SUBJECTIVE EXPERIENCE AND THE LOGIC OF THE OTHER
R6MULO LANDER TRANSLATED AND EDITED BY
JUDITH FILC
N OTHER
Other Press New York
Copyright © 2006 Rdmulo Lander Translation copyright © 2006 Judith File Chapters 3 and 10 were previously published as a different translation in Reading Seminar XX. Lacan's Major Work on Love, Knowledge, and Feminine Sexuality, edited by Bruce Fink and Suzanne Barnard (Albany- SUNY Press, 2002) Production Editor Mira S. Park This book was set in 11 pt Berkley by Alpha Graphics of Pittsfield, NH 10
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All rights reserved No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by any information storage and retrieval system, without written permission from Other Press LLC, except in the case of brief quotations in reviews for inclusion in a magazine, newspaper, or broadcast. Printed in the United States of America on acid-free paper For information write to Other Press LLC, 307 Seventh Avenue, Suite 1807, New York, NY 10001 Or visit our Web site www otherpress.com Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Lander, Romulo Subjective experience and the logic of the other / Romulo Lander , editor, Judith File p cm. Includes index. ISBN 1-59051-165-4 (pbk . alk. paper) 1. Lacan, Jacques, 19012. Psychoanalysis. I. File, Judith. II Title BF109.L28L36 2006 150 19'57—dc22 2005000183
Is this the only way to understand and practice psychoanalysis? Those who place Lacan in the locus of the Master will answer, Yes. Those who are committed to the study of his teachings and place him in the locus of the analyst will answer, No.
Table of Contents
Preface
xv
1 The Logic of Desire 1 Being the Desire of the Other. The Concept of Desire in Freud. The Experience of Satisfaction. To Find Again. The Desire of the Other's Desire. Human Desire Is Instated. Some Specifications. Need, Demand, and Desire. Object (a) as the Object-Cause of Desire. The Dialectic of the Lack. 2 The Logic of the Signifler 8 De Saussure, Jahobson, and Lacan. Lacan's Thesis. The Signifying Chain. Meaning, Truth, and Signification. The Series of Signifiers. Metaphor. Metonymy. Then What Is a Signifier? The Origin of the Signifier. The Symbolic Order and the Letter. 3 The Three Orders (RSI) and the Borromean Proposition 17 Topology and the Three Orders. The Imaginary Order. The Symbolic Order. The Order of the Real. The Borromean Knot and Topology. 4 The Logic of Anxiety 23 What Is Anxiety? Anxiety as Loss in Freud. Types of Anxiety. Anxiety and Its Position in the Structure. "Presence in Excess" and "The Lack of the Lack." Anxiety and the "Present Absence." Anxiety and Object (a).
.CONTENTS
The Logic of the Phallus 29 The Meaning of the Phallus. The Phallic Signifier. The Logic of the Phallus. To Be the Phallus of the Other. The Relationship Between the Sexes. The Phallus and the Mask of Appearance. 6 The Logic of the Object 33 The Two-Faced Object. The Object of the Drive. Freud and His Objects. Object Cathexis. Part-Objects. The Splitting of the Object. The Anaclitic Object. The Love Object. Melanie Klein and Her Objects. The Controversy on the Total Object. Winnicott and His Transitional Object. Lacan and His Objects. Object (a). Chart of the Lack of the Object. 7 The Logic of the Subject 42 The Subject of the Unconscious. The Effect of the Word. Statement (Enonce) and Enunciation. Zero and the Subject. The Subject and Desire. The Subject and Anxiety. The Subject in the Cut. The Subject and Knowledge (Saber). The Fading of the Subject. The Subject and the Other. The Subject and the Borromean Function. The Subject and the Hole. 8 The Logic of the Other 51 The Symbolic Other. The Little Other. The Lacking Other. The Absent Other. The Big Other. Schema Lambda. 9 The Logic of Object (a) 56 A Remainder. The Eclats, or Fragments. The Topological Object. A Further Specification. Object (a) and Love. Object (a) and the Sexual Act. Object (a) and Anxiety. Object (a) and the Analyst. 0 The Logic of Jouissance 61 Psychic Suffering. The Logic of Jouissance. Another Issue Regarding Jouissance The State of Jouissance and Moral
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Masochism. Is the State o/Jouissance a Symptom? Relief of the State o/Jouissance. Pleasure and Jouissance. Jouissance and the Psychic Structure. 11 The Logic of the Cause 68 Complemental Series. The Logic of Trauma. The Logic of Psychic Conflict. The Logc of the Psychic Defect. The Cause and the RSI. 12 The Logic of the Symptom 77 What Is a Symptom? The Symptom as Signifier. The Symptom and RSI. Symptoms and the Psychic Structure. The Symptom Is What Doesn't Work in the Real. First Matheme of the Symptom. Second Matheme of the Symptom. Instating the Symptom. Clinical Symptom and Analytic Symptom. Logical Sequences of the Symptom. Time and the Symptom. The Fate of the Symptom. The Logic of the Sinthome. The Symptom as Prosthesis and the Symptom-Clamp Theory. 13 The Logic of the Fantasme 89 What Is the Fantasme? The Construction of the Fantasme. Matheme of the Fantasme. Symptom and Fantasme. Traversing the Fantasme. 14 The Logic of the Symptasme 94 The Fundamental Fantasme. The Construction of the Symptasme. The Symptasme and the Real. First Matheme of the Symptasme. Second Matheme of the Symptasme. The Symptasme and the Unary Trait. 15 The Logic of Hysteria 99 According to the Logic of the Phallus. The Phenomenology of Hysteria. The Matheme of Hysteria. A Modification to Lacan's Original Matheme. The Meaning of the Matheme. Clinical Application of the Matheme of the Hysteric. Two Types of Hysteria: (N/o) and (n/O). Hysterical Madness.
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16 The Logic of Phobias 108 Phobias in Clinical Practice. Phobias of the Narcissistic (Imaginary) Axis (N/o). Phobias of the Oedipal (Symbolic) Axis (n/O). The Construction of a Symbolic Phobic Object. Curable and Incurable Phobias. 17 The Logic of the Obsessive 112 Hysterization Phenomena. The Phenomenology of Obsessive Neurosis. The Structure of Obsessive Neurosis. The Matheme of Obsessive Neurosis. The Meaning of the Matheme. Clinical Application of the Matheme of Obsessive Neurosis. 18 The Logic of Depression 120 Structure or Symptom? Bereavement and Mourning. Clinical Manifestations of Emptiness or the Internal Void. Moral Masochism. Symptomatology o/Jouissance. The Depressive State. Depression and the Suicidal Act. 19 The Logic of the Suicidal Act 131 The Ethics of the Suicidal Act. Two Vertices. The Suicidal Act as Symptom. The Dialectic of Hope. To Be Loved by the Other. The Concept of the Death Drive. Hate Toward the Object. Imaginary Castration. The Triggering Factor. An Entanglement of Scenarios and Fictions. The Push Toward Suicide as Symptom. What to Do with Subjects at Risk of Committing Suicide. In the Face of an Imminent Suicidal Act. The Radical and Heroic Suicidal Act. The Logic of the Radical Suicide's Death. The Pure, Heroic Suicide. Heroic Act and Fundamentalist Act. Mass Suicides. Masada. 20 The Logic of Borderline States 147 The Dimension of Their Specificity. The Problem with the Borderline Paradigm. Inner Emptiness: The Hole. The Demand for Recognition and the Need for Affirmation. Object Relations. The Discourse of Domination. The Second Skin. Adhesive or Parasitic States. Sexual Life. System of Ideals. Reversal of Perspective. Impulse Control. Compulsions and Addictions.
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21 The Logic of Psychoses 163 Differential Diagnosis. Preamble to the Borderline Dysfunction. The Foreclosure of the Name-of-the-Father. Schema I. The Affirmation, or Bejahung. Elementary Phenomena. Psychotic Production. The Outside of Discourse. Two Types of Supplement (Suppldance) or Prosthesis. The Triggering of the Psychotic Breakdown. The Direction of the Cure. 22 The Logic of Perversion 177 The Psychoanalytic Viewpoint. What Is a Perverse Act? The Vertex of Phenomenological Clinical Description. The Vertex of Psychoanalytic Clinical Practice. The Meaning of the Perverse Act in the Perversions. A Street Exhibitionist. A Celebrated Masochist. A True Masochist. The Meaning of the Perverse Act in Neuroses. The Fantasme. The Inclusion of the Fantasme. The Fantasme in Act. Two Brief Examples. Access to the Fantasme. 23 The Logic of the Perverse Structure 191 Step by Step. The Graph of Perversion. Verleugnung. Ichspaltung. To Be the Phallus. To Be the Instrument of Jouissance. The Will-to-Jouissance (Volont6-deJouissance). The Tyranny of the Script. The Perverse Subject as an Exemplary Citizen. Masculine Men Only. 24 The Logic of the Transference 197 The Transference Effect. The Establishment of the Transference. Transference and Specificity in Psychoanalysis. Transference as Repetition. Transference as Resistance. The Banalization of Transference. Interpretation in the Transference. Transference Interpretation. 25 The Logic of the Transference Structure The Symbolic Vertex of the Transference. Algorithm of the Transference. More About the Symbolic Vertex. The "Wall of Language/9 Talking to the Wall. "Empty
203
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Speech" and "Full Speech." Wo Es War, Soil Ich Werden. The Imaginary Vertex of the Transference. Second Algorithm of the Transference. The Vertex of the Real in the Transference. Transference Hate. Transference Love. The Logic of Countertransference. The Effect of Transference on the Analyst. The Analyst's Transference. The Analyst as Waste (Des-Echo). Traversing the Fantasme and the End of Analysis. Summary. 26 The Logic of Negative Transference 219 Negative Transference: Resistance or Analytic Impasse? The Following Session. Some Notes on This Analysand's History. Chief Complaint and the Establishment of the Transference. A Qualified Listener. The Tyranny of the Phallic Other. Suspended Attention. The Problem of Bisexuality. The Master's Discourse. Why Is This Tyrannical Bond Established? Transference with a Phallic Semblance. 27 The Transference Graph 234 Introduction to the Graph: Two Sides and Four Levels. Presentation of the Graph. First Level: The Imaginary Order and the Locus of the Analyst. Second Level: The Symbolic Order and the Locus of the Analyst. Third Level: Borromean Logic and Resignification. Fourth Level: End of Analysis and the Question of "Being"— Postanalytic Effect. 28 The Logic of the Analytic Act (I) 241 A Call to the Knowledge in the Other. The Establishment of the Analytic Device. Becoming Waste (Des-Echo). The Locus of the Analyst. The Nonsymbolized Elements of the Transference. The Use and Misuse of Transference Interpretation. The Position of the Analyst. Saying the Unexpected. When the Analyst Knows Too Much. Who Is an Analyst? An Analyst Is the One Who Acts According
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to Ethics. The Ethics of Psychoanalysis Refers to Something Else. What Is It Then that Defines Psychoanalysis? 29 The Logic of the Analytic Act (II) 248 The Horror of the Act, The Direction of the Analysis. The Limits of the Act. An Untenable Act. The Pedagogic Act. The Orthopedic Act. The Power of the Transference. The Analyst in the Act. The Analyst and Desire. The Analyst in Symmetry with the Analysand, Ethics and the Analytic Setting, The Analyst and His or Her Word—A Summary, 30 The Logic of Specificity 257 What Defines Psychoanalysis? When Can We Say That a Session Is Actually an Analytic Session? 31 The Logic of Psychoanalytic Supervision 260 Teaching or Discovering? The Problem of the Training Model Analysenkontrolle and Kontrollanalyse. Approaches Within the International Psychoanalytic Association (JPA). A Clinical Vignette, Supervision and Resistance. In Other Words—Summarizing, Index
271
Preface
1 his book will reveal a new paradox. It is meant to be an accessible exposition of psychoanalytic theory and technique inspired by the original structural, logical, mathematical, and philosophical ideas of the French school of psychoanalysis, particularly of Jacques Lacan, Jacques-Alain Miller, and other European and Latin-American post-Lacanian thinkers. I am aware, however, that this approach goes against the nature of Lacan's own teachings. Such is the paradox: to produce an accessible text means to explain ideas in a comprehensible and organized way, that is to say, to give them closure. Yet it is well known that Lacan's ideas produce a strange and uncomfortable subjective split because they are unfinished, and therefore leave the subject with the uncertainty of knowledge. The subject will pose the question to the other, insisting on his search for some certainty, but since Lacan does not respond to that demand, the other remains split. Such is the manner of Lacan's teaching. In this text I do the opposite—I have tried to respond to the request for clarity and certainty stemming from my subjectivity,
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and the Other will therefore be satisfied and achieve closure. However, this is the only way I can present Lacanian and post-Lacanian ideas with some clarity and show the benefits of these new concepts to the current practice of psychoanalysis. The enigmatic nature of Lacan's teaching is already well known. Louis Althusser wrote about him in 1963 that one must hear him speak to understand athe splendid wickedness of his style."1 He described the attendants to the seminars as adopting a religious attitude in the face of a discourse they could not understand. In this book you will find a variety of ideas. Many of the notions I expound here originate in, and are inspired by, my persistent reading of Lacanian and post-Lacanian texts. They represent the ways in which I have understood these texts and make use of them. 1 am aware that mine is not an orthodox treatment of Lacanian and post-Lacanian ideas, since I am free of obligations born from institutional loyalties to a Lacanian school. Motivated by the nature of Lacan's own teaching, moreover, I have taken the liberty to propose ideas that are different from, and complementary to, his own conceptions. Finally, I only ask that you read this book with persistence and tolerance. Persistence will lead you to keep reading even if the text annoys you at times, and tolerance is required concerning the "narcissism of the small differences,"2 for each one of us conceives of psychoanalysis in a slightly different way. Rdmulo Lander
ENDNOTES 1. Louis Althusser (1963), quoted in Elisabeth Roudinesco (1993), Jacques Lacan, translated by Barbara Bray. New York: Columbia University Press, 1997. 2. Sigmund Freud (1918), The Taboo of Virginity. Standard Edition 11:199.
1 The Logic of Desire
BEING THE DESIRE OF THE OTHER For Lacan, who always insisted on his being a Freudian, the subject's desire uis the desire of the Other's desire."1 Lacan theorized extensively on the concept of desire. He introduced an important difference among the notions of desire, need, and demand, thus opening the possibility to withdraw desire from the biological field. In that sense, desire is an effect of a lack and a mark of the signifier in "the speaking being."
THE CONCEPT OF DESIRE IN FREUD Since 1895, Freud saw his hysteric patients' ignorance of sexual desire as the cause of the symptom.2 Freud always included the concept of desire (sexual yet not necessarily genital desire) in his
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SUBJECTIVE EXPERIENCE AND THE LOGIC OF THE OTHER
theories. While he never developed a specific theory of desire, this notion is present throughout his work. Freud uses the concept of desire since his first topographical theory. From then on, a relation between drives and representations is established. Freud claims that desire emerges early in the formation of the psychic apparatus, after the first experiences of satisfaction have occurred. Desire will always arise in relation to the representations (mnemic mark) of that previous experience of satisfaction.
THE EXPERIENCE OF SATISFACTION For Freud,3 the experience of satisfaction is crucial for the emergence of desire. He states that an essential component in the experience of satisfaction is the appearance of a certain perception whose mnemic image "remains associated . . . with the memory-trace of the excitation produced by the need. As a result of the link that has thus been established, next time this need arises a psychical impulse will at once emerge which will seek to re-cathect the mnemic image of the perception and to re-evoke the perception itself, that is to say, to reestablish the situation of the original satisfaction. An impulse of this kind is what we call a wish; the reappearance of the perception is the fulfillment of the wish."4 In the same text, Freud says that the dream constitutes a whole psychic act, and its driving force is always a desire to be fulfilled.
TO FIND AGAIN We can say along with Freud that desire is the desire to repeat the experience of satisfaction, the experience lived with the satisfying object, which will be called "the object of desire/'5 We should note here that according to Freud, the nature of desire is unconscious. In addition, it is related to representations and, therefore, belongs to the world of the fantasme.6 It is through this reasoning that we may sustain the Freudian theory of the "hallucinatory satisfaction
THE LOGIC OF DESIRE
3
of desire." In this way, we highlight, along with Freud, a relevant difference between desire and need.
THE DESIRE OF THE OTHER'S DESIRE As I mentioned above, Lacan states that the subject's desire is the desire of the Other's desire. The subject wants to be wanted by the other, that is, he or she experiences a desire for love and recognition. Here Lacan follows Hegel, via Kojfcve, who states that "desire is human only if the one desires, not the body, but the Desire of the other . . . that is to say, if he wants to be 'desired' or loved,' or, rather, 'recognised in his human value.'"7
HUMAN DESIRE IS INSTATED Lacan establishes clearly, as did Freud, that human desire must be instated, meaning that it is constituted early in life as an effect of the experience of satisfaction, and it appears when the subject loses his or her object of satisfaction. The lack of the object gives rise to the presence of desire. The subject's experience with the lost object leaves a mnemic mark (representation). The drives will become desire when joining this representation. In this way, Lacan defines at least three of the traits of desire.8
SOME SPECIFICATIONS Desire Is Unconscious and Mute Human beings cannot know desire in its fullness. Desire does not speak. In "The Direction of the Treatment and the Principle of its Power," Lacan states that language and desire are fundamentally incompatible.9 However, in his first open seminar (Seminar 1,1954), he suggests that the goal of the analytic cure is to allow the analysand
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SUBJECTIVE EXPERIENCE AND THE LOGIC OF THE OTHER
to recognize the truth of his or her desire. This implies that such recognition is only possible through language. In the same text, Lacan asserts that "it is only once it is formulated, named in the presence of the other, that desire, whatever it is, is recognized in the full sense of the term."10 In Seminar 2 (1954-1955), Lacan states that "what's important is to teach the subject to name, to articulate, to bring this desire into existence."11 Lacan is referring here to the possibility of "bringing desire into existence" through its articulation in language. However, unconscious desire is silent and resists articulation.
Unconscious Desire Is Sexual Desire arises as an effect of the "lack," the lost object [object (a)]. The drive, which is sexual in nature, joins the representation (a signifier of the lost object) and becomes desire. Since the drive is sexual in nature, its participation in the constitution of desire determines the sexual nature of the latter. However, desire is not the drive, for the latter, which is partial, achieves satisfaction; desire, by contrast, is never satisfied, because it is always a desire for something else.
Desire Is Impossible to Satisfy If desire is mute and cannot be articulated in language, it will always be the desire for something else. The unconscious desire that always presses for satisfaction will never find its lost object; it will always find another object. Hence, desire is unsatisfiable. The object that the subject finds is no more than a semblance of his or her lost object.
NEED, DEMAND, AND DESIRE Need refers to the biological field. It appears as a bodily requirement and can be satisfied, albeit temporarily. Our biological needs
THE LOGIC OF DESIRE
5
are, for instance, hunger, thirst, and sleep. Human beings are born in a helpless state, unable to satisfy their own biological needs and, therefore, they need the embodied other for survival. To get help from this other, the baby emits a scream. When the other grants meaning to this scream, the latter becomes a call—it is transformed into a signifier. In this way, the scream has become a call, and the call is then constituted as a demand. Afterward, the presence of the other acquires great significance. The other as an effect of the signifier has become the other of the unconscious, and not only will he or she satisfy biological needs but will also be expected to satisfy a yearning for love. Such a yearning constitutes an impossibility, since we are talking about the lost object. From now on, need and desire will find their place in this world through the demand, which is expressed by means of signifiers. Lacan states that desire, which is normally silent, becomes known to the subject when it passes through the defiles of the signifiers. Elsewhere he claims that "desire is neither the appetite for satisfaction nor the demand for love, but the difference that results from the subtraction of the first from the second."12 The demand is nothing more than the request expressed in the signifying chain. The demand that arises from desire, therefore, is not desire, because when articulated in the signifying chain (the defiles), desire is already the desire for something else. Hence, desire can never be satisfied. Lacan asserts that "desire begins to take shape in the margin in which demand rips away from need."13 This means that desire is an utterly human matter.
OBJECT (a) AS THE OBJECT-CAUSE OF DESIRE Desire arises from the lack that is instated due to the loss of object (a). For this reason, object (a) is the object of desire, always sought but never found. It is present only in fiction, in the experience of the "state of passion" (estado de pasidri) of love or hate; it is an illusion suffered by the subject, who has found object (a) in the field
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SUBJECTIVE EXPERIENCE AND THE LOGIC OF THE OTHER
of the other. This thesis bears a self-supporting logic—a logic that does not refer to other arguments. Yet in later years, Lacan insisted on claiming that object (a) is "the object-cause of desire." We should note here that the object of desire and the object-cause of desire are not the same thing.14
THE DIALECTIC OF THE LACK In Seminar 11 Lacan states that when a causal relation is established between two phenomena, the identification of an intermediary link becomes impossible, giving rise to the appearance of a gap. The lost object (a) may thus originate desire. Object (a) does not appear before the subject (summoned by his desire); on the contrary, it is located behind this desire, causing it. The lost object (a) is the one that will find the subject. The subject cannot rush successfully in search of the object (a) that would better suit him—object (a) is actually imposed upon the subject. It is clear that the subject's desire can only be the desire of the other. It is the other who casts, or leaves, a remainder in the subject's constitution. That remainder is the objet petite a. Confusion arises because the subject has no alternative left but to look for his lost object (a), and will always look for it before him or her. The object of desire presumably is placed before the subject as a semblance. In this way, object (a) is the object of desire, which is fictitiously placed before but appears also from behind as the object-cause of desire.
ENDNOTES 1. This statement can be found in several texts, for instance, in Jacques Lacan (1964), The Seminar. Book 11. The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, edited by J. A. Miller, translated by Alan Sheridan. New York: W. W. Norton, 1978, p. 38; and in Lacan (1960) The Subversion of the Subject and the Dialectic of Desire in the Freudian Unconscious,
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in Ecrits. A Selection, translated by Bruce Fink. New York: W. W. Norton, 2004, p. 300 (editor's note). 2. Sigmund Freud (1893-1895), Studies on Hysteria. Standard Edition 2:1-309. 3. Sigmund Freud (1900), The Interpretation of Dreams. Standard Edition 4/5:1-626. 4. Sigmund Freud (1900), op. cit., 5:565-566. 5. See, among others, The Interpretation of Dreams, op. cit., and Studies on Hysteria, op. cit. 6. See, for example, The Interpretation of Dreams, op. cit., and Studies on Hysteria, op. cit. 7. Alexandre Kojfeve (1947 [1933-19391), Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, translated by James H. Nichols, Jr. New York and London: Basic Books, 1969, p. 6. 8. The Subversion of the Subject, op. cit. 9. Jacques Lacan (1958), The Direction of the Treatment and the Principle of Its Power, in Ecrits: A Selection, translated by Bruce Fink. New York: W. W. Norton, 2004, p. 264. 10. Jacques Lacan (1953-1954), The Seminar. Book 1. Freud's Papers on Technique, 1953-1954, translated by John Forrester. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987, p. 183. 11. Jacques Lacan (1954-1955), The Seminar. Book II. The Ego in Freud's Theory and in the Technique of Psychoanalysis, 1954-1955, translated by Sylvana Tomaselli. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988, p. 228. 12. Jacques Lacan (1958), The Signification of the Phallus, in Ecrits. A Selection, translated by Bruce Fink. New York: W. W. Norton, 2004, p. 276. [There are three translations of this essay: two by this tide in Ecrits: A Selection, translated by Alan Sheridan. New York: W. W. Norton, 1977, and in the second edition of Ecrits, translated by Bruce Fink; the third one under the title "The Meaning of the Phallus," in Feminine Sexuality, edited by J. Mitchell and J. Rose. New York: W. W. Norton, 1982.] 13. The Subversion of the Subject, op. cit., p. 299. 14. Jacques Lacan (1964), The Seminar. Book XI. The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, op. cit.
2 The Logic of the Signifier
DE SAUSSURE, JAKOBSON, AND LACAN In "The Instance of the Letter in the Unconscious, or Reason Since Freud," Jacques Lacan subverts the fundamental algorithm that the Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure created in 1916.1 In that algorithm, de Saussure proposed a fundamental solidarity between signified and signifier whereby the two are perpetually tied.2 According to this author, the signifier constitutes the acoustic psychic representation of the signified or concept. That is why de Saussure places the signified (or meaning) above the bar, and its product, the signifier, below it, and confines them inside a circle that represents the permanent bond between them. The concept tree (signified) will always refer to the acoustic psychic representation tree (signifier). The concept (signified) comes first, and then the signifier as its effect. For de Saussure, signification and meaning are hence preestablished.
THE LOGIC OF THE SIGNIFIER
9
The Two Axes In 1956 Roman Jakobson, the prolific Russian linguist, published a paper in France in which he parted company with de Saussure's firmly established conception and suggested the notion of two axes of language—a horizontal and a vertical axis.3 Jakobson established a fundamental opposition between metaphor (vertical, synchronic) and metonymy (horizontal, diachronic). De Saussure's and Jakobson's ideas allowed Lacan to posit his own new theory of the signifier, which caused a negative reaction and multiple disagreements among linguists. However, the theoretical coherence of Lacan's proposal and its later developments determined its endurance and usefulness in the psychoanalytic field.
LACAN'S THESIS As we have already seen, in his 1957 essay 'The Instance of the Letter" Lacan radically transforms de Saussure's algorithm. Lacan takes this algorithm out of its circle and inverts the terms, privileging the signifier. In this way, the signifier is now above the bar, and the signified (meaning) below the bar. Through the erasure of the circle, the signifier loses its univocal bond with the signified (meaning). The bar that separates them will resist meaning, thus opening the possibility for the articulation of metaphor and metonymy.
THE SIGNIFYING CHAIN This proposition makes it clear that from now on, nothing will permanendy bind the signifier with its signified. The signifier no longer represents a preexisting signified (signifie) as meaning; it is the signifier that will determine the effect of meaning through its presence in the signifying chain. In this way, there is no preestablished meaning—there is no particular truth represented by a signifier.
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MEANING, TRUTH, AND SIGNIFICATION Meaning and truth (which will always be a half-truth) will arise as the product of the articulation of the signifiers (S^ S2, S3, Sn), that is, the signifying chain. In this way, true and false values will emerge within the signifying chain as a product of the unconscious, where the subject speaks more than he says and his truth will always be a half-truth. The other half of this unconscious truth will be concealed through misunderstandings, parapraxes, dreams, and symptoms. This mode of functioning of the signifying chain (which appears without a preestablished meaning) opens up the possibility for the operativeness of metaphor and metonymy. If we look at the RSI graph (see Chapter 3) Lacan developed in 1972, meaning is located in the area between the Imaginary and the Symbolic, truth in the area between the Real and the Symbolic, and signification in the area located between the Real and the Imaginary.4
THE SERIES OF SIGNIFIERS If the subject operates with a series ofsignifers instead of a signifying chain, we find that those signifiers (Sx) are not linked to each other; they produce neither meaning nor effects of truth (Sx, Sx> Si), fouissance, desire, and the drives, in their signifying presence, operate within the series of signifiers and not as a signifying chain. This proposition, set forth by Jacques-Alain Miller in 1998,5 enables our understanding of Lacan's early notion of desire, whose essence he describes as mute and silent.
METAPHOR The metaphor is a rhetorical figure that consists in the modification of the meaning of the word. According to Aristotle, the metaphor transfers to a thing a name that designates a different thing, constituting a relation of analogy.6 A word will replace another
THE LOGIC OF THE SIGNIFIER
11
word thanks to a conceptual analogy. In this way, the word lion can substitute for the word brave. In the matheme signifier/signified, the metaphorical substitution refers to a substitution in the vertical (synchronic) axis. In "The Instance of the Letter" Lacan affirms that "it is in the substitution of signifier for signifier that a signification effect is produced that... brings the signification in question into existence."7 The substituted signifier, as latent signifier, perpetuates the gap that will enable the introduction of a new signifying chain. Two things are clear in this statement: first, the primacy of the signifiers, and second, the substitution in the vertical axis. This thesis is congruent and agrees with Freud's suggestion of the concept of condensation to explain unconscious processes. Lacan extends the notion of metaphor to unconscious processes in their articulation with language.
METONYMY Metonymy is also a rhetorical figure that refers to a name change— a thing is designated with a word that does not correspond to it. However, a certain relation exists between one word and the other. In rhetoric, the metonymical relation corresponds to the relation between the part and the whole ("sails" for "ship"), the container and the contained ("to have a glass" for "drinking alcohol"), or the object and the material it is made of ("to buy a canvas" instead of "to buy a painting").
Freud and Metonymy In psychoanalysis the notion of metonymy is close to the Freudian notion of displacement. Freud describes the mechanism of unconscious displacement as the displacement from one representation to another through a relation of contiguity.8 In this way, the essential components of the representation are replaced by nonessential components. The possibility of the existence of screen
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SUBJECTIVE EXPERIENCE AND THE LOGIC OF THE OTHER
memories rests in fact on the figure of metonymy.9 Whenever the repressed signifier finds another signifier related to it by contiguity, the former will appear in conscious speech. One signifier is substituted for another through the mechanism of displacement. Dreams operate through metaphor and metonymy. In the metonymical process, a theme may lead to another theme following a relation of contiguity. For this reason, Lacan speaks of the slippage of the signifier through the horizontal axis of the matheme, and describes it as diachronic.
THEN WHAT IS A SIGNIFIER? In Seminar 11 Lacan states that "a signifier is what represents a subject for another signifier."10 Lacan institutes a break with the idea of a signifier bound to a word or to a figure of speech. The signifier becomes, above all, the signifier of the lack in the other, the other being the guarantor of the word. In this way, the metaphorical function appears, whereby a signifier (S2) represents a repressed signifier (Si). The signifier is not simply a marked word; rather, it is closer to the idea of a precise small concept, where a word or a phrase represents an idea that is itself a signifier.
The Sign In 1962, in his Seminar 9 (Identification), Lacan asserts that the sign is what represents something for somebody.11 Yet the signifier is not a sign, and it will not represent the subject's thought other than in an alleged and even misleading way. For this reason, Lacan says that "a signifier represents the subject for another signifier." This becomes more complicated, because the subject commits to his saying (decir) through the product of his statement, which refers to the apparent aspects of language. These aspects are supported on the act of enunciation, which refers to the latent elements of language. We know that there, in the enun-
THE LOGIC OF THE SIGNIFIER
13
ciation, desire has been inscribed. However, desire unfolds there in the negative, in what is not-said, in what is implicit, that is to say, in the enunciation.
The Supremacy of the Signifier The great significance that Lacan attributes to the supremacy of the signifier over the signified (as meaning) highlights two similar but different questions. One is the subject's commitment to his or her saying (decir) (which conceals desire), and the other is the subject's commitment to his or her listening. In Seminar 9 Lacan states that the subject invents the signifier starting with something that is there to be listened to, and he mentions the discovery of a footprint in the sand. The revealed footprint will provide the subject who listens with an identification with a negative (absent) trace. There is a background of absence—an absent object present in the footprint in the sand. The subject invents his or her signifier. We can think here of the mythical nature of the first identification, the identification with that "unary trait" whereby the subject tries to fill the emptiness left by the absence of the first object. This might be the originary signifier, an absence that will bring us to the problem of the constitution of the subject and the origin of the first signifier.
THE ORIGIN OF THE SIGNIFIER We know that the signifier is what represents a subject for another signifier. In its articulation, the signifier cannot represent what is absent from the beginning, and, therefore, will engender it. In Seminar 9 Lacan tells us that what is absent from the beginning and is, therefore, engendered by the signifier is the subject. In this way, signifier and subject bear a topological solidarity—the one does not exist without the other. The subject of the unconscious is a subject devoid of substance, and is founded by the action of the signifier.
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The inscription of the first signifier occurs on a background of absence—the "footprint in the sand." It is clear that this footprint originates in the other, and it refers to the first experience of the absence of the object. However, this absent something will require a designation, thus precipitating the ability to vocalize the absence (the phoneme). The footprint thus acquires a phonic status. As a syllable, it will have to be articulated with at least another syllable (Si, S2, S3, Sn). This first signifier (S{) will appear only when the marked word erases the trace: the word makes it disappear. This signifier, the letter, the word (parole), and the original absence are connected through a foundational relation that opens a path to the repressed and to a meaning that "escapes." In the act of enunciation, says Lacan, lies what could be viewed as the first nucleus of what will become the signifying chain, that speaking core of the subject, namely, the unconscious.
The First Signifier Any signifier can occupy the position of the Sx because, by definition, any signifier can represent a subject for another signifier. The Sx is then the first signifier, the condition for the initiation of the signifying chain. This signifier one (S^ has many synonyms: imaginary phallus, master signifier, the Name-of-the-Father, unary trait, the signifier of the law, and the signifier of the symbolic phallus. Lacan says about Sx that it is the signifier that has no meaning; it is devoid of signification and arises as a remainder of another signifier that supports meaning. Sx is the meaningless par excellence, the pas de sense or nonsense, that is, the absurd signifier.12
THE SYMBOLIC ORDER AND THE LETTER When the signifying chain is inaugurated with S^ the signifier will be located in the symbolic order. In this context, Lacan refers to Sx as uthe phallus," and "the master signifier." The letter, in turn, is
THE LOGIC OF THE SIGNIFIER
15
situated in the order of the Real, for according to Lacan, the letter arises from the negative. He refers to the effect of "what is not," a the unknown," which left the "footprint in the sand.M Confronting the Real as what is unthinkable, the subject, in a movement of anticipation that is imaginary in nature, will enter into the symbolic order. The unconscious, located in the locus of the other (of the unconscious), which corresponds to Freud's "other scene," will constitute the instance of its own unconscious letter. Thus, at the edge of the symbolic order, the letter becomes language, and will be the effect of a discourse.13 Once the letter (the word) is associated to the signifier, it will become the material linguistic support for discourse.
ENDNOTES
1. Jacques Lacan (1957), The Instance of the Letter in the Unconscious, or Reason Since Freud, in Ecrits. A Selection, op. cit, pp. 140-150. 2. Ferdinand de Saussure (1916), Course in General Linguistics, edited by Charles Bally and Albert Sechehaye in collaboration with Albert Riedlinger, translated by Wade Baskin. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966. 3. Roman Jakobson (1956), Two Aspects of Language and Two Types of Aphasic Disturbances, in Fundamentals of Language, edited by Roman Jakobson and Morris Halle. The Hague: Mouton, pp. 52-82. 4. Jacques Lacan (1972-1973), The Seminar of Jacques Lacan. On Feminine Sexuality. The Limits of Love and Knowledge. Book XX. Enco 1972-1973, translated by Bruce Fink. New York: W. W. Norton, 1998, Chapters 10 and 11. 5. Jacques-Alain Miller, Los Signos del Goce [Signs oijouissance]. Buenos Aires: Paid6s, 1998. 6. Aristotle, Aristotle*s Poetics, translated by George Whalley, edited by John Baxter and Patrick Atherton. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1997 (editor's note). 7. Jacques Lacan (1957), The Instance of the Letter in the Unconscious, or Reason Since Freud, in Ecrits: A Selection, op. cit., pp. 155-156. 8. See, for example, Sigmund Freud (1900), The Interpretation of Dreams, op. cit., pp. 180-181 (editor's note). 9. Sigmund Freud (1899), Screen Memories. Standard Edition 3:307 (editor's note).
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SUBJECTIVE EXPERIENCE AND THE LOGIC OF THE OTHER
10. Jacques Lacan (1964), The Seminar of Jacques Lacan. Book XL The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, op.cit., p. 207. 11. Jacques Lacan (1961-1962), LeStminaire. LivrelX. Uldentification [Identification], unpublished. 12. Jacques Lacan (1970-1971), Le Siminaire. Livre XVUL D'un Discours qui ne Serait pas du Semblant, 1970-1971 [The Seminar. Book XVIII. On a Discourse that Would Be No Semblance], unpublished. 13. Jacques Lacan (1972-1973), The Seminar ofJacques Lacan. On Feminine Sexuality. The Limits of Love and Knowledge. Book XX. Encore, op.cit.
The Three Orders (RSI) and the Borromean Proposition
TOPOLOGY AND THE THREE ORDERS The letters RSI refer to the initials of the three orders that operate in the human psyche, namely, the Real, the Symbolic, and the Imaginary. At the beginning (until 1953), Lacan devoted himself to the study and development of his theses on the Imaginary. From 1953 to 1963, he concerned himself with the study of the Symbolic, and from 1963 until approximately 1972, to the study of the Real. From 1972 on, he began his advanced study of topology and the Borromean knots theory. I have called this last period "the study of the absolute." It is in Seminar 20, in 1972, that Lacan introduces the topology of the Borromean knot as a new configuration in his thesis on the three orders.1 The Borromean proposal expands the study of topology. From this moment on, topology will prevail over linguistics in Lacan's concerns.
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SUBJECTIVE EXPERIENCE AND THE LOGIC OF THE OTHER
THE IMAGINARY ORDER The imaginary order refers to a capacity of the human psyche to operate fundamentally with images within a dual relationship with the Other. Lacan introduced the term after his research on the mirror stage in 1936. The prevalence of images (visual, auditory, olfactory, tactile) corresponds to the beginning of the constitution of the subject. During his study of the mirror stage, and later when he develops his thesis on the constitution of the subject, Lacan suggests that the ego (moi) is fundamentally imaginary. In Seminar 2 (1955) he affirms that to grasp something of the psychoanalytic dialectic, we must define the ego (moi) as an imaginary construction.2
Semblance The passage from the specular to the imaginary allows us to define the latter as a "semblance phenomenon," that is, as a way for the ego (moi) to operate by means of pure illusions, which takes place between the ego (moi) and the I (je). This imaginary order is characteristic of what we might call the early narcissistic period. The status or configuration of the imaginary order will be clarified when the three orders are described in their Borromean quality. The Borromean logic of the imaginary order bears a consistency of images. ;
THE SYMBOLIC ORDER The symbolic order refers to the ability of the human psyche to use words and language. What defines the symbolic order is the presence of the signifier and the signifying chain. As I have mentioned before, a signifier is what represents something for another signifier. Lacan presents his thesis on the importance of the Sym-
THE THREE ORDERS (RSl) AND THE BORROMEAN PROPOSITION
19
bolic in analytic work in his celebrated Rome Discourse, "The Function and Field of Speech and Language in Psychoanalysis," a sort of manifesto of Lacanian theory that triggers his rupture with the Paris Psychoanalytic Society.3 The next ten years of his life will be devoted to the study of the symbolic order, which consists of signifiers that will become operative thanks to the signifier of the Name-of-ihe-Faiher. This special signifier constitutes a paternal function that introduces the law (some sort of order) inside the psyche of the subject and breaks the imaginary motherson dual relationship. Such a break is necessary to enforce the fundamental law of incest prohibition. The Borromean logic of the symbolic order bears an insistence of the signifying chain.
THE ORDER OF THE REAL This order refers to what is impossible to symbolize and, therefore, is unknown to the subject. The real thing has an ex-sistence beyond the subject's knowledge. The Real has not been traversed by the signifying chain. For this reason, Lacan affirms that the Real has ex-sistence outside the subject's reality.
The Real and Reality It is necessary to distinguish between reality and the Real Reality alludes to everything that has come into contact with the subject through the senses. By means of perception, things acquire psychic representation, and these representations gain existence for the subject as an effect of cathexis or drive investiture. In this way, the Real ceases to be Real and becomes reality. By means of introjection and identification mechanisms, the object acquires existence. The difference between psychic reality and external reality is only topographical. Making use of topological theory, Lacan suggests that such a difference is relative—external reality constitutes a
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SUBJECTIVE EXPERIENCE AND THE LOGIC OF THE OTHER
different psychic reality. It is one and the same reality that comes to occupy relative topological places, a similar phenomenon to the two sides in the topological figure of the Moebius band.
The Real The Real also designates something else, that is, everything that exists unbeknownst to the subject. I am referring here to that which is impossible to symbolize, which has not been processed by the sensory organs, onto which the subject will stumble. As Lacan progressed in the study of the Real, the concept became more complex. Just as Freud before him, Lacan considers that there exists something of an unknown quality beyond the repressed unconscious. Freud called it Das Ding (the thing). Lacan takes up this idea of the existence of a Real beyond the repressed unconscious, maintaining the German word to define it. "The thing," then, refers to unconscious aspects (beyond the repressed) whose symbolization is impossible. The word impossible alludes to the fact that these aspects are not accessible in any way, and" therefore will remain unknown to the subject. Lacan will say later, however, that the subject has a single relative, partial way of access to the Real and will call it "the window to the Real," that is, object (a). The Borromean logic of the order of the Real bears an ex-sistence in some sort of outside.
THE BORROMEAN KNOT AND TOPOLOGY In Seminar 20, Lacan defines this knot as composed of three rings that are connected in such a way that untying any of them will set the others free.4 At that time, Lacan was searching for a way to understand the geometry of a tetrad he had posited in his texts on the logic of desire: "I ask you," "to refuse," "what I offer you," "because that's not it."5 With this tetrad, Lacan is referring to the logic of object (a) and its quality as the object-cause of desire.
THE THREE ORDERS (RSl) AND THE BORROMEAN PROPOSITION
21
The Borromean Function On the night of March 1,1972, Lacan discovers through a friend a mathematical proposition set forth by Georges Guilbaud, a mathematician specialized in topology. I am referring to the Borromean knot and the thesis on the Borromean function. Every knot bears the characteristics of the Borromean function—if we cut any of the rings, the other two are set free. This function is not assignable to any of the three rings in particular; rather, it is a property of the knot as such. Thanks to this property, the Borromean knot allows Lacan to propose and to illustrate the topology of the RSI.
The Borromean Becomes More Complex Yet later, in Lacaris lessons of October 1972, the Borromean theory expands and progressively increases in complexity. Lacan insists that the mental functions of the subject remain operative as long as the three knots are linked, and he tells us that it is not difficult to find an example of what happens when a ring comes unfastened and sets the other ringsfree.The consequences of loosening a ring are found in the psychic collapse characteristic of psychosis. This happens when a symptom that functions as a supplement (suppUance)—a fourth ring or artificial support that holds the rings together—is eliminated. This fourth ring or sinthome? can be any symptom that bears the function of holding the rings together, for example, some people may become bulimic, and others, drug addicts, compulsive gamblers, or workaholics.
The Borromean Function and the Three Orders In Seminar 22, titled "RSI" (March 1975), Lacan states that the topology of the Borromean knot allowed him to affirm that this Borromean function keeps the three orders (RSI) operative.7 He
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SUBJECTIVE EXPERIENCE AND THE LOGIC OF THE OTHER
posits there the consistency of the Imaginary, the insistence of the Symbolic, and the ex-sistence of the Real. Borromean Knot (RSI) Graph 1972
Imaginary: Bears the consistency of an image These three orders are holes that support one another in a paradox of a "nonrelationship"
Real:
Symbolic:
Has existence in an "outside of itself"
Bears the insistence of the signifying chain
ENDNOTES 1. Jacques Lacan (1972-1973), The Seminar of Jacques Lacan. On Feminine Sexuality. The Limits of Love and Knowledge. Book XX. Encore, 1972-1973, op. cit. 2. Jacques Lacan (1954-1955), The Seminar. Book II. The Ego in Freud's Theory and in the Technique of Psychoanalysis, 1954-1955, op. cit. 3. Jacques Lacan (1953), The Function and Field of Speech and Language in Psychoanalysis, in Ecrits. A Selection, op. cit., pp. 31-106. 4. Jacques Lacan (1972-1973) The Seminar of Jacques Lacan. On Feminine Sexuality. The Limits of Love and Knowledge. Book XX. Encore, 1972-1973, op. cit., p. 124. 5. Ibid., p. 126 (editor's note). 6. The author designates the sinthome in Spanish as sintoma-grapa (symptom-clamp), and explains this notion further in Chapters 7 and 12 (editor's note). 7. Jacques Lacan (1974-1975), LeSiminaire. LivreXXII. RSI, 19741975, published in Ornicarl, Nos. 2-5,1975. ["The Seminar XXII ofJanuary 1975—RSI," translated byj. Rose, in J. Mitchell and J. Rose, eds. Feminine Sexuality. New York: W. W. Norton, 1982.)
4 The Logic of Anxiety
WHAT IS ANXIETY? In Seminar 10 (1963) Lacan states that anxiety is "the enactment of castration."1 Later on, when he develops the RSI graph (Seminar 22, in 1975),2 he supplements his original proposal, characterizing anxiety as an invasion of the Real into the Imaginary that will hence affect both the body and the ego (moi). From the point of view of clinical phenomenology, anxiety is an "unpleasant affect" that cannot be easily verbalized. Even when it is of a different nature, this affect bears some similarity to the emotions of fear, terror, and panic. It is common for anxiety to present a somatic manifestation that will vary in intensity and type according to the characteristics of the subject. Anxiety may express itself in myriad ways. It may appear as a painful sensation in the stomach, referred to as a
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SUBJECTIVE EXPERIENCE AND THE LOGIC OF THE OTHER
dagger or a tightness in that part of the body; as an unexpected tachycardia and dryness of the mouth; as shortness of breath and lack of air; as an urgent need to move the bowels or to urinate; as a bothersome perspiration and sweatiness; as a painful contraction of the anal sphincter; as a sensation of imminent fainting or even a loss of consciousness; as a loss or a momentary reduction of vision or audition; as paralysis or muscular paresis; as strange auditory or visual perceptions; as a distortion in the perception of time and space; or as a variety of states of transitory mental confusion, distortion, or depersonalization.
ANXIETY AS LOSS IN FREUD Freud revised and changed his concept of anxiety three times. We find, however, that after 1917 (first series of introductory lectures),3 after his very relevant work of 1926 ("Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety"),4 after the 1932 "New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-analysis,"5 and until 1940 ("An Outline of PsychoAnalysis"),6 Freud still defines anxiety as a general response of the ego to unpleasure, that is, an increase in the intensity of excitation. Freud will consider the ego as the natural site of anxiety until his death. He describes anxiety as an affect caused by the loss of, or separation from, the object, and maintains the idea of anxiety as a "sign of danger" that precedes castration and loss.
TYPES OF ANXIETY In his lecture "Anxiety and Instinctual Life,"7 Freud states that there is a different type of anxiety for every stage of development. We can therefore study anxiety at the three levels of logical sequence that correspond to the three forms of loss of, or separation from, the object as presented by Freud: (a) oral annihilation, (b) anal separation, and (c) genital castration.
THE LOGIC OF ANXIETY
25
Annihilation Anxiety Also called "anxiety of death," annihilation anxiety corresponds to the subject's early anxieties. It is similar to the prototype of anxiety at birth (first separation from the mother). This type of anxiety appears when, in fiction, the subject believes that his or her mental coherence is in danger, that is, when he or she feels a threat of mental collapse or disintegration. We may find this form of anxiety in very small children and, later on, in adolescents and adults who present a narcissistic mental structure with a poor ability to discriminate between ego and object. Annihilation anxiety is thus characteristic of a symbiotic and narcissistic object relation in which the subject operates with the prevalence of the imaginary duality. In 1932 Melanie Klein suggested, with very keen judgment, that subjective annihilation happens because, in the very small child, destructive fantasies originally addressed to the object are deflected toward the ego. Klein, Wilfred Bion, Donald Winnicott, Francis Tustin, Esther Bick, and Donald Meltzer put forth original proposals on a variety of mental mechanisms that help the child handle and survive the difficulties arising from intense annihilation anxiety. These ideas, which have become classic concepts in present-day psychoanalysis, include Klein's "manic triad" (omnipotence, disparagement, and control of the object), Bion's integration/disintegration moments, Winnicott's intrusion phenomena, Bick's notion of the development of a second skin, Tustin's neurotic autistic phenomena, and Meltzer's adhesive identification.8
Separation Anxiety Separation anxiety appears when the subjectfictitiouslyexperiences the separation from the object of dependence. It is an anxiety that the subject feels in the face of his or her separation from, and loss of, the object. It arises when the subject has already differentiated
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SUBJECTIVE EXPERIENCE AND THE LOGIC OF THE OTHER
himself or herself from the object, that is to say, when ego and object are already differentiated.
Castration Anxiety Castration anxiety corresponds to the anxiety that appears when, in fiction, the subject believes to have failed. The sense of failure is subjective and depends on the subject's ideals—what someone experiences as failure another person may not. The illusion of the loss of the uphallic signifier" triggers the appearance of castration anxiety. Stage anxiety constitutes a typical example of castration anxiety.
ANXIETY AND ITS POSITION IN THE STRUCTURE Lacan's conceptualization of anxiety differs from Freud's. In his Seminar 10,9 devoted to the study of this phenomenon, L^can points out that rather than describing it or defining it, we must locate anxiety's structural position. He states that anxiety is an affect whose minimum function is to be a sign of something, not of danger but of a hyperpresence of object (a)—an omnipresence, a presence "in excess" of object (a) that will fill the lack. When Lacan says that anxiety is "an invasion of the Real into the Imaginary," he is accepting that the "natural sites" for anxiety are the body and the ego (moi).
"PRESENCE IN EXCESS" AND "THE LACK OF THE LACK" According to Freud, anxiety shows the loss of the object. For Lacan, by contrast, anxiety shows not the loss, but the "presence in excess" of the object. Such presence hinders the appearance of the signifier of the lack. Without lack, desire disappears. At a certain point, when referring to this issue, Lacan speaks of "the lack of the
THE LOGIC OF ANXIETY
27
lack." Without the inscription of the lack, the subject is immersed in an infinite experience without boundaries. Without the stgnifier of the lack, the subject stumbles into the Unheimlich, that is, the uncanny experience. The dialectical game between the presence and absence of the object (Fort-Da, hide and seek) will allow the subject to ratify the signifier of the lack, necessary for him or her to sustain desire and to reorder his or her psychic world.
ANXIETY AND THE PRESENT ABSENCE" When Lacan affirms that anxiety is the only subjective way to search for the lost object, he defines a paradox. What is sought is not the object but its absence, because its present absence introduces the signifier of the lack. The phallus (as the signifier of the lack) changes from a metaphoric to a metonymic signifier, for the lack (as phallic signifier) moves, circulates. It is everywhere and nowhere. Everyone may bear it and, at the same time, nobody does.
