Social Structure and Party Choice in Western Europe: A Comparative Longitudinal Study

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Social Structure and Party Choice in Western Europe A Comparative Longitudinal Study

Oddbjørn Knutsen

Social Structure and Party Choice in Western Europe

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Social Structure and Party Choice in Western Europe A Comparative Longitudinal Study Oddbjørn Knutsen Professor of Political Science, University of Oslo

© Oddbjørn Knutsen 2004 All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission. No paragraph of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, 90 Tottenham Court Road, London W1T 4LP. Any person who does any unauthorised act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages. The author has asserted his right to be identified as the author of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. First published 2004 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS and 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10010 Companies and representatives throughout the world PALGRAVE MACMILLAN is the global academic imprint of the Palgrave Macmillan division of St. Martin’s Press, LLC and of Palgrave Macmillan Ltd. Macmillan® is a registered trademark in the United States, United Kingdom and other countries. Palgrave is a registered trademark in the European Union and other countries. ISBN 1–4039–3320–0 This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Knutsen, Oddbjørn, 1953– Social structure and party choice in western Europe : a comparative longitudinal study / Oddbjørn Knutsen. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 1–4039–3320–0 (cloth) 1. Political parties—Europe, Western. 2. Political sociology. 3. Comparative government. I. Title. JN94.A979K66 2004 306.2′6′094—dc22 10 13

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Printed and bound in Great Britain by Antony Rowe Ltd, Chippenham and Eastbourne

Contents

List of Figures

vii

List of Tables

xi xiii

Preface 1. Party Choice and Social Structure: Theory, the Party Choice Variable and Statistical Measures 1.1 Introduction: the study of the relationship between party choice and social structure 1.2 Review of comparative literature on social structure and party choice 1.3 Grouping of parties in party families 1.4 The party choice variable 1.5 Socialist/non-socialist party choice 1.6 Statistical measures and the analysis of changes over time 1.7 The plan for the book and the organisation of the empirical analyses

1 1 4 14 19 31 34 41

2. Religious Denomination 2.1 Introduction: the two faces of the religious cleavage 2.2 Religious denominations 2.3 Religious denomination and party choice 2.4 Socialist/non-socialist party choice 2.5 Conclusion

43 43 46 53 76 82

3. Church Religiosity and Church Attendance 3.1 Introduction: church religiosity in a comparative perspective 3.2 Church religiosity and party choice 3.3 Party choice and church attendance within the different religious denominations in religiously mixed countries 3.4 Socialist/non-socialist party choice 3.5 Conclusions

86

v

86 97

115 123 128

vi Contents

4. Urban–Rural Residence 4.1 Introduction: the urban–rural cleavage, or urban–rural contrasts 4.2 Operationalisation of urban–rural residence 4.3 Urban–rural residence and party choice 4.4 Socialist/non-socialist party choice 4.5 Conclusion

132

5. Education 5.1 Introduction 5.2 The education variable in the surveys and changes in education levels in a comparative perspective 5.3 Education and party choice 5.4 Socialist/non-socialist party choice 5.5 Conclusions

159 159

6. Gender 6.1 Introduction 6.2 Gender and party choice 6.3 Socialist/non-socialist party choice 6.4 Conclusion

198 198 201 217 222

7. Conclusion: the Decline, Convergence and Transformation of Cleavage Politics 7.1 Introduction 7.2 Social cleavages and nominal-level party choice 7.3 Overlap and crosscut for the various cleavages 7.4 Left–right division of parties

224 224 225 240 243

Bibliography

278

Index

283

132 134 136 151 155

163 167 187 194

List of Figures 2.1

Trends in the portion that do not consider themselves as members of a religious denomination 2.2 Strength of the correlation between religious denomination and party choice, 1970–97, measured by Cramer’s V 2.3 Strength of the correlation between religious denomination and party choice, 1970–97, measured by Nagelkerke’s R2 2.4 Trends in the strength of the correlation between religious denomination and party choice measured by Cramer’s V 2.5 Trends in the strength of the correlation between religious denomination and party choice measured by Nagelkerke’s R2 2.6A The strength of the correlation between religious denomination and socialist/non-socialist party choice measured by the eta-coefficient, 1970–97. Green parties placed in the non-socialist group 2.6B The strength of the correlation between religious denomination and socialist/non-socialist party choice measured by the eta-coefficient, 1970–97. Green parties placed in the socialist group 2.7A Trends in the correlation between religious denomination and socialist/non-socialist party choice. Eta-coefficients. Green parties placed in the non-socialist party group 2.7B Trends in the correlation between religious denomination and socialist/non-socialist party choice. Eta-coefficients. Green parties placed in the socialist party group 3.1 Development of church attendance in eight countries according to the PDI-index 3.2A Trends in church attendance according to religious denomination in Britain. PDI-index 3.2B Trends in church attendance according to religious denomination in Germany. PDI-index 3.2C Trends in church attendance according to religious denomination in the Netherlands. PDI-index vii

52

54

54

59

60

77

77

78

79 93 95 95 96

viii List of Figures

3.3 3.4

3.5A

3.5B

3.6A

3.6B

4.1 4.2

4.3A

4.3B

4.4A

4.4B

The strength of the correlation between church attendance and party choice, 1970–97. Eta-coefficients Trends in the strength of the correlation between church attendance and party choice measured by the eta-coefficient The strength of the correlation between church attendance and socialist/non-socialist party choice according to the lor-measure, 1970–97. Green parties placed in the non-socialist group The strength of the correlation between church attendance and socialist/non-socialist party choice, according to the lor-measure, 1970–97. Green parties placed in the socialist group Trends in the strength of the correlation between church attendance and socialist/non-socialist party choice according to the lor-measure. Green parties in the non-socialist group Trends in the strength of the correlation between church attendance and socialist/non-socialist party choice according to the lor-measure. Green parties placed in the socialist group Strength of the correlation between urban/rural residence and party choice, 1970–97. Eta-coefficients Trends in the strength of the correlation between urban/rural residence and party choice measured by the eta-coefficients Correlation between urban–rural residence and socialist/ non-socialist party choice measured by the Lor-measure, 1970–97. Greens placed in the non-socialist party group Correlation between urban–rural residence and socialist/ non-socialist party choice measured by the lor-measure, 1970–97. Greens placed in the socialist party group Trends in the strength of the correlation between urban–rural residence and socialist/non-socialist party choice according to the lor-measure. Greens in the non-socialist group Trends in the strength of the correlation between socialist/non-socialist party choice and urban–rural residence according to the lor-measure. Greens in the socialist group

98

102

124

125

126

127 136

140

152

152

154

154

List of Figures ix

5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5

5.6A

5.6B

5.7A

5.7B

6.1 6.2A

6.2B 6.3A

6.3B

Average education level in the population of the eight countries, 1973–97 Trends in average level of education in the eight countries Average education level in different birth cohorts in the eight countries, 1973–97 Strength of the correlation between education and party choice measured by the eta-coefficient, 1973–97 Trends in the strength of the correlation between education and party choice measured by the eta-coefficient Correlation (lor-scores) between education and socialist/ non-socialist party choice, 1973–97. Greens placed in the non-socialist group Correlation (lor-scores) between education and socialist/ non-socialist party choice, 1973–97. Greens placed in the socialist group Trends in the strength of the correlation between education and socialist/non-socialist party choice measured by the lor-scores. Greens placed in the socialist party group Trends in the strength of the correlation between education and socialist/non-socialist party choice measured by the lor-scores. Greens placed in the non-socialist party group Strength of the correlation between gender and party choice measured by the eta-coefficient, 1970–97 Trends in the strength of the correlation between gender and party choice measured by the eta-coefficient Trends in the strength of the correlation between gender and party choice measured by the PDI-measure Trends in the strength of the correlation between gender and socialist/non-socialist party choice according to the PDI-measure. Green parties placed in the non-socialist party group Trends in the strength of the correlation between gender and socialist/non-socialist party choice according to the PDI-measure. Green parties placed in the socialist party group

164 166 167 168

172

188

188

190

191 202

206 206

219

219

x List of Figures

7.1A–H Trends in the strength of the various social cleavages according to the eta-coefficients 7.2 Trends in the impact of the religious cleavages on party choice measured by Nagelkerke’s R2 7.3 Trends in the controlled impact of the class variables (education and social class) on party choice measured by Nagelkerke’s R2 7.4 Trends in the impact of the total cleavage model on party choice measured by Nagelkerke’s R2 7.5A–H Trends in the bivariate correlations between social cleavages and socialist/non-socialist party choice. Greens placed in the socialist party group. Lor-scores 7.6 Trends in the impact of the religious cleavages (controlled for gender and urban–rural residence) on left–right party choice. Greens placed in the leftist party group 7.7 Trends in the impact of the class variables (controlled) on left–right party choice. Greens placed in the leftist party group 7.8 Trends in the impact of the total cleavage model on left–right party choice. Greens placed in the leftist party group 7.9 Trends in the impact of the total cleavage model on left–right party choice. The best fitted model regarding the placement of the Greens

227 235

236 237

244

251

252

255

257

List of Tables 1.1 Comparative effect of social structure upon partisanship based on data from the 1960s 1.2 Grouping of political parties into nine party families 1.3 Support for political parties in the eight countries grouped into party families, 1970–97 1.4 Trends in support for the parties in the various countries 1.5 Trends in support for socialist, non-socialist and green parties in the various countries 1.6 Examples of how various statistical measures are presented and analysed 2.1 Trends in belongingness to various religious denominations 2.2 Overall differences in support for the various political parties, according to religious denomination in a comparative setting, 1970–97, with parties grouped into party families 2.3 Religious denomination and party choice, 1970–97 3.1 Frequency of church attendance in different time periods, 1970–97 3.2 Overall differences in support for the various political parties according to church attendance in a comparative setting, 1970–97. Parties are grouped into party families 3.3 Church religiosity and party choice, 1970–97 3.4 Church attendance and party choice according to religious denomination in religiously mixed countries, 1970–97 4.1 Overall differences in support for the various political parties according to urban–rural residence in a comparative setting, 1970–97. Parties are grouped into party families 4.2 Urban–rural residence and party choice, 1970–97 5.1 Age when finishing full-time education 1973–97 5.2 Overall differences in support for the various political parties according to education in a comparative setting, 1970–97. Parties are grouped into party families 5.3 Education and party choice, 1973–97

xi

9 20 24 26 33 37 48

56 61 89

99 104

116

137 141 165

169 174

xii List of Tables

6.1 Overall differences in support for the various political parties according to gender in a comparative setting, 1970–97. Parties grouped into party families 6.2 Gender and party choice, 1970–97 7.1 Overlap and change in overlap for cleavage variables

203 208 241

Preface The comparative study of electoral behaviour is a difficult task because electoral surveys are designed in different ways in different countries. This makes comparative research extremely difficult within the field. Even to do longitudinal research within one country is not straightforward because question formulas change or questions are dropped or added from one election to another, and variables tapping the same question are assigned different variable names in various datafiles. For one researcher to do comparative and longitudinal research is therefore a difficult and industrious task. This work is based on a genuine cumulative database of Eurobarometers. It is difficult in explain in words how much easier it is to work on such a datafile compared with the alternatives. It also creates potential for doing analyses which otherwise would not be possible. I would like to thank Hermann Schmitt at the Mannheimer Zentrum für Europäische Sozialforschung for giving me the opportunity to use the integrated Eurobarometer datafile on which this work is based. I am also grateful to the Mannheimer Zentrum für Europäische Sozialforschung, which hosted me as a guest professor while I was doing most of the research on which this work is based. Oddbjørn Knutsen May 2004

xiii

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1 Party Choice and Social Structure: Theory, the Party Choice Variable and Statistical Measures

1.1 Introduction: the study of the relationship between party choice and social structure The study of the relationship between social structural variables and voters’ party choice is a classic topic within political science and political sociology. In their seminal essay on the development of the conflict structure in western democracies, Lipset and Rokkan (1967a) focused on the historical origins of the structural party conflicts. They saw the main political cleavages as direct products of two revolutions: national and industrial. The four cleavages which they identified all had clear structural anchorage. The centre–periphery cleavage was anchored in geographical regions and related to different ethnic and linguistic groups, as well as religious minorities (confessions). The conflict between the Church and the State pitted the secular state against the historical privileges of the churches; and over control of the important educational institutions. This cleavage has more specifically polarised the religious section against the secular section of the population. The conflict in the labour market involved owners and employers versus tenants, labourers and workers. Finally, the conflict in the commodity market was between buyers and sellers of agricultural products or, more generally, between the urban and the rural population (Lipset & Rokkan 1967a: 15–23). Lipset and Rokkan’s work was the theoretical basis for a large number of subsequent empirical analyses of the relationship between (changes in) social structure and party choice, and such analyses became a central part of electoral research in many countries where election studies are carried out on a regular basis. These studies often have a longitudinal component, but they seldom include comparison between countries. 1

2

Social Structure and Party Choice in Western Europe

The main comparative studies are Lipset and Rokkan’s volume Party Systems and Voter Alignments (Lipset & Rokkan 1967b), Electoral Behaviour: A Comparative Handbook (Rose 1974a), Electoral Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies (Dalton, Flanagan & Beck 1984a) and Electoral Change: Responses to Evolving Social and Attitudinal Structures in Western Countries (Franklin et al. 1992). Common to all these comparative works and others is that they are based on contributions from national experts who write about ‘their’ respective countries, with the available data that exists for each. 1 In addition to country-specific chapters, these volumes also include chapters that combine the perspectives and empirical findings to reach some overall perspectives on change and comparative patterns of differences in change. Variables are often differently operationalised in the different countries, and the comparative elements are often few and somewhat problematic. This study takes a more explicit comparative approach by employing a genuine cumulative data set based on all Eurobarometers from 1970 to 1997.2 The analysis comprises eight of the nine countries that were members of the (then) European Economic Community: Belgium, Britain, Denmark, France, (West) Germany, Ireland, Italy and the Netherlands.3 In this work we use a traditional notion of social cleavage. A cleavage basically reflects broadly based and long-standing social and economic divisions within society, and the political cleavage structure is thought of in terms of social groups, the loyalties of individuals to their social group and how these loyalties influence party choice and political action (Franklin, Mackie & Valen 1992: 5). One important perspective in Lipset and Rokkan’s work was the persistent impact of social structure on party choice, which they called the ‘freezing of party alignments’. Later research has documented considerable decline in the impact of at least some of the structural variables that they considered important, and in the literature there has been a focus on defreezing of party alignments, structural or secular dealignment (Dalton, Flanagan & Beck 1984b) and the decline of cleavage politics (Franklin 1992). This research will be reviewed in the next section. Our analysis comprises two aspects that may influence the strength of the various parties and the relationship between social structure and party choice, referred to in the literature as two main aspects of secular realignment: ecological and sectoral realignment (Flanagan 1984: 95–96). The first aspect is the changes in the social structure. Given that social structure changes in important ways, this may increase the support for parties which appeal to the social group that is increasing in size. 4

Party Choice and Social Structure 3

This is a perspective of ecological realignment, where changes in party support follow directly from the changes in social structure (Flanagan 1984: 96). In this work we have the opportunity to examine how social structure has changed in a comparative setting, since the respondents are asked about the structural variables in the same way in each survey. The other aspect is that social groups change party choice so that a given structural variable becomes more important, less important or changes significantly in relation to the way the various groups vote. These are the perspectives of sectoral alignment, dealignment and realignment, respectively. A large part of this work discusses this perspective in detail. The concrete research questions in this work are: 1. How have the central structural variables changed during the period in question? Are there basic comparative differences in this sense? This research problem is mainly included for descriptive purposes. I will not try to predict the changing fortune of the various political parties on the basis of these changes as, for example, Franklin et al. do (1992: 23–7, 43–50, 385–95). The underlying logic of such predictions is that if social structure still determines party choice to a large degree, we will be able to make such predictions fairly well, but not if social structure has lost its explanatory power. Since the focus in this work is not concentrated on the fortune of the parties of the left versus the parties on the right, but on parties belonging to the various party families, such predictions and explanations as to whether the predictions are supported by the empirical findings would be too cumbersome. 2. For the entire period (1970–97), what is the comparative strength of the various structural conflict variables, and how has this changed from the early 1970s to the late 1990s? 3. For which parties do the various structural variables have the largest impact within the various party systems and across national contexts? The various parties will be grouped into party families, and the crossnational comparison will be conducted on the basis of parties within the same party family. For which parties do we find the most significant change in support from given social groups? 4. How do we more concretely explain the comparative differences in the impact of a cleavage variable? Given that we will decompose the components that make up the various correlations, we will be able to indicate some basic comparative differences related to parties within the same party family that can explain the differences in the overall strength of the correlations.

4

Social Structure and Party Choice in Western Europe

5. What causes the changes in the strength of the correlation within a given country? How do the various social groups change their voting behaviour so that we observe a change in the impact of a structural variable?5 This research question mirrors the former research question: Here the change over time within a country is decomposed, while it is the comparative differences that are decomposed in the former approach. 6. How accurate is the traditional left–right or socialist/non-socialist division of parties for tapping the overall impact of a given cleavage variable on party choice? The left–right division is often used in analyses of social structure and party choice, but seldom is the question posed as to whether this division really taps all the impact of social structure on the entire set of parties. For this purpose I develop measures which provide a precise picture of the degree to which the overall impact of a structural variable overlaps or cuts across the left– right division of parties. I question the left–right division in this context by discussing the placement of the Green parties, which are normally not included among the leftist parties in this context. In this chapter I will first review the comparative literature dealing with the relationship between social structure and party choice. I will start with the freezing hypothesis formulated by Lipset and Rokkan and then review the succeeding comparative works which partly have taken the freezing hypothesis as their point of departure (section 1.2). Then I will discuss the central question about grouping political parties into party families, since the party families will be a basis for the comparison of the relationship between social structure and party choice between countries (section 1.3). I will then continue with presenting the party choice variable in the data material and the support for the various parties (section 1.4) and also the division between socialist and non-socialist party groups (section 1.5). I then discuss some statistical measures that are used in the empirical analysis in order to answer the research questions that have been formulated above (section 1.6). Finally, I briefly outline how each of the empirical chapters are organised (section 1.7).

1.2 Review of comparative literature on social structure and party choice The Lipset and Rokkan article was a scholarly theoretical and historical analysis of the development of party cleavages in a comparative West European context. One important perspective in Lipset and Rokkan’s

Party Choice and Social Structure 5

work was the persistent impact of social structure on party choice, which they called the ‘freezing of party alignments’. With few but significant exceptions, the party systems of the 1960s reflected the cleavage structure of the 1920s. The basic party alternatives were set for each national citizenry during the phases of mobilisation just before or just after the final extension of suffrage and have remained roughly the same for decades despite considerable changes in the structural conditions of party choice. In the 1920s all voters were mobilised in the sense that universal suffrage had been introduced in most countries and the main social groups in industrial society had developed parties which articulated their interests and values. In Lipset and Rokkan’s model all groups had received their rights of incorporation and representation. An amazing number of the parties that were established around 1920 (at the end of the First World War) survived the onslaughts of Fascism and the Second World War. In brief, the party systems of the 1960s had more or less frozen into place by the 1920s, and the party alternatives had mainly tended to survive (Lipset & Rokkan 1967a: 50–4). It should be emphasised that the freezing hypothesis was not tested in a systematic way in Lipset and Rokkan’s work, which indeed was about something very different. Their comparative historical analyses stopped at about 1920, and the freezing hypothesis can be understood as an attempt to show how relevant their historical analysis was. The freezing hypothesis – as Peter Mair has emphasised – ‘constituted little more than a postscript to what had been a very differently oriented analysis’ (Mair 2001: 34). The burden of the essay was devoted to an understanding of how the constellations of the 1920s had come about; it was not about how these had subsequently unfolded. The freezing hypothesis is basically explained by a strong relationship between the socio-structural variables that Lipset and Rokkan emphasised and party choice. Furthermore, existing socialisation patterns, institutionalisation of the party organisations and party identifications are variables (perhaps intervening) that explain the stability of the party systems in West European countries, and why party systems tend to ‘freeze’. The socialisation explanation is formulated as follows by Lipset and Rokkan (1967a: 50): The party alternatives, and in remarkably many cases the party organisations, are older than the majorities of the national electorates. To most of the citizens of the West the current active parties have been part of the political landscape since their childhood or at least since

6

Social Structure and Party Choice in Western Europe

they were first faced with the choice between alternative ‘packages’ on election day. Voters are socialised into a political culture where the existing parties and ‘their’ political agendas dominate the political arena. Furthermore, the institutionalisation of the political parties implies that they have organisational resources and have the potential to mobilise large sections of the electorate. Lipset and Rokkan hypothesised that parties which were able to establish mass organisations and entrench themselves in the local government structure before the final drive towards maximal mobilisation had proved the most viable.6 The timing of the formation of the local party organisations was important for understanding the processes of mobilisation and cleavage formation (Lipset & Rokkan 1967a: 51–3). The importance of the existing party organisations is also key to understanding why new party alternatives have not emerged (Lipset & Rokkan 1967a: 55). Lipset and Rokkan’s ‘freezing’ perspective is a perspective of stable alignment (Dalton, Beck & Flanagan 1984: 11–13). There is a strong relationship between social structure – defined by the cleavage variables in the model – and party choice. This contributes to stability in the party system and fairly stable support for the various parties over time. The most important ‘systemic’ features (in terms of the party system) of a stable alignment are a low degree of electoral volatility (constant support for the various political parties) and a stable level of fragmentation of the party system. ‘The frozen notion of party systems has been taken most often to refer to the party units comprising the system, the stability of support for those parties, and the cleavage dimensions delineating the system’ (Shamir 1984: 39). Lipset and Rokkan’s mainly theoretical discussion of the perspective of a frozen cleavage structure was followed up by more systematic empirical documentation by Richard Rose and Derek Urwin (1969; 1970). In their pioneer comparative study of the relationship between social structure and party choice, Rose and Urwin (1969) were not able to study changes over time due to lack of time-series data, although they formulated some interesting hypotheses about development over time (Rose & Urwin 1969: 24–8). Their study is first and foremost an initial systematic comparative examination of the relationship between the social structural variables incorporated in the Lipset–Rokkan theoretical model and party choice based on a variety of national data sets from the 1960s. In a profound way their analyses of surveys of voters for 76 political parties from 17 countries supported the idea of a strong relationship

Party Choice and Social Structure 7

between social structural variables and party choice, thereby confirming the freezing hypothesis. They found that 75 per cent of the parties were ‘socially cohesive’ according to at least one of the cleavage variables in the Lipset–Rokkan model, and only 25 per cent were socially heterogeneous (Rose & Urwin 1969: 12–20). They were the first scholars to document the enormous impact of religion in a comparative setting, and to compare the impact of religion with that of class. Their finding that ‘religious divisions, not class, are the main social basis of parties in the Western world today’ (Rose & Urwin 1969: 12) is perhaps the most cited finding from that article, but that finding was not based on large differences in the number of socially cohesive parties: 35 and 32 parties, or 46 per cent and 42 per cent of all parties, were socially cohesive on the basis of religion and social class, respectively (Rose & Urwin 1969: 12–20).7 Another important conclusion related to the Lipset/Rokkan cleavage model was that they may have overemphasised the importance of communal (language) and regional divisions, since only eight parties were socially cohesive on these variables (Rose & Urwin 1969: 15). In another work Rose and Urwin (1970) studied support for the various parties over time based on an extensive collection of election data from 19 Western democracies for the period 1945–69, and they found small changes: The electoral strength of most parties in Western nations since the war had changed very little from election to election, from decade to decade, or within the lifespan of a generation. They therefore concluded that ‘the first priority of social scientists concerned with the development of parties and party systems since 1945 is to explain the absence of change in a far from static period in political history’ (Rose & Urwin 1970: 295). Hence much of the empirical testing of the freezing hypothesis has been done on the basis of aggregate electoral data similar to that used by Rose and Urwin in their 1970 article (see for example Shamir 1984). The underlying assumption – which is formulated quite explicitly in the mentioned contributions – is that if support for the various parties is fairly stable over time, then the freezing hypothesis is sustained; if support proves volatile, however, the thesis can no longer be considered valid. As we have argued, there will normally, but not always, be a relationship between aggregate changes in the form of the party system, electoral volatility and fragmentation of the party system, but there may not be a clear relationship. The persistence or decay of cleavages is related to the strength of the relationship between social structure and party choice, i.e. for parties representing a given party family or the entire party system. Studies of aggregate level stability and change cannot therefore serve

8

Social Structure and Party Choice in Western Europe

as a substitute for the analyses of social cleavages if we want to test the freezing hypothesis of electoral alignments, dealignments or realignments. In Electoral Behaviour: A Comparative Handbook (Rose 1974a) the research problem was very broad. It was based on the country-by-country approach ‘to provide a systematic and detailed introduction to the social structure, party systems, and electoral behaviour of major Western nations’ (Rose 1974b: 5). In addition to empirical analysis of the relationships between central socio-structural variables and party choice, many of the chapters provide a long and detailed history of the development of the party and electoral systems of the given country. The socio-structural variables included in the various country-specific chapters vary considerably, but an attempt was made to include the socio-structural variables derived from the Lipset/Rokkan model, and many chapters also contain tables showing the relationship between age, gender and education and party choice. Party choice is considered as a nominal level variable with all parties represented. Several chapters control for a third variable to avoid spurious relationships, and nearly all chapters contain the most fashionable multivariate analyses in social science at the time: tree or A.I.D. analysis. The tree analysis required a dichotomous party choice variable, which was mostly accomplished by using the division between socialist and non-socialist parties (Rose 1974b: 12–13). The book contains no comparative chapter, because at that stage in the development of the relationship between social structure and party choice one needed ‘to know many details about national circumstances as a precondition of synthesis’ (Rose 1974b: 13). However, the introductory chapter written by the editor provides an extremely useful comparative table showing the explained variance from tree analysis from 15 countries (see Table 1.1). The table is based on the tree analysis from the country-specific chapters as well as some other sources. The first major finding is the enormous difference in the explained variance between the countries. In the Anglo-American countries – including Ireland – the explained variance is 15 per cent or less, while in most Continental countries and Scandinavian countries the explained variance is more than 30 per cent, with the exception of Germany. The tree analysis tends to overestimate the difference between the three variables because all common explained variance is attached to the variable that is first (and most strongly) splitting the leftist and rightist parties, but the ranking of the three variables within countries is illustrative: in all Continental countries the religious cleavage is far more important than class, and in the Scandinavian countries and (with a much

Party Choice and Social Structure 9 Table 1.1 Comparative effect of social structure upon partisanship based on data from the 1960s Variance explained by:

Netherlands Austria Sweden Norway Belgium France – 4th Rep. France – 5th Rep. Finland Italy Denmark Germany Canada Australia USA Great Britain Ireland

Occupation

Religion

Region

Total

0.0 12.0 32.0 24.3 5.8 4.9 2.4 31.8 0.3 19.4 2.1 1.7 8.9 3.0 3.3 0.0

50.1 30.3 0.0 3.9 23.3 28.4 11.2 0.0 21.9 n.a. 12.0 8.0 1.8 5.5 0.0 0.0

0.1 2.9 0.0 2.2 2.9 1.4 4.4 0.0 1.5 n.a. 0.0 2.9 0.0 4.5 0.0 0.5

51.2 46.0 37.9 37.9 34.5 34.4 18.7 33.1 28.3 27.7 19.7 15.0 14.6 12.8 12.0 3.1

Year 1968 1969 1964 1965 1970 1956 1971 1966 1968 1968 1967 1965 1967 1952–64 1970 1969

Mean 9.8 11.2 1.5 26.2 Mean European countries 11.1 12.7 1.2 29.2 Mean 8 countries 4.2 14.8 1.2 24.4 The sum of the explained variance for the three variables does not sum up to the total explained variance due to the nature of the analysis Source: Rose (1974b: 17)

lower explained variance) in Britain social class is the most divisive variable. The table provides strong support for the main finding from the Rose and Urwin article in the sense that religion is more important than social class. This is shown by the average explained variance that is calculated in the table for all countries, including all European countries and the eight countries studied in this book. The difference is particularly large when the average is articulated based on only the eight countries. It is – if not the entire party system as such – mainly the left–right division of parties that is the dependent variable, not the single parties as in the 1969 article. Later research has, however, documented considerable decline in the impact of at least some of the structural variables that were considered important by Lipset and Rokkan and by Rose and Urwin, and in the literature there has been a focus on defreezing of party alignments,

10

Social Structure and Party Choice in Western Europe

i.e. structural or secular dealignment (Dalton, Flanagan & Beck 1984a) and the decline of cleavage politics (Franklin 1992). Dalton, Flanagan and Beck’s Electoral Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies (1984a) was the first to consider alternative explanations for electoral change in a cross-national perspective, and as such it was largely exploratory.8 They documented increased volatility and fragmentation of the party systems in western democracies. The patterns for stable or frozen alignments and strong partisan attachments had given way to one of decomposition and partisan decline. Central to their approach is the perspective of ageing in the party systems. Intense differentiation and polarisation of a party system is most likely to take place along a social cleavage when new parties, representing new interests and new values which previously have been excluded, enter into parliament and the political system. During this formative period, the need to establish an identity separate from the established parties and to mobilise a previously unpoliticised constituency induces the new parties to develop a strategy based on extreme, non-negotiable policy demands. Once inside the system, the party leadership is socialised into the political realities and the need for compromise to achieve some of its goal, and in time the party moderates its platform and broadens its appeal to represent new kinds of issue interests and to attract the marginal voters. Therefore, the longer a party system remains frozen around a fixed set of institutional cleavages, the greater will be the tendency for party platforms to converge (Dalton, Beck & Flanagan 1984: 19; Flanagan & Dalton 1984: 9). Dealignment and realignment are discussed as alternative developments, formulating two models of electoral change, one based on each of these alternative developments. The social cleavage model was based on realignment, the eclipse of old cleavages and the rise of new ones. The transition period between the old and the new cleavage structure is characterised by considerable instability and fluidity as the old cleavages diminish in importance and as voters (and parties) adjust voting behaviour to the new structure of party competition. There is first a dealignment from the old cleavages and then a new alignment related to the new cleavage structure, and the period of the 1970s was considered as such a transition period. The social cleavage model is based on the same logic as the Lipset/Rokkan model of party cleavages. While Lipset and Rokkan focused on the national and the industrial revolutions, Dalton, Flanagan & Beck (1984b: 455–6) talked of a third post-industrial revolution which might create a new basis of social cleavages. New issues and values and changing group conflicts

Party Choice and Social Structure

11

will coalesce into broad social movements which would realign the electorate and the party system of advanced industrial society. The emerging new cleavages may assume a temporary generational form because of the rapid pace of the transformation of advanced industrial societies, which might explain the fact that new orientations and new parties attract strongest support from the postwar cohorts. When the pace of the post-industrial revolution has become slower, the generational cleavage might eventually be replaced by more enduring social group cleavages (Flanagan & Dalton 1984: 12). They very much perceived these new cleavages as related to New Politics in a broad sense because they interpreted the main results from the country-specific chapters as ‘evidence of the emergence of an industrial/ post-industrial cleavage between proponents of the established industrial order and supporters of New Politics goals’ and ‘eventually among the participants of the new order’ (Dalton, Flanagan & Beck 1984b: 456). This was exemplified by arguing that both several issue cleavages and social cleavages would become increasingly important in post-industrial society. The structural cleavages which they argued might be important in post-industrial societies were mainly between old (in the sense of belonging primarily to the industrial order) and new (by belonging to the post-industrial order) groups, conflicts between the declining manual workers and the rising knowledge workers, the shrinking old middle class and the expanding new middle class, and the economically decayed central cities and the affluent suburbs. They pointed to gender and sector employment as lines of cleavages in advanced industrial society by focusing on the increasingly important role of the women’s movement and the increase in public employment (Dalton, Flanagan & Beck 1984b: 456). Several issue conflict lines might also rise in post-industrial society. These were variants of the materialist/post-materialist value orientations related to environmental protection versus the need for economic growth, conflicts over life-styles, between the New Left and the New Right issue agenda and between the Old and the New Left (Dalton, Flanagan & Beck 1984b: 457–9). The alternative functional model is based on dealignment as a more permanent property of the electorate in advanced industrial democracies. The dealignments that are observed in many countries will not be followed up by new alignments and new social cleavages. The growing signs of instability are a result of the loss of functions that political parties have performed in advanced industrial democracies and the declining value

12

Social Structure and Party Choice in Western Europe

of party identification and long-term partisan attachment for a large portion of voters (Dalton, Flanagan & Beck 1984b: 460–1; Flanagan & Dalton 1984: 13–15). The other major comparative work is Franklin et al. (1992), which is perhaps the most exhaustive systematic cross-national comparison to date, first and foremost because each country-specific chapter follows a ‘unique procedure in order to maximize both comparability and coverage’ (Franklin, Mackie & Valen 1992: 14). Each country-specific chapter was based upon analyses of the same variables and the same procedures for multivariate analyses. Each country-specific analysis was ideally to be based on one data set from the 1960s, the 1970s and the 1980s in order to be able to analyse change over time. The focus was on the traditional structural cleavages and in addition some new structural cleavages such as sector employment, consumption sectors, gender and also the materialist/post-materialist value conflict (Franklin, Mackie & Valen 1992: 17–19). The dependent variable was a dichotomous left–right party choice or ‘left voting’. 9 The editors were aware of the fact that there was a mismatch between changes in social structure and changes in electoral behaviour, and sought to examine this question as well: ‘If electoral change is consequential upon social change, then why did the effects arise so late?’ (Franklin, Mackie & Valen 1992: 8–9).10 The main research questions were to explain the mismatch in timing between changes in social structure and electoral change, and to what degree changes in social structure could explain the change in support for the leftist parties (Franklin, Mackie & Valen 1992: 8–9, 12–13). The main result from the analyses of 16 countries performed by country specialists is summed up in the notion ‘the decline of cleavage politics’: the explanatory power of the traditional socio-structural variables has declined in nearly all countries. The only exceptions are Germany and Italy, while Ireland and Norway also show some deviant trends, although the long-term trend from the 1960s to the 1980s is a decline in the explained variance of social structure (Franklin 1992: 385–8). The generation replacement hypothesis which is formulated at the beginning of the book (Franklin, Mackie & Valen 1992: 11–12, 27–8) appears to receive considerable support. In most countries it is primarily among the postwar cohorts that the decline of cleavage politics is evident, although there are also period effects in several countries, where the explanatory power of the social structural model becomes smaller also in the pre-war cohorts over time (Franklin 1992: 395–9). Franklin (1992: 390–5) formulates a developmental process of electoral change which apparently has occurred in all Western societies. In all

Party Choice and Social Structure

13

Western democracies the social cleavages had about the same explanatory power at a given point in time, but the process of decline starts at different times in different countries, following the lead of Canada and the USA and then the other Anglo-American countries, where the explanatory power of social structure was low already in the 1960s, the first time point in the analysis. Gradually the other countries will ‘demonstrate their liberation from the straitjacket of traditional cleavage politics’ (Franklin 1992: 404). In other words we are witnessing the gradual decay of cleavage politics, at least in the social-structural sense of the term, and the only question which remains is the extent to which this process will be either accelerated or delayed. 11 Of the eight countries included in this analysis, Britain and France belong to the group of countries (together with the other Anglo-American countries) where the decline in cleavage politics started early, in a second group after Canada and the USA. Belgium and Denmark (and perhaps also Ireland where there is a deviant pattern) belong to a third group of countries, and the Netherlands to a fourth group (together with Sweden). In Germany and Italy ‘the decline in cleavage politics has not yet started’ (Franklin 1992: 386–95). The introductory and concluding chapters of the book do not address the comparative impact of specific social cleavages and how these have evolved, even though this is a major research problem in Lipset and Rokkan’s work, and in Rose and Urwin (1969) and Rose (1974a). Furthermore there is only slim support for the idea that new structural cleavages have become important for leftist voting, as indicators for the mentioned new social cleavages were only available in a few countries (Franklin, Mackie & Valen 1992: 17–20). Nevertheless, the main finding is that even in those countries where such indicators were available, the decline in the structuring properties of traditional cleavages is not balanced by increases in the structuring properties of new cleavages. Neither sector employment, gender, consumption, location nor materialist/ post-materialist value orientations ‘provide a counterpoise in any country to the decline in traditional cleavage politics’ (Franklin 1992: 386). The decline of cleavage politics cannot, according to the analyses in the country-specific chapters, be caused by the rise of any particular new cleavage, nor to the rise of new issues. There is an increase in independent issue voting, but the increase in issue voting is not primarily associated with the rise of new issues; it is caused by the traditional economic left– right economic issues. The new concern for issues therefore serves to reinforce the existing cleavage structure by providing new reasons for supporting the same parties, and the left–right dimension remains

14

Social Structure and Party Choice in Western Europe

important even for voters who no longer respond to group loyalties. The decline of cleavage politics and the rise of issue voting do not take place simultaneously or according to the same processes, 12 and issue voting should not primarily be associated with new issues, but with the economic left–right issue dimension (Franklin 1992: 402–3; Eijk et al. 1992: 410). The main explanation for the decline in cleavage politics is that it is caused by the successful resolution by the political systems of deepseated conflicts of interests. Open democratic systems have provided regular channels for the expression of conflicting interests, and the main distributional and religious conflicts have been solved by a variety of policies (Eijk et al. 1992: 422–4). The authors do not deny that new structural cleavages may arise. The concept of ‘particularisation’ of the voting choice implies that voters may derive many identities from their social positions, from each of which political orientations may arise. Objective social positions have not ceased to be relevant for political choices, but adequately typifying these social positions has become more complex. Due to the de-massification of societies, social interests and social positions have become diversified, and we do not have adequate categories for these new divisions. Hence, we observe a weaker relationship between ‘traditional’ categorisations of social positions and voting choice (Eijk et al. 1992: 411–13).

1.3

Grouping of parties in party families

In order to perform a comparative analysis of the placement of voters of various parties, we have to rely on some classification of political parties into a number of ‘familles spirituelles’. Such classification can be done by such criteria as names, historical tradition, party programmes and memberships in transnational party organisations. Our classification is based on the first three criteria, and first and foremost on similarities in party programmes. Further, it is based on four main groupings of Western European parties into party families (von Beyme 1985: Chap. 2; Lane & Ersson 1999: Chap. 3; Smith 1989: 122–3; Budge & Keman 1990: 91–5). Some other classifications of particular party families and notions of such families will be mentioned below (see also Knutsen 1995: 12–14; 1996: 258–66). There are many parties in several of the eight countries, and parties sometimes change names, merge or split. The classification of parties into party families is often decisive for how we treat these various changes. If it can be argued that the splinter parties or successor parties (still) belong

Party Choice and Social Structure

15

to the same party family, these parties will be merged. The same applies where there are parties (most often, only two) that have similar profiles and could arguably be grouped in the same party family. The comparative approach does not allow detailed analysis of within-country differences between small parties. 13 Communist parties These can be identified on the basis of their names, programmes and historical traditions. The main parties within this category are PCI in Italy and PCF in France. The two successor parties of PCI, PDS and RC, 14 are also grouped in this party family, the first one with considerable doubt since it does not consider itself Communist any more. It is nevertheless a direct successor party of PCI. Parties which have originated in the Communist party family but no longer consider themselves Communist, along with electoral alliances that include a left-socialist or Green component in addition to Communists, are generally grouped in the left-socialist group. Apart from the two major Communist parties in Western Europe, two smaller Communist parties in Belgium and Denmark are grouped here. Left socialist parties These parties typically place themselves to the left of the Socialist or Social Democratic parties on the economic left–right scale. They articulate pacifism and anti-militarism, as well as individualism and scepticism about the hierarchical organisation in trade unions and in Socialist/Social Democratic and Communist parties. These parties often emphasise New Politics orientations and a libertarian value orientation in addition to the traditional leftist concern for equality. In short, these parties often emphasise New Left value orientations, at the same time as they underscore economic redistribution and worker control of the same kind as the Traditional Left. Herbert Kitschelt (1988: 195) describes this in a characterisation of these parties which he labels ‘left libertarian’: They ‘link libertarian commitments to individual autonomy and popular participation, with a leftist concern for equality’. In Denmark there are two left socialist parties: the Socialist People’s Party, which is the country’s largest left socialist party, and the Left Socialist Party with its successor, the Unity List.15 The Green Left in the Netherlands is the result of the merger of the Pacifist Socialist Party, the Radical Party and the Communist Party and some other smaller parties from the late 1980s. Each of these parties gained quite small support from the electorate in the 1970s and 1980s, and to allow comparison of the voters of these parties over time, it was decided to merge these parties for the whole period under the Green Left name and place it in the left

16

Social Structure and Party Choice in Western Europe

socialist party group. We then use the name Green Left even before the new party was formed. In France the left socialists are the New Left party, PSU, and several other smaller parties. We refer to them as left socialists or PSU, although we are aware that PSU has been dissolved. The Irish Workers’ Party also includes the splinter party from 1992, Democratic Left, and will be referred to simply as the Workers’ Party. The Irish parties are more traditional left socialists with a Marxist ideological profile, without perhaps the libertarian components (Sinnott 1995: 59–60). Indeed, the profile of the Irish parties is the reason for not calling this party family ‘left libertarian’. We will sometimes refer to this party family as left libertarian when there are empirical results that justify such a conceptualisation. We have excluded from this category all parties that name themselves green parties only (see below). Socialist/social democratic parties These are the traditional reformist old left parties anchored in the industrial materialist conflict, whether they label themselves Socialist, Social Democratic or Labour Parties. 16 Green parties Here we have grouped Green parties established in the late 1970s or 1980s which are not in electoral alliance with any socialist party. We have not distinguished between various types of Green parties as some authors have done (Müller-Rommel 1985), but kept to the fact that they use the Green Party label and identify themselves as Green/Ecologist parties. In Italy both the New Politics Radical Party and the more pure Green party, Verdi, are grouped in this category, and in France the various Green parties are merged and all grouped into this category. 17 The distinction between this group of parties and the Left Libertarian parties within the left socialist group is not evident. Herbert Kitschelt, from whom we have borrowed the notion Left-Libertarian parties, groups New Left and Ecology parties together since they have ‘converging programmatic outlooks and electoral constituencies’ (Kitschelt 1988: 194–5). We have kept them as separate party families in order to examine empirically whether they have a similar structural profile at the electoral level. These parties have, however, some different origins and focuses. Christian Democratic parties Here we have included the Christian Democratic parties in Continental Europe and the Christian People’s Party in Denmark. The German CDU/CSU has also been grouped here, although it might be argued that it should be grouped in the conservative category. In the Netherlands there were several Christian parties with anchorage in the various religious denominations until the late 1970s:

Party Choice and Social Structure

17

the Christian Historical Union (CHU), the Anti-Revolutionary Party (ARP) and the Catholic People’s Party (KVP). These parties merged to form the Christian Democratic Appeal in 1977–80. The various Christian parties are considered as one party in most of the analysis, even in the 1970s when they were separate parties. For part of the analysis, the various components of the CDA will be analysed separately. There are also some smaller Calvinist parties with an orthodox religious anchorage. These parties are grouped together and named Calvinist Fundamentalist parties,18 and this group is not placed in any party family. With some doubt, the Irish Fine Gael is placed in this party group. The party belongs to the Christian party group in the European Parliament and is in some classifications grouped as a Christian party (Lane & Ersson 1999: 80). Liberal It is difficult to decide which parties should be grouped under the Liberal umbrella. 19 In fact, different authors have grouped different parties in this party family or divided liberal parties into two different groups, Liberal-Radical and Liberal-Conservative parties (Smith 1989: 122–3; von Beyme 1985: 45). We have used only one category for liberal parties, and as a rule we have included as liberal parties those who label themselves as such. There are liberal parties in all eight countries, but it was unproblematic to classify which party to include in that category in only two countries, Belgium and Germany. The doubtful cases were dealt with in the following way: — in Denmark we have included the Radical Liberals (not the Agrarian Liberals, which is considered an Agrarian party), — in Britain we have included the successor of the British Liberal party, the Liberal Democrats. The Social Democratic Party, which merged with the Liberal party and was involved in electoral alliances with the Liberal Party in the 1980s, also presented a problem. It was decided that voters for this party would be considered to have voted for a liberal party.20 — in the Netherlands the problem is that there are two main parties which can be considered liberal parties: the People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD) and Democrats ‘66 (D66). These parties have different political profiles. We have chosen to group VVD as the liberal party since it is the old and major liberal party in Dutch politics (Daalder & Koole 1988: 153–4). D66 is then not grouped in any party family, but sometimes both of these parties are referred to as liberal parties.

18

Social Structure and Party Choice in Western Europe

— in Italy we have merged the voters for the Liberal (PLI) and the Republican (PRI) parties since it is difficult to find any criteria to justify including only one of the parties (Pridham 1988).21 — in France we have included the whole UDF-alliance, not only the Radical and Republican component or even only the Radical component as some authors have argued.22 UDF was formed in 1978, and the various components that became the UDF-alliance have been coded into this category for the period 1970–78. That includes the predecessor of the Republican Party, Républicains Indépendents, the predecessor of CDS, Centre Démocrats, and the alliance between the Centre Democrats and the Radical Party, Réformateur. — in Ireland we have grouped the Progressive Democrats in this category.23 Conservative parties We have included here the traditional Conservative parties in Britain and Denmark and the Gaullists (RPR) in France. In addition, we have classified the largest party in Ireland, Fianna Fail, in this category. This dominant party in the Irish party system has been classified differently by different authors, but we rely on the fact the party’s basic policies and appeal are conservative, that it articulates traditional and nationalistic values, and that it is placed to the right of centre along the left–right axis (Carty 1988: 225; Gallagher 1985: 140–5).24 Radical Rightist parties In this category we have included the Radical Right-Wing Populist parties (Betz 1993a; 1993b) which have emerged in some countries. The characteristic feature of these parties is their combination of extreme right-wing liberalist and populist positions. They are right-wing in their rejection of individual and social equality, in their opposition to the social integration of marginalized groups, and in their appeal to xenophobia, if not overt racism. They are populist in their instrumentalization of sentiments of anxiety and disenchantment and their appeal to the common man and his allegedly superior common sense (Betz 1993a: 413–14). These parties are the Progress Party in Denmark, the Flemish Bloc in Belgium, the Republican Party in Germany and the National Front in France. We have also included the old right-wing extremist Italian MSI25 and its successor party Alleanza Nazionale in this group.26 We refer to the party mostly as MSI for the whole period.

Party Choice and Social Structure

19

Ethnic or Nationalist parties These parties protect the interests of an ethnic group or a region. These parties often want to have greater political autonomy for a region, in the extreme case advocating full secession for a region. They also support the right of an ethnic group or people in a specific region to speak and write in their own language (von Beyme 1985: 115–25). In this group we have included the Nationalist parties in Scotland and Wales, the Flemish and Francophone nationalist parties in Belgium and the Italian Lega Nord and its predecessors – various regional lists. These parties have different positions on the left–right economic scale, but they have in common the desire for regional autonomy. For example, a study of the left-leaning SNP in Scotland and the rightist Lega Nord in Italy describes the common regionalist programme of the parties by emphasising their demands for autonomy principally through the attempt to forge a link in the voters’ mind between their immediate and specific material concerns, and the existence of a real or imagined territorial community (Newell 1994: 136). Table 1.2 provides an overview of the various parties that are classified into the nine party families discussed above. The table also shows that some parties are not grouped into any party family. 27 These parties are small, except for the Agrarian Liberals in Denmark and D66 in the Netherlands. D66 is described above. The Agrarian Liberal Party belongs to the Agrarian party family, although it is ‘something of a special case’ (Elder, Thomas & Arter 1983: 39–42) compared with the other Agrarian parties in the Nordic countries. It has traditionally had its base among peasants, but it has also articulated a much more traditional rightist economic policy compared with the other agrarian parties, and has been classified differently by different authors.28 Since there are no agrarian party in other countries included in this study, the Agrarian Liberals is grouped under the ‘other party’ category.

1.4

The party choice variable

There are several party choice variables in the Eurobarometer material. We have chosen to rely on the voting intention variable,29 which has been asked in nearly every survey since the first one in 1970.30 The other questions are about voting in the last general election and voting intention in the European elections. These questions have been asked much less frequently in the surveys, and for the question on voting in last election, recall problems may occur because it may be several years since the last general election took place.31

20

Table 1.2

Grouping of political parties into nine party families * Communists

Left Socialists

Socialists/Social Democrats

Green

Nationalist/Ethnic parties

Belgium

Communist Party (PCB/KPB)

–

Ecolo/Agalev

Britain

–

–

Flemish and French-speaking Socialist Parties (PS/SP) Labour Party

Green Party

Denmark

Communist Party (DKP) Communist Party (PCF)

Socialist People’s Party/ Left Socialists/Unity List Unified Socialist Party (PSU)/other left socialist groups –

Social Democrats

Green Party

Volksunie/Walloon Gathering (RW)/ Democratic Front of French Speakers (FDF) Scottish National Party (SNP)/Plaid Cymru (Welch nationalist) –

Socialist parties (PS) and its predecessor 1 Social Democrats (SPD) Labour Party

Ecologists (Ecologist/Les Verts/Generation Ecologie)

–

Green Party/Alliance ‘90 (Bündnis ‘90)/Greens Green Party

–

France

Germany

–

Ireland

–

Italy

Communist Party (PCI)/ Democratic Left Party (PDS)/ Communist Refoundation (RC) Netherlands – Number of countries

4

Workers’ Party/ Democratic Left Proletarian Democrats

Pacifist Socialist Party (PSP)/Green Left 5

–

Socialist Party (PSI)

Radical Party/Verdi

Lega Nord/Lega Lombarda/Regional Lists

Labour Party (PvdA) 8

–

–

7

3

Belgium

Britain

Denmark

Liberal

Christian

Conservatives

Radical Rightist

Parties not grouped in any party family, but included in the tables and analyses

Flemish and French-speaking Liberal parties (PRL, PVV, PLP) Liberals/Social Democrats/ Alliance/Liberal Democrats Radical Liberals

Flemish and French-speaking Christian Parties (PSC/CVP) –

–

Flemish Bloc/ National Front

None

Conservatives

–

None

Christian People’s Party

Conservative People’s Party

Agrarian Liberals, Centre Democrats

Rally for the Republic (RPR) and Gaullist predecessors4

Progress Party/ Danish People’s Party National Front

Left Radicals (MRG)

Republican Party

None

–

None

France

Union for the French Democracy (UDF)2 and predecessors3

–

Germany

Free Democratic Party (FDP)

Ireland

Progressive Democrats

Christian Democratic Union (CDU)/Christian Social Union (CSU) Fine Gael

Fianna Fail

21

22

Table 1.2

Italy

(Continued) Liberal

Christian

Conservatives

Radical Rightist

Liberal Party (PLI)/ Republican Party (PRI)

Christian Democratic Party (DC) and successors5

Forza Italia

Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA) and predecessors6 6

–

Social Democrats (PSDI) Italian Social Movement (MSI)/ National Alliance (AN)/Other right-wing parties – D66, Calvinist fundamentalists7

Netherlands People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD) Number of countries

8

5

Parties not grouped in any party family, but included in the tables and analyses

5

Notes * English translations of party names are generally used, but the abbreviations used in the various countries are shown in parentheses for many parties. 1 The French Section of the Workers’ International (SFIO). 2 All components of the UDF-alliance are included (Radical Party, Republican Party and Centre Democrats (CDS)). 3 UDF was formed in 1978, and the various components that became the UDF-alliance have been coded into this category in the period 1970–78. That includes the predecessor of the Republican Party, Républicains Indépendents, the predecessor of CDS, Centre Démocrats, and the alliance between the Centre Democrats and the Radical Party, Réformateur. 4 Union for the Defence of the Republic (UDR) and Democratic Union for the Republic (UDR). 5 Popular Party (PPI), Centre Christian Democrats (CCD), Social Christians (CS) and Patto per l’Italia. 6 Christian Historical Union (CHU), Anti-Revolutionary Party (ARP) and Catholic People’s Party (KVP). 7 These parties are Reformed Political League (GPV), Political-Reformed Party (SGP) and Reformed Political Federation (RPF).

Party Choice and Social Structure

23

The portion of the respondents that indicate a party choice on the question on voting intention varies significantly between countries, as one perhaps should expect given some findings referred to in the literature. The largest portion of non-response based on the data for the whole period 1970–97 is found in Belgium (41%) and Italy (39%), followed by Ireland (31%)32 and France (27%), while this portion is much smaller in Germany (22%), Denmark (21%), Britain (20%) and the Netherlands (17%). The portion that does not answer the question is fairly stable over time in five of the eight countries. In France, Germany and Italy, however, there is a significant increase in the portion that does not indicate a party choice. As will be outlined below, we use five-year intervals for examining the relationship between party choice and social-structural variables, and these intervals can be used to indicate the increases in the portion who do not answer the question. The largest increase is found in Italy, where the portion increases from 30–39 per cent in the 1970s and 1980s to 46–50 per cent in the 1990s. This obviously has to do with the crises and transformation of the Italian party system in the 1990s. In Germany there was a very high portion who answered the question on voting intention in the 1970s and 1980s, but this drops considerably in the 1990s. The portion that does not indicate a party choice increases from 16–19 per cent to 30–32 per cent. In France the increase also takes place in the 1990s, from 22–24 per cent in the various periods in the 1970s and 1980s to 32–35 per cent in the 1990s. The original voting intention or party choice variable contains many parties, and often many empty cells when it is cross-tabulated with year of the survey, partly because some parties are successor parties of others. Therefore, a merged basic version was constructed to reduce the number of parties and to facilitate the comparative analysis. For example, some small parties that belong to the same party family and do not have very different profiles are merged. This is explained below in some detail. There were also some smaller parties that did not belong naturally to any party family or were too small in the data material to allow any analysis over time, and we grouped these together in the ‘other parties’ category.33 Table 1.3 shows the support for the parties in the eight countries grouped into the various party families. We note that the data material contains 32,000–46,000 respondents who have a party choice for each country for the whole period. We see that the Communists are clearly largest in Italy, followed by France, where the support for the Communists is underreported in these surveys, as in others. The unique strength of the Danish left socialists is clearly revealed in the table. Of the other

24

Table 1.3

Support for political parties in the eight countries grouped into party families, 1970–97 Belgium

Comm. Left Soc. Soc. Dem Green Nationalists Liberal Christian Conservative Radical right Spec. P. I Spec. P. II Other p. Nationalists

Britain

1.2 26.5 8.9 8.6 17.2 32.7

40.6 1.5 2.1 16.9 38.0

2.1

2.6 32,708

0.9 42,759

Denmark

France

1.0 14.2 32.1 0.5

8.6 2.9 34.9 8.3

4.9 1.8 15.2 5.8 17.2 2.7 4.5 40,656

18.3

Germany

42.9 6.8 6.1 40.9

17.3 2.6 2.2

1.3

4.9 42,719

2.0 44,935

Ireland

2.6 12.3 1.8 2.2 26.1 50.8

4.2 35,405

Italy 23.0 1.5 15.2 3.4 1.5 6.5 33.7 2.7 7.2 3.2 2.0 36,079

Netherlands

6.3 30.2

16.5 28.1

12.3 3.0 3.4 46,255

Average 8.5 5.5 29.4 4.5 4.1 11.1 27.2 24.8 3.8

3.1

Special parties are for Denmark Agrarian Liberals (I) and Centre Democrats (II), for France MRG (I), for Italy PSDI (I) and for the Netherlands D66 (I) and Calvinist Fundamentalists (II).

Party Choice and Social Structure

25

countries with significant left socialist forces, only in the Netherlands does the left socialists gain more than 5 per cent of the vote for the whole period. The social democratic parties gain largest support in Britain and Germany, and then France, Denmark and the Netherlands. Social Democracy is electorally weaker in Belgium and in particular in Italy and Ireland. We also note that the Greens have an electoral stronghold in three of the countries, Belgium, France and Germany. We find liberal parties in all eight countries, but these are larger in Belgium, Britain, France and the Netherlands than in the other four countries. The Christian parties are large in five of the six countries which have such parties, largest in Germany, and then Italy and Belgium, followed by the Netherlands and Ireland. The Irish Fianna Fail is the largest Conservative party with the largest support compared with any other party in the data material, followed by the British party. Denmark and France also have large Conservative parties. Finally, the size of the Radical Rightist parties is small partly due to the fact that they have not existed for the whole period for which we have data. The Italian and the Danish parties have existed from the early 1970s are the largest parties in terms of support for the whole period. For the analysis in this work, we divide the data into six periods. The earlier ones are five-year intervals, coinciding with the decades, but in the 1990s the periods are shorter, 1990–93 and 1994–97. Table 1.4 shows the distribution of the party choice variable over time. Below we comment briefly on the development in the strength of the parties in each of the countries on the basis of Table 1.4. We also discuss some general changes in the party systems in each of the eight countries on the basis on the literature with the changes in Table 1.4 as a point of departure. In Belgium the main changes over time are the decline in support for the Christian Democrats and the Nationalist parties and the increasing support for the Liberal parties. Support for the socialist parties has also declined somewhat. The emergence of and significant support for the new politics parties, Ecologists (Ecolo/Agalev) and radical rightist (Flemish Bloc) is also a major change over time. The Flemish and Francophone parties belonging to the same party families have been merged throughout this work (see Table 1.2). 34 In Britain support for the various parties fluctuates somewhat, but there is a clear increase in support for Labour and decrease in support for the Conservative Party in the 1990s. With regard to Denmark we have already commented on the strong position of the left socialist parties, which is particularly strong in the

26

Table 1.4

Trends in support for the parties in the various countries Total

Belgium 1970–74 PCB/KPB PS/SP Ecolo/Agalev Volksu./RW/FDF PRL/PVV PSC/CVP Flemish Block Other Parties Sum N

1980–84

1985–89

1990–93

1994–97

1970–97

14.2 14.0 41.6

2.0 27.2 0.1 12.6 13.3 43.4

2.0 27.5 6.7 11.4 14.7 35.0

1.8 100.0 3,467

1.4 100.0 6,602

2.7 100.0 5,225

0.8 29.4 14.3 6.0 18.4 27.5 1.0 2.6 100.0 7,274

0.3 24.2 17.3 5.1 19.2 26.3 3.9 3.6 100.0 5,103

0.3 23.0 12.7 4.1 23.5 24.4 8.4 3.7 100.0 5,037

1.2 26.5 8.9 8.6 17.2 32.7 2.1 2.6 100.0 32,708

1973–74

1975–79

1980–84

1985–89

1990–93

1994–97

1973–97

35.7 0.2 1.0 22.7 39.0 1.5 100.0 7,751

35.0 2.6 1.9 19.5 40.6 0.4 100.0 10,056

42.1 3.8 2.5 16.1 35.0 0.5 100.0 6,622

53.9 1.7 2.8 16.0 24.4 1.3 100.0 6,559

40.6 1.5 2.1 16.9 38.0 0.9 100.0 42,759

2.0 26.4

1975–79

Total

Britain Labour Party Green Party Nationalists Liberal Party Cons. Party Other Parties Sum N

44.3

39.4

1.2 20.1 31.9 2.4 100.0 2,483

2.6 9.5 47.8 0.6 100.0 9,288

Total

Denmark 1973–74 DKP Left soc. Soc. Dem. Greens Rad. Lib. Chr. Peopl. Party Cons. Peopl. Party Progress Party Agrar. Lib. Centr. Dem. Other parties Sum N

1975–79

1980–84

2.0 9.6 35.1

2.6 9.1 38.1

1.0 12.1 32.4

9.6 1.4 12.1 8.7 16.8 0.9 3.9 100.0 1,727

4.1 2.8 8.8 10.9 17.2 2.1 4.4 100.0 8,543

4.4 1.5 19.6 4.3 11.6 2.7 10.3 100.0 8,168

1985–89

1990–93

0.7 18.6 28.5 1.4 5.1 1.4 20.0 5.2 11.3 3.6 4.0 100.0 9,484

0.2 14.6 30.5 1.0 4.6 1.2 15.1 4.2 23.7 3.7 1.2 100.0 6,193

1994–97 18.1 30.1 5.5 1.7 12.0 2.8 26.9 1.7 1.2 100.0 6,541

1.0 14.2 32.1 0.5 4.9 1.8 15.2 5.8 17.2 2.7 4.5 100.0 40,656 Total

France PCF PSU PSF Ecologists UDF RPR Front National MRG

1973–97

1970–74

1975–79

1980–84

1985–89

1990–93

1994–97

1970–97

11.5 4.6 27.8 23.8 19.8

11.4 3.4 38.2 3.6 24.6 13.9

1.3

2.1

9.0 3.6 34.2 10.4 16.3 16.5 0.6 3.0

6.3 2.3 38.0 10.3 15.5 17.4 4.3 1.7

5.8 1.4 30.8 18.0 14.8 18.9 5.9 1.7

6.4 1.2 35.9 9.0 12.3 20.5 6.6 3.6

8.6 2.9 34.9 8.3 18.3 17.3 2.6 2.2 27

28

Table 1.4

(Continued)

Other parties Sum N

11.1 100.0 5,304

2.8 100.0 9,889

6.3 100.0 7,602

4.2 100.0 9,166

2.5 100.0 5,249

4.5 100.0 5,509

Total

Germany 1970–74 SPD Green FDP CDU/CSU Republic. Party Other parties Sum N

46.7

1975–79

1980–84

1985–89

1990–93

1994–97

1970–97

1.0 100.0 8,555

45.9 9.8 4.6 36.4 1.9 1.5 100.0 10,206

41.3 10.1 6.9 34.8 4.3 2.5 100.0 5,805

38.8 12.8 4.2 38.4 2.7 3.1 100.0 5,778

42.9 6.8 6.1 40.9 1.3 2.0 100.0 44,935

1980–84

1985–89

1990–93

1994–97

1973–97

4.6 8.4 1.6 3.5 26.9 51.2 3.8 100.0 8,418

4.5 13.5 4.0 4.1 20.8 49.9 3.1 100.0 5,524

3.4 14.1 4.9 4.5 22.8 44.8 5.5 100.0 5,430

2.6 12.3 1.8 2.2 26.1 50.8 4.2 100.0 35,405

7.7 43.0

41.8 0.7 7.8 47.4

41.9 7.9 5.6 43.6

2.6 100.0 5,244

2.3 100.0 9,347

1973–74

1975–79

Total

Ireland Workers’ Party Labour Green Prog. Dem. Fine Gael Fianna Fail Other parties Sum N

4.9 100.0 42,719

16.0

14.1

1.4 11.8 0.1

24.9 44.4 14.6 1 100.0 1,641

26.4 55.3 4.2 100.0 7,824

32.2 52.4 2.1 100.0 6,568

Total

Italy 1970–74 PCI/PDS/PCR Proletar. Dem. PSI Rad. Party/Verdi Lega Nord PRI/PLI Chr.Dem. Forza Italia MSI/AN PDSI Other parties Sum N

15.2

1975–79

1980–84

24.7 1.1 17.4 1.6

21.7 2.8 18.1 2.9

9.8 41.5

6.7 37.7

7.8 6.8 2.8 100.0 4,122

1970–74

16.2

1985–89

1990–93

1994–97 30.5

8.3 35.9

23.8 2.9 17.6 5.2 0.1 6.7 35.9

20.1 0.5 12.2 7.5 7.5 6.3 32.8

5.7 4.0 1.1 100.0 8,258

5.8 4.5 0.7 100.0 7,327

5.1 2.1 0.7 100.0 7,772

5.3 1.4 6.5 100.0 4,116

4.5 100.0 4,484

23.0 1.5 15.2 3.4 1.5 6.5 33.7 2.7 7.2 3.2 2.0 100.0 36,079

1975–79

1980–84

1985–89

1990–93

1994–97

1970–97

4.5 4.2 4.8 12.2 21.9 17.4

Total

Netherlands Green Left PVDA VVD

1970–97

4.1 30.1 15.1

5.6 33.9 16.9

6.7 30.5 18.0

5.9 35.8 13.7

7.5 22.0 13.4

7.8 24.6 22.4

6.3 30.2 16.5

29

30

Table 1.4

(Continued)

CDA D66 Calv. Fund. Other parties Sum N

32.7 9.4 0.6 8.1 100.0 4,357

32.9 6.5 2.4 1.7 100.0 9,207

27.6 10.0 3.1 4.1 100.0 8,731

29.9 9.9 3.2 1.6 100.0 10,405

Note 1 Other parties 1973–74 includes an electoral alliance between Fine Gael and Labour.

28.4 22.6 3.8 2.3 100.0 6,846

16.3 18.7 4.2 6.1 100.0 6,709

28.1 12.3 3.0 3.4 100.0 46,255

Party Choice and Social Structure

31

1980s and 1990s.35 There is much fluctuation among the major nonsocialist parties over time. The Conservatives were strong in the 1980s, when the Agrarian Liberals were much weaker. In the 1990s this has changed, and the Agrarian Liberals are the largest non-socialist party, according to the data. We note the decline in support for both the Radical Liberal Party and the Progress Party. In France support for the Communists, left socialists and UDF declines, while support for the Greens and Front National increases. Support for the Gaullist party (RPR) and the Socialists (PS) are more stable over time. As in other surveys, support for the radical right and for the Communists is underreported in the surveys. In Germany increasing support for the Greens and some decline for the old parties CDU/CSU, SPD and FDP are the main long-term trends. In Ireland the emergence of three parties which gain some electoral support, the Workers’ Party, Greens and Progressive Democrats, has changed the three-party system somewhat. This is reflected in the data. The support for the three established parties is nevertheless persistent. The many changes that have taken place in the Italian party system can be read from the table. Support for the Christian Democrats and the socialists has declined and support for the Liberals has even collapsed. The major winners in the 1990s are the successor of MSI, Alleanza Nazionale, and the new parties of the right, Lega Nord and Forza Italia. There has been even more change, since several splinter parties are grouped together (for example, among the Communists and the Christian parties). Finally, there are many changes in the Dutch case. Support for the Christian Democrats and the Labour Party has declined, while support has increased for leftist and rightist Liberals, D66 and VVD, respectively, and also the Calvinist Fundamentalist parties and the left socialist forces grouped under the label Green Left in Table 1.2.

