Space in Theory
Spatial Practices
An Interdisciplinary Series in Cultural History, Geography and Literature
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Space in Theory
Spatial Practices
An Interdisciplinary Series in Cultural History, Geography and Literature
7
General Editors:
Robert Burden (University of Teesside) Stephan Kohl (Universität Würzburg) Editorial Board:
Christine Berberich Christoph Ehland Catrin Gersdorf Jan Hewitt Ralph Pordzik Chris Thurgar-Dawson Merle Tönnies
Space in Theory Kristeva, Foucault, Deleuze
Russell West-Pavlov
Amsterdam - New York, NY 2009
Cover photo: © Russell West-Pavlov The paper on which this book is printed meets the requirements of “ISO 9706:1994, Information and documentation - Paper for documents Requirements for permanence”. ISSN: 1871-689X ISBN: 978-90-420-2545-5 ©Editions Rodopi B.V., Amsterdam - New York, NY 2009 Printed in the Netherlands
The Spatial Practices Series The series Spatial Practices belongs to the topographical turn in cultural studies and aims to publish new work in the study of spaces and places which have been appropriated for cultural meanings: symbolic landscapes and urban places which have specific cultural meanings that construct, maintain, and circulate myths of a unified national or regional culture and their histories, or whose visible ironies deconstruct those myths. Taking up the lessons of the new cultural geography, papers are invited which attempt to build bridges between the disciplines of cultural history, literary and cultural studies, and geography. Spatial Practices aims to promote a new interdisciplinary kind of cultural history drawing on constructivist approaches to questions of culture and identity that insist that cultural “realities” are the effect of discourses, but also that cultural objects and their histories and geographies are read as texts, with formal and generic rules, tropes and topographies. Robert Burden Stephan Kohl
Za moju ženu Tatjana, moju kerku Iva, i moge sine Joshua i Niklas
Contents
Introduction: Entering Space
15
1.
Kristeva’s Chora
37
2.
Kristeva’s Kehre
63
3.
Foucault’s Spatial Discourse
111
4.
Foucault’s Discursive Spaces
143
5.
Deleuze’s Territories
169
6.
Deleuze’s Intensities
209
In Place of a Conclusion …
247
Bibliography
259
Index
271
Acknowledgements I am grateful to the BVG and S-Bahn Berlin GmbH which made available seating and heating on the Berlin commuter trains and trams, thus facilitating a large part of the writing of the first draft of this book. The Free University of Berlin kindly afforded me a sabbatical semester in which the subsequent writing was carried out. The stay in Melbourne was partly funded by a grant from the German Research Council (DFG). The Australian Centre and the English Department at the University of Melbourne provided the socio-spatial infrastructure for a productive stay in Australia. I wish to thank Professor Kate DarianSmith, Professor John Murphy, and Professor John Frow, for hosting my time as an honorary visiting fellow at Melbourne. In particular the Baillieu Library at the University turned out to be a mine of useful material, and its staff unfailingly friendly and helpful. Queen’s College, affiliated to the University of Melbourne, kindly accommodated me and my family during the stay in Melbourne. Thanks to Professor David Runia, the Master of Queens, and the other staff members there, for the warm welcome they afforded us. Warm thanks to Elke Demant and Franziska Fröhlich who produced the find version of the typescript. Finally, I am grateful to the two anonymous readers and the many helpful suggestions they made regarding an early version of this book. Berlin, August 2008
R.P.-W.
Note on References and Translations All references to works by Kristeva, Foucault and Deleuze are given, in order to ease the task of the reader, as short titles in the text. All other references are given according to the author/date method. Translations, wherever available, are taken from the most easily accessible editions. Where not otherwise indicated, translations are my own.
Introduction: Entering Space Spacing/Espacement It is perhaps only in the age of the word processor or PC that, as writers, we have begun to pay attention to the spaces between words. Constructing our text and re-reading it before printing it out, we scan the page on the screen, following the cursor, perhaps with the formatting symbols activated, and keep an eye out for spaces one-toomany or one-too-few. Maybe we have left- and right-flush margins without syllablebreaks, so that in some lines, the spaces between the words look unpleasantly large. Possibly we have the voice of a difficult editor in our ear, insisting perversely that after a full stop there be two spaces instead of the standard one (why on earth? but the editor’s word is law …). What are these spaces? Why their regularity – or irregularity? (Is an indentation a derivation or a perversion of the space between words?) Why their exact alignment within the space of the printed text? (A space at the end of the line is not allowed to disturb the flush margin of the text, nor does it indent the subsequent line – what distinguishes, then, margin and space?) Why the rules that govern their implementation (no space after a hyphen, but in some cases after a long dash)? Space has long been regarded in two ways: on the one hand, at a microcosmic level, as the gaps between things which, as it were, keep them apart; on the other hand, at a macrocosmic level, as the larger container into which all things are inserted. This, broadly speaking, has been the Euclidean understanding of space which has determined Western thinking since antiquity. It makes space neutral, homogenous, and insignificant, meaningless. Only the things which occupy space are of significance to philosophy or the sciences. With the inroads of twentieth-century physics, however, space began to be seen
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as less neutral or homogenous than before: Einstein’s theory of relativity showed that space appeared to have different consistencies, so that depending on the position of an experiencing or perceiving subject time might stretch or shrink accordingly. For the literary scholar, space was simply the background upon which writing was carried out. The relationship of space to writing (secondary, neutral, invisible) was similar to that of writing to thought (writing was merely the recording code necessary to preserve and fix thought, which, though primary, was always in danger of being forgotten). The deconstructionist philosopher Derrida has fundamentally questioned this hierarchy, suggesting that the economy of writing is not subservient to thought or speech, but actually is productive in its own right. Likewise, in an essay exploring the way the closure of any text can be undone by something which appears to be ‘outside’ but is always at work within the text, he speaks of space: L’écriture dite phonétique ne peut [...] fonctionner qu’en admettant en elle-même des ‘signes’ non-phonétiques (ponctuation, espacement, etc.) dont on s’apercevrait vite, à en examiner la structure et la nécessité, qu’ils tolèrent très mal le concept de signe. (Derrida, 1968: 45) [What is called phonetic writing can only function [...] by incorporating non-phonetic ‘signs’ (punctuation, spacing, etc.); but when we examine their structure and necessity, we will quickly see that they are ill described by the concept of signs. (Derrida 1973: 387)]
Derrida uses the presence of “spaces” in writing to illustrate the deconstructionist idea of something commonly regarded as extraneous to the text but which, upon closer examination, proves to be essential to its functioning. Yet this something cannot be assimilated to the signifying economy of the text itself – a space is not a sign, it has no meaning, it does not make sense. Deleuze intimated something similar when he noted that “Peut-être y a-t-il [...] un rapport de l’écriture encore plus menaçant que celui qu’elle est dite entretenir avec la mort, avec le silence” (Différence et repetition 4) [“perhaps writing entertains a relationship with silence which is altogether more threatening than its supposed relationship with death” (Difference and Repetition xxi)]. Space, like silence, is feared. Yet space and silence make sense, meaning, possible. Withoutspacesnocoherentsentencewouldexist. With spacing, however, it becomes possible to write, and read, meaningfully: “Without spaces no coherent sentence would exist.” In order
Introduction: Entering Space
17
to underline the active participation of spaces in the production of meaning (despite the incapacity of traditional theories of meaning to include space as part of their explanation of meaning), Derrida has recourse to the neologism “espacement” [“spacing”]. “Spacing” denotes the active, productive character of space. Far from being a neutral void in which objects are placed and events happen, it becomes a medium with its own consistency and its own agency. In a gloss on an interview with Houdebine and Scarpetta, Derrida has written that l’espacement est un concept qui comporte [...] une signification de force productive, positive, génératrice. Comme dissémination, comme différence, il comporte un motif génétique; ce n’est pas seulement l’intervalle, l’espace constitué entre deux (ce que veut dire aussi espacement au sens courant), mais l’espacement, l’opération ou en tout cas le mouvement de l’écartement (Derrida 1972: 108-9 n31) [spacing is a concept which [...] carries the meaning of a productive, positive, generative force. Like dissemination, like différence, it carries along with it a genetic motif: it is not only the interval, the space constituted between two things (which is the usual sense of spacing), but also spacing, the operation, or in any event, the movement of setting aside (Derrida 2002: 106 n42)]
Far from being a neutral void in which objects are placed and events happen, space/ing becomes a medium with its own consistency and, above all, its own productive agency. This book aims to offer an introduction to the role of space in three important French thinkers who regarded space as being the actively productive condition of social significance rather than merely the invisible, transparent receptacle for events, objects, and meanings.
The Return of Space Derrida’s notion of “spacing” [“espacement”] can also be understood as a parable for a larger process underway in French intellectual life from the 1950s onwards. The nineteenth-century had been the century of developmentalism à la Darwin and of historicism à la Ranke. Nineteenth-century social theories laboured under the hegemonic rule of a historicism which devalued, occluded and depoliticized space (Soja 1989: 4). Foucault, speaking in 1967, announced to a Parisian audience, “La grande hantise qui a obsédé le XIXe siècle a été, on le sait,
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Space in Theory
l’histoire: thèmes du développement et de l’arrêt, thèmes de la crise et du cycle, thèmes de l’accumulation du passé” (Dits et écrits IV, 752). [“As we know, the great obsession of the nineteenth century was history: themes of development and space, themes of crisis and cycle, themes of accumulation of the past” (The Essential Works II, 175)]. He went on to explain: L’époque actuelle serait peut-être plutôt l’époque de l’espace. Nous sommes à l’époque du simultané, nous sommes à l’époque de la juxtaposition, à l’époque du proche et du lointain, du côté à côté, du dispersé. Nous sommes à un moment où le monde s’éprouve, je crois, moins comme une grande vie qui se développerait à travers le temps que comme un réseau qui relie des points et qui entrecroise son écheveau. (Dits et écrits IV, 752) [The present age may be the age of space instead. We are in the era of the simultaneous, of juxtaposition, of the near and the far, of the sideby-side, of the scattered. We exist in a momenet when the world is experiencing, I believe, something less like a great life that would develop through time than like a network that connects points and weaves its skin. (The Essential Works II, 175)]
Elsewhere, Foucault, describing the “disqualification de l’espace” [“disqualification of space”] reigning since well before Bergson, parodically said: “L’espace, c’était ce qui était mort, figé, non dialectique, immobile. En revanche, le temps, c’était riche, fécond, vivant, dialectique” (Dits et écrits III, 34) [“Space was treated as the dead, the fixed, the undialectical, the immobile. Time on the contrary, was richness, fecundity, life, dialectic” (Power/Knowledge 70)]. Genette attacked “la tyrannie du point de vue diachronique introduit par le XIXe siècle” [“the tyranny of the diachronic perspective introduced by the nineteenth century” (Genette 1969: 48)] and Pierre Dockès referred to the nineteenth-century vision of the social world as “a wonderland of no dimensions” (Dockès 1969: 9). With the rise of structuralism, this epistemological hierarchy was progressively reversed, and the last thirty years have witnessed a turn towards analyses of space and away from historical analyses as the ultimate interpretative instrument. Edward Soja, for instance, has judged structuralism to be “one of the twentieth century’s most important avenues for the reassertion of space in critical social theory” (Soja 1989: 18). In 1966, as Parisian structuralism was at its zenith, Genette wrote:
Introduction: Entering Space
19
Un fait paraît certain, sur le plan de l’idéologie générale, c’est que le discrédit de l’espace qu’exprimait si bien la philosophie bergsonnienne a fait place aujourd’hui à une valorisation inverse, qui dit à sa façon que l’homme ‘préfère’ l’espace au temps. (Genette 1966: 107) [One thing seems clear, at the level of general ideology, and that is that the discreditation of space expressed so well in Bergson’s philosophy has been replaced by the inverse value judgement, one which declares that in his own way, man ‘prefers’ space to time.]
With the benefit of hindsight, it was possible to declaim, albeit with a dash of mandatory Latin quarter exaggeration, “Une conscience planétaire, topographique, refoule la conscience historique. La temporalité bascule dans la spatialité” [“A planetary, topographic consciousness has repressed historical consciousness. Temporality has toppled over into spatiality”] (Dosse 1995: 413). More recently, Dick Hebdige has confirmed this trend for the English-speaking intellectual context, diagnosing a broader “growing scepticism concerning older explanatory and predicative models based in history [which] has led to a renewed interest in the relatively neglected, ‘under-theorised’ dimension of space. The preference for spatial rather than historical analyses and analogies influential in certain kinds of critical writing signals some kind of shift”. Similarly, Fredric Jameson claimed that the dominant cultural mode is one defined by categories of space; we inhabit the synchronic, he claims, rather than the diachronic (Hebdige 1992:16). In the English-speaking world, there is no longer any need to conduct skirmishes around this “spatial turn” in the human sciences. The new prominence of space was heralded by cultural geographers such as Derek Gregory with Geographical Imaginations (1993), John Urry with Consuming Places (1995), or Edward Soja, with his formative Postmodern Geographies (1989) and Thirdspace (1996). More recently, Doreen Massey’s For Space (2005), clearly echoing Balibar and Althusser’s For Marx, has summarized the developments of the past decade. Comprehensive theories of space in society such as that offered by Henri Lefebvre have gained broad acceptance. Lefebvre posits that space is not a container, but rather, the very fabric of social existence, a medium woven of the relationships between subjects, their actions, and their environment. Space in its traditional sense is not a pre-existing receptacle for human action, but is created by that action; space, in turn, exerts its own variety of agency, modelling the human actors who have configured it. Spatial practices gather up both
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Space in Theory
environment and actors into a single over-determined continuum. Furthermore, space is always already caught up in representational practices, with different groups vying for control of discourses about space, but also of the messages which are coded in spatial artefacts themselves. CCTV cameras, for instance, even if they are not turned on, configure public space in such a way as to code it as being under constant surveillance, thus (ostensibly) discouraging crime (Mills 2003: 44-5). “Representations of space” controlled by powerful elites in society may be contested by subaltern space users who attempt to make out of them “spaces of representation” (Lefebvre 1974: 42-3, 48-9/Lefebvre 1991: 33, 38-9). Lefebvre’s seminal contribution to subsequent elaborations of spatial theory has been extensively acknowledged by theorists such as Harvey or Soja (Harvey 1989: 21819; Soja 1990: 40-50). The purpose of the present book is not to carry on rear-guard skirmishes over such theories. That task has been carried out thoroughly in recent decades. Recent contributions to spatial theorization such as Massey’s For Space, for instance, set out these assumptions as inaugural propositions which can be taken as widely accepted starting points for further explorations (Massey 2005: 9). This book, then, seeks, more modestly, to offer a spatial introduction to three French critical thinkers whose thought is particularly apposite to the “spatial turn” in the human sciences: Julia Kristeva, Michel Foucault and Gilles Deleuze. I have chosen Kristeva, Foucault and Deleuze as symptomatic (not, let me stress, as representative) of three broader streams of thought in French poststructuralist theory. I take Kristeva as belonging to a loose grouping of psychoanalytical critics with an interest in the gendering of human subjectivity, such as Irigaray, Cixous, Ledoeff, Clément, Kofman. I take Foucault as one of a school of theoreticians with a more historical or sociological approach, such as Bourdieu, Gauchet or Latour. Finally, I have selected Deleuze as one of a group of more playful, exploratory, speculative thinkers such as Derrida, Barthes, Baudrillard or Virilio. All of these thinkers are concerned with space to a greater or lesser extent. I do not intend to homogenize these rough groupings, or elide the manifest differences which can be drawn between thinkers thrown together in such an unceremonious manner. Nor do I pretend that these groupings could not be re-configured around other common themes. I merely wish to suggest that the three thinkers I have selected
Introduction: Entering Space
21
– though this trio could be expanded to include many more – may be understood as being symptomatic of a much larger field of thinkers. Of course, it would be possible to write a history of the emergence of spatial paradigms in French thought since 1960, mapping the “spatial turn” across all of these thinkers. That project, however, would go far beyond the purview of this book, whose very modest aim is simply to read Kristeva, Foucault and Deleuze through the filtering lens of the “spatial turn”. Curiously, there has been only sporadic and patchy attention to the important theme of space in these three central thinkers. With the exception of two essays on space in Kristeva and Foucault, two chapters of a book on Heidegger and Foucault, and one essay collection on Deleuze, the role of space in these three thinkers has barely been explored (Berry 1992: 250-64; Philo 1992: 137-61; Elden 2001: part 2; Buchanan&Lambert 2005). In a recent volume entitled Key Thinkers on Space and Place Kristeva does not rate a mention at all, and the article on Foucault merely recapitulates Chris Philo’s earlier piece on him (Philo 2004: 121-8). There may be a rash of spatial theory in the social sciences at the present time, but a fundamental debt to the detailed work of these three central theorists has yet to be acknowledged. Thinkers such as Kristeva, Foucault or Deleuze/Guattari have produced a considerable body of work which less explicitly advertises itself as a reflection upon space, than, say, that of Lefebvre or Virilio. Perhaps for this reason their contributions to this field of spatial studies have yet to be given detailed attention they deserve. The work of Kristeva, Foucault and Deleuze on space is none the less highly significant and it is time to give it the close analysis it merits.
The Production of Space The basic trait shared by Kristeva, Foucault and Deleuze/Guattari in their spatial thought is what Baudrillard identified as a “production paradigm” (Baudrillard 1987: 20-1). Manuel DeLanda has suggested that the “theme of disguising of process under product is the key to Deleuze’s philosophy since his philosophical method is, at least in part, designed to overcome the objective illusion fostered by this concealment” (DeLanda 2002: 73). This concern is not only Deleuze’s. Common to all three thinkers is a dual motif made up of ‘producer’
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and ‘product’, whose duality is constantly blurred by the introduction of the term ‘production’. All three are interested in the manner in which the spaces which we inhabit are to be understood as processes – as dynamic, ongoing series of events of which we ourselves are a part. The notions of space-producers and space-products are constantly present, only to be overhauled by the idea of space as production, indeed, as productivity. Thus we move away from notions of space as “the material/phenomenal rather than the abstract […] [as] being rather than becoming” (Massey 2005: 29) towards a conceptualization which is more fluid, more dynamic. All three thinkers are concerned to reverse a common-sense relation of product and producer, which makes the product the object of interpretation, behind which a deeper meaning is to be deciphered. This, according to Foucault, is merely another instance of production – the production or re-production of replicative meaning – and thus needs to be considered as part of the field to be analysed. To go beyond this reproductive paradigm of meaning, one must ask not what artefacts or spaces mean, but how they mean (Archéologie du savoir 39-42/Archaeology of Knowledge 30-3). A deeper truth is not sought behind the statement, the text, the artefact, or the image. Rather the point of intellectual enquiry is to ask how that statement, text, artefact, or image came to be, what made it possible. Instead of a truth hidden behind the statement, one searches for the machinery or process which has produced it. This is the fundamental paradigm shift of modern thought. In Marx, an idealist interpretation of history is left behind for an enquiry into the manner in which production occurs under capitalism. In Freud, the question of the interpretation of dreams modulates into the question of the formation of the repressed, normed, neurotic subject. In Nietzsche the fundamental question is that of the genealogy of morals, their contingent emergence through accidents of history rather than their assessment as eternal truth. And Heidegger’s famous Kehre [about-turn, turning] took him from an interrogation of beings to that which gives meaning to beings, or enables their very existence, that is, Being. Kristeva, Foucault and Deleuze and Guattari are one and all busy with the question of the how of meaning. Their enquiry treats meaning as something produced, something specific to a time and a place, and that emerges out of that context. The task then becomes to lay bare the conditions of possibility which allow meaning to be gen-
Introduction: Entering Space
23
erated – and upon which truth is then delineated, not as something essential, intrinsic, or eternal, but as the contingent product of a process of production. Space as a paradigm of intellectual enquiry is crucial here because to situate a cultural artefact in space is to bring it down to earth, to re-orient reflection towards questions of context, of materiality, of relationship, of causality and interaction. Meaning is thus a function of the space in which it emerges. Truth and falsehood are replaced by space as the matrix of meaning. An artefact no longer has ‘a’ meaning, no longer unveils ‘a’ truth under the stern scrutiny of the scholar, but rather, participates in myriad relations and connections which permit it to be in such a way that it can subsequently be asked to reveal its truth. But before that interrogation of truth can happen, a more profound interrogation is demanded, one that asks questions about position, location, context, contours and dimension. Spatial analysis no longer searches for the hidden sense of an artefact. Like the letter in Poe’s “Purloined Letter”, what is to be found inside is of minimal significance. The secrecy of the letter lies in the place to which it has been assigned – a place perfectly visible, but undetected because the police do not think to search in the most prominent site of all, the sideboard in the entrance hallway. Like Poe’s letter, which is turned “inside out” (Poe 1986: 347), space is the perfectly, obvious, manifest fabric of social existence, not its mysterious underside. Under regimes of spatial analysis, nothing can be revealed because nothing is hidden. Everything is open to view. To quote Wittgenstein in the Philosophische Untersuchungen, “Da alles offen daliegt, ist auch nichts zu erklären” – or, in the Tractatus, “Das Rätsel gibt es nicht” (Wittgenstein 1990: 164, 88) [“Since everything lies open to view there is nothing to explain” – “The riddle does not exist” (Wittgenstein 2001: 84; Wittgenstein 1974: 88)]. Likewise, Deleuze: “Il n’y a rien à comprendre, rien à interpréter” (Dialogues 10) [“There is nothing to understand, nothing to interpret” (Dialogues 4)]. Analysis no longer means unearthing a cryptic meaning hidden within the artefact, but rather, drawing attention to a complex of ambient connections which have simply been neglected until now. Thus Rajchman’s maxim, referring to Deleuze, can be understood more broadly: “philosophy is about connections, it is an art of multiple things held together by ‘disjunctive syntheses’, by logical conjunctions prior and irreducible to predication or identification” (Rajchman 2000: 4). In De-
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leuze’s own words: “Seul est retenu […] ce qui augmente le nombre de connexions” (Mille Plateaux 634) [“What is retained […] is only that which increases the number of connections” (Thousand Plateaux 508)]. The fundamental difference between Kristeva and Foucault, and then between the latter two and Deleuze and Guattari, lies in the distance they identify between conditions of possibility and the meaning produced. In the progression we will be tracing through these three thinkers, the places from which meaning is produced, and the meanings produced in those places gradually blur into one another. In the trajectory from Kristeva to Foucault to Deleuze and Guatarri, meaning becomes increasingly more immanent to its conditions of production. Space as an ‘exterior context’ to be read off the artefact may well replace truth as a ‘deep secret’ to be extracted from the work – but the separation of object and meaning, whether spatial conditions of possibility or overhauled hidden truth, can all too easily remain one in which the two are clearly distinguished. For this reason, theorists such as Lefebvre, who by no means shared the same political or theoretical assumptions as Kristeva, Foucault or Deleuze and Guattari, but none the less participated in the same ‘spatial turn’, insist that space is not a pre-existing container for artefacts and practices, but is constituted by them in a relationship of reciprocal influence and inflection. Artefacts are made possible by the spatial configurations which give rise to them, but artefacts in turn reconfigure the spaces they inhabit. Indeed, to pursue this logic to its inevitable conclusion, one must eventually abandon the distinction between space and artefact, or between space and meaning. Instead, space emerges as the sum of relations between artefacts; artefacts in turn are pervaded and traversed by the space which they help to configure. In the playful formulation of Hiram Stanley, space is to be conceived as not “full of things, but things [as] spaceful” (quoted by Kern 1983: 153-4). Poe’s purloined letter has, in the end, no other meaning than the place where it lies and the manner in which it mobilizes actors and their respective interrelationships around it. The letter exists in a dynamic social space which is the letter’s exclusive meaning. Letter and space, once again, define each other in the reciprocal dynamic highlighted by Derrida’s work on “espacement” [“spacing”].
