Sledgehammers: Strengths and Flaws of Tiger Tank Battalions in World War II

·Chrl --her W"Wllbeck

,===== _

Prologue by Tiger Ace Otto Carius

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Epilogue by Tiger Killers Viktor Iskrov and Ray Holt

Technical Editor: Keith E. B o n n Production Editor: Patricia K. B o n n Cartographer: Tom H o u l i h a n Printer: Mercersburg Printing T h e Aberjona Press is an i m p r i n t of Aegis Consulting G r o u p , Inc., Bedford, Pennsylvania 15522 © 2004 C h r i s t o p h e r W. Wilbeck All rights reserved. Printed in t h e United States of America 10 09 08 07 06 05 04 6 5 4 3 2 ISBN: 0-9717650-2-2

Contents Acknowledgments v A Guide to Tactical Unit Symbols Rank Equivalences viii

vii

P r o l o g u e : T h r o u g h t h e E y e s o f a T i g e r A c e — O t t o Carius 1. I n t r o d u c t i o n to H e a v y Tank B a t t a l i o n s

1

3

Background 4 Historical Literature 5 O v e r c o m i n g Misperceptions 7 Measures of Effectiveness a n d Organization of Book 10 T h e Levels of Warfare a n d Heavy Tank Battalions 11 2 . H e a v y Tank Battalion O v e r v i e w

12

D o c t r i n e 12 Organization 18 E q u i p m e n t 25 Personnel 30 Tactics 31 S u m m a r y 36 3 . G r o w i n g Pains a n d A d a p t a t i o n

37

Heavy Tank Battalion 502 with A r m y G r o u p N o r t h 38 Heavy Tank Battalions in Tunisia 39 Heavy Tank Battalion 503 with A r m y G r o u p D o n in S o u t h e r n Russia Changes Before O p e r a t i o n ZITADELLE 63 O p e r a t i o n ZITADELLE: T h e Battle of Kursk 66 S u m m a r y 73 4. On t h e Strategic Defensive

58

75

Fighting on the Russian Front 76 Encirclement: The Cherkassy Pocket

78

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iv Italy 86 Conclusion

99

5 . T h e Last Year o f t h e W a r O p e r a t i o n BAGRATION

100

101

In the Aftermath of O p e r a t i o n BAGRATION: Heavy Tank Battalion 502 Defending D ü n a b u r g 104 N o r m a n d y 111 Poland 132 6. T h e Final B a t t l e s

1 52

H u n g a r y : T h e Early Battles Operation

Wacht am Rhein

H u n g a r y 164 T h e Vistula-Oder O p e r a t i o n Fragmented End 178 S u m m a r y 179

152 157

176

7. Assessment and Conclusion

182

Mission A c c o m p l i s h m e n t 182 A Statistical Perspective 185 Flaws 187 Synthesis a n d Conclusion 190 Epilogue: Through t h e Eyes of Tiger Killers— Viktor Iskrov a n d Ray Holt 192 A p p e n d i x : Comparative Analysis o f Heavy Tank Doctrines France 199 United K i n g d o m a n d United States Soviet U n i o n 209 Notes 220 Bibliography 253 A b o u t the A u t h o r 263

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199

Acknowledgments In a world where so m u c h information is so easily o b t a i n e d a n d so readily available, I am continually a m a z e d at h o w m a n y nuggets of history are still h i d d e n on a shelf in the dark corner of s o m e library or archive. For their great assistance in helping me to find these nuggets, I w o u l d like to t h a n k the librarians at the C o m b i n e d A r m s Research Library in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. I w o u l d especially like to t h a n k research assistant Michael Browne w h o kept his eye o u t for me for over two years while this b o o k was being written. For their advice and i n p u t d u r i n g the formative stages of this work, I w o u l d like to t h a n k three m e m b e r s of the faculty of the C o m b a t Studies Institute at the U.S. A r m y C o m m a n d a n d General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Dr. Curtis King, LLC John Suprin, a n d Dr. Sam Lewis. I w o u l d like to t h a n k the publishers of this b o o k , specifically the editor, Kit B o n n , a n d the chief of p r o d u c t i o n , Patti B o n n , for believing in it from the first time they saw the m a n u s c r i p t . Their suggestions, r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s , a n d good ideas all c o n t r i b u t e d to m a k i n g it a better b o o k , a n d helped to refine my t h o u g h t s a n d ideas in m a n y areas. For kindly granting me permission to include m o s t of the p h o t o s in this b o o k , I w o u l d like to t h a n k the Patton M u s e u m of Cavalry a n d A r m o r at Fort Knox, Kentucky, especially Candace Fuller, for helping me in searching the files there. Mr. Dale Ritter, an author, veteran soldier, a n d educator in Alburtis, Pennsylvania, shared b o t h p h o t o s from his exceptionally extensive private collection a n d his expertise in precisely identifying the subject m a t t e r in others. I am grateful for his truly collegial attitude a n d willingness to cheerfully share his formidable knowledge of Tiger tanks a n d units. I w o u l d also like to recognize a n d c o m m e n d the exceptional professionalism, expertise, a n d responsiveness of Mr. David Fletcher of the Tank M u s e u m , Bovington, Dorset, in the United K i n g d o m , w h o provided i m p o r t a n t p h o t o s on short notice. Mr. Wilfred Rogers of Helion Books in Solihull, Warwickshire, was i n s t r u m e n t a l in quickly scanning a n d t r a n s m i t t i n g those p h o t o s , m a k i n g their inclusion in the b o o k possible. Several World War II veterans shared their t h o u g h t s a n d recollections that comprise the Prologue a n d Epilogue of this b o o k . Famed Tiger c o m m a n d e r

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O t t o Carius very graciously agreed to contribute the former, a n d an officer w h o could easily have b e e n across the battlefield from h i m , Colonel Viktor Iskrov, formerly of the Red Army, kindly provided p a r t of the latter. Bob Holt, webmaster a n d creator of the very fine site telling the history of the 752nd Tank Battalion in W W I I (www.752ndtank.com) c o n t r i b u t e d the gripping story that comprises the o t h e r part of the Epilogue on behalf of his veteran father, the late Ray Holt, former S h e r m a n t a n k driver a n d c o m m a n d e r in B/752nd. I am indebted to all of t h e m for adding color a n d personal insights in reinforcing the t h e m e s of the book. I am also grateful to H a n s Roepke of Frankfurt, Germany, for eliciting a n d coordinating H e r r Carius's thoughtful c o n t r i b u t i o n . I am similarly grateful to Lars Gyllenhaal of Rosvik, Sweden, a n d Bair Irincheev of St. Petersburg a n d Helsinki for facilitating o u r receipt of Colonel Iskrov's vivid anecdote. Staff Sergeant Tom H o u l i h a n , U S M C (Ret.) of Aegis Consulting G r o u p , Inc., created the o u t s t a n d i n g m a p s which so vividly p o r t r a y the action in the case studies which are central to this study. A t r u e professional in every way, he was a real p a r t n e r in the process of fashioning these exceptional graphic aids. Lieutenant Colonel M a r k Reardon, US Army; Mr. Terry Poulos, Toronto, O n t a r i o ; Mark Rikmenspoel, Fort Collins, Colorado; a n d Lawrence Frappier, H o u s t o n , Texas also all c o n t r i b u t e d to the information contained on various maps. I owe a lasting debt to my close friend A n d r e w Harris, w h o read the initial draft a n d has always provided me valuable suggestions, for this b o o k a n d in life, usually over a late-night whiskey or a bottle of wine. Perhaps that is why his advice always seemed so sage at the time. I am grateful to my parents, Warren a n d Corlynn Wilbeck, for always s u p p o r t i n g me in whatever I have d o n e a n d for s o m e h o w instilling in me a thirst for knowledge and a passion for history. T h a n k s to my children, Jonathan a n d Abigail, for helping me in a variety of ways d u r i n g the p r o d u c t i o n of this book, from taking on increased responsibility in yard a n d h o u s e h o l d chores to simply being great kids. Finally, a heartfelt t h a n k s to my wife and best friend, Lizzie. H e r s u p p o r t d u r i n g the writing of this b o o k a n d also d u r i n g m a n y extended deployments away from h o m e have always been a source of strength. —Chris Wilbeck March 2004

A Guide to Tactical Unit Symbols Types of Units

Sizes of Units Platoon/British Tank or Recce Troop

Infantry Armored Infantry/ Panzer-Grenadier

Company/Battery/U.S. Cavalry Troop/ British Tank or Recce Squadron

Tank/Panzer

Battalion/U.S. Cavalry Squadron

Armored Recon

Battalion-sized task force or Combat Group

Parachute Infantry

Motorized Infantry

Tank Destroyer*

Regiment Regimental-sized task force or Combat Group Brigade/Group/ Combat Command Division

Antitank (Towed Guns) Armored Field Artillery or Assault Guns (Sturmgeschütz)

Corps Army Army Group

Engineers

Example Heavy Tank Battalion 501

US, Soviet, or British Forces

German Forces

"The German equivalent, Panzerjäger units, is symbolized by "PZJG" in the unit box. Note. If the specific sub element of a unit is not known, only its size is graphically indicated on the left of the unit box. Thus,

would be an unspecified battalion of Panzer-Grenadier Regiment 12.

Rank Equivalences US Army General of the Army

German Army Generalfeldmarschall

Waffen-SS

General Lieutenant General Major General Brigadier General

Generaloberst General (der Infanterie, der Artillerie, etc.) Generalleutnant

SS-Oberstgruppenführer SS-Obergruppenführer

Generalmajor

SS-Brigadeführer

Colonel Lieutenant Colonel Major Captain 1st Lieutenant 2nd Lieutenant

Oberst

SS-Oberführer SS-Standartenführer SS-Obersturmbannführer

Sergeant Major* Master Sergeant/ First Sergeant Technical Sergeant Staff Sergeant Sergeant Corporal

Stabsfeldwebel Oberfeldwebel

SS-Sturmscharführer SS-Hauptscharführer

Feldwebel

SS-Oberscharführer

Unterfeldwebel Unteroffizier

SS-Scharführer SS-Unterscharführer

Private First Class

Hauptgefreiter Obergefreiter Gefreiter Obersoldat (Obergrenadier, Oberkanonier, etc.) Soldat (Grenadier, Kanonier, etc.)

SS-Rottenführer

Private

Oberstleutnant Major Hauptmann Oberleutnant Leutnant

SS-Gruppenführer

SS-Sturmbannführer SS-Hauptsturmführer SS-Obersturmführer SS-Untersturmführer

SS-Sturmmann SS-Mann

*Not a rank in the US Army during WWII. NCOs serving as sergeants major during that era were usually Master Sergeants.

Prologue Through the Eyes of a Tiger Ace As a "Tiger-Man" from the design's earliest days, I am having difficulties appreciating the p h e n o m e n o n of such i m m e n s e interest in a w e a p o n of which only a little over a t h o u s a n d units were used by the G e r m a n a r m e d forces. There is no d o u b t that the Tiger was a technical masterpiece, in spite of insufficient p r o d u c t i o n sites d u r i n g this phase of the war. This was a situation that was less t h a n optimal, particularly in view of the b o m b i n g . Unfortunately, the front line activities of the Tiger battalions' crews were mostly unpleasant, b u t they were e m i n e n t l y necessary. We were to act as the backbone of the defensive lines of the rather weak infantry units, in order to prevent a major catastrophe on the Eastern Front. O p e r a t i o n Zitadelle a n d the action in the Kursk Salient were m o r e or less the only events w h e n Panthers a n d Tigers could really d e m o n s t r a t e their pree m i n e n t offensive strength, acting as sledgehammers to clear the path for units e q u i p p e d with Panzer IIIs a n d IVs. The attack was d o o m e d , however, because the order h a d been given too late, thus forfeiting the desired surprise effect. Ten times as m a n y Tigers w o u l d not have altered the situation, since o u r infantry forces had been m u c h too weak. T h e failure of O p e r a t i o n Zitadelle t u r n e d the tide toward ultimate Germ a n defeat. T h e only task left was to try to keep the Russians from forcing their way into G e r m a n y proper. In this, too, Tiger units played a major role, although it was n o t o n e for which they h a d been designed. O u r Heavy Tank Battalion 502 mastered its task with o u t s t a n d i n g efficiency. My o w n 2 n d C o m p a n y , Heavy Tank Battalion 502 participated in n u m e r ous defensive battles against the Russians. Tigers proved themselves superior against Soviet tanks countless times, even w h e n greatly o u t n u m b e r e d . O n e such occasion was d u r i n g the defensive battles a r o u n d Dünaburg in the s u m m e r of 1944. On 22 July 1944, Soviet forces broke t h r o u g h o u r front lines n o r t h of the city. My c o m p a n y was ordered to advance along the Rollbahn n o r t h of Dünaburg to hold o p e n the i m p o r t a n t road to Viski. Along this road, at the small t o w n of Malinava, my c o m p a n y encountered a Soviet force of 20 tanks, c o m p r i s e d of T-34s a n d Josef Stalins, their n e w heavy tank. We attacked immediately, using only two of o u r company's eight operational tanks, to limit exposure to e n e m y fire. In a battle that lasted a b o u t 20 m i n u t e s , my crew a n d the other, c o m m a n d e d by Feldwebel (later Oberfeldwebel a n d Knight's Cross recipient) Albert Kerscher, destroyed 17 of the e n e m y tanks.

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Even successful engagements like these were unable to stop the Red Army. No a m o u n t of skill or courage could stem the tide, a n d no tank ever designed could perform miracles. Still, I wouldn't have wanted to go into battle with any other tank b u t the Tiger, because it was superior in every aspect to all other tanks fielded by the G e r m a n military. A brief word a b o u t this book: As former frontline soldiers, my c o m r a d e s a n d I do appreciate every a u t h o r w h o holds discipline, chivalry, a n d readiness to fight in esteem. I have personally given up h o p e that politicians w h o never experienced war first h a n d will ever realize that war is the worst of all possible alternatives. Otto Carius Former Commander, 2nd Company, Heavy Tank Battalion 502 Herschweiler-Pettersheim, February 2004 Author's Note: Otto Carius was born in Zweibrücken, Germany, on 27 May 1922. He enlisted in 1940 and saw his first combat during Operation Barbarossa as a crewman aboard a Czech-made Panzer 38(t) with the 20th Panzer Division's Panzer Regiment 21. Following about a year of combat against the Soviets in the central sector of the Eastern Front, Carius attended an officer candidate course in Germany and was commissioned a lieutenant in the Panzer branch. He was assigned to Heavy Tank Battalion 502 in April 1943, and deployed with the unit to combat in the vicinity of Leningrad. Over the next 14 months, his unit fought mostly defensive actions, ultimately withdrawing to the Narva Pocket before being transferred to the Dünaburg (Daugavpils, O t t o Carius Latvia) sector. There, Oberleutnant Carius and his men participated in several spectacular tank duels; subsequently, he was awarded the Oakleaves to the Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross. In August 1944, Carius was transferred to the armor center at Paderborn to assume command of a company in Heavy Tank Destroyer Battalion 512. This unit, equipped with the heaviest armored vehicle to ever see combat (even to this day, in 2004!), the Jagdtiger ("Hunting Tiger"), later conducted defensive operations along the Rhine in March and April 1945, before capitulating to the Americans. During his wartime service, Otto Carius earned the Wounds Badge in Gold; the Armored Combat Badge in Silver (for 100 engagements); the Iron Cross, 1st and 2nd Classes; and the Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross with Oakleaves. Since the war, he has pursued a career as a pharmacist, and continues in this profession even at the time of this book's publication.

Chapter 1

Introduction to Heavy Tank Battalions A r m o r e d units are not intended for m o p p i n g u p . T h e y constitute a s l e d g e h a m m e r for striking at decisive points. Militär-Wochenblatt, 11 N o v e m b e r 1936 1

T h e only i n s t r u m e n t of a r m o r e d warfare which G e r m a n c o m m a n d e r s regarded as qualitatively different from the rest was the M a r k VI Tiger, which was n o t allotted to divisions b u t organized in i n d e p e n d e n t battalions, kept u n d e r central control, a n d c o m m i t t e d to crucial offensive a n d counteroffensive missions. 2

John Keegan, The Second World War G e r m a n Tiger a n d King Tiger tanks are legendary a r m o r e d fighting vehicles. They were arguably the most feared w e a p o n developed by the G e r m a n s d u r ing World War II. M a n y of the c o m m a n d e r s a n d c r e w m e n w h o fought from these tanks accomplished extraordinary feats. This b o o k analyzes the c o m b a t effectiveness of G e r m a n heavy t a n k battalions {schwere Panzer-Abteilungen) Although they were rarely used in the role for which they were originally conceived, namely breaking t h r o u g h prepared e n e m y defenses, these units effectively destroyed e n e m y tanks, w h e t h e r employed in offensive or defensive tactical situations. Results varied between different battalions, however, a n d Germ a n d o c t r i n e a n d tactical decisionmaking s o m e t i m e s limited these heavy tank battalions' effectiveness. T h e analysis includes the performance of doctrinal a n d assigned missions from b o t h the Western a n d Eastern Fronts, a n d it considers the impacts of doctrine, force structure, e q u i p m e n t , leadership, a n d personnel. Although there is a great wealth of information available on m a n y aspects of the heavy t a n k battalions, no literature to date exists to answer w h e t h e r these units were viable forces that achieved the doctrinal mission for which they were conceived. Also, there has been no inquiry into w h e t h e r they were able to effectively accomplish the missions assigned to t h e m while the G e r m a n A r m y was on the defensive—counterattacking, reinforcing other units in the defense, or as a mobile reserve. This b o o k fills that void by e x a m i n i n g unit histories and engagements from all perspectives while analyzing the different 3

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organizations developed, types of e q u i p m e n t employed, and the missions of the heavy tank battalions.

Background After World War I, the best m i n d s of the major armies of the world wrestled with solutions for avoiding the linear, stalemated, deadly, positional c o m b a t that characterized World War I. W i t h the c o n s t r u c t i o n of the Maginot Line t h r o u g h the late 1930s, the French actually embraced the idea of fighting from fixed, linear positions, b u t the objective of other major armies was to avoid the massive attrition introduced by trenches, high explosive shells, a n d m a c h i n e g u n s by restoring m a n e u v e r to war. A m e c h a n i s m by which e n e m y defenses could be penetrated h a d to be found. Many military theorists tried to conceive a d o c t r i n e to r u p t u r e a n d exploit the e n e m y defensive line. T h e military thinkers of Great Britain, Germany, and the Soviet U n i o n all published m a t e rial in their professional military journals that p u t forth the idea of attacking in waves of tanks. In these theories, the lead wave consisted of the "heavy" tanks, while the follow-on waves included lighter, faster, a r m o r e d vehicles to exploit the breach m a d e by the first wave. A l t h o u g h the G e r m a n A r m y p l a n n e d for heavy tanks a n d development of the Durchbruchswagen (breakt h r o u g h tank) began in 1937, no heavy tanks were fielded before World War II began. T h e G e r m a n A r m y ultimately developed their o w n concept of mobile warfare that was very successful d u r i n g the first p a r t of World War II. Their success in Poland, France, a n d d u r i n g the first year in Russia was generally the p r o d u c t of envelopment or even encirclement, which precluded the necessity of having to "break t h r o u g h " a c o n t i n u o u s line of fortified defensive positions. T h u s , the G e r m a n s did n o t suffer from the absence of heavy tanks in their a r m o r e d forces. T h e G e r m a n Army's encounters with the Soviet T-34 m e d i u m a n d KV-1 heavy tanks d u r i n g their advances near the e n d of 1941, however, reinvigorated the d e v e l o p m e n t of their d o r m a n t heavy t a n k p r o g r a m . 3

T h e G e r m a n A r m y created the first two heavy t a n k companies on 16 February 1942 a n d assigned t h e m to the first heavy t a n k battalion, officially created on 10 May 1942. These heavy t a n k battalions were not assigned to panzer divisions; rather, they were used as army-level units (Heerestruppen). F r o m this p o i n t forward, the Oberkommando des Heeres ( A r m y H i g h C o m m a n d , hereafter referred to as OKH) allocated these units to a r m y g r o u p s whose c o m m a n d i n g generals were free to s u b o r d i n a t e t h e m further to armies, corps, or even to divisions for tactical e m p l o y m e n t . Before the war was over, the A r m y fielded 11 a n d the Waffen-SS fielded three heavy t a n k battalions. 4

INTRODUCTION TO HEAVY TANK BATTALIONS

5

These organizations h a d several different Tables of Organization, b u t were always centered a r o u n d either the Tiger or the King Tiger (also k n o w n as the Tiger II or Royal Tiger) tank. In continual service from 16 September 1942, they saw their first action against the Russians near Leningrad, a n d fought until the e n d of the war. D u r i n g this time, they fought in almost every region of the European theater against Russians, Americans, a n d British forces. 5

6

Historical Literature There are m a n y books available that discuss the technical characteristics of Tiger a n d King Tiger tanks. There is also a vast a m o u n t of literature a b o u t m a n y of the soldiers w h o attained incredibly high kill totals while c o m m a n d ing these tanks. Very little, however, is written a b o u t the actual units in which these tanks a n d individuals operated. T h e biggest s h o r t c o m i n g is in literature concerning the effectiveness of the heavy t a n k battalions. At best, there are several books covering the c o m b a t histories of heavy tank battalions using c o m bat reports of these units. These b o o k s do n o t a t t e m p t to analyze any of these combat actions a n d do not include conclusions on their role in c o m b a t . Although there are weaknesses in the literature of heavy t a n k battalions, there are s o m e works that provide useful insights. Two of these accounts are by Generaloberst Heinz W. Guderian. G u d e r i a n played a very i m p o r t a n t role in the d e v e l o p m e n t of a r m o r e d d o c t r i n e before World War II as a leading theorist a n d as the Chef der Schnellen Truppen (Chief of Fast Troops, as the Germ a n s called their motorized a n d mechanized forces in general). D u r i n g the latter half of the war, he served as Generalinspekteur der Panzertruppen (Inspector General of A r m o r e d Forces). Any exploration of Germany's d o c trinal d e v e l o p m e n t a n d use of a r m o r e d forces is deficient w i t h o u t including Guderian's two b o o k s . His first b o o k , Achtung-Panzer! The Development of Armoured Forces, Their Tactics, and Operational Potential provides a backg r o u n d on d o c t r i n e prior to World War II. His second book, Panzer Leader, was written after the war and provides information concerning changes in the doctrine a n d e m p l o y m e n t d u r i n g World War II. Because Achtung-Panzer! was written prior to the d e v e l o p m e n t a n d fielding of any heavy t a n k battalions, it contains no specific analysis of these units, b u t it does provide the foundation for defining the doctrinal role envisioned for heavy tank battalions. Panzer Leader contains several reflections on the correct e m p l o y m e n t of heavy tank battalions, b u t its insights focus on the initial fielding of the heavy t a n k battalions prior to the battle of Kursk. In t e r m s of c o m b a t histories of the heavy t a n k battalions, Wolfgang Schneider's Tigers in Combat I a n d Tigers in Combat II are good sources of

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information obtained from personal interviews, unit histories, a n d battle reports. T h e first b o o k covers the ten separate A r m y heavy tank battalions a n d the second b o o k covers the Waffen-SS battalions a n d the heavy t a n k battalion of Panzer-Grenadier Division Grossdeutschland, a n d other units that included a heavy tank company. These b o o k s provide brief overviews of these units' e q u i p m e n t , organization, camouflage, a n d vehicle markings. The m a i n source of c o m b a t history comes in the form of a sentence or p a r a g r a p h describing each unit's actions on a particular date, similar to a daily log or diary. T h e type a n d a m o u n t of i n f o r m a t i o n provided varies from u n i t to unit a n d from t i m e p e r i o d to time period. A l t h o u g h providing a great deal of data, Schneider's b o o k s do not include an analysis of heavy t a n k battalion c o m b a t actions. T h e daily log entries, however, do contain information on the changes in the battalion's c o m b a t power a n d the operational status of its Tigers. His books p r o vide a table for each unit, detailing the date a n d cause of each Tiger lost. T h e y also contain information on the n u m b e r of e n e m y tanks a n d e q u i p m e n t destroyed d u r i n g stated t i m e periods so that an evaluation of t a n k kills a n d losses can be ascertained t h r o u g h the unit's log. These books are very helpful starting places for a study of heavy t a n k battalions' c o m b a t effectiveness. Three unit-specific heavy t a n k battalion c o m b a t histories provide c o m b a t details, b u t little analysis. T h e y are The Combat History of schwere PanzerAbteilung 503, The Combat History of schwere Panzer-Abteilung 507, a n d The Combat History of schwere Panzer-Abteilung 508, a n d they recount the respective u n i t histories from the officers a n d soldiers that served in these units. These books, published in 2000, 2001, a n d 2003 respectively by J. J. Fedorowicz Publishing, contain personal accounts of these units in c o m b a t from a variety of sources, from c o m m o n mechanics to c o m p a n y a n d battalion c o m m a n d e r s . Together these units were involved in i m p o r t a n t battles at Kursk; N o r m a n d y ; Italy; in the a t t e m p t to relieve the encircled G e r m a n forces in Cherkassy; a n d in O p e r a t i o n BAGRATION. As a compilation of logs, diaries, a n d personal accounts, these b o o k s are very valuable for gaining insights into the c o m b a t actions of the heavy t a n k battalions, b u t they do n o t attempt to analyze the effectiveness of the units. Some of the diary entries are from the battalion a n d c o m p a n y c o m m a n d e r s a n d include records of losses a n d casualties inflicted on the e n e m y on a daily basis, along with narrative accounts of the action. These expand, clarify, a n d a d d personal color to the information included in Schneider's b o o k s . There are m a n y b o o k s that address technical aspects of the Tiger a n d King Tiger tanks. T h e single m o s t i m p o r t a n t a u t h o r in English on Tiger tanks in general is T h o m a s L. Jentz. Based purely on p r i m a r y sources, his b o o k s Germany's Tiger Tanks, D. W. to Tiger I, and Germany's Tiger Tanks, VK45.02 to Tiger II, provide a great deal of information regarding the design, p r o d u c t i o n , a n d modifications of the Tiger a n d King Tiger.

INTRODUCTION TO HEAVY TANK BATTALIONS

7

Jentz has also written a t w o - v o l u m e w o r k on a r m o r e d forces titled Panzertruppen: The Complete Guide to the Creation and Combat Employment of Germany's Tank Force. This b o o k is valuable because it draws on m a n y other sources a n d participants in the d e v e l o p m e n t of the heavy t a n k battalions. It is especially helpful in tying together the doctrinal changes in the G e r m a n A r m y with the technical development of the heavy t a n k a n d the Tiger p r o g r a m . This b o o k contains heavy t a n k battalion c o m b a t reports that provide w a r t i m e reco m m e n d a t i o n s for i m p r o v i n g the doctrine, organization, a n d e q u i p m e n t associated with these units. By far, the single m o s t valuable w o r k on this subject is yet a n o t h e r b o o k by jentz. Germany's Tiger Tanks, Tiger I and II: Combat Tactics, concentrates on the tactical application of Tigers a n d uses original accounts in the form of after-action reports. As he states in his i n t r o d u c t i o n , "these original afteraction reports are very valuable in o b t a i n i n g a true picture of applied tactics. As written, they w o u l d have h a d to meet the t o u g h test of peer acceptance." Because they were written shortly after the events occurred, they also have the advantage of being recorded before m e m o r i e s became clouded by time. Most of the G e r m a n reports appear to have been written with the motive of initiating i m p r o v e m e n t s to the Tiger tanks themselves or of changing the tactics employed by heavy t a n k units. As useful as this b o o k is in researching the heavy t a n k battalions, it still only provides a limited foundation to evaluate the units' p e r f o r m a n c e a n d does not a t t e m p t to analyze c o m b a t effectiveness in a comprehensive m a n n e r . Finally, as the title of the b o o k suggests, the p r i m a r y focus is on the e m p l o y m e n t of units below battalion level, although there is some useful information on battalion tactics. 7

Looking at the heavy tanks from the o p p o n e n t ' s view, David Fletcher's Tiger! The Tiger Tank: A British View provides excellent insight into the British perspective of the Tiger t a n k as a technical piece of e q u i p m e n t . M o r e detail about the t h o u g h t s of British c o m m a n d e r s d u r i n g World War II regarding the heavy t a n k battalions, their doctrine, a n d effectiveness w o u l d have b e e n useful, b u t m a y n o t have been available.

Overcoming Misperceptions A t h o r o u g h study of various battles a n d engagements from Allied u n i t histories a n d published historical accounts reveals strong biases within the Allied forces. A m o n g the Allied armies, units continually reported that Tiger tanks were in their sector or that they h a d destroyed Tiger tanks. A casual reading of m a n y Allied accounts d u r i n g the battle of the Bulge, for example, w o u l d indicate t h a t at least half of the G e r m a n tanks employed there were Tigers. Actually, no m o r e t h a n 136 Tigers were involved, with the vast majority of

8

SLEDGEHAMMERS

G e r m a n tanks in the battle being Panthers a n d Panzer IVs. T h e Soviet reports also have to be treated with the same skepticism in s o m e instances. Soviet p r o paganda, for example, claimed that 700 Tigers were destroyed d u r i n g the battle of Kursk. This n u m b e r is five times m o r e t h a n the actual n u m b e r engaged in the fighting. 8

9

Generally, this p h e n o m e n o n should be attributed to the formidable reputation of the Tiger a m o n g its adversaries, a n d sort of parallel to the insistence by m a n y American infantrymen that they were being continuously shelled by "88s," w h e n , in fact, they were almost always being b o m b a r d e d by the 1 0 5 m m a n d 150mm howitzers s t a n d a r d to a G e r m a n divisional artillery regiment. Just as the deadly 8 8 m m artillery piece was the m o s t dreaded G e r m a n gun, so also was the Tiger the m o s t feared—and therefore, m o s t often misidentified— G e r m a n tank. To obtain the m o s t accurate picture possible, this study uses m a n y different sources. Tank kills reported by the heavy t a n k battalions against the British a n d U.S. were verified in specific engagements from a variety of records, including unit histories, after-action reports, diaries and other personal accounts. N o t surprisingly, Soviet t a n k losses were often omitted in their unit histories a n d in personal accounts, making an accurate c o u n t m u c h m o r e difficult to obtain. Several western sources provide s o m e analysis of Soviet t a n k losses in several battles a n d were used to evaluate G e r m a n claims. A source of confusion in reporting tank losses a n d kills is the definition of what constitutes destruction of a tank. Tanks of World War II, especially the Tiger, were robust a n d resilient a n d could be repaired a n d put back into action if they were recovered a n d b r o u g h t back to a m a i n t e n a n c e unit. O n e side m a y have claimed the destruction of an e n e m y tank, b u t in reality, that t a n k was repaired a n d r e t u r n e d to service. T h e G e r m a n heavy t a n k battalions s u b m i t t e d regular reports on Tigers destroyed a n d also on the quantity that were operational. An unserviceable tank required the unit to make a report, identifying the chassis n u m b e r , a survey of the damage, a n d an estimate of the t i m e needed for the r e p a i r s . A seco n d report was m a d e at a higher level, indicating the n u m b e r of tanks in w o r k i n g order for the unit, a n d the n u m b e r of tanks u n d e r repair." In all cases, clarity a n d accuracy were required. This makes obtaining an accurate accounting of the n u m b e r of G e r m a n tanks destroyed easier with one notable exception. T h e records for the King Tiger e q u i p p e d units, especially those fighting the Russians, are incomplete because the unit war diaries a n d other unit records were either destroyed or captured by the Soviets. 10

12

T h e accuracy of G e r m a n reporting, in t e r m s of Tiger losses, can be verified literally almost d o w n to the last vehicle against American and British forces. This is in part from the o u t s t a n d i n g historical coverage by b o t h the American

9

INTRODUCTION TO HEAVY TANK BATTALIONS

and British military establishments at m a n y different levels, from small unit journals to official a r m y level reports. Included in these are a n u m b e r of battle studies, including the "official histories," which received exhaustive coverage after the war, i n c o r p o r a t i n g d o c u m e n t s a n d sources from all sides. Another reason is that there were never m o r e than three heavy t a n k battalions c o m m i t t e d against American a n d British forces at any o n e time, thereby reducing the overall n u m b e r of Tigers employed against t h e m . In other words, w h e n A m e r i c a n a n d British forces destroyed a Tiger, it was a noteworthy event. 13

The result is that, at least in the West, the G e r m a n daily strength r e p o r t s — and therefore losses—can be verified with a relatively high degree of accuracy. Usually, in cases where a conflict exists, records a n d a small a m o u n t of research will reveal the t r u t h . For example, on 17 D e c e m b e r 1944, in the Ardennes, a King Tiger of SS-Heavy Tank Battalion 501 was immobilized a n d subsequently a b a n d o n e d as a result of a strike by P-47 " T h u n d e r b o l t " fighter b o m b e r s of IX Tactical Air C o m m a n d . Later, as G e r m a n forces withdrew, the c o m m a n d e r of an American S h e r m a n from the 740th Tank Battalion reported destroying it. Although b o t h forces justifiably claimed the King Tiger, the end result was still only o n e loss for the G e r m a n s . 1 4

Given the credibility of G e r m a n r e p o r t i n g in the West, there is no reason to d o u b t the veracity of G e r m a n Tiger losses in the east. Caution m u s t be exercised, however, in assessing the n u m b e r of tanks operational. As a m e m b e r of the 1st Panzer Division stated: I m u s t honestly confess that since 1942 we always reported we h a d 15-20 percent less t h a n o u r actual c o m b a t - r e a d y strength available to be p u t into a c t i o n . . . . Any c o m m a n d i n g general of any panzer division at that time was very h a p p y if he could assemble 20 or 25 tanks. For that reason, as we well knew, if he reported we h a d 60 tanks, we were sure that on the next day, as we defended on o u r o w n front line 40 kilometers wide, we would have only 20 tanks because the high c o m m a n d would take t h e m away to where the m o r e critical points w e r e . 15

D u e to extended frontages a n d heavy d e m a n d from higher echelons, it is logical a n d possible that s o m e heavy t a n k battalions employed in the East also followed this unofficial practice of r e p o r t i n g fewer vehicles operational t h a n were actually available. Unit c o m m a n d e r s , however, wanted replacement vehicles as soon as possible a n d a replacement vehicle could only be requested if a vehicle was lost, not just inoperable, so it is highly likely that the heavy t a n k battalions w o u l d have been meticulously accurate in reporting the loss of any Tigers. T h e p r i m a r y obstacle to overcome in researching engagements in the East against Soviet forces is confirming the kills m a d e by Tigers.

10

SLEDGEHAMMERS

While their accounts a n d reporting may indeed be accurate for the m o s t part, G e r m a n sources n o r m a l l y fail to provide a contextual b a c k g r o u n d for the account, especially at the operational level of war. If an o p p o n e n t ' s actions are included in the G e r m a n account at all, it is usually cursory, superficial, focused at the tactical level, a n d does little to help explain the reasons b e h i n d G e r m a n actions that resulted in failure or success. G e r m a n sources may simply state, for example, that a large n u m b e r of Tigers were destroyed by their o w n crews to avoid capture after they h a d broken d o w n . T h e y fail to include in their account h o w or why those Tigers were threatened with capture a n d w h a t action their o p p o n e n t s had taken to p u t those vehicles in an untenable position. Rather t h a n being an i m p e d i m e n t that c a n n o t be overcome, however, the lack of context in G e r m a n accounts simply reinforces the necessity of using sources from as m a n y different perspectives as possible. 16

Measures of Effectiveness and Organization of Book This b o o k is organized into seven chapters. This first chapter provides an o u t line, an overview of the central theses, a n d a general b a c k g r o u n d . Chapter 2 outlines the development of heavy t a n k battalions. This overview incorporates doctrine, organization, e q u i p m e n t , personnel, a n d tactics to assist the reader in u n d e r s t a n d i n g the doctrinal role of heavy t a n k battalions a n d the missions they were to be assigned. Chapters 3 t h r o u g h 6 are historical examples a n d analyses of heavy t a n k battalions in c o m b a t . C h a p t e r 3 examines the heavy t a n k battalions from their creation a n d initial c o m b a t actions in 1942 until the end of the Battle of Kursk. Chapter 4 continues to the s u m m e r of 1944. T h e Battle of Kursk in July 1943 m a r k e d a transitional t u r n i n g point in the development a n d organizational c o m p o s i t i o n of the heavy tank battalions. It was also the point after which the G e r m a n A r m y was overwhelmingly engaged in the defensive at the operational level. Because heavy tank battalion e m p l o y m e n t in Italy is difficult to divide into distinct periods, this chapter also includes analysis of heavy t a n k battalions' c o m b a t in Italy t h r o u g h o u t the war. Chapters 5 a n d 6 examine heavy tank battalion e m p l o y m e n t d u r i n g the final year of the war. Chapter 7 offers an assessment of the effectiveness of Tiger tanks in action. G e r m a n doctrine placed great emphasis u p o n the heavy tanks' destruction of opposing tanks in b o t h the offense and the defense. Because of this e m p h a sis, the heavy t a n k battalions' effectiveness is partly measured t h r o u g h o u t this study as the tank kill/loss ratios they produced.

INTRODUCTION TO HEAVY TANK BATTALIONS

11

Because circumstances m a y have precluded a t a n k - t o - t a n k battle, a simple ratio of kills to losses does n o t completely define effectiveness; therefore, a seco n d a r y measure of effectiveness used is that of mission accomplishment, or in other words, w h e t h e r the battalions accomplished their assigned missions. Where possible, direct accounts from veterans or after-action reports are used to d e t e r m i n e the unit mission. In m a n y instances there is no written historical record, t h u s m a k i n g it extremely difficult or impossible to k n o w exactly the mission of an individual battalion. Using the larger operational a n d tactical e n v i r o n m e n t a n d opposing forces, logical deductions are m a d e a b o u t the probable unit mission.

The Levels of Warfare and Heavy Tank Battalions D u r i n g W W I I , convention divided military endeavor into three levels of war. They were the tactical, operational, a n d strategic. T h e tactical level involves battles a n d engagements. T h e operational level links those battles a n d engagements into c a m p a i g n s designed to c o n t r i b u t e to the a c c o m p l i s h m e n t of strategic goals a n d objectives. World War II in the European Theater contains m a n y examples of operational-level maneuvers that linked small unit actions together to accomplish the larger strategic objective. In World War II, the operational level usually i n c o r p o r a t e d large g r o u p s of units in b r o a d or extensive maneuvers. Finally, the strategic level is the level of war in which theater, or even national, policy is established; direction is given; a n d goals and objectives are p u r s u e d . This level, in b o t h the military a n d civilian sectors, should include a n d address the overall resources available a n d those required to accomplish the strategic goals. 17

The levels of warfare are i m p o r t a n t in discussing heavy t a n k battalions for a n u m b e r of reasons. Heavy t a n k battalions engaged e n e m y forces a n d destroyed e n e m y tanks or lost Tigers at the tactical level. This is also p r i m a r i ly where their mission a c c o m p l i s h m e n t can be judged. This mission a c c o m p l i s h m e n t m u s t however, be taken in context. This context can often be found by discerning the situation at the operational level. As will be seen, heavy tank battalions m u s t n o t be judged on their tactical value alone.

Chapter 2

Heavy Tank Battalion Overview It is vital to establish the basic p u r p o s e of the t a n k forces. Are they intended to s t o r m fortresses a n d p e r m a n e n t defensive positions, or to carry out operational envelopments a n d t u r n i n g m o v e m e n t s in the o p e n field; to act at the tactical level, m a k i n g b r e a k t h r o u g h s on o u r o w n account, a n d checking enemy b r e a k t h r o u g h s a n d envelopments; or will they be no m o r e t h a n a r m o r e d m a c h i n e - g u n carriers? Heinz Guderian, Achtung-Panzer! 1937 1

Heinz W. G u d e r i a n is widely viewed as the principle architect of Germany's a r m o r e d forces d u r i n g the Third Reich and the m a i n intellectual a u t h o r of the military theory for their use. His writings greatly influenced the G e r m a n A r m y a n d Hitler's e n a b l e m e n t of Guderian's vision of a r m o r e d warfare allowed G e r m a n y to enjoy great success d u r i n g the initial years of World War II. 2

Doctrine G e r m a n doctrine d u r i n g World War II is difficult to define precisely. G e r m a n doctrine, like the d o c t r i n e of the Americans, British, French, a n d Soviets, did n o t precisely define the differences between light, m e d i u m , a n d heavy tanks. As well as generally following a vague weight classification, these tanks were also defined in discussions and publications of the period using doctrinal roles a n d missions. A l t h o u g h these roles overlapped to a certain degree a n d changed d e p e n d i n g u p o n the t i m e period a n d c o u n t r y discussed, they followed a general pattern. This c o m m o n — a l t h o u g h far from universal—classification categorized light, m e d i u m , a n d heavy tanks based on their differing doctrinal roles a n d missions. Light t a n k s were i n t e n d e d to c o n d u c t reconnaissance missions that required great mobility, b u t little a r m o r protection or offensive lethality. M e d i u m tanks were i n t e n d e d to be used for exploitation or pursuit missions. Because these tanks m i g h t c o m e into contact with fleeing forces, it required m o r e balance in t e r m s of mobility, armor, a n d a r m a m e n t . Speed is essential 12

HEAVY TANK BATTALION OVERVIEW

13

during exploitation a n d pursuit o p e r a t i o n s , however, so these tanks required a high degree of mobility, with an emphasis u p o n speed, range, a n d m e c h a n ical reliability. T h e last t a n k type, the heavy, was i n t e n d e d for overcoming prepared e n e m y defenses. These tanks, s u p p o r t i n g or s u p p o r t e d by infantry a n d artillery, were to penetrate e n e m y defenses to allow m e d i u m tanks to pass t h r o u g h and exploit that b r e a k t h r o u g h . M a n y theorists t h o u g h t it necessary to require tanks to be able to c o n d u c t missions normally associated with vehicles in the next category, up or d o w n . For instance, light tanks could also participate with m e d i u m tanks d u r i n g an exploitation operation. M e d i u m tanks could theoretically fulfill the roles of, or assist, b o t h light a n d heavy t a n k s . The multi-role use of heavy tanks was problematic, however. Because of their heavy a r m o r a n d consequent weight, they were slower t h a n b o t h m e d i u m a n d light tanks. This m e a n t that it was very difficult for t h e m to participate in any exploitation o p e r a t i o n that required high speed a n d / o r c o m b a t radius (the distance that a vehicle can normally operate w i t h o u t refueling). 3

4

3

G e r m a n d o c t r i n e d u r i n g World War II was d r a w n from n u m e r o u s sources, b u t elements of its total form can be traced to three p r i m a r y areas. T h e first source was the official G e r m a n field service regulation, Die Truppenführung (Troop G u i d a n c e ) . Authored by General Ludwig Beck, the Chief of the General Staff, 1935-38, it was published in 1933 a n d r e m a i n e d the p r i m a r y tactical m a n u a l of the G e r m a n A r m y in World War II. T h e second source of G e r m a n doctrinal t h o u g h t prior to World War II came from professional journals, the p r e - e m i n e n t o n e being the Militär-Wochenblatt. T h e final source of doctrine, especially a r m o r e m p l o y m e n t relating to that doctrine, came from Heinz W. Guderian's Achtung-Panzer! 6

Die Truppenführung provided the leaders in the G e r m a n A r m y a n d WaffenSS with a coherent foundation for thinking about future battle. A l t h o u g h primarily focused on i n c o r p o r a t i n g the traditional branches of infantry a n d artillery, it did include the evolving concepts of a r m o r e d warfare a n d air s u p port. T h e m a n u a l addressed b o t h the offense a n d the defense, a n d a i m e d at fighting mobile, decentralized battles likely to occur on the m o d e r n battlefield of the 1930s a n d 1940s. In addressing the use of tanks, the m a n u a l did n o t differentiate between light, m e d i u m , or heavy tanks. In offensive operations, the m a n u a l stated that "the frontal attack is the m o s t difficult of execution, yet it is the m o s t frequent." This statement was naturally based u p o n the G e r m a n experience with static warfare d u r i n g World War I a n d therefore the m a n u a l went into a great deal of d e p t h in discussing the frontal attack. At the foundation of the discussion is the idea of c o n d u c t ing a b r e a k t h r o u g h or a p e n e t r a t i o n of the enemy's defenses to subsequently exploit. This exploitation would be in the form of either a p u r s u i t of a retreating enemy or an enveloping attack. 7

14

SLEDGEHAMMERS

In providing doctrinal guidance on the e m p l o y m e n t of tanks d u r i n g the b r e a k t h r o u g h attack, Die Truppenführung states: Tanks a n d infantry that w o r k together ordinarily shall have the same objectives, the hostile artillery As a rule, tanks are employed where the decisive action is desired. 8

This emphasized the i m p o r t a n c e of the enemy's artillery a n d stressed that tanks should strive toward a decisive objective, seen in m o s t theorists' eyes as the artillery s u p p o r t i n g the defense. T h e j o b of coordinating all a r m s d u r i n g the attack was the responsibility of the senior c o m m a n d e r . T h e only exception to this was w h e n tanks were specifically given the mission of s u p p o r t i n g the infantry "to break d o w n the enemy." In this case, the tanks were to be directly u n d e r the c o m m a n d of the infantry c o m m a n d e r . In other words, integration of armor, infantry, a n d artillery was d o n e at high levels or, on an exceptional basis, was s o m e t h i n g to be accomplished by the infantry c o m m a n d e r solely. 9

Defeat of the enemy's antitank defenses was addressed, a n d emphasis was m a d e to break t h r o u g h as rapidly as possible to c o n t i n u e the progress of the attack. This implied that total elimination of the e n e m y defenses was n o t as i m p o r t a n t as the c o n t i n u a t i o n of forward progress in penetrating the entire defensive system. As a rule the advance develops into n u m e r o u s small attack g r o u p s that are c o m p o s e d of infantry a n d artillery, and, according to needs, of tanks. These m u s t quickly break t h r o u g h or p u s h back the enemy. If possible, we p u s h past hostile advanced positions to avoid delaying the advance. 10

Defeat of e n e m y tank counterattacks was to be accomplished by antitank guns that were to follow closely b e h i n d the leading e l e m e n t s . " Additionally, artillery was to s u p p o r t the attack by preventing "the intervention of hostile reserves." Close air s u p p o r t was incorporated into the overall b r e a k t h r o u g h . Die Truppenführung stated that "attack aviation s u p p o r t s the tanks by attacking hostile defense weapons, artillery, and reserves." These assets were also to w a r n friendly tanks of a possible e n e m y t a n k counterattack. 12

13

In t e r m s of the defense, Die Truppenführung advocated defending in depth, i n c o r p o r a t i n g infantry, artillery, a n d antitank w e a p o n s into the m a i n defensive p o s i t i o n s . In defeating tanks, it states that "advanced positions are to be especially provided with heavy m a c h i n e guns, t a n k defense weapons, a n d light [artillery] batteries." If a b r e a k t h r o u g h or p e n e t r a t i o n was m a d e in the defensive positions, the m a n u a l prescribed the c o n d u c t of two different levels of counterattacks, 14

15

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HEAVY TANK BATTALION OVERVIEW

namely local a n d general counterattacks. T h e force for the former type of counterattack consisted of "elements a n d s u p p o r t i n g w e a p o n s which are in proximity of the p e n e t r a t i o n . " T h e y were to "endeavor by i m m e d i a t e local counterattack to hurl back the e n e m y before he has o p p o r t u n i t y to establish himself." Should the local counterattack fail, or in the event of a very large enemy penetration, the "higher c o m m a n d e r decides w h e t h e r a general c o u n terattack will be m a d e to restore the position or whether the m a i n battle position is to be taken up further to the rear." T h e total guidance for tanks in the defense was: 16

17

18

Tanks are employed offensively. They are a decisive reserve in the h a n d s of the c o m m a n d e r , especially suitable for general counterattacks or for the engagement of hostile tanks. Ordinarily their assembly position is far to the rear, o u t of effective hostile artillery range. Direct observation of the battlefield is desired. T h e various e m p l o y m e n t possibilities are reconnoitered. In general, tanks are employed on orders of the higher c o m m a n d e r , w h o controls the t i m e a n d objective of the attack a n d the cooperation of other a r m s . 19

Prior to G u d e r i a n publishing his ideas on a r m o r e d warfare, other theorists from England, France, the United States, a n d the Soviet U n i o n developed their own ideas a b o u t the future of warfare. G u d e r i a n admits that the b o o k s a n d articles of J. F. C. Fuller a n d Basil Liddell H a r t interested h i m a n d provided i n s p i r a t i o n . T h e Soviet U n i o n p r o d u c e d s o m e of the best military theorists in Mikhail Tukhachevsky, V. K. Triandafillov, a n d Aleksandr A. Svechin. They formed large mechanized units in the Red A r m y a n d it is likely that some of their writings a n d theories were published in G e r m a n . G e r m a n theorists b o r r o w e d Soviet concepts, a n d their ideas are evident in the evolution of G e r m a n military t h o u g h t on the use of a r m o r e d forces. In France, the t h e n obscure Colonel Charles DeGaulle published n u m e r o u s works on the subject, a n d American officers wrote thoughtful—if unrealizable, d u e to Depression Era b u d g e t constraints—articles a b o u t c o m b i n e d a r m s mobility tactics in U.S. Army professional military forums such as the Infantry Journal, the Cavalry Journal, a n d Military Review. 20

21

In Germany, military leaders a n d theorists debated the use of a r m o r e d forces, a n d a r m o r e d doctrine continually evolved prior to World War II. In 1929, o n e G e r m a n a u t h o r published an article in the Militär-Wochenblatt (Military Weekly) that concluded that the tank had three different missions. T h e first was as an infantry battering r a m d u r i n g a tactical b r e a k t h r o u g h . Next, they were required to suppress the enemy's artillery, a n d finally they were to penetrate deeply to block approaches, a n d to complete a strategic breakthrough. 22

16

SLEDGEHAMMERS

T h e G e r m a n A r m y Chief of Staff, Ludwig Beck, published a m o d e r n i z a t i o n plan in 1935 that outlined two different r e q u i r e m e n t s for tanks: frontally assaulting an evenly-matched o p p o n e n t a n d exploiting beyond the front line toward deep objectives. G u d e r i a n realized that tanks or infantry alone could n o t overcome a well-prepared e n e m y defensive sector and published an article in 1936 that focused on the c o m b i n a t i o n of infantry, artillery, air s u p p o r t , a n d a r m o r in offensive o p e r a t i o n s . 23

24

A similar idea of most theorists d u r i n g the inter-war period was the use of tanks in waves, first to overcome the enemy defensive line; then to engage the e n e m y artillery a n d defeat e n e m y counterattacks; a n d finally to exploit the p e n e t r a t i o n by seizing deep objectives. T h e t e r m s used a n d the n u m b e r of waves of tanks varied with the different authors, b u t the ideas for overcoming e n e m y defenses r e m a i n e d similar. A constant t h e m e was that tanks m u s t be concentrated a n d that each wave m u s t have a special, well-defined mission. T h e tasks associated with the first wave necessitated attacking u n d e r fire from artillery a n d antitank g u n s as well as being able to defeat enemy a r m o r e d counterattacks. Heavy tanks were to comprise the first wave a n d follow on waves consisted of m e d i u m a n d light tanks. 25

In 1937, Guderian, in Achtung-Panzer!, detailed the tactics a n d concepts of the e m p l o y m e n t a n d use of tanks in a future war. It was based u p o n historical analysis of World War I e m p l o y m e n t a n d m o d e r n weapons capabilities, a n d was the p r o d u c t of a long evolution of t h o u g h t that relied heavily on the w o r k of previous a r m o r theorists. Although it was n o t originally intended to serve as a tactical m a n u a l , it was widely read in the G e r m a n A r m y a n d r e m a i n e d the p r i m a r y and p r e e m i n e n t reference for e m p l o y m e n t of a r m o r e d forces in the G e r m a n military until the end of the w a r . 26

In it, G u d e r i a n established the principles of concentration applicable to all tanks regardless of size or mission. These principles stated that t a n k forces m u s t be concentrated a n d "deployed en masse in b o t h breadth a n d d e p t h . " He stated that "concentration of the available a r m o r e d forces will always be m o r e effective t h a n dispersing t h e m , irrespective of whether we are talking a b o u t a defensive or an offensive posture; a b r e a k t h r o u g h or an envelopment; a pursuit or a counterattack." 27

28

W h e n discussing heavy tanks, G u d e r i a n was prophetic in writing that "there will never be m a n y heavy tanks, a n d they will be used either independently or within the structure of the t a n k forces, according to the mission. They represent an extremely d a n g e r o u s threat a n d are not to be underestimated." G u d e r i a n included a whole chapter in his b o o k illustrating h o w he envisioned c o n d u c t i n g a b r e a k t h r o u g h of an e n e m y position with a r m o r e d forces. He emphasized the i n c o r p o r a t i o n of all a r m s t h r o u g h o u t the b r e a k t h r o u g h . 29

HEAVY TANK BATTALION OVERVIEW

17

Of p r i m a r y i m p o r t a n c e in assisting the heavy tanks were the engineers because they needed to locate a n d clear m i n e s a n d other obstacles so that the tanks were n o t disabled or u n d u l y delayed. T h e first adversaries that the heavy tanks had to defeat were the antitank guns in the defensive line. G u d e r i a n wrote that they could be defeated by direct fire; suppressed with artillery or machine gun fire; or blinded by s m o k e . The next goal of the heavy t a n k forces was the enemy's artillery, b u t Guderian theorized that the p e n e t r a t i o n of the infantry a n d a n t i t a n k - g u n defense would force the e n e m y to c o m m i t his o w n t a n k s . In stressing the importance of the tank battle, G u d e r i a n wrote: 30

31

The tank's m o s t dangerous e n e m y is a n o t h e r tank. If we are u n a b l e to defeat the e n e m y armor, the b r e a k t h r o u g h has as good as failed, for o u r infantry a n d artillery will be unable to make further progress. Everything comes d o w n to delaying the intervention of the e n e m y a n t i t a n k reserves a n d tanks, a n d getting in fast a n d deep into the zone of the hostile c o m m a n d centers a n d reserves with o u r o w n effective tank forces—and by "effective" we m e a n forces that are capable of waging a tank b a t t l e . 32

The lead tanks that were tasked to complete this tactical b r e a k t h r o u g h had to overcome a great deal of resistance, a n d G u d e r i a n theorized that the m a i n weapon on the g r o u n d for this mission was the heavy tank. He stressed that the most i m p o r t a n t priority of the entire b r e a k t h r o u g h battle was that of defeating the t a n k reserves. G u d e r i a n wrote that "if we fail to beat d o w n the enemy tank defenses a n d defeat the e n e m y tanks, the b r e a k t h r o u g h has failed, even if we m a n a g e to wreak s o m e destruction in the infantry battle z o n e . " 33

34

D u r i n g the war, the G e r m a n concepts b e h i n d this doctrine did n o t change drastically. Albert Kesselring, former s u p r e m e c o m m a n d e r of Axis forces in Italy, a n d M a x Simon, o n e - t i m e c o m m a n d i n g general of the 16th SS-PanzerGrenadier Division a n d XIII SS-Corps, wrote in 1952 that tanks attacked in several waves, with the distance between waves d e p e n d e n t u p o n the terrain a n d e n e m y fire. They stated: 33

T h e heavy tanks form the core of the spearhead a n d their m a i n objective is the e n e m y tanks a n d antitank guns that can be eliminated early by using the greater range a n d larger-caliber g u n of the heavy tanks. T h e mission of the first wave is to p e n e t r a t e into the enemy lines as deeply as possible while the second wave enlarges the penetration, never losing sight of the first wave in order to provide fire protection to that w a v e . 36

In clearly defining the i m p o r t a n c e of penetrating to engage a n d defeat the e n e m y armor, they stated, "It is n o t the mission of the tanks to entirely eliminate e n e m y pockets of resistance. That is the mission of the panzergrenadiers."

