Sören Kierkegaard and Catholicism

H. Roos, SJ.

en Kierkegaard

and Catholicism

Translated from

the Danish with the Author's sanction by

RICHARD M. BRACKETT, S.J.

The Newman Press • Westminster, Maryland

1954

"B

Imprimi potest:

REV. WILLIAM E. FITZGERALD, S.J.

Praep. Prov. Nov. Angl.

March 12, 1954

Nihti, obstat:

REV. FRANCIS X. MEEHAN

Censor Deputatus

Imprimatur:

ffr RICHARD J. GUSHING

Archbishop of Boston

March 17, 1954

Copyright, 1954, by THE NEWMAN PRESS

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 54-7545

Printed in the United States of America

3J

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE vii

INTRODUCTION ix

CATHOLIC TENDENCIES IN KIERKEGAARD 1

Critique of Luther 3

The Principle of Action 12

The Analogy of Being 15

Objective Authority 20

ANTI-CATHOLIC TENDENCIES IN

KIERKEGAARD 26

The Subjective Basis of Faith 27

The Paradox 39

Rejection of the Church 41

SUPPLEMENT

Catholic Literature in S0ren

Kierkegaard's Library 45

REFERENCES 51

BIHLIOGRAPHY 59

ABBREVIATIONS

Soren Kierkegaard's Complete Works, Volumes I-XIV, published

by A. B. Drachmann, J. H. Heiberg and H. O. Lange,

Copenhagen, 1901 f. . . . S.V.

Soren Kierkegaard's posthumous Journals, Volumes I-IX, pub

lished by P. A. Heiberg and V. Kuhr, Copenhagen,

1909 ff. . . . Pap.

Catalogue of Dr. Soren A. Kierkegaard's Library, Copenhagen,

1856 . . . Ktl.

H. Denziger: Enchiridion Symbolorum, Definitionum et Declara-

tionum de rebus fidei et morum, editio 23, Friburg 1937

. . . Denz.

VI

Translator's Note

The following treatise on S0ren Kierke

gaard was originally a lecture delivered to the S0ren

Kierkegaard Society in Copenhagen. The author, Fr.

H. Roos, S.J., is professor of German literature at the

University of Copenhagen. In a most objective man

ner, Fr. Roos attempts to delineate Kierkegaard's

thought, analyzing both the Catholic and anti-

Catholic tendencies in the writings of the Danish

existentialist.

In the citations from Kierkegaard's works,

I have preferred, where possible, to give the standard

English translation and references are made to these

works already translated into English, as well as to

the original Danish editions of S0ren Kierkegaard's

v 11

volumes: S. K.'s Complete Works, Vols. I-XIV, pub

lished by A. B. Drachmann, J. H. Heiberg and H. O.

Lange, Copenhagen, 1901, ff. and S0ren Kierke

gaard's Posthumous Journals, Vols. I-IX, published

by P. A. Heiberg and V. Kuhr, Copenhagen, 1909, ff.

Those citations from the Journals not included in

Alexander Dru's English translation (Oxford Univer

sity Press: 1938) are marked with an asterisk.

The translator wishes to thank the following

publishers for their kind permission to quote from the

English translations of Kierkegaard's works: Prince

ton University Press (Either/Or, The Sickness unto

Death, Attack upon Christendom and The Works of

Love); Oxford University Press (The Journals of

S0ren Kierkegaard and The Present Age); American-

Scandinavian Foundation (Concluding Unscientific

Postscript and Philosophical Fragments). Further

information and credit to translators and publishers

are given in the References and in the Bibliography.

RICHARD M. BRACKETT, S.J.

Weston College (Weston, Mass.)

January 1,1954

v 111

Introduction

S0ren Kierkegaard's own contemporaries

were the first to raise the problem of the Danish

philosopher's relation to Catholicism. Hans Peter

Kofoed-Hansen (1813-1893), one of Kierkegaard's

most influential champions,1 was received into the

Catholic Church on July 9, 1887 by His Excellency,

Most Rev. John von Euch. "It is not at all unlikely

that Kofoed-Hansen was greatly influenced by the

critique of the Lutheran Reformation, contained in

the final volumes of Kierkegaard's posthumous works;

indeed, this critique favored certain points in the

doctrine of the Catholic Church."2

The generation following Kierkegaard poses

the same problem. Georg Brandes, the famous Danish

literary critic, writes in this manner in his treatise on

Kierkegaard: "In Kierkegaard, Danish intellectual

life was forced to its uttermost extremity, to a preci

pice from which a leap had to be taken into the black

abyss of Catholicism or to that point where freedom

beckons."3 H0ffding considers the possibility of what

would have happened had Kierkegaard lived longer.

He writes, "It would be idle speculation to attempt

to decide what position S0ren Kierkegaard would

have taken, had his life been prolonged. His sympa

thy for Catholicism, along with his recognition of the

principle of freedom to form one's own opinion of

Christianity (Feuerbach), open contrary possibili

ties." 4

In his book entitled Danske Filosoffer,

(Danish Philosophers), H0ffding compares Kierke

gaard with Cardinal Newman: "The attack Kierke

gaard launched upon the established Church [Danish

Lutheran] and the notion of Christianity was based

on a similar position held by John Henry Newman a

few years earlier (1836-1843) when he attacked the

Anglican Church and thereby was led to embrace the

Catholic faith. . . . Since Kierkegaard frequently de

clares that Christianity is distorted in the Protestant

Church to a far greater degree than in the Catholic

Communion, he is in close agreement with Newman,

whose acquaintance, unfortunately, he never made.

We shall, however, not venture to say that Kierke-

gaard, had he lived longer, would have travelled the

same path as Newman."B

Although other leading authors have only

cursorily considered this problem of Kierkegaard's re

lation to Catholicism and have intimated it in their

writings, the entire question came once again to the

fore in the years after World War I; it was at this time

that a systematic and probing investigation of the

matter was undertaken. Today, there exist Catholic

authors, theologians and philosophers, who have

studied Kierkegaard and suggest Catholicism as an

answer.6 Foremost among these scholars are Theodor

Haecker, Romano Guardini, Erich Przywara, and

Aloysius Dempf. According to Hermann Diehm, the

contributions of these Catholic thinkers have created

a "new development in controversial theology."7

The Austrian writer, Ferdinand Ebner (1882-1931)

was actually the first Catholic philosopher to be

aware of Kierkegaard's importance. In 1917, at the

age of thirty-five, he was reconverted to the Catholic

Church, after having studied the works of the Danish

philosopher. Through his book, Das Wort und die

geistigen Realitaten,8 and his articles published in

Brenner,9 Ebner exercised a powerful influence upon

Theodor Haecker. Haecker, in turn, not only learned

Danish in order to translate Kierkegaard but was

* Brenner, a periodical published in Innsbruck, Austria.

xi

also led by him to Christendom, just as he was led by

Newman to Catholicism.

Romano Guardini's studies of Kierkegaard,

in particular his two excellent articles, "Der Ausgang-

spunkt der Denkbewegung S0ren Kierkegaards" and

"Vom Sinn der Schwermut" ("The Starting Point of

S0ren Kierkegaard's Thought" and "The Meaning of

Melancholy"), have gained the distinction of being a

most expert presentation and skillful interpretation of

the Danish philosopher. The classical work on Kierke

gaard, from a Catholic standpoint, is Das Geheimnis

Kierkegaards (The Mystery of Kierkegaard) by

Father Erich Przywara. This work was published by

the famous Jesuit in 1929. The possessor of a sover

eign mastery of Kierkegaard's writings, i.e., his works

translated into German, Fr. Przywara manifests a

profound knowledge of the philosophical currents

influencing Kierkegaard and delves into the problem

of the Dane's relationship with Catholicism. He main

tains that Kierkegaard, through his demand for ob

jective authority and his tenets concerning ordination

as the foundation of the pastoral office, has over

stepped the boundaries of Lutheranism and is there

fore on the road to Holy Mother the Church. His

thesis in this relatively short but compact book is that

one discovers in Kierkegaard an anonymous Catholi

cism. We may criticize Przywara's tendency to syste-

x 11

matic logic and his somewhat daring interpretations,

but we should at the same time be mindful that he

has viewed the entire problem and has provided a

solution to many difficulties. In this connection, we

must also mention Hans Urs von Balthasar.9 In his

Apokalypse der deutschen Seele (Revelation of the

German Soul), the author attempts to probe into

Kierkegaard's innermost thoughts on life. Finally, we

call attention to the second chapter of Le Drame de

fHumanisme Athee (published in English by Sheed

and Ward, 1950, under the title, The Drama of Athe

istic Humanism) 10 in which the French Jesuit, Henri

de Lubac, contrasts the doctrines of Nietzsche and

Kierkegaard on religious problems.

We now focus our attention upon Kierke

gaard himself and the first question we should ask

ourselves is: How well was he acquainted with Ca

tholicism? In his journeys to Berlin and during his life

here in Denmark, Kierkegaard never knew a living

Catholicism. He had neither Catholic relatives nor

friends. Since he is a literary author, we ought to in

quire further: Did Kierkegaard meet Catholicism in

the domain of literature? If so, what were his Catholic

sources? This problem, as far as I can judge, has not

yet been satisfactorily solved. We possess, to be sure,

Kierkegaard's posthumous Journals, wherein he pre

sents an accurate picture of himself for our study. It

xi

is necessary, too, to discover how his professors at the

University, particularly his theology teachers, pre

sented Catholicism.

On the basis of accurate research into

Kierkegaard's posthumous works, we are justified in

concluding that he never read the great classical

Catholic thinkers, either the scholastic philosophers

of the Middle Ages (e.g., St. Thomas Aquinas) or the

great controversialists of the Baroque period, Suarez,

Bellarmine, and the others. This is probably due to

his deficient sense of the historical and to the fact

that Catholic philosophy and theology in Kierke

gaard's time was rather poor. At the beginning of

the 19th century, Catholic theology and philosophy

was, so to speak, down in a trough of the sea. Never

theless, it is an interesting experiment in the realm of

thought to reflect upon what might have happened

had Kierkegaard met Thomas Aquinas or the Fathers

of the Church, who conducted Newman into Mother

Church. Kierkegaard read the Fathers of the Church

only in the translation of Muus.11 He is thought to

have known Augustine from his position in Church

History and not from his own study, although he

possessed the large Maurist edition of Augustine's

works, published in eighteen volumes.12

In the light of this complete void in Cath

olic theology and philosophy, his strong reaction to

xiv

the reading of two Catholic authors becomes doubly

interesting. I refer to Mohler and Gorres. Johann

Adam Mohler (d. 1838) was a professor of theology

at Tubingen and Munich. He is the founder of the

historical Tubingen school and probably the most

important controversial theologian since the Refor

mation. Directly influenced by the Fathers of the

Church, his dogmatic works are profoundly classical

and widely read at the present time. Josef von Gorres

(1776-1848) was not a theologian, but a journalist

and politician. Following a stormy and violent youth,

he returned to the Catholic faith at the outset of his

twenties. As one of the leaders of the Romantic

movement, he was summoned to Munich where he

taught history at the University. In his political writ

ings, he fought for the Church's freedom and op

posed vigorously the interference of the State in

ecclesiastical jurisdiction; so effective was his enter

prising work that Napoleon labelled him "the Fifth

Great Power."

