Strategic Thinking about the Korean Nuclear Crisis: Four Parties Caught between North Korea and the United States (Strategic Thought in Northeast Asia)

Strategic Thinking about the Korean Nuclear Crisis

STRATEGIC THOUGHT IN NORTHEAST ASIA GILBERT ROZMAN, SERIES EDITOR Russian Strategic Thought toward Asia Edited by Gilbert Rozman, Kazuhiko Togo, and Joseph Ferguson Japanese Strategic Thought toward Asia Edited by Gilbert Rozman, Kazuhiko Togo, and Joseph Ferguson Strategic Thinking about the Korean Nuclear Crisis: Four Parties Caught between North Korea and the United States By Gilbert Rozman Korean Strategic Thought toward Asia By Gilbert Rozman, In-taek Hyun, and Shin-wha Lee Chinese Strategic Thought toward Asia By Gilbert Rozman

Strategic Thinking about the Korean Nuclear Crisis Four Parties Caught between North Korea and the United States Gilbert Rozman

STRATEGIC THINKING ABOUT THE KOREAN NUCLEAR CRISIS

Copyright © Gilbert Rozman, 2007. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be used or reproduced in any manner whatsoever without written permission except in the case of brief quotations embodied in critical articles or reviews. First published in 2007 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN™ 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10010 and Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, England RG21 6XS Companies and representatives throughout the world. PALGRAVE MACMILLAN is the global academic imprint of the Palgrave Macmillan division of St. Martin’s Press, LLC and of Palgrave Macmillan Ltd. Macmillan® is a registered trademark in the United States, United Kingdom and other countries. Palgrave is a registered trademark in the European Union and other countries. ISBN-13: 978–1–4039–7556–0 ISBN-10: 1–4039–7556–6 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Rozman, Gilbert. Strategic thinking about the Korean nuclear crisis : four parties caught between North Korea and the United States / Gilbert Rozman. p. cm. — (Strategic thought in northeast Asia) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 1–4039–7556–6 (alk. paper) 1. Nuclear arms control—Korea (North) 2. Six-party Talk. 3. Nuclear nonproliferation—East Asia. 4. Security, International—East Asia. 5. Korean reunification question (1945– ) I. Title. JZ6009.K7R69 2007 327.1⬘74709519—dc22

2007003254

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. Design by Newgen Imaging Systems (P) Ltd., Chennai, India. First edition: September 2007 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Printed in the United States of America.

Contents

Chronology of the Nuclear Crisis

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Acknowledgments

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Overview: The Nuclear Crisis and the Regional Context

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Navigating between the United States and North Korea

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The South Korean Response: The Nuclear Crisis

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The South Korean Response: The Regional Context

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The Chinese Response: The Nuclear Crisis

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The Chinese Response: The Regional Context

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The Japanese Response: The Nuclear Crisis

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The Japanese Response: The Regional Context

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The Russian Response: The Nuclear Crisis Written by Evgeny Bazhanov

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The Russian Response: The Regional Context

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Notes

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Index

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Chronology of the Nuclear Crisis

Aug. 27, 2002 The United States informs Japan of North Korean HEU program as Japan informs the United States of the plan for Koizumi’s visit to Pyongyang Sept. 17, 2002

Koizumi visits Pyongyang for summit with Kim Jong-il

Oct. 3–5, 2002 Jim Kelly visits Pyongyang and reveals U.S. knowledge of HEU program Oct. 15, 2002 The United States denounces North Korean program, soon ending KEDO cooperation, leading to the North’s defiance Jan. 23, 2003 Russia

Losyukov visits Pyongyang to try to mediate crisis for

Apr. 23–26, 2003 Three-way Talks in Beijing with the United States, North Korea, China Aug. 27–29, 2003

First Round of Six-Party Talks in Beijing

Feb. 25–28, 2004

Second Round of Six-Party Talks in Beijing

Jun. 23–26, 2004

Third Round of Six-Party Talks in Beijing

Jul. 26-Aug. 7, Sept. 13–19, 2005 Fourth round of Six-Party Talks ends with Joint Statement, followed by U.S. interpretive statement and a day later the North’s interpretive statement Oct. 28–29, 2005 Jong-il Nov. 9–11, 2005

Hu Jintao visits Pyongyang for summit with Kim Fifth Round of Six-Party Talks, 1st session in Beijing

Jul. 5, 2006 North Korea fires seven missiles in defiance of warnings, leading to UN Security Council vote against it on July 15

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Oct. 9, 2006 North Korea tests a nuclear weapon, leading to Oct. 14 UN Security Council call for states to block the supply of major weapons, hardware or technology for WMD, and luxury goods Dec. 18–22, 2006 Beijing

Fifth Round of Six-Party Talks, second session in

Feb. 8–13, 2007 Fifth round of Six-Party Talks, third session in Beijing reaches Joint Agreement, deciding on three phases and five working groups to end the crisis Mar. 19, 2007 Sixth round of Six-Party Talks, first session convenes in Beijing after working groups meet Jun. 21–22, 2007 Chris Hill goes to Pyongyang after frozen funds transferred to North Korea as plans are made for second session of sixth round

Acknowledgments

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his book project developed with a grant in 2003–5 from the National Council for Eurasian and East European Research, which supported collaboration with experts and collections of materials. Initially these activities centered in Russia but they quickly extended to all four of the countries covered. Only with this generous assistance could I have realized the goals of this wide-ranging project. The book manuscript was completed through a grant in 2005–6 from the Korea Foundation. Along with funding from Princeton University, it made possible an academic year’s leave to concentrate on research and writing as well as time in Seoul to meet with specialists and gather essential information. Academic experts and officials graciously assisted me in all of my efforts. Only with such generous support could I finish writing this book in a timely manner. In each country covered in this study gathering data was facilitated by academic colleagues. In South Korea I am especially appreciative of Shin-wha Lee as well as Sung Yong Lee and Dong Jung Kim. In China Li Jingjie helped me the most. In Japan Iwaki Shigeyuki once again provided extraordinary assistance. Finally, Evgeny Bazhanov not only helped with materials but also wrote a much appreciated chapter for this volume. Many others deserve thanks for their responsiveness to my queries and interest in sharing their knowledge. I hope that they will regard this work as a sign that their efforts were not in vain.

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CHAPTER 1

Overview: The Nuclear Crisis and the Regional Context

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his study makes Northeast Asia (NEA), not the United States or North Korea, the focus of analysis on how the nuclear crisis from 2002 affected strategic thinking and international relations. This means exploring the debates about the nature of the standoff and how it unfolded in four countries (the Other Four) on the front lines, each concerned about how the situation might spiral out of control and how the security framework in NEA might be reshaped. South Korea in 1998 launched the Sunshine Policy to engage the North and interpreted developments as prelude to reunification; its stake in the process was highest. China assumed the central role in steering Six-Party Talks that became the principal mechanism for addressing the crisis from 2003; its aspirations as a rising power were on the line as were efforts to shape a region free of domination by the U.S.-Japan alliance. Japan has long considered the Korean peninsula vital to its presence in Asia; as it grew isolated in the region the significance of its role in shaping North Korea’s future increased. Last, Russia calculated that making its voice heard in Korean affairs is critical to regaining influence in the region lost with the collapse of the Soviet Union. Caught in an intense struggle between the world’s sole “hegemon” and its most defiant “criminal regime,” these states faced a test of their strategic thinking on three layers: Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), reunification of Korea, and the geostrategic balance at the intersection of great power interests. North Korea is a repugnant regime because of extreme oppression and denial of basic human rights to its own people. Its rhetoric and oftthreatening posture mark it as a belligerent state too. Given these

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realities, what strategic responses are best suited for dealing with it? Demonizing one’s reputed enemy can be a recipe for failure to deal in a manner that can alter its behavior or make common cause with other states. Under President George W. Bush and Vice-President Dick Cheney the United States has often been seen as contemptuous of the global community, insensitive to the requirements of multilateral cooperation. Given that it was bent on unilateral transformation in NEA as in the Middle East, what strategic responses are best suited for dealing with it? Exaggerating a conspiratorial intent to boost its hegemony can undercut prospects for responding strategically. Two clashing assumptions arise repeatedly in arguments about the nuclear crisis. One is that the Kim Jong-il regime is rational and ready to deal; once it receives an offer that meets its security needs, economic assistance goals, and face-saving objectives, it will forswear all nuclear weapons or programs. Test it, and it will cooperate. The other is that the regime plans to hold onto its nuclear arsenal and does not really want to talk unless it is not only much better rewarded than most expect but also is able to drag out the process while reaping unreciprocated benefits. The first side insists that you cannot know how reasonable and eager for economic resuscitation the North is, until you make an enticing offer; the other answers that the slippery slope of rewarding a country reliant on threats will ensure that it keeps resorting to them. The truth can be best discerned by a two-fold approach, making incentives clear while preparing for tough sanctions that have to be multilateral. Progress can be achieved, as seen in the Agreed Framework of October 1994, the Perry Process peaking in September 1999, or the Joint Statement of September 2005—each a compromise requiring the North to stop some destabilizing or threatening action in return for incentives—but such opening moves require intensive follow-up. Only on February 13, 2007 was a wide-ranging deal reached that would place great demands on diplomacy through five working groups under the Six-Party Talks. The Other Four hold the key to applying either carrots or sticks and to the way the crisis transforms the peninsula and the region, even if their role has been mostly reactive. Led by neoconservatives in the United States and ultra-nationalists in Japan, one school saw the only solution of the nuclear crisis as sanctions to pressure North Korea into a deal or, better yet, capitulation. The other school, predominant among those in China and Russia obsessed with changing the power balance but also many in South Korea, favored economic cooperation to entice the North toward interdependence, trust, and reform. South Korea’s President Roh Moo-hyun sought peace

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in cooperation and development, aiming to swing the balance from military hard-liners to technocrats in the North to the dismay of Bush aides, who considered him gullible for bolstering hard-line forces under idealist illusions. China’s presidents Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao and Russia’s President Vladimir Putin joined Roh in paying at least as much attention to U.S. inflexibility as to provocations by the North, while Japan’s Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro and his successor Abe Shinzo, who won popularity stirring emotions on this issue, increasingly sided with Bush and then withheld support when Bush agreed to the February 13 deal. A classic split between containment and engagement lies at the heart of the crisis. While no consensus exists, there is widespread agreement on the following priority of objectives for resolving the crisis: (1) no proliferation of nuclear weapons from North Korea to terrorist groups or states that may support them; (2) no war that could cause widespread damage on the Korean peninsula and possibly beyond; (3) no collapse of the North Korean regime that could raise the specter of civil war and perhaps loss of control over WMD or intervention that could widen the war; (4) no intensification of the nuclear threat potential of North Korea; and (5) elimination of the North’s nuclear weapons and programs. These objectives calling for a return to an earlier status quo were shared by the Other Four. Other goals were not: in the United States human rights is a priority; humanitarian assistance is a concern in South Korea; in China’s internal debates the future of socialism has an enduring place; in Japan the abductions issue draws rapt attention; and a Russian preoccupation is the impact on the vulnerable Russian Far East. Consensus is difficult to reach on these other themes, but a forward-looking regional framework bridging at least some of these goals is possible. Four generalizations make clear the value of seeing the crisis through the lens of the Other Four. One, given the Bush-Cheney worldview and that of many in Congress as well as the Kim Jong-il regime’s worldview, the crisis was quite inescapable and stood little chance of resolution at least before the fall of 2006 North Korean nuclear test opened the door to strategic rethinking. Two, the crisis has unfolded in a predictable manner, proving that North Korea is more rational than many admit and that rosy statements from the Bush administration were unrealistic. Three, this crisis has played a role in redrawing the security geometry of the world’s most dynamic region as it stands at a crossroads, to the detriment of the United States and Japan, but renewed regional cooperation could limit the damage. Four, along with the reassertion of military strength as a means for seeking advantage, diplomatic dexterity has been

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put to the test, and found wanting; yet diplomacy kept reviving as the North tested the tolerance of others. Debates in the Other Four reveal the potential of the Six-Party Talks to produce the most important negotiations or the most serious missed opportunity since the end of the cold war.1 Significance The nuclear showdown’s importance was highlighted by the Bush administration in the first months and then obscured, perhaps because of the absence of a strategy to end it. William Perry, former secretary of defense, warned of the growing danger from the unresolved crisis,2 but his words may have been overlooked as mere partisanship from the past Clinton administration. Even such messages failed to put the showdown in a broad regional perspective. If we do so, we can identify reasons for its significance, with parallels to the talks over the end of the cold war that had to address a divided Germany as decisive in the transformation of an entire region. First, North Korea, as East Germany until 1989, lies at the heart of a region, an emblem of the cold war, and a dividing line that separates great powers. Even if the thirty-eighth parallel lacks the symbolism of the Berlin Wall and lost visibility with communism’s collapse in the Soviet Union and China’s entry into the global economy, the current crisis reveals its continued salience. Second, the crisis brings together four great powers with the most assertive posture in security affairs; it has potential to set their ties on a downward course or become a model for further coordination. Third, this crisis at the strategic crossroads of the world’s most dynamic region at a time when it is rising but lacks consensus for regionalism can shape its future institutions. Fourth, the fact that North Korea possesses nuclear weapons and poses a danger of proliferation, war, or blackmail raises the stakes. As one Seoul analyst argued, the Joint Statement at the fourth round of Six-Party Talks on September 19, 2005 was nothing less than a blueprint for the end of the cold war structure in NEA with three elements—a solution to the nuclear crisis, a peace system for the peninsula, and a multilateral security framework.3 The Other Four are debating strategies for further talks, while maneuvering over: the role of WMD in a region where countries with the fastest rising military assertiveness in the world can be found; the mode of Korean reunification at the center of a vital region; and the structure of security and regionalism in NEA, at a time when intraregional ties are growing at the expense of the U.S. “hubs and spokes” approach and a balance among powers is assuming new shape. The

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challenge is to contain a real threat while reaffirming the arms control system by verifiably eliminating the weapons and the potential to build them. If the United States achieved its goal of complete, verifiable, irreversible disarmament (CVID), it would signal reaffirmation of the U.S. role in the region. If, however, the North emerged as a state unfettered in its nuclear programs and capable of using them as a policy instrument, the United States would look battered as states in the region struggled for their own accommodation, leaving security at risk and the global system unsettled. In 1994 Clinton had decided that a compromise freeze with International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections of the rods in the nuclear plant would be preferable to war and would suffice to sustain the control system even if the North might already possess one or two weapons. Bush brought to power many who opposed that decision, insisting that they could realize the more desired option of eliminating all of the North’s nuclear weapons. When signs of a highly enriched uranium program led the United States to confront the North in October 2002, the line was drawn between the two antagonists deeply suspicious of each other. If at times, as in September 2005, the North said it would accept a deal to eliminate nuclear weapons on the peninsula, fear remained that a pariah state will be able to resort to nuclear blackmail, and it intensified after the nuclear test only to be somewhat alleviated in the diplomatic surge after the February 13 agreement. The dispute from 2002 can also be characterized as a struggle over reunification of the Korean peninsula. If North Korea abandoned its threat capacity and yielded to pressure from the United States or a coalition of regional actors, any chance of having a major say in reunification, already low because of the bleak state of its economy and isolation, would diminish further. If, however, it kept an expanded WMD capacity and also was rewarded with large-scale economic assistance and firm security guarantees, its voice could be amplified in a context where many in Seoul favor economic integration before political change. Caught between Bush’s desire for regime change, if possible, and Kim Jong-il’s demand for regime reinforcement, no matter what, the Other Four cannot avoid thinking of the endgame in the nuclear crisis as the starting point for reunification and how their national interests might be affected by a “peace regime” replacing the existing armistice and forming the basis for a process of national integration on the peninsula. For all of the parties concerned there should be no mistaking the presence of a third layer of calculations. The nuclear standoff is a struggle over the emerging security framework of the NEA region. To some, the Six-Party Talks serve only as a temporary device for dismantling the

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North’s nuclear program, leaving the U.S. alliance system as the sole security forum. For others, however, the talks should become institutionalized as a multilateral system for regional security, offering China continued opportunity to play a leading role as prime conduit to North Korea, raising the voice of Russia, and reducing South Korean dependency on one ally. Assessing how the balance of power is changing in the region and how the crisis endgame may affect it became essential for strategically furthering the interests of one’s state. U.S. staying power, the rise of China, the strength of the U.S.-Japan alliance, the viability of the Sino-Russian strategic partnership, and the strategic wavering of South Korea all figure into this evolving geopolitical landscape. The Six-Party Talks bring together six states with recent or lingering ambitions to play a leadership role through their presence on the Korean peninsula. North Korea had plans to sow unrest in the South and through militarization and even terror, such as the bombing in Burma in 1983 aimed at the Chun Doo-hwan leadership, sought reunification on its own terms and a defiant Korea at the center of NEA. In the early years of the Bush administration, the United States made a strong push to assert its leadership in NEA, and despite acceptance of multilateralism through the Six-Party Talks or preoccupation with Iraq, this orientation remained strong through 2006. The Soviet Union had high aspirations from 1945 and as late as 1984–85 was intensifying its strategic ties to North Korea. With Putin committed to Russia’s resurgence in the region and hopeful in 2000–2002 of Kim Jong-il’s support, Russian ambitions may yet be considerable. Japan ended the cold war with high expectations for leadership in NEA, anticipating a more autonomous position versus the United States and forms of regionalism that would convert its economic dominance into a new political role. With Abe’s nationalist outlook following Koizumi’s defiant stance in Asia, we should not dismiss Japan’s 1990s hopes as irrelevant to the coming period. South Korea clearly demonstrated its eagerness to become the center in planning for the future of the peninsula during the heyday of the Sunshine Policy, and Roh’s claims to make the South the hub of the region or balancer reveal added ambitions. Finally, since 2003, China has taken center stage in negotiations as well as becoming the economic glue for rapid integration in NEA. Its aspirations for centrality have deep historical roots, fueled by perceptions of its rising trajectory. Four great powers and both Koreas are grasping for a major say over the peninsula in circumstances in which negotiations started narrowly but can lead afar. Compared to the first nuclear crisis, more countries are involved in the second, complicating the diplomatic challenges. The Other Four are

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more energetically engaged than a decade earlier. Japan carries “a bigger stick with a bigger carrot.”4 North Korea is more dangerous, possessing a larger missile arsenal with a greater range and more nuclear weapons, but as a result of Koizumi’s visit to Pyongyang in September 2002, a process is in place for normalization talks too. After being sidelined in the first crisis, Russia counts on the personal ties Putin cultivated with Kim Jong-il, while its newfound energy clout may become a factor in the North’s revival and in regional integration too. South Korea raised its profile with the Sunshine Policy and keeps seeking a central role in negotiating an agreement as it woos the North with economic blandishments. As coordinator, China has emerged as a diplomatic force with standing far greater now than in 1994. NEA has come a long way from the time the first nuclear crisis was handled through a preponderance of U.S. power. Chinese power has grown explosively, South Korea demands a larger role, Japan insists on its realist foreign policy, and Russia has drawn closer to its Soviet roots. Assertive beyond anything seen in the 1990s, the Other Four are poised to shape the crisis dynamics. Along with the U.S. alliance system, the Six-Party Talks may become what Japanese diplomat Takeda Yoshinori calls “two-level stabilization.” Some view the role of the Other Four in the Six-Party Talks as a kind of garnish. They may at times add a little flavor to the proceedings, but they are dispensable and are incapable of changing the substance of the showdown between two stubborn antagonists. While on the most pressing issues that divide the “two antagonists,” this way of thinking is not far from the truth, on other agendas their voices matter. For China this is the first test since the nineteenth century of its claim to centrality, the “middle country” with responsibility for molding the regional structure weighing the fate of its “buffer state,” North Korea, and ties with the “lone superpower,” the United States. South Korea is at last navigating between “brother nation” North Korea and its “sole ally,” the United States. Japan faces its most serious diplomatic test since it hitched itself to the United States, normalizing ties in succession with the USSR (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (1956), South Korea (1965), and China (1972), aiming for two post cold war goals: to become a “normal nation” and to “reenter Asia.” Finally, Russia sees a chance to regain a good part of its footing in NEA lost at the start of the 1990s, winning U.S. recognition alongside North Korean reliance. The Other Four attach great meaning to these “hidden” agendas of regional balance. Each of the four at times showed frustration at being left with few options as the crisis unfolded and at other times sought to take the initiative. Japan acted first in a September 2002 trip by Koizumi to

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Pyongyang planned just before Koizumi was warned that the North had a uranium enrichment program in violation of past agreements and the United States was deciding how to respond. Moscow’s move came in January 2003 just as the crisis was escalating, and its failure left it at the back of the pack with little scope for action. China had the blessing of the United States and the ear of North Korea as it took the lead in February–April 2003 and resumed it through each round of the SixParty Talks, proposing ideas that were vetoed by one or the other of the antagonists while claiming the unassuming role of neutral facilitator. South Korea lost its lead role in 2001, but it aimed to regain the initiative and finally in June 2005 made a bold move that propelled talks through the summer. The fact that each of the Other Four showed willingness to surge in front shows the shared eagerness to gain an advantage whenever an opportunity presented itself, but the intensity of the showdown usually left little room for a third party to act. In the power balance of NEA, the United States is first but distant, China is second and counting on projections of the future, Japan is third despite confusion over the balance of economic and other levers of power, Russia is fourth without a strong presence apart from proximity and rising energy influence, South Korea may only be fifth but it has entered the world’s top ten economic and trading states with world-class industries and a middle power ranking, and North Korea while poor has formidable military assets and low vulnerability. This extraordinary mix of six states gives this crisis significance. The United States seeks an unequivocal commitment by Pyongyang to dismantle all of its nuclear weapons and programs that further their development, including acknowledgment of its uranium enrichment activities and unrestricted acceptance of verification monitors (CVID). North Korea seeks complete normalization of relations and a security guarantee from the United States with bountiful economic assistance from it and international organizations. Fearful of instability in NEA and aware that neither of the protagonists would yield on some points, the Other Four differ in their preferences for compromise. Three key points differentiate their thinking. One, how do they assess the reasonableness of the two protagonists, the North’s willingness to abandon its nuclear programs, and U.S. readiness to pursue a solution rather than regime change? Two, what process of integration in NEA do they expect to encompass the North and how will it affect future reunification? Three, how do they envision the framework for security that would emerge from the crisis, from a multilateral mechanism that may take precedence over alliances and confrontation to jockeying for power and

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uncertainty over the peninsula? At stake are ties with traditional allies in the region and with countries important for their future, testing four critical great power relations: Sino-U.S., U.S.-Japanese, Sino-Japanese, and Sino-Russian. Breakdown in the Six-Party Talks could heighten insecurity and division in NEA, push South Korea further away from the United States and Japan, damage Sino-U.S. relations, abet the North’s hard-liners, and lead to the spread of nuclear weapons. The value of a breakthrough could be dramatic. The nuclear crisis has become the defining moment in a region in transition. After the February 13 agreement and some confusion over the removal of financial sanctions imposed by the United States just after the September 19 Joint Statement, the first phase of implementation saw North Korea shut its Yongbyon nuclear reactor and allow IAEA inspectors to return, South Korea supply 50,000 tons of heavy oil to the North, and five working groups begin to meet. In the second phase the North was obliged to disable its reactor, but what that meant was subject to interpretation, and to make a full declaration of its nuclear materials including the uranium enrichment. The United States had promised steps on the path to normalization of relations, but how they would be synchronized with other actions remained unclear. The North was to be supplied with 950,000 more tons of heavy fuel oil, and it was likely to insist on moves toward building a light-water nuclear reactor to provide energy security. In this new atmosphere of “action-for-action,” diplomacy would be tested. The Other Four could exert an influence by being too generous to the North despite its slow compliance or in the case of Japan by imposing its own conditions and delaying expected rewards. As the crisis entered a new stage, we draw lessons from how it had been handled and what was its wider regional significance. Preceding Events The First Nuclear Crisis and the Agreed Framework. In the nuclear crisis of 1993–94 the United States faced a crossroads, as the Other Four winced without making momentous decisions of their own. China was tested by U.S. efforts to have it pressure the North, Japan by U.S. probes to secure its help as a staging area for possible attack, South Korea by the danger of war and then the high cost of constructing two light-water nuclear reactors in the North through KEDO (Korean Peninsula Economic Development Organization), which also put a burden on Japan and on Russia by its marginalization. Yet, none saw this as a strategic crossroads, even if a deal came only after the North had made clear

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its readiness to approach the precipice without outside support and the United States had prepared for war.5 In the 1990s various approaches were taken to incorporate or circumvent North Korea. In the first half of the decade Seoul and Tokyo as well as Beijing called for border openings and decentralized ties with Pyongyang establishing free economic zones and expanding cross-border trade. South Korea’s nordpolitik foresaw showcases of economic cooperation in the Russian Far East’s Primorskii krai and Jilin province’s Yanbian region bordering the North. Jilin authorities won Beijing’s and then the United Nations Development Program’s backing for an international city shared by China, North Korea, and Russia in the Tumen River delta. Japanese boosters of regionalism in prefectures facing the peninsula championed the “Sea of Japan Rim Economic Sphere,” that placed North Korea near the middle. The desired outcome was for Pyongyang to switch to a reform track, joining a region it would do little to define but could help to stabilize.6 After signing the Agreed Framework the United States dragged its feet, providing energy assistance through KEDO to avoid a nuclear buildup as many expected the regime in Pyongyang to collapse. China’s assistance did more to keep the regime afloat, but the absence of highlevel talks after 1992 when it recognized the South testified to relations that had cooled. With Jiang Zemin hesitant to intervene and Clinton aware that Congress after the Republican victory in 1994 would not back any U.S. initiative, Four-Party Talks were established in 1996 that recognized South and North Korea as the two actors that counted. Yet, the North appeared to be doomed to famine and oblivion, while the South hesitated on engagement while joining others in humanitarian food assistance. Japanese-North Korea talks were suspended, and Russia took only tiny steps to overcome the paralysis in its relations from 1992. After arousing trepidation in 1993–94 with its nuclear assertiveness, the North seemed to have lost its trump card. In 1998, however, newly elected Kim Dae-jung launched his engagement policy, and the North tested a missile that showed it would not be dismissed. In this context, countries shifted their approach. For China and Russia, which formed a strategic partnership in 1996, security on the Korean peninsula had become a test of their clout. The former, fearful of spillover from pressure applied against the North to its handling of reunification as Taiwan became assertive about independence, feared negative spillover. The latter, anxious about the precarious status of the Russian Far East and its own limited influence in NEA, hoped to reassert its voice. For the United States and Japan this was a time to strengthen their alliance and try to draw South Korea closer.

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If the earlier open-border approach had failed to entice the North, the strategic partnership and alliance approach proved equally futile in containing or reforming it. The North had promised in 1994 to declare all of its secret plutonium prior to the opening of the two reactors to be constructed. Pursuing enrichment of uranium was one way around the issue. If the United States did not establish an office in Pyongyang, as specified in the agreement, it was not for lack of effort, but the North Korean military may have resisted, refusing to allow diplomatic pouches to cross the DMZ (the demilitarized zone). The seeds of distrust were growing even as many ignored North Korea. The Perry Process. The Agreed Framework was not a conventional treaty based on mutual pledges of adherence, but a plan that required regular renewal as well as measures to demonstrate positive intent. Failure to pursue diplomatic normalization was a result of United States domestic politics, even if lengthy delays in the construction of two light-water nuclear reactors could be attributed in good part to the North’s own behavior. Since the North had frozen its plutonium processing and desisted from testing its missiles in return for assurances as well as a steady supply of heavy fuel oil, a breakdown in the Agreed Framework was understood to mean a return to nuclear weapons development. In 1998 after the North signaled its dissatisfaction with the progress, the United States was inclined to take a harsh attitude, skeptical of Kim Dae-jung’s abrupt shift of the South’s diplomacy toward engagement. Yet, under the influence of the Perry Process, Clinton took an increasingly conciliatory response, offering a deal to the North in return for a freeze on long-range missile tests and giving the green light to Kim Dae-jung. After consulting closely with South Korea, Japan, and China, Perry recommended moves to breathe fresh life into the Agreed Framework—through multilateral encouragement of the North. If a classified report by Perry at the time drew a red line beyond which the United States would consider military action, the main impact was to boost diplomacy on all sides. Neither state was prepared to accept terms appealing to the other, but in Clinton’s final years they found some common ground. The North won some room to negotiate terms for its foreign relations and economic reforms. Cognizant that prospects for containment were dim, the United States envisioned a gradual transition, expecting, in return, an end to security threats. Conditions were ripe for multisided diplomacy, and South Korea took the lead. The Sunshine Policy. A scramble over the North started just as the turmoil related to South Korea’s financial meltdown was ebbing. Perry’s consultations found Beijing and Seoul prepared to play a different role

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from a few years earlier. Confident of its new clout and angered by the U.S. war over Kosovo, China invigorated its ties to the North. Yet, its interest was eclipsed by Kim Dae-jung’s new outlook, expressed at his inauguration in 1998 and by the summer of 1999 through a delegation to China on regional security. His thinking fit well the direction of Russian foreign policy, searching for a fast track to rebuild ties with the North. As acting president, Putin sent his foreign minister to Pyongyang in February 2000. Not to be left totally behind, Japan sought to restart talks too. All six parties for the first time were actively engaged in preparations for an upsurge in diplomacy as Kim Dae-jung choreographed the steps for an inter-Korean summit. The Sunshine Policy took shape not only as a new president’s dream, but also as a stimulus to China, Japan, and Russia to reassess their strategic prospects on the peninsula. If some Japanese fixated on the North’s newly problematic security impact, diplomats as well as some politicians took care not to be excluded from the emerging engagement. Russians were determined to overcome the helplessness with which they had to watch the first nuclear crisis and frustration at the Four-Party Talk format that left them marginalized on a matter deemed vital to the security of their exposed Far East. Above all, Chinese recognized that as others were astir about the North, they had to reestablish ties suitable for steering any outcome. When Kim Jong-il came in May 2000 for his first trip as leader outside the North, China overcame years of suspicion about its reforms and open-door policy. A whirlwind of diplomacy engulfed Pyongyang, as the Other Four awakened to the North’s role not only as a feared failed state, but as the center of regional security. The June 15 inter-Korean summit unleashed a torrent of expectations. Kim Dae-jung’s journey to Pyongyang refocused the South Korean people on outreach to their brethren in the name of reunification, abruptly changing strategic goals. Putin’s quick follow-up with his own visit to Pyongyang en route to the G-8 summit in Okinawa, where he made a triumphant entrance delivering Kim Jong-il’s commitment to a missile freeze, reset Russia’s strategic orientation in the region. Taking comfort as summit facilitator, China’s leaders redirected their efforts to realizing its goals while boosting their new pursuit of regionalism. That left Japan to scramble not to be left behind as it saw with some trepidation Clinton’s embrace of the process. Thus the “summit of the Koreas” set in motion a region-wide quest for ambitious goals linked to a new security framework and regionalism. Although most observers focused on the effort to entice the North from its shell, the stakes were higher. While Kim Dae-jung took the initiative, Japan, having little success in

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talks with the North, became the most marginalized of the four.7 If, in his swan song, Clinton might have brokered a broader deal on missiles and Japan ridden his coattails to make its own arrangements—being stuck with a large bill8—the fact that the process was left in abeyance as a more skeptical Bush took power was greeted favorably in Tokyo. South Korea pressed for a new regional order, but Japan was not on board. The Bush-Cheney transition. In response to the Perry Process and the Sunshine Policy, Republicans blamed Clinton’s foreign policy for losing South Korea, isolating Japan from Asia, and standing by as regionalism as well as resuscitation of the North took place. Ironically, the very policies chosen in place of Clinton’s approach came much closer to producing precisely these consequences over the subsequent six years. By 2000 the Republican foreign policy elite consolidated its alternative thinking on North Korea in direct opposition to the Sunshine Policy. They prepared with the example of Republican handling of the Soviet Union in the 1980s in mind. The job of ending the cold war had been left incomplete. The United States remained dominant in Asia; firm leadership could make that power unchallenged. This meant not only greater willingness to confront China as it reached for power, but also putting a brake on South Korea’s turn to the North while tightening the squeeze on the North. While skeptical toward developments on the Asian continent, the Armitage report’s agenda stressing strong ties with Japan paled before that of others. A wide gap opened between Asianists linked to Richard Armitage, who took the State Department’s second post under like-minded Colin Powell, and neoconservatives and other generalists under Dick Cheney who had more ambitious goals. The new team calculated that it had gained power just in time to stop a process of transformation in NEA that could have left the United States with much less leverage. South Korea was turning away from the alliance in favor of multilateralism and engagement of the North. China and Russia were reasserting their roles as sponsors of the North to assist it in economic reform and diplomatic opening. ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) ⫹3 (including China, Japan, and South Korea) was boosting regionalism to the exclusion of the United States. Even Japan was eyeing its own overtures to the North. For some in the Bush administration it was essential to put a halt to these processes. U.S. insistence on bilateralism clashed with emerging multilateralism. When Bush took office in January 2001 the Sunshine Policy was left in limbo. The attack on the United States on 9/11 reinforced existing doubts, widening the notion of threats to the United States and

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strengthening the resolve to act aggressively against them. In turn, North Korea had reason to feel more threatened by the United States and its preemptive doctrine. Soon after 9/11 the State Department issued mixed signals about its intentions with John Bolton on the attack in a manner that hinted at the North becoming a target in the war on terror and Armitage calming nerves along lines set forth by Powell over the summer when he spoke of new opportunities with the North that the United States should try and seize.9 If the North signaled a desire to cooperate against terrorism, this response fell short of what the Bush-Cheney worldview of good versus evil could accept. In contrast, China, Russia, and South Korea continued to support the Agreed Framework and Sunshine Policy. In the precrisis phase each wooed the North, touting what it had to offer. Putin advocated the “personal touch,” a bond of friendship between him and Kim Jong-il that would give him a role as “facilitator” to the outside world and most trusted confident. Both Russia’s historic friendship and its allegedly pure motives in support of unification strengthened his case. Japan was slower to enter the fray, but soon after Koizumi became prime minister in 2001 secret talks began to impress Kim Jong-il with the importance of the “ODA card” (overseas development assistance and other financial help), and Koizumi’s September 2002 visit to Pyongyang embraced ambitious plans for normalization. Assistance in lieu of reparations should have been telling for a country desperate for funds to repair a decrepit infrastructure. Kim Dae-jung set in place the goal of “accelerated economic integration” that Roh Moo-hyun promised to pursue after he was elected in December 2002. After the fratricide of the Korean War, Seoul now offered “fraternal shared nationalism” as reason to give it primacy. Jiang Zemin tried to replace an image of coldness to the North, taking charge of its “allaround sponsorship” that Hu Jintao would continue. Kim Jong-il gave some encouragement to each, but in the final analysis he was determined to target the toughest challenge of all—Bush-Cheney and their supporters. As Kim Dae-jung and other leaders pursued Kim Jong-il, the powerful state chairman kept his focus on the United States, overshadowing others in North Korea’s entry into regional and global affairs. After Secretary of State Madeleine Albright visited him and Clinton contemplated but did not make a trip, Bush’s reticence focused attention on how to reconcile catering to his political base by condemning human rights abuses and not compromising his principles with acknowledging pragmatic reasoning in the State Department that favored renewed support for Kim Dae-jung’s approach. The failure of Kim Dae-jung’s March 2001 visit to Washington left a matter in need of continuity and

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caution to fester. If a policy review in favor of continuity might have been implemented in the summer of 2001 only to be derailed after the North fired on a South Korean boat and killed some sailors, after 9/11 Bush seems to have lost track of the danger inherent in the situation and needlessly provoked Kim Jong-il with his “axis of evil” statement. The Axis of Evil. Bush’s second State of the Union Address brought disastrous results: hurtling the United States toward war with Iraq on the basis of erroneous claims about its nuclear program; setting it on a more confrontational course with Iran, which accelerated its nuclear program; and exacerbating ties to North Korea as prelude to a nuclear crisis, for which no workable strategy existed. For a half year a cloud from this way of thinking hung heavily over speculation of U.S. approval for restarting the Sunshine Policy. Each of the Other Four cringed at news of this speech and reenergized its own engagement of the North. In mid-2002 U.S. policy hung in the balance, partly a reflection of the struggle for control between hard-liners led by Cheney and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and pragmatists. Political appointees made decisions with little regard for the views of experts. Bush accused all three in the “axis of evil” of developing nuclear weapons in order to threaten other states and using the prospect of proliferation as, at a minimum, a blackmail tactic to damage U.S. security while destabilizing their own region. In fact, North Korea differed in important respects not only from Iraq, where the accusations were soon proven to be false, but also from Iran, whose regime was replaced through elections by a more fanatical one committed to the development of nuclear weapons. It was neither an Islamic nation nor an oil producer, limiting its support from sympathetic outsiders and its revenue. It already had made one deal with the United States and was assumed to be laying the groundwork for a second more comprehensive deal in pursuit of regime survival, normalization, and developmental assistance. And the states of NEA were engaging Pyongyang with diplomatic initiatives and expectations of a great power consortium. Above all, the North was part of a divided state, where a legacy of nationalism could forge a special bond of attraction as well as fear of quick absorption and regime change.10 The interagency professional policy review of 2001–2 that pointed the way to comprehensive bilateral talks with North Korea stood scant chance of setting relations on a forward-looking course because BushCheney and their close associates did not intend to engage in real giveand-take with North Korea in any negotiations. This relationship hung on a precipice ready to slide rapidly downward. With inconsistent and at

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times threatening rhetoric, the United States was making negotiations more difficult. In the summer of 2002 when U.S. intelligence became convinced of evidence of the highly enriched uranium program the strategy chosen for addressing the issue was fraught with danger. Having informed the North in October of this discovery and been surprised that it acknowledged the program, James Kelly could only return to Washington and leave the decision in the hands of others at the very time the United States was preparing for war with Iraq over a supposed nuclear weapons program.11 Compromise with the North could have undercut this agenda, while burying news of the problem would only have left the administration vulnerable to an embarrassing leak. Yet, leaders were unprepared for the impact of renouncing the Agreed Framework, which became their course. Given other states’ resistance against pressuring North Korea, their suspicions of how the United States was dealing with Iraq, and the likelihood that the North would use the time when the United States was preoccupied with Iraq to produce more nuclear weapons, the United States set in motion a crisis for which it lacked a realistic bilateral or multilateral response. The Other Four scrambled for new strategies. This was not easy because they were caught between two indomitable forces—the globe’s most ruthless totalitarian state armed with WMD, and the most powerful state the world had seen in the hands of leaders ready to act unilaterally and preemptively to forge the security environment they deemed desirable. All wanted to avoid three choices that had been found wonting in the past: they did not want to opt out, as Russia had done from 1992, losing any voice and having their interests ignored; they also had no interest in siding with Pyongyang, being held hostage to its reckless regional agenda as the Soviet Union and China had long been; and none wanted to side unconditionally with Washington. Only in the 1990s had South Koreans begun to distance themselves from dependency on the United States, and especially younger generations were in no mood to return to it, even if the U.S. Army defended them against possible attack from the North. Japanese too had waited for a long time to lower their dependency on the United States and become more active in their neighborhood, although other concerns were growing. Above all, China remained determined to avoid the kind of dependence the other three had experienced. Stages in the Crisis Of the negotiating rounds in Beijing (inclusive of three-way talks in April 2003), three had some promise before the breakthrough in

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February 2007. The August 2003 first round was treated as a starting point and did not have a clear lineup of those on one side or the other. In contrast, the April 2003 meetings, the February 2004 second round, and the November 2005 fifth round first session were hostile confrontations with no sign of momentum. That leaves the June 2004 third round, the July/September 2005 fourth round, and the December 2006 fifth round second session of the Six-Party Talks as the seeming bright spots; from various quarters positive spin followed. Yet, in June 2004 the U.S. softer-line of deemphasizing CVID did not encourage give-andtake, leaving a clear impression before long that the North would not return to talks until after the fall U.S. elections. The September 2005 round received more favorable reviews, but the U.S. delegate was allowed to sign only if he immediately read a unilateral statement that slanted the statements that had been left purposely vague in a direction that predictably produced an equally one-sided statement from the North—an exchange that convinced each side that the other could not be trusted as did the impact of U.S. financial sanctions imposed just afterward and the North’s response that it would not proceed until they were lifted. Indeed, the situation deteriorated in the summer of 2006 as the North fired seven missiles, including one Taepongdong-2 that was aborted, in defiance of the appeals of the other five states. China and Russia then joined with the United States and Japan to support a critical UN Security Council Resolution. A similar sequence followed in October 2006 when the North held an underground test of a nuclear weapon and the Security Council responded with a stronger resolution calling for sanctions. The potential for coordination among the five had risen, seen in a flurry of diplomacy that raised hopes for the second session of the fifth round, even if talks ended with the North again insisting that the United States lift financial sanctions before progress could be achieved. Renewed diplomacy soon led to an agreement and serious negotiations testing all sides. Coverage in the following chapters does not rehash the hopes or disappointments of the U.S. side or the inflated language of the North Koreans through the cycle of talks, failures, and renewed hopes. Instead it traces responses of the Other Four in a chronology that divides the nuclear crisis into stages. (1) the crisis opening from October 2002 to July 2003 before the Six-Party Talks were set; (2) the crisis mid-game with three rounds of Six-Party Talks from August 2003 to June 2004 and then its resumption over the summer of 2005 with a fourth round in September 2005; (3) the prolonged standstill from late 2004 through May 2005, and again from October 2005; and (4) the new urgency in

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July and October 2006 when the situation deteriorated, leading to a burst of activity marked by both sanctions resolutions and the revival of diplomacy, which intensified to reach the February 13 agreement and then to implement it. The first stage was characterized by intense pressure from the United States. In the first months of the nuclear crisis the United States rejected bilateral talks and held open the prospect of seeking economic sanctions against the North at the Security Council or even readying armed forces to attack the North’s nuclear facilities, once it had expelled the IAEA inspectors. Later, the United States turned to China to force the North to yield, bringing it to three-way talks where the United States could set forth its demands. This was followed by a surge of diplomacy with Japan and South Korea in search of three-way pressure. In contrast, China made clear its preference for dialogue alone to resolve the standoff. In the middle were Japan, much closer to the United States with support for pressure but also calls for dialogue, and South Korea, closer to China with a strong preference for dialogue but, seeking to maintain good relations with its ally, agreeing to allow some role for pressure. Russia’s position resembled China’s, but fluctuated. Despite calls from other states, the United States made little effort to build trust with the North to seek reciprocity in give-and-take dialogue. The three-way talks starkly exposed divisions between the United States and North Korea, and within the Bush administration; Powell summarized the North’s proposal as a basis for further negotiations when those who had not favored the talks responded angrily and pushed for economic penalties. His positive twist on the session was reinforced by Brent Snowcroft and Arnold Kanter who had served under George H.W. Bush, who noted that the North’s behavior was alienating the Chinese who were pressing for more diplomacy and promising an active, constructive role. If only the United States offered credible assurances to the North going beyond those of 1994 to help end its political and economic isolation, it could determine if the North would, under a “reasonable set of circumstances,” abandon its nuclear weapons.12 If this appeal for multilateral engagement was overshadowed by U.S. efforts to rally Japan and South Korea to pressure the North in a de facto continuation of the TCOG (Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group) talks that were set up in 1999, it was a line of thinking that would endure. Japan joined China, South Korea, and Russia in calling for more dialogue and a conciliatory approach despite disappointment with the North’s open acknowledgment that it possesses nuclear weapons and is making bomb-grade plutonium and its proposal that dismantling

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nuclear weapons must wait until it receives a complete package of economic rewards and security guarantees.13 The Bush administration’s reasoning toward North Korea may have betrayed some of the same exuberance and unreality that was uncovered in its logic toward Iraq. Was the intelligence adequate? Some doubt it, and the United States did not present the evidence to convince them and by 2007 was downplaying the danger by suggesting that the uranium enrichment program was not likely to be far along. Were the means to realize the desired ends well chosen? In retrospect, the situation worsened and it is quite possible that other means would have produced better results. Was the strategy the best way to rally other countries to the side of the United States? Here, some may answer that it worked to draw Japan closer, although that was happening anyway. If the timing of the crisis was in any way intended to influence the December presidential election in South Korea, then Roh’s success riding a wave of antiAmericanism that was already gathering steam before the crisis began offers a rebuke. Although there was talk about U.S.-Chinese relations being the best since 1949, this meant that the United States needed China more and was solicitous of its views. If the United States hoped to change the dynamic in NEA toward slowing China’s rise, strengthening Japan’s influence, and drawing South Korea closer, it failed. The crisis led to mixed messages about multilateralism. After Japan’s overtures toward the North in the fall of 2002, it increasingly cooperated closely with the new U.S. strategy. In January 2003 Russia’s solo pursuit of North Korea hit a wall, and the United States was pleased that it was no longer active. In the winter of 2003 China appeared to yield to U.S. insistence and agree to apply pressure against North Korea when oil supplies were briefly cut. And Roh took office in February intent on winning Bush’s trust. Yet, initial impressions that firm action in the fall of 2002 had changed the entire dynamic of NEA could not be sustained. Roh’s election marked a backlash against the U.S. strategy, the April three-way talks revealed China’s very limited sense of its role as neutral facilitator, and, finally, convening the Six-Party Talks brought multilateralism back to the fore, as Powell sold the process as a means of leveraging Chinese and other international pressure against North Korea. There was no prospect for the Bush strategy to work. The war in Iraq was but one factor that made it useless to go to the Security Council on the North Korean issue. With Roh in charge, South Korea would continue to favor engagement, and with China at the vortex of negotiations, the United States could have no doubt that inducements had priority. The White House allowed Powell to pursue the Six-Party Talks without

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giving him the authority to proceed bilaterally or explore essential multilateralism. For ten months after the crisis began it was not clear what format would be used to try to solve it. U.S. toughness did not suffice to get the North to back down. Russian personal ties to Kim Jong-il did not broker a deal. Chinese pressure brought the North to the table, but did little else. And the United States rallied its allies, Japan and South Korea, behind a combination of dialogue and pressure, emphasizing early resort to the latter if the North refused to yield, but to no avail. Only at the start of August 2003 was this uncertainty resolved through the announcement that a six-party framework had been accepted by all. The second stage of the crisis saw multilateralism in form but unilateralism for the most part in substance. The United States essentially laid down an ultimatum. First, the North would have to commit to CVID, and only afterward could it expect to receive benefits, identified only in very vague terms of a security guarantee, but no peace or nonaggression treaty, and international economic assistance. Although Japan’s position wavered, the others regarded this approach as futile and called for at least sequences where incentives for Pyongyang were identified or even simultaneous consideration of its demands. Their preferences had some impact on the way the U.S. position was presented but did not lead to consensus. The talks became markers for each country to assess how matters were proceeding. We observe a cycle of preparing for a new round, evaluating its results, and then spending most time wondering when North Korea would agree to a date for the next round. At the end of 2003 after Bush yielded in approving written security assurances from the participating countries, the stumbling block remained U.S. refusal to consider such an assurance (insisting on a multilateral guarantee while the North demanded a bilateral one), removal of the North from the list of countries assisting terrorists, along with heavy oil assistance until the North clearly showed its intent to abandon nuclear weapons and return to the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The North offered only a freeze in return for initial, simultaneous rewards. The Other Four considered the possibility of softening the U.S. position in order to agree on a roadmap. There was talk that the United States would react to failure to narrow the differences at the second round of Six-Party Talks by insisting on use of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) to block North Korean exports of WMD and related items and also on a UN resolution.14 “It was already, clear, however, that the much vaunted breakdown of 5 vs. 1 was really at best 3 vs. 3. China, whose intensified role gave rise to talk of it as a ‘diplomatic great power,’ saw the United

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States as too hard-line, regretting in particular its response to Wu Bangguo’s trip to Pyongyang in October.”15 Yet, over the next two years it was Japan and South Korea that faced critical choices, as the three states clearly opposing the U.S. stance showed little movement. At last in June 2004 the United States sometimes used terminology other than the CVID formula, but its substance remained in demands for comprehensive denuclearization that would have to be the starting point for any agreement and then fully verified in return for multilateral security assurances, energy assistance, economic reconstruction, and removal of the North from the list of states that support terror. The United States might ultimately normalize relations with the North, but only after other demands were addressed, including changes in human rights policies. Yet, the fact that the United States had altered its language, at least temporarily, recognizing that it was isolated in trying to pressure the North and in not promoting an outcome that could entice the North, gave new impetus to strategizing over the future of the peninsula. A tour of Tokyo, Beijing, and Seoul in July by National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice showed a more forward-looking approach. Japan emerged somewhat from preoccupation with abductees left behind in the North. Koizumi visited Pyongyang for a second time, although many doubted his motives and denigrated the strategic thinking behind the move.16 When Koizumi met with Roh on Jeju Island in July, the two pledged to meet twice a year and strive toward coordination. Yet, the North delayed with indications that it had no interest in returning to the talks before 2005, the U.S. Congress passed a human rights law pressuring it, and the mood soured. Brief hope from the third round talks had faded by the time Bush was reelected. A third stage in the crisis that can be described as malign neglect by the United States followed, although there was brief reanimation to the search for a solution in mid-2005. With Armitage stepping down and Tanaka Hitoshi departing in Japan, two top diplomats fighting for pragmatism were gone, leaving concern that Dick Cheney on one side and Abe Shinzo on the other would further press their hard-line views. Signals early in the year suggested a tougher U.S. stance toward the North, leaving anyone who expected that the second term would bring a softer approach disappointed. Simultaneously, Koizumi was hardening Japan’s position, backed by public opinion aroused in late 2004 by news that the remains transferred by North Korea were not those of the abducted Japanese girl. A stalemate existed: Washington insisted that the “ball is in the North’s court” and “time is running out”; the latter was defiant and demanded “respect” before talks could resume.

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In June–July the impasse was broken in a manner that left many observers aware that a desperate Roh had found a stratagem to renew talks, but Bush was only giving Kim a chance to respond to very limited enticements through the six-party process before he turned to pressure and Kim saw an opportunity to shift the onus of failure to the United States by seeming to be open to a multistage process that left the tough decisions until later. Bush kept the focus on the big picture of denuclearization where he insisted that the lineup was five against one. When the United States and Japanese foreign ministers met on May 2, 2005 the focus was on how together they can prevail on China to get North Korea to change.17 Somehow, South Korea managed to turn the situation around for a time, suggesting it knew how to appeal to the North and in early June obtaining Bush’s consent to proceed. It was reported that Bush mentioned at the June 9 summit with Roh that the state of Japanese-South Korean relations may influence the response to the North Korean nuclear crisis.18 He did not get Roh to reconsider, however, as seen in the disastrous visit of Koizumi to Seoul soon afterward, and clearly there was no intention to press Koizumi to change course on his visits to the Yasukuni Shrine even if the issue arose in lower level talks. Losing control of the alliance triangle, the United States was illprepared to manage the negotiating hexagon. The basic trade-off Roh offered was large-scale economic assistance, centered on the promise of electricity through poles extended across the border, in return for strategic decisions about the North’s arms program. At the same time he called on the United States to make clear that it was not seeking regime change in return for the North signaling that it would disband its nuclear programs.19 Seoul’s initiative was accepted by Kim Jong-il in a meeting of June 17 with Chung Dong-young, the unification minister, leading to the fourth round of Six-Party Talks from July 26, and the Joint Statement on September 19. North Korea refused in the Six-Party Talks in 2003–4 to commit itself in writing to abandoning its nuclear weapons, although its officials repeatedly said that they did not wish to have them. Meanwhile, it sought a commitment by the United States for normalization and at least peaceful coexistence. Only when the United States declared a change of attitude, accepting the North as a sovereign country, pledging that it has no intent to attack, and recognizing its right to peaceful nuclear activities, did the North make the commitment in September 2005. Before a recess from August 7 all five states except the North reached agreement in principle on a draft statement by China excluding light-water reactors. This led the North to plead for a change. The next draft by the

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Chinese incorporated this provision, and after South Korea and Russia approved it the balance was four versus two, leaving the United States and Japan in a minority. This shift by Seoul ruptured the trilateral framework, confirming that it was taking an independent position, perhaps even giving priority to North-South cooperation over trilateral cooperation.20 Discussions ensued about whether the South’s posture would lead to the North toughening its position since it had split the others and was materially in a better position or would it reassure the North into softening its stance. Important for approval of the Joint Statement were U.S. efforts mainly on September 17 to secure promises from each of the Other Four that they would not support a light-water nuclear reactor for the North until its nuclear weapons were gone. Rice orchestrated this confluence of side statements to clarify what was meant by the language “at an appropriate time.” In comparison to the other rounds of talks, the United States was more flexible, made more use of multiple actors, and kept the Other Four together, as in the side commitments that they made in return for U.S. acceptance of the official statement. As late as September 16 the United States had rejected China’s draft as rewarding the North’s bad behavior with a light-water reactor and leaving sequencing vague, but with the South firmly on China’s side and China inclined to end the talks by blaming the United States, Rice appealed to Bush, who then declared the result a “wonderful breakthrough.”21 Language choices in the Joint Statement revealed how far the two protagonists remained from a roadmap for resolving the crisis. Instead of agreeing to dismantle its nuclear weapons programs, the North accepted the term “abandoning.” The fact that the words “existing programs” were added offered some compensation. In turn, the United States rejected language calling on it to “normalize” relations, agreeing only to “take steps to normalize.”22 The document is rife with signs of distrust between the two; yet there was sufficient movement to raise hopes of a possible turning point. In early November 2005 as the fifth round began, the United States was calling on North Korea to provide details on all of its nuclear programs, amidst talk that the United States and Japan would seek to establish a working group on human rights in North Korea. Their notion of a road map was a step-by-step plan for nuclear disarmament and verification that could be accompanied by benefits as it was implemented. Fearing that this approach would alienate the North, South Koreans and Chinese explained that the United States had also made commitments in the Joint Statement and should be patient about working out a balanced

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sequence of steps for all to undertake. Also, they wanted the tone of the talks to change, preferring realist diplomacy to moralistic posturing. The United States was frustrated with their soft approach, insisting that the talks shift toward substantial economic awards to the North in return for partial concessions that would not end all nuclear arms programs. One report noted that Cheney and Rumsfeld had been opposed to negotiations, seeing them as buying time for the North to expand its nuclear arsenal and impatiently calling for a different approach based on pressure.23 Scoffing at the idea that isolation would work in convincing the North or that it would occur given its growing economic ties with neighboring states, the skeptics warned that China and South Korea would never be convinced that the talks had reached a dead-end. Managing the Roh administration was the first challenge for efforts to “fashion a united front,” as explained in Ambassador Vershbow’s Senate confirmation hearings. After he spent several years playing to Russia’s pride in order to win its support in dealing with crises such as the Iranian nuclear weapons program, in the fall of 2005 he was sent to work with the South without “wedge-driving or backsliding” to induce North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons.24 When he met with Unification Minister Chung Dong-young on October 18, 2005 the message was to intensify joint efforts while slowing the pace of the South’s accelerating engagement. The United States was concerned that the South’s soft-line was taking pressure off Pyongyang. In approaching the North the Bush administration repeatedly suggested that it had a strategy that would work. Conservatives in Japan and South Korea wanted desperately to believe this or pretended it was true in order to pursue their own aims. Yet, the message from the Joint Statement was that the multilateral approach advocated by China was the only way out. Bush could not deliver on his assurances nor could the United States prevent a regional framework that left it with a lowered profile. Claims to have a superior approach to the North than Clinton could be discredited. With such dire consequences for backers at home and in NEA, some may have preferred the status quo. Skepticism rose that the United States was still interested to the point that Chris Hill, the U.S. representative to the talks, in Seoul asserted that the “U.S. takes very seriously the Six-Party Talks process.”25 When it tested a nuclear weapon in October 2006, the North understood that however united the international community in condemning this action it would be split in responding. Yet, it had to be aware that alienating the Other Four, especially China, could give the United States

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an opening for sanctions and joint pressure with Japan no longer an outlier. A fourth stage in the crisis saw preparation for enforcement of sanctions, while the United States agreed with China in the lead to make a last-ditch attempt to make use of the Six-Party Talks to reach a settlement. The United States realized that until talks had been exhausted, China would not abandon the North, South Korea would retain the Sunshine Policy, and, after its shock, Japan’s resort to tough sanctions could not alter the course of the conflict.26 The United States might react harshly, but it would confront the limits of its own power. Thus, it turned to China to prove that verbal condemnation came with meaningful pressure, while trying to prove to China that it had given the negotiating process a full chance to succeed. Instead of the United States being seen as disrupting the status quo, the burden had shifted to the North. Increased Chinese assertiveness on behalf of a compromise reduced the onus on the United States insisting on its way. Various moves tested the North’s vulnerability. Financial sanctions took away Kim Jong-il’s annual presents to a select elite, and more pain was to come from the luxury sanctions imposed after the nuclear test. China’s fall cutoff of oil hurt military preparedness.27 If the North adamantly held its ground on staying a nuclear state, the challenge would be to keep China in the lead upping the pressure in stages. If the North instead were to commit to denuclearization, agreeing on rewards was essential. At last the North faced the full brunt of concerted diplomacy. The February 13 agreement established five working groups with two others on the horizon. Three groups consisted of all six parties: the denuclearization group led by China with an urgent agenda; the energy and economic assistance group led by South Korea eager to proceed; and a peace and security mechanism group under Russia that was bound to await progress by the other groups. Indeed, the expected four-party group for a permanent peace regime, omitting Russia and Japan, would begin after denuclearization made some headway, determining whether a basis for a lasting regional framework had been established. The other working groups were bilateral: the U.S.-North Korean normalization group regarded as critical to allow denuclearization to go forward and assistance to be provided; and the Japan-North Korean normalization group seen as likely to lag as movement on the abductions issue awaited progress on other matters. Not part of the working groups were SouthNorth ministerial talks, operating at first as a parallel arena for economic assistance. It would require delicate choreography to keep these groups advancing in step with each other, not offering too many carrots to the

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North for it to lose sight of the necessity to abandon its nuclear programs, and not pressuring it with too many sticks for it to lose trust in the rewards ahead. The Japanese and Russian led groups would be marginal for a time; it was the responsibility of China and South Korea to avoid imbalance as the two adversaries tested each other’s intentions. The critical Phase 2 began in July 2007. All sides had awaited clear signals of U.S. determination and urgency to reach a compromise. The chaotic aftermath of the February agreement had not clarified if Bush, unpopular at home and beleagured in his foreign policy, would energetically pursue this matter. When Chris Hill visited Pyongyang in June as soon as the frozen funds had finally been transferred, intensifying bilateral consultations that the U.S. had long resisted, a positive signal was sent. The agenda was being prepared for the declaration of all of the North’s nuclear assets and the disabling of its reactors, at various stages of construction, and its fabricating and processing facilities. In turn, the North was indicating its agenda for normalization with the United States and energy and economic assistance. Whether the North would fully and verifiably denuclearize was a matter for Phase 3, which could be delayed in 2008 and was unlikely to make headway until all of the working groups were operating at full throttle to settle the wide array of issues raised in the course of the nuclear crisis.

CHAPTER 2

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T

he nuclear crisis is a serious confrontation between the defenders of international norms that offer the best chance for peace and stability and a rogue state that seems intent on wielding WMD to give it the option to threaten stability for its narrow regime interests. The United States has all of the tools imaginable to win other states to its side, while North Korea is an outcaste with little influence. Yet, to limit our story to this stark contrast would miss the diplomatic realities of NEA and the important roles of the Other Four. The nuclear crisis was not diplomacy as usual. From the United States, North Korea, and Japan too the language of demonization kept appearing, not the unprovocative, respectful atmosphere typical of negotiations. The State Department worked hard to avoid insulting the leadership of North Korea, as Chinese, Russians, and South Koreans also advised. Yet, George Bush, who set the tone, and John Bolton, who was not bound by the discipline of the State Department despite serving as a top-level diplomat before moving to the post of ambassador to the UN, showed less restraint. In hearings before joining the State Department, Condoleezza Rice too did not refrain from calling the North an “outpost of tyranny.” Such remarks played to a domestic audience, not to strategic thinking. “Regime taunting” exacted a price. In the North, as is their wont, even more extraneous rhetoric appeared. The United States and North Korea, the two states least fettered by international constraints, did not establish an atmosphere conducive to problem solving. U.S. power is beyond anything seen before, and its leaders treat U.S. values as superior, criticizing any thinking that would restrict them. In

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turn, the North’s ideology of juche insists on self-reliance at all costs, rejecting reforms that would require increased dependency, while insisting on a wide margin of safety first, perhaps even nuclear arms. These antagonists were often impervious to entreaties, let alone pressure, from other parties, which urged the United States to offer incentives and talk directly to the North while also imploring the North to agree to talks or return to them and commit itself to eliminating all nuclear weapons. A grueling process ensued, turning first to one and then the other in search of common ground. Apart from Japan, others blamed both, finding the United States too uncompromising and unilateral, but growing more upset with the North for belligerence, refusal to take part in talks, and ignoring the will of others. Caught between pressure for regime change and resort to nuclear blackmail, the Other Four scrambled to be heard. In diplomacy the United States focused on the specific theme of nuclear dismantlement, while North Korea had in mind the broad picture of its future role on the peninsula and in the region. No solution seemed possible until the focus shifted to a grand agreement. With tense relations among other parties, a broad agenda was not easy to achieve through Six-Party Talks. Part of the problem is discord over the power balance in the region. Japan’s inflated sense of its power and expectation of U.S. recognition of it contrasts to South Korea and Russia’s acceptance of China’s rising power. In addition, the United States and Japan appear reluctant to turn the Six-Party Talks into a regional security dialogue mechanism, which might confirm China’s standing at the center of the talks. The United States instrumentally agreed to the talks as a way to mobilize pressure on North Korea, not for enlisting multiple parties in a process of engaging it and developing a security system. Timing and trust proved to be two interconnected stumbling blocks in the nuclear crisis. The United States wanted a sequential approach, beginning with complete dismantling of nuclear weapons and including thorough verification to prevent any reversal (CVID). The North sought a simultaneous approach, with the United States agreeing to a roadmap for the whole process and taking critical steps toward normalization and economic assistance in tandem with actions by the North.1 Reminiscent of the 1994 Agreed Framework, such an approach would lead to a freeze prior to steps deemed vital by the United States. General agreement about the goals of the negotiations, as in the fourth round, did not conceal a sharp divide on the timetable about who does what when with virtually no trust that the other side will clarify what it is really promising and then will actually implement the agreements that it signs. With Japan and Russia on the sidelines, China and South Korea searched for a

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middle way. “Action for action” became their mantra. A long timetable with critical steps reserved for late in the process seemed advisable; yet, an early breakthrough to ensure that the process was headed for a successful outcome was also needed. The U.S. fears that the North will take the benefits of normalization and economic assistance and refuse to disband its nuclear programs. The North fears that dismantling will not bring the expected benefits. The United States seeks a roadmap for dismantlement, the North one for economic assistance and normalization. The Joint Statement saw progress in setting symmetrical responsibilities, beginning with word for word and proceeding to action for action. Yet, the United States frontloaded nuclear abandonment as the starting point for benefits, and the North insisted on a favorable timetable for benefits, including a lightwater reactor, in order to proceed. The United States demanded the North concede that its nuclear program—the ticket for not being ignored—is an albatross best discarded in order to join the international community. The North denied the U.S. claim to be the gatekeeper, noticing that qualifications for entry into the regional community were much more forgiving. After the North’s nuclear test focused pride at home on its success in becoming a nuclear power, it seemed more amenable to talk and under more pressure, especially from China. In turn, with Democrats in control of the Senate and the House and the Iraq War going poorly, Bush pursued bilateral meetings with the North and accepted a multistage process. The gap between the antagonists had narrowed, at least to the point that they would give diplomacy a chance in 2007. Even many who suspected that Pyongyang had chosen “nukes” over reform agreed that diplomacy that would marshal five against one was the best mechanism to persuade it to reconsider. From early 2007 the United States claimed the mantle of champion of multilateralism with strict accountability to the entire group, while North Korea struggled to avoid becoming a pariah through bilateral maneuvering. The U.S. Perspective North Korea’s development of nuclear weapons is one of the worst nightmares for the United States. If it retains these weapons and is in a position to threaten other states or transfer them, the consequences could be grave. Given a long history of hyperbolic rhetoric and demonic images, Americans are little inclined to trust any deal with the North that does not have full verification and comprehensiveness. They are also suspicious of other states using the North’s threat potential as a tool in

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their own great power balancing and showing scant regard for the prospect of it cheating again and emerging as a greater threat. The excuse of the moment—U.S. refusal to hold bilateral talks, the absence of respect from the United States, the need for the United States to lift financial sanctions, and so on—only hides the North’s determination to build nuclear weapons and obscures its record of contradictory statements filled with distortions. Negotiations are hard for the United States for many reasons: (1) its view of North Korea as fully at fault and not deserving any reward; (2) its view of the North as an “evil” regime that would gain credibility and wherewithal; (3) fear of weakening the Non-Proliferation Treaty and setting a bad precedent; (4) concern that Japan, the indispensable ally, would be wary; (5) worry about the impact on NEA regional security of a deal that leads South Korea and its leaders who are not fully trusted to pursue the North more energetically and work closely with China and perhaps Russia; (6) the need to rely on China, whose motives are doubted; and (7) a lack of strategic thinking in Bush’s political base and Congress for explaining why compromise is needed. The U.S. position that the North should make unambiguous its determination to give up its nuclear weapons programs and many good things will follow, and that it will not benefit by trying to change the subject so that the nuclear issues are left unsettled as other matters are addressed, was a recipe for stalemate. In response, the United States often did not show much urgency, despite warnings that a stalemate is unacceptable, and that if it were to declare an end to the Six-Party Talks, it would not be acting alone.2 Diplomacy stumbled before insistence that pressure was a credible alternative before all reasonable possibilities for negotiations had been exhausted. Undue optimism that the strategy is working plagued Bush’s policy. In the first months of the crisis supporters explained that his approach had a good chance of success through consensus with Japan, South Korea, China, and Russia on withholding assistance and insisting that the North abandon its nuclear weapons. China not only refused to protect the North but was pressing it to join in talks that would prevent the spread of nuclear weapons across the region, which it feared.3 Bush defined economic assistance to the North in a deal to scrap its nuclear weapons as extortion. He ruled out bilateral talks as rewarding misbehavior. Exuding confidence in a strategy to force compliance—selectively interdicting suspicious shipments and convincing other states to squeeze the North too, starting with Japan imposing new inspections to sharply curtail the number of North Korean ships entering its ports—he intensified pressure

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seen as aiming at regime change.4 Neither analysis of strategic thinking in the Other Four nor understanding of the dynamics between the United States and North Korea could justify the optimism.5 By the second stage, when Six-Party Talks were the venue, U.S. confidence rested on the shaky foundation that a line-up of five versus one would exert its will. U.S.-China policy was slow to adjust to changing U.S. interests and China’s skepticism. Exaggeration of the role of the United States in the region and the desire of others for a “regional hegemon” and “glue for peace” did not take into account South Korea’s shift toward a balance of regional powers and Japan’s potential to exploit unconditional U.S. support.6 Despite calls for solidifying Japan-South Korean ties so that North Korea could not exploit any differences, there was scant recognition that dead-end policies would drive Japan and South Korea apart. The façade of five versus one obscured the reality of the Other Four—three states frustrated by the Bush approach, and Japan using it to further a divisive regional strategy. The State Department and National Security Council had some success in making U.S. policy ostensibly multilateral. Unlike the neoconservatives, experts recognized that when the United States threatens North Korea it divides the Other Four and makes it easier for the North to get China to shift its attention to reshaping U.S. policy and drives South Korea to plead for a change in course. Many appreciated China for its efforts to reach an agreement and its support for the multilateral process that kept the crisis from spiraling out of control. After all, China recognized that this was a critical test for its U.S. relations as well as its prestige as a diplomatic actor. As argued by Michael Green, special assistant in the National Security Council for Asia, the key to managing the crisis is achieving solidarity of five, especially China and South Korea.7 Yet, negotiating positions dictated by higher officials undermined attempts to win over the Other Four and left the United States at an impasse. Funabashi Yoichi provides details of an administration at war with itself that could only develop a self-defeating hybrid policy based on procrastination due to preoccupation with Iraq, distrust for talks with North Korea and others in the region, and a tight leash for U.S. diplomats regarded as untrustworthy.8 At times the Bush administration showed slight flexibility. Secretary of State Colin Powell in June 2002 at the end of a lengthy review of policy toward the North had indicated readiness to make a proposal aimed at better relations. Early in 2003 he turned to China in search of help in dealing with the crisis, implying some willingness to address its concerns. In July 2003 after months of striving to apply pressure, the

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United States accepted the framework of Six-Party Talks. In October 2003 Bush finally yielded to Chinese insistence by offering to address, in some fashion, North Korea’s security concerns. Then after a long hiatus, the State Department gained a greater say, abandoned the slogan of CVID, and went to talks in June 2004 with a promise to offer many rewards if the North gave up its nuclear weapons. Following a long break in Six-Party Talks, the United States in June 2005 stepped back from some harsh language and encouraged South Korea as well as China to expect a flexible approach in the next round and to offer their own inducements to the North. As simple a change as calling Kim Jong-il “Mr.” served as a signal from Bush that the United States was ready to treat his government as more than a dictatorship that had to be ousted. Finally, on September 19, 2005 the United States accepted the Joint Statement, indicating willingness to discuss a light-water reactor for the North at an appropriate time. Having first insisted that all nuclear programs be scrapped before any concessions are given by any state to the North, the United States shifted to a position that all nuclear programs be dismantled before it would offer the security assurances and economic benefits foremost on the North’s agenda, opening the way for other states to offer energy aid prior to actual dismantling. Most importantly, with Chris Hill in charge of State Department engagement, the United States gave unquestioned priority to negotiations, leading to the February 13, 2007 agreement and to every effort to remove the financial sanctions and to advance the process in the following months. It took time for the United States to give security assurances to the North, to make public its promise not to attack, to state unequivocally that it regarded the North as a sovereign state, and to accept two-way talks with the North’s representatives. Other states kept asking the United States to do more along these lines, but instead it was prone to harden its position: in the fall of 2002 after confirmation of the uranium enrichment program; in the fall of 2004 when the North apparently was waiting to see if John Kerry would be elected president, and in the fall of 2005 over charges of the North’s criminality and counterfeiting. In each instance, the Bush administration proceeded without serious consultations, frustrating calls in the Other Four for more multilateralism, and not testing the North’s probing moves. Neoconservatives were pessimistic about the chances for success in the Six-Party Talks. Instead of taking the view that a multilateral approach might produce a consensus on the basis of overlapping national interests, they decided that there were no partners except for Japan to be trusted. It was not only extreme distrust of Kim Jong-il as a

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pragmatist or someone who would stick to an agreement, they also found leaders in China, Russia, and even South Korea too far from U.S. values or its outlook on security questions to proceed in a multilateral spirit. Indeed, the United States was inclined to see China as the only one of the Other Four that really mattered and its role identified largely as pressuring Pyongyang, even if there was recognition that South Korea’s voice should be heard and Japan’s respected. This group saw the Six-Party Talks as a necessary evil, not a precedent for regional security, and the United States in danger of falling into a trap. Containment without compromising U.S. purity on WMD and an evil regime was deemed possible because the North would not dare to proliferate and risk an attack that would destroy the regime and China would have no choice but to constrain any threat. Only when the influence of the neoconservatives was eclipsed, as seen in John Bolton’s harsh attacks on the February 13 deal after he left government when Congress refused to confirm him to remain as UN ambassador, does their hostility to compromise come fully into view. To many, Bush conveys the image of caring more about the ideological purity of his opposition to the “evil” regime in Pyongyang than the effectiveness of his diplomacy. They see a pattern of undercutting the diplomats bent on finding common ground. When it seemed that momentum was building toward accelerated negotiations, officials made provocative statements that were interpreted in Pyongyang as hostile. Congress also did its part, such as passing the North Korean Human Rights Act after the third round of talks. Following the third and fourth round of talks when feint signs of hope arose after U.S. diplomats were given some leeway, contradictory remarks by officials known for a hard-line signaled malign neglect. Playing the human rights card could be cynically construed as directed more at shoring up the political base or checking pragmatists than assisting North Korean citizens. Bush’s personal antipathy to the regime was a driving force. His moral reaction to leaving millions to a hellish existence was accompanied by incomprehension at South Korea’s seeming indifference. The Bush camp presumed that the North intends to hold onto its nuclear weapons no matter how reasonable the offer and that China, Russia, and South Korea were naive about the North’s intentions. Unless the North faces painful deprivation through pressure and sanctions, there was no reason for it to abandon this intention. Neither the U.S. negotiating position that had been slow to identify incentives for the North nor the U.S. invasion of Iraq were considered factors hardening the resolve of Kim Jong-il. On the contrary, they stood as necessary

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reminders of U.S. resolve. The purpose of multilateralism was, thus, to prepare the way for synchronized pressure for China to take decisive measures.9 At the time of the Joint Statement Chris Hill made it clear that the North would be judged by its “sustained commitment” to cooperation and transparency; an “appropriate time” for it to receive a light-water reactor and other benefits would occur after it had fulfilled all commitments. The United States was intent to show its insistence that actions would have to follow quickly and that it had means to pressure the North Korean regime. Rather than waiting patiently for China and South Korea to pursue a compromise, the United States imposed financial sanctions over counterfeiting dollars and money laundering, insisting that they were entirely separate from the Six-Party Talks. When Bush and Roh could not reach a common position in November at the APEC (Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation) summit, the United States stepped up pressure on Roh. whose soft approach to the North was criticized for foiling the U.S. strategy. Because of the sharp divide in the Bush administration over how to handle the crisis, it both insisted that the situation was serious and that no rush was needed in making concessions to the North or achieving consensus among the Other Four. This left an impression that the United States believed there really was no crisis even as other states that did not find the danger from the North as great sought more urgency in the talks. If others welcomed U.S. bilateral talks with the North and favored multilateral coordination with the voices of all sides searching for carrots that could achieve consensus, the United States handled the crisis as crime and punishment, allowing a limited degree of bilateral meetings for specific purposes and rejecting the Six-Party Talks as a full deliberating mechanism. A growing resort to pressure marked the third stage of crisis along with a deepening impasse. One possibility is that U.S. reasoning behind the handling of North Korea was not driven by WMD alone, but also by an overall regional plan to shore up alliances and impede regionalism. In preparation for the rise of China, this approach may start from a premise that Japan’s support and new cooperation from India and a few others may allow the United States to keep its hub and spokes system in Asia, since forces of integration in Asia are still weak and can be prevented from gaining momentum. Economic integration may continue to advance rapidly, but this does not easily translate into security cooperation. A duality can form between geopolitics and economics amid strategic distrust for an unproven power without a commitment to democracy and human

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rights. The United States aims to keep its alliance system intact, preventing any challenges from North Korean WMD, China’s potential to use its military buildup as a source of influence, and Sino-Russian security cooperation. Tightening the alliance with Japan preempts challenges. In 1993–94 the first nuclear crisis led to reaffirmation of security ties with Japan and maintenance of 100,000 troops in the region, followed by new defense guidelines in 1996. In 1998 alarm over North Korea’s testing of a missile over Japanese territory preceded Diet approval for the full package of defense guidelines and cooperation on missile defense. When Bush took office, he placed high priority on this alliance. The nuclear crisis serves that objective: the closer Japan clings to the United States in the crisis, the more it becomes a “realist” state overcoming past hesitancy on security. Yet, a nuclear North Korea has unsettling consequences that calls into question such logic. The fourth stage of the crisis raised the stakes for relying on China as it cast in doubt the strategy on which Japan’s leaders had counted. Those who justify the U.S. approach insist that the North, not the United States, broke the 1994 agreement, that is, there is no equivalency between the actions of the two. They argue that the United States is ready to compromise on many points as long as the North makes an unequivocal commitment to abandon all of its nuclear weapons programs in a verifiable manner. And they conclude that the slow pace of talks is almost entirely due to the North’s reluctance at each stage and lack of response to U.S. offers. The North’s inconsistent demands and extreme rhetoric make diplomacy difficult. When the North seeks to regain the spotlight, as in the summer of 2006 with its spate of missile launchings and in the fall with its nuclear test, the Other Four and the UN Security Council in its July 15 and October 14 resolutions blame it. The result is that China and others are now prepared to draw closer to the United States. After both resolutions U.S. diplomacy focused on China, whose votes in favor were welcomed. Instead of pressuring China to enforce sanctions, the United States agreed to test the North’s intentions. China had angered the North with its votes and its unequivocal condemnation, and signs were growing that China would use pressure to bring the North back to Six-Party Talks and, if needed, to punish any refusal to abandon its nuclear ambitions. At last, the United States turned to a two-track, joint strategy to boost multilateralism in the talks and to hold in reserve application of pressure tactics to squeeze the North if it refused to bargain in good faith. Regardless of earlier missed opportunities, in the face of a nuclear test, the United States showed more flexibility and took more seriously the goal of forging a multilateral coalition.