SLEDGEHAMMERS

18

(Panzergrenadiers could be m o t o r i z e d infantry, b o r n e in trucks, or a r m o r e d infantry, carried in a r m o r e d halftracks, d e p e n d i n g on the organization to which they b e l o n g e d . ) . " 37

G e r m a n d o c t r i n e d u r i n g this p e r i o d focused almost exclusively on t h e offensive. T h e defensive implications evident from the examples of the breakt h r o u g h battle are that a r m o r formations in the defense are to be held back to defeat any p e n e t r a t i o n s by e n e m y a r m o r e d f o r m a t i o n s . Albert Kesselring a n d Max Simon also w r o t e o n e p a r a g r a p h in their m a n ual on the e m p l o y m e n t of a r m o r e d forces in the defense. T h e y stated that a r m o r e d units "are used for defensive p u r p o s e s only in exceptional cases." Their mission consisted of being at the disposal of t h e mobile reserve of t h e higher c o m m a n d level to smash e n e m y b r e a k t h r o u g h s . These counterattacks were governed by the general attack principles. W h a t those specific attack principles were, they did not specify. O n e can a s s u m e that o n e of the u n d e r lying principles they h a d in m i n d was the e m p l o y m e n t of tanks en masse, attacking quickly to defeat that b r e a k t h r o u g h . T h e y a d d e d that crews a n d vehicles m u s t always be ready for action, that all counterattack routes m u s t be reconnoitered, m a r k e d a n d m a i n t a i n e d , a n d that t h e leaders of a r m o r e d forces m u s t be fully aware of t h e situation at the f r o n t . 38

39

Organization I n a m e m o dated 2 4 N o v e m b e r 1 9 3 8 , the C o m m a n d e r - i n - C h i e f o f the Army, General Walther von Brauchitsch, presented guidelines establishing a heavy t a n k c o m p a n y a n d assigning o n e to each panzer b r i g a d e . Inexplicably, in February 1 9 3 9 w h e n t h e G e r m a n A r m y General Staff outlined its plans for reorganization from light panzer divisions a n d panzer brigades to panzer divisions, it eliminated the heavy t a n k c o m p a n y a u t h o r i z a t i o n from t h e new p a n z er regiment o r g a n i z a t i o n . In a special reorganization, the A r m y General Staff a d d e d a m e d i u m tank c o m p a n y to the panzer regiment organization in September 1 9 3 9 . It was this panzer regiment a n d division organization that fought a n d w o n in Poland, France, a n d d u r i n g the early stages in t h e Soviet Union. Lacking a true heavy tank, the G e r m a n s used t h e Panzer IV with a lowvelocity 7 5 m m m a i n gun to fulfill the heavy t a n k role within these m e d i u m tank c o m p a n i e s t h r o u g h Poland, France, a n d d u r i n g O p e r a t i o n BARBAROSSA in June 1 9 4 1 . Until the G e r m a n a r m o r e d forces e n c o u n t e r e d Soviet heavy tanks, such as the KV I, KV II, a n d the T - 3 4 / 7 6 , the Panzer IV was sufficiently well a r m o r e d a n d a r m e d to meet the tactical d e m a n d s of a heavy t a n k . T h e appearance of the T - 3 4 / 7 6 specifically, greatly influenced a n d decisively accelerated G e r m a n heavy tank c o n s t r u c t i o n . T h e G e r m a n A r m y n e e d e d a 40

41

4 2

4 3

44

19

HEAVY TANK BATTALION OVERVIEW

heavy tank with m o r e a r m o r a n d a larger m a i n gun capable of p e n e t r a t i n g the sloped a r m o r of the T-34. While the A r m y o r d n a n c e d e p a r t m e n t was developing the heavy tank, the Army General Staff m a d e plans to field heavy t a n k companies w h e n p r o d u c tion began. Initially, the plan for the heavy tank c o m p a n y included three platoons, each with three Tigers, for a c o m p a n y total of nine heavy t a n k s . Until the spring of 1942, this plan included the heavy t a n k companies in the c u r r e n t panzer regiment organization within panzer divisions, a l t h o u g h a formal change to the organization was n o t m a d e . 43

After the a u t o m o t i v e design office of the Army o r d n a n c e d e p a r t m e n t finalized the Tiger a n d estimated p r o d u c t i o n figures, the A r m y General Staff realized that the Tiger could never be p r o d u c e d in sufficient q u a n t i t y to replace the Panzer IV on a one-for-one basis. T h e new t a n k also lacked the tactical mobility to be included in the panzer divisions. It was difficult to find a suitable place for the Tiger in the panzer divisions, a n d as a scarce resource, the Army General Staff decided to consolidate the available Tigers in i n d e p e n d e n t heavy tank battalions a n d employ t h e m where they were needed m o s t . T h e y t h o u g h t that in so doing, they could be m o s t economically employed directly u n d e r the c o m m a n d of an a r m y or corps h e a d q u a r t e r s . 46

47

48

On 16 F e b r u a r y 1942, the A r m y General Staff created the first two heavy tank c o m p a n i e s a n d subsequently assigned t h e m to the Heavy Tank Battalion 501. T h e first three heavy tank battalions, Heavy Tank Battalions 501, 502, a n d 503, were created in May 1942. 49

These units organized themselves based u p o n the c o n t e m p o r a r y w a r t i m e organizational table (in G e r m a n , die Kriegsstärkenachweisung, or K.St.N.). This table called for nine heavy tanks per company, consisting of three platoons with three tanks each. The heavy t a n k battalions received n e w guidance via an A r m y bulletin on 21 August 1942 to organize along the lines set forth in a n e w table of organization ( T / O ) . T h e new heavy t a n k c o m p a n i e s organized themselves in accordance with T / O 1176d, dated 15 August 1942. This c o m p a n y organization was k n o w n as "Heavy Tank C o m p a n y D" (hereafter referred to as the C o m p a n y Organization D) (see figure 1). T h e p r i m a r y difference between this organization a n d previous heavy t a n k c o m p a n i e s was that this organization authorized a mix of heavy a n d light tanks, with Tigers and Panzer IIIs—which were then the standard G e r m a n m e d i u m t a n k — b e i n g integrated within each platoon of the company. 50

51

This version of the heavy t a n k c o m p a n y lasted until the General Staff p u b lished a new T / O in May 1943. By that t i m e , the G e r m a n A r m y h a d e q u i p p e d and fielded five heavy t a n k battalions, with Heavy Tank Battalions 504 a n d 505 being created in December 1942 a n d January 1943, respectively. T h e leaders of these battalions e x p e r i m e n t e d a n d used almost every variation of C o m p a n y Organization D. S o m e companies changed their 52

20

SLEDGEHAMMERS

Company HQ 1 x Tiger 2 x Panzer Ills

Figure

1st Platoon

2nd Platoon

3rd Platoon

4th Platoon

2 x Tigers 2 x Panzer Ills

2 x Tigers 2 x Panzer Ills

2 x Tigers 2 x Panzer Ills

2 x Tigers 2 x Panzer IIIs

1. Heavy Tank Company, K.St.N. 1176d Dated 15 August 1942.

Source: Jentz, Tiger I and II, 2 5 - 2 6 .

o r g a n i z a t i o n i n t e r n a l l y t o f o r m t w o light a n d t w o heavy p l a t o o n s . Sometimes, c o m m a n d e r s organized their platoons so that each possessed a light section a n d a heavy section, while some had their sections within plat o o n s integrated with a Panzer III a n d a Tiger.

53

54

These internal reorganizations focused on finding the best c o m b i n a t i o n a n d organization to accomplish the missions assigned. All echelons of c o m m a n d granted great latitude to experiment to find a c o m b i n a t i o n of vehicles that worked best. Occasionally, s o m e c o m p a n i e s within the same battalion a n d s o m e platoons within the same c o m p a n y were organized differently. T h e p u r p o s e of mixing platoons a n d sections with Panzer IIIs a n d Tigers was for the m e d i u m tanks to provide the heavy tanks with close s u p p o r t against infantry and assist in destroying antitank guns threatening the T i g e r s . " T h e T / O did n o t specify which m o d e l of Panzer III was authorized for the heavy t a n k c o m p a n i e s . T h e heavy t a n k battalion was authorized three heavy tank companies, b u t because of a shortage of Tigers, no battalion ever fielded a third c o m p a n y of the C o m p a n y Organization D in c o m b a t . A h e a d q u a r t e r s c o m p a n y a n d a m a i n t e n a n c e company, along with the two heavy t a n k companies, completed the total organizational structure of the heavy t a n k battalion. T h e h e a d q u a r ters c o m p a n y was organized in accordance with T / O 1150d, dated 15 August 1942, thus keeping the " D " designation to the overall heavy t a n k battalion organization (see figure 2 ) . 5 6

T h e battalion "light platoon" was subordinated to the h e a d q u a r t e r s c o m pany, b u t presumably worked directly for the battalion c o m m a n d e r d u r i n g c o m b a t . T h e T / O for these platoons also failed to specify which m o d e l of Panzer III was authorized. This platoon could be used to reinforce the t a n k companies against infantry attacks or could be used to screen the battalion's flank. T h e focus on finding a m i x t u r e of vehicles a n d an organization that worked best seems to have c o n t i n u e d at the battalion level w h e n using the light plat o o n . Three of the first four battalions fielded, namely Heavy Tank Battalions

21

HEAVY TANK BATTALION OVERVIEW

Figure 2. Heavy Tank Battalion, Organization D, 1942-43. Sources: See G u d g i n , Tiger Tanks, 92; Jentz, Tiger I and II, 2 4 - 2 5 ; Schneider, Tigers in Combat

I, 79, 147, 228. Note: According to Jentz, the T / O authorized only five Panzer IIIs in the light platoon; it appears, however, that the light platoons were issued ten Panzer IIIs in every one of the first three heavy tank battalions.

501, 502, a n d 504, retained the light platoon u n d e r the control of the battalion as it was originally i n t e n d e d . Heavy Tank Battalion 503 formed a battalion light platoon consisting of five Panzer IIIs. T h e r e m a i n d e r of Heavy Tank Battalion 503's Panzer IIIs were allocated to the heavy tank companies, allowing each c o m p a n y to form a "heavy" platoon of three Tigers a n d o n e Panzer III, as well as a light p l a t o o n . T h e first five battalions created were fielded u n d e r the Battalion Organization D. These battalions fought in Tunisia against British and American forces, as well as in the Caucasus a n d in the vicinity of Leningrad against Soviet forces. These units' after-action reports indicated that the mix of m e d i u m a n d heavy tanks allowed these battalions a higher degree of flexibility. These reports also stated that the Panzer III did not have sufficient a r m o r to c o n d u c t offensive missions against prepared defensive positions with the Tiger. On 5 March 1943, the General Staff issued a new T / O for the heavy t a n k c o m p a n y a n d the heavy t a n k battalion. This new organization, T / O 1176e, 57

58

22

SLEDGEHAMMERS

formed a heavy t a n k c o m p a n y of 14 tanks, all Tigers (see figures 3 a n d 4). T h e n e w organizational structure reduced the n u m b e r of platoons within each c o m p a n y from four to three, and m a i n t a i n e d the n u m b e r of t a n k c o m p a n i e s authorized within the battalion at three.

Figure 3. Heavy Tank Company, k.St.n. 1176e, Dated 5 M a r c h 1943. Source: Jentz, Tiger I and II, 26.

Figure 4. Heavy Tank Battalion, Organization E, 5 M a r c h 1943. Note: There are several different versions of the battalion organization. This is probably due to the fact that w h e n one of the sub-units changed its T / O , the overall battalion w o u l d change also. Numerous small changes were made to the elements of the battalion w i t h i n the headquarters company and the supply company, creating different battalion T/Os. This makes it extremely difficult to identify a single battalion organization. Also, different pieces of equipment were issued to different battalions as they became available. For example, Heavy Tank Battalion SS-Heavy Tank Battalion 501's AA Platoon was issued w i t h the Wirbelwind ( " W h i r l w i n d " ) fully-tracked antiaircraft gun in lieu of the u n a r m o r e d , half-tracked Sd.Kfz. 7 / 1 . This was developed f r o m Wolfgang Schneider's Tigers in Combat 1, Thomas L. Jentz's Tiger I and II, and Peter Gudgin's The Tiger Tanks.

23

HEAVY TANK BATTALION OVERVIEW

The A r m y General Staff p l a n n e d to field all three authorized t a n k c o m p a nies, so the w o r k s h o p a n d h e a d q u a r t e r s c o m p a n i e s separated a n d increased in size. T h e w o r k s h o p c o m p a n y increased to three m a i n t e n a n c e p l a t o o n s a n d a recovery platoon. T h e n e w battalion organization also did away w i t h the light tank p l a t o o n within the battalion, b u t they gained an a b u n d a n c e of reconnaissance assets in return. This n e w organization a d d e d an a r m o r e d reconnaissance platoon, as well as a scout a n d engineer platoon. M o u n t e d in armored halftracks, the p r i m a r y mission of the a r m o r e d reconnaissance platoon was to reconnoiter to find the e n e m y or to provide Tiger c o m p a n i e s with early w a r n i n g of e n e m y attacks. T h e scout a n d engineer p l a t o o n assisted the a r m o r e d reconnaissance platoon in the mission, b u t was primarily i n t e n d e d to contribute to the t a n k c o m p a n i e s ' mobility. This former p l a t o o n was divided into four scout sections, each e q u i p p e d with wheeled a n d tracked motorcycles (an example of the latter is on page 1 4 3 ) , a n d three engineer sections m o u n t ed in halftracks. This p l a t o o n was capable of classifying a n d reinforcing bridges a n d was responsible for clearing m i n e s a n d other obstacles. With three heavy t a n k c o m p a n i e s a n d the battalion h e a d q u a r t e r s element, the n e w Battalion Organization E authorized 45 Tiger tanks for a heavy t a n k battalion. This was possible because of increased p r o d u c t i o n of the Tiger. W h e n the first battalions were fielded, the peak m o n t h l y o u t p u t goal was set at ten, b u t this was n o t m e t until August 1942. By M a r c h 1943, w h e n the n e w heavy t a n k battalion organization was published, the m o n t h l y o u t p u t h a d increased to over 75 per m o n t h a n d the n e w goal was increased to 125, even t h o u g h this w o u l d n o t be m e t until over a year later. 59

This increased Tiger p r o d u c t i o n allowed the G e r m a n a r m e d forces n o t only to field fully their existing heavy t a n k battalions, b u t also to field additional ones. On 8 M a y 1943, Heavy Tank Battalion 506 was created using the n e w heavy t a n k battalion organization. Three of the first five battalions created changed to the Organization E shortly after the n e w T / O was published. Two of these, Heavy Tank Battalion 503 a n d 505, were almost complete by the t i m e they fought in O p e r a t i o n Zitadelle in July 1943. T h e third battalion, Heavy Tank Battalion 502, changed to Organization E by the e n d of June 1943. In September 1943, three m o r e heavy t a n k battalions, Heavy Tank Battalions 507, 508, a n d 509, respectively, were created using this new organization. Also, d u r ing September 1943, the G e r m a n A r m y reestablished Heavy Tank Battalions 501 a n d 504 as Organization E battalions because they h a d b e e n destroyed, captured, or seriously reduced by c o m b a t losses. 60

In the spring of 1943, the G e r m a n A r m y created a heavy t a n k battalion for the elite Panzer-Grenadier Division Grossdeutschland. This battalion has the distinction of being the only heavy t a n k battalion assigned p e r m a n e n t l y to a division. T h e battalion was designated as the 3d Battalion of the division's panzer regiment. This battalion was organized u n d e r the Battalion 61

62

24

SLEDGEHAMMERS

Organization E a n d theoretically h a d 45 Tigers assigned to it, b u t because this u n i t was in almost continual c o m b a t from the day t h a t it was organized, it never reached its full s t r e n g t h . T h e last heavy t a n k battalion created on 6 June 1944 was Heavy Tank Battalion 510. This unit immediately deployed to a n d fought on the Eastern F r o n t . In addition to increasing the n u m b e r of a r m y heavy tank battalions, the G e r m a n s began organizing similar units in the Waffen-SS as well. These heavy t a n k battalions were developed from the heavy t a n k companies that were already formed a n d fighting with units like the Leibstandarte, Das Reich, a n d Totenkopf. On 22 O c t o b e r 1943, SS Heavy Tank Battalions 101 a n d 102 were created, b u t they were n o t fully fielded a n d c o m b a t capable until April a n d May 1944, respectively. T h e third a n d last SS heavy t a n k battalion, 103, was created on 1 N o v e m b e r 1943. Tiger p r o d u c t i o n did n o t meet the r e q u i r e m e n t s of the G e r m a n military, so the battalion never reached full strength a n d only fought in the last battles of the war. 63

64

63

66

All of the SS heavy t a n k battalions eventually changed their designations to 5 0 1 , 502, a n d 503. This led to s o m e confusion that also caused the a r m y to change the u n i t n u m b e r s for their first three heavy t a n k battalions. T h e prim a r y difference between the SS heavy t a n k battalions a n d the a r m y ones was the fact that the SS units were assigned directly a n d p e r m a n e n t l y to a corps. For instance, SS-Heavy Tank Battalion 501 was assigned to I SS-Panzer Corps. 67

T h e final variation of the a r m y heavy t a n k battalions was the inclusion of Heavy Tank Battalion 503 into the Panzer C o r p s "Feldherrnhalle" on 19 D e c e m b e r 1944. This was similar to the Waffen-SS heavy t a n k battalions because the u n i t was an integrated a n d p e r m a n e n t part of the corps. Officially, the battalion's n a m e changed to Heavy Tank Battalion "Feldherrnhalle" or (FHH), b u t because the n a m e implied close association with the Nazi party, the u n i t m a i n t a i n e d the designation " 5 0 3 " t h r o u g h o u t the w a r . 68

69

W h e n the first King Tiger was p r o d u c e d in N o v e m b e r 1943, the General Staff issued a new T / O for b o t h the h e a d q u a r t e r s element a n d the heavy t a n k company. The only change to the previous version of Organization E was that heavy t a n k companies a n d battalions were n o w authorized either the Tiger or the King Tiger t a n k . Ten heavy t a n k battalions received s o m e King Tigers before the war e n d e d . Of these, only six received the full c o m p l e m e n t of 45 that were a u t h o rized. These units continually rotated to different theaters a n d m o s t often received only a handful of King Tigers at a t i m e . This m e a n t that only a few heavy t a n k battalions ever fielded the full c o m p l e m e n t of 45 King Tigers at the same time. T h r o u g h o u t the war, heavy t a n k battalions were organized a n d e q u i p p e d using either the D or E organizational structures. T h e majority of the A r m y 70

71

72

25

HEAVY TANK BATTALION OVERVIEW

battalions, as A r m y level units, were employed by OKH. T h e Waffen-SS a n d several of the special a r m y battalions were treated differently a n d p e r m a n e n t ly assigned to particular h e a d q u a r t e r s , in m o s t cases to a corps. Units p r o duced successful results using b o t h organizations. Even t h o u g h Organization D allowed the heavy t a n k battalion to accomplish a wider variety of missions and gave it m o r e flexibility, the A r m y General Staff i m p l e m e n t e d Organization E for all heavy t a n k battalions. This organization, with p u r e Tiger c o m panies, was m o r e suited for fighting the b r e a k t h r o u g h battle.

Equipment The first m e n t i o n of a t a n k weighing m o r e t h a n 30 tons is included in a d o c trinal report p r o d u c e d in O c t o b e r 1935 by General Liese, Chief of the A r m y O r d n a n c e D e p a r t m e n t . He established the requirements for this vehicle as having a r m o r protection up to 20 millimeters thick a n d for it to be a r m e d with a 7 5 m m m a i n gun, m a k i n g it capable of defeating the French C h a r 2C, 3C, a n d D heavy t a n k s . The first r e q u i r e m e n t in m e e t i n g the design of the 30-ton t a n k was to build an engine capable of powering it. This initiated a p r o g r a m to build a high-performance engine with adequate horsepower for a vehicle of that weight. In consultation with the engine designer Dr. Karl Maybach, the a u t o m o t i v e design office of the A r m y O r d n a n c e D e p a r t m e n t d e t e r m i n e d that a 700horsepower engine was r e q u i r e d . T h e required vehicle changed n a m e s frequently. This was probably d u e to the c o n t i n u i n g doctrinal debate a b o u t h o w to employ a r m o r a n d what types of tanks s h o u l d be used for the different missions. In N o v e m b e r 1936, the A r m y O r d n a n c e D e p a r t m e n t requested that K r u p p create a conceptual design of the 30-ton tank. This t a n k was called an "Escort Tank (strengthened)," implying that it w o u l d escort lighter tanks. On 12 M a r c h 1937, the A r m y O r d n a n c e D e p a r t m e n t officially changed the n a m e to "Infantry Tank," which implied that it was i n t e n d e d to s u p p o r t the infantry. On 28 April 1937, the n a m e changed again to Durchbruchswagen ( " b r e a k t h r o u g h vehicle") or "D. W." This n a m e implied that a n e w tactical role was envisioned for these heavy tanks, n a m e l y that of breaching e n e m y defenses, in a fashion similar to Guderian's "first-wave" tanks. T h e D.W. u n d e r w e n t m a n y n a m e changes, b u t was finally called the Panzerkampfwagen ("armored c o m b a t vehicle") VI, or "Tiger." T h r o u g h o u t all of the n a m e a n d designation changes that followed, the designation "D. W." was r e t a i n e d . T h e entire heavy t a n k p r o g r a m soon came to be k n o w n as the "Tiger Program," however, a n d was assigned a high priority by the A r m y a n d Hitler. 73

74

75

76

26

SLEDGEHAMMERS

O n e of the m a i n reasons that the tank went t h r o u g h so m a n y different designations was that the A r m y O r d n a n c e D e p a r t m e n t kept s u b m i t t i n g n e w requirements for increasing the caliber of the m a i n gun. These r e q u i r e m e n t s were given the highest priority on 26 May 1941. On that day, a m e e t i n g took place at the Berghof in Berchtesgaden between Hitler, representatives of the a r m a m e n t s industry, a n d military e x p e r t s . D u r i n g this meeting, Hitler discussed the need for developing a n d fielding a heavy tank. He said, " T h e m a i n p o i n t is to create vehicles which, first, have greater penetrative capabilities against e n e m y tanks; second, which are m o r e strongly a r m o r e d t h a n previously; a n d third, which have a speed which does n o t fall short of 40 kilometers per h o u r . " 77

78

Several m o n t h s later, Hitler reduced the last r e q u i r e m e n t in favor of increased a r m o r a n d issued m o r e specific guidance. He praised the p e n e t r a tive capabilities of the antiaircraft gun k n o w n as the 8 8 m m Flak 41 L / 7 4 . He r e c o m m e n d e d that it be improved to enable it to p e n e t r a t e 100 millimeters of a r m o r at a range of 1,400 to 1,500 meters a n d be a d o p t e d as a Kampfwagen Kanone ( c o m b a t vehicle gun) or "KwK." Hitler also d e m a n d e d that the frontal a r m o r of future tanks be 100 millimeters thick a n d the sides 60 millimeters thick. 79

80

Two firms, Henschel a n d Porsche, c o m p e t e d for the design a n d developm e n t of the future heavy t a n k . These new r e q u i r e m e n t s forced the firms' respective design teams to increase their weight projections of the n e w heavy tank. Initially, Henschel focused on a c c o m m o d a t i n g the 7 5 m m g u n in their design a n d Porsche directed their efforts on installing the 8 8 m m m a i n gun in theirs. Ultimately, b o t h c o m p a n i e s a r m e d their tanks w i t h the 8 8 m m w e a p o n . Because weight projections for the t a n k increased to 45 tons, they b e c a m e k n o w n as VK 4 5 . 0 1 ( H ) a n d VK 4 5 . 0 1 ( P ) , for H e n s c h e l a n d Porsche respectively. 81

Despite all the changing r e q u i r e m e n t s a n d guidance, development was given a high priority after the invasion of Russia. Ultimately, the a u t o m o t i v e design office of the A r m y O r d n a n c e D e p a r t m e n t awarded Henschel the contract for the chassis a n d K r u p p the contract for the turret; together, these m a d e the Tiger (see table l ) . T h e Tiger was a heavy t a n k in b o t h weight a n d in doctrinal p u r p o s e . It weighed 57 tons a n d was a r m e d with the 8 8 m m KwK 36 L/56 gun, capable of p e n e t r a t i n g 100 millimeters of a r m o r at 1,000 meters using a Panzergranate 39 (PzGr. 39) projectile. This was a specially-designed a r m o r - p i e r c i n g r o u n d with a tungsten steel cap over an explosive filling. It also h a d p h o s p h o r u s paint on the nose, m a k i n g its ballistic track visible for adjusting subsequent shots (shells with this feature are called " t r a c e r s " ) . A l t h o u g h not widely available, a n o t h e r r o u n d , the PzGr. 40 a r m o r - p i e r c i n g projectile, with tungsten steel 82

8 3

84

27

HEAVY TANK BATTALION OVERVIEW WEIGHT:

56,000 KILOGRAMS (EARLY MODELS); 57,000 KILOGRAMS (LATE MODELS)

CREW:

5 MEN

ENGINE:

MAYBACH HL 2 1 0 P 45 - 1 2 CYLINDER / 600 HORSEPOWER (EARLY MODELS)

FUEL CAPACITY:

540 LITERS (IN FOUR FUEL TANKS)

MAYBACH HL 230 P 45 - 1 2 CYLINDER / 700 HORSEPOWER (LATE MODELS)

SPEED:

ROAD: 38 KILOMETERS/HOUR; CROSS-COUNTRY 10-20 KILOMETERS/HOUR

COMBAT RADIUS:

ROAD: 195 KILOMETERS; AVERAGE TERRAIN: 110 KILOMETERS

ARMAMENT:

ONE 88MM KwK 36 L/56 MAIN GUN 2 X 7.92MM MG 34S (EARLY MODELS) 3 X 7.92MM MG 34/42S (LATE MODELS)

AMMO:

88MM: 92 ROUNDS; 7.92 MM: 4,500-5,700 ROUNDS

ARMOR:

25MM-40MM (TOP) 80MM (SIDE AND REAR) 100MM-120MM (FRONT)

TABLE 1. Panzerkampfwagen VI Type E (Tiger) specifications. Source: Jentz and Doyle, Tiger Tanks, D. W. to Tiger I, 1 7 7 - 8 1 .

core with tracer, could penetrate 110 millimeters of a r m o r at 2,000 m e t e r s . The Tiger's p r i m a r y o p p o n e n t at the t i m e that it was fielded, the T-34/76, only had 4 5 m m of frontal a r m o r . T h e KV-1, however, an infrequent b u t m o r e formidable battlefield o p p o n e n t , h a d over 7 5 m m of frontal a r m o r . A l t h o u g h the Tiger's m a i n g u n could penetrate b o t h at ranges at which the Soviet tanks' 7 6 m m w e a p o n s could not p e n e t r a t e t h e Tiger's frontal a r m o r , t h e perform a n c e of t h e L/56 with the commonly-available PzGr. 39 r o u n d still fell well short of Hitler's stated r e q u i r e m e n t . 85

86

87

Even so, t h e 8 8 m m KwK 36 L/56, c o m b i n e d with the a r m o r of t h e Tiger, m a i n t a i n e d a standoff advantage over virtually all of their o p p o n e n t s t h r o u g h o u t t h e war. This m e a n t that for Allied tanks' guns to p e n e t r a t e a Tiger's a r m o r , they had to m a n e u v e r to a range that was well within t h e ability of t h e Tiger's m a i n g u n to p e n e t r a t e . This n o r m a l l y required m o v e m e n t — often, m u c h of it devoid of cover or concealment, over h u n d r e d s of meters of terrain, d u r i n g which the Allied vehicles were completely vulnerable to the Tigers' m a i n a r m a m e n t . D e v e l o p m e n t of the King Tiger was a c o n t i n u a t i o n of t h e heavy t a n k p r o g r a m . T h e King Tiger was developed because of the constant e m p h a s i s on a r m o r p e n e t r a t i o n capabilities a n d the desire to m o u n t t h e 8 8 m m Flak 41 L/74 g u n or s o m e t h i n g similar in a t a n k turret. Ultimately, K r u p p developed the 8 8 m m Kwk 43 L/71 gun that had similar penetrative capabilities to the 8 8 m m Flak 41 L/74 g u n . This gun was m o u n t e d on a chassis developed by Henschel, a n d w h e n m a t e d together, p r o d u c e d t h e King Tiger (see tables 2 a n d 88

28

SLEDGEHAMMERS

3). Various d e p a r t m e n t s a n d c o m p a n i e s t h r o u g h o u t G e r m a n y designated a n d called the King Tiger t a n k m a n y different things. Officially, the A r m y O r d n a n c e d e p a r t m e n t either called it the Tiger II or the Panzerkampfwagen Tiger Ausführung (Type) B, although a n u m b e r of other titles were used by the O r d n a n c e D e p a r t m e n t a n d o t h e r agencies t h r o u g h o u t the war. Using a PzGr. 39-1 r o u n d , the King Tiger's 8 8 m m gun could penetrate 148 millimeters of a r m o r at a range of 1,500 meters (see table 3). Using the rare PzGr. 40/43 r o u n d , it was capable of p e n e t r a t i n g 170 millimeters of a r m o r at 89

WEIGHT:

69,800 KILOGRAMS

CREW:

5 MEN

ENGINE:

MAYBACH HL 230 P 30 / 12-CYLMDER / 700 HORSEPOWER

SPEED:

ROAD: 38 KILOMETERS/HOUR: CROSS-COUNTRY: 15-20 KILOMETERS/HOUR

RANGE:

ROAD: 170 KILOMETERS; CROSS-COUNTRY: 120 KILOMETERS

FUEL CAPACITY:

860 LITERS

ARMAMENT:

88MM KWK43 L/71 AND 3 X 7.92MM MG 34742S;

AMMO:

88MM: 84 ROUNDS (68 STOWED, 16 LOOSE ON TURRET FLOOR);

(1 X MG - HULL); (1 X MG - COAXIAL); (1 X MG - CUPOLA) 7.92MM: 5,850 ROUNDS ARMOR:

40MM (TOP); 80MM (SIDE AND REAR); 150MM-180MM (FRONT)

Table 2. Panzerkampfwagen VI Type B ( K i n g Tiger) Specifications. Source: Jentz and Doyle, Tiger Tanks, vk45.02 to Tiger II, 152-65.

Tiger 1:88mm KwK 36 L/56

Tiger II: 88mm k w k 4 3 L/71

PZGR.39

PZGR.40

GR.39HL

PZGR.39/43

SHELL WEIGHT (KILOGRAMS)

10.2

7.3

7.65

10.2

7.3

INITIAL VELOCITY

773

930

600

1,000

1,130

PZGR.39

PZGR.40

GR.39HL

PZGR.39/43

120

170

90

202

PZGR.40/43 237

500 METERS

110

155

90

185

217

1,000 METERS

100

90

165

197

1,500 METERS

91 84

138 122

90

170

110

90

148 132

AMMUNITION TYPE

PZGR.40/43

(METERS/SECOND) PENETRATION CAPABILITY (MILLIMETERS) RANGE 100 METERS

2,000 METERS

152

Table 3. Tiger and K i n g Tiger M a i n G u n Comparison. Source: Jentz, Tiger I and II: Combat Tactics, 9. Note: Penetration capability was measured in millimeters of rolled homogeneous steel plates at a 30-degree angle of impact.

29

HEAVY TANK BATTALION OVERVIEW

that same range. This far exceeded the original r e q u i r e m e n t p u t forth by Hitler of p e n e t r a t i n g one h u n d r e d millimeters of a r m o r at a range of 1,400 to 1,500 meters. The King Tiger incorporated design a n d material elements, such as the engine, from the Panther t a n k . At almost 70 tons, the King Tiger was the heaviest t a n k of the war. (Although its t a n k destroyer variant, the Jagdtiger, or " H u n t i n g Tiger," was, a n d remains today, the heaviest a r m o r e d fighting vehicle to ever see action, at 79 tons.) T h e designs of the Tiger a n d King Tiger made t h e m formidable battlefield o p p o n e n t s . From the published histories of both Allied a n d Axis forces, very few Allied tankers willingly engaged in direct combat with a Tiger or King Tiger. If there were other options, such as bypassing their positions or employing artillery or tactical aircraft against the Tigers, these options were used first. 90

91

92

The Tiger a n d King Tiger also h a d a few weaknesses that b e c a m e evident in the defensive withdrawals after 1943. T h e complexity of the designs required extensive m a i n t e n a n c e to keep a Tiger or King Tiger operational. Their short radius of action was also a p r o b l e m . These two weaknesses caused severe logistical a n d m a i n t e n a n c e challenges which were particularly b u r d e n s o m e for G e r m a n y in the latter stages of the war. Given Germany's strategic situation a n d its chronic a n d worsening petroleum shortages, the fuel required for the Tiger a n d King Tiger was a major design weakness. This is clearly evident w h e n one considers that the Tiger had a m a x i m u m c o m b a t radius of 195 kilometers, b u t used 540 liters of fuel in the process. T h e King Tiger could m a n a g e only 170 kilometers on o n e 860-liter tank of gasoline. By c o m p a r i s o n , a T-34/76 could travel 455 kilometers using only 480 liters of fuel. 93

If a vehicle did break d o w n , was d a m a g e d in c o m b a t , or b e c a m e stuck, its weight a n d the absence of an adequate a r m o r e d recovery vehicle created a challenge in m a i n t a i n i n g a high operational rate. Generally, recovering a Tiger in the forward areas required towing it with at least o n e other Tiger, although this was officially forbidden. The w o r k s h o p c o m p a n y did have 18-ton halftrack tractors, b u t two of these were required to tow o n e Tiger. Additionally, if being towed over hilly terrain, a trail vehicle at least as large as a Panzer III was required to stabilize the Tiger so it did not b e c o m e u n m a n a g e a b l e . Beginning in 1944, heavy t a n k battalions started to receive s o m e a r m o r e d recovery vehicles, the Bergepanther, in addition to keeping the 18-ton halftrack tractors. T h e difficulties in recovering a d a m a g e d Tiger in c o m b a t usually resulted in it being a b a n d o n e d a n d destroyed by its crew. Ultimately, this was a devastating flaw that vastly reduced the n u m b e r of Tigers available to the G e r m a n a r m e d forces. 94

95

30

SLEDGEHAMMERS

Given that the Tiger battalions were assets of operational, if not strategic, value, they were shuffled from place to p l a c e — a n d even front to front—as a sort of "fire brigade." Long r o a d marches inflicted serious mechanical p r o b lems, a n d caused the Tigers to devour huge quantities of precious gasoline. T h u s , the preferred m e t h o d of m o v e m e n t across any great distance was rail. As the war went on, however, the G e r m a n rail net was increasingly disrupted by Allied strategic a n d even tactical air attack. Rail m o v e m e n t of Tigers, however, involved even m o r e difficulty, because special cars were required to t r a n s p o r t Tigers. This limited the G e r m a n s ' ability to transfer heavy t a n k battalions from o n e sector to a n o t h e r w i t h o u t a great deal of lead time a n d careful coordination. Even with the special rail cars, Tigers a n d King Tigers h a d to remove their c o m b a t tracks a n d replace t h e m with special, smaller ones to avoid excessive overhang w h e n in transit. Beyond the great additional effort by the c r e w m e n that it u n d o u b t e d l y required, such a changeout process t o o k even m o r e time away from the Tiger's c o m b a t role. Also, it i m p a r t e d a heavy logistical b u r d e n on the units, as they had to essentially m a i n t a i n two sets of track for every vehicle to enable rail m o v e m e n t . 96

A n o t h e r major weakness of b o t h vehicles was the p r o d u c t i o n costs in t e r m s of labor, time, a n d material. A Tiger cost 800,000 Reichsmarks a n d required 300,000 m a n - h o u r s to p r o d u c e . In an a t t e m p t to m a k e those n u m b e r s m o r e personal to the Tiger c r e w m e n , the Tiger Handbook, a h a n d b o o k p r o d u c e d by the Inspector of Panzer Troops, stated that it required o n e week of h a r d w o r k from 6,000 people to p r o d u c e one Tiger. It also stated that the 800,000 Reichsmarks was equivalent to the weekly wages for 30,000 p e o p l e . 97

98

99

Because G e r m a n y essentially controlled or h a d access to almost the entire c o n t i n e n t of Europe, these high resource costs probably were not d e t r i m e n t a l in 1942 w h e n Tiger p r o d u c t i o n first began. T h e t i m e required to p r o d u c e a Tiger was an i n p u t that the G e r m a n s could n o t overcome, regardless of m a t e rial resource availability. In the end, the c o m b i n a t i o n of dwindling resources a n d a very labor-intensive tank, m a d e mass p r o d u c t i o n difficult. This m e a n t that G e r m a n y p r o d u c e d only 1,348 Tigers a n d fewer t h a n 500 King Tigers t h r o u g h o u t World War I I . 100

Personnel T h e personnel of the heavy tank battalions c a m e from m a n y sources. O n e of the p r i m a r y sources was from experienced units that h a d fought in Poland, France, a n d Russia. A n o t h e r source was from Heavy Panzer Replacement a n d Training Battalion 500, established at P a d e r b o r n , G e r m a n y in early 1 9 4 2 . From the creation of Heavy Tank Battalion 503 on, s o m e of the personnel 101

31

HEAVY TANK BATTALION OVERVIEW

required for these units came from r e m n a n t s of t a n k units destroyed in c o m bat or tank units that h a d rotated back to G e r m a n y or France to reequip. In some instances, an existing battalion was ordered to convert itself into a heavy t a n k battalion. T h e 3d Battalion of Panzer Regiment 33, 9th Panzer Division, for example, became Heavy Tank Battalion 506 on 20 July 1943. This unit h a d been in c o m b a t in France a n d in Russia since the b e g i n n i n g of that campaign. Similarly, Veteran elements of Panzer Regiment 4 from the 13th Panzer Division b e c a m e Heavy Tank Battalion 507. T h e 1st Battalion, Panzer Regiment 29 from the 12th Panzer Division b e c a m e Heavy Tank Battalion 5 0 8 . It h a d served in Russia since the s u m m e r of 1941. 102

Because of a shortage of Tigers, training was c o n d u c t e d m a i n l y on Panzer IV tanks at P a d e r b o r n . The recruits assigned as replacements for heavy t a n k battalions were almost exclusively volunteers between 17 a n d 18 years o l d . The heavy t a n k battalions benefited from receiving veteran personnel, although replacements later in the war were y o u n g a n d inexperienced. T h e practice of converting entire combat-experienced units to n e w heavy t a n k battalions m u s t have increased their m o r a l e , esprit de corps, a n d cohesion. Also, because the Tiger a n d King Tiger were very survivable vehicles, these battalions benefited by retaining those experienced crews, even in instances where the t a n k was lost. 103

Tactics The first three heavy t a n k battalions received little guidance on h o w to accomplish their missions. T h e y were given a copy of m e m o r a n d u m N u m b e r 87/42 from the General der Schnellen Truppen (General of "Fast," or A r m o r e d a n d Motorized Troops) dated 10 February 1942. This m e m o r a n d u m provided only general statements on capabilities, a n d did n o t provide details of tactical employment. The Organization D companies a n d battalions, which integrated Panzer IIIs a n d Tigers into the same units, a d h e r e d to the following general tactical employment: In the attack, the role of the Tiger is that of s u p p o r t i n g the lighter tanks by fire; the latter leads, followed by the heavier Tigers, and, w h e n contact with the e n e m y a r m o r is m a d e , the screen of lighter tanks deploys o u t ward to the flanks, leaving the Tigers to engage frontally. In defense, the Tiger is usually sited in a covered a n d defiladed position. T h e lighter tanks watch the flanks of positions occupied by the T i g e r s . 104

32

SLEDGEHAMMERS

T h e first battalions were generally left to experiment a n d report back to the A r m y General Staff to develop further doctrine. By 20 May 1943, the G e r m a n A r m y published tactical m a n u a l s for the e m p l o y m e n t of the heavy t a n k c o m p a n y a n d the heavy t a n k battalion. The m a n u a l for the training a n d e m p l o y m e n t of the heavy t a n k c o m p a n y established four p r i m a r y capabilities or missions. They were: (1) to attack in the first wave against strong defenses, (2) to destroy heavy e n e m y tanks a n d other a r m o r e d targets at long ranges, (3) to decisively defeat the e n e m y defenses, a n d (4) to break t h r o u g h positions reinforced by defensive w o r k s . 105

106

T h e first half of the c o m p a n y m a n u a l contained sections on the organization of the heavy t a n k company, as well as basic g u n n e r y principles of the Tiger tank. T h e second half contained sections on the p l a t o o n a n d c o m p a n y that established basic tactical guidance a n d outlined c o m b a t formations for b o t h the platoon a n d the company. T h e four formations available to the plat o o n were the c o l u m n , line, d o u b l e c o l u m n (or box), a n d wedge. T h e m a n u a l stated that the wedge formation was preferred d u r i n g the attack. T h e four formations available to the c o m p a n y were the c o l u m n (with the three plat o o n s in c o l u m n abreast), the double c o l u m n (with the platoons in two c o l u m n s ) , wedge (with one p l a t o o n forward a n d two platoons following), a n d the b r o a d wedge (with two platoons forward a n d o n e p l a t o o n f o l l o w i n g ) . T h e m a n u a l stated that the b r o a d wedge was the m o s t useful attack formation a n d w h e n the c o m p a n y deployed in this formation, it occupied an area 700 meters wide a n d 400 meters d e e p . 107

108

109

T h e m a n u a l provided guidance to overcome the large fuel c o n s u m p t i o n of the Tiger by stating that "after leaving the assembly area it is often necessary to take a short halt within o u r o w n lines to again refuel to be able to totally exploit the small radius of action in e n e m y territory." 110

T h e c o m p a n y m a n u a l placed emphasis on tank-versus-tank c o m b a t by including an entire subsection addressing it. It stated that "the m o s t i m p o r t a n t task of the heavy t a n k c o m p a n y is the engagement of e n e m y tanks. It always has priority over every other a s s i g n m e n t . " Emphasis on the offensive was evident by n o t i n g that the only reference that could even remotely be considered defensive in n a t u r e is the last sentence of the m a n u a l , which stated " k n o c k e d - o u t or immobilized e n e m y tanks are to be blown up d u r i n g retreats." 111

112

T h e m a n u a l for the heavy t a n k battalion was m u c h shorter t h a n the one for the heavy tank company. It contained only two sections covering (1) p u r p o s es, tasks, a n d organization; a n d (2) e m p l o y m e n t . Portions of the first section included doctrinal a n d tactical guidance such as: T h e weapons a n d a r m o r in c o m b i n a t i o n with the high maneuverability make the Tiger the strongest c o m b a t w e a p o n of the Panzerwaffe (Tank/

33

HEAVY TANK BATTALION OVERVIEW

A r m o r b r a n c h ) . T h e Tiger battalion is therefore a powerful, decisive point w e a p o n in the h a n d s of the t r o o p c o m m a n d e r . Its strength lies in concentrated, ruthlessly-conducted attacks. Each dispersion reduces its striking power. Basic preparations for e m p l o y m e n t at decisive locations guarantee great success. Tiger battalions are A r m y Troops. T h e y will be attached to o t h e r a r m o r e d units in the decisive p o i n t battle to force a decision. T h e y m a y n o t be used up too early from being employed for secondary tasks. T h e y are especially suited for fighting against heavy enemy t a n k forces a n d m u s t seek this battle. T h e destruction of e n e m y tanks creates the prerequisite for the successful a c c o m p l i s h m e n t of the tasks assigned to o u r o w n lighter tanks. It is forbidden to assign the Tigers missions that can be accomplished by the lighter tanks or assault guns. In the same way, they are n o t to be e n t r u s t e d with reconnaissance or security m i s s i o n s . 113

T h e focus was on defeating e n e m y tanks, a n d the guidance was fairly clear that the heavy t a n k battalions should n o t be assigned missions that did n o t involve the destruction of e n e m y t a n k formations. The entire heavy t a n k battalion m a n u a l was surprisingly general a n d did not focus solely on offensive missions like the heavy tank c o m p a n y m a n u a l did. Instead of purely offensive words like "breakthrough," the m a n u a l used terms like "decisive p o i n t " a n d "decisive action." An interesting c o m m e n t , considering the Tiger's extremely limited radius of action, mechanical unreliability, a n d lack of mobility, was that "the Tiger is especially suitable for p u r suit." It c o n t i n u e d by stating that " p r e p l a n n e d scouting a n d early stockpiling of fuel a n d a m m u n i t i o n are the prerequisites for t h i s . " 114

115

Worthy of n o t e for its absence was the lack of any section in the heavy t a n k battalion m a n u a l regarding formations for tactical m o v e m e n t of the entire battalion together. There were several p a r a g r a p h s that discussed the employm e n t of s o m e of the separate platoons of the battalion. These statements were very general a n d did little to provide real guidance to the battalion c o m m a n der; for example, "the a r m o r e d reconnaissance platoon is to be sent in by the battalion c o m m a n d e r for c o m b a t reconnaissance" was the total a m o u n t of guidance for e m p l o y m e n t of that p l a t o o n . Similarly vague a n d obvious guidance of "timely deployment . . . a n d close cooperation with these (the engineer p l a t o o n ) to d e t e r m i n e a n d clear m i n e s a n d obstacles are necessary" was included for the engineer p l a t o o n . 116

117

T h e General Inspector of A r m o r e d Troops published an instruction p a m phlet for a r m y - a n d corps-level c o m m a n d e r s to guide t h e m in the correct e m p l o y m e n t of the heavy tank battalion. T h e p a m p h l e t , organized into 25 points, stated vaguely that all guidance was based u p o n the characteristics of the Tiger a n d the p u r p o s e for which it was created. Optimistically, the

34

SLEDGEHAMMERS

p a m p h l e t went on to say that "operations with this o u t s t a n d i n g special w e a p o n promise success if the following 25 points are observed." Because the Tiger h a d a limited radius of action a n d required a great deal of m a i n t e nance, the p a m p h l e t included the following guidance: 118

1. Close liaison of Tiger c o m m a n d e r with the operationally-responsible c o m m a n d h e a d q u a r t e r s [is necessary]. Reason: Long-range disposition is indispensable to the Tiger units. All pre-operation p r e p a r a t i o n s (reconnaissance a n d supply) require m o r e t i m e t h a n with other weapons. 2. Issue orders for m o v e m e n t or action to Tiger c o m m a n d e r s as early as possible. Reason: As in l . 119

This p a m p h l e t emphasized the i m p o r t a n c e of this u n i t in the b r e a k t h r o u g h a n d it provided guidance to keep the heavy t a n k battalion informed of its mission. T h e p a m p h l e t also discussed the concept of b r e a k t h r o u g h by the heavy t a n k battalion a n d exploitation by lighter, faster forces in the following waves. 3. As a general principle, issue orders to the Tiger c o m m a n d e r s first. Reason: T h e Tiger is the carrier of the b r e a k t h r o u g h . They are to be incorporated in the first strike at the p o i n t of m a i n effort. 4. Never place a Tiger unit u n d e r the c o m m a n d of an infantry division in an attack. Reason: In difficult situations contact breaks d o w n between division a n d battalion. T h e infantry division lacks t r o o p s which, on the basis of their e q u i p m e n t a n d experience, can fight with a n d keep pace with the Tigers. In m o s t cases the Tigers' success c a n n o t be exploited by the infantry a n d the c o n q u e r e d territory cannot be held. 1 1 . As a general principle, employ the Tiger unit in c o o r d i n a t i o n with other weapons. Reason: Following the p e n e t r a t i o n , it is the Tiger's task to p u s h t h r o u g h to the e n e m y artillery a n d smash it. All o t h e r weapons m u s t s u p p o r t t h e m toward reaching this objective. Simultaneously, light tanks a n d assault guns are to s m a s h the enemy's heavy infantry w e a p o n s a n d antitank guns. O u r o w n artillery suppresses the e n e m y artillery a n d covers the flanks. Panzergrenadiers follow m o u n t e d on the tanks and occupy the c o n q u e r e d territory. T h e y protect the Tigers against close-in attack by e n e m y infantry. Light tanks exploit the success and expand the tactical p e n e t r a t i o n into a strategic b r e a k t h r o u g h . 120

35

HEAVY TANK BATTALION OVERVIEW

In keeping with the G e r m a n Army's concept for the e m p l o y m e n t of tanks formulated by G u d e r i a n , the p a m p h l e t discussed the need to concentrate the battalion to achieve its mission. 10. T h e Tiger u n i t m u s t be the c o m m a n d e r ' s m a i n w e a p o n for the decisive action. Reason: C o n c e n t r a t e d e m p l o y m e n t of the Tiger unit at the p o i n t of m a i n effort forces the success. Any dispersal of forces places it in question. 121

The a u t h o r s of the p a m p h l e t realized the Tiger's deficiencies a n d weaknesses, including its weight, which limited the bridges it could use; a n d its h i g h - m a i n t e n a n c e requirements. Because of these weaknesses, regarding movement, the p a m p h l e t stated: 5. As m u c h as possible allow the Tigers to move alone. Reason: T h e stress on the a u t o m o t i v e parts of the Tiger are least w h e n it is given the o p p o r t u n i t y to drive quickly w i t h o u t changing gears, braking, a n d restarting. T h e Tiger also disturbs the m o v e m e n t of other units. Bottlenecks, bridges, a n d fords often present surprises for the Tigers t h r o u g h which traffic can b e c o m e completely blocked. 7. Do n o t request forced marches. Reason: T h e result will be high wear on the engine, transmission, a n d r u n n i n g gear. T h e Tiger's c o m b a t capability will thus be used up on the road a n d n o t in action. The average speed for a Tiger unit is ten kilometers per hour by day and seven kilometers per hour by night. [Italics by the editor] 8. Have tanks travel as little as possible. Reason: D u r i n g m o v e m e n t s the great weight of the Tiger results in considerable material wear. 2 4 . Following p r o l o n g e d action, allow the Tiger battalion two to three weeks to restore its fighting power. Reason: Otherwise the percentage of technical b r e a k d o w n s will climb increasingly in subsequent o p e r a t i o n s . 122

As with other doctrinal guidance, this p a m p h l e t focused on offensive operations, b u t did provide s o m e guidance relevant to defensive o p e r a t i o n s . T h e focus of the p a m p h l e t was on the c o n c e n t r a t i o n of all tanks in the decisive action. This could be adapted to offensive b r e a k t h r o u g h s or to mobile c o u n terattacks c o n d u c t e d while in an overall defensive posture. T h e sections on m o v e m e n t and m a i n t e n a n c e are i m p o r t a n t w h e n considering using the heavy t a n k battalion as a mobile reserve in the defense. W i t h

36

SLEDGEHAMMERS

the high m a i n t e n a n c e r e q u i r e m e n t s of the heavy t a n k battalion, positioning it as a mobile reserve was very i m p o r t a n t so it could c o u n t e r e n e m y penetrations of the defensive line with the least a m o u n t of m o v e m e n t . This was especially t r u e across the vast distances of the Eastern Front.

Summary Based on the published G e r m a n doctrine a n d the Tiger p r o g r a m guidance, the heavy t a n k battalion was f o r m e d with the p r i m a r y focus of killing tanks. G e r m a n doctrine envisioned a decisive t a n k battle once a penetration of the initial defensive line h a d b e e n m a d e . T h e heavy t a n k battalion was developed a n d fielded to fight that decisive t a n k battle. Originally, it was intended to fight that battle on the offensive d u r i n g b r e a k t h r o u g h operations, b u t it was also capable of fighting in a defensive posture by counterattacking e n e m y a r m o r p e n e t r a t i o n s as a mobile reserve. However, it was fully recognized that Tiger battalions' mobility was extremely limited; its mobility was barely 50 percent greater t h a n a foot-borne infantry battalion by day, a n d a b o u t the same as an infantry battalion by night. A t t e m p t s to move faster t h a n t h i s — o r to move a great deal, at any speed—were sure to cause serious m a i n t e n a n c e problems. These were indeed harbingers of things to c o m e w h e n Tiger battalions were c o m m i t t e d to battle against mobile a n d agile f o e s . . . .

Chapter 3

Growing Pains and Adaptation The e n e m y doesn't have anything to o p p o s e us of equal value to the Tiger. N o t m o r e t h a n four Tigers were in operation at the same time. In o p e n terrain these few Tigers totally d o m i n a t e d the battlefield. 1

Report by H e a d q u a r t e r s , G e r m a n 18th Army, 2 April 1943 From May 1942 until the Battle of Kursk in July 1943, the G e r m a n A r m y created a n d fielded five heavy t a n k battalions. T h e initial c o m b a t actions involved Heavy Tank Battalion 502 in August 1942. T h e y attacked as p a r t of Army G r o u p N o r t h in the vicinity of Leningrad. O n e c o m p a n y of Heavy Tank Battalion 504 a n d all of Heavy Tank Battalion 501 fought in Tunisia from N o v e m b e r 1942 until the s u r r e n d e r of G e r m a n forces in May 1943. The deteriorating tactical situation for the G e r m a n s in both theaters caused these battalions to be i n t r o d u c e d piecemeal into battle as their platoons a n d c o m p a n i e s arrived. 2

Heavy Tank Battalion 503 participated as p a r t of A r m y G r o u p D o n in attempting to stop the Soviet advance following the encirclement of the G e r m a n 6th A r m y a r o u n d Stalingrad. D u r i n g O p e r a t i o n Zitadelle (the G e r m a n offensive near Kursk in the s u m m e r of 1943), OKH c o m m i t t e d the only two fully-operational heavy t a n k battalions. These were Heavy Tank Battalions 503 a n d 505, which were the only heavy t a n k battalions remaining (Heavy Tank Battalions 501 a n d 504 h a d been destroyed or c a p t u r e d in Tunisia a n d Sicily a n d were being rebuilt in Germany). At the same time, Heavy Tank Battalion 502 h a d only o n e u n d e r s t r e n g t h c o m p a n y serving with A r m y G r o u p N o r t h . Until O p e r a t i o n Zitadelle, the G e r m a n A r m y only employed Tigers in small n u m b e r s . These were usually cross-attached with other units e q u i p p e d with other t a n k types a n d other a r m s . Prior to Kursk, moreover, they were never employed for the specific p u r pose of creating a b r e a k t h r o u g h to facilitate operational-level exploitation by other units. 3

4

37

38

SLEDGEHAMMERS

Heavy Tank Battalion 502 with Army Group North In the s u m m e r of 1942, Hitler ordered the first c o m p a n y of Heavy Tank Battalion 502, assigned to A r m y G r o u p N o r t h , to s u p p o r t the attack on Leningrad. This company, along with elements of the w o r k s h o p c o m p a n y and battalion headquarters, c o n d u c t e d c o m b a t operations in the vicinity of Leningrad starting at the end of September 1942. The 2d C o m p a n y of this battalion wasn't formed until later, a n d in an attempt to stabilize the front after the Soviet encirclement of Stalingrad, OKH attached t h e m to A r m y G r o u p D o n in early 1943. T h e 1st C o m p a n y of Heavy Tank Battalion 502 fought in the vicinity of Leningrad with A r m y G r o u p N o r t h until the battalion was reunited in the s u m m e r of 1943 after having b e e n refitted in accordance with Organization E. 3

6

A vast a m o u n t of literature exists concerning the initial e m p l o y m e n t of Tigers in the vicinity of Leningrad. In this literature, there are m a n y different versions of the events, dates, a n d c o m b a t venues of Heavy Tank Battalion 502. A c o m m o n t h e m e in all accounts, however, is a degree of criticism a b o u t the e m p l o y m e n t of heavy tanks in s w a m p y terrain that did n o t allow m u c h offr o a d m o v e m e n t . G u d e r i a n s u m m a r i z e d the lessons learned from the employm e n t of this c o m p a n y with A r m y G r o u p N o r t h in Panzer Leader: He [Hitler] was c o n s u m e d by his desire to t r y his n e w w e a p o n . He therefore ordered that the Tigers be c o m m i t t e d in a quite secondary o p e r a tion, in a limited attack carried o u t in terrain that was utterly unsuitable, for in the s w a m p y forest near Leningrad heavy tanks could only move in single file along the forest tracks, which, of course, was exactly where the e n e m y antitank guns were posted, waiting for t h e m . T h e results were n o t only heavy, unnecessary casualties, b u t also the loss of secrecy a n d of the element of surprise for future o p e r a t i o n s . 7

D u r i n g this initial attack, all of the Tigers received s o m e damage, a n d the Soviets captured o n e Tiger. Even t h o u g h the Tiger was superior to any Soviet t a n k at that time, several subsequent attacks achieved similar results because the Soviets positioned antitank guns in d e p t h along the few roads in the area. T h e capture of the single Tiger h a d some l o n g - t e r m a n d detrimental consequences for the G e r m a n s . T h e Soviets evaluated the Tiger, d e t e r m i n i n g its strengths a n d weaknesses, a n d took steps to develop vehicles to counter the design. T h e testing a n d evaluation of the Tiger, a n d the consequent developm e n t a n d fielding of n e w Soviet vehicles was accomplished in an amazingly short time, although these n e w vehicles did n o t see service in great n u m b e r s until the Battle of Kursk in the s u m m e r of 1943.

