Street Politics

STREET POLITICS STREET POLITICS Poor People's Movements in Iran Asef Bayat ( :olurnhia lJnivcr. I . Tahriz ( .,...

Author: Asef Bayat

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STREET POLITICS

STREET POLITICS Poor People's Movements in Iran

Asef Bayat

( :olurnhia lJnivcr
1\:r•· You

r.olumhaa University Preu Publishers Since 189 3 New York Chichester, West Sussex Copyright 0 1997 Columbia Umversity Press All rights reserved Library of Congreu Cataloging-in-Publication Data Bayat, AKf. Street politics : poor people's movemmts in Iran I Asef Bayat. p. em. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN o-Z..Jl-lo8s8-3 jcloth: alk. paper). -ISBN o-Z..Jl-I08J9-I Ipaper) 1. Squatter stttlements-lran. z.. Squatters-Iran. 3· Vending stands-Iran. 4· Poor-Iran-Political activity. S· Iran-Politics and govemmmt-1979- I. 1irle. HV4qz..s6.AsB39 1997 3U.4'4-0CZ.1 97-18986 CIP Casebound editions of Columbia University Preu books are printed on permanent and durable acid-fru paper. Printed in the United St•lfts of America C 10 9 8 7 6 S 4 3 Z. I p 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 Z. I

To my mother and !'ather

Contents

PIIFFAl.a ACitNO'IVLI!.IHoMlN T\ CIIIIONOLOGY OF PilE· ANil Pll\fllf.VOiliTION EVENT\

XI

XVII XIX

PHOTO IN\f.IIT FOLI U'IV\ PAC:Ol lit.

ONE

The Quiec Encro«hmcnt of the Ordinary A Frw Minor Evrnts? Thr Qutrt Encroachmrnr of rhr Ordinary Thr Aims Brcommg Political Strrrt Pohti~s Thr Making of thr Quirt E.-.-roachmrnt

TWO

THREE

Mappiq Ou11he •New Poor•

7 10

13

rs 19

Thr Nrw Poor In Slumli and Squanrr Setdrmrnrs

13 13 15

T'bc Disfranchised and lhe Islamic: Rnolulion: •Our Revolution and Thein•

H

Thr Rrvolu11on Thr Poor and rhr Rrvuluricm

H j8

•111

00.!1.'1'8

The Parallel Strugln The Poor, thr State, and thr Rrvolution Mobilization in the Popular Neighborhoods l1lamic Con1umer C.ooprrativn Thr Neighborhood Councils ISh11raha-~ Mahallat) FOUR

SIX

SEVEN

S1 S3

The HCJUiiat Rcllcls: Thc Occupltioa of Homa andH~s.

FIVE

44 48 SI

1979-198t

S9

Taking over Homn and Hotels Life m the Occupied Dwellings Brmg Evictftt

67

BKk-Scrcct Politics: Squancn aad the Stare

7S

Usual Businns Why So Much Expansion? Shaping the Communities AS50Ciational lJfe Working Within the System Sqwmen and the State

76 81

Worldcu Revolutionaries: Thr Movanenc of lhe Unemployed

60 6S

83 89 9S 98 109

The Onsec Campa1gns m Tehran The Escalation of Collective Act10ns The Vanrty of Street Protrst5 Grttmg Organued The Demiw

119 111 116

Scrcct Rebels: The Policin of Street Vcadina

IH

Spreadmg Out m the: Srrrcn Political Vending Ordinary Vc:ndon Why So Much Growth? Consequences and Contradiction• Confrontations Rn1stmg the Eviction Policy Incorporation, Diffusion, and Back to the Streets?

IJS

I I I I I 1. IJS

137 1J8 141 143 146 149 IS)

conu~s

EIGHT

Grusroou and State Power. 11ac Promi1c and Perils of Quicc Encroac:hmcnc

IS7

Significaocc Shoncommgs and Costs

157 161

NOTE\

167 101

III!ILIOGIAPtiY GlO~iAIY

117

IN be X

111

iJt

Prei·aae

An nhibat of New York Tim~s photographs, "Pi~o.."tures of the Tames," documenting major world events in rhe past hundred years, was held in the New York Museum of Modem An in july 1996. The exhibit devored only one photograph to the Iranian Revolution of 1979: that of a .. fanatical crowd" tearing the shroud off the dead Ayatollah's ~o..--of fin during his spe~..ucular funeral. And this was displayed next ro rwo .. related" photographs. The first showed a jubilant crowd of New Yorkers welcoming home the American hostages from Iran in a parade; the other, bodies strewn across an airpon lounge after the bomb attack on Rome's airpon by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) in 1985. The exhabitors made sure that the necessary link-from Iranian Revolution to fanaticism and Islam to international terrorism-was established in the mind of the viewers. This book is in pan a rea~o..'tion to such misrepresentations of a major social and politacal event of our time, the revolution of 1979. I artempt to show that the Iranian Revolution and ats aftermath were much more profound and complex than these and many similar images suggest. As such this book is nor a history of the Iranian Revolution; those unfamiliar with ats events may consulr the chronology of the rrvoluuon before they begin to read. Rather, the book is about the movements of

:di

l'liiUCI

ordinary prople, the poor. during these turbulent yean in Iranian history. The narratives aim at transcending the much-written-about public dimensions of elite pohtics, the clergy, and the •Great Satan ... This study attempts ro reveal instead what was happening under the surfac~ of the revolution, in the back streets and alleyways of the cities, nor only on the main boulevards. At the same time, by narrating the poor prc,pJes' movements in Iran in a comparative context, I will attempt to contribute to an examination of informal pohtlcs in Third World settings. I have analyzed this m terms of the .. quiet encroachment of the ordinary... This book therefore explor~ the politics of the ordinary people, the individuals and families without institutional power of disruption, the •informal prople"'-squatten, !ltreet subsistent workers, the unemployed, and members of the underworld. The analyses contained in this book are based upon mult1ple source materials ranging from published interviews and scholarly research conductfii in Iran before and after the Islamic Revolution, newspaprr reports, primary documents (such as rracts, posters, leaflets, pamphlets, and the like), prrsonal interviews, and, finally, direct observation. I have reviewrd a massive number of dailies, weeklirs, and monthlirs, both official and opposition papers focusing on the period betwern 1977 to 1990; I have also indudfii reports and analysts as recent as the early 19905 whrre they havr been relevant. In addition, I havr conductrd morr than a dozen in-«kprh interviews with key participants and observers in the movements under investigation in this book. The publication of my previous work on the Iranian Rrvolution ( WorArt"Ts a"d Revolut1o" '" Ira") encouraged somr involved rrspon«knrs-labor activists, organizers, reporrrrs, and eyrwitnes.!it'S--to voluntarily share their experiences with me. This work draws considrrably on these narranvrs. During 1980 and 1981 I conducted a survey of the housing conditions of the working dass as parr of the field work for a project on factory workers and the revolution. My visits to thrse poor rrsidential areas have contributed to the analysis underrakrn in rhr present study. During this same period and before 1979, I was witness ro the activities of the unemployed and the srreet vrndors, thrir organizations, mobilization, and confrontations with thr authorities. I have used many of my memories of these and earlirr rrlrvanr evrnts, including visits ro a number of sires in Tehran Pan (an area east of the capital

PJIIIUCI

city) during the waves of shantytown demuhtion in autumn 1977. Finally, dunng the summer of 1995 I returned to Tehran to update my data, coll~'t further mformaraon, and fill the data gaps in the first draft of thr manuscript. This rrsultrd in funhrr interviews with fifty squat· ters and street vendors. These materials aside, I consider my own life ex~riencr to~ the single most important source of my insights and data. By this, I mran my dire'-'1 involvement, and mrensr mteraction, in other words, my memhershap for a signifi~nr part of my childhood through early adulthood with the people who make up this study: the migrant poor. Although I now write as an academic, with all the requisite qualifications, I count the years I lived, srruggled, and maturrd within this community in Tehran as among my richest resources. I was born in the mad-r9sos, in a small village located some ~;ixty miles west of Tehran, which had no more than fifty mostly Azaris~akmg households. I was one of six children born into a lt.hushnulnn, a rural nonagricultural famaly. My grandfather. having lost two teenage sons to dehydration and a daughter tu complications during childbirth, decided that my father, the only surviving son, should pursur a lifC' more fruitful than that of a peasant. He rhus brcamC' a shopkeeper in the village, K"llmg goods that rangC'd from heating oil and sweets to Russian shoes. When, in rhC' early 1960s, the Land Reform allocated plots of a dozen hectares each to our villagers, my father. being a lt.hushnishm, remained a landless rural dweller, moving from one job ro the next and remaining unemployed in between. At nnepoint he was a ~tty-trader, then a bus driver, tr~k owner, mechanic, and driving ins~or; he vacillated between the countrysadc- and the city, bringing many modem things to our village life. My father was one of the three men in the village: who learned to read and write in my grandfather's Quranic sessions, succeeding, later, in complenng primary school. My mother, howc-vc:r,like so many others in the village remained illiterate. By the time I was growing up, we wrre fortunate enough to have teaching classes in the vallagr- first, in the warehouse of the absc:ntre feudal lord, and then, with the arrival of the first literaq Corps (sepah•-ye danesh ), in a pro~r !aChool. The vallage schools only went up to tifth grade; and my father. wanting us to get an education, found no choice but to take the entire family of nine to the city. We emigrated to Tehran in 1967. I therefore left my village:, venturing on a journey of which I had so

x111

zJ.y

P'RIUCI

oftrn drra~d~reams of bright lights and bus ridn. morning-frnh bread, walking along the strttrs in the busy evmings, not to mention the Indian mnv1n that our villaKC" sch1x,llamuh's son, who was from Tehran, used to rrlate to the villaRe boys with commrndable parirncr and in prrfcL-r Prrs1an. In Tehran we first settled in a lower-dass nrighborhood dose to Ghazvin Srrrrt in south Trhran wherr the neighbors consistrd mostly of rural migrants like ourselvrs. Thr area was surrounded by slums and the growing squatter areas that were filled with many colorful lit· rlr shops and chanting strcrr vendors, and in which I, like so many of my fnends, lrarnrd to sprnd a glXKI pan nf the daytime in the strrrrs. Our one-story hou!it' was located in a narrow alleyway in the middle of which ran the sewage duct, a 1ouy. The house had a toilet, a small kitchen, and five separate rooms, two of whk:h werr rented to rwo scp· arate families (a migrant worker and a pasban, a member of thr lowstatus strrrt police). later wr moved into a new house 10 the same vicinity but with morr rooms; our migrant relativn. on the other hand, remaint'd in the nearby slums of javadieh and Mrhrahad, to wh1ch we would pay regular visits. Our long-trrm trips. however, were to the villagr with which wr maintained strong rirs-ties we still retain rven to this day. My first rxprrience of schooling in the c1ry was wnh an Islamic institution. It taught the regular cumculum hut placrd sprdal emphasis on extracurricular activities including daily collective prayers. Quran recitmg. and lslam1c mtenainment. The teachers werr mostly commirtrd young lslam11ti, 10duding drrgymen. Indeed. at some point my grandfather, him~~elf brmg a rural mulla. expres..~d delight at the poss1b11ity of sering me onr day a Qum-educated akhund. I later realized that my school rrprrsented an instancr of lslamist civil activism during the late 1 96os, a reaction to the secular education and the growing forrign schools that the childrrn of the rlites attmded. A frw years latrr, in 1970, we movrd to Chrrzar. the remnant of an old urban village in the nonhern part of Tehran. where my father workrd 10 a dnving school. In rhr years that we res1drd in thr first ncighborho,Kf, 10 South Tehran. a great deal happrned. I htcame a true young Muslim. learning to rrcite Quran m puhhc rvrnn. taking pan in the local h~'ats and mosques, visiting the shrines of Qum, Mashad, and our local mwmuJrhs, and bring perhaps the only serious listener to my grandfather's rrligiuus h1ltayat-a grandfather who in this new

P!IIUCI

setting seemed to have lost his village constituency and be unable to gain the respect of city dwellers, as the tide of modern education and sa:ularization began to conquer even lower-class familirs. But, by the time we left that 6rst neighborhood, I began to sense the pressure of the institutional indoctnnation of my Islamic Khoul. The early 1 'nos, a period of an unprn:edented oil boom, coincided with a period of relative prosperity for my family. We experienced some degrte of upward mobility, acquiring a lower·m•ddle-class lifestyle. My father's income rose, my brothers were accepted into college, my sister became a school teacher, and I obtained my diploma in a government high school that cattred to students of lower-class and lower-middle class hackgrounds. The school was loured in Gholhak, close to the Husseinieh Ershad, where many of Ali Shariati's followers were garherrd and wherr their study teams flourishe-d larrr. In my last yrars of high school, I attended Shariati's popular la"tures on radical Islam in the Husseinieh Ershad. However, by the time I began my umversiry years, I had become an entirely secular t«nager, moving into leftist campus politics that I maintained throughout my higher education m the United Kingdom. Despite the!ie tremendous changes in my personal life, there was also some continuity. My family and I never suspended our strong ties with our village-with kin members, neighbors, and friends who remainrd in the village, as well as with those who left it and began to search for a better life in the dry but mostly ended up in the '"slums of hope." These pages have benefited much from the memories of these people-their struggle for survival, their valurs and mode of life, their hopes and despair. The chapters of this book chronicle the struggles of similar ordinary men and women to survive and to secure a dignified life. They rxplore the dynamics of the pour's quiet encroachment and colla-rive mobilization and discuss the intricate rdationships of the poor with outside muhilize~ locallraders, and the starr, as wrll as the diala:tic of silentindividualistic and audible-collective !litruggles. I will examine in detail four instancrs of grassroots activities in rrvolutionary Iran, whose participants possibly overlap. These activities range from those relating to the occupation of homes and hotelr-urhan land squatting-to those of the unemployed and the street \'endon. While each activiry constitutes a distinct pirce of social history, together they provide empirical narratives for my theoretical propositions on the '"politics of the informals" and '"str«t politi'---s" that I present in the following introductory chapter.

.n

n1

P1UlP.lOI

In chapter 1. I offer a 50Ciological background to the lives of the urban nrw poor in Iran, with a sp«ial focus on the ciry of Tehran. I trace the quiet t'ncroachment of Iran's poor from tht' 19505 until the Islamic Revolution of 1979. In chaptt'r 3 I argue that, despite many daims as to tht' aL"tive participation of the dismfranchised in the rt'volution, the urban poor largely remained on the margin of revolutionary t'Vt'nts. The poor, although on the margin, were involved in tht'ir own quiet revolution m the back strrets of their communities. They came under the banner of tht' Islamic Revolution only at its last stage, when the leadership adoptrd a !litrong pro-mustat'afin (downtrodden) discourse, and continued under that banner through the first few months after the revolution when they were intmsely woord by both lslamrc leaders and secular groups. Utihzing this favorablt' opponumty, the poor engagrd in widesprrad collecrivr mobili7.ahon. Chaptrr 4 tells thr story of one of these mobilizations-the occupation of homes and apanmmts. The convergence between the perspectives of the poor and the power-holders did not last long howrver. The disenfranchised were polarized. One segment was integrated into the new state structure, and the other, facing political constraints, retumrd to the strategy nf mdiv1dual and qu1et encroachmmt. Chapter 4 uplorrs the dynamics of this rupture by examining the !iquatten' movement in postrevolutionary Iran and tracing its history from the days of the Islamic Rrvolution to the squatters riors of the early 19905. In addition to discussing the actions of the poor in everyday life, m the commumties fchaprrrs 4 and s), I attempt also to consider them in the domain of working life. Chapter 6, therefore, exammrs in detail the remarkable movement of the unemployed, a movement that is unique 10 the context of the developing countries. Chapter 7 analy1..rs the mobilization of the street vendors in large Iranian cities in an attempt to rstablish and maintain their subsistence-levt'l activities m the srreet comers; this mobilization altered at the local level the powrr relations that ultimately emanated from the control of public space and businru opportunity. Finally, in rhe concluding chapte~ I offer an overall evaluation of these types of grassroots activism. I discuss their merits and shortcomings, as well as exploring their implrcations both with reference to the specific case of Iran and, more generally, in relation to a number of theOretical issues.

.Acknowled&ments

No scholarly work is an entirely individual enterpri~. And mine is ~er tainly not an ex~eption. Numerous Kholars, activists, individuals, and institutions have assisted me in urious ways during the preparation of the presenr volume. I wish ro thank the publishers of two of my arlldes-'"Un-Civil Society: On the Politics of the 'Informal People, ... Third World Quartt'Tiy r8, no. r ( 1997) and .. Workless Revolutionaries: The Movement of the Unemployed m Iran, 1979," lnternatwrwl Re1•iew of Soc~al Hrstory ~ ... no. z. (Augusr 1997)-for their kind permission to use materials from those articles in rhis hook. A granr from the Middle East Research Comperition (MERC), Ford Foundation, Cairo, made a big portion of the project possible. My thanks especially to Dr. Najla T chergui of MERC for her conrinuous encouragement. I conducted a good deal of research in the libraries of the University of Chicago; the School of Oriental and African Studies ar the University of London; Columbia University; and Near F..astem Studies, Princeton University. At Princeton, the competent librarian, 1\t.. Ashraf, offered much support, while Shahab Ahmad hosted me in his campus residence. I thank them all for their aid. My thanks are also due to the dira:tors, employees, and ~olleagues

m the lnsmute of lndustnal Relations, University of California at Btrkeley, and the M1ddle East Institute, Columbia University, where I was stat1nned during my sabbatical leave. I received valuable assistance in Tehran, in the Markaz-i Motaleat va Tahghighat-i Shahrsazi va Me'man·)'e Iran, Ministry of Housing. and at the Research Institute of Tehran Municipality, and School of Social Xlences, Tehran University. I owe special thanks to those employ~s who kindl)· ofkred me data and guidance. I have also benefited from the intellectual contnbutions of many scholars and friends, including Professor Ahmad Ashraf, Professor Ali Asht1ani, Professor Nicholas Hopkins, and Kuros Esmaili, who read and commented on sections of the early versions of the manuscript. Simon O'Rourke pohshed and Susan Heath scrupulously copyedited the final \'ersiun of the manuscript. Clarisa Bencomo, Samir Shahata, joe Storke, and professors Farhad Kaumi, Richard Bullirt, and Sami Zuha1da read the variou5 versions of the entire manuscript. I would like to express my appreciation for their invaluable comments and suggestions. I am particularly grateful to Professor Bullitt, of Columbia University, for his encouragement and special suppon. I also thank Manoocher Drghati, Rna Deghati, E.mad Allam, and Ashraf Saloum who assiSted me m the collection and preparation of the maps and photographs m this book. Beyond Kholarly conuibutions, there were many relatives and friends, as well as anonymous soc1al al.-rivists, most of whom I have never met, who ~ve me priceless information and expertise. They did so with the sole aim of preserving our historical memory of poor peoples' struggles. Herr I mention only Reza, Akbar, Roham, and Siamak. However, my greatest debt is due to Fateh and Tahereh, wnhout whose assistance m arranging for interviews with various key respondents th1s book would certainly nor be Jn its present shape. Linda Herrera never ceases to be enthusiastic, encouraging, and supportiVe not nnly of the prrsent project but of my enure intellectual enterprisr. I cannot thank her enough. Finally, perhaps here 11 the place where I can register my d~pest tribute to my mother and my father who, hke the subjects of th1s bonk, have endured tremendous hardship m their life in the hope of bringmg up .. worthy children." Without their love, trust, and darmg, my 1ourney from village to the West would nrvrr have taken place. I dedicate this hook to them in appreciation of their limitless trust and tolerance.

Cb.ro11olocy o1· Pre- ucl Postre"Yolution E'Yents

1796-191s: 190S-190?:

Mar~h

19s1:

Iran 1s ruled by the Qajar dynasty. Iran's con~otitutional revolution rsrahlishrs rule of law; rhr first Parliament is ~t up. Rru Shah, the father of rhr late Muhammad Rrza Shah, rnd~o the rrign of Qajar dynasty; the Pahlavi dynasty is rsrabhshrd. Rrza Shah brgms an ambitious program of rcnnomrc, social, and educational modrm1zariun through a s.ccular autoc:ratic starr. Re7~ Shah 1s forced to abdu:atr hy the Allied fon:n 1n favor of his wn, Muhammad Rrza. A period of democratic rxprrirn~. whrn nanonalist and Communrst movements nprrit'ncr unprrce· drnted growth. 'The campa1gns of thr nationalist leader, Muhammad Mouddrq, lrad to thr nanonaliz.ation of oil industry; Britain thrratms to invade Iran. A CIA-enginrrrrd coup nvrrthruws the S«ular nationalist govrrnmrnt of Mosaddeq; thr Shah, who had flrd thr country, returns ro Iran. Thr drmocratic rlCprriencr terminates. Iran becomes the most "TUcral ally of rhr Wrsr, notably thr li.S., m thr frKion. lndeprndrnt political parurs, auoc1ations, and movrmrnrs arr systrmati~:ally supprrs~d. Pro· grams of modrm1zation, industrialization, and wntrmization a"umr nrw momentum.

The Shah inaugurates bas White: Revolution, composed of some: si~i6canr reform measures, including land reform, the: nationalization of forests, the: c:nfranchasc:ment of women, the: literacy corps, and profit-sharing ~ehemes. A series of largc:-~ealc: noli break our in Tehran and June: 1963: some: other catin. Ayatollah Khomc:ini emc:rxc:s as a religious opposuinn leader and i1 sent to elule in Iraq. Oil income: increasn, 1upporring econumi~ dc:vc:l1960\-19?0S: opmc:nr and social change:. The: new middle: dass and the: industrial working class expand, tORrthc:r wuh the: numbc:r of .. modem· youths and women active: in pubhc. The: old clasr.c:s-feudal, traditional petty bourgeuum:, and the clergy-shrink or feel threatened. The: rc:gamc remains autcx:rat1c. The: protest of the: antelhgenn1a surfacn an the: form May 1977: of open lmc:n to the: Coun. A violent confrontation erupts between rhc:ology January 1978: students and pulil:c: in the: holy cary of Qum. A mau demonstration and ri01 cx:cun in Tabriz, the: 11 February 1978: capital of Azerbaijan. Maa demonstrations 1pread to other urban areal. March 1978: Man1al Law 11 declared an Tehran and c:lc:vc:n other 7 !;c:ptc:mber 1978: ma1or ~iran. Hundrc:d1 of protc:stc:n arc: killed an Tehran on 8 !;c:ptc:mbc:r 1978: Black Fnday. !;c:ptc:mbc:r 1978 onward: lndustnalstral'c:' spread nauonwidc. 6 November 1978: The: Shah appoinrs a military government; Gnleral Azhara's cabinet as formed. 1o-11 December 1978: Mallions of people: demonstrate again1t the: regime:. Soldien an many pl~c:s 1oin the marchc:n. General Azhari'r. cabinet collapr.c:r. as Shahpour J 1 Dc:cc:mbc:r 1978: Bakhtiar, a lc:adc:r of opposition National Front, agrees to form a new civilian government. Thi1 i1 followed by a general ltnkc: that branp the whole: rconomy to a hah. Nnghborhood councils c:mc:I'Kc: in thc: popular dastricta. Land takc:oven are c:ffectc:d. The Shah leaves the counuy. 16 january 1979: Ayatollah Khomeini return• to Tehran from Pari1. I February 1979= Khomc:ini appoints Mehda Bazarpn at prune man· s February 1979: istc:r of his provisional government. The: Javadan Guard llm~nal Guard) attacks the 9 February 1979: january 196J:

1o-11 February 1979: 1 1 February 1979:

February-March 1979:

April 1979: August 1979:

4 November 1979:

J.- _, December 1979: J. S January 1980:

April198o:

J.S Aprd 1980: J.S July 1980:

11 Auguar 1980: u Srprembrr 1980: 10 January 198 1: Man:h 1981:

10june 1981:

barracks of rhe mutinous air forc:e trchnk1ans in Tehran. There are rwo days of insurrecrion. The Monarchy is ovenhrown; Bakhuar escapes; jubilant armed youths rake over conrrol of rhr streets. The radio declares rhr victory of the Islamic Revolution. Mau demonstrations of military personnel, Kurdish people, Turkoman people, and women for drmoc:ratic r1pts. The unemployed are mobilized. Outsrr of home and hotel squatting. After a referendum Iran becomes an l1lamic Republic:. There is an arrack against the left, as well as againsr Kurdish and other ethnM: minoritin. Political vendors are auaulted. The U.S. Embassy is ~rized; the hostage c:risi1 brings down the Bazargan government. Meanwhile, following the embass)' !leizure, a new wave of labor unrest escalates. Following a referendum, the 11lam1c Constitution is rarified. Abui-Hassan Bam-Sadr is elected as Iran's first prnidrnt. A •cultural revolution" begins: the Islamization of education, cultural institutions, and endustnal workplaas. Meanwhile a new crackdown on labor and unemployed movement is waged. An American rescue m1ssion ro free rhe hostages fails. The deposed Shah dies in exile in Egypt. Muhammad Ali Rajaii, an lslamist prime manistrr, forms a cabiner. Iraqi fon:n invade Iran. An right-year war bqcens. The American hostages are frttd. Conflias berwem Bam-Sadr and rhe ruhnglslamic Republican Pany URPI surface violently when a rally orgamud by the president is attacked by supponers of rhr IRP. Bam-Sadr is dismaaed as commander-en
July 1981:

1

August 19lh:

JO AUKUit 1981:

September 1981:

11 } I

Apnl19h.:

july lyh: 4 january 198_1: 1 1 January 19h:

Mujahedin, aprnst the ruling clergy turn into a bloody confrontation with Paldaran. Twenty-four people are krlled and more than two hundred mtured 1n dashes. Widespread guerrilla warfare apmst the lslam1c regime begin,. The headquarters of the Islamic Republican Party is blown up; ~eventy-four leaden of the Parry are killed, 1ndudi111 Ayatollah Beheshti. More than two hundred members or supporters of Mujahedin are reponedly exn:uted during the follow1ng few months. Ban1-Sadr and the Mu1ahed1n leader Masoud Rajav1 escape to France, where thry Kt up the Naaunal Council of Rrsistancr. Prrmc M1msrer Ra1a11 bn:ome!l prnident, and E.ducat1on M1n1srer Bahonar 1s named as hrs new prime mmi.ur the next day. Presuknt Rajaii, Prime Mim1ter Bahonar. and srveral othrn arc killed rn a bomb blast. MahdavrKani rs elected as primr minister on September 1. The Iran-Iraq war mtrn11fin. The liquidation of opposition, labor, and neighborhood councils escalarn. Factional fighung between the •Imam linr" and Hoitatiyc begins. Khameneu 11 swum m as new prn1dcnt. Hus~rm Mousav1 11 appointed as rbr new pnmr minister. Morr than a thousand proplr arr arrrstrd in connection with the Sadrq Quthzadeh (fDr~Mr forrrgn ministrrl group'• plan to anu~marc Ayatollah Khomrmi. On April J.O Ayatollah Shanatmadari ia ousted from the ranks of rhr rrhgious leaden and pli14:cd under houac arrC'It for h11 all~ link to the plot. Heavy fighting continurs at the war front. GaKJiine rarion1ng ends. Parliament drcrdn ro confiscate the proprny of Iranians who do not rnum from exile wrthin two months. The government dissolves rhr Tudrh party. !;orne one thousand Tudrh supporters arc detained in thr following daya. Meanwhrlr thr drba1r brtwrrn

rojuly 1983: 1 1 February 1984:

16 Augusr 1985:

~J

November 1985:

J April 1986: (}!;tober I 986:

17 jilnuary 1987:

February and April1~88: 1 ~ April 1988: ~June 1988:

18 July 1988: July ry88:

~s

~:tober 1988: 4 june 1989: Early 19901:

free-marketer• and etatlsl$ w1thm the government comes to the &urfa"~The government clamps down on bazaar merchants. Iraq beRms the "war of the cities." In the meantime, oppos1tinn groups m exile continue their campaign against rht Islamic governmenr. The "war of the cities" escalates; civilian targets are attacked. President Khamene1i is reelected. Candidates of Bazargan's Freedom Movement were excluded from the campaigns. Ayatollah Montaztri is dtctrd by tht AIOStmbly of Expens as Khomemi's successor. Ayatollah Shar1atmadari d1es of cancer wlule under house arrest. The "lrangate" scandal begins to surface. In the "war of the Clhts," Tehran 11 bombed. Iran responds by attacking Baghdad. A polarized IRP is dissolved on the order of Ayatollah Khomein1. The leader of Mu1ahedin, in Baghdad, declares the formation of rht Iranian National Liberation Army to fight aga1nst the IslamiC Republic. An01htr round of tht "war of the cities'" erupts. The elt\:tion of the third Majlis i1 held. Rafsanjam, the speaker of the Majlis, IS appointed commander-m-chief of the army by Khomeini. Mehd1 Baurgan cntK:Izrli the war policy in an open lmer. Iran accepts UN Rnolurion J98 to end the war. Mu1ahcdm forcn attack iln Iranian ~:ity from Iraqi soil. A po1rwar reconstruction plan tS launched. Ayatollah Khomemi din. Major drbatcs. rethinking, and revilion around the rxpenence of thr Islamic government emrrge within the sudety. In the meantime, conflict between the "pragmatists" and "fundamentalists" cnnnnun.

STREET POLITICS

One The Quiet Encroachment o! the Or41nary

Between 1976 and the early 19905 a senes of popular activities took place in Iran's large cities thar did nor receive sufficient attention from scholars. primarily because they wert drowned our by the extraordinary big bang of rhe revolution. Their importance was dasmissed in pan because they seemed insignificant when comparrd with the revolution, that universal image of social change par excellence, and in pan because they seemed to be ordinary pra~-rices of everyday hfe.lndttd, the origin of these activities goes back decades earlier, bur it is only an the late 198os and early 19901 that their political consequences began to surface. Thts book is devoted to recovering sUi:h ordinary practi~o:es, prevalenr in most developing counrnes, and making sense of their dynamics. By discussing these events, I attempt to construct a theory of informal politics.

A Few Minor Events? Since the 1 9 sos hundreds of thousands of poor families have been pan of a long and steady migration from Iran's villages and small towns to its big cities, some seeking to improve their lives, some simply trying to survive. Many of them settled quietly, either individually or more often

with their kin members, on unused urban lands or/and cheap purchased plots largely on the margin of urban centers. To escape from dealing with private landlords, unaffordable rents, and overcrowding. they put up thetr shelters with their own hands or with the help of relatives in tllegally established sites. Then they hegan to consolidate their informal settlements by bribing bureaucrats and bringing m urban amenities. By the eve of the lslamac Revolution the number of these communities in Tehran alone had reached fifty. The acton; had become a counterfurce, without intending to be so. The advent of the h;lamic Revolurton offered the dist'nfranchised the opportumty to make further advances. As the revolutionaries were marchmg in the strttts of big citirs, the very poor were busy rxtendmg their hold ovrr thrir communities by bringing more urban land under {mal-)devdopmmt. And immediately after the revolution, many poor families tlM)k advantagr of the collapse of police conrrol to take over hundreds of vacant homrs and half-finished apartment blocks, refurbishmg them as thetr own properties. As the option of home-squattmg was limited, land takeover and illegal construction accelerated, despite the police crackdown. This contributrd to a spectacular growth of both large and small cities in thr years following the revolution. What made these men and womm a collective force was a way of lifr that engendered common mterests and the need tn defend them. The squatters got together and demanded eln:tricity and running water; when they were refused or encountered delays, they resorted tn do-it-yourself mechanisms of acquiring them illegally. They established roads, opened clinics and storrs, constructed mosques and libraries, and organized refuse collection. The)' further stt up associations and community networks, as well as participating m local consumer cooperatives. A new and a more autonomous way of living, funL-rioning, and organizing the commumty was in the making. The domain of work was subject to the same kind of silent encroachment. The unemployed poor, alongside the middle-class jobless, resorted initially tn an impressive collective action to demand work, mamtenance, and compensation. They were involved in a movement unique in the contut of Thtrd World politics. Although the unemployed movement benefited a number of faL-rory and office worken, a large majority remained joblrss. Having rxhaustrd wllective aL-rion, the unemployed pnnr turned tn family, kin, and friends for sup-

pon. Bur many more poured inro the strrrts of the big cities to estab· lish autonomous subsistam:e activities, engaging in street·vrnding, peddling. and strrrr serv1ces and industries. They put up stalls, drove pushcans, set up kiosks. Business sires were lit by connel.'ting wires to the main electrical poles. Their collective operation converted rhe street sidewalks into vibrant and colorful shopping places. However, the authorities could hardly tolerate such a chrrrful and secular coun· rerculture, such an active use of urban space and rhus waged a pro· tracted war of attrition against the street vendors. Many shopkeepers whoK favorable busmess environment had been appropriated by the sidewalk vendors jomed the authorities in the1r clampdown. This confrontation brrwrrn the vendors and the state/shopkeepers exemplifies a protracted instance of srrrrt politics in the Islamic Republic, which I will discuss in more detail later. These kinds of practices are not extraordinary. They occur on a daily basis in many urban centers of the developing world. In the Middle East, for example, Cairo contains well over one hundred .. spontaneous" communnies, or manat1q al·ashwa"yya, housmg over seven million people who have quietly claimed cemeteries, rooftops, and the state/public land on the outskirts of the city; these rural migrants and slum dwellers have also subdivided the formerly agricultural land surroundmg the city and put up their shelters there unlawfully. By their sheer perseverance, millions of slum dwellers have forced the authorities to extend amenities to rhe1r neighborhoods1 by otherwise tapping mto them 11legally. For mstance, illegal use of running water alone in rhe Egyptian city of Alexandria costs rhe city an aver· agr of thrrr million dollars each year.' The srrrrt vendors have taken over many public thoroughfares in order to conduct their business. Thousands of the city's poor subsist on tips from parking private cars in the streets, which they control and organiu in such a way as to ere· ate maximum parking space. In the eyes of the authorities, such prac· rices havr caused major urban d1sorder in the country. The government policy of halting these practices has largely failed• as the poor have tended to respond by on-the-spot resistance,legal battles, or simply by quiet noncompliance. The accounts of Maidan EI-'Ataba, Sayyeda Zcynab, Boulaq EI-Dakrour, Suq El-Gom'a in Jmbaba, and the fon:e· ful relocation of the EI-Ezbakia book-sellers attest to only a few of the many in.•tancrs of strrrt politics in Cairo.' The same phenomenon occurs in Asia as well. ln South Korean

citi~s.

for example, almost anyone can easily set up pushcan on a vacant street area, "but one~ a spot is taken and business ~stablished, it is vinually owned by the vendors." In these settings, '"tax collrctions are nil, and regulating busin~ss practices is almost impossible. Louis Vu.itton's Pusan Outler could only stop a pushcan vendor from selling counterfeits of its bags in front of the shop by purchasing the spot. Nikr International and Ralph Lauren have had similar problems."• Larin American cases are quite well documented.· In the Chilean city of Santiago during the mid-198os, for example, as many as 100,000 poor families were using .. clandestine installations" of electricity and runmng water in the mid-19801. Police and military vehicles drove through popular neighborhoods to catch the offenders. In response the residents had to "unhook at dawn and hook up again after the last patrol," as one settler pur it. • Of those who had legal installations, some 100,000 had not paid for electricity and 170,000 had nor paid for water.~ "BaJumo" is the term that signifies the recent upsurge of such grassroots activities in Latin America-with their emphasis on community and local democracy, and their distrust of formal and large-sule bunaucracies. 10 In a similar vein, more than z.o percent of South Africa's urban population lives in shacks and shantytowns. Many poor families havr r~fused to pay for urban services. "Masalrhanl!," or the '"culture-of-paying" campaign organized by the government and business community after rhe first multiracial ele~:tion m March 1994, represents an attempt to recover these massive public appropriations by the poor. 11 Far from destructive behavior on the pan of the .. lumprn proletariat" or the .. dangerous classes, .. u these practices represent the natural and logical ways in which the disenfranchised survive hard.bips and 1mprove their lives. What is significant about these activities, and rhus interests us m this book, is precisely their seemingly mundane, ordinary, and daily nature. How can one account for such daily practices? What value\ can one attach to such exercises? How do we explain the politics of these everyday lives? ~ are only sot'M of the questions I hope to address in the course of this book by focusing on the case of Iran between 1 9 77-1 990. A discussion of these 1ssues helps us arr1ve at some 1mponant crmclusions with regard to the relationship hrrwrrn social movements and social change. Fir!it, adoprang a relative distance from both james Scott and

his critiqu~s. my aim is ro show how these ordinary and ofren quiet practices by very ordinary and ofren silent ptople engender significant scx:ial changes-the kinds of chang~s that are comparable to those that revolutions are s~ud to achieve for them. Relying on the Iranian experience, I w15h to deemphasize the totalizing notion of .. the revolution" as the change par excellence, to discard the assumption that real change for all social groups comes necessarily and exdusively from a generalized political campaign. A totalizing di5Course suppresses the variations in people's ptrceptions about change; diversaty 1s 5Creencd, conflicts are belinled, and mstead a grandlumted language is emphasized. This suppression of difference by the dominant voice of the leadership has usually worked against the di5Course of the ordinary, the powerless, the poor, minorities, women, and orher subaltern dements. My aim, therefore, is to rn:over and give agency to one of thosr suppressed voices, that of the urban disenfranchised. 11 Finally, I want to stress, in panial agreement with Gram5Ci, the significance of the lc-=al both as a crucial arena of social struggle and as a unit of analysis to examme social change. While a generalizedlpoliticaVglobal (revolutionary?) campaign is essential for removing many obstades for many real changes in favor of the poor, it is the local that serves as the essential criterion and locus of change. It is in the localities that oppres.saon as felt and resisted, where the people actually experience the effect of national policies. At first glance, the ordinary pra":tices I have described above conjure up james Scon's '"everyday forms of ptasant resistance." Scon, Colburn, and others have highlighted the ability of poor people to resist the .. oppressors" by such actions as foot dragging. dissimulation, false compliarK:e, sland~r, arson, sabotag~. and so fonh. Peasants are said to act predominantly andividually and discretely, but giv~n repressive political conditions, their pra"'"tices are functional to their needs. 14 The .. everyday form~ of resistance" perspecrave has undoubtedly contributed to recovering the Third World poor from "passivity," '"fatalism" and "hopelessness"---essentialist f~atures of the '"cultur~ of poverty" with its emphasis on adentifying the "marginal man" as a .. cultural type."'' Scon even transcends the survival strategies model, which limits th~ activities of the poor tn mere survival within the daily context, •• ofren at the cost of others or themselves. As Escobar suggests, the language of "survival strategies" may contribute tn mainraining the image of the poor as vac:tims.•· Thus, to counter unemploy-

ment or price increases, they are often said to reson to theft, begging, prostitution, or the n:oric:ntation of the1r consumption pattenl5. Scott's work is also imponant from a different angle. Until recently thr prevailing concern of !1Cholars, from both left and right, focu.N on the poor's political threat to the existing order; they were preoccupied with the question of whether rhr poor constituted a destabilizing force, 11 thus ignoring rhr dynamics of the the poor's microexistence and everyday politics. On the other hand, many of these authors still view the politics of the poor in terms of a revolutionary/passive d1chotomy. 19 Such a paradigm surely limits thr possibility of looking upon the matter in a d1fferrnt light-1 do not mean by raking a c:entnsr approachl" but by adopting an entirely new perspective. The concept "everyday forms of resistance" cenamly contributes to a shift m the terms of the debate.l 1 Yet Scott's "Brec:htian mode of class struggle and resistance" is madc:quate to account for the dynam1cs of the activities of the urban poor in the Third World. While it is undeniable that concerns of survival constitute the main preoccupations of the urban disenfranchised, thry also strive ru move forward and improve their lives, howrver calmly and quirrly. Thrir struggles are nor merdy defensive, an everyday rrsulanu against thr encroachments of thr "superordinate" groups; nor are they simply hidden. quirt, and mostly individualistic:. In my understanding. thr struggles of the urban poor are also surreptitiously offnuit'r, that is, disenfranchised groups place a great deal of restraint upon the privileges of the dominant groups. allocating constituents of the life chances of those groups (including capital, social goods, opponunJty, autonomy, and thus power) to themselves. This trnds ro involve the urban poor in a colluttvr, open, and highly audible campaign. Moreover, in addition to srrking conassions from the state, their ind1vadual and quart struggles, predominantly by darrct action. also effect strady and significant changrs in their own lives, thus gomg beyond "marginally affrctlingl the various forms of rxploitationa whach peasants confront ... u Scott's implicit subscription to rational choler theory would overlook the complexity of motives behind this type of struggle, where moral elements arc mixed with rational calculations. Can thrsr undenakings then be analyzed in terms of urban social movemenrs-undersrood as organized and territorially based movements of thr Third World urban poor who strive for "social transfnr-

marion" (according to Castdls),ll "emancipation" (according to Schuurman and van Naerssen)/4 or an alternative to the tyranny of modernity (in Friedmann's percepnon)?l' The similarities appear to be quite striking: both movements are urban, struggling for analogous aims such as housing, community building, collective consumption, official recognition of their gains, and so forth. Yet the)' differ from one another in many respects. First, whereas social movements in general represent a long-lasting and more or less structured collective action aiming at social change, the activities I describe herr carry, among other features, strong elements of spontaneity, individualism, and intergroup competition. They place spedal emphasis, moreover, on a""tion over meaning. or, in Castrlls' terms, "urban meaning." In addition, while these ordinary practices resemble both new and archaic social movements-in terms of bring self-producmg, possessing vague or nonexistent leadership, incoherent or diverse ideologies, and a loose or total lack of structurfii organization-they nevertheless differ significantly from both. The primitive social movements, explored by Eric Hobsbawm, were often generated or mobilized by distinct charismatlc: leaders/• whereas the type of activism I describe are mostly, but not entirely, self-generating. On the other hand, while the new social movements are said to focus largely on identity and meaning/· my protagonists concern themselves primarily with action. Therefore, in a metaphorical sense, these everyday encroachments may br seen as representing a movement in itself, becoming a social movement per se only if and when the acton become conscious of their doings by articulating their aims, methods, and justifications. However, should such public articulation occur, the chara'-"trnstic of quirt encroachment is lost. In other words, these desperate everyday pra""tices exhibit distinct undertakings with their own particular loglc: and dynamics.

The Quiet Encroachment of the Ordinary The types of struggles I dtscribr herr may best be characterized as the .. quirt em.:roachment of the ordinary" -a silent, patient, protracted, and pervasive advancement of ordinary proplt on the propertied and powerful in order to surv1ve hardships and better their lives. They are marked by quirt, atomized, and prolonged mobilization with episodic collective action-an open and fleering struggle w1thour dear lrader5hip, ideology, or structured organization, one that produces signifi-

cant gams for the a<:tors, eventually placing them m counterpoint to the state. By initiating gradual .. molecular" change&, the pour in the long run "progressively modify the pre~xisting cumpositaon of forces, and hence h«ome the matrix of new changes. "l" But unlike Gramsci's "passive revolutaon(aranJ," di~nfranchi~d groups do not carry out their a'-'tivatiet. as a conscious political strategy; rather, they are driven by the force of necnsaty-the necessity to t.urvive and ltve a dignified hfe. Thus, the notion of necessity and a quest for dagnity justify their struggles a1 moral, natural, and logical ways to survive and advance thear lives.l• Gramsci's '"passive revolution" ultimately targets state power. I wash to emphasize, howevt'r, that quiet encroachment, although it maght andira:rly follow generalized politacal impliutions, amplaes changes that the actors consider a!t significant in thenu;dves without intending necessarily to undermine political authority. Yet the~ very simple and everyday pra~o:tices are bound ru shift inro the realm of polincs. The panicipants engage in collective actaon, seeing rhear domgs and themselves as political only when confronred by those who threaten thear gains. Hence one key anribure of these movements is that while advances are made quiedy, individu.lly, and gradually, the defense of these gains is always collective and audible. Thousands of such men and women embark upon long and punful migratory IOUrnt'ys, scanering in remote and alien environs, acquirmg work, shelter, land, and living amenities. Driven by tht' force of na:est.ary (economac hardship, war, or natural disaskr), they set our indivadually and without much clamor, often 11lowly and unnotaceably, as perseverant as the movements of turtles in a remote colony. They often deliberately avoad collective dfon, large-scale operationli, commotion and publicity. At times squaners, for instance, prevent others from jommg them an specafic arras; and vendors discourage their counterpart~ from senling an rhr same vacinity. Many even hesitate to share mformation about their strategaes with simalar groups. Yet, as these seemingly desperate individual!i and families pursue similar paths, their sheer cumulatavr numbrn transform them into a potential soda) force. This complex maxture of individual and collective acraon results from both the social position of the a~tors and, to use Tarruw's term, the .. structure of opporrunirie~" avaalahle for them.'" Tht- most common agents involved in quit't encroachment movemenu en~.:ompass a vari~ of largely floating social dusters-migrants, refugees, the unemployed, squatters, street vendors, and other margin-

fBI QUllf

18C~OAOBM~8f

OP fBI

O~Dl8A~I

aliz.ed groups. Rural m1grants encroach on cities and their amenities, refugees and international migrants on host states and their provisions, WJUatters on public and private lands or ready-made homes, and street vendors on the opponunity costs of business as well as on public space in both irs physinl and social facers-street sidewalks, intersa:tions. public parks, and the like:. What brings these groups anto this form of struggle: 1s, first, the: initial urge: fur an alrc:rnanve mode of life, requiring them to change jobs, places, and pnorities, and second, the lack of an institutional mechanism through which they can colla-tivdy upress their grievances and resolve their problems. This latter point panially explains why the snuggles of these subaltern groups often take the form of a silent repertoire of individual direct action rather than collective demand-making protests. Unlike groups of organized workers or students, the unemployed, emigrants, refugees, or street vendon are groups an flux; they are the structurally atomized individuals who o~rate outside the formal institutions of factories, schools, and associations. They therefore lack the institutional capacity to exert pressure, since they lack an organizational power of disruption-disruption, in the sense of "the withdrawal of crucial contribution on which others depend," one that is therefore '"a natural resource for exerting power o\·er others." 11 They may, of course, participate in street demonsrrations or riots, but only when these methods enjoy a reasonable degree of legitimacy 11 and when they are mobilized by outside leaders. Under rxcc:prional circumstances, land takem·ers may be led by leftwing groups or the unemployed and street vendors may be invited to form unions. This happens mainly an relatively democratic periods, when political panies engaged in competition inevitably attempt to mobilize the poor in exchange for electoral suppon. That 11 how the unemployed were organized in postrev· olution Iran, the self-employed women in Bombay, the housewives an postwar Britain, and the srreet vendors in Lima." However. in the abs.ence of electoral freedoms. the contenders tend to remain institutionally powrrless sincr, more oftrn than not, mobilization for collective demand-making is forcibly repressed in many developing countries where these struggles often take placr."' This initaallack of institutional power is compensated, however, by the poor's perforcr versatility in taking direct action, be it collective or individual, precipitous or piecemeal, which, an the long run, might rvolve inro a more self-regulating/autonomous local life.

9

Consequ~ntly, in place of prot~st or publicity, thesr groups move directly to fulfill their needs by themselvn, albeit individually and discrnely. In shon, theirs is a politics not of protest but of ~dress, and is a struggle for im~diate outcomes largely through individual direct action.

The Aims What do thes~ men and women aim for? They seem to pursue two major goals. The first is the rediJtr1bution of social goods and opportumtic-s in the form of the (unlawful and direct) acquisition of collective consumption (land, sh~lter, pipc=d water, ele":tricity, roads), public space (srrut sidewalks, inrerS«rjons, strut parkmg places), opponunines (favorable business conditions, locations, and labels), and other life chances essential for survival and a minimal standard of living. The- other goal is anainmg autunumy, both cultural and polincal, from the- regulatiOns, institutions, and discipline imposed by the state. The disenfranchi!iied expreS!ii a d~ep desire to live an informal life, to run the1r own affairs without involving the authorities or other modern formal institutions. Thi!i is not ro suggrsr rhar tradition guidrs the1r lives, but rather to instst that modem institutions, in one sensr, r~pro duce pc=ople'!i tradittonal relariom; as solutions to the problems that rhesr institutions engender. In many informal communities in Third World cities, pc=ople rely on their own local and tradinonal norms during their daily al."ttvities, whethrr tt he establi!ihing contracts (e.g. marriage), organizing their locality, or resolving local disputes. In a way, they are compdlrd ro ucn ~ontrol over their working livrs, regulating their time and coordinating their space. They grow weary of the formal procedures governing their time, ohhgations, and commitments; they are reluctant to undertake the dasciphne 1mposed, for mstance, by paymg taxes and bills, appc=aring in public in particular ways, and most broadly in the pra'-"tice of everyday life.'' This distrust of the modern state and of institutions has aroused two contrasting reactions. Some soc10logasts, notably followers of the Chicago school and politicians, dismiss the urban poor as marginals, ourlaws, and criminals, and their communities as bastion.s of rural parochialism and traditionalism. This devaance, they suggest, can be corrected only by integrating these people hack into the state and the society; in short, by modernizing them."' Others, notably janice Perlman and Castells, have vehemently attacked the premise of mar-

ginality, arguing that far from being marginal, these people are all wellintegrated.,. Despite their differences, these rival perspectives share one imponant assumption. Both assume that the ideal man is the welladjusted and well-integrated man-in shon, modern man. The fact is that these men and women are neither marginal (i.e. essentially traditional and i501atrdl nor fully integrated. Rather, their poverty and vulnerability drive them to seek autonomy from the state and from modern institutions. They tend to refrain from rrsoning to police and other government offices primarily because of the failure of bureaucracies and modern institutions to &kliver for them. These institutions impose the kind of diKiplinc (in terms of regulating their time, behavior, and appearancrl that many simply cannot afford or with which they du nut wish to comply. Only the the very pour may favor intrgrataon since, at least in immediate terms, it gives them more than it takes. Many slum-dwellers and those relocated from shantytowns, however, are inclined to live in squatter arras panly bec;ause they seem fr~ from officialsurveillam:e and modem social control (for instance, in terms of the ability to communicate easily, appear in public, and pral."ricr thrir \.:uhurel. While the poor tend to re1rct the constraining facet of modernity, they welcome its liberating dimensaon. Thus, while the squatters do want to light their homes with elf'l.-rricity, use piped water and watch color TV, they do nor want to pay bills subjel."t to strict bureaucratic regulations; they yearn for flexibility and negotiation. Similarly, street subsistence work, despite its low status, low security, and other costs, has the advantage of freeing people from the discipline and controlling relations of the modern workmg institutions.'" Although somewhat romanticised, John Friedmann's characterization of the Brazilian barrios as a kind of postmodemist movement points to the alternative ways of life the poor tend to pursue. In his view, the barrios' emphasis on moral economy, trust, cooperation, production of use-values, local autonomy, and self-regulation in a sense challenges modern principles of exchange value, bureaucracy, and the state.'" Let me make rwo points dear. The first is that the notions of autonom)' ami integration in the view of both the poor and the state are far from straightforward. They are the subject of contradictory processes, constant redefinition, and intense negotiation. Informality is not an essential preference of the urban poor; it serves primarily as an alternative to the constraints of formal strul."tUres. Indeed, as the examples above illustrate, many poor people perhaps aspire and pra""tice inte-

grated life, only if they can afford its social and culrural-not to mention its economic-costs. Thus in thr early 1990s thr srttlers of lslamshahr, an informal community in south Trhran, campaigned for the official inrrgration of their community. Once that was achieved, howrver, new informal commumties began to spring up around that township. In addition, just as do the poor, statrs also exhibit contradictory stands on autonomy and intrgration. Most governments rend in practicr to promote autonomy as an effon to transfrr thrir responsibilities to the citizens, hence encouraging individual initiativr, selfhelp, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and so fonh. Observers such as Gil ben and Ward considrr thrse measures as a means of social control. However, they fall to recognize the fa~"t that at thr samr time governments display apprehension about losmg political space. h is not uncommon to observe states simultaneously implementing conflicting policies of both promoting and restricting autonomous and informalmstitutions. Third World urban life, in shon, is chara~"teriud by a combined and continuous process of informaliz.ation, integration and reinformalization. The second point is that the rich and the powerful may also desire self-regulation and autonomy from the disciplinr of modem organizations. However in reality, unlike the poor, they mostly benefit from those arrangements; it is the powerful who institute them in the first place. Moreover, unlike the poor, the rich, by virtue of posseuing resources (knowledge, skill, money, and connections) can afford to fum:tion within such institutions. They are able, for instance, to pay their bill!i or get to work on time. The rwo chid goals of the disenfranchised-re-distribution and autonomy-are quite interrelated. The former ensures survival and a better material life; the latter serves not only as an end in itself hut also as a means to achieve the objective of the redistribution: acting autonomously from the state, poor individuals may be able to obtain public goods (illewtlland, shelter, and so on) that they are unlikely to attain through legal and institutionalized mechanisms, unless they demand thrse goods through a powerful collecrive mobilization. In the quiet encroachments, the struggles to achieve these unlawful goals are hardly planned or aniculated. They are seen as natural and moral responses to rhe urgency of survival and the dC"Jite for a dignified life, however defined. In the Middle Eastern culture, the notion of necessity-the necessity of maintaining a digmfied life-underlies poor 4(1

~oples' sen~

of justice. The Persian phrase chare-1i neest (there is no other way) and its Arahic equivalenr na'mal eih? (what else can we do?) articulate a moral language of urban politics, responses through which the poor often justify their acts of transgression!' And this idea of dignity is very closely associated with the public ;udgmmt, with the community or friends and foes determining its meaning. To maintain a dignified life, a family needs to possess certain cultural/material abilities. Preserving abirou or 'ard (honor) through generosity, bravery, and more important, through securing the ha)'a (sexual modesty) of the women in the family mark a few such resources. But the essential components more relevant to our discussion include the ability to provide, rhe ability to protect the har~m of the household from public intrusion, and finally the ability to conceal possible failures (abtrour;~,. or fadiha). For a poor head of a household, not only would the failure to provide for his family jeopardize the1r survival, it would also infli", a hlow to his honor. Homelessness, for instance, signifies an ultimate loss in all these accounts. A dwelling, heyond its function of protecting the household from physical dangers (cold, heat, and the like), serves also as a cultural location. By preserving the harim, safeguarding people frnm moral dangers, a dwelling conceals shortcomings and preserve5 abiruu hefure the public gaze. The rich may also share similar values, hut the poor have a lower capacity to conceal failure5, thus making their dignified life more vulnerable. In this perception of justice informed by necessity, one who has a basic need may and should fulfill it, even if illegally, so long a!i he does not harm others like himself. The rich can probably afford to lose some of their wealth. When the state begins to challenge these notions, rhus violating codes of justice of the JXKlr, the morally outraged poor tend to rebel. 41 Yet I have to stress that this moral politics don not preclude the poor from the rattonal use of any p
Becomin1 Political If these movements hegin without political meaning, and if illegal encroachments are often justified on moral grounds (as a way to survive), then how do they tum into cnllecrive/p
fronted seriously by any authority, they treat their doing5 as ordinary everyday practice. Once thear gains are threatened, they ba:ume con· scaour. of thear actions and the value of their gain!., and they defend them collectively and audibly. I de!iCribe the logic of tranliformation from indivadual to coJJectJve act1on later. Suffice it to !itate herr that the numerous antigovernment riots by ~oquatters, street vendon, and other marginalized groups pomt to thr crntraliry of collective resistance among these atomized poor. The struggle of the ;u:tors is not about winnmg a gain but primanly about defending and furthering gains already won. In such conJunctures, the contenders may go as far as ro gave some structure to their activities, by networkmg, cooperat· ing, or m1tiating more structured organizations. Such organizing is aimed at maintaining, consohdaung, and extendmg those earhcr achievements. When does thr state enter the arena? State opposiuun usually occurs when the cumulative growth of the encroachers and their doing.-; pass beyond a tolerable point. Depending on the dfic1em:y of the particular state, the availability of alternatave wlutions, and the resistance of these quaet rebels, states normally tolerate scattered offen· sives, especially when they have still not become a critical force. The tnck for the actors, therefore, as to appear limited and tolerable while expandmg so much that resastancc: against thc:m becomes difficult. Indeed, many (squatters, vendon, and ur-parkcrs) try deliberately to halt their spread in certam areas by not allowing their counterparts tn Join them. Others resort to bnbmg minor officials. or minimizing vis· ibilny (fur mstance, squanmg in remote arras ur vending in less provocative areas). Almost all take advantage of undermined state power at times of crises (following a revolution, war, ur economic breakdown) to spread further and entrench their position. In bncf, the protagonists exploit these three opportunitier-crisis, bnbmg, and mvisibility-rhat allow them to remain apparently tolerable whale they arc m fact multiplying. Once the extent of their expansaon and impact is rrvcaled, however, state rea~.-rmn and crackdown often becomes inevitable. In most cases, crackdowns fail: they arc: usually launched too late, when the encroachers have already spread, become visible, and achieved a criti· cal mass. Indeed, the description by most officials of the process as .. cancerous" caprurcs rhe dynamics of such a movement. 41 The sources of the con flier hetwcoen the stare and rhe disenfranchised

have to du with the ~onomic and politkal costs that quiet encroachment imposes on both the authorities and the rich. The informal and free-of-charge redistribution of public goods exens a heavy burden on a state's resour~es. The rich-real estate owners, merchants, and shopkerprrs-also lose proprnies, brands, and business opportunities. The alliance of the rich and the s.tate adds a da~ dimem;ion to the existing political conflict. Beyond the economic dimension, the poor peoples' drive for autonom)' in everyday life creates a big crack in the domination of the modern state. A fully autonomous life renders states irrelevant. Popular control m.·er conrracrs, regulation of rime, space, cultural activities, working lifr-in shon, self-regulation-redaims signifi~anr politiul space from the state. Herein lies the inevitability of conflict. Street politks44 exemplifies the most salient aspect of this confliL'1, accounting for a key feature in the social life of the disenfranchised. Street Politics By street politics, I mean a set of conflicts and the attendant implications herwern a collective populace and the authorities, shaprd and expressed episodically in the physical and social space of the srrerrsfrom the alleyways to the more visible sidewalks, public parks, or spun places. The street in this sense serves as the only locus of collective expression for, hut by no means limited to, those who structurally lack any institutional setting to express discontt'nt. This group indudes squatters, the unemplnyt"d, strt'et suhsistem:e workers (e.g., vendors), members of thr undrrworld (e.g., beggars, prustitutt"s), prtty thieves, and housewivrs. The trrm signifies an articulation of discontent by dusters of differenr !tOCial agrnts without institutions, cohrrent ideolng)', ur r\·ident leadership. Two key factors rransform the srreets into an art"na of politics. Tht" first follows Foucault's general observation about spacr as power. •1 It results from tht' use of public space as a sight of contestation between tht' populact" and the Authority. At ont' lrvd, what makes street activity political is the active or participative (as opposed tu passivt") use of public space; thus, the use of strt't't side· walks, uossruads, urban land, the space for assembly, and public practices of culturt' all become the sites of contestation. TheSt" sites increasingly h«ome the domain of the statt' power that regulates their usa~, making them ordt"rly. It exp«ts their users to oprrate passively according to rules !art by the state. Any active and paniciparive use challenges

16

!KI QUII! IICRO&CKMBI! OP !KB OR»liARY

thr control of both thr Authority and thc>Sr social groups that brnrfit from such ordrr. Thts kind of meet lift- and thtst" type~ of activihrs arr hy no means a novelty. They could ~ ~en in sixternth- to eighternth-crntury Europe.... and, until vrry rn:rnrly, in thr ur~n Middle East. •' They did not entail street politi"-s, howrver. What makrs them political arr novel features: in contrast wnh thr past when local communities rnjoyed a grrat dral of auronomy and ~lf-rrgularion, tht-y arr now under centralized govemmrnts that rrgulate and control the strrrr and locallifr. 44 Thr second elrmrnt in shaping street politics is the operation of what I havr called the passrve "rtworlt among the people who usc public spacr. Any collrctivr political act-mobihzation-rrquires somr degree of organization, communication, and networking among its acton. For thr mmt pan this is constituted drliberatrly, rithrr formally or informally. Thus squatters, the unrmployed, or immtgrants from thr samr plact' of origm may establish formal asso.;1ations with constant communication and regular meetings. Or they may instead develop mformal contacts among thrm~lvC's. Vendors on the samr street, fur example, may get together on an ad hue basis to discuss their problems nr s1mply ro chat and scxiahze. In both formal and informal cases, the panicipants would have an activ~ nrrwurk among themselves in that thry ~omr known to each other, talk, meet, and conKiously interact with nne another. However, contrary tu Tilly's perception of organiz.a· rion-one with high "carness"' and .. nerness" nr strong coheston and interpersonal cnmmuniuticm 4 "-networks need not be activt•. The strttt as a public place pnssnses thi!!o intrinsic feature, making it pnssi· hiC' for J.'C'nple to mohihzC' without having an active network. Such a mobilization '" carried nut through passive networks-the instantaneous commumcation among atomized individuals, which 15 estab· lishrd by thr tacn recognition of thrir common identity and Ji medi· ated through \pace. A woman who enters a male-dommated party instantly notict's anuth~r f~mal~ among the m~n; vendors in a strert nouce each other even though they may never speak tn ~ach other. Unlik~. say, disprrsrd tax strikers, a passivr network rx1sU among both rhr women m the parry and vendors in a givrn locality. The t~nants nf a council housing unit, illegal immigrants tn a coun· try, tax strikC'rs, the women in a malr-dominated parry, vendors in a street, or !ipa:tarors at a fcx1thall match all reprt">t'nt atomized individuah. who, ar a certain level, havr a similar status and an idrntity of

inter~srs among themselves (see figures 1.1 and 1..1). For Bourdieu, each of rh~ above groups signifies a "theoretical group," becoming "real" only wh~n they are "~presented. "
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down in social control, and access to rnources may all facilitate collective action; and, in turn, the threat of "repression, .. u intergroup division, and the usefulness of temporary compliance are likely to hinder mobilization. The point here 1s not that a threat to evil."t a group of squatters may nor necessarily lead to their collective rnisrance; trade unions may also acquiesce before a threat of layoff. The point rather is to show how groups of atomtzed mdividuals without active networks and organization can and do engage, often instantly, in collective action;this is due to the operation of passive networks among them. This unplanned, unstructured, and instantaneous possibility of group action renders the street a highly volatile locus of conflict and thu.'i of politics. It is the operation of passive networks that lies behind the polit· ical danger of the srreets: the streets reprnent public space par excellence. No wonder every unpopular government pays such dose attention to controlling them. While states may be able to restrict deliberately organized demonstrations or rallies, they are often incapable of prohibiting street populations from working. driving. or walking-in shun, from street life. The more open and visible the public place, the broader the operation of passive nrtworks and therefore the possibility of collective action brcomrs. Pass1ve networks, in shon, represent an inherent element of street and backstreet life; they ensure the instant cooperation of the indiv1dual actors once those actors feel a threat to their well· being. In the absence of the concept of passive networks, many find it difficult to make sense of the surprising. unexpected. and spontaneous mass eruptions that take place in urban settings. •• This dialectic of indiVIdual and collective action-the possibility of collectin resistance together with their moral justification for individual encroachmentperhaps explains the resiliency of the disenfranchised in carrying on their srruM!e for survival and the betterment of their predicaments. The Making of the Quiet Encroachment How universal is the quiet encroachment of the ordinary? And under what conditions ts such acttvism likely to emerge? Quiet encroachment in developing countries St'ems to evolve from a combination of strul.-rural and cultural factors that render it a htstorically specific phenomenon. To begin with, the raw material of the movement, the actors, originates largely from the desperate duster§. of the urban unemployed and underemployed, as well as from other marginalized groups. 14 It seems that natural population mcreases (primarily resulting from poveny)

and especially the dassacal modrl of rural-urban migration (mulling from the maldistribunon of land, rural unemployment. natural or man-made disasters, urban bias, and limned mdustrial expansion) have been the primary reasons for urban unemployment. Evidence shows that for the most parr the urban economy as unable ro absorb fully the amount of labor created by natural population growth." Thus a large number of relatively educated and first-time job-!C'ekers remam out of work. Overall, urban migration serves as rhe primary factor. On average, nearly half of rhe increase in urban popularion in the Third World has rnulted from migration. This rate for borh Ghana and Tanzania was 6o percent, and for the Ivory Coast 70 percent. '• Beside rhas dassk scenario, some new developments have m rt•cent years multiplied the size of these groups. A global crisis of populist modermzataon m a number of Third World counrries since the 198os, and the collapse of socialist economies since rhe 1990s, have led to maS!Jiive de-anstirutionalization, prolerarianizataon, and marginalization. Alternative strategies-structural adjustment and stabilization programs-rend ro makr a sizablr segmrnt of already rmployrd people redundant, without a dear prospect of boosting the rconomy and creating viable Jobs. In the early 19905, during the transition to market economin in post-Socialist, adjusting Latin American and Middle Eastern countries, formal employment fell by 5 to 15 percenr. •· In Africa the number of unemployed grew by 1o percent or more every year throughout the 19801, whale labor absorption in the formal wage sector kept declining. •• By the early 19901 open unemployment in Th1rd World countries incrra!ied dramatically. •• Thus a large number of the once well-to-do and educated middle classes (government employees and students)and public sector workers, as well as segments of the peasantry are pushed into the ranks of the urban poor in labor and housing markets. The statt''s unwallingnns and inabiliry to offer adequate work, protection, and urban amenities puts thne new urban poor in a similar c:ollecuve position, if nut a collective identity, as the unemployed, squatters, slum dwellers or street subsistence workers-in short, they become potential street rebels. The lack of an instirutional setting leavrs these men and women to struggle in their atomized formations. Many developing counrries seem to have experienced similar processes. What distinguishes the form of mobilization within these nations has to do with local political culturn and institutions.