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The North Korean Perspective Images of North Korea’s real intentions in the nuclear crisis varied sharply across the Other Four. On the one hand, most sources in China and Russia as well as many in South Korea and a few in Japan long gave credibility to the notion of Kim Jong-il as a shrewd bargainer ready to abandon his nuclear programs for a compromise that offers assurance against efforts to topple his regime and ample economic assistance. They portray a leader faced with desperate conditions prepared to use the only leverage available in support of reasonable objectives. Even if rhetoric from the North can be alarming, there are strong expectations that compromise offers will be met with suitable responses and the crisis can be resolved after tough, but understandable, bargaining. On the other hand, most sources in Japan and some in South Korea and Russia were pessimistic about Kim’s intentions, while after the nuclear test pessimism that had been aired quietly in China came into the open. Full of doubt that reform is possible in this extreme totalitarian system, critics charge that the North is buying time to expand its WMD threat. It may feign nuclear disarmament, but its aim is limited to dividing the other parties as it extracts concessions. North Korea seeks a nuclear arsenal as the best deterrence against attack or other forms of pressure aimed at forcing regime change or absorption by South Korea. In 1994 it accepted a last-minute arrangement to freeze and inspect its nuclear material after some had been diverted to build, perhaps, one or two nuclear weapons. Its threat potential was left intact, and a steady supply of heavy oil gave it a respite to continue developing and building missiles of ever-longer range while it still held the South hostage to a massive conventional artillery buildup. In 2002 after the United States prepared to attack Iraq for allegedly developing nuclear weapons, the North’s determination to have these weapons and interest in expanding its arsenal could only have risen. North Korea capitalizes on the fact that options for dealing with it are very limited. Bush’s labeling of the North in the axis of evil and the justifications given for preemptive war as well as preparations for and then the attack on Iraq are interpreted in the Other Four as provocative moves that unnerved leaders in North Korea. Unlike the atmosphere from 1994 when the United States sought to assure the North of its goodwill or of 1999–2000 when the Sunshine Policy induced regional reassurance, there was no such confidence-boosting under Bush. Under these circumstances, the North grew more fearful. It saw the United States pressing

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for unilateral action instead of recognizing the bilateral nature of the origin of the crisis and an acceptable solution. It regarded the oft-stated “irreversible” part of the U.S. call for CVID as a euphemism for “unilateral.”10 Thus, it insisted on its own unilateral demands, awaiting genuine bilateral solutions and preparing for worse. Since the North views the United States as not taking it seriously, the North is inclined to speak and act in ways to heighten the perception of threat. Before North Korea openly declared itself a nuclear state, it told the United States in bilateral sessions that it was, it intended to keep making nuclear bombs, and it might transfer them. Regarding the survival of the regime and the state as it is understood at risk, the North awaits far-reaching bilateral talks, even if it may misjudge how best to persuade the United States and resorts to provocative actions at times when it has opportunities, such as in June 2002 when its aggressive shooting at a South Korean ship delayed talks with the United States. It speaks in belligerent tones and raises the stakes with behavior that deepens concern about its nuclear potential, but what are its motives? Some see this as a tit-for-tat strategy to keep pressure on the United States. For instance, when Bush started his second term not with overtures to go beyond the progress seen at the third round but with renewed warnings, the North withdrew an offer to freeze its nuclear program as part of a deal and insisted it would have to be recognized as a nuclear state. Bush’s term “tyrant” was countered by the term “hooligan.” Clearly, the North answers word for word to perceived provocations, as some call for the United States to turn this into a positive exchange. North Korean spokesmen convinced official visitors, including some from the United States, that they had made a “brave strategic decision” for new relations with the United States, for which they are prepared to abandon their nuclear weapons if the United States accepted normal relations. This is buttressed by the assertion that denuclearization of the peninsula was the revered Kim Il-sung’s dying wish. Although they insist on equal terms for South Korea, where similar verification would have to proceed, the South seems to be amenable and it is U.S. bases in the South that would be affected. It is understood too that the North from the beginning of the 1990s indicated that it would accept the United States in NEA as the preeminent power and balancer to the point of not resisting its continued stationing of armed forces in the South. This message, in the eyes of some, shifted the burden to the United States to test if its goal is denuclearization rather than regime change. The North capitalizes on uncertainty over its intentions as it persuades some of its reasonableness.

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The North sees the Six-Party Talks as a chance to balance the powers by isolating Japan to oblige it to join any arrangement on weaker terms and by keeping China at a distance while sucking economic support from it in return for just agreeing to another round of talks. Ultimately, Pyongyang is still looking for ways to shape reunification to its benefit in a gradual process that brings a revival of its economy and a shift in South Korean views based on Korean nationalism before political issues are addressed. Most important is sentiment among the South Korean people that reunification is within reach on the basis of reconciliation and a “soft landing” in the North. Views differed on North Korea’s insistence in the fourth round of talks on a light-water reactor. Was this a disguised strategy to develop nuclear weapons or was it a way to save face after explaining to their own people for ten years that the KEDO agreement to supply light-water reactors was a victory? After the United States reversed course and agreed with other states in June 2006 that Iran could have a light-water reactor if it forsook its program that could lead to nuclear weapons, the fact that the Joint Statement had said that at an appropriate time there could be talk about such a reactor acquired new salience. The North seeks maximum mileage from its nuclear card and the divisions among the other negotiating parties. This means not only winning protection from attack and economic assistance, but also an environment for revitalization of its security state. With the right outcome it might preserve a strong, autonomous state able to shape reunification despite its economic weakness. After all, the regime’s preoccupation for sixty years has been on how to gain the advantage in establishing a single, united Korea. The Kim Jong-il regime seeks nothing short of North Korea’s reemergence as an actor able to approach reunification from a position of some strength, making use of great power balancing in the region. In order to achieve these goals it has sought since the end of the cold war to normalize relations with the United States, above all, and with Japan and to turn on the spigots of international development assistance. The goal may be a developmental state along the lines of Park Chung-hee’s economic miracle,11 for which China and South Korea would cooperate, and Russia could become a source of energy. The economic priorities are secure energy supplies, massive infrastructure construction, state-centered trade through well-chosen economic zones and companies, and access to new technology that will allow the North to skip stages of development. Chinese investment in mining and commerce and South Korean investment in industrial parks are initial steps. Yet, in June 2006 the North’s refusal to open the inter-Korean railroad for

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use by Kim Dae-jung to go from Seoul to Pyongyang was met by the South’s refusal to supply materials for small-scale production, in accord with the quid pro quo that had been arranged. After having rescinded some economic reforms of 2002 that had suggested interest in market forces and cutback on cross-border forays that had helped trade to grow to $2 billion bringing new incentives and information to its citizens,12 the North hunkered down as an unfettered military state. In 2007 NorthSouth talks were again focused on opening the railroad and expanding economic ties, as China continued to show initiative in cross-border investments and commerce. For North Korea the most desirable outcome is to capitalize on its WMD to shape a framework that leaves the region cognizant of its potential to be disruptive and prepared to give it all it needs for reform and revival without regime change. The resulting security system would keep the United States, and its alliance with Japan, from applying pressure, while leaving China, Russia, and South Korea supportive of the North’s autonomy. This is not a return to two blocs opposed to each other, since the North does not seek dependence on China or Russia. It is rather an effort to keep security in the forefront as a means to gain maximum leverage on multiple occasions and over the long run to allow for an advantage over the South in reunification. Pyongyang would retain the threat potential to ward off pressure and forge a balance of power to shape regional currents. Yet, by July 2006 its anger over financial sanctions had risen to the point that hard-liners decided to flex their threat potential. Michael Green saw four possible explanations: (1) to raise the level of tension as a card to press the United States into direct talks; (2) to strengthen Kim Jong-il’s base of domestic support since he lacked the fear and respect of his father; (3) to increase missile exports, a big source of revenue; and (4) to increase missile capabilities. The move left the North more isolated with China and Russia upset that their warnings went unheeded.13 In October the nuclear test brought further isolation and more defiant rhetoric by the North. It also gave it the direct talks it wanted, as the United States proved to be willing to work with the Other Four to determine if the North would compromise. In the first part of 2007 Pyongyang tried to justify its delays with charges that the bank funds that had been frozen through financial sanctions were not released on time, but the real tests in phase two of the February deal were looming. Having soured on Beijing, it appealed to Seoul for fraternal support against all great powers attempting to control the peninsula and to Washington for a geopolitical deal to block China’s control. To forestall five against one it looked for bilateral gains, but they

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seemed doubtful in the short run. If it were not cooperative, it would risk isolation or the election of a conservative president in the South. Pyongyang’s diplomatic finesse would be tested more than in the past. The U.S.-North Korean Competition The struggle for diplomatic credibility persisted throughout the crisis. On the exposure of the North’s secret highly enriched uranium program, skepticism reflected loss of U.S. credibility after the false charges against Iraq for possession of WMD as well as distrust over the overall U.S. posture toward the North.14 Failure to share intelligence in briefings from the outset of the crisis raised doubts, not only in China and Russia.15 but elsewhere where attention to Cheney and Rumsfeld’s lack of trust in U.S. allies fueled criticisms of U.S. diplomacy.16 At the extreme, objections to U.S. policy that isolates the North and adds to its paranoia led to accusations, as found in South Korea, that the North was “forced to develop nuclear weapons for its own security and to deter outside attacks.”17 This is part of the impression that neoconservatives were long eager to derail the Sunshine Policy and South Korea’s drift from dependency, having grown nervous in 2002 at Japan’s uncoordinated moves to normalize relations with North Korea, sought an excuse to marginalize more pragmatic officials in the internecine battles within the Bush administration, and also saw a conciliatory line toward the North as incompatible with containment of China’s rise. Diplomats struggled to overcome such doubts, prevailing over those insistent on regime change as early as the end of 2002 when they were given the role of developing an “international approach” to the crisis, but not gaining the upper hand until late 2006.18 Defining moments turned national strategies in new directions. For South Korea such a moment occurred on June 15, 2000 with the interKorean summit. For Russia, it was Putin’s July visit to Pyongyang when he cultivated a personal bond with Kim Jong-il. In the case of the United States, the year 2002 was decisive in two stages: the axis of evil speech in January that demonized the North made cooperation harder, and the denunciation on October 15 of the highly enriched uranium program presaged an uncompromising response. That left Japan and China with decisions in 2003 on how to face the new crisis. On September 17, 2002 Koizumi had taken a conciliatory stance, but in May 2003 in consultation with Bush he decisively shifted to support the United States and pressure the North. China’s leaders in 2003 also faced intense efforts by the Bush administration to apply pressure, but first in April three-way

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talks and then in the first round of the Six-Party Talks in August China set its course as honest broker. U.S. options narrowed until a new set of defining moments leading to the February 2007 agreement. Diplomatic skill required taking into account these evolving national strategies. The U.S. position in NEA proved more vulnerable than many had expected in the 1990s. China emerged as a pole around which resistance to the United States rallied. Its rapid rise, acquisition of advanced weapons, and strategic ties with Russia put limits on U.S. power in the region. Higher energy prices gave Russia room to escape from financial dependency and become more influential. Japan’s reduced economic clout compared to the end of the 1980s as well as its alienation from other states in the region occurred even as it drew closer to the United States. South Korea refocused on reunification and winning regional cooperation for both its economic future and support in dealing with the North, allowing it to play on the desire for national unity.19 These changes in the regional atmosphere put to the test the Bush approach that was reliant on firmness of will and military power. It outsourced the crisis response to China without offering sufficient incentives or flexibility and welcomed Japanese nationalism to a degree that undercut pragmatic thinking on how to resolve the crisis. South Korean sensitivities were not addressed, causing frustration. And Russia was treated as an afterthought, whose contribution is not to cause any real damage. With Japan drawing closer to the United States, South Korea making clearer its similar views to those of China, and Russia finding common cause with those two, the line-up over how to address the nuclear crisis settled at 2:3:1. Only in the fourth stage were positions again in flux, as the United States shifted ground to realize a line-up of five versus North Korea, but this would not be the final test. Words such as “face,” “equality,” and “respect” appear in comments on the negotiating process. They are used as criticisms of the U.S. approach, in which calling North Korea “evil” or Kim Jong-il a “tyrant” constitutes a self-defeating strategy for inducing talks or compromise. There is a sigh of relief when the United States just refers to it as a “sovereign state,” as Condoleezza Rice did two months after her reference to it as an “outpost of tyranny.” One persistent theme is how the world’s supreme power should deal with countries it does not like in order to change their behavior and gain the cooperation of other states with different approaches. Warning that treating the talks as an arms control exercise is futile for reconciling diverse national interests, former U.S. ambassador James Goodby suggested instead planning to stress a future security structure in NEA, energy and transportation infrastructure,

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conventional arms regulation, and even cultural exchanges.20 Only in late 2006 were there signs of a responsive multilateral agenda. In the first half of 2005 there was heightened skepticism, as some in the Bush administration doubted that China was really acting to halt proliferation of WMD when it appeared to be flexing its military toward Taiwan and its diplomacy in new directions.21 Chinese showed concern about the United States too, fearing a hardened stance toward the North. One factor contributing to progress in the summer of 2005 in the SixParty Talks was agreement to work toward overcoming this worrisome drift. Cooperation in the crisis, indeed, helped to set a new direction; in 2006 intensified Sino-U.S. diplomacy made a major difference in transforming the way the crisis was handled. Japan let the United States take the lead, despite insistent warnings that only resolution of the abduction issue would lead it to drop sanctions. Russia stayed in China’s shadow after its assumptions were shaken by the nuclear test. South Korea lowered its profile too in this new climate. Strategic linkages may be denied, but they are vital to comprehending this crisis. The Iraq War was foremost on Bush’s agenda from 2002, and the states of NEA reacted (controlling their opposition or offering support, sending troops, etc.) in hope of spillover in U.S. handling of the North Korean crisis. The Taiwan issue is uppermost on China’s agenda, and it expected U.S. restraint in support of independence and arms sales in return for its cooperation on the North. Japan’s new assertiveness in Asia is premised on a U.S. tilt toward it; it counted on this continuing even as China’s role became indispensable. Russia, in turn, assumes that the United States has not welcomed its revived influence and aims to make its presence felt. There is yet no broad strategic approach achieving these desired linkages. One sign of this is that despite recognition that only when the United States and South Korea work together closely will there be an effective policy toward North Korea, they were often working at “cross purposes.” Bush lurched U.S. policy toward a harder-line, disregarding the will of the South but showing little urgency, and Roh ignored lack of reciprocity while offering rewards that reduced the North’s incentives to negotiate. Former U.S. ambassador to Japan Michael H. Armacost argued that only the North benefits from this dual “tacit acquiescence” to its nuclear activities, and time is on its side. He urged taking the Joint Statement as a starting point, as the United States abandoned efforts to subvert the North and the South made clear its intolerance for a nuclear North.22 Another sign of the strategic shortfall is that the United States and China have only reached a partial compromise on the perceived trade-off between

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Chinese self-restraint over the Iraq War and willingness to broker talks with the North and U.S. self-restraint toward Taiwan independence and in rhetoric viewing China as a threat. Although both sides refused to acknowledge any such connection, their meetings were divided between the two issues. At the end of the 2006 there were signs that strategic trade-offs were easing cooperation: new U.S. urgency and flexibility, a tougher Chinese stance, and agreement that the United States and South Korea would coordinate better. Critics fault the Bush administration for not developing an overall strategy for NEA that would show North Korea a positive future and convince the other wary actors, especially China, of the shared benefit to a package deal. The Agreed Framework is seen by many as a model that needs refining or expansion through the slogan “more for more,” not as something that must be jettisoned in favor of an incoherent strategy with dim prospects. They raise the following points: stress on the highly enriched uranium program led to resumed plutonium processing, making verification harder and allowing a real threat to grow by overreacting to an eventual threat; failure to focus on strategic interests puts pragmatism in doubt; politicians tie the hands of experts ready to pursue diplomacy vigorously; and, the United States ignores issues of North Korean national identity and face. Many were waiting to see if this had changed as diplomacy was pursued in early 2007. The combination of the Iraq War and the dead-end strategy for dealing with North Korea gave the North time to build up its nuclear forces. U.S.-led negotiations with little sense of urgency led China, South Korea, and Russia to expand their economic ties with the North, rendering possible U.S.-led sanctions problematic. Memory of the 1994 Agreed Framework as containing the problem and lack of clarity about the consequences of the North’s new enrichment program dulled alarm in these states over the North’s intentions. They took it for granted that the North could be “bribed” to revert to a deal parallel to that reached in 1994, and they failed to understand the logic of the U.S. negotiating strategy. Yet, in each of the Other Four some voices could be heard arguing that no matter how one-sided the Bush administration’s approach, the real danger stems from North Korea and the only realistic response is to side with the United States. In South Korea this takes the form of reaffirming the priority of the three-way alliance with the United States and Japan.23 In Russia it is linked to warnings about depending heavily on China and falling back into a narrow Soviet-era approach to Asia. In China this position is associated with the view that destabilization of

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NEA and the spread of nuclear weapons should draw China, Japan, and South Korea together to ensure the region against North Korea’s actions.24 For a time, other responses prevailed, as the United States grew more isolated. Much changed, however, in the second half of 2006 after the North showed its defiance instead of striving for more talks. It confirmed the worst fears about its intentions. This gave the United States an opportunity to be conciliatory by delaying sanctions in order to test whether the North was prepared to revive the 2005 Joint Statement with a genuine commitment to denuclearization. In this atmosphere multilateralism put North Korea on the defensive in 2007, as its actions would be jointly assessed by the others. At last, the United States was using diplomacy well, but ambiguities in the February 13 agreement would keep testing its skills. Comparisons of the Other Four While this crisis has elements of a global confrontation, at the center are matters of regionalism and reunification in a specifically NEA context. Comparisons show how countries are arrayed according to their preference for carrots or sticks in resolving the crisis. At one extreme is optimism that engagement with positive incentives will work, while at the other is pessimism that pressure with the threat of sanctions and perhaps force is essential. Thinking about the balance of power in the region ranges from insistence that equilibrium is within reach with multiple powers and rejection of any such effort in favor of a hierarchical order based on the United States and its alliances. Comparisons reveal a continuum with the United States and North Korea at two extremes and the remaining states spread between them. Japan’s position consistently is closest to the United States, even on some issues appearing more extreme on the hard right than that of its ally; yet it at times showed signs of becoming a swing state. Russia’s position varied over time and was not always unambiguously articulated, but it increasingly was closest to North Korea. China sought the role of neutral mediator, inevitably placing it in the middle between the two adversaries, but its reasoning long leaned toward the North’s logic on the talks. South Korea is in the middle too, with potential to be a swing state that was little realized under Roh’s leadership. With Koizumi and Roh mostly steering their countries in different directions, the alignment of the Other Four was generally one near the United States and three inclined to accept North Korea’s negotiating demands. After the nuclear test, however, the line-up changed with China the decisive swing

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country and the United States finally moving closer to the middle, leaving Japan more isolated. The crisis is defined differently by the various parties involved. The United States takes a global perspective, seeing North Korea through the lens of WMD with linkages to terror. China, Russia, and South Korea are all seen as too soft on the North, which leads some to suspect their motives—old thinking about balance of power, blind nationalism toward compatriots, and so on. In contrast, China, Russia, and South Korea, whatever their differences, view the problem in terms of regional stability. They think that the North is not inclined toward proliferation and is using its nuclear weapons program to secure regime survival and global assistance for cautious reform. Thus, the best approach is to recognize that in the past the United States and the North reached agreements that neither fulfilled and both should redouble their efforts as well as accept the need for a multilateral framework to meet their bottom lines and to stabilize the region. If the United States framed the crisis as the North versus five states anxious to end its nuclear weapons programs, others saw the United States as having its own goals beyond elimination of these weapons, including regime change. They viewed it as driven by implacable hostility toward the North, guided by ideological insistence on driving another stake through the lingering carcass of communism and completing the task of ending the cold war. According to this perspective, the United States risks a sharper confrontation in order to avoid compromises that would allow North Korea to survive and a mixed outcome without clear-cut, geopolitical dominance by the United States. At the end of 2006, however, fear grew of regional instability coupled with new hope that the United States was taking the Six-Party Talks more seriously. Sino-U.S. convergence on regional issues was growing. The negotiations over the nuclear crisis were, from one perspective, targeted at one irreversible decision by North Korea that the other five parties all sought, making success an early declaration by Pyongyang of all of its plutonium/uranium enrichment facilities and products and an unambiguous commitment to their rapid elimination. Yet, the talks were also a process of confidence building, laying the groundwork for security and economic development in the North that would permit regime survival and lead to regional balance. Narrowing the differences proved difficult; the United States feared that North Korea would strengthen its regime and revive its economy without, in the end, abandoning its nuclear weapons, while the North feared that the United States and Japan would press for regime change after it was left exposed. The others sought middle ground.

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The Other Four start from two distinct backgrounds. China and Russia were the two claimants to leadership in the socialist bloc, based on a worldview that set them at odds with the “imperialist” United States and its “lackey” Japan. For decades they fixated on the Korean peninsula as the testing ground for a clash between two systems, acceding to the North’s insistence that any normalization of the status quo had to be seen as a threat to bring “convergence” in modernization and “peaceful evolution” that would destroy socialism. Japan and South Korea, in turn, were the outliers in capitalism, championing a strong, protectionist state against foreign investors as well as “convergence.” Each had struggled with “internationalization” or “globalization” and at last brought into the open dreams of reordering the regional order by leaving the United States at a distance. The two socialist great powers and the two Asian corporatist economic miracle achievers aspiring to be political powers watched intently as the United States grew more unilateralist, parading its military superiority, and North Korea became even more autonomous, boasting of its nuclear weapons potential. The United States and North Korea differ on the scope of talks. The United States aimed to narrow the focus as much as possible, trying to force an end to nuclear weapons development without building momentum for regime survival, reunification, or multilateral security. Neither bilateral talks that could bolster the regime nor multilateral talks that could put a new framework in place were desired in this defensive response of a hegemonic power unwilling to accept the rise of a multilateral regional order. In turn, the North sought bilateralism above all as the best path for regime survival, while allowing some scope to multilateralism as long as the thrust was a broad agenda. Its paranoia extended beyond the United States to multilateralism. The Other Four with their strong interest in going beyond the nuclear issue and the bilateral agenda found themselves at odds with both antagonists. Most blamed the United States for setting the agenda and preventing exploration of diverse themes that matter for building trust or developing a forwardlooking agenda. The North Korean nuclear crisis has shown Japan, which in September 2002 had plans to develop an independent diplomacy to the North,25 as well as Russia, which in January 2003 made an unsuccessful attempt to become the mediator between the North and the United States, that they must coordinate closely with another more influential power. Soon Japan chose the United States and Russia picked China. Preoccupied with Iraq over the four years that a standoff with the North has persisted, the United States tried to buy time by accepting China as

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the main mediator. In February–April 2003 China proved that it could bring the North to three-party talks. In June–August it derailed U.S. efforts to build a coalition of pressure or naval inspections by persuading the North to accept Six-Party Talks. Then in October–December China enticed the North to consider a package deal, but the United States backed away. To a degree, China salvaged the effort in Six-Party Talks convened in February 2004 that were followed by establishment of a working group and by back-to-back visits to Beijing of Dick Cheney and Kim Jong-il. Yet, the impasse continued, as China and Japan each looked beyond the immediate crisis to position themselves in the long-term struggle to shape regionalism and the security environment in NEA to suit their national objectives. The United States held the overall global initiative, but in NEA multilateralism was on the rise. The United States could not promote the atmosphere it sought for addressing the nuclear crisis not so much because of China or Russia but due mostly to its allies. After Bush won reelection he faced first a bolder Roh, then a breakdown in Japanese-South Korean ties, then further deterioration in Sino-Japanese ties, and later a more assertive Japan toward its neighbors. In late 2004 Roh embarrassed his own Foreign Ministry with speeches in Los Angeles and Europe hinting at a bold, autonomous foreign policy, raising U.S. concern. By March 2005 Roh’s language was becoming more assertive in the midst of a harsh new approach to Japan. Then in the spring Sino-Japanese relations worsened as demonstrations in Chinese cities targeted Japan, and Koizumi’s response was to press the history issue further and later in the year to choose a cabinet bound to keep provoking China as well as South Korea. Under these circumstances the Six-Party Talks were becoming an unwieldy forum with less trust and dimmer prospects of advancing together toward a regional grouping capable of steering the North toward cooperation. They showed signs of becoming four versus two in terms of a soft-line to entice North Korea versus a hard-line to pressure it. The format seemed to lose its appeal to the Bush administration not only as a long-term framework for security in NEA but even as a temporary expedient for coaxing the North to abandon its nuclear weapons. China and Russia had solidified their tolerance of Kim Jong-il’s communist dictatorship to assist it toward a gradual transition with human rights concerns set aside, and Roh increasingly sided with them. Yet, the North squandered this tolerance with its nuclear test. The crux of the division in dealing with North Korea is different priorities. The United States is focused on WMD, South Korea on the process of reunification while preventing the danger of war, China on

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the security framework for the region while hastening the return of Taiwan, Japan on overturning historical verdicts while denying China’s claims to centrality, and Russia on combining the right security framework with an economic boost to its Far East. Clashing objectives make coordination in the crisis difficult. Yet, by the start of 2007 a nuclear North Korea had narrowed these divisions. WMD and the NEA security framework had become deeply intertwined. As China and the United States took a fresh look at their common interests and the South Korean public pressed Roh to work for more consensus in facing the North, a stronger basis existed for pressing the North. Reunification and Regional Security American strategists hesitate to put North Korean crisis resolution in a context of gradual Korean reintegration and that, in turn, in a framework of steps toward some type of regionalism. They favor Japan without knowing how to find suitable balance for China and address new security needs. Continuing to regard Japan as the indispensable ally in this region, the United States seemed to be blinded to whatever strategy Japan’s right wing chose on the premise that Japan has the same goals. There was scant consideration given to how Japanese-Russian ties can serve regional security or how the Sino-South Korean-Japanese triangle at regionalism’s core can be buttressed in support of globalization. Short on strategic thinking on these matters, the United States watched as the crisis fueled five negative phenomena in NEA: (1) a rapid rise in China’s leadership role; (2) a Sino-Russian strategic partnership beyond earlier expectations; (3) rapid alienation of Japan from its neighbors; (4) a rapid shift in South Korean strategic thinking away from the United States and Japan; and (5) North Korea’s partial reemergence from isolation with regional understanding. Apart from predictions of the North’s collapse, the reunification debate assumes that the nuclear crisis ends in a compromise that revives the Kim Jong-il regime and emboldens it to proceed with leaders in Seoul toward the goals set forth when Kim Dae-jung visited Pyongyang in 2000. On the one hand, South-centered predictions optimistically argue that the South holds almost all of the cards, economic forces will be decisive, other states will be secondary and the fact that the international community will provide much of the funding will strengthen the hand of the United States as well as Japan, and the timetable will be fairly quick. On the other hand, two-sided predictions vary from hopeful to doubtful, with arguments that neither side will have the advantage

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as politics and other noneconomic factors dominate, or other states will play a large role as part of some regional balance, and the timetable is likely to be long. Optimists may be sober in admitting that North Korea will not be ready for much integration until it has a market economy, a civil society, and considerable transparency, but they argue that a more secure North would allow the South to produce those conditions. In contrast, many who claim to be even-handed insist idealistically that the South will have to change to accommodate the North’s anxieties, for example, by altering its security alliance with the United States and approving some shared political process even without the North’s respect for human rights. The United States prefers postponing reunification matters until after the crisis is resolved. In contrast, the soft-line in the Other Four is to proceed with plans for a “peace regime” and other precursors of peninsular integration as soon as a blueprint for dealing with the crisis is acknowledged and some sort of nuclear program freeze is achieved. In contrast to the U.S. call for human rights conditions to be met early in what is likely to be, if not regime collapse, an extended period of weak ties between North and South, others favor sustained economic cooperation with chances rising for an early confederation. The six countries active in NEA have different notions of the security architecture for the region. They regard the current crisis as an opportunity to forge an arrangement with lasting consequences. Backers of the notion of community link economic integration and cultural understanding to a framework that would operate parallel to the U.S. alliance system, reducing tensions between China and Japan and integrating Russia into the region at the same as it would chart a path for transforming North Korea. It follows that pursuing reunification is not enough; the entire security framework of the region must prevent the emergence of a new dividing line between continental and maritime zones at the thirty-eighth parallel. Along with multilateral security would come regionalism, breaking down trade barriers and establishing an energy grid across borders. Attitudes toward resolving the nuclear crisis are linked to the stance countries take on regionalism.26 Along with the Iraq War, the nuclear crisis tested the Bush administration’s expansion of the war against terror into a struggle against states pursuing WMD. Both policies were sharply contested within the administration not only as they emerged but even as the consequences unfolded in the following years. If the approach to North Korea was less damaging to U.S. interests and reputation, it too had corrosive effects. Bush gave Japan the impression that the United States could sustain an assertive foreign policy beyond its realistic means, and Japanese leaders

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seized the opportunity for their own ends at the cost of thinking more realistically about a regional strategy. South Koreans answered the U.S. call fearing that to do otherwise would leave them shorn of alliance protection, but this exacted a price in respect needed for cooperation in dealing with the North. China and Russia seized new opportunities, growing bolder. While some changes were under way anyways, the crisis accelerated and transformed NEA geopolitical dynamics. For the Other Four the focus alternated between what can be done to encourage the United States to offer more incentives and what must be done to stop the North’s nuclear weapons development and testing. By the fall of 2006 a line-up of five versus one had agreed to some enforcement of Security Council sanctions. China’s centrality was confirmed. Russia had found acceptance as a regional player. Japan was more hard line than the United States, but the North’s extreme position gave it new scope for regional diplomacy. Roh kept a low profile to avoid confronting the North in ways that could lead to hostilities or further alienating the United States. The Six-Party Talks had proven their value to test the North, to regularize contacts among the parties, and to lay the groundwork for joint pressure if needed. However, in order to become a framework to reconcile conflicting notions of security, they needed agreement on carrots to offer the North to contain WMD, a forwardlooking strategy for the peninsula, and a plan for regional multilateralism. This required narrowing differences in strategic thinking among the Other Four as well as the United States. Only the U.S. leadership will make that possible. In its absence the region had been left with China’s adamancy about expanding its power at breakneck speed, Japan’s defiance toward NEA states, South Korea’s overreaching in hope of becoming the balancer, and Russia’s challenge to U.S. and Japanese interests. Such divisions left room for North Korea’s belligerent moves to proceed and offered only feint hope that the resultant danger would lead the others to rethink their priorities and find common ground. In 2007 the United States at last emboldened diplomats to make progress, but there were bound to be sharp differences with the North that would again test the assertive strategic thinking of the Other Four and the United States. The five working groups established in the February 13 agreement give each of the Other Four a mechanism to further its interests in the end game to the crisis. The two of greatest priority are the working group on denuclearization, which under China’s lead and the watchful eyes of the U.S. will press the North to meet benchmarks for declaring and disabling its nuclear assets, and the one on normalization of U.S.-North Korean

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relations, which will show to the North how far and fast the U.S. will go in accepting it into the world community. The third working group on economic and energy assistance to the North led by South Korea, along with the ministerial consultations between North and South, will indicate if the South will show the restraint needed to keep benefits in line with the North’s moves toward denuclearization. The other normalization bilateral working group will show how far Japan is prepared to insist on its own agenda as opposed to coordinating with others. Finally, the group on regional security, led by Russia and presumably building on a new four-party group (omitting Japan and Russia) to negotiate a peace regime to replace the armistice on the peninsula, would become active only after at least the first three groups had made a lot of headway. Coordinating the interests and strategic thinking of six states involves synchronizing the progress in the five working groups and additional bilateral networks under the rubric of Six-Party Talks. As Phase 1 ended in mid-2007 the Other Four were adjusting their strategies for a very different environment in the Six-Party Talks. The United States was taking the initiative in direct talks with North Korea to the satisfaction of China and South Korea. Sino-U.S. cooperation was enhanced, but their different strategies for NEA were bound to be tested. Meanwhile, Sino-Russian differences were becoming more apparent, as Russo-U.S. ties worsened and Russia did not seem so concerned about a nuclear North Korea. U.S.-Japanese differences were brought to the surface; Japan was most nervous about negotiations that could produce a compromise with the North and impact the regional framework for cooperation. South Korean opinion was split, as Roh intended to advance ties with the North faster than the U.S. preferred. Each party’s strategic thinking on the nuclear issue, regionalism, and reunification would likely be seriously tested in this new atmosphere in which the Six-Party Talks could become a full-fledged mechanism for seeking multilateral consensus on the future of NEA.

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CHAPTER 3

The South Korean Response: The Nuclear Crisis

T

he outbreak of the nuclear crisis was the third and most telling shock by the Bush administration to Kim Dae-jung’s Sunshine Policy. First, there was Kim’s March 2001 visit to Washington, where after preliminary agreement with the State Department on continued U.S. support for his signature project and an upbeat meeting with Colin Powell, Kim was humiliated by a press conference that left U.S. backing in doubt and his visit in shambles. Second, in January 2002 Bush’s axis of evil speech demonizing the North amidst talk of preemptive action in the context of the “war against terror” cast grave doubt on prospects for reinvigorating the Sunshine Policy. Finally ten months later, Bush was accusing the North of dangerously violating the Agreed Framework, thus rendering that agreement, the very foundation on which the Sunshine Policy was built, dead. Suspecting that Bush was eager to abandon this framework anyway and that the evidence was exaggerated for the highly enriched uranium program that had been exposed, Kim could only plead with the United States and desperately seek to prevent the crisis from escalating as his term as president drew to a close. His Nobel Prize achievement was fading for reasons that some saw as more linked to Washington than Pyongyang. After Bush’s axis of evil reference in the State of the Union Address, he traveled in March 2002 to South Korea and joined Kim in opening the railway station next to the DMZ that was planned as a stop en route to Pyongyang. Kim thanked Bush for endorsing the Sunshine Policy, as if the U.S. president had retreated from his remarks earlier in the winter, and asserted that the two partners in a strong alliance were together

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opening this window to show their welcome to the North. In turn, Bush used strong language to depict North Korea as a hell, a prison for its own people as if he were advocating regime change, calling for the beacon of the South to light up the darkness of the North.1 The details of the two speeches and the basic logic underlining them belied the façade of unity. South Koreans noted the Bush administration’s reliance on reasoning about the end of the cold war in Europe as a guide for dealing with North Korea, but interpreted European history differently. Instead of pointing to Ronald Reagan labeling the Soviet Union the “evil empire” and proving to it that U.S. determination and military strength mean that the cold war is lost, their story points to West German reconciliation, engaging East Germany and the Soviet Union, as the Helsinki Accords built trust through security, cooperation, and mutual respect.2 While in 1990 the East German economy was one-third the West German one, the North Korean economy has sunk to only one-thirtythird of the South’s. It follows that a Korean merger is for some time ahead undesirable economically as well as due to the potential of a backlash provoking chaotic intervention by others.3 If most on the political right framed relations with North Korea in moral terms, denying the legitimacy of the regime, condemning its human rights policies, and urging regime change,4 already in 1996 there was a shift after South Korea felt bypassed by the 1994 U.S. deal with the North and by its own decision to shun the North in the first nuclear crisis. Kim Young-sam switched course with three negative assurances: (1) South Korea would not take advantage of the North’s troubles; (2) it would not try to isolate the North; and (3) it would not seek unification by absorbing the North. Even prior to the December 1997 election of Kim Dae-jung that turned the conservatives out of office, a new direction was emerging that laid the groundwork for an active engagement policy. While conservatives welcomed some sort of engagement, many thought that Kim Dae-jung lost balance and, later, objected to Roh’s policy to North Korea. For instance, at the time of the critical fifth anniversary of the inter-Korea summit when a delegation to Pyongyang succeeded in restarting bilateral ties and breathing new life into the SixParty Talks that would lead three months later to the Joint Statement, one paper called the visit disappointing since not only was there no clear progress on the nuclear issue, but also the South had not raised human rights issues or identified itself with universal standards, thus losing international support.5 Such messages called on Roh not to veer far from the U.S. policy after his moves in 2004–5 had aroused concern, but

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given the power of the presidency, Roh was not nearly as encumbered in his engagement moves at home as he was abroad. Voices on the Korean left took for granted that North Korea would abandon all of its nuclear weapons once trust was reestablished. Valuing engagement polices, they put the onus on the United States to accept normalization of relations with the North.6 To refute their logic was not easy, since the North’s behavior could always be blamed on lack of trust. Indeed, the North sought to kindle a spirit of inter-Korean cooperation to appeal to fellow Koreans and lay the blame on the United States for blocking efforts on both sides of the peninsula. Arguing that the two together could avert a war, the North called for nationalist backing.7 Yet, it was not easy simply to stick to engagement in the face of a complex strategic environment with enormous stakes. If Roh let ties with the U.S. fray, he could be isolated from his security establishment and foreign policy elite, weakening his hand with the North. The media was merciless: in June 2003 it both said that the United States was distrustful that Roh’s real heart was with the North and accused Roh of “kowtowing” to Bush.8 The First Stage of the Crisis In the first stage the crisis was escalating month by month, as the United States appeared to weigh a military option and North Korea methodically responded with steps to reactivate its nuclear weapons development. Consultations with China revealed similar skepticism of the U.S. rationale and handling of the crisis, but no rush to respond. Japan was obsessed with the abductions issue, as politicians such as Abe Shinzo aroused the public against the North without concern for what the United States was doing. That left Russia. A delegation went there in January 2003, urging Putin to utilize personal ties with Kim Jong-il to prevent further escalation. To Kim Dae-jung’s disappointment the Russian mission to Pyongyang failed. The North watched as its three neighbors blamed the United States for needlessly provoking a crisis and turned to it for restraint as their appeals to the United States were ignored. The mission Kim Dae-jung desperately sent to Pyongyang with an appeal for another North-South summit and a package deal, including a representative from Roh Moo-hyun bringing the message that he was ready to greatly expand ties, was spurned without even meeting Kim Jong-il. The image spread of a sharp U.S.-South Korean gap, as Roh prepared to take office under the shadow of election-time “antiAmericanism.” His brain trust was split, some advocating escape from old thinking and U.S. dependency while others saw no option but to

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draw closer to the United States and try to convince it to talk to the North rather than press for UN sanctions and regime change. Anxious for a peaceful resolution through dialogue and no repeat of the 1994 war scare from the United States, Roh tried to take the initiative but had to settle for cultivating ties with Bush.9 Even before taking office, Roh sent a delegation to Washington in early February to narrow the gap. It failed, and he faced a stark choice. If he put the alliance in jeopardy, the United States would be even less constrained as it and the North reached the brink of war on a battlefield likely to reach Seoul. Instead, the choice was made to stay close to the United States to try to restrain it, but not overlooking multilateral diplomacy. The same delegation stopped in Japan and another delegation went to China, which also preferred bilateral talks between the United States and North Korea despite Bush’s refusal. Talk in the United States of convening the UN Security Council made little sense when China and Russia opposed such action and the march to war in Iraq left in shambles any consensus about how the United States was using that institution. Suggestions that a coalition of the willing might discuss the North Korean nuclear danger also perplexed Seoul for fear that it could be the lone dissenter. As the Iraq War unfolded, the United States proceeded without haste, but Seoul as well as Beijing grew alarmed by the tough posture and where it might lead. As the Roh administration organized in the shadow of the nuclear crisis, the United States left no doubt of its distrust and readiness to keep Roh in line. A comment by a member of the February delegation to Washington that the new government “would prefer that North Korea had nuclear weapons to seeing it collapse” as well as the message that it was against penalties contrasted with Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s charge that the North was a “terrorist regime” and his order that long-range bombers be placed on alert for possible use to deter it.10 Only the growing role of Colin Powell to shift the United States onto the track of diplomacy and the sobering shift of Roh to avoid any rupture in U.S. ties kept relations on track, if never far removed from a serious rift. The South’s continued pursuit of the North contrasted with U.S. efforts to isolate that regime.11 In his first months in office Roh stayed in the background, as the United States turned to China to influence the North. When in April China arranged a three-way meeting, South Korea was excluded, the United States made strong demands without clear incentives, North Korea flaunted its nuclear status with no sign of compromise, and China clung to the neutral role of convener arguing that just by meeting

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progress was made. Triumphant after apparent victory in Iraq, Bush took a hard-line and expected Roh’s backing. If in January Seoul sought help from Russia and in February–April it depended on China, in May–June Japan became the third target in efforts to deter Bush’s drive to pressure North Korea into submission. At last, the United States was turning to South Korea for a joint response, but only in the framework of existing alliance ties including Japan and the TCOG with determination to pressure the North. Koizumi had kept a low profile after his visit to Pyongyang in September, but in calling for peaceful resolution of the nuclear crisis and showing little enthusiasm for the hard-line statements from Washington he was deemed to stand in the middle between Bush and Roh. In three bilateral summits over one month differences were narrowed. The United States understood at Roh’s May visit that if it continued to pursue some sort of multilateral talks with the North seen as “dialogue,” Roh would use restraint in engaging it and not stand in the way of some sort of “pressure.” In contrast to this limited compromise, the United States was heartened by Koizumi’s May visit, where more fervent support was offered, including joint efforts in a new Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) on the high seas and financial pressure. That left the June 9 summit in Tokyo between Koizumi and Roh to complete the three-way planning. Despite a façade of agreement, major differences were exposed. Roh focused on dialogue, while Koizumi called for pressure and dialogue. The timing of the visit on South Korea’s Memorial Day and just as the Japanese Diet passed a law permitting new military action that was bound to arouse concern in the South as well as the tone of remarks by some Japanese politicians caused embarrassment to Roh. His leftist supporters were upset over his spinelessness, and critics on the right were able to capitalize on his deference to the one state for which national pride is most at stake. In order to gain a say in the crisis, Roh saw no alternative but to feign satisfaction; Koizumi was seen as the main check on Bush. A façade of agreement at meetings between Bush and Roh hid a deep vein of mutual distrust. South Korea feared being relegated to a mere observer.12 The United States was wary of Roh, and North Korea dismissed any role for the South. At the May 2003 visit, Bush urged Roh to agree to pressure the North, while Roh sought with little success to get Bush to commit to dialogue. Memories of the axis of evil speech by Bush and the anti-American rhetoric of Roh’s camp in 2002 flitted in the background. After the North failed to show flexibility at the three-way talks, Roh did more to satisfy Bush as well as to cooperate with Koizumi. If some accused Roh of abandoning his principles, he made it clear that

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he excluded force as an option in line with expectations that the North would open up as long as it could save face.13 While the United States had plans to squeeze the North’s shipping, it took direct military action off the table.14 Roh’s position was weak; he could not vigorously register his distaste for how Bush was proceeding, tacitly consenting to show caution in advancing relations with Pyongyang until the nuclear issue was resolved. With China prodding the North to talk and showing empathy for its fear of a preemptive strike, Roh counted on China to insist that dialogue continue while waiting to see if the United States could bear the double burden of Iraq and North Korea. His strategy yielded some benefits after U.S. efforts to apply pressure on the North in June failed. As Japan’s Foreign Ministry mediated between the United States and South Korea in seeking balance between dialogue and pressure, it was agreed to convene Six-Party Talks with Japan pleased to join this multilateral format even if some U.S. officials were dubious about its value. Thus, Tokyo gained some credit in Seoul as a moderating influence, Beijing won praise for creating the negotiating mechanism, and Moscow’s role was appreciated too. For Roh the value of the Six-Party Talks was not only to constrain the United States and get the North to talk; more than Kim Dae-jung, he favored regionalism in NEA, and a forum that could be useful for reaching his dream. In the first stage of crisis Seoul perceived a genuine threat from U.S. unilateral moves, for many months linked to the possibility of a preemptive attack on the North and over the next months associated with pressure tactics. If later it no longer regarded the danger of a U.S. attack to be real, this did not mean there was no appreciation for the North’s perception that a threat existed. Frequent reference to the worldview among the North’s leaders and the absence of any basis for a rival way of thinking to emerge in the populace or among the political elite appears as a rationale for giving priority to winning the trust of the North. Once the Six-Party Talks had begun, South Korea emphasized how to alleviate anxieties in the North, which continued to see a U.S. threat, imagined or real. Lacking leverage with Pyongyang, Seoul was left searching for a means to influence U.S. policy. Under these circumstances, it was conciliatory, reliant on ties with Japan and China, and patient as it became increasingly clear that Bush had no answer for the crisis. The Second Stage of the Crisis From August 2003 the dynamics changed from just finding a way to pursue talks to narrowing differences in order to advance to the next

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round, especially by persuading the North to attend. Many in Seoul were pessimistic from the start about any early resolution of the nuclear crisis, convinced that neither protagonist was prepared to compromise. While some foresaw a solution consistent with each side’s basic interests, they doubted it would materialize. Taking the North’s stubbornness and suspicions for granted, they concentrated on why the Bush administration would not do what was necessary. If the North was ideologically obsessed with avoiding dependency, the United States allegedly was guided by moral absolutism about eliminating evil and retaining hegemonic unilateralism. Thus, neither was prepared to accept compromise through a framework favoring genuine multilateralism and gradual increases in trust. The fact that the United States accepted the Six-Party Talks did not mean that it was giving priority to diplomacy unless it could become a vehicle for multilateral pressure. The North was not ready to abandon its brinksmanship. Recalling the joint communiqué of October 13, 2000 signed by Madeleine Albright at the time of her visit to Pyongyang, which indicated no hostile intent, mutual respect, and noninterference in each other’s domestic affairs, analysts in Seoul said that it captured the spirit that would allow for diplomatic progress, but Bush came to office bent on rejecting Clinton’s “appeasement” in the face of blackmail, after 9/11 he divided the world more sharply into good and evil, and then in 2003 confidence owing to supposed success in the war in Iraq fueled an uncompromising stance. When in October at the APEC summit he spoke of accepting the North’s security but not by treaty, this was too little to persuade the North15 Supporting China’s quest to get a firm U.S. security guarantee, Roh was disappointed that matters floundered in Washington. Many in South Korea differed from the Bush administration on the origin of the standoff, the goals of the Six-Party Talks, and the methods for dealing with both North Korea and the Other Four. They blamed assertions that the United States would offer no dialogue or inducements for driving Pyongyang into a corner. Seeing military options by the United States as not feasible and the Other Four opposed to them and amenable to serious negotiations, analysts in Seoul assumed that the United States would eventually have to change its approach.16 Roh persistently sought to persuade Bush to treat Kim Jong-il with respect and his state as a “sovereign nation” with the optimistic view that resuming the Six-Party Talks would allow progress to follow. He sympathized with China’s role of generous supporter of the North each time it took a step forward, viewing encouragement as the key for the North to make the tough decisions the others required. When finally the second round of talks occurred, it was another false start. The U.S. position

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made CVID a precondition for a security guarantee or economic assistance from the world community. This demand to proceed sequentially, dealing with the nuclear issue before others, contrasted with the North’s insistence on simultaneously addressing the issues that matter to both sides while providing incentives for dismantling its nuclear programs. While disappointed with the outcome, Seoul praised Beijing’s efforts, found some satisfaction in Tokyo’s role in the middle between Washington and Seoul, and had no problem with Moscow’s passivity. Seoul’s agreement to send troops to the Iraq War seemed to improve relations. Stories are still emerging about the unpopular dispatch during the course of the Vietnam War of 320,000 South Korean soldiers, some 5,000 of whom died. Rather than believing in the cause, the South had feared that the United States would withdraw divisions and increase the chance of an attack by the North; Park Chung-hee made a mercenary deal in return for promised assistance to develop the South’s economy.17 In the Iraq War too, many believed the South had no choice but to send troops for fear of even faster removal of U.S. forces than was soon announced. Hints that Seoul wanted the United States to soften its stand toward the North as a kind of linkage angered some in Washington.18 Resentful that their sacrifice was little appreciated, South Koreans had little recourse. Seoul’s greatest challenge was to overcome the U.S. temerity to offer incentives. The first minor success in the nuclear crisis occurred in the June 23–26, 2004 third round after months of meetings with the United States and an atmosphere where all of the Other Four were agreed on the minimal requirements. The priority was to get the United States to drop CVID, to persuade it to hold genuine discussions with the North, and to lend support to Jim Kelly, the U.S. representative to the Six-Party Talks, and his superior, Richard Armitage, to take charge. Seoul accelerated its diplomatic activity as U.S. Ambassador Chris Hill won praise for his efforts. This was a high point of Roh’s accomplishment. Although an effort to impeach him had sidelined him briefly in early 2004, it backfired politically, leading to elections for the National Assembly that gave his Uri Party sudden dominance. In May he resumed his duties, energized to push the United States toward compromise and pleased that Koizumi was making another visit to Pyongyang, even if the atmosphere proved strained. The momentum of the June talks carried over to a successful July Jeju island summit with Koizumi, the start of twice a year shuttle diplomacy, and an upbeat September “dacha” summit with Putin, where evening festivities were extended by two hours. Momentum seemed to be building for a multilateral push to accelerate the talks; yet,

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the U.S. election hiatus followed by Bush’s hardened approach proved discouraging. South Koreans are inclined to side with China in linking denuclearization to other issues, including security and economic assistance, acknowledging a multistage process with simultaneous steps, as sought by the North, rather than the sequence favored by the United States. Although the United States refused to speak openly about the details of a package agreement that it might accept, there was talk in the South that in June 2004 at the third round the United States was prepared once the North agreed to renounce its nuclear programs to accept a comprehensive deal after a transition of some months whereby it would offer security guarantees, remove the North from its list of terror states, lift economic sanctions, and approve of others supplying heavy oil. Yet, this step forward soon faded from view. South Korea’s frustration was reinforced by its difficulties in dealing with the North. Already in the fall of 2004 ties were damaged as the South accepted more than 460 North Korean refugees who had reached Vietnam and at the same time the North learned of its contingency plans in case of a collapse. Having welcomed U.S. conciliatory moves in June 2004 and sought to keep its ally on course toward a deal, the South may have misjudged North Korean sensitivities. Also, Roh’s refusal to allow civic groups to visit for the tenth anniversary of Kim Il-sung’s death drew criticism.19 Official meetings with Roh’s administration were suspended from the fall of 2004 to the spring of 2005 even as economic ties were advancing. The South found that it could alienate the North or the United States. It was hard to find a middle road. The Ministry of Unification had lost some ground to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, which coordinated responses to the Six-Party Talks and U.S. diplomats, and Chris Hill effectively represented the State Department’s growing rapport with Roh. Yet, Roh found by late 2004 that the South had become marginalized and the United States was taking it for granted rather than listening. The deal stuck in May 2003 unraveled, as Roh foresaw a new stage of U.S. malign neglect.20 Many in South Korea see United States and Japanese talk of human rights in North Korea as a smokescreen for regime change, regretting in the fall of 2004 how this issue gained new priority in both nations. It is thought that those who talk so much about human rights violations have no practical ways of improving the lot of the North Korean people. Instead, they are seeking to rally the public in their countries and elsewhere to become more hostile to the North Korean regime at the very time that its nuclear weapons program puts a premium on give-and-take

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negotiations to find a peaceful resolution. If showing a tough façade on this emotional issue gives the impression of doing something to an impatient public when the strategy to the North is not working, it makes compromise more difficult. On November 12, 2004 Roh gave a speech in Los Angeles that raised doubts about whether he and Bush agreed on the crisis. En route to the APEC summit in Chile he said it was “understandable” for the North to develop nuclear weapons in light of the security environment it faced, a thinly veiled reference to Bush’s preemptive doctrine and treatment of the North as “evil.” He seemed too to accept a freeze as an intermediate stage that falls short of complete dismantlement. This assertiveness may have reflected the views of a small study group enamored of terms such as “cooperative independence” and “harmonious balancer.” His speech came as a shock to the United States. If in Chile advisors to Roh and Bush had agreed to avoid the topic, Roh tried to explain himself and only made matters worse. Critics accuse him of acting under the influence of naive thinking about Korean independence and peaceful reunification out of touch with the actual levers available to the South. Others insist that the United States as well as Japan had driven Roh into a corner. Seoul was upset with Bush’s approach to the Six-Party Talks, and Washington bridled at the effrontery of Roh’s claim to be the balancer of NEA.21 With U.S. relations with China also somewhat troubled, South Koreans were concerned about calls in the United States for a new defense pact that would allow troops stationed in their country to be used in regional conflicts such as in Taiwan at the same time as they feared a harder-line to the North that could lead to an attack on its nuclear facilities.22 Even conservatives denied the warnings by United States or Japanese advocates of a China threat, insisting that they would provoke instability.23 Similar doubts were applied to reasoning about a North Korean threat and concomitant demands for regime change, even by those who criticized “unconditional” assistance to the North. Yet, many warned that Roh was endangering the U.S. alliance while earning little credit from North Korea. They reasoned that: (1) the talks were likely to break down, despite Roh’s optimism about the North’s readiness to return; (2) Roh lacked any channel to the North and was wasting aid on the regime that often did not reach the people; (3) the United States would be prepared for firm pressure, perhaps even a surgical preemptive strike, contrary to Roh’s insistence that talk of pressure is just a negotiating strategy; and (4) the South would be reduced to the status of an onlooker by the United States and a nonentity for the North. They argued that South Korea was falling into a trap of “national cooperation.”24

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After Bush’s second term started with a harsh tone rather than pragmatism, North Korea responded with belligerent rhetoric and in early April shut down the Yongbyon reactor to extract its nuclear rods. On April 28 vitriolic language emanating from Bush’s news conference ratcheted up the U.S. rhetoric. South Korea had opposed pressure, but it held back some fertilizer supplies that spring in order to entice the North back to talks. Given the rapid increase in trade, this fell far short of what U.S. officials had wanted, but it was a step forward. A turning point occurred when Bush and Hu consulted by phone on May 5, reaffirming Bush’s readiness to work together. Kim Jong-il followed with a positive response on commemorating the fifth anniversary of the summit together with South Korea. A statement from a North Korean spokesman on June 3, 2005 that the North would observe whether Mr. Bush could alter his words and thus abandon his “hostile” policy then became a signal to move ahead to the fourth round of talks. The new atmosphere prompted Roh to redouble his efforts to entice the North while asking the United States and Japan too to do their part. At the June 2005 summit Bush made a gesture, referring to Kim Jong-il as “Mr.,” but two weeks later Koizumi did not do his part after his foreign minister tarnished the process by suggesting that the United States had lost confidence in the South. South Koreans disparaged Koizumi for his stubbornness and insensitivity.25 When Roh went to Washington on June 9 Bush spoke of readiness to normalize ties and his desire for a peaceful resolution. South Koreans credited this as well as their own subsequent offer of massive electrical assistance for bringing the North back to the talks and inducing the North to discuss dismantling everything, including missiles, in return for full normalization with the United States. This summit gave the South more authority in dealing with the North. It produced talk of the United States and South Korea being close allies, sharing the same goals and being in perfect agreement on the basic principles. Along with a renewed façade of harmony came reassurance essential for Roh to proceed: Bush’s reaffirmation that the United States is sticking to its offer of June 2004 and his declaration that the United States is prepared to build “more normal relations” with the North.26 While not speaking of normalization of relations, he referred to pursuit of a “more normal relationship,” and if he did not offer a U.S. security guarantee, he did note a “collective security guarantee.”27 After a year of waiting the South had its chance. Unification Minister Chung Dong-yong headed to Pyongyang with the message that the North could get security guarantees, substantial economic aid, and

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improved U.S. relations. His visit for the fifth anniversary of the 2000 summit was considered a breakthrough, but when a delegation to the United States was viewed with skepticism about its positive report on the June 17 results, a visit by Chung to Cheney was quickly sought. Making his case for trusting Kim Jung-il and for pursuing an agreement on principles, Chung met with Rice too and broke the logjam, at least gaining Bush’s consent not to stand in the way. On July 9 the North announced it would return to the Six-Party Talks.28 Over the summer Chung led a diplomatic offensive, third only to the Sunshine Policy five years earlier and nordpolitik fifteen years earlier in boldness. Insistent that Seoul could move the Six-Party Talks forward, Roh and Chung drew linkages with steps toward reunification: massive supply of electricity from the South to the North to meet the urgent need for economic recovery, and a process aimed at establishing a “peace regime” in place of the armistice on the peninsula dating from 1953. This gave the South a “back channel” to the leadership in the North that would be used often in subsequent months, providing “flank support” for the crisis talks.29 Roh’s strategy in the summer of 2005 depended on a combination of positive outcomes. One, he needed U.S. hard-liners to be on the defensive and accept a more active role for South Korea and pragmatic diplomacy, as occurred in the spring of 2004 before the electoral triumph reinforced their influence. As Bush’s public support slipped through the persistence of suicide bombings in Iraq and the New Orleans hurricane fiasco, the United States showed more patience and flexibility. Two, Roh depended on a united front among the Other Four with China invigorating its mediating efforts and Japan, as in the spring of 2004, encouraging its close ally to take a softer stance. China played its part, and Japan did not press its divisive demands to the North so vigorously; yet a foul mood after the Roh tongue lashing of Koizumi at their June summit and Koizumi’s unquestioning backing of Bush removed any sense of joint pressure on the United States. Three, Roh relied on Kim Jong-il to respond through intensified inter-Korean contacts and forward-looking meetings with U.S. and Chinese diplomats. Although Kim’s demand for assistance in constructing a light-water nuclear reactor raised a new obstacle, he largely did his part. The Joint Statement was greeted by some as a triumph of diplomacy. Roh spent much of 2003 striving to turn Bush from pressure to dialogue with Kim Jong-il, the first half of 2004 urging the United States to abandon CVID in favor of a flexible negotiating posture with carrots for the North, the first half of 2005 pacing nervously until Bush approved

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his initiative with Kim, and more than three additional months in intense negotiations for acceptance of a statement of principles that all could accept. After interpreting remarks from North Korea as a sign of renewed interest in proceeding with the Six-Party Talks, he turned to the United States with reaffirmation of the alliance and, in turn, elicited support for engaging the North. Then he readied an appealing offer, while conveying to Kim Jong-il U.S. seriousness in reaching an agreement that would meet his main concerns and to Bush that the North was willing to abandon its nuclear weapons and able to justify it at home as Kim Il-sung’s legacy to denuclearize the peninsula.30 In mid-September 2005 there were intensive talks between U.S. and South Korean officials, many in New York for the UN summit, on the contents of what became the Joint Statement. One report suggested that Roh was so upset over the prospect that Bush would not accept some wording, causing the Six-Party Talks to break down, that he even threatened to rethink the alliance. Support for the North’s position, arguing that reassurance is needed given the North’s isolation, may have helped to sway the United States to accept, in principle, the right to a lightwater reactor, but it fueled a backlash. Approval of the Joint Statement did not hide the anger of some in the United States against Roh.31 In the tense final stages of negotiations the gap had widened between the two. According to one report, on September 15 South Korea broke ranks by agreeing that the North can have a light-water reactor.32 Although the United States eventually accepted the idea after being reassured that the Other Four all interpreted the wording “at an appropriate time” to mean “following the complete abandonment of nuclear weapons,” the September 19 statement brought to the surface fissures between the allies. Moreover, at the UN during the critical days of negotiations, Roh’s language warning the United States against dividing NEA was deemed provocative.33 U.S. support for the South’s initiative toward the North may have produced a written statement that some considered to be a tangible advance, but some who at first had welcomed the Joint Statement feared it could become another boon to South Korean romanticism in favor of a deal that would be even less positive for denuclearization than the 1994 agreement. Despite engaging the Bush administration with unflagging energy and finally persuading Rice to agree to the wording of the Joint Statement and having her convince Bush, the South’s euphoria did not last. U.S. acceptance had been conditional, after the others had approved the statement on September 18. North Korea at the last minute had found the wording one-sided in listing various responsibilities for it and

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not for the South; so it insisted on changing the wording to include denuclearization of the entire peninsula. The United States then demanded that the cold war language of peaceful coexistence be struck in favor of existing peacefully together. Such struggles undercut satisfaction that a give-and-take approach that produced the document could produce a final resolution.34 In the first phase of the nuclear crisis and into 2004 the TCOG mechanism worked quite well. Seoul valued the periodic, constructive sessions aimed at coordination, even if some differences remained to be aired at the Six-Party Talks. For a time it even favored this in the hope that Japan would join in trying to soften the U.S. position. Yet, the atmosphere changed; the triangle that mattered in the summer of 2005 was South Korea joining with the United States and China. Japan was seen as a source of trouble, persistently trying to insert the abduction issue onto the agenda of preparations for Six-Party Talks. What mattered in Seoul’s eyes were its breakthrough with Washington and Pyongyang in June and three months of dogged pursuit in close coordination with Beijing. The celebration, however, was short-lived. The United States quickly spoiled matters by provoking and exaggerating the meaning of the North’s follow-up remark to the Joint Statement, and imposing financial sanctions that stopped any momentum buildup. The Third Stage of the Nuclear Crisis The Roh administration welcomed the Joint Statement for its potential to reduce tensions in NEA, ameliorating the security factor while advancing joint economic projects. This might remove the “Korea discount” for the South’s stocks due to risks in its environment, while also freeing it from dependency on the United States to become a politically activist state. With integration of the peninsula in progress, even if it proceeded slowly, the national economy would be stimulated and the region transformed.35 While many regarded the three years of on-again off-again talks from the onset of the nuclear crisis as largely wasted time, the agreement in principle drew praise as a major breakthrough in which the North committed itself to abandoning all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs while returning to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and IAEA safeguards, and the United States to respect the North’s sovereignty and eventual normalization. In this way, risk of military conflict or a nuclear weapon’s domino effect was significantly reduced as prospects for multilateral security cooperation and a permanent peace regime on the peninsula rose.36 The Joint Statement was a shared

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achievement: the United States was pragmatic, China showed impressive diplomatic skills, Japan exercised self-restraint, and Russia undertook useful mediating efforts with the North. Above all, credit was claimed for the more active role of the South, complementing China’s shuttle diplomacy in bridging North Korea and the United States. Many in South Korea disagreed with this positive assessment. As long as Bush firmly opposed compromising with the North, they could take some comfort that Roh was in an untenable situation. Yet, when the United States approved the Joint Statement concern rose that this would be a harbinger of further compromise by a weakened Bush whose priorities were elsewhere, leading to an ambiguous agreement as in 1994 that strengthens the hand of the North and emboldens Roh to appease it and leave the South vulnerable. Already at the end of September the gap between the United States and South Korea on how to proceed defied the façade of a united front. The South was rushing to invite the North to APEC in November, as Chris Hill was sending a message that this was inappropriate while also raising criticisms about the South’s advocacy for the North on the sensitive light-water reactor issue at the September talks.37 In contrast to U.S. skepticism over what had been accomplished, Roh was trumpeting the big success reached by building on the positive momentum for reducing tensions in the June talks between North and South, and suggesting that it was time for an inter-Korean summit.38 Roh was looking ahead to a timetable for peace, turning the next round of talks into action-for-action. Unlike U.S. reasoning that placed the burden on the North to act first through verifiable complete dismantling, he envisioned the North earning credit for returning to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and other steps toward nuclear dismantlement and being rewarded by steps from the United States and Japan toward normalization. Similarly, as the North started dismantling, the South would agree to talks over electricity leading to construction over three years of transmission lines as heavy fuel oil would be supplied in the interim and a light-water reactor could follow later.39 As in unconditional food aid, the goal was to reduce instability such as an outflow of refugees, in favor not only of the survival of the Kim Jong-il regime, but even of regime reinforcement to bring trust. Roh’s eagerness to expand ties conflicted with U.S. intentions to keep economic pressure on the North. The Unification Ministry even before the September 19 agreement was proposing at the inter-Korea Cabinetlevel talks to open more industrial parks, using the Gaeseong complex as a model. With trade rising to more than $1 billion in 2005 stimulated by