1.5

Socialist/non-socialist party choice

The division between parties on the left and parties on the right is central in much literature on predictors of party choice. Our main analysis will not be based on this division; we present it more as a result of the various changes in the support for the parties and party families that are analysed in detail before we focus on the left– right division. We also present two versions of the socialist/non-socialist division. The traditional way of determining which parties to include in the socialist group is that they should belong to the communist, socialist/ social democratic or left socialist party families.36 In an important work,

32

Social Structure and Party Choice in Western Europe

Bartolini and Mair (1990: 42–3) explicitly define the new politics parties as not belonging to the socialist party group, a rule that is followed in other influential works (Franklin et al. 1992; Nieuwbeerta 1995: 36). The Green parties were not part of the industrial conflict structure, and therefore did not belong to the established left. They appeared or made electoral inroads from the late 1970s. We are, however, studying predictors of party choice in a period which many observers would characterise as a transition period, when some of the conflict patterns in industrial society were being partly replaced by new patterns, including new political parties and conflict lines. The Green parties represent an important pattern in this regard, and they have been characterised as the post-industrial left. Many of the issues and values that the Greens inject into the political arena are new, challenging the established conflict structure and the established left. We see the Greens as a phenomenon that is (partly) challenging the values and issue agenda of the established left, and these new values are becoming an important element of the overall left–right dimension. New Politics and the parties that most clearly articulate values and issues on the new politics dimensions, the Greens and Radical Right, contribute to transform the meaning of left and right (Inglehart 1984: 33–53). In addition, although there may be some differences between the left socialist and the Green parties in ideological profile and historical origin, they are so similar that placing them in different categories is questionable. In brief, we would question the above-mentioned rule by examining the degree to which the findings differ when the Greens are placed in the non-socialist party group versus the socialist. Therefore, we present and compare the results of two analyses in which the parties in the Green party family are placed in the non-socialist and the socialist party group, respectively. One convenient aspect of the data is that the first period for our analysis (1970–74) does not contain Green parties in any of the eight countries. We therefore have a common starting-point for both analyses. It should be emphasised that this applies only to the Green parties that are grouped into the Green party family in Table 1.2, not those that are grouped among the left socialist parties. Thus, we do not do two separate analyses for the Netherlands, since the Green Left (and its predecessors) is grouped as a left socialist party there. Table 1.5 shows the support for three groups of parties over time, the ‘pure’ non-socialist and the ‘pure’ socialist parties and the Greens.37 The two ways of treating the Greens is to group them together either with the non-socialist parties or alternatively among the socialist parties. We

Party Choice and Social Structure

33

Table 1.5 Trends in support for socialist, non-socialist and green parties in the various countries Belgium

Total 1970–74 1975–79 1980–84 1985–89 1990–93 1994–97 1970–97

Non-soc. Green Soc. N

71.6 0.0 28.4 3,467

70.7 0.1 29.2 6,602

63.8 6.7 29.4 5,225

55.6 14.3 30.2 7,274

58.2 17.3 24.5 5,103

64.0 12.7 23.3 5,037

Britain

63.3 8.9 27.7 32,708 Total

1970–74 1975–79 1980–84 1985–89 1990–93 1994–97 1970–97 Non-soc. Green Soc. N

55.7 0.0 44.3

60.6 0.0 39.4

64.1 0.2 35.7

62.4 2.6 35.0

54.1 3.8 42.1

44.4 1.7 53.9

57.9 1.5 40.6

2,483

9,288

7,751

10,056

6,622

6,559

42,759

Denmark

Total 1970–74 1975–79 1980–84 1985–89 1990–93 1994–97 1970–97

Non-soc. Green Soc. N

53.3 0.0 46.7 1,727

50.1 0.0 49.9 8,543

54.5 0.0 45.5 8,168

50.5 1.4 48.1 9,484

53.4 1.0 45.6 6,193

51.9 0.0 48.1 6,541

Germany

52.0 0.5 47.5 40,656 Total

1970–74 1975–79 1980–84 1985–89 1990–93 1994–97 1970–97 Non-soc. Green Soc. N

52.5 0.0 47.5 5,244

56.7 0.9 42.4 9,347

49.7 8.0 42.3 8,555

44.0 9.8 46.2 10,206

48.3 10.1 41.6 5,805

47.5 12.8 39.7 5,778

France

49.7 6.9 43.4 44,935 Total

1970–74 1975–79 1980–84 1985–89 1990–93 1994–97 1970–97 Non-soc. Green Soc. N

56.1 0.0 43.9 5,304

43.3 3.6 53.1 9,889

42.8 10.4 46.8 7,602

43.1 10.3 46.6 9,166

43.8 18.0 38.1 5,249

46.5 9.0 44.5 5,509

Ireland

45.2 8.3 46.5 42,719 Total

1970–74 1975–79 1980–84 1985–89 1990–93 1994–97 1970–97 Non-soc. Green

84.0 0.0

85.9 0.0

86.6 0.1

85.2 1.6

76.9 4.0

76.0 4.9

82.9 1.8

34

Social Structure and Party Choice in Western Europe

Table 1.5

(Continued)

Ireland

Total 1970–74 1975–79 1980–84 1985–89 1990–93 1994–97 1970–97

Soc. N

16.0 1,641

14.1 7,824

13.2 6,568

13.2 8,418

19.1 5,524

19.1 5,430

Italy

15.4 35,405 Total

1970–74 1975–79 1980–84 1985–89 1990–93 1994–97 1970–97 Non-soc. Green Soc. N

67.2 0.0 32.8 4,122

54.9 1.6 43.5 8,258

54.6 2.9 42.6 7,327

50.6 5.2 44.3 7,772

56.9 7.5 35.6 4,116

58.3 4.2 37.5 4,484

Netherlands

56.0 3.4 40.6 36,079 Total

1970–74 1975–79 1980–84 1985–89 1990–93 1994–97 1970–97 Non-soc. Soc. N

63.0 37.0 4,357

62.8 37.2 9,207

65.3 34.7 8,731

60.3 39.7 10,405

70.5 29.5 6,846

65.2 34.8 6,709

64.2 35.8 46,255

see from the table that this makes a real difference in certain time periods, in particular in Belgium, France and Germany. We also note that the sizes of the pure socialist parties vary considerably cross-nationally. For the whole period and for most of the shorter periods, support for socialist parties is low in Ireland, Belgium and the Netherlands. For the whole period the support in those countries is 15 per cent, 28 per cent and 36 per cent, respectively, while it is 41–48 per cent in the other countries.

1.6 Statistical measures and the analysis of changes over time The approach in this work is basically bivariate. We analyse trends in the strength of the impact of a given structural variable by various correlation coefficients, corresponding to the level of measurement for the given variable. We use traditional correlation coefficients (Cramer’s V and the eta-coefficient) to tap these correlations. Sometimes we also use Nagelkerke’s R2 from logistic regression and multinominal regression to compare these correlations with statistics based on some other

Party Choice and Social Structure

35

assumptions. These latter methods are also used in the multivariate analyses in Chapter 7. We also use odds ratios (sometimes called the cross-product ratio) as a measure of the strength of association (Mosteller 1968; Fienberg 1980: 16–19) in order to compare differences in support for given party groups over time and differences between party groups. This measure has the important property of being statistically independent of the marginal distributions (Reynolds 1984: 64–7; Fienberg 1980: 17; Mosteller 1968: 4). We can compare the odds ratios from different tables (or segments of tables) even when the distributions of variables are different. In contrast, because of the existence of ‘floor’ and ‘ceiling’ effects (i.e. percentages that are close to 0 and 100), the absolute percentage difference in support for a given party group between, for example, men and women may be a misleading measure of the strength of association. The odds ratio should generally be used instead (Heath et al. 1991: 21–2). The odds ratio is an asymmetric measure in that if the high and low values on a given structure variable are reversed, the figures will be different. However, if we take the natural logarithm of the two ratios, they will have the same magnitude but different signs. The log odds ratio is then a symmetric measure in the sense that the odds ratio of two tables (or parts of tables) represents the same degree of association if the logarithm of the two odds ratios is such that they have the same absolute value but different signs (Agresi 1996: 24; Fienberg 1980: 17). This is important, because otherwise it would be difficult to use the measures for comparing, for example, parties that men are more likely to support to those women are more likely to support.38 We will refer to the log odds ratio as the lor-measure, or for specific values, the lor-score. In addition we present the traditional percentage difference measures (called PDI in the tables). Percentage difference measures will be used for different purposes, as will be explained below. The lor-scores will be used for comparing the impact of a given structural variable on parties within a party system, for comparing trends in the impact on given parties and for comparing the impact on parties across countries (research problem 3 in section 1.1). The sizes of the lor-scores are not affected by the size of the parties or by the fact that parties change overall support over time, in contrast to percentage difference measures (PDI). On the other hand, the traditional percentage difference measure is important for other purposes, namely to examine what causes the strength of a structural variable within the entire party system, i.e. not for the

36

Social Structure and Party Choice in Western Europe

comparison of single parties. We want to explain in some detail how a given conflict variable has an impact on party choice (the whole party system) and what causes the changes in the impact (research problems 4 and 5 in section 1.1). This is a very difficult task, given that all party systems being examined are multiparty systems, and that the dependent variable is a nominal level variable. For these research purposes, the percentage difference measure is relevant. The larger percentage differences are the most important for the overall impact of the structural variable on the party system, and a larger percentage difference is more easily obtained for a large party. Therefore, the trends for the larger parties are of particular importance for examining the impact and changes of impact of a given structural variable. Let us study this in detail with Table 1.6A as an illustrative example. The table shows a typical example of a relationship between gender and party choice in a party system with five parties, A–E. If the structural variable has more than two values and is at an ordinal level, we compare the lowest and the highest value. 39 We have calculated the effect of gender on voting for each of these parties by percentage differences and lor. In addition, in the right-hand column the absolute value of the percentage differences is calculated (PDI), and below these figures there is a sum based on them. This is simply a measure of the impact of gender on party choice which is obtained by summing the absolute values of the various PDIs and dividing by two. It can be understood as the total percentage of difference for the parties that enjoy stronger support from women or stronger support from men and is called the PDI-index. Let us first answer the research question related to comparing the impact of gender on support for the various parties. For which parties does gender have the strongest effect? Since the overall levels of support for the parties are different, PDI would be highly misleading. We note that a PDI of 10 in absolute value is obtained for three parties, but these vary from 10 per cent to 40 per cent in overall electoral support. Parties A and D get stronger support from women, while the other three get stronger support from men. When we compare the impact of a given structural variable, we normally compare the absolute figures, since we want to compare parties that get stronger support from one or the other (‘extreme’) value on the cleavage variable. According to the lor-scores, the impact of gender on party A is largest, followed by D (despite the fact that PDI is largest for D), then C, on which it is larger than on B and E, even though PDI is larger for those two parties.

Party Choice and Social Structure Table 1.6 analysed

37

Examples of how various statistical measures are presented and

A. Example I Gender Parties A B C D E Sum N

Men 5.0 35.0 7.0 8.0 45.0 100.0 500

Women 15.0 25.0 3.0 22.0 35.0 100.0 500

Lor −1.21 0.48 0.89 −1.18 0.42

|PDI| 10.0 10.0 4.0 14.0 10.0

Total 10.0 30.0 5.0 15.0 40.0 100.0 1,000

PDI −10.0 10.0 4.0 −14.0 10.0

Total 60.0 40.0

PDI 0.0 0.0

Lor 0.00 0.00

|PDI| 0.0 0.0

Total 20.0 30.0 10.0 15.0 25.0 100.0 1,000

PDI −20.0 16.0 10.0 −14.0 8.0

Lor −1.35 0.78 1.21 −1.18 0.43

|PDI| 20.0 16.0 10.0 14.0 8.0

Total 50.0 50.0

PDI 4.0 −4.0

Lor 0.16 −0.16

|PDI| 4.0 4.0

Total 10.0 30.0 5.0 15.0 40.0 100.0 1,000

PDI 10.0 20.0 −15.0 −5.0 −10.0

Lor 1.21 1.12 −1.56 −0.46 −0.42

|PDI| 10.0 20.0 15.0 5.0 10.0

Sum

24.0

Support for socialist/non-socialist parties Non-soc. Soc.

Men 60.0 40.0

Women 60.0 40.0

B. Example II Gender Parties A B C D E Sum N

Men 10.0 38.0 15.0 8.0 29.0 100.0 500

Women 30.0 22.0 5.0 22.0 21.0 100.0 500

Sum

34.0

Support for socialist/non-socialist parties Non-soc. Soc.

Men 52.0 48.0

Women 48.0 52.0

C. Example III Gender Parties A B C D E Sum N

Men 15.0 35.0 5.0 10.0 35.0 100.0 500

Women 5.0 15.0 20.0 15.0 45.0 100.0 500

Sum

30.0

38

Social Structure and Party Choice in Western Europe

Table 1.6

(Continued)

Support for socialist/non-socialist parties Non-soc. Soc.

Men 50.0 50.0

Women 80.0 20.0

Total 60.0 40.0

PDI −30.0 30.0

Lor −1.39 1.39

|PDI| 30.0 30.0

Total 10.0 30.0 5.0 15.0 40.0 100.0 1,000

PDI −10.0 20.0 15.0 −5.0 −20.0

Lor −1.21 1.12 1.56 −0.46 −0.85

|PDI| 10.0 20.0 15.0 5.0 20.0

Total 60.0 40.0

PDI −10.0 10.0

D. Example IV Gender Parties A B C D E Sum N

Men 5.0 35.0 20.0 10.0 30.0 100.0 500

Women 15.0 15.0 5.0 15.0 50.0 100.0 500

Sum

35.0

Support for socialist/non-socialist parties Non-soc. Soc.

Men 60.0 40.0

Women 70.0 30.0

Lor −0.44 0.44

|PDI| 10.0 10.0

Parties A and B are socialist parties, C-E are non-socialist parties.

The overall impact of gender on party choice is 24 percentage points. The contribution of the various parties to that percentage can easily be read from the table. The largest contribution is from party D (14 percentage points), followed by parties A, B and E (10) and finally C (4 percentage points). C’s contribution is very small, despite clear gender differences, because it is a small party (in terms of electoral support). Let us now examine how we can analyse comparative differences and change over time within a given country. In the second example (Table B), we again have five parties. If Tables A and B (examples I and II) are two time periods within the same country, the parties are the same; if Tables A and B represent the results from two different countries, the parties labelled A–E represent parties within the same party families. Let us first consider the two tables as if they were part of a longitudinal analysis within the same country with the result in B representing a later time point. The impact of gender has increased from 24 to 34 percentage points according to the PDI measure. How can we decompose this change? We first examine the overall support for the various parties. Parties A and C have increased their support substantially, party E has declined considerably, while parties B and D enjoy constant support. The increase

Party Choice and Social Structure

39

in the correlation has several components, and we should first notice that there are two aspects of such an increase, one associated with the parties where women get stronger support, and one associated with the parties where men get stronger support. Both of these have to be considered and described. Of the two parties that gain stronger support from women, the increase in the impact of gender is caused by party A where the PDI increases from 10 to 20. This is mostly a consequence of the large increase in the support for party A because there is only a small increase in the lor-score associated with the party. For party D overall support is stable, as is the gender gap. Among the parties that gain greater support from men, all effects are changing, and they counterbalance each other to a certain degree. Gender differences in terms of PDI become greater for parties B and C and somewhat smaller for party E, and the net result is an increase of 10 percentage points. The contribution of parties B and C to the overall increase is similar (6 percentage points). For party B, where overall support is stable, gender differences simply increase. For party C the overall support is growing, but the increase in the gender difference is not only caused by this increase, as the increase in the lor-score shows. Finally, the decrease associated with party E is totally a consequence of the large decline in support. Relative gender differences are stable, as the lor-score indicates. If the results from Table A and B represent two countries with five party families, the parties belonging to party families A and C gain larger support in the country that is illustrated in example II, the party in party family E is considerably stronger in example I, while parties in party families B and D are of the same size in the electorate. Research problems 3 and 4 in section 1.1 would lead us to examine the lor-scores and the PDI-scores, respectively. There is basically the same comparative pattern in the two countries since party families A and D get stronger support from women, while party families B, C and E get stronger support from men. However, the gender differences are larger in the country illustrated in Table B for the parties in party families A–C according to the lor-scores, while they are fairly similar for the parties belonging to the two other party families (D and E), as the lor-scores show. The main reason why gender has the largest impact in the country illustrated in Table B, is that gender has larger impact in terms of PDI-scores from parties in party family A (stronger support from women) and B and C (stronger support from men). In these two examples, the conflict variable is uncomplicated; it has two values, and it has a simple distribution, 50 per cent women and 50 per cent men. Other conflict variables have more values, and their

40

Social Structure and Party Choice in Western Europe

distributions may change over time. This is what happens when the social structure is changing. A correlation coefficient normally takes into account two types of changes, the distribution on the conflict variable and what is ‘happening in the table’ – the changes in, for instance, gender differences in support for the various parties. The PDImeasure takes into account only the latter aspect of change, and is therefore not very appropriate as an overall correlation coefficient (in particular when the social structure is changing). On the other hand, we can use it for precisely analysing changes in the impact of a given structural variable, by assuming that the social structure is constant. In the empirical analysis, we describe the changes in the social structure and ‘what is happening in the table’ as separate aspects of the overall change in the correlation. As mentioned above, we also analyse the relationship between social structural variables and the socialist/non-socialist division of parties. In order to examine the relationship between the overall correlation between a social structural variable and party choice and the impact on the socialist/non-socialist division (research problem 6 in section 1.1), we introduce the concepts of overlap and cross-cutting. The socialist/ non-socialist division of parties may tap the entire correlation that exists between a structural variable and party choice, or it may tap none of that correlation. These patterns correspond to an overlapping versus a crosscutting pattern.40 In Table 1.6 examples III and IV illustrate this phenomenon (together with example I). Let us assume that parties A and B are the socialist parties in the party system and the other three are non-socialist parties. In Table A (example I), one of the socialist parties gets stronger support from women (A), while the other gets stronger support from men (B). Correspondingly, among the non-socialist parties two get stronger support from men (C and E), while D gets much stronger support from women (D). As can be seen in the table for all parties, there is no effect of gender on voting for the parties along the socialist/non-socialist division. Gender has considerable effect on party choice, but this effect cuts completely across the left–right division of parties. On the other hand, gender creates considerable division within both the socialist and the non-socialist camps. 41 In Table C (example III) we have an example of exactly the opposite. There is complete overlap between the overall impact of gender and the impact on the left–right division. The two socialist parties (still A and B) get stronger support from men, while the three non-socialist parties get stronger support from the female electorate. There is a total overlap,

Party Choice and Social Structure

41

illustrated by the fact that the two overall PDI-measures are equal (30 percentage points). In the last example (Table D, example IV), there is neither complete overlap nor complete cross-cutting. One of the socialist parties gets 20 percentage points stronger support among men, while the other party gets 10 percentage points stronger support among women, and there is a similar trend among the non-socialist parties, which nevertheless get stronger support among women. The PDI-measures are 35 and 10 percentage points for the overall correlation and the correlation with socialist/non-socialist party choice, respectively. In this example the cross-cutting pattern of the left–right division is dominant: the left–right division of the parties taps only 10 of 35 percentage points. The degree of overlap is 28.5 per cent (10/35), and the degree of cross-cut is 71.5 per cent (25/35). These measures will be used for analysing the degree of overlap and cross-cut, or the degree to which the left–right division is relevant for tapping the overall impact of a cleavage variable on the party system. Finally, in example II we have an instance of a slight degree of overlap where women are more likely to support the socialist parties. The degree of overlap is, however, small (12%). It should be underscored that the degree of overlap and crosscut is totally independent of the overall strength of the correlation between a given social structural variables and party choice. If, however, the strength of the overall correlation (with party choice treated as a nominal level variable) is very small, the degree of overlap becomes less interesting to study since we are analysing correlations of small magnitudes. For example, PDI-indices of 4 and 2 percentage points for the overall and socialist/non-socialist party choice variables, respectively, produce a degree of overlap of 50 per cent, but is nevertheless fairly uninteresting since the magnitudes of the correlations are so insignificant.

1.7 The plan for the book and the organisation of the empirical analyses The empirical analysis for each conflict variable starts with a discussion of the cleavage variable, how it is measured, and distributions over time in a comparative perspective. Then the correlation with party choice for the entire period is presented, with focus on the comparative strength of the cleavage. The data material for the period 1970–97 is thus used to get a main impression of comparative differences. Then the impact of the cleavage variable on the parties in

42

Social Structure and Party Choice in Western Europe

different countries is focused on. We present the lor-scores and PDI for the various parties, according to party families, based once again on the data for the whole period. We calculate average differences for the various party families, and comments will be made on the impact of the various party families and cross-national variations within the party families. This analysis is also done on the basis of the data for the whole period 1970–97. We then go on to study the changing impact of the structural variable over time. We start by presenting trends in the relevant correlation coefficient in a comparative setting. We then present a more detailed analysis of how the changes in the various countries have been produced. This starts with the analysis of the cross-tables between the given structural variable and party choice for the whole period, presented in a table for all eight countries. We go on to analyse change by means of the percentage differences and the lor-scores for the various time-intervals. This analysis is quite detailed, and we do not present the tables on which the analysis is based. It is based on tables similar to Table 1.6, six for each country, one for each time period in each country. This requires a somewhat more lengthy and detailed presentation in the text than if the tables had been presented. We go on with analysing the impact of the cleavage variable on the socialist/non-socialist party division. The main research problems are to analyse the strength of the correlations over time, with the alternative placement of the greens and to examine degree of overlap and cross–cut as these concepts have been outlined in section 1.6 above. We start with the cleavages that emerged from the national–religious revolution according to Lipset and Rokkan, the two faces of the religious cleavage, religions denomination (Chapter 2) and church religiosity (Chapter 3), and then focus upon urban–rural contrasts (Chapter 4). The cleavage from the industrial revolution, related to hierarchical status variables is then examined by focusing on education (Chapter 5). Social class is only analysed in the multivariate analysis in Chapter 7. We then examine how men and woman have changes their party choices over time in Chapter 6, and finally – in Chapter 7 – we perform multivariate analysis within each of the eight countries in order to determine the relative impact of the various cleavages on party choice and to control for the other cleavages in a causal model.

2 Religious Denomination

2.1

Introduction: the two faces of the religious cleavage

In their seminal article on the development of the party cleavages in western democracies, Lipset and Rokkan (1967a) were impressively detailed about the development of the religious cleavage. The religious cleavage was first shaped by the Protestant Reformation, which created divisions between Catholics and Protestants. These divisions had political consequences because the control of the nation-building process often became intermixed with the religious cleavage. Protestants frequently found themselves allied with nationalist forces in the struggle for national autonomy. In Anglican England and the Calvinist Netherlands, the Protestant church supported national independence and became a central element of the emerging national political identity. In other nations, religious conflicts also ran deep, but these differences side-tracked the nation-building process (Dalton 1990: 66; Martin 1993: 100–8). Gradually the political systems of Europe accommodated themselves to the changes wrought by the Reformation. The French Revolution renewed religious conflicts in the nineteenth century. Religious forces – both Catholic and Protestant – mobilised to defend church interests against the Liberal, secular movement spawned by the events in France. Conflicts over church/state control, the legislation of mandatory state education and disestablishment of state religion occurred across the face of Europe. These conflicts often were intense, as in the Kulturkämpfe in Germany and Switzerland. In reaction to these liberal attacks, new religious political parties formed in Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Austria, Italy and Belgium. These parties ranged from the Calvinist AntiRevolutionary Party in the Netherlands (named in reaction to the French Revolution) to the Vatican-allied Catholic Partito Populare in Italy 43

44 Social Structure and Party Choice in Western Europe

(Dalton 1990: 66–7). The party alignments developed at the start of the twentieth century institutionalised the religious cleavage in politics, and many basic features of these party systems have endured to the present. The religious cleavage has two aspects: the various religious communities of which people are members, including a category for those who are not a member of any religious community (religious denomination); and how religious they are – independent of the religious community to which they belong (Bean 1999: 552; Dalton 1996: 177–9). This latter aspect is normally measured by frequency of church attendance. For example, Lane and Ersson (1999: 44–53) differentiate between a latent and a manifest religious cleavage. Religious denomination belongs to the latent religious category and represents the structural aspect of the overall religious cleavage. A religious structure is composed of religious communities and is by definition a latent, or unconscious, structure which can be transformed into a manifest structure through a process in which religious cleavages become tied to some kind of religious awareness. Religious awareness operates on religious structure in such a way that the higher the religious awareness, the more likely that the cleavages will become conspicuous. (Lane & Ersson 1999: 51) Religious awareness is operationalised by church attendance in Lane and Ersson’s study. The religious cleavage thus consists of two separate components: religious denomination and religious/secular differences. Either or both of these traits are often strongly related to partisan preferences. We choose to separate the two aspects as two different religious cleavages, but will see them in relation to each other. There may also be interaction between these two aspects with regard to voting. Being among the most religious segment of the population may induce voters to vote differently if they belong, for example, to a Protestant or a Catholic church community. Many researchers have noted that there is a somewhat paradoxical situation related to the importance of the religious cleavage. Only a small number of political issues clearly follow the religious/secular conflict line. By the same token, there are very few issues that are completely divorced from them. Despite the paucity of explicitly religious issues and the lack of religious themes in most campaigns, religious beliefs have proven to be a strong predictor of party choice in many West European democracies. Smith (1989: 20) has therefore characterised the religious cleavage as a passive rather than an active force in shaping political behaviour.

Religious Denomination 45

Perhaps the most important reason why religion continues to play an influential role for voter choice is that religious conflicts helped determine the structure of the modern party system and therefore still affect the electoral choices open to the voter. The religious cleavage is also important because it reflects deeply held human values, which have a great potential for influencing behaviour. Although religious issues are not very prominent on the political agenda, religious values are related to a wide range of social and political beliefs: work ethics, achievement aspirations, life-style norms, parent – child relations, morality, social relations, attitudes toward authority and acceptance of the state. Religion signifies a Weltanshauung that extends into the political area (Dalton 1990: 86). Religious faith is strongly connected not only to party choice. The connection encompasses political ideology, issue outlook, and attitudes towards a wide range of political objects (Wald 1987: Chap. 3). Empirical research on mass behaviour has underscored the continuing importance of the religious cleavage. Rose and Urwin (1969) conducted one of the first comparative analyses of the topic, examining the social basis of party support in 16 western democracies. Their finding was that, contrary to conventional wisdom, ‘religious divisions, not class, are the main social basis of parties in the Western world today’ (Rose and Urwin 1969: 12). In a comparative study that included most West European countries, Rose (1974b: 16–18) compared the impact of religion, social class and region on left–right voting on the basis of data from mainly the 1960s, and found that religion was much more important in all the Catholic and religiously mixed countries. Only in Britain and the Scandinavian countries was social class the most important predictor for left–right party choice. Several studies have examined the impact of the religious cleavage (the two faces of it or only one) over time and/or in a comparative setting (Inglehart 1977: 216–25, 245–9; Dalton 1990: 82–8; Dalton 1996: 176–85), and numerous studies have focused on trends within a single country (see, for example, Baker, Dalton & Hildebrandt 1981: Chap. 7; Lewis-Beck & Skalaban 1992: 171–4). The main findings from these studies are that although there has been a considerable change in the distribution on the religious cleavage variables in the direction of a more secular mass public, the correlation with party choice has shown a surprising persistence at a high level. For example, Dalton (1996: 185) compares the impact of religion on voting with the impact of social class in a comparative longitudinal study and concludes that the time lines of religious voting . . . do not show the marked dropoff found for class voting . . . Despite the paucity of explicit religious

46 Social Structure and Party Choice in Western Europe

issues and the lack of religious themes in most campaigns, religious characteristics can still be a strong predictor of party choice. Let us now go on to examine the data. Is the impact of religion still persistent, or have there been changes that are not captured in the analyses mentioned above? Let us first examine the religious structure in the eight West European countries in some detail. How has the secularisation process affected the religious structure, and what are the comparative patterns in this respect?

2.2

Religious denominations

Lipset and Rokkan (1967a: 33–41) suggested a three-fold division based on religious denomination that had consequences for the party alignments: Protestant countries, on the basis of a dominant national church which in the nation-building process did not stand in opposition to the nationbuilders; Roman Catholic countries where the overwhelming part of the population were Catholics; and religiously mixed countries where Protestants had allied with the nation-builders, but where there were large Roman Catholic minorities, producing lasting political divisions that had consequences for the party system. 1 These three types are all represented among the eight countries: Britain and Denmark belong to the Protestant group; Belgium, France, Ireland and Italy to the Catholic group; and Germany and the Netherlands to the religiously mixed group. Of these countries Britain and the Netherlands have the most complex religious structures. In Britain the Anglican Church of England is dominant in England and Wales, while the Calvinist Church of Scotland is the established church in Scotland. There are also a considerable numbers of Catholics and non-conformists (Methodist, Baptists and others). The Catholics are predominantly immigrants from Ireland, who came to Britain particularly in the 1920s (Bennie, Brand & Mitchell 1997: 112–16; Rose 1974c: 517–18). In the Netherlands the Protestant Dutch Reformed Church experienced conflicts within the church in the nineteenth century. A group of committed Calvinist Christians established their own religious communities, free of ties to the state and the nation. These Orthodox Rereformed (Gereformeerd) churches are offshoots of the Dutch Reformed Church (Lipset & Rokkan 1967a: 15–17; Lijphart 1974: 228–9). Let us see how this division is reflected in our data. The question that has been asked quite frequently in Eurobarometers is phrased as follows:

Religious Denomination 47

‘Do you regard yourself as belonging to a religion?’ (if yes) ‘Which one of them?’ 2 The question includes a subjective element. It is asked if one regards or considers oneself as belonging to a religion, not if one de facto is a member of a religious denomination or organisation. Before EB 31 (1989) the response categories on the religious denomination variables have changed somewhat from survey to survey, and the categories have been different between countries. Further, in some of these surveys the categories are merged or important categories are missing for some countries. These surveys are dropped for the analysis of religious denominations for the relevant countries. Since EB 31 common categories have been used on the religious denomination variables. 3 These create, however, some interpretation problems for a few countries. The largest problem concerns Britain. We were not able to identify the non-conformists with the new set of response categories.4 The analysis of the non-conformists can not be done after 1988.5 We therefore analyse this group of various non-conformist confessions only from the early 1970s to the late 1980. Table 2.1 shows the distributions over time according to religious denominations. Since there is much change over time in the portion who consider themselves as belonging to various denominations, let us start the description with the distribution in the early 1970s which represents the traditional denominational structure – at least according to the available data. We should, however, not overlook that important changes could have taken place before the 1970s and that therefore the situation in the early 1970s may mark a transition period. In all four Roman Catholic countries, more than 80 per cent of the population considered themselves Catholic in the early 1970s: 83 per cent in Belgium and France and 93 per cent in Italy and Ireland. In the first two countries, 15 per cent and 12 per cent do not consider themselves as belonging to any religion, while the percentage is 3 per cent and 6 per cent in Ireland and Italy, respectively. In France 2 per cent were Protestants and an additional 2 per cent belonged to other denominations (or religions), while the percentage in these categories was less than 1 per cent in the three other countries. In other words, these countries were very religiously homogenous, predominantly Roman Catholic countries. As to the two Protestant countries, we find as expected larger varieties in Britain than in Denmark. In the British data we could only differentiate between the Church of England and the Church of Scotland in a few surveys where the question on religious denomination was asked. For many of the surveys, the two churches were mentioned in the same

48

Table 2.1

Trends in belongingness to various religious denominations 1970–74

1975–79

1980–84

1985–89

1990–93

1994–97

Total 1970–97

Ch. 1970–74/ 1994–97

Ch. 1975–79 1994–97

83.4 0.7 0.5 15.4 100.0 3,967

76.5 0.9 1.0 21.6 100.0 6,847

75.9 0.7 2.1 21.2 100.0 2,844

69.0 1.4 1.9 27.8 100.0 5,817

69.8 1.0 1.9 27.2 100.0 10,984

69.4 1.1 2.8 26.6 100.0 7,060

72.7 1.0 1.8 24.5 100.0 37,519

−13.9 0.3 2.3 11.3

−7.0 0.2 1.8 5.0

9.2 54.3 6.7 4.3 25.5 100.0 1,933

8.8 51.5 9.5 3.0 27.3 100.0 7,478

10.4 50.5 9.8 1.8 27.5 100.0 3,263

7.8 48.2 5.3 4.1 34.5 100.0 3,957

10.2 46.8

10.9 42.5

1.7 −11.8 −6.7

2.1 −9.0 −9.5

6.7 36.3 100.0 11,481

9.3 37.3 100.0 7,452

9.7 47.8 3.6 5.8 33.1 100.0 37,451

11.8

10.1

Belgium Catholics Prot. Other den. No denom. Sum N Britain Catholics Prot. Non-conf. Other den. No denom. Sum N

Denmark Catholics Prot. Other den. No denom. Sum N

0.6 81.7 1.8 16.0 100.0 1,199

0.9 83.3 1.9 13.9 100.0 6,905

0.6 76.3 1.9 21.2 100.0 2,957

0.9 75.0 1.9 22.1 100.0 5,964

1.2 72.3 1.8 24.7 100.0 10,834

1.7 72.8 2.3 23.1 100.0 6,957

1.1 75.7 1.9 21.2 100.0 34,816

1.1 −8.8 0.5 7.1

0.9 −10.5 0.4 9.2

84.4 2.3 1.7 11.5 100.0 6,323

69.8 2.1 2.1 25.9 100.0 8,194

71.0 1.7 2.5 24.7 100.0 2,978

68.1 1.8 2.1 28.0 100.0 6,011

63.4 2.3 3.6 30.8 100.0 10,985

63.7 2.0 3.7 30.5 100.0 6,982

69.1 2.1 2.7 26.0 100.0 41,473

−20.7 −0.3 2.0 19.0

−6.1 −0.1 1.6 4.6

41.7 52.6 1.4 4.4 100.0 5,920

41.3 47.9 1.8 9.0 100.0 6,783

42.7 48.6 1.4 7.2 100.0 2,871

43.9 46.2 1.3 8.6 100.0 8,291

38.8 46.0 1.6 13.7 100.0 11,306

39.0 44.1 2.1 14.8 100.0 7,353

40.9 47.1 1.6 10.4 100.0 42,524

−2.7 −8.5 0.8 10.4

−2.3 −3.8 0.4 5.8

France Catholics Prot. Other den. No denom. Sum N Germany Catholics Prot. Other den. No denom. Sum N

49

(Continued)

50

Table 2.1

1970–74

1975–79

1980–84

1985–89

1990–93

1994–97

Total 1970–97

Ch. 1970–74/ 1994–97

Ch. 1975–79 1994–97

93.1 0.0 4.4 2.5 100.0 1,199

93.4 3.3 1.2 2.1 100.0 6,960

92.9 3.2 0.9 3.0 100.0 2,954

93.7 2.7 1.0 2.7 100.0 5,992

93.0 2.5 0.8 3.8 100.0 11,055

92.0 2.1 1.0 4.9 100.0 7,052

93.0 2.6 1.1 3.4 100.0 35,212

−1.0 2.1 −3.5 2.4

−1.3 −1.2 −0.2 2.7

93.3 0.9 5.9 100.0 5,680

92.9 0.5 6.6 100.0 7,422

93.3 0.6 6.1 100.0 3,216

91.6 1.2 7.1 100.0 6,238

90.5 1.2 8.3 100.0 11,393

91.1 1.2 7.6 100.0 7,167

91.8 1.0 7.2 100.0 41,116

−2.1 0.4 1.8

−1.8 0.7 1.0

32.2 21.6 9.4 2.0 34.8 100.0 4,514

35.6 21.4 8.3 3.2 31.5 100.0 4,092

32.1 15.4 9.1 4.1 39.3 100.0 1,006

28.2 14.0 8.3 3.5 46.0 100.0 5,996

26.2 14.3 8.5 3.7 47.3 100.0 11,099

23.0 11.5 7.6 5.2 52.7 100.0 7,078

28.0 15.6 8.4 3.7 44.4 100.0 33,785

−9.2 −10.1 −1.8 3.2 17.8

−12.6 −9.9 −0.7 2.1 21.1

14.5

17.2

18.8

22.1

24.0

24.7

21.3

10.2

7.5

Ireland Catholics Prot. Other den. No denom. Sum N Italy Catholics Other den. No denom. Sum N Netherlands Catholics Prot. Rereform. Other den. No denom. Sum N Mean no denom.

Religious Denomination 51

response category. There are also some problems with the important non-conformist group from 1989 as discussed above. In Britain only 54 per cent belonged to the two established churches; 9 per cent were Catholics, 7 per cent were non-conformists, 4 per cent belonged to other denominations and 26 per cent did not belong to any denomination. In Denmark the situation was similar to that in the Catholics countries in that more than 80 per cent were members of the Danish state church (Den danske folkekirke), while 16 per cent considered themselves as not members of any church. Finally, the two religiously mixed countries appear to have very different portions who consider themselves as belonging to the main churches. In Germany more than half of the population consider themselves as Protestants, and more than 40 per cent as Catholics. Only 4 per cent did not belong to any church. By contrast, about a third of the Dutch population did not consider themselves as belonging to any church, and belongingness to the Catholic Church equalled the portion who considered themselves as belonging to any of the two Protestant churches. The changes are seen in Table 2.1. The easiest way to study changes is perhaps to analyse the increase in the portion who do not consider themselves as belonging to any religious denomination.6 To consider oneself as not belonging to a church is a strong indication of secularisation. It implies that one personally does not consider oneself to belong socially or psychologically to a church community. It can also imply that one has actively informed the community that one is not a member. This trend is shown in detail in Figure 2.1. There is generally an increase in the portion who do not consider themselves as belonging to a denomination. The average increase is not very large, from 15 per cent in the early 1970s to 25 per cent in the late 1990s (see also the average figures in the latter section of Table 2.1). This can be considered a central component in the secularisation process. The figure shows, however, considerable variations between countries in the increase in the unaffiliated group. In two of the three countries with the lowest unaffiliated percentage in the early 1970s, Ireland and Italy, there is virtually no change, only 1–2 percentage points, and these countries are clearly (more clearly than in the 1970s) a group of their own with very high level of denominational belongingness in the 1990s. Germany, which belonged to the same group in the 1970s, has an increase in the unaffiliated group that is similar to the average change for all countries. Germany comprises a group of its own: 15 per cent of the population do not belong to any church in the 1990s. In Belgium, Denmark and France, 11–16 per cent did not belong to any denomination

52 Social Structure and Party Choice in Western Europe

60.0 50.0 40.0 30.0 20.0 10.0 0.0 1970–74

1975–79

Belgium Germany

1980–84

Britain Ireland

1985–89

Denmark Netherlands

1990–93

1994–97

France Mean

Italy

Figure 2.1 Trends in the portion that do not consider themselves as members of a religious denomination

in the early 1970s. Changes have been largest in France and smallest in Denmark in this group. Much of the change in France takes place from the early 1970s to the late 1970s. In Britain there is a modest increase, similar to the average for all countries. Finally, in the Netherlands there is a considerable increase so that the country stands out as even more extreme compared with the 1970s. The Netherlands is clearly the most secular country on this indicator. More than half of the Dutch population do not consider themselves as belonging to any denomination in the late 1990s. In terms of percentage differences, the increase in the denominational group has been largest in France and the Netherlands (18–19 percentage points), followed by Belgium, Britain, Germany and Denmark (7–12), while the change in Ireland and Italy is very small (1–2). The growth of the non-affiliated group has in all countries come at the expense of the main churches. In the mainly Catholic countries of France and Belgium, there is a significant decline in the portion who consider themselves Catholics, while there is a very small decrease in Italy and Ireland. These differences mirror the comparative differences in the increase in the unaffiliated group. In the mainly Protestant countries,

Religious Denomination 53

Denmark and Britain, the decrease is due to a loss in the portion affiliated with the main Protestant churches. In Britain there may also be a decrease among the non-conformists, but the data are somewhat inconclusive in this respect. The portion of Catholics is not declining; in fact, it is increasing somewhat. In Germany the decline is first and foremost taking place among Protestants, although there is a small decline among Catholics in the 1990s. In the Netherlands the increase of the non-affiliated group has traditionally come at the expense of membership of the Dutch Reformed Church (Lijphart 1974: 228). This appears also to be the case after 1970s, but from the mid-1980s the Catholic group also declines considerably, and the overall decline from the early 1970s to the late 1990s is indeed on the same level among Catholics as among the Dutch Reformed Church. One could argue, however, that there is a floor effect with regard to the latter. The percentage of the Dutch population that consider themselves members declines to nearly 10 per cent in the 1990s, and it is more difficult to have a greater decline than among the Catholics, which starts from a higher percentage. In some contrast to the pattern for the two main churches, affiliation with the Rereformed group is fairly constant, declining only about 2 percentage points.

2.3

Religious denomination and party choice

Patterns based on the data for the whole period, 1970–97 Let us now go on to study how religious denomination affects party choice. The analysis of the relationship between party choice and religious denomination must take several things into consideration. First, religious denomination is a variable at nominal level of measurement. It is therefore necessary to use Cramer’s V as the main correlation coefficients. Moreover, in many countries the number of cases for the minor religious confessions is so small that it is difficult to analyse their voting behaviour, at least over time. To the extent that their voting patterns will be commented on, we restrict the analysis to the pattern for the whole period. The same applies to the analyses of the group other denominations/religions, which in addition is a heterogeneous group. The analysis of changes over time in the religious homogeneous countries will mainly be restricted to those who belong to the main religious group and those without any religious affiliation. Let us start by examining the strength of the correlation for the whole period (see Figure 2.2). Given that Cramer’s V is a conservative measure

54 Social Structure and Party Choice in Western Europe

0.300 0.250

Cramer’s V

0.200 0.150 0.100 0.050 0.000 Netherlands

Italy

Belgium

France

Germany Denmark

Ireland

Britain

Figure 2.2 Strength of the correlation between religious denomination and party choice, 1970–97, measured by Cramer’s V

0.300

Nagelkerke’s R2

0.250 0.200 0.150 0.100 0.050 0.000 Netherlands Belgium

France

Italy

Germany Denmark

Ireland

Britain

Figure 2.3 Strength of the correlation between religious denomination and party choice, 1970–97, measured by Nagelkerke’s R2

in the sense that large differences are needed for considerable strength, the correlations for some of the countries are quite large. The correlation is strongest in the Netherlands, followed by Italy and Belgium, and France and Germany. The smallest correlations are found in Britain, followed by Ireland and Denmark (compare with Dalton 1996: 179–82). We also present the impact of religious denomination measured by Nagelkerke’s R2 from multinominal logistic regression with religious

Religious Denomination 55

denomination treated as nominal-level factor variable since the comparative pattern is somewhat different. Nagelkerke’s R2 shows the same ranking of countries with one exception. Italy is ranked as number four, with a correlation lower than the correlations in Belgium and France. The correlations are different in particular in Italy and Belgium. A possible explanation is that is more sensitive to the very skewed distribution while Nagelkerke’s R2 take into consideration the more skewed distribution on the religious denomination variable in the Italian case. 7 To compare the placement of the parties on the denominational cleavage is somewhat complicated given the nominal level measurement of the cleavage variable. It is in particular difficult for the countries with significant portion of the population belonging to more than one religious group, Britain, Germany and the Netherlands. The comparison will be done for the major denominational group and the unaffiliated in all countries. In Britain the Protestant is definitely the major confessional group, and the Netherlands the Catholics are larger than the two Calvinist confessions. In Germany the two confessions are fairly equal, the Protestants though somewhat larger than the Catholics. However, what is important for Germany and the Netherlands is that the largest division compared with the unaffiliated group is found when we compare with the Catholics. We therefore use the Catholics for comparison with the unaffiliated in these two countries, but we also present the figures for a comparison of the Protestants with the unaffiliated group. Table 2.2 shows the two measures, lor and PDI where the parties are grouped into party families for the whole period. A positive value means that the party gets strongest support from the unaffiliated group in the table. I will comment upon the lor-scores in this connection since we can compare these between countries and parties within the various countries. I take the average scores for the various party families as my point of departure. The leftist party families and the Greens get strongest support from the unaffiliated group. The average scores are largest for the Communists and the left socialist parties, and considerably smaller for the Social Democratic parties. The scores are high for all the Communist and left socialist parties, while there are more variations within the Social Democratic parties. There are three levels of difference for these parties. In Belgium, Ireland and the Netherlands the differences are high, while they are more moderate for the parties in Britain, France and Germany. In Denmark and Italy we find a significant opposite trend compared with these parties. Those who are a member of the dominant church,

56 Table 2.2 Overall differences in support for the various political parties, according to religious denomination in a comparative setting, 1970–97, with parties grouped into party families A. Lor Prot./no rel. Belgium Comm. Left Soc. Soc. Dem Green Nationalists Liberal Christian Conservative Radical right Spec. P. I Spec. P. II Other p.

Britain

1.28 1.01 0.82 −0.21 0.11 −2.39

0.34 0.74 0.26 −0.01 −0.47

0.71

0.88

1.08

Denmark

France

1.46 1.14 −0.35 1.14

1.22 1.02 0.39 0.72

0.22 −1.90 −0.33 −0.08 −0.58 −0.41 0.45

−1.22 −1.29 0.01 0.11 0.19

Germany

0.48 1.52 0.39 −1.54

Ireland

1.52 0.74 1.54 0.80 −0.44 −1.42

0.97

1.19

1.33

Italy 1.48 2.12 −0.38 1.01 0.11 −0.22 −2.99 −0.66 −0.65 −1.24 1.24

Netherlands

1.20 0.88

0.44 −2.50

0.74 0.29 0.34

Average 1.36 1.40 0.39 1.07 0.05 0.06 −1.96 −0.83 0.19

0.84

Netherl.

1.50 0.65

0.03 −1.95

Germany

−0.11 1.32 −0.04 −0.80 0.99

0.75 −3.37 0.29

1.11

B. PDI Prot./no. rel. Belgium Britain Comm. Left Soc. Soc. Dem Green Nationalists Liberal Christian Conservative Radical right Spec. P. I Spec. P. II Other P. Total

1.9 21.0 8.0 −1.5 1.7 −35.5

8.1 2.6 0.6 −0.1

Denmark France 1.9 17.1 −7.4 0.9

11.2 3.2 9.0 6.0 −15.0

2.7

0.6

1.1 −1.7 −3.7 −0.5 −8.0 −1.0 1.2

37.1

11.8

22.3

−10.9 1.9

Germany Ireland

11.6 13.3 2.1 −33.2

8.6 10.4 6.9 3.2 −7.1 −31.4

−15.2 0.0 0.2

2.4

0.7

3.8

9.2

30.2

33.2

38.4

Italy 31.9 4.5 −4.3 5.1 0.2 −1.1 −34.1 −1.6 −3.5 −2.3

Netherlands

6.9 18.1

5.8 −41.5

Average 11.7 8.1 8.3 6.1 −0.2 −0.3 −25.5 −12.6 0.1

Netherl.

Germany

7.8 14.1

−2.9 12.3

0.5 −28.2

−0.2 −15.3

2.4 3.7 18.4

5.1

9.4 0.0 1.2

3.1

9.5 −4.7 1.1

46.9

41.5

32.7

32.9

Notes Special parties are for Denmark Agrarian Liberals (I) and Centre Democrats (II), for France MRG (I), for Italy PSDI (I) and for the Netherlands D66 (I) and Calvinist Fundamentalists (II) For Germany and the Netherlands, the figures are based on calculations for the Catholics versus the unaffiliated. For Britain it is based on the Protestants versus the unaffiliated. The figures for Britain are the averages for the two tables, apart from the Green party where the figures for the last period (1988–97) are used.

57

58 Social Structure and Party Choice in Western Europe

vote more frequently for the social democrats in these countries. In both countries there exists a large left socialist or Communist party that absorb many of the unaffiliated voters, a possible explanation for this pattern. A third country that also has a significant Communist party, that also may absorb the vote of most unaffiliated, France, has a low, but positive lor-score. As to the Green parties, we note that the German party has a much higher lor-score than the other large Green parties in Belgium and France. The Radical Rightist parties also get strongest support from the unaffiliated but the average lor-score is small. The Belgian and the German party do get much stronger support from the unaffiliated, while the Italian MSI counterbalance this by a high negative score. There are no significant differences for the Danish and French party. The Liberal party family appears to have large differences with regard to support along the denominational cleavage. In Ireland, and then in the Netherlands and Germany they get considerably stronger support from the unaffiliated group, while the opposite is the case in France and to a smaller extent in Italy. For the remaining three parties (in Belgium, Britain and Denmark) there are only insignificant differences. The Christian and the Conservative party families are the only ones that receive stronger support from the member of the main confession, and the average lor-score is decisively largest for the Christian parties. As to the Christian parties the highest lor-scores are found in Belgium, Italy and the Netherlands. The smallest lor-score is found for the Irish party that is (after some doubt) grouped in the Christian party family, and we note that the German parties (CDU/CSU) have a considerably lower score than the parties in Belgium, Italy and the Netherlands. As to the Conservative parties, we find that there are large variations. The strength of the tendency for these parties to get stronger support from the members of the main confession is largest in Ireland and France, and smallest in Britain and Denmark. Strength of the correlation over time Figure 2.4 shows the development of the strength over time based on Cramer’s V. No uniform or clear decline is observed for all countries, although a small decline is observed when we estimate the average correlations for the various periods. This can be seen by the trendline in the figure. The average correlation increases somewhat from the early 1970s (0.185) to the early 1980s (0.200), but then declines gradually to the late 1990s (0.163) to a level somewhat lower than that of the 1970s. The pattern for most countries is fairly stable. The largest changes are

Religious Denomination 59

0.350 0.300

Cramer’s V

0.250 0.200 0.150 0.100 0.050 0.000 1970–74

1975–79

1980–84

1985–89

1990–93

Belgium

Britain

Denmark

France

Ireland

Italy

Netherlands

Mean

1994–97 Germany

Figure 2.4 Trends in the strength of the correlation between religious denomination and party choice measured by Cramer’s V

found in Italy, where there is a gradual decline to the early 1990s and then a large decline to the late 1990s; in Denmark, where there is also a decline; and in Ireland, where the impact of denomination increases sharply from the 1970s to the 1980s. Ireland is a deviant case in that it is the only country where the impact of religious denomination increases over time. There are also smaller long-term decreases in Belgium and France. Figure 2.5 shows the trends in the correlation based on Nagelkerke’s R2 from multinominal logistic regression. Basically the pattern is fairly similar to the one based on Cramer’s V, but the trends towards dealignment is somewhat larger. According to the average correlation, the decline is from 0.115 to 0.090 which represents a 22 per cent decline compared with 12 per cent based on Cramer’s V. We note first that the correlation for the Italian case is consistently smaller than for Cramer’s V in accordance with the findings from the analysis based on the data for the whole period. The decline of the correlation in the Italian case is nevertheless substantial but in contrast to the pattern for Cramer’s V nearly all decline takes place from the early to the late 1990s. The other different pattern is that there is a clear decline in the impact of religious denomination, indeed

60 Social Structure and Party Choice in Western Europe

0.400 0.350

Nagelkerke’s R2

0.300 0.250 0.200 0.150 0.100 0.050 0.000 1970–74

1975–79

Belgium Ireland

Britain Italy

1980–84

1985–89

Denmark Netherlands

1990–93

France Mean

1994–97

Germany

Figure 2.5 Trends in the strength of the correlation between religious denomination and party choice measured by Nagelkerke’s R2

the largest decline in a comparative setting, in the Netherlands based on Nagelkerke’s R2, 0.062 (from 0.332 to 0.271). The impact of religious denomination remains nevertheless much higher in the Netherlands than in any other country. For the other countries the patterns we find for the two measures are very similar, something which is reflected in the correlation between the coefficients based on the 48 units, 0.89. Detailed analyses of the impact of religious denomination and changes over time within the eight countries Let us now study the pattern for each country and start with the data for the whole period. For comparison, we use lor-scores, and we use (one of) the main denominations as a point of comparison. 8 The relationship for the whole period is shown in Table 2.3. 9 We start with the Catholic countries, then move on to the predominantly Protestant countries. Lastly, we consider the two religious mixed countries: Germany and the Netherlands. Catholic countries In Belgium only the Christian Social parties and the Nationalist parties get stronger support from the large group of Catholics than from the

Table 2.3

Religious denomination and party choice, 1970–97

Belgium

PCB/KPB PS/SP Ecolo/Agalev Volksu./ RW/FDI PRL/PVV PSC/CVP Flemish Bloc Other parties Sum N

Prot./Cath.

Other den./Cath.

No den./Cath.

PDI

|PDI|

0.86 0.59 1.14 −0.34 0.14 −1.69 0.75 1.02

1.28 1.01 0.82 −0.21 0.11 −2.39 0.71 0.88

1.9 21.0 8.0 −1.5 1.7 −35.5 1.9 2.7

1.9 21.0 8.0 1.5 1.7 35.5 1.9 2.7

Catholics

Protestants

Other denom.

No denom.

Total

0.8 20.6 7.5 8.7 16.9 41.7 1.9 2.0 100.0 14,667

0.0 34.3 12.3 11.8 23.5 13.2 1.5 3.4 100.0 204

1.8 31.8 20.1 6.4 19.1 11.7 3.9 5.3 100.0 283

2.7 41.5 15.4 7.2 18.6 6.2 3.8 4.7 100.0 4,739

1.2 25.9 9.6 8.3 17.4 32.5 2.4 2.7 100.0 19,893

Catholics

Protestants

Other denom.

No denom.

Total

Cath./Prot.

Other/ Prot.

No den./Prot.

PDI

|PDI|

0.8 12.6 38.1 0.8 6.3 2.5 14.6

0.6 11.2 33.9 0.4 4.6 2.1 14.9

1.0 13.6 27.9 0.5 7.0 7.3 11.7

2.5 28.4 26.4 1.4 5.7 0.3 11.2

1.0 14.8 32.3 0.6 4.9 1.8 14.1

0.33 0.13 0.18 0.65 0.32 0.20 −0.02

0.56 0.22 −0.28 0.17 0.44 1.32 −0.27

1.46 1.14 −0.35 1.14 0.22 −1.90 −0.33

1.9 17.1 −7.4 0.9 1.1 −1.7 −3.7

1.9 17.1 7.4 0.9 1.1 1.7 3.7

0.70 0.55 0.34 0.41 −1.55 −0.25

Sum

37.1

CV = 0.210 Denmark

61

DKP Left soc. Soc. Dem. Greens Rad. Lib. Chr. Peo. P. Cons. Peo. P.

(Continued)

62

Table 2.3 Denmark

Progress P. Agrar. Lib. Centr. Dem. Other parties Sum N

Catholics

Protestants

Other denom.

No denom.

Total

Cath./Prot.

Other/ Prot.

No den./Prot.

PDI

|PDI|

5.4 15.5 2.5 0.8 100.0 239

6.4 20.8 2.9 2.2 100.0 17,994

6.8 16.2 2.9 5.0 100.0 383

5.9 12.8 2.0 3.4 100.0 4,788

6.3 19.0 2.7 2.5 100.0 23,404

−0.17 −0.36 0.16 0.99

0.06 −0.30 −0.02 0.84

−0.08 −0.58 −0.41 0.45

−0.5 −8.0 −1.0 1.2

0.5 8.0 1.0 1.2

Catholics

Protestants

Other denom.

No denom.

Total

Prot./Cath.

Other den./Cath.

No den./Cath.

PDI

|PDI|

5.6 1.9 32.0 6.5 23.1 22.7 2.7 2.0 3.4 100.0 18,661

4.7 1.8 35.5 6.5 22.2 21.8 3.6 2.0 2.0 100.0 555

8.3 3.1 38.8 12.6 14.2 13.9 1.0 3.4 4.6 100.0 611

16.8 5.0 41.0 12.5 8.1 7.5 2.8 2.2 4.1 100.0 6,625

8.5 2.7 34.5 8.2 19.1 18.7 2.7 2.1 3.6 100.0 26,452

−0.19 −0.04 0.16 −0.01 −0.06 −0.05 0.28 0.00 −0.55

0.42 0.52 0.30 0.73 −0.59 −0.60 −1.05 0.56 0.31

1.22 1.02 0.39 0.72 −1.22 −1.29 0.01 0.11 0.19

11.2 3.2 9.0 6.0 −15.0 −15.2 0.0 0.2 0.7

11.2 3.2 9.0 6.0 15.0 15.2 0.0 0.2 0.7

Sum

22.3

CV = 0.140 France

PCF PSU PSF Ecologists UDF RPR Front National MRG Other parties Sum N CV = 0.177

Sum

30.2

Germany

SPD Green FDP CDU/CSU Republic. P. Other parties Sum N

Catholics

Protestants

Other denom.

No denom.

35.4 4.5 4.7 52.0 1.5 1.8 100.0 11,999

49.9 5.5 7.0 34.2 1.5 1.9 100.0 13,583

47.5 8.7 6.7 27.8 0.6 8.7 100.0 345

47.0 17.8 6.8 18.9 3.9 5.6 100.0 2,734

Catholics

Protestants

Other denom.

No denom.

2.7 12.3 2.1 2.8 23.7 52.6 3.8 100.0 19,873

1.5 6.2 1.9 5.2 56.9 24.6 3.7 100.0 517

5.7 13.0 3.6 3.1 37.0 27.6 9.9 100.0 192

11.4 22.8 9.0 5.9 16.6 21.2 13.1 100.0 589

Total 43.5 6.3 6.0 40.1 1.7 2.3 100.0 28,661

Prot./Cath.

Other den./Cath.

No den./Cath.

0.59 0.21 0.42 −0.74 −0.02 0.08

0.50 0.70 0.37 −1.03 −0.97 1.67

0.48 1.52 0.39 −1.54 0.97 1.19

PDI

|PDI|

11.6 13.3 2.1 −33.2 2.4 3.8

11.6 13.3 2.1 33.2 2.4 3.8

Sum

33.2

CV = 0.160 Ireland

Workers’ P. Labour Green Prog. Dem. Fine Gael Fianna Fail Other parties Sum N

3.0 12.5 2.3 2.9 24.4 50.8 4.1 100.0 21,171

Prot./Cath.

Other den./Cath.

No den./Cath.

−0.58 −0.76 −0.07 0.66 1.45 −1.23 −0.04

0.77 0.06 0.58 0.13 0.64 −1.07 1.01

1.52 0.74 1.54 0.80 −0.44 −1.42 1.33 Sum

PDI

|PDI|

8.6 10.4 6.9 3.2 −7.1 −31.4 9.2

8.6 10.4 6.9 3.2 7.1 31.4 9.2 38.4 63

CV = 0.123

Total

(Continued)

64

Table 2.3 Italy

PCI/PDS/PCR Proletar. Dem. PSI Rad.P./Verdi Lega Nord PRI/PLI Chr. Dem. Forza Italia MSI PDSI Other parties Sum N

Catholics

Protestants

No denom.

Total

Other den./Cath.

No den./Cath.

PDI

|PDI|

19.4 0.6 15.2 3.2 2.1 6.1 37.0 3.3 7.5 3.3 2.3 100.0 19,860

28.0 1.9 14.6 7.0 3.2 14.0 12.7 2.5 9.6 2.5 3.8 100.0 157

51.3 5.2 10.9 8.4 2.3 4.9 2.9 1.7 4.1 1.0 7.4 100.0 1,743

22.0 1.0 14.9 3.7 2.1 6.0 34.1 3.2 7.3 3.1 2.7 100.0 21,760

0.48 1.09 −0.05 0.81 0.45 0.92 −1.39 −0.26 0.26 −0.26 0.54

1.48 2.12 −0.38 1.01 0.11 −0.22 −2.99 −0.66 −0.65 −1.24 1.24

31.9 4.5 −4.3 5.1 0.2 −1.1 −34.1 −1.6 −3.5 −2.3 5.1

31.9 4.5 4.3 5.1 0.2 1.1 34.1 1.6 3.5 2.3 5.1

Sum

46.9

CV = 0.216 Netherlands Catholics Green Left PVDA VVD CDA D66

3.3 21.0 12.9 48.7 10.8

Reformed 2.5 25.0 18.2 35.5 10.7

Rereformed 3.4 6.4 5.9 56.6 5.9

Other denom.

No denom.

Total

Ref./Cath

Reref./Cath.

Other den./Cath.

No den./Cath.

9.0 22.2 16.0 16.2 13.9

10.2 39.1 18.7 7.2 20.2

6.3 28.1 15.7 28.4 14.5

−0.31 0.23 0.41 −0.55 −0.01

0.03 −1.36 −0.85 0.32 −0.65

1.05 0.07 0.25 −1.59 0.29

1.20 0.88 0.44 −2.50 0.74

Calv. Fund. Other parties Sum N

0.1 3.2 100.0 6,875

4.9 3.3 100.0 3,853

18.1 3.7 100.0 2,136

16.7 6.0 100.0 789

0.2 4.4 100.0 10,272

3.1 3.9 100.0 23,925

3.67 0.05

5.13 0.15

5.03 0.66

0.29 0.34

CV = 0.289 Britain 1. 1970–89 Catholics Protestants Non-conform. Other No denom. denom. Labour Party Green Party Nationalists Liberal Party Cons. Party Other parties Sum N

47.6 0.4 2.2 14.8 34.6 0.4 100.0 1,135

34.6 0.3 1.9 14.5 48.4 0.3 100.0 6,550

33.3 0.4 1.5 20.3 43.9 0.6 100.0 1,040

32.9 0.6 1.2 20.8 44.5 0.0 100.0 346

42.3 1.0 3.0 15.9 36.7 1.1 100.0 3,546

Total 37.8 0.5 2.2 15.6 43.4 0.5 100.0 12,617

Cath./Prot. Non-conf./ Other/Prot. Prot.

No den./Prot.

−0.06 0.34 −0.24 0.41 −0.18 0.64

0.33 1.26 0.44 0.11 −0.48 1.26

0.54 0.47 0.13 0.02 −0.57 0.14

−0.07 0.75 −0.53 0.44 −0.16 –

CV = 0.072

65

66

Table 2.3

(Continued)

2. 1989–97 Catholics Protestants Other Other No religions denom. denom. Labour Party Green Party Nationalists Liberal Party Cons. Party Other parties Sum N

56.2 2.6 2.1 13.1 25.0 1.0 100.0 1,354

39.8 2.6 2.7 17.2 37.5 0.3 100.0 5,685

49.5 6.2 0.7 10.7 32.6 0.3 100.0 291

46.6 4.1 3.0 15.8 29.4 1.1 100.0 639

48.3 5.2 2.9 15.5 27.3 0.8 100.0 4,399

Total 45.2 3.7 2.7 15.9 32.0 0.6 100.0 12,368

Cath./Prot. Non-conf./Prot. 0.66 0.01 −0.27 −0.32 −0.59 1.19

0.28 0.48 0.10 −0.10 −0.36 1.25

Other/Prot.

No den./Prot.

0.39 0.92 −1.39 −0.55 −0.21 0.08

0.35 0.74 0.07 −0.12 −0.47 0.90

CV = 0.076 Notes The PDI-scores that are shown for five countries in the table are based on a comparison between the unaffiliated group and the main denomination in the given countries. For Germany the PDI-score is based on the comparison between the Catholics and the unaffiliated group since the difference between these groups is largest. The same applies to the sum of the PDIs (|PDI|). The other relevant |PDI|-sums are 18.4 between Protestants and the unaffiliated group, and 17.9 between Catholics and Protestants. For Britain and the Netherlands no PDI-score is shown due to lack of space in the table. For Netherlands the relevant |PDI|-sums are 41.5 for Catholics versus the unaffiliated group, 32.9 for Protestants versus the unaffiliated groups, 14.2 for Catholics versus Protestants and 67.3 for the Rereformed versus the unaffiliated groups. For Britain where we have two tables for two different periods, the |PDI|-sums are 5.2 and 8.2 for Catholics versus the unaffiliated groups for the periods 1970–89 and 1989–97, respectively. For Protestants versus unaffiliated the |PDI|-sums are nearly identical, 11.7 and 11.8, and for Catholics versus Protestants 13.8 and 17.2.