Introduction: Entering Space
25
The trajectory I trace from Kristeva and Foucault to Deleuze and Guattari sees an increasing abandonment of a structuralist paradigm. Structuralism conceived of space in a manner similar to the ostensibly undifferentiated pre-cultural field which culture then configures, using meaning-making binary oppositions. Instead, the spatial paradigms of poststructuralism stress that space persists in a constant re-configuring of already extant configurations. There is no space outside those configurations, disfigurations or re-configurations, and no virginal space before configured space. Space is the agency of configurement, and the fabric of configurations is from the outset spatial. It is in those spatial processes of configuration and re-configuration that human life takes place and unfolds its unceasing dynamic. In pursuing this line of argument, the first and second chapters are devoted to an examination of the role of space in the very diverse work of Julia Kristeva since her major publication La Révolution du langage poétique in 1974. Chapter one begins with a summary of the essential features of Kristeva’s theory of the Semiotic and the Symbolic in cultural and linguistic life. It then goes on to stress that the seat of the Semiotic, the chora, simply means space. This is an aspect of Kristeva’s much commented theory which, curiously, has received virtually no attention. The space of the chora is a pre-linguistic space of only partly structured proto-meaning, a space which must be left behind but none the less is essential to the establishment of socialized Euclidean space with its regularities and linearities, and above all its regime of absence and presence. The space of the chora, celebrated on the one hand as a maternal space of colours and rhythms, is simultaneously excoriated by Kristeva as a space which, when not relinquished by the subject, merely leads to a schizophrenic cul de sac. At this stage, Kristeva’s work evinces a dichotomous structure in which the pre-subjective space of the chora is accepted as the condition of social space, at the cost of its inevitable relinquishment. However, as I show in chapter two, the progression of Kristeva’s researches throughout the 1980s and 1990s take on a somewhat different tenor. The spaces which she investigates are less and less predominantly textual spaces and more and more psychosocial spaces derived from her own work as a psychoanalyst. The remaining sections of the chapter investigate the manner in which the dichotomy between pre-subjective space and post-Oedipal socialized space is progressively eroded, with the once denigrated space of the
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Semiotic taking on an increasingly significant role in her conception of post-Oedipal subjective space. In her work on abjection, Kristeva scrutinizes the movements of rejection provoked by visions of fluidity, viscosity and formlessness. She traces them back to the moment of emergence of a pre-Oedipal subject. But in the implicit critique of fascism which her theory of abjection contains there is an equally implicit critique of the normative move from pre- to proto-subjectivity, and thus a less willing compliance with the imperatives of relinquishment of pre-subjective spatiality. Kristeva’s new emphasis upon the spatial parameters of life in the Symbolic realm continues with her work on depression. Depression is defined, following Freud, as a clinging to an absent or lost object. The absence of the object is internalized, cannibalistically, in place of the object itself. This is an empty subject, one hollowed out by its loss. Borders once again become the site of abjection in the next area of social life Kristeva turns her attention towards, that of the foreigner and immigrant. Once again brittle borders are the sign of a dysfunctional relationship to that first, fluid realm of pre-subjective being. In her later work on love and revolt, Kristeva increasingly imports aspects of the chora as a loosely-structured fluid spatiality into social practices attributed a redemptive or salutary value in society. This development culminates in the strong emphasis, in her most recent writings, upon storytelling and sensation as linked facets of an existence founded upon the plenitude of being. The third and fourth chapters on Foucault follow a similar twostage trajectory to the reading of Kristeva. I begin in chapter three by concentrating upon Foucault’s initially relatively abstract notion of space, one which is not dissimilar in its structural functioning to Kristeva’s chora. In chapter four I then move on to a much more complex and real-world notion of space as a crucial element in practices of power and contestation in society. This second notion of space can be aligned with Kristeva’s second phase, that of the practices of constructing an existence in the Symbolic. In both cases, the early interest in explicating the manner in which social reality is generated by an invisible ground cedes to a subsequent scrutiny of the manner in which that productive process continues to operate in a society traversed by everyday conflicts and contests.
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Chapter three begins by tracing Foucault’s already intense focus in the 1960s upon the spatiality of language, which explains to some extent the spatialization of discourse which underlies the method of Les Mots et les choses. Even in the 1960s Foucault was reflecting upon space as that which makes language in its (post)modern manifestations possible. From there it was but one further step to the notion of discursive space as a realm that could be thought of as a “trihedron”. Its triple dimensions were: first, the conditions of possibility which enabled one to think and say certain things; second, the network of statements which were generated by that grid of possibilities; and third, the tectonic fault lines where one discursive epoch or episteme broke off. The chapter illustrates such abstract concepts as the episteme and epistemic rupture by utilizing Foucault’s own well-known work on the “author function”. In particular it is literature, the privileged bearer of language as the space of thought, which Foucault, in the first phase of his work takes as being the seismograph for tectonic shifts in the episteme. I trace the transition to this more complex, power-ridden notion of space across Foucault’s various mentions of what he called “heterotopias”. The notion of the heterotopia, in its several manifestations through the 1960s, slides from a literary concept to one situated in concrete social sites at specific moments in history. In chapter four I show how in the second phase of Foucault’s work, a more dispersed and complex notion of social, rather than aesthetic, space takes over the role previously occupied by literature as the privileged focalizer of spatiality. Foucault’s uses of institutional or architectural examples in his work successively modulate from crudely analogical instances in the early phase to a detailed analysis of the interactions of institutions, real social practices (architecture, the spatial configuration of subjects in institutions), political practices, and a wide variety of discourses and forms of knowledge. The nexus of discourse, practice and space is one that is traversed from top to bottom by relations of power. Foucault coined the term dispositif [apparatus] to designate these complex bundles of discursive, spatial and political practices, for which I also employ the triad ‘power-knowledge-space’. The chapter explores examples of these bundles of power-knowledge-spatial practices, focussing upon Foucault’s own typical case studies: the hospital, the prison and the population of nineteenth-century cities. These examples exemplify the transforma-
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tion evinced in his work from the 1960s to the 1980s: namely, a development from a static model of discursive space to a dynamic model of social space, one which is shot through with power relations and participates actively in their productive work. The remaining two chapters, on Deleuze (and Guattari, his cowriter on several major works) relinquish the two-tier system employed for Kristeva and Foucault. Deleuze’s thought eschews from the outset any form of binarism. The distinction that I have traced between a more theoretical or discursively dominated phase and a later more experiential or politically accentuated phase, with a gradual blurring of the boundaries between the two, does not hold with Deleuze’s work. Admittedly, Deleuze did publish, in the 1950s, works on single philosophers, subsequently moving on to publications on broader thematic bundles. None the less, in each of his books, Deleuze works consistently to highlight immanent forms of production of meaning in a given social context. This production of meaning is coeval with the generation of life in its dynamism itself and therefore does not admit of dichotomized thought. It is for this reason that there can be no double articulation in my presentation of space in Deleuze. These chapters are thus obliged to relinquish a linear model of exposition, and have recourse instead to a loose series of theoretical concepts. These concepts can be considered as nodes of thought in Deleuze’s philosophy. Indeed, the construction of Deleuze’s philosophical corpus makes it virtually impossible to proceed otherwise. His reflection on space consistently proceeds ‘rhizomatically’, beginning in many dispersed sites, and inevitably spreading out to interconnect with other themes or topoi in a dense web of allusions and overlaps. The very structure of Deleuze’s thought vitiates a hierarchically arranged, linear mode of exposition, and forces an author such as myself similarly to proceed ‘nodally’ or ‘rhizomatically’. Chapter five commences with the notion of flow so as to establish the most primary ground of being in Deleuze and Guattari’s thought. Fluidity, difference, multiplicity are the basic generative facts of life, rather than clearly fixed identities or stabilities. This leads Deleuze and Guattari to eschew binaries, the contrastive differences upon which much social thought and practice is based. It causes them to reject the hypostatized 0-1 thinking of computational logic that arranges space according to alternating zones of presence and absence, inside and outside, here and there. Rather, they think in terms of an al-
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ternation between flow and the stemming of flow – what they call territorialization. Territory emerges when relationships of desire and attraction organize the flow of being in provisional zones of intensity. Such territorializations can occur in any area of organic, non-organic, animal, human or intellectual life. They are likewise subject to deterritorializations, when such zones subside, making room for new territorializations elsewhere under new conditions. Flow is then released once more to follow its fluid meanderings. Life in its cycles of becoming and unbecoming is an inherently spatial business. At the same time, however, Deleuze and Guattari recognize that the alternations of territorialization and de-territorialization have been co-opted by modern capitalism in a process of accelerated dissolution of traditional social relations so as to create new, consumer-oriented modes of social organization. Under this regime of cynical deterritorialization, the flow of becoming is displaced by the vectors of permanently insatiable consumer desire. One response to this constant de-territorialization under the ubiquitous regime of organized lack is what Deleuze and Guattari refer to as re-territorialization – attempts to reconstruct sites of recuperated social meaning and tradition. Often these evince neo-conservative traits of a most disturbing sort, as in reterritorialized identities such as ‘our’ nation, ‘mainstream’ culture, the traditional marriage, so-called Christian values, and so on. Against such movements of nostalgic recuperation, Deleuze and Guattari pose the “line of flight”; a constant de-territorialization which moves through given territorialities, casting overboard established certainties, towards a horizon of the as-yet-unknown. What constitutes a territoriality? Desire, according to Deleuze and Guattari. In chapter six, I trace the way in which desire fixes upon an area of becoming-being and converts its flow into a “zone of intensity”. This zone of intensity can be understood as a luminous sign which signals to us, beckons to us. The sign, for Deleuze and Guattari, signifies fully and is not subjected to the regime of lack evinced by the Saussurean rift between signifier and signified. The sign is what orients the vectors of desire which make all beings alive. It is the trigger of a plenitude of becoming, not the medium of the non-being of language and of things which founds subjectivity according to Lacan. Deleuze and Guattari’s insistence upon the plenitude of the sign thus goes hand in hand with their rejection of the Oedipus complex and its institutionalized regime of psycho-social lack. In contrast, they declare
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that the subject is multiple, but not lacking. The subject relates to language not as that which splits it from itself at the very moment of affording social identity, but as a further plane of becoming along which we move from intensity to intensity, from territoriality to territoriality. This regime is schizoid, an entirely positive term in their eyes, for it denotes a happy proximity to the materiality of the world and an engagement with its becoming instead of an abstracted distance towards it. Zones, planes, territorialities – the persistently spatial language of Deleuze and Guattari’s theory exemplifies their conviction that reality is a tangible fluid medium which we traverse, constantly transformed by it and hence guided by passions and sensuality, and not by a remote, abstract, mediated set of mental categories or linguistic terms. In order to conceptualize the relationships of self and flows of becoming, of sameness and difference, without having recourse to the binaries which they consistently eschew, Deleuze works with perhaps his most genial concept, that of the fold. The fold is a notion which reconciles identity and difference, subject and environment, inner and outer, singularity and multiplicity, by deeming these paired terms the diverse surfaces of a single folded fabric. My concluding chapter employs the notion of the fold to account, finally, for the two sides of Deleuze’s own oeuvre, its commitment to exploring a spatial ethos of plenitude and to critiquing the Oedipal economies of lack which dominate contemporary society. The final chapter suggests that from the perspective of Deleuze’s ethics of plenitude and critique of the politics of lack, it is possible to integrate Kristeva’s and Foucault’s work, in their turn, to a larger spatial theory with both a positive and a negative theory of social agency. This book is at once passionate and critical. It addresses the theory of Kristeva, Foucault and Deleuze from the point of view of an author who has been deeply formed by these three thinkers since his undergraduate degree, and whose peregrinations across Europe as a student and a teacher have been marked by successive readings of the texts analyzed. The approach of this book is enthusiastic, understanding these theories not merely as ways of comprehending the world, but also as instruments of articulating one’s place as a subject within it. Thus the theories are apprehended, in part at least, within the perspective of what Foucault called “le souci de soi” [“the care of self”], or what more recent philosophers, following Foucault’s lead, have
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termed “Lebensphilosophie” [life philosophy] or “sculpture de soi” [self-sculpture] (Schmid 1991; Schmid 1998; Onfray 1993). The book’s relationships with the writers it comments upon echoes that of an early translator/commentator of Foucault, Alan Sheridan, in his avowed intention to “praise” his object, appropriately for a meditation on space, “by making room” (Sheridan 1980: 1). At the same time, the book seeks to qualify praise while equally admitting critique. It mobilizes more critical, distanced perspectives upon Kristeva, Foucault and Deleuze so as to open up what may easily become an excessively proximate relationship to their thought. Likewise, to ensure that this book does not remain completely abstract and removed from the phenomena it tries to describe, but none the less in order to refract the theories through another medium, it attempts to illustrate the concepts it discusses via a large number of literary examples. A poem in a recent collection by Chris WallaceCrabbe lambasts many of the vices of modern life, among others, literary theory, But let them not proclaim I am A late for literary production For I spin magic from the clam And weave a bright web through deflection. The self that I was going to be Language has blocked out and picked But what I will be writing next Nobody living can predict. Look, there goes a flimsy text Bobbing across our mortal sea. (Wallace-Crabbe 2001: 38-9)
Wallace-Crabbe’s lampoon of the tired notion that language writes the self, and that the self is a mere producer rather than the creator of an oeuvre, is wonderful. He demands a notion of writing which eludes ‘reflection’, in its manifold senses, which is always in advance on the tame platitudes of ‘reflection’ (be it mimesis of contemporary antimimetic theory!). Always in excess of ‘reflection’ there is something more sinuous and complex – the word as “deflection”: “But what I will be writing next | Nobody living can predict.” Some sophisticated literature today is written, perversely enough, to reflect not merely reality, but literary theory. Such texts are intricate, pretentious – and generally self-impoverishing. The literary
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text, like the world itself, should continue to “deflect” theory, not reproduce it. Literature has always outstripped theory in its adherence to the wonders of complexity. At its best, in turn, theory, “flimsy” theory, is a perplexed attempt to confront the exciting complexities of reality, and in that spirit should acknowledge its debts to the literary text. To pin down literature to literary theory, then, whether in writing or reading, is to miss the point. Spatial theory, however, “bobbing across our mortal sea”, deals in basal realities, and is perhaps better equipped to elude the pitfalls of abstraction. As Stephen Muecke has written, “thinking about place-based continuity seems more sustainable in its key ecological and ethical perceptions [than temporal continuity]. In short, one lives in a place more than in a time” (Muecke 2004: 9). My literary examples remind us of the existential fabric which underlies and pervades the theories of space I discuss here. The short anecdotal glimpses into literary texts (from Barrico, de Beauvoir, Beckett, Bodroži or Bonnefoy, via Borges, Forster, Gide, Gilbert, Glissant, Hall, to Kafka, Ondaatje, Perec, Proust, Sartre, Warner and Woolf) in their working constitutes a way of opening up theory to the complexities of something outside itself. Theory does well to remember its own ground – in many cases the literary, textual space out of which it has arisen, even when it has forgotten that past. In part, this attempt to ground theoretical abstraction in the earthiness of the narrative I is a response to literary texts’ own foregrounding of spatial ordering. Todorov has proposed that we “distinguerons deux types principaux d’organisation du texte, suivant en cela une suggestion de Tomachevski […] On appellera le premier type l’ordre logique et temporel, le second – que Tomachevski identifie négativement – l’ordre spatial” (Todorov [1968] 1973: 68) [“distinguish two main types of organization of the text, thereby following a suggestion of Tomashevski […] We shall name the first type logical and temporal order, the second – that Tomashevki identifies negatively – spatial order” (Todorov 1981: 41; translation modified)]. In introducing this distinction, Todorov claims, he is merely following clear impulses in contemporary literary production: “Aujourd’hui, la littérature s’oriente vers des récits de type spatial et temporel [le temps de l’écriture], au détriment de la causalité” (Todorov [1968] 1973: 77) [“Today, literature is oriented towards narratives of a spatial and temporal type [the time of writing], to the detriment of causality” (Todorov 1981: 46)]. Other critics such as Joseph Frank stress that the
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dominant spatial tenor in literature since the modernist period merely represents an increased emphasis on an essential aspect of literary production that was previously latent but none the less always present, with sporadic eruptions manifested by maverick writers such as Sterne or Diderot (Frank 1978). Moreover, in paying attention to literary exemplifications of spatial conceptualization, I go down the same path as my three theorists: Kristeva, whose gaze is directed from the outset towards narratives and the manner in which they are generated historically (Le Texte du roman), intertextually (6KPLHLZWLNK/Desire in Language), subjectively (Histoires d’amour/Tales of Love) and finally socially (Le Génie feminine: Hannah Arendt/Life as Narrative); Foucault, for whom literature is central in his early work, and whose work broadens to include a plethora of textual forms in later phases of his thinking (see During 1992); and Deleuze, for whom literature forms a privileged avenue for forging a non-philosophy (see Lambert 2002; Rajchman 2000; and more specifically Bogue 2003; Bryden 2007; Buchanan & Marks (eds) 2000; Colombat 1990). Whereas the text itself aims to work in a linear and centripetal manner, battening down a clearly articulated argument, the very articulations of the text, the ‘hinges’ linking the sections, seek to generate a centrifugal effect. A linchpin by definition introduces a small fissure between door and frame, a fissure which anticipates and inaugurates the opening of the door itself. Thus any articulation is an opening, a breach in the closed structure whose construction it both maintains and weakens. The insertion of literary vignettes into this work is an attempt, in Derrida’s words, to introduce “l’espacement à la fois comme ‘intervalle’ ou différence et comme ouverture au dehors” (Derrida 1967: 96) [“spacing both as ‘interval’ or difference and as openness upon the outside” (Derrida 1973: 86)], so as to mark the debt I owe to the world I live in and the ground upon which we stand.
1. Kristeva’s Chora Eruption, Disruption The 1960s saw the literal eruption of space into a French academic tradition whose dominant paradigm until then had been historicist. Structuralism privileged the analysis of systemic rather than developmental modes of meaning-making. Its example for this change of focus was the work of Ferdinand de Saussure, who shifted the attention of linguistics from the diachronic study of language change to the synchronic study of linguistic systems. In its efforts to describe cultural systems in terms which were tabular, dispersed and stratified, rather than linear or filiatory, structuralism inevitably had recourse to spatial concepts. Foucault, who knew enough about structuralism to be able to deny being a structuralist, commented: Le structuralisme […] c’est l’effort pour établir, entre des éléments qui peuvent avoir été repartis à travers le temps, un ensemble de relations qui les fait apparaître comme juxtaposés, impliqués l’un par l’autre, bref, qui les fait apparaître comme une sorte de configuration. (Dits et écrits IV, 752) [Structuralism […] is an effort to establish, between elements which may have been spread along a time-line, a collection of relationships which cause them to appear as if juxtaposed, implied by one another, in short, which make them appear as a sort of configuration.]
Structuralism introduced an idiom whose terminology was spatially inflected. But this terminology would take on more political resonances in the work of poststructuralist theorists such as Foucault. In a famous interview with a group of geographers, he commented that dans le repérage des implantations, des délimitations, des découpages d’objets, des mises en tableau, des organisations en domaines, ce qu’on faisait affleurer, c’étaient des processus – historiques, bien sûr –
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Space in Theory de pouvoir. La description spatialisant des faits de discours ouvre sur l’analyse des effets de pouvoir qui leur sont liés. (Dits et écrits III, 34) [in the identification of implantations, delimitations, of marking out of objects, of tabularization, of organization in domains, what one brought to light were processes – historical processes of course – of power. The spatializing description of discursive facts opens onto the analysis of the power effects to which they are connected.]
The connections between spatial analysis and a close attention to power may also alert us to the disruptive force of spatial analysis as a paradigm shift. In drawing attention to the workings of power the new emphasis upon space unmasked the fallacious neutrality of knowledge itself. By politicizing regimes of discourse and of production of knowledge it necessarily casts into question the university institution as well. The eruption of space into academic discourse was one index of the deeper turbulence in the academy, a turbulence which would spark off the 1968 uprisings and would continue in intellectual debates for several decades to come. The work of Julia Kristeva needs to be understood in this context of eruption and disruption. The young Bulgarian scholar arrived in France for doctoral study in 1966, and defended her first doctorate (the minor doctorat de 3e cycle introduced to make up the shortfall of lecturers in the expanding university system) during the uproar of the May 1968 revolts (Le Texte du roman). Her massive senior doctorate (the time-honoured and weighty these d’Etat), which was defended at the radical University of Paris VIII-Vincennes in 1973, theorized this duo of eruption and disruption. The central concept of Kristeva’s major thesis, subsequently published as La Révolution du langage poétique (Revolution in Poetic Language) in 1974 was that of a turbulent and sensual pre-linguistic regime of not-quite-meaning (the Semiotic) which is subsequently organized, disciplined, coded and repressed by the societal rules of language and propositional meaning (the Symbolic, or what Kristeva also calls the Thetic). This pre-Oedipal regime is identified, physiologically, with the infant’s relation to the mother’s body, during the time in the womb and after birth – a relationship not yet marked by a sense of separate selfhood, and not yet organized by fully-fledged access to language and other social codes. What constitutes proto-meaning at this early stage are colours, sounds, sensations, movements, fragments of language, configured only in very rudimentary ways by parental
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care and the presence of family relationships. The child has not discovered its own separateness from the mother; nor has it discovered the punitive law of the Oedipal process; nor has it acceded to language and the notion of the lacked object, for which the word will stand in as a replacement. The Semiotic, as a domain of ephemeral, constantly evolving flows of semiotic material, has not yet been subject to segmentation, discipline, and the binary code of presence and absence which makes social meaning work. None the less, it is the necessary basis upon which those later regimes of socially processed meaning will build. The Semiotic “provides the matter, the impetus, and the subversive potential of all signification. It is the ‘raw material’ of signification, the corporeal, libidinal matter that must be harnessed and appropriately channelled for social cohesion and regulation” (Grosz 1990: 151). The Semiotic is a ‘becoming’ which will later be moulded into ‘being’, both semantic, and by extension, existential. Paradoxically, this realm prior to language can only be hypothesized, but not genuinely known, precisely because it comes before the language which would be necessary to report it. We can, however, indirectly deduce the existence of this pre-linguistic domain of proto-meaning. It can be known by its effects, when it surges up within the realm of ‘common sense language’ in the form of avantgarde texts, art or music, in a way which ‘makes no sense’ but, we suspect, has some sort of obscure or perverse logic. The order of the Symbolic is ruffled by the turbulent messiness of the Semiotic, by the muddle of signs apparently cut loose from a neatly delineated meaning. The linear communication of normal language is disrupted by the syntactic breakages, verbal fragmentation, typographical dispersal and semantic punning of the avant-garde poem. Perspective and realist portrayal are distorted by the unrecognizable forms, the shattered contours or the shrill colours and textures of abstract painting. Melodies, harmonies and rhythms are rendered strange in twelve-tone-row, concrete or other experimental music; the singing human itself becomes a weird form of instrument or sets about producing unsettling sound effects. All these alienating forms of literature, art or music are witnesses, according to Kristeva, of something which precedes – but also founds – social communication, whether verbal, visual or tonal. Such art forms resist easy interpretation, but none the less insistently sug-
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gest a tantalizing meaning-beyond-meaning. They are not formless, as one might at first glance think. They do not evince a total collapse of coherence. Rather, they bespeak more fluid, mobile manifestations of structuration upon which form has been imposed. The Semiotic, Kristeva claims, albeit lacking a central authoritarian rule “n’en est pas moins soumise à une réglementation, différente de celle de la loi symbolique, mais qui n’effectue pas moins des discontinuités en les articulant provisoirement, et en recommençant continuellement” (Révolution 25) [“is nevertheless subject to a regulating process (réglementation), which is different from that of symbolic law but nevertheless effectuates discontinuities by temporarily articulating them, and then starting over, again and again” (Revolution 26)]. Kristeva is thus interested in an ostensibly foreign, and feminized, mode of signification which precedes the ordered domain of socially useful language, but which, though cast off, repressed, is never entirely absent and may from time to time re-emerge in maverick semiotic practices such as art or experimental literature. Although she does not pay very much explicit attention to questions of space, these are latently present in her work, in various forms, from the outset. Space is anticipated in a suggestive passage in a textbook of linguistics she published just after completing her minor doctorate: Pour nous, sujets appartenant à une zone culturelle dans laquelle l’écriture est phonétique et reproduit à la lettre le langage phonétique, il est difficile d’imaginer qu’un type de langage – une écriture – ait pu exister et existe aujourd’hui pour de nombreux peuples, qui fonctionne indépendamment de la chaîne parlée, qui soit par conséquent non pas linéaire (comme l’est l’émission de la voix), mais spatiale, et qui enregistre ainsi un dispositif de différences qui où chaque marque obtient sa valeur sa valeur d’après sa place dans l’ensemble tracé. (Le Langage, cet inconnu 32) [For us, subjects belonging to a cultural zone in which writing is phonetic and reproduces phonetic language letter by letter [or literally], it is difficult to imagine that a type of language – a writing – might have existed and still exist today for many peoples, which functions independently of the spoken chain, and which is thus not linear (like the emission of the voice) but spatial, and which in this way registers a system of differences in which each mark gains its value by virtue of its position in the whole apparatus.]