Thr rrprrssivr policy of the: starr rrndrrs individual, quirt, and hiddrn mobilization a morr viablr stratc:gy than open, collr~tivr protrst. lJnder su~h conditions, ~ollrcrivr and open dJrt'\:t action rakes placr only at rxceptional conjuncturrs-in pankular, when statrs rxperirncr crises of legitimaq such as the revolutionary crisis in Iran during 1979; Egypt after thr 1 967 drfrar; and South Africa after thr fall of apanheid in the early 1 CJCJOS. Howrver. wherr somr degree of political openness prevails, competition between political panies provides a breathing ground for thr collective action of ordinary people. The rival political groupings and patrons, in order to win electoral and mass suppon, inevitably mobilize the poor (as in India, Mexico, Peru, Brazil, and Chile in the early rcnos)_." This is unlikdy to happen undrr autocratic systems where winning vorrs is not a ~nncern of thr politi~al lradrnhip. In shon, quirt rncroachmrnt is largrly the featurr of undrmocratic political systems, as well as of cultures where primordial institutions 'it'rvr as an altemativr to civic associations and social movrments. This may par· tially explain why in most Middle F.astern ~ountrin, whrrr authori· tarian rule dominates and whrrr family and kinship are pivotal for individuals' suppon and security, it is largely thr strategy of quirt encroachment that seems ro prrvail." 1 In many latin Amrrican nations, on the other hand, whrrr some tradition and pra~ticr of political competition and political patronage operate, mobilization tends to assumr a collective, audible, and associational chara~-rrr; urban land invasions, urban poor associations, and street tradr unionism appear to mark a major featurr of urban politics in this region of thr world.t.J Statrs may also contributr to quirt encroachmrnt in another way. This type of movement is likely to grow where both the inefficienr state bureaucracy and rigid formal organizations, notably thr .. mercantilist" starr described by De Soto ( JCJ8CJ), predominate; such institu· tions trnd to encourage people to ~k more informal and autonomous living and working conditions. Thr situanon in more efficient and democratic settings is, howner., quite differrnt. The more democratic and rfficirnt the state, thr lrss ground for the rxpansion of highly autonomous movements; under such drcumstances, the pnnr rend to become integrated inro thr state structure and are inclined ro play the prevailing gamn, utilizing the nisting mn~ns and institutions, howrver limited, ro improve their livrs."

By the late 19705 thr quirt encroachment of the di~nfranchi~d had dearly marked Iranian cities. Rural-urban m1gration, the housing problem, spontanrous commumtirs. demands for collrctivr consumption, and the spread of street subsistence work had all h«n discus~d and presented as major developmental failures. The urban poor were seen as both villains (hy policy makers) and victims (by the opposition)-thry were the villains of development and modernization and the victims of the .. maldevelopment" and .. psrudomodernization"' that Iranian society had been going through since the 1940s. This chapter describe-s the main features of the .. new poor" by focusing on the c1ty of Tehran. It spells out their origm, size, and economic, communal, and housing conditions. It argues that by the eve of the Islamic Revolution the poor constituted a fairly distinct social group identtfied chiefly by the place of their residence. The New Poor The category .. poor" is not simply an economic one. It points primarily to social and cultural identity. Seen as a social category, the prrrevolution urban poor in Iran were a modern entity, a quite distmct social group. The members of thts group, called interchange-

ably thr urban poor or thC' disC"nfram:hisC"d, WC'rr distinguished chiC"fly by their low-im:nme, low-skill, low-status, and in!i(."curr position.' Ar times the much crJUcized trrm .. marginality" 1s employrd to describe this group. h so happens that rh1s rrrm is an exact rquivalc.-nr of thr Prrsian rrrm hashiy~nishini, whi\.'h has been widely used in official language in Iran. Undc.-rstandably, the problem wirh this terminology IS that thoK m tht' tradition of Chicago xhool sociologists tend to C"ssentiahzr the concept by giving the poor crrtain cultural essentials that separate" them from mamstrram urban lifr. J Huwevrr, I think that thr concrpt can be takrn as an empirical category-as a structural and historical pnx:ess in the developing world that rends ru exdude segments nf urban populations from devrlopmental achievements and modern institutions.' In this senK tht' urban poor in Iran, somrhuw ovrrlappcod with the industnal working dass, were distinguished from other social groups pnmarily by their social t'Xdusion and rheir rt"sidenrial status as squatters and slum dwellers: In Iran rhe nt"w urban diKnfranchised drveloped as a consequence of policies that both Reza Shah and Muhammad Rna Shah pursued from the 19305 onward.' Modt'rnizauon rC"sultrd m rapid urban growth, urban migration, the creation of new l
KAPPll~ OU! !R~ ··~· POOR•

homogeneous culrural and brhavtoral patterns, dnpite the persistence of patronage linking rich and pour. The new pour are the product nf a modern stratification system. From the early twentieth cenrury on, the traditional stratification partern began to givr way to a "dual class srru'-'ture. " 1" Thr integration of Iran in rhe world economy. along with the eventual establishment of a manufa"'tUring industry, resulted in the creation of new ~ial groupings, notably a modern bnurgemste. a workmg dass. and modern bureaucrats, all restding udustvely in urban areas. These social changn were accompanied by the modernization of urban form, residential pattern, and soc1al structure. 11 The traditional pattern of community changed into what Khosrowkhavar has characterized as a "oro-community," and is marked by tthmc and ongm heterogeneity, a tendency to modemtze tradttion and care about public !llpace, community pamcipatiun, and the state control uf public order. 1! Tehran, a walled city of nmtteen square kilometers with rlio,ooo inhabitants in I 90S, grew to house over 100,ooo in the early 19305, with segments settling in new mahalles that sprang up outside the ciry wall. In 1930 this wall was destroyed and modern straight streets were constructed. This marked a new phase in urban structure. With the establishment since the 1940s of city planning, the old mahalleh system gave way to a planned zonal pattern based largely upon class segregation. The low-income groups were invariably ignored by the various urban comprehensive plans. The free market un land and 1ts high price, and unaffordable construction standards set by the plans-such as size of plots, the form of construction, problems of gradual buildmg. and cost of preparation--all pushed the poor to pur up their shelters informally just outside the cny limits. This procn5 was speeded up particularly after 1966 when the notorious Prov1s1on 100 of the Municipality Law was approved. The law authonud demolition of unlawful constructions both within the city limits as well as in the buffer zones, harim, crrated around the cities. 11 Subsequently, informal and marginalized settlements hrRan to grow, leading to the formation of distinct poor communities. In Slums and Squatta- Settlements

By the eve of the 1979 revolution, Tehran, with a population of some five million, exhibited a remarkable and perhaps unique class l«onomic, social, and cultural I hierarchy. located on a north-to-south

25

slopang landscape, the geophysical pyramid of the &:ity reflected irs social and economic h1erarchy. To the far nonh, the highest district was the s1te of the most affluent populations. The lowest lands of the city were aliO&:ated to the poor. new migrants, and other strata of the working dan. The middle arras, from east to west, housrd the middle dassn.•• A number of !KfUatter settlements and lower-class neighborhoods located an the old Tehran .. v.Uages" had spread into nonhem and cmtral arras of the city. Their scale, however. was insignificant in comparison to those in South Tehran. The poor were thus pushed to settle in the vast southern plain, encompassing a variety of slums and squatter settlements, beginning roughly from Mawlavi Avenue. Many of the slums, especially those located in old Tehran (such as Munirieh, Mawlavi, Park-i Shahr, Maidan-i Soush, Ra1lway Station) were formerly the neighborhoods of the relatively well-off traditional middle class who gradually moved into the modern nonhem areas.leavang rhr poor behind to be joined by the new rural m1grants. These quarters then turned anto overcrowded slums 11-urban services deteriorated, Illegal additions were made. and homes were redesigned or panitioned to accommodate the nerd• of the poor. Yet other sen~mrnts, such as Naz1abad and Kouy-i Nuhum-i Aban, were deliberately created through a strategy of spatial segregation. By the m1d-19705 Tehran had some fifty slums and squatter '-'"Dmmunit1cs. Similar settlements spread also mother Iranian cities, such as Tabriz, Kermanshah, Hamadan, Bandar Abbas, Ahwaz, Bousher, Shiraz and Mashad. Among these, Tabnz (with 7.6 percent) and Ahwaz (4 per&:ent) had the h1ghest ratio of squatters to total population.•• Even so, the overall scale of those settlements was smaller than their counterpans in such Third World countries as Egypt, Pakisran, Turkey, the Philippines, or the Larin American nations. L1ke many of their equiValents in the Third World, the slums in Tehran were overcrowded, muddy, dirty environs, with narrow alleys in the m1ddle of wh1ch ran /Ouys, open waste-water/sewer ducts, playgrounds for barefoot chddrrn. But Tehran's poor neighborhoods had theu own peculiar features. Small, dense, and hurriedly built one- or two-story houses lined the edges of narrow alleyways. Despite the inadequacy of space, homes were characterized by little ponds in the middle of their wurryards. Small identical mud or brick rooms faced mto thr courtyard on three sides. Each flK)m was usually occupied by

a tenant household (with three or more children). whil:h might livt' and share the bathroom and kitchen with the landlord. The t'ntrance door and window ~when they existed) of each room looked out beyond the courtyard onto the neighbors. Thick curtains on the doors were the only shield against the curious. The square front yard was the central gathering place for almost all daily at.-tivities and important events: it could be a washing area for women, a space to spread the laundry, a playground for children, a secret rendezvous for young adults. a bat· dt'ground for squabbling tenants (or quarelling tenants and landlords), a joyous wedding hall, or a grieving funeral home. In slum dwellings there was no room for privacy. Within each individual household, the extreme limits of space exposed the most private affairs. The physical density led poor residents to incorporate the alleyways into their own private spheres. In these poor communities the line between private and public could hardly be drawn. While young females spent much of their time indoors or in the courtyards. male youngsters hung out mostly in the sar-i lwucheh (intersections of the alleyways and the str~ts). The sar-i lwucheh fun":tioned as perhaps tht' must important space where youth street culture took shape. It was here that the youth formed gangs and group solidarity, articulatt'd their local identity, smoked, chrcked out the passersby-notably the adult girls-and were I'C\:ruited for cultural and religious events. In the southern landsca~ of Tehran, meanwhile, lay the estates of the traditional brick-making industry whose enormous chimneys resembiC'd thC' .. satanic mills" of the industrial revolution. Around these mills sprang up thC' main squatter communities of the metropolis-including caves, tents, hovels, shacks, shanties, and urban villages-which lacked almost all city amenities. Although many spontaneous settlements mushroomed also in the north, east, and western margins of the city, the 5outhem plain maintained its lead well through the postrevolutinn years. The squatters usually called their communities by the terms that dC'S('ribed the mode of their constru'-'tion. Thus Muftabad meant the community built free of charge; Zuorabad, by force; Halabiabad, those made of tin containers; and Ha.sirabad, of bamboo leaves. The settlements exhibited a great diversity in terms of infrastructure, as well as in socioeconomic and property relations.•~ But most shelters were located in tiny spaces-over 6 3 percent of squatter households occupied l..S square meter single rooms, when the average standard

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size wa'i to be 18. s square meters. 11 This ~ontrasts sharply with informal communities developed mainly after the revolution in the villaRes around Tehran-such as lslamshahr, Akbarabad, and Sultanabadwherein per captta space was 10.6 square meters, well above those in Nairubi, Rabat, or Tunis, which ranged from 5 to 6. 7 square meters. 1" Most of the squatters owned their shacks or tents but had no legal title to land. 1" The size of the communities also varied, ranging from sites with less than 1 o units to ones with over 6oo houscholds. 11 The gowd residential community, a virtually underground settlement created by the brick-making industry in South Tehran, sheltered 1,040 households and over 4ft,ooo inhabitants;lZ in 1976 Halabiabad housed some u,ooo households and 6o,ooo residents.ll And by the late 19705 about 56,ooo residents were concentrated in Zourabad, a hillsite squatter ~ommunity in Karadj. 14 By 1980 at least one million poor lived in the slumsL' of Tehran and an estimated 400,000 resided in the squatter communities. This figure excluded spontaneous settlements that lay nutside the city limit'l, such as those around Varamin, Qan:hak, and Shahriar. If these were included, the total squatter population of Tehran would probably rea~h some soo,ooo, or over 1 s percent of the city's population;1" slum dwellers and squatters together accounted for .J s percent. Informal settlements in Iran have, in many respects, been different from those in other developing nations. Their total size is smaller, and the quality of housing better. Nondurable shelters-such as shacks, tents, boats, or rooftops homes--constituted only about 1 pcr~ent of total housing units; most squatters, particularly those in urban villages, lived in relatively spacious red-brick homes. And finally, although land invasion and fur~eful seizure did take place, illegal construl""tions were rrt'l.""trd mainly on purchased land.~The vast majority of the urban underclass-squatters, slum dwellers, and unskilled migrant workers-originated from among the impoverished rural masses of various ethni~ and linguistic ba~k grounds who emigrated both before and after the land reform program of 1961. Apart from su~h '"pull factors" as the availability of jobs, higher income, and better living conditions in the cities, especially in Tehran, important '"push factors" were also involved. A decline in agriculture, forceful expulsion frum land, sale of land, reduced income, and bad living conditions were among the most important of these. 11

29

'0

KAPPIIG 00! !II •11w POOR•

The poor m Tehran ume pnmarily from the Turkash-speakmg rrgiom ( Azarbaajan, Zan jan, and Hamadan in the northwest and west), the cmtral provinces, and rhc: villages around the capital.~· After the ~ond World War Tehran experienced large-scale emagration from Azarbaijan where the &nst'\:unty of war and i.truggles over regional autonomy pushed many rural people out of the area. The ammayants srttlc:d m poor distri~.:n of South Tehran, notably javadieh. wo A survc:y of Zoorabad ( m Karadj) in 198 1 showed that some ss percent of 56,000 rc:sidc:nts of thas squatter community wc:rc: Azari speakc:n from Azarhaijan, Zanjan and Hamadan. 11 The mostly rural ongm and eth· nic backgrounds among the migrant poor marked their cultural/social sc:gregation from thc: Wc:stc:rniud urban nch, who stigmatized thc: poor as dihaatr (rural/backward). Fur the disc:nfranchisc:d, the multac:thnac magration crc:atc:d ethnically basc:d neighborhood~o that later influenced the cultural c:volurion and community mobilization of the inhabnants before and after thc: revolutionary upheaval of 1978-79. Although these ethnically based communities commanded a high degrec: of internal cohesion and solidarity, they also caused mtercom· mumty conflicts and disunit}' at times. Beyond ethnic variation, squatter settlements were also differenti· ated along the occupational qualaty and income level of thear occupants. By 1 979 some communities, such as Zoorabad in Karadj and those urban villages in Ray and Shahriar, were mostly mdustrial working-da:\s communities: many (about 50 percent m Ray and over 30 percenr m Zoorabad) worked m the nearb)· modern industries, whale others were skillc:d laboren wath fairly high job security. In fa~-r. no more than 10 percent of the mhabitantli wc:rc: earning a strec:t subsis· tence. 11 Thc:se settlc:ments, however, wc:re not typial. Their indwotrial charlk."ter was due, pnncapally, tn their proximity to the largc:st industrial sites an thc: ~:ountry, located in the: south and south east of the capital city, strc:tching up to Karadj. Both in Tehran and c:ven more in other cities, the: squatter poor !>Ubsasted chaefly (betwec:n 6o and 8o pen:ent of heads of households) by c:ngaging in unskilled consrru""tion jobs and various types of ansa:ure casual work. They mostly worked in sweat!>hops or as street vendon, shOC' polasheril, car deaners, lonery-tickc:t !tellers, doormen, waiters, shop assistants, servants, and portenacross the vast underground «onnm)· (see table 1.1 ). Neverthelesli, contrary to popular amagc:, "fake, black and unhc:althy occupations"

TABU l.. I O~~upational

Structure of Squarre~ in Sele\."ted Serrlci1K'nt5 in Iran, based on Ca!iC Studies in Various Years

Unclass1fird llnsk1llrd work~r

Srmi!ikilkd workrr Skillrd work~r Str~rt v~ndon

Bandar Abbu

Ahwu

Naqo~d~h

(1971)

I 19"11

119741

f.1

ll.o

~6.1

4).0

7-4 J.O Jy.J

CJ.O

If>. I

.

Tahriz (

.,.,~)

l..o1kdan

Zoorabad' IK.tradt

1197111

19791

(,,6

H.o

.\.1.1

41.1

4}.0

I<J.O

14·4

10.0

19.0

11.0

~.II

111.9

,...

11.0

JO.O

9.0

7-9

1y.o

J.S

100.0

100.0

6.0 100.0

100.0

6.1

Low·status ~mplnyrr

Fanner Crafnmen Tural

"·'

11.6

10.0

1.1 100.0

100.0

.'inurc·c>: Thr Iranian Crnlrr for Urban and Archit«'tural Studirs, Hashryrrti$b;,., d.lr Ira.., R~pm on rflaw 4· vol. 1, p. &6. 'llrduad from ..:.nrrrd data from tM umr r~pon.

such as begging. drug-dealing, and prostitution constitutN no more than a smalJ fra~tion of their activities. 11 For instance, a 1971 study of Tehran's several squatter settlements showed that over So percent of squatters were involved in unskilled or semiskilled jobs, induding construction. street vending. and low-paid government employment. They remained jobless on average between three to five monrhs of the year. while working hours brought to each household (with an averagt' number of 4.6 members) only Rls 4460 (about sixty dollars) a month. 14 Other surveys in the 1cnos confirmN the very high job insecuriry among the squatter poor. Slum dwellers seemed to have hight'r incomes and job !it'Curiry. 11 They werr also les..o; distant, geographically and socially. from mainstream urban life and were descended from oldt'r migrant generations. Many of them had b«n hom in the cities. These variations notwithstanding. by the late 1970s one could observe a sizable marginali~rd urban underclass, identified hy their geographical, social, and to a large extent economic exclusion from the formal mainstream urban life. While tht' bulk of the nt'w poor prrft'rrt'd the existing conditions of their life to their pan, ... vulnerability in everyday life remained the salirnt frarure of tht'ir collective rxisrencr-in St'Curing a placr to live and a subsistenct' job, in debt payment and in

maintaining their dignity (ablrou). The identity of this underdass was very much tied to their place of rt"Sidence. They evolved into a fairly distinct social entity-an identity articulated both by themselves and others. Slum dwellers carried their identities in the public discourse, not as much with reference to their poverty or work conditions as to their communities, which in the meantime connoted their particular social and economic conditions. Thus Na:.iabadi ur Mardum-1 jaa,adiyeh descri~d the social identity of the slum dwellers in Naziabad and Javadieh. On the othrr hand, squatters saw themselves and were chieOy viewed as z.aghehnishinan or aluunaknlshinan (literally senler!\ of shacks and shanties) with some regarding them as belonging to a "fourth class."'' The official language, however, generally referred to them as the mardum-i hashiyenishin, rC'!\idents of ciry margins. Others looked at the new poor through the eyes of denigration, pity, and poetry. The middle-dass use of demeaning words--amaleh and hammal-stressrd the urban pour's degraded status. Amaleh genrrally means "unskilled cunstru~1ion laborer" -im:identally the major occupation among the underdass. Yet its derogatory use presented the pour as a caste, making them conscious of their particular position in relation to others: "My daughter tells me" stated a squatter, When I go to school through this long and muddy road, my doths grt all dirty, and I really grt embarrat.K'd among my classmates. And the women uf thi• neighborhood are now Jingled out (m4'ruuf). When they go •hopping m other area., prople louk at them with disdain. Their apprarance •how• that they arr pour l{aqir). ••

In addition, the amage of the new poor has enterrd the movies, 1V programs, and critacalliterarure. Khosrow Golesorkhi's moving recitation, during his court trial, of his poem .. Under tM javadiyeh Bridge" expressed a sense of both pity and piety. •• Short stories by Samad Behrangui..' and Gholam Hussein Sa'cdi 41 focused chiefly on the misery of the underclass and their wretched life. Anomie and rootlessness among urban migranrs was a principal theme in Jalal Ale-ahmad's social criticisms.•: And Sa'edi's "Garbage Place" (Ashghaldouni), which became the movie Dayne-ye Mina, dralt with the social psychology of thr lumpm proletariat whosr lifr, according to Ali Akbar Akbari, did nut differ much from that of the "poor prtty-bourgroisir .. or the urban underdass.•• So in this prriod, althouKh thr nrw poor

became a parr of the public imagination, the image remained one of powerlessness. lr was not until after the Islamic Revolution that the poor were granted an element of agency, when the term mustaz'a(in began to dominate the public language. The following chapter discusses in detail the complexiry of this agency over the course of the Iranian Revolution.

Three The Disfranchised an4 the Islamic ~eTolutiona •Our ~eTolution an4 Theirs" This mommtnu~ J~lam11: RrvnlutJnn 15 m.XbtC"d tn thr dfons of this da-thr d.an of thr .Xprivrd, thr dan nf rhr guu.oJ,usbJII, thr sh.anty dwdkn, thr dan th;u j,ro~ht about rhr viL"tory of rhr l't'Vnlurion, and yrr did nM rl(p«t any rrward. -Ayatollah KhoriK"IIIi, 111 a lJiftCh tn a group of JCOWd Ktrlrn of ~ourh TC"hran' !iwnr to
The Revolution On Frbruary 1 1, 1979, Trhran radio announcrd the victory of thr Iranian Rrvnlurion with frverish jubilation. A mood of ecstasy ovrrtook thr populacr, who rushrd into thr streets en massr. Womrn millrd through thr crowd, handing out candies and sharbat, swrrt drinks. Vrhiclrs snundrd thrir horns in unison, beaming thrir lights as thry drovr down the main strrrts that only days beforr had witnrssrd bloody dashes berwren the protrstrrs and thr army. Thrsr samr strrets were now being patrolled by thr revolutionary militias, the Pasdaran. For thosr present, it was ada)· of incomparable victory. This victory day was the cuhninarion of more than t'ightren months of mass demonstrations, bloody confrontations, massivr industrial actions. a general strike, and much political maneuvering. 1 The gene\is of the rrvolutinn can br tracrd to the structural changes that had bern undrrway since the 19 JOs, when tht' country began to undrrgo a procrss of modernilation. This process accrlrrated a ftt'r the 1 9 53 coup, rngineered by the CIA, which topplrd nationalist prime ministrr Muhammad Mnsaddrq and reinstated the Shah. Thr modernization policy and the economic changes initiated by thr starr under both Rrza Shah ( 191 s-1946) and his son, thr late

Shah, resulted in the growth of new social forces-much to the dismay of the traditional social groups. By the 1enos a large and well-to-do modern middle class, a modern youth, women engaged in puhl1c activism, an mdusrrial working class, and the new poor-slumdwellers and squatters--domanated the social 54:ene. With the exception of the- latter group, these groups were the bene-ficiaries of the new economic de-velopment; they en1oyed high status and high economic rewards. However, the persistence of the Shah's age-old autocra~-y prevented their panicipation an the political process. This angered them. At the same time the old 50Cial groups--represented by the traditional hazaaris or merchants, the old urban middle strata, the declining dergy, and those whn adhered to Islamic institutions--were also frustrated by the strategy nf modernazauun since it undermined thear economiC interests and rheir power bases. With all the institutional channels dosed through repression for the expression of diKontent, the populace was increasingly alienated from the state. In the meantime, corruption, inefficiency, a sense of injustice, and a feeling of ..:ultural outrage marked the social psychology of many Iranians. During the tense yrars of the I enos, therefore, at the height of the Shah's authoruarian rule and during a period of remarkable economic growth, many people (except perhaps the upper dass and the landed peasantry) seemed d1s~tisfied, albeit for different reasons. But all were united in blaming the Shah and his western allies, especially the U.S., for that state of affairs. It is therefore nor surprising that the language of dissent and protest was largely anumonarchy, antiimperialist, Third Worldist, and even nationalist, turning m the end into a religious dis.course. The opportunity for popular mobilization arrived wnh what we used to ..:all the UCarterite breeze" Inasseem-e Carterl). President Carter's human rights poliq in the late 1970s force the Shah to offer a pohtical space for a hmated degree of expression. This expression built up cumulatively and an the ..:ourse of less than two years swept asade the monarchy. It all began with a limited relaxation uf ..:ensorship, which allowed some literary/inrelle~-rual activities (in the Goethe Institute and the unaversmes in Tehran) and public garhermgs uf lslamasts (in Oqba Mosque). It ..:onrinued with distribution by the intellectuals and liberal poliucians of openly uitical letters to highlevel officials. While thi!io was all going on, an insulting an1de against Ayatollah Khomeini in a daily paper, Ettllaat, triggered a demonstra-

!RB

»ISPR~ORISKD

AI» !Ri

IS~IC

RKYOLU!IO•

tion m the: shrine: City of Qum that left some: dc:monsrrators killed. To commemorate: this, a largc:-snlc: dc:monsrranon took place: in the: Auri city of Tabriz in the nonh. This marked the beginning of a chain of events that formed a nationwide: revolutionary movc:mc:nt in whkh diver~ segments of the population-modem and rradirional, religious and secular. men and wumc:n-panicipared in massive numbers, and in which the ulama, the Shi'i clergy, assumed its leadership. Over twenty-five years of the Shah's auux:racy since the 19H coup had removed or destroyed almost all the effective secular political and civil organizations. The coup crushed both the nationalist and commumst movements; trade unions were infiltrated by the: secret police (SAVAK); publications were strictly censored; and hardly any effective NGOs remained. • The main organized political dissent came from the underground guerrilla organizations, the Marxist Fedaian and the radical Islamic Mujahedm, whose activities were limited to isolated armed operations.' Student activism also remained restricted either to campus politics inside the: country or to aL-rions carried out by Iranian students abroad. In short, the: secular groups, while badly dissatisfied, were orgamzatiunally decapatated. Unlike: the secular forces, however, the: dergy had the comparative advantage of possessing invaluable institutional capacity; this included its own hierarchical order-over ten thousand mosques, hussein~yehs, huwuhs, and associations, which aL'ted as a viral means of communication among rhe revolutionary contenders. Young lslamists, both boys and girls as well as young clergymen, linked the institution of the ulama to the people. A hierarchical order facilitated unified decisionmaking and a systematic flow of order and information; in the mosques higher-level decisions were dissemmated to both the activists and the general public. In shun, this institutional capacaty, in addition the remarkable ambiguity of the clergy's message, ensured the ulama's leadership. Given the msecunty, poverty, inequality, and high infl.ation characteristic of the poor communities, the availahility of a mobilizing force of revolutionary agitators was sufficient for many nb~rvers to assume the active participation of the disenfranchised in the Islamic Revolution. The ponrayal uf the revolution by new Islamic leaders as the inqilab-1 musta: 'afin, the revolution of the downtmddrn, signified the supposed centrality of the underdass to the revolutionary process. The Islamic leaders derived their own legitimaq and that of rhe rno-

'7

58

~ »I8~Cfti5X» ~

!KI ISLAMIC ftllOLU!IO.

Iuti on by propounding thi~ imagr of participarion by the musta: 'afin and the lwulthnlshlnan. Politicians apart, many scholars have also comr ro similar conclusions. Some have pomted to dislocated rural migrants as the fundamental social bas1s of thr lslam1c Revolunon.• Others havr written that thr miserable living conditions, violent behavior, and the declasse character of thr lumpm pro~tariat made them fit to support the Khomeinirype revolution.~ Many write~ have srres.sed the institution of hey'at, rthnically based and ad hoc Islamic sermons, as rhr mrchanism through which rhr poor wrrr mobilized by the clergy." What all these conclusions imply is a functional, structural, and even rssential affinity hetw~n the poor and political Islam. Lacking adequate rmpirical llacking, they are largrly theoretical constructs lla~d upon rither an 1drology or a deduct1on wherrby the rconomic and social position of a group a priori drtrrmines its political behav· ior. Thrse authors also sharr an assumption that privilrgrs generalIzed/global or political strugglrs over local mobilization. By focusing on the city of Tehran, I argue hrre that thr urban poor werr nor rrvolurionary m the conventional stnse of wanting to transform rhr rx1sting macro power srructurr. lnderd the disfranchised remamed on the margins of the revolutionary campaign nearly until the rnd. Yt't, I will suggest, they were not passive. Rather, the poor were involved m a parallel strugglr ro bring about change in their own livrs and communitirs. They werr engaged in rhe kmd of strugglesquiet encroachment at the localiries--rhat, unlike that of rhr revolution, seemed to tht'm both meamngful and manageable. The Poor and the Revolution Rev1rwmg the major daily paper reports ( Ko~yhan, Ettilaat, and Ayandegan) during 1977 and 1978, nne em:ounters dt'talled accounts of da1ly demonstrations, stnkes, and nots in vanous cities and provmces, sumnimes with unusually detailed descriptions of the number nf participants, slogans vnu:ed, leaders, speeches delivered, rewlutiuns read, as well as the nature and outcumr of the events. They report the procession of vannus members of the population: teachers, stu· dents, worken, lawyers, nurses, rhr clergy, women, guilds, and unions, wuh each group and mstituuon carrying us own symbols. Among the~;C participants one hardly comes across squatter groups or, for mstance, mc:n of Khak-1 ~did. My mtc:rviews w1th a number nf young

middle-dass parti~ipanrs in the street demonstrations and riots confirm this observation. Janet Bauer, an Arneriun anthropologist who carried our fieldwork among the poor communities of South Tehran and a num~r of rural ~ommunities for the eight~n months JUSt before rhe revolution Uune 1977 through late 1978), also observed that .. up through the end of 1978, relatively few women (or men) from the lowest in~ome neighborhoods of Tehran were actively participaung in s,rr~r events .... In addition, out of a ~ample of 646 ~ople killed in Tehran in the street eventli during the revolution (from August 13, 1977 to February 19, 1978) only 9 or just over 1 percent came from the shantytownlii. 111 The largesr proportions were among artisans and shopkeepers( 1H9), srudents ( 149), factory and workshop workers (96), and state employ~s (70). Why were the poor, especially the squatter settlers, generally aloof from the revolutionary struggles? Poverty, inequality, and oppression do not by themsdves indu~e antistate political action. The crucial questions are: how do the poor pcr~e1ve rhe1r poverty, oppression, and day-to-day troubles? Who do they blame? What mechanisms and srraregies, if any, do they devise or resort to to tackle those problems? Finally, ro what extent are external political fun::es interested and able ro '"activate" the poor by offering a different analysis and treatment of their problems? The members of the underdasli m Tehran dearly v1ewed themselves as poor, unfortunate, afflicted, and even wretched-the terms used were "faq~r r•a blcharrha"(thr destitute), '"badbakhtha" (the unfortunate), and "tabaqeh-yr sr'lma .. (third,lass ~oplc). They were aware of the differences between their lives and those of the rich.'' Yet it is nor dear whom they blamed fur rheir misfortune. Ar times they attributed their problems to "their fare, destiny, and God's will." Nevenheless, in general they ex~ted the '"government," ~rhap~> as a great patron, to amehorate the1r difficulties.' 1 As for rhe Shah, if anything rhty seemed to view the monar~h as outside the cirde of their day-today rroubles. In some ways, rhe migrant poor of the 1970s in Iran (especially those in Tehran) are reminiscent of eighreemh-century mobs in the preindustrial cities of southern E.urupe such as Rome, Palermo, or Istanbul. 11 like them, rhe migrant pour seemed to regard the ruler, in their case the Shah, as the great patron, rhe provider of livelihood, and the sourc:c of JUStice: they horh admired him and f~ared h1s power. It

40

!KI »IS,...CRIBI»

~

!RB ISLAMIC

IBTO~U!Io•

was to this ultimate arbitrator that the poor turned in times of acute crises. '"To his ex&:ellency, the crowned father of the nation, Shahanshah Aryamehr!" pleaded a squatter who had lost his homr to demolition agents in 1977: .. I have borrowed too,ooo tumans to build my home. Now, the agents have demolished it. Who should I go for compensation? I am hungry and wretched. I always pray and will pray for your well-hrmg. I hrg Your Excellency to consider my case. 14 There were some who, even a~r the downfall of the Shah, believed that .. the country nerds a 14at-o-tallht" 11 and that without its monarch it could not continue to function. 1" Although in the perception of the pnor it was dear that the local officials, the municipality agents, the bureaucrats, and thr other rich sucked the blood of thr poor, they thought the Shah probably did not knnw what was done tn his name. '"The Shah himself does nor mmd, and he does not know about thrs problem lof the municipality demolishing their homes!. It is the~ bullies and bureaucrats who destroy our homes." '"The one who is sitting at the top lthe Shahl dnrs nor want to sre people's homes get ruined. Hr doesn't know. It 11 the IMunicipality I agents who destroy homes ..... Far from tactical statements to gain '"political insurance," these appeals reflected the urban underclass's mythology about their monarch. 11 Th1s mythology may perhaps be traced hack to their rural commumtirs, where the tradition of patronage was so w1dely practiced among the prasanrs and the rural poor. I can recall how we, the residents of a village in the <..:rntral Province, constructed a transcendental image of the Shah. We always wondered, for instancr, up to what grade the Shah had studied 1f the maximum were twelve. Our answen vanrd from twenty to nne hundred! We also imagined what he ate: always roast turkey? With what? Ahnut this, we were quitr sure: ir must have bern with golden forks. When transistor radios came to the village, they brought h1s mythical qualities much dosrr tu home. Folk tales about the puwrr and the generosity of kings ahnundC'd. EvC'n thC' shaikh of thC' village advanced stories of this nature. HC' had large' portraits of thr royal family nn his wall. The dreds and discourse in thC' village conveyed a sense nf sympathy, admiration, and yet apprehension. As these personal storin illustrate, the poor's image of themselvt'S and the Shah contrasted sharpl)' with those of the revolutionarit'S (the participants and the agitaton alikel who srrmt'd to chaJ"Kt' the starr and its head with all the countr)"s social. economic. and politn:al shon~omings. From these groups tht' disenfranch1srd wt're largely margm-

~KI

DlSPftAIOftlSS» AI»

~KI

lS~IC KKlOLU~Io•

alizcd. Th~y were located on the periphery of the city's political ~:on omy in many r~sp«ts. AmonK the squaners, the number of the employees working in large-Kale" formal enterprist'S was minimal (see chapter l.).ln this sense the composition of the: squattc:n in Iran was quite different from that of Turkey, Egypt, or most of Latin Amerk-a, where large numbers of the middle and working classes have been forced to reside in informal senlements and have brought outside experiences with them into the shantytowns.'~ In Tehran the poor communities were located on the fringes of the city or in the end~d spots within it, inhibiting inhabitants' contact with the city's mainstream life. For instance, only about 40 pen:c:nt of the men (and just 4-5 percent of women) of a poor district in South Tc:hran traveled more than sixry minutes from their homes daily.l" Although a few senlcments spread in wealthier areas (like Shahabad community near Niavaran Palace) their number was very insignificant/' Their access to the print media was also limited, as most of the heads of households in these communities were illiterate.L! The urban poor also lacked meaningful formal associations of their own that could act as political intrnnC'dlaries between them and the national elites. There was nu equivalent ro the Latin American popular organizations in the Iranian shantytowns. Although a kind of neighborhood association (an1uman-t mahal/i) did exist, they were state-sponsored and their leaders were in alliance more with the local bureaucraq than with their ..constituencies." There is no evidence to suggest that these state-sponsored associations were used by the poor to serve their own interests as, tor example, many stare-run unions were converted to serve the factory workers.l' Thili is not to suggest that the poor in Iran were uninterested in collective activities. Rather, important political factors were involved in their nonorganization. Formal assu~:iations between the poor and national movements develop normall)· in conditions where (as, for instance, in India, Turkey and some Latin American countries) the existence of representative demtX:racy allows a relatively genuine rivalry between political parties. lo secure the votes of the large popular sector., partie!tt inevitably attempt to mobilize the poor. which in the end makes the p<xn ~un~K:ious of thrir power and their political leverage ar the national lrv~t.l• Even illrKal movements, such as ~ndero Luminoso movemrnt in Peru, mobilize the poor in the shanryruwns in exchange for securing the latter's political support.l' In

41

addition, organized indu!itrial worker•, who make up a large §egmenr of the squatters in Larin Ameri~a. often play a significant mobilizing role by bringing their exprrien"·r of ~ollrrtivr action from rhr fa,-rorirs mto the shantytowns. In the Iran of the 1970s these conditions were larKC"IY absent. The political dktatorship of the Shah had made genume party rivalries impossible, let alonr rhr possibiliry of bargaining for the electoral support of the poor. Industrial workers did nor constitute a signifil:anr portJUn of the squatter population, although rhry do seem to have had a SIKJlificant pr~nce in the inner,iry slums.z• Mnreover, the industrial workers themselves were largely deprived of indept"ndent labor organizations. The indrprndrnt trade uninn movrmenr had Men supprr~d sin~r the coup of 19 B r and the official factory uninn!i had Mt'n infiltrated by the sKrrt policr, lraving litrlr room for grnuinr union activity and culln.-rivr action.JI Thrsr circumstan~es prrvrntrd the poor-living in the slums or the squatter st"ttlrmrnts- frnm 'ittting up voluntary and formal associations in thrir neighborhoods. In practice, traditional networks in the form of kinship, ethnic relations, and self-help relations rook the place of formal community orgamzahons. To tadde their daily problrms, thr poor rrlied on their relatives, friends, and fellow villagers. They assisrrd each other in providing loans, labor, and adv1ce, and in raking carr of childrrn, thr u~mpluyrd, and thr rlderly. Th1s 1s not ro say that conflict was nor rndrmic to hfr in poor communiurs. Daily dispurrs over children, gang-like groups (/aats), ethnic differencrs, competition ovrr scarce resources such as land, watrr, or othrr resources characterized thr lifr of the pour.!• Nevrrthdrss, the poor did exhibit a strung 'lt'nse of uniry and coordination when thtu common channels of survival, tspt'Cially thrir dwellings, wrre pur in danger. k• Community rituals wrre crucial in bringing the poor togrther. Wrddings, funerals, Nowr
h IS commonly assumed thar theM" mstirutions were utilized by rhe dergy to mobilize rhe poor in rhr anri-Shah campaign during rhr Iranian revoluuon of 1979. 11 There 1s, howevrr, no solid evidence of this. lnd~d. horh s«ular (left or liberal) and lslami~ agitarurs (rhe ant1regime dergyl largel)· ignored rhe underdass, ~:on~:enrraring instead on rhe polirico-inrclle"-rual training of young educared groups, chiefly srudents. In eighty-eight !lrrmons, messages, and letters, in rhe fiftt't'n years prior ro the rtvolution, Ararollah Khomeini madt only eight passing rrfcrences to lowrr-dass people, compared with fifty referc-n~cs ru tducated youths, students, and umversities. 14 In turn, Ayatollah Mutahhari's elitist approach is dear through his warnings ahout avaam-wd~KN' or populism~ 11 and for Ala Shariati, it was intellectuals, not the popular masses, that constitUtC'd the revolutionary for~:e. •• lntC'rC'srtngly the term Mmustaz'a{in" entered Khnmemi's discourse only during the hc1ght of the revolution (Aban 1 \pi, when he used it merely ro repud1atr the Lommunisu. ·- and anempred to offer an alternative (blamic) ~on~eptualization of the poor. Indeed, the drrgy dir«red irs attention ro the musta~ 'afin, or rhe lower dasse!t, predominantly after rhr revoluriun. They did so, first, hecause thr lower da~>ses were S«n as a !t.nhd social has1s for rht new regime~ S«ond, ba:ause lower-dass radtcahsm in rhe pustrrvolution furced the dergy 10 adopt a radiul language; and third, because the dergy's emphasis on mustaz 'a{in could disarm the left's proletarian dtscourse after rhr rnrolutinn. But during and ~fore the revolurion rhe acrivturs of both leftist and religious militants were limited ro ~asual agitation among the squatters during the government crackdown on illegal scttlemenrs, such as the fedaian Guerrilla Organization's bombing of thr municipality building of Rey m 1977 to rxhibit its ~olidarity with puor squatters. •• Relig.toU!t sermons (rou,u-kh.mi), preaching, and prayers ~ertainly diJ cxisr m underdass neighborhooJs. I myself was an active pani~i pant m these activities throughout my adolescent years. But they focused almost exclusively on religious inJunctions and stories, Islamic behavior, purtty, and the like. It was prrha~ true that "nothing brings us together more than the lnvr for Imam Hu!tsrm," as a young squarter proudly stated. These '*hey'ats have a posttive role in unitmg us and keepmg us mformed about each other." But the occasions did not go, as he attested, beyond '*scx:ializing" and simply "sacrif~emg Imam Hussein and w~pmg (for h1s dead body(."'~

for the marg~nal poor., the revolution ~mainrd by and large a pra~ rice whose slogans, a1ms, and ideals appeared distant and drta~hed from theu da1ly ~on~ems and ~omprehens1on. They were ~on~erned primarily with thosr marters that were essrntial to maintaining their daily survival. They needed ~unuere and immediate solution& to their problems. These were bound to be limited to their l~alities. llnril the last phasr of the ~voluuon, the poor in general seemed for the most parr salent, on the frmge of events. They were not, however., passive. Indeed, they were involved in a parallel struggle to bring about ~hange in their own hves and communities. The disenfranchised were engaged in the lund of muggles that, unhke the revolution, sremrd both meaningful and manageable, as well a• in bringing about a kind of change no leu sigmti..:ant than the one the Islamic Revolution was to tmng about.

The Parallel Str'UIIIcs Wr havr bren hrrr for a lung time nnw, ~in'r evrrythmg 1n the v1llagr was dnrroyed, and our houK was demoll'lhed. Even in thDK day• we hardly had a dn:ent hnu!lr in the v1llagr. But whatever happened, we managed "'mehow. That VIllage, called Nowrouz. had a little- orchard in u. One day m)' husband, whn was forty then, came home and said: MPack up! wr are gmng to Tehran. • And we ~:amr. In those day~. no one wa• livmg m the: Halab1abad. There wat~ nor even such a pla'e as Halab1abad at all. But whrn we 'amc, we w:a"hr-d all over the garbage and mud ro look for nn• and tm platn.IWe 'ulln:ted them! then we put them on the: top of t'ach ()(her, added !oumc mud m bnwttn. And began to hvc m them. That wa' rhe tim d•y. Bur my husband was 1oblt'1>S. So he looked for a 1ob, for anyrhmg to hve by. One d.ay he worked .a• an JrMI'h lum.killed wnstru~:tion laborer I, anotht'r day ho~mmalt Jwurlung a!l a punrrJ, then garbaKr ~:olln:tmg., and '>t'llinK labou luM1ked
fundamentally, ir is the will tn survive and a strong resihen4:e in tM face of hardship that mnuvates the poor ro change the panern of their hves. By dmng so, they also change the social env1ronmrnt in which rMY live and hem:e t~ narure of polirics. It IS true that often, though not always, they pr~eftt tndividually and quietly, but tMsr individual and quiet acttons entail collrctJve and noisy consequences, involving issues of power and politics.

~ »lS~BlSB»

.-»

~KB

ISLAMIC

~XTOLU~lOW

Khaleh Fatimeh, one of the founders of the Halabiabad squatter settlement in South Tehran, is one such a'-"tor. The uiRen'-1' of her (and her husband'sl hfe and theu desire to survive the hardship caused them to venture on a long jnumry. They packed up, taking a chance and settling in a remote and my-.tenous land where the)' hoped ro begin a new and btrter life. To escape from the agony of high rent, bills, formal institutions, and the insecurity of draling with urbanites, they .. naturally"' ~t up thrir own dwelling in the cheap, common, state land outside the city boundaries. They began a new life, ra1sing chickens, goats, and ch1ldren. As protagonists, however, they were not alone. Others gradually joined them as the yrars passed. Many came dirr.:dy from v1llages or small towns; some tmtrged from the nearby overcrowded slums, escaping the hardships associated with life there. By 1976, 11,000 households wert living with Khalrh Fatlmeh in thr settlement the)· named H.alabiabad. The settlers gradually began to demand security of tenure, Improvement of dwelling units, and services rangmg from elr.:triciry, running water, and sewer systems to social needs such as health centtrs and transportatiOn. 01 When thrir demands fell on deaf ears, they resorted to quiet direct action. Thty stole electnciry from the ntarby pnwer poles and obtained water illrgally and mgemou!.ly from thr main water pipes in the streets; they rxtended their privatt domain into the public space of the alleyways. They made their living by engaging in divtrst activitits, chiefly in the unauthorized .1nd underground economy. This kmd of work was carried out by and large in the S(JCial and physical space of the srrett corner, tht kiosk, IJasaat, or behmd wagons and hand trucks. For security, they began to establish community networks, informal associations, and cultural/religious groupings ro compensatt for their anomit and uprootedness. With the incremental agglomtration of peuplt orgamzed along similar lines, the sector of spontaneous habitation was complete. This quiet encroachment prcx:ess reprnents the kind of significant sociospaual change engendered h)· people such as Khaleh fatimeh. But they hardl)· wnsidered th1s change and thC' a~tivities associated with 1t as political; they saw them simply as natural ways to sunr'ive and improve. Nevertheless, rhe political outcome of this change followtd before lung. It was manifested in the contestation between the poor, whoSt' srrat~its for survival requirtd a good degret of autonomy in the practice of everyday life, and the modern state, which tonk fnr

45

granted its power to maintam order and ~ulatr space, time, work, commumry life, and lrisure. This active or participative use of public 41pacr, embodied in the ptK,r's initiative in spontaneously takmg over and construL"ting land/space, came inro sharp conflict with state control of order. The state's solution was tn attempt to eradicate these informal communitin. On the other hand, the trndency of the poor to practice a cultural autonomy (With resp«t to dwellings, community, and work) flew m thr face of rhr sratr's intervention in people's ways of life. By the summer and autumn of 1977 the squatter areas had emerged as battle grounds. The municipality's demolnion squads, escorted by hundreds of paramihtary soldiers, as well as dozens of hulldozen, trucks, and military Jeeps, ra1ded the settlements to destroy illegal dwdlings and ro stop their further expansion. The policy of violent eradication was not new. Much earlier, in 195\, the state had resorted ro v1olent action in evu.:ting the m1granr poor from the cavelike settlements m South Tehran. The new wave of aL"tion againsr 11legal housing started in 197 4 and culminated in 1977. The mator targets indudt'd th05t' communities located in east Tehran (javadiyeh m Tehranpars, Ma11diyeh, and Shemiran-nou in Narmak), and m the !KJuthern and southeastern peripheries (in Afsariyeh, Mu!ihiriyeh, Kavous1yeh, Soleimaniyeh, Mesgarabad, Dowlatabad, Aliabad, Chnhmeh-ah, and many more). Similar operations. although on a smaller scale, were also undertaken m other citier. including Sharaz, Zan)an, Ghazvin, and Karadj. The asroaults were normally carried out at night, when collective resi\tance against demolition was very difficult-when the re~o~dents wrrr either in bed or away from their shelter\. Thr mumcipal agentli would ask people to come out of their dwellings and the bulldo1.rrs would wrrck the shacks and shantin, leaving behind the rubble of tin platn, car tirn, and mud bricks ... Well, yes," observed a resident of javadieh in Tehran Pars, when we KOt nut of rhr huu'C' that mght, I \aw s.omethmg that I ho~ nobody will nrr \er ilftain. The whnlr nc•~thborh,KKI h;ad brcn ~or rounded hy the ~nld1rr'i who had •mrakcd in quirtly and ttopped anyone from tummg a light nn .... Yn, thry had brought four bulldozrn. Thry for~rd rvcrybody our of rhe1r home,, and then 1tarttd to dnnnhsh them. In one hou~e, a wholr fam•ly mduding childnn went up on rhe roof top, and u1d "wr won't \:orne out." But the agent• dnrro,cd thr hoUK. Thr

man kll and thr house collapKd on h1m. And thr woman, as !KKJn as shr saw th11, famtrd and dropprd her ch1ld from hrr hands." A1xnrdmg to a sene-. of repnrt!i baSC'd upon over one hundred observations and mrerv1cws with squatters, hundreds of homes were demolished in Tehran in the autumn of 1977 alone. This involved at least thirtern bloody dashrs betwern thr squatters and thr government forces, leaving a dozen drad. 4 ' At times the crowd, bewildered and outraged, remained shocked and hdplr!ilt. At othrr timrs, confronted with the drmulition agrnts, they resortrd to every methnd possible to protect their homes. The squatter!~. attrmpted to talk the agrnts nut of their plans, pleaded with thrm, and argued about the Immorality of their destructive acts. Women sought san~"Tuary in their homes with their childrrn and a copy of Quran, making their shelter a kind of a sacred place, a shrine that could not be demolished. A few, probably bisaz-u-bt-{ruush (land drvelopers) offered bribes. Many hoisted the Iranian flags and hung portraits of the monarch on their walls, chanting .. Long l.ive thr Shah, Long Live the Shah!" Few of these !K:attrred rfforts managrd to save homes. The pervasiveness and frequency of the attacks did not leave much doubt among the squattrrs that .. tomorrow m1ght he our turn." The necessity of collet."Tive res1stancr was genuinely felt ... We are nut united; we ourselves are rcspuns1ble for whatrvrr ills happening to us, hecause wr don't stick together".u echoed the mood of the crowd. Yet in the end they did demonstrate group sohdanty. Collective resistance induded both 'iponranC'oU.'i and planned crowd at.·tmn. During or following many attacks, the indignant crowd responded with rage and fury, resorting to dubs, stones, shovels, and whatever was at hand. On many occasions they ransacked municipality offices, set government cars on fire, and heat up and, on a fC'w occasions, even kiiJC'd thC' demolition squad agents. During the autumn of 1977 at least thirteen major confrontations were reponed. These crowd at."Tinns did succeed in repelling a number of raids. You\«' th~y Ithe demolition squad I wouldn't darr wmr during thr day. d1d come once, bur on that Ol:'"asJon proplr got ttJRether and beat rhem all up. They all ran away, but thr h~ad of th~ shahrdtln lthe disrru.:t muni~•paliryl ..:ould nor. Thr uowd acot h1m and beat h1m wuh stonn and clu~ w m~Kh that he wa• torn apart. Then we put him into a cemetery. The -.:rnwd smashed rhe1r L3r\. The)· alsu 'lei a ~nuple nf Th~y

48

!Jill DllndCJilSID AD !D IILAIIIC IDOLO!IO.

them lthe canJ on fire. And now they Jrhe squanersl have prepared themselves wirh kmves, duhs, shovel1 and packaxn. They are un guard rvrry mghr in cali.C rhe aRtnts come to raid again."

While some vigilante groups we~ formed to defend the settlements, diplomatic a'--rivitin were~ also initiated to negotiate with the authorities to legally halt the demolition. On srveral ~casions dusters of locals, among them women and children, assembled in the str~ts to discuss strategies. Most drliMrations seemed rather disorderly, with the panicipants seldom coming to an aweement. A few concrete initiatives, nrvenheless, were taken. Small crowds (of rwo hundred or so people) ~re organized and dispatched with women in the fo~front to negotiak or appeal with the authorities in thr local municipality, local council, Rasrakhiz Party, and the royal palace. Bur each timt' they were drivrn away, often with false promises. The squatters were thus forced to rely primarily on their own defense initiatives and on a war uf attrition. Following each demolition and the departure of the government agrnts, the squatters would reappear on the ruins of their wrecked shelters and try once again to pur together the ruhble to rC'llurre.:r their homes. '"If they demolish even for 50 times, we will rebuild again," said a shantytown dweller. •• The lack of an alternative solution, u~ether with a sense of justice and a vague dream of victory in the long run, allowed the poor to carry on their ~sistance ... Of course not, they can't simply kill aU of us!," a squatter stated assuringly, "They !the govemmentJ have lifted rntrictiun Inn home buildingJ in other areas, they will eventually do the same in hrre too .... - And rventually they did. Facing a crisis of such proportio~aily dashes in the shantytowns followed by revolutionary riots in the str~ts of central Tehran-successive cabinets acted with desperation and confusion, moving from one de.:ision to the next. Their response to thr crisis varied according to the political mood of the day, ranging from tenancy reform to the construcnon of low-income hou!lling and, finally. rolrrancr of spontaneous settlements. Bur each and rvery policy offered the poor new opponunities and lrverage tu keep thrir pressure mounting. The Poor, the State, and the RcvoJution Awarr of thr acute problems of high rrnr, rhe high cost of land, and rhr shonaKe uf housing. the government uf jamshid Amuzgar. in thr

'l'D DlSn.dCIIlSU AD '1'0 ISLAMIC UVO:LIJ'l'IO.

midst of shantytown clashes in October 1977, began to force owners of vacant apartments to rent out some z..t,ooo units in Tehran. About 70,000 tenants sent applications, ss,ooo of them came from poor families, migrant workers and university students; all of these applicants had requested single rooms. The monthly rent was set between 8 percent to Jl. per(;enr of the price of the homes. By summer 1978 it had become dear that pra(;tical difficulttes doomed the policy to failure. Fur instance, while the municipality was authorized to rent out an entire home to a tenant, it c:ould nor rent mdividual rooms within a given house. ~ the hopes of low-income families who could afford to rent single or double rooms were dashed. The projn.-t did not bring many tanMihle results for middle-class home~kers either. In almost all cases, the landlords refused to comply with the new regulations. Only seventy-two such homes were rented our in the course of one year 41 • Some landlords proceeded to place a few piecrs of furniture in the vacant flats, pretending thrir apartments were already occupird. In the end both landlords and tenants remamcd dissatisfied. Following the fall of the Amuzgar government on August 2.7, 1978, Manucher Azmoun, a cabinet mmisrer under Prime Minister ja'far Sharif-lmami, unveiled a nrw plan ro build .. inexpensive housing units" for '"the masses of the people." Somr of these were tube located in the low-income vi(;iniries uf mdustrial plants nrar Tehran. 4• This hardly sermed a practical policy, given thr bureauc:ratic bottlenecks and the urgency of the situauon. Thus, on ~ptember 1 1, 1 'J78 (Shahrivar z.o, 1357), thrtt days after the "black Friday" massacre, when scores of demon!i.trarors were killed in lower-class neighborhoods in defiance of martial law, the government submirted to the strategy that the poor themselves were already pursuing. '~• For the first time, the stare recogni7.ed the legalization and wnsolidation of squatter communities. The policy began gradually, each step derermmed by the political exigency of the day. During ~ptember and October 1978, for example, ir was decided rhar squarrr·r settlements would receive de'\.tticity. Some J s,ooo squatter families submitted applications to the municipality in response to the government's decision. •• The mayor of Tehran, Shahresram, sought for the first time the "participation of the people in the planning of the city. "'l In a dramatic poliq reversal, Azmoun announced that rhe c:oncept of kh~re1-1 mahdudt'h lliterally

49

50

'fD DIIPUJrCR'liD .dD !liS ISWillC IDO.LO!IO.

outside ciry boundary) 11 had .. caused inflation an housing and rent, a serious hardship for the people ... The government thus officially endorsed home construction beyond the municipality limits. An imponanr condition artached to the plan, however, was that thtsr arras were not to be mtitlrd to basic urban scrvicrs. 14 F.vrn thu; condition was dropped Within a ftw days. Thus, on ~ptrmbrr 16, 1978, the government authoriud construction of home!t within the new and enlarged (by soo hectares) city limih of z.so kilometers, along with a pledge to provide the squaners with piprd water and electricity." The policy in itself was a radical concession. Thanks tu thr1r resistance and to the broader revolutionary protests, the undtrclass had won a long hanle. However, these concessions did nor tame the mobilization of the underclass. Far from it, they funher legitimized their street politics. Land occupation contmued, independent from both government ininatives and the leadership of thr rrvolution. Earlier troubles in the shantytowns m the o;ummrr of 1977 had produced thr Shah\ decree that the demolition of shantytowns and illegally bu1lr homes be diM:untinued; th1s an tum led the government, in October 1977, to hft restrictions on squatting in sixteen districts in the south, southeast, and Shahr-c Rey, although it contanued to stop squatling an the remaining restricted lones. Squaners an such southern and southeastern areas as Huhimahad, Nazarahad, Kouy-i Deylaman, Zahirabad, Afsariyeh, Homayounshahr, Qal'eh Morghi, Yakhchiabad, and others were legally allowed to mamtain ur further construct dwellings. 1• However, red tapr delayed rhe prnce~s of obtaining building permits for which the squaners were hardly inclined ru waat. The mere fact of legal authorization legitamaled further land takeovers. Illegal housing mu~hroomrd nor only an the newly permined zones but also beyond them. Some squanen could nor distinguish brrween the authorized and restricted zones and hence went ahead, raking over plots; others, among them many affluent oppnnunisr develo~rs (buaz-o-bt~fmush), simply ignored the new rules. When confronted with the demohtion squads, almost all ~ferred to the royal decree to JUstify their da1ms. p With rhe escalation of riots and demonstrations, thr attention of the security forces was divrntd from the !llhanrytowns. Thus even when the politicians were rna4.1ing legislation to end intervention on building, the undrrdass poor were busy reclaiming hundreds of acres uf land m the vicinity of the ciry. In South Tehran, durmg 04.1ober and

!KI

DIS~CBISID ~

!KI ISLAMIC KITOLU!IO.

Nuv~mber 1978 (A ban 13 51), scores of slum dwellers from Darvazehghar, Khazane-yc Farahabad, Khaniabad, Naziabad and elsewhere took over a plot of roughly one hundred acres. The news spread, bringing more prople onto the scene... l:::verybody was looking for a pin:e of land."" They divided the plots by drawing lints with white chalk powder, leaving no room for streets or alleyways. When allocation was complete, each remained responsible fur hili own plor. They made sure ro leave someone on guard on the land, except at night when martial law forced them ro stay indoors. A large number installed national flags on the lots to discourage attacks by government forces. To offsrt the common threat, they made sure 10 act collectively in order to maintatn their hold over the land.'" Similar actions continued in other pans of the capital city and in various other towns until the collapse of the Shah's reg~me, which triggered yer a new squatters' movement with a larger scale and novel features.

Mobilization in the Popular Neighborhoods It was nor until toward the end of the Shah's rt"gime in December 1978 that youths brought the concrete experience of the revolution home into the underdass neighborhoods. The community-based organizations of the Islamic Consumer Cooperatives and Neaghborhood Councils served as the must effective link betwem rhe revolutionaries and the underdass communities. The condition of dual power during the last phase of the revolution, December 1978 ro january 1979, characterized the erudmg power of the ancien rrgime and the mounting authuruy of the opposition. Demonstrations of m11lions of people during the holy month of Muharram, on December 10 and 11, in the midst nf the military rule, underscored t~ regime's vulnerability to the revolutionary movement. The collapse of the military cabinet of Azhaari, the coming tu office of Bakhtiar, and the return of Ayatollah Khomeini from exile in Paris created favorable conditions for the transfer of power. At this stage, the old administrative and decision-making centers in the cities were relinquishing thear power, and new organs of authoraty were emerging. In most urban areas, police authority collapsed, the old city councils gave up authority, and the municipahnes ceased functioning. As a consequence, varaous revolutionary committees sprang up ro fill the vacuum. Militant youths took control of various provin· cial towns and cities in Rezaieh, Shahpour. Ardabil. Maragheh. and

51

Ajabshu in Azarbaijan Province, as they did in rhe c:iri~ of Ramsar and Langroud an Gilan Provance. SertinR up committees in dafferenr dasrrkts and neaghborhoods, hands of militant youth mobalized to foil counrrrrevolutionary atta,ks on properties and public amenities by regime thugs. The committees were, in the meantime, mvolved in certain police functions: maintaining order, administering traffic, welfare a'-'tiviries, food distribution, petroleum rationing. and street sanitation.~ .. In L.angroud Ia Caspian Sea town I," a daily paper in Tehran reported, .. the police have withdrawn. They no longer show up in the streets. The town is now controlled by the people. Every night some two thousand volunteers are guarding the city. ITo coordinate their a'-'tivniesl, youths h.ive devised secret codes in each district. ••• Tlus situation lasted until the aftermath of the insurr«'taon on February 1o and 1 1, 1979· Islamic Consumer Cooperatives From Decembt-r through january, the distribution of food was disrupted in the midst of the cold Tehran winter. The disruption was caused partially by the general disorder in the national distribution 'iystem that had resulted from the general strikes and ROvernmental dysfunction. It was also due to the profiteering activaties of some businessmen who indulged in hoarding. Similar practaces by well-off bur nervous familirs conrnbuted to the problrm. As the lrader of the Rrvolunon, Ayatollah Khomeini had called upon the busmess community ro be fair, bur has appeal fell on deaf ea". The urban poor were immediately aff~'ted by the maldistribution. In order ro relirve hardship and to possibly neurrali1.e the poor ar this late stage, Islamic Consumer Cooperatives were Sd up. They aimed, in effect, at forcing down price rises by a poli.:y of dumping, providing the needy with basic materials including food, warm clothing, and the hke.~2 Initially some rwrnty-five cooperatives started operating in the ptKlr southern neaghhorhoods of Tehran, such as Bab-i Homayoun, Naziabad, Khazaneh, Maidan-i Khorasan, and Shadshahr in early January 1978.•• At the beginning the cooperativ~ were mobile stores on the back of trucks driving through the poor settlements; later they developed into more stationary shops and large outlets. The founde" of the cooperativ~. encouraged by the clergy, were philanthropists from diverse urban backgrounds, ranging from mechanics, shoe-makers, and driven to frun sellers, government

!KI

»IS~CRISB»

.-» !KI ISLAMIC RBTOLO!IO.

employees, and students .... A manager of a hooks tore, for instance, filled his bookca~s with basic food supplies for sale at low prices. Bauar merc.:hants cunrributed to the cooperatives by extending credit or providing c.:ertain scarce commodities, such as fuel. While the initial capital fur the c.:ooperatives came mainly from the affluent middle dasses, the labor power and executive elements were drawn largely from the popular nrighborhoods themselves. predominantly from enthusiastic youth groups. The~ youths volunteered to srll merchan· dise. supplying tht'ir frllow cus10mrrs with plastic bags and carton boxes. Thry were also rnponsable for transporting commodities from wholesale markers to c:noperanve stores."' Often thr volunteers provided the coops with .. shelves. sc.:alcs and weaghing devices, and even refrigerators. They constantly keep in touch with their relatives and ac.:quaintances asking them to offer the cooperatives with short-sup· plied food stuff. "•" A Coordinating Commirttt of the Consumer Cooperatives was srt up in order to monitor the activities of the ICK:al c.:oops throughout the city. It attempted tn organize the supply of scarcr commodities to individual C:(KJps. Cooperatives of this son sub~quently expanded into provincaal towns throughout the country. The ancim regime's reaL-raon to the alternative supply systems was farst apprehension and thrn defeat. The regime was witnessing the barth of a new civil nrder ovrr which it had no control. Far from being able to appropriate or incorporate it. the regame simply resorted to the taL-ric of disruption. Security forces ransacked scores of cooperatives in Tehran and other cities; they ~t many coops on fire and detaaned volunteers··. Immediately following each attack, however, the coopera· ti\•rs reorganized their operations and began work. They continued to funL"tion until the fall of the Shah. Following a brief halt after thr ~v olutaon. they resumed work, albeat with a different form and structu~ (~e chapter s). The Neighborhood Councils (Sht~raha-~ Mahal/at) The Neighborhood Councals (NCs) represented neighborhood-based groups informally organized to alleviate the daily nec:ds of the local people by mobilizing them. They were established to respond to the economic .1nd cn·ac.: exigencies brought about by this phasr of the revolution. NC!!t differed from the Komltehs. The latter were initiated by local youths primarily ru maintain public order and withstand cuun-

53

trrrevolutionary sabotal'e. After thr revolution they were im:orporated into the state as pan of the urban srcuriry forces fun~:tioning alongside the old police imtirution. In early January 1979 NCs were srt up in a number of popular districts in Tehran and in provincial citin. Thry also rmerged in order tu contain the counte-rrevolutionary activities of agents of the incumbent government. The regime's thugs began to anack nor only institutions such as the Islamic Consumer Cooperatives but also public propenirs, in order to falsely represent the revolutionaries as violrnt. In rrspon1r, groups of militant youth, often under thr dir«rion of a locallradrr or clergyman, wrrr organized in the neighborhoods to deal with such ubotage. In the popular districts, howrver, the most pressing issue was the shortage of furl caused by strikes, maldistribution, and possibly by sabotage. Beyond the issue of fuel, the NCs coru:rrned them5t'lves also with a number of other arras of civil life, including the supply and distribution of daily nrct"ssiries, medical care, defense, and political work. The NCs mobilized young people in each locality to supply and distribute the basic and daily needs of each neighborhood. They delivered furl. fresh bread, and foodstuffs to the doorsteps of thr inhabitants who otherwise had to line up in front of the stores for hours. A large amount of these supplies was offered free of charge to the vrry poor, rhe elderly, and rhe sick .... The initiative began in Yakhchiabad, a popular neighborhood in South Tehran, where over 3,1-40 liters of hearing and cooking fuel were distributed. The NCs also monitored local stores to prrvenr maldistribution (hoarding or favoritism) and overpricing. In some sertlement!ii, women in panicular were in charge of inspecting rhr prier tags of the merchandise and reporting any misconduct, for which the culprit was punished by public denunciation and boycun. Some NCs superv1sed areas as large as Narmak, in east Tehran. The council divided the area into several administrative districts. In every district the council issued households with special coupons for fud, petroleum, and chalk coal. to make sure: the locals obtained their fair !ihare.•' Maintenance and development of the neighborhoods al!io came under the supervision of the NC.;. They repaired local water pipes, remedied power outages, and dug deep wells to supply water to the local bakeries, public hath!lii, and households in communitin such as Afsariy~h in South Tehran wh~rr running warrr was lacking.