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the South pouring money as well as concrete into Gaeseong, there was little talk of conditionality linked to nuclear abandonment. Instead, regionalism in NEA was emerging as a vision to be grounded in the North’s economic emergence.40 Eager to seize the success on September 19, Roh ordered preparation of a comprehensive economic cooperation plan, shifting the focus from assistance to development in the name of reunification: energy, railroads, roads, harbor modernization, joint river management, agriculture, reforestation, mining, and a new tourist destination at Mt. Baekdu. Talk of an inter-Korean economic community by 2020, beginning with low wage North Korean labor working in industrial parks for South Korean firms, turned to the second and third stages of the Gaeseong complex, ensuring that manufacturing would be the economic leader in inter-Korean ties. Gangwon province in the northwest was eager to extend this concept even to the South Korean side of the border, offering to provide land for North Korean workers who would cross as day laborers. This rush to reward the North clashed, however, with assurances to the United States and Japan on coordination to ensure removal of its nuclear weapons programs. If Roh for a time claimed that the South had finally gained support for a NEA community in which the U.S. role would be but one of multiple powers,41 such wishful thinking collapsed with the failure of the brief fifth round of talks as well as growing tensions with Bush. A sharp difference appeared in the responses to the talks in November. Chung referred to the roadmap proposed by the North as an achievement, arguing that it reaffirms the decision to abandon nuclear weapons, not criticizing the fact that the North would, as it gradually showed its hand, expect rewards in five stages—suspension of tests, ban on relocation, ban on production, verifiable stoppage and dismantlement, and return to the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty and the IAEA regime. Reporting on Chung’s reaction stressed the continued hostility of the United States toward the North as justification for the latter to hold onto its nuclear card and called for “respecting each other’s sovereignty and peacefully living together,” implying that an early lifting of U.S. sanctions would set the right tone.42 In contrast, U.S. officials saw North Korea, using financial sanctions as an excuse, dragging out the talks and dividing the other parties without really showing any seriousness about scrapping its nuclear weapons. As Bush sought to convince others to apply pressure, the differences among the Other Four were not narrowing. Koizumi’s visit to the Yasukuni Shrine in October left no doubt that he had no intention of changing course toward Asia during his remaining year in office. Hu

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Jintao brought to Pyongyang in October an economic agenda to boost bilateral ties, and he went to South Korea for the APEC meetings in November in sympathy with Roh. After his plea to lift the financial sanctions fell on deaf ears, Roh refocused bilateral ties with the United States on future-oriented goals including an FTA (free trade agreement) and a strategic dialogue that diverted attention from an alliance in trouble, but he also turned to more intense engagement with the North. The announcement that Kim Dae-jung would visit Pyongyang in 2006 brought new attention to reunification’s first stage, starting with a peace regime and seeking a way to bridge Pyongyang’s support for a loose federation with Seoul’s notion of confederation in the Joint Declaration of June 15, 2000.43 Roh dropped the long-required reciprocal visit of Kim Jong-il to Seoul, offering to meet elsewhere, such as at the border. He took heart from accelerated ministerial-level talks, a big jump in inter-Korean trade, and the public’s rising support for reconciliation. Only a quarter of respondents still saw the North as an enemy.44 At the time of the APEC gathering coverage of the Roh and Hu Jintao summit emphasized their mutual praise, Roh expressing gratitude for China’s role in the Six Party-Talks, as Hu commended Roh’s “peace and prosperity policy,” and each lauded the September 19 agreement as laying the foundation for denuclearizing the peninsula. South Korea gave China the status of a market economy, removing a lever that the United States, Japan, and others wield against China to press for more reform, but only the South is running a $35 billion surplus in bilateral trade.45 At the Roh-Bush summit, however, there was little indication of agreement on how to proceed with the North. South Korean optimism and plans for economic integration clashed with U.S. pessimism and appeals for putting more pressure on the North. Rhee Bong-jo, vice minister of unification, spoke of an economic community preparing the way for a peace mechanism, highlighting the emerging era of the “northern economy” as three networks linked the entire peninsula through distribution of goods, energy, and communications.46 Reports that the North was seriously engaged in economic reforms—creating markets, offering investment guarantees, encouraging joint ventures, and increasing economic growth—suggested that momentum was building for joining the world community, even as many in the United States saw more assistance by the South for the North’s economy without conditionality as abetting its WMD development. After moving from Moscow to Seoul, Ambassador Alexander Vershbow pressed the South to join in strong measures consistent with the financial sanctions imposed by the United States even as his hosts

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complained that name calling and U.S. sanctions had interfered with the momentum from the Joint Statement.47 The divide between Bush and Roh came increasingly into the open when Seoul urged that six pending issues—the North’s missiles, biochemical weapons, conventional military power, human rights, drug running, and forged currency—be left for bilateral U.S.-North Korean talks.48 The South Korean National Assembly passed a bill to ease economic assistance to the North, and Kim Dae-jung proposed a three-stage reunification process while insisting that the United States must accept give-and-take negotiations and let the Six-Party Talks become a permanent body.49 In turn, Vershbow’s stress on conditions the North had to meet in order to end its selfimposed isolation from the international community and use of the term “criminal regime” were seen as provocative, reminiscent of Rice’s “outpost of tyranny” label. This was coupled with the news that at his November summit with Koizumi, Bush again referred to Kim Jong-il as a tyrant.50 The United States was putting pressure on Roh, scheduling a human rights conference in Seoul in a highly visible manner and implying that Roh was at odds with the international community’s values due to his refusal to criticize the North’s record. This split aroused attention when U.S. envoy for North Korean human rights Jay Lefkowitz, in Seoul, was denied high-level meetings, even with Unification Minister Chung.51 If Park Geun-hye, chair of the opposition GNP (Grand National Party), appealed to Roh to honor universal values and become involved in human rights discussions, others defended engaging the North without provoking it and cast suspicion on U.S. motives.52 In late 2005 South Korea boldly called for a six-sided session on Jeju Island to resolve the dispute over U.S. sanctions that the North cited as reason to block resumption of the Six-Party Talks.53 The United States refused to withdraw the sanctions. Attempts to entice the North back to the talks with rewards at Roh’s disposal also had no impact. The gap between Bush and Roh was too wide to allow him an active role. Criticism of the U.S. approach claimed that it strengthened hard-liners in Pyongyang, intensifying their reliance on the nuclear card and on provocative missile launches. Instead of increasing the prospects for regime change, it hardened the North’s resolve. Seoul’s independent diplomacy continued in the first half of 2006, giving the appearance of appealing to Kim Jong-il to bypass Bush. New Unification Minister Lee Jong-seok on March 28 warned that various nations (the United States and Japan), were tacking “their mid- and long-term strategies for the Korean Peninsula onto the preexisting North Korean nuclear issue,” making them less attentive to

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dealing with the central issue.54 Introducing human rights abuses, counterfeiting, and other matters linked to radical regime transformation, these countries were loath to pursue a deal focused on the nuclear problem. In May, Lee added that even if the North did not resolve the nuclear crisis, inter-Korean normalization with its attendant economic benefits would be possible.55 Unable to influence the nuclear showdown through the United States, Seoul was trying to do so through Pyongyang. This direct route had failed in the early 1990s and again when Kim Dae-jung sought to keep Kim Jong-il interested in the Sunshine Policy despite Bush’s hesitation in 2001–2. It was tinged with idealism. At a May 2006 meeting of university presidents within the “Northeast Asian community” in both Seoul and Gaeseong South Koreans described Roh’s leadership as a repudiation of balance of power thinking in order to bring countries together. This outlook sees as the real culprit the cold war–type thinking such as the notion of danger from North Korea as well as China and appeals to everyone to think positively in order to overcome it.56 Talking of a “separate route” to the North, Roh dropped any conditionality for holding a summit with Kim Jong-il, offered “unconditional support” for the North’s economy, and broke sharply with the United States in what some called a “declaration of urgency and independence.”57 While one interpretation saw a replay of the spring 2005 tactics for giving the North a chance to justify its return to the SixParty Talks, albeit this time with no coordination with the United States, others considered it an end run in pursuit of reunification steps unconnected to nuclear abandonment. Losing patience with United States resort to human rights and financial pressure to make the North yield, Roh was prepared to help it break through the containment in a manner seen in the United States as coddling.58 In late June Lee Su-hoon, chairman of the Presidential Committee on the NEA Cooperative Initiative, went further, predicting that the U.S. policy on North Korea was likely to fail, accusing it of being inconsistent, a low priority, and pointless. 59 The only “realistic option” was for the United States to hold bilateral talks with the North when the Six-Party Talks reconvened. The plan for Kim Dae-jung to make a high profile visit to Pyongyang in June, inaugurating use of the reconnected train route and promising a reprise of the triumph of June 15, 2000, aroused debate. Was he making a private nostalgic trip or serving as an emissary of Roh, putting bilateral ties ahead of the Six-Party Talks and aiming for a second summit, if need be in Pyongyang? How far would he proceed in discussing unification?60 Indeed, was this a last-ditch effort by Roh and Kim Dae-jung as they

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watched public opinion in South Korea turn against their soft policies toward the North for lack of reciprocity and its failure to return to the Six-Party Talks? Conservatives argued that in the absence of a return visit by Kim Jong-il or other tangible gains the new trip was only to deceive public opinion,61 and ridiculed Roh’s dream of taking the lead in the nuclear dispute by drawing close to the North and winning its trust.62 The effort failed, first when the North refused to open the railroad, stripping the trip of its most potent symbol, and then when it launched multiple missiles, in defiance of appeals and warnings. The Fourth Stage of the Crisis Roh’s insistence on going forward without conditionality was tested in July and again in October, as he grudgingly suspended humanitarian assistance in the face of pressure from the United States to do more in the spirit of new Security Council resolutions. Despite halting supplemental assistance in grain and fertilizer, Roh’s remarks that seemed to shift the blame to the United States and reject pressure as a means toward solving the crisis left his country isolated when the Security Council voted unanimously for sanctions.63 Following the missile tests in July, he had made it clear that he would not curtail his engagement efforts, including the three big projects of Gumgang mountain tourism, the Gaeseong industrial park, and the railroad link that the North had put on hold.64 This did not change even after the nuclear test, as Roh warned of the danger of military tensions rising on the peninsula and insisted that the path to dialogue must be kept open.65 Many in Japan and the United States called on the South to apply economic pressure. Japanese, however, were dismayed as Roh, who was meeting with Abe and trying to repair ruptured ties at the time the test occurred, rejected the idea of a joint statement due to the history issue.66 Politicians in Seoul sparred over assessing blame for the North’s test. Former president Kim Young-sam accused Kim Dae-jung’s Sunshine Policy of providing the money to the North to make nuclear weapons. The latter retorted that U.S. hard-line policies were to blame, including sanctions that blocked improvement in bilateral ties and drove the North to develop nuclear weapons for its survival. Conservatives vehemently denounced such reasoning,67 citing Bush’s offer on November 18 of incentives in support of moving beyond the existing armistice to a peace regime and improved relations from economics to culture and education.68 Contrasting his “reasonableness” with the North’s

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belligerence, they were inclined to abandon hope of dealing with Kim Jong-il and call for tightening the alliance with the United States, including support for the PSI, missile defense, or even a Pacific NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization). An exposed state has to abandon its dreams to ensure its security.69 Yet, soon U.S. overtures to the North would undercut their arguments and breath new life into Roh’s engagement policies. Disagreeing with the stress some in Seoul put on U.S. financial sanctions, former foreign minister Han Sung-joo argued that the main reasons for the North’s nuclear test were for Kim Jong-il to maintain his domestic political base, to gain equal treatment with great powers as India and Pakistan had done, and to change the political balance on the Korean peninsula with the North in a superior position. Even so, in order to remove UN sanctions, gain economic assistance from China and South Korea, and improve relations with China, it may have to reconsider. Han called for a patient combination of carrots and sticks with South Korea working closely with others involved in the Six-Party Talks.70 In 2007 accelerated diplomacy gave it another chance to offer to pursue this agenda, although many doubted that Roh would use restraint or that Bush would keep his focus instead of just concentrating on the Middle East and leaving this problem for his successor. The February 13 agreement launched what was expected to be a lengthy process in which Seoul would take its cue from Beijing and Washington on how best to keep the momentum going. Many on the left worried that Roh had actually been sidelined, as U.S. officials feared the harm he could cause by prematurely rewarding Pyongyang. In turn, many on the right fretted that Bush had capitulated in a manner that would allow North Korea to retain its nuclear weapons and would reinvigorate Roh and the left to the degree that another progressive might be elected president in December. Roh, indeed, sought to make clear that he was still active and would not let delays in crisis resolution slow his pursuit of Kim Jong-il for a summit meeting and other bilateral breakthroughs. The first test was the resumption of humanitarian assistance in the form of fertilizer and then rice. Then came developmental aid and expansion of investment projects, as discussed prior to the summer of 2006. Far-reaching energy and infrastructure programs could follow, but would they be a joint decision of the Six-Party Talks conditional on elimination of all nuclear weapons programs or a hasty bilateral venture? Roh might be focused on his own legacy and an arrangement with Kim Jong-il to influence South Korean politics at the

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expense of strategic reasoning shared with conservatives and other states in the talks. Conclusion South Koreans often fault the United States for the way it approaches the North Korean issue, concentrating on the nuclear threat and human rights, but not preparing for a series of compromises based on recognition that there is no military option and no prospect of economic sanctions working. One reason suggested for this unrealistic approach is lack of attention to what the true objectives of North Korea are. By demonizing Kim Jong-il and failing to acknowledge what he might accept, the United States has made it seem that a more pragmatic approach would be pointless. Some attribute this not just to ideology, but also to a drive for power that has contributed to widening distrust between China and Japan and refuses to accept the natural course of China’s rise and a less dependent South Korea. Only by facing the facts of emerging multilateralism can the United States find a way forward. Balancing the dual goals of coordination with an ally and building trust across a divided nation has proven difficult. In May 2003 Roh agreed to link inter-Korean ties to the North’s response on the nuclear issue as well as to a stronger alliance, satisfying Bush’s minimal requirements for their first summit even if he alienated the North. In the fall Roh sent troops to Iraq, placating the United States as a price to pay for support. In June 2004 in return for some softening in the U.S. line, Roh showed restraint, and again in June 2005 Roh was conciliatory in an effort to win U.S. backing for a diplomatic initiative to Kim Jong-il that resulted in the Joint Statement. Moreover, early in 2006 Roh first gave priority to an FTA with the United States, which led to accelerated negotiations conducive to bilateral ties, and then agreed at the first strategic dialogue session with the United States to language infuriating to many on the political left. With low popularity at home and little leverage on the Six-Party Talks, he took pains to reassure Bush and keep ties from succumbing to the sharp divergence in strategic thinking. Yet, he kept striving to boost ties with Kim Jong-il, and in the hope that a dual-track approach could work. In 2006 the alliance between the United States and South Korea was in more jeopardy than at any time since the U.S. Occupation. South Korean “historical amnesia” about the sacrifices the United States had made in fighting the Korean War and stationing a large military contingent for half a century in hardship conditions near the DMZ suggested that “romantic” ethnic reconciliation had turned the

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nation away from sober realism about the true friends who had assured its security and prosperity. Many Koreans perceived the United States as callously disregarding the continued support of a faithful ally, whose troops were active in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the war against terror, because of an obsession with an outdated image from the cold war. Americans fretted over an ally’s abandonment, as Koreans were anxious about an ally’s entrapment. South Koreans as well as Chinese stress the national identity of North Korea’s elite in discussing how the crisis should be handled. They speak of paranoia, driven by fear that no way forward exists without a security deal and normalization with the United States. If the nuclear card is counterproductive, it is the only card available. Lumping North Korea with Iran and Iraq, branding it part of an axis of evil, and waving the banner of “regime change,” exacerbated the existing sense of insecurity. Refusing to make a fundamental shift toward assuring the North of a safe external environment, the United States long blocked any breakthrough in the Six-Party Talks. If some conservatives see Clinton as having given too much support to the Sunshine Policy, more share the view on the left that Bush went too far by undercutting it and then overemphasizing pressure rather than dialogue in the Six-Party Talks. Whereas Roh supporters largely put the blame on the United States, his critics warn that the South’s position is not so strong and should not disrupt the alliance. If the talks break down and the rift with the United States bursts into the open, security will be further endangered. They blamed Bush and Koizumi, but growing doubts about the North’s harder-line, seen in its missile and nuclear tests, turned many against Roh’s soft policies. In the last period of his presidency Kim Dae-jung lacked leverage in the triangle with the United States and North Korea, but he was cautious. Early in his tenure Roh struggled impatiently to break free of his narrow options and alienated the United States but he at least kept within the bounds of the alliance triangle that included Japan. Then in March 2005 Roh undermined the triangle, lashing out at Japan and challenging the United States without achieving a strategic advantage. By late 2006 the gap had widened: Roh’s unpopularity at home, the new danger posed by the North, and a renewed search for five versus one after its nuclear test did not alter the reality of South Korea’s strategic impasse. Instead of becoming the balancer, it was no more than an outlier: a pariah in the alliance triangle, dependent on China in a newly unbalanced core East Asian triangle with Japan, and ridiculed for its one-sided beneficence to a dangerous North Korea.71 The United States and Japan

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had put the South in a difficult position Despite intense strategic debates among Roh’s advisors, his choices exacerbated the deepening dilemmas. If in 2007 a new atmosphere revived the South’s options, prudence would be needed to avoid rushing ahead with the North when what mattered most was coordination to make clear that rewards would only follow progress. As Roh looked ahead to reconciliation and coexistence with North Korea based on deepening trust, his conservative critics warned against his one-sided concessions. Their position was weakened, however, by the upbeat mood in the Bush administration in preparation for Phase 2 of carrying out the February 13 Joint Agreement. Not only was Roh pointing to the targets for the remainder of 2007, he was underlining too the dual goals that he sought to accelerate: establishment of a peace regime on the peninsula and a formal multilateral security framework for the NEA region. Charging that hostile sentiment against the North could slow progress, he urged a fast track that could include an inter-Korean summit and a four-way summit with the United States and China to advance beyond the armistice on the peninsula. Having withheld rice to the North until it fulfilled its obligations in Phase 1, Roh could now release the rice, provide the promised heavy fuel oil, and encourage many steps in pursuit of closer economic ties across the DMZ.

CHAPTER 4

The South Korean Response: The Regional Context

O

ver the past 615 years since the Mongols were expelled from the land, Korea has experienced 500 years of dependence on China, 40 years of dominance by Japan, 60 years of divided reliance on the United States in the South and mostly on the Soviet Union in the North, and just a few decades when it was even possible to search for autonomy through a balance of powers.1 The concept of sadae recalls how Koreans work with a hegemonic power to keep control of their own destiny or, if unavoidable, just to achieve partial autonomy. When deterring war with the North at last no longer seemed necessary, the goal of expanding national independence or even ending sadae rose to the fore but with disappointing results. Many see the United States trying to retain its dominance, China inclined to reassert its, Japan eyeing ways to reimpose its, and Russia not to be ignored.2 Hopes endure, however, of seizing a rare opportunity to work with all of these countries to find a balance conducive to reunification, more sovereign control, and regional influence. The nuclear crisis arose amidst a shift in South Korea’s four most significant outside relations and also its ties to the North. While the alliance with the United States endured, there was room for exploring other ties. Links to China were growing closer, driven by rapid economic integration as well as overlapping interests in North Korea, but Japan was also drawing nearer. Could this duality be maintained in the midst of deteriorating Sino-Japanese relations? Reinvigorated ties with Russia contrasted with that country’s fraying ties with the United States and Japan. Was this combination sustainable? The crisis tested the South’s role as a swing country in pursuit of a balance including all regional powers.

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Seoul had grown accustomed from 1992, after relations were normalized with Moscow and Beijing, to expect some power balance to complement the alliance with the United States. In 1998–2000 Kim Dae-jung skillfully expanded these connections and ties to Japan in support of his Sunshine Policy. Once the nuclear crisis was unfolding, leaders were eager not to lose this diplomatic diversity or succumb to either extreme: the revival of a North Korean threat that would force a return to the cold war relationship with the United States, or the chaotic collapse of North Korea eliciting a scramble for power of military forces within the country and outside powers. Accepting the need to start with the U.S. alliance and triangular coordination inclusive of Japan in preparing for multilateral talks, Seoul sought to keep an active role in shaping its own fate. A pattern began in 1998 of offering rewards to the North in return for meetings and minor concessions; vice-ministerial talks in Beijing were resumed after four years as the South offered fertilizer for discussing reuniting separated families. Although the North through much of 1999 scuttled the process with excessive demands, took provocative steps at sea, and even denounced the Sunshine Policy, Kim Dae-jung kept making one-sided concessions to win its trust. The Mt. Gumgang tourism program from November 1998 was the first child of the Sunshine Policy, bringing 10,000 tourists a month to the North as well as a steady stream of cash payments. If Japan was alarmed by the North’s missile test in August 1998, Kim continued to call for the United States to change its position to the North and lift economic sanctions as he met with Clinton in November and worked closely with the Perry Process until a deal was reached in 1999 that laid the foundation for a “comprehensive engagement policy.”3 As new TCOG talks brought Japan into the picture and China and Russia endorsed Kim’s efforts, South Korea had placed itself at the center of integrated engagement of the North. Its appetite was whetted for active coordination of outreach to Pyongyang even as Bush took office raising doubts. Through most of 2002 when a conservative was expected to be elected president, many argued that Kim Dae-jung’s replacement would pull back from the Sunshine Policy and solidify ties with the United States and with Japan in order to face the North from a position of strength. Instead of inflated hopes for striking a balance among four powers, he would rely on the United States with its reinvigorated, assertive posture in the region. If concern rose that Bush might dangerously explore a military option to the North anathema to the South, few conservatives treated this as likely. As the United States prepared to attack Iraq, they assumed that complete victory would lead to renewed

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pressure on the North and an outcome in the interest of the South. In this atmosphere, China would cooperate as a buffer against the U.S.Japan maritime build-up and Japan would value the South as its best partner in Asia. Wishful thinking confronted the reality of the nuclear crisis, as Roh capitalized on the crisis atmosphere to win election but then lacked leverage to influence it. Kim Dae-jung blamed the Bush administration for the deterioration in dialogue with North Korea from the time it took office and for continued unfortunate choices of words that revealed intent to rely on pressure. He linked this to efforts to block the East Asian Community (EAC), an idea he had helped to launch, and to Japanese rationalizations of past invasions that made meaningless the 1998 Joint Statement between Obuchi and him.4 Such a combined assault on reconciliation in the region could only be attributed to a grand strategic design, assumed many in Roh’s entourage as he took office proclaiming an era of peace and prosperity in NEA just as the nuclear crisis was threatening stability. Roh had strong reasons to seek a compromise that would end the tugof-war between the United States and North Korea that left little room for his country to maneuver and would simultaneously lead to a better relationship between the United States and China conducive to the regionalism he sought. All could work together integrating North Korea into the regional economy and security framework. While summits with Russia focused on its cooperation in economic projects involving the North, the real prize might be Japan whose normalization with the North would likely draw it closer to Roh’s vision for the South. If progressives were skeptical of Japan and most outraged by its shift to the right, they were not inclined to be critical of China or attentive to Russia’s drift toward nationalism. Foremost, of course, was their desire to become less dependent on the United States while also sustaining engagement with the North. In contrast, conservatives strongly supported U.S. ties, although they hesitated about Bush’s hard-line. They were rather divided on Japan, blaming Koizumi on the history issue while disagreeing about whether Roh’s response was excessive. They mainly supported ongoing policies toward China despite misgivings that Roh was too unconcerned about problems ahead. And on North Korea they found it hard to take a clear position, doubting Roh for offering unconditional assistance and ignoring human rights issues but also questioning U.S. reluctance to reassure the North’s leadership. This complex outlook on great power relations led to blame to various sides when the Six-Party Talks stalled mixed with hope when even a flicker of progress arose.

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With memories of 1900–1905 in the background when Koreans lacked the political or economic power to shape their own fate and misguidedly put their trust in others, Roh was intent on active leadership that would reduce dependency. Accusations against Roh and his advisors suggest that they were determined to escape U.S. dominance, which they saw as targeted at containing China, rearming Japan, demonizing North Korea, and dividing NEA. They reportedly sought to improve Chinese ties to gain leverage on the United States and even balance it, to expose Japan’s revisionist tendencies as a way of denying its realist military moves, to trust North Korea’s support for peaceful reunification if it only could receive the assurances and economic assistance that would give it security, and to focus on the shared goal of regionalism. None of these efforts reflected the limited means available to the South. Critics argued that the impact would instead be to embolden China, alienate Japan, harden the North’s resistance, and further divide NEA. South Koreans not only doubt that other states, especially Japan and the United States, support gradual reunification that does not mean the collapse of North Korea, but often are suspicious that the policies of these states toward the North are in part designed to shape bilateral relations with the South. Playing up the threat from the North is thought to give the United States and Japan an argument for keeping the South dependent and preventing its foreign policy from straying. China and Russia take a different approach for keeping the South reliant on their services; they cultivate ties with the North and stress the benefits of seeking a compromise. Thus, all sides treat Pyongyang as a tool in self-serving policies. The most important shift in Seoul’s handling of relations with other states was at the end of 2004 and start of 2005. A January 2005 report prepared for the Blue House set the tone for a new direction and, when read by officials in Japan and the United States, may have aroused anxiety. It called for separating economic cooperation with the North from the Six-Party Talks, arguing that it was not strategically suitable to entangle the South’s diplomatic ties to Japan, the United States, China, and Russia with the North’s nuclear question. Moreover, it distinguished national concern over the North’s sudden collapse or armed disorder with U.S. concern over the North’s intentional threat or proliferation of WMD, noting that the South’s dispatch of troops to Iraq had brought no real benefit. In contrast, it praised China, calling for autonomous appraisal of China’s stance on guidelines to limit the regional use of U.S. troops stationed in Korea. Finally, it argued against Japan’s new diplomatic and security policies, warning that the shift toward a “normal

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country” would cast a dark shadow on conditions in NEA.5 Relations with Japan turned downward from late February, and ties to the United States grew more troubled, especially from the fall. Pessimism in Seoul over the nuclear crisis did not subside over four years. The primary problem was that the Bush administration distrusted North Korea to a degree that serious compromise was blocked even when U.S. diplomats privately showed flexibility, and for ideological and other reasons there was a lack of multilateralism at critical junctures even as the United States insisted that this was its principle in managing the crisis. A secondary problem was that Koizumi with LDP support and acquiescence from the Japanese public repeatedly aligned solidly with the United States, abandoning earlier flexibility and showing scant regard for coordination or for finding a multilateral way forward. Somewhere on the list of problems too was the suspicious nature of North Korean leaders and their extreme rhetoric that played into the hands of hard-liners on the other side. A fourth factor was a lack of consensus in the South undermining the president’s authority, blamed by Roh supporters on the media distorting his image as pro-North and amateurish and by opponents as due to Roh’s clumsy management of ties with the United States and Japan. The summer of 2006 brought a sharp deterioration in inter-Korean relations. The North launched missiles in defiance of other states, including the South, and then resorted to more belligerent rhetoric to blame the others. Its unilateralism led Roh, while claiming to continue his engagement policies, to suspend economic assistance. The outcry among South Koreans against the North and Roh’s soft policies reached a new high. If the North continued to interrupt ties, such as supervised family reunions, Roh might find it difficult to disassociate his country from a renewed push for coordinated economic sanctions. Yet, there was little doubt that he would struggle to preserve his legacy of encouragement to Kim Jong-il to return to the Six-Party Talks and accept his brethren in the South as the most sympathetic and reliable supporters for a soft-landing that could be orchestrated in a multilateral context. Even as the crisis intensified, Roh’s search for balance continued. On the left, including Uri Party leaders in the National Assembly and Roh’s advisors, are some South Koreans who regard the United States as at least as responsible as North Korea—not fulfilling and then breaking the 1994 Agreed Framework, not showing normal diplomatic respect in order for negotiations to advance, and not taking seriously the views of other parties to the dispute as unilateralism prevailed. Backers of Roh credit him with keeping the crisis from worsening in the face of dangerous

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choices. They point to the September 2005 framework approved at the fourth round of talks as a victory against the threats of war, sanctions, containment, and collapse, each of which would have exposed NEA to danger.6 Given the standoff, Roh could not develop a long-term strategy but had to concentrate on crisis control, dealing now with the United States then with North Korea while coordinating with China and seeking to enlist Japan and Russia in supporting roles. To end the North’s nuclear gambit they want to give the assurance its concerns are addressed, offering real benefits. Conditionality can be set aside in the process of building trust even if it will be critical later; This worldview guided strategic choices during the crisis, even if they were inevitably limited by a lack of leverage over any of the other five parties. A word on some people’s minds but rarely spoken in Seoul is “equidistance.” So far, the leadership takes pains to go to the United States first and only later to China, but nobody doubts that the balance has been shifting. The United States is an ally and has military bases in the South. As much as anti-Americanism spread in 2002–3, the Korean security, academic, and business elite remains attached to the United States. In contrast, the positive mood to China is not very deep, and there is still much hesitancy about how close relations will be. Yet, after Roh’s ties with Bush and Koizumi frayed the idea of equidistance linked to balance could not be easily suppressed. Roh tried to weave an intricate web, maintaining the U.S. alliance, playing on brotherhood with the North, becoming a special partner with China based on greater trust than China has with any other developed country, and giving Russia hope that Seoul would approve its regional influence in conjunction with special ties to the North. Yet, Seoul’s targets were unattainable: alienation of the United States grew, North Korean suspicions endured, ties to Japan suffered the most, and beneath the surface of tranquility the role of China in dealing with the North became more contentious. This tumultuous environment left little room to explore possible strategic options. The Chinese Connection While China had great economic and geopolitical significance, it was also valued as a force for reshaping ties with North Korea. In 1992 normalization made this linkage, and from 1998 the Sunshine Policy boosted China’s role. With ties to the North, a priority for Kim Daejung and later Roh, China’s strategic value rose as the only power that can exert influence on the North. Care was taken not to upset China, rejecting in 1998 a U.S.-proposed study of theater missile defense and in

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2003 the PSI. It was taken for granted that more than Japan and the United States. China is favorably disposed toward reunification as well as to a soft landing. For example, in February 2005 when the North declared itself a nuclear power, the South approved China’s soft response, warning that pressure only backfires.7 South Korean ties with China are drawing closer. Not only did it become in 2005, along with the United States and Japan, a country with more than $100 billion in trade with China, the plan of Roh and Hu Jintao to reach a level of $200 billion in 2012 appeared to be reachable by 2010. If that were true, this trade could surpass the combined total of trade with the United States and Japan and rise from 20 percent to more than 30 percent of the South’s commerce. Despite nervousness about economic dependency, a large trade surplus was a strong lure for the South. The fact that from 2002 relations with Beijing had broadened to include high level security dialogue made it easier for leaders to shift emphasis in the Six-Party Talks from the triangle of Japan as well as the United States to that of China plus the United States. Roh had lost confidence in triangularity with Japan and distanced the South from tough U.S. stands toward the North, while prudently not drawing attention to the closer coordination with China. His early 2005 call for the South to become a NEA balancer was seen as a shift away from pro-U.S. thinking toward working with the United States and China together to build an all-around, peaceful order in NEA. Seeking to change the dynamic for resolving the crisis, Roh aimed to build on the negotiating process to proceed to a peace and security discussion for NEA,8 despite charges that he was acting naively toward the North and pretending that the South could move to the forefront of the Six-Party Talks, for which he lacked a national strategic consensus. Rejecting collapse or even pressure to deal with the North, Minister of Unification Chung Dong-young proposed phased reunification through three distinct steps: reconciliation, integration, and unification. This approach stressed positive political talks increasingly accompanied by eager economic ties while insisting that human rights along with political freedom can wait, essentially to the stage of unification. Backers, such as Hankyoreh, avoid coverage of human rights in the North even as they blame the United States for applying a double standard, for example, having supported Japanese colonialism.9 In comparison China is seen as prudent in offering carrots not sticks to the North. Its support for reconciliation draws the South closer, contrasting with the stands of the United States and Japan. Of course, conservatives disagree, clinging to the United States rather than China.

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South Korea and China were hesitant to consummate their convergent relationship in dealing with North Korea in the context of the Six-Party Talks. To avoid alienation of the United States it was wise to downplay appearances of working together. To minimize China’s alienation of North Korea, Seoul also accepted a low profile. In addition, China’s great power worldview and its place in the spotlight of the Six-Party Talks leave little room for a second player to share top billing. Yet, South Korean illusions about China that had accompanied anti-Americanism in 2002–3 were fading,10 along with the view that political, military, and economic ties between China and the North were so meager that Beijing’s interests would tilt sharply to Seoul. South Korean public opinion, despite its lack of concern about a China threat, was unprepared for a special bond with China, and Roh’s motive was preoccupation with North Korea rather than affection for China. If China’s approach to the Six-Party Talks best reflected Roh’s thinking, there was nervousness over China’s economic ties to the North expanding faster than South Korean ties. Keeping up with China, including reestablishing bilateral consultations with the North in June 2005 after nearly a year’s interruption, became a priority. Controversy over the historic identity of the Goguryeo state had repercussions for trusting China’s role in reunification. Considered one of three founding states of the Korean nation, Goguryeo occupied a space that overlaps today’s China and North Korea. To assert anew in 2003–4 the claim that this was actually a part of historic China was tantamount to raising doubt about the future boundary between a newly unified Korea and China. Against the background of China’s rapid rise and expanded economic role in North Korea as well as growing technical challenge to some of the South’s leading exports, this claim led to warnings against sinocentrism and hegemony as well as talk of China not playing a positive role in Korean reunification.11 When the dispute erupted Roh was eager to bring it under control. His advisors on China relied on quiet diplomacy, working out an arrangement whereby the South would downplay the issue as China orally agreed not to bring it up at the central level and to keep its Northeast provinces from raising it further. Roh’s advisors took credit for knowing how to deal with China. In contrast to ill will in Japanese ties left to simmer, confidence in finding common ground with China persisted. Yet, the Chinese side in 2006 renewed its claims, leading to a new burst of apprehension. The geographical integration of North Korea became a contentious issue, as both Beijing and Seoul look beyond the nuclear crisis. China’s assiduous commercial advance along the coast to Shinuiju and beyond to Pyongyang, and as far north as Rajin in search of an outlet to the sea

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drew concern in South Korea. Some warned that, along with claims that Goguryeo was part of China, it is planning to make North Korea the fourth province of Northeast China. In the background was Jilin province’s hunger for an outlet at Tumen where North Korea and Russia meet or, alternatively, a longer corridor across North Korea, to Rajin. China had a long, more porous border that was giving it the advantage even as South Korea developed ties across the thirty-eighth parallel and cast around for more enticements to keep pace. For instance, the east coast province of Gangwon, which had been bypassed by the frenzied growth of commerce across the Yellow Sea to North China, appealed for priority in emerging ties. Its port of Sokcho, already the ferry stop to Zarubino in Russia could serve three-way ties. Efforts to prod reform and build trust in the North mixed with positioning for reunification where China may be gaining an edge. The South Korean debate on China’s role started slowly and remains far less extensive than the debate on U.S. ties with North Korea. China’s quiet expansion of influence was easily overlooked, but attention rose along with suspicion that a strategy existed to integrate economically with the North and to solidify political relations not only to reassure it in negotiations with the United States but also to give China more influence over the reintegration process. In 1999 the Perry Process drew China further into working with the North, as the United States was doing. The Sunshine Policy made China the vital conduit between the Koreas but also alerted it to the need to keep pace with South Korea in engagement. In 2003 the United States pressed China to become more involved. China strove to win the North’s trust. In turn, South Korea eventually awakened to the benefits to China from its pursuit of the North. China’s role is less threatening to North Korea’s legitimacy, less subject to U.S. pressure, and better able to use cross-border channels through separate provincial strategies. Historical precedent and renewed evidence of a sinocentric worldview recall dependency and raise the possibility of using a pretext to install a friendly regime, possibly citing continuity in its communist-led political system. In 2007 Sino-U.S. cooperation in dealing with the North eclipsed South Korean-U.S. coordination. North Korean anger at China for its harsh reactions to the July and October tests and Chinese anger at the North’s behavior and the rude reception of its diplomats accompanied U.S. moves to work closely with China. On both the right and the left, South Koreans worried that their role in the crisis had been weakened. If an incomplete deal means that North Korea remains a nuclear state, then acquiescence by both the United States and China could leave the South

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with less leverage. Sustained multilateralism might also lower the South’s voice on peninsular matters. Having acquiesced to Japan’s dominant role in Korea a century ago, the United States may again make a deal at the expense of Koreans. Without a strategic approach to great power relations, the South could be vulnerable. The Japanese Connection The cold war ended with Japan in pursuit of North Korea without coordination with the South.12 Even after Kim Dae-jung in October 1998 reached a breakthrough with Japan, his Sunshine Policy was not reassuring to its leaders, who scrambled not to be left behind in dealing with the North. Seoul’s national interest became normalization of ties, reducing the risk of war or instability while serving economic interests through cheap labor as well as forging a multilateral security framework in NEA that could stabilize the region with a balance of power. Japan, in turn, focuses on the danger of China’s potential for hegemony in the region and concern over an outcome on the Korean peninsula that would either strengthen China’s hand or lead to reunification with the potential for strong nationalism. It sees the Korean peninsula as a challenge to ascendant revisionist historical claims. Potential was rising for discord that could complicate alliance ties. Bush came to power with unrealistic views of how this triangle would evolve; his sharp tilt to Japan made its management more difficult. The nuclear crisis produced more strain, as the United States found no answer to deteriorating ties between its two allies in NEA. The Roh leadership kept alive the leftist rhetoric against imperialism without at times specifying whether this was just aimed at Japan’s historic behavior or it carried on a leftist worldview that U.S. and Japanese imperialism made a deal in 1905 that sacrificed Korea to Japan in return for the Philippines, that the division of Korea in 1945 followed by the restoration in 1948 of Japanese collaborators to power was less a necessity to save Korea from communism than part of a hegemonic strategy, and that the deal that approved Park Chung-hee’s dictatorship in the 1960s was a kind of reprise of imperialism to mobilize Korean troops for the war in Vietnam that prevented a divided country from uniting on the basis of nationalism. Guided by such reasoning among his supporters and also the view that at another critical turning point in 1980–81 the United States along with Japan backed the dictator Chun Doo-hwan and set back democracy, Roh may see Japan as inseparable from the United States in, arguably, holding back Korean history.

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Roh had hoped that Japan would join South Korea in encouraging the United States to engage the North or at least to be in the middle exerting a moderating influence. Koizumi’s visit to Pyongyang in September 2002, and his repeat visit in May 2004 at the same time as he seemed to have an impact on the United States softening its line in the June 2004 Six-Party Talks, suggested that this hope was not futile. In July 2004 the mood was sufficiently positive that Roh and Koizumi agreed to turn their informal meeting on Jeju island into the first twice-a-year shuttle event. Yet, Roh soured on Koizumi as a partner. While the history issue and the Dokdo/Takeshima island dispute were the ostensible causes in February 2005, Koizumi’s full support for Bush’s more hard-line approach to North Korea and the uproar in Japan at the end of 2004 over the latest shock over the abduction issue (DNA testing of the remains delivered by the North) were deeper causes. Koizumi’s mix of revisionism and realism gave the impression that he was using the nuclear crisis as a means to block the natural course of evolution in NEA. After Bush won reelection, Roh met with Koizumi in Kagoshima and sent Chung Dong-young to Beijing to seek help in setting a positive course for reviving the Six-Party Talks. Roh stressed joint efforts to encourage the United States to soften its stance and to seek China’s energetic role in luring the North back to the talks, but that was not Koizumi’s inclination. Roh’s frustration would grow over the winter as the United States used tough rhetoric and North Korea answered with brazen language about becoming a nuclear state. Japan’s hard-line at this critical juncture may not have been cited by Roh in March when he lashed out at its behavior, but it was likely a determining factor in deteriorating relations. There was no mistaking the existence of a broken alliance triangle. In June 2005 the last of the shuttle summits was consumed with the history issue. And in November the fact that Roh even agreed to meet Koizumi (as host of the APEC summit it was hard to avoid, and a month later at the ASEAN ⫹3 summit he refused along with China’s prime minister) did not disguise that his aim was to give a tongue-lashing and register a sense of individual betrayal. Japan’s provocative disregard toward core themes in South Korea’s national identity aroused commentary that this threatened cooperation in the Six-Party Talks.13 Some South Koreans link U.S. ties to Japan with its handling of North Korea, perceiving in both an intention to keep the South from emerging from the shadow of U.S. power. Given the high priority for Japan in Bush’s thinking, they saw an attempt at triangulation premised on the crisis. Koizumi’s callous disregard of relations with Seoul

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reverberated in Seoul-Washington ties. Even if U.S. officials distanced themselves from the Yasukuni visits and offered no support to Japan’s claims to Dokdo/Takeshima, the Japan factor was dragging down U.S. ties to the South and the trust needed to cooperate. While Americans took for granted Japanese sincerity in pressing the human rights issue with North Korea, South Koreans were cynical. After all, Japan had failed to address concerns in the South over its human rights record, ranging from war victims to sex slaves, even as it followed the U.S. example in appointing a human rights envoy to North Korea.14 They saw a double standard at work, and they sympathized with North Korean reasoning that Japan lost all sense of proportion in minimizing its massive historical atrocities while dwelling on a small number of abductees. As Japan broadened its critique of human rights in the North, the gap widened with South Korean reasoning. In July 2005 as negotiations took a promising turn, the Roh administration was upset that Japan again inserted the abductee issue into the Six-Party Talks, even if Japan later showed more caution by reopening bilateral talks with the North. It was thought that the issue could be finessed with some symbolic satisfaction to Japan. As soon as the Joint Statement was issued, Roh raised the prospect of a peace regime that would focus on four rather than six countries. After all, Japan and Russia were seen as somewhat superfluous as well as not part of the armistice process that had ended the war. Talks over a peace regime could offer a face-saving way to reduce and transform the North Korean military, opening the way to confidence-building measures, but they only widened the gap between Seoul and Tokyo in dealing with Pyongyang. South Koreans were troubled by Japan’s handling of the nuclear crisis, stressing the abduction issue at the expense of regional dynamics, following the U.S. lead when quiet persuasion might have led to more U.S. flexibility, and failing to show much interest in coordination with the South and China as they searched for middle ground.15 This frustration intensified when Roh after a year of difficult relations with the North following his decision to block civic groups from attending the tenth commemoration of Kim Il-sung’s death and then his approval for 467 refugees who had reached Vietnam to be airlifted to the South, strove to strengthen ties by advocating a “mini–Marshall Plan” that went far beyond the meager incentives the United States favored.16 The gap with Japan widened. Seoul saw Koizumi’s fall 2005 cabinet as hostile to reconciliation in the region and even capable of spoiling the atmosphere in the Six-Party Talks, and Tokyo found Roh’s blueprint for “comprehensive cooperation” with billions in aid to the North proposed over several years a blow to efforts to induce the North to change direction.

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Many in Seoul fault Japan’s leaders who have discovered a convenient excuse to exploit fear and emotions for the purpose of boosting military power, amending the Constitution, and maintaining power. This portends a divided region ahead and their own country left in limbo. Noting that regime change in Iraq brought deepening instability and even civil war, they see no sign of greater forethought in the United States about what is meant by the pursuit of regime change in North Korea. In contrast, they foresee an opportunity to reach the North Korean people, using economic ties to change the thinking of people whose primitive lives stand in stark contrast to the prosperity of fellow Koreans. Roh initially appeared to agree that progress with North Korea would have to wait until the nuclear issue was settled, but after the June 2004 third round talks his tune changed. Limited progress at the talks was interpreted optimistically and the South took credit for pushing both the United States and North Korea toward making concessions.17 With Roh in firm control of his country after the Uri Party won a stunning electoral victory for the National Assembly and his power restored when the impeachment effort was ended by the judiciary, Roh grew more assertive in dealing with North Korea. With domestic opposition to engagement with the North quieted, there was talk of Roh seeking a summit with Kim Jong-il without waiting for the nuclear issue to be settled. 18 Yet, he misjudged that Kim would be swayed by his efforts (leading to a year of curtailed contacts) that Koizumi’s cooperation in pressing the United States would continue (resulting in a sharp rift with Japan), and that the U.S. adjustment was a sign of sustained flexibility (causing a downturn in relations with the Bush administration). South Koreans were keen on sustaining the momentum of the September 19 Joint Statement. Since North Korea showed a strong desire for having a light-water reactor, it followed that this could become a card in subsequent talks in return for abandonment of nuclear weapons. One idea was that the United States and Japan should proceed promptly with talks on normalization, proving that they would supply the energy and that the United States would offer the desired security guarantee.19 More reassurance was seen as key to moving forward, but Japan as well as the United States took a different approach. In May 2005 Chung spoke in Tokyo on his vision for addressing the North Korean nuclear crisis. He took a broad perspective on the future of Asia, seeking preparations for a three-way summit of Japan, China, and South Korea in which South Korea would make important suggestions for going forward. Arguing that all should throw their full energy into early resolution through the Six-Party Talks of the nuclear issue,

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Chung reaffirmed the notion of the South as a balancer,20 despite deteriorating relations with Japan and Sino-Japanese tensions after a last-ditch mission from China ended with Vice Premier Wu Yi returning home precipitously in the wake of Koizumi’s insensitive remarks on visits to the Yasukuni shrine. In April 2005 when officials of the two Koreas met in Jakarta Roh was hopeful that he had a strategy for renewing the Six-Party Talks, using the fifth anniversary of the inter-Korean summit to ply the North with gifts, especially much desired fertilizer.21 Kim Jong-il agreed to a celebratory visit in June by Chung Dong-young, who then offered to provide electricity on a large scale to entice him to end the nuclear crisis and was greeted by a new attitude that made possible a surge in diplomatic contacts and a new round of talks in September. Roh tried again in May 2006 with an offer to finalize an aid plan for supplying materials to light industries in the North and jointly develop natural resources in return for opening the Seoul-Pyongyang railroad for testing.22 Bribing the North to cooperate had become a habit, but it was not appreciated in Tokyo or Washington. Over two months in mid-2005 meetings with Cheney of Abe Shinzo and Chung Dong-young, each aspiring to succeed the leader of his country, reveal the unmistakable U.S. role in reshaping politics in this region. Abe had ridden the abduction issue to stand as Japan’s foremost hard-liner and ardent backer of economic sanctions against the North. By meeting Cheney he brandished his credentials as able to work closely with Japan’s main partner and keep the country on course against pressure in Asia to soften its line. Chung champions unconditional engagement with the North, and he met Cheney after Bush and Roh had agreed on a South Korean initiative to bring the North back to the Six-Party Talks and he had just met with Kim Jong-il in Pyongyang. With Cheney willing to associate himself with Chung at this time, North Korea had reason to take the initiative seriously. Yet, Cheney’s anointment of Abe soon contrasted with Chung’s outcaste status. Abe and Chung would have had little to discuss with each other. Koizumi and Roh failed to reconcile their differences at the final shuttle summit of June 21, 2005 on the heels of Chung’s triumphant return from Pyongyang with an agreement to go forward, a sign of loss of coordination just when the urgency was rising.23 As prime minister, Abe was visiting Seoul just when North Korea conducted a nuclear test. Resumption of high level talks, however, did not mean more agreement on how to proceed. While Japanese energies went into preparations for tighter sanctions, the South stressed compromise at the December 2006 Six-Party Talks. Abe kept stressing the abductions

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issue and was working on severe economic sanctions over the nuclear test, while Roh stuck to his appeal for a better offer to the North and refused to impose the restrictions sought by the United States and Japan. The gap between Roh and Abe on nationalist issues only added to their clashing strategic visions. Stark differences over regional strategy compounded a fundamental divide over history. As Sino-Japanese relations were at least stabilized with a visit of Premier Wen Jiabao to Tokyo in April 2007, South Korean-Japanese ties remained troubled. After the February 13 agreement Roh showed his impatience to accelerate rewards to the North while Abe proved resistant to any cooperation until the abductions issue was resolved. The two leaders showed little inclination to narrow this gap or to improve relations. The Russian Connection Among the Other Four, China’s importance rose for the South as reliable support for engagement of the North, while Japan’s declined as increasingly a stumbling block in this effort. An early mission by Vice Foreign Minister Kim Han-kyung to Moscow began the process of consultations with the other relevant actor. Seoul encouraged Moscow to play an active role, hoping not only that the recent meetings between Putin and Kim Jong-il would give it leverage but also welcoming efforts that could attenuate U.S. stubbornness. If when the nuclear crisis erupted Putin’s exploration of a shortcut to Pyongyang alienated some in the United States, 24 this did not prevent visions of a romantic partnership on the part of South Korean leftist strategists toward a country that appears to share long-term objectives. After the Losyukov mission failed, it was clear that Russia would not play a major role, but with Russia accepted into the SixParty Talks a half year later and the South struggling to influence the two recalcitrant adversaries there was still reason to cooperate. In his first year as president Roh focused on reassuring the United States as well as establishing a good relationship with Japan. In July 2003 he was scheduled to visit Russia, but this trip was cancelled to Russia’s annoyance. Having cultivated ties with Kim Jong-il and viewed his own 2001 visit with Kim Dae-jung as a milestone in Moscow’s growing role as a force on the peninsula, Putin was not pleased to be marginalized by a new leader making the rounds to prove the South’s centrality in regional diplomacy. Many in South Korea consider Russia to be the outlier in NEA, a state that cannot be ignored but also does not warrant the kind of major voice that the United States, China, and even Japan expect. When in the summer of 2003 North Korea asked that Russia be

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included in the Six-Party Talks and China gave its assent, South Korea may not have seen benefit in Russia’s participation but calculated that any opposition would dampen North Korea’s interest. Yet, some saw Russia as the second positive influence after China in reassuring the North that it could get a fair hearing in these talks. At times officials have sought Russia’s help in bringing the North back to the talks or allaying its fears. It is assumed that Putin is serious about wanting North Korea to return to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, to abandon its missile development supposedly aimed at forestalling a U.S. attack, and also to refocus the South after it declined to participate in U.S. missile defense plans and was becoming more distant from the United States. Thus, there is a realistic basis for cooperation even if it is sandwiched between widespread apathy on the right and latent romanticism on the left. As, Roh’s relationship to Bush became increasingly strained, the value of ties to Putin rose for some officials. Roh’s visit to Moscow in the fall of 2004 came amidst growing doubts that if Bush won reelection the SixParty Talks would make headway. This warm meeting in Putin’s dacha that highlighted shared thinking as U.S.-North Korean relations were at an impasse suggested that Russia’s place was rising in the South Korean strategic calculus. Yet, Putin no longer was seen as close to Kim or as having strong interest in the Six-Party Talks, and there was little to gain from broadcasting a special Russian connection. Three triangles loomed in the background. For the inter-Korean and Russian triangle there was optimistic talk of five Eurasian corridors: an oil pipeline, a gas pipeline, the TSK or Trans-Siberian-Korean railroad, an electricity grid, and an optic fiber line. This triangle depended on the Six-Party Talks and on subsequent plans for economic development linked to reunification. Basic agreement between the two leaders on how to handle North Korea made it easier to stress shared goals. In dealing with the nuclear crisis and security, Roh and Putin had the triangle with China in mind. Putin is largely going through China in the Six-Party Talks, and Roh’s position is close to Beijing’s too. In Roh’s emphasis on moving toward a multilateral regional security structure, he finds support from Russia and China. In the background is awareness of the U.S.-South Korean-Russian triangle. Even as Roh’s fear mounted that the United States was pushing Japan toward a divisive approach to the region with long-term consequences, he understood that it was advisable not to appear very close to Putin amidst increasingly strained U.S.-Russian ties and warnings that Putin might again, as he had in 2001 with Kim Dae-jung on the ABM treaty, be trying to lure the South into a statement that could alienate it from its ally.

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The brief meeting between Roh and Putin on May 9, 2005 at the sixtieth anniversary of the victory in World War II may have had some significance in shoring up the three-way coalition to soften the U.S. position in the Six-Party Talks. Hu Jintao and Putin had met a day earlier, and despite the great many foreign leaders who were not awarded an audience with the host at this busy time, Roh was so honored in light of the significance of the North Korean nuclear issue. They agreed that the negotiations must revive, and the burden was on the United States to not drive the North into a stalemate. With the shared goal of a peaceful resolution, the two had no need to discuss different notions about what might follow.25 An image of strategic consensus obscures great uncertainties about Russian policy toward the region that should be part of the calculus in the South. Russian officials made the case to the Roh administration that the two states really have very similar approaches to critical international issues. In September 2005 Ambassador Gleb A. Ivashentsov on the occasion of the fifteenth anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations listed support for creation of a multipolar world based on equality among all states, support for the key role of the UN, and rejection of dictating to others in interstate relations, before adding combating international terrorism and securing WMD from proliferation. He noted that Moscow plays a constructive role in the Six-Party Talks, supporting steps taken by both North and South Korea and building on the success of the September 19 agreement. Beyond that, he saw this achievement as laying the groundwork for the future structure of peace, security, and cooperation in Northeast Asia. Also he went further to suggest that a special economic bond be created through joint investment projects in energy, petrochemicals, the automobile industry, and creation of “Europe-Korea” through a Russian railroad corridor and an electrical energy supply system reaching North Korea from two sides. As Putin was preparing to visit South Korea in November, this was an appeal for reorienting the state from its maritime and U.S.-Japan orientation to a continental one, in which the 2005 level of $8 billion in trade could be greatly boosted.26 During the nuclear crisis Russia’s role, arguably, shifted from independent voice seeking its own solution, to constructive force serving a joint effort to convince the North, to a nonentity with few expectations, to signs of becoming a spoiler contributing to the North’s resistance. Seoul welcomed Moscow’s initiative briefly at the start in January 2003. Then it showed little interest as Moscow coordinated with Washington and Beijing through much of that year and even less so as it kept a low profile in late 2003 and much of 2004. Roh’s own discontent with the

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Bush policy deepened just as Moscow’s role was starting to show signs of becoming more supportive of the North. While there was no apparent coordination in criticism of the United States, a failure to look critically at what Moscow was doing came with some romanticism about an overlap of interests. Indeed, Seoul took pains to send officials to Russia to keep it informed about talks on the North and, more than any other state, to conceive of it in regional planning. If many South Koreans treat Russia as quite irrelevant, others attach some long-term importance to it as a country inclined to multilateralism in security and eager for partners for a regional balance of power. The growing appeal of multilateral security cooperation in NEA drew analysts to Russia’s long-standing advocacy of this. Unlike China and Japan, which are often suspected in South Korea of having hegemonic designs, Russia is seen as wary of any country gaining dominance. In the 1990s it experienced a time of weakness with little influence, sentiments sometimes shared by South Korea, and under Putin it is grasping for a way to gain a larger role. Rather than behaving as in the time of the Soviet Union as a superpower bent on dominating or even as the three other powers active in the region inclined to putting South Korea in a subordinate role, Russia shares the South’s priority of seeking partners for multilateral ties that can limit assertive powers. It follows that Russian interest in having a say on the North Korean nuclear question poses no problem, while Roh’s priority on “a policy of peace and prosperity” with good ties to all meshes well with Russian thinking; however there are limits to the relationship. Seoul has no reason to follow Beijing’s path in forging close strategic ties to Russia, in part because it lacks great influence in dealing with the North and the peninsula in general. This is a sympathetic view of Russia as pragmatic and worthy of a “comprehensive, friendly, partnership” without urgency to reach for more.27 Yet, warnings note that it is still early to say how Russia will behave.28 Roh sympathized with Putin’s pursuit of Kim Jong-il and his frustration with U.S. policy. The fact that Putin was determined to integrate North Korea into a regional grid for energy and transportation drew the attention of Roh’s advisors to looking ahead together and contributed to a positive view of Russian objectives.29 Deterioration of relations with Japan made it easier to give Russia the benefit of the doubt. Little thought was given to what kind of reunification Russia might prefer or how its backing might be utilized by the North. The fact that it is relying on the North’s belligerence as a mechanism for shaping the balance of power, especially seeking to gain a foothold in the triangle with the United States and China and as a force in troubled relations with Japan,

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has not registered. Not only does Russia border on the North and have historic ties to it with bold ideas for projects to integrate the region and use its energy card, but it is also a middle power in this region with overlapping interests to allow it to join with the South as region builders, straddling Japan’s alienation, U.S. distrust, and China’s potential for dominance. The Overall Regional Context South Korea together with China and Russia saw a way to resolve the nuclear crisis through showing patience, concentrating on consensus building, focusing on the regional big picture, and taking a long-term strategic outlook. Calls for multilateralism sustained reasoning that an alternative existed to the crisis. Yet, Roh was in no position to lead the way. He lacked trust from other leaders to sustain an active diplomacy. Neither Bush, who found him too gullible toward the North and China, nor Kim Jong-il, who still found him too close to the United States, showed much trust. Roh had little leverage on Hu Jin-tao and ties to Koizumi degenerated from 2005. While he was apt to seize the slightest sign of North Korean flexibility as proof of epochal developments in inter-Korean relations ahead,30 such positive spin failed to enhance his credibility before suspicious partners. The price for retaining U.S. support was not inconsiderable. As seen at the first Korea-U.S. Ministerial Level Security Dialogue in March 2006, the United States insisted on strategic flexibility for its forces stationed in the South. Given Seoul’s insistence that the military threat posed by North Korea was much reduced, denial of such flexibility would have called into question the very presence of U.S. forces. A second U.S. goal was for the South to provide more support for the war on terror as well as participation in the PSI program to prevent the proliferation of WMD. Failure to agree to the PSI was construed by some as proof of a tilt toward the North that would render the South untrustworthy in controlling its nuclear weapons development. A third objective was to back the spread of freedom, recommitting Seoul to support for values in its foreign policy. With consent or at least ambiguity on these matters, Roh kept the alliance alive and laid the foundation for security dialogue on other matters. Yet, some left-leaning supporters who had taken seriously exploration of creating a “self-reliant national defense” or “balanced” diplomacy ending dependency on the United States were disappointed. A dearth of realistic debate about the limits of autonomy in the context of alliance with the world’s greatest power

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contributed to their surprise. Having sent troops to Iraq in an implicit deal of yielding on global issues while insisting on U.S. concessions on peninsular affairs, Seoul was conceding on the latter as well, even if it inserted a clause that allowed some leeway. “In implementing the strategic flexibility, the United States will respect Seoul’s position that Korea will not be involved in regional conflicts of NEA without the consent of Korean people.”31 The limits of South Korean independence in dealing with North Korea and even China had become clearer. However strong the yearning for multilateralism, the realism of bilateralism is still a necessity. South Koreans are less confident than Chinese about their state’s capacity to take the lead after the nuclear crisis is resolved, but an influential group is insistent on this. They start with the assumption that as one nation with a shared history and a common geopolitical perspective on ending dependency and balancing China, the United States, and Japan they can work together with the North. Given the superior assets in the South, they also assume that they can handle the North without serious danger of its regime gaining control over the peninsula. A coherent and centralized North Korea serves the vital objective of preventing a chaotic collapse. It also gives its leaders reason to expect a good deal without retribution for its past excesses. Critics, however, doubt that the North’s leaders would be enticed even by the payoffs and concessions or that leaders in the South would demand sufficient conditionality to gain control over the reunification process. Driven by economic reasoning, South Koreans feared the price of reunification. In favor of it as an abstraction, they were amenable to a strategy that kept the costs modest while bringing some gains. Thinking in the mid-90s that reunification at any cost is the top priority while actually having little prospect for it had shifted to a preference for continuing two separate countries or “one nation, two systems” while moving toward reunification as other issues are realistically addressed and tax increases are kept under control.32 That leaves them skeptical about appeals such as Roh’s to rally behind the leader in a pannational movement, to work in unison toward unification. His proposal for a coalition cabinet was not accepted, nor was his call for a grand compromise for addressing major social problems, as an emerging pension crisis and labor disputes.33 Yet, the benefit of cheap manufacturing, employing North Korean labor staying in the North and helping to reduce dependency on outsourcing manufacturing to China, won support. As the Gaeseong industrial park within sight of the DMZ in 2005 began to truck products to Seoul, hopes were high. Avoiding large-scale migration

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from the North would be welcome too. Yet, some in the South doubted that Roh’s generous treatment of the North, ignoring safeguards and reciprocity as well as manipulating the nationalist desire for unity, would follow the desired cost-benefit analysis. Indeed, the North might press for an early federation to share in power and wealth and gain a veto over the South’s policies rather than being satisfied with the symbols of a single nation. Pyongyang was the prize in competition over which state would have the most impact in reorienting the North Korean economy and forming networks with the existing elite. South Korea was reaching north across the border, through Gumgang mountain, then Gaeseong industrial park, and finally a railroad line the leadership was eager to connect. Yet, China had the edge, allowed FDI (Foreign Direct Investment) into North Korea with much easier cross-border movement to a variety of places, especially Pyongyang. Its personal networks with North Korean leaders were more developed. Filling the vacuum in consumer goods, Chinese firms were advancing in the North. Although many local Northeast China traders sought a quick return taking advantage of low quality controls, there were efforts to involve solid businesses, such as Wenzhou merchants known throughout the country. Big South Korean firms, however, fearful of high-tech transfers that would invite retaliation in the lucrative U.S. market, kept their distance. U.S. hostility, Japan’s retreat from the North, and Russia’s weak inroads in the impoverished northern areas left the South only concerned about the competition with China. Yet, new 2006 visa requirements for Chinese visitors left less reason for fear of loss of leverage. The main problem remained for all together to make the case for region-wide engagement advantageous to the North. Economic ties with North Korea are prone to corruption. Market forces are weak, a small number of North Korean officials have decisionmaking authority, and in Russia, China, and even South Korea corrupt business practices have been common. In the late summer of 2005 a state audit agency was investigating embezzlement by the head of Hyundae Asan, who was accused by the Hyundae Group, as North Korea retaliated by forcing a sharp reduction in tourists to Mt. Gumgang.34 A legacy of buying connections cannot be broken in the current climate of ends are more important than means. This is a shared problem, but one a region rife with corruption would be unlikely to address. Roh’s goal for regionalism had three major components: economic integration with South Korea as a hub; peninsular reunification with the South generously drawing the North closer in a supportive regional

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environment; and a security framework favorable to cooperation. The South’s interest in regionalism went beyond Roh to conservatives and reflected realities that the United States would be unwise to deny, but Roh overreached and lost support at home and abroad. South Korean leaders are focused on reconciliation first and human rights later. Damaged relations with Japan left the triangle of SinoJapanese-South Korean ties out of shape, crippling the leg with Japan and leaving little leverage on China. Russia was free to pursue the North with little concern for thinking in the South. Indeed, close Sino-Russian relations served the interests of the North, not the South. These regional ties did not bode well for reunification largely on South Korean terms nor did the South stand any chance of regaining the centrality in a multilateral context it had in 2000. Roh had faced a difficult environment, but his initiatives did not provide answers to the problems the South faced. In 2007 Roh and Bush agreed on an FTA that put pressure on Japanese and Chinese leaders to seek an FTA with South Korea too. Yet, Roh was mainly focused on bilateral ties with Kim Jong-il that raised questions in the other states about how much he would withhold benefits until Kim reconsidered his nuclear programs. With a presidential election looming and the South Korean public skeptical of his openended pursuit of Kim, he was determined to show that it would pay dividends. This added to doubts in Japan as well as the United States about his restraint, and it no longer served ties with China. Roh was on his own without a strategy beyond dealing with North Korea as his final legacy in the hope that peninsular reconciliation would lead to his cherished regionalism. Waiting until the end of Phase 1 to supply humanitarian rice assistance after earlier providing fertilizer, Roh kept in step with the other states. As Phase 2 began, he set his sights on a more active role in resolving the crisis. With Abe insisting that progress on abductions come before a foreign ministers’ meeting, the troubled state of ties with Japan was not changing. Coordination with the United States and China remained the focus for Roh, as he sought to shape a favorable atmosphere for progressives in the December presidential elections.

CHAPTER 5

The Chinese Response: The Nuclear Crisis

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ext to Taiwan, North Korea is the most significant territory for national security and legitimacy not currently under the control of Beijing. Its location, historical ties, and communist regime make it vital for China’s national interests. Moreover, its centrality for the NEA region—the obsession of South Koreans, the immediate extension of Russia’s coastal corridor linking the main cities of the Russian Far East, and the albatross for Japan in its ambitions to normalize by leaving history behind and establishing secure footing on the Korean peninsula—means that the outcome for the North will shape the emergence of regionalism that matters most for China. Finally, as in the 1950s, North Korea has become a testing ground for the role of the United States in the region. Chinese and Japanese draw different lessons from the history of Korea. When Korea is divided or under Japanese control, Chinese calculate that their country cannot avoid trouble or even being drawn into war. In the seventh century, sixteenth century, nineteenth century, and again in the 1950s China fought over Korea in such situations. In contrast, Japanese consider that a Korea under Chinese influence leaves their country isolated in Asia. In the 1960s–1980s Japan tried to find leverage on the Korean peninsula, but it was constrained by the dominant U.S. role in South Korea and the difficulty of a breakthrough with North Korea in a cold war atmosphere.1 The situation for China on the peninsula was rather similar: It could not outflank the Soviet Union as the North’s main security guarantee, and it refused to accept the regional consequences of pursuing normalization with South Korea.2 In these

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circumstances when Tokyo and Beijing started to improve their bilateral ties in 1972 they had little reason to be concerned about the other’s influence on Korea or potential for using the peninsula to transform NEA. This situation changed after China’s normalization with South Korea in 1992, which angered the North and, more abruptly, in 2000 with the Sunshine Policy of Kim Dae-jung. It is understood that China gave Ronald Reagan assurances that it would not support North Korea’s reckless behavior, and these were repeated in 1994 during the nuclear crisis. When leaders in Seoul turned to engagement, a new strategy to the peninsula was required.3 For seven years the North’s resentment offered little chance to China. China’s ambassador was not allowed to travel beyond Pyongyang. Its military intelligence was ousted from Panmunjom. When the North convinced China to ship some goods on its ships that had unused space, China found many items stolen and faced frequent nonpayment for contracted shipments of food and fuel. Only the Sunshine Policy created incentives to overcome this trouble. As Tokyo responded defensively with the aim of slowing unification, Beijing shifted to support for a gradual process to prop up the North and use unification as a lever for regional security. A turning point occurred in early June 1999 when Kim Yong-nam, number two in the North Korean political hierarchy, visited Beijing and revived high-level political ties. This encouraged Kim Daejung, who turned to China as the indispensable intermediary at the same time as the Perry Process produced multisided consultations.4 Japan scrambled to keep pace, looking to the South to make its alliance with the U.S. triangular as well as pursuing talks with the North that resulted in Koizumi’s September 2002 visit to Pyongyang, but in the nuclear crisis Beijing retained the upper hand. Having faced the limits of North Korea’s stubborn insistence on noninterference for decades, China’s leaders stress the futility of applying pressure. Recalling how pressure from Nikita Khrushchev in 1959 to abandon nuclear weapons development had only toughened their country’s resolve to go it alone, they assume that the leaders of North Korea are no less stubborn or willing to put their country through sacrifice. In accord with their own country’s history of reforms and open-door policies, they also accept the logic of gradual transformation controlled by the communist leadership. In 1999 they tutored Kim Dae-jung on how to improve ties with Kim Jong-il, in 2000 they answered Putin’s request with advice on how to deal with Kim Jong-il, and in 2003–4 they did not stint in suggesting how Bush should deal with him. The first instance led to the June 2000 inter-Korean summit, the second to the July 2000 success

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for Putin at the G-8 meeting, and the third to improved Sino-U.S. relations. China’s steps toward leading the North away from isolation aim not only at “peace and development,” but also at preservation of socialism in the face of renewed U.S. interest in erasing its last vestiges. Struggle over the fate of North Korea is infused by debates over how China found the right balance of reform and retention of socialism, but the Soviet Union lost its balance. Steering the North to a “soft landing” has both ideological and strategic value for making NEA the cradle for multipolarity and regionalism that can keep globalization at bay. When Kim Dae-jung launched his outreach to Kim Jong-il at the end of the 1990s China felt vindicated. It had been telling North Korean leaders from the time of its normalization with the South in 1992 that a way forward existed based on economic reform and reconciliation that would bring acceptance of the Pyongyang regime by the various powers. If the North’s leaders remained sceptical even after the Agreed Framework was signed, they reconsidered in the light of the improvement of relations with China and Russia and then the summit with South Korea. For Beijing the Sunshine Policy justified a patient approach to Pyongyang withstanding U.S. pressure. In 2001 as relations with the North grew friendlier, Beijing made clear that it favors NorthSouth cooperation in finding their own path to reunification. This opposition to outside interference and equal treatment of both Koreas was contrasted to the cold war logic that aimed to entangle one or the other side in the selfish aims of another country. The fact that Putin had approached Kim Jong-il with the same logic strengthened China’s hand. The Bush approach of 2001, linked to a quasi-containment strategy toward China, was seen as reversing Clinton’s shift to dialogue and likely to lead to a dead-end. It could turn the South against the United States, even if it dare not go far. It had potential to damage Japan’s ties to the North and South, since Japan now had a green light from the United States. After 9/11 when Japan rushed to improve relations with the South and to restore dialogue with the North while the United States learned the folly of focusing on China as the primary military threat, the clash in dealing with the North continued.5 After declaring the North part of the axis of evil, Bush was in China in February 2002 seeking in vain the help of its leaders in pressuring the North. When Koizumi went to Pyongyang in September, China called it a huge success and foresaw normalization,6 but the nuclear crisis shattered China’s hopes. Praising the U.S.-North Korean talks of 1999–2000 for successful diplomacy, Chinese saw Bush, driven by cold war logic, interfering with reconciliation in NEA. While China respected peaceful coexistence and

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noninterference by other states on the peninsula, the United States reverted to containment. Refusing to yield to pressure on economic assistance and dialogue, South Korea could not dare to go against the United States will completely. Jiang’s visit to Pyongyang in September 2001, a year and a half after the visit of Kim Jong-il to Beijing in the run-up to the inter-Korean summit, was aimed at support for the unification process in which the two Koreas played the central role. Insistent after 9/11 that this attack exposed the strategic error of Bush’s focus on East Asia as the central security concern and anxious that he would soon take a tougher line toward the North, some Chinese foresaw a security crisis over North Korea a full year before its inception.7 Reasoning about North Korea is couched in terms of state interests. Having lost half a million soldiers in the Korean War, China is not inclined to lose the Korean buffer and make its border vulnerable. A strong, united Korea could raise territorial questions with China and look for support to check the rising regional power. Moreover, even if U.S. troops did not advance to the Yalu River in alliance with a united Korea, they would no longer be tied down by the North and could focus more fully on Taiwan. Thus, China settled on the three “no’s”: no war (peaceful resolution of the crisis), no nuclear weapons (denuclearization of the peninsula), and no collapse of the regime in the North (preservation of peace and stability on the peninsula). China’s priorities are: great power status, nationalism, stability, and economic benefit. Great power concerns mean that the United States must not strengthen its position in the region with the possibility of containing China’s rise, while the chance for a multipolar regional security framework should not be missed. The Six-Party Talks became an ideal venue for pursuing this goal, leaving the United States and Japan as just two of six actors and giving South Korea a strong foretaste of putting multilateralism ahead of its traditional alliance. In this context China could prove it is a responsible country interested in stability and cooperation while also capable of playing a lead role. Nationalist objectives combine concern for the legitimacy of socialism with leverage for the return of Taiwan. If it can assist in reforming a socialism system, that would be useful to China, but if it abetted the North’s collapse after blaming other leaders for allowing their own states and other socialist states to collapse, this would cast doubt on its notions of sovereignty and noninterference in internal affairs. Another goal is to prevent instability that could spill into Northeast China. Avoiding the high costs of collapse and turning the North into an engine for increased development in Northeast China would prove economically beneficial.8

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Self-serving arguments may disguise some motives even as censorship keeps half truths alive. If many intellectuals know how the Korean War began, textbooks conceal it. Not knowing the context, some accept simplistic statements that the North is a victim of unreasonable U.S. charges and demands and that once essential conditions exist the world will be amazed at how it proceeds with reforms and economic growth. Yet, privately, critics of the North’s Stalinist human rights record— beyond the horrors of the Cultural Revolution—doubt that a few modest reforms so far lay a foundation for transition, for example, seeing the 2002 choice of Shinuiju as a special administrative zone as a subterfuge for money laundering through casinos.9 Debate centers mostly on power politics, a subject amenable to the Chinese worldview. The First Stage of the Crisis Chinese blamed the Bush administration for taking a hard-line approach just when the North was improving ties with the South, launching economic reforms, turning to Japan to attract U.S. attention, and seeking guarantees from the United States for its security and support for economic transformation and political normalization. The image conveyed was that of Bush rejecting the North’s approach and seeking to undercut South Korean overtures and emerging Japanese interest in the North. Given this reasoning and insistence that China lacks influence on the North, writers argued that a solution requires a broad rubric of security guarantees, normalization, and economic support in return for inspecting and stopping the nuclear program.10 China would stick to the middle, earning the trust of both sides and facilitating an agreement. In the first months of the crisis, its response to U.S. entreaties was vague, implying that the burden was on the United States to handle the matter bilaterally. It urged the two parties to resolve their differences through dialogue. In the run-up to the war in Iraq, China grew nervous about threats toward North Korea, such as Rumsfeld’s warning that the United States could fight two wars at once or his putting 24 long-range bombers on alert for deployment in Guam in range of the North. Yet, as the United States anxiously sought its help in bringing the North to the negotiating table, China relaxed its position on noninterference in internal affairs to apply pressure on the North and took to heart Powell’s appeal to use its influence to play a positive role, even voting on January 23 in favor of an IAEA resolution to present the North’s nuclear development to the Security Council. In pursuit of negotiations, however, it then joined Russia in blocking the U.S. move to pressure the North there.

