State, Economy, and Society in Post-Military Nigeria

State, Economy, and Society in Post-Military Nigeria

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State, Economy, and Society in Post-Military Nigeria Edited by Said Adejumobi

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STATE, ECONOMY, AND SOCIETY IN POST-MILITARY NIGERIA

Copyright © Said Adejumobi, 2011. All rights reserved. First published in 2011 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN® in the United States—a division of St. Martin’s Press LLC, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010. Where this book is distributed in the UK, Europe and the rest of the world, this is by Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited, registered in England, company number 785998, of Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS. Palgrave Macmillan is the global academic imprint of the above companies and has companies and representatives throughout the world. Palgrave® and Macmillan® are registered trademarks in the United States, the United Kingdom, Europe and other countries. ISBN: 978–0–230–11170–7 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data State, economy, and society in post-military Nigeria / edited by Said Adejumobi. p. cm. ISBN 978–0–230–11170–7 (hardback) 1. Nigeria—Economic conditions—21st century. 2. Nigeria—Social policy—21st century. 3. Social conflict—Nigeria. 4. Nigeria—Politics and government—21st century. I. Adejumobi, Said. HC1055.S7143 2011 330.9669—dc22

2010048467

A catalogue record of the book is available from the British Library. Design by Newgen Imaging Systems (P) Ltd., Chennai, India. First edition: February 2011 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Printed in the United States of America.

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To my late Mother, Alhaja Risikat Adunni Adejumobi, who passed away when this book was being completed

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CON T E N T S

List of Tables

ix

Acknowledgments

xi

Abbreviations

xiii

Note on Contributors

xix

One

Introduction: State, Economy, and Society in a Neo-Liberal Regime Said Adejumobi

Section I Two

Three

Four

Five

1

State, Society, and Social Conf licts

The Press and the Democratic Question: Narrating Ethno-Religious Identities and Conf licts in Nigeria Wale Adebanwi

23

Ethno-Religious Conf licts and National Security in Nigeria: Illustrations from the “Middle Belt” Samuel Egwu

49

Beyond Electoral Democracy: An Anatomy of Ethnic Minority Insurgency in Nigeria’s Oil Niger Delta Cyril Obi

85

Women’s Empowerment Julie Sanda

113

Section II Economic Issues Six

Economic Reforms and Social Welfare Ademola Ariyo

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135

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viii Seven

Contents Corruption in Nigeria Antonia T. Okoosi-Simbine

157

Selected Bibliography

181

Index

191

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TA BL E S

3.1 3.2 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 5.6 5.7 6.1 6.2 6.3

6.4 6.5 7.1 7.2

Internally Displaced Persons from the Nasarawa and Taraba Crises Seeking Refuge in Benue State (Those Living in Recognized Camp) Displaced Persons Living with Willing Hosts in the Local Government Areas of Benue State Challenges to Women Empowerment Participation of Women in Governance in Nigeria, 2000 Women Representation in 1999, 2003, and 2007 General Elections Report Card on Selected MDGs Survey Result on Women’s Participation in Domestic Decision Making Survey Result towards Female Circumcision Attitudes toward Wife Beating Five-Year Average of Federal Government Fiscal Profile (N’million) Five-Year Annual Average of Selected Macroeconomic Indicators What Happened to the Volume of Goods and Services You Buy Now Compared to the Period before the Inception of the Obasanjo Civilian Government and the Provision of Safe Drinking Water? Has There Been Improvement in Power Supply since the Inception of Obasanjo Regime? Regression Result Rating of the Performance of Anti-corruption Agencies Summary of Petitions Referred for Investigation, October 2000–September 2005

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75 76 120 123 124 126 127 127 128 138 139

150 152 153 167 169

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AC K NOW L E DGM E N T S

This is my second book on analyses of the nature of Nigeria’s political economy in the post-military era (post-1999). The first is Governance and Politics in Post-Military Nigeria. This book focuses on the interface between the state, economy, and society in Nigeria explicating the conf licts, contestations, and contradictions in state inf luences and intervention in the economy and social life. The salient character of the Nigerian state during this period was its strong neo-liberal bent in which far reaching neo-liberal economic reforms were undertaken in privatization and banking sector, a new economic blueprint (NEEDS) was put in place, and a strong enterprise to curb the menace of corruption was launched. As the neo-liberal state navigated its economic reform agenda in a highly contested civilian milieu, it was confronted with old and new challenges, some of which assumed heightened proportions, and sometimes shook the country to its very foundation. Some of the challenges include inter-ethnic, inter-communal, and inter-religious conf licts; the age-long problem of the Niger Delta and growing militant insurgency; the role of the media in a civilian dispensation and their projection of conf lict situations; and the problem of citizenship, social welfare, and corruption. This book focuses mainly on the Obasanjo civilian administration; many of the issues raised and the analyses made define present developments in the country. I would like to thank three groups of people. The first is the wonderful and extremely professional staff of Palgrave Macmillan, who supported and assisted me tremendously in making my two books on post-military Nigeria, a reality. Here I have in mind, Chris Chappell, Samantha Hasey, Sarah Whalen, and Kristy Lilas. Of course, there were other people “behind the scenes” in Palgrave who made the publication of the books possible. My gratitude also goes to the team at

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xii

Acknowledgments

Newgen Imaging Systems for their excellent work on the copy-editing process of the book. The second is the staff of the Open Society Initiative for West Africa (OSIWA). My thanks go to Nana Tanko, the Executive Director of OSIWA, Dakar, Senegal, who supported the research project from which this book has emerged. Peter Ocheikwu, the OSIWA Programme Officer in its Nigeria Office, Abuja, remains a friend and brother, whose friendship I continue to cherish. The third group to whom I owe a profound debt of gratitude is my family. They remain a great source of inspiration to me, and their support reinforces my conviction that together we can make Nigeria a better place to live in. Said Adejumobi Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

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A BBR E V I AT ION S

ACE ACP Af DB AFRICOM AFRIGOV AID AMIS ANAPP APP APRM ASCL AU BLP BPE BPFA CA CAN CAPP CBN CCB CDC CDD CDF CEDAW CET CFCR CIDA CLEEN

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Alliance for Credible Elections African, Caribbean and Pacific African Development Bank US Command for Africa African Centre for Democratic Governance Foreign Aid African Union Mission in Sudan All Nigerian Peoples Party All Peoples’ Party African Peer Review Mechanism Ajaokuta Steel Company Limited Africa Union Better Life Programme Bureau for Public Enterprises Beijing Platform for Action Constituent Assembly Christian Association of Nigeria Community Action for Popular Participation Central Bank of Nigeria Code Conduct Bureau Constitution Draft Committee Centre for Democracy and Development Comprehensive Development Framework Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against Women Common External Tariff Citizens’ Forum for Constitutional Reform Canadian International Development Agency Centre for Law Enforcement Education

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xiv CLO CMC COCIN COR COSEDEC CPC CPI CRC CRS DCGG DEOG DFID DMO DPA DPA DRC ECA ECOMIL ECOSOC ECOWAS EFCC EOM ERN ERP EU EXC FATF FCT FEDECO FGD FGN FIRIS FOMWAN GDP GECORN GEM GPAC GSM HDI HPRC

Abbreviations Civil Liberties Organization Citizens Mediation Centre Church of Christ in Nigeria Cross River Ogoja State Movement Socio-economic Development of Coastal States in the Niger Delta Consumer Protection Council Consumer Price Index Convention on the Rights of the Child Catholic Relief Service Donor Coordinating Group on Gender Domestic Election Observation Group UK Department for International Development Debt Management Office Darfur Peace Accord Distributive Pool Account Democratic Republic of Congo Economic Commission for Africa ECOWAS Mission in Liberia UN Economic and Social Council Economic Community for West African States Economic and Financial Crimes Commission European Union Election Observer Mission Electoral Reform Network Economic Recovery Programme European Union Exchange Rate Financial Action Task Force Federal Capital Territory Federal Electoral Commission Focused Group Discussion Federal Government of Nigeria Federal Inland Revenue Service Federation of Moslem Women Association of Nigeria Gross Domestic Product Gender and Constitutional Reform Network. Gender Empowerment Measure Global Programme against Corruption Global System of Telecommunication Human Development Index Health Professional Centre

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Abbreviations HYPPADEC ICJ ICPC IDEA IDPs IEA IGAD IGP IMF INEC IPCR IPPA IYC JDPC JNI KM LEEDS LEMT LGA LGEA LR MAN MCIA MDGs MEND MITP MNOC’s MOPOL MORETO MOSOP MULAC MBZL NADECO NAFDAC NAPEP NAPTIC

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Hydro-Electric Power Areas Development Commission International Court of Justice Independent Corrupt Practices Commission International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance Internally Displaced Persons International Energy Agency Inter-Governmental Authority on Development Inspector General of Police International Monetary Fund Independent National Electoral Commission Institute for Peace and Conf lict Resolution Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement Ijaw Youth Council Development and Peace Commission The Jama atul Nasril Isalm Kaiama Declaration Local Government Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy Labour Monitoring Team Local Government Areas Local Government Education Authority Commercial Lending Rate Manufacturers Association of Nigeria Ministry of Cooperation and Integration in Africa Millennium Development Goals Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism Multinational Oil Corporations Mobile Police Movement for the Payments of Reparations to Ogba People Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People Moslem League for Accountability Middle Belt Zone League National Democratic Coalition National Agency for Food and Drug Law Enforcement Agency National Poverty Alleviation Programme National Agency against Trafficking in Persons

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xvi NASS NBOS NDC NDDC NDLEA NDPCRC NDVF NEC NEEDS NEIT NEPAD NGO NGSF NHRC NIDO NIIA NIOMCO NIMASA NIPC NITEL NLC NNPC NNVS NOA NOC’s NPRC NSCIA NTF NXIM OAU OMNC OMPADEC ONAF OPC PCC PCC PDP PEFS

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Abbreviations National Assembly National Bureau of Statistics Niger Delta Congress Niger Delta Development Commission National Drug Law Enforcement Agency Niger Delta Peace and Conf lict Resolution Committee Niger Delta Volunteer Force National Electoral Commission National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategies Nigeria Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative New Partnership for African Development Non-Governmental Organization National Gender Strategic Framework National Human Rights Commission Nigeria Diaspora Organization Nigerian Institute of International Affairs National Iron Ore Mining Company National Maritime Administration and Safety Agency National Investment Promotion Council Nigerian Telecommunications Limited National Labour Congress Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation Nigerian National Volunteer Service National Orientation Agency National/State Oil Corporations National Political Reform Conference Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs Nigerian Trust Fund National Export-Import Bank Organization of African Unity Oil Multinational Cooperation Oil Mineral Producing Areas Development Commission Oran National Forum Oduaa Peoples’ Congress Consumption Per Capita Public Complaints Commission Peoples’ Democratic Party Programme on Ethnic and Federal Studies

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Abbreviations PHCN PR PRC PRONACO PRSP PWYP REC RECs SAP SEEDS SERAC SMEDAN SNC SOKAPU SRI TAC TI TMG TRANSCORP UMBC UNCICP UNDP UNICEF UNOMIL UNSC USAID VP VVF WAGP WARDC WEP WORNACO

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xvii

Power Holding Company of Nigeria Proportional Representation Provisional Ruling Council Pro-National Conference Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper Publish What You Pay Resident Electoral Commissioner Regional Economic Communities Structural Adjustment Programme State Economic Empowerment & Development Strategy Social and Economic Rights Action Centre Small and Medium Enterprises Development Agency Sovereign National Conference Southern Kaduna Peoples Union Shelter Rights Initiative Technical Aid Corps Transparency international Transition Monitoring Group Transnational Corporation of Nigeria United Middle Belt Congress United Nations Centre for International Crime Prevention United Nations Development Programme United Nation Childrens’ Fund UN Mission in Liberia United Nations Security Council United States Agency for International Development Vice President Vesico-Vaginal Fistula West African Gas Pipeline Women’s Advocacy Research and Documentation Centre Women Environmental Programme Women for Representative National Conference

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CON T R I BU TOR S

Adejumobi, S. (PhD), Associate Professor of Political Science, currently Chief, Public Administration Section and Coordinator, African Governance Report (AGR) at the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. He was Governance Adviser at the ECOWAS Commission, Abuja, Nigeria. Adebanwi, W. (PhD), Assistant Professor, African American Studies, University of California, Davis, USA. Ariyo, A. (PhD), Professor of Economics and Director, Centre for Public-Private Sector Partnerships, Ibadan, Nigeria. Egwu, S. (PhD), Professor of Political Science, University of Jos but currently Governance Team Leader, UNDP Nigerian Country Office, Abuja, Nigeria. Obi, C. (PhD), Associate Research Professor and currently Programme Coordinator, State and Civil Society Programme, Nordic Africa Institute, Sweden. Okoosi-Simbine, A. T. (PhD), Senior Fellow, Nigerian Institute for Economic and Social Research (NISER), Ibadan. Sanda, J. (PhD), Senior Fellow, Nigerian War College, Abuja.

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CH A P T E R

ON E

Introduction: State, Economy, and Society in a Neo-Liberal Regime Said A de jumob i

Introduction The introduction or practice of civilian or democratic rule carries a burden with it. Democracy has relevance especially in underdeveloped countries when it provides a link to social progress and economic improvement in society. Although democracy is fundamentally good in itself, given the freedom and political opportunities that it affords, but this is certainly insufficient in developing societies. Rising expectations and unfulfilled demands are part of the peoples’ underlying basis of political support for democratization in developing countries (Adejumobi, 2002). As Claude Ake (2000: 31) rightly noted, the people “see their political empowerment through democratization as an essential part of the process of getting their economic agenda right at last, as well as managing the development project better, so as to address the intensifying poverty and the prospect of physical extinction.” Thus, the support for democracy in Nigeria, as in many other African countries, is premised on the delivery of both political and economic goods (Bratton and Lewis, 2007) or what Stein Ringen (2007) calls economic and political democracy. In Ringen’s words, If we have democracy in political life but not in economic life and if the weight of economic power grows relative to political power,

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Said Adejumobi then the citizens might have reason to question how democratic their society is and whether political democracy is really of much relevance. . . . The absence of economic democracy strikes back and undermines political democracy. (Ringen, 2007: 48) (Emphasis mine)

As such, the nature of the state, the economic policies that it pursues, and how it defends the interest and welfare of the people are fundamental issues in a democratic political system. But liberal democracy offers a paradox. It is a system premised on a free market ideology. The genealogy of liberal democracy originates from the interest of capital to secure a political system that protects private property while affording political legitimacy and vile political freedom for the people. Liberal democracy constitutes the political and institutional infrastructure for a free market society; a means of effective and legitimized social control with little encumbrances of force and coercion. In liberal democracy, as Ake (2000: 25) observed, “it is not the economy that gets politicized; it is the polity that gets economicized.” In a globalized neo-liberal context, the challenge is even more for a democratizing society. Human relationships are increasingly monetized and depersonalized, society and its welfare largely disconnected from the state, human alienation and desocialization gain ascendance, citizenship becomes hollow and the economic organization of society titled substantially in the interest of capital and the propertied class. The logic of a neo-liberal free market society is “fend for thyself.” This is the context in which civilian rule—a budding form of liberal democracy—was re-introduced in Nigeria in 1999. Although the period of the emergence of civil rule in Nigeria can be regarded as a postadjustment era, as Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) had been thoroughly discredited at that time, and largely abandoned even by its protagonists—the World Bank and the IMF—in favor of a new cliché of building “capable and effective states,” the fundamental premise of neo-liberalism was never jettisoned. The Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP) that replaced SAP created a semblance of popular participation with a fallacy of being “home grown” were premised on market forces. Free market ideology remained the overbearing creed of economic policy formulation and political choices for many countries. The policy choices of Olusegun Obasanjo (Nigeria’s president from 1999 to 2007) exemplify the limitations and contradictions of power in a neo-liberal global context. Obasanjo operating within the ambit1 of civil society during the Babangida military dictatorship (1984–1993) openly and virulently criticized SAP as lacking in “human face and

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Introduction

3

milk of human kindness”; however, his economic reform agenda on the assumption of power from May 1999 was not particularly different from that of the Babangida regime. It was premised on the logic of economic neo-liberalism with free reign to market forces and unprecedented privatization and deregulation measures. More importantly, there was a privatization of politics and power in the country under the Obasanjo regime. Obasanjo’s apostasy to market doctrine may well be part of the constraints and reality of power of a peripheral country in a hegemonic neo-liberal global system. What was the nature of the state, society, and economy after the inception of civilian rule in Nigeria from May 1999? What were the tensions, conf licts, and contradictions generated in the process? How did the Nigerian state connect to the lives of ordinary people and provide the gains of democratic politics? What were the contradictions of a neo-liberal democratizing regime? These are the issues discussed in the book. This chapter raises key conceptual issues on the relationship between state, economy, and society and the nature of the state and the transition it underwent in the post-colonial era in Nigeria. State, Economy, and Society: Conceptual Linkage The association between state, society, and economy defines the totality of human social formation, nature of political organization, character of class and social forces, the contradictory views among social groups and classes, and the progress or otherwise of any modern political community. Extant conceptualization of the state largely derives from three major perspectives. The first focuses on the history and essence of the state, the second on the instrumentalism of the state, and the third on its main features. The first set of conceptualization derives mostly from the philosophers of the age of Enlightenment in Europe like Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and Jean Jacques Rousseau who wanted to create a basis of the legitimacy of power and promote social order by redefining the nature of the law and relations among social classes. For them, the state in terms of its genealogy emerged through a “social contract,” and is a form of a “social pact” in which individuals in a society seek to set up a sovereign power through collective agreement and a “general will” that will protect their interests, which otherwise they could not individually guarantee—law, order, and social protection. Although, these philosophers had different views on the nature of pre-state society, they were united on the theme of the development and essence of

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the state. Jean Jacques Rousseau, a highly revered name in this group, noted that the idea of a state is to “find a form of association which will defend the person and goods of each member with the collective force of all, and under which each individual, while uniting himself with the others, obeys no one but himself, and remains as free as before” (1968: 60). The social contract theory encapsulates the notions of state and citizenship. The instrumentalist perspective to the conceptualization of the state focuses on the utility, value, or functions that the state performs in society. Scholars like David Easton and Max Weber toe this line. Easton defines a state as an institution or authority that authoritatively allocates values in society (1965). The state determines who gets what, when, how, and how much in society. Max Weber (1965: 78) defines a state as a “human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory.” Along the same line, Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol (1985: 47–48) view the state as an organization “invested with the authority to make binding decisions for people and organizations juridically located in a particular territory and to implement those decisions using, if necessary, force.” From a different angle and ideological persuasion, but from the same instrumentalist strand, Marxists scholars conceive of the state as an instrument of the dominant class—a mechanism by which the dominant class legitimizes its authority and subjugates, exploits, and controls the dominated classes in society. According to this viewpoint, the state is not a neutral arbiter among social classes and forces but an instrument of the bourgeois class. The third perspective to the conceptualization of the state dwells on its main features. The state is seen as that organization that possesses the following elements: (1) juridical sovereignty and authority; (2) territory with formal boundaries; (3) population; (4) legal order and judicial system; (5) monopoly of the legitimate use of force and violence in society; and (6) public order. (7) recognition by other states within the international system. While there are differing perspectives on the notion of the state, the interface between the state and society is usually a common area of agreement. The state exists within but superintends over society. In many cases, as Robert Fatton (1992: 3) noted, the state is usually grounded in society and ref lects necessarily society’s class relationships and power structure. States, as Joel Migdal (1987: 396–397) puts it, are “spawning organizations which exist within society that co-exist with many other formal and informal social organizations, from families

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to tribes to large industrial enterprises. What distinguishes the state at least in the modern era, is that state officials seek predominance over these myriad other organizations.” Thomas Paine, writing about the relevance of society to the state, observed that state and government complement society as society is central to human existence; it provides social order, man’s material needs, and a system of social affection, which no state can provide. In his words, “man is naturally a creature of society that it is almost impossible to put him out of it. . . . Government is no farther necessary than to supply the few cases to which society and civilization are not conveniently competent; and instances are not wanting to show, that everything which government can usefully add thereto, has been performed by the common consent of society, without government” (1996: 122). Being the overarching locus of power and authority in society, a state and its actions or inactions have fundamental impact on society—its inter-group relations, material production, and class structure. The economic system of a state consists of institutions and processes by which a society produces and distributes scarce material resources, and the control of economic resources provides a continuous and important base of power in society (Dye, 1983: 82). The state is central to the economic organization of society. Being the allocative agency, the state makes core economic decisions—the structure of the economy, the constitutive and regulative rules of economic production, the property regime, and the distribution of income and resources; hence class formation processes are largely inf luenced or determined by the state. The state, therefore, plays a crucial role in shaping both the economy and society in any modern political community. The nature of a neoliberal state defined by a market doctrine has implications for the constitution of the economy, society, and politics, and in turn the conf licts and contradictions generated in such social formation. In a neo-liberal state, as Ake (2000: 27) averred, “the market subsumes society and consumer identity becomes the overriding identity, democratic politics, any politics for that matter, becomes difficult. This is so because the market is about self-seeking and private concerns; it is a moment of particularity. Democratic politics on the other hand, is the moment of universality. It is about collective enterprise, about how common concerns are to be addressed.” In addition, it is not only democratic politics that is challenged in a neo-liberal state; social harmony is also often impaired as inter-group and inter-class relations deteriorate as the interest and capacity of the state to promote and protect the “common

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good” and the welfare of the people dips, especially in underdeveloped countries. The State in Nigeria: Transition, Continuity, and Change The discourse on the state in Africa particularly by Africanist scholars has taken two major extremes. On the one hand are those who contend that it is perhaps problematic to acknowledge or agree that there are states in Africa. What exist, according to them, are at best political caricatures, which mimic the notion of a state but do not approximate it. The main features of a state as identified above are mostly absent in many countries in Africa, and as such, it would be difficult to qualify the nature of the political organization in Africa as states. Often, a center of political authority does not exist or is not easily identifiable; there is no monopoly of the instruments of violence by the so-called state as violence is democratized; the territory is largely contested; a common identity that defines statehood is yet to be forged and; the legitimacy of the state is mostly in doubt and violently challenged. The conclusion is that, perhaps, there is need to find another term to qualify what exists in Africa. Carolyn Warner puts it poignantly: While for the most part current boundaries are accepted as legitimate, many states themselves may lack a central locus of authority, and there are significant areas where boundaries are in dispute. In numerous places, states do not seem to be “sovereign” even if they are territorial. . . . There is no agreement on the “authoritative allocation of values,” on the rules governing resource access and distribution . . . . Perhaps, the problem for Africa is that, given international norms and the current structure of the international system of states, it is constrained to force its politics into the “state” format, even while it is unable to do so. (2001: 87–89) As such, some have qualified African states as “quasi-states,” that is, they are referred to as states only in the international system but lack all the features of a state as defined in the modern world and exists elsewhere (Williams, 2000; Warner, 2001; Jackson, 1990; Jackson and Rosberg, 1982). On the other hand are those who acknowledge the existence of the state in Africa but in its deformity. Various adjectives are used to describe the African state—weak, lame, neo-patrimonial, prebendal, failed,

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Introduction

7

vampire, collapsed, soft, rogue, irrelevant, criminal, rentier, and so on. Indeed, theorizing on the pathologies of the African state has become an academic industry on its own, especially by Africanist scholars. Three basic points are worthy of note on this issue. First is that states exist in Africa in spite of their imperfections and challenges. Second, state formation and consolidation processes are usually very long and tortuous in any society, and it is especially so in Africa. Third, the nature of the state in Africa cannot be divorced from its historiography. The colonial encounter was a major departure point in state formation process in Africa, which created rupture and discontinuities and largely inf luenced the current state system in Africa, and the emergence of the class structure and social forces that continue to shape the nature of the state in the post-colonial era. As noted by Crawford Young (2009: 20), “embedded in the institution of the new states was the deep imprint of the mentalities and routines of their colonial predecessors. Overall, colonial legacy cast its shadows over the emergent African state system to a degree unique among the major regions of the world.” On the character of the state in Nigeria, in terms of its ideological thrust and public orientation, it is possible to identify three major phases in terms of its trajectory. The first is the colonial state system, which I qualify as a “conquest state”; the second is the immediate postcolonial state, which I characterize as the “welfare state”; and the third from the mid- 1980s to the present, which I refer as the “neo-liberal state.” The last is a state system whose politics and economy are largely inf luenced by market principles. However, the class structure and relations have not been significantly altered especially in the post-colonial era in spite of the differing public orientation and vision of the state system in Nigeria. The colonial state was basically a military-administrative unit (Chazan, Lewis, Mortimer, Rothchild, Stedman, 1999: 43; Young, 2004). The object of the colonial state as variously documented was to subjugate the local people, create a system of power without responsibility or accountability, and form a state with foreign citizens, but local subjects. Ruthless exploitation and material extraction were the raison d’être of the colonial state system. The immediate post-colonial era saw a reformation of the public character and vision of the state in Nigeria, as in other parts of Africa. The state assumed a “human face” and sought to reconcile itself with society. The state was an agency for class formation and welfare interest both for the ruling class and the masses, respectively. A state development policy underpinned by economic nationalism, indigenization, and social welfare was evolved

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and pursued by successive political regimes that saw rapid increase in local involvement in controlling the commanding heights of the economy and the public sector, and massive expansion of the social welfare base of society. Nigeria’s post-independent national development plans prioritized social sectors of education, health, water provision, rural development, and economic infrastructure of roads and power provision. For instance, in the first National Development Plan (1962–1968), a sum of 667.9 million naira was allocated to the social sector, but this increased to 16,572 million in the second National Development Plan (1970–1974). Primary school enrolment that was 2,849,500 at independence in 1960 rose astronomically to 15,607,505 in 1980. In the colonial period, there was only one university; this increased to 17 by 1980 and 30 by 1983. University student enrolment rose from 1,000 in 1959 to 113,158 in 1983 (Adejumobi, 2004: 30–31). The prof ligacy of the political leadership, and the burgeoning global economic crisis from the 1980s had implications for the public character of the Nigerian state. With imposed fiscal austerity and financial cuts, the welfare bent of the state was easily compromised. Successive regimes from 1981 tried to deal with the management of the emergent economic crisis, and the policy option of the Babangida regime (1984–1993) was a major defining point in reshaping the public nature of the state in Nigeria. The regime introduced the SAP, which adopted neo-liberal market logic and principles and redefined the scope of state engagement, its economic character, and its relationship with society (Adejumobi, 1995). The responsibility of the state to facilitate social provisioning for the people was transferred to the market and the private sector, with the expectation that as the economy grows, and private capital is consolidated, society as a whole will benefit with trickledown effects and welfare multiplier through increased employment creation, efficient market-based public service provision, and increased income for the people. SAP was underpinned by the diminution of the state through the reduction of its budget profile, involvement in the social sectors of education, health and public infrastructure, privatization and commercialization policy, exchange rate deregulation, and other macro-economic reform measures. The reformed role of the state was to be that of a “night watchman,” providing public security and the “enabling environment” for private capital accumulation to thrive, unhindered. This is what I refer to as the “neo-liberal state.” Subsequent regimes, particularly the Obasanjo regime, were to maintain the neo-liberal character of the Nigerian state.

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“Rich Government,” “Poor Citizens”: “Progress,” Conf licts, and Contradictions in a Neo-liberal Era The emergence of the Obasanjo civilian administration in 1999 was marked by nostalgia for a welfare state that can provide the basic necessities of life, often captured euphemistically as “dividends of democracy”; however, in practice, the contrary was the case. The Obasanjo regime deepened the neo-liberal character of the Nigerian state by embarking on market-based reforms of the economy. Just before the inception of the Obasanjo civilian administration, a privatization law was promulgated by the out-going military regime (the Abdulsalami Abubakar military junta)—the Public Enterprises (Privatization and Commercialization) Act of April 1999. The Obasanjo regime followed up religiously on the privatization process. The National Council on Privatization (NCP) was established by the regime, headed by the vice president, which was to approve all privatization deals negotiated by the Bureau for Public Enterprises (BPE)—the technical agency facilitating the privatization scheme. Under the law, 74 public enterprises were to be fully or wholly privatized. However, in April 2008, the Director General of the BPE claimed that the Bureau had finalized 170 transactions between 2005 and 2007 (Economic Intelligence Unit, 2009: 30). The Obasanjo regime undertook far-reaching economic reforms in the country, which were later articulated in an economic blueprint called the National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS). Although NEEDS was to last from 2003 to 2007, the strategy defined the framework of the economic policy of the Obasanjo regime and beyond. NEEDS is conceived as “Nigeria’s home grown poverty Reduction Strategy”2 and was to build on the initial two-year interim PRSP document. Emphasizing its neo-liberal bent and focus, the NEEDS foundation document says: NEEDS is a development strategy anchored on the private sector as the engine of growth- for wealth creation, employment generation, and poverty reduction. The government is the enabler, the facilitator and the regulator. The private sector is the executor, the direct investor and the manager of businesses. The key elements of this strategy include renewed privatization, deregulation, and liberalization programme (to shrink the domain of the public sector and buoy up the private sector). (2004: 3)

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NEEDS was predicated on four main strategies: reforming the way the government works and its institutions; growing the private sector; implementing a social charter for the people and; reorienting of the people with enduring African value system (Marcellus, 2009). Although the NEEDS document talks about a “social charter,” the accompanying policies were anything but social-the policies were more geared towards private sector needs and priorities. The reforms embarked upon include, in the public sector, monetizing the benefits of public servants by downsizing it, promoting budget transparency and discipline by establishing the Budget Monitoring and Price Intelligence Unit (BMPIU), the Due Process Office in the presidency, reforming the pension scheme, and establishing two national anti- corruption agencies—the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) and Independent Corrupt Practices Commission (ICPC). In the financial sector, far-reaching reforms were undertaken. A Bank Consolidation Exercise was undertaken in which banks were required from 31 December 2005 to increase their paid up capital from a minimum of 2 billion naira to 25 billion naira. This directive engendered a wave of bank mergers, acquisitions, and the liquidations of some banks. From 89, the number of banks in the country went down to 25; 13 banks that could not meet the minimum capital base requirement were liquidated. Similarly, in September 2005, the National Insurance Corporation (NAICOM) increased the capitalization requirement of insurance companies to 2 billion naira for life insurance, 3 billion naira for general insurance, and 5 billion naira for composite insurance businesses. The insurance companies were given up to 27 February 2007 to comply with the new regulation. It is in the area of privatization that market reform measures have been most profound even beyond the Obasanjo regime. Between May 1999 and May 2009, the BPE reported that 127 companies were privatized in which government shares in those companies were in most cases relinquished completely. The government itself was neck-deep in the privatization deal as it assisted in creating a mega private company called the Transnational Corporation of Nigeria (TRANSCORP), which acquired government sold shares in many state divested companies including Nigerian Telecommunications Limited (NITEL) and the Nicon-Noga Hilton Hotel, Abuja. TRANSCORP was also given various concessions in the oil sector. The deregulation and privatization policy of the government was lauded in certain quarters as having promoted economic progress and

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set in forth the transformation of the economy. It is argued that operational efficiency has returned to many of the privatized firms, and the scope of political patronage by the government drastically reduced through relinquishing board appointments in privatized firms, reducing budget deficit of government, generating additional resources from privatized firms, and boasting the stock market in Nigeria. For example, for nine privatized firms, about 2.5 billion naira shares were added to the capital market, and the federal government raised 35.6 billion naira from the sales of those shares (Anya, 2002: 3). Thorsten Beck, Robert Cull, and Afeikhena Jerome (2005: 2355–2379) in a study of privatized banks in Nigeria from 1990 to 2001 discovered that there is evidence of improved performance in nine of those banks. However, the performance improvement relates only to profitability and portfolio quality, not employment generation or cost reduction. The privatization scheme concealed major inadequacies, illegal practices, and challenges especially in its implementation. There were serious cases of under-pricing, insider trading, questionable valuations, and political patronage. Two big privatization cases—NITEL and that of its subsidiary, Mobile Telecommunications (Mtel)—were reversed by the Yar’adua administration (2007–2010) for what the regime considered to be the untidy way in which the transactions were conducted. In the banking sector, by 2009, the bubble was soon to burst, unraveling what was vaunted as Nigeria’s glorious banking reforms and era. Some of the newly consolidated banks came under serious financial stress and were on the verge of collapse. An audit commissioned by the new Central Bank Governor, Lamido Sanusi, in 2009 revealed the depth of financial malfeasance in those banks in which depositors’ funds were siphoned and bank funds were laundered by bank chiefs.3 The report also revealed that the central bank was compromised in the act. In 2010, the federal government had to inject over US$4.2 billion to save nine failing banks from imminent collapse. Nigeria’s neo-liberal economic reforms impacted positively on economic growth. Nigeria’s GDP growth rate was on the average of about 6.0% from 2002 to 2008. The government also boasted that the country’s external reserves were significantly boosted under the Obasanjo regime.4 Furthermore, the country was able to re-negotiate its foreign debts, and secure debt relief of about $18 billion from the Paris club of creditors in 2005. However, though the government claimed economic “progress” and “success,” the contrary was the case for society. Poverty rate continued to dip, unemployment soared, life expectancy at birth marginally

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improved, strikes and industrial unrests increased, while tensions, conf licts, and violence in inter-group and inter-communal relations assumed heightened proportions. The percentage of youth unemployment especially from the age group of 15–24 rose from 49.6% in 2002 to 55.2% in 2005. Life expectancy increased marginally from 42.8 years from the period 1970–1990s to 46.6% in 2000–2005 (Economic Intelligence Unit, 2009: 12). Nigeria’s healthcare provision remains abysmally poor with majority of the population without access to public medical care. While federal government spending on education in nominal terms increased from US$909 million in 2004 to US$1.66 billion in 2007, this did not lead to improvement in the quality of education or better welfare package for staff of educational institutions (12). On Nigeria’s deteriorating poverty level and the skewed nature of income and wealth distribution, the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) has this to say: Nigeria possesses a stark dichotomy of wealth and poverty. In spite of the country’s vast oil wealth, the majority of Nigerians are poor with 71 per cent of the population living on less than one dollar a day and 92 per cent on less than two dollars a day. Although the country is rich in natural resources, its economy cannot yet meet the basic needs of the people. Such disparity between the growth of the GDP and the increasing poverty is indicative of a skewed distribution of Nigeria’s wealth . . . Nigeria remains one of the world’s poorest countries with the largest population of the poor in Africa.5 Nigeria’s infrastructure, especially its road transport, were (and still) in a terrible state of disrepair in spite of the colossal funds reportedly spent on them. For instance, between 1999 and 2007, it is estimated that the Obasanjo administration expended about 16 billion naira on road rehabilitation and construction in Nigeria. The energy sector also gulped colossal public funds but the result was highly unimpressive, fuelling the suspicion that the funds were diverted for political purposes rather being used to provide stable electricity supply for the Nigerian people. In 2009, the National Assembly had to institute parliamentary enquiries to investigate funds spent on the road and energy sectors in Nigeria under the Obasanjo regime. In the context of deepening social crisis and shrinking material provision by the state for the people, identity politics—predicated on the logic of political exclusion and closure—assumed a major means of

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accessing public resources and goods from the national to the local levels. The dichotomy between “settlers” and “natives” and “indigenes” and “non-indigenes” or local citizenship became the rule for distributing position, power, and resources in Nigeria. This generated serious tensions and conf licts between “majorities” and “minorities” creating the logic of “we” and “them” at all levels in the country. From 1999 to 2010, more than 13,500 people were killed and maimed in interethnic and inter-communal violence in Nigeria. In September 2001, over 1000 lives were lost in the outbreak of violence in Jos, Plateau; in May 2004, inter-communal clashes in Yelwa, Plateau, claimed over 700 lives; no less than 700 people died in the conf lict in Jos on 28 and 29 November 2008; in January 2010, over 700 people were killed and over 3,000 maimed in inter-communal conf lict, conf lated with interreligious violence in Jos.6 The city of Jos, which hitherto had been celebrated as the oasis of peace and tranquility in Nigeria—a very attractive tourist center—has regrettably degenerated into a killing field in the country. Hassan Mathew Kukah, a priest and notable civil society voice in Nigeria, puts the issue of identity and communal based conf licts quite poignantly: You can identify the strands of identity mutation that make this country so vulnerable: nobody is in charge of anything. The result is that foot soldiers are springing right, left and centre, and everybody has gone back to their little tribe to fight their cause. (see The Africa Report, No. 23, June–July 2010: 36). (Emphasis mine) Increasing levels of poverty and deprivation along with environmental factors such as diminishing land space due to population growth and desertification have reinforced the exclusionist policy of “indigene” versus “settler,” which most states in Nigeria now practice (Human Rights Watch, 2006: 17). The “indigene”–“settler” policy is an instrument of political manipulation and power control by the political elite in a crisis ridden political system. The militarization and privatization of politics constitute the political f lip-side of neo-liberal market reforms in Nigeria. As market logic structure politics, the political process is monetized and political entrepreneurs often referred to as “moneybags” or “political godfathers” do hijack political parties and the electoral process. The result is that political and electoral goods are easily negotiated, bought, and sold in an unregulated political market. Public ethics, morality, and trust are

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rare virtues in the neo-liberal political marketplace. Given the cost and stakes involved, the nature of electoral competition in the political market leaves no margin of error or defeat, hence all means—legal and extra-legal—are deployed in the process. Blackmail, intimidation, violence, arson, and political assassination are all tactics of political competition in a Hobbesian political struggle. Post-1999, there have witnessed unprecedented numbers of assassinations in the country.7 Media workers, members of civil society, and professional groups also have been killed in circumstances that are ostensibly politically related. The tactics of violence, which characterizes politics, is also employed by the state to deal with agitations in the society. For example, to quell the rebellion of the militant groups in the Niger delta region, who were agitating for better environmental condition, improved social services and infrastructure, and greater access to the resources generated from the region, extreme force and violence had been used by the state. The military is regularly deployed to the region in which previously villages and communities had been completely destroyed by military invasion8 and large-scale human rights abuses and a culture of impunity perpetrated. The neo-liberal state privileges capital accumulation over and above the welfare of the people, as the most important and ultimate goal is for oil and petro-dollar to f low unhindered no matter what the social cost may be. The militant groups have also increasingly horned their expertise in the deployment and use of violence against the Nigerian state. Thus the cycle of violence and destruction continues in the delta region. In summary, crises, conf licts, and contradictions in society have accompanied neo-liberal reforms in Nigeria. The gains of neo-liberal reforms are disproportionately distributed and highly skewed against majority of the people. A neo-liberal state is ideologically anti-social and anti-welfare, which by its very essence is conf lict based. Structure of the Book The subsequent chapters of the book elaborate on the issues raised in this chapter. The book is divided into two main sections. The first section focuses on state, society, and social conf licts, in which the impact of state policies and actions in the social sphere are analyzed, including media perception and reporting based on ethno-religious divides and their construction of nation-hood; ethno-religious conf licts in the middle belt region in Nigeria in the context of democratization; the

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problem of ethnic insurgency in the Niger delta in its interface with elections and democratic politics in the region; and the issue of women’s empowerment especially on their level of political participation in the country. The second section of the book dwells on economic issues, namely, the impact of the economic reforms undertaken by the Obasanjo administration on social welfare, especially on how the people perceive it based on field survey; and the concerted efforts by the regime to combat the menace of corruption in the country. Chapter two is a content analysis of how the media reported two major incidents in the country—the introduction of the Sharia law in some northern states in the country and the activities of the Odua Peoples Congress (OPC), which is an ethnic militant group committed to the defense of the interests of the Yoruba people of South Western Nigeria. The print media were focused upon—especially the Weekly Trust and the New Nigerian (both of northern orientation and ostensibly committed to the defense of northern interests) and the Guardian, Post Express, and Tell magazine (based in Lagos and generally perceived to have a southern bent in their orientation). The chapter argues that in liberal democratic theory, the media is seen as a major democratic institution that facilitates the expansion and deepening of democratic values and practices and to be national in orientation and non-partisan in their reporting; however, the Nigerian experience under civilian rule confounds this. The press as part of the heterogeneous public sphere has been central to further fragmentation of that sphere. Their reporting is tainted with their ethnic location and interests, which is sometimes inf lammatory in character, and deepens social divisions and political polarization in the Nigerian society, with implications for the growth of democracy in the country. Chapter three focuses on ethno-religious conf licts in the middle belt reg ion and the implications for national security in the country. Three conf licts were analyzed: the Jos ethno-religious conf lict of 7 September 2001; the communal conf lict in Nasarawa South Senatorial District in June 2001 and; the sectarian violence in Kaduna in March 2000 following the introduction of the Sharia legal system in Kaduna state. All these insurgencies brought to the fore the question of citizenship depicted in the dichotomy between “settlers” and “natives,” “indigenes,” and “non-indigenes” in which contestation over power, position, land, religious rights, and access to state resources heightened. The conf licts that ensued led to wanton loss of lives and property, mass destruction, refugee f lows, and general insecurity in the region and the country as a whole. The chapter argues

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that those conf licts though locally based are linked to the failure of democracy and governance in Nigeria that have proved incapable of ensuring equal citizenship, representation, inclusion, and provision of material improvement and social services for the Nigerian people. Escalating political and social fragmentation and conf licts are usually the consequences of a failing political system. Chapter four focuses on ethnic minority insurgency in the Niger delta region of the country in which various militant groups have seized the political landscape and are using the language of rights, consistent with democratic politics, to wage a violent political struggle, inconsistent with democratic culture. The chapter argues that rather than a commitment to democratic politics, which may f low the voice of the people and their demands into the political process, what exists in the delta region is a perversion of democracy, in which the Nigerian state and the political elite from the delta region are seldom interested in transparent, credible, free and fair elections. Political perversion and manipulations are major means of political control by the political elite of the delta region, and the country, hence, they have little or no interest at all in promoting democratic politics or free elections in the delta region. Real democracy in the delta region is a threat to the interests of the political elite and the ruling class in Nigeria. Democracy demands accountability, transparency, popular participation, and responsibility, all of which the political elite and the ruling class are unprepared for. Cheap petro-dollar is the prime motivation of the political elite and ruling class in the delta region. Thus the cycle of social militancy and political violence will continue in the delta region for some time to come. Chapter five details on women empowerment in Nigeria under the civilian dispensation (post-1999). The chapter contends that though there are slight improvements in the participation of women in the political arena, the performance and current practice still fall far below the expectation and regional standards.9 Women representation in the federal parliament in Nigeria is less than 10% since the inception of civilian rule in 1999. Women issues when raised at the level of public policy are usually bemoaned, trivialized, or simply ignored. Nigeria does not have a quota policy for women representation in parliament or in executive political positions. The consequence is that state actors, especially men, consider the appointment of women to political positions not as a right, but a privilege. The chapter concludes that the level of women’s political participation in Nigeria ref lects the nature and quality of Nigeria’s democracy. Nigeria’s democracy is one in

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which political participation remains an arduous challenge not only for women, but also for the entire citizenry. Chapter six deals with the economic reforms and social welfare. The chapter focuses on how economic reform policies of the Obasanjo administration improved the welfare and livelihood of the people. Relying on survey technique, the chapter reveals that there is no marked improvement in the living standards of the people as they consider the prices of goods and services to have increased under civilian rule; the roads are hardly motorable; housing not readily affordable and the quality of health services deteriorated. The chapter concludes that effective participation and commitment by the people in the design and implementation of economic policies is central to ref lecting their interests and aspirations in those policies. The last chapter (chapter seven) focuses on the spirited efforts by the Obasanjo administration at combating the problem of corruption in the country. The regime enacted anti-corruption laws, and established two new anti-corruption institutions—EFCC and ICPC—while invigorating two other existing ones—the Code of Conduct Bureau (CCB) and the Public Complaints Commission (PCC). Though the regime recorded remarkable progress especially through the EFCC in raising public consciousness about the problem of corruption and prosecuting some high profile offenders, the process of fighting corruption is yet to be institutionalized in the country, and appeared more to be a “one man show” rather than be a systematic process of addressing the problem. Furthermore, key political figures and state governors in the Obasanjo administration were implicated in corrupt practices. The dismissal of Nuhu Ribadu as chairman of the EFCC by the Yar’adua administration and his subsequent self-exile from the country for fear of being killed suggests how pro-corruption forces can fight back and overwhelm anti-corruption agents. The conclusion is that there is a long way to go in tackling the problem of corruption in Nigeria. Notes 1. Obasanjo in the 1980s and 1990s was the founder and chairman of the African Leadership Forum (ALF), a civil society organization advocating for good governance in Nigeria. 2. See the NEEDS Document by the National Planning Commission (2004), p. 1. 3. Some of the bank chiefs who swindled their banks are currently being prosecuted, but whether the government will have the political will to carry the prosecution through given the political network of those alleged culprits is very much in doubt. Similar high profile cases were initiated in the past but never carried through with a court verdict. The prosecutions are usually abandoned or the court proceedings stalmated.

