said. It is that given a choice, we must avoid that act which attacks another's subjectivity; it cannot be justified. We might be happy doing just about anything, but the only happiness which is justifiable is that which either fails to intersect with another's, or when it does intersect, fails to overide their happiness. Remember, though, that no moral theory is truly able to classify every possible action or confluence of actions in a historical development; it is only meant as a rough guide.

188 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

AGAINST OBJECTIVISM

Objective Irony Given your other commentary, does it bother you that Objectivists claim to be philosophers?

Yes, it does! It is because Objectivists claim to be philosophers, when they are really religious zealots. If they would just be honest about it, we philosophers wouldn't care what they say. Isn't their highest principle reason?

I suppose that is their God, but that is not what bothers me. I'm an atheist, as well. What bothers me is that they claim that everyone needs a personal philosophy; that no one should take life at face value, but then they turn around and shame others into taking Rand's system at face value,with absolutely no debate about the fundamentals. It is about these fundamentals which philosophers are going to be preeminently concerned. If we are to live by her fundamentals, and take them on faith by the way, then we are not constructing a personal 189 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

philosophy, but are merely succombing to a religious cult which has substituted Rand's definition of "reason" for Christianity's definition of "God." Rand is probably one of the first philosophical writers many high school students would have encountered in their studies, during the last several decades. It is on the young, philosophically untrained mind, that her prose has the most sway; and once swayed, it is very hard to overcome her misperceptions, bitterness, and straw arguments. Lucky me, I encountered real philosophers before I ever heard her name, and so I could easily dismiss her claptrap, and especially Piekoff's, as inconsistent, irrational, and preachy. But they would say Ayn Rand offers a refreshing and consistent defense of man's ability to reason.

It is hardly refreshing, since Hesiod did the same centuries before even Plato wrote, who was probably one of the first to be recognized for defending reason. Every philosopher has provided this defense, in fact; all which differs in them is their method of delivery, and their ultimate directions of reasoning. It is just that impressionable type of mind, which is swayed, by the Rand marketing, into believing that she was the first to do anything, and that ALL other philosophers were mislead and corrupt. Forgive me if I say whatever. It seems the appeal is with those who wish to say they have no duty to sacrifice themselves to anyone.

190 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

Yes, her thought comes across as a life saver, except it doesn't work. She preaches a Howard Roark, but delivers a Gail Wynand and a Peter Toohey. Her thought implicitly leads to the same uniformity of thinking and living which she so ardently opposed, and that is due to the very basic assumptions with which she works. For one example, if the senses are to be taken as necessarily valid, and if it is assumed that the senses perceive "facts," then there is hardly much room left for any type of creativity, or even slight difference of perception and opinion, is there? Each moment of perception from each person would be bound to the same truth, governed by a strict determinism, and no one would be capable of the least bit of freedom. There would not be the very possibility of an individual, to experience freedom in the first place. Her thought boils down to a very clever type of religion, or pseudo-philosophy cult, in that it preys upon the unsuspecting mind and feeds it with lots of "newspeak" about individuality, honesty, consistency and happiness, when on closer inspection, it leads to the same totalitarianism, mysticism, and blind faith which it claims to avoid. The reason it leads to that which it states as "unsanctionable," is due to its lack of clarity, and insistence upon the uniformity of reason. An unclear philosophy can lead anywhere we care to push it, because it's author or followers have spun their wheels on marketing and hype, and not enough on detailed exposition, in the philosophical, and logical, senses.

191 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

As an added irony, and a bonus for me, is that her named opponents, Kant and Nietzsche, offer a far more justifiable and constistent defense of the goals of individuality and freedom. Her blatant misreading of those thinkers, as well as others, is quite a laugh to those of us who know better, since we got our Kant and Nietzsche from actually reading them, studying them, and working out the processes of reasoning ourselves, rather than taking her word for it. Rand, along with Piekoff's help, is the cause of her own philosophical problems, in a way. It is rather like an advertising gimmick, where they might say, "you want honesty and reason, right? Well, you can do it with Objectivism"; not themselves realizing or ever pointing out that an Objectivism which is merely an advertising slogan cannot deliver its high road of philosophical promises. Existence ~Exists So, let's get down to details. Why would the famous axiom 'existence exists' be needed?