As far as we know, Kierkegaard first came

in contact with the works of Mohler during his univer

sity years. It was by chance that he saw a review of

Mohler's Symbolik eller fremstilling af de dogmatiske

modsaetninger imellem katolikkerne og protestan-

terne efter deres offentlige bekendelse (Symbolism

or Exposition of the Dogmatic Opposition between

xv

Catholics and Protestants According to Their Public

Creed). This book, the most important of Mohler's

works, appeared in 1832 and is particularly note

worthy for its clear analysis of Schleiermacher's the

ology and the philosophy of Hegel. A review of this

treatise appeared in the periodical of foreign theo

logical literature published by Clausen and Kohlen

berg (Vol. II, 1834). Kierkegaard probably read this

review in November, 1837, when he wrote the follow

ing comment on it in his Journals: "It seems to me

that we can settle the controversy between Catholics

and Protestants by inquiring whether the freedom by

which man receives divine grace is conditioned by

the activity of the Holy Spirit or whether this free

dom finds its foundation in man himself. The Prot

estants have expressed their opinion that human

nature is of itself incapable of receiving grace and

must first, so to speak, be transformed anew. As to

the Catholic point of view, Dr. Mohler (he is the

nearest source I have available) writes (in Clausen

and Hohlenberg's Quarterly, Vol. II, No. 1, p. 137):

'the divine calling, which goes out to man for the

sake of Christ, is issued not only in the outward invi

tation announced in the Gospels but in the inner

activity of the Holy Spirit as well, for it is the Holy

Spirit who awakens the slumbering powers of man.'

I must therefore conclude that man, according to the

xvi

teaching of the Catholic Church, has the power to

receive grace (in the proportion in which it is offered

him), but first he must be internally disposed to

accept it and thereby his powers are awakened; this

doctrine certainly cannot be labelled Pelagianism. It

appears, however, that Mohler does not discuss this

doctrine elsewhere in his work. It is my opinion that

a solution to this problem on both sides would lead

to a better understanding of each other." 13 *

It is most probable that Kierkegaard never

read Mohler's greatest work, Symbolik. However, we

do know for certain that he was acquainted with an

other book of Mohler's, namely, the dogmatic-historical

monograph entitled Athanasius der Grosse und die

Kirche seiner Zeit, besonders im Kampfe mit dem

Arianismus (Athanasius the Great and the Church,

The Struggle with Arianism), Mainz, 1827. Kierke

gaard must have read this treatise in his studies.

Among his dogmatic theology notes we discover

brief references to it. Two entries in his Journals,

dated December 6, 1838, illustrate how engrossed he

had become in Mohler's work. The second note is

most interesting: "Starting on page 165, Mohler gives

a summary of Hilary's work on the Trinity in twelve

volumes. Oddly enough, I have now devoted some

years to dogma and have never heard these volumes

mentioned—they are indeed powerful; I am tempted

x v 11

to say of them what King Pyrrhus said of the Roman

Senate: it is a realm of lapidary thoughts, wherein

each one presents a norm for the points of view ex

pressed in any treatise in speculative dogma—I must

read this work; at the present moment, I feel over

whelmed by it, as when the Nile's waters blessed

Egypt"14*

The importance of this notation is note

worthy, since Kierkegaard wrote three exclamatory

remarks in the margin beside it. The series of lectures

on Christian Symbolism conducted by Professor Mar-

tensen during the winter of 1839-1840 are further

proof that Kierkegaard had been occupied with the

study of Mohler.

Equally interesting is Kierkegaard's reaction

upon reading Gorres' Athanasius. In the same year,

1838, he wrote: "During these last few days, I have

been reading Gorres' Athanasius not only with my

eyes but with my whole being—in the depths of my

heart."15 This Journal note is significant if we recall

the fact that here we are concerned with an essen

tially Catholic book. Gorres' Athanasius, published

in 1838 in four editions, was written during the so-

called Kolner Ereignis (Cologne Incident). At this

time, there was open strife between the Catholic

Church and the Prussian government in the Rhine-

land. Prussia aimed to suppress the freedom of the

xv 111

Church and establish a State Church, subject only to

civil authority. The Archbishop of Cologne, Clement

August Droste zu Vischering, dared to oppose the

designs of the government and subsequently on No

vember 11, 1837 was sentenced to prison and taken

to Minden, where he was placed in chains. This

"Cologne Incident" served as a flourish of trumpets

to raise a strong barrier against the Prussian govern

ment's designs. In a very short time, there arose a

Catholic consciousness, the result, in particular, of

Gorres' Athanasius; Gorres, with a powerful mastery

of language, defended the cause of the Church and

excoriated the State's encroachment in ecclesiastical

affairs. Kierkegaard's perusal of this treatise lends

credence, in my opinion, to the probability that his

later invectives and bitter irony directed against the

Danish State Church may have their foundation in

Gorres' Athanasius.

We will not emphasize the fact that Kierke

gaard read Franz von Baader.16 Baader was captivated

by anti-rationalism and in his lectures on speculative

dogmatics—the work Kierkegaard studied—he as

signed a new theological-gnostic interpretation to

dogma.17 If we are mindful of the vast amount of

literature with which Kierkegaard came in contact

during his formative years, then his reaction to the

two Catholic writers, Mohler and Gorres, is most

xi x

remarkable and his admiration for Hila

tate is all the more striking in its si

regards Catholic literature, Kierkegaai

a compiled edition of the Latin work:

dictine mystic, Lucius Blosius,18 an

prayerbook, entitled Prayers and Med

Alphonsus Liguori (Aachen, 1840).19

Kierkegaard read Blosius since he men

approval.20 The same is true in the case or i_iiguun a

prayerbook.21 What course might Kierkegaard's

thought have taken, if only he had encountered clas

sical Catholicism to a greater extent and become

more intimately acquainted with its doctrines in daily

life?22

xx

I

Catholic Tendencies in Kierkegaard

If Kierkegaard's attitude on Catholicism

was somewhat conditioned by his deficient knowl

edge of its true essence, it was still further influenced

by his singularly dialectical tenor of mind. His posi

tion with relation to Catholicism was in itself dia

lectical; to quote the oft-used phrase, it was an

"antipathetic sympathy and a sympathetic antipa

thy." This dialecticism is quite apparent in the fol

lowing two diary annotations written during his last

years: "The Retreat. It is a unique type of retreat

that we must make. Back to the monastery, from

which Luther fled—that is the truth—this is what must

be done. Yet, we do not mean that the Pope shall be

victorious or that the Papal police shall lead us back

there. The fault with the monastery was not asceti

cism, celibacy, etc. . . . No, asceticism and all that

is related to it is the very first essential required of

witnesses to the truth. Consequently the decision that

Luther made was wrong; this cannot be denied, one

must accept it. It has therefore constantly struck me

how God can be found in the Lutheran doctrine; be

cause, wherever God's assistance is given, there will

the progress that is made recognize the fact that the

debt is becoming greater, the matter more difficult.

On the contrary, however, the human tendency is to

desire that things be made easier, and progress con

sists in this." 23 The above Journal note was inscribed

in the year 1854. Kierkegaard maintained the same

dialectical position in an article entitled "Salt," dated

March 30, 1855. "Protestantism, viewed from a Chris

tian standpoint, is quite simply a fraud, a dishonesty

which adulterates the teaching of Christianity, its

perception of the world and life itself, as soon as it

becomes a principle for Christianity, not as a remedy

(corrective) for any particular time and place.

Wherefore, to enter the Catholic Church would be a

rash act which I shall not commit, but which one

will expect, since in these times it is as though the

nature of Christendom has been entirely forgotten,

and even the best exponents of Christianity are only

beginners."24

With these citations as a background for

our investigation, I shall now point out where we

may find in the literary production of Kierkegaard

noteworthy indications of his "anonymous Catholi

cism," to use Przywara's term. In the next chapter, I

shall examine those points where Kierkegaard stands

in diametrical opposition to the Catholic concept of

life.

CRITIQUE OF LUTHER

The first consideration we shall take up in

Kierkegaard's relation to Catholicism is his critique

of Luther's person and actions; this critique perme

ates the entire period of the Danish philosopher's

literary productivity and is particularly striking dur

ing the last years of his life. Also, we will note that

this critique is dialectical, i.e., we can note passages

wherein Kierkegaard is speaking positively concern

ing Luther and the Reformation. Yet, in comparison

with these positive texts, the negative criticisms are

even more abundant and violent in tone. One will

notice, too, that Kierkegaard's critique of Luther is to

be found exclusively in his private papers and manu

scripts. "In his published works, Kierkegaard always

spoke with the greatest reverence for Luther."25 The

following will serve to indicate his censure of Luther:

"he has denied, where he should concede"; he is not

content that his principle be a corrective; it must be-

come a norm of life; the secular and worldly element

in Luther's Reformation gained its influence in Chris

tianity. The aim of the entire Lutheran critique is

stated in this manner in the Journals: "The correc

tives. It is a disastrous error for one to become accus

tomed to applying the corrective and thereby grow

impatient and attempt to make the corrective a norm

for others; this is an attempt to confuse everything."20

There can be no doubt that Kierkegaard is

here concerned with Luther since in another text he

has this to say on the Lutheran principle: "Lutheran-

ism is a corrective—but a corrective made into the

norm, the entire thing is eo ipso confusing in the next

generation (when the conditions it was meant to cor

rect no longer exist). And with each generation,

things become worse, until finally the corrective,

which had established itself as self-subsistent, gives

way to the exact opposite of its original determina

tion. And this is actually the case. The Lutheran

corrective, considered by itself as the whole of Chris

tianity, produces the most refined type of worldliness

and paganism."27

The same train of thought is evident in this

excerpt (1849): "The misfortune of Christianity is

clearly that the dialectical factor has been removed

from Luther's doctrine on faith and as a result it has

become a pretext for pure paganism and epicurean-

ism; people forget entirely that Luther insisted on

faith in contrast to fanatically eccentric asceticism."2S

We receive the impression, upon reading

these excerpts, that Kierkegaard was not on the same

wave-length with Luther. In another annotation

dated 1851 we read, "In the third volume of Henry

Calvin's Me, I read in a reference to Luther that

when the time should be at hand for him to die and

draw up his last will and testament, and people de

sired that there be witnesses on hand, he said, 'That

is not necessary, since I am quite well known both on

earth, in heaven and hell; my name will bear its own

weight.' Here Luther is so naively humorous that it

is almost frivolous."29 *

Another notation from the Journals, writ

ten three years later, attacks Protestant narrow-mind

edness and its lack of heroism: "The minister is so

readily at a loss because of it, that at present he is not

at all the Christian one would point out as a model;

he can easily be suspected and distrusted. Catholi

cism, on the other hand, always has some members

who are Christian in character. Then, too, the Protes

tant clergymen contrive this deception: that there

live in the land true Christians, people who are pri

vately true, genuine Christians—yes, after all, we are

all true Christians in our hidden fervor, we are all

models. Charmant! If the New Testament should

voice an opinion on what constitutes a genuine Chris

tian, it would—in perfect agreement and exquisite

fashion—declare that it is just as impossible to be a

genuine Christian privately as it is to fire a cannon se

cretly." 30 •

In the second Journal note following the

above quotation, we read: "O Luther, Luther! You

have a great responsibility; for the closer I look, the

more clearly I see that you have overthrown the Pope

—and have set 'the public' on the throne. You have

altered the New Testament concept of the 'martyr'

[the 'witness'] and have taught men to seek victory

by the numerical."31

One gathers the impression that, as the

years pass, this critique becomes sharper and more

penetrating: "The more I look upon Luther, the more

convinced I am that he was a confused man [literally,

'out of his wits']; it was a comfortable type of reform

that consists in casting off all burdens and making life

easy—this is an easy way of finding friends to help—.