Although the lraman Revolution was comparatively shorr and v1olence did occur m cenain instances. To alleviate the ~on dirions of rhe injured, a num~r of shuras attempted tn organize mrdlcal reams wnh the cuo~rat1on of physicians and nurses within these urban communities. The teams we~ to train local volunteers m first a1d and assist the inhabnants with the1r regular medical needs. Women were panicularly anstrumenral in these effuns. The NCs mobilized the youth sending them door to dnor to collt\:t sheets, blankets, and medicine to be used in the hospitals to care for the InJUred. They also made special rffons to ensure that medical dlX."tors' automobiles as well as garbage trucks rt\:eived adft)uate petrol. ·u Drfense seemed to be on the agenda nf most of the Neighborhood Councils. Thr NCs needed to encourage the volunteers in each locality to form vigilante groups to maintain order where the police system had vinually collapsed. At the same time they organized poliucal discussion meetings, dissemmated news (particularly the num~r of the .. martyrs"), distributed leatlets, and cir~ulated the tapes of the revolutionary leaders. It was concrete local measures of th110 nature, generated by these popular organizations and administered in a decentralized and comprehensible manner, and nor s1mply the hey'ats (ad hlX: religious sermons), which brought the ex~rience of the inqilab (revolutionl into the communiues of the underdass. Structurally, the NCs represented loo11e and mformal associations with limitrd divisiOn of labor, where leaders were recogmzed and respa:ted rathrr than formally rlected. Attempts wt're undrrway, howrver, ro establish a morr solid structure an the cuun~1ls, by forming executive committees which had dec1sinn-making pnwer. Thr executive committees were to identify the daily needs of the locality, mobilize resourcrs, and assign tasks to volunteers from among thr local pt'ople and youth from nthrr a~as. The institutionalization uf the civic and community organizations would most likely have continued had the revolutionary cnsis lasted longer. The victory of the revolution brought these activities to an end, giving rise tn new gra~asroots movement!li with different structures, scales, and constituencies. Despite thr1r CIVIC fum.-uons, the a~-rivists of the Popular Organizations (the ICCs, LCs, and Se\:urity Organizationsl, did possess political biasn that at times contradicted their presumed princ1plrs. Their repudiation of ideologically rival elements as .. saboteurs .. wac; in con~aceful,

56

TU Dlll"'ldCIIlSD .dD !D lS:LAIUC QTOJ.UUO.

fiiL"t with th~ pnnL,pl~ of communiry .. sulidariry and coo~ration. "., This. howev~r. dad not reduc~ the vital role of the Popular Organizations in responding tn an ammedaat~ n~ed. creatmg the nud~us of cavil aHOCaatJOns, and finally linking th~ ~xperi~nc~ of th~ revolution to rh~ ammedaat~ cc~erns of the underdass. Youth played a deosav~ pan in this proce55. The young revolutionaries from ben~r-off ar~as went into the popular neighborhoods wh~re they found the underdass youth ready for mohllizannn. Cenain sociologacal traits distinguish~d underdass male youth sharply from their parents and sisters. A good num~r of them had attended high §Chools and were more mohile. Many were second-generation migrants, with more contacts wath other snL"ial groups. 'l They had wnnessed the modern maddle-classlifesryle and desired to ~a pan of n. They lungnl to pursue the leisure. fashions, and dating games of rhr rich boys.'' Bur these rt"'uirrd money, MJCial skills, and a suarable cultural environment-all of which they lacked. Even going to the uptown parks .. gives us new complexes ... when we rarely have the npponuniry rn even talk ru a girl. .... Their shahhy and tacky imitation of Wesrrmiud youth ~arne a matter of ridicule and denigration, forcing them ru rehear~e withm rhear own sar-1 lwuchehs (intersu."tions of alleyways and strttts). The nonh Tehranis used the derogatory terminul~y of u~al and dihaati to refer to this group of youths who knew that they were poor hut were faKinated b)· the lifestyle's and values of the rich. frustrated hy the impossibiliry of attaining such life-\ryles and by the ensumg confusion in terms nf identity, they turned against what rhey could not be or have. Hence the undC'rdass youth Joined rhe revolution m its moment of breakthrough, ~commg the indignant pustrev· olutionary crnical "mass on the stage" (mardum-1 dar sahn~h). They were the street warnors, the thugs, of the clerical figures who m return offered them regular income, power, and a divinely sanL:taoned social role, setting the scene fur a nuvd stage m street politics m Iran. · 1 Untd the very end, thr dasrnfranchased, the squatter poor in panicular, remained on rhc fringes of revolutionary events. Only at the end were they drawn into the da5Course and the practice of the Islamic Revolution, primarily through the activataes of popular organizations, rhr Islamic Consumer Cooperatives, and thC' Neighborhood Councals. Although on the peraphery of rhe large events, the underdass were nor passive in thear daily livrs. They were involved m the process of grad-

!KI

Dli~CRIBBD

AaD !KI IS1£KIC

~ZTOL~Io•

ual but significant change that their struggle for survival had engendert·d. Their dive.v struggles for subsistence came into being years before the revolutionaries set our in 1978 ro demonstrate in the strrets of Tehran and other big cities. Lacking an institutional mechanism to advance their demands colle(fively and coherently, they resorted to quiet direct action in acquiring shelter, setting up collective consumption, acquiring jobs, and consolidating their communities. This process represented a crucial change in the lives of millions of poor who pursued similar a'-"hons. Indeed many of these developments occurred outside state regulations, with the poor living an informal life. They made the1r advances gradually, albeit with great hardship. Once the state began to rxen its authority, they resisted. The resistance of the poor squatters did nor represent deliberate political struggle against the state as such, nor even opposition to pnvate landowners or the system of private property. Rather, their campaign origmarrd primarily from the violation of their sense of justice and was retla'ted in the struggle over the use of public space, community development, and cultural autonomy. What the- poor saw as a natural, rational, and just way of sustaining the-ir livelihood was, according to the state-, a breach of law. Unauthoriud land takeovers, illegal siphoning of elecrnciry and running wate-r, demanding basic ame-nities, extending private domain into the public space-, squatting on public thoroughfare-s, using streets as markers, assembling in the communitit'S-fo the state- all these activities meant chaos, loss of control, and political instability. For the poor, however, these unlawful activlhes were seen as JUst acts, nfi-essary to sustain dignified lives. The response of the squatters to the municipality's demand for ownership titles to the land was: .. we do nut need a sanad lownersh1p titles), our sanads are our wives and childre-n !who need a dwelling) ..... As a squatter during the 1977 rims stated: Th~y fth~ mumdpaliryl \a)' th~t w~ are m th~ khllr~1-1 mahdudeh and that the ~ity nnnot afford to gi,·e water, paved-roads and so on to rh~ arras. Bur still people cannot !limply !tl~p in the ~~r~t!i! They must have a shdter to live m. Besides., these people cannot afford to g~t a plac~ in the city. Su th~y come herr to mak~ a dwelling .... Th~ mumcipahry must not dntroy thew homes. You know how much moM)', en~rgy and effort we hav~ put on thew?" ~

In retrospe~t. the- locaV~ummuniry struggles uf the Iranian poor to improve their lives we-re not necessarily less significant than those of

57

58

'l'D lllBn.dCIIIIIII AD tD lSWillC JtliTOJ.U'l'lO.

the revolutionaries targeting state power. After all, many poor people contmued waging similar campaigns as before. They continued to migrate massively, squat vacant apanments and lands, man:h in the streets to demand jobs, and make a living in the underground economy. The occurrence of the revolution did not alter their needs substantially, although it established a new structure of opponunity for mobilization. It implanted in the poor a new spirit and new expericncei, offering a broader ground for their usual claims, albeit more militantly and daringly. The qui~ encroachment of the ordinary sur· passed in continuity the revolutionary struggle. The followmg chapters explore the manifestation of this form of politics, as well as the story of these mobilizations in the spheres of both living spa~e and working life.

Four The Houainc Rebelaa The Oooupation o! Homes an4 Hotels, 1979-1981

Khaleh Sakineh and Hassan• were among the many hundreds who had joined the crowd, carrying their entire belongings in a tremendous rush. Utensils, bed, boxes, and babit"S hung down from their shoulders; and chickens and children followed the multitude. Mobiliud by young activists, the crowd had emerged from a South Tehran slum. Young men directed the crowd toward an empty building. Upon their arrival the group flooded into the house taking over the empty rooms. The activist leaders began putting up banners and billboards around the !>tructure, informing the public that the homelt"Ss poor were squatting this vacant home. 2 Thus was a large home in Mirdamad, an uppermiddle-class nrighborhood in Tehran, taken ovrr. This was one way in which the poor secured their dwellings. Others, like Hassan's brother, Mahmoud, had beC'n involved, days earlier, in raking over a piece of land in Oowlat Abad where he hired his wife's cousin to put up a shelter into which he and his family moved the following day. In the same way as the inhabitants of many neighborhoods who had scattered around like blots of dropped ink, Khaleh Sakineh and Hassan became homeowners literally overnight. Unlike Hassan's group, Mahmoud's operation was rather discreet and without much darter. Thus they began a new life in the new cummu-

nity. Th~ r~volution had paid off for ooth famili~s. as w~ll as many thousands mor~. This and th~ following chapt~rs show that th~ sil~nt r~volution, or qui~t ~ncroach~nt, which th~ urban poor had inaugurat~d d«ad~ prior to th~ Islamic R~volution continu~d c~a~l6sly aft~r th~ insurrtction of F~bruary r 979, al~it in a diffc-r~nt cont~xt. Th~ n~w squatr~rs· mov~ment represented a break frnm the past; the Islamic R~volution alter~d rhe form and stru'-"tUrr of the squatt~rs· activiti~s. Between r 979 and 1981, under political uncertainty, various political groupings em~rg~. srriving ro gain popularity and support by mobilizing the dis~nfranchisni groups. Th~ r~sulrant political competition within the oppositional groups, and ~rwe~n the opposition and the government, offer~d an opportunity for squatters to mobiliu radically. Thus rhe squatter poor experienced, through kinsh1p and individual initiatives, not only cre~ping dir~ct action bur also some kind of a social movement-one characterized hy colle\.'tive effort, some- d~grtt of organi1..arion and nrrwork, and a perc~ption of social change. T WOK over Homes and Hotels The new squatten' mov~mc-nr c-m~rg~d against tht- ba'kground of thcinsurr«tion of Fe-bruary 1o and 1 1, 1979, when rhc: Islamic R~volu tion had ~a,hc:d its climax. An enormous energy had ~en relea~d and a tremendous vo1d had ~merged. In this "'mom~nr of madness," the body politic tingled with every little mm·e in any segment within rh~ society. It was a rime of gr~ar dualitie-s-of enormous hope and despair, of ~xhau!iotion and rejuvenation, of relaxation and energy, of a ~nse of job-done and work-to-~gin. The 'enrral authority had collap5W. Ther~ was no S«ret police, no municipalit)' guards, not ev~n a traffic police. Following the insurr«rion, the power vacuum bqan to be filled by various grassroots organizations, as well as by opportunistic, self-d«lared pow~r heirs in various !ie'-"tors of the soci~ry. Many busmess people deserted companies; manag~rs left factories; the rich abandoned hom~. hurriedly leaving behind million-dollar properties. In rhe end, some r so,ooo housmg units-palaces, hotels, villas, and unfinished apartment blocks remained; their original owners had either rushed to the West, or were in hiding somewhere in the country. The properties would later fall under the control of rhe Bonyad-i Musta:'afin (the Foundation of the D1spossessed 1. 1

TKI ROOSIIG

~IBBL5

Landless ptasants confiscated large agribusin~ss estates; hundreds of factories were taken over by workers; and the stare offices ~n to be run by their employees. The revolutionary youth took the charge of the dry police. F.ven the unemployed, who intrinsically lacked any institutions in which to function, took control of the strttrs by regulatintc the traffic. It was the time of role-pl.1ying, of making a differmer, nf being counted, of taking revenge, of ~izing the mnment. It was at thas moment of madness, of the new social order, that thl' new squatters' mm·emC'nt came into life. Only days after the insurrection, a group of tent-settlers at the southrm margin of rhr capital warned that if thr new regime did not providr them with decent housing, .. we will occupy vacant apartmrnrs." Two days later, some thrre hundred families, most of them armed, rook over apartment blocks in Dowlatabad in South Tehran! In the days and wttks that followed thousands of homelt"Ss familit"S, poor tenants, and 'itudents jnin~d the protagonists m Tehran and other urban centers, occupying empry apartment bloch, luxury homes, villas, and dest"rted hotels. Tehran witncssnl the largest mc.:idl'nce nf squatting. mainly in tht' southern plain of thr city, hut homes, hotels, and apartmencs werr occupil'd mother areas as wdl. Mirdamad, Maidan·i Azadi, M.Jid.Jni lnqilab, Tajrish, Park-i l.alth, and Khiahan Hashemi, plus the townships of Tehran Pars, Kianshahr, Islamabad, Nizamahad, Dnwlatahad, Shahrak-i Najafabad, and Gilanshahr ac~.:ount for only a few nf the reponed casn. In tht' laner th~ communities alone, according to a repnn, over ... soo villas had been taken over by the .. poor'" in the first months of the ~volution.' Home invasions took place collrcuvely, with km folk, villagt mates, and neighbors acting together, oftrn mobilized by the leftist and Islamic activists, and at times with sophisticated plannmg. On December ~ 1, 1979. some thirty families from thr poor neighborhoods of Maidan-i Soush and Gowdnishinan, in South Tehran, took over half-finished apartments near Islamabad in the southeastern plain. The group was led hy a thirt)·-year-old,left-WJnK fa~:tnry wnrker. The news spread amon~ nrighbors and acquaintancn, and hundrtds of famihes from the vicinity mvaded thl' area. About 400 hnu~hnlds occupied \08 homes: In another early operation, at thr beginning of 1980, some forry-one squatter famiht"s who occupied honlC's located in South Tehran gowds, forced tht' Municipality to supply tht'm ready-made

61

apanmrnti in rhr Shahrak-i Soush. The Municipality pur~hascd rhr ~cup1ed homes from the Sdders m order to level them tor develop· ment. ·A f~ communities grew even larger as the cxcuparion of newly hu1h apanmenrs (Ontinued. About five hundred families had Sddrd in the townsh1p of Kianshahr by 1985." Young acuvists played a crucial part m orgamzing the homeless . .. We were a group of left-wing workers who had known each other for yean .... We began planning to expropriate so many vacant homes and apartments. "• The core group had wme twenty members, each relating to a doZt·n contacts who were active in popular areas such as Shadsh.thr. Darvazehghar, and Halabiabad. The core group would 1denrify vaunt propenin, and the contact reams mohilizC'd the homelr!>S and hrnughr rhem ro the rargrr buildings... We would hegm our invasion in a ~p«ific rime. Then men, women, and children carrying rhru urrns;1ls, rugs, hearers, hnis, and whatever would join in rht- O(CUpation." '" In this manner, they O(Cupied bUildings in the Shadshahr, Mirdamad. a neighborhood near Maidan-i Azadi, Maidan-i lnqilab, and Khiaban Ha!oheml. Provmcial cu1es also expenenced home invasions. ThC'y included Qur-1 Shmn, SanandaJ, and K1rmanshah in the WC'st, Ahadan (in South Iran), Arak and 'lonkahon (in Central Provmce}, and Mashad (a huly City m East Iran). 11 In Ahadan, m addition, some one hundred oil mdusrry workers' fam11ies moved in to the apartments previously occup1cd by .. the military personnel. SAVAK Ithe Shah's secret police! employcn, puli,emcn, and loyal workers. "' 1 These units were believed tu belong to the .Sa:man-1 Kargaran IWorkrrs Organization) of rhe L·ompany, hut had bern allocated iiiL"gitimatdy ro the abuvr-mrnrioned pc.-uplr. In Kirmanshah, during rhr first wrrk after rhr m.surrrct1on, one hundred and fifty families of flood \'ICtlms werr mob1hzed m a carefully planned campaign by left-wing yourhs who led them to occup)' the governmenr-bu1lr apartment blocks in rhr Shahrak-1 Valiye'ahd. The aparrmentli wrre onginally to be aiid YI~Ums, but unly for an unaffordahlr sum of Rls 500,000 1morr than u.~.S6,~oo1." Beyond humes and apanmenn, many luxury hotels also hr\:ame the lilrgt:t of highly urganized oc~upatiuns in whi~h university students ryp1(;al1y rook rhr lead. The student• participated nor only as mohiliz.rrs uf the poor bur also as benehCJarirs in their own right. Dunng 0\:tnber l'liY. over ont: thou~nd \tudenrs, complaining that the gov-

rrnment failed to provide them with suitable dormitories, took over the International Hotel and the Royal Garden Horel on Takht-i jamshid Avrnue. 14 Around the same time, mostly left-wing students occupied the Hotel Imperial. the Hotel Sina, and many more in Tehran. Borh male and female students thwarted the resistance of the hotel employees. who were afraid of losmg their jobs. The squatters guarded the buildings, resisting the hi4bullahis, informal groups organized by some dergy. who attempted to oust the original O(cupien.'' The major impetus for hotel occupations came from the radical Islamic groups, which mushroomed in those da~·s under the- leadership of such figures as Ayatollah Beheshti, Sheikh Muhammad Karruhi, and Hojjatal-lslam Hadi Khusrowshahi who sanctioned and guided the activities of the militant Muslim students in taking over hotels and luxury villas. These c:leriulleaders were not only constructing mass support fur themselves; they were also undermining the weak Provisional Government. Sheikh Muhammad Karrubi (brother of Mehdi Karrubi) began his agitation activities lin Sc.-ptember 1979) by seizing a twosuny house in nonh Tehran (Serah-i Zarrabkhaneh) as the headquarter for hi!io Committee for Housing for the Downtrodden (Komite-ye Khaneh Baraye Mustaz'atin). Around him gathered young mm from different walks of life-leftists, mu;ah~ds, laats or srrr-et bullies, and opportunists. Many of them came from South Tehran, acting as Karrubi's executive soldiers. Bands of young males grouped in the streets identifying homt's, hotels, and land for the sheikh, who would .. officially" assign these dwelling-places to tht' needy as well as to his own associates.'• .. , also received a few assignment orders," stated a participant in tht' operations, .. and consequently I managed to transfer about ten families from Naziahad into these homes . .,,Immediately following an occupation, the squatters would appoint a committee, a sbura, to take care of the internal order within the building!> and orgamu against extt'rnal threats of eviction. In the occupied hotels the sburas assigned rooms to .. needy students" who came largely from the provincial towns. Normally t'ach room was given to two or mort' studt'nts ... for instanct', I used to livt' with my part'nts in Tehran," describt'd a studt'nt squattt'r, .. but I shared a room with a friend in the hotd." •• In lint' with tht'ir ideological commitment, rhe students oftrn took organizational work very seriously. Tht'y held largdy free and comperitivt' elt"Ctions for the sbura!i., and formed various ext'Cutive committees ro o~ratt' rhe daily livt's of the residt'nts. In

the Hotel Royal Garden they formed Committrcs to dral with residence, tranr.portation, cooperation with the employee!>, and ddensc. 1" '"The students, hoth boys and girls, mamtamrd order and di!M:iplinc, prote~-ring che Hmel by a cwenry-four·hour petrol of the hu1lding. "!" Most squatters came from poor migrant families who either could nut afford to pay rent or were living in tenu and shacks in other parts of the cines. In Dowlatabad the newwmers came from varioui poor communities of South Tehran, induding the almmaks (shackli) of Tehranpars, Tehranvila, Darvazehghar, Naz1abad, and M;udan-1 Sou!iih ... We used to live in a damp basement," !>aid a wumen squatter in Dowlat Abad, "I get terrified thmkmg that we m1ghr still be forced to return to that place. " 11 Residents in the squatters' l>ettlemenrs of Halab!iohahr in District l. in Tehran se1zrd the opportunity to upgrade thrir posmon, moving m to empty apartments and houses l<x:ated m Mahalle-ye ~raJ.lJ Not all the squatters came from poor backgrounds; nor were all desperately !itrlvmg fur a place to live. ~me relatively affluent developers and local bullies (/aat) also furthered their own interests. A revolutionary committee mnnber daii11C'd that wme of the squatters had already .. owned a home." They simply sold thelt' to others to make money.~' ~me uf them, he reponed, had esuped from pnsons during the revolutionary chao!io; they were now involved in gambling and drug dealing. !• Corruption at the level of the offic1als chemsclve!li also played a role. The Pasdaran Comm1tten, who were- in charge- of controllmg the ncighbnrh,xlds and were later to ass1gn expropriated apartments to the homele~. actually gave a number of homes away to their own relam·c-s, fnends, and "ideulugically correct" familie!io. 1 ' The mass of student squatters war. mostly from the provmc1al town!>; rhe1r complamcs about the1r accommodation problems m the rent-noturiUU!Io capnal city dared back tn many yearli before the revolution. Yet the logtc behind their mobih7..atlon had le~ to do with an immediate need for hou!>mg and mure w1th a desire ru nrgatr the opulence that they adm1red m private but turned againsr because rhey could hardly afford tn be part uf 1t. Fur leftists, a!> one leader pur it, .. the <Xcupauun of the hotel!!. wh1~h belonged to the large capitalisrs wa-. in a~cordam:c: with our political and 1dcolog1cal hnes. " 2• These radical mcasurn; al!ifl tit well wirh the strategy of the hardline l•lamic leade-rs uf putung pre~ure nn the moderate Prov1sional llovernment uf Mehdi Bazargan. The largely poliucal motive tas opposed to !>heer

need) of the students in taking over propenies was later reflected in their early eviction by the authorities. l.ife in the Occupied Dwellings Unlike the students. the poor began to cons.olidate their positions in the occupied residential blocks. Squatting fur them represented a lungawaited objective they could not afford to lose. Once they mov~ in, they began completing the unfinished apartments, putting up win· dows, glasses, and tiles. In Dowlatabad, each household spent some Rls .z.o,ooo ~U.S.S.z.8o at 1979 ex..:hange rate) to install doors and windows. The squatters divided the apanments, e;,~..:h famrly occupying a smgle room, and brought their chickens, goats and even their ..:ows into the settlements. r Within the na:upied huildmgs, the left-wing activists organized lit· erary and language dasses, held political and ideological meetmgs, and taught so..:ial skills to the youngsters. !N Upon squattmg, some men began opening thcrr busmessrs m the same neighborhoods, whether in the apanments, by the door, or in the street. Street butcher shop!!> were opened, poor grocery shops staned to operate, and the unemploy~ looked for JObs on ..:unstru..:tion sites. Yet most men mamtained their previous occupations, which required them to commute longer hours. Like their fathers, ..:hildren, too, had to cummute long hours to a trend thear previous schools. The problems of the squatters who had resided in the affluent pans of nonh Tehran :s«med even greater. They had to shop in the storrs of the affluent. Class tension remained another problem. In their gestures, Jokes, and day-to· day intera..:taons, the nch expensed their distaste over bcmg neighbors with the dispossessed mrgrant poor. !• None of these shurtcummgs, however, reduced the anraction of being the master of one's own dwelling. Thus the higgest challenge remained to protect the\t" homes from the fnr..:es of eviction. To thas end. some families made sure that a member of family stayed at home during the day. Some men who stayed behind tu prntL"Ct thear dwellings from the ev...:tron forces lust their Jobs, su It was mamly women who undertook the task of dealmg wath the authonties and defending the dwdlmg!l>. Maantaming the dwelhngs, however, required an nrganazed rl'sistance. Like the studrnts, thr poor \quarters in a numbrr of 'ommumurs wrnr as far as to ..:nnsritute mort' stru..:tured orgamzations: the shurar.,

electrd or appointed councals, reprrsrnred and organized mhahirants of a building, or many occupied blocks within a neighborhood. The shuras bore the responsibility of tackling rrnblem!'l that m1ghr irorar· dtzr the inhabitants security of tenure. Thry werr to upgrade the community, deal with day-to-day problems, maintain cleanliness, rrsolvr disputes, and administer cultural events. Morr immrdiatrly, they were to coordinate the relations of the communities with the outside world, indudmg hosrile neighbors and especially the original ownt'rs of the propt"rtirs."' Several local power centers had emerged, each claiming sole authority over rhe affairs of the neighborhoods, and all, by implication, were hostile to the organization of thr shuras. They ranged from the local Pasdaran Kommirre, tht' drrgymc:n, and thr local mosques rn thr office of tht' Construction Crusade and the local municirality. To countt'r the rhrc:ars and intrigues coming from these bodies, the organization of councils sc:emed vital. In a southwc:!ltrrn outskirt of Tehran, according to Bassri and Hourcadr, rhr four hundrt'd familit's that had rakrn ovt'r rhrrr hun· drrd and right apartments elrctt'd a lrfr-wing council in which women played an activr role. Thr hou~holds of t'ach "trrrt (lwuch~hl rlectrd thrrr rt'prrsrnrarivt's all togrrhrr, making a twrnty-onr-prrson grnrral assembly. Thr general assembly. in rum, rlrcrrd a five-membrr central council, which was to meet oncr a wrrk and was rt'sronsiblr for the decisions concerning thr rnrirr neighborhood. Once consolidated, thr council wc:nt so far as to create a coordinating council to organize all squatters at the lrvrl of the city of Tehran. It organized rallit's and callrd fnr a rent strike by poor tenants." In a srn!IC', the shura associations arrested to the "spatial solidarity .. among the inhahitann who camt' from different social, ethnic. and linguistic backgrounds but sharc:d nne imronant goal: protecting and upgrading the alrt'ady <x:cupit'd homes. 11 Our of this common interest and mechamcal solidarity, basrd uron what John E. Davis trrmrd domt'stic rroreny (land and buildings that art' u!it'd lor usable! for shelter), 11 grrw friendship and kinshir ties that further cemented thr local bond. Young adults within thr communitirs married; neighbon lookrd after each orher', children and watched onr another's hrlong· ings; and childrt'n playrd wnh tht'ir nt'W mates. INspire thts rejuvenated mood and the highly energt'tic local atmosphere, the sp«ter of the hrardt'd Pasdaran and the nightmare of eviction krpt haunting these housing rebrls. Knowingly or unknowingly,

rhey had violared a fundamental propeny righr rhar all the governmenrs in rhe posrrevolurion period were c.:ommirted to prorect. The confrontation between rhe squarters and the authorities rhus seemed unavoidable.

BrinR Evicted The 1-.:cupation nf residential buildings, homes, and hntds constituted one of rhe first challenges ro rhe new authorities m the re\•olutionary period. There had been other im:idenrs that defied the Islamic regime, such as nationalist rebellion!> in Kurdistan and Azarbaijan, the activities of the left-wing organizations, seizure nf farming land in the nunh, and the takeover of factones by the workers in must parts of tM country. Housing seizure!o, however, proved ro be a more acute crisis. In direct a~:tions such as factory takeovers, the government was confident rhat n could evenrually secure the ownership uf the enterprisn.'" These enterpnses would eventually belong either to the state or to the original owners; the most workers could do would he ro mamtain some degre-e of control uvcr the operation of the workplaces through the organizations of the fa'-·rory shuras. The situation with regard to the buildings was quite different. With a simple hinr of governmental r«ognition, the squarters would vinually usurp the occupied properties. There was no easy, short-term, and middle-of-the-road solution, especially since many unllmshed apanments, unlike the luxury villas and hotels, belonged legally to mdividuals such as 'iehoul teachers and the government employees for whom the previous regime had built homes as pan of their benefits. The new authorine\ were consequently caught up betwcoen rhreats of disorder and chaos, of losing their legitimacy as the .. servant!> of the d1spO!osessed," and of being irrelevant. On the other hand, the instability of the Islamic regime, with the intense power struggle ar the rop and the constant turnover of politicians, meant then~ was hardly a consistent policy to deal w1th the prublem. The Housmg foundauun along with a number of radkal derical leaden such as Khusruwshah&, Karrubi, and Beheshti, encouraged takeovers; the provisional government of Mehdi Bazargan opposed the action vehemently; the suhse~uent Rajaaii's cabmer tolerated it without, however, giving ir official recognition. Indeed, the authorities' response ru the squatting crisi~ during the firsr two years remained largely d«entralized; If wa~ handled mainly by the local power ernten, t>spec1ally tht> loul commirtcoes nr Pasdaran, and the local mullas

and their armed men centered in the local mosques. The committees' po!iition on the i~sue depended on which authorities they were following-sympathetic or critical. The radical clergy's sympathy for the squatters had in general the political aim of undermining the Provisional Government. Yet, since the squatters were mobilized generally by the radical left groups, the Pasdaran were quick to oppose the squatten on the ground that they were acting as the agents of the .. communist counterrevolution ... The success of the local Pasdaran in ending the occupation, and the extent of the !>qUarters' hold over rhe occupied properties depended on a balance of forces at both national ami lucallevrls. The power struggle at the top (between the li~rals and the radical drrgy) offered br~thing space to the ordinary citiz.rns in thrir mobilizatinnal dforts. This macro ~hism reflected itself at the localities, with groups allying with this or that govemmrntal tendrnq or personality. But thrre werr othrr playen on rhe local Jrvrl as wdl: rhr squartrrs, thrir lrftisr allirs, the local Pasdaran, local mosqurs and mulla!!o, and rhe owners of the occupied homes. In short, thr d~ree of the squatters' hold ovrr thr occupird proprrties varied a great deal. lr deprnded on how organizttd thry werr, how forceful the original ownrrs were, who the owners wrre (rithrr rhr old rlirr-s or ordinary prople), and which officials thr squatters resortrd to (sympathizttrs or opponents). This may explain why snmr squatters managed tu stay on; others lasted nvrr six years; and some, likr th~ in the occupied hotels, wrre rvicted aftrr a few w«ks. The ways in which the government and the Pa!idaran confronted the housing rrhrl-. varied considerably. They adopted different tactics that ranged from issuing strongly worded warnings, using religious verdk'ts publicly denouncing thC' .. un-lslamic" naturr of their actions, to divide-and-rule tacticr,, cutting water and electricity, arrests, and armed raids. Some, mainl)· srudrnts, lrft without much rrsistancr; others did su after nbtainmg compensation or a promise of alternative housing; many resisted and stayed on, though \ome agreed to pay some compensation to the government. Studrnrs were among the first ro vacate the hotels, largely nf their own frre will. lmmediatdy after thr seizure of the U.S. embassy by the militant muslim uudents (on Novrmhrr 4, 1979) many hotels were evacuated. Even prior to that event, ideological division within the organizing student bodies in the hotel!> had already underminrd the

viahiliry of long-t~rm occupation. Th~ students sympathizing with the Mujah~din argu~d for peacdul ~vacuation; th~y thought thes~ kinds of dir~ct actions would und~rmine th~ nasc~nt rrvolutionary r~im~·s position with th~ West. The Marxist students, m contrast, wanted to stay unl~s\ the government did something for th~ir housing conditions. In many hot~ls this division paralyzed the protective function of the shuras. 11 With th~ seizur~ of thro U.S. embassy, as a left-wing panicipant in one operation put it, '"the justification behind thro occupations lost its validity." In this situation, the "excuse of student housintt )for the occupation of the hotels) also shed its legitima'-""Y· ..... Although a number of the students retained some hotels (for instance, those in Takht-i Tawous and Karim Khan in Trohran) because the own~n ~re tawghoutres (opulent royalists), the politicaVid~ological logic of stud~nr squatting made- their occupation far less v1able-. The Situation with rhe poor squatters was quite diffe-rent. For them. squatting was not a political or ide-ological hattie hut simply a way to survive. (~fending their gains was VItal. And this alone would make their eviction difficult. As a squatter state-d: frnm

rh~ ~RJnmng.

I have !i;u:rafK-rd all uf my rhmgs on th1s revuluuun .

. . . I hav~ wid my urpc-r and TV lru pay for my cosbJ. Nnw I won't leav~ thl\ humr. Ynu ~C"C, w~ roo h;n~ rh~ nght to hve a hfe. II want ro tolthn!iC whn want us to leave thu, place: finr gn·e U5 a piau~ of our own.''

!iii)'

The squatters were mvariably denounc~d in public hy some religious authorities as .. counterrevolutionaries... "They are opponunists who hav~ taken advantage of the good will of the revolutinnary l~ad ership and th~ Provisional Government, .. declared Hojjat al-lslam Khansari, the leader of the committtt locat~d in Nizamabad. "They have ill~ally se1zed thnr apanmrnts, in the days when our combatant people wrr~ engaged in armed struggle )during the revolution)."'• for rh~ most pan, the religious authorities condromnrd th~ squatters and justified their eviction on reli~ous grounds. Upper echelon d~rgy, •uch as Ayatollahs Qomi and Mar'ashi, 1ssued fitu.1as ruhng that occupying homes was haram, unlslamic. In one specific case in Mashad. they ruled that the '"prayer of the Muslims in such hom~s are nor acceptable ... ,~ In rt'Sponse, squatters referft"d to earlier proclamations hy Khomcini on free housing and urban services. '"Dues the government not plan to provid~ housing for the mustaz'afi,?" asked a squat· ter of the authurttic-s who de-manded his eviction, "Wro have behaved

and thcar armN men centerN in the local mosques. The committ«s' position on the issue deprnded on which authorities they were followmg-sympatheric or criracal. The radical dcrgy's sympathy for the squatters had in gencnl the political aim of undermining the Provisional Government. Yet, since the squatters were mobilized generally by the radtcallrft groups, the Pawiaran were quick to oppose the squatters on the ground that they were acting as the agents of the .. communist counterrrvolution." The success of the local Pasdaran an ending the occupation, and the extent of the squatters' hold over the occupied proprrtirs deprnded on a balance of forces at both national and local levels. The power !itruggle at the top (~tween the liberals and the radical dergy) offered hreathing space to the ordinary citizens in their mnbililational efforts. Thas macro Khi!llm reflected if!lltlf at the localities, with groups allying with this or that governmental tendency or personality. But thcrc were other players on the lnc.-llrvel as well: the squarrers, thcir leftist allies, the l
viabiliry of long-term nc~uparion. Thr !lltudenrs sympathizing with the Mujahedin argued fnr praceful evacuation; they thought thC'se kinds of direct actions would undermine the naKent revolutionary rt>gime's position with the We'it. The Marxist students, m contrast, wanred to stay unless thr government did something for their housing conditions. In many hotels this division paralyud the protective function of the shuras. 11 With the seizure of the U.S. embassy, as a left-wing participant in one oprrarion put it, .. the justification hrhind the occupations lost its valid1ty... In this situation, the "excuse of studenr housing Ifor the occupation of the hotels I also shed its lrgirimacy. •leo Although a number of the students retained some hotels (for instance. those in Takht-i Tawous and Karim Khan in Tehran) ~ause the owners were tau•ghnut1es (opulent royalists), the poliricaVideological logic of student squatting made their occupation far less viable. The snuation w1th the poor squatter'i was quirr diffrf'C'nt. For them, "JUatting was nor a pnhtical or idrological battle hut simply a way to survive". Defending thrir gains was vital. And this alone would make thrir evu.:t1on difficult. As a squattrr stated: Frum the beginmng, I have ..a~nti~C'd allni my thmgs nn rhu. rC'voluuun . . . . I havr !>Old m)· ~.upt"r and TV lrn pa)' ior my .:mrs). Now I won'r lca\'e rh•'~ home. You sec, we IIKI have rhe nghr ro hvc a life. II wanr ro !kl)' roJ those whn want us rn lravc th1s pla,C': fint ~1vc U!ll a pla~C' nf uur ,. nwn.

The squatters wrrC' invariably denouncC'd in public by o;ome religious authorities as "counrerrevolut1onaraes." '"They are upportumsts who have takC'n advantage of the good will of the revolutionary IC'adership and the Provisional Government, .. declared Hojjat al-lslam Khansari, the leadC'r of the commtntt located m N1zamahad ... They have iJIC"gally seizt'd these apanments, in the days when our combatant people were engaged in armrd struggle !during the revolution!."'" Fur the most pan, the religious authorities condemned thr squatten and justified their C'Viction nn rrhgtous grounds. Upper C'ChC'Ion dergy. such a!"> Ayatollahs Qomi and Mar'ashi. 1ssued (itu•as ruling that occupying homes was haram, unlslam1c. In one specific casr in Mashad, thC'y ruled that the "prayer of the Muslims in such homes are nut at.·,:eptable. " 1• In rC'sponSC', squatters f'C'ferred tn C"arhC'r proclamations by Khomem1 on free housing and urban srrvtees... Does the government not plan to provide housing for the mustaz'a(in? .. askt'd a squatter of the authorities who demandC'd his eviction, .. We have behaved

exactly according to the government poliq..... , The1r resistance rhus grew nor simply from the moral «onomy of the poor, nor purely from their rauonal conviction. Rather. it repre~nred a moral politics on the pan of the rational poor. Ignoring such verdicts or antervcmtions, the squatters lrft the authonties with no other option but to take a'--r1on that at nmes had far-reachmg politiul consequence!!i. In Dowlatabad, in Tehran, the Pasdaran cur off running water in the public taps on the grounds that, according to a res1denr, "its use was announced to be baram !religiously prohibited I. " 41 Such pressures, however, faded to yield results. Following several warnings to the squatters ru vacate, the Pasdaran in one case raukd a squattt'rs' community at night. The settlers expressed their outrage at tht' assault by organizing a five-hundred-person angry demnnsrranon m front uf the Pasdaran headquant'rs, demanding the release of fin women who were arrnted. !K:uffles broke out and shoormgs followed, leading to the wnhdrawal of the Pasdaran. ·~ Five years passed, dunng wh1ch rime the Pa!Odaran patrolled, off and on, around the settlement, remindmg the squatters of their insecure positiOn. On February 1o, IIJ8 ~. the Pasdaran returned in full force to finish the evi"·tions. In response, thousands of the inhabuant!t of Dowlatabad stagC"d a demonstration. "The demonstrators hl~ked the Be'sar highway, and the strerts around the township, brmging the traffic to a halt." In the confrontations that followed, a large number of the squatter!!~ and IJasdaran were inJured. The secunty forces Withdrew once agam, onl~· to rerum rwo days later with the a1d of the paramilitary (gendarmel. They were confronted with fierce reMstance agam, and left. 41 This was the end nf the affair fur a nme. Squatter!!! made spec1al effnns to organize themselves more systemati~.":ally at the local level, often With the a1d of left-wing groups. They designed strategies to confront the security forces, to outline alternative solutions, and to negotiate With tht' authoritie•. In the township of Kianshahr, in South Tehran, after four years of unsuccessful ev1ction attempts, the sc:ttlers elected a number uf local leaders to appeal to a populist der~Q"man, Ayatollah Montazari. He referred them to the munic1pal authorities. Not being prepared to accept any responsibility, the latter in turn SUKSrsted the squatters present their case at the Friday prayer !it'rmons where mo1t officials, including the prime mmister, would be in attendance. In the me3ntime, an alre3dy-esrabhshed Council of the Apanment

(shura-ye apartimaan) invited people into the local mosque to di~uss the plan. They agreed that they would not leave the apartments and would take their ~ase to the Friday prayer session. One of the proposals pointed out that .. If these houses belong to police ~rsunnd, we are prepared to purchase them. The govem~nt may begin buildmg new apartments for the ~rsonnrl with our monthly payments. Otherwise, we demand the government to build suitable houses for us." The day of friday prayer arrived. The settlers presented their ~tition to the prime minister, who assured them that they could stay in the apart· ments until an appropriate law was enacted with regards to these pro~rties. One year later, however, the Pasdaran raided the community to force them out. The dwellers remained steadfast and the sccunty forces were once agam re~lled. While evictions continued in many spots in Tehran, due to its politICal sensitivity, thing!> appeared ealliler in provincial urban areas. In the holy city of Mashad, tht' government was able to end, albeit aftc.-r several unsuccessful attempts, the oc~.:upation of the apanments of Aabkouh, wh1ch had bttn taken over few days after the revolution. On December Jl., 1 980, wme fuur hundred armed ~uriry men raided the.- bu1ldmgs, and in one surpn~ move forced out some five hundred squatters. 44 The prevailing tactic of the authoriries c.:on~nsted of divide-and-rule. They would offer a segment of the squatters the promise of ahernanve housing or the c.:nnwlidatinn of their tenure, m exch;ange for repud1at· ing more uncompromising, especiall)· leftist, factionli."' Once the sh11ra members were divided, the snuatinn would be npe fur the security forces, backed by the lawsuit of the original owners, to exert pressure. Alternatively, through enforcing new eiC'\."tlons or creilting alrernative shuras, the government would eventually diminarr the disst'nting groups!" This tactic was reinforced especially after 198l. wht'n, followinK the suppression of rhe hherals, the Mu1ahedm, and the left. the regime began to consolidate it!>elf. Although apartment seizure sropprd, nic..-riuns lingered un for some years to c.:ome. Most apartment squatting lasted between two and six years. Only a fraction of the squatters were allowed to stay on. For the rest, forced evic.:t1ons eventually occ.:urred. The major problem was that the !iquatters had aimed at the wrong targets. Unlike their c.:ounterparrs in Punugal in 197 4 or in Briram in 1968-70, who aimed at forcing property uwnen (in Purtugal) ur local KUvernmems ru prnvide hnmn with

72

!ftl

ftOU51·~

ftiiiLS

reasonable rent, the Iranian squatters had 'ieized the properties of other citizens. •' Although some propenies Mlonged to the previous government, foreigners, or very rich landlords, many Mlonged ro the citizen~overnmrnt employers, teachers, or police personnel who were not cons1dered panicularly opulent. Some had not even completed their payments to the contractors. These Citizens were adamant to rrsecure their proprrtin. On the other hand, the government's promise of housing for the poor through the Fund 1 oo program initially created some hopr among the poor. The activities of the Jihad-• Sala,deKu• (the Construction Crusadel seemed initially a v1able grassroots solutmn. But rh~ measures were both limited and far off. •• Thesr shortcomings, together with the waring pnce of land and ~nt, a new wave of urban migration, and the relea~ of war rrfugee'i, therefore encouraged the poor to focus on the alternative strategy of 'ipontaneous settlements through the occupation of urban land. Taking over empty apanments and land around the cities represtnted a kry means by the poor rn survive homdessnns and the hardship of urban housing. The a"-rors also aimed at mastering their own ph~ical space and pract1cmg their autonomy by liberating rhem~lvn from the whims of landlords and government regulations. In this srnse, the squatter activities of the poor represent an extens1on of their daily practice mvolving the constant struggles for the redistribution of resources and the expansion of their autonomy. But what facilitated such practices at thi'i panu:ular jun"-rure was, apart from tht' urge for survival, a political space crt'ated by the revolution. Th1s political !!ipace opened up a nrw opportunity and granted a new chara"'ter to the squarten' practict', making it an exceptional measure. The nprriment of wtdrspread home takeover was the first its kind in Iran, and was not repeated in the postrevolutionary prriod. 49 Unlike the oc.:cupanon of hotd!!i hy student!!, home !!iquatting by the pour was nor intended as an ideological challenge against pnvare propeny. While rhr srudenh arrrompted to create a bitueer squatter movement by involving more panicipants, poor squatters werr wary of such measures. They prefcnrd more 'itlrnr, limited, small-scale operations. Thry knew that at nmrs of rncroachmrnt, visibility, solidarity and clamor, would he cnuntrrprodu""tive. Somr roven arrrmptrd to curtail thr extent of their activities. Yet when tht' challenging

moment of eviL"tion and rhus defense of their gains arrived, rhe poor did their best to extend their movement by advocating involvement, participation, and solidarity. Also, unlike the studenr takeovers, the squatter activities of the poor were not meant as a deliberate protest act1on to force the state to solve the housinR problem. Tht>ir measure was the solution to that problt>m. Whert'as squatting for tht' srudt>nts largely meanr a deliberate political action, for the poor it meant s1mply a living practice, a form of daily resistance and struggle to surv1vc: and improvt' life, to rt>distrsbute collecrivt' goods and win autonomy. Both groups, the students and the urban p<xn:, were involved m illegal aL-rs. Whereas Ideological bias justified the stucknts' action, the notion of nccessiry warranted that of the poor. As a squatter of the Nizamabad apartment blocks in South Tehran 6rmly stated: We: arc: must.J:'.JI- rtlust.Jz'.z{ in a rc:al SC"nse; othc-rwiM" we: wouldn't mudc- the- apanments m ~uch a manner ... We h.a\·e been tenants for a lung rime; h.t\"e had enormous hardships; a miKrable lik. All of our con· cern has t-ee-n to fee-d our children, and pay rent, whach in most caSt"!>, we- §Imply nJUid nor manage. Our ch1ldrt'n have ne-ver tas.tc-d any kind of fru1t throughout the year. Aftc:r the- strikes that brukt' the Shah's back-and ours as well!-our s1tuat10n gut worse; so that we ..:-ould hardly pay our rent, and make ends mm. So we had no cho1cc: but to rnon tn squanmg theK apanmenrs.'·•

lndet>d, tht' motives behind each group's actions influenced rhesr uurcume a great deal. Man)· students relinquished the <x:cupied hotels, especially after the seizure of the U.S. embassy in Tehran, when they reexammed their political muuves and found thesr action politically unsound. Bur the motive of the J)qUatter movement uf this sort, if It occurred under nonrevolutionary conditions .mdlor espe<:ially under a liberal dem«x:raric state, might he: ~>«n as une which questions bourge()ls legality and private prnperty. 11 The lraman ca~ was, however, quire different, since the emergent pohric.al space created by the revolution .and the initial suppun of the populist dergy justified to a considerable degree the squarrcors' cause. The rad1calism of rhe poor and that of the populist derg)· had a reinfurcmg effect upon each other. Maldistrihution and the sheer shortaRe of urban housing were

problems upon which the squatters had reflected, problems the govem~nt strove to address. However, With the government's inability to resolve the housing problem (discussed later), together with an almost total collapse in private investment m housing, the flooding of war refugees, and the new waves of rural migrants, basic dwelling continued to remam a ch1ef issue that galvamzed the social activism of disenfranchised groups. Ahhough the squatter movement made 1mportanr gains by allocat· ing homes among some poor families and by affecting public housing policy, it facrd its limitations before long. The time for organized and radical direct actions had come to an end. Activist support for the movement was curta1lrd by the advent of political repression. In addition, the short supply of usurpable homes and the subsequent legal complications of takeovers made the option nonviable. In short, the extraordinary ~:onditions that had given rise to the birth of the movement soon ~:arne to an end. The JXKlf needed to adopt a sustainable strategy to suit the subsequent penod of polit~~:al normalcy and stabilIty. They did so by returning to a strategy of indiv1dual and silent enuoachment. Qu1et squatting and illegal construction of thousands of plots of land in the back streets of the urban centers and beyond was Sttn as the most v1able wlunon. The following chapter spells out the dynamics of th1s movement.

Five Back-Street Politicsa Squatters and the State

I ha~r talkrd w many rr"drnh uf thn.C" 1hahrak~ j\t"ttlrmrnt\1. Apart from man)' v.·ho havt ~:umt from orht-r rnwn' and villagn, thC'rC' art al~l rhow who ~:omr from dtfkr· mr ITrhranl nr1ghhorhoods. I rn)'stlf wa1 ;a rconanr m ;a h0111C' lm Tt"hranl .... Bur rnl· •ud that I could not afford to pay rhco rt"nt. Ntgnflafluns wlfh rhr J.mdlord wrnr nuwhrrr ... So onco day a .:olkaKUr of mmr ~aid In me "Why don't you rakr a look at 1~ arr.n around Savrh Road.~ Wtll, I camt" hrrt and 'lt'nltd. Now, I am happy that at ltatt my fam1ly livr1 undrr a roof. -A !iqUoiRC'r m 'ia,·rh Road in Sourh Trhran'

Is is common among scholars to examine the politics of the poor in terms of a set of simple dichotomies-:onservativelradical, orientation to individual resistancelcolltttive a'-"tion, and adherence to primordial loyalties/civil associations/ The narratives of this chapter demonstrate the inadequacy of such dichotomies in uncovering the complex nature of the poor's politics. The disenfran<:hised, indeed, combine and expe· rience all of these seemingly contradictory positions. Change in the political climate, the efficacy nf tactics used, and their own abiliry rn mobiliu account for major factors determinin~ the variation in their methods. Concern for thC' concrete and the immC'diate compels the poor to adopt pragmatism; unlike the intC'IIectual class, the disenfranchised cannot afford to be ideological. In postrevolutionary Iran, the poor realized that radical, direct, collective action (e.g., squaning in hotels and homes) belonged to an exceptional conjum."ture, and that the phase of political nurmaliry and rcogime-stabiliry required a movement with a new strategy-low-key, nonprovocative, often individualistic, requiring patience, precision, and perseverance. Because squaning homes and hotels proved to be a nonviable solution, many poor tulll('d to the alternative strategy of colonizing silently

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the territories outsidr thr htg cirirs, away from the watchful eyes of the policr, putting up ~ohrlters and !ldting up communities without much regard ro regulations or legality. This largely discrert direct action allowed the dtsrnfranchi\ed to evade the burden nf high rent and starr control by constructing communities at the margins of government influence, whrre family, kinship, and local norms governrd their daily lives. To sn.-urr thdr status in the face uf the state, r..:onomic hardship, and sex-tal anomie, both rradtnonal nrrworks and modern associations became an mseparable pan of thetr communallifr. Whilr kinship and ethmc tdentities ~;emented their wllcctivc: existem:r with the informal norms governing their daily lives, the modern associations (Neighborhood Louncals and Consumer Loo~rattves) rven m their restri~:trd forms strove to aniculate spatial sohdarity overriding rthnic and kinshtp divisions. Here I rxamine the dynamics of thas alternative community construction, s~lling out conflicts of interrst and prr~;ept10ns between thnr st'tders and the authuritir!i. Thr elements of conflict revolved around three major arras: First, nver the meaning of migration from one place to annthrr; second, over the distribution of social goods (e.g., public land, drinking water, electricity, roads, schools, clinics, dean a1r, etc.); and third, the struggle over the extension of autonomy, of cultural and politi..:al spacr free of state control. Usual Business 1-:vrn at the hetght of the occupation• of hotels and homes, the process of illegal squatter !it'ttlement had ncvrr rmirely stopped. Earlier chapters havr described how during the rrvolution the needy (as well as greedy devrlo~n;) conrinued squatting on many plot• of urban land, ere'-"tmg dwellinp overnight. The proc~ ~ontmued tmmediatel)· after the revolution, desptte parallrl home and hotrl occupation. But both thr limared supply of vacant apanments suitable for ()(cupaunn and the attendanr legal comph~atinns rendere-d squ.aner senlrmrnt as the must v1ahle ammediatc- alternative to the housmg crisi~o and ex..:es~oive starr control. Thu~o hashryemshm1 and z.aghehmslum, thr constr~tiun nf 11legal communities, continued tu increase, affrcting even the smaller towns. Many large cities exprnem:ed gradual hut extensive land mvasions and tllrgal conlitr~tiun. In Tehran the increa~ was more rapid. The number of 'ihanry dwdler'>, nr zagh~hnuhm.m, began ro dimh quickly

BACI-S!RIIf

PO~IflCS

from the very first year of the revolution. The shanty settlemrnts (z.lgh~h) of Zanjan-i jonoubi Strert increased by 140 peru~nt; and those of ~lrimanieh, R~lat Highway, Zanjan-i Shomali Street, and Tajrish almost doubled. In the meanrame, new spontaneous c;:ommunities emerged m Maadan-1 Azada, and in South Tehran. 1 Thus, the total population of the gnwdnishman (inhahnants of gowds) and shanry dwellers within the capital cny reached some 1 oo,ooo households b)· early 1980. In 1980 the municipality formally enlarged the city limit from us square kilometers ro 510 ~uare kilnmrters, recngnizmg many mformal communaties on the margms of the city by extending urhan servac.:es. Despite this, figures show a sharp drop in Tehran's annual growth rate from s.1 percent m 1976 to 1.9 percent in ry86! The decline was at the cost of extensive growth just outside the formal city limits, on agricultural lands, nearby villagrs, in planned townships, and informal communities. Thousands of urban poor acquired land, legally nr iJiegally, and wnstructed more durable homes With reasonable materials such as mud or baked bricks. A large num~r created permanent settlements. large areas experienced spontaneous construction around Shahr-i Rey, Varamin, NiLamabad, Shahrak-i Mamazan, Shahrak-i Qiam, K1anshahr, Shadshahr, and Q.m:hak in rhe southern plain of thr capital c1ty, and Khak-1 Sefid in Trhran Pars. From the wrst the city stretched as far as Karadj and its sardlite ruwns Rajaiishahr and Mrhrshahr, encompassing numerous enlarged communines such as Shahrak-i Quds (see maps a and 1.). In 1990 the population of these townships reached some 1.1 million.' As early as 1986, 1. 3 uf the settlements that had mushrcK•med o~ruund the capital qualified fur integration into the city bus servtee. These settlements had a population of wdl over 460,000, SIX nmes thear size in 1976: Perhaps for the first time, rural communities at the marRin of the cit)' began extensively to hou~ the urban poor. Thrse nrw urbanized villages provided "hraper land for home construction, lower density, cheaper goods and servi~rs, and more autonomy from typical urban regulations. Agriculture was unly a mmor activity• thr inhabitanrs, mostly immittrant!o from other rural arras as wrll as from thr inner city areas nf Tehran, were dependent on the economy nf the urban ~enter. Population nf these spontaneous communities ~rew nearly 1 7 percent per year herween 1976 and r9H6, and 10 percent hetwern 19H6-r991 (from 'J04,00o to 1,l.H4,oool;- at the same tame Tehran's nvrrall

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growth rat~ d~dined from 1.9 percent to 1.4 percent as many poor and middl~-class Tehranies, as well as low-incom~ families from oth~r cities, mov~d into marginal settlements and urbaniz~d villag~s." lslamshahr and 8agh~rabad ar~ two such communities. lslamshahr, Tehran's largest satrllite community, where the capital's largest popular protest took placr in April 199 _s, is locatrd 18 kilometen. southeast of the city. Originally known as Shadshahr, it grew out of ten neighboring villages with a population of 1,000 in 1966; by 1976 its population had rcach~d so,ooo. Sine~ th~ r~volutiun it has grown an average of 1H to z. 3 percent annually, housing an ~stimated _lOO,ooo to iOO,ooo people by 1990. • Over 70 percent of them camr from the capital city.'" Most of the inhabitants worked in the streets, workshops, and factories in the vicinity. Bagh~rabad with 1 _s,ooo inhabitanrs is locat~d near Varamin, ro kilometers south west of Tehran. The population of this shahrak consists of poor migrants of various ethnicities including Kurds, Lours, A1.aris, Baluchis., Arabs, and Afghans, and some who came from the slums of the capital. 11 They spr~ad out in a village that once housed only eighty-seven peasant households. "~inning in the early sev~n ties, .. remembered an elderly inhabitant of the old villagr, the landlords sold their lands and d~rrrd rht \'illage. With rhrm gone. rht agriculture deterinrared, leading to the out-migration ol praunt families. Thm, tht newcomers apprarrd hnle by linle. As soon a!i anyone arrived in the villa~'<'• he bouRht a plot of land, wh1ch at tht time was very cheap ... pur up a shelter, pllK.-ed his wit.: and children in ir, and left for work in the city. Many worktd as labortn in Tehran. The)' sprtad rhe newt around labour rht ,·ilia"" I; and rhctr friends nl1lt' and joined rhem. And in rhis way, rht '·illagt gor l.uger. Rut these proplt hardly did any agricultural work ... Now if you movt around Tehran rhr-K day1, you will find a new shahrak every few milrs. •!

Indeed, by the early a 990s new shahrak communities, induding the shantytowns and urban villages, numbered well over one hundred within and around the Gr~ater Tehran.'' In 1992 the mayor of T~hran admitt~d binerly that, .. The land area of Tehran has rapidly expanded from z.oo squar~ kilomet~rs in the first year of the revolution to 6oo square kilometers at pr~sent ... He went nn, .. This rapid expansion has, for the most part, been devoid of any order and legal procedures. Much uf the construction has bern qachaqui Iillegal I, carried out in the middle uf the night. Homes have heen turned into shops and man)'

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buildings have been builr on public: thoroughfares and public space's ... 14 1n 1994 some 674,000 low-income people were living in the informallit'ttle~nts around Tehran. 11 The capital was not alone in experit'ncing squatter colonization. Hasbtynrrsbini mushroomed also m the provincial cities and towns, mdudmg Mashad, Tabriz, Bakhtaran, Arak, Hamadan, ldahan, Shiraz, Bandar Abbas. Maraght'h, and Ahwaz to namt' only a few. 1• By the end of the 198os, m the holy city of Mashad in the far east, the size of the basbiyentsbinan had reached some ~oo,ooo residing in squatter st'ttlements such as Kouy-e Aab-u-Bargh, Seyed1, Najafi, AI-Mehdi, Hemmatabad, and Knuy-e Tollab. This last was the sitt' of rhrt't' days of ru>rs in 1991, the country's biggest political event of that year. These St'ttlements outside the capital devduped mamly after the revolution. The squatters consisted of the rural migranrs, Iran-Iraq war rdugt't's, Iranians upelled from Iraq, and Afghanis. Kuuy-e Aab-o-Bargh was built by rhe gradual colonization of the hills1dn overlooking the ciry by migrants fltting from the nrarby rural areas of Ghnuchan, l>argaz. and Torbat-i Haydariyeh. Altogether they managed to build some 1,000 homes under the high pressure elt'ctricity poles supplying Mashah, not n~ecting to take a share nf that electricity. 1' Berwt'l'n 1980 and 198 .~ thl" land area of the city of Bakhtaran grew from a mere 6 square kilometer'> to about Ko square kilometer... 11 In 1984 the mayors in the nonhem cities of Tabriz and Urumiyeh warned about the threat of basbiye,.,sbtnl and illegal nighttime constructions, calling for mea•ures tn hair the trl"nd. 1• In short. a"i expens confirmed, by the end of the 198os, .. against our expa'"tations, the basbryenisbim spread even to the small and med1um-siz.ed towns in the country.,..!~)

Why So Much Expansion? Undoubtedly the Islamic gtwernment inhenreJ a good pnrnun of the problem frum the previous rrg1me, bur m the earl)' years afrc:r the rl"volutinn the situation deteriorated funher. lr was estimated rhar durmg the 1970s, z.oo,ooo new homes a year were nttded 10 keep up with demand.ll Th1s number jumpt"d to JOO,ooo during the pustrrvulution yean.Zl Yet the relative supply of housing declined \harply. In the first years following thl" revolution, prrvate mvt>stment in housing almost totally collapsed. The total number of humrs with ~rmlts huilr in 1981. (lUSt over 1 1,6oo units) wa!i. only nne-tenth of that rn 1979 (some 1&o,ooo homesl.~' To amehnratl' the s1tuat1nn. the govcrnment

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aimed both ro ensure renting vacant accommodations and ro build low-cost dwellings. Rent mfora-mmr failed due to rh~ landlords' noncooperation, even though rhr measure was supported by draconian nate concrol over land and housinK rransa~-rions. On the other hand, dnpire rhe much publicisrd policy of home construction for the poor, and large sums of money ar the disposal of the Housing Foundation the rrsults werr Ins than impressive.l• By 198.1. the Foundation had distributed nor more than 1 1,000 plots of land ro low-income families m Tehran at a time when, according ro the Chirf justice, Ayatollah Moussavi-Ardahili, som~ 100,000 "homdrss families" were living in the capital.!' Rapid increase in the urban population played a key role in the urban housing crisis. Btrwrm 1976 and 1986 the urN!n population grrw by about 71 pen.-rnr, with an annual growth rare of S·S percent (from 15,715,000 to 16,991,000). Thr~ main factors contributed to this. First, the influx of 1. 5 milhon Iran-Iraq war refugees, many of whom were forced to live in makeshift housing and temporary tmts in the maJor urban arras. Second, by the mid-198os an estimated 1 million Afghan refugees had entered rhe country, many of them relocating in big cities s~h as Mashad, Zahedan, and an estimated 110,000 to 300,000 in Tehran. Finally, rural-urban migration played the biggest role. During the decade 1976 to 1986, over 1,115,000 rural penple left their homes to live and work in rhr cirirs-abour 1. s million to Greater Tehran. u The population of somr cities, such as Bakhtaran, morr than doubled. The early migrants rushrd to the h1g citirs expecting to harvest the fruit of the revolution-free housing, jobs, or high income. Many opportunist d~velopers also joined the bandwagon of the musta:'afin taking over urban land for rent or sale:!' rheK Sft'med insignificant, however, cnmparrd to the needy. Thousands of v11lagers camped in the big squares and thoroughfarrs of Tehran to gd their share of the free homes that radical clergy like Ayatollah Khosrowshahi had promised ro the mustaz'afin. l.arer migrants were pushed our of rhe rural areas largely by economic nrcrssiry. The rht'toric of rhe new lradcors with regard ro the high value of agriculture and rural developmenr in an Islamic Iran was rarely translated into practice. While rhe }1had-i Sa:andegui (Construction Crusade) carried out many development proJ«ts (in particular road constructlon and electricity supply), 11 the poor farmrrs' income from agriculture remainrd sluggish. In 1981 a

rural hou~hold earned Ins than half-44 pcrcent-tlf an urban family.1• A survey by the }ihad-i Saz.andep1 in 1984 on migration in the provinces of Hamadan and Isfahan showed that over Hs percent of the poor migrants had left their villagrs b«aw;e of low income, and inadequate water and land.~'n Hence sc;om; of pour villagers, war refugees and displaced people, against the wishes of the1r polincalleaders, chose to live in the cities to utilize the available ~rvicrs and opponunities. However, just as before the revolution, rhe high price of land and costly legal procedurn-sripulared in the dry plans-continued to exclude nor only th~ emigrants but also many low-mcome urhamtes from the formal housing market. Evm the formalized squatter communities, such as lslamshahr. began to create their own informal ~ttlements once city planning was put into df«t. 11 Thus somt' poor familit's managed to purcha~ plots of land outside tht' city hmits where they built their shelters illegally; some ~ttled in nearby villages with secure land holdings and buildings but lacking urban ~rvices. Many simply rook over pieces of public and legally obscure land, as far as possible out of public s1ght-behmd a hill, in a river bed, under big bridges, or our of town. C-ertainly the poor utihzed the existing political opportunity; yet they justified their unlawful actions by the moral princ1ple of necessity. While some resorted to .. land belongs to God," most reasoned forcefully thar .. chare-ii n~est," .. there is no other way out. " 11 In tht' end rhey shaped new cummunitin thar in some ways differed from their prerevolution counterpam. Tht' massive and rapid dislocation of migrant families with diverse origins marked the hybrid character of these communities: they contained more residents of urban origin, they were less communal and traditional in their social relations and institutions and contained a wider range of occupations. Shapin1 the Communities Having sa:ured a dwelling, the most urgent need for the settleB was ro uhtam water and electricity. later on came sewerage systems, refuse collection, chmcs, schools, roads, and cultural activities. To ensure these essentials, the poor utiliud ~If-help iniriam·es to organize collective campaigns, bur when these efforts did not yield results, they resorted to silent hut direct action. Once the gams were assured in this discreet fashion, the poor did evrrythmg rhry wuld collectivrl)· to

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defend them. As the disenfranchised la1d funher daims, they consolidated the1r posnion and captured wider arenas of power. In 19Ho some 4H,ooo households remained without running water and 1H,Hoo wrre wuhout electricity in Trhran alone. By 1986 the number of famllie!i without running watt'r in thr urban areas of Tehran Prov1nce was rwicc that of six years earlier. In the same year ~ J 89 000 famihes in other caries lacked pi~d water. 11 In the new squatter cummunitin, dectricity was either nonexistent or had to be purchased from the small power grnt'rators that richer dwellers installed in cenain squatter communitin to cam an mcome. 14 Drinking water had to be supplied either from outdoor fountains or from ad hoc elevated rest"rvoirs that residents had conna.~ to the1r homes through plastic hosrs. Purchasing ranker water was also common; every day water tankers would drive into the hean of the slums, where they wrrc surrounded by women and children with buckers. Both the inadequacy as well as the cost of water and clccrri"ty• however. became a heavy burden. In 198J, 17,000 inhabitants of a poor ..:ommunity such as Shahrak-i Masoudich in South Tehran, or that on the nonh !foide ot Ayatollah Ka!>hani Boulevard, had ro pay as much as Rls 1,ooc:rRJs 1, .~oo fnr a rank of ponablc water rhat was hardly suit· able for drink mg. 11 Some spent as m&K:h as Rls 1,000 a week for unpurificd water that .. had causcd k1dney problems among the children."'"" An alternative was local cno~ration and self-help. Some commumtit's gut to~ther to dig deep wells. Thas method, however, d1d not always work due to the \hon supplies of equipment.'" The mfamous squatter community of Zoorabad, 40 kilometers cast of Tehran, was one 1uch commumry. Spread nut on the hillsides dominating the migrant city of Karad1. the settlement housed about ~6,ooo inhabitant!i in 1&J8o. •- Purch.asing water from water urners cost them up to trn nmn the cnst uf p1ped water tn which only 11 percent of the residrnh had acce ..... 1• D1ggmg deep wells and installing sewer p1pes proved extremdy ardunu!i. It was a tremendously hard job for women to carry heavy buckets nf water up the hills every day. The settlrrs, thereforr, turned to buymg tank water and storing it in aab-anbaars, underground water reservoirs con!ittructed nprcially for rhas purpose beneath their hnuses. 4" The aab-anbaars, however, harbored many !ions uf bactrna and d1~a~. A!> rhr bcnrfits of self-hrlp proved limned, rc!iidcnt!i rurncd rn lnul govemmcnr to demand proper urban amenities.