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Here the concept of an ‘other’ language is proposed – a language which is unimaginable for us because its very form and conceptualization is utterly different from ours. Eluding the linearity we take to be the very essence of language, this other language remains under the threshold of our notions of meaning. It does not constitute sense on the basis of detachable units which can then be put together at will in a chain, and thus, for us, does not constitute meaning. At best it can be assimilated to a semi-linear oral economy. Leroi-Gouhran detects behind such arrangements of figures “un contexte oral avec lequel l’assemblage était coordonné et dont il reproduit spatialement les valeurs” [“an oral context with which the symbolic assembly was connected and whose values it reproduced spatially”] (Langage, cet inconnu 32). The site where Kristeva discovers such forms of writing is significant: des les grottes de Lascaux, on peut remarquer des rapports topographiques constants entre les figures des animaux représentés : au centre, bison et cheval; sur les bords, cerf et bouqetins ; à la périphérie, lions et rhinocéros. […] De tels dispositifs spatiaux semblent constituer le support graphique-matériel, et par conséquent durable et transmissible, de tout un système mythique ou cosmique propre à une société donnée. (Langage, cet inconnu 32: Kristeva’s emphasis) [from the caves of Lascaux onwards, it’s possible to trace constant topographical relations between the animals represented: at the centre, bison and horse, on the edges, deer and mountain goat, on the margins, lions and rhinoceros […] Such spatial assemblages seem to constitute the material and graphic, and thus enduring and transmittable support for a whole mythical or cosmic system of a given society.]
These non-linear systems of semiosis are to be found in caves – out of sight, below the surface of our culture, coming to light only after millennia of obscurity. The space of spatial writing is an ‘other’ space, separate and distinct from ours. Kristeva’s subsequent theory, working initially with the notion of “genotext” and “phenotext” in poetry (Quelques problèmes de sémiotique littéraire 208-34), elaborated further the notion of an “archaic” spatial domain of meaning that is unimaginable – unrepresentable, in other words – within the linear means of representation of a “later” cultural realm.
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In her magnum opus of 1974, Kristeva had recourse to texts from classical philosophy (Plato’s Timaeus) to describe an analogous pre-verbal domain which erupts as a disturbance of ordered language, coming to light in the realm of avant-garde literature and art. Her term for this domain of proto-meaning is chora – space: Platon insiste sur le caractère […] tout en mutation et en devenir, du réceptacle […] qui est nommé aussi espace () vis-à-vis de la raison […] ‘Une place indéfiniment; il ne peut subir la destruction, mais il fournit une siège à toutes choses qui ont un devenir […]’ Timée §52 […] (Révolution 23 n15) [Plato emphasizes that the receptacle […] which is also called space () vis-à-vis reason, is […] ‘Space which is everlasting, not admitting destruction, providing a situation for all things that come into being […] (Timaeus)] (Revolution 25 n11 239)
It is significant that Kristeva describes this fertile, matrix-like receptacle, out of which subsequent socially coded forms of communication emerge, as a space. Granted, Kristeva may simply be reiterating a trope going back as far as classical philosophy which masculinizes time and feminizes space (Jardine 1985: 24-5). Despite this acquiescence to an ancient misogynist stereotype, it is none the less striking that Kristeva consistently privileges the latter half of the binary, discretely but insistently foregrounding its spatial aspects, in her work on poetics. What erupts into the realm of coherent communication, disrupting the well-oiled functioning of common-sense semantics and syntax, is a space – but more significantly, space. It is curious that in the considerable body of critical literature on Kristeva’s work, the patently spatial character of the chora has received virtually no attention. This oversight is all the more striking for the fact that Kristeva returns to the point repeatedly, and as recently as 1996: ‘Father’s time, mother’s species’, disait Joyce. C’est en effet à l’espace générateur de notre espèce humaine que l’on pense en évoquant le nom et le destin des femmes, davantage qu’au temps, au devenir ou à l’histoire. […] Freud, à l’écoute des rêves et des fantasmes de ses patients, pensait que ‘l’hystérie était liée au lieu.’ Les études ultérieures sur l’apprentissage de la fonction symbolique par les enfants démontrent que la permanence et la qualité de l’amour maternel conditionnent l’apparition des premiers repères spatiaux. […] les exemples […] convergent tous vers cette problématique de l’espace
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que maintes religions à résurgences matriarcales attribuent à la ‘la femme’. (Les nouvelles maladies de l’âme 301-2) [Joyce said ‘Father’s time, mother’s species,’ and it seems indeed, that the evocation of women’s name and fate priviliges the space that generates the human species more than it does time, destiny, or history […] Freud grew to believe that ‘hysteria was linked to place.’ Subsequent studies on children’s aquisition of the symbolic function have shown that the permanency and quality of maternal love pave the way for the earliest spatial references […] the examples […] all converge upon the problematic of space, which so many religions with a matriarchal bent attribute to ‘the woman’. (New Maladies 204)]
Immediately following this passage, she goes on to recapitulate her central thesis since the mid-1970s: Platon, résumant à l’intérieur de son propre système les atomistes de l’Antiquité, l’avait désignée [cette problématique de l’espace] par l’aporie de la chora: espace matriciel, nourricier, innommable, antérieur à l’Un […] (Nouvelles maladies 302) [Plato, who echoed the atomists of antiquity within his own system, referred to as the aporia of the chora, a matrix-like space that is nourishing, unnameable, prior to the one […] (New Maladies 204)]
Thus from the 1970s, with the appearance of the mythical chora in her first major work, through to the present, the problematic of space recurs unmistakeably across the entire trajectory of Kristeva’s thought. This chapter seeks to review her theoretical productions from the 1970s onwards, beginning with this obvious but hitherto barely remarked aspect of La Révolution du langage poétique. Kristeva’s work is part of the general privileging of space over time which took France by storm in the 1960s and 1970s. Her description of the Semiotic, this pre-verbal domain which furnishes the conditions of verbal communication, stresses that the chora is an alternative form of space which underlies space as we think of it in its everyday sense. Nous empruntons le terme de chora à Platon dans le Timée pour designer une articulation tout provisoire, essentiellement mobile, constituée de mouvements et de leurs stases éphémères. Nous distinguons cette articulation incertaine et indéterminée, d’une disposition qui relève déjà de la représentation et qui se prête à l’intuition phénoménologique spatiale pour donner lieu à une géométrie. […] la chora elle-même, en tant que rupture et articulations – rythme – est préalable
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Space in Theory à […] à la spatialité et à la temporalité. Notre discours – le discours – chemine contre elle […] de sorte qu’on pourra la situer, à la rigueur même lui prêter une topologie, mais jamais l’axiomatiser. (Révolution 23) [We borrow the term chora from Plato’s Timaeus to denote an essentially mobile and extremely provisional articulation constituted by movements and their ephemeral stases. We differentiate this uncertain and undeterminate articulation from a disposition that already depends on representation, lends itself to phenomenological, spatial intuition, and gives rise to a geometry […] the chora as rupture and articulations (rhythm), precedes […] spatiality and temporality. Our discourse – all discourse – moves with and against the chora […] as a result, one can situate the chora and, if necessary, lend it a topology, but one can never give it axiomatic form. (Revolution 25-6)]
The chora is made up of movements and articulations. These movements and articulations constitute a spatial domain. It is a space which underlies and precedes, but by the same token eludes the dispositions of geometry or spatiality. Just as the chora precedes the segmentation of temporal experience, so too it precedes measurable, unified, empirical space as we are used to conceiving it. The space subsequent to the chora is Euclidean space, the stable, regular, knowable space of rationality and common-sense, upon which we all draw when we think about space. The Euclidean notion of space posits a container and medium unaffected by the changing objects, landscapes, persons or events, which inhabit it. The spaces of Euclidean stability are coeval with the world which is represented by common-sense thought and language. Space contains things, language represents them. In this down-to-earth view, space and the world are the pre-existent givens upon which language communicates and human action works. We take this sense of space for granted, and assume that it always has been this way and always will be. Kristeva, however, suggests that this space of common-sense, to paraphrase Foucault, also has a history (see Dits et écrits IV, 752-53), that it has emerged from a prior and very different sort of space. Kristeva’s feminization of the space of the chora, in contrast to Irigaray’s problematization of that selfsame feminization, has been trenchantly criticized, among others, by Judith Butler (Butler 1993: 35-42; for a riposte see however Nikolchina 2003). Clearly, Kristeva accepts classical philosophy’s masculine/feminine polarization of form as opposed to matter and time as opposed to space, thus essen-
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tializing the chora in ways which recent feminist theories find deeply problematic. Kristeva appears to essentialize maternity (see also Grosz 1989, Kuykendall 1989, Stanton 1989). Other theorists argue for a more indeterminate conception of maternity in her work (Ainley 1990, Ziarek 1992, Chase 1989). For our purposes the chora is less an essentialized localization of femininity than a de-essentialized version of space – one rendered dynamic and productive via its connection with embodiment.
Space before space Kristeva is interested primarily in the manner in which the Semiotic is canalized into the ordered forms of meaning which constitute the Symbolic, and the ways in which the Semiotic, conversely, then explodes back into those neat structures, usually in the guise of avantgarde literature and art. The terms with which she works are ambiguous. On the one hand, the model she constructs is a temporal one of early childhood development towards the acquisition of language and its concomitant logical processes. On the other hand, the countermodel she proposes, that of the “return of the repressed” Semiotic in the form of avant-garde artistic creation, is couched in spatial terms of eruption, effraction, displacement. In the ambiguous paradigms which underlie her dual model, what can be seen is the surging up of (deviant) space into (normative) temporality – an intrusion described in spatial terms. To this extent, the eruption of the space that was the chora and its concomitant Semiotic largely remains tacit, acknowledged only by the metaphors used to describe cultural processes. Consequently, Kristeva only seldom explicitly pursues the question of space. However, on the basis of the little she does say, it is possible to reconstruct the implications of her theory in terms of the spatial paradigm shift of the times. The space of the chora is a space not yet differentiated into the fundamental dichotomy of space-as-container and space-occupying objects/persons/events/landscapes. It thus eludes the basic tenets of Euclidean space. It is only later through the codings and regulations of this primordial, heterogeneous space, that Euclidean space will be constructed. It is for this reason that Kristeva attributes to this primordial, pre-Euclidean space, at the very utmost, a “topology” – perhaps
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one akin to the experimental topologies of alternatives spaces that have been envisaged since Riemann’s spatial models or Einstein’s theory of relativity and warped spaces. However, she refuses both a “geometry” and an “axiomatics” (Révolution 23/Revolution 25) both of which are redolent of Euclidean certainties. Just as the pre-language domain of meaning has not yet been carved up into the meaning-making blocks of syntactic units or of signifier/signified, so too the chora-space is prior to the division between space and things. If Kristeva asserts that the chora evinces “une modalité de la significance où la signe linguistique n’est pas encore articulé comme absence d’objet” (Révolution 25) [“a modality of significance in which the linguistic sign is not yet articulated as the absence of an object” (Revolution 26)], the same goes for pre-Euclidean space. The spatiality of the chora knows no absence. In contrast, Euclidean space, by installing a central dichotomy between space and things, separates things from their environment. By so doing, it gives rise to the possibility of absence. It is possible for a thing to be separate (absent from here or there), from which it is only a step further to imagining its absence tout court. Other notions of space which do not install such a separation, for instance the spatial conceptuality of Australian indigenous philosophy, are thus not plagued by absence, and thus enjoy a boundless plenitude, as connection with space is never severed. Things, objects, persons, events are always part of a continuum that one can always tap into, and whose loss thus does not need to be compensated for by accumulating discrete objects or wealth. In the words of the novelist Craig Roberston, “battles […] were not fought over territory, as each tribe was only interested in its sacred lands, and had no motivation to expand and conquer those of other tribes” (Roberston [1980] 2002: 74). This contrast is embodied in Marina Warner’s Indigo, in her fictive Caliban, named Dulé, and his adoptive mother Sycorax: Dulé developed an idea of the past that was foreign to the people among whom Sycorax had been raised; it was a lost country for him which he wanted to rediscover, whereas for her, the past abided, rolling into the present, an ocean swelling and falling back, then returning again. But Dulé apprehended that he was born in a place that the ocean never brought back to lay at his feet, even in fragments, a shell here, a pebble there: something lay far, beneath him, and he could not dive deep enough to retrieve it. (Warner 1992: 95)
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Dulé’s space is posited on the experiences of loss, separation, and absence brought about by the slave trade, whereas Sycorax’s experience of space is one in which past and present, here and there, flow in and out of one another. It is a space of fluid connectivity very akin to Kristeva’s chora. It is also, as we shall see in due course, one very similar to that deployed by Deleuze and Guattari in their spatial thinking. Entry into the Symbolic implies both an ordering of meaning and a battening down of space. Kristeva conceptualizes these two notions together by spatializing meaning in its visualized manifestation as sentences on the page: “la proposition et, pour autant qu’il lui est coexstensif, le jugement déplient ou linéarisent (par une concatenation ou par une application) la significantion (enunciation + denotation) ouverte par le thétique” (Révolution 53) [“the proposition, and judgement as well – to the extent that the latter is coextensive with the proposition – unfold or linearize (by concatenation or application) the signification (enunciation + denotation) opened up by the thetic” (Revolution 54)]. The “unfolding” of discursive space which occurs in the realm of the Symbolic (or Thetic, as Kristeva also names it, in derivation from ‘thesis’) carries the unmistakeable hallmark of Euclidean space. This “unfolded” space is even, constant and smooth. It is without ripples, curves, kinks, and favours linearities – linearities epitomized in the Western mode of writing. Kristeva’s comments on Euclidean space are not merely a passing whim. Thirty years later she reiterates, “Notre esprit – le language, les formes de signification que nous employons – est toujours interprété selon les catégories aristoéliciennes. […] la linguistique ou la logique d’aujourd’hui se construsient toujours suivant le même order: sujet-objet-prédicat” [“Our mind – language, the forms of meaning we employ – is always interpreted according to Aristotelian categories. […] Today’s linguistics and logics are always constructed according to the same subject-object-predicate order”]. We should make an effort, she suggests, to think the “l’espace de l’esprit […] la vie psychique autrement qu’à travers la géométrie euclidienne” [“space of the mind […] the functioning of psychic life in other ways than via Euclidean geometry”] (Au risque de la pensée 50). According to this Euclidean geometry, subject and object, utterance and enunciation are clearly distinguished, just as the notion of space-as-container allows objects to appear in all their self-identity. The unfolded linearity, the
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unvarying order, which they attain in the sentence-like series of the Thetic world of Symbolic order, is that of the straight lines of Euclidean regularity. Implicitly, Kristeva sets up a binary opposition between preEuclidean space and Euclidean space. This binary pair corresponds to the oppositions between chora/Semiotic and Symbolic, and, by extension, between the pre-oedipal and oedipal phases. Because we inevitably inhabit Euclidean space, the customary common-sense space of everyday life, we have difficulty envisaging other spaces and the values that accompany them. This is, of course, the problem which underlies any attempt to represent that which precedes representation. As Kristeva does not tire of pointing out, the chora or Semiotic can only be known indirectly, by the manner in which they disturb or disrupt the Symbolic. At the same time, however, the binary between preEuclidean space and Euclidean space is one which is a function of the rigid parameters of Euclidean space itself. The binary is necessary to show up the differences between the two regimes, but by the same token, it is produced by only one of them and may thus distort, perhaps even wilfully falsify, our understanding of the other regime. This, of course, is one of the salient contradictions within Kristeva’s theory, cognate with the contradiction between her insistence upon the revolutionary character of the Semiotic and her insistence upon its inevitable subordination to the Symbolic: Although the semiotic is a possibility of language that escapes the paternal law, it remains inevitably within or, indeed, beneath the territory of that law. Hence, poetic language and the pleasures of maternity constitute local displacements of the paternal law, temporary subversions which finally submit to that against which they initially rebel. (Butler 1990: 88)
As we shall see in the later part of this book, it is just such a binary which is disputed by Deleuze and Guattari. Kristeva herself will also gradually move away from the implication of such spatial oppositions. Two things are worth noting about the manner in which these spaces are presented in Kristeva’s writing. First, it is striking that these respective spaces are presented as successive stages in a developmental process. “L’ordre symbolique – ordre de communication verbale, ordre paternal de la généalogie filiale – est un ordre temporal. Pour l’animal parlant, il est l’horloge du temps objectif” [“The sym-
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bolic order – the order of verbal communication, the paternal order of filial genealogy – is a temporal order. For the speaking animal, it is the clock of objective time”] (Des Chinoises 39). The temporality of the Symbolic is imposed upon that which precedes it – a space (as noted above, the Semiotic is coeval with the chora, which means literally ‘space’). This implies that it is normal to move from one to the other, from atemporality into temporality, in a process of individual and societal maturation. Secondly, these respective spaces are arranged as a binary, and binaries almost unavoidably shape up as hierarchies. The earlier phase is inevitably coded as being of less value than the later phase. Unsurprisingly, although Kristeva welcomes the eruption of the Semiotic into the Symbolic in her semi-revolutionary post-1968 stage of writing, there is a lingering impression in her work that the domains to which these semiotic modes correspond are morally coded, and that the ineluctable developmental process she accepts as the condition of growing up into sociability is also the right one. The ambivalence which surrounded her work on space for a number of years can be ascribed to a tension between a conviction of the necessity of travelling the developmental path and a strong sense that ‘maturation’ means suffering. In the course of our subsequent analyses, we will see that Kristeva gradually relinquishes this binary structure. One significant problem which Kristeva addresses is the peripherality of subversion: “By relegating the source of subversion to a site outside of culture itself, Kristeva appears to foreclose the possibility of subversion as an effective or realizable cultural practice. Pleasure beyond the paternal law can only be imagined together with its inevitable impossibility” (Butler 1990: 88). However, Kristeva will increasingly place these respective structures (spatialized meaning vs. temporalized meaning; pre-Euclidean vs. Euclidean space) in the very midst of social life, rather than on respective sides of the border dividing pre-social and social life. In this way, the initial hierarchy will be deconstructed, allowing a much more fluid approach to different spaces and the modes of social relationship associated with them. In turn, the incipient hierarchies between different spaces will be interpreted not as a transcendent given, but as an effect of worldly power relations.
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These power relations are evident in the very functioning of the terminology. To think the contrast between the temporality of the Symbolic and the pre-temporal Semiotic as a developmental progress, for instance, is to retrospectively impose a temporal understanding upon an atemporal domain. The developmental thesis is thus a coercive model which colonizes, by epistemological means, one space at the hands of the other. Likewise, as I pointed out above, to conceptualize pre-Euclidean and Euclidean spaces as binary oppositions is to impose upon the former the very oppositions which underlie the latter – and which the former, as fluid domain of connectivity, does not know. The debate between these two modes of understanding time, space and meaning, then, is not simply a function of ‘the way things are’. Rather, it is the result of a power struggle between two competing modes of understanding the world. It is a function of power relations. To this extent, as we will see in due course, Kristeva’s later work on space will come closer to that of Deleuze and Guattari. They refuse to cede to modernity’s central narrative of spatial banishment and loss (the story of Oedipal struggle, the status of factual description) relegating it instead to the realm of coercive ideology.
Kristeva’s ambiguous spaces In a famous passage from his L’Invention du quotidien (The Practice of Everyday Life in English), Michel de Certeau describes the view from the World Trade Centre (as once was) in New York. He employs the magisterial view from the top of the twin towers to set up a contrast with the everyday itineraries of space-users inhabiting the labyrinthine city streets below. De Certeau clearly privileges the spatial “tactics” of embedded, ground-level space-users, but this does not prevent him from qualifying them as “blind”: “ils en ont une connaissance aussi aveugle que le corps à corps amouereux” (de Certeau 1980: 141) “their knowledge of them [the cities] is as blind as that of lovers in each other’s arms” (de Certeau 1984: 93)]. Behind his politicized privilege of the local and immediate habitation of material space is a lingering hierarchy which persists in ascribing true knowledge to the aerial objectivity and (stereo-)scopic command of Euclidean distanciation – paradoxically enough, a hierarchy which is re-inscribed in the very act of critiquing the eroticism of scopic power. This ambigu-
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ity in his work becomes more clearly evident, perhaps, in the wake of the 9/11 attacks which manifestly aimed at the phallic visibility of the towers. As aerial constructions, these viewpoints were most vulnerable to aerial attack by terrorists employing micro-“tactics”. “Blind” as the inhabitants of the streets below may have been, they were less trapped than the three thousand victims tragically caught in the blazing towers. And in contrast, the patently myopic, blundering, grand geopolitical strategies of the subsequent war on terrorism hardly need commentary half a decade later. 9/11 may demonstrate some of the aporias which are latent to Euclidean space and its visual regimes of spatial command. Conversely, it may also point up residual elements of pre-Euclidean space (local, haptic, tactical) which may bedevil the implementers of a centralistic New World Order. This broader framework of strategies and tactics of space in the messy world of post-9/11 geopolitics may point up what is at stake in the micro-spatialities of the Semiotic and the Symbolic. For the moment, I wish to continue to explore the ambiguities surrounding Kristeva’s attempts at working with a strongly hierarchical, binary mode of opposed spatial regimes (Semiotic vs. Symbolic). Which values are attached to the “folding” that preceded the moment of unfolding, the non-linear before the linearization of language and the Symbolic? Kristeva’s oppositional and hierarchical notions of space are dominated by the normativity of the Oedipal process – a process which is eminently spatial because it imposes a distance in the putatively incestuous proximity between mother and son. The postOedipal intersubjective exile is in turn replicated, in the psychoanalytic theory of 1970s France which Kristeva helped to elaborate, by a distance between the linguistic signifier and its referent (signified). Oedipus produces a fundamental absence of the signified. For Kristeva, growing-up in psychic terms means leaving behind the maternal body and entering into the abstract order of language. Language, with its dislocation of signifier and signified, its inevitable displacement of the thing by the sign, is part and parcel of the necessary removal from maternal space. The scission of maternal fusion jolts the child into a linguistic realm in which the signifier stands in the place of a lost plenitude – without, however, being able to re-
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plenish that lack. The signifier does nothing to bridge the gap – even worse, it cannot but perpetuate it. The Oedipal moment coinciding with this loss of earlier maternal space is thus a quintessentially spatial event. The Oedipal crisis imposes absence, thereby inaugurating space as a negative dimension in humanity and its language. As Foucault notes in a succinct summary: Le père est alors celui qui sépare, c’est-à-dire qui protège quand, prononçant la Loi, il noue en une expérience majeure l’espace, le règle et le langage. D’un coup sont donnés la distance tout au long de laquelle se développe la scansion des présences et des absences, la parole dont la forme première est celle de la contrainte, et le rapport du signifiant au signifié à partir duquel va se faire non seulement l’édification du langage mais aussi le rejet et la symbolisation du refoulé. (Dits et écrits I, 199) [Consequently, the father separates; that is, he is the one who protects when, in his proclamation of the Law, he links space, rules, and language within a single and major experience. At a stroke, he creates the distance along which will develop the scansion of presences and absences, the speech whose initial form is based on constraints, and finally, the relationship of the signifier to the signified which not only gives rise to the structure of language but also to the exclusion and symbolic transformation of repressed material.] (The Essential Works II, 15-16)
The post-exilic regime is posited upon dialectic of presence and absence, of object and (empty) space. This quintessentially Euclidean space is thus coeval with a linguistic regime of absence and presence. It is a regime which brooks no questions. It is only via presence and absence, via the difference between this and that (this is not that, which can be translated into spatial terminology as follows: this is here and not there, that is there and not here), that language can function at all. Identity is posited upon the basic binary of a non-a. Identity is differential, as is language. And without language, communication between discrete human subjects would be impossible. Indeed, without language, the separateness of individuals (their status as monads within an empty Euclidean social space) would possibly be vitiated, and with it, their very identity. There is, it seems, no alterative to this regime of spatial and linguistic absence. Kristeva is adamant about the consequences of a failure to emerge into the Symbolic realm. In some of her early work she argues
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that the price of not joining the Symbolic is the exclusion from language, history and politics. Speaking specifically of women’s ostensibly privileged connection to that domain, she accuses a woman who stays close to the formlessness of the maternal domain of evincing a dangerous complacency. Only an escape from the maternal space, she claims, facilitates an engagement with the wider world of society: Savoir qu’une identification censée être masculine, paternelle parce que support du symbole et du temps, est nécessaire, pour avoir voix au chapitre de la politique et de l’histoire. L’accomplir, cette identification, pour sortir du polymorphisme béat où, sans cela, une femme ici peut se complaire; et entrer ainsi dans une pratique sociale. (Des Chinoises 43) [We need to recognize that an identification which is supposedly masculine and paternal in character, because it is the basic for symbolization and for temporality, is necessary, because it allows one to have a voice in the congregation of political and historical participation. It’s necessary to accomplish this identification so as to escape from the serene polymorphism where a woman in the West can otherwise complacently tarry – so as to enter into social practice.]
