State versus Gentry in Late Ming Dynasty China, 1572–1644
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State versus Gentry in Late Ming Dynasty China, 1572–1644
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State versus Gentry in Late Ming Dynasty China, 1572–1644 Harry Miller
STATE VERSUS GENTRY IN LATE MING DYNASTY CHINA ,
1572–1644
Copyright © Harry Miller, 2009. All rights reserved. First published in 2009 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN® in the United States—a division of St. Martin’s Press LLC, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010. Where this book is distributed in the UK, Europe and the rest of the world, this is by Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited, registered in England, company number 785998, of Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS. Palgrave Macmillan is the global academic imprint of the above companies and has companies and representatives throughout the world. Palgrave® and Macmillan® are registered trademarks in the United States, the United Kingdom, Europe and other countries. ISBN-13: 978–0–230–61134–4 ISBN-10: 0–230–61134–6 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Miller, Harry, 1966– State versus gentry in late Ming Dynasty China, 1572–1644 / Harry Miller. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0–230–61134–6 1. Elite (Social sciences)—China—History. 2. Gentry—China—History. 3. China—History—Ming dynasty, 1368–1644. 4. China—Social conditions. I. Title. HN740.Z9E462 2008 951⬘.026—dc22
2008017169
A catalogue record of the book is available from the British Library. Design by Newgen Imaging Systems (P) Ltd., Chennai, India. First edition: January 2009 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Printed in the United States of America.
For Yuka
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CONTENTS
List of Tables
ix
Acknowledgments
xi
Conventions Followed in the Book Introduction: The Problem of Sovereignty in Traditional China
xiii
1
I
Zhang Juzheng, 1572–1582
31
II
The Righteous Circles, 1582–1596
55
III
The Wanli Emperor, 1596–1606
75
IV The Donglin Faction, 1606–1626
95
V
Wei Zhongxian, 1626–1628
125
VI
The Restoration Society, 1628–1644
139
Notes
165
Bibliography
195
Index
213
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TABLES
1.1 2.1 2.2 3.1 4.1 5.1 6.1
Table of Revenue versus Expenditure, 1577–1578 (Taels) Table of Revenue versus Expenditure, 1580–1592 (Taels) Table of Accumulated Reserves, 1583–1590 (Taels) Table of Revenue versus Expenditure, 1596–1606(Taels) Table of Revenue versus Expenditure, 1607–1626 (Taels) Table of Revenue versus Expenditure, 1626–1628 (Taels) Table of Revenue versus Expenditure, 1629–1644 (Taels)
45 66 66 92 122 137 156
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
M
adeleine Zelin and Robert Hymes inspired and supported this project during my graduate career at Columbia University. Richard Lufrano, Wu Pei-yi, Peter Bol, Paul Smith, and Murray Rubinstein provided generous encouragement, at all stages of this project. I was fortunate to have received a Fulbright grant and a grant from the American Council of Learned Societies, to support research overseas. I am also grateful for the scholarly guidance I received from Chuang Chi-fa, Lin Li-yueh, and Cheng Wing-cheong, while in Taiwan, and from Gao Wangling, Wei Qingyuan, Zhu Wenjie, and Zhu Shuyuan while in mainland China. In Japan, Ono Kazuko and Kishimoto Mio helped me find an extremely rare source. I would like to thank my colleagues at the University of South Alabama, especially Clarence Mohr and Leonard Macaluso, for their support, and Matthew Johnson, for the cover image. I am grateful to Chris Chappell, of Palgrave Macmillan, for his interest and assistance. Of course, all flaws in the book are my own responsibility.
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CONVENTIONS FOLLOWED IN THE BOOK
T
his book uses the Pinyin system of Romanization to transcribe Chinese sounds into English. The only exceptions to this rule include the spelling of Taipei, Taiwan, in the bibliography, as well as the names of various Taiwanese people (Pinyin is not used in Taiwan). I have converted Chinese dates to the Christian calendar following Zheng Hesheng’s Jinshi zhongxi shiri duizhao biao. Official titles have been rendered in English according to Charles Hucker’s A Dictionary of Official Titles in Imperial China. (See the bibliography for both of these reference works.) The most important fiscal unit used in this book is the tael (in Chinese, liang), or ounce of silver, which actually weighed approximately 1.3 ounces (or 37.3 grams, metric). Taxes were also paid in grain, according to the following measurements: a sheng was about a quart; a dou was 10 sheng; and a shi was 10 dou. As for land measurement, a mu was 0.14 acre (or 5.803 acres, metric), and a qing was 100 mu (or 5.803 hectares, metric). All these conversion rates are listed on page R 19 in Edward Farmer, Romeyn Taylor, Ann Waltner, and Jiang Yonglin (comps.), Ming History: An Introductory Guide to Research, which also cautions that the numbers are approximated as closely as possible. Administrative geography during the Ming dynasty consisted of (from smallest to largest) the county (xian), the prefecture (fu), and the province (sheng), though the subprefecture (zhou) sometimes interposed between, or took the place of, the first two. The county was administered by the magistrate (zhi xian), and the prefecture by the prefect (zhi fu). Regional officials called grand coordinators (xun fu) were in charge of several prefectures, and supreme commanders
xiv
Conventions Followed in the Book
(zong du) supervised affairs in two or more provinces. The central government in Beijing was dominated by the Six Ministries (liu bu): Personnel (li bu), Rites (li bu—using a different Chinese character than the one meaning Personnel), War (bing bu), Revenue (hu bu), Punishments (xing bu), and Works (gong bu). Administration was coordinated by the Grand Secretariat (nei ge), though only informally. A Censorate (yu shi tai) was supposed to monitor government at all levels. Above these offices, there was the emperor (tian zi [son of heaven]).
INTRODUCTION: THE PROBLEM OF SOVEREIGNTY IN TRADITIONAL CHINA
King Xuan of Qi received Yan Chu in court. “Come forward, Chu!” the King ordered, but Chu likewise said, “You come forward, King!” King Xuan was displeased. The King’s attendants said, “The King is your lord (jun), Chu, and you are his subject (chen). The King calls you forward. How can you call him forward?” Yan Chu replied, “Now, if I went forward, it would mean I was trying to curry favor with the powerful. If you, King, came forward, it would mean you sought worthy gentlemen (shi). Rather than for me to be drawn to your power, it would be better if you, King, were drawn to the gentlemen (shi).” 1
T
his droll exchange was taken from the book Intrigues of the Warring States (Zhan guo ce), which was compiled in the second century BCE. At first glance, a simple, almost silly contradiction on a question of precedence, it actually signifies a profound disagreement on the proper locus or origin of authority. Should Yan Chu bow to King Xuan’s monarchial power, or should King Xuan be swayed by Yan Chu’s gentlemanly influence? Who, in other words, is supposed to be working for whom? King Xuan and Yan Chu seem most unlikely to meet each other halfway, each, rather, believing himself to be the rightful master of the other. Their standoff is a poignant vignette of political impasse, containing much potential for rupture and violence.
2
State versus Gentry—Ming Dynasty China
Although China had certainly come a long way since the days of King Xuan and Yan Chu, one can almost detect reverberations of their stubborn exchange, nearly two millennia later, in the closing decades of the Ming dynasty (1368–1644), as the following pair of statements should show: I daresay that such a promulgation of virtue and beneficence [as the waiving of tax arrears] had better come from the court (chu zi chaoting). If local officials ask for and receive such waivers, then gratitude will remain below with the said local officials, and resentment will be directed upward at the court. (Zhang Juzheng [1525–1582]) When insufficiencies caused by flood or drought are reported, the court will naturally order tax relief. But once the court above waives its taxes, can landlords (zhu) continue to collect full rents from those below? No, they are forced to be lenient, and the imperative comes not just from their feelings but also from considerations of power. Now, the tenants who work the lands are cunning and stubborn people. If the government proclaims a tax amnesty, the tenants have leverage over the landlords. They can coerce the landlords into being lenient about the rent, and being coerced into making a gesture of magnanimity rather defeats the purpose. It is much more appropriate for the local government to call together a committee of gentry and the rich (shen/fu) and for the resulting tax amnesty edict simply to follow the opinion of the committee. This will make the tax relief come from the landlords (chu yu tianzhu). The tenants will enjoy real benefits, and the way of maintaining proper relationships between rich and poor will be preserved. (Qi Biaojia [1602–1645])2
Once again, the issue seems to be a simple question of precedence, a difference of opinion on the legitimate origin of policy and power. Did it “come from the court” or “come from the landlords?” The Japanese Sinologist Mizoguchi Yuzo, who has juxtaposed these two statements, is quite correct to point out the utter lack of policy difference per se, for Zhang Juzheng and Qi Biaojia were in perfect agreement on the need for tax relief. It is also interesting to note the absence of any class boundary separating Zhang and Qi. Both men were educated landowners from southern China who were qualified to serve in the imperial bureaucracy. Both were landlords, then, and both were officers of the Ming court. Thus, their interest in the struggle for authority between the landlords and the court was largely philosophical. The abstract nature of the issue, however, made it no less contentious, for the idea of the proper locus and origin of authority, evidenced in these examples, would seem to answer for a definition of sovereignty, which, though an abstraction, is obviously of
Introduction
3
vital importance. From 1572, when Zhang Juzheng became de facto prime minister of China, to 1644, when the Ming capital fell to roving bandits, China’s political elite became engulfed in a bitter dispute over sovereignty. They sparred with each other in controversy after controversy, over such issues as education, court ritual, and bureaucratic appointments. As with tax policy, the question of sovereignty—where authority in these matters came from—was the underlying point of contention, far more important than the details or even the merits of any question in particular. The factional conflict surrounding this disagreement severely weakened the dynasty. By 1644, when the rebel army of Li Zicheng (1605?–1645) entered Beijing and forced the Chongzhen emperor (r. 1627–1644) to hang himself, the Ming empire had already been convulsed by generations of strife, at the heart of which lay the two prepositional phrases “from the court” and “from the landlords.” This book is about the struggle for sovereignty between the two objects of the preposition. The book is titled State versus Gentry (two variants of “court” and “landlords”), because these terms are the best translations of the Chinese words most often used by the historical actors themselves to indicate where they thought sovereignty resided. The words meaning “state” were guo or guojia, and since the Ming state was a monarchy, chaoting, or “court,” would seem to be synonymous. The Chinese words read here as “gentry” include shi, shidafu, shen, shenshi, shenjin, jinshen, xiangguan, and tianzhu, and the rationale for translating these semantically nuanced terms as the single word “gentry” will be given below. It is extremely important to emphasize that the battle for sovereignty between state and gentry was theoretical and symbolic. No actual combat between state and gentry was really possible—although the Wanli emperor (r. 1572–1620) would nearly realize it—because state and gentry were not discreet entities. Aside from the emperors and palace functionaries such as eunuchs, who can be treated as organic parts of the state, most of the characters in this book are people like Zhang Juzheng and Qi Biaojia, who were both gentry and officers of the state. It was the achievement of China’s civil service examination system to have co-opted state and gentry in this manner, for the academic degrees it awarded served simultaneously as the bases of gentry status and the keys to bureaucratic office. Graduates of this system are often called, in English, “scholar-officials” or “gentrybureaucrats,” terms that effectively capture their somewhat bifurcated nature. Only a very forced mental effort, an especially artificial and academic self-consciousness, would induce a minority of Ming China’s “gentry-bureaucrats” to choose one affiliation over the other.
4
State versus Gentry—Ming Dynasty China
Indeed, the chauvinism that necessarily accompanied this choice no doubt added to the bitterness toward those who were inclined the other way. State versus gentry was a subjective and not an objective dichotomy, an idea rather than a reality. Its chief product, in this context, was a bitterly fratricidal partisanship, and its chief by-product was the fall of the dynasty. Narrating a largely symbolic conflict, this book should perhaps have been entitled State-ism versus Gentry-ism or State Sovereignty versus Gentry Sovereignty, but in the interest of brevity, and to avoid mutilating the language, State versus Gentry, hopefully, will do. The next few pages will explain how the symbolic struggle for sovereignty, discernable in the dialogue between King Xuan and Yan Chu in the Warring States period (453–221 BCE), should appear also in the late Ming. Was it a constant in Chinese political life, or did it undergo periods of dormancy and eruption? Also requiring elucidation is the process by which King Xuan’s role came to be played with such enthusiasm by Zhang Juzheng (who spoke for the throne but was not a king), as well as the relationship between Yan Chu’s “gentlemen” and Qi Biaojia’s “landlords.” If Qi’s landlords were simply economic creatures, how was Qi claiming for them, as Yan Chu had claimed for himself, a certain authority over the court? A quick survey of Chinese history and political thought, focusing on the evolution of the ideas of state and gentry sovereignty, seems in order.
The Issue of Sovereignty in Classical Chinese Philosophy There is no doubt that the question of the proper locus of authority, in other words sovereignty, is elemental to Chinese political philosophy, as it developed through the formative Spring and Autumn (772–453 BCE) and Warring States periods. Both the Confucianists (ru jia) and the Legalists (fa jia) posited mythical archetypes of authority known collectively as Sage Kings (xian wang). They differed, however, as to what sort of authority the Sage Kings wielded. The Confucianists believed that the Sage Kings’ power was moral in nature—based on such virtues as humaneness (ren), ritual decorum (li), and filial piety (xiao)—and, as Herbert Fingarette has observed, magical in effect. The revolutionary corollary of this theorem was that this sort of magic power could be had by anyone, not just a king, provided he learned the sagely Way (dao). Indeed, one of Confucianism’s most important ideas—or conceits—later came to be known as the
Introduction
5
“succession to the Way” (dao tong), which maintained that the Way of the Sage Kings was no longer in the possession of kings at all but had been transferred to the itinerant scholar Confucius (551?–479? BCE) and from him to his disciples. It was a philosophical usurpation, earning Confucius the informal sobriquet su wang, or “Throneless King.” In his own time, Confucius appropriated for himself the title junzi, which had literally meant “son of a ruler,” but which now connoted a morally “superior man,” “noble man,” or “gentleman.” He did so, on one occasion, in response to his students’ warning to stay away from the supposedly rude people known as the Nine Yi (the “various foreigners”). “Where a noble person (junzi) dwells,” Confucius asked rhetorically, “what rudeness can there be?” The implication was that Confucius could single-handedly civilize the Nine Yi, or anyone else, through the magic power of the Way. Mencius (385?–312? BCE) likewise transformed the meaning of the word shi (used by Yan Chu, above) from “warrior-official” to a moral superman capable of maintaining “a constant heart (xin) in spite of a lack of constant means of support.” This moralistic conception implied that the shi (“gentleman,” in this context), and not necessarily the king, was the natural lord over the common people, who, unlike him, were unable to control their animal instincts and thus needed his nurturing moral influence. Reprising one of Confucius’s analogies, Mencius likened the influence of the gentleman (junzi) over the common people to that of the wind over the grass. He also said that “absent the gentlemen (junzi), there would be no one to rule the common people, and absent the common people, there would be no one to feed the gentlemen.” In case there was any doubt about who had power over whom, Mencius on another occasion said, “The great man (da ren) alone can rectify the evils in the prince’s heart.” In sum, the Confucian gentleman (shi or junzi), armed with the Sages’ magic powers, ruled over the common people and the kings as well.3 The Legalists, on the other hand, never believed in any sort of authority that could be alienated from the throne. Both Shang Yang (d. 338 BCE) and Han Fei (d. 223 BCE) conceived of the Sages, not as moralists, but as legislators. “The ancient kings,” Han Fei said, “allowed law to be supreme and did not give in to their tearful longings. Hence it is obvious that humaneness cannot be used to achieve order in the state.” In place of a mysterious corpus of ancient rites, which would be subject to interpretation (and exploitation) by selfinterested scholars, Shang and Han proposed a system of laws, to be promulgated by the ruler. While some recent writers, such as
6
State versus Gentry—Ming Dynasty China
Karen Turner, have suggested that the Legalists’ scheme for rule by law might have included the idea that the monarch was himself bound by the law and ought not to rule arbitrarily, Yongping Liu strongly asserts that the Legalists’ ideal ruler was the only rightful source of the law, which “should not only be set up by the ruler but also altered in accordance with his will.” For this reason, Liu believes that “totalitarian” is technically a better description of Shang’s and Han’s philosophy than “rule of law” or “Legalist.” The rewards and punishments envisaged by both Shang Yang and Han Fei as the keys of good government, Han called the “two handles,” which, though they might, conceivably, be used ineptly, could be used by none other than the king. The “unification of punishments,” which might again suggest an equality before the law encompassing also the king, was actually but another tool of the king. “What I mean by the unification of punishments,” Shang Yang said, “is that punishments should know no degree or grade, but that from ministers of state and generals down to great officers and ordinary folk, whosoever does not obey the king’s commands, violates the interdicts of the state, or rebels against the statutes fixed by the ruler, should be guilty of death and should not be pardoned.” This last clause implicitly equates the king with the state, a tendency noted by Liu and by Xiao Gongquan (Kung-chuan Hsiao). So whereas the Confucianists made sagely authority moral, claimed it, and wielded it over kings, the Legalists made sagely authority legal, kept it firmly in the grasp of kings, and urged that it be wielded, exclusively and relentlessly, for the good of the state.4 Of course, Shang Yang and Han Fei—like Zhang Juzheng—were not kings but ministers. Their proposing to reform the laws on behalf of the king was thus technically at variance with their contention that the king was the master of the law. Indeed, both Confucianists and Legalists could easily fall under the suspicion that they improperly wielded borrowed powers, with the former presuming to speak with the moral authority of the Sage Kings, and the latter presuming to speak with the legal authority of their own kings. In spite of this shared boldness, however, Legalists and Confucianists naturally tended to operate on different planes. For the Legalists, satisfaction of their ambitions necessitated the attainment of ministerial positions, which often proved dangerous or fatal, because they became subject to the draconian laws they trumpeted but could not rightly control. (Neither Shang Yang nor Han Fei met with a good end.) As for the Confucians, though they also tried to secure ministerial employment, they were not as necessarily dependant upon it as the Legalists were.