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Since 1950 it has been difficult to separate the Taiwan and North Korean issues in Sino-U.S. relations. The U.S. decision to defend Taiwan against the PRC arose in the context of the Korean War, and the Chinese decision to intervene in the war has been attributed to U.S. intervention in Taiwan. This linkage was discussed by Richard Nixon and Zhou Enlai on February 22–23, 1972.11 It arose again in 2003 as Taiwan’s Chen Shui-bian pressed for formal marks of independence and China’s leadership sought U.S. pressure to restrain him. China responded to the U.S. appeals over the North with hints that healthy Sino-U.S. relations achieved through handling Taiwan independence moves differently would have consequences. U.S. willingness to restrain Chen made it easier for China to join in restraining Kim Jong-il, although any talk of linkage would be denied. Having been unnerved by the deterioration of relations early in 2001, China saw an opportunity to reinforce the improvement in U.S. ties that occurred after 9/11. Yet, leaders feared that the United States would try to get China to do its dirty work. China pursued the North, both through pressure in suspending oil deliveries in February and blandishments such as increased foreign assistance in July. It walked a narrow path, assuring the United States of its determination to end the nuclear programs, assuring the North of its consistency in seeking security guarantees and economic assistance in a multilateral arrangement, and coordinating with the others. As honest broker, it took control of shuttle diplomacy and the agenda at meetings. Warnings that the United States might encourage mass refugee flight by agreeing to accept escapees from the North who could inundate Northeast China were, perhaps, one factor leading to a strong diplomatic push,12 as was the danger of instability from a conflict. Although the Bush administration vigorously pursued China in 2003 and accepted multiparty talks, Chinese concluded that there was no relaxation in its hegemonic intentions, including pursuit of absolute military superiority that had intensified after the shock of 9/11. Too weak to face the brunt of U.S. power by itself and careful to limit its exposure, it dealt with the Korean peninsula cautiously,13 as the United States allowed its sense of moral superiority and rush to military force to undermine its global leadership. It could use the nuclear crisis to constrain the United States and assist in its own rise.14 Chinese see North Korea blustering and bluffing with the goal of bargaining with the United States for survival. The more besieged the regime feels, the tougher its bargaining tactics. At the onset of the crisis China feared that the United States would act precipitously. To forestall that it urged the North to agree to talks. Fears rose for a time that the United States

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would address North Korea after Iraq, putting China under new pressure. One faction suggested abandoning the burden of the North. After all, the Mao era had ended, China was now integrated into the world community and could leave its Stalinist roots behind, and the North (socialist or not) had little in common with it. Harsh judgments of the North and of Kim Jong-il as inflexible accompanied suggestions for abrogating the treaty that obliges China to come to its defense. Young persons and the emerging elites in Southeast China find the regime reprehensible and are now under the spell of the “Korea wave” emanating from popular culture from South Korea.15 Another faction insisted that China must help the North. In contrast to intellectuals and foreign affairs experts who might have been looking for a wedge to advance reform at home and a global agenda, leaders preferred a realist response without moralistic overtones and responsive to party and military veterans unwilling to cast the North aside. The label socialist matters, but even more important the balance of regional power depends on standing by the North. Its collapse would resonate against the deeply imprinted image of how collapse of the Soviet Union had inflicted a powerful blow to socialism. Not only could the new united Korea be distant from China, but Japan would be emboldened as would the United States. The message to Putin, who had not solidified the close strategic partnership sought by China, also would be negative if China yielded to U.S. pressure. When the United States sought a more active Chinese diplomatic posture to induce the North into three-way talks, Beijing responded with pressure on Pyongyang and the desired outcome. Keeping a low profile as the Iraq war loomed and then was at full force, Beijing strengthened its position in Washington. Yet, the April talks only exposed the wide gap between the two antagonists. After the United States had forged a triangular consensus with Japan and South Korea in May and June, it again approached China to bring the North to the negotiating table, and the result was Six-Party Talks in August. This time, however, Beijing relied on substantial enticements to Pyongyang. In early July intense Chinese diplomacy clarified principles for resolving the crisis, including that the Korean peninsula should be free of nuclear weapons and that use of force to resolve the crisis was unacceptable while security guarantees and economic assistance must be provided as incentives. Hu coordinated with Putin and in early July concurred with Roh that the North’s security needs must be addressed. Dai Bingguo, former head of the International Liaison Department and now number two in the Foreign Ministry, visited Pyongyang on July 12–14 with an offer to mediate the crisis and increase economic assistance while insisting that

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China would urge the United States to assure the North’s security, and then visited the United States on July 18–19 outlining the role China would play. Alarmed by United States and Japanese moves to pressure the North through inspections at sea or even a blockade, Beijing was eager to establish an enduring negotiating process. The dynamic through the summer of 2003 for China contrasted with that of 2004. The central theme was the United States on the offensive, and China’s response was to restrain the North, making clear that it would not be entrapped by it into a conflict despite the 1961 Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance. The mood was tense when the North threatened to withdraw from the armistice in place for fifty years and restarted its Yongbyon nuclear reactor. Beijing flexed its muscles while adding incentives in the form of additional food and oil assistance. After the April three-way talks had at least begun the process of negotiations, Beijing continued to take the threat of a U.S. attack or economic sanctions leading toward war seriously and strove to bring Pyongyang to talks. Putting its regular army troops on the border in place of border guards was one indicator of concern about war leading to a flood of refugees. When the August talks brought no concessions from the North, China kept exploring restraining efforts, such as cooperating with the PSI to board ships that might carry WMD.16 For a full year after the crisis erupted, there was much talk of restraining North Korea’s belligerent and uncooperative conduct, but notions of even-handedness brought strong reservations about U.S. actions. Having faced the most difficult environment since the cold war, China was rather pleased with the results. Although it opposed the U.S. invasion of Iraq, leaders calculated that it could only do so quietly without departing from overall cooperation. Similarly, with the U.S. handling of North Korea earning little respect, China positioned itself to increase its diplomatic capacity as a defender of international principles. The goal of multipolarity drew closer. The United States had shifted from a containment psychology in 2001 to a sense that China was but one of many supporters of the U.S.-led war on terrorism in 2002 to considerable reliance on China in 2003. While downplaying their own influence over both the United States and the North, Chinese portrayed their country as a consensus builder intent on reassuring others of its “peaceful rise” through stability along its borders, while clearly opposing North Korea’s nuclear weapons ambitions. Restrained in criticism of the United States and reactive toward Taiwan’s provocations and the U.S.-North Korea showdown, China could be trusted as essentially a status quo power. In fact, the post-9/11 environment was ideal for China’s rise. The United

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States faced a different enemy, was mired in Iraq, and was dependent on China in dealing with the North’s nuclear program. The Six-Party Talks became a platform for China to take the middle ground. The Second Stage of the Crisis Deeming the first round of talks a success merely because it occurred, China redoubled its diplomacy. Aiming for a more productive second round, it obtained a pledge from Bush to guarantee the North’s security and offered about $50 million worth of aid in return for the North agreeing to the talks. With the United States assuring the North that it was not thinking of attacking, Chinese saw common ground.17 Yet, the visit of Wu Bangguo, chairman of the National People’s Congress, to Pyongyang in October 2003 and the responses of North Korea and the United States altered the dynamics of China’s role. In December Bush hosted Premier Wen Jiabao, and it became clear that the deal the Chinese were trying to broker was unacceptable as were requests for a softer U.S. stance on Taiwan. In contrast, by the end of 2003 internal evaluations had concluded that the North had abandoned its extreme views and become more flexible. It had declared a willingness to drop its nuclear program and to sign a nonaggression pact. It was willing to be compensated for the light-water nuclear reactors with electric power plants. The North would freeze its nuclear program, the United States and Japan would accept diplomatic relations, inspections would proceed, and a positive environment would ensue politically, economically, and militarily. Pyongyang was credited with favoring principles such as parallel moves, simultaneous acts, progress in stages, and resolution of all issues in one basket. In response to such flexibility the U.S. security guarantee was no more than a vague oral statement.18 Analysts drew sharp contrasts between the plan attributed to the North and the absence of real change in the U.S. position, arguing that despite the positive role China was playing the United States was to blame for no Six-Party Talks convening in December. With the U.S. resistant to possible strategic costs, even loss of South Korea as an ally,19 it was not ready to end the impasse.20 Behind the surface of remarks claiming that Sino-U.S. relations were the best ever were debates in each country about the fragility of relations. Beijing’s concern was that Washington will press for it to force Pyongyang to act without reasonable compromises and that Bush could return to his 2001–2 posture on Taiwan, aiding moves toward independence if Beijing does not provide enough support on Korea. In

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December 2003 some saw a trade-off between Chinese help in bringing North Korea to the negotiating table and U.S. refusal to accept Chen Shui-bian’s referendum plans leading toward independence; yet many Chinese doubted that Bush was doing more than the minimum required to avoid an immediate crisis, and some in the United States saw Hu Jintao’s reassuring phrase of “peaceful rise” becoming eclipsed by a tougher foreign policy. China saw the danger of war attenuating. Occupied in Iraq and seeking stability for the election season, Bush would not act precipitously. With the North receiving more economic assistance and trade from China and South Korea, it too was likely to avoid provocative behavior. China slowed its diplomatic efforts. On February 14, 2004 Dai Bingguo summarized one year of efforts to forge a consensus. He called on the United States to be patient and work harder at dialogue and urged Japan to separate the abductee issue from the Six-Party Talks. And he spoke reassuringly about North Korea, insisting that it needed time to change. The focus was on keeping the talks going and encouraging the United States to compromise more. With doubts lingering over whether the Bush administration still was seeking regime change and new tensions flaring over Taiwan, Beijing concentrated on the United States in contrast to 2003 when it spent much energy on eliciting the North’s participation. After the second round of talks one analyst called for “honest cooperation” between the United States and North Korea along with positive contributions from the Other Four. Crediting the talks on February 25–28 with starting substantive discussion and proceeding in a calm and constructive manner, the analyst stressed that all parties’ confidence in the process had increased, adding that the contours of a deal were clear with the North giving up its nuclear option and the United States its hostile policy along with compensation. The critical issue had become timing; the United States insisted that any “reward” await realization of the goal of CVID and the North demanded simultaneous concessions. Calling the North’s approach flexible, the analyst found it unfortunate that the United States did not make corresponding concessions instead of insisting on an “unrealistic price.” Sincere dialogue and no escalation of tensions would follow if the United States made a better offer. Assessing the other parties, the analyst saw South Korean security concerns and interests more in line with those of China than the United States, Japan aligning with the U.S and exploiting the issue for domestic politics but (as its bottom line) preferring a peaceful settlement and willing to try to persuade the United States, and Russia showing “enormous interest in playing a proactive and constructive role” in finding a peaceful

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solution.21 A shift in Japan or even a new balance in the Bush administration could reenergize the Six-Party Talks. China claimed to see a consensus forming on the future of relations in NEA. All states understood that they share an interest in not letting any one state gain total regional superiority, opening the way for a new security framework that denies any one control, that is, unilateralism does not work, and the United States will have to accept the message. Welcoming more mature strategic relations with the United States, Chinese still blamed it for failing to provide a security guarantee.22 In the spring China tried to get both sides to take a more conciliatory position. In April first Dick Cheney and then Kim Jong-il visited Beijing. Although Cheney had moderated his earlier position of taking China as a strategic competitor, it was Kim’s responsiveness that more impressed the Chinese. Whereas Bush and Cheney were ideologues steeped in cold war thinking and seeking to get China to put pressure on the North,23 Kim was a realist playing a weak hand for specific goals that China could accept; that is, a deal was within reach and depended mostly on the United States being more forthcoming, more realistic. In contrast to cultivating an image in 2003 as an even-handed mediator prepared to pressure a recalcitrant North, China had shifted to favoring inducements to the North.24 If some noted North Korean flexibility as cause for optimism,25 others took a more pessimistic view. Zhang Liangui summed up the results of the visits by Dick Cheney and Kim Jong-il as producing no concessions and offering no confidence that planned June Six-Party Talks could make headway. Meanwhile, the North’s further development of nuclear weapons is bad news, and the U.S. intention to delay until after the fall elections and then most likely to toughen its position (even if Kerry wins he will be pressed to be tough) means that an unwanted situation for China is possible.26 Such warnings often carried an assumption that China’s pragmatic purpose was peace and stability, in contrast to U.S. ideological pursuit of regime collapse and domination as well as Japan’s strong intent to raise its political and military status. China’s posture had shifted to viewing great power relations as more balanced, U.S. hegemony more limited, and Japan as less amenable to persuasion. Increased confidence that the North Korean crisis could be managed allowed China to take a more long-term perspective. In the half year from Wu Bangguo’s visit to Pyongyang to Kim Jong-il’s visit to Beijing, Chinese grow more critical of both the United States and Japan for many reasons: the Taiwan independence issue grew more serious, U.S. power appeared more vulnerable; the Iraq situation

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deteriorated and U.S. paralysis ensued in dealing with the North; Koizumi rebuffed Chinese “new thinking” by visiting the Yasukuni shrine again. Analysts did not deem these short-term factors owing to the Bush, Koizumi, and Chen Shui-bian regimes,27 but reevaluated the context for addressing the crisis as one where China had to resist U.S.-Japan containment. Chinese sources accentuate the proud, strongwilled character of North Koreans, who are not afraid of pressure. If their leaders were treated with respect and a process that stresses equality and focuses on national interests, they would cooperate, but harsh accusations against their leader only agitate them. Kim Jong-il is depicted as feeling vulnerable with no economic assets and waiting for the right external environment, above all an unambiguous security guarantee, to launch major reforms. In this way, the North would avoid dependence on any one country and be able to utilize the competition of four great powers and the enthusiasm of South Korea to gain influence in reshaping the Korean peninsula. If the United States were truly focused on making the North nonnuclear and preventing it from engaging in proliferation, then there should be a way to meet these goals. Yet, the assumption was that U.S. motives, including rejection of a regime whose totalitarianism and human rights violations symbolize evil, will not change soon, and that North Koreans with little trust that pressure will not be applied against them in the future were reluctant to give up their nuclear card. Chinese debated how far to go to do the bidding of the United States, doubting that it would make much of an effort to achieve an outcome that would meet diverse interests. As one New York Times headline put it, “Doubting U.S., China Is Wary of Korea Role.” Given scepticism about U.S. strategic designs in the region, there was concern that a Chinese cut-off of aid could lead to the collapse of the North.28 Piao Jianyi was among those who expressed optimism that the North is now turning to economic reforms and, if it no longer feels threatened, will stop threatening others. A change in U.S. behavior would be the key to solving the crisis and stabilizing the region. In contrast, other authors such as Zhang Liangui worried that nuclear competition in the region may spiral out of control, warning that the North’s behavior is irresponsible and China must give priority to finding a solution that obliges it to abandon these weapons without just trusting it to take the right course. If some analysts called for the United States to change course and others for China to be an honest broker assisting the two antagonists, still others argued that China must play a much more active role before a dangerous situation deteriorates further.

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There was little published criticism of North Korea in China. It would offend the North and reduce China’s leverage on it, and it could arouse the Chinese public over human rights issues to notice parallels with Chinese communist history, and to press for a moral diplomacy rather than a realist one. Officials were well aware that intellectuals were inclined to raise human rights issues or to place the nuclear danger ahead of broader realist power interests and that some were engaged in lively debates related to the North: the truth about who started the Korean War and the legacy of socialism. All could become a launching pad for criticism of the Chinese Communist Party, even if those who pressed for more open discussion insisted that China had turned the corner and would benefit from distancing itself from the excesses of North Korea. The debate reached a peak in the summer of 2004 when some scholars reassessed the Korean War as doing harm to China’s foreign policy and warned against repeating that mistaken choice and others criticized North Korea’s regime for its human rights and nepotism and for not showing gratitude to China for its economic assistance.29 Above all, strategic thinking centered on the impact of China’s handling of the crisis on relations with other countries, notably the United States, and the danger of failure in this diplomacy. Bold scholars tested the limits of Foreign Ministry and Propaganda Department tolerance for new thinking on North Korea, such as the call for revising the bilateral treaty with that country to remove the clause that commits China to go to war.30 Yet, leaders found that control over information allowed them to frame issues narrowly and keep realism as the focus. Even as some in China argued that North Korea was a “liability” that should not hold it hostage, the majority continued to see it as a “buffer zone” that must not be let go or even a potential “gangplank” from which China could be attacked. The journal Zhanlue yu guanli was closed and issues confiscated in August after the North protested over its unprecedented open airing of the debate, putting the North Korean problem in the contest of NEA conditions, indicating its negative potential for goals for the region, and accusing the North of being completely ungrateful for China’s political support and economic assistance.31 Criticism that could isolate the North, leading to war or collapse, was seen as not in China’s interests. It is not clear why neoconservatives believe that China would sacrifice North Korea rather than insisting on a compromise that gives it many incentives and high promise of regime security. One suggestion is that China would act in its own self interest, fearing a domino effect as Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan all go nuclear and instability grips the region. While that is a reasonable argument for why China would strive to reach

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a deal to end the North’s nuclear threat posture, it is no more convincing than would be the argument that the United States would be so alarmed by these dominos and by the danger of proliferation that it would make a bounteous economic offer with security guarantees to the North. If the United States turned to China early in 2003 with the idea that it would save the United States from having to make a compromise offer as was done in 1994 and then embraced the Six-Party Talks as a formula that would avoid bilateral talks with the North and make China the mouthpiece for five against one, Chinese foresaw trying to win North Korea’s trust while demonstrating to the United States that it had no choice but to compromise. It would show the North that it could emerge from the crisis in a favorable situation and the United States that it had no choice but to accept normalization with this regime. Chinese put a positive spin on the Six-Party Talks, seeing progress at each stage and the prospect of a breakthrough even before the Joint Statement at the fourth round. The first round was a success just because it took place and started in motion a valued process. The second round saw some progress as all sides committed to a nuclear weapons free Korean peninsula. And the third round was the best yet, as all parties constructively agreed on a concrete, step-by-step solution through wordfor-word and action-for-action exchanges. But the U.S. offer of security assurances lacked concrete promises in return for the strong demands on the North, and China waited a year for another offer, when the South promised generous supplies of electricity and gained U.S. acquiescence, and then was skeptical that the United States was ready for a strategic decision.32 When criticizing North Korea for its refusal to keep the talks going, as in September 2004, Chinese sources provided some excuses, such as waiting for the U.S. elections, and some balance, noting that Condoleezza Rice called the North an “outpost of tyranny.” Their logic favored encouragement rather than pressure. If North Korean leaders focused first on internal stability, then a way forward could be found by addressing that problem, leading later to an atmosphere of reform and opening, even if it would be cautious.33 The Six-Party Talks drew praise for their positive momentum and further potential. A deal was within reach. The Third Stage of the Crisis At the fourth round of talks China worked hard to draft a Joint Statement and then deftly isolated the United States that until the last minute balked at signing it because of the plan for talks over construction

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of a light-water nuclear reactor in the North. Unlike other rounds of the Six-Party Talks, this one was on the verge of consensus, and the United States could be blamed for its failure and even lose legitimacy as advocate of other multilateral talks. Having proceeded this far, the United States acquiesced even as some officials apparently blamed China as well as South Korea for cagily orchestrating this result. Yet, those governments despaired when instead of grasping the agreement on principles and seeking a favorable climate for moving toward implementation, the United States reverted to tough talk to the North and reassurance for its conservative base. Chris Hill had to reiterate the provocative CVID principle, which may have sparked North Korea to play to its own base by warning that without talks on the reactor it would not return to the Six-Party Talks. Such mutual irritants were not the reward China sought from its efforts to find common ground. There was no time to bask in the spotlight for a hard-earned diplomatic achievement; it had to deal with the fallout. Chinese were quick to dismiss the North’s rhetoric on September 20 as playing to its hard-liners. They saw Kim Jong-il’s position as not so strong, leading to a need to couch policy as if he were following the blueprint of his father Kim Il-sung and to interpret compromise moves in an extreme manner. Outside pressure or harsh rhetoric in response only aroused the hard-liners, they argued. They held too that the North needed to set a course for economic reform to create a favorable environment for resolving the internal political struggle over the nuclear program. When the United States imposed financial sanctions, Chinese responded that however justifiable defense of one’s national currency against counterfeiting, the timing sent the wrong signal. Putting the best possible face on the Joint Statement as a framework for resolving the nuclear crisis, Beijing insisted that the North’s promise to abandon nuclear weapons development was significant as was the U.S. commitment not to attack the North. Giving as the reason for optimism the argument that nuclear weapons are only an instrument employed by the North to change its external environment and overcome its isolation and insecurity, Beijing argued that if the United States places priority on stopping the spread of nuclear weapons, then the basis for a deal exists. They stressed that the United States lacks sincerity for creating an environment conducive to progress. China offers hope to North Korea that its regime can be stabilized through an international agreement; then it can expand its economy and in the process raise the standard of living of its people. In this way, it would accomplish two goals shared with China: increase the overall national strength of the country and preserve and perfect its socialist

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system. It advises the United States too that the most positive outcome can be reached through “mutual respect and peaceful coexistence.” With the September 19 agreement, the United States should have been eager to test North Korea. Instead intensified U.S. criticism of human rights abuses was seen as bullying it into surrendering its nuclear programs.34 Chinese kept a close watch to determine if policies were still under the control of the neoconservatives or had realists finally bypassed them in setting prudent strategic objectives. For a fleeting moment with the Joint Statement there was talk that the change had occurred, but after financial sanctions and the renewed human rights stress in the fall Chinese sources saw regime change and the spread of democracy and freedom back at the top of the U.S. agenda.35 They equated the Joint Statement with the Agreed Framework eleven years earlier as a realistic compromise exchanging the abandonment of nuclear weapons for provisions of economic assistance, normalization of relations, and firm guarantees of security for the North leading toward a full peace regime for the peninsula. With Bush’s ideological bent and then the 9/11 attack on the United States, it would not be as easy to accept such a deal. The same held for the North’s leaders, whose trust had diminished because they saw the United States as not abiding by the first agreement and showing greater rancor. Only a comprehensive, long-term resolution would serve in this new climate. China found it hard to reassure North Korea of its fairness at the center of talks. Many in Pyongyang apparently viewed it as closer to the United States in applying pressure to abandon its nuclear weapons than to the North in seeking security guarantees and economic compensation. Some warned that China could sell out the North in order to improve ties to the United States, particularly if its more important goal of reunification with Taiwan were advanced. After Jiang Zemin had allowed high-level meetings to languish for years, according to one Japanese source, Hu Jintao upgraded ties from September 2004. Jiang Zemin in the fall of 2002 had put cooperation with the United States first as the route to peace and stability on the Korean peninsula, but Hu apparently at the Fourth Plenum of the Sixteenth Party Congress showed a new tone of respect to the North. Foreign affairs and military authorities may have feared that if the United States succeeded with the North it would turn all of its pressure toward China and would no longer be restrained on the Taiwan question. Already in 1993 and 2002 the United States demonstrated that when it needs China’s influence with the North it softens its posture toward China. China increased aid and improved ties, perhaps, in order to be able to play the “North Korean card.”

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Hu established four guiding principles to improve relations and enhance China’s prospects in the Six-Party Talks: more summit meetings, closer trade ties, enhanced cooperation in regional affairs, and more coordination in taking a common stance toward adversaries. When he visited Pyongyang at the end of October 2005, he brought a generous gift, a call for greatly expanded trade, and a way to lure the North to the fifth round of talks in November,36 which started badly before adjourning for the APEC summit. Hu’s visit served two purposes. Given that he would go to South Korea for the APEC summit and meet with Roh, this trip reinforced the image of China as an even-handed broker. Yet, its emphasis on economic relations with scant attention to the nuclear talks may have alerted the United States that China would not isolate the North as the United States desired and would not let its interest in assisting the North’s reform be held hostage to the U.S. strategy, seen as again veering toward regime change. This visit reflected a confident China offering its model of reform to the North. Hu invited Kim Jong-il to visit Shenzhen, where China’s economic success began. In January Kim did travel across China to its gateway to Hong Kong, although speculation that this would lead him to launch reforms proved inaccurate. While the United States was calling on China to become a stakeholder in the global system with the assumption that it had yet to make a clear commitment, China was raising its stake in North Korea. Not only had its trade with the North tripled since the start of Bush’s presidency, but by the end of 2005 it had become responsible for half of all trade, even as North-South trade also was rising sharply. In Pyongyang the open casino largely served Chinese, a deal was made for Chinese to run the First Department Store, and language study of Chinese was spreading fast. Opinions varied about the expanded Sino-North Korean business dealings. Some viewed this as China propping up the regime, making it less likely to abandon its nuclear weapons and serving a strategy of spreading China’s influence over the peninsula. Others were sympathetic to Chinese explanations that these moves increased trust in the North. Overlooked by many was the fact that much of the new commerce was through firms in Northeast China near the border seeking a quick return on their investment. When such border trade had occurred with the Russian Far East, similar firms had caused havoc with their lowquality goods and shady practices. It followed that North Korea’s economy would not rebound substantially on this basis nor would China gain a lasting hold over it. Corrupt deals with payoffs to officials and protection to cronies were all that could be expected without market conditions. Beijing was focused on security, not the economy, although

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it urged Kim Jong-il to look closely at its economic successes and offered rewards such as a large glass factory. With Kim Jong-il’s visit to China in early 2006 came the message that China would strive to assist the North to reform its economy and gain confidence, even if there is no resolution of the nuclear crisis. The thrust of its approach is regional integration, not regime change. In contrast to the U.S. message that the North must transform its human rights record in order to be accepted, China asserts that political stability under the existing regime, regardless of the human rights situation, is the way to advance economic reforms and regional economic integration. This means not pressuring the North but also not sponsoring its recovery without crisis resolution. The Fourth Stage of the Crisis In various countries we found an ongoing debate over whether China was able to pressure North Korea to abandon its nuclear programs consistent with the offer the United States was ready to make before late 2006. The answer found in most sources from the Other Four and in China is “no,” North Korea would resist Chinese pressure even at the price of renewed famine and much more serious energy shortages.37 Thus, China’s leaders understand their limitations. They were drawn into the crisis when in early 2003 Colin Powell resolutely requested Beijing’s help. At that time there was talk that North Korea was so dependent for its wherewithal on China that pressure could solve the problem. Yet, Chinese argued that the North joins talks owing to inducements or indications of U.S. flexibility, not due to pressure. Moreover, they contend that what matters most is a guarantee of security, and the North is not looking to China but to the United States for that. As the United States grew more skeptical, China’s role as a force for pressure acquired new salience in July 2006 when it reacted strongly against the North’s new belligerence. While it opposed a sanctions resolution invoking Article 7 of the UN Charter, it signaled support for some sanctions and strong opposition to what the North was doing. The United States agreed to a compromise Security Council resolution and showed new interest in finding common ground aware that should the North resist China was likely to pressure it.38 Even earlier China had shown some signs of hardening its position to the North. A week after the North made its mood-shattering declaration on February 10, 2005 that it possessed nuclear weapons, Wang Jianrui, head of the International Liaison Department, visited Pyongyang and apparently did not bring any promise of economic assistance unlike when other high-level visits occurred. In late June and early July 2006 as

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the North readied missiles for launch, China showed its displeasure. With the missile launches it sent a mission to Pyongyang to try to bring the North back to the talks, as the United States sought. China had lost face due to the belligerence of the North and seemed helpless in restarting talks in the following months, leading to more coordination with the United States. State Department officials show understanding for China’s handling of the crisis, indicating that the two sides have achieved considerable trust. They recognize that China sees its job not as resolving the crisis no matter what but as assisting the two opposing parties to find a solution and credit it with striving to bring the North to the talks and to find a way forward. Some also indicate that Chinese officials have been pleased with U.S. compromises on abandoning CVID, offering a security guarantee of sorts as well as economic assistance and normalization of a kind, in September 2005 agreeing to the principle that the North could have a light-water reactor at some future time after the nuclear weapons issue is settled, and in joint efforts to find compromise wording on Security Council resolutions. Yet, they also insist that China proceed with full realization that with regard to nuclear dismantling and verification the U.S. position is firm, and Chinese officials continually make clear that they too are firmly against nuclear weapons in the North. If earlier some in the Bush administration had expressed dissatisfaction that China was not using its leverage, the second half of 2006 brought new mutual understanding. The North had tested the limits of China’s patience. Ignoring Chinese as well as international appeals not to launch missiles, it proceeded and then, after China agreed to a compromise Security Council resolution calling for a freeze, defiantly denounced the resolution declaring its intention to continue. Months later in an even greater act of defiance its nuclear test embarrassed China, putting it on the spot. Hu Jintao had to take a more active role in both pressing for resumption of Six-Party Talks and agreeing to sanctions that would make Kim Jong-il pay a hefty price for his defiance. North Korea had become a threat to regional stability. The rules had changed for China’s role in the crisis. From the October Security Council deliberations on sanctions, through two Beijing preparatory six-party meetings, to the December talks themselves, Sino-U.S. cooperation rose to a higher level than previously. China had become a more active force in the talks, the United States was more serious about multilateralism, and regional dynamics were changing. The North was more isolated, as five versus one had become a reality. As many continued in 2007 to concentrate on debates over the wisdom of

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U.S. policy (now with neoconservatives attacking Bush’s moves) and the chances that North Korea would adhere to the February agreement (critics of past U.S. policies now had to focus on the North’s troubling tactics), few paid attention to China’s enhanced role at the center of a multilateral framework in NEA. As a status quo power, China was prepared to squeeze the North but only after it was given ample opportunity to partake of the benefits in the existing regional order. When it proved to be more disruptive of that order than the United States, China made clear that it would steer the Six-Party Talks to rein it in. Conclusion China considers its approach constructive and realistic. It had what some saw as a thankless task of bridging differences between two implacable foes that did not trust it and made little effort to observe the customary diplomatic niceties with readiness for a deal that would achieve a few priorities even if it necessitated many compromises. Yet, hard work has won China commendation for its steadfast efforts, leading to the Joint Statement at the peak of optimism, sanction resolutions as pessimism spread, and a common course of pressing ahead through Six-Party Talks even after a nuclear test. The nuclear crisis gave it a favorable opportunity to prove to the United States that it is a “stakeholder” in the regional and global order, not a disruptive force. It showed that it was determined, patient, attentive to the views of the various parties, acting in accord with a long-range strategic focus, and at times skillful in diplomacy. Indeed, in mid-September 2005 China’s intense efforts, pressing each protagonist hard and warning each that it would be blamed for failure if only the other one accepted, drew much admiration. There seemed to be little doubt that China would do more of the same, with the likelihood that it could orchestrate a compromise ending if both the United States and North Korea kept their eyes on achieving their most important objectives with flexibility concerning others. Neither the United States nor North Korea showed the realism that China desired; so it had to turn its attention first to one and then to the other just to move ahead. It did so as the facilitator, aware of its weakness in using pressure against either protagonist but also of the lack of any good alternative. Chinese saw the process as serving to ameliorate two extreme attitudes, what it regarded as U.S. hegemonic thinking, insisting on its way on more than just WMD, and North Korean paranoia, trusting no other country and doubting that promises would be fulfilled. Steering these two states toward a deal was no easy task.

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As American leaders voiced concern about dealing with China’s leaders, coming from a communist tradition not respectful of human rights, China’s leaders bemoaned the inconsistency stemming from U.S. democracy that produced a new leader in 2001 even more obstinate in ignoring the realities of NEA than Bill Clinton in 1993. They see Bush driving North Korea into a corner, then refusing to talk or consider a deal, then appealing to China to fix the problem and give “face” to the United States by making it multilateral, and only gradually broadening the scope of the talks to address issues essential for an agreement. Chinese claim to understand North Korea’s regime and worry that the United States does not. They picture it as filled with resentment over perceived historical humiliations and firmly resistant to outside pressure, as Chinese leaders were in the 1960s. Yet, they argue that it can change through positive incentives and a favorable external environment. Now that Beijing and Seoul have intensified their engagement, the United States should assure the North of its benign intentions too. Chinese insist that they lack soft power to sway either the North or the United States. Since the North is fixated on U.S. hard power, that is where the solution lies. The central dynamic has been for the United States to appeal to China to press the North harder, and China to respond to the United States seeking more concessions and then to turn to the North to seek its participation in the talks. The United States showed little urgency, concerned that China might ask for concessions also in other spheres or that the North would pounce on weakness. Chinese argue that they became involved at the request of the United States because it did not want to negotiate with the North and the United States did not consult with it when making critical decisions. It should not imagine that China can substitute for it in providing the security guarantee and access to international economic assistance desired by the North. Some suspect that the United States is using the crisis to justify missile defense programs, legitimate its military presence in South Korea, prod Japan to boost its military and alliance, and even to serve domestic political objectives.39 Yet, Sino-U.S. mistrust has been reduced as it becomes clear that China is indispensable for resolving the crisis. Chinese describe a North Korea unafraid of pressure, proud, and strong-willed. It demands equality in foreign relations as well as respect. This suggests that China not only has no way to persuade the North to abandon its nuclear program without a deal that is in its national interests, but also that China cannot even make progress by overtly parading its own reform successes. Instead, it and others must patiently and

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indirectly expose the North to the gains within its reach and then wait for it to draw its own conclusions. Chinese also depict Kim Jong-il as anxious to develop his country and reasonable about what must be done once conditions are created that provide for national security. He feels totally vulnerable and must have a security guarantee to proceed with reforms he recognizes as inevitable. Rather than behaving as a wild man who might recklessly endanger the region, Kim is seen as a realist playing a weak hand for specific goals that China can accept. By showing respect to Kim, especially on a personal basis, the United States could find a deal within reach.40 Of course, this message serves China’s interest in a security outcome that exposes the weakness of the United States and forges multilateralism in which South Korea pursues the North and Japan has little choice but to join the process. China has often expressed its agreement with the United States to cooperate to end the crisis in a way that will lead the North to abandon its nuclear weapons. When the North seems to be stalling, China actively pursues it to rejoin the talks. China also draws the line at assisting the North, helping to overcome famine that could lead to more refugees crossing its border and aiding reform that could open the North’s economy but not contributing to revival of heavy industry or major infrastructure projects. This leaves the North in limbo with no prospect of rebuilding its military and industrial complex until the crisis is resolved. Yet, it also means that the United States cannot expect regime collapse. China balances two potentially contradictory objectives: to stabilize the North Korean regime and to denuclearize the Korean peninsula. If the path to denuclearization leaves no alternative but to accept the United States dictates on how that is to be achieved, then China’s preference seems to be to stabilize the regime by taking a different path and waiting for the United States to change direction. In light of what happened to the Soviet Union after Gorbachev and then Yeltsin embraced U.S. thinking about radical regime reform and change, Chinese consider the North Korean regime wise to avoid what the United States is proposing. Yet, a North Korea that is wreaking havoc on regional security while not reforming would deal a blow to China’s interests. In 2006 the North’s bellicosity drove China away, and the United States responded with new flexibility. In the aftermath of three years of pursuit by the U.S. and increasing frustration with the North’s rejection of diplomacy, China was cooperating in a dual strategy of pressing the North to make a firm commitment to denuclearize in the Six-Party Talks and readying sanctions to isolate

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the North and deny it acceptance as a nuclear power. It was drawing closer to the United States and even improving relations with Japan. Yet, it would be premature to conclude that either George Bush or Hu Jintao were close to the strategic middle ground that would allow them to reach agreement on how to proceed and bring South Korea along with Japan and Russia into a reliable pattern of five versus one In April 2007 Wen Jiabao in Tokyo made a strong appeal for continued upgrading of SinoJapanese relations, expressing some understanding for Japan’s emotional response to the abductions. China also welcomed U.S. moves to end the financial sanctions on the North, while patiently waiting for the North to fulfill its promises for the first phase of the February agreement. It was orchestrating the complicted endgame of multiple working groups, but it was bound to be tested by the North’s brinkmanship. Beijing had waited since 2001 for Bush to put direct talks with Pyongyang in the forefront. While both Tokyo and Moscow reacted nervously to Chris Hill’s late June 2007 visit to North Korea, it was in line with Beijing’s requests. North Korean leaders had left little doubt of their hostility to China’s treatment of them for at least a year and even gave Americans the impression that they would like the two states to work together to limit China’s clout, but this traditional attempt to capitalize on divisions among the powers was ineffective. The Sino-U.S. understanding reached in 2006 was holding. If both sides could sustain it, the chances would substantially increase that the North would meet the requirements of Phase 2 as set by the Joint Agreement. Should there be stalling into 2008 with no disablement of the reactors and no declaration of the North’s nuclear assets, then this new understanding would be tested. Even if Phase 2 were completed, the most difficult challenge would be agreeing on the terms for complete denuclearization in Phase 3 likely to last beyond the end of the Bush presidency.

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CHAPTER 6

The Chinese Response: The Regional Context

C

hina’s position in the NEA region is closely intertwined with North Korea’s fate. The outcome of the nuclear crisis promises to bear on China’s relations with South Korea, the major state most closely integrated economically with it and caught in an uncertain geopolitical reorientation; Japan, the historic rival on the peninsula in the midst of a complicated reassertion of its political and military power; and Russia, the on-again off-again partner with renewed strategic ambitions in NEA. Of course, it is also a demanding and still inconclusive test of the role of the U.S in NEA. Along with Seoul, Beijing views the crisis in the broad context of a gradual process of reunification and, even more, of far-reaching realignment in the security architecture of the entire region. Nervous about North Korea’s uncontrolled impact on other countries, China kept responding to it warily. The Sino-Soviet split trapped China in a competition manipulated by the North; even long after China’s rapprochement with the United States and Japan it was embarrassed by its ally’s provocative actions and delayed normalizing ties to the South. Through most of the 1990s despite chilly relations, China let North Korea slow progress in political ties with the South even as economic integration accelerated. The Sunshine Policy allowed more breathing room between unnerving actions and accusations from the North with potential to destabilize NEA; yet China remained hostage to a state it would not disown even as a region-wide movement at last was addressing the issue. In 2002 China was working with South Korea, Russia, and Japan to construct a favorable environment for the North’s reform. Perhaps, the

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Bush administration’s tough line to the North had intensified its efforts. In dealing with South Korea, as far back as 1992 when relations were normalized it had sought and received assurances that the South would not try to isolate the North. In 1994 when Kim Young-sam had pleaded for China’s help in ending the first nuclear crisis, again in November 1995 when Jiang Zemin visited him, and at other times Beijing urged Seoul to seek a dialogue with Pyongyang. After endorsing the Sunshine Policy when Kim Dae-jung came calling in November 1998, it pledged that it would play a constructive role on the peninsula. Kim Jong-il’s visit to China of late May 2000 after the South Korean foreign minister had come in April is proof of the virtual triangle behind the June NorthSouth summit. Thus, we should not be surprised by Beijing’s earnest efforts in 2002 to have the United States resume support for the Sunshine Policy, to facilitate Koizumi’s unprecedented trip to Pyongyang, to coordinate with Putin on his eager pursuit of Kim Jong-il, and to support Kim Dae-jung’s desperate attempts to ensure his Nobel Prize legacy in dealing with the North. Kim Jong-il’s approval of some economic reforms in July 2002 was greeted as a harbinger for the success of China’s regional strategy as long as the United States did not derail it. There was talk of a new diplomatic logic in China by 2003, accepting the era of the United States as the lone superpower and cooperating with it as China proved itself to be a responsible great power and stressed its peaceful rise reassuring to neighboring countries. Along with a new approach to great power ties, there would be new urgency for economic integration. Already at the end of 2002 Zhu Rongji had called for expansion of the FTA being negotiated between Japan and South Korea into a three-way plan including China. Although this was rebuffed by Koizumi, who said that China needs ten–fifteen years after entering the WTO, it showed China’s priority for regional cooperation.1 The ASEAN ⫹3 meetings appeared to be working well, enabling China to look ahead not only to a broad regional framework but also to the ⫹3 becoming a core of its own. With the nuclear crisis came a more divisive atmosphere, contributing to renewed doubts about the United States, deteriorating relations with Japan, and troubles in NEA to the point that the ⫹3 did not even meet in December 2005 and regionalism had to be put on hold. Many Chinese analysts see the North Korean-U.S. standoff less as a struggle over WMD and more as a contest over control of NEA. In this view, the United States is using the North to reassert control over a region that may be slipping from its grasp due to the rise of China, realignment of South Korea, and movement toward rapprochement of the two Koreas. Even if the nuclear issue were settled, these forces would

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relegate the United States to a less prominent position. Russian reassertion of a great power role in NEA and willingness to reach an accommodation with China is also unwelcome to the United States. Continued crisis may allow the United States to sustain the appearance of keeping the initiative in the region as it embraces Japan tighter and leaves South Korea hesitant, but this puts off reckoning with unwelcome realities. Chinese see the United States, as the foremost power in NEA for at least another decade as the area gradually becomes multipolar, striving to hold onto its power by stoking Japan’s ambitions and crushing South Korea’s while treating North Korea as a convenient target to be isolated from the civilized world. Thus, the United States is inclined to make regime change inseparable from the process of ending the North’s nuclear programs. This view treats the United States as hostile to reunification through reconciliation and determined to keep the South dependent within an alliance triangle rather than a force for multilateralism.2 To prevent this from succeeding China must produce a compromise combining strategic stabilization and a roadmap, however, long-term, for reunification. China’s growing role has come with encouragement from others. Early in the 1990s the South was eager for China to help get the North to talk. In 1994 the United States pressed China to assist in the first nuclear crisis, although it grew concerned that Seoul was giving Beijing a greater strategic role, as reflected in comments by the South Korean ambassador to China in March that later were downgraded into his personal views.3 In the Perry Process and the Sunshine Policy China again found itself the target of others trying to gain the ear of the North. After a near collision between United States and North Korean aircraft on March 2, 2003 raised the specter of war,4 China retook center stage, agreeing with the United States to work for a nonnuclear North, with South Korea to oppose sanctions as well as a military response, and with Russia to coordinate closely. Not only were economic relations ascendant, security cooperation with the South was advancing too, but China’s edge could be squandered if the North failed to compromise or the South recoiled in fear at its vulnerability. More than any other state, Chinese insist that they welcome the unification of Korea. History demonstrates that a unified and stable Korea makes China’s Northeast provinces secure, while a divided Korea leads to threats and war that China cannot easily avoid. If Korea is the crossroads of great powers, the NEA region is unstable. The division of the peninsula is becoming a matter for the two Koreas to resolve if others will support this. According to analysts, China’s rise provides a favorable

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external environment for this and for unification. In contrast, Japan fears this natural process, preferring perpetual separation. Russia’s views are more complex, looking to a multilateral framework as positive but also fretting that it would lose international status if a sense of threat from Korea faded without such an outcome. The United States, in turn, fears unification’s impact on its strategic interests in South Korea and beyond.5 With this reasoning, Chinese doubt that other countries have the will to do what is necessary to find a comprehensive approach. Chinese claim to be optimistic about the endgame even if they retain some doubts about U.S. acceptance of what seems inevitable. Any resolution will be in stages, emphasizing enticements to the North including security guarantees and ample economic assistance. The North will agree to end its nuclear programs, even if there remains some lack of clarity about its full compliance and verification. With the South absorbed in managing gradual economic integration with the North, Japan will offer substantial economic assistance, but it will not gain much influence. The United States will lose its special security role on the peninsula even if it maintains its military presence for a time. Sino-Russian cooperation over Korea will persist. All of these outcomes will suit China well, stabilizing the region and laying the foundation for a power balance that facilitates its rise. Without an obvious threat, the United States will turn its attention elsewhere and Japan will have no choice but to accept arrangements in NEA to end its “perpetual separation.”6 China eyes a long-term security framework in which all of the powers, led by the U.S., would guarantee the survival of the North. In the face of U.S. unilateralism, China became more multilateralist on a regional level. It valued the annual ARF talks, championed the SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organization) framework that it had initiated, and favored turning the Six-Party Talks into a regular NEA security cooperation exchange. The U.S., in turn, had little choice but to couch its unilateralism in multilateral language and respect diplomacy based on regular consultations that might edge toward a compromise solution. With Japan tailing the U.S. and Russia tailing China as South Korea searched for its voice, multilateralism faced a regional divide. Moreover, it had to overcome the hurdle of a more reclusive, belligerent North Korea in 2006. China faced U.S. impatience, North Korean defiance, South Korean interest in playing a similar role, Japanese emotionalism, and Russian determination to win favor in the North. Without much progress in reducing any of these barriers, China at least kept the talks alive. In 2005 it won agreement on the Joint Statement. In 2006 it steered the response to the North’s nuclear test toward more intensive

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talks. Wearing the host’s hat of peacemaker, it aimed to build on the “landmark” 2005 accord, and it succeeded. To realize the February 2007 agreement Beijing had to look beyond the two adversaries to the role of all states heading working groups and needing to coordinate for maximum impact on Pyongyang as well as Washington. The South Korean Connection In the rejuvenated strategic reasoning of 2002–3, there was much discussion in China of the importance of surrounding countries, second only to great powers. This meant new priority for ASEAN ⫹3, where South Korea had been active under Kim Dae-jung even if Roh grew less engaged because of his preoccupation with making the South the hub of NEA—a narrower notion of regionalism. The prevailing mood of “peaceful rise” aimed to facilitate the economic integration of China’s neighbors, making them more dependent and reducing the prospect that China would appear as a hegemon. Regional integration was well along with South Korea. When ASEAN ⫹3 talks made the South the third and potentially decisive voice in annual meetings of China and Japan, Chinese welcomed its active support for regionalism, but did not trust it as the middleman with Japan. In 2002 as anti-Americanism spread in South Korea, Chinese did not expect it to undercut the foundation of the alliance, and when Roh Moo-hyun took great pains in 2003 to reassure the Bush administration, this was what was anticipated. As the crisis revealed a glaring gap between Roh and Bush, China appreciated the limits of South Korean autonomy. Sino-South Korean coordination did not draw much attention in the first two years of the crisis, but it became a subject of some speculation in 2005 when the South also began actively dealing with both antagonists, striving for similar goals. Yet, it would be an exaggeration to suggest that they forged some kind of united front. A controversy spilled into the open in July 2004 over the history of the Goguryeo state that straddles the current border of China and North Korea. The views expressed at a Northeast China institute on regional studies were publicized in a South Korean newspaper and reaffirmed in Beijing, claiming that the military expeditions sent over 1,300 years ago in the Sui and Tang dynasties to Goguryeo should be included in China’s internal wars of unification. Many in the South, where this area is regarded as one of the three Korean states that gave rise to a unified country in the seventh century, denounced this affront to national integrity, even with protests in front of the Chinese Embassy.7 In a year of preoccupation with the

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threat of Taiwan declaring independence de jure, the mood in China was to act preemptively to prevent border issues from arising. A reunited Korea posed the danger, based on past control over parts of Northeast China and the presence of an ethnic Korean enclave. Chinese were puzzled by Roh Moo-hyun’s claim that his country could play a balancing role.8 Unlike ASEAN in ASEAN ⫹3, which has been ceded centrality in pursuit of regionalism, South Korea has no supporters for this exalted role. Both China and the United States find its claim to be a balancer provocative, as does Japan with regard to SinoJapanese ties. Even in the nuclear crisis, where Chinese assert that they have no objections to the South doing more if the two antagonists approve, they note that the North is wary or the United States sees China as more salient. Working together has limits, even if this is the primary dyad among the Other Four with active ties to both antagonists. The two states have a great deal in common in their thinking on the crisis and in approaching the North, but the impact of this is weakened by the South’s caution about alarming its ally, the United States; China’s care in not giving North Korea reason to think that it is leaning to the South; and a lack of Chinese trust in the South that exceeds the South’s reticence about depending on China. The third factor may be the most surprising. From the time Kim Dae-jung was elected in December 1997 the South has been under presidents whose strategic objectives are largely favorable to China, it has experienced waves of anti-American and anti-Japanese sentiment without a similar emotional response to China, and economic ties are drawing the two states together beyond any ties the South has with other states. A realist China eager to gain leverage against Japan or even the United States might have looked to South Korea for more opportunities. Instead, its distrust permeates the way it discusses the role of South Korea and even prepares for regional strategic cooperation. The Goguryeo controversy is one sign it does not focus on building trust, leading to ambivalence in the South and as the crisis persisted a shift in preference from China to the United States9 South Korea has never gained the appeal it might have in China. Through the first half of the 1990s there was talk of the Korean model of economic development. In the mid-1990s the contrast was stark between the headache caused by the North’s nuclear ambitions and famine, both setbacks to Chinese goals for peace and development, and the South’s rapid economic integration with China. Kim Dae-jung and Roh respectfully turned to Beijing for support in engaging the North as public opinion grew friendlier to China. Yet, China dismissed South Korea’s special role, continuing to seek balance on the peninsula.

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Chinese distrust is rooted in at least five causes. First, it is wary not only of the continuing alliance between the South and the United States but also of the Western orientation of the security elite and, also to some extent, the academic and economic elites in the South. Second, China finds it difficult to draw close to a mature democratic society, perhaps acknowledging a clash of values that realists may overlook. Third, ties to North Korea are more important to China’s strategic goals than many academic experts in China concede. China fears the collapse of North Korea and unification of the peninsula under leadership elected in the South, even as it sees benefit in a communist regime turning to China and raising its profile in peninsular affairs. Fourth, Chinese strategic thinking in Asia weighs Russia far higher than South Korea, even if thinking about economic regionalism means the reverse. The sharp differentiation between security and economics and the presence of a preferred partner in the former reduces the South’s priority. Finally, the problems between China and Japan are far more serious, including the Taiwan issue, and South Korea is unlikely to take sides in any trouble linked to security. The result is parallelism with only limited coordination. China disappointed North Korea not only in 1992 when it normalized ties with South Korea despite the fact the United States and Japan were not normalizing their relations with the North, but also in 1996–97 when it treated four-party talks as an opportunity for the two Koreas to work out their problems rather than as a format for backing the North as the South “obeyed” the United States. If gradually the North came to understand China’s position, it also awakened to the fact that China is at least as interested in pleasing the South. Distrust deepened in the summer of 2006 after China’s vote in favor of a Security Council resolution critical of the North’s missile launches and a failed mission to Pyongyang. The downturn in Beijing’s relations with Pyongyang in 2006 left the latter more isolated. As Chinese economic ties with the North grew substantially in 2004–5, some in South Korea wondered if the status quo was not leading to a solution appealing to Beijing and especially to Northeast China, even calling this a “neocolonial push” in which economic dominance results in political influence.10 Yet, this competition with the South remained at a low level in circumstances where the North’s economy was still weakly integrated with any outside entity. Limits to economic ties across the Yalu River became clear in 2006 as North Korea grew cautious. The impact of the crisis over four years was to draw China and South Korea closer without damaging China’s claim to steer an even-handed course on the peninsula. In the Chinese prism, mishandling of the crisis

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by the United States and Japan that had allowed narrow nationalist thinking to interfere with realistic moves to quell the nuclear danger had not only not served China’s interests but also widened the divide between the South and each of these states.11 This made it easier for China to reestablish a power balance that would draw Russia closer, keep North Korea and the United States apart, and widen the divide between South Korea and both the United States and Japan. Yet, gaining advantage at the height of the crisis was not the objective. Regional instability and uncertainty over the outcome were not in China’s long-term interest. The real goal was a regional realignment with the South serving as the swing country with an impact on multiple triangular relations. Chinese envision a reunification triangle of the two Koreas and China in which the United States, Japan, and Russia had supporting, but secondary, roles. Seoul would rely mostly on Beijing to influence Pyongyang, which would regard Beijing as insurance against a takeover by its far wealthier brethren. A gradual process with considerable balance between North and South would stand it in good stead. The SinoJapanese-South Korean triangle could also gain new vitality through regional reconciliation following crisis resolution. The big prize for China is Japan as a partner in regionalism and a state not solely in the U.S. camp. With the North Korean threat removed, Japan’s sense of alarm can be better addressed by China with improved South Korean ties to Japan in a triangular context. Finally, with energy in the lead, the triangle of China, Russia, and South Korea can entangle the North in shared projects and become a force for regionalism. Even if conservatives regain power in Seoul, Chinese doubt that they would tilt sharply back to the United States and accept Japan as an alliance partner. Instead, they would resume the search for engagement with the North and regionalism through the various triangles of NEA. China has best positioned itself for this regional reorganization. If in 2003–5 Beijing saw Seoul as its most important partner in trying to persuade Washington to compromise in the nuclear crisis, in 2006 the two had to refocus on how to convince Pyongyang to return to the SixParty Talks and forsake its new posture of blaming all states and cutting back ties even with these two supporters of engagement. The United States had failed to forge five versus one, but now its adversary seemed bent on isolating itself as one versus five. From July 2006 Beijing showed signs of coordinating more closely with the United States and even Japan. After the North’s nuclear test, Chinese analysts acknowledged that progress in the talks would be more difficult, but they warned that further division among the other states would only result in tacit

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acceptance of its nuclear status as well as uncontrolled nuclear proliferation.12 The February 2007 agreement raised the profile of Sino-U.S. cooperation, leaving South Korea almost an outlier due to Roh’s impatience to keep advancing ties to the North. The Japanese Connection Chinese are suspicious of Japanese motives in dealing with North Korea. Not only are the Japanese unwilling to face the historical truths of their imperialist rule in a process of normalization, it is assumed that they are most opposed to reunification that could bring the Korean people together with one voice in facing the past and the future. Many see Japan as having been fearful of the Sunshine Policy and later resentful of South Korean reliance on China to assist with the North. These factors make Japan more dependent on the United States in support of nationalist assertion and regional power. The crisis is seen not as the cause of deterioration in SinoJapanese relations, but as a contributing factor giving Japan’s politicians cover for their actions in an emotionally aroused public. In 2003 even as the United States drew closer to China and made concessions to realize multilateral talks, Japanese were obsessed with the abduction issue and remained quite aloof in the diplomacy over the nuclear crisis. Koizumi drew closer to the United States and seemed to operate more through bilateral talks and, for a time, trilateral ones including South Korea, while feeling out of place in the larger format with its lack of focus on the abductions. His shift away from bilateral talks with the North in the fall of 2002 to bilateral pressure with the United States and appeals to South Korea to join came as a blow to China. In late October 2003 as diplomacy intensified after the first round of Six-Party Talks, Chinese sources reported that the hysteria of the Japanese public and tougher talk about inspections and revisions of the currency law left Japan more on the side of pressure than of dialogue. Politicians known for attempting to improve ties with the North had become targets inside Japan.13 Analysts decided that Japan’s response to the crisis was to view it as a golden opportunity to remove the barriers to its military power. Instead of fearing a nuclear attack by the North and turning to China and the South to use their connections to defuse the threat and to the United States to seek a compromise, leaders found it convenient to use the threat to transform Japan’s national will with an eye to competition with China. Chinese depict Koizumi as bent on raising Japan’s influence on the Korean peninsula. At first, this did not seem to be under U.S. direction

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or against China’s interests. Koizumi’s visit to Pyongyang in September 2002 received high marks in China as in Russia and South Korea. His May 2003 agreement with Bush to launch inspections and apply pressure against the North; however, was targeted at boosting Japan’s military influence over Korea. and showed that he was ready to seize every chance to advance Japan’s power. He focused on the hostage issue regardless of the effect on multilateral talks, searching for ways to apply pressure as Japan’s only hope to boost its modest role.14 On June 17, 2003 Chinese concluded that the month-long effort to forge a trilateral consensus to press North Korea had fallen apart. Driven by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, U.S. pursuit of multilateral pressure had stumbled as South Korea balked and Japan indicated that it was not ready either. Although Japan’s policy had moved to the right, it was still distant from the United States in dealing with NEA. Its own interests dictated that it did not let the United States decide how it deals with Asia or close the door to normalization with North Korea.15 China credited Japan’s contribution at this juncture of the crisis, but later grew much more critical as Koizumi sided more fully with Bush. Chinese writers praised Koizumi’s second visit to Pyongyang on May 22, 2004, calling it a big success. Supposedly, it put pressure on the United States, showed that Japan could deal with a flexible Pyongyang, brought success at home through the return of five hostage family members, put relations back on the road to normalization, and even had a positive impact on reaching a resolution of the nuclear crisis. 16 Of course, such analysis omitted the grim details of the summit and was part of an effort to put a positive spin on all contacts with the North as talks progressed. Yet, both before and after the summit Japan’s motives in Korean relations aroused suspicion. Chinese warned that Japan seeks perpetual separation as a means to avoid taking historical responsibility and as justification for becoming a military power. If Japan was seen as unable to accept the U.S. intention of relying on pressure that could lead to a limited military strike and more than the United States seeking normalized ties with the North and a multilateral consensus,17 it was also viewed as aiming to break through the fetters of its postwar status, for which the North provides an excuse.18 This ambivalent judgment reflected uncertainty about Japan’s role, a sense that in the spring of 2004 Japan exerted some positive influence on the United States in the third round of talks but that it was mostly playing a more negative role. The Chinese posture on the Korean crisis was shaped by internal analysis that U.S.-Japan ties since Bush took office are directed at a longterm military alliance to contain China.19 Even if there may be some

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differences between a Japan seeking more independence and a United States wanting to exert more control, a shared view of regional security is likely to reduce friction, as seen in the North Korean crisis. Although in 2003 Hu Jintao had responded to this growing challenge with a cautious strategy to reassure others of China’s peaceful and cooperative intentions, the leadership in 2004 was more impatient and more critical of both Japan and the United States. Considering the possibility that the United States would no longer be tied down in Iraq and Japan would have revised its constitution as it upgraded its military, China foresaw a more formidable combination ahead. Some in China see a linkage between the Korean peninsula and Taiwan. After all, it was war on the Korean peninsula that led to the U.S. commitment in 1950 to Taiwan’s defense, and despite the shift in diplomatic recognition in the 1970s prospects for reunification with Taiwan cannot be divorced from the extent of cooperation between the United States and China over North Korea. Looking back further, Japan’s advance began in Taiwan and proceeded to Korea, and Japan still focuses on both areas as part of its security perimeter with changes in one having possible ramifications for the other. If the North Korean nuclear crisis is a pretext by the Bush administration to reshape NEA that has had the intended impact of drawing Japan closer as a military ally and dividing it further from China,20 then one objective is to use North Korea’s negative image to swing Japan behind the defense of Taiwan, creating an atmosphere of strategic division in the region. Chinese officials insisted that the United States and Japan should not demand from North Korea what it could not deliver and should help it to become a normal member of international society.21 If Japan applied pressure in this case, despite the North’s interest in positive incentives to reach a deal, then it might be emboldened to try to apply pressure over Taiwan as well. As Sino-Japanese relations deteriorated in 2005, coordination in dealing with the nuclear crisis suffered. Sankei shimbun reported that People’s Daily accused right-wing forces in Japan of using the crisis to make Japan a military great power, doubting Japan’s interest in finding a peaceful resolution and its motives for thrusting the abduction issue into the Six-Party process.22 With China and South Korea supposedly reflecting anti-Japanese movements, Sankei saw the situation as increasingly favorable for North Korea to exploit, while the Chinese regarded Japan’s failure to create a positive regional climate as a factor negatively impacting the negotiating process. When Chinese spoke of how Japan could prepare for a role in North Korean reforms and resume the appeals to Pyongyang that were tried in 2002 as independent diplomacy, they

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found some interest among diplomats, but little among the increasingly powerful conservative LDP leadership and the security officials. With Sino-Japanese relations still deeply troubled, divergent responses to the North Korean missile tests of July 2006 threatened to make matters worse. Japan readied a strong sanctions resolution invoking Article 7 with its potential for military action in the Security Council as China made its opposition clear and sent a mission to Pyongyang. Japan’s leaders went so far as to discuss a preemptive strike against the North’s missiles, and Abe Shinzo rode this rhetoric to an invincible lead in the race to succeed Koizumi. There was a sharp exchange between the two as China feared that the door to military action would be opened. Only with the help of the British and French was a compromise found, dropping Article 7 but getting China to agree to sanctions. Yet, even as some in China were prone to criticize Japan’s new assertiveness, sober thinking prevailed. China worked with Japan and others to find compromise wording that still criticized the North. China cautioned Japan against calling for the Other Four and the United States to meet without the North at the ASEAN Regional Forum to consider economic sanctions. Moreover, it agreed on July 28 to allow Japan to introduce the kidnapping issue at the Six-Party Talks should they reconvene. Instead of exacerbating distrust, the two states had found common ground, helping to boost trust just as Abe was preparing to win LDP support as the next prime minister and discussing with Chinese officials how to start his tenure with a visit to Beijing and a fresh start to relations.23 Clearly, a debate was under way about the impact of the crisis on Japan and the value of acting to resolve it for cooling Japanese passions and eventually improving Sino-Japanese ties. Frustrated by the North’s missiles and refusal to return to the Six-Party Talks as well as the inability of its delegation to meet Kim Jong-il to explain its UN vote, China was cooperating anew with Japan as well as the United States. In 2006 it had imposed financial controls on some North Korean assets in Chinese banks amidst talk of counterfeited Chinese currency.24 If the crisis was deepening, prospects for multilateral cooperation were growing. Success would depend on overcoming doubts in Japan that China so feared instability in the North that it would continue to draw the North closer economically without working in parallel with the United States and Japan on sanctions.25 For China the impact of the crisis endgame on Japan matters. If the North chose to become a nuclear state, Japan might follow. If, on the other hand, the North capitulated, Japan might be emboldened by its

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success to become more assertive with or without its alliance partner. The challenge remains to entice Japan into a multilateral regional format through a compromise agreement that stabilizes the situation in North Korea. The visit of Premier Wen Jiabao to Tokyo in April 2007 was a public relations success that highlighted Chinese eagerness for putting the past behind and working together on challenges such as implementing the February agreement. Abe remained vulnerable for his nationalist outlook on history and isolated preoccupation with the abductions issue, and Wen took the high ground by pointing the way to becoming part of a regional consensus. China was keen on drawing Japan closer in the six-party process. The Russian Connection North Korea has been a factor drawing China and Russia closer together. As Putin rebuilt Moscow’s relations with the Pyongyang leadership from 2000, this was welcomed by Beijing as the kind of normal great power politics that had been missing since Gorbachev proclaimed “new thinking” in 1986. Still assessing that the Sino-Soviet alliance had been correct to fight for North Korea in 1950–53 and, even as it degenerated into the Sino-Soviet dispute, to stand behind the North in its efforts to block absorption by the South, Chinese accepted the new coordination in dealing with the North as a kind of shared great power responsibility. While Russian relations with the United States drew closer for a time after 9/11, the hard-line United States approach to North Korea a year later was one of many signs to Russia of growing hegemonic tendencies. Reliant on China, it was gratified to become part of the Six-Party Talks and to avail itself of this arena to reactivate great power balancing in NEA. China took advantage of Russia’s sense of isolation in the talks by becoming its closest partner. As the crisis began, North Korea was distant from Chinese calculations. Unlike the hot pursuit of Kim Jong-il by Putin, China’s leaders showed modest interest. After backing the Sunshine Policy as a promising direction, they were not pleased that it was not moving forward. Yet, they saw the United States and North Korea as showing too little flexibility and calculated that they lacked leverage on either. Thus, at the inception of the crisis, they were inclined to let the two confront each other to clean up their own mess. Moreover, there was little expectation that Beijing could shape regional relations around the crisis. Sino-Russian ties suffered some deterioration at the end of 2002 and the start of 2003 when

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Putin reversed a decision to allow Chinese investment in an oil company and welcomed Koizumi’s proposal to redirect a planned oil pipeline from Daqing in China to the Pacific coast, where it would likely heavily serve exports to Japan. Chinese leaders did not think that they had much leverage on North Korea, but they made some efforts with an eye to not damaging U.S. ties and preventing a provocation that would be used to justify the reemergence of the Japanese military. Coordination with Russia was not high at this time, but there was also no sign of concern about Putin’s pursuit of Kim Jong-il, including the mission of January 2003 to find a breakthrough at the outset of the crisis. If Beijing and Moscow failed to work together after the Korean War in dealing with North Korea, it was not likely that after the glue of communism was gone that they could really join hands. Chinese indulged Russia, but did not expect it to have much say in shaping reunification or integration into the regional economy. As Japan increasingly realized that its role was dependent on working with the United States, Russia recognized that it had to rely on China. China knew that Russian plans for establishing Vladivostok as a center for engaging the North or for big projects linking the Russian Far East to both sides of the peninsula were rather harmless daydreaming. Indeed, at a later stage Russia might welcome a united Korea wary of China, seeking to use it for balance. Talk that Russia was the most enthusiastic backer of reunification had overtones of Russia warning Koreans on both sides that China opposed a strong, united Korea due to its hidden hegemonic intentions. Yet, potential differences quickly were left aside. Although they had different notions of regionalism and North Korea’s place in it, they found compelling reason to work together. Putin was a leader China could understand and appreciate. His objectives in boosting ties with Kim Jong-il proved that he is the kind of realist with whom China could forge a great power partnership. Russia’s resistance to the United States in 2004–5 helped to balance the Six-Party Talks. While the United States hesitated to continue with the Agreed Framework in 2001, China and Russia strongly endorsed it. And as the Bush administration in the fall of 2002 pressed South Korea as well as Japan to join in a tough posture over the North’s alleged cheating on that agreement, reinforcing its stance on regional security centered on the United States, Hu and Putin jointly made the case that United States resort to pressure and possible use of force was unacceptable, a more appealing stance in the South. The lines were drawn for two conflicting approaches to the nuclear crisis. In the summer of 2003 after Rumsfeld warned Beijing that its ties with Pyongyang were a litmus test for

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Sino-U.S. relations and was seen as demanding that China help the United States to oust Kim Jong-il.26 Bush rallied Koizumi and tried to rally Roh around pressuring Pyongyang. In contrast, Hu sent Dai Bingguo to Pyongyang with an offer of generous assistance and then to Russia as well as to the United States. With China and Russia blocking the U.S. call for a Security Council resolution condemning the North for leaving the Non-Proliferation Treaty, China’s strategy prevailed and Russia gained a spot in the Six-Party Talks.27 Chinese recognize a split in the United States between those who are appreciative of sincere, diligent efforts to conduct serious negotiations and those who blame China for propping up the North with economic assistance and believe that it is harder to change the North due to China’s support. Chinese insist that economic circumstances and the will of the North are such that critics who argue that pressure would work are deluding themselves. On the contrary, the North is amenable to positive incentives, showing the way to development and a favorable external environment. As the United States grew more impatient, China claimed that its extremely patient handling of the North, offering timely incentives, was having a positive effect. They added that if the United States did more to create a positive atmosphere, the effect would be multiplied, instead of the recurrent setbacks due to harsh comments from the Bush administration. Criticisms of U.S. setbacks to the negotiating process grew more frequent in the first half of 2005. Among the Other Four, Russia was most outspoken in airing the same complaints. Indeed, as the host for the talks the Chinese government exercised some restraint as Russia more freely voiced its disapproval, as if working in tandem. China claimed to be upbeat about the next stages of the Six-Party Talks after the agreement on principles of September 19. Turning to implementation, it stressed sequential actions.28 It also took pains to present itself as striving for good ties with all parties, even coordinating actively with Japan and playing the host role by separating the Six-Party Talks from bilateral ties. In response to suspicion that Sino-Russian coordination has deeper historic significance, Chinese were quick to note that Russia’s role in the talks was the most marginal and that apart from the SCO Beijing did not really see Russia as a major actor in either Southeast Asia, where it was pressing to join the East Asian Summit, or the Korean peninsula. It did not have the clout to influence North Korea despite its aspirations to do so, and its dreams for three-way integration of the Russian Far East, North and South Korea are far-fetched because of its limited economic assets and the geographical realities that favor ties in other directions.