Religious Denomination 67

unaffiliated group. There are only small differences in support for the Liberals. The parties that get strongest support from the unaffiliated group are the Communist and the Socialist parties, followed by the New Politics parties, Greens and Flemish Bloc. The tiny group of Protestants appears also to support some of the same parties that get strong support from the unaffiliated group, primarily the Socialist and Green parties, but also the Liberal parties. The unaffiliated group has increased and the Catholic group has decreased significantly in size, though it is still dominant. The correlation between party choice and religious denomination has declined somewhat. Let us now analyse the changes in the voting patterns of Catholics and unaffiliated in some detail. There are greater changes in the voting patterns of the two main groups, Catholics and unaffiliated, than the small decline in the correlation indicates. The major changes are found for the two antagonist parties in Belgian politics, Christian Socials and Socialist parties, for which the polarisation according to religious denomination declines strongly, and the new parties, Green and Radical Rightist, which both get considerably stronger support from the unaffiliated group. The main trends for the major parties are that they gradually lose support from their core groups, unaffiliated and Catholics. The Socialist parties have fairly stable support of about 20 per cent from the Catholics, but lose significantly among the unaffiliated, from nearly 60 per cent in the 1970s to about 30 per cent in the 1990s. A similar trend takes place for the Christian parties. Their support from Catholics declines from about 50 per cent to 33 per cent, while the support is 4–9 per cent among the unaffiliated for the whole period. These changes have caused a dramatic decline in denominational polarisation between these two groups of parties. It is primarily the New Politics parties, Greens and Flemish Bloc, that gain support among both the Catholic and the unaffiliated groups that the traditional parties have lost. Although both of these parties get stronger support from the unaffiliated group, they also make significant inroads among Catholics. Having started at ‘zero’ – no support at all in the early 1970s – they gain much of the support lost by the two major parties in both groups, 17 and 30 percentage points among the Catholics and the unaffiliated, respectively, by the late 1990s. The Liberal parties also make significant inroads among Catholic voters: in the 1970s they gained stronger support among the unaffiliated group; in the late 1990s support is marginally stronger among Catholics, and consequently their increased support is stronger among Catholics than among the unaffiliated group.10

68 Social Structure and Party Choice in Western Europe

In sum, polarisation according to religious denomination associated with the traditional parties has declined significantly in Belgium. This is most pronounced among the parties contributing to the polarisation on the secular side: the Socialist and Communist parties. The polarisation caused by the new secular parties, Greens and Radical Right, is not of the same magnitude. In France the religious cleavage has followed the division between the socialist and the non-socialist parties to a large extent (Boy & Mayer 2000: 154–6). Looking at the table for the whole period, we find that this is true to some extent. According to the lor-scores, both of the main non-socialist parties get much stronger support from the Catholics than from the unaffiliated group. There is no significant difference between the two parties in this respect. The Communists and also the small PSU get correspondingly much stronger support from the unaffiliated group. The Socialist Party, however, gets only somewhat stronger support from the unaffiliated than from the Catholics, and is the largest party also among Catholics voters. The Ecologist parties do get much stronger support from the unaffiliated group than from Catholics, but this does not apply to the radical rightist Front National. The tiny group of Protestants votes very similarly to the Catholics. Those who belong to other denominations and religions appear to be leftist, being much more likely to support the Socialist and Green parties and less likely to support the non-socialist parties compared with the Catholics. Their voting behaviour is in many ways more similar to the unaffiliated group. The unaffiliated group increases significantly in France, while the Catholic portion of the population declines correspondingly. The correlation declines significantly from the 1970s to the 1990s, and we observe a clear decline in polarisation for four parties: the two main non-socialist parties among the parties who get strongest support from Catholics, and among the Communists and the left socialist PSU. The decline is particularly large for the Communists and is associated with the declining support for the party, but the lor-score indicates that this decline is relatively larger among the unaffiliated group. The party’s support among Catholics was only 8 per cent in the early 1970s, and declines to 4 per cent in the late 1990s. By contrast, support among the unaffiliated group declines from 34 per cent to 11 per cent. The Socialist and the Green parties gain some of the votes from the unaffiliated group. In sum, the decline in overall correlation for the parties that gain strongest support from the unaffiliated group can be decomposed into a major decline associated with the Communists and the left socialists

Religious Denomination 69

(25 percentage points), but this is to some extent counterbalanced by a new polarisation caused by the Green and the Socialist parties (12 percentage points). Among the parties gaining most support from the Catholics, the decline is fairly evenly divided between the two major non-socialist parties. According to the lor-scores, however, changes are most significant for the Gaullist Party, which increases its support among the unaffiliated group considerably. In Italy the portion of the population who consider themselves Catholics is high, and there is nearly no change over time. The correlation between party choice and religious denomination declines significantly, but most of the change takes place from the early to the late 1990s. The group of unaffiliated is low, but there is a great polarisation between this group and the Catholics. The main polarisation takes place between the Communists and the Christian Democrats. The Communists get a majority of the vote of the small group of unaffiliated, while the Christian Democrats are not that dominant among Catholics, gaining only 37 per cent of their vote. Other parties that get considerably larger support from the unaffiliated are the left socialists and the Greens, while PSDI, MSI and Forza Italia get stronger support from Catholics. This also applies to the Socialist party, although not to the same extent. This is perhaps a surprising finding. In the 1970s the large polarisation was between the Communist Party and other left-wing parties versus the Christian Democrats. The greens get a significant portion of the vote of the unaffiliated in the 1980s and early 1990s. MSI and the rightist splinter party from the Socialist Party – PSDI – gain, on the other hand, larger support from the Catholics in the 1970s and 1980s. In the 1990s the support for the Christian parties11 from the Catholics collapses. Support decreases from nearly 40 per cent in the 1980s and early 1990s to about 15 per cent. It is primarily two parties that gain disproportionately from this collapse of the electoral alliance between Catholics and the Christian parties, MSI/Alleanza Nationale and Forza Italia, who gain altogether 43 per cent of the vote from the Catholics and only 20 per cent from the unaffiliated group in the late 1990s. Both of these parties are increasing their support significantly during the 1990s – Forza Italia was founded in early 1994. The decline of the religious cleavage is then primarily associated with the collapse of the Christian and also the Socialist Party. However, the reason why the decline was not even larger is to be found in the much stronger appeal among Catholics voters than among the unaffiliated group of the two main (new) non-socialist parties, Forza Italia and Alleanza Nationale.12

70 Social Structure and Party Choice in Western Europe

In Ireland the portion of the population who consider themselves Catholics is fairly stable at the same level as in Italy: more than 90 per cent also in the 1990s. The strength of the correlation with party choice is increasing, and most of the change takes place the early 1970s and the early 1980s. Later on, the strength of the correlation declines somewhat. Fianna Fail – not Fine Gael, which we have classified as a party belonging to the Christian party family – gets stronger support from the Catholic voters than from other denominations or those without any religious confession. Fine Gael gets strongest support from the tiny groups of Protestants (in particular) and other denominations, while the smaller parties – Workers’ Party, Greens, Labour Party and Progressive Democrats – get stronger support from the unaffiliated group. One should be cautious in starting the analysis of change over time in the early 1970s because the data are based on only one survey, and the number of respondents that are non-Catholics is very small. The data for the late 1970s, where the strength of the denominational cleavage is still small, may be a better starting-point. The denominational cleavage was at that time a cleavage between the two main parties, Fianna Fail and Fine Gael, versus the Labour Party. The data from the early 1980s are also based on few respondents from the unaffiliated group, so the best way to comment on the data is to use the late 1980s for comparison. It is evident from the data that the new parties (Greens and Progressive Democrats) and the Workers’ Party, which increase their electoral support somewhat during the 1980s, get a strong share of the vote of the unaffiliated group partly at the expense of the Labour Party, whose share decreases. The lor-scores for the Workers’ Party and the Greens are particularly high. The emergence of new secular parties and the increased support of the Workers’ Party (formed in 1969) are the major causes of the increase in the strength of the denominational cleavage in Ireland. This pattern is fairly stable also in the 1990s. Protestant countries Let us then go on to the Protestant countries, starting with Denmark, since Britain has some similarities with the religiously mixed countries. In Denmark membership in the Lutheran State Church is high even in a very secular population.13 The portion of unaffiliated increases somewhat in the period, and the correlation between religious denomination and party choice declines from the 1980s to the 1990s. In their comparative discussion of the character of the religious cleavage, Lipset and Rokkan emphasised that the established churches in the Scandinavian countries (and in Britain) did not stand in opposition to

Religious Denomination 71

the nation-builders in the way the Roman Catholic Church did, and ‘the “Left” movements opposed to the religious establishment found most of their support among newly enfranchised dissenters, nonconformists, and fundamentalists in the peripheries’. (1967a: 38) ‘The broad “Left” coalitions against the established powers recruited decisive support among orthodox Protestants in a variety of sectarian movements outside and inside the national churches’ (Lipset & Rokkan 1967a: 38).14 Support for the pre-industrial left movements and later the Christian People’s Parties in the Scandinavian countries has not been greatest among active members of the dominant state churches. Strongest support has been found and still is found among active members of more fundamentalist sects, partly found within and partly outside the Lutheran Church. In accordance with this perspective, we note that the small Christian People’s Party gets stronger support from the ‘other’ denominational groups than from the members of the Lutheran State Church. Support from the tiny groups of Catholics is even on the same level as support from the members of the state church. A similar pattern is found for the Radical Liberal Party. It is mainly the left socialists, the Communists and also the Green Party, who get stronger support from the unaffiliated group than from the Protestants in Denmark, and it is the largest of these components – the left socialists – that contribute most to the party polarisation. The main non-socialist parties, Agrarian Liberals and Conservatives, and also the Social Democrats, get stronger support from members of the state church than from the unaffiliated. Why, then, is the denominational cleavage declining from the late 1980s when the portion who are unaffiliated is increasing, creating a potential for an increase in the denominational cleavage? The explanation can be found by analysing the voters for the parties which contribute most to the overall polarisation, the left socialists and the major nonsocialist parties, Conservatives and Agrarian Liberals. The left socialists’ share of the vote of the unaffiliated group is fairly stable at about 30 per cent in the whole period. There is at the same time a gradual increase in support among Protestants, from about 10 per cent in the 1970s to nearly 20 per cent in the late 1980s and the 1990s. The two major non-socialist parties experience something of an opposite trend: in the 1970s they are among the parties with the highest negative lor-scores, indicating much stronger support from the Protestant segment. For both parties there is a dramatic decrease in the lor-scores. The overall change for these parties from the 1970s to the 1990s illustrates the major change: in the 1970s support from the Protestants was about 30 per cent, while

72 Social Structure and Party Choice in Western Europe

support from the unaffiliated was 12–13 per cent. In the 1990s support from these groups was about 40 per cent and 30 per cent, respectively. In sum, a large segment of voters supporting the major non-socialist parties in Denmark increasingly do not see themselves as members of a religious community, while an opposite trend is found among the left socialists. This contributes to a decline of the denominational cleavage. In Britain the major changes in the size of the various religious groups are the increase of those who do not belong to any denomination, and the decrease among those who define themselves as Protestants. The correlation between religious denomination and party choice is fairly constant at a low level over time.15 The portion of Table 2.3 that shows the relationship between party choice and religious denomination for Britain for the whole period is divided into two periods because of the problems with equivalent categories, and we will comment on both of these tables, focusing first on similarities and then some differences. The first is to be considered the main table since it contains the relevant categories in pure form. The Labour Party gets stronger support from Catholics and then the unaffiliated group, and considerably less support from Protestants and non-conformists. It also gets considerable support from those who have other religions in the second period. The Liberal Party gets, as expected, strongest support from the non-conformist group and fairly equal support from the other main groups. The Conservative Party gets, as expected, strongest support from the Protestants and least support from Catholics and those without any denomination. The different voting patterns between Catholics and Protestants are quite stable over time. There is a decline from the 1970s to the 1980s, and then an increase to the 1990s. The division between the dominant Protestants and the Catholics is primarily between Labour and Conservative, and the changing differences reflect mainly differences in support among Catholics and Protestants for these parties. The non-conformists support first and foremost the Liberal Party more frequently than the Protestants, and there are only small changes over time, from the 1970s to the 1980s. The different voting patterns among the unaffiliated and the Protestants are to a large degree related to the contrast between the Conservative Party and all the other parties in the British party system. The Conservative Party gets stronger support among the Protestants, while all other parties get stronger support from the unaffiliated group. To sum up, the confessional cleavage in Britain has several components and is fairly stable at a low level. The main elements are the stronger

Religious Denomination 73

support for the Labour Party among Catholics and unaffiliated compared with support among Protestants, the strong support for the Conservative Party among Protestants, and the stronger support for the Liberal Party among the non-conformists than among the main confessions. Religiously mixed countries In Germany the denominational structure is fairly stable over time. The unaffiliated group is comparatively quite small but has increased somewhat, particularly in the 1990s. The portion who considers themselves Protestants declines somewhat. The correlations between party choice and religious denomination decline from the early to the late 1980s, but then increases gradually to reach the same level in the 1990s as in the 1970s. The main pattern according to the data for the whole period is that SPD gets stronger support from the Protestants and the unaffiliated than from the Catholics, while the opposite occurs for CDU/CSU. Support from SPD is similar at a high level for all denominational groups other than the Catholics, while support for CDU/CSU declines considerably from Catholics to Protestants, and then again considerably to the unaffiliated group. Support for FDP resembles the pattern for SPD, with least support among Catholics. The Greens get much greater support among the unaffiliated group than the main confessional groups. The same applies to the Republican Party. Let us start the analyses of changes over time by comparing the two main confessional groups, Protestants and Catholics. Support for the main parties among Protestants and Catholics is quite stable over time. The main long-term trend is that CDU/CSU gets support from a smaller portion of the Catholics: the decline is from about 60 per cent in the 1970s to 50 per cent in the 1990s. Polarisation between the Catholics and the unaffiliated declines over time, and most of the change takes place from the early to the late 1980s. There is also a major change taking place with regard to which parties appear to gain most different support from the Catholics and the unaffiliated. In the 1970s SPD and FDP got considerably stronger support from the unaffiliated group than from Catholics. In the early 1980s this difference becomes much less pronounced for SPD, while it evaporates for FDP. The emerging Green Party, on the other hand, gains much larger support from the unaffiliated. The changing character of the vote of Protestants and unaffiliated is also worth a comment. We saw above that SPD got the same portion of the vote from these groups when the whole period was considered, while the Green got much stronger support from the unaffiliated group.

74 Social Structure and Party Choice in Western Europe

The pattern changes over time mainly due to the appearance of the Green Party. In the 1970s SPD got stronger support from the unaffiliated group than from the Protestants. With the emergence of the Green Party, this difference evaporates in the early 1980s, and in the late 1980s and the 1990s, support for SPD is stronger from the Protestants than the unaffiliated group. In the 1970s the differences in voting patterns between Protestants and unaffiliated were largely related to SPD versus CDU/CSU. In the 1990s both CDU/CSU and (to a smaller degree) SPD get stronger support from the Protestants, while the two New Politics parties, Green and Republican, get stronger support from the unaffiliated group. The most stable element over time in this respect is the support for CDU/CSU, which is considerably larger among Protestants in the whole period. The three religious communities in the Netherlands established their own political parties in the late nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century: ARP (the Anti-Revolutionary Party) derived its essential electorate from the Orthodox Calvinists (Gereformeerde); CHU (Christian Historical Union) from the orthodox segments within the Dutch Reformed Church; and the KVP (Catholic People’s Party) from the Catholic segment. The different religious affiliations corresponded largely with the distinct and deep subcultural cleavages in Dutch society, the so-called pillarisation or Velzuiling. These religious parties got more than half of the vote in elections until 1967, when their support started declining rapidly. In 1976 these parties entered into an electoral alliance called the Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA) and merged into one party in 1980 (Daalder 1987: 193–5; Lucardie & Napel 1994: 53, 56–7). Here I will look into the separate components of CDA in the early 1970s when they existed as three parties. Let us now go on to examine the relationship between party choice and religious denomination. The table based on data for the whole period shows that Green Left, Labour Party and D66 get stronger support from the unaffiliated group than from any of the denominational groups. Labour and D66 get fairly similar support from the Catholics and members of the Reformed Church, but small support from the Rereformed churches. The Green Left receives small support from all denominations, apart from the tiny group of ‘other denominations/ religions’. The main Liberal party (VVD) gets a similar portion of the vote of members of the Reformed Church as of the unaffiliated group, but smaller support from the Catholics and definitely from the Rereformed churches. Support for CDA is strongest among members of the Rereformed churches, followed by the Catholics and then the Dutch Reformed Church, and very low among the unaffiliated. Finally, the Calvinist Fundamentalists receive strong support from the Rereformed

Religious Denomination 75

churches and from other denominations, but absolutely no support from Catholics or the unaffiliated group. We study the development of the denominational cleavage over time in some detail, starting with the situation in the early 1970s. What is striking about the pattern in the early 1970s is the tendency for the secular parties to get stronger support from members of the Dutch Reformed Church than from the other confessions. The liberal VVD even gets equally strong support from the members of the Dutch Reformed Church as they do from the unaffiliated group. The basis for the CDA is members of the Catholic and Rereformed churches, while support from the Dutch Reformed Church is considerably smaller. The fairly stable relationship between religious denomination and party choice in the Netherlands is based on the treatment of the dependent variable. We have for the whole period treated the Christian parties as one party, but the CDA first became evident in the late 1970s. In the early 1970s the three confessional parties, which had their basis in the three confessions in the Netherlands, existed as separate alternatives. We might expect that the correlation will increase considerably if we code these parties as three separate parties, given that each party has their basic anchorage in one of the three denominations. That is exactly what happens: it increases from 0.288 to 0.504! If we use this correlation as a starting-point for the comparison of the development, there is then a dramatic decline in the correlation, but the whole decline is due to changes in the party system. If we ‘control’ changes in the party system, as we have done in the main analysis, by merging the three confessional parties, the correlation is fairly stable (at least according to the Cramer’s V), and even increasing somewhat from the early 1970s to the early 1980s. How has the confessional cleavage changed from the early 1970s to the late 1990s? Voting differences between Catholics on the one hand and members of the Dutch Reformed Church and the secular group on the other have declined significantly, while differences between Catholics and the members of the Rereformed churches have increased. How can we explain these patterns? Let us first compare the two main confessions, Catholics and the Dutch Reformed Church, where there is a clear decline. The major reasons for the decline are that differences in voting for the secular parties, Labour and VVD, decrease, and so do differences in voting for the CDA. Differences between Catholics and members of the Dutch Reformed Church decline because Catholics adopt a voting pattern very similar to members of the Dutch Reformed Church. In the early 1970s VVD and Labour combined got 24 per cent of the vote from Catholics and 49 per cent from members of the Dutch Reformed Church. Most of the changes take place in the

76 Social Structure and Party Choice in Western Europe

early 1980s, where support among Catholics increases to 47 per cent while support among members of the Reformed Church increases to only 55 per cent. From the late 1980s there is nearly no difference between the two denominations in inclination to support these main secular parties. The loser among the Catholics is CDA, whose support among Catholics falls from nearly 60 per cent in the early 1970s to 32 per cent in the late 1990s, while support among members of the Dutch Reformed Church is fairly stable, at 30–40 per cent. Differences between Catholics and the unaffiliated group decline for much the same reason as the decline between Catholics and the Reformed Church. Catholics increasingly vote for the secular parties, while the secular parties in the whole period get nearly all of the votes of the unaffiliated group. A small exception from the latter takes place from the late 1980s: CDA gets 10 per cent of the vote of the unaffiliated, compared with 3–4 per cent earlier, another trend that contributes to decrease the difference. Why, then, do we find an increasing difference between the rereformed group and the Catholics? The characteristic voting pattern for the Orthodox Rereformed group for the whole period is to support the CDA (and the previous ARP-component) and the small Calvinist Fundamentalist parties. For the whole period 75 per cent of the Orthodox group support these parties. In contrast to the pattern for Catholics, the rereformed group continues to support the religious parties, and it increasingly supports the Calvinist Fundamentalist parties. The two religious party groups get 75–80 per cent of the vote from the rereformed. The Calvinist Fundamentalist parties get 16 per cent of the vote from the rereformed in the late 1970s and early 1980s, and this increases gradually to 27 per cent in the 1990s. It is this persistent support for the religious parties, as well as the changes from the mainstream Christian Democratic CDA (where Catholics also gain considerably support) to the Calvinist Fundamentalist parties (where Catholics get 0 per cent of the vote), that explains the increase in the voting differences between Catholics and members of the Rereformed churches. This is also, together with the changing distribution on the religious denomination variable, a main reason why the correlation between party choice and church attendance remains fairly stable at a high level in the Netherlands.

2.4

Socialist/non-socialist party choice

Figure 2.6 (A and B) shows the strength of the correlation between socialist/non-socialist party choice and religious denomination for the

Religious Denomination 77

0.350 0.300

Eta-coefficient

0.250 0.200 0.150 0.100 0.050 0.000

Netherlands Belgium

France

Italy

Germany

Ireland

Britain

Denmark

Figure 2.6A The strength of the correlation between religious denomination and socialist/non-socialist party choice measured by the eta-coefficient, 1970–97. Green parties placed in the non-socialist group

0.350 0.300

Eta-coefficient

0.250 0.200 0.150 0.100 0.050 0.000 Netherlands Belgium

France

Italy

Germany

Ireland

Britain

Denmark

Figure 2.6B The strength of the correlation between religious denomination and socialist/non-socialist party choice measured by the eta-coefficient, 1970–97. Green parties placed in the socialist group

whole period, and Figure 2.7 (A and B) shows the strength of the correlation over time. As in all these figures, separate figures for the two ways of treading the Green parties are shown. The ranking of the countries based on the data for the whole period is fairly similar to the analyses, where all parties are treated separately (based on party choice as a nominal level variable). When the Greens

78 Social Structure and Party Choice in Western Europe

0.450 0.400

Eta-coefficient

0.350 0.300 0.250 0.200 0.150 0.100 0.050 0.000 1970–74

1975–79

Belgium Ireland

Britain Italy

1980–84

1985–89

Denmark Netherlands

1990–93 France Mean

1994–97 Germany

Figure 2.7A Trends in the correlation between religious denomination and socialist/non-socialist party choice. Eta-coefficients. Green parties placed in the non-socialist party group

are placed in the socialist party group, correlation increases significantly in the countries with considerable Green parties, primarily Belgium, France and Germany (0.04–0.06); and the correlation in Belgium and France approaches that of the Netherlands. The Green parties have secular and unaffiliated voters, which is the case with the traditional socialist parties in most countries. When they are placed among the non-socialist parties, they tend to reduce the correlation, while the opposite is true when they are placed among the socialist parties. As to the correlation over time, there is a more pronounced reduction than in the previous analysis based on all parties. The average decline is smaller when the Green parties are placed in the socialist group. Let us first examine the pattern when the Greens are placed in the non-socialist group. The decline is large in Belgium (−0.20) and the Netherlands (−0.17), the countries with the decisively largest correlations in the 1970s and early 1980s. There are also significant, but smaller, declines in Denmark, France, Germany and Italy (−0.04 to −0.09). There is no long-term change in Britain, and there is a significant increase in Ireland (0.07). The main changes when the Greens are placed in the socialist group are that the decline becomes smaller, but still significant

Religious Denomination 79

0.450 0.400

Eta-coefficient

0.350 0.300 0.250 0.200 0.150 0.100 0.050 0.000 1970–74 Belgium Ireland

1975–79 Britain Italy

1980–84

1985–89

Denmark Netherlands

1990–93 France Mean

1994–97 Germany

Figure 2.7B Trends in the correlation between religious denomination and socialist/non-socialist party choice. Eta-coefficients. Green parties placed in the socialist party group

in Belgium (−0.14), and there is no significant decline in France or Germany. The placement of the Green parties in one or the other category on the dichotomous left–right party choice variable, then, is crucial for the trend over time in several countries. The large decline in the Netherlands is caused by the Catholics’ voting similarly to members of the Dutch Reformed Church and less differently from the unaffiliated group. According to the PDI-measure, differences in socialist voting decline from 14 to 0 when we compare the former groups, and differences between Catholics and the non-affiliated decline from 42 to 18 percentage points. In the Belgian case, the decline (even when the Greens are considered as socialists) is caused by the increasing support for the socialist parties among the Catholics and a corresponding increase for the non-socialist parties among the unaffiliated group. The pattern is described for the various parties in detail above. Much of the same can explain the decreasing correlation in Denmark. We focused above in particular on the increase in the support for the non-socialist parties among the unaffiliated group, and a corresponding increase in support among Protestants for the left socialists. The small decrease in the correlation in Italy is caused by the tendency for the unaffiliated

80 Social Structure and Party Choice in Western Europe

group increasingly to support the non-socialist parties, while gaining a more stable portion of the Catholics’ vote. Finally, the increasing correlation in Ireland is caused by the tendency of the small unaffiliated group to support the socialist parties, a trend that is described in detailed above. The degree of overlap is somewhat complicated to analyse since the denominational variable is a nominal-level variable and has more than two categories. As for the analysis of the comparative placement of parties above, we rely on contrasting the main denominations with the unaffiliated, and we use the Catholics in Germany and the Netherlands in our main comparison, but also include figures for the (main) Protestant confession in these countries. It is natural to use the figures when the Greens are placed among the socialist parties in the main analysis, since the Greens in all countries have electorates that are most likely to be unaffiliated similar to voters for the socialist parties. We first examine patterns for the whole period and then changes over time.16 When the Green parties are placed in the socialist party group the degree of overlap between the socialist/non-socialist division and the total impact of denomination on party choice is high, 0.78 on average for the eight countries. It is extremely high in France (0.98) and 0.80–89 in Italy, Britain, Belgium and Germany, and nearly on the same level in Ireland (0.77). In two countries, Denmark and the Netherlands, we find an overlap on a considerably lower level (about 0.60). We also find a lower overlap when we compare the (main) Protestants and the unaffiliated in both Germany and the Netherlands (about 0.65). The reasons for the higher degree of crosscut in these countries have been elaborated in the detailed analyses above. Here we shall only repeat the main patterns: for Denmark the crosscut is to a large degree explained by social democratic voters who are more likely to belong to the Danish Lutheran State Church than to be unaffiliated. In the Netherlands both liberal parties, VVD and D66, get stronger support from the unaffiliated segment than from Catholics, and the same applies to a large degree for D66 compared also with members of the Reformed Church. In Germany the higher degree of crosscut found when we compare the Protestants and the unaffiliated is caused by the tendency for SPD to get stronger support from Protestants than from unaffiliated based on the data for the whole period. When the Greens are placed in the non-socialist group, the degree of overlap decreases significantly in all countries with significant green parties. The average degree of overlap decreases from 0.78 to 0.62, and in the countries with the largest green parties the drop in degree of

Religious Denomination 81

overlap is large. The drop is about 0.20 in Belgium, France and Ireland, and about 0.10 in Britain and Italy. The largest drop is found in Germany the degree of overlap when we compare the party choices of Catholics and unaffiliated decreases from 0.82 to 0.42. For the Protestants, the decline is even more dramatic, from 0.64 to about zero (−0.03). This has to do with the strong tendency for Green voters to get the unaffiliated vote at the expense of SPD, something which makes it decisively where the Green party is placed in the socialist/non-socialist division in the respect. As to trends over time in degree of overlap/crosscut it is again natural to use the analysis based on placing the Green parties in the socialist group in the main analysis. When we place the Green parties in the non-socialist group, we find of course a large decline in the degree of overlap due to the fact that the Greens become a significant component of the ‘non-socialist’ parties, and they have an electorate that is predominantly unaffiliated. The average decline in overlap is from 0.76 (in 1970–74) to 0.61 (in the late 1990s) and for several countries, first and foremost Belgium, France and Germany, the decline is very large. When the Greens are placed in the socialist camp, we have controlled for the emergence of the Greens as an important secular force in many countries, and we can analyse the influence of other forces. The average degree of overlap is now fairly stable: the average coefficient for the eight countries measuring the degree of overlap is virtually unchanged. There are, however, several significant changes in both directions that covers this stability. Only in France, Italy and Germany (for comparison of Catholics and unaffiliated) do we find stability, in all countries at a very high level of overlap, higher than 0.80. In Ireland we also find stability but on a somewhat smaller level of overlap. We find a significant increase in overlap in Britain, caused by the Liberal Party, which gets stronger support from the unaffiliated in the 1970s. This trend is reversed in the 1980s and 1990s. This increases the degree of overlap. We find a decrease in the degree of overlap in Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands and also in Germany for the comparison of the Protestants and the unaffiliated. In Belgium there is a moderate decline due to the emergence of the Flemish Bloc which gets most support from the unaffiliated. The pattern in Denmark is somewhat difficult to describe. The Social democrats get a stable and significantly greater support from members of the Lutheran State Church than from the unaffiliated. The denominational cleavage declines considerably due to the changes regarding the main non-socialist parties described above. This implies that the pattern for the social democrats becomes a more significant

82 Social Structure and Party Choice in Western Europe

component compared with the overall correlation, and therefore the degree of crosscutting increases. In the Netherlands there is a small decline in overlap due to the tendency for D66 to get relatively stronger support from the unaffiliated over time. This decreases the degree of overlap. Finally the decline in degree of overlap in Germany when the Protestants and the unaffiliated are compared, is caused by the patterns described in detailed above. Over time voting for SPD changes, from considerably stronger support from the unaffiliated to considerably stronger support from the Protestants. In addition the emergence of the radical rightist Republican Party also contribute to a certain degree of crosscutting since it get stronger support from the unaffiliated. Of the five17 patterns of decrease in overlap, three are modest, namely in Belgium and both decreases in the Netherlands. The decisively largest declines are found in Denmark and Germany among Protestants. In both cases the degree of overlap decreases from about 0.70 to about 0.25 – large decreases. In all these cases the decline of the impact of religious denomination on socialist/non-socialist party choice tends strongly to overestimate the decline of the impact of the overall denominational cleavage which is considerably smaller. The increase in crosscut simply implies that the left–right division of parties taps a smaller portion of the overall impact in these countries.

2.5

Conclusion

The denominational cleavage varies considerably in strength in the eight countries in accordance with previous findings. It is strongest in the Catholic and religiously mixed countries in Continental Europe, and considerably weaker in the predominantly Protestant Britain and Denmark. It is also of modest importance in Ireland. The empirical analysis has shown that there has been a major growth in the unaffiliated portion of the population in six of the eight countries. The growth of the portion that do not consider themselves as members of any of the institutionalised churches opens the leeway for religious denomination to become a more significant cleavage even in religiously homogenous countries. Being a member of a church or not being a member is a conscious choice that reflects deep-seated values that also may have consequences for how people vote. However, the larger unaffiliated segment might also be more heterogeneous with regard to party choice: unaffiliated voters may become an important component of the main non-socialist parties which previously have had predominantly affiliated voters, as the Danish case illustrates.

Religious Denomination 83

However, we only find an increase in the correlation in one country, Ireland. We do not, on the other hand, find large decrease in the correlations in the other countries. There is stability in the correlations in most countries. The most significant decreases are found in Denmark and Italy (and in the Netherlands according to Nagelkerke’s R 2). The denominational cleavage appears to be highly resistant to dealignment. The main polarisation according to the denominational cleavage involves to a large degree voters for parties on the left versus voters for parties on the right. This must, however, be differentiated in the sense that it varies considerably which parties on the left and the right have voters that contribute to the polarisation. If we take the situation in the 1970s as an indication of the traditional polarisation, we have seen the following main patterns in the detailed analysis above: in Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands the main polarisation involves the Christian Democratic parties versus the social democratic parties. In Italy the main polarisation takes place between the Christian democrats and Communist Party, and in France between the major non-socialist parties and the Communists. In Britain and Ireland the polarisation involves the major non-socialist and socialist parties. Finally, in Denmark, we find a similar pattern in the sense that it is the major non-socialist parties that get most of the vote of the affiliated group, but it is the left socialists, not the social democrats, that get most of the vote of the unaffiliated group. There are then voters for different parties that contribute to the polarisation along the denominational cleavage among both the leftist and rightist parties. This partly reflects differences in the party systems in the eight countries. It is for example interesting that in the countries with large parties to the left of the Social Democrats (Denmark, France and Italy), the unaffiliated group votes most frequently for these parties, not for the Social Democrats. In two of these countries, Denmark and Italy, the Social Democrats, as the only Social Democratic parties, get stronger support from the affiliated group, and in France the differences in support for the socialist parties among the various denominational groups increases from a low level only when the Communist Party declines. The parties that contribute to the polarisation along the denominational cleavage changes to some extent due to changes in the party systems. This indicates that party system changes are not neutral in relation to the denominational cleavage, although it is not the denominational cleavage that primarily causes the change. The most important changes takes place among the parties that get strongest support from the unaffiliated group, and I will focus on these changes here.

84 Social Structure and Party Choice in Western Europe

The Green parties make inroad in the secular or unaffiliated section of the population, and change the polarisation caused by religious denomination in the sense that denominational differences becomes smaller for some other parties, first and foremost the Social Democratic and (in the French and Italian case) the Communist parties. There are two versions of this change. The most frequently found is a case of ‘supplementation’: the polarisation caused by the emerging Green parties ‘takes over’ some of the polarisation which previously was coupled to the major Socialist or Communist party, but the polarisation caused by the established left party(ies) is still dominant. This is the case in Belgium, Ireland and France. In Germany we find an even stronger pattern which we can call ‘supplantation’: the Green party takes over the unaffiliated electorate of the established left party (SPD) so that the dominant polarisation is caused be the Greens. In Ireland this type of change is found for the left socialist Workers’ Party which in the 1990s has voters that cause stronger polarisation than the Labour Party on the denominational cleavage. Voters of both the Irish Greens, but first and foremost of the Workers’ Party, contribute to the increase of the denominational cleavage in Ireland. The radical rightist parties contribute to a certain polarisation in the 1980s and the 1990s in Belgium and Germany, by getting stronger support from the unaffiliated group, but not in the other countries with such parties. In the Netherlands we find a pattern that is not very different from the one found in Belgium, Ireland and France. The major polarisation is in the 1970s mainly caused by voters for the Social Democrats, but this polarisation is supplemented with polarisation caused by D66 and Green Left. In the remaining three countries, Britain, Denmark and Italy there is no change in the parties that cause polarisation on the unaffiliated side. The parties that get stronger support from the affiliated group(s) are fairly stable over time. A major change takes place only in one country, Italy, in connection with the collapse of the Christian Democratic Party. The Catholics voters prefer in the 1990s the new and renewed parties Forza Italia and Alleanza Nationale, but it should be underscored that these parties do not gain all the Catholic votes that the Christian Democrats lose, a major explanation of the decline of the denominational cleavage in Italy. In the Danish case, there are no new parties that cause a significant new polarisation along the denominational cleavage, and the decline of the denominational cleavage is to a large extent caused by secular unaffiliated voters who increasingly vote for the major non-socialist parties.

Religious Denomination 85

The degree to which the socialist/non-socialist division of parties taps the total impact of the denominational cleavage is generally high, above 75 per cent in most countries. In Denmark, among all denominations in the Netherlands and among Protestants in Germany, it is considerably lower. In these countries the degree of overlap decreases considerably over time causing the pattern for the strength of the correlations for the left–right divisions of parties to be somewhat misleading for the total impact of religious denomination.

3 Church Religiosity and Church Attendance

3.1 Introduction: church religiosity in a comparative perspective In a pioneering work, Jagodzinski and Dobbelaere (1995a) analyse church religiosity and secularisation in a comparative West European setting. In their theoretical discussion of religiosity, they use church integration as their central variable. They consider people as more integrated into the churches the more frequently they participate in religious rites and services ( Jagodzinski & Dobbelaere 1995a: 86). Admitting that church integration is an indirect measure of more basic religious orientations and beliefs, they go on to examine the relationship between church integration (measured by frequency of church attendance) and more direct measures of church religiosity or religious beliefs. They find very strong correlations between church attendance and more direct measures of church religiosity. On the basis of the European Value Surveys (I and II), they find that correlations vary between 0.41 and 0.73 in different countries (Jagodzinski & Dobbelaere 1995a: 87–91). This is a magnitude seldom found in survey research. Moreover, they analyse changes in frequency of church attendance and in more direct measures of church religiosity, finding that pronounced changes in church integration are paralleled by similar changes in church religiosity or religious beliefs. Frequency of church attendance can then be used also as a measure of more general changes in church religiosity. There is apparently no clear time lag between the two processes (Jagodzinski & Dobbelaere 1995a: 91–6). Jagodzinski and Dobbelaere differentiated between four basic categories of church integration on the basis of the question of frequency of church integration. Here we use a modified three-category version. We distinguish between: 86

Church Religiosity and Church Attendance 87

1. nuclear or core Christians: those who go to church once a week or more frequently; 2. marginal Christians: those who go to church more than once a year but less frequently than the former category; and 3. the disengaged: those who practically never go to church (never or once a year or less). One problem is what to do with those who do not consider themselves to belong to any denomination. In the Eurobarometer data, the question on frequency of church attendance is asked only of those who say they consider themselves as belonging to a religious community. Should we exclude the unaffiliated from our analysis of church religiosity, or should they be grouped together with the disengaged or even placed in a category indicating a lower degree of church religiosity? The latter seems not to be a logical solution, given that the disengaged show the lowest degree of church religiosity, as it is defined here. Jagodzinski and Dobbelaere (1995a: 116) argue for merging these two groups: in most countries it seems to be a matter of attachment and feelings whether respondents assign themselves to a denomination when they have withdrawn from the church. ‘Withdrawal from the church is an internal, rather than external, formal act’.1 The distribution on the church attendance variable will be highly affected by the portion of the respondents who do not consider themselves members of a denomination, if the unaffiliated are excluded. We have seen that the portion varies largely cross-nationally. The analysis of the relationship between party choice and church attendance would be based on a very different portion of the samples in the various countries, from 56 per cent in the Netherlands to 97 per cent in Ireland (according to the data for the whole period), and the portion would change from period to period due to the increase in the unaffiliated group. In line with the reasoning above, we have included those who do not belong to any religious denomination in the disengaged group, that is, those who consider themselves as belonging to a religious community without attending church. In the Eurobarometer data set, it is possible to use this division for the whole period, although the response categories have changed somewhat over time. The question has been asked as follows: Do you go to/attend religious services? Response categories (until EB 30 in 1988) were:

88 Social Structure and Party Choice in Western Europe

1. 2. 3. 4.

several times a week once a week a few times a year never

Response categories (from EB 31 in 1989) are: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

several times a week once a week a few times during the year once a year or less never

The core Christians are those who choose the two first alternatives in both versions; the marginal Christians are those who choose the third alternative in both versions; while the disengaged are those who choose ‘never’ in the first version and the two last alternatives in the second version. The distributions can be studied in detail over time and in a comparative perspective (see Table 3.1). I present figures for all religious denominations altogether, and will come back to within-country differences according to religious denomination after the analyses based on all respondents for each country. As expected, the Irish mass publics stand out as the most faithful churchgoers. In the early 1970s more than 90 per cent belong to the core group, but this drops gradually to around 70 per cent in the 1990s. In Italy and Belgium the core group made up about half of the adult population in the early 1970s. In both countries there is a sharp decline to about 35 per cent in the late 1970s, and in Belgium there is then a more gradual decline to about 15 per cent in the late 1990s. This contrasts sharply with the development in Italy, where there is stability and even a small increase in the core group from the late 1970s. The core group in the Netherlands was at 40 per cent in the early 1970s. This decreases rapidly to less than 30 per cent in the late 1970s, and the pattern then follows that of Belgium at very similar levels. The core group is at 29 per cent and 23 per cent in Germany and France, respectively, in the early 1970s, and in both countries there is a gradual decline, so that only 13 per cent and 7 per cent, respectively, belong to the core group in the late 1990s. In Britain the core group constitutes 16 per cent in the early 1970s and, in contrast to many of the other countries, this percentage is fairly stable over time, declining to 12 per cent in the late 1990s. The Danish core group

Table 3.1

Frequency of church attendance in different time periods, 1970–97

1970–74

1975–79

1980–84

1985–89

1990–93

1994–97

Total 1970–97

48.8 18.1 33.2 4,021 100.0 15.6

34.8 24.5 40.7 7,056 100.0 −5.9

30.0 25.9 44.1 1,954 100.0 −14.0

22.1 28.5 49.4 5,072 100.0 −27.3

18.9 26.6 54.6 10,150 100.0 −35.7

15.3 23.6 61.1 5,167 100.0 −45.8

26.4 24.9 48.7 33,420 100.0 −22.3

Belgium

Core Marginals Diseng. N Sum PDI

1970–74

1975–79

1980–84

1985–89

1990–93

1994–97

1970–97

15.9 37.7 46.4 1,933 100.0 −30.5

15.8 37.7 46.6 7,553 100.0 −30.8

15.8 36.2 48.0 2,245 100.0 −32.2

14.4 25.1 60.5 5,021 100.0 −46.1

12.0 19.2 68.8 10,527 100.0 −56.8

12.2 18.4 69.3 5,357 100.0 −57.1

13.8 26.5 59.7 32,636 100.0 −45.9

−33.5 5.5 28.0

−19.5 −0.9 20.5

−61.5

−40.0

Ch. 1970–74/ 1994–97

Ch. 1975–79/ 1994–97

−3.7 −19.3 22.9

−3.5 −19.3 22.8

−26.6

−26.3

Ch. 1970–74/ 1994–97

Ch. 1975–79/ 1994–97

−1.4 −14.9 16.4

−1.2 −20.8 22.0

Total

Denmark 1970–74

1975–79

1980–84

1985–89

1990–93

1994–97

1970–97

4.8 46.1 49.0 1,199

4.6 52.0 43.4 6,961

4.5 49.7 45.8 1,997

4.0 37.6 58.4 5,042

2.8 30.1 67.2 10,000

3.4 31.2 65.4 5,006

3.7 38.5 57.8 30,205

89

Core Marginals Diseng. N

Ch. 1975–79/ 1994–97

Total

Britain

Core Marginals Diseng. N Sum PDI

Ch. 1970–74/ 1994–97

Denmark Sum PDI

(continued)

100.0 −44.2

90

Table 3.1

100.0 −38.8

100.0 −41.3

100.0 −54.4

100.0 −64.4

100.0 −62.0

1970–74

1975–79

1980–84

1985–89

1990–93

1994–97

1970–97

22.6 36.1 41.3 6,368 100.0 −18.8

15.6 37.1 47.3 8,272 100.0 −31.8

12.8 39.5 47.8 1,997 100.0 −35.0

10.3 30.7 59.0 5,064 100.0 −48.7

7.3 23.2 69.5 10,161 100.0 −62.1

6.5 21.1 72.5 5,046 100.0 −66.0

12.4 30.2 57.4 36,908 100.0 −45.1

1970–74

1975–79

1980–84

1985–89

1990–93

1994–97

1970–97

29.3 39.5 31.2 5,968 100.0 −1.9

22.7 45.0 32.4 7,029 100.0 −9.7

19.4 49.2 31.4 1,969 100.0 −12.0

15.7 41.4 42.8 5,420 100.0 −27.1

15.3 33.5 51.2 10,357 100.0 −36.0

12.7 31.4 55.9 5,226 100.0 −43.2

19.0 38.5 42.6 35,969 100.0 −23.6

Ch. 1970–74/ 1994–97

Ch. 1975–79/ 1994–97

−16.1 −15.0 31.1

−9.1 −16.1 25.2

−47.2

−34.3

Ch. 1970–74/ 1994–97

Ch. 1975–79/ 1994–97

−16.6 −8.1 24.7

−10.0 −13.5 23.5

−41.3

−33.5

Ch. 1970–74/ 1994–97

Ch. 1975–79/ 1994–97

−22.8 7.8

−20.3 6.4

Total

Ireland 1970–74 Core Marginals

−23.2

Total

Germany

Core Marginals Diseng. N Sum PDI

−17.8

Total

France

Core Marginals Diseng. N Sum PDI

100.0 −54.1

91.2 4.9

1975–79 88.8 6.3

1980–84 87.6 7.0

1985–89 81.9 10.2

1990–93 78.0 10.7

1994–97 68.4 12.8

1970–97 80.7 9.5

Diseng. N Sum PDI

3.8 1,199 100.0 87.4

4.9 7,002 100.0 83.9

5.4 1,992 100.0 82.1

7.9 5,021 100.0 74.0

11.3 10,123 100.0 66.7

18.8 5,086 100.0 49.6

1970–74

1975–79

1980–84

1985–89

1990–93

1994–97

1970–97

53.3 29.7 17.0 5,732 100.0 36.3

33.7 40.1 26.2 7,470 100.0 7.6

33.4 43.7 22.9 2,186 100.0 10.6

39.3 39.1 21.6 5,250 100.0 17.7

40.6 35.2 24.2 10,444 100.0 16.5

37.5 35.0 27.5 5,285 100.0 10.0

40.1 36.4 23.5 36,367 100.0 16.7

13.9

−37.8

−34.2

Ch. 1970–74/ 1994–97

Ch. 1975–79/ 1994–97

−15.8 5.3 10.4

3.8 −5.1 1.3

−26.2

2.5

Ch. 1970–74/ 1994–97

Ch. 1975–79/ 1994–97

−27.0 3.4 23.6

−15.2 −6.8 22.0

−50.6

−37.3

Total

Netherlands

Core Marginals Diseng. N Sum PDI

15.0

Total

Italy

Core Marginals Diseng. N Sum PDI

9.8 30,423 100.0 70.8

1970–74

1975–79

1980–84

1985–89

1990–93

1994–97

1970–97

40.7 14.6 44.7 4,542 100.0 −4.0

29.0 24.8 46.3 7,103 100.0 −17.3

27.0 24.6 48.4 1,992 100.0 −21.4

18.4 20.7 60.8 5,028 100.0 −42.4

16.9 18.6 64.5 10,195 100.0 −47.6

13.7 18.0 68.3 5,142 100.0 −54.6

22.9 19.9 57.1 34,002 100.0 −34.2

91

92 Social Structure and Party Choice in Western Europe

is clearly the lowest in a comparative context. It was at only 5 per cent in the 1970s, and declined to 4 per cent in the 1990s. The largest changes in the size of the core group (in terms of percentage differences) from the early 1970s to the late 1990s are found in Belgium and the Netherlands, where the decline is about 30 percentage points, followed by Ireland (23 percentage points) and France, Germany and Italy (16–17 percentage points). The change is much lower in Britain and Denmark, but in these countries there is a ‘floor’ limit that delimits the possibility for change. The major decline may have take place at an earlier time-point in these Protestant countries. ‘The core had almost dissolved by the end of the 1960s’ (Jagodzinski & Dobbelaere 1995a: 104). The size of the disengaged group does not simply mirror that of the core group. As early as the early 1970s, those who did not go to church on even an irregular basis constituted nearly 50 per cent in Denmark, Britain and the Netherlands (46 – 49 per cent), 41 per cent in France and 31–33 per cent in Belgium and Germany. As for the core group, Ireland is outstanding, with only 4–5 per cent belonging to the disengaged group in the 1970s, and Italy is also unique compared with the other countries (apart from Ireland), with a much lower portion (17 per cent). The size of the disengaged group increases in all countries and the increase is gradual, although a sharp change takes place in the early 1980s in several countries. The increase for the whole period is largest in Belgium and France. In these countries the increase is about 30 percentage points, but the increase is of nearly the same magnitude in Britain, Germany and the Netherlands, and somewhat smaller in Denmark. In France, Britain, the Netherlands and Denmark in the late 1990s, the size of the disengaged group is 65–73 per cent, but Belgium and Germany approach the size in these countries (61 per cent and 56 per cent, respectively). The increase in the disengaged group is considerably smaller in Ireland and Italy. In Italy the disengaged group increases to about 25 per cent in the late 1970s, but is then quite constant. In Ireland the significant increase takes place in the 1990s, when the disengaged group increases from 8 per cent to 19 per cent. Figure 3.1 presents the trend on an overall index of church attendance, calculated by the percentage belonging to the core group minus the disengaged group.2 In the whole period, the three countries with the least religious populations in terms of church attendance are Britain, Denmark and France. Of these, the Danish population is the least religious

Church Religiosity and Church Attendance 93

100.0 80.0 60.0

PDI-index

40.0 20.0 0.0

–20.0 –40.0 –60.0 –80.0 1970–74 Belgium Ireland

1975–79 Britain Italy

1980–84

1985–89

Denmark Netherlands

1990–93 France Mean

1994–97 Germany

Figure 3.1 Development of church attendance in eight countries according to the PDI-index

in the 1970s, while the population of France is somewhat more religious than those of Britain and Denmark. These differences become smaller over time. In the next group of countries we find Germany, the Netherlands and Belgium. Church attendance is higher in Belgium than in the two other countries in the 1970s, but a rapid decline during the 1970s (in particular among the core group) brings Belgium to the same level as Germany. The decline is larger in the Netherlands than in Germany, so that the Netherlands has a very similar level of church attendance as the first group of countries in the 1990s. Belgium and Germany follow each other quite closely. Italy is a deviant case in this respect. A rapid decline in the 1970s is followed by a small increase and then a small decline. Overall church attendance is – according to the index – a few percentage points higher in the 1990s than in the late 1970s.3 Finally, there is a clear decline in church religiosity in Ireland, but since the starting-point is so deviant from the level of the other countries, and the change is not particularly large, Ireland remains by far the country with the highest level of church religiosity.

94 Social Structure and Party Choice in Western Europe

As to differences between members of various denominations in church religiosity, we might expect differences between Catholics and Protestants. Church attendance should be expected to be higher among Catholics. Whereas for Catholics church attendance is an almost indispensable manifestation of their beliefs, Protestants usually attribute less importance to attendance at religious services (Jagodzinski & Dobbelaere 1995a: 87). We saw in the analysis of membership of various religious denominations that there was a tiny Protestant minority in France, Belgium and Ireland, and a corresponding Catholic minority in Denmark, while no such information was available in the Italian data. Given the data for the whole period, we do find some differences in these four countries, but they vary cross-nationally. In France there is no difference between Catholics and Protestants with regard to church attendance, while there is some difference in Belgium. On the index discussed above, the Catholics score 8 and the Protestants score -2. The core group is of the same size for both denominations, but a larger portion of the Protestants is disengaged. Larger differences are found in Denmark and Ireland. The index value in both countries is higher for Catholics: -23 and 81, compared with -41 and 50, respectively. The Catholics in Denmark are surprisingly disengaged, and the Protestants in Ireland resemble more the members of the other confessions in their own country than members of the same confession in other countries. Although we find some difference in church attendance between Protestants and Catholics in these countries, country appears to be more important than confession for explaining variations in church religiosity. For the remaining three countries, the frequency of church attendance is shown in Figure 3.2A–C. In Britain there is a huge gap in the level of church attendance between the Catholics and members of the dominant Protestant churches in the 1970s. There is a considerable decline in the level of church attendance among Catholics during the 1980s and then stability. The non-conformists, for whom we have reliable data only to the late 1980s, also show a high level of church attendance, which even increases somewhat. The level of church attendance among Protestants is much lower and is also declining, but to a smaller degree than among Catholics. There are nevertheless also large differences between the two denominations in level of church attendance in the 1990s. In Germany we find differences that are even larger between the two confessions in the 1970s. The core groups of Catholics and Protestants are at 55 per cent and 11 per cent, respectively, in the early 1970s. There is a large decline in church attendance among Catholics from the early

Church Religiosity and Church Attendance 95

50.0 40.0 30.0 PDI-index

20.0 10.0 0.0

–10.0 –20.0 –30.0 –40.0 1970–74

1975–79 Catholics

1980–84

1985–89

Protestants

1990–93

1994–97

Non-conformists

Figure 3.2A Trends in church attendance according to religious denomination in Britain. PDI-index

50.0 40.0 30.0 PDI-ndex

20.0 10.0 0.0 –10.0 –20.0 –30.0 –40.0 –50.0 –60.0 1970–74

1975–79

1980–84 Catholics

1985–89

1990–93

1994–97

Protestants

Figure 3.2B Trends in church attendance according to religious denomination in Germany. PDI-index

96 Social Structure and Party Choice in Western Europe

100.0 80.0 60.0 40.0 20.0 0.0 –20.0 1970–74

1975–79 Catholics

1985–89 Dutch Reformed

1990–93

1994–97

Rereformed

Figure 3.2C Trends in church attendance according to religious denomination in the Netherlands. PDI-index

1970s to the late 1980s, followed by a stable pattern to the late 1990s. Church attendance among Protestants is fairly stable until the late 1980s, followed by a considerable decline. The decline in the core groups is remarkable among the Catholics, 25 per cent in the late 1990s, while it is the portion of disengaged members of the Protestant church that contribute most to the declining index score among Protestants: from 37 per cent to 56 per cent from 1970–74 to 1994–97. The pattern in the Netherlands also shows a steep decline in the number of Catholics who attend church frequently.4 As in Britain and Germany, most of the change takes place before the late 1980s. The change is much smaller, though significant, from the late 1980s to the 1990s. The change among members of the Dutch Reformed Church is much smaller, and from the late 1980s the index scores among the members of the Reformed Church and the Catholics are similar, indeed lower for the Catholics in the late 1990s. The change among Catholics is indeed remarkable in the period examined here. This can be illustrated most dramatically by the portion of Catholics who belong to the core group. It declines from 70 per cent to 18 per cent in that period. The Dutch Reformed Church has a significant larger core group in the 1990s, about 35 per cent. The pattern for the Orthodox Calvinists can be contrasted

Church Religiosity and Church Attendance 97

with the Catholics in particular. The level of church integration is very high, and it is not declining to the same extent as for members of the other denominations. The index score declines somewhat, but remains very high. The core group constitutes 84 per cent in the early 1970s and still 69 per cent in the late 1990s. The disengaged in the same time period increases from 4 per cent to 12 per cent. It appears that we have here a group which has a much more solid and cohesive collective creed than that of the Dutch Reformed and the Catholics in the Netherlands.

3.2

Church religiosity and party choice

Patterns based on the data for the whole period, 1970–97 The pattern of church attendance for all religious confessions is the basis of analysis here. For the countries with a small minority of Catholics or Protestants, an analysis based on the various confessions for the whole period did show fairly similar patterns, and the fact that the small religious minority was included did not at all change the results from analyses in which that minority was excluded. For the three religiously mixed countries (including Britain), the impact of church religiosity within the various denominations will be examined after the main analysis. The different variance in the dependent variable should be kept in mind when we analyse the strength of the correlation between party choice and church religiosity. This applies in particular to the countries at the extremes of the scales, Ireland versus Britain, Denmark and France. The fact that the variance changes largely over time in many countries should also be kept in mind. The three-fold church attendance variable is on the ordinal level of measurement. We have the choice between using Cramer’s V and eta as the statistical coefficient for measuring the strength, assuming that the variable is on a nominal and interval-level of measurement. These two measures show basically the same pattern. This is also the case for Nagelkerke’s R 2 from multinominal logistic regression. Figure 3.3 shows the strength for the whole period measured by the eta-coefficient. The correlation is strongest in the Netherlands (0.55), followed by Belgium and Italy (0.48–0.50). These correlations are indeed at a level one seldom finds in social research. The voting gaps between the core and the disengaged groups are indeed ‘extreme’ in these countries (Dalton 1990: 82). In the next group we find France, Germany, Denmark and Ireland, where the correlations are 0.28–0.35. The skewed distributions on the church attendance variable for the last two countries should be

98 Social Structure and Party Choice in Western Europe 0.6

Eta-coefficient

0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0 Netherlands Belgium

Italy

France

Germany Denmark

Ireland

Britain

Figure 3.3 The strength of the correlation between church attendance and party choice, 1970–97. Eta-coefficients

kept in mind. Finally, the correlation is considerably lower in Britain than in the other countries. The correlation in the former group of countries is about five times higher than in Britain.5 Let us now examine the placement of the various parties and party families on the religious cleavage. Table 3.2 presents the PDI and lorstatistics for the various parties in the party families for the whole period. The statistics are calculated by comparing the differences between the core and the disengaged groups. On the right-hand side of the table, the average scores for the various party families are calculated. I take these scores as my point of departure for commenting on the pattern for the party families, and focus mostly on the lor-scores as mentioned in the introduction. There are indeed only two party families that have clearly positive lor-scores, indicating that they get stronger support from the core group than from the disengaged, namely the Christian and the Conservative parties. Of these party families, the Christian party family has by far the highest lor-score. All three socialist party families, Communists, left socialists and Social Democrats, have much greater support from the disengaged segment, with lor-scores between −1.00 and −2.00. The Greens and the Radical rightist parties also have much stronger support from the disengaged group. Both of these New Politics parties, then, appear to be anchored in the disengaged segments of the population. Looking at the parties within the various party families, we note the high lor-score for all the Christian parties. The score is highest for the

Table 3.2 Overall differences in support for the various political parties according to church attendance in a comparative setting, 1970–97. Parties are grouped into party families A. Lor Belgium Comm. Left Soc. Soc. Dem Green Nationalists Liberal Christian Conservative Radical right Spec. P. I Spec. P. II Other p.

Britain

−1.10 −1.97 −1.37 0.26 −0.66 2.60

−0.45 −0.55 0.16 0.19 0.39

−1.37

−1.26

−0.67

Denmark

France

−1.87 −1.62 −0.81 −0.81

−2.44 −0.63 −1.05 −1.22

0.15 4.30 0.07 −0.85 0.77 −0.18 −0.01

1.43

Germany

−1.23 −1.79 −0.41 1.80

1.18 −0.70 −0.83

−1.45

−0.07

−0.88

Ireland −2.17 −0.79 −1.74 −0.70 0.64 1.07

−0.99

Italy −2.27 −2.62 −0.35 −0.93 −0.43 −0.13 2.67 0.22 −0.04 0.27 −0.77

Netherlands −1.67 −1.77

−1.07 2.68

−1.40 2.27 −0.09

Average −1.92 −1.74 −1.05 −1.20 0.00 −0.15 2.45 0.59 −0.88

−0.59

99

100

Table 3.2

(Continued)

B. PDI Belgium Comm. Left Soc. Soc. Dem Green Nationalists Liberal Christian Conservative

Britain

Denmark

France

−1.3 −14.4 −15.3 −0.5

−11.7 −1.8 −20.5 −7.4 25.1

9.2

0.7 21.6 0.8

−1.4 −1.4

−2.5

−0.2

−2.1

−5.1

−2.3

−13.2 7.7 −0.3

43.6

41.9

35.6

50.2

60.8

−1.3 −30.7 −9.3 2.0 −8.4 52.7

−10.8 −1.1 0.4 2.6

Radical right Spec. P. I Spec. P. II Other P.

−2.3

−2.7

−0.3

−3.8 12.6 −0.4 0.0

Total

53.4

12.1

35.7

Germany

Ireland

−27.9 −7.3

−11.1 −10.6 −6.6

−2.1 41.9

19.3

−2.2 10.3 25.3

Italy −36.2 −2.4 −3.9 −3.6 −0.8 −0.8 49.0 0.5 −0.3 0.7

Netherlands −7.1 −29.0

−11.2 53.0

Average −12.6 −7.3 −18.6 −5.1 0.5 0.5 38.1 11.0 −2.1

−1.6

Note Special parties are for Denmark Agrarian Liberals (I) and Centre Democrats (II), for France MRG (I), for Italy PSDI (I) and for the Netherlands D66 (I) and Calvinist Fundamentalists (II)

Church Religiosity and Church Attendance 101

small Danish party, underscoring the character of the Christian parties in the Protestant countries. The Christian parties in Scandinavia have been far more deviant than their Continental counterparts in their national setting (Karvonen 1994: 137–8), something which is documented empirically here for the Danish case compared with the Continental counterparts. The other deviant pattern is the low score for the Irish Fine Gael, which is indeed lower than for the party that we have classified as Conservative, Fianna Fail. This illustrates that it is still problematic to classify these parties as Christian and Conservative, respectively. The other mainstream Christian Democratic parties have quite similar lor-scores, with CDU/CSU being somewhat lower than the parties in Belgium, Italy and the Netherlands. The stronger average support from the churchgoers for the Conservative parties does not apply equally to all of these parties. It is primarily the French and Irish parties that contribute in this respect, while the difference is low for the other parties. Neither the French nor the Irish parties belong to the mainstream Conservative parties and, for more mainstream Conservative parties, differences are small (in the British case) or even insignificant (in the Danish case). The liberal party family is the most differentiated in this respect, as we perhaps should expect. Behind the average lor-score of −0.16 there are indeed three groups of liberal parties with regard to the religious cleavage. The largest group, comprising four parties, gets clearly stronger support from the disengaged segment. This group comprises the parties in Belgium, Ireland, the Netherlands and, to a smaller degree, Germany. Although the differences are significant, the different levels of support from the core and disengaged groups are nevertheless smaller for these parties than for any of the socialist party families in these countries, although the difference for the Irish party approaches the one for the social democratic party. A second group of Liberal parties gets fairly even support from the religious and the disengaged segments. In this group we find the British, the Danish and the Italian Liberal parties. Finally, only in France does the Liberal party get much stronger support from the core segment than from the disengaged. As discussed in Chapter 1.3, the UDF alliance includes a Christian component. The nationalist parties also differ with regard to support among the religious and disengaged segments. The Italian Lega Nord clearly gets stronger support from the disengaged segment of the population, while the opposite tendency is found in Belgium and Britain, although the differences are small.

102 Social Structure and Party Choice in Western Europe

Four of the five radical rightist parties get clearly stronger support from the religiously uncommitted than from the core group. The exception is the Italian MSI, for which we do not find any difference. All green parties get strongest support from the disengaged group, and the strongest differences in terms of lor-scores are found in some of the countries where the green parties are large: Belgium, France and Germany. The pattern is also very consistent for all the socialist party families, Social Democrats, Left Socialists and Communists. Some variances exist with regard to the size of the difference, however. Differences are much smaller for the Italian and British and (to a lesser extent) the Danish and Irish Social Democratic parties than for the other four parties. All left socialist and Communist parties are heavily religiously disengaged with regard to voter support. The only exception is the small left socialist PSU in France, for which differences are comparatively small. Strength of the correlation over time Figure 3.4 shows how these correlations have changed over time. There is generally a decline in the strength of the correlations, but it is not large, and the decline does not involve all countries. The small general decline can be illustrated by the decline in the mean correlation for the eight countries. It declines from 0.37–0.38 in the 1970s to 0.32 in the 0.700 0.600

Eta-coefficient

0.500 0.400 0.300 0.200 0.100 0.000 1970–74

Belgium Ireland

1975–79

Britain Italy

1980–84

1985–89

Denmark Netherlands

1990–93

France Mean

1994–97

Germany

Figure 3.4 Trends in the strength of the correlation between church attendance and party choice measured by the eta-coefficient

Church Religiosity and Church Attendance 103

late 1990s. The decline is significant if we examine the countries where the impact of church attendance is largest: Belgium, France, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands. For these five countries, the average correlation in the 1970s was 0.55, and it declines gradually to 0.43 in the late 1990s. This is a significant decline: the average decline is nearly 25 per cent of its original strength in the early 1970s. The decline is largest in Italy (−0.17), followed by Germany and France (−0.11) and then Belgium and the Netherlands (−0.08, −0.07). These findings, then, show that there is some average decline in the strength of the impact of church religiosity on the party system, but, on the other hand, there is much persistence in most countries.6 There is no specific period when the decline is particularly large for these countries. In Belgium and the Netherlands, the decline takes place from the late 1970s to the late 1980s, and there is then no further decline, but indeed a small increase in the impact of church attendance in the Netherlands from the late 1980s to the late 1990s. In Italy much change takes place during the 1990s, when the party system changes in a fundamental way. In Germany much decline takes place from the early to the late 1970s, but there is also a decline in the 1990s. The decline in France is gradual from the late 1970s. There is an impressive stability (at a low level) in the impact of church religiosity on party choice in Britain, and a small decline in Denmark. In Ireland there is a large increase, largely from the early to the late 1980s. Detailed analyses of the impact of church attendance and changes over time within the eight countries. Let us now go on to examine more closely how church religiosity polarises the various party systems and how the changes take place over time. The decline of the correlation between party choice and church attendance implies that party voters have moved closer to each other, or that parties that contributed in particular to the polarisation have declined in overall support, contributing to the decrease. When we examine the material, it is evident that the patterns over time are even more complicated. The polarisation may even be caused by different parties at different time-points, and new parties may contribute to an increasing polarisation while the polarisation between the old parties may have declined, establishing a fairly stable net result over time. Our starting-point is the cross-tabulation between frequency of church attendance and party choice for the whole period. These cross-tables are shown in Table 3.3, along with the lor- and PDI-measures. Changes over time are commented on only in the text; no tables or figures are shown for the various parties.

104 Social Structure and Party Choice in Western Europe

Table 3.3

Church religiosity and party choice, 1970–97

Belgium PCB/KPB PS/SP Ecolo/Agalev Volksu./ RW/FDF PRL/PVV PSC/CVP Flemish Bloc Other parties Sum N

Core

Marginals

Diseng.

Sum

0.7 8.2 3.7 9.7 11.2 64.6 0.8 1.1 100.0 5,298

0.7 24.0 9.1 9.0 19.4 34.1 1.6 2.1 100.0 4,401

2.0 38.8 13.0 7.6 19.6 11.9 3.1 3.9 100.0 8,177

1.3 26.1 9.3 8.6 17.1 33.0 2.1 2.6 100.0 17,876

Core

Marginals

Diseng.

Sum

34.5 1.6 2.9 17.7 42.9 0.3 100.0 3,224

34.2 1.3 2.0 16.0 46.2 0.3 100.0 6,477

45.3 2.8 2.5 15.1 33.7 0.7 100.0 13,153

40.6 2.2 2.4 15.7 38.6 0.5 100.0 22,854

Core

Marginals

Diseng.

Sum

PDI

Lor

−1.3 −1.10 −30.7 −1.97 −9.3 −1.37 2.0 0.26 −8.4 −0.66 52.7 2.60 −2.3 −1.37 −2.7 −1.26 Sum

|PDI| 1.3 30.7 9.3 2.0 8.4 52.7 2.3 2.7 53.4

CV = 0.358 Eta = 0.503 Britain Labour Party Green Party Nationalists Liberal Party Cons. Party Other parties Sum N

PDI

Lor

−10.8 −0.45 −1.1 −0.55 0.4 0.16 2.6 0.19 9.2 0.39 −0.3 −0.67 Sum

|PDI| 10.8 1.1 0.4 2.6 9.2 0.3 12.1

CV = 0.099 Eta = 0.119 Denmark DKP Left soc. Soc. Dem. Greens Rad. Lib. Chr. Peopl. Party Cons. Peopl. Party Progress Party Agrar. Lib. Centr. Dem. Other parties

PDI

Lor

|PDI|

0.2 4.4 18.3 0.4 5.5 22.0 13.3

0.4 6.7 33.2 0.4 5.0 1.6 15.1

1.6 18.8 33.6 0.8 4.8 0.4 12.5

1.1 13.3 32.8 0.6 4.9 1.7 13.6

−1.3 −14.4 −15.3 −0.5 0.7 21.6 0.8

−1.87 −1.62 −0.81 −0.81 0.15 4.30 0.07

1.3 14.4 15.3 0.5 0.7 21.6 0.8

3.0 27.6 2.2 3.2

7.5 24.5 3.1 2.5

6.8 15.0 2.6 3.2

6.9 19.3 2.8 2.9

−3.8 12.6 −0.4 0.0

−0.85 0.77 −0.18 −0.01

3.8 12.6 0.4 0.0

Church Religiosity and Church Attendance 105 Sum N

100.0 820

100.0 8,261

100.0 11,558

100.0 20,639

Sum

35.7

CV = 0.274 Eta = 0.293

France PCF PSU PSF Ecologists UDF RPR Front National MRG Other parties Sum N

Core

Marginals

Diseng.

Sum

1.3 2.1 17.9 3.5 37.9 31.8 1.5 1.1 3.0 100.0 3,330

5.0 1.6 33.4 5.8 23.9 23.2 2.0 1.9 3.2 100.0 7,488

13.0 3.9 38.4 10.9 12.8 12.5 2.9 2.5 3.2 100.0 12,789

8.8 2.9 33.9 8.2 19.8 18.6 2.4 2.1 3.2 100.0 23,607

Core

Marginals

Diseng.

Sum

24.2 1.6 4.5 67.4 0.8 1.5 100.0 4,948

45.4 4.0 7.4 40.1 1.2 1.8 100.0 9,771

52.1 8.9 6.6 25.5 3.3 3.6 100.0 9,594

43.7 5.5 6.5 39.9 1.9 2.4 100.0 24,313

Core

Marginals

Diseng.

Sum

PDI

Lor

−11.7 −2.44 −1.8 −0.63 −20.5 −1.05 −7.4 −1.22 25.1 1.43 19.3 1.18 −1.4 −0.70 −1.4 −0.83 −0.2 −0.07 Sum

|PDI| 11.7 1.8 20.5 7.4 25.1 19.3 1.4 1.4 0.2 43.6

CV = 0.248 Eta = 0.344

Germany SPD Greens FDP CDU/CSU Republic. Party Other parties Sum N

PDI

Lor

−27.9 −1.23 −7.3 −1.79 −2.1 −0.41 41.9 1.80 −2.5 −1.45 −2.1 −0.88 Sum

|PDI| 27.9 7.3 2.1 41.9 2.5 2.1 41.9

CV = 0.235 Eta = 0.319 Ireland Workers’ Party Labour Green Prog. Dem. Fine Gael Fianna Fail

1.6 11.2 1.5 2.3 25.7 54.4

5.8 21.1 4.1 4.5 21.0 37.8

12.7 21.8 8.1 4.5 15.4 29.1

2.9 12.9 2.3 2.6 24.5 51.0

PDI

Lor

|PDI|

−11.1 −10.6 −6.6 −2.2 10.3 25.3

−2.17 −0.79 −1.74 −0.70 0.64 1.07

11.1 10.6 6.6 2.2 10.3 25.3

106 Social Structure and Party Choice in Western Europe Table 3.3

(Continued)

Ireland Other parties Sum N

Core

Marginals

Diseng.

Sum

3.3 100.0 15,521

5.8 100.0 1,667

8.4 100.0 1,413

3.9 100.0 18,601

PDI

Lor

−5.1 −0.99 Sum

|PDI| 5.1 35.6

CV = 0.203 Eta = 0.284

Italy

PCI/PDS/PCR Proletar. Dem. PSI Rad.P./Verdi Lega Nord PRI/PLI Chr. Dem. Forza Italia MSI PDSI Other parties Sum N

Core

Marginals

Diseng.

Sum

PDI

Lor

|PDI|

7.4 0.2 11.1 2.5 1.6 5.9 57.6 2.6 6.0 3.0 2.1 100.0 7,912

22.1 0.6 19.4 3.7 2.4 6.5 27.5 3.0 8.0 4.2 2.6 100.0 6,944

43.6 2.5 15.0 6.1 2.5 6.7 8.6 2.1 6.3 2.3 4.3 100.0 4,724

21.3 0.9 15.0 3.8 2.1 6.3 35.1 2.6 6.8 3.3 2.8 100.0 19,580

−36.2 −2.4 −3.9 −3.6 −0.8 −0.8 49.0 0.5 −0.3 0.7 −2.3 Sum

−2.27 −2.62 −0.35 −0.93 −0.43 −0.13 2.67 0.22 −0.04 0.27 −0.77

36.2 2.4 3.9 3.6 0.8 0.8 49.0 0.5 0.3 0.7 2.3 50.2

CV = 0.344 Eta = 0.471 Netherlands Green Left PVDA VVD CDA D66 Calv. Fund. Other parties Sum N CV = 0.397 Eta = 0.549

Core

Marginals

Diseng.

Sum

PDI

Lor

|PDI|

1.8 9.7 7.2 63.8 5.3 8.7 3.6 100.0 6,277

3.9 25.5 17.5 36.5 13.7 0.5 2.3 100.0 5,023

8.9 38.7 18.4 10.8 18.4 1.0 3.9 100.0 13,537

6.1 28.7 15.4 29.4 14.1 2.8 3.5 100.0 24,837

−7.1 −29.0 −11.2 53.0 −13.2 7.7 −0.3 Sum

−1.67 −1.77 −1.07 2.68 −1.40 2.27 −0.09

7.1 29.0 11.2 53.0 13.2 7.7 0.3 60.8

Church Religiosity and Church Attendance 107

Let us study some of these details, starting with the five countries where the decline of the impact of church attendance was significant. I comment first on the pattern for the whole period, then on the development over time. Let us start with the three countries where we observed the largest decline in the correlation between party choice and church attendance: Italy, France and Germany. In Italy the parties with the highest negative lor-scores, indicating strongest support from the disengaged segment of the population, are the Communist and the left socialist parties, followed by the Green parties. Lega Nord appears also to be a secular party at the voter level. Democrazia Cristiana appears to get very different support from the core versus the disengaged segment of the Italian population. The only other parties that get stronger support from the core segment are Forza Italia and the tiny PSDI. The main polarisation takes place between the Communists and DC, as the PDI measure shows. The decline in the strength of the correlation takes place in two periods, from the late 1970s to the early 1980s and then from 1990–93 to 1994–97 (see Figure 3.4). The first decline is associated with the decline in support for the Communist Party, which decreases its support among the disengaged group from 53 per cent in the late 1970s to 36 per cent in the early 1980s. Although some of this loss is absorbed by the left socialist Proletarian Democrats and the Greens, the Christian Democrats also increase their support among the disengaged segment, and consequently the strength of the religious cleavage declines somewhat. In the latter period there is a sharp decline. This change is associated with the crises and changes in the party system, as well as the overall decline of the main larger parties, DC and Communists, and the splinter parties that succeeded them. Forza Italia, however, gets considerably stronger support from the core than from the disengaged segment of the Italian electorate, counterbalancing the strong decline associated with the Christian parties. In sum, the strength of the religious cleavage – and also the decline – in the Italian case is mainly associated with the main rivals, the Communists and Christian Democrats. In the 1990s these parties dissolve or are divided into several parties, which together get smaller support than their forerunners. The magnitude of the religious party cleavage is only to some extent absorbed by other parties, and declines significantly. The large decline takes place even though, as we have seen from the changes in the distribution on the church attendance variable, the secularisation process is slower in Italy than in other countries with a large core segment in the 1970s.