Temporality must be taken up, at the cost of spatiality. In this account of psycho-social maturity Kristeva sees the maternal domain (that of polymorphous spatiality) as a place where one can only remain at the cost of falling out of social and linguistic processes. If there is no alternative to the Oedipal regime, there is likewise no alternative to Euclidean spatiality. For the early Kristeva, the spatial medium of the pre-Euclidean Semiotic must be left behind. One model of this failure to integrate with Euclidean space is proffered by Kristeva in the illustration of a schizophrenic mode of spatial organization. This mode of configuring space does not arrange objects against the background of an ordered, regular space which contains them, as in Euclidean space. Rather, the schizophrenic space places the subject within the accretive, haptic economy of an ‘and-and-andand’ without the salutary objectifying and ordering effect of distance. This focussing and clarifying distance vis-à-vis the earlier realm is relinquished by the schizophrenic: “L’opération essentielle qui domine l’espace du sujet en process et dont le schizophrène porte le témoignage douleureux, est une operation d’adjonction de territories – corporels, naturels, sociaux, investis par la pulsion” (Révolution 97) [“The essential operation dominating the space of the subject in proc-
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ess/on trial, and to which schizophrenia bears painful testimony, is that of the appending of territories – corporeal, natural, social - invested by drives” (Revolution 102)]. The schizoid space Kristeva speaks of here is one characterized by an immediate connection to things, without the intercalation operated by language as a system which represents, and thus distances, the world. This subject is caught in a relation of excessive proximity to the world. It negotiates space metonymically, without being able to attain the meta-level of spatial abstraction. Something resembling this schizoid space has been described by Piaget in his work on children’s conceptions of space. Piaget documents the child’s prescribed development towards an adult understanding of space – one which is akin to a mental bird’s eye view of space, distanced from places despite being embedded within a concrete spatial environment. Piaget’s infantile “pre-operational” stage of spatial conceptualization “implies that the child ‘may be able to negotiate successfully sequences or routes, but cannot reverse these, hypothesise about them, or add to them in any major way’” (Piaget 1929 in Ward 1979: 24). This child’s concept of space can only slide metonymically from one place to another, it cannot imaginatively gather up these places all at once. These material sites are the “folded” spaces which will be “unfolded” in language and Euclidean space. Such archaic spaces are “folded” together in a paranoid, intense agglomeration of subjects, things, affects, sensations, which all go to make up the gluey-ness of not-yet-(Euclidean)-space. Sartre gives some sense of this experience of space in his novel La Nausée: […] j’étais tout à l’heure au Jardin public. La racine du marronnier s’enfonçait dans la terre, juste au-dessous de mon banc. Je ne me rappelais plus que c’était une racine. Les mots s’étaient évanouis et, avec eux, la signification des choses, leurs modes d'emploi, les faibles repères que les hommes ont tracés à leur surface. J’étais assis, un peu voûté, la tête basse, seul en face de cette masse noire et noueuse entièrement brute et qui me faisait peur. […] la diversité des choses, leur individualité n’était qu’une apparence, un vernis. Ce vernis avait fondu, il restait des masses monstrueuses et molles, en désordre. (Sartre 1938 : 179-80) [ [ …] So I was in the park just now. The roots of the chestnut tree were sunk into the ground just underneath my bench. I couldn’t remember it was a root any more. The words had vanished and with
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them the significance of things, their methods of use, and the feeble points of reference which men have traced on their surface. I was sitting, stooping forward, head bowed, alone in front of this black, knotty mass, entirely beastly, which frightened me. […] the diversity of things, their individuality, were only an appearance, a veneer. This veneer had melted, leaving soft, monstrous, masses, all in disorder. (Sartre 1964: 126-7)]
What is lost along with the words to identify things in their discrete existence is the subject’s own distance from the world. Deprived of words and the screen they set up between him and the world, Sartre’s narrator finds himself surrounded by a mass of things in their overwhelming thingness. He discovers himself submerged in existence, impotent to remove himself from its overpowering proximity. The condition of transforming this not-yet-space into the binary of empty-“space” or filled-“space” is the imposition of distance typified by the Oedipal narrative. The tension of presence and absence is, fundamentally, a spatial one, both on the synchronic axis of nearness and distance (vitiated fusion, forbidden intimacy), but also on the diachronic axis which leads away from a lost paradise of foreclosed plenitude. Freud discovered a concrete example of this apprenticeship in distanciation in the childhood game of “fort/da” [“now you see it, now you don’t” – more literally, the dialectic of “gone”/“there again”, or, in more static spatial terms, “elsewhere”/“here” (Freud 1920: 1113/Freud 1961: 13-16)]. Freud’s account of the “fort/da” game dramatizes the rehearsal of distance as an obligatory condition of social life. Not to undergo this rite de passage, to traverse this process of distanciation is, from the normative perspective of Euclidean spatial logic, unthinkable, quite simply deviant. However, Kristeva’s position on Euclidean distanciation is ambiguous. She does offer other models which are analogous to that of schizoid accretion, but which do not resonate with the same negative connotations. One example of a more positive model of pre-Euclidean space is the linguistic mode of deixis associated with early childhood. In the first stages of language acquisition, children produce utterances based on the topic-comment model rather than the subject-predicate model. Deixis, linguistic ‘pointing’ (including pronouns and prepositions such as “this”, “that”, “here”, “there”) is one of the main markers of language in its primary stages. Any parent can testify to the importance of deictic pointing in early language acquisition! “Nous verrons
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dans ce phénomène […] la récurrence du repère spatial qui non seulement amorce le sémiotique, mais aussi étaye les premières acquisitions syntaxiques” (Polylogue 486-7) [“we see here a recurrence of the spatial marker, which not only initiates the semiotic disposition but also shores up the first syntactic aquisitions” (Desire in Language 287)]. In this deictic mode of language, the gesture of pointing and the spoken word participate in the immediate space of reference, but are also involved in the construction of an emergent linear, syntactic order of language. On the one hand, then, deixis cannot abstract or distance itself from an immediate environment. Deixis, by definition, is dependent upon pointing at things. Deictic shifters are so multipurpose in character precisely because they have no semantic content, and thus need context in order to be deployed. By the same token, deixis is a linguistic mode more metonymic than metaphoric, and thus eludes the dialectic of absence and presence which bedevils metaphor. On the other hand, though, Kristeva notes that the use of spatial reference points straddles both the Semiotic and the early phases of the syntactically structured Symbolic. Clearly deixis is a linguistic mode which dissolves the rigid oppositions between pre-Euclidean and Euclidean spatial consciousness. To that extent it retains its allegiances to the prebinary Semiotic – to the maternal space which eschews any dichotomy between presence and absence. Curiously, despite Kristeva’s adamant insistence that relinquishment of the earlier spatial mode is a necessary condition of social life, this relinquishment it is repeatedly registered as a loss. Once inserted within language, within the Symbolic, within the linearity of the Thetic, the “being of language” [“être du langage”], according to Lacan, turns out to be the “nonbeing of objects” [“non-être des objets”] (Lacan 1966: 627/Lacan 2007a: 524) – and to this one might add the non-being of an earlier type of spatial experience. What has been lost, tragically left behind, is a form of space more tangible, tactile and immediate. (Kristeva will recuperate this space, if we may anticipate the next chapter, in her later work on sensuality.) What she terms an “adjunction of territories” is a rich and un-distanced spatial immanence of the world. During early childhood, the incipient subject remains in a fluid relationship of easy communion with its environment. Subsequently, however, the socialized spatial subject finds itself imprisoned in a world of non-being, of mandatory absence. In the spatial
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terms of this conception of psychic development, the plenitude of an inaugural ‘here’ without an opposed term must be relinquished. The subject moves to a second-order ‘here’ – abstract, regimented, and constituted from the outset by an oppositional relationship to a lost ‘there’. Kristeva insistently privileges the maternal facets of the chora and the Semiotic, celebrating them as an alternative to the oppressive rigidities of the patriarchal system. Much of her mid- to late-1970s work on maternity collected in Histoires d’amour celebrates the intensity of the mother-child relationship and the ways in which it eludes the ossified structures of adult life – while mourning the inevitable exilic loss of maternal proximity: “Destin toujours douloureux, l’exil est la seule voie qui nous reste […] Dans ce deuil infini, où la langue et le corps ressuscitent […] j’ausculte le cadavre toujours chaud de ma mémoire maternelle” (L’Avenir d’une révolte 69) [“An always painful destiny, exile […] is the only way left […] In this infinite mourning, where language and the body rise from the dead […] I place an ear to the still-warm cadaver of my maternal memory” (Intimate Revolt 2445)]. Even in this very recent reiteration of the theme, however, Kristeva still accepts the inevitability of this exile. Seen from the point of view of the lacunary but inevitable ‘here” of adult, Euclidean space, the pre-Euclidean, maternal, schizoid or deictic space, with its happy accretion of whatever comes to hand, its reliance upon the immediacy of context (‘that and that and that’) can only be construed as deviant. Its blithe indifference to vectors of post-Oedipal desire, vectors that are condemned always to miss the objects they pursue, is so provocative that it must be labelled ‘abnormal’. Its preparedness to do without the distanced (and thus absentee, abstracted) overview, for the sake of a full nearness to things and places, flies in the face of post-Oedipal spatial logic. The attribution of labels such as “painful” or “pre-operational” works to obscure the possibility that its modalities might offer viable alternatives to those of post-Oedipal Symbolic. Kristeva provides a mirror image, virtually identical but reversed, of the thinking of Deleuze and Guattari at about the same time, who, as we shall see below, conceive of schizoid space (that is, accretive space) in far more positive terms. For them, this embedding in space must not necessarily be renounced. It becomes clear that exile
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from immediate space is the norm which Kristeva unquestioningly accepts, just as the moment of the Oedipal conflict, exile from the mother is ordered by the punishing father as the condition of social belonging. It is paradoxical that although Kristeva celebrates many of the characteristics of the chora as a space (its links to maternity, to the sensual materiality of the concrete sign of modernist art) she can only reject its chaotic materiality from the normative perspective of Euclidean space.
Writing the Semiotic Kristeva’s patently ambivalent relationship to the spatiality of the chora gives rise to a further inconsistency. She writes about the Semiotic, but rarely visits it on her own intellectual journey. When she does pass close to it, it is almost always regarded from a safe distance. A classic example of this ambivalent rapport to the spaces of the Semiotic is her work on modernist poetry. The schizoid space of accretion, which annexes territories without abstracting them, is figured in striking visual form in the classic modernist poem by Mallarmé, “Un Coup de dés” [“A throw of the dice”] which forms the heart of her Révolution du langage poétique (293-313; see also La Charité 1987). The poem, whose typography sketches a stellar dispersal, cascading from upper-left to bottom-right-hand corner across twenty pages, offers no clear explanation of its textual space. It merely invites the reader to scan its constellation of variously-sized subphrasal fragments so as to constitute fleeting scraps of local meaning. What comes to light in this ostentatious dispersal of the text at the heart of an exceedingly formal academic exercise (that of the senior doctorate guaranteeing entry to the ranks of the French university professorat) is the concretude of the spatial genesis of the chora within the domain of symbolic language. Into the Thetic realm par excellence (the major university thesis) bursts a jet of lava-like molten language, rupturing the typographical and syntactic order of academic systems of communication and hierarchical rituals of institutional initiation. Yet the intrusion of the Semiotic is contained by the framework of the Thetic, and held at a safe distance by its patent attribution to a modernist poet.
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Kristeva herself, as she candidly admits in La Révolution du langage poétique (23) [Revolution of Poetic Language (25)], rarely adventures outside the conceptual linearity of the Symbolic in her own academic work. Even novels such as Les Samouraïs are built around the fundamental duality of the roman à clef. Only a few exceptions to this rule are to be found in her academic work: the article ‘Stabat Mater’ included in Histoires d’amour, her later detours into personal writing in her work on the loss of the maternal language, or the meditative concluding pages of her book on Proust. (Histoires d’amour 295-327; L’Avenir d’une révolte 65-73; Le Temps sensible 3958/Tales of Love 234-64 ; Intimate Revolt 240-8; Time and Sense 2236). ‘Stabat Mater’ sets two texts, a poetic stream-of-consciousness around the experience of pregnancy and motherhood, and a more formal discussion of representations of the Virgin Mary, alongside one another. The duality of pregnancy, the intimate together-apartness of the mother-child relationship, structures the double meditation. This deconstruction of the Thetic mode of writing, however, is very tentative, and does not exceed the side-by-side of two texts, thus remaining well below the threshold of formal experimentation in academic writing evinced in the work of Irigaray or Derrida, to name only two comparable examples. Kristeva pays tribute to the spaces of the Semiotic, even inhabits their immediate vicinity on occasions, but does not venture there herself. It is only in the later work, where the relation between sensation and language is being explored, that Kristeva begins to adventure into a more sinuous, fluid mode of writing. It comes as no surprise, then, when Kristeva, in a recent piece, distances herself from Mallarmé’s “musique surveillée de sens” [“music watched over by meaning”] as the embodiment of the Semiotic’s effraction of the Symbolic. Rather, she turns to Colette’s “saveurs païennes” [“pagan flavour”] and to her “la langue du sensible” [“language of the sensory”] as the locus classicus of the later, less shy delving into the sinuosities of the Semiotic (L’Avenir d’une révolte 71/Intimate Revolt 246). Above all, it is in her own fiction, in particular in the three works which follow upon her first roman à these, Le vieil homme et les loups (1991), Possessions (1996) and Meurtre à Byzance (2004), where she launches more fully into a poetic mode of writing – though always maintaining the presence of a incisive, limpid, Thetic mode which regularly imposes itself within the body of a more poetic flow
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of meaning. Poesis, in her fiction, although ever more dominant, is never absolutely bereft of analysis. Despite her sustained interest in the disruptive eruption of a preOedipal space into the ordered, linearized realm of socially normed language, Kristeva appears, then, only gradually to genuinely question the dominance of the latter social and linguistic order: Kristeva accepts the oedipal structure and its necessary organising role in the acquisition of culture without seriously criticizing Freud. […] [She] will use basically unquestioned psychoanalytic tools to explain the way ‘texts’ of all kinds function […] [She] remains committed to psychoanalysis as an overarching framework or theoretical paradigm. (Grosz 1989: 102-3)
And she has remained committed (until quite recently) to the Oedipal genealogy as the path down which every subject must go. The unified, albeit patterned space of the chora must be left behind if a subject is to attain full subjecthood and enter the world of social existence. To be fair, Kristeva does stress that the Semiotic and the Symbolic can never be found in isolation from each other: “Le sujet étant toujours sémiotique et symbolique, tout système signifiant qu’il produit ne peut être ‘exclusivement’ sémiotique ou ‘exclusivement’ symbolique, mais il est obligatoirement marqué par une dette vis-à-vis de l’autre” (Révolution 22) [“Because the subject is always both semiotic and symbolic, no signifying system he produces can be either ‘exclusively’ semiotic or ‘exclusively’ symbolic, and is instead necessarily marked by an indebtedness to both” (Revolution 24)]. Yet this proclamation of heterogeneity and debt is none the less a secondary revision of a fundamental dichotomy which, though it may be palliated by such statements, is not wholly erased. The interlocking of Semiotic and Symbolic, though it may complicate the clear division between the pre-Oedipal and Oedipal phases insisted upon, for instance, by Lacan (to whom Kristeva owes much) never entirely abandons a fundamental dichotomous structure (Grosz 1990: 157-60). But its duality, as we will see, is increasingly eroded in her later writings from around 1980 onwards.
2. Kristeva’s Kehre The chora, always In a fine exemplification of Kristeva’s theory of the eruptive manifestations of presence, the chora continues to resurge in all her subsequent work, right through to the present – for instance, in the judicious lecture series on the necessity and possibility of revolt in the conformist, post-political 1990s (see La Révolte intime 19-20/Intimate Revolt 10-11). The theory of the chora was proposed in the heady (post-) revolutionary days of the early 1970s, and, if personal anecdotes are to be believed, put down on paper in one single feverish rush of writing (I owe this account to David Kelley). Yet it the chora has its own afterlife well beyond La Révolution du langage poétique and frequently resonates in Kristeva’s mature writing. Kristeva’s work from La Révolution du langage poétique onwards seeks less to overturn the structures of the Symbolic, than to ask the question: How does the subject manage life in the Symbolic? Parallels may be detected here with Foucault’s late works succeeding La volonté du savoir (1976) which pose a similar question: How does the subject manage its existence, and configure its life under regimes of surveillance? (see Histoire de la sexualité: 2 13-14/The History of Sexuality: 2 7-8). It is possible in the work of many French thinkers of this era to detect symptoms of an accommodation with mechanisms of social control, in the wake of the failed revolts and utopian aspirations of May 1968 (Starr 1995). In Kristeva’s case, it would appear that the increased orientation towards the pragmatics of life under the regime of the Symbolic are less a retreat from the political struggles of the 1970s, than a result of her engagement in another form of practice, that of psychoanalysis. The plethora of case studies which intersperse her theoretical reflections or aesthetic studies after the 1980s are an index of this in-
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creasingly hands-on approach to the pragmatics of human existence within the Symbolic. They embed her rigorous theoretical meditations, whether of psychoanalytic or philosophical nature, in the dialogical practice of a psychotherapy. In turn, the therapeutic session, in turn, is quite literally a synecdoche of the broader life of her patients and the contemporary society in which they live. One further symptom of an intimate engagement with contemporary existential contexts is a change of style. It is hardly a coincidence that in the wake of her engagement with psychoanalysis (the ‘talking cure’) Kristeva’s writing style became less technical and thesis-like, and more conversational. She herself notes that à partir du moment où j’ai entamé ma pratique analytique, mon écriture a changé. La cure apprivoise la langue quotidienne. L’analyse nous donne accès à notre mémoire infantile et nous parvenons à trouver des mots pour l’innommable, le sensible, la passion. C’est d’autant plus vrai pour un étranger ou une étrangère – comme moi – pour qui la langue française, jusqu’alors, avait été une sorte de code artificiel, théorique. Je parlais la langue artificielle de la philosophie, de la sémiologie, de la linguistique. (Au risque de la pensée 62-3) [from the moment when I began my [psycho]analytic practice, my writing changed. The cure tames everyday language. Psychoanalysis gives us access to our childhood memory and we come to find words for the unnameable, for sensuality, for passion. This is all the more so for a foreigner – like myself – for whom French had been, until then, an artificial, theoretical code. I had been speaking the artificial code of philosophy, semiology and linguistics.]
Likewise, it is hardly surprising, given the dialogical nature of psychoanalysis, that in Kristeva’s recent writing there are many indices of an oral context of delivery. She has a persistent habit of leaving marks of a text’s original address to an audience in the printed version. This proclivity finds its earliest manifestation in her unwillingness to erase the infelicities of expression from the first work she wrote in French, so as to preserve traces of its context of production (Le Texte du roman 193). Later works finish with a tag like “Si vous m’aviez suivi dans ce parcous volontiers heteroclite […]” (Au commencement était l’amour 77) [“If you have followed this deliberately unorthodox presentation […]” (In the Beginning was Love 59)]. These are peripheral symptoms of a significant paradigm shift in Kristeva’s work. From the late-1960s to the late-1970s, Kristeva’s
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spatial reflection staked out the spatial parameters of pre-Oedipal subject-formation as a fluid realm of becoming, as “le lieu d’un chaos qui est et qui devient” [“the site of a chaos which is and which becomes”] (Polylogue 57 n1; Kristeva’s emphases). The theory of the chora itself has also undergone a significant “becoming” since its original inception. Pippa Berry notes that Kristeva’s maternal origin occupies a liminal position. It is on the borderline between all polarities: […] this mysterious, negative ‘beginning’ is vitally related to the present as well as the future. […] for Kristeva, chora’s interest is not only in its association with what comes before the subject, but also as a means of thinking what might come after the subject. (Berry 1992: 256-7)
Indeed, the contours of the chora itself appear to undergo reworking as it undertakes its own textual trajectory towards the future in Kristeva’s work. From around 1980 onwards, beginning with Pouvoirs d’horreur, Kristeva has explored the consequences for post-Oedipal adult life of those dynamic spatial contours. This occurs in two principle ways. First, Kristeva increasingly imports spatial operations of the post-Oedipal subject into the pre-Oedipal realm. These imports will be discussed in the section which immediately follows on this one, with particular reference to abjection and melancholy. Secondly, she increasingly exports aspects of the chora into post-Oedipal, adult space, a matter which will be discussed in the sections below pertaining to racism and sensuality. First, however, let us turn to the importing of facets of post-Oedipal space into the domain of maternal fusion.