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China has found an effective strategy toward Russia. It has made Russian elites recognize that China’s rise is so fast and Russia’s levers on China are so few that it would be futile to try to balance against China. Moreover, its economic interest in Russia with energy in the lead so far outdistances that of any other Asian state that Russia cannot disregard it. In addition, Chinese coordination on strategic matters contrasts with the indifference or suspicions of others, offering joint benefits. Finally, Chinese have been conciliatory of border and migration issues to the point that Moscow at least has come to appreciate that this constructive approach is a lot better than a troubled border. China’s dream of a revived balanced strategic triangle was dashed by Gorbachev, but this did not mean that China did not patiently pursue Russia even if Russia’s role would be more limited. One goal was to enlist Russia’s support for balance between the two sides on the Korean peninsula and prevention of a North Korean regime collapse or a U.S. alliance advance into the North. Chinese and Russians calculated that they understood North Korea’s leadership best. The security apparatus was a known force, the goal of retaining a strong, domineering state was respected; the paranoia about Western values and market forces undermining the existing order had a familiar ring. Failure for the North Korean regime was construed by many as a blow to the political elites of China and Russia too. The struggle over North Korea resonated with leaders anxious to hold at bay the U.S.-Japanese alliance. Russia had to defer to China’s lead, as China did to Russia’s in Central Asia. This was not an aggressive strategy to use North Korea to disrupt the region. It was not a sign of support for nuclear weapons in the North. Rather it was recognition of the priority of peace and stability in North Korea, preventing sanctions and collapse, and reducing threats. The 1994 Agreed Framework served that purpose, and China and Russia would not be adverse to another deal along similar lines. Many in China and Russia blame the United States for the failure of that framework. They see it along with the U.S. preparations for war with Iraq as the 2002–3 rush to domination out of all proportion to the challenges the United States faced and with serious negative consequences for regional and global security. They regard the North as justified in seeking security guarantees and other benefits to protect the regime and the United States as able to provide them in a manner that would reduce tensions. To fail to act is to be driven by moralist concerns and unrealistic hopes of regime change. In 2007 as Sino-U.S. ties focused on realizing the February 13 agreement, Russia was relegated to leadership of the working group on a

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regional security framework, which was not likely to be taken seriously until the other working groups had succeeded. Its bad ties with the United States and lack of influence over North Korea now were compounded by new Chinese coordination with the United States and even pursuit of Japan. As long as implementation of the agreement was in the forefront, Sino-Russian ties would be secondary. The Overall Regional Context Once the first stage of the crisis had passed and China no longer feared a U.S. military operation following the march into Iraq, it could stick closely to its priority on maintaining peace and security on the peninsula in a way that raises China’s profile. Thus, the second stage of the nuclear crisis saw plans based on convincing both sides to compromise with the common denominator becoming acquiescence to multilateralism. Yet, in the third stage of the crisis after the Joint Statement was followed by a widening gulf, regional trust no longer offered much prospect of bilateral cooperation. This increasingly put China in a dilemma. Clinging to the middle ground of asking both sides to change course seemed futile. Now the United States insisted that it was still ready to talk and would be flexible, while the North set preconditions for talks and warned of forceful moves ahead. China would keep a posture of mediator ready to find middle ground, but it might need to shift toward the United States as it had done toward the North earlier in pursuing a comprehensive package. As the North grew more defiant and the United States showed flexibility in late 2006 in coordinating with China, the shift toward five versus one became clearer. In adopting a “good-neighborly” ethic toward Asian countries, Chinese hammer home the price of arrogance. This serves both to underscore the contrast with the Bush administration and to draw attention to Japan’s failure to respect the lessons of history. Beijing is staking its claim to regional leadership based on cultivating traditional ties of friendship, showing respect in personal relations with leaders, generously providing assistance, and making clear the importance of peace and development as shared goals. Chinese spokesmen note that as long as the North has nuclear weapons it cannot expect to have the favorable external environment needed for development, but they place most of the responsibility on the United States to persuade the North by meeting its fundamental needs: promise no preemptive strike, stop pressure for regime change, remove obstacles to normal economic growth, and develop a climate of cooperation and trust. Not only does Beijing seek to

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use U.S. reliance on its help as a lever for a more accommodating position on Taiwan, it also wants to ensure that the Korean outcome will contribute to positive momentum for the reintegration of China and for the regional balance of power. The experience of Six-Party Talks helped to increased Chinese interest in forming a lasting security organization in NEA to coexist with the SCO and the ARF on other sides of China. The talks had demonstrated that all sides agree that only peaceful dialogue can solve the crisis, that progress comes gradually through exchanges of word for word and action for action and acceptance of the need for a multilateral framework bringing the parties into contact, and that hostility is reduced as trust is increased. Some in China suggest the name NEA Security Cooperation Dialogue, but they warn that only a gradual effort will overcome the state of hostilities still present in the region. Even as the North became more isolationist, China did not waver in its multilateral orientation. Chinese aims for the Korean peninsula seek gradual reunification as part of: (1) a security arrangement that reduces U.S. hegemony; (2) a firm territorial understanding that confirms China’s sovereignty over the Yanbian autonomous region in Jilin province; and (3) regional economic integration that affords China maximum openness. The United States and Japan are seen resisting the first goal, both Koreas are seen as wary about the second goal, and North Korea and Russia are viewed as most anxious, but not alone, in fearing the third goal. Reunification would not be easy even if there were a nuclear deal. China views the regime in North Korea as firmly in charge and capable of enduring for a long time. It also expects the opening and reform of the country to proceed slowly. Given these realities, the United States with its human rights pressures and South Korea with its allure for fellow Koreans cannot be welcome as close partners. Instead, China is the logical pivot of North Korean transformation and even of steps in the reunification process. Its steadfastness in peaceful coexistence will give it the upper hand. Although the North has other priorities, China’s lead in commercial integration will likely proceed much faster than the South’s pursuit of industrial integration and especially Japan’s eventual contribution to infrastructural regionalization, U.S. approval for international assistance, and Russia’s minor role centered on labor recruitment. These five economic forces will eventually coalesce with China in the lead. Also, North Korean preference for Chinese assistance in human resource training will add to China’s advantage. Chinese indulgence of Kim Jong-il reflects an outlook on how to resolve the nuclear crisis and steer the process of reunification and the

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evolution of regional strategic cooperation. One element is to show respect to Kim Jong-il and his regime, winning their trust and allowing them to save face as they make concessions. Another element is to boost confidence and a sense of security in order to make it easier for the North’s leaders to risk reform as well as abandonment of the nuclear weapons crutch on which they rely. A third element is to make it clear that at each step of the way there will be tangible material rewards. Few in China expected early resolution of the crisis, but they sought to set in motion a process of reciprocity and forward motion. If South Korea as well as Russia accepted this logic, the United States and Japan were dubious. After all, some suspected that China was interested in propping up the regime, helping it to resist pressure in order to use it as a lever for influence on the peninsula and in the region. In short, China was aiding the North to escape the crisis no less than it was helping the United States to resolve it. In the mid-90s Chinese alienated the Russian Far East, isolated North Korea, failed in a strategy to boost Northeast China, and were still wary of muiltilateralism. A decade later their strategic thinking had matured. Chinese increasingly stress the advantages of creating one large economic space, including the Russian Far East, North Korea, and Northeast China as well as neighboring areas. They argue that China not only has a market for goods from the other areas, but it now has the capital and continues to have the labor. Many specific plans are presented by Chinese researchers to realize these goals. Yet, fears abound in the Russian Far East and presumably in North Korea that the result would be Chinese dominance. If these areas become more market oriented, Chinese will seize the opportunities. If not, nobody else will be interested. Chinese are open to many approaches, but each gives them the edge among wary neighbors. China has long sought an outlet to the sea through North Korea or the Russian Far East for two Northeast provinces, Jilin and Heilongjiang. This would give a boost to the economies of a high priority area and also further economic integration and development within the NEA region with closer linkages to Southeast China, taking advantage of the growing prosperity in that area. Only in the fall of 2005 was China able to sign an agreement with North Korea to establish a transportation corridor from Hunchun in Jilin to Rajin on the coast, including plans for a highway and an industrial zone in Rajin. Hunchun had waited since being declared an open city in 1992 for such an opportunity, but it was doubtful that the North would implement the agreement. After all, it fears being swallowed by the Chinese economy. China envisions a plan for

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NEA that centers on Shenyang as the “dragon’s head’ in Northeast China extending its influence through Harbin to the Russian Far East and through Changchun and Dadong to North Korea, as well as through Dalian to the Yellow Sea and on to South Korea. Given the stronger links between South Korea and the major ports of Shandong province as well as the Tianjin-Beijing nexus at the west of the sea, Shenyang’s spokes would reach mostly overland destinations. Revitalizing economic ties with North Korea between the maritime nexus to South Korea and the overland Sino-Russian nexus would leave the North with little room. In Jilin province there was general awareness that the horrors of North Korea are worse than the Cultural Revolution, but such information was confined to internal reports for high leaders and not allowed to appear openly. As economic ties with the North were growing, the Korean minority in Yanbian was serving more to ease nonmarket ties than to serve as a bridge to South Korea with potential for boosting reforms in the North. China showed no interest in reviving the socialist triangle of NEA, which might in response to the intensified U.S.-Japan alliance lead the region toward bifurcation. It reinforced Sino-North Korean ties, but the goal for regionalism was inclusive not divisive. When Putin seemed to be more assertive about resistance to the United States or even when Roh Moo-hyun magnified South Korea’s role as if it could bypass the United States as some sort of balancer or with an independent approach to North Korea, Beijing showed little interest. It kept its eye on the big regional picture for an eventual deal with the United States that would accept the North in a multilateral framework. It also sought to leave no precedent for sanctions that could be applied against it in case a crisis arose over Taiwan or by strengthening the hands of those in the United States and Japan who would be emboldened by success with the North to take a hard-line in defense of Taiwan. U.S. neoconservatives overestimate U.S. power, facing Russia with its nuclear weapons and energy supplies and China with its booming economy and appeal as the emerging second global power. Hopes for pressuring Russia not to reassert its balance of power ambitions faded with Putin’s firm centralization of power and the explosive rise in energy prices. And hopes for pressuring China to force North Korea to abandon its nuclear programs without major U.S. concessions confront China’s multidirectional economic diplomacy that keeps drawing more countries closer as well as the rapidly intertwining nature of the United States and Chinese economies. Neither Russia nor China is very vulnerable to economic pressure, whose application would reverberate badly on the

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U.S. and the global economy. Officials in Beijing have recognized some benefit from working with the United States closely, but they have not felt the heavy weight of pressure. The decision to squeeze the North came not be to satisfy the United States, but due to the North’s rejection of the Chinese multilateral strategy and its potential destabilization of the region. China’s central role in the talks served its antihegemony objectives. Recognizing that the United States shares common interests in a nonnuclear Korean peninsula and stability, Chinese welcomed the Bush assessment that bilateral relations were the best they had ever been, even if some found it rather superficial and did not trust things to stay that way. Both at the top and among foreign policy elites in general, respect for the United States had declined. Resentment against U.S. pressure resembled feelings toward the Soviet Union in the 1980s. U.S. handling of North Korea was not seen as principled or consistent. It was deemed to be a way to retain power in the region. If China could demonstrate that it is a responsible power and accept the constructive presence of the United States in the region without conceding on its core interests, China could continue its rise in an environment of regional stability.29 Yet, there was disagreement about how much regional stability suited Sino-U.S. relations, since some destabilizing elements gave China leverage over the United States. Once the North had tested a nuclear weapon, however, the shared goal of stability took center stage, as Chinese leaders grew more confident that the United States would rely on it. China’s views on a peace regime and the process of reunification stand sharply opposed to the Bush administration’s reasoning. Likewise, on themes linked to the balance of power in NEA—the U.S. role, China’s rise, regionalism, and so on—the differences are pronounced. Yet, given the high costs of a deepening crisis, which involves a nuclear-armed North Korea, there are strong incentives to find a compromise. By the beginning of 2007 China was positioned to be the driving force in the Six-Party Talks, deciding how much pressure to apply on the North and how responsive the process should be to U.S. policies. As North Korea nervously watched the growing consensus, they warily searched for common ground in forging five versus one to stop its nuclear program and also to establish a lasting framework for the region.

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CHAPTER 7

The Japanese Response: The Nuclear Crisis

J

apan has tried four distinct approaches to North Korea over half a century. For the longest period it bought peace, standing by as large cash flows from Korean-Japanese went to the North and relying on various forms of deferential informal diplomacy. Briefly in 1971–74, again in 1989–92, and especially in 2002, it turned instead to fast-track efforts to achieve bilateral normalization. This combined respectful diplomatic appeals with talk of generous financial assistance, recognized as a substitute for reparations payments in a manner similar to what had been agreed with South Korea in 1965. A third approach was to rely on the alliance with the United States to defer any aggressive moves by the North, and this acquired a new character after 1998, for example, through joint development of missile defense. Finally, with participation in the Six-Party Talks from 2003 Japan has become involved in multilateral diplomacy, which had the lowest priority. even in 2007 when the United States changed course and Japan found itself isolated. Since no unification could be expected within the foreseeable future and the United States provided an ironclad guarantee of South Korea’s security, Japan had leeway to explore its own interests. Three were obvious even before the titanic shift in diplomacy with China in 1972, and they gained new impetus afterward. Leaders used talks with the North to pressure the South, eager to add another dimension to the clout growing economic prowess gave Japan in order: (1) to soften the Korean position on its historical occupation; (2) to become a political power that could shape the development of relations between the South and North, since vital security interests were at stake and the United States could not be

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trusted to share them; and (3) to reassert Japan as a regional political power able to deal with China and Russia independently of the United States. The isolated North gave Japan its opportunity, even if the South did not see this as a service on behalf of reunification but as an unwanted intrusion that could reinforce the peninsular status quo.1 More than any other country Japan demonstrated through the cold war repeated interest in triangular ties to South and North Korea. Other great powers were reconciled from the time of the Korean War to an alliance with one or the other. In the two decades after its defeat Japan lacked diplomatic relations with either side, and it conveniently allowed the internal division between parties on the right and left and Korean Japanese communities connected to both Koreas to permit divergent agendas. In 1965 when it established relations with the South it seemed to yield to U.S. pressure to stand firmly on one side, but talk of a twoKorea policy soon intensified. Slow normalization and exploration of a triangular approach when an opportunity arose indicate that the usual explanations for Japanese foreign policy in the cold war era as mercantile state or U.S. ally with a pacifist bent do not apply well to the Korean case. Instead, strategies toward the Koreas provide an early indication of assertive thinking toward Asia. Why was a balanced Korean triangle important for Japan? First, many on the left and right of the political spectrum agreed on the desirability of gaining leverage on the South and making a bold move toward the North. Whereas in policies toward the United States and China the two sides were split and toward Russia they both largely accepted the status quo, Korea alone brought agreement on trying something new. Here we see the beginnings of consensus even at the political extremes that chafed under the status quo. Second, the Korean peninsula, where the Asian mainland begins and where the projection of national influence seems most essential, had high priority for Japan but had slipped to a secondary concern for the United States, making it easier to take a risk. Third, in the early 1970s and early 1990s international relations were in flux and Seoul was exploring new approaches to Pyongyang too. Contemplating neither reunification nor collapse, Japan’s leaders searched for a new approach beyond what any other party deemed possible. Even as relations with Seoul advanced after Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro’s state visit in January 1983 and a large loan package, Tokyo kept resisting Washington’s plans for forging a genuine three-way alliance under U.S. leadership and annoying the United States in its contacts with Pyongyang.2 Both the political left with animus to the South and sympathy to the North and the political right, which also inordinately

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criticized the South, expressed little guilt toward Koreans, unlike the atmosphere of guilt toward China. The Seoul Olympics, following democratization, only improved the South’s image marginally, amidst a new quest for a breakthrough with the North as the cold war was abating. After South Korea announced its northern strategy Japan seized the opportunity. The message delivered not only by the Japan Socialist Party but also by major figures from the LDP including Kanemaru Shin, who visited Pyongyang in September 1990, was that Japan would help to legitimate the regime, recognizing it and providing economic benefits. When many doubted that the North could survive, Japan signaled it would help in return for a boost to its great power aspirations. In March 1993 when the North withdrew from the Non-Proliferation Treaty, Japan awakened to a nuclear threat and the failure of its offer of cooperation. There was little to do but to support the United States, pressuring Pyongyang to stop its nuclear program and then supporting a compromise that froze the program in return for the KEDO agreement that was to cost Japan at least $1 billion. Despite consensus that the North would not collapse in the face of the death of Kim Il-sung and economic crisis and that Japan should play an active role in shaping the external milieu as the two Koreas began cooperating, years passed without prospects of a breakthrough. It would not be until 2002 that the next window of opportunity would open. In the meantime, the main trend was for Japan and South Korea to draw closer together with rising expectations;3 yet, mutual understanding was made difficult by Kim Dae-jung’s obsessive Sunshine Policy and Japan’s insensitive preference for historical revisionism. Unlike the situations in the early 1970s and early 1990s, Japan found itself at the back of the pack. Of the five states pursuing the North, it was most fearful of being left behind as a process of reconciliation went forward. North Korea’s leaders focused on the Clinton administration, and the Japanese public became agitated about increasingly credible accounts of past kidnapping incidents that had left innocent Japanese to an unknown fate in the North. It proved frustrating to have to wait as Seoul and Washington informed Tokyo about the progress of their meetings with Pyongyang, and Beijing and Moscow positioned themselves to play a larger role in any transition. In the fall of 1998 Japanese and U.S. leaders as well as the media diverged in responding to the missile test. Just when the Japanese public was aroused and the government was prepared to show its mettle, beginning with suspension of funding for KEDO construction, the United States took a softer line and its media downplayed the event. Japan resumed its KEDO funding, but many

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doubted that its interests were adequately addressed.4 There was no recourse but to talk anew to the North as prospects for pressure grew dim. While momentum remained on the political right to make a stand against it, as a symbol along with China of Japanese weakness, at the end of 1999 a cross-party delegation led by former prime minister Murayama Tomiichi restarted talks after eight years. An opening was eagerly pursued in 2002 when Kim Jong-il chose to encourage Koizumi to develop ties after Bush’s rhetoric grew more threatening. The impact of North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs on Japanese foreign policy was felt at several points. In 1993–94 the first nuclear crisis was one factor that undermined the left’s post–cold war idealism that security takes a back seat to community, and when the United States moved for a time toward UN sanctions and preparation of a military response Japan’s leadership had to reconsider limits to the bilateral alliance. Along with China’s nuclear tests in 1995–96 and its assertiveness in the Taiwan missile crisis of March 1996, North Korea played the key role in reviving security as a focus in thinking about Asia, drawing Japan closer to the United States and to constitutional revision. The 1998 firing of a Taepongdo-1 missile over Japan came amidst heightened media coverage of alleged kidnapping and concern about U.S.-China relations bypassing Japan. The response was to join the U.S. missile defense program and broaden other strategic cooperation while seeking to raise Japan’s profile on security through closer ties to South Korea. Soon the North’s impact took a different form, as the South moved energetically with support from China and even the United States to reach a deal with the North that would bolster the North and its reforms. Instead of confidence that the threat from the North was fading, Japan feared its own isolation. Belatedly, it sought to join the process of reconciliation, only to find its efforts out of step with Bush’s tough posture to the North. For five decades Japan had a dual relationship to North Korea: the mainstream LDP largely condemned and stood aloof from the North although individual politicians at times took a strong interest in improving relations, and the Japan Socialist Party managed unofficial ties, playing a role in trade, cultural exchange, ties with Japanese Koreans, and “pipes” that could serve official purposes such as when intraparty delegations explored the way to talks. The left stood for vigorous pursuit of normalization, equal distance with South Korea, praise for aspects of the North’s autonomous development, sympathy for its anti-imperialist, anti-U.S. stance, a frank historical apology, and expanded economic ties. Only as the cold war ended and the left lost clout in Japan did it show concern over human rights issues and only after the nuclear issue arose

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was the North’s military posture a problem. This informal channel to North Korea proved useful for both sides, helping Pyongyang establish a flow of economic resources and Tokyo resolve thorny disputes over fishing and Japanese prisoners in the North or start negotiations on political ties.5 In 2002 the left was discredited for denying that the North had kidnapped Japanese, now acknowledged by Kim Jong-il. Yet, in pursuing secret diplomacy, Koizumi had made use of its informal channels. After rallying behind Koizumi in September 2002, the left was marginalized, as the right became invigorated. In 2001 Koizumi pledged full support for the U.S. war against terror without much opposition at home or in Asia, while a North Korean vessel that had intruded into Japan’s territory and fired at a Japanese ship in pursuit was sunk to much fanfare. Yet, when Bush made his axis of evil statement, Koizumi hesitated to show support. After all, it came when Japan had only recently overcome tensions with South Korea over a textbook controversy and saw an opportunity to boost ties as the cohost of the World Cup, and Japan was stressing a regional strategy of cooperation with China and, by spring, secret talks with the North. When Koizumi learned in late August of the North’s highly enriched uranium program he kept his eye on the planned summit of September 17. The potential for divergence was at its peak; Koizumi pursued Pyongyang and Bush prepared to confront the North with evidence of its cheating on its commitments. The First Stage of the Crisis The fall of 2002 brought three stunning developments for strategic thinking about the peninsula: the September Koizumi visit to Pyongyang, the October start of the nuclear crisis, and the December election of Roh Moo-hyun as president backed by a leftist base aroused by anti-Americanism and critical of existing networks of accommodation with Japan that drew on persons seen as collaborators and Japanesespeaking veteran assemblymen. Korea was now critical in Japan’s foreign policy agenda and its relations with the United States. No longer could officials count on separately handling ties to South and North Korea or isolating ties with China and Russia from events on the peninsula. A comprehensive, forward-looking strategy was needed. Yet, the return of abductees and images of family members left behind and those reported to be dead dominated the news. In 2002 a vision guided those in Japan, notably leading LDP politician Fukuda Yasuo and Foreign Ministry official Tanaka Hitoshi, pursuing better ties with North Korea. They saw increased interest in the North,

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troubled by U.S. actions after 9/11, in improving ties, as well as encouragement from the South in contrast to its suspicions in 1990 and 1995 when Japan had made overtures to the North. Moreover, they pictured the North as ripe for normalization in accord with the well-tested model, whereby Japan’s economic power overcomes its past. A breakthrough would both boost Tokyo’s leverage with Seoul and Beijing and lead to a leadership role around the Japan Sea rim. At a time of diplomatic impasses in Asia, this would be critical for Japan’s geopolitical revival, but it was kept secret until the last moment for fear that Bush would try to block it.6 In September 2002 the logic of the left seemed to prevail. Most papers and journals offered positive reasons for why Koizumi’s forthcoming visit to Pyongyang would be a geopolitical breakthrough and then for a time why it indeed had been a great success. One writer concluded that North Korea had changed and Koizumi’s visit would speed its soft landing, having failed to notice China’s new pragmatism, Japanese now had an opportunity to cooperate with it and draw the North into a new structure.7 Similar views reappeared over the next two years. When Bush in early 2004 appeared to be rigid and Koizumi resumed talks with the North, some argued that it was a sign of autonomous diplomacy that would serve Japan well.8 The second Koizumi visit to Pyongyang in May elicited less optimism than the first, but, somewhat desperately, old hopes were echoed. The concept of regionalism captured the hopes of the few voices on the left continuing to be heard in the cacophony of accusations against the North after September. It conveyed sympathy with China’s pursuit of regional ties, optimism that the North would respond to a regional appeal promising it peace and development, and cooperation with the South’s energetic calls for NEA regionalism. The fact that the United States was wary of this was more a plus than a minus for the left, while the idea that China insisted on positioning itself at the center of the region was overlooked. Instead, when North Korea signaled an interest in reaching an agreement with Japan, as allegedly happened in late April 2004, this was taken as proof of realism about economic assistance and a desire to clear away the abduction issue in order to focus on solving the nuclear one.9 Somehow, a shared consciousness and pursuit of regionalism would become a force for trust and lead to the emergence of a spirit conducive to solving problems, a framework for resolving the crisis, for rallying the Other Four primarily against the mistaken U.S. approach.10 As the crisis began, some argued that the hostage issue could be finessed as personal ties with Kim Jong-il allowed Koizumi to serve as intermediary

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in U.S.-North Korean relations,11 based on the closest ties to the United States and future financial assistance coveted by the North. With Koizumi visiting Pyongyang and Japanese speculating that the United States would attack Iraq and emerge successful to face the North, the idea spread that the timing was right to use the “assistance card” to transform ties with a North under pressure.12 As the abduction issue became the focus, some still argued that Japan should make the nuclear issue its priority and negotiate in close coordination with the United States and South Korea, dangling its economic aid before the North. It should not rely on rosy predictions of the collapse of the North that gave it leeway to play up emotionalism.13 Tanaka Hitoshi’s appointment as deputy foreign minister in December 2002 after, as director general of the Foreign Ministry bureau in charge of the region, orchestrating the September summit and then being subjected to a barrage of hate mail and threats, signaled Koizumi’s determination to pursue dialogue. Yet, talks did not advance due to the North’s distrust after Koizumi in October broke his promise to return the five abductees following visits to their Japanese homes as well as U.S. demands that left him little room to maneuver. Before a confrontational atmosphere with China spread, many continued to look with skepticism on U.S. neoconservative arguments and idealistic claims to be spreading democracy. Without wanting to be associated with the early 2003 bluster in the United States about containing or even attacking North Korea amid plans for regime change, officials and academics talked of cleverly using the situation by acceding to U.S. calls for pressure while helping to steer the United States toward negotiations.14 Given the line-up within the Other Four against any use of military pressure, Japan could find a role as the state most trusted by the United States while also becoming invaluable to others by working to limit such pressure. Tanaka Hitoshi kept alive recently nurtured ties with Pyongyang, asserting that Japan and the United States have different roles and Japan will not exclude dialogue,15 and that Pyongyang had to make a strategic decision to accept great benefits in return for changes in its policy, implying that the United States and Japan also had to make a positive decision in favor of a regional community and suitable rewards.16 Even as Tanaka’s influence waned, his official role until June 2005 left open the possibility of renewed bilateral overtures. On the left journals such as Sekai and Ronza suggested that the essence of the nuclear crisis was whether the United States would impose its will with Japan’s unconditional support or would the post–cold war natural evolution of NEA toward multilateralism be confirmed. This

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view was buttressed by warnings that Koizumi was using North Korea as a pretext for turning Japan to the right and that the effect would be alienation of the South Korean public.17 Many recognized the crisis as a struggle over the essence of Japan’s foreign policy and its postwar uncertainty over national identity. Coming in the midst of a sharp backlash against the North’s handling of the abduction issue, the North’s belligerent rhetoric and nuclear brinkmanship boosted alarmist thinking. This led to growing dependence on the United States, intensified concern about China’s rapid rise, and a widening chasm with the South over strategy. No sooner had the nuclear crisis arisen and Japanese been aroused over the abductions issue, then did the right wing warn of the “hour of death of the North Korean tribe (zoku),” listing the names of officials, politicians such as Tanaka, and academics who had allegedly seen its economy as “paradise on earth” and denied any abductions.18 This agenda served the aims of historical revisionism more than realism in foreign policy. Yet, as the United States hinted at a preemptive military strike or at least sanctions against the North, Japan was loathe to follow. During the first stage of the crisis it was only on May 23 at the Crawford Ranch when Koizumi signed onto a strategy giving equal weight to dialogue and pressure. Bush had pulled back from his early tough posture of an ultimatum with little room for dialogue, and Koizumi had listened to the public demand for a stronger response by agreeing to pressure. Yet, when the two leaders found that other states, especially South Korea and China, insisted on dialogue and their early pressure tactics showed no promise of success, they agreed to the Six-Party Talks. For Japan this was a victory of sorts; for the first time it became a full party to formal negotiations over the future of North Korea. The right wing in Japan kept blaming the Japanese left and weak government policy toward China and South Korea for allowing North Korea to emerge as a threat to international society. There were charges that China acquiesced to nuclear development and that the South’s Sunshine Policy actually inhibited change in the North. Chosensoren, the proNorth organization in Japan that annually delivered vast assistance to it, was seen as decisive in maintaining the system, and the government as having such lax credit controls that it allowed vast public funds to flow to the North. But special blame focused on the mass media and intellectuals for coddling the North and for supposed mind control that leads to Japanese historical atonement consciousness and spinelessness.19 Even before the abduction issue refocused opinion, conservatives had charged that Koizumi was moving too fast toward normalization with a dictatorship

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on its last legs and underselling Japan as a political great power able to achieve more.20 Each time that Koizumi visited Pyongyang, writers for the “Seiron” column in Sankei shimbun noted that the LDP was split in two with many finding these rash actions lacking in strategic rationale. One critic found a parallel to the situation in Korea prior to 1894 when Koreans had lost a capacity to manage their own affairs, which led to the necessity of Japan annexing it in 1910. In contrast to decisive action in that period, this time Koizumi by acting without any strategy is endangering his country.21 Links were made between the pro–North Korean faction (shinchoha) and those at the Foreign Ministry who for years have conducted diplomacy of appeasement based on mistaken values. Instead, Japanese should see their country as a victim of a terror state and use North Korea as an opportunity to toughen its posture in the region.22 As South Korea grew more cooperative with the North, there were warnings that “amateur politics” laced with anti-Japanese and anti-American sentiments as well as pro-North policies obliged Japan to view its neighborhood with a new sense of danger.23 Japanese demands for North Korea honestly to admit what it had done and transfer the persons responsible for the abductions drew retorts calling for honesty and compensation from Japan for its colonial-era rule.24 Few in Japan debated the legitimacy of the North’s demands or the efficacy of Japan’s approach in the face of emotional public opinion. Opposition to Koizumi’s first visit to Pyongyang did not come only from extreme elements. Former Prime Minister Nakasone called the visit a gamble that was not well prepared and lacked mid-term and long-term strategy.25 Even before the North’s uranium enrichment program was exposed, many objected to seeking normalization with a state of this sort, some in fear of undermining Japan’s rising nationalism and pursuit of historical revisionism. Others on the right, however, decided that Kim Jong-il had backed down due to the crisis of his economy and the U.S. military threat and gave the Koizumi administration the benefit of the doubt that it would withhold economic aid and avoid any rush to early normalization.26 Their muted response at first was vindicated when Koizumi in collaboration with Abe Shinzo steered the growing outrage toward more nationalism. Just as some right-wing Americans kept alive hope that the North would soon collapse, the argument that pressure was working and should be intensified appeared in Japan. This was at times coupled with virulent accusations against China, for instance, for welcoming a nuclear North that could be used in place of China to hold Japan in check.27 Realists such as Kitaoka Shinichi regarded U.S. pressure as necessary in a world where countries were acquiring nuclear weapons. Lumping North

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Korea with Iraq, he recognized that this was not a private fight and international society should be united. Yet, he also credited Koizumi for trying to advance ties with the North, and succeeding in getting Kim Jong-il to acknowledge the abductions and apology verbally as well as to return five victims to Japan. Moreover, Koizumi had retracted past excessive demands for normalization, thus opening the door for further talks. As a result, the Japanese people’s consciousness of danger rose, a blow was dealt to the pro-North group in Japan, and the North’s use of Japan for its regime’s purposes was made more difficult.28 Aware that war with the North would cause enormous damage and collapse of the system would bring great disorder, Kitaoka called for avoiding a hard-line extreme. This reasoning helped Japan to distant itself from the United States in 2003 and contributed to an atmosphere that led to the Six-Party Talks. Suspicions that the United States was taking too hard a line were widespread, at least until Koizumi gave his strong support to Bush in May and gave optimism to many on the right about Japan’s rising clout and ability through diplomacy to contain the North. “Victorious” in Iraq, Bush was snubbing some European leaders while rewarding Koizumi with attention, as Japan became the second ally after Great Britain in forging a new world order.29 The cordon of North Korea was tightening, as Japan echoed Bush’s warning that no one would yield to threats.30 At times Japanese critics of accommodation with the North grew nervous that the U.S. might cut a deal with North Korea guaranteeing its security and changing the geopolitical dynamics of the region. Old suspicions of the deals made in 1994 and 1999 with the North and then the Clinton administration’s role in the Sunshine Policy that left Japan sidelined could not be brushed aside. It mattered that Washington was relying ever more on Beijing to resolve the crisis at a time of tense political relations between Tokyo and Beijing. After the United States failed to make progress in April 2003 in Three-Party Talks that excluded Tokyo and Bush turned away from Beijing to pursue Tokyo in May with plans to pressure Pyongyang, misgivings might have been set aside. Yet, in July when the United States made its second set of overtures to Beijing, some Japanese were not satisfied just with the prospect that a deal was soon reached whereby their country was to be included in new Six-Party Talks. They feared a nonaggression pact between the United States and the North now that the Iraq War left the United States newly constrained in its actions in NEA. One response on the right was to warn the United States that this would increase the appeal of nuclear weapons in Japan.31 For the most part, however, it meant sticking closely to Bush and welcoming his tough negotiating posture.

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The Second Stage of the Crisis In September 2002 and to a more limited extent in May 2004 Koizumi was welcomed in Pyongyang as someone who might help to convince Bush to moderate his stance on the North. This seemed plausible before the nuclear crisis and abduction issue hardened Japanese public opinion, and it was not totally inconceivable in the spring of 2004 when Koizumi was known to be urging Bush to give diplomacy more of a chance. Yet, mutual trust had slipped, and the May visit was replete with mutual snubs barely disguising the minimal nature of a deal for family members of former hostages to depart in return for humanitarian assistance. Not an active force in the Six-Party Talks, Japan exploited the North’s threatening image for domestic politics and sided with the United States. The dilemma for Japan in the fall of 2002 even before the abductions issue preoccupied the public was how could it proceed with talks with North Korea when the United States refused all dialogue after it exposed the North’s uranium enrichment work.32 While there was some handwringing over the loss of prospects that had seemed promising in September, even without the abductions matter it is likely that Japan would have sided firmly with the United States while playing a somewhat more active role in trying to bridge the differences with South Korea. For those who expected more there was a tendency to overrate Japan’s economic assistance card that would soon be recognized as of little value due to North Korea’s obsession with security before economics. Japan may have found that one reason it was hard to make progress in relations was because it was not as generous in paying for meetings as South Korea and China were. It did not offer much for its September 2002 meeting, and the North was in no mood to let it off as cheaply as Russia, a long-time ally. It paid some for the May 2004 meeting, but the North did not offer much in return. Earlier Koizumi had kept open his options for both dialogue and pressure, even after tilting toward pressure. In May 2004 he agreed with Kim Jong-il that the Pyongyang Declaration was still in effect and appeared to promise no economic sanctions if the North kept its moratorium on missile launches. At the G-8 summit in June he urged Bush to proceed with dialogue; yet at the end of 2004 with Japanese public opinion hardening over North Korea’s deception on the abduction issue the tilt toward sanctions became pronounced.33 As the only one of the Other Four with few direct contacts with the North, Japan’s profile in the crisis was fading. If China has been the country with the most potential to shape the dynamics of the talks and in the summer of 2005 South Korea grabbed

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that role, Japan in the first half of 2004 had some aspirations too. By then it was clear that the United States had not secured a clear victory in Iraq and, thus, was less of a military threat toward the North. This led to talk in Japan that the United States would have to soften its negotiating strategy. With economic sanctions in doubt, one idea was a return to the 1994 formula of a freeze, but with a tighter inspection system in return for supplies of energy and other assistance. This sort of Clinton-era thinking held out hope that this time Japan would gain a significant role as the abductions issue was soon overcome in order for the North to obtain essential Japanese assistance to rebuild its economy.34 The May summit, in fact, did not have such potential, but the burst of speculation shows the desperation by some to revive Japan’s diplomacy after it had become marginalized. Voices on the left praised the decision by Koizumi to return to Pyongyang after twenty months, suggesting that Japan is uniquely able to persuade Kim Jong-il to break the impasse in the SixParty Talks. China, the United States, and South Korea have all failed, and the value of Japan has risen. The North is feeling the loss of irregular funds and smuggling revenues from “backdoor” economic dealings with Japan and, more than ever, needs the large-scale financial assistance Japan is prepared to offer. Giving North Korea the benefit of the doubt, idealists suggested that the North had saved face with Koizumi’s visit and could now proceed in quest of Japan’s economic assistance as it really intended merely by reinvestigating the cases of the dead hostages. Able to play its big card, Japan would no longer find North Korea hinting that it should be ousted from the Six-Party Talks. Instead, Japan could make use of its close ties to the United States and assume a central position able to shape first the talks and then a new regional order.35 This thinking could still be seen in the fall. One Korea expert writing in the Asahi shimbun noted that so far North Korea had stuck to a posture of dealing with the United States on security and Japan on economic cooperation; now that the North sees that concessions from the United States on security are difficult Japan’s role may become the pivot in negotiations.36 As opposed to Sankei shimbun’s charge that Koizumi’s visit and generous aid were a betrayal,37 Asahi shimbun saw signs of the North respecting Japan’s substantial influence now that its dependence on the United States had diminished. With relations with Washington not progressing, it would use Japan as an independent force that could persuade Bush or his successor in 2005.38 Still others took an intermediate position, suggesting that the summit reflected a softening in Tokyo’s stance that could break the logjam at the Six-Party Talks.

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Critics on the right, such as Ozawa Ichiro, faulted Koizumi for paying a huge “ransom” in food and medical aid to recover five victims of terror. Just when February 9 legislation had given the government the tools to forbid port calls and the transfer of money, Koizumi turned away from economic sanctions.39 Further doubts came over the summer of 2004 when Koizumi helped to raise expectations for the Six-Party Talks at the June third round and pursuit of the North continued with a comment that his two foreign policy priorities in his remaining time as prime minister were Russia and North Korea. But given the North’s refusal to attend planned working group meetings, hopes faded until they finally collapsed with reports that the remains returned to Japan were not those of an abducted Japanese woman. As Pyongyang failed to provide information on those it had conceded in 2002 had been abducted and could not explain these remains, voices on the right grew bolder in favor of economic sanctions. Even before others wearied of discussions aimed at reconvening the Six-Party Talks, Japan was the first to lose hope in the process and to make it clear there would be no repeat of overtures to the North. In the first half of 2005, others, including the United States, worked to dissuade Japan from imposing sanctions. On the Japanese right the belief was spreading that economic sanctions should be used, although the timing was in dispute with Koizumi asking for restraint for the time being as he made clear his interest in coordinating with Bush. Yet, in early summer Japan was again faced with a spurt of diplomacy that left it behind. This second wind for the negotiating process aroused some interest in the more concrete ideas under diplomatic scrutiny. A report of the Japan Institute of International Affairs in July 2005 noted that an understanding had been reached on some sequencing and on security guarantees and economic assistance as part of a large comprehensive package, but it warned that big differences existed in the goal of the talks, the timing of steps, and even the process that should unfold. Compared to the Japanese government’s reluctance to focus on compromise steps that might go beyond the U.S. position, the report noted that a freeze should come first as part of a phased dismantling matched by rewards. Distinctive to Japan’s thinking, one focus was elimination of both Rodong and Taepodong missiles.40 Having in the third round of talks emerged as a separate force from the United States that could provide energy assistance to the North as part of a package deal or, on the contrary, could raise the specter of unilateral economic sanctions that could change the dynamics of the crisis, Japan had reason to take into

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account the impact of its moves on the other actors. The report called on it to step up coordination in support of China’s leading efforts. Japanese media warned that the Six-Party Talks in the summer of 2005 had acquired a new form with Japan’s presence virtually unnoticed. Indeed, it seemed to be changing the subject rather than focusing on the talks. When in July 2005 others were anticipating forthcoming talks as diplomacy intensified, Japanese coverage was distracted by other options for dealing with the North or the abduction issue. It was not taking seriously the prospect of a compromise solution. In place of an equilibrium of three versus three that had existed, an imbalance of two versus four had formed,41 leaving Japan in danger of becoming isolated, as happened early in 2007 when the United States showed flexibility. The Japanese government never had much hope for the Six-Party Talks, aware that its role was minor. It approached them with the idea that being excluded, as occurred in the Four-Party Talks of 1996, would be worse. It saw the United States as the power that really mattered for the North and as barely tolerant of the temporary expedient of the SixParty Talks while giving more weight to coordination with Japan. Comments from both the left and right media exaggerated Japan’s potential for shaping the end of the nuclear crisis. In contrast to sober foreign and government views that it had little leverage, these sources kept anticipating a new, substantial role. The Third Stage of the Crisis In the spring of 2004 when the South Korean National Assembly elections were harshly received (to the degree that some warned the result would be to extend the Kim Jong-il regime), the United States was preoccupied with Iraq, and Sino-U.S. ties suggested coordination more than conflict, the inclination of some in Japan to proceed to sanctions threatened to set their country apart.42 Koizumi’s visit to Pyongyang delayed that prospect, and when the call for sanctions burst forward more ominously late in the year there were warnings that they might wreck the Six-Party Talks,43 as other states were still focusing on talks. Handling of the investigation into the fate of the ten persons recognized as having been abducted but not returned in 2002 became the litmus test of North Korean conduct. When remains were discovered in December 2004 to not match those of the abducted Japanese from whom they were said to originate, the outcry undercut the faction in Koizumi’s camp in favor of dialogue. Having promised to withhold sanctions as long as the North observed the 2002 Pyongyang Declaration,

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Japan was now free to act by the failure to cooperate in clarifying the abductions.44 Koizumi’s popularity was slipping for a time, and Abe loomed as aspiring LDP prime minister with a call for exerting pressure. While the Foreign Ministry appeared passive and others raised doubts about the reactions of other states to economic sanctions, support for Abe’s position grew. Japan could not only freeze the humanitarian assistance offered since the May summit in Pyongyang, but also stop trade and financial dealings and seek UN support for economic sanctions. One poll in the Tokyo area showed 72 percent for economic sanctions, 22 percent opposed.45 The United States left no doubt about its rejection of any deal without an incontrovertible commitment by the North to eliminate all nuclear weapons, and Japan’s stance hardened to demand that the North identify and turn over those who had kidnapped Japanese citizens. In response, North Korea demanded that Japan turn over workers for Japanese NGOs who assisted those fleeing its territory.46 Talk of unilaterally imposing economic sanctions intensified when it seemed unlikely that North Korea would return to the talks after its February 2005 claim of having become a nuclear power. As Richard Armitage, now former deputy secretary of state, spoke of cracking down on drug trafficking that benefits the North’s leadership, Abe insisted that Japan could crack down on seafood imports without Kim Jong-il daring to risk his regime on a harsh response.47 In late July 2005 Japanese sought to include the abductions issue in the fourth round of Six-Party Talks to the consternation of China, South Korea, and Russia. With the talks progressing, however, Japan then used restraint, avoiding mention of economic sanctions and reopening its own bilateral talks with the North. Yet, pessimism about Japan’s role and nervousness about where the Six-Party Talks might be headed led Yomiuri shimbun to argue that this framework for Japan was a “doubleedged sword.”48 Isolated from the rest of the Other Four, Japan waited to play its diplomatic card of economic assistance, raising the abduction issue as well as the North’s short-range missiles only in a bilateral framework. If most eyes would be fixed on the first normalization between the United States and North Korea, the second normalization with Japan would determine if concrete assistance would be provided to the North. The Joint Statement gave critics of Japan’s policies another chance to make their case. After the September 19 statement, academics in Japan who regarded it as a success debated what significance to attach to it. Calling it a valuable first step, Izumi Hajime stressed that although one should not be optimistic the time had come for Japan to assume a leading

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role, giving priority to the nuclear issue over the abductions question and considering extremely appealing incentives for North Korea toward a comprehensive resolution and normalization of relations. More positive, Lee Jong-won argued that after more than ten years of nuclear crisis on the Korean peninsula at last the shape of the exit can be seen. The Joint Statement represents a foundation in principle for a comprehensive resolution of the cold war structure on the peninsula, as the United States agrees to peaceful coexistence and normalization and joins others in assisting with energy and supplying a light-water nuclear reactor. With the North’s demands virtually accepted, it will fulfill its promise to abandon all existing nuclear programs. While the stages and concrete steps are unclear, there is now a roadmap, and the United States and North Korea have stepped away from their showdown, each making a strategic decision.49 This shifts attention to Japan to proceed with diplomatic relations and with others to build a new framework for post–cold war NEA. Lee draws a parallel with the Helsinki Accord’s three baskets for security, economic cooperation, and human rights cooperation, adding that, aware of the parallels, Condoleezza Rice in China in July explored the possibility of making permanent the six-party structure. Now it is time for parallel movement in bilateral talks and the six-party meetings, Lee added, as Japan shows vision beyond the abductee issue. While more reserved than Lee, Okonogi Masao welcomed the new realism in U.S. policy in September 2005, noting that the North cannot be treated as Libya was. Threats cannot work because its nuclear development is for regime survival and comes from regime weakness. By guaranteeing the other side’s security through a long-term and multistage process in which the promise of a light-water reactor is relevant, the scene is set for a diplomatic breakthrough. Okonogi suggested that in the first stage a freeze on nuclear activity would be matched by energy assistance, in the second stage normalization of Japan and U.S. ties with the North would occur, and in the final stage the North would obtain a light-water reactor while simultaneously completely eliminating its nuclear weapons and development. He even predicted that the ideal timing is for Bush to strike this deal before the November 2006 elections in order for his North Korean diplomacy not to appear as a failure. Before Koizumi ended his term in office that fall, parallel progress on Japanese-North Korean relations and the abduction issue would be possible, leading to a third Koizumi visit to Pyongyang to propel an agreement forward. All welcomed the fact that North Korea agreed to abandon all nuclear weapons and plans, but media editorials varied in the warmth with

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which they greeted the agreement.50 Asahi shimbun was positive, praising the U.S. direct talks with the North and China’s hard work that brought results. It saw no alternative to tenacious negotiations to reach a breakthrough, taking the Joint Statement as proof that the United States was changing, ceding to China and South Korea leadership on the Korea question and moving toward accepting an Asia-centric region. Arguing that there is no choice but to deal with the North, it noted that the U.S. position has weakened and newfound U.S. flexibility is realistic.51 Giving China credit for its diplomacy and expecting a continued leading role for the South, Asahi was calling on Japan to awaken to the new realities, even as it advised the government to continue to press the North on the abductions. Mainichi shimbun praised the Joint Statement as a roadmap showing the way for long-term peace in NEA, crediting a softening in the U.S. position and China’s hard work as mediator. Yomiuri shimbun also welcomed a step forward, even if it showed a lack of confidence in the North’s actions to go beyond the promised words. Nihon keizai shimbun praised the first success of the Six-Party Talks, opening the way to resolving the nuclear crisis through talks, while arguing that the North after secretly trying to develop nuclear weapons must not be allowed peaceful use of nuclear power. In contrast, Sankei shimbun took a sober view, warning that until the North’s attitude was tested no grounds for satisfaction existed. At the extremes, Asahi urged moving forward “realistically” with normalization and economic assistance if the North made a big decision on the abductees and pressed to put the nuclear issue first, while Sankei was toughest, giving equal weight to both issues and offering no economic assistance until nuclear weapons were completely eliminated. Now a private citizen, Tanaka Hitoshi appealed repeatedly in the fall of 2005 for a new posture toward the North in bilateral talks. Seizing the agreement on a Joint Statement as an opportunity, he argued that the U.S. posture had become more realistic and flexible, focusing on the concrete goal of confirming elimination of nuclear weapons, and that the new statement should be recognized as a great success of the SixParty Talks. The situation has changed for Japan, he insisted. Pyongyang is refraining from direct criticism of Koizumi or repudiating the joint declaration with him of 2002 and expects to proceed with normalization talks. Given his secure political base following the Diet Lower House election in September, he can pursue persistent, calm negotiations. The Foreign Ministry in North Korea has to take care not to delve deeply into the abduction issue for fear of exposing the special service organs that along with the military wield power, argued Tanaka as he implied

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that Japan should be prudent in what it demands. He added, Pyongyang understands that with no progress on the abductee issue it cannot obtain economic assistance from Japan; so Japan need not fear that turning to other issues will send the wrong message. If it showed restraint, it still had a chance to rise to the center of diplomacy. While noting a strong hard-line faction in Pyongyang and many voices pressing for economic sanctions in Tokyo, Tanaka saw a chance to bridge the differences. He recalled the pains taken from the fall of 2001 to prepare for Koizumi’s visit to Pyongyang and welcomed Japan’s shift in the new round of talks with the North from single-minded preoccupation with the abductee question to comprehensive themes. Tanaka saw promise only in building a broad framework for advancing relations, adding that the North expects Japan to play the role of bridge to the United States in the SixParty Talks.52 Tanaka’s optimism was not widely shared even before the atmosphere for further Six-Party Talks deteriorated at the abortive fifth round. One journal warned of the folly of Tanaka’s attempt to have Koizumi make a third visit to North Korea. 53 His critics charged that he was a stalking horse for a Foreign Ministry again ignoring the national interest instead of reinforcing U.S. resolve and intensifying pressure on the North. Immediately after the Joint Statement and agreement for talks with Pyongyang after many days of discussion on the sidelines of the fourth round of talks, there was renewed interest in normalizing relations by building on this momentum.54 Yet, there were three fundamental obstacles. One, the United States, Japan’s close ally, remained opposed to the pursuit of other issues until the nuclear question was resolved. Two, the North argued that the abductee issue had been settled and was not inclined to new compromises with Japan, which would not build momentum unless the nuclear dispute were over. Finally, the Japanese public was not prepared for any serious bilateral moves on other issues until abductee concerns were satisfied. Insisting on no normalization or economic assistance until all abductees were returned and suspected ones fully explained as well as the criminals who took them sent to Japan for prosecution, hardliners demanded that even if there was an agreement for the North to abandon its nuclear weapons program and for others to supply energy Japan should stand alone and refuse economic cooperation.55 This occurred against the background of China moving vigorously to expand investment and trade with the North, importing goods previously sent to Japan and trying to draw it into China’s orbit.56 As Japan’s trade shrunk from 23 to 7 percent of the North’s total from 2000 to 2004, China’s rose to nearly half of the total. Some said that already Japan’s

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economic sanctions had begun or that it had lost the leverage to deliver a decisive blow to the North or even to keep its relevance. South Korean trade with the North had been close to the Chinese level, fallen behind from 2002 to 2004, and was rising again in an attempt to keep up, but Japan’s fell below the level of Thailand’s.57 This showed that sanctions would not work; even an estimated $40 million of transferred funds were far below their earlier levels.58 New rules requiring ships to have insurance were having an impact. In the third stage of crisis the response was similar to U.S. malign neglect of the North with more forthright denial of the prospects for negotiations and talk of economic sanctions. Talks with North Korea resumed with three issues uppermost: abduction, missiles, and nuclear weapons. Since the nuclear issue was handled in the six-party format, the bilateral focus was on learning the fates of ten suspected kidnap victims (the North had said that eight had died and two never entered the county) and reducing the threat of Rodong missiles targeted at Japan, which might become capable of carrying nuclear warheads. Given expectations that Japan would become the foremost donor of economic assistance, some Japanese were again hopeful of their country’s leverage. Yet, conservatives saw little room for optimism, warning that the North would talk with Japan in order to drive a wedge between it and the United States or that the North was just buying time. The leader of the DPJ (Democratic Party of Japan) Maehara Seiji joined in insisting that no rewards be offered until all three issues had been resolved.59 The talks soon failed as the crisis deepened. If optimists reacted to the Joint Statement as a basis for bringing matters back to where they were when Koizumi three years earlier visited Pyongyang and moving toward normalization during his time left in office, their hopes rested on the premise that both the United States and North Korea understand the seriousness of a rupture in negotiations, the North is now prepared in stages to abandon nuclear weapons, and the United States has completely given up the idea of regime change. It would now be necessary for the North to address the abduction issue with sincerity.60 This hope quickly faded, however, when neither the United States nor the North treated the new statement as a foundation for new accommodations. In 2006 as relations with China and South Korea remained poor and Koizumi’s time in office was ending, there was renewed discussion by pragmatic diplomats as well as idealists of setting a new course toward Asia. One criticism was that throughout the crisis Japan had been discussing only the abduction question with the North, while China, South Korea, and even the United States had a wider agenda and would

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welcome a broadening of its talks with the North too. Just as many in Japan, led by the victims’ families, clamored for economic sanctions, some urged Koizumi to pursue a new strategy should the talks reopen in order to play the role of a bridge with the United States.61 The very rightist groups that rejected human rights criticisms of Japan’s historic behavior took the lead in capitalizing on North Korean human rights violations, reporting that these were the worst in the world and included about 200,000 people in forced labor camps.62 Pointing to linkages to China’s poor record, including forced repatriation of North Koreans, they gave the impression of playing the human rights card to counteract Japan’s isolation in the region. An image of hypocrisy could not be avoided. Only in the United States was Japan’s increasing advocacy of human rights welcomed. The Fourth Stage of the Crisis With Abe in the forefront, Japan in the spring and summer of 2006 joined the United States in pressing the North harder on human rights and in finances, as tensions ratcheted upward. Changes in the tax status of pro–North Korean organizations across Japan were one sign of this tougher posture. As U.S. financial sanctions angered North Korea, Abe led others in calling for Japan to impose its own economic sanctions. At first this seemed to equate outrage over abductions to that over counterfeiting in the United States, but after the North’s provocative missile firings in July it put Japan in the forefront of Security Council calls for criticizing the North and consideration of sanctions. The North’s shift toward defiance of all parties diminished the image of Japan as an outlier. With most states at the St. Petersburg G-8 summit in July 2006 focusing on the Iranian nuclear crisis and fighting in Lebanon, Japan reminded the group of the three threats from North Korea—missiles, abductions, and the nuclear issue. It had just won approval in the Security Council for a sanctions resolution. With Abe managing close coordination between the Prime Minister’s Office and the White House, working directly with National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley and not becoming caught in a possible crossfire between Rice and Bolton within the State Department, Japan was satisfied that it had won strong U.S. backing and, despite compromises to pass a resolution, had played a leadership role that played well at home and put it back in the thick of the crisis talks.63 The debate inside Japan intensified in the summer of 2006. In contrast to Abe’s tilt to pressure over dialogue and to the U.S. hard-line

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posture over multilateralism, in July 2006 Finance Minister Tanigaki Sadakazu argued that it was essential to improve ties to China and South Korea and work with them too.64 Others in the middle cautioned that Japan should avoid taking the hardest line and isolating itself. Whipping up nationalism could come at the expense of strategic thinking about Japan’s future in Asia. Japanese weighed various options of responding to a nuclear North Korea from developing their own nuclear weapons to a U.S. surgical strike on the North to tightening sanctions. Yet, amidst the unanimity in editorials calling for strong responses, the themes highlighted by Sankei shimbun were consideration to Japan developing its own nuclear weapons and wide-ranging debate on constitutional reform,65 as opposed to many others who, aware that the U.S. primary concern was proliferation and that China and South Korea were against hard sanctions, suggested that Japan was left without any realistic choice except to intensify all-around diplomacy with more emphasis on a U.S. promise not to attack.66 For instance, Tanaka Hitoshi praised Abe’s October visits to China and South Korea as a basis for expanding coordination in order not to repeat the mistake of letting North Korea adroitly make use of the differences among them as well as the United States.67 Abe reinvigorated Japanese diplomacy at the end of 2006, especially ties to China but not excluding hints of a new compromise position on the territorial dispute with Russia. Instead of constant Sino-Japanese rivalry, a problem-solving atmosphere was now possible, but even the common challenge of a nuclear North Korea could not disguise the divide between Japan’s emphasis on sanctions and the incentives preferred by China, South Korea, and Russia. Chris Hill’s energetic diplomacy, including bilateral meetings with North Koreans, caused alarm in Japan. The U.S. position was changing, and Japan had become isolated. In April 2007 Abe visited Bush and sought assurance that Japan would wield a veto over any deals with the North until the abduction issue was settled. Over the previous months many Japanese analysts had expressed alarm at the February 13 agreement. As long as the negotiating process advanced, Japan was likely to be nervous about the United States deserting it and even to explore a more independent foreign policy. Conclusion The most flux in thinking about North Korea from 2002 can be found in Japan. In September 2002 on the eve of the crisis Japanese analysts were contemplating the most important breakthrough in relations after

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the South’s summit in 2000. In contrast, with increasing intensity Japanese have expressed the most emotional criticisms, suggesting the greatest sense of threat and the strongest justifications for a tough response. Any shift in the U.S. position could have the most ramifications in Japanese strategic thinking. Alternatively, a change in leadership in Japan with a new direction for North Korean policy could reverberate strongly in the United States. Japan retains leverage, as seen in continuing debates over economic sanctions to choke the flow of funds from Japanese Koreans. Japanese felt the frustration of slipping influence on the Korean peninsula after having high expectations for shaping the future of the area. For some it was possible to conceal their disappointment by exaggerating the import of Koizumi’s 2002 and 2004 visits to Pyongyang, overstating the importance of their presence in the Six-Party Talks and their influence on George W. Bush’s handling of Korean security, and, for a time, overestimating the state of relations with South Korea. Dismissive of evidence to the contrary, many argued that Japan had it within its means to change the course of Korean affairs through the lure of economic assistance or threat of sanctions against the North, or the prospects of an FTA and reinforcement of shared values with the South. This avoided candid treatment of Japan’s real problems on the peninsula and how to overcome them. Japan’s response to the nuclear crisis revealed some balancing that could not easily be sustained. One challenge was to balance coordination with the U.S. patient approach with calls at home for immediate economic sanctions. Restraining actual sanctions, the Japanese government found a partial response in a March 2005 law that required all ships over 100 tons to carry liability insurance against fuel spills if they entered a Japanese port, in effect reducing North Korean port visits. Another challenge was to work with South Korea and the United States to maximize joint influence and also serve Japan’s bilateral relations with each state, but this proved difficult and in 2005 Japan opted for the United States in the midst of a downward spiral in relations with the South. A third challenge was to find a way to increase Japanese influence on the SixParty Talks while retaining a tough stance acceptable to the U.S. and the Japanese public. In June 2004 and September 2005 when some flexibility was shown by the United States and Japan was renewing its bilateral diplomacy with the North a degree of balance was achieved, but generally Japan was reconciled to little influence as it relied on the United States. After the North isolated itself, however, its visibility increased in the December 2006 round of talks.

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In the four stages of crisis Japan increasingly followed the hard-line U.S. position, but then was left isolated when in 2007 the United States changed course. If in the first stage there was considerable support for a moderate alternative at least until Koizumi met Bush in May 2003 and in the second stage Koizumi softened his stance in May–July 2004 to get the United States to relax its CVID demands, the third stage saw Japan often take the lead in making demands and issuing warnings to the North. Koizumi proved that Japan had influence on the United States, but he mainly used it to reinforce U.S. recalcitrance. In the fourth stage Abe took the lead in the October sanctions resolution and was ready to keep playing the abductions issue for all the mileage he could get from an aroused public; however, given the U.S. focus on coordinating with China, Japan found itself out of step The crisis had brought Japan and the United States closer, but many equated the February 13 agreement with the Nixon shock of 1971 that transformed regional relations and left Japan scrambling to find its place. U.S. policy had helped to drive Japan into a strategic impasse, from which it did not know how to extricate itself. Having leaned one-sidedly on its ally, it now reacted with excessive loss of trust in U.S. handling of the crisis or even support of Japan in a nuclear showdown. Many now were skeptical of the one country they had trusted; Abe pleaded with Bush to give Japan a veto over U.S. normalization with North Korea and the removal of it from the list of states supporting terror until the abduction issue was settled.68 While many U.S. experts saw this reaction as a sign that an emotional issue had blinded Japanese to their strategic interests, in Japan there were appeals for a strategy independent of the United States and the Six-party Talks.69 Unprepared for multilateralism, Chinacentered diplomacy, and compromise with North Korea until the abductions issue was settled, Japanese feared that their diplomacy as well as the Bush strategy in Northeast Asia over six years had failed and North Korea would retain its nuclear weapons.70 In the fifth year of the crisis Japanese strategic thinking toward Asia was exposed for its lack of foresight in recognizing that the United States would have to rely on China and multilateralism.

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CHAPTER 8

The Japanese Response: The Regional Context

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orth Korea has considerable significance for Japan’s relations with the other countries of NEA. Armed by the Soviet Union as an extension of its strategy toward the region, the North loomed as a dangerous and loosely connected attachment to the Soviet military juggernaut and has lately reemerged as part of Russia’s strategy for influence in NEA. Pursued by China, even after it normalized ties to the United States and Japan, as a buffer and then as a target for achieving a regional security framework, the North remains associated with China’s drive for leadership in NEA. Finally, under the spell of fraternal nationalism South Korea is newly attentive to the North in ways that affect ties to Japan. The nuclear crisis brings all of these connections to the forefront, posing the sharpest test for Japanese diplomacy in Asia in many decades. In normalizing relations with or asserting itself in order to contain one state, Japan cannot avoid influencing its entire regional environment. After, in 2002, the Russia school was lambasted in the Suzuki Muneo scandal and the China school in the Shenyang incident, it was the turn of the NEA or Korean school in 2003 to lose its influence after Koizumi’s visit to Pyongyang became colored by what was regarded as mishandling of the abduction issue. Freed from the calming influence of these schools, Koizumi and other LDP politicians steered relations in the region with little restraint in directions that isolated Japan. Instead of searching for advantage in the Six-Party Talks, Japan was content to follow the U.S. lead even as its own rhetoric could cater to an aroused public without regard to any impact on diplomacy. Many in Japan

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denied the message coming from diplomats that the United States has no choice but to negotiate with North Korea in the Six-Party Framework if not bilaterally. In turn, they did not seem to be preparing for a complicated endgame to the crisis that may leave Japan isolated by appearing too harsh. In 2007 Japan scrambled to win a U.S. commitment to give it a veto even as its insistence on putting the abductions issue in the forefront left it marginalized. In the first stage of the crisis Tokyo had multiple diplomatic options. Even if official summits with Hu Jintao fell victim to Koizumi’s Yasukuni visits, Sino-Japanese cooperation continued over regionalism and other issues. Consultations over the crisis were taken seriously. In the second half of 2002 and early 2003 there was a spike in relations with Moscow, as Koizumi thanked Putin for facilitating his trip to Pyongyang and then went to Moscow with a bold proposal for redirecting a proposed oil pipeline from Daqing, China to the Pacific coast. The two states were groping for a strategic upgrading not excluding positive exchanges over the emerging crisis in Korea. Most important, Koizumi and Roh started their relationship with the crisis looming before them and in the spring of 2003 were engaged by Bush in trilateral talks to settle on a common strategy. They strove at their June 2003 summit to present a united front. Japanese assumed even after Koizumi gave his strong support to Bush in May that multilateralism would emerge, leading to positive reactions when the Six-Party Talks were announced. In the second stage of the crisis options were narrowing. Relations worsened with each of the three states other than the two antagonists; yet, Koizumi could capitalize on his ties with Bush to draw the attention of the others. Especially, Roh took pains through much of 2004 to work within the triangular framework and found modest satisfaction in June when Koizumi helped tilt the United States toward a softer position. This stage saw the high point in meetings and prospects for multilateralism. In the summer of 2004 varied targets existed: Roh through new shuttle diplomacy; Putin through a long anticipated visit after his 2004 reelection; and Hu in pursuit of an East Asian Community at the first East Asian Summit planned for December 2005. Yet, all of these options were soon slipping away. The year 2005 was replete with occasions when Koizumi had a strained visit or faced an awkward cancellation of a visit by a foreign leader: with Korea’s Roh in June, November, and December; with Russia’s Putin in May and November; and with China’s Wen Jia-bao or the emissary Wu Yi in April, May, and December. Japan’s isolation in NEA became pronounced and did not change during Koizumi’s tenure

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in 2006, as he kept visiting the Yasukuni shrine, defiant of the sentiments of nations victimized by Japan during its imperialist era, and as territorial disputes, no matter how insignificant the islands in question, kept being exacerbated. In the midst of a crisis with a state yet to agree on how to settle the historical legacy and how to stabilize security in the region, Japan became newly obsessed with divisive problems with the other states in NEA.1 The crisis’s third stage left Tokyo aloof from desperate efforts in Seoul and Beijing to revive the stalled Six-Party Talks and seemingly indifferent to pressing Washington or enticing Pyongyang to consider a genuine multilateral framework for addressing the crisis. Koizumi shifted from balancing the Abe and Fukuda approaches to foreign policy to swinging firmly behind Abe by the end of 2004. Fukuda had championed talks with the North and a regional approach, only to find himself vilified by the right while Abe inflated the abductions issue and stressed U.S. ties as the answer and gained increasing popularity. Even as former prime ministers Nakasone and Hashimoto Ryutaro grew uneasy with Japan’s drift away from its Asian neighbors, Koizumi persevered in the new line with Abe standing in the wings as his presumed successor. The summer of 2005 left uncertainty in the minds of some Japanese experts. What was the significance of the upsurge in diplomacy marked not only by the Joint Statement but also by a Sino-U.S. strategic dialogue aimed at China becoming a “stakeholder?” At a time when Japanese relations with South Korea and China were at their nadir and many had lost hope in talks with North Korea, the United States showed signs of taking a different track. Concern lingered that Japan could become isolated as the United States softened its stance and the Joint Statement became a basis for further talks. After all, in June 2006 the United States reversed its long-standing position on Iranian nuclear programs by agreeing not only with Great Britain, France, and Germany but also with China and Russia to a softer posture as part of a coordinated approach that would provide light-water nuclear reactors, normalization of relations through direct talks, and forward-looking acceptance of Iran into the WTO (World Trade Organization) and the international community. Parallels with North Korea were difficult to ignore. One response was to resume bilateral meetings with the North, raising the possibility if the Six-Party Talks advanced that the North would have an incentive to solve the abductions issue and welcome an expanded role for Japan. Yet, after bilateral talks failed, Japanese made plans for unilateral moves. Despite the alarm over North Korea and support for the United States in the crisis, many in Japan prefer a regional framework that wins broad

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support. While suspicious of China framing an outcome to suit its regional strategy that would make many concessions to the North, they also disagree with Japanese right-wing pessimism that by default if not design leads to a divided region and little prospect of resolving the crisis. In the view of many the North’s nuclear gambit must be reversed to avoid a region locked in tension and make progress in overcoming intense sovereignty consciousness now at play. For this to happen they favor more active U.S. leadership to strike a deal. In the fourth stage of the crisis some hoped that such multilateralism was at last taking shape even if the Abe leadership raised grave doubts about it. After drifting upward from 44 to 57 percent in the 1990s the animosity of the Japanese public toward North Korea rose sharply to 79 percent by 2005. Compared to 1997, twice as many Japanese (57 percent) felt a military threat, while respondents who thought first of abductions climbed to double those who put the development of nuclear weapons first. Yet, while 39 and 62 percent respectively of Chinese and South Koreans perceived a large threat from these nuclear programs, as many as 85 percent of Japanese did. In particular, a striking gap between the perceptions of young Japanese and young South Koreans toward North Korea complicated coordination of policies, as did divergent views of the United States and its motives in the crisis.2 Distrustful of regionalism and wary of reunification, Japanese would not be disposed to working closely within the Other Four. In the February 13, 2007 agreement refusal to provide any assistance until its working group with the North resolved the abductions issue left Japan isolated The South Korean Connection The October 1998 visit of Kim Dae-jung to Tokyo on the heels of the alarm over North Korea’s missile test and the Asian financial crisis raised hopes for all-round improvement in relations, including unprecedented strategic ties. Over the next five years cooperation expanded, including through TCOG, and the pace of interaction grew more rapid after the start of the nuclear crisis. With newly institutionalized ties in pursuit of regionalism through ASEAN ⫹3, a bounce in relations from the summer 2002 cohosted World Cup, and formal talks to establish a bilateral FTA, Tokyo and Seoul were poised to cooperate in dealing with the broad implications of any proposed solution to the crisis. Yet, their ties were much shakier than many assumed, having reeled in 2001 over history textbooks for Japanese middle schools, remained uneven as South Koreans were wary despite Japanese optimism, and taken a

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nosedive from February 2005 ostensibly over matters of history and territory, damaging the chances for cooperation in facing the crisis. For a time, some Japanese grew so hopeful about bilateral ties with South Korea that they suggested that the two together could balance each country’s alliance with the United States and recall the closeness of their golden age in historical ties through the mid-seventh century. Their special relationship, bolstered by mutual attraction to each other’s culture and shared democratic values, held promise for Japanese of becoming a stabilizing force in Asia. It was not surprising that idealists would take this position, but they were joined by influential conservatives, who in explaining why this was now possible noted first of all a strategic consensus between the two states. These strategists, critical of Clinton’s handling of the Korean peninsula and Sino-Japanese relations, called for building up the U.S.-Japan alliance beyond what Clinton had already been doing and strengthening the hub and spokes system by inserting a new Japan-South Korea bar between the two important spokes leading from the United States. Expecting the South to respond to the new geopolitics by drawing closer, they targeted overcoming the left in Japan as the way forward rather than alleviating the anxieties of Koreans about history and security. Projecting Japanese threat perceptions onto Koreans, they failed to bolster ties.3 Reviewing the history of Japanese-South Korean relations, Takesada Hideshi of the National Institute for Defense Studies ignores the impact of the right wing in Japan. He refers only to the divide between realists and idealists that left many on the Japanese side ambivalent while failing to look deeply at what caused Koreans to be “ambivalent” about defense ties to accompany burgeoning economic ties. In 1994 at the time of the first nuclear crisis, Takesada notes, Japan was not ready to cooperate with the United States and South Korea opposed economic sanctions as did China, limiting U.S. options. After that experience, many appreciated the need to strengthen the alliance triangle, especially the Japan-South Korea leg. In 1999 he sees a breakthrough in defense cooperation— Japan overcame its taboo on collective self-defense, and the South also grew more fearful of the North after sinking one of its submarines that had intruded in December 1998. Takesada concludes that South Koreans came to recognize that Japan’s responses were defensive, indicative of a normal country, rather than rightist, and that an agenda of U.S.-Japanese-South Korean shared responses to China’s rise was operating, even if the South seemed less concerned. Although as the Sunshine Policy emerged and Seoul refused to join in joint missile defense, he fretted that coordination was insufficient, he saw a good chance it would

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advance.4 This kind of misjudgment ill prepared Japanese for the nuclear crisis. Many who masquerade as Japanese realists are in fact ultra-nationalists driven by revisionist goals. On the one hand, they stress that for Japan the Korean peninsula is of immense strategic importance, even to the point that Okazaki Hisahiko called it the No. 1 security concern always.5 On the other, increasing numbers interpret past and present in ways that confuse security with right-wing identity. For example, Okazaki insists that a century ago Russia caused Japan to act in Korea and that in recent times South Korea is saved by Japan since it serves as the U.S. base and resupply point if the North attacks. He notes that the two have common security interests and ideology based on freedom and democracy as well as strong economic ties and shared sea lanes. Arguing that conditions are ripe for a “natural affiliation” of close security ties, he adds that only Koreans must deal with their sentiments since Japan is neither the cause nor the solution. Such one-sided interpretations were given credence in an environment where U.S. backing was assumed and the North Korean threat was not used to weigh realist options in Asia. Sowing distrust in Japan toward South Korea is Kuroda Katsuhiro of Sankei shimbun, perhaps the most prolific writer on bilateral relations and Korean thinking. He warns that a confederation between North and South Korea would result in a takeover by the North because more than one quarter of the ruling Uri Party are so pro-North that they would endorse its positions in a jointly elected parliament. Their thinking is so extreme, he alleges, they believe that poverty in the North is a product of U.S. bullying, and he accuses the mass media of making criticism of Kim Jong-il and his system a taboo, similar to what occurred in Japan before the abduction issue arose. Kuroda adds that while a writer who takes a pro-Japan position such as on Korea’s good fortune to be ruled by Japan instead of Russia will be ostracized without regard to freedom of speech, a writer who is anti-United States and pro-North on the nature of the Korean War now receives protection.6 Dominated by leftist thinking and now a leftist government in both the executive and legislative branches, the South is incapable of resisting the North or China. Kuroda’s message is not to patch up relations, but to stand firmly against the South and resist its attempts at coordination in the Six-Party Talks. Crushed hopes in the fall of 2002 created an opening for rightists to take the lead in discourse about South as well as North Korea. Briefly there had been talk that Japan would become the nexus in talks over North Korea, premised on the notion that the Pyongyang Declaration was a success based on shared reasoning in Japan and South Korea and

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that the North sincerely made this agreement through calculations that the economic benefits would be decisive in allowing it to become a member of the regional community as it abandoned its nuclear weapons. Yet, soon Japanese were focusing on abductions rather than on strategic opportunities at the same time as Americans began stressing serious nuclear dangers. In contrast, South Koreans lacked understanding for Japan’s position, and Chinese were increasingly bothered by Koizumi’s Yasukuni visits and urging both the United States and Japan not to overreact against North Korea.7 Hopes for Japan’s diplomatic centrality rested on a flimsy foundation that was completely eroded. In the first winter of crisis there was some prospect of Japan distancing itself from the hard-line U.S. posture. After all, if the North was fearful of a U.S. attack and had decided to admit the abductions to Japan to achieve the summit in September 2002, then U.S. preoccupation with attacking Iraq with the possibility of turning against North Korea next could provide an opening. In January a joint Putin-Koizumi statement without directly criticizing Kim Jong-il called for talks to resolve the crisis.8 Yet, after China showed willingness to press the North and the United States called for a joint response, Koizumi accepted a supporting role under Bush’s lead. In the spring of 2004 some saw a second short period of distancing from the United States again marked by pursuit of a summit with the North and a lively debate about its significance. It was thought that deepening trouble for the United States in Iraq along with the demands of an upcoming presidential election would make the United States more flexible, while China’s diplomacy was opening room for other actors. If Koizumi could turn the public’s eye away from the abductions, then multilateralism might really take hold.9 Yet, this mirage of Japanese autonomy in the Six-Party Talks soon faded, frustrating Seoul, which on each occasion had sought to coordinate. In the second stage of the crisis Japan’s position was rather passive, combining fruitless and unappreciated calls for inserting the abduction issue onto the agenda with only occasional moves to help the talks advance. This duality can be linked both to a two-track process within the Japanese government,10 and the dynamics at the heart of the talks. Along with posturing to show that the abduction issue was being taken seriously, politicians looked for ways to reactivate Japan’s diplomacy. Fukuda Yasuo’s standing as chief Cabinet secretary as well as Tanaka Hitoshi’s presence in the Foreign Ministry made that easier, but it was Koizumi’s own preference that gave a voice to the “dialogue faction” as it kept struggling against calls for unilateral sanctions. When the United States in the spring of 2004 softened its position a little, it became easier

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for Japan to seek dialogue. Three-way coordination with South Korea also played a role. In July 2004 after Koizumi’s second visit to Pyongyang and some signs of new flexibility at the third round of Six-Party Talks, the mood at the Koizumi-Roh summit on Cheju was upbeat. The right praised the meeting for its call for tighter coordination in the alliance triangle with the United States to ensure that no space among the positions of the partners could be exploited by the North. Anxious for assistance, the North supposedly was vulnerable to joint “pressure.”11 The left took this first instance of planned twice a year “shuttle diplomacy” as a chance to sustain the momentum at the May Pyongyang summit by drawing closer to the South in stressing incentives and building trust with the North, even if the United States was reluctant. After all, Tokyo had finally shown some sign of putting the carrot before the stick in talks with Pyongyang, giving it more influence at the talks. Adding its voice to those of Seoul, Beijing, and Moscow, it was prepared to play a more constructive role and even to provide energy assistance.12 Optimists, who detected a second honeymoon in North-South relations, foresaw a new role for Japan.13 Japan could alienate South Korea either by advancing unilateral initiatives, as in the 1990s, or by rejecting compromise moves with the North, as occurred often from 2003. Despite lingering memories of the uncoordinated, bold visit by Kanemaru in 1990 that rattled Seoul and Kato Koichi’s 1997 offer of food assistance to Pyongyang without informing Seoul in advance, fear of unilateral moves diminished. Indeed, the Koizumi visit to Pyongyang in 2002 was welcomed as prelude to a comprehensive deal eagerly sought by Seoul. In its absence, even if the South expanded investment in the North with the idea of hiring many workers in industrial parks and China expanded commerce eager to sell more goods and gain access to the North’s natural resources, the line was drawn for these countries as well as for Japan at pouring money into rebuilding the North’s industrial structure or supplying additional energy before the nuclear issue was settled. With the position of Japan hardened by the abductions issue and the United States talking about a “surprise gift” to the North should a deal be reached, the question of Japan taking the lead had been eclipsed by concern that in the event of a deal it would stand in the way of a package requiring all sources of possible financial support. Tokyo and Seoul were not in accord on preparing a package of incentives, and Tokyo did not show sensitivity to Seoul’s desire for centrality in dealing with Pyongyang. Japanese media warned of a sea change in South Korea politicians’ ties to their country in 2004. Many who had been active in forging links in

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the 1960s left the scene, especially as a result of the Uri Party’s near sweep of the April elections to the National Assembly. Others more inclined to China and keen on economic projects with North Korea rose to prominence as Uri spokespersons. If China was replacing the United States as the future partner, Japan could be sidelined with new potential for explosive rifts over history.14 Even as a “South Korean boom” swept Japan, there was a strong undercurrent of warnings that the threecountry cooperation at the core of Japan’s strategy in the Six-Party Talks was only a façade. The situation was not helped by the fact that, having only visited Japan once prior to assuming office, Roh was not well known or trusted.15 After a year in office reservations remained, but many assumed that even if Roh preferred a different course, he could not alter giving priority to the United States and, in its shadow, Japan.16 Japan disappointed the South with its switch from occupying the middle in triangular deliberations over the crisis to standing at one end from the end of 2004. In March 2005 when Roh lashed out ostensibly over Shimane Prefecture’s decision to declare an annual Takeshima (Dokdo) day, Japanese did not link it to the deteriorating coordination over the nuclear crisis and other security matters. It sufficed to blame deep-seated nationalism that left Koreans emotional about Japan and, personally, Roh for being soft on the North. Japanese saw funds poring into projects in the North to no avail in persuading it to reform, open up, relax its despotism, or abandon its nuclear program. While Seoul claimed that it could not countenance the North’s nuclear program, the fact that it did not reduce cooperation was taken by some as tantamount to approval. The decision to abandon an image of the North as “chief enemy” in favor of “brotherhood” identity was called “psychological disarmament.”17 Roh’s visit to Europe in December 2004 aroused anxiety. In Paris he spoke of South Korea and China as countries that are not seeking the collapse of North Korea, raising warnings about a breakup of the Six-Party Process by those who were so inclined. Suggesting that Roh was reacting to recent meetings of Korean assemblymen with Stephen Hadley, the designated National Security Advisor and trying to contain Bush’s hard-line posture, Sankei shimbun contrasted pro-North leanings in the South with a hardening of anti-North feelings in Tokyo.18 The split between the two allies over security widened in the shadow of Bush’s tougher stance. After the North made its most provocative declaration early in February 2005, the two allies of the United States did not rally behind a common response but turned to bickering between themselves. As the U.S. tone toward Kim Jong-il and his regime grew testier, Roh was too alienated from Bush and Koizumi too close to him to have an impact.