The true reform always aims to make life more diffi

cult, to lay on burdens; and the true reformer is

therefore always put to death, as an enemy of man

kind. This verse alone of Luther's, 'Listen to me, thou

Pope,' etc., seems to me to be almost loathsomely

worldly. Is that the sacred earnestness of a reformer,

concerned only with his own responsibility, who

6

knows that all true reform consists in becoming more

inward? Such an utterance is a perfect reminder of a

journalist's slogan, or something similar. This un

blessed polemic attitude, this desire to overthrow the

Pope, is the source of Luther's confusion."32

Reflecting thoughtfully upon Luther's

abandoning his vocation to the monastery life,

Kierkegaard says, "In view of the error in leaving the

monastery, this flight (from the monastery) appears

so simple, yet upon closer consideration, what violent

collisions slumber here, because it is the precise char

acteristic of the genuine Christian that he does not

belong to this world. But Luther was no dialectician,

so constantly was he aware of only one side of the

matter." S3 *

Though Protestants reprove Catholicism for

its remissness in fulfilling its duty to spread the mes

sage of Sacred Scripture, Kierkegaard, nevertheless,

wrote these bitterly ironic lines on the subject of

Bible Societies: "The Bible Societies, those erroneous

models of the mission, are essentially like all the

other companies that operate on money and in such

a worldly manner they hustle about, spreading the

Bible, just as other companies in their enterprises.

The Bible Societies have caused irreparable harm.

Christianity has long been in need of a religious hero,

who in fear and trembling before God had the cour-

age to forbid people to read the Bible. This is just as

necessary today as it is to preach against Christian

ity." M

The strongest attack on Protestantism, from

a religious standpoint, is discovered in two notations,

dated 1854, expressing the same idea: "Protestant

ism is quite untenable. It is a revolt, occasioned by

proclaiming 'the Apostle' (Paul) to the neglect of the

Master (Christ). As a corrective for a given time and

under certain conditions, it may have its importance.

Otherwise, should there be question of maintaining

Protestantism, it should be done in this manner: we

admit that this doctrine is a mitigation of Christian

ity, which we men have allowed ourselves, leaving it

to God to agree to it. And, in place thereof, Protes

tantism is trumpeted abroad as an advancement in

Christendom! No, this is perhaps the most marked

concession that is made to the numerical, this numer

ical which is the hereditary enemy of Christianity,

which wants to be Christian but which loses or re

duces its ideality, and prides itself upon its material

numbers."35

It is clear from this text that Kierkegaard,

in employing the pair of contraries, the one and the

many, is not considering the opposition between re

ligious freedom of thought and strict adherence to

dogma, but rather that much more profound oppo-

8

sition: ideality (from a Catholic point of view, the

striving for sanctity) and religious secularism. The

same concept is expressed in these equally plain and

sharp lines composed during the same year: "Luther

—the Reformation. Luther is the direct opposite of an

'Apostle.' The 'Apostle' expresses Christianity in

God's interest, his authority is from God and in His

interest. Luther expresses Christianity in the interest

of man, is in truth the reaction of mankind against

Christianity in God's interest. Therefore we have

Luther's formula: 'I cannot do otherwise,' which is

not at all that of the Apostle. Behold, here, what con

fusion arises if we call Luther an Apostle."36

The concept of Luther's expression of

Christianity "in the interests of man" leads in genuine

Kierkegaardian fashion to a further conclusion. "In

his extreme anguish [Angst], Luther discovered this

principle of 'fighting in fear and trembling and

anxiety until death'; it is this principle which must

be proclaimed as unique and universal (the golden

principle); and it is not in every generation that

there is one individual who has undergone such a

similar test."37 * How close to Catholicism this con

sideration brings Kierkegaard: "I do not intend to

reintroduce the monastery, even if I could; my pro

posal is only that we become conscious—what truth

9

there is in this—that we are approaching the truth by

our concessions. •

• *» 1H A

Building on this concept that Protestantism,

from being a "consolation" in an extraordinary situa

tion, where man "in fear and trembling and anxiety

fights to the death," is made into a universal principle,

Kierkegaard discusses the problem of "Catholicism-

Protestantism" and, in my opinion, develops it in one

final consideration: "Are not Catholicism and Protes

tantism related to each other like—this may seem

strange, but it is actually the case physically—like an

edifice which cannot stand to a buttress which can

not stand alone, whereas the entire structure is quite

safe and firm, as long as it is kept together, the edifice

and the buttress which supports it. In other words:

is not Protestantism and Lutheranism a corrective;

and has not the fact that Protestantism has been

made into a regulative produced great confusion?

. . . For, in order to be able to perceive clearly

whether and to what extent Protestantism can stand

alone, it is desirable to select a country where there

is no Catholicism. It would then be apparent whether

Protestantism—presuming that it is degenerated—

would lead to a state of corruption, to which Cathol

icism—presuming that it is degenerated—would not

lead, and whether this does not point out that Prot

estantism is not fit to stand alone." 39

10

Kierkegaard now engages in an interesting

experiment in thought. He compares the "thoroughly

worldly" Catholic prelate with a Protestant bishop,

who is "quite the counterpart of the Catholic." How

will the Catholic judge his bishop? "I think that he

will say (quite fittingly): it is not my position to pass

judgment upon the higher clergy; yet, nevertheless,

the Catholic will easily see that it is worldliness. And

why will he easily see it? Because the Catholic sees

at the same time an entirely different side of Chris

tianity expressed—a thing that the prelate must put

up with, for side by side with him there walks one

who lives in poverty, and the Catholic has a pro

found concept that this is truer than the prelate's

manner of life, which, alas, is nothing but worldli-

ness.

« A(\

How can we now pass judgment in a Prot

estant land, "where we have for a long time neglected

asceticism, fasting, the cloistered orders, and those

who proclaim by their lives of poverty the message

of Christendom; how can we pass judgment when we

have abandoned these, indeed, have considered them

to be ridiculous and foolish?

"Look, say the contemporaries one to an

other—behold this Lutheran frankness, watch him at

the turtle soup, there is no connoisseur like him,

watch him at the oyster banquet, see how he can suck

11

enjoyment from every situation, and how shrewdly

he looks to his own gain; so let us admire his Lutheran

frankness! High he soars—in Lutheran frankness-

high above the lower and more imperfect ideal of

entering a monastery, of fasting, of preaching Chris

tianity in poverty, high he soars above it all in free

dom of spirit and Lutheran frankness! The noble

ideal is not to wander away from the world, to flee

from it—no, genuine Lutheranism is like the prelate,

for this is godliness; his contemporaries not only put

up with this or take pains to ignore it; no, they regard

it with admiration—as though it were godliness."41

Kierkegaard concludes this comparison with the fol

lowing observation: "And this—as I maintain—cannot

happen in Catholicism." 42

The texts that we have cited from Kierke

gaard—and we could suggest many more—prove that

we do find in the Danish philosopher a tendency to

Catholicism, an "anonymous Catholicism" (Przy-

wara); perhaps Brandes and H0ffding are both cor

rect when they state that we don't know what path

Kierkegaard's life might have taken, had he lived

longer.

THE PRINCIPLE OF ACTION

In addition to these polemical utterances

which bring Kierkegaard near to Catholicism, there

12

are certain positive tendencies which likewise point

in the direction of the Catholic position; this is espe

cially true of his emphasis upon the principle of

action in contrast to that of faith.43 Kierkegaard's

argumentation in this consideration is naturally dia

lectical. "When I consider 'works,' my thought is

drawn to Catholicism. In order not to be misunder

stood, I will note—a thing that is indeed not neces

sary or ought not to be necessary to note—that

everything that Catholicism has taught concerning

the meritoriousness of works is absolutely to be re

jected." 44 *

This notion finds its strongest expression

in The Works of Love, particularly in Kierkegaard's

discourse on the subject, "Love is the fulfillment of

law." In the same book he states, "It is a work of love

to remember the departed"; here he is close to the

Catholic faith and practice. When we recall that

Luther termed St. James's Epistle, with its strong

emphasis on the necessity of good works, "an epistle

of straw,"45 it becomes interesting to see what attrac

tion this Epistle had for Kierkegaard. The first chap

ter of James's Epistle he calls "my very first, my

beloved text." 46

We shall now consider the Kierkegaardian

concept "imitation," which plays a major role in his

philosophy; indeed, it is a key-word in his system of

13

thought. "There is more meaning to Catholicism

simply because it has not entirely forgotten imita

tion." " * The concept of "imitation" is perfectly

coherent with his idea of Christ as the "model." "No,

surely Christ did not come to destroy the law—He

Himself is the fulfillment of the law. This is an en

tirely qualitative aim: the fact that He is the model

and it is He we must imitate." "8 *

It is not a contradiction to maintain that

God is love and that we must "die"; rather, one is a

logical corollary of the other. Kierkegaard goes as far

as to say, "Only a man with a purpose can be a Chris

tian." ta * He grants the will an important role in the

process of Christian education, a concession quite the

opposite of Luther's teaching on the "enslaved will."

It is our will that frees us from "the illusion of the

senses," "the baser representations," and keeps us in

harmony with "objective" reality, the reality of God.

As a consequence, Kierkegaard had early in life re

jected the doctrine of predestination. "From every

point of view, the concept predestination may be

considered as an abortion, since it has unquestionably

arisen in an attempt to relate freedom and God's

omnipotence; it solves the riddle by denying one of

the concepts and consequently explains nothing," he

wrote in 1834 at the outset of his Journals.™

14

THE ANALOGY OF BEING

This emphasis on the cooperation of the

will in the attainment of salvation and the conse

quent rejection of the doctrine of predestination

leads us to another essential concept where Kierke

gaard moves further away from Protestantism and

nearer to Catholic teaching on the analogy of being.