39

GROWING PAINS AND ADAPTATION

During the next year, the Soviets l a u n c h e d several major attacks that forced the G e r m a n s o n t o the defensive in this sector. T h e s w a m p y terrain that restricted heavy vehicle m o v e m e n t enabled this c o m p a n y to provide excellent defensive s u p p o r t t h r o u g h o u t the sector. T h e Soviets did n o t possess a t a n k or armored vehicle capable of defeating the Tigers, except at close range, so the Tigers d o m i n a t e d the battlefield in this e n v i r o n m e n t . F r o m 12 January to 31 March 1943, this c o m p a n y destroyed 160 Soviet tanks while losing only six Tigers, establishing a kill ratio of 26.7 to l . 8

9

As with m o s t similar units, Heavy Tank Battalion 502 suffered from inadequate recovery assets a n d a low operational-readiness rate a m o n g its Tigers. During this entire t w o - a n d - o n e - h a l f - m o n t h period, the unit never h a d m o r e than four operational Tigers o u t of an o n - h a n d strength that changed continually with losses a n d replacements. T h e highest n u m b e r of Tigers on h a n d was thirteen on 20 February 1943 a n d the lowest n u m b e r on h a n d was two on 31 January 1 9 4 3 . T h r e e of the six Tigers lost were destroyed by their o w n crews; two of t h e m after they h a d b e c o m e stuck in a "peat-bog" a n d one because of mechanical failure. This may have been a result of the p o o r terrain, b u t adequate recovery assets m i g h t have c o m p e n s a t e d for s o m e of the losses. T h e unit's diary is filled with entries a b o u t pulling out "bogged" Tigers a n d there is one instance w h e r e the recovery t o o k three d a y s . 10

11

12

Heavy Tank Battalions in Tunisia After the British victory at El Alamein in the a u t u m n of 1942 a n d the Allied O p e r a t i o n T O R C H landings d u r i n g that same period, Panzerarmee Afrika was forced o n t o the defensive a n d w i t h d r e w t o w a r d ports in Tunisia. As a result of the emphasis placed u p o n this theater by Hitler, OKH ordered Heavy Tank Battalion 501 to N o r t h Africa. T h e first elements landed in Bizerte, Tunisia, on 23 N o v e m b e r 1942. Because of Allied pressure on the p o r t s a n d airfields in Tunisia, elements of the battalion formed p a r t of an ad h o c C o m b a t G r o u p immediately u p o n disembarkation, fighting their first action on 1 D e c e m b e r 1942. Heavy Tank Battalion 501 engaged in m i n o r counterattacks until 17 March 1943. This unit fought in m a n y small actions a n d s o m e large scale 13

attacks

such

as

Operations

Eilbote

(COURIER)

Frühlingswind

(SPRING

W I N D ) , AND Ochsenkopf ( O X H E A D ) . C o m b a t actions usually involved elements of the battalion no larger t h a n a company. O n e of the largest consolidated actions of the battalion occurred d u r i n g O p e r a t i o n Eilbote I, w h e n the battalion fielded 13 Tigers, although they were attached to two separate u n i t s . A n o t h e r large-scale e m p l o y m e n t of the entire battalion occurred 1 4

15

40

SLEDGEHAMMERS

d u r i n g O p e r a t i o n Ochsenkopf w h e n the battalion fielded 14 Tigers as p a r t of the 10th Panzer Division's Panzer Regiment 7, d u r i n g its attack toward Beja. Heavy Tank Battalion 501's first engagement was a r o u n d Tebourba in early D e c e m b e r 1942. Generalfeldmarschall Kesselring directed General der Panz e r t r u p p e n Walther N e h r i n g , c o m m a n d i n g the G e r m a n forces defending Tunis, to enlarge the G e r m a n l o d g m e n t in Tunisia. T h e m o s t i m m e d i a t e threat came from forces in the Tebourba area, which were a little m o r e t h a n 48 kilometers from the p r i m a r y G e r m a n p o r t of Bizerte a n d fewer t h a n 32 kilometers from Tunis. N e h r i n g , directed to seize the Tebourba Gap area, placed the o p e r a t i o n u n d e r Generalleutnant Wolfgang Fischer, w h o c o m m a n d e d the 10th Panzer Division. Elements of this division, along with Heavy Tank Battalion 501, were only b e g i n n i n g to arrive in theater, (see m a p 1) 16

17

Drawing on a wide variety of units, Fisher divided his force into four separate c o m b a t g r o u p s . T h e o p e r a t i o n called for attacks from three different directions using these four different forces. C o m b a t G r o u p Koch's mission was to fix Allied forces from the s o u t h by attacking El Bathan. Tanks from Heavy Tank Battalion 501 were divided between C o m b a t G r o u p s Lüder a n d Djedeida. C o m b a t G r o u p Lüder, n a m e d after the c o m m a n d e r of Heavy Tank Battalion 501, Major Lüder, was given the mission of attacking to the s o u t h to destroy the American a r m o r e d force at Chouigui, effectively blocking the r o a d t h r o u g h Chouigui Pass. After completing that task a n d in conjunction with C o m b a t G r o u p H u d e l , it was to m a n e u v e r s o u t h to attack Tebourba from the west. T h e soldiers of C o m b a t G r o u p Djedeida were to wait a n d p u r s u e Allied forces if they pulled back d u r i n g the operations n o r t h of Tebourba. 18

Early on 1 D e c e m b e r 1942, C o m b a t G r o u p s Lüder a n d H u d e l c o m b i n e d in their attack a n d successfully forced A m e r i c a n forces south. D u r i n g C o m b a t G r o u p Lüder's attack s o u t h of Chouigui, a counterattack by tanks of the British 17th/21st Lancers was defeated by the "longer-ranged g u n s " of the G e r m a n t a n k s . Five Crusader tanks were lost, a l t h o u g h it is uncertain w h e t h e r any of these were destroyed by elements of Heavy Tank Battalion 5 0 1 . This attack was stopped just n o r t h of the m a i n road, between the Tebourba G a p a n d Tebourba, by concentrated artillery fire. 19

2 0

Later that day C o m b a t G r o u p Djedeida attacked the Allied defenses on the ridge west of Djedeida. These were the closest Allied units to Tunis at the t i m e a n d w o u l d be the closest the Allies w o u l d c o m e to Tunis for several m o n t h s . According to a G e r m a n after-action report: T h e attack was carried forward against e n e m y tanks in the olive groves five kilometers west of Djedeida. T h e field of view a n d the field of fire were very limited in the thick olive groves. E n e m y tanks could only be fought at close r a n g e . . . . T h e Tigers were hit by General Lee tanks firing

Map 1: Heavy Tank Battalion 501, First A c t i o n s in Tunisia 1-3 December 1942 2 Hamp. = 2 n d Battalion, The Hampshire Regiment; 1 ES = 1st Battalion, The East Surrey Regiment; BF = Blade Force

42

SLEDGEHAMMERS

at a last was 150

range of 80 to 100 meters. This resulted in deep penetrations, b u t the ten millimeters of the side a r m o r held. This proved that the a r m o r e x c e l l e n t . . . . Two General Lee tanks were k n o c k e d o u t at a range of meters. 21

T h e report went on to state that other Allied tanks were destroyed by 8 8 m m antiaircraft guns, a n d that the r e m a i n i n g Allied vehicles pulled back. It is clear from reading U.S. a n d British sources, however, that the 2d Battalion, T h e H a m p s h i r e Regiment held the key terrain in the area at the end of the day a n d that the G e r m a n s m a d e little progress in the east d u r i n g 1 D e c e m b e r 1942. T h e attack in the east c o n t i n u e d with C o m b a t G r o u p Djedeida on 2 D e c e m b e r 1942. The 2d H a m p s h i r e s c o n t i n u e d to hold against this force, b u t was forced to w i t h d r a w to a n e w line of defense three kilometers to the west. D u r i n g this day's action, only o n e Tiger a n d three Panzer IIIs were operational in C o m b a t G r o u p Djedeida because o n e Tiger suffered engine failure on the previous day. Indicative of the ferocity of the day's fighting, all three Panzer IIIs were destroyed. 22

T h e U.S. 1st A r m o r e d Division's 1st Battalion, 13th A r m o r e d Regiment l a u n c h e d a strong counterattack using 30 Stuart light tanks a n d a c o m p a n y of M4 S h e r m a n m e d i u m s against the c o m b i n e d forces of C o m b a t G r o u p s Hudel a n d L ü d e r . Most of the vehicles of this American force were destroyed d u r ing the attack, with the elements of Heavy Tank Battalion 501 claiming to kill six of the very t h i n - s k i n n e d Stuarts. This ill-fated A m e r i c a n attack did, h o w ever, p r o d u c e the benefit of denying the G e r m a n c o m b a t groups in the west t h e o p p o r t u n i t y of c o n t i n u i n g their attack t o w a r d either Tebourba or the Tebourba Gap. 23

By 3 December, the G e r m a n s finally forced the withdrawal of Allied forces a r o u n d Tebourba. T h e single r e m a i n i n g operational Tiger of C o m b a t G r o u p Djedeida, along with two Panzer IIIs, assisted in eliminating s t u b b o r n British defenses on Hill 186. According to British sources, this single Tiger was apparently hit by a British 1 7 - p o u n d e r ( 7 6 m m ) antitank gun; although only d a m aged a n d n o t destroyed, it was sent back to the rear area for repairs. T h e r e m a i n i n g two Panzer IIIs from Heavy Tank Battalion 501 c o n t i n u e d to s u p p o r t the attack t h r o u g h o u t the day. After dark that evening, the r e m a i n i n g Allied forces began to w i t h d r a w to the west. A key avenue of retreat was sealed off w h e n C o m b a t G r o u p Koch, possibly s u p p o r t e d by several Tigers that had just arrived from the p o r t , c a p t u r e d the key t o w n a n d bridge at El B a t h a n . 24

T h r o u g h o u t three days of fighting, Allied forces lost a total of 55 tanks. Of these, elements of Heavy Tank Battalion 501 claimed the destruction of at least 1 5 . A l t h o u g h Heavy Tank Battalion 501 c o n t r i b u t e d ten or fewer tanks to the overall effort of all four c o m b a t groups, they destroyed 27 percent of the total achieved. This was an exceptional achievement, although 9 of the 15 25

26

43

GROWING PAINS AND ADAPTATION

destroyed e n e m y tanks were very poorly a r m e d ( 3 7 m m m a i n g u n ) a n d a r m o r e d Stuarts. On 10 D e c e m b e r 1942, Generalleutnant Fischer ordered elements of Panzer Regiment 7, s u p p o r t e d by a contingent of Heavy Tank Battalion 501's Tigers, to seize the t o w n of Medjez el Bab. This force, consisting of a b o u t 30 tanks, was part of a general attack a i m e d at e x p a n d i n g the G e r m a n bridgehead in Tunisia, a n d was in its fifth a n d final day. This attack was an e n v e l o p m e n t intended to seize Medjez el Bab, effectively t r a p p i n g Allied forces between Medjez el Bab a n d the Tebourba Gap. (see m a p 2) There was a heavy rain the previous night so vehicular o p e r a t i o n s were restricted primarily to the roads. S u p p o r t e d by three Tigers from Heavy Tank Battalion 5 0 1 , the envelopment was led by two of t h e m , with the third in reserve near the rear of the c o l u m n . This attack m e t with initial success, destroying ten Stuart light tanks a n d half-tracks of the U.S. 1st A r m o r e d Division's 1st Battalion, 1st A r m o r e d Regiment, forcing the r e m a i n d e r of the u n i t to w i t h d r a w to the w e s t . It was ultimately stopped by obstacles a n d heavy artillery fire from Free French forces three kilometers from Medjez el B a b . 27

28

29

C o m b a t C o m m a n d B of the 1st A r m o r e d Division tried to relieve pressure on Medjez el Bab by using elements of the 1st Battalion, 13th A r m o r e d Regiment, a n d C o m p a n y C, 701st Tank Destroyer Battalion in a flank attack from the n o r t h . T h e G e r m a n s , along w i t h at least two Tigers a n d several Panzer IIIs from Heavy Tank Battalion 5 0 1 , t u r n e d back to meet this n e w threat. Being c o m p o s e d primarily of Stuart light tanks, the A m e r i c a n force was no m a t c h against the Tigers. T h e official U.S. A r m y history states: 30

T h e A m e r i c a n light tanks were o u t g u n n e d by the e n e m y a n d m i r e d w h e n they m a n e u v e r e d off the road; 19 were lost. The t a n k destroyers claimed ten G e r m a n m e d i u m tanks knocked o u t before being p u t o u t of action themselves. 31

In a single day's combat, an attack led by a small element of Heavy Tank Battalion 501 destroyed 36 tanks, four a r m o r e d reconnaissance vehicles, two antitank guns, a n d other miscellaneous e q u i p m e n t . T h e three Tigers alone claimed 14 of the tanks destroyed, 38 percent of the total, d u r i n g the day a n d led the attacks t h r o u g h o u t the o p e r a t i o n . A l t h o u g h the attack did n o t capture the t o w n of Medjez el Bab, because of severe losses d u r i n g the day, the American c o m m a n d e r w i t h d r e w all forces to the west of the t o w n d u r i n g the night. It m u s t be r e m e m b e r e d , however, that the Tigers were primarily facing the least well-armed a n d a r m o r e d t a n k in the U.S. Army's inventory. For the next m o n t h , Heavy Tank Battalion 501 acted primarily as the reserve for Generaloberst Hans-Jürgen von Arnim's 5th Panzer Army, b u t did participate in s o m e operations with small elements of the battalion. T h e 2d 32

Map 2: Heavy Tank Battalion 5 0 1 , Attack Vicinity Medjez el Bab in Tunisia

10 December 1942

45

GROWING PAINS AND ADAPTATION

C o m p a n y finally arrived in Tunisia in early January 1943, just in t i m e to participate in O p e r a t i o n Eilbote I in the m i d d l e of that m o n t h . This o p e r a t i o n was the first t i m e that m o s t of the battalion participated in a single operat i o n . O p e r a t i o n Eilbote I was conceived of as a limited attack, m e a n t to p r o tect the lines of c o m m u n i c a t i o n from Tunis and Bizerte to R o m m e l ' s headquarters. Its objective was to p u s h back Allied forces threatening that line of c o m m u n i c a t i o n between Enfidaville a n d Sousse. (see m a p 3) 3 3

34

35

Generalmajor Friedrich Weber, C o m m a n d i n g General of the 334th Infantry Division, was given c o m m a n d of the m a i n effort of the o p e r a t i o n . He organized his force in three c o m b a t g r o u p s . T h e first two were tasked with c o n d u c t i n g b r e a k t h r o u g h s of the e n e m y positions for exploitation by the third group. T h e third g r o u p was to exploit the b r e a k t h r o u g h by advancing to the west to complete the destruction of Allied units on the Eastern Dorsal hills. Elements of the 2d C o m p a n y , Heavy Tank Battalion 501 were ordered to s u p p o r t C o r p s G r o u p Weber in its attack to seize the high g r o u n d by the Kebir Reservoir (467) a n d the high p o i n t k n o w n as the Djebel M a n s o u r ( 6 7 5 ) . C o m b a t G r o u p Lüder, with the 1st C o m p a n y a n d the Engineer Platoon of Heavy Tank Battalion 5 0 1 , was to p u s h up the Kebir valley to the r o a d intersection at the southwest end of the reservoir, then swing s o u t h for a b o u t 20 kilometers to the Hir Moussa crossroads. After that, it was to t u r n east toward the K a r a c h o u m Gap. If possible, this g r o u p was also to secure the KairouanOusseltia r o a d that ran t h r o u g h the gap between Djebel Haifa (572) a n d Djebel Ousselat ( 8 8 7 ) . 36

37

38

C o m b a t G r o u p Weber broke t h r o u g h the defending French forces, o p e n i n g the way into the Kebir valley for C o m b a t G r o u p Lüder on 18 January 1943. D u r i n g this attack, the Tigers led b o t h p r o n g s of the attack a n d e n c o u n t e r e d a device for which they never really developed an effective c o u n t e r m e a s u r e t h r o u g h o u t the w a r — t h e land m i n e . As the unit after-action review stated: At 5:30 A.M., in close cooperation with 2d Battalion, M o u n t a i n Infantry Regiment 756, the Panzer-Kampftruppe [small, mobile, c o m b i n e d a r m s units] started engaging antitank guns a n d gun positions as well as b u n kers that were very cleverly built into the m o u n t a i n slopes. Toward 11:00 A.M., the left-hand Kampftrupp c a m e to a halt because a further advance on the m a i n road was prevented by a m i n e barrier watched over by heavy s u p p o r t i n g fire. It was cleared after employing an additional three Tigers a n d three Panzer IIIs as well as the a r m o r e d engineer p l a t o o n . . . . Losses were: o n e Tiger from destruction of the suspension c o m p o n e n t s a n d d a m a g e to the transmission caused by hits, o n e Tiger by a h u n g - u p transmission, a n d two Panzer IIIs d u e to hits on the suspension a n d driving o n t o m i n e s . 39

46

SLEDGEHAMMERS

Map 3: Heavy Tank Battalion 501 Attack During Operation EILBOTE, Tunisia, January 1943

47

GROWING PAINS AND ADAPTATION

The report stated that the engineer platoon cleared over 100 mines t h r o u g h o u t the day a n d that this was accomplished only t h r o u g h "the closest coordination a n d c o n t i n u o u s personal exchange of ideas with the infantry battalion c o m m a n d e r s . " C o m b a t G r o u p Lüder c o n t i n u e d the attack that same day, starting a r o u n d 2100 h o u r s . Against heavy resistance, and led by Tigers, this force reached its objective of the road b e n d southwest of the Kebir Reservoir a r o u n d m i d night. On 19 January, C o m b a t G r o u p Lüder c o n t i n u e d its attack to the south, c a p t u r i n g the key crossroads in the vicinity of El Glib. This attack was delayed by effective a n d extensive use of land mines, along with artillery a n d antitank fire, b u t the G e r m a n force m a n a g e d to seize its objective for the day. 40

41

The attack flowed s m o o t h l y forward after o p e n i n g a narrows that h a d been blocked by antitank guns a n d mines. T h e surprised o p p o n e n t found no t i m e for a serious a t t e m p t to effectively block the road. Resistance first increased in the afternoon. Two Tigers were immobilized by mines at a m i n e barrier guarded by antitank guns. A b o u t 25 guns (antitank a n d artillery) a n d 100 m o t o r vehicles of all types were destroyed or were ready for capture by following elements a n d a b o u t 100 prisoners b r o u g h t i n . 42

There were no recorded instances of the hull being penetrated, b u t the G e r m a n c o m b a t r e p o r t stated that "the effect of the mines on the Tigers is more or less heavy d a m a g e to the suspension, based on the type of m i n e . " 43

On 20 January, C o m b a t G r o u p Lüder completed its initial mission by attacking toward the K a r a c h o u m Gap, ultimately linking up with Italian forces attacking from the east. After regrouping, the attack r e s u m e d to the s o u t h a r o u n d 1700 h o u r s , c o n t i n u i n g with the help of a full m o o n until a r o u n d 0300 the next m o r n i n g . Allied forces were a d a p t i n g to the Tigers a n d taking into account their o w n weaknesses in a r m o r a n d strengths in t e r m s of artillery a n d mines. According to the G e r m a n s : 44

43

T h e o p p o n e n t very cleverly pulled back from ridge to ridge while laying n u m e r o u s m i n e barriers that he guarded with antitank guns a n d artillery. Often the last elements of the m o t o r i z e d m i n e layers were captured. The following c o m b a t m e t h o d s were employed: Two advance Tigers followed the a r m o r e d engineer platoon, followed by the rest of the tanks. If the first t a n k hit a m i n e barrier, all of the rest of the tanks i m m e diately drove right a n d left to build straight platoon fire fronts a n d s u p pressed the antitank guns a n d artillery by suddenly o p e n i n g fire. U n d e r this protective fire, the engineers cleared the barrier while halted on the road; the panzer-grenadier battalion provided flank security by firing from the vehicles. 46

48

SLEDGEHAMMERS

Amazingly, using the Tigers as m i n e detectors to locate the leading edge of minefields seems to have been the preferred technique because the mines "did n o t cause any substantial d a m a g e " b u t rather immobilized the Tigers, "even if only for a short t i m e . " T h e lesson, therefore, was that "the m o r e Tigers, the better the advance flows" w h e n facing extensive minefields. 47

48

On 21 a n d 22 January 1943, C o m b a t C o m m a n d B of the American 1st A r m o r e d Division c o n d u c t e d cautious counterattacks against C o m b a t G r o u p Lüder, which defended the Kairouan-Ousseltia road. T h r o u g h o u t these two days, Allied forces used extensive artillery a n d air s u p p o r t . O n e of the casualties from the heavy artillery was a Tiger that caught fire r e t u r n i n g to the rear. O p e r a t i o n Eilbote I was a costly success for the G e r m a n s . It succeeded in accomplishing all of its objectives and even c o n t i n u e d on, accomplishing the follow-on mission of attacking a n d seizing the Kairouan-Ousseltia road. T h e Tigers of Heavy Tank Battalion 501 led the attacks t h r o u g h o u t the operation, b u t paid a heavy price for it. For its efforts, Heavy Tank Battalion 501 claimed the destruction of only seven tanks a n d m o r e t h a n 30 guns, for the loss of four Tigers a n d at least two Panzer IIIs. T h e after-action r e p o r t indicated that the battalion's leadership was aware of the impact of mines a n d terrain on the Tigers: 49

On average three Tigers a n d eight to ten Panzer IIIs were operational each day d u r i n g this period. T h e stress of the previous marches t h r o u g h the m o u n t a i n s a n d the d a m a g e caused by m i n e s started to b e c o m e noticeable in the tanks. . . . T h e fact that only one Tiger o u t of nine was still fully operational a n d two or three others were conditionally operational at the end of the o p e r a t i o n should n o t be disregarded. 50

T h e m a i n t e n a n c e p r o b l e m was exacerbated by the fact that the battalion's m a i n t e n a n c e c o m p a n y a n d supply element still h a d n o t arrived in Tunisia. T h e 5th Panzer Army's attack against Sidi Bou Zid, designated O p e r a t i o n Frühlingswind, was placed u n d e r the direct c o m m a n d of General von Arnim's chief of staff, Generalleutnant Heinz Ziegler. This attack, c o n d u c t e d primarily by the 10th Panzer Division, was s u p p o r t e d by the 1st C o m p a n y of Heavy Tank Battalion 5 0 1 . T h e attacking forces were organized into three c o m b a t groups, (see m a p s 4 a n d 5) 51

C o m b a t G r o u p s G e r h a r d t a n d Reimann broke t h r o u g h the Faid Pass by 0600 on 14 February 1943, destroying C o m p a n y G of the American 1st A r m o r e d Regiment in the process. After traveling generally along the m a i n road to Sbeitla, C o m b a t G r o u p G e r h a r d t moved to the n o r t h and encircled the high g r o u n d near Djebel Lessouda, on which the Americans h a d constructed a strongpoint. At the same t i m e , C o m b a t G r o u p R e i m a n n , led by Tigers, attacked along the m a i n road.

GROWING PAINS AND ADAPTATION

49

Map 4: Heavy Tank Battalion 501, Attack in the Vicinity of Sidi Bou Zid, Tunisia, Operation FRÜHLINGSWIND

14-15 February 1943

Map 5: Heavy Tank Battalion 501, Attack Vicinity Sidi Bou Zid, Tunisia During Operation FRÜHLINGSWIND, 14-15 February 1943

51

GROWING PAINS AND ADAPTATION

Uncertain of the situation, C o m b a t C o m m a n d A of the 1st A r m o r e d Division sent two companies from the 1st A r m o r e d Regiment a n d a c o m p a n y from the 701st Tank Destroyer Battalion "to clear up the situation." This force traveled up the road from Sidi Bou Zid to the r o a d j u n c t i o n called Poste Lessouda. At s o m e p o i n t they were w a r n e d by American forces on the Djebel Lessouda that the G e r m a n s were in the vicinity of Poste Lessouda. A few minutes later, they came within sight a n d range of the e n e m y a n d began to take losses from w h a t was believed to be 8 8 m m guns, p e r h a p s from Tiger tanks. 52

53

C o m b a t G r o u p R e i m a n n , s u p p o r t e d by six Tigers of the 1st C o m p a n y , Heavy Tank Battalion 5 0 1 , forced the A m e r i c a n tanks a n d t a n k destroyers to withdraw. Later in the day, only one of the A m e r i c a n companies was available to c o n d u c t a n o t h e r "counterattack by fire a n d m a n e u v e r " to delay the G e r m a n s . This counterattack was also t u r n e d back with the assistance of the Tigers. According to the American official history, "American losses were heavy, and, in the last h o u r of the m o r n i n g , the u n e q u a l contest e n d e d in a withdrawal southwestward." T h e r e m a i n d e r of the day was spent completing the encirclement of American forces on their m o u n t a i n t o p strongpoints, to be followed by their eventual reduction a n d elimination. 54

The a c c o m p l i s h m e n t s of the handful of Tigers operating with C o m b a t G r o u p R e i m a n n — i n the space of a b o u t six h o u r s , just prior to daybreak until a r o u n d n o o n — w a s remarkable. T h e y assisted in breaking t h r o u g h their o p p o n e n t s ' forward defenses, destroying a t a n k c o m p a n y in the process. T h e y continued the attack a n d assisted in defeating two counterattacks, destroying a total of 20 S h e r m a n s t h r o u g h o u t the day. 55

T h e next day, 15 February 1943, the 1st C o m p a n y of Heavy Tank Battalion 501 was held in reserve d u r i n g the envelopment of the ill-fated counterattack of the 2d Battalion, 1st A r m o r e d R e g i m e n t . 56

D u r i n g the r e m a i n d e r of the o p e r a t i o n that ultimately came to be called the "Kasserine Pass" battles, the 1st C o m p a n y of Heavy Tank Battalion 501 was held in reserve a n d engaged in s u p p o r t i n g operations 65 kilometers n o r t h of Sidi Bou Zid. There were no Tigers lost t h r o u g h o u t the n i n e days of the G e r m a n offensive. On 26 February, Heavy Tank Battalion 501 b e c a m e the 3d Battalion of the 10th Panzer Division's Panzer Regiment 7 . This was the same day that they began an ultimately-unsuccessful attack as p a r t of the large-scale o p e r a t i o n k n o w n as O p e r a t i o n Ochsenkopf ( O X H E A D ) . This offensive t o o k place along the entire Fifth Panzer A r m y front a n d was designed to gain a further extension of their b r i d g e h e a d . T h e m a i n effort, which involved all of Fifth Panzer Army's available armor, was directed at Sidi Nsir, with Beja as its ultimate objective. (see m a p 6) 57

58

59

Map 6: Heavy Tank Battalion 501, Attack During Operation OCHSENKOPF, Tunisia 26 February-1 March 1943

53

GROWING PAINS AND ADAPTATION

The force c o n d u c t i n g this mission, C o m b a t G r o u p Lang, c o m m e n c e d its attack on Sidi Nsir on 26 February 1943. Led by Tigers, C o m b a t G r o u p Lang attacked along the m a i n road a n d r a n into the defenses of the 128th Infantry Brigade of the British 46th Division. This force constituted only a c o m b a t outpost, b u t m a n a g e d to delay the G e r m a n attack for 12 h o u r s . T h e British position was seized only after the G e r m a n s outflanked a n d suppressed the defenders from b o t h flanks a n d t h e n frontally assaulted the defenders, with the Tigers leading the assault. 60

61

62

The m a i n British defensive positions were located 20 kilometers southwest of Sidi Nsir, in a key defile k n o w n as H u n t ' s Gap. C o m b a t G r o u p Lang continued their attack along the m a i n r o a d to Beja the next day. M u d d y g r o u n d conditions a n d hilly terrain confined the attack primarily to the m a i n r o a d . The attackers were stopped at H u n t ' s G a p by a well-placed defensive position consisting of mines a n d antitank guns with excellent observation a n d fields of fire, s u p p o r t e d by five batteries of field artillery. A well-timed a p p e a r a n c e by the Royal Air Force also assisted in halting the attack. 63

The attack was c o n t i n u e d t h r o u g h o u t the night, b u t by 28 February, seven Tigers were immobilized in the British minefield. Of the 14 Tigers that started the o p e r a t i o n two days previously, only two Tigers were still o p e r a t i o n a l . According to the U.S. A r m y history:

64

T h e leading section could n o t t u r n a r o u n d , could n o t leave the road, could n o t back out. Some of the vehicles, a b a n d o n e d d u r i n g w h a t appeared to be a panic, were demolished by British engineers after dark. 65

According to the British Army's official history: Lang's defeat was caused mainly by the excellent British artillery fire, by the rain-soaked g r o u n d on which his tanks could n o t m a n o e u v r e , a n d by the well-staged infantry attacks d u r i n g which the Sappers destroyed damaged tanks which the e n e m y m i g h t have pulled o u t of h a r m ' s way. 66

All hopes of c o n t i n u i n g the attack were gone by 1 M a r c h 1943 a n d G e r m a n forces ultimately w i t h d r e w to defensive positions in the vicinity of Sidi Nsir. After four days of fighting, n o n e of Heavy Tank Battalion 501's 14 Tigers were operational. Seven Tigers were lost, along with four Panzer IVs a n d eight Panzer IIIs. A report from Heavy Tank Battalion 501 provided the following reasons for the loss of the Tigers: 67

68

Bottomless terrain that h a d been softened by violent rain storms operating on a n a r r o w front. E n e m y minefields h i n d e r e d further attack. E n e m y artillery fire of all calibers and a n t i t a n k gunfire then hit the Tiger attack, which was immobilized in the m u d a n d on mines. Strong e n e m y

54

SLEDGEHAMMERS

counterattacks didn't let o u r o w n infantry attacks advance far e n o u g h to recover the d a m a g e d Tigers. Five Tigers h a d tracks d a m a g e d by mines (one of these Tigers was also hit by an antitank g u n ) , o n e Tiger took a direct hit from an artillery shell, a n d o n e Tiger b e c a m e stuck in the mud. 6 9

O t h e r t h a n assisting in breaking t h r o u g h what a m o u n t e d to a weakly-held forward defensive position, O p e r a t i o n Ochsenkopf was a complete failure for Heavy Tank Battalion 5 0 1 . T h e area a r o u n d H u n t ' s Gap, just n o r t h of Beja, c a m e to k n o w n as the "Tiger Graveyard" by Allied forces. 70

Interestingly, this was the first a n d only occasion d u r i n g the c a m p a i g n in N o r t h Africa that Heavy Tank Battalion 501 was employed as a concentrated a n d c o m b i n e d battalion u n d e r m o r e or less a single c o m m a n d . O n e of the reasons for the generally piecemeal e m p l o y m e n t of the battalion was the fact that the individual vehicles arrived over a six-week p e r i o d from late N o v e m b e r to early January. G e r m a n forces employed c o m b a t vehicles as soon as they were available in response to continual Allied pressure. A n o t h e r reason for the piecemeal e m p l o y m e n t was that the heavy tanks of the battalion were needed in m a n y places to stop the p e n e t r a t i o n s of the A m e r i c a n a n d British forces a n d to s u p p o r t n u m e r o u s G e r m a n attacks a t t e m p t i n g to e x p a n d their bridgehead. 71

T h e final reason for e m p l o y m e n t in a fragmented fashion was that this unit was plagued by a low operational rate of Tigers d u r i n g its t i m e in N o r t h Africa. Of the 22 Tigers assigned to Heavy Tank Battalion 501 t h r o u g h o u t this period, the highest n u m b e r operational at the same t i m e was 14 Tigers, on 14 a n d 26 February 1 9 4 3 . A l t h o u g h the battalion m a n a g e d to achieve an overall 62-percent operational average for Tigers t h r o u g h o u t its t i m e in Tunisia, this is misleading by itself; on m a n y occasions, the battalion only h a d a h a n d ful of tanks on h a n d . 72

73

This low rate was d u e in p a r t because the Tiger was a new weapon that had design flaws requiring modifications. T h e c o m b a t elements of the battalion, possibly because they were given a higher priority in s h i p m e n t to Tunisia t h a n the s u p p o r t units, arrived in Tunisia before any s u p p o r t units of the battalion. This forced the heavy t a n k c o m p a n i e s to operate for an extended period of t i m e w i t h o u t dedicated m a i n t e n a n c e s u p p o r t . T h e f i r s t m a i n t e n a n c e platoon from the w o r k s h o p c o m p a n y did n o t arrive until 25 D e c e m b e r 1942. This absence of s u p p o r t severely h i n d e r e d the battalion's ability to not only m a i n tain its vehicles, b u t also to recover a n d tow t h e m back from the front to be repaired. Additionally, because the Allies often interdicted the Axis supply lines in the M e d i t e r r a n e a n , there was always a shortage of repair parts. In fairness, of course, the G e r m a n s ' supplies had far less distance to travel t h a n those of the Allies. 74

55

GROWING PAINS AND ADAPTATION

Heavy Tank Battalion 501 improvised as best it could to m a i n t a i n its tanks, but it was especially challenged because they were the only u n i t in N o r t h Africa e q u i p p e d with the Tiger. On 18 January 1943, a Tiger that h a d hit a land mine was officially scrapped because the battalion lacked the replacement idler wheel to fix i t . This Tiger was cannibalized to establish a reserve of necessary repair parts for the other d a m a g e d Tigers. 73

An additional p r o b l e m created by the dispersal of the battalion was that the maintenance elements were also necessarily dispersed. Because the m a i n t e nance elements were spread out, the battalion's 18-ton recovery vehicles found it difficult to provide s u p p o r t to all areas. Also, the 18-ton recovery vehicles did not have a r m o r protection, so they could only recover a n d tow a Tiger in a secure area. The lack of an a r m o r e d recovery vehicle a n d of towing vehicles in general forced the battalion to destroy s o m e disabled Tigers that may have otherwise been recovered. T h e battalion again improvised as best it could a n d in o n e instance, a single Panzer III towed a disabled Tiger o u t of the effective range of the e n e m y a n t i t a n k guns a n d infantry w e a p o n s . 76

Whatever the reason for piecemeal e m p l o y m e n t of the battalion, it violated the principle of concentrated e m p l o y m e n t of the battalion that was necessary to achieve decisive results. Given the results of the o n e t i m e that the battalion was concentrated, p e r h a p s the principle of c o n c e n t r a t i o n was n o t always applicable, either. T h e a u t h o r of final after-action review of the battalion's o p e r a t i o n s in Tunisia blames the inability to employ the bulk of the battalion at the same time to m o u n t a i n o u s terrain which forced the attacks to largely follow the roads in their z o n e s . 77

It is interesting to note that this report only m e n t i o n s the devastating effect of mines once a n d t h e n only to confirm that Tigers m u s t lead attacks once contact has been m a d e because they are " n o t as susceptible to m i n e s . " Presumably, the solution to breaking t h r o u g h a minefield still lay in having enough Tigers. This is extraordinary, considering that the United States, the British, a n d the Soviets were all e x p e r i m e n t i n g and fielding a wide variety of mine-breaching e q u i p m e n t attached to t a n k s . T h e G e r m a n s , however, seemed to be c o n t e n t with u s i n g — a n d a b u s i n g — t h e i r m o s t expensive, most valuable tanks as m i n e detectors a n d breaching vehicles. 78

79

The doctrinally-correct m e t h o d , as inferred from published G e r m a n reports, was for the G e r m a n s to overwatch an obstacle with Tigers a n d other direct- a n d indirect-fire systems, while engineers breached the obstacle. Until the e n d of the war, this required d i s m o u n t i n g personnel to either physically remove the mines or obstacle or to emplace explosive charges to blow a breach t h r o u g h the minefield. Obviously, this required exposing skilled personnel to great hazards.

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A l t h o u g h n o n - d o c t r i n a l , an accepted a n d supposedly preferred m e t h o d in m a n y instances was to "bull t h r o u g h " the minefield with Tigers. This saved personnel from having to expose themselves, b u t was costly in t e r m s of m a i n taining a high operational rate for Tigers. This is apparently the m e t h o d that was chosen d u r i n g O p e r a t i o n Ochsenkopf. H O W else could five Tigers have b e c o m e immobilized in the minefield on a single road? W h e n the leading Tiger was immobilized by the leading edge of the minefield, it m u s t have been a p p a r e n t to all following that there was a minefield to their front. T h e only way for four m o r e Tigers to b e c o m e d a m a g e d by m i n e s was to move forward b e y o n d those already disabled Tigers. T h e p r o b l e m of overcoming mines was o n e that heavy t a n k battalion leaders never solved d u r i n g the course of the war. Heavy Tank Battalion 501 destroyed m o r e t h a n 150 Allied tanks in N o r t h Africa while losing only 11 Tigers. This a m o u n t s to a kill ratio of 13.6 e n e m y tanks destroyed for every Tiger lost. Most sources do n o t differentiate the kills of the Panzer IIIs from those of the Tigers, b u t the u n i t diary is filled with specific entries that indicate the kills of the day were by the Tigers. There are few entries that specifically m e n t i o n the Panzer IIIs destroying an e n e m y t a n k . Regardless of vehicle type, the high kill ratio is a testament to the unit's effectiveness in spite of its infrequent d e p l o y m e n t in accordance with doctrinal precepts. A n o t h e r indication of the effectiveness of the vehicles, if n o t necessarily the unit, is the fact that of the 11 Tigers lost, only three were destroyed by e n e m y fire. 80

81

82

Even t h o u g h the p r i m a r y t a n k killer of the heavy t a n k battalion was the Tiger, the reports continually emphasized the necessity of i n c o r p o r a t i n g the Panzer IIIs within the battalion. T h e battalion c o m m a n d e r stressed that the battalion "constantly needs light panzers for m a i n t a i n i n g contact with other units, reconnaissance, a n d other similar duties (that is, scouting, guarding, b r i n g i n g repair parts, or retrieving w o u n d e d u n d e r fire) for which you can't use Tigers." 83

Even with only a few Tigers, Heavy Tank Battalion 501 helped the units it s u p p o r t e d to accomplish m a n y of their missions. G e r m a n reports indicate t h a t the Allied forces recognized the superiority of the Tiger a n d did n o t a t t e m p t to engage it frontally, if at all. On the attack toward Medjerda, the battalion reported that "the objective was reached w i t h o u t e n c o u n t e r i n g any e n e m y activity," b u t that "fleeing e n e m y c o l u m n s a n d tanks were observed as soon as the Tigers a p p e a r e d . " Evidently in an a t t e m p t to counter this a n d destroy m o r e enemy tanks before they could escape, the battalion c o m m a n d e r issued the guidance that "Tigers m a y n o t o p e n fire too early against e n e m y tanks, in order to keep retreating e n e m y tanks within the effective range of o u r w e a p o n s as long as possible." 84

85

GROWING PAINS AND ADAPTATION

57

The Allied forces did n o t have a tank that could counter the Tiger, so they resorted to the tactic of pulling back from ridge to ridge while laying m i n e fields that were protected by a n t i t a n k guns. Artillery b o m b a r d m e n t s were also fired on the Tigers w h e n they were slowed by the minefields. As has been shown, this tactic was very effective. 86

On 17 March 1943, Heavy Tank Battalion 504 took possession of Heavy Tank Battalion 501's 11 r e m a i n i n g Tigers; it later s u r r e n d e r e d on 12 May 1943. D u r i n g this time, they e n c o u n t e r e d m a n y of the same p r o b l e m s as their predecessors, although G e r m a n forces were primarily on the defensive during the two m o n t h s Heavy Tank Battalion 504 fought in N o r t h Africa. They assisted in stopping the b r e a k t h r o u g h of the A m e r i c a n 1st A r m o r e d Division in the vicinity of Maknassy d u r i n g the end of M a r c h 1 9 4 3 . T h e y also helped temporarily stop the British offensive in the vicinity of Medjez el Bab, as well as n u m e r o u s other smaller defensive e n g a g e m e n t s . This battalion did n o t engage in any large-scale offensive operations. It p e r f o r m e d defensive missions to defeat e n e m y p e n e t r a t i o n s of the front line. T h e battalion also counterattacked several times, as p a r t of a larger G e r m a n force, to reestablish front line positions. 87

88

89

The battalion was only able to m a i n t a i n an operational readiness rate of about 50 percent for their Tigers, a n d the largest n u m b e r of Tigers that were operational at o n e t i m e was 17 on 4 April 1 9 4 3 . Heavy Tank Battalion 504 lost a total of eight Tiger tanks between 17 March a n d 12 M a y 1943, a n d destroyed the r e m a i n i n g 14 to prevent their capture before the u n i t surrendered to Allied forces. 90

91

D u r i n g the two m o n t h s that they operated in Tunisia, Heavy Tank Battalion 504 destroyed m o r e t h a n 150 e n e m y t a n k s . Prior to destroying the 14 remaining Tigers, the battalion achieved a t a n k kill ratio of 18.8 e n e m y tanks for every Tiger lost; because the entire battalion was ultimately lost, however, the kill ratio m e a s u r e d against all 22 Tigers c o m m i t t e d was still a respectable 6.8 e n e m y tanks destroyed for every Tiger. 92

This battalion's counteroffensive actions were effective in delaying the Allied forces in Tunisia. T h e y could have been even m o r e cost effective h a d the G e r m a n s been able to evacuate the r e m a i n i n g Tigers of the battalion to Sicily or Italy. This battalion, like Heavy Tank Battalion 501, also suffered from inadequate recovery assets d u r i n g its retrograde actions. Of the eight Tigers lost prior to s u r r e n d e r i n g , only four were lost as a result of direct e n e m y c o n t a c t . Of these four, the battalion destroyed two because they were unable to recover t h e m . T h a t m e a n t that e n e m y fire completely destroyed only two Tigers, one from concentrated antitank a n d artillery fire, a n d the other from a direct hit by an artillery r o u n d . 93

94

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This testifies to the survivability of the Tiger tank, b u t it also highlights its weaknesses. As the G e r m a n s were discovering, the Tiger was a very m a i n t e nance-intensive c o m b a t vehicle that h a d a limited radius of action because of the high fuel c o n s u m p t i o n a n d m a i n t e n a n c e requirements. These weaknesses were exacerbated w h e n the G e r m a n s w i t h d r e w following the Allied offenses in Tunisia. A l t h o u g h the actions of Heavy Tank Battalion 504 indicate that Tigers were effective in destroying e n e m y tanks, if the G e r m a n A r m y h a d devoted some resources to developing an a r m o r e d recovery vehicle, they m a y have been able to reduce the n u m b e r of Tigers destroyed by their o w n crews. Only two Tigers were total a n d complete losses on the battlefield as a result of e n e m y direct fire. For the loss of these two Tigers, the battalion destroyed over 150 Allied tanks, which equals a kill ratio of 75 to 1 in t a n k versus t a n k combat. F o r t u n ately for the Allies, there was m o r e t h a n o n e way to kill a Tiger. Unfortunately for the G e r m a n s , the solutions to the twin p r o b l e m s of recovering such m a s sive m a c h i n e s w h e n d a m a g e d on the battlefield a n d c o n d u c t i n g the m a i n t e nance required to keep such complex vehicles r u n n i n g w o u l d prove elusive.

Heavy Tank Battalion 503 with Army Group Don in Southern Russia On 27 D e c e m b e r 1942, OKH sent Heavy Tank Battalion 503 to A r m y G r o u p D o n to assist in stabilizing the front. This unit was needed to help protect Rostov so that the 1st a n d 4th Panzer Armies a n d other G e r m a n units in the Caucasus could w i t h d r a w across the D o n River to the D o n e t s River, where the high c o m m a n d p l a n n e d a n e w defensive l i n e . This battalion arrived at the b e g i n n i n g of 1943 a n d A r m y G r o u p D o n immediately assigned it the mission of securing bridges across the Manytch River for use by w i t h d r a w i n g forces. By this t i m e there was not a c o n t i n u o u s front in the area. G e r m a n forces defended a series of blocking positions a n d s t r o n g p o i n t s in an a t t e m p t to stop the Soviet advance. These were located at key points at road or railroad j u n c t i o n s a n d major river crossings. T h e fighting was characterized by rearguard actions, while the m a i n b o d y of troops t o o k up n e w positions farther back. Heavy Tank Battalion 503 participated in this fighting from 1 to 17 January 1943, primarily securing i m p o r t a n t river crossing sites. D u e to the fluid n a t u r e of the battlefield, however, they were sent from o n e i m p o r t a n t area to a n o t h er, a n d in o n e instance covered 65 kilometers in o n e day. (see m a p 7) Probably the battalion's largest single e m p l o y m e n t occurred on 6 January 1943 w h e n the battalion, s u p p o r t e d by 2d Battalion, Panzer-Grenadier 93

96

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98

99

Map 7: Heavy Tank Battalion 503 with Army Group Don 1-20 January 1943

SLEDGEHAMMERS

60

Regiment 128, attacked towards Stavropol. T h e 1st C o m p a n y attacked frontal ly with the battalion of panzergrenadiers, while the 2d C o m p a n y attacked from the left flank. Altogether, the battalion fielded 17 operational Tigers o u t of 20 assigned a n d 20 Panzer IIIs o u t of 3 1 . D u r i n g the engagement, the Tigers knocked o u t 18 Soviet tanks a n d destroyed an a r m o r e d car a n d five antitank g u n s . The e n e m y retreated, a n d d u r i n g the p u r s u i t the battalion lost its first vehicle d u r i n g the entire engagement, a Panzer III, to artillery fire. 100

1 0 1

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103

Possibly the m o s t i m p o r t a n t mission given this battalion was its attack to reduce a Soviet p e n e t r a t i o n at Vessely. T h e battalion fielded 11 Tigers and 12 Panzer IIIs a n d was again s u p p o r t e d by the 2d Battalion of Panzer-Grenadier Regiment 128, as well as by a battery of light h o w i t z e r s . T h e attack began in t h e early m o r n i n g of 9 January 1943. G e r m a n forces m a d e three attempts to achieve their objective d u r i n g the day, b u t the Soviets repulsed all a t t a c k s . 104

105

T h e battalion m a n a g e d to destroy eight T-34s d u r i n g the attack, b u t also lost two Tigers a n d one Panzer III to e n e m y fire. In addition, the nine other Tigers were so badly d a m a g e d t h a t the battalion h a d only one operational Tiger at the e n d of the day. Two of these Tigers were sent back to G e r m a n y for general r e p a i r s . In the space of six h o u r s , o n e of these received 227 hits from a n t i t a n k rifles a n d was struck 14 times by 5 7 m m a n d 11 times by 7 6 m m antit a n k r o u n d s . It is a t e s t a m e n t to the vehicle's durability that despite this d a m age, the Tiger still traveled back 60 kilometers u n d e r its o w n p o w e r . 106

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On 14 January 1943, the 2d Company, Heavy Tank Battalion 502 was attached to Heavy Tank Battalion 5 0 3 . This b e c a m e the only instance where three Organization D c o m p a n i e s were c o m b i n e d u n d e r the control of a single battalion. This a r r a n g e m e n t lasted only eight days because of losses to the battalion, however; on 22 J a n u a r y 1943, the b a t t a l i o n d i s b a n d e d the 2d C o m p a n y . The battalion integrated the r e m n a n t s of this c o m p a n y into the 3d C o m p a n y , a n d c o n t i n u e d to operate with only two Organization D companies. 109

110

111

After partially rebuilding its strength, A r m y G r o u p D o n assigned the battalion missions that involved securing the i m p o r t a n t railroad centers a r o u n d Rostov. T h e battalion participated in m a n y m i n o r local counterattacks that forced it to operate in c o m p a n y - a n d platoon-sized units. These elements o p e r a t e d with a wide variety of other units, usually in a s u b o r d i n a t e role. In accomplishing these missions, the battalion d e m o n s t r a t e d excellent flexibility in c o m m a n d a n d control a n d in c o m p a n y a n d p l a t o o n organizations, repeatedly changing c o m m a n d relationships a n d c o m p o s i t i o n to accomplish the mission, (see m a p 8) D u r i n g this fighting, the battalion integrated Tigers a n d Panzer IIIs in m a n y different ways. On two occasions the battalion formed a light c o m p a n y

Map 8: Heavy Tank Battalion 503 with A r m y Group Don 7-20 February 1943

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consisting of a company's w o r t h of Panzer IIIs a n d a heavy c o m p a n y e q u i p p e d with Tigers a n d the r e m a i n d e r of the Panzer IIIs. This light c o m p a n y p r i m a r ily covered other units' withdrawals, b u t did participate in an attack of 8 February 1943 in the n o r t h w e s t e r n sector of Rostov, where it destroyed 12 e n e m y tanks a n d three a n t i t a n k g u n s . T h e battalion c o m m a n d e r employed this light c o m p a n y because of the difficult terrain, consisting of m a n y ditches, across which the attacks were carried out. 112

F r o m 19 February to 22 February 1943, the light company, starting with eight Panzer IIIs a n d two Tigers, c o n d u c t e d local counterattacks a n d occupied covering positions in the vicinity of Rostov. D u r i n g this four-day period, the c o m p a n y destroyed 23 T-34s a n d 11 antitank guns while losing o n e Tiger a n d o n e Panzer I I I . After an engagement on 22 February 1943, the battalion h a d only two Tigers a n d five Panzer IIIs operational a n d w i t h d r e w to an area near Taganrog to refit. This battalion was n o t employed again until O p e r a t i o n 113

114

Zitadelle

in

July

1943.

D u r i n g the almost two m o n t h s of c o m b a t with A r m y G r o u p D o n , Heavy Tank Battalion 503 destroyed m o r e t h a n 71 e n e m y tanks a n d 55 antitank guns. In so doing, they lost a r o u n d 13 Panzer IIIs a n d h a d three Tigers knocked o u t d u e to e n e m y a c t i o n s . A n o t h e r Tiger was destroyed while waiting at the Budenny rail station for t r a n s p o r t back to G e r m a n y for factory repair w h e n the battalion was forced to retreat to R o s t o v . A total of four Tigers were so badly d a m a g e d in c o m b a t that they were t r a n s p o r t e d back to G e r m a n y . This m e a n s that this battalion destroyed 23.6 e n e m y tanks for the loss of each Tiger, or 4.4 e n e m y tanks for the loss of any type tank, Panzer III a n d Tiger. 115

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Heavy Tank Battalion 503 was m u c h m o r e effective t h a n the units a r o u n d Leningrad a n d in N o r t h Africa in recovering disabled Tigers. D u r i n g c o m b a t that always involved retrograde m o v e m e n t s , its soldiers destroyed only o n e Tiger to avoid capture. Additionally, this Tiger h a d already been recovered a n d loaded on a rail car for t r a n s p o r t back to Germany. This battalion's leadership was very reluctant to destroy its o w n vehicles a n d did everything possible to recover Tigers. In o n e instance, three Tigers broke d o w n in a withdrawal; instead of destroying t h e m , the crews stayed with the vehicles until they could be recovered, which was over 30 h o u r s later. Diary entries are filled with examples of operational vehicles towing d a m a g e d vehicles back to the m a i n tenance p l a t o o n to be repaired. In a n o t h e r instance, while the rest of the u n i t withdrew, six 18-ton recovery vehicles a n d two o t h e r Tigers recovered a Tiger that broke t h r o u g h the ice of a s t r e a m . 119

120

Despite the great efforts of the recovery elements, this battalion still suffered from a low operational readiness rate of its Tigers. On average, the battalion only m a i n t a i n e d a r o u n d 35 percent of its Tigers in operational

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condition. Probably o n e of the m a i n reasons for Tigers being in need of repair was from damage d u e to e n e m y fire. A n o t h e r reason m a y have been the great distances t h a t the u n i t h a d to traverse. In one instance, the 2d C o m p a n y conducted a 107-kilometer r o a d m a r c h in ten a n d a half h o u r s . This u n i t did not lose any vehicles to m a i n t e n a n c e b r e a k d o w n s d u r i n g the r o a d m a r c h , h o w ever, probably because the c o m p a n y c o m m a n d e r ordered a m a i n t e n a n c e halt every 20 k i l o m e t e r s . 121

122

123

Overall, Heavy Tank Battalion 503 was very successful in its o p e r a t i o n s a r o u n d Rostov. This unit played a large p a r t in protecting the key r o a d a n d rail networks that allowed the 1st Panzer A r m y to retreat. S o m e historians attribute the actions of this battalion to preventing the Soviets in breaking t h r o u g h to Rostov a n d cutting the road a n d rail l i n e s . 124

Changes Before Operation

ZITADELLE

A measure of the effectiveness of the heavy t a n k battalions fighting the Soviets can be ascertained by looking at the n u m b e r of actions that the Soviets took in response to this threat. T h e y did n o t have t i m e to develop a t a n k to c o u n t e r the Tiger before O p e r a t i o n Zitadelle, b u t t h e y did begin p l a n n i n g for vehicles such as the T-34/85 a n d the KV-85 heavy tank. In the interim, the Soviets developed a n d fielded a heavy self-propelled gun, the SU-152, which was a r m e d with a 1 5 2 m m gun designed to defeat the G e r m a n heavy t a n k s . Additionally, the Soviets c o n t i n u e d to field the SU-76 and the SU-122, which were a r m e d with 7 6 m m a n d 1 2 2 m m guns, respectively. All of these vehicles were g r o u p e d by type into regiments of 21 vehicles (four batteries of five vehicles each a n d o n e for the c o m m a n d e r ) By the t i m e O p e r a t i o n Zitadelle began, 21 such regiments were at the front, mainly concentrated in the vicinity of Kursk, w i t h three in reserve a n d 17 still in training. Also in response to the Tigers, the Soviets formed antitank battalions a n d assigned t h e m to t a n k a n d mechanized corps. Some of these were a r m e d 8 5 m m antiaircraft guns on special m o u n t s w i t h crews trained as a n t i t a n k g u n ners. Many, a l t h o u g h n o t all, of the t a n k a n d mechanized corps at Kursk h a d been reinforced w i t h the 8 5 m m antitank battalions prior to the G e r m a n attack. A n o t h e r Soviet response to the a p p e a r a n c e of the Tiger was the formation of heavy t a n k regiments. P r o d u c t i o n of the KV-85, a r m e d with an 8 5 m m m a i n gun, did n o t begin until August 1943, after t h e G e r m a n offensive at K u r s k . So the Soviets gathered all available K V l s a n d KV2s, a r m e d with a 7 6 m m a n d 152mm guns, respectively, a n d formed five heavy t a n k regiments before the 123

126

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128

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G e r m a n offensive b e g a n . N o n e of the n e w t a n k regiments took p a r t in the Battle of Kursk, b u t their availability was an indication of the concern to bolster the defense against the G e r m a n Tigers and the heavy t a n k b a t t a l i o n s . T h e Russians realized that the Tiger h a d a powerful long-range 8 8 m m m a i n g u n a n d thick frontal armor, m a k i n g it superior to their tanks with 7 6 m m guns a n d less a r m o r protection. T h e y believed that they could "only be fought effectively in close combat, where the T-34 could use its greater maneuverability a n d direct its fire at the sides of the heavy G e r m a n t a n k s . " This tactic resulted in the Soviet tanks "charging" at the G e r m a n Tigers in an a t t e m p t to close the range as quickly as possible so the T-34/76 could have a chance of destroying the Tigers. 129

130

131

T h e G e r m a n s , for their part, were also busy reorganizing the heavy t a n k battalions into Organization E battalions, doing away with all the Panzer IIIs in the battalion. T h e deletion of the Panzer IIIs from the organization is cont r a r y to almost all of the r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s in the available heavy t a n k battalion after-action r e p o r t s . 132

T h e sole exception to the call for Panzer IIIs in the after-action reviews was a r e c o m m e n d a t i o n from the heavy c o m p a n y of the Panzer-Grenadier Division Grossdeutschland. At this time, this unit fielded only a heavy c o m p a n y as p a r t of the divisional panzer regiment, b u t this was s o o n increased to an entire heavy t a n k battalion. This r e p o r t stated: T h e previous c o m b a t actions have s h o w n that the Panzer III, originally i n t e n d e d to be a security vehicle for each Tiger, has n o t evolved to withstand hits from e n e m y w e a p o n s . The o p p o n e n t ' s defensive w e a p o n s take it u n d e r fire in preference to firing at the Tiger. In addition, it w o u l d aid in improving the n u m b e r of operational Panzers by having a p u r e c o m p a n y m a d e up of only o n e type of Panzer. A very inefficient a n d complicated repair staff for the Tiger C o m p a n y is necessary only because of t r a n s p o r t a t i o n of Panzer III repair parts in addition to the difficulties with Tiger repair parts. In this case, it is appropriate to reduce Tiger units to only o n e type of P a n z e r — t h e Panzerkampfwagen VI ( T i g e r ) . 133

This report was probably m o r e insightful, in retrospect, t h a n the others that advocated retention of the Panzer IIIs. T h e majority of the r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s argued for the c o n t i n u e d inclusion of the Panzer IIIs so that they could accomplish missions other t h a n those for which they were originally i n t e n d ed, namely scouting, liaison, evacuation of w o u n d e d , a n d resupply of Tigers. General Guderian, as Inspector of A r m o r e d Troops, rejected the majority of the r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s that advocated c o n t i n u e d inclusion of Panzer IIIs a n d argued for the concentration of Tigers in Organization E . He did, however, see the need for an i m p r o v e d scouting a n d liaison capability, a n d requested 134

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the creation of a reconnaissance platoon, m o u n t e d on a r m o r e d half-tracks, that became p a r t of Organization E . A n o t h e r report from Panzer-Grenadier Division Grossdeutschland suggested incorporating a heavy tank platoon into every panzer b a t t a l i o n . Others r e c o m m e n d e d i n c o r p o r a t i n g a heavy t a n k c o m p a n y into the panzer regiment of every p a n z e r division. G u d e r i a n rejected this, saying "dispersing t h e m [Tigers] . . . is an idiotic s q u a n d e r i n g of this valuable e q u i p m e n t . " 135

136

137

The report by the heavy tank c o m p a n y of the Panzer-Grenadier Division Grossdeutschland indicated that the unit was constantly employed as the lead element. This initiated responses from the Chief of the A r m y General Staff, as well as from G u d e r i a n , which contradicted the established d o c t r i n e for the heavy t a n k battalions. T h e a r m o r representative to the G e r m a n Chief of the Army General Staff wrote: E m p l o y i n g Tigers as the lead u n i t s is n o t self-evidently correct. Situations will occur where this is necessary or useful. T h e controlling factors are the tasks a n d the n u m b e r of operational Tigers. If there are [only a few Tigers], their assignment to the p o i n t m e a n s that the Tigers will n o t be available w h e n they are needed to attack e n e m y tanks. Losses will frequently occur d u e to mines a n d bridge failure, plus getting h u n g up in uncrossable terrain. In order to m a i n t a i n the high operational a n d p r o d u c t i o n value of the Tigers, it is necessary to concentrate the Tigers in units so that concentrated purposeful e m p l o y m e n t , m a i n t e n a n c e , a n d care can be a c h i e v e d . 138

This message was followed shortly by a n o t h e r from G u d e r i a n w h o took a similar position that seemed to argue against the use of the heavy t a n k battalion as the lead element in the attack. He wrote: The Tiger u n i t is the m o s t valuable a n d strongest w e a p o n in a Panzer unit. If it is used as the point unit, it will quickly b r i n g localized success because of its high c o m b a t power. However, they will have insufficient force at the start of a decisive battle that could m e a n destruction of the o p p o n e n t in the depths of his position because the Tigers will suffer heavy b r e a k d o w n s d u e to mines, hits, a n d terrain obstacles. Therefore, they will enter the decisive phase of the battle already greatly depleted. Fundamentally, point units have increased fuel c o n s u m p t i o n . Because the Tiger already has a limited radius of action, w h e n it is used as a lead vehicle it will sometimes be short of fuel at the start of the decisive phase of the b a t t l e . 139

Despite these views, there is no record of any new doctrinal guidance being formally published. In any case, o n e aspect of the d o c t r i n e that clearly did not

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change was the emphasis u p o n concentration of the heavy t a n k battalion instead of dispersing it.