ANXIETY AND OBJECT (a) This missing object, object (a)—supporter of desire and organizer of the subject—may also be conceptualized as a "phallic object." Object (a) is the object without which there is no anxiety. Any circumstance that fills the subject will lead to the emergence of anxiety. Thus, in the December 5,1962 lesson of Seminar 10, Lacan states that anxiety appears at the height of the presence of the objects that are not absent, and adds that anxiety is what does not deceive, what is foreseen and doubdess. Anxiety is the awful certainty of what looks at us and leaves us depending on the Other, without the presence of words. Anxiety originates when the object is not absent. Lacan uses the example of the Wolf Man, who, in his anxiety, was terrified when seeing the five pairs of eyes looking at him from the threshold of the window.
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ENDNOTES 1. Jacques Lacan (1962-1963), Le Stminaire. Livre X. Uangoisse [Anxiety], edited by J. A. Miller. Paris: Seuil, 2004. 2. Jacques Lacan (1974-1975), Le Seminaire. LivreXXII. RSI 19741975, op. cit. 3. Sigmund Freud (1915-1916), Introductory Lectures on PsychoAnalysis, Standard Edition 15/16. 4. Sigmund Freud (1926), Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety, Standard Edition 20. 5. Sigmund Freud (1933), New Introductory Lectures on PsychoAnalysis, Standard Edition 22. 6. Sigmund Freud (1940), An Outline of Psycho-Analysis, Standard Edition 23. 7. Sigmund Freud, (1933), Anxiety and Instinctual Life, Lecture XXXII, New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, op. cit. 8. See, for example, M. Klein (1932), Child Psychoanalysis. London: Hogarth Press; W. Bion (1970), Second Thoughts. London: Heinemann; D. W. Winnicott (1958), Collected Papers: Through Paediatrics to PsychoAnalysis. London: Tavistock; E. Bick (1968), The Experience of the Skin in Very Early Object Relations. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis 49:484-486; F. Tustin (1980), Autistic Objects. International Review of Psycho-Analysis 7:27-40 and Autistic Barriers in Neurotic Patients. London: Karnac, 1985; and D. Meltzer, John Bremner, Shirley Hoxter, Doreen Weddell, and Isca Wittenberg, Explorations in Autism. Perth: Clunie, 1975. 9. Jacques Lacan, Le Stminaire. LivreX. Uangoisse [Anxiety], op. cit.
5 The Logic of the Phallus
THE MEANING OF THE PHALLUS Lacan's 1958 lecture at the Mark Plank Institute of Berlin, titled "The Signification of the Phallus,"1 made it clear that we must differentiate between two fundamental theses, namely, the thesis on the meaning of the phallus, and the notion of the phallus as signifies In the first case, from the point of view of meaning according to the logic of the phallus, the penis becomes the referent—it refers to the presence of the visible sexual organ. When from the perspective of meaning we are referred to the organ, we confirm the difference between the sexes according to the presence/absence dialectic. Thanks to this reasoning, a space is opened for the appearance of the castration complex.
THE PHALLIC SIGNIFIER In the second case, if we consider the phallus as signifier, the phallus becomes a metaphor. In one of its aspects, this metaphor refers
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SUBJECTIVE EXPERIENCE AND THE LOGIC OF THE OTHER
to the visible sexual organ. In its other aspect, it refers to the first signifier. In other words, uthe phallus is the signifier of the Other's desire."2 The phallic signifier is mysterious, since both sexes simultaneously have it and do not have it, and each sex, in fiction, attributes its presence or absence to the other.
THE LOGIC OF THE PHALLUS Following this logic of the phallus, both sexes fall into the trap of appearance and deceit, suffering from the illusion of having what in fact they do not have. Furthermore, this proposition of the "phallic logic" becomes more complex, for the male is the one who bears the organ of phallic signification. The female, who does not possess it (because of anatomical reasons), will be organized and marked by incompleteness, that is to say, by the logic of not-all. This logic will contribute to the organization of the essence of the feminine—of femininity.
TO BE THE PHALLUS OF THE OTHER To enjoy the body of the other, both male and female subjects must transform each other, in a metaphorical sense, into their phallus. The female is the one who gives the phallus to the male and who takes it away from him. Both sexes will be marked by the anxiety of sexual difference. Men and women know that they do not possess the phallus and they want the other's phallus. What is paradoxical is that it is always the other who gives the phallus, a paradox that refers us to castration anxiety. In "The Signification of the Phallus" Lacan says that the real of sexual jouissance is in the phallus, that is to say, that jouissance is in that something that one does not have and that one will find, in fiction, in the field of the other. Lacan states that "the fact that the phallus is a signifier requires that it be in the place of the Other that the subject have access to it. But since this signifier is there only as veiled and as ratio [raison]
THE LOGIC OF THE PHALLUS
31
of the Other's desire, it is the Other's desire as such that the subject is required to recognize."3
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE SEXES The phallus is the signifier that designates the organ's effects. The phallus, therefore, is neither good nor bad, neither external nor internal—it is a signifier. The presence of the phallus produces a deflection of the subject's needs. Because the subject speaks, he or she has to subject his or her desire to the demand. Sexual desire, presented as a demand, will always return partially unsatisfied. The sexual relationship in the human couple is trapped in this enclosed field of sexual desire. A twofold difficulty arises here: on the one hand, the existence of a perpetually unsatisfied sexual demand, and on the other hand, the systematic doubt of the other's love due to the effect of the lack of being* The other will always be questioned and tested due to the unavoidable demand of the love test. As we all know, this love test will always result in an impossibility. A satisfactory answer to such a test can only originate in the same subject who has given it. Consequendy, the one who has been questioned (in absentia) will always give an unsatisfactory answer. The lack of being constitutive of the human subject will prevent both the subject and the other from ever achieving full satisfaction. Since this relationship cannotfillthe lack and since the phallus is a desired signifier (desired to fill this lack) and, as such, imposed on the subject, it is only in the locus of the other that the subject may have illusory access to the muchdesired phallus. For this reason, Lacan claims that "the phallus is the signifier of the other's desire." The fact that in both stxts the organ of signification acquires a fetish value is thus unavoidable.
THE PHALLUS AND THE MASK OF APPEARANCE As I have already mentioned, both sexes have and do not have the phallus as signifier. Since this signifier appears in the locus of the
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other, both sexes will necessarily get involved in a game of appearances, a game that, along with the "phallic deceits'* that occur between the sexes, becomes increasingly complex in its social articulation. "Phallic ideals" arbitrarily assign different attributes to each sex. Neither men nor women can escape this dialectical situation until the moment when all signifiers disappear, that is, the moment of sexual copulation. In that brief moment of intercourse all signifiers are suspended, and masks fall. The multiple phallic signifiers receive their validity through the subject's need to belong and to be desired by the other. The mask or "seeming [paraitre] signifier"5 coincides in the male with his possession of the organ of signification. In the case of the female, the mask—the phallic signifier by which she wants to be desired—does not correspond to the possession of the organ of signification—woman is "not-all." She finds the meaning of her own desire in the body of the addressee of her demand for love. Once again, the phallus as organ acquires a fetish value. Lacan maintains that in the game of sex women will reject the essential part of their femininity, that is, being not-whole. This is where they will show their mask and their phallic signifier. Woman is desired for that which she is not.6
ENDNOTES 1. Jacques Lacan (1958), The Signification of the Phallus, op. cit. 2. Jacques Lacan (1958), The Signification of the Phallus, op. cit., p. 279. 3. Jacques Lacan (1958), The Signification of the Phallus, op. cit., p. 278. 4. This is Bruce Finks rendition of Lacan's term manque & ttre. Alan Sheridan translates this phrase as "want-to-be." According to Fink the dashes are misplaced (The Lacanian Subject: Between Language and Jouissance. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995) (editor's note). 5. Jacques Lacan (1958), The Signification of the Phallus, op. cit., p. 279. 6. Jacques Lacan (1960), Guiding Remarks for a Congress on Feminine Sexuality, translated by J. Rose, in J. Mitchell and J. Rose, eds. Feminine Sexuality. New York: W. W. Norton, 1982.
The Logic of the Object
THE TWO-FACED OBJECT The notion of object in psychoanalysis is two-faced: on the one hand, it is the object of the drive; on the other hand, it is the object of desire. Traditionally, if we follow the logic of the drive, psychoanalysis designates as "object" anything that becomes a psychic representation, that is, anything whose image, perceived through the organs of perception, is energetically charged—receives libidinal investiture or cathexis. In this way, what has been perceived becomes a mental representation—it becomes an object that has psychic existence. The drives and their journey around the perceived thing thus give rise to the radical psychoanalytic concept of object.
THE OBJECT OF THE DRIVE Early in life, the organs of vision, smell, and hearing are of great significance in the construction of the psychic object. Children who
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are born blind will experience tremendous difficulties in their relationship with the maternal figure and in the construction of psychic representations. Only those mothers who possess enough capacity for reverie,1 and verbal and tactile communication as well, will be able to help their blind children construct the maternal object with their other senses, thus saving them from autistic isolation.2 We can see here how the object of the drive rests initially on biological need. Needs and the struggle for survival allow the appearance of the object of the drive, the one that by means of identification will initiate the subjects mental life. The object of desire, in turn, appears as a consequence of the absence (or loss) of the first object. This object "in lack" will become a fundamental notion in psychoanalytic theory. Freud, and later Lacan, expounds with much detail on the special trait this object acquires in psychoanalysis. I am referring here to the quality of absence.
FREUD AND HIS OBJECTS Freud points out the importance of the game of hide and seek known as "Fort-Da" and its relationship with the lost object.3 This Freudian theoretical proposal helps us understand the phenomenon of repetition and highlights the importance of "the act" in the constitution of the subject. In the human act we find the possibility of the statement. It is sometimes necessary for the subject to have a capacity for transgression to produce his or her necessary statement.
OBJECT CATHEXIS Freud states, "The object of an instinct is the thing in regard to which or through which the instinct is able to achieve its aim."4 The object, in this case, is a means to reach drive satisfaction—the subject invests the object libidinally. This object is contingent, that is to say, it is not rigorously predetermined by biology. The object,
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35
in turn, determines the singularity of the subject's history—it appears as an object-choice that will determine the subject's future sexual life.
PART-OBJECTS Freud speaks of partial drives when referring to erogenous body zones. In some passages, the notion of partial drive implies that of part-object.5 Yet it is Melanie Klein who speculates on this matter, and she considers the part-object and the total object as fundamental in the child's early development.
THE SPLITTING OF THE OBJECT The splitting of the object refers to the possibility of dividing (splitting) the object representation and repressing the distressful or unpleasant aspects of it. Such a repression includes the possibility of setting in motion a different mechanism, namely, that of projection. Once the representation of the object is divided (split), part of this representation is repressed and then projected. In this case we have a horizontal split. In the case of disavowal (Verleugnung), which implies the forced presence of the division (splitting) mechanism, we will have a splitting of the object and of the subject in vertical form. First, the ego disavows "the exigencies of reality (Ananke); then the subject is split. In this way, the two opposing realities coexist in the subject side by side, so that things are and are not at the same time. The classic example is the traditional Spanish saying, UI don't believe in witches, but they do exist."6 When disavowal refers specifically to the discovery of the anatomical difference between the sexes in early childhood, a perverse structure emerges (the child simultaneously sees and does not see the mother's penis). In the case of neurosis, other aspects of Ananke that do not refer to the anatomical differences between the sexes are also disavowed.
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SUBJECTIVE EXPERIENCE AND THE LOGIC OF THE OTHER
THE ANACLITIC OBJECT In his essay "On Narcissism: An Introduction,"7 Freud describes this object as a prototype of the narcissistic relationship and defines it as a peculiar type of love relationship. The anaclitic object is important for the subject only when it is necessary to satisfy the subject's current need.
THE LOVE OBJECT Freud makes a difference between the love object and the object of the drive. The love (and hate) object refers to what Freud describes as the relationship of the ego with an object of satisfaction or frustration. Freud's work on narcissism makes it difficult to identify his position in relation to the love (and hate) object.
MELANIE KLEIN AND HER OBJECTS Klein introduces an entire theory of the object into psychoanalysis. She speaks of the part-object and the total object, the good and the bad object. The most controversial and debated aspect of her thesis is her view on the supposed completeness of the object, that is, the "total object."8
THE CONTROVERSY ON THE TOTAL OBJECT Melanie Klein and some post-Kleinian authors consider that the drives may evolve from partial to total, producing a so-called mature sexuality tied to genital sexuality and the total object.9 The total object would be present in mature sexuality, which would be harmonious and healthy. This way of thinking is incompatible with the thought of Jacques Lacan (who does, however, accept other ideas of Klein's). Lacan insists that because of its diversity, the drive
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necessarily passes through the partial drives. He affirms that there are no such things as "the genital," the "total object," or "adult maturity." Lacan attributes great significance to a special object that is neither a part-object nor a total object, but a topological object he designates as "object (a)" and that, among other things, bears the characteristic of being a lost object. Lacan insists that this absent object is the fundamental object for psychoanalysis.
WINNICOTT AND HIS TRANSITIONAL OBJECT The subject construes this transitional object within his or her singular subjectivity to replace the mother in her absence. The object is created in an intermediate (transitional) space, in the other of the unconscious, and as something differentiated from the subject, in what Winnicott calls a "not-me possession."10 At the same time, this object represents (occupies the place oO another absentee. Transitional phenomena, the transitional space, and transitional objects refer to an object that bears "a quality of absence." This notion comes close enough to Lacan's concept of object (a).
LACAN AND HIS OBJECTS Lacan states clearly that the object of psychoanalysis is the absent object. He sometimes refers to this object in terms of "the object of lack." Both Freud and Lacan postulate that the concept of object is a two-faced one. On the one hand, it is the object of the drive, contingent to the satisfaction and support of the subject's identifications; on the other hand, it is the object of desire, the product of the lost object, that is to say, the object of lack.
OBJECT (a) Lacan speculates on a new type of object that he designates as object (a). This object is a special one; it is neither a part-object nor a total
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object—it is a remainder of the early relationship with the primordial object. Lacan refers to it as the object concerning which one has no idea. The notion of object (a) as remainder refers to a residue of the partial drives that is not conscious. This object is the object of desire (which means that desire does not become independent of the partial drives). Later Lacan will assert that object (a) is the cause of desire, that is to say, the "object-cause."
CHART OF THE LACK OF THE OBJECT In Seminar 4, La Relation d'Objet (Object-Relation),11 Lacan outlines the three presentations of the absence of the object defined as "the lack of the object." There he develops his thesis of the object as an "object of lack." Access route
Object
Agent
Imaginary (frustration) Real (privation) Symbolic (castration)
Real Symbolic Imaginary
Symbolic Imaginary Real
We should note here that this "lack of the object" has nothing to do with Hegel's logic of the lack-in-being, which is referred to often as "the lack." It is necessary, therefore, to distinguish "the lack-inbeing" from the "subject in lack." We may identify three separate operations in this table. First, Lacan outlines three ways of presenting the lack of the object: (a) Privation (b) Frustration (c) Castration Then he defines their relationship with the three orders: (a) Imaginary (b) Symbolic (c) Real
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Finally, he relates them to the three forms of the absence of the object: (a) Nature of the lack (b) Object of the lack (c) Agent of the lack I have ventured to add another level Lacan defines in the seminar and that I have designated as the environment of the lack: (a) Need (b) Demand (c) Desire In this way, the chart is configured in three levels: Environment Access route
Nature
It has to do The nature of with privation the lack is real It has to do with needs
(It is a matter of specular fusion)
It has to do with frustration It has to do with demand (It is a dual matter where there is a specular rupture)
(Possible clinical example: a subject who has been an orphan since birth)
Object The object of the lack is symbolic
Agent The agent of the lack is imaginary
(The absence of the mother: (The concept absence as an of the mother imaginary within the symbolic order) construction)
The nature of the lack is imaginary
(Possible clinical example: a subject who suffers from shame due to having been dishonored by his daughter's pregnancy out of wedlock)
The object of the lack is real
The agent of the lack is symbolic
(Unexpected pregnancy as real)
(It refers to the ideals within the symbolic order)
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Environment Access route
Nature
It has to do with desire
The nature of the lack is symbolic
It has to do with castration
Object
The object of the lack is imaginary
(Possible clinical example: a subject (It is a matter who is an investor of the suffers a financial (Concept of symbolic crisis, goes wealth as bankrupt, and third) imaginary) commits suicide)
Agent
The agent of the lack is real (Money as a Real)
ENDNOTES 1. According to R. D. Hinshelwood, the term reverie "was adopted by Bion (1962) to refer to a state of mind that the infant requires of the mother.... The idea is that the infant will, through projective identification, insert into the mother's mind a state of anxiety and terror which he is unable to make sense of and which is felt to be intolerable.... Mother's reverie is a process of making some sense of it for the infant" (A Dictionary ofKleinian Thought London: Free Association, 1998, p. 420) (editor's note). 2. Selma Fraiberg (1968), Parallel and Divergent Patterns in Blind and Sighted Infants. Psychoanalytic Study of the Child 23:264-300. New York: International Universities Press. 3. Sigmund Freud (1920), Beyond the Pleasure Principle. Standard Edition 18. 4. Sigmund Freud (1915), Instincts and Their Vicissitudes. Standard Edition 14:122. 5. Sigmund Freud (1905), Three Essays on a Theory of Sexuality, Standard Edition 7. 6. The saying in Spanish is: "Yo no creo en las brujas, pero que las hay, las hayn (editor's note). 7. Sigmund Freud (1914), On Narcissism: An Introduction. Standard Edition 14:90. 8. Melanie Klein (1932), The Psycho-Analysis of Children, op. cit.
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9. See, among others, Donald Meltzer (1973), Sexual States of Mind. Perth: Clunie. 10. Donald Winnicott (1953), Transitional Objects and Transitional Phenomena. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis 24:2. 11. Jacques Lacan (1956-1957), Le Seminaire. Livre IV. La relation d'objet, 1956-1957, edited by Jacques-Alain Miller. Paris: Seuil, 1994 [I have not found an English translation; editor's note].
7 The Logic of the Subject
THE SUBJECT OF THE UNCONSCIOUS According to Jacques Lacan, for psychoanalysis the subject is the subject of the unconscious. In this sense, the concept of the subject refers to the effects of the signifier. We may say that the subject is an effect of language. This concept is hence topological, since the subject is both cause and effect of the signifier. The signifier determines, and is determined by, the subject: "A signifier is what represents the subject to another signifier. This latter signifier is therefore the signifier to which all the other signifiers represent the subject—which means that if this signifier is missing, all the other signifiers represent nothing."1
THE EFFECT OF THE WORD In Seminar 1 Lacan states that the subject is both the effect of speech and its support.2 In 1960, in turn, he will assert that "a signifier
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43
represents the subject to another signifier,"3 adding later that "the subject is what a signifier represents for another signifier." In this way, the subject is not the Freudian ego or the subject of consciousness, but rather, a subject that inhabits the system of the unconscious. Lacan poetically asserts the unconscious nature of the other, and wonders: Who is this other to whom I am more bound than to myself because, in my deepest being, he is the one who stirs me? In this way, the substance of the subject is not flesh and blood, is not an individual, is not the self, is not the entire psyche; the subject is an effect of words.
STATEMENT (£NONC£) AND ENUNCIATION According to psychoanalytic theory, the subject is structurally split, alienated from himself forever. On the one hand, the subject is a being of consciousness that recognizes himself or herself in the locus of the ego (moi), in the "I am" and in the "I," which correspond to the French words je and mot On the other hand, the subject is the being of the unconscious, to which one does not have access. Lacan refers to the subject as "the subject of the unconscious" and introduces this notion in his grammar with the letter $ of the barred subject. The subject as such appears by way of a statement (inonct), and is located in the locus of enunciation, where the subject does not know. In this way, a profound difference is established between a statement, which comes from the ego, and an enunciation, which comes from the subject of the unconscious.
ZERO AND THE SUBJECT At the end of his life, in Seminar 26, Lacan makes a revealing comparison between the subject's nature in psychoanalytic theory and the mathematical characteristics of the one and the zero.4 Lacan states that zero is a number endowed with two opposite properties: it is an impossible object, yet in the numeric succession it
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SUBJECTIVE EXPERIENCE AND THE LOGIC OF THE OTHER
counts as any other number. In the same way, the subject, while utterly rejected by the signifying chain, is nevertheless represented by a signifier. Lacan thus outlines a tight likeness between the subject and the zero. This becomes even clearer when Lacan says that in the "speaking being," the subject is both subject of the unconscious and an effect of the signifier. The presence of signifiers renders the subject a constant, a zero, a subject in absence who will in fact sustain the whole chain, to be later eclipsed (efface) in that chain. When being eclipsed in the signifying chain, the subject vanishes in the Other. Thus, a subject speaks and, in doing so, vanishes. Later in the seminar, Lacan moves on, and, according to David Nasio, insists that the subject's split does not reside between being and not-being but between one and Other—between a signifier that represents the subject and the subject's dissolution in the signifying chain (Sx^), that is, in the locus of the Other.5 At the end of Seminar 26, Nasio, who had been invited by Lacan to speak in that seminar, asked the same question again: u What is the subject?" To that question, Nasio himself responded, "We, the speaking beings, are but wind beings, evanescent messengers between jouissance, which longs for words, and the Nameof-the-Father, which orders them."6
THE SUBJECT AND DESIRE We have seen that the subject is not the ego (moi). We might say that the ego is a psychic agency represented by a group of functions that are spread within the dimension of the imaginary order. The ego sustains the subject of consciousness. It participates in a feeling of a unified body that is a consequence of the specular relationship with the other in the imaginary axis. This relationship with the imaginary other, which sustains the illusion of completeness, will become an obstacle to the subject's recognition of his or her desire. Desire is originated in the lack of being (manque-ct-itre) related to the lost object. Desire is silent and unsatisfiable, as the
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formations of the unconscious (dreams, jokes, symptoms, parapraxes, and so on) show. Desire will always be slippery and unknown. It may be partially known only through the demand, which will always be a demand for something else. This demand is structured like a language: the demand is construed when desire passes through the defile of the signifiers and begins to have an existence in the signifying chain. In this way, demand shifts the concept of the subject toward the problem of desire. Lacan will finally say that the subject is the subject of desire.
THE SUBJECT AND ANXIETY We have said that the subject is the subject of the unconscious and that he or she has ex-sistence in language. In other words, the subject sustains language but, at the same time, exists outside of language (which constitutes a topological reasoning). The subject is the cause of language and simultaneously vanishes in it. We have also said that the subject is the cause of desire (by means of the lost object) but, at the same time, suffers from desire, which he or she will never be able to know. As I mentioned above, Lacan defined the subject as the subject of desire. The subject is made of wind; it is sustained momentarily in the absence of that lost object. When this object makes its irruption from the Real, it produces an Unhcimlich effect—an uncanny experience that leads to the appearance of anxiety. The subject will not be able, in the outside world, to avoid suffering the experience of anxiety: the subject is a subject of anxiety.
THE SUBJECT IN THE CUT At the end of Seminar 6, titled "Le dtsire et son Interpretation9* (Desire and Its Interpretation), Lacan posits the emergence of the subject in the moment of the cut (meaning a sudden interruption). He asserts that such an emergence has something of the Real
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SUBJECTIVE EXPERIENCE AND THE LOGIC OF THE OTHER
symbolized by nothing.7 Where there is nothing, in the Real, in the foreclosure, is where Lacan locates the subject's being—his or her pure being. The statement that the Other is not a subject but a locus constitutes a recourse to topology, since we are speaking of relative places. Desire, Other, demand, and subject, devoid of any reference to flesh-and-blood substance, become logical operative terms. The cut in the Moebius strip illustrates this thesis. Lacan states that the Moebius strip is the cut itself, and may be considered the structural support of the split subject.8 Indeed, the Moebius strip has no surfaces—it is but an edge. The Moebian property is to have that edge, so that when the strip tries to cling to itself, it disappears as a strip and what remains is the interval, the edge (which we designate as the cut). If the cut is the Real, what is impossible to say, then it is legitimate to say that the Moebius strip does not represent the subject, does not offer a metaphor; rather, the subject appears in the cut, which is transformed into act.
THE SUBJECT AND KNOWLEDGE (SABER) In Seminar l l , 9 Lacan postulates that the subject is instituted in the certainty of being—of a "lack of knowing," and he designates the signifying chain, S2, as knowledge (saber). The question of knowledge (saber) returns insistently, for Lacan makes the subject supposed to know10 the pivot of the transference. In relation to knowledge, Lacan affirms that it is that opaque term in which the subject himself gets lost, is eclipsed. This assertion refers us to the notion of the fading of the subject.
THE FADING OF THE SUBJECT In his essay "Observacidn sobre el informe de Daniel Lagache" (Observations on the Report by Daniel Lagache),11 Lacan states that the fading of the subject takes place in the suspension of desire,
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47
because the subject is eclipsed in the signifier of the demand and in the fixation of the fantasme—in becoming absent (in the cut), the subject makes the part-object (the object of the drive) shine.
THE SUBJECT AND THE OTHER We had pointed out that the subject's split is not a split between being and not-being but between one and the Other, that is, between a signifier that represents the subject, and its dissolution in the signifying chain (S!-S2)—in the locus of the Other. The subject is sustained by, and vanishes in, the signifying chain, that is to say, in the locus of the Other. The unreachable nature of the Other renders this locus the place of the Urverdrangung (primal repression). The topological structure of the Other suffers from a lack, The Other is not whole, it cannot by identified with one or with a totality.12
THE SUBJECT AND THE BORROMEAN FUNCTION From 1972 (Seminar 20) on, the topology of the Borromean knot will introduce a new statute in Lacanian theorization. Lacan states there that each one of the three rings is an S\. He then wonders about the nature of the Other, and affirms that the Other is "the One-missing."13 We should recall here that when defining the nature of the Borromean knot, we stated that if one cuts any one of the rings, the other ones are set free. This Borromean function cannot be attributed to any of the three rings in particular—it is a property of the knot as such. The property of the Borromean knot allows us to illustrate the topology of the "surplus" (en-plus) of the subject. This new topology affects the way we understand the signifying chain, for it modifies the link between Sx and S2. Lacan affirms that it is only on the surface that this sequence makes two. There is no sequential order between the signifiers; it is simply a relationship between two elements. However, he also claims that
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SUBJECTIVE EXPERIENCE AND THE LOGIC OF THE OTHER
there is no relationship between two elements. That is the case because, since there is no complementary relationship between both signifiers in the chain, a third is needed to hold them together. This third signifier is, at the same time, primogenitor (that is to say, there are no hierarchies). In this way, the signifying chain acquires a trait of the Borromean knot, so that none of the three signifiers is tied to the other because they need one another—at least three signifiers are necessary for them to stay together. This Borromean characteristic does not pertain to any one of the rings, and it represents the surplus of the subject.
THE SUBJECT AND THE HOLE All subjects have to be constituted—nobody is self-engendered. We know that the subject is constituted in the locus of the other. This locus is in the unconscious, but at the same time it bears a specular reference to the embodied other: it is the other as a fellow man. The subject is constituted through the effect of the signifier, yet, at the same time, he or she is the cause of the signifier. This constitutes a topological paradox. The relationship with the imaginary other, cause and effect of the subject, will weave a signifying weft. Early life experiences will endow this weft with certain characteristics.
First Hole The unavoidable loss of the object and the lacks experienced during childhood will give rise to the appearance of a certain insufficiency in that weft, which we can designate as a hole in the signifying weft. This hole is located in the imaginary order. If we resort to schema Lambda, we can draw this hole on the left side of the schema. The size of this hole varies in relation to the subject's childhood experiences. Being this the logical moment of narcissism (imaginary axis a—»a' of schema L), the bigger the hole, the
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bigger the subject's narcissistic problem, and the harder the obstacles for the subject to have access to the dialectic of recognition (desire of the other) in the operability of the symbolic order.
Second Hole The constitution of the signifying weft will find another obstacle in the lack of inscription of the Name-of-the-Father (also known as foreclosure of the Name-of-the-Father), which will give origin to a second hole in this weft. This second hole belongs to the symbolic order, and we can draw it on the right side of schema L. The first hole is responsible for the serious narcissistic difficulties suffered by neurotics. The second hole will lead to the subject's irreversible psychotic structure. Sometimes it is possible to maintain the psyche functioning reasonably well without producing a clinical schizophrenia, because a fourth term (or fourth ring) will sustain the Borromean structure. We might call it a symptom-clamp™ for its function is to tie, to hold together. This symptom may appear in a variety of guises: bulimia, drug addiction, compulsions, and so on. If the symptom-clamp disappears, the three orders come unfastened and the psyche collapses.
ENDNOTES 1. Jacques Lacan (1960), The Subversion of the Subject and the Dialectic of Desire in the Freudian Unconscious, op. cit., p. 304. 2. Jacques Lacan (1953-1954), The Seminar. Book I. Freud's Papers on Technique, 1953-1954, op. cit. 3. Jacques Lacan, The Subversion of the Subject and the Dialectic of Desire in the Freudian Unconscious, op. cit., p. 304. 4. Jacques Lacan (1978-1979), LeS&ninaire. LivreXXVI.LetopologLe et le temps, 1978-1979 [The Seminar. Book XXVI. Topology and Time], unpublished. 5. Jacques Lacan (1978-1979), LeStminaire. LivreXXVI. Le topologjie etletemps, 1978-1979 [Topology and Time], op. cit., lesson of May 15,1979.
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6. Jaques Lacan (1978-1979), Le Stminaire. LivreXXVI. Le topologie et le temps, 1978-1979 [Topology and Time], op. cit., lesson of May 15, 1979. 7. Jacques Lacan (1958-1959), Le Stminaire. Livre VI. Le desire et son interpretation, 1958-1959, published in part in Ornicar?, 24-27,19811983 [Desire and Its Interpretation, published in part as "Desire and the Interpretation of Desire in Hamlet" translated by James Hulbert, Yale French Studies, 1977, 55/6: 11-52]. 8. Jacques Lacan (1958-1959), Le Stminaire. Livre VI. Le dtsire et son interpretation, 1958-1959 [Desire and Its Interpretation], op. cit. 9. Jacques Lacan (1964), The Seminar of Jacques Lacan. Book XI. The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, op. cit. 10. Alan Sheridan's translation for sujet suppose savoir. Stuart Schneiderman (Returning to Freud: Clinical Psychoanalysis in the School ofLacan. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1980) prefers "supposed subject of knowledge" (editor's note). 11. Jacques Lacan (1969), Observacidn sobre el Informe de Daniel Lagache [Observations on the report by Daniel Lagache], in Escritos. Volumen 2 [Ecrits. Volume 2]. Mexico City: Siglo 21 Editores, 1984 [I have not found an English translation (editor's note)]. 12. Jacques Lacan (1969-1970), Le Stminaire. Livre XVII. Venvers de lapsychanalyse, 1969-1970, edited by Jacques-Alain Miller. Paris: Seuil, 1991 [There is a synopsis in English from unedited French manuscripts: The Seminar of Jacques Lacan XVII: Psychoanalysis Upside-Down, translated by Cormac Gallagher. London: Karnac Books, 2002]. 13. This is Bruce Fink's rendition of the French Vun-en-moins (Jacques Lacan, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan. On Feminine Sexuality. The Limits ofLoveandKnowledge. Book XX, Encore, 1972-1973, op. cit., p. 129; editor's note). 14. See footnote 6, Chapter 3 (editor's note).
8 The Logic of the Other
THE SYMBOLIC OTHER In Lacanian structural psychoanalysis the concept of Other (with a capital O) refers to the Other of the symbolic order, to the Other of the unconscious. It is a complex notion, for a relationship exists between the Other of the unconscious and the flesh-and-blood other. This proposal is a consequence of a previous Lacanian structural conception whereby the subject, who refers us to the subject of the unconscious, is both cause and effect of the signifying chain. The subject vanishes in the locus of the Other, but what is this locus? This locus points to the unconscious. Lacan states that the subject is constituted in the locus of the Other, that the Other is the locus of the treasure trove of signifiers, and that the subject receives from the Other the message the subject himself or herself emits. We should linger here for a moment to specify that Lacanian theory establishes a clear difference between the little other and the big Other. The little other, represented with a lowercase a ("a" refers to autre, the French word for "other"), refers to the other of
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the imaginary order, while the big Other corresponds to the Other of language, that is, the Other inscribed in the symbolic order.1
THE LITTLE OTHER The concept of little other, petit a, refers us to the imaginary order, that is to say, to the world of images. There, in that locus, the subject is constituted in the lack in the other. This relationship is twosided and topological, because the specular relationship with the flesh-and-blood other precipitates the subject into an unavoidable bond with the object in lack and with the absent object. From the moment of his or her constitution, therefore, the subject is marked by the lack in the other (and by his or her own lack as well). On the side of the lack in the other arises the unavoidable existence of jouissance (the signifier of the lack in the other), and on the side of the absent object, the little a is introduced into the scene.
THE LACKING OTHER According to the grammar he developed, Lacan writes this Other in the following way: s(A).This notation represents the signifier of the lacking Other and is also, in fact, the matheme for jouissance. This twofold meaning attests to the fact that the capacity to suffer (jouissance) is constitutive of the subject and universal.
THE ABSENT OTHER The subjects' relationship (in the imaginary axis) with their originating fellow man will generate their little a, which is the source of their constituting imaginary identifications. Such identifications would be the subjects' original supporters (or guarantors). In this way, this flesh-and-blood, caretaking, maternal other becomes the other of the unconscious. These first identifications will leave a lost
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53
remainder, a testimony to that original time that becomes the cause of desire and is designated as object (a).
THE BIG OTHER The concept of the big Other refers to the locus where the signifying chain originates. Subjects will encounter this locus from the very moment of their arrival in this world. This locus (the locus of the Other) will always refer to other subjects, the flesh-and-blood others who inevitably participate in the symbolic order in which we are all immersed. We should note here that, due to the effect of identifications, this big Other is no one in particular. It refers us to the Other of the unconscious. It is the locus where the signifying chain emerges and where the subject is constituted. The big Other is the locus of the treasure trove of signifiers. Lacan writes this concept algebraically as s(A), which means the signifier of the Other without lack. The subject thus vacillates in his or her constitution between the locus of the little other—the imaginary axis—and the locus of the big Other—the symbolic axis. This thesis is not conceived of as a development or evolution, nor is it topographical; it is topological. In his essay uThe Direction of the Treatment and the Principles of Its Power," Lacan affirms that "we must establish the notion of the Other with a capital O as being the locus of speech's [parole] deployment."2
SCHEMA LAMBDA3 In 1955, in his seminar "The Purloined Letter," Lacan presents a new nonanthropomorphic conception of the psychic apparatus.4 Here the new concept of the subject corresponds to the subject of the unconscious. We find it on the left side of the graph, with the letter S, which is pronounced "ess" (the word for the letter S in French), that is, the term for id in German. It is there because the subject is ex-sistent for the ego (moi), that is, is located outside
54
SUBJECTIVE EXPERIENCE AND THE LOGIC OF THE OTHER
the ego's realm. The subject will be constituted in the locus of the other. We have learned that the notion of "other'' implies that this other is the other of the unconscious, represented with the letter a' on the left side of the graph, below. The signifying chain (in the other) is thus the repressed unconscious. In the graph the dotted arrow goes from S to <£. This graph shows how the ego (moi) receives its own (inverted) message from the other (direction of the arrows). The full arrow from a' to a represents the imaginary relationship, designated as the imaginary axis. The full arrow goes from the big Other (treasure trove of signifiers), represented with the letter A and located on the lower right corner, to S (on the upper left side). This arrow is initially full, but after traversing the imaginary axis becomes dotted because of the "wall of language." Inaccurately yet didactically we might call the imaginary axis the narcissistic cods, and the symbolic axis the oedipal axis. The permanent presence of the imaginary axis (a'—>a) blocks and impedes the subject's reaching the locus of his or her signifying determination—the locus of A, creating an unavoidable imaginary effect, the cause of the language barrier due to structural reasons. This leads, in the first place, to the inevitable situation of "speaking to the wall" (didlogo de sordos), and, in the second place, to the inevitable effect of subjectivity. Lacan affirms that "the subject . . . is [interested in this discourse] insofar as he is drawn to the four corners of the schema: namely, S, his ineffable and stupid
Es(id)S
ego (moi) a'
"
A,^%,
Little a (other)
>w
symbolic axis
^ Big A (Other) Treasure trove of signifiers
THE LOGIC OF THE OTHER
55
existence; a, his objects; a\ his ego, that is, his form as reflected in his objects; and A, the locus from which the question of his existence may arise for him."5
ENDNOTES
1. See The Seminar. Book 11. The Ego in Freud's Theory and in th Technique of Psychoanalysis, 1954-1955, op. cit, Chapter 19 (editor's note). 2. Jacques Lacan (1958), The Direction of the Treatment and the Principles of Its Power, op. cit., p. 252. 3. In £crits. Paris: Seuil, 1966, p. 53. There is a later, simplified version in Merits: A Selection, translated by Bruce Fink, op. cit., p. 183 (editor's note). 4. Jacques Lacan (1955), Seminar on "The Purloined Letter,*' translated by Jeffrey Mehlman. Yale French Studies, 1972; 48:38-72, reprinted in John Muller and William Richardson, eds. The Purloined Poe. Lacan, Derrida and Psychoanalytic Reading, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988, pp. 28-54. 5. Jacques Lacan, On a Question Prior to Any Possible Treatment of Psychosis, in tcrits. A Selection, op. cit., p. 183.
The Logic of Object (a)
A REMAINDER Object (a) is the only original contribution that Lacan claimed to have made to psychoanalysis. It refers to a very special type of object that originates in the earliest experiences of the subject with the other. Of these early experiences that produce drive investitures (cathexes) there will be left an unconscious remainder that will be incorporated into the constitution and structure of the psyche.
THE ZCLATS, OR FRAGMENTS This remainder is lost forever, but the subject will always search for it. The lost objects (as remainders) are partial fragments of the body Uclats). The lost object may be the image of the gaze, the voice, the breast, or the feces, or it may also be the image of another bodily object. It will constitute the object-cause of desire. It is a remainder construed (acquired) by each subject. It is a win-
THE LOGIC OF OBJECT ( a )
57
dow (maybe the only one) that the subject has to the Real The subject fictitiously believes to have found that lost object in the passion object of love or hate. Object (a) thus becomes an illusion of a perceptible object fictitiously found in the other (because it is no more than a projection). In this way, the subject cannot avoid falling into the imaginary a-d axis (narcissistic organization) of schema Lambda. In other words, the fictitious encounter with object (a) precipitates the subject into a state of passion, inscribed, therefore, in the imaginary axis.
THE TOPOLOGICAL OBJECT This object (a) is a topological one. It is neither a part-object nor a total object, neither an internal nor an external object. It is not the Real, although it opens a window into that register. It is the lost object, never found and always sought. It is the cause of desire. It is a fundamental element in the subject's sexual fantasme. In this locus of the fantasme, object (a) is opaque—it is the veil of castration, soothing castration anxiety and triggering the intensity of sexual pleasure.
A FURTHER SPECIFICATION As we have seen, the concept of object (a) is a complex one. As a topological object it is one thing, and at the same time it is a different thing, but it is not that either. Object (a) dwells in the paradox. Object (a) has to do with the partial drives, yet at the same time it is not the object of the drive. It is the object-cause of desire. Thus, desire does not become independent of the presence of partial drives. Since it is unconscious, object (a) is not known by the subject. Lacan asserts that object (a) is the object concerning which one has no idea. Yet at the same time it is a perceptible object that
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the subject's senses recognize when the other (fictitiously) bears it. The other thus shows what he or she does not have. Object (a) is present for the subject as a semblance, also known as a lure.1 Object (a) as a remainder suggests the idea of a residue. It is linked to the initial life experiences, in which partial drives are present. An unconscious remainder persists of those experiences that introduces the idea of a lost object. According to Lacan, the remainder corresponds to the parts (the iclats) that are left of the image of the maternal body, that is, the lost object. This lost object assumes the notion of the lack, which takes ' us back to the idea of the lost object. This concept thus opens up a relationship among desire, the drives, the lack, and object (a). I am not referring here to the lack of being (maw[ue-d-&re), which is tied to another concept—that of the constitutive, the original lack (introduced by Hegel). This lack, as cause of desire, substitutes for another, earlier, lack. As the object of desire, object (a) sustains desire in the matheme of the (sexual) fantasme, and outside the fantasme, this object constitutes a lure. In both cases, object (a) becomes the object-cause of desire. In 1970, Lacan outlines the idea of object (a) as a surplus jouissance or plus~de-jouir.2 It marks a surplus in jouissance (and, at the same time, it sets a limit to it).
OBJECT (a) AND LOVE Lacan defines love as ato give what one does not have."3 The subject in love believes he or she has found in the other his or her lost object (a). Love is something difficult to specify, for it is perceived in the look, the voice, or the hands—in sum, in the body of the other. This (fictitious) encounter with object (a) produces a state of passion (characteristic of the imaginary order). The other (of the unconscious), with his image of the body, offers his support to the subject, who believes he or she has found his or her lost object. Love is thus a true state of fiction; it is a state of passion.
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59
OBJECT (a) AND THE SEXUAL ACT During the sexual act, object (a) will eclipse the inevitable "alter" quality of the other. During the encounter of the bodies in the sexual act, object (a), which is perceived in the other, will allow the subject to live the momentary illusion of becoming one with the body of the other.
OBJECT (a) AND ANXIETY According to Lacan, anxiety arises from a certain structural relationship between the subject and the lost object—object (a). Freud, in turn, considers that anxiety is caused by the lack of the object (separation anxiety and loss). For Lacan, the emergence of anxiety is tied to the appearance of something (anything) in the locus of object (a), the object-cause of desire. For a subject to be a desiring subject, the object-cause of his or her desire must be the object of the lack. Anxiety is not the sign of a lack but the manifestation of a possible lack of the lack. Lacan says that what produces the anxiety of the lost breast is not the lack of the breast—which in any case originates desire—but rather its omnipresence, that is, its presence in excess. Any experience that seeks to fill the lack gives rise to anxiety. In Seminar 9 Lacan states that anxiety is the temptation, not of the loss of the object, but of its presence—of the objects that are never absent.4
OBJECT (a) AND THE ANALYST In Seminar 15, VAct Psychanalytique (The Psychoanalytic Act),5 Lacan points out that in the analytic device, the analyst will occupy for the analysand the locus of the semblance, that is to say, the place of object (a). When occupying this locus, the analyst should be professionally qualified to bear the weight of the projections and of the transference the analysand will develop with the
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semblance. The analyst does not identify with these projections, occupying an asymmetric place, and is, therefore, able to speak from where he or she is not expected to speak. In this way, a relationship is established among the semblance, object (a), and the transference, all of them unconscious elements. The relationship of the analysand and the analyst has many variables and vertices, some of them within the realm of consciousness, and some within that of the unconscious. Transference is located among the latter, that is, among unconscious phenomena.
ENDNOTES
1. According to Alan Sheridan, the French term leurre may be translated as "lure/' "decoy," "bait," and "allurement" or "enticement." (See Alan Sheridan's glossary in the 1977 English edition of Ecrits. A Selection. New York and London: W. W. Norton, editor's note.) 2. Bruce Fink explains the different connotations of the French term: "The expression plus-de-jouir is constructed on the model of plus-value, the traditional French translation of Marx's Mehrwert (surplus value).... The plus should . . . be understood as virtually a synonym for Encore!— More!" (The Lacanian Subject. Between Language andJouissance. Princeto Princeton University Press, 1995, p. 191, n. 28) (editor's note). 3. Jacques Lacan, he Seminaire. Livre VIII. Le Transfer^ 1960-1961 [The Seminar. Book VIII. The Transference], edited by Jacques-Alain Miller. Paris: Seuil, 1991, p. 147. 4. Jacques Lacan (1961-1962), Le Stminaire. Livre IX. L'identification, 1961-1962 [The Seminar. Book IX. Identification], op. cit. 5. Jacques Lacan (1967-1968), Le Seminaire. Livre XV. VActe Psychanalytique, 1967-1968 [The Seminar. Book XV. The Psychoanalytic Act], unpublished.
10 The Logic ofJouissance
PSYCHIC SUFFERING Suffering refers to an excess in the amount of psychic energy that the system has at a given moment. Physical pain and anxiety may cause suffering, but psychic suffering may also exist in their absence. Freud had already introduced his theory of human masochism in 1905, and he expanded it in 1924.1 Freud distinguished three types of masochisms: sexual, feminine, and moral. According to this theory, masochism is a product of an unconscious guilt. Naturally, the subject is not aware of it. The conflict that produces unconscious guilt compels him or her to seek forms of suffering so as to achieve unconscious atonement. The paradox lies in the fact that moral masochism simultaneously represents a suffering and a relief—that this suffering is a form of cure. In a way, it is a cure from guilt. We should point out here that the moral theory of masochism does not include any of the elements of the depressive logic. Failure as a trigger for depression is absent, as is the predominance of hate in the link to the other (of the unconscious). Nor is
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there a diminished self-esteem—on the contrary, the moral masochist often shows great self-esteem, an altruistic stance, and an ability to endure psychic pain. These are doubtlessly two different types of clinical logic, yet both evince the presence of psychic suffering.
THE LOGIC OF JOUISSANCE Jacques Lacan introduces his theory of jouissance in 1960, in his famous Seminar 7, The Ethics of Psychoanalysis.2 This theory represents a very important innovation and is a major contribution to psychoanalysis, for it will allow us to advance in the study of psychic suffering. In current psychoanalytic clinical practice we find that most analysands who finish their analysis cannot escape suffering.3 They suffer to maintain their psychic balance. We might say, "They need to suffer." When studying these cases, we find that they do not correspond to the Freudian classic moral masochism— we do not find indications of unconscious feelings of guilt. Nevertheless, the permanent search for suffering remains. Lacan introduces his theory of jouissance as a structural phenomenon that no human being can escape. Following Freud, Lacan considers that jouissance is implicit in the logic of the drive, and is located in a beyond of Freud's pleasure principle.4 Every human being would have a certain amount of jouissance in his or her daily hit. Jouissance is located beyondpleasure, that is to say, it constitutes a special form of taking delight in suffering. When the amount of jouissance is high, the analysand presents a similar clinical picture to that of the depressive. These patients have created a life situation that inevitably leads them to suffering. They show an inability to solve the situations in which they are immersed because, ultimately, they do not want to solve them. The paradox lies in their desire not to continue to live like that, that is, in pain. These subjects feel trapped, they sometimes cry, and they experience an unavoidable interference with their happiness. In these cases of high levels of jouissance, the patients' childhood his-
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63
tory reveals the presence of serious difficulties at the beginning of their lives. We find histories of abandonment and serious losses, early histories of abuse, death in the family, and poverty; there is a history of traumatic separation from their parents with the consequent affective deficiency, and histories of parental drug abuse, with or without serious mental pathology. All these early traumas increase the amount of jouissance that will appear later. Such an early childhood panorama introduces a daily quantity or amount of suffering that is inscribed in the structuring of the subject's personality. Other human beings have experienced less traumatic events and smaller amounts of suffering in their lives. The important thing is that this jouissance (suffering) is a necessary component of every individual's life in the attainment of psychic balance. Consequendy, it is not a symptom, and it cannot be cured. Many of our analysands acquire some self-knowledge during the analytic process, a self-knowledge that may open up new opportunities for a better life. They rescue much of the capacity for pleasure in their sexual life, but they are not able to revert their need for suffering {jouissance). Such a need is inscribed in their being—it is necessary for their psychic balance. We should point out here that this type of analysand does not present a dynamic of hate toward the object or toward himself or herself, nor does he or she show a decrease in his or her self-esteem. It is therefore clear that the state of jouissance is neither a masochistic nor a depressive state per se.
ANOTHER ISSUE REGARDING JOUISSANCE We should clarify and amplify here some points regarding the theory of jouissance. Lacan defines at least four types ofjouissance: phallic, feminine, absolute, and mystic. Phallic jouissance, presented as organ pleasure, is related to the sexual organ's capacity for pleasure in both sexes. Let us remember here that the phallus as metaphor is present in both sexes. In both sexes, therefore, jouissance is phallic. This stance of Lacan's
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SUBJECTIVE EXPERIENCE AND THE LOGIC OF THE OTHER
soon became obsolete, and jouissance came to be "something" located beyond pleasure. Feminine jouissance refers to the natural ability for suffering characteristic of the feminine psychic structure. This is a Freudian thesis, and it is based on a relentless logic that appears in his text on the economic theory of masochism.5 Absolute jouissance constitutes an imperative for suffering. It is singular, personal, individual—a script written in early childhood as a consequence of multiple infantile traumas. Every subject would have a variable quantum of absolute jouissance, determined by the vicissitudes of his or her early history. Mystic jouissance refers to a particular form of jouissance that characterizes the figure of the hero or the heroine. Lacan initially identified it in the religious catholic figures of Teresa de Avila and San Juan de la Cruz. He chose these figures because they produced a written record of their lives. This type of mystic jouissance also appears in heroic figures of both sexes who, for the same reasons of imaginary restitution, are propelled to a heroic act that will necessarily involve their death—they die for their ideals. They are heroes and they die in a state of jouissance. We should clarify here that in Lacan's proposal of a mystic jouissance no particular form of psychopathology is implicit. That is to say, jouissance may be present in any psychoanalytic clinical entity.
THE STATE OF JOUISSANCE AND MORAL MASOCHISM Are the state of jouissance and Freud's moral masochism the same thing? As I have stated previously, jouissance refers to the way the subject has survived childhood traumas, that is, how the subject has incorporated suffering into the progressive and simultaneous constitution of his or her psyche. The notion of a progressive and simultaneous constitution seems to be a contradiction, yet it is not so, because it is synchronic and topological.6 If in the initial period of life psychic suffering occupied an important space, this suffering will be incorporated into the subject's homeostatic bal-
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65
ance. In the subject's later life, the delight in suffering or, we might say, the state of jouissance will be necessary to maintain his or her psychic homeostatic balance. Hence, jouissance is not a symptom. Moral masochism refers to a different notion. It refers to sadism turned onto the ego (moi) as a consequence of the subject's not being up to his or her own ideals (in Lacanian theory, the ideal ego, i(a)y in the imaginary axis, and the ego-ideal, 1(A), in the symbolic axis). Depending on which axis prevails, we will find in masochists a greater or lesser degree of sadistic cruelty toward themselves. Consequently, moral masochism and its own suffering are different from the delight in suffering characteristic of the state of jouissance.