The analogy of being can best be enunciated in its

classical form, as it was formulated by the fourth

Lateran Council (1215): "Between the Creator and

the creature there is certainly a resemblance but at

the same time there is also a greater disparity." 51

The Reformation, by its doctrine maintaining God's

absolute omnipotence and man's utter weakness,

stressed this greater disparity and this consideration

does have some foundation. (Kierkegaard calls it

"distance-theology.") The Reformation, however,

overlooked the other side of the truth, namely, that

amid this disparity there is found a certain resem

blance.

In other words, the Reformation forgot the

dialectical in relation to God. The concept of God's

absolute omnipotence led to the doctrine of predes

tination. The concept of man's utter weakness and

total corruption, on the other hand, led to the conse

quences which Kierkegaard is careful to point out in

his critique of Luther and Protestantism. In logical

15

sequence, there is the Protestant principle of God's

"AWeinwirksamkeit" [sole efficacy] in contrast to the

Catholic principle of God's "AWwirksamkeit" [al

mighty efficacy] in and with His creatures. This latter

concept is naturally Thomistic. The transcendency

of God is demonstrated by the fact that He as "the

first Cause" (causa prima) creates really autonomous

"secondary causes" (causae secundae). It may be

advantageous to recall some examples from St.

Thomas: "Since God possesses Being in its entire per

fection, it follows that He is able to communicate it

to others, giving His creatures the power to act self-

existently." 52 And again, "The nearer a creature is

by nature to God, the less it is determined by Him,

and to that greater degree does God allow the crea

ture to determine itself."53 9 The potency of the free

* Translator's note on reference 53: Father Roos has

followed a reading which seems to be inaccurate. He based him

self on the Parma edition of the De Veritate, where we read:

"Unde quanto aliqua natura est Deo vicinior, tanto minus ab eo

inclinatur, et magis nata est se ipsum inclinare." De Veritate, Q.

22, a. 4 corp. Editio: P. Lethielleux, Paris, 1884, and the Parma

edition, Musurgia, New York, 1948.

The text, in a critical edition recently published, is as

follows: "Unde quanto aliqua natura est Deo vicinior, tanto minus

ab alio inclinatur, et magis nata est se ipsum inclinare." De Veri

tate, cura et studio P. Spiazzi, O.P., Ed. IV, Marietti, Turin, 1949.

Cf. Bulletin Thomiste, IV (1934-5), n. 94, p. 58;

also, Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Theologiques, P. Heris,

1928, p. 806, n. 1. These two articles contain a fine evaluation of

the recent correction made on this Thomistic text.

16

creature seipsum agere ad finem [to direct himself

towards an end] is the characteristic of his supreme

likeness to God and as such is an outpouring, so to

speak, of the Causa prima.

Kierkegaard states this precise notion and

doctrine in a somewhat difficult text, yet it is a text

extraordinarily clear: "The whole question of God's

omnipotence and goodness and its relation to evil

(instead of the distinction that God works good and

only permits evil) can perhaps be explained quite

simply in this manner. The greatest act that can be

performed by any being, greater even than any end

to which it can be created, is to make it free. In order

to be able to do that omnipotence is necessary. . . .

God's omnipotence is therefore His goodness. For

goodness means to give absolutely, yet in such a way

that by taking oneself back one makes the recipient

independent. From finite power comes only depend

ence, and omnipotence alone can make something

independent, can create something out of nothing

which endures of itself, because omnipotence is al

ways taking itself back. Omnipotence cannot be

involved in any relation to the other, since there is

nothing to which it has any relation; it can give with

out giving away the very least part of its power: it

can make the other independent. This is what is in-

17

conceivable; omnipotence can not only bring forth

the most imposing of all things, the world in its vis

ible totality, but it can create the most delicate of all

things, a creature independent of it. Omnipotence

can lay its hand so heavily upon the world and yet

can make its touch so light that the creature receives

independence. It is only a miserable and worldly

picture of the dialectic of power to say that it be

comes greater and greater in proportion as it can

compel and make things dependent. Socrates knew

better: the art of using power is to make free.—

Creation out of nothing is once again the expression

of omnipotence for being able to make things inde

pendent. It is to him who made me independent,

while he nevertheless retained everything, that I owe

all things. If in order to create man God had lost any

of his power, then he could not have made man inde

pendent." "

This Kierkegaardian chain of thought is

Thomistic through and through and is in complete

opposition to the Lutheran point of view.55* This

* Translator's note on reference 55: Cf. Cornelio

Fabro: "Foi et Raison dans 1'oeuvre de Kierkegaard," Revue des

Sciences PMosophiques et Theologiques, Vol. 32 (1948), p. 171;

also, Fabro's article, "Jaspers et Kierkegaard," Ibid., Vol. 37

(1953), pp. 209-252. A fine comparison between Kierkegaard's

philosophy and the Thomistic system is presented by Dr. James

Collins in his book, The Mind of Kierkegaard, Regnery (Chicago:

1953).

18

agreement between Kierkegaard's thought and Cath

olic philosophy serves to point out how very wrong

Hermann Diehm is in stating that "Catholicism is the

most undialectic conception" that exists, although he

is speaking, in the text I refer to, only of the

Church.58

There are many other tendencies in

Kierkegaard which bring him extremely close to

Catholicism. Here, we shall point out briefly the "in-

tellectualistic" element in Kierkegaard's concept of

Christ. Thus, we will understand that, for Kierke

gaard, faith in Christ is not merely a subjective quan

tity. It is not a matter of indifference whether I

believe in the divinity of Christ or not. The divinity

of Christ is most assuredly one of those truths objec

tively revealed in the Person of Christ. It is possible,

then, to observe in Kierkegaard a tendency to replace

the Protestant fides qua (the act of faith) with the

Catholic fides quae (the deposit of faith). In this

connection, I mention Ruttenbeck's observation: "In

stead of Protestant individualism, the church is con

ceived as a community (fellowship); instead of

vindicating subjectivity, Kierkegaard advances an

objective faith which is independent of all subjectiv

ity. Such utterances point without doubt in the direc

tion of Catholic Christendom." "

19

OBJECTIVE AUTHORITY

There is yet another consideration where

Kierkegaard in a certain manner approaches Cathol

icism: his concept of the apostle as a man, called by

God, who speaks with authority, i.e., with power, and

therefore can demand the absolute adherence of

those whom he addresses. The Danish philosopher

draws an exact distinction between the "Christian

Address" and the "Sermon." "The difference between

a Christian Address and a Sermon. The Christian

Address deals to a certain extent with doubt—a Ser

mon operates absolutely and entirely through au

thority, that of Holy Scripture and of Christ's

apostles. It is therefore neither more nor less than

heresy to entertain doubt in a sermon, however well

one might be able to handle it. The preface to my

'Christian Discourses,' therefore, contains the phrase:

// a sufferer who has run wild in many thoughts. A

Sermon presupposes a priest (ordination); a Chris

tian Address can be by a layman." 5S

The type of address used by the Christian

preacher is "indirect," "imaginative," 59 whereas the

sermon presupposes an ordained priest who speaks

with authority. Kierkegaard was quite occupied with

this problem in his Book on Adler. He never pub

lished this treatise which he wrote in 1846-1847.

However, he did publish anonymously two short

20

essays: "May a man let himself be put to death for

truth's sake?" 60 and "On the difference between a

Genius and an Apostle." 61 Following an account of

his concept "authority," he writes in the second of

these two essays: "Perhaps this will be the case with

some readers, as it was with me: that when thinking

of 'authority,' I happen to think of magister Kierke

gaard's 'Edifying Discourses,' in which he, with such

strong emphasis and accentuation, repeats in almost

every preface: 'they are not sermons, because their

author has no authority to preach.'"62

Kierkegaard discloses the difference be

tween the Genius and the Apostle: "Genius is, as the

word itself shows, immediateness (ingenium, that

which is inborn, primative, primus, original, origo,

etc.), it is a natural qualification, genius is born. . . .

It is otherwise with the Apostle. The word itself indi

cates the difference. An Apostle is not born; an

Apostle is a man called and appointed by God, re

ceiving a mission from him."ea An Apostle mounts

the pulpit with authority. "What is authority? Is it

the profundity, the excellence, the cleverness of doc

trine? Not at all! . . . Authority is, on the contrary,

something which remains unchanged, which one can

not acquire even by understanding the doctrine per

fectly. Authority is a specific quality, which, coming

from elsewhere, becomes qualitatively apparent

21

when the content of the message or of the action is

posited as aesthetically indifferent."6*

Whence does this authority come? Kierke

gaard answers: "Authority is a specific quality either

of an Apostle's calling or of ordination. To preach

simply means to use authority; and that is exactly

what is completely and utterly forgotten in these

times."65

Kierkegaard returns frequently to this no

tion: "What is the qualitative, the specific essence of

the 'sermon'?" "1) In the first place, it is spoken by a

priest. A priest is what he is through ordination. He

represents the possibility of scandal. The paradox.

Nowadays that is entirely forgotten, as though it had

never been known. It is all nonsense to talk about

genius, talent, studies, eloquence and becoming vest

ments, etc. 2) In the second place, authority. A priest

must use authority, he must say to men: You shall.

He must do that even though they put him to death,

though all men fell away from Christianity and al

though every one would accept it so long as it was

put in the form: I humbly beg the respected, learned

public to consider fairly the following eternal

truths." 66

To this authority on the side of the Apostle

there corresponds a dutiful submission on the part of

the faithful. "The whole of modern philosophy is

22

therefore affected, because it has done away with

obedience on the one hand, and authority on the

other, and then, in spite of everything, wishes to be

orthodox."6T In this regard, it is important to note

Kierkegaard's clear position, that this authority comes

"either from the apostolic calling or from ordination."