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4. The government claimed that the nation’s external reserve was about US$30 billion around 2007 when the Obasanjo regime was about to leave power. However, the successor regime, the Yar’adua regime, contradicted this claim. 5. UNICEF-Nigeria, “The Nigerian Situation,” see http://www.unicef.org/nigeria/1971_2199. html accessed on 6 July 2010. 6. See, for details on the Jos conf licts, Human Rights Watch, “Use of Restraint in Curbing Jos Violence,” http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2010/01/19/nigeria-use-restraint- curbing-josviolence accessed on 4 July 2010. 7. Since 1999 when civilian rule was re-introduced in the country, many prominent politicians have been killed across party lines, including the former minister for justice and attorney general of the federation, Chief Bola Ige. 8. Communities attacked by the military and completely destroyed by them include Odi in Bayelsa state, Nigeria. The Odi operation was named Hakuri II by the military in which no less than 2,483 people were killed. See Elias Courson, “Odi Revisited? Oil and State Violence in Odioma, Brass Local Government, Bayelsa state,” Niger Delta: Economics of Violence Working Papers, No. 7-r. Institute of International Studies, University of California, Berkeley; United States Institute of Peace, Washington, DC; and Our Niger Delta, Port Harcourt, Nigeria, 2006. 9. The standard set for women participation in governance, national and regional institutions by the African Union (AU) is 50%.

References Adejumobi, S. 1995. “Structural Reforms and Its Impact on the Economy and Society in Nigeria,” in S. Adejumobi and A. Momoh (Eds.), The Political Economy of Nigeria under Military Rule: 1984–1993. Harare: SAPES. ———. 2002. “Between Democracy and Development: What Are the Missing Links,” in S. Adejumobi and A. Bujra (Eds.), Breaking Barriers, Creating New Hopes: Democracy, Civil Society and Good Governance in Africa. Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press. ———. 2004. “Economic Globalization, Market Reforms and Social Welfare Services in West Africa,” in Tade Akin Aina, Chachage S. Chachage, and Elizabeth Annan-Yao (Eds.), Globalization and Social Policy in Africa. Dakar: CODESRIA, pp. 23–46. Ake, C. 2000. The Feasibility of Democracy in Africa. Dakar: CODESRIA. Anya, O.A. 2002. “Privatization in Nigeria.” See, http://www.nigerianembassy.nl/Prof.%20 Anya.htm retrieved on 10 May 2010. Beck, R., R. Cull, and A. Jerome. 2005. “Bank Privatization and Performance: Empirical Evidence from Nigeria,” Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol. 29: 2355–2379. Bratton, M. and P. Lewis. 2007. “The Durability of Political Goods: Evidence from Nigeria’s New Democracy,” Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, Vol. 45, No. 1: 1–33. Chazan, N., P. Lewis, R. Mortimer, D. Rothchild, and S. Stedman. 1999. Politics and Society in Contemporary Africa. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. Dye, T. 1983. Power and Society. Monterey, CA: Brooks/Cole. Easton, D. 1965. A Framework of Political Analysis. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. The Economic Intelligence Unit. 2009. Nigeria: Country Profile, 2009. New York: EIU. Evans, P., D. Rueschemeyer, and T. Skocpol (Eds.). 1985. Bringing the State Back in. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Fatton, R. 1992. Predatory Rule: State and Civil Society in Africa. Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner.

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Human Rights Watch. 2006. “They Do Not Own This Place: Government Discrimination against ‘Non-Indigenes’ in Nigeria,” Human Rights Watch Report, Vol. 18, No. 3 (A), April. Jackson, R. 1990. Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Jackson, R. and C. Rosberg. 1982. Personal Rule in Black Africa. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Marcellus, I.K. 2009. “Development Planning in Nigeria: Ref lections on the National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy,” Journal of Social Science, Vol. 20, No. 3: 197–210. Migdal, J. 1987. “Strong States, Weak States: Power and Accommodation,” in Myron Weiner and Samuel Huntington (Eds.), Understanding Political Development. Boston: Little Brown. National Planning Commission. 2004. Nigeria: National Empowerment and Development Strategy: NEEDS. Abuja: NPC. Paine, T. 1996. Rights of Man. (with introduction by Derek Matravers). Hertfordshire: Wordsworth Editions. Ringen, S. 2007. What Democracy Is For: On Freedom and Moral Government. Princeton and Oxford. Princeton University Press. Rousseau, J., 1968. Social Contract. London: Penguin Books. ———. 1999. “ ‘The Political Economy of Quasi- Statehood’ and the Demise of 19th Century African Politics,” Review of International Studies, No. 25: 233–255. Warner, C. 2001. “The Rise of the State System in Africa,” Review of International Studies, Vol. 27: 65–89. Weber, M. 1958. From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology. New York: Oxford University Press. Williams, D. 2000. “Aid and Sovereignty: Quasi- States and the International Financial Institutions,” Review of International Studies, No. 26: 557–573. Young, C. 2004. “The End of the Post- Colonial State in Africa? Ref lections on Changing African Political Dynamics,” African Affairs, No. 103: 23–49. ———. 2009. “The Heritage of Colonialism,” in John Harberson and Donald Rothchild (Eds.), Africa in World Politics: Reforming Political Order. Boulder, CO: Westview, pp. 19–38.

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S E C T ION

I

State, Society, and Social Conflicts

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The Press and the Democratic Question: Narrating Ethno-Religious Identities and Conflicts in Nigeria Wale Ade banwi

Introduction The heroism of a critical section of the Nigerian press under Nigeria’s military regimes in the 1980s and 1990s is hardly in doubt. This has been noted and celebrated both in academic and lay literature (Adebanwi, 2004, 2007; Ajibade, 2003; Dare, 2007; Diamond, 1991; Director, 2007; Olukotun, 2000, 2002, 2004; Ojo, 2003). From the early to the late 1990s, the radical press became the pivot on which the country’s effervescent civil society rotated in the struggle to end the tyranny inf licted on Nigerians by the military regimes. At critical conjectures in Nigeria’s history, and despite the political context that promoted and necessitated a media institution factionalized by alliances with different ethno-regional persuasions, the press sometimes rose above the divisive formations to promote and protect the ideal of a democratic and egalitarian Nigeria. This capacity to sometimes rise above the ethno-regional and ethno-religious divisions, helping to organize the barricades against the ascendant martial order was possible partly because, as an institution, the press is able to reach to, and key into, a robust associational life that predated the Nigerian state. Yet, this same factor, it can be argued, is also responsible for the

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fact that, for the most account, the press is captive to ethno-regional and religious loyalties that predate, and are stronger than, the loyalty to the emergent state-nation. A key criticism of the press in Nigeria is that it is overtly sectional, both in its coverage of events and its canvassing of perspectives (Obadare, 1999: 38). For instance, while noting the critical role of the press in sustaining democracy in Nigeria, Sam Oyovbaire, professor of political science and former information minister, argued that the press “could do well only if its mindset or worldview was much more robust and comprehensive than as presently designed by history.” He added that “[The press] should provide accommodation for the complex and pluralistic corporate Nigerian society” (Oyovbaire, 2001; Cf. Ado-Kurawa, 2001). Odia Ofeimun—poet, journalist, and political scientist—concedes that the press “has not been able to avoid a parochial edge to its reports and comments,” despite the fact that it has sometimes “displayed a certain readiness to outgrow sub-national considerations, especially in matters of political integrity and fiscal probity” (Obadare, 1999: 38). In this chapter, I focus on this “parochial edge,” because it gives a different pointer to the crisis of democratic rule in Nigeria as ref lected in, and accentuated by, the complex role of the press. In the two cases that I consider, the press withdrew into ethno-regional and ethnoreligious ramparts in the coverage of the crises. Ayo Olukotun typifies the focus on the positive contributions of the press in the building and consolidation of democracy in Nigeria from the late military era to present times (Olukotun, 2002, 2004). For instance, in his analysis of “media accountability and democracy” in the first half of the Obasanjo presidency, within an “ethnically polarized and occasionally corrupt” context, he argues that the ensuing ethno-religious crises were “symptomatic of underlying tensions” (Olukotun, 2004: 70), but he did not elaborate on this. This chapter elaborates on these “tensions” and the media’s role in (re)producing the tensions. The Press, Democracy, and State-Society Relations When the press appeared as an important factor (and actor) in the history of the post-colonial state, it was seen as “the primary means of bringing together people who spoke different languages, had different value systems, different religious backgrounds, and different cultural histories” (Casmir, 1991: x). Part of the normative assumptions is that the press will

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assist in what James Curran (1991: 30) calls the “equitable negotiation or arbitration of competing interests through democratic processes.” The press in the African post-colonial state has largely failed to accomplish this task. The task seems even more insuperable in societies where a strong tradition of a virile press predates the colonial and post-colonial state such as Nigeria. The attempts to ignore or overcome cultural factors for the sake of political unification have been unsuccessful (Casmir, 1991: x). This failure can be traced to the limitations of the theoretical assumptions that undergird the extant dominant conception of civil society and public sphere within which the press is located. The “pursuit of common political agendas as well as common cultural identities and solidarities” are some of the critical outcomes of the “web of associational and public spaces” that are defined as civil society (Jacobs, 2000: 2). Public sphere, on the other hand, captures a specific practice in civil society, which is that of “open discussion about matters of common public concern” (ibid.). In his popular theorization of the bourgeois public sphere, Jürgen Habermas (1989) argues that the development of this public sphere, where public discourse was not only freed from state regulation, but was also used to engage with the state about matters of political legitimacy and common concern, was a single public arena (2–3). But critics have argued that the Habermasian model is a “historically specific and limited form of public sphere” (Fraser, 1990: 58). It is not only the singularity of the Habermasian conception that has been challenged, its assumption on “rationality,” “consensus,” and the exclusively “political” nature of the bourgeois public sphere have also been contested. As Jacobs (2000: 3) puts it, [C]ontemporary theorists argue that civil society consists of multiple, frequently nonrational, and often contestatory public spheres, which are oriented just as often to cultural issues as to political ones. Established and maintained by communication media, there public spheres support many different (but overlapping) communities of discourse. Even though Jacobs assumes that most of these public spheres are “oriented (in differing degree) to a putative larger ‘national sphere,’ ” here I illustrate a context in which the competing publics challenge and subvert the national sphere, even though all claim to be the most committed to building such a national sphere. Fundamental questions of national political identity and community are implicated in the media in the context of ethno-regional and ethno-religious crisis.

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With Nigeria’s return to democracy in 1999, while remaining a critical institution in the sustenance and entrenchment of democracy, the press also became part of the problems confronting the new democratic arrangement. This was particularly so in terms of how the press was imbricated in the struggles of divisive ethno-regional and religious formations for primacy and ascendancy within the Nigerian federation. Though the emerging literature on the media in post-military Nigeria has paid a lot of attention to their role in enhancing democracy and promoting good governance, justice, freedom, and equity, little or no attention has been paid to the media’s role in exacerbating the crises that are integral to the (de-)constitution of the Nigerian state and the recurrent divisiveness that these have provoked. In this chapter, I examine the role of the press in the context of violent inter-ethnic and inter-faith conf licts that plagued the democratic government and threatened, afresh, to sunder Nigeria under President Olusegun Obasanjo (1999–2007). The role of the media in this is critical because the press is at the vortex of the struggle by social forces, that is, groups and elements within the society, to dominate, or respond to the (perceived) domination, of the state by other contending forces. Evident in the way this narrative struggle is enacted in the cases examined below is a challenge to the idea of the state within the context of state-society relations in contemporary African postcolony. While the classic studies of the state in the literature on state-society relations that emerged in the 1970s and 1980s treated the state “as an autonomous structure—a structure with a logic and interests of its own not necessarily equivalent to, or fused with, the interests of the dominant class in society or the full set of member groups in the polity” (Skocpol, 1979: 27), competitors for state power in Africa often assume that the state is neither autonomous nor capable of freeing itself from the specific interests of groups whose members are dominant in the government that is at any time in charge of state power. However, research on state-society relation has since focused on democratic transitions and consolidation of democracy (Diamond, Linz, and Lipset 1988; Linz and Stepan 1996; Schmitter 1993), particularly in terms of how the character, nature, and the strength of each and the relations between both, structure the opportunities, possibilities, challenges, and the problems of democratic rule. However, as Zhao (2000: 1597) argues, few of these works “focus on the impact of statesociety relations on the discursive and symbolic dimensions of political processes.” In a context where the state is mostly assumed to be captive

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to ethno-regional and religious formations, state-society relations and the relations between social forces are often structured by this assumption, thus producing desperate, extremist discourses on the opportunities or possibilities of redress for perceived social and political injuries. Ethnicity and religion are at the heart of the Nigerian crisis. Virtually every major (violent) conf lict in the country’s post-independent history has centered around, or has been provoked by, these twin issues. Given the tensions regarding national togetherness that were integral to the democratic struggle in the 1980s and 1990s Nigeria, and the central role played by the press in this, many assumed that the press would be, exclusively, part of the solution and not part of the problem in the post-military era. While this expectation was somewhat misplaced— given the history of the press itself, and its inherent constitution as an ideological arm of ethno-regional relations and negotiations—it was nonetheless understandable. This is because the overriding concern displayed by the press over the democratic question would have necessitated greater moderation in the coverage and reporting of emergent violent clashes and contentions between the disparate groups. The discourses in the press on violent inter-ethnic and inter-faith crises are used here to ref lect on the democratic role of the media in contemporary African polities and the media’s role in determining the solutions to the questions of national togetherness and accommodation raised by the multiplicity of interests and identities. Liberal democratic theory assumes that the opening up of the democratic space creates greater freedom and access and that this necessarily results in fewer problems for the society and the state. However, post-authoritarian (“democratic”) states in Africa have presented challenges to this assumption. Issues and tensions that authoritarian regimes either swept under the carpet or forcibly suppressed through violence or threats of violence usually re-emerge in the post-authoritarian era, under the guise of democratic freedom and the struggle for justice and equity, presenting critical challenges regarding the terms and procedures of democratic solutions. The high democratic deficits inherited by the new democratic government and the society at large often times present grave circumstances that precondition identitarian social tensions and contradictions to be resolved through a recourse to violent clashes. How a liberal institution, such as the press, reacts to such tensions and contradictions can throw some light on the limitations of these assumptions. Conf lictual ethno-regional and ethno-religious relations generate their own communications and media frames through which events

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are analyzed. These media frames are then imagined as central to the survival of the ethno-regional groups as well as critical to the representation and sustenance of the political standpoints of each of the groups. A sociological understanding of how this plays out in a specific context through an analysis of media content is, therefore, useful. This is particularly so because the conf licts analyzed here are also central in the attempts to construct “democratic” group solidarity in the face of violent assault by the other and structure democratic state-society relations. These conf licts induced ethno-regional and ethno-religious markers, which were then picked up and re-emphasized in new, even inventive, ways in the press—by ethnic and religious entrepreneurs acting under the badge of democratic (group) rights. The media constitute part of the social structure at the center of state-society relations. Therefore, they ref lect identities, perceptions, ideas, and views of their social locations, ideologies, interactions, and class configurations in the present society. However, because the literature on the media and democracy takes for granted the importance of media for democracy (Scammell and Semetko, 2000: XI), democratization of state and society is assumed to produce a situation in which the society attends, almost always, to problems in and through democratic means, which leads to lesser problems for society. On the basis of this perspective, the press, as one of the critical institutions in civil society, is assumedly insulated against the demands from the state and political society as it “follow[s] a code of conduct that contemplates listening to opponents, pursuing political compromises and engaging in transparent behaviour” (Schmitter, 1997: 127). As an institution that is implicated in both the state and society, it is fruitful to approach the media as an arena that straddles both the state and society and in which “boundaries, rights, jurisdictions [and] power distribution” and interests “are debated, contested, and resolved (at least temporarily)” (Kerkvliet, 2001). Arenas, as Benedict Kerkvliet points out, can be problems and controversies that straddle the state-society dichotomy; they structure and are structured by relations between the two. The incomplete construction of the nation-state project in Nigeria has resulted in a continuous and unending struggle to create, sustain, and maintain identities and allegiances outside of the terrain of the state—and, sometimes, to challenge the state—that often leads to violence. The conf licts over state power organized along class, ethnic, regional and religious lines, are, in part, produced by the overcentralization of power that conditions societal forces toward a ruthless struggle. Consequently, within the context of state-society relations,

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the press in Nigeria has failed to achieve what Alexander (1981: 33) calls a process of media differentiation; that is, the process by which the press can become “structurally free of directly inhibiting economic, political, solidarity, and cultural entanglements.” The press that is thus free would be not be “adjuncts to parties, classes, regions, and religious groups” (27; Jakubowicz, 1995: 126). I illustrate this reality in Nigeria with two cases: The crisis triggered by the Oodua People’s Congress (OPC), and the violence provoked by the institutionalization of Sharia laws as basis of criminal justice in some states in northern Nigeria. The method adopted is content analysis of the specific newspapers and newsmagazines that were mostly devoted to reporting the twin crises. Sharia, Secularism, and the Press The challenge to (Western) modernity and ‘modernist projects’—such as liberal democracy and secularism—which Islam is perceived to represent has acquired a central place in both public and academic arenas in the past two decades. The past quarter of the century produced what Manuel Castells (1997: 2) describes as “widespread surge of powerful expressions of collective identity that challenge globalization and cosmopolitanism on behalf of cultural singularity and people’s control over their lives and environment.” These challenges would include “a whole array of reactive movements that build trenches of resistance on behalf of God, nation, ethnicity, family, locality” and such other “fundamental categories of millennial existence.” In the literature on the developing world, the politicization, or the political instrumentalization, religion has become part of received wisdom. In this context, Levine has argued that such instrumentalization is conditioned by the socially pervasive character of religion, which, in the developing world, makes it “a perennial source of political action and meaning” (Levine, 1986: 97). This holds true for the specific case of Nigeria where religion ‘has become more deeply entwined with the issue of everyday life’ (Obadare, 2004: 177) in the democratic era, in a way that is over-determined by the patterns of domination in culture, politics, and economy (Kamrava, 1993 [2000]; Levine, 1986: 97). The history of the conf lict over Sharia and the debate surrounding it is already well documented in the literature (Ilesanmi, 1997; Suberu, 1996; Kalu, 2003). The Sharia issue snowballed into a high tension controversy in October 1999, when, in what many, particularly Christians and “secularists,” believed to

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be in deviance of the Constitution and the federal government, the Zamfara state government initiated the adoption of the Islamic legal code, extending it from personal law to criminal law. The attempt to introduce the Sharia law in the important state of Kaduna where the largely Muslim Hausa-Fulani majority group had been having a running battle with Christian minority ethnic groups, however, led to violent clashes that claimed several lives, with reprisal violence in other parts of the country. The debate on secularism is linked with the ‘National Question’ and democracy; therefore, the debate about secularism is also a debate about the organizing principles of political/ethnic relations in Nigeria; it is a fight for the public space as a space of access to political power and the state. However, most of the scholarly works on the Sharia issue in particular, and religion, in general, in Nigeria, hardly pay full attention to the role of the media in igniting, exacerbating, and amplifying politico-religious crises.1 Given the characteristic “media warfare” (Kalu, 2003: 397) inherent in the crisis that drove opposing sides to the “defensive trenches” (ibid.), it is important to analyze media reporting of the crisis as this relates to the important quest for the control of the state, power, democracy, and secularism in Africa’s biggest nascent democracy. Here, I analyze the reports and comments in four major newspapers and one newsmagazine on the Sharia. It must be noted here that this analysis is concerned less with the actual practice of secularism than with the debates on secularism. The newspapers analyzed are Weekly Trust, New Nigerian,2 Guardian, Post Express, and a newsmagazine, Tell, representing different ethnic/religious formations in the country. Weekly Trust and New Nigerian are regarded as the “voices” of the (largely) Islamic north.3 The Guardian is owned mainly by Christian minority elements in the south of Nigeria, and is a leading voice for secular democracy. Post Express, now defunct, was owned by an Igbo businessman and was created to defend Igbo—who are almost wholly Christians—interests. Tell, which is largely owned by professional journalists of minority and Yoruba extraction, is generally regarded as defending Yoruba/southern/Christian interests in Nigeria. Tell captures the background to this crisis in its reporting of how the immediate past military regime that handed over power to the civilians grappled with the issue in drawing up the 1999 constitution—in which the status quo was maintained: The pro-Sharia group wanted a provisional amendment that would fundamentally alter the status quo. The 1979 constitution

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only provides for states that so desire to set up a Sharia court of appeal . . . The proposed amendment would make it mandatory for all states to set up Sharia courts. Christian Northern members of the [Provisional Ruling Council] including those from the Middle Belt, were especially embittered by what they perceived as an attempt to remake the whole of the old North in the image of the Caliphate.4 They argued that the so-called North was no longer a geographic and political monolith, and that it was high time the cultural and particularly the religious diversity of the region was recognised and accepted as a reality. The fierceness of the opposition to the whole Sharia gambit has forced the opponents to retreat for now. (Tell, 1999: 20–25) That Zamfara state goes against the status quo, according to Tell, constitutes planting “a political bomb which may soon set the nation on fire unless care is taken” (Tell, 15 November 1999). While emphasizing that the Sharia matter constitutes a threat to democracy, The Guardian agrees largely with Tell’s reading. States the paper: [I]n a rather unfortunate twist of familiar reality, it appears the Sharia system is being turned into a factor with a potential to unleash centrifugal religious tension in our new born and still fragile democratic polity. (The Guardian, 4 November 1999: 16) The Post Express describes the Sharia law as a “treasonable legislation” and the Zamfara Governor and the State Assembly members who passed the law as “law breakers” who should be arrested and charged for “treason” (Post Express, 21 October 1999). “Of greater concern,” states the paper, “is that these obviously retrogressive steps are being taken in Nigeria on the eve of the 21st century” (Post Express, 21 October 1999, emphasis mine). The phrase “retrogressive steps” is as much a description of how the Express views the introduction of the Sharia law as well as a metaphor for the general frustration and anger among the Christian population especially of southern Nigeria and also liberal Muslims across the country. The Guardian, Post Express, and Tell examine the implications of this “retrogressive steps” for secular democracy and for the country. For the Express, [B]y far the most fundamental problem which the current experimentation with the Sharia option poses is that it has the potential

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of bringing matters of restricted religious application into direct conflict with matters of a larger socio-political and therefore secular nature. As matters stand today, there is no way of winning the Sharia challenge without altering either the present constitution or the configuration of the territorial expression to which it refers. (Post Express, 21 October 1999, emphasis mine) The Guardian elaborates on these changes in the “configuration of the territorial expression” in pointing out that what the Sharia supporters are “saying, in essence, is that this country cannot be one. It is a threat to national unity” (The Guardian, 28 February 2000: 20, emphasis mine). Tell links Zamfara governor’s “political crusade” with that of the “desire” and “project” of the Sardauna of Sokoto, Ahmadu Bello, the late premier of the northern region, to ‘dip the Koran into the Atlantic Ocean” (in the south) and, consequently, dominate the rest of the country “eternally” (Tell, 15 November 1999, emphasis mine). This marks a clear linkage of the religious with the political, or in fact, the construction of the religious as a scaffold for the political, by the three southern news organs. A contributor to the New Nigerian more or less confirms what The Guardian describes as “monstrosity” (The Guardian, 28 February 2000: 20) as he declares that the “Sharia issue . . . has today become so fundamental even to the extent of life or death” (New Nigerian, 16 February 2000: 15, emphasis mine). This contributor also links the Sharia debate to the Caliphate, but to a contrary effect. He notes that “Muslims . . . especially the flag-bearers of [the] Shehu Usman Dan Fodio [-led] Islamic Jihad of the 19th century cherish nothing dearer to their hearts other than the Sharia issue” (ibid.). The Guardian’s lead editorialist and columnist reacts to this line of reasoning by noting that government, Christians, southerners, and secularists must not accept a “compromise” over the Sharia issue, given that “those who want to f ly the f lag of religion will stop at nothing” (The Guardian, 3 March 2001: 41). The Guardian columnist echoes, but for a contrary argument, the writer in the New Nigerian who sees the matter as concerning “life or death” for the “f lag-bearers” of the Fulani Jihad: I have already argued that what we are confronted with is the Second Jihad. It is a religious and political project . . . [T]he HausaFulani second-generation Jihadists are all out to remain faithful to the project of their ancestors which is to turn Nigeria into an

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Islamic state, to impose the Sharia on the rest of us and to question the very basis of the Nigerian nation . . . .What does the North contribute to this nation? . . . (The Guardian, 3 March 2001: 41) In the context of all these attacks against the Islamic north, New Nigerian publishes a two-part essay ostensibly to educate “ignorant people and mischief-makers” (New Nigerian, 15 March 2000: 14) on the Sharia. It is written by the Emir of Ilorin, Sulu Gambari, a retired Federal Appeal Court judge—and one of those who claim direct descent from Usman dan Fodio, the leader of the nineteenth-century Fulani Jihad. Argues the emir: In English/common law, parlance, law is made for man and not man for law. But in Islam, it has been neither the nation nor the people, which has made the law, it is the law, which has made and molded the nation and the people. It (Sharia) is supreme because it emanates from God who decreed its main basis in the Qur’an. (New Nigerian, 17 February 2000: 14, emphasis mine) The “ignorant mischief-makers” who describe Nigeria as a “secular” state, argues the emir in the New Nigerian misunderstand the concept and are misapplying it “to confuse the citizens of the actual meaning of secularism to the effect that Nigeria or the state has no religion at all” (ibid.). The northern weekly that describes the Sharia riots which resulted in nothing less than a carnage and destroyed property worth billions of naira in Kaduna, however, describes the retaliatory attacks in the east of Nigeria against the Hausa-Fulani as “massacre” (Weekly Trust, 3–9 March 2000: 6). While carnage does not immediately convey agency, massacre clearly does. The introduction of the Sharia legal code and the subsequent riots raised questions about national survival and the means of ensuring this—or alternatively a surrender to disintegration. All the newspapers express this. Tell puts it down to the need for the convocation of a Sovereign National Conference to rethink the basis of unity in Nigeria (Tell, 5 November 1999). In what constitutes a rare admission of a fundamental crisis in the Nigerian polity by a medium that represents the north, Trust submits that a structural problem that has regularly resulted in widespread dissatisfaction aff licts Nigeria, as exemplified by the Sharia crisis. The weekly even agrees with the Express (22 November 1999) that the

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call for a fundamental remake of Nigeria is borne out of “patriotic desires”: The current cries for restructuring or sovereign national conference by sections of the Nigerian federation [are] apparently a derivative of the patriotic desires of the people to realise self-determination and freedom to develop after having lived together since 1914 [when the northern and southern protectorates were amalgamated by the British]. These years of the Nigerian alliance did not seem to augur well for either of the conglomeration . . . (Weekend Trust, 24–30 March 2000: 15, emphasis mine) In the editorial that echoes the statement of Sir Ahmadu Bello, the late Premier of the Northern Region, regarding “the mistakes of 1914,” the Trust, contrary to the narratives of the north as a “leech,” feeding off the rest of the country—as Tell and The Guardian allege—argues that it is the north that has made the most of the sacrifices for the rest of the country: From the 1950s to date, the North has always played the role of the absorber of the shocks of the Nigerian federation. The Northern leadership at great expenses and risks has contained agitations especially from the [Yoruba] South-West . . . (Weekly Trust, 24–30 March 2000: 15, emphasis mine) This is an indication of the fact that the debate over secularism and the narratives of Christian-Muslim divide almost always fuse into northsouth divide. In this reading, the south is assumed to wear the garb of Christianity, while the north wears the garb of Islam. Consequently, Islam is roughly substituted for the north, while Christianity is roughly substituted for the south. The fact that this does not fully represent a complex reality is disregarded in the discourses in the press. However, it must be noted that these discourses are also ref lections of the convenient polarization that even the major protagonists in the Nigerian crisis, including the Sharia dispute, promote, and ossify. However, obviously irked by the “loss of power” to the south and the Sharia crisis, Trust states that Nigeria should either revert to status quo ante—that is, power in the hands of northerners—or disintegrate. The weekly completely opposes “restructuring,” despite admitting earlier that the calls for this represented the “patriotic” desire for selfdetermination by Nigeria’s constituent groups. Trust advances that the

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proposed sovereign national conference could hold only if it would ensure the disintegration of the “unholy alliance” between the south and the north, which is Nigeria: The Nigerian national question is unending and the contradictions among the peoples are increasingly assuming primacy . . . (A) national sovereign conference will only be relevant if it will have as its focus, the dismemberment of this unholy alliance of incompatibles. The question of restructuring does not arise. (Weekly Trust, 24–30 March 2000: 15, emphasis mine) For the weekly, therefore, it was better for Nigeria to dissolve rather than for it to be re-organized, ostensibly in a way that the Trust assumes will not be in the interest of the “Islamic north.” However, the Express disagrees with Trust on which section bears the greatest burden for Nigeria’s oneness, while insisting on the demand for “confederation as the only political arrangement that can ensure Nigeria’s continuing survival as a united and indivisible country.” As the debate on Sharia progressed and acquired greater ethnopolitical dialect, the north/south divide was further deconstructed as the ethnic split in the north and south was introduced to push the argument earlier mobilized on the Christian/Moslem and north/south fronts. This was despite attempts to maintain the unity of the ethnic blocs/regions. “Inside Politics” in Trust, for instance, avers that the call by Igbo governors in the south on their kinsmen to retaliate when attacked by other Nigerians, particularly in the north, is not surprising given the antecedents of “Igbo tribal leadership beginning with the January 15th 1966 bloody military coup.” Their “game plan,” pursues “Inside Politics,” has always been, the elimination of northern and Yoruba leaders to pave way for the imposition of “Igbo hegemony” over Nigeria (Weekly Trust, 31 March—6 April 2000: 37). The column concludes that “When that scheme failed . . . the Igbos rebelled and seceded to form the so-called Republic of Biafra [1966–1970]. This was crushed after a bloody civil war. It appears that history is repeating itself ” (ibid.). The economic dimension of the Nigerian crisis is clearly also an important consideration in the debate over the introduction of the Sharia. Therefore, each side in the “media warfare” is eager to insist on the economic viability of the part of the country it represents, even while insisting that the other part would not be viable in the event of a break-up of the country (Tell, 20 March 2000). Contrary to

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the “paradise for the masses” that Trust says the “Arewa Republic” or “Northern Nigerian Federation” would be with 90 percent literacy within ten years of separate nationhood, Tell states that, if the north secedes, nineteen out of the twenty almajiris (street urchins) in the north—who are regularly “employed” to foment trouble—“would go through a Hobbesian life that is short, nasty and brutish” (17), given that “by the latest figures from the Federal Office of Statistics, [the northern states have the] weakest capability to generate any sort of revenue internally” (Tell, 20 March 2000, emphasis mine). When the National Council of States, a federal advisory council, reportedly resolved that the Sharia be shelved and the states returned to status quo, The Guardian, in its editorial, argues that the decision “is the triumph of reason over irrationality, of national spirit over bigotry” (The Guardian, 3 March 2000: 6). On its part, the Weekly Trust insists that the decision is not binding (Weekly Trust, 10 March 2000). The OPC and Inter-Ethnic Violence In this section, I analyze the discourses in the press on the OPC phenomenon, between the news organs that valorize the group as an example of identity validation, and others that dismiss the group as a “gang of (ethnic) criminals.” The case of the Oodua People’s Congress, and the representations of the activities and violence of this group in the “Yoruba press” (west) and the (counter-) “Arewa Press” (north) and the others not directly in the “line of fire,” the “minority press,” are used in identifying and understanding the negotiation of difference and power among the disparate ethnic groups within a democracy. Stuart Hall (1977: 340) has argued that the mass media, in contemporary times: are more and more responsible (a) for providing the basis on which groups and classes construct an “image” of the lives, meanings, practices and values of other groups and classes; (b) for providing the images, representations and ideas around which the social totality, composed of all these separate and fragmented pieces, can be coherently grasped as a whole. (Emphasis mine) The OPC case is illustrative of this, particularly in the way the practices of the Congress is dumped, by the press, into the overall “agenda” of a major ethnic (Yoruba) nationality in its struggles for ethnic validation against a rival dominant ethnic group (Hausa-Fulani). Also,

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the violence employed by the OPC necessitates judgment on whether it is legitimate or not, based on some ethical and political values to which the “community” adheres (Schlesinger, 1991: 1). Central to this is whether or not violence is assessed as “a strategically, consciously employed resource,” as David Riches (1986 in ibid.) describes it. Thus, the interpretation of violence is capable of producing a codified world of “friends” and “enemies,” separating “us” from “them” (2). The OPC was a product of Nigeria’s peculiar crisis of nationhood, particularly as this manifested in the annulment of the 12 June 1993 presidential election won by Moshood Abiola, a Yoruba millionaire businessman. The founder of the congress, Dr. Fredrick Fasehun, a medical doctor and activist, saw the annulment as “an affront and a crime against a Yoruba man” (Fasehun, 2002: 160). He argued that “the Yoruba people, who should have naturally led the vanguard of those resisting that dastardly act, could not do so because, though they felt a common grief, they lacked the unity required to marshal a befitting confrontation” (ibid.). He, therefore, decided to form an organization to reverse the “display of racial impotence.” As argued elsewhere, while the peculiar conditions of the Nigerian State and the pattern of the structured relations among the dominant ethnic groups created the conditions for the emergence of the OPC, it was the annulment of the 12 June 1993 presidential election believed to have been won by Abiola that exploded it unto the national space in 1994. The fact that prominent northerners backed the annulment “proved” to the Yoruba, that it was a “northern conspiracy” against one of their own and by extension, their nation (Adebanwi, 2005: 344). Against this backdrop, the OPC then set for itself the goal of the “emancipation of the Yoruba race.” Barely six months after the then twenty-nine–year-old Gani Adams took over a faction of the group; the OPC started what became regular, violent clashes with other ethnic groups, particularly the Hausa, the Ijaw, and the Igbo in Lagos and other places in the west of Nigeria— and ultimately the police and the state. At a point, President Obasanjo issued a shoot-on-sight order against the members of the group at the height of its reign of violence in Lagos. Given the inter-ethnic tension and clashes occasioned by the activities of this group, the press became more and more implicated in the crisis as the newspapers representing different geo-political, ethnic interests ref lected clashing discourses on the violence and the activities of the group, in general. I gathered data from two Nigerian newspapers and one newsmagazine between 1999 and 2000. The papers included New Nigerian

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(ref lecting the position of the core north) Tell5 (ref lecting the position of the west) and The Guardian (ref lecting generally the position of the minority nationalities and the south in general). Analysis of data shows that some key themes run through the discourses on the OPC phenomenon in the press. These include those of democratic governance; inter-ethnic relations/ethnic domination; National Question/national conference; social questions relating to youth and social conditions; violence and law and order; and the meaning and significance of OPC. All these are not necessarily treated separately in the data; often, more than one theme is presented in each case, or each narrative. One of the major concerns noticed in the data is the contest over what OPC represents. This is not surprising because the very process of naming is essential to defining the parameters of any contested idea or phenomenon particularly as such an idea or phenomenon is linked to the politics of representation. The politics of representation, Pietkäinen and Hujanen (2003: 255) argue, “refer the significance and consequence of the ways in which, people, regions, ideas and knowledge are represented.” It is, therefore, understandable that considerable space is given in the newspapers and newsmagazine to discuss the significance of OPC. The New Nigerian that captures the OPC as “Nigerian’s most notorious ‘cultural association,’ ” explains its significance thus: Chanting the present claptrap, it decries Yoruba marginalisation and as the way out, OPC wants a restructured Nigeria. In the alternative, it wants an Oduduwa Republic . . . . In pursuing it, the group has gone over the edge, killing and maiming innocent people. Except the Yoruba, every tribe is vulnerable to attack . . . (New Nigerian, 2 October 1999: 3) The characterization of the group continues even to the level of the “incredible”: A law unto themselves, OPC members defy constituted authority and armed with charms and amulets, their exploits are incredible . . . . With a handkerchief, they deflect bullets or any ammunition . . . Potent with magic, their weapons are deadly and in the face of arrest, members disappear into thin air . . . (ibid., emphasis mine) Tell is not so different in the social characterization of the OPC membership, but it emphasizes, unlike the New Nigerian, the intellectual

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and the political (democratic) origins of the group, rather than the cultural: Founded in 1994 by Fasehun, a medical doctor and a few other Yoruba intellectuals, OPC took off to a purposeful start. It was part of the Yoruba’s grand re-alignment of forces to challenge late dictator [General] Sani Abacha’s self-succession bid. It was also meant to complement efforts of the NADECO that spearheaded the struggle for the revalidation of the June 12 presidential election won by MKO Abiola . . . . But suddenly, senselessness and hooliganism soon replaced the intellectual pugilism hitherto associated with OPC . . . (Tell, 31 January 2000: 18, emphasis mine) Even where the New Nigerian accepts largely—but not totally6 —that the Abacha tyranny provoked the formation of the OPC, it argues that with Abacha’s death, the group “transformed into a monster” (New Nigerian, 4 December 1999). Tell avers, again unlike New Nigerian, that the political conditions of Nigeria explain the OPC phenomenon. The group is, therefore, “only a symptom of a fundamental and much more dangerous problem—the total dysfunctionality of the Nigerian polity” (Tell, 31 January 2000: 18, emphasis mine). The Guardian more or less argues in the same vein. First, it represents opinions of people along this line. For instance, after the clashes in Mushin, Lagos, in January 2000, Dr. Beko Ransome-Kuti, himself a chieftain of the Fasehun-led faction, blames the clashes on “the rot in the socio-economic and political lives of the nation . . . adding that the clashes have shown that people have no confidence in the nation” (The Guardian on Saturday, 8 January 2000: 3). In an editorial, the paper sums all these up by noting that “No less significant is the economic environment which breeds frustration and violence” (ibid., 14 January 2000: 12). An aggregate of opinions expressed through the New Nigerian challenges this “political economy” perspective. Rather, the OPC remains a group of “tribal gangsters and moronic” (New Nigerian, 14 December 1999: 5) people, and “area-boy militia for the Yoruba politicians, bureaucrats and intellectuals to press their agenda of disintegration of the country” (ibid.). As captured in the “Political Diary” column of the paper, the fundamental basis of the OPC activities, or the leitmotif of the organization “smack(s) of the ethnic cleansing project brutally carried out by