Because Rand claims so. She and Piekoff claim if one were to be rational, and honest, then one would have to take as granted that the fundamental edifice of Objectivism is the fact that existence exists. They further argue, if one were to deny this claim, then one is being irrational and dishonest, since it is a self-evident truth. I usually set out to refute both claims, as well as provide

192 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

counter-arguments for them. First, we must refute "existence exists," and refute that one would be irrational to deny a fundamental tenet, qua tenet, since a tenet is not an axiom. Then we should provide offensives against repetition, by challenging the value of such an edifice, in light of the very aims of Objectivism, and by turning the moralizing table on the Randists, by questioning the name calling function of "irrational and dishonest." You see, the fact that you or I may need a complex system, is no indication of its universality to all humans, or that it should be applied in the same manner. This is one of my beefs with Randism; that once she set up the universal need for a system, it is all too easy to start dictating the characteristics of that system. From there, it is a skinny step to totalitarianism, or some kind of ethically justified power technique. This is in direct conflict with individualism, of which Rand claimed to be in support. So did Rand fail those she wanted to help?

Objectivism is opinion. In that, it cannot be "wrong," so much as "misguided." It cannot fail, but when it proposes to be more than an opinion. Therefore, the most fundamental objection to Objectivism is that it proposes itself to be not opinion, but glorious Truth, then, in labeling all other theories and religions as opinions, which it attempts to refute on those grounds, it proposes to transcend its own boundaries. It's a bit like a stolen concept, ironically.

193 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

In every reading, and in every conversation with proponents, I find that Rand continually misunderstood the philosophers she wishes to refute; most notably, Kant and Nietzsche. She spends pages talking about their supposed "anti-life" campaign, when, if she had spent a little more effort, she may have realized that her theory borrows heavily from the flow of ideas which these thinkers both utter, and to which they both give rise. This is to leave aside her quite erroneous comments on the nature of capitalism, especially the morality of capititalism, if there really is such an animal. Further, there is not much rigour in her work, compared to the thinkers she attempts to deface. There is the endless repetition of silly concepts like "existence exists", and A is A; but for all of her ashen breathed preaching, she did little to advance philosophical thought, but to repackage Aristotle, Kant, and Nietzsche in contemporary dress, thus muddled and poorly excecuted as philosophy, for an American audience who did not, nor would not, take the time to study the history of ideas in their depth. But, as an individualist and one against religion, she claims Kant and Nietzsche are against those values.

If I had to pick the two philosophers who were the strongest individualists and who were both against religion, I would pick Kant and Nietzsche. At what point has she really disagreed with them, when she quite simply reversed their positions? In Nietzsche's case, he says that our task is to transgress from the Christian morality, to get beyond it; beyond mere good and evil,

194 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

toward a new moral basis which can hardly be defined in Christian terms; a new morality which would be based upon the individual, rather than the war of master herd and slave herd? If that is what Nietsche said, and Rand says his position is opposite that, I have to side with the one who wrote the text in question. Didn't Ayn Rand discover and identify the basis of man's individual rights and Capitalism's morality?

No, Rand did not discover these bases, nor can I discern what she may have identified. I find in her work nothing we can't easily pick up from John Locke, or Thomas Jefferson, both of whom went into fair detail about how a Capitalist commonwealth would be the only system worth having. And, what has she said about a philosophy of individual rights which we can't get from Kant, Schopenhauer, Marx, Kiekegaard, Nietzsche, Freud, Bergson, and so on, all of whom based their very thoughts - from sythetic a priori, to representation, to modes of production, to faith, to transgression, to subconsciousness, to elan vital - upon the individual's gainful input into his own reality? You mentioned her lack of rigor. What do you mean by that?