Introduction
7
The relative independence of the Confucians from the state would have some bearing on their relations with the state—especially when the state was dominated by hostile Legalists.5 When they were not employed by the state, it stands to reason that Confucian scholars had to find ways to support themselves. Confucius himself was known to have accepted compensation from his students, but otherwise, both he and Mencius were quite cagey about their economic interests and never identified themselves with any socioeconomic class or practical profession. In one imponderable exception to this rule, Mencius said, “To govern isn’t difficult. Just don’t offend the great houses (ju shi). Whatever the great houses value, the state will value. Whatever the state values, all under Heaven will value, until moral teaching spreads to the four seas.” In this formulation, Mencius used the term ju shi exactly as he would have used shi or junzi, to designate the wielder of a civilizing moral force. The problem is that ju shi was not as easily transformed in meaning as the other two terms. It never came to denote moral perfection and remained a rather amoral expression meaning aristocratic or leading family. When Confucius and Mencius transformed shi and junzi into moral leaders, they were clearly recommending themselves for the positions, but “great house” seems a little beyond Mencius’s reach in this way. The relationship of Confucianism to aristocracy and landed wealth is very unclear, especially at this early stage, but Mencius seems to have been serving at least as its advocate, if not as a reasonable pretender to it. Whatever his interest in the project, Mencius, in positing a sagely magic as emanating from the great houses, was foreshadowing Qi Biaojia’s schema by which legitimate authority came from the landlords.6 This speculation on the early Confucianists’ socioeconomic proclivities, based, admittedly, on one quotation, is somewhat confirmed by Legalist criticism. Although the Legalists found Confucian advice pedantic and hoped to shield their kings from it, they seemed even more alarmed that the Confucians were often all too ready to take their leave from court and pursue their interests elsewhere. “At court, they deceive their ruler,” warned Shang Yang, “and, retiring from court, they think of nothing but of how to realize their selfish interests.” In fact, the entire Confucian program of expropriating authority from the state and wielding it at some lower level is discernable in another indictment from Shang Yang: Those people who form parties with others do not need us for obtaining success, and, if superiors pull one way with the people, then
8
State versus Gentry—Ming Dynasty China the latter will turn their backs on the ruler’s position and will turn toward private (si) connections. When this is the case, the prince will be weak and his ministers (chen) strong.7
Like the advisors of King Xuan, Shang Yang used the word chen to mean “minister,” with the implication that the minister was supposed to be unconditionally committed to the throne, which remained the only true sovereignty. The fact that the minister was, on the contrary, economically independent, adept at fomenting faction, and in possession of his own constituency, clearly drove Shang Yang to distraction. This perceived insubordination, the direct result, as they deduced, of the Confucianists’ appropriation of authority, moved Shang Yang and Han Fei to view the relationship between the state and these slippery elites as basically antagonistic. Whenever they wrote of “lord and minister” (jun and chen), “above and below” (shang and xia), and “public and private” (gong and si), they were almost invariably expressing the idea of this antagonism. Thus did Han Fei warn that “the wealth of the ministers (chen) is the undoing of the ruler (jun),” and “the state’s (guo) territory will contract as the private (si) houses get rich.” Armed with this Legalist logic, the state of Qin conquered all of China in 221 BCE and proceeded to level society beneath it. Especially singled out were at least two Confucian texts, which were burned; and anyone, especially a Confucian scholar, who “used the past to criticize the present,” was threatened with execution.8
The Early Triumph of the State The Qin dynasty (221–207 BCE) ushered in the imperial system, which, for a time, reaffirmed the sovereignty of the state and denied the claim to sovereignty made by its gentlemanly rivals. Although Qin absolutism proved unsustainable—partly because Qin’s laws were too harsh but also because they could not be applied consistently to the greater empire—the succeeding Han dynasty (202 BCE–220 CE) offered no real challenge to the imperial thesis. Legalism was permanently discredited, but a new generation of Confucianists, of which Dong Zhongshu (195?–105? BCE) was the most prominent spokesman, fortified the theoretical basis of the imperial state by describing it in cosmological terms. Reprising the idea of the Mandate of Heaven (tian ming) from the Western Zhou (1027?–771 BCE), Dong theorized that the legitimate state was patterned after Heaven (roughly defined as an impersonal collection of natural forces, not a deity). It was the
Introduction
9
job of the ruler, the Son of Heaven, to do the patterning. “Only the Son of Heaven receives the Mandate of Heaven,” Dong wrote, “and all the empire (tian xia) [in turn then] accepts the mandates of the Son of Heaven.” True, Dong Zhongshu was subordinating the ruler to Heaven, but he was positing no competing sovereignty on Earth, certainly not the gentlemen or great houses extolled by Confucius and Mencius. Under Heaven, “The ruler is the origin of the state. He speaks and he acts, and all things find their pivot in him.” As Xiao notes, Dong assigned to the ruler the same transforming power illustrated in Confucius’s metaphor of the wind and the grass. Mencius’s attempt to uncouple this power from both the ruler and the state was discontinued.9 During the next great dynasty, the Tang (617–907 CE), Confucian literati were employed in various central government institutions, compiling dynastic histories and other works on statecraft, researching state ritual, and organizing the education system. David McMullen has described their outlook as “court-centered,” with their work tending “to emphasize the role of the emperor,” according to the models of cosmological legitimacy inherited from the Han. To be sure, Wei Zheng (580–643) earned lasting fame with his severe criticisms of an early Tang emperor and by vetoing many of his policies, but at no time did he question the ruler’s sovereignty, and he certainly never claimed a moral sovereignty of his own. On the contrary, Wei often wrote of the emperor as a Sage or a potential Sage, which would seem to have been a definitive confirmation of the emperor’s sovereign status. Of course, no simple rubric can comfortably apply to the Han, Tang, and the other very diverse polities, which ruled over all or part of China from the third century BCE to the tenth century CE. The point to be emphasized, however, is that the Confucian scholars of the era generally refrained from claiming sovereignty for themselves. For that matter, the “conquer or die” mentality of the Legalists, vis-à-vis the Confucian scholars, was also little in evidence. The bitter debate on the nature of sovereignty having been pretty much decided in favor of the state, a certain philosophical accord seems to have prevailed.10
The Rise of the Gentry and Neo-Confucianism The disinclination to challenge directly the idea of imperial sovereignty was finally overcome during the next major dynasty, the Song (960–1279), owing to institutional innovation, demographic
10
State versus Gentry—Ming Dynasty China
change, controversial reforms, and enemy invasion. The result was the revival of the idea of a sovereignty outside the state, a fundamentalist version of Confucianism, known in Chinese as daoxue or Song ru—“Neo-Confucianism” or “Song Confucianism” in English. Robert Hartwell has written authoritatively about the transition. On the institutional level, the Song made the civil service examination (in which the Confucian canon played a small but growing part of the curriculum) the single most important method of filling government posts. This innovation did not immediately signal the weakening of what Hartwell calls the “professional elite,” a group claiming prestigious Tang ancestry that continued to monopolize examination degrees and to stress government service. However, new men, locally wealthy residents of south China, finally began to enter the elite by winning (through the exam system) lower level bureaucratic offices and by intermarrying with the professionals, exchanging their wealth for the older elite’s prestige and superior political position. This southern nouveau riche, called “gentry” by Hartwell, represented the new demographic development. They briefly inherited the preoccupation with government office that had marked the professional elite, but in the 1070s, the controversial reforms of Wang Anshi (1021–1086) led to bureaucratic factionalism and purges that dramatically lessened the appeal of the central government bureaucracy as the best place to realize career ambitions. Philosophical disenchantment accompanied the professional, for the frustration brought about by Wang’s reforms, coupled with the loss of the north to Khitan and Jurchen invaders, dissuaded Confucian scholars from viewing the state as the proper platform from which to “put the world in order” (jingshi). Confucianists of the Southern Song survivor regime (1127–1279) turned away from the state and resolved instead to order the world from their local communities.11 The modus operandi of this “localist strategy” has been detailed by Robert Hymes. The new Southern Song elite eschewed the national marriage alliances that had prevailed during the preinvasion Northern Song (960–1127) and began instead to marry and consolidate power locally. They continued to compete for academic degrees but now viewed them chiefly as a component of local importance, rather than as the basis for a lifetime of service to the state. They also developed a repertoire of community leadership and service, designing improvements to irrigation, providing for famine
Introduction
11
relief, organizing the militia, overseeing religious life, and so on. In some of these projects, they cooperated with local government, but in most cases, they remained the prime movers.12 Neo-Confucianism was the ideology of the Southern Song gentry. It justified, as it sanctified, the economic and political independence and leadership of this newly ascendant class. Conceptually complex, its rather straightforward propaganda value was based on the “succession to the Way,” the old Confucian conceit that the Way of the Sage Kings had been lost by kings and recovered by scholars. Zhu Xi (1130–1200) extended the conceit by speculating that after Mencius, the Way remained lost for about fifteen hundred years before being recovered by Song scholars like himself. In asserting that the Way had been lost, Zhu effectively delegitimized all the regimes of the imperial system. In asserting that the Way had been found, that he had “connected up with the tradition from Mencius,” Zhu was claiming for Neo-Confucians like himself nothing less than the Mandate of Heaven, or the right to rule, as Peter Bol rightly asserts. A bolder claim to sovereignty could not have been made.13 As might be imagined, this rediscovered idea of localized moral sovereignty spelled trouble. The Song dynasty itself may have been its first victim. Separate studies by Herbert Franke and Paul Smith both cite the Song survivor Zhou Mi (1232–1308), who blamed both an aggressive state and recalcitrant Neo-Confucians for the loss of the dynasty. On the one hand, the activist chief councilor Jia Sidao (1213–1275), by nationalizing great estates in 1263 in order to boost Song’s revenue, alienated big landowners from the Song cause and made them less reluctant to welcome the invading Mongols. Jia’s actions cost the Song “the affection of the people,” in Zhou’s words. On the other hand, Zhou also believed that the Song bureaucracy was overrun by Neo-Confucian scholars who scorned the business of government and pedantically philosophized, even as the frontier collapsed. The affair of Jia Sidao and his combined landlordphilosopher opposition in the late Song dynasty may be seen as a close antecedent to the following narrative of the late Ming, which features likewise a set of uncompromising statists and a similarly uncompromising opposition.14
Raised Stakes in the Yuan and the Ming Admittedly, placing the events of 1572–1644 within the background of the Song-Yuan-Ming transition incurs the risk that they will fade
12
State versus Gentry—Ming Dynasty China
into it. With the Neo-Confucian gentry fully formed and contending for sovereignty with the state in the thirteenth century, it might well be asked what was so special about a similar conflict during the turn of the seventeenth century. The answer is that the late Ming debacle was much more intense and prolonged than the Song version, because the intervening Yuan or Mongol dynasty (1279–1368) added new dimensions of absolutism to both sides of the sovereignty debate. John Dardess has recently highlighted the importance of the Yuan era. The Mongols introduced to China a monarchy bounded neither by culture nor by geography. The Confucian mind was revolted, but it was also tempted to appropriate this enhanced power for its own purposes. When Khubilai Khan (1215–1294) patronized the Confucian scholars of north China and used them to spread propaganda and encourage Song defections as he gradually conquered the south, the scholars did not view themselves as pawns at all but, on the contrary, saw Khubilai as their creature. Since he possessed a vast empire, the scholars could use him to “sinify barbarian ways.” No doubt the product of denial and wishful thinking, this project of civilizing the world through an imperial patron (or puppet) was nonetheless vastly more ambitious than the “localist strategy” of the Southern Song. In its grand imperial scope, it aimed even higher than Mencius, who had set his civilizing sights only on minor princes. The Mongol experience, by raising the stakes across the board, made the all-important question of “Who’s working for whom?” an especially contentious and weighty one.15 Indeed, the essential fact about the Ming dynasty, which would have the most disastrous implications for the generations active in 1572–1644, was the set of absolutist and absolutely contradictory assumptions upon which it was founded, surrounding precisely this question. Both the monarchial state and the Neo-Confucian gentry, as much as the Legalists and Confucians of old, expected the total submission of the other. Significantly, it was the decentralization of the Yuan, as well as the loss of patronage to “magnates, clerks, and local bullies,” after the death of Khubilai, that turned Neo-Confucians against Mongol rule. They did not withdraw into their own villages but, on the contrary, cast about for a more effective autocrat. Ultimately, as Dardess shows, the gentlemen of south China lent their support to the rebel chieftain Zhu Yuanzhang (1328–1398), in the hope that he would lead them (or they would lead him) on a grand campaign to expel the alien Mongols, chastise their Chinese lackeys, and effect the moral regeneration of all China.16
Introduction
13
Unsurprisingly, the ensuing transition from the Yuan to the Ming dynasty saw many of these expectations violently shattered. It was not that Zhu Yuanzhang and his Neo-Confucian supporters really disagreed as to the substance of China’s hoped-for regeneration. They simply differed as to who should take the active and who should take the passive role in the project. “Far from becoming the tool of the scholars and their ideology,” writes Edward Farmer, “[Zhu Yuanzhang] saw the scholars as his tools.” However, Zhu Yuanzhang’s ideal polity, one that would be both completely responsive to him and free of corruption, was difficult to realize. Studies by Edward Dreyer and John Langlois Jr. have narrated Zhu’s reign as a protracted search for a governing apparatus he could trust. Armed by what Dreyer has called a “quasi-Legalistic managerial despotism,” Zhu consecutively embraced and violently abandoned a variety of alternative elites and bureaucratic institutions of both Mongol and Chinese origin, purging (and executing) thousands while concentrating more power in his own hands. Brave remonstrators risked imprisonment or execution by criticizing the founder’s policies and the incredibly severe discipline he brought to bear on the supposedly disloyal. Langlois suggests that service to the Ming in the founding generation was such a thankless and dangerous prospect that many literati prudently opted out.17 Zhu Yuanzhang, also known as the Hongwu emperor, ruled from 1368 to 1398. His grandson and designated heir, Zhu Yunwen, or the Jianwen emperor, ruled only until 1402, before being overthrown by the founder’s son, Zhu Di, who ruled as the Yongle emperor through 1424. Yongle’s status as usurper was problematic from the Confucian standpoint. When the scholar Fang Xiaoru (1357–1402), who had endeavored to make the Jianwen administration a better embodiment of Confucian values, rebuffed and denounced Yongle, the latter had him executed, along with a great many others. As was the case during the founder’s tenure, the Yongle reign saw only a very limited role played by Confucian scholars. Like his father, the Yongle emperor favored military men (as well as eunuchs and other individuals personally attached to him), and also like his father, he promulgated the idea of his own sagehood.18 It was the Yongle emperor, however, who unwittingly laid the groundwork for the Confucian literati’s resurgence. Although eager to have his way in matters of personal interest (mostly military), he did not undertake, as his father had, to bend the entire empire to his will, and he tried to conciliate all social classes, even as he occasionally
14
State versus Gentry—Ming Dynasty China
punished individuals who stood in his way. Grand literary projects, by which he hoped to legitimize his rule, effectively elevated the status of Neo-Confucianism in general, and the commentaries of Zhu Xi in particular. The resulting orthodox ideology became the approved course of study for young scholars as they prepared for the civil service examinations, which (after the uncertain Hongwu years, when the exams were haltingly reinstated) were again the chief avenues to bureaucratic office. Furthermore, Yongle delegated routine administrative tasks to the small department of senior scholars known as the Grand Secretariat, which became a sort of informal cabinet, especially during the emperor’s prolonged absences while on military campaign. So while the emperor continued to be absorbed in military matters, a Confucian-dominated bureaucracy gradually found itself in a position to oppose such expansive initiatives. After Yongle’s death in 1424, the new Hongxi emperor (Zhu Gaozhi, r. 1424–1426) became the champion of the Confucian echelon. Assisted by a group of grand secretaries who outlived his brief reign, Hongxi envisaged an imperial government that would allow greater input from Confucian advisors. This vision was mostly realized by the mid-1400s, by which time, civil officials were favored over other elites (with the occasional, ominous exception of palace eunuchs), and imperial military and maritime expeditions (including the voyages of Zheng He [1371–1433]) were finally discontinued. “Thereafter,” Dreyer writes, “Confucian officials routinely dominated the political process.” Despite the cruelly frustrated hopes of the Hongwu and Jianwen periods, Confucian scholars thus emerged from the tumultuous Yuan-Ming transition with the leading role, after all.19
The Ming Gentry Confucian domination of the state applied also to society. The civil service degrees, which steered candidates toward government office, also granted significant social and economic privileges. An intelligent and ambitious young man, whose family could both spare his labor and invest resources in his education, would typically enter the recruitment system by becoming, after passing an exam, a shengyuan (stipend-supported student, attached to a state school). Alternative credentials were available too, such as jiansheng (student at the guozijian, or Imperial Academy), and gongsheng (tributary student); but the next big step was to sit for the provincial exam, which awarded successful candidates with the juren (elevated man) degree. Finally,
Introduction
15
there was the metropolitan exam, which conferred the superlative jinshi (presented scholar) degree. After the founding generation, only the winners of the latter degree could reasonably expect a significant official posting. However, the possession of any of these degrees (or credentials, since shengyuan did not technically hold degrees) was the key to what will be called “gentry” status in this book.20 The word “gentry” is serviceable and familiar but by no means universally accepted by modern Sinologists. Even if a more general English word such as “elite” were to be used, however, all the perennial difficulties attendant to defining the elite would remain, and no definition would prove completely airtight. One basic question is whether or not shengyuan should count as gentry. Although Chang Chung-li, Frederic Wakeman Jr., and other scholars drew a distinction between the jinshi- and juren-holding “upper gentry” and the shengyuan, this book will follow the modern Chinese writer Chen Baoliang in treating the shengyuan as gentry, albeit a lower order of gentry.21 Moving from the question of whether a given individual should be considered a member of the gentry to the question of whether a given family should be considered a gentry family obviously introduces even more uncertainty. In general, it seems fairly uncontroversial to say that a family that produced a degree holder (or shengyuan) could be considered a gentry family; but it is not explicitly clear how far gentry status effectively extended from the individual degree holder. Timothy Brook roughly draws the line at “degree holders and their larger circle of male agnates, affines, and associates,” but this boundary is somewhat indistinct. A further obscuring factor is the tendency of Ming families to maintain their statuses for several generations without producing any degree holders. Perhaps these families could rely on a few occasional shengyuan to tide them over, but they also, according to Martin Heijdra, could draw on other tangible and intangible resources such as “wealth, position in the community, or social benefactions.” These latter, intangible assets exemplify how much reputation and behavior effectively helped to determine class status—as much as they blurred it by making it at least a little subjective. However, the more tangible aspect of this survival strategy, wealth, suggests yet another important component of gentry status, namely, land. As Heijdra and, especially, Hilary Beattie clearly demonstrate, landowning was both a prerequisite to gentry status (because it supplied the wealth and leisure necessary for education) and a very important means to maintain status during
16
State versus Gentry—Ming Dynasty China
those generations that failed to achieve examination success. In sum, the Ming gentry seem to have based their status on a set of interrelated criteria, of which civil service examination performance, with the attendant possibility of government office, was perhaps primary, but which also included landholding and conventional behavior patterns.22 All three of these class markers—official degrees, land, and behavior—figured in the process by which the Ming gentry, and the Ming dynasty, matured. Of obvious importance is the question of whether or not the basic pool of degree holders grew larger, both in aggregate numbers and as a proportion of the population, over time. In fact, jinshi and juren degrees were awarded on a quota system, and as these quotas remained nearly fixed, no remarkable growth in the numbers of individual “upper gentry” took place. For a variety of reasons, however, the numbers of shengyuan skyrocketed. Ho Ping-ti describes this increase as approaching twentyfold, far outstripping the not-quite threefold increase of China’s population, during the Ming. The competition among the continually growing shengyuan cohort, for the limited number of juren degrees, created the chief bottleneck in the education system. Soon, frustrated shengyuan were turning to local government clerking, freelance litigating, tax farming, or more disruptive activities, simply to make a living.23 If only the shengyuan, and not the jinshi and juren, increased in number, however, the privileges enjoyed by latter two groups did greatly expand. Jinshi, juren, and shengyuan were granted an exemption, for themselves and some family members, from that part of their tax obligation originally derived from manual labor. (The fact that shengyuan enjoyed these exemptions is, perhaps, the best reason to place them in the larger gentry group.) This Ming system was an innovation, for, in the past, only office holders, not degree holders, received these exemptions, which dramatically increased over the course of the dynasty. Heijdra reports that jinshi exemptions increased tenfold, juren exemptions twenty- or even thirtyfold. Shengyuan exemptions increased hardly at all (though again, the shengyuan population did). These mushrooming tax exemptions, known generally as youmian, created opportunities for fraud. A common chicanery involved the commendation of other people’s lands to those holding exemptions, to share the benefit of the tax shelter. As a result, the degree holders (and shengyuan) thus became big landlords, sometimes with a number of serf-like dependents. It would appear, then, that if large landholdings sometimes enabled
Introduction
17
gentry status, they could sometimes richly reward it, too. Taking into account not only the growth of the gentry population but also the gentry’s privileges, especially its youmian tax exemptions, establishes a clear trend of rising gentry influence. Since land is more finite than population, the gentry’s progressive consolidation of the former was probably the key to its increasing domination of the latter. As Gao Shouxian reports, the gentry, by their increasing numbers and also by their economic influence, were able to dominate rural society, after the middle of the fifteenth century.24 The proliferation of the gentry and their tax-sheltered estates came also at the expense of the Ming treasury, making Han Fei’s warnings about the wealth of the ministers undoing the ruler seem rather prophetic in this respect. Somewhat more recently, in the 1960s, Joseph Levenson and Franz Schurmann also theorized about the parasitic nature of Confucian landholders, vis-à-vis the various dynasties. Although their work may, perhaps, be showing its age by now, it might still be used as a point of departure in this context. In Levenson’s and Schurmann’s view, private encroachments on the state’s interests were inexorable, because China’s “landlord-officials” could hardly be expected to support bureaucratic crackdowns on their own gentry interests. “And so,” they wrote, “the concentration of land ensued, the growth of ominous private interests, threatening the state that sought ideally to fragmentize private interest, but whose bureaucracy was staffed by the very people who had to be most controlled.” This description indeed suggests the operation of a “dynastic cycle,” by which Chinese states were, as Levenson elsewhere suggested, “eaten away recurrently” by private power. So was the Ming dynasty simply a victim of the dynastic cycle, along these lines?25 The answer is yes and no. As is well known, the Ming dynasty died not only of fiscal insufficiency but also from partisan strife, and the dynastic cycle scenario outlined by Levenson explains only the former but not the latter. In fact, by explaining the former, it cannot account for the latter, because the primacy of selfish economic interests assumed by Levenson, which supposedly compelled China’s landlord-officials to devour their dynasties unquestioningly, would seem to have left them little to fight about. In other words, if Ming landlord-officials were as inherently incapable of private restraint for the public good as Levenson implied, then the Ming should have died without a word of genuine protest. Obviously, Levenson’s assumptions about the economic selfishness of the elite were
18
State versus Gentry—Ming Dynasty China
somewhat overdrawn, and late Ming faction must have had other than purely economic roots.
Psychological Origins of the Conflict Indeed, the true origins of late Ming faction may be found, not in the wanton pursuit of private interest, but rather in the widespread acceptance of the need to restrain it. This basic acceptance became the prerequisite for general dissolution, because of the disputed nature of sovereignty that is the theme of this book; for once it was agreed that the gentry’s private interests should be restrained, the next question was: Where should the restraining power come from? Should it come from the gentry itself, or should it come from the state? That was a question with no easy answer and one that came with a rich heritage of reinforced prejudices, bitter disagreement, and, especially since the Yuan and early Ming, absolutely contradictory assumptions. Evidence seems to suggest that the problem of excessive economic engrossment on the part of the gentry was first recognized by the gentry itself, not because it was threatening to the state, but because it was threatening to the gentry’s own self-image (as well as to a more enlightened sense of self-interest than Levenson was willing to concede). If this interpretation seems to stray a bit into the realm of psychology, it should be stressed that psychological factors can be historically important, especially if one is dealing with historical characters as complex as China’s elite. Historians, it bears repeating, are often reduced to adopting a variety of hyphenated terms, such as “gentry-literati-officials” or “gentry-literati-Confucianists”— both from the pen of the otherwise elegant wordsmith Levenson—as the only way to capture, in English, the Chinese elite’s inescapably hybrid nature. These hyphenated personalities are what make Chinese history so psychologically interesting in general, and they would seem to have had great bearing on the unraveling of the Ming elite in particular. Perhaps the elite’s most fundamental multiformity stemmed from its dual occupations of landowning and bureaucratic service. The conflict of interests between government and private power, which occupies many pages in the histories of other civilizations, was in China’s case an internal, personal conflict. Levenson was definitely on the right track when he explored the psychological implications of this situation, and one of his treatments of the subject, subtitled “The Landlord-Officials against Themselves,” certainly anticipates the present study of state versus gentry as first a psychological and then a
Introduction
19
fratricidal conflict. Again, however, Levenson rather hastily resolved the “landlord-official” psychological conflict of interest in favor of the landlord psyche (with private interest, in other words, trumping public interest), leaving the causes of Ming faction unexplained. The problem is that the elite’s “landlord-official” bipolarity, perhaps obvious in the final debacle of the Ming, was not the fault line along which the Ming elite initially divided. The original break in tension, rather, occurred along the “Confucian landlord” or “Confucian gentry” duality. It was the elite’s moral, Confucian persona that first revolted against its economic, gentry persona, and it was this revolt, or revulsion, that led to the acceptance of the need for the gentry to be restrained. This acceptance, again, would prove fatally divisive in the long term, for the Confucian-motivated self-reform of the gentry led ultimately to the Legalist-motivated bureaucratic suppression of the gentry. Here, then, is the current study’s hypothesis concerning the origin of late Ming faction: gentry versus gentry was the initial spark; state versus gentry was the resulting explosion.26 The Confucian gentry may inevitably have rebelled against its own economic success in general terms, but the crisis seems to have been made more acute by the fabulously commercial nature of the Ming economy. The era was witness to a mushrooming population, an increase in urbanization and literacy, an expansion of agricultural markets, a greater use of silver as money, and a spreading of trade networks. While the state adjusted itself very slowly to these new realities—commercial taxes were low and haphazardly enacted, and the Ming revenue remained firmly based on farm income, even more so than the revenue of the Tang or Song—the gentry improved every opportunity afforded by commerce. As Timothy Brook recounts, the gentry effectively merged with the merchant class and absorbed its values and survival skills, and Cynthia Brokaw confirms that late Ming merchants began acting very much like gentry, and vice versa. Writing about this trend in Chinese, Xu Min uses the term shi-shang, meaning “gentleman-merchant” and cites a number of late Ming commentators, including Gui Youguang (1507–1571), who wrote that the gentry (shi) had become “mixed together” with the merchant class and also the agricultural class. So not only did the Confucian gentry embarrass itself through the un-Confucian pursuit of profit, it also embarrassed itself by the very act of class amalgamation, blurring the social boundaries upon which Confucianism depended. Even if the gentry themselves had not partaken of the commercial life, the increasing complexity of society in general, with
20
State versus Gentry—Ming Dynasty China
its socially confusing proliferation of luxuries and new occupations, was quite threatening. In this mutating world, therefore, the gentry became very ironically hypocritical, complaining bitterly about the social mobility to which many of them owed their prominence; and they also became quite reactionary, waxing nostalgic about a pastoral world they had never really known. During the early sixteenth century, many of them concluded that the dynasty was in decline, corrupted by the same ingots of silver upon which they themselves depended. In their feeling that “the world is grown so bad,” they echoed the discontent of Richard III: “Since every Jack became a gentleman/There’s many a gentle person made a Jack.” The Confucian gentlemen’s lament, however, was really that they were once (and were still) Jacks themselves. Since Confucian gentlemen needed to think of themselves as morally evolved and not merely economically successful, many of them were compelled to reinvent themselves along moralistic lines. Evidence of this complex process would include the “ledgers of merit and demerit” studied by Brokaw. Using these merchants’ balance sheets to post net gains of good deeds, the upwardly mobile could claim to have won gentry status via moral rigor, not merely economic windfall. Though condemned as a vulgar threat to academic and philosophical orthodoxy, the ledgers ultimately fortified the idea of Confucian moral distinctions by perpetuating “the belief that only virtuous men were fit to rule.” 27 Sixteenth-century zeal in distinguishing virtuous from unvirtuous gentry has produced some lasting historiographical reverberations. It is, in fact, precisely because there was so much confusion about what it meant to be a member of the gentry in the sixteenth century that there is so much confusion about the term today. Martin Heijdra has found that many Sinologists view the Ming gentry in a “normative” sense, as a class of people who “behaved the way the elite was supposed to behave.” According to this view, the gentry were “morally, intellectually, ideologically, and culturally the ‘leaders of the people,’ politically and economically influential solely as a result of this, and for this reason forming the axis about which the social order revolved.” The problem, as Heijdra and Mori Masao separately explain, was that a more pejorative view actually prevailed in the sixteenth century, in which the gentry were depicted as a mostly economic and utterly self-interested class of strongmen and bullies.28 It would be a great mistake to try to determine which of these views of the gentry, the normative or the pejorative, was “correct,” and it would be equally wrong to try to separate the “moral leaders” from the
Introduction
21
“strongmen” in any objective way. The contradiction between these two views of the gentry is simply a subjective expression of the psychological tension described by Levenson, the confusion described by Brook, and the need for justification described by Brokaw. It was clearly an issue in the sixteenth century, with the normative view reflecting the Ming gentry’s idealized self-image, and the pejorative view reflecting a more jaundiced self-image. Taken together, they suggest a sort of Jekyll-Hyde fantasy, with commerce as the transforming poison. Furthermore, the gentry’s contrasting (self-) images had to be mutually reinforcing, since only a self-supposed “moral leader” would object to, and would undertake to reform, the allegedly corrupted behavior of his cousins. Emphatically, however, even though some gentry were no doubt more moral and less acquisitive than others, and even though some gentry would use morality to justify their politics for the rest of the dynasty, the moral distance separating “good gentry” from “bad gentry” was relative or subjective. One man’s “moral leader” was another man’s “evil landlord,” in other words, and it remains very difficult to qualify these terms empirically.29 The present work will not, therefore, adopt the morally specific translations of Chinese gentry terms discussed by Heijdra, such as “moral elite” for shidafu and “officials” for shenjin, which create the false impression that the Chinese elite can be conveniently separated into discrete moral categories. Furthermore, just as the gentry’s moral identity was ambiguous, its sociopolitical roles were likewise interchangeable. Wu Han (1909–1969) wrote that officials (guanliao), intellectuals (zhishi fenzi), “moral elite” (shidafu), gentry (shenshi), and landlords (dizhu) were pretty much the same. To dispense, finally, with the recurring and complicated issue of nomenclature, this book will follow Wu Han in referring to the elite, when necessary, by whatever role they might have been playing at the time (such as “official”), but otherwise, they will be referred to as “gentry.” “Gentry,” according to Wu, corresponded to their permanent social identity (as opposed to their temporary political identity) and would thus seem to take precedence. To classify the Chinese elite more rigidly would be to ignore its fundamentally multifarious nature. Also, as will be seen, the historical actors themselves used the various terms rather haphazardly.30 In any case, the gentry’s reform of itself was underway. First, a “subgroup of the gentry” (Heijdra’s phrase), morally animated but also calculatingly fearful that their own excesses invited backlash
22
State versus Gentry—Ming Dynasty China
from their local communities (or even divine retribution), resolved to play a more positive role in them. They resurrected the whole repertoire of benevolent gentry leadership that Hymes has studied for the Southern Song, funding irrigation projects, overseeing famine relief, and organizing local security. They also, according to Brook, patronized Buddhist religious institutions, publicly distinguishing themselves with “lofty gentry-sounding titles” and thus differentiating themselves from those merchants who were still making the initial investments in education by which they hoped to attain gentry status.31 Viewing the gentry in the normative sense, once more, necessitated condemning the gentry in the pejorative sense. Once the reformers recovered the moral high ground, they began enforcing discipline over their allegedly corrupted neighbors. Serving in their bureaucratic guises as county magistrates and other local or regional officials, but significantly without central direction and in some cases responding to local initiatives, they worked to equalize the tax burden between rich and poor, in effect cracking down on the more blatant cases of tax evasion by members of their own class. Perhaps the most noteworthy of these tax adjustments was the Single Whip Reform (yi tiao bian), which began in the 1530s and prorated onerous service levies (shouldered mostly by the poor) onto the land tax (thus redistributing the burden onto the rich).32
Emergence of the State versus Gentry Paradigm One episode involving the Single Whip can shed a great deal of light on this preliminary period of gentry self-reform as well as illustrate how the reform process escalated beyond the gentry’s control and came to be carried out under the auspices of the state. Hai Rui (1513–1587) was grand coordinator of Songjiang prefecture and other southern territories, from the middle of 1569 to the early spring of 1570. While carrying out the Single Whip, Hai undertook to restore to poor families various lands that had been expropriated from them by engrossers. This policy brought him famously into conflict with Xu Jie (1503–1583), a former grand secretary in the central government, who had amassed a large estate in Songjiang. The ensuing battle between the two men attests to the preponderance of relative or subjective factors distinguishing the reformers from the reformed. Hai Rui was animated by a Confucian ideology that could well be described as fundamentalist, since he believed its tenets should be
Introduction
23
followed literally. From this fundamentalism, however, it does not follow that Hai Rui was more moral (or even more Confucian) than Xu Jie, any more than a religious fanatic is more moral than a modest believer. In fact, both men were committed to moral governance and both had nearly lost their lives by chastising the Jiajing emperor (r. 1521–1567) for his dissolute behavior. Strictly speaking, neither man could escape the gentry label, were it pejorative, and with two jinshi among them, Hai’s family may actually have enjoyed more gentry privileges than Xu’s. Both men were rich, and Hai’s affected austerity and Xu’s claims that his estates were a benefit to the community should be seen simply as two different justifications for great wealth. When Hai condemned half of Xu’s property, he claimed he was only helping Xu to enjoy the remaining half in peace, without fear of the even harsher lawsuits that Xu would surely bring on himself for his excessive acquisitiveness. This reasoning might not have convinced Xu at the time, but it perfectly supports Heijdra’s contention that the reformers believed they were serving the gentry’s long-term interests by moderating its behavior. It is also the sort of thing that one would expect from a brotherly quarrel, with one brother acting as the selfappointed conscience of the other. These mid-century reforms, of, by, and for the gentry, should be seen just so: as a family affair, as a cleaning of dirty laundry, as a makeover of self-image from evil landlord to pillar of the local community.33 As the gentry tried to keep house, there was a basic agreement that the state should not get directly involved (which it didn’t; through the 1560s, it merely endorsed the various reform efforts that were initiated throughout the country at the local level). John Meskill has reported that the local gentlemen of Songjiang (who, while selfconsciously gentlemanly, were mostly examination failures) took the incompetence of the central government as a given. Beijing’s inaction during the Sino-Japanese pirate attacks earlier in the century made a lasting impression on these men and habituated them to look to their own devices for community defense. They also grew very suspicious at the prospect of any attempt to remove the iniquities from the tax system that was not undertaken by informed local men, and thus they tended to side with Xu Jie, while pronouncing Hai Rui a zealot and troublemaker who could only make things worse. In their view, then, the reform movement had already gone too far, and their attitude makes it clear that even a relatively modest gentleman would, when push came to shove, sympathize with a big landlord rather than a reform-minded bureaucrat, even one who acted on his own initiative.