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the Hutus against Tutsis in Rwanda in 1994,” making the organization to represent for the Yoruba, according to Abubakar Jika, “what Nazism was to the Germans in the era of Adolf Hitler [given that the] OPC advocates a Nazi version of Yoruba ‘Aryan race’ ” (New Nigerian, 9 December 1999: 5). Jika affirms that the OPC “is a rabid, violent and lawless organisation formed . . . to sensitise, mobilise, organise and lead the Yoruba race to marginalise and dominate other ethnic groups in Nigeria . . .” (ibid., emphasis mine). The New Nigerian declares that “The OPC was created by wrong people and for wrong reasons . . . First to give a solid voice to the Yorubas in such a way as to remain violent dictators lording it over the other ethnic groups within the Nigerian society, as a revenge for the so-called ‘marginalisation of the Yoruba race’ for decades. And to give final approval to, and fight for Oduduwa Republic . . .” (New Nigerian, 16 November 1999: 5, emphasis mine). While the New Nigerian emphasizes the theme of “disintegration” and “secession” in characterizing the OPC, Tell and The Guardian emphasize “marginalization” and “injustice.” The latter also provides a broader socio-economic and political context for the OPC phenomenon. For instance, Tell notes a broad sociological backdrop, touching on political, economic, and social conditions that shows “understanding” for the phenomenon of OPC thus: After 15 years of unbroken military rule, the collective psyche of the nation is bruised and battered. The economy remains just a primitive contraption kept alive by petro-dollars from crude oil exports. Infrastructures have broken down completely. Citizens get just electricity bills that they do not get to use . . . . Unemployment has reached epidemic proportions. The army of the unemployed youths daily prowl the streets, hoping against hopelessness. Hence, many of them eventually find solace in criminal activities; it provides them an outlet to dissipate their energies and long-simmering frustration about a system that gives them no chance at all . . . (Tell, 31 January 2000: 18) This sociological context, according to Tell’s reading, would explain why the OPC phenomenon is inevitable and understandable: Indeed, the life of the majority of those who found voice in violence today has been distorted by the vicissitudes of the Nigerian polity. It is, therefore, not surprising that the renegade OPC is largely peopled by urchins, known as “area boys.” An “area boy” is either

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a criminal, an aspiring rogue or a frustrated and aggrieved youth. (Ibid., emphasis mine) Although not always stated this sharply, the political economy of ethnic clashes is an important dimension of the OPC phenomenon. From the Mile 12 and the Tincan Island to the Ojo clashes, the issue of economic space as it relates to extraction of economic benefits and socioeconomic deprivation are key issues. Another central theme is the implication of the activities of the group, particularly, the group’s violence, for democratic governance. Most of all the items analyzed point directly or indirectly to how the group’s activities have the capacity to destroy the newly won democratic rule. Tell, for instance, captures the “killings and maimings [sic]” as ending the joy of “a nation still basking in the euphoria of a new democracy still in the making . . .” (Tell, 31 January 2000: 13) The New Nigerian argues that “What we are witnessing is indeed another blasphemy [sic] of democracy, which goes to show that our politicians are never prepared to learn” (New Nigerian, 16 November 1999: 5). Yet another key theme is that of inter-ethnic relations/ethnic domination. While Tell and The Guardian provide the background to the intransigence of the OPC as rooted in the domination of power for many years by the northern power elite, the New Nigerian either overlooks this or raises it as evidence of “blackmail.” The latter is more concerned about the present “domination” of the Yoruba as represented principally by Obasanjo’s presidency. It is important to note here that while the southern newspapers often emphasize the need to represent the OPC phenomenon within the context of the history of inter-group relations, particularly in relation to perceived “Hausa-Fulani (northern) hegemony,” the northern press represents the phenomenon within present and future intergroup relations, particularly as relates to the “voluntary surrender of power” by the north and the perceived “unfair” exercise of that power by the “ruling Yoruba elite” led by President Obasanjo. For instance, Tell argues that “the emergence of the OPC, and indeed, other militant ethnic groups has its own history” (Tell, 30 October 2000: 27). This “history” included “wrongs visited on some ethnic groups,” which “were seen as a deliberate plot to tame the other ethnic groups to submission by the northern ruling class whose arrowhead was the military dictatorship” (ibid.). Interesting enough, the New Nigerian that is silent about this backdrop as articulated in Tell is

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interested in what it describes as the current “silence” of the “LagosIbadan axis press”—which is “well groomed to mould people’s opinion on tribal sentiments [but which has] kept mute on the tribal killings” (New Nigerian, 14 December 1999: 5, emphasis mine). The New Nigerian expresses concern mainly with ref lecting current “Yoruba domination” (New Nigeria, 13 January 2000: 6). Against the backdrop of the some of the issues above, including domination, ethnic strife, violent clashes, military rule, socio-economic decline, and sundry, the discourses on the desirability of a national talkshop are also central to the reporting and writings on the OPC in the press. The need to address Nigeria’s fundamental problems, captured under the rubric of National Question, has, over the years become a very critical matter for debate. For Tell, therefore, “a lasting solution to the ethnic distrust and suspicion” in the country, brought to the frontburners by the OPC crisis, is the convocation of a Sovereign National Conference (SNC). The magazine argues that “[s]urely, most Nigerians believe that the continued existence of the country rests squarely on it” (Tell, 30 October 2000, emphasis mine). But this position on SNC is not shared by the New Nigerian. As a piece in the paper captures it, the OPC phenomenon and the resulting call for SNC are attempts at “balkanizing” Nigeria. “The question is,” states the piece, “were the Yorubas looking for political power to preside over the balkanisation of Nigeria? Were they looking for power to hold the knife in the final sharing of Nigeria?” (New Nigerian, 13 January 2000: 6; see also, New Nigerian on Sunday, 20 February 2000: 10). On its part, The Guardian gives regular attention to the issue of the SNC in its own reporting of the OPC crisis. For example, in reporting the reaction of former presidential aspirant, Olu Falae, to OPC-inspired ethnic clashes, the paper describes Falae’s suggestion as a panacea for ethnic violence (The Guardian on Sunday, 5 December 1999: 3). The paper avers that the issues raised by the rash of ethnic militia-inspired violence relates to constitutional matters having to do with “residual authority, control and funding of police and related federalist safeguards” (The Guardian, 14 January 2000:12). Since the present constitution, the 1999 Constitution, argues Tell “is nothing but a parody of a true federal political system,” “the calls for a sovereign national conference that would produce a constitution to ref lect the country’s ethnic, political, social and cultural diversity [is] ever more compelling” (Tell, 31 January 2000: 18). For most contributors to the New Nigerian, it is a surprise that after getting the presidency, the Yoruba would pursue the

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line favored by the OPC: sovereign national conference. The Yoruba are, therefore, warned by the paper about the consequences of their actions: Now that the nascent democratic experiment has begun with a Yoruba man as the executive president and the commander-inchief of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, why are the Yoruba still disgruntled and misbehaving? . . . If these atrocities were to lead to war, the battlefield will be Lagos and other Yoruba states. This will end the terrible Yoruba monopoly of all finance institutions in Nigeria and allied industries. (New Nigerian, 27 January 2000: 5, emphasis mine) Conclusion Margaret Scammell and Holli A. Semetko (2000: xiii) have argued that it makes no sense to continue to theorize and analyze the mediademocracy interface as if “there were no contests about democratic ideals and possibilities.” As a major democratic institution, the press is expected to uphold democratic ideals and facilitate the expansion and deepening of democratic practices. I have used the coverage of two violent ethno-religious and ethno-political clashes to illustrate the limitations of the assumptions of liberal democratic theory on the role of the press in a democracy. The press, as an important institution in Nigeria’s heterogeneous public spheres, often commits itself to further fragmentation of these publics. Despite the heroic efforts of the press in ensuring the restoration of democratic rule and its critical role in monitoring democratically elected officials and institutions, on a few critical occasions, the Nigerian press renders itself totally captive to ethno-regional and ethno-religious passions and calculations. Post-authoritarian (democratic) press is expected to perform such specific roles as expanding the freedom of expression, acting as interlocutor for hitherto marginalized groups, disseminating the values of a democratic culture (Tironi and Sunkel, 2000: 174), and in multi-cultural societies, facilitating the re-legitimization of democratic cross-cultural dialogue and exchanges and “bringing all classes of the population together [thus] strengthening national social solidarity” (Mughan and Gunther, 2000: 10–11). The effective performance of these functions is critical to strengthening and deepening democracy. However, the foregoing analysis of the coverage of ethno-religious violence in the press in Nigeria shows the problems that arise when what Phillip Schlesinger

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calls “divergent concepts of rationality, order and criminality coexists” (Schlesinger, 1991: 19) “within the matrix of a single political domain” (Leach, 1977 in ibid.). As Nigeria emerged from a very violent military era, the press that was fully embroiled in the struggle to free Nigeria from this history of violence ought to have shown greater restraint in its coverage of the religious and inter-ethnic clashes, which, in many respects, carried heavy historical baggage. Democratic rule is particularly constructed around the possibilities of peaceful settlement of competing social interests. Therefore, if a major democratic institution, such as the press, exacerbates the unavoidable crises that arise from this difficult process, it would have failed in one of its most important duties. As ref lected in the newspapers and newsmagazines analyzed here, the press ended up subverting the legitimacy of the democratic government and promoting, ironically, non-democratic ways of settling social crises. Perhaps one positive thing that can be said about the narratives of the press in the context of these violent crises is that the press, again, re-presented the dominant standpoints as regards the fundamental questions that need to be addressed in Nigeria. However, the implications of this for democratic rule is grim; because there were no efforts to integrate the grievances and focus on the grand questions without talking past one another, the newspapers and newsmagazines failed to promote common problem-solving. This is no cheering conclusion given the fact that those same questions would define and determine the future of Nigeria. In the coverage of major ethnic and religious crises by the press, as evident above, the state is often delegitimized, with regular insistence on the desirability or imminence of its dissolution. As a critical agency for the exchange of information between citizens and between citizens and the holders of state power, the media constitute “the critical lifeblood of democracy.” While it would be impossible to expect that they will not ref lect or maintain partisan position of the critical issues in the Nigerian society, the media are expected to rise above such partisanship in encouraging dialogue across ethnic, religious, regional, class, and gender lines so as to build a more democratic and multi-cultural society that would also help to further humanize the state. Notes 1. A noteworthy exception is Matthew H. Kukah, Religion, Politics and Power in Northern Nigeria. Ogbu Kalu and Ebenezer Obadare, at different times, like many others, make a brief allusion

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3.

4.

5.

6.

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to the “media hype [on the Sharia which] also heated up the political temperature” and “rankled,” and the southern suspicion of the northern desire to “deep the Quran into the sea” that “resonates in the western (Yoruba)-based and dominated print media” in Nigeria. Ogbu U. Kalu, “Safiyya and Adamah: Punishing Adultery with Sharia Stones in TwentyFirst Century Nigeria,” pp. 396–397; Cf. Ebenezer Obadare, “In Search of Public Sphere . . .” p. 183. Weekly Trust was chosen because it was more unfettered as the “voice” of the Islamic north, while north-based New Nigerian, wholly owned by the federal government, but serving the interests of the north, was chosen to compliment the Trust given that the latter was a weekly during the height of the Sharia crisis. (It has since become a daily). Interesting enough, some northerners, including significantly, a Trust columnist, Aliyu Tilde, would argue that the Weekly Trust “employed the same strategies [as] the southern press in its contribution towards the killing of the Shari’ah.” Danladi A. Mohammed even accused the “modernist intellectual wing” of the paper of “anti- Sharia’h posture.” Danladi Adamu Mohammed, “Why Newspapers Fail in Northern Nigeria,” Paper presented at Graduate Seminar, Centre for Journalism Studies, Wales, February 2002. This is a reference to the Sokoto Caliphate created by Fulani aristocrats after the Jihad— which started in 1804—through which they established a theocracy over much of what was to become northern Nigeria. Although traditionally in the analysis of the press in Nigeria, Tribune is typically used to represent the Yoruba West, I have used Tell magazine here, one, to depart from this “tradition”; and two, because the newsmagazine has also been identified as the arrowhead of “NADECO-Afenifere” press. Therefore, I am persuaded that using the magazine in this context will further highlight—and also complicate—this “role.” For instance, one writer in the paper argues that “Abacha regime saw to ( . . .) the humiliation and surrender of Yoruba extremism.” “State of the Nation and the OPC,” New Nigerian, 13 January 2000: 6, emphasis added.

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Diamond, L. 1991. “Nigeria’s Search for a New Political Order,” Journal of Democracy, Vol. 2, No. 2: 54–69. Diamond, L., J.J. Linz, and S.M. Lipset. 1988. Democracy in Developing Countries: Latin America. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. Director, O. 2008. Suicide Journalism. Ibadan: Bookcraft. Fasehun, F. 2002. Frederick Fasehun: The Son of Oodua. Lagos: Inspired Communication. Fraser, N. 1990. “Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing Democracy,” Social Text, Nos. 25/26: 56–80. Gunther, R. and A. Mughan. 2000. “The Political Impact of the Media: A Reassessment,” in R. Gunther and A. Mughan (Eds.), Democracy and the Media: A Comparative Perspective. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Habermas, Jürgen. 1989. The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society. (Trans.) Thomas Burger. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Hall, S. 1977. “Culture, the Media, and the Ideological ‘Effect,’ ” in J. Curran, M. Gurevitch, and J. Woollacott (Eds.), Mass Communication and Society. London: Sage. Ilesanmi, S.O. 1997. Religious Pluralism and the Nigerian State. Athens, OH: Ohio University Press. Jacobs, R.N. 2000. Race, Media and the Crisis of Civil Society: From Watts to Rodney King. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Jakubowicz, K. 1995. “Media Within and Without the State: Press Freedom in Eastern Europe,” Journal of Communication, Vol. 45, No. 4, Autumn: 125–139. Kalu, Ogbu U. 2003. “Safiyya and Adamah: Punishing Adultery with Sharia Stones in TwentyFirst Century Nigeria,” African Affairs, No. 102: 389–409. Kamrava, M. 2000. Politics and Society in the Developing World, 2nd ed. London and New York: Routledge. Kerkvliet Benedict J. Tria. 2001. “An Approach for Analysing State- Society Relations in Vietnam,” SOJOURN: Journal of Social Issues in Southeast Asia, Vol. 16, No. 2: 238–278. Kukah, M.H. 1993. Religion, Politics and Power in Northern Nigeria. Ibadan: Spectrum Books. Levine, D. 1986. “Religion and Politics in Contemporary Historical Perspective,” Comparative Politics, Vol. 19, No. 1. Linz, J.J. and A. Stepan. 1996. Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Mohammed, D.A. 2002. “Why Newspapers Fail in Northern Nigeria,” Paper presented at Graduate Seminar, Centre for Journalism Studies, Wales, February. Mughan, A. and R. Gunther. 2000. “The Media in Democratic and Non- democratic Regimes: A Multilevel Perspective,” in R. Gunther and A. Mughan (Eds.), Democracy and the Media: A Comparative Perspective. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Najmabadi, A. 2000. “(Un) Veiling Feminism,” Social Text, Vol. 64, No. 18: 29–45. Obadare, E. 1999. “The Press and Democratic Transition in Nigeria: Comparative Notes on the Abacha and Abubakar Transition Programs,” Issue: A Journal of Opinion, Vol. 27, No. 1, “Transition in Nigeria?”: 38–40. ———. 2004. “In Search of a Public Sphere: The Fundamentalist Challenge to Civil Society in Nigeria,” Patterns of Prejudice, Vol. 38, No. 2: 177–198. O’Donnell, G. and P.C. Schmitter. (1991). Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies. Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press. Ojo, E. 2003. “The Mass Media and Sustainable Democratic Values in Nigeria: Possibilities and Limitations,” Media, Culture and Society, No. 25: 821–840. Olukotun, A. 2000. “The 1999 Nigerian Transition and the Media,” African Journal of Political Science, Vol. 5, No. 2, December: 33–44.

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———. 2002. “Authoritarian State, Crisis of Democratization and the Underground Media in Nigeria,” African Affairs, Vol. 101, No. 404, July 2002: 317–342. ———. 2004a. “Media Accountability and Democracy in Nigeria,” African Studies Review, Vol. 47, No. 3, December: 69–90. ———. 2004b. Repressive State and Resurgent Media Under Nigeria’s Military Dictatorship, 1988– 1998. Research Report No. 126. Upsalla: Nordiska Africainestitutet. Oyovbaire, S. 2001. “The Media and Democratic Process in Nigeria,” Lecture at the National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies, Kuru, 7 August. The Guardian, 29–30, August. Scammell, M. and H. Semetko (Eds.). 2000. The Media, Journalism and Democracy. Dartmouth: Ashgate. Schlesinger, P. 1991. Media, State and Nation: Political Violence and Collective Identities. London: Sage. Schmitter, P.C. 1993. Some Propositions about Civil Society and the Consolidation of Democracy. Wien: Institut d fur Hohere Studien. Suberu, R.T. 1996. “Religion: A View of South,” in L. Diamond, K.Greene, and O.Oyediran (Eds.), Transition without End: Nigerian Politics and Civil Society Under Babangida. Ibadan: Vantage Press. Thompson, J.B. 1994. Ideology and Modern Culture: Critical Theory in the Era of Mass Communication. Cambridge: Polity Press. Tironi, E. and G. Sunkel. 2000. “The Modernization of Communications: The Media in the Transition to Democracy in Chile,” in R. Gunther and A. Mughan (Eds.), Democracy and the Media: A Comparative Perspective. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Zhao, D. 2000. “State- Society Relations and the Discourses and Activities of the 1989 Beijing Student Movement,” American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 105, No. 6 (May): 1592–1632.

Newspapers and Newsmagazines New Nigerian, Kaduna. Post Express, Lagos. Tell, Lagos. The Guardian, Lagos. Weekly Trust, Abuja

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Ethno-Religious Conflicts and National Security in Nigeria: Illustrations from the “Middle Belt” Samue l E g w u

Introduction Ethno-religious conf lict is a form of conf lict supposedly generated on the basis of real or imagined “difference” rooted in ethnic and religious identities. It is “supposedly” because of the need to avoid the essentialism that characterizes discourses on identity politics, especially the independent power assigned to these identities in shaping political consciousness. The notion of ethno-religious identity derives from the congruence and the mutually reinforcing relationships between ethnic and religious identities in the social and political process. As the situation has been well captured, sometimes religious identity becomes part of an ethnic group’s identity or vice versa, and presents a volatile social mixture coupled with the power of the ethnic group’s myth of common descent (Salomone, 1991). Numerous studies have shown the overlapping boundaries between ethnic and religious identities in Nigeria in the daily struggles of groups and communities for access to power and resources, or resisting domination (Kastfelt, 1994; Adamu, 1978; Paden, 1973; Miles, 1994; Ikengah-Metuh, 1994: 12). Conf lict and violence expressed along these lines has remained a salient feature of Nigeria’s social and political life from the mid-1980s. This period coincided with Nigeria’s economic decline and the deleterious impact on various social groups and classes, of the orthodox IMF/

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World-supported Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP). The return to civil rule in May 1999 has also been marked by the most violent and protracted ethno-religious conf licts resulting in massive destruction of lives and property, the physical displacement of thousands of populations, and increased social distance among various ethno-cultural and religious groups. Consequently, these forms of conf lict have intensified the crisis of the nation-state project, undermined the viability of the on-going democratization process and pose mortal threat to Nigeria’s national security. The classification of the Nigerian state as either fragile or failing largely derives from the threat posed to the viability of the process of state-making and nation-building in contemporary Nigeria by these patterns of conf lict. National security is understood as freedom from danger or the absence of threats to a nation’s ability to protect and develop itself, or promote its legitimate interests and enhance the well-being of its citizens (Imobighe, 1990: 225). According to Nnoli (2006), national security has “objective” and “subjective” dimensions: the former measured by the absence of threat, anxiety, or danger, while the latter is measured by the absence of fear that threat, anxiety, or danger will materialize. However, despite what appears to be the inclusiveness implied in this definition with the emphasis on the well-being of the citizens, the traditional literature on national security takes as its point of departure the framework of defense and strategic doctrine such that national security is reduced to the security of the state and the narrow interests of the ruling elite. Although rooted in ethnic and religious differences it would be misleading to assume a correlation between the reality of diversity and conf lict. Underlying violent ethno-religious conf licts are a number of factors: the state of unequal ethnic relations defined in terms of access to state power and resources, exclusive practices associated with citizenship, decline of social citizenship, and opportunistic manipulation of differences by the elites (Egwu, 2003). These factors are reinforced by the global and domestic processes at work, the chief ones being the ascendancy of the forces of globalization, the massive economic decline, and the attendant market reforms and its failures. The deliberate denial of the relevance of ideology under the assault of globalization and radical capitalism has tended to create a social void in the everyday struggles of individuals and groups such that cultural and primordial identities are brought to the fore. It is well established that deepening economic crisis and the failure of the state and its attendant declining legitimacy have created the crisis of individual and group identity and

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consequently, the quest for the redefinition of identities in the context of rapidly changing domestic and international environment (Bangura, 1994; Laakso and Olukoshi, 1996). The massive resurgence of identity-based conf licts in the post–Cold War era and the negative impact on national security in the post–Cold War era dramatize the paradox of the African continent. The end of the Cold War was expected to mark a paradigm shift in the conception of national security, which placed emphasis on the militarization of the state as a means of responding to the challenge of external aggression. The assumption was that the end of the Cold War would be followed by “peace dividends,” which would then “free” resources to meet development and welfare needs of citizens. However, for most African states especially Nigeria, the end of the Cold War has been accompanied by intensification of intra-state conf lict expressed along communal lines pitching individuals and groups in deadly confrontations. Unfortunately, the politics of the elite in power tends to favor extreme projection of state power as opposed to dialogue, consensus building, deepening democracy, and participatory politics as means of engaging diversity. It is easy to establish the nexus between ethno-religious conf lict and national security. According to Iweze (1990: 237), ethno-religious conf licts impact on national security in two major ways: in the form of direct threat to lives and property of citizens and in the challenge to the authority of the state. In other words, ethno-religious conf lict poses threat to national security at both horizontal and vertical levels. At the level of the former, for example, violent ethno-religious conf licts have pitched different communal groups in deadly confrontations. While at the latter level, such conf licts have the tendency to challenge state authority and bring the state directly into the arena of conf lict, with the consequence that such conf licts directly threaten state survival and national security. At the horizontal level the implication for national security is manifested in the humanitarian tragedies of all kinds including the killings and maiming of tens of thousands of people, the destruction of properties, and the physical displacement of people. The humanitarian tragedies that have accompanied the chains of ethno-religious violence have been prohibitive. Hudgens and Grillo (1995) estimated that by 1994 the Tiv/Jukun conf lict in Wukari had claimed 5,000 lives. Okoye (2000) also estimated that “ethnic and religious cleansing” of communities, groups, and individuals led to the death of over 15,000 people between 1990 and 1999. Similarly, the Maitetsine riots in Kano

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in 1980, the Jimeta religious riot of 1984, and the ethno-religious violence in Rigasa in Kaduna in 1992 resulted in the death of over 5,000 persons (Egwu, 2001). Other studies have confirmed that these conf licts are violent and protracted, and have led to untold humanitarian tragedies (Bagudu, 2003; Nnoli, 2003; Alubo, 2006; Effiong, 2003; Abdu and Umar, 2003). These studies show that ethno-religious conf licts and violence have not only intensified across the length and breadth of Nigeria, they have produced devastating effects in several communities as a result of wanton killings, destruction of property, growing culture of impunity of individuals, groups, and state officials, and have led to displacement of thousands of civilians who have had to live under precarious conditions without clearly defined state obligations. Apart from the negative impact on national development and national integration, there are several specific implications for national security. The chapter examines the phenomenon of ethno-religious conf lict and its implication for national security. It explores the nuances surrounding the concepts of ethno-religious identity and national security and attempts to establish the link between ethno-religious conf lict and national security. The chapter uses three case studies from the “Middle Belt” to illustrate the linkage: the ethno-religious violence that engulfed Plateau state starting with 7 September 2001; the communal violence in Nasarawa South Senatorial District in June 2001; and the March 2000 sectarian violence in Kaduna in the wake of the adoption of Sharia legal code. These cases are by no means “isolated” and “localized” incidents in the sense that the chains of violence sparked by each of these incidences impacted on the wider issues of the Nigerian political economy including the national question, democratization, and national development. But even more importantly, these cases raise questions that relate to discourses on national security as it is used in the research. The field survey for the research was based on in- depth interviews and Focused Group Discussions (FGDs) in the conf lict-affected areas. The chapter is divided into six sections. The first section serves as the introduction. Section two examines the concept of national security drawing attention to the shift in the emphasis on military considerations to issues of human security and welfare. Section three examines ethno-religious conf lict and the dilemma of national security, while the three case studies are discussed in section four. Section five draws the concluding remarks, while section six is on key policy recommendations.

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Ethno-Religious Conf lict and Human Security There is often a tendency to problematize the phenomenon of ethnoreligious conf lict in terms of national security rather than human security. This tendency is grounded in the conventional wisdom that reduces “national security” to “state security” as opposed to the collective welfare of the citizenry. Given that the objective of protecting state territories dominated security policies in the Cold War period, it is easy to understand the crude reductionism. This lies at the core of the contestation surrounding the concept of national security. For instance, how individuals and groups understand and relate to the idea often depends on the social location, or where individuals and groups find themselves in the power calculus. For the ruling elite or fractions of the elite in power, national security is hardly distinguished from their narrow interests defined in terms of how to access, control, and project political power. It is thus abstractly posed as the approximate of the interest of the national-state, which is often reified above group and sectional interests. However, for the subaltern groups and classes, national security simply represents an ideology of domination, exploitation, and political repression. For this reason, it becomes imperative to go beyond the narrow concern for national or state security and focus on issues of human security. Recent discourses attempt to shift emphasis from “national” to “human” security largely in recognition of the altered security environment in the post–Cold War period of globalization. Whereas national security tends to focus on the security of the state in military terms and the protection of the state from external aggression, human security shares the conceptual space of people-centered approach to human development pioneered by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). Central to the idea of human security as espoused by the 1994 Human Development Report on Human Security are two important concerns: freedom from fear intended to indicate freedom from violence, and freedom from want, which is intended to indicate freedom from poverty (UNDP, 2004; Social Watch Report, 2004). In this conception of human security, human beings become the “vital core” with “fundamental set of functions related to survival, livelihood and dignity” as the irreducible minimum (Alkire, 2003: 24). The evidence appears to suggest that ethno-religious conf lict is driven by the wider issues of democracy, and governance is found in the underlying economic, political, and social dynamics. For instance, in environments marked by scarcity and poverty, ethnic and religious

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identities tend to become political resource deployed by the elites and groups in the competition for power and material advantages. The mobilization of ethno-religious identity, therefore, should be seen as a part of the prevailing system of seeking power and authority, and a strategy of attaining material and psychological survival (Egwu, 1998; Hendricks, 1997). Being a part and parcel of the technology of power of the African ruling elite, ethno-religious identity cannot simply be dismissed as a form of false consciousness in which the ruling elite manipulate the masses for their own narrow political and economic ends. Furthermore, the mobilization and conf lict dynamics associated with this identity can operate at both levels of the elite and the masses (Nnoli, 1978). On the whole, ethno-religious identity is Janus-faced, combining elements of imagination and reality, both determining and determined, fixed and yet, ever-changing, or simultaneously providing ideology of domination and resistance. The massive resurgence of ethno-religious conf lict and violence in Nigeria has occurred under conditions of the economic crisis that started in the 1980s and intensified with the implementation of the market-based adjustment policies supported by the World Bank and the IMF. Not surprisingly, therefore, the return to civil rule in 1999 has witnessed renewed conf licts despite the expectation that democracy would offer a better framework for the management of conf lict. It would appear that market reform policies have conduced to the escalation of ethno-religious conf lict in addition to the result of eroding state autonomy and legitimacy as well the constricted democratic space arising from state repression and authoritarianism that inheres in market reforms. Where state repression is targeted at specific communities, regions, and ethnicities, responses take similar form. It is in this context that Ake’s (1993:7) remarks that ethnic formations could serve as a counter-veiling force to state power and provide a separate space against the totalizing tendencies of the post-colonial state becomes useful. There is also the question of citizenship. What obtains in Nigeria is a bifurcated system of citizenship by which a pan-Nigerian notion of citizenship operates at the national level while indigeneity operates at the local level. This ignores the rich history of migration and constant mingling of Nigerian peoples and creates a distinction between “indigenes” and “non-indigenes” or between “natives” and “settlers.” Finally, there is the question of interface between the on-going democratization process and the political mobilization of identities. The hegemony of the Bank and the Fund has ensured that the robust and rich idea in democracy has been reduced to liberal democracy. The

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consequence is that democracy is narrowly defined in terms of civil and political liberties, and the associated representative institutions ignoring group rights, fears, and concerns. Thus, liberal democracy is one that disempowers economically, and does not guarantee social welfare for the people. It is in this context that we situate the communal conf licts of ethno-religious nature in the middle belt. The “Middle Belt”: Context of Identity Politics and Conf lict The “Middle Belt” of Nigeria represents a social and cultural zone inhabited largely by ethnic minorities who have constructed a political identity based on lived experience within the Nigerian state in general, and the erstwhile northern region, in particular. Underlying this political identity is the real and imagined fear of exclusion from power, resources, and respect for their culture and language. Although the ethnic minorities of the Middle Belt are predominantly Christians, religion may be a factor in framing their political identity and providing a weapon of resistance, but these minority groups have significant Muslim population. Those who assume and invoke Middle Belt identity, therefore, do not necessarily inhabit the geographical space presently constituted as the North Central geo-political zone that, for example, excludes the present Kaduna state. The cases of ethno-religious conf licts and violence used to illustrate the implication of identity-based conf licts for national security have been taken from the “Middle Belt.” According to Otite (1990), the ethnic minorities in the former northern region vary between 150 and 200, and account for about 35% of the population of northern Nigeria. As a result of the lived experience of these predominantly Christian minorities in relation to the predominantly Islamic Hausa/Fulani, they perceive the relationship as based on “internal colonialism.” Consequently, they are more pre-occupied with the question of “Hausa-Fulani” domination, religious victimization, and subtle Islamization (Mustapha, 1998), which constitute the underlying sources of tension, contradictions, and antagonism. The notion of “Hausa-Fulani” hegemony, which resonates in the political discourses of northern minorities, is expressed in categories such as the Kaduna Mafia, the Northern System, and the Northern Oligarchy (See Takaya and Tyoden, 1987). The significant presence of “settler” Hausa-Fulani communities and the competition for power and resources under conditions of scarcity has heightened tension and conf lict. While Balarabe Musa (2000)

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estimates that not less than 30% of the population of states in the Middle Belt apart from Plateau and Benue states are of “settler” origin, Tyoden (2000) suggests that “settler” communities constitute a demographic force that cannot be ignored. The numerically insignificant population of the numerous ethnic minority groups compared to the large and relatively mobile Hausa population is a product of centuries of migration and contacts cemented by religious movements including the Jihad in the early nineteenth century, trade, and commerce ( James, 2000). The colonial intervention, however, transformed the character of inter-group relations and transformed the relationships that hitherto existed between the “Hausa/Fulani” communities and the northern ethnic minorities. The historical construction of “Hausa/Fulani” and “Middle Belt” identities that frames ethno-religious conf licts brings to the fore the manifold character of the process of state-making and nationhood. According to Kuna (1998: 83), the construction of a “northern Nigerian” identity from the inception of colonial rule was rigidly defined as Islamic and Hausa, thus, elevating the social categories ‘Islamic” and “Hausa” into a more politically dominant position within the area. This was necessitated by the colonial imperative of law and order, advanced by establishing a system of rule based on the “Indirect Rule” system. Among others, the consequences include the subordination of minority groups in northern Nigeria to the pervasive political and cultural inf luence of the aristocracy; the conferment of excessive powers in the hands of the ruling aristocracy that constitutes its core, while at the same time insulating it from the direct pressure of Westernization as evident in the restriction on the activities of the Christian missions; and the restriction of opportunities for Western education to scions of the aristocracy and palace officials for much of the colonial period (Takaya, 1987; Turaki, 1993). The response to this system of domination is simply predictable: it has to be necessarily anchored on nonHausa, ethnic minority identity, as well as some element of resistance to Islamic religion. The disadvantaged situation of northern minorities was recognized by the Willink Commission that described them as “a section of the population which the northern system has touched very little, around which, rather than over which, it has f lowed, which has never been absorbed into the (Northern) system but merely enclosed within it.” In many respects, a common consciousness arising from disadvantaged position exists among these minority groups. One expression of this is the increasing tendency on the part of some minority groups to revert

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to their original names in place of those given them by their more powerful Hausa neighbors, with pejorative meanings.1 This perceived domination has been accentuated by the nature of the state system and the distribution of power and resources in the post-independence period. The advent of Christianity and Western education as a result of the activities of the Christian missionaries among the ethnic minorities of the north led to the emergence of an elite leadership in the struggle against the perceived domination. The consequence of this was the identification of “Middle Belt” identity with Christianity (Kastfelt, 1994). It is in this sense that the struggles for minority identity coincided with the attempt to project and protect a Christian identity in a predominantly Muslim region (Tyoden, 1993). This increasingly took organizational form in the 1940s and the 1950s with the formation of the Northern Non-Muslim League and later, the Middle Belt Zone League (MZL). These, including the successor political organization the United Middle Belt Congress (UMBC), drew heavy support from the Christian missionaries. Together with other minorities, they created the political agitation that led to the appointment in 1957 of the Willink Commission by the departing colonial officials. Middle Belt identity experienced a period of dormancy for much of the period of military rule, but has been revived by the elites of the region in the context of the return to electoral politics, which began in the late 1980s and the 1990s. Many activists and politicians involved in the struggle appear to define the “Hausa-Fulani” as their main problem, rather than the political absurdity called the Nigerian state. The elevation of Sharia to the level of criminal jurisdiction since the return to civil rule has heightened political tension along ethnic and religious fault lines in the region. But these tensions and conf licts are, however, linked to the fierce struggles for political power and resources in the context of scarcity and deepening poverty that appears to be more endemic in a region that is widely acknowledged to be an enclave of underdevelopment and poverty. The reality of the Middle Belt and the dynamics of conf lict and violence points to another layer of identity politics and forms of contestation. For example, aside from the ethno-religious fault line that pitches the ethnic minorities against the Hausa/Fulani community, the reality of multi-ethnic existence in both urban and rural situations in the face of stiff competition for power and resources is a source of inter-ethnic tension and violence among the ethnic minorities. In no other sphere is this dynamic played out more than the competition for land especially

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for farming purposes in which “indigene/settler” dichotomy is invoked with dire consequence for inter-group relations. It is in this situation that groups that at one level tend to define the Hausa/Fulani as the common enemy are at other levels involved in fratricidal war. For these reasons, the Middle Belt has remained a f lash point of ethno-religious violence, which appears to have accentuated in more recent times. Examples include the Kaduna sectarian violence of 2000; the Bassa/Ebira conf lict in Nasarawa state; the Jos carnage of 2001 and the spill over to the rest of Plateau state; and the protracted Tiv/Jukun conf lict in Wukari as well as the Chamba/Kuteb crisis in Taraba state to mention but a few. These conf licts are by no means “localized” considering that each incidence of violence produces a chain of reactions that impact on national ethnic and religious consciousness. The existence of ethnic and religious platforms across the country makes it easy for local conf licts to impact on national consciousness and to widen the zone of conf lict and violence as evident in reactions in the South-East cities of Owerri and Abah to the violence in Kaduna. The ripple effect of the ethno-religious violence in southern Plateau was felt in neighboring states such as Nasarawa, Kaduna, and Kaduna where revenge killings directed at Christian communities elicited reactions in the southern part of the country. The national tension it generated led to the declaration of a State of Emergency in Plateau state for six months in 2005. The cases examined are relevant to issues of national or human security such as direct threat to the physical survival of citizens and their property as well as challenge to the authority of the state. At one level, these conf licts pitch different communal groups in deadly confrontations; while at another, they tend to challenge state authority and bring the state directly into the arena of conf lict, with the consequence that such conf licts directly threaten state survival and national security. Evidence that this is the case is illustrated in cases where soldiers and policemen drafted to intervene in communal conf licts were alleged to have taken sides raising doubts about the neutrality of the state. The three cases are discussed below, one after the other. Ethno-Religious Conf lict and Violence in Plateau State In September 2001, the city of Jos experienced one of the deadliest ethno-religious conf licts in Nigeria’s post-colonial history. The violence that led to mass killings, resulting in over 1,000 deaths, and the

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physical displacement of thousands of the civil population (Human Rights Watch, 2001) with spillover effects to other parts of Plateau state shattered the myth of Jos and the entire state as “home of peace and tourism.” It all started on Friday, 7 September, following an incident in a Christian-dominated part of the city where a Christian lady, Rhoda Nyam, was said to have protested the barricading of a road during the Jumaat prayer. The exchange between her and the Muslim youth led to the chains of events that culminated in an orgy of violence that lasted for days. Fueled largely by rumors about the supposed death of the lady on the one hand, and the supposed loss of lives on the part of the “Hausa/Fulani” community following a revenge attack, spontaneous violence gripped the city of Jos. The targeting of places of worship by both Christian and Muslim rioters gave a religious tint to the conf lict. It assumed a more complex dimension and protracted character as other interpretations emerged in the course of the violence; while some interpreted it as a battle between the “Hausa/Fulani” community and northern ethnic minorities, others presented it as a confrontation between Nigerians on the basis of North/South dichotomy. Although the underlying causes can be attributed to the history of contestations of the various groups in the city over citizenship rights, the most significant appears to be the competing claims for the “ownership of Jos,” which is an idiom of contestation for power, resources, and citizenship rights that pitches the predominantly Christian minorities such as the Berom, Afizere, and Anaguta against the “Hausa/Fulani” community that consists predominantly of Muslims. The violence was preceded by high levels of ethnic mobilization undertaken by Jasawa Development Association (representing the Hausa), the Berom Youth Council, and the Afizere Youth Council, among others. As it turned out, the aftermath of the violence reinforced the ethnic segmentation in settlement that had been a hall mark of the city from inception (Plotnicov, 1967). What followed was a re-drawing of the ethnic map of Jos as Hausa/Fulani Muslims who had previously lived in areas predominantly populated by indigenes and non-Muslim groups relocated to areas they consider safe, while indigenes and other non-Muslim groups reacted in a similar manner. In the months that followed, the theater of conf lict and violence shifted to rural communities in Jos North, Jos South, Riyom, Bassa, and Barkin/Ladi local governments areas where villages were routinely attacked and hundreds of people killed allegedly by Hausa/Fulani armed attackers (Bagudu, 2003). However, it was in the lowlands of southern Plateau in Langtang, Shendam, and Wase local governments

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with a large number of Hausa/Fulani settlers that the ethno-religious crisis assumed a frightening dimension. It was the continuation of this wave of violence in this part of Plateau state in May 2005 that led to the declaration of a “State of Emergency” for a period of six months. Plateau state is made up of some fifty-two ethnic groups, ranking as one of the most ethnically diverse in Nigeria (Alubo, 2006: 35; Otite, 2002: 10–11). The major ethnic groups in the state include Berom, Goemai, Taroh, Ngas, Afizere, Hausa, Fulani, Iregwe, Miango, Jasawa, and Kwalla. Most of these ethnic groups with the exception of the Hausa/Fulani community claim to be indigenes. The presence of a large population of Hausa/Fulani in Jos and in the rest of the Plateau lowlands can be attributed to different waves of migration especially during the Jihad and the demand for labor in the tin mines during the colonial period. More recent waves of migration were occasioned by ethno-religious conf lagrations in other northern cities such as Kaduna, Kano, and Maiduguri ( James, 2000; Danfulani and Fwatshak, 2002; Jasawa Development Association, 2004). The Hausa/ Fulani are found in virtually all the Local Government Areas (LGAs) in the state, with heavier concentrations in Jos North, Kanam, Wase, Yelwa, Kurgui, and Namu. The spate of ethno-religious conf lict and violence in Plateau state since the return to civil politics has brought to the fore a number of contentious issues in the relationship between Hausa/Fulani Islamic and ethnic majority identity on the one hand, and Christian/ethnic minority identity on the other. For instance, it brought to attention underlying issues of ethno-religious identity, citizenship rights, and the tension generated by the pressures of democratization in the context of deep ethnic and religious divisions. These issues re-echo the recurrent fears of ethnic minorities of the north regarding “Hausa/ Fulani” domination, religious victimization, and subtle Islamization (Mustapha, 2000). This perceived domination is reinforced by the feeling that political power at the national level is controlled by the Hausa/ Fulani. Minority opposition to this is most profoundly expressed by the ethnic minorities on the Plateau. Thus, not surprisingly, ethnoreligious violence fueled by these fears have been expressed in about forty separate incidents since May 1999 (Bagudu, 2004). The September 2001 violence in Jos was sparked by opposition to the appointment of a Hausa man, Alhaji Muktar Mohammed, as the coordinator of the Federal Government Poverty Alleviation Programme for Jos North Local Government Area. The tension and conf lict generated by the appointment was preceded by a series of deadly confrontations

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that pitched “indigenes” against “settlers.” For example, the appointment in 1994, of Alhaji Aminu Mato, another Hausa man, led to 12 April disturbances in which four persons were killed and a large quantity of properties destroyed, including parts of Gada Biu Market and part of the Jos main market (Plateau State Government, 1994: 135). But it was the manner in which what was formerly Jos Local Government was arbitrarily split into three local governments ref lecting the demands of the Hausa/Fulani community that rekindled minority fears that a hegemonic agenda by the Hausa/Fulani to dominate political and economic life in the Jos metropolis was real (Egwu, 2003). The Gero disturbances that pitched a group of Hausa farmers against the Berom over a piece of land for growing tomato further fostered a sense of social distance between “indigenes” and “settlers.” While the ethnic minorities in Jos claim to resist the hegemonic ambition of the Hausa/Fulani community and have sought to exclude them from participation in the political life of Jos, the Hausa community, on their part, alludes to the systematic attempt to deny them citizenship rights in Jos. In their intense “production of history,” they point to an earlier plan to relocate the Hausa community from the city of Jos, the emancipation crusade targeted at the Hausa/Fulani community by the government of Chief Solomon Lar in the second Republic, and denial of certificate of indegeneship, which guarantees access to education and scholarship, the early role of the Hausa community in the urbanization and economic growth of the city, notwithstanding (Egwu, 2003). Against this background, the appointment of Alhaji Muktar Mohammed as Coordinator of the National Poverty Alleviation Programme (NAPEP) in Jos North elicited angry reactions from the indigenous ethnic communities. Both the Jasawa Development Association and similar associations representing the Berom, Afizere, and Anaguta were drawn into acrimonious exchange. While the former protested the labeling of Alhaji Muktar Mohammed as a “nonindigene” and the refusal of Jos North Local Government to issue certificate of origin to members of the Hausa/Fulani community, the latter detested the colonizing antics of the Hausa community (Egwu, 2003). Unfortunately, while frenzied mobilization continued on both sides, the civilian governor of Plateau state chose to travel out of the country on holidays without taking any concrete steps to halt the palpable drift to anarchy and violence. Thus, following the minor incident in Congo Russia area of the city, there was open confrontation between the two groups that brought life