IS THE STATE OF JOUISSANCE A SYMPTOM? If we understood suffering as originating in moral masochism, we would see it as a symptom and, therefore, amendable or eradicable, because the guarantors of those ideal egos can be resignified. The psychic suffering implicit in the state of jouissance is not a symptom. It is "something" that belongs in the psychic structure, represented by the signifier of the lacking Other, s(A) and hence not eradicable.
RELIEF OF THE STATE OF JOUISSANCE Do analysands demand relief of their state of jouissance! Certainly, analysands demand to be cured of their life of suffering. In a first stage it is not clear what kind of suffering this is. At the beginning of the analysis we may find that suffering is mainly masochistic, produced by unconscious sexual guilt feelings (strict sexual morality, tributary of the ideal ego). This strict morality can be modified and progressively updated when the subjectivity of the idealized guarantors is resignified. When their severe sexual repressions (built in their childhood) are lifted, the nature of the analysands'
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own sexual desires can be known, opening the way for the traversing of the fantasme.7 Later on, the same analysand may begin to discriminate a different type of suffering that originates in the state of jouissance. The subject recognizes this suffering as such, but his or her recognition does not lead to relief or cure. The subject will have to learn how to live with his or her quantity (amount) of jouissance.
PLEASURE AND JOUISSANCE J. D. Nasio points out that pleasure equals a decrease in the amount of tension (energy), while jouissance equals an increase in the amount of tension (energy) whereby the body is subject to a test.8 Pleasure is definitely transitory, while jouissance is radically permanent, and in its expression it becomes atemporal. Pleasure happens and vanishes, while jouissance is a tension fixed to life itself—it bears a nature of permanence and is akin to repetition.
JOUISSANCE AND THE PSYCHIC STRUCTURE The capacity for jouissance is constitutive of the subject, which means that jouissance occupies a place in the structuring of the subject's psyche. Lacan establishes the place of jouissance in his graph of desire, which appears in Seminars 5 and 6.9 There, in the third level of the graph, we may see the arrow that goes from the algorithm of jouissance, s(A), to the algorithm of the drives, ^ o D . The algorithm ofjouissance refers to the signifier of the lacking Other. The algorithm of the drives, in turn, refers to the subject joined to his or her demand. We know that the subject is constituted in the locus of the other and, therefore, in lack. Since he or she is constituted in lack (in a hole), the subject will be marked from the beginning of his or her psychic life by a tension, by a constitutive suffering, that is to say, by a capacity for jouissance.
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ENDNOTES 1. Sigmund Freud (1905), Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality. Standard Edition 7, and (1924), The Economic Problem of Masochism. Standard Edition 19. 2. Jacques Lacan (1959-1960), The Seminar. Book VII. The Ethics of Psychoanalysis, 1959-1960, translated by Dennis Porter, with notes by Dennis Porter. London: Routledge, 1992. 3. Jacques Lacan (1959-1960), The Seminar Book VII. The Ethics of Psychoanalysis, 1959-1960, op. cit.; and R6mulo Lander (1996), Estado de goce [State of jouissance], in Tr(o)picos, vol. 5. 4. Sigmund Freud (1920), Beyond the Pleasure Principle, op. cit. 5. Sigmund Freud (1924), The Economic Problem of Masochism, op. cit., p. 239. 6. This constitutes an important debate regarding the constitution of the psyche. Lacan rejects the classic, developmental approach of ego psychology theories and suggests a nondevelopmental constitution. According to Lacan, the various stages (oral, anal, and genital) are all inscribed from the beginning and will activate according to the bonds the subject forges. These stages are simultaneous but also singular. Jouissance is incorporated precisely at this constitutive stage, in the first months and years of life, when each subject acquires a particular amount ofjouissance, the necessary quantity for the optimum mental functioning of that subject's superego. 7. See The Seminar. Book XL The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, op. cit., p. 273 (editor's note). 8. J. D. Nasio (1995), Cinco Lecciones Sobre la Teoria de Lacan. Barcelona: Gedisa Editorial. [Five Lessons on the Psychoanalytic Theory of Jacques Lacan, translated by David Pettigrew and Francois Raffoul, Albany: SUNY Press, 1998.] 9. Jacques Lacan (1957-1958), Le Siminaire. Livre V. Les formations de Vinconscient, 1957-1958 [The Seminar. Book V. The Formations of the Unconscious], edited byj. A. Miller. Paris: Seuil, 1998; and 1958-1959, Le Stminaire. Livre VI. Le dtsir et son interpretation, 1958-1959 [The Seminar. Book VI. Desire and Its Interpretation], unpublished. Partially published according to J. B. Pontalis's report in Bulletin de Psychologie 1959-1960; vol. 13.
11 The Logic of the Cause
COMPLEMENTAL SERIES Freud introduces the concept of complemental series in his early work.1 In this theoretical proposal we find that there is no single cause for the difficulties in the constitution, construction, and proper functioning of the psyche, but a sum of different noxas. In this set of noxas that constitute the etiological factors of psychic illness we may find genetic elements with their corresponding hereditary deficiencies, acquired organic deficiencies—congenital factors, that is, damages that occur during the uterine life of the fetus—and damages that take place at childbirth and immediately after. Moreover, we know that such damages may occur during breast-feeding as well. Other problems may stem from the motherchild duality or from the absence of a proper introduction of the father figure. In addition, sibling conflicts related to the fraternal may occur. These multiple causal factors will add pathological experiences that may be reorganized into three fundamental areas: psychic
THE LOGIC OF THE CAUSE
69
trauma, psychic conflict, and psychic deficiency (as structural deficit and lacks). These three types of cause supplement one another, that is to say, they are not mutually exclusive and are, therefore, complementary factors. They are also universal, since some of them are part of the constitution of every psyche.
THE LOGIC OF TRAUMA What Is Psychic Trauma? This notion refers to the inability of the ego (moi), as an imaginary agency, to process or assimilate into its system the amount of stimuli originated by the signifying chain at any given moment. This concept assumes the subject's capacity to register his or her experiences through the perceptual pole of the psychic apparatus. Yet not everything that happens to the subject generates an experience; the subject may not register experiences, as occurs with autistic neurotics. In that case, what has taken place is not an experience; it is just an event that does not leave a trace in the subject (of the unconscious). Furthermore, not every experience the subject undergoes is traumatic. In the case of a nontraumatic experience, the amount of stimuli is assimilated and the experience produces an object drive. If the experience is not assimilated or processed, it leaves a trace that we might define as traumatic even if it does not produce a symptom. This theory of experience introduces the relation existing between the order of the Real and trauma. Symptom production could happen later, with the aprts-coup effect (nachtrdglich). The trauma will be located in the intersection of the order of the Real and the order of the Imaginary in the rings of the RSI graph.2 Here several questions arise. What qualifies the original experience as traumatic? Is it the amount of nonprocessed stimuli determined by desire and the ideals, or by the aprts-coup effect? Why is the experience not assimilated? Might it be that it is unacceptable to the ideal? Why does the aprts-coup effect correspond
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to that earlier experience and not to a different one? Might it be that that experience is marked as a trace? What psychic mechanism will allow the aprts-coup effect to resignify a certain previous experience? I think that the answer may be found in the dialectic between desire and prohibition (censorship), which is automatic and unconscious and is connected with the system of ideals of the subject (of the unconscious). We know that the repressed signifying chairi shifts to the unconscious through the effect of censorship. From there, this content insists—we are speaking here about the return of the repressed.3 The system of ideals, especially the ego-ideal— 1(A)—can be corrected or modified with the acquisition of new selfknowledge as an effect of the analytic process. As a consequence of this process we may find deep modifications in the type of symptom that the subject will produce later on. In psychoanalytic theory, symptom and trauma are related through the theory of conflict, anxiety, and defenses. Let us recall here that the symptom has two sides: one of drive satisfaction and another of jouissance. I think that it would be of use to retrieve here the conceptual link between trauma and the Real because it will allow us to relate trauma to anxiety and defense. According to Lacan, anxiety is an invasion of the Real into the Imaginary. The ego (moi)y as a response, will produce, according to its resources, a variety of defense mechanisms—repression, splitting, projection, and denial.
Trauma and Sexual Fantasy (Fantasme) I continue to use the notion of fantasme that Lacan presents until 1975,4 when he affirms that the fantasme is sexual and is always of a perverse nature. I distance myself from the later concept of the fundamental fantasy (fantasme), developed by Jacques-Alain Miller,5 which, unlike the earlier notion, is not of a sexual nature. I prefer to give a different name to this fundamental fantasy (fantasme)—that of symptasme (sintasma), a combination of symp-
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torn and fantasme. For Lacan, the fantasme refers to a sexual fantasy, with its mini-script and its purpose, which is to veil castration and to allow for the full pleasure of the sexual organ. The fantasme is not a symptom; it is the treasure trove of sexuality. We should remember, however, that the veiling of castration is the essence of the perverse structure. That is why the fantasme is said to always have a perverse nature. This fantasme is construed by each subject (of the unconscious), and is unique to that subject. Each subject has his or her own private fantasme, although often repressed. Is there a relation between the fantasme and trauma? The fantasme is organized according to early infantile experiences. Would these be traumatic experiences? Let me ask: Is all repressed material of a traumatic nature? Might there be some repressed elements that are not traumatic? Might there be some experiences that are not traumatic but are unacceptable to the system of ideals and, therefore, repressed? The answer will depend on the notion of trauma that we apply. It is worth recalling here that the repressed infantile experience, which contributes to organize the personal fantasme, is of an incestuous nature.
Trauma and the Real We should remember here something about the nature of the Real. The Real is what is not symbolized, and is not traversed by the signifying chain. It has existence in this world, but it does not have a known existence for the subject (of the unconscious). Furthermore, the Real is in a beyond of the repressed. Following Freud, Lacan refers to Das Ding, the Thing, which is an aspect of the Real and hence neither symbolized nor traversed by the signifying chain. Let me pose a different question: If the Real is not bound or traversed by the signifying chain, how can it be traumatic? Mirta Goldstein claims that the Real leaves a trace that seeks a binding with the imaginary order.6 Let me ask again: How can this trace be of the
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SUBJECTIVE EXPERIENCE AND THE LOGIC OF THE OTHER
nature of the Real if we know that once the Real is traversed by the signifying chain it ceases to be the Real and becomes psychic reality? I think that Goldstein's "unbound trace" (which becomes traumatic) will acquire psychic existence only when it is bound to the signifying chain in the imaginary order as a symbolized image. Goldstein maintains that trauma is connected mainly with infantile sexuality. I tend to agree with her, but I believe that this, relation is not exclusive. For example, let us look at the trauma of the anatomical difference between the sexes, which is a relevant trauma but not the only one. Accepting the difference between the sexes will allow the subject to assume castration and, in doing so, he or she enters the world of neuroses. Will this trauma—to accept or not to accept castration—be a prototypical one? Lacan considers this issue and asserts that anxiety is the enactment of castration. Let me raise one more question: Is anxiety the necessary correlative to any traumatic experience? I would say yes. Anxiety is the reason for, and the obstacle to, the subject's assimilation of experience. It is what allows us to define such an experience as traumatic.
THE LOGIC OF PSYCHIC CONFLICT What Is Psychic Conflict? This notion refers to a dynamic conception of two forces that are opposed, and is connected to the dialectic of the drives, of desire, and of the system of ideals, processed through the superego and the unconscious automatic censorship that instates prohibition. In all the work he produced between 1895 and "An Outline of Psychoanalysis,"7 Freud insists on the unyielding dualism of the mythical nature of the psychic conflict, a dualism between sexuality (the drives and their representation through the signifying chain) and the prohibition of parricide and incest on which the Oedipus complex hinges. In this way, the conflict in the speaking being bears a universal incestuous and parricidal origin.
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Conflict, Anxiety, and the Real Freud pointed out that the human being's very nature is based on conflict. The civilization process is founded on the repression of the incestuous and parricidal desire, and from then on the subject cannot escape his or her conflicting nature. A tight relationship exists among conflict, anxiety, the symptom, and the Real. The symptom is located in the space that exists between the Real and the Symbolic in the RSI graph, while anxiety is located in the space between the Real and the Imaginary. Conflict creates a tension that propels the subject toward anxiety and the symptom. These are two manifestations that, in traversing the psychic conflict and the Real, become signs of existence.
THE LOGIC OF THE PSYCHIC DEFECT What Is a Structural Defect? This notion refers to a variety of types of deficiencies that appear during the early constitution of the subject. Since we accept that the psyche is constituted early in life, in this early process flaws may occur that will produce defects, deficiencies, and lacks in the unconscious subjective structure.
Structural Invariants In this way, foreclosure (Verwerfung) may happen. This foreclosure refers to what has not been inscribed. One foreclosure among others may refer to the important inscription of the paternal function, which, when foreclosed (not inscribed), will cause what Lacan calls "the foreclosure of the Name-of-the-Father."8 We must remember here that the inscription of the Name-of-the-Father will inaugurate the acquisition of the symbolic order. With the foreclosure of the Nameof-the-Father, the child will be in serious trouble. These structural
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defects cannot be restored ad integrum at a later stage. If the Nameof-the-Father has been foreclosed, the effects of this function could be partially restored through an imaginary or symbolic substitute called suppUance or "supplement." Such a supplement will function as a symptomatic prosthesis—it will allow the subject to continue with his or her life, but it is not a fully restored function. The foreclosure of the Name-of-the-Father cannot be resolved later in life by effec;t of the word—we are in the presence of a structural invariant. The subject, relieved by the establishment of an imaginary supplement or prosthesis, will be able to develop some social ties and, therefore, survive in the community.
Constitutive Variants During this process of the constitution of the subject, variations may exist, for instance, in the magnitude of the desire for the other's desire. This desire is processed through the maternal function. There may also exist differences in the other's capacity for reverie,9 processed equally by the maternal function. The particular differences that exist in each newborn's tolerance to the satisfaction/frustration dialectic are unavoidable. Variations may also exist in the degree of timely presence and generosity of the maternal function, which will give rise to particular variations in the lacks or early deficiencies related to this function. These early deficiencies will cause a variety of phenomena, such as the feeling of an inner hole that cannot be restored later in life. Moreover, they are not accessible to speech, but the anxiety they provoke may be relieved by a supplement or prosthesis that may be of imaginary or symbolic nature. Variations in the quality and characteristics of the newborn's cognitive apparatus will lead to an infinite variety of types of relationships with the drive object, attributing, by means of identification, different qualities to this object. Therefore, we may find children who are blind, deaf, or suffer from an excessive hearing sensibility from birth and children with increased or diminished
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sensibility in the other sensory organs who will experience variations in the assimilation of stimuli and hence variations in the constitution of the drive object. We also find particular variations in the baby's natural tolerance to physical pain, which will in turn produce variations in the assimilation of stimuli and in the constitution of the drive object. The defects or structural deficiencies—lacks—will show in the subject's psychic activity throughout his or her life. They may take the guise of symptoms when they are actually the expression of constitutional invariants.
THE CAUSE AND THE RSI If we follow the theory presented by Lacan in his seminar on the RSI10 and we are familiar with the Borromean thesis with its three rings, we may affirm the following: 1. Psychic trauma is located in the intersection of the Real and the Imaginary. 2. Psychic conflict is located in the intersection of the Imaginary and the Symbolic. 3. Structural defects are located in the intersection of the Real and the Symbolic.
ENDNOTES 1. See, for example, Sigmund Freud (1916-1917), Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, 1916-1917, op. cit. 2. See Chapter 3 (editor's note). 3. Sigmund Freud (1895), Studies on Hysteria (1893-1895), op. cit. 4. See Jacques Lacan (1958), The Direction of the Treatment and the Principles of Its Power, op. cit.; 1960, The Subversion of the Subject and the Dialectic of Desire in the Freudian Unconscious, op. cit.; 1964, The Seminar. Book XL The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, op. cit. (editor's note).
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5. Jacques-Alain Miller (1992), De la Naturaleza de los Semblantes [On the Nature of Semblants], Buenos Aires: Paid6s, 2002. [I have not been able to find an English translation. There is an article on the topic that has been published in English: Of Semblants in the Relation Between Sexes, Psychoanalytical Notebooks of the London Circle 1999; 3: 9-25.] 6. Mirta Goldstein (2002), Trauma, el conflicto y lo Real [Trauma, Conflict and the Real], in www.spdecaracas.com.ve. 7. Sigmund Freud (1936), An Outline of Psychoanalysis, op. cit. 8. See Jacques Lacan, On a Question Prior to Any Possible Treatment of Psychosis, in Merits: A Selection, op. cit., p. 205 (editor's note). 9. See note 1, Chapter 6 (editor's note). 10. Jacques Lacan (1974-1975), Le Stminaire. LivreXXIL RSI 19741975, op. cit.
12 The Logic of the Symptom
WHAT IS A SYMPTOM? According to medical science, a symptom is the manifestation of a dysfunction in the affected person. Illnesses are detected through their symptoms—verbal complaints—and signs—bodily evidence. Patients express their complaints (symptoms) through words. It is axiomatic that each medical symptom is related and tied to a certain type of illness. The various medical illnesses necessarily produce certain symptoms and signs, and not others, so that by studying symptoms and signs, a physician can correcdy diagnose the affection suffered by the patient. We may say along with Lacan that within the medical field, a symptom is the Real. Psychiatric practice understands symptoms in a similar way to other medical disciplines. Psychiatric symptoms, therefore, are fundamental for the proper identification of so-called psychiatric illnesses. These illnesses are listed in the ICD-10 (International Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems), published by the World Health Organization (WHO), and in the DSM-IV (Diagnostic and
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Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders), published by the American Psychiatric Association (APA) in 1994.
THE SYMPTOM AS SIGNIFIER In psychoanalysis, a symptom is something different. Undoubtedly, symptoms refer to verbal complaints—to the ailments the subject suffers and presents to the analyst through words and acts. Their signification, however, is very different. The symptoms produced by the psyche are not bound to any type of specific mental pathology. We cannot reach an understanding of what is happening to the subject solely through the study of symptoms. In his famous Rome Discourse of 1953, Lacan defines the symptom as a signifier, organized like language in the unconscious. 1 This symptom offers an opaque message that does not summon interpretation. We should establish here a distinction between clinical and analytic symptoms. The clinical symptom is a demand for help addressed to the Other. The analytic symptom, by contrast, does not constitute an appeal to the Other and, essentially, bears an important component of puissance addressed to nobody. For the psychoanalyst, symptoms are signifiers—the product of the effect of the Real in the Symbolic. We may understand this idea if we apply the topological logic of the Borromean knot of the three orders (RSI graph). The symptom has another component, namely, the partial satisfaction of the drive. It has then a component of jouissance, and a component of partial satisfaction of the drive. The innovation presented by this theory of symptoms lies in the affirmative function of jouissance.
THE SYMPTOM AND RSI When Lacan presents his proposal of the RSI he is suggesting a topological logic that is useful to further the study of the symptom. In Lacanian psychoanalysis, the symptom ceases to be a linguistic
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notion (posited initially in 1953) to become a topological one in 1964.2 If we stay at the topographical level, we are caught in the dialectic of surface and depth. According to this topographical vertex, which is insufficient, the subject's complaint—the clothing— that sustains and wraps the symptom would be in the surface, while its repressed, latent unconscious aspects would be buried underneath. Unconscious censorship, which prevents the satisfaction of the drives, would be hidden beneath the surface, where the symptom as incomplete satisfaction would be located. Although essentially accurate, this topographical vertex is very simple and inexact and prevents us from advancing in the study of the symptom. For this reason, we must introduce the topological vertex. In other words, we must work with the concepts of the RSI and of psychic structures.
SYMPTOMS AND THE PSYCHIC STRUCTURE Symptoms are products of the psychic structure and not of a specific illness. We may find so-called hysterical symptoms in obsessive structures and vice versa, and we identify so-called hysterical manifestations in a psychotic schizophrenic, and vice versa. Consequently, we understand that the purpose of analysis is not the simple relief of symptoms, since new symptoms will take their place; rather, the purpose of analysis is the search for the subject's inner truth. In so doing, the subject will be able to accept the subject of the unconscious, be what he or she is, according to Bion, and not to yield regarding desire, according to Lacan.3
A SYMPTOM IS WHAT DOESN'T WORK IN THE REAL Lacan affirms along with Freud that symptoms are formations of the unconscious, and that they represent partial solutions, an incomplete satisfaction of the drives, that is to say, they are compromiseformations. When in 1953 Lacan asserts that symptoms are signifiers
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of the subject (of the unconscious), he implies that there is no such thing as a universal meaning for each symptom.4 Each symptom expresses each subject's singularity. Clinical unconscious structures are organized according to the logic of the phallus and the logic of castration. It is clear, therefore, that each psychic structure will have its particular production of symptoms. The symptom does not appear as an effect of the Imaginary, and each symptom bears an inner truth that does not depend on its signification.
The Symptom as Opaque In 1958 (Seminar 6) and in 1960 (Seminar 8), as well as in his study of the symptom in the graph of desire,5 Lacan establishes that the analytic symptom appears to the subject as an enigmatic and opaque message coming from the Real (the analysand does not recognize it as coming from himself or herself). In 1974 Lacan states that a symptom is "what doesn't work in the Real." Shortly after, he affirms that "a symptom can only be defined by the particular way in which each subject jouit of his unconscious."6 He will also claim that the symptom is a truth that does not depend on its meaning.
FIRST MATHEME OF THE SYMPTOM
Z = J(x) z-jcso 2 J
Sigma refers to the symptom, and it represents the subject. This notation refers to the function oijouissance. The radical and affirmative element of the symptom does not lie in its partial satisfaction of the drive, but in the function of jouissance.
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(x) This notation represents any unconscious element that may have the force of desire (a drive cathexis) and lead to the formation of a symptom. Sx It is an element of language that represents the subject as a product of early identifications. In the end, this element has a substantial presence for the subject. In this first matheme, the analysand shows us his or her demand for analysis through the signifying chain, which will constitute the clothing of the symptom—(x). Inside this parenthesis we could also include the algorithm S2 as synonymous, but we will keep the (x), as Lacan did. We may see here the symptom in two successive algorithms. In the first one, the letter sigma refers to the symptom, which is but "something that doesn't work in the Real." The function of jouissance and the (x) indicate that this signifying chain—(x)—is a fundamental function of jouissance. If the (x) represents the signifying chain, it is in this chain (the verbal complaint) where the subject will express his or her symptom. In this demand for help the patient's initial saying operates as a Master's discourse, namely, a discourse spoken from the perspective of certainty and with a conviction coming from the symptom as the moment of demand. This moment corresponds to what we have called a clinical symptom. The patient, who is not yet an analysand, demands a cure from the other. In the following algorithm there is a transformation, and the analytic symptom appears. A psychic change takes place here when the function ofjouissance refers to Sx and not to (x). This Sx appears as a consequence of the analyst's interventions (silence and words), which are able to separate some particular sigmfiers from the signifying chain or (x). The patient stops demanding happiness and a cure from the analyst and begins to wonder about the nature of his or her own problems. In this way, the patient becomes an analysand as an effect of the analytic process. The second algorithm bears witness to the appearance of the analytic symptom.
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Symptom and Semblance The suffering (a function of jouissance) expressed in the symptom will grant power to the other whose help the patient expects. That is why we say that the analysand grants knowledge to the other in his or her imaginary, and in so doing he or she confers on the analyst a particular power—the power to cure him or her. Lacan states that the locus the analysand assigns to the analyst is the locus of the subject supposed to know (SsS).7 The analysand will also grant the analyst another privileged locus, that is, the locus of the semblance.
SECOND MATHEME OF THE SYMPTOM8 S =d
5(A) $0a
2
The letter Sigma corresponds to the symptom. It refers to a saying of the id, and represents the subject of the unconscious. d This refers to desire, which is silent and always slippery. Desire is what cannot be said, and propels the subject toward what can be said, as shown in the s(A), supported on a repressed sexual element: the fantasme. s(A) This refers to the algorithm of the signifier of the complete Other, the Other without a lack. It also alludes to what can be said. Aprts
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id, represents the subject of the unconscious and will always be addressed to the Other. The desire that impels it is something that cannot be said, since we know that desire is silent and mute. Within this algorithm of the symptom, desire propels the subject toward what can be said. This saying rests on repressed sexual elements represented in the algorithm by the fantasme. The saying of the id has a failed signifying intention and is always addressed to the Other. At the end of analysis we will find that the symptomatic, fantasmatic, and symptasmatic elements have separated. Through the modification of the system of ideals, the symptomatic elements will change their saying. In this way, the subject modifies his or her symptom. As to the fantasmatic elements, when thefantasme has been traversed, the subject comes to know them and accept them. The symptasmatic elements (which are nonmodifiable, invariant) originate in the "id wants to say" and are processed by the I (je) and returned in an "I am." The subject accepts his or her essence, that is to say, his or her indelible original marks. Lacan equates the end of analysis with the analysand's identification with his or her sinthome? I do not agree with this view. I would rather say that the subject accepts his or her own symptasme.
INSTATING THE SYMPTOM At the beginning of analysis the subject establishes a special relationship with the analyst. This initial relationship, in the transference, places the analyst in the position of the subject supposed to know (SsS). The patient expects to receive "health and happiness" from the analyst, and will request solutions and advice through his or her speech. For this reason, we might say that at the beginning of his or her analysis the subject is a patient. This patient will progressively realize that his or her demands are not being satisfied, and the analyst will invite him or her to look inward for his or her own answers. When the subject questions something about himor herself (a signifier) and is willing to investigate within him- or herself the meanderings of that signifier, we may say that he or she
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has instated a symptom and, therefore, has shifted from patient to analysand. The clinical symptom requests to be deciphered—it asks for its lost meaning, which will be either in the imaginary order or in its intersection with the symbolic order. Here we may encounter a dangerous situation if the analyst feeds this lost meaning with ? his or her own fantasies and imaginary productions. When the analytic symptom is instated, Sx appears. The latter is what does not cease to be inscribed, but it does not produce a sign for the other. In the end, we encounter an enigma and a paradox, that is, uthe meaning of nonsense." It is at this point that the symptasme appears; it is that something that does not make sense to anybody, something one cannot decipher any further—the limit of the not-all in psychoanalysis. It is an essential part of the subject, something that maintains impotence and avoids impossibility.
CLINICAL SYMPTOM AND ANALYTIC SYMPTOM While the patient keeps requesting orientation and guidance, the analyst understands his or her complaints within the status of the clinical symptom, which pertains rather to psychiatric clinical practice. When the patient becomes an analysand, that is to say, when he or she ceases in his or her demand for guidance and engages in an inner search, he or she has instated, as I have explained above, what we call the analytic symptom.
LOGICAL SEQUENCES OF THE SYMPTOM The Moment of Demand
The symptom represents the subject in a Master's discourse, the clothing of the symptom. This moment corresponds to the clinical symptom.
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The Moment of Instatement of the Symptom I
S2 I
L!iJ Analytic work separates Sx (identifications) from the clothing of the symptom (S2), and the insight as testimony is expressed in the appearance of Sx. This moment corresponds to the analytic symptom. This algorithm refers to one of the four basic discourses, of which Sx is the product.10
The Moment of the Analytic Effect
i /(Sx) = 2 I This is the moment when the symptom ceases to make sense. For this reason, the Sigma appears on the right side of the algorithm. The analytic effect lifts the veil (S2) that covers the elements of the unconscious (Sx). The subject identifies with his or her founding features. In other words, he or she accepts being what he or she is. This is what we have called the moment of the symptasme. In the process of his or her psychic change, the subject has traversed, has known the fantasme, and has reduced his or her Sx to a basic identifiable element of the drive. It is then that the symptasme appears on the scene.
TIME AND THE SYMPTOM The symptom does not appear instantaneously. Rather, it is constituted in a sequence of logical time and may remain until the subject's death, or even beyond death, when the subject qua symptom has written or drawn. In this case, his or her symptom survives his or her death.
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THE FATE OF THE SYMPTOM
|S = J(S!) 1 In the neurotic, insight will produce a quick change in the symptom— a symptom will substitute for another symptom. The thesis that in the neurotic the symptom represents the subject holds. In this way, we will have the following algorithm:
I z - J(...) I In the psychotic, the delusional metaphor is not a simple symptom; it is a symptom-clamp, also called the fourth ring.11 In the algorithm, that particular clamp or fourth ring will occupy the void in the symptom, functioning as an orthopedic device. We know that in the psychotic structure the function Name-of-the-Father will be foreclosed (verworferi). That is why we say that in the psychotic, the symptom is the subject. This symptom-clamp is what Lacan will later call sinthome.
THE LOGIC OF THE SINTHOME From 1975 on Lacan will introduce a new concept for the study of the symptom; it is the notion of sinthome.12 Lacan found that there are certain symptoms that are absolutely necessary to maintain the psychotic subject's cohesion and mental operability. Without this special symptom, the three orders (RSI) would separate, causing the subject's mental collapse—a so-called nervous breakdown or psychotic crisis. This particular symptom works as an orthopedic prosthesis that may be symbolic or imaginary (based on a case-by-case rule), tying the three orders (RSI) in the manner of a fourth ring. Lacan designated it as sinthome and devoted a one-year seminar to it. This name arose from a condensation of "symptom" and "sacred man, or saint/' inspired in the
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reading of Saint Thomas. It is a homophony between symptdme (symptom) and saint homme (sacred man, or saint).
James Joyce and the Sinthome In Seminar 23, Lacan studies this new concept using James Joyce's oeuvre and biographical material.13 He concludes that Joyce's strange writing is the expression of his sinthome. The latter "fills in" for the subject of the unconscious of James Joyce the absent function of the Name-of-the-Father, which is foreclosed. The sinthome allows Joyce to maintain a certain mental cohesion and to continue to function as a subject. That is why Lacan affirms that the sinihome is a natural characteristic of human reality. As opposed to the symptom, which falls and is replaced by another one, the sinthome does not fall—it is what must remain. Lacan concludes by saying that at the end of analysis the subject knows his or her sinthome and identifies with it.
THE SYMPTOM AS PROSTHESIS AND THE SYMPTOM-CLAMP THEORY In our psychoanalytic practice we often find in our analysands a symptom that may be characterized as a true sinthome. Following the teachings of Lacan, this sinthome would work as a fourth ring that holds together the three rings of the Borromean knot, thus enabling the subject to avoid mental collapse. This possibility of mental collapse forces us to be very alert in our clinical practice and to recognize the presence of a sinthome. We must also understand that the sinthome must be preserved during analysis. To clarify this complex concept, I have designated this sinthome elsewhere with a different term—that of symptom-clamp.1* J. A. Miller prefers to call it the fourth ring.15 As I have explained above, this symptom-clamp can also be conceptualized as a prosthesis,
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and may have imaginary or symbolic characteristics. In the case ofJames Joyce, it was of a symbolic nature, expressed in his unique writings.
ENDNOTES 1. Jacques Lacan (1953), The Function and Field of Speech and Language in Psychoanalysis, op. cit, p. 58 (editor's note). 2. Jacques Lacan (1964), The Seminar of Jacques Lacan. Book XI. The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, op. cit. 3. W. R. Bion (1970), Attention and Interpretation. London: Tavistock; and Jacques Lacan (1959-1960), The Seminar. Book VII. The Ethics of Psychoanalysis, 1959-1960, op. cit. 4. Jacques Lacan (1953), The Function and Field of Speech and Language in Psychoanalysis, op. cit. 5. Jacques Lacan (1958-1959), Le Siminaire. Livre VI. Le Dtsire et son Interpretation, 1958-1959, op. cit.; (1960-1961), Le Seminaire. Livre VIII. Le Transfert, 1960-1961, op. cit.; 1960, The Subversion of the Subject and the Dialectic of Desire, op. cit. 6. Jacques Lacan, Le Seminaire. Livre XXII. RSI, 1974-1975, op. cit., lesson of February 18,1975, p. 96. 7. See note 10, Chapter 7 (editor's note). 8. 1 proposed this matheme for the first time in 2002 in "La Naturaleza del Sintoma" [The Nature of the Symptom], paper presented as guest lecturer, Universidad Catolica Andres Bello (UCAB), Caracas. 9. Jacques Lacan (1975-1976), LeStminaire. LivreXXlII. LeSinthome, 1975-1976, published in Ornicar?, nos. 6-11,1976-1977 [I have not found an English edition, editor's note]. 10. See Chapter 26 for an explanation of Lacan's four discourses (editor's note). 11. See Chapters 3 and 7 (editor's note). 12. Jacques Lacan (1975-1976), Le Seminaire. LivreXXlII. Le Sinthome, 1975-1976, op. cit. 13. Jacques Lacan (1975-1976), Le Seminaire. LivreXXlII. LeSinthome, 1975-1976, op. cit 14. Romulo Lander (1999), El Sentido de los Sintomas [The Meaning of Symptoms] series of lectures at the Caracas Psychoanalytic Society. 15. Jacques-Alain Miller (2000), Los Signos del Goce [The Signs of Jouissance]. Buenos Aires: Editorial Paidos, 2001 [I have not found an English edition, editor's note].
13 The Logic of the Fantasme
WHAT IS THE FANTASME! The concept of the fantasme is an important contribution of Lacan's. This notion appears in his work as a clear proposal after 1957. * With this new idea, Lacan develops further Freud's original 1895 thesis on the nature of the sexual fantasy of his hysterical patients.2 According to Freud, a fantasy is a representation, a scenic script that involves one or several characters and stages the subject's desire. Freud outlined the idea of sexual fantasies as a scar of the Oedipus complex. Lacan grants significance to the defensive aspect of these fantasies, related to castration anxieties. In Seminar 14,3 devoted to the study of the logic of the fantasme, Lacan affirms that the fantasme is sexual and that, because its main function is to veil castration, it will always be of a perverse nature. In the end, Lacan calls it "the treasure trove of sexuality" and "theflowerin the branch of guilt."
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The Sexual Scene Lacan defines thtfantasme as a sexual scene in which images prevail and some text may be present. Initially it is either unconscious or preconscious, but it may become conscious. The fantasme enacts the primal desire, which functions as a propelling force and support for the subject's current desire. A circularity exists that involves desire, the fantasme, and sexual life. The unconscious fantasme becomes conscious either through the effect of life revelations or through the analytic cure. We have found that the most important aspect of this new contribution of Lacan's is his assertion that the fantasme, which is of a perverse sexual nature, is not a symptom, and does not summon any interpretation on the part of the analyst. It is not something that needs to be "cured" but, on the contrary, it should be enjoyed, even though when thtfantasme represents the subject's unconscious desire, this same subject may be present in its script.
THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE FANTASME Each subject construes his or her fantasme in his or her earliest childhood. It is an imaginary construction that will establish a subjective and exclusive relationship between the subject and object (a); thtfantasme occurs as an exclusive, singular connection between the two. We should point out that this image will be traversed by the symbolic order. In "The Direction of the Treatment and the Principles of Its Power," Lacan states that it is uan image set to work in the signifying structure [the symbolic order]."4 Thtfantasme will protect the subject from the unavoidable lack in the other and will offer him or her an illusion of completeness. We might also say that thtfantasme provides a relief from castration anxiety. The way each subject construes his or her fantasme (which is always sexual and perverse) indicates that subject's particular mode of organization of jouissance. Thtfantasme thus satisfies both circumstances—it offers a particular form of jouissance
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and it sustains the subject's desire. Lacan asserts in Seminar 11 that in the fantasme the subject supports himself or herself in the dimension of a desire that vanishes.5 This fantasme, therefore, is perverse, but it does not bear the nature of a symptom. It is an early unconscious construction, hard to modify later in life.
MATHEME OF THE FANTASME The fantasme will constitute what Lacan called "the treasure trove of sexuality." In the construction of the fantasme, the subject will encounter object (a) and an exclusive connection between the two will take place.
Sou On the left side of the matheme we find the capital letter S crossed by a bar. This algebraic figure represents the subject marked by his or her unavoidable castration and his or her original splitting (Spaltung). It corresponds to the subject who will always be in lack. On the right side we find the little other, represented by the letter a. This letter represents object (a), which is a very complex topological object. It is an unconscious remainder of something that has been left behind (that has fallen) from the subject's earliest relationship with the caregiver. In the middle of the matheme we find the geometric figure of the losange (rhombus), sometimes called the punch. It represents the exclusive union each subject has with his or her own little (a). In this way, the reading of the matheme tells us that the subject engages in an exclusive and personal relationship with his or her little (a). That is why the algorithm of the fantasme in the neurotic structure is (Soa). We should add here that the litde (a), as an object, is part of the Real. As I have pointed out earlier, Lacan states that object (a) is the subject's only window to the Real, that is to say, something lost to the subject—the lost object that the subject seeks with no chance of finding it. Yet in the passion of love and hate, the subject
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(fictitiously) believes to have found it. It is this belief that allows Lacan to affirm that this object is the subject's only window to the Real. Since the subject's belief is a fiction, he or she will eventually and inevitably be disillusioned.
SYMPTOM AND FANTASME Subjects with a neurotic structure accept their incompleteness and will assume their castration. They are inscribed in the law of desire and marked by the Law of the father—they accept and submit to the prohibition of incest and parricide. As I have just explained, the subject's fantasme is an attempt to veil castration. Subjects with a neurotic structure can engage in sexual activity in utter ignorance of the existence of their fantasme. Such sexual activity is propelled by the sexual drive and does not include the repressed fantasme. The sexual fantasy produces a phallic satisfaction and jouissance in the pure register of the libido as drive. In the analytic cure analysands will speak of their sex life, of the ways in which they reach an orgasm, and of their desires, fears, and guilt in relation to their sexual fantasies. Analysts may misunderstand these manifestations of jouissance and desire and believe that they are neurotic or perverse symptoms. Nevertheless, they are not symptoms—they are the fantasme.
TRAVERSING THE FANTASME The crossing or traversing of the fantasme expresses the subject's possibility to get to know and to accept his or her fantasme during analysis without presenting guilt feelings or fears. For this to happen, a great modification of the subject's ideals must take place, a transformation that is achieved during the analytic cure. There was a time in 1964 when Lacan affirmed that the subject reaches the end of analysis when he or she is able to traverse the fantasme.6 Today, the concept of end of analysis has been expanded with the
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addition of other goals, such as the idea that the subject should not yield regarding his or her desire7 and be able to be what he or she is.8 In his or her fantasies, the subject with a hysterical structure looks for the whole Other, that is, the bearer of the phallus. He or she will search for someone not marked by the lack, and will identify with the other's object of desire. The subject with an obsessive structure, in turn, searches for the lacking Other so as to fictitiously complete it. These others of the obsessive are interchangeable and also very eroticized objects. In the perverse structure, the perverse subject becomes the object of the Other, and transforms the Other into a subject. This new subject will sustain the illusion of the perverse subject being the object of desire.
ENDNOTES 1. Jacques Lacan (1957-1958), LeStminaire. Livre V. Les Formations de VInconscient [The Seminar. Book V. The Formations of the Unconscious], op. cit. 2. Sigmund Freud (1895), Studies on Hysteria (1893-1895), op. cit. 3. Jacques Lacan (1966-1967), Le Stminaire. Livre XIV. La Logique du Fantasme, 1966-1967 [The Seminar. Book XIV. The Logic of the Fantasme], unpublished. 4. Jacques Lacan (1958), The Direction of the Treatment and the Principles of Its Power, op. cit., p. 260. 5. Jacques Lacan (1964), The Seminar of Jacques Lacan. Book XL The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, op. cit. 6. Jacques Lacan (1964), The Seminar of Jacques Lacan. Book XL The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, op. cit., p. 273. 7. Jacques Lacan (1959-1960), The Seminar. Book VII. The Ethics of Psychoanalysis, 1959-1960, op. cit. 8. W. R. Bion (1970), Attention and Interpretation. London: Tavistock.
14 The Logic of the Symptasme
THE FUNDAMENTAL FANTASME In 1957 Lacan presented his new readings of Freud's 1895 work concerning the repressed sexual fantasies of Freud's hysterical patients.1 Lacan prefers to call these fantasies fantasme in French, and I have chosen to retain the French word instead of resorting to the English "phantasy" to preserve the specificity of the Lacanian term. In 1967, in his well-known Seminar 14 on the logic of the fantasme, Lacan established that the fantasme is of a sexual and perverse nature and that its purpose is to veil castration.2 As we already know, the subject construes his or her own fantasme in his or her early childhood. In a later work by Freud, "A Child Is Being Beaten,"3 Lacan finds an additional, nonsexual logic to the fantasme. After Lacan's death in 1981, Jacques-Alain Miller further developed this thesis of Lacan's about the fundamental fantasme* This is a fantasy-like construction at the basis of the constitution of the subject, and it is not of a sexual nature. It is not a symptom, and it moves away
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from the classic concept of sexual fantasme Lacan introduced in Seminar 14. For this reason, as I have already mentioned,5 I have chosen a different name for this so-called fundamental fantasme— I call it symptasme. It is not a symptom and it is not a fantasme but something halfway between the two, and it is also structural and unmodifiable—it is an invariant.
THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE SYMPTASME The topological sequence for the construction or the constitution of the symptasme is located in the unavoidable experience of the lack of being and the imaginary hole that occurs at the beginning of the psychic life of any subject. These are, as Lacan has stated, indelible marks etched in the unconscious, and they will allow the subject to organize the original chaos. The subject will identify with the unary trait. This identification occurs at the logical topological moment when the subject of the unconscious simultaneously construes the object and is construed by it. It is the moment when the signifying chain organizes the subject's experiences with the circularity characteristic of the imaginary phallus (S^.
THE SYMPTASME AND THE REAL This phallic signifier (S^ also represents an aspect of the Real, and the lost object (little a) represents another. Their inclusion in the fantasme allows us to affirm, as I have already pointed out,6 that object (a) is the only window the subject has to the Real. Here the Real seems to divide into the fantasme, on the one hand— thanks to object (a)—and the phallic signifier of the symptasme, on the other. Since object (a) is an unavoidable cause of desire and it also contributes with elements of the lost object (the remainder, the tclats), it offers an unavoidable dose of jouissance. The imaginary phallus, in its reorganizing of the initial chaos and
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of the imaginary hole, leaves a trace of unavoidable ambiguity and incompleteness: s(A). On the side of the symptasme, this lack opens the way for the inescapable jouissance in the constitution of the subject. The symptasme originates in an "id-jouit" and it does not concern the other. It does not, therefore, introduce the "I am" of the symptom.
FIRST MATHEME OF THE SYMPTASME J (Sx) = S
2 Refers to a symptom J A function (something is a function of jouissance) (Sx) An early identificatory element, the unary trait, a signifier separated from S2 thanks to the analytic effect The subject of the unconscious produces a saying, which is a function of something, that is, a function of jouissance. During the analytic cure the practice of free association offers the analysand the opportunity to examine his or her unconscious production. Some of these unconscious productions, construed through the symptom, may open the possibility for a deeper exploration of the repressed. Others, construed through the fantasme, will allow the exploration of the subject's repressed sexuality, "the flower in the branch of guilt," as Lacan called it. Yet other productions of the unconscious are beyond the symptom; they are part of the subject's fundamental traits, tied at the same time to the subject's fundamental jouissance. This symptasmatic aspect of the subject appears under the clothing of a symptom that does not constitute a sign for anybody and cannot be deciphered any further. For this reason, in this matheme the sigma of the symptom has been moved to the right side (and is not on the left side, as in the matheme of the symptom). Lacan states—and so does J. A. Miller—that at the end of the cure the analysand identifies with the symptom. I understand this statement in the following way:
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at the end of analysis the subject knows something about his or her own nature, and accepts it. In other words, he or she accepts his or her symptasme. The subject re-cognizes him- or herself and appropriates him- or herself in Sx.
SECOND MATHEME OF THE SYMPTASME s(A) -> s(A)
s(A) Corresponds to the algorithm of jouissance (the lacking Other) s(A) The signifier of the complete Other, what can be said (i)a Refers to the presence of the earliest identifications 2 Corresponds to the veil of the symptom The reading of this second matheme is as follows: Lacan used to say that at the theoretical end of analysis the subject identifies with his or her symptom. In my opinion, this statement means that when the subject identifies with his or her symptom—accepts his or her symptom and knows it—the clothing of such symptom is actually located beyond his or her symptom and his or her fantasme, and is called symptasme. The original marks of the constitution of the subject, the unary traits [which we might call early imaginary identifications, or i(a)]> should bear an inevitable production of jouissance expressed in the jouissance of the id. From the locus of jouissance—s(A)—the subject can say "s(A),w and he talks about his "I am"—i(a). Since this "I am" is located under the bar in the equation, it means that it does not correspond to the saying of the symptom. For this reason, contrary to the matheme of the symptom, we find the Sigma (2) of the symptom on the right side of the matheme. The symptasme gains its impetus and validates its presence through jouissance and not through the dialectic of desire (d), as is the case with the symptom.
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THE SYMPTASME AND THE UNARY TRAIT fs(A) -> s(A)
I
0)a
= 2 JW
The subject enters the world as the object of the other's desire, which grants him or her an initial mark, a special feature that Lacan designates as unary trait. This mark is neither a symptom nor a fantasme. Out of the subject's originary experiences, some features will be included in his or her symptasme. Seen from the perspective of the end of analysis, the symptasme is what remains from the subjective destitution of Sx—reduced to a drive feature represented in letter (a)—once the fantasme has been traversed. The drive element is related to this new construction, close to the unary trait, which is neither a symptom nor a fantasme and is sustained by object (a). It is the symptasme, that is, the "I am what I am."
ENDNOTES 1. Jacques Lacan (1957-1958), Le S&ninaire. Livre V. Les Formations de Vlnconscient [The Seminar. Book V. The Formations of the Unconscious], op. cit. 2. Jacques Lacan (1966-1967), Le Siminaire. Livre XIV. La logique du fantasme, 1966-1967 [The Seminar. Book XIV. The Logic of the Fantasme], op. cit. 3. Sigmund Freud (1919), A Child Is Being Beaten: A Contribution to the Study of the Origin of Sexual Perversions. Standard Edition 17. 4. Jacques-Alain Miller (1989), Los Signos del Goce [The Signs of Jouissance], op. cit. 5. See Chapter 11 (editor's note). 6. See Chapters 9 and 13 (editor's note).
15 The Logic of Hysteria
ACCORDING TO THE LOGIC OF THE PHALLUS Any unconscious clinical structure will be organized according to the position the subject has in relation to the castration complex and to the logic of the phallus. Regarding hysteria, Lacan states that it is a slave that looks for a Master upon whom to reign.
THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF HYSTERIA Subjects with a hysterical structure have a tendency and a need to charm and seduce both sexes—to charm and seduce anyone who has a significant position as a phallic metaphor. Hysterics will see in this desirable object a figure with some power, with a phallic lure,1 the one they want to conquer in order to achieve what is most important to them, that is, that figure's attention and, more deeply, its desire. For this reason, hysterics show great interest in their own physical attractiveness, seductive appearance, and bodily adornment, and evince a constant demand for attention,
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recognition, and approval. This behavior is accompanied by a certain naivete, for hysterical subjects do not fully realize the intense eroticism they radiate. Hysterics show an unavoidable tendency to attract, to be the center of attention, and to catch everyone's eye, particularly that of those personages who sustain some form of imaginary phallic semblance, that is, who possess fame, money, beauty, power, and knowledge. Such a tendency causes a propensity to emotional exaggeration, thence the hysterical structure's natural command of the stage and special capacity for the "as if." The true interest of hysteria lies neither in itself nor in its careful seductive arrangements, but in the field of the other/Other, where the bearer of power is the one who possesses what the hysteric so much wants, that is, the phallic semblance. The successful seduction and possession of this phallic figure would bring about the selfappreciation of the hysterical structure and, ultimately, a feeling of completeness. In this way, the subject with a hysterical structure grants this phallic Other a particular and intense significance and, in so doing, a power over him or her. This phallic object has what the hysteric wants—to be desired and wanted by this phallic Other, bearer of the semblance. The need of the hysteric is to win over as many people as possible, particularly those who possess the imaginary phallus. That is why hysterics are naturally successful in seducing both men and women, evidencing the hysterical structure's natural tendency toward bisexuality. Because this structure grants so much importance to the phallic Other, it will be under this Other's influence well before the Other notices anything. Hysterics are utterly subjected to the desire of the other/Other and, therefore, inevitably under his power of suggestion; to quote Lacan once again, the hysteric is a slave that looks for a Master upon whom to reign. The hysterics' relationship with an idealized other/Other places them before a powerful other/Other who functions as a phallic semblance. Subjects with a hysterical structure experience conflicts with their sexual desires. At the beginning of the twentieth century, the lack of sexual skills and the various sexual inhibitions of hysterical subjects were paramount. The contrast between their seduc-
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tion skills and their lack of sexual availability was dramatic. From this contradiction stem the various cliches of seducing and frustrating, "playing hard to get," or "cock teaser." This aspect of the structure appears only in a certain group of hysterias, namely, those with a wide repression of the sexual drives. They keep on, somewhat naively, with theirflirting,unaware of the erotic effects their behavior has on others. The reasons for their sexual repression are tied to their infantile ideals—to infantile oedipal sexual experiences. Another group of hysterics, more frequent today, are able to seduce and to surrender to the sexual act, although with certain fears and limitations in their capacity to enjoy the experience. Penetration may become painful, arousal may be difficult, or orgasm may be absent, or in the case of the men, sexual interest may decrease or premature ejaculation and impotence may occur. The subject's early identification with a castrated object of the same sex will sustain the feeling of being incomplete both in the feminine and in the masculine hysterical structure, which attributes a humiliating and unacceptable meaning to the absence of the phallus. Sexual identification with the same sex is not ambiguous, but it settles on a devalued object. Consequendy, hysterics try to hide their insufficiencies through the search for a new identification with an ideal model, in the case of the feminine subject, an ideal woman. The sexual object choice, of heterosexual prevalence, therefore, is, ambivalent, with repressed homosexual elements that are stronger in hysterias of imaginary organization. For this reason we often find in our clinical practice that the phallic semblance, which may be present in men or women, may drive these hysterics to a sexual activity that we would call bisexual, which is very common today.