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Finally after Roh and Bush agreed to an initiative to restart the talks, Roh and Koizumi had a strained meeting that killed the prospects for “shuttle diplomacy.” As the most intense diplomacy proceeded through the summer in search of a statement of principles, TCOG was absent and Japanese-South Korean trust was shattered. Even if Koizumi in the final stages exercised restraint, South Koreans gave him no credit for the Joint Statement. Instead of working together to build on a fragile agreement, the two states were embroiled in more feuds, leading in April 2006 to fear of an armed confrontation over their disputed island. The poor state of bilateral relations may have indirectly led to the breakdown of negotiations as joint encouragement for the United States to soften its stance had ended. The Joint Statement of September 19, 2005 touched on many elements of a package deal that would require coordination between Tokyo and Seoul, ranging from energy cooperation to normalization of Japanese-North Korean relations. While Roh was optimistic about resolution of the crisis and subsequent transformation of the region on this foundation, Koizumi was pessimistic about both. For the former, the nuclear card was a response to isolation and would be abandoned when the North’s leaders felt confident of their future role in the region. For the latter, a criminal regime had little prospect of transformation or abandonment of its sole source of attention and, ultimately, survival. Some on the Japanese left responded as did Roh with calls for Koizumi, having just won a resounding mandate from the electorate in September, to push ahead with negotiations with the North while urging the United States to be conciliatory. He should avoid a micro-approach to the abductions issue, they insisted, leaving that for later after Japan had taken a leading role in alleviating the fear of isolation in the North.19 Yet, many on the right criticized the way South Koreans had undercut a clear message to the North after the U.S. financial sanctions aroused its ire. Analysis dwelt on what is wrong with Korean nationalism, rife with chauvinism while easily stirred by unification. Long driven by anticommunism, it supposedly had shifted to find a substitute in anti-Japan and anti-American emotions, blaming them for the division of the peninsula. Mention was made of two factors that intensified this disposition. One is the economic web being woven as South Korean trade with China surpassed that with the United States and Japan and the gap kept widening and also as the North’s economy drew closer to China. Two is the shift in the dynamics of the Six-Party Talks in September 2005 to four against two, as South Korea broke with the United States and Japan.20 Although not reflected in the Joint Statement to which all parties agreed, this

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threatened to become the enduring reality. Japanese compounded their anger at Roh’s criticisms with deepening emotions against this betrayal in the talks. Japanese writings expressed concern about the difficulties of dealing with South Korea in the context of the Six-Party Talks. After U.S. flexibility at the fourth round of talks was met with the North’s insistence on nuclear energy through the construction of a light-water reactor and the South’s agreement, one scholar charged that the South had become an advocate for the North’s position. By breaking so clearly at a critical point with the U.S. position, it had made renewed coordination difficult. In addition a new theme that drew attention was the expressed interest in both the North and the South for converting the armistice to a peace regime, combining peaceful coexistence between the United States and the North and peaceful reunification to be pursued through a four-party forum of the countries directly involved in the war. By raising this theme, Seoul was seen as distancing itself from the triangle of the U.S.-Japan-South Korea, while suggesting that in the eyes of the North the South had become a more useful partner than China and, therefore, should be welcomed as a kind of middleman different from its former role. As leaders in Seoul appealed for a second North-South summit, some in Japan took seriously the possibility that new inter-Korean dynamics might reshape the negotiations and regarded the South’s conduct as extreme and naive about the North.21 Official Japanese rhetoric toward South Korea grew more critical and direct. In May 2005 Yanai Shotaro of the Foreign Ministry spoke of the United States not trusting South Korea, angering Roh, whose own statements from March toward Japan had been labeled “amateurism” catering to public opinion without regard to the opinion of diplomats.22 Even sharper was the comment on March 16, 2006 by Foreign Minister Aso Taro to a Diet committee that South Korea and China are helping North Korea, adding “I can’t understand why.”23 With Koizumi, Abe, and Aso all regarded as historical revisionists who had offended public opinion in the South, bilateral trust was inconceivable. In mid-2006 the gap only widened as Japanese objected to Roh’s reconciliation steps, such as declaring he would meet Kim Jong-il anywhere and anytime, and saw the North’s missile launchings as a much-deserved political blow to Roh.24 After the North’s nuclear test, some went so far as to equate Roh’s handling of the North to Hitler’s appeasement.25 In the spring of 2007 as Pyongyang delayed in fulfilling its commitments made on February 13, Tokyo and Seoul occupied opposite ends of the spectrum. Tokyo seemed to see this as confirmation that it had been

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right all along and renewed sanctions would be required, while Seoul was still offering rewards to Pyongyang and seemed confident that delay was a result of the slow release of bank funds frozen due to U.S. sanctions. When Beijing tried to bridge the gap, expressing understanding of Tokyo’s position on the abductees, critics in Seoul charged that it was not Abe but Roh who was becoming isolated.26 With Roh and Abe in office, their nations had little chance for reconciliation. The Chinese Connection Just as neoconservatives in the U.S. link North Korea to China as communists opposed to the moralistic role of the United States in the world, ultra-nationalists in Japan view North Korea together with China through the prism of a half century of condemnation of those who reject Japan’s national identity as a force for the betterment of Asia. Each movement is critical of fuzzy-thinking academics and diplomats, especially in Japan the Foreign Ministry’s China school, who fail to take threats seriously. One article accused the China school in the 1980s of favoring substituting the word “aggression” (shinryaku) in the approved textbooks for “advance” (shinshutsu) as if Japan began the war, and then working with three politicians (one being Kato Koichi who had been part of the China school in the Foreign Ministry before entering the Diet, and the others Kono Yohei and Nonaka Hiromu) to provide North Korea with a generous supply of rice, while putting off concern for the abductions issue in the second half of the 1990s. In 2002 their capitulation to Chinese police in handling North Korean refugees who had managed entry into the Shenyang consulate offered further proof of their failure to defend the national interest. The article continues with criticism of both Anami, ambassador to China, for disregarding the refugees, and Tanaka Hitoshi, deputy foreign minister to 2005, for his insistence on engaging the North.27 Three themes were bundled together: the recovery of normal nationalism blocked by diplomatic compromisers and media that failed to draw a clear line between moral Japanese and immoral others; the North Korean threat that could be met only by national unity and ardent resistance; and the danger from China’s rise. Optimists in Japan tried for a time to salvage the significance attributed to the Koizumi visit to Pyongyang, drawing a connection with China’s “new thinking” that was seen from late 2002 as accompanying the rise of Hu Jintao and providing an opportunity for smoothing bilateral relations and dealing with the North in a regional context. When in February 2003 China was seen agreeing that the North be denuclearized

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and ready to use economic pressure against it, some linked this to the debate there on how to improve ties with Japan.28 Some also saw rejection of the North’s plans to establish an economic zone at Shinuiju on the Chinese border as proof that Beijing is ready to bring the North into line.29 Since China was changing, Japan should support its efforts and make use of tensions dividing the two communist-led countries.30 Signs of new cooperation and mutual dependence between the United States and China provided additional reason for Japan to impress China with its interest in creating a positive environment to resolve the crisis. 31 In 2003 many rejected both the China threat argument and the notion that the Japan-U.S. alliance suffices, embracing a NEA think tank network.32 Yet, lack of interest in responding to Chinese “new thinking” with Japanese “new thinking” and the Yasukuni visits cast doubt on Koizumi’s interest in a regional strategy. After Koizumi swung his weight behind Bush in May, there was talk about how this would enhance Japan’s leverage in working with China. Recognizing that South Korea and Russia had only a limited role at this stage of the crisis, advocates of a more moderate strategy called for Japan to emerge from the pact by becoming a bridge between China and the United States. This means both increasing its influence with China, such as by stopping visits to the Yasukuni shrine, and showing more autonomy from the United States.33 In mid-2003 it still seemed possible that Japan could take such initiative, but soon it became clear not only that the United States was difficult for Japan to sway and Sino-Japanese relations left little hope but, more importantly, Koizumi had no such bridging role in mind. In the spring of 2004 an opportunity arose. If Putin was credited with facilitating Koizumi’s first visit to Pyongyang, Hu Jintao was seen as playing a role in the second visit. When Kim Jong-il visited China on April 19, 2004 Hu was said to have argued that for the Six-Party Talks to advance it would be helpful to resolve the pending issues between Japan and North Korea.34 This could have been appreciated as an opening for more Sino-Japanese coordination, but it was overlooked in a trip with narrow objectives. A mood of competing with China to champion regionalism had been spreading. In the fall of 2003 Japan played catch up with ASEAN as it hastily called its own summit of ASEAN ⫹1 after China had outmaneuvered it at the ASEAN ⫹3 summit. Some on the left asserted that Japan should make the same effort to recover its voice in NEA, noting that China’s multisided diplomacy in the nuclear crisis was giving it the air of a great power, while Japan was sidelined.35 To be sure, most proponents of regionalism prefer to stress that Japan can cooperate with

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China and South Korea in integrating North Korea. Funabashi Yoichi noted that Yanbian Koreans in China are showing the way; almost half are working away from home, some for Korean firms in Shandong province or as brides on South Korean farms and waitresses in its restaurants. Noting that many believe Japan will be the key to future development in North Korea and Yanbian, he reminds readers that there was a time when Rajin in the North, facing Japan with an excellent port, was called the gateway to North Manchuria as Dalian in China served as gateway to South Manchuria. Eying North Korea, he argued, Japan should embrace the theme of the East Asian community.36 Whether perceiving regionalism as competition or cooperation, acceptance of the concept meant striving to work with China and South Korea to engage the North, but skeptics were gaining the upper hand. Japan and China may have forged deep economic ties, but on security they lack established networks. As bilateral political ties deteriorated and Koizumi chose assertive nationalists to serve as foreign minister, coordination on the Six-Party Talks grew even weaker. Rather than credit China with a responsible role in conducting the Six-Party Talks, many Japanese became suspicious that China really did not mind that the North was nuclear. In the second stage of the crisis deterioration in bilateral ties left Japan far behind the United States in coordinating with China, as pessimism prevailed over the talks. After Bush’s reelection, one Korean expert in Japan, Okonogi Masao, raised tough questions. Would the limits of the Six-Party Talks be reached as Bush’s policy shifted more openly to containment? Had the United States made Japan more secure by its approach to the talks? Suggesting that should an unequivocal standoff ensue, the situation in NEA would be very different from U.S.-Japanese cooperation in distant Iraq, Okonogi warned that Japanese diplomacy was at a decisive juncture.37 Japan had cast its lot with the United States, although it had scant impact on the Bush administration’s policies and grew more nervous as the State Department team that had prized Japan’s role was being replaced. For some time, many Japanese had repeatedly calculated that their options were promising in Asia and would soon give them a more balanced foreign policy and a leadership role in regionalism, but as relations with China plummeted, the North Korean danger grew more serious, optimistic plans for normalization with Russia stumbled, and differences with South Korea intensified, the result was growing dependency on the United States. Of course, Japan could flail away with its own symbolic and unilateral gestures toward the North, but they did not disguise the reality of U.S. unilateralism that would determine

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Japan’s fate. The third stage of the crisis came with warnings of this sort to no effect. In the fall of 2004 Japan’s position hardened. One explanation is that the public was angrier after the news that the North had lied when it claimed that the remains being returned were those of Yokoda Megumi. Another view is that Koizumi decided to draw closer to Bush, as the divide widened between Bush and Roh and the reelected U.S. president took a tougher stance on the North. There does not, however, seem to have been a strategic dialogue between the two allies or inside Japan about how to proceed when, as expected, the North retaliated with its own hard position. A third explanation is that Koizumi in choosing the United States also made a decision to stand against criticisms of rising nationalism in Japan regardless of the cost to relations with China, South Korea, and the ASEAN ⫹3 process of regionalism. South Korean leaders were disturbed at the shift, and the TCOG meetings sank into discord and soon oblivion. The December 2004 Defense Planning Outline, which named China and North Korea as threats and indicated plans for responding as well as the February 2005 2 ⫹2 talks with the United States that drew Japan more clearly into the security of Taiwan raised the security stakes in the region. Some took pains to explain that the real purpose of the strengthened U.S.-Japan alliance is to face the North not China, whose constructive role should be welcomed,38 but this distinction was hard to make, especially as relations with China deteriorated amidst growing concern about its emerging threat. More alarmed about China’s rise than South Korea, Russia, or even the United States, Japanese were hesitant to rely on it in the nuclear crisis. One Japanese commentary on the eve of the two December 2005 regional meetings of ASEAN ⫹3 and the EAS insisted that China was seeking to marginalize Japan, starting with a united front with South Korea over history and including the pursuit of hegemony with the United States kept out.39 Chinese, in turn, were arguing that Japan aims to contain China, limiting its rise while working with the United States to bolster its hegemonic role. This sharp split damaged the mood for China or the United States to rally other countries around a joint strategy. It played into a growing mood in the United States that talks were useless not only because the North was determined to retain its nuclear capability but also because the Other Four were divided. Suspicion of China’s role at the center of the Six-Party Talks was linked to accusations about its intentions across Asia. One Korean report showcased Japanese fears of the Six-Party Talks turning into another Shanghai Cooperation Organization, attributing to Kaneda Hideaki, director of the Okazaki

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Institute and former vice-admiral, the conclusion that Japan limit its cooperation and work to contain China’s strategy while urging the United States to keep vigilant.40 Similar warnings appeared about Chinese “undercover” dealings with the North that were taken as signs of indulgence that only serve to condone the North’s criminality. When Kim Jong-il visited China in January 2006 after Hu Jintao had gone to Pyongyang three months earlier and boosted economic assistance centered on capital investment, this was seen as helping the North evade containment and even as acceptance of its decision to boycott the Six-Party Talks after the United States imposed financial sanctions.41 The picture conveyed of China raised doubts that Kim was there to learn from its economic reforms as opposed to gaining sustenance to withstand pressure to abandon nuclear weapons. Some went so far as to assert that China is in cahoots with North Korea, warning that it is not strictly neutral as an intermediary, whether dealing with the abductions or chairing the Six-Party Talks. Such views supported growing aloofness from the talks.42 Other views on China were heard. On November 24 at Upper House hearings on China there were warnings that Japanese politicians and the public need to change their consciousness on leadership in the region after assuming for twenty–thirty years that Japan is the only regional great power. In contrast to the view of a LDP Diet member that Yasukuni is just a card for China and if it were gone China would find another to pressure Japan and arouse anti-Japanese sentiments among a populace educated to be hostile by museums that teach the history of the war, politicians from the Komeito and the Minshuto as well as academic experts suggested that when Chinese with high-level approval probed “new thinking” toward Japan in early 2003 Japan should have responded with “new thinking” toward China and that the Japanese people need to think in terms of an Asian community. After all, Japan now purchases more Chinese goods than U.S. goods, and before long its exports to China will exceed those to the United States. Although the Korean peninsula barely figured into the hearings, the unmistakable message was that in contrast to China’s diplomatic successes Japan’s reliance on the United States to resolve the crisis was contributing to its drift away from the region and growing danger of its isolation.43 In the summer of 2006 in anticipation of the succession to Koizumi the media and some LDP politicians debated whether a new policy toward Asia was needed. After the July multiple missile launches by North Korea and agreement on compromise wording of a critical resolution proposed by Japan and amended to meet Chinese objections, a new

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opportunity arose with U.S. encouragement to find common ground in facing a deepening threat. As many in Washington appreciated, the road to Pyongyang went through Beijing. Tokyo would be unlikely to find a workable strategy to the North without coordinating not only with Washington but also with Beijing. Sino-Japanese relations had stabilized after Abe’s visit to Beijing in October 2006 and Wen Jiabao’s return visit to Tokyo in April 2007. Especially Wen’s speech before the Diet pointed the way to improved ties. Solicitous of Japanese views on the Korean crisis, Chinese played the role of chair of a regional reconciliation process (now coordinated with the United States) that left little room for Japan to keep its distance.44 The Russian Connection Japanese generally gave Russia the benefit of the doubt as it improved relations with North Korea before the nuclear crisis, assuming that Putin was acting in accord with the premise that for the sake of stability in NEA it is necessary not to isolate the North.45 Both in September 2002 when Koizumi took his initiative and January 2003 when Putin tried to find a short cut to resolve the crisis relations were upbeat without criticisms of the other’s motives. During a hopeful mood in relations some Japanese wrote optimistically on Russia’s promise as the G-8 state with the closest ties for influencing the North to resolve the emerging nuclear crisis. It was assumed that this would be in Russia’s interest because of its desire to develop the Russian Far East and attract foreign investment such as Japanese support for the oil pipeline across Siberia to the Pacific coast. This thinking, which complemented views elsewhere along the political spectrum that Japan was well positioned to use its “economic card,” misjudged the struggle under way.46 It was one more example of overestimating Japan’s role in the region, ignoring signs of isolation. Many of those who assumed that Russia has a “North Korea card” and is likely to play it ignored the great power balancing aspect of the crisis and the potential for resisting both U.S. and Japanese strategies.47 With China’s influence rising with no end in sight, Japan and Russia might have seen value in coordinating on strategies toward North Korea. After all, the logic of their probing discussions in 1997–2001 to reach a breakthrough in relations was precisely that they had common strategic objectives in NEA. In 2002 when Putin facilitated Koizumi’s preparations to visit Pyongyang, shared aims again drew attention. Yet, the overall state of bilateral relations undermined such prospects. Japan was pulled closer to the United States and Russia closer to China in 2003,

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leaving little room to find common ground. If in the first stage of the crisis each grew quieter for a time, they found that their voices could be at least somewhat magnified through Koizumi’s shift to the U.S. emphasis on pressure and then Putin’s awareness that Russia was part of the SixParty Talks due to North Korea’s insistence and could be taken more seriously through coordination with China. Japan and Russia did not find much to discuss in the course of the Six-Party Talks. Each was relieved to be part of the talks, but saw the other as a marginal actor unlikely to have much impact. There was little geopolitical substance to their relations, as Japan turned ever closer to the United States to compensate for its weak strategic hand and reflect its nationalist stubbornness to its neighbors and Russia relied heavily on China to keep its voice audible and force the United States to take its interests seriously. At early stages of the nuclear crisis each had expected to gain more clout through its ties on the Korean peninsula—for Russia Putin’s personal ties to Kim Jong-il offered grounds for hope, and for Japan Koizumi’s triangular ties to Roh and Bush generated many meetings. Yet, the Korean connections proved disappointing, and rising dependency on the United States or China made it less likely that they had much to gain from dealing with each other. Some in the rising chorus of nationalism toward China raised hopes for a time that Russian interest in North Korea would lead to a convergence of thinking. Assuming that Russia fears the rise of China as well as assertive U.S. behavior in Iraq and elsewhere, analysts reasoned that Russian interest in North Korea reflected alarm about the vulnerability of the Russian Far East and that would lead to renewed interest in Japan. Without giving thought to moves by Japan to compromise on the disputed islands, some on the right grasped for signs of Russian weakness that would boost Japanese leverage with it and with China and North Korea.48 Yet, nationalism led some politicians and foreign policy experts to suggest, even in the midst of rising tensions with China and mounting talk of economic sanctions against North Korea, a new aggressive strategy to pressure Russia to return four islands in a batch. Rejecting a return to the compromise tone of the negotiations in 2000–2001 that led to the Irkutsk summit, they insisted that Putin’s offer to return two islands in November 2004 and warnings that Putin would not visit Japan in early 2005 as anticipated unless there was forward movement in relations were a provocation that had to be met by a tougher strategy. Ambassador Aleksandr Losyukov warned in late October 2004 of illusions in Japan that without the give-and-take of extended talks over a compromise and preparation of public opinion on both sides a quick

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solution to the territorial dispute could be found, presumably by Putin conceding to Japanese demands. He saw rising calls in Japan for getting tough with Putin if he did not proceed in this fashion endangering years of preparations to improve ties. Mentioning the Korean peninsula as one area that requires a multilateral approach and China as a country that Russia trusted, Losyukov was forthright in alerting Japanese to the danger of setting back relations.49 Putin’s visit to Tokyo in November 2005 came as the momentary hopes in September for progress through the Six-Party Talks had faded. There was no sign that he and Koizumi had much to discuss on Korea, since the former had become more assertive that the United States should engage the North and the latter more assertive in warning the North. In the summer of 2006 after the North had turned its back on entreaties by the Other Four not to fire its missiles, Koizumi took the lead in trying to rally the Security Council against it. While Putin agreed on a critical resolution after its wording had been weakened, a gap remained between Japan’s push for authorization of strong sanctions and Russia’s call for more earnest efforts to engage the North. The overall uneasy state of bilateral relations appeared to leave these two states with little to discuss apart from economic ties, which were improving. Sato Masaru, the former diplomat arrested at the time Russia policy changed in 2002, charged in July 2006 that mismanagement of policy had cost Japan the “Russia card” in its diplomacy on North Korea driving it to rely on China, as in watering down the UN Security Council’s response to the North’s provocative missile launchings. He argued too that at the St. Petersburg G-8 summit a few days later a statement in support of sanctions might have been achievable if the host Putin had not been alienated by the Foreign Ministry’s mistakes.50 Yet, other Japanese saw Russia’s position changing after the North had embarrassed Putin’s time in the spotlight and took heart from its willingness to support a compromise resolution.51 With some voices on the right warning that in a confrontation the North would be supported by China, Russia, and South Korea,52 Japan’s success in the UN resolution led others to find hope for multilateralism. With memories still fresh of the Japanese media echoing official claims and the view of Stephen Hadley, U.S. National Security Advisor, on Japan’s great diplomatic success at the Security Council,53 Koizumi capped his record of insensitivity toward Asia by visiting the Yasukuni Shrine on August 15, 2006. Yet, it was Abe’s agreement to remain silent on whether he would visit the shrine that revived summit ties with China and South Korea and offered hope that Japan could work with

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multiple partners in the nuclear crisis. Even the territorial dispute with Russia could now be addressed, as seen in Foreign Minister Aso Taro’s December 13 comment about dividing the territory evenly, with Japan receiving three islands plus one quarter of the largest island Etorofu. Reasoning that Putin had great authority and wanted to resolve the issue, hinting at a parallel approach to the solution found in 2004 for the Sino-Russian border dispute, at least a few Japanese officials showed some haste in speaking of acting before his term in office expired in 2008.54 Those who opposed a compromise argued that it was too early to negotiate because high oil prices and rising nationalism had boosted Russian confidence, warning that Aso’s remarks would invite misunderstanding.55 Others favored new thinking through linking a breakthrough with Putin to new realism toward the region,56 perhaps even to North Korea. Under Abe, however, the abductions issue was likely to take precedence. The Overall Regional Context More than any other party to the Six-Party Talks Japan has treated the process as a bilateral setting with the United States its primary contact, but that has not excluded other ties. The Russian connection was recognized in September 2002 when Koizumi went to Pyongyang and thanked Putin for facilitating the meeting. Regular contacts with China, as host country, have continued, even when Sino-Japanese relations flagged. Despite the vilification of North Korea, Koizumi long kept alive a track to direct talks, building on the Pyongyang Declaration he made with Kim Jong-il in 2002. Finally, the habit of working closely with South Korea in dealing with the North, developed in the 1990s only after many missteps, has not died even if it has been bruised. Japan may be increasingly isolated since 2005, but it retains the means to influence regional dynamics. Although some may consider South Korea the swing country among the Other Four with the greatest contradictions in its policies toward the United States and North Korea, in the course of the crisis Japan was no less conflicted at times or significant in deciding the balance of countries. If the degree of threat is the critical factor, then it was second only to South Korea in vulnerability to attack by the North. Yet, while some considered the degree of danger decisive in convincing the South that only dialogue is possible, the same variable is used to explain why Japan was often most inclined to pressure. In both cases politicians were waiting in the wings to change course, critical of Roh or Koizumi for loss of

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balance in dealing with the United States and managing relations with China or North Korea. None of the Other Four was likely to switch positions on handling North Korea without extreme provocation. One could speculate that Moscow had switched toward Pyongyang in the 1990s and might do it again or Beijing under pressure could switch because it had far more to lose if ties with Washington worsened, but only if the North threatened to destabilize the region would these two actors face a crossroads. In contrast, Tokyo had already shown in 2002 that a breakthrough with Pyongyang was desired and could again recognize the merits in a marriage of convenience. After all, it could use closure from one final diplomatic normalization and historical settlement in Asia and gain from an economic deal that would help to keep Pyongyang in line, while the latter had some of the same reasons as Seoul in 1965 and Beijing in 1972 to cut a deal. If Japan’s tight alliance with the United States is fixed for years ahead, its shaky place in NEA is not. Japan might ignore inducements to North Korea since it demonizes the regime and has little to gain economically, but there are strategic reasons not to do so. The North is, after all, a symbol, of abnormality since there is no reconciliation or peace treaty after the end of World War II. With support from the South and China, the North can keep raising unsettled issues for reparations, the return of stolen cultural objects, and so on. Without an agreement with the North, as outlined during the 2002 visit by Koizumi, it will be difficult to argue that the history issues are settled. Moreover, as Japan becomes more isolated in NEA apart from the U.S. alliance, it can look to North Korea as the country most desperate to make the deal that South Korea and China made before it, accepting Japan as a serious partner and economic patron and giving it a larger voice in the region. Finally, as tensions linger with the South, there is no better way (apart perhaps from reconsidering its view of history) for Japan to gain leverage over the South as well as to improve its image there than to become active in the North. Japanese disagreed on the cause of the nuclear crisis. The prevailing view is that North Korea had provoked the crisis by secretly enriching uranium in violation of its agreements. The outlook is pessimistic, and Japan must be wary of providing normalization and assistance to a regime that is bound to keep threatening it. A minority view is that North Korea is using nuclear weapons as a bargaining chip. When in the Joint Statement it promised to abandon them, this was taken by some as its real intent. According to this reasoning, only when the United States clearly moves ahead to negotiate is the North encouraged to proceed. Given its objective of regime survival, it must eventually normalize

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relations with Japan as well as the United States. A broad NEA security framework is within reach, and North Korea will abide by its promise.57 In 2007 such reasoning was used against Abe, as the U.S. shift drew praise from the left. On the left many in Japan looked hopefully at the Six-Party Talks as a framework full of possibility for a lasting security structure in NEA.58 They are inclined to blame the United States for not sticking to its promise in 1994 for lifting economic sanctions and instead waiting for the collapse of the North. It follows that the resulting distrust in the North linked to the continued attitudes of the United States remained the biggest reason for the slow progress in the Six-Party Talks. Welcoming the “roadmap” of September 2005, some saw the Bush administration as forced to make concessions, losing public support in the United States and tied down in Iraq. This makes the United States dependent on China, and offers hope that the spirit of 1994 can be revived with genuine fulfillment of obligations. Such thinking is coupled with recommendations that Japan drop its obsession with the abductees. Seeing a multi-stage process ahead, they would have Japan engaged throughout, even accepting that the light-water reactor is a symbol of peaceful coexistence on the peninsula and that Japan’s future is best pursued by combining U.S. ties with Asianization, becoming a “responsible” country in Asia.59 It follows that Japan could gain a central role in efforts to resolve the crisis,60 as it realized the long-standing goal of balancing ties with the United States and the Asian continent.61 This is a minority view, but it continues to be expressed in the media. Japanese advocate resolving the crisis through regional economic integration on the basis of large projects in accord with global standards and only after the North has yielded on nuclear weapons, missiles, and the abduction impasse. They fault the three states bordering North Korea for pursuing cross-border economic ties on easy terms. Nonetheless, some Japanese companies had positioned themselves for assisting North Korea with electricity, sending secret delegations and taking advantage of the view that Koizumi advocated a dual approach of dialogue and pressure. Maintaining ties with powerful politicians and keeping in mind ODA that would be forthcoming from Japan, major companies were prepared should the crisis end.62 Yet, in 2006–2007 their activities were put on hold as economic ties faded. Compared to other states, Tokyo is dubious about moves toward reunification. Even more is at stake than for the United States if nationalism among Koreans is boosted or if China is ascendent in a regional forum. Tokyo has become a skeptic of regionalism, clinging to the hub

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and spokes system and resisting a multilateral security framework. Increasingly, this gives it the image of a spoiler, especially among Roh supporters in South Korea. In the summer of 2006 Japan was taking a leading role in calls for greater pressure; yet, it soon showed alarm over the search for common ground, encouraged by the United States in order to achieve five versus one against the North’s increased belligerence and to point the way to joint engagement if it changed course. Japan was unnerved by the regional implications of the February 13 agreement. It was the only state to refuse to provide fuel oil to the North in phase two of the agreement, insisting that resolution of the abduction issue had to come first. Unless the process failed, Japan’s alienation from it would likely test U.S. diplomacy. In mid-2007 as others were preparing for Phase 2 and a special foreign ministers’ meeting on the sidelines of the annual ARF gathering, Abe was insisting that the abductions issue had to be addressed first. This preoccupation distracted attention from Japan’s marginal interest in the strategic maneuvering under way as the Six-Party Talks acquired new importance. Uncertainty about how long Abe’s tenure would last after the Upper House elections in July, the wait for Roh’s successor to be elected in December and somehow set bilateral relations on a new course, and confusion about Bush’s embattled leadership with Democrats in charge of Congress and his foreign policy in disarray, all left Japanese hesitant about looking ahead. With U.S. dependability newly in question for many and no consensus on how to deal with China, the SixParty Talks appeared as a perilous venue for which there was no precedent in Japanese foreign policy since World War II.

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CHAPTER 9

The Russian Response: The Nuclear Crisis Evgeny Bazhanov

A

fter the second nuclear crisis erupted, in August 2003 Russia for the first time joined a multinational conference on the North Korean nuclear issue, restoring its voice in Korean affairs. The Korean peninsula had remained a focus of attention throughout the twentieth century. Tsar Nicolas II, Lenin, Stalin, Brezhnev, and finally Gorbachev, for various reasons and in different forms, tried to get the upper hand there. After the acute disappointment at being marginalized in the first nuclear crisis, officials under Boris Yeltsin again sought to raise Russia’s profile on the peninsula from the mid-1990s. The move to balance relations with the two Koreas culminated in Vladimir Putin’s framework of both improving relations with the DPRK (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, North Korea) and keeping good rapport with the ROK (Republic of Korea, South Korea), while intensifying collaborative actions regarding Korea with other players—the United States, China, and Japan.1 Explaining how this framework operates, I examine Russian contributions at the Six-Party Talks and views on the nuclear issue. There is no serious challenge to the overall Putin framework; however, the new nuclear crisis rekindled debates among experts as well as in the media concerning how to appraise the stands of North and South Korea, the United States, China, and Japan. In the process, discussion turned not only to prospects for unification of the Korean nation but also to the roots of the current problem. Most experts of the liberal (pro-Western)

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and centrist (progovernment) persuasions paint a similar picture of the sequence of events in Korea after World War II. They admit that confrontation between Moscow and Washington triggered the split of the Korean nation, but stress that at the time of liberation Koreans were sharply divided with opposing sides concentrated in the North and the South.2 Some put the domestic Korean factor ahead of international influences as the cause of the split. Anatoly Torkunov writes, the division of Korea was the result of the rift between leftists and conservatives inside Korean society, “maintained and promulgated by the military administrations of the USSR and the United States, whose relations acquired an increasingly confrontational character.”3 In contrast, communist and nationalist writers see Korean history in a completely different light, denying any wrongdoing on the part of the USSR and their North Korean allies. They maintain that the division of Korea was the product of nothing else but “imperialist policies of the U.S. and intrigues of their South Korean stooges.”4 They also accuse Seoul and Washington of instigating the Korean War, refusing to accept the blame on Kim Il-sung for the bloodshed.5 In contrast to the criticisms of Stalin and Kim common a decade earlier, Stalin is also credited for the approval of Kim’s aggressive designs and then using the protracted warfare in Korea as leverage in the global rivalry with the United States. Refutations of these views are less common now, as centrists, mostly for diplomatic reasons, avoid the Korean War altogether or blur it to such a degree that it is impossible to understand from their writings how it arose. Clashing views of history set the background for contrasting views of the nuclear crisis. Regardless of the differences, a consensus exists not to repeat the errors of policy during Yeltsin’s first term. A report by Gorbachev and a group of experts lists many negative consequences of the Yeltsin-Kozyrev line: “The role of Russia in the complicated knot of the Korean settlement decreased; the Russian factor lost its value in the eyes of South Koreans; and decline of Russian-North Korean ties had a bad impact on the foreign and domestic policies of the DPRK.” It added, “Even fragile hopes of democratization, connected with the change of the leader in North Korea, did not materialize. And many countries began to actively promote relations with the DPRK . . . Even the United States and Japan opened direct contacts with North Korea . . . Russia was progressively pushed to the fringes of these processes losing not only political, but also economic positions in the country.” Putin’s balanced policy in Korea is characterized as “adequate to the tasks of strengthening peace, security and cooperation in the region as well as to the future peaceful, democratic unification of Korean peninsula.”6

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Centrists, communists, and nationalists insist on the importance of ties with the DPRK, but for different reasons. Centrists support Putin’s balanced line as pragmatic and realistic. They believe it enhances Russian security, given the potential danger of renewed hostilities on the peninsula. Since the North Korean regime is unlikely to collapse soon and its collapse might actually create even greater security risks, it is deemed important that Moscow resume an active role, including improved relations with the DPRK and a more balanced policy on the peninsula. “Without normal, good-neighbourly relations with the DPRK (no matter how the sociopolitical regime of this clone of the Soviet system is appraised in Russia), without taking into account its legitimate interests, interactions with it not only in bilateral affairs, but also at the international arena, Russia’s national interests will be damaged while stability in our border region will not get strengthened.”7 Others take the argument further. Restoration of links with the North is justified on the grounds that Moscow created Kim Il-sung’s regime and spent much time and money nourishing it and that, while leaders come and go, people’s memories and friendship endure. A pro-North lobby, consisting of military men, diplomats, scholars, and former technical advisers to Pyongyang, advances such a thesis. If most communist-leaning authors do not object in principle to cooperation with the South, they feel that not enough is done to restore close friendship with “our country” the North, insisting on it because of historical and spiritual feelings, as a moral obligation and as a rebuff to U.S. hegemonism.8 For nationalists the last argument is critical.9 These feelings are reinforced by envy of American activities in Korea. In the 1990s it seemed that the United States was winning over the North: the attempts of the North to sign a peace treaty exclusively with the United States, the proposal on four-power peace talks, and the cooperation between the DPRK and the United States in the nuclear field. Russian Ambassador to the DPRK Valerii Denisov argued that the United States was undertaking a broad offensive irrespective of Russian interests aimed at expanding its influence over the North in order to become the sole master of Korea’s destiny and that an active role for Moscow did not coincide with U.S. interests.10 Russians observed too that the United States continued its security links with the ROK and still dominated this ally, while Russia’s prestige and influence in the ROK had diminished precisely because of the weakening of its position in the North. While Seoul had sought Moscow’s help because of its influence over Pyongyang, as soon as relations were formalized it began to pressure Moscow against further military and other aid. When Russia did

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downgrade its cooperation, the South, instead of being satisfied, lost respect for it. Clearly, better ties with the DPRK would help to restore Russian credibility after poor ties had “limited its possibilities to positively influence developments in the immediate neighborhood of its borders.”11 Economic considerations are another motive for Russia’s activities in the region. South Korea continues to figure prominently among prospective partners; however, its role as an economic partner has been disappointing due to low investment of its companies in Russia and problems with loans and credits. Moscow also recognizes that the only way to get North Korean debts back is to smooth tensions with it. Russia may someday participate in the modernization of the numerous Sovietbuilt enterprises there. Deliveries of nuclear reactors and involvement in the development of free economic zones in border areas are among the economic aims of Russia.12 Another argument is that only together with the DPRK would it be possible to realize large-scale Russian-South Korean projects, such as a gas pipeline to the ROK and a trans-Eurasian railroad.13 Even if many recognize that disorganized policies have not encouraged economic interactions with neighboring states in the East,14 they appreciate that integration into NEA is a prerequisite for economic development in Russia’s Far East.15Special value is attached to the project to rebuild the trans-Korean railroad and connect it to the trans-Siberian line. The powerful Ministry of Communications lobbied aggressively for it with public support, stressing that the new railroad will not only bring significant economic benefits by creating a cheaper and faster alternative to delivering freight from South Korea to Russia and Europe, but will also become an important factor in regional stability and rapprochement between the Koreas.16 Yet, some cautioned against “excessive optimism,” citing economic troubles in the DPRK and its fear of a large foreign presence.17 A bimonthly, specializing in Korean affairs, argued that the trans-Korean railroad project, no matter how profitable, “presents a threat” to the North Korean regime, concluding that for this reason the project as well as free economic zones “do not really go forward.”18 The overwhelming majority of Russian observers hold a very pessimistic view of the internal situation in the DPRK. One of the most sympathetic and cautious among leading orientologists, Vadim Tkachenko admits: “North Korea is undergoing an extended systematic crisis, facing serious challenges in all spheres of life comparable only with the Korean war of 1950–1953.”19 He explains these troubles in part by pressures and intrigues of outside powers and offers some hope that current “experiments” by the regime will lead to meaningful, successful economic

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reforms and eventually democratization of social life.20 Another sympathetic researcher Alexander Vorontsov argues that Kim Jong-il has indeed realized the necessity of veritable economic reforms and begun them in July 2002, a process that may be interrupted only because of tough U.S. policy “aimed at the removal of Kim Jong-il’s regime.”21 Many are more pessimistic.22 They draw the verdict that this “utterly ineffective, crisisstricken regime lacks any historic perspective.”23 North Korea: The Decline of Kim-Jong-il’s Epoch asserts: “The epoch of Kim Jong-il has begun only ten years ago, but it has already created so much suffering and trouble for North Korean people. Time will come when people realize its arbitrary situation and curse the Kims and their tyrannical regime.”24 Vasily Mikheev has equally harsh words, calling the regime “an enemy of its own people,” whose aim is “to survive at all cost even at the expense of its own people.”25 As many Russian observers, he describes the North’s economic reforms as purely cosmetic. Prospects of successful economic transformation are also appraised as negative, since it is closer to the Soviet (predominance of a military-industrial complex) rather than the Chinese model. Consequently, he predicts that the regime will eventually collapse, even if reform efforts acquire a genuine character. Yet, these opinions are not popular in many circles, which criticize “a certain portion of the Russian elite oriented to the West which cannot and does not want to objectively appraise the significance of the ‘oriental angle’ in the foreign strategy of the country, including the Korean direction.”26 Sober communists privately admit excesses in the DPRK and deficiencies in its economic policies. For most Russian communists China’s model of socialism is much more appealing. Yet, officially the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF) continues to praise juche ideology and the “great successes” of the DPRK in socialist construction and in pursuing an “independent, proud” foreign policy.27 Every aspect of North Korean life (including the disastrous economic situation) is defended and, if necessary, covered-up. Some fringe Stalinist sects still picture the DPRK as “the only remaining bastion of true socialism, a beacon showing the way to the future.”28 On the other side of the political spectrum the CPRF established permanent contacts with Pyongyang, regularly sending to the North high-level delegations. In Joint Statements and other documents the two sides swear to unite “in the struggle for socialism and against reaction.”29 Communists and their supporters castigate those who suspect North Korea of military nuclear ambitions and aggressive plans. They blame Yeltsin for betraying the DPRK and joining the Western anti-Korean chorus, even demanding increased military cooperation with the North and support of its nuclear

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program as a contribution to the defense of Russia against Washington and its allies. It must be remembered though that LDPR (Liberal Democratic Party) leaders use such pro-Pyongyang rhetoric simply to receive commercial benefits as well as for publicity to position themselves as champions of nationalism. In reality, they do not hold any admiration for the North Korean regime and accept the Kremlin’s line in Korean affairs (as everything else President Putin does). The nationalist LDPR under Vladimir Zhirinovsky also praises Pyongyang, and its leaders frequently visit and hail the “great achievements” of Kim Jong-il. The State Duma and leading political circles at large support the pragmatic, flexible approach of Putin to North Korea.30 The Duma almost unanimously (383—“for”, 8—“against”, 1—“abstained”) ratified on July 19, 2002 the new treaty of friendship, good-neighborhood, and cooperation of February 9, 2000. Russian foreign policy is now formulated and implemented by the executive branch of the government without any serious challenge within the country. The consensus is that Putin-Kim Jong-il meetings “strongly influenced the situation on the Korean peninsula and around it, underlying a positive role of Russia in the region,”31 and that Russia should proceed with its constructive policies thanks to which it “can raise its own role in regional affairs” and help the North when the regime shows signs of change.32 Russians largely approve that Putin is following a balanced, nonideological approach that “does not permit improving relations with one side at the expense of the other side and vice-versa.”33 The prevailing mood in the Russian political elite is to support Putin’s decision to overcome “the decade of coolness” in relations with the North.34 As Alexander Lukin argues, “it is quite clear that the collapse of the North Korean regime is inevitable and few must doubt it in the Kremlin . . . However, it is important for both Koreas and their neighbors when and how such a reunification will occur . . . The Hungarian or Chinese model of transition would be much preferable to the Romanian one,” and it is in Russia’s interest “to demonstrate the advantages of the market economy to the North Korean regime and to encourage reformist tendencies within it.”35 It is generally believed that international cooperation that brings in foreign investment and technology provides access to world news, and necessitates foreign travel will stimulate the growth of reformist forces within North Korean society. Consequently recommendations are offered to the government “to use every possibility to promote trade and cooperation of the outside world with the DPRK.”36 Approving the Kremlin’s strategy an influential expert writes that “in the interests of economic cooperation and increasing

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Russia’s role in the region and the international community as a whole it is necessary to continue the policy of reviving traditional ties with Pyongyang and to use them for enhanced security and stability on the peninsula and for stimulation of inter-Korean dialogue.”37 The First Stage of the Crisis With the advent of Kim Dae-jung as president Seoul’s policy toward the North became the object of praise in Russia. “Activization of the Russian policy in the North Korean direction, despite some fears and worries of Seoul, fit well with the Kim Dae-jung concept of inter-Korean relations.”38 Observers note that Kim rejected the counterproductive strategy of previous administrations aimed at strangulation and absorption of the DPRK. It is argued that such policy just made the North Korean regime “more obnoxious, more xenophobic, and isolationist, helping to intensify the nuclear and missile programs of Pyongyang and exacerbate the material hardships of North Korean population.” The Sunshine Policy, to the contrary, “creates conditions for a gradual exit of North Korea out of the self-isolation, for its escape from the socio-economic crisis, for bringing closer the levels of development of the South and the North, for promotion between the two sides of economic, humanitarian and later political ties and, finally, for humanization of the North Korean regime.” While it does not promise quick breakthroughs, there is no reasonable alternative. If the ROK returns to the old line, it will provoke military conflicts or, so to say “at best,” an uncontrollable collapse of the DPRK “with the ensuing chaos and shift of the unbearable North Korean burden onto the economy and society of the ROK.”39 South Korea is also regularly praised for its nationalistic, independent stand vis-à-vis the principal ally, the United States as well as Japan. 40 There is virtually a consensus in the ruling circles of Russia that the ROK is one of the most important Russian neighbors as “a center of regional development, a valuable economic partner, a vital link to the overall security in the Far East and as a future regional superpower.”41 Both sides hold similar or identical views on inter-Korean relations as well as on regional cooperation and broad international issues.42 The election of Roh Moo-hyun as president was hailed as beneficial to bilateral relations.43 In the first stage of the crisis this decision by the South Korean people reinforced bilateral ties. Pyongyang’s foreign policy has been interpreted in different ways. Prior to the nuclear crisis its increased contacts with the outside world were mostly approved as promising signs of change; however, the

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announcement of its withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty came as an unpleasant surprise and (along with its following moves such as refusal to cooperate with the IAEA, reactivation of nuclear programs, and admission that it possessed nuclear weapons) was roundly condemned by the mainstream political and academic elites of Russia.44 The Kremlin received strong internal support for its appeals to the North to renounce all WMD programs. At the same time the public applauded the government’s efforts to make the United States assume its share of blame for the failure of the 1994 deal and agree to a peaceful compromise. One observer argued, “the creation of a nuclear-free Korean peninsula is a must, but simultaneously the United States must guarantee the security of the DPRK and help promote favorable conditions for its socio-economic development,” and another stressed the need “to work together with all partners in extending real guarantees of security to the DPRK.”45 Pro-Western liberals give a very different appraisal of the nuclear crisis. Mikheev argued that North Korea for decades has been employing “simple and persistent tactics of intensifying tensions on the peninsula forcing others, first of all Washington and Seoul, to look for ways to resume a dialogue with it. Finally the DPRK enters the dialogue and for this move alone gets economic aid while winning additional political time for the regime’s existence.”46 It offers only empty promises. Another researcher develops a similar scenario: “Pyongyang repeatedly invents various security pretexts to engage the U.S. and South Korea in a dialogue in order to postpone the collapse of the regime, to promote military programs in a relatively calm environment, to receive economic aid without making any concessions as far as reforms and open-door policy are concerned.”47 The current crisis, according to such observers, was provoked by Kim Jong-il in order to boost foreign economic aid as well as to diminish a perceived military threat in the wake of the Iraq situation. The aim is to engage the United States in dialogue and normalize relations, and on this basis to exchange the nuclear program for economic aid.48 Pyongyang is accused of similar tactics toward Tokyo when nuclear and missile threats as well as promises to solve the problem of kidnapped Japanese citizens are used to extract more and more concessions. China is presumably another target of its blackmail. It supposedly warns Beijing of an increased flow of refugees from the DPRK unless China increases economic aid. Critics maintain that North Korea has managed to instigate competition among big powers as to who succeeds more in engaging Pyongyang. Both China and Japan were worried at some junctures that Russia was outplaying them in this game.49

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A majority of analysts have harsh words to say about Bush’s policies in Korea, blaming him at least equally with Kim Jong-il for triggering the latest nuclear crisis, and in many cases the blame is put squarely on Washington. Russian observers give Clinton credit for a flexible strategy, arguing that the “positive potential acquired in relations between Washington and Pyongyang during the Clinton presidency was ruined” by Bush.50 The White House “has broken in recent years all obligations to North Korea,” hoping for its early collapse under the weight of economic problems.51 Tough rhetoric and actions by the Bush administration led many analysts in Russia to believe, especially in the wake of the swift U.S. occupation of Iraq, that Washington was preparing a military solution to the Korean nuclear crisis.52 Various explanations for such American plans were offered. Some thought that “the United States was increasingly looking at Korea through the prism of strategic competition with China in the 21st century.”53 Others believed that Washington’s stand on Korea was part of its broader, global goals. The authoritative Diplomatic Yearbook had the following to say: “By the mid-1990’s the White House put on the agenda the task of transforming all states, including rogue and failed regimes, into the “core” zone, controlled by the U.S . . . The tragic events of September 11, 2001 intensified further the new ‘crusade.’ Hegemonist and messianic motives were supplemented by the thirst to avenge and firm desire to achieve absolute security for America . . . Iraq is already checked on the map. There are new ‘blank spots’ to be checked.” 54 U.S. policy was strongly criticized as “useless, impatient, trigger-happy.”55 Experts advised the Kremlin not to follow Bush’s lead and instead to aim at “maintaining a dialogue with Pyongyang based on our own long-term economic and political interests in coordination with Far Eastern neighbors with whom Russia has to live and cooperate in the future.”56 The U.S. policy of “pressures and threats,” according to Russian critics, was not supported by the leading actors (China, Japan, Russia, the European Union, and South Korea), all of which preferred “a political solution . . . based on the reaffirmation of the non-nuclear status of the Korean peninsula, real repudiation by North Korea of its missile-nuclear programs.”57 Russian officials and centrist observers were unhappy with U.S. efforts to change Moscow’s approach on the nuclear issue in early 2003 as well as its opposition to Russia’s participation in multilateral talks on the issue. There were those in the Russian establishment who favored a tough response to the American “anti-Russian actions,”58 yet, the overall improvement of Russo-U.S. relations in the wake of the September 11

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terrorist attacks led Putin to a more cautious stance. While showing understanding of U.S. concerns, the Kremlin tried hard to encourage the North to be accommodating. When the U.S.-North Korean confrontation deepened at the beginning of 2003, the Kremlin advanced a package deal to reach a compromise. Alexander Losyukov went to Pyongyang with a special message from Putin to Kim Jong-il, presenting a threepoint package: (1) a nuclear-free status for the Korean peninsula and strict observance by all of international agreements, including the 1994 framework accord; (2) a constructive bilateral and multilateral dialogue between the parties to result in granting security guarantees to the DPRK; and (3) resumption of humanitarian and economic assistance to the DPRK.59 Kim described the Russian initiative as positive and added some elements to it. The proposal provided a reasonable way out of the crisis; however, the United States held a different view. At first it insisted on Ten-Party Talks, including the five UN Security Council permanent members as well as the two Koreas, Japan, the EU, and Australia. The idea was rejected by Pyongyang. As a result, after Losyukov’s visit, Washington called for Five-Party Talks (the United States, the two Koreas, China, and Japan). At that point China intervened suggesting the trilateral meeting (Pyongyang, Washington, Beijing) as a compromise taking into account views in both the United States and the DPRK. Russia was quick to welcome the proposal, noting that “a more limited number of negotiators is preferable at the initial stage; some aspects can be settled by the United States and the DPRK only.”60 The trilateral talks in China in April 2003 did not yield any progress. Washington increased pressure on the North while Beijing did its best to convince Kim Jong-il to resume talks in some format, including a FiveParty Format (two Koreas, the United States, Japan, and China). Russia again demonstrated full flexibility, encouraging the North to return to the negotiating table.61 Reacting to the Russian appeals, Kim Jong-il instead asked Moscow to join the talks and moreover to host them. Not wishing to become the center of the controversy, Putin suggested that China continue to be the host. At the same time he readily agreed to enter the talks together with the five others, arguing that this would help to resume the negotiating process and soften the tough U.S. stance.62 Thus, Moscow helped to alleviate tensions over the nuclear issue and also scored a diplomatic victory. Russia is torn between the obligations of a responsible nuclear power and a country anxious to maintain good relations with the North. Every time it puts an accent on nonproliferation, it makes Pyongyang unhappy and jeopardizes bilateral relations. To please the partner right from the

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start it began to discuss security guarantees as if in advance agreeing with it that the United States presents a threat to the DPRK.63 Bureaucrats in the Foreign Ministry continue to see North Koreans as “almost our people.” Neither the Kremlin nor big business puts pressure on the diplomats to adjust their ways.64 The Second Stage of the Crisis The Iraq War reinforced Russia’s balancing tactics. Moscow was eager to repair the damage done by this war to its relations with Washington and at the same time to discourage the euphoric superpower from spreading aggressive policies to the Korean peninsula. At the first round of SixParty Talks the Russian delegate in fact endorsed the U.S. demands on Pyongyang to end its nuclear program in a comprehensive manner as a precondition for aid. Yet, at the second round a half year later Moscow’s position had changed. Feeling that Washington was too inflexible, it argued that energy aid must be provided to the DPRK if the United States wanted the North to freeze its nuclear program. This line persisted at the third round, distancing Russia from the United States and drawing it to China. As far as the Korean problem is concerned, China regularly gets very high marks in Russian political circles and the media. It is noted with satisfaction that Beijing shares similar concerns with Moscow and holds similar positions on the solution to the Korean problem. China is singled out as the most wise and effective participant in the Six-Party Talks. This includes praise for Beijing for its pressure on Pyongyang, which finally made it accept negotiations. Chinese pressure is not limited to the nuclear issue but includes “strong recommendations” to stop militarization of its economy, to reform, and to open the country to the outside world.65 Russia endorses those positions. The Russian and Chinese governments have been closely cooperating regarding the crisis. Beijing readily supported Pyongyang’s request for Russian participation in the nuclear talks. With Russian encouragement China played an active role as a mediator to bring about the Six-Party Talks.66 Moscow and Beijing held a similar position at the first round of the talks and jointly concluded that the negotiations were useful and resulted in an international framework in which all participants expressed readiness to pursue a peaceful and diplomatic solution to the nuclear crisis.67 The two sides also agreed that Washington’s line presented the most formidable hurdle to the resolution of the crisis. Russia and China decided to persuade Kim Jong-il to agree to the second round of Six-Party Talks. The plan worked due to diplomatic pressure and

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economic “carrots” (including deliveries of fuel oil and foodstuffs to the DPRK). At the second round of talks Moscow and Beijing again coordinated their stands, pushing for a Joint Statement of all participants to resolve the crisis. Washington blocked it, refusing the North’s demand that the United States change its hostile policy. Finally only a “chairman’s statement” was issued. In the wake of this round Russian and Chinese delegates agreed that the road to a settlement remained long and difficult, but it was necessary to persist.68 Clear disagreements exist in the Russian expert community concerning Beijing’s views on Korean unification. Some insist that China does not welcome it since a unified Korea is “capable of growing into a serious political, economic, and military factor detrimental to hidden plans of Beijing to dominate in this part of Asia and in the Pacific.”69 Others feel that China will get more pluses than minuses from Korean unification: settlement of one of the most painful tension spots near Chinese borders; brilliant economic prospects of cooperation with a united Korea; and the rise of China’s prestige due to its intermediary role in Korean affairs. They argue that China in principle welcomes the unification of Korea, but it is against the collapse of the North Korean regime and is apprehensive about U.S. predominance in the future Korean state.70 Russia and China mutually agreed on applying pressure on the DPRK to actively participate in the Six-Party Talks, at the third round supporting its right to tap nuclear energy for peaceful purposes under the control of the IAEA and adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. After the meeting it was recognized by both sides that the main obstacle in the negotiating process remained a serious lack of mutual trust among the parties.71 Koizumi’s decision to go to Pyongyang in September 2002 had been welcomed by official Russia as a breakthrough in Tokyo’s pro-American hard-line.72 However, soon the positive appraisal gave way to more critical analysis. It was noted that the summit where North Korea admitted kidnapping Japanese nationals in the past created a wave of antiKorean sentiment and led to a harder stand. Officials as well as centrist and leftist observers were especially dismayed with Japan’s launching of spy satellites over the DPRK and talk of using a preemptive strike to rebuff potential threats. The second Koizumi-Kim Jong-il summit on May 22, 2004 rekindled hope of a more flexible Japanese approach to North Korea, and to the on-going nuclear crisis. Yet the following third round of talks disclosed, according to Russian observers, that, unlike Seoul, Tokyo was inclined to follow Washington’s line, a result of its “unreasonable” preoccupation with the abductees and “strategic ineptness.”

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Japan presumably feels that it is too weak militarily to be a serious and independent player vis-a-vis North Korea.73 Together with Beijing, Moscow favored Pyongyang’s approach of compensation for freezing its nuclear program. Russian officials and observers feel that it was due to Moscow and Beijing’s insistence that at the third round Washington finally presented a proposal to settle the controversy. Pyongyang in its turn made a counterproposal, which was welcomed as a “small victory” for Russo-Chinese joint diplomacy.74 Moscow continued its efforts to close the gap. In July 2004 Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and in September the speaker of the upper chamber of the parliament Sergei Mironov delivered to Kim Jong-il personal messages from Putin, urging him to accept a compromise.75 Russian observers see also internal weaknesses in the Roh administration, due to its rejection by the political elite, bureaucracy, and military circles. Inconsistency in foreign policy is noticed when it vacillates between Washington’s tough line and its own attempts to engage the North through concessions and initiatives. On concrete issues Russia is disappointed that the ROK does not show more enthusiasm for such economic projects as the trans-Korean railroad and modernization of North Korean power stations. While experts assert that the current economic recovery of Russia should give a new stimulus to bilateral cooperation, partly the South Korean side is blamed for “surely lagging behind European, American, Japanese corporations in tapping business opportunities in the Far East.” South Koreans are warned that “the trailblazers will get the lion’s share of profit and advantages” in the Russian market.76 Vorontsov concludes that the ROK “is not quite ready yet to fulfill the historical mission of complete national accommodation with the North and to acquire a more independent role in the world arena, adequate to the economic potential of the country.”77 The visit of Roh Moo-hyun to Russia in the fall of 2004 helped to alleviate some misgivings. Officials found him quite reasonable on the nuclear issue and enthusiastic on promoting cooperation; he was forgiven for lack of attention to Russia early in his presidency. The Kremlin expressed its belief that the two states would be cooperating closely in handling the nuclear issue. As Bush’s reelection loomed, Russia was eager to build on the momentum of the third round and the consensus with China and South Korea. It expected progress if Bush began his second term committed to building on the elements of progress. Naturally, the response to the hardline that was adopted was disappointment. A more dire stage in the crisis would place new strains on Russian diplomacy in responding to both adversaries.