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to a standstill as parties to the conf lict freely used dangerous weapons to inf lict maximum damage on perceived enemies. According to Human Rights Watch (2001), a total of between 1,000 and 2,000 persons were killed in the confrontation in which tens of thousands of people were forced to seek refuge in the Police Headquarters and the Army Barracks at Rukuba. According to Idris and Nwogugu (2003), about 171 persons were detained at the end of the disturbances out of which 26 were under-aged children. They also reported the displacement of over 50,000 people who sought refuge in the Police Headquarters, Jos, and the Army Barrack at Rukuba. These tragic occurrences excluded acts of extra-judicial killings, indiscriminate shooting, and ill-treatment of people. Their report is also inundated with unconfirmed stories of bias demonstrated by security agencies in the handling of the conf lict. In Jenta Ademu area of Jos and similar places where Christian population predominated, Muslims were attacked and their property destroyed, while in Angwan Rogo and Dilimi areas where Muslims predominated, Christians were subjected to a similar fate. The immediate impact of the conf lict could be felt in the re-drawing of the ethnic and religious map of the city as Christians on Muslim dominated areas gave up their residence in the same way that Muslims in Christiandominated areas relocated to ethno-religious kith and kins. Tension was further heightened when in the aftermath of the crisis, Dr. Ahmed Datti, Chairman, Supreme Council of Sharia Implementation in Nigeria, called for the introduction of Sharia in Jos to protect the interest of the Hausa/Fulani “settlers” (This Day, 12 October 2001). The religious angle to the conf lict contributed significantly to the high level of violence. Both Christians and Muslims offered different accounts of what occasioned the conf lict. While the spokesperson of the Muslim community alleged that there was an “ethnic cleansing” agenda directed at the Hausa/Fulani community, the Christians held that the Muslims had prepared to fight and take over Jos, for which reason they accused them of depositing caches of arms in various strategic locations in the city as well as recruiting mercenaries from other states with the aim of prosecuting a jihad. A clergy man interviewed strongly expressed the view that the Islamic agenda in Jos and Plateau has a long history, which explains the desperation of the Hausa/Fulani to acquire more and more land in Jos, and trying to control the main economic activities and attempting to penetrate the political circle; the same control that they would not allow Christians in Kano, Zamfara, and Sokoto states (Interview, 10 March 2007). The sharp division along ethno-religious lines created the basis for the explosion of 2 May 2002

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in the Eto Baba area of the city during the Ward Congress of the ruling People’s Democratic Party (PDP). The violence followed the relocation of the polling station from Angwan Rogo, a predominantly Muslim slum area, to Eto Baba largely populated by Christians (Human Rights Watch, 2002). At the end of the Jos disturbances, both the federal and Plateau state governments responded by setting up commissions of inquiry. On its part, the federal government set up the Justice Suleiman Galadima Commission to investigate the circumstances under which twentythree inmates of the Jos prison were killed, while the Plateau state government set up the Justice Niki Tobi Commission of Inquiry, to among other issues, investigate the remote and immediate causes of the conf lict as well as proffering solutions. Not untypical with similar experiences, the reports of these commissions were not made public. In the southern part of Plateau, the most important incidences of violence occurred in Wase, Yelwa, and Shendam, pitching the predominantly Muslim Hausa/Fulani and Jarawa communities against the indigenous ethnic minorities such as the Tarok, Goemai, and Montol who are predominantly Christians. Although ethnic and religious cleavages were the outward expressions of the chains of conf lict and violence, the underlying causes include “indigene/settler” divide; political representation and access to power especially at the local levels; the land question and access for farming and grazing purposes; and horizontal inequality as socio-economic differentials appear to occur along communal lines. The first major spot of violence was Yelwa where the conf lict occurred in two phases. At issue here is the contradictory claim of the Jarawa and the Goemai over the “ownership” of Yelwa town, a town considered strategic for commercial purposes. Yelwa is not only under the administrative control of Shendam Local Government Area, but the traditional leader of the Goemai people, the Long Goemai, lays traditional claim to the town as being founded by his forefathers. Both Goemai and Jarawa have produced historical evidence and account to justify the claims they make over the town (Hoomlong, 2008). While the Jarawa claimed to have founded the town well before British colonization and completely independent of the authority of the Long Goemai, the latter is incensed by this historical narrative. Instead, they argue that Yelwa had always been a Goemai settlement which was originally called Nshar, which was f lourishing before the arrival of the Jarawa. However, because local power is controlled by the Goemai elite, they are accused by the Jarawa of using this control to classify them as

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“settlers” and to deny them access to indigene certificates. Other issues that have created the basis for the protracted conf licts include demand for the creation of Yelwa district for the Jarawa and the creation of a paramount chieftaincy, elite manipulation for electoral gains, and use of masquerades by rival groups to harass opponents. The first phase took place in June 2002 during the ward congress of the PDP. It is believed that the crisis was fueled by the fear of the predominantly Christian ethnic minorities that the Muslims would use their relative demographic strength to electoral advantage. The ethnic minority groups were said to have mobilized masquerades in launching the first attack to which the Muslims later responded, leading to between 20 and 150 deaths (Human Rights Watch, 2005; Alubo and Egwu, 2006). The second phase of the violence started on 24 February 2004, with the two sides giving different account as to how it all started. While the Christian group claimed that it was the Muslims who swooped on the Christians during morning prayers at Church of Christ in Nigeria (COCIN), the Muslims claimed that the first confrontation took place between the Christian community and the soldiers drafted to keep peace, claiming that they defended themselves only when they came under attack. The Muslim community in Yelwa accused the leadership of Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) and Plateau state government of siding with the minority ethnic communities. However, the more devastating conf lict in Yelwa, which was clearly a backlash and a logical continuation of the 24 February incident, took place on 2 May 2004 and resulted in the complete routing of the town. According to accounts of some members of the Muslim community, the government of Plateau state was behind the attack by providing their adversaries logistic support in the form of government vehicles and sophisticated weapons. The perception that the state government did not exhibit neutrality in managing the conf lict was reinforced by allegations by parties to the conf lict that soldiers and other security operatives became partisan and took sides. The report by Human Rights Watch contained accounts of abductions, rape, and women and children forced to work for their captors (Human Rights Watch, 2005: 40–43). The conf lict was followed by large-scale internal displacement of population in which the predominantly Muslim victims f led to the neighboring Nasarawa and Bauchi states. The ripple effects of the conf lict reached Kano with inf lux of refugees where angry retaliatory attacks targeted at Christians were launched. Again, the attack on Igbo persons and property in Kano led to further retaliatory attacks in many south-eastern states. Although

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the president imposed a State of Emergency on Plateau state in the aftermath of the violence in Yelwa, the conf lict opened another front of blood-letting in Wase and Langtang. From Yelwa, the ripple effects of ethno-religious violence spread to Wase and Langtang. The initial site of violence was Wadata and Kadarko. The removal of corpses and the arrangements for relocating displaced persons from the Yelwa conf lict caused passion to rise in both Wase and Langtang. In Wase where passion among the Christian community rose to uncontrolled level, the consequence was repeated attacks by the Taroh in Wase directed at the Hausa/Fulani Muslim community. This incident led to the spread of violence outside Wase to places like Shendam where Christians freely attacked Muslims with Muslims seeking revenge. There was mutual suspicion on both sides that complete annihilation of the other was the motive behind the attacks. The Muslim community accused the Taroh of carrying out a deliberate massacre of the Muslims in the area, with the alleged support of the Plateau state government and the numerous retired generals from Langtang, believed to have armed the rampaging youths. For the Christian community, the wider motive for the attack was to rid Wase of Christian elements, which explained the resort of Muslim combatants to ritual baths before the attack and the deployment of guerrilla tactics. The Taroh, in particular, claimed it was an ethnic cleansing agenda targeted at them. There is ample evidence to show that “settler/indigene” divide and the struggle for local power are central to the spate of communal conf licts in the southern part of Plateau state as in the Jos Metropolis. Many of the Key Informants interviewed and participants in the FGD in Wase town and its environment strongly expressed the feeling that the fratricidal inter-tribal war is primarily political. As one participant in the FGD bluntly put the matter, “As far as I am concerned the problem here is political; religion is a mere cover up in the prosecution of a political battle” (FGD, 15 March 2007). There was unanimity of view among the participants in the male FGD drawn from the Taroh and other non-Muslim communities that the Hausa and their allies in the Wase area feel politically threatened by the demographic strength of the Taroh for electoral purpose. It is for this reason that the Taroh in Wase allege that they are targets of an ethnic cleansing agenda. In fact, the Huasa/Fulani community in Wase, in the construction of their own identity and claims to power and resources maintain that the Taroh in Wase are “settlers” and “colonizers” whose presence in Wase is quite recent (Interview, 14 March 2007).

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Samuel Egwu The March/May 2000 Kaduna Sectarian Violence

The sectarian violence that erupted in Kaduna in February 2000 following attempts by the government of Kaduna state to adopt the Islamic legal system, Sharia, provides another useful illustration of the linkage between ethno-religious conf lict and “national” security. Available evidence suggests that the violence that erupted in the city was not a localized incident. Apart from the spread of the violence to other parts of the state such as Kachia and the rest of southern Kaduna, it had a reverberating effect in other parts of the country, notably the south-east and the south-south geo-political zones. In the commercial city of Aba in Abia state, for example, revenge killings targeted at the Hausa residents because of alleged attack on persons of Igbo origin and their commercial interests led to carnage and destruction of property. The same chain of violence moved to Owerri, the capital of Imo (Agakemeh, 2000). The attack on Hausa/Muslims also took place in Portharcourt and parts of Akwa Ibom state, drawing attention to the implication of ethno-religious violence to the corporate existence of the country and the physical survival of individuals and groups. Sharia is the Islamic religious code of conduct guiding all the aspects of life of Muslims as individuals and as a collective from birth to death (Salisu, 2002). Recognized as a basic right of all Muslims, the Sharia legal regime hardly realizes the separation between state and religion. The Sharia issue assumed a national dimension first during the transition to civil rule between 1976 and 1979 when it was debated at the Constituent Assembly (CA). At issue for pro-Sharia members in the CA in the 1978 debate was the question of the “secularity” of the Nigerian state. According to the late eminent Nigerian jurist, Akinola Aguda, attempts to introduce Sharia prior to this period was resisted in recognition of the diversity of the northern population, for which reason it was limited to civil matters such as divorce, marriages, land disputes, and child adoption (Tell, 13 March 2000: 23). With the return to civil rule in 1999, the introduction of Sharia by Zamfara state government has brought the Sharia question to the forefront of national political debate. It is, however, important to treat the violence that engulfed the northern city of Kaduna in March 2000 as a logical consequence of the protracted ethno-religious conf licts that had plagued Kaduna state from the late 1980s and the early 1990s. At the center of the conf lict are layers of identity and contestations for power and resources, which in an important sense polarizes the predominantly Islamic and Hausa

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northern part of Kaduna state against the predominantly Christian ethnic minorities of southern Kaduna. The series of communal conf licts generated by the conf luence of ethnicity and religion, however, have been over issues of political exclusion, lopsided representation in the public bureaucracy, access to local power, and self-determination. Alongside this is that within the Kaduna Metropolis, which pitches minority groups such as the Gbagyi against the Hausa/Fulani community over the “ownership” of the city (Yahaya, 2004; Kukah, 1996). The agitation for a new Kaduna state with River Kaduna as the natural border to the north championed by the political elites of southern Kaduna, under the umbrella of Southern Kaduna Peoples Union (SOKAPU), is largely a response to the cumulative grievances of the ethnic minorities in the state. As former president Olusegun Obasanjo summed up, it is the recurrence of old habits, fears, and dichotomy in the old Zaria province (Punch, 5 June 2000: 8). The controversy that eventually blew into open confrontation in February 2000 dates back to December 1999, when the Kaduna state House of Assembly raised an eleven-men Committee to ascertain the applicability of Sharia to the state. The work of the committee was dogged by controversy from the beginning. While the Christians in the Kaduna state House of Assembly expressed dissatisfaction with the manner in which the motion for the appointment of the Committee was passed, the Muslim members defended the procedure on the ground that Sharia was exclusively the affairs of Muslims. This was followed by intense and frenzied mobilization on the part of both Christian and Muslim communities. The Jama atul Nasril Islam ( JNI)—established for propagation of Islam—and CAN—established to promote the interest of the Nigerian Christian community—for example, embarked on campaigns and mobilization for and against Sharia respectively. The JNI organized a workshop in Arewa House, Kaduna, to which they invited Christian leaders who rejected the attempt to persuade them to accept the implementation of the Sharia legal system. CAN, on its part, organized a seminar at the Hekan Church, Katsina road, Kaduna, to “enlighten Christians on the implications of adopting Sharia on Christians and Christianity” (CAN, 2000). However, the more each group tried to persuade the other, the greater the difference was with regard to the level of division. Concerned about the rising tense atmosphere in the state generated by the Sharia controversy, the government constituted an interreligious committee, which had equal numbers of Muslims and Christians. However, following the public hearing conducted by

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House of Assembly Committee at which Muslims in large numbers from the various local governments appeared to canvass their support for Sharia, CAN decided, on 21 March, to organize a peaceful protest. However, the peaceful protest turned violent, spilling over to other parts of Kaduna state, especially southern Kaduna. Two days later, the conf lict engulfed outlaying local governments such as Kachia and Birnin Gwari. While the investigation ordered by the government of Kaduna state was yet to be concluded, another wave of violence and blood-letting followed between 22 and 23 May, in which Christians and Muslims carried out attacks against one another. The attempt to introduce Sharia in Kaduna state re-ignited the historical issues that had shaped the relationship between the groups at conf lict in Kaduna state, especially the struggles of the ethnic minority groups in Kaduna against perceived Hausa/Fulani hegemony. Ref lecting the deep-seated animosity, available evidence from various sources points to the ferocity of violence and the consequence for the different ramifications of humanitarian tragedies. For instance, the Kaduna state Police Command reported a total of 609 deaths, destruction of 1,944 houses including business premises and hotels that were burnt, a total of 746 burnt vehicles of various descriptions, and about 123 Churches and 55 Mosques in various locations such as Kawo, Barnawa, Sabon Tasha, Sabon Gari, Kakuri, Tudun Wada, Kurmin Mashi, Rigasa, Kachia, Birnin Gwari, Zaria. It also found that properties estimated at N4,929,306,603.00 and N1,445,881,151.00 were lost or destroyed by individuals and organizations respectively (Kaduna State Government, 2000: 15). The government-appointed Judicial Commission of Inquiry established much higher level of casualties. It established the death toll at 1,295, and an unspecified number of dead people who were buried unidentified (15). In Kachia and Birnin Gwari, local government areas, residential houses, shops, and clinics belonging to Muslims were targets of attack. Abdu and Umar (2003: 96) estimated that over 63,000 persons were displaced within Kaduna and its surrounding, while about 25,000 people were left homeless in the violence that spread to Kachia and Birnin Gwari. The JIN on its part reported that 797 Muslims were killed. The report of Kaduna state Commissioner of Police on the calibre of weapons retrieved from combatants in the conf lict gives further indication of the level of violence. They include lethal weapons such as locally made pistols, Dane guns, swords, cutlasses, daggers,

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axes, and knives. In addition, military weapons including two large size military rocket launchers; two medium size military bombs; two small military grenades; and some quantity of .9mm ammunition and cartridges (Yahaya, 2005 ). As in other places where similar violent confrontations along ethnic and religious lines have occurred, what followed was relocation of residents along ethnic and religious lines, with Muslims and Christians segregated in different areas in the city, coupled with the untold hardships experienced by thousands of internally displaced persons especially women and children (Okoye, 2001). The complexity of the issues underlying the persistent ethnoreligious conf lagration in Kaduna state and the deep sense of divisions among the different communal groups come out tellingly in the Key Informants Interview and the FGD in Kaduna town. For instance, many of the participants in the FGD allude to the communal divide along ethnic and religious lines as the source of the festering conf lict in Kaduna. They alluded also to the level of violence and animosity in the carnage and how in the aftermath of the violence the ethnic and religious map of the town had been re-drawn, creating divisions that can reinforce the social distance between the different communal groups. Even more disturbing were allegations across the divide that security personnel were biased in the discharge of their duties, bringing to the fore the additional danger posed to national security by ethno-religious conf lict. The views of participants in the FGD are supported by other available sources. Although the theater of conf lict largely remained the key northern city of Kaduna and the southern part of the state, the conf lict had a reverberating effect on inter-group relations across the country. Following the spate of killings and destruction of property in which several Christians of Igbo origin were victims, there were reprisal killings targeted as Hausa/Fulani Muslim communities in southern parts of the country. In Abia and Imo states in particular, indigenes carried out massive retaliatory attacks on Hausa commercial interests in Aba and Owerri. The violence almost spread to Port Harcout, the Rivers state capital, until governments in those states were forced to impose dusk-to- dawn curfew (Tell, 13 March 2000). The tension generated by the crisis shook the entire national polity, and, once more, brought to the foreground the Christian/Muslim divide with CAN and JNI taking the center stage, the question of ethnic majority/minority divide, and indeed, the future of Nigeria as a corporate entity.

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Samuel Egwu The Tiv-Azara Communal Conf lict in Nasarawa State

Nasarawa South Senatorial district experienced one of the deadliest cases of communal violence in 2001. Beginning from 12 June 2001, the entire area comprising Awe, Doma, Obi, and Keana became embroiled in a chain of conf lict and violence that lasted for about two months. For the entire period, peace was maintained as a result of the presence of soldiers and police personnel assisted by local vigilante groups. Killings, arson, and massive destruction of lives and property were recorded in the encounter that pitched the Tiv on the one hand, against other ethnic minorities such as the Gwandara, Kambari, and the Alago on the other. The Tiv speaking population in Nasarawa state, a majority of who are found in the adjacent Benue state, is widely regarded as a “settler” community. Prior to the outbreak of the violence in June there had been a series of skirmishes involving the warring ethnic communities over land and the control over local power and authority beginning from February. At issue here is alleged Tiv colonization of land and the “resistance of the indigenes of Nasarawa state against the expansionist approach of the other people living in Nasarawa state in terms of land acquisition” (Tell, 13 August 2001). However, what had remained essentially as lowintensity conf lict turned violent on 12 June following the alleged murder by the Tiv of the Sarkin Azara (the paramount chief ), Alhaji Musa Ibrahim. The paramount ruler, a Special Adviser in the cabinet of the Nasarawa state governor, Alhaji Abdullahi Adamu, was said to be on his way to Lafia, the state capital during which he was ambushed and beheaded, along with six other people in his entourage, which included three policemen. What followed was a revenge attack on the Tiv community in the entire Nasarawa South Senatorial District. However, it is important to situate the conf lict within the wider context of the historical relationship between the Tiv and their neighbors. As Alubo (2006: 139) suggests, the protracted Tiv/Jukun conf lict in Taraba state and the conf lict between the Tiv and other Jukunoid groups from the old Kwararafa Empire in Nasarawa south are driven by some common underlying factors, chief among which is the perceived threat of the Tiv to land and local political interests. For example, the population pressure among the Tiv, a basically agrarian community, makes demand for farming land insatiable. The political decision, therefore, to acquire more land is largely dictated by the need for farming land (Mkar, 1991:1). This pressure for land brought forth the different waves of migration of Tiv people into several parts of the

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present Nasarawa state as in other neighboring states such as Taraba and Cross River. Nevertheless, available evidence seems to suggest that Tiv relationship with their neighbors such as the Alago, Jukun, and Gwandaran for a long time had been characterized by varying degrees of harmony and cooperation. Crowther (1855), for instance, shows evidence of harmony between the Kororofa ( Jukun) and the Munshi (Tiv). This long history of peaceful co-existence was bolstered by a series of administrative reforms in the course of colonization that encouraged waves of Tiv migration (Alli and Egwu, 2003). Prior to 1905 when Lord Lugard declared the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria, the Tiv and the numerous ethnic nationalities in the present Nasrawa state were grouped under the then Lower Benue Province. But probably informed by the evolving indirect rule system, the situation changed in 1905 when all these groups including the Tiv were placed under the jurisdiction of the Muri Province to ensure their supervision by a more centralized administrative system. The second administrative re-organization took place in 1918 when the Tiv and other groups such as the Igala, Idoma, Bassa, Jukun, Chamba, Alago, Koro, Gwandara, and Kamberi were brought under the Munshi Province, covering what is today Taraba, Nasarawa, parts of Benue and Kogi states. Again, in 1926, the governor of northern Nigeria, Mr. Palmer, carried another re-grouping of ethnic groups into provinces. A new Kabba Province was excised from the Munshi Province (renamed Benue Province), which removed the Igala and other nationalities. Under the new Benue Province which comprised the Tiv, Jukun, and most of the ethnic groups in the present Nasarawa state, the Tiv were balkanized into the existing administrative divisions, while the bulk of Tiv population, west of Katsina-Ala River, was placed under the Protectorates of Southern Nigeria and administered from Ogoja and Obudu in the present Cross River state. The arbitrariness that characterized these administrative re-organizations even into the post-colonial period has tended to put the Tiv in odd situations while creating the basis of antagonism between the Tiv and their neighbors. It is more so in the context of ethnicized notion of citizenship. One of such took place in 1976 following the creation of new states by the Irikife Panel to address grievances arising from ethnic domination. In the creation of Benue state out of the then Benue-Plateau and Kwarra states, the Tiv were split into three states: Gongola, Benue, and Plateau states, with the majority in Benue state. The Justice Mamman Nasir Commission on Boundary Adjustment found the boundaries between the three states confusing as

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a result of the situation of the Tiv people. The recommendation of the Commission for boundary adjustment was never implemented. One consequence is the demographic strength enjoyed by the Tiv in that part of Nasarawa state has consequences for electoral politics. The population of Lafia Division by the 1963 Census was 424,219, out of which the Tiv accounted for 289,559 (over 50%). The population of Nasarawa South Senatorial District, which is essentially the old Lafia Division, is 621,210, out of which the Tiv account for 305,635 (about 49%). On the whole, the Tiv are said to account for about 30% of the population of the entire Nasarawa state. On account of this demographic strength, the Tiv community had always been given political recognition, which had ensured election of persons of Tiv origin into various elective positions from the 1940s up to the early 1990s. However, there has been a transformation in the relationships between the Tiv and their neighbors in the context of deepening poverty and scarcity as well as the desperate struggles for state power at all levels in which identities mobilized by the actors. The significance of Tiv votes in elections that ushered in the fourth Republic in 1999 brought to the fore the electoral power represented by the Tiv in Nasarawa state. In recognition of this power, the civilian governor of Nasarawa state, Alhaji Abdullahi Adamu, rewarded the Tiv community with a number of visible appointments in addition to the fact that another Tiv man, Michael Koko, was elected to represent Doma South Constituency in the Nasarawa state House of Assembly. The governor rewarded the Tiv with not less than eight visible appointments including a permanent secretary, a civil commissioner, and chairmen of boards of parastatals. These appointments became a source of resentment by elites of the other minority ethnic groups in Nasarawa South who saw the threat represented by the Tiv to their political interest as real (Nasarawa State Judicial Commission of Inquiry, 2002). It was this anti-Tiv sentiment that largely explains the massive attack against the Tiv. As one leading Tiv spokesman expressed the Tiv dilemma, “Tiv vote has the capacity to inf luence significantly the results of elections in Nasarawa State” and hence in “the desire to suppress Tiv votes, the local tribes in Nasarawa were incited to drive away the Tiv from the State” (Hagher, 2002: 207). Apart from issues of representation, there are other problems framed around access to local power structures as exemplified by the creation of chiefdoms. The government of Abdullahi Ademu created a number of chiefdoms that included Azara chiefdom. This itself created new opportunities to appoint people into positions of District

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and Village heads. The appointment of the District Head of Kurume became a hotly contested issue between the Tiv and the Kwalla, the latter a migrant ethnic community from Plateau state. At the end, a wealthy Kwalla farmer, Anthony Dafaan, known to be a close friend of Sarkin Azara, was appointed to the position of District Head. This enraged the Tiv community who argued that being the largest ethnic group in the area; it amounted to a perversion of justice for a Kwalla man to be so appointed. It is believed that the Tiv killed the Sarkin Azara for the role he played in the appointment, and this provided the trigger for the large- scale violence that commenced on June 12, 2001. The 12 June 2001 conf lict started in Azara District in Awe Local Government following the assassination of Sarkin Azara and members of his entourage by persons suspected to be Tiv. In a quick response, almost all the other groups in the area such as the Alago, Koro, and Gwandaran, who had long held grievances against the Tiv joined in the attack directed against the Tiv community. The news of the assassination of the paramount chief whose head was severed and removed by the assassins enraged people and caused passion to rise to the level that what was believed to be retaliatory attacks were directed at Tiv in Obi, Doma, and Awe local governments. The violence spread to Namu in Lafia Local Government and eventually to the state headquarters, and lasted for three days in which massive destruction of lives and property was carried out. In Lafia town where administrative and commercial activities were brought to a standstill, the situation appeared worse because of the relatively high concentration of population and the preponderance of unemployed youth. Although incidences of sporadic attacks and violence continued after three days of intense fighting, the broadcast by the governor of Nasarawa, Alhaji Abdullahi Adamu, and the prompt intervention by the state Police Command helped in calming nerves and reducing tension. In a state-wide radio and television broadcast, the governor condemned the perpetrators of the violence in very strong terms and promised to protect the lives and property of all Nigerians living in the state based on their inalienable rights as citizens of the Nigerian state. Nevertheless, sporadic outbreaks of fighting continued in Awe and Doma local government areas, with the warring groups resorting to guerilla tactics. In one of such cases, over 200 people were reportedly killed in Tudun Adubu, Daadare and Agaza villages (Vanguard, 4 July 2001) A few days later, the crisis boiled over to Nasarawa Toto area of the state which had been a theatre of recurring violence between

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the Ebira on the one hand, and the Bassa and the Gbagyi on the other (Nigeria Standard, 29 June 2001). The recruitment of youth elements as part of the fighting army compounded the conf lict. Reminiscent of the phenomenon of ‘child soldiers’ in most of the violent cases of conf lict on the continent, youths from the different ethnic groups that were party to the conf lict had access to sophisticated light weapons. It was reported, for example, that in Lafia town, acts of arson, destruction of property and killings were carried out by the youth, many of whom chanted anti-government slogans and blaming the civilian governor for giving undue recognition to the Tiv community in the state. The situation was further worsened by the presence of a large number of ex-servicemen who played the role of combatants in the chains of conf lict and violence. In the cause of mayhem, government officials and policemen were freely attacked as a result of which not less than 6 policemen reportedly lost their lives (Vanguard, 6 July 2001). The humanitarian crisis that followed the spate of violence was unprecedented. The Nigerian Red Cross estimated that not less than 200 people were killed at the cessation of hostility (Vanguard, 2 July 2001), with over 100,000 IDPs (Alli and Egwu, 2003). However, the statistics on displaced persons produced by the Benue state Emergency Relief and Crisis Management Committee (see tables 3.1 and 3.2) from nine refugee camps indicate much higher level of displacement and the accompanying humanitarian tragedies. According to table 3.1, a total of 99,267 persons of Tiv origin drawn from about 5,287 families were found in nine refugee camps scattered all over the state. A break down of the population of displaced persons shows that while 41,404 (41.7%) were female, 32,212 (32.4%) were male. The figure reveals the higher vulnerability of women who do not only shoulder the burden of cooking the meals in refugee camps, but are exposed to additional physical and psychological violence including rape. The table also shows children constitute a significant number of displaced persons which is a total of 23.682 (23.8%). The conf lict which largely involved rural and agrarian communities brought to the fore the mobilization of communal identities in the context of competition for land, access to power and political representation. However, unlike other examples of communal violence discussed in this chapter, religion did not feature as a key issue in the mobilization of identities despite the fact that some of the parties to the conf lict such as the Gwandaran and the Muslim elements were pitched against the Tiv who are predominantly Christians. Participants

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Table 3.1 Internally Displaced Persons from the Nasarawa and Taraba Crises Seeking Refuge in Benue State* (Those Living in Recognized Camp) S/N

Name of camp

1

Sankera Camp

2

Chito- Camp

3

Tor- donga Camp

4

Abede Camp

5

7

Daudu Camp and Environs Agasha Camp Ukpiam

8 9

Umanger Torkula

6

Grand Total

Location

L.G.E.A. Primary School, Ukum L.G.A L.G.E.A.. School, Chito, Ukum. L.G.A L.G.E.A. Primary School, Tor Danga, Katsina-Ala L.G.A. L.G.E.A. Primary School, Abeda Daudu Camp, L.G.E.A. L.G.E.A. Primary School, Agasha Ukpiam Camp, Guma. L.G.A. Umanger Torkula and Environs

No. of Families

Number in camp Total

Male

Female

Children

715

10,180

4,500

5,6000

3,780

900

19,755

8,105

11,650

5,360

188

3,117

1,153

1,964

1,017

125

2,115

1,114

1,001

731

1.125

23,000

11,230

13,120

1,180

615

15,000

6,110

7,990

5,614

766

11,5000

N.A

N.A

N.A

130 723

2,500 12,100

N.A –

N.A –

N.A –

5,287

99,267

32,212 (34.4%)

41,405 (41.7%)

23,682 (23.8%)

Source: Benue Emergency Relief and Crisis Management Committee. Note: * As of 5 December 2001.

in the youth FGD in Lafia expressed the deep resentment of the “settler” communities against the rising political inf luence of the Tiv who had been accused of land colonization in the area. One participant, for example, noted that although they had cultivated friendly relationships with Tiv “settlers” over time, the vaulting political ambition of the Tiv was unacceptable. As he puts it: “The problem with the Tiv is that they hardly accept their “settler” status, and so they want to grab every thing including political appointments even at the expense of the owners of the land”. The outrage directed at the Tiv largely derives from the combination of threat to economic and political interests of those who consider themselves “natives” of the area.

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Samuel Egwu Table 3.2 Displaced Persons Living with Willing Hosts in the Local Government Areas of Benue State S/N

L.G.A

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14

Unum Guma Logo Katsina-Ala Vandekia Kwande Konshisha Buruku Gwer Gwer West Gboko Makurdi Ushongo Takar Total

NUMBER 47,350 87,814 38,579 22,500 28,70 25,340 21,070 18,11 13,500 12,356 16,572 26,192 13,113 3,750 374,952

State Displaced from Taraba Nasarawa, Taraba, and Plateau State Taraba and Nasara States Taraba State Taraba State Taraba State Taraba State Taraba State Nasarawa State Nasarawa State Taraba State Nasarawa and Taraba State Taraba State Taraba State

Source: Benue Emergency Relief and Crisis Management Committee. Note: * As of 5 December 2001.

There is evidence to suggest that convergence between the land question and politics increased the level of animosity and violence between the groups at conf lict. For the Tiv in particular, it raised to the foreground the security of the Tiv population outside Benue state, especially in Nasarawa and Taraba states and the severe limitation placed on their citizenship rights. The spontaneous reaction of the Tiv elites who called on the federal government to revisit the dilemma of citizenship faced by the Tiv community outside Benue state was predictable (Hagher, 2002). But the consequence of ethnic mobilization that followed renewed tension and violence in the Wukari area, where less than a year later, the attack by Tiv militants which resulted in the killing of 19 soldiers led to the invasion of the town of Zaki-Biam by soldiers who destroyed property and maimed civilian population (Human Rights Watch, 2001). The boiling over of the crisis into Nasarawa Toto area where “inter-tribal war” had raged between the Bassa and Ebura showed that the conf lict had national impact. Concluding Remarks Nigeria needs to rise to the challenge of managing and cultivating diversity, and making “difference” the building block of national

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unity and integration. It is only then that it will be possible to mitigate ethno-religious combustions which have posed a mortal threat to national security and existence. But this requires multiple politics and engagements at different levels. It is, for instance, a challenge for constitutional reform that provides a legal framework that seeks, among others, to build a national notion of citizenship to address the tension between ‘civic’ and ‘ethnic’ citizenship as well as the entrenchment of a regime of rights that protect minority groups. It also requires at the same time repositioning and reconfiguring the state as the catalyst of development. This would ultimately require the formulation of a comprehensive social policy that takes as its point of departure, the central role of the state in social reproduction beyond the ‘safety nets’ promised under structural adjustment and market reforms. The ultimate focus of public policy is to address the underlying factors of ethno-religious conf lict in the country. These underlying factors, which have been carefully documented in the various commissions of inquiry, include issues of access to land for farming and other commercial purposes, access to local power and the exclusion of people from participation in civic life on ground of ethno-religious identity. However, because ethno-religious conf licts are tied to issues of human development and human insecurity, the challenge is that of effective management of resources to ensure sustained economic growth alongside a conscious effort to promote even and balanced development, investment in the welfare and basic needs of the people, and guaranteeing development as a right to the people. The reform of the electoral system to enhance the credibility of elections, promote diversity in representation, and strengthening the demand side of governance to ensure the accountability of governments at all levels to the citizens are important elements in the search for human dignity and security in Nigeria. Key Policy Recommendations: Confronting the Challenge of Human Security in Nigeria At the core of increasing human insecurity in Nigeria is the failure of democracy and governance to ensure inclusion in the mode of representation, and make government at all levels transparent and accountable to the citizens in a manner that enhances delivery of social services, equity in the distribution of amenities, and the eradication of poverty, and want. This challenge, though daunting at all levels, is

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most acute at the local level because of weaknesses or paucity in institutions and organizations of people to checkmate the excesses of those in power. Citizens require capacity to monitor the performance of local governments through requisite skills on issues of budgeting and budget tracking as well as organizing Town Hall meetings as platforms for subjecting the performance of elected public officials to scrutiny. Alongside this is the need for the reform of the electoral system in such a way that some form of Proportional Representation (PR) is adopted to tone down divisive and acrimonious competition associated with the majoritarian system. Similarly, there is need to promote self- determination through decentralization of power, while simultaneously strengthening of institutions that promote unity and cohesion at the centre. There is also the need to ensure that public policy responds to the challenge of multiculturalism given Nigeria’s complex ethno-regional configuration beyond federalism. This goes beyond entrenchment of formal equality in the constitution, or providing for non-discrimination clauses. At the core of the challenge is the guarantee of the principles of equality and freedom in the public domain. Thus, it is not enough to pronounce equality of access to opportunities for majority and minority ethnic nationalities. It is much more about the degree of protection of ethnic minority rights and the establishment of mechanisms that are capable of sustaining the protection of such rights. This can be achieved through the establishment of independent commissions that are publicly funded and accountable to the legislature. The recognition of minority languages in national life and promoting their development and use at the formal level is one sure way of entrenching respect for diversity and group right. A total and comprehensive review of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria needs to be pursued with vigour by the executive, the legislature and civil society. This arises from the fact a participatory approach to constitutional review can be used to engineer desirable social change. Thus, apart from using the exercise to entrench a right-based approach to development, it can be used as a mechanism to build national concensus on divisive issues such as federalism and decentralization of power, resource control and revenue sharing among the different tiers and layers of government, citizenship and residency rights, political and economic empowerment of women and the justiceability of the chapter two of the Nigerian Constitution on the Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy. In this way, for example, it will be possible to jettison unpopular economic

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policies such as the current National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS), which derives largely from neoliberal economic policies. While governance and democracy are primarily about institution building and strengthening, the question of statecraft and the importance of leadership is important in the management of diversity. This is because central to ethno-religious conf lict and violence is the absence of visionary and responsible leadership that is capable of promoting justice, fairness, equity and tolerance. Leadership in this context also includes elected public leaders at all levels as well as occupants of traditional offices. Besides, it is important for government at all levels to develop proactive framework of conf lict management by putting in place effective Early Warning Systems (EWS), while addressing policy issues that have arisen from the reports of several panels and commissions of inquiry. This would include issues of access to economic resources especially land and self-determination expressed in the form of demand for chiefdoms and cultural autonomy put forward by marginalized communities. Furthermore, there is the need to train the Police and other security agencies to adopt a right-based approach to the management of communal conf licts and violence. However, to accomplish this will require a huge investment in the training, re-training and the re-professionalization of the military and other security agencies to accept unquestionable subordination to civilian and democratic control as well as a new form of re-orientation to law and order. This requires strengthening the role and efficiency of oversight institutions and the sharing of oversight responsibility between the executive, the legislature, civil society, and the public. In addition, there is need to emphasize the re- orientation of policy makers and improve their skills and capacity to deal with issues of conf lict management, conf lict transformation and peace-building, while addressing the policy issues that have been identified in the reports of various judicial commissions of inquiry in response to the various incidents of ethno-religious conf lict. Finally, there is need to put in place a comprehensive program of civic and political education targeted at the Nigerian people on the positive elements of diversity, and the need for mutual respect and tolerance among different Nigerian groups. There is a need to intensify human rights education among the youth and the populace at large to draw attention to the implications of communal conf licts for rights violations.

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1. Examples are the Gwari who now prefer Gbagyi, the Yergam (now Taroh), Sura (now Maghaavul) and Bachama (now Bwatiye), to mention just a few examples.

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CH A P T E R

FOU R

Beyond Electoral Democracy: An Anatomy of Ethnic Minority Insurgency in Nigeria’s Oil Niger Delta Cy ri l O b i

Introduction The chapter explores the inter-related issues in the escalating violence in Nigeria’s oil-rich Niger Delta since the country’s return to democratic rule in May 1999. In spite of the promises electoral democracy stands for, in 1999, 2003, and 2007, at the local, state, and federal levels, the Niger Delta has witnessed unprecedented levels of disillusionment, violence, and insecurity that is linked to the inequities and contradictions of “the paradox of plenty.” Another critical factor in the unfolding crisis in the region relates to the depredations of the various factions of the local political elite intent on monopolizing the region’s share of federally allocated oil rents, by hanging on to power at any cost, including the violent subversion of the popular will. This much can be gleaned from various reports by civil society groups, the news media, local election monitors, and international election observer missions that attest to the f lawed nature of the elections in the Niger Delta and Nigeria, including the high levels of violence around the period of all elections since 1999 (Human Rights Watch, 1999, 2002, 2004, 2007a, 2007b; EOM, 2003, 2007; Niger Delta Civil Society Coalition, 2007; DEOG, 2007).

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A case, therefore, exists for drawing a connection between the predatory activities of the political elite, misrule, violence, the intimidation of political opponents and voters, and the stealing of elections in the region. The intermingling at certain levels of the politics of the elite with the grievances of the marginalized people of the Niger Delta,1 and the emerging complexity of local resistance in a context where violence, greed, and opportunism have assumed prominence, presents a complicated picture that has to be systematically “unpacked” and analyzed. This enhances an understanding of the crisis of electoralism within the context of the broader Niger Delta and national politics, and underscores the point that the real issues lie beyond electoral democracy, which has so far faced severe limitations in giving expression to the will of the people in a volatile, oil-rich region. In this regard, this chapter is divided into five broad sections. The introduction provides the context for exploring the connections between the subversion of the democratic process and the escalating violence in the region. The result is that violence and access to oil wealth by any means dissolve into one another and provides legitimacy for the use of violence in the pursuit of conf licting interests. The second section focuses on ethnic minorities and the struggle for resource control in the Niger Delta. It explores the ways in which the current crisis has fed off the deepening democratic deficit that has resulted both from the inability/refusal of the Nigerian federal state and political elites to address the grievances and demands of the people for a redress in Nigeria’s centralized fiscal federalism (equitable re-distribution of oil revenues) and the foreclosure of meaningful dialogue and the amicable resolution of differences in a participatory, mutually acceptable and equitable manner. The third section explores the role of the forces and processes of globalization: the transnational elite, including oil multinationals and their home countries, the international media, and local players in the unfolding situation in the region. It shows the connections between the international political economy of oil and the rising stakes in the control and exploitation of oil in the Niger Delta, which, in turn, undermines the democratization of social relations alongside its emphasis on social justice, equal participation, and the equitable re-distribution of oil revenues. The fourth section relates to the nature of the insurgency in the Niger Delta in the context of the contradictions embedded in Nigeria’s federal experiment. It is argued that the subversion of the will of the people through f lawed elections in a context of decades of exploitation, marginalization, and injustice has spawned a complex insurgent

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brew of militant resistance, infiltrated by some opportunistic and criminal elements. This is because of the legitimization of violence following prolonged militarization of the region, the proliferation of armed groups, and the depredations of political elites that manipulate the armed groups for political inf luence and profit have taken root in the region. There is also the view that redress in favor of the masses and the forces of local resistance can be obtained only by mobilizing a countervailing force “from below” in the quest for local autonomy and “resource control” for the “benefit of the people.” In conclusion, the chapter addresses the deepening crisis in the Niger Delta in the broader context of the crises of citizenship, leadership, and development in Nigeria. It also puts forward some suggestions aimed at tackling the roots of the travails of democracy in Nigeria. The Niger Delta: Some Conceptual Issues in the Militarization of Politics Explaining the Roots of Oil Conflict Several attempts at explaining the Niger Delta crisis have traced it to the region’s long history of ethnic minority agitation against marginalization by hegemonic ethnic majorities that control federal state power in Nigeria, wanton oil exploitation and pollution in the region by foreign oil companies operating in partnership with the Nigerian state, and meddling by Multinational Oil Corporations (MNOCs) keen on ensuring uninterrupted access to oil. Other explanations refer to the high stakes involved in the desire to control oil by the competing factions of the Nigerian ruling elite, and the activities of ambitious/ subversive elements or groups in the Niger Delta exploiting existing grievances to secede from the federation. This discourse has recently fed into a larger one at the global level since 9/11. (Obi, 2005b: 38–41; Watts, 2007). The new emphasis is on “resource conf lict,” both in terms of the security threats it poses to the supply of energy resources to global markets/industrial powers, and the extent to which it is an indicator of “state failure,” widely seen as a threat to national, regional, and global energy security, and a possible basis for international intervention. The “resource curse” is also used as an explanatory tool for the (pathologies of resource-fuelled corruption, institutional-failure, and misgovernance) “failure” of some “resource-rich” countries to develop (Rosser, 2006: 7–13; Auty, 1993, 2004).