What appears to be rigour on her part, is simply verbosity. She is an interesting novelist, and in that, I can respect her, but, like Robert Persig, she does far more to confuse the relevant issues, and in the process her readers, than to approach clarity. I cannot fathom how she

195 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

contributed to the history of ideas, rather than muddling them. To state an idea, an opinion, as an established fact, and then demand of the reader it be taken on such ambiguous grounds, is not to practice philosophy, but to require concession. In that, Objectivism is not about an individual's individuality, but about Rand's individuality; it is not about life, but all for the destruction of it in favour of proclaiming what is truth with a capital "T". For, from the assumption of a central facticity, it is painfully easy to justify the atrocities of imperialism. It's just where those ideas lead, based upon her own thinking. It seems Rand's epistemology is based upon establishing the fact of reason, as a separate realm of objectivity apart from subjectivity, her morality is based upon the willfull snubbing of those who do not follow the pattern of reason which is set up in the epistemology. Her view therefore leads to inequity, racism, totalitarianism, and is truly antilife, since it destroys by devaluation our subjectivity, or at least subjectivity which is not in line with a Randist "established fact" of reason, as above. The whole problem, then, is how is this "fact" supposed to be taken as anything BUT an assertion of one person's subjectivity? What works by Rand have you studied?

"Objectivist Epistemology," "Fountainhead," "The Virtue of Selfishness," and a couple of other bits and pieces, along with some comments by Peikoff, and one of his lectures and books. I have tried to read others on many occasions, but these are very painful books for me to

196 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

read, as I am disagreeing with every single sentence, both on logical and ideological grounds. As a thinker, Initially, I want to give her a fair shake, but it feels as if I'm dealing with a religious cult, rather than a philosophy. It's as if what she has to say must be taken on faith, but is worded as reasoning. Worse still, what she says about other philosophers is flat wrong; what she says is evident, isn't, and what she says follows from this, doesn't. But wasn't Rand clear about the basis of her philosophy, the fact that 'existence exists'?

What is existence? What is it to exist? I don't mean to be combative, but what is taken as a starting point borrows heavily on some other ontological concepts. Is this existence a substance? Is it a force, or pattern, or what? So, Rand was painfully explicit about something being the starting point, but that something is itself not explicit. The phrase itself may be a starting point, but it is hardly crystal clear, nor is it anything but an assumption. In metalogic, we can start with any assumption we care to, constructing a consistent system, if we like, but that assumption is just that; an assumption. We could say that "existence exists" implies two corollaries; that something exists, and that someone exists to percieve it. But, do the corollaries hold? Or is it that they are further assumptions? To say "someone exists" is to borrow on another concept which is not stated in the earlier phrase "existence exists." The claim is that existence exists, not that perception exists.

197 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

We could say Rand was unique in identifying the relationship of conciousness to existence, but as I look at any book on modern philosphy, I have to admit this is not unique to Rand. As stated, this would be characteristic of thinkers from Descartes to Deleuze. But looking back farther; what about Parmenides, Plato or Plotinus? A cursory look at summaries of their thought would reveal the same conclusion; they were uniquely concerned with the relationship of conciousness to existence, and further, how to base such views in rational thought. But even an assumption is a statement which is taken as a fact in lieu of validation, to validate something, something has to exist.

We cannot claim that something is fundamental to all of reality and consciousness, without first establishing the perceptory mechanism at work which would have that fundamental something. This is one reason why "existence exists," is NOT fundamental, but only an assumption. There are others. We can't make a claim, first, that existence exists, ignoring reason, then say that it borrows on no concepts. We cannot then respond to the attack that it does borrow on concepts by saying that if it did, it would borrow on "something exists." This is a concept that would have to come after the first one, but only if we can establish the first one, which we can't. But axioms are fundamental. They only need to be validated. 198 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