24
State versus Gentry—Ming Dynasty China
Indeed, gentlemanly impatience with outside meddling seemed vindicated when Beijing did get involved in the Xu Jie affair, with predictably complicated results. Of greater interest here, though, are the radically different values and assumptions underlying Hai Rui’s and Beijing’s interests in the same case.34 Dovetailing with Hai Rui’s prosecution of Xu Jie was an attack on the latter by the grand secretaries Gao Gong (1512–1578) and Zhang Juzheng. Gao had ousted Xu as chief grand secretary (shou fu) in 1568 and continued to harass him in his retirement. With Gao Gong’s star on the rise, more Songjiang plaintiffs were encouraged to file claims against Xu Jie. Beyond these court politics and land disputes, however, was a deeper issue, which the historian Wei Qingyuan has described as an academic or philosophical revolution at the center of power. Gao Gong and Zhang Juzheng were closet Legalists whose overthrow of Xu Jie was part of a coordinated campaign to neutralize the influence of Neo-Confucian philosophers in the bureaucracy. Xu Jie was a notorious devotee of jiangxue, or Neo-Confucian speculative lecturing and discussion. This activity was not merely academic but was, in modern parlance, a networking tool, by which Neo-Confucian philosophers amassed prestige, followers, and considerable political and economic power. Gao Gong and Zhang Juzheng despised the practice, as it encouraged impractical, empty talk, and as Legalists, they were surely as alarmed as Shang Yang at the prospect of scholarly network building. In 1570, Gao and Zhang prohibited serving bureaucrats from engaging in jiangxue, as part of their campaign to rationalize the bureaucracy, making it more a instrument of government and less a forum for philosophical discussion. Though Xu Jie was already gone (as was Hai Rui, by that time), his successors’ banning of jiangxue might have been intended as a parting shot.35 The episode of Hai Rui versus Xu Jie versus Gao Gong and Zhang Juzheng is treated here as a transitional case of gentry versus gentry versus state, in the course of which the former conflict gave way to the latter. Taken as a whole, the affair contains a portentous irony: while Hai Rui believed that Xu Jie was a wayward landlord whose faults could be corrected by a healthy dose of Confucianism, the grand secretaries believed that Xu was a wayward bureaucrat whose faults were the natural outgrowth of Confucianism. Here is further evidence that the historian’s difficulty in nailing down the Chinese elite (“landlord-bureaucrat-Confucians”) was anticipated, with a great deal more at stake, in the sixteenth century. It is also another
Introduction
25
important illustration, following Mizoguchi, of how essentially the same policy (the prosecution of Xu Jie, in this case) could contain much potential disagreement, depending on whether it came from the gentry or came from the state. Perhaps by carrying out their program in the lower reaches of the bureaucracy—that gray area claimed by both state and gentry—the gentry were, like the would-be handlers of Zhu Yuanzhang, presuming to borrow the power of the state to serve the interests of the gentry. As was the case in Zhu’s day, the Ming state would react very sharply against the presumption. Zhang Juzheng, representing the new Legalism, was the man to make sure the gentry worked for the state and not vice versa (Gao Gong would have less of a historical impact, as will be discussed below). The enthusiasm he brought to the project had the same origins as the Confucian reformist impulse of the gentry, for he had passed through the same confusing identity crisis, brought on by the role of commerce in Chinese elite life. According to Robert Crawford, Zhang too believed that the Ming dynasty was in decline, and he wrote on one occasion that “merchants held power” during the mid-sixteenth century. However, just as some sought to restore the gentry to its normative greatness, Zhang sought to do the same for the state. His standard, in fact, was the early Ming government of Zhu Yuanzhang, and centralized authority and discipline thus became his watchwords. It may be hypothesized that Zhang, like every other concerned person in the sixteenth century, simply assimilated the point of view fate chose for him during those decades. For example, whereas coastal piracy persuaded Meskill’s non–degree-holding Songjiang gentlemen to write the state off, the Mongol raid on Beijing in 1550 convinced Zhang Juzheng, then serving as an official there, to come to the state’s rescue. Still, this hypothesis cannot account for the fact that not every official in Beijing in 1550 reacted with Zhang’s statist fervor. It might also be pointed out that Zhang came from an old military family, greatly declined in fortune, with no previous scholarly achievement. Perhaps his infiltration of the scholarly elite was personally awkward, and perhaps this unease caused him to find comfort in Legalist texts promising revenge on the type of smug scholar with whom he found himself in competition. The problem with this line of reasoning, though, is that similarly obscure beginnings would lead other young men to aspire even more self-consciously to a gentry identity and Confucian values. In the end, there is really no avoiding the conclusion that Zhang’s statist outlook
26
State versus Gentry—Ming Dynasty China
was determined chiefly by his subjective temperament, rather than by any formative event or other objective factor.36 If subjectivity is an unsatisfying explanation for historical phenomena, it should be remembered that subjectivity was an especially important characteristic of Ming intellectual life, after Wang Yangming (1472–1529), the dynasty’s most eminent and influential philosopher, emphasized the role of private intuition in the search for truth. While this development might seem to have heralded a revolution in Chinese thought, Ray Huang suggested that the rather unprogressive effect of this innovation was simply to individualize each thinker’s path to the Confucian truths he was eventually supposed to believe anyway. At the same time, Crawford has surmised that Yangming subjectivism might also have opened the door for nominal Confucians like Zhang Juzheng to rediscover Legalist authoritarianism. In either case, the philosophy of Wang Yangming, by encouraging the formation of personalized, often fundamentalist beliefs, may indeed have contributed to the resumed dispute between Confucianism and Legalism, as well as added to its fratricidal ferocity.37 As the Confucian reformists were attempting to advance and protect the gentry interest, as it were, from the bottom up, Gao Gong and Zhang Juzheng were contemplating the reform of the gentry from the top down. One of their two chief goals, as they led the government during the Longqing reign (1567–1572), was to rationalize the bureaucracy, making it more responsive to central control than to local influences. Gao Gong was concerned that bureaucratic postings had become little better than sinecures. “When the country (guojia) employs someone,” he declared, “it is with the expectation that he will assist the government. Giving out official salaries is not like slopping the farm animals.” Zhang Juzheng, writing with a more heroic (and Legalistic) air, complained, “Everyone is talking about real responsibility, but without a clear reward and punishment system for encouragement, who is going to risk life and hardship for the country (guojia)?” Zhang’s remarks allude to the idea of bureaucratic performance evaluations by which he hoped (and would succeed in doing, after 1572) to improve government efficiency. The grand secretaries’ other major policy objective was to stabilize the frontiers, against both the Mongols in the north and the Sino-Japanese pirates in the south. To this end, they promoted and protected two fighting generals, Qi Jiguang (1528–1587) and Yin Zhengmao (1513–1592), though the solution to the Mongol problem was mostly diplomatic.38
Introduction
27
The junior partner in these Longqing reforms, Zhang Juzheng, was clearly more eager than his boss, Gao Gong, and his writings from this time, furthermore, betray a palpable self-importance and combativeness. In a letter of encouragement to General Yin (who was the target of frequent criticism), Zhang wrote, “People these days haven’t the brains to go beyond the prevailing trend. They just love to join in controversies. Like jealous prostitutes, they rush to embrace the opinion of the unthinking mob, mindful only of personal benefit (si) and ignoring the effect on the country (guojia).” Fortunately, Zhang’s own resolve, as well as his selfless patriotism, would save the day, as he went on: My policies were completely at odds with universal opinion, and yet, all alone, I acted as was necessary for the task at hand. His Majesty adopted my measures, and fortunately, they were both timely and successful. Meanwhile, the dissenters were still bent on sabotage and obstruction, to further their selfish (si) goals. Alas! For us ministers laboring faithfully for the country (guojia)—that it should come to this!39
Referring in another letter to opposition to the peace initiative with the Mongols, Zhang continued to use two of his favorite words, gong and si, to point to the public spirit embodied by himself and the treasonable selfishness of all who were against him. “They think only of the injury to their private (si) families and forget the benefit to the public (gong) weal,” he said. “In wanting to let slip this opportunity, they are not thinking of their country (guojia). In my view, they are not only disloyal but also unintelligent in the extreme.”40 In yet another letter, Zhang took sole credit for the peace with the Mongols, and he invested the controversy with a definite historical and philosophical context: I burdened not a single officer. I deployed not a single soldier. I merely sat back and was rewarded, for Heaven was with me. What a pity that people should take the tone of the Song Confucianists (Song ru) and gladden their own hearts with the sound of each other’s voices, like a bevy of cawing crows. Their clamorous bickering gives me a feeling akin to vertigo.41
Plainly, Zhang Juzheng saw himself as the protagonist in an epic struggle to save the Ming from garrulous Song Confucianists (or Neo-Confucianists), and he fancied that Heaven itself was on his
28
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side. Perhaps he was right. The Longqing emperor died on July 5, 1572, and the deceased monarch’s favorite, Gao Gong, who lacked Zhang’s political savvy as well as his zeal, alienated chief eunuch Fang Bao (1530–1582) and so was forced into retirement. Zhang thus emerged as senior grand secretary, a uniquely powerful position, especially considering that the new Wanli emperor was an eight-year-old boy (for whom Zhang continued to act as guardian). Zhang, the self-supposing hero, finally found himself with tremendous power.42 Although Zhang Juzheng has the reputation of being a reformer, his true historical significance derives not from his initiating new reforms but from his centralization of existing reforms, and that is why the narrative of this book begins in 1572, the year of Zhang’s ascension to power. It was Zhang Juzheng, in fact, who turned reform on itself, and the elite with it, by positing a different reforming agency, the state, in place of the prevailing agency of the gentry. This subtle distinction— the question of agency—ignited the new struggle for sovereignty. Zhang’s ten-year hold on power was the first of six alternating regimes (or subregimes, since they tended to be shorter than the reigns of the various emperors), in which either the Legalist idea of the sovereignty of the state or the Confucian idea of the sovereignty of the gentry prevailed. These alternating ideological regimes have suggested the chapter organization for this book, the synopsis of which is as follows: Chapter I—Zhang Juzheng, 1572–1582: Ruling as de facto prime minister during the minority of the Wanli emperor, Zhang endeavors to subordinate the gentry to the state. His efforts are mostly symbolic, and his actual policies differ little in substance from initiatives heretofore popular among the gentry themselves, but they are provocative enough to incite a permanent opposition, which survives Zhang’s natural death in 1582. Chapter II—The Righteous Circles, 1582–1596: The anti-Zhang opposition, led by the Neo-Confucian scholar Gu Xiancheng (1550–1612), achieves Zhang’s posthumous disgrace and demolishes the remnants of his political machine. Augmenting their bureaucratic representation, Gu’s righteous elements engage in numerous controversies, often challenging the authority of the emperor, in order to prevent any subsequent reappearance of an activist centralizing regime. The state’s control over the countryside, accordingly, grows weaker. Chapter III—The Wanli Emperor, 1596–1606: Alarmed by fiscal insufficiency and by the unresponsiveness of the righteousdominated bureaucracy, the Wanli emperor launches an unprecedented
Introduction
29
economic and political attack on the gentry. He dispatches eunuch-led “mine tax commissioners” into the countryside, ostensibly to open silver mines, but actually to extort wealth from the gentry, even as he undermines the gentry’s political power in the bureaucracy. Violent protests and the commissioners’ own tendency toward embezzlement compel Wanli to abandon the policy. Chapter IV—The Donglin Faction, 1606–1626: Using the Neo-Confucian Donglin Academy as his base and Mencius as his guide, Gu Xiancheng seeks to unite the gentry class and rule China through it. Gu’s clumsy cooperation with the ambitious politician Li Sancai (d. 1623) illustrates the difficulty in applying philosophy to politics and creates bitter opposition to the Donglin in the bureaucracy. As the Donglin pursue their obstructionist tactics in the bureaucracy, gentry tax evasion in the countryside grows out of control. Chapter V—Wei Zhongxian, 1626–1628: Targets of Donglin purges organize under the protection of the court eunuch Wei Zhongxian (1568–1628). Although excoriated by posterity for its violent suppression of the Donglin group (which it often identifies as “gentry”), Wei’s faction of self-styled patriots provides reasonably competent administration, even in the face of the growing frontier problem in Manchuria. The regime perishes shortly after the death of the Tianqi emperor (r. 1620–1627). Chapter VI—The Restoration Society, 1628–1644: As the Chongzhen emperor (r. 1627–1644) calls for unity, Zhang Pu (1602– 1641) and Zhang Cai (1596–1648) organize a complex federation of scholars called the Restoration Society, which attempts to dominate and neutralize the bureaucracy, leaving the country to be run locally by the gentry. With the fiscal situation unimproved, more voices complain of gentry recalcitrance, while the Restoration Society members accuse the state of avarice. Higher taxes, levied by the state and evaded by the gentry, lead to popular uprisings, which destroy the dynasty. Many Restoration Society members appear to sacrifice themselves for the Ming lost cause, but this heroism is in itself yet another claim of sovereignty. It is hoped that this narrative, describing the six alternating phases of ascendancy of two philosophically demarcated factions, might lend some much-needed structure to the history of late Ming faction, which often appears as a formless, chaotic melee. A better understanding of late Ming faction might, in turn, shed some more light on the general subject of Ming decline. The issue of sovereignty, finally, has an obvious appeal, transcending the Ming dynasty and China as well.
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CHAPTER 1
ZHANG JUZHENG, 1572–1582
Z
hang Juzheng became the most powerful man in China on August 4, 1572. On that date, he began to direct affairs of state on behalf of Zhu Yijun (1563–1620), also known as the Wanli emperor, who was then only a boy. This rather unusual political arrangement lasted about ten years and turned out to be momentous enough to merit its own special phrase in Chinese historiography, Jiangling bingzheng, which best translates as “Zhang Juzheng’s administration.” The single-minded purpose of Zhang’s administration, in the words of Ming dynasty survivor and chronicler Tan Qian (1594–1658), was “to build respect for the sovereign power” (zhuan zun zhuquan).1 It is hard to determine precisely how Zhang himself had acquired the respect for the sovereign power (meaning, specifically, the state’s sovereign power) that he was so eager to impose on his peers, for his background and early career were largely indistinguishable from theirs. Like many of them, Zhang had climbed from humble origins by immersing himself in the Confucian classics and passing a series of civil service examinations based on their contents. As an ambitious young official in Beijing, Zhang was said to have shunned literary gatherings and parties and to have focused instead on dynastic histories and practical statecraft, but neither his ambition nor his pragmatism radically set him apart from his colleagues. He had expressed indignation at the Mongol raid on Beijing in 1550, but this indignation, too, must have been quite common. Pleading illness, he left his post in Beijing and returned to his ancestral home county of Jiangling in Huguang province (in what is now Hubei province). There, he might have continued to follow the example of many of his contemporaries, by abandoning his official career and living the life of a country gentleman.2 At this point, however, Zhang’s course diverged from such a path, for he did not evidently see himself as a country gentleman but rather as an officer of the state. He soon made his way back to Beijing and
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remained there until reaching his position of supremacy. Although Zhang later claimed that selfless patriotism fueled his determination, his rise owed as much to his political skill as to anything else. Making effective use of the timely retreat, he was able to keep a low profile while more powerful senior ministers destroyed each other and themselves. With the last of his superiors, Gao Gong, out of the picture in that summer of 1572, Zhang had emerged as the government’s first grand secretary, a position, though only semiofficial, that gave him a commanding access to the young Wanli.3 On August 23, 1572, Zhang had the young emperor issue a “warning edict” (jie yu), directed at China’s bureaucracy. It was full of references to gong and si, or public and private interests, with the implication that officialdom had become demoralized and had forsaken the former in favor of the latter. “From now on,” the edict read, “you will be pure in your hearts and scrupulous in your work. You will not harbor private (si) designs and deceive your sovereign . . . You will not complicate debates and disconcert the government.” The edict further suggested that good government would prevail as long as top ministers were resolute in the administration of the empire and the more minor officials were selflessly devoted to the public (gong). Following the release of this warning edict, Tan Qian noted, the various officials became “very guarded and circumspect.”4 Thisalertstatelastedaboutayear,asZhangconsolidatedhispositionand continuedtostabilizethefrontier,buttheothershoefinallydroppedonJuly 26, 1573, when the First Grand Secretary promulgated new rules designed to restore discipline and improve bureaucratic performance. The Regulation for Evaluating Achievements (kao cheng fa) was the administrative centerpiece of Zhang’s regime. It simply assigned time limits for following government directives and made officials responsible for any lapses. Such a reform was necessary, because government in sixteenth century China was often little more than a formality, a circulation of memoranda throughout the empire, with no follow-up. “In the affairs of the Empire,” Zhang wrote in his request for the reform, “it is not difficult to erect laws, but it is difficult to see they are enforced.” With this new measure, Zhang was able to monitor bureaucratic efficiency and direct a more centralized administration. That the new rules were not themselves ignored attests to Zhang’s basic success in making the bureaucracy work for the state.5 Who else would the bureaucracy be working for? Zhang’s fears in this regard were outlined in a 1574 letter to Song Yiwang
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33
(a jinshi of 1547), who was a grand coordinator, or regional official, based in Yingtian prefecture (which includes the city of Nanjing), in the economic heart of the empire. Zhang’s letter was subtitled “On Equalizing Taxes and Succoring the People,” and in it, Zhang postulated that a “laxity” (guxi) or partiality of local officials toward powerful local interests was responsible for abuses in tax collection, which hurt both the common people and the Ming state. According to Zhang, the local officials watched while the “powerful and influential” (quan hao) dodged their own taxes, pocketed revenue while serving as tax farmers, concealed their property on tax registers, and seized land from defenseless neighbors—land that would become shielded from taxation, as the state’s revenue contracted yet further. The result of this malfeasance was that the fixed revenue quotas for each county were being deflected onto the poor, impoverishing them (and in extreme cases turning them to banditry) and yielding only arrears in place of revenue for the state. The task at hand was clear: “For every corrupt official we punish, the people in the villages will be that much freer from exploitation and will be able to remain peacefully right where they are.”6 According to Robert Crawford, the problem of “laxity” or leniency was one in which Zhang invested a great deal of historical import. Together with its positive counterpart, “firmness” (gang), it suggested a Legalist dynastic cycle, with firmness characterizing the vigorous, disciplined, first days of a dynasty, and leniency describing its lawless, demoralized final days. Obviously, laxity needed to be prevented at all costs, but the remedial firmness Zhang demanded— for local officials to be firm with local gentry—was conceptually a very tall order. In making this demand, Zhang ran into a significant stumbling block, namely, the dualistic nature of the Chinese elite.7 Just as the impromptu reforms of the mid-1500s suggested a false distinction between moral and economic gentry (see introduction), Zhang’s letter to Song Yiwang made a distinction between local officials and local gentry that was at best only technically or temporarily valid. Rather than representing two distinct groups or classes, local officials and local gentry were really members of the same social class at different stages of their careers. The most common road to success in imperial China, the road Zhang himself had followed up to a point, was to pass the civil service examinations, serve in a few bureaucratic posts, and then parlay the honor into local prestige and power in one’s home village. Even when employed as a local official, then, he was more likely to identify personally with the local gentry
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(who did, after all, share with him the same Confucian “examination culture”) than to conform to impersonal bureaucratic discipline (a conformity discouraged by that same culture). Furthermore, the prohibition against a local bureaucrat’s serving in his home area placed him in an alien environment where, if anything, he probably craved the familiar companionship of the elite even more; and since he was an outsider, his administrative effectiveness became rather dependant upon the gentry’s local influence. The natural and indispensable consultation and compromise between local officials and the local elite, therefore, would seem to render nearly meaningless any distinction between the two. The historian Wu Han made no such distinction, writing that the local official who alienated the local gentry, in fact, did so at great peril.8 In fact, it doesn’t seem that Zhang Juzheng himself was really able to separate the local officials from the local gentry after all, for, in the space of writing his 1574 letter to Song Yiwang, his focus, and his ire, seamlessly shifted from “lax” officials to the powerful local interests they failed to restrain. As he warmed to the subject, Zhang began to use phrases nearly identical in structure to those used by the Legalist Han Fei nearly two thousand years before, such as “Private families (si jia) are becoming daily richer, while the public house (gong shi, or the government) is daily poorer.” Elsewhere, he identified the ideal result of his policies as “Private interests (si men) being cut off, the public house (gong shi) will be strong.” Aside from reprising this explicit Legalist statement of the irreconcilable conflict between private (si) and public (gong) interests, Zhang invested the terms with an absolute moral quality, rendering gong the essence of a saintly public spiritedness and si close to pure treason. In fact, Zhang sought to canonize himself along these lines, saying, “In another time, a prime minister might feel no loyalty to the state (guojia) and instead indulge his desire for private gain (si) . . . Now, with our sovereign but a youth, I bear on my own shoulders the weight of all under Heaven. I will not spite the destruction of my own family, as long as I might benefit the state.”9