108 Social Structure and Party Choice in Western Europe

France does not have a large Christian party, although one of the components of UDF defines itself as Christian, and the Christian voters have traditionally voted for the parties on the right, while the secular voters have voted for the parties on the left. This can clearly be seen from the figures based on the whole period under study (see Table 3.3). The PDI-scores are largest for the main socialist (PCF, PSF) and non-socialist (UDF and RPR) parties. The same pattern appears when we examine the lor-scores, although the Green parties have lor-scores on the same level or even higher than RPR and PSF. The declining correlation with party choice is gradual from the late 1970s (see Figure 3.4). Among the disengaged segment, the declining support for the Communist party is a main explanation for the declining impact of the religious cleavage. In the 1970s about 20 per cent of the disengaged segment of the French population supported the Communists. This drops gradually to less than 10 per cent in the late 1980s and the 1990s. Some of the reduced support for the Communist party is absorbed by the Greens and by the MRG in the 1990s, but this is less than the declining support for the Communists. Front National gets fairly similar support from the core and the disengaged segment of the French population according to these data and does not contribute significantly to increase or counterbalance the decline of the religious cleavage.7 The support for the various levels of church religiosity is very stable for the Socialist Party in France. Although support is stronger among Catholics than among the unaffiliated, it is the passive members of the Catholics church that are most likely to support the socialists. As to the changes among the core segment, we find that there is a main change related to support for the UDF-alliance. In the late 1970s UDF was a large party, 8 and gained considerably stronger support from the core segment than from the disengaged segment: 50 per cent versus 15 per cent. We find that the decline of the alliance is nearly exclusively taking place among the core segment, gradually from 50 per cent to about 20 per cent in the late 1990s. In the same period the decline is only from 15 per cent to 13 per cent among the disengaged segment! Indeed, this decline in the impact of church attendance on the UDF-vote is then larger than the decline for the whole party system, and is counterbalanced by a somewhat larger difference for RPR, particularly in the late 1990s. In sum, the decline of the impact of church religiosity it is primarily caused by the decline of the Communist Party, which draws most of its support from the disengaged segment of the population, and the decline of the UDF-alliance, which is mainly supported by the core segment. These trends are to some extent counterbalanced by other parties gaining

Church Religiosity and Church Attendance 109

support from the various segments on the church attendance variable, but these trends are not strong enough to hinder an overall decline. In Germany we find a relatively clear decline in the impact of church attendance on party choice. According to the data based on the whole period (see Table 3.3), CDU/CSU is the only party that gets stronger support from the core segment, while the disengaged segment supports SPD and the Greens. The lor-score for the Greens is on the same level as for CDU/CSU, and clearly higher than for SPD. The Republican Party also gets most of its vote from the disengaged segment, while differences are much smaller for FDP. The main polarisation takes place, however, between SPD and CDU/CSU. There is some decline in the correlation from the early 1970s to the late 1970s, and then stability to the 1990s (see Figure 3.4). The decline during the 1970s is caused by decreasing polarisation between SPD and CDU/CSU. The decline of the SPD vote is stronger among the disengaged than among the core group, while the increase in the CDU/CSU vote is correspondingly stronger among the disengaged than among the core. The result is a decline in the overall correlation. The rise of the Green Party takes place mainly among the disengaged segment of the electorate, and during the 1980s support for the Grees increases within that segment at the expense of SPD. The SPD decline mirrors the increase of the Greens, and the overall strength of the religious cleavage is stable and even increases somewhat compared with the late 1970s. The main change in this period takes place between the Greens and SPD within the disengaged segment, while support for CDU/CSU is stable among the three levels of church religiosity. During the 1990s a major change takes place. While the anchoring of Green voters is stable also in this period, this is not the case for SPD and CDU/CSU. The voting pattern among the core segment is fairly stable from the late 1980s to the 1990s, but the voting pattern among the disengaged segment changes. SPD loses support, about 6–8 percentage points, while CDU/CSU increases correspondingly. This declining polarisation is not compensated for by other parties. The result is a considerable decline in the impact of church religiosity on the vote. In sum, in both relevant periods the declining correlation is caused by smaller polarisation between the core and the disengaged with regard to support for the main parties, SPD and CDU/CSU. In Belgium and the Netherlands the decline was smaller than in the other three countries within this group. Table 3.3 based on the data for the whole period shows that in Belgium the Christian Democrats have by far the highest lor- and PDI-scores.

110 Social Structure and Party Choice in Western Europe

Only the nationalist parties get stronger support from the core segment in addition to the Christian Democrats, and that difference is small. The Socialists, Communists, Greens, Liberals and radical rightist Flemish Bloc all get stronger support from the disengaged segment. The lor-scores are largest for the Socialist parties, followed by the Greens and radical rightist parties, and it is the Socialist parties that contribute most to the polarisation among the parties receiving strongest support from the disengaged segment. In Belgium the changing character of the religious cleavage is much more pronounced than the relatively small overall decline indicates. The pattern on the core side is fairly stable. The difference in support for the Christian Social parties is very stable over time across the core and disengaged segment. On the disengaged side, the two parties representing the old party families, the Communists and Socialists, contribute much less to the polarisation in the 1990s than in the 1970s. The Communist Party loses overall support and is not significant at the voter level in the 1990s, in some contrast to the 1970s and early 1980s, when it gained some support from the disengaged segment. The Socialist Party gains extremely different support from the disengaged and the core segment in the 1970s and early 1980s: nearly 50 per cent of the vote of the disengaged compared with less than 10 per cent of the vote of the core groups. The main polarisation clearly involves the Christian versus the Socialist Party. However, the appearance of the Green party changes this pattern to some extent. The Green Party draws support mainly from the disengaged part of the electorate. The Socialist Party loses support among the disengaged segment, while the support among the core segment is fairly constant. The result is a clear decline in different support for the Socialist Party according to church attendance. In fact, the decline of the Socialist Party and the support for the Greens among the disengaged segments are nearly of equal size. However, the two parties’ combined support among the core group increases somewhat, indicating that their overall support among the various segments contributes to a small decline in the religious cleavage. Another party, however, contributes to diminish this decline somewhat, namely the radical rightist Flemish Bloc, which in the 1990s gets considerable support from the disengaged group, but not from the core. To sum up, there is only a small decline in the religious cleavage in the Belgian case. There is fairly stable support for the Christian parties from the various core groups, while there are several changes with regard to how the increased disengaged portion of the population is voting. The old secular party families, in particular the socialist parties,

Church Religiosity and Church Attendance 111

are losing support among the disengaged part of the electorate at the expense of the New Politics parties, Greens and radical rightists. The religious cleavage in the Netherlands remains the most significant in a comparative setting throughout the whole period, and there is only a small decline when church attendance is examined for all denominations combined. The eta-coefficient shows a significant decline to the late 1980s and then an increase (see Figure 3.4). According to the PDI- and lor-measures for the analysis of the whole period (see Table 3.3), two parties (or, more correctly, groups of parties) gain overwhelming support from the core segment, CDA and the Calvinist Fundamentalists, while the other four parties gain significantly more votes from the disengaged segment. The lor-scores are large for all parties, but of the secular parties they are largest for the two socialist parties, Labour and Green Left. According to the PDI-measure, the main polarisation takes place between Labour and CDA, but the other secular parties also contribute significantly. The relatively stable pattern in the strength of the correlation over time masks, however, clear changes in the character of the religious cleavage in the Netherlands. According to the lor-scores, the differences between the disengaged and the core segment of the population decline with regard to support for the Labour Party, and also for the Green Left, while they increase for the secular non-socialist parties, VVD and in particular D66. Among the core segment, differences in support for CDA decreases significantly, while increasing among the Calvinist Fundamentalists. The religious cleavage increasingly involves the secular versus the religious non-socialist parties. The socialist parties, and the Labour Party in particular, are losing support among the disengaged segment, while support is more stable at a low level among the core segment. In the 1970s PvdA gained support from about 50 per cent of the disengaged voters, but this decreases to around 40 per cent in the 1980s and about 30 per cent in the 1990s. Support from the core segment is fairly stable at around 10 per cent. The two secular non-socialist parties, VVD and D66, increase their support among the disengaged correspondingly, from a total of about 30 per cent in the 1970s to nearly 50 per cent in the 1990s. The increase is particularly large for D66. Something similar is taking place among the two religious parties: in the 1970s CDA gained nearly 70 per cent of the vote from the core segment. This declines gradually to about 60 per cent in the late 1980s and 53 per cent in the late 1990s. Support among the disengaged segment increases somewhat, from 6 per cent in the early 1970s to 14 per cent in the early 1990s, but declines to 7 per cent in the

112 Social Structure and Party Choice in Western Europe

late 1990s. On the other hand, the Calvinist Fundamentalists get stronger support from the core segment over time, from 7 per cent in the late 1970s to 15–20 per cent in the 1990s, while support among the disengaged segment remains at 2 per cent or even less. The core segment, then, votes increasingly for the Calvinist Fundamentalists and less for the mainstream Christian Democratic party, CDA. In sum, there is little change in the strength of the correlation between party choice and church religiosity, but important changes are taking place within the secular and religious blocs. Let us now examine the three remaining countries, where the impact of the religious cleavage has been small or has involved a smaller segment of the population than in the countries discussed above. In the British case there is a small, but stable, correlation between church attendance and party choice (see Figure 3.4). According to the results for the whole period (see Table 3.3), the small percentage difference is first and foremost caused by the Labour and Conservative Parties. An interesting finding is that support for the Conservative Party is strongest among the marginal group, not the core. The Liberal Party, which traditionally has been supported by non-conformists, also gets somewhat stronger support from churchgoers than from the disengaged segment. There is no significant difference for the Nationalist parties. Despite the fact that the overall correlation is fairly stable over time, a significant change takes place among the voters, according to the data. The different support from voters at different levels of church religiosity declines for the Conservative Party, while the differences for the Liberal Party increase. In the 1970s the Conservatives got stronger support (11–13 percentage points) from the core than from the disengaged; in the 1980s this declined to 6–7 and in the 1990s to about 5 percentage points. The corresponding figures for the Liberal Party are on average for the three decades 0, 4 and 6 percentage points. Support for the Labour Party is, on the other hand, stronger among the disengaged segment at a stable level compared with the core segment. In Denmark we have already noticed that that core group is very small for the whole period. It is, in fact, so small for some of the time periods that we should be careful to make inferences. Perhaps we should look more into the irregular churchgoers in the Danish case and compare them with the disengaged segment. The core groups comprise fewer than 100 respondents in the early 1970s, early 1980s and in 1994–97, even in this large data material. The material for the whole period is, however, a good starting-point (see Table 3.3).

Church Religiosity and Church Attendance 113

The left socialists and the Social Democrats gain significantly stronger support from the disengaged population than from the core segment, while it is particularly the Christian People’s Party and the Agrarian Liberals who gain strongest support from the core segment. The lor-score for the Christian People’s Party is remarkably high, as we indicated above. The lor-scores indicate a significant tendency for the radical rightist Progress Party to obtain stronger support from the disengaged segment. In the Danish case as in others, the voting pattern for the marginal group shows basically that it is a medium category between the extremes. No parties get significantly larger support from these groups than from the extremes, although the Conservative Party is a possible exception. The differences are, however, small. On the other hand, there is not a monotonic decline or increase from the disengaged to the core group for all parties. A major difference between the Social Democrats and the left socialists is, for example, that the Social Democrats gain nearly the same level of support from the marginal and the disengaged group, while the left socialists gain much higher support from the disengaged group than from the core and the marginal segment, between which there are only small differences. The Christian People’s Party resembles the left socialists in that support of the marginals are at the same low level as one of the extremes, but in this case it is at the same low level as the disengaged group. Support from the core is large. The development over time is interesting, particularly with regard to the voting behaviour of the small core segment. The Christian People’s Party in Denmark was formed in 1970 and was initially quite marginal, but became more significant later in the 1970s. For some reason the party did not get support from any of the respondents in the survey from 1973, on which the data material for Denmark for the first time period is based. The party made its inroads in the late 1970s, according to the survey. In the early 1970s other non-socialist parties gained a large portion of the core segment’s vote, in particular the Agrarian Liberal and the Radical Liberal Parties. The Christian People’s Party got 20–30 per cent of the vote of the regular churchgoers from the late 1970s on according to the data, and the tendency for the Radical Liberal Party to get stronger support from the core segment disappeared immediately. The tendency for the Agrarian Liberals to get stronger support from the core segment is more permanent, but drops in the 1990s in an interesting way: support from the core segment remains constant (26–30%), while support among the disengaged segment increases dramatically, from 8 per cent in the 1980s to 25 per cent in the late 1990s. The Agrarian Liberals have become the leading rightist party in

114 Social Structure and Party Choice in Western Europe

Denmark, now combining support from urban secular forces with their traditional agrarian-based supporters, who are religious. The strength of the religious cleavage in Denmark increases during the 1970s due to the impact of the new Christian People’s Party, which gains support from a segment of the churchgoers that apparently had no previous ‘political home’. The decrease from the late 1970s is due to the development among voters for the Agrarian Liberals commented on above, as well as a corresponding change among the left socialists (including the Communists, which were incorporated into the left socialist group in the late 1980s). These parties gain some support among the core groups, while support among the disengaged segment remains at a high level. Finally, the development in Ireland deserves some attention because the impact of the religious cleavage increases (see Figure 3.4). According to the table for the whole period (see Table 3.3), the two old and dominant parties in Irish politics, Fine Gael and Fianna Fail, both get strongest support from the large core segment of the Irish population. It is Fianna Fail, not Fine Gael, that clearly has the most disproportionate support from the core segment versus the disengaged and the marginal Christians. All the other parties get stronger support from the small disengaged segment, in particular the Workers’ Party and the Greens, but the differences are also significant for Labour and the Progressive Democrats. In order to understand the increase of the religious cleavage in Ireland, it is necessary to underscore that the Irish party system was to a large extent a three-party system in the 1970s, comprising not only Fine Gael and Fianna Fail but also the Labour Party. The ‘Other parties’ category in the early 1970s comprised an electoral alliance between Fine Gael and Labour, which makes it somewhat difficult to use 1970–74 as a starting-point for the analysis. In any case, the religious cleavage is stable at a fairly low level until the late 1980s, and the basis for the stable cleavage is a clear polarisation between Fianna Fail and the Labour Party. Voters for Fine Gael appear to have no stable anchoring in the religious cleavage. The party gets stronger support from the core segment in the late 1970s, and a small opposite tendency is found in the early 1980s. From the late 1980s the Irish party system changes in a profound way. Several new parties gain significant support, and all these are appealing to the increasing disengaged segment of the population. The left socialist Workers’ Party, and the new parties, the Greens and the Progressive Democrats, gain a combined 11.4 per cent of the support

Church Religiosity and Church Attendance 115

of the electorate according to the data, and the support is heavily skewed towards the disengaged segment of the population: for all three time-points from the late 1980s, their combined support is about 10 per cent from the core segment, 20 per cent from the marginal segment and nearly 35 per cent from the disengaged group. Although the polarisation along the religious cleavage associated with the Labour Party declines somewhat when these parties make their entrance primarily among the disengaged segment of the population, this decrease does not counterbalance the increase caused by the three new secular parties. Among the parties that generally gain strongest support among the core segment, Fine Gael gets firmer and more stable anchorage along the religious cleavage by getting consistently stronger support from the core than from the disengaged segment, a difference that increases significantly from the late 1980s. Fine Gael has even more different support from these segments than Fianna Fail in the late 1990s. In sum, the Irish party system underwent some important changes, with new secular parties on the left and right sides of the political spectrum being established or gaining increasing support, something which increased the impact of the religious cleavage. According to the percentage difference measure, nearly all of the increase can be attributed to voters for the Workers’ Party and the Green Party. Secularisation and changes in the party system increased the impact of church religiosity on party choice in a way that is opposite to the main trend found in other countries.

3.3 Party choice and church attendance within the different religious denominations in religiously mixed countries Table 3.4A–C shows the relationship between party choice and church attendance among the various denominations in Britain, Germany and the Netherlands for the whole period. I comment on these tables first and then go on to discuss changes over time, which are shown only by the correlation coefficients in the latter part of the table. The Conservative Party gets stronger support from the Established Protestant Churches in Britain (Table 3.4A), the Church of England and the Church of Scotland, and support is indeed stronger among the core within the Protestant Churches. The same applies to a smaller extent for the Liberal Party. The Labour Party’s stronghold within the established churches is clearly within the disengaged strata. The correlation is clearly higher than for the other denominations in Britain.

116 Social Structure and Party Choice in Western Europe Table 3.4 Church attendance and party choice according to religious denomination in religiously mixed countries, 1970–97 A. Britain Catholics Core Labour Party Green Party Nationalists Liberal Party Cons. Party Other parties Sum N

51.4 1.4 3.1 12.7 30.8 0.7 100.0 1,047

Marginal

Diseng.

Total

PDI

Lor

|PDI|

52.7 1.8 1.6 13.4 30.1 0.3 100.0 677

55.9 2.5 1.4 13.4 26.2 0.6 100.0 485

52.8 1.8 2.3 13.1 29.6 0.5 100.0 2,209

−4.5 −1.0 1.6 −0.7 4.6 0.1

−0.18 −0.56 0.77 −0.06 0.22 0.08

4.5 1.0 1.6 0.7 4.6 0.1

Sum

6.2

Cramer’s V = 0.054 Eta = 0.068 Protestants Labour Party Green Party Nationalists Liberal Party Cons. Party Other parties Sum N

Core

Marginal

Diseng.

Total

PDI

Lor

|PDI|

24.5 1.9 3.4 19.4 50.5 0.2 100.0 1,540

32.2 1.3 2.3 15.4 48.5 0.3 100.0 4,904

45.2 1.4 2.1 14.0 37.0 0.3 100.0 4,335

36.4 1.4 2.4 15.4 44.1 0.3 100.0 10,779

−20.7 0.5 1.3 5.5 13.5 −0.2

−0.93 0.31 0.50 0.40 0.55 −0.58

20.7 0.5 1.3 5.5 13.5 0.2

Diseng.

Total

PDI

Lor

|PDI|

−10.5 −0.3 1.3 1.8 8.5 −0.8

−0.46 −0.69 1.27 0.11 0.35 −1.39

10.5 0.3 1.3 1.8 8.5 0.8

Sum

11.6

Sum

20.8

Cramer’s V = 0.117 Eta = 0.159 Non-conformists (1970–89) Core Marginal Labour Party Green Party Nationalists Liberal Party Cons. Party Other parties Sum N Cramer’s V = 0.084 Eta = 0.092

31.0 0.3 1.9 21.8 44.8 0.3

31.6 0.5 1.2 18.2 48.1 0.5

41.6 0.5 0.5 20.0 36.3 1.1

33.3 0.4 1.3 19.9 44.5 0.5

377

412

190

979

Church Religiosity and Church Attendance 117

Correlations over time (eta) Catholics Protestants Non-conf.

1970–74

1975–79

1980–84

1985–89

1990–93

1994–97

0.047 0.169 0.159

0.100 0.154 0.118

0.048 0.148 0.017

0.162 0.171 0.101

0.096 0.189

0.142 0.145

B. Germany Catholics SPD Green FDP CDU/CSU Republic. Party Other parties Sum N Cramer’s V = 0.252 Eta = 0.349

|PDI|

Core

Marginal

Diseng.

Total

PDI

Lor

20.8 0.9 3.4 72.6 0.9 1.4 100.0 3,818

40.1 4.3 6.1 46.5 1.5 1.6 100.0 3,920

50.6 7.6 5.7 28.9 3.7 3.5 100.0 2,212

35.0 3.8 5.0 52.6 1.7 1.9 100.0 9,950

−29.8 −6.7 −2.3 43.7 −2.8 −2.1

−1.36 −2.16 −0.53 1.87 −1.47 −0.96

Marginal Diseng.

Total

PDI

Lor

|PDI|

50.1 4.8 7.6 33.7 1.7 2.0 100.0 11,485

−20.0 −2.2 1.3 23.7 −2.2 −0.5

−0.82 −0.46 0.20 1.02 −1.60 −0.29

20.0 2.2 1.3 23.7 2.2 0.5

Sum

25.0

Sum

29.8 6.7 2.3 43.7 2.8 2.1 43.7

Protestants Core SPD Green FDP CDU/CSU Republic. Party Other parties Sum N Cramer’s V = 0.119 Eta = 0.161

35.1 4.1 7.9 50.8 0.6 1.6 100.0 1,061

48.9 3.8 8.4 35.9 1.1 1.9 100.0 5,786

55.1 6.3 6.6 27.1 2.7 2.1 100.0 4,638

Correlations over time (eta)

Catholics Protestants

1970–74

1975–79

1980–84

1985–89

1990–93

1994–97

0.378 0.196

0.314 0.108

0.324 0.160

0.331 0.216

0.328 0.133

0.263 0.119

C. Netherlands Catholics Green Left PVDA

Core

Marginal

Diseng.

Total

PDI

Lor

|PDI|

1.5 10.4

3.6 24.5

5.5 31.4

3.2 20.4

−4.0 −21.0

−1.34 −1.37

4.0 21.0

118 Social Structure and Party Choice in Western Europe

Table 3.4

(Continued)

C. Netherlands Catholics VVD CDA D66 Calv. Fund. Other parties Sum N

PDI

Lor

|PDI|

Core

Marginal

Diseng.

Total

8.0 70.1 6.6 0.0 3.4 100.0 2,211

13.9 40.6 14.7 0.2 2.5 100.0 2,454

16.1 27.7 14.6 0.1 4.7 100.0 1,094

12.0 49.5 11.6 0.1 3.3 100.0 5,759

−8.1 −0.80 42.5 1.81 −8.0 −0.88 0.0 −0.70 −1.3 −0.33 Sum

8.1 42.5 8.0 0.0 1.3 42.5

Core

Marginal

Diseng.

Total

PDI

|PDI|

1.7 12.2 10.3 54.8 6.0 10.5 4.5 100.0 1,238

2.7 26.6 21.8 31.0 14.2 1.0 2.8 100.0 1,052

3.2 38.3 22.8 18.2 13.6 0.5 3.4 100.0 1,046

2.5 24.9 17.8 35.8 10.9 4.4 3.6 100.0 3,336

Cramer’s V = 0.248 Eta = 0.336 + A152 Dutch reformed Green Left PVDA VVD CDA D66 Calv. Fund. Other parties Sum N

Lor

−1.5 −0.64 −26.1 −1.50 −12.6 −0.95 36.7 1.70 −7.6 −0.90 10.0 3.20 1.1 0.28 Sum

1.5 26.1 12.6 36.7 7.6 10.0 1.1 47.8

Cramer’s V = 0.316 Eta = 0.425 Gereformeered Green Left PVDA VVD CDA D66 Calv. Fund. Other parties Sum N Cramer’s V = 0.296 Eta = 0.370

Core

Marginal

Diseng.

Total

PDI

Lor

2.6 3.5 3.0 62.2 3.1 21.4 4.1 100.0 1,353

4.4 13.9 16.8 45.3 15.0 2.6 2.2 100.0 274

6.2 16.0 10.5 37.7 15.4 9.3 4.9 100.0 162

3.2 6.3 5.8 57.4 6.0 17.4 3.9 100.0 1,789

−3.6 −0.91 −12.5 −1.65 −7.5 −1.32 24.6 1.00 −12.3 −1.74 12.2 0.98 −0.9 −0.20 Sum

|PDI| 3.6 12.5 7.5 24.6 12.3 12.2 0.9 36.8

Church Religiosity and Church Attendance 119

Correlations over time (eta)

Catholics Dutch Ref. Geref.

1970–74

1975–79

1985–89

1990–93

1994–97

0.363 0.429 0.496

0.380 0.483 0.494

0.272 0.423 0.324

0.296 0.445 0.391

0.393 0.499 0.427

The correlation is fairly stable over time, but there is a basic change taking place among the parties getting strongest support among the Protestant core. The Liberal Party gains votes while the Conservatives lose votes among this group. In the 1970s the Liberal Party did not get stronger support from the core than from the marginal group and the disengaged, while the differences were considerable for the Conservative Party, which got nearly 60 per cent of the vote from the core compared with about 40 per cent from the disengaged. This pattern is fairly stable in the 1980s compared with the 1970s. In the 1990s the Liberal Party increases its support among the Protestant core from 11–16 per cent in the 1970s to about 30 per cent while maintaining stable support among the disengaged of 15–20 per cent. The Conservative Party, on the other hand, gets less than 40 per cent of the vote of the core and about 30 per cent of the disengaged in the 1990s. The pattern for Labour is stable in the period, contributing to a stable overall correlation among the Protestants. In sum, the Conservatives lose heavily among the core, while the Liberals gain increasing support, and polarisation according to church attendance among the Protestants is now primarily caused by the Liberal Party, not the Conservatives (in addition to the Labour Party). Labour’s large support among Catholics varies little with integration into the Catholic Church. The same applies to the other parties. The correlation is in most periods barely significant. There is a small tendency for the Conservative Party to get stronger support from the Catholic’s core, while the opposite is the case for Labour. It is difficult to study changes over time due to the small number of cases in each period. The basic pattern from Table 3.4A is, however, sustained throughout the period. The strong support for the Liberal Party among non-conformists is not particularly anchored in the core among this group. Indeed, we find the same main pattern as for the other confessions for the whole period. Conservatives get their strongest support from the core, while Labour gets its strongest support from the disengaged. The correlation is relatively weak, and we find the same pattern in both the 1970s and the 1980s.

120 Social Structure and Party Choice in Western Europe

In sum, the impact of church attendance on party choice is largest within the Protestant churches and barely significant within the Catholic Church and among the non-conformists. Although the frequency of church attendance changes greatly in the period within the various confessions, the strength of the church attendance cleavage is very stable within all three religious communities. The most important change takes place within the Protestant churches. The impact of church attendance within the two main religious denominations in Germany (Table 3.4B) is similar in the following senses according to the table based on the data for the whole period. SPD, the Greens and the Republican Party receive strongest support from the disengaged, while CDU/CSU receives strongest support from the core. The differences are that the impact of church attendance is stronger among Catholics than Protestants. This is indicated by the correlation coefficients and by the PDI- and lor-measures for all the parties mentioned above. The correlation coefficients are more than twice as strong for Catholics. According to the PDI-measure, the differences are particularly large for CDU/CSU, but according to lor, they are even larger for the Greens. Another difference is that church attendance has only a small effect on the FDP vote among Protestants, while being considerably correlated among Catholics, where support is strongest among the disengaged. The strength of the correlation drops considerably for both confessions over time. Among the Catholics, the decline in the correlation takes place in two steps, during the 1970s and the 1990s. In the 1970s, SPD loses support from the Catholics while CDU/CSU increases its share of the vote. The main change takes place among the disengaged strata, and the polarisation between the major parties decreases. The change among Catholic voters in the 1990s is somewhat different. CDU/CSU loses about 10 percentage points of the vote of the strongly diminished Catholic core, while gaining a corresponding percentage among the disengaged. SPD and the Greens gain a stable 25 per cent of the vote of the Catholic core but lose about 10 percentage points among the disengaged from the late 1980s to the late 1990s. Among the Protestants a major change also takes place in the 1990s, although there are some considerable fluctuations also from the early 1970s to the 1990s. The strength of the impact of church religiosity declines considerably from 1970–74 to 1975–79 but then rebounds to the same level as in the early 1970s. There is then a large decline in the 1990s. The change in the 1990s follows a classic pattern of how a conflict variable becomes less important. Changes basically take place

Church Religiosity and Church Attendance 121

among the core: from 1985–89 to 1994–97, CDU/CSU loses a large portion of its support among the Protestant core, while SPD and the Greens increase their support considerably. In the late 1980s support for CDU/ CSU among the Protestant core was 58 per cent, but drops to 39 per cent in the late 1990s, while support for SPD and the Greens combined increases from 35 per cent to 50 per cent. In the same period CDU/CSU increases its support among the disengaged, while SPD/Greens lose nearly 10 percentage points in this group. The PDI-index for the two party groups declines from 36 to 11 and from 31 to 10, respectively. In sum, the same processes appear to be at work among Protestants and Catholics. Church religiosity appears to be less important for voting for the major parties in the system. The changes are fairly similar in size in the two countries, but the impact of church religiosity was considerably larger among Catholics than among Protestants in the early 1970s. Church religiosity has therefore become unimportant for voting among the Protestants, while still being of considerable importance among Catholics in the 1990s. Finally, let us examine the patterns in the Netherlands. Table 3.4C shows the pattern for the three religious denominations separately. The analysis of the changes in party choice within the various denominations in Chapter 2 showed that there was a remarkable change towards greater support for the secular parties among Catholics. We have seen above that the erosion of the Catholic core has been dramatic in the Dutch case. It is natural to see the decline of the support for the religious parties in connection with the secularisation of the Catholic segment: The decline of the religious parties (especially CDA) among Catholics is caused more by secularisation than by declining support among the religious core. This interpretation may even result in a stable relationship between church attendance and party choice, despite the gradual loss among Catholics for the Christian Democrats. The alternative explanation is that the core, marginal and disengaged groups vote more similarly over time. According to the pattern for the whole period (see Table 3.4C), CDA gets 70 per cent of the vote of the Catholic core, while the secular parties get the remaining 30 per cent. Among the disengaged, CDA gets nearly 30 per cent, and the secular parties get the remaining vote. All parties are strongly affected by church religiosity among Catholics, apart from the Calvinist Fundamentalist parties, which do not get the vote of the Catholics. It is the stable correlation perspective that gains support from the data. The correlation is fluctuating somewhat over time but is basically

122 Social Structure and Party Choice in Western Europe

stable. CDA gains a stable 70 per cent of the Catholic core, while the support is even decreasing among the disengaged. The secular parties all get a small and stable percentage of the core, while there are some changes among the disengaged, in particular from the 1980s to the 1990s: D66, VVD and the Green Left gain at the expense of the Labour Party. There is an even stronger correlation between church attendance and party choice among members of the Dutch Reformed Church than among members of the Catholic Church according to the data for the whole period. Church attendance affects the voting pattern of the Dutch Reformed Church in a way very similar to the pattern among Catholic voters. There are, however, two exceptions. The lor-score for the Green Left is much lower among the Dutch Reformed Church. The support for the Green Left is indeed low among all levels of church religiosity. The most important difference is that the Calvinist Fundamentalist parties get a significant portion of the vote of the core, while support is nearly absent among those with a lower level of church religiosity. Another difference in the voting pattern between the Catholics and members of the Reformed Church is that support for CDA is higher at every level of church religiosity among Catholics. The correlation between church attendance and party choice is not becoming smaller over time. It remains stable at a high level. Does this mean that the voting pattern is very stable? Let us first examine the changes for the religious parties, CDA and the Calvinist Fundamentalists. CDA gets fairly stable support from the reformed core, about 55 per cent, but is increasing its support among the marginal and disengaged groups somewhat, in particular from the 1970s to the 1980s. The Calvinist Fundamentalists increase their share of the vote among the Reformed core from 6 per cent in the late 1970s 9 to 18 per cent in the 1980s and 1990s, causing the support among the core for both religious parties to increase from about 70 per cent to 80 per cent from the late 1970s to the 1990s. The overall impact on support for these two parties according to church religiosity is then fairly stable since CDA’s increase in support among the marginal and disengaged groups is of a similar magnitude. Among the secular parties the Labour Party loses heavily among the marginal and disengaged segments, while D66 gains considerably, from 7 per cent to nearly 25 per cent of the vote of these groups. These two changes among the parties gaining strongest support from various segments of members of the Dutch Reformed Church then counterbalance each other, and the strength of the overall conflict variable is stable.

Church Religiosity and Church Attendance 123

Finally, the pattern for the Gereformeerden should be examined. We have seen that church religiosity among this group remains unusually high, and since nearly two-thirds of the group belong to the core even in the 1990s, there is indeed small variation in the church religiosity variable. Table 3.4C shows that the two religious parties get more than 80 per cent of the vote of the core and that the Calvinist Fundamentalist parties get more than 20 per cent of the core, a considerably larger share than among the Dutch Reformed core. Even among the tiny marginal and disengaged groups, the religious parties get nearly 50 per cent of the vote. One should resist overly detailed analyses of changes over time due to the small number of cases for the marginal and disengaged groups in particular. We are on firmer ground when we analyse the trends among the core group. The Calvinist Fundamentalist parties gain about 30 per cent of the vote from this group in the 1980s and 1990s, compared with less than 20 per cent in the late 1970s, while support for CDA decreases correspondingly. Other changes are difficult to detect due to the small number of cases.

3.4

Socialist/non-socialist party choice

There are several interesting aspects of the relationship between socialist/ non-socialist party choice and church attendance seen in relation to the detailed findings above. First, we might expect the placement of the Green parties to be crucial for the strength of the relationship. Green voters are decisively disengaged and unaffiliated, and if the Green parties are placed in the non-socialist group, the correlation might be severely depressed compared with the opposite treatment – placing the Green parties in the socialist group. Independent of the Green parties, we expect to find some cross-cutting of the church religiosity cleavage in relation to the socialist/non-socialist party choice dichotomy. This may be strongest in countries with significant non-socialist parties that gain most of their support from the disengaged. This applies in particular to countries where considerable secular Liberal parties exists, primarily Belgium and the Netherlands, but also to countries with radical rightist parties which also to a large degree draw strongest support from the disengaged segment on the church attendance variable. Let us first examine the strength of the correlation between socialist/ non-socialist party choice and church attendance for the whole period. Because we want to compare the strength over time and since we are interested in comparing the effect of the placement of the Green parties

124 Social Structure and Party Choice in Western Europe

in different categories, we use the lor-measure as the basic measure for examining change. PDI-measure will be used for comparison of the overall impact of church attendance with the impact of socialist/nonsocialist party choice. Figure 3.5(A and B) shows the strength for the whole period with the Green parties treated in the different ways. We first comment on Figure 3.5A, where the Greens are placed in the non-socialist group. The correlations are large, except in Britain. They are largest in Italy, Belgium and the Netherlands, and quite similar at a lower level in Denmark, France, Ireland and Germany. When the Green parties are placed in the socialist group (Figure 3.5B), correlations increase significantly in the relevant countries (increase in lor-score in parentheses): Germany (0.28), France (0.26), Ireland (0.21), Belgium (0.14) and Italy (0.12). The correlation in Belgium and Italy is now larger than in the Netherlands, and the correlation in France nearly approaches the one in the Netherlands. Comparing with Figure 3.3, which showed the correlations for the whole party choice variable, we note that the Netherlands does not show the largest coefficient for socialist/non-socialist party choice, while this was the case for the overall effect. Apart from that deviation, the ranking of countries is fairly similar to that in Figure 3.3. I have analysed the degree of overlap first for the whole period and then changes over time. The degree of overlap for the whole period (see Table 7.1A in Chapter 7) is, as expected, smallest in the Netherlands

2.25 2.00 1.75 Lor-score

1.50 1.25 1.00 0.75 0.50 0.25 0.00 Italy

Belgium Netherlands France

Denmark

Ireland

Germany

Britain

Figure 3.5A The strength of the correlation between church attendance and socialist/non-socialist party choice according to the lor-measure, 1970–97. Green parties placed in the non-socialist group

Church Religiosity and Church Attendance 125

2.25 2.00 1.75 Lor-score

1.50 1.25 1.00 0.75 0.50 0.25 0.00 Belgium

Italy

Netherlands France

Ireland

Germany Denmark

Britain

Figure 3.5B The strength of the correlation between church attendance and socialist/non-socialist party choice, according to the lor-measure, 1970–97. Green parties placed in the socialist group

(58%) and in Belgium (77%). This means that the left–right division of parties taps 58 per cent and 77 per cent of the total relationship between party choice and church attendance. In the other countries the degree of overlap is considerably larger, ranging from 0.86–0.90 in Denmark, Germany and Ireland to 0.95 in France and Italy and 0.99 in Britain. All socialist parties get strongest support from the disengaged strata in all countries.10 It is among the non-socialist parties that we find considerable deviations from the rule (which is indeed very consistent) that support is strongest from the core. The figures (in percentages) can be read directly from Table 3.3. In the Netherlands it is the two liberal parties that contribute to the large cross-cutting by getting decisively strongest support of almost equal magnitude from the disengaged. In Belgium it is the Liberal parties that are the major component, but the Flemish Bloc also contributes significantly. Of the other countries the largest figures are found in Germany, Ireland and Denmark (4–6 percentage points). In Germany it is FDP and the Republican Party that contribute to the cross-cutting, and in Denmark it is the Progress Party. In Ireland the Progressive Democrats are a major source. Figure 3.6 (A and B) shows the development of the correlation between socialist/non-socialist party choice and church religiosity over time measured by the lor-scores, by the two ways of treating the Green parties. Let us start with Figure 3.6A, where the Greens are placed in the non-socialist group.

126 Social Structure and Party Choice in Western Europe

3.00

2.50

Lor-score

2.00

1.50

1.00

0.50

0.00 1970–74 Belgium Ireland

1975–79 Britain Italy

1980–84

1985–89

Denmark Netherlands

1990–93 France Mean

1994–97 Germany

Figure 3.6A Trends in the strength of the correlation between church attendance and socialist/non-socialist party choice according to the lor-measure. Green parties in the non-socialist group

There is no doubt that the correlation is declining when the Greens are grouped in the non-socialist group. According to the average figures for the eight countries, there is a small increase from the early to the late 1970s, and then a gradual decrease. From 1970–74 to 1994–97 the decline in the average lor-score is 23 per cent, and from the late 1970s the decline is 31 per cent. In the early 1970s the correlation was largest in Belgium, Italy and the Netherlands, followed by France and Germany and then Denmark. The correlations drop in these countries, but those in the first group remain highest for the whole period. The correlation in Ireland increases to a level similar to that found in France and Denmark in the late 1980s and 1990s. The correlation in Germany drops to a lower level than in these countries. This implies that the decline is particularly large in the countries where the magnitude of the correlation was large in the 1970s. The decline is about 0.80 in Germany and Italy, 0.60 in Belgium and the Netherlands, and 0.40 in France. In Denmark and

Church Religiosity and Church Attendance 127

3.00 2.50

lor-score

2.00 1.50 1.00 0.50 0.00 1970–74 Belgium Ireland

1975–79 Britain Italy

1980–84

1985–89

Denmark Netherlands

1990–93 France Mean

1994–97 Germany

Figure 3.6B Trends in the strength of the correlation between church attendance and socialist/non-socialist party choice according to the lor-measure. Green parties placed in the socialist group

Ireland it is increasing somewhat (about 0.20), while again there is stability at a low level in Britain. The decrease becomes smaller when the Greens are placed in the socialist party group (Figure 3.6B), but the difference is not large according to the lor-measure. The average lor-score declines by 17 per cent and 27 per cent, respectively, from 1970–74 and 1975–79 to the late 1990s. The main differences from the former figure are that the increase in the magnitude of the correlation becomes even more pronounced in Ireland and the decline in Germany becomes less pronounced. Indeed, the figures for seven of the eight countries are fairly similar in the 1990s. When the Greens are placed in the socialist group, the decrease is largest in Italy (0.77), followed by Belgium and the Netherlands (about 0.60), and then German (0.47) and France (0.42). The increase in the strength of the correlation in Ireland is, on the other hand, remarkable, placing Ireland in a group where the strength is largest in the 1990s, together with Belgium, Italy and the Netherlands. Finally, we have examined whether the degree of cross-cutting of the church religiosity cleavage increases or decreases over time. We have seen that the overall correlation between party choice and church attendance

128 Social Structure and Party Choice in Western Europe

decreased in most countries. The same applies to the correlation with the socialist/non-socialist division, and for some countries this decline appears to be even stronger than for the overall decline based on all parties. It appears that especially in Belgium and the Netherlands the decline for the left–right division is much more pronounced than the fairly moderate overall decline in the correlation observed in Figure 3.4. We have again compared the PDI-measures for the tables based on all parties and the left–right division as described in some detail above. The results of this comparison are not shown directly in any table (although see Table 7.1B in Chapter 7), but the pattern for the Netherlands is outstanding: the degree of overlap decreases from 0.78 in the early 1970s to 0.44 in the 1990s. It is the two liberal parties that contribute to the decrease, first and foremost D66. There is also a decrease in overlap in Belgium of a somewhat smaller magnitude, from 0.86 to 0.69, caused primarily by voters supporting the radical rightist party Flemish Bloc. In Belgium and the Netherlands the decline of the church religiosity cleavage on overall party choice is 10–15 per cent of the original strength in the early 1970s, but for the left–right division of parties it is considerably stronger, about 30 per cent. In these two countries where the religious cleavages traditionally have been very pronounced, the decline of the church religiosity cleavage is considerably larger for the left–right division of parties that for overall party choice where all parties are taken into consideration. The left–right division of parties simply overestimates the overall decline of the religious cleavage in these countries because the church religiosity cleavage increasingly cut across the left–right division of parties. Similar decreases are not found in any other country, and there is indeed an increase in some countries. In Italy there was a certain crosscutting pattern (overlap of 0.90) in the early 1970s, caused mainly by the liberal parties. The decline and collapse of these parties contribute to the evaporation of the cross-cutting pattern in the 1990s; the overlap is 1.00 in the late 1990s. In Denmark a larger cross-cutting pattern in the 1970s (overlap of 0.76), caused by the Progress Party, is reduced (overlap of 0.89) in connection with the decline of the party. For the other countries where the church religiosity cleavage is significant there is a small degree of cross-cutting, as explained above, which is fairly stable over time.

3.5

Conclusions

We find clear and even large cross-national differences in church religiosity throughout the whole period examined. Frequency of church attendance

Church Religiosity and Church Attendance 129

is low in Protestant Denmark and Britain in the early 1970s, and this low level of religiosity is reached in several other countries during the 1980s (France and the Netherlands) and 1990s (Belgium and Germany). There is a clear decline in the degree of church religiosity measured by the church attendance variable in all countries apart from Italy where there nevertheless is a decline during the 1970s. The core group declines dramatically in most of the countries where a large portion had this high level of religiosity in the 1970s, first and foremost in Belgium and the Netherlands, but also in France, Germany and Ireland. The portion of the population who is disengaged is also increasing largely, and comprises 55–70 per cent of the population in six of the eight countries in the 1990s. In Ireland and Italy the disengaged segment is much lower. In the religious mixed countries, Germany and the Netherlands, we find a dramatic decline in church religiosity among the Catholic segment. In the 1970s there was a huge difference in church religiosity between the Catholic and the Protestant segments. This declines significantly in Germany, and evaporates completely in the Netherlands. In both countries it is the portion of Catholics who belong to the core group that declines dramatically. A decline of considerably smaller magnitude takes place among the smaller Catholic segment in Britain. The strength of the church religiosity cleavage is on average high in the eight countries, but varies largely cross-nationally. Given the emphasis in the literature on the resistance to decline of the religious cleavage, the empirical analysis shows that it is declining considerably in some of the countries where it traditionally have been strong, first and foremost in Italy, France and Germany, and – to a considerably smaller degree – in Belgium and the Netherlands. In the former countries we would question the emphasis of stability of the basis of the empirical analysis here. The decline is considerable. In some contrast to the denominational cleavage, all socialist parties have voters that belong to the secular segment on the cleavage variable – the disengaged. We find some exceptions to the rule that all non-socialist parties are most likely to belong to the core or marginal segments, and these exceptions are most pronounced in the Netherlands and Belgium. In these countries the Liberal parties have considerably stronger support from the disengaged segment – a main explanation for why there is a much higher degree of crosscutting of the church religiosity cleavage in relation to the socialist/non-socialist party division compared with other countries. In Belgium the tendency for the radical rightist Flemish Bloc to get stronger support from the disengaged also contribute

130 Social Structure and Party Choice in Western Europe

in this respect. In both countries this crosscutting tendency increases over time. The main polarisation along the church religiosity cleavage involved the major socialist parties versus the Christian and some other nonsocialist parties in the 1970s. In Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands the main polarisation was between the socialist and the Christian Democratic parties, but the Liberal parties also played an important role in strengthening the cleavage by getting considerably stronger support from the disengaged segment in all these countries. This tendency was strongest in the Netherlands and weakest in Germany, and these crossnational differences are important for explaining the comparative strength of the religious cleavage then – and later. In Italy the church religiosity cleavage polarised the Communists versus the Christian Democrats to a large degree. This was a very different pattern from the one found in France where the cleavage more strongly involved both the Socialists and Communists versus all bourgeois parties. In the three remaining countries where the cleavage was of much more moderate strength, the cleavage involved the social democrats versus (some of) the main non-socialist parties, the Conservatives in Britain, the Christian and the Agrarian Liberal parties in Denmark and both main non-socialist parties in Ireland. The left socialists in Denmark were already a large component of the secular or disengaged coalition by the beginning of the 1970s. The decline of the church religiosity cleavage involves (some of ) these parties in the relevant countries. The Christian parties get a smaller share of the vote of the Christian vote not only in an absolute sense, but also relatively compared with the disengaged in Italy, Germany and to a smaller extent in Belgium and the Netherlands. The same applies to UDF in France. The same phenomenon takes place among the main parties that contribute most significant to the polarisation by getting definitely strongest support among the disengaged segment, the Communist parties in Italy and France, and the Social Democratic parties in Belgium and Germany. In some countries New Politics parties contribute significantly to increase, or perhaps more correctly to diminish the decrease, of the church religiosity cleavage by getting significantly stronger support from the disengaged part of the electorate. As the analyses have shows, it is natural to see this increasing polarisation in connection with the declining support for the established socialist parties among the disengaged. The New Politics parties, and the Green parties in particular, are gaining support among the disengaged at the expense of the established

Church Religiosity and Church Attendance 131

parties of the left. This is a pattern that is most clearly found in Belgium and Germany, but also in France and Ireland. In the Netherlands a similar pattern is occuring, but the parties that gain relatively most from the disengaged segment are first and foremost the centrist D66, and then the major Liberal party VVD and the Green Left. This new polarisation caused mainly by the Green parties does not at all counterbalance the decrease caused by the old parties in Germany and France, but in Belgium and the Netherlands the decreasing polarisation is severely reduced cause by this factor. Finally, the increased polarisation in Ireland is also caused by new parties, the left socialist Workers’ Party, the Greens and to a smaller extent the liberal Progressive Democrats. This increased polarisation associated with the new parties is taking place at the expense of the social democrats, but in contrasts to the other countries, the new polarisation is considerably larger than the old polarisation, and the impact of church religiosity is then increasing. Finally, the analyses of the impact of church religiosity within the various denominations in the religiously mixed countries, have shown that many of the same patterns and changes can be found within the Catholic and the (main) Protestant denomination in Germany and the Netherlands. In Germany degree of church religiosity becomes less important for voting for the major parties in the system, CDU/CSU and SPD both among Catholics and Protestants, and the impact of church religiosity declines for both confessions. The impact is generally considerably larger among the Catholic segment, and in the 1990s the church religiosity cleavage is still of considerable importance among Catholics, while of only minor importance among Protestants. By contrast, in the Netherlands it is among the Calvinist Protestants that we find the largest impact of church religiosity, and the impact of church religiosity does not decline considerable for any of the denominations. The strong decline of the distinct voting pattern for the Catholic segment that was found in the analysis in Chapter 2, on religious denomination is totally explained by the strong decline of church religiosity. The voting pattern within the various levels of church religiosity is fairly stable. The same applies basically to the other denominations, but for these the decline of church religiosity is considerably smaller than for the Catholics.

4 Urban–Rural Residence

4.1 Introduction: the urban–rural cleavage, or urban–rural contrasts The urban and rural populations may vote for different political parties due to differences in political orientations and values, differences in general social structural characteristics (for example, education, income) and differences in political interests. The rural population is likely to vote for parties that articulate the interests of the rural and the agrarian population. Lipset and Rokkan’s seminal analysis focused on variations in the urban–rural cleavage and showed that in most countries the rural–urban cleavage rarely found direct expression in the party system. The economic conflict between the landed and the urban interests was centred in the commodity market. The peasants want to sell their wares at the best possible prices and buy what they need from the industrial and urban producers at low costs (Lipset & Rokkan 1967a: 21). Distinct agrarian parties emerged only when strong cultural oppositions deepened and embittered the strictly economic conflicts. The population in rural areas is generally more conservative and religious than the urban population, and could be expected to vote for religious and possibly also Conservative parties. There is often a difference in character as well as size between rural areas and large cities. In rural areas small communities have centuries of pre-industrial history and have been least affected by great population changes consequent to industrialisation. ‘Traditional’ values have a greater chance of survival in the countryside, even though some people may work in a modern environment (Rose 1974c: 511). This is also the conclusion of Lipset and Rokkan’s analysis. One of their criteria for the establishment of distinct agrarian parties is illustrative: 132

Urban–Rural Residence 133

the Catholic Church should be without significant influence (Lipset & Rokkan 1967a: 44–6). The premise for this criterion is that the rural population is religious and in the Catholic countries the Church has so much influence over the rural population that there would be only small potential support for a distinct agrarian party which articulated the specific economic interests of the agrarian population. The agrarian interests were subordinated to the Christian orientation. ‘Other cleavages, particularly between the state and churches and between owners and tenants, had greater impact on the alignments of the electorates’ (Lipset & Rokkan 1967a: 20). The tendency for the rural population to support the Christian parties is documented in studies from many countries (Hill 1974: 90–1; Lijphart 1974: 250–2; Urwin 1974: 153–4). Specific agrarian interests can also be articulated via political parties that do not define themselves as agrarian. The Christian parties, for example, have developed close connections with farmers’ association in many countries. The rural interests should not be equated too strongly with the agrarian interests in the period studied here. Rural political interests in modern society are much broader, including for example decentralisation of political decisions and transfer of economic means to smaller municipalities and specific welfare efforts that benefit the rural population in particular. Comparing the Continental countries and Britain, Lipset and Rokkan emphasised that the conflicts between rural and urban interests had been much less marked in Britain. On the Continent the conflicting interests of the rural and urban areas had been established in the Middle Ages and deepened during the Industrial Revolution. In country after country, opposition between Conservative-Agrarian and LiberalRadical interests found expression in the party systems (Lipset & Rokkan 1967a: 19). In the Nordic countries distinct agrarian parties developed from the pre-industrial left-movement, and the Conservative parties articulated primarily urban interests and values. ‘The cultural contrasts between the countryside and the cities were still strong, and strict market controls favored by the Agrarians could not easily be reconciled with the philosophy of free competition espoused by many Conservatives’ (Lipset & Rokkan 1967a: 20). In Britain, by contrast, the agricultural and the business interests merged to some extent. This consolidation of the national elite soon changed the character of the Conservative–Liberal conflict. As to Conservative parties, Britain and the Nordic countries are therefore expected to be very different. The Conservative parties in the Nordic countries (Denmark among the countries in this study) represent

134 Social Structure and Party Choice in Western Europe

the urban interests, in some contrast to the pattern expected to be found in Britain. Another pattern of urban–rural difference is the strength of Communist parties in rural areas in parts of France and Italy. In Central Italy a widespread system of sharecropping created a large group of tenant farmers and farm labourers, who traditionally have voted for the Communist Party (the so-called ‘red-belt’) (Barnes 1974: 198; Dogan 1967: 146–8). The phenomenon of ‘red peasants’ in France has a somewhat different anchorage. It is mainly small independent farmers in poorer regions who vote frequently for the Communist Party (Dogan 1967: 149–50; Smith 1989: 30). These patterns do not imply that the Communists are stronger in the rural areas in the whole of Italy and France, but may result in smaller urban–rural differences in support for the Communists than we otherwise would have expected. In sum, the parties that will gain stronger support from the rural population are first and foremost the Christian parties, the Conservative Party in Britain and perhaps in other countries where such parties exist (for example, in France and Ireland), and the Agrarian Liberal Party in Denmark. In a comparative perspective we expect the urban– rural conflict to be strongest in countries with distinct agrarian parties, followed by countries with Christian parties. That is, we expect urban– rural residence to be most strongly correlated with party choice in Denmark, followed by Belgium, Germany, Ireland, Italy and the Netherlands.

4.2

Operationalisation of urban–rural residence

There are two variables available to measure urban-rural residence in the Eurobarometer data set. One is an ‘objective’ variable relating to the size of the community where the interview with the respondent took place. The problem with this variable is that the categories vary extremely between countries and over time within each country. The number of categories also varies, from 3–4 to 10, even within surveys in the same country. This means that it is problematic to do both comparative and longitudinal analyses on the basis of this variable. From EB 3 in 1975, another variable is also available, whereby the respondents themselves are asked to characterise their community. This question was asked as follows: Would you say you live in a – Rural area or village

Urban–Rural Residence 135

– Small or middle size town – Big town [from EB 33]: Large town. This is, of course, a crude measure which opens for some subjective evaluations from the respondent, and evaluations may differ over time and between countries, for example regarding what is a ‘small or medium size town’. This latter objection is not very important, because it is the relative size of the communities within countries that matters. On the other hand, the measure has some obvious advantages. It is easy to deal with in a comparative analysis. In addition, it is the immediate surrounding of the respondent, not a larger area which may be difficult to classify, that is the basis for the respondent’s evaluation. Municipalities and corresponding units may combine rural and more urban areas, and it is certainly the municipality that is classified according to more ‘objective’ measures. In order to get data from the first period in our time series, the variable concerning the ‘objective’ size of the community is used. This variable was available from the first European Community Survey in 1970, and we considered it very valuable to have data from that time period. The various categories in the four relevant surveys were recoded into three categories that should reflect the same division as in the more subjective measure. In several cases we used the distributions of the variable as an important criterion for the classification. The distribution should be fairly similar to the distribution on the more subjective variable in the late 1970s. The patterns found for the early 1970s should, however, be considered with some caution, since the urban–rural variable is operationalised somewhat differently from the operationalisations in the later time periods. This applies in particular if the results appear to deviate from the pattern found in the late 1970s or do not represent a natural first time point in a linear long-term trend. The distribution of the variable can perhaps not be seen as indicating objective differences between countries. For the whole period, 1975–97, the portion of the respondents indicating that they live in a rural area or a village varies from 44–47 per cent in Belgium, Ireland and the Netherlands to 25 per cent in Britain, 28 per cent in Denmark and 31 per cent in Germany. The portion indicating that they live in a large town varies much less, 20–32 per cent. It is the medium category that to a large extent mirrors the first category. There is surprisingly little change over time in the distribution on the variable, given that we know urbanisation has taken place during this period. The average changes are illustrative. From 1975–79 to the late 1990s, the share of the rural

136 Social Structure and Party Choice in Western Europe

population declines by 4 percentage points, while the other categories each increase by 2 percentage points.

4.3

Urban–rural residence and party choice

Patterns based on the data for the whole period, 1970–97 Let us start by looking at the strength of the correlation between party choice and urban-rural residence for the whole time period. These correlations are shown in a comparative setting in Figure 4.1 by means of the eta-coefficient. The strength of the correlation is, as expected, largest in Denmark (0.22). It is fairly similar in Ireland, Belgium, Italy and the Netherlands (0.16–0.19), followed by Germany (0.13), Britain (0.10) and finally France (0.06). One might argue that Cramer’s V is the best coefficient to show the relationship between party choice and urban-rural residence. We have also analysed the strength of the relationship in a comparative setting and the trends over time using Cramer’s V. The Cramer’s V coefficients do show exactly the same ranking of the countries and very similar relative strength for the whole period and for the trends over time.1 Let us now examine which parties get strongest support from the urban and the rural population. In the calculation of the lor-scores, we have compared the two extreme categories ‘rural area or village’ and ‘big towns’. In Table 4.1 we have shown the lor-scores for the various

0.250

Eta-coefficients

0.200

0.150

0.100

0.050

0.000

Denmark

Ireland

Belgium

Italy

Netherlands Germany Britain

France

Figure 4.1 Strength of the correlation between urban/rural residence and party choice, 1970–97. Eta-coefficients

Table 4.1 Overall differences in support for the various political parties according to urban–rural residence in a comparative setting, 1970–97. Parties are grouped into party families A. Lor Belgium Comm. Left Soc. Soc. Dem Green Nationalists Liberal Christian Conservative Radical right Spec. Party I Spec. Party II Other parties

Britain

−0.65 −0.29 −0.38 −0.44 −0.29 0.97

−0.50 −0.47 −0.08 0.16 0.46

−0.07

−0.76

−0.28

Denmark

France

−1.39 −1.04 −0.16 −0.83

−0.27 −0.48 −0.06 −0.14

−0.08 0.95 −0.26 0.59 1.12 0.13 0.14

0.20

Germany

Ireland

−0.36 −0.77

−1.52 −0.84 −0.79

−0.23 0.64

0.19 0.07 −0.08

−0.04

−0.07

−0.20

−0.46 0.40 0.35

−0.53

Italy −0.26 −0.68 −0.18 −0.65 0.61 −0.89 0.79 0.29 −0.27 0.01 −0.17

Netherlands −0.91 −0.36

0.08 0.73

−0.26 0.88 −0.41

Average −0.64 −0.92 −0.34 −0.58 0.03 −0.19 0.75 0.21 0.06

−0.28

137

138

Table 4.1

(Continued)

B. PDI Belgium Comm. Left Soc. Soc. Dem Green Nationalists Liberal Christian Conservative Radical right Spec. Party I Spec. Party II Other Parties Total

Britain

−0.8 −5.7 −3.1 −3.9 −4.2 20.0

−11.8 −0.8 −0.2 2.2

Denmark

France

−1.4 −12.6 −3.5 −0.4

−2.0 −1.3 −1.2 −1.1 3.2

−0.3

−0.4

−2.1

−0.3

−2.7 2.2 −1.4

6.2

15.2

16.6

18.4

17.5

−2.1

−0.3

−0.4 1.6 −3.2 3.4 15.6 0.3 0.6

20.0

13.0

21.5

10.9 −0.1

2.8 0.2 −0.2

Germany

−8.8 −4.7 −1.3 15.2

Ireland −3.6 −8.8 −1.2 −0.9 7.8 8.8

0.0

Italy −4.6 −1.2 −2.4 −2.3 0.7 −6.0 17.1 0.5 −1.6 0.0

Netherlands −5.6 −7.8

1.0 14.3

Average −2.2 −4.9 −6.3 −2.0 −1.1 −0.8 12.7 3.9 0.4

16.1

Note Special parties are for Denmark Agrarian Liberals (I) and Centre Democrats (II), for France MRG (I), for Italy PSDI (I) and for the Netherlands D66 (I) and Calvinist Fundamentalists (II)

Urban–Rural Residence 139

parties according to party families. The lor-scores are calculated so that rural area is given the highest value. A negative value, then, implies that the party gets strongest support from the large towns. According to the average scores for the various party families, the Christian and then the Conservative Party family get stronger support from the rural population than from the large towns. As to the Christian parties, the trend is consistent for all parties, and there are only small differences between the countries, although the lor-score for the somewhat deviant Irish party is smaller than for the other countries. CDU/ CSU has also a smaller lor-score than the other parties. As to the Conservative parties, there is also a fairly consistent pattern, with one important deviation as expected: the Danish Conservative Party gets stronger support from the urban population. It is also in accordance with our expectations that the lor-score is largest for the British Conservative Party, which has the strongest rural base of all these parties. There are three other parties that get clearly stronger support from the rural population. The largest lor-score among all parties is, as expected, found for the Danish Agrarian Liberals. The Dutch Calvinist Fundamentalists and the Italian Lega Nord also appear to have a strong rural base. The Italian MSI also appears to get slightly stronger support from rural population. All the party families of the left, including the Greens, and the Liberal parties get stronger support from the urban population. The highest average lor-score is found for the left socialists, the Communists and the Greens. There are large differences between the levels of support from the urban and rural populations for the social democratic parties. Differences are largest for the Irish and British parties, and smallest for the French, Italian and Danish parties. We also note that the Green parties in France and Belgium have smaller lor-scores than the others in this party family. The radical rightist parties show large variation in this respect, with an average lor-score close to 0. Three of the five parties have fairly similar support from the urban and the rural population, while the Danish party gets stronger support from the rural population; the opposite is the case for the Italian party. The average score for the Liberal party family is also small, and there is large variation between the parties. The average correlation indicates that the liberal parties lean towards the urban side, and four of eight parties – those in Belgium, Germany, Ireland and Italy – get stronger support from the urban population. The opposite is true for the parties in Britain and France. The Danish and Dutch parties have fairly even support from the urban and rural populations.

140 Social Structure and Party Choice in Western Europe

Strength of the correlation over time The next step is to look at the development of the urban–rural cleavage over time. Figure 4.2 shows the strength of the eta-coefficients over time in the eight countries. The main trend is that the strength of the urban–rural cleavage is declining, but the decline is not large according to the average figures; from 0.18 to 0.13. The decline takes place gradually, but there are large comparative variations: by far the largest decline is found in Denmark, where the strength of the correlation in the 1990s is less than half of that in the 1970s. For the other countries the changes are only modest, and when the deviant Danish case is excluded from the calculation of the average, the decline is even more modest, from 0.15 in the early 1970s to 0.13 in the late 1990s. Apart from Denmark, we find a clear decline in Italy and small declines in Belgium, France and Germany. In Ireland, on the other hand, there is a clear increase, and in the 1990s the urban–rural cleavage is stronger in Ireland than in any of the other countries. 2 The size of the urban–rural contrast in Denmark is much greater than in the other countries in the 1970s and early 1980s. In the 1970s the magnitudes are high also in Italy and Belgium. The lowest correlations

0.350

Eta-coefficients

0.300 0.250 0.200 0.150 0.100 0.050 0.000 1970–74

1975–79

Belgium Ireland

1980–84

Britain Italy

1985–89

Denmark Netherlands

1990–93 France Mean

1994–97 Germany

Figure 4.2 Trends in the strength of the correlation between urban/rural residence and party choice measured by the eta-coefficients

Urban–Rural Residence 141

in the 1970s and 1980s are found in Britain and France, while the correlation drops to a very low level in Germany in the 1990s. The considerable increase in the correlation in Ireland gives that country the largest urban–rural contrasts in the 1990s. Detailed analyses of the impact of urban–rural residence and changes over time within the eight countries Let us now examine the pattern in each country in more detail and the trends over time. The pattern for the whole period is shown in Table 4.2. Let us start by commenting on the countries where a clear change is observed: Denmark, Italy and Ireland.

Table 4.2

Urban–rural residence and party choice, 1970–97

Belgium

PCB/KPB PS/SP Ecolo/Agalev Volksu./RW/FDF PRL/PVV PSC/CVP Flemish Block Others Sum N

Rural/village

Town

Large town

Total

0.9 24.1 7.5 8.1 15.4 40.5 1.6 1.9 100.0 14,255

1.5 28.7 9.7 7.7 17.2 31.0 2.1 2.3 100.0 8,672

1.8 29.8 10.7 12.0 19.6 20.5 1.7 4.0 100.0 7,080

1.3 26.8 8.9 8.9 16.9 33.0 1.7 2.5 100.0 30,007

Rural/village

Town

Large town

Total

34.0 1.3 1.9 17.6 44.3 0.9 100.0 9,260

38.3 1.4 2.2 17.6 39.7 0.8 100.0 17,505

45.8 2.1 2.0 15.4 33.4 1.2 100.0 10,988

PDI

Lor

−0.8 −0.65 −5.7 −0.29 −3.1 −0.38 −3.9 −0.44 −4.2 −0.29 20.0 0.97 −0.1 −0.07 −2.1 −0.76 Sum

|PDI| 0.8 5.7 3.1 3.9 4.2 20.0 0.1 2.1 20.0

Cramer’s V = 0.129 Eta = 0.177 Britain

Labour Party Green Party Nationalists Liberals Conservates Other parties Sum N Cramer’s V = 0.074

Eta = 0.100

PDI

Lor

39.4 −11.8 −0.50 1.6 −0.8 −0.47 2.1 −0.2 −0.08 17.0 2.2 0.16 39.0 10.9 0.46 0.9 −0.3 −0.28 100.0 Sum 37,753

|PDI| 11.8 0.8 0.2 2.2 10.9 0.3 13.0

142 Social Structure and Party Choice in Western Europe Table 4.2

(Continued)

Denmark

DKP Left soc. Soc. Dem. Greens Rad. Lib. Chr. Peopl. Party Cons. Peopl. Party Progress Party Agrar. Liberals Centr. Dem. Others Sum N

Large town Total

Town

0.5 8.8 28.8 0.3 4.8 2.7 12.9 7.9 25.6 2.7 4.8 100.0 10,294

0.9 12.4 34.2 0.5 4.3 1.8 16.9 5.5 15.2 3.3 4.9 100.0 14,208

Rural/village

Town

Large town

Total

PDI

7.1 2.3 33.5 7.9 21.5 19.0 2.6 2.0 4.1 100.0 11,463

9.1 2.6 36.7 8.8 17.3 16.7 2.5 2.0 4.2 100.0 14,565

9.2 3.6 34.8 9.0 18.3 16.2 2.4 2.1 4.4 100.0 11,897

8.5 2.8 35.1 8.6 18.9 17.2 2.5 2.0 4.2 100.0 37,925

−2.0 −0.27 −1.3 −0.48 −1.2 −0.06 −1.1 −0.14 3.2 0.20 2.8 0.19 0.2 0.07 −0.2 −0.08 −0.3 −0.07 Sum

2.0 1.3 1.2 1.1 3.2 2.8 0.2 0.2 0.3 6.2

|PDI|

1.8 21.4 32.3 0.8 5.2 1.1 16.2 4.6 10.1 2.4 4.2 100.0 11,841

PDI

Lor

|PDI|

Rural/village

1.1 −1.4 −1.39 14.3 −12.6 −1.04 32.1 −3.5 −0.16 0.5 −0.4 −0.83 4.7 −0.4 −0.08 1.8 1.6 0.95 15.5 −3.2 −0.26 5.9 3.4 0.59 16.5 15.6 1.12 2.8 0.3 0.13 4.7 0.6 0.14 100.0 Sum 36,343

1.4 12.6 3.5 0.4 0.4 1.6 3.2 3.4 15.6 0.3 0.6 21.5

Cramer’s V = 0.165 Eta = 0.222 France PCF PSU PSF Ecologists UDF RPR Front National MRG Others Sum Total No.