Abjection I remember, as a final year high-school student studying de Beauvoir’s Les belles images, my bewilderment at the narrator’s visceral rejection of her mother, described as “cette femme que je vomis” [“this woman that I vomit up”] (de Beauvoir 1967: 254). This expression made such an impact upon me that it is the only thing I have retained, a quarter of a century later, from that text. The possibility of an immediate physical reaction to a social relationship struck me as exaggerated – despite the patent evidence of my own viscerality, pure
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somatization unfathomable to myself at that time. What disturbed me even more, however, was that the French vomir quelq’un needed no mediating preposition like the English to vomit up or vomit out someone or something. But in retrospect what I had perhaps unwittingly identified in the French expression, the excessive syntactic proximity between the act of gagging, regurgitation, and that which was spat out, was the core of the matter. Maybe there was an inarticulate sense, in my vague discomfort with a syntactic difference, of an all-too-closeness which had to be rejected in a brusque assertion of the nascent subject’s own boundaries and autonomy. After all, despite my incapacity to make sense of this vomir quelq’un intellectually, some performative grasp of the notion of self-distancing came to the fore in my own striking out for the other side of the world only a few months later. What I had at some level approached, without realizing it, was something akin to the Kristevan concept of “abjection”. La Révolution du langage poétique picks up the Freudian concept of negation and “rejet” [“rejection”] to explain how the chora is a space in which a sort of proto-identity is constantly being constructed and deconstructed in the movement of sounds, colours, rhythms, motions, and pulsations of desire across the child’s infantile body (Révolution 101-50/Revolution 107-64). In Kristeva’s later work on “abjection”, she re-deploys the concept of negation to re-jink her ideas on proto-subjectivity. In Pouvoirs d’horreur (1980), Kristeva proposes a theory of expulsion which sketches the manner in which the proto-subject, even before the Oedipal phase and accession to language, is already beginning to delineate its own contours. “Avant le commencement: la séparation” (Pouvoirs d’horreur 20) [“Before the beginning: separation” (Powers of Horror 12)] is the telegraphic summary she gives of what she calls “abjection” The prefix ‘ab-’ signals the spatial aspect of this theory. Underlying Kristeva’s work subsequent to La Révolution du langage poétique is, alongside her continuing focus upon representation, subjectivity and temporality, a less obvious but equally important preoccupation with representation, subjectivity and spatiality. When, in the recent Sens et non-sens de la révolte (1999), Kristeva writes, “Ne craignons pas de raffiner ces explorations de l’espace subjectif, de ces méandres, de ces impasses” (Sens et non-sens de la révolte 17) [“Let
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us not be afraid to examine meticulously these explorations of subjective space, these complexities, these impasses” (The sense and NonSense of Revolt 9)], she is not employing a mere decorative turn of phrase. Rather, she is continuing a strand of her thought which considers subjectivity as a space – as something which is crafted spatially. Subjectivity is, from the outset, constructed and perpetuated spatially – by meanderings and impasses, by explorations and re-routing. As Victor Burgin observes, No space of representation without a subject, and no subject without a space it is not. This, of course, is precisely the import of the mirror stage […] For Julia Kristeva, however, there is a necessary gesture anterior to this first formation of an uncertain frontier in the mirror stage, a prior demarcation of space. (Burgin 1996: 16)
The theory of abjection continues the reflection upon the spaces at the origin of subjectivity. Into the erstwhile fluidity of the chora, however, it imports conflicts and demarcations hitherto reserved for the carving-up of the post-chora epoch. At the origin of subjectivity and its temporal trajectory from birth to death, is space – a space which continues to resonate all along the biographical path taken by the individual. The chora theory grounded the subject in a turbulent space of sensations; in the subsequent theory of abjection, Kristeva elaborates a spatial theory of genetic subjectivation, building upon the extant concept to create a more dynamic model of the emergence of selfhood. According to this model, becoming an individual is predicated upon carving out a space for oneself: “Avant même que les choses, pour lui [l’enfant] soient – avant donc qu’elles soient signifiables – il les expulse, dominé par la pulsion, et se fait son territoire à lui, bordé d’abject” (Pouvoirs 13) [“Even before things for [the child] are – hence before they are signifiable – he drives them out, dominated by the drive as he is, and constitutes his own territory, edged by the abject” (Powers 6)]. Before the object which will be internalized and loved and desired, there is the abject, that which has been thrown out. The subject itself is an abject in need of objects: “L’abjection de soi serait la forme culminante de cette expérience du sujet auquel est dévolié que tous ses objets ne reposent que sur la perte inaugurale fondant son propre être” (Pouvoirs 12) [“The abjection of self would be the culminating form of that experience of the subject to which it is revealed that all its ob-
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jects are based merely on the inaugural loss that laid the foundations of its own being” (Powers 5)]. The condition of subjecthood, even at this very early phase of existence, is the rejection of that closest other, the mother, whose much needed proximity will forever be associated with a threat to the proto-subject’s own existence and apartness. The desired other will thus always be a dreaded other. To become a subject is to become a separated being – but one only ever separated precariously. Fusion is nostalgically longed for, but terrifies us because it contains the threat of our obliteration. This theory of abjection draws upon anthropological material on the sacred or taboo nature of detachable body parts such as fingernails, hair, blood, menstrual fluids, etc., in some pre-writing cultures. Our own modern culture has replaced the sense of sacred fear with disgust (see Menninghaus 1997/Menninghaus 1999). Kristeva claims that this disgust at fluids such as breast milk, blood, menstrual blood, vomit, saliva, mucus, and so forth, is the adult reaction to viscosities which are not susceptible of clear delineation. Rejection (the gagging reaction or vomiting which accompanies disgust) is a visceral repetition of an archaic movement of expulsion by which the proto-subject once asserted its own distinction from the mother. Critics of Kristeva’s theory of abjection have remarked upon the manner in which Kristeva’s identification of abjection with a murderous desire to escape from a fusional nearness to the mother appears to contradict her location of subversion and revolt in the self-same maternal site (Menninghaus 1997: 547-9/Menninghaus 1999: 387-9). Obviously, proximity to the body of the mother can be interpreted in less confrontational, and politically less self-defeating ways (see Irigaray 1981/Irigaray 1993; West 2007). However, this central contradiction in Kristeva’s theory of abjection may be resolved by the more concrete, and politicized spatializations assumed by the later avatars of the theory (the abjection of foreigners within the body of the nation, for instance). Disgust is a reaction-formation which focuses upon viscosities symbolizing, quite concretely, the absence of clear demarcation, the blurring of boundaries. Its concomitant, ‘abjection’, as ‘throwing off’, clearly relates to the “rejection” at work in the chora, is a phenomenon whose repercussions continue to be felt as long as the subject is an individual. But that individualism is gained at a cost, that of eject-
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ing the first nurturer figure, and can only be maintained by repulsing future avatars of that pre-secession persona. All figures of fusion, according to the theory of abjection, will call up the prospect of the subject’s non-existence, and must therefore be violently expelled again and again, in reactions which range from the individual to the collective – from visceral bodily spasms which performatively enact the primordial negation of the subject’s own amorphous origin, to racist attacks which aim to expunge the ‘dirty foreigner’ from the body politic. All figures of fusion, whether on the micro- or the macro-scale, will provoke gestures of expulsion. All forms of fluidity, viscosity, inbetweenness, remind me that in my far-distant pre-subjective past, I, before I became I, was not-I, merged with another. What is at stake is the very existence of the subject, predicated upon its fragile contours. “In terms of the thermodynamic model that informs Freud’s concept of the death drive”, comments Burgin, “what is feared is the ‘entropy’ at the heart of all organization, all differentiation. In religious terms, it is the ‘dust’ to which we must all return” (Burgin 1996: 55). Kristeva has been accused of anti-Semitism and fascism for devoting so much analytical attention to Céline (Gidal 1983; Stone 1983). For her, this author epitomizes the individual, psychic roots of collective racial extremism and for precisely this reason merits analysis. According to Kristeva, one cannot combat racist-fascist attitudes without running the risk of merely polarizing and thus replicating them, if one does not understand their structure and genesis. The racist hatred of all elements which threaten the clarity of nationalist boundaries, all ‘impurity’ which sullies the body politic, can be seen to be the driving force behind the pogroms, programmes of genocide great and small, or ethnic cleansing which have scarred world history up to the most recent years. An analogous account of the fear of ‘maternal flows’ underlying the fascist mentality is offered by Klaus Theweleit’s Männerphantasien (Male Fantasies). There he analyses the writings of the fascist Freikorps militia of the 1920s which subsequently became Hitler’s SA and SS troops (Theweleit 1987/Theweleit 1993). If Kristeva’s work on abjection spatializes human subjectivity, constructing the image of the body and its interior and exterior through the very action of expulsion, then the practical criticism she embarks upon prefigures the later spatialization of identity she studies in her work on the nation, and on foreignness and racism. Céline’s work is thus treated by Kristeva as a “symptom”, in Jacqueline Rose’s words
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(Rose 1985: 155). Its significance is synecdochic, looking forward to the later critique of the nation. But by the time of the later explorations, Kristeva’s attitude to such structures will be more explicitly contestatory. Implicit in the critique of fascism which underlies her work on Céline and abjection is moreover an equally implicit critique of the normative movement from fluidity-cum-fusion to coherence-cumseparation. If the anxiety of clearly demarcated borders of selfhood brings forth faschoid social tendencies, then the relinquishment of the pre-subjective space of porous intersubjectivity cannot be quite as easily accepted as in an earlier phase of Kristeva’s writings.
Melancholy According to the account of selfhood proposed in Kristeva’s work on abjection, subjectivity is a brittle construct, a paranoid structure defensively walled up against intruders from the outside. The ramparts of the self are bulwarks against infiltration by polluting flows and fluids of all kinds – but by the same token, they remain vulnerable to those in-fluences. Unsurprisingly, both Lacan and Kristeva employ the metaphor of the fortress or castle. But, in the formulation of Bruno Bettelheim, it is an empty fortress, a ring of walls encircling a central absence (Pouvoirs 58-60/Powers 46-48; Lacan 1966: 97/Lacan 2007a: 98; Bettelheim 1967). The self that constructs its space in the act of expulsion is a self marked from the outset by loss. The subject that has asserted its own existence already in the pulsion-based gesture of distancing the pre-Oedipal mother is condemned to seek forever objects of love which will promise full replacement of that rejected other. The Abject, the ab-jected, thrown-out fusional nurturer figure, heralds the procession of subsequent Objects which will take its place. They precede the avatars of the later lost mother barred by the forbidding Oedipal father. To lose the Object, however, through dispute, divorce, death, or any number of other modes of separation, merely hollows out that cavern at the centre of the self – the cavern which was once carved out by the very process instrumental in clearing a space around the henceforth separate self. Separateness inaugurates many subsequent avatar-
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separations, and each of these creates echoes in the subject’s interior space – echoes of mourning and melancholy. In her work on depression, Soleil noir, Kristeva pursues the spatial implications of loss, inscribed from the outset in her work on subjectivity, into adult life. According to Freud, depression ensues when the subject refuses to accept the loss of an object in the process of mourning and instead clings stubbornly to that lost object. Indeed, the object’s absence is held on to as an ersatz-object (Freud 1997: 428-46/Freud 1999: 20118). The empty space left by the departure of the loved one is internalized and preserved as a walled-up mausoleum, rather than being left open to new objects of love. Depression is the process by which the subject stops the process of mourning, acceptance, forgetting, and replacement. Depression freezes the progress of life, with its cycle of psychic death and regeneration, in the moment of loss. Let us make these processes more concrete by reference to an Australian indigenous text. In Kevin Gilbert’s Living Black, a text documenting the experiences of indigenous Australians in the 1970s in a society which continued to treat them in many respects as colonized peoples, one of the interviewees, Horry Saunders, lamented: You say anything in the lingo to the kids now and they wonder what yer talkin’ about. It breaks my heart to think of it, the way they’re goin’. We are losin’ our identity, our culture, you know? Just fadin’ out all the time. A lot of our young people don’t want to be part of it or learn it. The more we lose, the more it destroyin’ us. (Gilbert 1978: 33)
The phenomenon registered here is one of cultural loss, and the concomitant melancholia which goes with it. Saunders mourns, “It breaks my heart to think of it, the way they’re goin’.” The central structure is a depressive one: what has been lost constitutes an absence possessing a deadly agency: “The more we lose, the more it destroyin’ us.” In the context of Australian indigenous dispossession, the loss of territory underlies all other losses. Land was the ground of all other cultural forms in indigenous society. Upon its confiscation by predatory white settler culture in the nineteenth century, all other indigenous cultural forms (from subsistence practices such as hunting, to social practice such as tribal meetings, through to the mythological forms which pervaded land and custom) crumbled away. Language and land and the loss of language and land are at the heart of this perverse corrosive
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dynamic, with the “more”/“more” structure expressing the increasing self-destruction wrought by a pool of linguistic resources in inverse proportion to its lost spatial matrix and dwindling demographic spread. The chiastic concatenation of more and less is implicitly palliated, however, by the act of enunciation and publication embodied in Gilbert’s texts. The semi-oral genre of Gilbert’s text stands in as an ersatz-object for the erstwhile orality of a culture rooted in the land; it points the way, in turn, to enhanced indigenous political emancipation, and the renewed cultural self-confidence of the land-rights movement in recent decades. This example may help us to deal with a major problem associated with Kristeva’s theory of melancholy. If the theory of depression is partly based upon the theory of abjection, then it would appear to continue to perpetuate the central contradiction around the body of the mother which emerges in the theory of abjection: the maternal body is the site of space (chora) but also of time (the ostensibly necessary stagist development towards separation); of subversion (the source of the Semiotic) but also of matricide (the inevitable aggression provoked by the stifling proximity to the mother). The loss of the maternal site entailed by maturation would thus appear to plunge the social subject inevitably into melancholy. Melancholy, like Freudian neurosis, would be the condition of ‘normal’ adult subjectivity. Yet alternative theories such as Irigaray’s notion of a fluid, interstitial relationship between mother and child, eschewing the polarities of fusion and separation (see Irigaray 1984/1992), would suggest that matricide and ensuing melancholy might be a contingent, socially conditioned, rather than necessary path for subjective maturation. Seen from this point of view, rather than being ascribed to a putatively ‘natural’ process of separation as the psycho-spatial prerequisite for mature adult subjectivity, melancholy ought to be situated clearly within a field of social power relations, ranging in scope from mother-child relations to larger political configurations. This critique may explain the ambivalent character of language in Kristeva’s theory of melancholy. Kristeva suggests that the depressive process can be resolved by regarding language as a “counterdepressant”. Language may thus function, paradoxically, as both symptom and palliative. The word always stands in for a thing which it is not and cannot be. It re-presents something, which by virtue of its own place-taking, is rendered absent. Language stands in for the lost
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object. Accession to language in the form of the Symbolic is a moment of loss of access to the unformed Semiotic. But at the same time, by virtue of its stand-in function, language and psychoanalytical dialogue can also become a transitional space for the mourning subject, helping the movement from the static moment of depression to a dynamism of continued existence: life goes on. Kristeva is careful to stress that literary production does not replace psychoanalysis as a therapeutic tool. Literary creation does not offer an “elaboration” in the form of the “consciousness raising” of psychoanalysis. Rather, literary creation works more by catharsis and sublimation (Soleil noir 34-5/Black Sun 23-24). It stands at one remove from the more everyday process of the ‘talking cure’, pointing in its direction, elucidating its processes and structures, but never taking its place. It is here that a central divergence in Kristeva’s work, between the avant-garde literary text and the everyday language of anguish, despair and psychoanalytic conversation, begins to come to the fore. While the literary text continues to manifest the resurgence of archaic pre-linguistic structures within the Symbolic, psychoanalysis, with its emphasis upon the hic-and-nunc of analytic dialogue, shifts towards an immanent model of psychic life. The latter trend becomes increasingly prominent in Kristeva’s work, and brings her ever closer to the spatial thought of the late Foucault and of Deleuze and Guattari. If depression, the clinging onto loss, is put in the long-term perspective of the very constitution of the subject by a process of separation, then it must be regarded as being symptomatic of a broader structure. Depression may be a sign not merely of a punctual loss, but more globally, of the subject’s subjection to loss. Loss, in this view, is the very condition of possibility of subjectivity. Neurosis, the ‘normal’ condition of all well-adjusted post-Oedipal subjects, is characterized by a stoic, albeit anxious, acceptance of that loss. Depression is merely the acute state of an otherwise chronic condition. These two terms could be seen simply as graduations upon a scale of bereavement. Such a regime would admit of calibrations, but not of exceptions to a tragic regime deemed to be our ineluctable destiny. From La Révolution du langage poétique onwards, says Liz Grosz, Kristeva “makes explicit the unspeakable cost of representation, which requires the child’s abandonment of the immediacy of its pleasures and experiences, together with the loss of the most privileged and powerful of all its love objects” (Grosz 1989: 231). By
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Soleil noir, however, the traversal of the Oedipal phase, the relinquishment of the chora and the Semiotic for the Symbolic is no longer simply accepted as a norm, but is questioned as a repressive and destructive social mechanism. My choice of an Australian indigenous anecdote as an exemplar of depression attempts to index the roots of depression in worldly structures of power and powerlessness. Such an example casts into question the stoic acceptance of loss as the human condition, and as the very medium we inhabit as speaking beings. As early as the 1980s, Kristeva’s work on depression already displays the contours of a refusal of norms of adjustment and integration which erupts in her later works on revolt and revolution. A subjective space patterned from the outset by bereavement, and forever condemned to labour under the sign of mourning, appears to be more and more untenable for her. Increasingly, semiotics rediscovers its legacy of resistance in the upsurging of the Semiotic.
The foreigner, the insurgent In Michael Ondaatje’s The English Patient, in a parody of Boccacio’s Decamerone, four people gather in a ruined Renaissance villa in the Tuscan countryside during the last days of World War Two. The villa has been scarred by the recent combats: “Some rooms could not be entered because of rubble. One bomb crater allowed moon and rain into the library – where there was in one corner a permanently soaked armchair” (Ondaatje 1992: 7-8). The ruined villa is a synecdoche for European civilization with its now discredited Renaissance and Enlightenment legacy. But with its gaping mortar-shell holes, “wounds” in its walls (Ondaatje 1992: 11), the villa also figures the warring European nations and their shredded borders and boundaries. The four refugees from a war that has moved north are a Canadian nurse, an Indian bomb-disposal specialist, an Italian-Canadian criminal who has been tortured as a spy – and an English patient dying slowly of severe burns to the whole body: the “man burned black. Who turned out to be, up close, an Englishman” (Ondaatje 1992: 85), is, however, neither English nor white. If Englishness has long been the acme of whiteness, both categories are seriously confuted by Ondaatje’s English patient. His Englishness is merely attributed: by association with a group of British 1930 expedition members in the West-
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ern Desert; or by identification with his lover Katherine Clifton and by appropriation of her husband’s place and name (Ondaatje 1992: 250); or, finally, by perverse opposition to the nation against whom he took up arms for the German forces in North Africa. He appears to acquire his Englishness by a conglomeration of operations (association, identification, appropriation, opposition) which collectively lay bare the artifice of nationality. “Everything about him was very English except for the fact that his body was tarred black, a bogman from history among the interrogating officers” (Ondaatje 1992: 96). These “things about him”, so many metonymies by which nationality is constructed, are stripped away: “here they were shedding skins” (Ondaatje 1992: 117). His is a scorched “black body” (Ondaatje 1992: 3), the colour of Englishness reversed into the very colour of the colonial other against which whiteness has perennially defined itself. The dying man, Almásy, has acquired his Englishness at school in England (Ondaatje 1992: 165), making it merely a prosthetic addition to a Hungarian identity, a nationality in turn generically unstable. He and the others are all “international bastards – born in one place and choosing to live elsewhere. Fighting to get back to or get away from our homelands all our lives” (Ondaatje 1992: 176). Englishness is thus an accretion, scorched off by the burns. But it is also a supplement, that which buttresses the ‘deeper’ identity of the permanently fluid Hungarian identity, not unlike the tannic acid sprayed on his burns at the hospital in Pisa “that hardened into a protective shell over his raw skin” (Ondaatje 1992: 48). Ondaatje’s English patient, the burned man, embodies, quite literally, Kristeva’s archetypical foreigner. Her foreigner bears one of the marks of the abject, one of the triggers of disgust: the loss of skin. “L’étranger est un écorché sous sa carapace d’activité ou d’infatigable ‘travailleur imigré’” (Etrangers à nous-mêmes 16) The English translation gives: “The foreigner is hypersensitive beneath his armour as activist or tireless ‘immigrant worker’” (Strangers to Ourselves 6) – thereby translating “écorché” figuratively and losing the brutal force of Kristeva’s “scorched” or “flayed” outsider. The foreigner is the flayed person, stripped of the protective epidermal coating of the nation, ejected from the national nest, ab-ject and vulnerable in a new environment. The foreigner, stripped naked to the raw flesh, is hated by the host nation because it reminds the natives of the fragility of their own outer mantle. The uncomfortable relationship between the
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foreigner and the local was neatly summarized by the German antiracism slogan of the 1980s that ran “Everyone is a foreigner – almost everywhere” [“Jeder ist ein Ausländer – fast überall”]. The foreigner is that which must be ‘abjected’, the foreign body in the commonwealth which reminds me of the fragility of the boundaries of the self, and the porosity of the boundaries of the nation. The fact that the foreigner can enter the host-country is often taken by the natives as evidence of the generosity of the nation (for which foreigners are proverbially ungrateful), thus pandering to national narcissism. But the fact of intrusion also raises a more disturbing suspicion that perhaps somehow the borders have failed in their essential function. They have failed to keep out that which does not belong, suggesting that the nation is somehow crumbling. The bounded self and the bounded nation exist in a mutually reinforcing symbiosis. I know who I am because I know where I belong, and the nation knows who it is because it is recognized by its citizens. The foreigner arrives on the border, and, stripped of her or his boundaries of national or personal identity, implicitly poses the uncomfortable question of my or our own boundaries: “Etrangement, l’étranger nous habite: il est la face cachée de notre identité, l’espace qui ruine notre demeure” (Etrangers 9) [“Strangely, the foreigner lives within us: he is the hidden face of our identity, the space that wrecks our abode” (Strangers 1)]. Kristeva highlights the symbiosis between national identity and individual identity by throwing them up against that polysemic entity which conflates in itself the threat to the individual and to the polis: l’étranger, the foreigner and the foreign space, abroad. Elsewhere and the immigrant from elsewhere ruins our dwelling [demeure], reactivates our forgotten mobility, and thus opens up the space of our identity to its constitutive other term. “Strangely, the stranger/strangeness dwells within us” [“Etrangement, l’étranger nous habite”] – strangely, because it is estranging to discover that what we took to be “we”, “us”, “here”, has been infiltrated by “them”, “there”. The “other space” of the Semiotic surges up in the national Symbolic, sowing disorder, but also revealing the conceptual ground upon which the Home, and by extension, its Homeowner, is constructed. It has become a political platitude to say that the homeland must be protected, and ironically, this is deeply true. For the homeland is
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indeed a vulnerable entity. “Homeland security” is under threat. Not merely because masked fanatics are everywhere on the prowl, but because the homeland has never ceased to be marked by the loss of that other space upon which it is predicated. The homeland is unwillingly connected to that abjected other realm in two interdependent senses: upon the other space as its ongoing but unavowed material precondition (often in a quite pragmatically literal sense: where does our unskilled, underpaid labour come from?), and upon its ongoing and willed erasure, as the rhetorical condition for the hermetic closure of the nation (whence the real meaning of the German slogan, “Germany is not a land of immigration” [“Deutschland ist kein Einwanderungsland”]). Because the other space as economic pre-condition and other space as erased contrast run at odds to each other, the homeland as that which is constructed out of the forgotten relationship with poor neighbours cannot but be a fragile entity. Into the conglomerate term ‘home-land’ something else is constantly threatening to intrude which will lay bare the spurious singularity of the term by inserting a hyphen. The hyphen, the connector, reveals within the concept its unseen dependence upon its environment. ‘Home-land’ would signal the difference at the heart of the nation which arises out of its constitutive relationship with the “Inquiétante, l’étrangété est en nous: nous sommes nos propres étrangers, nous sommes divisés” (Etrangers 268)]. [“Uncanny, foreignness is within us: we are our own foreigners, we are divided” (Strangers 181)]. The unhomely influence must be warded off, in an avatar of the primeval spasms of abjection: “le moi archaïque, narcissique, non encore délimité par le monde extérieur, projette hors de lui ce qu’il éprouve en lui-même comme dangereux ou déplaisant en soi, pour en fair un double étranger, inquiétant, démoniaque” (Etrangers 271) [“the archaic, narcissistic self, not yet demarcated by the outside world, projects out of itself what it experiences as dangerous or unpleasant in itself, making of it an alien double, uncanny and demoniacal” (Strangers 183)]. The solution is simple: expulsion, extradition, deportation. In order words, the abject must be cast out. At the time of writing Etrangers à nous-mêmes, such exclusionist stances were clearly un-
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tenable in a Europe of increasing political integration, but also increasing racism. Victor Burgin comments: In this changed space, this new geometry, the abject can no longer be banished beyond some charmed, perfectly Euclidean circle. The postmodern spaces of our ‘changing places’ can now barely accommodate the old ghettos, which are going the way of the walled city-state. (Burgin 1996: 56)
By this stage of Kristeva’s reflection, it is becoming clear that the space of loss and abjection that underlies subjectivity also patterns social spaces at a macro-level. The same parameters of self-definition by exclusion and ejection appear to similarly constitute the macrosubjectivity of the nation. Abjection with national dimension founds the regimes of exclusion which increasingly marginalize large tracts of the European population (the poor within the gates), not to mention those who live beyond the borders of Europe (Sens et non-sens 1415/Sense and Non-Sense 7-8). Loss is not a given, it is created politically and institutionally. It is co-opted by nationalist rhetoric, whipped up by the incantations of terrorist threats. We can take the measure of this new perspective in Kristeva by examining to one of her late texts, a talk on the foreigner as “translator” published in L’Avenir d’une révolte. The talk begins with a meditation upon the foreigner as a “translator” whose translations do not erase the traces of the source language: “L’étranger est un traducteur non idéal: on repère toujours, plus ou moins, ‘quelque chose’ par où s’insinue sa différence” (L’Avenir d’une révolte 61-2) [“The foreigner is a nonideal translator: one can almost always locate something whereby his difference seeps through” (Intimate Revolt 241)]. Abruptly, then, she switches into autobiographical mode: “Supposons que je sois ce traducteur” (L’Avenir d’une révolte 65) [“Suppose that I am this translator” (Intimate Revolt 244)]. What then follows is a remarkably frank account of the loss but persistence of Kristeva’s native Bulgarian. It is worth noting the striking structural similarities with the corporeal theory of the maternal, matrix-like chora of two decades earlier: Je n’ai pas perdu ma langue maternelle. Elle me revient, de plus en plus difficilement, je l’avoue, en rêve. […] Dans ce deuil infini, où la langue et le corps ressuscitent dans les battements d’un français gref-
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fé, j’ausculte le cadavre toujours chaud de ma mémoire maternelle. (L’Avenir d’une révolte 65, 69) [I have not forgotten my maternal language. It comes back to me with increasing difficulty, I must admit - in my dreams; […] In this infinite mourning, where language and the body rise from the dead in the pulse of a grafted French, I place an ear to the still-warm cadaver of my maternal memory. (Intimate Revolt 242, 245)]
Kristeva’s description evinces all the dualism of the theory of the chora. French is the language of designation, of proposition, of logic, of sociability: “Nommer l’être me fait être: corps et âme, je vis en français” (L’Avenir d’une révolte 66) [“To name being allows me to be: I live in French, body and soul” (Intimate Revolt 243)]; “j’aime la frappe latine du concept, l’obligation de choisir pour tracer la chute classique de l’argument” (L’Avenir d’une révolte71) [“I like the Latin touch of the concept, the obligation to choose in order to trace the classical cadence of the argument” (Intimate Revolt 246)]. Her childhood Bulgarian resurges, an unruly and irrational force from ‘below’ which disturbs the regularities of French. With “les ambiguïtés lexicales et les sens pluriels, souvent indécidables, de l’idiome bulgare, insuffisamment rompu au cartésianisme, en résonance avec la prière du cœur et la nuit du sensible” (L’Avenir d’une révolte 71) [“the lexical ambiguities and often vague plural meanings of the Bulgarian idiom, insufficiently severed from Cartesianism, in resonance with the prayer of the heart and the darkness of the sensory”(Intimate Revolt 245-6 )]. French may impose an argumentative structure, but it is in narrative that the influence of Bulgarian makes itself felt: Pourtant, lorsque l’intrique s’en mêle, c'est-à-dire qu’à chaque fois que l’Être me revient comme une histoire, […] naturellement celle d’un songe, d’une passion ou d’un meurtre, alors une houle qui n’est pas des mots, avec sa musique bien à elle, m’impose une syntaxe maladroite, et ces métaphores abyssales qui, si elles n’ont rien à voir avec la politesse et l’évidence française, infiltrent ma sérénité d’une byzantine inquiétude. (L’Avenir d’une révolte 66-7) [Yet when plot interferes, that is, each time being returns to me like a story […] then a surge that is not composed of words, with its own music, imposes an awkward syntax on me. These abysmal metaphors, which have nothing to do with French politeness and clarity, infiltrate my serenity with a byzantine uneasiness. (Intimate Revolt 243)]
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Should we have any doubts about the analogies with the theory of the Semiotic and its resurgence within the Symbolic, Kristeva formulates this uneasy coexistence of two languages in specifically architectural terms which resonate with her earlier insistence that the chora is a space: Mais par-dessus cette crypte enfouie, sur ce réservoir stagnant qui croupit et se délite, j’ai bâti une nouvelle demeure que j’habite et qui m’habite, et dans laquelle se déroule ce qu’on pourrait appeler, non sans prétention évidemment, la vraie vie de l’esprit et de la chair. (L’Avenir d’une révolte 66) [But above this hidden crypt, on this stagnant and swamplike reservoir, I have built a new dwelling that I inhabit and that inhabits me, where what one might call, somewhat pretentiously, the true life of the mind and flesh unfolds. (Intimate Revolt 243)]
By striking an architectural tenor here, Kristeva underlines the analogy with the earlier spatial theory of Semiotic and Symbolic, of chora and socially utilitarian language. From the horizontal space of the nation infiltrated by the never-quite fluent foreigner, with its frequent topoi of dwelling, Kristeva’s account gradually modulates towards a vertical paradigm of multiple linguistic spaces. French is erected above the buried but not dead body of Bulgarian, the ab-jected putrefying other. That other language continues to surge up into the strict logic and clarity of French as a musicality, a disturbance of syntax, but also as a contamination, thus appropriating the terms of the choraSymbolic theory. A significant change has occurred, however, in this theoretical avatar. Both components of the dual system are located in the social world. Both languages are now part of the Symbolic. Bulgarian, albeit the mother tongue and intimately attached to the childhood world, is clearly always already part of a social structure, and not part of a presocial womb-world. If there is a Semiotic at work here (and Kristeva’s choice of metaphors enforces this analogy) it is a Semiotic, however, which is lodged, from the outset, in the Symbolic, not before or outside it. The previous duality has been blurred. From now on, there is only one realm in which the production of the social takes place, and that is the social itself. If there is transcendence, it is one which is immanent, through and through.