The Philosophical Conflict Was Zhang Juzheng aware that he was using Legalist language and adhering to the classical Legalist position? If he was, he could not have admitted it, since it was taboo to show anything but reverence for Confucius and Mencius, at least on the surface. Rather
Zhang Juzheng, 1572–1582
35
than defend his views explicitly as Legalism, in fact, he defended them as Confucianism, but he seems always to have had his fingers crossed when he did so. Early in his letter to Song Yiwang about equalizing the tax burden and succoring the people, he stated that Confucius himself put the adequate supply of food (and by extension, a functioning economy) at the top of his priorities for government. He also quoted another philosopher, Guanzi (seventh century BCE), to the effect that ritual and rightness (the Confucian concerns) were both born of wealth and plenty (the alleged Legalist ideals). Zhang’s focus on the economy and fiscal matters was therefore perfectly justifiable, on the highest Confucian authority. Then, unable to leave well enough alone, he added, provocatively, “Supposing Confucius were prime minister today . . . I’m afraid he would do no more than I.”10 The sense of philosophical discord became more ominous when Zhang unveiled his educational policy in a memorial to the throne during the summer of 1575. This rather extensive treatise was addressed to the problem of lax standards in the cultivation of talent by the empire’s education officials. It alleged that the bureaucracy’s recruitment system had deviated from its past practices of encouraging the pursuit of practical knowledge for the good of the country and was now used more commonly to advance cronies and establish scholarly networks. The solution Zhang proposed was a firming up of all regulations pertaining to the lowest-ranking members of the academic and professional hierarchy: the state-supported students known as shengyuan. Zhang wanted tightened restrictions on their selection, academic regimen, behavior, and political activity. Zhang was also concerned about shengyuan privileges, especially the partial exemption from taxation called youmian, which Zhang believed to lie at the heart of tax evasion. For this reason, Zhang was eager simply to control the aggregate numbers of shengyuan and thus close as many tax loopholes as possible. Education policy, therefore, had an economic coloring. The administrative language of the memorial was couched in terms of the earlier Regulation for Evaluating Achievements in that education officials were faced with demotion if they did not adhere actively to the guidelines put forth in Zhang’s memorial (which the emperor approved).11 It is important to note that, in principle, Zhang’s attempt to curb the shengyuan should have met with much approbation, for this class of petty elite seemed to be almost universally disliked. The writings of the theoretician Wang Wenlu (1503–1586), for example, contained the basic idea of shengyuan control. He felt that education officers
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State versus Gentry—Ming Dynasty China
in charge of the examination system should try to develop “true” shengyuan (as well as other degree holders), and he warned these officers in general that they should be careful and discriminating in selecting talent. A passionate advocate of tax reform, Wang was also conscious that the shengyuan were abusers of the youmian tax exemption, and he urged that local tax officials keep the shengyuan within the limits of their actual privileges. While he might have put two and two together and concluded that the simple reduction of the numbers of shengyuan would reduce youmian, Wang seems to have been more concerned with regulating their moral quality. A few generations later, though, the Ming survivor Gu Yanwu (1613–1682) did object to the superabundance of shengyuan, and he was able to make the connection between their numbers and the resulting disruption of the political economy. He said that the bulk of the shengyuan were hopelessly untalented, and they were unwilling to be productively employed in any case, taking their privileges simply as a practical advantage for themselves and their families. The system, Gu concluded, was corrupted beyond recognition and should have been abolished and replaced with another method of recruiting talent.12 So given the support that certainly existed for reform of the shengyuan system, it is a bit ironic that Zhang Juzheng’s proposals were rather unpopular. Tan Qian, after encapsulating Zhang’s suggestions in his dynastic chronicle, pronounced this policy to be a serious lapse in Zhang’s otherwise sensible and respectable effort to instill discipline and practical knowledge. As soon as it became known that the path of political, social, and economic advancement was being drastically narrowed, there was an empire-wide howl of indignation, and even young boys were filled with disappointment and resentment. Why was Zhang (as Tan summarized public opinion) so anxious to weed out talent when he should have been cultivating more of it? Apparently, attitudes concerning the shengyuan were rather conflicted, as many individuals seemed now to be taking sides with them and against Zhang. The chorus continued to carp on this theme as a reservoir of scorn began to accumulate.13 The problem was that Zhang seemed, in ways that must have appeared gratuitously jarring to some practitioners of Confucian statecraft, to link his education policy to the idea of loyalty to the state. While Confucian scholars would no doubt profess to be against nepotism in the recruitment of students, they probably would not have invested it with treasonable intent as Zhang did,
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37
when he accused overly generous education officials of being “willing to resist the edicts of the Court but unwilling to resist peer pressure, willing to violate the laws of the government (gong jia) but unwilling to refuse a private (si men) request.” Later in Zhang’s memorial, he referred specifically to retired or off-duty officials residing in the countryside (xianghuan), warning them against interfering in lowlevel exams so as to yield a favorable outcome for their progeny and extended families. Surrounded by all these fighting words, Zhang’s attack on youmian tax exemptions may have been read as a declaration of economic war thrown into the bargain. Finally, when Zhang moved to prohibit the establishment of private academies (shuyuan), it must have seemed that Zhang was trying to discourage country scholars from organizing politically—which he was. In sum, Zhang Juzheng’s 1575 education program, while containing nothing intrinsically inimical to the Confucian agenda, was, as he framed it, extremely offensive.14 Likewise, Zhang Juzheng created discord even while proposing—and what could be more Confucian?—tax relief. Far from being a tax-hungry minister, Zhang tried rather to limit the state’s expenditures as much as possible, and he truly wanted to lessen the tax burden on the common people. Again, however, style trumped substance, and benevolent policies became in Zhang’s hands frightening schemes. In a memorial of July 31, 1576, Zhang repeated the adage from the Confucian classic known as the Book of Documents (Shu jing) that the people were the foundation of the state. He next asserted that it was a large part of a local official’s responsibility—as a representative of the state—to remain sensitive to the needs of the people and keep them from hardship. Then, with a sweep of his ministerial hand, he urged that most of the accumulated tax arrears dating back to the end of the emperor Jiajing’s reign be summarily waived. The Heavenly gallery of antitax statesmen going back to Confucius and Mencius would surely have smiled down on Zhang, and the political world of 1576 would have greeted Zhang’s benevolence with universal acclaim—had not Zhang gone on in his peculiar fashion and made a few additional remarks. Zhang made it quite clear that he was not trying to make Confucian advocates of low taxes happy, and he really was not even trying to make the people happy for their own sake alone. He was only trying to make them happy with the state. Furthermore, he seemed to be engaged rather obviously in damage control, trying to counteract one unfortunate consequence of his own Regulation for
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Evaluating Achievements, namely, that local officials, fearful of the new discipline if they proved ineffectual at collecting current or past tax quotas, were going about tax collection somewhat too energetically, so that Zhang was afraid the people would think the state too grasping. Using the terms above (shang) and below (xia) to refer to (and to emphasize the proper relationship between) the throne and the people, Zhang explained: It is a matter of the people’s responsibility to submit their taxes to the Emperor. It is a matter of the Emperor’s grace if he should feel pity for the people’s suffering and grant a tax amnesty. And as for that portion of the revenue that cannot simply be waived, if the Emperor should condescend to obtain it from another source, then that is grace within grace. Today there are still some people who do not understand gratitude and harbor resentment against the Emperor, and that is simply the fault of local officials who do not carry out the Emperor’s gracious intentions. Furthermore, the ignorant also do not understand that by paying their taxes to the Emperor, they are benefiting themselves.15
And how were the good people of China enjoying the benefits of paying taxes? In a letter written sometime during 1576, nearly contemporary with his memorial recommending such imperious charity, Zhang wrote again to the regional official Song Yiwang, saying that he believed the latter’s efforts to equalize the tax burden were starting to have some effect on alleviating the local people’s hardship. A note of impatience, however, was becoming discernable through this encouragement. Song had indeed harmonized the relations between gong and si (public and private) when he could, and his recent effort to reform a particularly burdensome tax paid in cloth, for example, was especially praiseworthy. And yet somehow, the decisive blow against fiscal abuses had yet to fall. Zhang singled out the youmian tax exemption for shengyuan and higher academic degree holders as the key issue, for youmian led to a phenomenon known as toukao, in which crafty or desperate people sought tax protection under exempted scholar-gentry. The abuse of youmian, then, was the origin of the vicious cycle by which the state was forced to seek its revenue only from the poor. Telling Song how to do his job, Zhang wrote, “When you investigate youmian, the problem of toukao will naturally ease; and then when toukao declines, the tax burden will naturally become more evenly distributed. We have exhausted all talk on the subject . . . It is time for you to submit the appropriate memorials and then move forward with your proposals.”16
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Zhang soon tried to take back these harsh words by redirecting his anger at Song’s constituency. Song was grand coordinator of the southern prefectures that together comprised the region known as “Jiangnan,” meaning “south of the (Yangzi) River.” The Ming state depended on Jiangnan for much of its revenue, but the area was also home to many of China’s wealthiest, and most powerful, families. Maybe, therefore, it wasn’t Song’s fault that the region was slow to be fiscally pacified. Zhang wrote Song again in 1576, on the subject of Song’s frustrating jurisdiction, saying, “The gentry (shifu) . . . do not pay their taxes.” Song’s constituents were in fact “the most unprincipled in the empire,” and Jiangnan was the “land of devils” (gui guo). The place was almost ungovernable, for “the orders of the Court have no force there,” and Zhang felt certain that future crises affecting the Ming state would emanate from Jiangnan. The only thing Song could do was to keep to the righteous path and do his best.17 Song Yiwang, however, had completed his assignment in the land of devils. On November 12, 1576, he was promoted to another post. Three days later, he was replaced by Hu Zhili.18 Independent evaluation of Song Yiwang’s performance may help explain Zhang Juzheng’s frustration. A local history of Zhenjiang, one of the prefectures under Song’s jurisdiction, painted a bleak picture of conditions before Song’s arrival. “Powerful families became adept at concealing their holdings,” reads one passage, “with the result that the rich had land but paid no taxes and the poor paid taxes but had no land.” In 1575, though, Grand Coordinator Song managed to ascertain each landholder’s total acreage and levied thereon a universal land tax, prorating onto it the various regressive head taxes that had hitherto oppressed the poor. This procedure was the essence of the Single Whip reform (see introduction).19 Equalizing the tax burden was exactly what Zhang wanted Song to do, and incorporating regressive head taxes into a universal land tax amounted to a curbing of youmian privilege (since youmian granted exemption only to the former), which was also in perfect conformity with Zhang’s wishes. Apparently, however, what the Grand Coordinator did was not as important as how he did it. Song Yiwang, while equalizing taxes and stimulating revenue, had done so without the glorious frontal assault on the gentry that Zhang was really spoiling for. According to a contemporary tribute, Song did encounter some opposition to his local tax reform effort at first, but the powerful families (hao jia) apparently respected him, and on the strength of this respect, they no longer insisted on the right to avoid
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paying their entire tax. Escaping a portion of it was good enough. Song Yiwang, in other words, had relied on the Confucian art of moral suasion, developing his tax reforms in consultation with the powerful families in his jurisdiction. Compromising with the gentry, while an inevitable part of the modus operandi for any local official, was for Zhang a sign of “laxity,” the dangers of which he had already explained to Song. While Zhang should have been happy that more gentry were paying more taxes, he positively hated the fact that they had merely condescended, and had not been compelled, to do so. In no small part, then, the reforms in Song Yiwang’s jurisdiction had come “from the gentry,” and the forfeiture of the state’s sovereignty implied by this prepositional phrase was, in Zhang’s eyes, abominable.20 The condescending gentry of Jiangnan still having possession of the field, Zhang’s attitude toward them developed into an even more palpable bigotry. In 1577, Zhang wrote to Hu Zhili, the new grand coordinator, a letter subtitled “Strict Control Is Loving Kindness.” “Strict control” (yan zhi) was Zhang’s antidote for “laxity,” but whatever loving kindness might have informed Zhang’s advocacy of strictness, it seems in this letter to have been superseded by personal resentment. He called the Jiangnan elite “these people” (shi ren), and opined that they simply did not understand their own interests. The state was their only protector from banditry. All they had to do was to render to the state some small hundredth part of their wealth, and they could continue to enjoy undisturbed the sizable hoard that remained. Alluding directly to an adage from Han Fei, Zhang said that a good mother was not squeamish about lancing her son’s boils. If the people of Jiangnan would, like the wise mother’s child, submit to a little pain, they would enjoy lasting health and happiness. It was meanwhile up to Mr. Hu, as the new grand coordinator, to apply the lance.21
The Duoqing Controversy Unfortunately, “these people” regarded Zhang Juzheng with as much suspicion as he regarded them, and the opportunity now came for them to put Zhang on the defensive. On November 5, 1577, Zhang Juzheng learned that his father, Zhang Wenming, had passed away at the ancestral home in Jiangling. This sad event quickly became a political powder keg, owing to the ritual peculiarities of Ming customs. In case of the death of an official’s mother or father, he was generally expected to take leave of his post, return home, and
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observe a three-year mourning period. Some exceptions to this rule were permitted, especially if a higher official was expressly retained by the emperor to deal with some special crisis. In Zhang’s case, while he does not appear to have wanted to return home, he did not go so far as to compel the fifteen-year-old emperor to order him to stay. Instead, he dutifully and repeatedly requested leave to go, biding his time until, at length, the emperor, as well as the other grand secretaries, began to press him to stay. To remain at one’s post without following the usual morning ritual was known as duoqing, or “putting aside one’s feelings,” and this name came to denote the major political crisis of the Zhang Juzheng administration.22 The motion against Zhang Juzheng evolved gradually, beginning as a series of friendly suggestions to return home and developing into bitter acrimony and revealing caricature. One of the attacks of the latter description was launched by a man named Ai Mu, who said, “Juzheng lacks the public spirit and cleverness of Shang Yang, though he has Shang’s cruelty; and he lacks both the theoretical and practical ability of Wang Anshi, though he is as controlling.” Shang Yang was one of the founding fathers of Legalism, and Wang Anshi was the ultrastatist reformer of the famously factious Song dynasty. In this one short sentence, Ai Mu recalled China’s ancient political divide and identified Zhang not merely as a political opponent under the present circumstances but as a representative of the rival political tradition since antiquity. Zhang was not just an enemy; he was the enemy.23 The promising young scholar Zou Yuanbiao (1551–1624) also went way beyond the question of duoqing to complain about Zhang’s shengyuan policy, and then he added the seemingly gratuitous remark that Zhang’s academic views were biased, which pointed to more fundamental differences between Zhang and his opposition. The First Grand Secretary dealt with this criticism in ways that justified it: he repressed the dissent harshly and violently, just as a stereotypically cruel Legalist would. A group including Zou Yuanbiao was flogged in court, and more were dismissed from official service. In an escalating chain reaction, people pleading for justice on behalf of those already punished were themselves punished. The most noteworthy sort of this latter group of martyrs were in fact shengyuan themselves, who traveled about the southern provinces denouncing Zhang. Two of them were arrested and taken to Nanjing by officials eager to curry favor with Zhang. With Zhang’s apparent approval, the shengyuan were tortured to death.24
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With the opposition taking shape in the crucible of beatings, dismissal, and exile, Zhang’s sympathizers also justified their position in terms of historical antecedents and philosophical antagonisms. During the continuing unfolding of duoqing, Minister of Works Li Youzi found himself being lectured by a court compiler on how it was only proper for a junior minister (Li) to persuade his senior minister (Zhang) to do the right thing and return home to mourn his father. Li dismissed this learned rebuke by saying, “Song Confucianist pedantry (Song ru yu lun)! This is why the Song could not last. The sagely thing now is if Zhang does not return home.” The ease with which the antagonists in the duoqing affair identified a dichotomous philosophical dynamic is quite remarkable. They seem almost to have been following a script, as though they were players in a well-known political thriller in which the “mean Shang Yangs” were fighting the “pedantic Song Confucianists.” All these assigned roles, as they seem to have known, were drawn from China’s long history of disputed sovereignty.25
Eviction of the Lian Hu Squatters Meanwhile, as the philosophical battle between Shang Yang’s statists and pedantic Song Confucianist (or Neo-Confucianist) gentlemen was being reprised in the capital, a real battle was taking place in the vicinity of Lian Hu, or the “lake for drilling troops,” in Danyang county, Zhenjiang prefecture (in the Jiangnan region). In 1576, two successive regional inspectors (xun an) memorialized to explain that the lake was the scene of a serious conflict of interests. As the inspectors recounted, the government was accustomed to use Lian Hu as a reliable reservoir of water that could be channeled into the nearby Grand Canal to aid transportation of official grain shipments during dry weather. Otherwise, the Lian Hu reservoir was used to irrigate fields nearby. Recently, however, powerful families had moved their tenant farmers into dried out portions of the lake, damming up feeder streams to keep their fertile new lands from becoming reflooded. These powerful families apparently had enough political influence to advance the argument that they were opening up new farmland and thus enlarging the government’s tax base, but the regional inspectors were unconvinced. These officials maintained that the inconvenience to grain transport far outweighed any benefit of new cultivation, which could be found just as conveniently elsewhere in the county. They moved that the lake be dredged and
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refilled, and the next year, 1577, a censor named Lin Yingxun was ordered to move forward with these projects, as part of a general Grand Canal renovation.26 When Lin Yingxun arrived on the scene, he was himself deluged by a flock of petitioners who had long complained about the local strongmen and their land grabbing in Lian Hu. Mr. Lin thereupon summoned up the prerequisite righteous indignation and took the case in hand. Perhaps acting under the authority of grand coordinator Hu Zhili, who had memorialized on August 9, 1577 that the Lian Hu tenants be removed, Lin ordered the local officials to draft several thousand deputies, and he put these men to work demolishing the illegal dikes and embankments, thus effecting the eviction of the squatters. Lin went on to imprison the former landlords until they in effect bailed themselves out of jail by remitting to the government the equivalent of their ill-gotten rents, though some apparently died in prison. This repatriated (or restolen) wealth was applied toward the costs of the larger Grand Canal renovation project, so that the latter did not represent any additional burden on the national treasury or the taxpayers. Despite the tremendous obstacles stemming from the project’s powerful enemies, the work was started on April 26, 1578 and completed exactly one month later.27 As might be imagined, Lin Yingxun’s aggressive (and economical) performance at Lian Hu endeared him splendidly to Zhang Juzheng. Sometime in 1578, Zhang wrote Lin a gushing letter of support. He said, “I am unaware of anyone engaged in such work as dedicated and conscientious as you have been recently. You have my greatest respect! You have my greatest encouragement!” What is most noteworthy about Zhang’s response to the Lian Hu evictions, however, is its strange blend of combativeness and self-pity. Zhang might have focused on the positive, noting that the lake restoration had necessitated no new taxes. He might, then, have claimed happily that the results had benefited the state and the people equally, perhaps using the words “zu guo yu min” (sufficiency for the state and plenty for the people), a phrase he employed on other occasions. Lin Yingxun had, after all, used his public office for the benefit of the many private citizens who had complained about the squatters, so both public and private seemed to be winners. Instead, however, Zhang took the opportunity only to reemphasize the conflict between public and private, veritably reeking with the zero-sum logic of the Legalists. “That which benefits the public (gong) will certainly not benefit the private (si),” he said, capturing
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this logic in the starkest possible terms. Zhang assumed that Lin’s actions would elicit not gratitude but complaint and calumny, and in this assumption, it is quite clear that he was projecting his own experience onto Lin. After a few sentences, in fact, Zhang gave up encouraging Lin and began praising himself. The passage is worth studying in its entirety. That which benefits the public will certainly not benefit the private. It is inevitable that the level of discontent will rise. What need is there to fear criticism, though, with our enlightened sovereign on the throne, promulgating the law to rule our land, rewarding merit and punishing malfeasance, in accord with Heaven’s will? For several years now, more than a few complaints have been circulating about me. Evil people have formed vicious factions, attacking me indirectly via their henchmen. When have they ever let up? I have in any case resolved to put the state before my own family, as well as everything else. Though the path ahead be strewn with snares and a million arrows be pointed at me, I am not afraid.28
In Zhang’s mind, duoqing and Lian Hu were parts of the same battle. The pedantic critics in the capital were the same enemy as the brazen strongmen in the lakebed. Moreover, even as he ruled China through the young emperor, and even as his man Lin Yingxun evicted and imprisoned the Lian Hu trespassers, Zhang saw himself as the underdog.