!ACE-STREET POLITICS

Many locals publiciled rhC'ir needs in the form of petitions and open letters to the authorities in the daily papers ... Khaniabad-i Nou lacks safe drinking water, .. wrote the settlers of the community in South Tehran. "We are buying water from a well that a few profiteers dug some rwenty years ago .... The water is full of calcium materials and salt ... The shun age of dean water has caused problems for the peo· pie in nbsen·ing their religious duties. •• The inhabitants of Shahrak-i Valiye'asr, in South Tehran, protested: "We are using underground water which is unhygenic and causes disease ... Now that this serrlemem has Iofficially! h«ome pan of the city of Tehran, we expect the honorable authorities to grant us a favor, the musta:'afin, by extending piped water to our community. " 42 The open lerters covered all aspects of local life, ranging from garbage collection {in Khaniabad-i Nou), pavement of roads (ln Afsariyeh)"', electricity, power-cuts (in Afsariyeh) 44 and food rationing. The pc=ople of lslamshahr complained: "Rice has been distributed only once in the last three months; and no eggs have ~en brought to the locality at all during the last five monrhs, .. demandin~ the authorities tn "come and end this situation herr .... , In rhe meantime people rook to the streets in demonstrations and sn-ms in front of government offil.:es and municipalities to pressure the authonties for result!!. In 1981 the women of Zoorabad, Karadj, following days of mob1lizat1on, fon;ed city officials to extend the dry's refuse collection nerwork to their communities. In the first year of the revolution, the women had organized them· selves in order to acquire running water for each house. They went to the Water Board of the city and .. refused to leave until they had been promised p1ped runnmg water to all households.,..,. Within rwo months, piped water gu•hed into the alleyways of a large part of the settlement. They had earlier campaigned, with the help of more educated women, to improve conditions in their local public bathhouse, whose owner had confined its usage to men only on the grounds that women would use a lot more water and take mo~ rime.•~ Indeed the struggle for piped water in th1s settlement continued until 19H~, when rhe growing (ommuniry n~ded e\·en more running water. That year the settlers managt"d tn obtain the ~onsent of the municipality ro extend the supply. Yet without waiting fur the initiative nf the bureaucracy, they themselves hegan to dig dnches and lay p1pes. In doing so, they offended nffi~:ials. In a hlood)• ~·onfrontarinn

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betwttn the people and the Pasdaran, some ~ttlers were arrrsted and a number inJured. u In 1984 in Arak, an mdustnal town m the ~enrral province, hundreds of squatters from Zoorabad mar~hed toward the town hall to demand running water. Rattling metal ~onrainers, they chanted: .. water, water, we are thirsty." The protrstC'rs were forced to retrC'at after the Pasdaran WC're ~nt to ~ontrol the situation. •• Women of Mehd1yeh in South Tehran (in June 1 y8s ), Shahrak-i Fardis m Karadj jm june J98.f), and rlsrwhere began similar s.trugg.IC'S in thr hope of developing their ~ommuniues. '" The rc5idcnrs of squaner areas an Trhran-KaradJ road demonstrated while chanting .. na sharqu1, na Rharbl: IW aabl, M barqul" (nrirhC'r ust nor West; neithC'r water, nor rla:tncity), sarustu::ally refernng to a govemment policy that ignored mtemal cri!iC!i, soch as urban problems, in favor of a senseless foreign policy rhetorK: that dogmatically reJected llelt with both the East and the West. When nmsy demonstrations proved insuffi~1ent, households began, individually or coll~"tlvely, to conna:t the1r homes to the main street water pipe or ro the ele~-rri~iry poln, at nmes by ingenious methods. The people of thr Hu§§rini neighborhood, in the southwest of Tehran, havmg annnprcd through the ncceDary formal ~hannrls ro secure running water, dc..:1ded in June 1984 to rake the matters into their own hand•. One night they secretly broke the main water p1pe in the strttt and conne~-red rhe1r already prepared p1pes. Although this brought the arrest of s1x parnctpants and a fine of Rls JOO,ooo, they managrd to mamtaan the illegal flow of \:ity water.'' In Khak-i Sefid, a settlement of 4,000 mhabnanh, the squatters a~quired cla:tricity hy do-it-yourself tact1~s ... We requested wJ many t1mn ro the M1msrry of Power to conna:t us; bur they didn't," stated a ~rtler... Now, ba:ausc we really needed clectri\:ity, the people cooperated with ea~h other to bring power into the communny. "' 1 Another zaghehmshin an Tehran had similar story... Whrn I umc to this place lin 198~1. things were bad. But then people colle~ted money to pave the roads. We got ela:triciry from the power pole!i. And as for water, we ourselves installed pipn from the main street water tap"; .. but we are still waiting for a s.chool and gardens."'' In 19H7 an extensive study of about fifty shantiC's with some H,ooo families in seven districu. of Tehran ~onduded that the majonty of these settlements utilized 1llegal runmng water and el~ rne~ry, m wmt 'ases With the ta~::it agreemC'nt of the mum~ipaliry.,.

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rcht

II

nJ HarmJt>h 7..olf.aghan,

r~hran ,

bouk ul photo , 'Irhran,

iaid. n South urh Tc hron . rtJ H nuJrh Zuliai}t n, lrhr.m, • bno ol rhot~ , t-hro~n,

A shantytown in RC".za l)t&h.ar&llma

uth Tehran, M rch 1980.

A hantytnwn in South T~hran, une I ~81. Rru lk&h tillnau

n intormal dwdlmg in Tc:hr.111, Nm·cmh r I 1179. Kt:"7>~

De: •h.. llllma

An partment hutlding lX upied 1n • Avolfll~ga",

A ene !rom I lam!>hahr, an inform (,oft~,

mabad, an r.ourlt Tehr n.

at

I Khordad I II /june l 1979.

t (I

): 78.

ommunary in outh Tehr n, 1993.

Khak·a

fiJ 4-JU.tttrr

~nlcmcnr,

Tehran, 19H6.

1\ 11 5tudent •I rh•· I· ·~1lr ol An <mJ Ar•hn

Khak·t 8) ..

fiJ

ruJ~nr

~uaner

nt thr

nlemcnt, ·lrhran,

la~ulo·

nt

n arul

fllfl',

llruver •r • of 'lehr n.

198~.

r..httr<.turc, Un"Tr 11 ·of thr.m.

A shantytown tn South Tehran, March 1981. "Pra1dent: Welcome to the gate of IViliUtiOtl!'" llru Drabahllmax

qu ar I h711'

11

r u•mmurut ' ,f h hr k· r I htd

1: 54.

I.

·~

I

Children of Gowd uauer serrlc:m nt in south Tehran. The plaLard read , ~we.-, the ~oplc: of the gowds, are in the fnretrunt of anti-im~riilh t ;and antt· meri n trugglc ." 1-aryad., Cttu,J,.,sJ,, 0 (I lir l 5811 79).

t .t huu c in M •iJ.m Sou h, south lchrm. l\fllll h K~Sf11)30 .loti lhmt I h ~>I f:han, ehr.m, a buu

I 'Hlii'N~, l'·

m.

t

ph oro'i, I

h~1n.

Un mrlc lt:IJra•l M

~d

•t.rkcr J mun '' .1r 11.!11 'I ~

in Tehr.tll, \JHII 19 9. r.ltn I \ ~ f prtl I \, I 791: ll.

(fltlftg

D mon tmtium uf 1he unrrnplu t:t.f, hr n, ~.mdt'WJri, l' Fum~rdm 13 IJ/Apnl I II, I '17~.

pril I ~7!1 .

A tr ltcza r

t

v ndor tn th( h rillm

T~hr m

llu ttrnltn I.

A yuung vendor, dO'>c tn Tr:hran &uar, March I !JSO. Reu Dt"ltb.a1illm:a

Vmdon packed in

halaar alleywa)·, Tehran, mid· l !#80 .

' rullah Ka ra•yan and t·um1dch Z !If Khan, Tthrt111,11 book ul phot.._ Te-hran, 137 I 1'194, p. 'i4,

" .ive u jobs and we wall gi e up trttt vendang. Main rain our li dihood and we hall gJV up endmg.• Union of trrrt vendor. Tehran, Drcember 1979. Rtu ~atillma

De~h tJllm x

IAOI-S!RIIf POLI!ICS

At time!i the skills of young volunterrs, mainly students and activi!tts, were also utilized for devdopment, education, and health purposes. Groups of young volunterrs established libraries, tutorial and literacy classes in neighborhoods." In 1 980 thr residents of thr Dowlatabad senlrment brought illegal light to their communit)' whm studmt a'"tiv1srs hooked their homes to power linn that passed over the senlrment. With the nrw drctricity came a communal place to receive guesrs, a mosqur, and a mobile clinic. •• Volunterr work in specialized firlds was even more prevalent. Many popular neighborhoods enjoyrd the assistance of doctors, nurses, and engineering studmrs. In the squatter areas of South Tehran (e.g., Arab gowds), a numbrr of medical units were set up, where over a hundred patimts were diagnosed daily for a meager Rls 30 (nearly U.S. So. s) each. In this community some 1,000 medical 61es were nrganiud. '" The spirit of voluntarism, however, tended to dimmish among the middle-clas.o; activists when revolutionary fervor began to subside and the police surveillance kept many youths from such activities. Unlike scattered :.aghehs huilt beforr the rrvolution, I found a number of squatter areas such as Khak-i ~fid or lslamshahr reasonably dean, green, and orderly, with wide paved strttts and alleyways, and siz.able one-story homes whose residrnts collectively self-managed the communities. In Khak-i ~fid, for instance, residents realized that .. the area did not have a plan and the srreets were all irregular. So we got an architect who did the job; and we helped to build the pavements.... Wr built our own mosque where rvery two weeks people go for rou'%r-khaPII." •• This appears to br the kind of community panic1pation that many in today Third World, mcluding the right and the left, favor. The right views self-help as reducing dependence on the state and its finanC"ial burden; community participation, in this sense, is hoped to consolidate the political systrm. for the left, community participation serves to raise the social consciousness and living standards of the poor, eventually producing social transformation. Bued upon Latin American rxperience, others conclude that community participation serves the interests of the state better than it serves the poor. 1 ~ The Iranian pattern deviated from the prrvailing models, first brcause, in thrir strugglrs the Iranian poor often combined mstitutional channels with direct actions, legal with illegal mrthods. On thr other hand, community participation was understood not simply as self-cost self-help but as com-

88

BACI-S!WBB! POLl!lCS

munal activism that mcu"rd costs (in terms of pro~ny, profit, and power) to the state and the nch-m shon, others-cost self-help. In rhe case of Iran, as the ~overnment confronted extensive illegal land occupation and unpaid consumption of urban amenities, it felt that it would be bcner off integrating pans of the settlements to ensure both state control and com~nsarion for rhe use of collective services. As a resuh some squaner land11 in South Tehran were placed under au,qaf, which, although it tolerated seniC'rs, require-d thmt to pay some annual rent. In this way, the authorities recognized and extended urban services ro a number of poor settlements. The immediate problem, so far as the government was concerned, was that over-consumption of water and eleL'tricity mtailed lowering water pressure and daily power cuts, rhus causing widespread dissatisfa.:tion and protests. "'l For the settlers, on the other hand, the policy appeared to be a victory. Apan from securing the formal provision of city amenities, official recognition also greatly reduced thrir tenure insecuriues. Yet the involvement of the authorities wnthcted with t~ desut for autonomy and for life without state inttrference. Formalizing tht stttltmentl> meant undtrgning hureaucratic control and taxataon. Formal suhscript1on to water, e-lectricity, and refuse coll«tlon meant that the poor were obliged ro pay for the-se services, ar spec1fic times. The issun of payment, rimmg, and procedures were no lon~r negotiable. Although the poor had struggled to rxtend stK:h serVIces to their •llegal homes, they soon realized that they could not afford to pay the hills and play bureaucratic games.'' Some poor families ended up having services suspended due- to delays in payment (as in Distnct 16 in Tehran). Once again women made journeys to nearby mosques and neighborhoods to wash dishn and clothes, and resoned to oil lamps and burners instead of electrical power. The more persistent inhabitants rnoned to manipulating meters as their shon-term alternativr. In sum, ro develop their communities, the poor utilized their own mmat1ves and efforts. When the effects of self-help proved hmited, they pressed the government ro a1sisr them. Whtn the authorities resisted, the poor red1stnbuted collective goods to the1r own advantagr--~hat JS, they stole urbo~n infrastructure. Once gams wt're assured in this unlawful fashion, rhe poor coll«rively defended them, eventu· ally forcing rhe state to recognize the communirit'S in exchange for rhe1r integration into the formal structures. Thus the disenfranchised

I&Cl-S~RII~

POLITICS

laid further cla1ms, consolidated their position, and secured wider ~on cessions. In the~ attempts, creating local asS<X:iations was pankularly significant, sm~e in their genuine forms, the associations represented a si~mficant ~ounterpomt to formal power. Associational Life In poor communnics, association and networking served in the short run a!> the nece!ltsary mechanism for mobilization and defense. Air hough the encroachments of the pc.x,r were, by and large, quiet and individual, there were issues concerning everyone that were beyond the capacity of individual households. Dealing with floods, police raids, paving roads, diggmg ditches, collectmg garb;~ge, setting local prices, and other undertakings needed the cooperation of all settlement members. In the long term autonomous life under a modern state also re~o~uired some kmd of lnul affiliation and identity, which often assumed an organi7.ational expression. Performing common cultural and religious rituals, resolving conflict!io, and providing mutual assistancc- were among the more salient examples. The assocaational life wa!'t one of primordial and civil extra-kinship. Two associations particularly stood out in the pour neighborhoods-the Neighborhood Councils (NCs), and the Local Consumer Cooperatives (l.CCs). The Neighborhood Counctls

The Neighborhood Coum:ils (NC!t)(Shura-ye Mahallat). or Neighborhood Committees (Kom1te-ye Mahallat) as some preferred to call them, were loosely structured local bodies that were formed, appointed, rleL"ted, or even self-designated in order ro protect, regulate, and upgrade local communities. Their function ranged from negotiating with the authonries for urban upgrading to resolving conflicts in the localities. The terms "committee" or '"coune~l" referred interdungeably both to the appomtedldected executive body and to the totality of the organization including the executive body, the constituency. and finally its activities. Along wath the Factory Commirtees (Shura-ye K~Jrgaranl, Peasant (Shura-ye Dehqanan), University (Shura-ye Daneshgah), and City Councils (Shur.J-ye Shahr) las in Kurdistan, for instance), and Pasdaran Committees (Kum1te-ye Pasdaran) m the early days following the insurre\."tion, the NCs consmuted the massive grassroors mobi-

89

90

B£CI-Sf~Jif

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lization of the rrvolution. The~ organizations, along with other selfhelp activities, gavt an organized rxprrssion to popular mobilization; they exemplified the s~1al and c1vic (as oppo~ to purely political) aspect of the revolution. A whole range of NCs !iiiprang up in various lower-class neighborhoods. Some continued the activities of the Local Commuters that had emerged during the last phase of the revolution. Others were established after rhr insurrection. Apart from the general mood of mobilization dunng the postrevolutionary period, certain material reasons also stimulated their emergence. Confronting common cnses such as flooding or earthquakes in the localities often necessitated collective mollilizarion. The gowd communities of South Tehran were the \'ictims of frequent flooding due to their location some so meters llelow ground level (some places had 1 so stain). Any ramfall, flood, or sewage system failure would threaten almost rvrry household. Only the cooperation and coordination of all of housrholds was capablr of countering such disasrrrs. Protecting allryways from flood, securing personal llrlongings, and divertmg flood water from the community demande-d highly collective efforts. Although these crises and rhrir consequent social impact were periodic, they nrverthelrss implanted the \eeds of a nascent yet durable and stru'"-rurrd form of cooperation. Prior to thr rrvolurion, a numbrr of neighborhoods m the gowds formrd mformall~al associations. They rai~ funds and managed to construct stairways connecting the underground srnlemrnrs to the surfa..:r. Thry also succeeded in bringing communal water raps to their alleyways, and installrd drctricity polrs. Soon rlrctric light illuminated the narrow pa!isageways and before long found its way into homes as well. The graveyards of the poor surrounding thr area were transformed into picmc places With greenery and trres: 1 LcJCal mobilization a!iide, thr competition of various political groui)\ ovrr mob11i1Jng thr poor also contributed to the formation of the Nu. The advocacy of the radical left and Mujahrdin organi1.ation fur tht> idea of .. councilism" certainly played a significant role. Their sympathizers we~ involved directly in l~al mobilization, and their emphasis on thr adra of shura forced eventually the authorities to give legal unCtion to the 1dea. One important figure who pursued shuraism quite vehemt>nrly was a popular liberal clergyman, Ayatollah Talrghani, whose death in 1979

brought the concept into public discourse. Radio, lV, and the prmt media, not to mention public speeches, began to focus extensively on the merits of shuraism, and on how this notion originated with h;lam. Fur the must pan shuraism wa~~; conccwed of as some degree of popular partiCipation, but Its extent and mechanism rcmamed vague. Some even went so far as to propose restru'--rurmg the country's political system along the pnnciple of shuraism. The left 1010ed many others to support Taleghani who had called in April 1979 for the constitution of local aSMX"iations as well as city and regional councils.~' Sympathetic figures in the municipality followed suit and began implementing the idea from above. In the spring of 1980 the government of Isfahan, the second largest city in Iran, ruok up the initiative. Within a few month!i !iome 70 per· cent of the city was administered by the Neighborhood Committees. NCs elected the mayor and administered their locales. But the policy .:cased to function in thr summer of that year, when thr budget allocatrd by the Governorate was halted due to financial difficulties.,.. The city of Tehran followed Isfahan. Conditions of the war with Iraq had made the need for local admmistration and self-organization more urgrnr. People needed to get mobilizrd, remain vigilant, organize in self-defense committees, and participate in the local distribution of basic resources such as tood and medicine. Thr capital was div1ded into twenty distn'"'tS and 34 1 neighborhoods of 1 o,ooo people. Each constituency was to "appoint" five reprcsrntauvrs from among .. trust· worthy," "pious" (ba-taqwa) and "enthusiastic" people, who then needed to be approved by the imam of the local mosque. This restm:tive selection of shura members shows that the Islamic state perceived local organizations as an extension of itself. The early rnthusiasm and pretense of officials with regard to thr idra of councilism and decentralization was followed, before too long. by the monopoly of power and paternahstlc and selechve mnbihz.at1on of progovrrnment individuals. Councils were mcorporated into the Islamic Constitution, hut they w~r~ nor properl)· convened. It was a concesliaon to Taleghana and thr lrft, but on~e h~ died and rhe left was crushed, the prnmtsc was forgotten:' Despite the state's attempt to control local inauauves, peopl~ m certain neaghborhoods managed, With the cooperation of the volunteers, to establish genuine loul councils. The gowds of South Tehran, for instan~e. developed a highly act1ve shura, wh1ch came to be known as rhe Shura-y«' Aali-ye Eskan-

92

BACI•&!IBIT

PO~l!lCS

r Gou,dnrshinan (Coun1.,l forth~ Rcsctd~m~nt of th~ Gowd in shun, th~ Counc1l of Rnenl~m~nt (CR).

P~opl~)

or

The Cmmcrl uf Re$eltlement

In

rh~ ~arfy

days of the spring of ay8o a group of young volunteers cam~ to rh~ gowd ~rtlemmrs to offer their hdp in improving rh~ conditions of lik in th~~ neighborhoods. A frw week~ later, on April 4, 1980, an drction was hdd, with the support of rhr radical mayor of Tehran, Muhammad Tavassoli, to fonn the Council of the gowdnishinan. Fifteen our of sixtttn gowd srrtlemrnts rook part in the elections, each srnding three d~lrgates to fonn the central council of the gowdnishman. A combination of two reprnentatives from the central council, two from the munkipaliry, and nne from the local Pasdaran Committee established the Shura-ye Aali-e Gowd, the supreme Council of the Gowds.""' Most of the d«rtd reprnentatives were local leaders who wrrr factory workers in nrarhy industries such as SAKA on Tehran Karadj Road. Although the CR aimed, in the short term, to improve the conditions of life in the gowds, its prime concern revolved around the r~srttlement of th~ 46,000 rnidents into more drcmt housing.'' With th~ hdp of th~ council and the cooperation of the central municipality, the srttlers, in particular the youth, establish~d a dime, a hussei,ieh (an ad hoc mosque), srvrral librari~s. and a soccer field. Fishaaris (strttt fountains) wrre erected; ~wage ditches (iouys) were dug, and the roads of fourteen sertfemmts wrrr fully pav~d.•• The council also set up mobile medical trams and clinics in th~ struts of South Tehran, providing general medical services and vaccination for infants."' Some cultural activities and sports facilities for youths were housed in the already occupied buildings of thr p~vious regime,"'' while the morally deviant rlem~nrs in the community, e.g., gamblers and drug dealers, we~ idmtified and isolated. Thr outbreak of war with Iraq in Sept~mhrr 1980, and the msuing threat of air raids broke nrw ground for th~ acrivitie!l of th~ CR and thr local poor. The CR and thr Mujahedin Organization in th~ gowds called for the creation of Local Resistancr Groups (LRG) to respond to the wartimr emrrgrncy situation. They were ro link their activities with the local people through insrrucrions on wall posters, pamphleteering, and assrmbli~ in thr local mosques. Although not entirdy successful, somr LRGs werr formed in South Tehran with the panici-

B~CI-&TRII!

POLITICS

pation of the youth. They identified local ~suurcn, especaally medical services and basic needs, for emergency purposes, formed vigtlante teams, enR3grd in military training, put up wall posters w&th information and war news, and provided mstructions regarding security and self-defense:• A young volunteer dt"SCn~d some of the functions of the LR(;s m Yakhchiabad squanrr settlement: Initially, we: began ralkmK to our l,~~,;al fuc:l-d1stnhunon bram:hes ahuut the prohlem of &he fuel shnrtaKe, and suggested 1mplc:mentmg a rationmg system. They acL:epred rhe !>uggc:snun. We rhc:n talked to the peoplc: ahout thr plan and they re&:c:lved it warmly and offered their conprratmn. To implement rhe plan, we dinded our nc:ighhnrhood, which i\ quire largt", mro smallrr zones. Then, wr took a crnsuo; of thr households within each wne. With the cooperation nf Basil IMohilization GroupiJ brothers, we plannrd tu 1ssue rannnmg cards to each household, so that thry ~·ould get their sharn on the aS!ilgned days. Th1s a1mrd to prevent long queues •nd hoarding. We now plan to aik the people ru provide Ui With some help so tlut we can hnng c:ach houKhold's sh.uc: of fuel tu their dtxtr stc.-~ .... About other ba~•c food stuff, we.- have alrc.-ady preparc.-d thing!> hke gram, eggs, ncc, '!Iugar, tea, and washmg powder, wh~eh we \Upply ru the people wuhuut makmg any profit. However, we'rr planning to ration theM' items as wrll 1n the future.' 1

Despite these activities, the CR considerrd its most important func· tion to ~ relocating the gowd residents. Some significant steps were taken. Thr CR was able to compensate the owners of over 6ve hundred run-down homes so that they could sdtlr in other areas; it also managed to rehouse another six hundred households in already occupied apartments .. , Some familirs needing immediate assistance were taken to rmergen'"-y headquarters until ~rmanent housing was available. '• The CR also combined irs policy of negotiations with the authorities with a morr militant tactic of local mobilization. When necessary, the CR staged srrret demonstrations so that local people could makr their ~mands ro thr aurhoririrs morr forcrfully. '' The activities of thr CR came to an end after a year and a half, in the midst nf growmg political rivalry and intolerance. At the beginning it samed that all the different local groupings-thr Komit~hs, the Mujahedin, thr leftist!! and the municipality-cooperated with one another on local issues. However, political and Ideological differencrs soon surfaced, and alliancrs gavr way to sectarianism both at the

93

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national and local levels. The Pasdaran Komit~hs, which oraginally emerged as a voluntary civk organization ~onsisting of youths with different political orientations, soon bec.:ame a vestige of the ruling Islamic Republican Pany. In early summer 1979, the Komitehs were "deansed" of those who refused to follow the IRP lmr. In Tehran alone, some 40,000 to so,ooo members of about r,soo Korl'lltebs were sent home. '• Many others had already left after becommg disenchanted with the monopolistic policies of their leaders. The Komitehs then hegan a sustamed campaign agamst the growing power of leftist5 and the Mujahedin. Thus the CR bec:ame the target of mounting pressure on the pan of the local Pasdaran Komlteh, which by now had become a parallel power in the community. Organized thugs supported by the local Revolutionary Guards attacked the headquarters of the CR; the Komiteh organized mass meetings to discredit the CR; and rumors spread accusing its members of bribery. Finally, materialsuppon to the council was suspended from both the municipality and, of course, the Kom1tehs. Not being able to cope with such a mounting pressure, all members of the CR jointly resigned on May 14, 1980 as a gesture of protest. A few months later the publication of Faryad-i Gowdnishin, a weekly journal of the Mujahedin, devoted to the gowd commumty, was suspended by the government. With this, the activities of one autonomous local organization came to an end. Bryond political pressure, internal problems also weakened the CR. Political organizations lent their suppon to localities not so much to promote people's welfare as to cultivate political suppon. For the Mujahedin, for example, thr "local Resistance ulls not only play an effective role, in the shon run, in alleviating war damages, but in the long run serve people's mobilization against impenalism ... ~On the other hand, the elitist nature of such activism made residents rely excessively on outside organizations, whose infighting ultimately undrrmined local mob1hzation. finally, the council was far from genuinely democratic institution; activists had only begun to experience panic1patory Mmocracy. To make a comparison, in postrevolutionary Ponugal, for mstance, the neighborhood commission was an elected body. Although activists spearheaded local organizations, ordinary people were extensively involved m decision-making. Local power lay m weekly general assemblies, with the votes cast by raising hands.'' In Iran formal polls were UJK:ommon and lines of power and respunsibil-

IAOI-S!WII! POLl!lCS

ities unclear. A!i regular, general meetings were rare, rumors more than ~orrect information reflected local politin, in tum, fueling sectarian ~onflict and rivalry. Ordinary people only hqcan to experaence modem pamcipatory democracy in these turbulmt times when the starr instituted its own brand. Working Within the System Like the Coun~il of Resettlement, many of the independent shuras were dismantled and their members were purged. With the stare-sponsored "new dectanns .. more proregame members were put in ~harge, and m many ways the neighborhood councils turned mto an exten!iu>n of the ruhng IRP. The poor had to adjust to the new phase of increasang politacal restriction and the absence of opposuion groups. They needed to work within and against the official apparatuses. Pauenr and perseverang, the poor struggled to gam from these paternalistic mstnurions as mu~h as they wuld by exploiting the pru-mustaz"afin discourse of the government to exert pressure on local authoritin. Ali autonomous and gra!isroots institutiom were gradually dasman· tied due tn political pressure and their own short~omings, the alternative government-!iponsored organizations, Mosque Asscx:iations (shura-ye masa;id) and Islamic Neighborhood Councils (INCs), rapidly filled the vacuum. They began to serve with more zeal and commitment, partially in order to demonstrate the efficacy of the alternative arrangements. The local Pasdaran Komites first tonk the initiative, involving proregime lcx:al individuals who thrn crntrrrd their activities in the local mosques.. Thrsr ll~al councils became increasingly active after the outbreak of the war with Iraq, when local popular mobilization beume a necessity. Thus the Mosque Associations were: engaged in mobilizing the local population for the war effort, dis· tributing scarce goods such as domestic apphances, and settling disputes. They were also charged with supervising and monnoring the rationing system involving ltK:al shops. The members of thne asSt~ia tions, in the meanrime, also a~ted as neighborhood watchdogs fur the ruling IRP. Hundreds of such associations functioned throughout the urban arras during the e1ghr-year war. Their main strength derived from their official status, which enabled them ro utilize guvt'rnmrnt rnuurcrs and political support. They coopt>ratt'd wirh the Governorate of Tehran (farmandari) to control the flow of rural mi~rants to tht' city, by con-

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trolhng the issuan&:e of ration cards within the localitaes. '• In 198 3, Mahdavi-Kani callrd upon the Mosque Associations to .. furnish the ground for the stability of the Islamic Republic. " 111' The weaknesses of the INCs, however, remained more acute. Corrup11on, inefficanu:y in the distribution of the basic needs, bureaucratic incompetence, and overlapping functions with other agencies (such as Kom1trh-ye lmdad-1 IIPUim), tarnished their ima~ Mfore their constituencies. 11 Yet, given rhe &:onditions of war, scarcity, and govern· menr intolerance of autonomous association, the situation at the local level would probably have h«n worse without the Mosque Associa· rions. With the war at a stalemate, and with the gradual relaxation of prnsure on the distribution system, thl' conjunctural role of the associatanns ~n to suhsade. By thl' rime the war was moving toward a resolution, rhr Mosque A!i.~ociarions were es..~nraally withering away. Controllrd by luult"litrs, rhear function in the postwar period was relegated largely ru ad hoc ceremonial al."tivitit"s. 11 Thr l.ocal Consumer Cooperatives

On May 1.4. 1980, a group of angry housewives from a lnwer-dass neighborhood, Gorgan Street, forcefully closed down the fruit market of the Maidan-i Sumaiych and the nearby storrs. Thr womrn's rrpeatrd complaints to both h-=alshopkeepers and the authorities over the hagh prices of fond had Mn ignored. When one woman protested rna fruit-sellrr about has high prices, other!"~ rallied behind hrr, expressmg their frustratJUn and angrr. A \treet demonstration of local reople soon fnllnwed, as housewives proceeded to dose down the market plact", one 'ihnp ;1hrr the other, by yanking down the mrtal gates (lrerltt'rt'h) of ea"-h store. The police reponed that the angry women wanted tn set the markrt on fire hut wc.-rc.- pe-rsuaded ro disperse nnly by an ammediate repricing of the K'KKis. The shops remained closed for the entire day."' l.ike hou!t.ing, fu,Kf constituted a special commodity, nne that thepoor viewed in moral terms. Whrn thr satisfaction of these basic nerds was left ru the whims of thr market alone, thr poor rrsisted and anempted tn suhvrn the market both by direct al.-rinn, as evidenced hy thr angry houK"wives, and hy institutional means, e.g., the &:nnsumer coorerativrs. Through 1.'-=al Consumer Conprratives (I.C:Cs), poor urbanites attempted tu secure easy acce-ss to inexpensive consumer goods by

removing gr~dy middle men. Earlier anemprs to set up consumer cooperatives had occurred during the few weeks before the insurrKtion (~« p. s.z.). After an initial decline immediately after the revolution, l.CCs resurfaced throughout lower-class and poor districts after the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war. By December 1979 the constitution recognized cooperatives as one of the three main economic uctors. In 1981 some 6o LCCs were set up in tM lower-class neighborhoods of Tehran. By 198s, 6oo,ooo Tehranies cooperated in SJO LCCs with a total capital of Rls 4,000 million. These cooperatives, along with those in the provincial cities, were placed under the supervision of the Central Organization of the Cooperatives, a govern~Mnt agency. 14 In general, the people themselves ran the cooperatives. In the more indepmdent experiences, a number of individuals, the .. constituent group, .. set up ad hoc cooperatives, inviting local people to purchase shares. The members subsequently elected executive committees (EC) and dissolved the constituent groups. The 1-:Cs then assumed the responsibility of managing the LCC in terms of purchasing, distribution, and book-k~ping. A group of observers (ba~resaN) were rrsponsiblr for monitoring the operation. 11 Middlemen were eliminated and the profit motive, when it existed, was only to cover the cost of hiring full-rime administrators .., Most of the LCCs, however, were dominated by local dires, the religious, community, and economically well-to-do leaders.·· For these leaders the LCCs served more as their personal propenies, at hest functioning as typical charities and at worst as a sour"-e of local prestige and access to the high officials. Instead of cooperatioN, a spirit of patnm~lism prevailed. During the revolution ideas of solidarity and selflessness constituted the spirit of voluntarism. After the revolution prindples of efficiency and prufn- motive eventually replacrd ideals of cooperation. As a result, sume cooperatives, ended their activitin. 11 Yet the lCCs did contribute to the poor's access to bask commodities in the difficult rimes of the scardty of consumrr goods, war-time economic conditions, and high-priced black market goods. In addition to subsidizing basic goods and implrmenting a rationing system, the government contributed to the lCCs by allocating 10 percrnt of the total domestic production and imponed goods direc:rly to the l.CCs to be distributed among members, with fixed prices and without profits. Moreover, the I.CCs furnished a veh1de through which common peo-

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pie were a"1ivated S«Xially and were directed onto a path of institution· buildin1. Nevertheless, when institutional channels such a!> LCCs were nonexistent or proved to be ineffective, the common people did nor heSitate to rake martrrs directly into the streets. Early plan• to remove sub1idic:s on bus fares provoked r1ots m Tehran and Muhad. Indeed, the postwar economic liberalization under President Rafsanjam Wit· nesscd w1dc:spread unrest on the pan of the urban poor in the early 1990s (!itt bc:lowl. The latest nfthesr riots in Apriii99S in lslamshar, a South Tehran squatter settlement, left at leur one dead, dozens mjured, and hundreds arrested. This three-day street protest was sparked by wme two hundred youths who dc:mandni bc:ner supplies of fresh water, as well as a decrease in the bus fare. h rapidly grew into a demonstration of _50,000 poor people: protesting against price rises for public transpon and fuel. The police used tear gas from helicopter units to disperse the crowd who attacked government buildings, banks, dcpanrncnt srores, gas stations, and busrs.~· As elsewhere, poor housewives were maJor actors m the: nreer politics that involved food priers and shonages. In contrast to occasional food riots and collective actions (e.g., the houscwJve!o of Maidan·i Somaiyeh and the lslamshahr riots), public nagging was employed as an everyday form of protest by ordinary pro· pie. It mvolvcd people cullectivdy voicing their complaints without the fear uf persecution an public places-in taxis, buses, bakery queues, grocery shops, and so on--in the form of loud conversations about state pohcJe!i mduding price!i, rent!i, war, shortages, and the like. l,ublic nagging represented an effr'-1ive me~.:hanism for expressing the public opimon nf ordinary men and women; 11 became an epidemic and Irrepressible !ltoun:e of dili.Stnt ... ' Squancn and the State In brief, squatters' struggles rook plact• in three main arenas: First, resistance ru existing hardship and aspiring tu a bc:rtt"r life. Thc:st wert" manifested m physical movement and migrannn and entailed a profound demographic change in the country. S«ond, struggln around the redistribution of public goods, induding land and urban colln:rive consumption. And third, attempts tn extend autonomy from the state, relying on local norms instead nf state lc:gi!tlarurc:!lt, traditional and a~cc:ssiblr mstitutions instead of modl'rn official arrangements. These

B~CI•S!!lB!

POLitiCS

snuggles, when cumulative, positioned the poor a!'l a counter-hegemonic fon;e against officialdom, il!> each practi~:e captured an arena of control from the state and en~:ruached on its power. These three areas accounted fur the mmt amponant sites uf contestation between the state and the marginal poor. Without intending to, the mustaz 'afin had become an enemy of the lslamM: state. How dad the Islamic state, as the government of the poor, respond to these snuggles? The earlier official r~ponses to squatters' al.'tions were characterized by competition, confusion, and contradi~:tion. Whereas prior to the lslamu: revolution the poor had remained vanually unnoticed (see chapter z.), after the revuluuun their mubalizataon became the subja:t of competition among over twenty official and unofficial groups and organilatlons working wnhin p«Kn neaghborhoods. The ruhng dergy, seekang a reliable SO\:ial bar.e, made the mustaz 'afin the champanns of struggle for Islam and the Islamic revolution. Wnhm tha!'l broad category, urban marginals, or kuuklmlshlnan (literally hut-dwellers, the destitutes), acquired a central pc,satiun. "This Islamic revolution as indebted to the efforts of thas class, the dass of shanty dwellers," declared Ayatollah Khomeim. ..Ther.e South Tehranies, these footbearers, as we call them, they are our masters lr,al•-nr'matl ... They were the ones who brought us to where we are.""' To the dismay of Pnme Mamster Mehdi Baz.argan, Khomcam declared only a few days after the revolution that .. everyone must have access ru land, this divine endowment," that .. no one must remain wathout a dwelling m this c.:nuntry," and that water and el«tricity should be supplied free of charge ru the pour:~ Bazargan, like l,re!ioident Bam Sadr and Muhammad Tavassoli, the mayor of T~hran, feared that such statemenr!> would unleash uncontrollable migration and urban disorder. They cillled instead for rural d~velopmenr and improvements in agnculturc, although they also favored the sdecti't·e upgrading of existing pour neighborhoods. In 1980 the Revnlutaonary Council di!tc:USf>C'd, without results, wa)'!io to repatraate tu the country· side some shanty dwellers, lake the inhabitanrs of the gowd in South T~hran.

In the meantime, as I ha't·e already d1scussed, the Office of Housing for the Dis.possessed led by Hassan Karruha and the: Housmg Foundation of Ayatollah Khosrowshahi, opted for radacal \:onfiscation and allo~ation of homes and land for the homeless. The major leftist groups supported these measures. The Pasdaran opposed the ~unfisc.:a-

99

tions, advocating the upgrading of poor communitin instead. Yet they prevented volunteer groups, an parricular Lcfri~t and Mujahedin orR3mzations, from undrrraking similar act1v1rks rherr." This rivalry in pracricr and opinions had significant implications for the housing S«tor and the status of squanrr'i. first, it offered new opportunities for the mobilization of the poor by encouraging them to make demands and funhrr legitimizing their direct acrion. On the other hand, a profound policy confusion with regard tu housing and land prevailed, rendering the systematic handling of homdrssness and povrrry impossible. Troubles rased slightly only when, in June 1980, Hassan Karrubi's Office was abolished and Ayatollah Khnsrnwshahi was K'nt off to he the ambassador in the Vatican.~ With the fall of the housing radicals, the government brought some legal and admini1trarivr order to the s«tor; its most impnnant single step was the promulgation of the Urban l.and l.aw whereby the Revolutionary Council nationalized and thu~ controlled mau•aat (unused) land and later baayer (previously usrd) lands in urban arras:' Nevrrrhrlrss, the government never formulated a consistent policy with regard to housing the poor. Even the new thinking, which advocated thr elimination of government responsibility by leaving rhr housing of the poor to themselves and to their '"savmgs,"' remained up in the air.'"' Indeed, throughout rhr 1 9Ros the prevailing policy combined five srrategin: selrcrive housing provisions, halting rural-urban migration, integratmg the informals, demolishing unlawful homes, and de facto tolerance .

.r;~l~clll'~ Provrs1uns The Housing Foundation continued to funct1nn with the aim of providing housing for the poor. In 1980, upon the invitation of the Foundation, more than 8oo,ooo people sent in applications for land or housing. The foundation claimed to grant about roo,ooo pints of land and .z.,JOO homes, most of rhrm in rural arras:' Yet following the IranIraq war, the bulk uf the foundation's activities were dira"ted to war reconsrrucunn, and its function was hmited to promoting self-help housing through mterest·frer loans and the provision of materials and technical assistance.~• In addition to thr Housing Foundation, the municipalities in the large cities dearcd a number of slums, relocating their residents ro more decent dwellings, or offered them aid and loans to build the1r own homes. The squaners of Khaniabad in South Tehran

were ro ~ relocated in about 1,ooo rwo-brdroom, 7 .z.-square-merer flats the government planned to construct,'" converting the srnlement to public parks and recreational facilities. Some of the communities, such as the notorious gowd settlements in South Tehran, have had symbolic significan~e for offkials as the embodiment of lstlz'af (poverty and misery), and thus were m~ompatible with the srlf-image of the lslami~ Republic as the government of the d1spossessed. Halting Migration, "111is Soci41

Catastroph~"

Yet the continuous flow of rural poor to the ~itirs m sear~h of a brner life diluted the effects of su~h pie~emeal measures. Whtle the regtme seemed to have succeeded in reducing the overall fertility rare, 11"' cityward mtgrarion remained a major problem. By 198 3 Iran had more peoplr in cutes ls.z..s percent) than in the countryside. Despitr the shortcomings, squatters were evidently happier in thr ~ity and were nor prepared to return to the country. 101 Whereas the poor viewed migration as a means to a better life, for the authorities it represented a .. social catastrophe," '''1 .. thr most important problem hrsidr the war,"'"' and .. a major threat tn thr revolution and the Islamic Republic." .... This was because the population flow was altering the urban order by bringing ahout communities, social groups, and social practices upon which the central authority would have littlt practical control. By 198 _\ when the ciryward migration was acceleraung, offi~ials frantically sought a solution. In ftbruary of that year, the mayor of Tehran, Habibi, plradN with Ayatollah Khomeim to dedare a •stare of emergency" terming the migration one of the most crucial political concerns of the day. The state mNia subsrqucnrly bqan a umpaign against the population drih; friday prayer traders were mobilized to discuss the vices of moving to cities and numerous seminars were organized ro address this .. major social problem." The dominant discoursr denounced migration as a social pathology that was infecting the whole of urban life. lr was responsible for .. land !ipe'-"Uiarion," .. unemployment," "parasitic oc~upations," .. drug dealing," .. diseasr," and urban unrnr, and was also .. destroylmgl social and lslami~ values."'"~ In their rum, migrants werr portrayed as the victims of this disorder. Hamshahri, the Tehran municipality daily, unknowingly invokN the spirit of Simmel, Park, and Wirth when it described rural migrants as '"those who wander aimlessly around in

102

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PO~l!lCS

the qu1cksand of the city ... these Vll-"fims of ignorance, naivete, and propaganda-they live a particular sort of life; they represent the men on the margin. " 11"' The anxiety over squatter expansion al110 perplexed the community of experts: the rural poor were shaking their epistemological order. These experts viewed migration as .. a phenomenon which is transforming the destiny of the cities, preKnting itself as an urban and political challenge.,.,,. The roots of the di10rder were to~ found pnmarily in the '"wrong policies nf the past regimr," notably in thr Land Reform prugram.•u• At nmrs the problem was even attributed to .. a calculated plot by our enemies who lure the vallagers into the cit1es." ''"' The m1grant poor were not aloof from this di~oursr. Their reaction was bitter; as sumr squatters put it: h is ndi~ulous that they lthe gm·ernmentJ are trraung us, the mus· ta:'a(in, like this, slandering us. They wnrr lm nrwspaprral that wr krC'p thr watrr taps runmng, that we wao;te water. Rut thrn we don't rvrn havr runmng water! Or that wr krrp nur ~tn oprn unnl vrry latr at mght, nr that our hoys rdutr gmng to mihtary serv1cr; whrre;u my own son 1s in the srrv1ce! A!i a maner of fact, rh1~ commumty is hrmg protected hy our own ba"l hoy1; the mumc1pahry hn done nothmg for thr sccumy of thts place.... '' th1s d1vmr and lslamu.: government nut supposrd to prote\.·t us, the lwulrhnuhm, the htuh•y,nllhm, the wrak?''''

Beyond the adeolngical campaign, the state also devised some con· measures to stop the population draft. Thr Mosque' Associations were anstructed to deny food ration card-. to migrant families. ThC' government also attempted to rrstril."t the purchase of homes or land by the migrants in citiC's by controlling all reiC'vant transactions.'" These legislative measures had little impact, howC'vrr, pr«isely hrcaus.r of the informal and autonomous way in which the P'K>r trnd to operate and subs1st ... These migrants s1mply need not and do not apply for any permits; as a matt~r of faL"t, they do not deal with us at all," thC' housing mimstC'r acknowledged. 'u In thC' long run the governm~nt aimed to improve agriculture and rural communities as necessary measures to deter ciryward migration. Thr Construction Crusade achieved considerable success in rural electrification and the construction of roads, which in practicr facilitated traveling to cities. Nevertheleu, urban bias remainrd the practical policy of thr Islamic govC'mment despite iu ruralist discoursr.' 11 c~Tte

IACI-S!WII!

PO~I!ICS

formal1vng the /nformals Given theSf' conditions, ft"w options remained nailable ru the government. One was to formalize or int~rate the illegal communities into the stare structure by rr\:ngnizing their status and incorporating them in urban colle'-"tive consumption. Th1s strategy would not only ensure popular support and state control nf the poor, it would also make residents pay for the services that they would otherwise tap informally. For the poor, informality served both as a means of coping and of livelihood, and as an end in it!>t'lf. In the Sl'ttlements the poor evaded the institutions uf the state and governed their own lives, tacirl)' rejeaing bureaucraq, taxation, the di!i(:ipline of time, and the regulation of spac.:e. Fur instance, over So percent of lslamshar inhabitants did nor set' any rolr for the municipality in regulating their cummunity. 114 And in the surrounding settlements, over half of rhr people avoidrd the stare hureaucracy.••• Instead, extending kinship through intercommunal marriages served ro expand cc,operarion and mutual responsibility. '"One nf the advantages of living here" said a resident of Aliabad, Kha7..aneh, .. is that I am next to my village fellows lh11mshahril. And since my work requires me: tn travel a lot, I always feel relieved that my family is secure among them ...... Others felt happy that "e,;eryone is related in here, and they help e;.u;h other our ...... The poor contested tht" dominant spatial policies and perceptions. They built their dwellings according to their own needs, taste, and resources (e.g., raising domestic animals), avoiding police control concerning how to appear or asSC'mble in public, and when to pay bills and return loans. For instance, when relocated to the apartments of the Shahrak-i Shoush, squatters of the gowd settlements built courtyards around their apartments by making the alleyways private domain and erecting a wall or fence around the apartments. A number of them returned to their old squattt"r dwellings. Some nf the settlers of Pol-i Mudinyat and Halabshahr of Tehran Pars, who had been given humes in new apartments, eventually moved and settled in uther squatter SC'trlements. 11 " The relocation pmje'-"t of Kouy-e Nnhom-i Ahan in South Tehran before the revolution had a !iimilar problem. Many squatters who had been relocated into the government housing either sold or rented out those homes and moved hack into shacks. In Bandar Abbas, the z.,soo-unit governmt"nt housing turned aftt"r a while into a spontaneous settlement primarily hecause such government housing patterns did not meet the needs of the pnor. 11 "

10,

104

BACI-i!WIIf POLlflCi Y~t integrating these- communill~!io was uu~:ial for the lslamil: stat~. The populist rrgim~ ~:ould hardly tol~rat~ div~r~>ity, let alone autonomy. It walt adamant abuut molding an obedient lslam1c umma-a con~:~pt totally in ~:onrrast with that uf the squatter settlements, which som~ officials viewed as butions uf lawlctrr funhcr migration; it wuuld also require ma~>5ive infra5tructural facilities, as well as a reorganization of the cities. funhermore, as the expen~nce uf lslamshahr in Tehran shuws, any pract1cr of mtegratlon wnh whu:h the sub1e..:ts could nut afford lO cope, suws the Sttds of new marginahty. In the earl)· 19905 the ~triers uf lslamshahr campaigned fur th~ official rC\:ogmtiun of theu community. Once that was achieved, however, new marginal communities sprang up around the settlement in Akharahad and Soltanabad through the illegal construction of agricultural and au.,qaf lands. 11n It wali panl)· these- constraints that would push the authoritin to resort to fon:ed eviction and demolition of unlawful dwellingi.

Demulishmg Communities Squatters suffered intermittent attacks hy the sn:urity forces throughout the 19805 and the early 19905. The intensity and frequenq of a56aults sh1fted depending on national political conditions, the policies of parti..:ular mayors, and the reaction of the squatters. The earlier ( 1979-1984) demolitions !l«med haphazard and unsystemauc, with the Pasdaran mainly in ..:harge of urban order. The pressure un the squaners increased after the summer of 1981, followmg a widespread government ..:rackdown on the oppo!ioition. from 1984 on, demolition work bec=ame more systematic. In July 1984 the Tehran municipalit)' builr a JOO·man task for~:e composed of the army and municipality agrnr., who patrolled the streets to cat..:h violations before they a4.'1Ually occurred. The task force wu made up uf seventy-six unit!> who covered mainly the peripheral areas of South and Northwest Tehran around the d01:k m thr~ separate shifn. 111 By September 198S the task for..:e had mcreased to 1,000 men.•u Numerous communities were attacked throughout the 1980s, often by paramilitary gendarmes CKoned by trucks and bulldours. The earliest reported attempts in Tehran induded tho~ in Dashtak, Shahrak-

IACI-STJIIT POLitiCS

i Mamazan, Shahrak-i Qiam, Shahrak-i Karoun, Shahrak-i K1anshahr., Qal'eh Hasankhan, Shadshahr, Nizamabad, a community m Varamin road, all m the south, and Khak-1 Sefid in the east of the city. Squaners m provinc1al c1t1es such a!lo Mashad, Arak, Tabriz, Isfahan, Bakhtaran, Kradt, Khoramabad, Ardabil, and others did not remain immune from eviction auernpts. While sd«ted homn were destroyed, settlements were under constant surveillance by the vigilant Pasdaran and spccial task forces, who drove around m military tttps to make sure that no new shacks were put up and that none of the nisting ones were consolidated. The totilll number of homes and business places destroyed is unknown. But a report qu01ing the municipality of Tehran suggested that dunng summer 1 CJ9l. alone, some 1,000 unlawful homes and business places were tom down. Ill In an earlier well-known mcident in Khak-i Sefid, in Tehran Pars, east of the capital City, where illegal housing grew rapidly after the revolution, some 1,000 Pa~odars and army soldiers encircled the settlement from the nonh on january 1 1, 1980, intending to level the community once and for all. At 4 A.M. they halted traffic m the area; the operation began at 7 A.M. By the end of the day, thiny homes had bttn destroyed and more than forty people detillined. "The day after when I went there, the §Canered debns pointed to what had happened," rec:alled illn eyewitne!ios and activist ... It was dear that people had not slept through the night. They had anticipated the assault. Women with sleepy eyes were busy taking their belongings out of rubble, while swearing at the regime, especially the municipality and the Pasdaran. " 1l 4 '"It was also obvious that the sa:urity forces had been unable to destroy them all; people had resisted ... w Resistance against the destruction of squatter areas was confirmed repeatedly by the authorities.u• The Pasdaran's routine warnings and deadlines were missed, renewed, and invariably ignored. Corruption among government agcmts made thmgs even harder. "A few years ago I• yyoJ, the municipality sent its agents to evict us from here. They came, got some money, and left." 1F The interminent offensives often entailed bloody confrontations and street unrest. On many occasions the assaults were offset by women and children refu!"ting to leave their dwellings, and by others laying themselves down in front of the bulldozers. In the Khak-i Sefid in~idrnr, once the security forces withdrew, the inhabitants staged a demonstration, chanting, .. We built homes

105

106

IACI•S!WII! POLI!IC&

with our blood. and they destroy them so easily." They marched on to convey their anger at the local municipality office. The day after. when the mumc1paliry trucks returned to collect the debns. the residents attacked them, anflicting heavy damages. A new march was organized,bringing some four hundred prople ro the municipality office once again. The demonstrators stagrd a s1t-an and demandrd that they be compensatrd for the damages to their homes. Three mrrnbers of the Neighborhood Coundl began negoraaring with the authorities, agreeing on a plan to identify the opportunist developers from the .. real homeless" who deserved to keep their homes.'!' Noisy resistance of this sort made the government try d1fferent rae· tics, indudintt buying off certain resident'i and divide-and-rule tactics-as is evident in the case of Shahrak-i Kianshahr. The government's anempt to evkt over !>eVen hundred households in this shahrak failed, despite the destruction of some one hundrrd homes in March 1990.u• When its compensanon offer was collectively rejected by the squatters. the municipahry dividrd the latter by persuadang a group of them (who worked for the municipality) to accept the offer. It then began to pur pressure on the rest to comply. while rhreatemng to cut off water and electricity and destroy shacks. By December 1991 it succeedrd in evictang about 8o prrcent of the squatters in exchange for a payment of Rls 1,soo,ooo-Ris 1,soo,ooo to each household.''" The squaners of Pol-i Mudiriyat, in Tehran, however, rejected a similar deal an 1987, arguing that the comprnsat1on offered was nor sufficient to purchase new homes. But ro offset police provocation, they consciously prevenred newcomers from joimntt the senlemenr.'" The prevalent spirit immediately after the revolution contributed to the militancy of the squatters m defending their gains. The urban riots some ten years later demonstrate the continuing collective pass1on with which the squaner poor defended the1r communities. Dunng 1991 and 1991. five ma1or inc1dents of unrest took place an Tehran. Shiraz. Mashad. Arak, and Khoramabad. m addition to frequent minor dashes in many urban centers. In August 1991 the squatters of Bagherabad, a district in South Tehran, rioted against the munic1pahry agents who had begun demohshing their illegal shacks. The protesters threw stones at polrce and set the government cars on fire. 11 z The Shiraz rants came less than one year later in March 1991, when some three hundred disabled war veterans staged street protests against the mismanagement of funds at the state-run Foundation of the

B£Cl•STRKK! POLITICS Disposses~d.

They were immediately joined by !KJUatters protesting their forced eviction from their illegally built humes. The protesters went on a rampage uf looting, burning city buses, banks, and police stations. During thts one-day not, two protesters and six police were killed, many injured, and three hundred arrested; four were subsequently ex«uted by the government.'" More widespread riots occurred in the industrial city of Arak, 140 kilometers southwest of Tehran, which lasted for two days and resulted in "hundreds" of arrests and detentions. The nots broke out in May 1991 when a dump truck bring chased by a municipality pickup hit and killed a young boy. '"Neighbors stopped the truck and set fire to the municipality pickup." The following day '"up to 3,000 people marched on the ciry center chanting 'down with the mayor.' setting fire to several bank branches and three municipality butldings. " 1 w The ciry remained under manial law for several days. The most dramatic of these events took place in Mashad, a holy city uf three million people dose to the Afghanistan border. Mashad's disturban'-~!> on May 30, 1991, began in a squatter area, Kouy-c lollab, where the municipality had refused to grant construction pcrmtt5 to the illegally built dwellings. When local repre~ntatives returned home from the municipality office where they had made their rt~quests, they encountered bands of demolition squads and ~curity forces with trucks and bulldozers who had come to destroy the unlic:cn!iN homes. Many mhabttants resisted by assauhing the officers, others by refusing to leave their dwellings. A temporary lull in the skirmishes ended when the local children returned from their schools. The crowd grrw larger, and in the C'nsuing dashes with the security forces, two young boys WC're shot and killed. The indignant rioters then '"went on an orgy of llx>ring and arson, burning thC' city hall, thC' main library. several police !ltatinns." "By the evening the ciry was in the hands of the rioters, with the police and Islamic guards standing back and letting the crowd get on with it. •• '' .. The anny could not quieten the city, so thC' govC'rnment sent in units of basii (voluntary militia)" in the hope that thC'y could calm thC' crowd. 1 -.. Among the crowd were eight masked gunmen who IC'd the looting and attacks on the gnvernmC'nt buildings.••· In thC' C'nd thC' riot ldt ovC'r onC' hundred buildings and stores destroyed and thirry-fivr cars burnt, with an estimated total damage of Rls 1 o btl· lion. 1 •• Over thrrr hundred people were arrrsted, 1 '¥ six police officers wrre killed, and 4 riotrrs were hanged. GovernmC'nt offictals blamed

107

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the .. religious hard-liners ousted from the parliament," .. foreigners," .. opportunists." and the Mujahedin for the unrrst. 1411 While 1t is hkrly that some professional activists took part in the incidrnt, It srrms rvi· drnt that squattrr discontent lay at the core of rhe unrest. Following each attack, things seemed to go back to normality before long. In the Khak-i Sefid srtrlrmrnt, '"500n after thr departure of thr demolition agmts, people began to rebuild the1r homes oncr again ... Women helped their husbands in rrbuilding their dwrllings ... And I pursued my work on a srlf-help plumbing project to bring running watrr to the community. " 141 Despite the intensity of rhesr riots, they were not extraordinary pohtical events. Rather, they were the logical corollary to the politics of the squatter poor m their everyday lives, which maintamrd no line srparatmg srrugglr from life; they represented rhr vocal facer of the silrnt movrment of the poor, in the backstreets of the urban prriph· erirs, in pursuit of a brtter lifr. Given the resistance of the poor, it !iC'ems that the limited available opt1ons made a de facto tolerance of the mformal communJtJes an undedarrd state policy, leaving the task of drterrence to '"nature"- a recent mrthod rmployed by thr municipaliry of Trhran is the foresta· tion of vacant land around the city as a way to halt the creeping advance of the squatters. This measure ~presents the quirt rrsponR of the state to the quiet encroachmrnt of the homrlns. Indeed this policy, along with forceful rviction and rconomic exdusion, has to a large extrnt succ«drd. During the late 198os and rarly 1990s Tehran expe· rimcrd ourmigrat1on. However. the people driven from onr spot are likely to end up srtthng in diffrrent, usually more distant places. Not surprisingly, informal communities, as we saw rarher. spread at an unprrcrdrntrd rate nor within the big cit1rs but just outside their admmistrative boundaries, by turning hundreds of the nearby villages into low-income urban senlrments. ••; The silent movemmt of the poor in the backstr«ts of theu ms«ure communitirs is likely to continue. But if and when the captured gains are rh~atenrd, the silent movemrnt of the backsrreets is likely to tum into open and audible str«t action.

Six ~orkleaa

Revolut1onar1eaa The Movement 01' the Unemployed

The victory of the 1979 revolution resulted in a sudden and "unprecedented high level" of urban unemployment in Iran. 1 Hundreds of companies, businesses, and fa"'tories suspended their work. The owners and managers of these ventures, foreign and Iranian alike, had left the country months ~fore the insurrections of February 1o-11, 1979. Those who remained in the country shut down their enterpnses in the midst of chaos, waiting to see what ecnnom1c policy the new revolutionary government would pursue. Labor strikes, which escalated after Octo~r 1978, had almost crippled industry, large-scale services, and the government offices. Hardest hit was the construction sector. which resulted in hundreds of projects being abandoned mid-way. Cranes and tools stood idle on the lots of half-finished building complexes, and worksites remained deserted. In the end thousands of laborers who had withdrawn their labor for the victory of the revolution found themselves without JObs on us morrow. To these was added a new army of unemployed: those workmg in ideologically unfit occupations. Western-type restaurants, cafeterias, cabarets, liquor stores, red-light district theaters, and brothels were all dosed down, not only because they were incompatible with the Islamic Revolution but also ba:ause they were considered symbol\ of the drca-

drncr of the ancarn regime. In Tehran alone, an estimated J,ooo employers of such establishments lost their jobs.z The lottery ticket company was shut down entirely, laying off 100,000 low-income strrrt ticket sellers. The entry of about 1 so,ooo high school graduates, d1plomehs, gradually added a new weight to the army of the jobless. Thus in the very first year of the revolution, some 1. s million Iranians, 11 percent of the workforce, were out of work.' About s s percent of the Jobless, according to an official survey of Tehran unemployed, were laid off owing to closures; to percent were casual laborers who left their jobs because of low income and hardship; the rest were migrants and schoolwaduates who sought work for the first time. • In 'ihon, between 1. s to 1 million people lost their work within the few months of revolutionary events. The preceding two chapters have focuKd on the politics of the everyday life of ordinary people in their sphrre of living spacr. In this chapter. I shift my attention to the domain of wnrk. Herr, I shnw how thr ordinary unemployed utilized the revolutionary situation by rrsoning to colle~'tive action to demand jobs and maintenance. They Kt thr ground for the binh of a movrment of the unemployed in postrevolutionary Iran. The jobless were not a hrterogrnrous group. While factory workers and high sehoul graduates played the Jradang rolr in the movement, the amculataon of differing interests and discontent at the extraordinary conditions, brought many pour unemployed, casual laborers, and rural migrants into an audible and collective strrrt politics. In developang countries an unemployed movement t~t struggles for jobs and prote~'tion is extremely rare, despate high rates of visible and invisible joblessness. Family, kinship, patron-client relationships, and especially the informal sector provade essential mrc~nisms of protection and survival; in addition, the lack of orgamzation prevents sustained protest movements from developang. 1 In this chapter, I argue that what distinguished the Iranian case was a conjunctural aniculation of resources and pohtacal opponunity that underlay the movement. The resources included the creataon, after the revolution, of a mauiv~ and suddm loss of work, along with a revolutionary ideology among the jobless. The simultaneous suddnt decline in the standard of living and dampang of expectations generated a moral outrage. The movement was perceived as the contanuation of a broader revolutionary struMie. Expectataons among the poor and rhr unemployed had

WORKLISS

RBYOLU!IO.~RlBS

~n rai~d

dramatically; in addition, the.- int~nsr comprtitinn of thr ruling dergy and thr left opposition to gain thr suppon of thr poor funhrr h~ightrnrd nprctatinns. This ideological dimrnsion ~rvrd as thr c:nginr to th~ massin body of th~ joblrss, who utilized both the rxisting rdativ~ political frredom and the skills of mobilization they had lrarnrd during the re,·ulutiun.