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Of relevance to the analysis of the Niger Delta and Nigerian politics is the recent trend in the literature on conf lict toward the perception of oil in relation to a “resource curse.” Ross (2003) captures the “resource curse” succinctly by asserting “that natural resources play a key role in triggering, prolonging and financing conf licts.” Going a step further, he argues “oil and mineral wealth tends to make states less democratic” (Ross, 2001: 325–361). This perspective has been used in explaining the conf lict in resource-rich African countries, such as (diamond-rich) Sierra Leone, (mineral-rich) Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and (diamond and oil-rich) Angola. A recent study of “the dirty politics of African oil” (Shaxson, 2007) also applies the “resource curse” brush in painting an unf lattering picture of the Niger Delta crisis. The main argument that f lows from the protagonists of the resource curse approach is that resource abundance in Africa is subversive of development and peace, because it is a recipe for inevitable corruption, state “failure,” and violent conf lict. However, as noted elsewhere, “in spite of all its attractions, the ‘resource curse’ does not fully capture the complex dimensions of the politics and international linkages that underpin violent conf licts in resource-rich African countries” (Obi, 2007a: 14). If applied to the Niger Delta, the resource curse analogy presents the inevitable conclusion that oil “blocks” democracy and promotes violent conf lict. But such a conclusion would be simplistic and inaccurate, given the complexity of the politics, and the reality that the real problem lies not in the existence oil in the region, but the ways its production and commoditization spawns social contradictions, inequalities, and inequities at two levels: local-global, and state-society. Since the transformation of oil from a resource to a commodity is fully realized in the global market, bestowing it with immense economic and strategic value, a “resource curse” can be the creation of only a globalized economy in which transnational actors, that is, oil multinationals, international banks, and elites are deeply involved. Thus, the “resource curse” is transnational by virtue of its construction and tied to a particular mode of global production and accumulation: capitalism. As such the distribution of the “oil curse” and “oil blessing” would correspond to the highly inequitable relations of power and the vertical integration of the Nigerian oil sector into the global oil industry. Either way, the profits go to the state, the transnational elites, financial institutions, and oil corporations—their home governments, while the costs and curses go to those whose lands and livelihoods are polluted or expropriated, and whose rights are trampled underfoot as

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they continue to live out a paradoxically impoverished existence in an oil-rich, but blighted context. The roots of conf lict in the Niger Delta do not lie in stagnant pools of oil; they lie in the inequitable power relations embedded in the production of oil and the highly skewed distribution of its benefits and pernicious liabilities. Oil and the Combustibility of Politics To understand fully the complexity and volatile nature of politics in oil-rich regions, it is important to grapple with the political economy of oil. Oil is the whetstone of modern capitalism. It provides the energy that powers the engines of industry, fuels the world’s modern militaries, provides petro-chemical feedstock for manufactures, plastics, and fertilizers, as well as energy for domestic use. It also fuels power plants and modern transportation. As the world’s most viable and versatile source of energy, oil is a most sought after commodity, and given its existence often in rather inhospitable and difficult-to-access regions of the world, the stakes in getting access to supplies and controlling oil are very high. Such high stakes defined by its value to global capital and power underscore the association of oil with violence. As argued elsewhere, “oil power is seized rather than negotiated, and once taken it is defended by force” (Obi, 2004: 4). This explains why oil politics is first and foremost a strategic game where issues of production, accumulation, and distribution are characterized by inequalities and inequities, and, ultimately, organized violence. Most oil transactions are either shrouded in complicated contracts, and utmost secrecy amid cut-throat competition. For those seeking to defend their dominance of oil power (at the local, national, or global levels), democracy could be a threat, but for those seeking participation, re- distribution, and social equity, democracy is an asset to be embraced and used in pushing for change. The volatile mix of oil and power can also be gleaned from the Nigerian context. The seizure of power by the military in 1966, after which the country experienced an oil-boom in the 1970s laid the foundation for the militarization of oil politics, and the politicization of military rule. But it should be noted that the foundation for political authoritarianism had been laid much earlier by the interventionist colonial state, and was further reinforced by its neo-colonial successor at independence. What happened after the military coups in 1966 and

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the post-war oil-boom was that oil added volatile dimension to political authoritarianism and class relations in Nigeria. The military officers in control of the state used their positions and military decrees to access and dominate providential oil rents and political power. Also, the indigenization policy, which was adopted by the military government in the 1970s and aimed at transferring the ownership of the “commanding heights” of the Nigerian economy to Nigerians, provided ample space and opportunities for the military and their civilian allies/business partners to “buy into” the economy and become a “local bourgeoisie” of sorts. After a series of military coups or attempted coups, they ceded power to their anointed successors, partly as a way of protecting themselves from any future demands for them to account for their period in power. The legacy of military rule was, therefore, one of using state power to access oil rents, non-accountability, and the manipulation of political transitions to ensure that only “chosen civilian successors” took power after their exit. Strategies for inf luencing political transitions included military supervision of constitution-making: 1979, 1989, 1995, and 1999; appointment of loyalists/civil servants as top officials of electoral institutions, control of the funding of electoral institutions, control of security agencies used during elections, support for certain candidates, and legislative immunity for the past military rulers. More than this, the culture of the military command system and intolerance for opposition was taken into post-military rule, both by military officers who retired into civilian politics, and civilian politicians who were nurtured under military rule (Obi, 2007b: 382). In this way, the legacy of military rule has been writ large in the class struggles around oil in the Nigerian polity till date. Elections and Democracy An assumed relationship between elections: as a modality of freely choosing leaders/representatives and democracy: rule by the people, runs through the liberal paradigm of politics. The logic is that democracy is expressed through periodic elections in which equal voters (in a market society) choose their leaders and hold them accountable. Those who perform well (on the basis of delivering on their promises to the electorate) are returned by the people’s votes, and those who betray the trust of the people or fail to perform, are voted out of office. This gives the political system and the leadership the

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legitimacy and authority to rule as the elected custodians of the sovereign will of the people. Several critical issues have been raised about the central role of elections in the liberal perspective to democracy. Adejumobi (2000: 61) provides an overview of such issues as they relate to the elections and democracy nexus. He notes that from the elite theory of democracy, “the existence of an oligarchy in society, shows that elections/representative democracy provide a legal and political framework to justify and legitimize minority rule.” Also, reviewing the Marxist perspective that views elections as a “system of political and ideological reification of the hegemony and power of the dominant class,” Adejumobi, nonetheless surmises that “elections as an element of liberal democracy should be taken seriously.” However, such an acceptance is predicated upon certain conditions tied to “the constitutive and regulative mechanisms and precepts necessary to promote healthy and free electoral competition” as well as “the environmental conditions (socio-economic and political)” (61), under which elections take place. What the foregoing shows is that the notion that elections inevitably result in the expression of the People’s Will or democracy is inherently problematic. Rather than being a one-stop event, elections are deeply contested processes, involving structures, social forces, and political (and electoral) institutions that may represent different interests and tendencies. It also implies that even the right to hold free and fair elections cannot be taken for granted, nor should the context, events before, during, and after elections be taken for granted. Elections offer opportunities/political space(s) for change, but the balance of the social forces and the level(s) of political mobilization in society inf luence their outcomes. Electoral democracy, short of social justice and the guarantee of people’s rights and democratic governance, has its limitations, as the Nigerian case exemplifies. The foregoing factors find expression in the most recent phase of the election-democracy nexus in Nigeria. Yet, as Lewis (2003: 131) contends, “the survival of electoral rule is crucial to Nigeria’s democratic prospects.” The point, however, is that electoral democracy will thrive only under certain conditions embedded in Nigeria’s political structure and process, and the balance of power between the contending social forces. A look at what Adejumobi (2000: 59–73) refers to as “caricature elections,” “kangaroo elections,” or “electoral coup d’etat” in Africa has some relevance for Nigeria. Since 1999, safe to some extent for the judiciary, political parties, electoral institutions, security agencies, and incumbent governments have been embroiled in electoral controversies

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a la “electoral coup d’etat,” particularly in the 2003 and 2007 elections. Although some sections of the press and civil society have put up a brave struggle to defend some of the democratic gains, they have been weakened and divided, and lack sustained effectiveness on a national scale. Equally relevant is the observation that electoral institutions and political values that should have facilitated democracy have been undermined and devalued by the long years of military authoritarianism as well as the depredations of the political elites (Agbaje and Adejumobi, 2006). In such a context, elections are reduced to a zero-sum game/process for determining those who would govern the country’s oil wealth at the various levels. The only rules that are observed are those that give the advantage of winning to those who can mobilize greater resources and violence. When elections are blatantly rigged or the results are hotly disputed, the result is often a descent into political crisis, followed by military intervention or the forced (illegal) seizure of power. This was the pattern that led to the collapse of the first republic in 1966 and the second republic in 1983. Given the high stakes involved and the legacy of military rule, elections in Nigeria have taken the form of political wars. In the absence of democratic consolidation, the point must be made that the struggles for democracy (between those that have “captured” the state versus the “others”) in Nigeria precede the oil-boom years; what oil has done is to raise the stakes in the zero-sum game that characterizes political competition in the country. As argued elsewhere, “democracy for these people is more than the freedom to vote (without choosing). It is about ‘democracy dividends’ that will open the doors to resources and creative participation, which will lift them out of their present conditions, marked by deprivation, oppression, fear and poverty” (Obi, 2007b: 67). The struggles around oil in Nigeria take place between factions of the dominant elite (mainly for the capture of federal power—the site for power over oil rents), struggles between the governing elite and the people over the distribution of oil revenues, and the struggle for “resource control” that pitches the ethnic minorities of the oilproducing Niger Delta against the federal government and foreign oil companies. The latter struggle has since 1999, after Nigeria returned to electoral democracy, assumed rather violent and complex forms, including armed insurgency and intra- and inter-communal strife. While the “democratic opening” added more impetus to the agitation in the region, it was equally a protest against the non-arrival of the long

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expected “democracy dividends” by the people, and the continued underdevelopment of the oil-rich region. However, rather than a failure of electoral democracy, what has been witnessed in the Niger Delta is its subversion by a hegemonic transnational alliance: local, regional, national, and global, feeding off the plunder of oil. The status of ethnic minorities in a democracy is another issue that has not been fully addressed in the volatile politics of the Niger Delta beyond calls for the re-negotiation of Nigerian federalism through a Sovereign National Conference. The fact that most of Nigeria’s oil is produced there, but the people cannot in terms of numbers match the “voting power” of the ethnic majorities is a rather explosive aspect of oil politics in an electoral democracy. What should be the basis of political representation: individuality or group identity? Either way, this issue on which the citizenship of the people of the Niger Delta rests is yet to be resolved. Ethnic minorities end up being subject to the majoritarian hegemony of larger groups, in contexts where ethnicity is manipulated and politicized by dominant elites. In the Niger Delta, where an “oil” minority region produces the bulk of national revenues and export earnings, but surrenders control to a central government in which larger (non-oil producing) regions are dominant, resentment against perceived “internal colonialism” is rampant. The inability to muster sufficient votes to change the current oil allocation formula in favor of the ethnic minorities of the Niger Delta referred to as “resource control,” and the breakdown of efforts at negotiating a broadly nationally formula for the re-distribution oil rents to address the grievances of the people of the region, constitute one of the formidable stumbling blocks in the struggles around oil in Nigeria. At stake are the citizenship and group rights of the ethnic minorities of Nigeria’s oil-rich region. It is important to note that this crisis cannot be resolved outside of a democratic framework, yet, elections since 1999, have largely failed to lead to any serious level of democratization in the region. Rather, the Niger Delta has witnessed some of the highest levels of political violence linked to electoral malpractices in the federation. As Kemedi (2006: 14) perceptively put it, In the Niger Delta, election is a violent activity. It is not something you prepare for by campaigning or producing manifestos. You prepare for elections by assembling guns, drugs and thugs. Evidence from election observer reports and the local press supports the position that elections in 1999, 2003, and 2007 have been incrementally

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manipulated to subvert the will of the people. In a statement on the 1999 elections, the Carter Center expressed concerns “about the serious evidence of serious f laws in the electoral process in certain parts of the country” (The Carter Center, 1999). Of note was Rivers state in the Niger Delta where some local governments recorded a 100% voter turnout, in the elections described as “massively corrupt” (Kew, 1999: 31). Four years later, in 2003, in its final report, the EU Observer Mission (EOM) concluded that the Presidential and Gubernatorial Elections “were marred by serious irregularities and frauds” (European Union Election Observation Report, 2003: 2). It is remarkable that Delta and Rivers states, both in the Niger Delta, were among the states singled out as places where widespread violence and rigging was witnessed since the 1999 elections. It is also significant that the same conclusion was reached by another group that was also concerned about the levels of election-related violence in the Niger Delta (Human Rights Watch, 2002, 2004, 2005, 2007). In 2007, the stakes were much higher, given that this was the first time Nigeria would be undergoing an elected civilian to civilian transfer of power at the presidential level, and many two-time elected governors would be ceding power to elected successors. Apart from the large-scale violence in the run-up to the 2007 elections, particularly in the Niger Delta, the elections themselves were seriously f lawed. On the eve of the 2007 elections, two police stations were attacked by “armed men” in Port Harcourt resulting in the death of seven policemen (Simmons, 2007). In the post-election period, the country home of the Bayelsa state governor (and later vice president), Goodluck Jonathan was bombed by suspected militants. After that, they reportedly moved to the Ogbia Divisional Police Headquarters and “razed down a block of offices” (Etim and Ebiri, 2007). Subsequently, there have been more reports of attacks, kidnapping of oil workers, and even children of highly placed expatriates or highly placed locals. In the week before the elections, a militia group, the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), claimed responsibility for blowing up major pipelines belonging to Nigerian Agip Oil Company, cutting off its estimated 200,000 barrels of oil per day in exports (Olaniyi, 2007). During the elections, there were reports of violence and intimidation of voters across the state. Apart from the observer reports of the EU EOM, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Election Observers, and many local election monitors, and the local press also confirmed the fraud that characterized elections in the delta region. A pro-democracy civil society coalition in the

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Niger Delta was particularly scathing in its statement of the 2007 elections in the Niger Delta (Niger Delta Civil Society Coalition, 2007):2 The gun, the machetes, the club, non-registration of voters, non-arrival and availability of electoral materials, outright stealing of election result sheets, political thugs as ad-hoc staff of INEC—produced fear and intimidation that was a main barrier to voting—a barrier erected since May 1999, with incredible level of small arms proliferation by politicians—exposure to the psychology and brutality of oppression and executive lawlessness. Another local observer report on the elections in the Niger Delta states: Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Delta and Rivers noted that the results did not ref lect any actual voting and ballots cast (IDASA Stake Holder Democracy Network, 2007: 13). Also, a group of local election monitors—Alliance for Credible Elections (ACE)3 —identified Delta and Rivers states as being among ten states where it strongly felt that the elections should be cancelled on the basis of “serious malpractices” (Obayuwana and Asubiojo, 2007). The foregoing underscores the reality that democracy has been undermined through the subversion of the electoral process in the Niger Delta and Nigeria. This subversion of democracy has come at a high cost to the people of Nigeria and the Niger Delta. Yet, because the stakes in controlling oil power have continued to rise locally and internationally, the incentives for the dominant political elites to open up the political space to a free and fair democratic contest has all but evaporated, replaced by the hard-headed calculations of retaining power at all cost. This is the real danger confronting the prospects of electoral democracy in Nigeria. The obsession with controlling power over a petro-state partly explains the ambushing of the electoral process by vested political interests. In an international context, where anxiety about “peak oil” feeds into a tightening of global oil markets, amid an intensified scramble for Africa’s oil by the world’s industrial powers, few, if any, among the transnational extractive interests will think twice about placing oil before the people—and democracy will be the poorer for it. While the domestic and the global contexts raise some challenges for political theory, the on-going struggles and violence in the Niger Delta show the complexities embedded in the struggles of the oil minorities for democracy in Nigeria. It is, however, important to place the most recent phase of the struggle of the Niger Delta ethnic minorities for “resource control” in historical perspective.

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The struggle for resource control is directly connected to the desire of the ethnic minorities of the Niger Delta for self-determination, local autonomy, and democracy. It has its roots in the creation of Nigeria as a colonial state in 1914, an act that consigned the people of the region as minorities in relation to the numerically preponderant neighboring ethnic groups, which dominated political life in what later became the Western and Eastern regions of Nigeria. The successive institutionalization of revenue sharing and power distribution along regional lines tended to reinforce the politicization of ethnic identity, and its mobilization in the struggles for access to power and resources. On this basis, smaller groups defined as “ethnic minorities” tended to loose out, while the dominant ethnic groups asserted power at the regional (North: Hausa-Fulani, East: Igbo and West: Yoruba) and national levels. The initial reaction of the ethnic minorities was to protest against “the majoritarian stranglehold of the three ethno-regional blocs” (Mustapha, 2003: 8) over power and resources by forming political parties representing their interests, and seeking local autonomy through state or region creation in the context of Nigerian federalism. These parties included the Cross River Ogoja State Movement (COR), the Midwest Movement and the Niger Delta Congress (NDC). Although they did not succeed in their quest for states creation before Nigeria’s independence in 1960, the post-independence crises that culminated in civil war from 1967 to 1970 provided new opportunities. But this was not before an abortive secession attempt in February 1966 by a group of Ijaw ethnic minority youth: the Niger Delta Volunteer Force (NDVF), led by Isaac Adaka Boro, by declaring the Niger Delta Republic. Boro’s action was partly to prevent the oil in the Niger Delta that was part of the Eastern region from falling into the hands of the dominant Igbo elite, and to assert Ijaw control of the oil in the region. Shortly before the eruption of war between a secessionist Eastern region (which re-named itself Biafra) in June 1967, and the federal government, the four regions of Nigeria (North, East, West, and Midwest), were abolished and replaced with twelve states, of which the ethnic minorities of the Niger Delta had three. Sensing that the creation of states had pulled the rug from under their feet in relation to gaining access to the oil fields of the Niger Delta, one of the early actions by the Igbo political elite was to stake Biafra’s claim to the oil in the Niger

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Delta and demand the payment of royalties and taxes by oil companies to the Biafran government. In response, the federal government imposed a naval blockade on the Bonny and Port Harcourt oil export terminals and attacked Biafran forces in the Niger Delta (Ikein and Briggs-Anigboh, 1998: 128). Thus, the Nigerian civil war was to some extent an oil war. It was logical that the victorious federal army went on to establish its full control over the oil during and after the war. In this way, oil became the main object in the acrimonious politics of revenue allocation after the end of Nigerian civil war. This laid the ground for the merging of the quest for the control of oil with that for the distribution of oil revenues, which in the first place was the prerogative of those who controlled oil in the first place. By the 1970s, oil had become the main source of national revenue, and the fiscal basis of the Nigerian State, accounting for over 85% of national revenues and over 90% of export earnings. In spite of the ethnic minorities of the Niger Delta having their “own” states, the federal government, largely controlled by the political elite from dominant ethnic groups had seized the monopoly of the control of the collection and distribution of oil revenues. Just as the states were created by federal military fiat, federal monopoly over oil was similarly established through Decree No. 51 of 1969 and Decree No. 9 of 1971. Apart from the state creation exercise, and the centralization of power over oil, the revenue allocation principle of derivation was progressively changed to reduce the “share” of oil-producing states of the Niger Delta from 50% in 1966 to 1.5% in the 1990s. Oil power had effectively moved from the regional/state tier of federal governance to the center. The reduction of derivation—which provided for revenue allocation in proportion to the contribution to the federal purse by each state— and the introduction of the Distributive Pool Account (DPA) or federation account that emphasized the allocative principles of population size and need (and deemphasized derivation), was viewed as injustice by the ethnic (oil) minorities, particularly in the context of decades of marginalization and neglect of the Niger Delta by past governments. It was also strongly felt that the principle of derivation that gave 50% of revenues to the old regional governments controlled by the dominant ethnic groups was abandoned in order to enable these same groups to control the oil wealth produced from the oil minority states. Hence the struggle between the oil minorities/states of the Niger Delta and the non-oil producing ethnic majority groups/states/federal government became the object of the politics of controlling oil revenue or resource control.

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The campaign, which in Nigeria’s political lexicon is referred to as “resource control,” is based on the demand for self-determination to control the resources within the “territory” of the Niger Delta (inhabited by minorities), compensation for damages inf licted upon the territory by oil production (pollution, degradation, loss of livelihoods), and access to an increased share of oil revenues. It draws its rationale from the view that the control of oil by a federal government controlled by elite from the dominant (non-oil producing) ethnic groups is both unjust and explains why the Niger Delta has suffered decades of neglect, and its people discriminated against in the federal distribution of political and socio-economic opportunities, entitlements and welfare services, and development in general. Federal control of oil is also perceived as the result of an iniquitous political arrangement that enable the ethnic majorities to “colonize,” exploit, and persecute the ethnic minorities, who they feel “cannot pose any real threat to federal hegemony” (Okonta, 2005). The agitation for resource control was led by various ethnic minorities and environmental/human rights groups protesting against the exploitation, neglect, and pollution of the region by successive governments and oil companies. It was not until Nigeria returned to democratic rule in May 1999 that the derivation principle was increased to 13%. The increase was in response to the international campaigns and local protests by ethnic minority organizations, and the strategy of the new democratic regime of seeking legitimacy on the basis of attending to the grievances of oil-producing communities of the Niger Delta. Part of the calculation was also to demobilize Niger Delta ethnic minority protest groups by providing patronage to the local elite, co-opt the leadership of the protest and activist groups, and create the conditions amenable for the operations of the oil industry by stemming the tide of restiveness. Unfortunately, the result has been the exact opposite, leading to the militarization of the ethnic minority resistance and escalating violence in the region. In spite of the increase in the derivation revenue–sharing principle and the increase in oil revenues going to the states of the Niger Delta, the campaign for resource control has continued and even assumed more violent forms. At the level of the political elite, the initial position of the federal government that it would calculate the 13% derivation only on the basis of onshore oil revenues and the counter-claims of the Niger Delta states resulted in the federal government filing a suit at the federal Supreme Court in 2001 against the eight littoral states (mostly in the Niger Delta) that contested its ownership of offshore revenues.

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In spite of the ruling of the Nigerian Supreme Court in 2002 largely affirming federal control of offshore oil, the question of the ownership of oil continued to fester. Amid protests from the Niger Delta, a “political solution” in the form of the onshore/offshore dichotomy bill, abolishing the dichotomy between offshore and onshore oil revenues was approved by the National Assembly and signed into law by the president in 2004. In the following year, the sharing of oil revenues was again a source of acrimony at the National Political Reform Conference (NPRC) where most of the delegates were nominated by the state and federal governments. The conference ended up in a deadlock over its inability to reach an agreement (between northern and southern delegates) the demand of delegates from the Niger Delta for an upward increase in the derivation formula from 13 to 25%, and a progressive increase within five years to 50% (IRINnews, 2005). This further increased the frustration of the people of the Niger Delta and fuelled demands for the restructuring of the Nigerian federation in ways that decentralized power and emphasized local autonomy and resource control. It is clear that the most explosive factor in oil politics in Nigeria relates to the sensitive issue of the sharing of nationally collected oil revenues. The continued refusal of the federal government to restore derivation principle of revenue allocation to the 50% that it was before the Nigerian civil war in 1967 has been widely seen as proof of its discrimination against the marginalized ethnic minorities of the Niger Delta. Furthermore, the creation of federal institutions such as the Oil Mineral Producing Areas Development Commission (OMPADEC) in 1992, the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) in 2000, the Council on Socio-Economic Development of Coastal States in the Niger Delta (COSEDECS) in 2006, the Niger Delta Peace and Conf lict Resolution Committee (NDPCRC) in 2007, and the newly established Ministry of Niger Delta to address the grievances of the ethnic minorities of the Niger Delta have been seen more as federal institutions for the cooptation of the local elite in the region through the distribution of federal government largesse and patronage, rather than effective tools for fundamentally addressing the developmental demands of the region. Closely related to the discontent fuelled by the feelings that the oil minorities of the Niger Delta have been severely short-changed by the dominant groups that control federal power and oil is the issue of the ownership of land. One of the legacies of military rule was the 1978 Land Use Decree, later the Land Use Act, and a host of related

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legislations that transferred the ownership of land from communities to state governments, and gave the latter the power to use land for (oil) “development” purposes. As Omeje (2005: 324) notes, “what evidently compounds the institutional disadvantage of the oil-bearing communities and the stultification of their customary land rights is that the 1978 Act denies courts the jurisdiction to inquire into matters of compensation relating to the provisions of the Act.” Therefore, the Act has been largely seen as yet another ploy to dispossess the Niger Delta people of their oil-rich land. The other dimension is that state control of land has also fed into the politics of compensation (payments), which has become a source of intra- and inter-community tension and conf lict in the region. Another point that rarely emerges in the discussion of the marginalization and exploitation of the Nigeria Delta is the role of its local state/ regional elites, who either control federal allocations, including the 13% oil derivation money (which amounts to a lot of money), and indigenes who are political office holders/appointees of federal agencies or those who collaborate with the federal government to expropriate the resources of the region. Some observers have noted that elected officials or political leaders have not done much in terms of improving the conditions in the region in spite of increased federal allocations. Their case has been strengthened by reports linking some of the (elected) governors of the Niger Delta to corruption involving billions of naira and alleged money laundering. An impeached ex-governor of one of the states was tried on charges of corruption, found guilty, and jailed. Others are currently being investigated with two already standing trial on corruption charges. However, what is not so clear is the rather ambivalent relationship between the Niger Delta faction of the ruling elite and its partners from other parts of the country. While, they are united, on the one hand, by politics, by being members of the same national political parties/ class and national institutions/agencies, they are, on the other hand, divided by disagreements over the sharing of the spoils of oil (Obi, 2007c). The dominant group within the Niger Delta elite faction often rides on, and manipulates the widespread anger and alienation felt by the people of the region to extract more resources and privileges from its federal allies, but this is largely for its narrow interests, while it seeks to co-opt and neutralize opposition to federal hegemony and transnational exploitation of the oil in the region. This group experienced a major scare and challenge to its legitimacy in the early 1990s when one of its own, Ken Saro-Wiwa, formed an

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alliance with radical young militant elements within the Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP). In a bid for political power based on a populist agenda of Ogoni control of its oil, and a wellarticulated international campaign (targeting Shell) for the rights of the Ogoni, as an indigenous people faced with “the threat of extinction or genocide” by the extraction, exploitation, and pollution resulting from the activities of the state-oil alliance, Saro-Wiwa expressed solidarity with and appealed directly to, and radicalized the younger elements in MOSOP, and through them mobilized the people to resist global oil. The execution of the Ogoni “Nine,” including Saro-Wiwa by the federal military government in 1995, and the considerable weakening of MOSOP, contributed significantly to changes within this faction, and its politics. However, it laid the basis for further complication of politics in the Niger Delta, a trend that had emerged toward the end of the 1990s characterized by the materialization of a new force: the militant youth and the proliferation of armed groups in the context of further militarization of politics. Globalization and Oil Politics in the Niger Delta: Between Transnationalism and the Politics of Local Resistance MNOCs—some of the world’s wealthiest and most powerful corporations—play a key role in oil production, transportation, trade, and consumption. They are globally integrated at all levels and are, therefore, a vital part of the transnational process linking up different parts of the world and spawning global relations of production. A critical issue is that these global oil companies and their home countries are keen to ensure that a government that is sympathetic to their energy security interests is always in power in oil-exporting countries. It is not a contradiction that emphasis in such relations is often based on the uninterrupted supply of oil, and optimization of revenues/profits. This has implications for democracy in oilproducing countries, as Western support to an authoritarian regime that is “friendly” to external extractive interests has been the norm, rather than the exception. Thus, advanced oil-importing countries show considerable ambivalence in relation to issues of human rights and democracy, when their strategic and energy interests are involved, and tend to prefer dealing with oil-exporting countries with a highly centralized set-up, where matters related to oil can be sorted out with a few complications.

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When global interests within oil-rich developing countries are threatened, local states (backed by oil companies and their home governments) seek to crush those threats through a combination of repression of local protests and the cooptation of some local leaders. This transnational alliance poses a potent challenge to any form of democratization that could threaten its interests through demands for the re-distribution of oil wealth or for a radical re-negotiation of the control of oil rents in favor of the majority of citizens in oil-exporting countries. Oil production in Nigeria has been dominated by MNOCs that have operated in the transnationalized Nigerian oil industry since 1938, when Shell D’Arcy got a license to search for oil in Nigeria. As such, Nigeria has been integrated into the global oil market as a supplier of crude oil and gas. The enmeshment of “the global,” and “national” in “the local,” in oil production in the Niger Delta is both emblematic of a seamless trans-global capitalist accumulation process, which also defines the region as a “local” site of “global” production (mediated by the Nigerian “state”) with its attendant contradictions, contestations, and crises. Given the nature of the political economy of oil in Nigeria, the transnational production of oil is underscored by a Nigerian stateMNOC alliance. The politics of local resistance (to transnational oil production) in the Niger Delta is rooted in the global production relations that enrich the national (and local) elite(s) and MNOCs, while polluting and impoverishing the oil-producing communities of the region. It pitches the ethnic minorities of the Niger Delta against Oil Multinationals and their partner—the Nigerian state. The popular struggles in the Niger Delta in the 1990s when Nigeria was under military rule were led by a radical fraction of the elite and the youth, who mobilized the people to support the quest for self-determination as a basis for confronting the federal government and the Oil Multinationals, and (re)claiming the oil found in the Niger Delta (Obi, 2005a: 318–319). The basis of their struggle was the need to redress the injustice of being alienated from the oil produced from under their lands and waters, and the destruction of their livelihoods by oil pollution. Adopting global discourses on human, minority, and environmental rights, they targeted oil companies and the international community as a strategy of attracting attention to their plight, and finding their voice(s) to resist oil exploitation and pollution, and political marginalization, and demand for change. The first group to confront the Nigerian state and Shell was MOSOP. The Ogoni, one of the smallest ethnic groups in the Niger Delta with an estimated half a million people organized themselves and through

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MOSOP presented a Bill of Rights to the federal military government in 1990, in which it demanded among other things compensation for the exploitation of oil from Ogoni land and oil pollution, which had destroyed the livelihoods of many Ogoni, and threatened their existence. In 1991, it decided to internationalize its protest and targeted Shell, the oldest and largest onshore producer of oil in Nigeria. Ken Saro-Wiwa, a writer, and minority rights activist spearheaded the international campaign. This local campaign was also successful internationally by framing Ogoni grievances in the discourse of human, minority, and environmental rights as well as the rights of Ogoni as indigenous people, facing imminent destruction of their culture and way of life in the hands of the state-global oil alliance. MOSOP was quite successful internationally in putting the Nigerian government and oil companies under immense pressure, forcing Shell to stop operating in Ogoniland for its alleged complicity in the exploitation of the Ogoni people and the violation of their human rights (Obi, 2005a: 324–325; Saro-Wiwa, 1995). In response, a special Rivers State Internal Security Task Force at the time led by an Army Major, Paul Okutimo, led the military campaign against MOSOP and the Ogoni people for daring to challenge the State- Oil partnership, and also to set an example to other oil minorities in the Niger Delta. Ogoni villages were systematically attacked, suspected MOSOP sympathisers were arrested, tortured, extorted, and some lost their lives. Many left their homes, went underground or f led into exile in neighboring countries, and later, Europe, and North America. In November 1995, Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight other Ogoni activists were hanged in a Port Harcourt prison after a trial that was widely condemned for falling short of the conditions for fairness, and in spite of worldwide pleas for clemency. Since then, MOSOP has been weakened by internal fractionalization and an intense international Public Relations campaign by Shell, but the Oil Giant has still remained persona non grata in Ogoniland. Partly drawing lessons from MOSOP’s experience, the largest of the oil minorities, the Ijaw mounted a new struggle for the control of oil. In December 1998, Ijaw youth from six states of the federation, organized under the Ijaw Youth Congress (IYC), met in Kaiama, the birthplace of Ijaw martyr, Isaac Adaka Boro. At the end of the meeting, on 11 December 1998, the IYC drew up the Kaiama Declaration (KD, 1998), which asserted that “all land and natural resources (including mineral resources) within the Ijaw territory belong to the Ijaw communities and are the basis for our survival.”

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This direct challenge to the Nigerian State and MNOCs by the IYC was met with force. The federal military government declared a state of emergency in the Niger Delta, and f looded the region with the police, Navy gunboats, and Army troops. Ijaw protesters were arrested, and anti-riot police shot some during demonstrations in support of the Kaiama Declaration (Ukeje, 2001: 29). In this way, the Ijaw local resistance was repressed, but as in the case of the Ogoni, it survived, and re-generated itself particularly after the return to democratic rule in 1999. Since 1999, the politics of local resistance has been further complicated both by the opening up of the local political space by the return to democratic rule, and the f luid re-alignments within the local fractions of the political elite. An alliance of convenience between some of the local politicians, and some elements within the forces of local resistance have sought to re-negotiate the re-distribution of oil revenues in favor of the region, while some armed groups f loat in between, using violence to interrogate both the power relations in the Niger Delta and sometimes opportunistically using the situation to forcibly extort the state, oil companies, politicians, and inf luential locals. The result of the foregoing is that oil-fuelled globalization has intensified local resistance in complex and increasingly violent ways. So far, the evidence suggests a disarticulation between electoral outcomes and local resistance in the Niger Delta, but it does not completely erase the obvious linkages between the various actors that navigate the complex and slippery transnational oil terrain in pursuit of profit, resistance, and survival. Freedom Fighters or Fighters for Fortune? Insurgency in the Niger Delta The democratic deficit in the Niger Delta has led to the failure to enthrone legitimate political representation, and the occupation of the political space largely by a motley of complex political and social forces: politicians, volatile ethnic minority militant coalitions, and criminal gangs, fuelling a conf lict that has assumed insurgent proportions. According to a Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) report, “between January 2006 and March 2007, militant groups such as the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) abducted over 100 oil-sector employees. A rising level of hostage taking has also made oil and gas service companies increasingly reluctant

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to dispatch personnel to repair sabotaged or ruptured pipelines, contributing to the enduring shut-in of over 600,000 barrels a day of oil production” (Iannaccone, 2007: 2). While it is difficult to verify the accuracy of such claims, it is clear that based on the proliferation of small arms (Ibeanu, 2005: 36–56), escalating violence in the region, and the attacks on oil installations and security forces, that the militant groups have indeed multiplied and so has their capacity to inf lict damage on oil installations and inf lict causalities on the armed forces and the police. According to Alexander’s Gas and Oil Connections ( July 2007), which cites the International Energy Agency’s (IEA) June Oil Market Report, “violence pulled Nigerian oil production in May to its lowest level since early 2003.” It is a curious co-incidence that in the period around 2007 elections in Nigeria, violence in the Niger Delta led to a production shut-in estimated by the IEA at “an average of 800,000 barrels per day in May.” Alongside the mounting violence is the targeting of global media by MEND as the face of militant local resistance, which has since January 2006 captured the attention of oil market watchers, security strategists, and governments across the world. Its emergence and capacity to force a reduction in Nigeria’s oil exports by an estimated 25% has caused concern among oil company officials, the Nigerian government, the United States (Nigeria is the fourth largest supplier of U.S. oil imports), and strategic/energy analysts (Hanson, 2007; Kurti, 2006). However, the new trend in the Niger Delta is also feeding into the global securitization of oil extraction in the region, whereby the international community, particularly the United States, is concerned about its energy security interests in the volatile region. According to Klare (2007), citing the State Department’s Fiscal Year 2007 Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, noted that the “disruption of supply from Nigeria would represent a major blow to US oil security strategy.” The foregoing underscores the extent of the crisis in the Niger Delta and its ramifications for the oil-democracy nexus. The deepening contradictions around oil production and the protest against “monopoly of access to oil,” by a transnational elite alliance has fuelled violent politics involving those seeking to preserve their monopoly over oil, and those seeking entry, or a forced re-negotiation. The most recent face of oil minority resistance against the state-oil partnership can be gleaned from the activities of a rather complex insurgent coalition of Niger Delta armed groups, MEND.

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The emergence of MEND in 2006 has radically altered the face of oil politics in the Niger Delta and has had far-reaching global ramifications. MEND has effectively been able to attract international attention to the plight of the Ijaw ethnic minority group and its campaign for resource control by taking hostage of foreign oil workers, demonstrating the inability of Nigerian security forces to stop its attacks and sabotage of oil installations and the effective use of the global news media; using the Internet to send e-mails and images to the world’s leading news agencies and local newspapers, taking foreign and local journalists to its camps in the swamps of the Niger Delta ( Junger, 2007), and the ransoming of foreign hostages, and tapping into local idioms, symbols, and grievances to embed itself in the people’s consciousness. MEND has been profiled by the Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT) (2007) as “an active terrorist group that uses violent means to support the rights of the ethnic Ijaw people in the Niger Delta.” The report also notes “led by a notoriously shadowy and secretive elite cadre, MEND’s ultimate goal is to expel foreign oil companies and Nigerians not indigenous to the Delta region from Ijawland. In the short run, the group wishes to increase local control over the money made from the exploitation of the region’s abundant natural resources.” While this profile dwells on labeling, rather than analyzing, the circumstances within which MEND emerged and the content of its message(s), with a view to constructing the image of an imminent “terrorist threat” to Western energy interests, a more nuanced and informed view locates its emergence in “the lethal cocktail of economic deprivation, military dictatorship and worsening environmental crisis” in the Niger Delta, and its tapping into “the fifty year Ijaw quest for social and environmental justice in the Niger Delta” (Okonta, 2006: 7–11). While MEND has targeted foreign oil workers, it has released all such hostages after a period, all unharmed, giving credence to the view that they are used to draw international attention to the injustice in the region, seen as an important aspect in globalizing local resistance in the Niger Delta. In an interview with Brian Ross (2007), Jomo Gbomo, its spokesperson, describes MEND as The Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) is am amalgam of all arm bearing groups in the Niger Delta fighting for the control of oil revenue by indigenes of the Niger Delta

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who have has relatively no benefits from the exploitation of our mineral resources by the Nigerian government and oil companies over the last fifty years. It appears that MEND’s grouse against the oil companies is based on their partnership with the Nigerian petro-state in the plunder and pollution of the Niger Delta (Saharareporters, 2007). In response to a question from Ross on whether it would be fair to call MEND a terrorist group, Gbomo replied, “It depends on who is looking at us. To the oppressed impoverished people of the Niger Delta, we are angels. If we are terrorists to the oil companies and the Nigerian government, so be it.” The foregoing captures the dynamics of local resistance, which has now assumed the level of insurgency in the Niger Delta. Continuous neglect of the region by successive administration since independence, the alienation of people from oil profit accruing from oil exploitation from their land and water has produced envorinmental degeration and unprecedented militarism in the region. With elections as political wars in which the region’s youth, groomed in an atmosphere of repression, poverty, and fear, is conscripted and armed by various factions and oil interests, politics is completely drained of any democratic content but is marked by the rule of the survival of the fittest (strongest). It is in the context of the subversion of democratic will of the neglected and traumatized people of the Niger Delta that the move toward insurgency and conversations of violence can be best understood. The proliferation of armed groups in the Niger Delta is driven by a complex mix of agendas: personal, resistance, political, and criminal, and the complex dynamics of such groups makes any simplistic reading of the violence in the region problematic, except that the political violence lies at the conjuncture of transnational oil-based accumulation and the politics of resource control, including contestations over the distribution of oil revenues. Conclusion: Prospects and Suggestions The foregoing concretely shows that the fully blown insurgency in the oil-rich, but impoverished Niger Delta (UNDP, 2006), is partly the outcome of a long history of marginalization, oil exploitation, and repression, but more fundamentally since 1999, a democratic deficit hinged upon the subversion of the political process by a predatory and

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opportunistic political elite and self-serving leadership, which has characterized the violent subversion of elections and the popular will in the region. There is no doubt that the impunity with which elections have been rigged is both a ref lection of the high stakes involved in controlling state power at all levels and controlling access to providential oil revenues, as well as the reality, that the Nigerian state (including its electoral institutions), far from being a neutral arbiter in the midst of competing interests and demands, is an actor in, as well as a site of the intense struggles around oil. The Nigerian state seems to profit from the decadent situation in the delta region. Given the political economy of oil, democracy in Nigeria and the Niger Delta has a somewhat difficult prospect. While the dominant elite in Nigeria seeks to maintain its political hold over oil (power), and, therefore, sees democracy as a threat, because democracy could engender accountability and reduce impunity, two elements which have been central to illegal wealth accumulation by the political elite. Unfortunately, the main interest of the World’s major powers is to ensure that any local challenge (threat) to global oil interests in the Niger Delta is neutralized or crushed; democracy or environmental concern are secondary issues for them. Part of the response of the Nigerian government to the mounting violence in the Niger Delta has been to strengthen the capacity of the elite faction from the Niger Delta to co-opt, or divide the opposition, and criminalize and demobilize the militias in the region (Onuorah, Etim, and Ebiri, 2007). There has also been a sustained effort by top government officials to criminalize the militants and label them “obstacles to development” (Chiedozie, 2006). This way the state implicitly rejects and de-legitimizes the grievances and claims of the Niger Delta ethnic minority resistance, as a basis for their further police and military repression. At the same time, by labeling militants as “terrorists,” they are also set up for being neutralized or eliminated within the context of the U.S.-led Global War on Terror, as threats to Western energy security interests. It is within the overall context of its global security that we can understand the growing Western security assistance and the role of private transnational security companies in the Niger Delta, alongside that of the U.S. Command for Africa (AFRICOM) that “polices” the waters of the oil-rich Gulf of Guinea providing maritime security and training in “peacekeeping” and “humanitarian assistance” to African forces. The magnitude of the crisis in the Niger Delta transcends one of electoral democracy introduced since 1999; yet, the crisis of democracy

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in the region constitutes a critical part of the crises of citizenship and nation-statism in Nigeria. Except, Nigeria goes back to the roots of the current travails of democracy by tacking the challenges of building a social contract based on equity, popular dialogue, and inclusion of all Nigerians on an equal basis of representation, the dominant political elite risks shooting itself in the foot, when the current struggles around oil spin out of control. This challenge calls for more than the usual cosmetic reforms and the offer of “carrots” to a few complicit elites and “militants” from the Niger Delta or the granting of political amnesty to the militants, which is a policy thrust of the Yar’adua administration, and by extension the Jonathan administration, toward addressing the crisis in the Delta region. Except the local roots of the crisis are addressed, its transnational dimension cannot be effectively addressed. This would involve greater engagement with the various groups in the region and the country as a whole based on an open and equal dialogue, the democratic and equitable decentralization of oil power and the guarantee of social justice, political and socio- economic rights, and respect for the rule of law. The culture of impunity, violence, opportunism, and predation that has characterized and undermined democratic politics will have to be transformed, difficult though this may appear in the face of the stranglehold of vested interests on power and the sharing of the “spoils of oil” in the region. It is either the local Niger Delta and national political elites out of their own enlightened selfinterest rediscover the truth that their relevance and legitimacy as leaders lie in providing a sense of purpose and the delivery of concrete “democracy dividends,” welfare, and dignity to the long- suffering and traumatized people of the region, particularly the angry youth of the oil region, or they risk the situation spinning out of control and immersing the region in more destructive and destabilizing forms of violence. Notes 1. The Niger Delta in the context of this chapter refers to the leading oil producing states in the region: Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Delta, and Rivers. This is without prejudice to other states of the geo-political South- South. 2. See http: www. Greenlightnigeria.org 3. Made up of Transition Monitoring Group (TMG), Civil Liberties Organisation (CLO), Centre for Democracy and Development (CDD), Federation of Moslem Women Associations of Nigeria (FOMWAN), Labour Monitoring Team (LEMT), Women Environmental Programme (WEP), and Moslem League for Accountability (MULAC).