Zhang’s Land Survey Perhaps Zhang was daunted by the next task he had set for himself, something that had not been attempted since 1393 and that would define the success or failure of his regime: a general cadastral survey. Toward the end of 1577, Beijing ordered local officials to “measure the lands of the whole empire.” This ambitious policy’s rationale was that the total reported acreage in the empire had declined since the earlier survey and was continuing to fall every year. The cause, of course, was the concealing of holdings by powerful people (hao min), which had left poor peasants with most of the tax burden. The land survey was intended to uncover these concealed holdings and thus equalize taxes, undertaking formally and on a national scale what had been tried informally in selected areas, such as in Jiangnan, during the regional administration of Song Yiwang. The next year, Zhang
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issued a supplementary order, this one following the pattern of the Regulation for Evaluating Achievements by giving a three-year limit for the survey’s completion.29 Since it would take three years for the cadastral survey to be completed, Zhang had plenty of time to worry about the fiscal crisis that the survey was supposed to alleviate. On April 19, 1578, the Ministry of Revenue memorialized with some budgetary figures. The army, it was stated, needed about 2.6 million taels of silver a year, and the salaries of the various officials in the capital took another seven or eight hundred thousand. The writer claimed that revenue was (barely) sufficient but was still adamant that the meager surplus was unacceptable. He applied to silver the ancient truism that a full nine years worth of stored grain in the imperial granaries was necessary to provide for the unforeseen, and he insisted that the present arrangement fell far short of this standard.30 If anything, Zhang himself was even less sanguine and was convinced that China was flirting with genuine fiscal imbalance. On April 18, 1579, Zhang memorialized the throne and compared income and outgoes, as per table 1.1. Although more and more of the state’s revenue was being commuted to silver, as part of the continuing Single Whip reform, Zhang was in no way referring here to the entire budget, which was still computed mostly in kind, not as silver. As a frame of reference, Ray Huang estimated that the average yearly revenue for the Ming was about 26.6 million piculs (shi) of grain, which was worth about 21 million taels of silver. However the revenue was being measured, Zhang claimed that the people were too exhausted to sustain any additional extractions and recommended instead simple frugality on the part of officials at all levels of government. He moved also that the emperor waive yet more arrears, as humane statecraft dictated. While Zhang said nothing about increasing revenue, his land survey, then in progress, was quietly extended to the ancestral lands Table 1.1
Table of Revenue versus Expenditure, 1577–1578 (Taels)31
Year
Revenue (Taels)
Expenditure (Taels)
1577 1578
4,359,400 3,559,800
3,494,200 3,888,400
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of the imperial family and meritorious officials a few months later, on July 10, 1579.32 This book is not a fiscal history, but the competition for economic resources between the state and the gentry was an important component of their overall struggle for sovereignty. What sovereignty, after all, could be more significant than the sovereignty over wealth? Although the state claimed this sovereignty every time it collected taxes, the gentry denied this claim every time they evaded taxes. The fiscal statistics that appear occasionally in this book, therefore, are simply intended to provide a very abstract picture of whether or not the state’s claim to revenue was respected by the gentry—or the gentry’s claim to wealth was respected by the state—at any given time. It needs to be emphasized, however, that even when revenue questions were at stake, state and gentry were not so much fighting for wealth as they were fighting for the right to manage it. As has been shown, Zhang Juzheng was perfectly willing to waive taxes, as long as it was clear that the state, and not the gentry, had the authority to do so. The issue was symbolic, not economic; but it was, in any case, played out in the realm of fiscal policy, and it would remain a constant theme in the prolonged conflict of 1572–1644. As far as Zhang Juzheng was concerned, establishing the state’s symbolic precedence in fiscal issues continued to be the prime directive in Jiangnan (a.k.a. the “land of devils”), where grand coordinator Hu Zhili, the man who had replaced Song Yiwang, was showing the same disappointing tendency toward leniency that Zhang had deplored in his predecessor. Hu seemed, in a very familiar way, to be ceding the state’s prerogatives to the gentry. Flooding in Jiangnan in 1579 had brought Hu under pressure (from the local gentry, officials in the capital, and other regional officials) to permit some sort of tax amnesty. In a letter, Zhang called upon Hu to ignore the pressure, assuring him that Beijing was watching the situation carefully and would authorize tax relief if necessary. In the meantime, Hu was to stick to his guns and beware of the “crafty ways of Wu,” an ancient name for Jiangnan.33 Soon, however, Hu admitted that he had requested a tax amnesty anyway. Zhang replied that the court was able to grant some but not all of the tax relief Hu had requested, and he proceeded to lecture Hu about how tax amnesties should work. Zhang maintained that tax amnesty was for the state to grant and for no one else even to discuss. If someone knew in advance of the court’s intention to allow a tax amnesty, they might use this information to usurp some of the public gratitude
Zhang Juzheng, 1572–1582
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the court expected for itself. Hu, in fact, had unwisely discussed the question of tax relief in public, causing the “gentry and commoners” (shimin) of “that place” to await the issue in anticipation. In the event, though, the court had been unable to offer as much tax relief as Hu and the local elite had projected, so that now, “beneficence will seem to be coming from those below (en chu yu xia), and complaint and dissatisfaction will be directed toward those above (yuan gui yu shang).” By ignoring the prepositional aspects of the situation, Hu had thus lost a crucial public relations battle. Zhang urged him to salvage the situation as best he could by carrying out the compromised tax amnesty while proclaiming the beneficent intentions of the emperor.34 By October 21, 1580, the land survey in Fujian province was completed, and the central government used the Fujian experience to promulgate survey guidelines for other provinces later that year. The most noteworthy of the guidelines called for harsh punishments to be handed to land grabbers and those who concealed their holdings. Otherwise, Zhang’s sights were set uncharacteristically low, for he directed that new surveys were necessary only in districts where registered acreage did not equal or exceed the reported totals from the beginning of the dynasty. For China in the 1580s to be trying to restore the tax base of the 1390s was very conservative indeed.35 The story of the implementation of the land survey on the local level reveals both sanguine and paltry expectations, as well as a wide range of results. The optimistic Jiao Hong (1541–1620), for example, felt that all the project needed for success was the right man with the right methods. To illustrate, he used the case of Duan Xu, who, as magistrate of Qi county in Kaifeng prefecture, Henan province, during an earlier attempt at tax equalization in the Jiajing reign, simply asked landowners to report their total acreage to him and to mark the boundaries of their fields with placards. Duan next subdivided the county into several smaller territories, representing the holdings of each landowner on a chart for each one. Armed with these charts, it was an easy matter to refer to a given family’s total holdings and thus compute its tax obligation. The goal of equalizing the tax burden for the whole county was thus reached. According to Jiao Hong’s account, Duan got the full cooperation of all the people in the county, including the landowners, who dutifully reported to him all their holdings. Roger Des Forges, who has studied Qi county, reports that Duan Xu encountered a bit more resistance from landowners than Jiao Hong saw fit to mention. Still, however, Duan was justly renowned as an effective reformer, and Qi county served as a model of tax equality for the surrounding
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area. It is thus easy to understand how Jiao Hong, with the example of magistrate Duan in his mind, would have imagined land surveying to be a relatively simple undertaking.36 At the other end of the spectrum was Fang Yang (1540–1583), prefect of Hangzhou in Zhejiang province. He seems to have been more skeptical of the land survey’s success than Jiao Hong was. In fact, Mr. Fang hoped to enlist the aid of the gods, perhaps figuring he needed all the help he could get. In his “Prayer to the City God on the Occasion of the Land Survey,” Fang candidly revealed what he thought he would be up against: From now on, the Spirit will find out anyone who dares to cheat the public cause (qi gong) and misuse the law, anyone who dares to disguise rich as poor, alter units of land measure, increase or reduce acreage amounts or tax rates, keep the poor in misery, or let the rich evade the law. The Spirit will strip them of their positions, ruin their farms and houses, disperse their families, and abolish their posterity. Conversely, all those who undertake the public good and maintain the laws, apply their full strength and spirit, are unafraid of bullies, and do not cheat the poor and distressed, all those who measure land accurately and apportion taxes fairly, all those who audit and adjust cases of untaxed land and tax without land . . . all who help make the state’s revenue collectable and the people’s livelihood sustainable, all these will be rightly known as good clerks, worthy gentry (shifu), or righteous commoners, as the case may be. The Spirit will be looking out for them as well.37
Now that his subordinate officials and clerks had the fear of gods in them, to what end did Fang propose to direct their efforts? The answer is contained in his “Instructions for Land Surveying,” which was also reprinted in Fang’s collected works. Although this document offers no supernatural content a la the prayer to the city god, it is in fact even more mysterious, since it reveals the supernatural complexity of the Ming tax system. What is quite certain, however, is that Fang’s goal was the restoration of the original land and tax levels, specifically those from the beginning of the dynasty. With this fourteenth century tax quota as the fixed objective, all that remained was to apportion it evenly to the sixteenth-century community, and this process was necessarily one of averaging, prorating, and abstraction, so that one wonders whether or not a true survey of anything really took place. Fang was anxious to see the tax burden
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redistributed fairly and evenly—if a bit haphazardly: at one point he advised, “If there is not enough land in one place, then there must be too much land in some other place. Use the overages to make up for the shortages.” Another regulation, ordering that the land occupied by public buildings be treated as taxable farmland, further testifies to the prevalence of abstracted accounting techniques. If there was any actual surveying at all, it must have been on the lowest possible level, where unofficial tax farmers were often in charge of taxation anyway. Even so, Fang made it a point to have tax rates inscribed for public inspection so that everyone could understand them (though what would happen if everybody paid taxes based on these rates, and the result was greater or less than the fixed quota?).38 Another account, this one from the heart of Jiangnan (Hangzhou, the jurisdiction of Fang Yang described above, is a little peripheral to Jiangnan), also suggests that creative accounting was used in the survey, and it also sheds light on the question of whether or not the survey would yield new revenue. A Zhou Xuanwei wrote: Zhang Juzheng, with his harsh methods, turned next to a survey of lands. He ordered that the regular officials of each sub-prefecture and county suspend their routine affairs and [without being assigned any temporary help] personally take to the fields, and there was none among the poor villagers who did not look up and stare. In the seven counties of my Suzhou prefecture, there were cases of raising the tax base by several ten thousands of acres; and some commoner families resorted to forging obituaries before their numbers were reassessed, just to escape having their taxes increased. Only in Taicang subprefecture, though, did the authorities really put any new land in the register that had never been taxed before. It was newly cleared acreage that, for purposes of generosity, had been treated as land occupied by the government, not to be taxed. The officials were in a dilemma: they wanted the additional revenue, but they didn’t want a windfall that would attract too much attention, relative to the other counties. They put the matter to a man of the local gentry (xiangshen), Mr. Wang Fengzhou, who suggested making a formal request to assess taxes on newly opened land at a special, lower rate. Then, the difference between the low rate and the normal rate could be prorated evenly as a tax reduction throughout the sub-prefecture, so that the owners of both new land and old land would benefit. Application was accordingly made to the supreme commander and grand coordinator and duly granted. Taicang’s tax rate thus dropped from 3 dou, 3 sheng per mu to 2 dou, 9 sheng. Hence, no other county
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State versus Gentry—Ming Dynasty China has yet to enjoy any benefit from the land survey. Only Taicang has been so fortunate.39
The effect of the land survey in Taicang subprefecture was thus an increase in acreage, balanced by a reduction in the tax rate. The equalization of the tax burden was indeed a stated goal of the tax survey (although usually such equalization was supposed to occur between rich and poor people, not old and new land); but even the most conservatively phrased advocacy of the land survey, with its modest objective of restoring original acreage, implied that revenue would likewise be brought up to previous levels. In Taicang, this increase in revenue was either moderated or negated, because the officials there would have been embarrassed by it. With help from a leader of the gentry, they counteracted the effects of “Zhang Juzheng’s harsh methods.” It is also apparent that officials in the nearby counties were either discovering or dreaming up new acreage and prorating the tax burden thereof onto the old tax base—at least the poor families. The only other conclusion to be made here concerns the tone and the bias of the account itself, which was obviously written from the perspective of the gentry. Protecting the poor was accomplished by deflecting the state’s attempt to raise revenue, not by making the rich pay their fair share. The fact that Zhang’s land survey was for the bulk of officialdom simply a sanction for more creative accounting indicates that even if local officials did in fact uncover more land, their basic relationship to the taxpayer was still indirect or nonexistent, and thus, their power to regulate the relationships between rich and poor was quite limited. An account by Zou Yuanbiao (who was flogged during the duoqing affair) tends to confirm the view that the land survey presented in some cases an opportunity for even greater exploitation. “The influential families (hao jia) are so much more powerful than the local officials,” Zou said, “that the latter are afraid of them and are easily moved to make concessions. They not only agree not to survey the large estates but also give their owners part of the additional revenue they derive from surveys in other areas.” If such gratuitous tribute payments (or refunds or other adjustments) were really being made, they meant that any recovered revenue the state was extracting from the poor was not actually being delivered to the state but was instead being transferred to the rich. The state’s land survey was thus being hijacked and perverted into a sort of charity in reverse, brokered by the state, which kept little or nothing. Zou’s general remark, that the
Zhang Juzheng, 1572–1582
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influential families were much stronger than local officials, spoke volumes.40 Did the land survey ever manage to hit the mark and recover hidden estates from the people who had actually hidden them? Some evidence answering this question in the affirmative comes from Shanxi province. According to the official record of the Shanxi survey (one of the few such sources still extant), a group of men led by a Zheng Jingfang was found by investigators to have concealed holdings totaling 5182 qing, which were reclaimed as taxable land by the government. It is not reported what happened to Mr. Zheng and the other perpetrators, though in theory, they could have been executed. In at least one county in Shanxi province, the survey procedure was designed to encourage the reregistration of concealed property. Initially, landholders were made to survey their own land and report the results to the local government, those revealing concealed holdings at that time escaping punishment. When these self-surveys were subsequently audited by a team of appointed local citizens and the magistrate, inconsistencies were supposed to warrant the death penalty. Furthermore, the newly registered lands in this particular county (Quwo county, in Pingyang prefecture) were taxed at the full rate, so that those honest (or unlucky) taxpayers who had been paying extra to make the regional quota were fully relieved of the additional burden of the tax evaders’ unpaid taxes. This scenario represented the true spirit of equalizing taxes.41 However, there is also evidence that Shanxi, too, was the scene of regressive prorating and continued immunity for the powerful that was more characteristic of Jiangnan. A Ding Yuanjian wrote in his Shanxi Diary (Shanxi riji) that local officials simply treated mountain land as arable farmland and apportioned the new, bogus acreage onto the current taxpayers. In the process, Ding noted explicitly, the rich were allowed to escape, and the poor ended up with the tax hike. 42 The last anecdote concerning Zhang Juzheng’s land survey comes from Li Le (Li Yue? [1532–1618]), who included the following passage in his notebook: When debating the merits of Zhang’s land survey, one really should not say Zhang was wrong. His intentions were good. It is just that the local officers who handled the matter were for the most part indiscriminate and ended up hurting the common people. If one wants to investigate excessive taxation . . . all one has to do is make
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State versus Gentry—Ming Dynasty China sure of the basic quota, and as long as a given place is making the quota, there is no need to measure anything. Not only was all the surveying a complete waste of energy, but powerful villains and great houses went rampant with various frauds, which the government surveyors and scribes merely served to formalize. How can all that be blamed on Zhang Juzheng?43
Martin Heijdra, citing Japanese studies, has asserted that Zhang Juzheng’s land survey was remarkably successful at generating “detailed landholding maps,” which set a new standard for accuracy and were used by local administrators for generations to come. This upbeat appraisal is quite uncorroborated by the preceding anecdotal evidence, with its repeated references to abstract measures and creative accounting. An additional frame of reference comes from Hilary Beattie, who has written about Tongcheng county, Anqing prefecture, Nanjing province, and has suggested that Zhang’s land survey there was a failure. Whatever the accuracy of the new land registers, their significance for fiscal operations would seem to have been limited, and if their impact on tax collection was limited, then the state had lost this important battle with the gentry. 44 Perhaps no one was more aware of this fact than Zhang Juzheng himself. As the project drew to a close in 1581–1582, the acreage registered by all the provinces totaled 7,013,976 qing. Although this figure was less than the 8,507,623 qing listed in the survey of 1393, it was more than the 4,238,058 qing in the books as of 1502. (According to the counterintuitive logic of the Ming dynasty, the effect of peace and prosperity was to decrease, not increase, the amount of officially registered acreage, owing to the concealment of landholdings by gentry already described, as well as to a difficulty in grading different qualities of land.) Zhang might, therefore, have congratulated himself for recording an additional three million qing, which, all things considered, was no mean feat. But these numbers were no cause for celebration, for the land survey brought Zhang no closer to his goal of breaking gentry power in the countryside. The gentry would continue to escape taxation, no matter how accurate the land registers were. 45 In the last major memorial of his life, submitted on March 2, 1582, Zhang unequivocally conceded this particular defeat. The key passage reads: Taxes have always been very high in that place [meaning Jiangnan]; therefore the burden of arrears is exceptionally heavy. Moreover, there
Zhang Juzheng, 1572–1582
53
are to be found powerful bullies and crafty villains who stubbornly refuse to pay their taxes, as well as poor families who are really unable to pay. The authority of local government practically extends only to the common people and not to the strongmen (hao you), with the result that only the poor are really pressed to pay their taxes at all.
Realizing that the just completed survey would be of no benefit to tax collection, Zhang was forced to waive more than one million taels of silver, representing the accumulated arrears from 1567 to 1579, of which more than 700,000 taels originated in the two Jiangnan prefectures of Suzhou and Songjiang. Even as he granted this amnesty, though, Zhang continued to insist that only the state had the sole prerogative to grant it: I have said before that such a promulgation of virtue and beneficence [as the waiving of arrears] had better come from the Court (chu zi chaoting). If local officials ask for and receive such waivers, then gratitude will remain below with the said local officials, and resentment will be directed upward at the Court . . . Even if these arrears are waived, it will not immediately harm the state’s revenue, and the common people will be so full of gratitude that their chorus of thanks will be heard throughout the universe. Popular sentiment will be firm [in the state’s favor], and the root of the state (bang ben) will be pacified.46
In Zhang’s struggle against the gentry, even a concession of failure could be used as a weapon. Meanwhile, in the gentry’s struggle against Zhang Juzheng, a snub could be used as a weapon. On April 1, 1582, Zhang Juzheng fell ill. While the various officials attended a Buddhist ceremony to pray for the first grand secretary’s recovery, a man named Gu Xiancheng refused to join them. Then, when someone else placed Gu’s name on a list of contributors for the same ceremony, Gu made it a point to remove it. It is unknown how much Zhang Juzheng was hurt by this demonstration, but for whatever reason, he never recovered. Having received permission to handle administrative business at his Beijing residence, he pleaded in vain to be allowed to return home to Jiangling. On July 9, 1582, Zhang Juzheng died, leaving Gu Xiancheng unpunished for his rather unusual vote of no confidence.47 The young man’s demonstration of defiance augured poorly for the days ahead. Zhang Juzheng had not only failed to equalize
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taxes, but he had failed in his larger goal of building up respect for the sovereign power. Gu Xiancheng, representing the succeeding political generation, resented rather than respected the “sovereign power” and he also, as will be explored in following chapters, subscribed to an entirely different sovereignty. This disaffection was Zhang Juzheng’s chief legacy. “After Zhang Juzheng,” wrote an associate of Gu named Miao Changqi (1562–1626), “there arose a war of words among the gentry (shidafu) that lasted decades.” Indeed, it would last until the end of the dynasty.48
CHAPTER II
THE RIGHTEOUS CIRCLES, 1582–1596
W
hen Gu Xiancheng removed his name from the list of the ailing Zhang Juzheng’s well-wishers, he was, in a sense, using an eraser, rather than a pen, to compose a declaration of war. This negative gesture appropriately marked the beginning of a new political movement, one that was determined to negate or reverse the statist trend of Zhang Juzheng’s administration. While tirelessly engaged in nullifying Zhang’s policies, however, Gu and his friends were also quietly pursuing a positive goal. Ray Huang wrote that “The effectiveness of the rural elite in leading the illiterate masses to pursue their lives within the limits of social custom was essential to the success of . . . minimal governing.” It was the inverse of this proposition, that a minimal government was needed to realize normative gentry leadership, that inspired the rather subversive policies of Gu’s newly ascendant faction.1 Gu’s group of antistatists will be called here the Righteous Circles (qing liu in Chinese), which is admittedly a vague name, applicable to any faction of moralistic critics from any period in Chinese history. However, this nomenclature conveniently describes a basically consistent political faction that had yet to acquire the name Donglin Faction (Donglin dang). In their subsequent incarnation, described in chapter IV, their objectives were articulated a bit more clearly, yet even now in this formative stage, their ultimate goal of gentry rule is occasionally discernable in their immediate effort to neutralize the government.2 The Righteous Circles’ first order of business was to set in motion a great revolving door by which Zhang Juzheng’s former adherents were removed and his critics restored. In this effort, they were greatly aided by the Wanli emperor, who tacitly condoned the posthumous denunciations of Zhang that began in the winter of 1582–1583. These indictments fell under the general heading of corruption, and once Wanli’s disinclination to defend Zhang became known, they increased in stridency and grew to encompass an ever-widening
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circle of Zhang’s confederates and protégés. While Ray Huang has studied the psychological aspects of Wanli’s belated disenchantment with Zhang, it is also possible that Wanli’s interest in the demolition of Zhang’s regime was at least partly economic, for he seemed especially eager to confiscate Zhang’s property and that of his alleged conspirators. While this acquisitiveness hinted at the continued insufficiency of the Ming revenue and foreshadowed more desperate attempts on Wanli’s part to address it, the emperor found that even confiscated revenue had a way of disappearing into the pockets of the confiscators (another foreshadowing), and he also came to fear that the attacks on Zhang’s remnant had spun out of his control. It was, in fact, too late for him to stop the avalanche, for, having already admitted the guilt of the accused, Wanli could not reign in the attacks. In this way, the throne lost the political initiative and would not get it back for over a decade.3 Thus unleashed, the Righteous Circles were unsparing in their purge of Zhang’s friends. Their rampage did not stop with civil officials but extended also to military personnel associated with Zhang, including the famously effective general Qi Jiguang (perhaps mindful of his record, Qi’s enemies merely transferred him to a backwater). Simultaneously, the Righteous Circles advanced members of their own faction into the spaces they created. On January 11, 1583, just four days after Wanli had warned officialdom not to try to settle old accounts, a Sichuan censor moved that the righteous officials from the 1577 duoqing affair, a group including Ai Mu and Zou Yuanbiao, be together restored to their former honors. Wanli could only concede, claiming that he had been tricked into punishing the heroes. In an astonishingly short amount of time, the revolving door had spun, the ins were out, and the outs were in.4 Having realized their power in the central government, the Righteous Circles dedicated themselves to their only true policy, which was to prevent another activist, centralizing regime like Zhang Juzheng’s from ever again taking shape. To this end, they launched attack after attack on Zhang’s institutional power base, the Grand Secretariat, which was an easy target, for its power was largely informal. Technically just a clerical pool for the emperor, the Grand Secretariat had come to advise the throne on policy, but this prerogative, never explicitly codified, could always be challenged. The first grand secretary, in particular, was simply the most senior of the four or five grand secretaries and was not recognized as prime minister—in fact, the mature Ming had no such office. Zhang
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Juzheng had relied on his connection to the young emperor (and to Wanli’s family and eunuchs) to maintain his power. With Zhang gone and Wanli now grown, it was a simple matter for the Righteous Circles to keep the grand secretaries off balance.5 The first righteous attack on the Grand Secretariat was launched in 1583, when the examination for the highest civil service degree, the “presented scholar” (jinshi), was to be held. Gu Xiancheng applied to junior grand secretary Xu Guo (1527–1596), requesting that sons of grand secretaries be excluded from the exam. Such a request was justified, Gu explained, by the great potential for mischief by senior ministers. If they were not kept within bounds, they could “ruin everything in the world” with their nepotism and favoritism, for their small-minded sycophants would crowd out the upright gentlemen (zheng shi) and wreck their good work. The Ming dynasty, Gu continued, was especially infamous for this sort of abuse. It had produced no sages of anywhere near classical caliber, and had seen, on the contrary, no shortage of evil ministers, the most egregious of which was Zhang Juzheng, whom Gu pronounced guilty of “supernatural treachery and devilish machinations.” It was time for such ministerial tyranny to end. If Xu Guo acceded to his entreaty, Gu concluded, he would be breaking the cycle of nepotism and cronyism and recreating an environment in which the country’s system of promoting worthies and nurturing talent could be salvaged from its current corrupt state. In the event, however, Xu Guo ignored Gu’s request, and sons of two grand secretaries sat for (and passed) the jinshi exam. Several Righteous Circles leaders cried foul (including Li Sancai, who will figure prominently in succeeding chapters) and earned sundry punishments that increased their prestige at the expense of the Grand Secretariat’s. Incidentally, Gu Xiancheng’s younger brother, Gu Yuncheng, passed the exam too.6 Getting back for a moment to Gu’s petition to Xu Guo, it is worthwhile to point out that Gu used the terms gong (public) and si (private or selfish) almost as frequently as Zhang Juzheng did, but he used them in very different ways. Whereas Zhang had used gong and si to denote the Legalist (in other words, the inversely proportional) relationship between public and private, Gu did not really place si in the private sector at all. Instead, he used it to describe a selfish abuse of power or position on the part of central government officials. Indeed, Joseph Levenson commented on the agility with which the Confucian mind could hurl the charge of si right back at imperious ministers or even emperors, with the claim that the latter personages
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treated the empire as their own private estates. Furthermore, Confucians were not about to leave to the state the idea of “public” (gong). As Timothy Brook has observed, “Every claim to representing gong was potentially open to contest.” Representing the public was what the struggle for sovereignty was all about.7 As for the pejorative si, it cut in interestingly divergent ways. Nepotism (a common species of si), which to Zhang Juzheng was a sort of treason against the state, Gu Xiancheng believed to be a more general evil almost naturally facilitated by the state. Zhang’s answer to the problem was to limit the number of stipend-receiving students (shengyuan) entering the education system at the local level. Gu’s answer was to limit the power of the grand secretaries controlling the education system at the state level. Once again, common ground on a certain issue (nepotism, in this case) was reached from opposite directions. The different philosophical or ideological assumptions brought to bear on the issues tended to eclipse them, ensuring that they would not be addressed on their merits but would become subsumed in the larger philosophical struggle. Who was guilty of nepotism, and by whom should the guilty ones be restrained? Zhang Juzheng and Gu Xiancheng offered contrasting answers. For Gu, it is clear, the state was part of the problem, certainly not part of the solution. Indeed, the problem seemed to be going away. By the middle of the year 1583, the Grand Secretariat was definitely getting weaker. On May 27, Zhang Siwei (1526–1585), the successor of Zhang Juzheng, though not a relative, left his post to observe the mourning ritual for his father. Zhang Siwei had tried to appease the Righteous Circles by promoting their members and by relaxing much of the discipline that had been established by Zhang Juzheng. As administration grew lax again, Shen Shixing (1535–1614) took over as first grand secretary, but he was generally unable to meet the continued Righteous attacks on his office.8
Gu Xiancheng’s Activities at Home While the Grand Secretariat continued to lose its influence, the Righteous Circles leadership continued to organize, both within and without the government. In the autumn of 1583, Gu Xiancheng took leave and returned to his home in Wuxi county, Changzhou prefecture, Nanjing province. According to Gu’s nianpu, or career chronology, he traveled part of the way home with Wei Yunzhong
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(whose brother was punished in the outcry surrounding the 1583 exam). The two friends stopped off at the residence of a gentleman named Meng Qiu, where they “discoursed on learning” for two days and nights. Finally arriving home, Gu was visited by An Xifan (1562–1621), who “asked about learning.” This An Xifan, while not yet famous nationally, was a scion of an extremely powerful gentry family of Wuxi. His grandfather, An Guo (1481–1534), was himself the fourth generation descendent of a local merchant family, and had, during his lifetime, become a colossal magnate. An Guo’s resume was typical of the Chinese gentry. He had financed troops and city walls to help defend against Sino-Japanese pirates, rebuilt and maintained a shrine by establishing a corporate estate using part of his lands, and constructed huge pleasure gardens while providing (from his private granaries) famine relief to the workers who built them. He was an art connoisseur, and he had steered his offspring toward official service, though he himself was never an official. The An family was one of Mencius’s “great houses” if there ever was one. Now, An Guo’s grandson, by asking Gu Xiancheng about learning, had put himself under the latter’s scholarly wing, thus formally joining the Righteous Circles and conferring upon his new patron even more status as the champion of the gentry interest.9 Beyond this scholarly link to a great gentry family, did Gu Xiancheng qualify for gentry status in his own right? He obviously possessed sufficient academic credentials to warrant gentry status for himself and his extended family, and the Gu’s seem also to have owned a great deal of land. Xia Weizhong reports that, upon the division of his father’s holdings, Gu Xiancheng received some several thousand mu (hundreds of English acres), placing him solidly in the “big landlord” rank. (One was doing quite well to possess over two thousand mu.) It may truthfully be said, though, that the Gu’s attained this eminence via a rather low road. Gu Xiancheng’s ancestors were in fact small-scale merchants, not established magnates like the An’s, and in spite of a vague claim of past greatness, they seem fairly described as new wealth. Gu Xiancheng’s father, Gu Xue, despite his scholarly name, was a busy peddler, who lived on very thin margins. With each of several bankruptcies, he moved his family to a new village in the county and soon recovered through the sale of beans, spirits, and so on. The two oldest sons assisted with the family business, thus enabling the two youngest sons, Xiancheng and Yuncheng, to train for the civil service exams. No one else in the family had ever been an official before them.10