The Onset Some.- three.- months prior to the.- victory of thr r~volutum, ovrr 1 .J.OOO or "project" workrrs in the city uf Abadan, a large oil pon city in the.- south, were madr rrdundant wh~n rhrir compani~ cea~d operations. The.- workrn had lost thrir jobs bur they considrrrd thrir situation of joblrssn~s insignificant comparrd to the rrvolutionary strugglrs around thrm. Even those who had maintained the1r JObs were on strike.-. Yrt for thr~ workers the.- extraordinary days of unity and sacrifice wer~ coming to an end. Thr revolution was rntrring into a new stag~ whrre groups and prrsonalitirs began revealing thrir true colors. The factionalism and strugadc for power amonK the new leadrrs was growing as thC' dericallead~rsh•p sraned rxhibiting irs inroiC'rancr of dis~nting political voices. As the days pas~. the~ workrrs began thinking about thrir precanous prr~nt and uncrnain future. During the.- unstrady prrmirrship of Shahpour Bakhtiar, the last prime ministt"r appointed by thC' Shah, a small number of tht"~ workers gathrrrd frrqUC'nrly in local trahousn to discuss thrir phght and decide.- on a cour~ of a..-rion to rakr. Out of rh~s~ and subSC'quC'nt mretings emrrgrd thr Syndicatt" of the Unemployrd Projr..-r Workrrs of Abadan (SUPWAI. This markrd the onset of collrctive actions taken by rhr unemployrd. Within five months campaigns succrssfully sa:urrd jobs and unrmpluymrnt ben~ fits." Sevt"ral drmonstrations, all confrnntC'd by the Pasdaran, wrrr organiz~d to srcurr th~r objectives. Two months latC'r, on April •-~• 1979, as sodal strugglrs intensifird, somr four hundred laborrrs resont"d ro a sit-in in the syndicate.- hradquaners, thrratrning to go on a hungrr srrikt": An unemployed protrsr movemrnt was wdl undrrway in srvrral big ciri~ including Tehran, Isfahan, Tabriz, Ghazvin, Gachsaran, as well as in thr province of Kurdistan. In rhr capital city srveral laid-off and rxpelled worker groups (kargaran·i bikaar-shudeh) had initially been mobilized by the leftist organizations. Before.- long they came togt"thrr ~asonal

111

to form a loosely knit Organization of Unemployed and Seasonal Workers, which included laborers made redundant in manufacturing. construction, and orher industries.

Campaips in Tehran On Mar~h 1, 1979, a group of laid-off workers gathered in the Ministry of labor to publi~ize their plight. The labor minister, Dariush Foruhar, a liberal follower of Mosaddeq, spoke. Disappointed with his response, and due to their small num~r. the workers ended thear protest actaon by reading a resolution calling for job creation, a mttt· ing place for a syndicate organization, a forty-hour work w«k, and unemployment benefits. The group returned soon, better prepared and with over 1,000 members. Over the next rwo w«ks they visited the ministry more than five times. In the subsequent meetings rwo funher demands were made: that their organization be recognaz.ed, and that the naraonal radio and 1V broadcast their grievances." Facang mount· mg pressure in ats first few weeks in office, the Ministry of Labor decided to establish an .. unemployed loan fund ... The plan envisioned grannng loans of Rls 7,500 to Rls 9,000 (U.S.S11o-U.S.Sqo) per month for a maximum of six months. Workers between the age of twenty-five and sixty years who had paid social security for at least one year, would be eligible, • effectively excluding casual laborers and recent high school graduates. In the debate that followed, the unemployed turned down this concession, demanding that age and contribution to social security requirements be removed. They further insisted that the payments be based on fam· ily size and that the program be implemented and supervised by unemployed representatives. Most important, they called for the idea of "loans .. (vaam-i bdtaari) to be changed to "benefits" (baqq-1 bikaari). In the meeting. a laad-off employ« of Tehran bus services, Sh~rkat-i Vahid, echoed the concern of those who consadered the loan concept to be a sell-out for the working-class struggle as a whole: Wr arr rrprnrnrmg all nf rhr suffrrmg Iran tan workrrs. Our drmand is nor an mdividual drmand. llnfonunarrly. it was announcrd today that everybody gns onr thousand '"""'"s•~ and lcavn ... l11 it rrally fa1r to spoil th<- spirit of workers' srruRK!e with thrK few pcnnie•? ... How ~an they call themselves '"worken," thOR whoK character i1 not worth more than one-thousand tNma,.s? ... One hundred thousand were killed !for the revolution!, and still we cannor get wh.tt wr want? 11

A representative of the unemployed offered his support in rrjC\.-ring the plan. Addrrssing the laborers he said: You arr thr soun:r of our powC'r. Wr will act according to your drd· sions. I am glad that thr group, with a compiC'tr awarrnns, drdarrd its criticisms and harred on 8L"CC'pting the offrr. By this; decision, wr proved that wr arr nor just concC'mrd about our stomach ... h 11 your conKiousllC'SS that must rule. It is your faith, belief, and consciou!.ness that givr us. power. u

The issue of loans versus benefits became the fundamental source of cunfruntation Mtween the unemployed and the Provisional Government. Undoubtedly, the left played an instrumental role in articulating and radicalizing the workers' demands. As people who had supported and endured hardships during the revolution, this group of unemployed considered it their right to make demands on the new leadership. That their movement was influenced by the left held no hearing on their conviction that their demands were legitimate. The Provisional Government, howrver, considered their demands unacceptable. For the Prime Minister, Mehdi Bazargan, this was connected to Communist currents to undermine his government, especially after the left had characterized the guvernment as "liberal" and .. procapitalist." 11 Moreover, the gnvc:"rnment did nor want to hear the huge burden of permanently feeding the unemployed.•• The Labor Minister msisted that the term .. loan" could nut be changed ... I do not want," he stated to the workers' representatives on March u, 1979, '"to give the impression that this is a grant without a repayment. Workers' honor is above all this. I want this plan to be understood merely as a loan." •• Consequently, following a meeting on March 1 7, over J,ooo jobless laborers began a sit-in in the labor ministry compound. When nothing came out of subsequent negotiations with rhe ministry, some 700 participants went on a hunger strike in the late afternoon in a state of frustration and anguish.•• To mobilize support from other citizens, they issued a statement three days later, which was distributed in Tehran: Wr arT thr unrmplnyc-d workrn who havr stagrd a Slt·in in rhr Ministry of l.ahor. Siner the- authnnt•rs have- not rc-srondc-d to our demands, wr have- bee-n on a hunger strike sincr March 1111 A.M.), and arr prTpared to continue our stnkr to the poinr of our death, unless our grievances

ar~

cons1dcred. w~ request our laborm1 brorhc:rs to d1stribut~ this noc~. and pubhc1u our sJtuauon among the worlun1 pt'Ople, so th.t they an all tom us. As w~ wnt~. at the ~nd, lthC' aurhoritin) han come to ur. r.hootmg thC'ir guns.''

Immediately after the hunger strike started, the Labor Minister mer with the workers' representatives at 1 A.M. After negotiating for one hour, there was still no agreement. According to a strikers' spokesper· son, the minister had insisted on the loan issue--a pomt that was unacceptable to the strikers. •• A further attempt was made to appease the strikers, this time by a clergyman who tried to utilize his religious authority. H1s appeals, however, were to no avail, and thC' sir-in carried on. •• On the first night, h•zbullahrs. lprorC'gime strC'd thugs) marched on the mmisrry to arrack the strikers. Outside the compound leftist students joined groups of unemployed to C'xpre!'>s thC'ir support of the srrikC'rs, despite rrpratC'd duhes with the proreg1me thugs.!" lmude, however, the mood surrounding the protesters was one of frustration and determination to fight on. Workers felt as 1f they had been betrayed and cheated by the new politicians whom they had trusted. They felt a kind of moral outrage that their leaders had violated a tacit social contract that had C'Volved in thC' course of the re\·olution. They C'Xpected respect as well as material rC'wards. They felt they had gotten neither.!' One of the women strikers, Zahra Dorostkar, angril)· n:hoed this feeling publicly at the cumpound: I want to know why thr radio and TV do not broadcut our Krinalk.-n, so rhat pt"npl~ can und~rltand ho"· much WC' sufkr. and apprrciare how hnle lthe authoritinl a~ offering us. If th~y hroadcatt this, the people w1ll no longC'r ~ m111nformed Jby the government) who p~nd that they ar~ g.vmg us our nghn. We havC' gathered here, and have gone on hunger smke, ~l.:.liUK we want unemployment ~netits (haqq-1 h1/ta..m). We don't ask for ..:hanry. If there are 1ob!i, we ar~ pr~pucd to work. ( >therw1w, our livmg Upt'R!in mu!'it ~ .'IC\:urcd. We all shoutnf that we wantt'J Mr. Khomcmi; w~ r.upporrcd the rd1KIUU5 IC'adt'n. Now Wt' exprct them to tackle our problcm~o. I have rwu childrm; my hushand ha!io workrd for thC' Iaiit s1x months, bur ha!i nor been pa1d; they say, '"W~ don't hav~ any muncy"! And I mysc:lf usc:d to work m the.- Vitana !bitcull fa'-"rory m Tehran). I '11\"as forced to re~>ign beuu•e they did not ac..:epr my ..:hddrt'n m their nuf!>Cry. Now, Jth~ labor MmistryJ tell us '"take one thousand t11mam for the timC' being"! I have not paid my rent for thC' last "" months.; we hardly have: any food at home; my childrC'n

are Without dothn ... What ~an I dn With th1s one thousand t11mans? ~onsidrr my life situation.ll

So, I am relling you, I will nut leave th1s place unlesi they

While the hunger strike was underway, negotiations with the authorities continued. The strike leaders had sensed that the Provisional Gm·ernmenr was nor prepared to hal:k down. Some progovernment elements had hegun ro spread seeds of division. The loan offer undoubtedly fed into the di,·isinn hetwecn the political and nonpolitical lahorrrs. Adding tu thh,, sustaining a hunger strike against a governmenr that had just come out of a victorious revolution was not easy. On New Year's Day, March z.r, 1979, the Pasdaran hrnke into the compound, attacking the strikers and terrorizing them by continuously shooting in the air. 11 A number of hunger strikers passed out and were taken to hospitals; others were given glul:ose. H The strikC' leadrrs softC'nC'd their positions and eventually accepted the loan principle. The remaining differC'nces revolvrd only around the provisions of the lnan. A compromise was finally reached on March u, 1979. According to the agreement, each unemployed person was to he granted a monthly payment of Rls 9,oocr-Ris 1 z.,ooo, with an advanl:e payment of somr Rls ro,ooo. The conditionality of the payment was substantially modified. In addition, the unemployed succreded in having Khant--ye Kargar CHouse of Llbor) recognized as thrir organizational headquarters in Tchran. 1 '

The Escalation of Collective Actions The government hoped that the compromise would bring an end tn the protes~ nf the unemployed. Peace, however, nrver came in thr lifetimC' nf thC' Provisional GovC'mmC'nt. Both thC' govC'rnmC'nt and thC' unemployed knC'W that loans wert' not a solution tn thC' misC'ry uf johlessnC'Ss. The government madC' thr concession primarily tn pacify tht" jobIC'Ss crowd. Privatdy it assumC'd that the workers would nor pay hack the loans hut hoped that the measure would defusC' their protC'sts. Similarly, the unemployed and thC'ir ldt-wing leaders did nor consider the payment as a loan hut a!i a mere piecemC'al monetary gain. In addition, thC' Tehran agreement had left a lafKe number of casuallahorers and recent high sc:hool graduates out of its prnvisinns. !~The agret"ment ended the hunger strike in Tehran hur failed to halt the protest aL-rions of the unemployed in general. The campaign would go on.

Thr followmg three months saw an escalation in the protest move· ment of the jobless in different parts of the country. In some regions the organizations of the jobless flatly rej~"ted the Tehran compromise; others, notwithstanding theu desire tn obtain the loan, continurd the1r protests. In rhr meantime thr migrant poor and rhr schnolleavrrs nut covrred by rhr loan became even more aggressive. Thus, les!o rhan two weeks afrer the inirial agreement, on April 1, 1979, more rhan 3,000 jobless held an open meering in labor House, rhe outdoor loudspeakrn carrying rhe debates into the streets. The meeting condemned the loan plan once again and resoh•ed to continur the campatgn. An unemployed speaker angnly a:hoed the mood of the crowd: Sw~ar

by my consc~tn4~ I would havr nrvrr ac~rptrd t~ promasr of th~ flaborJ mma,rcr; would have 11C\'Cr agreed to be on lV cven to the point of lkath, af I had Knsrd that fendmg our hungrr \trikrl would lead to thas hopc"lelili 11tuanon. I would rathrr dae than face this •~tuataon .... Wr don't want a free ride, don't want chanty. Gave u11 work.~!·

The crowd suhsequenrly sraged a sit-in within rhe Mininry of justicr for five days. It ended only whrn the liberal justice Minister, Asadullahi, promised to rake the issue to the cabinet. He also facili· rated the unemployed's publicization of their grirvances on national radio and TV. 21 The Syndicate of the Unemployed Project Workers of Abadan focused its campaigns on consolidating its position and struggling to dislodge the rival Union of Workers and High-School Graduatrs that had been created by the local authorities to undermine the SUPWA. At the same rime it continued negotiating with local and national officials ro win conc.:nsions from the governmenr. Some rhrec weeks afrer the Tehran agreemenr, in the same region, the Unemployed Workers of Ahwaz and the Vicinity rejected the Labor Ministry's plan and demanded .. UnC'mployment benefits• instead.:• In thC' southeastern c1ty of Khorram Abad, only a few days after the Tehran agreement, hundreds of jobless laborers rook over the head· quarters of the Governorate demanding jobs, an unemployment fund, and a headquaners for their assemblies. The proresren were attacked by progovernment forces, espa:iall)· the Pasdaran of Komit~·ye Imam, violently assaulted, and fired upon.'" The unemployed in the industrial city of Ghazvin began their collective action by electing representatives to nC"gotiate with city authorities. Demoralised hy the response of the

WOII~KSS

IJYO~U!IO.AIIIS

authorities, who had askrd them to "wait for two months," they went on protest marches and later organizrd gatherings in local mosques to discuss their strategy. 11 In the northwestern Azari ~ity of Tabriz. on March z.8, hundreds of unemployed and laid-off workers staged a sit-in of several days on the premises of the Workers' Club. 11 Another group marched on Tabriz's radio and television station to force the authorities to publicizr thear graevances. Some two weeks earlier the jobless had already bern mobilized by left-wing actavisrs and had voiced their grievances in a number of gatherin~. One of the meetings issurd a resolution calling for an immediate return to work, the creation of an unemployed benefit fund, and the assignment of a permanent headquarten. 11 Similar sit-ins and protest marches took place in Shahr-i Kord and Sari during April and May. 14 In each city s~h protest actaons would often be prolonged primarily because the- authunties would rather rqt'l.'t the demands or delay their re-sponses to them. The violent reactaon of the sa:urity forc.-es resulted in further escalation of protests. The Union of the Unemployed Workers of Isfahan and Vicinity (UUWIV) established in March 1979, had also rejected the minister's loan provisions and made a number of other demands, giving the- officials two weeks to rnpond. When a favorable response did not come, some 7,000 unemployed and thdr sympathizers staged a protest dC'monsrrataon nn March .z.6, 1979. Thr}· ~arried slogans that read .. The burden of the revolution was on the- toilers, but the outcome has gone ro others."' The banners ~ailed for the govern· ment recognize the Council of the Unemployed Workers and their right to assemble.'~ The demonstrators were blocked hy the Pasdaran and h1t.bullahis who were carrying cluhs and knives. The governor rebuffed the demonstrators and Pasdaran arrested a number of organizers. In an effort to pur furthe-r pressure on the authuritiC's, another prote-st march of some 10,000 marcher5 gathered in front of Isfahan's House of Labor less than two weeks later to demand direct talks with the governor. The talks produced no tangible result, and the mar~hing continued. A rumor was spread accusing the demonstrators of intending to arra~k the police station. In the violent confrontations with the security forces that followed, one demonstrator, Na!lit'r Tawfiqian, was killed, eight others injured, and nearly three hundred detained.'" These collr-c.'tive prntests were not always in vain; at rimes desirable outcomes followed. In the Kurdish towns, for example, where thr- left

117

and Kurdish nationalist organizations enjoyed mass support, the protests were more fierce and more successful. In the capital city of the Kurdistan Province, Mahabad, the employees of the power and water supply who had heen laid off during the revolution managed ro regain their jobs following a b1rter struggle. The Fedaii Organization appears to have played a crucial pan in this success and began appeals to jobless in other areas. F In another town, Sanandaj, following intense negotiations with various authoririn of the city, some temporary measures were taken to as!iist the jobless who numbered nearly 7,000, including the immediate employment of ~oo, payment of benefits to those laid off, and loans for others until they found reemployment. ta Toward the end of May 1979 the unemployed of Krrmanshah were mobih1.ed by young socialist activists. Recent h1gh school graduates, the unrmployed poo~ somr parrnu' groups, and othrr sympathizrrs Joined togrther in street demonstrations and sit-ins. They organized !'lOme of the largest protest marches in the c1ry, with thr participants in one demonstration reaching s.ooo. •• In one incident m May the demonstrators intended to launch a sitin in thr Governorate headquarters. Despitr opposition from the guards, the demonstrators broke the gate and seized the building for a few hours. This forced the governor, who had already flrd the buildmg. to return and listen to the crowd. The protesters agreed to end their sit-in only when the govc·mur assured them that he would seriously consider their demands. Before long, joint planning by the governor and the Union of the Unemployed, an elected body, resulted in the reopening of a house-building factory, which was able to rmploy 50me one hundred people. The plan al\n included jobs for another group of thC' unemployed at Kashmir Factory. ThC' remaining jobless were to be compensated between Rh; 7,ooo-Ris 1 s,ooo per month until they found work.4(1 Although the unemployed were mobihzed in almost every town whC're some workers had been laid off, thr movement remained dis· persrd and isolated fur the mo!it pan, but the protest actions of thC' unemployed culminated in a massive' show of unity and force on May Day 1979. Some soo,ooo people marched in the streets of Tehran, and many more in other provincial cities. The rally, organized by the Coordinating Council of May Day, a committee composc'd of various socialist and labor organizations, was thro biggest independent gathering of lower-class people in yean. Groups of mron and womC'n, parents

WO!ILISS ftiYOLO!IOI.ftliS

and children marched hand-in-hand through the city's main streets chanting slogans. May Day was a show of the strength of the working dass, but even more so of the left. It was their forces who had been mobilized m such a massive numbers. Young male activists held hands along both edges of the march, creating a human chain in order to protect the demonstrators from the occasional assaults of organized thugs--the informal groupings under the protection of this or that powerful mullah. A number of stare organizations, such as Sepah-i Pasdaran, }rhad-1 Sa~and~gur jrhe Construction Crusade), and the Islamic Republinn Pany, also made statements on May Dayi some took pan in the marches. However, they focused more on the .. danger of Communism," the '"agents of the U.S." (referring to socialist activists), and Wahdat-i l
The Variety of Street Protests As would he expected, Jobs constituted the major wncern of the jobless. During the first five months after the revolution, eighty-six major worker collective actions protested lock-outs and layoffs, and campaigned for their return to work. This made up the largest proponion (some .z.o percent) of the mdu§otrial actions waged by the working people.•• Yet the variety of demands reflected the strategy of the leadership of the unemployed movement to relate the struggle for jobs to other political and social concerns of the working class. Socialist leaders drew anennon to such well-known demands as the forty-hour work week, hener working conditions, equal pay for men and women, and the right to stnke. It is not dear if the possible imphcations of the demands were well thought our or if they were made simply in order to radicalize the movement. Cenamly the insistence in almost every campaign on having a headquaners pointed to the urgency of organizational work among the actors. Some of the demands (such as the expulsion of foreign expens) contradicted the central concern of sav-

119

ing jobs; tM withdrawal of fort'ign companies wa~ partly responsible for many closures and layoffs. The protest act1ons mainly assumed the form of demonstrations, sit-ins, and issuing rnolunons. The demonstrations focused on voicing the plight of the jobless both to fellow citizens and to the authoritlt'S. Some woups forced the local rad1o and 1V stations to publiciu their grievances. Demonstrations wert' also staged a!l a method of practicing collective action and protest. Bur in the postrt'Volutionary conditions, when nr~ marching had brcomr a common practice, rhr immediate impact was Jess than '8tisfactory. Sit-ins (tahassun and ishghal), or temporarily occupying public premises and uusing disruptions, h«ame the most prevalent method of bringing pl't'SSUrt' to bear. The buildings of thr l.abor Ministry, local lahor offices, the governorates, and thr Ministry of Justice served as the major targets. At times the sit· ins wert' combinrd with hungrr strikes, which rC"sulted in some immC'diatr gams. Although tabassun seems to havC' a long historical tradition in Iran, it 11 unlikely that thC' practices of thC' unt'mployed drew on this history. In the traditional form, bast-nisbirri, the actors St't'k refuge in holy places, such as shrines or mosqun, in an attempt to seek forgiveness, wage a protest, or pursut' justice. The a"-r reprt'sents a defensive cry for demenc.:y and justice, normally by nne suffering under arhitraf)' rulr. 44 Thus those.- who had commined a cnme would seek refuge m a shrine where they would he- immune so Inn~ as they remamed in a!llylum. The connotariomi of contemporary actions are es~ntially different. ThC' unemployrd referred to their acts not by the traditional term, .. bast-msbirri• but in thC' terms .. tahassurr" (sir-in) and .. isbgbal" (occupation, '!iquaningl. fnr the unC'mplnyC'd, tht' tC'rms had a different meanin~. ThC'y signified a form of collective action through wh1ch the actors seek either publicity for a cau~ or, mort' oftt'n, a mt'thod of disruption to hrmg puhhc pressure to he-ar on the authorities .• , Nevt'rthrless, '>ome symbolic elements uf the traditional idea rt'main. Fur instance, the unC'mployed did organiZe sit-ins in •mch places as tht' headquarters of Workers' Syndicates or House of l.ahor, which were not intended to disrupt. Sim1larly, staging a sit-in m front of the Ministry nf Justice 'iignified a uy for justice in a morC' traditional srnsr. In '>pite of the.- large.- number of sit-ins, there i'i no C'vidC"nce of 'iuch direct a'tions 35 mob looting or rrnt riots. In Iran such actions historically result from 3 'iudden drop in income and a lack of alternative

!iources for survival. Rapad, massive, and unexpected unemployment may produce such phenomena in any country, as evidenced during rhe Depression in thr U.S .... In Iran, though, as in most drvdoping countries, people are better prepared to adopt survival strategies m a relatively short timr. Kinship, friendship, patronage, and especially infor· mal economic activities offer the most handy mechanisms. In Iran those who had alrrady been unemployed were equipped with coping techniqurs, and those who were laid off could partially rely on the support of their kin membrrs while searchmg for another job. Although it was qune limited, the unemployed also launched a fundraasmg campaagn. The contributions came largely from workmg people who had not lost their work. Significantly, the bazaar, a major source of funds during the revolution responded negatively. •· Unemployment loan~, however meager, providrd immediate relief. So long as the jobless believed they could gain ground through collective resistance, they refrained from limiting themsrlves to indavadualistic acts and survival strategirs. And so long as the unemployed poor lacked any institutional setting in whach they could rxercise direct action, such as workplace u~.:cupation, they needrd to resort to collective protest. Thas anterest in culla:tive activity, encouraged by the left· ist groups, paved thr way for some degree of associational activities among the jobless. Getting Orpnized The struggle uf the jobless was somewhat ..:hantic. For one thing, the unemployed did not constitute a homogenous group. They originated from different backgrounds, which gave them differrnt capacities for mobilization and ~.:ollectivr a~.:uun. A!io I have already pointrd out, threr main groups made up thr jobless population: laid-off and rxprllrd workers, recent graduates, and already jobless and casual laborers. No organizational link between them was cum:eivahle. Laidoff workers had largely worked in thr factunes or on construction sitrs. Whereas a cnmmon workplace gave: this group some basis fur communication, the other two groups were generally atomized and disprr~d. lacking t'Vt'n a ~.:ommon physical space. Within these categories, individuals met each other aCL:identally and nnly for a short whilr. Leaders of thr group!> wrre often chosen spontaneously without much drliberation or competition. At rime!> exciremrnr outweighed rational decisions and ukulatrd a~rinns. As une participant cnm-

mented, .. We had not decided to oc~upy the Labor Ministry; it just happened. We were only demonstrating in the stret'ts; chanting slogans; people got very rx~ited, and all of a sudden we found ourselves jumping over the fenas. " 4 M Nevenhrless, some degree of orgamz.ation and coordination could be observed. Two fa'-"tors played a key pan in th1s: simple necessity, and the role of mobilizers. Organtzallunal Nu~ssll)' Brfore all rise, before demonmatiuns and sit-ins, and instead of looting or rioting, the unemployed rehrd on the disposition of the new authorities. They initially prrfn-red to negotiate. Thi!li required that reprrsrntativrs be appointrd (u in the cities of Ghazvin, Tehran, Isfahan, Tabriz, and Krrmanshah). If nrgOliations did not bring a result, thry ma~ !liurr to maintain rome kind of communi~ation and network in order to continue their campaign. To achieve this, they needed first a place ro assemble and then recognition of their representatives by the authorities. Such recognitiOn, they believed, would !iC'rvr to protect them from the arbitrary assaults of the Pasdaran and others. These formal woupings of the unemployed workers were given different labels depending on the perception of the leaders. Among the most ~ommon names were shura (council), sandika (syndicate), and kaanun lcenter). Some groups went beyond merely appointing representatives, anrmpting instead to give a more durahiC' structure to their organizations. In Isfahan, when thr jobless realized that securing jobs was nut as easy a\ thr)· had initially thought, they began tn consolidate' their organization by involving thr unC'mplnyed workers of the ent1rr city and Its environ!i in the Union nf thC' Unemployed Worker!!. of Isfahan and the Vicinity. In Tehran, when thC' imtial negotiations with rhe Ministry of Labor failrd, jobless leaders gathered (on March -~)in the Hnusr of Labor to brgm plans for a more structured organization. This was followed by the formation of a Steering Committee of Casual/Seasonal Worker\ and (un March .u, 1979) official recognition of the House of Labor as theu permanent headquaners. The latter ~ame a significant institution for the laboring poor. Thr House of Labor was originally taken over quite spontaneously by thr unemployed. Its early meetings, open to all, revolved around diver5e rop1cs. Tht"SC general meC'tings were often hoth dynamic and

chaotic, drawing crowds of three to four hundred people. To remedy this problem, separate workshops were sometimes held. As political groups became more involved, some disciplinary standards were introduced: discussions became more organized, speakers more aniculate, and, simultaneously, ideological div1sions more pronounced. Speakers affiliated to a panicular political line were heckled by opponents and cheered by sympathizers. It was as if rhr huge slogans hanging on the background waii-.. The Only Solution for the Toilers is Unity and Organization" and "Workers' Democraq Is Limitless" -had lost their resonance. The debates introduced by militants tended ro center on such issues as .. democratic versus socialist revolution, .. and "economic versus political struggles," which seemed less relevant tn the da1ly concerns of the unemployed.~· Whatever the debates, official recognition of thr House of Labor signified a v'L"tnry for the labormg poor both in praL"tical and symbolic terms: It providrd a spac:r for their organizational activ1ties and a symbol nf their capac:iry for indrpendent c:ollective aL"tion. For many it was an intimate shelter: .. Some would spend the nights there; would bring fond and share with other fellow laborers. Othen spent their lu"':h break in the House, whilr discussing topics of mterrst. In this way so many simplr-minded lads experienced das.s solidarity. The House had practic:ally turned into a !K:houl for collective act1on ... sot The organized activities of the joblns wen~ nm limited to the House of Labor. however. A number of unemployed associations were also created. Unemployed workers in the oil and port city of Abadan, in southern Iran, developed a more elaborate organi7.ation known as the Syndicarr of Projectl~asonal Workers of Abadan (SPWA). As I discussed earlier, the embryo of the syndicate was formed weeks before the insurrection in the c:asual gatherings of laborers in the local trahouses (Bushehri-ha), where preparatory registering and campaigning began. These were followed by an assembly of a group of workers in the Oil Industry College, where they formed a steering committee (shura-ye muassess). The committee began recruiting members by using teahouses as their meeting points. At rh1s rime the priority was to obtam a permanent headquarten. Following intense negotiations and confrontations with city officials, they succeeded in getting the state-owned premises of the former Workers Union as their headquarters." They also registered rhe SPWA with the Komrtt--ye Imam, the lex:a I Pasdaran, and the office of rhe (Jovernorate .I! The SPWA man-

agrd ro organiu over 1 J,ooo unemployed workers from rwenty diffrrmt trades, with various skills and income levels.'' The steering com· mittee produced a set of by-laws based on the union experiences in postindrpendmcr Algeria, postrrvolution Nicaragua, and Iran during the 19401. The most pressing tasks comprised negotiations with employers to ~uirr them to reemploy the laid-off workers. They also included finding jobs for thr rest of its members and SC'Curing unem· ployment benrfirs."' In rhr long run, the SPWA aimed at establishing unions of unrmployrd workers m other provinces, and ulrimatrly creatmg a unified national union. lluring irs hfettme the SPWA won a number of concrssions through negotiations w1rh the Provisional Government, including reemployment of groups of workers and securing unemploymrnt loans. 11 A conflict arose berween thr SPWA and the authorities on the mrthod of ali
Young activists, mainly students with radicallslamk and socialist orit'ntations, played a significant pan in mobilizing and organizing the unemployed. Activists often initially targeted r«rnt high school graduates, diplomeha-ye bilzaar, who were bcttt"r prrpared for mobilization; the revolution had given 'itudents much experience in group work. The acrivists then linked thr concern!! of these young job-seekers ro those of the general mass unrmployed. The social skills, literacy, and mobility of thr high-school graduatrs made them potential mobilizers in their own right. A socialist organizer describcd how this raeric was effrcrive in creating an unemployed organization in Kermanshah, a city in the East nf Iran: We gathered the othen (drplomchs) and asked them to expreu theu VIeW\ Jun nunen. uf protnt a'tumsJ. We 'onduded rhat ea<:h of u• who wa• prncnt thert• should takr a rnpnnsib1lny. We should, fur mstance, mform our fnrnd'li, relatiYC'!'o, ne1ghhurs, and danmates of suc:h an a~:uon. We 'hould also think of preparing flyen w be distributed throu~hout the c:ity."

WOWILESS

!ITOLO~IOIARI18

The diplom~hs in Kirmanshah initially insistrd on having thear own exdusivt' organization. Tht'y were later ~onvin~rd, howevrr, that they had a ~ommon cau~e with orht'r jobless proplr. 11 Thus their recruiting began among tht' unrmployed poor, construction workt'rs, and casual workers in the lower-class neighborhoods. In their first coll~-rivt' effun thry managed to bring one thousand unrmployrd togethrr. In this aSS('rnbly thr sprakrrs stressed thr imponanct' nf setting up an association of thr unt'mployed and uniting all the jobless. Following a street march, the organizers ~allt'd for a !iit-in on the premases of the Governorate. It was during this ocusion that thr crowd appointed sevrn rrpresentatives, including four diplnmehs frwo men and two women). two unemployt'd labort'rs, and one rrprrsentativt' from among the part'nts of thr diplomehs. A ft'w days later the rrprt'SC'ntativrs mrt in a public park with a group of fifty participants to adopt an offkial name for thr organization and to propose by-laws for discussion and adoption. Thus was the Union of Unrmployed Proplt' of Kermanshah crrated. •• Although widrsprrad, the orgamzational acttvtties of the unemployed rrmained largrly localized and isolated around diffrrent pans of thr counrry. Most were so involvrd an their daaly struggles for survival that they hardly paid attt'ntinn to thr outside world. The vttal tasks of rec:ruitmrnr, ~onfrontarions with the Pasdaran, and sustaining morale ~onsumed mu~h of thc.>ir energies. Talk of ~rearing a national C(KJrdinating association ~arne by and large from left·wing a~"tivtsts ..., One crucial attrmpr was made tu link these individual campaigns in a national contrxr. On April13, 1979, delrgates from over rwrnty citit's and towns prhered in the House nf labor in Tehran. Their aim was to unify their stands and strategie~. to crearr eventually a nationwide orgamzation of the unempluyt'd. Delegates also discussed the conditions uf jobless people tn different pans of tht' country, especially the ramifications of a~~epting the unemployment loan.~• The meeting lastt'd three days, and no reponer was allowed tntu the met'tmg hall. A statemrnt issued at irs end instru~ted all unemplo~·ed masses in the country to stagr demonstrations on May r>ay 1979 and to direct their demands toward the government. Tht' rt'snlution warned that if the authontit's did nut respond posirivt'ly, thr national nrJtamzrrs .. will take harsher and more resolute measures to ensure that the Iranian working peoplt' will achtt've thetr just obJt'Ctl\'es. ""!

125

lndred. the speed wtth which organizational effons were carried our was quire extraordinary. The Tehran Mrrting on April .Z.J. the climax of the organizational activity, came only rwo months after the revolution. ~ng up a StruL"tUrN association ohm constitutes the last stage of a umpaign. If mass action, spontaneous protests, and an unstructured mobilization have nor produced results, then a structured organi1.ation is requirni to ensure continuity. In Iran the line betwffn mass action and organizational work ~ttmed blurred. For one thing. people had just come out of a sua.:rssful revolution and were prepared to br mobilized. Second, the mobiliurs highly valued associationbuilding and considered it as a measure of success. The left especially msisred on organizational work, viewing institution-building as an essential element for creating a sustained working-da11s base for itself. Yet for the most pan these associations remained loosely structured, often serving only as ad hoc coordinating comminrcs to mobiliu the campaigns. They rarely employed any elaborate orgamzarional procedures or advcx:ated rlectoral campaigns and competition in appointing rt'prescntatives. Despite mrmsive t'ffons, lack of time did nor allow these organizations to develop and confront the rest of efficaq. The unemployed movement soon came to an abrupt halt.

The Demise The movement withered away as quickly as it had wme to life. May Day marked the climax of the collective action of the Jobless. The slowdown began gradually afterward, until its vinual demise by midautumn 1979. The war in Kurdistan in o;,ummer 1979 undermined the activities of the movement. During its clampdown on Kurdish nationalists, the government used rhe opportunity ro quell other dissent. Although a number of joble'is protest marches did take place their scope remained limited. On October 1, a crowd of •.soo jobles.o;, the sa:nnd march of its kind organiud withm a wrek, demonstrated out· side rhe prime minister's office. Pasdaran fired over their heads and the government warned of rough action against the protesters.'' In the dramatic atmosphere associated with the seizure of the U.S. embassy in Tehran m November 1 979, the c;:oncems uf the unemployed were lost in the noisy campaign of "Islam against rhe Grear Saran." Indeed, on the very same day that the Muslim students dimhcd over the walls of rhe embaso;.y, a large group of unt'mployrd were marching in the streets nf the capital. But the desperate voic;:es of theSC' marchers were stifled

WORILISS RITOLU!XO.AJIIS

by the nationalist outcry of the mass demonstrations that ~gan to unravel from the Embassy compound. Why did the movement disappear so rap1dly? First, political pressure intensified. Pr~overnment paramilitary organizations stepped up psychological and physical anacks, raiding and ransacking the headquarters of the johless. The leaders of the movement were stigmatized as "infidel communists," or "munafiqs" (hyaxx:rites), referring to the Mujahedin-i Khalq, a left Islamic group. Almost any sit-in hy the unemployed was assaulted violently by the armed Pasdaran, especially when the)' were convmced that the radical left and the Mujahedin were behind the rrouhles that they believed were aimed at undermining the revolution. Various anacks were reported in Tehran, Isfahan, Abadan, Ahwaz, Gachsaran, and Khorram Abad, most within the first two months after the victory of the revolution. In addition, worker gangs were set up hy employers to harass laid-off workers who voiced their protests, especially those calling on the government to rake over industry:• Friday prayer leaders would often denounce the unemployed activists as agents of a counterrevolution, provoking the praying crowd, often from lower-class backgrounds themselves, to anack and disrupt gatherings of the johlcss. The Islamic leaders were able to mobilize the poor against the poor. Whatn-er their differences. the various fal.'tions within the ruling elite all favored ending the unemployed protest. Radicals and conservatives, liberals and lslamists, all considered the activists as impatient opportunists who aimed at harvesting the fruits of the revolution before they were npe:' Second, an internal banle among the leaders, elipecially those with strong political convictions, further weakened the movement. Whereas Muslim activists along with nonpolitical workers tended to compromise for immediate gains, radical left leaders and .. political" workers insisted on prolonging the campaign, making it pan of a general struggle to undermine the Provisional Government... In addition, despite the anempts of the mobilizers to unite jobless graduates and unemployed lahorers, the rift between the two rmtained. Undoubtedly the left played a significant parr in publicizing the plight of the johless masses. It was particularly adamant that rhr movrment ~ radicalized and he given a distinctly political character. Most leftist puhlicatiom~:· especially those of the Maoist groups, known as ltbatt-i Sft'"""'· carried divt'rse reports on the struggles of the unemployed. They provided analyses of the causes of layoffs, often relating

127

them to the "crisis of capitalism," followed by pr~riptions for how to combat Joblessness. One particular wec:kly, Ala1h1!-1 BIJraar1 lAgainst Unemployment) of the Razmandegan Organization:M was wdl known for raising these issues. A number of miluanr workers, such as Ali Adalatfam, Hassan lur, Asad, and others, mamly with Maoist tendencies, led the campaign in Tehran; their counterparts mobthud Job-sttkers in the provincial citirto. •• While the 1dea of helpmg out the poor was a prime mO[ive of the lt'h activists, they nevertheless utihzcd the campa1gn for their own political ends-first, to undermme the "hberal bourgeois" Provisional Government and, second, to build popular !iupport for the left. This meant that thr interests of the movement could in practice bt' sacn6crd to favor the political strategy of the individual socialist groups. Fmally, and perhaps most important, the exceptional conJUncture and condinons (I.e., sudden and mass1ve loss of work in a revolunonary snuatton) that had fostered the barth of the movement began gradually to be transformed. A number of the factories resumed operauons, rremploymg some of tht'ar labor force. Wuhin the farst six months of the revoluuon, some so prrcrnr of tndustrtes and small untts had returned to production."-' The labor-intemnve constru~"'tion ~tnr, wh~eh had prevtou!lly employed some one million laborers, still needed to be revived. To thts end, the provisional government extended Rls 11.,000 mtlhon credn to contractors to enable them to pay back wages and to rejuvenate the whole sector.'' Construction activ1tiN lx-gan to rise slowly m the sa:und half of 1 fJ79 as small and inrxprnstve housing units were built. ·1 By May 1979 some 1.1,000 jobs were creatrd m thn; S«ror:' On occasion laid-off workers took over their workplaces, appointing a shura to run them. At times they requested that the government appomr professional managers'" order to resume work. ·4 On May 6, 1979, for instance, ten workers at the Mrtusak factory attemptrd to rrgam their jobs by stagmg a sit-in m the factory. They continued their occupannn for twenty-tlvr days, after which they 1ssued a statement: '"z. s days sJt·m With four days hunger strikr! The result? ... Nothing!" "Whar could we do?," they went on. "There was only one way left. And that was: taking over the workshop, uprrating it by ourselves." So, "on Sunday 9 Ord1lx-hesht !May 1, 19791, we went into the work'ihop and. after repairmg th~ machmes and dividing responsibilities, began to produ'e and sell the product:oo. "'' S1milarly, laid-off workers

in Plastou Masourehkar reopenend their plant and resumed work.·~ While the~ ra'-"tics were effective in rrgaining jobs in some ca~. they were ineffective in many others. The former employres of such .. unlslamic" occupations as cabarets, nightclubs, and the lottery business, for example, had no chance of rrrmployment. Under intense pressure from the movement, the Ministry of Labor attempted to create some tt'mporary jobs, including public works such as road construction and planting trees in public plact's. Although Bazargan's government officially bannt'd any further starr sector employment, a number of new revolutionary inst1tunons (nahadha·ye lnq•lab1) such as Pasdaran Komitehs (Revolutionary Guards), jihad-1 Saundegu1 (Construction Crusade), Nlhut-1 Savad Aamu~i (Movement for Literacy), and Bonyad-i Masltan (Housing Foundation) nevertheless did absorb a good number of the jobless population. For instance, the Construction t:rusade, established in June 1979, had 31.7 centers in the country, employing 14,800 persons in 1979, with 4,700 voluntrrrs. ~ A small percentage of the z.oo,ooo lottery ticker sellers were hired by the local Pasdaran l
political prnsure and changn m the economy, resulted in the demise of the movement. Traditional institutions made the unemployed less desperate; econom1c changes eroded the constitut'ncy of thr movement; and political repression deprived ir of its leadership. The beginning of the war in Kurd1stan inflicted a heavy blow to the weak body of the movement, while the euphoria over the seizure of the U.S. embassy drow~d out it111 presence. Despite orgamzational weaknesses, the movement of the jobless in Iran did make some important inroads. It forced the Provisional Government to granr loans and aid to over 18o,ooo unemployed for six months, and to create a number of temporary jobs. In some provinces the authorit1n were forced by the campaign• of the unemployed to reopen shut-down factorin. At some point groups of laid-off workers them§t'lves began reopening thrir own workplaces without the consent of the employers. Most important, the movemenr prompted the Provisional Government ro rush ro reconnruct the economy, npecially the crippled indusrries where mosr jobs had been lost. Bur these very achievements undermined the movement irself. The laid-off factory workers who were in the forefront of the organizations and campaigns of the unemployed began ro rerum to work. Others either found tobs, went back ro their old occupations, or began to warch for alternative means of survival. In short, the unemployed movement began to decline primarily because it was to some extent succnsful. For many of the people without work the problem of joblessness remained, m parti'--ular as new groups of tob-wrkers entered tht' labor marker. Concession~ neirher reduced unemployment significantly nor ended rhe plight of many of the jobless. From the start the movement faaled to win unemployment benefits as it had originally demanded, and accrpted an unemployment loan. Thr loan, although never expected ro hr paid back, covert'd only some 1 o percent of rhe unemployed" and was discontinurd after six month~. job creation schemes remained limjred. Nor only did rhousands of the remaining jobless fail to find work, hut a new wave of rural-urban migrarion in the following years inflated thr size nf the tobless population even further. In shon, the excepnonal cin:umsrances (masr.ive and sudden unemployment and an adrological elrmenr l that facalitated the dnrlopment nf the unemployed movement began to change, evrn though unemploy-

ment persisted. The jobless population needed to adjust their activities to the new political and econnm1c reality. The Islamic regime ~gan to stahiliu and seize control of popular struggles. The critical mass of unemployed, the laid-off fa~:tory workers, mostly regained their work and exited the movement. for the remaining jobless, activities in the mformal sector, petty-trade, and street vending served as the most common recourse. While involved in their movement, many workless revolutionaries never stopped their mdividual search for alternative sources of income. There were probably many like Ahmad Miruii, a diplomeh who d~ri~d his posuiun as .. owing to unemployment, I take care of the electrical problems of my neaghbors and get paid for it; some rimes, I work on my brother's taxi. " 14 Some were convinced that they could secure some kind of work if only they would make a little effon. Ali Golestani, a diplomeh who was on the job market for six months, believed that .. if people are only a hit clever, they can do thousands of things; they c:an sell fruits in the streets, do vending, ~ sales persons, ur engage in pan-time and casual work ..... Indeed, thousands of jobless resoned ru street suhsistem:e work, occupying spots on the sadewalks, public parks, and busy thoroughfares of the big caries to erect kaosks and stalls. The unemployed movement came ro an end, but strttt politics continued. It simply shifted from the jobless onto the street subsistence workers, notably the street vendors. By changing the agency, stnet polItics assumed a different form and dynamics, involving datferent politICal ground-the subja:1 of the following chapter.

Seven Street Hebel&l The Politics

ot Street Ven4in& IFrom rh~ l•lam1.: v1rwpomrl

rh~

nccuparion of rhnrou&hfarn by

r~

vmdon is h.Jrilm

Innr ~rm•rttd 1. -Ayatollah

Khom~mi'

Wh)' don lM muni4:ipaliry want ro prt'V~nt us from our lvrndingl world Wr don't ~am our hvlnK tn a htlram way. -A wo~n food vmdor m 'Trhran' Thr authorilin think in 1uch a way u if rhry havr in~ntrd th~ 5frC'C'U from thru farhrrs.

-A fru11 prddlrr'

By thr dose of the first year of the revolution, thousands of unemployed urbanites realized that they had to come to terms with the sratr of their joblessnrss. Neither the movrmrnt of the unemployrd nor the effons of the new government were sufficient to amdiorate the situation. With industry and construction stagnant, recruirmrnt in the starr sector frozen, an annual release of thousands of school lravers and soaring urban migration all combinrd to inflate the number of jobless. In Tehran, open unemployment had jumped from 3 percent in 1 y76 to some 1.. percent in 1979_. One year later it rose to 16.3 percent: By 198.. the rate for the whole country was 18.7, or z..1 million people our of work. • Over 6o percent of the jobless in cities were new entrants, including high school graduates (30 percent): While joblessness grew in the postrevolutionary years, no protest movemrnt emerged to address the issues of jobs and social protection. The particular sociopolitical circumstance that had caused the emergence of the unemployed movement in 1 Y79 began to change. The bulk of the movement's leadership, mainly experienced laid-off worken, returned to work. In addition, the subsequent political restri~-rions cunailed independent popular mobilization as well as the activities of militants who had inf1uenc:ed the earlier jobless collective action.

134

S!BII! BIIELS

The jobles~. consequenrly, resorted to individual and quiet e-ncroachment strategies. In addition to relying on family, friends, and patrons, most found opponumties in casual work. The black market, largely fr« from the bureaucratic control of the state, offered the only space in which mdividuals could exercise their own initiatives to hrt· ter their lots. Despite its own costs, this sector offered such a versatility that many individuals, even many unskilled rural immigrants, were able to secure a job, earn a relatively decent income, and enjoy some degr« of autonomy in their working lives. Street subsistence activities wnstituted the largest segment of such a"-rivities. They were the prodw::tlve, service, and distributivr al.'tivitles that took place in the soc1al and geographical space of the street comers. Among them, prny-trade, street vrnding, and stall-holding ldaltkeh-daan, dast-foroushi, basaati and cbarlth·ddtm) proved to be thC' most flourishing occupations. In Iran just as elsewhere, street vendors are rarely the subject of serious scholarship, despite their growing significance. Available" studies focus mostly on the-ir economic activities. For instance, lk Soto's wdlknown work, The Other Path, is interested not in vendors' politics but in their prrce1vrd enthusiasm for and pral."tice of a free market. • On the other hand, officials often regard street vending as a social problem, a side effect of .. maldevelopment•; it is rarely considrred as a possible solution to cenain economic and social ills. And, finally, sympathiurs often look upon street vendors with pity and patronage, perceiving them as powerless and wretched: All of these diverse' views share one thing--rhey deny any agency to the street subsistence worken. This chapter attempts to examine street vendors nor simply as a byproduct of economic shift but also as agents of social change. It shows how economic necessity made the poor appropriate public space as well as (business) opponunities that had been primarily generated by the rich and powerful. Both the- use of public space--physical and social-and thr opportunity cost becamr thr subject of intrnse contestation. As thr vendors spread out their business in thr busy allryways, public thoroughfares, and comers of the public parks, thrir activities inevitably came mto conflict with the prerugativrs of both the state, which tends to control the public order and space, and the merchant dass who felt their business opportunities appropriated. While the state insisted on the passive use of public spaces, the vendors needed to use them actively and panicipatively through their own initiatives. 111 The conflict between the street rebels and the state over the use of pub-

S7ftll~

ftiBI~S

li~

space, the meaning of order, and rhe aim of economic activity char· a~trrized the strttt politics in postrevolutionary Iran. In this conflict, the stare sided with the business dass, since both power and profit were contested. Spreading Out in the Streets Street vending was nor a novel phenomenon in Iran. Indeed, ir was characrerisri~ of the premodern urban quarters where local street traders exhibited their merchandise in publi~ thoroughfares, usually in the vi~inity of the established Bazaar.'' local norms and lo«.:al authorities regulated the use of the streets, which varied a~«:ording to the local ~ulturc:, and a kind of Durkht-imian organic solidarity (reciprocity, sodal «:ontrol, primordial ties, and norms) prevailed in the neighborhoods. If the sratt" ~emed to lie far away from the local life, the street vendors were at irs center, performing a highly significant function of distributing goods in the local markers and providing services for the communities. Srrttt vending represented perhaps the most salient feature~ of street life as ir kept «:apruring the imagination of the writers, artists, and historians. Street vending, peddling, and cart-carrying continued throughout the prerevolutionary years hoth before and after the establishmt-nt during the 19 30s of Reza Shah's centralized state. Along with «:onstrucrion work, srrt-et vending offered rural migrants and unskillt-d urbanites easy access to urban employment. Indeed, throughout the century, street life was ddint-d very much by the activities of the chant· ing peddlers and vendors who operatt-d side by side in the busy rhor· oughfares and local marker places. Although the stare began as early as 1 896 to regulate their activities,•: nevertheless many hawkers simply continued ro operate unlawfully, often by being scattered, invisible, and thus tolerable. Nevertheless, bribing and/or befriending the local police also helped them carry on thdr work. Indeed, more often than not, the vendors and the local police were brought together. Although they divt-rged in their roln, they nevertheless shared many traits-they operated and interacted on daily basis in the same geographical area and shared more or leS& similar economic needs and probably living standards. Our of this developed a complex relationship in which the line betwet-n favor and friendship, bribe and assistance, control and cooperation was often blurred.'' What underlay this state of affairs was the small size of the vending population and its apparent invisi-

1,5

1,6

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hility, which in terms of both state regulation and shopk~pen's interests made it tolerable if not legitimate. Nevenhelns, by the mid-19705 over 1 s,ooo vendors were spread our both in the southern and central areas of the capital (especially in the strttts of lalehzar, ferdowsi, and Saadil. 14 Insecurity, nevenheless, remained a lasting cost of this informality. The postrevolution period brought new changes to the vending sec· tor. In addition to a sharp increase in their siu, a new form of politi· cal vending emerged, thus rendering the group more susceptible to control by the state. During the period betw~n February 1979 and mid-198 1 political vending enjoyed vrry high visibility as rducatrd young men, mainly supporters of the opposition political groups, traded intelle~:tual merchandise such as hooks, newspapers, and cassettes. Political vending, however. rrpresented only a transitory phenomenon, comprising a small ponion of the total number of str~t traden. More imponant were the ordinary vendors, who~ main concern was ro makr a living. The collapst of the Shah's regime brought with it a temporary halt in bureaucratic control of economic activities. The breakdown of police and mumcipal control opened the way for thousands of young, educated, unemployed, and rural migrants to utiliu their own initiatives in economic life. Many conquered new territories in the public space. Scores of new handcans, kiosks, and stalls mushroomed in the busy thoroughfares of thr major citirs. Betwern 1976 and 1986 the tnfonnal economy became the fastest-growing sector, second only to thr public sector, attracting over JOO,ooo new entrants. By 1986 these activities madr up some 18 percent of urban employment, or dose to one million people.'• Of this, about 310,000 were petty-traders and 'itreet suhsastence workers, and thr rest were workshop workers or family and domestic laborers.•• The stretts of the capital experienced the largest groups of street workers whose number is estimated to about 40,000 in 1981." Between 198 1 and 1984, at the height of urban migration when 1, soo persons migrated to greater Tehran every day, strret subsistence work spread like a brush fire in the capital and in other cities and towns. The authorities were apprthensive of ats political ramifications. Within these thr~ ytars, about 8o,ooo new vendors ~n working in tht capital11 providing support for an estimated 400,000 Tehranis. 19 ln August 1984 a Tehran daily acknowledged that .. Today, vending as the most

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widespread strttt a""tiviry.... attracting a major segment of the labor force. It seems that the mashaghrl-i lca~lb !fake occupations) have in the long run established themselves, and cannot he dismantled. "z" Political Vending

In the late afternoon of one hut june day an 1~79, about thirty young men and women m the garden of the Teatri-shahr in Tehran were involved in an inrenie d1M:ussion. They had gathered there to explore ways of dealing with the official threats against street book-sellers. They disc.:ussrd the procedures for establishing a street association, and where it should he, puning its by-laws to the vote:. Four men and one woman were elected as members of the executive comminee.H The Association of Street Book-Sellers would fight to secure the position of street bcKJk-sellers against the municipality's attacks. It also planned to put prnsure on the authorities to create permanent jobs for its members. '"In fact, we arc: seasonal street workers," explained a woman book-seller. "The mumdpality and the Labor Ministry must feel responsibility for our Situation. Bad weather does nor allow us to work in the srrerts during the fall and wmter.... The municipality must g1ve us a place Ifor the Association 1. and the Labor Ministry should give us Jobs. "z~ Street "·ending as a pnhtkal is.'iur began ro unfold from the very first days of the postrevolutionary period. Politicized young unemployed, school and college graduates rook advantage nf the chaotic freedom and began to set up stalls and kiosks along the s1drwalks of the main streets of the capital city. They filled the pavements with their merchandise, mostly in the hetter-uff central districts--Tehran University, Park-• Farah, Park-i Mellat, the streets of Kargar and Keshavarz, and those surrounding the major public parks. Some simply spread their handful of goods on a piece of newspaper on the ground. Others preferred to stand by a single table, trading their major items-books, newspapers, music casst'nrs, and rapes of political speeches. Some supplemented th1s men.:handise with a variety of sandwiches, hot tea, and cold drinks. The more ambiunus vendors installed permanent structures, metal k1osks and wooden shacks, and felt free to tap mto elrctru:ity from the nearby power lines, which illuminated the surroundings with colorful lights. Thus every evening the occup1ed sidewalks turned into exotic fun-fairs, with vendor-shoppers and passers-by browsing amid jeers, Jokes, music, and plenty of politics.

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For the~ young men, vending ~rved multiple purposes. Primarily, it was a job, ~rvang as a means for the young unemployed to makt> a livang. A fixt>d busint>ss locanon providt>d them with a base to assemblr, a placr tu d1Kuss puhrics, to S<x.ulir.t", and to havr fun wirh fncnds and mares. The daltkeh-daari (kiosk-holding) for them also meant doing polir~eal work. lksides their ca-.senes and cold drinks, rhesr young vendors also traded dissenting nrwspapers, pamphlets, and books, and distributed tracts and tlyers.ln this role they werr the most important agents for disseminating, in a relativrly oprn fuhion, the publications of the opposition groups up until June 1981, when the major crackdown of tht> opposition began. Th1s role became even more crucial afterward, as their strcon businesses acted as covers for contmuing distribution of underground literature and maintaining a base for public communicaraon herween political activists. It was eSSt'lltial for them ro maintain the capturt>d spact'S, and to help other vendors to do so as well. h was under the initiative of the political vendors that the rwo vendor associations, the Association of Srrret BookSellers (ASBS) and the Association of the Vendors of Fatemi Avenue were set up. Durmg thr first few months the ASBS gathered some rwo hundred vendors together. To prevent obstruction of thoroughfares, it advised irs members to place standard one-by-two-meter stalls on tM edges of the sidewalks. 11 But rhe municipality did nor seem to agree to such a proj~-r. The associations were dismantled during the first government attacks against the strttt vendors latror in rhe summer of '979· Ordinary Vendors Despite its salient pohtical pre~>ence, political vending was only a short·hved phenomenon and made up a small portiOn of the total street subsistence activitin. More important were rho~ ordinary vendors who continued their prerrvolunon business, as well as the many who joined them by thousands following the revolution. Thr newcomcn were composed of rural migrants. war refugrn, young Tehrani unemployed, and low-income state employers seeking a second ancome. While the politiCal vendors centered in more affluent areas, the typical street squatters spread out in the most heavily rraff1cked thoroughfares and big maidans such as Valiye'asre Street, Ma1dan-i lnqilab, Maidan-1 Imam Hussrin, Maidan-i Khomrini, Mawlavi Street, Maidan-i Shoush, Maidan-1 Azadi, Lalehzar, Istanbul, lmamzade Hasan, and in the vicinity of Park-i Shahr, as well as the

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neighborhoods in lower-class South Tehran. In 1980 over 1,8so stallholders were concentrated in Mosaddrq Avenue and 686 along lnqilab Street.:• Their means of tradmg ranged from simple carton boxes or tm plates to wagons, hanckarts, and kiosks. Many peddlers carried their merchandise in baskets that hung down from their necks. Thru business activities ranged from selling goods to providing services and producing objects. Their merchandise extended from fresh produce, old clothing. cigarettes, and washing powder to domestic appliances, car parts, medicine, stair bread, and their own bodirs. Some ingeniously traded phone coins, Xeroxed car application forms, and rationed gasoline coupons. Indeed. the wartime rationing of basic commodities boosted thrir busmess. as thrir genuinrly free market offrrrd almost anything restrictrd by the state. They produced and $Old food, kitchen appliances, and handicrafts. They offered entertainment, performing as magicians, rnacting passion plays. displaying animals. trlling fortunes. Or they remamed in silent despair next to their handcarts, waiting for somrone tn buy thrir muscle power. The morr desperate did almost any and everything that they thought would rn!llure their survival. This did not exdudr brgging. theft, drug-dealing. and prostitution.:• For these mrn and women, neither their underdog status nor the morality nf their enterprise hindered them so long as t~y made a living... Hawking is a disgrac:rfullabrrouri.til job. You see, I really get embarrassed whrn sometimes my relatives or friends pass by this placr. If they lthe gm·ernmcontl would prov1de for m)' livelihood, I would nevrr do this work. ":• This panorama of individuals, objects, and al."tlvities. this street culture, marked the social space of the street sidewalks, c:reating an imagr of a soc.:ial wholr that embodied a seemingly harmonious division of labor-beggars begged; shoppers and trilders bargained; the village traveler are from the cheap f,xxf stands; porters carried heavy loads; young men flirted. and belirvers broadcast loud religious chantings. Bur these busy thoroughfares b«ame so dogged with screaming rradrrs and street shoppers that moving through became a troublesome venture. It was as if this universe of hurrying individuals, shifting events, and constant noise had turned these streets of Tehran into a boundless macrocosm of 1ts great old bazaar. with 1ts densely packed linle shops and narrow alleyways !i«mingly filled with everyone and neryrhing. The street subsistence workers came from diverse social and reonomic backgrounds. Political vendors apart, the bulk nf them were

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urban youths without work, high school graduates who failed to grt into collegr or find office positions, war refugees, dasabled war veterans, luw-incmne state employees seeking SC'Cond jobs, and-the largest group thro~JKhour the 198o!i-rural magranrs. Some three-quaners of the vendors in Sharaz were magrants from other regions; one out of three was a war refugee.z. ~amalarly, the hulk (over 8o percent) of Tehrani street vendors originated from unskalled peasant migrants, most of whom (about 75 percent) became vendors for the 6nt tame after the revolution.u Many had migrated from the Turkish-speaking provincn of Azarbaijan, Zanjan, and Hamadan-rhe origin of many of the squatter settlers in South Tehran.z~ Vendors often embarked upon their new venture individually and quietly. Perceiving at as a natural way to make a living, they encroached on public spaces by rolling their pushcam around, spreading their #Nuaats, or sening up their stalls, often without being aware of the legal implications of their actions. Those who knew the laws jusnfied themselves hoth pnvately and publicly by referring to the moral principle of necessity. "I don't see this as unlawful. IBecause I only the needy and the poor do this job, nor the rich; only those who are embarrassed before their families because they cannot afford to provide for them-these do the street vending. Otherwise, they would have to rrson to theft and pickpocketing. " 111 But some viewed the strttts simply as public property. '"Look," they often argued "the authorities have not inherited the strerts; have rhey? It is nor their private property! They belong to all."'' To escape from pohce control, some became "invisiblr" by scattering to the less strategic locations. But once the vendors gained some drgrrr of securiry, stalls werr replaced by permanent kiosks. Secunty could be msured by the legitimacy of continual occupancy. Relatives and friends often offered advice on the quality of the '"spot," thr desirabiliry of the merchandise, police harassment, possibilities for bribes, and the like. The vendors alw thought about the cost-benefits of travel-peddling (dast-foroushl), srall-holding (basaati), or kimk-ownang (dalrkeb-daa,). Peddling offered versatility in finding customers and escaping police harassment, hut it required the physical fimess to walk long distances. Possessaon of baS~Wts in fixed locations in the busy thoroughfares was a highly competitive enterprise. Informal norms among the vendors regularrd who possessed which locatmn. Key money of crnain sites was calculated in terms of square

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meter sidewalk tiles and the sires were at rimes traded for hundreds of dollars. 'l On occasion vending began and operated ~ollectively when groups nf relatives and village-mates would take over a public space, a maldan, or a vacant piece of land by hurriedly constructing stalls, kiosks, and booths to form collective markers. These group vendors often specialized in single commodities. In T~hran, for instance, a large numbc!r bought ust-d clothing and appliances from affluent homes and !iold thrrn in the poor southern districts. Most residents of the p
Why So Much Growth? Three ma1or factors ~ontributed to the mass1ve growth of street vendors in postrevolurion Iran: unemployment, a possibility of earning higher ln,·ome, and autonomy frum state regulations and anst1tutions. Unemployment remained a salient feature uf the economy through the 1980s. The total unemployment rate jumped from ro percent m 1~76 to 18.7 percent in 1984"' or some .z. •.z. m1llion people. From 1~7ft to 1986, on ave-rage, some 301,000 (ten-year5-old and over) entered the job market each year. while about .Z..Z.4,ooo jobs were created." More than 64 percent of the unemployed lived in thC' citiC's. Of thC'se, 40 percent werC' prC'Viously employed and 6o percC'nt were new entrants into thC' job market. In the ~o:ities, open unemployment increa~d from 5. 1 percent in 1976 to 1 s..z. percent m 1986. '" Rural migration pla~C'd a hC'avy strain on the urban 1ob market. for instance, during 1981 to 19K 3. the rwenry districts of the capital were receiving an average 1,soo daily nC'W immigrants. This rxduded those who migrated ro and senled on the margin of the ciry.••

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Many of this jobless crowd, Including unskilled village migrants as well as educated Tehranis, moved inro the street subsistence sector. 40 Muhammad Ali Kehzadi, 1 young man (rwenty-seven yean old in 1980) arrived in Tehran immediately after the revolution from 1 village around rhe ciry of Khorram Abad. Hr rnded up in the srrrrts of South Tehran, making a living by entenaining children with a toy gun (tu/tJng baadil: I used to do farmang an the village. lr's ~n now some two months sincr I'\'C arrived in Tehran. What madC' mr comr herr wa5 the pressure of making a living in the village: unemployment, debr, and thC' Idanger I of thr starvation of my family. Maybe- therr is a way out hrrr in Tehran. My brother and I have two hrctarn of land which wr inhrritrd from our fathrr; and we dividrd the income brtwrrn us.... Swear to God, both of our famil~n would work the land for ovrr nme months to produce only rwo tons jof whratl. And that, we would consume allfwnhout brmg able to sell any portion! .... At 11mrs., toward rhr rnd of the yrar:, we would rvc:n be shon of that amount; so, we had to buy some extra flour. In addition to that, we still ncrdrd to buy dcxhrs, shoe~, sugar, tea, mrat, cookang oil, rtc., rtc. We barrly madr it ... Now, I am m debt for 1s to 16,000 tumans .... I carne to Tehran to make th11 money to pay my debt hack .... At the brginnmg.l dtdn't want to do this work at all. I trird thr fruit retail markets; I tried thr bazaar. No way! nobody wants ru hire labor. Tbrrr arC' ju1t no jobs around. So, I harrowed 700 tumans, and bought rh" "gun" to make a living With. ••

Abbas lsmaili, 40 years old (in 1980), had lrft his village nrar the town of Tawiserkan years brforr thr revolution, in 1973, after thr death of his wife: In fac.:r, I do not havC' a rqular 1oh. I will do anything that 1s offrrrd to me. In the pa1n, when llwas young andJ had somC' enC'rzy,l usrd to do c.:onstrucrion work. I was also a poner for •omr t1mr. Bur when my health drtrrioratrd, I ~n doing lighter work.l said to my~lf. •1 don't have !anybody orl anything in this world. So, lrt's not suffer morr than this 1n the~r couplr of days rC'matntnR of my life." Now, it's been a month or so since l'vr begun selhng 145brb strings!1 Btforr doinR th1s., I was a vrndor. If I had enough money, I would RO to the business of buy· ang and Idling nngs or rhmp hkr this!'