THE MATHEME OF HYSTERIA
1 -» 1 Lacan described the matheme of the hysterical subject in Seminar 8, Le Transfert (Transference).2 Lacan proposed there the following
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hypothesis: the hysterical subject identifies with a castrated object, as seen in the minus phi (-
A MODIFICATION TO LACAN'S ORIGINAL MATHEME
s
i(a)
oA(a)
I have slightly modified (expanded) this matheme so as to render it somewhat clearer and more didactic.
THE MEANING OF THE MATHEME The barred $ expresses the subject marked by a lack of being, crossed by the Spaltung (original splitting) that constitutes the subject of the unconscious.3 The brackets allude to the fact that the subject is constituted in a particular way, specified in the mathematical formulation they contain. The algebraic formula i(a) over minus phi refers to the imaginary early identification with the other (it may be with aspects of the maternal figure that are perceived as having insufficient or castrated elements). The little (a) represents the imaginary other. The minus phi (-9) represents the imaginary phallus, and the algebraic symbol minus (-) refers to the phallic absence or castration. In sum, the hysterical subject S is constituted by the imaginary identification with a castrated other—i(a) over minus phi. The condition of having an imaginary castrated other with whom to identify stems from the repression of an infantile sexual trauma that
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allows the subjects belief in the fiction of an idealized imaginary phallus that the hysterical structure knows it does not possess. For this reason, this imaginary castrated other appears in the algebraic formula as minus phi (-
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experience. For this purpose, we can compare the clinical picture (a clinical phenomenology), with the structural proposition, the matheme, as a theory.
CLINICAL APPLICATION OF THE MATHEME OF THE HYSTERIC The hysteric's need for approval and recognition, their seductive behavior and exaggerated concern for physical attractiveness addressed to figures of apparent importance, rests on this logic, because the matheme suggests that the subject of hysteria wants to be wanted by a phallic other bearer of the idealized phallus. Lacan affirms that the hysteric wants to be wanted by the father. This imaginary phallus represents wealth, fame, power, beauty, and knowledge. For this reason, the subject of hysteria takes care of his or her body, diet, skin, in sum, his or her appearance, and develops his or her seductive and theatrical skills. In this sense, he or she cannot deal with frustration without falling into despair. One of the traits of the hysterical subject is being susceptible to suggestion. The structure determines the constitution of the subject of hysteria in his or her identification with a castrated other. The hysterical subject, therefore, wants to be wanted by the Other bearer of the idealized phallus who, in fiction, would complete him or her. The hysterical subject's desire to be desired by that phallic Other is so imperative that he or she submits to the will of this Master in an unavoidable passive position of susceptibility to suggestion. Concerning the repression of the sexual drives, the imaginary castrated condition of the other, with which the subject will identify in the imaginary axis (schema L), stems from the prohibitions, and later the repression, of the sexual infantile oedipal drama. In the hysterical structure, the minus phi that represents castration and the lack is connected with repressed sexuality. The enactment of the lack triggers anxiety. The hysterical display of seduction, theatrics, emotionality, and submission to suggestion uplugs up the lack" and relieves anxiety.
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In the hysterical structure there is a certain deficiency in the imaginary sexual identification with the same sex, which is perceived as castrated—i(a) over minus phi. The hysterics' solution to this drama is to create, in the field of the other, an idealized phallus that will desire them. In this scenario of a certain insufficient imaginary identification, the sexual object-choice may be heterosexual, but such a choice leaves a remnant of doubt regarding the same sex. This logic opens up the possibility for the emergence of bisexual facets in the hysterical structure, so that subjects with such a structure sometimes feel compelled to enact homosexual acts. We should recall here the case of Dora and her homosexual desires, sometimes repressed, for Mrs. K.4
TWO TYPES OF HYSTERIA: (N/o) AND (n/O) If we introduce the two axes of the constitution of the subject clearly described in schema L, we can speculate on the constitution of the hysterical structure. Such constitution may depend on certain lacks or serious traumas that happen during early childhood, an excess of lacks and traumas that will produce a psychic structure with mechanisms characteristic of the imaginary axis (a -»a') of the schema L. A second type of hysteria, by contrast, is constituted with a prevalence of the symbolic axis (A —»a') of this graph, and has not suffered as many historical difficulties in that early constitutive period. We may use capital N to designate the prevalence of the imaginary axis (sometimes called the narcissistic axis) and lowercase n to designate the lack of prevalence of this axis. In addition, we may use capital O to designate the prevalence of the symbolic axis (sometimes called the oedipal axis), and lowercase o to designate the lack of prevalence of this axis. We can thus say that Dora's case, which is a case of hysteria with a prevalence of imaginary mechanisms, may be formulated as N/o; that is to say, a hysterical structure where the imaginary axis dominates over the symbolic axis. In other cases we may find the formula n/O, which represents a hysterical structure where the symbolic axis prevails.
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SUBJECTIVE EXPERIENCE AND THE LOGIC OF THE OTHER
HYSTERICAL MADNESS If subjects with a hysterical structure present the N/o prevalence and, as a consequence, function mainly in the imaginary axis, they will respond to certain life situations that place them in a state of impotence with an early mental mechanism that functions like the Mosaic law of all or nothing. There occurs here a massive identification with the Other and a prevalence of a psychic functioning with the ideal ego—i(a).
The Other in the Position of the Master and Hysterical Psychosis The imaginary N/o prevalence very rigidly situates the Other in the apparently permanent position of the Master. If, due to some circumstances in their life, subjects with a hysterical structure are exposed to a situation of imperfection that reveals the failure of the Master (who will then appear as castrated), they will suffer a double castration—the castration of the subject and that of the Other, which has just been revealed. As a consequence, an unmanageable state of anxiety will be unleashed. Hysterics will lose their ability to discriminate the object and their sense of adequacy to social reality, will occupy a position of omnipotence and show grandiose feelings that appear in the act, and, finally, may suffer visual and auditory hallucinations. In clinical practice, this state of hysterical madness is similar to a psychotic episode, which in fact it is. In the 1950s it was called functional psychosis to differentiate it from the truly psychotic schizophrenic process.
Dissociative Crisis The dissociative crisis is a hysterical phenomenon. The clinical picture is very similar to hysterical madness, though it presents less dramatic clinical manifestations and is shorter. The logic behind dissociation is similar to the double castration and the state of
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impotence. It is important to emphasize here that this spectacular dissociative crisis has nothing to do with the truly psychotic structure that belongs to the logic of schizophrenia, with its three-hole theory, namely, the lack of being, the imaginary hole, and the foreclosure of the Name-of-the-Father—a hole in the symbolic psychic texture.
ENDNOTES 1. See note 1, Chapter 9 (editor's note). 2. Jacques Lacan (1960-1961), Le Stmmaire. Livre VIII. Le Transfert, 1960-1961 [The Seminar. Book VIII. Transference], op. cit., lesson of April 19,1961. 3. See Chapter 7 (editor's note). 4. Sigmund Freud (1905), Fragments of an Analysis of a Case of Hysteria. Standard Edition 7.
16 The Logic of Phobias
PHOBIAS IN CLINICAL PRACTICE I would like to begin by advancing my thesis on the existence of two primary types of phobias: first, phobias of imaginary prevalence, which are present in subjects whose psyche operates mainly within the imaginary axis—N/o—and are also called structural phobias; second, phobias of symbolic prevalence—n/O—that appear as a consequence of the oedipal conflict and are also called symptom phobias.
PHOBIAS OF THE NARCISSISTIC (IMAGINARY) AXIS (N/o) These phobias are the result of early pathology, either traumatic or due to structural deficiencies. The end result of these noxas will be the appearance of a flaw in the structural constitution of the subject, aflawthat forces him or her to search for a survival method. The subject will thus construct an object that will plug up or re-
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pair the flaw. This object will be the phobic object, which will cure or repair the structural flaw and will serve the subject as a guide toward an inevitable avoidance behavior. That is to say, that special object will repair the flaw, but the subject must avoid it. We might call it the phobic object Anxiety will reappear in the presence of this object as a testimony to the imaginary trauma or deficiency. This castration anxiety might also be called imaginary or narcissistic anxiety. Phobic anxiety emerges when the subject is faced with the reappearance of the structural flaw, that is to say, when faced with the internal imaginary void. In some cases, such as an imaginary phobia (phobias to enclosed spaces, elevators, or airplanes), the claustrophobic object becomes the object to avoid, even though initially—and paradoxically—this very object was the one that rescued the subject, through displacement, from his or her fictional trauma of maternal entrapment and maternal deficit (of continence and reverie). This type of phobia is very difficult to eradicate through psychoanalytic dialogue, since it has a structural function of plugging up and survival. In other words, the construction of the phobic object was the cure to the early trauma and deficiency. However, these phobias can be minimized or temporarily relieved by providing a new substitute object that will plug up the flaw. Sometimes the appearance of multiple love objects will perform such substitution and temporarily relieve the imaginary phobia.
PHOBIAS OF THE OEDIPAL (SYMBOLIC) AXIS (n/O) These phobias appear as a solution to a pathological oedipal conflict. In this type of phobia the father figure introduces an exaggerated amount of castration anxiety. It is a type of anxiety different from the imaginary one, for it refers to the threat of loss of something due to the presence of the paternal figure. We may call this anxiety oedipal castration anxiety or symbolic castration anxiety, as it is the paternal figure who will introduce the law and a new order by prohibiting incest and parricide. We should clarify here a
110
'
SUBJECTIVE EXPERIENCE AND THE LOGIC OF THE OTHER
topological detail. First, it is the mother who will introduce the child into the relationship with the father—the mother will introduce the paternal metaphor.1 This introduction is possible because the father figure was already inscribed in the mind of the mother or caregiver. Second, the paternal metaphor, in turn, will rescue the child from maternal entrapment or maternal specular duality.
THE CONSTRUCTION OF A SYMBOLIC PHOBIC OBJECT In the face of that supposed exaggerated castration anxiety of a symbolic nature, the solution for the subject is to construe a phobic object. Through the mental mechanism of displacement, this oedipal danger will be placed in the new phobic object, which will have to be avoided from then on. This phobic construction is not a consequence of a structural flaw but of the presence of an oedipal conflict in which the forbidden oedipal desire and the presence of castration anxiety will play an important role. The construction of that symbolic phobic object, therefore, might be considered as part of the notion of conflict in psychoanalysis. This psychic conflict and its consequence, the symptom, would be accessible to the analytic cure, and the symptom could be eradicated. The cure will be the effect of a resignification both of the characters in the oedipal romance and of the subjective danger these internalized figures represent.
CURABLE AND INCURABLE PHOBIAS The first type of phobia does not correspond to this logic and, consequently, it is not curable (in the sense of eradicable). For this reason, it might be considered as a special repaired structure, that is, capable of being replaced but not eradicable. There is a great difference, therefore, between the structural phobias (located in the imaginary axis or N/o) and phobias such as symptom phobias, which appear in the symbolic axis, or n/O. We should point out here that
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both types of phobias may be present in the same subject, and each one will have its own outcome.
ENDNOTE 1. See, for example, Jacques Lacan (1957-1958), On a Question Prior to Any Possible Treatment of Psychosis, in Bcrits. A Selection, op. cit. (editor's note).
17 The Logic of the Obsessive
HYSTERIZATION PHENOMENA The obsessive structure does not exclude the presence of certain hysterical manifestations or symptoms, because the positive phallus (plus phi) of the obsessive occasionally changes to a negative phallus through identification with the castrated Other. In this way, being in lack makes it possible for the obsessive to maintain the dialectic of the desire of the other, precisely because he or she is in lack. The most common hysterical manifestations in the symptomatology of obsessives are phobias and psychosomatic concerns. The phenomenon of hysterization takes place in the symptom, because to become analyzable, the obsessive's symptoms should take a hysterical wrapping. That is how the obsessive enters the analytic device: the analysand begins to speak of his or her symptom. The fact that the obsessive structure becomes a hysterical structure means that the obsessive comes to be in lack and a negative phallus appears. This insufficiency opens the way for the obsessive subject to receive help from the Other to whom knowledge may
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be granted, and so the analyst appears in the analysand's field. The obsessive, bearer of the positive phallus (the certainty of truth and power), resists this hysterical position of a negative phallus. Only after the obsessive has accepted the hysterical position, however, can the analytic device be established. Meanwhile, the obsessive will be a patient who resists instating the symptom and becoming a subject of analysis. It is the kind of patient who insists that he or she "needs nothing, and least of all an analyst/'
THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF OBSESSIVE NEUROSIS The obsessive structure is described as of superior intelligence. It is present in the male or female phallic subject, and is organized, controlled, and secredy sensitive to frustration. Obsessives express clear and strong opinions despite showing indecision in certain areas. Their perfectionism is complemented by a concern for detail. The clinical picture—the phenomenology of obsessive neurosis— covers a wide range of manifestations: 1. Obsessive ideas: the intrusion of unwelcome conscious thoughts, such as ideas and fears of death of the subject's loved ones, or the intrusive thought of killing one's own family or of killing one's beloved spouse. Religious individuals may suffer from obscene thoughts during prayer. These ideas (desires) produce anxiety and hence obsessives try in vain to reject them. Obsessions have three characteristics, namely, they are not wanted, they are not understood, and they cannot be rejected. 2. Superstitious ideas, whereby the fear of misfortune is neutralized with thoughts or acts of a magic nature, for instance, counting three times three, making the sign of the cross, or saying a prayer. This symptom is sustained by the psychic mechanism of undoing. Many amulets and religious rituals act through this mechanism, whereby the wicked, destructive, and aggressive element is neutralized or
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SUBJECTIVE EXPERIENCE AND THE LOGIC OF THE OTHER
undone thanks to a thought, a superstitious ritual act, or an amulet. 3. Obsessive doubts appear in the field of thought as indecision. Obsessives experience doubt regarding whether they have done a routine activity correctly or incorrectly, or whether they locked the door, put out the light, or shut off the gas. Rituals of compulsive safety sometimes acquire exaggerated proportions. Doubt is occasionally so intense that it can block the subject's ability to work efficiently. Sometimes procrastination without action appears. 4. Compulsive rituals refer to acts that the obsessive cannot avoid performing lest a small anxiety attack appears. These acts are construed as relieving anxiety, and they include cleaning rituals, ceremonial acts, magic (superstitious) acts, and the exaggeration of rigidity in the daily routine. These subjects may think that their hands are dirty and that they need to be washed repeatedly. They sometimes believe that their clothes or their furniture is dirty, and are forced to carry out lengthy cleaning operations. 5. Obsessive control appears as a need to appropriate the other's behavior that is connected to perfectionism and a need to impose an order that, if lost, will lead to the appearance of anxiety. Obsessives invest a lot of energy so that the Other will lack nothing—the universe of the Other must remain tidy and satisfied. Obsessives say, "She or he lacks nothing," or "Whatever you ask you will get, my love." This means that they are in charge of everything, and if the Other is satisfied, the Other has nothing to demand, that is, is not castrated. We all know the importance obsessives attribute to the issue of loss. To lose something will refer them to the logic of the lack, to the unbearable negative phallus. Hence, it is very important not to lose anything. To successfully avoid facing the lack, it becomes necessary to neutralize the Other's desire by rapidly satisfying it. For this reason, obsessives will inevitably satisfy the demand
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of the hysterical structure, which bears witness to this structure's lack. Obsessives adjust to rigid norms of behavior and a strict order in everything that surrounds them. The furniture must be organized in a certain way, sometimes symmetrically. There cannot be tilted paintings on the walls. When walking, obsessives cannot step on the joining of the tiles—all these examples are metaphors of the lack, of imperfection. Sometimes obsessives cannot get rid of useless objects (because of their attachment to the object and their fear of loss). They suffer from an attachment to money and to things. Obsessives show a difficulty in being generous related to anal-retentive aspects and to a need to control the object. 6. Feelings of guilt are connected to obsessives' need for perfection and to an exaggerated and sometimes primitive morality. When they break their rules in their daily routine, anxiety and guilt appear. The incessant impulse to repair the imaginary damage produces what has been called the unpayable debt. The unconscious risk lies in the appearance of the lack. 7. In the obsessive neurosis sexual activity is not impeded— on the contrary, obsessives feel somewhat proud of their great sexual capacity to satisfy their partner, the one who is in lack. They speak of their sexual abilities and success. In some cases, the obsessives* cleaning rituals, their unavoidable need for order, or the performance of ceremonial acts partially interferes with the sexual act. Obsessives satisfy the lack in the Other and hence enjoy the Other's pleasure. This pleasure of the obsessive neurotic is very different from the jouissance of the perverse structure, which experiences jouissance in the locus of the Other. Obsessives reach a paradox: they want to satisfy the lack in the Other, thus becoming everything for the Other. To be everything for the Other closes the field of the lack and, therefore, closes the field of desire (which always arises from
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the lack). In order to open a space for desire—which implies making a space for the lack—obsessives end up being nothing. They disqualify themselves in the dialectic of desire. Promises and offers—all of them given in good faith—are worth nothing. Obsessives have to make a space for the lack so as to inescapably plug it up. This is their paradox—a King who cannot cease to be a slave. 8. Just as hysterics are very fearful of speaking or being in the presence of death because of the negative phallus, obsessives show tolerance of the idea of death, and even talk about their own death without fear. Lacan used to say that obsessives, who believe they possess a positive phallus, are convinced that they know a thousand tricks to deceive death.
THE STRUCTURE OF OBSESSIVE NEUROSIS As in the case of hysteria, the structure of the obsessive is organized according to the obsessive^ position regarding castration and the logic of the phallus.
THE MATHEME OF OBSESSIVE NEUROSIS1
s
i(A) +< P,
oA
THE MEANING OF THE MATHEME The barred S refers to the subject crossed by the Spaltung (splitting), which constitutes him as subject of the unconscious: the original splitting. The mathematical brackets represent the constitution of the subject of the unconscious, which is represented by the algebraic formula contained in them.
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The lowercase (i) indicates an imaginary identification, and the big (A), the Other of the symbolic order. Consequently, (i of A) refers to the imaginary identification with the big (symbolic) Other, an Other that is complete—that is, not castrated and, therefore, the bearer of the phallus. The positive phi confirms that the subject is constituted as bearer of the positive phallus. The subject behaves as if he or she were a Master. The figure of the lozenge ( o ) represents the particular union with the field of the other. This relationship is singular and specific to each subject. To the right of the lozenge we find the big barred A. The Other in this structure is a castrated Other who does not bear the semblance of the phallus, and hence an Other whose desire must be completed. The mathematical proposition of the obsessive structure reads: The subject of the unconscious is constituted through an imaginary identification with the noncastrated, whole Other. This subject is the bearer of a positive phallus and is bound to the castrated Other in a particular way. The latter demands things from the obsessive, who cannot resist pleasing him. Anxiety appears whenever the illusion of the phallic object is threatened.
CLINICAL APPLICATION OF THE MATHEME OF OBSESSIVE NEUROSIS All arbitrary structural proposals should be validated in the clinical field. For this reason, we will apply the matheme to the clinical picture. In the obsessive structure, anxiety arises due to identification, associated with the appearance of the castrated Other. When the subject loses the Master's illusion of power and control, he or she experiences anxiety due to fear of castration. The matheme proposes the subject as constituted on an illusion of completeness— as bearer of the positive phi phallus. Castration—A—is located in (projected onto) the Other.
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The symptom, as a construction of the unconscious, aims to diminish castration anxiety and to succeed in satisfying certain elements of the drive. Just as the symptoms that involve controlling the object, the symptom of compulsive rituals and ceremonial and magical acts is produced by the need to recover the lost phallus. The symptom places the subject in the position of a positive phallus, that is, of the powerful subject, the one who can control the world with his or her superstitious ideas, magical acts, and obsessive ceremonials. In other words, these acts retrieve the subject's position of bearer of the phallus. At the same time, they trap the obsessive in the disease of doubt, because when performing the obsessive ceremonial or the magical act to retrieve the positive phallus, obsessives doubt once again the effectiveness of such acts. Doubt, in turn, leads them once again to the need to reassure themselves of the possession of the phallus through the obsessive act. Guilt feelings are linked to the imaginary identification with the Other who, in fiction, is not castrated—(i) of (A). The imperfection that characterizes everyday practices will increase the tension with the ideal of completeness and will produce feelings of guilt. In the obsessive structure, the matheme shows the constitution of the subject through identification with the (i) of (A) and, due to this identification, the existence of guilt feelings. During the oedipal period this ideal of perfection is damaged by the child's incestuous and parricidal component. A debt with the father (stemming from parricidal desire) is established that, in fiction, will never be paid. While the obsessive subject stays in the position of the Master, knowing he is whole and the bearer of the phallus—positive phi—the structure is neurotically stabilized. The relationship with the other will break this stability. This relationship occurs in the subjective field of the Other (the relative topological position of the object). Consequently, it is the Other of the unconscious who is placed in an external object through projection. This Other, who bears the mark of castration, will request love, sex, help, and so on. Obsessive subjects are not able (for structural reasons) to refuse, and these demands will put them
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to the test. What is tested is the obsessives' position as bearers of the phallus—the positive phi. If they fail this test, castration anxiety will appear and, with it, the symptoms. The sexual life of obsessives is generally very active, and they are proud of their sexual skills. The matheme explains this feeling by positing their identification with a positive phallus that structurally forces them to place castration in the locus of the Other. If the Other is castrated, then he can make demands, and, at the same time, if he makes demands, it is because he is castrated. In this way, to keep castration in the Other and sustain their own position as Master, obsessives must necessarily satisfy the sexual demand of the Other—of the one who is in lack.
ENDNOTE 1. I expanded this matheme in 1993 (Rdmulo Lander, Clinicay Estructura del Obsesivo [Clinical Manifestations and Structure of the Obsessive] , lecture delivered at the Caracas Psychoanalytic Society, Caracas).
18 The Logic of Depression
STRUCTURE OR SYMPTOM? From the point of view of psychiatric nosology, depression is a definite clinical entity. It is conceptualized through a group of phenomenological data that constitute a diagnostic clinical entity. Psychoanalytic clinical practice, on the other hand, sets depression in a different way—as a symptom that is instated in any clinical structure. Depression is not an unconscious structure in itself.
Depression as Symptom We may, therefore, find depressive symptoms in neurotic unconscious structures, such as hysterical and obsessive structures, or in schizophrenic or psychotic structures. We may also encounter a series of mental states that share some traits with depressive
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symptoms—such as sadness, weeping, and a decrease in activity— but that do not present true depressive symptoms.
The Difference There is a clear difference, on the one hand, between depressive symptoms and phenomena such as (a) bereavement and mourning, (b) the clinical manifestations of the "hole" (see below), (c) the clinical manifestations of moral masochism, and (d) the clinical manifestations of jouissance, and, on the other hand, between depressive symptoms and the suicidal act, since they may be independent of each other.
BEREAVEMENT AND MOURNING Mourning is a normal affective state that appears due to the loss of a love object or its equivalent metaphorical signifier, for instance, the loss of freedom or of one's ideals. It is characterized by the presence of sadness, weeping, psychic pain, and an inward attitude.
The Work of Mourning In the process of bereavement, the ego (moi) must engage in the painful work of accepting the loss of the beloved object. This acceptance involves the achievement of the withdrawal of cathexes, that is, the withdrawal of the libidinal energy invested in the psychic representation of the lost object. When mourning follows a normal course, the subject will eventually be able to invest libidinal cathexes in a new love object. In this way, the subject may end his or her mourning and continue with his or her life. Yet this normal mourning process may become pathological for diverse reasons.
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Necessary Losses Throughout his or her life, the subject will have to face inevitable separations and losses of his or her love object. We know that the child inevitably will have to separate from the nutritious breast so as to continue its development. The child will also be separated from the mother or caregiver to whom it is attached so as to adapt to the preschool environment, and so forth throughout life. The subject's difficulty or inability to accept and tolerate these necessary losses will result in arrested development and the persistence of an infantile mental state.
Pathological Mourning When the previous relationship with the lost object has been ambivalent and intense love passions have developed, the presence of an unconscious feeling of guilt toward the lost object will hinder the process of normal bereavement. Self-punishing mechanisms arise, as well as a self-imposed penance due to unconscious guilt feelings. We thus encounter what we might call a pathology of the mourning process.1 As we all know, the clinical manifestations of pathological mourning vary according to a case-by-case logic. It is useful to clarify here that the pathology of the mourning process may have other causes than unconscious guilt feelings. I am referring here to some cases where the relationship with the love object has had a symbiotic or fusion quality. In these cases, the survivors feel that the loss of the love object is intolerable and that the world has ended—that there is no ground beneath their feet. They want to die and disappear next to the object of their love. When the object of intense dependence and of a symbiotic kind of relationship has disappeared, the abandoned subjects feel that without that object life is no longer possible. Experience shows that after a brief period, they settle down quite quickly and well, thanks to a new symbiotic relationship that enables their survival.
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CLINICAL MANIFESTATIONS OF EMPTINESS OR THE INTERNAL VOID Current experience in psychoanalytic clinical practice repeatedly shows the existence of new pathologies. It is common to hear patients express the presence of a new kind of symptom referred to as the experience of an internal void, like a hole sometimes physically located in the chest, which is hard to define and is accompanied by a nameless uneasiness or, at times, by anxiety and a feeling of purposelessness. These patients sometimes wonder if they have a good reason to live. Some of them present these kinds of symptoms to us, mistakenly referring to them as a chronic depressive problem. Clearly, this is something these symptoms are not. The study of this internal void has increasingly led us to interesting discoveries. Internal Void The subject in question is capable of forging relationships with a significant object and of establishing transference with the analyst. That is why we may say that this is not an autistic neurotic with an autistic core.2 However, we find that those patients who present clinical manifestations of emptiness, even though they forge love and hate bonds and have both a family life and an active professional life, allude to the long-lasting presence of this internal void and to their feeling of purposelessness. What they have achieved in life they have done passively, pushed by familial ideals and goals. We should mention here that these analysands present neither a decrease in their self-esteem nor an intense dialectic of hate toward themselves. Still, even though hope is being questioned, we can say that we are not facing a true depressive clinical picture. The Logic of Emptiness and the Structural Hole When we study the childhood history of these analysands we find highly intelligent subjects, capable of fighting for survival, but who
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have had a particularly difficult early relationship with the mother figure. They had a present mother, yet cool and distant. Rather than a hated maternal object, she is an absent object. The psychical weft of these subjects has been constituted with a structural hole, a hole that may vary in dimensions according to the magnitude of the subjective perception of the absence of the maternal object. These subjects enter a triangular relationship with the paternalfigureand instate an Oedipus complex—in some cases a positive Oedipus and in other cases a negative one. In this way, we find cases of married women with children who enjoy their heterosexual erotic life to a certain extent, but who yearn (sometimes with a passage to the act) for the love of a woman—the absent mother. Similarly, we sometimes encounter a clinical picture of emptiness in bulimic women for whom food offers a momentary relief to that internal hole. Men with internal emptiness often try to fill this constitutive hole with compulsive activities such as seduction, compulsive gambling, and the consumption of alcohol. All these symptoms that aim to relieve the internal hole will fail in the end, because the feeling of emptiness corresponds to a structural hole that may certainly be relieved thanks to an artifice of life—the symptom—but that cannot be cured. This emptiness is a constitutive part of these subjects, and they must learn to live with it.
MORAL MASOCHISM Sigmund Freud had already introduced his ideas about human masochism in "Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality," and he developed them further in uThe Economic Problem of Masochism."3 Freud distinguishes here three types of masochisms, namely, sexual, feminine, and moral masochism.
Masochism and Guilt According to Freud's theory, moral masochism is a product of an unconscious guilt conflict of which subjects are naturally unaware.
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This conflict propels them to search hopelessly for ways of suffering (unconscious atonement). The paradox lies in the fact that this suffering simultaneously represents a relief. Masochism and Self-Esteem We should note here that in the clinical picture of true masochism we do not find any elements of the depressive logic. The trigger of a subjective experience of failure does not exist, nor is there a prevalence of the usual bond of hate with the object, a diminished self-esteem, or depressive despair. On the contrary, masochists often show high selfesteem, an affirmative position in life, and a capacity to tolerate pain and suffering. We undoubtedly have here two different types of clinical suffering, for masochistic and depressive logic differ gready.
SYMPTOMATOLOGY OF JOUISSANCE Jacques Lacan introduced the theory of jouissance in 1959 in his famous seminar on ethics.4 This innovation has represented a very important contribution to psychoanalysis, since it has allowed us to progress in the study of psychic suffering.
The Need to Suffer In our current psychoanalytical practice we often find analysands who cannot escape their need to suffer.5 What is more, they need to suffer to maintain their psychic balance. When studying these cases we find that they do not correspond exclusively to classic Freudian masochism, in which we generally find indications of unconscious feelings of guilt, but the permanent search for suffering is also present. Lacan defines jouissance as a structural phenomenon that no human being can escape. Following Freud, this author points out that it is something implicit in the logic of the drive and is located in a beyond of the Freudian pleasure principle.6 Every person would have a
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quantity of jouissonce in one's daily life. This jouissonce is beyond pleasure, that is, it is a special form of delight in suffering.
The Sum of Jouissance When the quantity of jouissonce is high, analysands mistakenly appear as if they were displaying the clinical manifestations of depression. This is a common mistake, because these analysands are experiencing a situation in their lives that inevitably drives them to suffering (as a delight). They also show an inability to solve this situation, because, at bottom, they do not want to solve it. The paradox lies in the fact that they experience a desire not to continue to live like that, because they feel trapped. There is a certain despair—sometimes expressed by crying, sometimes not—and a lack of happiness in their life. Their childhood history reveals the presence of serious difficulties during their first years of life. We often find a history of abandonment, lack, and serious losses; of war, death, or poverty; of traumatic parental separation that has produced affective abandonment; or of drug addiction and serious mental pathology in the parents. This pathological panorama introduces a daily amount of suffering that is inscribed in the structuring of the personality, that is, in the constitution of the subject. Other subjects present a smaller amount of suffering in their early history.
Unavoidable Jouissance What is important is that this jouissonce (suffering) is necessary for these subjects' psychic balance, and hence it cannot be cured. Many of these analysands increase their knowledge about themselves during the analytic process. They find new opportunities to live better, they rescue much of their capacity for pleasure in their sexual life, but they are unable to do away with their need to suffer (which is not of a masochistic nature). Their need for jouissonce is part of their being and is necessary for their psychic stability. We should point out here that these analysands do not present a dynamic of hate ei-
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ther toward the object or toward themselves. Neither do they present a decrease in their self-esteem. We may say then that this state of puissance is neither a depressive state per se nor a masochistic state.
THE DEPRESSIVE STATE As I have already mentioned, depression is a symptom that is instated in the neurotic or psychotic structure when some of the following conditions are present: (a) the prior existence in the subject's history of a prevalence of the bond of hate with the object; (b) the consequent self-hate, which opens the way to the development of low self-esteem; (c) the accidental appearance of a subjective experience of failure; and (d) the onset of hopelessness.
On the Logic of Hate Toward the Object Hatred toward the object is unavoidable among human beings, because the child's early relationship with its mother involves a twofold experience with the breast—an experience both of satisfaction and of frustration.7 The experience of satisfaction will produce the introjection of the beloved object—a good object—and the experience offrustrationwill lead to the introjection of the hated object—the bad object. This dialectical process is relentless and unavoidable. Consequendy, we all have, to a different extent, a lovehate bond with the object. It is true that, theoretically, we may all instate a depressive symptom. Yet for this symptom to develop in a pathological form of intense depression, a prior prevalence of the bond of hate over the bond of love must exist, as well as a triggering subjective experience offailure.
Self-Hate The prevalence of hate toward the object in the infant will cause excessive introjective identifications with the hated object that will
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lead in turn to a decreased self-love or self-esteem. When the subjects' hate toward the object becomes self-hate, it marks the beginning of the symptomatic manifestations of the depressive state. If the history of the subjects' early life has shown a prevalence of primal mental mechanisms that seriously hinder their capacity to discriminate between subject and object, the depressive symptom will persist. These primal mechanisms perpetuate the loss of otherness and the tendency toward fusion with the object or oneness with the other. These mechanisms, together with the decrease in self-esteem, explain the intensity and persistence of some depressive states.
The Subjective Experience of Failure Life experiences—particularly subjective experiences of success or failure that include early preschool and school experiences, love experiences, and experiences related to professional and family life, to the subject's financial situation, to physical beauty, or to the loss or mutilation of internal or external organs—will bring into the scene the fiction of imaginary castration. The subjective experience of failure may contribute to trigger the emergence of the hate that already exists in the subject. The subject will hate the object due to envy and jealousy. The energy of this hate, which may sometimes lead to the subject's death, comes from the libido as a life drive, and not from the death drive. I, therefore, have always disagreed with the repeated cliche that a suicidal act is nothing more than the pure expression of the death drive.
Despair and Hopelessness Despair and hopelessness result from the fact that the subject has relinquished being loved by the other. The hate toward the other, due to the mechanism of the return of the projection, finally becomes a hatred and scorn toward oneself. This mechanism is si-
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multaneous with the subject in despair (which refers, as we have seen, to the subject's relinquishing his or her being loved by the other) and provides the necessary energy to maintain the depressive state. The subject who has given up his or her desire to be desired by the other and the other as a hated object together maintain this dialectic of despair.
DEPRESSION AND THE SUICIDAL ACT Suicide is an act, but not all suicidal acts originate in a subject with a depressive symptomatology. The logic of the suicidal act allows us to differentiate between two fundamental types, namely, (a) the suicidal act as symptom, and (b) the radical suicidal act. I will not present the logic of the suicidal act in this chapter but will only advance a few comments. We may approach the study of the suicidal act from two different vertices.8 First, the suicidal act that originates in a subject's acting out. I am referring here specifically to the suicidal act as symptom. Second, the suicidal act that originates in a passage to the act or enactment, that is, the radical suicide. The ethics and aesthetics of these acts will be determined, in thefirstcase, by the dynamics of hate, and in the second case, by the dynamics of sacrifice and ideals. The difference between these two suicidal acts is based on the psychoanalytic concepts of acting out and passage to the act.
Suicide as Symptom This type of suicide will cause a wrong death; it is a death that should not have happened. Potentially suicidal subjects with a serious neurotic or psychotic conflict may enact their suicidal violence without clearly knowing the reason for their death. It is a scene where somebody is dead without knowing the reasons for it.
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The Radical and Heroic Suicidal Act In this type of suicide the suicidal subjects have good reasons to die. They neither have nor show the symptomatology of despair or hopelessness, nor have they had a dramatic bond of hate with the other or with themselves. The desire to be the other's desire is intact; the desire to be loved is satisfied. There is neither despair nor a decrease in self-esteem. An intense libidinal object cathexis may exist with a bond of love toward the object. Nonetheless, radical suicidal subjects have a clear desire to die and there is a logic underlying their death.
ENDNOTES 1. Sigmund Freud (1917), Mourning and Melancholia. Standard Edition 14. 2. Frances Tustin (1981), Autistic States in Children. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. 3. Sigmund Freud (1905), Three Essays on a Theory of Sexuality, op. cit. (1924), The Economic Problem of Masochism, op. cit. 4. Jacques Lacan (1959-1960), The Seminar Book VII. The Ethics of Psychoanalysis, 1959-1960, translated by Dennis Porter, with notes by D. Porter. London: Routledge, 1992. 5. Jacques Lacan (1959-1960), The Seminar Book V1L The Ethics of Psychoanalysis, 1959-1960, op. cit.; and R6mulo Lander (1996), Sufrimiento y Goce: iSintoma o estructura? [Suffering and Jouissance: Symptom or Structure?], in Trdpicos. Revista de psicoandlisis 5:1 and 2. 6. Sigmund Freud (1920), Beyond the Pleasure Principle, op. cit. 7. Melanie Klein (1932), The Psycho-Analysis of Children, op. cit.; and 1952, Some Theoretical Conclusions Regarding the Emotional Life of the Infant, in M. Klein, Paula Heimann, Susan Isaacs, and Joan Riviere, Developments in Psycho-Analysis. London: Hogarth, pp. 237-270. 8. R6mulo Lander (1997), ttica del Acto Suicida [The Ethics of the Suicidal Act], lecture, Caracas.
19 The Logic of the Suicidal Act
THE ETHICS OF THE SUICIDAL ACT Society considers suicide as a selfish and egocentric act that may cause damage to others. The relatives of suicides suffer a heavy burden of pain due to the imposed absence of the beloved object, and a burden of anxiety due to unconscious guilt feelings produced by the love/hate bond that exists in every human relationship. An attempt at a nonbiased study of this topic will encounter serious obstacles. Thefirstone lies in the researchers themselves, who will have a personal stance regarding death and suicide. They might suffer from the horror of death and will, therefore, find reasons to sustain and affirm the inappropriateness of a self-inflicted death. The pure overflowing presence of imaginary castration always provokes an uncomfortable feeling. The second obstacle lies in the social aspects of the suicidal act, which is considered a forbidden act both by religious morality and by the civil code. The JudeoChristian religious code will excommunicate the suicidal subject in a de facto procedure, while Western civil codes define the suicide
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as a social criminal. In this sense, the message is clear: the suicidal act is unacceptable in present-day Western societies.
TWO VERTICES I will approach the study of the suicidal act from two different vertices.1 First, I will tackle the suicidal act that originates in an acting out. I am referring here specifically to the suicidal act as symptom. Second, I will look at the suicidal act that originates in a passage to the act or enactment, and by means of this concept I will analyze the radical suicide. The ethics and aesthetics of both acts will be determined by the dynamics of hate and sacrifice. Since, as I mentioned earlier,2 I base the difference between these two suicidal acts on the psychoanalytic concepts of "acting out" and "passage to the act," I believe I should offer here some theoretical specifications. We may differentiate these two concepts according to the extent of the awareness the subjects have concerning their act, and not according to their entrance into or exit from the scene. I thus take a stance with regard to other psychoanalytic theories.3
Acting Out This refers to an act carried out by a subject without clear knowledge of his or her motivations for this act. Neither is there any awareness of its reason or purpose. The unconscious desire imposes itself upon the subject and the act speaks for itself outside consciousness. It is an act without a subject.
Passage to the Act (Enactment) This refers to a conscious act that is carried out after the subject's struggle with anxiety, the latter being an expression of a conflict between unconscious desire and unconscious prohibition. The
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passage to the act is an act carried out by a subject who, having conquered anxiety, is able to act. Sometimes the act may be totally blocked or partially interfered with so that a non-act appears. We may think of various clinical examples of such interferences. In the case of obsessive neurosis, conflict causes the drives to be wasted away in endless thoughts. The subject is thus inhibited from carrying out his or her voluntary act. In the case of phobic neurosis, the subject suffers because of the fear of carrying out an act that is part of the phobic conflict. He or she is then also totally or partially inhibited from carrying out his or her voluntary act. Finally, in hysterical neurosis, due to repression of the sexual desire, the hysterical subject inhibits some aspects or the totality of the sexual act. In this situation, desire has been blocked by a prohibition. The subject will finally overcome the conflict and will carry out the act in full conscience. It is an act with a subject.
THE SUICIDAL ACT AS SYMPTOM The suicidal act as symptom causes a wrong death—it is a death that should not have happened. The act is suicidal, somebody ends up dead, but the act lacks a subject. For this reason, I insist that this type of suicidal act is an acting out. To understand the unconscious motivation of this suicidal acting out we need to thoroughly analyze it from a psychoanalytic perspective. To study the suicidal act as symptom in depth we must consider two variables, namely, the object of desire and the hate toward the object.
THE DIALECTIC OF HOPE The dialectic of despair as hopelessness and the desire not to live constitute a key aspect of the unconscious motivation of the suicidal act as symptom. To clarify this problem we need to study the theory of desire. Along with Freud and Lacan, we may say that the subject's desire is the desire of the other's desire. For
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structural psychoanalysis, the subject is constituted in the locus of the other. The creation of a new subject requires the presence of another (flesh-and-blood) subject who, through the effect of the signifier, will initiate the psychic constitution of the new subject and—via Spaltung—a long life of self-alienation. We know that the mother usually experiences a desire for her child before the child is born. One might say that the child preexists its own birth, for it exists as a wish in the field of the other's desire. Consequently, the subject is the product of the other's desire from the beginning, and the child wants to be desired by the other (of the unconscious). The child will finally differentiate itself from that specular other through processes of alterity or defusion thanks to the paternal metaphor, which will break up the motherchild couple. However, the law of desire will tyrannize the subject throughout his or her life, because he or she retains the mark of being the desire of the other's desire.
TO BE LOVED BY THE OTHER The subject in lack wants to be loved by the other and sometimes believes he or she has achieved it, or is convinced of it, exclaiming with certainty that the other loves him or her. Yet this is but a fiction or, rather, a true fiction. Lacan affirms that "to love is to give what one does not have."4 The child believes it is loved, and this belief has as its effect the development of self-love and increased selfesteem, on the one hand, and object investiture (or so-called libido object cathexis) on the other hand. The latter gives the subject a feeling of inner energy that manifests in a desire for adventure and a feeling of living fully. Until now, everything seems to go well. The problems appear when the subject, for various reasons connected with a trauma or deficiency produced during early childhood, abandons the desire to be loved. The desire for the other's desire disappears—it is a lost desire. When this happens, despair or hopelessness settles in, and the desire not to live passively
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emerges. The subject does not care whether he or she is alive or dead. Death is not sought, but if it arrives it will be welcome. In cases like these some additional psychic factors are required for the suicidal act to appear, linked to the variable of hate toward the object. We should clarify here what corresponds to the death drive, what to primal projective mechanisms, and,finally,what corresponds to the hate toward the object
THE CONCEPT OF THE DEATH DRIVE This is a controversial concept in psychoanalysis. The basic notion of the drive refers to an idea of energy. Freud first spoke of the sexual drive as libido and then he posited the dual theory of the drive for the first time in Beyond the Pleasure Principle.5 Freud introduces here the novel and obscure concept of the death drive. First he defines it as the unavoidable, mysterious force that returns the living being to the inanimate substance from where it arose. That is to say, the death drive represents a catabolic energy that will take the living being to a previous state of nonlife. At a second theoretical level Freud defines the death drive as configuring the psychic mechanism of repetition compulsion, which leads the living being to ceaselessly repeat the same error— the living being repeats what it does not know, namely, the repressed unconscious. Everything that is unacceptable to consciousness and creates a conflict with the ideals and values of the superego is repressed, and from the unconscious presses for satisfaction. At a third theoretical level, Freud points to human aggressiveness as an indirect expression of the death drive. He thus establishes an indirect relation between aggression and the death drive, which has generated great theoretical controversy among psychoanalysts. Endless debates and antagonistic positions have emerged, for some psychoanalysts suggest that aggression and violence come from frustration and early envy, and are, therefore, acquired, and not a product of the drives.
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HATE TOWARD THE OBJECT Hate toward the object is unavoidable among human beings. The bond of hate is implicit in the child's bond of early love—these are complementary and not antagonistic bonds. The antinomy of love is indifference, not hate. The latter is as affirmative a bond as the bond of love. Melanie Klein's thesis of-the good and the bad mother refers to the loved and hated mother, two different moments tied to the child's experiences of satisfaction or frustration of its demand to the mother.6 These early-life experiences are often haphazardly balanced. Having a mother with a capacity to tolerate both her own anxiety and that of the child—with a fully developed reverie function—will contribute to the prevalence of experiences of satisfaction in the child, that is, the prevalence of love over hate. Yet this is not always the case, and experiences of frustration may prevail. When that happens, the load of hate (envy and jealousy) toward the object in very small children will hinder their development and will play an important role in the appearance of neurotic symptoms.
IMAGINARY CASTRATION The subsequent experiences of success or failure the subject may undergo as a child and as an adult in different environments and settings—such as failure at school, love affairs, professional life, family life, financial decisions, the loss of beauty, the loss or mutilation of parts of the body—will introduce into the scene the fiction of imaginary castration. These subjective experiences of failure will weaken a subject who is already in despair or feeling hopeless, and may help trigger the emergence of the hate that already preexists in the subject (of the unconscious). In this way, the subject's envy and jealousy will produce hate toward the object. As I have mentioned before,7 the energy for this hate that may finally cause the subject's death comes from the libido or life drive,
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and not from the death drive. I believe, therefore, that a suicidal act is not motivated simply by the death drive. In relation to the problem that concerns us here—the relation between hate toward the object and the suicidal act—we should point out that if the subject's hate toward the other is due to the mechanism of the return of the projected signifier, it will ultimately become self-hate. If it coincides or is simultaneous with the subject in despair—a condition related to his or her relinquishing being loved by the other—this self-hate will possess the necessary energy to carry out the suicidal act as an acting out. In this case, as I explained above, the suicidal subject dies without having full conscience of the reason for his or her death. In other words, we are facing an act without a subject. Both the subject who has given up being desired by the other and the other as an internal hated object die with the suicidal act. There is no doubt in my mind that this is a wrong death. It is an entanglement of scenarios andfictionsthat ends with the death of somebody who has no clear notion of the reasons for his or her own death.
THE TRIGGERING FACTOR When a triggering factor—a subjective experience of failure— occurs in any of the subject's various life settings (love, school, work, finances, business, and so on), this current subjective failure brings the old intensity of the bond of hate and despair to the fore. If the analyst observes that the analysand is functioning with primal mental mechanisms, then the danger of suicide is high. In a case such as this it is necessary to talk explicitly about the suicidal desire (to interpret it in case the analysand resists or refuses to express it), to speak of its apparent reasons, to talk about the analysand's despair and about the bond of hate. Potential suicides should speak of all these issues and intensely express, through catharsis, everything related to their feelings of impotence and despair.
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AN ENTANGLEMENT OF SCENARIOS AND FICTIONS I am referring here to the presence in the psyche of potential suicides of early psychic mechanisms that distort their perception of alterity and otherness, their ability to discriminate self from object, and their unconscious need for punishment. The presence of early imaginary mechanisms of projective identification, the overflow of early anxieties, and a primal, cruel, and sadistic superego will contribute to the subjects' poor discriminating ability in the moment of the suicidal acting out. Their hate toward the object turns toward themselves by means of the mechanism of identification, and they thus perceive that the other—the hated object—hates them and wants their death. Self-hate, added to the idea that the other wants their death and to despair, may unleash a suicidal acting out. The magnitude of the subjects' hate will determine the aesthetics of the act. The suicidal scene, with its sense of opportunity, and the suicidal method will determine the magnitude of the horror that will affect the loved ones when finding the suicide's body. The suicides' message is present in their act. The ethics of the suicidal act as symptom is the ethics of non-meaning.
THE PUSH TOWARD SUICIDE AS SYMPTOM I would like to summarize the final push toward the symptomatic suicidal act: 1. There is a prevalence of the bond of hate toward the other. 2. The subject has a blurred perception of alterity and a poor capacity for self/object discrimination. As a consequence, primal mechanisms of projection and (later) of identification will be established in which the bond of hate (of hate toward the other) is projected (the other hates me) and is followed by the subject's identification with the projected signifier—I hate myself. Death circles around and returns
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to the subject, shifting from "the other wants my death" to "I want my own death." We should recall here that these psychic mechanisms are automatic and unconscious. 3. A triggering factor will make present the bond of hate at the moment of the suicidal act. The subject's hate toward the other becomes self-hate. This factor may be a personal, subjective experience of failure. The primal ego ideal, which is tyrannical and inflexible, will facilitate the shimmering intensity of the fiction of failure. In the end, the subject dies for nothing—everything has been a fiction.
WHAT TO DO WITH SUBJECTS AT RISK OF COMMITTING SUICIDE 1. Enter the conflict area. Talk explicitly about the analysands* suicidal ideas and their desire to commit suicide. Accept the existence of suicidal ideas. 2. Explore the origin and the apparent reasons for these suicidal ideas. Question and denounce the presence of despair and of the bond of hate. 3. Specify the subjective experience of failure. Make these subjects speak of this experience. Try to break their conviction of being in a dead-end street. Offer, through dialogue, the possibility to resignify the experiences of failure a posteriori. 4. Allow and stimulate the possibility of emotional abreaction, that is, the potential suicides' possibility to express intensely, through catharsis, their feelings of despair, of hate toward the other, and of self-hate. 5. As a last resort, when the suicidal subjects have carried out repeated suicidal acting outs, we should ask ourselves if it is right to acknowledge their right to die. Should we confront them with this option? This is a fundamental ethical point for the psychoanalyst, but not so for the suicidal subjects. The suicidal subjects who perform an acting out
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have not chosen death as an option because they do not know what they are doing. They think and know about the reasons for their hate and despair, but have no clear notion of the reasons for their death. If they do know the reason, then we are not dealing with a suicidal acting out but with a radical suicide, which corresponds, as we have seen, to an entirely different kind of suicidal act. It falls within the ethics of the analyst to discriminate between radical suicide and symptomatic suicide.
IN THE FACE OF AN IMMINENT SUICIDAL ACT The risk of suicide is determined by the nature of the compelling factors. The symptomatic suicide decides to commit suicide in a flashing instant. If some time may elapse without the subject's acting, then the pathological regression resulting from the subjective fiction of failure will decrease, and the suicidal risk will diminish and eventually disappear. What can be done in the moment of greatest danger? 1. Eliminate the means to commit suicide, at least for a few hours. This means getting rid of firearms and keeping the subjects away from heights, automobiles, medication, ropes, and other means that they could resort to during a crisis. 2. Do not leave the suicidal subjects alone. Keep them company for several hours. 3. In some cases it is useful to resort to hospitalization with the following goals: a. To separate suicidal subjects from the familial, social, or professional environment that has caused the subjective experience of failure. Banning visitors will help disconnect these subjects from that environment. b. Infantile regression is favored during hospitalization— the patient is in the hands of the Other, and surrenders to
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him. This might soothe the cruel primal superego that demands punishment. c. To take advantage of this moment and approach the suicidal conflict through dialogue so as to explore the subjects' relationship with the hated object, their supposed experience of failure, and so on. To accomplish these goals one must not prescribe any medication. Many analysts believe that medication will not eliminate the subjects' despair or their hate toward the object. On the contrary, it will further entangle their primal mental mechanisms. It is in the power of the word and of dialogue that we should place all our hopes.