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What may appear as a philosophical subtlety is of considerable political importance. By abolishing the duality the earlier theory of the chora, and situating the Semiotic within the Symbolic, Kristeva indicates that she wants to have no truck with dualisms of any sort – for it is on the basis of such dualisms that the very nationalism and racisms that she opposes can be erected. The hierarchy that she experiences between French and Bulgarian is one which, though she does not say it explicitly, arises from the resolute monolingualism of French universalism and republicanism: Nulle part on n’est plus étranger qu’en France. […] Même lorsqu’il est légalement et administrativement accepté, l’étranger n’est pas pour autant admis dans les familles. Son usage malencontreux de la langue française le déconsidère profondément – consciemment ou non – aux yeux des autochtones qui s’identifient plus que dans les autres pays à leur parler poli et chéri. (Etrangers 57-8) [Nowhere is one more foreigner than in France. […] Even when they are legally and administratively accepted, they are not for all that received into families. Their awkward use of the French language discredits them utterly – consciously or not – in the eyes of the natives, who identify more than in other countries with their beloved, polished speech. (Strangers 38-9)]
France is a nation which resolutely marginalizes other languages for the simple reason that French understands itself as the universal language of reason – of the revolution, of the Encyclopédie, of the Emlightenment. The openness which allowed Kristeva to make her home in the French academic system (“Et pourtant, nulle part on n’est mieux étranger qu’en France” – Etrangers 58-9 [“And yet, one is nowhere better as a foreigner than in France” – Strangers 39]) was and is an openness predicated on taking on the stamp of humanity, that is to say, of Frenchness. To live in France is to insert oneself into an ambient identity which can only comprehend its others as the absence of identity. The immanent transcendence which Kristeva arrives at in her political translations of the theory of the Semiotic is a pragmatic response to the immanent transcendence of a French nationalism incapable of admitting of culture outside its own complacent universalism – one which thereby installs the most arrogant dualism possible. Such dualisms were reflected, for instance, in the comments made in 2005 by the Ministry of the Interior, and future Prime Minister, Sarkozy, when he branded the immigrant inhabitants of the poor housing estates
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on the outskirts of Paris (the banlieues or cites) as “canaille” [“scum”]. Against this overbearing universalism, with its racist scions, Kristeva poses a foreignness which is for her, from the outset, the very condition of subjectivity: “La psychanalyse m’a conduite à penser que c’est l’exil qui me construit, et non pas une appartenance” [“Psychoanalysis led me to think that it was exile which constructed me, not belonging”] (Au risque de la pensée 26). As such, foreignness also provides a model for social identity and by extension, for responsible citizenship. If there is any form of integration, national identity, collective belonging possible, it is only upon the condition of accepting the foreigner-within, the outside-inside at the heart of society. It is that element of otherness which may liberate a collective identity from an overly rigid adherence to its own origins, and open it up to evolution and flexibility.
Kristeva’s Kehre What spaces come after these spaces of loss? An answer comes from the protagonist of Kristeva’s novel Possessions, who declares, “J’étais sûre que mon père m’avait aimée” (Possessions 55) [“I was sure my father had loved me” (Possessions 38)]. In Histoires d’amour, the lost, banished or abjected pre-Oedipal mother is counterweighed by an idealized pre-Oedipal father. Identification with this ideal figure, one diametrically opposed to the punitive castrator of the Oedipus complex, founds the capacity to love (Histoires 56-61/Tales 41-45). Upon the basis of this positive relation of pre-Oedipal idealization, selfhood, fragile but potentially resilient, can emerge into being. An index of this trunk of selfhood is evident in Kristeva’s own retention of the patronymic (albeit feminized) in her authorial identity, rather than her French marital name (Le Langage, cet inconnu was originally published under the name of Joyau, before reappearing in the Points paperback series as a work by Kristeva). Histoires d’amour sketches a different type of primordial intersubjective space which is re-activated throughout the subject’s history. This primordial space, like that of abjection, comes hard on the heels of the chora. However, in contrast to abjection, it does not react to the amorphous, chaotic character of the chora. Rather, it finds in the
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chora the presence of a parental figure. Where abjection rejected the heterogeneity and fluidity of the chora space so as to constitute a discrete selfhood, in Kristeva’s theory, pre-Oedipal paternity retains the reassuring proximity and warmth of that first space. The chora as positive rather than negative space is exploited here to give the contours for a proactive adult subjectivity. The affirming relationship with the pre-Oedipal father reemerges in the transference relationship of the psychoanalytic therapy, which Kristeva understands as the workshop of a restored selfhood. Whereas Kristeva’s earlier work on the “subject in process” [sujet-en procès] deployed an unsubtle emphasis upon the legal resonances of procès [trial] to stress the deconstruction of bourgeois subjectivity, the new phase foregrounds the re-constructive character of psychoanalysis. This conception of psychoanalysis posits the viability of “une humanité adulte qui essaie de compter sur ses propres forces devenues disponibles grâce à l’accès du langage aux inscriptions les plus inaccessibles de la pulsion et aux représentations les plus toublantes du désir” (Au commencement était l’amour 73) [“Grownups who attempt to rely on our own strengths, made available by the ability of language to reach even the most inaccessible traces of instinct and the most troubling representations of desire” (In the Beginning was Love 56)]. Kristeva stresses that the triangular space of the therapy (analyst-patient-patient’s object(s) of love), is one where the ongoing work of self-making is carried out in a privileged manner: Car si je n’aime pas mes patients réellement”, she writes, speaking as an analyst, “que pourrais-je entendre d’eux, que pourrais-je leur dire? L’amour de contre-transfert est ma capacité de me mettre à leur place: de regarder, de rêver, de souffrir come si j’étais elle, comme si j’étais lui” (Histoires 21) [“For if I do not really love my patients, what could I understand in them, what could I tell them? Countertransference love is my ability to put myself in their place; looking, dreaming, suffering as if I were she, as if I were he” (Tales 11)]. The processual character of the chora is not, however, relinquished entirely in this workshop-theory of subjectivity. The task of reconstructing the self is not something that can be achieved once and for all. It remains, patently, a work-in-progress, no different in this respect to the earlier concept of “selfhood as process” (the sujet-en-procès) (Polylogue 55-106/Tel Quel Reader 13278). “When barbarism reigns”, Kristeva writes in her dystopian novel Le vieil homme et les loups,
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In modern times, one site where this concept of ‘selfhood as journey’ can be experienced is in the transference relationship of psychotherapy. The transference relationship is a space in which the patientobject relationship is mapped onto the patient-analyst relationship, and can be “worked through” and “elaborated” in a safe environment, on the basis of “recognition”: “A partir de votre désir ainsi reconnu, vous êtes libre de construire votre réalité comme bordure plus ou moins fragile de votre vie amoureuse” (Histoires 18) [“Once you have thus identified your desire, you are free to construct your reality as a more or less fragile border of your love life” (Tales 8)]. “Recognition”, of course, is a polysemic term. It is worth lingering on it a moment, in order to unpack some of the meanings which have accrued to it during its history of usage within psychoanalysis. Recognition can denote on the one hand cognitive understanding, but also on the other the admission of existence of an entity. Both aspects of the notion of recognizing desire are drawn by Kristeva from Lacan’s work. The cognitive notion of recognition clearly echoes the negative rhetoric of “misrecognition” which is at the heart of the concept of the mirror stage: the “méconnaissances constutives du moi” (Lacan 1966: 99) [“ego’s constitutive misrecognitions” (Lacan 2007a: 80)]. But it also resonates with the more positive ontological notion that what the subject most desires is to be recognized by another subject’s desire (Lacan 1966: 813-15/Lacan 2007a: 688-691). Here the sense of having one’s existence recognized is at stake, albeit filtered through the aporia of desire. “Recognition” also alludes to Lacan’s seminar on the “ethics of psychoanalysis”. This “ethics” does not promise the fulfilment of desire, but none the less demands that the subject be loyal to her or his desire – that she or he recognize that desire. Again, both facets of rec-
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ognition (cognitive and ontological) are at work here. Lacan enjoins the subject “ne pas céder sur son désir” [“not [to] relinquish her or his desire”] (Lacan 1986: 68-9). The odd negative form in which this positive injunction is couched is a stylistic device corresponding to the stoical pursuit of desire (ontological recognition) propelled by the knowledge that it is “there” (not there) that her or his inevitably lacunary meaning resides (cognitive recognition). The object of desire cannot be attained, but in following the path traced by the constantly retreating markers of desire, a path which is nothing other than a chain of signifiers, one will learn (recognize) who one is (not). Love can be understood as just such a process of engagement with an other or with others under the difficult conditions of cognitive self-honesty – recognizing the flimsiness of our desire at the same time as recognizing its central organizing agency. Desire and love here display the same characteristics which Kristeva later celebrates in narrativity: intersubjectivity, undeniable fictionality, but also the capacity to afford a subject a sense of direction and a constitutive meaning. These multifaceted processes of recognition which traverse love are all the more difficult today given that, according to Kristeva, “c’est le système même de reconnaissance-déni qui est en crise” (L’Avenir d’une révolte 54) [“it is the system of recognition-denial itself that is in crisis” (Intimate Revolt 236)]. It becomes increasingly difficult to know who we are because, in our simulacrum-society, it is also increasingly difficult to know who we are not. This dilemma is manipulated in the most facile and stereotypical manner by populist politicians. In Australia, for instance, “we” are not those who behave in an “unAustralian” way, like refugees in desert internment camps, sewing their lips closed or embarking upon hunger strikes to “manipulate” public opinion. Other more complex forms of the ‘not’ which might disturb rather than cement identity, forms of uncomfortable “recognition”, are difficult to activate in today’s culture. Love, perhaps, is one of the last bastions of “re-cognition” to eschew the simplistic and facile categories of stereotypical identity. The “notness” of selfhood which is the difficult object of recognition can be construed in different ways – either as a space of pure illusion to be put on trial (in the juridical sense of procès) or as a fluid space of becoming (in the processual sense of procès). Subjective space is then to be understood as a site of emergence without closure: “Wo es war, soll Ich werden. Là où fut ça, il me faut advenir” (Lacan
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1966: 416-7, 524, also 801) [“Where it was, I must come into being” (Lacan 2007a: 347, 435, also 678) said Freud, ventriloquized by Lacan. In other words, at the place where the Id was, I should become what I am. The place of selfhood is a pathway traced by the pursuit of unattainable desire, so that the self must be ultimately regarded as a journey without maps, and without a goal. Desire, if “recognized” in the multifarious senses sketched above, is the vector which guides us in navigating across the difficult terrain upon which love has its only chance of thriving. But what sort of desire is being staged here as the spatialized framework for subjectivity? According to Lacan, it is by embarking upon that futile journey, in full knowledge of its futility, do we accept our incompletion: “Le sujet ne s’y engage-t-il pas dans une dépossession toujours plus grande de cet être de lui-même […] il finit par reconnaître que cet être n’a jamais été que son œuvre dans l’imaginaire et que cet œuvre déçoit en lui toute certitude” (Lacan 1966: 249) [“Doesn’t the subject become involved here in an ever greater dispossession of himself as a being […] he ends up recognizing that this being has never been anything more than his own construction [oeuvre] in the imaginary and that this construction undercuts all certainty in him” (Lacan 2007a: 207)]. Desire, in the Lacanian axiology of human existence, thus marks out a tragic anti-ontological destiny to be stoically endured from birth to death. In Kristeva’s version of this injunction, however, it is not the facticity of the “imaginary work” of selfhood which counts, but the fact that there is a work of selfhood. Taking up, in her late writings, the notion of the chora and its manifestation in avant-garde literature, Kristeva specifies, cette musicalité infralinguistique que vise tout langage poétique, devient la visée principale de la poésie moderne, une ‘psychose expérimentale’. Je veux dire par là qu’elle est œuvre d’un sujet, mais d’un sujet qui se met en procès: c’est par le retour à l’archéologie de son unité, mené dans le matériau même de la langue et de la pensée, qu’elle atteint des régions risquées où cette unité se néantité. (L’Avenir d’une révolte 26) [this infralinguistic musicality that all poetic language aims for, becomes the main objective of modern poetry, an experimental psychosis. By this I mean that psychosis is the work of a subject, but a subject in process. It is through the archaeology of this unity, conducted in the material of language and thought itself, that the subject reaches
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the hazardous regions where this unity is annihilated. (Intimate Revolt 10)]
There is no doubt about the existence of the subject (“it is the work of a subject”), it is the self-scrutiny of its own existence (“a subject puts itself on trial/a subject which launches itself into a process”) which is important here. For Kristeva, we have a life fabricated out of the pursuit of desire, a necessarily fraught undertaking. This life is a fabric woven along the “bordure plus ou moins fragile de votre vie amoureuse” (Histoires 18) [“more or less fragile border of your love life” (Tales 8)]. Life is a margin, a peripheral residue, a realm of knotting and unknotting. The trajectory of human living takes place in a border zone where the braiding of selfhood goes hand in hand with its inevitable fraying. Risk, then, is the hallmark of subjectivity. But the risky liminal space in which subjectivity is constructed and reconstructed is counterweighed by the central anchor of desire-as-process – a process construed not as lack but as love.
Revolt, she said. The process of cautiously optimistic construction, celebrated in Kristeva’s writings on love, continues to be the privileged terrain of analysis in her recent writings on revolt. In Sens et non-sens de la révolte she begins her analysis by stressing the temporal and spatial resonances (rupture on the one hand, circularity on the other) of the term across its etymological history (Sens et non-sens 6-10/Sense and Non-Sense 1-3). These spatial and temporal aspects can then be applied to the subjectivity of the individual-in-revolt, from the very earliest episode of revolt, that of the Oedipal revolt against the father. This revolt is not the revolt of the Oedipal narrative in its classic denouement. This revolt is not curtailed by the threat of castration and deflected into the subject’s submission to social rules and regulation, with the concomitant repression of taboo desires. Rather, revolt in Kristeva’s recent work stands alone, prior to suppression and repression, as a powerful impulse by which the subject constructs itself. This construction is not that of a closed, stable, identity, but is one
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which, in revolting in some ways against identity itself, works towards a porous selfhood open to the world and to alterity: Déserrer ces enclos du ‘propre’ et de l’ ‘identique’, du ‘vrai’ et du ‘faux’, du ‘bien’ et du ‘mal’, devient une nécessité de survie, car les organisations symboliques, comme les organismes, perdurent à condition de se rénover et de jouir. (Sens et non-sens 31) [Loosening the strictures concerning ‘one’s own’ and the ‘identical’, ‘true’ and ‘false’, ‘good’ and ‘bad’ becomes necessary for survival, because symbolic organizations, like organisms, endure on the condition of renewal and joy. (Sense and Non-Sense 18)]
Revolt emerges here as a potent means of structuring the “l’espace subjectif” (Sens et non-sens 17) [“subjective space” (Sense and NonSense 9)] by a mode of ‘negativity’ which Kristeva has seen as a positive force from La Révolution du langage poétique onwards, and to which she has returned as recently as L’Avenir d’une révolte, written in pensive commemoration of the thirtieth anniversary of May 1968 (L’Avenir d’une révolte 23-6/Intimate Revolt 223-4). Clearly revolt has graduated from the inevitable subordination to the Symbolic and the paternal law which hampered the earlier theories of the Semiotic. Equally important, in the passing reference to the “propre”, with its concomitant “propreté” and thus connection to the theory of disgust, it is patent that revolt has moved beyond the limitations of abjection. Revolt is no longer predicated upon a self-vitiating notion of matricide posited as a prerequisite of subjectivation in the theory of abjection and evoked subsequently as a cause of melancholy. The all-too-easy adherences to notions of the primeval space as a space of loss have been repudiated for a revolt as a site of unmitigated positivity. Revolt may be understood as the movement by which selfhood marks itself, to anticipate upon Deleuze and Guattari, as an intensity in search of other intensities. In the re-turning upon oneself which occurs in the self-interrogation of psychoanalysis, Kristeva notes the emergence of selfhood as a “singularity”: Par le récit de l’association libre et dans la ré-volte régénérant contre et avec l’ancienne Loi (interdits familiaux, surmoi, idéaux, limites oedipiennes ou narcissiques, etc.), advienne l’autonomie singulière de chacun, ainsi que son lien renouvelé à l’autre. (L’Avenir d’une révolte 22)
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[Through a narrative of free association and in the regenerative revolt against the old law (familial taboos, superego, ideals, oedipal or narcissistic limits, etc.) comes the singular autonomy of each, as well as a renewed link with the other. (Intimate Revolt 8)]
The singularity which comes to the fore in the talking therapy is plenitude. It emerges not in the ultimate moment of oedipal submission, and integration into society on the basis of renunciation of desire, but rather, in the preceding, penultimate moment of self-delineation, of self-marking in the very act of rejecting authority. It is a positive event, not the negative moment of loss under the order of threatened castration. Deleuze and Guattari, as we will see, condemn individual identity because it is posited upon Oedipal normativity. Kristeva defines “singular autonomy” precisely as an intensity untrammelled by that moment of capitulation. Rather, subjective space is constituted in a process of uprising which marks it out as an elevation above the surrounding landscape of collective space. In Deleuzian terms subjective space can be understood as a “signature” – a mark which establishes the unmistakeable neighbourhood of a subject. Lacan declares subjectivity nothing more than a signifier (“un signifiant, c’est ce que représente le sujet pour un autre signifiant” - “a signifier is what represents the subject to another signifier” [Lacan 1966: 819/Lacan 2007a: 694]). Thus he inscribes the gravestone for the signified of the self, its substantive content, meaning and identity. He thereby obliges us to understand subjectivity according to an elegiac mode. In her earlier work, Kristeva similarly highlights a subject dissolved by the work of the subconscious and a sign thus negated by the subject’s ignorance of itself: “Dans cet espace autre où les lois logiques de la parole sont ébranlées, le sujet se dissout et à la place du signe c’est le heurt des signifiants qui s’instaure” [“In this other space where the logical laws of language are unseated, the subject is dissolved and in the place of the sign we find a collision of signifiers cancelling each other out”] (6KPLHLZWLNK 273). In her earlier thinking, the sign of the subject is shattered by the concatenation of signifiers cut loose of their signifieds. But according to the more celebratory mode of her late works, subjectivity is a sign, a zone of intensity happily unaffected by the tragic cleavage of signifier and signified, a sign in all its plenitude for other signs.
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The sign which Kristeva particularly privileges in this emergence of the subject is the sign minted in psychoanalytic therapy. Within the ‘talking cure’ a revolt, a reflective, retrospective re-turn to the past via narrative, recuperates the doomed revolt of the Oedipal moment in its conformist guise. The instance of psychic re-structuring rescues the moment of happy revolt initiating the Oedipal narrative. For this reason, Kristeva claims, psychoanalysis must be preserved as one of the creative sites in our hyperconformist times: “A côté et en plus de la culture de l’image […] la culture des mots, la narration et la place qu’elle réserve à la méditation, me paraît être une variante de révolte minimale” (L’Avenir d’une révolte 18) [“Alongside and in addition to the culture of the image […] the culture of words, the narrative and the place it reserves for meditation, seems to me to offer a minimal variant of revolt” (Intimate Revolt 5)]. The sign of the subject which emerges in the space of therapy is a sign whose subversive potential is no longer understood under the aegis of a psychoanalytic conformism, but as a vital function of a residual spirit of revolt.
Telling experiences The later Kristeva is a story-teller. Perhaps, through her long years of semiotic analysis, she has always been a reader, but as an analyst, she has become a listener, and a reteller of the stories she has heard. The psychoanalytic case-studies scattered through Kristeva’s cultural analyses in Pouvoirs d’horreur, Soleil noir, Histoires d’amour and Les nouvelles maladies de l’âme are anecdotes which foretell her emergence as fully fledged novelist in Les Samouraïs (1990), Le vieil homme et les loups (1991), Possessions (1996) and Meurtre à Byzance (2004). Indeed, many of the descriptions of the characters in a novel such as Possessions could have been taken from the earlier psychoanalytic works, so similar is their style and structure. These stories are ubiquitous in her late writing. The frame-narrator of Les Samouraïs, the psychoanalyst Joëlle Cabarus, laments at the beginning of the novel, “Il n’y a plus d’histoires d’amour” (Les Samouraïs 9) [“There are no love stories anymore” (The Samurai 1)]. But the novel, like the study which also bears the title Histoires d’amour goes on to rectify this lack, multiplying tenfold its narratives of troubled selfhood.