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International Crisis Group. 2006. The Swamps of Insurgency: Nigeria’s Delta Unrest. Africa Report No. 115–116, August. IRIN news (UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs). 2005. “Nigeria: Constitutional Change Conference Deadlocks Over Oil Dispute,” 2 August, http://www. irinnews.org/report Junger, S. (2007). “Crude Awakening,” The Observer Magazine, 15 April. Kemedi, D. 2006. “Fuelling the Violence: Non- State Armed Actors (Militia, Cults, and Gangs) in the Niger Delta,” Institute of International Studies, University of California, Berkeley, The United States Institute for Peace, Washington DC, Our Niger Delta, Port Harcourt: Niger Delta Economies of Violence Working Paper No. 10. Kew, D. 1999. “Democracy—Dem Go Craze, O: Monitoring the 1999 Nigerian Elections,” Issue: A Journal of Opinion, Vol. 27, No. 1. Klare, M. 2007. “The Pentagon as an Energy- Protection Racket,” Tom Dispatch, 14 January, http://www.tomdispatch.com/post/ Kurti, D. 2006. “New Militia Is Potent Force in Nigeria’s Oil-Rich Delta Region,” The Christian Science Monitor, 7 March, http://www.csmonitor.com Lewis, P. 2003. “Nigeria: Elections in a Fragile Regime,” Journal of Democracy, Vol. 14, No. 3. Memorial Institute for Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT). 2006. Group Profile: Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), http://www.tkb.org Mustapha, A.R. 2000. “Transformation of Minority Identities in Post- Colonial Nigeria,” in A. Jega (Ed.), Identity Transformation and Identity Politics under Structural Adjustment in Nigeria. Uppsala: Nordic Africa Institute, pp. 86–108. ———. 2002. “Ethnic Minority Groups in Nigeria: Current Situation and Major Problems (Paper prepared Commission on Human Rights, Sub- Commission on Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Working Group on Minorities, Ninth Session, 12–16 May), Mimeograph. Niger Delta Civil Society Coalition Statement on the Elections. 2007. www.greenlightnigeria. org Obayuwana, Oghogho, and L. Asubiojo. 2007. “Local Monitors Want Polls in 10 States Cancelled,” The Guardian (Lagos), 18 April, http://www.guardiannewsngr.com/news Obi, C. 2004. “The Oil Paradox: Ref lections on the Violent Dynamics of Petro-Politics and (Mis) Governance in Nigeria’s Niger Delta, Pretoria,” Africa Institute Occasional Paper No. 73. ———. 2005a. “Globalization and Local Resistance: The Case of Shell versus the Ogoni,” in L. Amoore (Ed.), The Global Resistance Reader. Oxon: Routledge. ———. 2005b. “Oil, US Global Security and the Challenge of Development in West Africa,” CODESRIA Bulletin, Special Issue, Nos. 3 and 4. ———. 2007a. “Oil and Development in Africa: Some Lessons from the Oil Factor in Nigeria for the Sudan,” in L. Patey (Ed.), Oil Development in Africa: Lessons for Sudan after the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies Report No. 8. ———. 2007b. “Democratising Nigerian Politics: Transcending the Shadows of Militarism,” “Briefings” Review of African Political Economy, Vol. 34, No. 112. ———. 2007c. “Ethnic Minorities and the Quest for Democracy in Africa,” in Equal Representation—A Challenge to Democracy and Democracy Promotion: Proceeding of a Conference and Workshop in Uppsala, 3–4 April 2006, Uppsala: Collegium for Development Studies/ Uppsala Centre for Sustainable Development, University of Uppsala. Okonta, I. 2005. “Nigeria: Chronicle of Dying State,” Current History, May. ———. 2007. “NIGER DELTA: BEHIND THE MASK, Ijaw Militia Fight the Oil Cartel,” in WORLD WAR 4 REPORT, http:ww4report.com

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Olaniyi, B. 2007. “Militants Blow Up Oil Pipelines,” The Punch (Lagos), 9 May, http://www. punching.com. Omeje, K. 2005. “Oil Conf lict in Nigeria: Contending Issues and Perspectives of the Local Niger Delta People,” New Political Economy, Vol. 10, No. 3. Onuorah, M., W. Etim, and K. Ebiri. 2007. “Militants Not Fighting for Niger Delta, Says Obasanjo,” The Guardian (Lagos), 19 January, http://www.guardiannewsngr.com/news Ross, B. 2007. “ABC News Exclusive: Online Interview with a Terrorist,” ABC News, 3 January, http://abcnews.co.com Ross, M. 2001. “Does Oil Hinder Democracy?” World Politics, No. 53, April. ———. 2003. “Natural Resources and Civil War: An Overview,” , http://www.sscnet.ucla. edu/polisci/faculty/ross/WBpaper.pdf Rosser, A. 2006. The Political Economy of the Resource Curse: A Literature Review. Brighton: Institute of Development Studies (IDS) Working Paper 268. Saharareporters. 2007. “Interview: We Will Soon Stop Nigerian Oil Export—Jomo Gbomo, 1 August, http://saharareporters.com/www/interview Saro-Wiwa, K. 1995. A Month and a Day: A Detention Dairy. London: Penguin Books. Shaxson, N. 2007. Poisoned Wells: The Dirty Politics of African Oil. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Ukeje, C. 2001. “Oil Communities and Political Violence: The Case of Ethnic Ijaws in Nigeria’s Niger Delta,” Terrorism and Violence, Vol. 13, No. 4. United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). 2006. Niger Delta Human Development Report. Abuja: UNDP. Watts, M. 2007. “Crisis in Nigeria: Oil Inferno,” Counterpunch, 2 January, www.counterpunch. org/watts.

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CH A P T E R

F I V E

Women’s Empowerment Jul i e Sanda

Nigeria is at a crossroads. Now, more than at any other time in its history, Nigeria has the opportunity to build a society that can guarantee justice, human dignity and civil liberties to all Nigerians . . . Olusegun Obasanjo, 29 May 1999 (cited in IDEA, 2001: 1) Introduction Democracy, which like a tidal wave blew across Africa in the early 1990s, caught up with Nigeria also, culminating on 29 May 1999 with the beginning of elected civilian governments at both federal and state levels. Protracted military rule disempowered the citizenry at large, and women, in particular. Thus the return to democracy after so many years of military rule and failed attempts to democratize was received with great enthusiasm. This enthusiasm was borne out of the belief that democracy offered enhanced opportunities for mass participation of citizens in the processes and institutions of governance in the country. Democracy, in its practice, was also expected to create institutional and structural leverage for those who had for long being marginalized and disempowered in society. Expectedly, the question of women empowerment was one such problem inherited from military rule that needed to be addressed if

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democracy was to take root in Nigeria. Admittedly, the “women question” was not a creation of military rule, its roots being in the traditional cultures and norms from which modern Nigeria emerged. However, women are strategic actors in the country playing a crucial role in the home, economy, polity, and society, yet they are grossly marginalized. Thus, the equal representation and participation of women in all spheres of public life is critical to sustaining the democratic process and balancing the development equation. Accordingly, the ruling Peoples’ Democratic Party (PDP), like the other parties, responded to the demands of women for greater voice in the polity by making campaign promises, which it was hard pressed to fulfill, once in the saddle. Segments of civil society have consistently insisted on gender balance as well as the international development partners. Some strides have undoubtedly been made and over ten years of democratic rule constitute a sufficient timeframe to look at the progress made toward women empowerment in a democratic Nigeria and assess the progress made. This chapter undertakes a review of the efforts made toward the empowerment of women since 1999; analyze those efforts; and identify the challenges and prospects of ensuring effective women empowerment as an integral part of democratic consolidation. The chapter commences with a discourse on the problematic of women empowerment in general and a conceptual clarification on the concept of empowerment. Some extant studies are also reviewed to show the experience in other parts of the world, highlighting the political, economic, and social dimensions of empowerment as relates to women. The emphasis is on the efforts made toward the participation of women in all spheres of public life in general, and decision making, in particular. The following section identifies the challenges to effective women empowerment. The chapter ends with key policy recommendations. The chapter adopts a limited but purposive interview survey for its field research focused mainly on women. The idea is to allow women tell their “own stories” about empowerment and its challenges in Nigeria. Theoretical Conceptualization Studies on women empowerment can be broadly classified into those that are essentially quantitative and, therefore, count numbers to assess the impact of empowerment policies and programs; and those that emphasize the improvement in the quality of women’s lives as a result

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of empowerment interventions. In both cases, the problem of measurement presents itself immediately. Some of these studies are rooted in democratic theory and, therefore, focus on problems of participation and representation. The main argument here is that “[a]n equal distribution of public and private responsibilities and a more equitable presence of men and women in political decision-making organs are fundamental both to redress gender power imbalances and to ensure good governance” (Mehrotra, 1998). The UNDP Human Development Index (HDI) and Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM) disaggregate the numbers to show the specific extents to which women benefit from interventions in various key sectors. The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) for their part seek to achieve gender equality and women empowerment by eliminating gender disparity in primary and secondary education by the set target dates. It is, however, silent on the content of the education they are to receive (Akanji, Bonat, and Salihu, 2003). While literacy and numeracy skills are a basic necessity, in themselves they do not break attitudinal barriers. Again the focus on the girl child does not address the particularities of the adult woman who is either past formal school age or who for religious or other reasons cannot partake in “regular” programs. Even the goal for improving maternal health that seeks to reduce maternal mortality rates may not necessarily address the woman’s right to decide when or who to marry, or the number of children she would like to have. These are issues that are religiously or culturally determined in many African and Asian societies, and are still largely untouched by the state. Where, for example, an under-aged girl/woman ends up with vesico-vaginal fistula (VVF) because of prolonged and obstructed labor, her life thereon most likely becomes a “living hell”; it can be redressed only by massive intervention on several fronts—medical, social, economic, and so on. Empowerment has several meanings and approaches and, therefore, measurements; these are often context-specific. Yet some scholars have provided definitions and parameters that are generalizable/universal. To understand empowerment, some would argue, one has to first analyze power. For Kabeer, one way of understanding power is in terms of the “ability to make choices: to be disempowered, therefore, implies to be denied choice” (Kabeer cited in Sidastudies, 2000: 18, emphasis mine). Page and Czuba (1999) agree that at the core of the concept of empowerment is power, an assumption that power can change and power can expand. They take a Weberian approach to power, which

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says power exists in relationships and not in isolation and, therefore, can change the environment and social relations. Again moving away from traditional zero-sum conceptualizations of power, they argue that power can be shared and thus can expand. This perspective takes us beyond the “domination” notion of power that leaves the powerless at the mercy of the powerful to decide whether, when, or how to give it up. Empowerment is a multidimensional social process that helps people gain control over their own lives (Page and Czuba, 1999); in other words, a process that fosters in people the capacity to implement projects that concern their progress and development. As a process, empowerment is not a destination but a continuum; interventions provide tools to aid this process; they do not in themselves empower. According to Narayan and Kabee, empowerment is “the expansion of assets and capabilities of poor people to participate in, negotiate with, inf luence, control, and hold accountable the institutions that affect their lives” (cited in Glenzer, 2005: 6) and “the expansion in people’s ability to make strategic life choices in a context where this ability was previously denied to them.” This definition views empowerment in terms of abilities, capabilities, and choice. Empowerment is thus about agency, structure (both tangible and intangible), and relationships, the medium through which agency and structure are mediated. While recognizing that empowerment is “context, culture and time specific . . . some aspects can be generalized and operationalized both quantitatively and qualitatively—cross culturally and cross nationally” (Glenzer, 2005: 7) though such macro-level measurements can obliterate or may not capture what happens at other levels or units of analysis. This work does, however, provide a framework that operationalizes empowerment as power, gender, and gender equity. Another issue of discourse is whether empowerment is a process or an outcome or both. Where a 30% quota is achieved, would women be said to have been empowered? At a project level, how, for example, is impact to be measured? If a change in state of mind is to be the yardstick, how would it be measured? Who makes a particular decision at household level? How is participation to be measured? These are issues unsettled in the literature. Democracy as the Context for Empowerment If democracy is taken as the system of government that gives people a say in the exercise of power because the power rests with them in the

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first place and they cede it to their chosen representatives to exercise the same on their behalf, then democracy in a polity emerging from authoritarian rule as was in Nigeria, should inherently be an empowerment mechanism. If democracy is about equal rights and opportunities, then it must be about equal rights to development for women, men, girls, and boys. Some argue that for democracy to be meaningful it must include accountability, genuine popular participation in political and economic decision-making processes beyond elections and multipartyism (Martin, 1993 in Jega, 2007: 16). In other words, it must ensure “socio-economic empowerment of the masses . . . be popularly-driven; in addition to having formal/procedural attributes,” deliver concrete democracy dividends beyond the basic minimal requirements. Taking this further, women empowerment is an integral political process of the democratization of the polity. Thus, the issue of women’s empowerment has to be contextualized within the nature of the state and political system. According to Hudson, “. . . the state has been depicted as one of the main sources of women’s insecurity. But the analysis is, in fact, more complex. While it is true that men benefit more from the African state than women, it is also correct to point out that, in the context of a continent in crisis, where corruption, undemocratic government procedures, and lack of political accountability exist, and where élites control civil and economic power, both men and women are left insecure . . .” (2006). The empowerment of women also has meaning in a gendered context. Gender is a socio-cultural construct that assigns roles to the sexes that define their place in society. It is “a structural relationship between the sexes that is linked to the state, the economy and to other macro- and micro- processes and institutions. The relationship is asymmetrical and it is inscribed in law and finds expression in political processes and economic structures . . . reproduced institutionally” (Karunwi in Anifowose and Babawale, 2003: 191). This relationship also takes its bearings from cultural and religious norms and practices, and is reinforced by the gatekeepers of these traditions. These artificially assigned male and female roles have served in the main to legitimize male supremacy both in the public and private spheres. Elsewhere in the World Women empowerment remains a major challenge in all parts of the world where there is continuous struggles, contestations, conf licts, and contradictions, yet progress in some instances. A study on Latin

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America and the Caribbean looks at political participation from a gender perspective (Mehrotra, 1998) . This is done within the context of the legislations—national and international—for affirmative action and quotas. A major finding of the study is that the inadequate number of women in the political arena and in political positions questions the democratic nature of the political systems in the region. The barriers to women’s political participation include ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●

unequal partition of and responsibility for household work; the difficulty of balancing professional life and family life; judgments emanating from their civic status; preconceived ideas about women and “their role”; economic dependence; relatively lower levels of education and formal training; resistance to women’s participation; lack of tradition and motivation to actively intervene in politics; the electorate’s lack of confidence in women; economic and social criteria for political candidacy; and the exigencies of availability that political activity demands.

But rather than remain passive, Latin American and Caribbean women directed their political actions through civil society thereby seeking to improve their status and position in society and the nation and circumventing the formal rules constraining their participation. In some countries, notable progress has been made in which quota for women is officially sanctioned in national parliament, key political positions, and at the local level of governance. Sweden is an example in this regard. In 1972, its Liberal Party decided that 40% of its leadership posts are to be held by women, and was followed soon after by the Social Democratic Party. In September 1993, the Congress approved a resolution recommending that candidate lists for municipal, provincial, and legislative elections have equal representation of men and women. Other notable examples are Germany’s Social Democratic party (which established an indicative quota of 40%), Green Party (which sanctioned an obligatory quota of 50%); Spain’s Socialist Party (PSOE) (which ruled that a minimum of 25% of the positions in its internal representative organs are to be occupied by women, and to be applied, where possible, to other elective positions); France’s Socialist Party (which, in 1993, ratified the 30% quota established in its statutes). Argentina, drawing heavily on European experiences, was the first

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country in Latin America and the Caribbean to institute a quota law in 1991 whereby political party candidates for officially elected office must comprise a minimum of 30% of qualified female candidates. Brazil followed in 1995, passing a Quota Law, though this was not enforced until the municipal elections in 1996. According to this law, registration as a political party for these elections was contingent upon having women make up 20% of the total number of party candidates. The results of the 1996 election saw a 12% increase of women elected to office, an increase of 140% in four years. However, empowerment as we earlier noted, is not all about numbers. In an examination of women in post-conf lict societies, Manchanda (2001: 99) posits, in a study of South Asian conf licts, that conf lict “opens up intended and unintended spaces for empowering women, effecting structural social transformations and producing new social, economic and political realities.” She provides a spectrum with Afghan women at one extreme of “absolute loss” and the Naga women of Northeast India at the other. In the latter case, she refers to the emergence of women’s agency for peace while in the middle of this spectrum is the “dark area of empowerment through arms,” citing, for example, Maoist women guerrillas in Nepal (100–101). In the particular case of Sri Lanka she describes an “ambivalent empowerment” in which women in the aftermath of conf lict are encumbered with guilt about the gains occasioned by their loss. Moreover, these gains within the domestic space do not translate into the public sphere (101). In a similar discourse, Meintjes, Pillay, and Turshen (2001) argue that whether it is a transition from war to peace or military dictatorship to democracy, “the rhetoric of equality and rights tends to mask the reconstruction of patriarchal power, despite recent emphasis on women’s human rights” (5). In a study on post-conf lict situations in Africa, Koen (2006) argues that periods of transition provide opportunities for political reorganization particularly as regards human security for women and girls. The focus on transition periods makes her findings applicable to newly democratizing societies, whether emerging from conf lict or authoritarian rule (whether military or civilian). She investigates how international rights-based instruments can be used to achieve this reorganization. Transitions to democracy have the potential to reshape the institutions of state and radically alter power relationships. In Africa, Rwanda is a notable example of a post-conf lict country that has made remarkable progress in women’s empowerment. In Rwanda, over 40% of the national parliament is made up of women, with

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120 Table 5.1

Julie Sanda Challenges to Women Empowerment

Beijing +10—Challenges Identified Weakened women’s movement Economic barriers for women’s empowerment Social and cultural attitudes Problems in gender mainstreaming Illiteracy Disabling international environment Gap between policy and practice Poverty HIV/AIDS Conf lict Weak political power and participation of women Lack of resources Weak or ineffective national machineries on women Lack of political will Weak legal framework for promotion of gender mainstreaming and equality The global political context (fundamentalism, war on terror) Analysis of gender and inequality is weak Lack of evidence of success on women’s human rights Access to education is varied Weak government and problems in governance No change in gender division of labor High maternal mortality Urbanisation/rural-urban migration Absence of women in peace processes

Out of 7 Reports 6 6 5 5 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

Source: Mehrotra, A. 1998. “Gender and Legislation in Latin America and the Caribbean,” www:undp. org/rblac/gender/legislation/

the country having the highest representation of women in national parliaments in the whole world (UNECA, 2009). However, challenges to women’s empowerment remain worldwide. In a review that uses the Beijing Platform for Action (BPFA) as an analytical framework, a summary of the challenges are reported in table 5.1. The “Nigerian Story” Women have long been a disadvantaged group in Nigeria, whether under authoritarian military rule or the intermittent periods of civil democratic rule. In pre-colonial history there were women who stood out as “saviors” because of the significant roles they played in the socio-

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political development of their peoples. According to Awe (1992: 9), they “helped to strengthen the foundations of their societies at a time when those societies were in a state of f lux and poised for change, and . . . paved the way for their future development.” From the colonial up to the pro-democracy movement of the 1990s, women have played an active part in the efforts at widening the political and socioeconomic space, both in individual capacities and as organized groups. This did not, however, produce commensurate results as they remain marginalized in the socio-economic and political arrangements of the country. However, in class-based societies, it is not only women who may be powerless. In Nigeria especially, there are groups of men who are powerless. But it is a historical and universal fact that women carry a huge burden as a disadvantaged group first and culturally as women, and this cuts across all classes of society, and second, as the poor in the realms of politics and economics. Though poverty is on the decrease in many parts of the world, it is on the increase, unfortunately, in Africa. Poverty has exacerbated the plight of women in Africa as they bear the greatest burden of it. Thus, the issue of the “feminization of poverty” is a major discourse in Africa. Poverty tends to wear a woman’s “face” in Africa. The Nigerian Constitution written in “gender-blind” language guarantees all Nigerians equal rights and opportunities irrespective of gender. However, the poor and majority of women can hardly realize those rights without state or societal intervention. A combination of traditional, state structure, and other systemic impediments militate against the ability of women to realize their human rights in society. In Nigeria, it took the momentum gathered during the United Nations Decade for Women (1975–1985) to arouse interest in the role of women in nation-building. Significant steps in this direction include the Better Life Programme (BLP) for Rural Women in 1987 and the National Commission for Women established in 1990. It wasn’t until the 1990s that a Ministry for Women Affairs was established. It is noteworthy that all these occurred under military rule but also replete with several shortcomings. The BLP particularly made an impact in its ability to mobilize large numbers of women, making them aware of their numbers and the powers, therein. Another legacy of the military era is “ first ladyism” popularized in the 1990s first by Maryam Babangida and then Maryam Abacha whereby wives of chief executives of national, state, and local governments assume a public standing, which though unconstitutional, wields

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considerable clout mobilizing power and resources including unbudgeted funds, for whatever cause or “pet project” the First Lady chooses to embrace. This trend has continued with significant modifications. Most “pet projects” were registered as non-governmental organizations (NGOs) thereby giving them legal standing to solicit for funds and be accountable. Under the Obasanjo administration, the practice was the same. Led by the late Stella Obasanjo, wife of Nigeria’s former president, the wife of the former vice president, Titi Atiku and wives of state governors initiated their own projects, drawing public attention to a wide array of challenging issues like trafficking in women and children, harmful widowhood rites and practices, girl child education, entrepreneurship development. The most notable of these was that initiated by Ms. Titi Abubakar, which led to an international campaign against trafficking in persons, especially young women, its greatest target. It has also resulted in a National Agency against Trafficking in Persons (NAPTIP) established by an Act of Parliament, in addition to the NGO she formed for the rehabilitation of victims of trafficking (WOTCLEF). The Promise of Democracy Insofar as democracy holds a promise of opening up opportunities for self-actualization for individuals and communities, it is itself “a quest for empowerment” (IDEA, 2001: 111). Under the Obasanjo civilian administration there were mixed results at the federal, state, and local government levels in terms of progress on women empowerment. But of the three, the federal level was more inclined toward empowering women particularly at senior decision-making levels. The most obvious was the filling of ministerial slots and heads of various government agencies. Thus for the first time, Nigerian women were appointed to head ministries otherwise traditionally male preserves. During this period, women were in charge of ministries like Aviation, Environment, Education, Finance, Foreign Affairs, Science and Technology, Solid Minerals, among others. Others were ministers of state in key ministries like Defence, Health, Water Resources, Finance, and Women Affairs. Apart from ministerial appointments, women also headed key federal agencies like the National Food and Drugs Administration and Control (NAFDAC), Federal Inland Revenue Service (FIRS), National Maritime Administration and Safety Agency (NIMASA), Consumer Protection Council (CPC), National Industrial

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Women’s Empowerment Table 5.2

Participation of Women in Governance in Nigeria, 2000

Level of Political Position Government

Federal

State

Local

123

Number Number of Position of Female Contestants

Federal Executive Council

49

Senate House of Representatives Governors Deputy Governors Commissioners Speaker, House of Assembly Member, House of Assembly LGA Chairmen Councilors

Number Percentage of Occupied Position Occupied by Women by Women 6

12.2

109 360

None for President (and Deputy) 5 29

3 12

2.8 3.3

36 36 360 36

6 – NA –

0 1 15 1

0 2.8 4.17 2.8

995

39

12

1.2

774 8800

46 510

9 143

1.2 1.6

Source: Development Policy Centre , (2002) African Governance Report: Country Report, Nigeria 2002.

Bank, National Export-Import Bank (NEXIM), Legal Aid Council, Bureau of Public Enterprises (BPE), Small and Medium Enterprises Development Agency (SMEDAN), and so on. Though the promise of 30% quota was not kept, these were positions of high visibility and served to give women a voice at that federal level. It also served to demystify, if not completely remove the barriers—cultural and structural—that blocked them. Table 5.2 above provides an indication of the extent of women’s participation in top levels of governance in Nigeria in 2000. The figures were not particularly different for subsequent years up to 2007 as table 5.3 shows. The Policy Environment In the early years of the Obasanjo government, the Ministry of Women Affairs spearheaded efforts at mainstreaming gender in all sectors of public life, using the National Policy on Women as the rallying point and drawing from the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). This initiative served to raise gender awareness in the public service for as long as it lasted, pushing as it did, for the establishment of Gender Desks/Officers in all public agencies.

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Table 5.3 Women Representation in 1999, 2003, and 2007 General Elections Election Offices

No of Seats, No of Women No of Seats, No of Women No of Seats, No of Women Elected, and Percentage of Elected and Percentage of Elected and Percentage of Elected Women in 1999 Elected Women in 2003 Elected Women in 2007

Presidency Senate House of Representatives Governorship

1–0% 109–2.75% 360–3.33%

1 – 0 – 0% 109 – 4–2.75% 360 – 21–5.83%

1 – 0–0% 109 – 8–7.34% 362 – 30–8.29%

36–0–0%

36 – 0–0%

36 – 0–0%

Source: Pogoson (2007)

The Ministry also doggedly pushed for the domestication of the CEDAW. It seems, however, that both initiatives went into a coma after the erstwhile minister Aisha Ismail left office. Toward the end of the second tenure of the Obasanjo administration, Inna Maryam Ciroma was appointed the Federal Minister of Women Affairs and Social Development. Under her leadership, working with local NGOs and international partners was invigorated; and a National Gender Policy was formulated, replacing the earlier National Policy on Women. This policy shift also marked a significant change in the approach to gender and development. The empowerment approach that seems to underlie the gender policy has as its objective empowering “women themselves to work to change and transform the structures that oppress and limit them.” In her own admission, “in Nigeria, traditions, customs, sexual stereotyping of social roles and cultural prejudice continue to militate against enjoyment of rights and full participation of women on an equal basis with men in national development” (National Gender Policy, 2006: v). While recognizing that this initiative was a major stride, in keeping with international standards, and useful for raising awareness, its formulation was at best incomplete. By its own admission the National Gender Strategic Framework (NGSF) that would “outline explicit implementation, monitoring and evaluation guidelines for achieving measurable targets and enhancing accountability to gender equality and women’s empowerment” is yet to be developed (National Gender Policy 2006: v). The CEDAW otherwise referred to as the International Bill of Rights for Women is a strategic international instrument from which the policy draws strength. Though signed and ratified by Nigeria (in 1984 and 1985, respectively) it is yet to be domesticated by the national legislature, despite the years of efforts put into the process. The main

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stumbling blocks to passage of the bill are Articles 12 and 16 that concern sexual and reproductive health rights and betrothal and marriage of children, respectively. These are matters considered to be in the private or family sphere. A related instrument, because of its implications for the girl child, is the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC). Signed by Nigeria in 1991, it was passed by the National Assembly in 2003 into the Child Rights Act. However, only 10 out of 36 State legislatures have enacted it. The difficulties here are connected with child marriage/betrothal, female genital mutilation, street children, almajiris,1 child labor and other forms of exploitative labor (including domestic helps) and corporal punishment (Fijabi and Ajayi-Lowo, 2007). Fijabi and Ajayi-Lowo (12) contend that the interplay of power and politics, sheer discrimination against the female gender, desire by men to maintain the status quo and fear of the unknown effects of female liberalization account for the opposition to the bill. The MDGs reinforce aspects of the CEDAW principally as concerns gender equality, maternal and child health, education and economic development. While all eight MDGs impact on women, we will consider the report card on only three specific ones: Goal 1 is to eradicate extreme poverty and hunger, Goal 3 is to promote gender equality and empower women, and Goal 5 seeks to improve maternal health (table 5.4). Although the numbers indicate an overall decline in poverty rates, the statistics would have to be disaggregated to show the real impact of poverty reduction measures on women. The reforms and huge investments in the agricultural sector did not necessarily target women and children as the most vulnerable of the poverty bracket. Moreover, most of these reforms that took place at the federal level were not replicated in the states, in spite of the framework provided by the National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS) and its correlates at state and local government levels (SEEDS and LEEDS). This itself is not surprising given the broad nature of the framework. The ratio of girls may be improving but it says nothing about the actual number of girls in school in relation to the total population of girls. The content, that is, the type and quality of education is not captured. More fundamentally the indicators for this goal are rather narrow, being restricted to public sphere, whereas the greatest battles for empowerment are fought in the private sphere. The most genderfriendly men are committed so long as the structures at home are unaffected. The conclusion one can draw as regards the worsening statistics on maternal mortality is that the infrastructure base for service delivery in this regard has not improved.

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Table 5.4 Report Card on Selected MDGs GOAL 1. Eradicate extreme hunger and poverty

3. Promote gender equality and empower women

5. Improve maternal health

1990

1995

2004

2005

Percentage of population living in relative poverty

43 (1992)

66

54

54 (2004)

21

Slow

Percentage of population living in extreme poverty (consuming 2900 calories or lower, daily) Percentage of underweight children (under 5) Ratio of girls to boys in primary education (girls per 100 boys)

–

–

35

35 (2004)

–

Insufficient data

36

31

30

30 (2004)

18

Slow

79

81

100

Good

79

81

100

Good

72 (2003)

72 (2003)

100

Good

79 (2003)

79 (2003)

5.76 (2003)

5.76 (2003)

30%

Slow

704 (1999)

800 (2004)

>75

36.3 (2003)

44

>60

Worsening/ insufficient date Worsening/ weak database

82

Ratio of girls to 106 boys in secondary education (girls per 100 boys) Ratio of girls to boys 46 (1991) in tertiary education (girls per 100 boys) Share of women in 66 (1991) wage employment in the non-agriculture sector (%) Proportion of seats 1.0 (1991) held by women in national parliament (%) Maternal mortality – rate (per 100,000 live births) Proportion of 45 births attended to by skilled health personnel

Target Progress 2015 toward Target

Good/ insufficient data

Source: Ibrahim, A.J. 2007. “Millennium Development Goals (MDGS),” Paper Presented to Participants of Course 16, National Defence College, Abuja, p. 9

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The 2003 National Demographic and Health Survey distills statistics relevant to women’s empowerment. These include those defined by the MDGs and a few other culture-specific ones like attitudes toward wife beating, female circumcision, contraceptive use as justification of wife beating. The figures on certain situations within the home are instructive as is demonstrated in tables 5.5 and 5.6. As concerns female circumcision, 66% of women and 63% of men think it should be discontinued. This is significant considering that its prevalence is still high in some parts of the country as shown in table 5.7. The above indicators are an important pointer to the extent of cultural and religious barriers women continue to face in private, which have remained unaffected by education and public policy. Women’s Perceptions of Empowerment A survey was conducted within Abuja in the Federal Capital Territory or women’s perception of their empowerment. A sample of women

Table 5.5 Survey Result on Women’s Participation in Domestic Decision Making Decision Types

Percentage Who Participate in Decision Making

All decisions Making large purchases Own health care Making daily purchases Visits to family/relatives What food to cook each day

Table 5.6

Survey Result towards Female Circumcision

Region North West North East North Central South West South East South- South

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14 20 25 30 36 40

Percentage of Women Circumcised 1 1 10 57 41 35

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Julie Sanda Table 5.7 Attitudes toward Wife Beating Reasons Burns food Refuses to have sex Argues with him Neglects the children Goes out without telling him At least one of these reasons

Percentage of Men

Percentage of Women

16 34 40 47 50 61

31 38 44 49 53 65

from various walks of life was randomly selected. The main objective of the survey was to find out what they understand by empowerment and how in their views the civilian administration enhanced their empowerment. The responses of the women touched on different aspects of empowerment in both public and private/family spheres, from the political, economic, social, and cultural to psychological. They described what they considered to be empowerment or aspects of it: less dependence on men, increased participation of women in politics, access to free education, growing confidence (engendered by the growing visibility of women in the highest levels of public life), freedom to express themselves and “freedom to do” (as they decided). One woman understood empowerment as “making women to have something doing whether they are literate or not, to support their husbands, family and the society at large.” For yet another “It’s also to make women independent by acquiring basic skills, being financially, religiously and educationally empowered.” Barriers to empowerment they mentioned included the state of the economy, unemployment, religion, culture, hostility from men, and certain government policies. These may not be a rigorous measure of women’s perceptions of empowerment; nevertheless, it is indicative of how familiar public policy issues are to them. A lot of work has been put into policy and programmatic interventions for empowering women, but women are either unaware of them or feel alienated because the language is complicated. This speaks to the issue of ownership. If women are not aware of what is being done “on their behalf” how can they be part of it? Little wonder these processes are easily hijacked or manipulated by those who would prefer the status quo because of the benefits accruing to them, therefrom. When the target knows what the issues are, it raises their involvement as stakeholders, they can make contributions, and when they know what the benchmarks are, they can monitor implementation and hold authorities accountable.

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Conclusion: Where Do We Go from Here? The question is how far has the democracy project gone in Nigeria? We argue that for the empowerment of women to go from ideal to practical, democracy itself must be deepened. How much democratization is there when the basic perquisites/rudiments like a transparent electoral system cannot be taken for granted? Participation, it has been rightly argued, does not necessarily translate into “having a say.” Women for long disempowered cannot actualize the rights accruing to them without the intervention of the state and providing the right policy and institutional framework necessary to change the condition and status of women. However, there must be clear implementation guidelines for strategies. The (male) gatekeepers in Nigerian society will not give up without a gallant fight and because they are so highly placed and entrenched in positions of power, working with them to “expand power” or claim space is an uphill task and so women activists will have to be prepared for the long haul. Those who have been working on the Violence against Women bill, CEDAW bill, and such are well aware of this reality of democracy. A recent debate on a bill on violence against women was turned into a debate on a dress code for women. The same debate shows how quickly women’s issues are redirected against them or def lected and trivialized and how gendered discussion has come to mean that each time a women’s issue is mentioned, it has to be counterbalanced with a man’s example. Public policy is important for professional, scientific, and political reasons (Igwe, 2007). The National Gender Policy (and other instruments from which it draws strength) that seeks to mainstream gender into all aspects of public policy needs to be studied to ensure that it meets the political yearnings of citizens. Women’s empowerment is a human rights issue; it has to be posed as a democratic question. Recommendations “In many African countries, the state is the only equalising power in society. It is the only institution with the capacity to provide for the needs of all citizens, and ensure equality among citizens as a given according to the prevailing democratic norms. It is, therefore, important that the state should not retreat from its social obligations to the citizens, but rather deepen its commitment to social spending and development. The state has to be capacitated and strengthened to meet these

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challenges and obligations through its organs and institutions” (IDASA cited in Koen, 2006). In this regard, the Ministry of Women Affairs and Social Development and the National Assembly are key agents to focus on. The NGSF should be developed as a matter of priority. Gender-based civil society organizations should be commended for the great work they have done and encouraged to keep going. They, however, need to broaden their bases and reach out to greater numbers of women and partners. Democracy-inclined NGOS are one of such; they should be encouraged to deliberately take on board women’s concerns. One of the hindrances to greater participation of women and other partners is the specialized language employed (“NGO lingo”). Communication strategies should be more creative and less alienating. International partners should work with local partners in facilitating the latter’s (local) agendas. Usually the short-term programatic interventions they support are based on a predetermined agenda. Culture and Tradition: This should be continuously contested, refined, and redefined to have a better accommodation and respect for women in society. Note 1. Almajiris are street kids who beg for a living in northern Nigeria.

References Akanji, B., Z. Bonat, and A. Salihu. 2003. Gender-Aware Analysis of the Federal Budgets in Nigeria (1995–2002): Focus on the Education and Agriculture Sectors. Centre for Democratic Development, Nigeria, supported by the Heinrich Boell Foundation. Anifowose, R. and T. Babawale. 2003. 2003 General Elections and Democratic Consolidation in Nigeria. Lagos: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. Awe, B. (Ed.). 1992. Nigerian Women in Historical Perspective. Lagos and Ibadan: Sankore/ Bookcraft. Development Policy Centre. 2002., “United Nations Economic Commission for Africa African Governance Report: Country Report.” Ibadan: DPC. Federal Republic of Nigeria. 1987. Report of the Political Bureau, March. ———. 1999. Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. Fijabi, M. and E.O. Ajayi-Lowo. 2007. “Domestication and Implementation of Gender Sensitive International Instruments (CEDAW and CRC),” Paper presented at Workshop on National Gender Policy organized by the Freidrich Ebert Foundation, 29–30 October. Glenzer, K. 2005. “Of Structures and Scraped Coconuts: Findings from the Meta- evaluation Component of the Strategic Impact Inquiry on Women’s Empowerment.” Impact Measurement and Learning Team August.