THE RADICAL AND HEROIC SUICIDAL ACT Radical suicides have a good reason to die. They show neither the clinical characteristics of despair nor the dramatic bond of hate toward the other and toward themselves. Their desire to be the other's desire is intact. Their desire to be loved is satisfied. There is neither despair nor self-devaluation. An intense libidinal object cathexis exists, with a bond of love toward the object. Nevertheless, they have a clear desire to die and a reason to do so. I will list some of the possible reasons in the following section.
THE LOGIC OF THE RADICAL SUICIDE'S DEATH 1. When the subject suffers from an incurable chronic illness: This type of illness may entail physical incapacity, suffocation, deformities, and chronic unbearable pain. The subjects drag themselves through life in handicapped conditions and physical pain. These illnesses cause what these subjects could subjectively consider a bad or terrible quality
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of life. Because they are incurable, they do not offer any possibility for a return to a state of good health. We could mention the better-known and most frequent ones: Alzheimer's disease, cerebral arteriosclerosis, advanced lung emphysema, disseminated cancer, and AIDS. The subjects may end up considering that life is not worth living. That is their option. Many prefer to continue to live like this, but others do not want to do so. 2. Physical disability due to simple aging, without the presence of a serious chronic illness: advanced age, depending on the subjects' family situation, may become undignified. Just as in the first case, the subjects who can still maintain ethical and aesthetic goals regarding their living conditions may decide that life in such conditions is no longer worthwhile. That is their option. 3. Chronic mental disability: This point is controversial and delicate. There are mental pathologies that have incurable organic aspects. The great majority of these subjects does not know any other way of life and has adjusted to this confinement. These subjects do not want to die—on the contrary, they expect an illusory improvement. Subjects who have had full, affirmative, and extraordinary lives, however, feel otherwise. Their irreversibly damaged mental conditions condemn them to an undignified way of living, and they do not want to accept this kind of life anymore. In their moments of lucidity, they talk about their desire to die. The existing conflict between their values and the pathetic reality of their current life makes them think about the desire to die of their own free will. This radical suicidal act could be posited as a legitimate act. It is clear to me that this is not the argument of a symptomatic suicide, where the dialectic of the loss of self-love and the hate toward the other and toward oneself is present. On the contrary, these subjects can have an intense loving bond, with a full life, and the tragedy lies in their desire to be liberated from this incurable disability and to liberate their
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family from this unwanted condition. They generally have bonds of love with others who may and could agree with their argument of a dignified death, and who, despite the pain of the farewell and the loss of their beloved object, will respect the radical suicide's will. 4. Subjects who die for their ideals in a radical suicidal act: These subjects do not expect to receive praise. They have great sensitivity and are very much identified with the highest personal ideals, sometimes ideals of patriotism and of love of humanity. Due to their dissent with the absurdity and the loss of social values that prevail in society and their impotence to change this, they opt for a radical statement that they sustain with their own death. In this situation there is an act with a subject. I wonder if these heroes are actually heard after their act. To whom do they address their allegation? If Jesus of Nazareth was only a man, to whom did he address his last teaching, affirmed with his heroic death? Who listened to what Jesus actually said?
THE PURE, HEROIC SUICIDE I wish to state clearly that I respect any person's right to live or die. The absurd symptomatic suicidal act bears the ethics of hate and revenge. The heroic suicidal act bears the ethics of dying for an ideal and the aesthetics of knowing how to do it. When Yukio Mishima, through a carefully thought-out action, decides to make a final statement of his radical dissent with Japanese modern society and proceeds to carry out his suicidal act in the Japanese traditional honorable form, he is not suffering from a depressive state but exercising the right to express and to affirm his patriotic ideals up to the limit of his own death. The same is true in the case of the Buddhist monk who immolated himself in a ball of fire in Saigon, South Vietnam, in 1967. This monk made afinaland dramatic statement according to his own religious ideals and patriotism. I am not saying that I agree or disagree with any of these statements.
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What I want to express here is that I respect people's right to make the statement they see fit to make regarding their ideals, even at the cost of their life.
HEROIC ACT AND FUNDAMENTALIST ACT We must specify here the (very thin) boundary between the heroic patriot and the fanatic fundamentalist. I prefer to discriminate between them based on the act and not on the unconscious motivation, which I find very similar in both cases: 1. The heroic act shows a personal death: "I die for my ideals." 2. The fanatic fundamentalist act kills the other for the fanatic's own ideals: "I kill you for my ideals." I must insist that we find in both cases a dialectic of ideals and not of idolatry. When a figure who is celebrated among the young dies, suicidal ideas emerge. This was the case when Kurt Cobain, of the musical band Nirvana, died. Many adolescents called American radio stations with suicidal ideas and intentions. In this case we find that the suicidal desire of these youths stems from a simple identification with the dead hero. It is a case of idolatry: "I want to be like my hero." In the previous case of the dialectic of ideals, the psychic dynamics are very different. The suicide is saying, "I take myself seriously and I die for what I believe."
MASS SUICIDES We may find examples of mass suicides both in our own times and in history. I will only take two, one of each type—one symptomatic and one radical. I will begin with a mass suicide in the city of Los Angeles in August of 1997. A group of people of both sexes and different ages who called themselves "Heaven's Gate," carried out a collective suicide in their group's headquarters. The bodies
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were discovered days after their death, and each body was clean and well placed on its bed. What had happened there? Why did they commit suicide? According to the information in the press, I understand that this group was certain that the tail of Halley's comet (which was passing near the Earth during that week) would serve as a spaceship that would take them to other galaxies. Yet for this to happen they had to get rid of their bodies. Their bodies were conceived as a simple box that contained their spirits. To liberate their spirits and board the spaceship, they needed to eliminate their bodies. This mass suicide is thus based on an idea that bears a quality of certainty. In my view, it is a false idea, a delusion. Their intention is not to die but to live in another galaxy. It is a suicidal act without a subject, a psychotic acting out that produces a symptomatic mass suicide.
MASADA The other case of mass suicide is the radical and heroic suicide. I refer here to a mass suicidal act that happened approximately 1,930 years ago—the mass suicide of the Hebrew warriors (zealots) of Masada. This historical place, located on a high hill fifty kilometers south ofJerusalem, had been surrounded by the Romans. There was no possible escape. The attack on the Masada fortress up on the hill took two years. The warring zealots offered strong resistance even though they knew they were lost. Yet they resisted until the last day. They knew that when the Romans entered the fortress they would rape, humiliate, and slaughter them and enslave their wives and children, and therefore decided to die by their own sword. Using his eloquence and his charismatic presence, Eleazar the Zealot, commander of Masada, convinced his co-religionists to carry out a mass suicide. Flavius Josephus, a historian of the first century A.D., quotes Eleazar's harangue. Eleazar encourages his comrades to die before they become slaves, to die in a state of freedom.8 When the Roman troops finally entered the fortress, out of a thousand people they found only seven alive. The warriors of
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Masada died for their ideals. In a voluntary act, they decided to die by their own hand. It was a suicidal act with a subject, and, therefore, a radical mass suicide and a heroic act.
ENDNOTES 1. R6mulo Lander (1997), txica del Acto Suicida [Ethics of the Suicidal Act], op.cit. 2. See Chapter 18 (editors note). 3. See, for example, Jacques Lacan (1962-1963), LeS&ninaire. Livre X. VAngoisse [Anxiety], op. cit. 4. Jacques Lacan, Le Stminaire. Livre VIII. Le Transfert, 1960-1961 [Transference], op. cit., p. 147. 5. Sigmund Freud (1920), Beyond the Pleasure Principle, op. cit. 6. Melanie Klein (1932), The Psycho-Analysis of Children, op. cit.; and 1952, Some Theoretical Conclusions Regarding the Emotional Life of the Infant, op. cit. 7. See Chapter 18 (editor's note). 8. Flavius Josephus, The War of the Jews, translated by William Whiston. New York: E. P. Dutton, 1915, Book VII, Chapter 8.
20 The Logic of Borderline States
THE DIMENSION OF THEIR SPECIFICITY Borderline dysfunctions constitute an important diagnostic category included in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, fourth edition (DSM-IV). This category, originally introduced in the United States, was eventually integrated into the current European and Latin American terminology. In previous years both European and Latin American professionals refused to accept it, as we can see in the International Code of Diseases (ICD-10). According to the average use of this term in psychiatry, borderline refers to a dysfunction of the psyche located on the boundary between neuroses and psychoses. The DSM-IV establishes that it is a serious pathology that does not evolve toward either psychosis or neurosis. The manual acknowledges that borderline cases improve their functional capacity in the personal, familial, and labor realms with psychoanalytic psychotherapy, but the primal mental mechanisms that we may call "imaginary" stay intact. In psychoanalysis we see the problem of the borderline subjectfroma different vertex
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or viewpoint. Psychoanalytic theory establishes that psychic dysfunctions are first named or diagnosed and then understood in the dimension of their particularity. Thanks to the emergence of psychoanalytic theories, we can understand the hidden sense of our patients' symptoms, and following this path toward understanding we open up the way toward a cure by means of the word.
THE PROBLEM WITH THE BORDERLINE PARADIGM As I have already mentioned, for clinical psychiatry borderline dysfunctions are located between neurosis and psychosis. It is a serious pathology that evolves neither toward psychosis proper nor toward some benign type of neurosis. This paradigm poses a serious problem, namely, that from the point of view of psychoanalysis borderline pathology is conceived of as a neurotic structure, that is to say, as an unconscious psychic structure that is built through the mechanism of repression Freud originally designated as Verdrdngung. The psychotic structure, by contrast, is based on a different mechanism—that of the foreclosure of the Name-of-theFather, or Verwerfung. The perverse structure, in turn, rests on the mechanism of a particular kind of negation Freud designated as Verleugnung (disavowal) whereby the subject refuses to admit yet simultaneously admits, as a living paradox, the anatomical difference between the sexes.1 Regarding the type of unconscious psychic structure, we have pointed out that it is not possible for a subject to switch from one unconscious structure to another. These structures are constituted in early childhood and are permanent. Psychic changes that occur thanks to the therapeutic action of psychoanalysis constitute important transformations that modify and improve the quality of life of our analysands but take place within the boundaries of each particular structure. We thus find this borderline pathology in a neurotic structure in which imaginary mechanisms prevail that render borderline dysfunction a serious pathology. The difficulties
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and particularities of the psychic mechanisms I will describe next are common in our analytic practice with borderline cases.
INNER EMPTINESS: THE HOLE This feeling of emptiness refers to a sensation of having a hole inside the subject sometimes described as an existential void and sometimes as a physical hole—as an "indescribable" sensation in the chest. Subjects feel both a mental and a physical hole, and sometimes describe it as a distressing experience, as if, turning at night in bed, they would fall into an infinite black space. The fear of falling into an empty black space forces them to lie in bed motionless.2 This feeling of an inner hole decreases when the subject develops an attachment to a loved object. For this reason, borderline subjects develop a special type of object relation, with the prevalence of a fusional quality—a form of pathological attachment to the object. Psychoanalytic theory considers that the origin of this inner hole may lie in serious inadequacies and deficiencies resulting from the quality of the early mother-child relationship. We all know how significant the latter is—the subject (of the unconscious) is constituted thanks to the intensity of this dual relationship. The development of the child's early identifications with its mother (or caregiver) will give rise to the formation of a primal imaginary ego (moi). The texture of that early ego (moi) will be woven with the progressive introjections of gratifying and frustrating experiences. Deficiencies in these introjections and identifications due either to interference or inability in the container capacity (which depends on the maternal reverie function) or to a biological cognitive failure in the child will leave a hole effect in the texture of that primordial ego (moi). Every subject has an acceptable quota of deficiency in the maternal function and, therefore, an empty area or hole in the ego (moi) that corresponds to the imaginary ego. The magnitude of this hole or empty area will
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vary according to magnitude of the early experiences of frustration each subject undergoes.3
THE DEMAND FOR RECOGNITION AND THE NEED FOR AFFIRMATION The child usually receives a first recognition when the other transforms its cry into a message. In this way, when its basic need is satisfied, the child's scream acquires a meaning granted by the other. This dialectic of recognition has been designated as the child's "first affirmation," expressed as a sort of statement. The second affirmation occurs with the child's intense "no," and the third takes place in adolescence, with the transgression of the Law of the father. Those subjects who bear an imaginary deficiency have had difficulties with these early demands. Due to the extent of the inadequacy of their recognition by the other in their first affirmation and to the consequent magnitude of their inner hole, borderline cases will be very sensitive to the other's acknowledgment of their subjective perception of reality. As adolescents and adults, these subjects require the other's confirmation of such perception. When the other denies them this confirmation, borderline subjects unleash unexpected, involuntary, and intense affective states (agitation, anxiety, violence, or weeping). In clinical practice we observe unexpected affective states that seem not to have a justified cause. They correspond to what we call "unstable affects" and are triggered by a lack of recognition. It is important not to confuse this recognition mechanism with the need to be accepted we find in benign neurotics, who usually regulate their self-esteem to a large extent through the other's approval of their ideas and acts. The failure to gain this approval produces a certain degree of loss of self-confidence. This benign mechanism sometimes triggers states of sadness without depressive symptoms. As we have seen, the need the developing imaginary ego (moi) has for the other's recognition as a first affirmation refers to something else.4
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OBJECT RELATIONS Object relations in borderline cases are characterized by an exaggerated attachment to the object, an attachment that relieves the inner emptiness or hole. Thus, we observe a tendency to fuse with the object due to these subjects' poor subject/object discrimination capacity: whatever happens to them seems to happen to the object as well, and vice versa. This needy attachment explains the difficulties they experience at the moment of separationfromthe object. Unexpected separations may lead to the appearance of intense affective states such as anxiety, sadness, fear, panic, and sometimes serious difficulties in continuing with daily life activities. When the separation from the object presents the features of object loss—because of death, divorce, migration, and so on— borderline subjects show their inability to tolerate their inner emptiness or hole in the form of a mental collapse. Life itself seems to have lost meaning. A desire to die and suicidal ideas may appear. This effect of psychic breakdown as a consequence of object loss quickly disappears when another attachment object makes its presence felt.
THE DISCOURSE OF DOMINATION As I have already mentioned, borderline pathology arises as a consequence of the onset of an inner emptiness or hole in the texture of the imaginary ego (moi). The subject's excessive attachment to the object, which has as its goal the relief of his or her inner emptiness, produces an effect regarding the ways in which the other's discourse is subjectively imposed on the subject. Lacan expounded his theory of the four basic discourses in 1969, and among them he included the Master's discourse.5 Lacan describes it as a discourse uttered by the subject whose unconscious nature may only be revealed after its utterance. It is not voluntary but rather an effect of the unconscious on language. The subject, who speaks passively and unwittingly, situates himself or herself in the locus of the
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Master—the locus of Sx as master signifier. Through this kind of discourse, the subject attempts to impose his knowledge on the other. The Master's discourse has nothing to do with the discourse of domination. The discourse of domination refers to the effect that the word of the other has on the subject. The latter's attachment to the object is such that the word of the other acts as law. This attitude entails an illusion, that is to say, the subject's mistaken submission to the other. For the borderline subject, the other's simple opinion constitutes an order that must be obeyed. While this excessive attachment to the object persists, the subject cannot escape the discourse of domination. Analysts ought to take this phenomenon very seriously because it will affect the transference. The analytic interpretation that invites analysands to explore and discover on their own the signifiers hidden in the unconscious may become an order, a form of imposition. Analysands who develop a transference through this inescapable attachment to the object—in this case, the analyst—will be upset and annoyed with this subjective domination by the other. In these cases we may sometimes encounter the mechanism of "reversal of perspective" or may find ourselves facing an analytic impasse with an affective explosion. Another form of discourse of domination exists that I do not believe is present in the borderline subject (nor, therefore, in neurotic structures) but may be found in subjects with a psychotic structure. This stable, functioning psychotic structure has developed a sinthome [also called fourth ring or imaginary or symbolic supplement (suppUance) to the lack of the Name-of-the-Father] and therefore presents the functioning capacities of a neurotic structure without being one. Through this mechanism, subjects believe they are able to read the thoughts and desires of the other— they believe they know what the other is thinking and desiring. This grants certainty to their subjective reading of the other, and from then on they will be dominated by those alleged thoughts and desires. They feel enslaved by the other, who has not uttered a single word. I have observed this phenomenon several times, and it does not seem to unleash a psychotic episode. Yet if rejec-
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tion on the part of the analyst develops, then the mechanism of "reversal of perspective" will emerge but will be of short duration; the excessive attachment to the object remains intact. The analyst must take special care with this type of analysand at the moment of intervention. Experience teaches us that it is useful to provide an added capacity for silent containment—an expanded reverie function—and that we should give back to these analysands what they themselves have said, interpreting or pointing out a signifier with particular clarity.
THE SECOND SKIN In some serious cases of neurotic borderline subjects, the relationship with the object of attachment is interfered or blocked because of some difficulties in their capacity for introjection and identification. In these cases the mechanism of attachment and fusion with the object is not established. The subjects feel the different aspects of their ego (md) as if they lacked a uniting force that might hold them together. The development of this function of a certain something that unifies or contains these primal imaginary parts of the psyche depends on the child's early introjection of a container object. The best object to create this function is the nipple (or its substitute) inside the mouth, together with the mother who speaks, carries, feeds, cares for, and sings to the child. Maternal care gives rise to the constitution in the child's psyche of a psychic internal space for its introjections, identifications, and object relations. When this mechanism fails, psychic states of unintegration appear that are characteristic of the subject with borderline pathology. Esther Bick 6 was the first one to describe these psychic states. Later, Didier Anzieu7 expanded Bick's use of the skin metaphor. Wilfred Bion8 and Donald Winnicott9 have also referred to "integration/unintegration" (Winnicott) and "integration/disintegration" (Bion) states. Adult subjects who suffer from such states describe the intense moments of anxiety they experience in the solitude of the night, and the soothing feeling of the sheets tightly
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wrapping their bodies. It is as though these sheets (or a narrow jacket, or a very tight hug) could contain the fragmented aspects of their mind. Bick called this a second-skin mechanism.
ADHESIVE OR PARASITIC STATES These states were described independently by Jose Bleger10 and Herbert Rosenfeld,11 and expanded later by Donald Meltzer.12 They correspond to a psychic structure that seems to lack interiority, has no self/object discrimination capacity, and shows many difficulties and limitations in the use of introjection. This structure does not seem to have an internal psychic space in which to locate the necessary introjections that will allow the constitution of the psyche. It seems as if introjections could not find that internal space, and were therefore located on the surface of the psyche, becoming fragilely supported by the presence of the other. For this reason, these subjects' psychic integration is very vulnerable and their relationship with the object has no bounds. In their need for psychic survival, these subjects stick to the object in such a way and with such insistence that the ensuing relationship suggests an adhesive quality—just like sticking a stamp on an envelope. In clinical practice we may see the subject as a parasite of the object, obviously prior to a dependency stage. These patients attach fully to the object, and this may happen both with the analyst and with other significant objects. The object thus becomes responsible for the subjects' psychic life. The subjects sometimes perceive themselves as passive and with dead aspects in their psyche, and use the vitality and life force of the object of attachment as a source of psychic survival. Here a paradox arises: this attachment often produces a strong hostility toward the badly needed object. Hostility is due to the fact that the subjects perceive that life is outside of them, thus developing jealousy and envy toward the one who, according to their subjective (and projective) perception, is full of life. The great movie director Luis Bunuel states in Viridiana that men never forgive those who help them.
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Rosenfeld calls this structure an "omnipotent narcissistic" psychic structure, and Bleger had previously alluded to it as a parasitic "glischro-karyc"13 ambiguous structure. Both descriptions are based on the consequences of the subjects' impossibility for introjection early in life. These subjects have experienced the absence of a container object able to join the rudimentary fragments of their psyche and create the feeling of an internal psychic space due to a serious deficiency in the maternal reverie function. Such a deficiency is caused by serious difficulties in the maternal psyche and in the rudimentary mental apparatus of the newborn. (I am referring here to the presence in the child of organic problems and cognitive difficulties.) In any case, the consequences we may observe in our clinical practice are the following: floating anxiety, adhesive attachment to the object, intolerance to separation, and a feeling of having dead aspects in one's psyche.
SEXUAL LIFE Among the early difficulties that borderline subjects may experience are difficulties regarding their conviction as to their sexual identity. We all know that one's conviction about one's sexual identity is acquired early in life and usually becomes irreversible after the fifth year of life. Parental discourse assigns a sexual identity to the child when naming it as a boy (male) or a girl (female) according to the imperative of the parents' unconscious desire. In most cases, anatomical reality and parental desire fortunately coincide, and children recognize themselves as male or female. Later on sexual object-choice will take place. This unconscious and involuntarily chosen object will be the object of sexual desire, that is, the object that will satisfy the drive. In this way, when choosing the object of desire, the subject is guided toward a heterosexual, homosexual, or bisexual organization. This choice occurs during the period of the oedipal drama. The passionate, intense relationship (oedipal romance) that the litde boy or girl has with the parents is crucial for the definition of the type of sexual object choice.14
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The many difficulties borderline cases experience with their introjection mechanisms and introjective identification (and, therefore, with their bond with the object) enable us to foresee that we will encounter subjects with serious difficulties in establishing a stable sexual identity and developing a clear conviction regarding this identity. A similar difficulty will appear with their choice of a sexual object. Consequently, in these cases we will find that there is neither a conviction of the subjects' sexual identity, nor a clear sexual object choice. It is true that borderline subjects may enjoy the sexual act if certain conditions are fulfilled, and that they have the possibility of experiencing orgasm. However, their sexual performance will depend to a great extent on the other's sexual demand. Their feelings of being a man or a woman may vary according to the other's subjective demand, and their engaging in homosexual or heterosexual acts will hence depend on the demand of the other. That is why in our clinical practice with borderline cases we may find a so-called lability in their sexual orientation.
SYSTEM OF IDEALS We know that the subject's system of ideals will depend on the constitution of the psyche in relation to the early ideal ego and of the later ego ideal. This unconscious system of ideals and its conscious censors are formed according to each child's singularity. The first one, the ideal ego, whose matheme is i(a), corresponds to the imaginary order present during the mirror stage of the constitution of the subject. This early ideal ego bears a tyrannical, inflexible, and cruel nature, imposing its values and ideals. The Mosaic law of "all or nothing" and "an eye for an eye" applies here, without the consideration of attenuating factors. The later ego ideal, whose matheme is 1(A), is constituted during the oedipal stage, that is, the symbolic period in the constitution of the subject. Here the law of tolerance applies, with the presence of attenuating factors or worsening added difficulties in the application of values and ideals.
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Subjects will apply these laws of intolerance or tolerance to themselves in an automatic and unconscious way. They will be the first unconscious target of their own ideals and will then apply them to the world. Both systems of ideals are usually present in every subject. In the moments of greater integration of the psyche, they will operate with the system of the ego ideal, without cruelty and with a capacity for tolerance and understanding. In the critical moments of ego (moi) regression and of serious psychic conflict the early ideal ego mechanism will prevail, and subjects will be cruel and intolerant, suffering and being mortified by their own primal ideals and inescapably projecting them onto others. Freud used to refer to this process as the tolerance or intolerance of the narcissism of the small differences.15 Because of the above-mentioned difficulties with their early introjective mechanisms, borderline subjects experience problems in the progressive establishment of their system of ideals and, as a result, show a prevalence of the more primal system. In other words, they function with a predominance of the imaginary ideal ego or i(d) and hence present a tendency to be cruel and intolerant. Their values push them to insist on the search for an impossible ideal perfection, and they show primitive fundamentalist values in relation to the world. These mechanisms are automatic and unconscious and cause intense feelings of unconscious guilt, with great suffering. Such feelings, which are an effect of the ideal ego's search for relief, will give rise to intense desires for self-punishment. Relief comes from redemption and forgiveness, achieved by means of punishment or penance. To differentiate these feelings from the guilt feelings that originate in the ego ideal, we may say that the latter are relieved through the reparation of caused damages. Subjects with a borderline dysfunction suffer from intense guilt feelings due to the action of their cruel ideal ego, and they will seek relief in the practice of severe self-punishment. They may pursue the loss and destruction of their personal property, of their loved ones, or of their family and social network. At other times the feeling of unconscious guilt is so intense and cruel that it leads to the appearance of a desire for death, and these subjects may attempt
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to commit suicide. These borderline subjects experience an unnecessary and senseless suffering.
REVERSAL OF PERSPECTIVE Wilfred Bion introduced this concept in 1963 in his book Elements of Psycho-analysis.16 The subject sees things in his or her life in a certain way, such as the quality of his or her bonds to objects, but suddenly (involuntary and unexpectedly) he or she sees things from the opposite point of view, that is to say, he or she "reverts his or her perspective" on things. Bion states that "reversal of perspective" constitutes a special form of thinking that appears when the individual must avoid mental pain. This primal mechanism is located in what Bion calls the "psychotic part of the personality." We might also refer to this way of thinking as "the mind functioning with a prevalence of imaginary mechanisms." Bion especially refers to the psychic mechanism of stable horizontal splitting. One of the points of view of the subject would be split-off, dissociated, and then repressed in a more permanent way, and that is why Bion defines this process as "horizontal and stable." Reversal of perspective aims at achieving a new type of mental balance so as to decrease the subject's psychic pain. Bion illustrates this mechanism with a figure that shows the simultaneous presence of background and foreground. The figure consists of two silhouettes facing each other. At the same time, if we focus on the background, we see the same silhouettes forming an empty vase. Depending on where our focus is or which is our privileged area of attention, we see either the two faces facing each other or the vase. In other words, what we see depends on the perspective or point of view. Subjects with a borderline dysfunction frequently present the mechanism of reversal of perspective in a dramatic form. The analyst who was idealized, who was seen as the bearer of the secret of happiness, suddenly becomes a rejected, selfish, and evil person. Borderline subjects situate themselves in this new perspective and
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in some cases will not abandon it. Future events will be read in such a way that they will always confirm this point of view. The problem is that this new perspective is not always reversible. Borderline subjects cannot put themselves in the other's place. They maintain their own perspective with certainty, and hence the matter is closed—they have to protect themselves. Psychic events that precipitate a serious reversal of perspective are tied to the dialectic of anxiety and frustration borderline subjects experience due to the lack of confirmation on the other's part of their own subjective perception of reality. This dialectic of recognition, compounded with the presence of a discourse of domination, gives rise to frequent misunderstandings that leave no chance for reparation.
IMPULSE CONTROL The human subject has to tame his or her drives in order to be able to enter the civilized world. The infant has to give up its strong parricidal, matricidal, and fratricidal incestuous desires. The renunciation of these human desires (by way of repression) inaugurates the subject's entrance into neurosis, culture, and civilization. Nonetheless, such a renunciation unavoidably has an effect on the subject, namely, a feeling of discontent with regard to culture and civilization that we all experience when living in an organized and civilized world. Repression is the key mental mechanism that sustains neurosis. It is likely, therefore, that the mechanism of repression is necessary for a subject to overcome the early imaginary or specular stage and operate within the symbolic order. For this to happen, the mother must introduce the paternal metaphor (the paternal function) into the child's psyche. This means that the paternal function has been able to break the intense mother-child imaginary duality and has introduced the child into the new oedipal order—the bond of two becomes a bond of three. The symbolic register inaugurates this new order. The ego (tnoi) that emerges from this psychic operation is capable of sustaining repression in spite of the insistence of the drive and the intensity of desire, which
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constantly incite the subject to do the opposite. The new order leads to the success of repression. Subjects with a borderline dysfunction may have achieved the breaking of the intense mother-child duality, albeit with great difficulty because of the obstacles to the early introjection mechanisms. That is to say, borderline subjects have reached the Oedipus drama, yet with a prevalence of the imaginary mechanism (N/o). Even though they have achieved oedipal functioning capacities, the inadequacy of the maternal function of reverie has been too great. This deficiency has left an enormous constitutive hole that is irreparable. These subjects emerge from this psychic operation with a serious inadequacy in the mirror stage, an inadequacy that may make it difficult for the ego (moi) to maintain repression. The force present in the insistence of the drive subdues the ego (moi), and unacceptable behaviors appear in the personal, familial, and social orders. In phenomenological clinical practice we find poor impulse control. Desire and the (sexual and aggressive) drives encounter weakness in the forces of repression. Acts are often carried out that violate personal rules, family habits, and social laws and that are sometimes in conflict with the subjects' own values and ideals, thus giving rise to intense feelings of guilt.17
COMPULSIONS AND ADDICTIONS Borderline subjects will search for multiple ways to relieve the anxiety that originates in the ego (moi) and stems from the inner emptiness or hole. Attachment to the object is one successful mechanism and drug consumption constitutes another. This is a very successful recourse but is seriously damaging to the subject. When the hole that originated during the imaginary stage is very big, addiction is severe, and the subject relapses frequently unless we offer a substitute to fill the inner emptiness, such as a new religious attachment, a new love object, or a new professional participation in the therapeutic community. Addiction may be to any drug: alcohol, marihuana, cocaine, heroine, legal psychoactive
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drugs, and other types of drugs such as diuretics. These subjects are called hard addicts. We should point out here that not all drug consumption or addiction is due to borderline dysfunction. Another way to alleviate the anxiety caused by the inner emptiness or hole is through eating disorders such as bulimia or anorexia. Eating disorders in subjects with borderline dysfunction evince a more difficult recovery. As in the case of drug addicts, for these subjects to achieve recovery and avoid relapse a valid alternative to relieve their anxiety must be offered. Such an alternative is generally found in another, more benign symptom—attachment to an object, to a group, or to an institution. Yet as in the case of drug addiction, not all bulimic or anorexic subjects present borderline pathology. There may be yet another way to relieve the anxiety of the interior hole, and that is the onset of a compulsive sexual activity. Both men and women find in their compulsive sexuality a relief to their anxiety. The sexual act offers psychic intimacy and an extraordinary physical intensity to both bodies. The feeling of penetrating (of being inside the other's body) or of being penetrated and feeling the fullness of the vaginal hole during the sexual act, as well as the presence of the intense feeling of being desired, produces a relief to the inner hole and to the anxiety that derives from it. The knowledge these subjects have of the relief the sexual act offers, along with their intolerable anxiety and poor impulse control, explains their tendency to compulsive sexuality.
ENDNOTES 1. Jacques Lacan (1955-1956), The Seminar. Book III The Psychoses, 1955-1956, translated by Russell Grigg, with notes by Russell Grigg. London: Roudedge, 1993; 1962, Kant with Sade, translated byJames B. Swenson, Jr., October No. 51, Winter 1989, pp. 55-75. 2. Rdmulo Lander (1998), Dos Huecosy una Falta [Two Holes and One Lack], lecture presented at the Caracas Psychoanalytic Society. 3. Romulo Lander (1980), La Aparicidn del Espacio Psiquico Interno (The Appearance of the Internal Psychic Space]. Revista de Psicoandlisis (Asovep) 1:43,1984.
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4. R6mulo Lander (1993), La Constitution del Sujeto [The Constitution of The Subject]. Trdpicos, Revista de Psicoandlisis 3:43,1994; and 1986, Desarrollo Temprano de la Realidad [Early Development of Reality]. Revista de Psicoandlisis (Asovep) 3:7, 1988. 5. JacquesLacan (1969-1970),LeStminaire. LivreXVll. VEnversde la Psychanalyse [Psychoanalysis Upside-Down or the Other Side of Psychoanalysis], op. cit. 6. Esther Bick (1968), The Experience of the Skin in Early Object Relations, op. cit. 7. Didier Anzieu (1985), The Skin Ego, translated by Chris Turner. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1989. 8. Wilfred Bion (1963), Elements of Psycho-analysis, London: William Heinemann. 9. Donald Winnicott (1945), Primitive Emotional Development, in Through Paediatrics to Psychoanalysis, op. cit. 10. Jos£ Bleger (1967), Simbiosis y ambigUedad. Buenos Aires: Editorial Paidos. [Symbiosis and Ambiguity: The Psychoanalysis of Very Early Development. London: Free Association Books, 1990.] 11. Herbert Rosenfeld (1969), On the Treatment of Psychotic States by Psycho-Analysis: An Historical Approach. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis 50:615-631. 12. Donald Meltzer (1975), Adhesive Identification. Contemporary Psycho-Analysis 11:289-310. 13. This term comes from the Greek and may be translated as possessing an agglutinated nucleus (editor's note). 14. R6mulo Lander (1985), Destino de las Identifications en el Narcisismo y el Edipo [The Vicissitudes of Identifications in Narcissism and in the Oedipus Complex]. Revista de Psicoandlisis (Asovep) 2:69,1985. 15. See footnote 2 of the Preface. 16. Wilfred Bion (1963), Elements of Psycho-analysis, op. cit. 17. Romulo Lander (1997), Clinicadel odio [Clinical Manifestations of Hate]. Trdpicos, Revista de Psicoandlisis 4:43,1998.
21 The Logic of Psychoses
DIFFERENTIAL DIAGNOSIS From a clinical perspective, we must distinguish first between psychotic clinical manifestations of hysteria and those of schizophrenia. In its psychotic moment, hysteria may produce auditory and visual hallucinations and delusional thoughts as well. The analysand's personality prior to this moment and the triggering factors of the episode will help establish the difference between both. From a psychoanalytic viewpoint it is difficult to differentiate between a stabilized psychotic structure and a neurotic structure proper. This difficulty stems from the fact that prior to the psychotic crisis, the stabilized schizophrenic psychotic structure presents the appearance of a neurotic structure. To distinguish this stabilized psychotic disguised as a neurotic from the true neurotic structure is no easy task. Only if we know the theoretical differences well and are clear about the psychic mechanisms that correspond to what Lacan calls "psychotic structure" shall we be able to distinguish them clearly.
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PREAMBLE TO THE BORDERLINE DYSFUNCTION When there are deficiencies in the early mother-child bond such as flaws in the maternal reverie function or cognitive deficiencies in the newborn, a structural defect appears in the area of the Imaginary, on the left side of schema Lambda. This defect corresponds to an empty space or hole in that area. The texture of the imaginary ego (moi) is woven early on as an effect of the dual motherchild interaction. Lacan calls the defect in this texture "a hole in the Imaginary." If later on this subject has access to a triangular bond, it means that the previous dual intense mother-child relationship has been broken by the introduction of the paternal function, as happens with the inscription of the paternal metaphor. As a consequence of this psychic operation, the subject may gain access to a neurotic structure that will resort to repression to solve the oedipal drama. The subjects who possess this enormous hole in the imaginary area will constitute what in psychiatric diagnostic manuals are called borderline disorders. From a psychoanalytic structural point of view, the borderline structure is a neurotic structure that presents very alarming and severe symptoms. These cases are sometimes erroneously called pre-psychotic because of the severe nature of their symptoms, but the truth is that they do not evolve toward a schizophrenic psychosis because their structure is neurotic.
THE FORECLOSURE OF THE NAME-OF-THE-FATHER This type of foreclosure or Verwerfung corresponds to a psychic mechanism that involves the failure to inscribe the paternal signifier, that is, its foreclosure. Lacan affirms that it is the mother or caregiver who instates the paternal metaphor in the child. In order for the mother or caregiver to do this, she must have inscribed a triangular psychic structure in her own mind. If the mother's psychic structure is dual (dyadic), she will not be able to introduce or instate the paternal metaphor in her child's psyche. This metaphorical
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encounter with the paternal signifier may happen regardless of the presence of a flesh-and-blood father, what will allow the inscription is the triangular or triadic maternal psychic structure. In some cases the child inscribes the Name-of-the-Father thanks to the presence of another triangular maternal substitute figure. In other cases, the father's psyche is dual (dyadic), and it replaces the mother in the topological maternal place. When the paternal metaphor is foreclosed, we find a psychic structure with two holes, one in the Imaginary and another in the Symbolic.1
SCHEMA I Lacan introduced this graph in 1957 in his essay "On a Question Prior to Any Possible Treatment of Psychosis."2 It constitutes a modification of the earlier schema Lambda and it shows two empty areas or holes, one located in the imaginary area (to the left), and the other in the symbolic area (to the right). The first hole corresponds to the castration hole in the imaginary order. The second hole is caused by the foreclosure of the Name-of-the-Father, and appears in the area of the symbolic order. These holes are irreparable, but it is possible to plug them up momentarily with a special symptom construed by the unconscious that will work as a prosthesis or supplement.3
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THE AFFIRMATION, OR BEJAHUNG Bejahung is the term Freud used to describe an early mechanism that precedes any possible negation.4 Lacan takes Freud's term to designate an initial act of affirmation that occurs when the child, with its cry, finds the world (and vice versa), and the other transforms this cry into a message. It is when this cry is understood as a message and the child is assisted in its primal need that the child has produced the first affirmation or Bejahung. With this first affirmation the child inscribes the signifier, and its psychic life is inaugurated in the imaginary order. Later on, during its second year of life, the child will produce a second affirmation (the second Bejahung), which expresses its opposition to the other through repeated "noes." This "no" constitutes an affirmation for the subject, and it appears when the latter can discriminate between himself or herself and the other. This second affirmation (Bejahung) is very important because it rescues the child (and the mother) from the dual or dyadic maternal entrapment. The triangular or triadic bond becomes possible only when the signifier of the Name-of-theFather has been inscribed and the subject has been initiated in the neurotic structure. If this does not happen at an early stage—at what we might call the right moment in the constitution of the subject— it will not be possible for the child to inscribe the Name-of-theFather. The structure, with its corresponding foreclosure, will not change into another structure—this symbolic hole will remain forever. The third affirmation occurs when the subject resorts to the passage to the act or enactment to affirm the truth of his or her arguments (his or her perception and understanding of the world). It corresponds to an act of rebelliousness against the Law of the Father. This is a third way for the subject to achieve the important affirmation or Bejahung. Sometime during adolescence the subject has to defy and transgress the Law of the Father in order to achieve autonomy. Prior to this moment, the subject acquired knowledge not only through the awareness of experience but also through the other's acknowledgment of the subject's experience. The third
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affirmation will relieve the subject from the tyranny of such a need for recognition on the part of the I (je).
ELEMENTARY PHENOMENA These phenomena correspond to a kind of schizophrenic mark. I am referring here to the minimum clinical phenomena that characterize the schizophrenic psychotic structure and that may be detected in interviews with stabilized schizophrenics (who have not suffered a breakdown, prior to a crisis). They are difficult but not impossible to identify, their detection requiring a special clinical ability. At least six types of such elementary phenomena have been described: (a) the push toward the other sex (which Lacan originally called the push-to-the-woman),5 (b) the absence of the shifter, (c) the other as Master (as a "thing-in-itself"), (d) genitality without a subject, (e) the sea of jouissance, and (f) ambiguity in the subject's sexual object-choice.
The Push Toward the Other Sex Subjects with a stabilized schizophrenic psychotic structure will experience difficulties in establishing their sexual identity. We already know that human sexual identity is precocious. The subject acquires it early in life, learning it through identification with the parents' discourse—the parents will name the child in its sexual gender. This acquired sexual identity carries conviction and certainty and becomes irreversible after a certain period of time— approximately during the fifth year of life. Stabilized psychotic subjects experience difficulties with this certainty and present ambiguity in their sexual identity. Male subjects sometimes express the feeling that parts of their body are those of a woman's body. It is not a transsexual problem: they know and accept their given sex, but they believe they bear physical features of the opposite sex. This is observable in the clinical picture of stabilized psychotics who seem
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to be neurotic. An analysand of mine, a stabilized psychotic (a productive professional), affirmed that when he walked, the back of his body (which he could not see) was certainly the back of a woman. Through supervision, I knew of another analysand who was convinced that he ran like a girl, and that he could not avoid it. This phenomenon has to be carefully evaluated without reaching hasty conclusions, since these may lead to error. Particularly if one suspects a stabilized psychotic structure, one should carefully validate such a suspicion.
The Absence of Shifters Lacan borrowed the concept of shifter from the Russian linguist Roman Jackobson, who used it to designate a syntactic function. Lacan borrowed it freely to refer to a difficulty in the production of speech in the psychotic schizophrenic structure.6 I understand and use the shifter concept in psychoanalysis as follows: the shifter is an ability of the I (je) to slip the signifier (through metonymy) in the relationship with the other (of the unconscious). It refers to the subjects* capacity to resort to metonymy in their speech, to "slip the signifier." The presence of the shifter will allow neurotic subjects, as a neurotic structure, to develop the ability to joke, to hesitate when speaking, to free themselves from the discourse of the other, and to lie. The absence of the shifter in a psychotic structure introduces rigidity in the subject's speech, with scarce or null flexibility. Clinically, these subjects show a marked difficulty to relate to others and, therefore, to establish a social network. This absence of the shifter constitutes another "elementary phenomenon," in Lacan's terms, of the psychotic structure. Lacan would say that subjects with psychotic structures are unable to lie. Such inability hinders their social interaction, because they cannot make use of common social hypocrisy. To lie, the subject needs the shifter in order to slip the signifier. What characterizes neurotics is precisely their capacity to lie.
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The rigidity of speech found in subjects in whom the shifter is absent has nothing to do with the rigidity of thought that characterizes obsessive ideas. I have called this absence of the shifter the mark of the stabilized schizophrenic. The presence or absence of the shifter is not easy to detect in an interview. It emerges in the subjects' spontaneous description of their relationship with the other, a relationship where there is usually a "discourse of domination" of the other (of the unconscious). An analysand of mine who was a stabilized psychotic experienced enormous difficulties in requesting a cup of coffee in the presence of a large group of customers at the coffee shop where he used to go. Amid so much competition, he would try to order but could not find the right time to do so. After a long wait, he would finally get very upset and react inappropriately, screaming and angrily demanding his coffee. Another analysand would go out on a date with a woman and would not know where to stand when walking with her on the street. He experienced anxiety regarding whether he should walk on her right or on her left, behind her or ahead of her, and his anxiety was very intense.
The Other as Master (as a Thing-in-Itself) This special difficulty to slip the signifier—to use metonymy in language—leads to the tyranny of the other (of the unconscious). Subjects with a psychotic structure relate to the other (of the unconscious) in speech in such a rigid way that they cannotfindalternatives to facilitate the forging of social bonds. They perceive the other as their Master, and are thus caught in a tyrannical speech, or rather, a "discourse of domination." As I explained earlier,7 this bond with the object as Master is different from the "Master's discourse" that Lacan described as one of his classic "four discourses" in 1969.8 In the Master's discourse the subject produces a discourse that is qualified a posteriori, through the logic of language, as a Master's discourse produced by the subject himself or herself. The
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difference is that in the psychotic structure, the other is the Master, the tyrant. The other is perceived as the "thing-in-itself," and, therefore, as a master and tyrant. This type of discourse often instates a tyrannical bond in the transference (whereby the analyst is perceived as an inflexible ruler) that may cause a psychoanalytic impasse.
Genitality Without a Subject The sexual organization of the psychotic structure is precarious. As we already know, sexual identity in these cases is fragile, and there is a push toward the opposite sex whereby subjects believe they have physical features of the other sex. Sexual object-choice may also be fragile, which produces a certain ambiguity in the sexual object capable of provoking arousal. These subjects' difficulties in their relationship with the other within language will hinder love relationships, which are generally unidirectional and autistic. In this psychotic structure there is a capacity for acceptable sexual performance with orgasm. However, these subjects live the subjective sexual experience as a robotic experience. Their sexual partner also reports having had a strange sexual experience (like having sex with a robot). It is difficult for psychotics to maintain a romance, a loving relationship with the other. In fact, as a consequence of these obstacles and because of the absence of the shifter capacity, the men's sexual life consists of occasional encounters with prostitutes with a robotic orgasmic sexuality.
The Sea of Jouissance Jouissance is a concept introduced by Lacan that refers to a necessary amount of suffering present in the subject and located beyond pleasure. Its function is to maintain psychic balance. This idea has nothing to do with Freudian masochism.9 We know that the subject will be constituted in the locus of the Other and will bear a
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constitutive lack. These subjects will not be able to avoid the need for a certain amount of jouissance throughout their life whose purpose is to maintain psychic stability. Lacan called it jouissance inspired by Freud's Beyond the Pleasure Principle.10 The psychotic structure, with all its constituting deficits and insufficiencies, needs a much larger amount of jouissance to maintain its homeostasis or psychic balance. Lacan called such an increment "the sea of jouissance"11
Ambiguity in Sexual Object-Choice As we have already seen, subjects with a psychotic structure show serious difficulty in their capacity to establish a sexual identity characterized by both stability and conviction, and will experience as much difficulty in their sexual object choice. These subjects do enjoy sex and may reach orgasm, provided that certain conditions are fulfilled. We find here that the capacity for sexual enjoyment follows a case-by-case rule. However, their sexual life will depend on the other's demand. Their feelings of being a man or a woman may vary according to such a demand, as happens with their homosexual or heterosexual behavior. In our clinical practice we will, therefore, find ambiguity in these subjects' sexual life and sexual desire.
PSYCHOTIC PRODUCTION When subjects with a psychotic structure lose their stability, symptoms typical of a schizophrenic psychosis will appear. Serious dysfunctions will materialize both in the field of perception (with the appearance of hallucinations) and in the thought processes (with the appearance of delusions). Hallucinations represent a return of the Real, that is, the return of the signifiers that the psychotic subject cannot symbolize. Delusions are healing processes—also called "restitution symptoms"—that aim at relieving the anxiety produced
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by psychic collapse. In Seminar 23, Lacan asserts that in the psychotic breakdown the three orders (RSI), represented as three rings held together by the Borromean quality of the knot, have come unfastened.12 As a consequence, the functioning mind collapses. Delusions aim at mending the knot and holding the rings together. In this way, we may see them as an imaginary prosthesis, also called imaginary supplement (suppUance), fourth ring, or symptom-clamp.13
THE OUTSIDE OF DISCOURSE Delusions are a language located outside of discourse where the letter may be taken for the thing-in-itself. In this case, the anxiety of the "outside of speech" decreases with the appearance of the delusional metaphor. Delusions, characterized by their certainty and conviction, represent an attempt at the restitution of the "outside of discourse" and to achieve psychic stability.
TWO TYPES OF SUPPLEMENT (SUPPLEANCE) OR PROSTHESIS The notion of supplement (suppkance) or prosthesis refers to a psychic production, a construct under the form of a symptom that seeks to hold together the three Borromean rings (RSI) and thus preserve psychic functioning. In the imaginary order, this prosthesis consists of fundamentalist beliefs that serve as a symptomclamp or fourth ring between the imaginary and the symbolic orders. We call it imaginary prosthesis. This imaginary prosthesis maintains the word within the structure of language. The delusional construction, which is located between the symbolic and the imaginary orders, with its corresponding certainty, will function as a supplement (suppUance) or prosthesis, and we call it the delusional metaphor. Those symptoms that have a compulsory quality—for instance, bulimia, anorexia, and drug abuse—may exercise the func-
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tion of a supplement (suppUance) or fourth ring. That is why we must be cautious when working analytically with patients who conceal a psychotic structure. If through the therapeutic action of psychoanalysis the supplement (suppUance) or prosthesis is undone or, we might say, the symptom-clamp is cured, we will release the three rings and precipitate a schizophrenic psychotic breakdown.
THE TRIGGERING OF THE PSYCHOTIC BREAKDOWN Anxiety crises in a stabilized psychotic do not represent a risk of breakdown. It is sometimes difficult to specify the factors that trigger a psychotic breakdown. There are at least two main ones: (a) the sensitivity to rejection characteristic of the psychotic structure, and (b) the impossibility to occupy the locus of the father within the symbolic order. In his psychiatry thesis, written in 1932, Lacan studied episodes of paranoia unleashed by feelings of guilt.14 We need to establish here the difference between a psychotic structure and a lucid paranoia. Lucid paranoia is not, and does not correspond with, a schizophrenic psychotic structure. The subject who develops a lucid paranoia has inscribed something in the locus of the Nameof-the-Father. Sometimes these cases have something inscribed in the locus of the father, and sometimes they have a double inscription of the maternal function. The father is inscribed in terms of the mother, reinforcing the mother-child duality, and thus the child's entrapment.
Intolerance of Rejection Neurotics experience difficulty in tolerating the frustration of their desire. Psychotics, in turn, experience difficulty in accepting or tolerating any form of social rejection coming from the other. Psychotics equate or blend the Other (of the unconscious) with the other (of the social order). The experience of social rejection
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implies that the (social) phallic other leaves the psychotic in a void. Rejection may be direct or indirect, explicit or implicit. Psychotic subjects evince a particular sensitivity to acceptance and rejection. Anxiety provoked by being in a void may produce or unleash a schizophrenic psychotic breakdown.
Occupying the Locus of the Father Neurotics yearn to be able to occupy the locus of the father; that is, they yearn for their recently acquired symbolic phallus—their fear and insecurities will always be associated to its loss. At the same time, we know that no one has the phallus, since it is an illusion. We say that the illusion of the phallus circulates among both women and men. For the stabilized psychotic subject, occupying a phallic locus in his or her social network becomes intolerable. Since the paternal metaphor has been foreclosed and psychotic subjects do not have a paternal space in their mind, they cannot occupy such a space in the social network. Anxiety is so great that it dismantles any imaginary supplement (suppUance) or prosthesis that may have been instated before the psychotic crisis. We should remember here that Schreber begins his schizophrenic psychotic episode when he is promoted to the presidency of the senate of a court of appeal, that is to say, when he ascends to the locus of the father in the social fabric, a situation that becomes intolerable.