Of course, Kierkegaard is careful to point out that

there is a difference between the Apostle and the

ordained priest: "It follows consequently that there

is and remains an infinite qualitative difference be

tween Christ and each one of the elect. Christ him

self is the sphere of the paradox and the elect

participate in and bear the character of belong

ing to this sphere." "8 * The words which Kierke

gaard employs point in the direction of Cath

olic teaching. Since the Catholic priest is a priest

essentially through ordination, the sacrament of

holy orders which is but a sharing (participatio) in

the priesthood of Christ (indeed it is a partnership),

he serves, by his ordination to the priesthood, as a

"beacon—the character of belonging to this sphere,"

by the very fact that he receives an indelible charac

ter.69 Many of Kierkegaard's concepts which are

found in this short essay, "The Difference between a

Genius and an Apostle," are difficult to fathom—they

may be well exemplified, not in Catholic dogmatics,

but in Graham Greene's novel, The Power and the

23

Glory, the substance of which tends to point out the

Catholic priest's spiritual authority, entrusted as it is

to weak and fragile human nature: the priesthood in

the priest. E. Geismar has taken pains to remind us

that Kierkegaard's philosophic thought can hardly

be reconciled with Protestant dogmatics. He main

tains that Kirkegaard's theory on the Apostle

"would have led him directly to Catholicism, if it had

been elaborated," and he states that "when this

theory on the Apostle is extended to include the

ordained priest, then we are on the road that leads

straightway to Catholicism." 70 On the other hand,

L0gstrup is of the opinion that Kierkegaard's tenets

on the Apostle manifest a logical evolution of his

principal theses—which are diametrically opposed to

Luther's teaching—yet, he is unable to evaluate the

passages wherein Kierkegaard is speaking of the or

dained priest. He thinks, however, that in Protestant

ism, in its dogmatic system, there is no provision for

the office of preaching.71 Hermann Diehm writes that

neither Geismar nor L0gstrup are correct, because "if

this alone is tantamount to having foreboding Cath

olic tendencies, one then finds no church and no ser

mon, and dogmatics are entirely explained in a

philosophy of existentialism." 72 But the question is

whether Geismar and L0gstrup are not more justified

in accepting the Kierkegaardian philosophy as non-

24

Protestant. Since the problem, by what right does the

church impart a spiritual authority through ordina

tion, now arises, we are forced to a further consid

eration: successio apostolica. He who accepts this is

no longer Protestant, but eo ipso Catholic.

25

II

Anti-Catholic Tendencies in

Kierkegaard

In the last chapter, I attempted to examine

those aspects of Kierkegaard's philosophical thought

which point in the direction of Catholicism; I shall

now consider those ideas and concepts which are

either in apparent or actual opposition to Catholic

doctrine. First I shall mention the anti-intellectualism

of Kierkegaard. This philosophic attitude is quite

naturally conditioned by its counterpart: Hegel. In

contrast to the Hegelian rationalization of the doc

trines of faith, Kierkegaard posits the paradox, which

always bears within itself the possibility of scandal.

In his opposition to Hegel, Kierkegaard is anti-

rationalistic. We do not upbraid him for this attitude;

on the contrary, Catholicism can follow him quite

some distance along this path. His anti-rationalism,

26

however, is further accentuated by an exaggerated

anti-intellectualism. The latter element is historically

conditioned by Kant's system of philosophy, with

which Kierkegaard had a profound acquaintance. In

the first half of the 19th century, it was almost im

possible to escape the Kantian influence; even Cath

olic philosophers and theologians were obliged to

recognize it. I refer to the fideism of De Bonald and

Bautain who regarded faith as the only fount of re

ligious knowledge. The tenets of fideism were con

demned by the Catholic Church in 1840 (Denz.

1622)

THE SUBJECTIVE BASIS OF

FAITH

With Kierkegaard, the issue revolves

around the ancient problem: the relation between

faith and reason. On one occasion, he employed a

formula very close to the Catholic position: "Love

stands in the same relation to law as reason does to

faith—there is no conflict between the law and love,"

he wrote in The Works of Love.73 He does not deny

the importance of reason or underestimate its value.

How could he do this, being of such an intellectual

stamp? "Truly, it is not knowledge that defiles a man,

far from it; knowledge is like sheer transparency,

precisely when the most perfect and clear; just as the

27

most perfect water is tasteless."74 There are two

Kierkegaardian objections to knowledge. The first is

that "knowledge is infinite indifference." 75 Faith, on

the other hand, is one's individual assumption of a

position. "Knowledge as such is impersonal and must

be communicated impersonally. Knowledge posits

everything in possibility, and is to that extent outside

the reality of existence in the possibility. The indi

vidual first begins his life with ergo, with faith." 76

The second objection to reason is that "the intellect

counts and counts, reckons and reckons, but it never

attains the certainty which faith possesses." " Fur

thermore, since reason never attains certitude,

Kierkegaard concludes, "Faith is thus not an under

standing, or the inference of an understanding, but

a choice which must be made just when knowledge

has balanced the opposing possibilities." 78 It is pos

sible to understand this statement in the Catholic

sense, since, according to Catholic teaching, faith

possesses an infinitely greater certitude than reason

because it is founded on God's authority, while

reason has its basis in human insight; then, too, the

deposit of faith can never be completely compre

hended by reason, not to mention, in some instances,

even the possibility of its perception.

Kierkegaard, though, would go a step fur

ther. He would maintain the opinion that reason is

28

not of the slightest value on our path to faith. Cathol

icism, in its middle path between Hegelianism and

fideism, maintains that there is a logical foundation

for faith, an introductory knowledge, which is ca

pable of demonstrating the preambles of faith, the

existence of God and the historical fact of revelation;

Kierkegaard rejects this road to faith (praeambula

fidei) as being worthless and in itself impossible.

Catholic doctrine, on the other hand, holds that the

act of faith, in order to be an act consonant with

man's rational nature, must find its basis and rational

confirmation in the "argumenta" and "signa certis-

sima" (Denz. 1790); Kierkegaard claims that this

rational foundation for faith can guarantee at the

most only probability. According to him, to believe is

"to choose in the equilibrium of contradictory possi

bilities." 79 Since faith presupposes an "election" and

a "leap," we can likewise leap over all these rational

considerations. Consequently, Kierkegaard must re

ject any discussion that attempts to prove the exist

ence of God; but the proof of God's existence plays

an important role in the foundation of the Catholic

faith. In his work, The Sickness Unto Death, Kierke

gaard considers the existence of God a "postulate."

This concept has no objective validity. Objectively,

there always remains uncertainty which can never

be removed. The route, along which Kierkegaard in

29

his Sickness Unto Death travels and demonstrates

the dialectic of despair, leads ultimately to the con

clusion that the concept of "finiteness" can hardly be

grasped unless viewed in the light of the idea of

"infiniteness."80 The concept "finiteness" in itself

postulates its opposite "infiniteness." And this idea is

not something fanciful. It springs from the necessity

of understanding the "finite." It is, so to speak, die

Bedingung seiner Moglichkeit [the condition of its

possibility]. It is interesting that Kierkegaard, with

out being conscious of it, is reverting to the ancient

proofs for the existence of God. Not only does he

claim that our existence "is founded" on the trans

cendency of God; at the very outset of his book, The

Sickness Unto Death, he states, "a self must either

have constituted itself or have been constituted by

another." 81 He chooses the second member of the

disjunction. It is this precise disjunction "by itself" or

"by another" that is the foundation for the proofs of

God's existence devised by the scholastics of the

Middle Ages who followed Aristotle. This presup

poses causal thought. Since, however, Kierkegaard

never abandoned his Kantian prejudice, he was un

able to reconcile his own ideas with Thomistic meta

physics. We might ask whether a sober analysis of

man's existence must not necessarily follow the

Thomistic metaphysics, even though the manner of

30

its expression naturally differs from that of the clas

sical proofs for the existence of God.

According to Catholic teaching, the act of

faith has its foundation on the authority of God, who

can neither deceive nor be deceived. But the path to

faith (the so-called praeambula fidei) must be acces

sible to reason and absolutely certain. Not only the

existence of God but the historical fact of revelation

belong to these praeambula. Both these truths must

be logically secure, before one can elicit an act of

faith. Kierkegaard rejects even the possibility of a

rational proof for the existence of God; furthermore,

and just as vigorously, he denies that it is possible for

an historical-philological method to arrive at any cer

titude on the factual existence of revelation. What,

then, is his foundation for faith?82 He points to Holy

Scripture, where there can be no question of any

other attitude but that of absolute submission. The

critical problem: what confidence can I place in the

Holy Scripture?, seems not to have occurred to him.

Nevertheless, he cannot entirely escape the difficulty

of assigning some foundation for faith. He would

seem to be satisfied with the fact that men, who were

contemporaries of Christ, believed in Him. He writes

in Philosophical Fragments: "If the contemporary

generation had left nothing behind them but these

words: 'We have believed that in such and such a

31

year God appeared among us in the humble figure of

a servant, that he lived and taught in our community,

and finally died,' it would be more than enough. The

contemporary generation would have done all that

was necessary; for this little advertisement, this nota

bene on a page of universal history, would be suf

ficient to afford an occasion for a successor, and the

most voluminous account can in all eternity do noth

ing more."83

We see then that the purely critical prob

lem of the historical existence of Christ does not in

terest Kierkegaard; he is occupied with the historical

fact under an entirely different aspect, namely,

whether this Person was God. But how do we arrive

at any certainty concerning this problem? He points

in his Journals to Christ's words in the Gospel, "Do

according to my words and you shall know" (John

7:17). This utterance plays an important part in the

Kierkegaardian foundation of faith. He says: "One

can believe first and imitate secondly . . . one can

imitate first and believe secondly . . . Christ, who

never attempted to prove the truth of his teaching or

to provide a foundation for it, used only the proof:

'If any man do the will of my father, he shall know

of the doctrine, whether it be of God, or whether I

speak of myself' (John 7:17). Herein is contained

the idea that the positing of an act is necessary in

32

order to arrive at that point where the decision of

faith can exist; this is a hazardous venture. It is not

thus (as some have maintained, reversing the order):

first the proof and then the venture (which anyway

is a self-contradiction and nonsense), no, first the

venture, then the proof comes afterwards."8* *

A year later (1851), he wrote: "The world

has quite thrown off Christendom's point of view.

In the New Testament, the matter is quite simple.

Christ says, 'Do according to my words and you shall

know.' Consequently, there comes first the decisive

action. With the assistance of the will, your life

comes into collision with all of reality, and then you

will find something to think upon, rather than doubt;

in both the first and the second instance, you will

need Christendom, as a model and as a gift."85 *

The same thought appears under another

formula: "The imitation. The imitation of Christ

(correctly understood, consequently not self-torment,

hypocrisy, or righteousness of conduct, etc.) is its

own guarantee that Christianity is not becoming

poetry, mythology, an abstract idea—this it has almost

become in Protestantism."86 * If we analyze such

passages as these, we will reach the following con

clusion: understanding-act, i.e., imitation, this must

be reversed. Imitation must come first: I must first

adapt myself in my practical life, as if I were con-

33

vinced of the truth of Christianity, and then, and as

a consequence thereof, I will come to an understand

ing of the truth of Christianity. The imitation fur

nishes the guarantee that Christianity is true. A

"decisive action" which brings me into "collision with

the whole of existence" places me in the situation

where I "need" Christendom. Thus, I accept it, even

though I am not convinced of its objective truth. It is

precisely this little word "need" that betrays a weak

ness in Kierkegaard's thought. In this manner, the

objective validity of Christianity becomes a function

of my needs. In his valuable book, Die Existenzdia-

lektik von S0ren Kierkegaard [The Existential Dia

lectic of S0ren Kierkegaard], published by the S0ren

Kierkegaard Society, Hermann Diehm arrives at the

very same conclusion: "By imitation, man discovers

that he 'needs' Christianity. Grace corresponds with

this 'need' in the perfecting of the imitation. Imita

tion, at the same time, furnishes a guarantee that

Christianity is not becoming poetry, mythology, an

abstract idea. In this manner, the truth of Christian

ity is entirely reduced to subjectivity."87 This he

terms a "fatal condition." Man is forced to presup

pose an historical fact, the actual existence of which

he has knowledge of only from the testimony of con

temporary witnesses, and he then accepts divine

revelation on the basis of his inner experience, as it

34

reveals itself in him. Catholicism can never agree

with this position: in all intellectual honesty, it is

logically impossible, a "vicious circle." It is to be

noted that a modern Protestant Kierkegaardian

scholar like Hermann Diehm is in perfect accord with

Catholic doctrine on this point.