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Kristeva is tacitly implying the generation of narrativity is the very stuff of subjectivity. In a deliberately gauche instance of self-reflexivity, Cabarus records in her diary that the other authorial alter-ego in the novel, the expatriate Eastern European academic Olga, has just published a children’s novel entitled Les Samouraïs. All novels, Joëlle adds, are a form of children’s literature: En definitive, toute literature est peut-être faite pour enfants. On dit que les romans sont achetés par les femmes. Je dirais: par les femmesenfants, par les hommes-enfants. Il faut un don de rêverie naïve pour fabriquer encore de l’émotion avec ces signes ridés que sont les mots. Après tout, cela ne vaut peut-être la peine d’écrire que pour refaire le jeu de vie et de mort à l’usage d’enfants que nous oublions d’être. (Les Samouraïs 458-9) [Perhaps, when you get right down to it, all literature is really for children. They say that nearly all novels are bought by women. I’d say by child-women and child-men. It takes a talent for innocent reverie to create emotion still out of those wrinkled old signs we call words. And after all, perhaps it’s only worth bothering to write in order to rewrite the game of life and death for children – the children we forget that we ourselves are. (The Samurai 340)]
The apparent clumsiness of this mise-en-abyme, from a writer so well versed in the devices of literary creation is perhaps no accident. It may aim to provoke a reflection upon the naivety of literature in general. Naivety, the youthful condition of not-yet-knowing, is perhaps the very raison d’être of narrative – the openness of existential possibilities yet to be unfolded. Narrative may be deeply symptomatic of ongoing processes of maturation and transformation. In an interview in which she comments on Olga’s children’s book, Kristeva speaks of “cette écriture de la plenitude et de l’abondance dans la joie et la souffrance. Puérile, infantile, elle répond […] à l’enfance permanente en nous, à son besoin de contes d’horreur, de contes de fées” [“writing of plenitude and abundance in the midst of joy and suffering. Puerile, childish, it responds to the permanent childhood in us, to its need for horror stories, for fairy stories”] (Lettre ouverte à Harlem Désir 68-9). Fantastic narrative contradicts the stasis of what is for the open horizons of what may come to be, it mobilizes childhood as a futureoriented mode of existence marked by plenitude rather than constric-
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tion. But more needs to be said about the precise mode of configuration of such ontological parameters in their narrative codifications. In this ingenuous mise-en-abyme, Kristeva is obliquely commenting upon the notion that the subject comes to being in narrative. In her work on Hannah Arendt, she suggests that pour que l’histoire vraie devienne une histore racontée, deux conditions inséparables sont nécessaires. D’abord, l’existence d’un interesse dans et par lequel se forment ensuite la mémoire et le témoinage. Le sort du récit depend d’un ‘entre-deux’ où surgit la logique résolutive de la mémorisation comme détachement du vécu ex post facto. A ces conditions seulement, le ‘fait’ peut être révélé en ‘pensée partageable’ par la verbalisation d’une ‘intrigue’. (Hannah Arendt 125) [for a true history to become a narrated history, there are two inseparable conditions. First, the existence of inter-esse within which and through which the second condition is realized. The fate of the narrative depends on an ‘in between’ where we eventually see the resolving logic of memorization as detachment from the lived ex post facto. On these conditions alone, the ‘fact’ can be revealed in ‘shareable thought’ by the verbalization of a ‘plot’. (Hannah Arendt 16-7)]
The ingenuous frankness of Kristeva’s mise-en-abyme in Les Samouraïs signals that it is simply saying what it does. The author introduces herself and her text into the narrative – a performative gesture which puts the subject, quite simply, back into the process of textuality. This gesture directly re-enacts the intersubjective nature of narrative and the narrative character of (inter)subjectivity which Kristeva has stressed from the very beginning of her writing. In her early linguistic textbook, Kristeva underlines the manner in which the ‘I’ and the ‘you’ of linguistic utterance are always mutually constitutive (Le Langage, cet inconnu 40-1). Likewise, Les Samouraïs suggests that it is in the narrating/reading process that selfhood and otherness come to being. In other words, textuality is not a ‘process without a subject’, it is the very opposite: the process by which the subject is constituted. Reading furnishes a mode of meaning-making which is analogous to the manner in which subjectivity is formed from the outset. A similar instance of this unsophisticated but self-mocking mise-en-abyme comes in L’Avenir d’une révolte, where Kristeva, speaking of her work on Proust’s manuscript notes, writes:
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Trop longtemps, un certain nombre de gens (Jakobson, Barthes, Kristeva) ont soutenu contre les salons, les idéologues et les syndicalistes qui s’appropriaient la littérature que celle-ci était un texte. Opération salavatrice, et cependant limitée. Les brouillons peuvent lever le voile sur l’expérience sous-jacente au texte […] [peuvent] reconstituer l’expérience dans le texte. (L’Avenir d’une révolte 80) [For too long, a number of people (Jakobson, Barthes, myself) maintained, against the salons, the ideologues, and syndicalists who appropriated literature, that literature was a text. A salutary process, yet limited. Rough drafts may lift the veil on the experience subjacent to the text […] reconstituting experience in the text. (Intimate Revolt 251)]
Once again, Kristeva, by means of clumsy mise-en-abyme, points to the link between subjectivity, narrative and experience. The mocking distance upon oneself engineered by the use of the third person turns the self into a text, and by the same token, points up the very processes by which subjectivity is constantly being re-made. As Colin Davis comments, “The story deforms what it gives form; in other words, its form is uneasy, precarious, and at best provisional, it never entirely accommodates the material which it nevertheless makes intelligible. Other forms, other stories, are always possible” (Davis 2004:146). The draft text, the scribbled note, the unfinished jottings witness to language in a raw form, also give a view upon the mobility of experience as it traverses and jostles the unfinished subject. Whence her glossing of notes as “a transition from experience to the text” [“Le brouillon: un passage de l’expérience au texte” (L’Avenir d’une révolte 80)]. The scribbled draft mediates between experience and the text, just as we can imagine the subject coming to being along a similar trajectory of processual constitution and re-constitution. Here Kristeva’s work also links up again with the notion of revolt – the term which best describes the unruly emergence of subjectivity and language among others. Narrative, and its correlative (not necessarily its referent), experience, are the central analytic categories with which Kristeva works in her study of revolt. She proposes un enjeu qui consiste à dépasser la notion de texte […] Je m’efforcerai d’introduire, à la place, la notion d’expérience qui comprend le principe de plaisir ainsi que celui de re-naissance de sens pour l’autre, et qui ne saurait s’entendre qu’à l’horizon de l’expérience-révolte. (Sens et non-sens 15-16)
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The return of experience is not to be heralded, as some critics did upon the publication of Foucault’s successor volumes to La Volonté de savoir, as signalling the rehabilitation of a much-maligned Cartesian subject (Merquior 1985: 135ff). On the contrary, experience (and particularly the experience of revolt) stands here as a category of the fluidity, instability, or impulsive dynamism, closely linked to revolt, which is the hallmark of life itself: “Dans des époques que nous sentons obscurément en déclin ou du moins en suspens, le questionnement demeure la seule pensée possible: indice d’une vie simplement vivante” (L’Avenir d’une révolte 11) [“In periods that we vaguely sense to be in decline or at least in suspension, questioning remains the only possible thought: an indication of life that is simply alive” (Intimate Revolt 223)]. Here Kristeva has recourse to concepts taken from systems theory and cybernetics which characterize the human being as an open system maintaining its existence via a positive feedback process (see Morin 1981). All healthy organisms, from the individual subject to the open society, stay alive by taking on board information from outside and integrating it into a system that thereby remains in a constant process of self-adjustment: Comme le concept de ‘processus’ distingue l’histoire moderne de celle de l’Antiquité basée sur le destin et le génie des grands hommes, le concept d’ ‘auto-organisation’ spécifie l’histoire contemporaine qui, à notre siècle, se fait à coups de crises. (L’Avenir d’une révolte 21) [Just as the concept of process distinguishes modern history from that of antiquity, based on the destiny and brilliance of great men, the concept of self-organization is specific to contemporary history, which, in the twentieth century occurred in bouts of crisis. (Intimate Revolt 7)]
Psychoanalysis, for Kristeva, epitomizes this positive feedback process of progress via crisis-driven re-organization. It is a re-turn (thus connected etymologically to re-volt) to the self’s past via the means of narrative and meta-narrative. Telling one’s story and reflecting critically upon the story one has told allows the psyche to re-organize it-
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self upon the basis of a re-presented past history. Psychoanalysis is concerned to “Reprendre sans relâche le tour rétrospectif pour le conduire aux frontières du représentable, du pensable, du soutenable” (L’Avenir d’une révolte 20-1) [“Relentlessly repeat retrospective return so as to lead it to the limits of the representable/thinkable/ tenable” (Intimate Revolt 7)]. In her preliminary overview of the etymology of the word ‘revolt’, Kristeva notes the tension between the circular, repetitive notion of re-turn and the discontinuous, innovative notion of turning in the history of the word ‘revolt’. This tension, however, is, or could be seen as nothing more than the fundamental set of parameters, themselves marked by flux and fluidity, underlying individual and social identity in its most sophisticated form. To transform oneself one must return to one’s own narrative and re-read it, indeed, re-write it. “L’homme révolté” [“The Rebel”] was the upstanding figure of Camus’ existential ethics. In Kristeva’s late works this subject in revolt is not a given entity but rather, by definition, a subject in process. Thus, experience is not a given to which we are passively exposed, but the very mode of processual engagement with a world which constantly provokes the active auto-re-organization of selfhood. This point is nowhere made clearer than in her latest works, when she defines experience as an openness to alterity: Ouverture à l’autre qui m’exalte ou me déstablise, l’expérience trouve ses fondements anthropologiques dans mes liens avec l’objet primaire: la mère, pôle archaïque de besoins, de désirs, d’amour et de répulsion. (L’Avenir d’une révolte 80) [As an opening to the other that exalts or destabilizes me, experience finds its anthropological foundations in my links with the primary object: the mother, archaic pole of needs, desires, love and repulsion. (Intimate Revolt 251)]
In Kristeva’s use of the word, experience is therefore not that rather jaded stock of topoi generated by the common-sense everyday functioning of language which in turn claims merely to represent normal, universally-shared human existence. Experience is not this reassuring object represented by a realist notion of narrative – the stable given which provides the referent of a stable representation. Rather, experience is radically destabilizing, transformative, aleatory, an engagement with the world in which both self and environment are embarked
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upon a process of ongoing change. Indeed, it is our situation from the beginning, the engagement with otherness which, by virtue of the way in which it always threatens to make us other (to the point of the fear of extinction) has accompanied us from the very beginnings of our existence. This is why Les Samouraïs opens with the lament, “Il n’y a plus d’histoires d’amour” (Les Samouraïs 9) [“There are no love stories anymore” (The Samurai 1)], and then proceeds to propose a cornocupia of happy/unhappy love stories.It is love, the fluid medium par excellence, going back to our intersubjective origins, which joins us to others and to our world, makes us (happy/unhappy/both of the above), unmakes us, re-makes us, forever. Kristeva achieves here a transition from a semiotic theory of textuality which mounts an aggressive onslaught upon a selfhood deemed illusory and fallacious (“un ‘sujet’ zérologique’” [“a zerological ‘subject’”] – 6KPLHLZWLNK274), via psychoanalysis, to a return to the categories of experience and narrative subjectivity. This return to experience and narrative aims to remedy what she sees as an ambient and deep-seated incapacity to narrate (“des difficultés ou des incapacités de representation psychique” – Les nouvelles maladies 19 [“difficulties or obstacles in psychic representation” – New Maladies 9]) as the ground of a contemporary malaise. Without this ability for narrativity, the very contours of the psyche are subject to erosion: “Les conditions de vie moderne, avec le primat de la technique, de l’image, de la vitesse, etc., induisant stress et dépression, ont tendance à réduire l’espace psychique et à abolir la faculté de représentation psychique” (L’Avenir d’une révolte 28) [“The conditions of modern lives - with the primacy of technology, image, speed, and so forth, inducing stress and depression – have a tendency to reduce psychical space and to abolish the faculty of representation” (Intimate Revolt 11)]. The spatial parameters of our psyche are defined by stories. Psychic space is a space structured by signs, by the tissues of narratives which make up the shape of our selves. Deprived of these narratives, the dimensions of our selfhood begin to shrink. Such ‘spaces’ are not merely metaphors, derived from the ‘real spaces’ outside. On the contrary, the ‘real spaces’ are equally imaginary in their semiotic organization. They are crucially inflected, represented, traversed, coloured by the dimensions of what we all too simplistically describe as ‘interior, psychic space’. It is hugely important, then, that we pay due attention to the stories structuring the puta-
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tive personal, private spaces of our inner lives, for they determine the public spaces we inhabit no less than vice-versa. Deleuze and Guattari speak of “interior charts” which dictate our navigation of the outside world, taking up a position very similar to Kristeva and her insistence upon the force of narrativity and its intimate connections to the configuration of experience.
Time, space and sensuality Experience re-enters Kristeva’s work in two guises. The first, as we saw above, is that of narrative. Experience is that encounter with the world which, in its codification by a subject in transmission to another subject, creates that subject as a living being. Experience is by definition textual, for without the process of narrativization there would be no subject to transmit its experience to another subject, as, for instance, in psychoanalytic therapy. This, then, is not a narrative without a subject, nor, however, is it a narrative controlled by the subject – rather, it is a narrative which provides the fabric for a subject. It is a narrative which allows a subject to continue to weave its own precarious, aleatory, unpredictable trajectory among other subjects. The second guise in which experience re-emerges as a category of analysis in Kristeva’s later work is one that is closely linked, as her major work on Proust demonstrates, to narrative: namely, sensuality and the senses. Kristeva plays heavily upon the ambiguity of the word ‘sense’, connoting as it does both ‘meaning’ and base-level perceptions of the body. As she summarizes in Les Samouraïs, “ajuster des mots […] aux sensations […] obtenir un sens, une direction qui font vivre” (Samouraïs 93-4) [“to fit […] words to the sensations […] attain a meaning or directions that promotes life” (The Samurai 68)]. Where sensation and meaning meet, as in Kristeva’s work from La Révolution onwards, space comes to the fore. It is at the triangular intersection of meaning, sensual receptivity and space that experience coalesces, in “l’indissociable co-appartenance du sensé et du senti, du Verbe et de la Chair. L’intermédiaire entre les deux – un état de grâce – devient un lieu possible” (Temps sensible 545) [“the indissociable symbiosis between the sensible and the sensed, between the Word and the flesh. This process created a space for the middle term: a state of grace” (Time and Sense 319)]. These abstractions are given tangible
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form in Proust’s work. His novel constantly searches for the moments of sensual experience in which the past, long gone but retrievable in memory, is reconstructed in the moment of recounting, and anchored anew in the immediacy of bodily sensation. Sensation cannot, in reality, bring back time past, but what it does achieve is to replace the linearity of time with the present dimensions of space. Time and its constant progress condemn experience to an irreversible process of loss (“le temps perdu”), but sensation alerts the subject to the plenitude of space. In the moment of focussing upon the intensity of physical sensation, the immediacy of such experience may banish any sentiment of the loss incurred by our subjection to time passing. Kristeva locates this redemptive intersection between time and space in the literary text. Narrative is, as Bakhtin and many after him have recognized, a ‘chronotope’, a hybrid space-time construct: In the literary artistic chronotope, spatial and temporal indicators are fused into one carefully thought-out, concrete whole. Time, as it were, thickens, takes on flesh, becomes artistically visible; likewise, space becomes charged and responsive to the movements of time, plot and history. This intersection of axes and fusion of indicators characterizes the artistic chronotope. (Bakhtin 1981: 84)
Sensual experience is thus always torn between temporal loss and spatial plenitude. “Le temps proustien”, Kristeva summarizes, “est irrémédiablement perdu et immanquablement spatialisé” (Temps sensible 543-4) [“Proustian time is irreparably lost and invariably spatialized” (Time and Sense 318)]. The literary text binds these two apparently contradictory facets together in what Kristeva has famously termed “la négation non-disjonctive […] un accord des écarts, une identification des différences” [“non-disjunctive negation […] an agreement in separation, an identification of differences”] (6KPLHLZWLNK 83-4). This is the paradoxical undertaking which lies at the heart of any signifying process. Why is this paradoxical? Not simply because time forms an axis of loss (in our culture, the vector of time is irreversible).To situate the plenitude of the senses in the literary text is paradoxical because modern linguistics has overwhelmingly claimed that the sign is a site of absence. The sign stands in for a referent which by definition must be absent. In her work on Proust, however, reviewing Freud’s very sketchy work on sensation and recent neuro-cognitive research on
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sensation, she notes that sensual perception and linguistic activity are neurologically linked in aporetic ways from the earliest stages of cognitive development. Sensation flows into a regime of semi-signs [“quasi-signes”] akin to the realm of the Semiotic, which need to be accessed, in later stages of linguistic development, by fully-fledged language. Sensation is not coeval with cognition or judgement, but cannot be experienced without cognition and language (Temps sensible 286/Time and Sense 151-2). Sensation occupies the same structural position as the chora/Semiotic of Kristeva’s earlier work. But it does not function as a mere replica of the erstwhile matrix of avantgarde effraction. The connections to the hic et nunc of everyday experience are much stronger. And the links between sensation (the early stages of meaning-making) and socialized language are graduated and susceptible of a high degree of continuity. This constitutive, genetic connection suggests that far from being a medium riddled by absence, as post-Saussurean linguistics has claimed, language is intimately connected to the plenitude and presence (present-ness) of sensual experience, despite, or indeed thanks to the necessity of mediation. Here, another central category of Kristeva’s conceptualization, one which resurges again and again from the outset, is to be detected: the materiality of the sign. The concreteness of the sign is a central aspect of the theory of textuality in the early structuralist and semiotic phase of Kristeva’s thought (see Le Langage, cet inconnu 23-46). The emphasis upon the material status of the sign takes over the crucial task of banishing earlier abstract, idealist theories of linguistic meaning. To combat such theories was important for the structuralists and their successors because the idealization of linguistic meaning furnished the conceptual basis for a notion of selfhood whose thoughts, untrammelled by the body or desire, were in control of its life. It was the materiality of signs, their intrusive unruliness, their status as things, which bore the burden of dethroning self-control and selfknowledge as documented by Freud and pursued in the poststructuralist death of the subject. The paradoxical coupling of the materiality of the sign and the absence of full meaning is resolved here by the reestablishment of the lost link between signification and sensuality in its plenitude (albeit one which must be mediated). In other words, in the shift from the chora and its eruption in avant-garde literature and art to the world of sensation and its media-
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tion in language, there is a softening of the rigid dichotomies between spatial experience and the linearities of socialized, disciplined regimes of meaning. In the connections between sensation and language, Kristeva implicitly posits an easy, everyday accessibility of the spaces of sensation, and a permeability between sensation and language which, albeit dependant upon translation or mediation, is one which allows the possibility of a modest plenitude. These quite abstract notions are rendered more accessible in Kristeva’s own fiction – a genre which, as we will see, foregrounds the sensual category of experience. In her novel Possessions, the connection between language and sense is dramatized in the protagonist’s experience of learning a second language: La nouvelle langue pénétrait en Stéphanie par l’intelligence ou par l’âme, en tout cas elle venait d’en haut – le professeur Zorine dit qu’elle entre par les couches supérieures du cortex, suit une voie descendante pour exciter à la fin seulement les sens, les organes, le sexe. ‘[…] ce n’est pas la perception qui stimule le language, mais, à l’inverse, le langage qui provoque la perception. Vous connaissez mon modèle, que j’appelle top down […] Tout vient d’en haut: au commencement était la Verbe, comme on disait autrefois.’ (Possessions 236) [The new language entered into Stephanie through the mind or the soul - in any case, from above. Professor Zorin says it enters an individual through the upper layers of the cortex, working its way downward until it affects his or her senses, organs, and sex. ‘[…] it isn’t perception that stimulates language, but the reverse: language causes perception. You know the model I suggest, I call it a top down […] Everything comes to us from above: in the beginning was the Word, as they used to say once upon a time.’ (Possessions 177)]
Zorine describes the classic constructivist model of language, which suggests that the world is not there to be represented in language, but rather, that language renders the world intelligible, imposing its own structure upon the world. However, Kristeva, via her protagonist, proposes a countervailing model which she evidently regards as no less plausible than the first: Elle […] était prête à accepter qu’une nouvelle langue précède une nouvelle corps ; à condition d’ajouter au modèle top down de Zorine un autre modèle, tout aussi indispensable, appelons-le bottom up: lente, paresseuse, sensuelle, la montée commençait par le chatouillement des odeurs, le tremblé des sons, quelques soupçons de couleurs
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et leur mise en ébullition, puis s’éclaircissait jusqu’à choisir des mots, ce qui revenait à les inventer, ou, plus modestement, à renouveler leur sens ridés. Tant qu’elle n’avait pas accès à la seconde étape de l’alchimie, Stéphanie restait une somnambule dans l’autre langue – celle du top down. (Possessions 236-7) [she was willing to admit a new language does precede a new body – so long as Zorin’s top down model was complemented by another, equally necessary, that could be described as bottom up. This was slow, lazy and sensual: a rising movement with the tingle of smells, the flutter of sounds, a few hints of color, all boiled up together. Then the mixture cleared and chose words; to put it another way, invented words or, more modestly, overhauled their old meanings. Until Stephanie reached the second stage in this alchemy she was still sleepwalking through the first stage: that of the top down. (Possessions 177)]
Kristeva reiterates, in the bottom-up model, to something that looks very much like her old model of the Semiotic and the manner in which it gives rise to the Symbolic world of language. But if we are to take her point in this fictional passage, we must do more. Namely, we must blend the Semiotic and the Symbolic. The two processes are not temporally separate domains, those of early infancy and then childhood onwards. The two processes inhabit one another. And we should note a second modification to the theory of the chora. Kristeva is not speaking of the child’s gradual accession to language in close proximity to the mother. Here she describes second-language acquisition – that is, a process which is well and truly embedded in a Symbolic long-since established. This intersection of the plenitude of the senses and the plenitude of language is located squarely in the here-and-now of social existence. The language of sensual experience revises the earlier theories of Semiotic and Symbolic in two ways: first, by blurring a rigid distinction between the two levels; and secondly, by situating these processes irreversibly in the hic et nunc of our existence in the world of politics and social interaction. Let us return to the third element of the triad language-sensation-space. Proust, for Kristeva the writer of sensual experience par excellence, forges space out of the debris of time. He creates what she calls “an imaginary geometry in time” (part three of her exhaustive study of Proust is entitled “L’Imaginaire ou la géométrie dans le temps”). Proust’s narrator programmatically announces: “je passais la plus grande partie de la nuit à me rappeller notre vie d’autrefois, à
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Combray chez ma grande-tante, à Balbec, à Paris, à Doncières, à Venise, ailleurs encore, à me rappeller les lieux, les personnes que j’y avais connues” (Proust 1999: 17) [“I […] used to spend the greater part of the night recalling our life in the old days at Combray with my great-aunt, at Balbec, Paris, Doncières, Venice, and the rest; remembering again all the places and people that I had known” (Proust 2004: 9)]. Time modulates almost immediately here into space and place. The temporal vector of speech spreads out into a network of remembered sites of experience. Time, once released from its normal restraints, relaxes into space, and that space is the space of an attention to sensation, to the texture of the moment. Kristeva often expresses the sensation of the space of a moment most lucidly in her fiction: Quant il n’est pas saturé d’actes, quand il est livré à sa courbe naturelle, le temps s’élargit. Une journée se dilate et prend les dimensions d’une saison, d’une année ; l’aubre s’étire et se confond avec la longue fraîcheur du printemps ; la clarté du soleil mûrissant occupe de larges mois d’été ; le calme en fin d’après-midi n’en finit pas de piétiner vers le coucher comme un automne hésistant et fané ; tandis que la nuit creuse sans relâche des angoisses hivernales sous les menus faits du jour. (Possessions 169) [Time expands when instead of being saturated with action it’s left to take its natural course. A day grows into a season or a year: dawn stretches out and merges with the long coolness of spring; the strengthening daylight fills broad months of summer; the peace of late afternoon loiters towards sunset like a pale reluctant autumn; and night burrows endlessly wintry anguishes beneath the trivialities of day. (Possessions 127)]
Once time slows down and coagulates, it gradually transforms into space, producing, in this text, a collision of spatial attributes attached to temporal substantives. What links these apparently incompatible terms is the intermediary of sensation. In her study of Proust, Kristeva undertakes an extremely detailed analysis of the multiply embedded sentences of the famous halfdreamed-bedrooms sequence in the opening pages of Combray. She describes Proust’s sentences according to a spatializing vocabulary which includes articulation, embedding (“enchassement”), apposition, expansion, and localisation (Temps sensible 344, 346, 348, 350/Time and Sense 195, 197, 199, 201). Proust’s extraordinarily complex prose works via constant inward syntactic and semantic expansion. He un-
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packs and elucidates successive phrases by the means of attributive clauses so as to create multiply embedded structures resembling Russian dolls. The phrastic construction thus assembles a series of fictive places (the various bedrooms which the narrator reviews in the moment between sleep and awakening) each of which is excavated to yield successive levels of information embedded in subordinated clauses. This phrasal construction offers a model of the entire construction of Proust’s gigantic work. The novel as a whole portrays successive fictive places which become the scene of explorations of past memory. And this memory is, famously, anchored in physical sensations (the “madeleine” is only the most famous of many sensual anecdotes). Kristeva suggests that the phrastic excavation gives a ‘body’ to past time by taking past sites of experience and elaborating them into spaces of sensual immediacy. The spatialization of each past site engenders a global work of metonymic creation: expansions of space compensate the shrinking of temporal possibility. Les déplacements provoqués par cette syntaxe polymorphe construisent, en métonymie de l’espace psychique et de l’espace de représentation […] une cinquième chambre: la chambre psychique, celle de ‘ma pensée’ qui est celle d’un ‘je’ écartelé par ses sensations (yeux, oreilles, narines, cœur). (Temps sensible 351 498) [The displacements that ensue from this polymorphous syntax form a metonymy of physical space and the space of representation […] a fifth room: the room of the psyche, the room of ‘my mind’, which is an I ripped apart by sensations (eyes, ears, nose, heart). (Time and Sense 289)]
The re-membering self, created as a metonymy of the sites it remembers, is also a self located in various sensual experiences. It is a self whose being is anchored in locations that are assembled around an organ of sensual perception. The linearity of time as the tragic locus of existence is thus re-oriented towards the compensatory synchronicity of multiple spaces of sensory immediacy. Sensuality is the second route, alongside narrative, by which experience re-enters Kristeva’s late work. In the later Kristeva, the tangibility of experience restores the subject, not as sovereign, but as site of experience – a subject no longer in command but not, for all that, banished completely. Experience is a third term between the myth of the bourgeois sovereign subject and the abstraction of the text as process without a subject.