Operation

ZITADELLE:

The Battle of Kursk

Two heavy t a n k battalions participated in the Battle of Kursk, a n d b o t h were i n t e n d e d to play major, if n o t decisive, roles. Heavy Tank Battalion 503 was still in s o u t h e r n Russia as p a r t of A r m y G r o u p South. It was attached to III Panzer Corps, p a r t of A r m y D e t a c h m e n t Kempf, d u r i n g O p e r a t i o n Zitadelle as p a r t of the s o u t h e r n t h r u s t against the Kursk s a l i e n t . T h e other heavy t a n k battalion involved in this operation was Heavy Tank Battalion 505, attached t o A r m y G r o u p C e n t e r . Both of these battalions received orders to change from Organization D to Organization E in the spring of 1943. Heavy Tank Battalion 503 h a d completed this transition a n d fielded 45 Tigers in three c o m p a n i e s for the operat i o n . Heavy Tank Battalion 505 was still in the process of m a k i n g the t r a n sition to the Organization E as the offensive began. It completed the formation of two Organization E heavy t a n k companies, b u t the third c o m p a n y did n o t arrive until 8 July 1943, after the start of the offensive. In an a t t e m p t to c o m p e n s a t e for this, Funklenk (Wireless Radio) C o m p a n y 312 was attached to i t . This u n i t fielded r e m o t e controlled Borgward B IV vehicles, carrying 500 kilograms of T N T each. These vehicles were remotely m a n e u v e r e d into position a n d t h e n exploded to destroy antitank positions a n d other emplacem e n t s . This company's mission was to detect minefields a n d assist in clearing lanes t h r o u g h t h e m , as well as assisting in destroying e n e m y defensive s t r o n g p o i n t s such as fortified antitank guns as well as heavy t a n k s . 140

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This battalion was also u n i q u e because of the way in which they used the Panzer IIIs that were still present at the t i m e of the battle. They converted these obsolescent tanks into bridging material carriers by r e m o v i n g their t u r rets a n d placing planks, b e a m s , a n d other b r i d g i n g material on t o p . A l t h o u g h the battalion was ordered to repair these vehicles, they h a d n o t repaired or t u r n e d t h e m in p r i o r to the start of the offensive. T h e two heavy t a n k battalions involved in O p e r a t i o n Zitadelle were n o t only organized differently, b u t were also employed in dissimilar fashions. In the N o r t h , A r m y G r o u p Center attached Heavy Tank Battalion 505 to the 6th Infantry Division of the XLVII Panzer Corps. This corps consisted of three panzer divisions a n d one infantry division, a n d was assigned as the m a i n b r e a k t h r o u g h force in the N o r t h . This was a mission fully in keeping with the doctrinal role for which Tiger battalions h a d b e e n created. On the other 1 4 7

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side of the Kursk Salient, A r m y G r o u p South attached Heavy Tank Battalion 503 to III Panzer Corps, which also consisted of three panzer divisions a n d one infantry division. This corps was p a r t of the larger ad hoc organization k n o w n as A r m y D e t a c h m e n t Kempf a n d initially h a d the mission of guarding the flank of II SS-Panzer Corps. It was also tasked with destroying e n e m y counterattack forces expected to arrive from the east a n d the n o r t h . In spite of Guderian's guidance that Tigers be employed in a concentrated heavy t a n k battalion a n d against the strong advice of the battalion c o m m a n d e r , the c o m m a n d e r of III Panzer C o r p s initially attached o n e heavy t a n k c o m p a n y to each of the corps' p a n z e r divisions. 150

T h e units c o m p r i s i n g the s o u t h e r n pincer of the G e r m a n attack consisted mainly of a r m o r e d units, b u t there was a shortage of infantry for the tasks at h a n d . T h e c o m m a n d e r s of 4th Panzer A r m y a n d A r m y D e t a c h m e n t Kempf thus decided to use their tanks in the initial assault on the first d a y . III Panzer C o r p s ' zone of attack t o o k its units across a level flood plain crisscrossed with small tributaries of the N o r t h e r n D o n e t s a n d R a z u m n o e Rivers. These m a d e excellent obstacles for defense by the Soviets. T h e defenders reinforced these with mines a n d other obstacles to vehicular m o v e m e n t , severely restricting G e r m a n a r m o r e d units' m o b i l i t y . (see m a p 9) 151

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Records concerning Heavy Tank Battalion 503 are filled with accounts of Tigers being halted by minefields; t a n k ditches; a n d streams a n d rivers. On the first day of the attack, t h e 2d C o m p a n y h a d 13 of its 14 Tigers disabled by mines in a single m i n e f i e l d . After a t t e m p t i n g b u t failing to ford the D o n e t s River at 0230 on the first day of the attack, t h e 3d C o m p a n y was finally able to cross early in the afternoon, using a bridge erected by c o m b a t e n g i n e e r s . D u r i n g the first three days of the attack, the battalion's Tiger c o m p a n i e s s u p p o r t e d the three Panzer divisions of III Panzer Corps. D u r i n g this t i m e , the corps m a n a g e d to break t h r o u g h the first a n d second defensive lines, b u t was still only a b o u t 20 kilometers from their line of d e p a r t u r e , w i t h a n o t h e r 100 kilometers to go to reach K u r s k . 133

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By 7 July 1943, the Soviets were focusing their attention primarily on the success of II SS-Panzer C o r p s to the west. Tasked to protect the flank of II SSPanzer Corps, b u t still well to the south, this success presented a p r o b l e m for III Panzer C o r p s . On 7 July 1943, III Panzer C o r p s consolidated Heavy Tank Battalion 503 a n d s u b o r d i n a t e d it to Panzer Regiment 11 of the 6th Panzer D i v i s i o n . T h e c o m m a n d e r of III Panzer C o r p s gave 6th Panzer Division the mission of spearheading the attack to link up with II SS-Panzer C o r p s . To complete this link up, the corps h a d to cross the D o n e t s River again further u p s t r e a m . S u p p o r t e d by Heavy Tank Battalion 503, the 6th Panzer Division fought t h r o u g h Soviet defenses to Rzhavets across the D o n e t s River, before being detached from III Panzer C o r p s . 156

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Map 9: Heavy Tank Battalion 503 as Part of the Attack by III Panzer Corps During Operation ZITADELLE

5-12 July 1943

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The highlight of this attack was a b o l d infiltration of Soviet defenses on the night of 11-12 July 1943 by Panzer Regiment 11 a n d Heavy Tank Battalion 503. This attack, led by Major Franz Bake u n d e r cover of darkness, successfully moved t h r o u g h Soviet defenses a n d then infiltrated Soviet a r m o r c o l u m n s as they a t t e m p t e d to reposition in p r e p a r a t i o n for the next day's operations. To assist in the delicate a n d risky action, Bake used two captured T-34s to lead the c o l u m n , along with two t a n k c o m m a n d e r s w h o spoke fluent Russian. He also gave orders for the infantry riding on the tanks to smoke a n d act relaxed. The G e r m a n c o l u m n was finally discovered on the outskirts of the t o w n of Rzhavets. This allowed Soviet engineers to blow up the bridges across the Donets before the G e r m a n s could capture t h e m . G e r m a n infantry a n d engineers used a small bridge to cross over a n d establish a bridgehead, b u t it was several days before a m u c h larger bridge capable of carrying the Tigers across was built. As a result, III Panzer C o r p s did n o t link up with II SS-Panzer C o r p s before the tanks from t h e Soviet 5th G u a r d s Tank A r m y attacked on 12 July 1943. Heavy Tank Battalion 503 destroyed approximately 72 Soviet tanks from the beginning of the offensive until the battalion was taken from III Panzer Corps on 14 July 1 9 4 3 . D u r i n g this time, they lost four Tigers in c o m b a t a n d no Tigers h a d to be destroyed to avoid c a p t u r e . This was primarily d u e to the fact that the battalion was on the offensive a n d its m a i n t e n a n c e a n d recovery elements could evacuate a n d repair d a m a g e d a n d disabled Tigers on the battlefield, instead of having to a b a n d o n t h e m as in previous battles involving retreats. Overall, the battalion achieved a kill ratio of 18.0 to 1. 160

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In a little over ten days of almost c o n t i n u o u s combat, the battalion was able to m a i n t a i n 57 percent of its Tigers operational, with the highest n u m b e r available at o n e t i m e being 42 at the b e g i n n i n g of the operation a n d the lowest n u m b e r being six, on 14 July 1 9 4 3 . 162

In the n o r t h , 9th A r m y h a d fewer tanks t h a n the s o u t h e r n pincer attack a n d thus, its c o m m a n d e r chose to attack primarily with infantry forces on the first day. T h e plan was for the infantry to break t h r o u g h the Soviet defenses, allowing panzer units to exploit that b r e a k t h r o u g h . T h e exception to this was the m a i n effort in the n o r t h , the XLVII Panzer C o r p s . This corps attacked on the first day with the 20th Panzer Division a n d the 6th Infantry D i v i s i o n . Despite the official guidance against attaching a heavy t a n k battalion to an infantry division, Heavy Tank Battalion 505 was attached to the 6th Infantry Division as p a r t of the XLVII Panzer C o r p s . (see m a p 10) 163

On the first day of the attack, after crossing the river O k a a n d seizing the village of Novy-Chutor, the c o m m a n d e r of the 6th Infantry Division ordered Heavy Tank Battalion 505 to attack at 0930 h o u r s . With its two c o m p a n i e s a n d the attached Funklenk C o m p a n y 312, the battalion easily destroyed 164

Map 10: Heavy Tank Battalion 505 in Operation ZITADELLE

5-15 July 1943

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dug-in e n e m y tanks to their front a n d penetrated the defenses on the 15th Rifle Division's right wing. This battalion attack allowed G e r m a n forces to secure the i m p o r t a n t village of Butyrki a n d threatened the Soviet first echelon divisions with encirclement. Heavy Tank Battalion 505 had advanced farther and faster t h a n M o d e l h a d ever anticipated, b u t because the plan called for the c o m m i t m e n t of the panzer divisions on the second day, these units were n o t in position to exploit the b r e a k t h r o u g h . G e r m a n accounts m e n t i o n an o p p o r tunity lost by n o t positioning a r m o r e d forces to exploit the tactical breakthrough of the Soviet defenses by Heavy Tank Battalion 505. The C o m m a n ding General of the 6th Infantry Division stated: We could observe m o v e m e n t s by the Russians. If the tanks h a d rolled t h r o u g h t h e n , we could p e r h a p s have reached the objective of Kursk because the e n e m y was completely surprised a n d still weak. Valuable t i m e was lost, which the e n e m y used to r u s h in his reserves. 165

T h e u n i t history of Heavy Tank Battalion 505 tells m o r e of the potential o p p o r t u n i t y lost: 5 July 1943: T h e battalion's p e n e t r a t i o n to Butyrki leads to the complete collapse of the Soviet 15th Infantry Division, causing a major crisis on the right wing of the 70th Army. T h e e m p l o y m e n t of the 2d Panzer Division at t h a t time, n o t as scheduled on the following day, w o u l d have destroyed the whole f r o n t ! 166

T h e success of the battalion's attack is reemphasized by the fact that the Central Front c o m m a n d e r , General Rokossovsky, quickly reinforced the 13th Army with 350 aircraft a n d control of the 13th a n d 1st Antitank Brigades, an artillery brigade, a n d the 21st Separate M o r t a r Brigade from the Central Front Reserve. In an i m m e d i a t e a t t e m p t to stabilize the front, the 13th A r m y c o m mander, General Pukhov, c o m m i t t e d his reserve 27th G u a r d s Tank Regiment and c o m b a t engineer units from all parts of the 13th A r m y . 167

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T h e next day, 6 July 1943, Heavy Tank Battalion 505 c o n t i n u e d its attack, this t i m e s u p p o r t i n g the 2d a n d 9th Panzer D i v i s i o n s . This attack caused the front a n d a r m y c o m m a n d e r s to c o m m i t further a r m o r e d reserves to defeat the G e r m a n p e n e t r a t i o n a n d reestablish the first defensive b e l t . T h e Soviets c o m m i t t e d the 16th Tank Corps consisting of two t a n k b r i g a d e s . T h e lead tank brigade unexpectedly e n c o u n t e r e d Heavy Tank Battalion 505 a n d in a matter of a few m i n u t e s , the G e r m a n s destroyed 46 of the brigade's 50 t a n k s . T h e s u p p o r t i n g t a n k brigade was also heavily damaged, losing a further 23 t a n k s . For the next three days, the battalion c o n t i n u e d to attack, along with the 2d a n d the 9th Panzer Divisions, in an a t t e m p t to secure the strategically 169

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i m p o r t a n t town of O l ' k h o v a t k a . In addition to d e t e r m i n e d resistance from Soviet infantry, the Soviets c o n t i n u e d to c o m m i t their a r m o r e d reserves int~ the battle a n d the G e r m a n s never t o o k the town. On 9 July 1943, 9th A r m y ordered Heavy Tank Battalion 505 to withdraw from the battle to act as corps reserve for XLVII Panzer Corps. F r o m 10 to 11 July 1943, Heavy Tank Battalion 505 s u p p o r t e d attacks toward Toploye. T h e battalion went over to the defense a n d from 15 to 17 July 1943, it withd r e w to its original start l i n e . 174

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Heavy Tank Battalion 505 was successful in destroying a large n u m b e r of e n e m y tanks d u r i n g their b r e a k t h r o u g h a t t e m p t on the first day a n d were again successful in destroying a large g r o u p of e n e m y tanks d u r i n g the Soviet counterattack on the second day. They were, however, u n a b l e to overcome the repeated counterattacks a n d the well-established, deep Soviet defenses, to assist in breaking t h r o u g h on an operational level. Heavy Tank Battalion 505 destroyed 42 Soviet tanks on the o p e n i n g day of O p e r a t i o n a l Zitadelle on 5 July 1943 and a n o t h e r 67 the next d a y . D u r i n g fighting in the next few days, the attached Funklenk C o m p a n y 312 destroyed an additional T - 3 4 . After the G e r m a n offensive in the n o r t h stalled, the battalion assisted in repulsing Soviet a r m o r e d counterattacks on 15 a n d 17 July 1943, destroying a n o t h e r 22 a n d 32 enemy tanks respectively. D u r i n g the period of e m p l o y m e n t w h e n the G e r m a n s were on the offensive, Heavy Tank Battalion 505 destroyed a total of 110 e n e m y tanks, a n d a further 54 tanks after going over to the defense. 178

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D u r i n g the same time, this unit lost a total of only five Tigers to enemy fire. Three of these were lost d u r i n g offensive o p e r a t i o n s and two were lost d u r i n g defensive o p e r a t i o n s after 16 July 1943. As with Heavy Tank Battalion 503 in the south, this battalion was on the offensive a n d could m o r e easily recover its d a m a g e d a n d b r o k e n vehicles. The result was that there were no Tigers destroyed by their o w n crews. Even t h o u g h this battalion was unable to penetrate t h r o u g h the entire Soviet defenses a n d accomplish its mission, it was able to achieve a 36.6-to-l kill ratio d u r i n g offensive o p e r a t i o n s against an e n e m y that was in well-prepared, deeply-echeloned defenses a n d a 27.0-to-l kill ratio w h e n on the defensive. 182

This battalion suffered from a low operational rate d u r i n g O p e r a t i o n Zitadelle, m a i n t a i n i n g an average of only 45.7 percent operational from 4 to 20 July 1 9 4 3 . At the start of the battle it fielded 26 Tigers, b u t by the e n d of the second day of fighting, it only h a d six operational Tigers r e m a i n i n g . After its 3d c o m p a n y arrived on 8 July 1943, the battalion fielded 29 Tigers, the highest total that it was able to achieve t h r o u g h o u t O p e r a t i o n Zitadelle. Unit diaries a n d other histories do n o t indicate exact n u m b e r s , but they m a k e it clear that a major p o r t i o n of the vehicles from b o t h heavy t a n k 183

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battalions involved in O p e r a t i o n Zitadelle were d a m a g e d by mines. This is very surprising considering that b o t h battalions were a u g m e n t e d or s u p p o r t ed by additional engineer troops d u r i n g s o m e or all of the o p e r a t i o n . Also, G e r m a n sources do not m e n t i o n it, b u t Soviet sources credit the Tiger t a n k with being m o u n t e d with a m i n e roller capable of detecting the forward edge of a minefield. U n d e r pressure of o u r powerful artillery fire, the G e r m a n s cleared m i n e s a n d obstacles with the help of tanks, together with the w o r k of sappers. For this p u r p o s e the enemy used Tiger tanks in front of which were attached 6 to 7 meter rods with a w o o d e n roller set up on t h e m . W h e n the roller c a m e up against a m i n e , the m i n e exploded, while the t a n k remained u n h a r m e d . In this m a n n e r the e n e m y easily detected the forward edge of the minefield, which was cleared with the help of sapper units. 186

T h e heavy t a n k battalions did, however, receive considerable d a m a g e from mines a n d w h e n they e n c o u n t e r e d a minefield they were slowed or stopped until sappers could clear a path. Regardless of w h e t h e r these m i n e rollers were actually used, it appears that the preferred m e t h o d of m i n e clearing was by m a n u a l means, exposing personnel outside of an a r m o r e d vehicle. W h e n e n e m y fire was too heavy, it seems that the secondary m e t h o d of m i n e breaching was to drive t h r o u g h the m i n e field with Tigers. This resulted in d a m a g e to the vehicles, b u t saved personnel. Minefields probably had a great deal to do with the d r a m a t i c decline in operational rates within b o t h battalions after the first day or two of c o m b a t .

Summary From the initial e m p l o y m e n t until the Battle of Kursk, the heavy t a n k battalions evolved from Organization D, which integrated Tigers with Panzer IIIs, to the Tiger p u r e Organization E. This change was m a d e based u p o n experience gained in c o m b a t in N o r t h Africa a n d t h r o u g h o u t Russia, a n d was m a d e possible by increased Tiger p r o d u c t i o n . T h e inclusion of Panzer IIIs provided the heavy t a n k battalion with a high degree of flexibility in tailoring the force required to accomplish the missions assigned. However, the Panzer IIIs were not sufficiently well a r m o r e d to survive long in c o m b a t as p a r t of a heavy t a n k battalion. With a few notable exceptions, the heavy t a n k battalions were n o t employed in accordance with the d o c t r i n e established for t h e m . Specifically, their e m p l o y m e n t violated the concept of concentration. This was largely d u e to the

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tactical requirements of each situation. At Kursk, w h e n they were concentrated, they did not meet the high expectations t h r o u g h o u t the G e r m a n A r m y for these units, although they did achieve respectable results in t e r m s of sheer n u m b e r s of enemy tanks destroyed. D u r i n g this period, guidance for the e m p l o y m e n t of heavy tank battalions changed slightly based u p o n after-action analyses. Originally, doctrine advocated using the battalion as a p o i n t element. After evaluating several reports from heavy t a n k c o m p a n i e s a n d battalions, G u d e r i a n a n d other influential leaders cautioned restraint in employing it in the lead in all cases. They felt that the unit w o u l d achieve initial results as the v a n g u a r d of the attack, b u t m i g h t n o t be available to fight the decisive battle. This did n o t deter the leaders at Kursk from employing the heavy t a n k battalions as the leading units in the attack. Guderian's fears were realized d u r i n g O p e r a t i o n Zitadelle w h e n b o t h heavy tank battalions involved were reduced to low n u m b e r s of operational Tigers within a few days. T h e Tiger proved to be an excellent t a n k that could withstand m a n y hits from large-caliber shells a n d still c o n t i n u e its mission. T h e low n u m b e r of Tigers destroyed by direct e n e m y action is p r o o f of its resilience. It was, however, a very maintenance-intensive vehicle. On m a n y occasions, this forced heavy tank battalions to operate with only a fraction of the vehicles authorized. T h e low operational rate m a y have, paradoxically, c o n t r i b u t e d to the low n u m b e r of Tigers destroyed in c o m b a t . There were only a few Tigers operational d u r i n g the various campaigns, therefore, there were also only a few Tigers available to be destroyed in battle. The handful of operational vehicles proved m a n y times, especially in the defense, however, that they were capable of locally wreaking havoc on e n e m y a r m o r e d units. T h e defense, a mission for which heavy t a n k battalions were not originally intended, b e c a m e the p r i m a ry focus of G e r m a n units after the Battle of Kursk.

CHAPTER 4

On the Strategic Defensive An A.F.H.Q [Armored Force H e a d q u a r t e r s ] training instruction states that the size a n d weight of the Pz Kw VI [Tiger] present m a n y p r o b lems. PW [Prisoner of War] indicated that extensive reconnaissance of terrain, bridges, etc., was necessary before operations with this t a n k could be u n d e r t a k e n . Bridges h a d to be reinforced in m a n y cases, a n d it was necessary for the "going" to be good for the effective e m p l o y m e n t of the PzKw V1. 1

British interrogation report of captured G e r m a n prisoner, April 1943 Tiger p r o d u c t i o n greatly increased after the Battle of Kursk. T h e three heavy tank battalions that were largely destroyed by the s u m m e r of 1943 were reconstituted a n d all new heavy t a n k battalions fielded were e q u i p p e d a n d organized in accordance with Organization E. By the beginning of s u m m e r 1944, G e r m a n y fielded 12 heavy t a n k battalions a n d was in the process of e q u i p p i n g the last A r m y heavy t a n k battalion, Heavy Tank Battalion 510. T h r o u g h o u t this 1 2 - m o n t h period, most of these heavy t a n k battalions were employed against Soviet forces in the east. O n l y two heavy t a n k battalions fought against American a n d British forces d u r i n g this year, b o t h in Italy. As the expected Allied invasion of France neared however, the G e r m a n s positioned several heavy t a n k battalions in the West to counter the anticipated landings. Two of these were newly-fielded Waffen-SS battalions, with SSHeavy Tank Battalion 501 being stationed in Belgium a n d SS-Heavy Tank Battalion 502 being stationed in the Netherlands. The third heavy t a n k battalion was the very combat-experienced Heavy Tank Battalion 503, which was reconstituted in Germany. In spite of the fact that the G e r m a n military was forced into a defensive posture at the strategic a n d operational levels, doctrine for the e m p l o y m e n t of heavy t a n k battalions did not change. Expectations were high for heavy t a n k battalions a n d they were continually given extremely difficult missions. As a result, heavy t a n k battalions suffered from heavy losses of Tigers a n d experienced sharp declines in the n u m b e r of operational Tigers w h e n c o m m i t t e d . Additionally, the Tiger's mechanical unreliability c o n t i n u e d to plague the

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heavy t a n k battalions a n d stress their recovery a n d m a i n t e n a n c e assets, especially d u r i n g rapid a n d extended m o v e m e n t s .

Fighting on the Russian Front T h e failed G e r m a n offensive at Kursk was followed by a series of Soviet c o u n teroffensives that p u s h e d the G e r m a n s back 240 kilometers across a front of 1050 kilometers. In addition to the two heavy t a n k battalions that participated in O p e r a t i o n ZITADELLE, OKH c o m m i t t e d four m o r e heavy t a n k battalions to A r m y G r o u p s Center a n d South by the end of 1943 in an attempt to stop the Soviet offensives. T h e Soviet threat was focused in the south, so three heavy t a n k battalions joined Heavy Tank Battalion 503 in A r m y G r o u p South's sector. T h e s e t h r e e b a t t a l i o n s , the 3d Battalion of P a n z e r R e g i m e n t Grossdeutschland, a n d Heavy Tank Battalions 506 a n d 509 arrived on the Eastern Front in August, September, a n d November, respectively. All of the battalions that took part in the retreat in the latter half of 1943 e n c o u n t e r e d m a n y difficult situations. These heavy t a n k battalions defended across extended frontages, often w i t h o u t any infantry s u p p o r t . They also h a d to overcome obstacles such as recovery of d a m a g e d a n d b r o k e n - d o w n vehicles d u r i n g retrograde o p e r a t i o n s involving river crossings. A n o t h e r c o m m o n experience a m o n g these battalions was that of piecemeal e m p l o y m e n t as elem e n t s of the battalions arrived at the front at different t i m e s . O n e of the m o s t extensive a n d candid after-action reviews from a unit d u r ing this t i m e came from the c o m m a n d e r of Heavy Tank Battalion 506, Major Withing. It exhaustively detailed the losses that the Tigers suffered a n d the t r a n s p o r t a t i o n p r o b l e m s encountered, as well as the p r o b l e m s of m a i n t e nance; c o m m a n d and control; a n d coordination with s u p p o r t i n g units, especially infantry. T h e n a t u r e of the p r o b l e m s this battalion encountered are probably indicative of the p r o b l e m s encountered by all of the heavy t a n k battalions with A r m y G r o u p s South a n d Center at this t i m e . 2

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D u r i n g its deployment in September 1943, it t o o k four days for the trains carrying the battalion's vehicles a n d e q u i p m e n t to arrive a n d be d o w n l o a d e d at a single station. It was attached to the 9th Panzer Division of the XL Panzer Corps, which h a d the mission of containing the Soviets in the Z a p o r o z h e bridgehead. Withing's report was very critical of the s u p p o r t i n g infantry, a n d placed the b l a m e for their p o o r performance on low morale resulting from long retreats and s u b s t a n d a r d training. T h e battalion was in c o n t i n u o u s c o m b a t from the m o m e n t they arrived at the front a n d because of the repeated Russian attacks, XL Panzer C o r p s t r a n s ferred t h e m back a n d forth across the front to the m o s t threatened sectors. 6

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This did n o t allow m u c h t i m e for m a i n t e n a n c e of the Tigers a n d the report states that they barely h a d t i m e to refuel a n d load available a m m u n i t i o n between e n g a g e m e n t s . This type of e m p l o y m e n t , w i t h o u t adequate m a i n t e n a n c e periods, caused extreme difficulties. Within seven days, the battalion was reduced from 45 new, operational Tigers to zero ready for c o m b a t . Only six of these Tigers were totally destroyed, however, all from hits by direct-fire weapons. T h e unit after-action r e p o r t did contain a complete accounting of the d a m a g e to the other Tigers of the battalion. This r e p o r t m a d e it clear that there were m a n y other Tigers that were very badly d a m a g e d from c o m b a t . 7

8

An interesting aspect of the damages is the fact that even small deficiencies like the destruction of the driver's vision block severely degraded the Tiger's operation. T h e Soviets found it difficult to penetrate the Tiger; consequently, the battalion c o m m a n d e r wrote that "the Russians fired all of their w e a p o n s at the r u n n i n g gear, gun, a n d vision slits." This effectively immobilized a large n u m b e r of Tigers or rendered t h e m c o m b a t ineffective. A n o t h e r deficiency on many Tigers was the failure of the vehicle's internal c o m m u n i c a t i o n system. The report stated that "the driver could no longer be directed by the c o m mander, which m a d e c o m m a n d extraordinarily difficult because the Tiger h a d to halt a n d the engine switched off each t i m e the c o m m a n d e r needed to redirect the driver." 9

10

Withing m a d e it clear in his report that he believed that the battalion was not being employed correctly. He c o m p l a i n e d that other units a n d his higher headquarters h a d such high expectations for his unit that the battalion was given impossible missions, without p r o p e r s u p p o r t from the other b r a n c h e s of the Army. A c o m m o n t h e m e t h r o u g h o u t this report is that this battalion was a victim of the p r o p a g a n d a concerning the Tiger tank. The battalion c o m m a n d e r wrote: T h e extensive p r o p a g a n d a in the newspapers touts the Tiger as being invulnerable a n d p u r e life insurance, so the higher c o m m a n d as well as the simple infantry soldier believes that they can continuously accomplish everything with this fortress. 11

Major W i t h i n g was killed in action less t h a n a m o n t h after he wrote the report, b u t his successor was equally critical of the e m p l o y m e n t of Heavy Tank Battalion 5 0 6 . After m a n y difficult m o n t h s of continual e m p l o y m e n t across wide frontages, usually in the foremost defensive positions a n d often with little or no infantry s u p p o r t , the battalion c o m m a n d e r sought to clarify the d o c trinal role of his battalion. He wrote: 12

O u r u n d e r s t a n d i n g still remains the same as a year ago, that the Tiger is a battering r a m in the attack a n d a b u m p s t o p to be used as the

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Schwerpunkt [decisive point, or m a i n effort] on defense. It is to stand ready in sufficient n u m b e r s for the higher c o m m a n d to use at the decisive m o m e n t . However, this can occur only if, in between the m a i n battles, t i m e is given for care a n d m a i n t e n a n c e instead of being c o n t i n u ously employed as mobile b u n k e r s . 13

His real criticism was on the performance of the infantry w h o m he stated lacked the training a n d m o r a l e to remain in defensive positions w i t h o u t the direct s u p p o r t of Tigers. As a positive example, he cited t h e c o n d u c t of the panzergrenadiers of the 13th Panzer Division as exemplary because they r e m a i n e d alone in their forward positions, allowing tanks to consolidate a n d counterattack from assembly areas in the rear. In other units he stated, "as s o o n as the tanks pull back, the infantry immediately follow, as if d r a w n magnetically." 14

Encirclement: The Cherkassy Pocket On 3 January 1944 Heavy Tank Battalion 503 received a full c o m p l e m e n t of 45 n e w Tiger t a n k s . T h e replacement vehicles arrived just in t i m e to take part in the fighting a r o u n d Cherkassy. On 11 January 1944, III Panzer Corps i n c o r p o r a t e d at least 35 Tigers of Heavy Tank Battalion 503 with the 2d Battalion of Panzer Regiment 23 a n d several s u p p o r t units to form Heavy Panzer Regiment Bäke, n a m e d for its c o m m a n d e r , O b e r s t l e u t n a n t Franz B ä k e . This regiment's e m p l o y m e n t a r o u n d Cherkassy can be viewed in three phases. T h e unit's initial mission was to relieve pressure on the t w o G e r m a n corps defending further east, at Cherkassy, by attacking n o r t h into the encircling Soviet formations a r o u n d M e d w i n . Soviet forces h a d n o t yet completed their encirclement of G e r m a n forces a r o u n d Cherkassy a n d this attack was i n t e n d e d to intercept a n d destroy Soviet a r m o r e d forces before they could complete their t a s k . T h e second a n d t h i r d phases involved the regiment spearheading attacks a t t e m p t i n g to break t h r o u g h the encircling Soviet forces to allow G e r m a n forces to escape. This improvised c o m b a t g r o u p began its initial attack toward Oratoff at 0600 h o u r s on 24 January 1944. Over the next five days of fluid fighting, the g r o u p destroyed 267 e n e m y tanks while losing only three Tigers a n d four P a n t h e r s . F u r t h e r m o r e , o n e of the Tigers was reportedly destroyed by a mistaken shot by a Panther, n o t from e n e m y fire. D u r i n g this attack, the battalion was plagued by resupply problems. These p r o b l e m s s t e m m e d from two sources: a lack of supply vehicles a n d strong partisan forces a n d other mobile Soviet formations that operated along the 15

16

17

18

19

20

21

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ON THE STRATEGIC DEFENSIVE

battalion's supply route. Extensive a n d continual c o m b a t e m p l o y m e n t , in addition to experiencing difficulties in m a i n t a i n i n g Tigers, caused this battalion to have trouble m a i n t a i n i n g its wheeled a n d tracked s u p p o r t vehicles that were necessary for it to function effectively. At o n e p o i n t in the operation, only 68 o u t of Heavy Tank Battalion 503's 111 cross-country vehicles were operational. This m e a n t that the battalion could carry only 119 tons o u t of the total 234 tons of supplies r e q u i r e d . This led to severe logistical p r o b l e m s since there were no paved roads in the area of operations a n d supplies, especially fuel, h a d to be t r a n s p o r t e d long distances over m u d d y g r o u n d w h e n t e m p e r a t u r e s rose above freezing. 22

The already-overburdened supply a n d m a i n t e n a n c e sections h a d to deal with the constant threat of Soviet attacks along their m a i n supply routes. T h e 1st C o m p a n y ' s entire m a i n t e n a n c e section was killed by partisan forces a r o u n d O r a t o v . In fact, when the battalion was ordered to reposition further south to begin attempts to break t h r o u g h to encircled G e r m a n forces, they found Soviet forces occupying the railhead from which they were to d e p a r t . After a short battle, involving the destruction of 46 Soviet tanks, Heavy Panzer Regiment Bäke loaded their vehicles o n t o railcars. This u n i t was lucky to depart w h e n it did because it narrowly escaped yet a n o t h e r Soviet attack on the railhead. 23

24

After the Soviets completed the encirclement of G e r m a n forces in Cherkassy on 28 January 1944, the 1st Panzer A r m y c o m m a n d e r ordered the III Panzer C o r p s a n d Heavy Panzer Regiment Bäke to move south a n d prepare for an attack to the northeast, toward the t o w n of Medvin. This was the shortest distance between G e r m a n forces outside of the Soviet encirclement a n d G e r m a n forces in the pocket a n d as such, was anticipated by Soviet c o m m a n ders. This attack, k n o w n as O p e r a t i o n W A N D A , was spearheaded by Heavy Panzer Regiment Bäke. Following b e h i n d this unit were the two panzer divisions in the corps, the 16th Panzer Division on the left a n d the 17th Panzer Division on the r i g h t . Heavy Tank Battalion 503 often led the attack of Heavy Panzer Regiment Bäke t h r o u g h o u t the o p e r a t i o n . 23

26

27

This attack began at 0600 h o u r s on 4 February 1944 a n d was preceded by a strong artillery b o m b a r d m e n t on the Soviet positions. Despite the fact that the Soviets expected a G e r m a n attack in this area, the G e r m a n attack progressed very well on its first day. Fighting over m u d d y road conditions because of an unusually early thaw, G e r m a n units still m a n a g e d to penetrate over 30 kilometers into the Soviet defensive p o s i t i o n s . This m a y have been d u e to the fact that on the first day the G e r m a n s were o p p o s e d by Only o n e Soviet rifle corps, which possessed no t a n k s . T h e next day, however, Soviet defenses were reinforced by 130 tanks from the 5th Mechanized C o r p s a n d the 5th G u a r d s Tank C o r p s . 28

29

30

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On 5 February 1944, the two trailing panzer divisions lost contact with each o t h e r because of the strong Soviet defenses. T h e corps c o m m a n d e r ordered Heavy Panzer Regiment Bäke to close the gap. D u r i n g this operation, c o m m e n c i n g early in the m o r n i n g , the regiment e n c o u n t e r e d a Soviet t a n k force, reinforced by antitank guns, defending between two ravines. O b e r s t l e u t n a n t Bäke used a tactic that he employed several times d u r i n g the existence of the heavy panzer regiment. T h e Tigers of Heavy Tank Battalion 503 fixed the Soviet forces frontally, probably t h r o u g h long-range direct fire, while at the same t i m e the Panthers of 2d Battalion, Panzer Regiment 23 maneuvered a r o u n d the flank of the Soviet defensive position. Carefully coordinating the two units, the regimental c o m m a n d e r described his plan: T h e attack began at 0600 h o u r s . . . . At daylight, the Panther battalion advanced in a large arc a r o u n d the r i g h t - h a n d balka [ravine] until it was possible to cross over in the enemy's rear. At a b o u t 0830 h o u r s , the Panther battalion attacked in the rear of the completely-surprised enemy. 31

In conjunction with the attack from the rear, O b e r s t l e u t n a n t Bäke also ordered the Tigers, s u p p o r t e d by the reconnaissance battalion from the 16th Panzer Division, to attack the Soviet forces frontally. This tactic was applied w i t h o u t the loss of a single Tiger or Panther and resulted in the rapid destruction of 31 of the 40 Soviet tanks defending the ravines. It also resulted in a quick p e n e t r a t i o n of Soviet defenses. 32

T h e G e r m a n attack c o n t i n u e d until the evening of 7 February 1944, b u t failed to achieve the desired l i n k - u p with the encircled G e r m a n forces. This failure can be attributed to several factors. First, the m u d a n d p o o r terrain c o n d i t i o n s severely restricted vehicular m o v e m e n t . This caused resupply p r o b l e m s for the forward elements in t e r m s of b o t h a m m u n i t i o n a n d fuel. As O b e r s t l e u t n a n t Bäke wrote later: T h e m o v e m e n t , especially of tracked vehicles, was especially h i n d e r e d by the completely m u d d i e d roads. As an example of the strength-robbing n a t u r e of the m e n against the m u d , m a n y Grenadiers t o o k off their b o o t s a n d walked barefoot t h r o u g h the morass, as this was easier t h a n taking several steps, each time having to stop to dig one's b o o t s o u t of the mud. 3 3

A l t h o u g h the weather a n d terrain were theoretically neutral, in that they did n o t favor one side over the other: the Soviets were able to transfer the 5th G u a r d s Tank Corps as well as r e m n a n t s of the 3d a n d 16th Tank C o r p s to the threatened sector. An indication of the ability of Soviet a r m o r e d forces to c o n t i n u e to operate a n d the difficulties that the G e r m a n forces h a d at the same time is seen in Heavy Panzer Regiment Bäke's operations on 6 February 1944. On this day, 34

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ON THE STRATEGIC DEFENSIVE

some elements were tasked with providing protection for supply convoys, with Tiger tanks being used to pull supply vehicles t h r o u g h the m u d , since n o t h i n g else seemed to w o r k . Some Tigers did stay in front-line positions a n d consequently suffered from a lack of supplies. As o n e t a n k c o m m a n d e r wrote: 35

For days, neither rations n o r other supplies h a d m a d e it to us, since the perpetual rain h a d t u r n e d every p a t h into a sea of m u d . Again a n d again, Russian tanks a n d infantry were shot to pieces in various attacks. O u r basic load had been reduced to a few r o u n d s . A fourth t a n k b r o u g h t us 15 r o u n d s for the three Tigers. 36

Heavy Tank Battalion 503's capability to assist in further attacks after 5 February 1944 was also limited by the destruction a key bridge in the area: the only span across the Gniloy Tikich River capable of bearing the weight of a Tiger was b l o w n up as they neared i t . Finally, on the evening of 7 February 1944, the 1st Panzer A r m y called off further attacks because the G e r m a n forces in the pocket h a d moved further to the east, away from the G e r m a n spearheads attacking to link up with t h e m . This was d u e in p a r t from increasing Soviet pressure, b u t the G e r m a n c o m m a n d e r inside the pocket also wanted to shorten his defensive l i n e s . 37

3S

39

Heavy Panzer Regiment Bäke c o n t i n u e d to defend for several m o r e days until m o v i n g further to the south to prepare for yet a n o t h e r relief a t t e m p t . A r m y G r o u p South ordered the 1st Panzer Army to move III Panzer C o r p s south to attack in an easterly direction toward the t o w n of Lysyanka, where they were to link up with G e r m a n forces in the p o c k e t . By 9 July 1944, m o s t of Heavy Tank Battalion 503 r e t u r n e d to the original starting position from which they h a d attacked on 4 February 1944. 40

By this time, the battalion was in very p o o r condition. At best, they p r o b a bly h a d only 20 mission-capable Tigers. In t e r m s of personnel, the battalion was in even worse shape. O u t of the 17 officers authorized in the battalion, only three were available for d u t y . O n e of these was the battalion surgeon, a n d a n o t h e r was a logistics s u p p o r t specialist. T h e sole c o m b a t officer was O b e r l e u t n a n t Walter Scherf, the C o m m a n d e r of the 3d C o m p a n y , w h o took over as battalion c o m m a n d e r . He dissolved the t a n k c o m p a n i e s a n d reorganized the "battalion" into four p l a t o o n s . 41

42

43

This battalion's shortage of operational Tigers was in p a r t m a d e up by the a t t a c h m e n t of Heavy Tank Battalion 506 to Heavy Panzer Regiment Bäke, although it appears that they were reassigned to the 16th or 17th Panzer Divisions after the first day of o p e r a t i o n s . This battalion possessed 27 Tigers, although it is doubtful whether even half of t h e m were o p e r a t i o n a l . T h e attack began early in the m o r n i n g on 11 February 1944 a n d c o n t i n u e d until 16 February 1944 w h e n elements inside the pocket began their breakout, (see m a p 11) 44

43

Map 11: Heavy Panzer Regiment Bäke in the Cherkassy Pocket

February 1943

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ON THE STRATEGIC DEFENSIVE

Just as with their attack d u r i n g the previous week, Heavy Panzer Regiment Bäke m e t with great initial success on the first day, overcoming three Soviet defensive belts a n d penetrating to a depth of 15 k i l o m e t e r s . D u r i n g this first day's attack, the Tigers of b o t h heavy t a n k battalions assisted in c a p t u r i n g a bridge over t h e Gniloy Tikich River. Even t h o u g h great care a n d effort was made in c a p t u r i n g this bridge intact, they found that it was n o t strong e n o u g h for the Tigers to use. T h e Panthers a n d o t h e r G e r m a n elements, therefore, continued the attack on the n o r t h side of the river, leaving the Tigers b e h i n d . Later in the day, reconnaissance efforts successfully located a ford site a n d the Tigers m o v e d to the n o r t h side of the river near the t o w n of Frankovka. They were short of fuel so they formed an assembly area a n d waited for the supply trains to catch u p . 46

Soviet forces countered the G e r m a n attack on 12 February 1944 by positioning elements of the 5th Guards Tank C o r p s a n d the 20th Tank C o r p s in a strong defensive position n o r t h of Frankovka. This force consisted of approximately 80 tanks a n d 50 antitank guns that effectively blocked the advance of G e r m a n units toward their objective. Integrating Stuka dive b o m b e r s w i t h the attack, O b e r s t l e u t n a n t Bäke employed the same tactic that worked so well for his unit d u r i n g their last attack. After being refueled, the Tigers of Heavy Tank Battalion 503 fixed the Soviet forces frontally while the Panthers m a n e u v e r e d a r o u n d the right flank. This attack was also s u p p o r t e d by elements of the 16th Panzer Division, which enveloped the left flank. Altogether, the G e r m a n attack destroyed 70 of the 80 Soviet tanks as well as 40 of the 50 antitank g u n s . Of these, Heavy Tank Battalion 503 claimed to have destroyed between 20 a n d 25 of the Soviet t a n k s . G e r m a n losses in Heavy Panzer Regiment Bäke were four Tigers a n d four P a n t h e r s . 47

48

49

The regiment c o n t i n u e d their attack on 13 February 1944, reaching the Medwin-Lisyanka road. There, they defeated several Soviet a r m o r e d counterattacks. By this t i m e , Heavy Tank Battalion 503 h a d only 12 Tigers operational. They m a n a g e d to destroy six out of seven Soviet tanks attacking d o w n the road from M e d w i n . Later in the day, they destroyed 10 of 15 Soviet tanks attacking from the t o w n of Chishinzy. 50

51

By 14 February 1944 Heavy Tank Battalion 503 was reduced to only n i n e operational Tigers. While follow-on forces secured the towns on either flank, they c o n t i n u e d to defend against Soviet counterattacks in the general area of the Medwin-Lisyanka road. As o n e of the t a n k c o m m a n d e r s described later: 52

We r e m a i n e d in o u r positions on the r o a d to D z h u r s h e n z y a n d h a d to ward off at least four attacks by groups of five to seven Russian tanks, each attack t h u s approximating a weak t a n k company. At least 20 tanks were k n o c k e d o u t in the process. Increasingly, we also h a d to fight off infantry. In the m e a n t i m e , o u r o w n infantry closed up a n d we were a bit

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m o r e secure against hunter/killer teams. Snow squalls a n d fog d a m p e n e d the noise of the fighting; d u e to p o o r visibility e n e m y tanks did n o t emerge into sight until they were extremely close. 53

T h e first p a r t of 15 F e b r u a r y 1944 was spent c o n d u c t i n g an attack n o r t h east t o w a r d D z h u r s h e n z y in an a t t e m p t to break t h r o u g h to the pocket. Unfortunately for Heavy Tank Battalion 503, the Soviets were continually concentrating forces, probably from the 20th Tank Corps, in that very area. T h e Tigers in the battalion succeeded in destroying 14 Soviet tanks, b u t in the process, lost o n e Tiger completely a n d h a d three others d a m a g e d . Despite their losses, the Soviets held back the G e r m a n attack. 54

S o m e t i m e d u r i n g the day, III Panzer Corps ordered Heavy Panzer Regiment Bäke, m i n u s the Panther battalion, to m o v e to s u p p o r t an attack to seize the key terrain feature k n o w n as Hill 239. T h e y linked up w i t h C o m b a t G r o u p Frank of the 1st Panzer Division later in the day a n d succeeded in capturing a section of the t o w n of Oktyabr. T h e y e n d e d the day extremely low on supplies, including fuel, a n d with only seven operational Tigers in Heavy Tank Battalion 503. 55

Early in the m o r n i n g on 16 February 1944, Ju-52 t r a n s p o r t s p a r a c h u t e d steel d r u m s of gasoline a n d crates of t a n k a m m u n i t i o n to the G e r m a n forces p r e p a r i n g to attack Hill 2 3 9 . After refueling a n d stowing a m m u n i t i o n inside their tanks, they attacked a n d seized the r e m a i n d e r of the t o w n of Oktyabr. F r o m here, they prepared for the final assault on Hill 239, only two kilometers away. Between the attacking G e r m a n forces a n d the ones t r a p p e d inside the pocket were an increasing q u a n t i t y of Soviet forces. In addition to the 20th Tank Corps, elements of the 3d Tank C o r p s were n o w in the area. These were reinforced by two rifle divisions a n d an antitank brigade. Although m a n y of these units were u n d e r s t r e n g t h , they were able to achieve an average density of between eight to ten tanks reinforced by 30 to 36 artillery a n d m o r t a r tubes per kilometer of front. 56

37

M a i n t e n a n c e efforts actually increased Heavy Tank Battalion 503's strength to eight Tigers ready for the attack. S u p p o r t e d by n i n e Panthers a n d 12 halftracks carrying infantry, these Tigers attacked Hill 239 a n d succeeded in reaching the road intersection near its crest. O n c e there, however, they came u n d e r intense counterattacks a n d direct fire from t a n k s in the t o w n of D z h u r s h e n z y a n d from w o o d s a r o u n d the hill. Initially, because of their vulnerability, the half-tracks withdrew, b u t eventually the Tigers also w i t h d r e w from the intersection. D u r i n g this brief attack, Heavy Tank Battalion 503's Tigers destroyed 20 Soviet tanks while losing o n e Tiger. Although the G e r m a n s developed plans to retake the hill, the attack on 16 February 1944 was the furthest that the relief attack came to the G e r m a n forces inside the pocket before they began their breakout. 58

39

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ON THE STRATEGIC DEFENSIVE

At s o m e p o i n t prior to 17 February 1944, O b e r s t l e u t n a n t Bäke assumed c o m m a n d of a c o m b a t g r o u p in the 1st Panzer Division. The acting c o m m a n der of Heavy Tank Battalion 503, O b e r l e u t n a n t Walter Scherff, t o o k over Heavy Panzer Regiment Bäke. A few m o n t h s before, he had b e e n a m e r e platoon leader in the 3d C o m p a n y of Heavy Tank Battalion 503; n o w he was c o m m a n d i n g a regiment, albeit in n a m e , not in size. G e r m a n forces inside the pocket were unaware that the linkup site of Hill 239 was n o t controlled by relieving forces. W h e n they began their b r e a k o u t at 1100 h o u r s on 16 February 1944, therefore, they m o v e d toward that p o i n t as planned. T h e first elements breaking o u t m a n a g e d to infiltrate past Soviet forces in the dark a n d m a d e contact with the Tigers of Heavy Tank Battalion 503, just a few h u n d r e d meters southwest of Hill 239, a r o u n d 0410 h o u r s on 17 F e b r u a r y . After Soviet forces b e c a m e aware of the breakout attempt, G e r m a n units were forced to m o v e to the s o u t h to a t t e m p t a link up with G e r m a n forces a r o u n d Lisyanka. 60

By 1100 h o u r s , O b e r s t l e u t n a n t Bäke realized that G e r m a n forces breaking out were having great difficulty in crossing over the Gniloy Tikich River three kilometers east of Lisyanka. In addition, Soviet forces were freely r o a m i n g t h r o u g h o u t the countryside searching for G e r m a n units a t t e m p t i n g to breakout. As Leon Degrelle, c o m m a n d e r of SS Assault Brigade "Wallonia," o n e of the units breaking o u t of the pocket, wrote: We were scarcely starting up the slope w h e n , t u r n i n g back, we saw h u n dreds of cavalry racing d o w n a hill to the southwest. We t h o u g h t at first that it was G e r m a n Uhlans [Lancers. Ed.]. Looking t h r o u g h my b i n o c u lars, I could clearly make out the u n i f o r m of the cavalry. T h e y were Cossacks. I recognized their nervous little b r o w n horses. T h e y were r u s h ing up b e h i n d us, swarming in every direction. We were stupefied. T h e Soviet infantry was m a c h i n e - g u n n i n g us. T h e Soviet tanks were following us. A n d n o w the Cossacks were s t o r m i n g in for the kill. 61

Bäke ordered Heavy Tank Battalion 503 to seize Hill 239 a n d attack toward the t o w n of Pochapintsy. This was i n t e n d e d to relieve the pressure on the troops breaking o u t of the pocket as well as s h o r t e n i n g their route to friendly lines. In c o m m a n d of eight Tigers, O b e r l e u t n a n t Scherff attacked a n d seized Hill 239 against little opposition by 1130 h o u r s . O r d e r e d by Bäke to c o n t i n u e the attack, Scherff's u n i t was relieved on Hill 239 by several Panthers. By 1230 h o u r s the eight Tigers reached the outskirts of Pochapintsy a n d quickly defeated several Soviet c o u n t e r a t t a c k s . After several groups of G e r m a n troops linked up with the Tigers, intense artillery fire forced Scherff a n d his m e n to w i t h d r a w to Hill 239. Artillery fire c o n t i n u e d on the hill as the Soviets 62

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launched a series of attacks, s u p p o r t e d by armor. At 1545 h o u r s , low on a m m u n i t i o n a n d fuel, Scherff w i t h d r e w to G e r m a n lines at Oktyabr. By the evening of 17 February 1944, Heavy Panzer Regiment Bäke only had eight operational Tigers a n d six P a n t h e r s . O t h e r G e r m a n units relieved it on 19 February a n d Heavy Panzer Regiment Bäke d i s b a n d e d six days later. Reports do n o t differentiate between the t a n k kills of Heavy Tank Battalion 503 a n d of the Panthers of the 2d Battalion, Panzer Regiment 23. These two battalions of Heavy Panzer Regiment Bäke are credited with the destruction of 329 Soviet tanks d u r i n g almost two m o n t h s of fighting a r o u n d Cherkassy. D u r i n g that time, Heavy Tank Battalion 503 lost 22 Tigers, six of which were destroyed by their o w n crews because of failed recovery attempts. 63

64

65

Even t h o u g h the battalion was unable to break t h r o u g h the encirclement, they did penetrate far e n o u g h to allow G e r m a n forces in the pocket to link up with relieving forces. T h e y were continually given the m o s t difficult missions as the spearhead of the G e r m a n attacks. T h e seemingly impossible was often asked of t h e m , a n d they usually accomplished it. As the lead unit t h r o u g h o u t m o s t of the operation, their participation m u s t be viewed as successful. T h e battalion played a major role in the attacks to relieve the 56,000 G e r m a n soldiers t r a p p e d inside the pocket, a n d m u c h of the credit for the extrication of m o r e t h a n 30,000 of these G e r m a n soldiers m u s t be awarded to this u n i t . 66

Because the n u m b e r of e n e m y t a n k kills c a n n o t be directly attributed to Heavy Tank Battalion 503, a precise kill ratio c o m p a r i s o n c a n n o t be m a d e . Attributing even a conservative n u m b e r of the 329 Soviet t a n k kills to the battalion establishes this as a very successful o p e r a t i o n . T h e low n u m b e r of Tigers destroyed by their o w n crews is also notable, a l t h o u g h the battalion was attacking most of the time, m a k i n g it easier to recover d a m a g e d a n d disabled vehicles. 67

Italy T h e e m p l o y m e n t of the heavy t a n k battalions in Italy highlighted their deficiencies in recovery vehicles a n d the high m a i n t e n a n c e r e q u i r e m e n t s of Tiger tanks. Two heavy t a n k battalions, Heavy Tank Battalion 508 a n d 504, saw action in Italy. T h e first to be c o m m i t t e d , Heavy Tank Battalion 508, arrived at the Anzio front in the m i d d l e of February 1944. A r m y G r o u p C c o m m i t t e d this battalion in various locations in Italy d u r i n g the next year until they t u r n e d over their remaining 15 Tigers to Heavy Tank Battalion 504 on 12 February 1 9 4 5 . T h a t battalion was first employed in Italy on 20 June 1944 a n d surrendered to American a n d British forces in Italy at the e n d of the w a r w i t h o u t any operational t a n k s . 68

69

70

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ON THE STRATEGIC DEFENSIVE

After the Allied landings at Anzio on 22 January 1944, OKH ordered Heavy Tank Battalion 508 to assist in eliminating the b e a c h h e a d . D u e to Allied air superiority a n d the p r o b l e m s in t r a n s p o r t a t i o n created by aerial interdiction of G e r m a n lines of c o m m u n i c a t i o n , the battalion was u n l o a d e d at a railhead 200 kilometers from its destination of Anzio. T h e Tigers' mechanical deficiencies were highlighted d u r i n g this r o a d m a r c h . A b o u t 60 percent of the Tigers broke d o w n because of p r o b l e m s in negotiating the narrow, sharply-twisting m o u n t a i n roads a n d one Tiger even caught fire a n d e x p l o d e d . Instead of a single powerful force of 45 Tigers, the battalion arrived at the Anzio front piecemeal. 71

72

73

T h e battalion's first attack was on 16 February 1944, b u t because of the swampy terrain, the Tigers were forced to stay on the few roads in the area, a n d they did n o t achieve their objective. This battalion participated in several m o r e unsuccessful attacks that a t t e m p t e d to reduce the Allied bridgehead from the n o r t h . O p e r a t i n g out of the area k n o w n as " T h e Factory," small elements of the battalion s u p p o r t e d attacks against the American forces defending along Dead E n d Road a n d t h e n along the Lateral Road. Because of the swampy terrain, the Tigers stayed on the p r i m a r y roads a n d s u p p o r t e d attacks along the road from T h e Factory to Anzio a n d the road called " T h e Bowling Alley." Its crews a n d their vehicles also helped to contain the bridgehead, destroying three S h e r m a n s that p e n e t r a t e d the front lines on 21 February 1944. (see m a p 12) 74

75

T h e G e r m a n forces launched their last a t t e m p t to eliminate the bridgehead on 29 February 1944. It was d o o m e d to failure because of the restrictive terrain, forcing the attack to proceed along the m a i n roads, (see m a p s 13 a n d 14) Even t h o u g h the G e r m a n s s u p p o r t e d this attack with a strong s m o k e screen to mask their m o v e m e n t , the attack suffered losses from an overwhelming a n d accurate barrage of naval gunfire; from well-placed mines, a n d from antitank fire from the A m e r i c a n 601st Tank Destroyer Battalion. As a Tiger c r e w m a n remembers: O u r artillery began firing at 0500 h o u r s . At 0700 h o u r s we m o v e d o u t of the assembly area, single file on a m u d d y road past Cisterna in the direction of Isola Bella. . . . T h e lead tank, c o m m a n d e d by Oberfähnrich Harder, ran over a mine. While the t a n k track withstood the shock, the leading road wheel's torsion bar was b r o k e n . T h e t a n k h a d to be towed away. T h e entire c o l u m n came to a halt since n o n e of the other vehicles could pass in that m a r s h y area. W h a t to do? Engineers were called up to clear the mines, b u t for the t i m e being we h a d to wait. And then it began. T h e e n e m y artillery began ranging in on u s . 76

A n o t h e r c r e w m e m b e r takes up the story:

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Map 12: Heavy Tank Battalion 508 Attack Vicinity of Anzio 16-20 February 1944 6 GH = 6th Battalion, The Gordon Highlanders (2nd Inf Bde, 1st Br Div) 1 LR= 1st Battalion, The Loyal Regiment (North Lancashire) (2nd Inf Bde, 1st Br Div) 7 O&B = 7th Battalion, The Oxfordshire & Buckinghamshire Lt Inf (167th Inf Bde, 56th Br Div) 1 LIR = 1st Battalion, The London Irish Rifles (167th London Inf Bde, 56th Br Div)

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O N THE STRATEGIC DEFENSIVE

Attack supported by 2d Company, Heavy Tank Battalion 508 stopped by mines, heavy artillery, and direct fire from U.S. tank destroyers. Four Tigers are lost along the road during the day.