The stones seem to reflr'-'1 the stereotypical image of the vendors as a desperate and destitute segment of the urban undrrclass. Postrevolutionary developments in fact produced greater diversity

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among the vendors by introdu(:ing people with diverse social attributes of age, income, education, and ambition into this subaltern group. Many unskilled as well as skilled mnr joined street work because it offered them a relatively high income. In 1990 about 6o percent of Tehrani vendors, with one out of three being high school graduates, made between J,OOO to 1 o,ooo rials a day. •• The mayor of Tehran claimed in March 1984 that some of the street bread traders in the capital earned as much as Rls s,ooo a day!' About 10 pen:ent of skilled people preferred the high income from vending to making use of their expertise. •• Finally, fur some the idea of running a business autonomous from government regulations and bureaucratic discipline made street vending an anrartive option. Despite the low status attached to the trade (considered as hamnwll and ablrouri:i) many street hawkers ~med to prefer remaining in similar activities! 7 As a worker put it in 198 3, .. working in large industries like car factories is very draining; one would always be under someone's thumb. That is why, I think, work like street vending is more suitable and wonhwhile. ""1 The vendor5 did suffer polke harassment, income irregularities, low status, and the physical hardship of working in the streets during the cold winters and hot summers. High income, autonomy, and easy entry for many, compensated for these costs of informalit)'· Nevertheless, they never stopped their effons to offset these costs while maintaining the benefits. This meant demanding security, shops, kiosks, and credit, which involved the petty business of the street in a major sociopolitical conflict.

Consequmccs and Contradictions With expansion of street vending. three main areas-urban employment, urban physical space, and urban social space-became sites of contestation and conthct berwren vendors and the state. By engaging in street subsistence activities, some 31.o,ooo people managed to earn a living. Many unskilled migrants, laid-off workers, disabled poor, recent high school leavers, and even university graduatrs moved into theK' occupations, primarily because they did not see .any other alternative." "What is our fault that we have no other opponunities but these jobs?," vendors argued when confronted by belligerent officials. m As an old man stated:

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Wdl, th•s•s the way I make my hvmg. lilt hcrc, and 10111e people bring me Kuods; I add a pcr~enugc ro the pnce and sell rhem ..• I know the government has said that we shouldn't uusc mflation. The municipality agrnrs 'arne a frw rima to s,top my work. I told them. .. What do you wanr me ro do ID.!Itcad, gu around and beg? Give us opportunity, then wr would "op th1s kmd of work.""

Offil:ial discourse perceived street work as a .. social disease" (bmtarr-ye ritrmari), an .. afflicting malaise" (bimari-ye mosre') •parasitic" (mashaghel-i anga/i), and .. fake and pseudo-occupations" (mashaghel-r kaub.-which caused nuis.anc~ and obstruction in public sites. 11 Strefl vendors were rep~nred as opportunists, lazy bums (tanparvar), political conspirators, military service escapees, and drug dealers. Those who .. have set up food stalls in the st.-errs are in fact rebuffing the Revolution," stated Tehran's radical mayor, Muhammad Tavauoli, in 1979 ... If the municipality docs not stop these activities, it will practically encourage idleness and indolence. " 11 The terms •mashagel-i lta:ib" and •sadd-i ma'har" became the most widely used terms in these discursiVe campaigns. ' 4 •fake occupations" were defined as the .. unproductive" and .. consumptionist" jobs that •create no valur-added ..... Thry wrrr responsible for shonagr and inflation. Ironically, most revolutionary officials, from radical d~gy ro conservative and liberal politicians, shared the modernization theory and ideology of urban duality. Their concept of insan-i hashiye-ir (marginal man) did not diverge much from the cultural type constructed and shared hy many late ninrtrrnth- and early twentieth-century Wrstrrn urban sociologists. ~• On the other hand, strrrt vending had an obvious impact on urban space. Once the individual vendors established their simple b,uaats or kiosks on thr strrrt sidewalks, they began gradually ro extend their spatial domain by putting chairs, benches, tables, and plants around their spms and wvrring their stalls with shades or umbrellas. Before long, and often illegally, the kiosks were connected to the city's electricity 5Upply, allowing colorful lights, fans, and music, which, for some, had become an inseparable component of vending life. Every morning and latc aftcrnoon, vendors became responsible for sweeping and wetting down the areas surrounding their Juts. Whrn some secunty was achieved, fringe artas werc riltd and stalls cementcd to the ground. Vendors were mvolved m an active usc of the public space by

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directly panicipating in its utilization. organization, and change. But such panicipative use came into sharp confli,:t with the tendency of the state to restrict public space for a pa5sive use. The state reserved for Itself the prerogative to determine how the space should be organized. In Iran, early attempts to regulate public space began in the late nineteenth century. In 1896 the state made systematic provisions to police the movements of hawkers, street workers, pimps, prostitutes, mules, carriages. loiters, and strttt children.,. Darughehs enforced the laws until 1916, when it was replaced by modern municipalities and the police. a policy that has continued to thr present. •• All modern statrs share this tendrncy, since thr issur of space 1s simultaneously an issue of order and ultimatdy an exenion of power." An active use of spacr means, in a sense, the statr relinquishing some degrtt of control over the activities of the populace. The Islamic authorities v1ewed strttt work as having a destabilizing effect, threatening the social fabric. They mvariably expressed fear about the .. cancerous" spread of street activities, this "contagious malaise." One can visualize how they saw cities being sunk into the chaos of an uncontrollable mass of .. fake" elements with their quarrels, complaints, and rumors. 110 Vendors were seen to cause obstruction, harass women, pr<J\'ide cover for draft dodgers, drug dealers, and opposition conspirator\, and present a squahd and chaotic image of the capital to foreign visitors." Vendors were also involved in creating a new social space in the sneers, which the Islamic state could not tolerate. The jubilance, jokes, music, assemblies of youths, colorful lights, and the brisk atmosphere together created an alternative cultural aura. This generally secular, cheerful, and colorful street culture was in sharp contrast to the prevailmg somber and dark religious mood. Street vendors, in panicular the political breed, had indeed created a highly visible cnunterhegrmonic street subculture that seemed to challenge the state's nution5 of governance and its meaning of order. Beyond this, vendors had appropriated the favnrablr business conditions that merchant class had creatrd. Many putrntial customers of stores were attracted to srrttt vendors who offered more affordable and convenient bargains. Merchants thus joined the government in combating the street vendors. In shon, what was at 'take was the relative: autonomy and fluidity of vending life, outside and against the surveillance of officialdom. In their capacity as autonomous or informal ind1v1duals, vendors were

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seen as promoters of disorder, immoral behavior, and political conspiracy.·~ for this, they had to be curtailed. Confrontations To outmaneuver the street Vl"ndors, the authorities resorted to institutional mechamsm!., exerted moral pres!ioure, and waged violence. Several agents and IO!iotltUtion'i Wl"re involved m combating strel"t subsistence acuvuies. lkyond the htzbul/aht groups-the l,asdaran and thl" munKtpalit)· authoruies-the Anri- Vice Court (L>adgah-1 Zedd-1 Munkarat) served to give legal cover to the demolition policie!io and to offset the legal struggles uf the ••endors. The Committee for Guild Affairs (CGA), a nongovernmental body administering business affairs m Tehran, al'>o intervened by l!.!iouing antivending warnings and mstrucuons on professional and legal grounds. In June 1CJHO for mstam:e, the committee rdu~d tu recogniLe street vending as a legitimatl" trade hy ~those who have taken advantage of the revoluuon by senmg up tents, hasaats, and trading ventures in the pubhc thornughfareo;.."•' On many nccaswns the attorney gl"neral and the General Commands of the Revolutionary Committees directly authonzed the Pasdaran to intervene, as in Karadt 111 November 1984 and Shiraz in December 1984.~ lksplte the operations of these agents, there was still a need for a central authont)' to manage the crisis systematically. Increasing rural mtgrauon and urban unemployment made this task even more urgent. In May 198 3 the ma)'Or of Tehran, Enginel"r Seifian, formed the Committee Agamst Obstruction of Thoroughfarl"s (CAOTI(Sttad-i Ra('-1 .')add-1 Mt~'bar), an Interdepartmental group composed of representati\'C''> from the central municipality, police, revolutionary committees, traffic, and a few othen.." Authorized by the attorney general, the CAOT instructed Its spa:ial agents to cv1ct the street vendors:• The CAOT created special antiobstru~:tinn squads, whiCh, in cooperation with the Pasdaran, replaced the street thug~. By May 1yH-4 ~ix mobile units were set up to provide surve1llan'e over the twenty-one distril.'ts of the capital city. Agents drove: around in their vans and pickup trucks; any 1llegal vendor they encounrered was evicted and his property confiscated. The merchandise might be returned or not, depending on certain procedure!>, indudmg the extent of illegality and the payment of hnC!.."-

Yet even th1s proved anadequate to contain the crisis. In September 198s, some eighteen months later, CAOT ba:ame the Committee for Conranuing Mobilization Against the Obstruction of Thoroughfares (CCMAOT) (Sitad-i Basij-r Paygu,; ''a Rll('-i Sadd-e Ma'bar). The change of name pointed to an emphasis on long and sweeping campaigm., with antiobstruction squads stationed permanently in the major trading l'x.:ations, induding the ma1dans of lnqilab and Ta1rish in the north, and those of Imam Hussein, Khorasan, Shnush, Rah-i Aahan. Gumrok, 1~th Khordad Avenue, Serah-i Azan, and streets off Lalehur, in the poor neighborhoods of South Tehran.~M In addnion to systemati~ institutumal mechanisms, many politicians resorted to rdig1ous leaders to eurt moral pressure on the vendors:• Urban migration, squatter ~ttlement, and street vending were discussai in friday prayers and local mosque sermons. Preachers often anstigated the1r audience into violent actions agaim-.t vendors. ·o The mayor of Orumieh procla1med that .. obstru~'tion and unemployment are haram lunac~eptableJ according tn sharr'a ... -. Attorney General, Ayatollah Muhammad Gilani requested Ayatollah Khomeini to issue a fitwa, forbidding street vendors from •causing obstruction. ""1 The fitu•a was sought nor only to put moral pressure on the street vendors but also to silence the few officials who cast doubt on the viability of violent crackdowns. ' I The rewrt to violenl.7e pointed to the fact that institutional and mural pressure was having little practil.7al effect. The t'arly antivending pohc1es and actions were directed largely against the politl1.7al vending. On Mar~.7h 17, 1980, only nne month after the revolution, .. the Tehran central municipality mstructed all other districts to remove as soon as possrble all the recently erected stalls.''·· This was followed by harsher instructions. The warnings in part functioned as a green light to the informal street thugs, the h•z:.bullah•s, to get on with the dissenting vendors. Groups of thugs, often escorted by the Pasdaran, went around kicking down stalls and basaat!!t and confiscating merchandise and other belongings. ' I Subsequent scuffles and fistfights resulted in many injuries and deaths. In the first year of the revolution, demolitions tended tu he random, concentrated mainly in the streets around Tehran University, Mosaddeq (then Valiye'ahdl. and lnqilab avenur-s in the capital ciry. Large-scalr- violence also took place. The largest antivending operation in Tehran coincided with the first widnpread attt'mpt to quell tht' Kurdish autonomy movements in tht'

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late summer of 1980. In rhe late afternoon of one of rh~ days, I ventured to thr are.11 around Trhran Univrr.sity. Thr locality, oncr crlebrared for 1ts brisk and energetic feeling, had turned into a lonely and joyless arra. Pasdaran and the h•:bullahi thugs were patrolling on foot or in military jerps, driving victoriou!!ily up and down the deserted streen. The pavement and the streets resembled a battle zone, with piles of scatte~d newspaper sheets, ripped books, tom flyen, broken rabies, and wrecked vending stalls littering the ground. The occasional passers-by looked bewildered, rnigned, and silent; among them were local vendors who had returned with dismay, anguish, and anger to learn the fare of their spou;. Small-scale and random attacks, demolitions, and the removal of rhe street traders becamr an rveryday practice, one that continued through the late 198os. Almost any national crisis was used by the government to crack down on strttt entrrprises. On May l. 5, 198 1, in the midst of the clerical confrontation with Prestdenr Bani Sadr and rhe Mujahedin, a group of fifty h•:hullahls attacked the kiosk holden of Faremi Avenue in Tehran. The thugs turned on the stall holders, using iron dubs, knives, and similar objects. Some thirty kiosks and stalls were badly damaged or totally destroyed, and seven vendors were seriously mjured. The attacken returned the following day to finish off rhe remaining daltlub-daars, this time leaving ten to fiftttn wounded.·· There were similar, though nor as devastating attacks in the provincial citaes. Between 198l. and 1984 rhe authorities in Shiraz. Tabriz, Urumiyeh, Khorram Abad, Masjid Soleyman, Ghazvm, Langroud, Kirmanshah, and Karadj gave the go-ahead ro both Pasdaran and dub-wielders to dnrroy kiosks and remove rhe peddlers. Everyday survetllancr Sttmed to have a marked impa"-r in rrducing street activirirs. In April 1984 officials announced they had removed over 90 percent of the tl.O,ooo illegal vrndors and kiosk holden from the strttts of Tehran. "The remaindrr," they promised, "will be dealt with harshly in accordance with law. " 77 Some 1,86~ strttt cigarette sellers were arrestrd by july 198 ~ in Tehran alone. '• In the words of the mayor .. thr obstruction of thoroughfares which could have major social and political ramifications 1s on the verge of total resolution ... ~ Although street violence did force some vendors to retreat, the removal poliq in the capital affected mainly those centered in Maidan Azadi, the margins of Valiye'asr Avenue (a mator shopping center of the well-ro do), and lnqllab Avenue. Four years inro rhe campaigns a

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mood of resignation replaced the language of aggression. In March 19H ~ the mayor of Shiraz pleaded with the citizens ro .. offer us a solution. ooMtl In Tehran the head of the CCMAOT, Muhammad Malayeri, adtnowlcdged that .. our !demolition I a~nts are operating an the most difficult and dangerous conditions. Every day a num~r of them get ~atcn up and injured by the vendors, and aher a whale they get tired and worn down. "'" 1 !K>me vendors stood and defended their enterpnse; many owners of the less versatile kiosks moved to less noticeable locations; the more flexible peddlers took up a guernlla-typc ta""tic of resistance.

ResisrinR rhe Eviction Policy Vendu~

rnisted the evictaon policy in different ways. They organized demonstrations, withstood the eviction agents on the spot, took legal actanns, and publicized their plight in the press. The most endurmg method was the everyday guerrilla-type tactic of .. sell and run .., What determined these diverse tactics had to do with the differing types of \'ending and the changing political cm;umstances. Vendors did nor rely solely on informal association or active mobilization; these tactics were Ins usdul after the state repression ht-gan. The enduring factor was the operatum of "passi\'e networking" among vendors. Passive networking is the instantaneous and silent communication established among atomized individuals with common interests by virtue of a visihility rhar is facilitated through common space. Those individual vendors who worked in the same street and saw one another on a daily basis could develop latent communications merely by the fact of their common interest, even though they might not know or speak with nne another. When a common threat arrived, they came together spontaneously to act colla'tivdy. Demonstrations and sit·ins were organized largely by the political and immobile vendors. They took place in the early years of the postrevolution, 1979 to 1981, when this method of protest enjoyed a wide legitimacy. The vendors demonstrated either in order to hinder their forced removal or to publicize their plight and express their anger after an evict ann had already tx.:currrd. Thus, on December 1 6, 198 1, a small group of Tehrani vendor!t responded ro a demolition raid by assembling in front of the muni,ipaliry. A representative was sent to plead with the mayor, who pledged to provide them with a ~pace to set up an off-street market. Similarly, in Kirmanshah (Bakhtaran), somr ~treet

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threr hundred vrndors stagrd a march on the ciry hall to protest against an arrack by thr Pasdaran who two wreks earlier had destroyrd rhrir kiosks. They asked thr authorities to allow them to sell all thrir merchandise and e11tablish a ~rmanrnt off-strert market for them. The mayor agreed to borh their claims.. •l For most pan, howevrr, demonstrations rrmained isolated, smallscale, and loosely organized. They occurred mainly during 1979 and 1981, when a frrer political climate allowed left-wing activisrs to mobilizr strert dissent. They often encountered violent reactions. from thr Pasdaran, who considered such activitirs as a ploy to deltgitimize the revolution. A joint march organized by the Union of the Street Book-Srllers and rhe lin ion of the KitKk Holders of Mosaddrq Avenue in July 1980 was dealt with very harshly. h lasted a few days, involved marching to the presidential office and city hall, and resulted in many IDJunes and the killing of one demonstrator by the Pasdaran .. ' Because of their mobilizing role, political vendors were more s.usceptible to v1olenr reactions than othen. They were nor only defrnding their jobs, they were also exposing the government's violation of freedom of expression. While thrir forms of resistance tended to be more elaborate and loud, their successes proved limited. By the summer of 1981 rhe political vendors had been driven off the str~ts, leaving the ordinary vendors on their own, with some resoning to on-the-spot defense nf their enterprises. On December 1_s, 1985, CCMAOT squads, along with groups of Pasdaran, raided a fruit market located m the Falake·ye Dovvom-i Khazaneh, a pour neighborhood in South Tehran. They bt-gan to collect handcans, scalrs, and similar belongings, throwing fruits into the sewage dirchrs running through the market. ThC' vendors responded with their fists, inciting the Pasdaran to shoot intn the au. One can owner rracted by throwing a heavy scale" we1ght at the agents, knock· ing one down. ThC'y beat him up and dragged him to the Security Knmiteh. Reportedly, the women present defended the vendors, screaming at the agents and blaming the troubles on them. 14 Despite open resistance of this son, the outcome for the vendors was not always favorable. On-the-spot resistance cenainly made the removal poliq very costly and slow. In panicular, the involvement during each confrontation of scores of sympathi7~rs and passers-by would frustrate police o~rahons, leaving the agents embarrassed and indignant. Yet the vendors also felt the cost of their constant vigilance

and the msecuriry of everyday dashes with the demolition agents. One vending stronghold around Tehran University resisted the eviction policy until April 1990; despite their hitter resistance-eighty were detained-they were eventually driven off the streets by Pasdaran and by local shopkeepers. 11 The scattered narure of street work, the localized narure of their operation, and the fact of self-employment rendered a large-scale resistance (similar to that of the fa~"tory workers or the squatters) difficult. 1u the threat of demolition persisted, vendors had to think of alternative solutions. From mid- 1981 they turned to other forms of struggle. Some took legal action against the CCMAOT, bringing complaints to the courts, the Committee of Act 90 of the Majlis, the Presidential Office, the speaker of the Majlis, and the Administrative justice Court (Divan ldalat-i ldaari). Lawsuits piled up to the extent that the head of the CCMAOT expressed his frustration at the rime and energy they consumed ... Others resorted to a campaign of publicity and appeal in the press. The two major Tehran dailies, Enilaat and K.ayhan, carried letters of the vendors that comhmed cnes for justice with desperation and urgency. Ahmad lslam1, a vendor from the ~iry of Karadj wrote: For rhr last r1gh1ren yean, I have been making a living and !luproning my !lrven-memhcr family by !Idling daily parers in a kiosk. Bur wmr time a~o. thr munic1paliry in rhr c1ty of Karadj began to cullect rhr kiosk5 on the ground that thry obstructed thr public thoroughfare and rhry a~ doing this in thr conditions where thr cold winter i!i on its way. We, the newspaprn sellen, cannot do our busine!IS in the srrrers withour shelters. So, wr appeal to the honnrablr mayor rn allow us to carry on our work through this wmtrr. Otherwl!lt', we will have no recourse bur to .ray at hume ldmng nmhingl. •·

Rahim Rnaii, a peddler from Tehran, appealed: I am a (aludrb .. hawkrr. a trnant, and a breadwinner fur a fam1ly of 6ve. I would like to r~uest the honorable mayor to think of the famihes, of the vendors when he orden their eviction from the: str~ts. If they lthr munu:1pahryJ allocate us a market s1tc: anywhr~ in rhr City, wr w11l rrmovr our busmrn off the: strrrts promptl)' and wnhout any hesitation.'"

Alrhough these nonconfrontational campaigns prov~d effective in changing the attitude of some policy-makers, they failed to deter the immediate: danger of evi~"tiun. Thne struggles represented largely the

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tactics of th~ kiosk hold~n and 1mmobil~ v~ndors, who~ fix~d location had b«om~ a liability. The mdhod serv~ as r~ last an~mpt to which the kiosk holden could resort under the conditions of repression. ~ situation for thr mobile and more versatile vendon, howrver, seemed quit~ diff~rmt. To survive th~ 1mm~iat~ threat of removal, the more venatile and mobil~ vendors turned from an open confrontation to a war of amition through a hidden and everyday resistanct-. The fluidity of the operation of the basaatis, peddlers, hawk~rs, wagon holders, lorry keepers, and van owners made it possible for them to pack up their ~rchandise once rhe antiobstruction squads appeared, and to resume their operation as soon as the agents left the liCene. The pass1ve network, which is facilitated by mere visibility and proximity, as well as rhr a"-rive informal communication among the srraor vendors rendered this quirt form uf resistance h1ghly successful. The vendors often appointed a few peers to guard the vicimty of their work by informing the others of the arrival of eviction agents, hy shouting: "the agents are coming, run away. "'I() On many occasions even the immobile kiosk holders followed similar tactics. In the cuurse of the six months following their first removal in summer 1980 from Fatemi Avenue in Tehran, a group went back several rimes to bu1ld then stalls, after betng driven away each time. On one day in February 198 1 a number uf them returned and hurri~ly erected some seventy-five kiosks in a few hours. •• Ettilaat concluded that, givt•n this guerrilla-type campaign, the activities of the demolition squads '"have no outcome, except to waste time and energy."'J The antiobstru"-rion vans and trucks drove around in the srreets, supposedly clearing away the unauthorize-d v~ndors. But as soon as they mov~d away, "in a f~w minut~s. rverything get11 back ro normal as if nothing had happenN ... It appears that the Municipality is simply unable to do away with this highly rxtrnsive n~twork ... u A large number of the vendors individually w~nt .. invisible" by scan~ring to less noticeablr and less strategic pmitions. Some vendors stood by in strategic locations wh~rr they displayed not me-rchandise but a piece of cardboard that carried a list of pot~ntial items. Prospective customers would then be guided to hackstreers where the actual merchandise were stored. This method reduc~ the risk of I06ing capital by enhancing vendors' ability to confront the pohce.

S!WBI!

IBBB~S

To he more agile and mobile. vendors had to transform from kioskowning to stall-holding, push-can vending, and ro simply carrying cardboard signs. While this maneuver reduced vendors' active use of both public space and business conditions. it ensured thear continuing presence 10 the street economy and politics. ln the end, the antanbstruction operations did nor reduce the number nf the venden as mush as they redistributed them. The problem remained. In 1984 an Azari vendor, commenting on anrivending polici~. srated: '"I have been a vendor for the last twenty yean. Different governments have been trying to remove us since the time of ~neral Razmara l•9so-I9JII. But they couldn't. I think, this regime also won't he able to force us off the streets ...... As larr as April 1990 a new mayor of Tehran, Gholam Hussein Karbaschi, summed up the state of affairs. "The problem of vending and obstruction in rhr larxr cities, .. he stated, .. has always existed and will continue to persist. But the approach to this problem should nor be 'sil4di' !what the CCMAOT adoptedJ." He then disclosrd rhr new stratqy of the government to incorporate" thr more mobilr vendors by establishing off-street collective markets throughout thr city."' Having failed to end street activities, the aurhnrines decided to bring them under their own control. Incorporation, Diffusion, and Rack to the Streets? By rarly 1986 the authorities had acknowledged that street activities there to stay. Thrir hope that at least the "seasonal" street peddlen would return to their villages... also appeared to be a fantasy. It was waddy accepted that the remedy to this "disease" must he sought not in the cities but 10 the countryside, by tackling the development problems in the rural areas. The official press earned anides, repons, and debar~ on the predicament of street trade, wondering where these desperate people would go if and when the removal policy succeeded.~~ The question now was how to accommodate them without lening the situarion ro get enrirely out of hand. In October 198 s the Tehran municipality began a survey of street activities to adentify those '"who deserved tu continue their actavaties, .. mdudang the old, sick, and disabled, and those with at least ten years in the business. Lawful vendors were required ro get offidal permits, ru be issued by the Union of the Kiosk Holders and ke Traders of Tehran (UKHITI), whach cooperated with the CAOT. This method replaced an earlier policy whereby the '"deserving vendors" would were~

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have to apply through and ~ recommendrd by the local mosques."• According to the new d1recrives, strttt a~'tivihes were restrictrd to srllmg Rowers, fresh fruu 1uice, machine-made brrad, and foreign newspapers.... The rest, the unlawful kiosk holders and peddlers, were to br removrd within fony-eight hours. Municipality plans to construct formal street and off-str«r markers had been rntenamed, two yean earlier, to accommodate some ~o,ooo to 40,000 vendors and stall-holders in Tehran, placing them in such street markets as Tangeh Chaabeh m Vahye'asr Avmue; Saz.:aarche-ye z.z. Bahman in N1zamabad, which had about z.oo stalls; and similar umts in Maidan-i lnqilah, Naser Khosrow Street, and especially m districts m South Tehran.'!](' The plan barely got off the ground until thr early 19905. as street vending kept growing undererrrd.'u' With the comul8 to office of Karbasch1, a young, Western-educated mayor. im:orporation overcame confrontation. In the wmter of 1991., 'lnm flea markets began operating at different localities in the capatal city. 1'1z Each of these "rraditional markets," as they were called, was organized on a different day oft~ week. They accommodated up to three hundred vendors. The markets were located in places such as parkmK lots and blocked streets for a limited tame, and no fees were charged. In addition to professional vendors, households were also allowed to sell their used items, and a specaal market was set up for anisrs ro exhibit and trade their creatauns. Some thirty-five markets were planned to operate during 1991.. The vendors were encouraged to establish shuras with the elected representatives serving the general interests of the trade, negotiating with the authorities, and supervising the tagged prices. The shura issued a special I.D. card for the "commined" vendors, recognizing them as members of the lawful vending commumty. Government officials stared that their ob1ectives in sening up the markers were to C
Sfftllf RIBILS

oping any ~n~ of territorialiry hy moving them around to different locations at different times. 11" Newspaper sellers also c:ame under surveillance through the standardization of their spac:e. The municipality relocated them into fixed kiosks, which it designed and that were given only tn lic:ensed vendon. More than 650 of th~ official kiosks were installed throughout Teheran. 104 Nonstandard kiosks, easily recogni7.ed, remained illegal. Vendors nevenheless as~ned their determination to remain in their occ:upations, albeit in different settings. The)' won recognition, hut had to function in a controlled struc:rure. How long c:an such a bargain last? It depends prohably upon the extent to which the markets will respond to the long-term needs of the street's ecunomic activities--to secure a c:ompetitive income and to respond to the possihle increase in the size of srreet work. Otherw•~. as it often happens in many plac:n such as Cairo, a return to the origmal panerns is a likely scenario. Already hy the mid- 1990s, indications were that the f1ea markets in Iran had begun to wither away, and many street rehels were on their way back 10 the streets.

155

Eight Grassroots and State Powera The Promise and Perils o1· Quiet Encroachment

This book has been about the strugglt'S of ordinary people to survive and improve their lives. I have heen concerned with a rype of informal politics, which I have termed the quiet encroachment of the ordinarythe lifelong, everyday, small-scale, and often silent strivings of the Third World poor, which at cenain historical moments assume a collective character, giving riK to major conflicts in snciery. At a different Ieveii have attempted to explore the relationship between social movements and social change. In this condudinK chapter I would like to aSKss the significance of this type of grassroots activism, exploring its implications both with reference to the spedfic caK of Iran and more broadly in relation to a number of theoretical issues. SiROificance The preceding chapters di.Ku~d in detail how the urban poor in Iran strove to extend their social and economic space both where they lived and in their working lives. The chapters chronicled the way in which squatter migrants brought urban land under development both long before the Islamic revolution and after, creating new communities; the way in which they demanded urban amenities from the authorities, or acquired them unlawfully. Street subsistence workers tonk over the

main public thoroughfarn, putting up stalls, driving pushcarts, and ~recting kio~ks. Taking advantage of the opportuniti~s provided by the revolution, poor familin appropriated vacant homn and hotels and the unemployed strove to secure jobs or else demanded social protection. Thr jusrifi~ation for aL-rion was b.ued invariably on thr moral principle of necessity. Neverthrless, rational calculation was also part of the game. Many of these efforts involvrd organizing, marching in the streets, and Kuffling w1th secunty forces. Others involved community mobiliz.ation, identity politics, and struggles for communal and cultural autonomy. Undoubtedly the Islamic Revolution of 1979 provided the poor with an exceptional opportunity for collective and audible mobilization. Yet, for the most part under normal circumstances, the actors. these .. informal people" wnhout any mstitutional structure, were individuals and families who made their advances steadily, individually, and without much clamor. From these considerations alone a number of simple but important conclusions emerge. First, given the limited opportunities available to the poor (in terms of income, education, skill, and connections), such direct actions constitute the most viable mrthod for their self-development. Most commentators, focusing on the structural processes of social exclusion and poverty, neglect those on the receiving end of the process-the excluded-or else regard them as victims. However. I have loo"d at the everyday life and social act1v1ties of the excluded groups in terms of a particular type of grassroots movemnrt, showing that the poor are nor simply passive recipients of change bur are also actors in its making. I have shown that, contrary to the prevailing stereotypes that portray them as "passive poor," .. fatalistic Muslim masses, .. or .. disoriented marginals," the di~enfranchiscd do not sir around to walt fur the1r fate hut are actively engaged, within their constraints, m shapmg rhe1r own destiny. In this context the Muslim Middle Easterners, despite cultural differences, are no different from other low-income groups in the developing world. This raises a second point. There is a widnprrad assumption that the appeal of political Islam is to the massn, npecially the recent poor migrants to cities. A deep religiosity, along with sharrd language and institutions, arc said to hrmg the masSt"S and the clergy togrther, rendering them close allies. The accounts in this book (and my current rt'St'arch in Egypt) show that the relationship brtween the poor on the

one hand and the Islamic movements and the Islamic state, on the other, i!ii much more complex. There is no such a thing as a natural ally for political Islam. The activities of Egyptian lslamists among the urban poor are very scattered and pragmatic, and so is the reciprocal support of the poor; the underclass in urban Egypt is left predominantly nn its nwn. In Iran, on the other hand, the ruling clergy never established total hegemony over the poor, despite its pro-musta:'afirr discourse. Rather, the disenfranchised were polarized. Some segments-including groups withm the revolutionary guards, Bas1;rs. the Construction Crusade, and the lik~were incorporated into the starr structure. Others remained outside, and their srruggles for self-development brought them into conflict with the Islamic state. These include those hybrid elements whose ideological affinity w1th the Islamic government did not deter their daily struggles against the same government's agents (Pasdaran, the municipality and so on I. Tht' fact is that the disenfranchi~d cannot afford to bt' ideological. As the historical narrativt's in this book t'vidence, the political ideological class par excellence is not the plKJr but, as usual, is the das.'i made up of students, teachers, and other sa"tors of the intelligentsia, who seem to he initiators and leaders of most radical and oppositional politics, including the lslam1c. Most of the poor seem to he uninterested in any particular form of ideology and politics, whether governmental (e.g., Islamic as in Iran) or oppositional (e.g .• leftist). Their interests he m tho~ stratcogies and as.'iOCiations that respond dir«tly to thetr immediate concerns. Their attachment to informal pnmary rl'lations and !KJiidarities Sttms to he the best form of prott'ction. This, I should emphasize, is not meant to imply an essential lack of interest on the pan of the ptKJr in abstract thinking or planning for distant futures. On the contrary, many poor people lll't' on the dream of a better future. In the Middle F.ast the particular attention that poor families pay to the well-being and education of their children is a proof of their foresight. My point is that such forerhoughts may he internalized only if the)· are immediately concrete and meaningful in the poor's cultural world· vi~s.

Of course, when opportunity arises, as in multiparty democracy or under political patronage, attempts are ind~d made to articulate the politics of the state and/or oppositional groups and the interests of the poor. Howevt'r, this articulation of interest docs nor usually last long, since the ptxu's !ltake in the immediate and the concrete distracts them

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from th~ absrra~t ideology and long-term program of both the opposition and the state. Perhaps more= than any oth~r social groups, the poor tend to rdy on themselves to survive and improve their lot. Yet in their endeavors ro survive-and this is my third poinr-rhesr ordinary pwpk with their ordmary ways bring about significant social changr-thr kind of changn that at rimn are comparable to those a rrvolution may (or may not I produce for them. Bryond affecting their hves, these localized practic~,., meanwhile, entail critical soc1al changes at the broader level-m national demography, urban structure, law and orde~ and pubhc pohcy. The actors' efforts m redisrr1buting !KX:ial goods and opportunities, together with their srruAA!e for autonomy, rend to lay a heavy economic and political cost on the dominant groups, tilting the balanc~ of power in society. Some may equate" these locahzed struggles with drsprratC' acts of survival m conditions where a nationwide reform movem~nr is lackmg. Thus a revolution sympathetic to the poor is expected to end their lJUid encroa~hment. Howrve~ such a formulation ra1srs some d1fficult lJUCStlons. To begm with, why 1s a nationwide rtform movement lackmg an the first plac~. and how can one~ brought about? How often do~s a r~vulution sympatheti..: to the causr of the pxu rake place, and what are thr ptKlr to do m antic1pat1on of such a reform or revolution? After all, the Islamic revolution in Iran did not entirely end the quirt encroa..:hmenr of thr poor. What it did was alter 1ts dynamics by facilItating collective mobilization and extrakinship association. Yet when the revolutionary uproar subsided and the lslami~ r~gime con!iolidatrd, the disenfranchised returned to the same stratrgy that they had pursued in the years befurr the revolution. This was nor becausr the Islamic rrgimr Willi anti-lower dass. In fact, its prn-mustaz'afin language was dear. Furthermore, the state based its lrgitimacy on Islam as a rrlig1un of lUStier, and on its ardent support of the downtrodden. Rather, for the poor, localized struggle, unlike an abstra"'t and disram '"rrvolunon," was both meamngful and manageaMe-mraningful m that they .:ould make sense of the purpose and have an idea about th~ con,.equence of those actions, and manageable m that they,rather than some remote nat1onalleaders, set the agrnda, projected the aims, and controlled the uurcom~. In th1s sense, for rhr poor, the local was usually privileged over the globaVnational. In addition, the Oexibility and perseverance associated with suc:h grtisroots activism enabled the poor to ntend theu social space and to rt'Spond to p,liti~al constraints

QJASSJOO!S A•D S!A!I POWIJ mor~

rffa.-rivdy. In authoritarian political conditions, family-c~nt~r~d and fr~e-form activism often substitute for and prove more durable than structured and formal organizations. Mor~ broadly, and preci~ly becau~ of this largely silent and fr~ form mobilization, the current focus on rh~ notion of .. civil socirry" t~nds to belittle or totally ignore the vast array of oft~n uninstirution· alizrd and hybrid social activirirs-srr~r polirics-rhar have dominated urban politics in many developing countries. To be sure, there is more than just one conceptualization of civil society, and of cou~ it is crucial to understand what one m~ans by rh~ r~rm. jillian Schw~dl~r's r~virw of rhr literature on th~ Middle East rncals the tremendous div~rsity of prrc~ptions not only betw~n the classical and wntrmporary variants bur also within the larrer. Some prrcriv~ of civil sociny as organiz~d life that li~s outside the state. Others exclude from this, family, tribe, and dan; others, r~ligious institutions; others, by attributing moral qualities to rhco concept, lcoave our violent groups.' Yet all ~m to agree that an associational core constitutes an integral element of civil society and is therefor~ essentially privileged over other forms of social expression. Without intending to downgrade the value of ..civility" 1-<:rntral ro rhe notion of social capital-my point is that the redul."tionism of rh~ debates on civil society excludes and even scorns modes of struggle and expression that, in 10me societies such as tho~ in the Middle East, arco more rxtrnsiv~ and rffrctivr than conventional independent institutions.

Shortcominp and Costs Rrcognizing the merits of grassroots activities associated with quirt should not blind us to their c:ostli and failures. Some hav~ already reminded us of the danger of "the romanc:e of r~sis tance."' Th~ sad truth is that not ev~rything in the life of the poor is. rosy, and that the poor fac:e enormous uhstades in bringing about fundamental change in their lives. Nor, on th~ other hand, is a lifelong struggle n~c:essarily a virtu~. ev~n if it ~v~ntually yi~lds the desired results. Th~ recent history of the poor in Iran as wirn~ss to this. Th~ un~mployed, d~spite a powerful show of force and visibility in rh~ str~ts. failed to realize fully their demands for jobs or social security benefits. Many homeless families fail~d to rnain the homes and hotels th~y had s~iz~d and were forc:rfully evicted. Squatters faced violent ~nc:roachmrnt, how~ver,

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;J£18100!8 AID 1!£!1 POWIJ

counterattacks by securiry forces; water and el~tnc1ry supplies were cur, hundreds of mformal homes were demolished, communities were d1smanrlrd, mdependent neighborhood ~.:ouncils fell apart, and a"'tivisrs were arrested and jailed. Srreet vendors endured !itimilar stthacks. After some ten years of confrontations, it was as 1f they had disa~ared from the streets. Of course, these contenders were not dimmated alrugerher. Yet although most of them reusted, they had to ~ar with constant Insecurity and despair. Indeed, for some time m the late 1yHos 1t was as if street politics had !nmply waned. What caused these costs and setbacks? What do they all mean? Some obstadcs had to do with the poor's own dynamK:s, and some were structural-notably those relatmg to the rule of thr state. But before rlaboratmg on these, let me make it dear that, despite rx:casional overlaps among the actors, each of these particular grassroots a"'tlvities li.e., home/hotel occupation, informal home construction, unemployed protest!i, and street vendor struggles) had their own s~i hclhes, whi~.:h aff~ted the degrer of their success. The composition of the actors, the mternal orgamzat1on, the nature of demand!., and the identity of the enemies were the most salient factors. Fur mstance, unlike in land-squartmg and streer vending, rad1cal studrnt!i also par· ucipated in both home takeovers and the unemployed protests. This was both a .rrength and a liability-a srrength ~ause of their suppun, and a liabiliry in that it would make the movement more suscepuble to government 1>Uppress1on. On the other hand, su~.:h radical demands as strture of private homes and hotels, or unrmployment benefits had a highly pohtical dimension; the state's reaniuns against them were much more sw1ft than against the unemployment loan or thC' squattmg on state" land or on properties belongmg to agC"nts of the past rt'gime. Furthermore, rhe Islamic: rrgime showed a greater hostilIty roward the political vendors, thC' studrnts occupying hotels, and the rich developers squatting on urban lands than toward their urban poor counterparts. And finally, the movement of the unemployed was more a protest movC"ment, whereas the squatters' and the vendors' direct actions served as the solutions to their probiC"ms. Specificities apart, the intrrnal shortcomings of rhe movemenrs expressed rhemselvn in various ways. First, as a lifelong, sustained, albeir silent encroachment, they were broadly independent and largely unlawful and thus constantly involved rhe risk of suppression. Second. quiet encroachmrnt is a fluid, oscattered. and unsrrucrured form of

ac;tivism. Surely this feature overrides Piven and Cloward's concern about thr danger of "organizational oligarchy" that, according to them, defeated the poor people's movements in the U.S. during the 19 30s. • Yet, whilr quiet rncroachment may have the advantage of dect'ntralization, flexibility, and t'ndurancr, it sufft"rs from the lack of struL-rured organi7.ation as well as le~l and tt"Chnical !iouppon. In addition, both the scatterrd individual initlativt's (rather than collectivt' action) and the repressivt' condition 5o under which tht'y usually operate are detrimental to solidarity and democratic association. loyalties are restricted primarily to families and kinship. Extrakinship mobilization and campaignmg do not usually dt'Vt'lop under repre~~ive conditmns, unless the aL"tOrs ~1 a common threat to their gains. When the possibility of nrganizt'd struggles and assocrarion immedratcly surfac;ed in pustrevolutinn Iran, the urban poor generally found themselves lacking tht' experience of modem organi1.ation and group work; tht'y tht'refore relied heavily on loc;al student or professional activists. Horizontal links among the contt'ndt'rs rt'mained scattered and feeble. Thus the major associations concrrned with the mobilization of tht' urban poor-i.e., thost set up in the occupied homes/hotels, in neighborhoods, among tht' unt'mplnyed, and among thr strret vendors-were considerably influencrd by thr lrfrists or radical Muslims. At timt"s political investment as well as rivalry among these largelymiddle dass agitators distorted both the local organi1.arions of the poor and the process of democratk decrsion-making. And eventually the Islamic guvrrnmmt's crackdown on the professional activists st'riously cunailed much of the organized mobihzation of thr poor. The wrath of repression also subsumed tht' pour's indrpendt'nt associations by either forcefully dismantling tht'm or mcorporatmg them inro thr ruling groups. As thr regulator of urban land, public space, and order, the state forged a tacit alliance with thr "legitimatt' propeny owners," shopkttpers. and bazaans in confronting street politics. Here the ruling clergy mixed a policy of repression with populistic reforms. EviL-ring home squatters, bulldozing informal settlements, and removing stret"t vendors went almost hand in hand with JOb erearion schemes, resrrtlemenr projeL"tS, urban land allocation, and the creation of flt>a markers. However, thrse reform measures proved insufficient to rt>spond to tht' growing demands of the urban disenfranchrsed. Given these internal weaknesses, it was the state that m the end

posed the ma1or challenge to street politics throughout the 198os. The crackdowns on the independent movements became more systematic and widespread when, following a short period of revolutionary chaos, normality returned and the Islamic regime was consolidated. The seizure of the U.S. embassy in 1979, and the escalation of the war with Iraq during the 198os facilitated the suppression of internal complaints, including those of the urban poor, in the name of national unity, nationaiKCurity, and the anti-imperialist campa1p. Thus open, collective, and audible mobilization was seriously undnmined, and the disenfranchised withdrew into backstreet politic!ii, only to reappear in the streets once again in the early 19905. Foucault's insistence that powrr 1s everywhere, that it .. circulates, .. and is never .. localized here or there, never in anybody's hands"' is surely instructive in transcending the myth of the powerlessness of the ordinary and m recognizmg their agency. The stories in this book are a testimony to this. Yet, this .. decentered" notion of power, shared by many poststructuralisrs: underestimates stare power, notably its class dimension, since it fails to !1ft! that although power circulates, it does so 11n~11~nly; in some piaL~ it IS far weightier and more L'"OnL"C'ntrared than m others. In the context of our d1scussion, this means simply that like it or not the state does matter: despite the current prevalence of nco-liberal ideas, it continues to be the major political player. The role of the state 1s not limited to control. It also undenakes the responsibility of coordination, of which national, regional, and local planning is a principal function. It is, indeed, an old question as to how far the quiet or even open ennoachment of the poor can proceed given the omnipresence of the state and the marker. John Friedmann is right that although alternative drvelopment must begin locally, '"wnhout the starr's collaboration, the lot of the poor cannot be sigmficantly improved ... ~ The fact is that if grasuoots development initiatives and direct actions are to succeed, they cannot remain isolated from plannmg systems. Beyond simple shelter, the poor also want (and struggle for) schools, roads, and public parks; in addition to a spot in the street, vendors also need sa:urity, credit, and market information. These, plus job!ii and social security, can hardly be ach1eved wnhour the cooperation of the stare. However, planmng as such 1s nor a neutral territory; rather, ir is a mamx of conf1iL'1ing interests and struggles. Development plans tend not only to ignore local diversity and differt'ncr but also to overlook

the particular nerds and concerns of the low-income population.• Perhaps a concept of a democratic planning might accommodate multiplicity and specific concerns within a broad planning mechanism. Democratic planning is projrL"trd and implemented with effective participation from those who are affe\.""trd. in panicular, the poor. h is only through struggle that the interests of the poor may br effectively assrnrd. Quirt direct actions and grassroots movements are likely to continue so long as the nerds of the disenfranchised are not met. A continuous grassroots activism of this son. despite its costs, not only ensures that some basic necessities are fulfilled but in the long run may compel the state to take account of the concerns of the poor in its broader policies.'

llo'tea

0 NE

Thr Quirt Encroachmrnt of rhr Ordinary

1. for documrntation sre Shorter, .. Cairo's l.cap forward'"; Soliman, '"Informal Land Acquisition and thr Urban Poor in Alrxandria'"; ~liman, "Government and Squanen in Alexandria"; Sollman, '"Housing Consolidation and thr Urban Poor'"; FJ-K..di, '"L.e Caire: La valle sponrantt sous controlc:"; Tawfiq, "DiiCOUIV Analysis of Informal Housing in F.gypt"; and AIIJmJm VIIHitly, Seprc:mber 1-7, 1994· :z.. Sec Abdel Taber, "Social Identity and Class in a Cairo Nrighbor-

hood." J. Cited by Alexandna Water Authoriry, in a conversation with Samir Shahara, May ,,,,. 4· For anatance, out of 104 spontaneous Knlc:mc:nts in Cairo and Giu only 6 have Men relocated. However. as a study sugesu, thr new state-sponsored smlcmc:ntt have: an larac: pan failed to respond to thr needs of the: anhabitants whu. an turn, have: pc:nisred in organizing rhrir own space. Sec Tawfiq, '"Discourv Analysis of Informal Housing'"; Ghannam, '"Relocation, Gender, and thr Production of Urban Space: in CainJ." S· Sc:c: Bayat, "Cairo's Poor: Dilemmas of Survival and Solidarity"; also sc:c: AI- Wa(d, January 17, 199S· p. }i AI- Wafd, D«embcr 9, 1994; AI-Ahram Vllultly, february 11-17, 199li ~also reports by fJ-Adly and Mony, "A Study of Screct Vmdon in Cairo. • Tadros, fekc:ha, and Hibbard, '"Squatter

168

1. !ftl QUII! IICRO£CKMII! OP !ftl OI»II£!J Markets en Ca1ro .. offers a very useful dew:nption of vendors' day-to-day activities m Ca1ro. 6. TM repon appeared in far F.JJstnn Econum1c Rev'""'· june 18, 1991, p. 68. 1. See, for •nsrance, DeSoto, The' Otho Path; Cross, "Organization and Resistance m the Informal Economy"; Bienen, "Urbanization and Third World S.tab11ity"; ~and Lftds, .. Accounting for Behavioral Oiffermcn." 8. Docummted m U.va and Petras. "Chile: New Urban Movements and the Tranution to Democracy, • p. 117. 9· Ibid, p. IIJ. 1 o. See Stiefel and Wolfe, A Vuic~ for tb,. f.xcbukd, p. 101. 1 1. From a lecture KJVen by Professor Ga1l G~rhan on new South Africa, The American llnivers1ty in Cairo, May J, 199S· 11. These loaded terms are often mcorrectly attributed to Marx who had a different undrntanding of them. Marx uAC"d the term "lumpen" to pmnt to those people who hved on the labor of others. The exploinng bourgeoisie, the well-off daues, wrre, of course, in th1s category. By the "lumprn proletariat, • Marx referred to those non bourgeois poor rlrmrnts who did not produce thcu own livelihood and !lubsisted on thr work of others. The aFnts that arc the subJrct of this book, the urban disenfranchised, arr not of this woup. For a detailed dlteUSIIOn see Draper, Karl Marx's Tbe'ory of R,.l'OIIItmn, vol.;z.. 1 J. By KJVing •KCI1CY to the urban disenfranch11ed, I do not me.n to dlsard classical working-clau struglrs. I have already dealt with this subject in the atr o#lran. See my WorA-ns aNd RnKJIMIIolr in Ira. 14· See Scott, DomiNtllrolf tnrJ, Arts of Re'SISIIIIfa, PP- I so-• s I; aiiO Colburn, Ewryday forwu of PNJ~U~t Re'sislalfa; Scott, WMPolll of tb, WH,, and h111 "Everyday Forms nf Rn~stancr," published 1n The' jourNt~l of p,._,,., SlwdUs, vol. 1 J, no. ;z., 1986. This volume of thr journal contains several pieces discuuma thil theme. 1 S· Thr major exponent of thr •culture of puvrny• rhni1 is Oscar l,cowis; see has "Culture of Poverty," and hiS mtroduct1on to C.h;JJ,,., of .wnche':. For a critical appraisal of thil thcsu ICC Leacock, ed. Tlw Cultllr,. of Pot,nfy: A Critiqw. Tbr nohon of "margrnal man" aors back decades rarlier: Simmrl, .. The Srrangrr"; Park, "Human Migrauon and thr MarKinal Man"; Stonrqui•r, "Thr Problrm of rhe Marginal Man"; Winh, "Urban Way of Lifr, • and cJthrr !IOCiolog~•rs adhered ro Chicaso school. For a strong cnhqur uf rhe "margmal1ty thrsi•, • see Prrlman, "Rio'• Favrlas and the Myth of Margrnaliry" and her The- Myth of MargrNtll,.,_ 16. For this persprctive see Power, World HuNgn: A Strategy for S..rvil•al; Mnrri10n and Gurkrnd. eds., HoNSrng UrlhiN Poor ,,. AfnUJ. 17. Anuro Escobar advances hia argumrnr specifically in relation ro poor women; sec Escobar. Encot~nle'""R l>e'Wiopmml.

1 K. On the right ~ Huntington, Pol1trcal Ordn 111 Ch11rtgrrtg Soc,ry, Nrlson, "The Urban Poor"; and Huntington and Nrlson, No EAsy Cholc~. On the left ~ fanun, 1"ht Wretched of the EArth: Bient'n, "Urbanization and Th1rd World ~atnlity." 19. Mosr of these works onjPnate from l.atin A~mrican experience, of which the institutionalization of community participation 1s a salient future that camn significant political implications. On the "l't'Volutiomst" position see, for mstance, Garr~on, "Popular Mobilization and Military Regime- in Chile." Frana Fa non's Wrttched of the f.4rth, 11 a well-known example of this position. For a "passiVIst" approach Ke Cornelius, Polrtrcs 1111d M1grlllft Poor ' " Mt1CICO

City .

.z.o. for mstancr, Stokn, "Polincs and Latin Amenca's Urban Poor" represents a "centrist" approach . .11. At the umr time, Scott's work on the peasantry ~ms to have moved many Kholan to another extreme of reading too much politics into dally life of ordinary people. In an nrherwtse excellent work, Singerman's A1,.,.u of Pt~mcipalrart, attempting to deduce politics from daily lives of popular cla~~et m Cairo, virtually m1xrs up res1stance/pohncs and the coping techniques adopted by thnc people. james Scott is very dear about dininguishing between the- two. u. Scott, •Everyday Formr. of Resistance," p. 6 . .&]. See Castells, "Is There an Urban Sociology?", •Squatters and the State in Latin America," and C.:itres 1111d the Grassroots. 14. See Schuurman and van Naensen, Urb.lrt Soc~t~l Movnrtertts '" the Third World . .z. J. See Fri~mann, "The Dialectic of Reason" and "The Latm Ammcan Barrio Movement." .16. For a brilliant analysis of "archaiC" r.ocial movements Ke Hobshawm, Primltrw RebdJ. I understand the term "primitive" or "archa1c" in the particular hutoncal conte-xt that Hobasbawm deals w1th (mainly nineteenth""'-entury Europe) and not as a theoretical catqory na-essarily applicable to social activities that llflpear to resemble to those he e-xamines. Some critics of Hnbshawm seem to ignore this historical dimension, leaving the-refore no rmp1rical possiblhry for certain act1v1rin to br m fact prepolit1cal or an:haic. Such a perception 11 implicit in Scott, '"Everyday forms of Resistance. • p. u; see also Abu-lugbod, "The Romance of Rnrstance," p. •47· .1.7. In general thrrr 11 not an agreement on the definition of the New S.oc1al Movements. For a discussiOn of the preva1hn~e ~:ontroversies see WignaraJa. ed., Th~ Nnv Social Mowmellls '" the So11th. Andre Gunder Frank hai shown many overlappmp bctwrc:n the old and the new move-ments; see Frank and fuentrs. "N1nr Theses on New Social Movements." Nrvenhelns, many authors have stressed the strugJe for identity and meaning as rM focal poinl of the new social move~mnts; for example, Mdlucci, "The New Social

1-

Movemcnu"; Touratne. The Vutc~ and Eye; Friedmann."~ Diale~-nc of Rea1011" and '"The Latin Amencan barrro Movement." d. GramiCl, Pruon NotJxxJrs, p. 109 . .19. Th11 snrr of moral Jusnfiunon, wh1ch I bcheve largrly gu1des thr activities of ordinary men and women, diStances my ~np«11¥e from those of orbcn 1uch a1 Jama Scott who seem to be.- thc1r analysis on rational choice theories. For a sharp crit1que of xon's framework see M1tchell, '"Everyday Metaphon of Power. • However, as I wiU afKUC later and show in the course of this book, I do not drny tM fal"t that acton react also rationally to the struc· ture of opponunit1n.ln otMr words when social and polittcal context change, the form and rattcmalr of then k"tiYitics may also shift. 30. Sec Sidney Tarrow, Poii.W m Mowm,.t. J 1. 5« Pivrn and Cloward, PofJr Propks' Mowmmts, p . .1-4. ).I.. Herr I UIC tbc com:rpr of lqatimacy in tbc Webcrain K"IIIC. 3 J. Fur thr case of Iran see chapt.:r 6 of thia book; for lnd~a see uumgcr, "Nobody Hrre to Yrll at Me"; and Spodck. '"The Self-employed Women's Assoc:aation ISEWA) 10 India"; for Briuin sec Hinton, "Mihtant Houscw1vrs"; for the Prruvian cxpcriencr see Dr Soto, Thr Other Path. 1989; and for Mexico Ciry sec Cross, "Organization and Rnistanc::r m the Informal Ecun· omy." )4. Srr Nelson, Access to Polft'T; lerds and leeds, "Accounting for Bth.vaoral D1fferences"; 81rnm, '"Urbanizaraon and Third World lnsrab1hry." J s. For the case of Iran ICC the following chapters of this book. For Cairo see Abdrl Taber "Soc::aalldrnriry and Clau1n a Cairo Nr1ghborhood"; also srr Oldham, et al .• "Informal Communatin in Ca1ro. • By the early 19901 lmbaba, a Cairo slum, had developed, ac::cording to the media, "a stare within tbr 5tare" as a result of the 1nfluencr of Islamic m1lnanu who were play1ng on the ablencr of the state from the communary. J6. Durlche•m's The l>•wswn of l.11bor m Soc;ny, and Freud's UVIhZAIIOtl attd Its D•scont,.ts rrprnc:nr early ~umrnrntaton on rhe 1ssuc. O!hen mdudr Simmrl, "The Stranger"; Parle, "Human Mignmon and thr Margmal Man"; Stonrqu111, "The Problem of MarRin a I Man"; and Win h. "Urban Way of

ufe.·

c;,,,.,

J?. Perlman, The Myth of M•rg1MI1ty; Castt'll•, and the Grass· mots. Sec also Vda-lbancz, R.•IN4u uf Margrulity. Jll. De Soto also findll the "mercantilist" structUre of the starr and thr "bad laws" in many dcvelopinR 4'0Untric:s to bt' rnponsible for rhe growth of mformals. He refeB to mcrcanhhsm as a starr of affa1n in whiCh the economy 111 run by political considerations, rhus 'oncludmg that the anformal sector rdln.-u people's dn1rr for a frc:r market as an altrmarivr to the ryranny of the stare; Dr Soro, ·r~~e Oth~ Path. However, Dr Soto's fa~einarwn With thr free market as a solut1un to rhe «onoma: problc:nu of the Th1rd World appears to blind h1m to other fa4"tnrs that contribute to the creanon of tnformaliry. For

instance, in the U.S., where mercantilism hardly nitts, informality ha~> appeared. In addition, he ignores the fa'-"t that the vrry market mechanisms ~ cites (on land, for install(e) have contributed ro the creation of informal commumnes. For a more comprehensive analysis of the informal economy, although nor of informality as such, !liCe Portes, Castells, and Benton, eds., Tlht l11(omuJI Ecorromy. On the autonomous chara'-ttr of informal activities see also Hopkins, rd., l11{omuJI S«tor"' f.gypt. }9. See Friedmann, '"The Dialectic of Reuon"; for a critique of Friedmann's romantK:uarion of the ba"ios moventftlt s« Palma, "Commenh on John Friedmann's 'The DialectiC of Reason' '"; Ro~ru, '"Comments on John Friedmann'!ii 'The Oial~"tic nf Rea50n'"; and Touraine, "Comntftlts on John Friedmann's. 'The Dialectic of Reason.' .. 40. See Gil~ and Ward, "Community Action by the Urban Poor." 4 1. Interestingly, similar la~uaRe srema to be used in Latin America. As Miguel Diaz Barriga rrpom, '"for many colon• lin Mex1co C.tyJ involved in urban politics, understandings of culture and power are articulated through 11ecesidad fnrcessityJ ... See BarriRa, •NrceSidild: Notes on the Discourse of Urban Politics," p. ~91 . 4~. For the literature on the moral economy of rhe pnor see Thompson, CMstOifU in Common. 41· For instance, chapter ? of this book. On the cancerous growth of

spontaneous setdernents see var~ou!l Issues of A/-Abra,, analyud 1n Tawtiq, "DiscourK Analy!liis of Informal Housing in F.gypt." 44· The term was brought to my attention for the fint time by Profnsor Aye~ Uncu of Boghazichi University, Istanbul. dunng a Joint Conference of Turk1sh-Egypnan scholars Mid in Cairo m spring r991. Although my defini· flon is t'ntirely d1ffnmr from hrn, I am nevertheless indebted to her for the UK of the term m this book. Sfto al11o her "Srrm Politics." 4 ~. See Fou011ulr. Pn~Wt/K,owledgr. 46. See Lis and Soly, "Neighborhood Social ChanRt' in Wt"st Europran c1rin, .. PP· , s-•8. 47. See Abraham Marcus. Thr Middle East o" the E.w of Modn-nrty. 48. Ounng the rarly 19901 the backstreets of lmbaba, a poor neighborhood in Cairo, were practically ~n taken uvrr and controlled by thr lslamist activisuand the rival local {Ntuwu'tlt groups. To counter the perct"ivrd Islamic threat in the locality. not only did the government anempr to cleanse it of the lslamists, n also had to transfurm thew typet of localines by opening them up (e.g., w1drning alleyways I, thu!i. malung them transparrnt to s.tate •urveillance. This policy of oprning up and transparency was also pracncrd during colonial rimes; see Mitchell, Co/o,vrrg Egypt. pp. 46 and 66. 49· Stt lilly. from Mobdt:atton to Ret•olutio,, pp. 6~-69. so. See Bourdieu, "What Makes a Social Class?" and '"The Social Space and the Gt'netl!l of Groups."

s1. lndrcd, nplamm& d~ hnk bc-twttn strll'-'tW'rlmtercsts--> ~onsclous neu-> action t5 sull a mator preo:C"upauon of IOC'iology; for a review of the debates we <.:rompton, Cwu t11UI Str41Jfict~tum. Among the contributon to the debate arc Tilly, from Moblllt~~lron to Revol,.tJOn; Barrington Moore, IrtfJUiice; SmelKr, A Theory of Collectille Behtlviur. sz.. Au:urdmg to Tarrow: '"Transformmg a grievanc.:r into a '-'UIIe<:uve arnon as nner automatiC; a great deal of C"ommunJC"arion and C"OilM:iOUI plan· ning is involved as well'"; see his l'oww m Mwemmt, p. 49· Like Tilly who developa conC"epfi of opportunity/repression and resource mobihzation, Tarrow aoo inrroduC"es clement of StrUC"turrs of opportunity to mediate betwem orpnaanon and lk.'rion. B· T1lly's concept of collKtivr aC"tJOn is very much conditioned by hi1 notion of rrp1't'511on. Thus m IW Khrme governmmu. #or insrance, can ea1ily seal off the strttts or da:lare mart1al law to supprna publtc.: demonstrations. This may iad«-d happen. However. ba:ausr hJJ IIIO&kJ lackt. a conccpr of "pu· sive network, • 11 cannot envisage the pouibiliry of mau action by ordinary people on the sums unleu they have developed intense mterprnonal interactiOns. S4· RegJonal estimates by the llO for 197 s pu1 open unemployment at 6.9 pcn:enr for Asaa lexcepr for Chma and orher centrally planned «onomies): 10.8 percent for Africa, and t..s percent for l.alln Amenca; sce Gilbert and Gualrr. C.t.a, l'otlft'l)l. t~rtd Developmertl, p. 67. SS· See for Instance Vandemuortelc, '"The Afncan Employment Cri111 of the IIJ80t. • s6. Cited in Sethurman, rd., The Urbtlrt ln{om~~~l Sector '" Developmg C.:O..IIIrtn, p. s. S1· Sec: World Bank, World Dewlopmntt Rlport. 1995, p. &oil. sB. Vandemnonclc, "The Afr~ean Employment Cr1si1 of rhe 19901,• pp. }4-J6. ~ 9. In 1 99 a the rate of open unemployment for 4 s developin& countries (exdudang the former ~.:ommunaar and newly induunahzina countries) was at an average of 17 percrnr. In thas year thr unemployment rare reached 1 z. per· c-mt rn latin America (19 ~.:ountriesl, 17 pen.-mt m Asia (14 c:uuntrial, and 2.1 percent for 1 z. Afncan countnes; lsrausrics c.:ompilrd from CIA, The World fact Boolt 1992). 6o. See Lrcd• and Leeds, "Accounrina for Behavioral DiffercnC"es '"; aiSayyad, "Informal Houaan1 in a Comparauve Persp«tave'"; Le11anaer, '"Nobody Here to Yell at Me•; Crou, '"Orpnization and Rnistancc in the Informal unnomy.'" 6&. Sec ai-Sayyad, "Informal Housutg an a Comparauvr Perspec.:rave'"; Nelson, .Acceu To l'own and "Thr Urban Poor. • 6J.. See Nelson, "The Urban Poor"; Gc1ue and Sabanoi., '"Latin Amcriun Citic• and Their Poor,'" p. 3z.7: Cross, '"Orpniution and Resi1tance in the Informal uonomy"; De ~to, The Other Path.

6j. For a dcraaled Peopk's Mot•t',lt'nls.