An axiom, or postulate, is only an axiom within the context of a proof, the result of which shall be a theorem; otherwise, it is simply an assumption - a statement or assertion. As such, it is the metalogical version of "statement/premise". A statement is a premise only in the context of a valid argument form, and otherwise, is just a statement. The word "assumtion" came to cover both premise and axiom, in an umbrella fashion. People can normally "speak" of something as being an axiom, because they intend to go somewhere with it, on their way toward, at least one, theorem. Now, if they intend for their axiom to be taken as a self-evident proposition on its own, then, if it is one, it is a tautology, such as A=A. Rand, as a further curiosity, intends us to take "existence exists" as one of these, as if it were merely an instantiation of A=A. The problem is, though, that it is not a tautology, for the concept of existence is semantically used as a property of something which is itself taken to be extant, and not an extant substance itself. So, the statement is not clear, and is therefore not a tautology, since it turns out to be equivalent to A=B, which has to be shown by some other means than utterance. Her "analysis" is in my view a confusion of the ontology of Being, but that is another subject. We cannot use an axiom as a fundamental building block of an ontology in the same way that "existence exists" is used, since it can quite easily, as I have shown, be made 199 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

dependent on other assumptions, which negates the claim that it is fundamental. If it were only a set of consistent statements we were after, all we would have to say is that "existence exists" is a working assumption for a deduction, but Rand is after some larger philosophical import to the nature of reality than that. But could we say that if there is no existence there is no knowledge?

That would be fallacious, since we are not attacking that things exist. What is denied is the primacy, in an epistemological sense of existence, which is to be established though no other evidence than the very flimsy example of "existence exists." After all, this is philosophy and reason we are talking about here, and using some very simple concepts, I have put into serious question the very foundation of Objectivism in a few short lines. If it were so easy for me to do, then Objectivism must not be very well thought out, resting only on some kind of "don't ask" mentality. Objectivism is just a cult with a nice website. Some would say, "We have to begin somewhere...", and this may as well be with existence.

This is perhaps the fatal flaw in Objectivism, from a theoretical point of view. It is a HUGE assumption that we have to begin with some irreducible point, or principle; so huge it begs for an explanation, which ironically means the irreducible must be supported with a genealogy of concepts. The problem particular to human

200 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

reason is it is thrown into a universe which is already ongoing; Quine had cited the ancient ship of Theseus, when he said that the mind must go along, making its meaning and truth without a clear theoretical beginning. It is like sailing on the ocean, having to repair the broken planks of the hull, while continuing to sail. Descartes blew the idealism of Archimedean causes away in his Meditations. There is no indubitable way to confirm the true nature of the wax in my hand, not, that is, before I confirm how it is I come to know of it, or how I percieve it. We must begin with perception, but with that, the entire thrust of Objectivism is ruined, since it depends upon an idealism of the thing-in-itself, to which reason must ascend. But is 'existence exists' self-evident, such as A=A?

Just because A=A doesn't need a proof for us to understand it, it by no means follows that it doesn't have a corresponding proof by which to complete it. If we wish for "existence exists" to be taken in the same light as A=A, then we will have to get around the problem that it is actually equivalent to A=B. But even in the vernacular, the statement is ambiguous and misleading. If existence is all that exists, then, is existence a substance?, or are the objects we experience that which exist? It's just like the time and space thing we have gotten into; is time a substance or not?, and no matter which way we go on it, it is not clear from the statement itself that the we have chosen the correct one;

201 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

therefore, it is not self-evident, it is not a tautology, and not an axiom I would use to derive a theorem. It sounds more like a conclusion, which would come after a good bit of groundwork, which only shows my point that "existence exists" is not irreducible. In the case of "all bachelors are unmarried men," would we say that the meaning of "bachelor" has any import to the status of the statement, and whether it is a tautology? All of us take "bachelor" to mean "unmarried man," so there is no problem. If we turn our attention to A=A, then it seems that the above statement is a perfect example of this kind of analytically true statement; but what was crucial to all of this was the clear representation of the meaning of the term "bachelor." The reason it was crucial was due to the fact that we were not merely dealing with symbols and functions, but with linguistic components which are rarely as clear as A=A. It is likewise the case with "existence exists." But here, I am calling into question both terms on the same basis. The reason they are both problematic is due to the fact that, not only are we dealing with linguistic components, which create both a semantic and syntactic problem which has to be explained, but also, we are dealing with what I can call "ontologically rich" concepts, the final meaning of which very few of us agree about. But, it is as if we are to take 'existence' as 'all that exists'?