Map 13: Heavy Tank Battalion 508 Attack to Reduce Anzio Bridgehead from East

29 February 1944

4 Rgr = 4th Ranger Bn

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Map 14: Heavy Tank Battalion 508 Attack to Reduce Anzio Bridgehead from Northeast

29 February 1944

T h e artillery fire b e c a m e heavier by the m i n u t e . T h e r o u n d s were bursting quite close to us. Shrapnel struck o u r vehicle. O n e burst shredded two road wheels on the right side, a n d a fragment pierced the storage box on the back of the turret. By that t i m e it was n o o n . A suspicious house a b o u t 1,500 meters in front of us was p e p p e r e d with high-explosive r o u n d s . Enemy infantry ran away. 1400 h o u r s : T h e e n e m y fire was u n b r o k e n . T h e n , suddenly, we were hit twice on rear of the turret; four or five hits m o r e followed. Two S h e r m a n tanks were firing at us from the right. We immediately r e t u r n e d fire; o n e S h e r m a n began to b u r n ; the other ran for i t . 77

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ON THE STRATEGIC DEFENSIVE

This t a n k was ultimately disabled w h e n its fuel, leaking from hits by artillery fire, was ignited by white p h o s p h o r u s r o u n d s fired by American artillery. T h e crew was forced to a b a n d o n the Tiger a n d retreat to their original start positions. T h e first crewman's story reinforces the i m p o t e n c e of the G e r m a n a r m o r e d c o l u m n in dealing with the A m e r i c a n minefield w i t h o u t being able to m a n e u ver off the road. E n e m y artillery gave us no rest. T h e [U.S.] artillery spotter directed the salvoes closer a n d closer to us. T h e n my c o m m a n d e r decided to change position. We pulled off the road past the trail vehicle. Bang! A n o t h e r m i n e exploded a n d blew off a torsion bar. The vehicle was disabled. A dreadful feeling to be sitting in a minefield like that. It was obvious that we were n o t going to reach o u r objective. We would have to wait for night before we could have the d a m a g e d vehicles towed away for repairs. The r e m a i n i n g serviceable vehicles w i t h d r e w toward the outskirts of Cisterna, from where they could cover the disabled vehicles. Luckily, at that point, the e n e m y artillery a b a t e d . 78

In the course of this abortive attack, eight tanks were d a m a g e d by mines, artillery fragments a n d direct fire. D u r i n g the next five days, the battalion recovered all of the disabled Tigers, usually at night a n d u n d e r constant artillery fire. Four Tigers were so badly d a m a g e d that they were b e y o n d repair. All of the disabled Tigers were u n d e r direct observation from Allied forces, so the u n a r m o r e d G e r m a n recovery vehicles were useless, a n d only Tigers were used to tow the disabled vehicles. 79

80

T h e battalion's recovery p r o b l e m s were partially offset by the acquisition of two Shermans. S o m e t i m e a r o u n d the end of February, the c o m m a n d e r of the 3d C o m p a n y succeeded in capturing these two vehicles d u r i n g a night engagem e n t . T h e G e r m a n c o m p a n y c o m m a n d e r , O b e r l e u t n a n t Stein, "moved his Tiger between the two, climbed out, p o u n d e d on the e n e m y tanks a n d convinced their crews to surrender." After having their turrets removed, these S h e r m a n s were used to recover disabled Tigers. These decapitated American tanks were found to be excellent recovery vehicles because of their m e c h a n i cal reliability. Further, 81

These e n e m y tanks were e q u i p p e d with an escape hatch in the b o t t o m of the hull. We saw this as advantageous to us. In m a n y cases, the tracks of disabled tanks h a d to be cut off with a welding torch. D u r i n g recovery, this work naturally drew e n e m y fire. It seemed a good idea to install welding gear in the Shermans. We could drive right up to the track of a disabled Tiger, r u n the hoses t h r o u g h the floor hatch a n d cut off the track in safety. 82

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After a short time in R o m e , where the battalion consolidated a n d prepared for further c o m b a t operations, it was employed along the front in small groups, d o w n to individual tanks. On 11 April 1944, the unit's log recorded an e n t r y that became familiar with Tiger units in Italy; "several tanks are employed in an artillery role." This was probably because of the acknowledged inadequacies of the terrain for c o n d u c t i n g a r m o r e d attacks a n d because the G e r m a n s were primarily on the defensive. 83

In an a t t e m p t to stop the Allied offensive to link the Anzio b e a c h h e a d with other Allied forces breaking t h r o u g h from the south, the battalion was given the mission of counterattacking American forces in the vicinity of C i s t e r n a . (see m a p 15) This was the last a c c o m p l i s h m e n t before the battalion lost m a n y Tigers d u r i n g their retreat n o r t h . D u r i n g this attack, o n e Tiger was lost to e n e m y fire. It was the first of 22 Tigers lost over a three-day period. T h e 3d C o m p a n y , starting the o p e r a t i o n as an overstrength c o m p a n y with 16 Tigers (instead of the 14 a u t h o r i z e d ) , experienced most of the trouble. Its p r o b l e m s are indicative of the p r o b l e m s experienced by the entire battalion. As a G e r m a n after-action r e p o r t described the action: 84

T h e 3d C o m p a n y formed up b e h i n d the railway e m b a n k m e n t between the Mussolini Canal a n d the level crossing, a n d engaged t r o o p concentrations with high-explosive fragmentation shells. It t h e n crossed the e m b a n k m e n t . Three Tigers broke d o w n in the a t t e m p t (one with t r a n s mission trouble a n d two with tracks riding over the sprocket teeth). T h e r e m a i n i n g 13 crews all h a d to stop on o p e n g r o u n d because their guns h a d d u g into the g r o u n d w h e n the Tigers descended the steep e m b a n k m e n t , a n d needed to be cleaned o u t . . . . T h e first loss sustained in action was a Tiger that h a d o n e radiator destroyed by an artillery r o u n d a n d h a d to limp back toward Cori in stages. Twelve Tigers were t h u s left in action d u r i n g the night of 23/24 May 1944. 85

T h o u g h costly, this attack across the Cisterna-Littoria railway e m b a n k m e n t m a n a g e d to destroy 15 S h e r m a n s a n d drive American forces back three kilometers in this local sector. On the m o r n i n g of 24 M a y 1944, A r m y G r o u p C o r d e r e d a withdrawal in the face of the Allied b r e a k t h r o u g h between Cisterna a n d the Mussolini C a n a l . Maintenance failures a n d recovery p r o b l e m s d u r i n g the withdrawal resulted in the destruction of every 3d C o m p a n y Tiger save one. The following relates the details of the calamity experienced by this c o m p a n y in this operation: 86

Eleven Tigers w i t h d r e w to the e m b a n k m e n t a n d the 3d C o m p a n y c o m m a n d e r ordered five Tigers to c o n t i n u e to hold the e n e m y while six were used to tow away the three Tigers that originally h a d failed to cross. Four

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1. Attack across railway embankment. 2. Withdrawal to unit maintenance area in Cori. 3. Destruction of Tigers in Cori to avoid capture. 4. Retreat of remnants north to Rome. Around Giulianello, another five Tigers break down and are destroyed by their crews. 5. A final Tiger breaks down around Valmontone. During three days of their fighting withdrawal, Heavy Tank Battalion 508 lost 22 Tigers, all from self-destruction.

Map 15: Heavy Tank Battalion 508 Attack from East and Withdrawal

21-25 May 1944

American offensive operations

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of the six towing Tigers experienced transmission trouble, a n d the c o m m a n d e r t h e n ordered the three towed Tigers to be destroyed. Two of the five operational Tigers assisted in towing away the n e w breakdowns. These eight Tigers got back to an assembly p o i n t near Cori, leaving only four Tigers in fighting order. Of these four, o n e was hit by antitank fire a n d two m o r e experienced transmission trouble (all three were blown u p ) , so that only o n e operational Tiger was left. Two converted S h e r m a n tanks came d o w n from R o m e d u r i n g the night of 24/25 May 1944 a n d extricated the last operational Tiger, which had also b r o k e n d o w n in the m e a n t i m e , by towing it in t a n d e m along the railway track. By 24 May 1944 [the a u t h o r possibly m e a n s 25 May?], the situation had deteriorated so m u c h that it was manifestly impossible to get towing vehicles t h r o u g h , a n d the 3d C o m p a n y c o m m a n d e r ordered that the nine Tigers which h a d reached the assembly area be blown u p . 8 7

R e m n a n t s of the battalion c o n t i n u e d their retreat n o r t h to R o m e t h r o u g h o u t 25 May 1944. A r o u n d Giulianello, a n o t h e r five Tigers broke d o w n a n d were destroyed by their crews. A final Tiger broke d o w n near Valmontone a n d was also destroyed by its crew to avoid capture. D u r i n g the three-day period from 23 to 25 May 1944, Heavy Tank Battalion 508 lost 22 Tigers. Every o n e of these was destroyed by its o w n crew a n d only a handful were d a m a g e d in c o m b a t prior to their destruction. Of those d a m aged in combat, n o n e were d a m a g e d beyond repair, b u t because they were u n d e r e n e m y fire a n d recovery was impossible, the crews were forced to destroy t h e m . 88

On 25 M a y 1944, the battalion c o m m a n d e r reported to Hitler's H e a d q u a r ters, as o r d e r e d . T h e battalion's losses were considered so high that the battalion c o m m a n d e r was relieved that evening, p r e s u m a b l y on Hitler's o r d e r s . T h e battalion lacked a suitable recover vehicle a n d the Tiger had a tendency to break d o w n in hilly, rugged terrain, however, so the battalion c o m m a n d e r ' s p e r f o r m a n c e c a n n o t be the sole reason, if he can be b l a m e d at all, for the high Tiger losses. 89

90

Immediately following the G e r m a n withdrawal, the Allies c o n d u c t e d a study of the destroyed Tigers in this area to "find o u t w h a t weapon or what tactics h a d been responsible, so that the dose m i g h t be repeated on other occasions." This report concluded that: 91

T h e Tiger is n o t yet sufficiently developed to be considered a reliable vehicle for long marches. It suffers from frequent suspension defects and probably also gearbox trouble. W h e n pushed, as in a retreat, these t r o u bles are too frequent a n d serious for the G e r m a n m a i n t e n a n c e a n d recovery organization to deal w i t h . 92

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ON THE STRATEGIC DEFENSIVE

This assessment was very astute. Tiger units were severely challenged w h e n confronted with difficult terrain or the r e q u i r e m e n t to move long distances by road m a r c h . These flaws did m u c h to offset the otherwise t r e m e n d o u s tactical advantages possessed by Tiger battalions. This battalion was not alone in its p r o b l e m s of maintaining a n d recovering Tigers. Heavy Tank Battalion 504 was first employed in Italy on 20 June 1944, just in t i m e to take part in the great withdrawal n o r t h of R o m e . D u r i n g the ten days from 22 June to 1 July 1944, the battalion lost 28 of its 45 Tigers a n d is a classic example of destruction from rapid m a n e u v e r . (see m a p 16) 93

94

T h e battalion lost most of its Tigers while w i t h d r a w i n g along Highway 439 north from Massa M a r i t t i m a to P o m a r a n c e while a t t e m p t i n g to delay A m e r i can forces. On 22 June 1944, the 1st A r m o r e d Division attacked as part of a larger offensive drive to Route 68. As the official Division history notes, the straight-line distance of this attack was only 65 kilometers, b u t because of the winding n a t u r e of the roads over the m o u n t a i n o u s terrain, the attack had to cover 190 kilometers over narrow, w i n d i n g , secondary routes. 9s

Initially, the 1st A r m o r e d Division attacked with two c o m b a t c o m m a n d s , each one attacking up on the right a n d left of the division zone. C o m b a t C o m m a n d B, in the west, attacked along the best road in the zone, Highway 439. Tigers from the 1st Company, Heavy Tank Battalion 504 initially stopped this attack, destroying 11 S h e r m a n s a n d forcing the a b a n d o n m e n t of 12 m o r e . The 1st A r m o r e d Division c o m m i t t e d a third force, Task Force Howze, along a trail that ran between a n d paralleled C o m b a t C o m m a n d A a n d B's routes. This force m a d e better progress that the o t h e r two C o m b a t C o m m a n d s a n d the G e r m a n s w i t h d r e w to the n o r t h . The Tigers of Heavy Tank Battalion 504 a t t e m p t e d to delay U.S. forces primarily along the best of the three routes, defending against C o m b a t C o m m a n d B, although a few Tigers were reported defending in the center against Task Force Howze. T h e terrain t h r o u g h o u t this area was extremely hilly a n d ill-suited to a r m o r operations. As the battle history of the 1st A r m o r e d Division stated: There were no first-class roads, few second-rate roads, a n d a h o d g e podge of small trails a n d footpaths. T h e roads ran t h r o u g h n a r r o w defiles, were cut into hillsides, a n d twisted up a n d d o w n heights with m a n y hairpin t u r n s . They often led t h r o u g h towns with n a r r o w streets lined by m a s o n r y houses. O p p o r t u n i t i e s for delay by demolitions were unlimited. 96

Given the terrible n a t u r e of the terrain, it is not surprising that m a n y Tigers broke d o w n d u r i n g their retrograde o p e r a t i o n . W h a t is surprising is that the G e r m a n s (primarily m o v i n g along Highway 439) were unable to recover or

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Map 16: Heavy Tank Battalion 504 Loss of 22 Tigers in Italy

30 June 1944

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ON THE STRATEGIC DEFENSIVE

repair those Tigers faster t h a n the advancing U.S. forces ( m o v i n g on roads which were little m o r e t h a n goat paths). An indication of the obstacles that the 1st A r m o r e d Division's two engineer c o m p a n i e s h a d to overcome is provided in the following excerpt. T h e engineers were heavily worked, as indicated by the record of the 16th A r m o r e d Engineer Battalion's a c c o m p l i s h m e n t s before the attack was completed. T h e battalion h a d swept m o r e t h a n 500 miles of r o a d for mines (finding two n e w types), bulldozed passage t h r o u g h the rubble in 11 towns, improved 8 fords, repaired 12 e n e m y bridges, constructed 37 steel treadway bridges, a n d built or graded a b o u t 150 miles of bypasses. 97

Despite this, the 1st A r m o r e d Division was able to m a i n t a i n an average rate of advance of five miles (six kilometers) per day. D u r i n g their delaying operations against the 1st A r m o r e d Division, Heavy Tank Battalion 504 lost 28 of their 45 Tigers. Of these 28, it is likely that only one was knocked o u t a n d totally destroyed in direct c o m b a t . O t h e r s broke down d u r i n g r o a d m a r c h e s , broke t h r o u g h bridges, or slid off the sides of r o a d s . O n l y a few were reported as having been slightly disabled in direct combat a n d were unable to be recovered, forcing their crews to destroy t h e m . 98

99

100

This great loss of Tigers was repeated on a similar scale d u r i n g the same withdrawal of G e r m a n forces n o r t h of R o m e by Heavy Tank Battalion 508. This battalion, operating east of Heavy Tank Battalion 504, s u p p o r t e d G e r m a n forces w i t h d r a w i n g against U.S. pressure. T h e terrain in this area was also rugged, so this battalion lost heavily from b r e a k d o w n s . D u r i n g its w i t h d r a w al, the battalion lost 13 of its 23 Tigers, m o s t from self-destruction. 101

In 40 days of c o m b a t , two heavy t a n k battalions fighting in Italy lost 64 Tigers. Possibly as few as five of these were destroyed in direct combat! Although there were clearly m o r e t h a n five that were d a m a g e d in c o m b a t a n d subsequently h a d to be destroyed to avoid capture, it is clear that the vast majority of the 64 were destroyed for reasons other t h a n c o m b a t d a m a g e . 102

Regardless of reason, two heavy t a n k battalions that were each at a full strength of 45 Tigers on 23 May 1944, were reduced to a total strength of ten for Heavy Tank Battalion 508 a n d 17 for Heavy Tank Battalion 504 by 1 July 1944. This was d o n e primarily t h r o u g h rapid m a n e u v e r which kept the G e r m a n s off balance a n d did not allow the heavy t a n k battalions t i m e to recover. U.S. forces in Italy found that w h a t was extremely difficult to overcome frontally was relatively easy to overcome t h r o u g h maneuver, especially in terrain that favored the m o r e mechanically-reliable tanks of the U.S. Army. D u r i n g the British 8th Army's offensive in September 1944, Heavy Tank Battalion 508 lost a further 11 Tigers d u r i n g its retreat to the Gothic Line, all

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were destroyed by their o w n crews to avoid c a p t u r e . Although not specifically m e n t i o n e d , it appears that the G e r m a n s a t t e m p t e d to overcome the Tiger's mechanical weaknesses in the latter stages of the Italian c a m p a i g n by employing it primarily on good roads. D u r i n g the fighting along the Gothic Line, the battalion was employed mainly along Route 9, between Bologna a n d Cesena. 103

104

D u r i n g the majority of these two battalion's e m p l o y m e n t in Italy, they were n o t employed as a battalion, or even as companies a n d platoons. To provide tank-killing coverage along the entire front, they were widely dispersed, often using single t a n k s . This violated the principle of concentration that the G e r m a n s called for in the e m p l o y m e n t of their armor. It also caused extraord i n a r y p r o b l e m s for c o m m a n d a n d control a n d for logistics for the battalion. 105

Log entries in the unit histories indicate that this was a misuse of the battalion. It m a y have been a misuse of the battalion based on its original p u r pose, b u t given the situation in t e r m s of mission a n d terrain, the e m p l o y m e n t in Italy was probably m o r e effective t h a n concentrating the unit at a single point. Small groups a n d even single Tigers proved they were capable of defending against heavy e n e m y attacks, especially in restrictive terrain. Given the mechanical difficulties of the Tiger, getting to a good defensive location seems to have been m o r e t h a n half the battle. If the G e r m a n s had concentrated these battalions along a single sector of the front, the Allies would have found it easier to break t h r o u g h in a n o t h e r sector a n d a repeat of the major losses d u r i n g withdrawals m a y have occurred, which is exactly the strategy that the Allies wished to employ against these powerful formations. T h e heavy tank battalions were n o t as successful in Italy at destroying e n e m y tanks as they were elsewhere. Heavy Tank Battalion 508 lost 70 Tigers in Italy a n d only m a n a g e d to destroy a little m o r e t h a n o n e h u n d r e d e n e m y t a n k s . This gives this battalion a kill ratio of only 1.43 to 1. Of the 70 Tigers lost, however, almost 50 were destroyed by their o w n crews to avoid being capt u r e d . T h u s , the kill ratio of direct c o m b a t losses was 3.3 e n e m y tanks for every Tiger destroyed in c o m b a t . 106

107

Heavy Tank Battalion 504 lost 87 Tigers d u r i n g its e m p l o y m e n t in Italy a n d destroyed 100 e n e m y tanks d u r i n g that t i m e . Of the 87 Tigers, probably only 13 were destroyed by e n e m y fire. Of the 74 Tigers that were destroyed by their o w n crews, 29 of these were destroyed d u r i n g the final m o n t h of the war w h e n the strategic situation was hopeless for the G e r m a n s . Until the final m o n t h of the war then, this battalion destroyed 7.7 e n e m y tanks to every Tiger lost in direct c o m b a t a n d almost two e n e m y tanks for every Tiger lost, regardless of the reason. W i t h the exception of the withdrawals where large n u m b e r s of Tigers broke d o w n , these two battalions were able to m a i n t a i n a fairly high operational rate for their vehicles. Heavy Tank Battalion 508 was able to m a i n t a i n a 60 percent 108

109

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operational rate for their Tigers while Heavy Tank Battalion 504 m a i n t a i n e d almost an 82 percent operational rate for t h e i r s . Notably, this was achieved despite being so widely dispersed across the front. Of course, once in place, these vehicles also were not required to c o n d u c t long r o a d m a r c h e s from o n e spot to another, which helped to reduce the n u m b e r of b r e a k d o w n s . Also, despite several spectacular advances by the Allies, the Italian theater was primarily static, with G e r m a n forces defending prepared lines. Undoubtedly, this static n a t u r e was also a factor in raising the maintenance status of the battalions. 111

Conclusion The increased Tiger p r o d u c t i o n capability allowed G e r m a n y to m o r e t h a n double the n u m b e r of heavy t a n k battalions from the s u m m e r of 1943 to the s u m m e r of 1944. Of the ten a r m y heavy t a n k battalions, all but two were c o m mitted in the east fighting the Soviets. A l t h o u g h the G e r m a n military was on the defensive, heavy t a n k battalions were still employed offensively in leading counterattacks, spearheading relief attacks, or attacking to eliminate bridgeheads, beachheads, or to restore the previous m a i n defensive line. Tiger tanks c o n t i n u e d to suffer from several deficiencies of e q u i p m e n t . Specifically, the inability to develop a n d field a m i n e roller or plow to assist the Tiger in overcoming the increasing Allied use of mines caused Tigers to suffer damage. This, in t u r n , resulted in a sharp decline in the n u m b e r of operational Tigers after their c o m m i t m e n t to battle. T h e lack of an a r m o r e d recovery vehicle, a n d the inadequate n u m b e r of recovery vehicles overall, presented heavy tank battalions with m a n y challenges in recovering disabled Tigers. Often, these challenges could n o t be overcome, with the end result being a large n u m b e r of Tigers destroyed by their o w n crews to avoid capture. By the s u m m e r of 1944, almost two years h a d passed since the Tiger began being p r o d u c e d . Despite several i m p r o v e m e n t s to the Tiger, the mechanical reliability r e m a i n e d poor, especially d u r i n g rapid m o v e m e n t s over extensive distances. This resulted in m o r e Tigers being destroyed by their o w n crews during several withdrawals. In m a n y instances, heavy t a n k battalions were able to successfully defend against attacks in which they were vastly o u t n u m b e r e d , often with only a few operational Tigers. Despite being primarily on the defensive, however, the doctrinal guidance for the e m p l o y m e n t of heavy tank battalions was n o t revised to address this reality. 112

CHAPTER 5

The Last Year of the War T h e e m p l o y m e n t of "Tigers" in individual groups (spread over the corps sector a n d frequently shifted from o n e division to a n o t h e r ) succeeded for the m o s t part in keeping the m a i n battle line of the corps intact. Wherever "Tigers" were employed, the Russians called off their attacks or only repeated t h e m with infantry in suitable terrain (woods and the area a r o u n d lakes). Major Hans-Joachim Schwaner, C o m m a n d e r , Heavy Tank Battalion 502 1

By the e n d of May 1944, the G e r m a n s had built up an impressive n u m b e r of heavy t a n k battalions to counter the expected Soviet s u m m e r offensive in the east a n d the Allied invasion of France. Six i n d e p e n d e n t heavy tank battalions a n d the Grossdeutschland's heavy tank battalion were on the Eastern front p r e p a r i n g for the inevitable Soviet attack. In the West, the G e r m a n s positioned SS-Heavy Tank Battalion 101 a n d 102 (redesignated 501 a n d 502 in N o v e m b e r 1944) in Belgium a n d the Netherlands respectively, prepared to react to an invasion in the Pas de Calais. In addition to the two heavy t a n k battalions operating in Italy, Heavy Tank Battalion 503 was reestablished after its near destruction in the East a n d fully reequipped with 45 new Tigers by 17 June 1944. OKH also formed its last new heavy t a n k battalion, Heavy Tank Battalion 510, which, coincidentally, was fully m a n n e d a n d e q u i p p e d by 20 July 1944. 2

3

4

This period m a r k e d a high p o i n t in the n u m b e r of heavy tank battalions available a n d in the strength of the battalions overall. T h e Allied offensive k n o w n as Operation OVERLORD in the West and the Soviets' O p e r a t i o n BAGRATION in the east led to heavy losses in heavy tank battalions. By the end of July 1944, three heavy t a n k battalions, namely 501, 505, a n d 506, had been decim a t e d in action against the Red Army. These battalions either had no tanks left or h a d so few that they h a n d e d t h e m over to o t h e r heavy tank battalions. In s o m e instances, the few r e m a i n i n g tanks were so badly d a m a g e d that they were t r a n s p o r t e d back to factories in G e r m a n y to be overhauled. In the West, of the three heavy tank battalions c o m m i t t e d to N o r m a n d y , only a handful of Tigers m a d e it across the Seine River, a n d probably n o n e of these m a d e it all the way back to Germany, although o n e m a n a g e d to get as far as Brussels. 3

6

7

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By the last year of the war, the heavy tank battalions e n c o u n t e r e d m o r e weapons capable of penetrating the Tiger, a n d even the newly-issued King Tiger. Tiger crews were so confident in their vehicle that they did n o t adhere to the same tactics that m o r e lightly-armored tanks did. This was b e g i n n i n g to cause losses from a general lack of care in a d h e r i n g to such basic tactical p r i n ciples as overwatch, use of terrain, a n d a d e q u a t e reconnaissance. To counter this, the Inspector of Panzer Troops wrote an article, stressing the i m p o r t a n c e of Tiger's adherence to accepted tactical principles. 8

9

The Allied offensives forced the G e r m a n military a n d the heavy tank battalions to operate primarily on the defensive, although heavy t a n k battalions did participate in s o m e offensives d u r i n g the last year of the war. However, an examination of the last year's major o p e r a t i o n s reveals that Tigers a n d heavy tank battalions gradually became less effective.

Operation

BAGRATION

As a result of Soviet deception efforts, the G e r m a n s concentrated their a r m o r e d forces s o u t h of Belorussia with A r m y G r o u p s N o r t h U k r a i n e a n d South Ukraine a n d left few a r m o r e d units with A r m y G r o u p Center, where the main Soviet offensive k n o w n as O p e r a t i o n BAGRATION was focused. W h e n the Soviet attack began on 22 June 1944, only o n e heavy t a n k battalion, Heavy Tank Battalion 501, was assigned to A r m y G r o u p Center. OKH assigned four heavy tank battalions, Heavy Tank Battalions 505, 506, 507, a n d 509, to A r m y G r o u p N o r t h U k r a i n e . M o r e fateful for the G e r m a n s , in the early p a r t of June, Heavy Tank Battalion 501 gave up n i n e of its Tigers to Heavy Tank Battalion 509, attached to A r m y G r o u p N o r t h Ukraine to bring it up to full strength. This left Heavy Tank Battalion 501 with only 20 Tigers in the battalion. A r m y G r o u p Center c o m m i t t e d Heavy Tank Battalion 501 immediately u p o n c o m m e n c e m e n t of the Soviet attack, a n d it fought in the vicinity of the Orscha j u n c t i o n , along with the 14th a n d 256th Infantry Divisions a n d the 78th S t u r m Division, beginning on 23 June 1944. Because these units were overwhelmed a n d destroyed within the first few days of fighting, reports concerning this battalion are incomplete. Probably only six Tigers from this battalion ever m a d e it back across the Berezina River, ferrying over on 1 or 2 July 1944. On 4 July 1944, the battalion received five new Tigers a n d fought near Minsk with several recently-repaired tanks. T h e battalion's last two Tigers were destroyed when they ran o u t of fuel on 5 July 1944 fighting near M o l o d e c h n o . In less t h a n two weeks of fighting, this battalion was c o m pletely destroyed, (see m a p 17) 10

11

12

13

14

15

16

Map 17: Overview of Heavy Tank Battalions' Retrograde Operations During Operation BAGRATION

June-July 1944

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Information is so incomplete for this u n i t that no reasonable assessment can be m a d e a b o u t its e m p l o y m e n t . It is clear, however, that t h e 25 Tigers fielded by this battalion were wholly i n a d e q u a t e to stop t h e Soviet attack against A r m y G r o u p Center. Once the G e r m a n s realized that the m a i n Soviet attack was focused on Army G r o u p Center, Heavy Tank Battalion 505 a n d 507 were loaded o n t o trains for t r a n s p o r t from A r m y G r o u p N o r t h U k r a i n e on 24 a n d 22 June 1944, respectively. A r m y G r o u p Center attached Heavy Tank Battalion 505, t h e first heavy t a n k battalion to arrive, to t h e 5th Panzer Division a n d employed it as a blocking force n o r t h e a s t of Borisov. Initially, its task was to keep o p e n t h e p r i m a r y r o u t e from Minsk to Orscha. It was also tasked with stopping the Soviet a r m o r e d attacks along the M i n s k - O r s c h a highway a n d with defending the bridges across the Berezina River near Borisov. 17

18

F r o m 27 to 30 June, the battalion fought against the 11th G u a r d s A r m y of the 3d Byelorussian Front near Krupki a n d Borisov. D u r i n g this t i m e , its crews destroyed m o r e t h a n 70 e n e m y tanks while losing nine Tigers, all d u e to enemy a c t i o n . M o r e importantly, as part of the 5th Panzer Division, they held o p e n t h e major M i n s k - O r s c h a highway crossings of t h e Berezina River for four days, allowing o t h e r G e r m a n units to w i t h d r a w to t h e west. 19

After the Soviets crossed t h e Berezina n o r t h a n d south of Borisov, t h e 5th Panzer Division a n d Heavy Tank Battalion 505 w i t h d r e w northwest of Minsk. From 1 to 6 July 1944, the battalion fought a r o u n d M o l o d e c h n o . On 7 July 1944, Soviet forces cut the battalion's line of c o m m u n i c a t i o n , forcing t h e m to destroy 12 Tigers that were d a m a g e d a n d to retreat to the west. T h e battalion, greatly dispersed, finally arrived in G r o d n o , a r o u n d 200 kilometers west of Minsk, on 9 July 1944. Sources vary, b u t at least 11 a n d probably 24 Tigers from t h e battalion survived the r e t r e a t . OKH o r d e r e d the survivors of the battalion back to G e r m a n y to be r e e q u i p p e d with the new King Tiger. 20

21

22

23

24

D u r i n g O p e r a t i o n BAGRATION, Heavy Tank Battalion 505 destroyed 128 enemy tanks while losing approximately 21 Tigers. D u r i n g desperate defensive a n d retrograde actions where it was always o u t n u m b e r e d , this battalion m a n aged to achieve a 6.1-to-l kill ratio. T h e other heavy tank battalion to arrive from A r m y G r o u p N o r t h U k r a i n e was Heavy Tank Battalion 507. This battalion detrained at Baranovichi on 2 July 1944 after Soviet forces cut the m a i n r o a d to M i n s k . T h e battalion fought a r o u n d Baranovichi a n d Slonim until 10 July 1944. After Soviet forces captured Lida a n d Vilna (Vilnius, Lithuania), the battalion withdrew, finally arriving across t h e Narev River at Trzeszczotki on 20 July 1 9 4 4 . In all, the battalion lost 10 Tigers, with o n e Tiger being destroyed by its o w n crew. Available records do not provide information on the d a m a g e inflicted u p o n t h e e n e m y forces, so a kill ratio c a n n o t be c o m p u t e d reliably. T h e 25

26

27

28

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battalion was successful in delaying the Soviet advance for m o r e t h a n seven days along the Soviet s o u t h e r n axis of attack, a l t h o u g h by this point the Soviets were probably very close to achieving their operational goals anyway. It is difficult to judge these battalions' effectiveness because records are incomplete. Two of these battalions fought against the m o s t powerful Soviet attacks, Heavy Tank Battalion 501 a r o u n d Orscha a n d Heavy Tank Battalion 505 northwest of Minsk. It can be inferred that all three battalions were locally a n d temporarily successful at stopping t h e Soviet advance. Both Heavy Tank Battalion 505 a n d 507 only w i t h d r e w to avoid encirclement after their line of retreat was cut or threatened. Also w o r t h y of m e n t i o n is the relatively low n u m b e r of Tigers destroyed because they could not be recovered. This is especially impressive considering the fluid n a t u r e of the battle and the great distances these battalions traveled d u r i n g their withdrawals. 29

In the Aftermath of Operation BAGRATION: Heavy Tank Battalion 502 Defending Dünaburg As a result of the success of O p e r a t i o n BAGRATION, a huge gap was t o r n in the G e r m a n defenses between A r m y G r o u p Center a n d A r m y G r o u p N o r t h . T h e situation was s u m m e d up by a report from A r m y G r o u p N o r t h to OKH on 29 June 1944: T h e d e v e l o p m e n t of the situation in the A r m y G r o u p Center area of o p e r a t i o n s has decisively changed the situation of A r m y G r o u p N o r t h . T h e right flank of the a r m y g r o u p hangs in the breeze. South of here, t h e e n e m y has achieved operational freedom on a wide front and can quickly advance strong forces to t h e west. T h e chance of reestablishing t h e form e r contact with A r m y G r o u p Center does n o t exist. 30

On 2 July 1944, Heavy Tank Battalion 502 was t r a n s p o r t e d by rail from O s t r o w to Dünaburg. T h a t s a m e day, after overcoming t h e G e r m a n strongp o i n t at Polozk, the Soviet 6th G u a r d s A r m y was exploiting the b r e a k t h r o u g h t o w a r d Dünaburg (Daugavpils, Latvia). In this area between t h e a r m y g r o u p s , there were only small, disorganized, G e r m a n units that were desperately a t t e m p t i n g to c o m b i n e to form a coherent defensive line. T h e II Corps was ordered to build a new front with units pulled from t h r o u g h o u t A r m y Group North. 31

32

A study of the e m p l o y m e n t of Heavy Tank Battalion 502 in and a r o u n d Dünaburg between 4 a n d 27 July 1944 highlights the weaknesses a n d

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deficiencies of the heavy tank battalions a n d indeed, the Tiger itself, in the conduct of warfare. At the same t i m e , such an examination highlights the incredible tank-killing capability of small g r o u p s of Tigers. Two c o m p a n i e s , the 2d a n d 3d, of this battalion arrived in Dünaburg on 4 July 1944 a n d occupied assembly areas to the southeast of Dünaburg in the towns of Peski a n d Laucesy. (see m a p 18) 33

The first limitation that challenged the battalion's ability to c o n d u c t mobile operations was the D ü n a (western Dvina) River. More specifically, it was the absence of bridges strong e n o u g h for Tigers to cross over the river. As the battalion c o m m a n d e r stated: At the time, the railroad bridge in Dünaburg represented the only crossing possibility for Tigers over t h e D ü n a . N o t only was a crossing n o t available for a distance of 100 kilometers east of Dünaburg, b u t there was also n o n e for at least the same distance northwest of that town. Fording possibilities across the D ü n a were o u t of the question. Because of these reasons, the construction of a 60-ton ferry over the D ü n a northwest of Dünaburg was p l a n n e d . 34

This was i m p o r t a n t because the Düna River ran generally along the route of march of the Soviet attack. To defeat Soviet attacks, the battalion had to be able to move quickly across the river to the n o r t h or the south. T h e existence of a single crossing site severely restricted the battalion's ability to deal effectively with the Soviet attack. Consequently, the battalion's scout a n d engineer platoon began construction of a 60-ton ferry northwest of Dünaburg. Beginning on 9 July 1944, the battalion began counterattacking, reinforcing G e r m a n defensive positions, a n d relieving encircled G e r m a n s t r o n g p o i n t s . These missions involved road marches across long distances a n d subsequently strained the mechanical reliability of the Tigers themselves. At 1000 h o u r s on 9 July 1944, the battalion was ordered to c o n d u c t a road m a r c h to Deguziai, a distance of 50 k i l o m e t e r s . T h e battalion requested p o s t p o n e m e n t of the m o v e m e n t until later in the day w h e n it was cooler, b u t because the situation was critical a n d the battalion was urgently needed by the 205th Infantry Division, this request was denied. T h e battalion after-action report stated: 35

Towards 1900 h o u r s , the c o m b a t elements of the 2d a n d 3d C o m p a n i e s arrived in the sector ordered with a large n u m b e r of road m a r c h breakd o w n s ( m o t o r damage, r u n n i n g gear d a m a g e ) . These were b o u n d to occur as a result of the high t e m p e r a t u r e and the long m a r c h distance. Of the 22 Tigers that originally participated in the road m a r c h , only five Tigers from the 2d C o m p a n y a n d three Tigers from the 3d C o m p a n y were c o m b a t ready. 36

Map 18: Heavy Tank Battalion 502: Post-Operation BAGRATION, South of Dünaburg

4-11 July 1944

1. Company Assembly Areas 2. Objective: Hill 216 3. Evening objective and recovery of disabled Tigers by 2d Company, Heavy Tank Battalion 502

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This m e a n t that 64 percent of the Tigers broke d o w n d u r i n g a 50-kilometer r o a d m a r c h along a p r i m a r y road. U p o n reaching the t o w n of Deguziai, the 205th Infantry Division ordered the battalion to move further southwest to Daugailiai a n d defeat e n e m y forces near t h e r e . To reach their objective, the battalion e n c o u n t e r e d a n o t h e r bridge three kilometers southwest of Deguziai. Engineers reinforced it so that it was strong e n o u g h to s u p p o r t Tigers. This required time, however, a n d the Tigers did n o t cross the bridge until 0600 h o u r s the next m o r n i n g . 37

On 10 July 1944, the 3d C o m p a n y , with a total of nine operational Tigers, drove 19 kilometers from Deguziai to Garniai. In consonance with an infantry battalion, it attacked e n e m y forces southwest of Garniai in an a t t e m p t to break t h r o u g h to an encircled G e r m a n c o m b a t g r o u p . Despite destroying a large n u m b e r of a n t i t a n k guns a n d m o r t a r s , the G e r m a n forces were unable to break t h r o u g h the Soviet force. In addition to failing to accomplish their mission, two Tigers were destroyed by flank shots from antitank guns. Early in the afternoon, the battalion c o m m a n d e r ordered this c o m p a n y to establish contact with a n o t h e r G e r m a n c o m b a t g r o u p to the south. After receiving additional a m m u n i t i o n , the 3d C o m p a n y a n d an infantry battalion from the 205th Infantry Division's Grenadier Regiment 335, began their m o v e m e n t a r o u n d 1800 h o u r s . This c o m b a t g r o u p also m e t stiff Russian resistance a n d was unable to break t h r o u g h to their objective. Until the onset of darkness, a large n u m b e r of antitank guns were destroyed a n d several artillery pieces were p u t o u t of action. E n e m y infantry, m a k i n g a counterattack o u t of the w o o d s , were successfully engaged. T h e e n e m y lost nearly 200 m e n . W h e n it b e c a m e dark, the attack h a d to be stopped at the line reached, because only two Tigers o u t of the original seven operationally-ready ones were still capable of fighting. Five vehicles broke d o w n d u e to the heavy d e m a n d s placed on the powerplants, the s u m m e r t i m e heat, a n d the long road m a r c h on the previous day. 38

T h e 3d C o m p a n y started the day with n i n e operational Tigers a n d m o v e d at least 32 kilometers t h r o u g h o u t the day. T h e five mechanically-inoperable Tigers presented a further p r o b l e m for the battalion because they were close to e n e m y forces a n d far away from recovery assets. T h e m a i n t e n a n c e woes for the battalion continued w h e n the 2d C o m p a n y was ordered from Deguziai, where they guarded the bridge, to assist in recovering the five b r o k e n d o w n Tigers of 3d C o m p a n y . T h e 2d C o m p a n y started with only five operational Tigers a n d reached the 3d C o m p a n y positions after m i d n i g h t on 11 July 1944 with only two Tigers. T h e others h a d b r o k e n d o w n on the road m a r c h . 39

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T h r o u g h o u t 11 July 1944, recovery an d m a i n t e n a n c e elements worked at towing and fixing the disabled Tigers, which was eventually completed w i t h great difficulty. By the early m o r n i n g of 11 July 1944, the battalion h a d seven operational Tigers. The battalion ordered these to move from Deguziai back to Dünaburg. From there they moved via Peski, their old assembly area, to Tarzeka, to support a counterattack by the 215th Infantry Division to regain the village of Karasino and restore the old front line. This m a r c h , although on p r i m a r y roads, was 65 kilometers l o n g . 40

Of the seven operational Tigers that began the m a r c h , only two m a d e it without breaking down. Although two o t h e r Tigers from t h e battalion m a i n tenance repair shop were b r o u g h t forward in t i m e to participate in the attack, these four Tigers represented the majority, if not all, of t h e battalion's c o m b a t strength after only three days of mobile defensive c o m b a t . This attack was successful, with the few Tigers destroying 10 Soviet tanks a n d six antitank g u n s 41

for the loss of two Tigers. T h e battalion's 1st Company arrived on 12 July 1944 in Dünaburg from X Corps in Idriza. It added ten operational Tigers to the battalion's c o m b a t power. From 12 through 21 July 1944, Heavy Tank Battalion 502 c o n t i n u e d to conduct operations south of Dünaburg. These o p e r a t i o n s consisted of several small groups of Tigers spread t h r o u g h o u t t h e area of operations, usually consisting of between two and five Tigers. D u r i n g this first p e r i o d of e m p l o y m e n t south of the Düna River, the battalion destroyed 12 Soviet tanks, 53 a n t i t a n k guns, a n d 15 mortars. This was accomplished at the price of losing seven Tiger tanks. (see m a p 19) A Soviet breakthrough on the n o r t h b a n k of the Düna on 21 July 1944 forced the battalion to focus their efforts to the n o r t h . They were given the following mission by II Corps: Cross over to the n o r t h e r n b a n k of the Düna with all operationallyready Tigers a n d , using the Dünaburg-Isvalta road, reach the 290th Infantry Division c o m m a n d post at Ohmelnickaja as soon as possible. H o l d u p further e n e m y a r m o r p e n e t r a t i o n s i n t h e d i r e c t i o n o f Dünaburg. 42

T h e battalion was further cautioned that e n e m y contact along the route to Ochmelnickaja was to be expected. T h e battalion moved along the designated route in at least three march c o l u m n s D u r i n g the movement, they received information that a p p r o x i m a t e ly 20 Soviet tanks had penetrated west of the new defensive line. T h e 2d Company, u n d e r Leutnant Carius, m o v e d back to Dünaburg to protect the m a i n road n o r t h of that city. In the small t o w n of Mahnava, Carius a n d two o t h e r Tigers encountered 20 T-34s a n d JS-IIs. W i t h o u t losing any Tigers, these

Map 19: Heavy Tank Battalion 502 Post-Operation Bagration, North of DÜNABURG

22-25 July 1944

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three tanks destroyed 17 of the Soviet t a n k s . This action effectively defeated the Russian attack on Dünaburg, for the day at least. A n o t h e r substantial Soviet b r e a k t h r o u g h occurred on the n o r t h side of the Düna River on 23 July 1944. T h e next day was spent m o v i n g groups of Tigers to intercept the Soviet a r m o r e d formations to block their m o v e m e n t to Dünaburg, primarily along the m a i n roads. The area a r o u n d Krivani was the scene of a n o t h e r major defeat of Soviet armor. This time, Leutnant Nienstedt, with six Tigers, defended the t o w n . 43

Nienstedt was able to initiate a firefight between his Tigers a n d the e n e m y tanks which had b r o k e n t h r o u g h . He was able to k n o c k o u t 17 of the 20 attacking tanks, a m o n g t h e m 2 assault guns. He himself knocked o u t 10 e n e m y tanks with his Tiger. Using his 6 Tigers, he conducted a counterattack in conjunction with Engineer Battalion 44. By evening, the old positions h a d been r e g a i n e d . 44

On the next day, 25 July, it was the t u r n of 3d C o m p a n y ' s Leutnant Eichhorn to distinguish himself. He led an attack on a Soviet tank unit that was p r e p a r i n g to attack along the Dünaburg-Kreutzberg (Krustpils) road. This unit, probably consisting of five Tigers, destroyed 16 JS-II heavy tanks within ten m i n u t e s at close range, w i t h o u t losing any Tigers. On 26 July 1944, Lieutenant E i c h h o r n s u p p o r t e d an infantry regiment in an attack on strong Soviet positions in the same area. A l t h o u g h his force of four Tigers m a n a g e d to destroy 12 T-34s, o n e SU-122, a n d ten antitank guns, the attackers were forced to withdraw, with the infantry m o v i n g back across to the west side of the Düna River. Also, two of the four Tigers were totally destroyed a n d the other two were badly damaged. 45

D u r i n g the battalion's e m p l o y m e n t on the n o r t h side of the Düna River, they destroyed 73 Soviet tanks a n d 24 antitank g u n s while losing only four Tigers. T h e 18.25-to-l kill ratio from 22 to 26 July 1944 was probably aided by the restrictive terrain that m a d e m o v e m e n t difficult, if n o t impossible, off of the p r i m a r y roads. T h e battalion also operated in a m u c h smaller area t h a n they did s o u t h of the Düna, reducing the n u m b e r of m o v e m e n t s and the distances required to travel d u r i n g those m o v e m e n t s . The initial p e r i o d of e m p l o y m e n t required rapid a n d extensive m o v e m e n t in a fluid a n d uncertain battlefield. This type of c o m b a t stressed the Tigers mechanically a n d consequently inflicted p r o b l e m s on the battalion's m a i n t e nance a n d recovery assets. T h r o u g h o u t the battalion's c o m b a t operations a r o u n d Dünaburg, it was only able to m a i n t a i n a 44.53 percent operational readiness rate for its Tigers. T h e o u t s t a n d i n g penetrative capability of the Tiger's m a i n gun allowed very small elements of the battalion to destroy large 46

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n u m b e r s of Soviet tanks, thereby delaying the eventual Soviet capture of Dünaburg.

Normandy Three heavy t a n k battalions were involved in c o m b a t in N o r m a n d y . Two of these were SS battalions assigned to I a n d II SS-Panzer Corps. T h e last was Heavy Tank Battalion 503, which was attached to the 21st Panzer Division t h r o u g h o u t the c a m p a i g n . This makes the e m p l o y m e n t of these battalions u n i q u e in that they were n o t shuffled a r o u n d the front from unit to unit, b u t were assigned permanently, in the case of SS Heavy Tank Battalion 101 a n d 102, or kept in s u p p o r t of the same division, as was the case of Heavy Tank Battalion 503. A n o t h e r u n i q u e aspect is that these were the battles in which the King Tiger t a n k was introduced, fielded by the 1st C o m p a n y a n d the headquarters element of Heavy Tank Battalion 5 0 3 . T h e final u n u s u a l aspect a b o u t the heavy t a n k battalions in N o r m a n d y is that they were all employed almost exclusively against the British a r o u n d C a e n . Tiger t a n k losses in direct c o m b a t action d u r i n g the N o r m a n d y c a m p a i g n increased in absolute n u m b e r s a n d t h u s reduced the c o m b a t kill ratio of heavy tank battalions, relative to previous engagements against British a n d A m e r i can forces. This was due in large p a r t to the static n a t u r e of the G e r m a n defensive p o s t u r e that allowed heavy t a n k battalions to recover d a m a g e d or disabled Tigers a n d repair t h e m in m a i n t e n a n c e facilities b e h i n d the line. T h e result was that fewer Tigers required destruction to avoid capture d u r i n g hasty withdrawals, a n d t h u s a higher percentage of Tigers were destroyed by direct fire t h a n in previous battles. A n o t h e r factor in this d y n a m i c was that the Allied forces, particularly the British, fielded m o r e w e a p o n s with better tank-killing abilities. 47

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49

Since the battles in N o r t h Africa, the British A r m y h a d sought to develop and employ tanks a n d antitank guns with high penetrative capabilities. After e n c o u n t e r i n g m o r e Tigers a n d their first Panthers in Italy, this necessity was only reinforced. By 1944, the British issued a 7 6 m m (the so-called "17pounder," after the weight of the cartridge a n d projectile) towed antitank gun to their antitank regiments at a ratio of two to every 5 7 m m ( " 6 - p o u n d e r " ) antitank gun that was already in u s e . This already excellent weapon was i m p r o v e d by developing n e w a m m u n i tion. Adding to the basic a r m o r piercing (AP) r o u n d , the British i n t r o d u c e d an a r m o r piercing capped (APC) a n d also an a r m o r piercing capped ballistic capped (APCBC) r o u n d . T h e last r o u n d h a d a second cap which gave it 30

51

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better p e n e t r a t i o n beyond 500 meters. Later in t h e war, t h e British developed an even better r o u n d , the a r m o r piercing discarding sabot (APDS). To increase muzzle velocity, a sub-caliber shot was placed inside an a l u m i n u m shoe (or "sabot") that detached itself after leaving the muzzle of the gun. T h u s , the subcaliber r o u n d was propelled forward with all the force available to a larger p r o jectile's surface area, b u t with t h e reduced friction of only the sub-caliber r o u n d itself. This increase in muzzle velocity greatly increased the kinetic p e n etration capabilities of the r o u n d , giving it the ability to penetrate 1 7 0 m m of a r m o r at 1,000 meters. The impressive n a t u r e of this is evident w h e n c o m p a r e d to the 1 0 0 m m of a r m o r that a Tiger's 8 8 m m m a i n gun, firing a PzGr. 39 r o u n d , was capable of p e n e t r a t i n g at t h e same r a n g e . 32

Both the American a n d British leadership realized that this 7 6 m m antitank gun h a d twice the penetrative capability of t h e low-velocity 7 5 m m g u n m o u n t e d in the S h e r m a n t a n k to that point, as well as s o m e versions of the British Cromwell a n d Churchill. After several unsuccessful attempts, t h e 7 6 m m was eventually m o u n t e d in a S h e r m a n . These u p - g u n n e d S h e r m a n s were called the "VC" or "Firefly," a n d a rush conversion p r o g r a m was u n d e r taken. T h e Royal O r d n a n c e Factories were able to provide every British a r m o r regiment with 12 Fireflies by D-Day for OVERLORD or shortly afterwards. This was e n o u g h for each British t a n k platoon (a " t r o o p " in British parlance) of four tanks to have o n e Firefly, greatly e n h a n c i n g the overall lethality of t h e unit. This was extremely i m p o r t a n t in the fighting to c o m e because it provided each platoon with a w e a p o n that was capable of destroying a Tiger. 53

T h e final area of emphasis on tank-killing ability for t h e Allies was in m a n p o r t a b l e a n t i t a n k infantry w e a p o n s . T h e British fielded the "Projector, Infantry, Antitank," or PIAT. This was a 3 4 - p o u n d w e a p o n that l a u n c h e d a t w o - a n d - o n e - h a l f - p o u n d projectile with a shaped charge w a r h e a d to a m a x i m u m effective range against tanks of 100 m e t e r s . T h e Americans fielded the i m p r o v e d M9 Bazooka. This famous w e a p o n fired a high-explosive rocket capable of p e n e t r a t i n g 7 5 m m of a r m o r a n d had a m a x i m u m effective range of 100 m e t e r s . Later i m p r o v e m e n t s on the rocket increased the p e n e t r a t i n g ability to close to 100 millimeters. 54

55

A l t h o u g h b o t h of these w e a p o n s were in service p r i o r to the c o m m e n c e m e n t of OVERLORD, they were available in m u c h greater n u m b e r s t h a n previously. M o r e importantly, t h e n a t u r e of the N o r m a n d y battlefield e n h a n c e d their effectiveness because e n g a g e m e n t ranges were generally greatly reduced in t h e c o m p a r t m e n t a l i z e d terrain. These w e a p o n s were still unable to destroy a Tiger, except in extraordinary circumstances, usually involving a lucky shot. T h e y did, however, provide t h e i n f a n t r y m a n with a w e a p o n that could disable a Tiger. To do so required a skilled and courageous operator, firing from very close range. Even then, t h e best chance of disabling a Tiger involved hitting the

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track or roadwheels to disable it or hitting it in the rear a r m o r to d a m a g e the engine. Chances of d a m a g i n g a Tiger could be improved by employing t h e m en masse, with two or three fired at the same t i m e at the same aiming point. SS-Heavy Tank Battalion 101 was the first heavy t a n k battalion to reach the invasion area. This unit r o a d m a r c h e d from its training area at Beauvais, near the Belgian-French border, t h r o u g h Paris, a n d finally to N o r m a n d y . Alerted on 6 June 1944, the battalion started to m o v e the next day. In recognition of Allied air superiority, the unit m o v e d primarily at night, but was still attacked n u m e r o u s times by fighters a n d b o m b e r s . T h e lead elements only arrived b e h i n d the front on the evening of 12 June 1944, with m a n y vehicles m e c h a n ically broken d o w n e n r o u t e . By d a w n on 13 June 1944, the 1st C o m p a n y deployed eight Tigers 10 kilometers northwest of Villers-Bocage on the N175 Highway, while 2d C o m p a n y deployed six Tigers just a few kilometers n o r t h west of the same t o w n . T h e 3d C o m p a n y was still e n r o u t e in the vicinity of Falaise a n d did n o t reach the front until 15 June 1944. It took six days to travel the 400 kilometers from their staging area to their c o m b a t assembly area. D u r i n g this r o a d m a r c h , despite the air attacks, SS-Heavy Tank Battalion 101 lost no Tigers to fighter-bombers d u r i n g the m o v e m e n t , (see m a p 20) 36

37

38

59

The battalion's b a p t i s m of fire, the battle of Villers-Bocage, took place on 13 June 1944, only h o u r s after m o s t of their Tigers a n d crews arrived in their assembly areas. This legendary engagement is often cited, b u t seldom well d o c u m e n t e d . Most versions address the battle in b r o a d generalizations, a n d accordingly, the accounts vary greatly. W h e n specific accounts are given, they almost universally focus on the initial engagement, led by the c o m m a n d e r of the 2d C o m p a n y , O b e r s t u r m f ü h r e r Michael W i t t m a n n , a n d fail to m e n t i o n the details of the entire battle. (see m a p 21) W h a t is indisputable is that two u n d e r s t r e n g t h companies of SS-Heavy Tank Battalion 101, along with elements from the Panzer-Lehr Division a n d the 2d Panzer Division, m a n a g e d to defeat the lead brigade of the British 7th A r m o u r e d Division. This was vitally i m p o r t a n t because this unit was a t t e m p t ing to exploit a break in the G e r m a n line between the I SS-Panzer C o r p s ' Panzer-Lehr Division a n d the 352d Infantry Division of the XLVII C o r p s . 60

This gap began to develop w h e n the 352d Infantry Division was forced to w i t h d r a w u n d e r American pressure. This caused a break in the line between the two G e r m a n divisions as well as between American a n d British forces, which was noticed by b o t h sides as early as 9 June 1944. The British 2d A r m y p l a n n e d to use the 7th A r m o u r e d Division to envelop the G e r m a n forces' left flank a n d use the m a i n highway, the N 1 7 5 , to attack toward Caen. Key to this operation was seizure of the i m p o r t a n t t o w n of Villers-Bocage a n d the high point 2.5 kilometers to the northeast of the town. F r o m this high point, Hill 213, the road led straight d o w n to Caen. Headquarters, British 2d Army, issued

Map 20: SS-Heavy Tank Battalion 101: Roadmarch to Normandy

7-13 June 1944

Map 2 1 : SS-Heavy Tank Battalion 5 0 1 : Attack on Villers-Bocage in Normandy

13 June 1944

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t h e order to execute this o p e r a t i o n at n o o n on 12 June 1944 a n d by that evening, the 7th A r m o u r e d Division was attacking deeply into the o p e n flank of the Panzer-Lehr Division, stopping overnight in the vicinity of Livry. T h e G e r m a n s were aware of the gap in their lines, b u t were unable to do anything a b o u t it because all available units were engaged. Because of this, as elements of SS-Heavy Tank Battalion 101 arrived, they were positioned generally along the N175 b e h i n d the Panzer-Lehr Division. The closest elem e n t to Villers-Bocage, the 2d C o m p a n y u n d e r W i t t m a n n , was "instructed to stand by in the Villers area, ready to attack a n d destroy an eventual e n e m y attack from the northeast a n d northwest." Both the 1st a n d 2d C o m p a n i e s probably arrived after dark a n d established assembly areas in the h o p e of cond u c t i n g m a i n t e n a n c e a n d resting from the long road m a r c h . This h o p e was n o t to be realized for W i t t m a n n ' s company. This c o m p a n y received heavy artillery fire t h r o u g h o u t the night and, because they were u n d e r the mistaken a s s u m p t i o n that they were being observed by the British, m o v e d twice in an a t t e m p t to avoid it. In reality, this was pre-planned, u n o b s e r v e d interdictory fire against obvious geographical targets, fired in s u p p o r t of the British attack. 61

62

T h e British c o n t i n u e d their attack at 0500 h o u r s the next day, 13 June 1 9 4 4 . By 0900, the lead unit, the 4th C o u n t y of L o n d o n Yeomanry ( T h e Sharpshooters), h a d passed t h r o u g h the t o w n of Villers-Bocage a n d were sitting on top of their m o s t i m p o r t a n t initial objective, Hill 2 1 3 . At this point, they were arrayed along the N 1 7 5 from Hill 213 back t h r o u g h town a n d along the r o a d leading back to Livry. A company-sized u n i t of T h e Sharpshooters, A S q u a d r o n , occupied the geographical crest of Hill 213. Behind t h e m , on the m a i n road stretching back to the east edge of Villers-Bocage, was their attached infantry company, A C o m p a n y , 1st Battalion, T h e Rifle Brigade, in infantry carriers a n d half-tracks. T h e y were followed by T h e Sharpshooters' regimental H e a d q u a r t e r s Section a n d elements of the regimental Reconnaissance Troop, which took up most of the m a i n road in the town. T h e next t a n k companies, B a n d C Squadrons of The Sharpshooters, started on the western edge of Villers-Bocage a n d stretched back toward Livry. Behind T h e Sharpshooters on the road back to Livry was the l s t / 7 t h Battalion, T h e Q u e e n s Royal Regiment (West Surrey), followed by the 5th Regiment (a battalion-sized unit) of the Royal Horse Artillery. 63

64

65

Michael W i t t m a n n a n d his 2d C o m p a n y watched in awe as the British a r m o r e d units passed by t h e m , a few h u n d r e d meters n o r t h of their assembly area. H a d W i t t m a n n k n o w n that the British c o l u m n was stopped temporarily for a leaders' reconnaissance a n d orders g r o u p on Hill 213, he may have taken the t i m e to coordinate a hasty attack by his u n d e r s t r e n g t h company. Probably because he believed that the British were going to c o n t i n u e toward Caen

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117

without pausing, he attacked the c o l u m n alone in a single Tiger. In an afteraction report written by W i t t m a n n later that day, he said: I had no t i m e to assemble my c o m p a n y ; instead I had to act quickly, as I had to assume that the e n e m y h a d already spotted me a n d w o u l d destroy me where I stood. I set off with o n e tank a n d passed the order to the o t h ers n o t to retreat a single step b u t to h o l d their g r o u n d . Drove up to the c o l u m n , surprised the English as m u c h as they h a d m e . I first k n o c k e d out two tanks from the right of the c o l u m n , then o n e from the left a n d attacked the a r m o r e d t r o o p carrier battalion in the m i d d l e of the a r m o r e d regiment. I drove toward the rear half of the c o l u m n on the same road, k n o c k i n g o u t every t a n k that came towards me as I went. T h e e n e m y was t h r o w n into total confusion. I t h e n drove straight into the t o w n of Villers, got to approximately the center of t o w n where I was hit by an antitank gun. My t a n k was disabled. W i t h o u t further ado, I fired at a n d destroyed everything a r o u n d me that I could reach; I h a d lost radio contact a n d was unable to s u m m o n my company. My tanks were o u t of sight. I t h e n decided to a b a n d o n my tank. We t o o k all the w e a p o n s we could carry, b u t didn't destroy the t a n k as I believed that we could regain possession of it. 66

This attack was a very decisive p o r t i o n of the battle because his actions forced the British to a b a n d o n all h o p e of c o n t i n u i n g the p l a n n e d attack a n d forced t h e m o n t o the defensive. D u r i n g this attack, W i t t m a n n destroyed p o r tions of the lead British t a n k company, the infantry company, the regimental headquarters element, a n d p o r t i o n s of the reconnaissance t r o o p . In all, he destroyed no fewer than 12 e n e m y tanks, 13 a r m o r e d t r o o p carriers, a n d two antitank g u n s . M o r e importantly, h e caused t r e m e n d o u s confusion t h r o u g h out the British forces remaining o u t of contact a n d panic in those units that he did engage. 67

While W i t t m a n n was engaging the units west of Hill 213 a n d in the t o w n of Villers-Bocage, other Tigers from his c o m p a n y attacked from the s o u t h a n d southwest t o w a r d A S q u a d r o n of T h e Sharpshooters on Hill 213. By a b o u t 1100 h o u r s , an ad hoc t a n k c o m p a n y from the Panzer-Lehr Division attacked from the northeast against the same objective. Some sources indicate that another company-sized tank unit was scratched together by the Panzer-Lehr Division, using tanks that were in its repair facility. This u n i t allegedly advanced s o u t h of the N175 a n d attacked Hill 213 from the s o u t h a n d s o u t h east. Finally, a r o u n d 1300 h o u r s , H a u p t s t u r m f ü h r e r Rolf M ö b i u s ' 1st C o m p a n y of SS-Heavy Tank Battalion 101 attacked d o w n the N175 from the east a n d northeast, a n d the hill was retaken.