THE DIRECTION OF THE CURE The unconscious structure cannot change from one type to another. It is not possible to think that a neurotic structure will become a perverse or a psychotic structure or vice versa. The direction of the cure in psychoanalysis, therefore, lies in achieving psychic changes within a given structure. As I have mentioned earlier,15 Wilfred Bion asserts that the goal of analysis is uto be what you are," while Lacan states that it is "to act in conformity with desire." Both are saying
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the same thing. Subjects with a psychotic structure cannot escape their own structure. They may only aspire to stabilization (also called psychotic compensation) and to achieve an appearance of neurotic functioning. Consequently, the direction of the cure lies in helping these subjects restore an imaginary prosthesis (or supplement) and reach a new stabilization. The analyst's strategy in these cases that, in his or her view, have a psychotic structure is to interpret in the transference as litde as possible, because these patients may feel accused, or worse, rejected. It is also necessary to be very attentive to these patients' need for the reconfirmation of their perceptions of reality as affirmations (as statements), a reconfirmation that will help them achieve stability. There are essential or basic things the patients are trying to say that we should confirm. For example, when we say to them, "You are telling me that you are very upset with your mother," in a way we are confirming their own saying.
ENDNOTES 1. Jacques Lacan (1955-1956), The Seminar. Book HI. The Psychoses, 1955-1956, op. cit. 2. Jacques Lacan (1957-1958), On a Question Prior to Any Possible Treatment of Psychosis, op. cit., p. 202. 3. Jacques Lacan (1957-1958), On a Question Prior to Any Possible Treatment of Psychosis, op. cit. 4. Sigmund Freud (1925), Negation. Standard Edition 19:235 (editor's note). 5. Jacques Lacan (1955-1956), The Seminar. Book III The Psychoses, 1955-1956, op. cit.; 1957-1958, On a Question Prior to Any Possible Treatment of Psychosis, op. cit. 6. Jacques Lacan (1955-1956), The Seminar. Book III. The Psychoses, op. cit; and On a Question Prior to Any Possible Treatment of Psychosis, op. cit. 7. See Chapter 20 (editor's note). 8. Jacques Lacan (1969-1970), LeStminaire. LivreXVIL UEnvers de la Psychanalyse [Psychoanalysis Upside-Down or the Other Side of Psychoanalysis], op. cit.
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9. See Chapter 10 for a definition of masochism and a comparison with jouissance (editor's note). 10. Sigmund Freud (1920), Beyond the Pleasure Principle, op. cit. 11. Jacques Lacan (1955-1956), The Seminar. Book III. The Psychoses, 1955-1956, op. cit. 12. Jacques Lacan (1975-1976), Le Seminaire. Livre XXIIL Le Sinthomef 1975-1976, op.cit. 13. See Chapter 12 (editor's note). 14. Jacques Lacan (1932), De la Psychose Paranoiaque dans ses Rapports avec la Personality [On paranoid psychosis and its relationship with personality]. Paris: Seuil, 1975. 15. See Chapter 12 (editor's note).
22 The Logic of Perversion
THE PSYCHOANALYTIC VIEWPOINT In psychoanalysis, the concept of perversion refers specifically to the subject's sexual life. The disturbing question of "who is" and "who is not" a pervert inevitably leads us to differentiate the psychiatric from the psychoanalytic viewpoint. We may ask: Is any subject who performs a perverse sexual act a pervert, or is a pervert rather the subject organized according to a perverse unconscious structure? How can we distinguish one from the other when both subjects carry out perverse acts? That said, we may present Lacan's ideas, which sought to bring the psychoanalytic concept of perversion up to date.
WHAT IS A PERVERSE ACT? This question may be answered from two different vertices. From the phenomenological vertex, the answer is a clinical description
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of the sexual act and its characteristics. This approach corresponds to the perspective of clinical psychiatry rather than to a psychoanalytic perspective, for it is based on the observable sexual act and on inferences based on the characteristics of this act. The second vertex is fundamentally psychoanalytic and refers to nonobservable phenomena such as the subjects' unconscious motivation, in other words, to the way in which sexual desire is organized and how the subjects present it in their demand. It also corresponds to the dialectic of phallic jouissance, to the logic of the loci, and to the conditions for the subjects' access to sexual pleasure, and it pertains to a structural psychoanalytic position. We will begin by defining and expanding on these two vertices.
THE VERTEX OF PHENOMENOLOGICAL CLINICAL DESCRIPTION This type of description rests on observable phenomena. Freud's first approach to the topic of perversion appears in 1905 in his famous "Three Essays on a Theory of Sexuality."1 In the first essay, titled "The Sexual Aberrations," Freud initially focuses on the problem of perversion following the phenomenological viewpoint. He describes sexual deviations as a consequence of a change in the sexual object and in the aim of the drives. This text is extraordinary in the richness of its psychoanalytic observations, yet the structure of the clinical presentation and the classification of the ideas Freud proposes in this first essay are phenomenological. The publication of this study was not without consequences. For example, Otto Fenichel, who introduced his encyclopedic clinical vision of psychoanalysis in 1945, presented his ideas from such a phenomenological viewpoint.2 When taking this approach, ideas appear as conclusive and final, unlike the enigmatic and mysterious analytic perspective, which allows for the advent of unexpected theories. If a topic is not closed, you can research it further. The truth is that in psychoanalysis nothing is closed or conclusive. Freud said it
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explicitly: Psychoanalysis was, and is, in constant evolution. If the difference between perverse structure and perverse act had no clinical consequences, we would not need to approach the perverse act with caution. The most important problem arising from the phenomenological vertex is that it renders the differentiation between a perverse act and a perverse structure impossible. I am referring here to the difference between a perverse act carried out by a neurotic structure and a perverse act carried out by a truly perverse structure. From the point of view of the sexual act, both acts are very similar. Let us take the example of the subject as voyeur, or of voyeurism features.
Neurotic Structure Let us start with men who have a neurotic structure and gain access to phallic jouissance by observing other people's intercourse. We are referring here to the sexual fantasme of the obsessive, which privileges iht jouissance of the gaze in the primal scene. This subject can achieve jouissance as a voyeur, attending live erotic theaters, watching explicit pornographic videos, or engaging in group sex. In the case of neurotics, this voyeuristic sexual arousal is part of the beginning of a sexual relationship with their partners. Sexual arousal would increase pleasure during an intercourse with penetration and full sexual satisfaction. This type of voyeuristic sexual activity is frequent among neurotic men with a phallic obsessive structure. Neurotic women with a hysterical nonphallic structure will not enjoy this voyeuristic activity, as their sexual/antasme is different. Their arousal is played out in subdety—in their ability to show and hide the object of sexual desire and mainly in provoking the other's desire. It is important for them to be attractive and to be able to give satisfaction to the man they love in an intercourse with penetration. The most common/antosme found in these subjects is a sexual act where a woman is so powerful that she has elicited sexual desire in two or three men at the same time during intercourse.
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Perverse Structure The subjects structured as perverse, by contrast, develop a totally different kind of voyeuristic act. Their voyeurism is their only access to a sexual life, and that is why we say that they are trapped in it. They do not have access to intercourse with penetration, and orgasm (or so-called organ pleasure) is achieved through masturbation. Their sexual organization is different—it is rigid and petrified in its erotic protocol. In neurotic and perverse structures the sexual act is similar and voyeuristic, but the subjects are very different. The clinical phenomenological approach cannot differentiate between them, yet this approach is important nonetheless, for it is necessary to support psychoanalytic theory. It is useful and necessary to go from one perspective to the other and back to confirm much of the psychoanalytic hypotheses and theories.
THE VERTEX OF PSYCHOANALYTIC CLINICAL PRACTICE This corresponds to the logic of the invisible. Conjectures within this vertex are based on phenomenological observations. When looking for the hidden sense and the unconscious motivation of the subject's behavior, psychoanalytic clinical practice becomes a theory. Psychoanalysts work and produce statements based on their understanding of what is happening, that is, on the invisibility of the latent cause of the symptoms. They cannot avoid working from the perspective of their own theory. Faced with the scene of a voyeur who watches through a window a woman getting undressed, the analyst wonders about what is happening in the mind of the subject who looks. Neurotic and perverse voyeurs are not the same. Both carry out perverse acts, for they both aim at veiling castration and, through this psychic mechanism, avoiding the intolerable anxiety associated to it. The subject's clinical structure, however, differs in each case. The perverse voyeur could not bear to be physically close to the other—he or she would lose his or her
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sexual arousal when confronted with the return of castration anxiety. Also, this subject has no access to intercourse. Let us recall for a moment Monsieur Hire's drama in Georges Simenon's novel.3 Monsieur Hire develops a full voyeuristic erotic relationship with Alice, his twenty-year-old neighbor, through a window. There is a scene in the novel where Alice, fully aware of being observed and of her enjoyment and jouissance in her exhibitionist role, decides to visit Monsieur Hire in his apartment. Monsieur Hire is surprised and terrified. She comes closer and gracefully offers herself to him, suggesting an erotic love encounter. Monsieur Hire rejects her drastically: he can neither touch her nor be touched by her. When Alice leaves his apartment, the protagonist gets sexually aroused in her absence with the remaining scent left in the place where Alice had sat down. This erotic protocol is a sample of Monsieur Hire's sexuality, organized like a perverse structure. He has no access to intercourse and his petrified phallic jouissance is reached and wasted away in the jouissance of the gaze. Alice, in the locus of the exhibitionist, shows her sexuality organized like a neurotic structure. She becomes aroused when being looked at, but she pursues a love encounter and the possibility of intercourse. In this example we have a vignette of two subjects, one with a voyeur clinical picture, and the other with an exhibitionistic one. Yet one is truly perverse and the other is a neurotic. We should remember that neurotics have a/antasme, and as we know, the fantasme is always sexual and perverse in nature. This/antasme can be acted out, producing a sexual act that is similar to the truly perverse act. Then how do we differentiate them? The difference lies neither in the act nor in the sexual object choice, but in the nature of the dialectic of desire and jouissance.
THE MEANING OF THE PERVERSE ACT IN THE PERVERSIONS T^ie goal of the perverse act is to veil castration. In the case of the Subject of perversion, the perverse act is his or her only access to
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the enjoyment of sex. This enactment is coded and rigid, almost like a contract between parties whereby each subject has a role to play. The perverse subjects invert the loci, that is to say, they have first to succeed in situating themselves (in fiction) as the object of the other's desire, and then to emerge as a subject in the locus of the other, which is the place of the object. In the locus of the other, which has been inverted and is now the locus of the subject, is where orgasm (organ pleasure) will take place. This will drive the subject to become a being of "pure pleasure." We can see how the perverse subject inverts the loci of the neurotic fantasme. Two logical consequences result from this mechanism. First, subjects with a perverse structure have the certainty that they—as a phallic subject—have been placed in the locus of the other (inversion of loci). There, in the new locus, is the object of the other's desire, which has been placed in the locus of the subject. This inversion of loci and the conviction that it carries introduce an element of madness in the protocol of the perverse structure. Second, these subjects' organ pleasure will appear in the locus of the other. Their orgasm is thus rather the orgasm of the other. For this reason, Lacan states that the pervert reaches jouissance in the locus of the other while the neurotic does so through the other's jouissance* Perverts develop a massive projective identification with the other. They believe they are the other, and it is in that locus that their phallic sexual pleasure will emerge. To achieve this goal, the setting of the scene of the sexual act must be rigidly coded. For this reason, we say that the scene is petrified. It is an erotic libretto whose script, costumes, props, staging, and role playing are rigidly organized in advance by the fantasme of the perverse structure. Not only is everything there but it is defined in a very precise way, so that the unexpected can have no place in it.
A STREET EXHIBITIONIST Let us take the example of a street exhibitionist, the man who exhibits his erect penis to a girl. These cases may bear neurotic, psychotic,
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or perverse structures. We will only consider here the case of the pervert. This man has access to his sexuality solely through the exhibition of his genitals and through masturbation. He needs the girl's eye that will look at his genitals. It is only through the girl's gaze— not her eyes, but her gaze at his genitals—that the reversal of loci will happen. If the girl turns around and does not look at the pervert's genitals, the perverse scene will collapse. The girl's gaze is hence fundamental. This perverse subject is convinced that the girl desires his genitals and he also believes that she will become sexually aroused by looking at them. This is the element of madness in him, namely, his conviction that the girl, who is for the moment in the locus of the other, desires him while he is in the locus of the sexual object. It is in the gaze where the perverse subject identifies with the girl—he inverts the loci so that the girl becomes him and he becomes the girl. The girl's supposed phallic pleasure is his pleasure. He masturbates and reaches orgasmic fullness. This subject believes he knows all about pleasure. He stages the scene as he pleases and forces the other to play her part. For this reason, Lacan affirms that the pervert bears the "will-tojouissance" (yolontt-de-jouissance) of the fictitious subjective other.5 As we can see, this is a rigid erotic protocol that is forced on the other, and it is the pervert's only access to sexual life. This behavior is very different from that of neurotics, for whom uncertainty and doubt are the rule. Since the subjects of perversion are not marked by castration, they cannot enter the dialectic of love, evidencing a wplea for love." Because neurotics are marked by castration, their suffering will always be caused by their doubt concerning whether they are loved by the other and by their unfulfilled demand for happiness.
A CELEBRATED MASOCHIST Let us take the example of a famous masochist, the nineteenthcentury aristocrat Leopold von Sacher-Masoch. In his novel Venus in Furs,6 Sacher-Masoch narrates the story of Wanda and Severin.
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Severin, who is a perverse masochist and not a simple neurotic like the Marquis de Sade, writes a letter-agreement to Wanda. There he states that, starting from that date, he swears on his honor that he will become her slave. He establishes his obligations, which are to satisfy all of Wanda's desires and to fully submit to her. At the same time, Wanda has the right to hit him and mistreat him at will, and even kill him. Being a perverse masochist, Severin is unable to consummate the sexual act through masturbation unless he is hit and humiliated by Wanda. This "furred Venus" is his perverse and necessary partenaire.
A TRUE MASOCHIST The three interviews with an amazing case that the French analyst Michel de M'Uzan presents in his book Del Arte a la Muerte (From Art to Death) in the chapter on perverse masochism illustrate the reversal of loci and the enigma of the pleasure of pain.7 This perverse masochistic man, whom we will call Monsieur M., finds his male perverse partenaires through a contract, that is, he pays them for a special sexual act. The masculine prostitutes he hires must follow a rigid script he presents to them. Following the script, the paid lover engages in a brutal verbal humiliation of Monsieur M. (the presence of the voice), and then starts to introduce physical pain. In this case, the masochistic act is accompanied by mutilations: the amputation of Monsieur M.'s little toe and nipples, needles of old record players stuck in his testicles, and so on. Everything is carried out under the orders of the perverse masochistic subject—Monsieur M. In the encounter with a sadist, masochists believe they are the object of the sadist's desire; this is their element of madness. We must remember that the perverse structure is the phallus, whereas neurotics doubt whether or not they have the phallus. The perverse structure inverts the loci through identification and its phallic jouissance will emerge in the locus of the other. The voice plays a very important role in this sadomasochistic scene—it is as important to this
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scene as the gaze is to the exhibitionist-voyeur scene. Masochists will request more pain from the sadist—we also find here the presence of a voice. Masochists believe that the sadist enjoys inflicting pain. According to Monsieur M.'s testimony, pain hurts him; it is not pleasurable. Masochists believe with full certainty that they are giving pleasure to the sadist. That is why they request more pain—another element of madness. For masochists, organ pleasure emerges in the sadist's locus. In other words, through their identification with the sadist masochists achieve their orgasm through masturbation. Immediately after their climax, masochists experience an awful pain. The will-to-jouissance (volont£-de-jouissance) of the perverse subject is in the locus of the other. In pain and humiliated, masochists always and repeatedly ask for more. It is the sadist who retreats, who backs down before excess may cause death or very serious damage. The meaning of the perverse act for the subject of perversion lies in the fact that this is the only way for him or her to have access to his or her sexual life. Perverse subjects achieve sexual satisfaction through their personal erotic protocol.
THE MEANING OF THE PERVERSE ACT IN NEUROSES The neurotic perverse act is nothing more than the enactment of the neurotic's fantasme. The meaning of the perverse act in neurotics is connected to the dialectic of anxiety. It is very different from the meaning of this act in the perverse subject, which is linked to the dialectic of the will-to-jouissance (volonte-de-jouissance).
THE FANTASME We know that the fantasme is of a sexual nature and that it is always perverse because it aims to veil castration. Lacan took the concept of the fantasme from Freud, who in 1895, in his work on hysteria, affirmed that human beings—and especially hysterics—
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repress their sexual fantasies because moral censorship offers them an opportunity to be in harmony with their ideals.8 Each person singularly construes these fantasies in early childhood. Lacan calls them the fantasme, and they are as unique as fingerprints. The subject construes his or her fantasme to relieve castration anxiety, and hence its goal is to veil castration in a very special way for each subject. That is why the fantasme is always perverse but does not share the features of a symptom. It is an early unconscious construction, it is unmodifiable, and will constitute what Lacan calls the "treasure trove of sexuality."9 In the construction of the fantasme, the subject will meet his or her object (a), and hence there exists in this process an exclusive individual union or encounter. As I have mentioned before,10 object (a) is a topological, complex object, an unconscious remainder, something that "has fallen away" from the subject's earliest relationship with the mother. For this reason, the algorithm of the fantasme in the neurotic is S 0 a. In the perverse subject, by contrast, this algorithm or matheme shows the inverted loci: a 0 S. Object (a), as object, is a Real. Lacan stated that it is the only window the subject has to the Real, that is to say, it is something unknown to the subject, something lost (the lost object) that is sought for without the possibility of ever finding it. Yet in the passion of love and hate, the subject (in fiction) believes to have found it, only to become disillusioned later.
THE INCLUSION OF THE FANTASME It is clear that neurotics accept their incompleteness and assume their castration. They are hence inscribed in the law of desire and marked by the law of the Name-of-the-Father, that is, the prohibition of incest and parricide. As I have just explained, their fantasme is a vain attempt to veil castration. Neurotics can develop sexual activity unaware of their fantasme. They may display sexual activity impelled only by their sexual drive, in the absence of their repressed fantasme. This sexual activity produces a phallic jouissance
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in the register of the pure drive. The fantasme may enter the neurotics' sexual life at least in two circumstances.
THE FANTASME IN ACT In anxiety-provoking situations, neurotics may enact their/ontosme. We may understand this perverse act as an acting out in which there is a truth in the locus of the other that is shown in the act unacknowledged to the subject. That is to say, it constitutes an act without a subject; it is an act in which the subject who acts does not know what he or she is showing—this act separates knowledge from truth, and the latter speaks without a subject. Lacan affirms that the acting out sets object (a) in the other's scene. The truth that is shown in this act is a truth about jouissance—it offers jouissance to the other. We should cautiously note, however, that it is not a jouissance in the locus of the other, as is the case with the true perverse structure.
TWO BRIEF EXAMPLES In his essay "Perversions: Treatable and Untreatable," Adam Limentani describes the case of a male exhibitionist neurotic treated in analysis for several years who had acted out through perverse exhibitionism in situations of anxiety due to abandonment.11 Limentani relates a transference episode. After the summer vacation, this patient shows a negative transference charged with hostility. Limentani decides to interpret his "protesting to father and then to mother," but does not interpret his intense and deep feelings of abandonment. At the end of the session the patient is very upset. When arriving at the corner of the clinic, he engages in an act of genital exhibitionism. Later in his analysis, he could understand his deep feelings of abandonment and the impotence in which his analyst placed him. This undoubtedly is not a true perverse structure, but the performed act was perverse.
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One female patient of mine had the need to have several simultaneous love objects—she had three boyfriends at the same time besides her husband. This patient suffered from an intense feeling of having an inner hole. She had suffered her mother's traumatic abandonment from the first to the eighth year of her life, when her mother, after separating from her father, began to recover from a long melancholic process. This patient enjoyed her orgasmic sexuality without any problems. Later, she began a relationship with a new boyfriend who introduced her to the practice of sadomasochistic sexuality, in a proper setting amid ritual masks and chains. She sometimes occupied the sadist's place as a partenaire, and other times she switched to the masochist's place, and the scene consisted of having rough sex, such as rape, and being humiliated. These sexual practices led her to an intense sexual ecstasy she had not known previously. She told me that somehow she always knew, as a sort of intuition, that these sexual practices suited her. We may ask here, what does this mean? There is no doubt that these are perverse sexual acts, since they attempt to veil castration. But are we dealing with a neurotic or a perverse structure? I suggest that this patient is neurotic, with an obsessive phallic organization of her sexuality. She also suffers from a serious imaginary deficiency, but this deficiency does not correspond to a perverse structure. Hers may be perverse acts or perverse features in a neurotic structure.
ACCESS TO THE FANTASME Certain people, thanks to analysis, to certain events in their lives, or to their pursuit of the humanities or the arts, can rescue many of their repressed elements. In some cases, their evolution in the life cycle may lead them to modify their systems of ideals without analysis. What used to be repressed at an earlier time is no longer repressed, and these subjects may become aware of their fantasme. When this happens, they can no longer ignore it. Their knowledge
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(or traversing) of the fantasme makes it available to them in their sexual lives.12 It may be used in fantasy, or it may occasionally be enacted—it all depends on a case-by-case rule. The presence of this fantasme is not a neurotic symptom—it is simply the fantasme. It is a construction of the unconscious that becomes conscious. When the analysand brings the fantasme to analysis, we may explore it to make it clearer, but we must not consider it as a neurotic sexual symptom that has to be interpreted or solved. The neurotic perverse act makes sense because it has to do with the dialectic of anxiety, whereas in the subject of perversion the act is connected to the dialectic of the will-to-jouissonce (yolonttde-jouissance). From the vertex of the act itself, both acts are similar. From the point of view of the subject, they are entirely different. The sexuality of the subject of perversion is hopelessly trapped in the certainty of his or her sexual protocol. The sexuality of the subject of neurosis, by contrast, is out in the open, and always in doubt—this subject can have no certainty.
ENDNOTES 1. Sigmund Freud (1905), Three Essays on a Theory of Sexuality, op. cit. 2. Otto Fenichel (1945), The Psychoanalytic Theory of Neurosis. New York: W. W. Norton. 3. Georges Simenon (1933), Les Fian$ailles de M. Hire. Paris: Presses de la Cit£, 2003. There is no translation into English. Patrice Leconte directed a movie, Monsieur Hire, based on the novel, in 1989 (editor's note). 4. Jacques Lacan (1962), Kant with Sade, op. cit. 5. Jacques Lacan, Kant with Sade, op. cit. 6. Leopold von Sacher-Masoch (1870), Venus in Furs, translated by Joachim Neugroschel. New York: Penguin Books, 2000. 7. Michel de M'Uzan (1972), Un Caso de Masoquismo Perverso [A Cast of Perverse Masochism], in Del Arte a la Muerte [From Art to Death]. Barcelona: Ediciones Icarias, 1978. [Editor's note: I have not found an English translation.]
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8. Sigmund Freud (1895), Studies on Hysteria, 1893-1895, op. cit. 9. Jacques Lacan, Le Stminaire. Livre XIV, La Logique du Fantasme, 1966-1967, op. cit. 10. See Chapters 6 and 9 (editor's note). 11. Adam Limentani (1987), Perversions: Treatable and Untreatable. Contemporary Psychoanalysis 23(3). 12. Jacques Lacan (1964), The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XI, The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, op. cit.
23 The Logic of the Perverse Structure
STEP BY STEP To conceptualize the constitution or construction of the perverse unconscious structure we must go step by step. I recommend reading the previous chapter, for it will ease the way toward our understanding of the unconscious constitution of the subject of perversion.
THE GRAPH OF PERVERSION \N\U-\o-jouissance
V .
Desire slips away
a
Subject of pure pleasure
S
<
Object-cause of desire
S Subject of perversion
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VERLEUGNUNG The basic mechanism in the formation of a perverse structure is a special form of negation Freud called Verleugnung.1 Freud originally designated the common form of negation as Verneinung.2 Verleugnung, or disavowal, corresponds to a psychic mechanism whereby the child simultaneously ignores and admits its perception of the fact that the mother does not have a penis. In its anxiety regarding the anatomical difference of the sexes, the child sees a penis that the mother does not have. In his 1927 work on fetishism Freud states that when the boy looks at the girl's sex, he denies what he has seen.3 The conflict between the weight of his perception and the power of his desire drives him to a conclusion that is only possible under the logic of unconscious thought. This is the first step in the constitution of the subject as a perverse structure, and it happens at a very early age. It coincides with the discovery of the anatomical difference of the sexes,
ICHSPALTUNG This special disavowal or Verleugnung demands from the subject that he or she experience a living contradiction. Since the child both knows and does not want to know of the absence of the maternal penis, it needs another mental mechanism to supplement this one. I am referring to the mechanism of the splitting of the ego (moi), which Freud called Ichspaltung* This mechanism allows and facilitates the irreconcilable and simultaneous asseverations of the absence and the presence of castration.
TO BE THE PHALLUS Thanks to this specific question of disavowal (Verleugnung) of maternal castration, this child will relieve its castration anxiety
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by being instead of having the phallus, as does the child with a neurotic structure. This fixation point of being the phallus will petrify the perverse subject's access to sexual life in a particular way.
TO BE THE INSTRUMENT OF JOUISSANCE Opting to be the phallus means that the subject is the phallus for the other. In this way, the pervert becomes an instrument of jouissance for the other—to be the other's phallus means to be the other's sexual object. Let us clarify this point further. The fact that the pervert wants to be the other's object of desire refers us to the neurotic structure, since neurotics want to be desired by the other. In the perverse structure, however, there is an additional twist. Although neurotics want to be desired, they preserve their locus as subjects. As such, neurotics experience the desire to be desired. Their dialectic of desire regarding the other places the latter as both a desired and a desiring object. They acknowledge their own castration—incompleteness—and, recognizing their condition, they want the illusory completeness the other offers. This is the neurotic dialectic of desire. The matheme that Lacan devised for neurosis places the subject on the left side and the object in the locus of the other, to therightof the lozenge: S 0 a. The additional twist that transforms this dialectic into that of a perverse structure is the following: since the fixation point petrifies subjects in their condition of being the phallus for the other, the subjects of perversion do not recognize their own castration or incompleteness. It is the other who is incomplete, that is to say, castrated. From this condition of been incomplete, the other can desire the subject (of perversion). When perverse subjects, via identification, invert the loci and occupy the locus of the other, they show an element of madness. Through this identification they invert the loci and appear as if they were the other, that is, they are located on the right side of the matheme a 0 S. For this reason,
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Lacan affirms that in the perverse structure, the other functions as a mere support for the subject.5 The other is reduced to a semihuman armor that holds the subject, and hence is not a fellow man. This additional twist explains the theoretical proposal that phallic jouissance or organ pleasure in the perverse structure arises in the locus of the other, and takes us to the next step—from the dialectic of desire, we move on to the will-to-jouissance (yolont&dejouissance).
THE WILL-TO-JOUISSANCE (V0L0NT£-DE-J0V1SSANCE) The petrified position of being the phallus for the other will make it impossible for the perverse structure to be inscribed in the law of desire (dialectic of desire), which will be replaced by the willto-jouissance. This transformation explains the antinomy between desire and jouissance Lacan (1962) described for the perverse structure. Desire, always in flight in the perverse, will become a will-tojouissance in the other. When the exhibitionist pervert comes out in search of a partenaire and finds it in the figure of an anonymous girl, he is convinced that the girl desires him. He needs the girl to look at his genitals. This eye that holds the gaze is fundamental— without it, the whole perverse scene collapses. It is in the gaze where the pervert will perform his identification and the inversion of the loci. It is the other's gaze, says Lacan, that sustains the perverse scene, and this happens due to the determined will-to-jouissance of the perverse. This conviction or certainty—that the girl wants it—represents the "element of madness" that characterizes the perverse structure. It makes the pervert see, in the brief flashing of her eyes, the clear presence of desire in the girl's gaze. His will-tojouissance and his identification lead him to invert the loci and to be convinced that he is giving the girl sexual pleasure. It is in the girl's locus that the perverse will achieve his orgasm through masturbation. For this reason, Lacan affirms that phallic jouissance sprouts in the locus of the other and the will-to-jouissance is a willto-jouissance in the other.6
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THE TYRANNY OF THE SCRIPT This perverse scene is rigid, and the subject of perversion is caught in it. That is why we find that the will-to-jouissance of perverse subjects is not born of their free will. To have access to their sexual life, perverts must follow the script that their unconscious processes have construed. They have to surrender to their own scene strictly and rigidly because, as we know, to achieve phallic jouissance they must succeed in becoming the other. Lacan says that perverse subjects become the object,7 and hence their erotic protocol is petrified. The final product of this will-to-jouissance will be a being of pure pleasure. There, in a brief moment, the perverts' sexuality is exhausted and they recover their good sense, and the former exhibitionist will escape from the scene. After successfully situating themselves in the locus of the sadist, masochists will request and claim for more pain. Amid that pain and humiliation, perverts will be able to achieve orgasm in the locus of the sadist through masturbation, in a scene where the voice plays the main role. It is the masochist's voice that asks for more, and the sadist's voice that humiliates and reviles the masochist. Here the masochists' sexuality is momentarily exhausted. They retrieve their good sense and feel an immense physical pain. The perverse scene has thus come to an end, and the perverse subject wants to leave quickly.
THE PERVERSE SUBJECT AS AN EXEMPLARY CITIZEN The splitting of the ego (moi) will allow this subject to lead an exemplary life as a citizen. Outside of their sexual world, perverse subjects are reasonably well adjusted to the social order. They are intelligent, responsible, and hardworking people. They do not suffer from anxiety or guilt because of their unusual sexual life, and therefore they do not need to consult either an analyst or a sex therapist. They know all about sex—they are experts in it. For all these reasons, most of the analysands we call perverse are but tormented neurotics with perverse features or a perverse/antosme
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who suffer from anxiety, guilt feelings, shame, and regret. It is clear that, according to structural logic, they are neurotics and not perverts.
MASCULINE MEN ONLY Before concluding this chapter, I would like to offer a controversial and polemic issue for debate. I am referring to the impossibility for women (organized as feminine) to be subjects of perversion. The logic of the phallus and of castration is relentless. The feminine woman does not become perverse—her sexual structure does not allow it. The logic of the difference of the sexes and the logic of castration produce different effects in women, yet not through the creation of a perverse structure but through the creation of erotomania. The (masculine) man can be a subject of perversion, and the (feminine) woman can be a subject of erotomania. The logic of the feminine structure propels women to erotomania and eliminates the possibility of becoming perverse in terms of their structure yet not in terms of their acts, because they may become a partenaire. The (masculine) woman may be a subject of perversion, just as the (feminine) man may be a subject of erotomania. I will describe the detailed logic of this thesis in a different chapter.
ENDNOTES 1. Sigmund Freud (1927), Fetishism. Standard Edition 21. 2. Sigmund Freud (1925), Negation, op. cit. 3. Sigmund Freud (1927), Fetishism, op. cit. 4. Sigmund Freud ([1938] 1940), Splitting of the Ego in the Process of Defence. Standard Edition 23. 5. Jacques Lacan, Kant with Sade, op. cit. 6. Jacques Lacan, Kant with Sade, op. cit. 7. Jacques Lacan, Kant with Sade, op. cit.
24 The Logic of the Transference
THE TRANSFERENCE EFFECT Lacan asserts that the transference is the enactment of the unconscious.1 Every psychoanalytic session takes place under the effects of the transference—it cannot be otherwise. During the analytic process, the analyst will occupy diverse loci in the analysand's psyche—he or she will occupy the locus assigned by the structure of the transference. The analyst does not choose his or her own locus; rather, he or she is passively situated in different loci according to the vicissitudes of the analysand's early childhood history. The transference will reveal unknown preverbal unconscious elements that are revived in this process. Such early identification elements, which do not attain symbolization (speech) level, cannot undergo a conscious secondary process, but they will become present through their effects and may be revealed in the transference.
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THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE TRANSFERENCE When a demand for analysis emerges due to the presence of psychic suffering or of disturbing symptoms, the patient (who is not yet an analysand) makes a call to the other, the subjective other deemed to have knowledge. The patient thus grants the analyst a knowledge and, with it, a power. This analyst situated in the position of knowledge is expected to relieve the patient's suffering and deliver him or her to a state of calm and happiness. The analyst appears on the scene as the bearer of wisdom and truth. Analytic technique demands from the analyst the ability to occupy this position of wisdom assigned by the transference, which Lacan designated as the "subject supposed to know" (with the algorithm SsS),2 in French, "sujet suppose savoir"3 The position of wisdom is sustained by the analyst's silence and attentive listening. The patient is invited to associate freely and is offered a listening that guarantees confidentiality, devoid of any form of censorship or value judgment. Such an offer will contribute to place the listening analyst in a special position. In this position of attentive listening that guarantees confidentiality, the analyst cannot avoid becoming a semblance to the patient. The analyst cannot but represent or subjectively evoke in the patient's mind primal and past figures, elements, and bonds that emerge as signifiers. These signifiers, in turn, had been the guarantors of the early constitution of the subject. Analysts will receive multiple unconscious projections. As a semblance, they may generate either a transference of a softly loving nature (love transference) or a transference of hostile and aggressive impulses (hate transference). Each of these forms of transference may appear depending on the vicissitudes of the patient's early life, prior to the acquisition of symbolization capacity. In this way, in the establishment of the transference we will find at least two axes. One is the axis of the knowledge granted to the other; the second one is the axis of the semblance, in which the patient will stage a love/hate relationship.
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TRANSFERENCE AND SPECIFICITY IN PSYCHOANALYSIS The analytic act is defined neither by the analytic setting nor by the presence of the transference. Rather, it is defined by the analyst's capacity to occupy the locus and the position that are incumbent on him or her. Regarding the locus, the analyst must sustain the analysand's assignment of knowledge and semblance without identifying with either of them or believing the projected signifiers to be his or her own, and he or she must engage in a listening devoid of value judgment that guarantees confidentiality. This implies working in an asymmetric relationship. Regarding the position, the analyst must utter his or her word or silence from the position of a subject who does not possess the whole truth. In other words, the analyst does not know and has no certainty about what happens in the unconscious of the analysand. Every time the analyst speaks, the analysand thinks the analyst has spoken with all his or her wisdom and truth. The analysand believes that the analyst's words will provide the clue and the solution to his or her anxiety and suffering. The analyst is thus repository, in the transference, of the position of knowledge the analysand assigns to him or her and of the love the analysand expects to receive. The analyst, however, surprises the analysand and frustrates this expectation. This is the analyst's abstinence—his or her refusal to satisfy the analysand's demand. The analyst appears where he or she is not expected, punctuating, interpreting, and once and again launching the search for the analysand's unconscious truth, a truth that is nothing but the analysand's lost desire. Such a slippery truth can only be found as a half-truth and, after all, has been in the analysand's unconsciousfromthe beginning.
TRANSFERENCE AS REPETITION The patient's original experiences and early identifications will recur, that is to say, will be actualized and relived in the analytic
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cure through the analyst's figure. The analyst knows that the transference is not repetition; however, there is repetition in the transference. This idea has its origin in the Freudian concept of repetition compulsion, which some analysts believe is linked to the death drive and others to the libido. This compulsion pushes the subject to repeat whatever is repressed in an impossible claim for satisfaction. In this way, the repressed will be repeated in the transference as an enactment of something involuntary and unconscious. Theflawin this thesis is revealed in our clinical practice when we observe that a certain analysand's transference changes with a first, a second, or a third analyst. Thus, the simple repetition of the repressed does not account for the transference— it does not give us a satisfactory explanation of the transference phenomenon. We must add another element to repetition, and it is here that the presence of the analyst appears with its system of ideals and its singularity. Still, even though good analytic technique demands and expects that analysts leave their desire out of the analytic process and place themselves in a "zero place" (according to Wilfred Bion)4 or "play dummy" (according to Lacan),5 it will be impossible for us analysts, as much as we try, to sustain this analytic attitude called "neutrality of the analyst" throughout the process of the cure. When the desire of the analyst appears on the scene, the analyst becomes a desiring subject, and from then on, the analysand's transference is not only evoked by the semblance [the object (a) placed on the analyst] but by the presence of a Real, of an intruder, in the cure. For this reason, an analysand's transference subtly varies according to the analyst's psychic structure, that is, according to who occupies the locus of the analyst at a particular moment.
TRANSFERENCE AS RESISTANCE It is common to think that the analysands' anxiety, brought about by the horror of knowing the content of certain unconscious elements, leads them to use the transference as resistance. Passions
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of love and hate will emerge that will try to paralyze the analytic process transitorily or definitively. Yet Lacan states that all resistance in the transference is ultimately the analyst's resistance born from the analyst's horror.6 Analysts experience difficulties in keeping their desire out of the analytic process and avoiding identifying with the signifiers of the ideals projected by the analysand. If analysts accept the demand and identify with these signifiers of ideals, then a desiring subject will emerge. Such emergence will impede or become a great obstacle for the analysts' work with the productions of the analysand's unconscious. The analysts' resistance emerges when they cannot occupy their true analytic position of identifying neither with the signifiers of the ideals offered by the analysand nor with the position of the subject supposed to know—in other words, when the analysts have fallen into symmetry. This is what will finally determine the perdurability of resistance in the transference. Consequently, all resistance in the analytic process is, at bottom, a resistance on the part of the analyst.
THE BANALIZATION OF TRANSFERENCE Knowledge (conocimiento) is a product of what occurs in each analytic session under the effects of the transference. We know that the being of each subject will be revealed during the analytic cure. Lacan's teachings will certainly affect the way analysts enact their practice and the way they carry out their transference work. They will have to decide very carefully when and how to interpret the transference. It is not possible to continue with the automatic practice of the hie et nunCy the "here and now" of many practitioners. We must insist here on the fact that transference interpretation is an extremely powerful tool and it is not acceptable to risk its becoming banal or trivial. We must distinguish between interpretation in the transference and interpretation of the transference. Lacan denounces over and over again the abuse of transference interpretation and the risk of producing banalities it entails.
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INTERPRETATION IN THE TRANSFERENCE This notion refers to those interpretations that do not include the analyst as an object or as the semblance of desire. It is clear that every psychoanalytic session takes place under the effects of the transference, so that all interventions, including the analyst's silences, will take place in the transference.
TRANSFERENCE INTERPRETATION This concept, by contrast, refers to those interventions on the part of the analyst that include the analyst as an object or as a semblance of desire. The analyst presents for the analysand's consideration an idea that the analyst perceives in the transference. This generally refers to repressed unconscious elements that are beyond the symbolic order, that is, events that happened in early childhood that the subject experienced but registered only as a preverbal, imaginary signifier. During the analytic session, these imaginary signifiers become visible to the analyst in the transference.
ENDNOTES 1. Jacques Lacan (1960-1961), Le Stminaire. Livre VIII. Le Transfert [Transference], op. cit. 2. Jacques Lacan (1960-1961), Le Stminaire. Livre VIII. Le Transfert [Transference], op. cit. 3. See note 10, Chapter 7 (editor's note). 4. Wilfred Bion, Attention and Interpretation, op. cit. 5. Jacques Lacan (1960-1961), Le Stminaire. Livre VIII. Le Transfert [Transference], op. cit. 6. Jacques Lacan (1960-1961), Le Stminaire. Livre VIII. Le Transfert [Transference], op. cit.
25 The Logic of the Transference Structure
THE SYMBOLIC VERTEX OF THE TRANSFERENCE The transference can be conceptualized in three different vertices, namely, imaginary, symbolic, and real When a demand for analysis emerges through the presence of a symptom, the analysand is making a call to the other who is supposed to have knowledge. It is a call to the knowledge in the other. This is one of the positions the analyst occupies in the transference—the position of the subject supposed to know (SsS). It is a faultless position where the other is conceived as complete—s(A)—that is to say, noncastrated and the bearer of knowledge and of the whole truth. When presented as a call, the symptom places the analyst in the position of knowledge, and from there, the analyst is expected to wisely decipher the latent meaning of the symptom. This call is verbalized; it arises through words and speech that Lacan links to signifiers, and hence corresponds to the symbolic vertex. The subject supposed to know, however, suffers the influence of the Imaginary. The analysand emerges through language, that is to say, through the signifying
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chain. These signifiers will mean something to another signifier, represented here in the analyst's speech. For this reason, the analyst must occupy his or her locus as a signifier, that is, as "other*— as "any other"—expressed by Lacan with the algorithm Sq, which means uany signifier." There, the analyst is expected to maintain an attitude of attentive listening that guarantees confidentiality, followed by the production, through his or her saying as "interpretation," of an "effect of meaning" on the analysand. The analyst intervenes with interpretations devoid of phallic meaning, that is, of the conviction of complete or whole truth, for we all know that such a truth is unattainable. At the most, we might have access to a half-truth. Analysands will gain knowledge about the incompleteness of the Other, first in the analyst—s(A)—and then in themselves. Here the letter s corresponds to the signifier, and the barred letter A to the imperfect, incomplete—castrated—big Other. Lacan refers to this when he speaks of the castrated Other as incomplete—s(A)—and of the fall of the ideal images—1(A). The capital I represents here symbolic identifications, and the letter A the big Other as complete, unbarred, that is, as fictitiously noncastrated. The knowledge of the other's incompleteness makes it possible for the subject to enter symbolic jouissance when he or she assumes the locus of the object-cause of desire that would, infiction,complete the other.
ALGORITHM OF THE TRANSFERENCE
S (Si,S2,S3)Sn Lacan proposes the above algorithm for the transference. The S of the numerator represents the unbarred subject, who will later recognize itself as split (S) through the effect of the analytic device.1 The S of the denominator refers to the signifier, represented by the signifying chain (the speech of the analysand and his or her free association): Sx> S2, S3, Sn. Sq is the locus of the analyst, who is in a position of attentive listening qua (any) other signifier.
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MORE ABOUT THE SYMBOLIC VERTEX The symbolic vertex of the transference occurs in the signifying chain, represented by the analysand's free associations, which will show the analysand's unconscious constructions. Analysts as Sq (signifier other), in their analytic listening (the position devoid of desire and judgment), should interpret from this locus where the symbolic vertex has located them. Analysts should be fully aware of the power that this locus grants to their words. Consequently, they should be alert to the suggestive power their interpretations or interventions of any sort may bear due to their position of noncastrated signifier—the locus S (A) -» S (A)—as a result of the transference.
THE "WALL OF LANGUAGE" During the analytic process (also called cure), as an effect of the analyst's interpretations and when the "wall of language" reveals its presence, the unfolding of the imaginary vertex of the transference becomes unavoidable and its presence welcome. To explain this transference phenomenon we must resort to schema L, related to the constitution of the original subject. The splitting or Spaltung (S) of the subject, who is thence both the subject of the statement (manifest or apparent discourse) and the subject of enunciation (implicit or latent discourse), evidences the impossibility for these two registers or discourses to coincide. The subject will be present only in his or her symbolic discourse to the extent that he or she is represented. The speaking subject, therefore, commits through his or her speech to an act of appearance. He or she articulates a discourse that can only be a discourse of appearance with regard to the truth of his or her unconscious desire (latent content of the enunciation). In this way, his or her access to the symbolic order, to the chain of signifiers that allows him or her to free himself or herself from the imaginary dyadic dimension in which he or she was previously located [in the imaginary axis (a—>a')], almost saves
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him or her from this imaginary capture only to throw him or her even deeper into it. The symbolic I (je) of the statement that is revealed in discourse progressively conceals the subject's unconscious desire (the wall of language). As a consequence, an imaginary objectification of the subject occurs, and he or she has no other option but to actualize his or her imaginary identifications, that is to say, the diverse representations that appear in his or her speech. This speech attests to the subject's total ignorance of what he or she is from the point of view of his or her unconscious desire. Imaginary representations will be from now on the only means he or she has to capture himself or herself. The imaginary influence exerted upon the subject corresponds to the imaginary ego (moi) of the schema L. What is paradoxical is that the access to the Symbolic (the order of language) is what organizes the subject's relapse into the imaginary order, which culminates in the perpetuation of the imaginary ego (moi).
TALKING TO THE WALL Every time a true word is addressed as enunciation to a true subject it ends, through reflection, in the axis a' —> a. In Seminar 2 Lacan mentions that he points to the true subjects and has to accept their shadows, adding that the subject is separated from the true other by the wall of language.2 The S of schema L represents the subject in "its ineffable and stupid existence." Lacan adds later that it is the subject caught in the net of language, where he or she does not know what he or she says. In spite of being in locus S, the subject does not stay there—he or she shifts to locus (a), and for this reason, his or her ego is essentially an imaginary ego (moi). When a subject speaks to and addresses another subject as a "true other," their communication, qua shared language, will always be mediated by the imaginary axis (a' —> a). If we follow this logic we must conclude that speaking to a utrue other" will inevitably lead to a dialogue between two deaf people.3 The mediation of language, the "wall of language," eclipses the subject of his or her uncon-
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scious desire. As a consequence, when he or she addresses a "true other," the subject can never reach him or her other than through the imaginary axis (a'->a). As Lacan once said, everybody is in the same boat and there is no way out.
"EMPTY SPEECH" AND "FULL SPEECH" Lacan affirms that the psychoanalytic cure should try to transform the empty speech exchanged between two subjects separated by the wall of language into a full speech.4 The analytic experience oscillates between the dialectic of an empty speech that occurs in the imaginary axis (a' -» a) and a "full" or "true speech" that occur in the (A —> S) axis of schema L. That is why the imaginary ego (moi) of the analyst should not be part of the analytic process. The analytic presence is a presence that listens attentively and with an understanding of confidentiality, and whatever happens in this process happens between the imaginary ego (moi) of the analysands and their other unconscious representations, which may appear in a projective form. What defines the end of analysis is the subjects' possibility to establish a relationship with a true other—with that other who, being true, can give an unexpected answer.
WO ES WAR, SOIL ICH WERDEN The progress of analysis consists in grasping this imaginary relation that unfolds in the transference, a production that belongs to the analysands and in which they do not recognize themselves. Analysis lies in the analysands' becoming aware of these bonds with their others, who are the true original guarantors, bonds in which the analysands do not recognize themselves. The subjects will progressively discover which "others" they are really addressing, albeit unwittingly, and they will progressively assume the transference bonds with their others even though they ignore their presence. Freud's statement "Wo Es war, soil Ich warden" (Where id was, there
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ego shall be)5 in fact refers to this process. There, where S, the subject of the unconscious, was, there ego shall be, and not the other way around. This defines analysis as a cure of the id and not of the ego.
THE IMAGINARY VERTEX OF THE TRANSFERENCE Thanks to the action of the "wall of language," the initially symbolic transference (SsS) will occur in the imaginary axis (a' —> a), leading to the unfolding of the imaginary transference. The analytic device sustains this imaginary transference as long as the analysts occupy their position of attentive listening with an understanding of confidentiality and do not appear with their imaginary ego (mot). Regarding this issue, Lacan would say that analysts "play dummy," as in the game of bridge, while Wilfred Bion states that analysts work "devoid of memory and desire." Freud, in turn, considers that analysts should work with a sort of "suspended attention."6 The phenomenon of the "subject supposed to know" belongs to the symbolic order, but it is a phenomenon located between both orders, symbolic and imaginary, for the subjects cannot avoid the influence of the Imaginary on their own perception of the analyst's figure. SECOND ALGORITHM OF THE TRANSFERENCE A
1(a)*
i(a)
A
s(A) S
In Seminar 8 (1960), Le Transfert (On Transference), Lacan proposes an algorithm to conceptualize these ideas.7 This algorithm has three levels. The upper level is the level of the analysand (A) in rela-
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tionship with the analyst In this imaginary relationship, the analyst is perceived as a "complete Other," fauldess, not castrated—s(A)— with whom the analysand will try to identify. For this reason we find i(a)2 on the upper right corner. The (i) represents the analysand's imaginary identification, and the (a), object (a). This matheme shows this (a) squared, which means that the analyst knows that he or she is the object of desire. The analyst knows that he or she is a semblance, an object (a), to the analysand, and must maintain the position of attentive listening that guarantees confidentiality. The analysand speaks from locus (A) of schema L (the locus of the treasure trove of signifiers) and engages in a free association addressed to the analyst, whom he or she perceives as the bearer of knowledge and of the whole truth [s(A)]. Here we are at the second level, which corresponds to the analyst. To the right we find the matheme s(A), as the analyst is perceived as a complete, fauldess other. To the left is the matheme i(a). This means that, in the cure, the analysts must separate from their imaginary ego (moi). In this sense, they have to "play dummy," that is, situate themselves in the analytic position of suspended attention, devoid of desire. The third level is where we find the analysand as subject of the unconscious: S. This subject will emerge as a consequence or an effect of the analytic device, provided that the analyst intervenes and interprets from the locus of symbolic transference and not from that of imaginary transference. To interpretfromthe locus of s(A) implies assuming that knowledge is not in the analyst but in the unconscious of the analysand. If analysts believe that knowledge is in themselves, they will produce an interpretation from the locus of the imaginary transference s(A), that is to say, from their imaginary ego (moi). The analysts' emergence with a desiring imaginary ego will complicate the analytic process, seriously hindering the analysands* ability to recognize and resignify the representations of their early identifications.