TWO

di~~:uwon

of this pointS« Pivm and Cloward. Poor

Mapping Out the .. New Poor"

1. I draw dus from the way Prter Worsle)' bar. identified the urban poor in his Three Worlds. pp. I 9 s-196. 1. The protogamsts andudc Park, '"Human Migr•uion and the Marginal Man"; Stonequist, .. The Problem of Marginal Man"; Wanh, '"Urban Way of l.ife"; and, more rrcC"ndy, Osur Lewuo, '"Cultwe of Poverry." 3· Thas as how Jani~e Perlman and Manurll Castells use the rerm; sec Perlman, The Myth of Marg,a/Jty; C.astdl•, C1t1cos and thco Grassroots. 4· For operational purposa, in thu. study I rake the ~ate-gory urban pour as ~onsrstang of urban "C~Uatrers, thC' unC'mployed, and srreet 'IUb!ioasrencr work· ers, who all seem to 'lhare !i.lmllar resuknual ~und1nons. Some of them mighr hr involved in all of the four movements-of squaners (homes and land), thr unemployed, and street vrndon-1 e-xamine an thas book. S· See Katouz111n, Thco Polil1c:al 1-~mnomy of Mockrn Iran. 6. Sec Shahra, Tehran-• Qad1m, 1:9-1 o; Ashraf, .. Mararrb-1 IJtrmai• dar Dowran-1 QaJanye"; Mar~us, The Muldle East on the Ea•co uf Modernity. 7· See Floor, '"Polira~al RoiC' of l.uus in Iran," pp. 84-Ks; and Abrahamian, Iran Betwcoen Twu Rn•oiNtJOns, p. u. 8. Ashuf, .. Maratrb·i ljtemaai dar Dowran-1 QaJari)·r," p. 84; Sa1dnia, '"Sakhrar·i Tehran," p. 314. ~- Talu~h reprrsent~; ad h<X: ls.lam" garhrnngs; 'f.J'l.iyeh i~; rclagiOU5 passion play, and M11harram, an Arab•~ month wbrn Imam Hus.ran, thr r.ecund Imam of rhe Sha'atcs, was kallrd an thr banle of Karbala. Thc:rr are numerou~; forms of ~ommemoration by rhr Sha'i ~ommunity dunng thas monrh. 10. See Ashraf, '"The Roots of Emrrgang Dual Class StriK."turc." 1 1. Banani, The Modern~zatwn u{ Iran, p. 144; Saadma, .. Sakhrar-1 Tehran," pp. 31.4-418. 11. See Khosrowkha\'ar, '"Nouvelle banlicur ct marxanalitc." I_J. For a useful rrvaC'W of ~omprrhcnsavr urban plannang sec: The lraman <.:enter for Urban and Archare~rural Studac~; (Markaz-i Morah'ar va Tahqiqat Shahruza va Mr'mari-yr Iran), Hash1yemshim dar Iran: f.lal Vol R~h-1 Hal-ha, rrporr on phuc 4, vol. 1, "Housang, Informal Settlemcnu•, and Spatial Dndopmrnt Plan nang." In rhe same sC'raes, see alsu the rrpon on phaK s. • Rrcogmzang thr l.ow -ln~ome a. Ciuzens, .. pp. 1b-u . 14. See Amarahmadi and Kiafar. '"Tehran: Growth and Cnntradactions," p. 17}. 15. Saidnia, '"Sakhtar-i Tehran," p. 31.9. 16. Scr HusKinzadeh Dalir. Tarh-1 Tahqiq1-ye Hashiyen1shinan-1 Tabr1~, pp. 13 and 14.

r ?· See Daner.h, R1mli Exodus and .~quail" .~ttlrmrnts 1n thr Third World, p. 11.9. r8. MuhadiuMh, Tahlil1 at Vithrprba-ye Bamarrwh Riti-ye Shabri dar Iran, p. 11.9. IIJ.Irani.1n unter for Urttan and Architectural Studies. Hashryrnishmi dar Iran, rrpon on phasr 5, .. Recognizing the l.ow-lncomr as Catizens," pp. 4'1-

so. Srr .Kurmi, Powrty anJ Rnlf>lution in Iran, p. 48. z.a. Ibid, p. so. u. Srr Dannh, Rural Exod11s and Squnn Sntlmwnts, pp. 1 3 1-1} z.. z. •. Ser Jalili, 1Hli, c:irrd in P.ran, .. Alounalcnishini dar Tehran," in

10.

fttrwt-i SytW1-Iqtisad1, no. 19, p. 51. 14. On Zoorahad ~Tehran Un1vrniry, lnsnrutr of Socaal Studies and Research, Mutillr 'r-y1 M11qaddamati Darbarr-yr Zoorabad (Islamabad} Karlld1. 1.5. It is notoriously difficult to givr a prrci~ figurr on the number of the slum-dwellen. But if we rake rhe density of people per room (fin to ten~,_

pie hving in two rooms) as an amponanr mrasure of 1r.lum dwrlling. rhen ir brcomn clear rhar at ~sr one million poor, accounnng for 11..4 percn~t of the rotal households, anhahared thrse neaghborhoods (Tthran C,nsNs, I J I9111 98oJ). Thu cntrrion firs well, for instance, with Khaune·a Fallaha 'I urn in Southeast Tehran. According to a survey, 46 percent of the houses in this neighborhood had only one room and another 4 5 percent two rooms. The ryp''-"al housrhold m this arra had httwem six and KVen rrsidC'nt membrn (cikd in Kaz.ema, Po&wty and Rnml11t1on "" Iran, p. ?8). In addition, rhr rrlationship hrrwern density and povrrty an Trhran is documentrd hy Connell, •Tehran," and Bahramhrygui, Tehran: An Urban Antdysu. See alr.o Amarahmada and .Kiafar, •Tehran: Growth and Contradicraons," p. r 7J. z.6. According to the Trhran census, wrll ovrr Ho,ooo unars (9 percent) had b«on constructrd with semidurahiC' materials including a mixturr of bricks and wood, mud. bamboo leavn, and sam1lar materials. Perhaps of rh~. morr rhan 4l,ooo lt'ttlrment unars ( 5 percent) lackrd dnnking watrr, instrad dt"pending on 1uch source' u rivrr, well!!, underground watrr, and public strtrt taps (Tehran C'.nuNS, 1 H9(1• 'IIIII, p. 411. ff one views rhnc as anformal unat!l rhat hoult'd fivr-memhrr housrholds, then wmr 400,000 propk of Tehran livrd in thr informalsrniC'ments. A1 I starrd earher, squanrr srnlrmenu; alsu grrw in other main citirs, among whach Tabriz. Bandar Abbas, and Ahwaz had thr highr!lt ratio uf .quattrn to total population; see Huswinzadeh Dalir, Tarh-1 Tahqigr-yr Hashry&'flisb•na": Tabnt. pp. q-14. 1?. Thr Iranian C.rnrer for Urban and Architectural Studies. Hash;,misbrru dar lra1f, repon on pha•r J, '"Recognizing the l.ow·lncomr as Ciuzrns." pp. 4'1-50-

'• !RI DIBPRAIORISII AID !RI ISLAMIC RITOLU!IOI .18. Sec: Amirahmadi and Kiafar. "Tehran: Growth and Contradknnns,"

p. 171. 19. See Plannmg and Budget Organization, Census of Popullltion, for 19S6; 1966; 1976. JO. Sec: ~idma, "Sakhtar-i Tehran," p. l -'4· J 1. Sec: Institute of Sotial Studies and Research, Mo14/e'e-YI Muqadt£Jrrwt1, p. 6. J1. Thas information is ba&cd upon a reant comprehensave study, sponsored by the Ministry of Housing, on an formal .enlement in Iran, published an 7 volumn so far; I t t The lraman Center for Urban and Architectural Studies, Hllsh;ynwhm• dar lr11n, Repon of phase 4, '"Housmg, Informal Settlements, and Spanal Development Planning." 1:1Y..JS· The lraman Center for Urban and Archatt'Ctural Studies, Hash1yenishim dar Iran, repon on phaK' 4, 1:15-3 •· )4. Kazeroum and Qal'cgolabi, '"Tasvar-a Aamara-ye Hashayemstunan." Mashadizadch alia gaves samilar picture of the occupanons of .quattcn; K'C has Tahll/i Vuhep1ha-~ &mwmrb,v, p. 1 J J. J s. Knema, Puwrty and Rn•olutlon in Iran, p. s J-s 6. J6. According to a 'urvcy, over yo percent of Tehran's squanen expressed their satisfaction with their cxasting situation when comparing at to thear past; see Mashadizadch, Tahlll• tn VllMpiha-ye Bamamrhmi, p. 14 s. 37· For anstance, aN!ustrial worken seemed to diannguash thcmselve1 from the new poor whom they regarded as belonging to a founh dass. ~ Ashraf, Iran: lmprrwlism, Class and Modnni~t1on from AIH)t•r, p. J4S· Jl.lntervaew with a squatter of Ah Abad, Khazaneh, an ~uth Tehran; conducted m 199S by 1101:10101)' students, Umvenity of 'Allame-ye Tabatbaai . .\9· liolcsorkhi, a poet and )ownahst, was charge-d wath plonang to assasSinate membrn of royal family during the m•d·1970s and was 1ubsrqucntly ex«Uted. 40. Hi1 shon stories include "a.4 Houn in Dream and Awakenmg" (8Hslo-Chahar Sat1'at Jar Kbab Vii Bldt~t~rl), and "The Sugar Beet Seller Boy" I P~sartllr-• Labou-forotuh l. 41. Such as '"The Beggar" (g~da), and "The Best Father in the World• IBrhltlrin 8aba-y~ Duny.~). 41. Thn theme is quate vivid in Alr-ahmad'li well-known e1say Gharb~depl, translated into English a11 Th~ Plap~ of'th~ W~st. 41· Sec: Akbari, Lump~ntsm, pp. Ho-89.

.•l·

a'

THREE

Tht' Disfranchised and rhe l1lamac Revolution: "Our Revolution and Thein•

1. Jumhuri-yr lslam1, Farvardan 17, q6ol1981. .a.. Quoted in Ft~,..,J·• Gowdnuhm, no. 14, 1 Aban qs8ll979, p. .a..

175

~. This ba~kground ~e<.'tion on t~ lraman rrvolution is based on Bayat, "Rrvolut1on Wnhour Movemmt, Move~nt Without Rrvoluunn: Companng lslamist A~tivism in Iran and Egypt," memo, 1996. For a histnri~al ba~k· ground to the Iranian revolution ste Ervand Abrahamian, lrtltl Bnwem Two RnJOlvt1mu (Prin~rton, 19h) and Homa Katouzian, Tb~ Polit1a~l Economy of Modnw Iran (london, 19hl. For litrrarure on the lslami~ Revolution, refle~tlng d1fferenr ~n~~tives, ~« Abraham1an, Iran B~tween TW(J R'i'DllltionJ; Said Amir Ar1omand, Thr T11rban for thr Crown (Oxford, 1918 ); Mansoor Moaddel, Clan, State, and ldrology 1n the lrani11n Rwol11tion (New York, 199 J I; and Mohsen Milam, The MIIIUJ•g of th~ t.lam1c Rft10111ttcm '" lrrm (Bouldn. 1988). 1'be besr aaount may M found in Miugh Paru, Th~ Socwl Ongim of th~ lranwn RwoiNhorr (New Brunswick, 1989). 4· On the anndemocratic nature of thr Shah'1 regime and 1t1 political 1mphcations ~ Fred Halliday on SAVAK activities in his/ran: Dictatorship artd Dn~lop~Wt11llnndon, 1977) and Habtb La1evardi, l.abor U1110m and Autocr11cy '" Irtltl (Syracuse, 19 Bs1. ~· On gurrrilla activities in Iran sre Halliday, Irati: Dictatorship and D~lnp~Wrrt, and Abraham1an, Ira" B~nr Twv Revol11tlom. 6. Eric Hooglund, for Instance, aucrts that thr land reform of 1963 dnrroyrd thr traditional rural social strunure without offering a workable altrmative. Rural maua were thus forced ro migratr to major urban cmten such as Tehran wherr they became available for mobilizatron on brhalf of thr rrvolurion; ICC Honglund, L..and aruJ Rwnlulion i1t lraPI. 1· For an rumple let Rahnama and Nomani, Secwlar Miracle. In addition, Mohammad Am1ad asserts: '"Thr rural miwants' active participation in the 1977-1979 movement against the Shah rvrnrually resulted 1n the overthrow of the Monarchy.... The populist 1deology of Islam played a c~ial role 1n mobilizing rhr maun"; IC'C' Am;ad, '"Rural Migranh," p. H· B. ~ Kazmu, Powrty aPid Rn10lution "' Iran; Monahedeh, The Ma,tle of rhr Prophn; Dmorux, UriNirr Ulfrest ;, the M1ddle 1-'AJt. 9. S« BaotT, •Poor Womm and Social Consciousness in Revolutionary Iran," p. 160. Mehdi Bazargan, the finr Prime Minister of the Islamic Republic, who partiCipated in most of the demonstrations in Tehran and rec:nrdrd his ob!ervations, al10 arrivrd ar r.1milar conc:lusinns; ~ BazarRan, lnqtlah-1 lra11 dar l>ow Hart~lrat, p. JCJ. ro. ~ Amraai1, 8arrtJJ1-yr Mnqr'tyyt~t-1 1111ma1-~ Shohada-~ IPiqtlab-1 lslam1, pp. t78-179. This unique work-'" A Study of the Soc1al Background of the Martyrs of rhe l1lamic Revolution: Augu1t 2.J, 1977 ro February 19, 1978•-revrali the 10c:ioeconomu; background of those who participated in the Rrvolut1on, wnh a foc:us on t~ City of Tehran. 1 1. for the bas" of th1s nblervauon see my analysis in chapter z. of this book. See al10 Banuazizi, .. Alounaknish1nan-i Khiahan-1 Professor Brown," and Orgamzarion of People's. Frdau Guerrillas of Iran IOPFGI), MuiNinzat·l

,. !KI DISP!AICKISID AID !KI ISLAMIC Daliran~b-y~

!ITO~U!IOI

Mardum-1 Kbarri a: Mabdud~b. I have also urilizrd my own dirm experimce and ob!ervations for many yean amonR thr poor famalies that I grrw up in and with. On thas sec the prrfacr to this book. 1.:z.. Sec Banuaz.iZJ, "Alounaknishinan." 1 ~· Hobtbawm, Primitll'f' Rrbe/s. 14. See the tnt nf intervacws in OPI-'GI, Mubar1UJI·I Daliran~h. pp. ~H and H• ! f t also Banuaziz.i, "Aiounakni!ihinan," pp. 61 and 6z.. To dramatize his story, the writer of the abovr lrtter KCms to rxagrratr about borrowing 1 oo,ooo tumans, which at the time was a rrlatavcly largr sum. l.ike the urban poor, the peasants and the rural poor would also makr sam· ilar appeals to rhr /l'tWr-i to~~~td~J~Jr, whom they considered as thr brnrvolrnt monarch. During my studrnt yrars in Iran, and as a pan-timr rmployrr of the Manistry of Higher Educatann, I ~.:amr across hundrrds of samilar appeals, or lettrrs, which a miHion of thr Ministry brought back aftrr a vasat to thr poor province- of Sistan and Baluchcstan. Thry had bcm srnt by the poor to the Shah, askang for varaery of assistance, including debt paymmr, bualding homes, and compensanon for crop failurr. One fine sunny morning rhe lrtters were disposed in a dustbin. 1 'I· Ta.Jt·o-talrht rrfers to the ~.:rown, and royalleadershap. a6. Interview with a poor rrsident of Scrah-i Azari in South Tehran, in Autumn 19No. 17. See OPFGI, MubtJ,ut-1 Dalir1111m, pp. ao, 11, u, z.H, 31, n. H. 41. and HB. 18. In the same repons frnm which thcsc statements arr drawn, there were also a number of statements from younger anhab1tants an the squatter communities, which dirrctly referred to the Shah and the government as soun:n of thesr malfonunr. If "polincal insurance" was a concern of the poor s.quatters, one would expl'\."t rhesr residents alsn to prrtrnd that the Shah wn inn01.:ent, which they in fact did not. My readang is that no one acted tactically herr. Most of thr poor considrrrd thr Shah above polincs; while only a frw found him responsible for their poverty. Both wnup1 exprnsrd their position dearly. 19. For Chile lil'l' Ca~~otell1, .. Squatters and the Starr in l.arin Amrnca "; for Peru, Stokes, "Politics and Latin Amrraca's Urban Poor," pp. 98-99; Bun, "Popular Struggle-s in Prru." and lle Soto, Tbr Otht'r Path; for Turkey, Karpat, The GeceltondN. For F.gypr I rrly on the- samplr survey-MSocial Responsr to F.nvironmental Changr in Egypt"-on four major Cairo poor nraRhhorhood .......Kafr ai-F.Iow (Hrlwan), llar ai-Salaam (South Cairo I, Sayyida 7...einah (central Cairo), and thr villagr of Abkhaz (about JO kilomrter§ nonh of Cairo), condu~:rrd by Social Research Centrr, thr American Univrrsity in Cairo, wath the pran~:~pal rC'Sl'an:hrrs, Sohaar Mrhanna and Nicholas Hopkins, 1¥96.

177

178

,.

fiX DliJB . .CilSKD . .D fiB ISLAMIC BB,OLU!lO.

At for Iran, 1t lft"Dls that the dau compusitiun of the an formal howilngsec· tor after the rcvoluuon is changmg. That 11, the member• of the industnal working dan and lower·m1ddlc daun are mcreas1ngly 1oaning the marganallz.cd poor an tern tonal terms; scr chaptrr s. J.O. ~e Bauer, •Poor Women and Socaal <.:onscauusnes1 an Rcvolutaonary Iran," p. 107. J.l. Thas "harply conua•u w11h the ~ttern m Cairo where numerouli squatter communities. and slums (e.g., lmbaba, Boula' Abui-Aiaa, S.ayyada Zcinab, Dar Eual.1am1 arc arta("hcd to wealthy nc:aJd1borhc.JOds (e.g., 7..amalck, Garden Cary, and Maada). u. A general revaew of squanen'lneracy statn that "iQuatten are of low an hteracy. Mos.t of the older prople arr alliterate. Children arr sent to work anstead of Khool. Mamly boys attend school"; sec N. Ma•hadazadch, Tablilr .u Vrzbrgu1ha·ye Banwmebnz.l, p. 1 J J.. 2.J. Sec Bayat, Wor.ns and Rn•olut10n '"Iran. J.4. ~e Pones and Walton, Urban Lltm Amnrca, pp. n-74· J. s. See Bun, "Popular StruMic!io in Peru." 2.6. My survey of 1so factory workers In Tehran an 1981 showed that over bo percent laved an the slums; !ioee Bay at, "Puvrrry, Urhana:r.auon, and Dt-vrlopmcnt." J.7. See l..a1cvanfJ, Llhor Un1ons and Autoao1cy m lro~n. d. Sec: Bayat, w,,.rrs and R.n•ulut~an m Iran. 2.y. ~ V1ellle, jaygah-1 Kargar11n·1 Tehr11n, pp. \8 and J9> Banuaz.azi, "Alounaknashman." JO. Sec Banuauc.a, • Alounakmshinan," pp. s9-6o; see also P1ran, "Alounaknashini dar Tehran." _, 1 • Ra~n rdcr. to the month of fasting when Ali, the lint Imam of thc Sha'irn was killed. Muha"""' 11 the month in whach HuSKan, Ali's wn, the ~e<:ond Imam was. manyrrd. Jl.. Both the Hussem,.,eh and Hey'at are ad hoc lslamac sermon• orga· mzrd 1110i(ly in the- month• of Muharram and Ramadan. janet Bauer ha• documenu:d some of thnc ik'hYataes m a poor South Tchran neighborhood dunq the revoluuon; scc Bauer, "Poor Women and Social ConKiou•ncu 10 Rnolutaonary Iran ... H· ~ fur instarKC K.iz.rma, Pmwty and Rn'Oiutrm• m /r11n, pp. 90o-96; Monahedeh, Th, M11ntl~ of thr Prophet, pp. H~JS6; Denorux, Urban Unrest"' thr Mu.ldle wt, pp. a s7-sB. J4· The trrms hr usrd to drtcribe rhr poor mdudcd badiNiltht." (unfor· tunate), mel/a,., bichareh fde•prrarc: people), ,.,.,,.,.a,.Ja, (the needy), tabaqa1-1 b1chflreh (unfortunate das~n) and Kargara" (workcrs); t.re Ayatollah Rouhollah Khomcani, Sah1{e-ye Nuur, collmed works compiled and edited by the Ministry of National Guidance. H· Hc stated that: "h •• mtnnsac to thc character of the Jay proplc to

adherr to thr pa!it and the way that they are a..:~ustumed to; they do nut distingursh brtween right and wrung. Common people usually lahd any new phenomenon as herer.y or ~:arnal dr.rre~ they du not understand the pnn~rpallaw of ..:reatron and the ~ircwnsta~r• of n;~rure and therefore they objrc.:t to any new rdras and endone the statu• quo. • ~ Anonymous, rd., &hs1 Darbart'· ye Mar,.,·,,, va Rwharuyat, p. t8J. The translation is by Profenor Air M11Kp81iSI.

16. S« Sharratt, }ahatgwm·yt' Tabaqat1·ye Islam. On the mrddlr-i:lass ..:un•titurncy nf the l.dt and the: Mujahed10-r Khalq Organrzations, see Abrahamian, '"The Guerrilla Muvrn1ent m Iran, I"JfiJ-1977• and hrs Rad1(al blam: The Mw,.,ht'din uf Iran. J7· See Ayatollah Khomeini, Sahl{t'·Yf' Nuur, ibid. 18. Sec OPFGI, Mub.m:at-1 Dal,aneh; Bakhash, Tht' Rt'tgn u{the Ayatollahs. W· Cited in Banuazizi, '"Alounaknuohinan, • p. S9· The above ",ted statement hy thr young squanrr-'"NothtnK tlrtnK' ur. together more than the love of Imam Hussrm; my prn;onal vrew ir. that these: hey'ats have a positive role in unrting us and krrping us 10formed about ea..:h other·, affarr" -ts quotrd m many major wrttmgs on the lslami~ Rrvolutton to rstabhsh the idrolugr..:al role of Islam 10 the rrvolurion and to prove how the hey'ats a..:ted as the mobihzmg medium hrtwren the dngy and the puor (srr for mstan~e: Kazrmi, Po,~rty aNd Rt'WI111111n tn Iran; Minepasst·Ashttam, '"The <.:rists of Sec.:ulansm, • p. ~'J; Mottahedeh, Tht' Mantlt' o{tht' Prophet; Arjomand, Turba11 for the Crown, p. "Jl..) None of thcsc wnters, however, have pard anentron to the remainder of the statcment madr b)· the same squatter who sugrsts that what the clergy prca~hed m thcr.r hey'al!i were, m fact, far from politi..:al education and agitation; rather they fo~.:ur.rd on srrr~tly religmus presurptions and mournmgs. 40. Khaleh Fatimeh, an old resrdent of Halabiabad, the Community of Tins. citc:d in Kayhan, F.sfand 11, •.H• Jl1981, p . .z.. 4 1. The demands are discussed 10 Kazemr, Puwrly Revolutwn "' lra11, pp. 77-lo. 4l.. Cited from intervrews rn OPFGI, Mulwrtl.lll-l Daliraneh, p. 4l.. 4)· Thnr repons were part of the acrivittes of the Marxiat·Lcmnisr OPFGI. Although pn»duced by an tdrologically committed organiutron, the cnntftlt uf theK rare mterviews does !ift'm to rrftn:t the mood of the 6rld. The polims of this orgamzation does not !ift'm to havc influenced the outcome of thr interviews. 44· Cttrd tn OPFGI, Mubanl.lll·l Dallralf~h. pp. 98 and 1111. 45· From rntervrews in OPFGI, Mub.Jnlill·• Dal~ra11f!b, p. 19. 46. Srr OPFGI, Mubartl.lll-1 Dal~ranf!h, p. H· 41· Ibid. 48. Srr l:.ttilaat, Shahrivar .Z.J-17, IJS7II97K.

,.,d

180

3o fKI DISPR. .OKISBD A•» fKI ISLAMIC

RITO~U!IO.

49. Enrwt, Shahlivar 16, 1 H7119?8. so. It is worth noring rhar d~monstrarion m Maidan-i Zhal~h (lar~r known as M.udan-i Shuhada, or rhr Martyrs Squarr), was inittatrd by thr activists who came lafRriY from Gholhak ar~a in nonh Tehran. Thr day brforr the "black Fnday" a Ia 'He collective prayrr had followed a demonstration that had bftn stopped by the polke. On that occas1on a m1ddlr-agrd, bazaan-lookmg a'-"tivl5t had said "Tomorrow Mommg, at I A.M., at Maidan-• Shuhada"; inurvirw wirh Akbar Askari, a participant in rhc rvmt, December 1911.1. s1. ~ EmiMr, Shahnvar 10, 1H7ll97ll. s1.. Ibid. 51· lr refers to the urban areas beyond the boundaries of th~ muntctpaliry provisaons, where most informal Sdd~mcnts ha~ brm locakd. 54· Ettiwt, Shahlivar JO, 1H7fl978. ss. Enr/Mt, Mehr J, 1JJ7IIy78. s6. fnrwr, M~hr 8, 1H?ll978. 51· ~ thr inrrrvirws in OPFGI, M11bari:.at-r Dtlll1a,.eb. sB. lnurvirw with an ey~witnns, Frbruary 1993. 59. Ibid. 6o. Aya..Jera.., lky 19, u., and 17, 1H7lt978. 61. Ayarsdt'ga,., ()coy 19, IJS7IIcn8. 61. Ayarukga,., ()coy 1S, I H7lr978. 6J. Aya..Jera,., [ley 1.0, 1H71January 1.0, 1979. 64. Ayatllkpt~, Dey ro, r H71r9711. 6,. AyaPUkpt~, tbid. 66. lbtd. 67. AyaMd#ga.., ()coy 1.1and JO, qpll978. 68. AyaMdefllltl, ()coy 10, I H711978. 6'J. Ayarukga,., o~y 1J, I H71t9?8. 10. AyaMd,a... [)coy l.J, I J S711 rnl. 71. Aya~arr, o~y ~.... I H71t9?11. 71.. Th~ spread of formal Nucation syst~m during the Shah's ruk also covered th~ poor dassn. lnd«d, by 1980 th~ ratio of male KCondary schools to populatiOn in the pnor districts of T~hran was not vrry diffrrent from that m rhr wrll-off arras (only 10 prrcmr Ins). Bur thu. d1ffr~ was much h1gher with respect ro the Rirls secondary schools (6o prrcrnt lru); 1ft of T,#,ra.. I H9111 'lloJ, T~hran 1981. In 1980, in Zoorabad squanrr community in Karad1, 50 prrcmt of boys anrndrd school and 1.0 prrc~nr of Rirls; we lnltitutr of Social Studin and R~arch, M11tale'e-yr Mt~qaddalrwtr Darbartye Zooralxul, K.arad1, p. 64. 1 J· Thas th~ was takm up in thr 19701 by a numbrr of writers and lilmmakrrs; sec, for in.ranc~. Gholam Hu~Rm Sa'rdi'lshon story, A•hgbald011rr1 (Garbage Place), whtch m rhe Jar~ 19701 was rurnN tntn rhr movir Dayere-ye Mma, directtd by Daryoush M~hrjouii .

c:,,.,.,,

4• !KB

KOUBII~ WIIB~I

74· CitnJ in Banuazizi, "Alounaknishinan," p. 6.J: and in Kaumi, Poverl'y

and Rrvo/11tion in Iran, pp. 1 2.9-1 JO. 7S· A great numbrr of speculations exist about the social profile of the Pasdaran and Ba~ji groups. However, empirical examination is scarce. Farhad Khosrowkhavar's study ~ems to suppon the prevailing view that membrn of these RfOUps come largely from urban poor families; personal communication, April1995, Pans;~ also his L'lltopw SIJ~h. 76. Interviews in OPFGI, M11barnat·1 Dal1raneh, p. 98. 77· Ibid. FOUR

The Housing Rebels: The Occupation of Homes and Hotels, 1979-1911

1. These names are all fictitious to pre~rve the anonymity of the actors. 2.. Baled upon interviews with Nucr. a lcadins organizer of the operation, Deamber 1994· J. Kayhan, Aban )O, q61/19BJ. 4· Ayarukgan, Rahman 2.8, IJS811979· J· K11r, no. 6 (farvardin .I.J, 1HIII979): 7· 6. For a detailed descraption of this incident sec Hourcadc, "Conlcillisme, claSKS scxiales, et espace urbain": also sec Baari and Hourcadc, "L'Experimce conaeillisrr." 7· EmltJat, "Az Gowdnishin1 ta Hashiyenishani dar Tehran,• Bahman J, I J7UI99}· 8. Rah-i Kargar, no. H lAban 1J6JI1984); no. 13 (farvardin 1J6-ti191S): 19. 9· Interview with Nawr, a leading activist in home takeovers, December 1994· 1o. Interview with Na~er, ibid. 11. Ettiltllll, Khordad 9, IJ6Jia914; also interview wnh panic1pants in home takeoven in Kermanshah; ~ws from the opposition publications. u. Khabar, no. s (16 F.sfand 1Jj7), pubhshed by the Organization of People FnJaii Guerrillas of Iran. 13. Interview with Rna, a leader of the operation, February 199 3. 14. MiJdle wt Economic D1g~st (November 2., 1979): H· 15. Interview with Fateh, a panic1panr in the raid, February 1991· 16. fltilMI, Dey 2.4, 1J J B/1979; also my Interviews with one of the participants in the takeoven, October 199 J. Karrub1 in add1tion extended 10me RJs 2.00 million (U.S.h.B million) in loans to the homeleu and the small business-holders; sec EttiltJat, Dey 1.4, 1H 8/r 979· 17. Interview with an anonymous participant, October 1993· 11. Interview with Fateh, a participant in the operation. 19. Interview with a ~quattrr leader of the Royal Garden Hoccl, February

181

182

4• !II IOV&l•G

1111~1

ICJ9J. 2.0.

lnrervn wtrh

Fa~h.

a participant.

Ayt~tukgtm,

Khordad .&), I Hlll979· u. Piran, '"Zaghehnishini dar Tehran. • .&J. Ayatukga,., Ordibchnbt 18, 1Hlll979· 2.1.

4· Ibid. Prr011ZJ, '"Goz.arnh-i Nafarjam u Maa'ale-ye Maakan, • no.

.a.s.

1 (Mehr 1 H9l191o1: u-sa . .&6. Interview with a Hotel Royal Garden tquatting leader. February 19~3; Also mterv~ew wrth f-·areh on the "'--.:uparaon of the Hotel Sina . .17- Interview with. Pasdar. in A.,tmtkgtm, Ordibehaht 18, I J sB/1979.a.l. Interview with Naser, a leading mobilizer of home takeovers, December 19'14· z.9. See p,o,ZJ, •c.ozaresh-i Nafar)am az Mas'ale-ye Maskan," no. 1 IMehr 1 HIJI'198o): 55-58; See also Bassri and Hourcade, "eExprrielk.'l: consrallisu.· JO. Interview with Na~~er. a leading orxaniur. J 1. See Ba111ra and Hourcade, •t• exprrimce conK'illiste." JZ.. See Hourcade, "Conteillismc, claues wcialn, ec espace urbain ... H· See Davis, Crmt~skd Gro.,,.J, p. 6. .... See Bayat, Woriorrs arul RPVOI11tirm '" lr.m. ) S· lntervltW With Fateh an occupation leader of the Hotel Sma in Tehran. J6. Ibid. J7. A shanty dweller, cited in Aya,Jtoga,, Khordad 1 J, 1H 811979JI. Ayarulega.,,Khordad IJ,I\~811979· )9· Khabar, no. s (Esfand 16, 1 H71197BI, publishe-d by OPFGI; ~«also Kar, no. 7.& (Mordad 19, 1 H91t91ol: 7. 40. A shantytown dwclk-r, cited m Aya,Jrga,, Khrdad 1J, IJ sB/1979· 41. Crted in K11r, Ordtbrhrsht 17, 1 H811979· 4z.. Ayarulega,, Ordibchnht 18, I Hllr979· 4J· See M11,ahid, no. 1J1 (Esfand J., 1J6JI19I4); 1ft! also Rllh-1 Kargar, no.q (Farvardin 1Jli4119lsl. 44- K4r, no 1Z. (Mordad 11, 1H9/19llo): 7· 45· See Bauri and Hourcade, '"L'Experience con~~eilliate, • on how the sh11ras were undermmed. 46. Ibid. 47· In Portugal the occupation of houaing waa very organized; it was coordinated not by indavidual families bur by a Neighborhood Commiuion 1NC). ~ NC had a list of empty apartments and a lilf of pcoople in nec'd of houams. If a fum1shed apartment waa occupied, the NC would uk the palace to be pre~mt and take inventories. Any 1~ found would be returned to their ownen. The cructal point here i1 that the occupaen did not want to OWN dw homes they took oYU; rather they aimed to force the owners to rent them out

5·

1~01-SfiBEf

POLlflOB

ro needy tcnanrs. Alrhough rhc ownen were forced ro siJPI leasn wirh rhcrr rmanrs, thry neverrhelns mainrained rheir right to own rheir aparunenrs. In Iran, however., squanen wanred to ou, rhc proprrtlrs rhcy seized, and many even did nor con11der makins any paymrnts for homes they rook over. For rhr Porrusune situation see Hammond, 8u1ldirrg l'opuwr l'own, pp. 116-111; for rhc Bratish, ~ Moorhousr, Wilson, and Chamhrrlam, "Rent Stnkes.• 48. On thc activiries of the }iahd-i Sa:Arrikgui, Construction Crusade,~ Frrdows, "Thc Rrconsrruction Crusade and Class Conflict in Iran." 49· Except thOK that wrrr carefully planned and sanctioned from rhr top. For instance, some five yran larer. in Au~tust 191J about JOO studrnll rook over a building in Maidan·i Tajrisb and convened ir inro a donn. The owner of the building had fled the country, lrning it vacant. The srudrnrs had obtained a prior authorization from rhr Prace Coun (Dadpah-i Solhl, whach authorizrs such takenven; sre F.nlltMI, Mordad 2.8, 1 .J64/191 s. ~o. Cited in Ayt~rrtkgarr, Khordad 1 J, 1 JSB/1919· p. See for instance Moorhouse, Wilson, and Chamberlain, "Rent Srrikes." FIVE 1.

Back-Street Politics: Squanen and the- Starr Origmally cued m Kayharr and quoted m Kar, no. 4S· Mehr u, 1}71/

1991 •

.z.. joan Nelson, "The Urban Poor," contains a good rrvaew of rhese dK:horomiC5. See al10 chaprer a of this book . .J. See lrrqllab-1 ufand u, 1.Js8119751. p. 6. 4· Sloe Mashadizadeh. Tahli/1 ll:l V1:h~p•ha-y~ Bamam~br•v. pp. 444 and

,,w,,,

446. S· lranaan Centrr for Urban and Archirrcrural Studies, Ht~•h•y~rr,.hm•: A.aar 11a Peyamadha-~ Aarr bar Shahrha. p. S1· 6. Sloe f.tt1l.lat·• Sya..,·lqtuad•. "Tehran, Yrk Tasvir-i Aamari," no. 17 IEifand 1 )66lt987): 44· 7· lranaan C'.enter for Urban and Architectural Studaes, Hll'hiy~rruhm•: .AII$ar va Payanwdha-ye Aan bar Shahrha, rrpon on phaiC J., pp. S7-S9· 11. A recent survey of rwo of theiC urban vtllagrs, Altbarabad and ~oltanabad, showed rhat over 70 prrccnt of the inhabitanrs moved from Greater Tehran. See Iranian Center for Urban and An:hirectural Studirs, Ha.hiy~n,.hirr• dolr Iran, repon on phaK 4• 1:4 s-46. 9· For a good profile of lslamshahr see Habiba, "lslamshahr: Yek Majmou'e-yr Zista." See also various volume• of Iranian Center for Urban and An:hnccrural Stud.acs, H1uhryen"h"'' dolr Iran. 10. According ro rhe figure• available in the comprehenSive plan of lslamshahr ( 19!17 ), some 71 ~rcent of the households sratrd housing problnn• to br thear main cause of migrauon ru lslamshahr. Of these, ovrr 94 per·

18,

184

5• 1£01-1!111! POLI!ICS cent came uriganally from the City of Tehran. Sec lran1an C-enter for Urban and Architectural Studies, H.ub;yn.uhm• dtlr ''""• repon on phase 4, 1:1 ) 7. 11. Enikwt, "Dar Rou.r-Shahrha-ye Tehran: Ba(dterabad," p. S· u. lnterv1c:w wnh a rc:poner of E.ttillult, Khordad s and 7, 1J64"191Js, p. S· r J. Ma,alk-~ Me'mt~rl '"' Shahrsav, •Editorial," no. 8 (July 1990): 4· 14. C11ed m H.,.,bdbri, Dry 7, 1 J71l1992.. Urban pl.nners esrimatr the land area of Tehran to have reached 8 so square kalometen by 1990; see M•talk-ye M~·,.,, va Shtlhr111t.1, "Editorial." no. 8 (july 19901: 4· 1S· See lraman Center for Urban and Architectural Studies, H.uh1yrrwhmi dtlr lrtm, repon on phase s, p. 49· 16. For an amprns1vc:ly dcu.ted survey and mappng of urban&Ud villqn (aabt~dts) on the margin of these cities, ~e lraman Center for Urban and ArchitC\."tW'al Srudin, H.ub~ishim: A.utlr lid 1'~. repon on pha~e 2.. 17. Ahmadian. "Hashaymishmi," pp. 8J.6, I H. 18. Stated by the mayor of Bakhtaran and cited in Ettikwt, Rahman 2.9, I )6V1981. 19. MayonofTabnzand Urum1yeh m fnilaat, Fanardm 2.5, 1)6}lr984. 2.0. Sec Matall~·yt M~t'ma" va Shabrsav, "A Semanar on Citir• and Proplr: lntervi&-w w1th two p;anic1pants," no..u ljunr 199.1): 49-50. u. Sec Middlt U.t f.cOflomic DiRest (April r, 198}}: 14. u. Sec f..tllkwt, F..afand 11, 1J6Jia984. 1J. Ibid . .1.4. At th1s tune rhr Housing Foundahon, a "revolutionary institution" Kt up after rhe revolution, had ovn $811 million in public g1fU and Sroo mallion 1ft ROVemmmt aid; K'r Ayandegan, Khordad I), I} sllla979· 2.5. M1ddlt f.tut Ect.mom•c Digest, February 11, 1911,. In 1979, accordin8 ro tM Miruster of Housing, for every 1,000 people there was on average only 1 17 homes, K'r AyarukgaN, Ordibeheshr 6, 1H 1/a 079 . .1.6. Kazrma and Wolf, •urbanization, MiRtation, and Politict of Protest in Iran," pp. 2._,-1.4 of its unpublished venaon. 1. 7. Indeed for tome, informal hous1ng had h«ome a lucrative busineu. In 1986 huu lof Halab5hahr) in T~hran wer~ selling for Rls 1 so,ooo-Ris 1,ooo,ooo, and tM more durable shelters, in rM village-like urban quarters, for Rl1 1,ooo,ooo-Ris 1,soo,ooo. Monthly rents ranRrd from Rls H,ooo to Rls .a.s,ooo. At this time a household in such communities earned on average Rls 50,000 per month h:alcularrd based upon the findings of Parviz Piran, •7..aghchnishrni dar Tehran"). A number of the shanry dwellers rented rhear extra dwellings our hJ otMr poor households on daily bois for Rls 3oo-Ris soo, w1th the prnv11o that rhe latter did nor bri"K children and gunts; ~ Parvaz P~tan, "Zaghehn1shini dar Tehran." 2.1. For an early analysis of the Construction Crusade see Ferdows, •The Construction Cf'UIIIdr and Class Contlia in Iran."

5· I£CI•SfRBI!

70~1!1CI

Lfi. That as, the annual average of Rls J.f2.,6JO ~ompared tu Rls 777,J.40 of urban householdr.; see Pl.an and Budget Orpnizarion, 198}, cited m E.wlaat, Aban JO, q6_JII9H4. JO. In a Provi~e of Isfahan survey of fifteen town•, 49· ~ per~ent of respondcnli pointed ro low m~ome as the reason for migrarion, J .s per~ent cited water and land, a 1 percent bc:ner urban services, and 4 percent ~onfb~'ts with the nomadi~ ~haefs. In Hamadan low m~omc ac~oumed for 77 peKCnt, land 18.4 pen:mt, water 17.1 pen:ent, and poor rural welfare issues 18.4 percent; here, the total ~omes ro more than 100 perCftlt, because some of the rea!iOni mentioned are repeated. See Report of the jlbad-1 SazaNd~gu1 m the Matlis debatero, in Eniillat, Aban 30, q6J. J 1. For a good analys.. of Comprehensive Plans of Tehran and other cltln before and after the revolutaon see lranaan Center for Urban and An:hatroural Studies, HIIShryertishim dar IraN, repon on phase 4• vols. 1 and 2.. J2.. This statement was made m almosr all the mterviews condu~ted. e1pe· cially re1adcnt1 of the Zagheh community beh1nd the: ASP building an Tehran. 3 3. Mmastry of Budget and Plannmg, ems,., of How•eholdJ mul HowsrNg, I 365//1986/ (01taN -,"ehraN}; Cemus of Household• ar~d Ho'"1r1g, I 365 (Nat1o,w1de); Budget and Plannang Organazation, Census of Tehrar1, IJJ9/[1981/, Tehran, Statistical Center, 1981. H· See Kargarar1, no. 10; Kargt~rar~, Mordad 1 H8/1979· H· See En1l.wt, Tir 6, 1 J6z.IJ98J, p. S· 36. Ibid. }7· For instan~e in a poor settlement l~ated on the nonh sade nf Ayatollah Kashani Boulevard; sec Enrla~~t, Shahnvar 14, 1J63l1984, p. .S· 38. Institute of Social Stud1es and Rnean:h, Mlllllle'e·y• Muqaddtlmati D11rbare-ye Zoor11bad, p. 13. The population of the Knlement m~re.-sed to 8,ooo by 1991; see Hamshahra, Dey s. 1J71la99L, p. 4· J9· lnsmute uf Social Stud1e1 and Resc:an:h, Mulllle'e·y• Muqaddt~mtltl D11rbare-ye Zoorab.Jd, p. 104. 40. KargaraN, no•. 10 and 11, Mordad 1JS&IJ 97941. f.niillat, Tir 1OJ and 2.1, 1 _J 6 3/1 '184 . .fL. f.tt1illat, Dey 14, 1}6)/1984; see also letters from thr ciry of Karadt squatter senlers in E.ttilllat, Dey 14, IJ6.JII984. 4J· f.millat, Khordad 16, IJ6JII9H4. 44· f.naillat, Bahman s. 1)61/t 982.. 4.S· E.ltli41af, Bahman 16, I J61/t1Jh. 46. Rezau, "Iran: Thr Walh-t-lousr to All Household1," p. 2. J. 47· Ibid. 48. See MuJahed, nn. 1JO, p. H· 49· See Rah-1 Kargar, no. 10, 196.Jit984. so. See R11h-i K11rgar, no. u., 1J64IJ98s, p. 10; R11h-1 Kargar, no. I, Aban 1J63h984.

185

186

5. 1£01-8!!11! POLI!IOS 5 a. See Rah-r Kargar, no. 8, Aban 1 J6J/11~84. 51. See Faryad-r Gowdrruhm, no. 61, p. J. H· Interview w1th residents of the Zagheh community behind the ASP huildmg. Tehran spring 1995· 54· See Paran, "7..aghehmshim ~r Tehran." 55· Interviews wnh Fa~h and Reymond, both develop~nt volunt«rs working in 1~ poor neighborhoods of Khak-i Sd1d during 198o. J6. See 14yaNd~garr, Khnrdad 1, 1JS8It979· p. See Faryad-r Gouldrrishrrr, no. 42., Ordibehnht 2.4, 1H91t980, pp. 1 and 2.. 58. Interview with a rnicknt of Shahrak-i Taleghani, Khak-i Sdid, cited an Frmch from Khosrowkhavar, "Nouvelle banlieue et marginalite," pp. J 11JIJ.

59· For a thorough di~euss1on on thl! ~. Gilben and Ward. •C'.ommunity ActiOn by the Urban Poor." 6o. For instance, the prOfnts in the Shadshahr (lslarnshahr) and Bagh-i Nardeh neighborhoods an the Saveh Road in July 1984, and Shahrak-i Aghanour an May 1985, Rah-r Kargar, no. 9, A:r.ar q6Jir9H4, p. 12.; Rah-1 Kargar, no. u., Dey 1 }64/1985, p. 19. Thr ma1or urban riOfs of lslamshahr and Akharabad in mid-April 1995 al1o began with squanrn demanding adequate fre1h water. So« below. 61. I hnr wnnn"ed such dcvdopmmts in the course of my life •• a rural m1grant to Tehran. Fnr 1mme fre'h ev1dence see rhr repon by Paran ".laghehnishin1 dar Tehran," Enil4at-i Syaur va lqtis4Jdi, no. 2.1, Tir 1_167/ 1988. 62.. See Faryad·l Gn~ttdm.hlrt, no. 2., Mordad 1o, 1 H 811 979, p. 1. 6}. See Krybarr, Ordibehnht 1, 1J5Hil979· 64. See lrtq1lah-1 lslamJ, Tir 8, 1 J 5911980. fiJ. Thanks to an anonymous reader who brou¢1t thas potnt to my anC"nnon. 66. For a detailed rcpon on this sC'e faryad-1 Gowdrrr~hlrt, no. 47, Khord;~d 18, 1H<J/1980, pp. 1 ;~nd 1. 67. ~ Kar, no. t 1. Khordad 3, 1H 811979. In 1980, according to the cmsu!i ot the Orpm:r.ation for U~ading the South Tehran 1Wah~d-1 l;t1ma11 Satmall·l Omra11 tlil BchUJV·Y' }ulla~~b-i T"'ra11), the gowds ~helterrd 10,450 houSC"holds wtth -46,11 o rnidC'nts; Hs pc-n:C'nt of the ~ads of houiC'holds werr m•gr.ants, while" 87 percent nf the c:hildrC'n h.ad heen born in the gowds; for .a repon un rhi1 see Endaat, Bahman J, 1}71111193· 611. See .also Enikwt, Dey 4, 1 l nit 994, p. H. 69. See farayad-1 Gowdrruhm, no. 1, Tir J, IJS8119?9, p. 1; al10 no. 17, Ab.an 1J, 1}S8/1979. p. 4· 70. farya-r Goutdrr•min, no. 16, Aban 1fi, 1 J s811979, p. '. 71. SC'r faryad-1 GouJtlnuhm, no. 6J, p. J.

71. Interview. cirrd in farydll-i Goll!dnJShm, no. 6J, p. l· 7J. Ser faryad-i Gou•dn11hm, no. 47, Farvardin 18, 1 H91r9?9. pp. 1 and 1.

74· Faryad-1 Got~!dnishm, no. 14, Aban 1 H8ll979, p. 1. Thr housrhold!!i did not ~erm to hr pleased with th1s arrangement. A resenkd squaner women starrd: "Swear to God, this is unfair; wr wcrr told 'a revolution has occurred.' Wr came to hrlinrr that our Situation would change, that wr won't suffrr that much. But, the only thing wr saw of thr rrvolunon was th1s: onr day wr hr<~rd from the TV: rhr Shah has gonr, and Mr. Khomrmi has come; and nothing rise," in 1-aryad-i Ciowdnish,, no. 14, AN!n 1, qs8/1979, p. 1..ln addition, ovrrcrowdedness caused tens1ons among the nrw rt"Sidrnts; faryad-i Gou•dnuh,., no. J9, p. 1 and 1. 7 ~. Srr faryad-i Gowdnishirr, no. _\4, Esfand u, 1J s811979, p. 1. 76. Srr Balthash, T'" Rngn oft~ Ayatnlwhs, p. f'. 71· Ser fary.~d·t GowdntShin, no. fils, Mrhr }O, 1H9i19Ho, p. r. 78. Ser Hammond, 811tldirrg Poflllwr Powrr, chapter 6. 79· See F.n•klilt, Rahman 17, 136U198J, p. 1 ~Ko. f.tttkwl, Esfand '• 1}6\/1984. 81. Eniwt, Farvardm 10, 1 J6z./r98\. h. For lnltan~""e. m thr Zageh community behrnd the ASP building rn Trhran; 1ntrrv1rw with rrs1denra, 199~. 8J. Rrronrd rn lrrqllab-1 Is/ami, Khnrdad 4· 1H91May 1J, 1980. 84. Ser Razzaghi, lqtuad·t Iran, p. S69; ah.o Ettllaat, Farvard1n 13, q6z./19lj. Ks. £tt1laat, Farvardin 13. IJ6UI98~. 86. f:tt1laat, Rahman 1.4, 1 J6Ur98.\. 87. Etlllaat, Rahman 14, I\6U198J. 88. A protagonist ~rihrd the fatr of an Islamic Cooperauve: "In this store, wr used hl sell things without Rt'(ting any profit. Withm thr course of only three month~;, brhevr mr, we made a loss of \,000 tumans. It wa~o impossable to continur in this way. My onginal1ob was to sell machanrmadr carpets; so I got back to my uwn job . . . . Unfortunatrly, Islamic Cooprrativn cannot carry on in thas ~>ituatinn. I Durang the revolution I thrk' storrs used to do things for thr saltr of God, cxprcri~ no ma~raal rewards. But lthings cannot go on likr th1sl. the cooperatives s1mply cannot carry on functioning while mak•nK losw1. Somrth1ng must hr donr about thii ... Citrd in AyandrRan, Farvardin 16, 1H lllr 979· 89. Based upon Rrutrr Nrws B11llrtin, April f, 199 ~. Rrpons on the death toll varied, rantpng from onr ro fifty;~ also AI-Hay11t, April 6, I'J9S; Sharq EI-Awsat, Aprils. 199s; lndrpmdrnt, Aprils. 199f· 90. The impa~-. of such pubhc naggang on rhr authoritit'i 1s dear in rhr memnriH of Asadullah 'Aiam. the Shah's coun miniiter: "I nredrd to assrss constantly the situation, thr public opinaon and thrtr reflection an socaety

through various c;ommatsaons and c;ommartftl> to find our why people: are disunafic:d, and what we: can do about it; see 'Aiam, Yodd.uhthtJ·ye 'ltt.m, p. 49Simalarly, the: lslamac regime: was sensitive: to people's pubhc naging, a• andi· camS in the: words of an officaal in a meeting of the Coun"il of Supply of Tehran Province: with rc:prnmtativn of the Interior Manastry in 199J: "We: have: vanous sorts of problc:m.. People complain about c:vCT}'thana: hagh praus, housan&. high rmu, populanon density, social decadence, llhonagc: of publac amenitan in justice: Ministry, office: of Attorney <.imc:ral, munacipality, and in daffc:rmt offices and so on. On the other hand, the: Mu1ahc:din keep anstiprin1 and fuc:hn1 thc:ac: di11atidactaons. All of these: have: doubled problems an Tehran. Our task is to make: sure uaconrrollablc: ancidents wiU nor happen"; cited an KhawrtJn weekly, San jose:, no. 130 lNovtmbc:r J, 199JI: J. 91. Cared an }11111h11"-~ IslA"''· Efand 10, J J6olr98r. 91.. Sec lnq•ltJb-1 lsltJ,,, Khordad 1.0, 1H!J/198o. 9 J. For debates on thas sec /nq1ltJb-1 lslarfll, Esfand u., 1 JSRIJ 979; Farvardin 18, 1HCJ/1980, p. 2.; Farvardan 1.0, 1 HCJ/1980; Khordad 2.0, 1 HCJI 1980; Khurdad Jl, 1H9I198o; Enlla41, Dey z.4, qs8h979; Dey z.s, IJS8/ 19'79· 94· Sec: f.nawt, Khordad 1.5, 1 H91r98o. 95· For an analysis of the: law 11ft Kiafar. .. Urban land Policies in PostRc:volunonary Iran." 96. Sec an antc:rvac:w wath the: leader of the: Housang and Urbaniutaon Comminaon an the Ma1lis. f.Jta~Adt, Aur s. 1363/a984. 91· Sc:c: a rc:pon by the: Housing Foundanon in "Bilan-i Kar-i Bonyad-i Maskan," cited an lnqiltJb·r lslamr, Ordibc:hnht 7, IH91ay8o. 98. For informanon on thi• see "An Overview of the: Activities of the: Housang Foundation in the: Past Dc:cadc:," reponed in f.niliwt, Farvardin 2.0, q69fl990, p. 4· 99· Sec Enrwl, Ordibc:bnht 1J, q6J./a9HJ; and Eafand 8, q6J./1983. 100. Sec: Hoodfar, '"Dt-va~n and Desire:•." 101. Sec Pi.ran, ·z.,hc:hm•haru dar Tehran." EttiWI-1 Syau•-lqtW.di, no. 18, p. H· 1oz.. Seated by Mohsm Habeb1, the: mayor of Tc:bran, in }lhtul: It pllhlicat•on of Consl,ct•on C"'ude 4• no. 62.jEsfand IJ6UI911J): IS; sec: also f.lliltJIJt, Bahman 2.9, 1J6J.IJ91J. 1 o J. Ayatollah Montazc:re, ~·uc:d by the: mayor of Tc:hran, Habebi, EmiAat, Ord1bc:hc:sht 19, I )6)/Jy84, p. S· 104. Ho1jat El-l•lam Oamghani, Fnday Prayer leader of the: c1ty of Ramhormuz.•n f.n1lilat, Esfand 17, IJ6J.IJ9IJ. •os. !;rarc:d by the: mayor of Balthtaran, c1tcd in ElllltJIJt, Bahman 2.9, I J6J.I I 98 J. 106. Sec: Ht~m~btJhn, Aur :.o, 1 J71/1992., p. s; and M41111le-ye M,"..wn 1/Q ShahtUJU, no. I lMordad q6,1 199()): I s-a6. 'l'1m latter publication rep-

5• BACI-S!HII! lOLl!lCI

usmts thC' vie~ of ~ity planner• and an:h1t«t1 in Iran. 107. Sec for anstan~C' Hab1b1, "lslamshahr," p. 61. 108. For iutanu 1ft £tt1kwt, Esfand J, 1 J6J/1984. 109. Aa stated by HoiJat Al-lslam Damghani c1rcd m Ett•llwt, Esfand 17, I J6.z.l 1118 J. 110. lntrrvaew With squancn of Aliabad, Khazaneh, in !louth Tchran, 1995· 11 .. Ettlwl, Aur 2.0, IJ6
189

190

5·

I~CE-8~111~

POLitiCS

u.9. Sft En•iallt, Farvardin 2.5, 1 J69i1990. qo. 5« Hamshahn, Azar )O, 1371ll992.0 and Dey 1-2., 1J71II992.. 13 1. 5« P1ran, "Zqbehn••hini dar Tehran." 1 ) 2.. For thr rrports srr New Yor~ Tima, Augult 14, 1991, and junr 12., 1991. 5« al10 Abrar, August 1991. IJJ. New Yor~ T"'ws,ju.w u, 1992... 1J4. Mrddl' F.41t Tr~rWs, Junr 2.-l, 1992.. 1H· Tl" Ecmtomut, Junr 1), 1992., p. 4J· 1 J6. Tbr EconomiSt, ju.w 6, 1992., p. 68. IJ7· Reponed in 811lrtm-i ICaban-yr Agha:.i Nou, Khordad 2.4, 13711 1992.. ql. See J.....hlln-yr IJiam•, Khordad n, IJ7r/r992.; Abrar, Khordad n, I )71IJ992.. 139· f.ttiJMI, Khordad II, 137111992.. 140. }11mlnm-yr ls/amr, Khordad u, 1371ll992.. 141. lncervicw with Fatrh. a parncipant. 142.. A Rovrmmrnt-spon10rrd rrpon on thr growth of informal communltin around Tehran Ita red as early as 1987 that "The devdopnvn11 m rccrnt yean show that the sovemmenn' stnct control of unlawful con&tructions rn Trhran has only led ro rhr rransfn of rhissociorconomic problem into ~r arras, just out11de thr crty limits." S« Hamsou (EnJinrrring Con~ultantsl Tarh·• ·rawsr'eh va 'Umran t•a Ht~t~~'-'Y' N11{rn-r IJiamshahr, p. sl. SIX

Workless Rrvolurionarin: Thr Movement of thr Unemployed

r. Bank Markazi Iran, An~UU~I Economtc R.,urt, 13581/1980/, p. 7· 2.. 5« Paylar, no. 13 (Mordad 1, &3J81198o): 6. l· uumarr of Budjrc and Plan Organ1:u11on based on thr generalization of a survey of thr unemployed in Tehran in 1979; srr Staluticlll Y'arboo •• I 161, p. 102., rablr JO. Thr T'hran M~Ut~Vvar, a Tehran weekly, reponed on farvardan 2.4, 1Hllr979, rhar "a"~ordin& to an offXial figure, thrrr million workrn an: our of work, most of them casual and consrr~-rion laborrn"; ~ Tehran Musawar 1, no. u (Farvardin IH8I1979): u. Thr Council of Unemployed Dtplomrhs al10 came up with a similar figun; arc P~rouu, no. J lAzar IH9ilt~Ho): )I. In 1976 there were wmr 900,000 unemployed l1o.2. percent uf the labor fon:r). If rhr number had reached onr million by the advenr of thr rrvoluuon, It follows that wmr two mallion people lost their job• as a result of thr rnolutionary events. Sec Farjadi, "Barrui-ye Bazur-i Kar., lahnghal va Bikaan dar Iran," p. 69. Howrvrr , we know that less than soo,ooo 1oblen had actually rrgistrrrd in the Ministry of labor by 1980. For thli and an early diKussaon of rhr compositaon of the unrmployrd an posrn:v· olutron Iran K'r "jang, Kar va Bakara,w P~rouza, no. J (Aur IH91198o): Jo-.lJ.

6.

WO!I~BIS

RBTO~U!lO.AIIIS

4· See Plan and Budget Organization, BarrtUI·Y~ B1iaarl dtlr T~hrarr, Tabut"" I JJ R. S· See Bayat, "Why Don't the Unemployed Rebel?" 6. Interviews with Mustafa, an unemployed workers organizer in the oil city of Abadan, conducted in Loa Angeles, May 1986; also sec Organizaraon of Peopln Guerrilla Fedaii of Iran (OPGFII, GoU~mh• a: Ttuhi•l-i S.11diia-~ Ka,aran·• Pmzhrii (FtUII) AIMdan. 1· See Ayanchg11n, Farvardm z.s, 1 H711971. 8. S« OPGFI, Golllr~sh• az M11hilnzat·1 Ka'llara11·1 Bii.w,.Sh..Jeh. CJ. It-lid. 10. Each "'""'" is equivalmr of Rls 10; in 1979 the exchange rate was ll.S.S 1 to Rls 8o. 1 1. See I'IZ'YghaiPI·i /mmMz, Farvardin 1 1, 11 s8/1979· u. Sec l'ayg#lam-i '""ONZ, Farvardin 11, 1 Hlll979· 1 J. Sec, for mstan~e. Kargar B~h Pish, a 1ourul of Paykar Orpmzat10n, no. 5 !Khordad K, 1J sHII 979): 4· 14. Sc:e Bazargan, Mau'rl '"' M111hiilat-i S.l-1 Al'l!al·• l,q,Jab. 1 5. OPGA, Gozareshi az Kar11garan-1 B•iaa,.Shudrh, p. JO. 16. See T~h'"" M11sawar, MBar Bikaaran-1 Murahassm dar NowrcN)I Che Goza!lht?," Farvardin 1o, 13 58/1979· Sec also Aya,dlgan, Farvardm 9, 1 3 58/ 1979, p. \; al1o interview• with Naser, a participant in the operations, ~mber 1994, Germany. 17. A copy of the flyer is in rhe author's possnsmn. 18. See Aynd~gan, F.sfand z.9, 1 H7l1978. 19.

Ibid.

&o. See T~h'"" MNWvtlflr, no. 10 (Farvardin 10, 1 }5811979): 19 . .u. Based upon an interview wnh Na~r. a leadang panicapanr in rhe hunger sttike, December 1994· This KnliC of deception and expc.:tation nn be detected in the angry uaremenr of a laid-off worker: "We are now our ut work for the last ~m months. Is this really the muir of our Rrvolunon-that we get leh aJoiK' without a job and moi'K'y of our own? Those days at the begin· ning of the rrvolutio11, durang our strikes, the managt'n would threaten us by calling the police. And now, they are domg tht' same thing, by ulling the Paldanl"; ~ Ayarukgan, Khordad I), I) sill 979. p. 4· u. Ayaruhgtltl, Eiland 1.9, I) pll CJ78. Z.J. See T'hr11n Mllaat'IICIT, no. 10 tfarvardan 10, 1HIIII979): &o z.4. Interview with Na.er. a participant in the hunger strikL', December 1994·

J.S. OPGfl, Gourrsbi a~ MMbttr~lllt-1 Karraran-1 Biiat~r-Sb,.J,h. Abo based on my interviews with Qasem. an exiled worker who was active among rhe unemployrd worken of rhe ciry of Abadan, and Mehrdad, a IL"ft-wing mobiliur. &6. See Ayalld,gan, Khordad 9, IHKII979·

191

5« AYt~rul~n. Farvardin r J, q '8/1979· p. J· z.8. S« Ayarulegan, Farvardin z.7, 1Hll1979, p. J. Z.IJ. K11rgar Beh Pish, no.' (Khordad II, •HBII979I: 7. _\0. 5« ""'·no. 5 (Farvardm I J s8119791· _11. Sft l<ar, no. 7 (Farvardin \O, 1Hlllr979). JZ.. Sft ""'·no. 6 (Farvardin 1Hll1979). J J. A ~opy of the rnolurion ism the author's poMCUIOO. J.4· Sft Kar, no. 9 (Ordiheheshr 1J, r J sf#/• 980): 8. H· Sft Kar, no. 7 Cfarvardin JO, qs8/1979): J. \ft. Ibid. J 7. The leatkt of thr Fcda1i Organization, daiN Esfand z.1, 1J s711978, is m the author'• pot~CS&ion. )8. Kar, no. 9 (Onhbrhesht q, q~H/19791. J9· lnrervit'W with Reza, an organizer •mons thr unemployed in the ~•ty of Kcrnunahah (Bakhraran), Fe-bruary ro, '99J· .fO. Ibid. 41. Sec the sratrments made by thOle organization• on May Day 13 s8. Sec also Abrahamian, Khomftlasm, "May Day in the Islamic Republic." 4z.. For a detailed rcpon on May Day 1979 1ft! farlNJng-i Nolli11, no. 4 (Ordibrhnhr 1Hll1979),speaal issue on May Day. 4J· Sft Bayat, Wor*ns tmd R.ftXllllhOPI m lf'tlll, p. 104, table 7.1. .f.f· 5« Khalnt, Tt~,lthchrh-ye &ut VII Bast-llilhmi. 45· Khalesa, ab1d., ICes a contanu1ty, from ancient to contemporary times, an thr uugr of the concept N&t-r~uhir~i (pp. S9-?0I. In addition, the term "t4hllu,,.· has been deauibcd lirrrally m rhe major rm:ydopcdias of both Dehlchuda and Mo'in as a synonym for N&,_,usha&lim. While tome eleRKnts of tradinonal ideas (such as resort to Royal Court, or t4hauur~ in the Minastry of Justicel, still ~niat, the mranings of the term have la~ly changed over time. In the traditional form, tllh~WM" ~nained to srclciJ18 rduge by individ· uals and groups in a holy 11te 1n an attempt tu escapc punishment or to voice a protest. It was u.cd •• a nvchanism of justice in the aMencc: uf laws by means of rnunms to divine procecrion. The concept ~hansc:d slightly at the dawn of modernity. In Iran aince thr Qa1ar dynuty ( 1797-19Z.1I, the places of refuge anduded nor only thC' holy sitn bur also the royal courts. stables of aristocrats, pubhc telegraph offices, and rs~ially fore~gn rmbauia (Khalcsl, pp. •crz.o). It was in th1s ~rmd that such concept~ as political asylum, diplomatic immu· mty, and the like rvolvcd. In this akercd seniC', the acton rnorred nor so much ro div1nc prot~uon as to political authority. finally, thr ~ontrmporary connotations of the tC'rm are enurely different. Today it is mostly undentood as esamnally a colla."tiVe action by a group of people who enher pursue publicity for a cauiC' or aim ar disrupcson in order to put preYUrC' on the authorities to mm certain demands. The concept 111 almost mixed with thC' modem concept of tC'I11purary occupation, where thr acton resort neither to God nur to polit· J.7.