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This success story does not read radically differently from that of any other member of the gentry, and in his rising from a fallen family, Gu Xiancheng actually had a lot in common with the man whose memory he hated most, Zhang Juzheng. Though both were newcomers to the gentry’s milieu, Gu embraced it as self-consciously as Zhang rejected it, and it would seem that only subjective factors could account for this divergence. To be more specific, since the Chinese gentry was a complex economic, academic, political, and moral entity, each man could adopt a view that stressed some of these aspects over others. Zhang had focused on the relatively negative components, viewing the gentry economically as strongmen, academically as pedants, politically as lax bureaucrats, and morally not at all, in keeping with his Legalist denial of any morality outside the state. Gu, on the other hand, largely ignored the economic and political and focused instead on the academic and, especially, the moral. Gu having taken what Martin Heijdra called the normative view of the gentry (see introduction), his literary remains, likewise, are very well stocked with conventional descriptions of normative gentry behavior. The academic shades of the gentry repertoire are the most obvious. During his 1583–1586 leave of absence, for example, Gu made a study of the Book of Changes (Yi jing) and Confucius’s Spring and Autumn Annals (Chunqiu). He named his studio Xiaoxin zhai, or “Careful Studio,” which referred to the scholarly debate concerning deliberate versus spontaneous action. As a well-known literatus, he wrote large numbers of funerary or memorial inscriptions, including one for the foster mother of Gao Panlong (1562–1626), another native of Wuxi who was becoming the chief philosopher in Gu’s circle, and one for Wei Yunzhong (d. 1585), who had been Gu’s recent political ally and travel companion. He also wrote prefaces for the collected works of other scholars. On another level, he was moderately active in famine relief, albeit not on the same scale as An Xifan’s family. Although he may, of course, have done many other interesting things too, this list of activities, preserved in his nianpu (career chronicle), is a conventional and conscious recitation of credentials for membership in the gentry, normatively conceived. Notably absent from Gu’s nianpu is any obsessing about affairs of state, which was allegedly all Zhang Juzheng ever did while he was at home. Looking at the record of Gu’s home leave, he does not seem to have given the state or even current events any thought at all. Far more common, rather, was the academic networking that Zhang Juzheng had hated
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so much. A nianpu entry from 1586 reveals that Gu participated in a large lecture session at the behest of the county magistrate, who had invited the gentry (shenshi) to attend. These gentlemen, it is reported, dutifully participated in large numbers, and Gu emerged as the most influential personage among them.11
Continued Demolition of Zhang Juzheng’s Remnant While Gu Xiancheng was building his gentry association in Wuxi, the Righteous Circles continued to dismantle Zhang Juzheng’s legacy in Beijing. The official chronicle of the Ming dynasty, the Veritable Records (Shilu), covering this general time period, contains unceasing denunciations of the late first grand secretary and his former associates, making the emperor’s earlier injunction against raising old business seem like a pathetic joke. On March 24, 1584, a censor from Henan brought charges against Zhang Juzheng dating back to the latter’s conduct during the Longqing reign. The charge was cronyism, and Zhang’s accuser, interestingly, believed he spoke for his class, saying, “The gentry (jinshen) cannot abide this sort of behavior.” The hapless Wanli emperor ordered one of Zhang’s supposed protégés sent home in retirement, another sent home a commoner. On March 31, Lin Yingxun, Zhang’s champion in the eviction of the Lian Hu squatters, was charged with accepting bribes and dismissed from his post.12 On April 23, 1584, a group of officials complained that Zhang’s land survey had inflated the tax quotas artificially and were a burden on the common people. (As was related in the previous chapter, perhaps they were right.) Wanli endorsed this complaint, and the results of the recent land survey, such as they were, were thus swept away at the stroke of a brush.13 Later in the spring of 1584, a censor named Zhang Wenxi memorialized the throne, stating his belief that the Grand Secretariat simply had too much power. Specifically, Zhang thought that the Grand Secretariat should not be shown reports from other branches of the government, should not govern certain appointments to various ministries, should not communicate with or instruct regional officials such as grand coordinators, and should not allow one of their number (in other words, the first grand secretary) to draft rescripts on behalf of the emperor without discussing the matter with the other grand secretaries. The contents of Zhang’s memorial may have been common knowledge by May 2, 1584, on which date the Wanli
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emperor, at his morning lecture, issued an edict that read, “Since We cannot at once be cognizant of all the affairs in the empire, We often rely on consultation with the grand secretaries. If the grand secretaries, therefore, are not themselves fully informed of the various affairs, how, then, can they be expected to serve Us?” Wanli ultimately rejected Zhang Wenxi’s radical suggestions. Commenting on the continued attacks on his office, first grand secretary Shen Shixing complained that “Among the gentry (jinshen), all the talk is about Zhang Juzheng, but they do not know how much practical control he had over the emperor. . . . Today’s [Grand Secretariat] simply does not compare.” The gentry kept attacking, though, just the same.14 There is evidence that the central government’s control over the countryside began to decline accordingly. A land dispute in Jiaxing prefecture, Zhejiang province may serve to illustrate how the balance of power on the local level had shifted away from government officials and toward the powerful gentry. The origins of the dispute were quite complex, but the catalyst was the recently repudiated Zhang Juzheng land survey, which was conducted in this area in 1581. The officials in charge of the survey had been especially determined to show an increase in registered acreage for their counties, so determined, in fact, that they not only recovered lands that had been hidden by gentry and other strongmen but also manufactured new acreage by making units of land measurement smaller. This expediency was unpleasant enough, but the high-tax Jiashan county faced the additional problem of having its actual tax base drifting fraudulently across its borders to the neighboring low-tax counties of Jiaxing and Xiushui, where enterprising taxpayers preferred to pay their taxes. In 1585, therefore, Jiashan county initiated the first of several lawsuits designed to reclaim its genuine tax base. Initially, the affair was successfully managed by county and prefectural government, but over time, more and more gentry took the opportunity to prevail upon local officials to reduce the reported sizes of their holdings for tax purposes. If, under Zhang Juzheng, local officials had exaggerated the amount of land under cultivation in their counties in order to appease him, now that the wind was blowing the other way, they underrepresented the amount of land in their jurisdiction in order to appease landowners. As far as land registration and taxation were concerned, then, the pendulum seemed to be swinging from one extreme of counterfeit to the other.15 There will be more from Jiaxing prefecture later. Meanwhile, back in Beijing, a new trouble was starting to brew. The emperor invested
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his favorite consort, a lady surnamed Zheng, with the title Senior Consort (gui fei), alerting many righteous officials to the dangerous possibility that improper imperial favor would soon be bestowed on her family and offspring. In the spring of 1586, as Gu Xiancheng was returning to Beijing from his leave, his younger brother, Yuncheng, memorialized to rebuke the emperor for his conduct. He claimed that by favoring Ms. Zheng, the emperor was “burying the public under the private” and “burying the empire under the self.” After reprising the Confucian version of the gong and si dichotomy in a style very similar to that used by his brother in the case of the 1583 metropolitan exam, Gu Yuncheng, too, went on to attack the grand secretaries, accusing them of monopolizing power by indulging the emperor, much as Zhang Juzheng had done. Gu Yuncheng was relieved of his duties, even as his brother was discoursing on philosophy during his journey back north.16 Upon reaching the capital, Gu Xiancheng was soon given a post in the Ministry of Personnel, just in time for another clash between the Righteous Circles and the Grand Secretariat. The conflict began when a Righteous attack on the pro-Zhang Juzheng Minister of Works backfired, and the grand secretaries convinced the emperor to cashier the attackers. Riding to the rescue, Gu Xiancheng memorialized the throne on April 17, 1587 to ask the emperor to reconsider approving the actions against his confederates. In addition, Gu was provoked by something Wanli had said. When Wanli sentenced the righteous ones, he claimed, “Decisions on the use of personnel come from the Court” (yongren chu zi chaoting). Now, in his memorial, Gu Xiancheng seized on this incendiary prepositional phrase and threw it right back in Wanli’s face. “Your Majesty claims that personnel matters come from the Court,” Gu wrote, “but does Your Majesty not regularly consult with the ministers in charge of administration? Do they not always manage to convey to Your Majesty their advice, and has Your Majesty ever managed not to listen to it? This whole affair is simply a matter of their influence on Your Majesty.” That Gu should pounce on Wanli’s prepositional phrase and refute it so aggressively attests to how thoroughly he resented the claim to sovereignty implied therein. Clearly, Gu’s point was that nothing came from the court and that everything came from the advisors to the court. Gu expressed his belief that the emperor’s advisors should be gentlemen (junzi) rather than “mean people” (xiaoren, literally “little people,” the moral opposite of junzi), and it was clear that by the former, he meant the
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Righteous Circles and by the latter, he meant the grand secretaries. Whomever the emperor listened to, he was a passive figure. All he could do was to choose whose advice to adopt. If he made the correct choice, then decisions in personnel matters, as well as all other matters, would come from the gentlemen.17
Gu’s Further Activities in the Countryside Gu’s tangle with the emperor earned him a demotion to the provinces. As before, his career chronicle and other sources are replete with examples of normative gentry behavior, stressing the scholarly or the moral, and in some cases emphasizing the nearly magical ability of the Confucian gentleman to put the local community in order. While serving in Guiyang subprefecture, Hunan province, in the fall of 1587, his only two recorded acts were to share in the inspiration of the drawing of a taiji (yin-yang) symbol during a moon-viewing excursion with a local notable and to write an inscription about the former residence of past Confucian worthies. The last line of Gu’s nianpu (career chronicle) entry from his tenure in Guiyang implies much about the sort of information it was intended to impart: “No further details of Gu’s educational and civilizing (jiao yu) activities while stationed here are available.” At the end of the year, he was permitted to return home while still collecting pay.18 Arriving back at Wuxi in the beginning of 1588, Gu spent most of the year editing the Great Learning (Daxue), a Confucian text, and then he and his brothers contributed some millet to help relieve a famine that had afflicted the area. At length posted to a judgeship (tui guan) in Chuzhou prefecture, Zhejiang province, Gu “concentrated on the task of moral proselytizing” (de hua). He seems to have been quite effective at this task: two brothers had brought suit against each other, but Gu shamed them to tears (and to dropping the case) with a lesson on the Confucian virtue of brotherhood. Gu was granted leave to return home again after only two months, but the death of his mother on July 8, 1589 determined that he remain in Wuxi, serving out the three-year mourning ritual.19 Gu’s provincial career thus passed with no expenditure of his talent on problems of local fiscal policy or infrastructure, at least none that he or his heirs thought worth mentioning. This sublime indifference to government, especially fiscal government, was rather extreme, for many Confucian officials continued to be very concerned about the equalization of tax burdens and other administrative
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reforms. One of them, Shen Bang (active from 1550 to 1596), was actually a member of the Righteous Circles. His tenure as magistrate of Wanping county (which included the western half of Beijing) during the early 1590s is described in his Wan shu za ji, which is such a meticulous local gazetteer that it reads as an administrative manual, very different from anything written by Gu Xiancheng. The work of Shen Bang represents an important, practical aspect of Neo-Confucian thought that had helped initiate the Single Whip reforms in the mid-1500s and would develop into the statecraft (jingshi) school of the late Ming and beyond.20 The problem is that Gu Xiancheng, and not Shen Bang, was in charge of the Righteous movement. As Ray Huang explained, the key to the reformist thinking of the time was not that its practitioners were unaware of institutional approaches but that they had decisively rejected them. In fact, Righteous Circles heavyweights Gu Xiancheng, Zhao Nanxing (1550–1628), and Li Sancai were all alumni of the Ministry of Revenue, where they had helped to compile the Wanli kuaiji lu, “the most thorough fiscal compendium of the empire’s resources to date.” However, the experience was negative. China’s fiscal complexity and diversity seemed to disallow rational management, so that the righteous three became “convinced that the empire’s interests could be better served through abstract moral exhortations than by auditing accounts at all levels.” As devoted as Shen Bang’s magisterial performance might have been, it simply could not overbalance the righteous disdain for such matters. Gu’s circle more closely resembled the Neo-Confucianists of the Southern Song, who, according to Zhou Mi, “viewed anyone who managed economic resources as a [fiscalist], anyone who led troops to defend the frontiers as vulgar . . . and anyone who put his heart into governing affairs as a common clerk.” It was this aggressively detached attitude, rather than Shen’s penchant for management, that now set the tone in Beijing.21
Strains on the Treasury The righteous disparagement of “fiscalism” may be reflected in table 2.1 depicting fiscal conditions during this general time period (including the last few years of Zhang Juzheng’s administration). From this admittedly somewhat unreliable data, it can nonetheless be plausibly inferred that China was operating generally on a deficit during this decade or so. From this supposition, the next conclusion
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Table of Revenue versus Expenditure, 1580–1592 (Taels)22
Year
Revenue
1580 1581 1583 1585 1586 1589 1590 1592
2,845,483 3,704,281 3,720,000 3,700,000 3,890,000 3,270,000 3,740,500 4,512,000
Table 2.2
Expenditure Not Available 4,424,730 5,650,000 Not Available 5,920,000 4,390,000 4,065,000 5,465,000
Table of Accumulated Reserves, 1583–1590 (Taels)23
Year
Taicang
Waiku
Jiaofang
Laoku
1583 1586
3,000,000 –
– 984,231
? 6,008,769
1589 1590
? 400,000
? –
? Included in laoku 2,240,000 1,170,000
? ?
is that some form of accumulated reserve was being tapped in order to meet expenses. The Ming Veritable Records (Shi lu) provide hints as to the silver reserves in various parts of the state treasury at select moments during this period, as shown in table 2.2. The various memorialists from whose writings these figures are culled were sometimes a little ambiguous about which sort of silver reserve they were mentioning. Probably, taicang and waiku represented the same thing, namely, the accumulated store that was most frequently utilized to pay out expenses. The jiaofang and laoku were separate reserves not generally tapped to pay out expenses and maintained as a type of emergency stash. Over most of the 1580s, then, it seems that the “open” portion of the treasury, the waiku, was considerably depleted; and the “closed” portion of the treasury, the laoku, as well as the separate jiaofang, was apparently being accessed as well (the laoku was considered “filled” with around eight million taels in the early part of the dynasty). The Ming state seems to have been in the red for at least a generation. Fan Shuzhi has brought together some of the relevant fiscal statistics (the ultimate source of which is in almost all cases the Veritable Records) to show that
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during the Jiajing reign (1522–1567), deficits ranged between one and five million taels every year. While Zhang Juzheng may have helped increase revenues by about a million taels per annum, he was probably able to balance the budget only once, in 1577. In the 1580s, apparently, the state was continuing to experience fiscal insufficiencies. It is difficult, given these figures, to see how the Ming state was not completely bankrupt well before the 1580s. Probably, the figures are not very reliable; and it is important to consider also that Ming emperors always managed to produce emergency funds from their private stashes, which was to be the only way the Ming would survive fiscally in the years ahead. In any case, by the beginning of the 1590s, the deficit situation certainly had not improved, and the country may finally have reached the end of its formal silver reserves.24 While Righteous Circles affiliates may or may not have contributed to this growing fiscal imbalance, they certainly did little or nothing to correct it. In fact, the budgetary crisis was treated with an indifference that was noted by others at the time. In 1584, Minister of Revenue Wang Lin, while lamenting in a memorial the continued deficits, lamented also that his prior invitation to discuss the problem had induced not a single proposal from any official in four months. First grand secretary Shen Shixing expressed great anxiety about the looming fiscal crisis, and he also was very bitter that political realities were extremely unlikely to allow for a solution. As he wrote during this period, “The deficit of military pay and provisions for the frontiers is reaching two million [taels], and yet the day doesn’t pass without word of some crisis in collecting taxes. What is to be done?” Shen was forced to concede, as Zhang Juzheng had done before him, that the state was powerless to prevent the rich from foisting their taxes onto the poor, and thus he was opposed to a general surtax or any raising of the revenue quotas. The Righteous Circles’ barrage of the Grand Secretariat was not making Shen’s job any easier. “If all is lost,” Shen complained, “then blame will revert to whoever is serving the state at the highest level. The gentry (shidafu) all enjoy their wealth and prestige and strive always to increase their own advantages as a group, but the immortal notoriety of failure will be mine and mine alone.”25 In the event, Shen Shixing escaped most of the blame when he retired in 1591, but he would have been dismayed to know that China’s fiscal woes were shortly to get much worse, for China was about to embark on a major war with a foreign power. In the spring of 1592, Toyotomi Hideyoshi (1536–1598), the de facto ruler of Japan, ordered
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his armies to invade Korea. The campaign was born of Toyotomi’s dream of unifying Asia under Japanese rule, and was ultimately aimed at China (an earlier diplomatic effort to persuade Korea to join in the attack or at least permit the passage of Japanese troops to China had failed). On May 23, 1592, the Japanese landed at Pusan with 200,000 men. They advanced straightaway to Seoul and put the Korean king Yi Yon to flight. Yi Yon finally stopped at Uiju on the Yalu river on July 30 and applied to Beijing for reinforcements.26 In response, Wanli undertook to rescue the Korean king and authorized a relief expedition for the peninsula. The Ministry of War, not fully heeding the size of the enemy army, dispatched a small reconnaissance force of three thousand men, which broke itself in an attack on the Japanese at Pyongyang on August 23. In the wake of this defeat, Wanli personally expanded the scale of the operation. He appointed vigorous commanders, protected them from the inevitable political attacks, and reaped the fruits of victory in a battle of February 6–7, 1593, when his generals recaptured Pyongyang from the Japanese. Protracted peace negotiations ensued, with most of the fighting being taken up by Korean units as the Chinese retired.27
The “Trunk of the State” and Other Controversies Wanli’s vigorous leadership of the country in war meant nothing to Gu Xiancheng, who, reinstated in the Ministry of Personnel in Beijing, attacked the emperor for his slowness in designating an heir (Ms. Zheng had given birth to a son, and Wanli was favoring him while delaying a formal choice). On March 9, 1593, Gu wrote a sarcastic and lecturing memorial, in which he insinuated, “Surely there is some part of Your Majesty’s heart that does not dare be arbitrary; and this being the case, Your Majesty will certainly conform to dynastic precedent in this matter.” As before, Gu seemed especially eager to mock Wanli’s assertions of imperial authority. To Wanli’s recent claim that “We are the lord of all under Heaven,” Gu Xiancheng replied, “I can understand that Your Majesty has already found much to regret and that surely you are not entirely pleased with yourself; so you will certainly conform to the will of the empire.” Some historians have written extensively about this succession dispute, which became known as the “trunk of the state” (guo ben) controversy and touched on such issues as dynastic precedent, the smooth succession and education of imperial heirs, and the role of imperial consorts. As far as this book is concerned, however, the main point was that
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Wanli believed that no one could tell the emperor what to do and Gu Xiancheng believed the emperor was there only to be told what to do. While this view of the guo ben affair may seem a bit reductive, F.W. Mote also identified “deeper issues” informing a similar controversy earlier in the dynasty, which he, likewise, reduced to a simple “game” of preeminence between the throne and the scholar-officials. Indeed, it would seem that the model for both these “constitutional” disputes was the basic disagreement concerning precedence between King Xuan of Qi and Yan Chu, explored on the first pages of the introduction. Wanli, who, “as a matter of principle,” according to Ray Huang, “refused to do what he was told,” was a fine King Xuan. Meanwhile, playing the part of Yan Chu in the current crisis, Gu Xiancheng admonished the first grand secretary, Wang Xijue, that it was the minister’s job to restrain the ruler, and he quoted Confucius and Mencius to the effect that only the morality of the minister could correct the emperor’s faults.28 To make sure there were as many moral ministers on hand as possible, the Righteous Circles continued to secure government posts for its own members at the expense of outsiders. During the 1593 evaluation of central government officials (jing cha), Minister of Personnel Sun Long (1525–1594) and his subordinate, Director of Evaluations and Righteous Circles leader Zhao Nanxing—Zhao, like Gu Xiancheng, had refused to pray for the ailing Zhang Juzheng in 1582—ignored the advice of the Grand Secretariat and recommended a series of demotions that favored the righteous interest. First grand secretary Wang Xijue objected to this circumvention of his department, and the emperor accused Sun and Zhao of “monopolizing power and fomenting cliques.” Responding on behalf of his comrades, Gu Xiancheng reprised an old argument that had first been voiced by Ouyang Xiu (1007–1070) of the factious Song dynasty: though cliques formed by mean people (xiaoren) were evil, those formed by gentlemen (junzi) were good. Armed with this logic, Gu proudly pleaded guilty to the charge of fomenting a clique, since he was so patently working with the best people for a noble cause. The more Gu Xiancheng (and others) defended Sun Long and Zhao Nanxing, the more these two were punished. At the end of a long round of denunciations, Sun and Zhao were cashiered.29 Now China needed a new minister of personnel, and the Righteous bureaucrats in that ministry fought with the grand secretaries over the power to fill the office. In the thick of this skirmish, Gu Xiancheng offered an interesting institutional history of the dynasty.
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He claimed that the Grand Secretariat was bucking the dynastic trend of decentralization. With increasingly abstract reasoning, Gu hypothesized that Our Great Ancestor [i.e., Zhu Yuanzhang] abolished the old Secretariat (zhong shu sheng) and set up the Six Ministries (liu bu). The only fear then was that power had not been dispersed, and great pains were then taken to do so. Afterward, the Grand Secretariat [the present nei ge] came to coordinate and control the Six Ministries; and the fear then was that power was not concentrated enough. When power is decentralized, it is checked and balanced (hu qian); one man cannot prosecute any selfish designs (si). This situation is advantageous for the country (guojia) and greatly disadvantageous for powerful officials (quan chen). When power is centralized, it is monopolized; it then becomes impossible for officials, as individuals, to keep their jobs. This situation is advantageous for powerful officials and greatly disadvantageous for the country.30
The Question of Incipient Democracy There is much in this passage that has contributed to Gu Xiancheng’s reputation as a protodemocrat in China. Zhang Xianbo has cited it in his recent study, which argues extensively that Gu and his associates, in their opposition to autocracy, were advocates of democracy. One of the chapters in Zhang Anqi and Bu Jinzhi’s book about Gu and his fellow philosopher Gao Panlong, is entitled “Opposition to Feudal Autocracy and the Roots of Primitive Democratic Thought,” which further exemplifies this general argument. It will not be denied in this book that members of the Righteous-Donglin group, very occasionally, made antiautocratic statements that were also protodemocratic, in that they seemed to place some authority, theoretically, in the hands of the people. Li Sancai wrote, “The people (min) are the sovereign’s sovereign (jun zhi zhu),” and “the commoners (bai xing) are the time-honored sovereigns (zhu) of he who is the sovereign of the people (ren zhu),” in what may count as the boldest statements along these lines. However, aside from these exceptional passages, the mere negation of imperial authority does not automatically imply the assertion of popular authority. Gu Xiancheng’s above-cited discourse on checks and balances is a good case in point. With twisted logic, Gu implied that Zhu Yuanzhang’s abolition of the Secretariat, part of an extremely violent campaign to concentrate more power in his own hands, was somehow an attempt at decentralization. That
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the ostensibly protodemocratic Gu could find common cause with the Ming’s decidedly autocratic founder, drives home the point that a weakened government might be as easily dominated by a faction of righteous gentlemen below as by the emperor above. Domination, rather than democracy, was Gu’s goal.31 Likewise, a remark by Gao Panlong, also cited by Zhang Xianbo, seems to convey a certain democratic and even an egalitarian potential: Whatever the gentleman (junzi) does, he must achieve a connection (tong) with the people of the world (tian xia ren), before his plans will reach fruition. If he holds only to his own view, then even if he be true-heartedly for the state (zhen xin wei guo) and for the world, his plans will come to naught. If he does not follow the masses (zhong ren), then even among his own comrades (tongzhi), he will not be followed. As a rule, [the gentleman] must connect with all the people of the world—the worthy (xian), the wise (zhi), the ignorant, and the degenerate (bu xiao)—before he may proceed.32
Again, however, in spite of Gao’s conviction that the gentleman needed to be responsive to all sorts of people, the fact is that he still believed the gentleman were the prime movers of society. Moreover, making the common people such an important part of the gentleman’s constituency implicitly denied that they were part of the emperor’s or the state’s constituency. Just as the emperor or the state was the implied loser in Gao’s gentlemanly expression of populism, the gentlemen were the implied winners in the Righteous Circles’ critiques of imperial power. Indeed, the Righteous Circles’ (and the later Donglin’s) opposition to “feudal autocracy” was based on what might be called “gentry power” (shen quan), which, while it may have been antiauthoritarian vis-à-vis the “imperial power” (huang quan), is really best described as alternately authoritarian. Wu Han and Fei Xiaotong (1910–2005) coined the terms gentry power and imperial power in the 1940s. If anything, Wu and Fei may have overstated the imperial power’s theoretical dominance over the gentry, as Wu did when he wrote that the gentry were servants of the throne but masters of the people—Gu Xiancheng might have taken issue with the “servant” part. Cataloguing the formidable powers and privileges the gentry wielded over the common people, Wu profoundly doubted that gentry power could ever have led to people power (min quan), and he explicitly denied that the Righteous-Donglin maneuvering against their rivals in the central government had
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anything to do with the people. Fei Xiaotong paid a bit more attention to the Neo-Confucian doctrine of the “succession to the Way” (dao tong), which allowed for a wielding of authority independent of the throne. No matter what the government power might do, Fei wrote, the affairs of the various localities were in the effective domain of the Throneless King (su wang), in other words, Confucius.33 Taking up the subject in a more recent study, Zhao Yuan pays yet more attention to how gentry power was justified by Neo-Confucianism. He cites Gu Yanwu’s claim that “The civilizing power (jiao hua zhi quan) is ordinarily [wielded] not from above but rather from below.” While Gu Yanwu lived a generation after Gu Xiancheng, it is evident from the career chronicle passages excerpted in this chapter that Gu Xiancheng exercised this civilizing power freely and fully (though it was called by variant names, jiao yu and de hua). Zhao also includes a passage from another Ming survivor, Zhang Lüxiang (1611–1674): “When one gathers the people, there is no one there who is not a child of the court (chaoting). When one manages the land, there is no [produce] that cannot be counted as the court’s revenue. However, the same principle applies to those of us who act out here in the countryside.” In community affairs, Zhao concludes, the gentry (jinshen) were both executives and legislators.34 The assumption of these prerogatives by Gu and Zhang points to the defining quality of the Neo-Confucian gentry. Comparing the Chinese with the English gentry, there was probably more similarity than difference in their elitist attitudes, privileged statuses, and propensities for economic exploitation. In their struggles against their respective thrones, furthermore, the Chinese and English gentry were no doubt equally self-interested. However, the English gentry’s resistance to kingly authority was based on principles that were ultimately appropriated by the people in their quest to rule themselves, while the Chinese gentry’s resistance to imperial authority was informed chiefly by the “succession to the Way” (dao tong) principle, the idea that the Confucian gentleman was himself a throneless king. It was probably this claim to civilizing power that distinguished the Chinese from the English gentry and greatly inhibited the evolution of people power from gentry power in the Chinese case. In some ways, the Chinese gentry may actually have had a more positive influence on their local communities than the English. Zhao Yuan’s work cites many examples of energetic relief effort and profound concern for the common people, on the part of Chinese gentlemen such as Qi Biaojia. However, Qi Biaojia’s
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proprietary—indeed, sovereign—interest in such matters has already been revealed in the first few pages of this book. In general, it can quite reasonably be asked how a class of people, who fundamentally believed Mencius’s statement, “Without the gentleman, there would be no one to rule the country people, and without the country people, there would be no one to feed the gentleman,” could ever conceive of the country people ruling (and feeding) themselves. Although it might have appeared in the late Ming that a new philosophy of freedom was contending with an old philosophy of authority, it is the assertion of this book, rather, that two old philosophies of authority were contending with each other. Both imperial power and gentry power claimed to rule the people, and in this dispute, the people could never be the victors; they could only be the prize.35
Gu’s Final Ejection from Beijing At any rate, the last point in Gu’s remarks about checks and balances, that a decentralized bureaucracy made for better job security, was positively hypocritical, for Gu’s gentry-based tyranny was just then conducting a grand sweep of its own. The Righteous Circles successfully blocked the Grand Secretariat’s nominee for personnel minister, and then they forced the resignation of first grand secretary Wang Xijue. They overplayed their hand, though, when next they tried to advance their own partisans into the Grand Secretariat. They rejected numerous compromises, until the Wanli emperor lost all patience with them. He selected for the Grand Secretariat two of his own favorites and demoted Gu Xiancheng. When too many people spoke up, righteously, on Gu’s behalf, Wanli decided that demotion was too good for him and had him cashiered instead, on July 1, 1594.36 Naturally, Gu Xiancheng left Beijing with a heroic and prodigious send-off and summered on the way home at Zhangjiawan, where he held a sort of court, meeting various notables who came to solicit his opinions concerning the mean people (xiaoren) who continued to infest the government. When he reached Wuxi in the autumn, he became ill, but he still had enough energy to begin keeping a philosophical diary. Gu did not seem to regret his loss of office in the slightest, and he would never formally serve the Ming state again.37 Had Gu Xiancheng really served the state at all? The very question might in fact have baffled him, for he believed the state was there to serve, and not to be served by, gentlemen of education and merit.