THE VERTEX OF THE REAL IN THE TRANSFERENCE The order of the Real is present in the structure of the transference, for the emergence of the analyst as object-cause of desire (or
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"little a") is unavoidable. We know that this little a constitutes a window to the Real, a remainder from early imaginary identifications. At the same time, it is a testimony to the analysand's lack of being and to his or her desire to plug up that hole with the little a that he or she perceives in the analyst. The transference relationship defined in terms of transference love is indistinguishable, in its theoretical structure, from the passion of love, in which the object of love, bearer of the litde a, plugs up, in fiction, the lack of being. If the analyst responds to the analysand as ideal ego with interventions from this locus of ideals where the analyst has been placed and, therefore, identifying with the analysand, the analyst will develop a relationship of passion that we might designate as the analyst's transference and has no legitimate place in the analytic process. In this way, the analysand finds in his or her analyst the object of his or her passion of love, a finding that is confirmed by his or her analyst's obliging answers. We may argue here that the demands of the analysand have been fulfilled. If the analyst rescues him- or herself from this locus and begins to interpret from the locus of the symbolic other—s(A)—in asymmetry with the analysand, maintaining his or her imaginary ego (moi) away from the analytic process and "playing dummy" yet sustaining his or her locus of semblance (of litde a), then the analysand will unfold the fullness of his or her lack. This behavior on the part of the analyst will allow for a negative transference to appear in the imaginary vertex—negative transference will only appear if a space is opened for it. Working on the negative transference will enable the discovery of special early representations in the subject's history. TRANSFERENCE HATE In his essay "Observation Sobre el Informe de Daniel Lagache" (Observations on the Report by Daniel Lagache), Lacan affirms that one must not respond to the calls the subject makes one listen to when in that locus, no matter how insinuating, under pain
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of seeing transference love take shape in them, which nothing other than its artificial production distinguishes from passionlove, for the conditions of its production will fail from now on due to its effect, and analytic discourse will be reduced to the silence of the evoked presence. And the analyst also knows that his lack of answer will provoke in the subject aggressiveness and even the hatred of negative transference.8 TRANSFERENCE LOVE If the analyst insists on accepting the analysand's identification with him or her as ideal ego—i(a)—what will take place is the materialization of the conditions for the passion of love. Free association ceases and a moment of silence ensues; that is, there is an absence of signifiers because the analysand is situated in this position of love and tries to reduce the analyst's position not to the locus of the symbolic Other—s(A)—but to a presence of the idealized other— i(a)—to a demand for love and not to the plain demand, which in fact commands speech. The demand for love tries to reduce that Other—s(A)—to the presence of the little a. In this way, any word that the analyst utters reinforces the analysand's silence, because the latter tries to increasingly reduce the analyst to a presence of i(a). In Seminar 8 Lacan suggests that the couch helps the analyst to stay outside the subject's gaze, thus favoring the analyst's being situated in the locus of the symbolic Other.9 The analyst's locus remains outside the focal point of identifications, outside the image presented by the subject. This does not mean that in face-to-face sessions the analysts, as experts in locus S(A), do not identify with that locus despite being in the field of the subject's gaze and knowing they are a desired object and knowing, furthermore, that they should sustain the semblance. When we speak of transference as love (imaginary axis), we should separate (a) transference love directed to the SsS (to the subject supposed to know) from (b) transference love maintained as a passion of love. Thefirstis the love directed to the subject of the analysand's own unconscious and allows for the transference
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to take place. This transference love occurs at the beginning of the analytic process and is different from the passion of love, which takes place as a resistance effect when the analyst accepts the ideal place, i(a). This demand of the analysand's is a demand for fiction, for the recovery of the lost jouissance that he or she wants to find in the analyst's person. It is the analysand's attempt to become one with the analyst, to complete the lack. If analysts accept this locus due to their own resistance to maintain the analytic device, they will fictitiously plug up the lack in the analysand, thus halting the analytic process. Those who have encountered this phenomenon in their lifelong experience know the difficulty, if not the impossibility, of leaving this position. The best thing is to avoid it. Analysts know that they must not respond to demands, but it is not a matter of what we respond to but of the locus from where we do so. Speaking from an artificial position, some say that the best thing is to remain silent, to present a mask as lacking in identificatory features as possible. Yet this is not possible, because if analysts acted this way, the encounter would not occur. Analysis does not work that way. It is better to respond with the interpretation from locus s(A) and to try to produce a subjective division, which will appear as an effect of the analyst's interpretations of the analysand's repressed unconscious. Melanie Klein alerts analysts to the danger involved in their always occupying the locus of the good object in the analytic process.10 As part of her analytic technique, Klein used to work with negative transference, that is, she was placed, in the transference, in the locus of the bad and persecutory object. The danger of only working with positive transference, besides ignoring the unconscious elements of the bond of hate (Bion's H link), lies in leaving the analysands at the end of analysis in a locus in which they will always expect something from the good object (analyst), which identifies with them as an imaginary ideal [i(a)]. In addition, so as not to leave the analysand hoping to receive a manifestation of love from that object, Klein was clear in her insistence on working on the analysand's hate (negative transference) in analysis. Lacan coincides with Klein and Wilhelm Reich in this respect. Neither the
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passion of hate nor that of love should be promoted; rather, analysts should avoid them both by placing themselves, with their interpretations, in the locus of the symbolic Other or s(A). If analysts identify with the locus of the semblance or little a—accepting the analysand's ideals or i(a)—they will assume the role of the hated or loved object—that is, the analysand's unconscious representations—thus fictitiously plugging up the lack and bringing the analytic process to a halt.
THE LOGIC OF COUNTERTRANSFERENCE In Seminar 8 Lacan states that the term countertransference is an unfortunate and inexact one, and he attempts to distinguish between two concepts. The first one refers to the effect of the analysand's transference on the analyst, and the second one to the analyst's own transference.11
THE EFFECT OF TRANSFERENCE ON THE ANALYST This effect of transference is produced in the analyst as an answer to his or her introjection of the analysand's speech. It is an imaginary effect, a response to the signifiers the analyst introjects when occupying the position of the listener in the analytic device. If the introjected demand is understood, the analyst should not have any difficulty in referring to these signifiers. This is possible when the analyst has a full discrimination capacity and occupies an asymmetric analytic position. It is clear that the analyst, when occupying his or her locus as a semblance and being the object of multiple projections, may take many of these signifiers as identification objects. In this way, he or she produces a symmetry in the analytic dyad of which he or she has to rescue him- or herself through his or her discrimination capacity. He or she will thus achieve the position of asymmetry with his or her analysand. Consequently, when the analyst proceeds to speak, that is to say, to occupy his or
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her analytic position, he or she will do so from a position other than that of identification.
THE ANALYSTS TRANSFERENCE If the analyst cannot rescue him- or herself from the identifications that take place in the locus of the semblance, he or she will be in full transference, that is, in a symmetrical relationship with his or her analysand. The analysand has become a semblance for the analyst, namely, an object (a). The analyst's transference impedes the materialization of the analytic act (at that particular moment, with that given material). When the analyst emerges with his or her ego (moi) and his or her desire, he or she has produced a symmetry that will obscure his or her possible perception of the unconscious elements coming from the analysand. This phenomenon occurs several times during the long analytic process. Within this process the analytic act slips into different types of acts that, albeit not purely analytic, are useful and, I would say, unavoidable in any analytic process. I am referring here to the orthopedic act and the pedagogic act. There would even be a third type of act, namely, the arbitrary act. The crucial point in this debate is the question of whether such acts originate as a consequence of the analyst's identification with the analysand's demand and, therefore, within the analyst's transference. My answer would be yes. The analysand's demand is often reasonable. Those dangers that place the life and property of the analysand at risk require the analyst's pedagogic or orthopedic intervention, which would stem from the analyst's transference (at least at this stage in the analytic process). The cost of this act, performed within the analyst's transference, is the interruption of the work of the unconscious, and it is often wise and necessary to pay that price. Later on (in following sessions) the analyst will rescue him- or herself from that pedagogic or orthopedic locus and recapture his or her analytic position, in asymmetry with his or her analysand.
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THE ANALYST AS WASTE (DES-ECHO)12 At the theoretical end of analysis analysands have progressively acquired some knowledge of their incompleteness, that is, of their castration, and of that of their analyst, which corresponds to the Lacanian algorithm s(A). The unfolding of the symbolic and imaginary transferences has supposedly allowed the acknowledgment of the formation of others as original guarantors in the analysand's infantile history. When the analyst refuses to accept the analysand's invitation to occupy the ideal locus [i(a)l, interpreting from the castrated locus [s(A)J and assuming the analytic position within the analytic device, the analysis can arrive at its theoretical end. Here the castrated analyst, devoid of the phallic feeling of knowing everything, ceases to be an object of desire and an identification model. The transference progressively dissolves and the analyst loses all his or her charm and supposed knowledge (SsS). He or she becomes another signifier (guarantor) in the subject's biography. The analyst ceases to be an idealized object and becomes waste. This phenomenon has nothing to do with resistance mechanisms or periods of negative transference during which the analysand attacks and devalues the analyst. Resistance and negative transference are tied rather to the vertex of the automaton or of the compulsion to repeat of the transference. This vertex is connected to oedipal and preoedipal figures characteristic of the imaginary axis (a' -» a), to narcissistic elements, and to the presence of the passion of hate. If analysands end analysis maintaining the analyst in an idealized niche—as the figure of a mentor who possesses the whole truth and, therefore, the phallus—it is because they have been unable to solve their Oedipus conflict. This does not mean that they cannot experience gratitude and good feelings toward the analyst, but they should know that the analyst is not SsS. The pain of accepting the loss of castration in the individual's early history may have been intolerable, and so the analysis finishes without having reached its end.
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TRAVERSING THE FANTASME AND THE END OF ANALYSIS Our considerations on the love and hate aspects of the transference lead us to the study of the traversing of the fantasme. The latter refers to the way in which we reach the individual essence of the sexual drives through love and hate in the transference. Passions aim at a person's being. This coincides with a truth, which is that it is the question of being that is raised at the end of analysis. Regardless of their knowledge about the early guarantors of their identifications, analysands face the end of analysis with the question about their being and about their position regarding essential jouissance. By virtue of their knowledge of the nature of their early identifications and partial knowledge of the nature of their desire, analysands gain a rim knowledge. They may thus cross the text of the fantasme, that is, traverse the fantasme and thus open a path to the Real (through the presence of little a). The notion of "rim" refers to the Lacanian theory of the sexual drives. The subject will always remain split, divided, and only the conditions of jouissance—that is to say, the nature of each subject's particular fantasme—are singular to each subject. The fantasme— S 0 a—will allow the articulation of sexual phallic jouissance with the other without plugging up the desire of being the other's desire. To traverse the fantasme is also to know that the means to form a love relationship with another are limited, for there are few openings onto the Real and the fantasme is one of them. In Seminar 1413 Lacan affirms that the fantasme is a window to the Real. Each person construes one's own fantasme with one's little a. This fantasme (S 0 a) creates a rim that may be crossed and delineated, and keeps open in the subject the dimension of the other's desire. One can enjoy the other in a drive route (trayecto pulsional). As Eric Laurent has argued, the fantasme is the only way to "say jouissance well," that is, to come closer, in a precise way, to a jouissance the subject may gain: that of the object of one's desire.14
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SUMMARY During the analytic process (the analytic cure) the transference takes place fundamentally in the imaginary axis (a' -» a). The ego (moi) of the analysand is located in a, and the analyst in the locus a' of little a, that is, the locus of the object of desire as a semblance (the object of projections and introjections). When analysts speak, they should do so from the symbolic locus of the castrated other, or s(A). They will achieve this position if they do not respond to the analysand's demands from the locus of an ideal identification or i(a). In this way, analysts situate themselves in the cure, in the locus a\ and speak from the position of s(A).
ENDNOTES
1. Jacques Lacan (1960-1961), LeStminaire. Livre VIII. Le Transfert [Transference], op. cit. 2. Jacques Lacan (1954-1955), The Seminar. Book II. The Ego in Freud's Theory and in the Technique of Psychoanalysis, 1954-1955, op. cit 3. This is an expression in Spanish, didlogo de sordos, that corresponds to the English idiom "to talk to a wair (editor's note). 4. Jacques Lacan (1954-1955), The Seminar. Book II. The Ego in Freud's Theory and in the Technique of Psychoanalysis, 1954-1955, op. cit 5. Sigmund Freud (1933), New Introductory Lectures on PsychoAnalysis. Standard Edition 22:80 (editor's note). 6. Sigmund Freud (1912), Recommendations to Physicians Practicing Psycho-Analysis, in Papers on Technique. Standard Edition 12:115116 (editor's note). 7. Jacques Lacan (1960-1961), Le Siminaire. Livre VIII. Le Transfert [Transference], op. cit. 8. Jacques Lacan (1960), Observation Sobre el Informe de Daniel Lagache [Observations on the report by Daniel Lagache]. Mexico: Siglo XXI Editores, vol. 2, p. 627. [Editor's note: I have not found an English translation.] 9. Jacques Lacan (1960-1961), Le Seminaire. Livre VIII. Le Transfert [Transference], op. cit. 10. Melanie Klein (1957), Envy and Gratitude. A Study of Unconscious Sources. New York: Basic Books.
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11. JacquesLacan (1960-1961), LeStminaire. Livre VIII. Le Transfert [Transference], op. cit. 12. The Spanish word desecho corresponds to the English word waste, yet by scanning it the author adds a connotation of something that has been undone, for hecho (which is pronounced just like "echo," the letter h being mute) is the past participle of the verb hacer, to do or to make (editor's note). 13. Jacques Lacan (1966-1967), LeS&ninaire. Livre XIV. La logique dufantasme [The Seminar. Book XIV. The Logic of the Fantasme], op. cit. 14. Eric Laurent (1987), Cardcter-ego-sujeto [Character-ego-subject] in El Significante de la Transferencia [The Signifier of Transference], vol. 2. Buenos Aires: Manantial. [Editor's note: I have not been able to find an English translation.]
26 The Logic of Negative Transference
NEGATIVE TRANSFERENCE: RESISTANCE OR ANALYTIC IMPASSE? A white, single, attractive, 39-year-old woman, a university graduate, has been in analysis with me for over a year, four times a week (Monday through Thursday). In the last session of the previous week, as has occurred in other opportunities, she expressed great annoyance toward me because she perceived me as dominating and authoritarian. Throughout this year the transference has oscillated between positive and negative. At times she feels I am a kind, understanding, and warm figure who is interested in her problems, and she conveys feelings of affection toward me. At other moments she is very upset because I do not understand her and want to dominate her. She feels once again that everything she has is "useless to me," and hence I am also useless. The analysand sometimes stes me as a man who has preconceived and unmodifiable ideas and who imposes his own thoughts upon her. She says that I am incapable of changing my mind and that in my interventions I persistently
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insist on the same thing. In the session I am relating here I told her that under these circumstances it was very difficult for me to help her, since she would view anything I said as an imposition coming from an authoritarian analyst. My interest had been to help her to get to know herself as much as possible. I told her that she should know that she was not trapped in her analysis with me, that she had the right to look for another analyst who could understand and help her better than I. The analysand asked me if I felt trapped with her and if I could unilaterally terminate the analysis. I answered that I could in fact decide to terminate the analysis, in which case I would refer her to another analyst.
THE FOLLOWING SESSION On Monday the analysand, who is usually prompt, arrives about ten minutes late. She apologizes and explains that the carpenter who is fixing her dining room arrived unexpectedly and she was forced to assist him before leaving, which is why she is late. I say to her, "It seems that fixing that dining room is important." The analysand tells me that fixing her dining room bears a very special significance to her. The design is strange, special, and something to be proud of. Her previous boyfriend (fianc6), with whom she broke up nine months ago, was the designer. Now that the carpenter is finishing it, every time she sees the furniture she remembers her fianc^. Here the patient cries a little. I say to her, "The absent presence." After a while she says that she never thought that her fiance would not see the finished dining room, and then adds, "Such is life." The analysand then says that she did not think that today she would be speaking of the dining room either. She thought that she would only speak of the "misunderstanding that we both have," that is, the problem of her relationship with me and the strong impact the last session had on her—it has stuck in her mind all these days. She says that it is very easy for me to close this chapter and move on to other things, that I could stay very calm during
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my weekend. This was not the case for her. The topic is stuck in her head and she keeps thinking about it. It is like a fixed idea, and has caused her great uneasiness. The analysand says that she wants to be able to clarify what has happened between us and, mainly, to know the reason for my inability to understand her. I ask what she means when she says that I do not understand her. She says that she knows I already know everything about her and that bothers her very much, that I am searching for what I already know. Now, after a year of analysis, she does not know whether I have the will to explore. She finds that I have preconceived ideas about everything. At this moment in the session my telephone rings and the answering machine picks up. I fold a paper I am using to make notes. When the ringing stops the analysand remains silent. I ask her what is on her mind. She answers that she is thinking about the paper I folded. Then there is a silence and I ask her what she thinks about this paper. She thinks that it is a paper that I am reading. (This means to me that the analysand believes I am not paying attention to her.) I say to her, "What I'm doing is taking some notes of what we talk about, since I find it very important," and I ask her if it bothers her that I take notes. She tells me that it does not bother her in the least. The analysand says: aNow Fm obsessed with the idea of motherhood. Soon I will turn 40." Then she begins to cry quiedy. She is so keen on having a child that she has begun to think about artificial insemination again. She says she has already thought about this many times. If she cannot find a husband, she will resort to artificial insemination. She continues to cry. She says that going through this whole process alone, without a partner, is very difficult. Her biological clock is telling her that her time is almost up. She would like to know whether or not she wants to have a child. She tells me that she thinks I have a preconceived idea about this, that I know that she does not really want to have a child and that I will tell her the following: That she does not want to have a child and also that her attitude is acceptable and good, because if she does not have a child she can spend all that money on herself, but then I will ridicule her. She adds that I will tell her "that one should not throw
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children into the world, should not be a supplier of children." Yet all I will supposedly tell her will be of no use to her. I tell the analysand that what she needs is to know—to know whether or not she wants to have a child—but that she protects herself from knowing and, therefore, she thinks that 1 will force her to believe what she has just said. There is a silence and then she says, "Well, I have to admit that I have a contradiction. What's bad is that you would have been able to reach very quick conclusions. 1 will give you an example. When you say..." [and she clarifies:] "Well, I do understand, and I know that it bothers you that 1 believe that I have to define my sexual orientation, and you will ask who's forcing me to define my sexual orientation? But I remember that you [plural] said very clearly that we must accept our own sexual orientation." 1 ask her, "The "you" [plural] that you used refers to whom?" She answers, "I'm referring to Joyce MacDougall's lecture and to you, because of what she said there and what you've written. You say that we must accept our sexual orientation, and you also said in your paper that when this happens, we increase our creativity and intellectual effectiveness. That's how we arrive at the end. Also, you have written regarding sexual orientation that one has to choose between homosexuality and heterosexuality, that one can only be one thing. Here I don't agree with you. I say I can have both. Here you have told me that it is actually possible to have both. Then I don't know what you ultimately think. If I'm in one place, I feel that I belong in the other one, and vice versa." There is a brief silence. Then she says, "The truth is I have no time left. My fertile life is ending. I want to be what I am. You say that I function entirely by the law of 'all or nothing.' I feel that I'm still solving my basic issues: my life, my sexual orientation, and my desire to be a mother. When I attended Joyce MacDougall's public lectures I felt that she was speaking to me, that she was describing my life, my most intimate things. I have to live my reality; I have to be what I am. You [plural] say that this will benefit me, but I don't agree, because to do this I have to believe in it, and I can't bear failure anymore. I have recently experienced the failure of my last hetero-
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sexual love relationship. It leaves me without a husband and without children. To have a child would be a change in my life. I remember that I had an abortion with a long-ago boyfriend. That was a time when I didn't want to have children, I was not prepared. My desire to have children has come and gone in the course of these years. Look, Fll give you an example. This is what I feel. I have to know what it is that I want in order to act accordingly. It can't be that I want a child simply to fulfill a social demand. I want to know. Yet I'm convinced that you have already reached your conclusion, and that's why I say that you don't understand me." There is a silence. Then she says, "I have a deep feeling of longing [in English] when somebody tells me that they got married and had a child." I ask her what she means by longing. She says it is a feeling of nostalgia, a waiting nostalgia. "I can't say this here freely because you will tell me that this is a defense, or that I want to fulfill a social desire. Here with you I can't engage in afreeexploration." There is a silence. "Look, if I am homosexual at bottom, then why do I have such a strong desire to marry and have a husband? And if I am heterosexual at bottom, why do I desire a woman? Then, since I don't want to hear your interpretation and I don't want to hear you say that it's a defense either, then what I do is, I don't tell you anything. I don't want to be convinced of anything. Well, I have to admit that you don't try to convince me of anything outright, but when I tell you all these things, you have already reached your conclusion. You'll say that what I say is silly, and this is an attempt to convince me." The analysand stays silent for a while and then says that she has been behaving poorly. She says, "I've been trying to test you. I've put you through many tests to see if you failed, and by doing so I'm hurting myself. Because when I put you through these tests and I see that they prove my idea that you had already reached your conclusion, in doing so I'm trapped. I intervene and tell her, "With your tests, you pay and give yourself the change" (meaning that she benefits from them without accounting for her acts). The analysand says, "My tests have confirmed that you have already reached your conclusions." I ask her, "Why the need to test me?" and she answers, "I wanted to know
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what you think of me." I say to her, uBut why don't you ask me straightforwardly?" After a short silence she says, "In my previous analysis [which took place abroad for a period of three years], I realized that it isn't possible to ask an analyst something and get an answer. All my tests aim at knowing what's your actual diagnosis." I ask her, "And what is it?" She responds, "I don't know, but above all I want to know your diagnosis of my sexuality. This is the way I function. But I have to admit that it's horrible, it bothers me to hear myself saying all this. It bothers me to have to put you through these tests. I listen to myself speaking and it sounds to me as if I were my mother. What a horrible thing. I don't want to resemble her."
SOME NOTES ON THIS ANALYSANDS HISTORY The analysand was born of a marriage that produced four children, and she is the youngest and the only daughter. The marriage ended in divorce when she was 3 years old. Her father married again and has three more children. He always maintained contact with the two families and assumed his financial responsibilities. Her mother is of humble origin and of a violent nature, and the children were disciplined with a belt. The mother is afraid of people and, according to my analysand, she has seriously damaged all her children. My analysand says about her mother: uShe is a damn spy." Of her father she says that he was a traveling salesman and, fundamentally, an absent father. She says that her father cannot love; he does not give love to anybody. She is convinced that her father does not love her. She has only one memory of her childhood in which her father shows some love for her. This is a vivid memory, indelibly etched in her mind. One day her father saw she had a runny nose and said to her, "Girl, you have to blow your nose." This conversation fragment was marked in her memory as the only "proof of love" that she got from her father. When she wants to remember that her father loved her, she remembers this sentence. Other than that, she is convinced that her father does not love her. Both par-
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ents are alive and lead separate lives. She maintains a distant relationship with both, and she seldom visits her parents and siblings. Her most sincere interest lies in visiting her nieces and nephews, whom she loves very much. This is a very intelligent woman who has lived alone in several countries. She has a superior university education and an outstanding intellectual performance. She began her sexual life after puberty with a deep homosexual love that led to a complete sexual experience, with orgasmic satisfaction. This happened again throughout the years with four slighdy older women whom she believed to have many good qualities. Initially she allowed them to seduce her, pleased to be desired and wanted and to be important for somebody. During those years, until she turned 36, she says she did not accept the possibility of being a lesbian. It was only a "love game," especially because during those years two intense heterosexual relationships occurred—she fell in love with full sexual and orgasmic capacity. She felt full orgasmic satisfaction with these two men, and she also says she is "attracted to the penis" and likes it. She also conveys the ability to fall in love with both men and women. In one of her love relationships with men, her boyfriend left her after a three-year relationship because he fell in love with another woman. In the other case, the man wanted to marry her, but he was an Iranian Muslim who had to return to his country. Women's conditions in that country were not satisfactory to her, and she decided not to accompany him. Recently she had a passionate, sexual, and loving relationship with the man she mentions in the Monday session narrated above. It was an intense yet fleeting relationship, and he walked out on her. This relationship ended three months before she began analysis with me. After starting analysis, she fell in love passionately in the form of a crush with a woman her own age, with whom for the first time she behaved like a seducer, actively enticing this beautiful woman. This bond has remained active. Her analysis has cautiously been able to help her discover her repetitive tendency to develop a "relationship of domination" with this new partner that places the relationship under the constant threat of a breakup.
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CHIEF COMPLAINT AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE TRANSFERENCE The analysand seeks analysis again because she thinks there is something wrong with her that prevents her from maintaining steady love relationships. She wants to marry or, in any event, have a steady relationship, with the possibility of cohabitation. During her analysis she shows a tendency to establish a type of object relation in which she has very specific concerns regarding what the other should do or think. This is perceived more clearly in the ways in which the other leaves and returns in her everyday life. It seems as if she were controlling the other, yet she is not an obsessive; neither is this an obsessive, rigid control. Hers is a strange reading of the encounter and the missed encounter1 where what matters is the wlove test": "If she loved me, she would not have left me like this." "If she loved me, she would have called me." "If she loved me, I would be first in her thoughts." And so on. It is worth noting here that the analysand's reading of the object relation leads her to a demand—to a confrontation with her love object in which she puts herself in the position of the victim and of the one who is not loved. This problem, which hindered the stability of her previous relationships, was repeated in the transference. At the beginning it was a warm and positive transference. Then the analysand began to strongly resent the fact that I was delayed a few minutes, or that my clock was fast, or that my telephone rang. Then she began to resent the manner of my interventions and interpretations. Finally a change took place, and she began to perceive anything I said as an imposition or an attempt to dominate her.
A QUALIFIED LISTENER When this type of transference achieved maximum intensity I found myself drawn to a corner. Anything I said would be perceived as an imposition. I was seen as an authoritarian and tyrannical analyst. I felt uncomfortable and impotent to solve this problem. I was
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even willing to terminate the analysis. I thought I could not help the analysand and that this analytic situation was unsolvable— that it was an "analytic impasse." In my view, the analytic impasse is a phenomenon in which both subjects participate with their unconscious mechanisms that brings the analysis to a halt. I let the analysand know of her right to terminate her analysis if she wished to do so. I refused to accept that I also wanted to terminate it. To my surprise, she also refused to be the one to do so. It was clear to me, therefore, that in the field of enunciation (the latent content) neither of us was willing to bring the analysis to an end. This insight helped me a lot, and I decided to write down what was happening. I discovered things that I already knew and yet refused to know—a disavowed knowledge. While I interpreted what I understood to be reasonable to interpret, my analysand increasingly resisted my interpretations and accused me of being authoritarian and tyrannical. I decided to stop interpreting and only engage in an attentive listening—working only with "evenly suspended attention"2—or to perform very short interventions just to let her know that I was there, awake, and attentive. The analysand did not stop speaking. She talked about important matters that would very often summon my intervention, yet I remained silent. My annoyance disappeared. I realized that she did not want to listen to me; she wanted me to listen to her ceaselessly, and that was the way we worked for some time. Occasionally she asked my opinion on some topic she was working on analytically. I responded with short and precise interpretations, sometimes about painful issues. She took them well. With some she agreed, and with others she did not, but she did not feel that I was imposing them upon her. The point was that she had requested my intervention, which put her in a receptive position to hear what I was about to say. She was the one who knew when she was in that receptive state. Meanwhile, I kept listening. It was not a catharsis or a state of mental fragmentation that required holding, but rather a need for the presence of a qualified listener who would hear what she was working through without interrupting her.
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THE TYRANNY OF THE PHALLIC OTHER I understand that in this particular cure or analytic process, the difficulty appears when a very special transference is established that I have called the "tyranny of the phallic other." We know that every transference begins with the establishment of a subject supposed to know. The analysand seeks the help of somebody who can relieve her anxiety and suffering. This phenomenon grants the analyst a power over the other in the transference—the power to help the analysand, which constitutes the basis for a warm, positive transference where the analysand forges an unconscious relationship with a beloved object. Negative transference, by contrast, refers to an unconscious bond with the "hated other." In the transference, the object goes from being loved to being hated. This is not the case with this patient—she neither hates me nor feels that I hate her. That is why I believe that it is not a case of a simple negative transference. She only hates me when she feels that I am dominating or tyrannizing her. That is the problem. Now, how does it happen that I find myself dominating her? In my opinion, it means that in the transference I have the power of knowing everything about her, knowing what goes on inside her, knowing what she needs, knowing what she should or should not do. She instates this dominating object in the transference and does so with an unconscious purpose. I believe she does so in order to be able to rebel against this object, that is, to rebel in the transference against the imaginary figure that is behind me as a semblance, as object (a). We know from her childhood history that her maternal figure is powerful, dangerous, and a "spy"—"the one who knows everything." I think that the analysand instates this figure in the transference to oppose her, to rebel against her, to affirm herself (Bejahung) and to obtain (in fiction) a transference victory over her. In no way is it in my analysand's interests to terminate her analysis. On the contrary, she needs to continue with this dominating relationship, to oppose it and to achieve affirmation (Bejahung)
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over and over again. My interpretations of this phenomenon are ineffective because they fall within the locus of the dominating object. Whatever I say comes from the phallic other, that is to say, the dominant object, and therefore is disqualified (tautological).
SUSPENDED ATTENTION I believe that my strategy of sustaining the transference semblance of the dominant object while remaining silent was a fortunate one. For the analysand, I continued to be the tyrannical object in the transference, but one that kept silent. She did not have a particular reason to oppose me because I did not say anything. With time, the annoyance we both felt progressively subsided. For me it had been crucial to understand what was happening (to some extent). This understanding brought about a change in my analytic position and allowed me to situate myself only in the position of evenly suspended attention, without identifying with the semblance (the tyrannical transference object). I was thus able to maintain the asymmetry with my analysand. A posteriori, I have thought that what happened in this analytic process could fall within the concept of what we call "psychoanalytic impasse," which, as we know, does not always lead to the termination of the analysis, since it can be reversed.
THE PROBLEM OF BISEXUALITY In writing this case history I initially left out the topic of sexuality. I was particularly interested in focusing on the study of the transference bond. I know that there are other important topics to explore in this case, for example, the analysand's sexual life. I have referred to her orgasmic sexual capacity and her experience of falling in love with people of both stxes. This aspect of her history posits enigmas, inviting the study of the problem of bisexuality.
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Some theoreticians of psychoanalysis (myself excluded) believe that the sexual structure derived from the subject's sexual object-choice is binary, that is, that the object of desire is chosen between a manobject and a woman-object. I think that a double object choice may exist of both the maternal and the paternal imagoes. Consequently, an unconscious bisexual structure may exist. This may explain some people's capacity for sexual arousal and sexual orgasm with both sexes. Not all bisexual sexual acts, however, respond to a bisexual sexual structure. A heterosexual or homosexual unconscious structure may engage in bisexual acts. These may have at least two possible origins: 1. If the original sexual structure is heterosexual, then the homosexual act may be understood as an acting out or as a passage to the act, and vice versa. This sexual act is motivated by the repressed sexual desire. Let us recall the whole nature of the Oedipus complex, both positive and negative, which includes sexual desires addressed at both father and mother. This could lead us to the question of this analysand's sexual structure. To this question I do not have an answer. 2. If the circumstances of the subject's early life show a serious deficiency in the maternal function, the sexual objectchoice (which will mark the subject's future sexual life) may be ambiguous. This behavior may be supplemented with the psychic mechanism of the vertical split of the object, which will allow the simultaneous existence of two successive objects of desire of opposite sexes. This ambiguous sexual object-choice (characteristic of serious neurotics such as borderlines) leads to a sexual life of a bisexual type. In this case, bisexuality is due to the fact that the subject, in his or her huge "desire to be desired" (due to the imaginary hole), will respond complacently to the demand of love from the other, be it a homosexual or a heterosexual object.
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THE MASTER'S DISCOURSE My interest in mentioning this issue stems from my concern with differentiating the domination bond from the Master's discourse Lacan introduced in 1969 in his seminar UEnvers de la Psychanalyse (Psychoanalysis Upside-Down or the Other Side of Psycho-analysis) . 3
$*a Let us recall here that the four discourses Lacan puts forth are the Master's discourse, the Hysteric's discourse, the University discourse, and the Analyst's discourse. These are four different signifying configurations that may be distinguished according to their distribution in the loci assigned for each discourse, that is, four fixed positions, and four signifiers rotate among these positions. It is in fact this rotation that will produce meaning and will categorize each discourse. These discourses do not represent a hierarchy or an indication of health or illness, nor do they refer to a clinical entity. They inhabit the subject despite himself or herself— they speak for the subject. They are not the kind of discourses that are produced intentionally. The subject does not choose his or her discourse but is chosen by it. In this way, at a given moment the subject may be functioning with one type of discourse, and at another time, with a different type. There is no relation among these discourses, and they may be explained according to their placement in the various loci. None of these discourses are "the true one"— they all produce an effect of half-truth. The Master's discourse is marked by the will to dominate (Sx —» S2). It is a univocal discourse in which there is a supposed unity between signifier one (S{) and the barred subject, or S. It is the legislative discourse, the discourse of the law par excellence. A subject may end up speaking as if he or she were the law, that is, uttering a final word. This discourse instates a word identical to itself. It ignores
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the reasons for its origin and for its impossible unity. The Other appears as "the one who knows" (S2), and the product of his discourse, the small (a)—the cause of desire—will remain hidden, barring the Master's access to it. In this way, the Master appears separated from his or her subjective truth and ignoring his or her desire. The difference between the Master's discourse and the discourse of domination lies in the fact that the Master's discourse arises in the locus of the subject. This subject unwittingly embodies the locus of the Master. It is only a posteriori that the subject will discover which locus he or she had occupied. The "discourse of domination," by contrast, will emerge, in fiction, in the locus of the other. The subject has projected the phallus onto the other with whom he or she has identified. The other is the tyrant and the ruler, for he or she has been assigned a phallic domination. The subject will thus suffer the tyranny of the other.
WHY IS THIS TYRANNICAL BOND ESTABLISHED? I insist on wondering why certain subjects instate this type of "tyranny of the phallic other." There is a possible answer: if these subjects, in their early constitution, find serious inadequacies in the maternal function, a structural defect will appear in the area of the mind that corresponds to the Imaginary. Following Lacan's ideas, we could say that a hole (or void) will form in the area of the Imaginary that corresponds to a hole in the upper left triangle of schema L. This structural defect is permanent and irreparable, yet there may be forms of relief, such as the instatement of an imaginary prosthesis in this structural hole; a symptom may sometimes work as prosthesis. The subject's irresistible tendency to identify with the other also functions sometimes as an imaginary prosthesis, and would correspond to a specular object relation. If the psychic structure is hysterical, the subject will bestow on the other the possession of a wonderful and desired phallus. Object proximity with the phallic other will produce an identification with this desired other and may bring about an illusion of merging, of an "I am you," and, therefore, an illusion
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of control over the other. If this phallic other shows some autonomy, this behavior will generate a strong annoyance and an anxiety crisis in the subject. Such annoyance may take the guise of a primal rage. The other as bearer of the phallus appears as a tyrant. The subject may believe that this tyrannicalfigurecan do with him or her whatever the phallic object pleases. In other words, the phallic tyranny of the other has been established—what I have called here "the discourse of domination."
TRANSFERENCE WITH A PHALLIC SEMBLANCE The analysis I have narrated here has continued satisfactorily. I remain in a phallic transference locus. I am very careful not to interpret excessively (what would seem excessive to the analysand) and prefer to keep silent until I am sure that my intervention will be appropriate. I believe I am working with a hysterical neurotic type of patient with significant deficiencies in her early constitution. Her structural hole in the imaginary is not curable but can be relieved, and she is able to function very well. She has shown other symptoms that she has been able to solve through speech. The most difficult aspect of this analysis has been working on her present love relationship, which appears in the current analytic material. The obstacle we encounter is that the analysand is always certain that she is not loved. Even considering this trait of hers, her life goes on and her progress continues.
ENDNOTES 1. There is no equivalent in English to the Spanish word desencuentro, which refers literally to a dis-encounter (editor's note). 2. Sigmund Freud (1912), Recommendations to Physicians Practicing Psychoanalysis, op. cit. 3. Jacques Lacan (1969-1970), LeSeminaire. LivreXVIL VEnvcrs de la Psychanalyse [The Seminar. Book XVII. Psychoanalysis Upside-Down or the Other Side of Psychoanalysis], op. cit.
27 The Transference Graph
INTRODUCTION TO THE GRAPH: TWO SIDES AND FOUR LEVELS I developed this graph in 1997, to summarize what takes place in the transference throughout the cure.1 It consists of two sides and four levels. The left side corresponds to the analysand and the right side to the analyst. The upper level shows what happens in the transference when there is a prevalence of the imaginary order: the analysand attributes a certain knowledge to the analyst and the latter occupies a locus of semblance without making value judgments. The second level shows what happens when there is a prevalence of the symbolic order: the analyst speaks from a position devoid of certainty and whole truth, that is, s(A). In this level, the analysand is increasingly pushed back into functioning within the imaginary order. The third level shows what happens at a possible articulation of the three registers (RSI). Toward the end of analysis the analyst is deprived of knowledge and appears in the locus of the "waste" (desecho),2 while the analysand becomes what he or she truly is. Finally,
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the Real in the analytic process will be found in (a) the money to be paid, (b) the duration of the session, and (c) the analyst's abstinence or lack of it. These are three elements of the analytic process that may undergo unexpected change, surprising the analysand. They become present (when they are modified) in an arbitrary way. In this graph we have introduced a fourth level, namely, the level beyond the transference. This is the realm of postanalytic effects.
PRESENTATION OF THE GRAPH Transference Graph Analysand
Analyst
(Symptom) Imaginary
(a)
Semblance axis
(SSS)
knowledge axis
Locus of theanalyst
Sq
Locus of privileged
S(s,s,s,s')
listening Suspended Attention (Freud) Zero point point ((ion) MMowon », vv zero (won) I ^ * V « /ToMayDumw(Ucon)
Symbolic
•(A)-
(with silence ana words)
sCA)0* as SRI Borromean logic
Beyond transference
Fantasme
, x S(A) Being
< Being what we are > (being according to desire)
Postanalytic e f f e c t Locus of t h e Symptasme
Dismissal o f the Other Analyst as < useless >
Analyst
Theoretical end o f Analysis
The real in the analytic cure 1. Money paid (variable or not) 2 Duration of session (variable or not) 3 Abstinence of the analyst (variable or not)
Proposed by ft Lander (1997)
FIRST LEVEL: THE IMAGINARY ORDER AND THE LOCUS OF THE ANALYST3 S-f(Si) Z: Refers to the symptom J: Refers to the function of Sx S\. Corresponds to the signifying chain
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In this matheme the analysand shows us his or her analytic demand through the signifying chain, which will constitute, in turn, the veil or clothing of the symptom. The letter Sigma represents the symptom, which is no more than "what doesn't work in the Real." The function of Sx indicates that this signifying chain is a function of something. S2 being the representative of the chain, it is in the signifying chain where the subject will express his or her symptom.
A Knowledge Attributed to the Other The suffering expressed in the symptom will confer a power on the other from whom the analysand expects help. For this reason, we say that analysands grant a knowledge to the other in their imaginary axis, and thereby a power—the power to cure them. Lacan states that the locus the analysand assigns to the analyst is that of the supposition of knowledge, or SsS.4 In addition, the analysand will place the analyst in another privileged locus, that is, the locus of the semblance, which appears in the graph as object (a), located on the side of the analyst and represented with a lowercase a. As we know, this is a very special object that the analysand thinks he or she sets in the analyst. This very special something is a remainder present in the analysand's psyche—an unconscious remainder from the analysand's relationship with the other who had constituted him or her in early childhood.
A Privileged Listener—The Locus of the Analyst The analyst offers the analysand a privileged listening, an attentive listening that guarantees confidentiality and is devoid of value judgment concerning anything the analysand may say. This is an asymmetric listening that establishes otherness or alterity thanks to a self/object discrimination capacity. Such an asymmetry implies that the analyst does not identify with the analysand. When
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engaging in this listening, the analyst has no personal desire to impose upon the analysand and guarantees the confidentiality of the analysand's discourse. To occupy this locus analysts must be properly qualified, that is, must have succeeded in becoming what they truly are at the end of their own analysis. In this way, analysands complete their analysis and become capable of sitting in the analyst's chair. We may say that they have become an analyst.
SECOND LEVEL: THE SYMBOLIC ORDER AND THE LOCUS OF THE ANALYST As an effect of the analyst's privileged listening and thanks to the containment he or she provides, the analysand slips his or her discourse of complaints and demands for cure and happiness into a discourse about him- or herself. That is why in the graph we find the algorithm i(a), which alludes to the fact that the analysand is speaking through his or her memories of earlier identifications. The small letter i refers to the analysand's imaginary identifications with object (a). From this position, the analysand grants the analyst even more power—a supposition of knowledge and a semblance of little a. That is why we say that, from the level of symbolic prevalence, the analysand returns in full force to a bond of imaginary transference.
The Signifier of the (Castrated) Other The analyst eventually intervenes with his or her word. This discourse, which is a privileged one due to the power the analyst receives when acting as semblance for the analysand, will be devoid of the whole truth. That is why, in the graph, the algorithm s(A)— the signifier of the castrated other—appears in the analyst's column. If the analyst occupies the locus of the Master, he or she will speak his or her whole truth. In this case, the analyst will interpret
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with conviction and with the certainty of his or her truth, like a pontiff who reveals Freud's truth. His or her interpretations will act as a full stop to the unconscious material that emerges in the session. We may therefore say that those interpretations charged with the whole truth occlude the analytic process—they close the exploration of the unconscious, they put a stop to the search, they plug up the process. Herein lies the risk of indoctrination. It is better to speak from ignorance, pointing out the little things we may find in the analysand's material. We should invite analysands to question themselves, launching their search for their lost desire, never to be found. Instead of speaking from a position of phallic wisdom, we should suggest to the analysands ideas to be explored further and further. We say that the analyst speaks from the position of a castrated signifier.
Transference Cure Thanks to the analyst's interventions (with this I mean his or her silence or his or her speech), the analysand may perceive himself or herself as "cured of something" and, erroneously, as the bearer of a special knowledge. That is why the analysand appears in the graph with the algorithm s(A). The analysand's behavior entails the danger that he or she may abandon analysis prematurely, erroneously believing that he or she has achieved some sort of cure. Some of these analysands maintain their well-being for quite a long time. In some cases, their analyses may even be considered successful when in fact they did not complete the cure. They terminate their analysis and keep their analyst in an idealized locus, or s(A). They identify with this wise (phallic) analyst and are thus able to maintain their well-being. We are dealing here with a symmetry between two wise (phallic) subjects, that is, a specular identification in the imaginary axis. Lacan affirms that this resistance of analysands to continue their analysis and to pursue its epilogue is ultimately the analyst's resistance to continue with his or her analysis.
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THIRD LEVEL: BORROMEAN LOGIC AND RESIGNIFICATION If the analysand remains in the analytic process and achieves the resignification of his or her earlier identifications, he or she will update his or her system of ideals. A crucial modification will thus take place in the superego due to the resignification of the original signifiers that had been the guarantors of the ideal ego—i(a)—and the ego-ideal—1(A).
Unconscious Resignification The unconscious and automatic censorship that had caused guilt feelings in the analysand will be modified. A space will open for the analysand to update his or her values, sexual desires, and destructive fears. The subject in analysis can gain knowledge about the nature of his or her fantasme. He or she will accept his or her considerable limitations and will know about (everyone's) castration. He or she will discover that he or she is not the Master (of anything). That is why the analysand appears in the graph with the algorithm s(A).
Dismissal of the Phallic Other It is in the analysand's relationship with the analyst that he or she will begin to deprive the analyst of the phallic value the analysand had previously assigned to him or her. The analysand starts to recognize the analyst's limitations and mistakes. That is why the analyst appears in the graph with the algorithm s(A). Having been an idealized analyst, he or she becomes "waste" (des-echo). Such a transformation heralds the end of analysis. The analysand may retain certain semblance elements and some supposition of knowledge (insoluble remnants of the transference), and, at the same time, recognize some insufficiencies and incorporate an element of
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impossibility or lack of harmony into the analytic cure. That is why this third level of the graph refers to the Borromean logic and to an articulation in the SRI.
FOURTH LEVEL: END OF ANALYSIS AND THE QUESTION OF "BEING"—POSTANALYTIC EFFECT The analysand accepts being what he or she really is—his or her true being. He or she says, "I am what I am." This being is not the being of the symptom, even though he or she shows his or her imperfections (which could be taken, erroneously, as new symptoms); it is something different. It is the symptasme,5 and these signifiers had been there from the start, at the basis of the early constitution of the subject. According to each case, the symptasme could adopt the clothing of a symptom without being one—it is the symptasme of "being what I am."
ENDNOTES 1. R6mulo Lander (1997), Grafo de la Transferencia [Transference Graph], presented at the Psychoanalysis Institute (SPC), Caracas. 2. See note 12, Chapter 25 (editor's note). 3. See Chapter 12 for an explanation of the ma theme of the symptom (editor's note). 4. See Chapters 7 and 24 (editor's note). 5. See Chapter 14 for an explanation of this concept (editor's note).
28 The Logic of the Analytic Act (I)
A CALL TO THE KNOWLEDGE IN THE OTHER When a demand for analysis arises due to the presence of psychic suffering or symptoms, the patient, not yet an analysand, makes a call to the other—to the one who is supposed to have knowledge; it is a call to the knowledge in the other. The patient attributes a knowledge to the analyst, and with it he or she grants the analyst a certain power. This locus assigned to the analyst by the patient is a locus without fault, where the analyst is conceived as a whole being and a sage. In psychoanalytic terms, following the Freudian theory of castration, we say that the analyst is a noncastrated subject and the bearer of truth. The patient expects the analyst to occupy the position of knowledge, and the analyst quietly sustains this position by means of his or her attentive listening.
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ANALYTIC DEVICE When patients instate (present and talk about) the symptom in the analytic process, we say that they have become analysands. This
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means that they have gone from the clinical to the analytic symptom; from descriptive phenomenology to working with the unknown; from speaking to freely associating. They are now capable of exploring their internal world in the search for their lost truth. The analysands will thus engage in an analytic work that consists of trying to discover their unattainable, permanentlyfleeingtruths and their mislaid desire. At the same time, the analysts sustain the analysands1 search by avoiding those interventions or interpretations that plug up the lack in the analysands. The analysts do not give final answers to any of the aspects of the analysands' search. BECOMING WASTE (DES-ECHO)1 The analyst knows that he or she is heading toward his or her final destination. At the end of analysis, when the analysand discovers the imperfections and the castrated condition of the analyst, the latter is transformed into a waste. This is the same analyst to whom the analysand had attributed full knowledge and perfection at the beginning of the cure without realizing that such perfection was the projection of his or her own ideals. Both Freud and the postFreudians have asserted that infantile ideals tumble at the end of analysis. The most radical analysts will affirm that at this stage the analysand discovers the castration of the other and, in this way, his or her own castration. Among other things, the analysand faces the reality of his or her own death. This is perhaps the reason why some analysands terminate their analysis without reaching its end.
THE LOCUS OF THE ANALYST Every psychoanalytic session progresses under the effects of the transference. It cannot be otherwise. As we have already seen, analysts will occupy different loci during the unfolding of the analytic process; they will inhabit the locus assigned by the structure of the
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transference. They do not choose their locus but are placed there according to the analysands* childhood history. Transference will enable the revelation of unconscious elements of this history by providing a space where they may be relived. The locus of the analyst, therefore, is that of a semblance—t(a). There, analysts will function through their privileged listening; it is the locus where the analysts listen without making value judgments and in strict confidentiality.
THE NONSYMBOLIZED ELEMENTS OF THE TRANSFERENCE These are vivid and emotional elements linked to early experiences in life that precede the acquisition of language. Through their emotional receptivity, analysts may perceive some of these elements as projections of the analysand and contain them thanks to their containing capacity and reverie.2 At the same time, analysts have to be alert to the appearance of false memories and screen memories. They may point out, interrogate, or interpret the transference in the crucial moments of the analytic process. I want to note here that, even though every session takes place under the effects of the transference, this does not mean that we must interpret the transference in every session.
THE USE AND MISUSE OF TRANSFERENCE INTERPRETATION The excessive use of transference interpretation may lead to the banalization of the transference. I am, therefore, of the opinion that the transference should be interpreted only when we are in the presence of transference anxiety or resistance. The transference, which the analysand construes with his or her early identification objects, will unfold in the imaginary axis. We should mention here that the task assumed by the analyst of supporting
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the weight of the transference is not an easy one. Enduring the feeling of being loved or hated as a decoy for the objects of the past while keeping one's own desire and personal life out of the analytic process eight to ten hours a day is not an easy task either. Again, the need for analysts to undergo a good and deep analysis is confirmed through, and made evident by, our practice. Without that preparation it is not possible to receive and endure the transference without becoming ill.
THE POSITION OF THE ANALYST When analysts decide to intervene with their words, they will do so from a certain position. This position appears as such when analysts utter their word or remain silent while devoid of certainty and of the whole truth, that is, from the position of the castrated subject [the position of the signifier of the castrated Other or s(A)]. Every time analysts speak, analysands expect them to show all their wisdom. Analysands believe that the analysts' words will finally offer them the revealed truth, which will lead to happiness. In the transference, the analyst becomes the repository of the knowledge and love the analysand expects to receive.
SAYING THE UNEXPECTED Analysts surprise the analysands and frustrate them by not satisfying the analysands* demand, that is, by not uttering the revealed truth. Rather, analysts intervene punctuating, questioning, interpreting, and leading the analysands back to working analytically in the quest for their truth—analysts say the unexpected. The analysands' search is the search for that lost truth that they will always find, at best, as a half-truth. The irony is that this truth has always been in the same place—in the analysands' unconscious. That is why, even when analysts interpret, they are interrogating the unconscious of the analysand. Analysts have to
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intervene from the position of the lack of knowledge because knowledge is in the other.
WHEN THE ANALYST KNOWS TOO MUCH Occupying this analytic position is not an easy task either, since analysts have to deal with an unavoidable problem inherent to their profession—they know too much about human nature. The experience of years of practice teaches analysts too many things, and too much knowledge is an unwelcome burden. It makes it difficult for them to occupy their analytic position of ignorance and to interrogate from there the unconscious of the analysand. The knowledge accumulated through years of clinical practice will thus become an obstacle.
WHO IS AN ANALYST? The psychoanalytic session starts from scratch every time, opening a space for the unfolding of the transference. Analysts become present as analysts during the performance of their act. Here the first question arises: Who is an analyst? A possible answer may be:
AN ANALYST IS THE ONE WHO ACTS ACCORDING TO ETHICS Which ethics, the ethics of psychoanalysis, or the ethics of the analyst? There might be a twofold answer here. First, the ethics of the analyst refers to his or her personal ethics. Following Jacques Lacan's teaching, I may consider that this ethics is the ethics of acting in conformity with the desire in the analyst,3 "the ethics of speaking well,"4 and according to Wilfred Bion's teaching, I may consider that the ethics of the analyst consists of "being what we are." As we can see, both thinkers are saying the same thing.