Lor

|PDI|

Cramer’s V = 0.052 Eta = 0.060 Germany

SPD Green FDP CDU/CSU Republic. Party Others Sum N Cramer’s V = 0.096 Eta = 0.134

Rural/village

Town

Large town

Total

PDI

39.3 4.5 5.4 47.8 1.3 1.8 100.0 13,589

42.2 6.2 6.2 41.9 1.5 2.0 100.0 14,880

48.1 9.2 6.7 32.6 1.3 2.2 100.0 13,192

43.1 6.6 6.1 40.9 1.3 2.0 100.0 41,661

−8.8 −0.36 8.8 −4.7 −0.77 4.7 −1.3 −0.23 1.3 15.2 0.64 15.2 0.0 −0.04 0.0 −0.4 −0.20 0.4 Sum 15.2

Lor

Urban–Rural Residence 143 Ireland Rural/village Town Large town Worker’s Party Labour Green Prog. Dem. Fine Gael Fianna Fail Others Sum N

Total 2.6 12.1 1.5 2.0 26.5 51.1 4.2 100.0 32,089

PDI −3.6 −8.8 −1.2 −0.9 7.8 8.8 −2.1

Lor

−1.52 −0.84 −0.79 −0.46 0.40 0.35 −0.53 Sum

|PDI|

1.1 8.1 1.0 1.6 30.1 54.9 3.2 100.0 14,942

2.4 13.1 1.7 2.2 25.1 51.2 4.4 100.0 5,616

4.7 16.9 2.2 2.5 22.4 46.1 5.3 100.0 11,531

3.6 8.8 1.2 0.9 7.8 8.8 2.1 16.6

Rural/village

Town

Large town

Total

21.1 1.2 14.8 2.7 1.6 4.7 41.3 2.1 5.6 3.3 1.6 100.0 12,241

22.2 1.6 15.9 3.7 1.6 6.3 34.0 2.3 7.2 3.3 2.1 100.0 12,042

25.7 2.4 17.2 5.0 0.9 10.7 24.1 1.5 7.2 3.3 1.9 100.0 8,157

22.7 1.7 15.8 3.6 1.4 6.8 34.2 2.0 6.6 3.3 1.9 100.0 32,440

Rural/village

Town

Large town

Total

PDI

4.2 27.4 16.5 34.6 10.5 3.9 2.9 100.0 18,102

7.3 31.3 15.6 26.4 13.5 2.7 3.2 100.0 14,917

9.9 35.3 15.5 20.3 13.2 1.6 4.2 100.0 8,382

6.5 30.4 16.0 28.8 12.1 3.0 3.3 100.0 41,401

−5.6 −0.91 5.6 −7.8 −0.36 7.8 1.0 0.08 1.0 14.3 0.73 14.3 −2.7 −0.26 2.7 2.2 0.88 2.2 −1.4 −0.41 1.4 Sum 17.5

Cramer’s V = 0.135 Eta = 0.189

Italy

PCI/PDS/PCR Proletar. Dem. PSI Rad.P./Verdi Lega Nord PRI/PLI Chr.Dem. Forza Italia MSI PDSI Others Sum N

PDI −4.6 −1.2 −2.4 −2.3 0.7 −6.0 17.1 0.5 −1.6 0.0 −0.3

Lor

|PDI|

−0.26 4.6 −0.68 1.2 −0.18 2.4 −0.65 2.3 0.61 0.7 −0.89 6.0 0.79 17.1 0.29 0.5 −0.27 1.6 0.01 0.0 −0.17 0.3 Sum 18.4

Cramer’s V = 0.120 Eta = 0.189

Netherlands

Green Left PVDA VVD CDA D66 Calv. Fund. Others Sum N Cramer’s V = 0.115 Eta = 0.160

Lor

|PDI|

144 Social Structure and Party Choice in Western Europe

In Denmark the urban–rural contrasts are very much left versus right according to the data for the whole period (see Table 4.2). In terms of percentage differences, the parties that gain most different support from the rural and the urban population are the left socialists and the Agrarian Liberal parties. All the socialist parties get stronger support from the urban population, and the only non-socialist party that gets stronger support from the urban population is the Conservative Party. What, then, accounts for the dramatic decline? Let us first describe what accounted for the large strength of the urban–rural cleavage in the 1970s. All the socialist parties got much stronger support from the urban population than from the countryside. This included the Social Democrats, for whom we find a 10–11 percentage point difference. The same applied to the Conservative People’s Party, which had very different support from the urban and rural populations. Indeed, the Conservatives got the second strongest lor-score among the parties gaining strongest support among the urban population. On the other hand, the Agrarian Liberal Party got very different support from cities and the countryside, and the same applied to all the other non-socialist parties. A lot of change has taken place to weaken the urban–rural contrasts in voting behaviour in Denmark. In the 1980s the Conservative Party experienced some of their best electoral results. The increase was particularly large in the countryside, considerably decreasing the urban–rural differences in voting for that party. In the 1970s support from the countryside was 6–7 per cent, and in the 1980s, 17 per cent . The corresponding increase in large cities was from 16 per cent in the early 1970s to 20–21 per cent in the 1980s.3 The declining support for the party in the 1990s is fairly even among the urban and rural categories, so the low differences are kept. An even more dramatic change takes place in support for the Social Democrats. The larger support among voters in the large cities evaporates suddenly in the late 1980s, and in the 1990s support is even somewhat larger in the countryside than in the larger cities. An opposite change takes place for the Radical Liberal Party, which in the 1970s got stronger support from the rural population. This difference disappears in the 1980s and is reversed in the 1990s. The party gets clearly stronger support from the urban population. The changes for the Conservative and the Social Democratic parties are important for explaining the decline of the urban-rural contrast among the parties that in the 1970s got stronger support among the urban population. The parties that contribute most to the overall polarisation on the urban side, the left socialists, have a more stable and large difference between urban and rural voters until the late 1990s. However, in the late 1990s this difference declines

Urban–Rural Residence 145

due to increasing support among the rural population. In the 1980s and 1990s, the left socialists get 20–27 per cent of the votes of those who live in large cities. The portion of the rural population who support the parties increases from 3–4 per cent in the 1970s to around 10 per cent in the 1980s and 15 per cent in the 1990s. Nevertheless, the declining differences for the left socialists are less significant for the overall decline than the pattern for the Social Democrats and the Conservative Party. What about the parties that received strongest support from the rural population? Since the Agrarian Liberals are the dominant party contributing to the polarisation, it is natural to expect that the decline is associated with this party, and this is indeed the case. There are two phases in this development. From the 1970s to the 1980s, the declining support of the party was relatively stronger in the rural areas than in the cities, and from the 1980s to the 1990s, when the party experienced a tremendous increase, support increases most in the larger cities. The breakthrough in the larger cities is significant: the increase is from 4–6 per cent in the 1980s to about 20 per cent in the 1990s.4 The pattern is related to the particular character of the party. It is an Agrarian party that also belongs to the rightist party group in Denmark, in clear contrast to the other Scandinavian agrarian parties. The upswing to the right in 1990 was due to a large increase for the Agrarian Liberals, not the Conservative Party as in the 1980s. These new voters have to a large extent been urban voters. From the 1970s to the 1990s, the PDI-score for the Agrarian Liberals decreases by 12.5 percentage points, which is about 75 per cent of the total decline of the PDI-index. Other factors are related to the Progress Party, for which the stronger rural support evaporates in the late 1990s, and the Radical Liberal Party, which is commented on above. In the Italian case, there is a gradual decline in the strength of the correlation, apart from a rise in the early 1990s, which is deviant compared with the trends before and after (see Figure 4.2). We should largely ignore the deviant pattern from the beginning of the 1990s. The urban– rural contrasts are closely related to the Christian Democrats versus all the other parties, as can be seen from Table 4.2. Of the overall urban– rural differences of 18.4 PDI, differences related to the Christian Democrats account for 17.1, according to the data for the whole period. Forza Italia and Lega Nord are the only other parties which get stronger support from the rural population. The parties that get clearly stronger support from the urban population are the socialist parties, the greens and the liberal parties. The differences are largest for the Liberals, left socialists

146 Social Structure and Party Choice in Western Europe

and greens according to the lor-scores, and for the liberals and Communists according to PDI. The difference in support for the Communists is not large, however, given the size of the party. The lor-figures for the liberal parties are indeed the largest in the whole party system. Liberalism appears to be very much an urban phenomenon in Italy. How, then, is the gradual decline in the impact of the urban–rural variable taking place in the Italian case? As to the Christian Democrats, there is a gradual decline in the PDI-scores and a dramatic decline in the late 1990s as the party system changes. In the 1970s the Christian Democrats got about 50 per cent of the vote of the rural population compared with about 25 per cent of the population in the large cities. In the 1980s and the early 1990s, support is stable in the cities but declines in the countryside to about 40 per cent. The decline in the late 1990s is due to the collapse of Christian Democracy. The overall support for the (Christian) parties declines dramatically, and the support from the countryside declines to 16 per cent versus 7 per cent in the large cities. The decline is not particularly large in the countryside: according to the lor-scores the urban-rural difference is constant when the general decline in support for the Christian parties is taken into consideration. Among the parties that get stronger support from the urban population, changes associated with the Communist and the Liberal parties are most significant. The changes for the Liberal parties are, of course, associated with the decline and collapse of the liberal parties in the Italian party system. In the early 1970s, support for the Liberals was nearly 20 per cent in the large cities compared with 6 per cent in the countryside. Support in the large cities declined to 10–12 per cent in the late 1970s and the 1980s and PDI from 13 to 4–6. From the late 1970s, when the Communists had their greatest electoral support in the period studied here, support was stronger in the cities.5 The difference declines somewhat and contributes significantly to the overall decline from 1975–79 to the 1990s. In sum, urban–rural differences are decreasing due to changes in support for first and foremost the Christian Democrats, Communists and Liberals. The magnitude of the decline has to do with the collapse and splintering of these parties, but the trend had started before the major changes in the party system in the early 1990s. In the Irish case we find significant increases from a low level in the late 1970s to the late 1980s and then in the late 1990s. How can we explain these changes? Let us first examine the pattern based on the data for the whole period (see Table 4.2).

Urban–Rural Residence 147

The two major parties, Fine Gael and Fianna Fail, get considerably stronger support from the rural population than from the urban segment, while all the other parties get stronger support from the population of the cities. According to the PDI-measure, differences are largest for Labour and then the Workers’ Party. According to the lor-scores, differences are particularly large for the Workers’ Party. The two traditional parties, then, have a strong rural base, while the newer parties have a more urban base. The urban–rural contrast in the 1970s is caused by the stronger support from the countryside for Fine Gael and Fianna Fail, while Labour gets much stronger support from the cities. Given that Labour’s overall support is considerably smaller than that of the two other parties, the lor-score is much higher.6 The increase in the urban–rural contrasts takes place because the new parties in the party system get a larger share of the urban vote, while the two main parties lose more strongly among the urban population than among the rural population. In the early 1980s the combined support for these two main parties was 91 per cent in the countryside and 78 per cent in the large cities. In the late 1990s support in the countryside has declined to 80 per cent, but the decline is much larger in the large cities, to 56 per cent. In the late 1980s it is mainly the Workers’ Party which contributes to the increase among the parties that get stronger support among the urban population. After gaining insignificant support in the early 1980s, the party increases its support from 2 per cent to 8 per cent in the large cities, compared with an increase from 1 per cent to 2 per cent in the countryside. In the late 1990s it is the Greens and the Progressive Democrats that contribute to the increased urban–rural polarisation. Combined, they get the support of 13 per cent in the larger cities, compared with 6 per cent in the countryside. In short, the modernisation and increased fragmentation of the Irish party system is strongly associated with the increased urban–rural contrast. The new parties are mainly an urban phenomenon in Ireland. They get an increasing share of the vote of the urban population, while the two old major parties increasingly see their major support concentrated in the countryside. Let us then continue with the three countries where we observed a small decline, Belgium, France and Germany. In Belgium most of the change in the strength of the eta-coefficient takes place from the early 1980s to the early 1990s (see Figure 4.2). There is stability during the 1970s and early 1980s, and in the late 1990s there is a small increase. The Christian Social parties get support from

148 Social Structure and Party Choice in Western Europe

41 per cent of the voters in the countryside, compared with 21 per cent in the large cities, according to the data for the whole period (see Table 4.2). All the other parties get stronger support from urban voters, but for these parties differences are much more moderate and of fairly similar magnitude. Let us start by looking at the changes for the only party that gets stronger support among the rural population, the Christian Socials. The Christian parties experienced a large electoral decline in the period, and this decline is strongest among the rural population (and in the smaller towns). In the early 1970s support was 49 per cent in the rural areas and 25 per cent in the large cities. In the late 1990s support has declined to 30 per cent and 14 per cent, respectively, i.e. by 19 and 11 percentage points.7 Which parties, then, are gaining support among the urban population and contributing to the declining impact of the urban–rural contrast among the ‘urban’ parties? The major decline is associated with the Socialist and the Nationalist parties. The Socialist parties, which also experienced significant decline in the period, decrease their support in the large cities, while their support is fairly stable in rural areas and smaller cities. In the 1970s the parties got 35 per cent support in the larger cities, decreasing gradually to 23 per cent in the late 1990s. In the rural areas and in the smaller cities, support is fairly stable around 25 per cent, so that in the 1990s the urban–rural difference for these parties has nearly evaporated. The same applies to the Nationalist parties. These parties had a significantly stronger appeal in the 1970s and early 1980s, and in this period support was significantly larger among the urban population than among the rural segment. With the decline of the parties, the urban–rural differences evaporate completely. The emergence of the ecologist parties, on the other hand, contributes to increase the urban–rural difference since these parties get stronger support among the urban population, but the differences are not very large in the Belgian case. Support for the ecologists is also significant in the countryside. Finally, the Liberal parties have larger support from the urban population, 2–6 percentage points, in the various periods. The party experiences a significant increase in support, and the increase among the rural population is indeed remarkable and on the same level as in the cities. The changes in Belgium are somewhat complicated. In retrospect, we realise we have tried to answer two questions in the analysis of the Belgian case: for which parties do the urban–rural contrasts even out, and which parties gain support from the urban population when the support for the major Christian Democratic Party declines significantly

Urban–Rural Residence 149

in the rural areas? We had assumed that the answers to these two questions were associated, but the empirical analysis showed that they were not. The decline of the urban–rural contrasts is associated with different voting patterns for the Socialist and Nationalist parties in addition to the Christian Social parties. However, the decline of the urban–rural contrasts for these parties is not due to a breakthrough among rural voters but a decline among urban voters. The parties that are gaining increasing support from the rural voters are the Ecologist and the Liberal parties, which nevertheless get even stronger support from the urban population. In France we find a small, but statistically significant, correlation between party choice and urban–rural residence. The correlation is about 0.10 to the late 1980s, when it drops to 0.05–0.07 and is barely significant. According to the table based on data for the whole period (Table 4.2), it is the two main non-socialist parties, UDF and RPR, which get slightly stronger support from the countryside, while the Socialist parties and the Ecologist parties get stronger support from the urban population. Urban–rural differences are generally small for all parties, including the Communists in accordance with the expectations that can be derived from the discussion in the introduction. The small impact of the urban–rural cleavage is caused by the ability for these parties to mobilise fairly equal support from the cities and the countryside. The pattern for the two main non-socialist parties is perhaps most important in this respect. Both parties are appealing to farmers and the rural population in general at the same time as they represent the major non-socialist alternatives in the cities. The decline in the correlation is primarily related to UDF, the Communists and the New Left party, PSU. In the 1970s and the early 1980s, UDF got 5–7 percentage points stronger support among the rural population. This declines to 2–3 percentage points in the 1990s. The Communists got somewhat stronger support from the larger cities than from the countryside in the 1970s (3–4 percentage points), but this evaporates in the 1980s and 1990s. The small left socialist PSU also contributed to the urban–rural contrasts in France in the 1970s and early 1980s by getting considerably larger support from the urban population. This contribution disappears when the party’s overall support declines. The emerging Ecologist parties and the Socialist Party also get stronger support from the urban population, but this fluctuates considerably over time, and there is no long-term trend. In Germany there is a small increase in the impact of urban–rural residence on party choice from the early to the late 1970s, then stability

150 Social Structure and Party Choice in Western Europe

until the early 1990s, when there is a sharp drop to a low level close to that found in France in the 1990s (see Figure 4.2). The urban–rural contrasts are related to CDU/CSU versus the other parties, mainly SPD and the Greens (see Table 4.2). According to the lorscores, the Greens have even more different support from the urban and rural populations than CDU/CSU. FDP gets only slightly stronger support from the urban population than from rural voters. The degree to which CDU/CSU gets strongest support from the countryside is large in the 1970s and 1980s: the difference increases from 14 to 19 percentage points from the early to the late 1970s, and is then constant to the early 1990s, when it declines considerably, to 8–9 percentage points. The party’s support declines considerably more in the countryside than in small and large towns. Support for SPD mirrors that for CDU/CSU in the 1970s. SPD got about 50 per cent of the vote in the larger cities and 35 per cent in the countryside. Urban–rural contrasts are declining in two steps, from the late 1970s to the early 1980s and then from the late 1980s to the 1990s. The first decline is associated with the emergence of the Green Party, which gets a considerable portion of the urban vote: in the 1980s urban– rural differences for SPD and the Greens are equal in terms of percentage differences (7–8), and the two parties together contribute to a stable urban–rural contrast compared with the 1970s. In the 1990s, urban–rural differences for both parties decline. In Britain the urban–rural contrasts are fairly stable at a low level. There is a small decrease from the 1970s to the 1980s, but then an increase to the same level as in the 1970s. The contrast is mainly caused by differences in support for Labour and the Conservative Party, but the Liberal Party also gets greater support, by a few percentage points, among the rural population and the population in the smaller cities than among voters in the larger cities (see Table 4.2). There is basically stability in these patterns for the whole period. The decline in the 1980s is caused by smaller urban–rural differences for all three parties, and then a small increase for all parties. Finally, we find a stable correlation at a considerably higher level in the Netherlands (see Figure 4.2). The urban–rural contrast overlaps to a large extent with the religious–secular orientation of party voters: CDA and the Calvinist Fundamentalist parties get considerably stronger support from the rural population, while the Green Left, the Labour Party and, to a smaller degree, D66 get stronger support from the urban voters. The only exception is that the secular Liberal Party (VVD) gets fairly even support from the three categories on the urban–rural variable (see Table 4.2).

Urban–Rural Residence 151

The stability in the overall correlation marks some important changes for individual parties. Among the ‘rural’ parties, there is basically stability until the late 1990s. The large decline of CDA in that period is significantly stronger in rural areas and smaller cities than in larger cities, 14 versus 7 percentage points. On the other hand, support for the Liberal Party and the Calvinist Fundamentalists increases in the rural areas. For the Liberal Party the increase is 10 percentage points from the early to the late 1990s, while the corresponding increase in smaller and larger cities is 6 percentage points. The party gets somewhat larger support from the countryside and the smaller cites than from larger cities in the late 1990s, in contrast to the earlier pattern in which there were no significant differences. The increase for the Calvinist Fundamentalists is smaller and more gradual from the early 1980s to the late 1990s. Among the ‘urban’ parties, some similar trends are evident. In the 1970s and the 1980s, the Green Left and the Labour parties got fairly stable support from the urban and rural population, with support in the larger cities 4–5 and 10–13 percentage points larger than in the countryside, respectively. D66 got fairly even support along the urban–rural categories. The Labour Party’s electoral support declines considerably in the 1990s, and the decline is largest in the larger cities. In the 1990s the Labour Party has only 3–4 per cent stronger support in the larger cities than in the countryside. By contrast, the Green Left increases its support by a few percentage points in the larger cities in the 1990s and increases the urban–rural difference; and D66, which experiences enormous electoral success in the 1990s, gets an uneven urban–rural profile. The party gets clearly stronger support from the population in smaller and larger cities, 5 percentage points higher than in the countryside. In sum, the urban–rural contrasts in the Netherlands change character although the strength of the cleavage is fairly stable. The contribution to the overall contrast associated with CDA declines, while the Calvinist Fundamentalists and VVD get a clearer rural base. Similarly, the Labour Party gets a less pronounced urban base, while the urban–rural contrasts increase for the Green Left and D66.

4.4

Socialist/non-socialist party choice

Figure 4.3 (A and B) shows the relationship between socialist/non-socialist party choice and urban-rural residence in terms of lor-scores.8 In all countries the urban population is more likely to support the socialist parties (see Figure 4.3A). When the various sizes of the socialist parties are taken into consideration, the strength of the correlation is

152 Social Structure and Party Choice in Western Europe 1.10 1.00 0.90 0.80

Lor

0.70 0.60 0.50 0.40 0.30 0.20 0.10 0.00

Ireland

Denmark Netherlands

Britain

Germany

Italy

Belgium

France

Figure 4.3A Correlation between urban–rural residence and socialist/nonsocialist party choice measured by the lor-measure, 1970–97. Greens placed in the non-socialist party group 1.10 1.00 0.90 0.80

Lor

0.70 0.60 0.50 0.40 0.30 0.20 0.10 0.00

Ireland

Denmark Netherlands Germany

Britain

Italy

Belgium

France

Figure 4.3B Correlation between urban–rural residence and socialist/nonsocialist party choice measured by the lor-measure, 1970–97. Greens placed in the socialist party group

largest in Ireland, 9 followed by Denmark, the Netherlands and Britain. There are indeed larger variations in the strength of the correlation with socialist/non-socialist party choice than for the general party choice, and the ranking of the countries is also somewhat different. The most obvious differences are that the correlation is largest for Ireland, not Denmark, and that Belgium and Italy rank considerably lower in Figure 4.3 than in Figure 4.1.

Urban–Rural Residence 153

When the Greens are classified in the socialist party group (see Figure 4.3B), the strength of the correlation increases strongly in countries with significant Green parties, since the Greens – as the traditional Socialist parties – draw stronger support from the urban population. The increase is definitely largest in Germany (0.19), followed by Belgium and Italy (0.09); it is smaller in France (0.04) and insignificant in Britain and Ireland. The correlation in Germany is now on the same level as in the Netherlands and Britain, and the correlation in Belgium and Italy approaches the correlation in these other countries. The changes over time are shown in Figure 4.4. Let us start with the figure where the Greens are placed among the non-socialist parties (Figure 4.4A). In the 1970s the correlation was clearly largest in Ireland and Denmark and fairly similar, though at a much lower level, in the other countries. The largest decline takes place in Denmark, where the correlation in the 1990s drops to less than a quarter of the strength in the 1970s – and is indeed lower than the average for all countries. There are also significant declines in Belgium, Germany, France and the Netherlands. The high correlation in Ireland fluctuates somewhat, but there is no long-term change. There are no long-term changes in Italy, Britain or Ireland. The average correlation for the eight countries declines sharply to about 65 per cent of the original strength in the early 1970s, and to 60 per cent compared with the late 1970s. In the 1990s the correlation is higher in Ireland, followed by the Netherlands and Britain. Since the measurement of urban–rural residence in the early 1970s is somewhat different than in the later periods, one could argue that the late 1970s should be used as a starting-point for the comparison. There are only two major changes to the conclusions above when the late 1970s is taken as the early point for comparison. There is no significant change in France, and a considerable decline in Italy. As can be seen from the figure, a major decline takes place in France during the 1970s along with a major increase in Italy. When the Greens are placed in the socialist party group (Figure 4.4B), there are only two significant changes. The decline of the correlations becomes much smaller in Belgium and Germany, less than half of the size when the Greens are placed in the non-socialist group. The average decline for all countries also becomes smaller, 75 per cent of its strength in the early 1970s, which is still a significant decline. We have also examined the degree to which the urban–rural contrast cut across the left–right division of countries by means of the PDImeasure (see Table 7.1A in Chapter 7). For the whole period the socialist/ non-socialist division taps only 48 per cent of the overall correlation in

Lor

154 Social Structure and Party Choice in Western Europe

1.30 1.20 1.10 1.00 0.90 0.80 0.70 0.60 0.50 0.40 0.30 0.20 0.10 0.00 1970–74 Belgium Britain

1975–79

1980–84

Denmark France

1985–89 Germany Ireland

1990–93 Italy Netherlands

1994–97 Mean

Lor

Figure 4.4A Trends in the strength of the correlation between urban–rural residence and socialist/non-socialist party choice according to the lor-measure. Greens in the non-socialist group

1.30 1.20 1.10 1.00 0.90 0.80 0.70 0.60 0.50 0.40 0.30 0.20 0.10 0.00 1970–74 Belgium Ireland

1975–79 Britain Italy

1980–84

1985–89

Denmark Netherlands

1990–93

France Mean

1994–97 Germany

Figure 4.4B Trends in the strength of the correlation between socialist/nonsocialist party choice and urban–rural residence according to the lor-measure. Greens in the socialist group

Urban–Rural Residence 155

Belgium, 59 per cent in Italy, 75 per cent in the Netherlands, about 85 per cent in Ireland and Denmark and more than 90 per cent in the remaining three countries. There are, then, large variations between the countries in this respect. It is among the non-socialist parties that we find the deviations from the rule that support for the socialist parties is strongest in the urban areas while support for the non-socialist parties is largest in the countryside. In Belgium the large degree of cross-cutting is caused by the fact that all non-socialist parties other than the Christian parties get strongest support from the urban population. The division is – as we saw above – a contrast between the Christian parties and all others. In Italy it is the Liberal parties and to some degree also the radical rightist MSI that contribute to the relatively high degree of cross-cutting. In the Netherlands, Denmark and Ireland, it is D66, the Conservative People’s Party and the Progressive Democrats that gain strongest support among the urban population and contribute to a significant degree of cross-cutting, respectively. For Britain, France and Germany, the left–right division of parties follows the urban–rural cleavage very closely. There are few changes in the degree of cross-cutting over time. The two largest changes take place in Denmark and Italy (see Table 7.1B in Chapter 7). In Denmark the degree of cross-cutting is increasing significantly. The left-right correlation taps 70–80 per cent of the total correlation in the 1970s. This drops to about 40 per cent in the 1990s. The change is coupled with the fact that the urban–rural cleavage decreases significantly, primarily due to the changes among the left socialists and the Agrarian Liberals, as described above. The fairly stable tendency for the Conservative People’s Party to get stronger support from the urban strata becomes, then, a more important cross-cutting pattern compared with the overall PDI-correlation. In addition, the non-socialist Radical Liberal Party and the Social Democrats experience a reversal, getting stronger support from the urban and rural strata, respectively, which contributes to a higher degree of cross-cutting. In the Italian case there is a decline in the degree of cross-cutting. This change is much smaller than that in Denmark, and is associated with the decline of the Liberal parties, which got strongest support from the urban strata.

4.5

Conclusion

The urban–rural cleavage is still of considerable importance in West European countries, but it is declining somewhat. The cleavage is largest

156 Social Structure and Party Choice in Western Europe

in the only country with a distinct agrarian party, Denmark, and then in the countries with Christian Democratic countries, Belgium, Ireland, Italy and the Netherlands. It is smaller in Germany for the whole period, but on the same level as in the other countries with Christian parties until the significant drop in the 1990s. The correlation between party choice and urban–rural residence is smallest in Britain and France, countries without major Christian parties. In these countries the major non-socialist parties’ gain only some stronger support from to rural than from the urban population – at least compared with the Christian parties in the other countries. The Christian and then the Conservative Party family get stronger support from the rural population than from the large towns. All the party families of the left, including the Greens, and the Liberal parties get stronger support from the urban population. The largest urban–rural differences (in terms of lor-scores) are found for the left socialists, the Communists and the Greens. The decline in the urban–rural cleavage is moderate and the trends vary between countries. The largest decline is found in Denmark, where the urban–rural cleavage was much stronger than in the other countries in the 1970s and 1980s. There is also a considerable decline in Italy, and smaller declines in Belgium, France and Germany. The urban–rural cleavage increases significantly in one country, Ireland, where we find the highest correlation in the 1990s. Perhaps the most interesting finding associated with the decline of the urban–rural cleavage in Denmark is the way the support for the Agrarian Liberal Party changes. It is not so much that the party loses support among the rural population, but that it gains a strong increase in the support from the urban population in the 1990s. This can be explained by the special character of the Danish Agrarian Party. It is a rightist party in some contrast to the other Scandinavian Agrarian parties, which more clearly belong to the centre on the economic left– right scale. In the 1990s there is a swing to the right in Denmark that to a large extent favours the Agrarian Liberal Party, not the Conservative People’s Party as in the 1980s. The new voters are then urban rightist voters. This contributes to decrease the urban–rural cleavage at the party level. Major reasons for the decline of the urban–rural cleavage in many countries are coupled to the Christian parties and the main party of the left. In some countries the decline is a consequence of the overall decline of the Christian parties, as in Belgium, Italy and also in the Netherlands where the component of the cleavage caused by CDA is reduced although

Urban–Rural Residence 157

the overall strength of the urban–rural cleavage is fairly stable. In Germany, however, there is an evening out of the support from the rural and urban population with regard to CDU/CSU. As for the parties of the left, the changes for several social democratic parties are interesting. Their anchorage among the urban population declines relative to the rural – a major cause of the decline of the urban–rural cleavage in several countries. We find this tendency in Belgium, Denmark, Germany and The Netherlands. In all these countries there was considerable larger support for the Social Democrats in the larger cities in the 1970s. This difference becomes smaller or disappears gradually to the 1990s. This occurs in all countries in the way the there is a relatively strong decline in support for the Social Democrats in the (larger) cities, while the decline is considerably smaller in the rural areas. In Denmark we even find an opposite pattern in the 1990s: Support for the Social Democrats is larger in the rural areas. In Belgium and Germany the declining urban–rural difference in support for the Social Democrats must to a certain degree be seen in relation to the emergence of the Green parties in these countries. These parties get strongest support from the urban population, and make a strong inroad into the urban segment of the presumably previously social democratic voters. In Italy the decline of the urban–rural cleavage is strongly coupled to the change in the party system. The parties that were strongest anchored in the urban–rural cleavage, the Christian Democrats and the Liberal parties, reduce their overall support and even vanish (the liberals). In France the urban–rural cleavage is also strongly coupled to the changes in the party system. The decline of the Communists and the New Left contribute to the reduced impact of urban–rural residence, and the UDF-alliance get a more even support from the urban and rural population. Finally, In Ireland the increase of the urban–rural cleavage is associated with the change in the party system. The new parties (Workers’ Party, Progressive Democrats and Greens) get much stronger support from the urban population than from the rural. The traditional parties, Fianna Fail and Fine Gael, got stronger support from the rural population in the 1970s, before the emergence or significant electoral support of the new parties, but differences were not large. When the new parties appear, they make substantial inroad among the urban voters, but not among the rural. The consequence is that the traditional parties gain their rural electorate but lose considerably among the urban, and the impact of the cleavage increases.

158 Social Structure and Party Choice in Western Europe

As for the socialist/non-socialist division we find a clear decline in the impact of urban–rural residence. The decline is 35 per cent and 25 per cent of the strength in the early 1970s when the Green parties are placed in the non-socialist and the socialist groups, respectively. The degree to which the socialist/non-socialist party division taps the whole correlation with party choice (as a nominal variable) is particularly low in Belgium, Italy and The Netherlands. In these countries several of the non-socialist parties get stronger support from the urban population, something which contributes to the cross-cutting pattern in relation to the socialist/non-socialist division.

5 Education

5.1

Introduction

The reason for choosing education as a variable to tap the hierarchical social status or class cleavage is that it is a variable that can be easily ascribed to all respondents, in some contrast to social class and income, for which the complications of the relationship between the individual’s own characteristics versus that of the family (or spouse) enter the discussion. In addition, education has a prior character in a causal sense compared with social class or other class-related variables. The causal impact of education cannot be diminished or insignificant when such variables are controlled for in multivariate analyses. On the other hand, much of the impact of education is often mediated via such adult characteristics as occupation, income/housing status, union membership, value orientation and issue position. It should nevertheless be underscored that, from a causal perspective, education is the prior variable in the causal chain where these variables are included. The education revolution that has taken place in West European countries has expanded the educational opportunities for successive cohorts in the population. Secondary education has expanded to become an opportunity for a majority of the population, and university and other forms of tertiary education have also expanded greatly. These changes are documented below in some detail. What are the electoral consequences of these changes in educational opportunities? Before the analysis of the education revolution enters the discussion, one should perhaps underscore that different education levels exist within the population at a given time-point and within different cohorts, and it is these differences that will be studied comparatively in a crosssectional analysis. 159

160

Social Structure and Party Choice in Western Europe

Let us therefore start by focusing on the electoral consequences of having a low and a high education level. There is an old and a new version of these consequences in the literature on value change and electoral behaviour, and they are related to the conflict structure and opportunity structure in industrial and post-industrial society, respectively. In the old version, education was an indicator of social class or social status, and the voting pattern of those with low and high education was expected to follow the pattern for the working class versus the new and (partly) the old middle classes. Those with lower education were expected to vote for the traditional parties of the left, primarily Social Democratic parties and Communist parties, while those with higher education voted for the parties that articulated the class interests of the middle class and the bourgeoisie, in particular Liberal and partly also Conservative parties (see note 1 below). This version of how education has an impact on voting behaviour may be most relevant for the older cohorts that grew up before the Second World War, and may become less important over time, but we still expect this pattern to be important. The new version is inspired by changes in the political landscape in connection with the student protests and the changes in conflict structure of the advanced societies. One line of reasoning focuses on the fact that higher education reflects several things, not only social class, and that these other aspects may have become more important over time (Inglehart 1977: 75–6): • It reflects general cognitive development: the higher educated have developed certain skills, above all, skills in dealing with abstractions. These skills might enable them to cope more readily with new ideas and remote objects. They may be more open to new values and trends. • It reflects informal communication patterns: the higher educated talk with different people, and they live within communications networks that carry different messages from those received by the less educated. One might expect these influences to shape the values and orientations of the higher educated. • Explicit development of attachment to certain political parties or political tendencies might also take place among the higher educated. This is partly a contextual effect which takes place when large numbers of young people are gathered together in university communities, relatively isolated from the larger society, but it may have some lasting effects on the political attachments of the higher educated strata.

Education

161

There might be generational differences in the cues that the higher educated receive from these environments, because in particular the informal communication patterns and the development of party attachment might be different due to the different spirits of the time (‘Zeitgeists’). The new version discusses the new electoral orientation in connection with changes in political values and the conflict structure in advanced societies. The higher educated strata will, due to the factors outlined above, and because they have grown up in more economically secure environments, be more likely to have post-materialist or libertarian values, while people who are not exposed to the effects of higher education will have more traditional materialist and also authoritarian values (Inglehart 1977: 72–84; 1990: 162–8, Dalton 1996: 102–4). In terms of electoral behaviour, the new middle class and the bettereducated strata are most likely to support ‘the post-material left’, that is, mainly Green and left socialist parties. And as post-materialist issues become more important, this may stimulate a materialist and authoritarian counter-reaction whereby economically and psychologically marginal segments of society, i.e. part of the working class and those with least education, side with conservative and radical rightist parties to reaffirm the traditional materialist emphasis on economic growth, military security and law and order (Inglehart 1984: 28; 1997: 244–51). This can also be expressed by means of spatial dimensions. In advanced industrial societies the economic left–right dimension has been supplanted by a materialist/post-materialist or authoritarian– libertarian dimension (Kitschelt 1994; 1995). On this new dimension, workers and people with less education tend to be located near the authoritarian pole, while the new middle class and those with higher education tend to be located near the libertarian pole (Kitschelt 1994: 30–9; 149–206; 1995: 13–19). In sum, the new education polarisation will take place along the New Politics conflict dimension, and will predominantly contrast the Green and left socialist parties with the radical rightist parties, which will get support from the higher and lower educated strata. The electoral consequences of education expansion are in general somewhat uncertain. Higher levels of education prepare people for middle-class jobs, higher income and certain types of life-styles. According to the old version of the impact of education, education expansion should benefit the parties that have traditionally articulated the interests of the middle class and the higher educated strata, Liberal and Conservative

162

Social Structure and Party Choice in Western Europe

parties of the established right. According to the theory of New Politics, the education expansion should lead to an increase of post-materialist and libertarian values, which will increase the support for Green and Left-Libertarian parties. Another thesis about education expansion is related to social mobility. The access to higher education for people of different social classes implies that children’s ultimate social placements are increasingly different from those of their parents. Some socially mobile individuals will change their adult political identifications to conform to the new contexts, while others will not. In sum, new educational and occupational opportunities have provided a social mobility that produces social and political crosspressure. The result may be a greater diversification of values and party choices among the higher educated strata (Dalton, Beck & Flanagan 1984: 16; Franklin 1992: 399). Finally, the increase in higher-educated people can be coupled with the partisan dealignment perspective. Advanced industrial societies are producing a new type of sophisticated voters who are relatively independent from partisan cues when they make their voting decisions. The process of so-called cognitive mobilisation has increased voters’ political sophistication and their ability to deal with the complexities of politics. This produces a group of politically interested and welleducated voters who orient themselves to politics on their own. They are relatively free of partisan ties, and their voting behaviour is not dependent on long-standing party predispositions. They tend to inject more issue voting into elections and demand that parties be more responsive to voters and public opinion (Dalton 1996: 21–38, 213–15). This is a group of highly politically volatile voters who do not have any strong partisan attachment and may change their party choice from one election to another. In sum, we expect the higher educated strata to show a more diversified (and volatile) voting pattern over time. We expect to find both the old and the new polarisation pattern existing simultaneously among the electorate, but the new polarisation will increase over time at the expense of the Old Politics polarisation. More concretely, we expect that higher educated persons in the 1970s voted mainly for the Liberal and Conservative parties, 1 while those with lower education voted for the Social Democrats and the Communists. The education cleavage closely followed the left–right division of parties. Increasingly, the higher-educated strata vote for the post-industrial left, Green and Left Libertarian parties, and the impact of education will cut across the left–right division of parties.

Education

163

5.2 The education variable in the surveys and changes in education levels in a comparative perspective Since 1973 the following education variable has been asked in nearly all surveys.2 How old were you when you finished your full-time education? 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10.

up to 14 years 15 years 16 years 17 years 18 years 19 years 20 years 21 years 22 years or older still studying

This is a continuous variable with an upper limit that corresponds to a certain level of higher education, normally 3–4 years of education after upper-secondary level. It does not differentiate between different types of education, which might have been preferable; on the other hand, a more qualitative education variable might have been difficult to use for comparative purposes, given that the educational systems are very different in the various countries.3 One problem might be that children start school at different ages in different countries, and this is not taken into consideration when we only have information about how old the respondent is when finishing her/his education. Figure 5.1 shows some basic comparative differences in education levels according to the data. Since the data cover the same period for all eight countries, the distributions based on the whole period should not influence the comparison between countries even though the general education levels have increased markedly. The figure shows that people finish their full-time education latest in Denmark and the Netherlands and earliest in Ireland, Italy and Britain. Means might underestimate the ‘visual’ differences compared with distributions, and they do not show the spread around the mean. Table 5.1 shows that nearly half of the respondents in Italy finished school when they were 14 years or less, compared with around 20 per cent in all the other countries. It is characteristic of the distribution in Ireland and

Age when finishing full-time education

164

Social Structure and Party Choice in Western Europe

18.00 17.00 16.00 15.00 14.00 13.00 12.00

Denmark Netherlands Belgium

Figure 5.1 1973–97

France

Germany

Ireland

Italy

Britain

Average education level in the population of the eight countries,

Britain that many finish school when they are 16 years or less. If we define those who finish school when they are 20 years or older as those who have higher education, we find the smallest portion of the respondents with higher education in these countries. The lower spread in the distributions of these countries is shown in the lower standard deviations. The highest number with higher education is found in Denmark. Italy has a surprisingly high level with higher education, given that so many Italians have a very low level of education. Figure 5.2 shows how the education level has changed in the eight countries, measured by the mean education level in various five-year intervals. The most interesting factor shown by the figure is perhaps not that there is an increase in all countries, but that the average education levels in the eight countries have become much more diversified over time. In the 1970s there were only small differences between the countries. From the early 1980s the education level in the Netherlands becomes higher than in the other countries, and from the late 1980s the education level in Denmark increases significantly more than in the other countries. The education level also becomes significantly higher in the Netherlands, France and Belgium than in the four remaining countries. This can be illustrated by the eta-coefficient between education level and country for the various periods: it is 0.113 in the early 1970s, 0.147 in the late 1970s and increases gradually to 0.318 in the early 1990s. There is then a small decline to the late 1990s (0.306).

Table 5.1

Sum N Mean Std. dev. Sum 14–16 Sum 20+

Age when finishing full-time education 1973–97 Age:

Belgium

Britain

Denmark

France

Germany

Ireland

Italy

Netherlands

14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22

25.1 6.8 12.3 8.1 17.7 6.7 6.5 6.0 10.8 100.0 59,824 17.28 2.70

22.8 23.0 24.8 8.3 7.2 2.2 1.8 3.5 6.5 100.0 61,643 16.25 2.27

27.5 7.2 8.6 7.9 6.1 6.0 6.9 5.2 24.7 100.0 58,160 17.78 3.19

26.8 5.5 12.1 11.2 14.4 6.8 6.4 4.1 12.9 100.0 60,896 17.24 2.75

22.8 18.9 15.7 11.1 10.0 5.4 2.8 1.8 11.4 100.0 60,396 16.72 2.57

21.3 14.6 19.5 15.7 15.5 4.4 2.5 2.6 4.0 100.0 58,228 16.50 2.10

47.8 6.9 5.5 5.1 8.7 7.7 4.3 2.2 11.9 100.0 61,908 16.43 2.90

19.9 9.5 13.3 11.3 11.0 6.5 5.3 4.9 18.2 100.0 59,335 17.58 2.85

44.1 23.3

70.5 11.8

43.2 36.9

44.4 23.3

57.4 16.1

55.3 9.1

60.1 18.4

42.7 28.4

165

166

Social Structure and Party Choice in Western Europe

20.00 19.00 18.00 17.00 16.00 15.00 14.00 13.00 12.00 1973–74

1975–79 France Italy

Figure 5.2

1980–84

1985–89

Belgium Denmark

Netherlands Ireland

1990–93

1994–97

Germany Britain

Trends in average level of education in the eight countries

By studying the changes between cohorts, we can say something about the basic changes in the educational systems in the various countries. A small portion of the population gets substantial full-time education later in life, so there are small “period” effects that have to be controlled for. Figure 5.3 shows the mean education levels in different cohorts for the whole period. 4 Some of the comparative variations in the older generations may not be found with the available education variable, because we can expect that large segments left school before they were 14 years old in some countries, but not to the same degree in others. Differences become clear in the cohort of the 1930s, with Denmark and the Netherlands ahead of the other countries. Differences are indeed large for all of the subsequent cohorts. The education level is consistently highest in Denmark, followed by the Netherlands, France and Belgium, while the level is smallest in Germany, Ireland and Britain. There is a large change in the education level in Italy from the cohort of the 1930s to younger cohorts, indicating that much change is taken place in the education system; and in the younger cohorts the education level approaches that found in France, Belgium and the Netherlands. Changes between the cohorts are largest in Denmark, followed by the second group of countries, where the education level is largest after the Danish case in the younger

Education

167

20.0 19.0 18.0 17.0 16.0 15.0 14.0 13.0 12.0 1890–99 1990–09 1910–19 1920–29 1930–39 1940–49 1950–59 1960–69 1970–79 France Italy

Belgium

Netherlands

Germany

Denmark

Ireland

Britain

Figure 5.3 Average education level in different birth cohorts in the eight countries, 1973–97

cohorts (Belgium, France, Italy and the Netherlands); and smallest in Germany, Ireland and Britain.

5.3

Education and party choice

Introduction How should we present the relationship between party choice and education? The variable has nine categories, and it is too detailed to present cross-tabulations with all these categories. One way is to use the mean education level for each party. This is an exact way of tapping the information from the data. The education variable can be used without losing information by recoding the variable. On the other hand, some details get lost, since a mean can mask many different patterns, and such an approach differs from the one generally used in this work. One does not get concrete information about how those with more and less education vote. An alternative is to recode the variable into a number of categories, for example 3–4. The problem with such a strategy is that the education levels are fairly different in the various countries, and that they change significantly over time within countries. One strategy

168

Social Structure and Party Choice in Western Europe

is to normalise the variable in some way so that it has the same distribution over time and between countries. I have chosen a very simple variant of this strategy. Given the distribution of the education variable over time with a large portion of the population with less education in the first period and a more even distribution on the various categories later, I have taken the distributions on the education variable for each five-year period in each country as a point of departure. For these distributions I have created a variable that approaches the distribution 40–20–20–20, and base most of the analysis on the comparison of those who belong to the lowest 40 per cent and those who belong to the highest 20 per cent.5 For each time period we compare those who have the highest education level with those who have less education.6 I have also examined the mean education level of voters for the various parties within each time period. These methods produce very similar results and very close correlations in terms of the eta-coefficients. I have chosen to present the eta-coefficient based on the original ninecategory variable. Thus, the recoding of the education variable has not influenced the correlation coefficients. Patterns based on the data for the whole period, 1973–97 Let us now look at the correlation between party choice and education for the whole period. Figure 5.4 shows the strength of the eta-coefficient for the whole period and is then based on the nine-category education variable. The correlation is significant in all countries, and indeed large

0.300

Eta-coefficient

0.250 0.200 0.150 0.100 0.050 0.000

Belgium

Denmark Netherlands

Italy

Germany

Ireland

France

Britain

Figure 5.4 Strength of the correlation between education and party choice measured by the eta-coefficient, 1973–97

Table 5.2 Overall differences in support for the various political parties according to education in a comparative setting, 1970–97. Parties are grouped into party families A. Lor Belgium Comm. Left Soc. Soc. Dem Green Nationalists Liberal Christian Conservative Radical right Spec. p. I Spec. p. II Other p.

Britain

0.03 −1.02 1.29 0.73 0.66 −0.40

−0.63 1.38 −0.08 0.35 0.29

−0.28

0.67

0.70

Denmark

France

0.06 1.19 −1.05 1.29

−0.81 0.66 −0.02 0.66

0.56 −0.31 0.52 −0.57 0.01 0.28 −0.05

0.09

Germany

−0.52 1.79 0.96 −0.24

−0.12 −0.73 0.16

−0.95

0.15

0.46

Ireland −0.55 −0.52 1.13 0.64 0.50 −0.34

0.40

Italy −0.35 1.97 −0.18 1.45 0.33 1.20 −0.58 0.32 0.34 −0.13 1.27

Netherlands 1.10 −0.63

0.83 −0.54

Average −0.27 0.87 −0.57 1.28 0.33 0.66 −0.26 0.14 −0.44

Average 2 1.231

−0.422 −0.633

0.83 −0.56 −0.10

169

170

Table 5.2

(Continued)

B. PDI Belgium Comm. Left Soc. Soc. Dem Green Nationalists Liberal Christian Conservative Radical right Spec. p. I Spec. p. II Other p. PDI Sum

Britain

0.0 −18.8 11.3 5.4 9.4 −8.6

−14.8 2.1 −0.1 5.3 7.0

−0.5

1.8 27.9

0.6 15.0

Denmark

France

0.1 14.7 −21.9 0.6

−5.6 1.9 −0.5 5.1

2.9 −0.6 6.5 −2.8 0.2 0.7 −0.2 25.5

1.3

Germany

−12.6 12.7 5.7 −5.8

−1.7 −1.6 0.4

−1.0

0.6 9.3

0.9 19.4

Ireland −1.3 −5.3 1.9 1.3 10.0 −8.4

1.7 14.9

Italy −6.0 3.4 −2.4 4.9 0.4 8.0 −12.7 0.6 2.0 −0.4 2.3 21.5

Netherlands 7.0 −13.4

10.6 −10.6

8.3 −1.6 −0.3 25.9

Average −2.9 5.1 −11.2 5.5 1.9 5.6 −4.7 0.8 −0.8

Average 2 6.l71

−7.72 −1.53

19.9

Notes Special parties are for Denmark Agrarian Liberals (I) and Centre Democrats (II), for France MRG (I), for Italy PSDI (I) and for the Netherlands D66 (I) and Calvinist Fundamentalists (II). The differences are calculated by comparing the highest and the lowest level on the four-category education variable. Average 2 are calculated without the deviant 1) Irish, 2) Irish and 3) Italian cases.

Education

171

in five countries – Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, Italy and Germany – and considerably lower in the remaining three countries. 7 The PDI-measures and the lor-scores are based on the categories with lowest and highest education levels (40% and 20% of the respondents, respectively). Table 5.2 shows the lor-scores for the various parties grouped into party families for the whole period. According to the average figures, four party families get stronger support from those with less education, namely the Communists, Social Democrats, Christian Democrats and Radical Rightist parties. The (negative) lor-score is largest for the Social Democrats and then the Radical Right. In fact, the average lor-score is at the same level for the Radical Rightist parties as for the Social Democrats when the deviant Italian case is omitted from the Radical Rightist party group (−0.63). The average lor-score for the Christian parties when the deviant Irish case is excluded is −0.42, considerably higher than when the Irish party is included. This is basically in accordance with our hypotheses. The Old Leftist and the New Rightist parties have voters with the lowest education levels. It is somewhat surprising that the Christian Democrats also have voters with such low education levels. There are interesting variations among these various party families. Among the social democratic parties, there are three levels of differences in educational support. Very high differences are found in Belgium and Denmark; then more moderate differences are found in Britain, Germany, Ireland and the Netherlands; and no significant differences are found in Italy and France. Among the Communist parties, the decisively largest effect of education is found in France, followed by Italy. Educational differences in support for the Christian parties are largest in Italy and the Netherlands and smallest in Denmark and Germany. The deviant Irish case shows that Fine Gail has strongest support among the higher-educated strata. The Radical Rightist parties get the most disproportionate support from the lower-educated strata in France and Germany. The remaining party families get stronger support from the higher educated strata. The clearest cases in this respect are the Greens and the Left Socialist parties, followed by the Liberal parties, while differences are smaller for the Conservative and Nationalist parties. These patterns are basically in accordance with our hypotheses. Among the Left Socialist parties, the Irish case is a clearly deviant one. The Workers’ Party gets stronger support from the lower educated strata. The average for the other parties is at the same level as for the Green party family (1.23). Apart from the Left Socialists and Greens in France, where differences are smaller than in the other countries, there

172

Social Structure and Party Choice in Western Europe

are consistently large educational differences in support for these parties in all countries. The largest lor-score within the Green party family is nevertheless found for the German party – well ahead of the other Green parties. All the Liberal parties get stronger support from the higher educated strata, but the strength of the correlation differs greatly between countries. There is a tendency for those Liberal parties that clearly belong to right in their party systems to have larger educational differences among their voters (in Belgium, Germany, Ireland, Italy and the Netherlands). The Conservative parties vary considerably with regard to support from different educational strata. In Britain, Denmark and Italy, support is stronger among the higher-educated strata, while the opposite is the case in France and especially in Ireland. Strength of the correlation over time Figure 5.5 shows the changes over time indicated by the eta-coefficient. Looking first at the average correlation for the eight countries, there is a small decline in the late 1970s, but then an increase to the early 1980s, and from the early 1980s there is a gradual decline. We could more roughly say that we find a high degree of stability in the 1970s and the 1980s, but then a decline in the 1990s. The average decline of the

0.350 0.300

Eta-coefficient

0.250 0.200 0.150 0.100 0.050 0.000 1973–74

1975–79

Belgium Ireland

1980–84

Britain Italy

1985–89

Denmark Netherlands

1990–93 France Mean

1994–97

Germany

Figure 5.5 Trends in the strength of the correlation between education and party choice measured by the eta-coefficient

Education

173

eta-coefficient in the late 1990s represents 26 per cent of the original strength in the early 1970s and 28 per cent of the average strength in the early 1980s. There is, however, much change in the various countries, following different patterns than the average figure indicates. In the 1970s the correlation is highest in Denmark and the Netherlands, but in both of these countries there is clear decline which starts somewhat earlier in the Netherlands than in Denmark. On the other hand, from the late 1970s to the 1980s, we find an increase in several countries, Belgium, Italy, Ireland and Germany. This increase is remarkably high in Germany, one of the countries where the correlation is lowest in the 1970s, while it reaches a level among the highest correlations in the 1980s. In all of these countries, we find that the correlations remain at a significantly higher level than in the 1970s, although there is a decline in Germany from the 1980s to the 1990s. A clear exception is the Italian case in the late 1990s, where the coefficient drops to a level much lower than in the late 1970s. The countries that contribute most to the average decrease are Britain, Denmark, Italy and the Netherlands, where the decrease is substantial – a decline in the eta-coefficient of 0.10–0.14 from the early 1970s to the late 1990s. In these countries the declines represents 35–60 per cent of the original strength of the early 1970s. There is also a smaller decrease in France (0.06). Only in Germany is there a significant long-term increase in the impact of education (0.06), smaller than the increase from the 1970s to the 1980s because there is the decline in the correlation in the 1990s.8 Detailed analyses of the impact of education and changes over time within the eight countries. Let us now examine the relationship between party choice and education in various countries in more detail. Table 5.3 shows the relationship between party choice and education for the whole period according to the four-category education variable discussed above. In Belgium there is a high correlation between party choice and education. There is an increase from the 1970s to the 1980s and then a small decline to the 1990s (see Figure 5.5). In a comparative setting, the correlation is highest in the 1990s but also high in the 1980s. It is not an education polarisation between left and right that primarily determines the strength of the educational conflict in Belgium. The most different levels of support from the various educational strata, according to both PDI and lor, are found for the Socialist and the Green

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Social Structure and Party Choice in Western Europe

Table 5.3

Education and party choice, 1973–97

Belgium 1 Low PCB/KPB PS/SP Ecolo/Agalev Volksu./ RW/FDI PRL/PVV PSC/CVP Flemish Block Other parties Sum N

2

3

1.1 1.2 1.4 35.3 26.4 21.1 5.2 9.5 10.2 5.7 8.8 11.7 12.8 17.4 19.3 36.1 31.7 32.1 1.9 2.3 1.3 2.0 2.7 3.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 10,968 7,212 4,854

4 High 1.1 16.5 16.4 11.1 22.2 27.5 1.4 3.8 100.0 5,909

Total

PDI

Lor

1.2 0.0 0.03 26.9 −18.8 −1.02 9.4 11.3 1.29 8.6 5.4 0.73 17.0 9.4 0.66 32.6 −8.6 −0.40 1.8 −0.5 −0.28 2.7 1.8 0.67 100.0 Sum 28,943

|PDI| 0.0 18.8 11.3 5.4 9.4 8.6 0.5 1.8 27.9

Eta = 0,280 Britain 1 Low Labour Party Green Party Nationalists Liberals Conservatives Other parties Sum N

2

3

4 High

46.1 41.5 29.0 0.7 1.7 1.9 1.9 2.5 2.2 15.8 16.2 17.4 34.8 37.0 48.5 0.6 1.1 0.9 100.0 100.0 100.0 16,146 10,443 6,915

31.3 2.8 1.8 21.1 41.8 1.3 100.0 6,726

Total

PDI

Lor

39.5 −14.8 −0.63 1.5 2.1 1.38 2.1 −0.1 −0.08 17.1 5.3 0.35 38.9 7.0 0.29 0.9 0.6 0.70 100.0 Sum 40,230

|PDI| 14.8 2.1 0.1 5.3 7.0 0.6 15.0

Eta = 0,131 Denmark 1 Low

2

DKP 1.0 1.3 Left soc. 8.4 13.3 Soc. Dem. 42.3 31.8 Greens 0.2 0.7 Rad. Lib. 4.1 3.5 Chr. Peopl. Party 2.3 1.5 Cons. Peopl. Party 11.5 18.0 Progress Party 6.8 7.8 Agrar. Lib. 17.5 11.2 Centr. Dem. 2.2 2.9 Other parties 3.9 8.0 Sum 100.0 100.0 N 15,506 6,094 Eta = 0,270

3

4 High

Total

PDI

Lor

|PDI|

1.0 1.1 1.1 0.1 0.06 0.1 14.9 23.0 14.2 14.7 1.19 14.7 28.0 20.5 32.4 −21.9 −1.05 21.9 0.7 0.8 0.5 0.6 1.29 0.6 4.8 6.9 4.9 2.9 0.56 2.9 1.0 1.7 1.8 −0.6 −0.31 0.6 18.6 17.9 15.4 6.5 0.52 6.5 6.2 3.9 6.1 −2.8 −0.57 2.8 15.6 17.6 16.2 0.2 0.01 0.2 4.0 2.8 2.8 0.7 0.28 0.7 5.2 3.7 4.7 −0.2 −0.05 0.2 100.0 100.0 100.0 Sum 25.5 6,176 10,253 38,029

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175

France 1 Low PCF 10.6 PSU 2.1 PSF 36.4 Ecologists 6.2 UDF 18.4 RPR 17.3 Front National 3.1 MRG 2.3 Other parties 3.8 Sum 100.0 N 14,881

2

3

9.7 7.2 2.8 2.5 34.3 35.6 10.3 10.6 16.3 17.0 17.4 18.0 2.8 2.4 2.3 2.4 4.2 4.3 100.0 100.0 7,058 7,597

4 High

Total

5.0 4.0 35.9 11.3 19.7 15.6 1.5 2.7 4.3 100.0 7,986

8.6 2.7 35.7 8.9 18.0 17.1 2.5 2.4 4.1 100.0 37,522

4 High

Total

PDI

Lor

−5.6 −0.81 1.9 0.66 −0.5 −0.02 5.1 0.66 1.3 0.09 −1.7 −0.12 −1.6 −0.73 0.4 0.16 0.6 0.15 Sum

|PDI| 5.6 1.9 0.5 5.1 1.3 1.7 1.6 0.4 0.6 9.3

Eta = 0,132

Germany 1 Low SPD Green FDP CDU/CSU Republic. Party Other parties Sum N

2

3

47.8 44.0 38.5 3.0 5.4 8.5 4.0 6.3 7.5 42.0 40.8 42.3 1.6 1.9 1.3 1.7 1.7 1.9 100.0 100.0 100.0 14,982 10,395 7,283

35.1 15.7 9.7 36.2 0.6 2.6 100.0 6,834

PDI

Lor

|PDI|

42.9 −12.6 −0.52 12.6 6.9 12.7 1.79 12.7 6.2 5.7 0.96 5.7 40.7 −5.8 −0.24 5.8 1.4 −1.0 −0.95 1.0 1.9 0.9 0.46 0.9 100.0 Sum 19.4 39,494

Eta = 0,223

Ireland 1 Low Worker’s Party Labour Green Prog. Dem. Fine Gael Fianna Fail Other parties Sum N Eta = 0,164

2

3

3.0 2.6 1.9 14.3 11.8 9.5 0.9 1.5 2.2 1.5 2.3 3.0 22.7 26.3 30.1 53.9 51.5 49.0 3.7 3.9 4.3 100.0 100.0 100.0 16,126 5,865 5,068

4 High

Total

1.8 9.0 2.8 2.9 32.7 45.5 5.4 100.0 6,242

2.6 12.1 1.6 2.1 26.3 51.1 4.1 100.0 33,301

PDI

Lor

−1.3 −0.55 −5.3 −0.52 1.9 1.13 1.3 0.64 10.0 0.50 −8.4 −0.34 1.7 0.40 Sum

|PDI| 1.3 5.3 1.9 1.3 10.0 8.4 1.7 14.9

176

Social Structure and Party Choice in Western Europe

Table 5.3

(Continued)

Italy 1 Low PCI/PDS/PCR Proletar. Dem. PSI Rad.P./Verdi Lega Nord PRI/PLI Chr.Dem. Forza Italia MSI PDSI Other parties Sum N

2

25.5 22.6 0.6 1.6 16.9 15.0 1.6 4.9 1.1 2.6 3.9 6.5 39.3 28.3 1.6 4.4 5.4 8.8 3.2 2.9 0.9 2.3 100.0 100.0 16,649 39,33

3

4 High

Total

20.4 2.6 14.7 5.8 1.9 8.8 29.8 2.3 7.6 3.5 2.6 100.0 5,654

19.4 4.0 14.5 6.5 1.5 11.9 26.6 2.1 7.4 2.9 3.3 100.0 5,811

23.1 1.7 15.9 3.6 1.5 6.5 34.0 2.1 6.6 3.2 1.8 100.0 32,047

PDI

−6.0 −0.35 3.4 1.97 −2.4 −0.18 4.9 1.45 0.4 0.33 8.0 1.20 −12.7 −0.58 0.6 0.32 2.0 0.34 −0.4 −0.13 2.3 1.27 Sum

Lor

|PDI| 6.0 3.4 2.4 4.9 0.4 8.0 12.7 0.6 2.0 0.4 2.3 21.5

Eta = 0,237 Netherlands Green Left PVDA VVD CDA D66 Calv. Fund. Other parties Sum N

1 Low

2

3

4 High

Total

PDI

4.0 38.3 10.3 32.6 7.6 3.9 3.3 100.0 16,592

5.6 29.1 17.9 27.7 13.8 2.9 2.9 100.0 8,018

7.3 23.5 22.1 27.6 14.5 2.6 2.4 100.0 7,911

11.0 24.9 20.9 22.0 15.9 2.2 3.0 100.0 8,509

6.4 30.9 16.3 28.5 11.9 3.1 3.0 100.0 41,030

7.0 1.10 −13.4 −0.63 10.6 0.83 −10.6 −0.54 8.3 0.83 −1.6 −0.56 −0.3 −0.10 Sum

Lor

|PDI| 7.0 13.4 10.6 10.6 8.3 1.6 0.3 25.9

Eta = 0,250

parties, followed by the Liberal and the Christian parties (see Table 5.3). The pattern is characteristic for several countries (see below): the voting patterns in different educational categories cut across the left – right division of parties since the Liberal and Green parties get stronger support from the higher-educated strata, while the opposite is true among the Christian and Socialist parties. The Nationalist parties also get stronger support from the higher-educated strata in the Belgian case. The increase from the 1970s to the 1980s has many components. Let us first describe the voting pattern according to education in the 1970s. The main education differences are found for the Socialist and Nationalist

Education

177

parties. The latter get much stronger support from the higher-educated strata (21–24% compared with 7–8% among those with less education). There are only small education differences in terms of voting for the Liberal and Christian parties. The Christian parties get an impressive share of the vote of the higher-educated strata (about 40%, a few percentage points lower than from the lower-educated strata). Much of this changes in the 1980s. The new Ecologist parties gain most of their support from the higher-educated strata, and the increased electoral support for the Liberal parties comes from the higher-educated strata. The parties increase their support among the higher educated by about 10 percentage points, while the support among the lower-educated strata remains stable. On the other hand, two party groups lose support among those with higher education: the Nationalist parties and the Christian parties. In fact, the declining support for these parties is first and foremost caused by higher-educated voters. For example, the support for the nationalist parties from the highest category on the education variable decreases from 24 per cent in the early 1970s to 5–6 per cent in the late 1980s and the 1990s, while the corresponding decline is much smaller among the lower-educated strata (from 7–8% to 4–5%). In sum, there appears to be a realignment among the higher-educated strata in Belgium in the 1980s. Instead of supporting the Nationalist and the Christian parties as in the 1970s, a large segment of the higher educated strata support the Greens and the Liberal parties. No basic changes take place for the Socialist parties, which still get much stronger support from the lower-educated strata. This new voting pattern among the higher-educated strata appears to be basically stable into the 1990s. The higher educated vote much more frequently for the Liberal and Green parties, while the lower educated prioritise the Socialist and Christian parties. In the 1994–97 period, the Flemish Bloc gains considerable support among Belgian voters, and this appears to be concentrated among the lower educated strata (9–11%, against only 5% among the higher-educated strata). On the other hand, the Socialist parties lose some of their strong support among the lower-educated strata, while maintaining stable support among the higher educated. In Britain there is a strong decline in the impact of education. According to the eta-coefficient, much of the decline takes place in the 1970s, and then to a smaller extent in the late 1990s (see Figure 5.5). According to the PDI-measure, the differences in support between the lower- and higher-educated strata are even larger than the eta-coefficient indicates. The PDI-measure declines in the late 1990s to about a third of the size in the early 1970s.

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Social Structure and Party Choice in Western Europe

The voting pattern for the whole period (see Table 5.3) indicates that differences are caused by the tendency for the lower-educated strata to vote for Labour, while the higher educated vote for the Conservative and Liberal parties. Differences are surprisingly small for the Conservatives, and there is a specific pattern that deviates from a linear pattern. Support increases from the lowest category to category 3, and then declines. This mirrors to some extent a pattern among Labour voters, whose levels of support among the two highest education categories are fairly similar. The decline in the strength of the correlation is nearly exclusively caused by changes among Labour and Conservative voters. Educational differences in support for these parties decrease considerably over time. Most of the changes for these parties take place from the early 1970s to the late 1980s, and the change is particularly large in the 1970s. Here we focus on the early 1970s and late 1980s, since the rapid decline during the 1970s is part of a long-term trend. In that period support for Labour among the lower-educated strata decreases by 11 percentage points while increasing by 5 percentage points among the higher-educated strata; and the differences between the lower and higher educated strata supporting the Labour Party decreases to less than half of the original difference.9 From the late 1980s to the late 1990s, support for Labour increases even more among the higher educated than among those with less education, but that difference is small. An interesting pattern is that from the early 1980s we find a certain curvilinear pattern with regard to support for Labour among the various educational strata. Support decreases from the lowest to the second highest level and then increases among the highest level.10 In fact, if we ignore the highest education level, changes in education differences are much smaller: the difference decreases from 22 to 17 percentage points from 1973–74 to 1994–97. As for the Conservative Party, to some degree the opposite change takes place. In the 1970s there is a strong and fairly linear relationship between support for the party and education. To the late 1980s there is a clear increase in the three lowest education strata (9–18 percentage points) and a decrease of 8 percentage points among the highest-educated strata. Education differences evaporate if we compare the lowest and the highest level, and this pattern continues into the 1990s. The pattern is, however, curvilinear since the party’s strongest support is in the second highest strata. Indeed, differences in support from the three lowest strata on the education variable are fairly stable for the whole period (9–13 percentage points). In sum, it is among the higher-educated strata that we find the large change for both of the major parties. This may also be the reason why

Education

179

changes are larger when the PDI-measure is used, because unlike the eta-coefficient it compares the lowest and the highest strata. In contrast to those for Labour and the Conservatives, the education differences in support for the Liberal party are fairly stable over time. It gets support from the highest-educated strata that is 5–8 percentage points stronger than from the lowest. Educational differences in party support in Denmark are large. There is a stable pattern at a high level until the late 1980s, when there is a sharp decline, and then a further, more moderate decline to the late 1990s (see Figure 5.5).11 According to the data for the whole period, education is primarily polarising the parties within the socialist bloc (see Table 5.3). The left socialist parties get much stronger support from the higher educated strata than from those with less education. Nearly a quarter of the Danish voters with higher education vote for the left socialists, which is the largest party among those with highest education level. A clearly opposite pattern is found for the Social Democrats, which as we saw above is one of the social Democratic parties with most different support from the various education strata. The various non-socialist parties have much lower PDI- and lorscores, although the Conservative and Liberal parties get clearly stronger support from the higher educated strata. The opposite is the case for the Progress Party, which gets particularly low support from the highest education level. There is no large educational difference in the support for the Agrarian Liberals, although a certain curvilinear pattern can be discerned. How, then, do we explain the large correlation in the 1970s and the early 1980s and the subsequent decline? The pattern in the early 1970s resembles a traditional ‘industrial’ conflict pattern in which the left and the right gain support from the lower- and higher-educated strata respectively, although a significant difference is found also for the left socialists. The Conservative People’s Party gets disproportionately stronger support from the higher-educated strata in particular; and the Social Democrats, from the lower-educated strata. From the late 1970s the pattern changes to become more similar to that for the whole period. The main education difference is found between the two major forces on the left, Social Democrats and left socialists, which mobilise a disproportionate portion of the vote of the higher educated strata. Educational differences in voting for the Conservatives decline somewhat, and the Agrarian Liberals get in these periods stronger support from the lower-educated strata. So does the Progress Party, in some contrast to the early 1970s, when its support was highest among those with medium and high levels of education.