Kierkegaard says: "Conviction must be

first; by that I mean that the personality, the argu

ments must be accorded an inferior level . . . argu

ment is not the basis for faith in the Son of God, but

conversely; faith in the Son of God is itself the wit

ness. No arguments can confirm one's conviction, on

the contrary, the conviction confirms the argu

ments." 8S * Thus, Kierkegaard must reject the objec

tive truth of Christianity and rely on the personal,

subjective element: not only is "subjectivity truth,"89

but the converse is true likewise, "truth is subjectiv

ity." Therefore, he will state: "There is only one proof

for the truth of Christianity: the inner proof, the

argumentum spiritus sancti."90 * Hermann Diehm

correctly observes that this position is quite impos

sible.91 We must first be certain of the historical

reality of revelation and then pursue its subjective

signification for mankind. The reality of revelation,

e.g., its historical existence, precedes faith, but the

converse is not true. A blindly-chosen position on

faith, based only on inner experience, can never guar-

35

antee the factual existence of revelation. Christianity,

in its entirety, builds upon historical fact. And histor

ical facts can never be demonstrated by inner expe

rience. It is because of this that Catholicism, in its

classical foundation for faith, proposed by the Vati

can Council, will point not only to "interna Spiritus

Sancti auxilia" (the inner assistance of the Holy

Spirit), which, by the way, corresponds with Kierke

gaard's "argumentum spiritus sancti"—but also to the

"externa argumenta" ond "signa certissima" (Denz.

1790).

Catholicism maintains the doctrine that

man, assisted by a purely historical-philological ap

proach, can prepare himself in a genuinely philo

sophic and quite satisfactory manner for these "ex

terna, argumenta": the miracles of Christ, especially

His own Resurrection. We demand, of course, proof

of the authenticity of the narrative and we must

establish the trustworthiness of the witnesses. Herein

lie the greatest difficulties and they cannot be under

estimated, especially since we are dealing with mod

ern skepticism, which denies outright the possibility

of such a procedure. In order to illustrate the fact

that this method, as an intellectual procedure, is

quite satisfactory, we cite the example of John Henry

Newman who discovered the path to Catholicism in

this fashion. This procedure demands certain psycho-

36

logical presumptions: a tranquil, rational system of

thought, a critical eye for critiqueless critique, and a

good measure of skepticism against the modern skep

ticism which often becomes a very pleasant and com

fortable cushion on which to repose.

The inner testimony of the Holy Spirit

cannot provide the whole foundation of faith, be

cause that rests only on the words of Christ. And the

words of Christ need further verification or con

firmation. Moreover, Kierkegaard errs when he states

that "Christ never attempted to prove the validity of

his teaching or to provide any basis for it." 92 * On

the contrary, Christ says in St. John's Gospel, "But I

have a greater testimony than that of John: for the

works which the Father hath given me to perfect, the

works themselves which I do, give testimony of me,

that the Father hath sent me" (John 5:36). And, in

another text, "If I do not the works of my Father,

believe me not. But if I do, though you will not be

lieve me, believe the works: that you may know and

believe that the Father is in me, and I in the Father"

(John 10:37-38). Again, "If I had not done among

them the works that no other man hath done, they

would not have sin" (John 15:24). Finally, the pas

sage Kierkegaard so frequently cites, "Do according

to my words and you shall know," does refer to an

inner confirmation, but only consequent upon man's

37

eliciting an act of faith with absolute certainty; the

text does not refer to an act of faith which is made

"ad experimentum." Imitation of [Christ's] doctrine

does provide a more profound understanding of it,

but the initial acceptance of the teaching must find

its basis on other grounds.

Summa summarum: if Christianity rests

upon historical fact—and it does, unless one takes

refuge in a philosophy of existentialism—it can hardly

be founded on interior perception alone; the histor

ical character of Christianity demands an historical

demonstration and this must necessarily be accom

plished by natural means and not by something

which is uncontrollably supernatural, although "the

future" shall reveal that from the very beginning

grace accompanied this historical demonstration.

Kierkegaard's concept of existential faith

is in complete accord with his basic, fundamental

understanding of existential truth, which, according

to him, does not consist in objective knowledge and

the validity of objective reality, but rather in subjec

tive existence. "Only the truth which edifies is truth

for thee."9S Yet, no matter how much one can con

cede that "existence in truth" has a certain impor

tance and value in one's perception of truth, no

matter how correct one is in stating that a certain

willingness to follow the perceived truth conditions

38

his own perception of truth, "existence in truth" can

by no means be the logical primary. Indeed, such an

intellectual dialectic cannot conceal the simple fact

that both perception and imitation must find their

norm in objectivity alone. Truth is, according to St.

Thomas Aquinas, the conformity of our intellect with

objective reality. Between ontological truth (the

thing in itself) and ethical truth (the truth for me)

lies logical truth, the personal recognition of truth.

THE PARADOX

Kierkegaard's anti-intellectualism is in ac

cord, too, with his definition of the God-man as the

absolute paradox, the absurd. "The absurd is—that

the eternal truth has come into being in time, that

God has come into being, has been born, has grown

up, and so forth, has come into being precisely like

any other individual human being, quite indistin

guishable from other individuals." 94 "That God has

come into being," "that God's eternal being is

bounded by the dialectical determinations of exist

ence"—this he terms a "contradiction." 95 If Kierke

gaard would only say that we cannot fathom the

mystery of the God-man, that this truth is supra

ratfonem, then Catholicism would agree with him.

But we cannot agree that this truth is "self-

contradictory." The Incarnation does not mean that

39

Christ ceases to be God and becomes enchained in

the dialectic of existence. Rather, it means that a

human nature, which from the moment of conception

the divine Person has made His own, now comes into

existence in a unity which is founded in the divine

Person. It is not the case of a divine nature becom

ing a human person. The two natures preserve their

relative independence in the hypostatic union in one

divine Person. The manner in which a human, cre

ated nature is elevated to the divine Person surpasses

our understanding. One cannot, on this account,

hastily conclude that this is a positive impossibility,

a contradiction.

By logical necessity anti-intellectualism

led Kierkegaard to subjectivism and consequently to

individualism. He is the prophet of individualism.

We can understand this position more clearly if we

take into consideration his opposition to Hegel on

the one extreme and his criticism of the Danish

State Church on the other. He has not, perhaps,

avoided the identical error, for which he reproves

Luther so strongly: I mean that his "corrective" has

become a "norm." Just as Kierkegaard did not have

an understanding of the historical, so too did he pos

sess a deficient notion of the "church," which is, of

course, a New Testament term. As early as 1848 we

discover the following note in his Journals: "We do

40

not need a revision of Christianity; what does matter

is that we remove 1800 years, as if they had not

existed."96 *

His final battle with official Christendom

was but a logical consequence of this attitude. This

becomes quite obvious in his article entitled "Salt" in

The Fatherland (March 30, 1855): "For in the last

resort, precisely to the concept 'church' is to be

traced the fundamental confusion both of Protestant

ism and of Catholicism—or is it to the concept of

Christendom?" 97

REJECTION OF THE CHURCH

It is important to note in this'connection

that Kierkegaard never encountered Catholicism's

classical notion of church, understood in the sense

of Corpus Christi Mysticum. Otherwise, he would

never have written these lines: "How did the greatest

thinker of the Middle Ages defend 'indulgence'? It

was by the assistance of the teaching which views

the church as a mystical body, in which all of us, as

in a social contest, participate in the church's vested

interests."98 *

Kierkegaard's relation to Catholicism was

of "double significance," as was everything in his life.

He is a two-faced Janus, looking forward and back

ward. No other Protestant theologian understood

41

and perceived so clearly as he the weakness of Prot

estantism. Neither has anyone carried further the

original position of Protestantism, the individual's

solitary meeting with his Savior God. It would there

fore be wrong to speak of him—as some writers have

done—as an anima naturaliter catholica. On the

other hand, as Brandes and H0ffding suggest, we do

not know where Kierkegaard's path in life might

have led him, had he lived longer. It is, however, true

that for many of our outstanding contemporary

thinkers he has been a "way-station" to Catholicism.

Unfortunately, Kierkegaard was unable to

meet his opponents in religious circles, on which

occasions he could have discussed the matter. As a

result, he delved steadily deeper into his own

thoughts, without ever coming into collision with the

"corrective" he needed. For Catholics he is a nega

tive proof for the necessity of an "official deposit of

faith." The latter is far from being a hindrance to

one's development; contrariwise, it serves as both a

corrective and an incentive to it. Had Kierkegaard

struggled through the barrier to the possibility of a

living, teaching church, his path in life would have

taken another course. Therefore, his contemporary,

John Henry Newman, with whom he had many

traits in common, is the greater of the two. Newman

did not surrender his "subjective dedication to

42

truth," the subjective quality of truth, which was of

such value also to Kierkegaard; but, beyond this,

Newman discovered the path to history, to the

Church, and to objective authority, as it is found in

the Church's teaching power." Even Newman's lit

erary style bears witness to this. It does not possess

Kierkegaard's piercing passion; it is clearer, more

tranquil and beautiful. It is not by any means acci

dental that both these thinkers are bringing about a

renaissance in our own days.

43

Supplement

Catholic Literature in Soren

Kierkegaard's Library

The following Catholic works, i.e., books

written by Catholic authors and treating Catholic

subjects, are found in the Catalogue of Dr. S0ren A.

Kierkegaard's Library, sold at a public auction on

Tuesday, April 8, 1856.

Abraham a St. Clara, Samtliche Werke, 22 Vol. Pas-

sau and Lindau, 1835^54. (Ktl. 294-311)

Augustini Aurelii Opera. Opere et studio monacho-

rum Ordinis S. Benedicti e Congregatione S.

Mauri. Editio tertia. Venice, Vols. I-XVIII,

1797-1807. (Ktl. 117-134)

Bernardi Clarevallensis Opera. Basil. 1566. (Ktl. 427)

Blosii Ludovici O.S.B., Opera omnia Lovanii, 1568.