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This is the point where accounts normally stop. T h e G e r m a n s h a d been wildly successful up to this p o i n t , with SS-Heavy Tank Battalion 101 destroying 23 or 24 British tanks, as well as n u m e r o u s t r o o p carriers a n d antitank g u n s . The real achievement, however, was the fact that it halted the 7th A r m o u r e d Division's a t t a c k . A major p r o b l e m r e m a i n e d for the G e r m a n s , however, in that while their forces were busy eliminating the British on Hill 213, infantry from lst/7th Battalion, the Q u e e n s Royal Regiment a n d B and C Squadrons of T h e Sharpshooters occupied Villers-Bocage itself. T h r o u g h o u t the town, S h e r m a n Fireflys a n d antitank guns were positioned at key intersections a n d alleys, m a n y positioned for flank shots. Also, the infantry were a r m e d with the PIAT, giving t h e m a tank-killing capability as well. 68

69

D u r i n g the afternoon, the 1st C o m p a n y of SS-Heavy Tank Battalion 1 0 1 a n d the ad hoc t a n k c o m p a n y from the Panzer-Lehr attacked to seize the town. Because there were n o n e available, this attack was virtually u n s u p p o r t e d by any panzergrenadiers or o t h e r d i s m o u n t e d troops. As could be expected, the G e r m a n s lost heavily in the t o w n a n d were unsuccessful in p u s h i n g o u t the British. Engagements were at such close ranges that on several occasions, vehicle loaders had to sight d o w n their guns' tubes because the g u n n e r s could not use their telescopic sights. Late in t h e day, British forces did w i t h d r a w to defensive positions in the vicinity of Livry, b u t this was probably because of a perceived threat from lead units of the 2d Panzer Division arriving from the s o u t h near Villers-Bocage, as well as a c o n t i n u i n g G e r m a n force build up t h r o u g h o u t the area. 70

71

By halting the British o p e r a t i o n to outflank G e r m a n forces, the tactical engagement initiated by Michael W i t t m a n n was sensational and definitely h a d m u c h larger implications. In stopping the British offensive, however, SSHeavy Tank Battalion 101 paid the price of at least five Tigers destroyed, a n d m a y have lost as m a n y as seven. This fact is often overlooked w h e n some recount the stirring story of W i t t m a n n ' s attack. W i t t m a n n ' s Tiger was reportedly the only Tiger d a m a g e d in his company, a n d it was indeed subsequently recovered a n d repaired. 72

73

In Möbius' 1st Company, which attacked into Villers-Bocage, losses were m u c h heavier. This c o m p a n y attacked Hill 213 with eight to ten Tigers a n d succeeded in destroying British forces there w i t h o u t any losses. Möbius left two Tigers in the vicinity of Hill 213 to secure the feature a n d attacked into the t o w n with the r e m a i n d e r of the company. This m e a n s that six to eight Tigers entered the t o w n . It is difficult to differentiate the Tigers that were destroyed from the ones that were totally disabled, b u t five Tigers were p r o b ably totally destroyed a n d a n o t h e r two were disabled b u t repairable. British forces in the town, possibly aware of the resiliency of the Tigers, m a d e every effort to ensure that the d a m a g e d Tigers were rendered irreparable. Sergeant 74

75

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Bobby Bramwell describes h o w the leader of his t r o o p d i s m o u n t e d a n d ensured that the disabled Tigers that he e n c o u n t e r e d were totally destroyed: It n o w began to rain heavily. O n e of the panzers had caught fire, the crew was either dead or had got out, b u t the G e r m a n s would be able to c o m e back a n d tow the tank away. Bill C o t t o n , therefore, took a G e r m a n gas can a n d a few wool blankets and we went o u t to destroy the panzer. Bill opened up an umbrella on account of the rain; we m u s t have been crazy! We went from panzer to panzer, Bill with his o p e n umbrella a n d the blankets a n d I with the gas can. We soaked a blanket with gasoline a n d tossed it inside the turret, followed by a m a t c h . 76

Of the nine Tigers that entered the t o w n of Villers-Bocage t h r o u g h o u t the day's battle, including W i t t m a n n ' s Tiger, all b u t one was either d a m a g e d or destroyed. Whatever the exact n u m b e r of tanks that were totally destroyed, it is indisputable that the 1st C o m p a n y of SS-Heavy Tank Battalion 101 was c o m b a t ineffective by the e n d of the day. Far from being the resounding a n d overwhelming G e r m a n success that m a n y accounts portray, when looked at in total, although they undeniably did stop the British advance, the G e r m a n s ' victory was essentially Pyrrhic. Further, the Tigers lost d u r i n g this battle were never replaced t h r o u g h o u t the r e m a i n d e r of the N o r m a n d y c a m p a i g n . T h e losses of the British, however, were quickly replaced. For example, three days later, on 16 June 1944, the 4th C o u n t y of L o n d o n Yeomanry was issued replacement vehicles and m a n n e d t h e m with reserve crews. 77

78

The other two heavy t a n k battalions in N o r m a n d y , Heavy Tank Battalion 503 and SS-Heavy Tank Battalion 102, also experienced difficulties in reaching the front because of Allied air superiority. Trains had to be u n l o a d e d a r o u n d Paris for SS-Heavy Tank Battalion 102, b u t the ones t r a n s p o r t i n g Heavy Tank Battalion 503 m a n a g e d to get to Dreaux, 80 kilometers west of Paris. Measures taken to evade Allied aircraft and mechanical b r e a k d o w n s caused these battalions to "trickle" to the front. For example, although most of the trains carrying SS-Heavy Tank Battalion 102 were u n l o a d e d by 27 June 1944, as late as 20 July the battalion still reported that ten Tigers were e n r o u t e to the front. Although few, if any, Tigers were destroyed completely en route to the N o r m a n d y front, Allied air power played an i m p o r t a n t role in interdicting their m o v e m e n t s and thus delayed a n d disrupted their c o m m i t m e n t to battle as coherent a n d cohesive organizations. 79

General G u d e r i a n , the Inspector of A r m o r e d Troops at the time, a p p r o p r i ately described the difficulties that the heavy tank battalions had to overcome in getting to, a n d fighting in, N o r m a n d y . On 19 June 1944, he wrote to Hitler, "by itself, the highest bravery of the a r m o r e d forces c a n n o t make up for the

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loss of two branches absence of Luftwaffe N o r m a n d y invasion were being asked to overcome.

of the Wehrmacht." In this passage he was lamenting the a n d G e r m a n naval participation in stopping the Allied a n d was probably implying that G e r m a n a r m o r e d forces do too m u c h considering the m a n y obstacles they h a d to 80

D u r i n g the r e m a i n d e r of the fighting in N o r m a n d y , all three heavy t a n k battalions were employed primarily as mobile reserves, c o u n t e r i n g e n e m y p e n e t r a t i o n s . T h e y accomplished this by counterattacking to defeat the e n e m y so that the previous front line could be reestablished. It was n o t u n c o m m o n for a battalion to array its three c o m p a n i e s in a dispersed p a t t e r n b e h i n d the front of the division or corps it was s u p p o r t i n g so that each could react quickly to e n e m y penetrations. This was probably also d o n e to reduce the size of the potential target. An entire heavy t a n k battalion in a single assembly area w o u l d surely have b r o u g h t a massive response from the Allied air forces a n d artillery. Even General G u d e r i a n seems to have s u p p o r t e d this dispersion. In a d e p a r t u r e from his principle of concentration, he r e c o m m e n d e d a change of tactics for all t a n k forces, p r e s u m a b l y based u p o n the restrictive terrain of Normandy: W h e n e v e r a r m o r e d forces go into action on the Invasion Front, the Panzer-Kampf-Trupp-Taktik is to be used instead of the previous tactic of employing concentrated forces. T h e latter tactics are still to be used in m o s t other circumstances. T h e Panzer-Kampf-Trupp-Taktik consists of close c o o p e r a t i o n of small a r m o r e d units c o m b i n e d with panzergrenadiers [mechanized or m o t o r i z e d infantry assigned to Panzer or Panzer-Grenadier divisions or Panzer brigades] or Infantry u n i t s . 81

Fortunately for the G e r m a n s , the heavy t a n k battalions a n d the individual heavy t a n k c o m p a n i e s were spread out b e h i n d the m a i n defensive line w h e n the British began O p e r a t i o n G O O D W O O D on 18 July 1944. This attack was p r e ceded by massive aerial a n d naval b o m b a r d m e n t involving 2,077 b o m b e r s d r o p p i n g 7,800 t o n s of b o m b s a n d 720 m e d i u m a n d heavy artillery pieces firing 250,000 shells. T h e British g r o u n d attack was t h e n spearheaded by three a r m o r e d divisions, the 7th, 11th, a n d the Guards A r m o u r e d Divisions. Including the tanks assigned to s u p p o r t the flank attacks, the British attack threw 1,100 tanks at the G e r m a n defenders. (see m a p 22) 82

83

Closest to the front, Heavy Tank Battalion 503, s u p p o r t i n g the 21st Panzer Division, played an i m p o r t a n t p a r t d u r i n g G O O D W O O D . T h e 3d C o m p a n y of Heavy Tank Battalion 503 was hit hardest from the massive b o m b i n g in their assembly area outside of Manneville, near C a e n . T h e 1st C o m p a n y , just o u t side of the t o w n of Emieville, also received damage. T h e British plan called for different types of o r d n a n c e to be d r o p p e d in different areas d e p e n d i n g u p o n 84

Map 22: SS-Heavy Tank Battalion 101 and Heavy Tank Battalion 503 Defense during Operation Goodwood in Normandy

18-20 July 1944

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the type of target and the scheme of m a n e u v e r of the attacking British forces. T h e t o w n of Manneville was inside, and Emieville was just outside, of B o m b i n g Area H, an area encompassing nearly 1,000 acres. The British plan called for this area to be c a p t u r e d by a follow-on unit, the 3d Division, and was not to be used as a route of m a r c h by the leading a r m o r e d divisions. This was i m p o r t a n t because—as the area was n o t required to be traversable by a r m o r e d vehicles in the initial stages of the attack—cratering was allowable and the RAF b o m b e r s d r o p p e d large 1,000- a n d 5 0 0 - p o u n d high-explosive b o m b s in Area H . 8 5

T h e British b o m b e d Area H from approximately 0545 until 0630 h o u r s . For heavy t a n k battalions, this was the worst day for losses from air attack d u r i n g the N o r m a n d y campaign. This battalion probably lost seven Tigers from air attacks d u r i n g this b o m b i n g , four in the 3d C o m p a n y a n d three in the 1st. In yet another, albeit u n u s u a l , testament to the survivability of the Tiger, o n e Tiger was flipped over by the b o m b i n g , ending up resting on its turret. Incredibly, the three crew m e m b e r s inside survived. M o r e i m p o r t a n t l y for the success of the British attack, the b o m b i n g d a m a g e d virtually all of the Tigers in the 1st a n d 3d C o m p a n i e s . It took several h o u r s just to dig o u t the b u r i e d tanks. 86

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T h e British g r o u n d attack began at 0745 a n d e n c o u n t e r e d virtually no resistance up to the railway line from Caen to Troarn, which they reached at a b o u t 0939. O b e r l e u t n a n t v o n Rosen, the C o m m a n d e r of the 3d C o m p a n y , m o v e d eight of its d a m a g e d Tigers toward the t o w n of Cagny in an a t t e m p t to attack the British advance in the flank. Six of those eight Tigers m a d e it to a defensive position n o r t h e a s t of Cagny by 1000, as the other two suffered engine fires d u r i n g the m a r c h . 88

W h e n they began engaging British tanks, they found that their Tigers h a d suffered m o r e t h a n just external damage. As O b e r l e u t n a n t von Rosen stated: It was only t h e n that it b e c a m e clearly evident w h a t h i t h e r t o unseen d a m a g e the tanks h a d received d u r i n g the carpet b o m b i n g . T h e worst result was that all of the t a n k s ' guns were completely o u t of alignment with the sights. We needed three r o u n d s n o w where only o n e w o u l d have b e e n adequate before. 89

Nevertheless, British accounts testify to the effectiveness of these six Tigers in disrupting their attack. M u c h credit, however, m u s t be given to a Luftwaffe battery of 8 8 m m antiaircraft guns positioned in Cagny. These four guns a n d the six Tigers were stationed in a key position that allowed t h e m to engage the attacking British a r m o r before they were able to deploy properly. In effect, the British a r m o r e d divisions "stacked u p " b e h i n d o n e another, from the leading elements a r o u n d Cagny to b e h i n d the railway e m b a n k m e n t . 90

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T h e lethality of the four Luftwaffe 88s is reinforced by the fact t h a t they also accounted for the only two Tigers in the 3d C o m p a n y ' s defensive position that were lost t h r o u g h o u t the day. These Tigers were penetrated in their frontal a r m o r while they were repositioning a r o u n d a small w o o d e d area. T h e Luftwaffe g u n n e r s , u n d e r s t a n d a b l y weak in a r m o r e d fighting vehicle identification, m i s t o o k t h e m for British tanks. Even at the range of 1,200 meters, the Luftwaffe 8 8 m m antiaircraft guns were able to penetrate the Tigers' frontal 91

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armor. T h e G e r m a n counterattacks c o n d u c t e d into the enemy's left flank also added to the confusion of the British c o m m a n d . S u p p o r t e d by the 1st a n d 2d C o m p a n i e s of Heavy Tank Battalion 503, starting in the early afternoon, these counterattacks played a large p a r t in protecting the wide o p e n gap in the G e r m a n right flank a n d containing the British a d v a n c e . T h e 1st C o m p a n y paid a heavy price, however, losing four King Tigers d u r ing the c o u n t e r a t t a c k . Two of these were destroyed by direct fire, although the exact source is u n k n o w n . These two were the first King Tigers ever lost to direct fire, on any front. A n o t h e r King Tiger drove or slipped into a b o m b crater a n d could n o t be towed o u t . T h e last King Tiger was lost in a very u n u s u a l m a n n e r . It was r a m m e d by a S h e r m a n t a n k of the 2d Battalion, T h e Irish Guards, although G e r m a n a n d British accounts over w h o r a m m e d or backed into w h o m . By late in the afternoon, the 3d C o m p a n y , Heavy Tank Battalion 503, only h a d o n e Tiger still operational. Some Tigers could move b u t could n o t shoot, while others could shoot b u t could n o t m o v e . The battalion c o m m a n d e r , therefore, ordered t h e m to pull back to the battalion m a i n t e n a n c e p o i n t . T h e 21st Panzer Division ordered the r e m a i n i n g two companies to consolidate in the Frenouville area to protect the C a g n y - V i m o n t r o a d . There, these two companies prevented a further advance by the British to the southeast. Meanwhile, d u r i n g the same day, SS-Heavy Tank Battalion 101 began the day in assembly areas a r o u n d Bretteville-sur-Laize. This battalion, along with several other a r m o r e d battalions, c o m p r i s e d the 1st SS-Panzer C o r p s ' reserve. Starting the day with a r o u n d 19 Tigers operational out of 28 on h a n d , the battalion escaped the destruction of the m o r n i n g carpet b o m b i n g . A r o u n d midday, they s u p p o r t e d a counterattack t o w a r d Bourguebus being c o n d u c t e d by a c o m b a t g r o u p consisting of a Panther battalion a n d a panzergrenadier battalion of the 1st SS-Panzer Division Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler (LSSAH). T h r o u g h o u t the day they c o n t i n u e d to defend in the H u b e r t Folie-SoliersBras area against attacks by the British 11th A r m o u r e d Division. By the e n d of the day, after losing only o n e Tiger to a British Firefly, the battalion occupied defensive positions on b o t h sides of the Route National from Caen to Falaise to block any British attacks toward the s o u t h e a s t . 93

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A l t h o u g h General M o n t g o m e r y did n o t formally call off O p e r a t i o n G O O D W O O D until 20 July 1944, it was essentially stopped by the evening of 18 July 1944. Both heavy t a n k battalions involved played a pivotal role in successfully defending against the massive British attack. Heavy Tank Battalion 503 cont r i b u t e d heavily to delaying a n d disrupting the British attack a n d in protecting the G e r m a n right flank. SS-Heavy Tank Battalion 101 t h e n reinforced a n d greatly assisted G e r m a n u n i t s in halting the British a d v a n c e . T h e exact n u m b e r of British tanks destroyed by each heavy t a n k battalion is u n k n o w n , b u t altogether, the British forces suffered 1,500 casualties of all ranks a n d lost a r o u n d 200 t a n k s . M a n y of these tanks were destroyed in the vicinity of Cagny. 101

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T h e t h i r d heavy t a n k battalion employed in N o r m a n d y , SS-Heavy Tank Battalion 102, did n o t even begin to arrive near the front until 6 July 1944. At that time, the battalion occupied assembly areas near the O r n e River, southwest of Caen. F r o m 10 July 1944 until the end of the m o n t h , this battalion fought on a n d a r o u n d the key terrain feature k n o w n as Hill 112. This p o i n t was key because it was "high g r o u n d which separates the valleys of the O d o n a n d the O r n e [Rivers]." T h e battalion c o n d u c t e d offensive a n d defensive o p e r a t i o n s in the vicinity of Maltot. This town, along with Eterville, was o n e of the objectives of the British attack to expand their O d o n bridgehead. T h e capture of these two towns was also i m p o r t a n t for the establishment of a bridgehead across the next river, the O r n e . 104

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T h e British seized Hill 112 on 10 July 1944, b u t lost it to a G e r m a n counterattack, s u p p o r t e d by SS-Heavy Tank Battalion 102, on 11 July 1 9 4 4 . It cont i n u e d to change h a n d s m a n y times t h r o u g h o u t the m o n t h . SS-Heavy Tank Battalion 102 played a p r o m i n e n t role in all of these battles, destroying 48 British tanks, 27 antitank guns, a n d at least 15 a r m o r e d t r o o p c a r r i e r s . A l t h o u g h m a n y of its tanks b e c a m e disabled, s o m e t i m e s being reduced to having only five Tigers ready for combat, the battalion only h a d seven Tigers that were completely destroyed d u r i n g the m o n t h ' s fighting a r o u n d Hill 1 1 2 . T h e fact that the battalion only m a i n t a i n e d a 33-percent operational rate t h r o u g h o u t the m o n t h is indicative of the ferocity of the fighting. 106

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By the first week of August, the overall situation for G e r m a n forces in N o r m a n d y h a d deteriorated significantly. T h e A m e r i c a n s were successfully exploiting their b r e a k t h r o u g h after O p e r a t i o n COBRA a n d were c o n t i n u i n g to advance, despite the G e r m a n counterattack a r o u n d M o r t a i n . In an effort to coordinate American, British, Canadian, a n d Polish forces in an a t t e m p t to envelop G e r m a n forces in N o r m a n d y , General M o n t g o m e r y ordered the 1st C a n a d i a n A r m y to renew their attack toward Falaise from the direction of C a e n . This mission, k n o w n as O p e r a t i o n TOTALIZE, was awarded to General G u y D. S i m o n d s ' II C a n a d i a n C o r p s . (see m a p 23) T h e direction, objective, 109

Map 23: SS-Heavy Tank Battalion 101 and Operation TOTALIZE

7-11 August 1944

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a n d i m m i n e n c e of this attack were readily a p p a r e n t to everyone, therefore, General Simonds attempted to overcome these disadvantages by an u n u s u a l plan that incorporated innovative tactics. This attack started at dusk a n d was s u p p o r t e d by heavy b o m b e r s a n d massed artillery in s u p p o r t of the advancing a r m o r e d c o l u m n s . This was the first-ever use of heavy b o m b e r s at night in close s u p p o r t of advancing troops. Also, in an a t t e m p t to e n h a n c e the ability of infantry to operate in close coord i n a t i o n with tanks, obsolete self-propelled artillery chassis were used as battlefield t r a n s p o r t . O p e r a t i o n T o t a l i z e was divided into two distinct phases, each of which relied heavily u p o n massive a n d carefully-planned artillery a n d b o m b e r s u p p o r t . T h e g r o u n d attack plan of the first phase called for the British 51st Highland Division a n d the 33d A r m o u r e d Brigade to attack on the east side of the m a i n Caen-Falaise road to seize the i m p o r t a n t G e r m a n strongpoints at St. Aignan de C r a m e n i l . On the west side of the road, the 2d C a n a d i a n Infantry Division a n d the 2d C a n a d i a n A r m o u r e d Brigade were ordered to seize t h e t o w n s of Gaumesnil a n d Caillouet. After these objectives were seized, the 1st Polish A r m o u r e d a n d the 4th C a n a d i a n A r m o u r e d Divisions, again s u p p o r t ed by massive preplanned b o m b e r a n d artillery s u p p o r t , would attack toward Falaise. T h e initial b o m b i n g attacks began at 2300 h o u r s on the night of 7 August 1944, a n d was followed half an h o u r later by the Allied g r o u n d attack. By first light, the attacking forces captured the m a i n objectives of St. Aignan a n d Cremesnil, although the western attack did not achieve its objectives until later in the m o r n i n g . Even so, these successes came considerably m o r e quickly than anticipated. T h e second phase, also s u p p o r t e d by p r e - p l a n n e d b o m b e r strikes, was n o t to begin until 1400 h o u r s on 8 August, so there was an unexpected pause in the attack. This allowed G e r m a n forces t i m e to consolidate their forces, reorganize, a n d c o n d u c t a counterattack. 110

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T h e G e r m a n unit defending the front line area, the 89th Infantry Division, was effectively destroyed in the first phase of the attack. Behind t h e m , in reserve, were the r e m n a n t s of b o t h the 12th SS-Panzer Division "Hitler Youth" a n d SS-Heavy Tank Battalion 101. SS Brigadeführer Kurt Meyer, the C o m m a n d i n g General of the "Hitler Youth" Division, organized the c o u n t e r a t tacks. On the m o r n i n g of 8 August 1944 he issued the order for C o m b a t G r o u p Waldmüller, including the 1st Battalion, SS-Panzer Regiment 1 and the r e m n a n t s of the C o r p s ' 101st SS-Heavy Tank Battalion, to seize the high g r o u n d south of St. A i g n a n . " 114

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T h e 2d C o m p a n y of SS-Heavy Tank Battalion 101 was against British forces in the vicinity of G r i m b o s q a n d was ily available on the m o r n i n g of 8 A u g u s t . The battalion p r o m o t e d H a u p t s t u r m f ü h r e r Michael W i t t m a n n , h a d only 116

involved in attacks therefore n o t readc o m m a n d e r , newly 10 Tigers available

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in the vicinity of the t o w n of P o t i g n y . W i t t m a n n was thrust into the battalion c o m m a n d e r ' s position on 10 July 1944 because he was the senior ranking officer left in the b a t t a l i o n . This is indicative of the heavy losses incurred by the battalion in the N o r m a n d y campaign. Further, the sole c o m p a n y c o m m a n d e r in the area was a newly-assigned O b e r s t u r m f ü h r e r with no previous experience leading a r m o r e d u n i t s . 117

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S o m e t i m e after 0600 h o u r s on 8 August, W i t t m a n n ordered the battalion's operational Tigers to assemble in the vicinity of Cintheaux. After conferring with a n d receiving orders from Kurt Meyer, W i t t m a n n arrived in his Tigers' assembly area at 1100 h o u r s . Although the battalion, m i n u s the 2d C o m p a n y , started the day with ten operational Tigers, only eight are recorded as arriving at the C i n t h e a u x assembly area. T h e y consisted of five Tigers from the 3d C o m p a n y ; the battalion c o m m a n d e r ' s a n d signal officer's tanks from the battalions h e a d q u a r t e r s element; and o n e other Tiger from a n o t h e r u n i t . 120

Even t h o u g h W i t t m a n n a n d Meyer observed masses of British, Canadian, and Polish tanks, or p e r h a p s because they observed t h e m a n d instinctively wanted to attack before being attacked, they ordered the attack to proceed. Meyer states that they were aware that we can not allow the e n e m y t a n k s q u a d r o n s to attack again. An e n e m y a r m o r e d division stands ready to attack d o w n b o t h sides of the road [Caen to Falaise], this attack m u s t not start, we m u s t take the initiative. 121

H a d they been aware of the o d d s a n d taken into account the fact that the British elements they were preparing to attack on the east side of the CaenFalaise road h a d been in place for at least six h o u r s preparing defensive positions, they m a y have reconsidered. Including the tanks of the 12th SS-Panzer Division, the G e r m a n s had no m o r e t h a n 50 tanks which, essentially, attacked m o r e than 900 British, Canadian, a n d Polish tanks of all kinds a n d m o r e than 30,000 m e n . W i t t m a n n showed s u p r e m e leadership when h e c o m m a n deered a tank a n d led the attack, saying "I m u s t go along, for Heurich [the new and inexperienced c o m p a n y c o m m a n d e r ] can scarcely c o p e . " (see m a p 24) 1 2 2

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W h e t h e r it was because of the haste in preparing the operation or d u e to a flawed plan, the G e r m a n counterattack was c o n d u c t e d in an u n c o o r d i n a t e d fashion. The attack began at a b o u t 1230 h o u r s with W i t t m a n n ' s Tigers attacking astride the Caen-Falaise road toward Gaumesnil. A battlegroup built a r o u n d the 2d Battalion, SS-Panzer Regiment 12 attacked toward Cremesnil while C o m b a t G r o u p Waldmüller (built a r o u n d Waldmüller's 1st Battalion, Panzer-Grenadier Regiment 25) attacked toward St. A i g n a n . British sources state—and the results of the attack reinforce the assertion—that these attacks did not s u p p o r t o n e another, thus dispersing their effectiveness. Of all the attacks, W i t t m a n n ' s may have h a d the best chance of success because the 124

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Map 24: Wittman's Counterattack During Operation TOTALIZE

7-11 August 1944 1 NY - 1st Northamptonshire Yeomanry, 33rd A r m Bde, British 79th Arm Div 144 RAC = 144th Regt, Royal A r m o u r e d Corps, 33rd A r m Bde, British 79th Arm Div

Caen-Falaise road appears to have been the b o u n d a r y between C a n a d i a n a n d British divisions a n d brigades. W i t t m a n n ' s Tigers attacked d o w n the Caen-Falaise road toward Gaumesnil with five Tigers on the east side a n d two m o r e on the west side of the r o a d . Waiting in good defensive positions were three Allied t a n k battalions: the 27th C a n a d i a n A r m o u r e d Regiment ( T h e Sherbrooke Fusilier Regiment) on the 126

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west side of the road; the British 144th Royal A r m o u r e d Corps Regiment, situated essentially astride the road; a n d the 1st N o r t h a m p t o n s h i r e Yeomanry on the east side of the r o a d . C o u n t i n g all type of tanks, the eight Tigers of SSHeavy Tank Battalion 501 attacked 216 British a n d C a n a d i a n tanks, all of which were likely to be within direct-fire r a n g e . Of this impressive n u m b e r however, it s h o u l d be n o t e d that "only" 36 were VC Fireflies, the only tanks that stood any chance of penetrating the Tiger. 127

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It w o u l d be an u n d e r s t a t e m e n t to say that accounts vary on what h a p p e n e d to the Tigers d u r i n g their attack. Based u p o n a wide variety of sources, it is likely that the Tigers received fire from C a n a d i a n tanks on the west side of the road a n d b e c a m e focused on t h e m . Regardless of w h a t the G e r m a n s ' focus was, they failed to detect elements of the N o r t h a m p t o n s h i r e Yeomanry in an orchard to their east. The Tigers c o n t i n u e d to move parallel to the road a n d ultimately provided A S q u a d r o n of the Yeomanry with excellent flank shots. 1 3 0

At 1240 h o u r s , the c o m p a n y c o m m a n d e r of A Squadron, Captain Boardm a n , t o o k personal control of his 3d Platoon a n d ordered the three S h e r m a n s , plus his o w n , to " p e p p e r " the turrets of the T i g e r s . This, he h o p e d , w o u l d cause the c o m m a n d e r s to retreat inside their turrets a n d close their hatches, severely restricting their vision. Because these S h e r m a n s were a r m e d with the standard low-velocity 7 5 m m m a i n gun, their r o u n d s w o u l d have h a d little effect u p o n the Tiger's armor. Judging from the results, however, it did have the desired effect of causing the t a n k c o m m a n d e r s to " b u t t o n u p " a n d cause confusion. 131

At the same time, the sole Firefly in the p l a t o o n began engaging Tigers from the rearmost o n e f o r w a r d . This single Firefly destroyed three, a n d possibly four, Tigers on the east side of the r o a d . W h e t h e r the destruction of the fourth Tiger is credited to this Firefly or not, the fact remains that there was a fourth Tiger destroyed on the east side of the road a n d a n o t h e r Tiger destroyed on the west side of the road. Only three of the original eight attacking Tigers survived, with the Yeomanry claiming the destruction of all five T i g e r s . Even if the single Firefly destroyed only three of the five Tigers that were destroyed, it w o u l d likely make the g u n n e r of this Firefly, Trooper Joe Ekins, the top British "Tiger Killer" in World War I I . 132

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This small engagement illustrates the difficulty in attacking even hastilyprepared defensive positions. The eight Tigers led by W i t t m a n n could easily be classified as o n e of the most, if n o t the m o s t , combat-experienced a n d lethal small units in the G e r m a n military at the t i m e . Despite this, they were quickly a n d easily defeated. T h e few h o u r s between dawn a n d the 12:30 P.M. Germ a n attack was e n o u g h t i m e for the C a n a d i a n a n d British tanks to establish a good, hasty, defensive position. A l t h o u g h they attacked against overwhelming odds, in the end, little m o r e t h a n one severely u n d e r - g u n n e d p l a t o o n was needed to defeat the attack. As o n e historian aptly described:

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T h e u s u a l roles in N o r m a n d y , of G O O D W O O D , E P S O M , COBRA, a n d so o n

[Allied offensive b r e a k t h r o u g h a t t e m p t s ] , h a d been reversed. Instead of the Allies being the vulnerable attackers, they h a d placed themselves in a position of the advantaged defenders, with G e r m a n a r m o r constrained to attack. Although the G e r m a n s knew the g r o u n d , b o t h the N o r t h a m p tonshire Yeomanry a n d the Sherbrookes had found their way into good defensive positions in w o o d s a n d orchards. T h e destruction of Wittm a n n ' s Tiger Troop is the best example of t h i s . 136

W h e n the second phase of the Allied attack began, the several Tigers that survived the W i t t m a n n attack, plus a few m o r e that m a y have been b r o u g h t forward from m a i n t e n a n c e repair facilities, as well as Tigers that h a d been recalled from the 2d C o m p a n y in the G r i m b o s q area, assisted in stopping the attack of the 1st Polish A r m o u r e d Division. Three Tigers destroyed seven Polish tanks attacking s o u t h of St. A i g n a n . D u r i n g this phase of the Allied attack, two m o r e Tigers were destroyed, for a total of seven Tigers lost d u r i n g the first day of O p e r a t i o n T O T A L I Z E . By the e n d of the day, SS Heavy Tank Battalion 101 h a d 18 Tigers on h a n d , of which only eight were o p e r a t i o n a l . An indication of the p o o r condition of the battalion in t e r m s of personnel losses is the fact that after the death of Captain Michael W i t t m a n n , the battalion surgeon, as the senior r a n k i n g officer in the battalion, was given c o m m a n d of the battalion by the chief of staff of the 1st SS Panzer C o r p s . 137

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T h e next day, 9 August 1944, five Tigers assisted in the total defeat of an elem e n t of the 4th (Canadian) A r m o r e d Division. D u r i n g this engagement the Tigers occupied good defensive positions on the flank of the attacking C a n a d i a n forces a n d took advantage of their extended range advantage over the S h e r m a n tank. While the Tigers m a i n t a i n e d their stationary firing positions, effectively containing the attacking C a n a d i a n forces, Panthers from SSPanzer Regiment 12 as well as infantry from the 85th Infantry Division m a n e u v e r e d on, a n d eventually destroyed the C a n a d i a n force. D u r i n g this engagement, 47 C a n a d i a n tanks were destroyed while G e r m a n forces lost no tanks. 141

T h e r e m n a n t s of SS Heavy Tank Battalion 101 c o n t i n u e d to defend the Caen-Falaise road for the next week. By 16 August 1944, G e r m a n forces were in danger of being enveloped a n d they began to w i t h d r a w toward the Seine River. As in other theaters of t h e war at other times, rapid withdrawals over vast distances resulted in the loss of m a n y Tigers. After m o r e t h a n two m o n t h s of combat, the first Tiger was destroyed by its o w n crew on 16 August 1 9 4 4 . D u r i n g the withdrawal to the Seine River, Heavy Tank Battalion 503 lost 28 of its Tigers from either a b a n d o n m e n t or destruction by their o w n c r e w s . After 20 August 1944 d u r i n g their retreat, the SS heavy t a n k battalions destroyed or a b a n d o n e d 22 of their T i g e r s . An 142

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additional two Tigers sank a t t e m p t i n g to cross the Seine River by ferry. Only four Tigers were lost to direct c o m b a t after 20 August 1 9 4 4 . These statistics lead to the conclusion t h a t the heavy t a n k battalions had improved in their vehicle-recovery efforts, especially w h e n employed along a fairly static front, b u t were still extremely vulnerable w h e n forced to retreat. A possible reason for the relatively high n u m b e r a n d ratio of Tigers destroyed in direct c o m b a t , c o m p a r e d to previous encounters, was the fact that the Western Allies were fielding m o r e weapons capable of destroying a Tiger, especially in close-range c o m b a t , as was the n o r m in N o r m a n d y . T h e following chart p r o vides a b r e a k d o w n of the cause of loss of Tigers in each heavy t a n k battalion in N o r m a n d y (see table 4). 145

146

These three heavy t a n k battalions m a n a g e d to destroy a r o u n d 510 Allied tanks as well as n u m e r o u s other vehicles a n d pieces of e q u i p m e n t . Other t h a n the few Tigers that were shipped back to G e r m a n y for factory m a i n t e nance, every o n e of the three battalions' tanks were lost. The overall kill ratio for the loss of every Tiger was 3.9 to 1 while the kill ratio for direct c o m b a t was 10.6 to 1. 147

Until the strategic situation b e c a m e hopeless then, the e m p l o y m e n t of the heavy t a n k battalions has to be j u d g e d as successful. For the m o s t part, they were employed in accordance with the p o r t i o n of their d o c t r i n e that called for heavy tanks to form mobile reserves to c o u n t e r e n e m y b r e a k t h r o u g h s . They adapted this d o c t r i n e to the terrain a n d to the operational situation by splitting the battalions apart into c o m p a n y assembly areas. Prior experience showed, a n d their e m p l o y m e n t in N o r m a n d y validated, that a handful of Tigers were able to defeat or delay a large enemy a r m o r e d attack. Also, by assigning c o m p a n i e s b e h i n d the front b u t across the w i d t h of it, they

Battalion 101

Battalion 102

Battalion 503

Total

Destroyed by direct or indirect fire Destroyed or abandoned by crew Destroyed by air attack Transported back to Germany for maintenance Total Table 4. Tiger Tank Losses in N o r m a n d y Source: Schneider, Tigers in Combat I and Tigers in Combat II. Note: This covers the period of initial employment on 13 June 1944 u n t i l 30 August 1944. The last Tiger in SS Heavy Tank Battalion 102 was abandoned on 1 September 1944.

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m i n i m i z e d the distance necessary to travel in order to react to e n e m y p e n e trations. Although this reduced the concentration of the entire battalion, in violation of their doctrine, this m u s t have helped the m a i n t e n a n c e status of the battalions because of reduced vehicular m o v e m e n t .

Poland A l t h o u g h the King Tiger first saw action against in the west against the British forces d u r i n g O p e r a t i o n G O O D W O O D on 18 July 1944, it was n o t until 13 August 1944 that King Tigers were first employed in the east against Soviet forces. This battalion, Heavy Tank Battalion 501, was the first heavy t a n k battalion to receive the full a u t h o r i z a t i o n of 45 King Tigers. Its initial c o m b a t action illustrates the p r o b l e m s a n d weaknesses of the King Tiger, especially in its initial fielding, before all the technical p r o b l e m s could begin to be rectified. As part of the subsequent offensive operations after O p e r a t i o n BAGRATION, Soviet forces established several small bridgeheads across the Vistula River in Poland in early August. O n e of the few initial bridgeheads was located in the B a r o n o w area. After experiencing shattering losses d u r i n g O p e r a t i o n BAGRATION, the Germ a n A r m y was short of forces to c o u n t e r the Soviet bridgehead. Additionally, units were in the process of being encircled in the Falaise pocket in N o r m a n d y . Finally, G e r m a n forces were still a t t e m p t i n g to stabilize the front in Italy n o r t h of the A r n o River, retreating to the Gothic Line after the b r e a k t h r o u g h at Cassino a n d Anzio a few m o n t h s prior. Heavy t a n k battalions, as well as the G e r m a n Army, were spread o u t a n d stretched thin. Of the 13 heavy t a n k battalions in existence at this point of the war, nine were engaged a n d u n a b l e to move to this threatened sector. Against the Western Allies, three heavy t a n k battalions were in the process of being totally destroyed in N o r m a n d y a n d two heavy t a n k battalions were in Italy. In the east, three heavy tank battalions were defending against Soviet attacks in Lithuania a n d East Prussia, a n d two were in P o l a n d . Of the two in Poland, o n e was retreating against Soviet pressure in the n o r t h part of Poland while the other was employed against the Soviet offensives across the Vistula in the Sandomierz a n d B a r o n o w areas. T h e final three heavy tank battalions were back in Germany, at the O h r d r u f Training Area, receiving the new King Tiger. 148

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Given the desperate situation on almost all fronts, it is interesting to n o t e that the OKH employed the first of these King-Tiger-equipped heavy t a n k battalions against Soviet forces a r o u n d the Baronow bridgehead in Poland. This m a y have been because the Soviet forces in this bridgehead at that t i m e were

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the closest Allied forces to Berlin. By the first week of August, Heavy Tank Battalion 501 h a d received all 45 of its King T i g e r s . Of the two other heavy tank battalions drawing King Tigers at Ohrdruf, only Heavy Tank Battalion 505 had received any King Tigers, d r a w i n g six to train u p o n on 26 July 1 9 4 4 . The last heavy t a n k battalion, Heavy Tank Battalion 506, was still e n r o u t e from the Budapest area after having t u r n e d over their few remaining Tigers to Heavy Tank Battalion 5 0 7 . They did n o t start receiving any King Tigers until 20 August 1944. 151

152

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D u r i n g these battalions' training on the King Tiger at Ohrdruf, they experienced m a n y mechanical problems. Of the six King Tigers issued to Heavy Tank Battalion 505, three caught fire d u r i n g training a n d were complete losse s . W h e n Heavy Tank Battalion 501 was ordered to deploy to Poland d u r i n g the first days of August 1944, they h a d to c o m b i n e the entire battalion's King Tiger fleet to field two c o m p a n i e s of operational vehicles. Additionally, Heavy Tank Battalion 505 was forced to transfer two of its r e m a i n i n g King Tigers to Heavy Tank Battalion 501 to help it achieve this objective. 133

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Heavy Tank Battalion 501's 2d a n d 3d C o m p a n i e s d e p a r t e d G e r m a n y on 5 August 1944 a n d arrived in Kielce, Poland on 9 August 1944. T h e 1st C o m pany r e m a i n e d at O h r d r u f with the broken King Tigers a n d joined the battalion later in the m o n t h . U p o n its arrival in Poland, Heavy Tank Battalion 501 was attached to the 16th Panzer Division a n d was tasked to attack Soviet forces to eliminate the B a r o n o w bridgehead. D u r i n g the 50-kilometer r o a d m a r c h from Kielce to their forward assembly area, almost every one of the battalion's King Tigers broke d o w n . These b r e a k d o w n s caused the counterattack to be delayed for several days while the battalion's m a i n t e n a n c e sections c o n d u c t e d repairs. (see m a p 25) 138

Despite the m a i n t e n a n c e section's efforts, only 11 King Tigers were o p e r a tional w h e n they attacked with the 16th Panzer Division on the m o r n i n g of 11 August 1944. Terrain in this area was extremely sandy, forcing the King Tigers to stay primarily on the existing roads. T h e G e r m a n forces attacked from the t o w n of Ogledow toward Staszow. Soviet forces defending in this area consisted of the 53d G u a r d s Tank Brigade reinforced by the 71st I n d e p e n d e n t G u a r d s Heavy Tank Regiment. Although this s o u n d s like a large force, they consisted of only nine T-34/76s in the 53d G u a r d s Tank Brigade; and eleven JS-2 Heavy Tanks a n d o n e JS-85 Heavy Tank in the 71st I n d e p e n d e n t G u a r d s Heavy Tank Regiment. 159

Soviet forces in this area primarily used defensive tactics, positioning tanks a n d assault guns in hidden a m b u s h positions focused on the k n o w n G e r m a n avenues of a p p r o a c h , the roads. This tactic was extremely effective a n d resulted in the destruction of three King Tigers d u r i n g the initial attack that started at 0700 h o u r s , a n d o n e m o r e d u r i n g a subsequent attack a few h o u r s later.

Map 25: Heavy Tank Battalion 501 Attempts to Reduce the Sandomierz Bridgehead

Summer 1944

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Most of these were destroyed by fire from JS-2s, b u t at least o n e was k n o c k e d out by a T-34/76 at a range of less t h a n 400 m e t e r s . Later in t h e day, Soviet forces counterattacked a n d seized the t o w n of Ogledow where they found three a b a n d o n e d King T i g e r s . Two of these were broken or d a m a g e d , and were repairable. T h e y had obviously been a b a n d o n e d before they could be totally destroyed. Worse still, the third a b a n d o n e d King Tiger still h a d fuel a n d a m m u n i t i o n on b o a r d a n d Soviet soldiers were able to start the engine w i t h o u t any t r o u b l e . D u r i n g the Soviet attack a n d subsequent G e r m a n counterattack, a JS-II destroyed a n o t h e r King Tiger from a distance of 1,000 m e t e r s . 160

161

162

163

T h e next two day's fighting m o v e d t o w a r d the t o w n of Szydlow. D u r i n g several counterattacks, Heavy Tank Battalion 501 lost seven m o r e King T i g e r s . Virtually all of these were destroyed by Soviet tanks occupying a defensive position against those G e r m a n attacks. T h r o u g h o u t three days of fighting, Soviet forces destroyed or captured 14 King Tigers out of a total strength of a r o u n d 30 or 31 King Tigers in two c o m p a n i e s of Heavy Tank Battalion 501. 164

In c o m b a t that pitted Soviet heavy tanks against G e r m a n heavy tanks, the Soviet JS-II definitely came o u t on top d u r i n g their initial contact. Of the 11 JS-IIs in the 71st I n d e p e n d e n t G u a r d s Heavy Tank Regiment on 11 August 1944, three were totally destroyed a n d seven were d a m a g e d . Four of the seven d a m a g e d tanks were so badly d a m a g e d that they were t r a n s p o r t e d back to a factory to be r e p a i r e d . 165

166

Soviet sources credit the maneuverability of their tanks as a p r i m a r y attribute that led to their success, allowing t h e m to move to key defensible terrain instead of staying tied to the roads like the King Tigers. T h e Soviets appear also to have c o m b i n e d the technical strengths of their vehicles with s o u n d tactical e m p l o y m e n t in dealing with the G e r m a n counterattacks. Even t h o u g h the Soviets were on the offensive at the operational level, they occupied strong defensive positions a n d defeated G e r m a n counterattacks before resuming attacks at the tactical level. O n c e they h a d captured m o r e terrain, they reverted to the defense a n d repeated the process. This inauspicious loss of the 14 King Tigers in their first battalion-sized engagement cost the battalion c o m m a n d e r his job, although he m a y also have been implicated in the plot to kill Hitler. M o r e costly to the G e r m a n war effort was the capture of three operational King Tigers that allowed the Soviets to c o n d u c t tests to evaluate its strengths a n d weaknesses. T h e y were t r a n s p o r t e d back to the m a i n testing area at Kubinka a n d overall, the tests on the King Tiger did not impress the Soviets. Just getting the King Tigers to a railhead for t r a n s p o r t was challenging a n d illustrated their mechanical unreliability. On the lone operational King Tiger, 167

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the left idler wheel's bearing failed, the m o u n t i n g bolts on the left drive sprocket sheared, a n d the engine overheated causing d a m a g e to the engine as well as the g e a r b o x . It was repaired, b u t the right side r u n n i n g gear failed a n d was fixed with parts from o n e of the d a m a g e d King T i g e r s . Finally, the drive shaft roller bearing failed, causing the replaced r u n n i n g gear to fail again. D u r i n g this ordeal, the track h a d to repaired n u m e r o u s times because it kept breaking d u e to the vehicle's weight. Reportedly, the King Tiger's track tension m e c h a n i s m did n o t m a i n t a i n tension a n d h a d to be adjusted every 10 to 15 k i l o m e t e r s . Track p r o b l e m s apparently increased w h e n pivoting or t u r n i n g the vehicle. 168

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T h e results of the Soviet testing indicated a low mechanical reliability in t e r m s of the King Tiger's chassis, engine, a n d transmission. Additionally, the performance specifications that were published for the King Tiger by the G e r m a n s were found to be extremely inflated or optimistic, for example: It was d e t e r m i n e d that 860 liters of fuel was sufficient for 90 kilometers of m o v e m e n t over a dirt road, even t h o u g h the vehicle's m a n u a l indicated that this a m o u n t of fuel should have been sufficient for 120 kilometers. Fuel c o n s u m p t i o n per 100 kilometers was 970 liters instead of the 700 liters according to this same [captured] m a n u a l . Average rate of m o v e m e n t along the highway was 2 5 - 3 0 kilometers per hour, 13.4-15 kilometers per h o u r along a dirt road. T h e average speed w h e n m o v i n g over rough terrain was even worse: 6 - 7 kilometers per hour. T h e maxim u m speed, given as 41.5 kilometers per h o u r in the tank's technical d o c u m e n t a t i o n , was never achieved in the maneuverability t e s t s . 171

T h e sole favorable p o i n t for the King Tiger in the Soviet tests was the impressive accuracy a n d a r m o r - p e n e t r a t i o n capability of the 8 8 m m Kwk 43 L/71 m a i n gun, c o m p a r i n g it to the Soviet 1 2 2 m m D 2 5 g u n m o u n t e d on the JS-II Heavy Tank. A l t h o u g h m a n y mechanical deficiencies were eventually rectified, the King Tiger c o n t i n u e d to be a relatively unreliable tank. These mechanical weaknesses dictated their tactical e m p l o y m e n t t h r o u g h o u t the war. Also, the high fuel c o n s u m p t i o n a n d c o n s e q u e n t limited radius of action reduced their effectiveness in c o n d u c t i n g m o b i l e operations across large distances. T h e King Tiger may, therefore, have been better suited for defensive operations t h a n for offensive ones. Heavy Tank Battalion 501 learned this lesson in August 1944 in Poland w h e n they were n o t only unable to eliminate Soviet forces in their bridgehead, but actually lost g r o u n d to Soviet forces while losing 14 expensive King Tigers. This battalion c o n t i n u e d to operate against the Soviet bridgeheads across the Vistula until they were destroyed in the Soviet offensive breaking o u t toward the O d e r River in January 1945.

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The legendary Tiger tank. Introduced in late 1942, its powerful m a i n gun and thick, resilient armor made it a threat to any Allied tank t h r o u g h o u t the war. However, its voracious fuel c o n s u m p t i o n , l i m i t e d maneuverability, mechanical unreliability, and l i m i t e d operational or strategic m o b i l i t y detracted f r o m Tiger battalions' combat potential. (Patton Museum of

Cavalry and Armor)

A Tiger advances d u r i n g Operation ZITADELLE in July 1943. After this massive offensive, Tiger battalions were used almost exclusively in defensive missions, a role for w h i c h they were not

designed. (Patton Museum of Cavalry and Armor)

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A Tiger f r o m Heavy Tank Battalion 504 in Tunisia, January 1943. (Pattern Museum of Cavalry and Armor)

This Tiger is f r o m SS-Heavy Tank Battalion 101. It is t o w i n g a second Tiger t h r o u g h the debris of a French t o w n i n Normandy. (Patton Museum of Cavalry and Armor)

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In July 1943 near Merefa/Ukraine, 18-ton halftracked recovery vehicles of Heavy Tank Battalion 503 tow Tiger 114. Tiger 114 was c o m m a n d e d by Fahnenjunker-Feldwebel Alfred Rubbel, and had been damaged d u r i n g the f i g h t i n g in Operation ZITADELLE.

(Dale Ritter Collection)

Tigers were prone to an unusually high breakdown rate when traveling even relatively short distances on roads, so rail movement was essential for long-distance transfers. Of course, rail movement included its o w n special challenges, i n c l u d i n g the need to use special narrow tracks on every tank, and a paucity of the unique rail cars w h i c h could carry Tigers. Here, a Tiger is entrained on the reinforced Ssyms rail car, awaiting transport to the front, M a r c h 1944. This particular tank is f r o m the 3d Company, Heavy Tank Battalion 505. M a r c h 1944—Leutnant H i l b i g is facing the camera. (Dale Ritter

Collection)

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The K i n g Tiger tank, also called the "Tiger I I " or the "Royal Tiger." Appearing in 1944, it was the successor to the Tiger in every way: its m a i n gun was even more lethal; its a r m o r thicker and better designed; its m o t o r and drive train more fragile; and its fuel c o n s u m p t i o n greater. (Patton

Museum of Cavalry and Armor)

A newly-issued King Tiger of Heavy Tank Battalion 505. The new vehicles are being strenuously tested at the O h r d r u f Training area in August, 1944. (Dale Ritter Collection)

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K i n g Tigers were employed in a few offensive operations in the last six months of the war. Here, a K i n g Tiger f r o m Heavy Tank Battalion 501 carries f o r w a r d paratroopers f r o m Parachute Regiment 9 d u r i n g the Ardennes Offensive. This picture was reportedly taken just south of Ligneuville, Belgium on 18 December 1944.

(Patton Museum of Cavalry and Armor)

The 8 8 m m L/71 m a i n gun was the most effective weapon m o u n t e d on any tank d u r i n g W W I I . (The 128mm L/55 was only m o u n t e d on the H u n t i n g Tiger tank destroyer.) Here, K i n g Tigers conduct gunnery exercises. These are f r o m the 3d Company, Heavy Tank Battalion 503, w h i c h received new King Tigers in July 1944. The tank in the foreground has the Porsche turret, as d i d 12 of the 14 initially issued to the company; the other two had the more c o m m o n Henschel turret.

(Patton Museum of Cavalry and Armor)

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A K i n g Tiger and crew in Budapest, Hungary, October 1944. The tank crew f r o m 2d Company, Heavy Tank Battalion 503 prepares its K i n g Tiger for movement. The soldier straddling the gun tube is covering the muzzle to protect it f r o m the elements. This battalion was employed in Hungary's capital for four days in m i d - O c t o b e r 1944 in the bloodless coup to reinstall a pro-Nazi government. The heavy tank battalion was probably chosen for this task because of the psychological impact on the local population of the K i n g Tiger.

(Patton Museum of Cavalry and Armor) B o t h the Tiger and K i n g Tiger required a great deal of m a i n tenance. In this instance, m e n of Heavy Tank Battalion 505 are replacing a m o t o r of a newly-issued K i n g Tiger at O h r d r u f Training Area, late summer, 1944.

(Dale Ritter Collection)

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Early "Organization D" Tiger battalions were partially equipped w i t h Panzer IIIs, Version (Ausführung) N. This model of the Panzer I I I was armed w i t h a low-velocity 75 mm L/24 gun.

(Patton Museum of Cavalry and Armor)

A Sonderkraftfahrzeug (Sdkfz) 2 Kettenrad. Six Kettenräder were authorized in the scout and engineer platoon of Organization E battalions. Intended for reconnaissance missions, each one carried t w o m e n . (Patton Museum of Cavalry and Armor)

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The Sdkfz 251/7 was armed w i t h t w o 7.92mm MG34s or 42s and one 7.92mm PzB39 a n t i tank rifle. It had racks to carry small assault bridges, mines, and other heavy equipment of the engineer platoon. There were three Sdkfz 251/7s in the heavy tank battalion scout and engineer platoon. Each vehicle carried one non-commissioned officer and eight other soldiers.

(Patton Museum of Cavalry and Armor)

Seven of these Sdkfz 250s were assigned to Organization E battalions, replacing the Panzer IIIs in the headquarters company. These were the p r i m a r y vehicle of the battalion armored reconnaissance platoon. Each Sdkfz 250 carried one non-commissioned officer and five soldiers.