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Every aspect of Gu Xiancheng’s official career from 1582 to 1594 confirms that, to him, the state merely provided a slightly raised platform from which he and his associates could discourse on learning, provide famine relief, and keep brothers living in harmony. Great danger arose when the state employed persons unknown to the Righteous Circles—Gu invariably called them mean people—whose pursuit of any agenda beyond that of encouraging village leadership confirmed their depravity. At that point, the state became in his eyes the wanton party, corrupt, gouging, wasting, and as Mencius said, “ruining all our endeavors.” To Gu and his Righteous Circles, the state was the perennial bully and aggressor, even as they thwarted and gutted it.38 Gu Xiancheng would continue to strengthen his faction as a civilian, and China had certainly not heard the last of him. As he was being feted after his sacking, the Ming state drifted toward the precipice of severe fiscal crisis. The Wanli emperor both received and issued rather hopeful pronouncements on the value of thrift, and such optimism appeared to have been rewarded when, on March 18, 1595, Toyotomi Hideyoshi was invested as tributary King of Japan by Wanli’s edict, and it seemed that China’s expensive foreign intervention was finally over. However, on August 22, it was announced that none of the provinces and metropolitan districts had collected their quotas of taxes in silver, and then, on April 5, 1596, several buildings of the imperial palace were destroyed by fire. The emperor claimed that the conflagration was caused by his lack of virtue, but inwardly, he must have been thinking that he had another big bill on his hands. The means he devised to pay for new palace buildings and for government itself, all at a time when the state was starving for funds, would push China into nearly total chaos.39
CHAPTER III
THE WANLI EMPEROR, 1596–1606
O
n August 13, 1596, the Wanli emperor ordered a special team of officials into the countryside to open up silver mines. The team was composed of a palace eunuch, a bureau director from the Ministry of Revenue, and a member of the Embroidered Uniform Guard (jin yi, the imperial bodyguard), and it was dispatched to the environs outside Beijing. The next day, another officer from the Embroidered Uniform Guard was sent to open mines in Henan Province. Within the month, more eunuchs and palace guards were sent out to mine silver, to places as far away as Shandong, Shaanxi, Zhejiang, and Shanxi provinces. There is evidence that Wanli was acting in response to a memorial by a lowly officer named Zhong Chun (himself perhaps a eunuch) suggesting that the measure was necessary to make good the treasury depletions resulting from the Korean war and the rebuilding of the burned palace structures. Such recommendations in favor of silver mining had been made before, and they had always been resisted; but this time, Wanli decided to accept the recommendations. Thus, by the summer of 1596, under the orders of the Wanli emperor, the state’s desperate search for silver had begun.1 Officialdom objected immediately. On August 17, two days after the miners were sent out around Beijing, the local grand coordinator asked that mining in the capital area be called off. His memorial was ignored. On September 2, another official stationed in Beijing claimed that mining in the area would spoil the hilly countryside in which the imperial tombs were located. The emperor ordered that miners keep their distance from the tombs. On September 7, it was reported (presumably, from the site of the Beijing mining operations) that renegade diggers who had long been mining the area illegally were being recruited by the official work teams. Much worse, wealthy residents were being conscripted to serve as the “heads” (kuang tou)
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of the mines, meaning that they were forced to put up the initial investment in equipment and property purchases in order to start operations. If Wanli had anything to say on this last point, it was unrecorded.2
The Mine Commissioner Scourge It is impossible to overstate the triple threat posed by Wanli’s new policy. Eunuchs, laughable exotics to the modern reader, were terrifying bogeymen to the Confucian gentry. By hoary tradition the only nonimperial males allowed to reside within the palace, eunuchs enjoyed a special access to the emperor and became in many circumstances his trusted henchmen, often employed as spies or, as in this case, revenue collectors. In the Confucian view, the eunuch wielded power out of proportion to his education, an arm of the emperor that could not be tied. Mining, furthermore, was just about the most disreputable activity in traditional China. Official mining projects, especially, showed the state at its acquisitive worst, violating the Confucian injunction that the state should not “compete with the people for profit” (yu min zheng li). During the Ming dynasty, the government usually refrained from large-scale mining projects, in part due to the generally accepted untrustworthiness of the miners themselves, who were often known by the term “mine bandit” (kuang dao). As recently as 1594, the Wanli emperor himself listed miners as among the plagues afflicting the common people, but now, two years later, the emperor had on second thought unleashed this plague on his people. Economic warfare, finally, was implicit in Wanli’s new policy, for his mining teams were indeed conscripting rich persons to serve as guarantors for the mines.3 The combination of eunuchs, mining, and economic warfare was a very natural one. In the first place, the eunuch supervisors of the mining teams were not as likely as conventional bureaucrats to be sympathetic to local gentry interests. Furthermore, the alleged business of Wanli’s work teams, mining, was in reality a subterfuge. True mining operations require a great deal of technology, expertise, and capital, certainly at a level beyond a sixteenth-century eunuch or other official dispatched from the palace. The Ming dynasty silver mine was, more often than not, simply a place where there was alleged to be silver, though there wasn’t necessarily any way to get it out of the ground. The eunuchs or other officials in charge of the project, reasonably anticipating failure, would indeed force rich people living
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nearby to act as the “heads” or guarantors of the mine, and these unfortunates were compelled to make up for the operating expenses, as well as for the inevitable short or nonexistent yield of the mine. In this way, mining, so called, was really a very roundabout way of implementing a tax on the wealthy. Disguised as a method to harvest silver from out of the ground, it was in practice nothing but a way to harvest silver from out of the pockets of the rich. If this method of taxation smacks of “Oriental” indirection, it should be pointed out that the operators of Spanish mines in South America also often collected payments from individuals in lieu of their coerced labor in the mines, so that Spanish colonial mines, too, realized their profits at least partly from taxing people. As will be seen in Wanli’s case, he gradually abandoned all pretense of mining and spoke of his policy simply as a tax. He did so, even as he continued to authorize tax relief for troubled areas. Plainly, he was trying to focus the extraordinary new taxes on the wealthy, since conventional taxes, he realized, were deflected by them onto the poor. The “mine tax” (kuang shui), therefore, while denounced in traditional histories as wantonly indiscriminate, was actually a desperate attempt at precision.4 When Wanli decided to declare economic war on the rich, he seems to have decided also not to mince words with them. Censor Wei Yunzhen, who had recently been held up as an example of thrifty administration (and who continued to be rewarded by the emperor for it) begged in a memorial of October 26, 1596 that mining operations be stopped, but Wanli did not even answer his memorial. He had already made up his mind and was not about to be dissuaded from his course, certainly not by gentry bureaucrats who were part of the problem, if not the source of it. Former first grand secretary Shen Shixing, writing a little later from his retirement, observed that The Emperor lacks neither intelligence nor spiritedness. In affairs, he is determined, resolute, and accustomed to making up his own mind, and he seldom shows any doubt or hesitation. Oftentimes, a profusion of memorials on a given subject, or an inordinately complicated debate, will make him exceedingly vexed, resulting in disaffection and stalemate. At such times, any further memorials that may arrive are like pebbles being thrown into the ocean. In the recent case of designating an heir apparent, the entire bureaucracy demanded it, and yet he would not suffer it to happen. As for the current mining tax, no matter how many are those who speak of its disadvantages, he will never abolish it.5
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Events overseas would confirm Wanli yet further in his determination. On October 21, 1596, Chinese envoys bearing Wanli’s edict investing Toyotomi Hideyoshi as king of Japan were finally received in Osaka. For some reason, perhaps because of the Chinese demand that the Japanese withdraw all their troops from Korea (they still held Pusan), Hideyoshi became enraged and canceled his own investiture ceremony. Negotiations were discontinued, and by the spring of 1597, Hideyoshi had sent another 140,000 men to Korea. The Chinese countered with a second expedition of their own, and the fighting was thus rejoined, to last another year.6 With an added sense of urgency, therefore, Wanli redoubled his efforts. He invested his mine tax agents with more official authority in such a way as to place them beyond the supervisory control of conventional local officials such as magistrates, prefects, and even grand coordinators. Now, in the event of a dispute between a mining commissioner and another local official, the mining commissioner would enjoy the benefit of all doubt, and the commissioners lost no time telling local officials what to do. One eunuch who had been sent out in the first wave of mine commissioners, Chen Zeng, wrote, “All matters should proceed as I wish. I will delegate tasks to the various civil and military officials and grand coordinators, managing them in such a way as to provide both clear encouragement and punishment.” Another eunuch, Lu Kun, memorialized that “Since the various officials answer to me, I should have a formal sphere of authority.” The historian Wen Bing (1609–1669), after paraphrasing these memorials, commented that “There were now some matters that were off limits to the gentry” (jinshen). Sure enough, in the fall of 1597, Chen Zeng charged that Wei Guoxian, the magistrate of Fushan county, Dengzhou prefecture, Shandong province was obstructing mining operations. Wei was jailed, and a grand coordinator who got involved in the case, Wan Xiangchun, was fined.7 It is important to note that, just as Wanli gave his commissioners favorable consideration in any dispute with conventional officials, he also gave them more attention in general. Even as Wanli ignored the complaints of the scholar officials, he responded to the memoranda of his mining officers quite promptly, often within the day they were received. This selective diligence belies the historical portrait of Wanli as an inattentive emperor, a portrait first painted by the members of the gentry bureaucracy, who claimed that he did not give enough attention to their official correspondence. Really, the problem was that the emperor gave too much attention to the wrong
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people’s correspondence. In the late 1590s, gentry bureaucrats would gladly have traded Wanli for ten inattentive emperors. A censor named Zhang Yangmeng complained around this time that Wanli was actively approving too many requests for more mines, and he seemed as bitter as a spurned lover that the emperor now sought council from other sources and not from people like himself, “as if these palace guards were all selflessly devoted to their sovereign and the court gentry (chao shen) were all hindrances to the state.” Zhang was trying to be sarcastic, but he represented the emperor’s thinking quite accurately. Wanli, who was as intelligent as he was attentive, no longer trusted the gentry to be of any service to him or to the state. He was, therefore, circumventing them in the bureaucracy and attacking them in the countryside. The gentry-dominated government was essentially overthrown, and a new apparatus, composed of minor palace functionaries responsible only to the emperor, was put in its place.8 The gentry were quite aware of their catastrophe. On December 2, 1598, a censor named Xu Wenzao memorialized the throne to describe what he saw of the provinces during a trip to take up a new post. River transportation was severely limited, Xu said, owing not only to drought but also to “bandits,” meaning mine commissioners. The evils wrought by mining from Henan to northern Nanjing province far outweighed the benefits. The miners were “levying heavy taxes on great families” (pou ke yu dahu) and had given up on digging altogether. “Your Majesty sent these people to obtain wealth from nature,” Xu naïvely (or sarcastically) informed the emperor, “but really they’re getting it from the villages.” He closed his memorial by linking the miners’ depredations cosmologically to the drought that paralyzed river traffic: “With a seizure of Heaven’s power like this, it is no wonder the rains have not come.” Xu’s memorial was, of course, ignored.9 Soon, all the exactions carried out by “miners” were classed broadly as kuang shui or “mine tax,” and the so-called mine tax commissioners (kuang shi) were given more and more control over the empire’s regular tax portfolios. This fine-tuning developed by stages, as the emperor took pains in late 1598 and early 1599 to grant imperial sanction to commissioners’ various activities and thus make them seem more legitimate. In the autumn of 1598, a Beijing memorialist charged that “false officials” were collecting taxes in the suburbs. In response, the court invented formal-sounding names for what the commissioners were taking, such as “boat taxes” (chuan shui), “shop taxes” (dian shui),
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and so on. Naturally, this haphazard search for revenue began to interfere with the tax operations of the conventional gentry-officials. Conflicts erupted violently in the spring of 1599, when a eunuch commissioner named Li Dao accused a prefect and a magistrate in his area of embezzling the state’s taxes. The prefect, Wu Baoxiu, had tried to restrain some of Li Dao’s more unsubtle activities, but the eunuch had the greater effective power. He ordered that Wu and the magistrate be arrested, causing Wu’s wife to commit suicide. Before a month passed (perhaps to prevent further misunderstandings in the future), the regular tax portfolios of every province in the empire were formally transferred to the mine commissioners.10
Chen Feng One particularly obnoxious mine commissioner was a eunuch named Chen Feng, who had worked in the imperial stables before being appointed in March 1599 as a commercial tax and mining supervisor in Huguang province. There, he epitomized the new experiment in direct control by imperial henchmen and was perhaps the most ruthless gatherer of wealth under the new order, as the following account of his operations shows: As soon as the eunuch commissioners arrived in the town of Shipai, they seized a local resident, Hou Tianjue, and through illegal beatings, forced him to deliver up the various precious metals in Daye county. They also seized Hou Tianming and some seven others. The next day, they entered Chengtian prefecture, where they hoped to open up the jade tombs from the Song dynasty that were rumored to be on the property of a Liu Canjiang. They took Mr. Liu into custody but were not able to find what they were looking for [meaning the jade]. The day after that, the eunuchs traveled many miles by boat to Zhongxiang county, where they arrested a rich man, Li Qinqin, who lived on the border with the next prefecture. This Mr. Li had about a thousand servants and another thousand tenant farmers, and thus the eunuchs were fearful of provoking a riot in the county. They therefore dispatched soldiers and designated officials to watch them [before bringing Li in]. [Subsequently], they moved again by boat to Jinhuatan, where they captured and began beating the twelve members of the family of Mao Tingbo. They forced the Mao’s to lead them to all the precious metal produced in Longwangzhou.11
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Ultimately, Chen Feng and company tried to appropriate the revenue of Zhongxiang county. To leverage this demand, they simply kidnapped a county official.12 Other accounts of Chen Feng’s operations follow closely this pattern of focused violence against the rich. A Wu Zhongming asserted that Chen Feng oppressed both gentry and commoners in Wuchang and Hanyang prefectures, though the eunuch seemed clearly to single out the former group. Chen approached individual gentry (here the word is xiangchen, meaning “officials residing in the countryside”) and claimed to be in the process of obtaining imperial authorization to confiscate their property. These gentlemen evidently believed Chen’s threats, for they paid him large sums to escape the promised persecution. Minor officials working for Chen visited other likely sources of revenue such as students and merchants, with similar results. This tactic of extortion only turned violent, according to Wu’s account, when it was extended to “poor families who could not respond to the pressure.” In such cases, women were searched for jewelry in their bedrooms, a process that seems to have led the excitable searchers to the act of rape. The wives and daughters of students (shengyuan) were raped as well.13 It is not the goal of this book either to elaborate on the depravity of Chen Feng or to exonerate him. The business at hand, rather, is simply to shed light on this most intense phase of the battle between state and gentry. It is quite certain, first and foremost, that Chen Feng focused his attacks on the local elite, though he certainly may have injured others as well. “The rich and influential were especially marked by Chen Feng,” reads yet another source, and this statement seems irrefutable. Second, although Chen’s methods may have been excessive, his general actions were fully in accord with the Wanli emperor’s policy, and he was basically following orders. Chen Feng was duly authorized to take over the tax portfolio of Zhongxiang county, for example, and even his brazen request to dig in a wealthy family’s tomb was speedily approved by the emperor. As has been noted, the local gentry allowed themselves to be shaken down by Chen Feng because they believed the emperor was behind him. Finally, the fact that there were local officials helping Chen Feng would suggest that this statist assault on the gentry, though carried out by infamous eunuchs and palace guards, was at least passively supported by some members of the amalgamated gentryofficial class. The struggle between state and gentry thus retained
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its fratricidal character, even as the two sides might have seemed, at last, to be so easy to differentiate.14 Chen Feng’s commissioners often faced mobs of angry people who objected to their activities, and some of these confrontations grew into large demonstrations and violent riots. Since it is very clear that Chen Feng was engaged in a focused assault on the gentry, can it not therefore be hypothesized that the riots against Chen were orchestrated by the gentry, as a response?15 In his preface to the Ying shi ji lue, a collection of documents concerning the Wuchang events, a gentleman named Hong Wenheng wrote, “The gentry (shi) here are resolute, the people (min) simple. Resolute means difficult to bend; simple means prone to alarm.” This cryptic style appears also in an account by prefect Wang Yusheng (the editor of the Ying shi ji lue) of one of the uprisings against Chen, in which he wrote, “In the countryside, the common people (xiaomin) are shutting their doors and hiding themselves, while in town, the gentry (shimin) are so agitated that the situation might get out of hand.” Wang asked his superiors to “Write Chen Feng and hold him responsible for the agitation and the injury. Issue an edit to the gentry (shimin) and order them to let Chen Feng go. Memorialize the throne and urge the abolition of all the silver shops (jinchang).” It is hard to keep track of the uprisings the people of Wuchang launched against Chen Feng. The incident described by Prefect Wang had broken out on July 6, 1599 and was occasioned by Chen Feng’s abduction of the Zhongxiang county official and several shengyuan (students). Perhaps Chen was besieged inside some government buildings, hence Wang’s desire that the gentry let him go. On or about January 17, 1600, there was a separate incident in which Chen Feng found himself trapped in a government office again, facing another set of rock-throwing shengyuan, who were seeking revenge for the outrages committed against their women, described above.16 Most of the rioting against Chen Feng in Wuchang thus seems to have been carried out by shengyuan, and the scholars Wang Chunyu and Du Wanyan confirm that shengyuan were the usual suspects in most cases of anti–mine tax riots. As members of the gentry fighting for their own protection, the shengyuan certainly cannot be discounted, but it still seems a bit surprising that the more influential, upper gentry did not bring out heavier guns. David Robinson has studied the well-known “resources of violence” available to the local elite, and many powerful gentry, such as Xu Jie (see introduction) and the art connoisseur Dong Qichang (1555–1636), were notorious
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for employing large gangs of intimidating henchmen to protect their interests. It is certainly quite reasonable to assume that gentry of this sort, coming under the attack of tax commissioners like Chen Feng, would simply turn their henchmen loose on their attackers. Chen Feng himself, according to one of the above-mentioned accounts, made just this type of assumption when dealing with the rich man (fu min) Li Qinqin and his thousands of house servants (jia tong) and tenants (zhuang dian). Chen chose on that occasion to exercise caution; but in other cases, if the sources are to be believed, the gentry seem to have submitted very meekly, ransoming their persons in lieu of counterattacking with their own thugs. What happened to the gentry’s vaunted power?17 The simplest answer is that the mine tax commissioners had nullified it, by usurping the gentry’s imperial protection. Wanli’s commissioners, marauders though they may have been, operated under imperial sanction and thus could command the resources of local government. Confronting Li Qinqin’s henchmen, Chen Feng needed only to “dispatch soldiers (bing) and designate officials (guan) to watch them,” and the words used to describe these personnel denote public operatives rather than private henchmen. Furthermore, Chen Feng did, after all, escape the numerous uprisings against him, behind defensive screens of government officers. During the January 17 riot, grand coordinator Zhi Keda and other regional officials manned the gates of the location where Chen Feng was barricaded, and they also posted additional soldiers to stand guard. These government forces made the difference between life and death for Chen Feng, and they enabled him to return immediately to his depredations.18 Wang Chunyu and Du Wanyan have brought to light evidence concerning anti–mine tax disturbances elsewhere, which is among the scant handful of accounts that do in fact describe the resistance of higher-level gentry, not merely shengyuan. Even these higher-level gentry counterattacks, though, were easily suppressed by government forces called in by the eunuchs, which would probably explain why they were so unusual. Somewhere in Shandong province in the spring of 1600, the eunuch mine tax commissioner Li Feng memorialized that gentry (xiangguan, or officials residing in the countryside) had conspired to launch an uprising. The ringleaders were local strongman (tu hao) Li Yunyi, together with Wu Yinghong, a former assistant prefect (tong pan), Lao Yangkui, who held the intermediate academic degree (juren), and several other people of name, and they had, indeed, organized a gang numbering over one thousand
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people. However, it just wasn’t strong enough. Responding swiftly to Li Feng’s memorial, the Wanli emperor dispatched the Embroidered Uniform Guard, with orders to take the leaders into custody and bring them back to Beijing for interrogation. In the fall of 1601, in Raochuan prefecture, Jiangxi province, the local mine eunuch (kuang jian), Pan Xiang, similarly complained that a local strongman named Yang Xinsan had led a gang of over ten thousand on a rampage of the imperial kilns at Jingdezhen, while assistant prefect Chen Qike looked the other way. On Wanli’s orders, these two men were also taken away by the Embroidered Uniform Guard. For better or worse, Wanli’s unconventional revenue machine had decisively broken the local power of the gentry.19 With Wanli and his commissioners holding all the powerful cards, as it were, it simply wasn’t prudent for most gentry to put up an active resistance. Instead, the gentry contrived an indirect response to Wanli’s attack. On the one hand, they would defend their interests at the local level by leaving the muscle work to the shengyuan, egging them on in some cases but refraining from supporting them too overtly. On the other hand, they would act in their official, bureaucratic capacities to continue to remonstrate with the emperor, while at the same time stealthily maneuvering to undermine his henchmen.20 This September 3, 1600 memorial on the subject of Chen Feng, written by Minister of Personnel Li Dai (1531–1607), highlights all the major components of this strategy. Since even Your Majesty’s officials ( guan) and gentry (shi) can offer no effective resistance to the palace officials’ lackeys, one can only imagine how hard it is for the common people. Therefore, while officials and gentry merely file their reports on the mine tax excesses, the common people, for their part, are compelled to take matters into their own hands to eradicate the problem. Their homes are being searched, their property confiscated, their very lives being thrown away in an orgy of profit seeking, as if they were caught in the middle of a war. They are selling off their wives and children as though they were livestock. They cannot work the land or engage in commerce. The mournful sound of their lament reaches heavenward, and the righteous fury of their anger is likewise boiling over. Alas that Your Majesty cannot hear them! . . . The militia that has been called out by Chen Feng now numbers several hundred. His people do not go out unless they are armed and armored and able to protect themselves. The situation cannot last long like this. Your Majesty has been observing the situation
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carefully, in lieu of accepting the hasty conclusions of others. Very well, I presume only to ask Your Majesty: if Chen Feng were not injuring the people so severely, why are they so opposed to him? If the people did not all want to kill Chen Feng, why would he require a guard? A militia several hundred strong must be costing Chen Feng at least ten thousand teals. Would he willingly part with such a sum if he were not plundering some ten times that amount from the people?21
The very truthful claim that local gentry were no match for Wanli’s commissioners, the doubtful assertion that the common people were suffering more, the half-disguised glee at the commoners supposedly taking matters into their own hands (allegedly with no gentry instigation), the general appeal for sympathy—all are well in evidence. In addition, Li Dai charged Chen Feng with embezzlement, playing on Wanli’s preoccupation with revenue, should the emperor prove unresponsive to moral suasion. Accusing the mine commissioners of holding out—of keeping some of the plunder for themselves, rather than remitting it to the treasury—was a clever way to erode Wanli’s support for them. Many officials besides Li Dai came to rely on this tactic. Sometime in 1600, another official complained about Chen Feng along similar lines, saying, “Your Majesty is under the impression that the mine tax is being used to the advantage of the state finances. In fact, owing to every species of selfish (si) embezzlement, only the dregs are left for the state. The rest has been spent on debauchery and jewelry.”22 The reason Wanli failed immediately to respond to the gentry’s remonstrance was not that he was insensitive to popular discontent or that he was unconcerned about the embezzlement of revenue but that he continued to distrust the source of the information. Categorically rejecting anything the gentry had to say, Wanli ended up categorically accepting the intelligence provided by his mine commissioners, for it was one party’s word against the other’s, and without knowing the situation first hand, Wanli’s trust, either way, could only be blind. Accusations against Wanli’s mine commissioners, therefore, were only effective if they were corroborated by other mine commissioners. It was, in fact, only the testimony of another eunuch that finally convicted Chen Feng. That Wanli would listen to a eunuch after he had ignored the two gentlemen cited above is yet further evidence that Wanli’s supposed inattentiveness was in reality a selective (and from the point of view of the gentry, incorrect) attentiveness.