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Ibrahim, A.J. 2007. “Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) (info-kit),” Paper Presented to Participants of Course 16, National Defence College, Abuja. Igwe, I. 2007. “Framework for Policy Formulation for Security Sector Reform,” Lecture delivered to Participants of Course 16, National Defence College, Abuja, 2 November. International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. 2001. Democracy in Nigeria, Continuing Dialogues for Nation-Building. International IDEA, Stockholm, Sweden, CapacityBuilding Series 10. Jega, A.M. 2007. Democracy, Good Governance and Development in Nigeria Critical Essays. Ibadan: Spectrum Books. Koen, K. 2006. “Claiming Space Reconfiguring Women’s Roles in Post- Conf lict Situations.” Occasional Paper, No. 121, February. Mehrotra, A. 1998. Gender and Legislation in Latin America and the Caribbean, www:undp.org/ rblac/gender/legislation/. Meintjes, S., A. Pillay, and M. Turshen (Eds.). 2001. The Aftermath: Women in Post-Conflict Transformation. London: Zed Books. National Demographic and Health Survey. 2003., Focus on Gender Nigeria. Abuja: National Population Commission. National Planning Commission. 2004. “National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy,” NEEDS, Abuja, Nigeria. Page, N. and C.E. Czuba. 1999. “Empowerment: What Is It?” Journal of Extension, Vol. 37, No 5, October. Pogoson, I. 2007. “Women and National Development in Nigeria,” Lecture delivered at the National Defence College, Abuja, 29 October. Renard, P.G. October 2005. “Gender, the Millennium Development Goals, Human Rights in the Context of the 2005 Review Processes,” Report for the Gender and Development Project. United Nations Economic Commission for Africa. 2009., The African Governance Report II. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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S E C T ION

I I

Economic Issues

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CH A P T E R

SI X

Economic Reforms and Social Welfare A de mola A ri yo

Introduction The avowed aim of any credible and legitimate government is to ensure continuous improvement in the overall welfare of the citizenry. The realization of this goal is often pursued through the design and implementation of policies geared toward effective mobilization and optimal allocation and purposeful management of national resources for meeting the articulated needs and preferences of the citizenry. All things being equal, the level of resource endowment will, to a large extent, determine the pace and level of the achievement of this goal. Successive governments in Nigeria have, over time, designed and implemented several policies and welfare programs toward the discharge of their responsibilities as noted above. The potential for achieving this has been greatly enhanced by the abundance of human and non-human resources, with which the nation is richly endowed. Top on the list of these resources is petroleum oil, which has become the major source of huge national revenue and foreign exchange earnings. A large pool of well-educated citizens also abounds, to ensure prudent and purposeful management of these resources. However, the aspirations of, and potential for enhanced welfare of, the citizenry remain unrealized, in spite of the abundant resources. Ironically, the deterioration in people’s welfare had its origin in the advent of, and subsequent mismanagement of, huge revenue accruable

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to the nation from petroleum oil from the 1970s. Consequently, abject poverty appears the most obvious legacy that has been bequeathed on the citizenry after the exploitation of enormous resources. This is in spite of several economic reform initiatives and programs embarked upon by successive regimes, with a view to steering the economy back on the path of purposeful resource management, sustainable growth, and balanced development. The National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS) is the latest in the series of these reform efforts. However, there is much concern on the part of all stakeholders that unless something unique was done, NEEDS may also fall victim to the virus that caused the failure of previous efforts. Herein lies the rationale for this chapter, which deals with the effect of the economic reform program of the Obasanjo administration on the socio-economic welfare of the people. The chapter relied on a survey to gauge the perceptions of the people with regard to improvements in their livelihood from 1999 to 2007 during the Obasanjo administration. Structure of the Nigerian Economy The word “structure” can be defined as the “organizational, institutional and social framework of the economic system, including the nature of resource ownership and control” (Todaro and Bell, 1982). According to this definition, the structure of any economy portrays the norms, conduct of production activities, or established production and distribution partners within such an economy (Central Bank of Nigeria, 2000). This shows that the structure of an economy is a complex phenomenon that cannot be covered in detail within the limited scope of this section. Therefore, our discussion of the structure of the Nigerian economy focuses on the sectoral contribution to the gross domestic product (GDP), given its relevance to and implications for the realization of the goals of economic reform. Nigeria has several sectors that contribute to the total output of the economy. In practice, these are grouped into four major sectors, namely, agricultural, manufacturing, oil/petroleum, and services. The services sector is further disaggregated into private and government components. Between 1981 and 2003, agriculture was the highest contributor to the GDP with 39.8%. The agricultural sector is followed closely by the services sector with a combined contribution of 36.0%, out of which the private services sub- sector accounts for

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about 30%. The oil sector is in the third position with an average contribution of 13.4%, in spite of its being the largest source of public revenue and foreign exchange earnings for the country. This suggests the relatively low linkage of the oil sector with other sectors of the economy. The government services and the manufacturing sectors respectively contribute 10.1% and 7.9% to GDP (Central Bank of Nigeria, 2000). The efforts to revive the economy, and hence reduce significantly the level of poverty, should be devoted to revamping meaningfully the agricultural sector. Further, the manufacturing sector deserves the special attention of government in order to revitalize the industrial sector of the economy, especially through the promotion of agroallied industries with their high employment-generation potentials. Also, it is highly desirable to enhance the linkage of the “enclave” oil sector with other sectors of the economy. Nigeria’s Fiscal Profile and Outcomes Although Nigeria is richly endowed with land, petroleum oil, and other natural resources, a substantial portion of its population still remains very poor (Thomas and Canagarajah, 2002). The view that Nigeria is a rich nation is supported by the steady rise in government revenue over the years. In fact, the trend in the revenue accruing to the country shows that there is no reason for the country to be listed among the poor (to talk less of being among the poorest) countries of the world. Although there are other sources such as cocoa, rubber, and other non-oil products that generate export revenue, oil has remained the country’s major source of national revenue and foreign exchange earnings since 1974. The consequential neglect of the agricultural sector has adversely affected the country’s revenue profile since the middle of the 1970s. With respect to government revenue, table 6.1 indicates that the five-year average annual federal government revenue steadily rose from N2461.6 million during 1970–1975 to N504559.4 million, during 1996–2000, and later to N507400 million in 2001–2004. This represents an annual average growth rate of 240%, and an annual average per capita revenue of N1,050 over the period. A majority of this huge revenue comes from petroleum oil, as noted earlier. A major policy implication of the observed economic structure is the need to diversify

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Table 6.1 Five-Year Average of Federal Government Fiscal Profile (N’million) Period

Total Revenue

Total Expenditure

1970–1975 2461.6 2262.9 1976–1980 8369.6 9411.1 1981–1985 7374.2 11188.4 1986–1990 20746.5 33457.7 1991–1995 113173.9 152054.4 1996–2000 504559.4 580259.1 2001–2005 507400 1188230

Internal Debts

External Debts

1227.5 261.1 5742.4 1094.4 20411.5 10767.5 48687.5 163041.2 244308.5 574228.3 586650.9 1509075.6 1246596.3 4232414.8

Foreign Direct Invest 1626.7 2901.4 12422.5 10396.4 57929.9 139382.6 151154.5

Oil

Non-Oil

2090.5 900.6 6580.98 2217.9 8565.04 3742.3 31596.7 11912.5 178717.4 50505.1 693198.8 193550.8 2216390 519240

Source: Computed from CBN Statistical Bulletin & Annual Report, various issues.

the economy away from its heavy dependence on the oil sector, in order to promote employment generation and, hence, effective poverty alleviation. In spite of the persistent increase in the revenue profile, both the internal and external public debts also increased substantially. For example, government’s domestic debts amounted to N1,227.5 million between 1970 and 1975, which rose to periodic averages of N20,411.5 million and N586651 million between 1981 and 1985, and 1996 and 2000, respectively. This increasing trend continued upward between 2001 and 2005 with the figure of N507,400 million. The corresponding figures for external debt were N261.4 million, N10, 768 million, and N1,509,075.6 million. However, from 2001 to 2005, it rose to N4,232,414.8 million. This shows that over the 31-year period under review, internal public debt grew at an annual average of 260.7% while external public debt grew at an average of 606.4%. In addition, per capita external debt rose from N129,000 during 1980–1984 to N13.58 million during 1996–2000, and to N33.7 million between 2001 and 2005.1 The implication is that there is a serious mismatch between per capita revenue, expenditure, and debt over the years. For example, while average per capita revenue rose from N118.8 during 1980/84 to N4, 616 during 1996/2000, the corresponding figures for per capita expenditure were N169 and N5,301 which resulted in huge per capita domestic and external debts over time.2 The structure of the fiscal profile has, no doubt, had an impact on the nation’s macroeconomic performance. Table 6.2 indicates that the economy performed well, with real GDP growing at an average of 9.7% between 1970 and 1975, although this declined to 4.0% between 1976 and

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1980. The positive growth experienced during this period was, however, reversed from the early 1980s because of the fall in world oil price, which adversely affected the Nigerian economy. This accounted for the negative real GDP growth rate experienced between 1980 and 1985. The economy bounced back between 1986 and 1990 with an average real growth rate of 5.6%, but was on the decline all through the 1990s, and by the period between 20001 and 2005, it rose to 6.5%. In general, Nigeria’s economic performance has not been stable over the years, and has obviously been unsatisfactory, relative to the huge resources expended over time. The effects of this performance on Nigeria’s socio- economic conditions are obvious. For example, table 6.2 further shows that nominal per capita income grew steadily over time, mainly due to developments in the oil sector. However, the high inf lationary trend eroded the gains of this growth. Consequently, real per capita income decreased from an average of N958.9 between 1981 and 1985 to N837.6 from 1996 and 2000, but increased to N3,059 from 2001 to 2005. The high inf lation trend was attributable to the unsustainable expansionary fiscal policies of government buoyed by a high level of borrowing (especially external) and budget deficit. All these led to an increasing trend of unemployment, which obviously had been in high doubledigit ranges, contrary to the distorted single-digit level documented in official publications. The fiscal profile of Nigeria reviewed above shows that the poverty situation in the country cannot, and is not, due to resource constraint per se; rather, it is attributable to persistently macroeconomic mismanagement.

Table 6.2 Period

Five-Year Annual Average of Selected Macroeconomic Indicators* Real GDP (growth rate)

Nominal GDP (growth rate)

Real Per Capita Income (naira)

Nominal Per capita Income (US$)

Inflation Rate

9.7 4.0 –5.6 5.6 2.8 3.0 6.5

31.8 19.0 7.6 30.9 53.6 14.4 18.0

– – 958.9 950.2 1057.1 837.6 3059

– – 568 274 246 258 432

14.2 15.0 19.4 25.9 48.9 12.3 15.1

1970–1975 1976–1980 1981–1985 1986–1990 1991–1995 1996–2000 2001–2005

Source: Computed from CBN Statistical Bulletin & Annual Report, various issues. Note: * There is general consensus that these figures are not reliable, and that realistically, unemployment has remained with the high double- digit range since the 1980s.

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Ademola Ariyo Economic Reforms in Nigeria: 1978–2007

In this section, we profile the various economic reforms that have been implemented in Nigeria in the past three decades. In doing so, we first of all define an economic reform as any form of policy and/or institutional intervention that changes or seeks to change the process of economic policy design and implementation, with a view to ensuring a better and more purposeful management of the economy. It generally refers to any attempt to truncate the dwindling fortunes of the economy and thereby enhance sustained improvement in the welfare of the citizenry. In addition, we classify the various previous reform measures and programs into three categories. These are (1) minor reforms covering the period 1978 to 1984; (2) major economic reforms characterized by the structural adjustment program (SAP); and (3) the poverty reduction strategy paper (PRSP). Economic Reforms: 1978–1984 The first attempt at economic reform was made in 1978 to cushion the effect of oil price decline. Specifically, owing to the impression that the decline in oil price in 1977–1978 was temporary because of f luctuations in international market, the Obasanjo administration took the first jumbo loan of US$1 billion in 1978 and introduced some austerity measures. These measures were, however, short-lived, owing to the rise in oil price in 1979, when the nation resorted to its ostentatious consumption behavior (Herbst and Soludo, 2001). This laid the foundation for the serious economic crisis that engulfed the nation in the 1980s. The second economic reform attempt was similarly induced by oil price shock, when in 1980 oil prices fell from about US$40 to about US$9.0 per barrel. This prompted the Shagari government to enact the Economic Stabilization Act of April 1982, with minimal involvement of non-governmental institutions. The act comprised a package of stringent demand management measures, aimed at rationalizing the overall expenditure pattern, to restore fiscal balance on the domestic front and equilibrium in the external sector. These stabilization measures were implemented mainly through administrative controls, which included tightening of import controls, the imposition of exchange restrictions on international transactions, substantial increases in customs tariffs, the introduction of an advance import deposit scheme, and ceilings on total Central Bank foreign exchange disbursements.

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The Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) in Nigeria Successive governments’ preoccupation with ad hoc, short-term stabilization policies was informed by the wrong impression that the causes of Nigeria’s economic crises were transient. The realization of the falsity of this belief led to a change of strategy toward a more comprehensive reform program known as the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP), the implementation of which commenced in September 1986. The policy thrust of SAP was meant to promote economic reconstruction, social justice, and self-reliance and realign aggregate domestic expenditure and production patterns for the purpose of speeding up economic recovery and promoting balanced economic growth. Specifically, the major objectives arising from the above policy thrust were to ●

● ●

●

restructure and diversify the production base of the economy, in order to reduce dependence on the crude oil sector and on imports; achieve fiscal and balance of payment viability over the period; lay the basis for a sustainable, minimal, or non-inf lationary growth; and lessen the dominance of unproductive investments in the public sector, improve the sectors efficiency level, and intensify the growth potentials of the private sector.

The core elements of SAP include the following: ●

●

● ● ●

● ●

●

rationalization and privatization of public enterprises to encourage competition through liberalization and deregulation to reinforce the process of efficiency; the stimulation of domestic production and the broadening of the supply base of the economy; tariff rationalization and restructuring; strengthening demand management devices; the adoption of a realistic exchange rate policy through the f loating exchange rate regime; ensuring improved trade and payments liberalization; reduction of complex administrative controls simultaneously with a greater reliance on market forces; and the adoption of appropriate pricing policies with a view to eliminating subsidies, particularly for petroleum products, social services, and utilities.

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Ademola Ariyo Sectoral Features of SAP

The features of SAP are in general sectorally focused. We highlight two of these, as well as some general features, as examples. Agriculture SAP was of the view that the benign neglect and poor performance of the agricultural sector accounted for the decline of its contributions to the GDP, domestic industrial inputs, and exports. To properly reposition the sector, SAP aimed at ● ●

●

enhancing domestic food supply and local industrial inputs; increasing non-oil exports to foster the diversification of the nation’s export base; and raising rural employment-generation opportunities for increased income generation, and halting rural-urban migration.

Some policy measures adopted toward achieving these objectives included suspending the importation of agricultural commodities, scrapping the Commodity Boards, adopting the f loating foreign exchange regime, and providing easier access to land for agricultural production. The Industrial Sector The SAP document articulated the problems of this sector to include inadequate supply of imported inputs and low capacity utilization. Others were poor infrastructure facilities and inappropriate tariff structure, which accounted for the weak industrial base of the economy. Toward addressing these problems, SAP adopted some policy instruments and strategies aimed at ● ● ● ● ● ●

● ●

accelerated utilization of local inputs; the promotion of export-oriented industries; development of small- and medium-scale enterprises; liberalization of controls to facilitate greater investment f lows; intensified provision of functional infrastructural facilities; pegging of public sector employment through attrition and freezing of vacant positions except for special skills; allowing wages to ref lect the scarcity values of skills; and the establishment of intervention programs such as the Directorate of Food, Roads and Rural Infrastructure (DFRRI) to foster selfemployment.

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Other Features of SAP There were other notable features of SAP contained in the document. These include ● ●

●

pegging of budget deficit to within 3% of the GDP; expenditure switching away from transfers and recurrent (especially wages) to capital expenditure focused on provision of infrastructures and other directly productive sectors of the economy; and rationalization of public sector investments to enhance the growth impact.

The adoption of SAP generated some criticism and skepticism. In particular, the two-year time frame was considered unrealistic for addressing the endemic structural problems of the economy. Incidentally, the events thereafter turned this into a self-fulfilling prophesy, as SAP failed to have an enduring impact in relation to its various laudable objectives. Pitfalls of SAP In spite of SAP’s comprehensiveness and good intentions, its impact on the economy could not be sustained. This is attributable to several pitfalls, which have been analyzed in detail in Adejumobi (1995) and Mkandawire and Olukoshi (1995). Some of the pitfalls include the following: 1. The lack of local ownership of the program, as it was generally perceived that the program was forced down the throat of the nation as part of the global strategy of the multilateral institutions; 2. Its various components were anchored on global principles and targets, to the neglect of the views, preferences, and real needs of the citizenry; 3. The whole process underlying SAP was non-inclusive; as it did not involve meaningfully the other primary partners in the nation’s development process mainly the private sector and the civil society; 4. Perhaps arising from (2) and (3) above, there was no sense of collective ownership or commitment toward the successful implementation of SAP;

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5. The assessment of impact of SAP focused on numbers, such as GDP growth rate, rather than on its identifiable impact on the people, such as its generation of gainful employment, level of reduction in poverty, and so on. Its design, implementation and performance, and evaluation were, therefore, not people-focused; and 6. SAP was a short-term (two-year) framework expected to address endemic socio-economic problems of the nation. The overall effect of SAP was to remove the citizenry from their normal means of livelihood, such as farming, without providing viable substitutes for them. This led to a massive upsurge in non-wage unemployment and a sharp deterioration in opportunities for employment generation, especially in the real sector of the economy. To worsen the situation, the booming oil sector is highly capital intensive, and therefore provides limited opportunity for gainful employment of the citizenry. It would be observed that all these reforms suffer from one type of deficiency or another. For example, other than SAP, which was based on an identifiable framework, all the reforms were ad hoc in nature, and were guided more by the fire brigade management strategy. Further, all the reforms failed to focus on redressing the structural deficiencies of the economy, thereby focusing more on the shadow, rather than the substance of the economic challenges facing the nation. Finally, it was obvious that none of these reforms was pro-poor, or people-oriented in their design and implementation. It is, therefore, not surprising that none of the processes was really inclusive. Therefore, they did not enjoy meaningful inputs from non-state actors and groups. Hence, the failure of these reforms seems to have been pre- determined. Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) The poverty reduction strategy process is an initiative of the multilateral institutions, aimed at evolving a realistic approach toward addressing the problem of poverty in the developing countries of the world. It prescribes the approach to be adopted by each country concerned, toward the preparation of an acceptable and credible Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP). Objectives of the PRSP The PRSP aims to ●

evolve a more realistic approach toward effective poverty alleviation efforts;

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●

●

●

145

ensure renewed emphasis on accelerated growth, which is a basic requirement for poverty reduction; transform the principles underlying World Banks’ Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF) into an effective and efficient plan of action for poverty reduction in countries concerned; ensure effective use of a country’s resources toward the goal of growth and poverty reduction; and promote structural transformation toward people-centered, resultsoriented, and inclusive national policy and management process.

PRSP Core Principles Toward achieving these objectives, the PRSP base document prescribed six core principles and processes that should be observed by a country to be adjudged as having produced an acceptable and credible national PRSP. These core principles are as follows: ●

●

●

●

●

●

the process must be country- driven, and ref lect broad based participation with civil society and the private sector, in each phase of analysis and policy formulation; the strategies are results-oriented, and focused on outcomes that would benefit the poor; the strategies must explicitly recognize the multidimensional nature of the task of poverty reduction; the new strategies and programs must be prioritized, so that implementation is feasible, in both fiscal and institutional terms; the plan of implementation must be built around partnerships, rather than focusing exclusively upon government as the vehicle to deliver poverty programs; and the strategies must be based on a long-term perspective for poverty reduction. National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS)

The National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS) was the major economic reform blueprint of the Obasanjo administration toward addressing the nation’s development challenges. Building upon previous endeavors, NEEDS is a comprehensive initiative that seeks to achieve effective poverty alleviation through wealth creation and employment generation. During its public presentation

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in 2004, the Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN) acknowledged that, like any new initiative of this magnitude, NEEDS could not be expected to be a perfect product right from the beginning. Hence, the enabling document classified NEEDS as a living document, the conception, packaging, implementation, and monitoring of which will be subject to periodic review, based on the resulting experience. This is with a view to improving upon the efficiency of its implementation, and enhancing the attainment of its noble objectives. An Overview According to official sources, NEEDS is a comprehensive mediumterm growth and development program based on some core principles. Further, the FGN stated that NEEDS is to serve as Nigeria’s homegrown version of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), earlier introduced by the multilateral institutions. It would be recalled that the original PRSP was concerned about an inclusive process toward a medium-term based fiscal operations of government. While imbibing these features, NEEDS also take into consideration some political, socio-cultural, and other country-specific considerations toward evolving an effective and enduring poverty alleviation strategy. We highlight brief ly herewith the major features of this home-grown initiative. Philosophy The philosophy of NEEDS is anchored on the belief that people constitute the beginning and end of any credible and legitimate public policy or process. Hence, its orientation has been informed by the Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles of State policy, as enunciated in the 1999 Constitution of FGN. Toward this end, the goals, aspirations, design, and implementation of NEEDS seem to be guided by the following core principles as stated in the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (Federal Government of Nigeria, 1999): (i) the security and welfare of the people shall be the primary purpose of government; (ii) the state shall, within the context of the ideals and objectives for which provisions are made in this Constitution: (a) harness the resources of the nation, promote national prosperity through an efficient, dynamic and self-reliant economy; and

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(b) control national economy in such a manner as to secure the maximum welfare, freedom, and happiness of every citizen, on the basis of social justice and equality of status and opportunity; (iii) The state shall direct its policy toward ensuring (a) the promotion of a planned and balanced economic development; (b) that the material resources of the nation are harnessed and distributed as best as possible to serve the common good; (c) that the economic system is not operated in such a manner as to permit the concentration of wealth or the means of production and exchange in the hands of few individuals or of a group; and (d) that suitable and adequate shelter and food, reasonable national minimum living wage, old age care and pensions, unemployment, and sickness benefits and welfare schemes for the disabled are taken care of. (iv) government shall direct its policy toward ensuring that there are equal and adequate educational opportunities at all levels; and (v) the national ethics shall be Discipline, Integrity, Dignity of Labour, Social Justice, Religious Tolerance, Self-Reliance, and Patriotism. Toward achieving these, NEEDS seek to ensure the emergence of (a) an incentive structure that rewards and celebrates private enterprise; entrepreneurial spirit and excellence; (b) new forms of partnership among all stakeholders in the economy to promote prosperity among and across all arms and tiers of government; private sector, civil society, the international community; and other stakeholders; and (c) a public service that delivers prompt and quality service to the people. NEEDS Policy Thrust The policy thrust of NEEDS is to improve the quality of life of Nigerians significantly, create social safety nets for the vulnerable segments of the populace, and cater for those displaced by the dynamics of the reform process. Given that overall economic growth by itself may

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not necessarily ensure poverty reduction at the desired pace, the need for direct and specific steps to facilitate individual economic empowerment, particularly among the poor and other vulnerable groups, becomes imperative. Hence, NEEDS identified five priority action areas. These are (1) wealth creation; (2) employment generation; (3) poverty alleviation; (4) corruption elimination; and (5) general value re-orientation. NEEDS Targets In the pursuit of the ambition to promote effective and enduring poverty alleviation, NEEDS intends to achieve the following broad targets: ●

● ● ●

●

Average per capita consumption growth of at least 2% per annum; Creation of about 7 million jobs over the period 2004–2007; Increase in immunization coverage to 60% by 2007; Access to safe drinking water to at least 70% (urban and rural) of the population; and Adult literacy rate of at least 65% by 2007. Pillars of NEEDS

The details given above show that NEEDS is a bold, comprehensive initiative that adopts a holistic approach toward addressing successfully the endemic development challenges of the nation. The realization of the goals and aspirations of NEEDS are focused on three major issues. These are referred to as the three pillars of NEEDS. They are as follows: 1. Reforming government institutions; 2. Growing the private sector; and 3. Social charter (or human empowerment). Methodology This study adopts both econometrics and descriptive method of analysis. The econometrics analysis involves the use of a model in showing

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the effect of government economic reform since 1999–2007 on people’s socio-economic welfare through the use of secondary data. Primary data is used in the descriptive analysis that involves a field survey of Nigerians and their opinion regarding the subject matter. Descriptive Analysis This involves the use of both quantitative and qualitative descriptive analytical means of evaluating any given phenomenon. The data for this analytical evaluation is from primary sources). This source of data collection is through field survey of target groups. The target groups in this study are the people in both public and private sectors, civil society groups, students, market women, artisans, and others who comprise the Nigerian masses. The basic objective of this survey is to investigate and analyze the effects of economic reform of the Obasanjo administration on people’s socio-economic welfare. Thus, the questionnaire method of gathering primary data was adopted and it is in conformity with the National Bureau of Statistic (NBOS) questionnaire on the subject matter. Sampling and Questionnaire Design A simple random technique was used to select respondents from different strata of the Nigerian economy, which cut across the country. The Nigerian masses were disaggregated into those in public and private sectors, civil societies, artisans, market women, and students. The questionnaire involves translating the research objectives into specific questions to generate data necessary for analysis. In designing the questionnaire, we follow the format of NBOS, in which questions specific to the objective were asked. We administered 300 questionnaires on the people, which cut across the above selected groups. The limitation to the number of questionnaire administered was mainly due to the available budget for the study. These questions were basically closedended ones. The Result of the Field Research The outcome of this study’s survey shows that out of the 300 questionnaires administered on the people, only 273 (i.e., 91%) were responded to and returned their questionnaires.

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The result shows that out of the 273 respondents, 56.8% are male; 37.7% are female; 5.5% of the respondents did not indicate their sex. The result also shows that 7% of the respondents are less than 20 years of age; 0.4% did not indicate or give their age. This means that about 93% of our respondents were 20 years and above. The significance of this is that this group constitutes those in the working class and the retirees. Out of this group, about 92% are in the working class; 1.1% are retirees or those that are old enough and not engaged in any economic activity. Also, almost all of the respondents are educated people; over 95% of them have formal education, hence their ability to evaluate the impact of the economic reform policies of the government on the people. The general price level in the country shows the extent to which the welfare of the people is depleted or reduced, since it affects the purchasing power of the people and thereby determines the status of their real income or social welfare. The survey shows that over 86% of the respondents confirmed that between 1999 and 2007, inf lation was a major issue in the country. Those who said there was no inf lation were only 9.5% and for those who believed prices over those years were relatively constant was 3%. This means that the economic reform program of the government led to increases in the prices of goods and services through some stringent policies of the government that have multiplier effects on the price level in the country. Thus, table 6.3 indicates that the purchasing power of the people decreased given the increase in the general price level in the country during the Obasanjo administration. The result shows that over 55% of the respondents indicated that there was reduction in the volume of goods and services they purchased; 32% shows that it increased; 7% believed that their purchasing power remained unchanged under the Obasanjo regime. Table 6.3 What Happened to the Volume of Goods and Services You Buy Now Compared to the Period before the Inception of the Obasanjo Civilian Government and the Provision of Safe Drinking Water? Purchasing Power

Increase, Decrease, Same, Missing

Access to Safe Water

Frequency

%

Frequency

%

88 151 20 14

32.2 55.3 7.3 5.1

36 142 84 11

1.2 52.0 30.8 4.0

273

100.00

273

100.0

Total

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Table 6.3 also shows that the provision of basic amenities like safe drinking water was inadequate under the Obasanjo administration (1999–2007); 52% of the respondents indicated that the provision of safe drinking water reduced during the Obasanjo administration; in fact, many communities complained that they were not given clean drinking water at all. The provision of water is very vital to peoples’ livelihood as it affects their health, household needs, and economic activities. The implication is that the provision of this basic amenity was inadequate despite the economic reforms under the NEEDS program. Thus, the social well-being of the generality of the people was worse off. Furthermore, we examined the issue of motorable roads in the country, which is an important infrastructure in the economic and social life of any country. Over 92% of the respondents indicated that there was no improvement at all in government provision of motorable roads, while only 4.4% of them indicated otherwise. Without good roads, economic activities will reduce, a lot of time will be wasted, and productivity will decline. Also, the provision of shelter to the needy was not encouraging during the administration. Even those who had enough money to build their own houses were confronted with increases in the general prices of building materials. From the survey, we can conclude that 62% of the respondents were of the view that government did nothing to ensure the provision of affordable housing in the country. The consequence is that many people did not have access to affordable housing despite government reform in that sector of the economy. With regard to the impact of the economic reforms on the education sector, about half of the respondents agreed that the reforms in the educational sector led to improvements in the quality of education under the regime. Reference here is made to the quality control introduced into university education admission by many universities in which applicants were required to undergo post–Joint Admission and Matriculation Board Examination in various universities before admission. According to the survey, the quality of health care provision did not improve compared to the period before 1999. Over 48% of the respondents were not happy with the quality of the health services provided in the Nigerian health sector. Table 6.4 indicates that the provision of electricity in the country was grossly inadequate, following the survey; 89% of respondents were of the view that the provision of electricity/power supply was bad and unsatisfactory. They disclosed that it adversely affected their businesses

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Ademola Ariyo Table 6.4 Has There Been Improvement in Power Supply since the Inception of Obasanjo Regime?

Yes; No; Missing Total

Frequency

%

24 243 6

8.8 89.0 2.2

273

100.0

and social welfare. This is in spite of billions of dollars the regime expended on the sector purportedly to improve power generation in the country. The Model This study set up an econometric model to test the effect of economic reform on the socio-economic welfare of the people from 1999 to 2004. We used consumer price index (CPI), exchange rate (EXC), commercial lending rate (LR), total government debt (DEBT), and foreign aid (AID) to measure economic reform while the total consumption per capita (PCC) was used as an index of socio-economic welfare. We used quarterly time series from 1999 to 2004, the reason being that the years under study are not enough to run any meaningful econometrics analysis. The source of the data for the analysis is from World Bank African Development Indicators 2004. This study specifies the following multiple regression equation using quarterly data for the natural logarithm of the variables.

InPcc = a0 + a1Cpi + a2Exc + a4Debt + a5Aid +1t – – – 1 Here PCC = Total consumption per capita CPI = Consumer price Index EXC = Exchange rate Debt = Total debt of the government Aid = Total government aid Theoretically, we expect that as the consumer price index goes up, there will be reduction in the level of consumption per capita, as the purchasing power must have been eroded. Depreciation tends to lead to increase in the price of imported goods and services, which in turn

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erode the purchasing power of the consumers thereby reducing their consumption. A rise in commercial bank lending rate will also have negative impact on the level of consumers’ consumption. The impact of debt on consumption is not specific in the literature, as in the short run it will increase consumption, while in the long run deplete it. The foreign aid to the government will lead to increase in consumption. Findings from Econometric Analysis The empirical result for this study is depicted in table 6.5 below. Table 6.5 indicates that there is a statistically significant relationship between consumer price index (CPI) and total consumption PCC in Nigeria. This means that as the prices of goods and services increase, there is corresponding reduction in the level of consumption per capita. Also, from the result we could see the degree to which per capita consumption level responds to changes in CPI is 2%, and there is inelastic per capita consumption. This result conforms to the a priori expectation. The EXC has a statistically significant positive relationship with PCC. This means that the higher the EXC (depreciation), the more attractive Nigerian exports are, given that its prices will be reduced, while imports will be unattractive as the prices tend to increase. The increase in exports will mean more income to the country, which means an increase in the consumption per capita and that for every 1% increase in the EXC, there is 6% increase in PCC. Also, foreign aid has a direct relationship with consumption per capita. This is, the more the inflow of foreign aid, the higher the income to the country and thereby enhanced productivity, which leads to a rise in the income level of the people and thus an increase in their consumption level. The result also shows that the degree of responsiveness of consumption per capita to change in foreign aid is 4%. This means that there will be 4% increase in the total consumption per capita due to 1% increase in foreign Table 6.5 Regression Result Variable

Coefficient

T-Statistic

Prob.

R 2 = 0.8994

C CPI EXC LAID LDEBT

23.5462 – 0.0204 0.0609 0.0401 –2.4642

84.7609 –4.9416 5.8714 1.7163 –35.2009

0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.1024 0.0000

Adj.R2=0.8990 S.E.=0.0200 F.Stat.=8313.66 0.0000 D.W.=1.9774

Source: Author’s Computation

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aid. The total debt of the government has a significant negative relationship with consumption per capital. This means that the more the government incurs debts, the lower the consumption per capital. The reason being that most of the debts were not spent on productive projects, thus as the debts were being incurred, they were siphoned or embezzled and did not have effect on productivity in the country. This makes economic activities to fall and thereby reduce the level of consumption per capita. The result also shows that for every 1% increase in foreign debt, there is 246% reduction in the consumption per capita and this is elastic. This is not in conformity with the a priori expectation. The coefficient of determination of this result shows that about 90% of the changes test occurred in the total PCC are caused by these explanatory or independent variables. This result is devoid of much error as this could be seen in the standard error of the regression result that is 0.0200. The regression result also shows that the model that is specified in this study is statistically significant and could be used to achieve meaningful inferences. There is also no serial correlation in the model. This means that our result has forecasting ability. Conclusion and Recommendation This chapter evaluated the effects of the economic reform program of the Obasanjo administration on the socio-economic welfare of Nigerians. We examined the structure of the Nigeria economy and different economic reform programs put in place in the country. This chapter used both primary and secondary sources of data collection in its quest to empirically test the effects of the economic reform program of the government on the people. The findings from the field survey (primary data) show that the reform program had little positive effects on the economic well-being and social welfare of the people. The government’s economic policy increased the cost of living and did not improve access, quality, and standard of many social services in the country. The issue of popular and effective participation in national economic policy process remains a big challenge in Nigeria. Hence, the level of real inclusiveness of the process remains low. This apathy is not unconnected with the nature of the resource base of the economy, a large proportion of which is derived from the oil sector. Given the low contribution of direct taxation to the national purse, and peoples’ level of ignorance that the oil revenue really belongs to them, rather than the government, the level of effective oversight over public revenue is

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very low. This has enabled the government to continue to free-ride. Technically, therefore, the government can afford to ignore the people without serious disruption of its revenue profile. It, therefore, behoves the government to live up to its role as an accredited agent of the people, to whom it should give, as a right, ample space in the economic policy process. This is a litmus test of government’s resolve and genuine commitment to the letter and spirit of NEEDS. Finally, most economic reforms or policy initiatives normally have some short-term negative effects, especially on vulnerable segments of the society. However, historically, government usually underplays the importance of social safety nets. This is another form of free-ride, whereby people are left to face the consequences of any national economic policy, in whose process they were not involved. This amounts to a lack of effective check on policy errors committed by government. This is an issue NEEDS—the economic reform program—must tackle once and for all. For example, research evidence shows that fiscal dominance has, over time, been a source of spiral inf lation. Hence, the adoption of an indexation of wages to movements in inf lation, which enable government, rather than workers, to bear the consequences of its fiscal indiscipline. Also, every unemployed Nigerian is left to fend for himself/herself. However, the adoption of a social security scheme, which guarantees a minimum standard of living for the citizenry, including the unemployed, will force the government to be more prudent in national economic management, especially, in the pursuit of employment-inducing policies and programs. These, among others, are some of the lapses of previous endeavors that NEEDS must correct in the future, in order to live up to its expectation as truly, a pro-poor, people- centered development initiative. Notes 1. These figures were extracted from the Central Bank of Nigeria Statistical Bulletin and Annual Report, various issues and years. 2. Ibid.

References Adejumobi, S. 1995. “The Impact of Structural Reforms on the Nigerian Economy,” in S. Adejumobi and A. Momoh (Eds.), The Political Economy of Nigeria Under Military Rule: 1984–1993. Harare: SAPES.

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Central Bank of Nigeria Economic and Financial Review. 2000. “The Role of Autonomy of the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) in Promoting Macroeconomic Stability,” Vol. 30, No. 1. Federal Government of Nigeria, 1999. Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999. Abuja: Government Printers. Herbst, J. and C.C. Soludo. 2001. Nigeria in Aid and Reform in Africa: Lessons from Ten Case Studies. Washington DC: World Bank. Mkandawire, T. and A. Olukoshi. 1995., The Politics of Structural Adjustment in Africa: Between Liberalization and Oppression. Dakar: CODESRIA. Nigerian National Planning Commission. 2004. Meeting Every One’s Needs: National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy. Abuja: Nigerian National Planning Commission. Soludo, Charles. 2001., “Debt, Poverty and Inequality: Towards an Exit Strategy for Nigeria and Africa.” Proceedings, International Conference on Sustainable Debt Strategy. Abuja, Nigeria. Thomas, Saji and S, Canagarajah. 2002., “Poverty in a Wealthy Economy: the Case of Nigeria, Nature and Evolution of Poverty in Nigeria between 1985 and 1992.” International Monitory Fund Working Papers. Todaro, P. and W. Bell. 1982. Economic Theory: An Integrated Text with Special References to developing Areas. Canada: Amazon.

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CH A P T E R

SE V E N

Corruption in Nigeria A ntoni a T. O koo si - S i m b i ne

Introduction Corruption has been a problem in Nigeria for long. It was, for instance, the subject of General Murtala Mohammed’s coup in 1975, and subsequently part of the reasons given for military takeovers ever since (Okoosi-Simbine, 1993). Several literatures have documented the large-scale political corruption that pervaded the Second Republic (Lewis et al. 2001: 55) and subsequent governments in Nigeria. Nuhu Ribadu, former chairman of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), estimates that over $380 billion has been expropriated by Nigeria’s political and military leaders since oil sales began in the 1970s.1 Given the ubiquity of the problem of corruption, the Obasanjo administration sworn in on 29 May 1999 promised to tackle the problem head-on. Immediately upon taking office, one of the executive’s first bills the president sent to the National Assembly was an anti-corruption bill. As a result, the Independent Corrupt Practices Commission (ICPC) and the EFCC, among others, were established. Unfortunately, the fight against corruption has been fraught with problems, and as a result, the tide of corruption is nowhere near waning. According to the U.S. State Department, corruption in Nigeria is “massive, widespread, and pervasive,”2 and there is a “culture of impunity for political and economic crimes” that must be reversed if development is not to be stalled.3

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The effect of corruption on a political system and a developing economy such as Nigeria’s are undoubtedly negative and disastrous and will ultimately affect the process and pace of national development (Heidenheimer, 1977), including democratic governance. The pertinent questions then are as follows; how do we gauge the problem of corruption in Nigeria? How do Nigerians perceive corruption—its meaning, manifestations—and to what extent are they personally involved in the practice? What is their assessment of the government’s efforts at curbing corruption, especially their evaluation of the ICPC, EFCC, and the practice of Due Process office among others, particularly, under the Obasanjo administration? Why, despite several efforts in the past and in the recent period, is corruption still a major problem? What specifically are the effects of corruption on the country? What are the suggestions of Nigerians on how malfeasance can be minimized in the short term, if not completely eradicated in the long term? These are some of the questions this chapter addresses. Section two of the chapter undertakes a conceptual and theoretical analysis of corruption within a framework of democracy. Section three provides some evidences of corruption in Nigeria including analysis of the views of a small sample population on corruption. Section four examines current efforts at eradicating corruption in the country, while section five contains the conclusion and policy recommendations for curbing corruption. Corruption: Conceptualization Nye (1967) defines corruption as a behavior that deviates from the formal duties of a public role because of private4 pecuniary or status gains; or violates rules against the exercise of certain types of private5 benefits; Johnston (1997) sees it as the abuse of public roles or resources for private benefit. Doig and Theobald (1999: 3), on the other hand, distinguish between grand and petty corruption. In the case of the former, it involves highly placed individuals who exploit their positions to extract large bribes from big-time operators such as representatives of trans-national corporations, arms dealers, drug barons, and the like, who appropriate significant payoffs from contract scams, or who simply transfer large sums of money from the public treasury into private (usually overseas) bank accounts. The latter refers to “the extortion of small payments by low level officials in order to expedite business by cutting through red tape.” Based on the interest that corruption serves, Heidenheimer (1989: 8–11) has a threefold classification. Thus, it may

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be public office–centered (when a public office holder misappropriates official privilege for non-material benefits), public interest–centered (when the incumbent official indulges in corrupt practices to favor a group), and market-centered corruption (when corruption is perpetrated for material or financial benefits). In essence, examples of corruption range from acceptance of money or other rewards for awarding contracts, violations of procedures to advance personal interests, including kickbacks from development and aid programs or multinational corporations, payoffs for legislative support; the diversion of public resources for private use, to overlooking illegal and unconstitutional activities, or intervening in the justice process, nepotism, common theft, over-pricing, establishing nonexisting projects, pay roll padding, tax collection and tax assessment frauds, insider trading, name-dropping and inf luence peddling, and misappropriation (Okoosi-Simbine, 1993; Olopoenia, 1999: 19–20; De Sardan, 1999; Doig and Theobald, 1999). At times, these become so interwoven that identifying and distinguishing them in practice or for analytical purposes is difficult. However, a common feature of most definitions is their in-built tendency to be peremptorily evaluative and moralistic (Edoh, 2003). Nevertheless, it is widely known that it occurs in virtually all but especially the political realm; and is at times referred to as political corruption. Irrespective of the sources of pressure, economically, corruption represents an arbitrary, exorbitant tax. It is most prevalent where there are all sorts of institutional inefficiency such as political instability,6 bureaucratic red tape as in the renewal of such an important identification document as a driver’s license,7 and weak legislative8 and judicial systems.9 It thrives where there are trade restrictions; where government engages in favorist industrial and business policies;10 and where there is large discretionary space available to public officials worsened by low salaries and wages.11 In Rwanda, Paul Kagame’s administration is dealing with the problem of corruption by addressing institutional efficiency through elimination of conditions that generate corruption—procurement and purchase of goods and services in the military, housing, transportation, and other sectors.12 According to Bailey (1969), political corruption relates to the misuse of authority; the use by government officials of their governmental powers for illegitimate private gain.13 Bribery, extortion, embezzlement, fraud, and conf lict of interest are, for instance, clear examples of political corruption.14 Klaveren (1970: 38) defines it as a “method of exploitation by which a constituent part of the public sphere is exploited

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as if it were part of the market sphere”; and that is often located within institutions of government, legislatures, courts, bureaucracies, and statutory bodies such as parastatals; and that manifests by transactions or exchanges of public resources and benefits between actors, some or all of whom are officials or public representatives. For the purposes of this chapter, political corruption is also viewed as all forms of irregular and improper activities that take place in the political sphere including campaign financing, checks and balances, civil liberties, structured competition in both political and economic realms, and so forth. In terms of conceptualization, what exactly is the nature of the phenomenon in Nigeria and what peculiarities mark out its character? Corruption in Nigeria belongs to the realm of Robinson’s (1998) categorization as systemic or entrenched corruption that fits into societies with low political competition, low and uneven economic growth, a weak civil society, and the absence or ineffectiveness of institutional mechanisms to deal with it. It affects institutions and inf luences individual behavior at all levels. Corruption is embedded in specific socio-cultural environments; tends to be monopolistic; is organized and difficult to avoid. Apart from pervading all strata of society, corruption—giving/taking bribes, kickbacks, side payments, fraud, capital f light, looting, settlement, over-invoicing, and so on—has deposed democratic principles of probity and accountability as guidelines for official conduct. It is generally taken for granted by the overwhelming majority of Nigerians in almost every conceivable field of endeavor. The fight against corruption under the Obasanjo administration appeared largely as a “one man (Obasanjo’s) show,” dependent on his stamina, moral reputation, administrative skill, and his commitment to succeed.15 Kpundeh (2004: 131), quoting Olowu (1993), warns that “the existence of political will to genuinely tackle corruption must not be assumed on the basis of policy pronouncements by political leaders. The most vocal often turn out to be the ones who aid and abet corruption most.” In addition, the Nigerian Constitution, section 308 (1) (a) and (3), grants absolute immunity to the president, vice president, governor, and deputy governor while in office. The Senate passed the anticorruption bill after inserting a clause that empowers an independent counsel to investigate any allegation of corruption against these categories of officials. If the administration were rarely serious, it would itself have sought appropriate constitutional amendments to forestall a situation in which a thieving vice president or state governor enjoys immunity until he leaves office.