(Patton Museum of Cavalry and Armor)

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Ninety "Porsche Tiger" hulls were converted to heavy tank destroyers armed w i t h the 8 8 m m L/71 m a i n gun. These were issued to Heavy Tank Destroyer Battalions 653 and 654, w h i c h first saw action in the battle of Kursk in July 1943. (Patton Museum of Cavalry and Armor)

The Panzerjäger VI "Jagdtiger" ( " H u n t i n g T i g e r " ) was the tank-destroyer variant of the K i n g Tiger. W i t h a combat weight of over 79 tons, it was slow and lacked agility, but its nearly 10 inches of frontal a r m o r and m a m m o t h 128mm L/55 m a i n gun made it a formidable o p p o n e n t . (Patton Museum of Cavalry and Armor)

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The Panther m e d i u m tank ( M o d e l A shown here) was probably the most successful armored vehicle the Germans developed. It had a relatively high speed and excellent maneuverability. These characteristics were c o m b i n e d w i t h sloped and relatively heavy a r m o r and a h i g h velocity 7 5 m m L/70 m a i n g u n w h i c h had better penetrative capability than the 88 mm KwK 36 L/56 m o u n t e d on the Tiger I. (Patton Museum of Cavalry and Armor)

The tanks in the M4 Sherman series were those p r i m a r i l y used by U.S. armored forces t h r o u g h o u t W W I I . Designed as a weapon of exploitation to be used in long-range thrusts deep i n t o the enemy's rear, it could attack his supply installations and communications. This required great endurance, l o w c o n s u m p t i o n of gasoline, and ability to move long distances w i t h o u t a breakdown. It was never intended to be used in direct combat against heavy tanks such as the Tiger. As such, it was originally armed w i t h a low-velocity 7 5 m m m a i n gun (above left). To deal w i t h the superior G e r m a n tanks like the Panther, Tiger, and Tiger I I , many Shermans (such as this M 4 A 3 E 8 , above right) were ultimately armed w i t h a higher-velocity 7 6 m m gun or w i t h the m u c h more effective British 17-pounder. (US Army Signal Corps)

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A Sherman VC arrives in N o r m a n d y . Nicknamed the "Firefly," this was a British m o d i f i c a t i o n of the American M 4 A 4 tanks that were delivered under the Lend-Lease agreement. Its o u t standing feature was its high velocity 7 6 m m L/58 m a i n gun w h i c h could penetrate a Tiger's a r m o r at ranges far greater than any other tank available to the Western Allies u n t i l the appearance of the Pershing in the closing days of the war. (The Tank Museum, Bovington)

This lend-lease Sherman in the hands of the Soviets was knocked out by the 5th SS Panzer Division " V i k i n g " on the eastern front. Like the crews of T-34/76s, u n t i l later versions of the Sherman were fitted w i t h US 7 6 m m or British 17-pounder m a i n guns, Sherman crews were all but completely helpless against Tigers.

(Dale Ritter Collection)

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The T-34/76 first saw action against opposing German forces d u r i n g Operation BARBAROSSA, the invasion of the Soviet U n i o n , the German invasion of the Soviet U n i o n . The c o m b i n a t i o n of relatively thick, angled armor, a m a i n gun w i t h good a r m o r penetrating capability, and superb m o b i l i t y placed it in a class above any German tank available in 1941. This led the Germans to develop the Panther and to reinvigorate its previously d o r m a n t heavy tank

p r o g r a m . (Patton Museum of Cavalry and Armor)

By the end o f 1942, when the Soviets encountered the first German Tigers, they realized that the 7 6 m m m a i n gun on the T-34 was inadequate. To improve a r m o r penetrat i o n , a n 8 5 m m gun i n an improved and more heavily armored threem a n turret was m o u n t ed on the T-34 chassis. Production began on the first models in December 1943.

(Patton Museum of Cavalry and Armor)

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The JS-2 was armed w i t h a 122mm gun derived f r o m the A-19 field gun. These vehicles were issued to special Guards heavy tank regiments whose role was to assist in breaking t h r o u g h German defenses. The JS-2's thicker frontal a r m o r protected it against Tiger I fire at ranges over 1,500 meters while the Tiger I was still vulnerable to the JS-2's fire. Against the Tiger I I , there was no clear advantage to either tank.

(Patton Museum of Cavalry and Armor)

A German officer inspects an SU-152 while several of his soldiers look o n . The appearance of the German Tiger spurred the Soviets to develop an armored vehicle capable of dealing w i t h it on the battlefield. The SU-152 first saw action in the battle of Kursk where it quickly earned the nickname " A n i m a l Hunter," for its reputed abilities to k i l l Tigers, Panthers, and Elephants.

(Patton Museum of Cavalry and Armor)

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The Soviets built the SU-122 by wedding the standard 122mm howitzer to a T-34 chassis. A l t h o u g h excellent in the i n f a n t r y support role, it had l i m i t e d antitank capability.

(Patton Museum of Cavalry and Armor)

The Cromwell first went into action in N o r m a n d y and became a mainstay of British armored units for the rest of the war in the European Theater. This C r o m w e l l is typical, as it is armed w i t h a 7 5 m m m a i n gun. The C r o m w e l l , although technically a "cruiser" design, was a solid and steady m e d i u m tank.

(The Tank Museum, Bovington)

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The Americans, British, and Soviets all developed specialized vehicles for clearing lanes through minefields. M o s t were highly effective. The Germans never d i d develop such a vehicle, and using Tigers to b u l l their way t h r o u g h minefields was an often costly alternative. A m e r i c a n Sherman (below) w i t h a " m i n e r o l l e r " (US Army Signal Corps Photo)

British Valentine "Scorpion" mine flail (above) (Patton

Museum

of Cavalry and Armor) Soviet T-34/76 with mine exploder (left) (Patton

Museum

of Cavalry and Armor)

Chapter 6

The Final Battles T h e fighting at Karniewo lasted a total of 3 days. D u r i n g the course of the fighting, the Russians lost 134 tanks to o u r battalion alone. As far as I know, we h a d hardly any losses. Of course, there were quite a few mechanical p r o b l e m s A l t h o u g h we h a d prevented the breakt h r o u g h of the e n e m y up to that point, the front h a d to be pulled back. T h e Russians h a d broken t h r o u g h on b o t h sides of o u r sector. Kurt Kramer, 3d Platoon, Heavy Tank Battalion 507

]

D u r i n g the last six m o n t h s of the war, heavy t a n k battalions were intensely engaged in fighting on all fronts. T h e missions given to t h e m were p r e d o m i nantly as mobile reserves, held b e h i n d the front lines. As the war neared its end, heavy t a n k battalions were split apart, being employed across wide areas, a n d continually shifted from o n e area to another. There are notable exceptions when battalions took part in offensive operations, albeit usually very limited ones. Two heavy tank battalions t o o k part in the A r d e n n e s Offensive in D e c e m b e r 1944, which the G e r m a n s c o d e n a m e d Operation

Wacht am Rhein ( W A T C H O N THE R H I N E ) . TWO heavy t a n k b a t t a l -

ions also participated in O p e r a t i o n Südwind ( S O U T H W I N D ) , the offensive against the Soviet G r a n bridgehead in Hungary. Ultimately, three heavy t a n k battalions took part in at least o n e of the several G e r m a n attempts to relieve Budapest t h r o u g h o u t 1945. Coincidentally, SS-Heavy Tank Battalion 501 (formerly 101) participated in every o n e of these offensives.

Hungary: The Early Battles Heavy Tank Battalion 503 m o v e d back to G e r m a n y after losing all of its tanks d u r i n g c o m b a t in N o r m a n d y a n d the subsequent withdrawal. While waiting for n e w vehicles, veterans were allowed to go on leave a n d new personnel arrived from the Heavy Tank Training unit at P a d e r b o r n . T h e battalion received 45 new King Tigers between 19 a n d 22 September 1944. After a short p e r i o d of training, including the p r o d u c t i o n of a p r o p a g a n d a film, the battalion loaded trains in G e r m a n y on 12 October. 2

2

152

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THE FINAL BATTLES

T h e battalion arrived in Budapest, Hungary, on 13 a n d 14 October. W h e t h e r intentional or not, the battalion's first e m p l o y m e n t was probably d u e to the high psychological value of the King Tiger. From 14 to 16 O c t o b e r 1944, the battalion assisted in suppressing the coup d'etat of the Imperial Regent, Admiral Horthy, w h o started peace negotiations with the Soviet U n i o n a n d other Allied powers. Positioning their King Tigers at key locations t h r o u g h o u t the city, such as bridges and the hilltop palace on the Burgberg, they helped to reinstall a pro-Nazi government in H u n g a r y . Based u p o n the results, which consisted of little a r m e d resistance, the King Tigers rolling t h r o u g h the streets of Budapest h a d the desired effect on the local p o p u l a t i o n . 4

3

T h e t e m p o r a r y peace overtures by Admiral H o r t h y resulted in m a n y H u n garian A r m y units leaving the front lines. This left n u m e r o u s G e r m a n units in untenable positions a n d the already-fluid battlefields on the H u n g a r i a n steppes southeast of Budapest b e c a m e even m o r e uncertain. After c o m p l e t i n g operations in Budapest, Heavy Tank Battalion 503 was ordered to move southeast to s u p p o r t the 4th SS-Police Panzer-Grenadier Division a n d the 24th Panzer Division. D u e to a shortage of the special railway cars required for t r a n s p o r t i n g Tigers, only o n e c o m p a n y at a t i m e was able to be sent to the battalion's forward assembly area, with the lead c o m p a n y arriving on 18 O c t o b e r 1944. As a result, the elements of the battalion were divided between the two divisions that it s u p p o r t e d . 6

The G e r m a n attack on 19 a n d 20 O c t o b e r 1944 was led by two c o m p a n i e s of Heavy Tank Battalion 503. On 19 O c t o b e r 1944, the 1st C o m p a n y led, followed a n d s u p p o r t e d by the 3d C o m p a n y . The attack, b e g i n n i n g at 0500 h o u r s east of the t o w n of Szolnok, succeeded in penetrating the initial defensive positions held by R o m a n i a n t r o o p s a n d seized their objective for the day, the t o w n of Mezotur. (see m a p 26) T h e C o m m a n d e r of the 3d C o m p a n y describes the success of the day: 7

Shortly after the lead t a n k h a d crossed the m a i n line of resistance, the first R u m a n i a n s [sic]—they were the ones w h o held the positions in that sector—approached the tanks with their h a n d s raised. . . . T h e next village was rapidly reached, from which the R u m a n i a n s tried in vain to flee. T h e y were waved to the rear since the tanks h a d no t i m e to concern themselves with prisoners. An antitank belt facing the direction of the attack was overrun. As it t u r n e d out, the entire depth of the defensive position h a d been penetrated. Mines were discovered twice on the avenue of advance, b u t it was possible to drive a r o u n d t h e m . As a result, the Tigers thrust ever deeper into the hinterland. Enemy trains were surprised; entire c o l u m n s swept from the road. N o t h i n g could halt the forward advance. 8

Map 26: Heavy Tank Battalion 503 in Hungary 19-20 October 1944 Rom* = Defending Romanian infantry units

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THE FINAL BATTLES

Later in the day as the attack c o n t i n u e d , the lead elements of the battalion e n c o u n t e r e d a train loaded with a Soviet G u a r d s cavalry division a n d w r o u g h t havoc on the train a n d the t r o o p s . T h e battalion also e n c o u n t e r e d a n d destroyed several rear-area c o l u m n s a n d logistics units d u r i n g the day. T h e attack on this day succeeded in p e n e t r a t i n g 40 kilometers deep into the Soviet defenses. 9

On 20 O c t o b e r 1944, the 3d C o m p a n y assumed the lead in the attack toward the t o w n of Turkeve. Soviet forces recovered from the day's previous attack a n d established strong antitank defenses between M e z o t u r a n d Turkeve. Additionally, the m u d d y terrain conditions restricted the King Tigers from m o v e m e n t off of the road. O n l y a few tanks in the lead, therefore, were able to effectively engage Soviet forces d u r i n g the attack. Despite the increased resistance a n d the restrictions on off-road m o v e m e n t , the c o m p a n y successfully defeated at least three separate Soviet antitank belts. T h e c o m p a n y c o m m a n der praised the King Tiger d u r i n g this day's action: If the Panzer IVs of the 24th Panzer Division h a d been forced to take the lead, n o t a single o n e of t h e m would have m a d e it t h r o u g h . T h e strong frontal a r m o r of the King Tiger w i t h s t o o d the antitank r o u n d s . N o t h i n g could stop t h e m a n d the tanks at the point chewed their way right t h r o u g h the strong antitank defense until they could gain o p e n a n d negotiable t e r r a i n . 10

After breaking t h r o u g h the Soviet defensive positions, the attack succeeded in capturing the t o w n of Turkeve a n d even c o n t i n u e d on 15 kilometers further to the outskirts of the t o w n of Kisujszallas. Extremely strong Soviet forces in a n d a r o u n d the t o w n of Kisujszallas prevented its capture, however. Also, the s u p p o r t i n g attack by the 4th SS-Cavalry Division, led by the 2d C o m p a n y of Heavy Tank Battalion 503, failed to reach Kisujszallas from the west. T h r o u g h out the day, the G e r m a n attack p e n e t r a t e d a total of 30 additional kilometers. T h e next day, 21 O c t o b e r 1944, the Soviet capture of M e z o t u r in the G e r m a n rear forced the leading G e r m a n elements to withdraw. Over the course of two days, led t h r o u g h o u t by elements of Heavy Tank Battalion 503, the G e r m a n attack successfully penetrated the Soviet defenses to a d e p t h of 70 kilometers. This relatively obscure attack is n o t e w o r t h y because it was p r o b a bly the deepest penetration of the war that was spearheaded by a heavy t a n k battalion. There were several reasons for this exceptional success. Foremost, the battlefield situation was uncertain a n d fluid after m a n y H u n g a r i a n A r m y units left their defensive positions. In m a n y places, there were not even defined front lines. Also, the morale of the R o m a n i a n defenders on 19 O c t o b e r 1944 appears to have been low, with m a n y s u r r e n d e r i n g easily. M o r e importantly, 11

12

13

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the G e r m a n s had d o n e little to equip their former allies with first-quality antit a n k weapons, so the R o m a n i a n s ' few, small-caliber g u n s were incapable of dealing effectively with the attacking King Tigers. D u r i n g the two days of offensive operations, the only m e n t i o n of the battalion e n c o u n t e r i n g any Soviet tanks was at the e n d of the second day in a n d a r o u n d Kisujszallas. This attack was c o n d u c t e d u n d e r very favorable conditions for Heavy Tank Battalion 503. Having just completed refitting with the King Tiger, it h a d its full a u t h o r i z a t i o n of e q u i p m e n t and personnel. To the battalion's credit, they penetrated several defensive lines each day a n d destroyed at least 36 antitank guns on the second day's attack. Although no King Tigers were totally destroyed d u r i n g the o p e r a t i o n , m a n y received d a m a g e from the n u m e r o u s antitank guns. By the t i m e that the 3d C o m p a n y m a d e it to the t o w n of Turkeve on the second day of the attack, there were only three King Tigers operational. 14

After this attack, Heavy Tank Battalion 503 w i t h d r e w gradually to the west with other G e r m a n forces. Initially, they defended along the Theiss River a r o u n d Szolnok, finally w i t h d r a w i n g from those positions on 31 O c t o b e r 1944. T h e battalion spent the m o n t h of N o v e m b e r 1944 withdrawing from their positions along the Theiss River, eventually occupying a new defensive line northeast of Budapest. 15

As could be expected, the battalion's c o m b a t p o w e r dramatically decreased after continual e m p l o y m e n t w i t h o u t providing or allocating any appreciable t i m e to c o n d u c t major m a i n t e n a n c e efforts. C o n t i n u i n g its tradition t h r o u g h out the war, this battalion's crews a n d o r d n a n c e personnel did an excellent job of recovering d a m a g e d a n d b r o k e n vehicles. T h e battalion destroyed its first King Tiger to avoid capture on 2 N o v e m b e r 1944, after it b e c a m e stuck in the m u d d y t e r r a i n . T h a t day m a r k e d the first t i m e also that a King Tiger from the battalion was destroyed by direct fire, namely, from a Soviet antitank g u n . On 30 N o v e m b e r 1944, A r m y G r o u p South ordered Heavy Tank Battalion 503 to m o v e to the vicinity of Lake Balaton to defend against Soviet forces that had broken o u t of their D a n u b e bridgeheads south of B u d a p e s t . 16

17

18

T h e battalion l o a d e d t r a i n s on 30 N o v e m b e r 1944 a n d arrived in Balatonkenese, on the east side of Lake Balaton, on 3 D e c e m b e r 1944. Their r e d e p l o y m e n t presented the battalion with a major p r o b l e m , however. 19

Fifteen d a m a g e d tanks were in the m a i n t e n a n c e facility at Kurt. It would take at least 14 days to repair t h e m since replacement parts h a d to be b r o u g h t from G e r m a n y in the unit's o w n trucks. T h e corps ordered that the Maintenance C o m p a n y h a d to remain in Kurt until the tanks were repaired. For the t i m e being, the e n e m y situation in that section of the front did not cause any concern. There was, indeed, no other alternative, since that n u m b e r of tanks could not be towed the approximately 50

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THE FINAL BATTLES

kilometers to a railroad station where they could be rail loaded. There were no p r i m e movers available for that. As a result, the m a i n t e n a n c e facility r e m a i n e d in K u r t . 20

T h e "enemy situation in that section" changed dramatically on 5 D e c e m b e r 1944 w h e n the Soviets began their largest offensive operation in H u n g a r y up to that t i m e . Although the King Tigers at the repair center were towed into defensive positions a n d m a n a g e d to destroyed several Soviet tanks, on 7 December 1944, eight King Tigers had to be destroyed to avoid c a p t u r e . Fortunately for the battalion, they were s o m e h o w able to t r a n s p o r t the remainder of the d a m a g e d vehicles to the relative safety of the battalion's new area of o p e r a t i o n s . 21

22

23

T h e battalion c o n t r i b u t e d greatly in stopping the Soviet offensive a n d stabilizing the front in the Lake Balaton area. Soviet antitank guns a n d selfdestruction of vehicles after they h a d b e c o m e stuck in the m u d were the two p r i m a r y causes of King Tiger losses t h r o u g h o u t their t i m e a r o u n d Lake Balaton. Heavy Tank Battalion 503 c o n t i n u e d to operate in a n d a r o u n d the Lake Balaton region until 11 February 1945 w h e n they were m o v e d n o r t h to participate in O p e r a t i o n SÜDWIND, the reduction of the G r a n Bridgehead. 24

Operation

WACHT AM RHEIN

Both of the heavy t a n k battalions that took part in the A r d e n n e s offensive, namely SS-Heavy Tank Battalion 501 a n d Heavy Tank Battalion 506, were equipped with new King Tiger tanks. As an organic unit of the I SS-Panzer Corps, SS-Heavy Tank Battalion 501 was attached to the 1st SS-Panzer Division which in t u r n attached it as the second battalion of SS Panzer Regiment 1. This unit, k n o w n as C o m b a t G r o u p Peiper for its c o m m a n d e r , O b e r s t u r m b a n n f ü h r e r Joachim Peiper, was assigned as a spearhead of the attack for the 6th Panzer A r m y . T h e King Tiger, however, was n o t suited for the type of o p e r a t i o n envisioned in the G e r m a n plan. They were very slow a n d c o n t i n u e d to be m e c h a n ically unreliable. T h e hilly terrain in the Ardennes further exacerbated the mechanical difficulties. The soft-surfaced, n a r r o w roads were also insufficient for such large, heavy vehicles needing to move quickly. Peiper realized these deficiencies a n d considered the King Tiger too slow a n d too heavy for the rapid advance that was required of his unit, therefore, he placed the entire battalion at the rear of his c o l u m n . C o m b a t G r o u p Peiper's mission was to move t h r o u g h the p e n e t r a t i o n in the American front lines to be m a d e by the 12th Volks-Grenadier Division a n d 25

26

27

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advance t h r o u g h Trois-Pont a n d W e r b o m o n t . Peiper's ultimate goal was to reach the Meuse River between Liege a n d H u y . There, his c o m b a t g r o u p was to establish a bridgehead for follow on forces to c o n t i n u e the advance to A n t w e r p . Peiper p l a n n e d to have his Panzer IVs, Panthers, a n d panzergrenadiers do m o s t of the initial fighting. After p e n e t r a t i n g the most difficult terrain of the Ardennes, SS-Heavy Tank Battalion 501 w o u l d move forward a n d spearhead the final p o r t i o n of the b r e a k t h r o u g h to the Meuse River. T h r o u g h o u t the initial stage of the operation, the p r i m a r y difficulty that SSHeavy Tank Battalion 501 faced was road m o v e m e n t b e h i n d the lead elements of C o m b a t G r o u p Peiper, a n d doing so with as m u c h speed as possible. 28

29

T h e G e r m a n offensive began early on the m o r n i n g of 16 December 1944, b u t the lead elements of C o m b a t G r o u p Peiper did n o t begin m o v i n g until 1630 h o u r s . As the trail elements, the King Tigers of SS-Heavy Tank Battalion 501 did n o t begin their m o v e m e n t until well after dark. T h e battalion's order of m a r c h was 2d C o m p a n y , the battalion h e a d q u a r t e r s element, 3d Company, a n d t h e n 1st C o m p a n y . (see m a p 27) 30

F r o m the very b e g i n n i n g of the m a r c h , King Tigers started to break d o w n with mechanical p r o b l e m s , m a i n l y failures of the final drive. In an a t t e m p t to keep pace with the lead elements, the battalion c o n t i n u e d forward t h r o u g h o u t m o s t of the night a n d on into 17 D e c e m b e r 1944. T h e battalion destroyed two A m e r i c a n a n t i t a n k guns in the t o w n of Honsfeld that m u s t have occupied the t o w n after the lead elements of C o m b a t G r o u p Peiper h a d already passed t h r o u g h the t o w n or h a d been bypassed by the lead G e r m a n elements. T h e first King Tiger d a m a g e d by e n e m y action occurred outside of the t o w n of Bullingen w h e n U.S. A r m y Air Force P-47s attacked the c o l u m n . This vehicle was damaged, b u t n o t destroyed completely, although it was never repaired a n d was eventually a b a n d o n e d by the b a t t a l i o n . 31

32

By 18 December 1944, C o m b a t G r o u p Peiper h a d b r o k e n t h r o u g h the defenses of the 526th A r m o r e d Infantry Battalion a n d 202nd a n d 291st Engineer C o m b a t Battalions a r o u n d Stavelot to p u s h on to Trois Ponts. W h e n the only bridge over the Ambleve there was destroyed by elements of the A m e r i c a n 51st Engineer C o m b a t Battalion, Peiper t u r n e d his tanks d o w n the narrow, w i n d i n g road toward the only remaining exit from the Ambleve Valley near La Gleize. Here, engineers of the 291st Engineer C o m b a t Battalion demolished the only bridge capable of holding Tigers; although there were m a n y days of fighting left, this was the furthest extent of C o m b a t G r o u p Peiper's advance, over 60 kilometers from the Meuse. T h e King Tigers of SS-Heavy Tank Battalion 501 h a d great difficulty in following C o m b a t G r o u p Peiper's advance even to this point. As a result of the m a n y mechanical b r e a k d o w n s , the battalion fragmented a n d large gaps in the m a r c h c o l u m n developed. Subunits a n d individual vehicles c o n t i n u e d

Map 27: SS-Heavy Tank Battalion 501 Attack with Combat Group Peiper During the Ardennes Offensive

17-18 December 1944

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forward as best they could, along whatever r o u t e they could find by t h e m selves. Shortly after the lead p o r t i o n of C o m b a t G r o u p Peiper drove t h r o u g h Stavelot e n r o u t e to Trois Ponts a n d La Gleize, the 1st Battalion, 117th Infantry Regiment of the American 30th Infantry Division, drove o u t the small detachm e n t Peiper had left there a n d established defensive positions in the town, blocking the sole bridge over the Ambleve River. O n l y six King Tigers were close e n o u g h to the lead elements of C o m b a t G r o u p Peiper to m a k e it t h r o u g h Stavelot before that route was closed by the counterattacking American forces. T h e attack by these six King Tigers was e n h a n c e d by the presence of unusually h i g h - r a n k i n g vehicle c o m m a n d e r s . T h e platoon leaders a n d c o m p a n y c o m m a n d e r s h a d c o n t i n u e d to switch to King Tigers that were still operational w h e n theirs broke d o w n . Consequently, the six t a n k c o m m a n d e r s w h o m a d e it t h r o u g h to C o m b a t G r o u p Peiper in the La Gleize area consisted of the battalion c o m m a n d e r , the battalion adjutant, the three t a n k c o m p a n y c o m m a n d e r s , and a p l a t o o n leader from the 2d C o m p a n y . (see m a p 28) 33

34

33

T h e trailing King Tigers c o n t i n u e d to move forward as best they could, repairing b r o k e n d o w n a n d d a m a g e d tanks as they progressed. Several King Tigers barely missed m a k i n g it t h r o u g h the t o w n of Stavelot a n d s u p p o r t e d attacks on that t o w n a i m e d at seizing the bridge across the river. This bridge was eventually blown up by the engineers attached to the 1st Battalion, 117th Infantry Regiment, effectively cutting off supplies to the rest of C o m b a t G r o u p Peiper. Two other King Tigers m o v e d s o u t h of Stavelot with the 1st SSPanzer Division's Reconnaissance Battalion toward Trois Ponts, b u t found that r o u t e blocked by strong A m e r i c a n defensive positions. These King Tigers e n d e d up guarding a light bridge across the Ambleve between Trois Ponts a n d Stavelot for the next few days. A few King Tigers with C o m b a t G r o u p Peiper in La Gleize followed an attack southwest t h r o u g h C h e n e u x toward W e r b o m o n t on 18 January 1945. T h e c o l u m n t u r n e d back w h e n they found the bridge over the Lienne Stream h a d been destroyed by the 291st Engineers; although there were other bridges over the Ambleve in the area, neither were Tiger-capable. These King Tigers did n o t have e n o u g h fuel to r e t u r n to La Gleize, so fuel was drained from several a n d they were towed back by the others d u r i n g the n i g h t . 36

37

On 19 D e c e m b e r 1944, A m e r i c a n forces closed in a r o u n d C o m b a t G r o u p Peiper, effectively t r a p p i n g the G e r m a n units in the vicinity of La GleizeS t o u m o n t - W e r b o m o n t - C h e n e u x area, with the Tigers a r o u n d La Gleize. From 19 t h r o u g h 23 December 1945, these six King Tigers defended against increasingly-intense counterattacks m o u n t e d by elements of the 30th Infantry Division a n d 3d A r m o r e d Division. These Tigers' crews, as well as the rest of C o m b a t G r o u p Peiper, suffered from a lack of resupply (especially fuel),

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a m m u n i t i o n and repair parts. Although American o p e r a t i o n s were s u p p o r t ed by s o m e armor, the battle a r o u n d La Gleize was primarily an infantry battle. T h e King Tigers s u p p o r t e d the defense as best they could, but a severe lack of fuel restricted their m o v e m e n t . Early on the m o r n i n g of 24 December 1944, the t r a p p e d elements of C o m b a t G r o u p Peiper broke o u t of the pocket on foot, leaving all of their vehicles a n d heavy e q u i p m e n t . T h e part played by SS-Heavy Tank Battalion 501 in the early p o r t i o n of the A r d e n n e s offensive has to be judged as a failure. N u m e r o u s mechanical breakd o w n s caused vehicles to trickle forward. T h e great fuel requirements of the King Tigers imposed a huge logistical b u r d e n on the G e r m a n forces. Even t h o u g h this battalion was assigned with the lead unit ( C o m b a t G r o u p Peiper), it essentially did not c o n t r i b u t e to any consequential c o m b a t action until the fourth day of the offensive. By this time, the offensive h a d t u r n e d into a defensive struggle for C o m b a t G r o u p Peiper. Of the 45 King Tigers that began the offensive from their initial assembly area, only six were able to keep up and not break d o w n , joining C o m b a t G r o u p Peiper a r o u n d La Gleize. T h e second heavy tank battalion involved in O p e r a t i o n Wacht am Rhein, Heavy Tank Battalion 506, started the offensive with only 41 King Tigers. This battalion had been in action against American a n d British forces since September 1944 a n d was transferred from the vicinity of Aachen to participate in the offensive. Because of this, it is likely that the n u m b e r of operational vehicles was m u c h lower t h a n the n u m b e r of King Tigers on hand. Heavy Tank Battalion 506 saw action in the Eifel Region, attacking southwest t h r o u g h the American 14th Cavalry G r o u p on 17 a n d 18 D e c e m b e r 1944, to encircle elem e n t s of the 106th Infantry Division defending the Eifel M o u n t a i n s . As part of the 5th Panzer Army, Heavy Tank Battalion 506 s u p p o r t e d the encirclement of these forces in the Schnee Eifel region t h r o u g h 20 D e c e m b e r 1944, blocking the withdrawal of A m e r i c a n forces to St. Vith. (see m a p 29) 38

39

T h e greatest c o n t r i b u t i o n this battalion m a d e was in its s u p p o r t of the 18th Volks-Grenadier Division's Grenadier Regiment 294 d u r i n g its attack to break t h r o u g h American defenses t o w a r d St. Vith on 21 D e c e m b e r 1944. D u e to the restrictive terrain, it is doubtful whether m o r e t h a n a few King Tigers took p a r t in this attack. 40

T h e m a i n b r e a k t h r o u g h occurred along the Schönberg Road. T h e A m e r i can official history states that only three S h e r m a n s of C o m b a t C o m m a n d B, 7th A r m o r e d Division defended this key road d u r i n g this attack a n d that they were easily destroyed by the attacking King Tigers. This attack successfully penetrated the American defenses, forcing the withdrawal of American forces from St. Vith. After this, the battalion moved s o u t h toward Bastogne where it s u p p o r t e d attacks on the defenses a r o u n d this key t o w n , as well as defending against American relief attempts. 41

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THE FINAL BATTLES

Both battalions were largely ineffective d u r i n g the Battle of the Bulge. Because of b r e a k d o w n s , p r o b l e m s in supply, a n d the restrictive terrain, only small n u m b e r s of King Tigers ever fought together as a unit. F r o m 17 December 1944 to 13 January 1945, b o t h battalions lost a total of 22 Tigers. Heavy Tank Battalion 506 lost six to direct fire a n d o n e m o r e from an Allied air attack. T h e SS battalion also lost six to direct fire, b u t a b a n d o n e d or destroyed a n o t h e r nine King Tigers. Until 17 January 1945 w h e n A m e r i c a n forces attacked a r o u n d Bastogne, Heavy Tank Battalion 506 did n o t destroy or a b a n d o n any of its tanks. In the face of the American attacks a n d the battalion's subsequent hasty withdrawal, they destroyed three of their o w n Tigers. 42

43

44

45

Probably only a handful of American tanks—possibly as few as 20—were destroyed by these two heavy t a n k battalions d u r i n g the Ardennes Offensive. This was d u e to a n u m b e r of factors: first, only a p o r t i o n of each heavy t a n k battalion m a n a g e d to make their way forward to engage the enemy, especially 46

Map 29: Heavy Tank B a t t a l i o n 506 A r d e n n e s Offensive 17-22 December 1944

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d u r i n g the initial stages of the offensive; also, d u r i n g those initial stages, the Americans c o m m i t t e d little of their o w n armor. These aspects of the situation make the c o n t r i b u t i o n of the heavy t a n k battalions difficult to judge. W h a t ever their c o n t r i b u t i o n s , it is doubtful that those a c c o m p l i s h m e n t s sufficiently offset the loss of 25 King Tigers.

Hungary 1945 While the G e r m a n s units t h a t participated in Wacht am Rhein were being driven back or destroyed in the snows of the Ardennes, the G e r m a n s launched a series of attacks in H u n g a r y with the goal of relieving forces encircled in Budapest. Two heavy t a n k battalions t o o k part in these attacks, n a m e l y Heavy Tank Battalions 503 a n d 509. Heavy Tank Battalion 503 was assigned as an organic unit of the Panzer C o r p s Feldherrnhalle (FHH) on 19 December 1944. It was officially r e n a m e d Heavy Tank Battalion "Feldherrnhalle" (or FHH) b u t c o n t i n u e d to be referred to as Heavy Tank Battalion 5 0 3 . This m e a n t that it was only the second a r m y heavy t a n k battalion to be assigned as a p e r m a n e n t c o m p o n e n t of a corps, although it did n o t operate exclusively with this corps until O p e r a t i o n SÜDWIND in m i d - F e b r u a r y 1 9 4 5 . This battalion h a d operated in H u n g a r y since m i d - O c t o b e r 1944 after its reconstitution in the wake of its total destruction in N o r m a n d y . T h r o u g h o u t January 1945, the m a i n effort for the G e r m a n attacks toward Budapest fell to IV SS-Panzer C o r p s . T h e overall G e r m a n relief effort was divided into three offensives, d u b b e d O p e r a t i o n s KONRAD I, II, a n d III, respectively. T h e first attack started on 1 January a n d lasted until 8 January 1945, with IV SS-Panzer C o r p s attacking to the southeast from starting positions west of B u d a p e s t . (see m a p 30) 47

48

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30

31

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33

A s u p p o r t i n g attack was m a d e by III Panzer Corps, attacking on the IV SSPanzer C o r p s ' right flank. A very-weakened Heavy Tank Battalion 503, attached to the 4th Cavalry Brigade, attacked as part of III Panzer C o r p s in a s u p p o r t i n g attack. These attacks originated o u t of the vicinity of Lake Balaton a n d h a d a general o r i e n t a t i o n of east a n d northeast. Of the 26 King Tigers on h a n d in Heavy Tank Battalion 503, the battalion started the offensive on 1 January 1945 with only 10 operational tanks. T h e largest quantity operational on any single day was 13, on 4 January 1 9 4 5 . This battalion s u p p o r t e d the 4th Cavalry Brigade d u r i n g the other days with only small n u m b e r s of King Tigers. For example, on 2 January 1945 only three King Tigers saw action; on the next day, only two were involved in a night attack. O p e r a t i o n Konrad II started on 9 January a n d lasted until 14 January 1945. This time, IV SS-Panzer Corps shifted further n o r t h of their original 34

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Map 30: IV SS-Panzer Corps and III Panzer Corps A t t e m p t s to Relieve Budapest

January 1945

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axis of attack and focused on a n a r r o w front 25 to 30 kilometers northwest of B u d a p e s t . Although the m a i n attack by IV SS-Panzer C o r p s began on 10 January 1945, the s u p p o r t i n g attack by III Panzer C o r p s occurred on 9 January 1945, again from the southwest of Budapest from the vicinity of Lake Balaton. 58

59

Heavy Tank Battalion 503, as part of the III Panzer Corps, attacked in concert with the 4th Cavalry Brigade a n d the 23d Panzer Division on 9 January 1945, a n d as part of C o m b a t G r o u p W e y m a n n on 11 January 1 9 4 5 . On 9 January 1945, o n e c o m p a n y s u p p o r t e d the 4th Cavalry Brigade while the r e m a i n d e r of the battalion s u p p o r t e d the 23d Panzer Division. Although limited in scope, it appears that b o t h attacks achieved their objectives, with the c o m p a n y s u p p o r t i n g the 4th Cavalry Brigade destroying seven Soviet tanks d u r i n g their attack. T h e King Tigers s u p p o r t i n g the 23d Panzer Division, although apparently achieving their objective for the day, encountered a Soviet unit e q u i p p e d with SU-152 assault g u n s situated in a reverse-slope defense. These well-sited Soviet assault guns m a n a g e d to destroy three King Tigers a n d d a m a g e d a fourth that was ultimately recovered by the G e r m a n s . 60

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63

T h r o u g h o u t these attacks toward Budapest in January, G e r m a n units were able to achieve numerical superiority in t e r m s of tanks, b u t had difficulty achieving numerical superiority in infantry. This affected the success of the a r m o r attacks such as the ones c o n d u c t e d by Heavy Tank Battalion 503. Lack of effective infantry s u p p o r t p u t extra strain on the a r m o r c r e w m e n w h e n they encountered trenches or minefields, a n d w h e n recovering disabled or d a m a g e d vehicles close to e n e m y units. W h e n Heavy Tank Battalion 503 e n c o u n t e r e d a strong e n e m y trench line on 9 January 1945, the battalion c o m m a n d e r personally a t t e m p t e d to motivate the s u p p o r t i n g infantry a n d lead t h e m in the attack: 64

O u r o w n infantry r e m a i n e d b e h i n d o u r tanks a n d m a d e n o move t o leave that cover. T h e n I saw h o w H a u p t m a n n von Diest-Körber climbed o u t of his tank and, right a r m gesticulating forward, tried to urge the infantry forward with h i m . A scene like s o m e t h i n g o u t of an old battle painting! I couldn't breathe. We tried to h o l d the Russians d o w n with o u r fire a n d give h i m cover. T h e infantry, however, did n o t follow h i m . He was all alone in front of the trench. He hastened back again b e h i n d our tanks. 63

As the battalion c o m m a n d e r relates, he c o n t i n u e d to a t t e m p t to rally the infantry a n d finally motivated several infantrymen to follow h i m : Finally, I succeeded, with the help of three decent corporals and a m a c h i n e gun, in getting to the ditch a n d eventually taking a b o u t 300 prisoners. A b o u t 100 dead or w o u n d e d lay a r o u n d in i t . 66

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On 11 January 1945, 13 King Tigers of Heavy Tank Battalion 503 led C o m b a t G r o u p W e y m a n n in its attack t o w a r d Zamoly. D u r i n g this attack, the battalion's crews successfully destroyed 21 Soviet tanks, 20 antitank guns, three airplanes, a n d o n e multiple rocket l a u n c h e r . M o r e importantly, they accomplished their mission, seizing the t o w n of Zamoly. This was d o n e at a heavy cost to the battalion, having three King Tigers totally destroyed a n d a n o t h e r seven severely damaged. By the e n d of the day, out of a total of 23 King Tigers on h a n d in the battalion, only three were o p e r a t i o n a l . W i t h the exception of a few operational King Tigers employed along the front, Heavy Tank Battalion 503 spent the r e m a i n d e r of the time d u r i n g the second G e r m a n offensive repairing vehicles to increase their c o m b a t power. 67

68

O p e r a t i o n Konrad III started on 18 January a n d lasted until 29 January 1945. This t i m e , IV SS-Panzer C o r p s ' m a i n effort originated from the same general area in which Heavy Tank Battalion 503 h a d been operating d u r i n g the first two relief efforts. The IV SS-Panzer Corps, s u p p o r t e d by Heavy Tank Battalion 509, attacked toward Budapest to the northeast. This effort reached an area s o u t h of the Soviet-held t o w n of Stuhlweissenburg (Szekesfehervar, H u n g a r y ) . Still attached to the 4th Cavalry Brigade, a n d the 23d Panzer Division, Heavy Tank Battalion 503 participated in the s u p p o r t i n g attack n o r t h of Stuhlweissenburg. After heavy fighting along the Vistula River in Poland d u r i n g the s u m m e r of 1944, Heavy Tank Battalion 509 t u r n e d over their few r e m a i n i n g Tigers to Heavy Tank Battalion 501 in early September 1944 a n d m o v e d back to Germ a n y . T h e y spent several m o n t h s in Germany, waiting for n e w King Tigers to arrive a n d on training with the few that they received. This battalion did n o t receive their full a u t h o r i z a t i o n of King Tigers until 1 January 1945 a n d only arrived in H u n g a r y on 15 January 1945, just in t i m e to take part in the third offensive toward B u d a p e s t . 69

70

Allocated to IV SS-Panzer Corps, Heavy Tank Battalion 509 m u s t have been a welcome addition by this time. W i t h its 45 b r a n d new King Tigers, the battalion c o n t r i b u t e d a major p o r t i o n of the entire c o m b a t power of the corps d u r i n g this attack. The IV SS-Panzer C o r p s consisted of two SS p a n z e r divisions, n a m e l y the 3d (Totenkopf, or "Death's Head") a n d the 5th (Wiking, or "Viking"). For this attack, the corps controlled the 1st, 3d, a n d 6th Panzer Divisions. These five panzer divisions s o u n d like an impressive array of c o m bat power, b u t in reality all the units were severely depleted a n d suffered from a low n u m b e r of operationally-ready tanks a n d assault guns. These divisions c o m b i n e d to field only 116 tanks a n d assault guns at the b e g i n n i n g of this attack. (see m a p 31) In O p e r a t i o n KONRAD III, IV SS-Panzer C o r p s attacked with b o t h WaffenSS divisions in the center as the m a i n effort, with the 1st Panzer Division 71

72

Map 3 1 : Heavy Tank Battalion 509 Last Attempt to Relieve Budapest with IV SS-Panzer Corps

18 January 1945

THE FINAL BATTLES

169

protecting the left, or n o r t h e r n , flank a n d the 3d Panzer Division protecting the right flank. Heavy Tank Battalion 509 attacked as the spearhead in the vanguard of the 3d SS-Panzer Division. T h e battalion's mission on the first day was to seize the bridges over the Sarviz Canal south of Stuhlweissenburg. Their ultimate objective was to achieve a p e n e t r a t i o n to the Stuhlweissenb u r g - B u d a p e s t highway, presumably to allow the following panzer divisions to c o n t i n u e to exploit that p e n e t r a t i o n t o w a r d Budapest. 73

74

This battalion's attack on 18 January 1945 is a rare example of an entire, fully-equipped heavy t a n k battalion, operating u n d e r its o w n c o m m a n d e r , attacking to accomplish the mission for which it was doctrinally intended (creating a b r e a k t h r o u g h ) . In other operations, elements of other battalions were used to effect b r e a k t h r o u g h s , b u t were only deployed piecemeal, with separate c o m p a n i e s being attached to different divisions. Still other battalions were employed in a b r e a k t h r o u g h role, b u t were n o t at, or usually anywhere near, their authorized c o m b a t strength of 45 t a n k s . 73

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Heavy Tank Battalion 509 initiated its attack at 0800 h o u r s on 18 January 1945 in a battalion "V" formation, with 1st a n d 3d C o m p a n i e s leading, or in the first "wave." T h e 2d C o m p a n y trailed in the center as t h e second "wave." This m u s t have b e e n an impressive sight as 45 King Tigers started the m i s s i o n . T h e battalion's initial objective was a ridgeline between two hills south of the t o w n of Jeno. 77

78

After fighting t h r o u g h several Soviet defensive belts that fields, a n t i t a n k guns, a n d tanks, the battalion reached its s o m e t i m e a r o u n d n o o n . T h e regimental engineers from Regiment 3 assisted in clearing the mines, reportedly taking in the process.

included m i n e initial objective the SS-Panzer heavy casualties

79

Heavy Tank Battalion 509 also suffered heavy losses d u r i n g this phase of the attack. In t e r m s of key personnel, the battalion c o m m a n d e r was w o u n d e d and the adjutant was killed. All of the officers in the 3d C o m p a n y were w o u n d e d , as was the c o m m a n d e r of the 1st C o m p a n y . T h e trailing c o m p a n y in the battalion attack, the 2d, fared the best. Its c o m m a n d e r assumed c o m m a n d of the battalion a n d o n e of the platoon leaders in the 2d C o m p a n y stepped up to lead the company. A senior n o n - c o m m i s s i o n e d officer assumed tactical leadership of the 3d C o m p a n y . 80

W h e n the battalion c o n t i n u e d its attack at 1400 h o u r s , only 18 King Tigers were o p e r a t i o n a l . In this attack the battalion adopted a wedge f o r m a t i o n . D u e to its greater remaining c o m b a t power, the 2d C o m p a n y a s s u m e d the lead a n d the r e m n a n t s of the other two c o m p a n i e s followed. They succeeded in seizing the t o w n of Szabadbattyan, b u t Soviet forces m a n a g e d to blow up the bridge over the Sarviz Canal w h e n the leading King Tigers were only 50 meters away. 81

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Heavy Tank Battalion 509 had successfully penetrated the first echelons of the Soviet defenses d u r i n g this day's operation. There was no intact bridge capable of holding King Tigers, however, so the G e r m a n attack c o n t i n u e d on w i t h o u t Heavy Tank Battalion 509 for the next few days. D u r i n g the attack on 18 January 1945, the battalion lost seven King Tigers a n d destroyed at least 20 Soviet tanks a n d n u m e r o u s other antitank g u n s . Sources indicate only four other King Tigers were d a m a g e d by e n e m y fire, leading o n e to assume that mechanical failures caused the r e d u c t i o n of the battalion's operational strength to only 18 tanks. This w o u l d m e a n that 16 King Tigers broke d o w n d u r i n g their first day's c o m b a t o p e r a t i o n . 84

Although this battalion achieved its objectives for the day, it c a n n o t be viewed as a total success for the heavy tank battalion as a unit. Admittedly, the unit was given the m o s t difficult mission of any unit in the entire corps, or in A r m y G r o u p South for that matter. Despite the difficult n a t u r e of the mission, the battalion did penetrate Soviet defenses to a d e p t h of 25 kilometers against prepared defensive positions. Doing so, however, cost the battalion 15 percent of its c o m b a t power in total losses. Also, after p e n e t r a t i n g to a depth of a r o u n d 12 kilometers d u r i n g its initial attack, it was reduced in operational c o m b a t power to 40 percent of its original strength. Finally, the King Tiger's great weight prohibited it from crossing existing bridges a n d this limitation restricted it from crossing the Sarviz Canal a n d c o n t i n u i n g to perform its mission of leading the IV SS-Panzer C o r p s ' attack. 83

T h e battalion s u p p o r t e d several other attacks d u r i n g this third G e r m a n offensive a n d although they didn't lose any m o r e tanks, the n u m b e r available for c o m b a t continually declined. On 27 January 1945, w h e n the Soviets launched major counterattacks in the 3d SS-Panzer Division's sector, there were only three King Tigers available to counter the Soviet a r m o r . T h e battalion c o m m a n d e r joined these three later in the battle a n d their accomplishm e n t s on this day illustrates the effectiveness of the King Tiger in the defense w h e n positioned along a major e n e m y axis of attack. Defending against the attacks of a Soviet t a n k brigade, these four King Tigers destroyed 41 Soviet tanks in a n d a r o u n d the t o w n of P e t t e n d . 86

87

By 29 January 1945, Soviet counterattacks forced the G e r m a n s to realize that further offensive actions were n o t possible, effectively ending the Germ a n s ' third a t t e m p t to break t h r o u g h to Budapest. By this time, Heavy Tank Battalion 509 only h a d five operational King Tigers o u t of a total of 38 on h a n d . T h e battalion c o n t i n u e d to operate between Lake Balaton a n d Lake Valence almost to the end of the war, participating in the final a t t e m p t toward Budapest, O p e r a t i o n FRÜhliNGSERWACHEN in March 1945. After the Ardennes Offensive, Hitler ordered the 6th Panzer Army, n o w designated the 6th SS-Panzer Army, to displace to Hungary. This powerful 88

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formation was to launch an offensive, O p e r a t i o n Frühlingserwachen (Spring Awakening), the objective of which was to clear all Soviet forces from the area west of the D a n u b e a n d n o r t h of the Drava Rivers, a n d to secure the Nagykanizsa oil fields. Prior to that, however, G e r m a n forces h a d to eliminate Soviet forces established in a strong bridgehead across the G r a n River n o r t h of Esztergom. This almost 20-by-20 kilometer bridgehead was a p o t e n tial assembly area for a major Soviet thrust toward Vienna, a n d to secure the G e r m a n lines of c o m m u n i c a t i o n , it h a d to be eliminated prior to the m a i n offensive a r o u n d B u d a p e s t . T h e o p e r a t i o n to eliminate this bridgehead was given the code n a m e SÜDWIND ( S o u t h w i n d ) . 89

90

Two heavy t a n k battalions t o o k part in SÜDWIND. SS-Heavy Tank Battalion 501 was still attached to C o m b a t G r o u p Peiper, a c o m p o n e n t of the 1st SSPanzer Division. This division was also still part of the I SS-Panzer C o r p s , to which the SS-Heavy Tank Battalion 501 was p e r m a n e n t l y assigned. T h e seco n d heavy tank battalion was Heavy Tank Battalion 503 (FHH) which had operated in H u n g a r y since O c t o b e r 1944. For this operation, the battalion was placed u n d e r the operational control of the 44th Infantry Division, the ReichsGrenadier Division "Hoch und Deutschmeister." 91

Neither heavy tank battalion was at full strength for this o p e r a t i o n . SSHeavy Tank Battalion 501 h a d 36 King Tigers on its rolls, b u t only 19 were operational for the start of the attack. Heavy Tank Battalion 503 (FHH) h a d 22 on h a n d , all of which were operational for the beginning of the attack. 92

93

T h e attack began at 0500 h o u r s on 17 February 1945 with Panzer C o r p s FHH leading a n d I SS-Panzer C o r p s following. Heavy Tank Battalion 503 (FHH) attacked in the v a n g u a r d a n d was successful in penetrating the Soviet defenses. 94

D u r i n g this attack, the battalion lost o n e Tiger to antitank g u n f i r e . This was the only Tiger lost to e n e m y action by either battalion d u r i n g the entire operation. D u r i n g the afternoon, b o t h battalions led the attack to the Parizsky C a n a l . This attack was probably the only instance d u r i n g the war where two G e r m a n heavy t a n k battalions attacked together toward a c o m m o n objective. (see m a p 32) 95

96

On 18 February 1945, SS-Heavy Tank Battalion 501 attacked o u t of the small bridgehead over the Parizsky Canal to key high g r o u n d n o r t h of Muzsla. A r o u n d m i d n i g h t , Heavy Tank Battalion 503 (FHH) linked up with elements of the 1st SS-Panzer Division in the same vicinity. D u r i n g their attack south, they ran into an extensive minefield. W i t h o u t the s u p p o r t of infantry or engineers, t a n k c o m m a n d e r s a n d other c r e w m e n d i s m o u n t e d a n d manually breached the minefield by clearing paths for the t a n k s . The next day, 19 February 1945, SS-Heavy Tank Battalion 501 c o n t i n u e d its attack with the Leibstandarte to the confluence of the G r a n a n d the D a n u b e 97

Map 3 2 : Heavy Tank Battalion 5 0 3 and SS-Heavy Tank Battalion 5 0 1 During the Reduction of the Gran Bridgehead, Operation SÜDWIND,

17-24 February 1945

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Rivers. D u r i n g the day, Heavy Tank Battalion 5 0 3 (FHH) s u p p o r t e d a n u m b e r of lesser attacks to secure the entire s o u t h e r n p o r t i o n of the b r i d g e h e a d . T h a t night, Heavy Tank Battalion 5 0 3 (FHH) c o n d u c t e d an u n s u p p o r t e d attack against the Soviet s t r o n g p o i n t in the village of Kemend. It was halted by an extensive minefield. The battalion then s u p p o r t e d the further reduction of the bridgehead by assuming defensive positions to contain Soviet forces. 98

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SS-Heavy Tank Battalion 5 0 1 took part in the final attack in the bridgehead that eliminated the Soviet s t r o n g p o i n t i n Kemend. O n 2 4 February 1 9 4 5 , the battalion attacked from the west with the rest of C o m b a t G r o u p Peiper a n d was successful in eliminating this Soviet s t r o n g p o i n t . 100

A l t h o u g h records do n o t indicate h o w m a n y e n e m y tanks were destroyed by each unit, this operation m u s t be d e e m e d as a complete success. T h e two heavy t a n k battalions led the two corps' attacks d u r i n g the i m p o r t a n t stages of the o p e r a t i o n a n d only suffered the loss of o n e Tiger to e n e m y action. This was achieved against a prepared Soviet defense that included 6 0 , 0 0 0 m e n ; between 1 0 0 a n d 2 3 0 tanks a n d assault guns; a n d over 1 0 0 antitank g u n s . 101

Although these battalions sustained only one Tiger destroyed, their m a i n tenance elements h a d difficulty repairing d a m a g e d Tigers as well as c o n d u c t ing routine t a n k m a i n t e n a n c e . At the e n d of O p e r a t i o n SÜDWIND, SS-Heavy Tank Battalion 5 0 1 only h a d four King Tigers operational o u t o f 3 6 o n hand. W h a t Russian tanks, guns, a n d t r o o p s could n o t accomplish, the u b i q u i t o u s mechanical a n d m a i n t e n a n c e p r o b l e m s did. 102

Immediately following this o p e r a t i o n , I SS Panzer Corps moved s o u t h to prepare for its next operation, FRÜHLINGSERWACHEN. This battalion only h a d nine days to recover from SÜDWIND before being t h r o w n once again into major offensive activity requiring extensive cross-country a n d road m o v e m e n t . As a result, SS-Heavy Tank Battalion 5 0 1 was unable to increase the n u m b e r of operational King Tigers, b e g i n n i n g FRÜHLINGSERWACHEN with four King Tigers. 103

Heavy Tank Battalion 5 0 9 was also c o m m i t t e d to FRÜHLINGSERWACHEN. AS part of III Panzer Corps, this battalion operated in a s u p p o r t i n g role in the n o r t h e r n zone of the G e r m a n attack. Since participating in the third G e r m a n relief a t t e m p t toward Budapest in January ( O p e r a t i o n KONRAD III), it h a d been allowed t i m e to c o n d u c t m a i n t e n a n c e a n d was c o m m i t t e d in primarily a defensive role, allowing it to begin this operation with 32 operational King T i g e r s . (see m a p 3 3 ) Both heavy t a n k battalions experienced great difficulties d u r i n g the offensive because of the m u d d y a n d s w a m p y terrain. T h e Soviets did n o t use very m a n y a r m o r e d vehicles to counter this offensive, so FRÜHLINGSERWACHEN t u r n e d o u t to be primarily an infantry battle on b o t h sides. 104

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Map 33: Heavy Tank Battalion 509 and SS-Heavy Tank Battalion 501 Operation FRÜHLINGSERWACHEN

6-22 March 1945

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As part of the m a i n attack, SS-Heavy Tank Battalion 501 did n o t c o n t r i b u t e greatly d u r i n g the offensive. Along with the rest of C o m b a t G r o u p Peiper, they generally trailed the two leading panzer-grenadier regiments of the 1st SSPanzer Division d u r i n g the attack. Even t h o u g h the Leibstandarte was able to establish a bridgehead across the Sio River, the King Tigers of SS-Heavy Tank Battalion 501 did not cross, probably because a bridge capable of s u p p o r t i n g the King Tigers did n o t exist. G e r m a n intelligence indicated the possibility of a Soviet counteroffensive, so the 1st SS-Panzer Division consolidated Heavy Tank Battalion 501 near the town of Deg on 14 March 1945. After the Soviets began their offensive the next day, I SS-Panzer C o r p s c o m m i t t e d C o m b a t G r o u p Peiper a n d the eight operational King Tigers of SS-Heavy Tank Battalion 501 to stopping the enemy penetrations to the northwest a r o u n d Stuhlweissenburg a n d Varpalota. These eight tanks were employed in a piecemeal fashion, with one or two King Tigers operating with other types of tanks from C o m b a t G r o u p Peiper. On several occasions, a handful of Tigers knocked o u t large n u m b e r s of Soviet tanks a n d a r m o r e d vehicles. On 20 March 1945, o n e King Tiger destroyed 15 Soviet tanks near Varpalota; on the next day, a single King Tiger s u p p o r t e d by two Panthers destroyed a n o t h e r 17 e n e m y t a n k s . On 21 March 1945, however, the battalion began a long series of delaying actions that eventually led to its s u r r e n d e r to the U.S. A r m y near Steyr, A u s t r i a . 105

106

Heavy Tank Battalion 509 was either in the lead echelon or closely s u p p o r t e d the lead units of III Panzer C o r p s a n d was directly responsible for the success of an attack on at least two occasions. On 6 March 1945, forward units of III Panzer C o r p s were n o t able to neutralize some JS-II Heavy Tanks near Seregelyes. Two King Tigers from the battalion r u m b l e d forward a n d destroyed six JS-IIs, which allowed the attack to c o n t i n u e . 107

On 13 March 1945, lead elements of III Panzer Corps e n c o u n t e r e d 24 SU152s in prepared defensive positions protected by a minefield. D u r i n g the battalion's attack on this complex, every o n e of the 16 operational King Tigers was severely d a m a g e d and three were totally destroyed. After lanes were cleared in the minefield, two King Tigers m a n a g e d to destroy all of the SU152s. 108

D u r i n g the offensive, Heavy Tank Battalion 509 lost three Tigers to e n e m y action, with m a n y others d a m a g e d b u t repairable, a n d destroyed at least 30 e n e m y tanks or a r m o r e d vehicles. This battalion was directly responsible for breaking t h r o u g h several layers of the Soviets' defense a n d m a n a g e d to achieve a 10-to-l kill ratio. At this very late stage of the war, even w h e n pitted against the newest a n d m o s t formidable Soviet tanks, King Tigers could still be particularly deadly.