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The Third Stage of the Crisis The new flare-up in the crisis, precipitated by the DPRK announcement in early February 2005 of its rejection of Six-Party Talks and its possession of nuclear weapons, drew a very negative response in Russia. Both officials and centrist observers, reflecting the official thinking, virtually joined the pro-Westerners in denouncing Pyongyang’s behavior. The head of the International Relations Committee of the upper chamber of the Russian parliament Mikhail Margelov said that “possession of nuclear weapons by the DPRK may pose a threat to the entire mankind . . . One should not forget,” continued Margelov, “that North Korea is a totalitarian state which demonstrates its desire to remain in isolation.”78 However, Russian officialdom, including Margelov, once again opted for diplomatic efforts to dispel fears in Pyongyang and convince it to continue negotiating. Moscow and Beijing further coordinated their positions. Through regular consultations on the issue the two sides worked out a scheme of pacifying Pyongyang as well as convincing Washington not to overreact to the North Korean declaration of its nuclear ambitions.79 Yet, analysts also debated the extent of China’s influence on the North. Alexander Mansourov, currently working at the Hawaiian Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, wrote: “China’s influence in North Korea is grossly misrepresented and exaggerated. In the past five years, Beijing’s economic assistance to Pyongyang and the latter’s economic dependence on China in terms of food, fertilizers, and monetary remittances declined in both absolute and relative terms.” Others noted that China’s militarytechnical assistance is sporadic and of questionable value. The DPRKPRC mutual defense alliance is hollow and on paper only. Controversial cross-border contacts aggravate tensions and increase uncertainty in the overall stressful bilateral relationship. At present, mutual trust between the leaders of the two countries is badly shaken. Yet, Kim Jong-il does not want to be abandoned by China. Hence, the North Korean manipulations of Chinese sensitivities, which are designed to make China recommit itself to its security and sovereignty at the expense of “strategic cooperation” with the United States. Pyongyang skillfully uses the American card and the nuclear card to leave Beijing with no options other than facing either the dreaded six-headed monster of American Scylla or the engulfing terror of nuclear Charybdis.” Mansourov does not even exclude “the ultimate risk” of Kim Jong-il falling victim to “China-sponsored forced dethronement.”80 While Mansourov advises the United States not to expect China to have much influence over the North, Mikheev sees value in its position

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for the United States, stating that though China “still harbors deep inside the fear of getting American troops on its borders,” it is “increasingly ready for collective measures aiming at the transformation of the North Korean regime.”81 Others agree that it will not defend the regime for ideological reasons and “will not support Pyongyang in a war since it is bound to spoil Sino-American relations with a global threat to the economy and social stability of China.”82 “To avoid a large-scale humanitarian catastrophe on its northeastern border in case the DPRK should collapse,” it encourages reform in the North and a political settlement of the crisis.83 Praise of China has internal undertones: pro-Westerners try to convince the Kremlin to follow Beijing’s example of readiness to cooperate with the United States vis-à-vis the DPRK. China’s relations with the South are pictured by most Russian authors as an example of wise pragmatism and a success. Jealousy is shown to the fact that Chinese-South Korean trade and mutual investments are much ahead of what has been achieved in Russian-South Korean relations. As one observer argues, “if worse comes to worst, a Chinese blessing for the gradually expanding South Korean protectorate over the Kim clan-run North Korea is better than a Beijing-sponsored military coup in Pyongyang or the PRCsanctioned, avalanche-style, outright absorption of the DPRK by the ROK.”84 A different point of view, however, holds that China “having shed blood for the socialist perspective of North Korea and being moved by great power logic wants to keep the DPRK on its side.”85 Advocates play down differences between Beijing and Pyongyang, insisting that China believes in the inevitability of China-style reforms in North Korea. Russian debaters are neutral in their appraisals of Japan’s policies toward Korea. They do note Tokyo’s toughness vis-à-vis the DPRK but do not denounce it to the same degree as they do Washington’s policies. In fact, certain sympathy is shown to Japanese concerns over the North’s nuclear and missiles programs as well as its insistence on the resolution of the issue of kidnapped Japanese nationals. It is acknowledged that Japan sees the situation as a threat created by militarization of the DPRK and its missile-nuclear programs.86 Japan, Russian observers admit, is “especially vulnerable” in case of attack, and it “reacted to the escalation of North Korea’s threat by emphasizing the role of military means in the Japanese strategy of national security.”87 The impression at times conveyed is that Japan would be more flexible if the United States set an example, even implying that it had tried to liberalize its policies, but the United States twisted its arm. Japan’s relations with other countries matter too. It is believed that Russia may influence Japan’s position on Korea by advancing projects of

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regional integration in NEA through the development of the rich resources of Siberia and the Far East as well as the Korean peninsula. Russian experts pay attention to troubles in Japanese-South Korean relations too, tending to agree with Seoul’s demands for settling “the historical scores” with Tokyo. As experts point out “the hatred syndrome towards their oppressors by the Koreans limits Japan’s opportunities for influence on the Korean peninsula.”88 It is also routinely predicted that a unified Korea will present a challenge to Japan both geopolitically and economically, leading to tough competition between the two nations in the future. As a result, Japan is suspected of hidden but firm opposition to eventual unification. As the Gorbachev Foundation argues, for Japan to facilitate rapprochement between the two Korean states would mean speeding up the process in which Japan does not play the leading role and may lose ground to a serious challenger in the region. Japan is presumably fearful that a unified Korea will be violently nationalistic, antiAmerican and anti-Japanese, and will eventually tilt to the Chinese sphere of influence.89 Of special concern for Japan is the prospect that a “settlement in Korea will weaken American positions in Northeast Asia and the Asian-Pacific region and will put into question the US military presence not only on the Korean peninsula, but in the entire region . . . And Japan needs the military-political alliance with the United States as a guarantee from the threat emanating from the growing military might of the Chinese giant.”90 Russian observers point out that three main strategies of solving the current nuclear crisis are contemplated. The first one is physical destruction of the DPRK as an “evil, dangerous, and inhuman” regime. Virtually all experts as well as the general public are categorically against this kind of strategy. The following arguments have been advanced. North Korea is not perceived as a direct threat to Russia. It was created and groomed by the USSR. Moscow did not like North Korean leaders much, but it always looked at Pyongyang as a poor, weak, and frightened regime, not a source of any future attack. Unleashing aggression against the South or Japan equals suicide. Kim Jong-il and his entourage are so cautious that they do not even dare to introduce overdue reforms in the country. A war against formidable foes is much more dangerous than such reforms.91 A military operation against the North would lead to an uncontrollable, unpredictable course of events. The participation of other great powers cannot be entirely excluded. There is plenty of evidence in the history of mankind when theoretically quick, easy military campaigns turned into nightmares for everyone, even for those who initially did not have anything to do with the conflict. A war in Korea is

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presented as “a terrible disaster with tragic consequences for all neighboring states.”92 The war could leave a nuclear cloud hovering over Russian territory, thousands of hungry people fleeing to it, and economic plans for the Russian Far East in ruins. An assault on the DPRK would be detrimental to international law and undermine the entire global security system. It would give a cue to weak states: there are no international bodies and norms that can defend them against a military invasion from outside. The weak ones would be tempted to deter potential aggressors with their own WMD. As for strong, ambitious states the signal would be if you have an opponent it is okay to use force against it.93 Russia could not accept “the disturbing wish on the part of Washington to unilaterally establish (or flout) international rules, ignore international law and defy international organizations, especially the UN and its Security Council.”94 Moreover, tens of thousands of innocent people would be killed supposedly to make life happier in Korea.95 The second proposed solution in Korea boils down to strangling the DPRK through pressure and isolation. Russians do not support this strategy either. It is argued that there are many countries with regimes not much better than the one in Pyongyang; yet, the United States and other democratic countries do not mind cooperating with them. So, the DPRK does not deserve such harsh treatment. Moreover, one should not in the name of liberating the North Korean population from the communist yoke starve this very population to death. The elite of the DPRK will anyhow manage to feed itself; it is simple people who are bound to suffer most.96 Third, the strangulation strategy would not achieve the planned result—the collapse of the communist regime. Instead, Pyongyang would redouble its efforts to produce WMD. Back in the late 1980s the DPRK lost its nuclear ally, the USSR, and faced mounting attempts by Seoul and Washington to speed up the demise of its communist regime. It decided to go nuclear in order to stop potential interference or even outright aggression.97 Russian observers do not believe in a North Korean Gorbachev either. “The top-level military coup in Pyongyang would rather consolidate the totalitarian regime . . . North Korean society is much more closed than the Soviet one was.”98 Even if a strangulation policy did work, the process would start with loosening control over the population, decreasing respect for authority, dramatically increasing crime and corruption, spontaneous local uprisings and struggles in ruling circles for power—all familiar scenes in other former communist countries. If the South interceded, the situation could grow even more chaotic. Attempts to strangle the DPRK

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may lead to heavy social consequences to make life even harder for simple Koreans, trigger uncontrollable migration and finally turn into a large-scale military conflict.99 That leaves a compromise, negotiated outcome as the only promising solution. The United States has failed to appreciate that, and North Korean insistence on dealing only with the United States on the nuclear issue seemed unreasonable to most Russians. Some argued, “Any possible United States security guarantee to Pyongyang can hardly be worth the paper it is written on . . . China and Russia are the only countries which can give Pyongyang formidable security guarantees. Sharing the border with North Korea, Russia and China can effectively prevent U.S. military action in North Korea if they think it is unreasonable and too dangerous.”100 It follows that Russia “holding such a unique and preferable position may have restraining influence on ideologically-charged approaches of the U.S. and China towards the North Korean regime.”101 The Fourth Stage of the Crisis In the second half of 2006 the nuclear crisis grew more serious, and Russia made clear its opposition to the North’s behavior by voting in July and again in October for sanctions in the Security Council. It agreed that application of some pressure could help to convince North Korea to return to the negotiating table and reverse its decision to become a nuclear state. Yet, this did not change the conclusion that incentives through the Six-Party Talks would be needed. When the December talks failed to produce an agreement, Russia joined China in urging that consultations be intensified. The February 13 agreement met these expectations. Russia feared that the United States would not act in accord with the agreement and also that North Korea would be hesitant to abandon its nuclear weapons. They were eager to realize the promise of the new deal, becoming more active in preparations for energy and other projects and anticipating the creation of a multilateral security framework. Conclusion It is argued that Russia’s strength in contributing to Korean rapprochement lies in two factors: historical influence on the DPRK and a genuine interest in a strong unified Korean state. Despite recent upheavals in RFDPRK relations the North Korean leadership looks at Russia with a special feeling as a country that helped to create the DPRK and kept it

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afloat in the 1950s–1980s with massive aid. Putin’s overtures have greatly increased Pyongyang’s trust in Russia. Active participation of Russia in the settlement process will make North Korea more selfassured, less worried about real or imagined threats. It is taken for granted that present-day Russia will use its influence on the DPRK only for constructive purposes. Inclusion of Moscow will in its turn help to promote economic cooperation of the two Koreas. The North desperately needs Russian raw materials. With Moscow as a partner in the settlement negotiations the DPRK will certainly have better access to Russian resources. Gorbachev-Foundation experts state that Russia does not have any claims “to achieve in Korea dominating positions in the spheres of economy and politics.” It more than the other four powers is interested in the settlement of the Korean problem, including unification of Korea, by peaceful and democratic means. Russia’s basic interest is “to have in the final analysis a united, large democratic state on the Korean peninsula, which will play an important independent role in the region and will maintain partnership relations with Russia, closely cooperating with it in the spheres of economy and culture, in the development of Far Eastern regions.” An image exists of Russia as “non-partisan and independent, promoting rapprochement of the two Koreas.”102 Also an image exists of the United States best achieving its aims regarding nuclear-missiles programs and totalitarian practices by convincing Kim Jong-il that it is not about to destroy his regime. The result would be the DPRK abandoning its military programs and moving toward reforms. The inter-Korean détente was very important to Kim Jong-il’s regime internally. The top leader had done little to impress associates of his ability to bring the nation to a better future. On the contrary, things went from bad to worse for North Korea. Lack of initiative in the face of mounting difficulties deepened disenchantment among leading figures as well as among wide circles of the population. Kim’s decision to reverse the passive foreign policy and to take the bold step of meeting the ROK president brought back an air of optimism in the DPRK. Russians mainly believe Kim was aiming at a real rapprochement with the South and through it long-term engagement with the West balanced by simultaneous reinforcement of ties with China and Russia. It was only the toughening of American policies by the Bush Administration that scared the DPRK back to xenophobia. The underlining motives for a genuine dialogue with the outside world are still valid. The following steps would be favorable for it. One, four outside powers should equally participate and cooperate with each other in the

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settlement on the Korean peninsula. Rivalry among these powers and attempts to exclude Russia or any other state among the four from settlement will only slow down or disrupt the process. Two, four outside powers should establish diplomatic relations with the North. The crossrecognition idea on the Korean peninsula was developed by Americans and supported by the ROK and Japan. However, after first the USSR and then China established diplomatic relations with the South, the United States and Japan did not take similar steps toward the North and set preconditions it must meet before recognition may take place. Three, the four powers should guarantee noninterference in the internal affairs of the North. According to Russian observers the main problem is division of the Korean nation as a result of World War II followed by the cold war. Koreans deserve to be reunited because they constitute “one nation which lived within one state for more than ten centuries and which possesses ancient common cultural-spiritual traditions, language and a unique civilization,” an impressive record since Korea was “hundreds of times invaded from outside and repeatedly and for long periods remained under foreign occupation.”103 Throughout all recent debates it has been argued almost unanimously by mainstream observers that Russia should wholeheartedly welcome the tendencies toward normalization on the Korean peninsula and the prospect of the country’s unification. It is pointed out that “normalization would lead to stabilization of the military and political situation on the peninsula for the benefit of Russia’s interests.”104 Russians also favor the creation of multiparty mechanisms of cooperation and security in NEA. It is argued that unification of Korea cannot be achieved in the foreseeable future, and the close cooperation of the countries involved in the Six-Party Talks will be needed for a gradual, long-term process of overcoming animosity between the two states. A united Korean state continues to be seen as a strong geopolitical boost for Russian playing the role of a useful counterbalance to Japanese and Chinese influence in the region. One expert asserts, “Many in Russia are concerned with a potential security threat posed by a rapidly developing China. Relations with Japan will remain limited by territorial disputes. A united Korea will become a natural partner of Moscow in off-setting the two Far Eastern giants since their relations will remain burdened with historical grievances and present-day competition.”105 There is also virtual consensus in the expert community that “in a united Korea Russia will have a larger and a more active economic partner and investor which Russia needs especially in its Far Eastern regions,” and that “a larger united Korea facing no permanent and direct military

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threat will adopt a more self-confident foreign policy thus reducing the American military role on the peninsula.”106 Yet, given the leading role of the United States and the strength of Korea’s neighbors, experts expect future cooperation between it and a united Korea. Summarizing the views expressed by various Russian observers, we find the following common points. Russia, unlike other great powers, has absolutely nothing to lose in case of the unification of the Korean nation. A strong Korea will not pose a security, political, or economic challenge to Russia (as it will to Japan and China). Instead, a unified Korean state will help Moscow to balance the two and support it in the territorial dispute with Japan. Specifically, Russians essentially agree on the following points: (1) development of the Russian Far East is a major national objective and cannot be realized without peace in Korea; (2) in this it needs Korean participation, which necessitates the unification of Korea; (3) stability and international cooperation in the neighboring areas are necessary for Russia’s development; (4) a security benefit can be envisioned by the buildup of a NEA regional security system, which would resolve various conflicts. Another set of broadly shared views centers on how the process of engagement of North Korea should unfold. First, should come assistance to the DPRK in acquiring a sense of security and international acceptance, a kind of appeasement involving: (1) full normalization of relations with the United States and Japan; (2) thorough implementation of the nuclear accord between Washington and Pyongyang; and (3) unilateral moves by the United States aimed at reducing its level of military activity and presence on the Korean peninsula, such as cancellation of any major joint U.S.-South Korea war games. To some these proposals may sound counterproductive, enabling the present Stalinist regime to prolong its lifetime. Many Russians think, on the contrary, friendly treatment of the North by the South and the international community would induce changes in the society, as reform-minded people in the upper layers of the establishment gained support in their quest for regime transformation and hard-liners found it more difficult to resist. Russian observers foresee a stage in the settlement in Korea devoted to the creation of the proper infrastructure of North-South ties. Most important is development of large-scale economic cooperation of South Korea, the United States, Japan and other countries with the DPRK. It would not only raise confidence in Pyongyang toward its traditional adversaries and help to change the society; but would also make the economies of the two parts of Korea more compatible for merger. The stronger the DPRK’s economy, the easier the burden of unification will

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be for the ROK. Cultural exchanges should closely follow economic interactions. If such contacts work, then military proposals can be realized. This optimistic scenario relies on change in the North through incentives after every opportunity has been provided to it. Koreans should not set goals to achieve unification by a certain date, but rather prepare for a long, slow period of mutual accommodation of North and South. Russia may be very helpful in this when North Koreans will have to adjust to new economic, political, and social realities. Most North Korean plants and factories will lose their usefulness and stop functioning, and Russia can become instrumental in their modernization since most were built by Soviets and according to their designs. After that it would become the principal consumer of their output. Meanwhile, it would be the country best able and interested to absorb the North Korean work force that is without jobs. It would also become a major supplier of spare parts for North Korean enterprises. (They are needed now, but Pyongyang does not have money to buy them). Of course, Russia would be the cheapest and the most convenient exporter of oil, gas, and electricity to the north of Korea too. Moscow may be useful as well in developing railroad links between the Korean peninsula and Europe; surveys of mineral deposits in the North (Russia has in its possession large quantities of data based on surveys done in the 1950s); reeducation of North Korean workers; teaching North Korean students; modernizing the armed forces of the North; buying agricultural products; developing special economic zones; and supporting a unified Korea in its dealings with Japan and China. After the transition period, Russia and a unified Korea are likely to become special partners in NEA. Even earlier Russia would assume a vital role as a guarantor of the North, a force for regional balance, and a vital component of a new multilateral framework for NEA.

CHAPTER 10

The Russian Response: The Regional Context

T

he Korean peninsula matters more to Russia than to any other state except China and Japan. The corridor where development in the Russian Far East is concentrated is a geographical extension of the Korean coastline, with Vladivostok a mere seventy miles away. A century ago Russia fought for control of Korea, sixty years ago it sent troops to split up the peninsula and then backed a war to gain the rest, just twenty years ago Mikhail Gorbachev began his tenure in office in the midst of such a substantial upgrading of relations with North Korea that the issue threatened to become the fourth “obstacle” to normalization of relations with China,1 and a decade ago Russia bemoaned the loss of any influence as the United States and others responded to the first nuclear crisis.2 At stake in the second crisis is not only the security of Russia’s eastern flank but also its prospects for a place in the geopolitical and economic upsurge of the world’s most dynamic region. Russia’s foremost concern since the first crisis is that it would be brushed aside as an outsider. Next to fears that China would try, in one way or another, to wrest the Far East away come fears that the United States and Japan would ignore Russia as an intruder without legitimate standing in NEA. Indeed, as China worked hard to reassure Russians, the more immediate concern became isolation reminiscent of the end of the cold war, but this time without the consolation of being treated as a superpower. Russians bridle at suggestions that their country is present only as an expansionist interloper sowing insecurity, it lacks genuine roots in Asia given its overwhelmingly European orientation, and its economic presence has become negligible. Fear of exclusion has become

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associated with anxieties about losing territory as well as worries about a far-off periphery in crisis. To appreciate the importance attached to the current crisis one must look back to the deep frustration in the Yeltsin era with marginality in Korean matters just a few years after there had been a kind of euphoria that not only would money be flowing into Russia at a time of economic urgency but also that a true partner for the future had been found in South Korea. While intent on inclusion, Russians appear to feel less of a security threat than the other parties to the crisis; they can be more patient as the process unfolds. In the summer of 2003 brief fright in the Russian Far East that war might be approaching, due to U.S. pugnacity more than North Korean recklessness, faded with the start of the Six-Party Talks, and soon the outcome of the war in Iraq revealed the U.S. military to be overcommitted. Opinion again focused on the big picture rather than the nuclear issue. In its dealings with the crisis, Moscow has argued that the key to agreement and reunification too is to relieve the North of its insecurity. It can be induced to accept the South’s overtures through tighter economic cooperation with other countries;3 including the embrace of a security framework for the entire region. Conveniently, the very things deemed most beneficial to Russian interests are the solutions to Korea’s troubles. If the Bush administration was determined to narrow the focus of negotiations, insisting from the outset that the sole issue was the North’s violation of assurances about nuclear weapons development and production, for Russia the broader the geopolitical and economic plan for the region, the more it expects to benefit. At the start of the crisis the message from the Foreign Ministry was that the North should receive guarantees of national security and noninterference, a civilized resolution to guarantee peaceful coexistence protective of the sovereignty of the two Korean states and taking into account their equal rights in a peninsular and regional division of labor. Disappointed that after considerable diplomatic effort the situation had deteriorated; Russians trace the cause to a lack of correspondence in the interests of the leading world powers in this region and the absence of a mechanism to secure their agreement.4 This view insists on the rationality of the approach in 2000–2002 to finding a solution, picturing Russia as a status quo power, interested in stability, which comes from the North achieving socioeconomic progress and a more secure state rather than from attempts by one side to gain a dominant position. The current approach to North Korea can be set against the background of the mid-1980s when Moscow briefly tried to boost relations. While internal papers sponsored by some officials and academic leaders

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Yevgeny Primakov and Georgii Kim were making the case that Moscow should improve ties to Seoul and be more critical of Pyongyang, political leaders under Konstantin Chernenko (when his health was bad and so was that of International Department Secretary Rusakov, O.B. Rakhmanin, the notorious opponent of normalization with China, filled the void) moved decidedly toward Pyongyang. They took advantage of a downturn in Sino-North Korean relations after the Burmese bombing of South Korean leaders and focused on countering the tightening U.S.-JapanSouth Korea alliance system while also gaining the right to make overflights and warship visits to North Korean ports. Rakhmanin was trying to block Soviet normalization with China,5 while singing the praises of Kim Il-sung as a strong, reliable ally. This course did not change for more than a year after Gorbachev’s rise to power,6 making even more dramatic the loss for North Korea that followed. After a hiatus of fifteen years, Putin may have again given thought to the merits of countering an assertive U.S. posture in NEA with support for North Korea’s role in at least exacting a price for compromise, if not pinning the United States down. Although of late there has much talk about Sino-Russian cooperation in dealing with the North, in 2000–2003 attention was also paid to Putin’s search for balance with China. His North Korean initiative could in part be an outgrowth of awareness that China and the North again had troubled relations in 1992–99, and another chance had presented itself to fill the gap. Even as partnership with China overtook competition, the benefits of revived ties with the North remained apparent. Instead of blaming the Soviet Union for providing North Korea with the means to become a nuclear threat, some recall the nuclear umbrella for the North as the right way to convince it that it did not need nuclear weapons. Only when Gorbachev and then Yeltsin withdrew this source of security while the United States refused to recognize the North as it dared to rattle the security of the regime did a more dangerous scenario arise. The United States had a chance to forestall a nuclear North Korea, but it failed to realize the vital role played by Moscow earlier and the need for an equivalent in a new era. Russian analysts are also prone to recall that while their leaders applied a moral test to the North in the first half of the 1990s the Clinton administration cut a deal based on realism in 1994. Over the previous decades Moscow had found that criticism and pressure against the North had led it to move closer to China, and now there was new danger of becoming sidelined. By 1996–98 China, the United States, and South Korea had gained a role in the FourParty Talks with Pyongyang and Japan was a member of KEDO dealing with it as well, while only Russia was shunned.

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Under the adage “the enemy of my enemy is my friend” Russia sees the North as convenient for boosting its voice in the region; from 1995 leaders frantically attempted to improve relations. Putin cultivated Kim Jong-il from 2000, disregarding his unsavory methods of rule. Once the current nuclear crisis began, there was fear that Russia would remain a bystander, unneeded by the United States. Putin sent Losyukov to Pyongyang to negotiate a comprehensive deal combining security and economic assistance to the North in return for denuclearization, much to the chagrin of Washington. Having failed, Russia over the next half year saw the United States turn to China to deal with the North and to Japan and South Korea for coordination in a strategy mixing dialogue and pressure. Only when the North insisted on its presence in what became Six-Party Talks could Russia at last be assured that it had a place at the table. After a decade of failure, Russians cling to this achievement, often giving the North the benefit of the doubt as in the view that it lacked the technology to make enriched uranium and that the United States was exaggerating the threat as an excuse to develop a missile defense system.7 Only the nuclear test in 2006 undercut this outlook. Disappointment came from the realization that Moscow did not gain regional influence or much economic benefit from embracing the South, whose ties to the United States and even to Japan had a much sturdier foundation, and Russia had little to offer after losing any clout in Pyongyang. South Korean-Russian relations sank to a new low in 1998. Some in Russia blamed Korean aggressiveness, liberally sprinkling bribes to get economic gains or intelligence. It was even alleged that the government was paying Central Asian migrants to return to their ancestral residences in the Russian Far East against the will, if not the laws, of Russian authorities. When the Korean financial crisis occurred, funds became scarce, but earlier South Koreans had discovered that economic projects were thwarted and goodwill hard to achieve even if Russians looked to Seoul as a partner in energy development.8 Into the mix came Kim Dae-jung’s spring 1999 visit, inviting a triangle with Pyongyang to boost his new Sunshine Policy and convince Kim Jong-il of its promise and Russia’s role as a strong backer of inter-Korean reconciliation. Russia’s tilt to South Korea from December 1991 to July 1994 was followed by a struggle to rebuild ties with the North and finally from 2000 a move to equidistance.9 The final affront had been the Perry Process, seen as the United States strengthening its hand without room for Russia to have a role.10 Before long, however, it led Pyongyang to reassess tough demands that Moscow must guarantee its security in order to normalize relations, allowing the revised friendship treaty finally to be approved.

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The Sunshine Policy raised the stakes for the North’s diplomacy, the failure of the Russian Communist Party in December 1999 elections proved that better friends of Pyongyang would not be returning to power, and finally the replacement of Yeltsin with a more palatable leader made a fresh start easier. The North remained preoccupied with its military, seeking Russia arms, such as on-site production of MIG-29s, and intelligence, including satellite photos. It wanted debt forgiveness, such as what Putin provided Vietnam in September 2000, and Kim Jong-il’s 2001 trip to Russia was delayed when debt issues were not resolved.11 His train ride across Siberia served as comic relief for Russians who were not caught in the traffic disruptions; yet the indulgence of a capricious dictator did not shake an emerging realist perspective to make use of a beleagured regime seen as posing little danger to Russia. Putin’s limits on cooperation lowered Kim’s expectations, but as tensions with Bush mounted the desirability of using each other for balance in NEA became obvious. Given assertive policies that left Russians feeling that despite Putin’s support for the U.S. war in Afghanistan their interests were being ignored, the January 2002 accusation that Pyongyang is part of the axis of evil was taken as another blow against their country. After all, Putin had fostered personal ties with Kim and was counting on them to lead to a multilateral process linked to the Sunshine Policy. Rejecting that policy and demonizing Kim would leave Putin with no way forward. While Bush’s motives were more easily attributed to goals focused on pressuring China, forcing South Korea back into the fold, and drawing Japan closer, the Russian side considered itself a target too. When Putin drew closer to Bush after the 9/11 attack on the United States, he did not let that interfere with efforts to boost ties with the North, for which he found encouragement not only from Kim Dae-jung and Jiang Zemin, but also Koizumi, who sought Putin’s help in arranging a trip to Pyongyang. After Putin met with Kim Jong-il in August 2002 in Vladivostok, he seemed to be the trailblazer, as Bush was making plans for a diplomatic initiative to Pyongyang. When news of the nuclear crisis arrived Moscow was desperate to put matters back on track, arguing that the North was heading in a reform direction and skeptical of U.S. intelligence and motives and then disappointed with Kim Jong-il too. Russians blame the crisis on the Bush administration. Saying that the North was not connected to the attack on the United States in 2001 and condemned it, they accuse Bush of abandoning the Agreed Framework and Sunshine Policy, provocatively branding the North part of the axis of evil, mishandling the uranium enrichment issue, and finally with its

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attack in Iraq sending frightening signals. Driven into a corner, Kim Jong-il resorted to the only strategy available.12 Another path was possible, supported by Kim Dae-jung and then Roh Moo-hyun as well as by China’s leaders. Russia had joined them in advising the United States to talk directly to the North; yet, Bush offered too little too late, overestimating the chance that pressure will work on a proud nation or that a coalition of five countries could reach agreement on an extreme approach of pressure or sanctions.13 With the United States before the UN on Iraq and talking about taking North Korea to the UN too, the winter of 2002–2003 appeared to offer a window for Russian diplomacy, capitalizing on personal ties between Putin and Kim. In December Putin discussed a plan for a joint security guarantee to North Korea from China and Russia as well as the United States along with normalization of ties in return for ending the North’s nuclear weapons programs. The United States balked, and officials calculated that it was less interested in ending the nuclear programs and stabilizing the region than in regime change and forcing the North to concede error without negotiations. When Losyukov came back from Pyongyang empty-handed in January, he had failed to convert Putin’s invested efforts into any Russian role while angering the United States. After all, the Russian side had conceded that the North was right to be fearful of U.S. intentions and called for bilateral U.S.-North Korean talks, contrary to U.S. policy. Losyukov’s package had assessed no guilt and eschewed pressure. It was a return to the Agreed Framework, as the United States recognized the North and ended its embargo, while guaranteeing security and noninterference in internal affairs.14 Moreover, a region-wide energy and transportation agreement was envisioned to bring large-scale assistance to the North.15 At this early stage the United States narrowly focused on compliance, and Russia’s premature attempt to find a package with economic rewards was not welcome; yet the fact that Pyongyang showed no sign of consultations, despite earlier promises to Putin, left Russia sidelined too, notably in the April three-way talks. If Russia’s “packet deal” might have provided a roadmap to stabilize the situation, Kim preferred a crisis atmosphere to bring matters to a head. Russia came to believe that the North’s actions were too extreme and the nuclear problem was real, making it easier for Bush and Putin when they met in St. Petersburg in June to find common ground. Some saw Putin trying to rebuild relations with Bush damaged by the Iraq War.16 In March 2003 a Japanese report that Primorskii krai was preparing for a massive influx of refugees as a result of a confrontation between the DPRK and the United States was reprinted in Vladivostok,17 raising

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concern of spillover from the conflict. Saying that the March article was a bombshell for the local population, the same paper reported that on July 19 a Foreign Ministry statement carried on p. 1 of Izvestiia in an article entitled “Does a nuclear winter await us?” warned of preparations for war.18 The fear of war, beginning with a U.S. attack on the North’s nuclear reactor, raised concerns about nuclear radiation reaching Primorskii krai.19 After the apparent U.S. success in Iraq and rhetoric pointing to strong action toward the North, there was talk of refugees crossing the border into Russia, and military exercises near the border.20 Having found little interest in Pyongyang in discussing ways to resolve the crisis, the Kremlin seemed in August 2003 to edge closer to the U.S. position that first the North had to abandon its nuclear weapons program in a complete, verifiable, and irreversible manner before talks on a security guarantee and large-scale economic assistance. North Koreans were furious with this “betrayal,” causing acrimony at the August talks. The Six-Party Talks soon had a calming effect, reviving realist thinking. In May Putin had responded to a letter from Kim Jong-il asking for help with the United States and in July sent his foreign minister to both Koreas. Russia claimed credit for advising Pyongyang against a hard-line position and in favor of a multilateral framework to address the crisis, while many had the impression that the United States was not eager for their country to become part of the talks, to the point of asserting that they gained a place against its will.21 In the fall there was a backlash to excessive cooperation marked by calls to adopt a more strategic position independent of the United States. Arguing that the United States is unwilling to accept an independent regime in the North and even seeks to extend its power so that the security of the Russian Far East is endangered, many took comfort in signs by late in the year that U.S. forces were overextended and that the North could hold out. If Moscow toughened its stance, the chance for peace might rise, however unwilling the United States might be.22 After being inconsistent earlier, in the second stage of the crisis Moscow drew close to Beijing. By the second round of Six-Party Talks Moscow required less of Pyongyang, basically a freeze of its nuclear program, and urged the United States to be more flexible, including to support energy assistance right away. In the third round it favored early and substantial economic assistance to the North, but without a direct challenge to the United States. In one of its few visible initiatives, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov’s visits to Pyongyang and Seoul in July 2004 failed to win credit for trying to build on the momentum in June. At this time Russians shared with the Chinese the image of Kim Jong-il ready to deal, eager to

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reform, and waiting for reasonable concessions. Believing that the critical issue was a security guarantee, many insisted that at low cost the United States could negotiate a deal that would remove any nuclear threat. Seeing that Pyongyang only focused on the United States for a guarantee of its security and that the United States would not risk a military strike, they assumed that the nuclear crisis would drag along. Having been disappointed by the way he was shunted aside earlier by Kim and Bush, Putin had no reason to try to become actively involved in the glacial process that ensued. The very existence of the Six-Party Talks provided a kind of stability and an appealing framework for NEA. There is an unspoken logic that what North Korea is seeking is good for Russian interests. This credits Kim Jong-il with a rational strategy for regime survival based on transformation guided by a strong state able to use any means possible to forge a supportive international environment. If successful, he would rebuild a largely state-controlled economy and gain leverage in talks with the South on gradual reunification. It is presumed that this path to Korean normalization would serve Russian interests strategically, economically, and even culturally. An ascendant North would partner with Russia. Stabilizing the peninsula would give rise to a multilateral security organization as successor to the Six-Party Talks. Coordinated reconstruction of the North, starting with its transportation and energy infrastructure, would have spillover effects in the Russian Far East. Besides, communist rule in Pyongyang with concerns about both the advance of globalization and dominance by Beijing would give Moscow a partner in putting the brakes on worrisome trends in NEA. The North’s strategy appears as a boon to Russia.23 Some appreciate that Russia’s standing in North Korea is precarious. Behind the façade of a major player lies a tenuous and expedient relationship between Putin and Kim Jong-il. Economically, Russian trade hovers below $200 million a year as Chinese and South Korean trade figures climb above $1 billion and their business interests target many projects that do not depend on international donors choosing among various options.24 Many in Russia overrate their country’s assets either for technological upgrading of North Korea’s moribund industries or for guaranteeing regional security. Yet, when prospects for resolution of the crisis rise, Russians grow hopeful. The Joint Statement was heralded as a long-favored compromise. Russia was eager to start constructing a lightwater reactor in North Korea, having been asked by North Korea since 2000 to resume its plans developed in the 1980s. After the Joint Statement approved discussion of the issue at an appropriate time, some Russians defied U.S. calls to wait until the North abandoned its nuclear

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weapons with assertions that, unlike South Korea, Russia did not need U.S. approval, and it could respond to the North’s desire for quick and cheap construction. Invoking North Korean distrust in China, they also suggested that Russia was the ideal partner for a juche identity.25 Given the obsession in the North for its own power generation free from external pressure, Russia claimed that it had a special role to play, but such optimism belied the impasse in the Six-Party Talks. A rival image of North Korea’s government as evil and untrustworthy exists in Russia, but is of no consequence in policy making. One study in 2004 claimed to be the first book unveiling despotic North Korea, charging that its leaders went beyond their teacher Stalin.26 If some Russians found a familiar, horrific picture, policymakers were reminded of the moralizing diplomacy of 1989–92 that did not serve national interests. If other states are proceeding from the perspective of national interest, Russia must do the same. Riding the North Korean threat to regional stability, Moscow would become a beneficiary of any agreement to end the nuclear crisis. As the North raised the security stakes and Moscow supported many of its claims as reasonable, the price was raised for the United States and Japan to satisfy the North’s economic needs and stabilize it through a multilateral framework of regional security. The message emanating from Russia was that it would be better to preserve an anti-Western authoritarian regime oppressive to its own people than to pressure the regime at the risk of collapse. Although the case was made that a gradual transition would better meet the interests of the North Korean people, the more compelling argument to Russians was that the balance of power would be more favorable this way and somehow the Russian Far East would benefit. In the third stage of the crisis, despite the more belligerent tone from Pyongyang, this logic endured. Putin tried to sustain a personal connection to Kim Jong-il, but he was eclipsed by Hu Jintao’s visit to Pyongyang in October 2005 and Kim’s follow-up trip to China in January 2006 as well as the continuous stream of high-level Chinese officials who met the North’s leaders. Putin chose Konstantin Pulikovsky, the presidential representative in the Russian Far East to the end of 2005, to be Kim’s “designated friend,” drinking together on the long train trip across Russia of 2001 and again visiting Pyongyang in 2005 to keep ties going. Insufficient Russian generosity and a lack of impact on the Six-Party Talks undercut such personal networks, even as Pulikovsky conveyed the optimism about North Korea desired by Russian leaders. After returning in October from the Arirang celebrations in Pyongyang, he declared that Kim Jong-il had clearly confirmed that the North was ready to renounce nuclear weapons

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as it prepared to move ahead to implement the Joint Statement. Yet, his fawning remarks, references to U.S. reliance only on pressure as “inhuman,” and confidence in the North’s readiness to respond to incentives and “just” regulation of the problem,27 were unconvincing. Some Russians doubted that their country would be taken seriously not only as the crisis reached its climax but also in plans for the reintegration of Korea. It does not bring much money to the table, and it may no longer be needed for security assurances. Indeed, despite insistence that Russia is the most supportive of unification, others argue it would lose its international status without the presence of a threat.28 In the third stage Russian officials increasingly made the most provocative statements challenging U.S. thinking on the nuclear crisis. For instance, the ambassador to Seoul insisted after the Joint Statement that there should be no bloc of five against one, while adding that the way forward is simultaneous provision of a light-water reactor and dismantling of nuclear weapons.29 As bilateral ties grew more troubled and differences over the Iranian nuclear program drew much attention, the two states had little new to say to each other about handling North Korea. Criticism of Bush’s plan to organize a broad international front of pressure on the North was countered by support for a regional front of engagement. Refusing to await the fruits of an evolutionary path for the North, the White House had decided on a revolutionary course aimed at regime change, and that is the principal cause of today’s crisis, argued many.30 They saw the United States as bent on excluding Russia, toppling North Korea, containing China, stifling South Korea, and controlling Japan. These designs could unravel, however, if the Six-Party Talks reached a compromise that left the North Korean regime intact and able to develop in a multilateral framework. Many Russians claim to understand the mentality of North Korean leaders, drawing parallels with past Soviet leaders or taking into account experiences in bilateral relations. They stress the meaning of a personal touch, suggesting that Kim Jong-il was very grateful for Putin’s visit in 2000 and that Putin’s assurances gave Kim the backing necessary to participate in the Six-Party Talks without fear of being steamrolled. Not pressure from the United States, but special ties to Russia could lead to a promising course.31 A deal remains within reach through intense, multisided diplomacy, according to this logic. Having argued that the North was bluffing about nuclear weapons or bargaining to get a good deal, many Russians were shocked by the North’s missile tests in July (into their territorial waters) and then the nuclear test in October 2006. Indeed, the Russian tone toward the North grew more

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critical. Yet, Russia’s goal appears largely to have been to draw a line in opposition to the United States, showing its great power status, and also to back up China on this issue just as China supported Russia on the Iranian nuclear issue. With China inclined to cautious rhetoric as crisis manager, it was the Russian ambassador who directly refuted U.S. Ambassador John Bolton’s claim that although Article 7 was not invoked in the July Security Council resolution its force was still present.32 Russia’s sale of petroleum products for cash continued, as it seemed to leave the nuclear issue to the United States and China and still position itself for a negotiated resolution.33 Naturally, Russia welcomed the February 13 agreement, especially the establishment of a working group it was to lead on forging a regional security framework. The South Korean Connection In 2001–2 Putin positioned Russia to take the most visible stance counter to Bush’s handling of North Korea and sought to make common cause with the South. Even before Bush had branded North Korea part of the axis of evil, he was broadening the agenda to address the North’s conventional forces and playing the human rights “card,” while stressing the need for missile defense in response to its threat and pressuring the South, for instance, against plans to supply electricity. In contrast, Putin cultivated personal ties with Kim Jong-il, while encouraging Kim Daejung to proceed with inter-Korean contacts in which Putin might play a role. Early in 2001 Putin enticed Kim Dae-jung to agree to a Joint Statement against missile defense programs to the consternation of Bush and with the aim of appealing to the North, and he proposed three-way cooperation for supplying electricity, repaying part of the debt of $1.8 billion to the South by renovating a North Korean thermal plant and supplying power.34 Yet, Putin could not count on Kim Dae-jung again, as Kim focused on not further alienating Bush. In 1999, 2001, and 2004 summit meetings found the presidents of South Korea reassuring Russia’s presidents that their country matters in dealing with the North, and the latter seeking concrete evidence of that. One assurance offered was that Russian natural resources would flow through the North to the South. Another was that Russia could be a useful balancer against U.S. unilateralism as well as welcome assurance to the North, serving as a kind of a back channel for reunification. At various times Russians reminded Koreans of their direct channels and presumed clout with Kim Jong-il. Even when a high Russian defense official in the summer of 2001 spoke of a plan to expand cooperation in

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military technology with North Korea in order to maintain military equilibrium on the peninsula, South Koreans showed little concern because the North would not have the funds for this and it was treated as just a means to gain a greater voice in peninsular relations.35 Awareness that Russia’s position on the nuclear talks was close to that of the South as well as the impression that Russia’s presence alleviates the North’s anxiety boosted Russia’s image. In turn, Russians found comfort in encouragement from the South’s leaders. Not a few officials on each side appreciated the other as an eventual balancing force to China. Shared reservations about Koizumi’s foreign policy may also have fortified their resolve to cooperate. Yet, negative images of Russia lingered from the late 1990s, and Russians blamed them on the South’s excessive dependence on the United States. When Roh took office Russia’s influence in North Korea seemed to be declining. Leaders in Moscow were eager for Roh to visit and confirm their importance. Yet, Roh decided that he must visit the United States first and then Japan to shore up his shaky image there. China followed. He finally paid a call on Putin on September 20–23, 2004. Despite the delay, the tone of relations quickly warmed up. The visit produced a joint declaration less provocative to the United States than when Putin visited Seoul in 2001, but still strong in its common principles stressing the closeness of positions on international relations, such as support for the decisive role of the UN. It also called for advancing three-way cooperation of Russia and the Koreas in energy and transport, in search of other projects, and from a political as well as an economic viewpoint. 36 If Roh’s visit alleviated tension over earlier oversight, a lack of follow-up in the next two years suggested that there really was not much to discuss despite the overlap in thinking about the nuclear crisis. By 2004 cooperation with the United States was regarded as difficult. If U.S. officials took care to convince China that policy toward North Korea was not part of a conspiracy to contain it, they had little to say about any effort to work with Russia, which seemed to be relegated to a peripheral role in the talks. Russia concentrated its attention elsewhere too. After Beijing, Seoul was the main target for coordination in the crisis. Economically, its goal was to persuade Seoul to pay for energy and railroad projects that would benefit the Russian Far East, arguing, for instance, that they would provide lots of jobs for North Korean workers and even for military officers serving as railroad staff. Yet, Moscow may have suspected that Seoul would not take its economic interests to heart unless it remained close to Pyongyang. Rather than count on shared economic interests, it cynically depended on triangular security

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considerations. One analysis just after the Joint Statement avowed that the crisis is about contracts that “promise to be quite profitable” for the restoration of the North’s economy. Having interpreted the Joint Statement as granting the North what it wanted—security guarantees, diplomatic recognition, and peaceful use of atomic energy—the analysis explained that now it will help to decide who gets what. In 2001–2002 Russia’s importance was stressed by the North and it has since served as a “little counterweight” to the four other participants. Moreover, the South has “tirelessly pressed Moscow’s important role,” as it makes plans to fund economic reintegration. Yet, doubts lingered on whether it was serious or was it just using Russia as in 1990–92 only to discard it later. Adding that Japan and the United States did not want Russia even as a participant in the talks, the analysis leaves the impression that the South also cannot be trusted. If the result of any deal may be Russia’s marginalization, ties to the North or support for its logic of integration provide insurance. Russo-South Korea ties were caught between grandiose designs to reset the infrastructure of the entire region and failed efforts to get small projects in the Russian Far East started. One failure was reported in Seoul with the sentencing of the former vice-minister of Construction and Transportation in connection with $6.2 million paid in advance for an investment by the Korean Railroad Corporation on Sakhalin. The project was rushed to be part of Roh’s state visit to Russia in September 2004 without a feasibility study and to show on the books new holdings of a South Korean company, but it later failed to win approval from Moscow.37 Seoul had difficulty separating economic and politics in its dealings with Russia, as the latter failed to put market principles first. Russia’s shortcut of winning the North’s approval as intermediary did not work when the crisis arose. It then relied heavily on China to magnify the weight of shared views, even if this continued to leave it marginalized. Also, it persisted in making the case to the South that their partnership could shape the outcome. Amidst ambitious great powers in NEA, the two could find common cause as ideal, long-term partners. Yet, the South’s ties to the United States and even Japan made it inadvisable to move precipitously. Economically, high costs would lead to uncertain payoff. As Seoul’s metropolitan area was extending across the border with commuters traveling daily to the Gaeseong industrial park and tourists spending a night or two on excursions at Gumgang mountain resort, and Dadong in China saw heavy truck traffic, Vladivostok failed to develop ties into the Rajin-Sunbong economic zone. Barely ten freight cars a week crossed the “Friendship Bridge” into North Korea as

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reconstruction funds budgeted in 2003 for the Khasan extension below Vladivostok meant little.38 The Chinese Connection While a few Russian academics address the immorality of the North Korean regime, the mainstream view is that the crux of the nuclear crisis is straightforward power politics. The very introduction of morality into the picture smacks of ideology, precisely the kind of value-laden worldview that induced Gorbachev to abandon the national interest. Instead of viewing U.S. invocation of it as principled thinking, many regard it as a rationale for pursuing an aggressive policy in the interest of state power. Rejecting a changing balance of power and the North maneuvering to find advantage through regional policies, U.S. pursuit of onesided advantage has left Russia with little choice but to rely on China Russia has decided on China as its gateway to NEA despite reservations about growing dependency. From Russia’s perspective, only the United States wants a collapse of the North Korean regime. China favors a North Korean buffer to keep the U.S. military in South Korea away from its border. It became involved in the crisis when a U.S. attack on the North seemed possible early in 2003 as it joined Russia in opposing taking the issue to the UN, and again after the initial success of the Iraq War as the United States appeared to be intensifying pressure. Its success in diverting the process into the Six-Party Talks is given high marks by the Russians. Defending the status quo against destabilizing U.S. moves, Russians believe that they are closer to the preferences and interests of the Koreans on both sides of the peninsula and have good reason to make common cause with China. Given the North’s fear of China colluding with the United States to sell out its interests, Russians also regard their country as poised to assume an independent role. If U.S. interest in creating a united front against the North led to hesitancy about including Russia unlike indispensable China,39 lack of leverage over the North proved that Russia’s only option was to rely on China. The nuclear crisis has contributed to triangular reasoning in Moscow parallel to that seen in Beijing a quarter century earlier. After siding with Washington, Moscow found that its influence was receding and it was being taken for granted. By switching toward the third party in the triangle, it regained its voice. In the background of the Six-Party Talks is the logic that the closer Moscow is too Beijing, the more this triangular element works in its favor. Of course, aware of Russia’s relative weakness

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in this region, many see this triangle as only a minor factor in the geopolitical geometry of the crisis. They understand that U.S. power is great and, even as the crisis proceeds, its hub and spokes approach dwarfs the multilateralism inherent in Six-Party Talks. Some observers have overemphasized the role that Russian nervousness over China would play in its policy toward the Korean peninsula. Early signals from Putin about China and his shift, with Japan’s encouragement in January 2003, to an oil pipeline route bypassing China fueled this way of thinking. Yet, he recognizes Russia’s limits, as in July 2003 when Kim Jong-il requested that Russia consider hosting multilateral talks he deferred to China without pursuing the matter seriously. As the crisis persisted, Putin calculated that only maintaining a united front with China would allow Russia to be taken seriously. The Sino-Russian-North Korean triangle has a rich legacy from the postwar era, and it again figures into calculations about the nuclear crisis. None of the parties is interested in conveying an image of solidarity among old allies. For Russia, this would damage its reputation and would lead to its diplomacy being subject to a veto by a regime with very different interests. Russian arms sales in the tens of millions of dollars provide some replacement parts without reopening the spigots of rearming the North and adding to its already huge debt. Indeed, failure to agree on how to handle that debt complicates such cooperation. As for China, coordination on dealing with North Korea in the nuclear crisis is expedient, but long-term agreement on diplomatic and economic strategy remains uncertain. Suspicions of the 1990s that China really was not keen on a role for Russia have not fully subsided.40 It is also understood that the North plays diplomatic games to try to divide China and Russia, as if it were able to return to the cold war era. In the years 1997–98 the North played hard to get, slowing talks with Russia and making excessive demands, including compensation for the losses suffered in the first half of the 1990s when assistance ended.41 Then, in 2000–2 when the Russian card seemed handy to use with the United States and with China too the North was welcoming. Having gained a foothold, Russia is keen on sticking to a pragmatic approach along with China that does not lead to a revival of divisive tactics. In 2002 and much of 2003 it was still common to read that China’s thirst for access to the sea by establishing a new city at the Tumen river border with Russia and North Korea or further north by renting Zarubino in the Khasan area was part of a battle with established ports in Primorskii krai. A special transport corridor could marginalize the Russian Far East if Russians did not have total control.42 Russians also had to prevent China

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and North Korea from proceeding on their own, leaving their country isolated. Indeed, in the first half of 2003 when China had a central role in the crisis and Russia seemed helpless, talk turned to how interests would be lost, such as an estimated $3 billion per year from a projected railroad connection through the Korean peninsula.43 Looking to a later stage in talks, Russians seem to think that China is not a disinterested party and the North will be wary about its excessive influence. The North’s reasoning will not be unlike that of the Russian Far East, suspicious of a rising neighbor and eager for support elsewhere. Only Russia is likely to be sufficiently distant. The crisis may have strengthened the Sino-Russian partnership and, given the regional environment, it is likely to remain quite strong, but Russia is eager for a crisis endgame that leads to a balanced region with South Korea and even Japan supportive of multilateralism inclusive of the United States. The extent of Sino-Russian cooperation is not likely to be tested in a deadlock situation, but only if talks advance. The North’s nuclear test drew China and the United States closer, causing Russia to consider sanctions and a line-up of five versus one. As Sino-U.S. cooperation grew in 2007, Putin, flush with energy revenue and recentralization of power, seemed more assertive in challenging each of them amidst new fear of marginalization on Korean issues. The Japanese Connection If Russians at times imagined that common interests could lead to coordination with Japan on the Korea question, Japan did not give Russia this option. In September 2002 Koizumi thanked Putin for facilitating his visit to Pyongyang and in January 2003 he went to Moscow upbeat about prospects for an energy pipeline to the Pacific Ocean just north of the Korean peninsula and cooperation on regional matters, but the reality was that he gave priority to the recovery of four islands and the terms for an energy deal remained elusive. Instead of trying to find common ground in dealing with the North, Russia cultivated ties to it with the possibility that Japan would find a need for Russia’s good offices again, and Japan focused exclusively on the United States. Russian views became hardened over the course of the nuclear crisis, especially due to the image of the United States and even Japan encroaching along Russia’s borders. In the West, Finland and Estonia’s growing interest in Finno-Ugric peoples in the Russian north, the shift of Ukraine after a contested election toward entrance into NATO, and the beleagured Russian presence in the Caucasus as the United States built closer ties with Georgia and Azerbaizhan all reinforced an image of

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“we” under siege by “them,” led by the United States44 In the South the U.S. bases in Central Asia became the object of increased criticism, leading to a call in July 2005 at the meeting of the SCO to remove them. And in the East renewed criticism in late 2004 of Japan’s insistence on the transfer of four islands was background for concern that the joint U.S.-Japan posture on North Korea was in some way part of the overall effort to weaken Russia. The continued image of Japan as more interested in the islands than in strategic cooperation left the two suspicions of each other’s objectives, even in the Six-Party Talks. The essence of the crisis to many Russians is U.S. determination to eliminate one more communist regime regardless of the attitudes of other states and of the danger from confrontation, seeing the North through both the lens of ideological aversion to an entire system and the lens of containing China. After Koizumi and the Japanese public were reserved in responding to Bush’s axis of evil declaration and then the United States learned that Koizumi would travel to Pyongyang, the existence of a crisis led the United States, it is argued, to send a message that there should be no distance between allies.45 Russians are critical of Japan’s strong support for the United States and one-sided emphasis on hostages, linking these responses to other negative attributes. Yet, criticism of Japan is far less intense than of the United States. After all, Japan has legitimate concern of a rocket attack or a flood of refugees, and, some argue, would be flexible if the United States were, even if it is opposed to a unified Korea.46 Although the emotionalism over abductions is treated as another sign of deficient realist logic in a country that has failed to compromise on the territorial dispute, Japan is credited with wanting to cut a deal with the North and to work with both Koreas as large-scale international aid goes to the North, in contrast to Bush’s ideological aversion to “devil communism” and skewed strategic intention to contain China and control Japan. Russia is in the talks at the North’s request, while Japan is seen as marginal to the main process except for the United States. Eager for Japan’s presence, the United States could not object to Russia’s. Thus, two secondary actors entered an accidental configuration that does not correspond to Japanese or American reservations about multilateralism. While others debate whether the Six-Party Talks might become the basis for a continuing security framework in the region, doubts that they were working even for the immediate task at hand abound in Japan even more than in the United States. If some in Russia exaggerated Russia’s future role and some in Japan ignored that country’s alienation from others in NEA, the gap was widening between Russia’s eagerness and Japan’s

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reticence on multilateralism. Yet, when the crisis deepened in the summer of 2006 each was making some effort to find common ground with others and more awareness of the other’s position. One Russian reporter who had just returned from three years in Pyongyang described for a Japanese audience a society with widening fissures and weakening authority as the search intensified in mid-2006 for a solution to overcome the military’s hardened posture.47 In the shadow of the North’s nuclear test. Recognized as nationalists sceptical about regionalism, Putin and Abe were both uncomfortable with their marginal roles as the February 2007 agreement was completing Phase 1.

The Overall Regional Context Moscow is distant from Pyongyang and does not have a strong sense of responsibility for resolving the nuclear crisis. Skeptical of Bush and doubtful that Kim Jong-il will give it priority, it awaited new developments. Sympathizing with Roh and offering at least temporary support to Hu, Putin maintained a low posture. With Japan isolated and the United States not having success in dealing with the North, but above all with China rising, Russians suggest that the United States needs it more for security reasons in NEA as well as in the Middle East. More than any other participant in the Six-Party Talks it focuses on an endgame involving multiple powers working together. Calls for overcoming a “monopoly of diplomacy” in NEA challenge the U.S. inclination to act as a superpower.48 Talk of a “belt of good neighborliness” contrasts to the axis of evil. Generally supportive of the North’s negotiating demands, Russia opposed the use of pressure as if a real threat did not exist. More than in the other countries, the view that the whole nuclear weapons program was merely a bluff was commonplace until the North’s declaration of February 10, 2005 that it was a nuclear state. (Indeed, even afterward, Russian officials made a habit of denying that the North has nuclear weapons.49) This may have soothed doubts about the unmentioned responsibility of Moscow in supplying the nuclear reactors that made the production of nuclear weapons possible. By minimizing any danger from the North, Moscow could deny any responsibility as well as keep the North happy with its presence in the talks. Russians also take care not to suggest that the North’s nuclear gambit is useful for their own diplomatic pursuits They insist that they too demand that the North not possess nuclear weapons or programs to make them. Just being at the talks is a success, and there is no need to be assertive and do some damage.

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By taking the threat from North Korea less seriously, Russia had the luxury of empathizing more with the North as fearful and poor and of remaining passive on nuclear matters as it looked ahead toward the stage of reunification, which, on the basis of rough equality between North and South and massive projects to assist the North, would be ideal for bolstering its position in NEA.50 Keeping on the good side of Kim Jongil did not seem to exact any cost. After all, this was seen as the way to pragmatic multilateralism in contrast to ideological unilateralism. Russia proudly depicted itself as the true friend of reunification even in comparison to China, allowing it to treat balancing the United States as appropriate for the foremost backer of strong Korean independence. Moscow was playing the “middle power” card while arguing that this is also the natural card for Seoul. It took the Six-Party Talks seriously even as it remained the most marginalized participant. Russia’s approach is flexible, not to lose the ground it has won and to position itself for the endgame. This means it overlooks China’s longterm rise and North Korea’s provocative behavior because these are the actors that welcome Russia. In this way, it boosts its claims to great power standing and its high-priority posturing toward the United States to demonstrate that it must be taken seriously. In the long run too, it is assumed that the two Koreas and even a united Korea will be positively inclined toward Russia, offering an opportunity in the region. Yet, Putin has learned that it is better to stay well in the background. Kim Jong-il is unpredictable and provocative, requiring special treatment such as the world’s longest red carpet in the 2001 closure of the trans-Siberian Railroad for his travel to Moscow. Russians consider U.S. interest in their views to be preemptory at best. Given limited options,51 multilateralism offers the best hope. Talk of establishing an Organization for NEA Security and Cooperation is encouraging.52 Russians see their country’s role as reducing contradictions among the four non-Korean actors and facilitating cooperation between the two parties to reintegration within a “triangle of promise.”53 The path to get there goes through China and North Korea, the former valuing its assets of nuclear power, arms, and energy highly, and the latter accepting it as one counterweight to the United States. In the long run, however, there is potential to draw closer to the South while assisting the North and becoming a more autonomous force in Korean affairs. Yet, Russian leaders have learned to be wary of resentment in Pyongyang toward ties with Seoul. In February 2001 when Putin visited Seoul and new arms sales were approved (some in further payment of the debt from South Korean loans in 1991–93), the North complained. At roughly the same time North Korean anger

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turned against Russian revelations of their actual bilateral military ties, violating a secrecy pledge.54 At times it is the Russian side that has been disgruntled. After Putin went in July 2000 to the G-8 meeting in Okinawa with news that in his stopover in Pyongyang Kim Jong-il had promised a missile freeze, Kim backtracked, showing he could not be trusted.55 Handling of the North Korean issue has become a touchstone in the Russian self-image of conducting a pragmatic foreign policy. Blame on “ideology” for the alleged failures of foreign policy in the 1990s has shifted the terms of discourse. Somehow, practical measures to boost the appeal of Russia to foreign investors or to win the trust of democratic nations are less associated with pragmatism than using friendly ties with the North as a launch pad for regional influence. The concept of “geopolitical interests” has gained precedence over the themes of “globalization” or regional economic integration. This transformation of discourse serves to change the subject away from corruption and good governance to political stability and state guidance of economic development. In this logic, North Korea serves to balance the region and to facilitate joint planning of state-led, limited economic integration. Its desire to win U.S. sponsorship in that transformation, “pragmatically” standing apart from globalization through economic openness and market forces, human rights requirements, and democratic processes is respected in light of memories of Yeltsin’s supposed blunders in a similar transition. Russians generally start with the assumption that the collapse of North Korea is extremely unlikely just as unification is not realistic until North Korea is more secure and economically more stable, acting of its free will. They see a peninsula that was sacrificed to the cold war and where a super-militarized environment leaves a psychology that must be transformed first.56 North Korea, even more than the Russian Far East, was isolated from world events and needs time to adjust, beginning with its political elite. While U.S. leaders ignore this reality, South Koreans and Chinese share the same reasoning. The best hope, it follows, is security multilateralism that stabilizes the region. Russians value the process of multilateral negotiations, realizing a goal of many decades. Some argue that their country started the multisided process that promises to lead to a regional structure.57 Even if differences between the two antagonists are too big to bridge in the short run, the expected outcome is a framework that suits Russian interests by securing regional order and stability without hegemony, engaging six actors in a geopolitical arrangement that ensures Russia’s influence, and promoting through state agreements economic growth centered on

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infrastructure projects. If Pyongyang and Washington may delay in approving the framework, they will eventually realize there is no alternative. Meanwhile, Russian leaders would achieve the objective of boosting national identity as a state that actively shapes relations on its borders and cannot be ignored. The ideal outcome is regional balance requiring an active Russian role with the United States feeling obliged to give its blessing and to approve international aid to a secure, gradually reforming North under a strong state. The result would be a multilateral security framework gaining ground against the U.S. bilateral alliances, and a special place for Russia as the key partner for the two Koreas working together in the midst of pressures from the United States, China, and Japan. Yet, many realize that the long North-South axis is a low priority versus the short inter-Korean capital axis and the East-West Sino-Korean axis. The “iron silk route” is costly and not in the interests of China, a full-fledged security system flies in the face of U.S. and Japanese interests, and the North is focused on cutting deals with the United States and then Japan to secure economic gains. Thus, the goals of balancing U.S. power, solidifying Sino-Russian cooperation, bypassing Japan, and especially boosting the Russian Far East could be severely tested. As talk continued about socioeconomic isolation and lack of infrastructure, Russia’s Security Council established a State Commission for the Russian Far East under the prime minister and held a debate on December 20, 2006 in the midst of a major reorganization of border controls to overcome smuggling and rampant criminalization. It was not clear from where the reported threat to national security arose, but the response seemed less focused on North Korea’s nuclear threat and the U.S. and Japanese big firm economic threat than the Chinese crossborder “quiet expansion” threat. Regional policy relied on China; handling of the nuclear crisis only deepened the strategic inconsistency. Even as Russia stressed geopolitical themes, its economic endgame centered on energy and transportation. The North backed by the South was expected to take a long-term view of regional cooperation as reunification proceeded, which would enhance Russia’s role. As fears grew of a global shortage of oil especially harmful to this dynamic and oil and gas-short region, Russia held out hope of a NEA energy community. It was ready to discuss construction of hydroelectric plants, a gas or oil pipeline, nuclear reactors, and an electricity grid. With energy central to resolving the nuclear crisis, hopes rested to a large extent on whether a joint strategy on energy would replace KEDO. Russia also seeks to stabilize the southeastern corner of its Far East by controlling the flow of population. This means preventing a massive influx of North Korean

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refugees, but it also may mean agreeing to a large, controlled labor allotment for specified time periods to cope with a labor shortage. North Koreans are seen as diligent, and also as supervised in a manner that makes their timely return home likely. Russia’s preference is for North Korea to emerge from the crisis with a favorable deal that inclines it toward a regional security framework and large-scale reconstruction projects. More than China, which would gain from open borders and economic reform, Russia seeks a region-wide plan to put infrastructure and energy supplies in the forefront. It stands closest to the North in preferring multilateralism and an economic thrust to unification, holding the forces of globalization at a distance. Should the North persist in its 2006 defiance and keep the region on edge, Russia would not benefit, but if it accepted the logic of multilateralism with the expected conditions, Russia sees itself a winner. In 2007 prospects for cooperation were rising, but in March the first session of the working group on regional security led by Russia showed that much more progress in other groups, especially the one on normalization of bilateral ties between the United States and North Korea, would be needed before Russia’s favored themes would be taken seriously. Direct U.S.-North Korean talks left Russia on the periphery. With Phase 2 expected to concentrate on denuclearization, normalization with the United States, and short-term assistance, Russians may have feared that the working group they are leading on long-term security would be an afterthought. Indeed, attention was turning to a prior matter of security with possible four-way talks over a peace regime on the peninsula, leaving Russia as well as Japan on the sidelines. It was not clear how Russia could stay heavily involved, even if Kim Jong-il might have felt some gratitude toward its more lenient response to his nuclear test. Alternatively, should Kim prove defiant and the talks reach an impasse, Russia’s options seemed limited in the face of Sino-U.S. agreement and likely support from the two U.S. allies. As the nuclear crisis turned in a new direction in the second half of 2007, each state would have to reassess its strategic thinking from a broader perspective.

Notes

1 Overview: The Nuclear Crisis and the Regional Context 1. In trying to fill the huge information gap on this crisis, I have used a combination of sources from five of the six countries, omitting only North Korea. 2. Warning that the Bush administration was refusing to negotiate, only “outsourcing” the problem to regional powers with hope substituted for a negotiating strategy, Perry argued against using economic pressure or even military action, saying that they would not work and would lead to a more serious nuclear threat. The only realistic choice, he insisted, was serious negotiations, best pursued after a freeze in nuclear activities, since they would likely be “difficult and protracted.” The Washington Post, July 23, 2003, p. A23. 3. Yu-hwan Koh, “Roh Moo-hyun Administration’s North Korea Policy and Nuclear Crisis Management,” Korea & World Affairs, Vol. 30, No. 1 (Spring 2006), p. 5. 4. JIIA Policy Report, “Resolving the North Korean Nuclear Problem: A Regional Approach and the Role of Japan” (Tokyo: The Japan Institute of International Affairs, July 2005), p. 26. 5. Joel S. Wit, Daniel B. Poneman, and Robert L. Gallucci, Going Critical: The First North Korean Nuclear Crisis (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 2004). 6. Gilbert Rozman, Northeast Asia’s Stunted Regionalism: Bilateral Distrust in the Shadow of Globalization (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), Ch. 2. 7. Tae-Hwan Kwak and Seung-Ho Joo, eds., The Korean Peace Process and the Four Powers (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2003). 8. Shigemura Toshimitsu, Kitachosen no gaiko senryaku (Tokyo: Kodansha gendai shinsho, 2000); Nishioka Tsutomu, Kim Jong-il & Kim Dae-jung (Tokyo: PHP, 2000). 9. Donald Gregg, “Collateral Damage in Korea,” The Korea Society Quarterly, (Fall 2001), pp. 4–6.

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10. On the North’s centrality, see Samuel S. Kim and Tai Hwan Lee, eds., North Korea and Northeast Asia (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002); Samuel S. Kim, The Two Koreas and the Great Powers (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Selig S. Harrison, Korean Endgame: A Strategy for Reunification and U.S. Disengagement (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002); Charles K. Armstrong, Gilbert Rozman, Samuel S. Kim, and Stephen Kotkin, eds., Korea at the Center: Dynamics of Regionalism in Northeast Asia (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2006); and Jonathan D. Pollack, ed., Korea: The East Asian Pivot (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2006). 11. Funabashi Yoichi, The Peninsula Question: Chosen hanto dainiji kaku kiki (Tokyo: Asahi shimbun, 2006), Ch. 3. 12. The New York Times, May 1, 2003, op-ed page. 13. The New York Times, April 29, 2003, p. A21. 14. Yoshida Kenichi, “Etsunenshita 6kakoku kyogi no yukue,” Sekai shuho, January 20, 2004, pp. 20–21. 15. Shiroyama Eiko, “Beicho no hazama de shinka towareru Chugoku gaiko,” Sekai shuho, January 20, 2004, pp. 56–57. 16. There was much criticism of the May 22 trip as serving only to distract Japanese from Koizumi’s political troubles and to provide a boost for the LDP before the Upper House elections in July. See Kunihira Osami, “Yokoda Megumi san shosoku joho,” Gendai, July 2004, pp. 130–35. 17. Mainichi shimbun, May 8, 2005, p. 3. 18. Nihon keizai shimbun, June 14, 2005, p. 2. 19. The Korea Herald, June 18, 2005, p. 1. 20. Nihon keizai shimbun, September 30, 2005, p. 3. 21. Michael Hirsh and Melinda Liu, “North Korea Hold ‘Em,’ ” Newsweek, October 5, 2005. 22. The Korea Times, September 27, 2005, p. 5. 23. The New York Times, March 20, 2005, p. International14. 24. The Korea Times, September 24, 2005, p. 1; The Korea Herald, October 17, 2005, p. 2. 25. The Korea Herald, May 27, 2006, p. 1. 26. Endo Tetsuya, “Kita ‘kaku jikken jissei’ ga motarashita shogeki,” Sekai shuho, Part 2, November 7, 2006, pp. 6–11. 27. Shigemura Toshimitsu, Chosen hanto “kaku” gaiko: Kitachosen no senjutsu to keizairyoku (Tokyo: Kodansha gendai shincho #1869, 2006), pp. 21–30.

2 Navigating between the United States and North Korea 1. The Korea Times, September 27, 2005, p. 5. 2. The Korea Herald, December 5, 2005, p. 2.

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3. Victor D. Cha, “Hawk Engagement and Preventive Defense on the Korean Peninsula,” International Security, Vol. 27 (2003), pp. 40–78. 4. Hangyoreh, June 12, 2003, p. 1. 5. Jung Hoon Lee and Chung-in Moon, “The North Korean Nuclear Crisis Revisited: The Case for a Negotiated Settlement,” Security Dialogue, Vol. 37, No. 2 (June 2003), pp. 131–48. 6. Carl W. Ford, “Future Strategic Cooperation among the United States, Korea, and Japan: An American Opinion,” in Sang-woo Rhee and Tae-hyo Kim, eds., Korea-Japan Security Relations: Prescriptive Studies (Seoul: New Asia Research Institute, 2000), pp. 23–42. 7. Michael Green, “U.S.-Japan Relations: Challenges Remain,” The Oriental Economist, February 2006, pp. 13–14. 8. Funabashi Yoichi, The Peninsula Question: Chosen hanto dainiji kaku kiki (Tokyo: Asahi shimbun, 2006), pp. 227–65. 9. Aaron L. Friedberg, “Only Continued Pressure, Combined with Inducements, Can Bring End to North Korean Nuclear Program,” The New York Times, March 21, 2006. 10. Scott Rembrandt, “Six Parties Sign Joint Statement, Fifth Round Set for November,” Korea Insight, Vol. 7, No. 10 (October 2005), p. 1. 11. Chae Kyongsok, “Hanbando pyonghwa cheje kuchuk goa Ilbon oe yokhal,” Bukhan yongu hakhoei, No. 2 (2003), pp. 390–411. 12. The Korea Times, May 27–28, 2006, p. 2. 13. Michael Green, “Amerika wa missairu hassha o koo miteiru.” Foresight, August 2002, p. 25. 14. The Korea Times, September 27, 2005, p. 5. 15. The Korea Herald, September 27, 2005, p. 4. 16. Funabashi, The Peninsula Question, pp. 203–10. 17. Son Key-young, South Korean Engagement Policies and North Korea: Identities, Norms and the Sunshine Policy (London: Routledge, 2006), p. 152. 18. Funabashi, The Peninsula Question, pp. 218–35. 19. Izvestiia, January 22, 2003, p. 8. 20. James Goodby, “Enlarge the North Korea Problem,” International Herald Tribune, June 21, 2005, p. 8. 21. Aaron Friedberg, “The Future of U.S.-China Relations: Is Conflict Inevitable?” International Security, Vol. 30, No. 2 (Fall 2005), pp. 7–45. 22. JoongAng Daily, June 1, 2006, p. 7. 23. Koo Boh-Hak, “Che4cha 6ja hoidam oe oimi oa Hanguk oe jongchaek banhyang,” IRI Review, Vol. 10, No. 2 (Autumn 2005), pp. 73–108. 24. Wang Zhongwen, “Yu xinde guandian lai guancha Chaoxian wenti,” Zhanlue yu guanli, No. 4, 2005, pp. 92–94. 25. Gilbert Rozman, “Japan’s North Korean Initiative and U.S.-Japanese Relations,” Orbis, Vol. 47, No. 3 (Summer 2003), pp. 527–39. 26. Gilbert Rozman, Northeast Asia’s Stunted Regionalism: Bilateral Distrust in the Shadow of Globalization (Cambridge: Cambridge university Press, 2004).

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The South Korean Response: The Nuclear Crisis

1. Notes left at the railroad station read on June 19, 2005. 2. Nam Mun-hui, “Yurop modelro Dongbuka cheje gaesonhada,” Shisa Journal, pp. 14–17. 3. The Korea Herald, October 20, 2005, p. 4. 4. “Oae urinun Bukhan ul kukkaro injonghalsuopna,” Wolgan Choson, July 2004. 5. Donga ilbo, June 16, 2005. 6. Hangyoreh 21, October 4, 2005, p. 21. 7. The Korea Herald, June 17, 2005, p. 2. 8. The Korea Herald, June 11, 2003, p. 3; Donga ilbo, June 11, 2003, p. A2. 9. Funabashi Yoichi, The Peninsula Question: Chosen hanto dainiji kaku kiki (Tokyo: Asahi shimbun, 2006), pp. 326–62. 10. The New York Times, February 11, 2003, p. A17. 11. Nakagawa Masahiko, “Nanboku Chosen kankei kaizen no rikigaku,” Sekai shuho, March 16, 2004, pp. 50–51. 12. “Iraku jonjaeng oa Bukhan haekmunje,” Tongil Hanguk, May 2003, p. 10. 13. “Inter-Korean Relations under Roh Moo-hyun,” Korea & World Affairs (Spring 2003), pp. 5–17; Pak Chong-chil, “2003 nyon Hanbando chinmang,” Bukhan, No. 1 (2003), pp. 65–73. 14. The Korea Herald, June 11, 2003, p. 1. 15. Chung-in Moon, Peter Van Ness, and Bae Jong-Yun “The Bush Doctrine and the North Korean Nuclear Crisis,” Asian Perspective, Vol. 27, No. 4 (2003), pp. 13–41. 16. Ibid. 17. The Korea Herald, December 3, 2005, p. 2. 18. Funabashi, The Peninsula Question, pp. 372–75. 19. Scott Snyder, “South Korea’s Squeeze Play,” The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 28, No. 4 (Autumn 2005), pp. 93–97. 20. Kohari Susumu, “Roh Moo-hyun seiken wa naze ‘tainichi kyoko’ ni natta noka?” Sekai shuho, June 7, 2005, pp. 50–51. 21. Funabashi, The Peninsula Question, pp. 406–12. 22. Mainichi shimbun, June 12, 2005, p. 6. 23. “Dongashia kallom,” Chosun ilbo, May 26, 2006. 24. Chosun ilbo, February 12, 2005, and February 27, 2005, reprinted in Korea Focus, Vol. 13, No. 2 (March–April, 2005), pp. 1–3, 9–11. 25. The Korea Herald, June 20, 2005, p. 18. 26. “Summit and International Meetings,” Korea & World Affairs, Vol. 29, No. 2 (Summer 2005), pp. 326–29. 27. The Korea Herald, June 17, 2005, p. 2. 28. JoongAng Daily, October 4, 2005, p. 2. 29. The Korea Herald, September 14, 2005, pp. 1–2. 30. “Bukhaek, 6ja hoidam, kurigo Hanbando samgak goangye: odiro kanunka?” North Korea Close-Up, August 2005, pp. 4–6. 31. The Korea Times, September 29, 2005, p. 2. 32. The Korea Herald, September 22, 2005, p. 3.

Notes 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71.

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Chosun ilbo, September 19, 2005. JoongAng Daily, October 8, 2005. The Korea Times, September 23, 2005, p. 1. The Korea Times, September 27, 2005, p. 5. JoongAng Daily, October 7, 2005, p. 1, October 8, 2005, p. 1, October 10, p. 1. The Korea Herald, October 20, 2005, p. 18. The Korea Herald, September 28, 2005, p. 2. The Korea Herald, October 14, 2005, p. 2. JoongAng Daily, October 22, 2005, p. 2. The Korea Times, November 15, 2005, p. 1. The Korea Times, December 6, 2005, p. 1. IFES, “NK Brief,” January 6, 2006. The Korea Times, November 17, 2005, p. 1. The Korea Times, October 27, 2005, p. 4. The Korea Times, December 8, 2005, p. 1. The Korea Times, December 6, 2005, p. 1. The Korea Times, December 9, 2005, pp. 4, 5. The Korea Times, December 8, 2005, pp. 1, 8. JoongAng Daily, December 10, 2005, p. 9. The Korea Herald, December 8, 2005, p. 2. The Korea Times, December 7, 2005, p. 4. “Unification Minister Decries Unfocused Approach to Nuclear Issue,” Chosun ilbo, March 29, 2006. Chosun ilbo, May 12, 2006, p. 1. The Korea Times, May 23, 2006, p. 5. The Korea Herald, May 11, 2006, p. 2; May 13, 2006, p. 2. The Korea Herald, May 11, 2006, p. 11; May 15, 2006, p. 9. Yonhap, June 27, 2006. The Korea Herald, May 27, 2006, p. 14. “Kim Dae-jung kallom,” Chosun ilbo, April 24, 2006. The Korea Herald, May 26, 2006, p. 4. Nihon keizai shimbunsha, Kitachosen kuraishisu (Tokyo: Nihon keizai shimbunsha, 2006), pp. 99–100, 122–27. Asahi shimbun, October 11, 2006, p. 8. Tokyo shimbun, October 11, 2006, p. 6. Nihon keizai shimbun, October 11, 2006, p. 2. Sankei shimbun, October 14, 2006, p. 6. “Bukhaek pyegi apso ‘6/25 jongryo’ non oe andoinda,” Munhwa ilbo, November 22, 2006. “It’s Time for the Pacific Version of NATO,” JoongAng Daily, November 2, 2006. Yomiuri shimbun, November 6, 2006, p. 11. Gilbert Rozman, “South Korea and the Sino-Japanese Rivalry: A Middle Power’s Options within the Core East Asian Triangle,” Pacific Review Vol. 20, No. 2 (June 2007), pp. 197–220.