But, it is to be taken as a fundamental axiom on her part, as that which doesn't depend on any other thought She

202 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

doesn't use the term in this way, she takes it as a self evident truth, which I say is impossible without a semantic understanding of the terms! Our whole problem has been in using "existence" as "all that exists." So, why must we "use" a term through another, thereby defining it, to say what we need about it, if it is fundamentally selfevident? If a statement is self-evident and also is not supposed to appeal to any other thought process, why do we need to have english equivalent understandings of the meanings of the terms in order to proclaim something is self-evident and doesn't appeal to any other thoughts? So, we could accept 'existence exists,' but only with explanation?

Right, Rand is arguing that "existence exists" is fundamental; it doesn't appeal to ANY other thought; not syntax, not maths, not logic. My claim has been that it borrows heavily on many assumptions; it's as simple as that. I question the simplicity because what we have are two ontologically and semantically loaded terms, "existence" and "exists." I argue that the sentence is not fundamental, that the two words are not necessarily equivalent, because, on some interpretation 'A' they refer to separate notions, and on some other interpretation 'B' they might be equivalent; they borrow on prior concepts because they are words which have ambiguous meanings. We could say to interpret "exist" one needs to say that things exist, but the irony is that we have needed to interpret "exist" in order to say that we didn't need to interpret it, since we wanted to take it as fundamental.

203 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

Things do exist, no fool would contradict, but that is not; IS NOT; the same statement as "existence exists" now is it? Now if Rand were willing to travel into Peano's systematization, then she would have found semantic questions would have to be answered before establishing the sentence as a basic truth, since it is not the same as 1+1=2. "Existence exists" relies on the concepts of existence and existing, and there is no way around this semantic requirement, since what are involved are philosophical concepts. We would have to start with the meaning of the concepts, since they are given by Rand as fundamental, and not as the theorems of an axiomatic set. They are philosophical words, rather than arithemetic functions, which would be exhaustively defined. Since they are presented as a tautology, this presentation has to be brought under the gun, not the notion of a tautology itself. We would all concede, 1+1=3 is not a theorem, because it is not derivable. What I am showing is how something which is described as fundamental, and without precedent, is only a sham of truth, and therefore must be derivable, if it is to be used as an edifice of reason. Since the status of the sentence is in question as an edifice, the whole of Objectivism is leveled as a joke. But this is just the first of many failings of Objectivism; in this conversation we have never made it farther than the first "axiom." There still remains the philosophical question of how these "truths" are to be played out morally.

204 of 206

Synthetic A Priori

In closing, then, pseudophilosophy?

you

find

Rand's

philosophy

Yes, indeed. I call it a cleverly mystical religion...itself irrational, if based upon the fundamental tenet "existence exists." I have shown how this utterance can be nothing but a merely vague and ambiguous assertion, not a tautological principle; not an edifice on which to base something billed as "rational." To build that edifice we must begin with experience and perception, if our goal is to understand human reason, and not control others with a mystical concept of Objective which must be obeyed. Objectivism thus ushers in philosophical racism, totalitarianism and any other political power we care to name. By beginning with the idea that there are things out there which are self-evident, and that anyone rational could understand them if they only were honest, is no different than any number of religious cults out there who prey on the weak in order to push their dogma. Objectivism is NOT philosophy. It is, however, a strong break with the train of thought after Descartes, but the wrong kind of break. It trades Christian power theory and control for one pretending to be philosophy; pretending to be about the discovery of individuality. It is NOT about individuality, but about establishing a social power by dictating what is right and what is wrong. It is completely against multi-culturalism, and humanism; it is in opposition to freedom and experimental thought.

205 of 206

Production in PDF from XML by rimric design