180

Social Structure and Party Choice in Western Europe

One way of illustrating what contributes to the overall PDI is to examine the contribution of the socialist and non-socialist parties. Let us take the period 1980–84 to illustrate the pattern, which also is found in the late 1970s. In this period the overall PDI-measure is 35.4 percentage points. Among the parties that get stronger support from the higher-educated strata, the left socialists (including the Communists) contribute with 21 percentage points, while the non-socialist parties (particularly the Conservative Party) contribute with 15. Among the parties that get stronger support from the lower educated strata, the Social Democrats contribute with 26 percentage points, and the non-socialist parties (Christian People’s Party, Progress and Agrarian Liberal parties) with 10. This also illustrates how education as a party cleavage clearly cuts across the socialist/non-socialist division, a phenomenon analysed more systematically below. How are we able, then, to explain the decline in the correlation? It is evident that the major changes take place among the socialist parties. Education differences decline first and foremost for the left socialists and also for the Social Democrats. In the early 1980s, when the impact of education on party choice was largest, the education differences in voting for the Left Socialists and Social Democrats were also largest. The left socialists got support of 5 per cent and 26 per cent from the lowest and highest-educated strata, respectively, while the Social Democrats got support of 42 per cent and 16 per cent, respectively, from the same categories. From the early 1980s to the late 1990s, the left socialist parties have stable support from the higher-educated strata (about 25%) while gradually and considerably increasing their support among the lower educated (from 5% to 17%). Conversely, the Social Democrats have stable support among the lower-educated strata (42%) while increasing their support among the higher-educated strata somewhat (from 16% to 23%). Important changes also take place among the non-socialist parties. Support from the various educational groups evens out for the Conservative party, while the Agrarian Liberal Party changes profile, from gaining highest support from the lower educated strata in the late 1970s and early 1980s to the opposite pattern in the 1990s. The party increases its support largely among the higher-educated strata (15–17 percentage points) from 1980–84 while gaining stable support among the lowereducated strata. The consequences of these changes are that the correlation between party choice and education declines and increasingly follows the left – right division. The left-wing mobilisation among the highereducated strata becomes much less significant, while a new mobilisation

Education

181

takes place for the Agrarian Liberal Party among the higher-educated strata, although not of the same magnitude as for the left socialists in the late 1970s and 1980s. The impact of education on voting patterns among French voters is generally small in a comparative setting, and it declines considerably over time (see Figure 5.5). For the whole period we find that the educational differences do not follow the left–right division of parties very clearly (see Table 5.3). It is mainly the Communists and the Greens that contribute to the overall difference, while several other parties gain fairly similar support from various educational strata, in particular the main nonsocialist parties and the Socialist Party. The very small education differences for these three parties are unique within the respective party families shown above. This is a main reason why the overall correlation is low. In the 1970s the correlation was fairly high in France and cut across the left–right divisions of parties. In the early 1970s the New Leftist PSU got clearly stronger support from the higher-educated strata,12 while both the Communists and – to a smaller degree – the Socialists got stronger support from the lower-educated strata. The main non-socialist parties got very different support according to education level: UDF13 from the higher-educated strata, and RPR from the lower-educated strata; and these differences were of some significance. This latter pattern (related to the two main non-socialist parties) nearly evaporates in the late 1970s, and contributes to the declining correlation. This pattern of small education differences in support for the major French non-socialist parties continues into the 1980s and 1990s (see, however, some qualifications below). On the other hand, the emergence of the Ecologists in the late 1970s contributes to a new polarisation according to education. The Ecologists get stronger support from the higher-educated strata when they emerge. However, the remarkable trend in the period when the party increases its support is that the increase among the lower-educated strata follows the increase among the higher-educated strata so that there is a stable percentage difference, but according to the lor-scores there is a clear decline. From the late 1970s to the early 1990s, the increase in support among the highest- and the lowest-educated category is, for example, 12 percentage points for both groups, from 7 to 19 and 2 to 14, respectively. This explains the low educational difference in support for the French Ecologists in a comparative setting. The Ecologists contribute to a new educational polarisation in the party system, but this is not very large. The polarisation caused by the left socialist PSU disappears in the 1980s, and the same is true of the small tendency for the Socialist Party

182

Social Structure and Party Choice in Western Europe

to get stronger support from the lower-educated strata. From then, the main education differences are found for the Communists and the Ecologist parties. The virtual disappearance of stable education differences other than those found for these parties contributes to the decline of the impact of education. However, in the 1990s the emergence of the National Front creates some new polarisation. The party gets much stronger support from the lower-educated strata, and it is the party with the most different support from the lower- and higher-educated strata, according to the lor-scores. We also find that RPR in the late 1990s appears to revert to its pattern of gaining stronger support from the lower-educated strata. Another major change is that the Socialist Party after 1985 gains stronger support from higher-educated voters, in some contrast to the previous periods. The new difference is not large. In the 1990s the major education polarisation is caused by the Ecologists versus the Front National and the Communists, who get stronger support from the higher- and lower-educated strata, respectively. Germany is a deviant case in that the impact of education increases over time. In the 1970s the impact of education was smaller in Germany than any of the other countries. Most of the increase takes place from the late 1970s to the 1980s, and there is a small decline from the 1980s to the 1990s (see Figure 5.5). The data based on the whole period show the same trend as in several other countries (see Table 5.3). The main percentage difference is found between the Social Democrats and the New Left – in Germany, the Greens. FDP gets considerably stronger support among the higher educated than among those with less education, while an opposite pattern is found for CDU/CSU, although of much smaller magnitude according to the lor-score. In fact, levels of support for CDU/CSU are fairly similar among the three lowest strata; only among those with the highest education level do we find smaller support. In terms of percentage differences, the education differences are largest on the left side (SPD versus Greens), but according to the lor-scores, the education differences in support for the Green Party are decisively largest, followed by the differences for FPD. In the 1970s, before the emergence of the Greens, education differentiated first and foremost between SPD and FDP. The differences were not large, and in particular for SPD the support among the higher-educated strata is substantial – about 40 per cent compared with 50 per cent among those with least education. CDU/CSU got nearly the same support among all education strata, only 2–3 percentage points less among the highest-educated category than those with least education. With the

Education

183

emergence of the Greens in the 1980s, this pattern changed significantly. Differences in support for the Greens immediately became large in the early 1980s and explain totally the increased impact of the education variable on party choice. Support among those with less education was 3–4 per cent compared with 19 per cent and 23 per cent among the highest-educated category, respectively, in the early and late 1980s. In the same period both SPD and CDU/CSU got relatively stronger support from those with less education. It is natural to explain the pattern for SPD as a defection of higher-educated voters to the new Green Party. Education differences in support for FDP decline according to the percentage difference measure, but this may be an effect of the overall decline of the party, as the lor-measure shows a fairly stable coefficient. The decline of the correlation in the 1990s is caused by some smaller education differences related to all the parties. The Greens gain a few percentage points among those with less education, being stable at around 20 per cent among the highly-educated strata, and education differences decline somewhat for SPD and in particular CDU/CSU. For FDP we observe a fairly stable pattern. In sum, the education variable increases its impact on party choice in Germany over time, and support among the lower- and higher-educated strata changes character with the emergence of the Green Party. From the 1980s the main difference with regard to the impact on voting is found between SPD and the Greens, and the declining correlation from the 1980s to the 1990s involves all parties. In Ireland there is a fairly stable correlation between party choice and education at a low level. There is a decline from the early to the late 1970s, but then an increase to the 1980s, when the magnitude is at the same level as in the early 1970s. It is then stable (see Figure 5.5). According to the data for the whole period (see Table 5.3), the two Socialist parties, Labour and the Workers’ Party, along with the conservative Fianna Fail, get stronger support from the lower-educated strata, while Fine Gael and the smaller parties, Green and Progressive Democrats, get strongest support from those with more education. In terms of percentage difference, it is the major parties, Fianna Fail and Labour versus Fine Gael, that contribute most to the overall polarisation according to education. Although Fianna Fail gets stronger support from the lower-educated strata, the support from all strata is indeed impressive, and in terms of the lor-scores the education differences are relatively small. Until the late 1980s Fine Gael got stronger support from the highereducated strata, while the opposite was the case for the two other main parties in the system, Fianna Fail and Labour. Education differences

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Social Structure and Party Choice in Western Europe

were largest for Fine Gael. These parties contribute fairly equally to the decline and increase in the impact of education until the late 1980s. With the emergence of the new parties in the late 1980s, the polarisation pattern changes somewhat, although the overall strength of the correlation is fairly stable. The changes are particularly significant among the parties that get the strongest support among the higher-educated strata. Education differences become much smaller for support for Fine Gael, while the Progressive Democrats and Greens get stronger support from the higher-educated strata. In the 1970s and early 1980s, support for Fine Gael was about 15 percentage points higher among the higher-educated strata than among those with least education. In 1980–84 support was, for example, 26 per cent among the lowest-educated strata and 43 per cent among the highest-educated strata. In the late 1980s support among the lower educated is stable, while decreasing to 30 per cent among those with the highest education level.14 The Progressive Democrats and Greens get very skewed support according to education, while the educational differences for support for Fine Gael decline and nearly evaporate. Educational differences are fairly similar for these two parties, and the combined educational differences associated with them are of the same size as those for Fine Gael in the late 1980s and much larger than those for Fine Gael in the 1990s, also in terms of percentage differences. In the 1990s these two parties get 15–18 per cent of the vote of those with higher education, compared with 5–7 per cent among those with least education. The Irish case is a rare one, in that the parties that should get strongest support from the higher-educated strata, according to the old and new polarisation pattern, emerge more or less simultaneously and contribute to the expected polarisation. A Liberal party did not exist before the emergence of the Progressive Democrats in Ireland. Changes among the parties which get strongest support among those with least education are smaller. The patterns are indeed fairly stable over time. Fianna Fail and Labour get stronger support from the lower-educated strata and it is stable over time for both parties. The Workers’ Party does not have such a clear education profile as the Greens or Progressive Democrats, gaining only some larger support among the lower-educated strata. The Workers’ Party is definitely not left libertarian in its social base, like the other left socialist parties in Western Europe. In Italy the correlation between party choice and education is fairly stable at a high level in a comparative setting until the late 1990s. There is, however, an increase from the late 1970s to the early 1980s, followed by a small decline to the early 1990s. In the late 1990s there is a large

Education

185

decline, placing Italy among the countries where the correlation is lowest (see Figure 5.5). Basically three parties have their largest support among those with least education, the Communists, Socialists and Christian Democrats (see Table 5.3). Differences are largest for the Christian Democrats according to both measures, and the table shows that support is particularly strong among those with least education, which appears to be a basic structural characteristic for support for that party. Education differences in support for the two main socialist parties are not very impressive. The difference for the Socialist party is the second smallest after that of the French party, and 19 per cent of the higher-educated strata supported the Communist party, compared with 26 per cent among those with least education. Most of the other parties get stronger support from those with higher education, and differences are largest for the left socialist, Green and Liberal parties. In terms of PDI, differences are largest for the Liberal parties, but in terms of lor-scores, differences are largest for the two other party groups. We note that the radical rightist MSI does not get stronger support from the lower-educated strata, but from those with medium and higher education. 15 In the early 1970s educational polarisation was primarily found among voters for the Liberal parties and the Christian Democrats. The liberal parties got nearly 20 per cent of the vote of the highest-educated strata and only 5 per cent among those with least education. Differences in support for the Communists and Socialists were very small. In the late 1970s differences in support for the Christian Democrats among the various educational strata were somewhat reduced, while educational differences in support for the Communists became more pronounced. The emergence of Green and New Left forces also contributes to the polarisation. The contribution of these parties becomes more pronounced in the 1980s, when it is basically these parties and the Liberals that get most support from the higher-educated strata. These New Politics parties combined get about 15 per cent of the vote of those with higher education, compared with 2–3 per cent among the lowest-educated strata. The small increase in the correlation from the 1970s to the 1980s is mainly caused by these parties. There is a high degree of stability in these patterns also in the early 1990s, but most patterns decline or evaporate in the late 1990s with the breakdown and change in the party system. Some of the parties that got uneven support from the various educational groups disappear or are absorbed by other political forces (Communists, New Left groups, Liberal parties), while others split into several parties whose overall support nevertheless declines (e.g. the Christian Democrats). The

186

Social Structure and Party Choice in Western Europe

decline in the impact of education is nevertheless large. The remaining difference is due to the Christian parties and Lega Nord, who get strongest support from the lower-educated strata, and MSI and the Greens, who have their strongholds among the more highly-educated strata. Forza Italia gets fairly even support from the various educational strata. Finally, the Dutch pattern shows a strong correlation in the 1970s and a gradual decline into the 1980s, which continues into the 1990s. Changes are largest from the late 1970s to the early 1980s and from the early 1990s to the late 1990s. The Dutch decline is the second largest according to the eta-coefficient, after the somewhat atypical Italian case (see Figure 5.5). We find again two types of polarisation according to the table for the whole period (see Table 5.3): a polarisation between the Old and New Left and between the Liberal parties (VVD and D66) and the CDA among the non-socialist parties. Differences in educational support are indeed large for all of these parties. In the 1970s education differences were primarily found in support for the main left–right antagonists in Dutch politics, Labour and the liberal (VVD) parties. CDA also got considerably stronger support from those with less education, but this pattern was significantly smaller than for the first-mentioned parties. The Green Left and D66 also got stronger support from the higher-educated strata, but these differences were small compared with the pattern for the other parties. The dominant polarisation pattern was between the Old Left and the Old (economic) Right. In the late 1970s the contribution of the Green Left and D66 to the overall polarisation increases somewhat at the expense of Labour and the Liberals (VVD). The decline from 1975–79 to 1980–84 includes all of the parties. We find small declines in education differences for all parties, and the magnitudes are small and fairly similar. From the early 1980s to the early 1990s, the fairly stable correlation hides some important changes. Educational differences in support for the Liberal and Labour parties decrease significantly, while differences increase for Green Left and D66. This trend continues into the late 1990s, when education differences in support for the former parties disappear almost completely, and the remaining polarisation is caused by Green Left, D66 and CDA, although differences decrease for CDA according to the PDI-measure. Let us examine this in some detail. Education differences in voting for the Labour Party change in the following way. From the early 1970s to the early 1980s, support among the lower-educated strata decreases somewhat while remaining stable among those with higher education. Then the party’s increasing support in the late 1980s is stronger among the higher-educated strata than among the lower educated, and the decline in the 1990s is much stronger among the lower educated than

Education

187

among the higher-educated strata. In the late 1990s there is only a 3 percentage point difference between the lowest and the highest category on the education variable, compared with about 20 and 15 in the 1970s and 1980s, respectively. The pattern for the Liberal party (VVD) is opposite to an extent. From the early 1970s to the early 1990s, the party decreases its support among the higher-educated strata gradually (in terms of changes from one five-year period to the next), but nevertheless dramatically (when we examine the overall change), from 33 per cent to 16 per cent, while the support among those with least education is stable at around 10 per cent. In the late 1990s, when the party experiences a significant electoral increase, the increase comes disproportionately from these with less education: the increase among the two lowest strata is 10 percentage points, but just 4 percentage points among those with the highest education level. There are indeed nearly no education differences in the support for the party in the late 1990s, while differences were about 20 percentage points in the 1970s and 14 in the early 1980s. This is a classic dealignment pattern between the Old Left and the Old Right. CDA gets fairly stable support from the various education strata until the late 1990s, when the PDI-measure decreases. The decrease is strongest among the lower-educated strata. However, the lor-measure indicates than when floor-effects are controlled for, it is not a large change. In the late 1990s, after the education differences for VVD evaporate, the Green Left and D66 are the parties that still get clearly stronger support from the higher-educated strata; and percentage differences increase over time until the late 1990s, when there is a small decline also for these parties. Education differences in support for these two parties are nevertheless large in the 1990s. Together they get 22–24 per cent of the vote of those with least education and 35–39 per cent among the highest education level. In sum, the large decline in the impact of education in the Netherlands is caused by changes in support for the traditional left – right antagonists in Dutch politics, Labour and the Liberals. There is also a decrease in education differences for CDA, mainly a consequence of the overall decline for the party. These changes account for nearly all declines in the impact of education in the Netherlands.

5.4

Socialist/non-socialist party choice

Let us now examine the correlation between socialist/non-socialist party choice and education. Figure 5.6 (A and B) shows the correlations measured by the lor-scores, which compared the highest and the lowest

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Social Structure and Party Choice in Western Europe

0.00

France

Italy

Denmark Netherlands Germany Ireland

Britain

Belgium

–0.10 –0.20 –0.30 Lor

–0.40 –0.50 –0.60 –0.70 –0.80 –0.90 –1.00

Figure 5.6A Correlation (lor-scores) between education and socialist/nonsocialist party choice, 1973–97. Greens placed in the non-socialist group

France

Italy

Germany Denmark Belgium Netherlands Ireland

Britain

0.20 0.00

Lor

–0.20 –0.40 –0.60 –0.80 –1.00

Figure 5.6B Correlation (lor-scores) between education and socialist/non-socialist party choice, 1973–97. Greens placed in the socialist group

category on the education variable. Greens are alternately placed in the non-socialist and the socialist party groups. Socialist parties are assigned the highest value on the party choice variable. A negative correlation therefore implies that the Socialist parties get stronger support from the lower-educated strata. Let us first examine the pattern when the Greens are placed in the non-socialist party group (Figure 5.6A). There are large variations in the correlation, from Belgium, where the lor-score is nearly 1.00, to France and Italy, where it is less than 0.20. The comparative differences are

Education

189

mainly caused by 1) the strength of the left socialist mobilisation, i.e. the left socialist parties get stronger support from the higher-educated strata, and 2) the impact of education on the Social Democratic vote. In France and Italy the latter component is the dominant factor. Support for the Social Democrats in these countries has a very different social basis than in most other countries. These two countries have strong Communist parties (in most of the period examined here), which get stronger support from the lower-educated strata, and this largely explains why the correlation is not zero; but this pattern is not strong enough to counterbalance the deviant pattern (in a comparative setting) related to the Social Democratic parties. The low correlation in Denmark and the Netherlands is mainly caused by the strong left socialist mobilisation, especially among the higher-educated strata. The four remaining countries, Germany, Ireland, Britain and Belgium, have Social Democratic parties which are strongly anchored in the lower-educated strata, and in these countries there is no significant left socialist mobilisation. 16 Figure 5.6B shows a somewhat different pattern when the Greens are placed in the socialist party group. The correlations in three countries – France, Italy and Germany – are positive, although of small magnitude – indicating that the higher educated strata is more likely to support the socialist parties. Belgium is now placed in a middle category, while the (negative) correlation is highest in Britain, followed by Ireland and the Netherlands. It is now the countries without significant Green components that have the highest correlation with socialist/non-socialist party choice. The differences in the correlations between the two tables are large, showing how important the placement of the Green parties is for analysis of the social anchoring of socialist/non-socialist party choice. The differences range from 0.67 for Belgium and 0.53 for Germany to around 0.20 for France, Italy and Ireland, 0.10 for Britain and 0.02 for Denmark. Let us now look at the trends over time in the relationship between socialist/non-socialist party choice and education (see Figure 5.7). Figure 5.7A show the trends indicated by the lor-scores when the Greens are placed in the non-socialist group. According to the average figures, there is a clear trend towards a smaller correlation. It is 0.64 in the early 1970s and drops to exactly half of that in the late 1990s. The correlation declines in all countries apart from Germany. Already in the early 1970s there is a very small correlation in France and Italy. In both of these countries the correlations fluctuate somewhat but are nevertheless among the smallest. In the late 1990s the correlation is positive in both countries, but of a very small magnitude.

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Social Structure and Party Choice in Western Europe

0.20 0.00

Lor

–0.20 –0.40 –0.60 –0.80 –1.00 –1.20 1973–74

1975–79 Belgium Ireland

1980–84

Britain Italy

1985–89

Denmark Netherlands

1990–93 France Mean

1994–97

Germany

Figure 5.7A Trends in the strength of the correlation between education and socialist/non-socialist party choice measured by the lor-scores. Greens placed in the socialist party group

This implies that the socialist parties get stronger support from the highest-educated strata than from the lowest. In the early 1970s the largest (negative) correlations are found for Britain, Denmark and Belgium. The correlation for Denmark declines dramatically due to the strong mobilisation of higher-educated people for the left socialists in the late 1970s, but becomes stronger in the 1990s due to a decline in this mobilisation. In Britain there is a gradual decline following the pattern for Labour described above. The pattern remains at a high level in Belgium, where the correlation is decisively largest in a comparative setting in the 1980s and 1990s. The largest declines/changes from the early 1970s to the late 1990s are found in Britain and the Netherlands (0.84–0.85), where we have seen that education differences for the social democratic parties decline sharply, followed by Denmark (0.50).17 The decline in Denmark depends on the use of the early 1970s as the starting-point for the comparison. From the late 1970s to the 1990s the correlation is increasing (negatively). For the other countries the decline is much smaller (0.10–0.20), and only in Germany do we find an increase (small).

Education

191

0.40 0.20 0.00

Lor

–0.20 –0.40 –0.60 –0.80 –1.00 –1.20 1973–74

1975–79

1980–84

1985–89

1990–93

Belgium

Britain

Denmark

France

Ireland

Italy

Netherlands

Mean

1994–97 Germany

Figure 5.7B Trends in the strength of the correlation between education and socialist/non-socialist party choice measured by the lor-scores. Greens placed in the non-socialist party group

Changes become much larger when the Greens are placed in the socialist group, as Figure 5.7B shows. The changes in the mean correlation are illustrative. It declines from -0.64 to nearly zero (-0.02). The patterns for the development of the correlation are different for all countries with significant Green parties. The decrease in the negative correlations becomes even more pronounced, and in several countries we find a positive correlation, indicating that the higher-educated strata are more inclined to support the socialist parties. Differences in the two ways of treating the Green parties are largest in Belgium and Germany, but we find a larger change also in Ireland and France. In Belgium the very small decline when the Greens were placed in the non-socialist group becomes the strongest change in the strength of the correlation, which is barely below zero in the 1990s. Instead of finding an increase in the negative correlation in Germany in the 1980s, as in the previous figure when the Greens were placed in the non-socialist group, there is a weak positive correlation and a fairly strong decrease in the negative correlation from the early 1970s. In fact, we find the first positive correlation between socialist party choice and education in the German case in the early 1980s. In France the small

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Social Structure and Party Choice in Western Europe

positive correlation in the 1990s that was observed when the Greens were placed in the non-socialist party group (0.09) changes to a much larger positive correlation (0.34) – the largest positive correlation observed at any time period in any of the eight countries. Also in Ireland the trend is very different when the greens are placed among the socialist parties. Instead of a fairly stable negative correlation, we find a strong decline to nearly zero. In the 1990s it is only in Britain and Denmark that we find a significant negative correlation between education and the socialist vote. In Belgium, Germany and Ireland, the correlation is close to zero; and in France, Netherlands and Italy, the correlation is positive. Previously, when we have analysed the degree of overlap between the socialist/non-socialist party division and the overall impact of a given cleavage variable, we have placed the Greens in the socialist party group because this placement contributed to maximise the correlation produced by the socialist/non-socialist division. In the case of education, the opposite is producing the strongest (negative) correlations, as we have seen. We have therefore placed the Greens in the non-socialist party group in our main analysis when we examine the extent to which the socialist/non-socialist party choice overlaps or cuts across the total impact of education. We have then controlled for the impact of the Green parties on the changes in overlap. It is, however, of considerable interest to examine the degree to which the conclusions we drew are determined by this placement of the Greens. We therefore also refer to an analysis involving the opposite grouping of the greens. We expect this treatment of the Greens to increase the degree of cross-cutting considerably. When the Greens are placed in the non-socialist camp, the impact of education on the socialist/non-socialist division taps on average 50 per cent of the total impact of education on party choice (see Table 7.1A in Chapter 7). There are however large cross-national variations. The overlap is nearly perfect in Britain (99%), and it is also considerable in Belgium and Germany (about 65%) and in France and Ireland (45%). It is lowest in the Netherlands (32%), Denmark (28%) and Italy (19%). The parties that cause a significant degree of cross-cut can be seen from Table 3.5. In several countries it is the Christian parties who are the main cause due to the strongest support from the lower-educated strata (Belgium, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands). In France and Ireland the Conservative parties gain stronger support from the lower-educated strata and contribute to the cross-cut, and in some countries the radical rightist parties also contribute somewhat in this respect (Belgium, Denmark,

Education

193

France and Germany). The tendency for the New Left parties (not the Greens who are controlled for since they are grouped among the nonsocialist parties) to gain stronger support from the higher-educated strata also contribute significantly to a cross-cutting pattern in Denmark, Italy and the Netherlands, the countries with the lowest degree of overlap. There is a trend towards a lower degree of overlap: the average degree decreases from 57 per cent to 45 per cent (see Table 7.1B in Chapter 7). This trend can explain the fact that the average decline of the correlation between education and party choice is considerably larger for the left – right division of parties (50% even when the Green parties are placed among the non-socialist party group) than for total party choice (26%). The total impact of education is increasingly cutting across the left–right division of parties, which division taps a smaller portion of the total impact it has on party choice. In all countries apart from Ireland and Italy there is a declining degree of overlap and consequently an increasing degree of cross-cut. The largest declines in overlap are found in Belgium (about 0.30), and then in Denmark, Germany and the Netherlands (about 0.20). In Belgium the decline in overlap is mainly caused by the increasing impact of education on support for the Christian parties, supplemented by the emergence of the Flemish Bloc which also gets stronger support from the lower-educated strata. The increasing degree of cross-cut is reflected in the fact that while the impact of education on the left – right division of parties is decreasing slightly, the impact on overall party choice is increasing. In the Netherlands the decrease in overlap is mainly caused by the denominator in the equation: the overall impact of education on party choice declines largely, mainly due to the declining polarisation between the Labour and the Liberal Party, while the tendency for CDA and also the Calvinist Fundamentalists to gain stronger support from the lower-educated strata and for the Green Left to gain stronger support from the higher-educated strata, remains fairly constant over time. The result is a considerably higher degree of cross-cut. In Germany, where the degree of overlap generally is high, the decline is caused by the increasing tendency for the Christian Democrats to gain stronger support from the lower-educated strata in the 1980s. This tendency becomes weaker in the 1990s, but the emerging radical rightist party, the Republicans, also gains stronger support from the lower-educated strata, keeping the degree of cross-cut at the same level as in the 1980s, and considerably higher than in the 1970s.

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Social Structure and Party Choice in Western Europe

The degree of overlap declines in Denmark from the early 1970s to the late 1990s but, indeed, the degree of overlap follows a curvilinear pattern in the Danish case. It was high in the early 1970s (0.70), drops dramatically to 0.12 in the late 1970s, and then remains low until the 1990s when it nearly approaches the level in the early 1970s (to 0.50). As we have seen, the impact of education in Denmark in the early 1970s resembles the traditional ‘industrial’ conflict pattern between left and right. The left-socialist parties did not mobilise the higher-educated strata to the same degree as later. The decline in overlap is caused by the strong mobilisation of the higher-educated strata for the left socialist parties, and the subsequent increase in overlap is caused by the demobilisation of higher-educated vote as described above. The radical rightist Progress Party also gains support most proportionally from the lowereducated strata from the late 1970s to the late 1980s, and then the difference in support from various educated strata vanishes. When the Green parties are placed in the socialist camp, the degree of overlap declines considerably as expected, on average to only 27 per cent compared with 50 per cent in the former case. According to the comparison of the figures for the whole period, the degree of overlap is now considerable only in Britain (85%), moderate in Belgium, Denmark, Ireland and the Netherlands (about 30%), and very low in France (10%) and in Germany and Italy (3%). In the countries with significant Green parties, the degree of overlap declines considerably due to the processes described above. Some of the main differences in support for the various education strata is found within the ‘socialist’ parties. We have seen from Figure 5.7B that in several countries the ‘socialist’ parties get stronger support from the higher-educated strata in the 1980s and paticularly the 1990s. This indicates a new model of overlap versus crosscutting which is reversed compared with the traditional model. We do not examine the degree of overlap according to this new model in detail here.

5.5

Conclusions

In the introduction to this chapter I formulated a model of change for the impact of education, based on an old and a new version of how education influences party choice. In the old version, education is an indicator of social class or social status. Those with lower education are expected to vote for the traditional parties of the left, primarily Social Democratic parties and Communist parties, while those with higher education vote for the parties that

Education

195

articulated the class interests of the middle class and the bourgeoisie, in particular Liberal and partly also Conservative parties. The new version discusses the new electoral orientation in connection with changes in political values and the conflict structure in advanced societies. In terms of electoral behaviour, the new middle class and the better-educated strata are most likely to support ‘the post-material left’, that is, mainly Green and left socialist parties. And as post-materialist issues become more important, this may stimulate a materialist and authoritarian counter-reaction whereby economically and psychologically marginal segments of society, i.e. part of the working class and those with least education, side with Conservative and Radical Rightist parties. The empirical analysis has shown that the model with an Old Left/ Old Right division according to education should be supplemented with the pattern for the Christian Democrats. They clearly belong to the parties that get strongest support from those with less education. In the early 1970s this old polarisation pattern is found in almost all countries. The deviant patterns are found in France, where there already was some small division between the Old and New Left, and where the non-socialist parties showed some important differences not captured by the model. Somewhat surprisingly, in Belgium the Nationalist parties, not the Liberal parties, were the non-socialist parties that got the strongest support from the higher-educated strata. And in Ireland the division along education lines conformed to well-known patterns in that country which does not correspond so clearly to the patterns found in other countries for the respective party families. The Christian Democratic Fine Gael got strongest support from those with higher education, while the two other parties in the system, Labour and Fianna Fail, got strongest support from those with less education. From the late 1970s these polarisation patterns are supplemented, and partly supplanted, by polarisations caused by the Green and left socialist parties. In the 1990s the Radical Rightist parties also contribute in this respect, in accordance with our hypotheses. In some countries the main education differences in voting behaviour are between the Old and New Left (Denmark until the 1990s, France, Germany, Italy and partly the Netherlands), while in other countries this polarisation supplements the old polarisation whereby Liberal and Conservative parties continue to get stronger support from the higher-educated strata (Belgium and Ireland). Only in Britain is the polarisation between the old left – right parties still dominant, and here we have found a clear decline. A specific pattern is found in Denmark, where the old left – right

196

Social Structure and Party Choice in Western Europe

patterns are becoming more pronounced in the 1990s at the expense of the new polarisation model. The impact of education on party choice in fairly similar in five of the eight countries based on the data for the whole period. The correlation is lower in Britain, France and Ireland. In all these latter countries education differences are fairly small for the main established parties. In particular, the major non-socialist parties in these countries get impressively large support from all educational groups. This applies in particular for the Conservative parties in all these countries and also for UDF in France. Education differences in voting for the Social Democratic parties are also comparatively moderate (in Britain and Ireland) or low (in France). An important reason for why the impact of education decreases and remains at a low level in France is that the large support for the Ecologist parties is fairly even across the various educational strata. The Greens in France contribute to a lower education polarisation than Green parties in other countries. There is an increase in the average impact of education on the vote from the late 1970s to the early 1980s, but there is then a decrease from the late 1980s. The largest increase from the late 1970s to the early 1980s is found in Germany, and it is totally explained by the emergence of the Green Party which gets very different support from the various education groups. Germany is also the only country where we find a significant long-term increase in the impact of education due to this factor. The decrease is largest in Britain, Denmark, Italy and the Netherlands. In Britain and the Netherlands the decline is caused by the main leftist and rightist parties that decrease the differences in support from the various educational groups. In Denmark the decline is caused by the changes in support within the leftist parties. The strong mobilisation of the highereducated strata for the Left Socialist parties become less distinct, and the Social Democrats increase its support among the higher-educated strata. In Italy the decline takes largely place in the 1990s in connection with the transformation of the party system. Some of the parties that got uneven support from the various educational groups disappear or are absorbed by other political forces (Communists, New Left groups, Liberal parties), while others split into several parties whose overall support nevertheless declines (e.g. the Christian Democrats). There are larger variations in the impact of education on socialist/ non-socialist party choice than when all parties are considered as values on the party choice variable. This has to do with very different degree of overlap between the correlation with socialist/non-socialist party choice and the overall correlation. The correlation between socialist/

Education

197

non-socialist party choice is low in Denmark, Italy and the Netherlands because we find a smaller degree of overlap in these countries than in the other countries. There is generally considerable cross-cut with regard to the total impact of party choice and the impact on the left–right division of parties. Even when the Greens are grouped among the non-socialist parties, the average overlap is only 50 per cent, and in addition to Denmark, Italy and the Netherlands, we find an overlap of less than 50 per cent in Ireland and France. Only in Britain is the overlap nearly complete. The reasons for the high degree of cross-cut varies considerable from country to country: in Belgium, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands the major component is the stronger support from the lower-educated strata for the Christian parties, in Ireland it is the stronger support from the lower-educated strata for the Conservative Fianna Fail, and in France for the Conservative RPR and the radical rightist Front National. The Left Socialist’s stronger support from the higher-educated strata is the main cause of the cross-cut in Denmark, and a significant cause in Italy and the Netherlands. The impact of education on socialist/non-socialist party choice decreases significantly even when the Greens are grouped in the nonsocialist camp. In the late 1990s it is half the strength of the early 1970s. The degree of cross-cut increases significantly over time according to the average figures for the eight countries. This explains why the impact of education declines considerably less for total party choice than for the analyses of the left–right division of parties. When the Green parties are grouped in the socialist party groups the degree of overlap decreases to an even lower level. In some country the correlation even changes sign. The ‘socialist’ parties get strongest support from the higher-educated strata in France, Italy and Germany due to (combined with other patterns) the strong education differences in support for the Greens. The average correlation for all eight countries is reduced to about zero when the Greens are considered as a socialist party in the late 1990s. In several countries we find a positive correlation between socialist party choice and education in the 1990s. This indicates a new model for education polarisation with regard to socialist/non-socialist voting.

6 Gender

6.1

Introduction

Until the end of the 1960s, women tended to have more conservative and traditional political orientations than men. Comparative studies indicated that women were more inclined to vote for religious and Conservative parties and less inclined to vote for socialist parties. According to the traditional gender gap, women were expected to be more conservative or centre-right than men, and a common finding in Catholic and religiously-mixed countries was that women were more likely to support the Christian parties and vote less frequently for the leftist parties. This was, for example, documented in Electoral Behavior: A Comparative Handbook (Rose 1974a), with data mainly from the 1960s in Belgium (Hill 1974: 92–4), Germany (Urwin 1974: 156–7), Italy (Barnes 1974: 191–2) and the Netherlands (Lijphart 1974: 255–6). Another major study (Dogan 1967: 159–67) documented large gender gaps in Italy and France. Women voted much more frequently for the Christian Democrats1 in both countries, as well as the Gaullist Party in France, and much less frequently for the left. Gender differences were much smaller in Britain (Rose 1974c: 521–2) and Ireland (Whyte 1974: 639). Traditional women’s values emphasising ‘private’ orientations associated with religion and family responsibilities were identified as the basis for these differences. Moreover, it was argued, women have been less integrated in trade unions and working-class culture, and have thus been less solidaristic and collectively oriented than men. The most important explanation was their higher degree of religiosity, since the major differences were found with regard to support for the Christian parties. In several of the studies mentioned above, when religiosity (church attendance) was controlled for, the impact of gender 198

Gender 199

more or less disappeared (Hill 1974: 93–4; Urwin 1974: 57; Lijphart 1974: 255–6). In the course of the past two or three decades, however, women in many Western countries have changed from being more conservative than men to being more radical. The term modern gender gap has been used to characterise these new gender-based value differences and differences in voting patterns between women and men in many western democracies (Norris 1999: 150). Various explanations have been advanced for how and why gender differences occur and what they imply. Here we may distinguish between two main types of explanations: those emphasising interests, and those emphasising cultural and value differences between women and men.2 Explanations that emphasise interests see changes among women as the result of concrete economic and structural changes. Changes in the gender-based division of work associated with the labour market and the family are seen as the most important reasons for changes in women’s and men’s interests. The transition from an economy based on one breadwinner to one based on the two-income family has meant than women have increasingly become independent economic actors, while the earlier division of work kept women in considerably weaker positions in the education system and the labour market. The integration of women in the work-force may have resulted in greater equality between men and women, but it has not meant full equality in the labour market, political life or the family. Employment provides women with life experiences that call into question traditional gender roles, and may increase women’s support for feminist political goals. Paid employment also directly exposes women to gender inequalities that they are less likely to experience as homemakers, while also providing them with a means of economic independence that may shape their political behaviour. Women are also more dependent on the public sector and the welfare state for employment than men, and they tend to depend more on social welfare to support and subsidise their families (Manza & Brooks 1998: 1243–4; Togeby 1994). Cultural or value-based explanations have also been applied to observed differences in political attitudes. This approach emphasises that there are extensive and deep-rooted value differences, or differences with regard to central political issues, between women and men. These theories are often cited by those who assume that the value foundations of women will result in new directions in, for example, management, the organisation of work or the political system. Some of the same reasoning occurs when ‘gender gap’ observations are linked with comprehensive moral and

200 Social Structure and Party Choice in Western Europe

political questions like peace, welfare, the environment and social care (Abzug 1984). According to the socialisation perspective within this tradition, value differences will not change considerably over time. Another explanation, which is supplementary to the ones mentioned above, focuses on generational changes among women. The traditional gender gap is expected to be found among the older cohorts, from a time when women primarily took care of the family, while men were preoccupied with bread-winning roles. In contrast, the postwar cohorts, who gained their formative experiences in the 1960s and 1970s, have been more strongly influenced by the transformation of sex roles, the women’s movement and changes in political attitudes and values (Norris 1999: 154). In these cohorts women may be more likely to support the parties of the left than men, and not to support the Christian parties to a (much) larger degree than men. The generation explanation may imply that either structural conditions or values and attitudes may be different between different cohorts of women, and that these changes gradually, due to generation replacement, transform the political orientations and voting behaviour of women. It is difficult to formulate comparative hypotheses about the size of both the traditional and the modern gender gap. Below, I have formulated two hypotheses about the comparative size of the traditional gender gap and two hypotheses about the modern gender gap. We expect to find the traditional gender gap in voting behaviour to a certain degree in the 1970s,3 and that – according to the first hypothesis – it was particularly large in Catholic and religiously-mixed countries with large Christian parties: Belgium, Italy, Germany, the Netherlands and possibly also Ireland. We assume in accordance with previous research outlined above that these parties appeal stronger to women than to men due to the religions and traditional orientation of these parties. 4 The traditional gender gap is expected to be smallest in the Protestant countries (Britain and Denmark) and in France, which lack a clear Christian Democratic alternative in the period studied here. France was also more secular that the other countries in the first group already in the early 1970s. An alternative hypothesis is that the size of the traditional gender gap is related (negatively) to the portion of women who are in the workforce (see below). In all countries we expect the traditional gender gap to decline, and we expect that – at least in some countries – it will have been supplanted by the modern gender gap, whereby women vote more frequently for the socialist parties than men.

Gender 201

In accordance with the theoretical discussion above, we expect the modern gender gaps to be pronounced in countries with a high level of female workforce participation, since it might be a decisive factor that generates the new gender gap. We also test an alternative hypothesis (to the first one above) about the relationship between the traditional gender gap and female workforce participation. Is the traditional gender gap largest in the countries with the smallest female workforce participation in the 1970s? These hypotheses will be tested at an aggregate country level by correlating the directional gender gaps with the level of female workforce. The participation of women in the workforce in 1970 and 1995 is shown in note 5.5 In the 1970s female workforce participation was lowest in the Netherlands, Italy, Ireland and Belgium and highest in Denmark and Britain. We therefore expect the traditional gender gap to be most significant in the former group of countries.6 In the 1990s the female workforce participation has increased significantly in most countries, but we find very much the same ranking of countries. The most significant change is that the relative ranking of the Netherlands among countries with a lower level of female participation has changed. To the extent that we find a modern gender gap we expect it to be largest in Denmark and Britain and smallest in the same countries as we expected a large traditional gender gap in the 1970s, Ireland and Italy in particular.7 An alternative hypothesis about the modern gender gap is that it is largest where the Left Socialist and New Politics parties which most clearly articulate feminist values, are significant in the 1990s. Countries with significant Green or New Left forces are the clearest candidates in this respect: Belgium, Denmark, Germany and France and perhaps also the Netherlands. Denmark is perhaps the clearest case in this respect, since the mobilisation of Danish women for the left socialist parties has been documented in several studies (Borre & Andersen 1997: 183–9; Svensson & Togeby 1991: Chap. 5; Knutsen 1998: 64–9).

6.2

Gender and party choice

Patterns based on the data for the whole period, 1970–97 Let us first examine at the overall strength of the correlation between party choice and gender for the whole period. Figure 6.1 shows the correlation for the whole period, measured by the eta-coefficient. Apart from the Italian case, where the correlation is significant (0.15), the correlations are small: from 0.08–0.09 in Denmark, Belgium and France

202 Social Structure and Party Choice in Western Europe 0.160 0.140

Eta-coefficient

0.120 0.100 0.080 0.060 0.040 0.020 0.000

Italy

Denmark

Belgium

France

Ireland Netherlands Germany

Britain

Figure 6.1 Strength of the correlation between gender and party choice measured by the eta-coefficient, 1970–97

to 0.05–0.06 in the remaining four countries. 8 The PDI-measure is very intuitively illustrative for the overall strength (not shown in a separate figure, but see Table 6.1B): it varies from 14 in Italy to 7–8 in Denmark and Belgium and 3–5 in the remaining countries. Gender, then, is a weak predictor of party choice, as we perhaps should have expected. It should be emphasised that the measures are non-directional and could hide important differences between the countries, even when the strengths of the correlations are fairly similar. Looking at the figures for gender differences according to party families for the whole period, it is evident that differences are small for most parties and party families (see Table 6.1). According to the percentage difference measure (Table 6.1B), the average percentage for the various party families is higher than 1 percentage point for only three party families, namely the Communists, the radical rightist and the Christian parties. The percentage differences are definitely largest for the Christian parties that consistently and in all relevant countries get stronger support from women. The average percentage difference is, however, only 4. For many of the party families that gain large support from the electorate, there are then very small differences according to gender. The lor-scores are more appropriate for analysing the various party families in a comparative perspective (see Table 6.1A). According to the average scores for the various party families, gender differences are largest for the radical rightist parties, which get stronger support from men.

Table 6.1 Overall differences in support for the various political parties according to gender in a comparative setting, 1970–97. Parties grouped into party families A. Lor Belgium Comm. Left Soc. Soc. Dem Green Nationalists Liberal Christian Conservative Radical right Spec. P. I Spec. P. II Other parties

Britain

0.44 0.09 −0.21 0.12 0.15 −0.24

0.13 −0.21 0.32 −0.12 −0.10

0.40

0.29

0.55

Denmark

France

0.38 −0.19 −0.15 −0.21

0.23 0.00 −0.06 −0.28

0.02 −0.32 0.09 0.42 0.23 0.12 −0.29

0.05 −0.11 0.46 0.34 0.15

Germany

0.06 −0.17 0.00 −0.08

Ireland 0.29 0.23 −0.15 −0.01 −0.13 −0.08

0.74

0.27

0.37

Italy 0.24 0.38 0.22 −0.24 0.63 0.18 −0.57 −0.12 0.53 0.13 0.15

Netherlands −0.01 0.01

0.24 −0.14

−0.07 −0.19 0.20

Average 0.32 0.09 0.06 −0.21 0.36 0.06 −0.25 −0.06 0.51

0.21

203

204

Table 6.1

(Continued)

B. PDI Belgium Comm. Left Soc. Soc. Dem Green Nationalists Liberal Christian Conservative Radical right Spec. P. I Spec. P. II Other parties Total

Britain

0.5 1.7 −1.7 0.9 2.2 −5.2

3.1 −0.3 0.7 −1.6

Denmark

France

0.4 −2.3 −3.3 −0.1 0.1

0.7

0.5

−0.5 1.1 2.3 3.3 0.3 −1.2

6.9

4.2

7.5

−2.3

0.8

Germany

Ireland

1.8 0.0 −1.4 −2.1

1.6 −1.1

0.7 2.4 −0.3

0.8

0.0

0.0

−2.0

−2.5 −1.9

−1.5 1.2 0.7

0.9

Italy 4.3 0.5 2.8 −0.8 0.9 1.1 −12.6 −0.3 3.5 0.4

Netherlands −0.1 0.2

3.3 −2.8

0.6

0.5

1.5

0.3

−0.7 −0.6 0.7

5.1

3.1

4.7

13.7

4.1

Average 1.8 −0.2 0.9 −0.9 0.8 0.7 −4.3 −1.0 1.7

0.5

Notes Special parties are for Denmark Agrarian Liberals (I) and Centre Democrats (II), for France MRG (I), for Italy PSDI (I) and for the Netherlands D66 (I) and Calvinist Fundamentalists (II). The differences are calculated so that a positive score means that support is strongest from men, while a negative score means that support is strongest from women.

Gender 205

Men are also significantly more inclined to support Nationalist and Communist parties, while women support Christian and Green parties to a larger extent then men. When the sizes of the parties are controlled for by means of the lor-scores, the gender differences in voting for the Christian parties are not particularly strong compared with the other party families. Differences are largest for the radical rightist, Communist and Nationalist parties. Within the radical rightist and Communist party families, there are only small variations between countries. The tendency for men to support these parties to a larger extent than women is found in all countries, with very similar strength. The same applies to gender differences in support for the Green parties. Among the Christian parties the Italian party clearly gets the most different support among men and women, while gender differences are smallest for the German, Irish and Dutch parties. Among the Nationalist parties, the tendency for men to be more inclined to support these parties is particularly strong in Italy. For the other party families, lor-scores are generally small. We note, however, the following comparative differences: the left socialist parties do not have the same appeal to female voters as the Green parties do. In Ireland and Italy men support these parties more frequently than women, while the opposite is the case for Denmark, as expected. For the Social Democratic parties there are also small differences and different trends in different countries. Denmark is again deviant, being the only country where women are more likely to support a Social Democratic Party. By contrast, we find again that men support the Social Democrats more than women in Ireland and Italy, as well as in Britain. Some of the Liberal parties that occupy the position of the established right in the respective party systems – those in Belgium, the Netherlands and (partly) Italy – get stronger support from men, while women are more likely to support the British Liberal Party. There are small tendencies for women to support the Conservative parties in all countries, apart from Denmark, where the opposite is the case.

Strength of the correlation over time Figure 6.2 shows the trends in the strength of the correlation over time measured by the eta-coefficient. I have also included a figure using the PDI-measure, since this has a very intuitive meaning with regard to the gender gap (Figure 6.2B). The comments will mainly concentrate on the table showing eta (Figure 6.2A), but I will also use percentage differences in my comments for individual parties.

206 Social Structure and Party Choice in Western Europe

0.200 0.180

Eta-coefficient

0.160 0.140 0.120 0.100 0.080 0.060 0.040 0.020 0.000 1970–74

1975–79

1980–84

1985–89

1990–93

Belgium

Britain

Denmark

France

Ireland

Italy

Netherlands

Mean

1994–97

Germany

Figure 6.2A Trends in the strength of the correlation between gender and party choice measured by the eta-coefficient

20.0 18.0 16.0 14.0 PDI

12.0 10.0 8.0 6.0 4.0 2.0 0.0 1970–74

1975–79

Belgium Ireland

Britain Italy

1980–84

1985–89

Denmark Netherlands

1990–93 France Mean

1994–97 Germany

Figure 6.2B Trends in the strength of the correlation between gender and party choice measured by the PDI-measure

Gender 207

Apart from the Italian case, the lines for the various countries are so close that they are difficult to distinguish. Here we will briefly focus on the significant long-term changes. The impact of gender is not increasing according to the mean trendline. The mean correlation decreases from the early 1970s to the late 1970s, and then increases somewhat to the 1990s, when it obtains about the same strength as in the early 1970s. The largest change is the declining correlation in the Italian case, with a deviate pattern in the early 1990s, when the correlation increases largely to the same extent as in the 1970s, followed by a pronounced decline. For the other countries the changes are much less pronounced. There is a gradual increase in the strength of the correlation in Belgium. In three countries, France, Germany and Ireland, there is a significant decrease from the early 1970s to the late 1970s. After that the correlation remains at a low level in Ireland, but increases in Germany and to a lesser degree in France. In the remaining three countries, Britain, Denmark and the Netherlands, the correlation remains fairly stable over time. The correlation in Denmark is quite stable at a comparatively high level, but increases somewhat in the 1990s. The correlation is the second largest in the 1980s and 1990s. The PDI-measure shows basically the same trends. The tendency for the strength in the Danish case to increase in the 1990s is even more pronounced. The eta-correlation (and the PDI-measure) is non-directional, and may mask important changes for individual parties. Let us now go into the more detailed data for the various countries to study what causes the correlation between party choice and gender and how this has changed over time. One possible explanation for the decrease in the mean from the early 1970s to the 1980s, which is also found in many countries, and then an increase to the 1990s, is that the decrease and subsequent increase may mask a change from the traditional to the modern gender gap. The impact of gender is small in a transition period, when the old gap disappears while the new one is emerging. Let us go on to examine the changes in more detail. Detailed analyses of the impact of gender and changes over time within the eight countries. Table 6.2 shows the relationship between gender and party choice based on the data for the whole period. Let us start with the Italian case, where the decisively largest correlation is found and also the largest change (see Figures 6.1 and 6.2). For the whole period it is evident that much of the gender gap is caused by the tendency for women to support the Christian Democrats to a larger

208 Social Structure and Party Choice in Western Europe Table 6.2

Gender and party choice, 1970–97

Belgium PCB/KPB PS/SP Ecolo/Agalev Volksu./ RW/FDF PRL/PVV PSC/CVP Flemish Block Other parties Sum N

Men

Women

Total

PDI

1.5 27.4 8.1 9.1 18.3 30.1 2.5 3.0 100.0 16,248

0.9 25.7 9.8 8.2 16.2 35.3 1.7 2.3 100.0 16,456

1.2 26.5 8.9 8.6 17.2 32.7 2.1 2.6 100.0 32,704

0.5 1.7 −1.7 0.9 2.2 −5.2 0.8 0.7

Men

Women

Total

PDI

42.2 1.4 2.4 16.0 36.8 1.2 100.0 20,707

39.1 1.7 1.8 17.6 39.1 0.7 100.0 22,046

40.6 1.5 2.1 16.9 38.0 0.9 100.0 42,753

Men

Women

Lor 0.44 0.09 −0.21 0.12 0.15 −0.24 0.40 0.29 Sum

|PDI| 0.5 1.7 1.7 0.9 2.2 5.2 0.8 0.7 6.9

Eta = 0.077 Britain Labour Party Green Party Nationalists Liberals Conservatives Other parties Sum N

Lor

3.1 0.13 −0.3 −0.21 0.7 0.32 −1.6 −0.12 −2.3 −0.10 0.5 0.55 Sum

|PDI| 3.1 0.3 0.7 1.6 2.3 0.5 4.2

Eta = 0.051 Denmark DKP Left socialists Social Democrats Greens Radical Liberals Chr. Peopl. Party Cons. Peopl. Party Progress Party Agrarian Liberals Centr. Democrats Other parties Sum N Eta = 0.087

Total

PDI

Lor

|PDI|

1.2 13.1 30.5 0.4 5.0 1.5

0.8 15.4 33.8 0.5 4.9 2.0

1.0 14.2 32.1 0.5 4.9 1.8

0.4 −2.3 −3.3 −0.1 0.1 −0.5

0.38 −0.19 −0.15 −0.21 0.02 −0.32

0.4 2.3 3.3 0.1 0.1 0.5

15.7 7.0 18.9 2.9 3.9 100.0 20,584

14.6 4.7 15.5 2.5 5.1 100.0 20,067

15.2 5.8 17.2 2.7 4.5 100.0 40,651

1.1 0.09 2.3 0.42 3.3 0.23 0.3 0.12 −1.2 −0.29 Sum

1.1 2.3 3.3 0.3 1.2 7.5

Gender 209

France PCF PSU PSF Ecologists UDF RPR Front National MRG Other parties Sum N

Men

Women

Total

9.5 2.9 34.2 7.2 19.0 17.0 3.2 2.6 4.5 100.0 21,117

7.7 2.8 35.6 9.3 18.2 18.5 2.0 1.8 3.9 100.0 21,560

8.6 2.9 34.9 8.3 18.6 17.7 2.6 2.2 4.2 100.0 42,677

Men

Women

Total

43.7 6.3 6.1 39.9 1.8 2.3 100.0 22,044

42.1 7.3 6.1 41.9 0.9 1.8 100.0 22,891

42.9 6.8 6.1 40.9 1.3 2.0 100.0 44,935

Men

Women

Total

3.0 13.5 1.6 2.2 24.8 49.9 5.0 100.0 17,824

2.2 11.1 1.9 2.2 27.3 51.8 3.5 100.0 17,539

2.6 12.3 1.8 2.2 26.1 50.8 4.2 100.0 35,363

PDI

Lor

1.8 0.23 0.0 0.00 −1.4 −0.06 −2.1 −0.28 0.8 0.05 −1.5 −0.11 1.2 0.46 0.7 0.34 0.6 0.15 Sum

|PDI| 1.8 0.0 1.4 2.1 0.8 1.5 1.2 0.7 0.6 5.1

Eta = 0.071

Germany SPD Green FDP CDU/CSU Republic. Party Other parties Sum N

PDI

Lor

1.6 0.06 −1.1 −0.17 0.0 0.00 −2.0 −0.08 0.9 0.74 0.5 0.27 Sum

|PDI| 1.6 1.1 0.0 2.0 0.9 0.5 3.1

Eta = 0.053

Ireland

Worker’s Party Labour Green Prog. Dem. Fine Gael Fianna Fail Other parties Sum N Eta = 0.062

PDI

Lor

0.7 0.29 2.4 0.23 −0.3 −0.15 0.0 −0.01 −2.5 −0.13 −1.9 −0.08 1.5 0.37 Sum

|PDI| 0.7 2.4 0.3 0.0 2.5 1.9 1.5 4.7

210 Social Structure and Party Choice in Western Europe

Table 6.2

(Continued)

Italy Men PCI/PDS/PCR Proletar. Democrats PSI Rad.P./Verdi Lega Nord PRI/PLI Chr.Democrats Forza Italia MSI PDSI Other parties Sum N

Women

Total

PDI 4.3

25.1

20.8

23.0

1.8 16.6 3.0 1.9 7.0 27.5 2.6 8.9 3.4 2.2 100.0 18,555

1.2 13.8 3.8 1.0 5.9 40.1 2.9 5.5 3.0 1.9 100.0 17,524

1.5 15.2 3.4 1.5 6.5 33.7 2.7 7.2 3.2 2.0 100.0 36,079

Men

Women

Total

6.3 30.3 18.2 26.7 12.0 2.7 3.8 100.0 22,470

6.4 30.1 14.9 29.5 12.7 3.3 3.1 100.0 23,755

6.3 30.2 16.5 28.1 12.3 3.0 3.4 100.0 46,225

Lor

|PDI|

0.24

4.3

0.5 0.38 2.8 0.22 −0.8 −0.24 0.9 0.63 1.1 0.18 −12.6 −0.57 −0.3 −0.12 3.5 0.53 0.4 0.13 0.3 0.15 Sum

0.5 2.8 0.8 0.9 1.1 12.6 0.3 3.5 0.4 0.3 13.7

Eta = 0.149 Netherlands Green Left PVDA VVD CDA D66 Calv. Fund. Other parties Sum N

PDI

Lor

−0.1 −0.01 0.2 0.01 3.3 0.24 −2.8 −0.14 −0.7 −0.07 −0.6 −0.19 0.7 0.20 Sum

|PDI| 0.1 0.2 3.3 2.8 0.7 0.6 0.7 4.1

Eta = 0.055

extent than men, while men are inclined to support several other parties to a larger extent than women (see Table 6.2). According to the PDImeasure, differences among these parties are largest for the Communists, Socialists and radical rightist MSI. According to the lor-scores, the stronger support among men is largest among voters for MSI and Lega Nord, for which the absolute value is on the same level as for the Christian Democrats. Gender differences in voting for the Christian Democrats were large in the 1970s, then gradually declined to the late 1980s. There is then an

Gender 211

increase in the early 1990s, followed by a sharp decline to the late 1990s. In the early 1970s the Italian Christian Democrats got support from more than half of the female voters (51%), compared with about a third of the males (32%). To the late 1980s support among men is stable (30–32%), while support among women declines gradually to 40 per cent, a major explanation of the decline of the gender gap – and of the declining support for the party. The increase in the early 1990s is partly due to increased gender differences in support for the Christian Democrats: support is stable among women, but decreases among men (from 31% to 26%). Another reason is that, for the first time in the period studied here, a party other than the Christian Democrats, Verdi, gets clearly stronger support from women than for men. In the late 1990s gender differences in support for the successor parties of the Christian Democrats have nearly evaporated. PDI drops from 14 to 2, and support from women from 40 per cent to 13 per cent. Gender differences are now stronger for Forza Italia and Verdi, which both get stronger support from women than from men. Men tend to vote more frequently than women for several parties, and it is basically those parties mentioned above – Communists, Socialists and MSI – for which we find the largest differences for the various periods. In the early 1970s gender differences were largest for PCI (of the parties receiving stronger support among men). The party got 20 per cent support among men and only 11 per cent support among women. The increased support for the Communists in the late 1970s appears to be larger among women – support increases to 23 per cent compared with 27 per cent among men – and the gender difference becomes much smaller and remain basically at that lower level. In particular for the two socialist parties, the size of the gender difference follows the same pattern as for the Christian Democrats: a decline until the early 1990s, then a sharp decrease in the late 1990s. There is virtually no gender difference in the support for the two socialist parties in the late 1990s. In the late 1990s the small gender difference that exists involves mainly Lega Nord and MSI, of the parties that get stronger support among men.9 In sum, the traditional gender gap has been highly persistent in Italy, although it has been gradually declining. It disappears (or is greatly reduced) with the crises and transformation of the party system in the 1990s. There are some small indications of a modern gender gap, related to the Greens and the radical right. In Belgium the gender gap based on the data for the whole period is caused by the tendency for women to vote for the Christian Social parties and the Greens, while men are more likely to support the other parties, primarily the Liberal and the Socialist parties (see Table 6.2).

212 Social Structure and Party Choice in Western Europe

This pattern is fairly stable over time although there are some fluctuations (see Figure 6.2). The main explanation for the small increase in the correlation is the emergence of the Greens and the radical rightist parties, which get stronger support from women and men, respectively. Gender differences for these parties are indeed significant, particularly in the 1990s.10 New Politics parties then contribute to the increase in the impact of gender in Belgium. The Socialist parties do not get stronger support from women, and the traditional gender gap for the Christian parties is fairly constant over time, at a moderate level. In France there is a moderate gender gap in party choice, which decreases from the early 1970s to the late 1970s then increases again (see Figure 6.2). Gender differences are small for all parties according to the data for the whole period (see Table 6.2). The Communists and Front National get stronger support among men, while the Ecologists, Socialists and RPR get stronger support among women. The gender gap in the early 1970s is mainly caused by the tendency for women to support RPR to a larger degree than men, while men support the Communists, left socialists and UDF to a larger extent than women. Of the two main non-socialist forces, it was then the Gaullist party, not the UDF-components, that contributed to the traditional gender gap. These tendencies decline significantly to the late 1970s, and the gender difference in support for RPR more or less evaporates. Instead, gender differences are caused by differences related to the Socialist Party and the Ecologists, which get stronger support from women, while Front National and the Communists gets stronger support from men. Apart from the differences related to the Communist Party, which are fairly constant over time until the late 1990s where they evaporate, gender differences are increasing for the three other parties. This is the main reason for the overall increase in the gender gap from the late 1970s. In the 1990s the Socialists and the Ecologists each get 3–4 per cent stronger support from women than men, while Front National and UDF get 2–3 and 1–2 percentage points stronger support from men, respectively. According to the lor-scores, gender differences are largest for the Ecologists and Front National in the 1990s. The traditional gender gap disappears, then, in France, and is supplanted by the modern one, whereby men support the New and Established Right, while women are more likely to support the Old and New Left. The gender differences in voting behaviour are very small in Germany according to the data for the whole period (see Figure 6.1 and Table 6.2). The gender gap follows a similar pattern to the one in France, with

Gender 213

a sharp decline and then a gradual increase (see Figure 6.2). It is again (as in France) different parties that contribute to the old and the new polarisation. In the early 1970s CDU/CSU get much stronger support from women, while men more frequently support SPD.11 These differences decrease to about 2 percentage points in the early 1980s, when there are very small gender differences in party choice in Germany. There is then an increase, mostly in the late 1990s. This new polarisation is completely different from the old: CDU/CSU and the Republican Party get stronger support from men, while the Green Party gets stronger support from women. There are no significant gender differences in the SPD vote from the late 1980s. Gender differences are largest with regard to voting for the Greens and the Radical Right, according to the lor-scores. In the late 1990s the Greens get the support of 10 per cent of men and 15 per cent of women; CDU/CSU gets 3 percentage points larger support among men; and the radical right gets 4 per cent of men’s vote compared with only 1 per cent of the vote of women. Thus, Germany was a typical example of the traditional gender gap in the early 1970s. This changes, and in the transition period, the impact of gender is extremely low. In the 1990s the modern gender gap emerges, polarising the CDU/CSU and the radical right versus the Greens. In Ireland a significant correlation in the early 1970s changes to a smaller correlation in the late 1970s. There is then an increase and a decline again to the same level as in the late 1970s (see Figure 6.2). It is the traditional pattern that emerges from examining the table based on the whole period (see Table 6.2). Men support the socialist parties to a larger extent than women, who are more inclined to support Fianna Fail and Fine Gael. This is indeed the pattern for all periods, and the changes over time are related to the strength of the gender differences for these parties. The large decline in the strength from the early 1970s to the late 1970s involves, for example, the Labour Party as well as Fine Gael and Fianna Fail. The increase in the early 1980s brings the gender gap for these parties to nearly the same level as in the early 1970s, and the small gender gap in voting behaviour involves the two socialist parties versus the two main, non-socialist parties. There is no consistent or significant gender gap in support for the new parties, the Greens and Progressive Democrats. In sum, in Ireland the traditional gender gap persists at a low level. If we use the early 1970s as the starting-point of comparison, the gender gap has, however, declined significantly. In Britain the gender gap is small, declining somewhat from the 1970s to the 1980s and increasing somewhat in the late 1990s (see Figure 6.2).

214 Social Structure and Party Choice in Western Europe

The main pattern for the whole period is that a larger portion of men votes for Labour, while women are more inclined to prefer the Liberal and the Conservative Party (see Table 6.2). This is also the pattern that causes the main gender gap in all time periods. There is some fluctuation as to which of the two main non-socialist parties causes the gender gap over time. For example, in the early 1970s gender differences were largest for the Liberal Party, while it was largest for the Conservative Party in the late 1970s. This fluctuation continues in the 1980s and 1990s. In sum, the traditional gender gap is persistent at a low level in Britain. 12 In Denmark we found the second largest gender difference in voting behaviour for the whole period (see Figure 6.1). This relatively high correlation is fairly stable over time, but it increases somewhat in the 1990s (see Figure 6.2). The pattern for the whole period is quite opposite to that found in Britain and Ireland. The Social Democrats and the left socialists get stronger support from women, while the major non-socialist parties, the Agrarian Liberals, Progress and Conservative People’s party, get stronger support among men. Ignoring some of the smaller parties, the highest lor-scores are found for the Progress and Agrarian Liberal parties (see Table 6.2). Major changes take place in the Danish case. In the early 1970s the then considerable gender gap was of the traditional kind: both of the major non-socialist parties got stronger support from women, while the left socialists got stronger support from men. The differences were not large, 5 and 4 percentage points, respectively. The Progress Party got stronger support among men among the non-socialist parties, while there was a small tendency for women to support the Social Democrats more than men. These tendencies were smaller than the first-mentioned. The gender differences for the left socialist and the major non-socialist parties gradually disappear by the early 1980s, and in the late 1980s the opposite gender differences are found for these parties: the left socialists get stronger support from women, while the Conservatives and Agrarian Liberals get stronger support from men. The tendency for the Social Democrats to get stronger support from women becomes more pronounced, although this fluctuates somewhat. The changes in support are indeed considerably larger than the non-directional measures indicate: 6–7 percentage points for the left socialists, Conservatives and Agrarian Liberals, and 4 for the Social Democrats. In the 1990s the left socialists and Social Democrats both get 4–5 percentage points larger support from women, while the Agrarian Liberals and the Conservative Party get 5–6 and 2–3 percentage points stronger support from men.13 Thus, Denmark provides a clear example of a traditional gender gap in a Protestant society, whereby

Gender 215

women support Conservative forces, being supplanted by the modern gender gap that follows the left–right division quite closely. Finally, in the Netherlands the gender gap is small and fluctuates somewhat over time, in particular in the 1970s (see Figures 6.1 and 6.2). From the early 1980s there is a small increase in the gender gap. According to the data for the whole period, the small gender difference in party choice is found among the non-socialist parties (see Table 6.2). The Liberal Party gets stronger support among men, while CDA gets stronger support among women. This is indeed the main pattern for the various time periods too. In the 1970s and the early 1980s, the socialist parties, Green Left and the Labour Party, got slightly stronger support from men, in addition to the Liberal Party, but these differences evaporate later. There is even a small tendency for the Green Left to get stronger support from women in the 1990s. The significant trend, however, is that men increasingly tend to vote more frequently only for the Liberal Party, while women persistently prefer CDA. In the late 1990s D66 also gets significantly stronger support from women. Indeed, in the 1990s all parties other than VVD get somewhat stronger support from women, but the differences for the two socialist parties and the Calvinist Fundamentalists are small. The main long-term trend is that VVD increasingly creates a gender gap by getting stronger support from men than from women. Among the parties that get stronger support among women, the difference for CDA is stable, while there are considerable fluctuations for the others. Thus, the traditional gender gap and part of the modern gender gap exist simultaneously in the Netherlands. The Christian parties get persistently stronger support from women, while the main economic rightist party, VVD, gets stronger support from men, in accordance with the perspective of the modern gender gap. We do not see a trend for women to increase their support for the socialist parties, a significant component of the modern gender gap. In sum, in the 1970s we see a pattern that is in accordance with the traditional gender gap in all countries. We can assume that this pattern may have been even stronger in the 1950s and 1960s, and that our first time-point was in a transition period. The strength of the traditional gender gap follows mainly from the correlations in Figure 6.2, but since the correlations mask gender differences for several parties, a clearer measure is to examine the gender differences for the Christian parties or the major non-socialist parties that women supported more frequently than men in the various countries.14 In the early 1970s women’s tendency to support these parties more frequently than men varied from 19 percentage points in Italy to 12 in

216 Social Structure and Party Choice in Western Europe

Ireland, 9 in Germany, 6 in France and 3–5 in Belgium, Britain, Denmark and the Netherlands. The comparative size of the traditional gender gap corresponds largely to the first hypothesis about the existence of large Christian parties. We expected the gender gap to be larger in Belgium and the Netherlands, and perhaps smaller in Ireland, but the other countries conformed mainly to our comparative hypothesis. It is also men’s and women’s different support for the Christian parties that cause the traditional gender gap in Belgium, Italy, Germany, and the Netherlands, and in Ireland it is the two traditional Christian parties. These differences in size of this aspect of the traditional gender gap are also to a large extent in accordance with our expectations from the level of female participation in the workforce. The large traditional gender gap in Italy and Ireland and the small gender gap Denmark and Britain are perfectly in accordance with the different levels of female workforce participation. We had, however, expected the gender gap to be considerably larger in the Netherlands, and also in Belgium. In particular the small gender gap in the Netherlands is deviant. A scatter-plot (not shown) between female workforce participation in 1970 and the size of traditional gender gap in the early 1970s shows clearly that the Dutch pattern is an outlier. If the Dutch case is dropped, the correlation between the magnitude of the traditional gender gap and the level of female workforce participation increases from −0.29 to −0.74. As our analyses above have shown, the gender gap changes much during our period, but the changes vary significantly from country to country. One way of examining the changes is to examine the support and changes in support for the parties that women were most likely to support in the 1970s. Women are still more likely than men to support the Christian and Conservative parties in five of the eight countries in the 1990s, but this gender gap is generally reduced. The largest and most persistent traditional gender gaps are now found in Belgium and Britain (5 percentage points), and in these countries there has not been any decline since the early 1970s. In Ireland, Italy and the Netherlands the size of this traditional gender gap is only 2–3 percentage points. In Ireland and Italy this represents a large decline, while the pattern is more stable (at a low level) in the Netherlands. In France the trend for women to support RPR has disappeared, and in Germany and Denmark men are more likely to support the Christian and Conservative parties in the 1990s. This pattern is clearly stronger in Denmark (9 and 3 percentage points, respectively). This decline of and partly transformation of the traditional gender gap is strongly correlated with the female workforce participation in the

Gender 217

midst 1990s, 0.60 in absolute value. The reversed traditional gender gap is found in two of the countries with the highest female workforce participation (Denmark and Germany) while the still traditional gap is found in the countries with the smallest female workforce participation (Belgium, Ireland, Italy and the Netherlands). In Britain, the tradition gender gap is still of some significant in the late 1990s according to the data, and Britain is an outlier since it has the second highest female workforce participation. When the British case is dropped from the calculation of the correlation coefficient, it increases to 0.81. The comparative pattern of change is large. In Italy the decline in the gender gap is 17 percentage points, but only 5 until the late 1990s. For the other countries the changes are as follows (percentage differences in parentheses): Denmark (13), Germany (12), Ireland (9), France (6) and Belgium, Britain and the Netherlands (0). The Italian case, however, is special, with the massive change in the late 1990s. The other component of the transformation of gender gap concerns the socialist parties, to which we now return.