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4

The South Korean Response: The Regional Context

1. Charles K. Armstrong, Gilbert Rozman, Samuel S. Kim, and Stephen Kotkin, eds., Korea at the Center: Dynamics of Regionalism in Northeast Asia (coeditor, M.E. Sharpe, 2006). 2. Sang-woo Rhee, “Introduction,” in Sang-woo Rhee and Tae-hyo Kim, eds., Korea-Japan Security Relations: Prescriptive Studies (Seoul: New Asia Research Institute, 2000). 3. Hong Nack Kim, “The Kim Dae-Jung Government’s North Korea Policy,” Korea & World Affairs, Vol. 29, No. 2 (Summer 2005), pp. 520–40. 4. Asahi shimbun, June 14, 2005, p. 15. 5. Kohari Susumu, “Roh Moo-hyun seiken wa naze ‘tainichi kyoko’ ni natta noka?” Sekai shuho, June 7, 2005, pp. 50–51. 6. Yu-hwan Koh, “Roh Moo-hyun Administration’s North Korea Policy and Nuclear Crisis Management,” Korea & World Affairs, Vol. 30, No. 1 (Spring 2006), pp. 6–7. 7. Chung Min Lee, “China’s Rise, Asia’s Dilemma,” The National Interest, No. 81 (Fall 2005), pp. 88–94. 8. “Kankoku no baransaa ron towa naninka?” Sekai shuho, July 12, 2005, pp. 28–31 9. The Korea Times, October 26, 2005, p. 7. 10. Maeil gyongje shinmun, January 3, 2005, p. 2. 11. Lee Wook Yon, “Korea-China Cultural Relations and a ‘Communal House,’” Korea Focus, Vol. 13, No. 1 (January–February 2005), pp. 125–38. 12. Yang Gi-ho, “Ilbuk gwangye oe jonchi gyongjejok,” in Chong Jin-oe, ed., Saeroun Dongbuka jilso oa Hanbando (Seoul: Homansha, 1998), pp. 502–21. 13. The Korea Times, October 18, 2005, p. 8. 14. The Korea Times, December 7, 2005, pp. 4, 8. 15. David Kang, “Japan: U.S. Partner or Focused on Abductees,” The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 28, No. 4 (Autumn 2005), pp. 107–17. 16. Scott Snyder, “South Korea’s Squeeze Play,” The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 28, No. 4 (Autumn 2005), pp. 93–106. 17. The Korea Herald, July 9, 2004, p. 6. 18. The Korea Herald, July 9, 2006, p. 6. 19. Yomiuri shimbun, September 20, 2005, p. 13. 20. Nihon keizai shimbun, May 27, 2005, p. 1. 21. “Nambuk dangguk hoidam jaegae gonggam,” Hangyoreh, April 24, 2005. 22. The Korea Herald, May 27, 2006, p. 9. 23. The Hangyoreh, June 20, 2005, p. 1. 24. Chung Taeik, “Bukhan haekmunje taihan Roshia oe ipjang mit shisajom” Oigyo (April 2003), pp. 26–33. 25. Kuon Oguk, “Kuraedo 6jahoidam oe yuilhan haebop,” Tongil Hanguk (2005), pp. 27–29. 26. The Korea Herald, September 30, 2005, p. 4.

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27. Cho Han-bom, “Bukhan oe taehan yonghyangryok jisok ul tonghan tae Hanbando palongwon kanghwa rul uido,” Bukhan (September 2005), pp. 53–56. 28. Chong Hui-sok, “Dongbuka dajaanbo hyopryok goa Roshia,” Hanguk jongji oigyosa ronchong, Vol. 27, No. 2 (2006), pp. 429–63. 29. Yon Hyon-shik, “Roshia yonbang oigyo jongchaek goa Hanbando tongil,” Jongsu yongu, No. 115 (2005), pp. 152–63. 30. The Korea Herald, June 14, 2005, pp. 1, 3. 31. Lee Chul-kee, “Strategic Flexibility of U.S. Forces in Korea,” March 9, 2006, http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/0619Lee.html. 32. JoongAng Daily, October 13, 2005, p. 1. 33. Ibid., p. 2. 34. The Korea Herald, October 1, 2005, p. 1.

5

The Chinese Response: The Nuclear Crisis

1. Victor D. Cha, Alignment Despite Antagonism: The US-Korea-Japan Security Triangle (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999). 2. Chae-Jin Lee, China and Korea: Dynamic Relations (Stanford, CA: Hoover Press, 1996). 3. Gilbert Rozman, “The Geopolitics of the North Korean Nuclear Crisis,” in Richard J. Ellings and Aaron L. Friedberg, eds., Strategic Asia 2003–04: Fragility and Crisis (Seattle: The National Bureau of Asian Research, 2003), pp. 245–61. 4. Quansheng Zhao, “Chinese Foreign Policy toward Korea and Coordination with Japan,” in Li Enmin, ed., The Possibility of an East Asian Community: Rethinking the Sino-Japanese Relationship (Tokyo: Ochanomizu shobo, 2006). 5. “Yingxiang Chaoxian bandao jushi de zhuyao guoji insu,” Heping yu fazhan, No. 36 (October 21, 2001), pp. 1–12. 6. Cankao xiaoxi, May 23, 2004, p. 1. 7. “Yingxiang Chaoxian bandao jushi de zhuyao guoji insu,” Heping yu fazhan, pp. 1–12. 8. Peter M. Beck and Nicholas Reader, “China and North Korea: Comrades Forever?” Korea & World Affairs, Vol. 30, No. 1 (Spring 2006), pp. 48–50. 9. Kaneko Hidetoshi, “Kitachosen no Chugokukei gyoseichokan ga mokuronda kajino tokku,” Ajia jiho (November 2002), pp. 66–67. 10. Piao Jianyi, “Chaoxian hewenti jiqi weilai zouxiang,” Dangdai Yatai, No. 3, (2003), pp. 23–26. 11. Yu Shinbo, “Chosen hanto o meguru Beichu pawagemu no kozo,” Ronza (March 2004), pp. 109–11. 12. Ibid., pp. 104–8. 13. Huanqiu shibao, September 22, 2003, p. 15; September 12, 2004, p. 15. 14. Ni Feng, “Ping Bushi zhengfu de duiwai zhanlue,” Dangdai Yatai, No. 3 (2003), pp. 2–13.

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15. Yiwei Wang, “China’s Role in Dealing with the North Korean Nuclear Crisis,” Korea Observer, Vol. 36, No. 3 (Autumn 2005), pp. 473–75. 16. Michael R. Chambers, “Dealing with a Truculent Ally: A Comparative Perspective on China’s Handling of North Korea,” Journal of East Asian Studies, No. 5 (2005), pp. 49–53. 17. Huanqiu shibao, October 24, 2003, p. 1; October 27, 2003, p. 2. 18. Zhang Jinfang, “Chaohe wenti zhanuan huahan,” Shijie xingshi yanjiu, No. 51, December 24, 2003, pp. 23–26. 19. Zhang Liangui, “Chaoxian bandao de tongyi yu Zhongguo,” Dangdai Yatai, May 2004, pp. 34–36. 20. Zhang Jinfang, “Chaohe wenti zhanuan huahan,” Shijie xingshi yanjiu, No. 51 (December 24, 2003), pp. 23–25. 21. Zhenqiang Pan, “Solution for the Nuclear Issue of North Korea,” The Journal of East Asian Affairs, Vol. 18, No. 1 (Spring/Summer 2004), pp. 19–48. 22. Jiang Xiyuan, “Chaohe wenti yu Dongbeiya anquan hezuo kuangjia qianjing,” Riben xuekan, No. 3, (2004), pp. 46–47. 23. Zhang Liangui, Shijie zhishi, No. 6, (2004). 24. In visits to China seven months apart in October 2003 and May 2004 I found the contrast striking. 25. Cankao xiaoxi, May 23, 2004, p. 1. 26. Shijie zhishi, No. 9, (2004), pp. 30–31. 27. There remains an important segment of Chinese analysts of Japan who insist that under Koizumi relations have only stumbled, but the course set by “new thinking” toward Japan can be renewed. See Feng Zhaokui, “Duiri guanxi de jiannan qiusuo,” Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi, No. 5 (2005), pp. 26–31. 28. The New York Times, February 19, 2005, pp. A1, A6. 29. Sukhee Han, “China’s ‘Peaceful Development’ and the Future of Six-Party Talks,” Korea & World Affairs, Vol. 29, No. 2 (Summer 2005), pp. 243–47. 30. Shen Jinru, “Weihu Dongbeiya anquan de dangwu zhiji: zhizhi Chaohe wentishang de weixian boyi,” Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi, September 2003, pp. 53–58. 31. Asahi shimbun, September 22, 2004, p. 8. 32. The New York Times, July 11, 2005, p. A4. 33. Xia Liping, “The Role of the Korea Factor in China’s Foreign Policy,” Korea & World Affairs, Vol. 29, No. 2 (Summer 2005), pp. 249–58. 34. Kyodo News, October 31, 2005, reporting on an article in Wen Wei Bao. 35. Huanqiu shibao, “Wenti buduan, Meiguo zhanlue mubiao bianlema?” October 7, 2005. 36. You Ji, China Brief, Vol. 5, No. 23 (November 8, 2005). 37. Yiwei Wang, “China’s Role in Dealing with the North Korean Nuclear Crisis,” Korea Observer, Vol. 36, No. 3 (Autumn 2005), pp. 465–70, 484–85. 38. “Chugoku no zokkokka’ susumu Kitachosen,” Sentaku, August 2006, pp. 34–37. 39. Wang, “China’s Role in Dealing with the North Korean Nuclear Crisis,” pp. 465–88.

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40. This is a composite message from dozens of interviews of Chinese experts and officials.

6

The Chinese Response: The Regional Context

1. Wang Yizhou, “Zhongri guanxi de shige wenti,” Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi (September 2003), pp. 8–9; Ling Xingguang, “Zhanlue duitou zhanshu qiantuo: ping Ma Licheng he Shi Yinhong de liangpian wenjang,” Zhanlue yu guanli, No. 6 (2002), p. 20. 2. Xia Liping, “U.S. Policy toward the Korean Peninsula and the North Korea Nuclear Issue: Chinese Perspectives,” Korea & World Affairs, Vol. 30, No. 1 (Spring 2006), pp. 83–85. 3. Chosun ilbo, March 31, 1994, as reported in Jae Ho Chung, “Korea’s Strategic Thought toward China,” unpublished manuscript for South Korean Strategic Thought toward Asia. 4. Jae Ho Chung, “China’s Ascendency and the Korean Peninsula,” in David Shambaugh, ed., Power Shift: China and Asia’s New Dynamics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), pp. 155–56. 5. Zhang Liangui, “Chaoxian bandao de tongyi yu Zhongguo,” Dangdai Yatai, No. 5 (2004), pp. 29–36. 6. Ibid., p. 34. 7. Asahi shimbun, December 11, 2004, p. 16. 8. Interview with a Chinese scholar on November 11, 2005. 9. Jae Ho Chung, Between Ally and Partner: Korea-China Relations and the United States (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), pp. 96–102. 10. Andrei Lankov, “China Raises Its Stake in North Korea,” Pacific Forum Online, January 6, 2006. 11. Lu Guoxue, “Yibo sanzhe de Chaomei zhengduan,” in Li Shenming and Wang Yizhou, eds., Quanqiu zhengzhi yu anquan baogao (Beijing: Shehuikexue wenxian chubanshe, 2004), pp. 161–84. 12. Yomiuri shimbun, November 6, 2006, p. 11. 13. Huanqiu shibao, October 24, 2003, p. 5; October 30, 2003, p. 1. 14. Wang Hongfang, “Koizumi zhizhenghou xiang ‘zhengzhi daguo’ chuanmian tuijin de guiji,” Guoji ciliao xinxi, No. 4 (2004), pp. 24–27. 15. Jiang Xiyuan, “Chaohe wenti yu Dongbeiya anquan hezuo kuangjia qianjing,” Dongbeiya luntan, No. 3 (2004), pp. 44–48. 16. Cankao xiaoxi, May 23, 2004, p. 1. 17. Jiang Xiyuan, “Chaohe wenti yu Dongbeiya anquan hezuo kuangjia qianjing,” Dongbeiya luntan, No. 3 (2004), pp. 44–46. 18. Wang Hongfang, “Koizumi zhizhenghou xiang ‘zhengzhi daguo’ chuanmian tuijin de guiji,” pp. 24–27. 19. Contrasts in coverage of international relations in public Chinese sources and internal or secret one have varied over times, and my impression is that the gap has widened again on issues of security raised here. 20. Mainichi shimbun, May 1, 2005, p. 25.

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21. Asahi shimbun, June 14, 2005, p. 15. 22. Sankei shimbun, July 30, 2005, p. 7. 23. Nihon keizai shimbunsha, Kitachosen kuraishisu (Tokyo: Nihon keizai shimbunsha, 2006), pp. 90–96. 24. “Editorials,” JoongAng Daily, July 31, 2006. 25. Hiraiwa Shunji, “Chugoku no taikitachosen seisaku o meguru 2tsu no gokai,” Sekai shuho, August 15–22, 2006, pp. 10–13; Komasa Teruo, “Chugoku e no izon fukameru Kitachosen keizai,” Sekai shuho, August 15–22, 2006, pp. 6–9. 26. Cankao ciliao, July 28, 2003, pp. 1, 4–6. 27. David Kerr, “The Sino-Russian Partnership and U.S. Policy toward North Korea: From Hegemony to Concert in Northeast Asia,” International Studies Quarterly, No. 49 (2005), pp. 411–37. 28. JoongAng Daily, October 13, 2005, p. 2. 29. Tang Shuping, “Zhongguo de jueqi yu diqu anquan,” Dangdai Yatai, No. 3 (2003), pp. 14–18.

7

The Japanese Response: The Nuclear Crisis

1. Young-Sun Lee and Masao Okonogi, Japan and Korean Unification (Seoul: Yonsei University Press, 1999), p. 38–40. 2. Michael J. Green, Japan’s Reluctant Realism: Foreign Policy Challenges in an Era of Uncertain Power (New York: Palgrave, 2000), pp. 113–15. 3. Victor D. Cha, Alignment Despite Antagonism: The US-Korea-Japan Security Triangle (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999), p. 213. 4. Michael J. Green, Japan’s Reluctant Realism, p. 125. 5. Tagasaki Soji, “Nihon shakaito wa Kitachosen to do kakawattaka?” Ronza, March 2004, pp. 112–23. 6. Funabashi Yoichi, The Peninsula Question: Chosen hanto dainiji kaku kiki (Tokyo: Asahi shimbun, 2006), pp. 105–16. 7. Asahi shimbun, September 27, 2004, p. 15. 8. “Tanaka Hitoshi shingikan no ‘taijo,’ ” AERA, March 1, 2004, pp. 72–73. 9. Tokyo shimbun, May 5, 2004, p. 1. 10. Wada Haruki, “Tohokuajia kyodo no ie ni mukatte,” Genshuku mondai shiryo (January 2004), pp. 8–11. 11. Cho Myonchol, “Nitcho kosho no kongo o tenposuru,” Ronza, No. 1 (2003), p. 101. 12. Yomiuri shimbun, August 31, 2002, p. 11. 13. Mainichi shimbun, November 4, 2002, p. 4. 14. “Seiron,” Sankei shimbun, May 28, 2003. 15. Asahi shimbun, December 27, 2002, p. 2. 16. Asahi shimbun, June 14, 2005, p. 15. 17. See the June 2003 issues of Sekai and Ronza.

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18. Inagaki Takeshi, “ ‘Kitachosenzoku’ no dammatsuma,” Shokun (December 2002), pp. 74–88. 19. Kuroda Katsuhiro, “Chukannitchi ga enmeisaseru Kim Jongil seiken,” Foresight, February 2004, pp. 84–85. 20. Arai Hirokazu, “Koizumi gaiko e no gimon,” Shin kokusaku, October 1, 2002, p. 3. 21. Nishio Kanji, Sankei shimbun, May 28, 2004, p. 17. 22. Sassa Atsuyuki, Sankei shimbun, October 1, 2002, p. 15. 23. “ ‘Shiroto daitoryo’ Roh Moo-hyun ni Kitachosen ga tsukekomu,” THEMIS (June 2004), pp. 96–97. 24. The Korea Herald, December 12, 2005, p. 4. 25. Kunimasa Takeshige, “Rubicongawa o watatta shusho,” Sekai shuho, October 1, 2002, pp. 44–45. 26. Hisahiko Okazaki, The Japan Times, October 1, 2002, p. 16; reprinted from Sankei shimbun, September 22, 2002. 27. “Kitachosen ‘kommei kara hokai e’ o shimesu shinjijitsu,” THEMIS, No. 1 (2006), pp. 100–101. 28. Asahi shimbun, March 5, 2003, p. 15. 29. Sankei shimbun, June 4, 2003, pp. 1, 3, 5. 30. Yomiuri shimbun, June 3, 2003, p. 4. 31. Nishihara Masahi, The Washington Post, August 13, 2003. 32. Nihon keizai shimbun, November 4, 2002, p. 5. 33. Funabashi, The Peninsula Question, pp. 93–7. 34. Mainichi shimbun, January 22, 2004, p. 11. 35. Hiraiwa Shunji, “Rokusha kyogi no naka de Nihon no yakuwari ga zodai,” Ronza (July 2004), pp. 30–33. 36. Asahi shimbun, November 17, 2004, p. 12. 37. Sankei shimbun, March 23, 2004, p. 5. 38. Asahi shimbun, May 23, 2004, p. 17. 39. Sato Katsumi, “Kaiketsusenu Nihonjin latchi mondai,” Sekai shuho, June 22, 2004, pp. 10–11. 40. JIIA Policy Report, “Resolving the North Korean Nuclear Problem,”: A Regional Approach and the Role of Japan (Tokyo: The Japan Institute of International Affairs, July 2005). 41. Sankei shimbun, August 12, 2005, p. 13. 42. Sankei shimbun, April 20, 2004, p. 15. 43. Asahi shimbun, December 10, 2004, p. 14. 44. Nihon keizai shimbun, December 12, 2004, p. 2. 45. Sankei shimbun, December 14, 2004, p. 3. 46. Asahi shimbun, March 15, 2006, p. 13. 47. “Abe, Armitage See N. Korea Returning to Talks,” Yomiuri Shimbun, March 2, 2005. 48. Yomiuri shimbun, September 22, 2005, p. 7. 49. Asahi shimbun, September 21, 2005, p. 15.

248 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67.

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Sankei shimbun, October 3, 2005, p. 12. Asahi shimbun, English edition, September 22, 2005, p. 1. Asahi shimbun, November 1, 2005, p. 15. “Tanaka Hitoshi zengaimushingikan ga nerau ‘Koizumi 3 dome hocho’ no gu,” THEMIS, November 2005, pp. 45–46 Sankei shimbun, September 21, 2005, p.1. Ibid., p. 2. Nihon keizai shimbun, September 19, 2005, pp. 2, 4. Asahi shimbun, November 9, 2005, p. 13. Ishimaru Jiro, “Gaiko no riarizumu ga Kitachosen no henka o unagasu,” Ronza (July 2004), p. 41. The Daily Yomiuri, September 21, 2005, p. 3. Yomiuri shimbun, September 20, 2005, p. 13. Asahi shimbun, February 16, 2006, p. 15. Sankei shimbun, May 1, 2005, p. 5. Nihon keizai shimbunsha, Kitachosen kuraishisu, pp. 102–7. Ibid., p. 194. Sankei shimbun, November 6, 2006, p. 12. Yomiuri shimbun, November 29, 2006, p. 21. Mainichi shimbun, November 6, 2006, p. 4.

8

The Japanese Response: The Regional Context

1. Gilbert Rozman, Kazuhiko Togo, and Joseph P. Ferguson, eds., Japanese Strategic Thought toward Asia (New York: Palgrave, 2007). 2. Hirata Mizuro, “Rekishi mondai, Kitachosen meguru ‘mizo’ no zonzai, kukkiri ugokabu,” AIR21 (June 2005), pp. 109–19. 3. Shinobu Miyoshi, “Korea-Japan Cooperation Can Stabilize and Balance Their Alliances with the U.S.,” in Sang-woo Rhee and Tae-hyo Kim, eds., Korea-Japan Security Relations: Prescriptive Studies (Seoul: New Asia Research Institute, 2000), pp. 259–72. 4. Hideshi Takesada, “Korea-Japan Defense Cooperation: Prospects and Issues,” in Sang-woo Rhee and Tae-hyo Kim, eds., Korea-Japan Security Relations: Prescriptive Studies (Seoul: New Asia Research Institute, 2000), pp. 123–40. 5. Hisahiko Okazaki, “Japan-South Korea Security Cooperation: A View towards the Future,” in Sang-woo Rhee and Tae-hyo Kim, eds., Korea-Japan Security Relations: Prescriptive Studies, pp. 90–98. 6. Sankei shimbun, October 7, 2005, p. 7. 7. Asahi shimbun, October 29, 2002, p. 3. 8. Sankei shimbun, January 16, 2003. 9. Kojima Tomoyuki, “Gakusha ga kiru 6kakoku kyogi to Chugoku no ‘yousuo zuowei’ gaiko,” Ekonomisuto, May 11, 2004, pp. 50–51.

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10. James L. Schoff, “Political Fences & Bad Neighbors: North Korea Policy Making in Japan & Implications for the United States” (Cambridge, MA: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 2006). 11. Sankei shimbun, July 23, 2004, p. 2. 12. Shiroyama Hideki, “Aseri no Beikoku, yoyu no Kitachosen,” Sekai shuho, July 27, 2004, pp. 10–13. 13. Suzuki Noriko, “Tenkanten o mukaeta 6kakoku kyogi,” Sekai shuho, July 27, 2004, pp. 48–49. 14. Sankei shimbun, May 29, 2004, p. 5. 15. “Nikkan jinmyaku nimo jidai no ha,” Jiji Top Confidential, April 23, 2004, pp. 7–8. 16. Yoshida Kenichi, “ ‘Jishugaiko’ shiko mo taibei jushi wa kawarazu,” Sekai shuho, March 2, 2004, pp. 18–19. 17. The Daily Yomiuri, June 16, 2005, pp. 6–7. 18. Sankei shimbun, December 11, 2004, p. 3. 19. Mainichi shimbun, October 4, 2005, p. 8. 20. Chi Tonuk, “Meiso suru Kankoku no taiboku rosen,” Sekai shuho, October 18, 2005, pp. 14–17. 21. Izumi Hajime, “ ‘Heiwa kyotei’ Nanboku kyodo teian no kanosei,” Chuokoron (October 2005), pp. 170–80. 22. Asahi shimbun, June 17, 2005, p. 4. 23. Yonhap News, March 16, 2006. 24. Yomiuri shimbun, May 30, 2006, p. 13; Mainichi shimbun, July 8, 2006, p. 17. 25. Yomiuri shimbun, November 6, 2006, p. 10. 26. “Nihon o ayamaru Gaimusho ‘Chyaina sukuru,’ ” THEMIS (June 2006), pp. 14–15. 27. Mainichi shimbun, February 7, 2003, p. 7. 28. Mainichi shimbum, July 15, 2003, p. 7. 29. Abe Junichi, “Kitachosen mondai ni shurensuru Chugoku gaiko no ‘henka,’ ” Sekai shuho, April 29, 2004, pp. 50–51. 30. Asahi shimbun, March 6, 2003, p. 14. 31. Sankei shimbun, April 15, 2004, p. 15. 32. Okonogi Masao and Lee Jong-won, “Kitachosen no kaku ni do taisurubekika?” Sekai (July 2003), pp. 54–77. 33. Suzuki Toichi, “Sangiin no tameni Kitachosen o tsukatta shusho no ningensei,” Shukan daiyamondo, July 17, 2004, pp. 104–6. 34. Asahi shimbun, December 7, 2003. 35. Funabashi Yoichi, “Mitsu no kokkyo ga majiwaru machi de,” Shukan Toyo keizai, June 26, 2004, pp. 126–27. 36. Mainichi shimbun, November 15, 2004, p. 7. 37. Mainichi shimbun, May 1, 2005, p. 24 38. The Daily Yomiuri, December 4, 2005, pp. 18–19. 39. The Korea Herald, December 8, 2005, p. 19. 40. Sankei shimbun, January 14, 2006, p. 7.

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41. Sankei shimbun, May 26, 2004, p. 2. 42. “Sangiin kokusaimondai nikansuru chosakai kaigiroku dainigo,” November 24, 2004, pp. 1–18. 43. Mainichi shimbun, August 5, 2001, p. 6. 44. Tokyo shimbun, October 26, 2002, p. 2. 45. Sankei shimbun, October 21, 2002, p. 2. 46. Sankei shimbun, April 5, 2003, p. 4. 47. A. Losyukov, “Puchin daitoryo no honichi to kongo no Nichiro kankei,” Ajia jiho (December 2004), pp. 4–17. 48. Sankei shimbun, July 13, 2006, p. 18; Sato Masaru, “ ‘Tepodo hinan ketsugi’ Gaimusho no senryaku misu,” Shukan bunshun, July 27, 2006, pp. 148–49. 49. Nagoshi Kenro, “Haji o kakasareta mo niekiranai Roshia no taiboku seisaku,” Foresight, August, 2006, p. 21. 50. Morimoto Satoshi, “Kitachosen no misairu hassha wa Hokuto Ajia kiki no hajimari,” Sekai shuho, August 15–22, 2006, pp. 54–55. 51. “ ‘Chugoku no zokkokka’ susumu Kitachosen,” Sentaku, August 2006, p. 237. 52. Yomiuri shimbun, December 14, 2006, p. 1. 53. Sankei shimbun, December 15, 2006, p. 2. 54. Mainichi shimbun, December 18, 2006, p. 8. 55. Yomiuri shimbun, October 25, 2005, p. 13. 56. Kan Sanjun, “Nihon no ‘Ajiaka’ ga towareteiru,” Sekai (January 2006), pp. 125–35. 57. Shinagawa Masaji and Ogura Kazuo, “Taichu, taikan kankei gaisen no tame ni,” Sekai (January 2006), pp. 147–53. 58. Asahi shimbun, May 19, 2004, p. 13. 59. Asahi shimbun, May 23, 2004, p. 17; Mainichi shimbun, May 24, 2003, p. 10; Nihon keizai shimbun, May 23, 2004, p. 3. 60. Mori Isao, “Kitachosen 3 okuen riken ni sattosuru Nihon kigyo,” Gendai, April 2005, pp. 62–73.

9

The Russian Response: The Nuclear Crisis

1. Igor Ivanov, Novaia rossiiskaia diplomatiia (Moscow: Olma-Press, 2001), pp. 158–9. 2. Rossiia i mezhkoreiskie otnosheniia: Itogovyi doklad (Moscow: GorbachevFoundation, 2003), pp. 5–10. 3. Anatoly Torkunov, “Koreiskii vopros,” Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn’, No. 5 (2003), p. 63. 4. Pravda, June 25, 2003, p. 3. 5. Rossiia i mezhkoreiskie otnosheniia, p. 11. 6. Ibid., pp. 38–42. 7. G. Toloraia, “Koreiskii poluostrov i Rossiia,” Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn’, No. 4 (2002), p. 65. 8. Pravda, May 10, 2004, p. 5.

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9. Zavtra, February 12, 2004, p. 2. 10. Segodnia, November 4, 1994, p. 4; Nezavisimaia gazeta, August 26, 1994, p. 4. 11. Materiali seminara “Koreia segodnya” (Moscow: Nauchnaia kniga, 2003), pp. 44–45; Anatoly Torkunov, ed., Istoriia Korei (Moscow: Rosspen, 2003), pp. 394–97. 12. Natalia Bazhanova, Ekonomika KNDR (Moscow: Diplomaticheskaia akademiia, 2004), p. 18. 13. Nezavisimaia gazeta, November 10, 2004, pp. 5–7. 14. A. Fedorovsky, “Severo-Vostochnaia Aziia v sovremennoi vneshnei politike Rossii,” Forum, Nos. 5–6 (2004), pp. 54–57. 15. Rossiia i mezhkoreiskie otnosheniia, p. 71. 16. Segodnia, July 20, 2003, p. 5. 17. Novaia gazeta, July 22–24, 2002, p. 3. 18. Forum, Nos. 5–6 (2004), p. 101. 19. Vadim Tkachenko, “O vnutrennei politike KNDR,” Iadernoe rasprostranenie, No. 46 (January–March 2003), p. 19. 20. Ibid., pp. 21–22, 33–34. 21. Alexander Vorontsov, Krizis vokrug KNDR (Moscow: IOS RAS, 2003), pp. 15–16. 22. Georgy Bulychev, “Two Scenarios for North Korea,” Russia in Global Affairs, Vol. 1, No. 2 (April–June 2003), p. 127–29; Rossiia i mezhkoreiskie otnosheniia, pp. 75–76. 23. Rossiia i mezhkoreiskie otnosheniia, p. 72. 24. A. Panin and V. Altov, Severnaia Koreia: epokha Kim Chen Ira na zakate (Moscow: Olma-Press, 2004), p. 313. 25. Vasily Mikheev, “Koreiskaia problema i vozmozhnosti ee resheniia,” Carnegie Moscow Center Working Papers, No. 5 (2003), p. 6. 26. Kommersant-Daily, June 16, 2004, p. 6. 27. Pravda, June 25, 2003, p. 3. 28. Zavtra, September 1, 2003, p. 2. 29. E. P. Bazhanov, Aktual’nye problemy mezhdunarodnyh otnoshenii, Vol. 3 (Moscow: Nauchnaia kniga, 2002), pp. 128–9; Pravda, August 16, 2003, p. 3. 30. Nezavisimaia gazeta, August 21, 2002, p. 5; Alexander Zhebin, “KNDR,” Forum, Nos. 1–2 (2004), pp. 29–35. 31. Tribuna, September 10, 2004, p. 5. 32. Kommersant-Daily, November 5, 2004, p. 6. 33. Tribuna, September 10, 2004, p. 5. 34. Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov used the phrase in his Novaia Rossiiskaia diplomatiia, p. 158. 35. Alexander Lukin, “Russian Policy towards the Korean Peninsula,” The Korean Journal of International Studies, Vol. 30, No. 1 (Spring–Summer 2003), pp. 78–79. 36. “Rossiisko-koreiskoe ekonomicheskoe sotrudnichestvo,” Forum, Nos. 5–6 (2004), pp. 69, 78–80.

252

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37. M. Trigubenko, “Popitki i perspektivy obnovleniia sotsialisma v KNDR,” Forum, Nos. 1–2 (2004), p. 46,49. See also Ilya Nikitin, “Osvoenie Sibiri,” Vremia novostei, August 22, 2002, p. 6. 38. Vladimir Goudimenko, ed., Novoe nachalo (Moscow: Respublika, 1998); Anatoly Torkunov, ed., Istoriia Korei, pp. 365–67; Rossiia i mezhkoreiskie otnosheniia, p. 43. 39. Evgeny Bazhanov, ed., Materialy seminara “Koreiskaia problema” (Moscow; Diplomatic Academy, 2004), pp. 9–14. 40. Andrei Lankov, “Antiamerikanism v Iuzhnoi Koree,” Forum, Nos. 1–2 (2004), pp. 71–72. 41. Russian Foreign Ministry, Press-Release, January 22, 2004. 42. Kommersant-Daily, February 13, 2003, p. 15. 43. Kommersant-Daily, December 20, 2002, p. 8. 44. Torkunov, “Koreiskii vopros,” pp. 69–72. 45. Vladimir Orlov, Iran, Severnaia Koreia i zavtrashnyi den’ nerasprostraneniia (Moscow: PIR-Center, 2004), pp. 7–8; Torkunov, “Koreiskii vopros,” p. 73. 46. Vasily Mikheev, “Koreiskaia problema i vozmozhnosti ee resheniia,” p. 6. 47. Andrei Kaliadin, Severnaia Koreia i iadernoe oruzhie (Moscow: IMEMO, 2003), pp. 83–88. 48. Natalia Romashkina, “Severokoreiskaia iadernaia problema,” Iadernoe rasprostranenie, No. 46 (January–March 2003), pp. 46–63. 49. Kommersant-Daily, October 22, 2003, p. 4; Anatoly Shutov, Uchenye Zapiski—2004 (Moscow: Nauchnaia kniga, 2004), pp. 20–21; The Moscow News, January 16, 2003, p. 8. 50. Torkunov, “Koreiskii vopros,” p. 71. 51. Yury Fokine, ed., The Fifth Russian-Korean Forum (Moscow: Nauchnaia kniga, 2003), pp. 23–24. 52. Alexander Mansourov, “North Korea Goes Nuclear, Washington Readies for War, South Korea Holds Key,” Northeast Asia Peace and Security Network, Special Report, December 10, 2002. 53. Torkunov, “Koreiskii vopros,” p. 69. 54. Yury Fokine, ed., Diplomaticheskii ezhegodnik—2003 (Moscow: Nauchnaia kniga, 2004), pp. 38–39. 55. Izvestiia, September 25, 2003, p. 5. 56. Kommersant-Daily, June 11, 2003, pp. 9–10. 57. Speznaz Rossii, August 8, 2003, p. 6. 58. Vremia novostei, February 26, 2003. 59. Trud, January 22, 2003. 60 Nezavisimaia gazeta, May 8, 2003. 61. Nezavisimaia gazeta, July 10, 2003. 62. Kommersant-Daily, September 12, 2003. 63. Maxim Gladkii, “Severokoreiskii plan,”Vremia novostei, August 20, 2002, p. 4. 64. Kommersant-Daily, January 23, 2003, p .10. 65. Nezavisimaia gazeta—Dipkurier, June 23, 2003, pp. 6–7; Alexander Vorontsov, Krisis vokrug KNDR, p. 43.

Notes 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76.

77. 78. 79. 80.

81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86. 87. 88. 89. 90. 91.

92. 93. 94. 95. 96.

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Trud, August 22, 2003. Izvestiia, August 31, 2003. Trud, March 1, 2004. A.V. Torkunov and E.P. Ufimtsev. Koreiskaia problema: novyi vzgliad (Moscow: Nauka, 1995), pp. 197–98. Rossiia i mezhkoreiskie otnosheniia, pp. 62–63. Vremia novostei, June 28, 2004. Delovoi mir, October 2002, p. 19. Profile, No. 3, 2005, pp. 22–23. Vremia novostei, June 28, 2004. Vremia novostei, September 30, 2004. Vladimir Sablin, “Koreiskii regionalism: vzgliad iz Moskvi,” Forum, Nos. 1–2 (2004), pp. 60–63; “Editorial,” Forum, Nos. 11–12 (2003), pp. 71–73; “Editorial,” Forum, Nos. 4–5 (2004), p. 14; “Rossiisko-koreiskoe ekonomicheskoe sotrudnichestvo,” pp. 69–71, 73–76; Kommersant-Daily, June 16, 2004, p. 3; Rossiia i mezhkoreiskie otnosheniia, p. 48. Alexander Vorontsov, “Koreiskii poluostrov,” Forum, Nos. 5–6 (2004), p. 41. Interfax, February 10, 2005. Izvestiia, February 14, 2005. Alexander Mansourov, “ ‘Lip Serving the Great (Sadaejuui)’ ” with an Attitude: North Korea’s China Debate,” Forum, Nos. 1–2 (2004), pp. 11–15. Vasily Mikheev, “Koreiskaia problema i vozmozhnosti ee resheniia,” p. 8. Shutov, ed., Uchenye zapiski—2004, p. 34. Oleg Bagdamyan, Koreiskii faktor, pp. 66–67. Mansourov, “ ‘Lip Serving the Great (Sadaejuui)’ with an Attitude,” p. 16. Rossiia i mezhkoreiskie otnosheniia, p. 59. Ibid., p. 66. Yury Saplin, Iaponskaia politika v Koree (Moscow: Nauchnaia kniga, 2004), p. 24. Fatakh Shodiev, Vneshnaia politika Iaponii (Moscow: Nauchnaia kniga, 2001), p. 125. Rossiia i mezhkoreiskie otnosheniia, pp. 64–65. Vladimir Nabokov, “Iaponskie motivy v Koree,” Megapolis, September 10, 2004, p. 9. Yury Fokine, ed., Diplomaticheskii ezhegodnik—2003 (Moscow: Nauchnaia kniga, 2004), pp. 72–85; Tribuna, June 12, 2003, p. 6; Alexander Timofeev, “Blef v stile chu’che,” Vremia novostei, April 24, 2003, p. 5. Rossiia i mezhkoreiskie otnosheniia, p. 75; Torkunov, “Koreiskii vopros,” p. 73. Novaia gazeta, June 30–July 2, 2003, p. 9; Izvestiia, June 17, 2003, p. 4; Evgeny Bazhanov, Sovremenni mir (Moscow: Izvestiia, 2004), pp. 181–82. Lukin, “Russian Policy towards the Korean Peninsula,” p. 93. Nezavisimaia gazeta, October 31, 2002, p. 5. Nezavisimaia gazeta—Dipkurier, May 27, 2002, p. 6; Kommersant-Daily, January 16, 2003, p. 6.

254

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97. Vladimir Lee, ed., Krugli stol po Azii (Moscow: Diplomatic Academy, 2004), pp. 15–17. 98. Rossiia i mezhkoreiskie otnosheniia, p. 74. 99. Torkunov, “Koreiskii vopros,” p. 73; Lukin, “Russian Policy towards the Korean Peninsula,” p. 93. 100. Lukin, “Russian Policy Towards the Korean Peninsula,” p. 94. 101. Yury Fedorov, Koreiskaia iadernaia problema (Moscow: IPMI, 2003), pp. 6–8. 102. Rossiia i mezhkoreiskie otnosheniia, pp. 68–69. 103. Torkunov, “Koreiskii vopros,” p. 61. 104. Lee, Krugli stol po Azii, pp. 20, 73; Rossiia i mezhkoreiskie otnosheniia. pp. 76–77. 105. Lukin, “Russian Policy towards the Korean Peninsula,” p. 95. 106. Lee, ed., Krugli stol po Azii, p. 23.

10

The Russian Response: The Regional Context

1. Oleg V. Bagdamian, “Iadernaia problema na Koreiskom poluostrove (istoki, nyneshnee sostoianie, puti i metody uregulirovaniia)” (Moscow: Candidate’s dissertation, Diplomatic Academy MID, Russia, 2005), p. 31. 2. Gilbert Rozman, “Russian Foreign Policy in Northeast Asia,” in Sam Kim, ed., The International Relations of Northeast Asia (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004), pp. 211–13. 3. The Korea Times, August 7, 2003. 4. G.D. Toloraia, “Koreiskii poluostrov i Rossiia,” Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn’, No. 12 (2002), pp. 63– 72. 5. Gilbert Rozman, “Moscow’s China-Watchers in the Post-Mao Era: The Response to a Changing China, “ The China Quarterly 94 (June 1983), 215–41; Gilbert Rozman, A Mirror for Socialism: Soviet Criticisms of China (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985). 6. Evgeny Bazhanov, “Soviet Policy toward the Asia-Pacific Region, the 1980s,” in Gilbert Rozman, Kazuhiko Togo, and Joseph Ferguson, eds., Russian Strategic Thought toward Asia (New York: Palgrave, 2006), pp. 37–55. 7. Funabashi Yoichi, The Peninsula Question: Chosen hanto dainiji kaku kiki (Tokyo: Asahi shimbun, 2006), pp. 270–80. 8. G. N. Bochnadze, Aziia i Rossiia: Polpred ekonomicheskie sziazy v 2000 godu (Moscow: 1999), pp. 261–68. 9. Kim Yonsu, “Roshia oe shim ampo jonryak goa Dongbuka,” Ampo haksul ronjip, Vol. 12, No. 1 (2001), p. 301. 10. G. D. Toloraia, “Koreiskii poluostrov i Rossiia,” pp. 63–72. 11. Saito Motohide, “Putin seiken no Chosen hanto seisaku,” in Chosen hanto no yobo gaiko (Tokyo: Nihon kokusai mondai kenkyujo, 2002), Ch. 4.

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12. Nodari Simoniia, “Vvedenie,” in Nodari Simoniia, ed., Polveka bez voiny i bez mira: Koreiskii poluostrov glazami Rossiiskikh uchenykh (Moscow: IMEMO, 2003), pp. 1–2. 13. G. Kunadze, “O Koreiskom uregulirovanii bez gneva i pristrastiia,” and A. Vorontsov, “Iadernii krizis na Koreiskom poluostrove i mezhdunarodnom kontekste,” in Simoniia, ed., Polveka bez voiny i bez mira, pp. 166–238. 14. G. D. Toloraia, “Prioritety Rossiiskoi diplomatii na Koreiskom poluostrove,” in Simoniia, ed., Polveka bez voiny i bez mira, pp. 257–59. 15. Sankei shimbun, January 22, 2003. 16. Saito Motohide, Roshia no gaiko seisaku (Tokyo: Keiso shobo, 2004), as cited in Yoshinori Takeda, “Putin’s Foreign Policy toward North Korea” (Washington, DC, unpublished manuscript, 2004). 17. Vladivostok, March 7, 2003, p. 10. 18. Vladivostok, July 22, 2003, p. 1. 19. Vladivostok, May 7, 2003, p. 3. 20. Vladivostok, July 22, 2003, p. 1 21. Hanro Forum, Nos. 11–12, 2003, p. 9. 22. Zavtra, October 2003. 23. This conclusion is distilled from the essence of what is discussed by those most supportive of Putin’s policy. It is not directly stated and does not reflect diverse criticisms in sources more distant from policy. 24. Delovaia KNDR, Vol. 3 (Moscow, Spravochnik Polpred, 2004); and Koreiskii vopros i integratsionnye protsessy v Severo-Vostochnoi Azii (Moscow: Gorbachev Foundation, 2005), p. 18. 25. George Bubychev, “A Russian Role in Resolving the North Korean Problem,” Japan Focus, October 2, 2005. 26. A. Panin and V. Altov, Severnaia Koreia: epokha Kim Chen Ira na zakate (Moscow: Olma-Press, 2004). 27. Vladivostok, September 10, 2003. 28. Zhang Liangui, “Chaoxian bandao de tongyi yu Zhongguo,” Dangdai Yatai, No.5 (2004), p. 34. 29. “The Need for a Team to Produce Positive Conditions,” The Moscow News, November 1, 2005. 30. Aleksandr Vorontsov, “Krizis vokrug KNDR,” Iadernoe rasprostranenie, January-March, 2003, pp. 16–8. 31. Bagdamian, “Iadernaia problema na Koreiskom poluostrove, ” p. 93. 32. Nihon keizai shimbunsha, Kitachosen kuraishisu, pp. 98, 100–102. 33. Shigemura Toshimitsu, Chosen hanto “kaku” gaiko: Kitachosen no senjutsu to keizairyoku (Tokyo: Kodansha gendai shincho #1869, 2006), pp. 57–59. 34. Hyun-ik Hong, “Kim Jong-il’s Russia Visit and South Korea’s Diplomatic Strategy,” Korea & World Affairs, Vol. 25, No. 3 (Fall 2001), pp. 341–51. 35. Tokyo shimbun, August 4, 2001, p. 6. 36. “Rossiia—Iuzhnaia Koreia: Rossiisko-Koreiskaia sovmestnaia deklaratsiia,” Diplomaticheskii vestnik, No. 10 (2004), pp. 24–26.

256 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57.

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The Korea Herald, October 22, 2005, p. 2. Zolotoi rog, July 22, 2003, p. 5. Funabashi, The Peninsula Question, p. 298. Gennadii Chufrin, “Vneshnepoliticheskie dilemmy Severnoi Korei,” Iadernoe rasprostranenie (January–March 2003), p. 44. Panin and Altov, Severnaia Koreia, pp. 220–22. Vladivostok, April 26, 2004, p. 3. Nezavisimaia gazeta, June 23, 2003, p. 14. Kommersant-Daily, July 25, 2005. Rossiia i mezhkoreiskie otnosheniia (itogovyi doklad po proektu na 2002 god) (Moscow: Gorbachev Foundation, 2003), p. 67. Bagdamian, “Iadernaia problema na Koreiskom poluostrove, ” p. 125. Stanislav Varivoda, “Kitachosen no tamaru ‘kakumei no maguma’,” Foresight, June 2006, pp. 12–4. Rossiiskaia gazeta, January 23, 2003, p. 4; Nezavisimaia gazeta, January 23, 2003, p. 3. The Moscow Times, March 11, 2005, p. 2. Yon Hyon-shik, “Roshia yonbang oigyo jongchaek goa Hanbando tongil,” Jongsu yongu, No. 105, (2005), pp. 147–66. Rossiia i mezhkoreiskie otnosheniia, p. 69. G. Bulychev, “ ‘Shestistoronka’—zarodysh regional’noi organizatsii?” Hanro Forum, Nos. 5–6, 2004, pp. 47–48. Rossiia i mezhkoreiskie otnosheniia (itogovyi doklad po proektu na 2002 god) (Moscow: Gorbachev Foundation, 2003), p. 69. Panin and Altov, Severnaia Koreia, pp. 227–29. Ibid., p. 227. Rossiia i mezhkoreiskie otnosheniia, pp. 7, 73. Bulychev, “ ‘Shestistoronka’—zarodysh regional’noi organizatsii?” pp. 47–8.

Index

Abduction issue, 147–9; handling of, 66, 169, 190; intensification of, 87–8, 90–1, 131, 152, 158–9, 204, 231; perpetrators, 159, 162; priority of, 3, 21, 42, 55, 156, 161–5, 172, 175, 191; request to treat separately, 108, 178; return of some persons, 132, 151, 154–7; understanding for, 121, 134, 150, 180 Abe Shinzo, 3, 72, 90, 180; nationalism of, 6, 91, 135, 171, 179; position on North Korea, 21, 55, 135, 153, 159, 164, 188; trips to Beijing and Seoul, 165, 185; view of Six-Party Talks in 2007, 98, 166–7, 172 Action-for-action, 9, 29, 67, 112, 137 Afghanistan war, 74, 219 Agreed Framework of 1994, 2, 5, 9–11, 14, 16, 54; as a model, 28, 36, 43, 65, 138, 156, 202, 220; limits of, 67, 135; violations of, 53, 81, 101, 114, 190, 200, 219 Albright, Madeleine, 14, 59 Alliance system, 35, 86–7 Anti-Americanism in South Korea, in 2002–3, 19, 55, 57, 82, 84, 127–8, 149; lingering impact of, 153, 174, 178, 208 Anti-ballistic missile defense (ABM) treaty, 92 Armacost, Michael H., 42

Armitage, Richard, 13–4, 21, 60, 159 ASEAN ⫹3, 87, 124, 127–8, 172, 181, 183 ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), 126, 134, 140, 191 Asian financial crisis, 11, 172, 218 Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), 34, 59, 62, 67, 69, 87, 115 Aso Taro, 179, 188 Assistance card, 151, 155–63, 166, 175, 185, 189 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), 13 Axis of evil, 15–6, 57; as U.S. thinking, 30, 40, 62, 110, 149; negative responses to, 33, 36, 53, 75, 101, 219, 225, 231 Baekdu mountain, 68 Balance of power, 1, 4, 6, 8, 28, 30–1, 38–9, 44–5; China’s view of, 105, 110, 126, 130, 143; Russia’s view of, 185, 212–3, 223, 225, 228, 235; South Korea’s view of, 71, 77–8, 86, 94 Balancer, 6, 37, 50, 62, 75, 82–3, 90, 128 Bolton, John, 14, 27, 33, 164, 225 Brezhnev, Leonid, 194 Burma, 217 Bush, George H. W., 18

258

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Index

Bush, George W., 2, 13–5, 23, 26, 73; assertiveness of, 5–6, 36, 42, 78, 119, 148, 154, 201, 211, 219–20; second term of, 37, 47, 61, 63, 87, 183, 205; worldview of, 3, 27, 33, 41, 43, 54, 59, 102, 114, 231 Censorship, 103, 111, 174 Central Asia, 138, 218, 231 Chen Shui-bian, 104, 108, 110 Cheney, Dick, 2–3, 13–5, 21, 24, 40, 47, 64, 90, 109 Chernenko, Konstantin, 217 China, and U.S.-Japan alliance, 1, 119, 125, 132, 138; as middle country, 7; as reform model, 4, 115–6, 119, 197; leading role of, 6–8, 19, 31, 41, 47, 50, 82, 84, 110, 118; neutrality of, 44, 56, 103–4, 114, 139, 184; rise of, 28, 34, 40, 48, 73, 102, 106, 108, 124–7, 139, 180, 183; socialist thinking of, 3, 46, 85, 99, 102, 105, 111, 113–4, 129, 142, 207; three no’s of, 102 Chinese Communist Party, 111 Chun Doo-hwan, 6, 86 Chung Dong-young, 22, 24, 63–4, 68, 70, 83, 87, 89–90 Clinton, Bill, administration of, 4–5, 10–4, 24, 119, 147, 217; as a model, 156, 201; rejection of, 59, 75, 154, 172 Cold war, end of, 4, 13, 38, 45, 54; logic of, 99, 101, 109, 146, 195, 229; revival of, 78 Complete, verifiable, irreversible disarmament (CVID), 5, 8, 17, 20–1, 28, 37, 67, 108, 113, 167, 221; deemphasis on, 60, 64, 117 Congress, 3, 10, 29–30, 33, 191 Conventional military power, 70, 225 Corruption, 97, 115, 209, 218, 234–5 Counterfeiting, 32, 34, 70–1, 113, 134, 164

Dai Bingguo, 105–6, 108, 137 Demilitarized zone (DMZ), 11 Democracy, 34, 83, 86, 114, 119, 129, 147, 151, 173–4, 234 Denisov, Valerii, 195 Denuclearization, priority of, 3, 37, 45, 61, 102; willingness for, 2, 44, 66, 106, 117, 223 Developmental state, 38, 46 Dialogue vs. pressure, 18, 20, 75, 131, 137, 151–2, 155, 176, 190, 218 Diet, 35, 57, 184–5, 191 Direct talks of U.S. and North Korea, 26, 29–30, 32, 37, 39, 56, 71, 121, 165, 220; for narrow purposes, 34 Disablement of reactor, 9, 26, 29–30, 50, 67 Drugs, 70, 159 Duma, 198 East Asian Community (EAC) and Summit (EAS), 79, 137, 170, 182–4 Elections, in Japan, 161, 178, 191; in Russia, 219, in South Korea, 19, 40, 60, 73, 79, 89, 97–8, 158, 177, 191; in U.S. in 2004, 17, 21, 32, 61, 64, 92, 108–9, 112, 175, 182; in U.S. in 2006, 29, 160 Electricity, 22, 63–4, 67, 90, 92–3, 107, 112, 190; and Russia, 214, 225, 235 Energy, and crisis resolution, 9, 51, 68, 73, 89, 104, 116, 203, 220, 225–6; as Russian card, 7–8, 41, 95, 142, 188, 235; from Russia, 38, 92–4, 130, 211, 214 Export controls, 97 Face-saving, 2, 41, 43, 58–9, 88, 117, 119, 141, 156 Family reunions, 58, 81 Famine, 10, 116, 120, 128, 209

Index Financial sanctions of U.S., imposition of, 17, 34, 66, 134, 164, 178; lifting of, 13, 26, 32, 68–70, 121, 180; reaction to, 39, 113–4, 184 First nuclear crisis, 6–7, 9, 12, 35, 54, 100, 124–5, 148, 173, 215 Four-Party talks, 10, 12, 129, 158, 195, 217 France, 134, 171 Free Trade Agreement (FTA), 69, 74, 97, 124, 166, 172 Fukuda Yasuo, 149, 171, 175 Funabashi Yoichi, 31, 182 G-8 summits, 12, 101, 155, 164, 187, 234 Gaeseong, 67–8, 71–2, 96–7, 227 Gangwon, 68, 85 Germany, 4, 54, 171 Globalization, 46, 48, 101, 115, 222, 236 Goguryeo, 84–5, 127–8 Goodby, James, 41 Gorbachev, Mikhail, 135, 138, 194, 209, 215, 217, 228 Great Britain, 134, 171 Green, Michael, 31, 39 Gumgang mountain, 72, 78, 97, 227 Hadley, Stephen, 164, 177, 187 Hashimoto Ryutaro, 171 Heavy fuel oil to North Korea, 9–11, 20, 36, 61, 67, 76, 191 Helsinki Accords, 54, 160 Highly enriched uranium (HEU), 5, 8, 11, 16, 32, 40, 189, 219; declaration of, 9, 43; evidence of, 53, 149, 153, 155; level of development of, 19, 218 Hill, Chris, 24, 26, 32, 34, 67, 113, 121, 165; as ambassador, 60–1 Hu Jintao, 3, 63, 83, 95, 108, 117; and Japan, 170, 180–1; and pursuit of Kim Jong-il, 14, 105, 114; and

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Putin, 93, 136–7; travel to Pyongyang, 68–9, 115, 184, 223 Hub and spokes, 4, 34, 136, 173, 191, 229 Human rights, 34–5, 79, 140, 209; as a card, 225, 234; forced labor camps. 164; hypocrisy of Japan, 164; in China, 111, 119, 164; in North Korea, 1, 3, 14, 21, 47, 49, 54, 103, 110, 114, 116, 148, 160; joint U.S.-Japan approach, 23, 88; law passed by Congress, 21, 33, 61; split of U.S. and South Korea over, 70–1, 74, 83, 98 Humanitarian assistance, 3, 10, 72, 98, 155–7; suspension of, 81, 159 Hyundae Asan, 97 Industrial parks, 38, 67–8, 176 Infrastructure, 14, 38, 41, 68, 73, 120, 140; and Russia, 213, 222, 227, 235–6 India, 34, 73 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 5, 9, 18, 66, 68, 103, 204; inspectors, 36, 200 Intelligence, 16, 19, 40, 100, 204, 218 Investment in North Korea, 39, 69, 73, 93, 162, 176, 184; Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), 97 Iran, 15, 24, 38, 75, 164, 171, 224–5 Iraq war, 6, 15–6, 49, 103–6; deterioration of, 64, 89, 107–9, 139, 156, 190, 216; impact of, 19, 29, 31, 33, 36, 40, 42–3, 58, 154, 182, 200–3, 220; preoccupation with, 46, 56, 138, 175; temporary triumphant effect of, 57, 59, 78, 134, 151, 186, 221, 228; troops for, 60, 74–5, 80, 96 Ivashentsov, Gleb, 93, 224 Japan, and Korea’s significance, 1, 99–100, 131, 149; as normal state, 7, 80–1; constitutional change in, 134, 165;

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Japan, and Korea’s significance––continued historical revisionism of, 47–8, 72, 79, 86–9, 132, 145–7, 153, 183; isolation of, 1, 12–3, 38, 41, 45, 145, 148, 155–6, 169–71, 184; leadership aspirations of, 6, 31, 46, 150, 175; limited cooperation of, 9, 42, 66; middle position of, 18, 40, 44, 57–60, 87–8, 154, 177, 181; realism of, 7, 35, 49; reentry into Asia, 7, 190; Russian card of, 187, split with U.S. in 2007, 51, 121, 158, 165–7, 172, 191; ultranationalists in, 2, 174, 180 Japanese Foreign Ministry, 153, 159, 162, 169, 180, 187 Japanese Koreans, 145–6, 148, 153, 163–4, 166; Chosensoren, 152, 154 Jiang Zemin, 3, 10, 124, 219; and pursuit of Kim Jong-il, 14, 102, 114 Joint Agreement of February 13, 2007, 2, 5, 33, 69, 131, 167, 225; realization of, 9, 41, 44, 73, 76, 118, 127, 138, 232 Joint Statement of September 19, 2005, 2, 5, 22–3, 29, 32, 34, 38, 139, 224; and Japan, 159, 178, cooperation leading to, 42, 54, 65–7, 74, 88, 112–4, 126; momentum of, 44, 70, 89, 93, 137, 227; significance of, 64, 82, 118, 127, 160–3, 171, 189, 222 Juche, 28, 197, 223 Kaneda Hideki, 183–4 Kanemaru Shin, 147, 176 Kanter, Arnold, 18 Kato Koichi, 176, 180 Kelly, James, 16, 60 Kerry, John, 109 Khrushchev, Nikita, 100

Kim Dae-jung, 10–2, 54–5, 70, 75, 79, 86, 100–1; and China, 124, 127; and Russia, 199, 218–9; travel to North Korea, 39, 48, 69, 71; visit to U.S., 14, 53, 78 Kim Il-sung, 37, 39, 61, 65, 88, 113, 147, 194–5, 217 Kim Jong-il, 5, 39, 104–5, 113, 117; and South Korea, 63–5, 69, 71–2, 90, 95; rationality of, 2–3, 33, 36, 73, 109–10, 120, 220–2; strategy of, 14, 153, 208; treatment of, 32, 137, 141, 150; tyrant, 37; 41, 70, 74; visits to China, 12, 47, 100, 102, 115–6, 124, 181, 184, 223; ties to Russia, 40, 55, 124, 202, 219, 225, 233 Kim Yong-nam, 100 Kim Young-sam, 54, 72, 124 Kitaoka Shinichi, 153–4 Koizumi Junichiro, 3, 6, 47, 57, 68, 79, 88, 95, 157, 171, 179; and Putin, 170, 175, 185–8, 219; hardening toward North Korea, 21, 40, 44, 63–4, 81, 131, 167; visit in 2002 and Pyongyang Declaration, 7–8, 14, 19, 87, 100–1, 124, 132, 148–55, 166, 174–6, 180, 188, 204; visit to Pyongyang in 2004, 21, 60, 87, 132, 150, 155–8, 175, 181, 204; Kono Yohei, 180 Korean appeal, wave, 105, 173, 177; model, 128 Korean discount, 66 Korean Energy Development Organization (KEDO), 9–10, 38, 147, 217 Korean ministerial consultations, 51, 67, 69, 78 Korean summit of 2000 and Joint Declaration, 12, 40, 48, 69, 100–2, 166, 211; anniversaries of, 63–4; talk of a repeat, 67, 71, 73, 89, 179

Index Korean War, 74, 99, 102–4, 111; and division in 1945, 86, 194, 212, 215 Kosovo War, 12 Kozyrev, Andrei, 194 Kuroda Katsuhiro, 174 Lavrov, Sergei, 205, 221 Lee Jong-seok, 70–1 Lee Su-hoon, 71 Lefkowitz, Jay, 70 Libya, 160 Light-water nuclear reactors, construction of, 9, 11, 38, 222–4; demand for, 64–5, 107, 113; promise of, 22–3, 29, 32, 34, 67, 89, 117, 160, 171, 179, 190 Losyukov, Aleksandr, 8, 19, 55, 91, 93, 136, 185–7, 202, 218, 220 Maehara Seiji, 163 Middle East, 2 Mining, 38, 68, 214 Mironov, Sergei, 205 Missile defense, 73, 82, 92, 119, 145, 148, 173, 218, 225 Missiles of North Korea, 7, 10, 39, 63, 70, 78, 157–9, 207, 231; barrage of July 2006, 17, 35, 44, 72, 81, 85, 116–7, 134, 164, 179, 184, 187, 224; freeze in testing, 11–2, 155, 234 Multilateralism, 41, 47, 15, 235; need for, 19–20, 29, 33–5, 81, 109, 139; security framework for, 76, 86, 92, 94, 126, 140, 190–1, 210–4, 222–3, 233; views on, 46, 74, 141–2, 167 Multipolarity, 93, 101–2, 106, 125 Murayama Tomiichi, 148 Nakasone Yasuhiro, 146, 153, 171 National Assembly, 60, 70, 81, 149, 158, 177

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Nationalism of Koreans, 38, 45, 55, 62, 86, 140, 169, 177–8, 190, 208; and romanticism, 65, 96 Neoconservatives, 2, 13, 32–3, 40, 64, 111, 114, 118, 142, 151, 180 Nixon, Richard, 104, 167 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), 20, 30, 66–8, 92, 137, 147, 200 Nonaka Hiromu, 180 Nordpolitik, 10, 64, 78, 147 Normalization talks of Japan and North Korea, 7, 12, 89, 145, 150, 154, 159, 162; goals for, 8, 22, 38, 189; working group, 50–51 North Korea, as criminal regime, 1, 56, 70, 178, 184, 197; belligerent rhetoric of, 1, 27–9, 35–7, 39, 50, 63, 81, 152, 200; chaos danger, 80, 199, 209–10; civil society in, 49; emergence from isolation, 48, 124; firing on boat, 15, 37, 78, 149, 173; hard-liners and military, 2, 70, 161, 209, 213; paranoia of, 40, 75, 118, 138, 199, 211; reforms of, 140, 196; respect for, 21, 110, 114, 119; treaty with China, 106, 111; worry about China, 141, 206–7 Northeast Asia (NEA), as focus, 1, 68, 71, 93, 101; dynamism of, 4, 215 Northeast China, 10, 84–5, 97, 102, 104, 115, 127–9, 141–2 Nuclear reactors, at Yongbyon, 9, 26, 63, 106, 221; others, 26 Nuclear state, declaration of, 9, 26, 37, 83, 87, 116, 177, 200, 206, 232 Nuclear test of October 2006, 17, 24, 29, 35–6, 39, 44, 179; impact of, 47–8, 72, 85, 90, 117, 126, 143, 218, 224, 232; reasons for, 73 Nuclear tests of China, 148

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Obuchi Keizo, 79 Oil, cut in supplies to North Korea, 19, 29; and gas pipelines, 136, 170, 185, 196, 229–31 Okazaki Hisahiko, 174, 183 Overseas Development Assistance (ODA), 14, 190 Ozawa Ichiro, 157 Pakistan, 73 Park Chung-hee, 38, 60, 86 Park Geun-hye, 70 Peace regime for peninsula, 4–5, 49–50, 64, 66, 69, 72; and a summit, 76; significance of, 88, 142, 179, 236 Perry, William, 4 Perry Process, 2, 11, 13, 76, 85, 100, 125, 218 Phases 1, 2, 3 from 2007, 26, 51, 76, 98, 121, 191, 232, 236 Philippines, 86 Piao Jianyi, 110 Powell, Colin, 13–4, 18–9, 31, 53, 56, 103, 116 Preemptive war, 14, 36, 53, 58, 62, 134, 139, 152, 165, 204 Primakov, Yevgeny, 217 Primorskii krai, 10, 220–1, 229 Proliferation of nuclear weapons, 3–4, 29, 33, 42, 45, 80, 93, 95, 202–3; and domino effect, 110–2, 134, 154, 165 Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), 20, 30, 47, 57–8, 73, 83, 95, 106, 132 Public opinion, in Japan, 21, 81, 152–5, 162, 167, 172, 183; in Russia, 186; in South Korea, 48, 69, 72, 74, 84, 97, 128, 179 Pulikovsky, Konstantin, 223–4 Putin, Vladimir, 3, 105, 142, 193–4, 217, 220; meetings with Koizumi and Roh, 60, 91–3, 170, 187, 225–6; pursuit of Kim Jong-il, 6–7, 12, 14, 20, 55, 91, 94, 124,

135–6, 185–6, 198, 211, 218–9, 223–5; visit to Pyongyang, 12, 40, 100–1, 224 Pyongyang, 84, 97 Railroads, 39–40, 53–4, 68, 71–2, 90, 97; Trans-Siberian-Korean (TSK), 92–4, 196, 205, 226, 235 Rajin, 84–5, 141, 182, 196, 227 Rakhmanin, O.B., 217 Reagan, Ronald, 54 Refugees, 61, 88, 104, 106, 120, 164, 180; and Russia, 200, 209, 220–1, 231, 236 Regime change, 3, 22, 28, 31, 36–7, 40, 45, 54, 56, 61–2, 70, 89, 108, 114–5, 120, 125, 163; resistance to, 138–9, 151, 197, 208, 220, 224, 231 Regionalism, 4, 6, 44, 47–9, 150, 181–2; exclusion of U.S. by, 13, 183; opposition to, 34, 80, 124, 190, 234; pursuit of, 12, 58, 68, 79, 99 Reparations, assistance in lieu of, 145, 189 Reunification, 1, 5, 38–9, 44, 46, 48–9, 64, 70; and economic conditions, 54, 96–7, 140; as South Korean focus, 12, 41, 47, 68; views on, 80, 83–4, 100, 125–6, 136, 190, 204, 211–4, 233 Rice, Condoleezza, 21, 23, 26, 41, 64–5, 70, 112, 160 Rodong missiles, 157, 163–4 Roh Moo-hyun, 2–3, 14, 19, 44, 50, 60, 67, 72, 86–7, 95–6, 149, 199; and regionalism, 6, 97–8, 127, 142; legacy of, 73–5, 98; meetings with Bush, 22, 34, 63; miniMarshall plan of, 88; tensions with Bush, 42, 47, 54–9, 62–5, 68–70, 81–2, 92, 127; visits to Russia, 92–3, 205, 226–7

Index Rumsfeld, Donald, 15, 24, 40, 56, 103, 135 Russia, assertiveness of, 7, 42–46, 51, 93–4, 125; historic friendship with North Korea, 14, 95, 195, 208, 211; marginalization of, 9, 12, 16, 91, 121, 137, 217 Russian Far East, 10, 48, 85, 99, 115, 136–7, 185; strategies for, 141, 196, 208, 213, 222, 226–7, 235; vulnerability of, 3, 10, 186, 209, 215–6, 220–1, 229–30, 234 Sadae, 77, 80, 153 Sanctions, 2, 43, 61, 74, 76, 90, 142, 155–67 Sato Masaru, 187 Sea of Japan rim, 10, 150 Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), 126, 137, 140, 183, 231 Shenyang, 142, 169, 180 Shenzhen, 115 Shinuiju, 84, 103, 181 Shuttle diplomacy of Koizumi-Roh, 21–2, 60, 87, 90, 170, 176, 178 Signing statement of September 2005, 17, 66, 113 Sino-Japanese relations, 9, 47, 77, 86, 90, 110, 120–1, 134, 169, 181, 184; and Korea, 99, 130, 154, 180, 208 Sino-Russian strategic partnership, strength of, 6, 9–10, 41, 48, 129, 235; and North Korea, 13, 42, 51, 97, 105, 125, 135–8, 186, 203–7, 228–30 Sino-U.S. consensus from 2006, 35, 43, 117, 120–1, 130–1, 134; U.S. critics of, 13 Sinocentrism, 6, 84–5, 127 Six-Party Talks, comparison of rounds, 17; dismissal of, 7, 183–4; establishment, 58, 137, 152, 154, 202–3, 218, 221, 229; line-up, 41, 44, 47, 50, 117, 121, 130, 139,

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143, 158, 178; significance, 4, 191, 224, 228; scope of, 46, 157, 216 Snowcroft, Brent, 18 South Korea, alienation from U.S. or China, 13, 42, 82, 128; as hub, 6, 97; between ally and brother, 7, 14, 44, 61, 74, 79; dependency of, 6, 16, 55, 66, 74, 80, 95, 102, 125, 226; leadership in summer 2005, 8, 63–7, 90; middle power of, 8; nuclear free, 37; political divisions in 2007, 51, 76, 83; role in trilateral alliance, 10–11, 31, 43, 48, 57, 75, 78, 97, 100, 146, 177 Soviet Union, collapse of, 1, 13, 105, 120 Stalin, Josef, 193–4, 223 State Department, 27, 31–2, 53, 61, 117, 182 Strategic dialogue, 69, 74, 95, 171 Sunshine Policy, heyday of, 6, 147; impact of, 36, 72, 75, 85–6, 100–1, 123–5, 152–4, 219; launching of, 1, 11–2, 78, 199; limbo of, 13, 15, 40, 53, 71, 135 Suzuki Muneo, 169 Taepodong missiles, 17, 35, 147–8, 157 Taiwan, 10, 42–3, 62, 99, 102, 129, 183; link to North Korea, 104–9, 114, 140, 142, missile crisis, 148 Takeda Yoshinori, 7 Tanaka Hitoshi, 21, 149–52, 161–2, 165, 175, 180 Territorial disputes, 102, 171, 187–8, 212–3, 230–1; Dokdo/ Takeshima, 87–8, 177–8 Terrorism, list of assisting countries, 20–1, 61, 167 Thirty-eighth parallel, symbolism of, 4, 49, 85 Three-way talks, 16, 18–9, 40–1, 47, 56–7, 105–6, 154, 202, 220

264

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Trade, with North Korea, 24, 30, 38–9, 43, 63, 67, 69, 97, 108, 115, 129, 159, 162–3, 190, 222; with China, 83, 85, 128, 140, 178, 207 Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group (TCOG), 18, 57, 66, 78, 172, 178, 183 Tumen, 10, 85, 229 United Nations (UN) Security Council, 19–20, 56, 93, 103, 209–10, 220, 225–8; sanctions, 17, 35, 50, 72–3, 91, 116–8, 129, 134, 137, 148, 164, 184, 187 United States (U.S.), 1–2, 6, 86; bases, 37, 62, 74, 80, 82, 95, 119, 174; security guarantee of, 8, 20, 32, 59, 61, 63, 89, 103, 107, 112, 116–7, 120, 126, 203, 212, 222; unilateralism of, 2, 13, 20, 37, 46, 58–9, 81, 109, 118, 182, 233; use of armed force, 18, 56, 106; universal values of, 27, 70, 104, 180, 228 United States-Japan alliance, 6, 9–10, 35, 48, 172, 181, 183, 235; 2 ⫹ 2 talks, 183 Vershbow, Alexander, 24, 69–70 Vietnam War, 60, 86 Vladivostok, 136, 215, 219–20, 227–8

Wang Jianrui, 116 War on terror, 75, 93, 95, 149; and North Korea, 14, 49, 53, 219; impact of 9/11, 13, 15, 101–6, 114, 135, 150, 201, 219 War on the peninsula, 3, 9–10, 14, 47, 56, 124, 148, 201, 208–9; scare of, 216, 221 Wen Jiabao, 87, 91, 107, 121, 135, 170, 185 Working groups, 2, 9, 26, 50–1, 121, 127, 138–9, 225, 236; failed effort in 2004, 157 World War II, 93, 189 Wu Banguo, 20, 107, 109 Wu Yi, 90, 170 Yanai Shotaro, 179 Yanbian, 10, 128, 140, 142, 182 Yasukuni shrine, 22, 68, 88, 90, 110, 170–1, 175, 181, 184, 187 Yeltsin, Boris, 193–4, 197, 216, 219, 234 Yokoda Megumi, 21, 87, 155, 157–8, 183 Zhang Liangui, 109–10 Zhirinovsky, Vladimir, 198 Zhou Enlai, 104 Zhu Rongji, 124