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It was the eunuch Li Dao, a supervisor of local boat taxes, who wrote that Chen Feng was stopping merchant boats, condemning their cargoes, and remitting to the state one quarter of the proceeds, while keeping the rest. Li declared this practice to be “injuring the state and exploiting the people.” Immediately, Wanli rescripted that “Chen Feng is levying heavy taxes on the people and forwarding small revenues to the treasury. His collections on land and water have harassed merchants and common people, and he has falsely withheld portions of the state’s taxes. Despicable!” Chen Feng was recalled to Beijing, where the emperor, in spite of everything, continued to protect him from his accusers. Chen Feng’s ultimate fate is unknown.23
Chen Zeng Meets Li Sancai The efficaciousness of the gentry’s sophisticated antieunuch strategy would be tested again in the prefectures immediately north of the Yangzi River, in the province of Nanjing, where the eunuch Chen Zeng (not to be confused with Chen Feng) was active. Chen Zeng was among the first eunuchs dispatched to open mines in 1596. One secondary source claims that Chen Zeng was really an informed advocate of actual mining operations, but the authoritative primary source for such a claim is unclear. It is much more certain, however, that Chen Zeng was even less popular than Chen Feng (if such a thing were possible). In fact, Chen Zeng was the most notorious eunuch among Wanli’s mine tax corps. He had already caused the removal of several local officials (including Wei Guoxian, magistrate of Fushan county, as related above) and had developed a considerable reputation for plunder. Like Chen Feng, Chen Zeng employed a number of shady accomplices. In Chen Zeng’s case, his chief collaborator was a man named Cheng Shouxun, and this lackey added greatly to the infamy of his boss. In the early days of 1600, an official named Liu Yuewu had the following report to make concerning Chen Zeng’s and Cheng Shouxun’s activities: I had recently taken ill in the Yizhen/Yangzhou region and was there awaiting orders. A rumor was then circulating to the effect that Assistant Secretary of the Hall of Military Glory Cheng Shouxun, on the authority of some secret edict, was visiting the rich merchants of every town and was searching these households for rare jewels. I scoffed at the rumor, giving it no credence, but in fact, this Cheng Shouxun did soon arrive. He and his entourage traveled in horse-drawn carriages, flying banners and pennants and blocking all other traffic.
The Wanli Emperor, 1596–1606 At the head of this procession, a mounted soldier in full military regalia held aloft a placard on which was written in golden characters, “ATTENTION TO ORDERS!” Following him were two similarly attired mounted officers. One carried a placard directing all rich merchants, great families, and those with illegal wealth to fall in behind him. The other carried a placard ordering all officials and civilians concealing precious stones to fall in behind him. The rest of the group, including halberd bearers, horses, and footmen, could not be counted. I was made speechless by the sight. Over the next few days, Cheng Shouxun promulgated several directives, each enforced by some hulking, rootless, goon. One day, someone could be told he was “rich in violation of the law” and thus beaten. The next day, someone else could be told, “Your family is concealing precious jewelry,” and likewise beaten. Cheng Shouxun also had a copy of a memorial by Chen Zeng [which contained a list of names]. He would refer to this memorial and point people out, saying, “You must be Mr. A. You must be Mr. B. You are Mr. Zhao. You are Mr. Qian.” All these individuals were from families of some influence and were identified in order and treated as a group. They were arrested without being immediately interrogated, shackled together, and dragged about in groups of three. Cheng Shouxun ordered that they be paraded around the wards and marketplaces, and all who saw this spectacle were outraged. Finally, they were interrogated, and then they were placed on prison barges that had been prepared for the purpose. They were confined on the barges day and night, forced to remain standing, and deprived of all food and water. Those who managed to sneak to shore were met on the bank by the usual crowd of hoodlums and hounded back aboard; and soon they were put under even heavier guard on the barges themselves. It was a completely illegal detainment, shameful and odious. The persons held had no means to stay alive, nor could they wish for an early and merciful death. Their hapless families bankrupted themselves to come up with tribute and ransom, which could total ten thousand taels in some cases and was rarely below several taels in any case. The Yizhen student Li Lianglin, the Nanjing salt merchant Wang Maoji, and other leading salt merchants of Huaian and Yangzhou such as the Gao’s, Wangs, Fangs, and Quans, all were completely wiped out in this affair, and many soon died. Public opinion was greatly agitated for a time, and the people closed up and abandoned their homes, scattering as far away as they could. Presently, Cheng Shouxun exhausted Yizhen and Yangzhou, and moved off to Nanjing, Taiping, Wuzhou, and Weizhou. His reputation has spread as far as Suzhou and Hangzhou. In feasting and revelry, he throws away money like it was dirt, and he pays his prostitutes and singing girls in the hundreds of taels . . . He often calls
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State versus Gentry—Ming Dynasty China out to people, saying, “I am the Emperor’s protégé. I report to no one else!” and, “I carry a secret edict; the censors cannot impeach me.” I have heard that in his home village, he has erected . . . above his gate an inscription reading, “Built by Special Grace of the Emperor” . . . He is somehow supposed to be an in-law of Chen Zeng, and he relies a great deal on the protection this status affords him. Now, Cheng Shouxun does not have the qualifications to engage in these activities. He was never subject to the normal evaluations of worthiness and faults. It is simply that the Emperor gives too much consideration to Chen Zeng’s requests and carelessly assigned Cheng Shouxun some empty titles and honors . . . As a result, Cheng Shouxun is emboldened to act brazenly, manufacture offices, insult good people, wantonly cause damage, cultivate a host of other evils, demoralize the gentry (shishen), wrong the common people—is there a limit to his lawlessness and immorality? . . . Chen Zeng is mine commissioner in Shandong, and since Cheng Shouxun is his running dog, his semi-authority should be limited to that place. I have recently heard him say, “I have already delivered several ten thousands of taels. Heaven is happy, and the Emperor has already sent his thanks.” I do not know if this is true or not, but assuming it is, the amount he mentioned is a mere day’s take for him in the form of high taxes (pou ke). Furthermore, people are saying that he must have amassed some hundred thousand taels in the years he has been in operation. He might, therefore, be embezzling millions for every hundred he remits to the government. Will Your Majesty be cheated by Cheng Shouxun? If your Majesty arrests him and confiscates his holdings, in a few days, the yield would be several hundred thousand taels, which would allow Your Majesty to waive a corresponding amount of the mine tax. If this is not so, I am prepared to face charges of speaking improperly.24
The main points of this memorial speak for themselves, and they basically conform to what was alleged against Chen Feng. Whereas Chen Feng was often attacked by gangs of shengyuan, Chen Zeng faced opposition from a powerful regional official. Li Sancai was a friend of Righteous Circles leader Gu Xiancheng who had lost his job in the Ministry of Revenue in the controversy surrounding the 1583 civil service examination. Since his departure from Beijing, Li Sancai had served in several provincial posts, cultivating an aggressive and flamboyant administrative style. On July 1, 1599, Li Sancai was made junior assistant censor in chief, concurrently to serve as Director General of Grain Transport (cao yun zong du) and grand coordinator of Yangzhou, Huaian, and Fengyang prefectures in Nanjing province. Li Sancai probably had the highest remaining
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authority still held by conventional, degree-holding officials in the provinces. He would use every ounce of his amazing political talent to disenthrall Wanli from Chen Zeng by simultaneous appeal to his humanity and his concern for revenue. In other words, Li and Chen would play a long game of cat and mouse, with the emperor acting as referee.25 On one front, Li Sancai kept up a steady barrage of memorials, in which he diplomatically acknowledged Wanli’s fiscal concerns while highlighting the excesses of his policy. Noting in a memorial of November 17, 1699, for example, that additional revenue had been a legitimate objective during the war with Hideyoshi, Li maintained that since hostilities were finally drawing to a close, increased extractions from the economy were no longer necessary. In a subsequent memorial, dated February 29, 1600, Li began elaborating on the mine commissioners’ abuses, though he was careful to present the problem as one in which Wanli’s honorable intentions had been subverted by thugs. Even if Wanli, with his impeccable judgment, had selected decent officers to put his policy into effect, Li submitted, there was no guarantee that these officers would select good people, in their turn. It was these villainous underlings of Wanli’s mine commissioners who were wreaking havoc wherever they went, such that “the rich are no longer immune to their depredations.” Here Li singled out Cheng Shouxun, who was terrorizing and extorting money from the wealthy students of Xuzhou.26 When Wanli responded evasively, Li Sancai’s memorials became less diplomatic and more accusatory, causing Wanli to give up replying at all. Li’s repeated denunciations of Wanli’s mine commissioner policy, made throughout the turn of the seventeenth century, became celebrated in their own day and are still frequently cited by historians. One harsh passage of this correspondence was paraphrased in the official dynastic history, the Ming shi. It reads, Your Majesty is enamoured of jewels and riches; the people want only to be warm and fed. Your Majesty cares about his future descendents; the people love their wives and children. What is to be done if Your Majesty seeks to pile his riches as high as the stars and yet does not allow the people to store up a few extra grains of rice?27
Hyperbole failing, Li tried sarcasm. Playing on the term “grand coordinator” (xun fu), he suggested that officers of the new revenue regime be dubbed “grand agitators” (xun rao) or “grand despoilers” (xun
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hai), and he invented another office, which might best translate as “taxistrate” (zhi shui), a pun based on “magistrate” (zhi xian). Sarcasm failing, he tried to manipulate the emperor’s vanity, writing, “History will convey to unborn generations in big characters how, in Wanli 28 [1600], the Emperor listened to the advice of censor Li Sancai and abolished the mine tax, ushering in a golden age of profound virtue and inspiring beneficence.” Flattery failing, he turned to ominous predictions of the fall of the dynasty. Stocking the imperial coffers meant nothing, Li warned, if the people were alienated in the process. “When the people’s sentiment is lost,” he wrote, “the Mandate of Heaven goes with it.” This tactic failed too.28 As was the case with Chen Feng, the problem was that Wanli still trusted his mine commissioners more than his conventional officials. Li Sancai continued to fight a losing battle, as even more taxation responsibilities, including those related to the Grand Canal (Li’s nominal responsibility) were transferred to Chen Zeng. Li mockingly impugned the competence of Wanli’s henchmen in dealing with such matters. “These people have no idea what they are doing or what they are talking about, and they seem to think they are playing children’s games,” Li complained. “They do not care about the important business of the Court, and their only real talent is that of enticing the Emperor and exploiting the people. Fortunately, Your All-Knowingness (sheng ming) fully understands how to handle this mob.”29 Wanli only understood enough to accuse the conventional administrators of obstructing his mine commissioners. In a rare defense of his policy, Wanli claimed that recent military campaigns and palace ceremonies had created a fiscal crisis. The usual methods of taxation, however, left both the state (guan) and the people (min) poor, while corrupt officials ended up with most of the wealth. Wanli had, therefore, resolved to open up mines “to extract wealth from the excess bounty of nature,” but officialdom thwarted this effort as well. “Why,” Wanli asked, “have the regional officials uniformly forsaken the state’s (guo) cause and failed to cultivate a public (gong) spirit to meet the crisis? They have, rather, sought only to augment their own reputations by obstructing Our policy, while seeking also to cover up their own faults. Is it their duty to sit back and watch taxes go unpaid or past due? They are hampering the state’s revenue, and it is extremely despicable for them to do so.” The emperor made the regional officials responsible for meeting the tax quotas that were then under the control of the mine commissioners. In other words, if the commissioners didn’t meet their quotas, the regional
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officials would be punished by forfeiture of salary. Li Sancai had no choice but to comply, and he settled into a rather uneasy working relationship with Chen Zeng.30 As it turned out, it was precisely by keeping his enemy so close that Li Sancai was able ultimately to destroy him. Continuing to question Chen Zeng’s competence, Li portrayed the eunuch as illiterate, untrained in politics, and a pawn of local ruffians. He charged that Cheng Shouxun was embezzling revenue right under Chen’s nose, and, not expecting Wanli to believe him, he invited the emperor to ask other eunuchs if any of his representations were untrue. “Your Majesty may have my head if they are,” Li swore. Soon, however, Li realized that Chen Zeng’s gullibility was an asset, not a liability, and he began playing Chen like a Stradivarius violin. To alienate Chen Zeng from his underlings, he issued an arrest order for some miscreants who he claimed to be impersonating or acting falsely on the authority of palace eunuchs. Continuing to monitor renegades and other impostors who were harassing local people by claiming some connection to the mine tax corps, Li claimed to be acting in Chen’s interest.31 At length earning Chen Zeng’s confidence in this campaign against naughty underlings, Li Sancai got Chen to cut off his own legs by impeaching Cheng Shouxun. Persuading the mine commissioner that his henchman was marring his otherwise sterling reputation, Li suggested that Chen should turn Cheng over to Wanli. Besides, Li said, Cheng’s extortion was enabling him to live in greater luxury than his boss, and perhaps he was even plotting rebellion. If Chen Zeng exposed this threat, Li promised, the emperor would certainly, out of sheer gratitude, promote him to Chief Eunuch. So swayed, Chen Zeng did in fact report Cheng Shouxun to Wanli, and the emperor promptly ordered Li Sancai to place Cheng under arrest. With Cheng gone, and with Chen’s remaining subordinates keeping their distance from Li Sancai, the eunuch was distressed to find that he was not raising as much revenue as before. Moreover, Wanli seemed more suspicious than grateful, in light of the recent allegations of embezzlement. Now that revenue had dropped off in Chen Zeng’s district, the emperor was said to be wondering if Chen himself were not also on the take. As Chen became increasingly panicked, the intriguing Li came to “warn” him that mounted guards had been seen leaving the capital and were heading their way. Without waiting to see what business they had with him, Chen Zeng hanged himself, sometime in 1605.32
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Wanli Backs Down The mine tax policy of which Chen was chief agent did not long outlive him. The allegations of embezzlement surrounding Chen Feng, Chen Zeng, and other mine commissioners may have broken the protective spell that Wanli had cast over his policy. Wanli had gambled that palace eunuchs directly supervised by the throne were more trustworthy than gentry bureaucrats. The gamble had failed to pay off, and after about nine years, Wanli was ready to call it quits. In the autumn of 1605, a gentleman named Feng Qi became perhaps the zillionth civil official to memorialize against the mine tax. He asserted that the emperor could not hope to enrich the state if the people were injured in the process. The emperor gave Feng’s memorial the customary pocket veto, but perhaps it was finally clear that officials like Feng were right and the mine tax had done more harm than good, even to the state itself. On January 10, 1606, Wanli issued an edict ordering the cessation of all mining and the return of all tax portfolios to the conventional officials. Twelve shengyuan held as prisoners in Chengtian prefecture (Chen Feng’s old territory) were also ordered released. Wanli’s desperate attack was over. The state’s charge against the gentry had been called back.33 Did Wanli’s attack bring back the expected loot? The results were noticeable but unspectacular, as table 3.1 suggests. A slight increase in revenue is perceivable, relative to past years (as is an improbable balance of revenue and expenditure in 1604 and 1605 that the modern statisticians Quan Hansheng and Li Longhua attribute to the Ministry of Revenue’s adopting a primitive budget system to control expenses during those years). This increase seems to have barely balanced the budget. Just the same, the big question during this stretch of time is not how much revenue was delivered Table 3.1
Table of Revenue versus Expenditure, 1596–1606 (Taels)34
Year
Revenue
Expenditure
1596–1599 1600 1602 1604 1605 1606
Not Available 4,000,000 4,700,000 4,582,000 3,549,000 4,000,000
Not Available 4,500,000 4,500,000 4,582,000 3,549,000 Not Available
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to the state but rather how much treasure was extorted from the countryside. Wang Chunyu and Du Wanyan, experts on the eunuch system during the Ming dynasty, have estimated that the mine tax generated some three million extra taels of silver for the Ming state but that eight or nine times that amount had been kept by tax commissioners. Fan Shuzhi has likewise quoted the complaints of several regional officials who served during Wanli’s mine tax gambit and has noted how they all claimed that the tax eunuchs were giving to the state much less than what they extracted from society. Compiling aggregate statistics from these reports, Fan gives his own conservative estimate that between 1597 and 1606, eunuch mine tax commissioners delivered to the central government treasury some 5.69 million taels of silver and kept for themselves between forty and fifty million taels. In other words, the commissioners turned over to the state only 10 to 20 percent of their total haul.35 This level of embezzlement seems quite excessive, yet some perspective is in order. It was certainly not unknown for civil officials of the Ming to profit handsomely from their government positions. The basic problem was that since official salaries were unrealistically low, almost the entire body of officialdom was compelled to resort to at least some amount of squeeze to meet their public operating expenses, as well as to provide a more comfortable living standard for their families. Some officials rewarded themselves at the public’s expense more lavishly than others. Though it might be too relativistic to say that everyone was as corrupt as everyone else, one might say more accurately that the eunuchs were being held to a double standard if they were expected to turn the entirety of their extractions over to the central government. One can really only conclude that they probably stole more than everyone else was stealing.36 A more important issue than whether or not the eunuchs withheld revenue from the government was the question of where they obtained the revenue in the first place. The stories of the two Chens, replete with tomb raiding and prison barges for the wealthy, make it quite clear that Wanli’s tax eunuchs singled out wealthy gentry for heavy taxation. Obviously, gentry-officials in the bureaucracy were unlikely to appreciate this sort of attention. Less obviously, and getting back to the question of official squeeze, gentry-officials were also unlikely to appreciate having lost their tax portfolios, with their attendant opportunities for graft, to the commissioners. Li Sancai, in particular, was in a position of significant regional importance
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as director general of grain transport. Presumably, without Chen Zeng’s having taken over the Grand Canal and setting up tax stations there, Li would have been able to skim from the Canal tolls himself. It is interesting to consider also how the officials who memorialized about the embezzlements of the mine commissioners were able to enumerate in such precise detail how much they had stolen. What happened to this money after the mine taxes were abandoned, given the fact that Wanli apparently wanted it delivered to him? It was rumored that Li Sancai, for one, simply repocketed most of what the dead Chen Zeng had pocketed, and the sympathetic Shen Defu (1578–1642), narrating the affair in his notebook, seemed more than willing to excuse him. Perhaps Li and his fellow officials felt they were entitled to it all along, certainly more than any lowly eunuch or servant to a eunuch. It is also interesting to recall from Liu Yuewu’s exposé on Cheng Shouxun that the latter was unqualified to behave as he did. In sum, it would seem that the shrill denunciations of Wanli’s mine commissioners were tinged with a bit of envy.37 Wanli had, after all, picked a fight with a privileged class, which was insulted even more than it was injured. Feng Qi, one of the last to memorialize against the commissioners, highlighted this point when he wrote, The most harmful thing about the mine tax was the considerable authority vested in the palace officials . . . When the pearl collectors were dispatched on their missions of plunder, the gentry ceased to be lords of the people (shidafu ji bu neng wei baixing zuo zhu) . . . This reality was outrageously shameful for the gentry (jinshen), with their Confucian tenets, and it also violated Heaven’s principle and the law of kingship.38
Thus, even at the height of economic warfare between state and gentry, the point of contention remained the abstract question of sovereignty, whether the state or the gentry were lords of the people. Now, in 1606, with the state’s attempt at direct rule thwarted, the gentry were poised to reestablish their dominion, not only over their own villages, but over the state as well.
CHAPTER IV
THE DONGLIN FACTION, 1606–1626
D
uring the hot summer of 1594, following his righteous ousting from the Ministry of Personnel, Gu Xiancheng returned home to Wuxi. On the way, he was questioned at nearly every town by other concerned scholar-officials, who inquired into the moral state of the empire. In answer to these queries, Gu called for patience and resolution. Arriving home in the fall, he fell sick but nonetheless had enough energy to begin work on his philosophical and political journal, the Xiaoxin zhai zha ji. There is a noteworthy entry in this work, made in 1595, that sheds some light on Gu’s thinking under the current circumstances. Apparently, Gu Xiancheng was anxious to cultivate, in addition to patience and resolution, a sense of indignation (fen). “The first prerequisite for learning is indignation,” he wrote. “As is said in the Analects, ‘One who is indignant even forgets to eat.’ All that is necessary to understand is the single word, ‘indignation,’ and then one may become a Confucius.”1 Comparing Gu Xiancheng’s own brand of indignation with the anger that was cultivated by Zhang Juzheng during a leave of absence earlier in his career, it is easy to imagine that both these individuals were simply experiencing a common sort of professional frustration. However, Zhang’s indignation compelled him to become a vigorous minister in order to save the state, while Gu’s compelled him to become a Confucius in order to save the world. For both men, indignation was the prerequisite for bringing all under the sway of their sovereign, be it state or sage. The only difference was that, while the state was singular, the Confucian gentry were plural: the sovereignty Gu espoused was not that of one gentleman but all gentlemen. Thus, once Gu Xiancheng had transformed himself through indignation into a sage, step two was to increase the number of sages and bring them together. Gu described such a gathering in almost
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cosmological terms, as a sort of harmonic convergence of sages that would bring about, as though by nuclear reaction or magic, a veritable explosion of civilization. Indeed, we should endeavor to gather all the good gentlemen (shi) of a single village together to investigate knowledge. In so doing, all the goodness of this village becomes ours, and the whole village is made ample in spirit. When we gather together all the good gentlemen of a single state (guo) to investigate knowledge, then all the goodness of that state becomes ours, and that whole state is made ample in spirit. When we gather together all the good gentlemen under Heaven, then all the goodness under Heaven becomes ours, and all under Heaven becomes ample in spirit.2
This consecutive progression of enlightenment and goodness, from lower to higher levels of social organization, does indeed mention the state (guo), but it is merely an intermediate step on the way to a universal transformation, without any intrinsic civilizing power of its own. Gu’s scheme followed the example of Mencius, who had postulated that the moral values of the “great houses” would likewise spread progressively until they reached the four seas. Gu’s version used the word shi, which seems here best translated as gentlemen, although other renderings would include scholars and gentry. In any case, the point for both Mencius and Gu Xiancheng was that the gentleman/ scholar/great house was the source from which all goodness flowed. The goodness, emphatically, flowed upward, from the massed gentry of the local community, not down from the state or any higher plane. Describing this vision on another occasion, Gu wrote of the practice of philosophical discussion and inquiry (jiangxue), ascribing to it a world-ordering potential that followed various progressions: “From childhood to adulthood to old age, a scholar will not pass one day without jiangxue. From the family to the village to the nation to all under Heaven, there will be no place without jiangxue. From the gentry (jinshen), no farmer, artisan, or merchant shall not receive jiangxue.” Here is perhaps the best example of a clinical, supposedly pejorative term for gentry (jinshen) becoming invested with a moral aura. Indeed, the essential preposition “from” (zi jinshen) implies that the jinshen were the sources of jiangxue, the engines of civilization itself.3 Where did Gu wish to begin this process of massing gentry, spreading goodness, discoursing, and transforming and nurturing society? Naturally, in Jiangnan, the place Zhang Juzheng called the “land of devils.” Around 1598, Gu remarked at how impressed he was with the philosophical discourse originating in the area. Elaborating
The Donglin Faction, 1606–1626
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upon this potential, he said, “Here in Wu [ Jiangnan], there are a great many gentlemen (junzi). If they were