6.3

Socialist/non-socialist party choice

In this section we rely on the PDI-measure since it has a very intuitive meaning, and since the lor-scores, which are also calculated, show nearly identical results. Here a positive PDI-score means that women are more likely to support the socialist parties. We have not shown the figures for the whole period because they are easy to sum up. According to the percentage difference for the whole period, gender differences in socialist/non-socialist voting are small. In Belgium, the Netherlands and Germany men are 1–2 percentage points more likely than women to support the socialist parties. In France the percentage difference is zero when the Greens are grouped in the nonsocialist group, but 2 when the Greens are classified in the socialist group, indicating that women are more likely to support the socialist parties. For the other four countries, the differences are larger: 3–4 percentage points in Ireland and Britain and 7–8 percentage points in Italy. In these countries men prefer the socialist parties more frequently than women. Only in Denmark do we find a clear opposite trend (5 percentage points). Apart from the opposite ‘extremes’, Denmark and Italy, all figures are 0–4 percentage points in absolute values. Figure 6.3 (A and B) shows the development of the socialist/nonsocialist difference over time when the Greens are places in the socialist and the non-socialist group, respectively. Let us first comment on the

218 Social Structure and Party Choice in Western Europe

Figure 6.3A, where the Greens are placed in the non-socialist group. In the early 1970s men were more likely to support the socialist parties in all eight countries. The percentage difference varied from 13 in Italy to 8 in Germany, 6 in Ireland and 2–4 in the remaining five countries. This traditional gender gap is only weakly correlated with female workforce participation (−0.29), but if we drop the Dutch outlier (see above), the correlation increases in absolute magnitude to 0.75. Already in the late 1970s women were more inclined to support the socialist parties than men in Denmark, and this trend continues into the 1980s and 1990s, placing Denmark in a group of its own. Gender difference in the direction of men’s greater inclination to support the socialist parties declines in several countries. The main trend, then, is that gender differences evaporate in most countries. For example, in the late 1980s gender differences are close to zero in France, Germany and the Netherlands. In the late 1990s women are more likely to support the socialist parties in France as well as Denmark, and it is only in Britain and Ireland that we find a significant opposite pattern in which men are most likely to support the socialist parties. The changes over time (from 1970–74 to 1994–97) are significant in four of the eight countries – Italy (12 percentage points), Denmark, France and Germany (7–9 percentage points) – but insignificant in the remaining four countries (0–2). The mean for all eight countries changes from −5 to 0, indicating that there is clear trend away from the traditional gender gap whereby women support the non-socialist parties. When the Green parties are placed in the socialist group (Figure 6.3B), changes become even larger since women support the emerging green parties to a larger extent than men. Already in the early 1980s women in France support the socialist parties to a larger extent than men, a pattern that becomes stronger later. In the late 1980s the traditional gender gap has evaporated in three more countries, Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands, and in the first two, this trend continues and a modern gender gap exists in the 1990s. The gender gap in France and Germany approaches the largest gender gap in Denmark in the late 1990s. In the late 1990s women are just as likely as men to support the socialist parties – even in Italy, there is a 1 percentage-point modern gender gap. Only in the Netherlands (0) and in Ireland and Britain (−4 and −3, respectively) do we find no modern gender gap or even a traditional gender gap. These comparative gender gaps are highly correlated with the female workforce participation (0.47) and even considerably higher (0.75) if we drop the deviant British case (see above). They are also strongly related

Gender 219 15.0 10.0

PDI

5.0 0.0 –5.0 –10.0 –15.0 1970–74

1975–79

France Denmark

1980–84

Belgium Ireland

1985–89

Netherlands Britain

1990–93 Germany Mean

1994–97 Italy

Figure 6.3A Trends in the strength of the correlation between gender and socialist/non-socialist party choice according to the PDI-measure. Green parties placed in the non-socialist party group

15.0 10.0

PDI

5.0 0.0 –5.0 –10.0 –15.0 1970–74

1975–79

France Denmark

1980–84

Belgium Ireland

1985–89 Netherlands Britain

1990–93 Germany Mean

1994–97 Italy

Figure 6.3B Trends in the strength of the correlation between gender and socialist/non-socialist party choice according to the PDI-measure. Green parties placed in the socialist party group

220 Social Structure and Party Choice in Western Europe

to the influence of New Politics parties which is important for explaining the comparative difference of the gender gap in support for the leftist parties. The three largest modern gender gaps in the late 1990s are found in three of the countries with significant Green or left socialist parties (Denmark, France and Germany) and the Green and left socialist parties contribute significantly to the gender gap in these countries. The same applies to Belgium and Italy where a very small traditional gender gap (see Figure 6.3A) is transformed to a small modern gender gap when the Green parties are grouped into the leftist party group (see Figure 6.3B). The change in socialist/non-socialist voting from the early 1970s to the late 1990s when the Greens are groups in the leftist camp is still largest in Italy (14 percentage points), followed by Germany (13), France and Denmark (9), and it is still quite insignificant in the remaining four countries (0–3). Apart from the Italian case, this is basically in accordance with our hypotheses. We had, however, expected larger changes in Belgium and the Netherlands. The degree of overlap between the gender difference in total voting behaviour and left–right voting is somewhat difficult to study over time since the figures change signs: in the early 1970s women were more likely to support the non-socialist parties in all countries, while the opposite is the case in many countries in the 1990s. In addition, the PDI-scores are small, leading to some fluctuations in the calculation of percentages of overlap that may be caused by sampling error. It is, however, possible to operate with two models, one for the period with a tendency for women to support the non-socialist parties and one for the period when women support the socialist parties. The degree of overlap is the degree to which the overall gender difference is caused by the former and the latter tendency. When women start to support the socialist parties to a larger degree than men, we turn from one model to the other. 15 For two countries, Britain and Ireland, we do not have to turn from one model to the other, because men there are more inclined to support the socialist parties in the whole period. In these countries the degree of overlap is quite high, about 0.70. In Britain it is declining somewhat. In Belgium, where gender differences in left–right voting are small for the whole period, but where women vote more frequently for the socialist parties from the late 1980s, the degree of overlap is small in both periods, less than 40 per cent. In Italy there was a high degree of overlap in the periods when the Christian Democrats got much stronger support from women, 60–70 per cent. This declines largely in the early 1990s, when the non-socialist Lega Nord got significant support and much stronger

Gender 221

support among men, and in the late 1990s the small overall gender difference cut across the left–right division nearly completely. In the Netherlands the small gender gap followed the left–right division quite closely in the 1970s (overlap: 0.60–0.70). CDA got stronger support from women, while both socialist parties and (to a smaller extent) VVD got stronger support from men. The overlap declines largely in the 1980s and 1990s, when the left–right gender gap is close to zero, while the overall impact of gender is 5–7 percentage points. The main division is between two of the non-socialist parties as described in detail above. The three most interesting countries in this respect are perhaps Denmark, Germany and France. In these countries gender differences in left–right voting change significantly and increasingly conform with a model whereby the overall correlation with party choice is caused by women who support the socialist parties and men who support the non-socialist parties. In Denmark there was a small tendency for men to support the socialist parties in the early 1970s, but this pattern taps only about a quarter of the overall correlation. Since the late 1970s women are more likely to support the socialist parties, and the overlap with the overall gender difference increases from about 40 per cent in the late 1970s to 80–90 per cent in the late 1980s and the 1990s. The largest degree of overlap is found in the early 1990s, when the overall gender difference was 11.6 PDI, of which 11.2 was caused by the left–right division (95%). In France the overall gender difference cut across the left–right division to a considerable degree, as explained above. From the early 1980s women support the socialist parties to a larger degree than men, and this trend increases significantly. Gender differences in left–right voting tap an increasingly larger portion of the overall correlation. The degree of overlap increases gradually from 30 per cent in the early 1980s to nearly 90 per cent in the late 1990s. Finally, the German case is interesting. In the 1970s there was a very high degree of overlap: women supported the CDU/CSU more than men, while men supported SPD. This tapped nearly the whole correlation (85–100%). In the 1980s the degree of overlap became lower, particularly in the late 1980s. The overall correlation is low, and the gender gap in left– right voting is nearly zero. In the 1990s there is again a nearly perfect overlap (about 0.90); this time men support the non-socialist and women the socialist parties, as described above. The strong tendency for women to support the non-socialist parties in the 1970s and the opposite pattern in the 1990s tap nearly the whole correlation in both decades. This type of change is unique in a comparative setting, as the analysis above shows.

222 Social Structure and Party Choice in Western Europe

6.4

Conclusion

Gender is a weak predictor of party choice compared with the other cleavage variables we have analysed. Men and women vote fairly similar, and it might be hypothesised that many of the same forces are important for both men’s and women’s party choice (degree of religiosity, social class, etc.). When their small overall support is controlled for, we find the largest gender gap for the Communist, the nationalist and the radical rightist parties. All these party families are strongest supported by men. Women are most likely to support the Christian and the Green parties and, in terms of percentage difference, the gender differences related to the Christian parties are the most significant in many countries. The perspective of a transformation of the gender vote from a traditional to a modern gender gap, is clearly supported from the empirical analysis. In the 1970s the traditional gender gap varied from 19 percentage points in Italy, 12 percentage points in Ireland, 9 in Germany and 3–6 in the other countries. The parties which women prefer to men in the period in our analysis where the traditional gender gap was of some importance (the 1970s) were the Christian and Conservative parties and in addition the Liberal Party in Britain and the Agrarian Liberals in Denmark. The comparative size of the traditional gender gap can be explained by the existence of large Christian parties and the comparative differences in female work participation. The traditional gender gap declines in most countries, but is persistent at a fairly low level in three countries: Belgium, Britain, and the Netherlands. In Ireland and Italy the large traditional gender gap decreases to a low level, in France it disappears completely in the 1990s, and in Denmark and Germany men are more likely to support the parties that caused the traditional gender gap in the 1970s. For these five countries the decline of the traditional gender gap is considerable. The non-directional measures of the impact of gender do not show any clear average trend because it masks important changes from a traditional to a modern gender gap, and this is not captured by non-directional measures. Women are increasingly voting for the socialist parties to the same extent than men, and even more frequently in the 1990s in some countries. This trend is first taking place in Denmark, where women already in the late 1970s were more likely to support the socialist parties than men, and for many of the other countries women are equally likely to support the socialist parties as men in the late 1980s. However, the modern gender gap is only evident of some size in France in addition

Gender 223

to in Denmark in the 1990s when we define the socialist parties in the conventional way, and in addition in Germany, when the Greens are included among the socialist parties. In Belgium, the Netherlands and Italy there is no significant correlation between socialist/non-socialist party choice and gender in the 1990s, only in Britain and Ireland do we find the traditional pattern where men are more likely to support the socialist parties. The comparative differences in the modern gender gap can be explained by differences in female workforce participation and the existence of significant green or left socialist parties which mobilise a significantly higher portion of female voters than men.

7 Conclusion: the Decline, Convergence and Transformation of Cleavage Politics

7.1

Introduction

The focus in the various chapters so far has been on the comparative impact of the various social cleavages over time. In this chapter the focus will change in two ways. First, the focus will change from analysing the impact of the various cleavages in a comparative setting to examining trends in the relative impact of various cleavages within the various countries over time. This analysis will continue the bivariate approach which we have used so far. Secondly, I will go on with multivariate analyses to analyse the impact of various cleavage types and the total impact of the social cleavages over time and in a comparative setting. My focus is on the impact of the religious and the class cleavages in a broad sense through an examination of the combined impact of religious denomination and church religiosity, and education and social class, respectively. The two first cleavages reflect the two faces of the overall religious cleavage as discussed in Chapter 2 and, although we emphasised that education – according to the new version of how this variable influences party choice – might reflect other aspects than social status, I consider it basically as a hierarchical variable in the same category as social class. As discussed in Chapter 1 I have not analysed the class cleavage in a separate chapter due to the complexity of the issue, and the limitation of space. I will therefore briefly outline how the class variable is operationalised below. I begin with a bivariate comparison as in the analyses above, and then move on to multivariate analyses. The basic research questions are in connection with the bivariate analyses to examine the relative impact of the various cleavages within the eight countries, and then to 224

Conclusion

225

analyse the impact of the various types of social cleavages (mainly the religious and the hierarchical social class cleavages) in the multivariate analyses. The multivariate analyses are somewhat problematic because the various variables have not been available for the entire period or for all surveys, and if multivariate analyses were performed on the bases of the surveys in which all the variables are included, we might obtain somewhat different results compared with the bivariate case presented in the analysis of the various chapters in this work. This problem is carefully managed by comparing the results with analyses in which as many units as possible are included and by contrasting the controlled analyses with those from the bivariate case. As in the analyses from the various chapters above, I begin by treating the dependent party choice variable as nominal level variable (section 7.2). In section 7.3 I sum up the finding about overlap and crosscut for the cleavages from the various chapters, and then – in section 7.4 I go on to analyse the impact of social cleavages on the left– right division of parties. Most of the comparative literature which compares the impact of the various social cleavages uses a dichotomous dependent variable, so the analyses in the first part are indeed innovative. In section 7.5 I sum up the main findings from the empirical analyses associated with each of the research questions formulated in Chapter 1.

7.2

Social cleavages and nominal-level party choice

Bivariate analyses This analysis will basically utilise the results from the analyses in the various cleavage-specific chapters and compare the impact of the social cleavages on the basis of the measures that was used. These measures are standardised measures and can therefore be compared. However, comparing the impact of the cleavage variables in the bivariate case is problematic given that they differ in levels of measurement, from nominal to interval level. This discrepancy was reflected in the empirical analysis in the various chapters where we have (mainly) relied on Cramer’s V and eta-coefficients dependent on the level of measurement of the various cleavage variables. These coefficients can not be compared. Cramer’s V can be used for variables on a higher level of measurement, but taps then a problematic type of the relationship among the variables. I have decided to use the eta-coefficients for comparing the impact of the various cleavages. This is the coefficient that is used to examine the impact of all cleavage variables apart from two: religious denomination

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Social Structure and Party Choice in Western Europe

and social class. To estimate eta-coefficients for the relationship between these two cleavage variables and party choice, I have followed this procedure: — For the variable ‘religious denomination’ the mainly homogeneous countries in a religious sense, where denominations other than the main denomination comprise only a small percentage of the population, these are merged with the category ‘no denomination’ to obtain a dichotomous variable. This technique applies to the predominantly Catholic countries Belgium, France, Ireland and Italy and to Protestant Denmark. For the religiously heterogeneous countries, Britain, Germany and the Netherlands, a different procedure was followed. The ‘no denomination’ category was used as a reference category and constructed two (three for the Netherlands) dichotomous variables were constructed, contrasting ‘no denomination’ and membership in a given denomination. The various eta-coefficients that were calculated by this procedure were then weighted according to the size of the various denominations (for the various time periods) in order to obtain a final coefficient. These coefficients are highly correlated with the Cramer’s V coefficients, 0.96 (based on 48 units), and produced the same relative strength among the countries and trends over time as Cramer’s V. — In order to tap social class we use a version of the Erikson-Goldthorpe class schema which comprises the following categories: 1) Higher-level non-manuals; 2) Other non-manuals; 3) Employers; 4) Employers in the primary industries; and 5) Workers. For details, see Knutsen (2003). The social class variable then comprises five categories. I have ranked the categories on the class variable in the following way: 1) Employers in the primary industries; 2) Employers; 3) Higher-level non-manuals; 4) Other non-manuals; and 5) Workers, and estimated the eta-coefficients on the basis of that ranking of the social classes. This strategy can be justified on the basis of the percentage that supports the socialist parties declines consistently from the former to the latter category in all eight countries (see Knutsen 2003 for details). The eta-coefficients obtained in this way are very highly correlated with other coefficients, tapping the correlations between party choice and all social classes without any ranking, 0.96 with both Cramer’s V and Nagelkerke’s R 2. The results of the comparison are shown in Figure 7.1. We lack data for social class for the first time period.1

Conclusion

227

A. Belgium 0.600

Eta-coefficient

0.500 0.400 0.300 0.200 0.100 0.000 1970–74

1975–79

1980–84

Religious denomination Church attendance

1985–89

Gender Education

1990–93

1994–97

Urban–rural residence Social class

B. Britian 0.350

Eta-coefficient

0.300 0.250 0.200 0.150 0.100 0.050 0.000 1970–74

1975–79

1980–84

Religious denomination Church attendance Figure 7.1

(Continued)

1985–89

Gender Education

1990–93

1994–97

Urban–rural residence Social class

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Social Structure and Party Choice in Western Europe

C. Denmark 0.500 0.450 0.400

Eta-coefficient

0.350 0.300 0.250 0.200 0.150 0.100 0.050 0.000 1970–74

1975–79

1980–84

Religious denomination Church attendance

1985–89

Gender Education

1990–93

1994–97

Urban–rural residence Social class

D . France 0.450 0.400

Eta-coefficient

0.350 0.300 0.250 0.200 0.150 0.100 0.050 0.000 1970–74

1975–79

1980–84

Religious denomination Church attendance Figure 7.1

(Continued)

1985–89

Gender Education

1990–93

1994–97

Urban–rural residence Social class

Conclusion

229

E. Germany 0.400 0.350

Eta-coefficient

0.300 0.250 0.200 0.150 0.100 0.050 0.000 1970–74

1975–79

1980–84

Religious denomination Church attendance

1985–89

Gender Education

1990–93

1994–97

Urban–rural residence Social class

F. Ireland 0.350 0.300

Eta-coefficient

0.250 0.200 0.150 0.100 0.050 0.000 1970–74

1975–79

1980–84

Religious denomination Church attendance

Figure 7.1

(Continued)

1985–89 Gender Education

1990–93

1994–97

Urban–rural residence Social class

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Social Structure and Party Choice in Western Europe

G. Italy 0.600

Eta-coefficient

0.500 0.400 0.300 0.200 0.100 0.000 1970–74

1975–79

1980–84

Religious denomination Church attendance

1985–89

Gender Education

1990–93

1994–97

Urban–rural residence Social class

H. The Netherlands 0.700 0.600

Eta-coefficient

0.500 0.400 0.300 0.200 0.100 0.000 1970–74

1975–79

1980–84

Religious denomination Church attendance

1985–89

Gender Education

1990–93

1994–97

Urban–rural residence Social class

Figure 7.1 Trends in the strength of the various social cleavages according to the eta-coefficients

Conclusion

231

The two religions cleavages are generally more important than the other cleavages in the Catholic countries of Belgium, Italy and France and the religiously mixed countries of Germany and the Netherlands, whereas the class variables (social class and education) are generally most important in Britain and Denmark. Ireland deviates somewhat, as the impact of social class is of similar magnitude as that of church attendance, although this effect varies over time. Although in many countries in the impact of some of the most important social cleavages declines over time, the overall pattern is also one of considerable stability. This effect applies in particular to the relative impact of the various cleavages, but also to the absolute magnitude of many social cleavages over time. Gender is generally the least important social cleavage of the cleavages for which we have time–series data. The urban–rural cleavage is generally less important than the religious and class cleavages, but is in most countries more important than gender. This effect does not apply to Ireland or completely to Denmark; the impact of urban–rural residence cleavage in these two countries is of the same significance as many of the other cleavages. Below I comment first upon the pattern in the Catholic countries, then the religiously mixed countries and finally the two (predominantly) Protestant countries. In Belgium (Figure 7.1A) church religiosity, followed by relious denomination, are definitely the most significant cleavages during the entire period although they are declining in significance. Social class and education are less important but do indeed have a more stable impact on party choice, approaching the impact of religions denomination in the 1990s. In France (Figure 7.1D) a somewhat different picture emerges. The impact of church religiosity and denomination is most pronounced in the 1970s and early 1980s, then declines significantly such that social class approaches both these cleavages in the 1990s. In contrast to the pattern found in Belgium, education is of much less significance in France than is social class. The Italian pattern (Figure 7.1G) does to a large degree resemble the pattern in Belgian and France, although the dominant impact of the religious cleavages is even more pronounced in Italy but declines over time. Urban–rural residence and gender have an impact on party choice which is similar in size to the impact of social class and nearly of the same magnitude as education. The decline of all social cleavages apart from social class in the late 1990s is very pronounced. The pattern for Ireland (Figure 7.1F) deviates from the other Catholic countries in several respects. First and foremost social class in Ireland

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Social Structure and Party Choice in Western Europe

has relatively large and stable impact; second, the impact of two other social cleavages – church attendance and urban–rural residence – is increasing, to become the most significant cleavages in addition to social class from the late 1980s.2 In Germany (Figure 7.1E) the two religious cleavages are also the most significant, followed by the class cleavage and education. The impact of church religiosity is declining whereas the denominational cleavage increased between the 1970s and the 1980s and is of even greater importance than church religiosity in the late 1990s. Increases in the impact of two important cleavages, education and religious denomination, take place from the 1970s to the early 1980s, and are associated with the emergence of the Greens, as we have shown in the analysis of single cleavages in earlier chapters. In a party system characterised as ‘hyperstable’, there is generally considerable change and short-term fluctuation in the impact of social cleavages although there is a high degree of stability in the support for the larger political parties. The dominance of the religious cleavages is pronounced in the Netherlands (Figure 7.1H) and, although they are declining somewhat, they still remain highly significant. Social class, which is the third most important cleavage in the 1970s and 1980s, is indeed declining significantly more than the religious cleavages, and in the late 1990s is of less importance than either education or urban–rural residence. In Britain (Figure 7.1B) social class remains the most important social cleavage although it declines largely over time. Several other cleavages occupy the position of similar importance and we observe a parallel decline for all of them between the early 1970s and the late 1970s, when they enter a period of relative stability. Education, which is generally the second most important cleavage, declines considerably in the late 1990s. Finally, we find a pronounced decline in most social cleavages in Denmark (Figure 7.1C), particularly for social class, which traditionally has been the dominant social cleavage in Denmark and the other Nordic countries. The second most important decline is found for urban–rural residence. The large impact of church religiosity must be interpreted in the light of the skewed distribution of that variable within Denmark. 3 In sum, the strength of the religious and class cleavages confirms previous analyses in the sense that the religious cleavages are more significant in the Catholic countries and the religiously-mixed countries, whereas the class cleavages are of higher importance than religion in Britain and the Nordic countries. There are few changes in the relative importance of these main cleavages over time, although we observe

Conclusion

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a decline in many countries. The impact of the religious and class cleavages are, however, approaching each other in most countries because the cleavages that traditionally had the largest impact demonstrate the clearest sign of decline. This effect applies to the religious cleavages in Belgium, France, Italy and partly Germany, and the class cleavage in Britain and Denmark. In these countries the class cleavage and religious cleavage, respectively, appear to be more resistant to decline. Only in the Netherlands, where the religious cleavages are dominant, are they more resistant to decline than the class cleavages, which decline considerably during the period. Multivariate analyses Multivariate analyses based on the complete set of cleavage variables are – as mentioned above – somewhat problematic because many cleavage variables were not available in each Eurobarometer survey. Ideally, multivariate analyses should be based on those surveys where all relevant cleavage variables are available. The multivariate analyses might then be based on only a small subset of cases compared with most of the analyses based on single cleavage variables and party choice. The results of the multivariate analyses in this chapter might then differ somewhat from the results from the various chapters above.4 Social class was not available in the surveys before 1975. This implies that we cannot perform multivariate analyses for the first time period of our data set, 1970–74. As we have seen – in the chapters on the religious cleavages – questions pertaining to religious denomination and church attendance were asked in only a few Eurobarometer surveys (in proper forms) in the early 1980s. Therefore the analyses from this period contain 1,000–2,000 units from each country, even though the bivariate analyses between other cleavage variables and party choice for that period generally vary between 5,000–9,000 units. For one country, the Netherlands, we have seen that no survey from that period contains data on either church attendance or religious denomination (in a proper form). We are therefore unable to perform any multivariate analysis of the impact of all cleavage variables in the Netherlands for that period.5 The research problems for the multivariate analyses are: 1. What is the impact of the two religious cleavages over time? In Chapters 2 and 3 we examined the impact of religious denomination and church attendance singly, but here we want to examine the combined impact.

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Social Structure and Party Choice in Western Europe

2. What is the impact of the class variables, education and social class, when the prior variables in the causal model are controlled for? Do these class variables decline in importance? 3. What is the impact of the entire set of cleavages over time and how has this impact changed? Is there a clear decline in the explanatory power of social cleavages over time as the thesis of decline of cleavage politics imply? 4. For these types of social cleavages, religion, total social class (social class combined with education) and the total cleavage model, is there a tendency towards convergence in the sense that the influence of the cleavages gains a similar magnitude across countries? It is not possible to examine the relative effects of the various variables by means of some coefficients from multinomial logistic regression, because this statistical method do not present any standardised coefficient to examine the relative impact of the various social cleavages. I therefore rely on the change in Nagelkerke’s R 2 in a stepwise (or hierarchical) model, in order to examine the combined and controlled impact of social cleavages. On the basis of time–sequence criteria, I have formulated the following causal model which determines the inclusion level of the given cleavage variable in the stepwise model: I start by including gender and urban– rural residence in the analysis, then the two religious variables, then education and social class, which combined will be referred to as ‘total social class’ below. Gender and urban–rural residence are first and foremost control variable in this analysis. I examine neither their combined nor their separate impact in the same way as for the other two types of variables. Gender and urban–rural residence are considered here to be ascribed variables which are characteristics determined early in people’s lives. The religious cleavages also belong to the ascribed variable group, although religious affiliations and religiosity may change somewhat during the life course. Education and social class, on the other hand, belong to the archived social structural variables, and are therefore entered after the other in the analyses. In accordance with the research problems above, we are first and foremost interested in the impact of the religious and class variables and in the impact of the whole cleavage model, including gender and urban–rural residence. I start by examining the impact of the religious variables on party choice, followed by the class variables, and finally the impact of the

Conclusion

235

whole cleavage model. The results of the multinomial logistic regression analyses are shown Figures 7.2–7.4. The combined impact of the two religious cleavages on party choice was largest in the Netherlands, followed by the Catholic countries of Belgium, Italy and France in the 1970s and early 1980s. It is in these countries that we find a clear decline in the impact of religious cleavages. Great change occurs between the 1970s and the late 1980s, although there is a strong decline in the 1990s in Italy. In Belgium the impact of religion is on the other hand increasing somewhat from the late 1980s to the 1990s. According to the absolute change in Nagelkerke’s R 2, the decline is largest in Italy and the Netherlands (0.11). However, in terms of percentage of the original impact of the religious cleavages in the 1970s, the decline is most pronounced in Italy and France where the impact of religion on party choice declines by nearly 50 per cent, compared with about 25 per cent in Belgium and the Netherlands. In the four other countries, Britain, Denmark, Germany and Ireland, the impact of religion is less pronounced and fairly stable over time. The impact is least significant in Britain and Ireland, and due to the strongly declining impact of religion in France and Italy, the impact of religion on party choice in these countries is at approximately the same level as in Denmark and Germany in the late 1990s. 0.450 0.400

Nagelkerke’s R2

0.350 0.300 0.250 0.200 0.150 0.100 0.050 0.000 1975–79

1980–84

1985–89

1990–93

Belgium

Britain

Denmark

France

Ireland

Italy

Netherlands

Mean

1994–97 Germany

Figure 7.2 Trends in the impact of the religious cleavages on party choice measured by Nagelkerke’s R2

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Social Structure and Party Choice in Western Europe

In sum, the combined impact of the religious cleavages is declining in importance due to the first four mentioned countries where the religious cleavage has traditionally been dominant. In these countries the average decline is 34 per cent of the strength in the late 1970s, and differences in the impact of the religious cleavage among some of these countries and some of the other countries are vanishing. On the other hand, religion still explains a large portion of the variance in party choice in Belgium and the Netherlands in the late 1990s. Due to the declining influence of religious cleavages in the countries where the religious cleavages have had a strong impact, there is a tendency towards convergence, reflected in the trends for the standard deviations of the Nagelkerke’s R 2 for the eight countries. It declines from 0.126 to 0.076 from the late 1970s to the late 1980s, but increases somewhat (to 0.086) in the late 1990s. This represents a decline of 32 per cent of the spread in the late 1970s. The impact of total class is definitely largest in Denmark, indeed at a totally different level than in the other countries in the 1970s and early 1980s. It then declines considerably to approach the impact of the other countries. The similarity of the impact in the other countries is at a much lower level. There are some trendless fluctuations that may be

0.200 0.180

Nagelkerke’s R2

0.160 0.140 0.120 0.100 0.080 0.060 0.040 0.020 0.000 1975–79

1980–84

1985–89

1990–93

Belgium

Britain

Denmark

France

Ireland

Italy

Netherlands

Mean

1994–97 Germany

Figure 7.3 Trends in the controlled impact of the class variables (education and social class) on party choice measured by Nagelkerke’s R2

Conclusion

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0.600

Nagerkerke’s R2

0.500 0.400 0.300 0.200 0.100 0.000 1975–79

1980–84

1985–89

1990–93

1994–97 Germany

Belgium

Britain

Denmark

France

Ireland

Italy

Netherlands

Mean

Figure 7.4 Trends in the impact of the total cleavage model on party choice measured by Nagelkerke’s R2

due to the small number of cases, in particular for the early 1980s. 6 We observe a decline in Britain and the Netherlands (in addition to Denmark), and an increase in Belgium, Germany and Ireland. The increase in Belgium and Ireland is peculiar, is concentrated in changes that occur between the early and late 1990s, and is consistent with the analysis based on the bivariate analyses in the previous chapters, albeit more pronounced in this multivariate analysis. The total impact of social class is larger in these countries than in Denmark in the late 1990s. The impact of total class is, on average, declining from the early 1980s to the early 1990s, but is increasing somewhat after that point.7 Indeed, we find a small increase in many countries during the 1990s, not only in Belgium and Ireland, where the increase is large. There is a tendency towards congruence with regard to the impact of the class variables, until the late 1990s. The standard deviations for the Nagelkerke’s R 2 decline from 0.035 to 0.020, but increase in the late 1990s to the same level as in the late 1970s (0.034), due to the deviant results for Belgium and Ireland. The decline in dispersion from the 1970s to the early 1990s is, however, exclusively caused by the Danish case. When Denmark is omitted from the calculation of the standard deviations, there is a relatively equal dispersion in the impact of the class variables until the late 1990s where there is a clear increase. The trend towards congruence on the impact of

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Social Structure and Party Choice in Western Europe

the class variables is, then, much less pronounced than for the religious cleavage. Finally, the total impact of the cleavage model varies impressive among countries in the 1970s. It was generally largest in the four countries where religion had a large impact on party choice (the Netherlands, Belgium, Italy and France) and the country where social class had a decisive impact (Denmark). Cleavage politics were of greatest significance in the Netherlands and of least significance in Britain, Germany, and Ireland. As can be seen from the average figure, there is a gradual, albeit small, decline in the total impact of the social cleavages. The average explanatory power according to the Nagelkerke’s R 2, decline from 0.307 in the late 1970s to 0.242 in the early 1990s, and then increases somewhat to 0.257 in the late 1990s. The declines represent 21 per cent and 17 per cent, respectively, of the original explanatory power in the late 1970s. We do find a large decline of cleavage politics in four countries, namely four of the five countries where social cleavages had a strong impact on party choice in the late 1970s, Denmark, France, Italy and the Netherlands. In all of these countries the decline represents at least 25 per cent of the original explanatory power in the 1970s.8 The basic decline in these countries occurs between the 1970s and the early 1980s to the late 1980s, and is then fairly stable, apart from in Italy where there is a gradual decline until the late 1990s, increasing to a very steep decline. The fifth country where cleavage politics was decisive in the late 1970s, Belgium, also experienced a decline during the 1980s, followed by a small increase in the impact of the social cleavages: in the 1990s the impact was slightly less than in the 1970s and early 1980s, and the second largest in a comparative setting. In Britain the impact of social cleavages was lower than in any other countries for the whole period, and it is declining somewhat over time. There are two countries where we find an increase in the impact of social cleavages: Germany, where there is a fairly small increase (0.045), and Ireland, where there is a large increase (0.103). In Germany much of the increase takes place between the 1970s and the early 1980s, and is associated with the emergence of the Greens as we have seen in previous chapters. The increase in Ireland is more gradual and, as discussed in previous chapters, is coupled to new parties and to the modernisation of the party system. The increases in these two countries are substantial compared with the original impact of social cleavages in the late 1970s; 26 per cent for Germany and 67 per cent for Ireland. Finally, we find a small decline in the impact of social cleavages in Britain. There is a gradual decrease until the late 1980s which indeed is

Conclusion

239

substantial: 0.047, or 32 per cent of the original strength in the late 1970s, but then the cleavage model increases its significance considerably, to that the decline represents only about 14 per cent. These findings can be compared with those of Franklin et al. (1992) although they use a dichotomous left–right party division as their dependent variable. They find generally a larger decline in cleavage politics and a clearer trend towards convergence (at a fairly low level) in the explanatory power of the structural social cleavages (see in particular Franklin 1992: 385–90). They also interpreted their findings to mean there were some clear sequences in which social cleavages countries began to decline. It is evident from Figure 7.4 that there is a trend towards convergence although considerable difference among the countries remains in the impact of the cleavages in the 1990s. The trend towards convergence occurs mainly because there is a clear decline in the cleavage model in some of the countries where the impact of the cleavages was strongest in the 1970s and early 1980s. This convergence occurs from the 1970s to the late 1980s and is reflected in the standard deviations of the explanatory power of the model (measured by Nagelkerke’s R 2). It declines from 0.14 to 0.09 from the late 1970s to the late 1980s and then becomes relatively stable. There is then convergence, but most of the original variation remains. The decline in the standard deviation of the explanatory power of the cleavage model represents about 35 per cent of the original dispersion in the late 1970s. In Chapter 1 I reviewed the findings from Rose (1974a) about the impact of three social cleavages on left–right partisanship in the 1960s. Of the eight countries in my study, social cleavages had the largest impact in the Netherlands (51% explained variance), the second largest in Belgium (35%), and then in Denmark and Italy (both 28%), followed by Germany and France (19–20%), and finally Britain (12%) and Ireland (3%). The results of the late 1970s in my study show similar results. The explanatory power of the social cleavages is largest in the Netherlands, followed by Denmark, Belgium and Italy. In the present study, however, social cleavages are more important in France than in Germany. In Ireland, the impact of social cleavages is at the same level as in Britain, which stands in some contrast to Rose’s finding. As to Franklin’s compilations of the country-specific findings of the impact of social cleavages, the explained variance in the 1970s was largest in Belgium, Denmark, Italy and the Netherlands, followed by Germany, Britain, Ireland and France at a much lower level (Franklin 1992: 387). Franklin’s findings are less similar to those of Rose than are the findings of this study, but nevertheless we get an impression of similarity in the

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Social Structure and Party Choice in Western Europe

way in which the cleavages differ among various groups of countries. The trends towards social dealignment and convergence at a low level are considerably stronger in Franklin’s analysis than in the analysis above. Franklin finds no decrease in the impact of the social cleavages in Germany and Italy, which is similar to the analysis above, until the large decline in Italy in the 1990s. Franklin’s analysis, however, compared the 1960s, the 1970s and the 1980s. I have also examined the cleavage types with the greatest contribution to the change over time, by decomposing the change into the three types of variables included in the cleavage model above. It is those cleavage types that have dominated the various countries that make the greatest contribution to the decline of the cleavage model. It is in the three countries where the religious cleavages have traditionally been dominant, France, Italy and the Netherlands, where we find a large decline of the cleavage model, and the decline of the religious cleavage contributes to 75–90 per cent of the total decline of the cleavage model. In Denmark class cleavage makes the largest contribution, but only about half of the total decline. Here the declining impact of urban– rural residence contributes equally. In Britain the small decline is exclusively caused by the class variables. The increase in the impact of the cleavage model in Germany and Ireland is predominantly caused by the class cleavage (about 80%), whereas the religious cleavage contributes to the remaining 20 per cent in Germany and urban–rural residence contributes 20 per cent in Ireland. Finally, the small increase of the cleavage model in Belgium is the result of counter-weighting forces: a considerable decrease in the religious cleavages and a small decrease in the urban–rural cleavage, followed by an increase in the class cleavage.

7.3

Overlap and crosscut for the various cleavages

Table 7.1 sums up the basic patterns for the overlap discussed in the various chapters. It shows the degree of overlap for the whole period (Table 7.1A) and the changes in overlap from the early 1970s (late 1970s for the class variable) to the late 1990s (Table 7.1B).9 It is based on different treatment of the Greens in order to get the highest degree of overlap for the various variables (see the comments to the table). Gender is omitted due to the small impact of gender and also the basic change from one pattern of overlap to the other, a pattern which is not easy to include in the table. I have also calculated an average degree of overlap based on the two religious variables, the two class variables and finally all five variables.

Table 7.1 A.

Overlap and change in overlap for cleavage variables

Overlap for the whole period (1970–97) Averages Relig. denom.

Church attendance

Urban/rural resid.

Education

Social class

Religious cleavages

Class Cleavages

All five cleavages

Belgium Britain Denmark France Germany Ireland Italy Netherlands

0.83 0.84 0.57 0.98 0.72 0.77 0.86 0.62

0.77 0.99 0.89 0.95 0.86 0.86 0.95 0.58

0.48 0.97 0.83 0.94 0.91 0.84 0.59 0.75

0.67 0.99 0.28 0.45 0.63 0.45 0.19 0.32

0.94 0.96 0.91 0.92 0.94 0.90 0.96 0.88

0.80 0.91 0.73 0.96 0.79 0.81 0.90 0.60

0.81 0.98 0.60 0.68 0.78 0.67 0.58 0.60

0.74 0.95 0.70 0.85 0.81 0.76 0.71 0.63

Mean

0.77

0.86

0.79

0.50

0.93

0.81

0.71

0.77

241

242

Table 7.1

(Continued)

B. Change in overlap from 1970–74 (1975–79 for social class) to 1994–97 Averages Relig. denom.

Church attendance

Urban/rural resid.

Education

Social class

Religious cleavages

Class Cleavages

All five cleavages

Belgium Britain Denmark France Germany Ireland Italy Netherlands

−0.23 0.42 −0.44 −0.04 −0.22 0.28 0.08 −0.11

−0.17 0.24 0.09 −0.09 −0.01 0.29 0.10 −0.34

0.09 0.11 −0.29 0.00 −0.03 −0.26 0.33 −0.11

−0.30 −0.10 −0.16 0.04 −0.21 0.00 0.03 −0.22

−0.46 0.01 −0.39 −0.32 −0.21 −0.04 −0.36 −0.58

−0.20 0.33 −0.18 −0.07 −0.12 0.29 0.09 −0.23

−0.38 −0.05 −0.28 −0.14 −0.21 −0.02 −0.17 −0.40

−0.21 0.14 −0.24 −0.08 −0.14 0.05 0.04 −0.27

Mean

−0.03

0.01

−0.02

−0.12

−0.29

−0.01

−0.20

−0.09

Note The Green parties are grouped with the socialist parties for the calculations of overlap for the religious cleavages and urban–rural residence. The Greens are grouped with the non-socialist parties for the calculation of overlap for the class variables (education and social class).

Conclusion

243

The table shows that the two class variables perform a fairly different pattern regarding degree of overlap. Social class shows the highest degree of overlap and education the lowest. The basic difference is indeed between the low degree of overlap for education and the considerably higher degree for the other variables. As to the variation between countries, we focus upon the three calculated average scores since the cross-national patterns for the various single variables are commented and analysed in the various previous chapters (apart from social class). As to the religious cleavages, there is an extremely high degree of overlap in France, Britain and Italy, while the lowest degree is found in the Netherlands, and then in Denmark. The socialist/non-socialist division of parties taps nearly all correlation between the class variables and party choice in Britain, but considerable smaller portions in the other countries, in particular in Denmark, Italy and the Netherlands. Finally, we find that the degree of overlap for all five variables on average is largest in Britain, and then France and Germany. Overlap is lowest in Italy, Denmark and the Netherlands. The most striking pattern regarding the change in degree of overlap is that only for the class variables do we find a lower degree of overlap over time. The decline is particular large for the class variables. It is then the class variables that mainly contribute to the pattern that the socialist/ non-socialist division of parties taps a smaller portion of the total correlation between social structural variables and party choice.10 As to the cross-national pattern regarding change in degree of overlap for the various types of variables, there is a common pattern for the religious cleavages, and the social class cleavage. The largest decline in overlap is found in Belgium, Denmark and the Netherlands, and the smallest decline is found in Britain and Ireland. In these latter countries there is even a significant increase in overlap for the religious cleavages. For France, Germany and Italy the decline is fairly moderate for both variable types. These comparative differences are also found for the overall degree of overlap based on the calculation of the five relevant cleavage variables.

7.4

Left–right division of parties

Bivariate analysis As to the division between the leftist and rightist parties, we have seen that it is decisive for the strength of the correlations for some countries whether the Green parties are placed among socialist or non-socialist parties. This placement is particularly important for a comparison of

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Social Structure and Party Choice in Western Europe

social cleavages. The impact of the religious variables tend to be strongest when the Greens are placed among the leftist parties, because the Green voters are as secular as the other leftist supporters, yet tend to belong to the new middle class and to have higher education, traits which are normally found among voters for the rightist parties. The relative impact of the religious and the class cleavages may then differ as a function of the placement of the Green parties in countries where such parties comprise a significant portion of the voters during certain periods, in particular in Belgium, France, and Germany. For these reasons, I have performed all analyses based on two alternative treatments of the Greens: among the leftist and among the rightist (or non-leftist) parties. I have presented the results only in cases in which the Greens are placed among the leftist parties in the figures, but the results based on the alternative treatment are discussed in the text. In Figure 7.5A–H. I have shown the lor-scores for various social cleavages over time for each of the eight countries.11 The relative strength of the various social cleavages and the trends over time resembles those found for the analyses in which party choice is treated as a nominal level variable, as in the analysis above. There are, however, many deviations, and the treatment of the Greens appears to be important and even decisive for conclusions about the trends of specific cleavages and the relative impact of various social cleavages for left–right party choice in several countries.

A . Belgium

3.00

Lor-scores

2.50 2.00 1.50 1.00 0.50 0.00 1970–74

1975–79

1980–84

Religious denomination Church attendance Figure 7.5

(Continued)

1985–89

Gender Education

1990–93

1994–97

Urban–rural residence Social class

Conclusion

1.40

245

B. Britian

1.20

Lor-scores

1.00 0.80 0.60 0.40 0.20 0.00 1970–74

1975–79

1980–84

Religious denomination Church attendance

1985–89

Gender Education

1990–93

1994–97

Urban–rural residence Social class

C. Denmark

2.00 1.80 1.60

Lor-scores

1.40 1.20 1.00 0.80 0.60 0.40 0.20 0.00 1970–74

1975–79

1980–84

Religious denomination Church attendance Figure 7.5

(Continued)

1985–89

Gender Education

1990–93

1994–97

Urban–rural residence Social class

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Social Structure and Party Choice in Western Europe

D. France

2.50

Lor-scores

2.00

1.50

1.00

0.50

0.00 1970–74

1975–79

1980–84

Religious denomination Church attendance

1985–89 Gender Education

1990–93

1994–97

Urban–rural residence Social class

E. Germany

2.00 1.80 1.60

Lor-scores

1.40 1.20 1.00 0.80 0.60 0.40 0.20 0.00 1970–74

1975–79

1980–84

Religious denomination Church attendance Figure 7.5

(Continued)

1985–89

Gender Education

1990–93

1994–97

Urban–rural residence Social class

Conclusion

247

F. Ireland

1.80 1.60 1.40

Lor-scores

1.20 1.00 0.80 0.60 0.40 0.20 0.00 1970–74

1975–79

1980–84

Religious denomination Church attendance

1985–89

Gender Education

1990–93

1994–97

Urban–rural residence Social class

G. Italy

3.00 2.50

Lor-scores

2.00 1.50 1.00 0.50 0.00 1970–74

1975–79

1980–84

Religious denomination Church attendance Figure 7.5

(Continued)

1985–89

Gender Education

1990–93

1994–97

Urban–rural residence Social class

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Social Structure and Party Choice in Western Europe

H. Netherlands 3.00 2.50

Lor-scores

2.00 1.50 1.00 0.50 0.00 1970–74

1975–79

1980–84

Religious denomination Church attendance

1985–89

Gender Education

1990–93

1994–97

Urban–rural residence Social class

Figure 7.5 Trends in the bivariate correlations between social cleavages and socialist/non-socialist party choice. Greens placed in the socialist party group. Lor-scores

In Belgium (Figure 7.5A) church attendance is the dominant cleavage, followed by religious denomination. These two cleavages decline considerably over time, as do education and social class, and the declines are of fairly similar size. There is generally a strong decline over time in cleavage politics with regard to left–right party choice. When the Greens are grouped within the non-socialist parties, a somewhat different picture emerges. The decline of the two religious cleavages is even stronger and the impact of education and social class is impressively stable. Social class and education approaches religious denomination because of the sharp decline of the denominational cleavage, and in the 1990s both class variables are even more strongly correlated with left–right party choice. In France (Figure 7.5D) the two religious cleavages remain dominant throughout the entire period although the impact of both cleavages declines somewhat. Social class and all the other cleavages are considerably less important. When the Greens are placed among the non-socialist parties, the pattern is similar, the main difference being that the impact of social class nearly approaches the magnitude of the correlation for religious denomination for all time points.

Conclusion

249

In Germany (Figure 7.5E) the two religious cleavages are dominant particularly in the 1970s and the 1980s. Both of these cleavages increase from the 1970s to the 1980s when the Greens are placed among the leftist parties, and then decline considerably. Urban–rural residence has a stronger impact on the left–right division than does social class for most of the periods considered. When the Greens are placed among the non-socialist parties, the decline of the religious cleavages are even more pronounced in the 1980s and 1990s, and several other cleavages – particularly education and social class – have a stronger impact than religious denomination (but not as strong as church attendance). There are indeed considerable changes in the absolute and relative impact of the various social cleavages as a function of the left–right placement of the Greens. In Italy (Figure 7.5G) the two religious cleavages have the most dominant impact in a comparative setting and, although their impact declines somewhat in the 1990s, they remain totally dominant, regardless of the placement of the Greens. In the Netherlands (Figure 7.5H) we have a clear case of decline of cleavage politics according to the left–right division of parties. Both religious cleavages and the two class variables are declining and the relative strength of the various social cleavages is fairly similar over time. A different pattern emerges in Ireland (Figure 7.5F) than in the other Catholic countries. Ignoring the deviant pattern for the early 1980s for the religious cleavages, these two cleavages demonstrate the highest correlation with party choice, and they do not decline. Social class and urban–rural residence are also important predictors of left–right party choice, but at a somewhat lower level than the two religious cleavages. Social class, and in addition education and gender, have a diminishing impact on left–right party choice over time. When voters for the small Green party are placed among the non-socialist parties, the impact of the class cleavages is nearly of the same size as the two religious cleavages. In Britain (Figure 7.5B) social class remains the dominant predictor of the left–right division of parties during the entire period although the class cleavage does decline over time, as does education. The decline of education is even more pronounced than that of social class. The other cleavages are more stable and, until the late 1980s, are at a considerably lower level than social class and education. Finally, church attendance has a stronger correlation with the left– right division of parties in the Danish case (Figure 7.5C), followed by social class and then urban–rural residence. The two latter cleavages

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Social Structure and Party Choice in Western Europe

are declining sharply over time and several cleavages are more important in the 1990s than urban–rural residence. The result for church attendance must be interpreted in the light of the fact that the lor-score compared the disengaged with the core Christians and that the latter is a small group in the Danish case. This finding does not emerge in other analyses when the whole church attendance variable is included, not just the two extreme categories as in the present analysis. In sum, the two religious cleavages are generally the most significant for the left–right division in the Catholic countries and the religiouslymixed countries as they are in the analysis based on party choice as a nominal-level variable. However, we also find some of the sharpest declines over time with regard to the religious cleavages in these countries. In Britain and Denmark where the class cleavage have been dominant,12 it is for these cleavage variables that the decline is most significant. Multivariate analyses I have performed multivariate analyses using the same method of including the independent variables as in the previous section in which party choice was treated as a nominal level variable. The present analysis differs in that we now use a dichotomous dependent variable, which allows for the use of logistic regression. We again focus on Nagelkerke’s pseudo R2 because the regression coefficients from logistic regression are unstandardised and because we use dummy variables for both religious denomination and social class.13 Furthermore, we again focus upon the total (controlled) impact of the religious and class cleavages in addition to the impact of the entire model. Let us first examine the impact of the religious cleavages when urban– rural residence and gender are controlled for. The combined impact of these two cleavages is shown in Figure 7.6. The figure illustrates that there is a convergence with regard to the impact of the religious cleavages because the decline is concentrated among the countries where the religious cleavages have had the strongest impact on the left–right division of political parties, first and foremost in Belgium, Italy and the Netherlands, and then in France. In the three former countries the combined impact of the religious cleavages have in the late 1990s lost about 60 per cent of their original strengths in the 1970s and in France 50 per cent. According to the average figures for the eight countries, there is a gradual decline of approximately 50 per cent from the late 1970s to the late 1990s. There is also a decline in Germany, where the impact of religion is smaller than in the four countries mentioned above, but higher than in the remaining countries. However,

Conclusion

251

0.300

Nagelkerke's R2

0.250 0.200 0.150 0.100 0.050 0.000 1975–79

1980–84

1985–89

1990–93

Belgium

Britain

Denmark

France

Ireland

Italy

Netherlands

Mean

1994–97 Germany

Figure 7.6 Trends in the impact of the religious cleavages (controlled for gender and urban–rural residence) on left–right party choice. Greens placed in the leftist party group

the impact increases in Ireland where the religious cleavages approach the impact in Germany in the 1990s. Religious cleavages remain at a low level in Denmark and Britain. The basic difference among the four countries where the religious cleavages have the greatest impact – Belgium, France, Italy and the Netherlands – and the other four countries, remains throughout the whole period, but the closing of the crossnational gap is the most pronounced feature. A strong trend towards convergence regarding the impact of the religious cleavages on left–right voting is illustrated by the spread in dispersion (represented by the standard deviation) regarding the impact represented by Nagelkerke’s R2: from the late 1970s to the late 1990s it declines gradually from 0.093 to 0.023, which is about 25 per cent of the spread in the late 1970s. When the Greens are grouped with the non-socialist parties we find basically the same patterns (not shown). The declines are even more pronounced because the secular location of the Greens tends to diminish the impact on left–right party choice over time as Green parties generally increase their share of the vote over time. This effect applies to some of the countries where the religious cleavages were strongest, Belgium,

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Social Structure and Party Choice in Western Europe

0.180 0.160

Nagelkerke’s R2

0.140 0.120 0.100 0.080 0.060 0.040 0.020 0.000 1975–79

1980–84

1985–89

1990–93

Belgium

Britain

Denmark

France

Ireland

Italy

Netherlands

Mean

1994–97 Germany

Figure 7.7 Trends in the impact of the class variables (controlled) on left–right party choice. Greens placed in the leftist party group

Italy, Germany and France. In the three former countries the decline of the religious cleavages is about 70 per cent of their original strength and 50 per cent in France. The average decline is nearly 60 per cent of the original strength of the late 1970s. The decline of the dispersion according to the standard deviations is similar to the decline reported above. The impact of the social class variables (social class and education) is outstanding in Denmark when the other cleavages are controlled for, as in previous analyses, whereas the cross-national differences are fairly small between the other countries (see Figure 7.7). In the 1970s and early 1980s the controlled impact of social class was smallest in Italy and Germany, but this difference vanishes in the 1980s and 1990s because of the decline in the other countries. The impact of social class in Italy also increases in the 1990s. The controlled impact of the class variables declines generally. These declines are largest in the Netherlands where the impact is weakest in the late 1990s while being among the highest in the late 1970s. The decline represents as much as 85 per cent of the original strength in the late 1970s. We also find a pronounced decline in Britain, Belgium, Denmark and Ireland, and smaller declines in France and Germany,14 and only a small increase in Italy. The average decline of the impact of

Conclusion

253

the class variables is 44 per cent of the original strength in the late 1970s. There is a trend towards congruence in the impact of the class cleavage on left–right voting, but it is not as large as for the religious cleavage. The standard deviation of the strength of the relationship between total social class and left–right voting declines from 0.027 to 0.019, that is with 30 per cent of the original dispersion. There is then a somewhat smaller decline in the class variables than in the religious variables, at least in the controlled case. 15 In Belgium, France, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands we find that the religious variables remain stronger predictors than social class variables during the whole period, whereas the class variables are dominant in Britain and Denmark. In Ireland a change occurs in the relative impact of the religious and the class variables: In the 1970s the class variables are most important, while the religious variables are more important from the late 1980s. The relative impact of the religious and the class cleavages can be illustrated by the means for the eight countries: the impact of the religious cleavages declines from 0.136 to 0.069 according to Nagelkerke’s R2, while the class variables decline from 0.071 to 0.040. These findings about relative impact apply whether we examine the controlled impact of class variables or the uncontrolled impact of the class cleavage with the religious cleavages. The religious cleavages remain strongest in the five mentioned countries, whereas class cleavage remains strongest in Britain and Denmark. There is only one exception: in the Irish case, the uncontrolled impact of the class variables remains of higher significance than the religious cleavages for the whole period. When the Green parties are grouped with the non-socialist parties (not shown) the decline of the social class variables becomes somewhat smaller due to the fact that the Greens get stronger support from the new middle class and thereby contribute to strengthen the traditional class division between leftist and non-leftist parties over time given that the Greens increase their support among the electorate. The decline in the impact of the class variables is even more pronounced in a comparative setting in the Netherlands and Denmark because there are no significant ‘pure’ Green party voters in these countries. There is still a decline of the class variables in most countries, but it is small. In Belgium, there is a great change in the impact of the class variables when the Greens are placed within the non-socialist parties. The impact of the class variables increases slightly, in sharp contrast to the findings based on the opposite treatment of the Greens. The average decline of the class cleavage for the eight countries is now only 20 per cent of the original strength in the late 1970s. In this case there is no decline in

254

Social Structure and Party Choice in Western Europe

dispersion of the impact of social class. The dispersion is stable and there is even an increase when the deviant Danish case (with a strong decline from a high point of departure) is taken into consideration. The placement of the Green parties has a profound impact on the conclusions about the relative strength of the religious cleavages and total social class. As we saw above, the average impact of the religious cleavages remained stronger than the impact of total social class, although they approached each other, and that the former cleavages remained stronger than the latter in the late 1990s in the countries where religion has traditionally had a stronger impact on party choice than class variables. When the Greens are grouped with the non-socialist parties, the average impact for the eight countries declines even more for the religious cleavages and total social class declines less, and the figures are nearly exactly the same in the late 1990s (about 0.055). In France the religious cleavages decline to a level just above total social class, and in Germany the impact of religion and social class reaches the same magnitude in the late 1980s and remains fairly equal in the 1990s. In Belgium exactly the same effect takes place in the late 1980s, but in the late 1990s total social class has an even stronger impact than religion. Even in Ireland – which has a small Green Party – we come to a different conclusion about the impact of the two main cleavage types: the class variables remain dominant during the entire period, in contrast to the change described above when the Greens were grouped with the socialists. Only in Italy do the religious variables remain considerably stronger than total social class, even with the alternative treatment of the Greens, and we come, of course, to no different conclusion for the remaining countries of Britain, Denmark and the Netherlands. Finally I have examined the impact of the total cleavage model. Figure 7.8 shows the impact of the social cleavages on left–right party choice when the greens are grouped with the socialist parties. The general trend is that cleavage politics is declining regarding left– right party choice. According to the average figure, Nagelkerke’s R 2 declines gradually from 0.239 to 0.126, that is: the average explanatory power of the social cleavages decreases by nearly 50 per cent (47%) of their strength in the late 1970s. This is a considerably stronger decline than the 20 per cent found based on the whole range of parties. The left– right division of parties tends to overestimate the total decline of cleavage politics to a considerable degree. The explanation is the decline in overlap described in section 7.3 above. The impact of the social cleavage model is also converging to a low level, as we see from the figure, and the declining impact of social

Conclusion

255

0.400 0.350 Nagelkerke’s R2

0.300 0.250 0.200 0.150 0.100 0.050 0.000 1975–79

1980–84

1985–89

1990–93

Belgium

Britain

Denmark

France

Ireland

Italy

Netherlands

Mean

1994–97 Germany

Figure 7.8 Trends in the impact of the total cleavage model on left–right party choice. Greens placed in the leftist party group

cleavages is largest in the countries where they had greatest impact in the 1970s. The decline from the late 1970s to the late 1990s is largest in the Netherlands (−0.25) and Belgium (−0.21), and then Italy (−0.15) and Denmark (−0.12), followed by France (−0.11), and Germany and Britain (both −0.04). In Ireland the impact of the social cleavage model follows a slightly curvilinear form with an increase followed by a decrease, which increases again in the late 1990s, becoming the country with the highest explanatory power of the cleavage variables in the late 1990s. There is a small increase from the late 1970s to the late 1990s of the cleavage model in Ireland (0.01). The trend towards convergence at a low level is much more pronounced for the left–right division of parties compared with the pattern found with the treatment of party choice as a nominal-level variable. This trend can clearly be seen by comparing Figures 7.4 and 7.8, and can also be illustrated by the trends in dispersion of the strength of the model indicated by the standard deviations for Nagelkerke’s R 2: It declines from 0.083 in the late 1970s to 0.019 in the late 1990s, representing a decline of about 77 per cent of the original dispersion in the late 1970s, compared with 35 per cent when party choice is treated as a nominallevel variable. Both the trend towards convergence and the decline of

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cleavage politics is considerably stronger for the left–right divisions of parties than for analyses based on the whole range of parties. We have seen that when the greens are placed in the leftist party group, these is a decrease in the decline of the religious cleavages, but an increase in the decline of the class variables, whereas the opposite occurs when the Greens are not placed in the leftist party group. The placement of the Greens may be a decisive factor for the strength of the decline in the whole cleavage model, depending on these counterweighting forces. I have examined the impact of the total cleavage model when the Greens are placed in the non-socialist parties and have compared the total impact and the changes over time. The differences in change of Nagelkerke’s R2 are less than 0.020 for all countries except Belgium (0.020) and France (0.027). As it turns out, the impact of the cleavage model is generally largest when the Greens are placed among the non-socialist parties in Belgium and also (to a much lesser extent) in Britain, whereas the impact is largest when the Greens are placed with the socialist parties in the other relevant countries (France, Germany, Ireland and Italy). The major changes from the findings presented in Figure 7.8 are that the decline in Belgium decreases to −0.19, whereas the decline in France increases (in absolute magnitude) to −0.14, to the same level as in Italy. The average trends regarding the decline of the cleavage model and the trend towards convergence is virtually the same as for the opposite treatment of the Greens reported above. If we define the best-fitted model as the model representing the highest explanatory model of left–right party choice, the Greens should be placed among the non-socialist parties in Belgium and Britain, while remaining among the socialist parties in the other countries. This best fitted model is then identical to the one presented in Figure 7.8, for all countries other than Belgium and Britain. I have shown the results from the analyses based on this model in Figure 7.9 which is similar to Figure 7.8. It is evident from Figure 7.9 that independent of the way in which we group the Green parties, cleavage politics is definitely on the decline for left–right party choice. The average explanatory power in the late 1990s represents 54 per cent of the impact of the late 1970s. In the late 1990s the socio-structural cleavages have the highest explanatory power in Ireland and Belgium, whereas there are small differences between the other countries. The trend towards convergence is again similar to the pattern reported above. The standard deviation of the impact of the model declines to 24 per cent of the original dispersion in the late 1970s, i.e. a decline of 76 per cent of the original dispersion.

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0.400 0.350

Nagelkerke’s R2

0.300 0.250 0.200 0.150 0.100 0.050 0.000 1975–79

1980–84

1985–89

1990–93

Belgium

Britain

Denmark

France

Ireland

Italy

Netherlands

Mean

1994–97 Germany

Figure 7.9 Trends in the impact of the total cleavage model on left–right party choice. The best fitted model regarding the placement of the Greens

I have decomposed the change/decline according to three main cleavage types, the two ascribed variables of gender and urban/rural residence, the religious variables, and the class variables in the same way as in the analysis of party choice treated as a nominal-level variable. What are the contributions of each of these cleavages to the overall change/ decline that we have observed for the best-fitted model? Given the fact that the religious cleavages are the most significant variables in most countries and that they decline somewhat more than the class variables according to the original strength in the 1970s, it comes as no surprise that decline of religious cleavages is the most significant contribution in the relevant countries. In the five countries where the decline is substantial (above 0.10), the religious cleavages contribute to nearly all the decline in Belgium and Italy, about 85 per cent of the decline in France and 60 per cent in the Netherlands. Even in the Netherlands, where the decline of the class cleavage was so pronounced, religious cleavages made a stronger contribution because of the high level of religious left–right voting of that country and the subsequent decline to a much lower level. Only in Denmark is the contribution of the religious cleavage small in this respect. However, it is not the class cleavage that is most important (40%), but the ascribed cleavages, represented by

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urban–rural residence (about 50%) which, as we have seen, declines dramatically in the Danish case. For the two countries with a small decline, Britain and Germany, we find opposite patterns. Germany belongs to the countries in which the decline of the religious cleavage is most important for the overall decline of the cleavage model (65%), but social class also makes a significant contribution (35%). In Britain, the overall decline is caused almost exclusively by the declining impact of the class cleavage. Finally, the small increase in the impact of the cleavage model in the Irish case is the product of small counterweighting tendencies for the class and the religious cleavages. The religious cleavages increase somewhat in importance, whereas the combined impact of the class variables declines with virtually the same magnitude. The increase is caused by a small increase in the impact of the urban–rural cleavage. In sum, although both religious and class cleavages contribute significantly to the decline of the overall cleavage model, the decline of the religious cleavages is dominant in most of the countries (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands). Only in Protestant Denmark and Britain is the contribution of the class cleavage more dominant, but even in Denmark the class cleavage is not the major determinant of the decline. The impact of the total cleavage model and the trends over time is similar for the left–right division of parties compared with the impact based on the nominal party choice variable, although we have noticed a considerable greater trend towards decline and convergence for the left–right division of parties. 16 I have compared the impact of the total cleavage model for the entire period based on the two ways of treating the dependent variable. 17 The size of the two Nagelkerke’s R 2’s are naturally largest when party choice is treated as a nominal-level variable, but this varies considerably crossnationally: in Britain and Ireland the impact of the social cleavages on the dichotomous left–right division of parties is about 85 per cent than when the party choice variable is treated as a nominal-level. The percentage decreases to about 80 per cent for France, 65 per cent for Germany and Italy, 60 per cent for Belgium and Denmark and only 41 per cent for the Netherlands. This is a broad-based measure for the degree to which the social cleavages overlap or cut across the left–right division of parties. We find a very similar ranking of countries as for the average measure of degree of overlap shown in Table 7.1. The average correlation between the degree of overlap in Table 7.1 and the percentages outlined above is also very high, 0.81 for the eight units (countries).

Conclusion

259

We have seen that the degree of overlap generally decreases over time. This is reflected in the observation above that the declining impact of social cleavages is considerably larger when we examine the left–right division of parties with the overall impact of party choice treated as a nominal level variable. When we compare the change in impact of the social cleavages based on the dichotomous left–right division of parties with the change when the party choice variable is treated as a nominal-level variable, we find that the decline is relatively more significant in some of the countries with the largest decline in overlap in Table 5.1, in particular Belgium and the Netherlands. In Belgium the impact of social cleavages on the left–right division of parties is 88 per cent of the magnitude of the impact on the nominal-level party choice variable in the late 1970s. This declines to 41 per cent in the late 1990s. In the Netherlands the corresponding figures are 69 per cent and 29 per cent, respectively.18 Another major difference regarding the results of the impact of the total cleavage model is found in Germany where the trend for the cleavage model to increase its explanatory power is changed to a decline of fairly similar magnitude based on the left–right party division. For the other countries there are only small differences in the size of the change/ decline of the cleavage model depending on how the dependent party choice variable is treated. The findings for the impact of social cleavages on left–right party choice (based on the best fitted model) are in accordance with the basic findings from Franklin et al. (1992) about convergence in the impact of social cleavages. In fact, based on an eyeballing of the figures from Franklin’s compilation of the findings from the various countries (Franklin 1992: 387, Figure 19.1) and the findings in Figure 7.9, the trend towards convergence is considerably greater and more consistent in this work than in Franklin’s data. Franklin also finds that the social cleavage had the largest impact of the left–right division of parties in Belgium, Denmark, Italy and the Netherlands in the 1970s which is fairly consistent with our findings.19 He finds that the social cleavages were of considerably smaller importance in France compared with our findings from the late 1970s. We also find a more consistent decline than Franklin does when the parties are grouped into leftist and rightist parties (but not when treated as a nominal-level variable). There is a gradual decline of cleavage politics in Italy in contrast to Franklin’s findings, and there is also a decline (albeit small) of the impact of social cleavages in Germany which is inconsistent with the findings in Franklin’s analysis. 20

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7.5

Social Structure and Party Choice in Western Europe

Main findings associated with the research questions

This study has taken an explicit comparative approach to the study of the relationship between social cleavages and party choice in contrast to most other studies which have been based on compilation of country-specific data and which has contained country-chapters written by experts on electoral behaviour in ‘their’ country. Instead of having country-specific chapters, this book has cleavage-specific chapters which all have a comparative focus and which are based on comparative research questions which were the same in each of the chapters. The first chapter set the framework for the empirical analyses. The Lipset-Rokkan model for stable or ‘freezing’ alignments and the scholarly discussion of various types of electoral change, named realigment and dealignment, were discussed. The research design formulated in the first chapter was exploratory in the sense that no concrete hypotheses were formulated. Instead I formulated a series of research questions. Concrete hypotheses were formulated in the various chapters which analysed the specific social cleavage, on the basis of specific scientific discussions related to the comparative impact of the given cleavage and the changes over time analysed or anticipated in the literature. The framework for the analyses set up in the first chapter was then consistently employed in the empirical analysis of the various cleavage chapters. In the first chapter I formulated six research questions which have steered the empirical analysis in each of the cleavage chapters. The concrete findings related to the various research questions have been summed up in the concluding sections of the various chapters. Different statistical measures were discussed to be used to analyse the various research questions. Specific attention was paid to the fact that the analyses would be based on comparison of parties belonging to various party families in different countries and to the fact that we should perform comparative longitudinal analyses. Here I shall go back to the six research questions and discuss some of the major findings from the various chapters which are related to each of these questions. The second and sixth research questions about the comparative strength of the various cleavages and the degree of overlap and cross-cut of the socialist/non-socialist division of parties, are summed up in the previous sections (7.2, and 7.3 and 7.4, respectively), and will not be focused upon here. I then focus upon the four remaining questions.