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Likewise, textualized sensual experience is also the median term between time as a site of loss and space as a new possibility for meaningful existence: Si la psyché est une nouvelle camera, un kinétoscope, elle nous restitue l’espace extérieur. Mais sans se fier aux apparences, en le faisant passer par sa propre technique qui est une syntaxe. La mémoire […] se rappelle pour finir que le monde est habitable. Habitude – habiter. La boucle est bouclée, qui clôt les mouvements centripètes des enchâssements. […] Nous revenons au Fragment O : ‘les chambres que j’avais habitées dans ma vie’. Les appositions nous avaient éloignés d’elles, en apparence. Elles nous y renvoient (habitude – habiter). (Temps sensible 353-4) [If the psyche is a new camera obscura or a kinetoscope, it restores external space to us. Yet it does so not by trusting appearances but by exposing external space to its own technique: syntax. Memory […] eventually reminds itself that the world is inhabitable. Habit – inhabitable. The loop is looped, concluding the centripetal movements of the embeddings. […]. We return to fragment O: ‘the rooms in which I had slept during my life’. The subordinating appositions have apparently drawn us away from these rooms. All the same, they refer us to them (habit – habitable). (Time and Sense 291)]
Language links psychic space and exterior space, sites of memory and sites of sensuality, which, despite the detours of linguistic meaning, finally bring us back down to earth again. The sensual language of space makes the world liveable according to our quotidian habits. We should ask, however, whether such formulations from Kristeva’s late work do not bring us back to an extraordinarily conservative version of space. Are we not confronted here with the most traditional binary view of space (psychic space vs. exterior space)? Is this not merely a dressed-up version of the worn-out Enlightenment dualism of public and private space? Does not this ultimate bourgeois binary merely fall into the same trap as phenomenology’s facile categorizations of space (‘lived space’, ‘perceived space’, ‘imagined space’, etc.) – categorizations which eschew any deeper analysis of the functioning of these putative spaces, thus failing to ask how they have come to be? On the contrary, Kristeva’s usage of these categories is predicated upon her analysis of their genetic emergence, textual and sensual. She implies that these two spaces, inner and outer, if we may employ this rather trite binary sous rature, are reciprocally constitu-
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tive of one another. For the exterior space of Proust’s introductory passage is no less textual then the interior space of malleable syntax. “The bedrooms that I had occupied”, ostentatiously lodged in the past perfect, are textual spaces, narrated spaces, subsequently subject to renarration. Exterior space as written space is moulded and made liveable by memory and the process of writing. Syntax restructures space in several phases, shifting its contours by the work of language, burrowing inwards so as to create a nest for subjectivity. Exterior space is not a given, it too is constituted, in tandem with psychic space, as a modus vivendi – that is, as a space which is always already mediated through language. The site of that mediation is the space of sensual experience, a space of plenitude: “A la recherche du temps, mais à condition qu’il soit perdu – gaspillé et détourné, s’ouvre l’espace des figures. Bâti des mots, métaphores, phrases, caractères, cet espace figurable est un ‘temps incorporé’” (Temps sensible 386) [“In search of time, but only if the time were lost, wasted and derouted, which would open up the space of figures. Built with words, metaphors, sentences and characters, this space can be represented; it is a ‘time embodied’” (Time and Sense 320)]. Paradoxically, the gap opened by the loss of time is the very realm in which that time can be recuperated in sensation. The immediacy of sensation in space reconciles us with the passing of time because time also forms the matrix of such experiences. If identity is supposedly plagued by lack, an idea which Kristeva adopts uncritically from Lacan in her early work, then by contrast, in her later writing the fragility at the heart of identity appears to become the central positive aspect of our being. The “primal lack” (During 1993: 18) which is rejected by Kristeva, Foucault and Deleuze (pace Racevskis 1983), as we shall see, is inverted so as to become something signifying plenitude. In a “turning” or Kehre of her own, the later Kristeva specifies the non-completion of our identity as its defining characteristic of aliveness. Non-completion (being inprocess) is what allows the presence of being itself to be experienced. Similarly, Judith Butler specifies ontological non-completion as the ground for the presence of the ethical relation: The opacity of the subject may be a consequence of its being conceived as a relational being, one whose early and primary relations are not always available to conscious knowledge. […] If we are formed in the context of relations that become partially irrecoverable to us, then
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As incomplete creatures we are generically open to our environment. This may be a cause of anxiety, or equally, it may be the quintessential ground of human experience. Experience is the mode, suggests Kristeva, by which we may be in the presence of being: “Dans la tradition religieuse, herméneutique, philosophique, l’expérience (lisez Hegel et Heidegger) implique une coprésence avec la plénitude de l’Être quand ce n’est pas une fusion avec Dieu” (L’Avenir d’une révolte 80) [“In the religious, hermeneutic, philosophical tradition, experience implies a copresence with the plenitude of being when not a fusion with God (see Hegel and Heidegger)” (Intimate Revolt 251)]. If for Lacan we are condemned to live in lack, if lack is the very condition of our subjectivity, it is for the later Kristeva something to be celebrated (as the very condition of our subjectivity) rather than stoically endured. In a sense, by the time we arrive at the late work of Kristeva, we appear to have returned, so to speak, to a space which looks very much like the chora, in its openness, its fluidity, and its constant recasting of symbolic meaning. Yet this space is no longer that which merely precedes subjectivity in its later, rigidified and normative form. Now it has become the ongoing condition of an individual subjectivity and a societal identity par excellence. A critics of Kristeva such as Anna Smith reamisn sceptical about the spaces of an avantgarde literary poetics while granting credence to the spaces of a psychoanalytically understood realm of everyday sensation and political engagement (see Smith 1996: 211-12). Part of what such a critique may be registering is the overcoming of a fundamental dichotomization which vitiated her philosophy in its earlier phases. There is a deep contradiction in Kristeva’s early writing between, on the one hand, an assertion of fluid transition between symbolic and semiotic and of the semiotic at work in experience and narration, and on the other, the belief in the immutability of a regime of
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loss governed by the law of the father, over which the phallus casts its long shadow. Space, however, militates against such economies of lack. Space is what is, in the sense of Wittgenstein’s opening gambit in the Tractatus: “Die Welt ist alles, was der Fall ist” (Wittgenstein 1990: 9) [“The world is all that is the case” (Wittgenstein 1974: 5)]. Translated into spatial language, the world is without a negative term. It has no outside. It simply is. It may display qualitative distinctions, but not absolute quantitative differences. It may evince unevenness, viscosity or rarefaction, but it does not admit of lack or absence. In precisely this vein, the 1980s alter-ego frame-narrator of Kristeva’s novel Les Samouraïs meditates: Le bonheur est un présent achevé. Aucune attente. Tout, ici et maintenant. […] Le bonheur est qualité, j’essaie de ne pas l’enfermer dans la quantité. Dès qu’il a lieu, le bonheur est. (Les Samouraïs 380) [Happiness is a fulfilled present. No waiting. Everything here and now. […] Happiness is qualitative; I try not to restrict it to quantity. As soon as it happens, happiness is. (The Samurai 284)]
Happiness is a space, is space taking place, without lack. It is a plenitude of qualities in which quantity (that is, time and its passing, the onset of ageing and the approach of death) are irrelevant. This is the culmination of Kristeva’s forty-year project of exploring the semiotics of psychic life in modern society. Her inaugural gesture of setting “space”, chora, at the very incipit of her theoretical trajectory has profoundly inflected the tenor of that multifaceted undertaking. “Space” may be subjected to lack in the Symbolic, just as it has been read under the sign of absence in a good deal of her work until the late 1980s. However, as Deleuze and Guattari point out, this regime of lack itself is an ideological construction, albeit a ubiquitous and all-powerful one, which does not alter the fundamental plenitude of space. It is this plenitude which, in Kristeva’s later work, once again comes to the fore under the jubilant signs of love, exile, and revolt.
3. Foucault’s Spatial Discourse Anecdote of space In one of her thumbnail sketches of the intellectuals she knew in Paris from the late 1960s onwards, Kristeva, in her novel Les Samouraïs, paints a cold and austere portrait of Foucault. There appears to be little mutual liking between her protagonist and the fictionalized Foucault. However, she adds, “Cependant, Scherner sait être un mélomane des mots: ‘La limite de la mort ouvre devant le langage, ou plutôt en lui, un espace infini.’ Telle serait la littérature” (Samouraïs 187) [“But Scherner [i.e., Foucault] can love the music of words. ‘Before language, or rather inside it, the limit imposed by death opens up an infinite space’. Literature” (The Samurai 139)]. Kristeva’s fictionalized Foucault is paraphrasing Blanchot – an enigmatic critic and novelist whose works Kristeva had in her suitcase when she arrived in Paris in 1966 (‘Memoire’ 43). The real Foucault had also written extensively on Blanchot. The fictive Foucault of Kristeva’s novel narrates the manner in which language, stopped short in its temporal vector of intention and communication by the brute fact of death (see Blanchot 1981), is diverted into a spatiality – that of its systematicity, its contextuality, and what Foucault and others would name its ‘exteriority’. In the literary text, according to Kristeva’s fictive Foucault, language is transformed into an architectonics of vitiated referentiality. Kristeva’s one-liner is perspicacious, because it mimics much of Foucault’s own writing in the 1960s. That writing, I will claim in this chapter, gave birth to his perennial concern with space, thus highlighting an area of concern common to their respective oeuvres. More importantly, Kristeva’s fictional vignette also indexes the manner in which time would be brutally usurped by space as a dominant intellectual paradigm. In this last respect in particular, her novelistic anecdote resonates remarkably with one of Foucault’s own telling.
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Again and again, in interviews, Foucault recounted the story of a talk he once gave on “other spaces” to a group of architectural theorists, some time in the late 1960s. After he had concluded the forum was opened up for questions. He found himself, so he liked to relate, being vociferously abused by an existentialist psychologist who accused him of shamelessly neglecting history. Foucault in turn retrospectively poured scorn upon his blinkered interlocutor. The story recurs again and again in the four-volume Dits et écrits, often with virtually the same phrasing (for instance Dits et écrits III, 334/Power/Knowledge 69-70; III, 193/Power/Knowledge 149; III, 576; IV, 282/The Essential Works III, 349-64). Foucault used this recurring episode to illustrate the erstwhile hegemony of the temporal paradigm over the spatial in French academic circles until the late 1960s. The anecdote, in itself, is slight. In the course of its retelling, however, it appears to have developed a substance and a life of its own. In it, an agon between space and time, played out in the area of academic debate, is reiterated on multiple occasions so as to stake out a set of discursive power relations, a space of cultural capital and concomitant power, but increasingly one which would assert the power of space as an emergent academic and intellectual paradigm. I am making a claim which goes beyond Chris Philo’s suggestion that Foucault strategically deployed “geography” as a weapon capable of shattering the totalizing continuities of historiography (Philo 1992: 141-3). By virtue of being reiterated sufficiently often, an embattled discourse on space takes on the contours of a belligerent space of discourse. The increasingly combative new paradigm would occupy more and more terrain of academic discourse, to a large extent dislodging the hegemony of historiography. The “other spaces” anecdote thus takes on all the attributes of a perlocutionary speech act, bringing something into being by virtue of its discursive assertion. The very reiteration of this anecdote contributed, quite possibly, to cementing the persuasiveness of the new paradigm. I begin with Foucault’s anecdote as a way of rendering the progression I wish to track in his thought in the following two chapters. I envisage Foucault shifting from a notion of spatial discourse (discourses described with the help of an array of spatial metaphors) to a concept of discursive space (spaces in which discourses about space interact with physical space in its architectural, urban, institutional forms). I suggest the other spaces anecdote can be seen, from the point
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of view of its content, as a local illustration of the first instance, that of spatial discourse. In its contextual functioning, however, it exemplifies the second instance, that of discursive space. The anecdote embodies the interaction of a spatial discourse with a number of institutional, architectural spaces. These institutional spaces stretch from the unnamed seminar room where Foucault gave the paper recounted in the above anecdote, to the prestigious Collège de France, where he took up a newly created Chair of History of Systems of Thought in 1970. The historian Paul Veyne commented on this development in Foucault’s spatial thinking by noting that “L’historien Foucault a commencé par étudier des discours plus que des pratiques, ou plutôt des pratiques à travers des discours” [“Foucault began by studying discourses more than practices, or rather, by studying practices via discourses”] (Veyne 1979: 203). Veyne’s comment is tantalizingly ambiguous. He claims that Foucault was interested, initially, in ways of talking, writing, conceptualizing, and only subsequently became interested in the more material practices which accompanied discourses. Alternatively, however, it is possible to (mis)read the second part of Veyne’s comment as implying that through his study of discourses, Foucault became interested in practices – that is to say, that the relationship between the two phases was a causal one. In this chapter I will analyze Foucault in this latter manner, moving from an analysis of his early spatial imagining of discourse, to his ideas about the way space is part and parcel of the processes of power. Stuart Elden highlights this contrast in the following fashion: While Foucault shared with the structuralists a predilection for spatial metaphors, he alone continually paired them with analyses of actual spaces. His histories were not merely spatial in the language they used, or in the metaphors of knowledge they developed, but were also histories of spaces, and attendant spaces of history. (Elden 2001: 1012)
Elden has brilliantly brought to the fore the debt that Foucault owed to Heidegger and his reflections upon space. By contrast, my concern is to place Foucault alongside French contemporaries such as Kristeva and Deleuze. While Elden productively sees Foucault’s spatial thought developing in a delayed dialogue with Heidegger, I trace Foucault’s conceptualization of space as arising out of a confrontation
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with writers such as Blanchot and his meditation on ‘literary space’ (1955; Blanchot 1989). I will begin, therefore, with metaphors, and move on to materiality. My approach to Foucault will follow the same pattern as my reading of Kristeva in the previous chapter. I will begin by concentrating upon Foucault’s initially relatively abstract notion of space. This notion of space is similar in its structural functioning, to that of Kristeva’s chora. I will then move on to a much more complex and real-world notion of space as a crucial element in practices of power and contestation in society, explicitly linking “la pratique effective de la liberté, la pratique des rapports sociaux et les distributions spatiales” (Dits et écrits IV: 277) [“the effective practice of freedom by people, the practice of social relations, and the spatial distributions in which they find themselves” (The Essential Works III, 246)]. This second notion of space can be approximately aligned with Kristeva’s second phase, that of the practices of constructing a psychic and social existence in the Symbolic. In both cases, Kristeva and Foucault’s early interest in explicating the manner in which meaning in society is generated by an invisible semiotic or epistemological ground is left behind. Their initial interest in the productive relationship between instances somewhat akin to the dual components of a Marxist basesuperstructure dialectic, or the linguists’ langue-parole couple cedes to a more entangled problematic. What follows here is a scrutiny of the manner in which that productive process continues to operate in a society traversed by everyday conflicts and contests. Both thinkers move on to a more complex and materialist attention to the manner in which these abstract productive binarisms operate in the midst of multiple social pressures, restraints and processes.
From spatial language to spatial discourse In a 1982 interview, the American scholar Paul Rabinow asked Foucault why Les Mots et les choses displayed such a profusion of spatial metaphors. Foucault claimed they arose from the fact that classical knowledge emerged quite literally out of a spatialization of the objects of science:
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Ce qui est frappant dans les mutations et les transformations épistémologiques qui se sont opérées au XVIIe siècle, c’est de voir comment la spatialisation du savoir a constitué l’un des facteurs de l’élaboration de ce savoir en science. Si l’histoire naturelle et les classifications de Linné ont été possibles, c’est pour un certain nombre de raisons : d’un côté, il y a eu littéralement une spatialisation de l’objet même des analyses, dont la règle a été d’étudier et de classer les plantes uniquement sur la base de ce qui était visible. […] Tous les éléments traditionnels du savoir, comme, par exemple, la fonction médicale des plantes, furent abandonnés. L’objet fut spatialisé. (Dits et écrits IV, 283-4) [What is striking about the epistemological mutations and transformations that occurred in the seventeenth century is the way the spatialization of knowledge made up one of the factors allowing the elaboration of this knowledge to produce science. If Linnaeus’ natural history and his classifications were possible, it was for a certain number of reasons. On the one hand, there was very literally a spatialization of the object of analysis. Previously, the rule had been to study and classify plants purely on the basis of what could be seen. […] All the traditional elements of knowledge, for example the medical function of plants, were abandoned. The object was spatialized.
Foucault then went on then to enumerate the manner in which spatial parameters founded the very fabric within which knowledge could be framed so as to emerge as scientific knowledge: Par la suite, l’objet fut spatialisé dans la mesure où les principes de classification devaient être trouvés dans la structure même des plantes : le nombre de leurs éléments, leur disposition, leur taille, et certains autres éléments comme la hauteur de la plante. Puis il y a eu la spatialisation au moyen des illustrations contenues dans les livres, qui ne fut possible que grâce à certaines techniques d’impression. Plus tard encore, la spatialisation de la reproduction des plantes ellesmêmes, que l’on s’est mis à représenter dans les livres. Ce sont là des techniques d’espace, et non des métaphores. (Dits et écrits IV, 284) [Subsequently, the object was spatialized to the extent that the classificatory principles were to be found in the structure of the plants themselves: the number of the elements, their arrangement, their width, and certain other elements such as the height of the plant. Then there was spatialization by means of the illustration to be found in books, possible only with the help of certain printing technology. And even later, the spatialization of the reproduction of the plants themselves began to be portrayed in books. All these aspects are spatial techniques, and not merely metaphors.
In a quite pragmatic manner, Foucault thus demonstrates how space, or spatiality (rather than function, for instance) provided a basic grid
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that made possible certain new ways of framing the object of scientific study so as to produce new knowledge. He made similar claims for the history of medicine: Il est question […] de l’espace, du langage et de la mort […] L’apparition de la clinique […] est signalée […] par le changement infime et décisif qui a substitué à la question: ‘Qu’avez-vous?’, par quoi s’inaugurait au XVIII siècle le dialogue du médecin et du malade avec sa grammaire et son style propres, cette autre où nous reconnaissons le jeu de la clinique et le principe de tout son discours : ‘Où avez-vous mal?’ (Naissance de la clinique xiv) It’s about […] space, language and death […] The appearance of the clinic […] must be identified […] by the minute but decisive change, whereby the question ‘What is the matter with you?’, with which the eighteenth century dialogue between doctor and patient began (a dialogue possessing its own grammar and style), was replaced by that other question: ‘Where does it hurt?’, in which we recognize the principle of the clinic and the operation of its entire discourse. (Birth of the Clinic xviii)
Thomas Flynn summarizes the shift by saying, “Clinicians were now interested in ‘geography’ rather than ‘history’” (Flynn 1994: 23). But Foucault’s assertions of an empirical shift towards spatiality were slightly ingenuous. Space as a framework producing a new paradigm of knowledge was at work not only in the classical epoch, in the local environment of seventeenth-century science, described by Les Mots et les choses, but also in the book itself. The reason why Naissance de la clinique or Les Mots et les choses were so replete with spatial metaphors also lay closer to home – in the postwar context of Foucault’s own highly innovative reflection. Significantly, the role of space in “the elaboration of knowledge to produce science” is already massively evident in Foucault’s thinking all through the 1960s. Foucault was a polymath, completing his undergraduate and postgraduate degrees in philosophy and psychology, toying with an alternative career in physics during his stay in Uppsala, Sweden, and writing his monumental senior doctorate in the interdisciplinary history of psychiatry. He was also a prolific writer on literature. The importance of space is everywhere evident in the articles and books on literature he wrote during the 1960s such as Raymond Roussel (Death and the Labyrinth) (see also Dits et écrits I, 205-15/The Essential
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Works II, 21-32, Philo 1992, 144-8). In a 1964 article about “language and space”, Foucault wrote: Ecrire, pendant des siècles, s’est ordonné au temps. […] Le XXe siècle est peut-être l’époque où se dénouent de telles parentés […] Ce qui […] nous dévoile que le langage est (ou peut-être est devenu) chose d’espace. […] Et si l’espace dans le langage d’aujourd’hui la plus obsédante des métaphores, ce n’est pas qu’il offre désormais le seul recours ; mais c’est dans l’espace que le langage d’entrée en jeu se déploie, glisse sur lui-même, détermine ses choix, dessine ses figures et ses translations. C’est en lui […] que son être même se ‘métaphorise’ […] L’écart, la distance, l’intermédaire, la dispersion, la fracture, la différence ne sont pas les thèmes de la littérature d’aujourd’hui; mais ce en quoi le langage nous est donné et vient jusqu’à nous: ce qui fait qu’il parle. (Dits et écrits I, 407) [Writing, over the centuries, has been coordinated with time. […] The 20th century is perhaps the era in which such kinships were undone. […] This […] reveals that language is (or, perhaps became) a thing of space. […] And if space is, in today’s language, the most obsessive of metaphors, it is not that it henceforth offers the only recourse; but it is in space that, from the outset, language unfurls, slips on itself, determines its choices, draws its figures and translations. It is in space […] that its very being ‘metaphorizes’ itself. The gap, distance, the intermediary, dispersion, fracture and difference are not the themes of literature today; but in which language is now given and comes to us: what makes it speak. (‘The Language of Space’ 163-64)]
In this view of things, language no longer has the shape of a direct transmission, from the past to the present. It relinquishes its uninterrupted vector of re-presentation of a prior meaning. Rather, language becomes something spread across distance, rarified, broken up, spaced-out. Its own constituent elements communicate and resonate with each other before they ever become communication with a recipient. Indeed, space begins to appear, in its work of ‘spacing’, of ‘making of intervals’, as that which defines the conditions of possibility of language as it is to be found in contemporary literature. Here the series spaceÆlanguageÆavant-garde literature, which we also find in Kristeva’s work, is once again in evidence. For Foucault, the language of contemporary literature de-linearizes the language of classical literature. His formulation thus reverses the “linearization” which Kristeva, as we saw above, identified as the mark of language in the Symbolic (“la proposition et […] le jugement déplient ou linéarisent
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[…] la significantion […] ouverte par le thétique” – Révolution 53 [“the proposition and jugement […] unfold or linearize […] the signification […] opened up by the thetic” – Revolution 54]). Literature, for both Kristeva and Foucault, is where language stops “symbolizing” and begins “semiotizing”, that is, going “off the beaten track” in a manner which is explored concretely in works such as Edouard Glissant’s runaway-slave novel Mahogany: Et j’en fus à me demander si dans ce maelström il n’existait pas quelque règle, une manière de loi qui eût imposé une ordonnance cachée ou tout au moins à découvrir, et si je ne devais pas indiquer que le marron Gani et le géreur Maho et le délinquant Mani, à des époques si éloignées, représentaient la même figure d’une même force dérivée de son allant normal. (Glissant, 1987: 22) [And I came to wonder whether there did not exist in this maelstrom some rule, a sort of a law, which might have imposed a hidden order, or at least one which could somehow made out, and whether I shouldn’t suggest that the maroon Gani and the overseer Maho and the runaway Mani, at periods so far apart, were the same face of a same force wandering from its normal path.]
Foucault contrasts to the “linearity” of traditional literature with its straight plot-line the paradoxical “curve” of a graph: Cette ‘courbe’ paradoxale, si différente du retour homérique ou de l’accomplissement de la Promesse, elle est sans doute l’impensable de la littérature. C’est-à-dire ce qui la rend possible. (Dits et écrits I, 408) [This paradoxical ‘curve’, so different from the Homeric return or from the fulfilment of the Promise, is without doubt for the moment the unthinkable of literature. Which is to say that which makes it possible. (‘The Language of Space’ 164)]
Space, evinced in the off-the-beaten-track-ness of modern literature, in its tendency to move sideways rather than forwards, is below the threshold of traditional literary thinking. With the concentration on the linearity of plot, older forms of literary criticism could not conceptualize a transversal literarity. Modern literature disturbs such paradigms. Alessandro Barico, in his novel City, proposes that “questo livro è construita come una città, come l’idea di una città. […] Le storie sono quartiere, il personaggi sono strada. […] Ci ho viaggiato tre anni, in City. Il lettore, se vorrà, potrà rifare la mia strada.” [“this book is constructed like a city, like the idea of a city. […] The stories are
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districts, the characters are streets […] I’ve travelled in City for three years. The reader, if he wishes, may retrace my path”] (Baricco 2002: dustjacket). The notion of narrative of journey is a familiar one which concurs with the linearity of plot. But Barrico asks the reader to bear with the space of narrative, not simply to move along its single path. He asks that we conceive of a sub-plot as a district, and not as a strand in a thread, that we imagine characters as spaces, not as points moving along a line. Indeed, Barrico’s “like a city” may be hinting at the city itself as a generator of stories, as the matrix out of which literature, especially in its modernist and postmodernist avatars (viz. Joyce, Döblin, Perec) arises. Space remains unthought within traditional meta-literature because it is the invisible framework which makes literature possible in the first