(Ktl. 429)

45

Bona, J. Card., Grundsätze und Lehren zu einem

christlichen Leben. Aachen, 1840. (Ktl. 434)

Bonaventura, S., Opuscula, 2 Vol. Lugd. 1647. (Ktl.

436-438)

Bücherkunde der katholisch-theologischen Literatur.

Augsburg, 1837. (Ktl. 978)

Calmet, A. O.S.B., Biblisches Wörterbuch, übersetzt

von Glöckner. 4 Vol. Leignitz, 1751-1754. (Ktl.

67-68)

Chateaubriand, F. R., Die Märtyrer oder der Tri

umph des Christentums. 2 Vol. Darmstadt, 1810.

(Ktl. 465)

Fenelon, Sämtliche Werke. 2 Vol. Leipzig, 1782.

(Ktl. 1912)

, Werke religiösen Inhalts, übersetzt von M.

Claudius. 3 Vol. Hamburg, 1822. (Ktl. 1913)

Nueste Geschichte der Kirche Christi von der

Wahl des Papstes Pius VII im Jahre 1800 bis auf

die Regierung des hl. Vaters Gregor XVI im

Jahre 1833. 6 Vol. 2te Auflage. Augsburg, 1836-

1838. (Ktl. 156-157)

Görres, J., Die christliche Mystik. 4 Vol. Regensburg

und Landshut. 1836. (Ktl. 528-532)

, Athanasius 4rte Auflage. Regensburg, 1838.

(Ktl. 1673)

46

, Die Triarier: H. Leo, P. Marheineke, K.

Bruno. Regensburg, 1838. (Ktl. 533)

Günther, A., Süd- und Nordlichter am Horizonte

spekulativer Theologie. Wien, 1832. (Ktl. 520)

, Der letzte Symboliker. Wien, 1834. (Ktl.

521)

, Die Juste-Milieus in der deutschen Philos

ophie gegenwärtiger Zeit. Wien, 1838. (Ktl.

522)

, Eurysteus und Herakles: Meta-logische

Kritiken und Meditationen. Wien, 1843. (Ktl.

523)

, and Pabst, J. H. Janusköpfe. Zur Philos

ophie und Theologie. Wien, 1834. (Ktl. 524)

Hefele, K. J., Patrum Apostolicorum opera. Editio

tertia, Tübingae, 1847. (Ktl. 152)

Ausführliches Heiligen-Lexikon. Cöln und Franck-

furt, 1719. (Ktl. 570)

Jocham, M., Moraltheologie oder die Lehre vom

christlichen Leben nach den Grundsätzen der

katholischen Kirche. I Teil. Sulzbach, 1852. (Ktl.

583)

, Leben des ehrwürdigen Ludwig de Ponte

aus der Gesellschaft Jesu. 2 Vol. Sulzbach, 1840.

(Ktl. 1957)

47

Kempis, Th., De imitatione Christi. Paris, 1702. (Ktl.

272)

Liguori, Alphonsus von, Hl., Die Herrlichkeiten Ma

rias. 2 Vol. Aachen, 1839. (Ktl. 625-626)

, Vollständiges Betrachtung- und Gebetbuch.

Aachen, 1840. (Ktl. 264)

Maistre, J. de, Les soirees de St. Petersbourg. Tome

I et II, Bruxelles, 1837. (Ktl. 1919-1920)

Möhler, J. A., Athanasius der Grosse und die Kirche

seiner Zeit. 2 Vol. Mainz, 1827. (Ktl. 635-636)

Muus, C. H., Justinus Martyrs Apologier, Polykarps

Brev til Philippenserne, Brevet til Diognetus og

Clemens Romanus, oversat af K0benhavn,

1835-36. (Ktl. 141)

Postelmayer, B., Leben und Thaten der Heiligen

Gottes für das christlich-katholische Volk. 3 Bde.

2te AuHage. Augsburg, 1836. (Ktl. 725)

Preces Catholicae-Christianae ex missali et breviario

Romano desumptae. Tübingae, 1841. (Ktl. 460)

Pyrker, Joh., Legenden der Heiligen. Wien, 1842.

(Ktl. 727)

Salviani Massiliensis et Vincentii Lirinensis Opera.

Edidit Stephanus Baluzius. Editio quarta, 1743.

(Ktl. 757)

48

Silesius, Joh., Angelas, Cherubinischer W anders

mann. Sulzbach, 1829. (Ktl. 783)

, Angelus, Heilige Seelenlust. Geistliche Lie

der. Herausgegeben von W. Winterer und H.

Springer. Mannheim, 1838. (Ktl. 208)

Abhandlungen Sinesischer Jesuiten über die Ge

schichte, Wissenschaften, Künste, Sitten und

Gebräuche der Sinesen. Leipzig, 1778. (Ktl.

657)

Staudenmaier, F. A., Enzyklopädie der theologischen

Wissenschaften als System der gesamten Theo

logie. Mainz, 1834. (Ktl. 69)

, Darstellung und Kritik des hegelschen Sys

tems. Mainz, 1844. (Ktl. 789)

Streiwolff und Klener, Libri symbolici Ecclesiae Ca-

tholicae cum notis, prolegomenis indicibusque.

Tom. I et II. Goettingae, 1838. (Ktl. 805-806)

Suso, H., genannt Amandus, Leben und Schriften.

Herausgegeben von M. Diepenbrock. 2te Au

flage, Regensburg, 1837. (Ktl. 809)

( PS. ) Tauler, J., Nachfolge des armen Lebens Christi.

Neu herausgegeben von N. Casseder. Frankfurt,

1821. (Ktl. 282)

Tauler, J., Predigten. Herausgegeben von Kuntze

und Bilsenthal. 2 Teile. Berlin, 1841. (Ktl. 245-

246)

49

, Predigten auf alle Sonn- und Festtage im

Jahr. 2 Vol. Berlin, 1841. (Ktl. 247)

Tertullian, Samtliche Schriften. Ubersetzt und bear-

beitet von Fr. Anton von Besnard. Augsburg,

1837. (Ktl. 151)

Das neue Testament. Ubersetzt von C. und L. van

Ess., Sulzbach, 1817. (Ktl. Appendix I, 15)

50

References

1. Aage Kabell: Kierkegaardstudiet i Norden, 1948, p.

64.

2. P. P. J0rgensen: H. P. Kofoed-Harisen. Med saerligt

henblik til S0ren Kierkegaard, 1920, p. 554.

3. Georg Brandes: S0ren Kierkegaard, 1877, p. 271.

4. Harald H^ffding: S0ren Kierkegaard som Filosof,

1892, p. 158.

5. : Danske Filosof er, 1909, pp. 170 ff.

6. Theodor Haecker: S0ren Kierkegaard und die Phi

losophie der Innerlichkeit, 1913; Der Begriff der

Wahrheit bei S0ren Kierkegaard, 1932; Chris

tentum und Kultur; cf. hans Kierkegaardsover-

saettelser med de respektive "Nachworte."

Romano Guardini: Der Ausgangspunkt der

Denkbewegung S0ren Kierkegaards. Vom Sinn

der Schwermut. Unterscheidung des Christ

lichen, 1935, pp. 466 ff. Erich Przywara, SJ.:

Das Geheimnis Kierkegaards, 1929. Alois

Dempf: Kierkegaards Folgen, 1935.

7. Hermann Diehm: Die Existenzdialektik von S0ren

Kierkegaard, 1950, p. 2.

8. Ferdinand Ebner: Das Wort und die geistigen Reali

täten, 1921; Wort und Liebe, 1935. Hildegard

51

Jone: Fur Ferdinand Ebner. Stimmen der

Freunde, 1935.

9. Hans Urs v. Balthasar: Apokalypse der deutschen

Seele, I 695.

10. Henri de Lubac, S.J.: Le Drame de rHumanisme

Athee, 1945, pp. 71 ff. This book was published

by Sheed & Ward, 1950, under the title: The

Drama of Atheistic Humanism. Also from the

Catholic viewpoint: Regis Jolivet: Introduction

a Kierkegaard, 1946; Pierre Mesnard: Le Vrai

Visage de Kierkegaard, 1948.

11. Ktl. no. 141.

12. Ktl. nos. 117-134.

13. Pap. I A 37 (p. 16).

14. Pap. II C 30 (p. 341); A 304 (p. 129); Ktl. nos. 635-

636.

15. Pap. II A 745 (p. 256); in English translation: The

Journals of S0ren Kierkegaard, A Selection

Edited and Translated by Alexander Dru, Ox

ford University Press, 1938 (199, page 58); Ktl.

no. 1673.

16. Pap. I C 27-33 (p. 203, ff.); S.V. IV, 311.

17. M. Grabmann: Geschichte der katholischen Theolo-

gie, 1933, p. 216.

18. Ktl. no. 429 Ludovici Blosii Opera Omnia, Lovanii

1568.

19. Ktl. no. 264.

52

20. Pap. VIII, 1 A 437 (p. 193), 450 (p. 200); IX A 429

(p. 249).

21. Pap. X 1 A 137 (p. 103) and Dru, 888, page 297.

22. Cf. Supplement: Catholic Literature in S0ren

Kierkegaard's Library.

23. Pap. XI 1 A 134 (p. 93); The Journals of S0ren

Kierkegaard, A Selection Edited and Trans

lated by Alexander Dru, Oxford University,

1938 (1318, p. 502).

24. S.V. XIV, 47-48; Attack Upon Christendom, Trans.

by Walter Lowrie, Princeton Univ. Press, 1944

(p. 34, "Articles in the Fatherland").

25. H. Diehm, op. cit., p. 156.

26. Pap. X 4 A 596 (p. 413); Journals, Dru (1260, p.

468).

27. Pap. XI1 A 28 (p. 23); Journals, Dru (1298, p. 495).

28. Pap. X 1 A 213 (p. 147); Journals, Dru. (899, p.

300).

29. Pap. X4 A 325 (p. 185).

30. Pap. XII A 106 (p. 74).

31. Pap. XI 1 A 108 (p. 75); Journals, Dru (1310, p.

500).

32. Pap. X 1 A 154 (p. 113); Journals, Dru (889, p. 298)

33. Pap. X4 A 394 (p. 239).

34. Pap. IX A 442 (p. 254); Journals, Dru (847, p. 274).

35. Pap. XI 2 A 162 (p. 175); Journals, Dru (1387, p.

539).

53

36. Pap. XI 2 A 266 (p. 269); Journals, Dru (1406, p.

547).

37. Pap. XI 2 A 303 (p. 321).

38. Pap. XI 2 A 304 (p. 323).

39. Pap. XI 2 A 305 (p. 323 f.); Journals, Dru (1327, p.

509-510).

40. Pap. XI 2 A 305 (p. 326); Journals, Dru (1327, p.

511-512).

41. Pap. XI 2 A 305 (p. 327); Journals, Dru (1327, p.

512-513).