Conclusion

261

The first research question was to describe the social change that has taken place in the eight countries according to the data. We find major structural changes in the eight West European countries. An advantage of the Eurobarometer data set is that the questions have been asked in the same way in the various countries. We can then examine these changes in a comparative setting with a fairly high degree of comparability. 21 The structural changes that are of particular importance are the changes in the denominational and church attendance variables. The portion of the population who do not consider themselves a member of any of the institutionalised churches has grown considerably, and the decline in church religiosity in the Catholic countries in particular, is dramatic, in particular the portion belonging to the core. This applies also to the size of the Catholic core in the religiously-mixed countries Germany and the Netherlands. Although we have presented detailed comparative analyses of the way social structural change has taken place in Western Europe, we have treated the ecological realignments that is associated with these changes in a general way. We have for example not calculated the possible gains and losses for the various parties given these structural changes. The third research problem was to compare the impact of a given structural variable on the various parties within the party systems. Here we used log odds ratios to control for the size of the various parties. The idea of examining the relative impact of a given structural variable on the various parties in a party system by the lor-scores often led to different conclusions compared with the next research question where percentage difference measures was used. Small parties often get very different support from various social groups which – given that the overall support of the parties is small – cannot be captured by traditional percentage difference measure. This study therefore illustrates the fruitfulness of combining these measures for tapping central information related to somewhat different research questions. It is often parties belonging to the small leftist party families, Communists and left socialists, and increasingly also the Greens, who have voters who are most anchored in one of the cleavage positions, being disproportionally unaffiliated and disengaged on the two religious variables and located in the urban areas. The Greens decisively have the strongest relative support from the higher-educated strata compared with all party families and the most female-dominated electorate in the latter period of our study. The Christian and the Conservative

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parties are influenced strongly by the same cleavage variables and are often strongest supported by the opposite social groups: the core and the affiliated religious groups and those living in the rural areas. The new radical rightist parties are also fairly strongly influenced by the structural cleavages, in particular education and gender. They get strongest support from the lower-educated strata and men. It is also an important finding in this study that the radical right is a predominantly secular phenomenon: the parties gain disproportionally strong support from the unaffiliated (in Belgium and Germany) and disengaged groups. The fourth research question was to decompose the components that made up the various correlations and to explain the comparative difference in the impact of a given cleavage variable. For this purpose the percentage difference measure has been used (PDI-index), and in each chapter I have shown a table which shows the decomposition of the overall PDI-index associated with the various political parties for the whole period in detail. 22 It is generally the larger parties belonging to the established party families in the various party systems, Christian, Conservative, Liberal, Social Democratic and Communist (in France and Italy) which generally contribute most to the polarisation of a given social cleavage when we analyse the data for the whole period for which we have data. The fifth research question was how we could explain the changes of the correlations between a social cleavage and party choice within the various countries. This has been analysed in detail in the various chapters. It is again the larger parties belonging to the established party families in the various party systems, Christian, Conservative, Liberal, Social Democratic and Communist which generally contribute most to the change of a given social cleavage. For example, the decline of the religious cleavages is clearly associated with reduced support for the Christian parties among the members of the major denominations and the core religious group. The new Green parties have a distinct anchorage in all social cleavages examined, and contribute in particular to new polarisation in the party systems in countries where these parties are significant, primarily in Belgium, France and Germany. A very important finding from this detailed decomposition is that although we find considerable support for the thesis of ‘decline of cleavage politics’, there is considerable transformation of how social cleavages influence party choice that is not captured by the traditional analyses of the left–right division of

Conclusion

263

parties or by simply examining the strength of the correlations between a structural variable and party choice. For example, the Green and left socialist parties make significant inroad in the unaffiliated and disengaged segments of the population in many countries and change the polarisation caused by the religious variables. New Politics parties contribute significantly to increase, or more correctly in most countries, to diminish the decrease of the religious cleavage. As to the education variable, major polarisation takes place within the socialist and nonsocialist segments, and these polarisations are increasing or changing character during the period studied. Within the non-socialist parties a traditional pattern was found in the beginning of the period studied here. The Christian parties gained strongest support from lowereducated strata in contrast to most other non-socialist parties where the opposite pattern was found. This pattern has been supplemented by the radical rightist parties which also gain strongest support from the lower educated groups. Among the socialist parties, the left socialist parties and also the Greens, if they are considered to belong to the leftist parties, have very different educational profile compared with the Old Left, Social Democrats and Communists, gaining strongest support from the higher-educated strata. This cross-cutting pattern related to the left–right division of parties increases generally over time and in the 1990s a major impact of education on party choice involves in several countries the Old versus the New Left (Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Ireland and the Netherlands). For education and gender we found an important overall change in how these social structural variables influence voting behaviour. For education we found for example that different processes contributed to a fairly stable pattern in the overall impact of education on party choice, but this fairly stable pattern revealed considerable change in how the education variable influence party choice. We found considerable support for a model of change which indicated that education no longer can be considered as an indicator of social status and social class interests as in typical industrial society. Increasingly the higher-educated strata support the post-material left, Green and left socialist parties, while the lower-educated strata support the Radical Right and also Conservative parties. The empirical analyses showed in details how this change took place in different countries. As to gender, we find considerable support for the hypothesis of a transformation of the gender vote from a traditional to a modern gender gap. The detailed analyses showed how the traditional gender gap was associated with the tendency for women to vote for the

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Christian and Conservative parties. The trend towards a modern gender gap was associated with a decline of these tendencies and the new trends where women support left socialist, Green parties and partly also the Social Democrats, whereas men support the radical rightist parties.

Notes

1 Party Choice and Social Structure: Theory, the Party Choice Variable and Statistical Measures 1. See some modifications in the review of the comparative literature in section 1.2 below. 2. The integrated Eurobarometer datafile is extracted from the ZEUS database. Eurobarometers are biannual surveys carried out for the European Commission throughout the EU. From 1987 to 1998, the ZEUS Institute at the University of Mannheim integrated these data sets in a harmonised database, analysed the data and advised the Commission in matters of comparative survey research. 3. Luxembourg is not included in this analysis. The Eurobarometers (and the cumulative file) contain specific data for Northern Ireland, which are not included in this analysis (nor in the data for Britain). We should emphasise that we use only the data for West Germany for the whole period. We refer to the country as ‘Germany’. Britain, Denmark and Ireland became members of the EEC in 1973, and were included in the Eurobarometer then. Thus, we have data only from 1973 from these countries, and the first time period in this study contains only two surveys (from 1973 and 1974) from these countries. The practice of biannual surveys started in 1974–75. Earlier, surveys called European Community Studies were carried out in 1970, 1971 and 1973. These surveys are considered a part of the Eurobarometer surveys and included in the integrated Eurobarometer datafile. 4. On the other hand, a large increase in a social category may also imply that the social category becomes more heterogeneous in a political sense. Strategically, many parties would appeal to such a group. 5. Changes in voting pattern that do not result in overall changes in the impact of a given structural variable are also interesting. Social groups may change their voting pattern in a fundamental way, but these changes may counterbalance each other, and the net result may be no change in the overall impact of a structural variable. 6. Lipset and Rokkan called this ‘the narrowing of the “support market”’ (Lipset & Rokkan 1967a: 51). 7. Four (of the 32) parties that were cohesive according to social class, were cohesive due to a large overrepresentation of peasants (the agrarian parties in the Nordic countries), and the authors argued that these parties could be grouped according to the urban–rural cleavage instead of the class cleavage (Rose & Urwin 1969: 15), which illustrates the double-faceted character of the commodity market cleavage, anchored in both social class and urban–rural residence. 8. It contains chapters written by established country experts who took varied approaches to the research problems, mainly offering insights about changes in the specific country. The country-specific chapters focus on quite different research problems, and the comparative component is not very pronounced. 265

266

9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

Notes On the other hand, the introductory and concluding chapters by the editors (Dalton, Beck & Flanagan 1984; Dalton, Flanagan & Beck 1984a) were both comparatively oriented, in particular the introductory chapter which presents important aggregate level statistics about electoral stability and instability and party system fragmentation. Both of these chapters formulated innovative and important explanations and models of change. Their argument for using ‘left voting’ as their dependent variable is basically that ‘the cleavage between left and right parties has been repeatedly established as defining as the most salient social division’, and that no alternative party grouping promises extensive comparability. They also argue that the Lipset/ Rokkan theory was not intended to apply to specific parties, but to electorate ‘alternatives’ which might vary in their ‘organisational expression’. The division between the various leftist parties (Socialist and Communist) is therefore irrelevant from a cleavage point of view, since these parties both fall on the same side of the class cleavage (Franklin, Mackie & Valen 1992: 16). The use of party families as a grouping criterion is not discussed, and the new party families, like the left socialists and the Greens, are not problematised according to this division. The idea of emphasising generational replacement as a main research area was strongly coupled to this assumed mismatch. Social change may lead to political change only after a delay consequent upon the slow-maturing emergence of new generations (Franklin, Mackie & Valen 1992: 11–12, 27–8). This argument is problematic from several perspectives. First of all, it is far beyond the research presented in the book to test the assumption that cleavages have been of fairly equal importance in all democracies. The traditional cleavages may always have had little impact on party choice in Canada, the USA and the other Anglo-American democracies. There may be comparative differences in the impact of cleavages at a given point in time, which reflects basic differences between the various countries and which deserves explanation. This is the main approach to the impact of social cleavages within much comparative electoral research. The difference in explanatory power in the 1960s is reflected in Figure 1.1. While the decline in cleavage voting is largely generational, in the sense that we find a smaller impact of social structure on party choice among the postwar cohorts, issue voting is largely a period effect which increases in all cohorts and which is not particularly large in the postwar cohorts (Franklin 392–402; Eijk et al. 1992: 410). Apart from the argument related to the comparison of party families crossnationally, a major reason for merging parties belonging to the same party family in some cases is that there is no one-to-one correspondence between an individual party and the presence of a political cleavage or a specific position on that cleavage. The relevance of a cleavage requires expression in some form of political organisation, but such an organisation may nevertheless include two or more political parties competing for more or less the same constituency. Thus while individual parties may rise and fall, the major ‘alternative’ which expresses more or less the same cleavage position may persist (Mair 1997: 65). Partito Democratico della Sinistra and Rifondazione Comunista.

Notes 267 15. The Unity List includes both the Green and Communist parties in Denmark in addition to being a successor to the Left Socialist Party, and it could be argued that these parties should have been merged under the left socialist umbrella for the whole period. However, the Communists gained some significant support in Denmark in the 1970s, and therefore such an approach might have made the left socialist category too diversified. For some analyses showing trends over time, the Greens and Communists and merged with the left socialists. 16. In France the traditional socialist party, SFIO, is grouped in this category in the early 1970s. PS is a direct successor of SFIO. We refer to both parties as the Socialist Party for the whole period. 17. These are Ecologiste, Génération Ecologie and Les Verts. 18. These parties are the Reformed Political League (Gereformeerd Politiek Verbond, GPV), the Political-Reformed Party (Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij, SGP) and the Reformed Political Federation (Reformatisch Politieke Federatie, RPF). 19. For an excellent discussion of the question of ‘identifying liberal parties’, see Steed and Humphreys (1988). 20. Also, the data material placed the Alliance in a separate category, which comprised both parties, and where most respondents were grouped for a certain time period. 21. In the Italian case we have excluded a third potential candidate – the Radical Party, which is a splinter party from PLI. The Radical Party has developed into a type of new politics party and can no longer be said to be a liberal party, according to Pridham (1988: 30). It is grouped as a Green party. 22. The Radical Party can be classified into the Liberal-Radical group in Gordon Smith’s two categories of liberal parties; the Republican might be classified as a Liberal-Conservative party, or even a Conservative party (Steed & Humphreys 1988: 412). The third important component of the UDF-alliance is the Christian Democrats, since 1976, named Centre des Democrates Sociaux (CDS) (Elgie 1994). We treat the alliance as one liberal party since it is common in the literature (Smith 1989; Frears 1988). In addition, the Eurobarometer data do not differentiate completely between these components, since there is a fourth category (apart from categories for the three components) for ‘UDF’, which is used in the surveys in the 1990s. 23. With regard to the parties discussed here, Smith (1989: 122–3) and von Beyme (1985: 45) group the PLI in Italy, the Belgian and Dutch (VVD) Liberal Parties, the Agrarian Liberals in Denmark, UDF in France and the Progressive Democrats in Ireland in the Liberal-Conservative group. The Italian Republican Party (PRI), the Dutch D66 and the Radical Liberals in Denmark are grouped in the Liberal-Radical group. These authors, however, group the British and German Liberal Parties in different categories. While Smith groups them in the Liberal-Conservative group, von Beyme groups them in the Liberal-Radical group. 24. The major Irish parties, Fine Gael and Fianna Fail, have been classified differently by different authors. Smith (1989: 103–4) classifies Fine Gael as a Liberal-Radical party (Liberal-Conservative in previous versions: 1976, 1980, 1983) and Fianna Fail as a Conservative party, while Lane and Ersson (1999: 80, 85) classify Fine Gael as a religious party and Fianna Fail as a Liberal party. 25. Movimento Sociale Italiano.

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26. We deviate from Betz’s classification by not including the regional Lega Nord/Lega Lombarda in this group. 27. There were other parties in the original data which were grouped into the ‘other parties’ category in an earlier phase. 28. Lane and Ersson (1999: 81) group the Danish Agrarian Liberals in the Agrarian category, as do Elder, Thomas and Arter (1983: 39–42). Smith (1989: 122–3) does not have a particular agrarian category. The Agrarian Liberals are grouped in the category ‘Liberal-Conservative’. In another study which discusses liberal parties in the Danish context, the Agrarian Liberals are also considered a special type of a liberal party (Thomas 1988). 29. The question is formulated as follows: ‘If there were a “general election” tomorrow (say if contact is under 18 years: “and you had a vote”), which party would you support?’ 30. The voting intention question has been asked in 54 of the 65 surveys that are included in the cumulative file. 31. Although it is not the actual vote that is tapped by the voting intention question, we often use the phrases ‘the vote (of specific social groups)’, ‘the voters’ and ‘the electorate’ in our presentation in addition to other formulations in order to vary the language. We also believe it is reasonable not to differentiate fundamentally between actual vote in a specific election and voting intention for the research purposes here. 32. In Ireland the proportional single transferable vote operates on the simple logic of voters ranking candidates according to their preference. Voters may rank candidates from different parties. There is however a very strong correlation between the party affiliation of the candidate ranked as number one and the party the voter prefers. In Irish election studies and opinion polls the voting choice question is used as if there was an electoral system in which it is not ambiguous. Almost all analysis published and unpublished of Irish voting behaviour uses a question asking which party someone would or did vote for, or to which party they would or did give their first preference vote. In practice it makes no difference (see various contributions in Gallagher, Marsh and Mitchell 2003). Therefore it is unproblematic to use the voting intention question in the Irish case. 33. The ‘other parties’ category also contains respondents who were placed there in the original data set. 34. We use plural form when we refer to the parties belonging to the same party family since they formally are two parties, for example ‘the Socialist parties in Belgium’. 35. The decline in support for the left socialists at General elections in the 1990s is not reflected in the data. 36. It is the socialist parties that are defined positively; the non-socialist parties are those not defined as socialist, according to the conventional rules for the socialist/non-socialist division. 37. We sometimes use the notion ‘left-right division of parties’ instead of socialist/ non-socialist division. 38. Log odds ratios are also appropriate for multivariate analysis. In a bivariate logistic regression, with one of the (binary) variables used as dependent and the other as independent variable, the regression coefficient (b) is identical

Notes 269 to the lor-score between these variables. There is then a direct and immediate connection between the bivariate measure (lor) and the bivariate and controlled coefficient from logistic regression (b). 39. Things become more complicated if the variable is on a nominal level. Then we cannot compare only two categories and we must choose a reference category with which to compare the other categories one by one. This is done in Chapter 2. 40. An overlapping pattern implies that the overall correlation equals the correlation with the left–right division of parties, while a high degree of crosscutting implies that the overall correlation is much higher than the correlation with the left–right division of parties. 41. It might also be possible to have a division within only one of party groups, socialist and non-socialists.

2

Religious Denomination

1. This basic division is also discussed in larger details in Martin (1993: 27–56, chap. IV) 2. From EB 31 (1989) the question is formulated as follows: Do you consider yourself as belonging to any religion? (If yes) Which one? 3. The categories are 1. Catholic, 2. Protestant, 3. Orthodox, 4. Jewish, 5. Muslim, 6. Buddist, 8. Other and 9. None. The non-Christian religions which comprise very few respondents are merged with the ‘Other denomination group’. This category is briefly named ‘Other denominations’, but includes after 1988 also religions other that the Christian religion. 4. The non-conformists do most likely place themselves in the category ‘other denominations’, but we can not be sure that only these groups place themselves there. We also assume that the members of the Orthodox Calvinists confessions in the Netherlands place themselves in the Orthodox group, which seems fairly reasonable after examining the data. 5. We do not have the possibility to make any further differentiation between the various non-conformist denominations before 1988. 6. This group will be referred to as the unaffiliated group below in accordance with Jagodzinski and Dobbelaere’s (1995a: 86) conceptualisation. 7. The correlation between Cramer’s V and Nagelkerke’s R 2 is 0.91 based on the eight units (countries). 8. In Germany and the Netherlands, the Catholic category is used for evaluating the support of the various confessions by the lor-scores. 9. The PDI-scores that are shown for five countries in the table are based on a comparison between the unaffiliated group and the main denomination in the given countries. 10. There is a time lag between this development and the programmatic profile of the parties. The Liberals dropped their anti-clerical image already in 1961 (de Winter & Dumont 1999: 198). 11. These parties are splinter parties from the Christian Democrats (DC) which all claim to be Christian, see Table 1.2 for details.

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Notes

12. The decrease in PDI-score caused by the Christian parties is 22, and for the Christian parties and PSI combined, about 30. The overall decline from the early to the late 1990s is 8. The new polarisation caused by Forza Italia and Alleanza Nationale is 23. 13. The statement that the Danish mass publics is secular, is based on comparative research on church attendance and even more direct measures of religiosity (Jagodzinski & Dobbelaere 1995a: 104; 1995b: 212–14; Halman & Moore 1994: 43–4). 14. They also compared the Scandinavian Christian parties with the nonconformists in Britain and the Anti-Revolutionaries in the Netherlands because they are opposed to the tolerant pragmatism of the Established Lutheran Churches, rejecting the lukewarm latitudinarianism of the national Mother Church (Lipset & Rokkan 1967a: 18). 15. For similar findings, see Seawright (2000). 16. We have not presented tables or figures for overlap in the chapters for the various cleavages, but an overview of overlap and changes in overlap for all cleavages is outlined in Chapter 7 (see Table 7.1). 17. There are two declines in the Netherlands, one for the Protestants and one for the Catholics versus the unaffiliated.

3

Church Religiosity and Church Attendance

1. Jagodzinski and Dobbelaere (1995a: 116) argued in favour of collapsing the two categories but, for technical reasons due to the surveys they are analysing, they keep these two categories separate. 2. It should be emphasised that this measure is somewhat different from other measures based on percentage differences that we also have named PDI. The PDI-index for church religiosity is developed to describe an univariate distribution, while percentage differences in other tables measure the effect of a cleavage variable on party choice, and is an effect measure of an independent variable on a dependent variable. 3. For a similar finding, see Jagodzinski and Dobbelaere (1995a: 103–4). 4. There are few surveys in which both the question about church attendance and that on religious denomination were asked in the period 1980–84. The religious denomination question was asked in only three surveys, and in only one of them was it differentiated between the three denominations that are central in the Netherlands. In this survey the question on church attendance was not asked. It is therefore not possible to present data showing the level of church attendance according to religious denominations for this period in the Dutch case. 5. Nagelkerke’s R 2 from multinominal logistic regressions with church attendance as an independent covariate shows the same ranking of countries and with the same basic four-fold division of countries. The correlation between the eta-coefficients and Nagerkerke’s R 2 for the eight units is 0.98. 6. Nagelkerke’s R2 from multinominal logistic regressions with church attendance as an independent covariate shows very similar results as the results based on the eta-coefficients. The relative decline for the various countries are, however,

Notes 271

7. 8. 9.

10.

4

somewhat different: The largest decline is found in Italy as for the analysis based on the eta-coefficients, but then in the Netherlands, while the decline is of fairly similar magnitude in Belgium, France and Germany. The average for all eight countries decreases from 0.163 to 0.106 for all eight countries, and from 0.264 to 0.156 for the five countries where the decline is substantial, reflecting a decline of 35% and 41%, respectively. The very similar patterns are reflected in the correlation between the two sets of 48 coefficients which is 0.98. For a somewhat different finding, see Boy and Mayer (2000: 155–6). More correctly, we refer to the parties that became part of the UDF alliance in 1978. We use the late 1970s as a starting-point for this comparison because the Calvinist Fundamentalists were not appropriately incorporated on the voting intention variable in the early 1970s. A small exception is the Italian PSDI, which is grouped under the socialist party group, but gets a 0.7 percentage point stronger support from the core (and an even stronger support from the marginal group) than from the disengaged.

Urban–Rural Residence

1. The correlation between the eta and the Cramer’s V coefficients is perfect, 1.00, based on the coefficients for the whole period. Nagelkerke’s R2 from multinominal logistic regressions with urban–rural residence as an independent covariate shows exactly the same ranking of countries according to the strength of Nagelkerke’s R2. The correlation between the two sets of coefficients (eta and Nagelkerke’s R 2) is 0.99 for the eight units. 2. The multinominal logistics regressions for the various time periods show the same pattern as the eta-coefficients. This is expressed by the correlation between the coefficients based on 48 units, 0.94. The only different pattern is that the decline of the impact of urban–rural residence is less pronounced in Italy based on Nagelkerke’s R 2 while the decline in Belgium is more pronounced. Based on Nagelkerke’s R 2 the decline is on the same level in these countries while it is more pronounced in Italy based on eta. 3. The support among voters in small and medium-sized towns follows the support in the countryside from the 1970s to the 1980s. The Conservative Party got strongest support from the large cities. From the 1980s the support in on the same level in towns as in large cities, and in the 1990s it is even larger in the medium category. 4. The increase in the small and middle size towns is also considerable: from 9–10% in the 1980s to 24% in the 1990s. 5. In the early 1970s, there was no significant difference in support for the Communist Party. 6. The urban base of the Irish Labour Party was a quite new phenomenon in the early 1970s. From the foundation of the party to the 1960s, its main source of strength had not been, as one might have expected, the urban areas, but a belt of rural constituencies in the south and east of the country. In the general elections in 1965 and 1969, the party gained more votes in the

272

Notes

Dublin area, while losing ground heavily in its traditional rural strongholds. For the first time in its history, it had become a predominantly urban party in terms of electoral support (Whyte 1974: 622; Sinnott 1995: 192). 7. The decline in smaller towns was from 41% to 23% and fairly similar to the pattern found among the rural population. 8. Since all correlations have the same signs, we have chosen to use positive signs all the way. We have then changed the higher value on the urban–rural variable from rural to urban in this analysis. 9. The Socialist parties are extremely small in strength in Ireland (15%) compared with all of the other countries, compared with, for example, Denmark (48%).

5

Education

1. These parties will be those who articulate the interests of the higher-level new middle class and the bourgeoisie in the various countries, i.e. the mainstream, established economic right in the various countries, and this varies crossnationally in terms of the division of party families that we have developed. Main established rightist parties are liberal parties in Belgium, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands. In Britain and Denmark they are the Conservative parties. The Liberal parties in these latter countries belong to the political centre on the left–right dimension. In France it is more difficult to indicate one of the two major non-socialist parties – we would expect both UDF and RPR to be relevant – and in Ireland no such party existed before the arrival of the rightist liberal Progressive Democrats. The Christian Democrats definitely do not belong to the mainstream economic right in this sense. They are to a large extent cross-class coalitions, that gain support from different classes and, one would expect, different educational groups (Kersbergen 1999: 352–9). 2. In four surveys in 1995, EB 43 (including 43.1 and 43.2) and EB 44, respondents were asked to place themselves in one of only four categories, each comprising several ages when finishing full-time education. These surveys are dropped in the analysis here. 3. Category 10, ‘still studying’, is dealt with in the following way in the construction of the final education variable: the age of the respondent is simply used to ascribe the value on the education variable. This indicates the present education level. Those who are more than 22 years old and are still studying are placed in category 9 since they will finish their education when they are more than 22 years old. 4. In this analysis I have excluded all respondents below 22 years old in the data in order to exclude those who are still in school. The final education levels for these respondents were unknown when the survey took place. 5. There were some problems with constructing such a variable in the first and later periods. In Italy nearly 60% of the respondents had finished school when they were 14 years old or younger in both the early and late 1970s, and even in the 1980s more than 50% of the respondents finished school at that age. In the 1990s it was not possible to get (close to) 20% of the voters in the upper educational category in Denmark because nearly 40% finished their education when they were 22 years old or older.

Notes 273 6. Another approach that was considered was to use the various cohorts in the various time periods as a point of departure for constructing the variable, for example to obtain a distribution of 40–20–20–20 within each cohort. This is a more cumbersome process, and the result would not necessarily be satisfactory. Those who would have had the highest education level in a specific time period would have had very different absolute levels of education due to the relative measure related to education level within their cohort. Also, the same results can be obtained by controlling for cohort in a multivariate analysis. 7. Nagelkerke’s R2 from multinominal logistic regressions with education as an independent covariate shows exactly the same ranking of countries according to the strength of Nagelkerke’s R 2. The correlation between the two sets of coefficients (eta and Naglerkerke’s R 2) is 0.99 for the eight units. 8. We have also performed multinominal logistic regression for the various time periods within each country. There is a nearly perfect similarity between the Nagelkerke’s R 2 from these analyses and the eta-coefficients. The correlation between the two sets of coefficients for the 48 units is 0.99. 9. Support for Labour was 52% and 25% in the early 1970s and 42% and 30% in the late 1980s among the lowest and highest-educated categories, respectively. 10. For a similar finding, see Heath et al. (1991: 90–1). 11. The latter decline is not reflected so clearly in the PDI-measure, which declines by only 2 percentage points. 12. The support for PSU was largely concentrated among the highest-educated category. Support was 2–4% in the three lowest categories and 7–9% in the highest-educated strata. The lor-scores were nearly three times as high as for any other party in the early 1970s, but in the late 1970s the emerging Ecologists have a fairly similar educational profile. 13. At that time UDF did not exist. We refer to the combined support for the parties that later became the UDF-alliance. 14. For similar findings, see Sinnott (1995: 190–1). 15. This appears to have been even more pronounced earlier in the postwar period. See Dogan (1967: 168–9). 16. Ireland is partly an exception, since there is a significant Left Socialist party in that country. This party, however, deviates completely from the others in that party family by being anchored in the lower-educated strata. 17. The decline in Denmark from the early 1970s to the late 1980s is of the same magnitude as in Britain and the Netherlands (0.83), but the increase in the 1990s is also significant (0.34).

6

Gender

1. Movement Republicain Populaire (MRP) in France at that time. 2. For an overview of various theories of gender differences in voting behaviour, see Manza and Brooks (1998). 3. Some decline in the traditional gender gap might already have taken place before the early 1970s.

274

Notes

4. The reason for including Ireland is that both major parties are traditional, religious and conservative. 5. Female labour force as a percentage of female population, 15–64 years, in 1970 and 1995. 1970 Denmark Britain Germany France Belgium Ireland Italy Netherlands Source:

58.0 50.8 48.1 47.5 40.2 34.3 33.5 28.0

1995 Denmark Britain Germany France Netherlands Belgium Ireland Italy

73.4 66.0 61.0 59.5 57.1 56.1 47.6 42.7

Change 1970/95 Netherlands Belgium Denmark Britain Ireland Germany France Italy

29.1 15.9 15.6 15.2 13.3 12.9 12.0 9.2

OECD (2002: 39, Table 2.8).

6. This hypothesis overlaps nearly completely with the first hypothesis since we find large religious parties in the same countries as those with small female workforce participation. 7. On could also examine the relationship between the increase in the female workforce participation and the change in the gender gap. However, as can be seen from the table in note 5, the change is fairly similar for all countries apart from the Netherlands where the increase is very large (from a very low starting point). From these figures we should expect the change from a traditional to a modern gender gap to be very similar in seven of the eight countries and considerably smaller than the change in the Netherlands. As will be shown below, this is not the case. 8. Nagelkerke’s R 2 from multinominal logistic regressions with gender as an independent covariate show exactly the same ranking of the countries according to the strength of the correlation between gender and party choice, ranking from 0.023 in Italy, 0.006–0.008 in Denmark and Belgium and 0.003–0.005 in the remaining countries. The correlation between the two measures are 0.99. 9. For MSI (in this period, Alleanza Nazionale) the large increase in electoral support in the late 1990s indeed decreases the stable gender difference which had existed in support for that party: in the 1970s, 1980s and early 1990s, support for the party was 7–8% among men and 3–4% among women. In the late 1990s, support increases by roughly the same number of percentage points among men and women, to 19% and 16%, respectively, and the lor-scores drop from 0.70–0.80 to 0.26. The late 1990s therefore mark a breakthrough for the radical right among women in Italian politics. 10. The Green parties get 3 and 5 percentage points stronger support from women in the two periods in the 1990s. The figures for the Radical Right, 2 and 3 percentage points are not impressive, but given the size of the party, differences are significant, and this is reflected in considerable lor-scores (0.40–0.50). 11. Support from CDU was 38% and 48% among men and women, respectively, while support for SPD was 50% and 43%, respectively.

Notes 275 12. Norris (1999: 151–3) finds a long-term tendency towards secular dealignment, where the described pattern decreases over time. Most of the changes, however, take place before the 1970s, when our data series starts. 13. In addition, the Progess Party continues to draw stronger support from men. This trend cuts across the pattern for the other non-socialist parties in the 1970s, but overlaps in the late 1980s and the 1990s. 14. In Britain these are the Liberal and Conservative Parties, in Denmark the Conservative and Agrarian Liberal Parties, in France RPR, in Ireland Fine Gael and Fianna Fail, and in the other four countries the Christian Parties. 15. For comparison, we use the data derived when the Greens are placed in the socialist groups, since the Greens were insignificant in the 1970s when the traditional gender gap was present, and gain stronger support from women in the 1980s and 1990s when the modern gender gap became significant in many countries.

7 Conclusion: the Decline, Convergence and Transformation of Cleavage Politics 1. I have also conducted the same type of bivariate analyses as below on the basis of Nagelkerke’s R 2. The results based on Nagelkerke’s R 2 are highly correlated with the results based on the eta-coefficient, and the results are generally the same as those based on the eta-coefficient. In a few cases the results deviate somewhat. These cases are mentioned in the comments below. 2. The increasing impact of church religiosity results in a pattern where church religiosity has a larger impact on party choice than social class from the late 1980s. According to Nagelkerke’s R 2 we find the same increase in the impact of church religiosity but it remains of a smaller magnitude than social class for the entire period. A possible explanation of these different results might be the skewed distribution of the church attendance variable which could create a higher eta-coefficient. 3. According to Nagelkerke’s R 2 social class remains a more important predictor of party choice also in the late 1990s although religiosity is approaching social class. 4. This situation equally also applies to bivariate correlations for those units which are possible to use in multivariate analyses, as it is not possible to obtain multivariate effects for all units used in the various single cleavage chapters above. 5. In the figures, I have drawn a straight line from the results of the late 1970s to the late 1980s for the Dutch case. For calculation of average impact for the eight countries, I have calculated the mean between the impact in the late 1970s and the late 1980s for the Netherlands in order to be able to calculate an average for the early 1980s. This strategy seems fairly reasonable given the general patterns for the Dutch case where there are quite linear changes which extend from the 1970s to the 1990s. 6. The peak in the early 1980s which can be observed for six of the eight countries, is only found for two countries in the analyses in which the other variables are not controlled, and which are based on a much larger number of cases.

276

7. 8.

9.

10.

11.

12. 13.

14.

15.

Notes I have therefore not commented upon this peculiar pattern because it may not represent a substantive pattern. This pattern is also found in the uncontrolled analysis which on more cases too. The declines in Nagelkerke’s R 2 are 0.10–0.15, and represent 25%, 33%, 34% and 41% of the original predictive power in the Netherlands, France, Denmark and Italy, respectively. The overlap for the religious denomination variable is a weighted measure where the degree of overlap for the various denominations (compared with the no denomination category as a reference group) is weighted according to their size. The class variable is dichotomised as described in note 11 below. The declining degree of overlap regarding the social class variable is generally caused by the same party families in the relevant countries. The non-socialist Radical Right get stronger support from workers, while the leftist Greens and left socialist parties increasingly tend to gain stronger support from the other class category on the dichotomous class variable. The lor-scores are identical to those presented in the figures in the previous chapters based on the different cleavages. However, all lor-scores have been presented as positive, because it is their absolute magnitude rather than the direction of the relationship that is relevant to a comparison of the relative strength of the various social cleavages. The figures for religious denomination are calculated in the same manner, as outlined previously in the analysis of party choice as a nominal-level variable. For social class I have used a dichotomous social class variable where all other classes than workers are collapsed into one category. This special treatment of religious denomination and social class applies only to the bivariate analyses. For social class all categories are used in the multivariate analyses, and religious denomination is also treated as a nominal level variable (as factor) in the multivariate analyses. Apart from the somewhat deviant pattern for church attendance in the Danish case in this particular analysis. We use all five categories on the class variable in the logistic regressions and in addition we employ a category for those who are not assigned a class, in contrast to the bivariate analysis above in which a dichotomous class variable was used. The declines in the first four countries are 0.030–0.050 and represent 40–60% of the original strength, whereas the declines in France and Germany are within 0.010–0.020 and represents about 30% of the original strengths. This effect applies both for the absolute average impact measured by Nagelkerke’s R 2 which declines with 0.066 and 0.031, respectively, and as a percentage of the original strength of the impact of the cleavages in the late 1970s (50% versus 44%). I have also performed multivariate analyses of the combined impact of the two class variables without controlling for the other cleavages. This analysis is based on many more cases than for the analysis discussed in the text. Basically this analysis confirms the pattern reported above, but the decline of the class cleavage is considerably more pronounced than in the controlled case. The average impact declines from 0.091 to 0.034 which represents a decline of 63% of the original strength and consequently an even larger decline than for the religious cleavages. The trend towards congruence is even larger than in the controlled case. The standard deviation of the impact

Notes 277

16.

17.

18.

19. 20.

21. 22.

for the eight countries declines to about half of the original size in late 1970s, compared with 30% in the controlled case. A main difference between the controlled and uncontrolled analyses is that the decline is largest in Denmark followed by the Netherlands, and that the impact of the class variables in Denmark appears to become even more similar to the other countries than what is reported in Figure 7.7 based on the controlled analyses. We find basically the same pattern as reported above for the other countries. Another main difference between the controlled and uncontrolled analyses is that the increase in the impact of the class cleavages from the late 1970s to the early 1980s in several countries which can be seen from Figure 7.7, is not reflected in the uncontrolled analysis based on considerably more cases in particular for the early 1980s. We find a decline which is fairly linear from the late 1970s to the late 1980s. For this reason I have not emphasised the peak in the early 1980s in my comments to Figure 7.7. It might be due to the fact that the analyses from the early 1980s are based on a relatively few number of cases. The correlation between the two measures which tap the impact of the total cleavage model on the two ways of treating the dependent variable is nevertheless, fairly high, 0.75, based on the eight units, and 0.76 when the magnitudes of Nagelkerke’s R2 for the various time points are correlated (N = 40). The best fitted model is used of the left–right division of parties with regard to the treatment of the Green parties. The comparison is then based on Figures 7.4 and 7.9. The large difference regarding change over time can be illustrated by comparing the decline in percentage of the original strength in the late 1970s: In Belgium the decline represents 55% and 5% of the original strength for the left–right division and the total party choice variable, respectively, while in the Netherlands the declines represent 69% and 24% of the strength in the late 1970s, respectively. I compare only the countries included in my study in this comparison. The decline of social cleavages in Germany is only found for the left–right division of countries, not for the overall impact when party choice is treated as a nominal level variable. For a detailed comparative analysis of socio-structural change in Western Europe, see Croach (1999). These figures are presented in Tables 2.2B, 3.1B, 4.1B, 5.2B and 6.1B.

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Index Agrarian Liberal Party (Denmark), 19, 27, 62, 104, 142, 145, 174, 208 Alleanza Nazionale (Italy), 18, 31, 64 Anglican Church of England, 46 Anti-Revolutionary Party (Netherlands), 17 Australia, social structure and party allegiance, 9 Austria, social structure and party allegiance, 9 Belgium church attendance, 83, 88, 89, 98, 99–100, 102, 110–11, 124–7, 227, 241 Ecolo/Agalev Party, 26, 61, 104, 141, 174, 208 educational level, 164, 168, 169–70, 172, 173, 174, 177, 227: age when finishing full-time education, 165; birth cohorts, 167; overlap, 241; trends with time, 166 Flemish Bloc, 18, 26, 61, 104, 141, 174, 208 gender effects, 202, 203–4, 227: trends with time, 206, 211–12 party families, 20, 21 party family support, 24, 25: church attendance, 98–9; educational level, 169–70; gender, 203–4; religious affiliation, 56–7, 58; socialist, non-socialist and green parties, 33; urban–rural residence, 133, 137, 139 party support: church attendance, 98, 99–100, 102, 110–11, 124–7, 227; church religiosity, 104; educational level, 168, 169–70, 172, 173, 174, 177, 227; gender, 202, 203–4, 206, 211–12, 227; religious cleavage, 235; religious

denomination, 54, 56–7, 59, 60, 61, 67–8, 227; social class, 227, 236; social structure, 9; trends in, 26, 60, 61, 67–8; urban–rural residence, 136, 137–8, 140, 141, 147–9, 227 PCB/KPB Parties, 26, 61, 104, 141, 174, 208 PRL/PVV Parties, 26, 61, 104, 141, 174, 208 PS/SP Parties, 26, 61, 104, 141, 174, 208 PSC/CVP Parties, 26, 104, 141, 174 religious cleavage, 235, 241 religious denomination, 48, 54, 56–7, 59, 60, 61, 67–8, 227, 251: non-affiliated, 52; overlap, 241 religious structure, 46 social class, 227, 236, 241, 244, 252 social cleavage, 227, 231, 237, 244, 248 social structure, 9 socialist/non-socialist party support, 77, 78, 79, 255, 257: church attendance, 124–7, 244; educational level, 188, 190, 191, 244; gender effect, 219, 244; religious denomination, 77–9, 244, 251; social class, 244, 252; trends in, 33; urban–rural residence, 152, 154, 244 urban–rural residence, 136, 137–8, 140, 141, 147–9, 152, 154, 227, 241 Volksunie/RW/FDF Parties, 26, 61, 104, 141, 174, 208 bivariate analysis social cleavage, 225–33 socialist/non-socialist party support, 243–50 283

284 Index Britain Catholics, 94, 95, 116 church attendance, 89, 92, 93, 98, 99–100, 102, 115, 116–17, 119–20, 124–7, 227: Catholics versus Protestants, 94, 95; Overlap, 241 Conservative Party, 26, 65–6, 104, 116, 141, 174, 208 educational level, 164, 168, 169–70, 172, 177–9, 227: age when finishing full-time education, 165; birth cohorts, 167; overlap, 241; trends with time, 166 gender effects, 202, 203–4, 227: trends with time, 206, 208, 213–14 Green Party, 26, 65–6, 104, 116, 141, 174, 208 Labour Party, 26, 65–6, 104, 116, 141, 174, 208 Liberal Party (now Liberal Democrat Party), 17, 26, 65–6, 104, 116, 141, 174, 208 Nationalist Parties, 19, 26, 65–6, 104, 116, 141, 174, 208 non-conformists, 116 party families, 20, 21 party family support, 24, 25: church attendance, 98–9; educational level, 169–70; gender, 203–4; religious affiliation, 56–7, 58; socialist, non-socialist and green parties, 33; urban–rural residence, 133, 137, 139 party support: church attendance, 98, 99–100, 102, 115, 116–17, 119–20, 124–7, 227; church religiosity, 104, 112; educational level, 168, 169–70, 172, 174, 177–9, 227; gender, 202, 203–4, 206, 208, 213–14, 227; religious cleavage, 235; religious denomination, 54, 56–7, 59, 60, 65–6, 72–3, 227; social class, 227, 236; social structure, 9; trends in, 26, 65–6, 72–3; urban–rural residence, 136, 137–8, 140, 141, 150

Protestants, 94, 95, 116 religious cleavage, 235, 241 religious denomination, 48, 51, 54, 56–7, 59, 60, 65–6, 72–3, 115, 116–17, 119–20, 227, 251: non-affiliated, 52; overlap, 241 religious structure, 46 social class, 227, 236, 241, 245, 252 social cleavage, 227, 232, 237, 245, 249 Social Democratic Party, 17 social structure, 9 socialist/non-socialist party support, 77, 78, 79, 255, 257: church attendance, 124–7, 245; educational level, 188, 190, 191, 245; gender effect, 219, 245; religious denomination, 77–9, 245, 251; social class, 245, 252; trends in, 33; urban–rural residence, 152, 154, 245 urban–rural residence, 136, 137–8, 140, 141, 150, 152, 154, 227, 241, 245 Calvinist Church of Scotland, 46 Calvinist Fundamentalist Party (Netherlands), 17, 30, 65, 106, 118, 122, 143, 176, 210 Canada, party support and social structure, 9 Catholic countries 46, 47 church attendance, 94, 95–6 party allegiance, 60–70 see also individual countries Catholic People’s Party (Netherlands), 17 CDA Party (Netherlands), 30, 64, 106, 118, 122, 143, 176, 210 CDU/CSU Parties (Germany), 16, 28, 63, 105, 109, 117, 142, 150, 175, 209 Central Democrats Party (Denmark), 27, 62, 104, 142, 174, 208 centre-periphery cleavage, 1 Christian Democratic Appeal (Netherlands), 17

Index 285 Christian Democratic Party (Italy), 29, 64, 106, 107, 143, 145, 176, 210 Christian Historical Union (Netherlands), 17 Christian parties 16–17, 21, 22 church attendance and support for, 98, 99 educational level of supporters 169, 170 gender differences in voting, 203, 204 religious affiliation of supporters 56–7, 58 urban–rural residence, 133, 137, 139 Christian People’s Party (Denmark), 27, 61, 104, 113, 142, 174, 208 church attendance, 86–131 overlap, 241–2 and party support, 97–115: religious denomination, 115–23; socialist/non-socialist, 123–8; trends with time, 102–15 church religiosity, 86–131 and party support, 104–6 Church-State conflict, 1 cleavage politics 12–14 cognitive mobilisation, 162 commodity market conflict, 1 Communist parties 15, 20 church attendance and support for, 99 educational level of supporters 169 gender differences in voting, 203 religious affiliation of supporters 55, 56–7 urban–rural residence, 134, 137 Communist Party (Netherlands), 15 comparative literature review, 4–14 Conservative parties 18, 21, 22 church attendance and support for, 98, 99, 100, 116–19 educational level of supporters 169, 170 gender differences in voting, 203, 204 religious affiliation of supporters 56–7, 58 urban–rural residence, 137, 139 Conservative Party (Britain), 26, 65–6, 104, 116, 141, 174, 208

Conservative People’s Party (Denmark), 27, 61, 104, 139, 142, 174, 179, 208 Cramer’s V, 34 religious denomination and party support, 54, 59 cross-cutting, 40–1, 240–3 cross-product ratio, 35 Danish state church (Den danske folkekirke), 51 dealignment, 11 Democrats ‘66 (Netherlands), 17, 19, 30, 64, 106, 118, 143, 176, 210 Denmark Agrarian Liberal Party, 19, 27, 62, 104, 142, 145, 174, 208 Central Democrat Party, 27, 62, 104, 142, 174, 208 Christian People’s Party, 27, 61, 104, 113, 142, 174, 208 church attendance, 88–90, 92, 93, 98, 99–100, 102, 124–7, 228, 241 Conservative People’s Party, 27, 61, 104, 139, 142, 174, 179, 208 DKP Party, 27, 61, 104, 142, 208 educational level 164, 168, 169–70, 172, 174, 179–81, 228: age when finishing full-time education, 165; birth cohorts 167; overlap, 241; trends with time, 166 gender effects 202, 203–4, 228: trends with time, 206, 208, 214–15 Green Party, 27, 61, 104, 142, 174, 208 Left Socialist Party, 15, 27, 61, 104, 142, 174, 208 Lutheran State Church, 70 party families 20, 21 party family support, 24, 25, 31: church attendance, 98–9; educational level, 169–70; gender, 203–4; religious affiliation, 56–7, 58; socialist, non-socialist and green parties 33; urban–rural residence, 133, 137, 139

286 Index Denmark – continued party support: church attendance, 98, 99–100, 102, 124–7, 228; church religiosity, 104–5, 112–14; educational level, 168, 169–70, 172, 174, 179–81, 228; gender, 202, 203–4, 206, 208, 214–15, 228; religious cleavage, 235; religious denomination, 54, 56–7, 59, 60, 61–2, 70–2, 228; social class, 228, 236; social structure, 9; trends in, 61–2, 70–2; urban–rural residence, 136, 137–8, 140, 142, 144–5, 228 Progress Party, 18, 27, 62, 104, 142, 174, 208 Radical Liberal Party, 17, 27, 61, 104, 144, 174, 208 religious cleavage, 235, 241 religious denomination, 49, 51, 54, 56–7, 59, 60, 61–2, 70–2, 227, 228, 251: non-affiliated 52; overlap, 241 religious structure, 46 social class, 228, 236, 241, 245, 252 social cleavage, 228, 232–3, 237, 245, 249–50 Social Democrat Party, 27, 61, 104, 113, 142, 174, 180, 208 social structure, 9 Socialist People’s Party, 15 socialist/non-socialist party support, 77, 78, 79, 255, 257: church attendance, 124–7, 245; educational level, 188, 190, 191, 245; gender effect, 219, 221, 245; religious denomination, 77–9, 245, 251; social class, 245, 252; trends in, 33; urban–rural residence, 152, 154, 245 Unity List, 15 urban–rural residence, 136, 137–8, 140, 142, 144–5, 152, 154, 228, 241, 245 DKP Party (Denmark), 27, 61, 104, 142, 174, 208 Dutch Reformed Church, 53, 96, 118

Ecolo/Agalev Party (Belgium), 26, 61, 104, 141, 174, 208 ecological realignment, 2, 3 Ecologists Party (France), 27, 62, 105, 142, 175, 181, 209 education, 159–97 age of finishing full-time education, 165 birth cohorts 167 educational level, 164 overlap, 241–2 and party support, 167–87 and social mobility, 162 trends in, 166 and voting pattern, 160–2 Electoral Behavior: A Comparative Handbook, 2, 8, 198 Electoral Change: Responses to Evolving Social and Attitudinal Structures in Western Countries 2 Electoral Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies 2, 10 empirical analysis 41–2 eta-coefficient, 34 church attendance, 98, 102 educational level, 168 gender effects 206 religious denomination, 77, 78, 79 social cleavage, 227–30 urban–rural residence, 136, 140 ethnic parties see Nationalist parties; and see individual countries and parties FDP Party (Germany), 28, 63, 105, 117, 142, 175, 209 Fianna Fail Party (Ireland), 18, 28, 63, 105, 143, 147, 175, 209 Fine Gael Party (Ireland), 17, 28, 63, 105, 115, 143, 147, 175, 209 Finland, party support and social structure, 9 Flemish Bloc (Belgium), 18, 26, 61, 104, 141, 174, 193, 208 Forza Italia (Italy), 29, 31, 64, 106, 107, 143, 176, 210 France church attendance, 88, 90, 92–3, 98, 99–100, 102, 124–7, 228, 241

Index 287 Ecologists Party, 27, 62, 105, 142, 175, 181, 209 educational level 164, 168, 169–70, 172, 175, 181–2, 228: age when finishing full-time education, 165; birth cohorts 167; overlap, 241; trends with time, 166 Front National, 18, 27, 62, 105, 142, 175, 182, 209 gender effects 202, 203–4, 228: trends with time, 206, 209 MRG Party, 27, 62, 105, 142, 175, 209 New Left Party, 16 party families 20, 21 party family support, 24, 31: church attendance, 98–9; educational level, 169–70; gender, 203–4, 206, 209; religious affiliation, 56–7, 58; socialist, non-socialist and green parties 33; urban–rural residence, 133, 137, 139 party support: church attendance, 98, 99–100, 102, 124–7, 228; church religiosity, 105, 108–9; educational level, 168, 169–70, 172, 175, 181–2, 228; gender effects 202, 203–4, 206, 228; religious cleavage, 235; religious denomination, 54, 56–7, 59, 60, 62, 68–9, 228; social class 228, 236; social structure, 9; trends in, 60, 62, 68–9; urban–rural residence, 136, 137–8, 140, 142, 149, 228 PCF Party, 15, 27, 62, 105, 142, 175, 209 PSF Party, 27, 62, 105, 142, 175, 209 PSU Party, 27, 62, 105, 142, 175, 209 RC Party, 15 red peasants 134 religious cleavage, 235, 241 religious denomination, 49, 54, 56–7, 59, 60, 62, 68–9, 228, 251: non-affiliated, 52; overlap, 241 religious structure, 46 RPR Party, 18, 27, 62, 105, 142, 175, 209

social class, 228, 236, 241, 246, 252 social cleavage, 228, 231, 237, 246, 248 social structure, 9 socialist/non-socialist party support, 77, 78, 79, 255, 257: church attendance, 124–7, 246; educational level, 188, 190, 191, 246; gender effect, 219, 221, 246; religious denomination, 77–9, 246, 251; social class, 246, 252; trends in, 33; urban–rural residence, 152, 154, 246 UDF Party, 18, 27, 62, 105, 142, 175 urban–rural residence, 134, 136, 137–8, 140, 142, 149, 152, 154, 228, 241, 246 freezing of party alignments, 2, 5 Front National (France), 18, 27, 62, 105, 142, 175, 182, 209 gender, 198–223 party support, 36–41, 201–17 socialist/non-socialist party support, 217–21 Gereformeered (Netherlands), 118, 123 Germany Catholics, 117 CDU/CSU Parties, 16, 28, 63, 105, 109, 117, 142, 150, 175, 209 church attendance, 88, 90, 93, 98, 99–100, 102, 117, 120–1, 124–7, 229: Catholics versus Protestants 94, 95, 96; overlap, 241, 242 educational level, 164, 168, 169–70, 172, 175, 182–3, 229: age when finishing full-time education, 165; birth cohorts 167; overlap, 241, 242; trends with time, 166 FDP Party, 28, 63, 105, 117, 142, 175, 209 gender effects, 202, 203–4, 229: trends with time, 206, 209, 212–13 Green Party, 28, 63, 105, 117, 142, 175, 209 party families, 20, 21

288 Index Germany – continued party family support, 24, 31: church attendance, 98–9; educational level, 169–70; gender, 203–4, 209; religious affiliation, 56–7, 58; socialist, non-socialist and green parties, 33; urban–rural residence, 133, 137, 139 party support: church attendance, 98, 99–100, 102, 117, 120–1, 124–7, 229; and church religiosity, 105, 109; educational level, 168, 169–70, 172, 175, 182–3, 229; gender, 202, 203–4, 206, 212–13, 229; religious cleavage, 235; religious denomination, 54, 56–7, 59, 60, 63, 73–4, 229; social class, 229, 236; social structure, 9; trends in, 63, 73–4; urban–rural residence, 136, 137–8, 140, 142, 149–50, 229 Protestants 117 religious cleavage, 235, 241, 242 religious denomination, 49, 51, 54, 56–7, 59, 60, 63, 73–4, 117, 120–1, 229, 251: non-affiliated, 52, 53; overlap, 241, 242 religious structure, 46 Republican Party, 18, 28, 63, 105, 117, 142, 175, 209 social class, 229, 236, 241, 242, 246, 252 social cleavage, 229, 232, 237, 246, 249 social structure, 9 socialist/non-socialist party support, 77, 78, 79, 255, 257: church attendance, 124–7, 246; educational level, 188, 190, 191, 246; gender effect, 219, 221, 246; religious denomination, 77–9, 246, 251; social class, 246, 252; trends in, 33; urban–rural residence, 152, 154, 246 SPD Party, 28, 63, 105, 117, 142, 175, 209

urban–rural residence, 136, 137–8, 140, 142, 149–50, 152, 154, 229, 241, 242, 246 Great Britain see Britain Green Left Party (Netherlands), 15, 30, 64, 106, 143, 176, 210 Green parties 4, 16 church attendance and support for, 99, 116–19 educational level of supporters, 169 gender differences in voting, 203 religious affiliation of supporters, 55, 56–7 role in party support, 32 and socialist/non-socialist division, 80–1 urban versus rural residence, 137 Green Party (Britain), 26, 65–6, 104, 116, 141, 174, 208 Green Party (Denmark), 27, 61, 104, 142, 174, 208 Green Party (Germany), 28, 63, 105, 117, 142, 175, 209 Green Party (Ireland), 28, 63, 105, 143, 175, 209 institutionalisation of political parties, 6 Ireland church attendance, 88, 90–1, 92–3, 98, 99–100, 102, 124–7, 229, 241, 242 educational level, 164, 168, 169–70, 172, 175, 183–4, 229: age when finishing full-time education, 165; birth cohorts 167; overlap, 241, 242; trends with time, 166 Fianna Fail Party, 18, 28, 63, 105, 143, 147, 175, 209 Fine Gael Party, 17, 28, 63, 105, 115, 143, 147, 175, 209 gender effects 202, 203–4, 229: trends with time, 206, 209, 213 Green Party, 28, 63, 105, 143, 175, 209 Labour Party, 28, 63, 105, 143, 175, 209 party families, 20, 21

Index 289 party family support, 24, 31: church attendance for, 98–9; educational level, 169–70; gender, 203–4; religious affiliation, 56–7, 58; socialist, non-socialist and green parties, 33–4; urban–rural residence, 133, 137, 139 party support: church attendance, 29, 98, 99–100, 102, 124–7, 229; church religiosity, 105–6, 114–15; educational level, 168, 169–70, 172, 175, 183–4, 229; gender, 202, 203–4, 206, 209, 213, 229; religious cleavage, 235; religious denomination, 54, 56–7, 59, 60, 63, 70; social class, 229, 236; social structure, 9; trends in, 63, 70; urban–rural residence, 136, 137–8, 140, 143, 146–7, 229 Progressive Democratic Party, 18, 28, 63, 105, 143, 175, 209 religious cleavage, 235: overlap, 241, 242 religious denomination, 50, 54, 56–7, 59, 60, 63, 70, 229, 251: non-affiliated, 52; overlap, 241, 242 religious structure, 46 social class, 229, 236, 241, 242, 247, 252 social cleavage, 230, 231–2, 237, 247, 249 social structure, 9 socialist/non-socialist party support, 77, 78, 79, 255, 257: church attendance, 124–7; educational level, 188, 190, 191; gender effect, 219; religious denomination, 77–9, 247, 251; social class, 247, 252; trends in, 33–4; urban–rural residence, 152, 154 urban–rural residence, 136, 137–8, 140, 143, 146–7, 152, 154, 229, 241, 242 Workers’ Party, 15, 28, 63, 105, 143, 175, 209

Italy Alleanza Nazionale, 18, 31 Christian Democrat Party, 1, 29, 64, 106, 107, 143, 145, 176, 210 church attendance, 88, 91, 93, 98, 99–100, 102, 124–7, 230, 241, 242 educational level, 164, 168, 169–70, 172, 176, 184–6, 230: age when finishing full-time education, 165; birth cohorts 167; overlap, 241, 242; trends with time, 166 Forza Italia, 29, 31, 64, 106, 107, 143, 176, 210 gender effects, 202, 203–4, 230: trends with time, 206, 207, 210–11 Lega Nord, 19, 29, 31, 64, 106, 107, 143, 176, 210 MSI/AN Parties, 18, 29, 31, 64, 106, 143, 176, 210 New Politics Radical Party, 16 party families, 20, 22 party family support, 24, 31; church attendance, 98–9; educational level, 169–70; gender, 203–4; religious affiliation, 56–7, 58; socialist, non-socialist and green parties, 34; urban–rural residence, 133, 137, 139 party support: church attendance, 98, 99–100, 102, 124–7, 230; church religiosity, 106, 107; educational level, 168, 169–70, 172, 176, 184–6, 230; gender, 202, 203–4, 206, 207, 210–11, 230; religious cleavage, 235; religious denomination, 54, 56–7, 59, 60, 64, 69, 230; social class, 230, 236; social structure, 9; trends in, 64, 69; urban–rural residence, 136, 137–8, 140, 143, 145–6, 230 PCI/PDS/PCR Parties, 15, 29, 64, 106, 143, 176, 210 PDSI Party, 29, 64, 106, 143, 176, 210 PLI Party, 18

290 Index Italy – continued PRI/PLI Parties, 18, 29, 64, 106, 143, 176, 210 Proletarian Democrat Party, 29, 64, 106, 143, 176, 210 PSI Party, 29, 64, 106, 143, 176, 210 Radical Party/Verdi Party, 16, 29, 64, 106, 143, 176, 210 religious cleavage, 235, 241, 242 religious denomination, 50, 54, 56–7, 59, 60, 64, 69, 251: non-affiliated, 52; overlap, 241, 242 religious structure, 46 social class, 230, 236, 241, 242, 252 social cleavage, 230, 231, 237, 249 social structure, 9 socialist/non-socialist party support, 77, 78, 79, 255, 257: church attendance, 124–7; educational level, 188, 190, 191; gender effect, 219; religious denomination, 77–9, 247, 251; social class, 247, 252; trends in, 34; urban–rural residence, 152, 154 urban–rural residence, 134, 136, 137–8, 140, 143, 145–6, 152, 154, 230, 241, 242 labour market conflict, 1 Labour Party (Britain), 26, 65–6, 104, 116, 141, 174, 208 Labour Party (Ireland), 28, 63, 105, 143, 175, 209 Left Socialist parties, 15–16, 20 church attendance and support for, 99, 116–19 educational level of supporters, 169 gender differences in voting, 203 religious affiliation of supporters, 55, 56–7 urban versus rural residence, 137 Left Socialist Party (Denmark), 15, 27, 61, 104, 142, 174, 208 left–right division see socialist/non-socialist party support

Lega Nord (Italy), 19, 29, 31, 64, 106, 107, 143, 176, 210 Liberal Party (now Liberal Democrat Party) (Britain), 17, 26, 65–6, 104, 116, 141, 174, 208 Liberal parties, 17–18, 21, 22 church attendance and support for, 99 educational level of supporters, 169 gender differences in voting, 203 religious affiliation of supporters, 56–7, 58 urban versus rural residence, 137 libertarian values, 15 lor-measure see lor-score lor-score, 35 church attendance, 98–9 church religiosity, 104–6 educational level, 169, 188, 190 gender effects, 37–8, 203, 206 religious affiliation and party support, 56 socialist/non-socialist party support, church attendance, 124, 125, 126, 127 urban–rural residence, 137, 152, 154 marginal Christians, 87, 88 modern gender gap, 199 MRG Party (France), 27, 62, 105, 142, 175, 209 MSI/AN Parties (Italy), 18, 29, 31, 64, 106, 143, 176, 210 multivariate analysis social cleavage, 233–40 socialist/non-socialist party support, 250–9 Nagelkerke’s R 2, 34 class variables, 236 religious cleavage, 235 religious denomination, 54–5, 60 Nationalist parties, 19, 20, 26 church attendance and support for, 99 educational level of supporters, 169 gender differences in voting, 203 religious affiliation of supporters, 56–7

Index 291 urban versus rural residence, 137 see also individual countries and parties Netherlands Anti-Revolutionary Party, 17 Calvinist Fundamentalist Party, 17, 30, 64, 106, 117, 122, 143, 176, 210 Catholic People’s Party, 17 Catholics, 117–18 CDA Party, 30, 64, 106, 118, 122, 143, 176, 210 Christian Democratic Appeal, 17 Christian Historical Union, 17 church attendance, 88, 91–3, 98, 99–100, 102, 117–19, 121–7, 230: Catholics versus Protestants, 96–7; overlap, 241, 242 Communist Party, 15 Democrats’ 66, 17, 19, 30, 64, 106, 118, 143, 176, 210 Dutch Reformed Church, 53, 96, 118 educational level, 164, 168, 169–70, 172, 176, 186–7, 230: age when finishing full-time education, 165; birth cohorts, 167; overlap, 241, 242; trends with time, 166 gender effects 202, 203–4, 230: trends with time, 206, 210, 215–17 Gereformeered, 118, 123 Green Left Party, 15, 29, 64, 106, 143, 176, 210 Pacifist Socialist Party, 15 party families, 20, 22 party family support, 24, 31: church attendance, 98–9; educational level, 169–70; gender, 203–4; religious affiliation, 56–7, 58; socialist, non-socialist and green parties, 34; urban–rural residence, 133, 137, 139 party support: church attendance, 98, 99–100, 102, 117–19, 121–7, 230; and church religiosity, 106, 111–12; educational level, 168, 169–70, 172, 176, 186–7, 230; gender, 202, 203–4, 206, 210,

215–17, 230; religious cleavage, 235; religious denomination, 54, 56–7, 59, 60, 64–5, 74–6; social class, 230, 236; social structure, 9; trends in, 64–5, 74–6; urban–rural residence, 136, 137–8, 140, 143, 150–1, 230 People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy, 17 PVDA Party, 29, 64, 106, 143, 176, 210 Radical Party, 15 religious cleavage, 235, 241, 242 religious denomination, 50, 54, 56–7, 59, 60, 64–5, 74–6, 117–19, 121–3, 251: non-affiliated, 52, 53; overlap, 241, 242 religious structure, 46 social class, 230, 236, 241, 242, 248, 252 social cleavage, 230, 232, 237, 248, 249 social structure, 9 socialist/non-socialist party support, 77, 78, 79, 255, 257: church attendance, 124–7, 248; educational level, 188, 190, 191, 248; gender effect, 219, 248; religious denomination, 77–9, 248, 251; social class, 248, 252; trends in, 34; urban–rural residence, 152, 154, 248 urban–rural residence, 136, 137–8, 140, 143, 150–1, 152, 154, 230, 241, 242, 248 VVD Party, 29, 64, 106, 118, 143, 176, 210 New Left, 15 New Left Party (France), 16 New Politics, 11, 15 New Politics Radical Party (Italy), 16 non-affiliated groups, 52–3 party support, 55, 58 non-conformists, 87, 88, 92 party support, 116

292 Index Norway, party support and social structure, 9 nuclear (core) Christians, 87, 88 odds ratios, 35 Orthodox Rereformed churches (Netherlands), 46 overlap, 40–1, 240–3 Pacifist Socialist Party (Netherlands), 15 party families, 14–19, 20–2 support for, 24 see also individual party families party support, 19–31 changes over time, 60–76 church attendance, 97–115 gender, 36–41, 201–17 non-affiliated groups, 55, 58 non-conformists, 116 religious cleavage, 235 religious denomination, 53–76 socialist/non-socialist see socialist/ non-socialist party support urban–rural residence, 136–51 see also individual countries Party Systems and Voter Alignments, 2 PCB/KPB Parties (Belgium), 26, 61, 104, 141, 174, 208 PCF Parties (France), 15, 27, 62, 105, 142, 175, 209 PCI/PDS/PCR Parties (Italy), 15, 29, 64, 106, 143, 176, 210 PDSI Party (Italy), 29, 64, 106, 143, 176, 210 People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy (Netherlands), 17 percentage difference measures, 35 church attendance, 93, 95, 96 church religiosity, 104–6 educational level, 169–70 gender effects, 37–8, 203–4, 206, 219 religious affiliation and party support, 57 urban–rural residence, 137–8 PRI/PLI Parties (Italy), 18, 29, 64, 106, 143, 176, 210

PRL/PVV Parties (Belgium), 26, 61, 104, 141, 174, 208 Progress Party (Denmark), 18, 27, 62, 104, 142, 174, 208 Progressive Democratic Party (Ireland), 18, 28, 63, 105, 143, 175, 209 Proletarian Democrat Party (Italy), 29, 64, 106, 143, 176, 210 Protestant countries, 46, 47–8 church attendance, 94, 95, 96 party allegiance, 61–6, 70–3 Protestant Dutch Reformed Church, 46 PS/SP Parties (Belgium), 26, 61, 104, 141, 174, 208 PSC/CVP Parties (Belgium), 26, 61, 104, 141, 174, 208 PSF Party (France), 27, 62, 105, 142, 175, 209 PSU Party (France), 27, 62, 105, 142, 175, 209 PVDA Party (Netherlands), 15, 30, 64, 106, 143, 176, 210 Radical Party/Verdi Party (Italy), 16, 29, 64, 106, 143, 176, 210 Radical Liberal Party (Denmark), 17, 27, 61, 104, 142, 144, 174, 208 Radical Party (Netherlands), 15 Radical right parties, 18, 21, 22 church attendance, and suppport for, 99, 100 educational level of supporters, 169, 170 gender differences in voting, 203, 204 religious affiliation of supporters, 56–7, 58 urban versus rural residence, 137 RC Party (France), 15 realignment, 2, 10 red peasants (France), 134 religious affiliation, 48–9 non-affiliated, 52–3, 55, 58 religious awareness, 44 religious cleavage, 43–6 overlap, 241–2 and party support, 235

Index 293 religious denomination, 46–53 overlap, 241–2 and party support, 53–82 see also individual countries religious divisions, 7 religiously mixed countries, 73–6 Republican Party (Germany), 18, 28, 63, 105, 117, 142, 175, 209 RPR Party (France), 18, 27, 62, 105, 142, 175, 209 Scottish National Party (Britain), 19, 26, 65–6, 104, 116, 141, 174, 208 sectoral alignment, 2 secular realignment, 2 social class, 227–30, 241–2 social cleavage, 2 and nominal-level party support, 225–40 and socialist/non-socialist party support, 244–8 Social Democrat Party (Denmark), 27, 61, 104, 113, 142, 174, 180, 208 Social Democratic parties, 16, 20 church attendance and support for, 99 educational level of supporters, 169 gender differences in voting, 203 religious affiliation of supporters, 55, 56–7 Social Democratic Party (Britain), 17 social mobility, 162 socialisation hypothesis, 5–6 Socialist People’s Party (Denmark), 15, 104, 113, 142 socialist/non-socialist party support, 4, 76–82 bivariate analysis, 243–50 church attendance, 123–8 educational level, 187–94 gender effect, 217–21 multivariate analysis, 250–9 religious denomination, 76–82

social cleavage, 244–8 trends in, 31–4 urban-rural residence, 151–5 see also party support; and individual parties socialist/social parties, 16, 20 SPD Party (Germany), 28, 63, 105, 142, 175, 209 statistical measures, 34–41 see also individual measures Sweden, party support and social structure, 9 traditional gender gap, 198 tree analysis, 8–9 trend analysis, 34–41 religious denomination and party support, 59–60 UDF Party (France), 18, 27, 62, 105, 142, 175, 209 Unity List (Denmark), 15 urban–rural residence, 132–58 operationalism of, 134–6 overlap, 241–2 and party support, 136–51 and socialist/non-socialist party support, 151–5 USA, social structure and party allegiance, 9 value differences, 199 Volksunie/RW/FDF Parties (Belgium), 26, 61, 104, 141, 174, 208 VVD Party (Netherlands), 15, 30, 64, 106, 118, 143, 176, 210 Welsh National Party (Britain), 19, 26, 65–6, 104, 116, 141, 174, 208 Workers’ Party (Ireland), 15, 28, 63, 105, 143, 175, 209 Zeitgeist, 161

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