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THE ETHICS OF PSYCHOANALYSIS REFERS TO SOMETHING ELSE This ethics refers to the analysand's expectation and demand that the analyst occupy the locus allotted to him or her in the analytic process—i(a)—and that he or she speak from the analytic position—s(A). The locus of the analyst is one of attentive listening that guarantees confidentiality. Analysts should be qualified to occupy the locus of the semblance without identifying with it. As we have seen, analysts are not placed voluntarily in any subjective locus; rather, analysands will place them according to the analysands* own psychic structure and the vicissitudes of their early childhood.
WHAT IS IT THEN THAT DEFINES PSYCHOANALYSIS? I will not refer here to the frequency of the sessions or to the implementation of an analytic setting. To define psychoanalysis by the frequency of four or five weekly sessions is inaccurate. We all know there are people who attend four or five weekly sessions and lie on the couch, and yet are unable to enter into the analytic process, while others who attend only two or three weekly sessions may do so. The establishment of the analytic device, therefore, does not depend on the frequency of the sessions. Then, if frequency does not define analysis, what does? Lacan defines analysis using the ethical criterion. In other words, for Lacan there is analysis when the analyst occupies the locus of the analyst and speaks from the analytic position.
ENDNOTES 1. See note 12, Chapter 25 (editor's note). 2. See note 1, Chapter 6 (editor's note).
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3. Jacques Lacan (1959-1960), The Seminar. Book VII. The Ethics of Psychoanalysis, 1959-1960, op. cit., p. 314 (editor's note). 4. UEthique du Bien-Dire, in Jacques Lacan, Television: A Challenge to the Psychoanalytic Establishment, edited by Joan Copjec, translated by Denis HoUier, Rosalind Kraus, and Annette Michelson. New York, London: W. W. Norton, 1990:65 (editor's note).
29 The Logic of the Analytic Act (II)
THE HORROR OF THE ACT If the analytic act can bring into consciousness some events of the past that had been repressed, it should not surprise us that this act may acquire a horrific quality. In his note to the Italian group, Lacan states that analysts experience horror regarding their act, to the point that they disavow it.1 The revelations of the unconscious produce anxiety, and that is why these discoveries are so often rejected and returned again to their unconscious state. Analysts should be prepared to tolerate this state of anxiety. Being qualified to endure the horror of their act will then enable them to sustain the revelations suggested in the latent content of the emergent material. Analysts will be able to do the work of the "alpha function" described by Bion,2 or the "work of reverie" this author described and Winnicott developed. They then will be able to endure the veiled presence in the analysands' latent material of their desire to kill their father, mother, siblings, or children, or their incestuous, perverse, envious, evil, homicidal, and scheming desires—in other
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words, those desires that are present in ordinary men and women and that analysts will be able to endure in the analysands because they have examined their own.
THE DIRECTION OF THE ANALYSIS The analysts' task is to help analysands learn the nature and the purpose of their own desires. Analysts must neither veil nor censor such a desire, nor applaud it, but rather enable the analysands to become aware of it. The analysts' work does not involve adjusting the analysands to society but helping them to be what they truly are, that is, helping them to act in conformity with their desires. The demand of analysands is a demand for well-being and happiness. Once analysands have disassembled their various symptoms and their awareness of being has begun to emerge, they realize that it is not possible to live in this world without a certain quantity of suffering, that is to say, of jouissance. Sometimes analysands cannot endure all these individual desires, and they must hide them, disguise them, give them an imaginary appearance, a clothing that will enable them to conceal the horror these desires arouse, thus hindering the progress of analysis.
THE LIMITS OF THE ACT The analytic act has its limits, which are given by the depth of each analyst's personal analysis. Analysts will not be able to work with the analysands on those elements they have not revised in their own analysis. Analysts will not be able to bear the horror of what they have not explored and do not know about themselves because of repression. In the apparent content of his or her speech, the analysand will suggest to the analyst something that the latter will not be able to detect—the analyst will not see the horror of what is present in the latent content. The analyst's desire, which will be what will finally lead him or her to the level of depth of his or her
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own analysis, has thus set unique limits to his or her act. Lacan states that psychoanalysts work using first their own symptoms, and then their fantasmes, as a reference. It is there that we will find the scope of their practice and the limits to their act.
AN UNTENABLE ACT The analytic act itself—the pure analytic act—is that by which analysts occupy their locus as a semblance and a receiver of the transference and speak from the position that corresponds to the analyst, namely, the position of not knowing, of the castrated subject. From this position the analysts, in the unfolding of the analysis, will daily query the unconscious of the analysands through misunderstandings or through open interpretations. To endure the passage of time, this process requires an analysand who is able to bear the solitude and anxiety of analysis and an analyst who can tolerate the horror of his or her act. Each analyst's style will give him or her a sense of the right time to intervene or to interpret, and the good sense to decide what to ignore from the emergent material and what to work on analytically. Melanie Klein used to say that everything that produces anxiety in the analysand may be interpreted immediately, whereas Freud would say that if patients are not prepared to assimilate or to understand our interpretation, they will simply ignore it. If analysts use these criteria to define the right time to act, analysis will become tolerable for both analysts and patients. During the analytic process, however, the analysts' concern (or anxiety) for the patients' wellbeing leads them to carry out other types of acts within the analytic process that differ from the pure analytic act. I am referring here to the pedagogic act and the orthopedic act.3
THE PEDAGOGIC ACT Through the pedagogic act the analyst, by means of words, proceeds to inform and to educate the analysand regarding a pressing
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issue. It is generally an issue that endangers the health, life, or personal property of the analysand or of his or her family. We could say that the analyst gives advice on a specific aspect of the analysand's life, that is, urgent matters such as the dangers of an unwanted pregnancy or the negation of serious health problems (like cancer) that jeopardize the analysand's life. Sometimes the issue at hand is an obvious instance of deceit that may threaten the analysand's property or that of his or her family and that has been negated or ignored by the analysand due to an unconscious need for punishment. The analyst may point out the mechanism of negation and its consequences, trying to hide or slighdy conceal the pedagogic act, or may just abandon the locus of the analyst and express concern regarding the danger the analysand faces. This rarely happens, but it does occur. In these cases, the analyst rightfully leaves his or her analytic locus and occupies that of the whole other, that is, of the other who knows, who is not castrated [s(A)J. Later on, the analyst may rescue himself or herself and return to his or her locus as object (a), the locus of the semblance.
THE ORTHOPEDIC ACT The orthopedic act is that act whereby the analyst, using the enormous power the analysand grants him or her in the transference, proceeds to support, order, or forbid something that is important or even vital for the analysand. The most common example is when the analyst acts as support for the analysand when he or she believes that he or she is crumbling or that his or her psychic functions are collapsing. This support works as a cane or crutch, hence the name orthopedic for this type of act. We find it more frequendy in deficient neurotic structures that attach themselves to the love object and to the analyst. In the face of the analysands' separation experiences (object losses), they may collapse. In the period of separation due to the holidays, the analysands* intense anxieties may be relieved if the analyst assures them that they can tolerate such a separation, thus offering a supportive element for their
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psyche. The analyst's voice (orthopedics through identification) will keep the analysands company and will tell them that they will be able to tolerate the separation until the therapy resumes. To hear the analyst's voice in the latter's answering machine is sometimes enough to produce an orthopedic effect. In the case of subjects with a phobic structure, the analyst's voice telling them that they can get on the plane and travel or that they can take the feared exam and that they will perform well may produce a very beneficial effect. In these cases the analyst, in a passage to act (or enactment), will voluntarily occupy the place of the whole, faultless Other, or s(A). Later on, the analyst should retrieve his or her proper locus—he or she should remain silent and return to the locus of the semblance.
THE POWER OF THE TRANSFERENCE I would like to stress that this is not an analytic act, but that throughout the process of working with serious neurotic disturbances with a deficit in the imaginary, analysts will need to rightfully resort to pedagogic and orthopedic acts. Nevertheless, over time, they should be able to stop performing such acts and recapture the locus and the position of the analyst. These acts are produced generally at specific moments in one session and, very rarely, in several sessions. The power granted to the analyst in the transference sustains the possibility of successfully forbidding or authorizing the analysand to do different things. I refer here to suicidal or homicidal moments during the analytic process. The analysand's unconscious indicators show the risk of suicide or homicide and the analyst cannot ignore them. The analyst should point out these indicators to the analysand and thus open a psychic space for the former to become present in the session. If the analyst succeeds, the analysand's suicidal or homicidal desires may usually be controlled within the analytic dialogue without the need for an orthopedic act. In some cases, when the impulse (the desire) to act is very strong, the analyst may use his or her transference power to
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forbid the analysand's passage to the act. The analyst's voice bears a power that is very useful in this type of serious neurotic disturbance, which operates entirely under the primal all-or-nothing principle. These analysands lack restraint and are not very reflexive, and they may easily pass to the act.
THE ANALYST IN THE ACT There are moments during the analytic process when analysts may perform either a passage to the act (enactment) or an acting out. As I have explained earlier,4 the notion of acting out refers to an act without a subject—an act the subject performs to relieve his or her anxiety without being aware of his or her unconscious conflict. How is it possible for analysts to act out during the session? The truth is that it is perfecdy possible for them not only to act out but also to present an acute somatic symptom. How do we explain this? Would it be due to the analysts' own inadequate or insufficient analysis? Not necessarily.
THE ANALYST AND DESIRE No matter how deep and prolonged the analyst's analysis may have been (and here we should remember the oceanic dimension of the unconscious), there are many aspects of the unconscious (mainly in the imaginary axis) that do not have access to language. This explains why projective identifications of the analyst may appear that trigger problems in the countertransference. With good reason, Lacan prefers to call this phenomenon "the analyst's transference." Such transference has no legitimate place in the analytic process. In the same way, the analyst's acting out has no legitimate place in the session, and neither does the analyst's sudden conversion symptom or somatic symptom. Still, it does happen. These manifestations of the countertransference (or of the analyst's transference) do not result from the analyst's inadequate or insufficient
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analysis but from a synchrony and symmetry between the analyst's repressed conflict and that of the analysand.
THE ANALYST IN SYMMETRY WITH THE ANALYSAND It is impossible to expect the analysts' psyches to become blank slates after their own personal analysis. Consequently, it is possible that, for haphazard reasons, the analyst may fall into symmetry with unconscious elements of the analysand. In this way, the analyst's arbitrary act may appear. For example, an analysand may find an analyst with his or her analytic capacities intact, and the following analysand, one hour later, may find that in this new session the same analyst produces a coughing fit or experiences an urgent need to urinate, a sudden and powerful sickness feeling, or a chest pain when certain unexpected material is presented. This analysand in particular has mobilized in the analyst unresolved aspects of the latter's imaginary axis. The analyst's analytic functions will be restored with the next analysand. In the same way, the analyst may perform an acting out. Examples of the latter: forgetting about an analysand who is waiting for a session in the waiting room while the analyst does something else; asking twice for the same monthly payment; forgetting to bill the analysand; refusing the analysand's acceptable request for a change in the appointment time; being bothered by the emergent material or by a peculiar behavior of the analysand; developing an erotic seductive behavior toward the analysand; or falling asleep during a session. In some cases these acts may be caused by the analyst's inadequate analysis or by a personal crisis in his or her life. In other cases, a symmetry with the repressed material in the analysand has generated that particular effect in the analyst, with the corresponding acting out. This act may lead the analyst to reexamine those elements of his or her psyche and, possibly, to know himself or herself better, in a never-ending process. Analysts thus cannot escape the learning effect and the
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consequent personal evolution that the analysand brings about in them.
ETHICS AND THE ANALYTIC SETTING In psychoanalysis, words and silence constitute an act. Every session starts from scratch and progresses under the effect of the transference and countertransference (and the analyst's transference as well). It is in the performance of his or her analytic act that the analyst will emerge as such. What defines an act as analytic is its ethics and not the analytic setting.
THE ANALYST AND HIS OR HER WORD—A SUMMARY When analysts decide to intervene with their word, they will do so from a certain position. What is this position? It is the one where analysts utter their word or silence from the position of the castrated subject, without the conviction of truth. Every time analysts speak, analysands expect them to do so from their full wisdom. Analysands believe that the analyst's word will finally offer them the revealed truth, which will lead to peace and happiness. The analysts are then the receiver, in the transference, of the knowledge and love the analysands expect in turn to receive. When engaging in their act, analysts will find the limits, the horror, and the untenability of such an act. In their concern (or anxiety) for the well-being of the analysand, analysts may depart from the pure analytic act and slip into the pedagogic or the orthopedic act. We designate as a pedagogic act the one whereby the analyst proceeds to inform and educate the analysand through words in relation to some urgent matter. In general, it is a matter that endangers the health, life, or personal property of the analysand or of his or her family. We could say that the analyst proceeds to give advice on a specific aspect of the analysand's life. We designate as the orthopedic
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act the one whereby the analyst, using the enormous power the analysand grants him or her in the transference, proceeds to order or forbid the analysand to do something in particular that is vital or important for the latter. It is most common for the analyst to act as a support for the analysand when the latter believes that his or her psychic functioning is collapsing.
ENDNOTES 1. Jacques Lacan (1973), "Note to the Italian Group," translated by Russell Grigg, Analysis No. 7, Centre for Psychoanalytic Research, Melbourne, Australia, 1997. 2. Wilfred Bion developed this concept in "A Theory of Thinking," International Journal of Psycho-Analysis 43:306-310 and in Learning from Experience. London: Heinemann, 1962. According to R. D.Hinshelwood "the term 'alpha function' stands for the unknown process involved in taking raw sense data and generating out of it mental contents which have meaning, and can be used for thinking" (A Dictionary ofKleinian Thought. London: Free Associations Books, 1991: 217) (editor's note). 3. See Chapter 25 (editor's note). 4. See Chapter 19 (editor's note).
30 The Logic of Specificity
WHAT DEFINES PSYCHOANALYSIS? We have frequently observed that the first answer given to this difficult question quotes the technical principles of psychoanalysis. Yet defining the specificity of psychoanalysis by its technique has turned out to be inaccurate. The presence of the transference, the frequency and regularity of the sessions, interpretation in and of itself, the acceptance of the unconscious, free association, the analytic setting, and regression and resistance do not grant psychoanalysis its true specificity. These are important aspects of psychoanalytic theory and technique and they shape the way we work, but they do not define psychoanalysis in its uniqueness—they are present in other types of interviews and therapeutic approaches. In these various therapeutic approaches we find that transference (albeit not worked analytically), interventions to give advice (that might sometimes be considered interpretations), resistance (which is sometimes ignored), a regularity in the sessions with either high or low frequency, and regression (which may take other names) are present, as is the acceptance of the existence and significance of the unconscious (named differendy as well).
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WHEN CAN WE SAY THAT A SESSION IS ACTUALLY AN ANALYTIC SESSION? I suggest that the specificity of psychoanalysis lies in the analyst's person and not in analytic technique. I am referring here to the analyst's ability to incorporate two elements that are specific to a very special ability and training: the mode of listening and the singularity of what the analyst says.
Mode of Listening Analysts have a particular way of listening that is difficult to acquire and therefore requires a deep personal analysis. I am referring to the ability to listen without making a value judgment, that is, to listen without being in symmetry with the analysand. The human being's natural attitude is to listen with empathy and with a tendency to identify with the speaker. In this way, the personal values and system of ideals of the listener are activated, inevitably producing a value judgment. Analysts are the only ones who, due to their vocation, training (personal analysis), and learning (and maybe also a natural gift), can listen without identifying, and therefore without operating—through unconscious mechanisms—with value judgments. Analysts thus provide a special and privileged listening specific to psychoanalysis. If we found this special mode of listening in other types of interviews, we would say that they offer a psychoanalytic listening, because this mode of listening is specific to psychoanalysis.
The Singularity of the Analyst's Speech In the same way, the analyst's intervention is a particular one, be it an intervention through the word (interpretation), through the analyst's act, or through silence. The analyst is neither a counselor nor a guide—neither approves nor disapproves. The analyst is
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neither a judge nor a professor. He or she is the only one who, in speaking, seeks to show the route to the unconscious, be it by pointing out the transference or by unveiling the repressed. Preferably, the analyst intervenes from where he or she is not expected and in a somewhat enigmatic manner. The effects the word will have will depend on the listener, since the latter will be the only one to discover the effect of whatever he or she has heard under the tyranny of his or her own subjectivity. Again, we find that this special way of speaking (the analyst's word) is unique and specific to psychoanalysis.
31 The Logic of Psychoanalytic Supervision
TEACHING OR DISCOVERING? Psychoanalytic supervision is a learning opportunity, both through teaching and through discovery. Thus, supervision covers two key dimensions: first, the transmission of psychoanalytic knowledge, often called "teaching"; and second, the discovery candidates will make of their new, previously unknown capacity to carry out the analytic act. Supervision offers a space to perform this difficult task, a space subjected to the unavoidable presence of the transference and countertransference. Candidates will (or will not) be able to discover their capacity to detect the unconscious in the material the analysand presents in the session. The supervisor cannot bestow or teach this special ability. Nonetheless, candidates who possess such an ability may not know how to work with it or may encounter difficulties or interferences, resistances or blind areas to the horror that the discovery of that repressed content within themselves might produce. Supervisors can help candidates recognize and analytically explore these contents. It is in the analytic
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work carried out by the supervisor and the personal analyst that the potential for the candidate's transformation resides. In this way, a synergy may emerge between the work of the supervisor and that of the personal analyst.
THE PROBLEM OF THE TRAINING MODEL The problem of the boundaries of psychoanalytic supervision and of the depth it may reach in relation to the candidate's psyche has given rise to intense debates since the 1930s. In 1953 Noami Blitzten and Joan Fleming, among others, claimed that the supervisor should also engage in a therapeutic work with the supervisee.1 They affirmed that a good supervision helps students recognize their own unresolved psychic conflicts, and they recommended that candidates explore such conflicts analytically with the supervisor when the conflicts interfered with the candidates' analytic work. By contrast, Jacob Arlow insisted on the need to define the boundaries of supervision.2 He affirmed that the supervisors' interventions should be constrained in their depth—that in relation to the candidates' psyche, such interventions should only refer to the most superficial phenomena, maybe pointing out only the most evident unconscious motivations without trying to interpret. Arlow asserted that we must not forget that the psychoanalytic supervision is an experience whose only role is the transmission of (theoretical and technical) knowledge. Le6n Grinberg, in turn, in his well-known text on psychoanalytic supervision, clearly establishes the difference between the latter and personal analysis when he affirms that psychoanalytic interpretation should take place only in the space of personal analysis.3 If the supervisor gave an interpretation to the candidate, with this act he or she would be transforming psychoanalytic supervision into personal analysis. Grinberg considers that far from helping the teaching-learning process, interpreting the supervisee creates unnecessary distortions in it. When necessary, he prefers to recommend that the supervisee bring such elements observed in the supervision to his or her personal analysis.
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ANALYSENKONTROLLE AND KONTROLLANALYSE These discrepancies concerning the establishment of a model for analytic supervision may be traced back to the beginnings of psychoanalysis. Max Eitingon made his famous proposal to reorganize psychoanalytic education in Berlin in 1922. 4 There he suggested the classic tripod of psychoanalytic training, namely, training (or didactic) analysis, clinical supervision, and official seminars. Eitingon even suggested that candidates not begin their analytic practice until they had finished their training analysis. This aspect of his proposal was not welcomed by the European institutes of the time. From then on, the boundaries between clinical supervision and training analysis were never established in a technically clear way. Coincidentally with Eitingon's model, Sandor Ferenczi and Otto Rank developed a different project in Budapest in 1924, suggesting that candidates begin their analytic practice when still in training analysis.5 This training analysis was called Analysenkontrolle, while the analytic supervision was called Kontrollanalyse. Such a designation reveals the inverted facets of the same process. Ferenczi and Rank expected candidates to analytically explore the unconscious relationship they established with their patients and thus achieve a deeper understanding of their own resistances and difficulties in the conduct of their analytic work. In their training analysis or Analysenkontrolle, candidates could explore even more openly and in more depth the origin of their difficulties with, and resistances to, analytic work. What is important about this model is that the Hungarians considered that, in the environment of analytic clinical supervision, candidates could be invited to associate freely and to explore more deeply the nature of the relationship that they maintained with their patients. There were two different aspects to this relationship. One was the emotional response of the analyst to what the patient projected (called countertransference), and the other was the analyst's transference. Ferenczi and Rank mentioned Freud and said that the analysis candidates conducted could not go beyond the unconscious
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conflicts worked and solved by the analysts themselves. The limits of the candidates' own analysis would constitute the limits of the candidates' analytic act. It was clear to them that the candidates' transference reactions to their patients were the most important thing to be explored analytically, and that the transmission of theoretical and technical knowledge was secondary. The personal analyst would conduct the Analy$enkontrolle> and the supervisor, the Kontrollanalyse. The topic is both controversial and crucial. At different times since 1930, different analysts have taken a stance in relation to this dilemma. In the 1950s, for instance, both M. Grotjahn and S. Keiser stated that they considered it very valuable for personal analysts to become their former analysands' analytic supervisor after the training analysis had ended.6 They believed that the postanalytic transference relationship and the knowledge the now-supervisor had of the candidate, derived from the analysis, would increase the depth of the supervising work.
APPROACHES WITHIN THE INTERNATIONAL PSYCHOANALYTIC ASSOCIATION (IPA) At present, in almost all the IPA institutes it is standard to respect the approach that limits the analytic clinical supervision in a voluntary way. It is not an official norm of the IPA, but the general practice insists on maintaining a clear division between the fields of training analysis and official supervision, coinciding with the guidelines expressed by Arlow and Grinberg. Nevertheless, in the intimacy of their work, many analytic supervisors who are members of the IPA continue to consider it useful for the candidate's transformation process to have access to the candidate's personal life and internal world, allowing the supervisor to explore in the supervision different aspects related to the transference and countertransference processes. This approach implies a greater freedom to occupy an analytic position in the supervision. It seems that, seen from a historical perspective, what led to the abandonment of the Hungarian model were the difficulties that
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arose from the transference power placed on the figure of the clinical supervisor, which was added to the power already attributed to the training analyst. How much power is it advisable to accumulate in these two figures? How much theoretical rivalry may develop between them? How to reconcile what seems to be the simultaneous presence of two analysts? If the relationship between them is friendly and if there are no serious theoretical or conceptual differences regarding the nature of what they both mean by psychoanalysis, then the Hungarian model could be applied successfully without further conflict. In that case, the candidate would have an extraordinary opportunity for transformation. If the conditions of the relationship between the two analysts are different, then the IPA-Eitingon model would be the most suitable. Still, we must acknowledge that even if we use any of these two models, the candidate will unavoidably maintain a working relationship with two analysts with whom he or she establishes a transference bond, and that a third analyst will appear with the second official supervision. The presence of the third analyst will be useful in helping the candidate discriminate between the two preceding ones.
A CLINICAL VIGNETTE I will illustrate this dilemma of the two models with a clinical vignette of a candidate under supervision. This supervisee is a 35year-old married male candidate. He says that he takes written notes of the analysis of two of his male patients, this not being the case with the rest of his patients. He brings one of these cases to supervision with Esperanza P£rez de Pla.7 This particular analysand is a 27-year-old single man who suffers from homosexual anxieties. In a recent opportunity, while being drunk, he had a sexual encounter in a car with a homosexual transvestite. During his supervision, the candidate has shown a certain difficulty in working analytically with this patient. The candidate says he is more interested in working with his next patient. He smiles and adds that the latter is a beautiful woman. On another occasion
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he says that his male patient does things that bother and irritate him. For example, this patient invites an attractive woman to go out and describes the encounter in some detail. The patient says that they had a good time and that at the end she kissed him. He left because he says he did not feel anything. He compares this episode with feelings he had in the past toward another woman. Finally, the anaiysand tells this woman they can only be friends. He rejected another woman because she would arrive late when they went out together. The candidate says, uTo me, when he . . . repeatedly complains about women, it sounds absurd His complaints are absurd, and I find myself irritated What I find most disturbing is the thought that he suffers from a heterosexual block, because at bottom he is looking for something homosexual, and this, to me, is absurd." And he adds, "Sometimes, irritated, I think, but don't say, 'You are sexually blocked with women because you're thinking about men.'" The most important help analytic supervisors can offer to a candidate under supervision has to do with the transference and countertransference elements that are present in the material. It is, therefore, unavoidable—and also necessary and potentially profitable—to work analytically with the candidate's psychic life. In this particular case, we must show the candidate that he may suffer from some form of homosexual anxiety. We must point out to him that the irritation he feels regarding the patient's so-called heterosexual block may arise from his own frustrated desire that his patient will stop thinking about men. In the analytic supervision it is most important to show the candidate these repressed elements and to invite him to elaborate on them in the context of the transference and countertransference. To ignore these issues and to concentrate on the analysand's psychic life (his complaints about not having a girlfriend or his difficulties in keeping a girlfriend) will favor the candidate's unconscious resistance concerning his own sexual desires and conflicts, which is what is really interfering with his analytic work. This sexual conflict is what prevents the candidate from occupying his locus and his position as analyst. Unveiling these repressed elements will undoubtedly produce anxiety in the candidate.
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These elements may be worked through in the psychoanalytic supervision as much as the time constraints will permit. Later on, the candidate may bring all these anxieties to his daily analytic session. When the candidate brings to analysis fragments of sessions with his own patients through free association, an entirely new world of problems opens up for the training analyst. The latter must determine when this associative material serves resistance and when it serves the analysis. Here the case-by-case law applies. For instance, in the case of this candidate I have just mentioned, he could bring to his personal analysis all these anxieties in relation to his personal repressed sexual desires that were mobilized in the session he had with an analysand, and then discuss them again in his meeting with his analytic supervisor. In the context of his personal analysis, this material would serve his analysis. Not speaking about it would imply a resistance to gaining knowledge about himself. Yet not all cases are like this one. Sometimes candidates flood their personal analysis with clinical material coming from a session with an analysand, running the risk of increasingly transforming their analysis into a supervision. In the latter case, bringing this material would serve resistance.
SUPERVISION AND RESISTANCE I want to introduce here another clinical vignette that may help illustrate this last point even better. It is associative material a candidate brings to her training analysis (not to the supervision). This material refers to a case that the candidate is analyzing, and it could imply an attempt to slip the personal analysis into a clinical supervision. The outcome shows that the material produced served analysis and not resistance.8 The candidate lies down on the couch and associates about an analysand that she has seen the previous day. Even before today's session she had already thought about this analysand several times. She thought of the unfolding of suffering and of the apparent need to suffer that this analysand often shows. The candidate begins to
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reconstruct parts of that session. She narrates that the analysand complains about her ex-boyfriend, with whom she has occasional encounters. She complains about his lack of fitness and cleanliness, and especially about his smoking, even though she had a good time with him. Then she talks about another former boyfriend, who to her surprise has invited her out again. She complains about this man's disposition and about the fact that even though he seeks her, he says he does not like brunettes, that he loves blond women. This patient has brown hair. She feels rejected and not loved, and yet she continues dating him. Here the candidate expresses her own annoyance and she exclaims, "That man is an idiot!" Her analysand keeps complaining, now about her new job. She complains that she has to work downtown and that the people there are very ugly. In the same way, she complains about her coworkers because they are ordinary and ugly. The candidate adds that when talking about these topics, this analysand always conveys a victim's feelings with a certain transferential masochistic pleasure. The candidate tells me that she cannot tolerate the annoyance this analysand arouses in her, and she does not like to feel this way. She complains that in the last eight months, due to the patient's unemployment, she has had to reduce weekly sessions from three to one, which has made her feel somewhat upset. The candidate says that she does not understand how some analysts can work comfortably with one session a week. I intervene and tell her that she is suffering, but that the most important thing is the way she tells me about this suffering. I understand that if she saw her analysand morefrequendyshe would suffer less; it would be more comfortable for her. I think: What about me? Would she want to see me more often? Might she be suffering with me? Finally I suggest to her that the reduction of the number of sessions brings about a feeling of impotence in the practice of her analytic work and that the impotence is what she cannot bear. I add that the candidate's desire is to change the life of her analysand and make her go out with more appropriate men, not with an idiot. Here the candidate faces an impossibility, and hence she suffers (as a product of her transference).
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The candidate listens to this interpretation and says that she is certain that she is suffering, but she does not agree with the reason I have suggested for such suffering. She tells me that now she realizes what is going on. She understands that she suffers because with the setting of one weekly session, the analysand can only reach a cathartic evacuation of her annoyances and complaints, and then there is no time for doing anything else. The candidate cannot find time in the session to open an analytic space—everything is a cathartic evacuation. The next session, a week later, the same thing will occur. Many things will have happened in one week, and therefore the session will always become a cathartic evacuation. The candidate suggests that her suffering stems from not being able to satisfy her desire to carry out her analytic work. She is forced to be no more than a receiver of her patient's cathartic evacuation. I ask her if that is not also part of the analytic function. The candidate answers that she understands that this is the case, but that at this stage in her career she prefers to be able to work by querying the patient's unconscious, and that with this patient she needs more than one session a week to progress from the locus of simple container to that of inquiry. She says that now she has realized that it is imperative to add at least one session per week and to place it preferably very close to the first one. Having two sessions close together would prevent the patient's accumulation of new evacuative material, and the candidate could try to get the patient to begin to question herself about this strange addiction to suffering. Now, from the point of view of the candidate, what has happened from the analytic perspective? Has all this worked in the service of resistance? Has there been some opening to unconscious elements? Has something been revealed? The truth is, not too much. These associations enabled the analytic exploration of a few things in relation to desire. What is it that this candidate wants to do with her patient? This undoubtedly is not a case of juror curandis (the belief that analysts can cure it all). But neither should one perpetuate an uncomfortable analytic situation that, if not worked through by the candidate, might lead to the latter's unconscious rejection of the patient. This ex-
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ploration was achieved. It opened up this candidate's oedipal area— the oedipal girl who refuses at first to be a passive witness, and later the mere container of the mother's suffering. The girl was willing neither to tolerate this suffering nor to remain passive in front of it. From here stems the idea that "I must do something else because I feel uncomfortable." This development shows that due to the transference of her childhood oedipal elements to her relationship with her analysand, remaining passive makes the candidate very uncomfortable. The candidate has discovered that such passivity is not possible for her. It was not possible during her oedipal stage, nor is it possible now. Consequently, this material, which at first impression seems like a clinical supervision, looks now like an associative material that may serve the analysis and not resistance.
IN OTHER WORDS—SUMMARIZING Psychoanalytic supervision becomes a learning opportunity through teaching and discovery. Supervision thus covers two key dimensions, namely, the transmission of psychoanalytic knowledge (often referred to as teaching) and the candidates' discovery of their new ability to perform the analytic act. The supervision will offer candidates a space to carry out this difficult task in the unavoidable presence of the transference with the supervisor. The problem of the limited scope of psychoanalytic supervision in relation to the candidates' psyche has caused intense debates during the last sixty years. There are analysts who claim that analytic supervision should include therapeutic work with the supervisee. They affirm that a good supervision helps candidates recognize their unresolved psychic conflicts, and they recommend exploring such conflicts analytically with the supervisor when they interfere with the candidates' analytic work. Other analysts, by contrast, insist on the need to define the boundaries of supervision. They affirm that the supervisor's interventions should be limited in relation to their depth, mainly
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avoiding interpretations. These analysts argue that psychoanalytic interpretation should take place only in the space of personal analysis. These discrepancies in relation to the model to use in clinical supervision have their origin in earlier years, when Max Eitingon9 set forth his famous proposal of the tripod to reorganize psychoanalytic education in Berlin.
ENDNOTES 1. M. Blitzten and J. Fleming (1953), What Is Supervisory Analysis? Bulletin of the Menninger Clinic 17:117-129. 2. Jacob Arlow (1963), The Supervisory Situation. JAPA 11:576-594. 3. Le6n Grinberg (1965), La Supervisidn Psicoanalitica [Psychoanalytic Supervision]. Buenos Aires: Editorial Paidos. [I have not found an English translation, editor's note.] 4. Max Eitingon (1922), Report to the International Training Commission. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis 7:130-134. 5. Sandor Ferenczi and Otto Rank (1924), Entwicklungszwiele der Psychoanalyse. Vienna: New Arbeiten zur arzzlichen Psa. 6. M. Grotjahn (1955), Problems and Techniques in Supervision. Psychiatry 18:9-15; S. Keiser (1956), The Technique of Supervised Analysis. JAPA 4:539-549. 7. I am grateful to Esperanza P6rez de Pla, from Mexico, for allowing me to discuss this case with her during the 39th IPA International Congress, San Francisco (1995). 8. The candidate in question has authorized the use of this material. 9. Eitingon (1922), op. cit.
Index
Absent Other, 52-53. See also Other saying the unexpected, 244-245 Absolute jouissance, 64. See also transference, nonsymbolized Jouissance elements of, 243 Addictions, borderline states, transference interpretation, 243-245 160-161 who is an analyst, 245-246 Adhesive states, borderline states, Analytic act (II), 248-256 154-155 analyst in, 253 Affirmation, psychoses, 166-167 desire, analyst and, 253-254 Althusser, Louis, xvi direction of analysis, 249 Anaclitic object, 36 ethics, 255 Analyst, object (a) and, 59-60 horror of, 248-249 Analytic act (I), 241-247 limits of, 249-250 analyst orthopedic act, 251-252 locus of, 242-243 pedagogic act, 250-251 position of, 244 symmetry of analyst and analytic device, establishment of, 241-242 analysand, 254 becoming waste, 242 transference, power of, 252call to knowledge in other, 241 253 knowing too much, 245 untenable act, 250
272
INDEX
Analytic symptom, clinical symptom and, 84. See also Symptom Annihilation anxiety, defined, 25 Anxiety, 2 3 - 2 8 defined, 2 3 - 2 4 Freudian perspective, 24 object (a) and, 27, 59 presence in excess, 2 6 - 2 7 present absence, 27 subject and, 45 types of, 2 4 - 2 6 Anzieu, Didier, 153 Arlow, Jacob, 261, 263
recognition and affirmation needs, 150 second skin, 153-154 sexuality identity, 155-156 specificity dimensions, 147148 Borromean knot. See also RSI graph RSI graph, 17 subject and, 47-48 symptom as signifier, 78 topology and, RSI graph, 20-22 transference graph, 239-240 Buftuel, Luis, 154
Bereavement, depression, 121-123 Bick, Esther, 2 5 , 1 5 3 Big Other, 53. See also Other Bion, Wilfred, 2 5 , 1 5 3 , 1 5 8 , 1 7 4 175, 200, 208, 212, 245 Bisexuality, negative transference, 229-230 Bleger,Jos£, 154 Blitzten, Naomi, 261 Borderline states, 147-162 adhesive or parasitic states, 154-155 compulsions and addictions, 160-161 domination, discourse of, 151153 hole, 149-150 ideals system, 156-158 impulse control, 159-160 object relations, 151 paradigm problems, 148-149 perspective, reversal of, 158159
Castration anxiety, 23-24 imaginary, suicide, 136-137 Castration anxiety, defined, 26 Cathexis, object, 34-35 Cause, 68-76 complemental series, 68-69 psychic conflict, 72-73 psychic deficit, logic of, 73-75 RSI graph, 75 trauma, logic of, 69-72 Clinical symptom, analytic symptom and, 84. See also Symptom Complemental series, cause, 6869 Compulsions, borderline states, 160-161 Cut, subject in the moment of, 45-46 Death drive, suicide, 135 Delusions, psychoses, 171-172
INDEX Depression, 120-130 bereavement and mourning, 121-123 clinical manifestations, 123124 depressive state, 127-129 jouissance, 125-127 masochism, 124-125 structure or symptom, 120-121 suicide, 129-130 Desire, 1-7 analyst and, analytic act (II), 253-254 Freudian perspective, 1-2 instatement of, 3 lack, dialectic of, 6 need, 4-5 object (a), loss of, 5-6 of the Other, 1 of the Other's desire, 3 satisfaction experience of, 2 repetition of, 2-3 series of signiflers, 10 specifications, 3-4 subject and, 44-45 Despair, depressive state, 128-129 Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) borderline states, 147-148 symptom, 77-78 Dissociative crisis, hysterical madness, 106-107 Drive, object of, 33-34 Eitingon, Max, 262, 264 Empty speech, full speech and, transference structure, 207
273
Enunciation, statement and, subject, 43 Ethics analytic act (I), 245-246 analytic act (II), 255 suicide, 131-132 Exhibitionism, perversion, 182-183 Experience, of satisfaction, desire, 2 Fading of subject, 46-47 Fantasme, 89-93 construction of, 90-91 defined, 89-90 matheme of, 91-92 perversion, 185-187,188-189 symptasme and, 94-95 symptom and, 92 transference structure, 216 traversing of, 92-93 Fantasy, trauma, logic of, cause, 70-71 Feminine jouissance, 64. See also Jouissance Fenichel, Otto, 178 Ferenczi, Sandor, 262 First signifier, 14 Flaviusjosephus, 145 Fleming, Joan, 261 Fragments, object (a), 56-57 Freud, Sigmund, 1-3,11-12, 20, 24, 26,34-36,61,62,64,65, 68, 71, 72-73, 79,89,94, 124-125,133,135,148,166, 178-179,185,192, 207-208, 242, 262 Full speech, empty speech and, transference structure, 207
274
INDEX
Goldstein, Mirta, 71, 72 Grinberg, Leon, 261, 263 Grotjahn, M., 263 Guilbaud, Georges, 21 Guilt, masochism, depression, 124-125 Hallucination, psychoses, 171-172 Hate depressive state, 127-128 toward object, suicide, 136 transference structure, 210-211 Hegel, G. W. F., 3 Heroic suicide, 130,143-144. See also Suicide Hole borderline states, 149-150 depression, 123-124 subject and, 48-49 Hope, dialectic of, suicide, 133-134 Hopelessness, depressive state, 128-129 Hysteria, 99-107 madness, 106-107 matheme of, 101-105 phenomenology of, 99-101 types of, 105 Hysterization phenomenon, obsession, 112-113 Ideals system, borderline states, 156-158 Imaginary castration, suicide, 136-137 Imaginary order. See also RSI graph narcissistic (imaginary) axis, phobias, 108-109
RSI graph, 17,18 transference graph, 235-237 Impasse, resistance or, negative transference, 219-220 Impulse control, borderline states, 159-160 Inner emptiness. See Hole International Classification of Diseases (ICD) borderline states, 147-148 symptom, 77-78 International Psychoanalytic Association (IPA), supervision, 263-264 Interpretation, transference, 202, 243-244 Jakobson, Roman, 9 Jouissance, 61-67 depression, 125-127 logic of, 62-63 masochism, 64-65 perverse structure, 193-194 pleasure and, 66 psychic suffering, 61-62 relief of state of, 65-66 series of signifiers, 10 symptasme matheme (1), 96-97 as symptom, 65 symptom ma themes (1), 80-82 types of, 63-64 Joyce,James,87,88 Keiser, S., 263 Klein, Melanie, 25,36-37, 212, 250 Knowledge, subject and, 46 Koj£ve, Alexandre, 3
INDEX Lack, dialectic of, desire, 6 Lacking Other, 52. See also Other Lack of the lack, anxiety, 26-27 Lack of the object, chart of, 38-40 Lagache, Daniel, 46-47, 210-211 Language, wall of, transference structure, 205-207 Laurent, Eric, 216 Letter, symbolic order and, signifier, 14-15 Limentani, Adam, 187 Linguistics, signifier, 8-9 Litde other, other, 52. See also Other Love object (a) and, 58 suicide, 134-135 transference structure, 211-213 Love object, 36 Masada, suicide, 145-146 Mask of appearance, phallus, 3132 Masochism. See also Psychic suffering depression, 124-125 Freudian perspective, 61-62 jouissance, 64-65 perversion, 183-185 Mass suicide, 144-146 Mathemes (1), symptom, 80-82 (2), symptasme, 97 (2), symptom, 82-83 fantasme, 91-92 hysteria, 101-105 obsessive neurosis, 116-119 Meaning, truth and, signifier, 10
275
Meltzer, Donald, 25,154 Metaphor phallic signifier, 29-30 signifier, 10-11 Metonymy, signifier, 11-12 Miller, Jacques-Alain, xv, 10,87,94 Moebius strip, subject in the moment of the cut, 46 Moral masochism. See Masochism Mourning, depression, 121-123 Muteness, desire, 3-4 M'Uzan, Michel de, 184-185 Mystic jouissance, 64 Name-of-the-Father, foreclosure of, psychoses, 164-165 Narcissistic (imaginary) axis, phobias, 108-109 Nasio,J.D.,44,66 Need, desire, 4-5 Negative transference, 219-233. See also Transference; Transference graph; Transference structure bisexuality, 229-230 case history, 224-225 clinical reaction, 220-224 Master's discourse (Lacan), 231-232 phallic other, tyranny of, 228229 phallic semblance, 233 qualified listener, 226-227 resistance or impasse, 219-220 suspended attention, 229 transference, establishment of, 226 tyrannical bond, 232-233
276
INDEX
Object, 3 3 - 4 1 anaclitic object, 3 6 cathexis, 3 4 - 3 5 of the drive, 3 3 - 3 4 Freudian perspective, 3 4 Kleinian perspective, 3 6 lack of the object, chart of, 38-40 love object, 3 6 object (a), 3 7 - 3 8 part-objects, 35 splitting of, 35 total object, 3 6 - 3 7 transitional object, 37 two-faced, 3 3 Object (a), 5 6 - 6 0 analyst and, 5 9 - 6 0 anxiety, 27 anxiety and, 59 complexity of, 5 7 - 5 8 fragments, 5 6 - 5 7 Lacan, 3 7 - 3 8 loss of, desire, 5 - 6 love and, 58 psychoanalysis, 56 sexual relations, 59 topological object, 57 Object relations, borderline states, 151 Obsessive neurosis, 112-119 hysterization phenomenon, 112-113 mathemes, 116-119 phenomenology of, 113-116 structure of, 116 Oedipus complex fantasme, 89-90 Oedipal (symbolic) axis, phobias, 109-110
Opaque, symptom as, 80 Orthopedic act, analytic act (II), 251-252 Other, 51-55 absent Other, 52-53 being the desire of, 1 big Other, 53 desire of the Other's desire, 3 hysterical madness, 106 lacking Other, 52 little other, 52 phallic, negative transference, 228-229 phallus of, 30-31 schema lambda, 53-55 subject and, 47 symbolic, 51-52 Parasitic states, borderline states, 154-155 Part-objects, 35 Pedagogic act, analytic act (II), 250-251 Perez de Pla, Esperanza, 264-266 Perspective, reversal of, borderline states, 158-159 Perverse structure, 191-196 Perversion, 177-190. See also Sexuality clinical descriptions, 178-180 clinical practice, 180-181 definitions, 177-178 examples, 187-188 exhibitionism, 182-183 fantasme, 185-187, 188-189 masochism, 183-185 perverse act, meaning of, 181182,185
INDEX perverse structure, formation of, 191-196 psychoanalysis, 177 Phallic jouissance, 63-64. See also Jouissance Phallic other, negative transference, 228-229, 232233. See also Other Phallus, 29-32 logic of, 30 mask of appearance, 31-32 meaning of, 29 perverse structure, 192-193 phallic signifier, 29-30 phallus of the Other, 30-31 sexual relations, 31 Phobias, 108-111 clinical practice, 108 construction of, 110 curable and incurable forms of, 110-111 narcissistic (imaginary) axis, 108-109 Oedipal (symbolic) axis, 109-110 Pleasure principle, jouissance and, 62-63,66 Presence in excess, anxiety, 26-27 Present absence, anxiety, 27 Prosthesis psychoses, 172-173 symptom as, symptom-clamp theory and, 87-88 Psychic conflict, logic of, cause, 72-73 Psychic deficit, logic of, cause, 73-75 Psychic structure, symptom and, 79
277
Psychic suffering. See also Masochism depression, 125-126 jouissance, 61-62 Psychic trauma. See Trauma Psychoanalytic supervision. See Supervision Psychoses, 163-176 affirmation, 166-167 differential diagnosis, 163 elementary phenomenon, 167171 Name-of-the-Father, foreclosure of, 164-165 preamble to, 164 psychoanalysis, 174^175 psychotic production, 171172 schema 1,165 supplement or prosthesis, 172173 triggering of breakdown, 173174 Radical suicide, 130,141-143. See also Suicide Rank, Otto, 262 Reality, real order, RSI graph, 1920 Real order. See also RSI graph RSI graph, 17,19-20 symptasme and, 95-96 symptom, 79-80 trauma, logic of, cause, 71-72 Reich, Wilhelm, 212 Repetition of satisfaction, desire, 2-3 transference as, 199-200
278
INDEX
Resistance impasse or, negative transference, 2 1 9 - 2 2 0 supervision and, 2 6 6 - 2 6 9 transference as, 2 0 0 - 2 0 1 transference structure, 215 Rosenfeld, Herbert, 1 5 4 , 1 5 5 RSI graph, 1 7 - 2 2 Borromean knot and topology, 20-22 cause, 75 imaginary order, 18 psychic conflict, logic of, cause, 73 real order, 19-20 signifier, 10 sinthome, logic of, symptom, 86-87 symbolic order, 18-19 symptom, 78-79 topology, 17 transference graph, 234-235 transference structure, 203-204 trauma, logic of, cause, 69-70 Sacher-Masoch, Leopold von, 183-184 Sade, Marquis de, 184 Satisfaction experience of, desire, 2 impossibility of, desire, 4 repetition of, desire, 2-3 Saussure, Ferdinand de, 8, 9 Schema lambda object (a), 57 Other, 53-55 Second skin, borderline states, 153-154
Self-esteem, masochism, depression, 125 Self-hate, depressive state, 127128 Semblance imaginary order, RSI graph, 18 symptom mathemes (1), 82 Separation anxiety, defined, 25-26 Series of signifiers, 10 Sexual fantasy, trauma, logic of, cause, 70-71 Sexual identity, borderline states, 155-156 Sexuality. See also Perversion desire, 4 object (a), 59 phallus, 31 psychoses, 167-171 Sign, signifier, 12-13 Signifier, 8-16 defined, 12-13 desire, 5 Lacan, 9 linguistics, 8-9 meaning and truth, 10 metaphor, 10-11 metonymy, 11-12 origin of, 13-14 series of, 10 signifying chain, 9 statement and enunciation, 44 subject of the unconscious, 42 symbolic order and letter, 14-15 symptom as, 78 word, effect of, 42-43 Simenon, Georges, 181 Sinthome, logic of, symptom, 8687
INDEX Specificity, 257-259 Splitting, of object, 35 Statement, enunciation and, subject, 43 Subject, 42-50 anxiety and, 45 Borromean knot and, 47-48 desire and, 44-45 fading of, 46-47 hole and, 48-49 knowledge and, 46 in the moment of the cut, 45-46 Other and, 47 statement and enunciation, 43 of the unconscious, 42 word, effect of, 42-43 zero and, 43-44 Suffering. See Psychic suffering Suicide, 131-146 castration, imaginary, 136-137 clinical management, 139-140 death drive, 135 depression, 129-130 ethics, 131-132 hate, toward object, 136 heroic suicide, 143-144 hope, dialectic of, 133-134 imminent risk, 140-141 love, 134-135 Masada, 145-146 mass suicide, 144-146 radical suicide, 141-143 scenarios and fictions, 138 as symptom, 133,138-139 triggering factor, 137 vertices, 132-133 Supervision, 260-270 clinical vignette, 264-266
279
International Psychoanalytic Association (IPA), 263264 resistance and, 266-269 teaching and discovery, 260261 training model historical perspective, 262263 problem of, 261 Supplement, psychoses, 172-173 Supremacy of the signifier, 13 Symbolic order. See also RSI graph letter and, signifier, 14-15 Oedipal (symbolic) axis, phobias, 109-110 RSI graph, 17,18-19 transference graph, 237-238 Symbolic Other, 51-52 Symmetry, of analyst and analysand, analytic act (II), 254 Symptasme, 94-98 construction of, 95 fantasme and, 94-95 matheme (1), 96-97 matheme (2), 97 Real and, 95-96 unary trait, 98 Symptom, 77-88 clinical and analytic symptoms, 84 defined, 77-78 fantasme and, 92 fate of, 86 instating of, 83-84 logical sequence of, 84-85
280
INDEX
Symptom (continued) mathemes (1), 80-82 mathemes (2), 82-83 as prosthesis and symptomclamp theory, 87-88 psychic structure and, 79 Real, 79-80 RSI graph, 78-79 as signifier, 78 sinthome, logic of, 86-87 time and, 85 Symptom-clamp theory, symptom as prosthesis, 87-88 Three orders. See RSI graph Time, symptom and, 85 Topological object, object (a), 57 Topology. See also RSI graph borromean knot and, RSI graph, 20-22 RSI graph, 17 Total object, 36-37 Transference, 197-202. See also Negative transference banalization of, 201 establishment of, 198, 226 interpretation in, 202 nonsymbolized elements of, analytic act (I), 243 power of, analytic act (II), 252253 as repetition, 199-200 as resistance, 200-201 specificity and, 199 transference effect, 197 Transference graph, 234-240 Borromean knot, 239-240 imaginary order, 235-237
overview, 234-235 postanalytic effect, 240 representation of, 235 symbolic order, 237-238 Transference interpretation, 202, 243-244 Transference structure, 203-218. See also Negative transference algorithm (1), 204 algorithm (2), 208-209 analyst effect on, 213-214 transference of, 214 as waste, 215 empty speech and full speech, 207 fantasme and end of analysis, 216 hate, 210-211 imaginary vertex, 208 language, wall of, 205-207 logic of, 213 love, 211-213 Real vertex, 209-210 symbolic vertex, 203-204, 205 where id was, there ego shall be, 207-208 Transitional object, 37 Trauma, logic of, cause, 69-72 Truth, meaning and, signifier, 10 Tustin, Francis, 25 Two-faced object, 33 Unary trait, symptasme, 98 Unconscious desire, 3-4 masochism, 61-62 object (a), 57-58
INDEX schema lambda, Other, 53-55 subject of, 42 symptoms, mathemes (2), 8283 Untenable act, analytic act (II), 250 Where id was, there ego shall be, transference structure, 207208
281
Will-to-jouissance, perverse structure, 194. See also Jouissance Winnicott, D. W., 25,37,153 Women, perverse structure, 196 Word, effect of, subject, 42-43 Zero, subject and, 43-44