42. Pap. XI 2 A 305 (p. 327); Journals, Dru (1327, p.

513).

43. Pap. XI 2 A 301 (p. 316).

44. Pap. XI 2 A 301 (p. 316).

45. "gegen sie" (John's Gospel, 1st Epistle of St. John,

Paul's Epistles, especially to the Romans, Gala-

tians, Ephesians; Peter I); Luthers Werke (Er-

langen udg. edition) LXIII (1854), p. 115.

46. Pap. X 4 A 323 (p. 183); Journals, Dru (1225, p.

446).

47. Pap. X4 A 354 (p. 205).

48. Pap. X4 A 366 (p. 216).

49. Pap. XI 2 A 436 (p. 432).

50. Pap. 1 A 5 (p. 3); Journals, Dru (2, p. 1).

51. "Inter creatorem et creaturam nan potest tanta simili

tude notari, quin inter eos major sit dissimili

tude notanda." Denz. 432.

54

52. Q. disp. de spir. creat.; a. 10, ad 16.

53. De Ver.; q. 22 a. 4 corp.

54. Pap. VII 1 A 181 (p. 116, £.); Journals, Dru (616, p.

180-181).

55. "God foresees, ordains and works all by His un

changeable, everlasting and infallible Will; by

His thunderclap, the free will is enslaved on

earth and is brought to annihilation." Luther:

On the enslaved will (Op. lat, Vol. VII, 1873,

p. 133).

"We think that the newborn man's reason, heart

and will, with relation to the spiritual and the

divine is naturally incapable of knowing, be

lieving, grasping, thinking, willing, beginning,

fulfilling, working, cooperating with anything,

and that man is completely ruined and dead in

relation to the good." Form. Cone. Sol. decl. 11,7

(J. T. Mullen Die symbolischen Biicher der

evangeiisch-lutherischen Kirche, 1928, p. 589).

56. H. Diehm, op. cit., p. 92; also see "Die romisch-

katholische Theologie . . . ist im tiefsten dia-

lektisch": Karl Earth, Kirchliche Dogmatik II,

Die Lehre von Gott, (1940) 660.

57. W. Ruttenbeck; S0ren Kierkegaard, der christliche

Denker und sein werk, 1929, p. 233.

58. Pap. VIII 1 A 6 (p. 6); Journals, Dru (629, p. 192);

S.V. VI, p. 319; VII, p. 232.

59. Pap. VIII 2 B 81, 22 (p. 151).

60. S.V. XI 55-91.

61. S.V. XI 93-109.

55

62. S.V. XI 101.

63. S.V. XI 97; Kierkegaard: The Present Age, trans. A.

Dru & W. Lowrie, Oxford Univ. Press, 1940, p.

142-143.

64. S.V. XI 100; The Present Age, p. 148.

65. S.V. XI101; The Present Age, p. 149.

66. Pap. VIII 1 A 434 (p. 192); Journals, Dru (716, p.

224).

67. S.V. XI106; The Present Age, p. 158.

68. Pap. VII 2 B 235 (p. 66).

69. "On the other hand, ordination bestows an indelible

character." S.V. VII 232.

70. E. Geismar: S0ren Kierkegaard III, 1927, p. 81.

71. K. E. L^gstrup: Die Kategorie und das Amt der

Verkundigung im Hinblick auf Luther und

Kierkegaard, Evang. Theologie 1949, p. 263.

Cited in H. Diehm, op. cit, p. 136.

72. H. Diehm, op. cit., p. 135.

73. S.V. IX, 103; The Works of Love, trans, by David F.

Swenson & Lillian Marvin Swenson, Princeton

University Press, 1946, p. 86.

74. ibid., 223; The Works of Love, p. 188.

75. ibid., 224; The Works of Love, p. 189.

76. ibid., 221; The Works of Love, p. 186.

77. ibid., 103; The Works of Love, p. 86.

78. ibid.. 224; The Works of Love, p. 189.

56

79. ibid., 218; The Works of Love, p. 184.

80. Cf. the following: H. Ogiermann: Kierkegaard,

Orientierung, XV (1951), no. 9, pp. 100, ff.

81. S.V. XI, 127; The Sickness Unto Death, trans, by

Walter Lowrie, Princeton University Press,

1946, p. 18.

82. Cf. H. Ogiermann, op. cit., p. 113, ff., no. 10.

83. S.V. IV, 266; Philosophical Fragments, trans, by

David F. Swenson, Princeton University Press,

1936, p. 87.

84. Pap. X 3 A 454, 455 (p. 308).

85. Pap. X4 A 349 (p. 202).

86. Pap. X4 A 354 (p. 206).

87. H. Diehm, op. cit., p. 178.

88. Pap. XI A 481 (p. 307).

89. S.V. VII, 169.

90. Pap. X1A481 (p. 308).

91. H. Diehm, op. cit., p. 181.

92. See reference 84.

93. S.V. II, 318; Eitlier/Or, trans, by David F. Swenson,

Lillian M. Swenson, and Walter Lowrie, Prince

ton University Press, 1946, Vol. II, p. 294.

94. S.V. VII, 176; Concluding Unscientific Postscript,

trans, by David F. Swenson, completed by Wal

ter Lowrie, Princeton University Press, 1941, p.

188. Also: A Kierkegaard Anthology, edited

57

by Robert Bretall, Princeton University Press,

1947, p. 220.

95. S.V., IV 251; Philosophical Fragments, p. 72.

96. Pap. IX A 72 (p. 40).

97. S.V. XIV, 48; Attack Upon Christendom, trans, by

Walter Lowrie, Princeton University Press,

1944, p. 34.

98. Pap.X4A369(p. 218).

99. Erich Przywara: Kierkegaard-Newman. Newman

Studien. (Erste Folge) 1948, pp. 77-101.

58

Bibliography

The Works of Kierkegaard in

English Translation

1. L. M. Hollander, Selections from the Writings of

Kierkegaard. 239 pp. University of Texas Bulle

tin No. 2326. 1932.

2. The Diary of a Seducer (from Either/Or, Vol. 1,

translated by Knud Pick. 173 pp. The Dragon

Press, Ithaca, N.Y.). 1935.

3. Philosophical Fragments, translated and with an in

troduction by David F. Swenson. 105 pp.

Princeton University Press. 1936.

4. The Journals of S0ren Kierkegaard: A Selection

edited and translated by Alexander Dru. 603

pp. Oxford University Press. 1938.

5. Purity of Heart Is to Will One Thing: Spiritual

Preparation for the Feast of Confession (Part

One of Edifying Discourses in Various Spirits).

Translated and with an introduction by Doug

las V. Steere. 207 pp. Harper's. 1938.

59

6. The Point of View for My Work as an Author (in

cluding two notes about "The Individual" and

"On My Work as an Author"), translated by

Walter Lowrie. 174 pp. Oxford. 1939.

7. Fear and Trembling, translated by Robert Payne.

192 pp. Oxford. 1939.

8. The Present Age (latter part of "A Literary Re

view") and "Two Minor Ethico-Religious Trea

tises," translated by Alexander Dru and Walter

Lowrie. 163 pp. Oxford. 1940.

9. Christian Discourses (including "Discourses about

the Lilies and the Birds"-"The High Priest"-

"The Publican"-"The Woman that Was a Sin

ner"), translated by Walter Lowrie. 309 pp.

Oxford. 1940.

10.

»_/AlUlU. J.O'IV.

Stages on Life's Way, translated by Walter Lowrie.

472 pp. Princeton. 1940.

11. For Self-Examination, translated by Edna and

Howard Houg. Augsburg. 1940.

12. Fear and Trembling, translated by Walter Lowrie.

209 pp. Princeton. 1941.

13. Repetition, translated by Walter Lowrie. (With an

essay, "How Kierkegaard Got into English," by

W. L.) 200 pp. Princeton. 1941.

14. Thoughts on Crucial Situations in Human Life:

Three Discourses on Imagined Occasions.

Translated by David F. Swenson. 117 pp. Augs

burg Publishing House, Minneapolis, 1941.

15. The Sickness Unto Death, translated by Walter

Lowrie, 231 pp. Princeton. 1941.

60

16. The Lilies and the Birds, translated by A. S. Aid-

worth and W. S. Ferric. Daniel (London). 1941.

17. Concluding Unscientific Postscript to the "Philosoph

ical Fragments," translated by David F. Swen-

son; completed and edited by Walter Lowrie.

579 pp. Princeton University Press and Amer

ican-Scandinavian Foundation. 1941.

18. Training in Christianity (and the Edifying Dis

course which accompanied it), translated by

Walter Lowrie. 275 pp. Oxford. 1941; Princeton,

1944.

19. For Self-Examination and Judge for Yourselves!

(and Three Discourses, 1851), translated by

Walter Lowrie (except the final discourse,

"God's Unchangeableness," translated by David

F. Swenson). 243 pp. Oxford, 1941; Princeton,

1944.

20. The Gospel of Sufferings (Part III of "Edifying

Discourses in Various Spirits"). Translated by

A. S. Aldworth and W. S. Ferric. Daniel (Lon

don), 1942.

21. Edifying Discourses: Volume I, translated by David

F. Swenson and Lillian Marvin Swenson. Augs

burg, 1943.

22. Edifying Discourses: Volume II, translated by

David F. Swenson and Lillian Marvin Swenson.

Augsburg, 1944.

23. Either/Or: a Fragment of Life: Volume I, translated

by David F. Swenson and Lillian Marvin Swen

son; Volume II translated by Walter Lowrie.

387 pp., 304 pp. Princeton, 1944.

61

24. The Concept of Dread, translated by Walter Lowrie.

154 pp. Princeton, 1944.

25. Kierkegaard's Attack upon "Christendom," trans

lated and with an introduction by Walter

Lowrie. 303 pp. Princeton, 1944.

26. Edifying Discourses: Volume III, translated by

David F. Swenson and Lillian Marvin Swenson.

Augsburg, 1945.

27. Edifying Discourses: Volume IV, translated by

David F. Swenson and Lillian Marvin Swenson.

Augsburg, 1946.

28. Works of Love, translated by Lillian Marvin Swen

son. 330 pp. Princeton, 1946.

29. A Kierkegaard Anthology, edited by Robert Bretall.

487 pp. Princeton University Press, 1947.

62

A NOTE ON THE TYPE

IN WHICH THIS BOOK WAS SET

This book is set in Caledonia, a Linotype face created

in 1939 by W. A. DWiggins, which is by far one of the

best book types created in the last 50 years. It has a

simple, hard-working, feet-on-the-ground quality and

can be classed as a modern type face with excellent

color and good readability. The designer claims Cale

donia was created by putting a little of each of Scotch

Roman, Bulmer, Baskerville and Bodoni together and

producing a lively crisp-like book type. This book

was composed and printed by the York Composition

Company, Inc., of York, Pa., and bound by Moore

and Company of Baltimore. The typography and de

sign of this book are by Howard N. King.