1cal authority, hut to public pressur~. 46. See Piv~n and Cloward, Poor Pt'Oples' Mm,.mts. 47· Interview, conducrrd in Oc;ro~r 199h with Roham, a ~pon~r on labor issues for tM Trhran daily Payxham-1 lmrou:c. Th~ ncwspa~r was publishrd afrn t~ uvolution 1979 hut banMCI in the summrr of that y~ar. 48. July 199.• Interview with M~rdad, a lrfr-wing artivisr 1nvolvrd in t~ UMmployrd movement. 49· lb1d. so. Dccem~r 1994 intrrvn with NaKr. a worker artivilt in th~ House nf l.abor, Decem~r 1994. s1. OPGFI, Go:~~resl11 a:c Tashlrll-1 Sarldrlra·yr Kargaran-1 Bilraar-ShNdeh·

-ye A#Mdtln. s&. See Klf'BIIP' Beh Pub, no. s. IJS811¥79o p. II. H· May 1985 intrrvi~ws With Mustafa, one of th~ lnden of SPWA, m Los Angelet. H· Ibid. H· lb1d. 56. Ibid. S7· May 1993 interv1rw with Rrza, a labor activist. 5s. lb•d. 59· Ibid. 6o. lb1d. 61. AyaruJegan, Ordibeh~sht 4• 1Hllt979, p. J; se~ also Tehran MNsawar, '"Cioz.arnhi az Khanc-ye Karpr va Sokhanan-i Kargaran-i Bikaar." no. & jKhordad 11, l_lSI/1979): &,.f-&s. 6.z.. Thr Resolution of th~ C~ntral ConstitUtnt Coum:il of the Un1ons of the Unemployed Proj«t and La1d-off Worken of Iran. ThC' anginal tC'xt is in the author's possession. 63. See Middk East fconomrc Digest, October J, 1979, p . .19. 64. lnt~rvi~w with Rohamm, a labor uponer. 65. Th~ point is made dnr by con11dermg th~ !litat~mcnts nf man)' officials immrdiately aft~r tbe rC"Yolution. 66. An intervi~ with kftist activists involvrd in th~ mov~m~nr confirmrd this point. 67. Such a1 Kar, Paylrar, Khabar-1 Kargar. Khabar Nameh, Kargar-1 Kommrul, MN/olhed. 68. A Mannst-Leninist Organiz.ation w1th Maoist or.~ntat•on. 69. lnterv•~w with Darvishpour, a panicipant in unemployed workers campaiRJ'S in Fall 1993· 70. ~~ Baz.argan, Masa'el va MNShlrrlat-1 Sal-1 Awal-1 lnqilab, p. t.z..z.. 71. Ibid. 7 .z.. Sec- Bank Markazi Iran, Ann11111 &·anomie Report, 198.z., p. 8. 73· This wn announced by th~ Labor Ministry, in Ayandrgan,

Ordi~h~sht 1, 1 Hl/1979, p. 1. In addition, the Mmistry of Roads and Supply announ~:cd that it employed 10me 5,000 skilled and unskilled laborers for road coMUIU.""tion; ICC Ayand~lfll"• Khordad 16, 1J s 8/1979, p. 4· 74· For the details. src Bayar. WorA:~rs and R~volution in Iran. 7S· 'IlK original tly~r is10ucd after rhe worken bcpn their sit-in i1 in the author'' pos.asion;~ce alsu Kar, no. 9, Ordibehesht IJ, IJSII1979, p. 10. 76. Sec AyanJ~an, Mordad 1.7, I.JSKII979• p. S· 77. Sec Bank Markazi Iran, AnnUIJI Economic R'(Jurt, 19111., p. so. 78. Sec AyanJ'I""• Farvardin 1.1, IJS81l979· 79· Sec Ettilaat, Shahrivar J., 1 J64fiiJBs. lo. Ayalld~ga11, Tit 1 7, 1 HIll 97'1· 111. Ibid. h. Sec Bazcrgan, MAsa'~l va Muhlriltlt-i !WI-i Avval-1 lnqiltlb, p. 1 J.SIIJ. Ayand~ftlll, Khonbd 'J, I JSIII979· 114. Ay.,.J~Il""• Khordad u, 1H H/1 979· Hs. Ibid.

SEVEN 1.

Suut Rebels: The Politics of Stret"t Vmding

Jihad, no. 6_J, bfand 1J6UI98J. AyanJ,.gan, Tir J.S, 1 JSH/1979, p.

J.. Cited in

s.

l· Cited in Ayandegan, OrdibchC'ht, 1J s8/1979·

4· Plan and Budget Organi:r.ation, Barras1-yr Bilt.wri Jar T~lm111. Ta,starr I 158. S· Plan and 8ud1rt Organization, Census u{Tl'hran. I.H9. 6. Sec Amirahmadi, Rr1•uiHtiun and Economic TraNsition, p. 187.

,_ lhld. Or ~Jfu, Th~ Oth~r Path. Other <~tudin indudc Cross, •organization .and Rrs1~talk:c in the Informal fA:unomy. • To my knuwledge, there arc only a f~ brief studir!"t of 10trrrt vrndun in Iran: I>annh, f.la/1'11 At'am~/-i Gustareshi Mashagbd-1 Ka:lib; Plan and Budget Organization, Barrasi-yr limali-y~ Dalzluh-Ja.m Jar lr11bat ba lsht1ghal•·a 81/raa,; Fallah and Khamench, Barrasi·Y' f.;mali-y~ Dast-foroushan d.lr Trhro~n. A more seriuu• work is Tum Thompson'!!. "Prtt)' Traders in lr;iin. w Thompwm charactertu' petty tradcr!ii hy •a suhs1stem:e lrvd ilk:omr,· "an underdog statui, • •an absmce of innovation, low lrvd uf literacy. and a fragile MK:ial netWork"; seep . .z.6o. 9. Fur in•tan&:c:, in shon storie!!. by Gholam HusKin Sacdi (DanJil) and Samad Bchr.angui (But-u-Cbahar Sa"'at Jar Khab va Bidaari), and in Mrhrjoui's film (Dayf'r-yr Minai, vendon portrayed sympathetically r.till appear as Yi«=tim'i and pitiful. 10. The cum;ept "a4.""t1Vt' and pn!!.ive use• is also di~&:ussc:d in Us and Soly, "NeiRhborhuod ~K:ial Change in the \Vcr.t European Cities." 11. The operations of street vendors are documented in historh:al work' II.

7. 8!11B! IIIIL8

utles in the lAter Middl~ Age.s; Mar~us, The Middk but oN the be of Mudnnity; Abrahamian, lrfln BetweeN Two R.e110lut1011.1. u.. See d&X:umenl "E'Iaan-e Vezaral-c Nazmieh" (Oedararion by the M1nis1ry of Order) printed in Willem floor, "ln premiere• regln de police

such as Lapidus. Musl1m

urbane a Tehran," p. 174. 1 J· A study m 1974 showed that vendon in Tehran pa1d between Rls 10 and Rl• 1oo da1ly m hnbn to poli~e offi""Cn for their •llegal operahons; sec: Fo~ILth and Khameneh, BamJSI·Y' E,mal1-ye DdSI-{orotUhan dar Tehran, p. 1J. 14. The figure is drawn from Bahrmbeygui, Tmran: An Urban Analy.sl.s, p. 84. 1 s- Sec hr,ad•, "Barrasa-ye Bat.aar·• Kar," p. 76. 16. A..:~ording to off1c1al figures, the total number of urban tradmg enter· prasc1 with one workman was 414,000; of thcsc worknK"n, J 18,ooo wen petty 1raden, or lthordrh forou.sh; t.ee Ciuudarza, "VizhrJCUiha va Tahnvolat-i Bauar-i Kar dar Iran," p. 86. 17. Sec Mu,.,J,.J, no. 137, 1 J 6 }II y84, p. 1 J. 18. The Tehran Muna..:1pal•ry, c1tC\J m Ettll.wt, Farvardm 6, 136.111984. 19. Auummg 6o percent mamcd with three chddrrn and 40 pcr~t single. The ratio is drawn from a sample survey of urm vcndon in Shiraz and Tehran; Ke ~hrakha, "Eial va Payam.adha-yc Dasr-fnrnur.h1 (Tehrani," and Sheikh•, Elal 1-.1 Avamrl-1 Da.st-{uroushr (Sh11a:). 10. Sec fllllowt, Tir 4, 1 J6\IJ984. A Mimstry of Planning rrpon in 198S re.khcd a s1milar ..:ondus1un, st.armg rhar '"Informal a~rivitlr..-producrJvr or unproducnvc-will prnast m our 1101:1rty in full force." Sec Oancsh, "Elal va Avarnel-i Gosrarcsh-1 Mashaghcl-1 K.zib," p. )1. 11. Thru namn: Torab1, ~rdoub1, Mughadda••· lslah1, and Oskuuii; ICC Abazari, '"Donya-yc Bozorg-1 K.Jtab-furou•han·• Kouchak," pp. 4o-41. u. Abazari, 1bid. 1 J. Aya..degarr, u Tir 1 H 811 97Y. P· S· 14. ~Pian and Budget Orgamzataon, &lrrast-Y' l1nwl•·~ DaU.eh-d.Jarr d..r lrtlbat b.J l.sht•ghalt-a B1luwrr, p. 1 ). 1S- See f.ttli44t, Mchr 16 and 17, qfiJII914 for reports on bcging and drugs; scc csp«ially Khosrowkhavar, .. Nouvelle banlicuc ct marginalite." 16. lnrerv1ew with a srrcct knife-seller, Tehran, Ma1dan-1 Tatrish, 19YS· 17. from a sample of one hundred vendor• in the 'IIY of Shiraz; sec Shc,kbi, f.wl va lwam~l-• Dast-{omu.sh1 dar Sb"a:. 11. Baw:d upon a sample survey of one hundrC\1 stncr vendors in Tehran; sec Shctkha, ~EiaJ va Payamadha-yc Oast-forousha (dar Tehran). • A survey of lnq•wb-i Islam• earned out ten y~r~ earlier put the rural background of the vendors at 6o per~rnt; scc lnqilab-r lslam1, "Gozarcsh-i Tahqaqi Darban-yc l>aat-forou1han-i Tehran," Khord.ad 14 1H y/198o. 19. Sec Shr1kha, "Eial va Payamadha-yr Dasr-foroushi (dar Tehran)"; lnq•wb-1 f...swm1, "Gozarrsh-i Tahqiqi Oarbarr-yr Oasr-foroushan-i Tehran,"

195

196

7. I!WJI!

1111~1

Khordad 14, 1 H9l1980. A study in 1974 camr to similar conclusions conermine thr rthnic background of Tehran vendon. It concluded that the •maJority of vendors spread throuKhout the city lft'm to ~omr from Aurbaijan province, in parti~ular, areas around Ardabil, Ahar, Meshkin Shahr, and 10 on"; Re Fallah and Khameneh, BamUI-yr E1mali--,r Dast{ormtsha" dar Trlmlfl, p. r f· JO. lnkrvirw with a food vendor. Maidan-i Tajnsh, 1995. J 1. Starrmmr of vmdor in f.ni/Mt, ShahrJVar z.o, 1 J6JI19I4. J z.. See Jihad, "An Interview with the M.tyor of Tehran," Jihad 4• no. 6~ (Eifand 1 j6z.l198 J 1: r6./ihaJ is the publicatitHI of the ]lbad-1 S.tu~r~Jrpi, the Construction Crusade Organiurion. JJ. See Ha,.sbahn, "Bar.aar-i Sayyed Ismail," Dey~~~. IJ711199~. p. 5· H· In a similar action, a group of 1 z.o vendor~, all from a villattr near Malayer. ntabli1hed their ttalls collectively in Maidan-i Fawziyeh, but wrre removed by tfKo Pasdan. They then moved to another Maidan, Golha, but were harnsed by the rc-sadents who complained to the police. Eventually ev~"ted from there also, they ended up on a va~ant piea of land along Amirabad Avenue; KC' Ayarttkga,, Tir 16, I nll1980. H· See Sheik hi, "Eial va Payamadha-ye Datt-foroushi !dar Tehran," p. 69. Jf't. See Amarahmadi, Rr&IOINIIOII arul Econom1c Tran1111mr, p. 187. 11· Ibid., p. 1 Ill. Jl. Athari, "Faqr va lthtighal dar Iran," p. 76; see al10 Farjadi, "Barrasiyr Bazaar·i Kar," p. 69. J9· Interview with the mayor of Tehran, Habibi, in J•bad, no. 6~. Esfand lJ6Ur91J,p. 14. 40. Ac~ording to a survey, close to half of the vendors in Tehran c1ted street tradmg as an alternative ro unemployment; K'e Sheikhi, "Eial va Payamadha-ye Dast-foroushi (dar Tehrani," p. 68; see also Ayandt'lfilll, Tir 1~. 1 Hlh979, p. s. for mtrrvirwJ with the street vendon. 4 1. In Ayandrgan, J Ordibrhesht 1 J s 8/J 979. 41.. Prayer brads. 4 3. Set- Ayt;rrulrgan, Khordad 19, 1J s8/J 979· 44· See Sheik hi, "E.Ial va Payamadha-ye Dast-foroushi (dar Tehran)." A survry of lnqtlilb-t /sU,,, conducted in r980 est1marrd thar vrndors made a daily average eammg of Rls r.s~s J,OOO, wh1le abour lo prKmt of them earned Rls soo-Ris 1,000; ' " lnqilab-i Islam•, Khordad 14, I HYIJtJIO. Anothrr study provided an esnmated income of between Rls soo and Rls J,OOO a day for I 'Jill; see Plan and Budget Orpnization,Ba"asi-yr ITmali-yr Otllrltrh·dtwri dar lrtrbtlt ba lshhghal va Biluum, p. 14. Sheakhi's survey showed thar over half of the vmdon were between ten and thirty yean of age. some 11 prr~t below eighteen, and tome z.o percent over fony-five.

1. 8!111!

1111~8

45'· See j1bad 4, no. 6z.IEsfand q6z./1983l: 16. A schoolteacher earned about Rls 1,500 a day at that rune. 46. See Sheikhi, .. Eial va Payamadha-ye Oast-foroushi (dar Tehran). • A similar survey was conducrrd by the University of Shiraz for the city of Shiraz in 198 s. The general rftulrs seem ro be very sim1lar to rhar carrird our for Tehran. See Sheikhi, f.lal Vd Avam~l-1 Das1-(oro1Uh1. My interviews with ven· don suppon this. 4 7. In depth interviews with twenty street vendors In different pam of Tehran, 19'H· While in Sheikhi's survey the vast matority of vendors said they dislikrd their job due to irs low status, insecurity, and to the fear of police harassment, about thrrt' out of fivr !tarrd rhat they would continue worki"8 in trade 1f they had sufficient cap1ral; we p. 69. 48. Cited in Danesh, f.lalr'a A.vt~mrl-i Gostll,sb·t M.ashaghrl-1 Ka:tb, p. Z.9. 49· My inrervirws; we al10 interviews w11h street vendors and officials in A.ya,drga,, lir u., qs81t979. p. s; A.yt,drga,, Tsr z.s. IJJ8/scn9. p. ,. so. Sec A.yandega,., lir z.s, 1]JI/1979. p. S· s r. Interview With an old cheese vendor, Ma1dan-1 Tatrish, 199 s. sz.. See Enilaat, Khordad 17, IJ6z./191J; Enilaat,lir 4• IJ6JII914. B· In 1\-ya..drga,, Tir u, I HBI1979, p. S· 54· Sec F.n1laat, Mehr 13, q64/t9Bs. H· Nateq Nouri, Interior Minister in f.trilaat, Dey r8, r.J6311984; En1Lwt, Tir 4, 1J6JII9B4. s6. These urban sociologists range from George Simmd to Roben Park, Everett Stonequisr, and the rest of the Chiago School such •• louis Winh. 57· SfC' the very interesting Persian document in Floor, .. us premieres regln de police urbane a Teheran, • p. 174. sR. Floor. "The Market Police in Qajar Persia. • 59· For a perceptive daborarron of the issue of space as power see Foucault, Pou>er/K,owkdgr. For a more recent discuu1011, we Dav11, C.ty of QNart:. 6o. This fear of chaos can be amsrd m srate~nenrs by officials, for instance the Mrnilter of Interior, Natiq Nouri, in f.tttlaat, Dey rl, q6.J; sec also Enilaat, Tir 4, 136.Jir984. 61. Muhammad Malayeri, tht head of the CCMAOT in Ettilaat, Shahnvar ro, 1 J6
197

6J. Etttlaat, Kbordad 17, 1J6.&/J98J, p. 1J. 66. Kryha11, farvardin f, 1J6JI1984. 67. Ettilaat, Farvardin 6, 1J6J/r984. 611. Eni/4wt, Shahrivar 10, 1J64l19Bs. 69. For the ase of Shiraz .ee Ettikwt, E.afand 7, 1)6z.l198). 70. On one suds occasion, in November 1984, Hojjat El·klam Ramazani in Shiraz warned: Ml have givrn thto authorities fifteen days to do away with the: oblh'Uction of tboroughfara. II the job 11 not finished by the dudline, J will ask the ,,,.,.al·l hlz:.bNililh to deal directly with them," cited in Khab111r-i JrnrONb, Aban 14, 1)6)/1984. 71. E.ttiwt, Farvardin .&.J, 116JII984. 7.1.. Sec PIUJ4r-l lslilm, no. J4 IMehr IJ6JII91141· 7J· Nariq-Nuun, the Interior M1nisrer, warned that "the offh.:ia(§ must ohcy the: laws, even if they think they hc:lp out tbe '""'"" 'afiN . •.• To be a ht:bMII.Jh means to comply with thto laws of the land"; cited in Enikwt, Dry IB, I J6JIIY84. 74· Aya,.J~I""• Esfand 2.8, 1H711971. 7S· Interview with an anonymou1 eyewitnesa, October 1993. 76. Sec Kar, no. 1 u. (Khordad 2.9, l)6ol1981): 9. 77· Committ« Against the Obstruction of Thoroughfares {CAOT) in Eniwt, farvardin 6, 1Jit3/a984. 78. Kll)'htllf, Tar 11, 1)6)11914. 79· Eni/4wt, Ordihchctht J, I )6)11914. 8o. Cited in 1-.Jtiwt, Esfand 7, 1 162.lr98). Ia. Enikwt, Shahrivar Jo, a J6-tla9BJ, p. 2.. Habibi, the Mayor of Tehran, admitted four months after Ayatollah Khomeini'1 verdict and ten months after claiming the removal of 90 percent of the: vcndon, th•n • Pseudo oa:upations !mashagb~l-1 kaubl in Tehran must be eliminated only grad1111Uy"; cited in Etblilat, Dey • I, 1 .J 6 Jh 9l4. Emphasis mine. h. Kar J,no. •4S (8ahman6, 1)6oi19B1I: 10. BJ. Sec Kar, no. 67, Tir 4, 1H9ll98o, p. 11. 84. Sec tbc story in Rab-1 Kargar, no. ;a. J, 1J64l198 s. p. 2.4. 8f. Sec Enillwt, farvardin .&.J, 1 )69l1990. 116. Sec Enil.wt, Sbahrivar 10, 1_l64l198f, p. ;a.. He justified his achons by rcferrifll to the lint amendment of Al:t ss of the Municipality uw, which prohibits obstruction of public thoroughfares; we Ettililllt, Shabrivar 1o, IJ6-ti19IJ, p. 2.. 87. Cited in f.n.~t. Aban 10, 1 J6JI1984. 81. fai..Jih is a kind of detcrt made of starch, aupr, and lemon. 89. Sec Kaybt.ur, Ordibehc:aht u., 1J6.&/19BJ, p. 4· ,o. See Eni/Mt, Ttr 4, 1J6J/19II4. 91. Two days later. however. the demolition apb eradicated them in a midnipt raid; ~« Kar 2, nn. 95 (8ahman 9, 1 H9i198o). Olhcn, however,

8.

GR~SSROOtS ~·D St~tl

POWIR

contmued to resume operation. 92.. Ibid. 93· Ibid. 94· Cited in Dannh, Elal va Avamel-i Gost11rrsh-i Mashaghrl·i Ka,ib, P· J2.. 9 s. See f..ttila11t, Ordibehnht 2., 1J 69l1990, p. s. 96. f..nil4wt, Eafand 11, q61l19h. 97· f.nil4wt, Shahrivar 10, q64"r9Bs. 98. For instance in Shahr Rey and District 12. of Tehran, 2.., 1JO Nsilt.lts and stall-holders were removed. Of these, Boo applied to get back to their busi· ness through the local mosques. Some 1 s s were recommended and began their operation in specified locations; f.ttil4wt, Farvardin 6, 1J6Jh984. 99· See f.ttil4wt, Shahrivar 10, IJ64"198J. 100. f..tlli4wt, Esfand 11, 1}6111912.; f..ttilallt, Khordad 17, 1J6U198J. 101. A5 late as
Grauroots and Starr Power: The PromiK and Perils of Quter Encroachmmt

1. See Schwedler, '"Civil Society and the Study of Middle Eat Politics. • 1. By which I mean people with different ethnic, religious, and class back· grounds, conststently associating with onC' another according to a set of accepted norms. .J. See Abu-Lughod, '"The Romance of Resistance." 4· See Piven and Cloward, Poor Pmplrs" Muvnrwnls. s. Foucault, Krmwledge/Power, p. 98. 6. See for example, Rahnema, '"Power and Regenerative Processes in Micro-Spaces'" and "Participation, • p. 11J. Al•o Escobar, ,.:nco11ntering Vn~lopment.

199

200

8.

11~11100!1

AI~

I!A!I

~OWII

7· Ser Friedmann. F..mpowrrmenl. p. 7. 8. For a good niriquc of plannins-its history, rationale, and language. ~«

E.cobar. f.,cou"teri"g Dewlopmmt and "Planning." A comprchenlive repon, 1pon10rcd by the Minir.try of Housing and Urbanization. rcconunendr. not only that the informals be formalized but al10 that the poor r.hould be conlidercd as "citiuna" with their &han in comprehensive planning. But it falls shon of aiking for the parflclfHJtiott of the poor in the plannins of thear own mvironmmts. Ser Iranian Cnter for Urban and Architectural ~tudin, Hahryn~Uhilli diu lr""• repon on pha~e ':"Regarding me Low-Income as Citizms... p. 4· I. 9·

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Glossary

aab-aabaar. 'ard. OPFG.

abirouri:r.i. abirou. akhund.

alounaknishiaan. amaleh. anjuman. avaam-zadqui. awqaf. badbakhdaa.

bauati. basij.

bazrnan. bast-nishini.

ba-taqwa. bikaar-ahudeh. bimari-yc ijtimaii. bimari-yc mosrc'. biuz-o-bcfrou&h. Bonyad-i Mustaz'afin.

llnderttround warer reservoir. Honor (Arable). Organi1-ation of People Fedaii Guerrillas. Scandal, di!>grace. Honor. low-rJnking clergyman. Hur settlen. Constru\."tion worker. As~~ea.u1on.

Populism, followmg ordmary people. Endowments. Destitute. Stall-holding. Mobiliution, refen ro voluntary m1litia. Ohserven.. Sit·in. Pious. l-a1d off. Sc~eJal disease. Affiictmg disease. tand developer. lbe Foundation of the Oppressed.

218

GLOSSARY

dwe-ii neat. cbarllh-claari. dadpb-i zedd-i munkarar. dakkch-claari. darughch. dast-foroushi. dihllati. diplomch.

dootr va doihmaa.

facliha. fahthaa.

faludeh. faqir. faqir va hichareha.

f.n-alh.

6sud. fiabaari.

firwa. ROWd.

IJOWdnishin.

hammali. haqq-t bikaari. baram. barim.

huhiych. h•hiymiibini. buwuh. IKy'ar. · hikayat.

hizbullahi. imamudcb.

inqilab. lnqila~i lslami. iaqn-i hahiyc-ii.

is¥af. isciz'al. jihad-i Saazandcwai.

joaoubi. joay.

uThere ill no O(her way our". Pu!ih-un vcndintt. Ann-vi~e coun. Kiclik·holding. Traditional ninetc:c:nrh;;:cntury market police. Street vending. Of rural origin. High Khool graduate. Fnends and focli. Scandal (Arabic). Prmmunon. A kind of dncn. Poor. Poor and wretched. One who spread!> rhe urpns or &:ushions; 1anitur. Corruption. Strc-n fountain. Re-ligious verdi~-.. A !KlUth Tehran squatter distr~'t. Settler of the gowd. Portering, ~ing a porter. Uncmpluymnn bnlcfir. Religiously proscribe-d. Sacre-d. Marg~n.

urcrally, livang on the- rnargtn; squatter K"ttlcment. Islamic K"manary. Ck~asaonal religious K"rrnom, often ethnically bued. Tale!i. Member of progovernmenr informal group!i llet up after the- revolution in Iran. Saint. Rcvoluuon. Islamic Revolunon. Marginal man. (kcupation. Beang opprnscd. Conuruction Crusade. Southerner. Crc:c:k; refe-rs to !itrect ditch.

GLOSUJtt

kunun. Khane-~ Karpr. kb.rq-i mahdudch. Khan-i Scvwm.

kbUihailhin.

k01111itch. kouchcb.

koukhnillliua. lui.

............ mahallc . ...-.... 11111111atiq

al-ashwa 'yya.

mardam-i dar sahnch.

ma•h.a.ct-i kazib. ma~hqhcl-i aapli. Muharram.

mujahed. Mujahcdin-i Kbalq. mwudiq.

munkarat.

mustaz'afia. aa'mal cib?.

aahadha-yc inqilabi. pa1ban. Paldaran.

pcdar-i raajdaar. qachaqui. rowzc-kh1111i. ladd-i ma'bar. tandika. ur-i kouchch. ur-qufti.

tepahi-yc danah. shabrdari.

Cmrer. House of Labor. Out5ick municipal boundarin. The Third line ~rdemnR ro MaoittjUoups). Nunagrl'-"laltural rural stnlcr. Commin~ ~ rc~n ro postrevolutionary urhan security fon:el. Alleyway. Poor urban shantytown dwellers. Street bully. Nt>ighborhoods . NriJChborhood. A square. lnformaiKnlt>mcnn hn Egypt). lncrally, people on the sta~; rc~rs ro the street mobilization of tht' pt"uple loyal to thl' Islamic government. Fake occupations. ParasitiC: n.:c:upauons. Araboc month, during which Imam HusKm, RJ"andson nf the Prophet, wa111 k1lled. Warnor; here refton to members of thl' Mutahcdm-1 Khalq organ11.auon. An oppos1tional radical lslam1c organization m Iran. Literally •hypocrite"; used by the Islamic: government 1n Iran to refer ro the Mutahedin-1 Khalq. Ev1l doings. Downtrodden. •\lfhar should we do?" lf.gypr1an1. Rrvolutionary institutions. Low·ranked policeman. Rnoolutumary guards. The crowned father lrckrring to the Shah). llndrrgrnund, illegal. l~>lamJc preaching. ObstnM.'tion. Syndicate. lnrrrsa:nnn of alleyway and street. Key mtmey. Literaq· corps. Municipality.

219

220

Glo08U.ltl

sharbaa. shura. shura-yc muauc~~. Shuraba-ye Mallallaa. aa'ziych. ...,....yciCiiha. .........a. tabih. aawpouti.

.......... .........

......

um....

,.....,..; bikari. wahdar-i Ulameh.

zatlwh. uthdlaishini.

Sweet drinks. Cuu~il.

Steering comm.iltff.

Neighborhood Coundls. Pas•ion piay. Third
Tady, shoddy, squalid, 1lcazy. Uncmploymcnr loan. Unity, unity of purpose. Hut. Hut dwrllinJ.

In4ex

Pagf' numbers in iwlrcs indicatr illusrrarions. Abadan, uncmploymC"nt in, 1 1 1, 11 J acquisition of coiiC'Cti\'e consumption, 10 activism, 161, 16J; '"also Krass.rnors activism act• of survival, 1 6o acts of transgfC'Siion, 1 3 Ahwaz, squatter SC'ftlemenrs in, 16, .JI A1ahshir, re\'olurionary comminet's in, J1 Akharabad, infonnal communiries

m, 1y Akh.art, Ali Akbar, _u AltJihr-1 Bi~aari nC'Wspapc'r, 118 Alt'·Ahmad, Jalal, }1 AIC"xandria, 1 Amuzgar., Jamr.hid, 4H-4y ancirn rqilllC', s 1, s}, 1 1 o

s

anriobsrrucrinn squads, 1 1 Anti-Vier Court, 146 Arak: riots in, 107; running watt'r in, 86 Ardabil, rrvolutionary commirtC'C'I 10, S I Asadullahi Uusrict' Ministerl, 1 16 ASBS. Ser Asscx:iarion of Srrt'C't Bonk-Srllen. AiS
aurnnnmy, 10, 1 s, 71, 141, 14s. I J8, 16o; aJtC'mative communiry

222

UIUtJ. autonomy... tcotllr11wdl

construction and, 76; of disenfranchised poor. u-u.. ·H-46; .quarters and. 98 A'}'illfikga11 Mwtpaper, J B Azarbaijan: revolutionary commitlen in, p.; rural-urban migration and, 30 Azmoun, Manuch~ 49 Baprahad (Tehran ureilite communiryl,79 Balthtaran, 8 1, Bz. Balthtiar, Shahpour, s1, 11 1 Bandar Abbas, I OJ; ~quarter~ mrnts in, z.6, _, 1 Bani Sadr, Abui-Hasan, 99, 148 &uismo (l.atin American grassroc.ns acriviryl. 4 Ba~

Janet, _l9

bazaars, 14 1 Bazarpn, Mrhdi, 64, 67, 99, 11 J begars, I So J I, I )9 Brhnhri, Ayatollah, 6 J, 67 Brhrangui, Sa mad, J 1 bdl paying. II, IOJ-4 black Friday mauac~Y, 49, 18onso Bombay, self-nnployrd women in. 9 Boulaq FJ-Dakrour, J Bourd~u. P~rrc, 1 7 Boushrr. squaner srnlemC'nCI. in, z.6 bribe's, 1 J, 14 bullin (Waf), 64 Cairo,}, 15J, I67M4-5, 17B11z.1 cancerous procn1, 14 CAOT. s~, Commince Apinsr Obitrax;tioo of Thoroughfares car cleanrn. JO can-carrying, 1 J' Can~ j1mmy, J6 Canmtr br«ze (~~~Bsrnrr-r C..artnil,

•'

Castrlls, Manuel, 7, 1o CCMAOT. S,~ Commince for C.onrinuing Mobdization Against t~ Obstruction of Thoroughfares (CCMAOT) censorship, )6, 37 C..n~tral Organization of Cooperatives, 97 CGA. s,, Commince for Guild Affairs Chicago School sociologists, 10, Z..f, 1971156 City Councils (Shura-~ Shahr), 89 civil society, 161 class hirran:hy, J.-4, z..s-z.6, 65 clergy, 158, 163; anti-Shah campaipand, 43; and dnwntruddm, 99; hierarchy of, )7-)1; Neighborhood Councils and, ~4; occupied buildi~ and, 67-68, 69; populism of, 1 J; unrmploy· IMftt

and,

I I I

Colburn, F. D., S colla:tive action, 7-10, 19, 17J.IrS); passive ncrworb and, 17; in urrllin- communitirs, 8 J; unrmplo)'IJK'nt and, 1 19 colln.'five acrivitin, 110; squanrn and, 4 1, 5 1; unemployment and, 11 ~-19, n ~; JH also labor lttikrs; 1ir-ins; union organization colltctive consumprion,7, 10, J7; in Iranian cities, 13 colltctivc demand-making. ,, 8 ~-86 colln.'tivr mobilization, wrsus autonomous ol(.'tion, 1 z. colln.'tivr resistance, 47-48 C.omnunrr Apinst Oblrrucrion of Thoroughfares (CAOT), 146, 153 Committft for Conrinuin1 Mobilization Against the Obstruction of Thoroughfares (CCMAOT), 147, 148, r~o. lSI

Comminee for Guild Affain (CGA), 146 Comm1nec for Housina for the Downtrodden, 6J committees (sburds), 1s..; in ocoaplrd buildinp, 6), 6~-66; unemployment and, 1u-&J; snlllso Neighborhood C:ounc1ls communication and mecrinp. 16 communist movement, J 7, 4 .h 68, I I J, I 19, I J. 7 communities, outside cities, 7 s-76 rommun1ty·bu1ld1ng KrUgle, 7 community orgaruzar1ons, 41-4 z. community participation, in Third World countries, 87 community solidarity and cooperation, H-S6 concealing fail urn, 1J conflicts: between state and dismfranchisrd, I So between vendors and state, 14 J-4 S Construction Crusade Vlhlld-1 .wulldlpil, 66, 71, h-8], 10&, I 19, I &9, I S¥ construction laborer lanwlrb), J& construction aector unemployment, 109, 1&8 consumer cooperatives, s1, sz.-s S, 76.96-98,1171188 Coordination Council of May Day, 118, IJ.J, 1&6 Council for the Resettlement of the Gowd Proplr (ShNra-ye Aali-)'e 1:.$•1111·1 Gowd11ilh1llilrrl, 91-9S Council of the- Apartment (shMrd·)'r d('llrllm4all), 7~71 Council of thr Unemployed WorkeR, 117 councils, in «MXupird buildinp. 66; sn allo committees; NriKhborhood Councils coun~revolutaonarin, 68, 69

crises of legitimacy, z. 1 cultural autonomy, 10 cultural identity, z. J culture of payang (~helM), 4 culrurr of povrny, s. 168111 s dangerous cla~~e~, 4 d4rNgbrbs, 14S Davis, John E., 66 drkl1sivr resistance, 6 demolition: of homes, 40, 16&; of squaner srnlemrnrs, 104-l; in Tehran, so demorutrarions, 19; occupied bualdi1J8s and, 70; street vendors and, 1490 in Trhran, 49-JO; unemployment and, I I 1-1 J., I I 7, I J.Oi water suppl1n and, 86; sn also labor ltrikn; sit-ins De Soro, Hernando, u, 1 J4 desubilizang force, poor as, 6 destitute (/aqir va b1chllrrh11), .\9 dignity (abiroN), 8, I J.-1 J, J& dismfranchised people, I S8-S9; autonomy and, I I, 4 J-46; dachotomies and, 7S9 integration and, 1&; marginalization and, 4~4t; parallel strulldn of, 44-48; in satellnc communities, IJ-84; wban poor as, 4, s6 distribution of social goods. altema· rive community construction and,

76,Rs-B6 doormen, JO l>orostltar, Zahra, 1 14 downtrodden (rmulll:'a(ill), J h H-,s, 4J, 69, n. sz., ss. 99, IJ9 drug dealeR, J 1, 19911101 dual class structure, 1.4-z.s dualism: post-revolution, 60; street vmdin1 and, 1 J S dual power., durin& revolution, s 1

Durkbcun, Emil, 1J s dwelling&. 1 J, 2.J; in Tehran, ~-1.~ rducarion, IS9. 1loN71.;c~in Iran and, 4 J; an occupird build· anp,6s Egypt, u, 1 s8-f9: • • 11lso Cairo eln:toral frttdoms, 9 EI-Ezbakaa book-sellen. J cmancapataon, 7

E.acobar., Anuro, s ethnic differences, 43. ethnic sermon• (hey'atl, J8, ss ethnic variation, an squaner settle· rnrnn. JO £n1Wfl1 n~per., J 6, J 8, I J I everyday forms of peaaan1 resasta~e. 5, 6 everyday life, disenfranchaled and, 10 ev~:tions, 106-7, 161, 16J; from occupied buildinp. 6s, 67-71; 1treet wndors and. 149-H exKUtive commiltfts (ECI, _n, 97 Factory Comminees (Sh11ra·)'t'

""""'liN

I. 19 failure of mc1dem anstalutiona to asaist di.enfranchiled, a a fake occupataona (rPIIIIhllghel·i uw). 144 f•f'7illl·i Gowdmshi,, 94 fataliiUil, s Fedaian (;uerrilla Organizaraon, J7, 4J. 1111 lloannasocaal d...ren, 1-9 food cooperatives, s ;a.-s J food diltribution, s 2.-n fon:ed rmtaJs polacy, 49 formal auociarioos, .of 1 foruhar., Dariulh. II ;a. Foucault, Michele, 1 ~. 164 Foundation of the Oasposlrllrd

(Bu,.u.u·• MIIII4U'afirt), 6o, lo6-7

Friedmann. John, 7, 11, 164 Fund 100 program, 73. gang-like groupa (Wilts), 43., 6J •Garbe~ J»~.a• (Sa'edi), J3. Ghana, urban migration and. 1.0 Ghazvan: unemployment in, 1 16; violent nadicanon an, 46 Gilani, Ayatollah Muhammad. 14 7 Gilben, Alan, 1 2. Goethe Institute, J6 Golaorkhi, KhOiroW, J ;a. ID~~raspatton,J9

gowd.s. 3.9, 77, 87, 9<>-9S• JOJ, IOJ-4 Gramsct, Antonao, s, II graiU'OOh activism. 1 J7, 1 6 s JVOUp action, 19 guerrilla orpnizatioos, J 7. 1 ' ' " s Halabiabad, 4 s Hamadan: rural-urban migration and, JO; squann settlrmenll an, 2.6

HamsiNihri newspaper., 101 handcam. q6 hagh school graduates (diplommsl, l.ofO; unemploymrn1 and, 11 s. U.S, IJ I Hobsbawm, Eric, 7 homeleaneu, 7 ;a., 16 r ; l011 of honor and, 1 J home·tquattina, z., 7 z.; in Trhran, 61-6& honor (abirm~), 1 J, J& hopeleuneu, s Hotel Royal Garden, 6.ot Hourcade, Brrn.rd, 66 HoUIIfl8 Foundation, Ia., 99, 100, 1:&9, 184ft14 hou5if18 issues, 99-100; in lranaan

UD.IX

c1tin, ~.Ji post-revolunon, 81-81; struMie and, 7; m Tehran, 49-~0, 5'9-74 hunger strike&, 114-1 s. 191nu hypocmn ~"''""'fiqs}, 1 17 ICC. ~~ lslam1c Consumer Cooperatives 1dmtity politics, 1s8 idrolog~e&, 1S!r6o illegal commumt)' construction ~ ughehnish~ni), 76, 86 illqal construc-hOn (qachaqt~i), 1, 79· 81, 104 allegal dcctrU:ity, 1, 4, 4 s. 81, 86; paying bills and, 11 illegal encroachments. 88; jultified on moral grounds, 1 J allegal hous1ng. in Tehran, so illegal water, 2.-4, 45, 86 illiter.u."')' of squaner&, 4 r lmbaba, 3 INC. SH lslamac Neighborhood Councils income levels, 14 1; in Iran, ~4; of tquanrrs, 3 1 individual actton, IWSIIS collective .u.""tlon, 19 mdividual dim:t action&, &WSIII organized demand-making protnta, 9 induamal revolution, ~ 7 industrial worken, 4 1-4 ~ mformal housing, 162., 1841117 mfonnal hves, 10, 100119 mstitutional mechanism for grievances, y institutional power, 9 inre,vation, squaner Kttlemrnts and, 11-12., IO_l-4 intergroup division, 19 International m1grann, 8-9 anters.ecrions ,.,,.. lrotKhrhs), 17, s6

invisability exploitation, 14 lran1an Center for Urban and Arch1tn:tural Studies, -~ 1 Iranian Revolution. n. H· 17611J Iran-Iraq War. 91, 164 IRP. Srr Islamic Republic:an Party Isfahan: communal differennation an, ~4; shuraism and. 91; uncm· ploy~t in, 117-18, I U lslamt, Ahmad, 1 s1 lslamtc C.onsllfution: recogninon of cooperatives, 97; shuraism and, 91 Islamic Consumer Cooperatives (ICC), Jl, S1-SJ, 54, SJ, 187n8K Islamic movt'tllmta, I s8-S9 lslamk Mujahrdin, J7, 69, 71, 90 Islamic Neaghborhood Councals, 9S-96 Islamic Republican Party, 94, 9S. 119

Islamic Revolution, 1, I s8; described, JS-JI; poor prople and, 2.J, Hi squatters movements and, 6o; unemployment and, 109 lslamshahr (Tehran .. tellite rommuntry), 79, ¥8, tOJ-4, 18 Jnro; settlement of, 11, 2.9; water supply and,83-K4 lsmath, Abbas, 141 Ivory Coast, urban nugration and, ~o Kaleh Fatimeh, 4 s Karadj, JO, n; squaner communities in, 19, J r; strrd vendors in, 146; vtolrnt eradication in, 46; water supply in, Bs Karbaschi, Gholam Hussein, 1 SJ, IH Karruba, Hassan. 99-100 Karruba, Shrakh Muhammad. 6J, 67 Kayha" nrw.paprr., J8, 1 s 1 Kehzadi, Muhammad Ali. 142.

225

226

U:DBX K~rmanshah: squ~n~r

ICttlemcntt in,

16; unemployment 1n, 114-15 K~rruhi,

Mehdi, 63

Kuk·i~.}K

Khansan, Hoi1~r al-l.lam, 69 Khazaneh, IOJ-4 Khomeana, Ayarol~h, 4 J, S 1, S.a., 99, 147; .:rirac.:wn of,36 Khorram Abad: stlftt v~ndon an, 141; unempluymcnr in, 116 Kh01rowkhavar, Farhad, 15 Khovowshahi, Houaral·l•l~m Hadi, 6J, 67, M.z., 99-100

kaosk-ownma (Jftlu•h-t£wn), 1 J4, ql, 140, ..... k101kio 4J, 136, asK Kurdaib ProvuK~ war. r 11, 1 JO

L.uc.:al Resastanc.:c Groupi (LRG), 91 loc:u• of chan~. S loc:ut of "-olleaive rxprn.saon, 1s loc:us of conflict, 19 lonery-nckt't Kilen, JO lower-claY rad~eabsm, post~volutaonary, 41 LRG. &, loc.:al ResiiUncc Groups lumpcn prolctaraar, 4• 31, Jl, a61nu Maidan fJ. 'Araba, J Malaym, Muhammad, 149 maJdnclopmcnr, an lran•an cinn. J. J maldistriburion, B-H· 7 J Maoism, u7-.z.8 MaraJhch, ~olunonary commanen

an, labor •rnk~•. aQ<J, 1 aJi sn t1lso llt•n•; un11m organization lanpoud, rrvoluno~ry c:omman«• m, s.a. lanpage ba.:qrounda. 19-JO la111uaJe of aurvival uratqprs. s lalnlf "vmmun~c.:.traon, 17 utm Amcria: c.:onamunity panKipanon an, 87; mohilwnon and, 11; ~quaner• in, 4 1-41; urm vrndon an, 4 ~wtutr•, strt'Ct vendon and. 1 s1 LCC. SH u-:al <.:on.unxr · Cooprrat1vn lrft-wmg actavasrs, 117; unemploy· nxnt and, 11 s lrft-wang orpmzatton•, 111 lcft-wmg publiuhon•, 117-18 uma, •trm vcndora m, 'I loam. unemployment and, 11 J, 119-30

loans t-WIMI brndits, UIK'IIIploynxnt and, I U-IJ u-:al umsumc:r Coopcraravn (l.CC),9~8

s•

Mar'ash1, Ayatoll~h. 69 marpnality, 1 o-a a; poor people and, z..t; squancr ICttlcmcnts and, 104 marganahry (b,uh~llhma), z..t, 76, II

margmahzar10n: dtsenfranch•&ed and, 4D-4 1; in Iran, .1.4; m Tehran scttlcmcnti, 1J; of urb.n undcrclaun, J 1 marganal pcn.ons, 1o- 1 1, 168111 s marginal poor,l1lamac.: Rcvolunon and,44 Martyr'• ~uarr, alonso M~rxism,

p, 69, J68"u.

~wd: ~fugca

m, B.a.; riots tn,

107; satelhre commumries and, I 1; squaner .enkments in, J.6

maR on rhr sta~ (r~~~~rJ,,.., d4r sahneh), 56 May Day rally, 1 18, 11.5, 116 mrdicaJ ca~: lraruan Revolution and, ss; 10 aatellirr commumtin, 17, 9.Z.-9J

mrn.:anr•hsr starr Ilk !KJ«o), 1 a, 17D-?IItJI

Metusak factory, 1z.ll maddle-dasa 1obless people, 1 Middle Eastern culture, dipified life and, u-1 J miwant poor, 16, 39-40, 1oz. magrauon, 1, II; altemahve commuruty construction and, 76; haJting of, 1o 1-z.; multi-ethnic, JO; r.quanen and, yll; su also ruralurban migration militant youth, J4; revolutionary committees of, s 1-sz.; su also young revolutJonanes mobilization, B· CJD-CJI, 100, 16o; authontarian rule and, z.1; in commumllie$, 1 58; of dircnfranchiM-d groups. 6o; handrancn to, 19; and kaMhip, 16J; occupied buddangs and, 611; pauive network.-. and, 17; poor apmsc poor, 117; 5treet politia and, 16; srrm vendon and, 1 so; unemployment .md, 11 J, 1 18, 114-15 modernization In Iran, 14 modemiuraon an Tehran, z.s modem man, 1o-1a Montauri, Ayatollah, 70 moralaty, street vending and, 1J9 mural polaacs, 1 J; ev1ctaon• and, 70; rational UK uf poliucalipaa, 1J Mo.que AliS«X:tatiom (shura·yr maSII/Id), 95-96, IOZ. mosques, ad hex: lh..urm.eh), 91. MoU5WIVI·Ardablla, Ayatollah, h Muhammad Rcu !ihah, 4, H-16

"'"tahrd, 6 J Mu1ahedan, 91, 94, 108, 148; see also hJami4: Mujahrdin Mu1ahrdan-i Khalq, 1z. 7 Municipality Law of Tehran, Prov1saon 1oo of ( 1966 ), 1 s Mutahhara, Ayatollah, 43 mythology about monarch, 40

Nairobi, infonnal communirin in, Z.9 Naqadeh, squaner Kttlements an, z.6, _J I NC. Sir Neaghborhood Councils ncauity: a5 driving force, 8; moral principle of, IIJ, I 58 neighborhood associatiOIIi lantll· ,..,., rruUN..IIi), 41, 16z.; su lllso comm1ncn Ne1ghhorhood Councils (Shura-~ Mahallilt), s 1, s..-s6, 76, 89-91 necKOmmunity (A!hosrowA!halrar), z.s networking, 16-17, 1B, 4S new poor, dr5Ctibrd, Z.J-Z.S NGO. Sl'r nonKovernmcntal orpmutaons night raid5, on occupied buildinp. 70 noasy rnistalk:e, 106-7 non,·omplaance, street vendors and, 1 nongovernmental orgamzations (NGO), u, 17 not1on of na:rssity, 1z.-1 J, IJ, 1 sll Nowrooz (iranian new year), 41

occupatiom.: of migrant fam1lie•, 8}; of satellite commumtin, 79; of squanrr5, .JD- J 1; su also unrmploymmt Offu of Houlilll(C for thr Dispossn-

srd, 99 Oil Industry Collqce, 1Z..J opulenr royaliiti {14"'1lh011Ms), 69 Oqba Moeque, lslanu1t ptheranp an, }6 Organiurion of Unemployed and !lcasonal Workrr5, 1 1z. The Othn Path (De Soto), 1 )4, 170ft}8 outside city boundary (ibarrj-• mahdudrh), 49-50 nwnenhip titles (sanad), S7

aae

xnn parallel struggl", of dismfranchi~. 44-48 Pasdaran Comm1tt~n. 64, 66, 67-68,70,R9,95,99-100; Council of R~tettl~mmt and, 94 Pasduan ~rrvolunonary mihna), JS, 67-1t8, 70, 71; and d~oh tions, 1o ~; st~~ v~ndor• and, 146-48; un~mployrMnt and, 11 ~. 116, 11.5, 11.6; wat~r supplin and, R6 passiv~ netWorks, 1 B; lit~ polina and, 16-19 pus1v~ r~volution, 5. 8 paternalism~'"' t:oopn-ation, 97 patronage a:mcrpt, 40 Puunt Counctls (Sht~ra-yr Drbqarr.:Jrl), 89 pcddlen, 3, 134, 1 H· 1.40 Perlman, janie~. 10 prtt}' thin-~, I 5 prtty tralkn. 1J4, 194"8 Plastou Muou~hkar, 11.9 polic~ authonty, ~4: pott-rnoolution, f>o, 1 46, 1 5J.; during rn·oluuon, 51-51. political party nvalry, 4 J. political strat~tn, 40; ditmfranchi!N groups and, 8; dunng lsl.tmic Rnoolution, l9> mobilization and, J. 1: quin mcroachmmt and, 8; r~volutton and, 71; urhan poor and, JH polina of r~rn'l, 1o politics of the! poor, 1 s8-6o: du:hotom•~ and, 75: ar. rnoolurionary/passive dichotomy, 6 pohtll:s oft~ stat~. 159 poor oommuninn: conAicn in, 41.; Islamic Rnoolunon and, J 7 poor peopl~ ({aqrrt, l1; as offmsivr to donunan1 group.. 6: politiCal restrictions and, 9 s: political

thr~at to existing ordn, 6; rrtilt oppressors, 5> as victims, s-6 poor urhan shantytown dweller (lroulrb,.ulmr.:m), 38 populace t'C'TSMS th~ Authority, 1 5 popular or~nll.ations, s s-s6; for 'lquan~n. 41 population increases, urban un~m ploymrnt and, 19-10 populism (avcwm-~1), 4 J popuhst lll0dnnizat1on, in Third World countries, 1.0 populist rrgJIIlt', squatter settl~enrs and, 104 pon~rs (htJrrmral), JO, Jl., 139 posnnod~mist movem~nt, Brazilian harrio as, 11 poverty and m1sery {rstiz'af), 101 power: and politics, 44> and profit, 1 H: ~~as, 1 ~. 164, 197"59 power cmten, in occup~d huild-

mgs, 66, 6R

powrrlrssnt'SI, 9 prostitutes, 1 s. Jl protest movrmmts, 161; t'C'Tsus indiVIdual dtr~ action, 1o; strrn vendon and, 1so: unemployment and, 116 psrudomodrmizatton, in Iranian cities, 11 public spac~: contnt1 in, 15: st~• as, 19; uv of, 46, 1 }4-H pull and push factors, 19 pushcam, J-4. 1 ~ 8 Qomt, Ayatollah, 69 qutet encroachment, 7-1 o, 11, 4 5, s8. 6o, ·~7. J6o, 16\; history of, 19-11; unrmploymmt and, 1H Qum, demonstration in, \7 Rabat, informal commumtin in, 19 Rahanjam, Prnidmt, 98

Inn

Ramsar:, rrvolutionary comminrn In, p. rational choiCe theory, 6, 170n&~ Ray: bombinR of buildings m, 43; ahantytowns in, so; ~quaner settlement!. in, 30 Razmandrpn Organization, 1&8 Razmara, General, 1s3 redistribution: and autonomy, 1&; of goods, II; of rnources, n redistribution of pubh~ goods: as burden on statt, 1 5i ~quanen and, 98 redistribution of soctal ROOds, 10, 160 rrform movements, 160, 176n6 refuRccs, B~ religious beliefs, shared, &4-&~ religious issun: hornogmcous cultural and behavtoral patterns and. &4-&S; lslamac Revolution and, ]6; in poor communitln, 4 &; ~« also clergy

religiously prohibited (haram), 70 reli1iouascrmons ~rowu-lthtnt•l, in undrrdass neighborhoods, 43 relocanon protects. 103-4 rcpressift statt policies, s, 19, 163; mobilizaticm and, 2. 1 rcsiliri'ICe, and hardship, 44 rcsiatancc, 6 rrvolutionary comminca, 146; dur· in& revolution, s1 Rrvolutionary Guards, 12.9 revolution ~mqilab), ss Rnaich, revolutionary committee• in, s1 Rrza1i, Rahim, 1s r Reza Shah, 2.4, ]S, I]S-]6 rtots. 9, Jl-}9; bu1 fare suba1dies and, 9l; demolitions and, 1o6-l; sattlhrr communities and, I 1; in Tehran, 49-SO

rirual1, in shanrytowns, 42. romance of militance, 161 royalleadenhtp, 40 rural/backward (d1haat1l, 30 rural nugranrs, J, ~ rural parochialism and traditionalism, urban poor and, 10 rural-urban m1gratioo, 82., 95, 1}6; in Iran, 2.4; in Iranian cities. &J; pull and push factors and, &IJ; Tehran and, 2.6; unemployment and, IIJ-2.0, 14 1; urban unemployment and, 19-&0

sabolnan vn-JNI community solidarity, ss-s6 Sa'rdi, Gholam Huucin, Sanandat. unemployment in, 11I Santiqo, Chilr, 4 SAVAK, J7 Sayycda Zcynab, 3 Schuurman, Framo, 7 Schwrdler, jillian, 161 Scon,jamt'l,4, s-6 scctaraani•m. Neighborhood CoutKils and, 93-9 s Security Organizations, ss, 18yn1 1s Scifian, Engineer, 146 self-reaulation and autonomy, 12., I J, I J8 self-reliance, 160 Scndero Lumin010 (Pcrul, 41 sermons. ~e ethnic sermons; religious sermon• servants, JO servants of the d11poueued, 67 sewage ditch ~,lOti)'), 92. sexual modesty (hfl)'d), 1J shacks (aiONnaits), 4• 64 Shadshahr. SH ltlam1hahr shah as patron, 39-40 Shah of Iran: coup (195)), 37; dictatorship of, 4 2.; downfall of, 40;

'2.

229

no Inn Shah of lr•n ... tco11h!IWJ) "' also Muhammad Rcza Shah; Rna Shah Shahpour, revolutionary commimcs

an, s1 shahrak commurutia, 79 Shahrntani (mayor of Tehran), 49 Shahnar. ~quaner .ettlcmenta in, JO shanty .etdcmcntt (u~). 77, 87 shantytown~, 4, 11; in Tehran, 41; violent eradication of, 46-48 Shariab, Ali, 4J Sharif-lmami, Ja'far (prime minister), 49 Sbiraz: communaJ diffrrcntlabOII in, :1.4; .quanrr sndementaan, z.6; street vcndon an, 140, 146-49; violmt nadiaation in, 46 shuraiam, 90-91, 1 S4i JH also ~ighborhood Cou~:ila

11lmt rrvuluuon, 6o; sn .Uo quirt encroachment Saraz riots, 1 o6-l lit-ins (tabaSJMII), I Z.O, I :1.7-Z.I, 149 slum dwdlcrs, J, 1 r, :1.4; ancomc bel. of, .J 1 slum dwcllinp. dncribcd, 2.6-2.7 !dums, in Tehran, z.s-n S«aal c:hange, 1p, a6o; in Iran, :1.4-z.s; pohtical movements and, S; Sllfllfican~;e uf the Joc~JI and, Ji squanc,.· movements and, 6o; universal imagr of, 1 socaal forcn, 8, u, J6 socia I idcntiry, z. J, :1.4 Socialiam, Z.O, I I 9 aocial movemrnts, 6-7, a691111z.6-z.7; and MX;ial chanae, 4-s; uniiU aoc:aal change, a S7 MX;ial space, 14 s socaa.l transformation, 6-7 !101:10101)', 144

solidarity, H-s6, I .JS, I s9-60; in o.:a.p!Cd buildinp, 66 ~uth Africa: cnsis of lqirimaq• in, z.1 ; shacks and shantytowns in, 4 spontaneous habitation, • s-46, 167114 spontaneous IC'tdcmcnu, tolctance uf, 48 SPWA. SN Syndica~ of Pro,ect/Seaaonal Workers of Abadan squanen, z., 8, 1s. 16, z.4; employ· mcnt of, 41; evictions of, 68; home invasions and, 64; oa:upativns of, J 1; street vrnding and, 140 squaner ~ettlemcnts: recognition of, 49; in Tehran, z.s-n. z.B, • 74rrz.6 llqu&RIOI (llhghfll) Vft'llasit-ins, I &0 srabihzanon pqrams, in Third World counrries, zo stall-hoidiDBI~tl), 114,140 stalls, a.J6, 158 stanltica: rural-urban migration, IJ.-1 J; squancr community z.7, Z9, J 1; aqua ncr oa:upations, J 1; 1treet event dcath1 in Tehran, J9; Tehran population~, 77-799 uncmploymcru, 110; uncmploymcot in Tehran, 1 Hi unemployment in Third World countria, &O, 172.11S9i unemployment rarcs, 141 ~renng Comm1nre of Caiiual/Sraaonal Worken, 1 u stratqy sharins. I street demonstration•, 9, JI-J¥; onworks and. 1 7 street fountain '/ishaNI), 9J. Street pnp, Z. 1 street hawken, 14J litlftt politics: dacribcd, 15-19; government contro4 uf, 19; leRit·

••zn.

imization of, so; sid~walk v~n dnrs and, \ strrn subsast~IK~ activitin., 3. 1 1, I~.

Z.1, 1)4

srrrn substsrmc~ workers. 1S7 strttt thugs (br:bNIIabl), 1 14, 1 17, 146, 147 1trrn vmdang, 1 J4 1trrn vmdors, J,IJ--9, _lo, 1 .n-u. aliz. st~~ vaolmu, 148 structural adjusnncnt, 10 struetu~ of opportunities (Tarrow), 8 student actavism, J 7; srr also young actiVIStS student squanen, 64-tis, n; evtctions of, 68-69 suhaltcm groups, 9 Sultanabad, infonnal communatia an, Z.9 superordanat~ groups, 6 Sup~mc Council of tM Gowds (ShNra·y~ A41H Gowdl, 9Z. SUPWA. Sr~ Syndicate of the Un~mployrd Projn:t Workers of Abadan Suq EI-Gom'a an lmbaha, 3 survival strategiQ, s, 6, ? J., 16o Syndacate of Projn:t/Scasonal Worker of Abadan (SPWA), IJ.J-2.4 Syndic:atc of th~ lln~mployed Proj~<."t Work~rs of Abadan ISUPWAI, Ill, 116

Tabriz: communal differmtianon in, 2.4; dnnonsrrations in, 37; sardlirr communities and, 81; aquatter ~lem~nrs in, J.6, J 1; uncmploymmr in, 1 17 ldhtJSSUII, I 9 2.114 S

Tanzania, urban misrat1on and, 2.0 Tarrow, Sidney, 8

Tavassoli, Muhammad, 92., 99, 144 Tawfiqaan, Naser, 1 17 tax collections, strt'et vmdors and, 4 Tehran: bus services in, 1 1 z.; com· munal differennation in, 1.4; dcmolinons squads in, 4ft-48; demonstrations in, 19; describrd, z.s; housing rebels m, 59; misration to, 1J6; new poor in, 2.}; shuraism and, 9 1; aquaner scnkmmts in, J.S-J.6, 45; squatters in, 1 o6-7; temporary communities in, J.; unemployment an, 12.2.; vii· lages surrounding, 76-77, 7B, llo T~hran Univ~nity, 147-48, lSI Telcghana, Ayatollah, 9o-91 rh~ormcal groups (Bourd~u), 17 third-class peopl~ (111~-ye w'ilhtl), 39 Third World countries: squann settlements in, z.6; urban disenfranchised an, s Third World poor, 1 S7 Tilly, Charles, ali trade unions: m61tration of, 1?; in Iran, 41-42.; sn also labor strikes; sit-ans; union oi'MIInization travel-peddling (t£ut-foroNshi), 140 Tunis, infonnal communities in, 2.9 tyranny of modernity, 7

UKHm. Sn Union of the Kiosk Holden and lc~ Traders of Tehran ulama (Shi'i clergy), )7 underground rconnmy, in Tehran, 4 s underground water reln'Voir (aaballbaar), 84 "Under the javadiyeh Brid~Jr" (Golcsorkhi), )J. underworld members, 1s Unrmployrd Workers of Ahwaz and tM Vicinity, 1 16

unemployment. 2., 1 .s. 16, 1 9-2.0. 141; posr-rrvolutJonary, 9, 109-.J 1; quad rncroachmmt and, 19-2.1

unrmploymcnr benefin, 112.-IJ, .. ,. 116, 162.

and,

81

U.S. Embauy St'izurc, an Tehran, 7J, U.6-J.?, 164

UUIWIV. See Umon of the Unanployed Worltrn of kfahan and Vicanaty

unfortunate- tbaJWbthtl), .J'I, 171ht}4

Uruon of dw Kiosk Holden and Ia Tradrn of Te-hran (lJKHriT), 15 J Unioo of the- Kio1k Holden of Mosaddcq Avenur, 1 so Union of the Strca Book-Scllen. 1 so Uruon of the Unrmploycd Worken of Isfahan and Vicinity (UUI-

WJVI,

117-18, IU

limon of UMmployrd Peoplr of Kermanshah, 1 2. 5 Uruon of Workcn and H1gh-School Graduates, 1 16 union orpnizanon, '~• J 7, 41-42., 1 n-2. 5; 10 Iran, 41-4 2.; su 11l.o labor strike.; Sit-ins; ttadc umon• UnivrrSJty Counc1l1 1Sb11ra·Y"

v..~.h,ahl, 19

urban dilmfranchllcd pe-ople, S urban rmploymcnt, 14 .J urban wowth, ID Iran, 2.4 urban bind. 2., 16 J urban I'JW'Iinall (kCMitb~ttshnutr), 99 urban miKrarion. ~e rural-urban mipation urban pbyucal •pacr, 14 J urban planni~t~o H}. 1 nn 1 J urban politJCI, morallanKuaF of, 1J urban poor, 1o, 2.4, 1 7llf4; food dilmbution and. 52.; in Iran, 1 57; 1trugks of, _1H; see also dllen· franchiicd pcoplr urban IC'Cunty forcr•, 54 urban soc1al muvrmmn. 6-7 urban socaalspaa, 14 J

Urumayrh.. sarcllirc communatirs

van NacnKn, Ton, 7

vrndor1, 1 s. 16; ~ alsu 1trcet Yendon vigdantc woup.., Nei1hborhood Council' and, s5 violent eradication, 46-48, 161-62. vubwrabwty of urban poor, J 1

Ward, Peter,

1 .2.

war of arrritJon, and violrnr eradication. 48 water aupplin, an utelhrr commurutlcs, 8 J-84; see also illegal warer will tO IUrYave, 44 womm: aa housnnvcs, 1 s; an maledominated pthcrinp. 16-17; protest• by, Bs, 96, 98; KJtUal modesty and, 1 J

Yakb.;hiabad taquattcr IIC'ttlcmcnr), 9J yoUJIIactivllli, unemplo}'mcnt and, U4-J.S

young rrvolurionarJCS: home aavasions and, 6 .J; importance of,

ss-,6 yoq unemployed, 137-) 8 young volunt~n, an satellite communatw~,

87, 92.-9)

yourha, urban,

140

Zahedan: refuFn an. 82.; aquarrc-r ICttlcrtJentl in, .J I Zanjan: rural-urban maparion and, JO; vaolenr eradicarion an, 46 Zootabad (aquaner Kttlcmenr), .2.9, _f 1; warcr supply in, 84-8 5

Street Politics: Poor People's Movements in Iran

Street

Street

Street

Street Love

Marlborough Street

Dead Street

Magic Street

Street Magic

Marlborough Street

Mercy Street

Magic Street

Chestnut Street

Street Music

Trinidad Street

Elizabeth Street

Elizabeth Street

Street Gang

Street Magic

Street Magic

Elizabeth Street

Main Street

Espedair Street

Street Boys

145th Street

Street Dreams

Espedair Street

Magic Street

Street Dreams

Never Street

Street Politics

Street Politics: Poor People's Movements in Iran

Street

Street

Street

Street Love

Marlborough Street

Dead Street

Magic Street

Street Magic

Marlborough Street

Mercy Street

Magic Street

Chestnut Street

Street Music

Trinidad Street

Elizabeth Street

Elizabeth Street

Street Gang

Street Magic

Street Magic

Elizabeth Street

Main Street

Espedair Street

Street Boys

145th Street

Street Dreams

Espedair Street

Magic Street

Street Dreams

Never Street

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