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Whatever the explanatory variable(s) for engagement in any forms of improper or selfish exercise of power and influence attached to a public or private office, that is to say, corruption, its effects are often damaging for any society. The April 2007 Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report pointed out that “due to decades of economic mismanagement, political instability, and widespread corruption, the education and social services systems have suffered from lack of funding, industry has idled, refineries are in poor state of disrepair and Nigeria, the sixth largest oil producing country in the world periodically suffers from severe fuel shortages.”16 These conditions for Nigerians, most of whom looked forward to democratic dividends in the form of better socio-economic welfare, cannot but temper their enthusiasm for democracy (Okoosi-Simbine, 2000). Corruption in Nigeria’s Political Life During the Obasanjo administration from 1999 to 2007, several efforts were put in place to curb the menace of corruption. The president made statements to reinforce this message and took several public measures including the termination of contracts and land, house seizure, oil block allotments, and offshore oil exploration contracts (This day, 30 November 1999: 48, 57) that were made under previous military regimes, while efforts to recover ill-gotten gains from the Abacha era were also put in place. An anti-corruption bill (that is discussed later) was also presented to the National Assembly, and passed by the Legislature in February of 2000. Initially, these efforts were widely acclaimed by Nigerians (64% by the 2000 Afrobarometer survey), but within a short time waned as ‘‘Nigerians [48%] are more critical of government measures to combat corruption, and relatively more ambivalent about the progress that has been made since the change of government” (Afrobarometer, 2001: 57–58). Corruption manifests in Nigeria’s political life at virtually all levels of government and all sectors of society. Below is an illustration of the phenomenon within states and local governments, party politics and electoral processes, and the security agencies (Police). State Governments Corruption within the state governments, amounting to abuse of public resources, is quite high, retarding the development of many of the states, even when states’ share of the federation account has been

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raised. In particular, since 1999, some of the oil-producing states have reported revenues of up to $1.3 billion per year but have dismal records of development or service delivery.17 One of such state governors18 was in September 2005 arrested by British authorities in London, and charged with money laundering. He was later tried in Abuja. Former governor Joshua Dariye of Plateau state was also indicted by the EFCC of stealing N1.6 billion of his state’s ecological fund,19 while Governor Ayodele Fayose of Ekiti state was impeached for using his state’s poultry project as conduit to siphon over N1 billion from the state treasury.20 In May 2003, the former governor of Borno state was reported as giving six limousines to the state’s monarchs “for their service to his administration, to thank them for working with him and ensuring peace in the state, and helping him to attain the successes that he achieved” (The Guardian, 28 May 2003). This was evidently a “soft” bribe to court the political support of the emirs. The former state governor of Kogi state Mr. Audu was accused of acquiring property abroad, after he became governor in May 1999. The Sunday Times of 7 April 2002,21 provided evidence to the effect that the governor bought the property in 2001, raising issues on the possible source of the funds for the purchase of the property. Local Governments and Other Government Agencies At the local government level, on discovering that a wide gulf exists between allocated financial resources and the corresponding completed public works, the Technical Committee on the Review of the Structure of Local Governments in Nigeria indicted the third tier all over the federation of having failed in meeting the needs of the people going by the unaccounted huge amounts of monies allocated to them.22 Corruption also occurs within government agencies, ministries, and parastatals as seen in the report of the House Committee on Public Accounts that indicted government agencies of waste and corruption, including payoffs for legislative support and financial releases. Indeed, of fifteen agencies examined, only one agency’s expenditure profile was found satisfactory (The NEWS, 21 March 2005: 26–28). Misallocation of State Funds According to the CRS (2007: 10), former Nigerian dictator Sani Abacha reportedly accumulated through corruption more than $3.5 billion

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during the course of his five years in power.23 Of this, Switzerland, the first country to repatriate stolen funds to Nigeria, transferred an estimated $505.5 million to Nigeria between 2005 and 2006. According to the World Bank, a significant percentage of those funds was used by the Nigerian government toward meeting the MDGs. The government has also recovered $149 million of the stolen funds from the autonomous British Island of Jersey and an estimated $150 million from Luxemburg. The level of poverty in the country, where most people live with less than $1 a day, shows misallocation of funds and does not indicate prudent management of these funds that may have gone into other individuals’ hands. Corruption within Political Parties and the Political/Electoral process Omolayo and Mokuolu (2005: 24) observed that political power is a major factor inf luencing corruption in Nigeria. Nowhere is that more evident than in the case of the Petroleum Technology Development Trust Fund (PTDF), which the former president and vice president (Obasanjo and Atiku) turned into slush funds for their party political campaigns during the 2003 general elections. According to Onyeoziri (2003: 14), politics in Nigeria is generally characterized by two dominant characteristics. “One is the weakness and arbitrariness of state behaviour and the other is the indiscipline and self-serving character of the political class who control the institutions or apparatuses of state. The combination of these two forces creates a political environment that is characterised by arbitrariness, instability, incompetence and lack of accountability.” Corruption thus occurs within political parties and Okoosi-Simbine (2003, 2005, 2006a) examined the case of the ruling Peoples Democratic Party (PDP), the chief promoter of the anti-corruption program of the administration. At the level of politicking, controversy surrounded the 2006–2007 voter registration exercise, the certification of candidates, and poor logistical preparations for the elections. One Independent Electoral Commission (INEC) official allegedly admitted that the voters’ register was “25–30% fiction” and reports of electoral malfeasance, or rigging, were also noted. Ballot box stuffing, falsification of election result forms, and threats of violence were among the most serious charges (CRS, 2007: 3–4). This caused the European Union delegation to note that “in at least six states the minimum standards for democratic elections were not met.”24

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Roberts and Okoosi-Simbine (2003: 86–111) have examined some of the problems of the police force that ought to protect citizens and the laws of the country in Nigeria. Petty corruption in the form of extortion that occurs among and within the rank and file of the force is very rampant. According to the business community in South Eastern Nigeria (Manufacturers Association of Nigeria) the amount of money extorted by security agents from road users in that part of the country was estimated at approximately N25 billion every year. According to the Manufacturers Association of Nigeria (MAN), there are no fewer than eighteen road blocks from Owerri to Port Harcourt International Airport, a distance of eighty-eight kilometres! (The Punch, 6 August 2003: 16) At each of these road blocks25 or check points, motorists, especially commercial ones, donate, contribute, or are simply expected to pay a token ten naira or lately (with inf lation), twenty naira, that can simply be dropped without stopping. To the Mobile Police (MOPOL) in High Way Patrol Vehicles, no less than fifty naira is paid. The Guardian (28 July 2003:1, 65; 30 July) reported a protest by mobile policemen in Osogbo, Osun state, against their Commanding Officer who was alleged to have ordered each of them on duty at road blocks to give him a sum of N5,000 as returns daily. Failure to do this attracts posting out of road blocks, arrests, and dismissal on trumped up charges. The situation is not only bad among the rank and file, it is worse within the leadership that is at times believed to be behind the road side extortions of motorists. Indeed, a former Inspector General of Police (IGP) was accused of grand corruption by the EFCC and later convicted of stealing over N17 billion belonging to the Police Force.26 Corruption within the force is also partly responsible for its inability to apprehend perpetrators of high profile and at times embarrassing (political) assassinations all over the country.27 The essential point is that corruption in the police department poses serious challenge to public security, peace, and order in the country. Analysis of Field Survey Data A miniature survey of 20 respondents, purposively selected to represent different (elite) sectors of society and their views about the issue under investigation (corruption) was carried out. This is relevant, even

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though Mundt and Aborisade (2001: 698) have concluded that the Nigerian public is highly ambivalent about the problem of corruption, frequently complaining but generally doing nothing or being resigned to its pervasive existence. In particular, respondents were chosen based on their professions, thus, one legislator, a policeman, a lawyer, a senior female civil servant, a male secondary school student, a female undergraduate, an unemployed male, an unemployed female, one middlelevel female academic, a female youth corps member, a businessman, an artisan (welder), a female fashion designer, a taxi driver, a female office cleaner, two male academics, and two market women respectively were sampled. This was meant to gauge how citizens engaged in different activities experience or perceive corruption. The following paragraphs present the views expressed by respondents. As indicated, 20 questionnaires were administered, however, only 19 could be analyzed and found useable. Virtually all respondents gave their views on what constitutes corruption and these agree with the explanations and examples given in sections on conceptualization and corruption in Nigeria’s political life above. Sadly, only 3 of 19 (or 16%) respondents opine that corruption has reduced since 1999; 5 (or 26%) say there has been no change; while majority (11 or 58%) say it has worsened. Furthermore, corruption is believed by 12 respondents to have worsened in public (civil service) and private sectors, that is, everyday living. This is followed by the political sector that is ticked by as many as 7 of the respondents. In turn, it is said by 6 respondents respectively to have reduced in the private sector and in the Armed Forces. A list of common manifestations of corruption in Nigeria today was provided respondents who may tick more than one to indicate which they consider as most common. These and the number of respondents indicating them include Financial Fraud/Crimes (18); Bribery (16); Exam Malpractice (13); Using official position for personal/group gain (12); Exchange of material gain (5); Delay/Denial of Justice (4) and Name dropping/Inf luence peddling (1). Some of these have already been discussed earlier; it is also interesting to note that exam malpractice is indicated by as many as 13 of 19 respondents, and clearly points to a negative educational development in the country, especially among youths, most of whom constitute approximately a third of this sample. Causes and conditions favorable to corruption are identified by respondents to be mainly Greed (11), poverty (5), and Lack of Non-implementation of Laws (3). Relatedly, the factors that conduce to corrupt activities in private or public office are said by majority of respondents (13 of 19) to be Lack of adequate societal/legal

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requirements of accountability from office holders. Lack of Sanctions and Negative Social/Societal Values are indicated by 2 respondents respectively. What affects respondents’ attitude to corruption mostly is the environment of “that is the way it is done” in which they (11 of 19 respondents) often find themselves. This is followed by “Compulsion/ Duress” that is pointed at by 5 respondents. Not surprisingly, the most corrupt profession in Nigeria is believed by as many as 10 respondents to be the Police Force. It is interesting that even the policeman in the sample cited the police! These uniformed men are followed by Politicians (6) and Civil Servants (2). The remaining one respondent selected the business profession. Religion and religiosity are considered to be factors that may inf luence peoples’ moral conduct and behavior. Religion can act as an internal control for individuals who may be deterred from amoral conduct. We thus sought to know whether respondents’ religion/religiosity have any impact on their attitude and vulnerability to corruption. Majority (53%) said “No,” while the remaining 9 respondents (47%) said “Yes, it does.” It should be noted that majority of respondents (14) are Christians and 4 are Muslims while 1 is an Eckist (Eckankar).28 Among the three arms of government, corruption is considered to be mostly pronounced in the Executive arm (14 of 19 respondents) than in the judicial (3 respondents) or legislative (2 respondents) arms. Similarly, the level of government considered most corrupt is the state and local government with 37% of respondents saying so, while 26% of respondents cite the federal tier. This may be explained by the fact that respondents know more about the governments closest to them. However, the (Federal) administration’s approach to fighting corruption is assessed as “fair” by majority (63%) of respondents, when 16% of respondents respectively rate it as “Inadequate” and “Poor.” Only one respondent assessed the approach as “Adequate.” This leaves room for improved initiatives in the fight against corruption. As to what should be the fate of corrupt officials/citizens, majority (11 or 58% of respondents) indicated a combination of Punishment/ Sanctions, Seizure/Forfeiture, and Loss of (official) position. Only one respondent feels that government/public officials should enjoy immunity from prosecution from allegations of corruption. Respondents were further asked to rate the performance of five anticorruption agencies in the country. Their responses are presented in table 7.1. While dates of establishment, functions, structure, nature of funding, and problems may differ from one organization to another, and may

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Table 7.1 Rating of the Performance of Anti- corruption Agencies Rating

Above Average Average Below Average Total Respondents

Agency ICPC

EFCC

8 9 17/19

4 10 4 18/19

Code of Conduct Bureau (CCB)

7 9 15/19

Public Complaints Commission (PCC) 1 8 9 18/19

Due Process 2 7 8 15/19

Source: Fieldwork, April–May, 2007.

constitute factors in the assessments of anti-corruption agencies, most respondents were reasonably aware (at least of the existence) of these agencies and proceeded to rate them accordingly. Results can be categorized as “Good” for the EFCC, PCC, and the Due Process, and “Fair” for the ICPC and CCB. The onus lies with these organizations to re-examine their roles and improve on ways to be more effective in performing their functions. The EFCC, for instance, seems quite popular and was able to garner “above average” and “average” ratings from 4 and 10 respondents respectively. However, in its own case, some of the reasons given for below average rating included “double standards” and “some are untouchable.” The ICPC is cited as being “inactive” and having “No free hand to operate.” One respondent was unaware of the existence of the CCB, PCC, and Due Process Office, while the PCC is said to be “non-functional” by another 2 respondents. For the CCB that was said to be “non-existent” by 2 respondents, open, rather than confidential accountability, the CCB style is a new way by which it can curb power. Majority of respondents (14 of 17–83%) opine that civil society and non-governmental organizations have roles to play in the fight against corruption. Indeed, their involvement is central to the successful exercise of over-sight functions, representing a homegrown strategy that demonstrates ownership and improves changes that lead to sustainability (Kpundeh, 2004: 130). However, 7 (50%) respondents think they have been inactive, 6 (35.2%) say they have been fairly active, and only 4 (23.5%) say civil society and non-governmental organizations have been playing their roles in the fight against corruption. Similar question was asked for the media, which can play a major role if it has strong investigative, reporting, and advocacy for good governance skills. While 16 of 17 (94.11%) respondents believe that the media have a role to play in the fight against corruption mainly by exposing it, just

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one person said they do not. Their performance in carrying out this role is adjudged by 7 (50%) respondents respectively as “Active” and “Fair.” Only 3 of 17 (17.6%) persons who responded thought the media has been inactive in playing its roles in the fight against corruption. Majority of respondents (13 of 17–76.4%) believe that corruption has negative effect on democratic development, and proceed to make some suggestions to curb it. Some of these are incorporated in the section on suggestions for curbing corruption in Nigeria. Current Efforts Of course, some commendable steps were undertaken, particularly when viewed against the fact that in the nation’s history, there has not been such hype about fighting the scourge of corruption. Some higher officials have been investigated and prosecuted accordingly, especially by the very vocal EFCC, while some other public officers were dismissed from office. For instance, the former Labour and Productivity minister and six others were arrested and detained in a $214 million National Identity Card project scam (The Punch, 9 December 2003: 1, 2, and 7)29 and a female INEC National Commissioner was dismissed over corruptionrelated charges. Similarly, in what has been described as the “bribe-forbig-budget” scandal, Adolphus Wabara, former Senate president, who was accused of taking more than $400, 000 from the then minister for Education, Fabian Osuji, had to resign (and the minister was dismissed from service). Similarly, former Housing minister—Mrs. Alice Ojomo— had to go in April 2005 for allocating more than 200 houses to senior government officials through unprocedural means. Anti-corruption agencies such as the EFCC also confiscated properties worth millions of naira from an erstwhile IGP, while according to the then senior special assistant to the president on Due Process, Oby Ezekwesili, by opening public contracts to competition, the federal government is believed to have saved $1 billion (The Punch, May 26, 2004: 4). Such actions have led some observers to say that this campaign is not only underway; it is the most serious and effective of such efforts in decades. Anti- corruption Agencies: ICPC Since the inception of civilian rule in 1999, the federal government, especially under the Obasanjo administration, has demonstrated some

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commitment to the fight against corruption that has yielded some positive results. Several laws and institutions of anti-corruption in Nigeria have been put in place and/or strengthened. They include Reform in the Police, Code of Conduct Bureau, Offices of the Auditor- General and Accountant- General of the Federation, the Judiciary as well as the establishment of the Due Process Office. Part of the steps taken to eradicate corrupt practices was the establishment in 2000 of the ICPC. It was set up and empowered by the Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act 2000, with the mission to rid Nigeria of all forms of corrupt practices and other related offences.30 The establishment of the Commission came on the heels of the stigmatization of the country by the international community as one of the most corrupt countries in the world. It is instructive that the ICPC has made impact in the public sector in Nigeria since its establishment. In its enforcement activities, the ICPC between the years 2000 and 2005 received a total of 1,846 petitions (ICPC, Progress Report, September 2000–2005). Table 7.2 further reveals the activities of the ICPC. While there are more incidences of corruption than those officially reported and documented, however, table 7.2 indicates that some investigations, prosecutions and sanctioning of public sector corruption were carried out under the Obasanjo civilian administration. In terms of prosecution, from May 2001 to July 2005, the ICPC filed a total of 49 cases in court involving 104 individuals including senators,

Table 7.2

Summary of Petitions Referred for Investigation, October 2000–September 2005

October 2000– September 2001 October 2001– September 2002 October 2002– September 2003 October 2003– September 2004 October 2004– September 2005

No. of Petitions Fully Investigated

No. of Petitions under Investigation

No. of Petitions Rejected for Lack of Jurisdiction

Total No. of Petitions Referred

11

9

–

20

19

139

27

185

17

335

87

439

16

292

19

327

17

187

5

209

Source: Progress Report (September 2000–2005), ICPC, Abuja.

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ministers, judges, senior advocates, top executives of parastatals, chief medical directors, local government chairmen, and so on (ICPC, Progress Report, September 2000–2005). It is interesting that the ICPC’s attempt to investigate allegations in respect of a petition filed by a senator of the Federal Republic, Arthur Nzeribe, against the then Senate president Pius Anyim and other senators resulted in the hurried set up of an ad hoc committee of the Senate, to exercise over-sight functions by in turn investigating the activities of the ICPC. Further, both the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the Senate president obtained court injunctions to prevent the Commission from continuing its investigations (Vanguard, 5 February 2003: 35) on them. While the ICPC agreeably saw this move as an attempt to stultify investigation into the case and prevent it from performing its statutory duties, the executive director of Transparency International—Jeremy Pope—said the attempt by lawmakers to investigate the ICPC (at this time), “will be construed as bare-faced abuse of legislative powers to protect legislators from being held accountable.”31 This attempt culminated in an amendment, if not total repeal of the ICPC bill and the promulgation of another one in 2003, which many believed was illegally passed (The Punch, 16 June 2003: 66–67, 69). The Guardian editorial (6 March 2003: 18) titled “Senate and the ICPC Act” expressed the view that even though the Senate may claim to have merely amended it, the changes made to the ICPC Act were so fundamental as to amount to a repeal. In short, it concluded that the move was self- serving and protective of the lawmakers and would weaken instead of strengthening the fight against corruption. Anti- corruption Agencies: The EFCC The Federal Government also set up the EFCC in 2004 to, among others, investigate all financial crimes including advance fee fraud, money laundering, counterfeiting, illegal charge transfers, fraudulent encashment of negotiable instruments, computer credit card fraud, contract scam, and so on.32 The Commission is equally empowered to coordinate and enforce all economic and financial crimes, laws, and enforcement functions conferred on any other person or authority. Among others, the EFCC was instrumental to Nigeria’s removal33 from the blacklist of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the world

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body that monitors nations’ compliance with global anti-money laundering regime and assist countries to put in place anti-money laundering law.34 The EFCC also established a new anti-money laundering electronic reporting system that enables financial institutions report suspicious financial transactions and money laundering activities of customers to appropriate law enforcement agencies.35 The EFCC received a total 8,610 petitions and recorded more than 2,000 arrests as on 16 October 2006 (Zero Tolerance, Vol. 1, No. 3, 2006: 7). In addition, approximately 2,103 cases were under investigation and 306 prosecutions respectively. Over 100 convictions (including of a traditional ruler)36 were secured while the value of assets and cash recovered was estimated at $5 billion.37 In October 2006, the head of the EFCC hinted that investigation of alleged financial crimes were underway for thirty-one of the country’s thirty-six state governors.38 After remarkable success fighting sundry economic and financial crimes, the EFCC set its eyes on the political space, leading to its profiling of corrupt politicians and recommending their disqualification to run for public office. As much as this is a good deterrent in the fight against corruption, some observers, as some of our respondents, noted that the fight has been selective,39 as corruption charges are used to intimidate and hoodwink critics and political opponents.40 The most related and controversial political corruption scandal handled by the EFCC centered on former vice president (VP) Atiku Abubakar,41 who was temporarily suspended from the PDP over alleged corruption charges in late 2006 and was thus unable to participate in the party’s presidential primaries toward the 2007 elections. To actualize his presidential ambition, he cross-carpetted to the Action Congress (AC), causing the PDP to seek his removal from office as VP. In December 2006, the court ruled that he was immune from prosecution for corruption charges while in office. In February 2007, a Federal Court of Appeal in Abuja confirmed Abubakar’s constitutional right to remain VP regardless of his change in party affiliation. The next step was that the VP’s name appeared in the EFCC list of corrupt candidates, and INEC subsequently excluded him from the presidential ballot. In early March 2007, however, a Federal High Court ruled that INEC lacked the authority to disqualify candidates unless so ordered by a court of law. On 3 April, an (higher) Appeal Court ruled that the disqualification of candidates was in fact within INEC’s jurisdiction. Hours later, the Federal High Court in Abuja contradicted that ruling, determining that INEC lacked the authority to exclude Abubakar from

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the election and ordering that the electoral commission place his name on the ballot. Abubakar proceeded to take the case to the Supreme Court that was expected to consider the matter during the week of 9 April 2007. However, on 11 April, President Obasanjo declared 12 and 13 April public holidays to allow voters prepare for the 14 April elections, effectively postponing any ruling by the Supreme Court until the week of the presidential elections. Though Abubakar’s name ended up on the ballot, the damage to his candidacy had been done already. The popular perception was that Obasanjo used the EFCC against the former vice president for political reasons. Based on this and others, the nation’s anti-corruption program remains weak in several respects. Among others, the Fiscal Responsibility (that could hold public officers accountable) and Freedom of Information (that could compel release of public information) bills have not yet been passed, while constitutional autonomy is not yet guaranteed for agencies such as the ICPC and EFCC. Conclusions and Recommendations for Curbing Corruption in Nigeria The negative impact of corruption on institutions, growth and productivity, policy processes, property rights, and consequently development often translate into political instability, frequent regime/administrative changes, unstable policies and economic investment environment that in turn slow the consolidation of participatory governance. Therefore, controlling corruption remains a great challenge for the consolidation of democracy. It is obvious that democratic sustainability will be difficult for Nigeria to attain unless corruption is squarely addressed and significantly reduced. Whatever measures are put in place in the short and long terms, it is clear that the country and its citizens deserve a real and sustained campaign to stem corruption beyond what may be considered occasional stunts that advertise the nation as beholden to a reformist agenda or seduce the Nigerian public into a false sense of confidence in the seriousness of the crusade against corruption. Among others, suggestions such as addressing good governance by attending to efficiency of public services, seeing through and sanctioning corrupt acts, and sustaining the fight against corruption are put forward to bring down the country’s corruption ranking and improve the nation’s democratic rating among other nations of the world.

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The point that should be recognized is that the magnitude of the efforts made by the Obasanjo administration can be assessed only by the pervasive extent of the problem itself, and the fact that prior to now, there had not been such serious efforts. Moreover, the war on corruption has improved the image of Nigeria, even if marginally. The establishment of an agency such as the EFCC and its courageous fight is quite commendable, which needs to be strengthened and sustained. To this extent, such agencies need to be nursed and nurtured as viable sanitising endeavors. Their capacities should be built progressively as effective dragnets against corruption. Ways by which such enhanced agencies will survive (various administrations and/or personalities who head them) as national watchdogs also need to be mapped out. However, a single or few agencies or instruments of anti-corruption will not do. Effective and durable corruption control requires reinforcement and overlapping institutions of accountability.42 In addition, strong political will (i.e., translating policy pronouncements and rhetoric into sustainable actions) at all levels of government is pivotal to confronting corruption. Hence, both government and citizens need to do more in order to sustain democracy. It is acknowledged that a few culprits have been identified and dealt with. However, these and other episodes are too infinitesimal, and too far apart compared to the rate of recurrence of corruption-related incidents to constitute a basis for high rating or applause for the Nigerian state in the fight to curb the scourge of corruption. Indeed, in spite of unbridled corruption in the executive arm of government, few ministers have been removed or prosecuted for corruption both by the Obasanjo and Yar’adua administrations.43 Policy Recommendations The following anti-corruption measures are quite apt in combating the scourge in Nigeria as TI44 alluded to. 1. Ensure that government officials and public servants are well paid45 in order to reduce the appeal to solicit for bribes and also make what will be lost if convicted (for corruption) high enough to deter corrupt activities. 2. Adoption and strict enforcement of anti-corruption laws. What is undesirable, is unfair and uneven application of anti-corruption laws that will only lead to loss of legitimacy and cease to have any deterrent effect.

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3. There is need for performance monitoring as well as periodic auditing of (elected and appointed) officials through passing of the fiscal responsibility bill and empowerment of Code of Conduct Bureau and the Code of Conduct Tribunal. The process of declaration of assets also needs to be taken more seriously and made public, beginning from the stage of seeking election (as contestant) or public service appointment and should be monitored till a person leaves office. It should, therefore, include provisions for the disclosure of assets owned by contestants and their dependants during the filing of nomination papers, as well as those for the declaration of any dues to banks and public financial institutions, government, and so on that have not been paid.46 This way, anticipatory declarations will be minimized. 4. There is need for increased resources, highly trained, qualified, well remunerated, protected and insured staff for anti-corruption agencies and whistleblowers. 5. There is also need for political will (including anti-corruption agencies’ insulation from vulnerability to regime changes, direct reporting to [a strong] Parliament, prosecutorial and sanctioning authority) for anti-corruption efforts. 6. An independent, efficient judiciary is a precursor to a reduction in corruption. The Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) and the ICPC had, for instance, in 2003 decried courts’ delay in prosecuting fraud cases (The Guardian, 3 December 2003:1). 7. Passing of Freedom of Information Law that will give citizens access to most government documents, budgets, revenue, and expenditure and allows citizens to (publicly) question public officials, is imperative for corruption control. 8. Enforcement: reward and punishment is critical. In particular, punishment of (many more) offenders, in other words, scapegoatism (Okoosi-Simbine, 1993) remains an important method of discouraging potential offenders.47 Situations where identities of offenders are protected and percentages (at times minimal) of stolen public funds are the only forms of punishment are insufficient to deter corrupt acts. Further, when sanctions are pronounced, they need to be implemented. Official corruption is attractive and widespread in Nigeria because the possibility of being caught or punished is remote. No risk, no deterrent. It is true that people may turn from negative political and social actions only when the costs of those forms of activity become too high. Also, the general principle that regimes under which a public official serves

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9.

10.

11. 12. 13.

14.

175

or subsequent regimes might hold the person responsible, and punish them for past actions, must be entrenched in the political culture (Ibrahim, 2001: 85, 2003: 9). Total reform of the political, economic, social, and value orientation of the society and specific mobilization against corruption. This should be carried out by the National Orientation Agency (NOA), political parties, civil society organizations, and the media. Awareness raising and public education will among others put an end to a culture of silence and the dismantling of preestablishment devices and cover-ups that make discovery difficult, if not impossible. Similarly, moral re-orientation, especially for a lot of youths who commonly engage in exam malpractices (and after “passing” such exams only desire to travel out of the country if they cannot work in banks and oil companies) is of urgent necessity and importance to safeguard whatever is left of the future of Nigeria. Governance capacity in all its ramifications needs to be improved in Nigeria. Generally, there are no standards because institutions are feeble and failing, making it difficult to hold public officers to any minimum level of performance, conduct, or accountability. This is patently exhibited in public accounts at all levels, which are not being properly, transparently, and regularly audited. Nigeria is still a nation of “anything goes” because laws are not properly applied. Commitment to institution building across all sectors (judicial, legislative, executive, private, civil society (a strong one with access to information and a mandate to oversee the state) and the media. Preventive measures need to be put in place through clear procedures, a simple accounting and an effective supervisory system. An effective tax regime that will put more money in government coffers and encourage better service delivery need to be put in place. Currently, it is mostly only formal sector workers who pay tax and this is even because it is deducted from source, while fake tax clearance certificates are very easy to come by. There is need to ratify, domesticate, and implement existing international and regional anti-corruption conventions48 in order to establish international norms. In addition, Nigeria’s anti-corruption agencies should work closely with sub-regional, regional, and international anti-corruption bodies in order to strengthen the fight against corruption in the country.

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1. “Strong Convictions; Nigeria’s First Anti- corruption Czar,” Christian Science Monitor, 8 February 2007; Nigeria looses 4.8 trillion to corruption in forty years, says EFCC. (The Guardian, 12 December 2006: 7). 2. U.S. State Department, “Nigeria,” Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2006, quoted in Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report, Nigeria: Current Issues, 2007: 10. 3. ICG (2006). 4. Regarding close family, personal, private, and clique gains. 5. Regarding inf luence. 6. Such as those caused by or arising from serious political disagreements between members of the same political party. 7. Which normally takes a long period that at the time it eventually does come out, the new one has already expired (!), whereas for a few extra naira, by the backdoor, one can be renewed and obtained in less than two weeks. 8. Where policy issues are debated and laws made on the basis of “seeing and settling” concerned committee or vocal members of the State or Federal Houses of Assembly. 9. Where cases are heard and adjourned at the whim and caprice of the highest bidder. 10. As was the case between the three Global System of Mobile (GSM) Communication networks- MTN, ECONET and (GLOBACOM) at the initial period of license granting. 11. As in the payment or non-payment of electricity bills, See Okoosi- Simbine (2001: 105–121) and Kyari Tijani (2005), “The Dynamics of Corruption,” The Guardian, 3 April 3: 13. 12. Zero Tolerance, Magazine of the EFCC, Vol. 1, No. 3, January 2006: 11. 13. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/political_corruption. 14. Zero Tolerance, Magazine of the EFCC, Vol. 1, No. 3, January 2006: 17. 15. See Obasanjo (1999) Inaugural Speech. The president’s inaugural speech did not contain any new approach to fighting the monster of corruption; bereft of any effective anti- graft strategy. It contained platitudes, suasion, preachment, and undue reliance on the Anti- graft Act. 16. CRS (2007: 11). 17. “Blood and Oil,” The Economist, 15 March 2007. 18. Governor Alamieyeseigha of Bayelsa State is believed by the EFCC to have looted close to N50 billion, See Zero Tolerance, Vol. 1, No. 3, January 2006: 13. 19. Ibid. 20. “The Three Peas in a Pod,” ibid., p. 16. 21. Quoted in Thisday, 8 April, 2002: 1 and 10. 22. The Punch, 14 November, 2003: 1–2. 23. The Abacha era corruption incidences were particularly worrisome in terms of magnitude, depth, coverage, and extent and these have been widely reported (See, for instance, Thisday, 26 September 1999: 1; The Guardian, 5 December 1999: 13–15; “Gavel to Gavel” in Thisday, 22 April 2000: 14 and 15; and T. Masland and J. Bartholet. 2000. “The Lost Billions,” Newsweek, 13 March. 24. EU Election Observation Final Report, Nigeria, 2007: 2, quoted in CRS (2007). 25. Ostensibly in place to check for arms and smuggled goods, their actual function is to extort payments from travelers by uncovering various minor violations (Mundt and Aborisade, 2001: 698). 26. See Zero Tolerance, Vol. 1, No. 3, January 2007: 7. 27. Some of these include the killings of the attorney general and minister of justice—Chief Bola Ige in Oyo state, lawyer and Mrs. Igwe in Awka, Anambra state, Chief Marshall

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28. 29.

30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36.

37.

38. 39.

40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48.

177

Harry of the All Nigeria Peoples Party (ANPP) in Rivers state, Chief Aminasori Dikibo of the PDP in Delta State, frontline politician and member of the opposition All Nigeria Peoples Party (ANPP), Lawyer Lanipekun in Ibadan, Oyo state, and a host of others. Beholden to the Holy Spirit. This is a project that has been on for long and on which billions of naira have been appropriated over the years and many Nigerians were hoping would eventually see the light of day under this administration. The National Identity Card scam involved three ministers—Internal Affairs (Late Sunday Afolabi and Mohammed Shatta) and Labour (Hussein Akwanga), said to have accepted bribe of more than $1 million to award a $214 million contract to SAGEM—a French electronics company. See FRN (2000). http://www.ngrguardiannews.com/news/article3, Wednesday, 27 November 2002. See EFCC (Establishment) Act, 2004, Abuja, EFCC. This followed the 2001 challenge by the FATF when it listed Nigeria among NonCooperative Countries and Territories (NCCTs) in the global war against corruption. See Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act, 2004, Abuja, EFCC. EFCC Alert!, Vol. 1, No. 1, 20 November 2006: 15. Igwe, Godwin Madu of Achi Kingdom, Oji River Local Government Area of Enugu State was convicted of duping a foreigner of $807, 000, EFCC Alert!, Vol. 1, No. 1, 20 November 2006: 6. For corruption, money laundering, advance fee fraud, pipeline vandalism and terrorism, some of them involving top government functionaries, Zero Tolerance, Vol. 1, No. 3, January 2006: 18. The Christian Science Monitor, “Strong Convictions; Nigeria’s First Anti- corruption Czar” (8 February 2007) puts investigations related to e-mail scams by the EFCC at over 2,000 and over 130 convictions for fraud. CRS (2007: 7); Alex Mabayoje, “Closing In on Corrupt Governors,” Newswatch, 9 October 2006. For instance, an unfinished anti- graft inquiry that stands out like a sore thumb is that of Julius Makanjuola, former permanent secretary in the Ministry of Defence, said to be the president’s cousin and some other persons who were arraigned in 2002 before Justice Sidi Bage at the Abuja High Court, to face fraud charges involving N450 million. Suddenly, the then chief justice of the Federation, Kanu Agabi, entered a nolle prosequi, indicating the government had decided, for unknown reasons, to withdraw from the case. Later, probably due to criticism, though explained as the fact that the accused persons were about getting away with the line of prosecution being pursued by the government, Makanjuola was later dismissed in 2004, and ordered to be tried by the ICPC (The Punch, 6 February 2004: 3). “Strong Convictions: Nigeria’s First Anti- corruption Czar,” Christian Science Monitor, 8 February 2007. Zero Tolerance, Vol. 1, No. 3, 2006: 14–15 and 20. Kpundeh (2004: 126). See “Ige, Igwes: NBA’s demand for fiats appropriate,” The Punch, 25 August, 2003: 61. See TI Corruption Perception Report, 2007. Nigeria is one of African countries identified as not paying a living wage, Kpundeh (2004: 126). See Kumar (2002: 3491), “Reforming Indian Electoral Process,” Economic and Political Weekly, 24 August. Public officers should either loose their office, forfeit illegally acquired wealth and/or even be jailed. Such as the regional convention of the African Union (AU), United Nations Convention against Corruption and the OECD Anti-bribery Convention.

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———. 2005. “Corruption as a Major Obstacle to Nigeria’s International Image,” Paper presented at Conference on Corruption and Development in Nigeria, Faculty of Social Sciences, Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife, Nigeria, 22 and 23 June. ———. 2006a. “Democracy and Development: Two Heavy Pillars for Nigeria’s Greasy Hands of Corruption,” in H. Saliu E. Amali, J. Fayeye, and Oriola, E (Eds.), Dea Democracy and Development in Nigeria, Vol. 3, Lagos: Concept, pp. 30–51. ———. 2006b. “Women, Money and Politics in Nigeria,” Proceedings of IFES-Nigeria Money, Politics and Corruption in Nigeria Seminar, held at University of Ibadan Conference Centre, in collaboration with Department for International Development (DFID), 1 June (IFES, DFID), pp. 146–157. Olopoenia, A. 1999. “A Political Economy of Corruption and Under-Development,” Faculty Lecture Series No. 10, Faculty of the Social Sciences, University of Ibadan, Vantage. October. Olowu, D. 1993. “Roots and Remedies of Governmental Corruption in Africa,” Corruption and Reform, Vol. 7, No. 3: 227–236. Omolayo, B. and B. Mokuolu. 2005. “Political Power: A Major Factor inf luencing Corruption in Nigeria,” Paper presented at Conference on Corruption and Development in Nigeria, Faculty of Social Sciences, Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife, Nigeria, 22 and 23 June. Onyeoziri, F. 2003. “Public-Private Partnership (PPP) in Nigerian Development: The Political Imperatives,” Commissioned Study by Nigeria Institute of Social and Economic Research (NISER) Ibadan, 9 December. Roberts, F.O.N. and A.T. Okoosi-Simbine. (2003). “Federalism, Hegemonic Politics and the Forces: The Case of the Nigeria Police Force,” in Mvendaga Jibo and A.T. Simbine (Eds.), Contemporary Issues in Nigerian Politics. Ibadan: JODAD. Robinson, M (1998), “Introduction” in M. Robinsion (Ed.) Corruption and Development. London: Frank Cass.

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I N DE X

Abdulsalami, A., 9 Abiola, M., 37, 39 Ake, C., 18, 80, 181 Alliance for Credible Elections (ACE), 95 Alubo, O., 52, 60, 70, 182 Bangura, Y., 51, 80 Bratton, M., 18, 182 Bureau for Public Enterprises (BPE), 9, 10, 123 Casmir, F., 24, 25, 45, 182 Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), 136–139, 155, 156, 174 Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN), 64, 67–69, 80, 182 Code of Conduct Bureau (CCB), 17, 167, 169, 174 Conf licts, ethno-religious Conf licts and human security, 53–55 Niger Delta and militarization of politics, 87–89 Tiv-Azara communal conf licts, 70–76 Constituent Assembly, 66 Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), 123, 124, 125, 129, 130 Corruption-conceptualization, 158–161 Corruption in public life, political parties, police force, 161–164

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Democracy and women empowerment, 116–117 Diamond, L., 26, 46, 183 Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), 10, 17, 157, 162, 164, 167, 170–172, 176, 177, 178, 180, 183, 190 Economic Intelligence Unit, 9, 18, 183 Economic reforms in Nigeria, 140–145 Elections and democracy, 90–96 Fasehun, F., 37, 39, 46, 183 Gbomo, J., 10, 107, 112 Glenzer, K., 116, 130 Globalization and oil politics, 101–104 Habermas, J., 25, 46, 183 Hagher, I., 72, 76, 81, 183 Hall, S., 46 Heidenheimer, A., 158, 178, 183 Human Rights Watch, 13, 18, 19, 59, 62, 63, 64, 76, 81, 85, 94, 110, 184 Ibeanu, O., 105, 110 Ijaw Youth Congress (IYC), 103–104 Independent Corrupt Practices Commission (ICPC), 10, 17, 157, 167–170, 172, 174, 177

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192

Index

Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), 95, 163, 168, 171 International Energy Agency (IEA), 105 International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), 113, 122, 131, 184 Jama atul Nasril Islam ( JNI), 67, 69 Jega, A., 82, 111, 117, 131, 185, 186 Kaduna Mafia, 55 Kalu, O.U., 29, 30, 44, 45, 46, 185 Kemedi, D., 93, 111, 182 Kukah, H.M., 13, 44, 46, 67, 81, 185 Kurti, D., 105, 111 Lewis, P., 111, 178, 185 Mehrotra, K., 115, 118, 120, 131 Middle belt, identity and politics, 55–58 Mkandawire, T., 82, 143, 156, 186 Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), ethnic militia, violence, 94, 104, 105–107, 110, 111, 114 Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP), 101–103 Multinational Oil Companies (MNOCs), 87, 101, 102, 104 Mustapha, R., 55, 60, 82, 96, 111, 186 National Council on Privatization (NCP), 9 National Democratic Coalition (NADECO), 39, 45 National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS), 9, 10, 12, 17, 19, 125, 136, 145–148, 151, 155, 156, 162, 186 National Gender Policy, 124, 129, 130 National Gender Strategic Programme, 124 National Independent Electoral Commission (INEC), 95, 163, 168, 171 National Poverty Alleviation Programme (NAPEP), 61 Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC), 99

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Niger Delta Volunteer Force (NDVF), 96 Nigerian economy-structure, fiscal profile, 136–137, 137–139 Nigerian Telecommunications (NITEL), 10, 11 Niki Tobi Commission, 63 Nnoli, O., 50, 52, 54, 81, 82, 183, 186 Nye, J.S., 158, 178, 186 Obadare, E., 24, 29, 44, 45, 46, 186 Ofeimun, O., 24 Oil Mineral Producing Areas Development Commission (OMPADEC), 99 Olaniyi, B., 94, 112 Olopoenia, R., 159, 179, 187 Olukoshi, A., 51, 81, 82, 143, 156, 185, 186 Olukotun, A., 23, 24, 46, 187 Olusegun, O., administration, 2, 3, 8–12, 15, 17, 18, 24, 26, 37, 41, 67, 110, 112, 113, 122–124, 136, 140, 145, 149, 150, 151, 154, 157, 158, 160, 161, 163, 168, 169, 172, 173, 176, 178 Onyeoziri, F., 163, 179 Oodua People’s Congress (OPC), conf licts, inter-ethnic violence, 15, 29, 36–45 Osaghae, E.E., 82, 187 Otite, O., 55, 60, 82, 187 Oyovbaire, S., 24, 47 Paden, J., 49, 82 Peoples Democratic Party (PDP), 63, 64, 114, 163, 171, 177 Petroleum Technology Development Fund (PTDF), 163 Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP), 2, 9, 140, 144–145 The Press and Democracy, 24–29 Public Complaints Commission (PCC), 17, 167 Resource control-ethnic minorities, 78, 86, 87, 92, 93, 95–99, 106, 107, 186 Ribadu, N., 17, 157 Ringer, S., 1, 2, 19, 188

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Index Ross, M., 112, 188 Rosser, A., 87, 112, 188 Rousseau, J.J., 3, 4, 19, 188 Saro-Wiwa, K., 100, 101, 103, 112, 187, 188 Schmitter, P.C., 26, 28, 46, 47, 188 Sharia and Secularism, press, 29–36 Soludo, C., 140, 156, 184 Sovereign National Conference (SNC), 33, 34, 42, 43, 93 State, economy, society-linkage, 3–6 The State in Africa, 6–8 Structural adjustment programme, 141–144 Takaya, B., 55, 56 Transnational Corporation of Nigeria (TRANSCORP), 10

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193

United Middle Belt Congress (UMBC), 57 United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), 12, 18, 178 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 53, 107, 112, 115, 120, 131, 189 United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), 120 U.S. African High Command (AFRICOM), 108 Weber, M., 4, 19, 115, 189 Women empowerment-policy environment, perceptions, 123, 127–129 Young, C., 7, 19, 189

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