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The Vistula-Oder Operation In January 1945, two heavy t a n k battalions faced the Soviet bridgeheads of the 1st Ukrainian Front a n d the 2d Belorussian Front across the Vistula a n d Narew Rivers. In A r m y G r o u p A's sector, Heavy Tank Battalion 501 was assigned to XXIV Panzer Corps, which was the operational reserve for the 4th Panzer Army. Its mission was to destroy e n e m y p e n e t r a t i o n s of the G e r m a n defenses a r o u n d the Sandomierz Bridgehead. Further n o r t h , as part of Army G r o u p Center, Heavy Tank Battalion 507 was assigned to the 2d A r m y a n d faced a similar mission against Russian bridgeheads across the Narew River. Heavy Tank Battalion 501 was a powerful unit at this time. This battalion had between 41 a n d 45 King Tigers a n d had recently taken over Heavy Tank Battalion 509's former Tigers, so that it h a d a total strength of 52 Tiger a n d King Tiger t a n k s . Along with the remainder of XXIV Panzer Corps, this battalion was concentrated well forward in the defensive sector so that they were near the front lines. F u r t h e r m o r e , their assembly area was in swampy terrain, which restricted the use of tanks primarily to the roads. T h e battalion occupied the same assembly area as the 17th Panzer Division, although it is unclear w h e t h e r they were formally attached to this division. (see m a p 34) 109

110

111

Records indicate that everyone in the chain of c o m m a n d from the battalion c o m m a n d e r to the C o m m a n d i n g General of A r m y G r o u p A disagreed with the deployment of these units so far f o r w a r d . Even t h o u g h s o m e m e m bers of Heavy Tank Battalion 501 claimed that they were being sabotaged, according to the C o m m a n d i n g General of the 17th Panzer Division, the orders came from Hitler. Others have speculated that they were ordered forward to bolster the confidence of the infantry m a n n i n g the front line defenses in anticipation of the forthcoming Soviet offensive. 112

Whatever the case, w h e n the m a i n Soviet attack c a m e on 12 January 1945, the G e r m a n operational reserve units were quickly overrun or bypassed. After waiting most of the day, the c o m m a n d e r of Heavy Tank Battalion 501 received word that the 17th Panzer Division headquarters was being overrun by Soviet t a n k s . After an unsuccessful a t t e m p t that day, the attack to relieve the divisional c o m m a n d post was c o n t i n u e d on 13 January 1945. D u r i n g this attack, the battalion destroyed 27 tanks w i t h o u t losing a single Tiger to enemy action. Nevertheless, the attack was halted and the battalion consolidated to begin its withdrawal, or m o r e specifically—because it h a d been bypassed a n d was n o w s u r r o u n d e d — i t s attack to the rear. T h e battalion's objective was to reach the city of Kielce via the t o w n of Lisow. D u r i n g the m o v e m e n t to Lisow, several tanks got stuck in the m u d and were ultimately a b a n d o n e d . 113

114

Presumably the Soviets were aware of the battalion's existence because, based on available reports, they prepared an a m b u s h for this battalion in the town of Lisow. By the end of the day, most of Heavy Tank Battalion 501 was

THE FINAL BATTLES

177

Map 34: Russian Attack from the Sandomierz Bridgehead and Destruction of Heavy Tank Battalion 501

12-13 January 1945

SLEDGEHAMMERS

178

destroyed. T h e few r e m a i n i n g tanks a n d crews c o n t i n u e d to fight on a n d joined part of "Nehring's W a n d e r i n g Pocket," n a m e d for the c o m m a n d e r of XXIV Panzer Corps, General Walther K. Nehring. T h e few vehicles t h a t survived the Soviet a m b u s h were reportedly destroyed later because they ran o u t of fuel, although one Tiger may have m a d e it all the way back to B e r l i n . Further n o r t h , Heavy Tank Battalion 507, like Heavy Tank Battalion 5 0 1 , was overstrength a n d fielded a total of 51 tanks, all Tigers. This battalion fared m u c h better, in large part because they were not in the direct path of the m a i n Soviet offensive. T h e y were spread out b e h i n d the front in separate c o m p a n y assembly areas, similar to heavy tank battalion e m p l o y m e n t in N o r m a n d y . F r o m 16 to 19 January 1945, this battalion destroyed 96 enemy tanks while losing only four T i g e r s . Its efforts could not stop the Soviet offensive a n d it began to w i t h d r a w west on 19 January 1945. F r o m 19 to 30 January 1945, 41 Tigers were lost with the majority being destroyed by their o w n crews. Of those 41 Tigers, 22 reached the east b a n k of the Vistula. Ferries were n o t available, however, so the battalion destroyed t h e m to avoid c a p t u r e . By 13 February 1945, one m o n t h after the beginning of the Soviet Vistula offensive, Heavy Tank Battalion 507 was reduced to two T i g e r s . 115

116

117

118

119

Obviously, Heavy Tank Battalion 501 was ineffective in its e m p l o y m e n t as a part of the mobile reserve defending the Sandomierz Bridgehead. It was positioned so far forward that it was unable to react to e n e m y penetrations of the front line before those p e n e t r a t i o n s bypassed t h e m . Their assembly area also was in an area that degraded their mobility by limiting t h e m primarily to existing roads. Also, although adhering to the concept of concentration by consolidating the entire battalion, the G e r m a n s were unable to counter, or even slightly influence, the m a n y Soviet p e n e t r a t i o n s from the bridgehead. F r o m the results, it is a p p a r e n t that the Soviets exploited these p o o r G e r m a n decisions, a n d t h u s eliminated Heavy Tank Battalion 5 0 1 . In contrast, Heavy Tank Battalion 507 appears to have been very effective in destroying e n e m y p e n e t r a t i o n s , although the deteriorating strategic situation to their s o u t h ultimately resulted in devastating losses d u r i n g their retreat. Positioning elements of the battalion across a wider frontage a n d locating those elements further in d e p t h helped t h e m inflict significant, b u t by this stage of the war, wholly inadequate, losses u p o n the attacking Soviet a r m o r e d forces. Prior to its retreat, this battalion destroyed 24 Soviet tanks for the c o m bat loss of each Tiger.

Fragmented End D u r i n g the last six m o n t h s of the war, 11 heavy t a n k battalions were destroyed in action against the Red Army. These heavy t a n k battalions usually fought with significantly fewer tanks t h a n the 45 that they were authorized. Even with

179

THE FINAL BATTLES

only a handful of Tigers, however, these units were sometimes able to destroy large n u m b e r s of e n e m y tanks. (see m a p 35) Four heavy t a n k battalions—Heavy Tank Battalions 501, 503 (FHH), a n d 509; a n d SS-Heavy Tank Battalion 501—fought in H u n g a r y a n d their r e m n a n t s retreated to Austria or Czechoslovakia before t h e war e n d e d . T h e 3d Battalion of Panzer Regiment Grossdeutschland, a n d Heavy Tank Battalions 502, 505, a n d 507 all fought in the n o r t h e r n part of Germany, Poland, a n d East Prussia. Their last battles, with only a few Tigers, were in places like Pillau, the Frische N e h r u n g , a n d Königsberg. Heavy Tank Battalion 510 fought as part of A r m y G r o u p N o r t h (later called A r m y G r o u p Kurland) in the Kurland Peninsula, ultimately s u r r e n d e r i n g to Soviet forces at the e n d of the w a r . Prior to that surrender, one c o m p a n y was t r a n s p o r t e d back to G e r m a n y a n d participated in the fighting in the R u h r Pocket. 120

After Heavy Tank Battalion 501 was destroyed along the Vistula in January 1945, only two heavy t a n k battalions defended the front east of Berlin. These were t h e two r e m a i n i n g SS battalions, SS-Heavy Tank Battalions 502 a n d 503. Both of these battalions operated with far fewer tanks than the 45 authorized a n d w h a t tanks they did have were usually employed in small elements. Although b o t h battalions fought in a wide variety of places, from January until the e n d of the war, SS-Heavy Tank Battalion 503 was employed with its tanks very widely dispersed. This battalion, or elements of it, fought in the vicinity of Küstrin, in Gotenhafen, a n d Danzig. Some parts of the battalion even participated in t h e attack o u t of P o m e r a n i a , O p e r a t i o n Sonnewende (Winter Solstice), in February 1 9 4 5 . At late as 2 May 1945, this battalion still h a d seven King Tigers fighting in B e r l i n . 121

122

Also d u r i n g the last six m o n t h s of t h e war, three heavy t a n k battalions were destroyed fighting the Western allies. Two battalions, Heavy Tank Battalions 504 a n d 508, were gradually demolished in c o m b a t in n o r t h e r n Italy. T h e r e m a i n i n g battalion, Heavy Tank Battalion 506, fought in western G e r m a n y following its participation in O p e r a t i o n Wacht am Rhein, a n d surrendered to American forces in the R u h r pocket.

Summary The last two years of t h e war saw a d r a m a t i c increase in the n u m b e r of heavy t a n k battalions. By the end of the war, s o m e battalions had been destroyed a n d reconstituted two or three times. OKH a n d OKW c o m m i t t e d the heavy t a n k battalions of t h e A r m y a n d Waffen-SS to almost every region of t h e E u r o p e a n theater d u r i n g the last two years of the war. Officially, the d o c t r i n e for the e m p l o y m e n t of t h e heavy t a n k battalions did not change d u r i n g this period. This d o c t r i n e c o n t i n u e d to be focused solely on the offensive, even t h o u g h t h e battalions participated primarily in defensive

Map 35: Snapshot in Time Locations of Heavy Tank Battalions Mid-January 1945

THE FINAL BATTLES

181

battles. T h e principle of concentration, extremely i m p o r t a n t a n d valid in the offense, was also stressed in these defensive battles. Conceptually, this m a y have been a valid principle. In reality, however, the limitations of the Tiger a n d King Tiger, along with the vast defensive frontages along which they were employed, invalidated this principle in m a n y situations. W h e n heavy t a n k battalions were concentrated in the defense, they were generally easier to bypass a n d / o r were targeted for destruction by Allied a r m o r e d units or from the air. T h e Allies naturally preferred to avoid the concentrated heavy t a n k battalions. W h e n concentrated, d e p l o y m e n t of heavy tank units to the threatened area reduced the operational n u m b e r of Tigers because of their persistent mechanical p r o b l e m s . In the defense, heavy t a n k battalions were m o s t effective w h e n employed as a reserve force to counterattack against e n e m y penetrations. T h e y were also most effective w h e n they were dispersed along the b r e a d t h of the defensive front, to diminish the distance they w o u l d have to travel to accomplish their missions. This was especially t r u e w h e n the terrain restricted vehicular m o v e m e n t to a few avenues of approach. W h e n employed in the offense, heavy t a n k battalions achieved mixed results. Their failure can be attributed primarily to the Tigers' a n d King Tigers' mobility limitations, b u t credit also has to be given to their enemies' everimproving ability to destroy G e r m a n heavy tanks t h r o u g h the i n t r o d u c t i o n of antitank w e a p o n s of larger calibers firing improved projectiles at higher velocities. Also, the widespread e m p l o y m e n t of m i n e s severely degraded the heavy t a n k battalions' effectiveness in breaking t h r o u g h the enemy's defenses. O p e r a t i o n SÜDWIND a n d Heavy Tank Battalion 509's involvement in O p e r a t i o n FRÜHLINGSERWACHEN are two notable exceptions a n d examples of successful e m p l o y m e n t of heavy t a n k battalions in the offense. D u r i n g O p e r a t i o n SÜDWIND specifically, heavy t a n k battalions were extremely effective and i m p o r t a n t in breaking t h r o u g h several echelons of prepared defenses. This success m u s t be attributed to the fact that this was o n e of the only instances where they were employed in accordance with their o w n doctrine. Specifically, two heavy t a n k battalions were used together toward c o m m o n objectives, t h u s achieving the principle of concentration. T h e c o m m o n objectives were also b e y o n d the front lines a n d were focused on destroying b o t h artillery a n d a n t i t a n k w e a p o n s in depth. Both heavy tank battalions were also part of a mechanized or a r m o r e d unit a n d were s u p p o r t e d by infantry, artillery, a n d engineers, which m e t the guidance that heavy t a n k battalions be attached to mechanized or a r m o r units a n d that b r e a k t h r o u g h s be accomplished t h r o u g h the close c o o r d i n a t i o n a n d cooperation w i t h other a r m s .

Chapter 7

Assessment and Conclusion " T h e Tigers!" The panic-stricken cry was flying from m o u t h to m o u t h . " T h e Tigers are coming!" A m e r i c a n Soldiers at Kasserine Pass 1

O n e h o u r of Tiger o p e r a t i o n requires ten h o u r s of m a i n t e n a n c e . Alfred Rubbel

2

T h e G e r m a n military developed and fielded the heavy t a n k battalion to break t h r o u g h an enemy's tactical defensive belt. These heavy t a n k battalions were rarely employed as a b r e a k t h r o u g h force as originally envisioned, b u t rather, d u e to the changing strategic situation, the G e r m a n s used t h e m primarily in the defense. W h e t h e r in the offense or the defense, its p r i m a r y p u r p o s e was the destruction of e n e m y tanks in furtherance of operational goals.

Mission Accomplishment There are only a few examples of heavy tank battalions employed as a breakt h r o u g h force. Therefore, it is difficult to accurately assess their effectiveness in the offensive role for which they were developed, organized, a n d fielded. In the few instances where the G e r m a n leadership employed heavy t a n k battalions as consolidated units in the offense, they achieved credible results a n d were successful in p e n e t r a t i n g at least o n e echelon of the enemy's defenses. These attacks were successful tactical b r e a k t h r o u g h s , b u t they did n o t lead to operational b r e a k t h r o u g h s , that is, penetrations that w o u l d enable decisive results for entire campaigns as G e r m a n theorists originally envisioned. T h e organization a n d e q u i p m e n t of heavy t a n k battalions themselves, however, were n o t solely to blame for this failure to achieve their designers' expectations. Additionally, the crews a n d leaders of these units c a n n o t be held primarily liable for the s h o r t c o m i n g s of the heavy t a n k battalions. 3

These units were tasked with the most difficult missions a n d m a n y times, were expected to accomplish those tasks w i t h o u t adequate s u p p o r t from other branches a n d a r m s of the military. W h e n a heavy tank battalion was employed as a consolidated unit in the offense, it achieved m u c h greater results in breaking t h r o u g h the initial defensive echelon t h a n w h e n it was dispersed. W h e t h e r 182

ASSESSMENT AND CONCLUSION

183

other G e r m a n forces or units c o m p o s e d of other tank types could have accomplished these missions is arguable a n d largely d e p e n d e n t u p o n the situation, primarily the terrain a n d c o m p o s i t i o n of enemy forces. It is fair to note that, t h r o u g h o u t the war, the G e r m a n s assigned tanks in g e n e r a l — a n d the heavy t a n k battalions specifically—with the p r i m a r y mission of breaking t h r o u g h e n e m y defenses. G e r m a n d o c t r i n e incorporated armor, artillery, infantry, a n d air power in b r e a k t h r o u g h operations. In theory, all of these branches were to c o m b i n e their effects to achieve a b r e a k t h r o u g h . In practice, e m p l o y m e n t of a r m o r units, especially the heavy tank battalions, gained ascendancy over the other branches d u r i n g the war. T h e especially heavy reliance on a r m o r in G e r m a n b r e a k t h r o u g h operations placed high expectations and t r e m e n d o u s b u r d e n s on heavy t a n k battalions. These expectations may have been m e t if the G e r m a n military h a d developed several relatively simple items to c o m p l e m e n t the heavy tanks a n d the heavy t a n k battalions. A mine plow or roller for the Tiger a n d King Tiger would have allowed these vehicles to effectively breach minefields along their axes of attack. Instead, m a n y heavy tanks were disabled by i m p l e m e n t i n g the " b u l l - t h r o u g h " breaching technique, severely reducing the n u m b e r of o p e r a tional vehicles available to c o n t i n u e offensive operations. W h e n heavy tanks did b e c o m e disabled, for whatever reason, the heavy tank battalion organization included insufficient n u m b e r s of a r m o r e d recovery vehicles to efficiently recover a n d repair disabled vehicles. In fact, until mid-1944, recovery operations h a d to be c o n d u c t e d with only the u n a r m o r e d , half-tracked 18-tons organic to heavy tank battalions; such vehicles were completely inadequate for recovery u n d e r fire. C o m m i t t i n g the resources necessary to field adequate n u m b e r s of a r m o r e d recovery vehicles, in sufficient quantities, w o u l d certainly have saved the loss of m a n y disabled heavy tanks. Every t a n k design is a c o m p r o m i s e between the three essential elements of mobility, firepower, a n d protection. T h e Tiger series, with their 8 8 m m m a i n guns, h a d a great deal of firepower t h r o u g h o u t the war. Although the Tigers were highly resistant to enemy fire, especially when each design was initially fielded, they paid for this high degree of protection with reduced mobility, in terms of b o t h speed a n d range. Heavy t a n k battalions possessed three major deficiencies for b r e a k t h r o u g h operations for which they were intended. First, because they were u n i q u e and scarce resources, w h e n the Tigers attacked, the e n e m y was able to accurately deduce the area of the G e r m a n m a i n effort. This allowed the Allies to move forces to c o u n t e r the G e r m a n effort. Second, t h a n k s to their Tigers' very p o o r mechanical reliability a n d large size, which b o t h c o n t r i b u t e d to limiting the Tiger's tactical mobility, heavy

184

SLEDGEHAMMERS

tank battalions were unable to achieve quick b r e a k t h r o u g h s ; it usually required extended a m o u n t s of time to overcome e n e m y antitank guns, tanks, a n d minefields. If the Tigers had been able to quickly break t h r o u g h the e n e m y defenses, the first deficiency may n o t have mattered because other G e r m a n a r m o r e d forces w o u l d have been able to exploit the b r e a k t h r o u g h before the e n e m y could react. Even these two deficiencies might have been overcome if the Tiger h a d the ability to exploit their o w n b r e a k t h r o u g h s . Although these units were n o t developed for this, their limited radius of action d u e to voracious fuel cons u m p t i o n , low speed (especially in the King Tiger) a n d intensive m a i n t e n a n c e r e q u i r e m e n t s precluded t h e m from exploiting any b r e a k t h r o u g h achieved. W h e n theorists conceived heavy tank battalions, they t h o u g h t that defenses w o u l d only consist of one, or at m o s t a few, defensive lines. As the war p r o gressed, armies of all sides extended their defensive d e p t h so that there were m a n y defensive echelons to penetrate. This extension of the defense was an effective c o u n t e r to the heavy tank battalions. T h e increased n u m b e r a n d effectiveness of a n t i t a n k guns, as well as the p r o liferation of landmines, also limited the effectiveness of the heavy tank battalions in the offense. These measures, employed in depth, m a d e achieving a deep b r e a k t h r o u g h extremely difficult. The Tiger helped in penetrating such defenses, b u t never really solved the problem of restoring offensive mobility a n d m o v e m e n t to the G e r m a n Army on a tactical or operational level. 4

In the defense, heavy t a n k battalions achieved mixed results d e p e n d i n g u p o n m a n y different factors. Heavy t a n k battalions performed defensive m i s sions far m o r e frequently t h a n offensive missions. These defensive missions included counterattacks to reestablish the front line; occupying front line defensive positions with or w i t h o u t infantry s u p p o r t ; a n d as a reserve force to counterattack e n e m y p e n e t r a t i o n s b e h i n d the front line. Generally, even a p o r t i o n of a heavy t a n k battalion could defend against an enemy force that possessed m a n y m o r e tanks. If there was an alternative, e n e m y units bypassed heavy t a n k battalions rather t h a n attacking t h e m . After being bypassed, the heavy t a n k battalions b e c a m e a liability because they could not be repositioned easily a n d required a great deal of logistical a n d other s u p p o r t to do so. T h e logical d e d u c t i o n from this is that heavy t a n k battalions may have been m o r e effective in the defense if they were dispersed along a wide front. This w o u l d also lead to a conclusion that heavy tank battalions, as c o m b i n e d units, were unnecessary in the defense a n d heavy tanks w o u l d have been m o r e effective had they been i n c o r p o r a t e d into other a r m o r e d units. Indeed, they could have been organized m u c h as Panzerjäger, or t a n k destroyer, units were assigned as integral parts of panzer, panzergrenadier, or even infantry formations. Incorporating t h e m into an infantry unit w o u l d have added m u c h

185

ASSESSMENT AND CONCLUSION

needed firepower, especially antitank firepower. Their i n c o r p o r a t i o n into panzer or panzergrenadier divisions would have added useful offensive a n d defensive capabilities, b u t w o u l d have significantly complicated an already hard-pressed supply a n d m a i n t e n a n c e system, so there would have been logistical challenges which may have m o r e t h a n offset the tactical advantages of such an a r r a n g e m e n t . An example of the i n c o r p o r a t i o n of the Tiger into a division actually exists in the heavy t a n k companies of the 1st, 2d, a n d 3d SS Divisions a n d the Grossdeutschland Division. All of these divisions eventually lost their heavy tank c o m p a n i e s except for the 3d SS Totenkopf Division, which retained its heavy c o m p a n y t h r o u g h o u t the war. These divisions, a n d their heavy t a n k companies, achieved notable results d u r i n g their existence. 3

6

Despite its shortcomings, a measure of the heavy tank battalion's effectiveness, in the offense or defense, can be gauged by the emphasis a n d level of attention accorded t h e m by their o p p o n e n t s . T h e Soviets fielded m a n y n e w weapons a n d i m p l e m e n t e d n u m e r o u s organizational changes to counter the heavy tank battalions. T h e British c o n d u c t e d several studies of the Tiger, and of the heavy t a n k battalions, in an a t t e m p t to identify weaknesses of each. General M o n t g o m e r y went so far as to b a n British c o m b a t reports that detailed the firepower of the Tiger tanks because he felt they u n d e r m i n e d m o r a l e . T h e Allied intelligence estimate of G e r m a n forces in the west prior to D-day shows that the heavy t a n k battalions were the only unit below divisional size that the Allies posted on their theater intelligence m a p . These examples show that Germany's enemies took the threat of the heavy t a n k battalions very seriously a n d thus provide testimony to their effectiveness. 7

8

A Statistical Perspective T h e G e r m a n s kept detailed records on the loss of each Tiger and on the n u m ber of e n e m y tanks they destroyed. T h e claims of American and British tanks destroyed have been confirmed, to various degrees of reliability, from available records. For Soviet losses, very few records are available to confirm the G e r m a n claims. In these instances, the G e r m a n claims are generally accepted w i t h o u t the benefit of verification. Whatever mission heavy tank battalions were given, their p r i m a r y task was to destroy e n e m y tanks. In so doing, they were undeniably successful. T h e kill ratio of heavy t a n k battalions w h e n measured against Tigers lost in direct c o m b a t is an impressive 12.2 to 1. T h e ratio as measured against all Tigers lost, regardless of reason, is still a credible 5.4-to-l kill ratio. A l t h o u g h the last ratio is based u p o n the total annihilation of every heavy tank battalion, it is 9

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SLEDGEHAMMERS

probably the most accurate considering that a certain percentage of kills claimed by Tigers m u s t certainly have been repaired a n d r e t u r n e d to service in the same way that Tigers were r e t u r n e d to service after being damaged, (see table 5) As w o u l d be expected, s o m e heavy tank battalions were m o r e successful t h a n others in destroying e n e m y tanks. Some battalions were able to destroy close to 13 e n e m y tanks for the loss of each Tiger a n d others were able to achieve only a one-for-one exchange. Variables that could account for this include the terrain, enemy, leadership, a n d missions assigned. Of these, the mission assigned to heavy t a n k battalions was the o n e area that the G e r m a n s

TIGER

NUMBER

LOSSES

COMPARISON

RATIO OF TIGERS TO ENEMY

Unit

TANKS

(1:X)

Enemy

Kill

Lost in

Dest.

Unk. or

Total

Tanks

Ratio

Action

by Crew

Other

Losses

Dest.

3d Bn/Pz.Reg GD

62

32

4

98

<500

8.06

5.10

SS-Hvy Tk Bn 101/501

72

33

2

107

<500

6.94

4.67

SS-Hvy Tk Bn 102/502

38

29

9

76

-600

15.79

7.89

SS-Hvy Tk Bn 103/503

10

9

20

39

<500

50.00

12.82

Hvy Tk Bn 501

24

12

84

120

<450

18.75

3.75

Hvy Tk Bn 502

88

14

5

107

<1400

15.90

13.00

Hvy Tk Bn 503

113

123

15

252

<1700

15.00

6.75

Hvy Tk Bn 504

29

80

0

109

<250

8.60

2.29

Hvy Tk Bn 505

47

62

18

126

<900

19.10

7.10

Hvy Tk Bn 506

61

116

2

179

<400

6.56

2.23

43

57

4

104

<600

13.95

5.77

Hvy Tk Bn 508

15

46

17

78

<100

6.67

1.28

Hvy Tk Bn 509

76

40

5

120

<500

6.58

4.17

Hvy Tk Bn 510

35

1

29

65

<200

5.71

3.08

713

654

214

1580

8600

12.16

5.44

Hvy Tk Bn 507

Grand Totals Total Percentages

45%

41%

14%

Kill Ratio

(in Action) (Total Lost)

100%

Table 5. Tank K i l l Ratio C o m p a r i s o n . Sources: Schneider, Tigers in Combat I, 47, 78, 100, 144-45, 173, 2 2 6 - 2 7 , 242, 263, 279, 3 1 1 , 323, 344, 357, 372, 3 8 1 , 408, 4 2 1 , 439, 447, 456; i d e m , Tigers in Combat II, 56, 83, 268, 320, 336, 365, 375, 398. Notes: Of all of the unit's claims, SS-Heavy Tank Battalion 503's is the most difficult to verify, but if accurate, the most impressive. This battalion was never fully equipped and only fought f r o m January 1945 u n t i l the end of the war. C o m m i t t e d to the Eastern Theater, it was split apart to many different areas under many different commands. Its records are incomplete and cannot be verified. This battalion fought in places like K ü s t r i n , the Seelow Heights, and in Berlin, in a d d i t i o n to many others. It is difficult to imagine how the battalion destroyed more than 500 Soviet tanks in a little over three months of combat.

187

ASSESSMENT AND CONCLUSION

could m o s t influence. In general, heavy t a n k battalions were m o s t successful when they were concentrated for offensive missions a n d dispersed b e h i n d the front for defensive missions. Even t h o u g h results differ greatly from battalion to battalion, w h e n taken as an overall average, heavy tank battalions were undeniably effective at destroying e n e m y t a n k s . 10

Flaws Deficiencies in organization and e q u i p m e n t detracted from the success of the heavy t a n k battalions t h r o u g h o u t their existence. Almost all of these deal directly or indirectly with Tiger a n d King Tiger technical a n d mechanical problems. These tanks were effective as tank-killing weapons, which is evident from the kill ratios. A n o t h e r virtue of the tanks was that they were very durable. Frequently w h e n a Tiger was d a m a g e d a n d was subsequently destroyed by its crew, the crew m a n a g e d to escape capture a n d return to its unit. This h a d the benefit of creating experienced crews. These benefits came at a cost in other areas, however. T h e high degree of m a i n t e n a n c e required to keep the Tiger a n d King Tiger tanks operating was o n e of their biggest deficiencies. This usually resulted in a low operational rate for tanks within the heavy tank battalions, especially after extended periods of c o m b a t . The tendency of the Tigers to break d o w n , coupled with the weight of the tanks, m a d e recovery difficult. T h e failure to field a suitable recovery vehicle, with the exception of the Bergepanther after mid-1944, or to field t h e m in sufficient quantities, resulted in the loss of Tigers in m a n y instances. A n o t h e r deficiency of the Tiger was its extremely limited radius of a c t i o n . W h e n this was included with the Tiger's m a i n t e n a n c e requirements, heavy tank battalions were limited in their ability to c o n d u c t mobile operations across an extended area. The Allies exploited this fact d u r i n g the n u m e r o u s and frequent operational a n d strategic withdrawals of the heavy t a n k battalions. T h e result of these deficiencies is clearly seen by the n u m b e r of tanks destroyed by their o w n crews, (see Table 6) 11

In m a n y instances in the offense, the G e r m a n s failed to adhere to their p u b lished doctrine. D u r i n g O p e r a t i o n Zitadelle, for example, III Panzer Corps divided Heavy Tank Battalion 503's three companies a m o n g the corps' three a r m o r e d divisions. This violated the principle of concentration that was p u b lished as being necessary for successful b r e a k t h r o u g h s . Even t h o u g h Heavy Tank Battalion 505 fought as a unit d u r i n g O p e r a t i o n Zitadelle, it was attached to an infantry division. This violated the guidance directing heavy tank battalions be attached only to other a r m o r e d units. T h u s , w h e n this

188

SLEDGEHAMMERS PERCENTAGE

LOSSES

RAW

NUMBERS

Lost in

Dest.

Unk. or

Lost in

Dest.

Unk. or

Action

by Crew

Other

Action

by Crew

Other

3d Bn/Pz.Reg GD

63%

33%

4%

62

32

4

98

SS-Hvy Tk Bn 101

67%

31%

2%

72

33

2

107

SS-Hvy Tk Bn 102

50%

38%

12%

38

29

9

76

SS-Hvy Tk Bn 103

26%

23%

51%

10

9

20

39

Hvy Tk Bn 501

20%

10%

70%

24

12

84

120

Hvy Tk Bn 502

82%

13%

5%

88

14

5

107

Hvy Tk Bn 503

45%

49%

6%

113

123

15

252

Hvy Tk Bn 504

27%

73%.

0%

29

80

0

109

Hvy Tk Bn 505

37%

49%

14%

47

62

18

126

Hvy Tk Bn 506

34%

65%

1%

61

116

2

179

Hvy Tk Bn 507

41%

55%

4%

43

57

4

104

Hvy Tk Bn 508

19%

59%

22%

15

46

17

78

Hvy Tk Bn 509

63%

33%

4%

76

40

5

120

Hvy Tk Bn 510

54%

>1%

45%

35

1

29

65

713

654

214

1580

Unit

Grand Totals Total Percentages

45%

41%

14%

Total Losses

100%

Table 6. Tiger Losses Sources: Schneider. Tigers in Combat I, 78, 144-45, 226-27, 263, 3 1 1 , 344, 372, 408, 439, 456; i d e m , Tigers in Combat II, 83, 320, 365, 398.

battalion penetrated the Soviet first echelon defenses, there were no other a r m o r e d units available to exploit that breach. T h e first instance where an entire, consolidated heavy t a n k battalion attacked to break t h r o u g h e n e m y defenses, as part of an a r m o r e d force, was n o t until February 1945 d u r i n g Operation SÜDWIND. After considering the limitations of the Tiger a n d recognizing that the prep o n d e r a n c e of missions given to heavy tank battalions were defensive in n a t u r e , it is puzzling that the G e r m a n s did n o t develop and publish m o r e guidance and doctrine to m o r e effectively deal with these realities. G e r m a n military doctrine stressed the concept of concentration, whether in the offense or the defense. In several instances, d u e to Tigers' mobility challenges, adherence to this principle d u r i n g defensive operations significantly limited heavy tank battalions' flexibility; they just couldn't respond in time or with sufficient c o m b a t power to stop the e n e m y p e n e t r a t i o n s . A prerequisite for employing heavy tank battalions, either as a mobile reserve or as a counterattack force employed to defeat enemy penetrations,

ASSESSMENT AND CONCLUSION

189 was for t h e m to have greater, or at least comparable, mobility a n d radius of action t h a n the e n e m y formations they were a t t e m p t i n g to defeat. If this criterion was met, then the principle of concentration in the defense might also be applicable. In m a n y instances, because of the deficiencies a n d limitations of the Tiger, this criterion was not m e t . In these cases, e n e m y a r m o r e d formations attacked where Tigers were n o t present. This led to m a n y forced operational a n d strategic withdrawals, d u r i n g which m a n y Tigers broke d o w n or ran o u t of fuel. Often, because they could not be recovered, this led to their destruction. In light of these facts, heavy tank battalions may have been m o r e effective if they had a d o p t e d a principle of dispersion in the defense in order to cover m o r e avenues of a p p r o a c h or m o r e defensive frontage. A p r i m e example of the effectiveness of this tactic was Heavy Tank Battalion 502, which operated primarily with A r m y G r o u p N o r t h a r o u n d Leningrad and in the Baltic states. This area was heavily w o o d e d a n d swampy, a n d a r m o r e d mobility was reduced to the roads. Because of this, the battalion rarely operated as a concentrated unit. Instead, it was spread o u t a n d broken d o w n to very small elem e n t s to effectively cover all the available a r m o r e d avenues of a p p r o a c h . This battalion achieved the second highest kill total of all of the battalions a n d p r o duced the highest overall kill ratio. In this example, the terrain favored, a n d in actuality it forced, the dispersion of the battalion. Even across extended defensive frontages encompassing terrain that offered g o o d a r m o r e d mobility, dispersion may have been m o r e effective t h a n c o n c e n t r a t i n g a heavy t a n k battalion. A handful of Tigers proved m a n y times that they were capable of stopping a numerically-superior enemy. Across an extended frontage, a concentrated heavy t a n k battalion m a y have had difficulty getting to an area prior to the enemy forces that were breaking t h o u g h the front-line defenses. In this case, it was probably preferable to counter an e n e m y p e n e t r a t i o n with a smaller-than-desired force t h a n n o t being able to c o u n t e r that same p e n e t r a t i o n at all. Fulfilling a wide variety of missions in the defense proved to be challenging for the heavy t a n k battalions. On o n e h a n d , the Organization E battalion m a y have been the optimal organization for a battalion attacking forward of the main lines into prepared defenses because it included only heavy tanks. M a n y heavy t a n k battalions, however, were tasked with defensive missions on or near the front line. Sometimes these missions were u n s u p p o r t e d by other types of units, either infantry or lighter a r m o r e d forces. In these instances, the Organization D battalion w o u l d have provided the battalion with a m u c h higher degree of flexibility to accomplish these defensive missions. Since the majority of missions assigned were defensive, it may have been worthwhile for the battalions to r e t u r n to the Organization D. This would have allowed the

190

SLEDGEHAMMERS

creation of m o r e battalions, each with a higher degree of flexibility in the performance of missions.

Synthesis and Conclusion D u r i n g W W I I , G e r m a n heavy t a n k battalions were effective at killing e n e m y tanks. They achieved a high kill ratio d u r i n g b o t h offensive and defensive m i s sions. Their overall kill ratio was severely reduced, however, d u e to forced withdrawals over extended distances. These withdrawals caused the loss of m a n y Tigers a n d highlighted the deficiencies in the Tiger a n d in the lack of recovery assets within the heavy t a n k battalions themselves. T h e heavy t a n k battalions were hindered by the failure to adhere to G e r m a n d o c t r i n e on their e m p l o y m e n t in the offense. G e r m a n c o m m a n d e r s often did n o t c o m m i t consolidated, concentrated heavy t a n k battalions in s u p p o r t of a major attack. D u r i n g their few offensive missions, heavy t a n k battalions failed to achieve the expected operational b r e a k t h r o u g h s , although they were often able to penetrate the first echelon defenses. G e r m a n heavy t a n k battalions were also hindered by the lack of a coherent, published defensive d o c t r i n e based u p o n the realities a n d weaknesses of the Tiger. G e r m a n c o m m a n d e r s c o n t i n u e d to stress the i m p o r t a n c e of concentration in the defense. This was n o t always an invalid concept, but the lack of dispersal in the defense often denied heavy tanks the ability to counter e n e m y p e n e t r a t i o n s in t i m e a n d with sufficient force. Conversely, in n u m e r o u s cases where heavy t a n k battalions dispersed their forces b e h i n d the entire frontage, they were very successful at destroying e n e m y tanks a n d thus had a better chance to stop the e n e m y p e n e t r a t i o n . O n e alternative that m a y have been m o r e effective for the G e r m a n military t h a n the fielding of heavy t a n k battalions was a change in doctrine that p r o vided for universal t a n k types to accomplish all missions. O n e can only hypothesize a b o u t w h e t h e r this w o u l d have been m o r e successful in achieving b r e a k t h r o u g h s . It w o u l d have surely allowed the G e r m a n s to p r o d u c e a m u c h greater n u m b e r of M a r k IVs or Panthers. T h e y t h e n could have used these vehicles, in a greater quantity, to possibly achieve better results t h a n they were able to achieve with the limited n u m b e r of Tigers p r o d u c e d . T h e strategic decision to develop a n d field the Tiger a n d the King Tiger was i m p o r t a n t because it was a massive investment in resources, time, money, a n d labor. T h e G e r m a n s ultimately lacked, or failed to c o m m i t , the p r o d u c t i o n facilities a n d raw materials to mass p r o d u c e the Tiger in large n u m b e r s . G e r m a n sources, a n d most histories of the war, continually emphasize the fact that the G e r m a n s were severely o u t n u m b e r e d in t e r m s of tanks, as well as 12

ASSESSMENT AND CONCLUSION

191

other vehicle types, on all fronts. Given the fact that they decided to build immensely-resource-intensive vehicles like the Tiger a n d the King Tiger, it is difficult to imagine that they w o u l d have expected for the situation to have been otherwise. Even if the G e r m a n s h a d resources equal to their o p p o n e n t s , the decision to build vehicles like the Tiger a n d the King Tiger ensured that they w o u l d be o u t n u m b e r e d . The Tiger a n d the King Tiger tanks were engineering marvels a n d extraordinary fighting vehicles t h r o u g h o u t the war. A single Tiger or a small n u m b e r of Tigers at the right time, place, a n d in the right circumstances, accomplished extraordinary, even p h e n o m e n a l feats n u m e r o u s times t h r o u g h o u t t h e war. This has led to a great n u m b e r of anecdotal stories heralding the prowess of the Tiger a n d King Tiger. While this is only natural, because they are interesting tales a n d rightly recognize the crews' bravery a n d abilities, it fails to adequately p o r t r a y the overall c o n t r i b u t i o n of the organization to which these tanks belonged to the war effort. In the end, o n e is left to w o n d e r w h y the G e r m a n military fielded heavy tank battalions. According to theorists like Guderian, a n d G e r m a n doctrine, heavy tanks were only o n e tool to be used to achieve a b r e a k t h r o u g h . If heavy tanks battalions were fielded d u r i n g the war to achieve a b r e a k t h r o u g h , the other a r m s a n d branches of the military were n o t developed, fielded, a n d incorporated as equal c o m p o n e n t s in that effort. By the t i m e that heavy t a n k battalions were fielded in significant n u m b e r s , the strategic situation h a d changed so that even if a b r e a k t h r o u g h was possible at the tactical level, the G e r m a n military was no longer capable of exploiting that b r e a k t h r o u g h on an operational scale. This should have signaled that there was no longer a need for heavy t a n k battalions, b u t the realities did n o t slow the p r o d u c t i o n of heavy tanks or the fielding of heavy t a n k b a t t a l i o n s . 13

Given these facts, it is interesting that the G e r m a n military did n o t reevaluate m a n y aspects related to heavy t a n k battalions. Like the Soviet, American, and British military establishments, the G e r m a n A r m y should have balanced the strategic realities they faced, with their limited resources, to develop a plan to achieve their strategic objectives. If that plan included heavy tanks, a n d allocated resources to field heavy t a n k battalions, the Wehrmacht should have at least developed and published n e w doctrinal guidance. This guidance should have further clarified the role of heavy t a n k battalions in w h a t h a d b e c o m e for G e r m a n y — a t the strategic a n d operational levels—a primarily defensive war. As a result of this inaction, the G e r m a n A r m y a n d Waffen-SS were left w i t h expensive, i m p o r t a n t organizations built for offensive o p e r a tions, operating on the defensive, a n d excelling n o t in the c o n d u c t of m a n e u ver for which the Wehrmacht is so often praised, b u t at achieving attrition of e n e m y tanks.

Epilogue Through the Eyes of Tiger Killers A Soviet View Author's Note: Heavy Tank Battalion 506 saw its first combat actions in the Zaporozhe Bridgehead in southern Ukraine in late September 1943. Formed from the 9th Panzer Divisions 3rd Battalion, Panzer Regiment 33, it was fortunate to be attached to that same division for its fust 10 days of combat. Arriving at the front with 45 brand new Tigers, the battalion was a welcome addition to the 9th Panzer Division's combat power, which fielded between 3 to 8 operational tanks during this time. Their primary mission during those first ten days was to defeat Soviet penetrations of the German lines, but on 26 September, they launched a surprise attack to break through Soviet lines to destroy Soviet artillery units— both missions being strictly in accordance with the doctrinal guidance on their employment. This attack was conducted with nine Tigers and was possibly supported by several other tanks from the 9th Panzer Division. During this unsuccessful attack, three Tigers were destroyed and the other six were damaged. One of these was so severely damaged that it had to be sent back to the factory in Germany to be rebuilt. After this attack, at the end of its seventh day in combat, Heavy Tank Battalion 506 had no operational Tigers remaining. Then-Captain Viktor Iskrov of the 116th Guards Artillery Regiment was commanding a battalion of 76mm field guns that opposed Heavy Tank Battalion 506's attack. Viktor M. Iskrov was born on 23 October 1915 in Petrograd (later Leningrad, now St. Petersburg). He graduated from the Leningrad Artillery School and was commissioned as a lieutenant in June 1938. He joined the Communist Party in August 1939, and participated in the campaign in Poland in September of 1939, and the campaign in Finland in 1939-40. Serving in various combat field artillery assignments, Iskrov was seriously wounded in a firefight against German infantry on 18 November 1941. He recovered from his wounds in time to participate in the Kharkov offensive in May 1942. When his unit was V i k t o r M . Iskrov encircled by German forces, Iskrov was severely shellshocked during a breakout attempt, and was captured. He later escaped, however, and continued fighting as a member of a local partisan unit. Rejoining the Red Army in the summer of 1943, he fought in the Ukraine, and later participated in 192

EPILOGUE

193

Operation Bagration in June 1944. On 23 June, he was wounded again, less severely this time. After participating in the conquest of the fortress of Königsberg in East Prussia (now Kaliningrad, Russia), his unit was transferred to Mongolia in June-July 1945. There, he took part in combat against the Japanese until the end of the war shortly thereafter. After the war, Colonel Iskrov served in positions of increasing responsibility in field artillery units stationed in the vicinity of Leningrad. He retired from active duty in 1958, and lives in St. Petersburg. He has two daughters, two grandchildren, and one great-granddaughter. His military awards and decorations include the Order of the Red Banner; the Order of the Great Patriotic War, 1st and 2nd Degrees; two Orders of the Red Star; the Medal "For Merit in Battle"; the Campaign Medal "For the Capture of Königsberg"; and many commemorative medals. Here is Colonel Iskrov's account of his successful action against the Tigers of Heavy Tank Battalion 506. . . .

Fighting in the 116th Guards " O r d e r of Lenin" Artillery Regiment as c o m m a n d i n g officer of the 2 n d Battalion, on September 26, 1943 at the village of Shevchenko we encountered a c o l u m n of G e r m a n armor. T h e events unfolded in the following m a n n e r . I was at the battalion's CP with the c o m m a n d e r of the 4th Battery, Senior Lieutenant D. S. Gaidaenko w h e n we spotted a g r o u p of G e r m a n tanks that were advancing toward the battery from the flank. Apparently, they h a d b r o ken t h r o u g h o u r infantry defenses a n d were n o w going for us. I immediately contacted the regimental c o m m a n d e r over the radio a n d asked for orders. His answer was short, "Act on your own!" I left the chief of forward observers, Senior Lieutenant M. M. Yakovlev, at the CP, a n d we (Senior Lieutenant Gaidaenko a n d I) ran as fast as o u r feet would carry us to the 4th Battery. I recalled faces of all my family a n d my relatives. In my t h o u g h t s I said farewell to t h e m all: to my m o t h e r (I did n o t yet k n o w that she h a d been dead for over a year, dying of starvation in besieged Leningrad), to my wife Maria, a n d others. This was a very brief farewell. In front of us were the advancing G e r m a n tanks a n d four ZIS-3 7 6 . 2 m m field guns of the 4th Battery to stop t h e m . T h e guns, camouflaged in the hedgerows at Shevchenko, were t u r n e d 90 degrees to the right to repel the assault. Inexperienced or green gun-layers were replaced by experienced officers. I found a place on a hillock b e h i n d the battery to have a good view of the battlefield a n d so that my crews could see m e . I told the crews to fire at the tracks and side armor, a n d ordered t h e m to o p e n fire only on my c o m m a n d , w h e n I waved a small red flag.

194

SLEDGEHAMMERS

Tanks appeared from b e h i n d the hills that were in front of us. O n e of the gun-layers, Sergeant Serdyuk, b e c a m e u n n e r v e d a n d fired as soon as the tanks appeared on the hilltops. He missed, and the G e r m a n tanks immediately spotted his gun. It was blasted with a direct hit. We found Sergeant Serdyuk's head lying s o m e 15-20 meters from the g u n after the battle. We were all very sorry a b o u t his death, but, in fact, he himself was to b l a m e . I saw the advancing G e r m a n tanks very well. As soon as I saw that they started t u r n i n g a little bit, exposing their side a r m o r to us, I waved the small red flag, which served as a c o m m a n d for o p e n i n g fire. After this, each individual crew fought independently. It was a real duel against the G e r m a n armor. We knocked out four of t h e m , including two Tigers. T h e G e r m a n s could n o t take this a n d started to retreat. O u r losses were also high. Killed in this battle were Senior Lieutenant S e m e n Markin from Leningrad, platoon leader Lieutenant Vladimir Kolymagin, Sergeant Serdyuk, a n d ten privates a n d sergeants. M a r k i n was killed w h e n the G e r m a n tanks started to retreat a n d his 6th Battery o p e n e d fire on t h e m , knocking o u t two tanks. T h e G e r m a n tanks were r e t u r n i n g fire as they retreated. An armor-piercing shell killed M a r k i n at the firing position. The solid steel shell tore his b o d y into two p a r t s — b o d y a n d head were o n e piece, a n d legs were a n o t h e r piece. This is h o w Lieutenant M a r k i n died, having fulfilled his d u t y to the u t m o s t . We used to talk with h i m for a long time, recalling Leningrad. He often told m e , "I w o u l d like to meet a little Tiger! (that is, G e r m a n Tiger tank.) I w o u l d answer, " W h e n you b e c o m e c o m m a n d e r of the 6th Battery, you will get to meet your Tiger cub!" That's exactly h o w it h a p p e n e d , b u t this was the last battle for Markin. After the battle, the senior officer of the 6th Battery, Lieutenant Danilenko, called me a n d said, "We b u r i e d Lieutenant Markin right here, at the battlefield." I was outraged a n d ordered, "Immediately dig up the corpse, w r a p it in a rain cape a n d t r a n s p o r t it to the battalion H Q , a n d then to the regimental H Q , to b u r y h i m with full military h o n o r s ! " This order was followed. Lieutenant Markin was b u r i e d in Svatovo in a mass grave. On the day of his death, the battalion received an order from the c o m m a n d i n g general of o u r corps (1st Guards Mechanized C o r p s ) , General Major Russiyanov, a b o u t the p r o m o t i o n of Markin to the r a n k of senior lieutenant. I did n o t even notice that d u r i n g the battle the sleeve of my tunic (we h a d just received new uniforms) was t o r n into pieces by small fragments a n d a tiny fragment h a d b e c o m e lodged u n d e r my skin. Soon after the end of engagement I received a message that General Major Russiyanov was a b o u t to visit o u r battery. I was not surprised, as this general often visited the battlefield. He was always driving a r o u n d in his Willys Jeep.

EPILOGUE

195

W h e n he saw the n i g h t m a r e at o u r positions after the b a t t l e — w o u n d e d screaming, dead lying right at the guns, s o m e crew m e m b e r s t o r n apart by direct hits—General Russiyanov took off his cap, took a deep b o w and, with tears in his eyes, said, "Eternal m e m o r y a n d glory be with the defenders of o u r Fatherland!" I, as battalion c o m m a n d e r , tried to m a i n t a i n military formalities, salute the general, and make an official report, b u t my nerves were so shaken by the battle that I did not succeed. Russiyanov, in t u r n , did n o t require any military c e r e m o n y at that m o m e n t . Right on the spot, on the battlefield, he handed Senior Lieutenant Gaidaenko a n d me medals, O r d e r s of the Red Banner, a n d ordered me to r e c o m m e n d all the m e n of the 4th Battery for decorations.

A n American V i e w Author's Note: Heavy Tank Battalion 504 arrived at the front in Italy on 20 June 1944. It was formed from the remnants of one of its companies whose personnel managed to escape from Sicily and from Tank Company 314, a unit with radio-controlled, tracked demolition vehicles. The remainder of the battalion had been destroyed fighting in North Africa the previous year. The Tigers of Heavy Tank Battalion 504 arrived at the front in Italy, just north of Rome, while the situation was still very fluid, with American and British forces continuing their attacks to the north and German forces attempting to stabilize the front. Two days after being first employed, on 22 June 1944, Heavy Tank Battalion 504 lost two Tigers in an engagement with American forces. Over its first ten days of combat, involving withdrawals over very rugged terrain, Heavy Tank Battalion 504 lost 28 Tigers, going from a combat strength of 45 tanks, its full authorization, to having only 17 on hand by the end of the day on 1 July 1944. The vast majority of these losses were from self-destruction by the crews. Possibly as few as three Tigers were lost to direct fire. One of those was Tiger 221, commanded by Leutnant Keitel, who attacked in the eastern portion of the town of Cecina. He and another Tiger were supported by a reinforced platoon (or a weak company) of infantry from the 16th SSPanzer-Grenadier Division, "Reichsführer-SS." His tank was destroyed by the crew of a Sherman driven by Technician 4th Grade Ray Holt of the American 752nd Tank Battalion, supporting the 34th Infantry Division. Raymond L. Holt was born on 7 March 1918 in Hartford, Connecticut. He joined the US Army on 8 September 1941. After basic training, he was assigned to the 752nd Tank Battalion, which was one of the first separate tank battalions to be formed, and one of the first to be shipped overseas. He received armored training at Fort Knox, Kentucky, and Fort Lewis, Washington, and then

196

SLEDGEHAMMERS

underwent desert training under General George S. Patton, Jr. near Indio, California, in preparation for combat in North Africa. Ray Holt was a tank driver during his first months of combat. His first tank was lost to German 88s on the outskirts of Rome, and in this action he saved the life of a fellow tanker in a field riddled by machine-gun bullets. Sergeant Holt was awarded command of his own tank on 9 July 1944, one week after his crew destroyed a Tiger at Cecina. He and his comrades fought up the west coast of Raymond L. H o l t Italy during the summer of 1944, and also fought in the Northern Apennine mountains during the following fall and the bitter winter of 1944-45. Sergeant Holt earned his first home leave in late February 1945, and upon reporting back to duty in April 1945, he learned that he had accumulated enough "points" to remain stateside. While home on furlough, his tank was knocked out by a German wielding a Panzerfaust in the Po Valley, just three days before the war in Italy ended. Sergeant Holt was honorably discharged from the US Army on 15 May 1945, after three and a half years of service. After the war, Ray Holt worked as a plumber until his retirement in the 1970s, and was blessed with four children and six grandchildren. He passed away in 1997. Sergeant Holt's military awards include the Good Conduct Medal, the American Defense Medal, the American Campaign Medal, the EuropeanAfrican-Middle Eastern Campaign Medal with four campaign stars and assault landing arrowhead, and the WWII Victory Medal. Here is Ray Holt's account of his successful action against the Tigers of Heavy Tank Battalion 504, as told to his son, Bob Holt. . . .

I was a t a n k driver with the 752nd Tank Battalion. My t a n k was c o m m a n d e d by Lieutenant Cox, w h o led the 3rd Platoon of C o m p a n y B. T h e c o m p a n y s u p p o r t e d an attack by the 133rd Infantry Regiment to the eastern edge of Cecina, Italy, on the third day of the battle. It took us all m o r n ing just to advance a few h u n d r e d yards, knocking o u t pillboxes a n d m a c h i n e g u n nests along the way. We still h a d not encountered any G e r m a n armor, although we knew there were Tiger tanks in the area. We finally reached o u r objective in the early afternoon. A little later, o u r c o m p a n y was ordered to m o v e o u t to s u p p o r t an attack on the other side of town. We started to move, b u t at the last m i n u t e the decision was m a d e to leave the 3rd Platoon in the center of t o w n to s u p p o r t the infantry in the event of a counterattack.

EPILOGUE

197

A r o u n d dusk, we received word over the radio that the G e r m a n s were counterattacking o u r sector with infantry a n d Tiger tanks. W h e n I heard that, I thought, " O h , my God, this is it." Just a few weeks earlier, o u r platoon had lost three of its five tanks to G e r m a n 88s on the outskirts of R o m e . We knew that we were a pretty p o o r match for Tiger tanks. Lieutenant Cox advanced the platoon up a dirt road along the edge of t o w n to meet the G e r m a n force. We got to the center of Cecina before m a k i n g contact, so Lieutenant Cox dispersed the four other tanks in the streets to maximize coverage of the G e r m a n s ' m o s t likely advance routes. T h e n he took o u r tank, which was an earlier m o d e l with a 7 5 m m m a i n gun, further up the street to meet the G e r m a n s . We still did not k n o w exactly where the G e r m a n s were, because the terrain and buildings blocked o u r view. As we a p p r o a c h e d a slight curve in the road, I saw a G e r m a n i n f a n t r y m a n , w h o stood up to wave to s o m e o n e w h o was out of o u r view. I called Lieutenant Cox on the i n t e r p h o n e a n d asked h i m if he saw the G e r m a n , a n d he said, "Yeah, I'm watching him." Suddenly we realized that the G e r m a n soldier was guiding a Tiger tank. W h e n you see a Tiger tank c o m i n g from the flank, the first thing you see is the gun barrel. It looks like a telephone pole on its side. Well, we saw that telep h o n e pole c o m i n g a r o u n d from b e h i n d a building on the curve, a n d we knew we were a b o u t to r u n into the lead Tiger. T h e infantryman stood up again to signal the Tiger, a n d we m a c h i n e g u n n e d h i m . The Tiger c a m e a r o u n d the curve, a n d n o w we were face to face at a b o u t 75 yards. We b o t h fired simultaneously. T h e Tiger's shot hit the g r o u n d next to us, a n d the concussion lifted my side of the t a n k off the g r o u n d . O u r g u n n e r fired a 7 5 m m armor-piercing shell, which hit the Tiger on the front hull. T h e a r m o r is extremely thick on the front of a Tiger, so o u r shell merely chipped the Z i m m e r i t coating a n d b o u n c e d off. Fortunately for us, the m o v e m e n t of the tanks a n d the exploding shells kicked up a huge dust cloud, so it was impossible to see m u c h of anything. Lieutenant Cox shouted "Back u p ! Back up! Back u p ! " so I p u t it in reverse a n d started backing as fast as I could. T h e n he told me "OK, t u r n left o n t o that side street." This positioned o u r tank next to a two-story building on the corner of a perpendicular street. The front of o u r t a n k was facing away from the road that the Tiger was on, and Lieutenant Cox traversed the m a i n gun over the rear of the t a n k to cover the m a i n road. We did not k n o w where the Tiger was. Lieutenant Cox knew that the best way to knock o u t a Tiger t a n k was by hitting its thin side a r m o r at close range. He assumed that the Tiger w o u l d continue to advance along the same road. If it did, its crew would be blind to the sides of the street, a n d they w o u l d not be able to see us hiding next to that building on the corner. If they did see us w h e n they passed, they w o u l d not be able to m a n u a l l y traverse their turret quickly e n o u g h to fire a shot before we

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hit t h e m . If we failed to stop the Tiger, the position of o u r t a n k allowed a clear escape route in the opposite direction. So the plan was to wait a n d h o p e that the Tiger crossed o u r p a t h . T h e Tiger shelled the buildings near us for several m i n u t e s in an a t t e m p t to locate us and d r a w us o u t . We held o u r position, t h o u g h , and after a while the Tiger slowly l u m b e r e d in front of us. Lieutenant Cox told the gunner, " H o l d o n . . . . Hold on. . . . Now!" a n d at that m o m e n t the g u n n e r fired a 7 5 m m armor-piercing r o u n d into the side of the Tiger from a range of only 25 or 30 yards. T h e r o u n d penetrated the Tiger's side a r m o r a n d hit the fuel tank, causing the Tiger to burst into a h u g e ball of flames. Its crew bailed o u t before the a m m u n i t i o n exploded, a n d sought cover in the ditch on the side of the road. W i t h the destruction of the lead Tiger, the other G e r m a n a r m o r w i t h d r e w a n d the counterattack collapsed. T h e Tiger was still s m o l d e r i n g w h e n we inspected it the next day. The interior was b u r n e d out, a n d the roof above the radio operator's position h a d buckled u p w a r d from the a m m u n i t i o n explosion. N o w t h e reality of what we h a d accomplished set in, a n d we realized that we were very fortunate to have survived this engagement.

Appendix: Comparative Analysis of Heavy Tank Doctrines The G e r m a n Army, a n d its a r m o r forces specifically, is widely regarded as the model of military forces d u r i n g the W o r l d War II era in t e r m s of doctrine, e q u i p m e n t , a n d organization. T h e Tiger a n d King Tiger tanks, in addition to the Panther, are venerated as the "best" tanks p r o d u c e d d u r i n g the war. A c o m parative analysis of other country's doctrine, organizations, a n d e q u i p m e n t will help to better evaluate the G e r m a n heavy t a n k battalions a n d their associated doctrine concerning b r e a k t h r o u g h s . This c o m p a r i s o n will help to determine, on a relative a n d admittedly subjective scale, the overall c o m b a t effectiveness of G e r m a n heavy t a n k battalions. This c o m p a r i s o n is necessarily generalized because doctrine, organizations, a n d e q u i p m e n t evolved d u r i n g the war.

France If the G e r m a n doctrine a n d organization could be characterized as a r m o r centric, French d o c t r i n e was definitely artillery-centric. T h e G e r m a n solution for overcoming the static, positional war of 1914-18 was centered a r o u n d the tank. T h e French solution for the same p r o b l e m was centered a r o u n d artillery. This led t h e m b o t h to a d o p t different doctrines a n d different organizations to accomplish those doctrinal concepts. T h e French General Staff d e p a r t e d from the Foch principle of W o r l d War I that stated that the best defense was in attack. T h e French military before World War II was faced with France's low b i r t h rate. This resulted in a great disparity in p o p u l a t i o n s capable of s u p p o r t i n g a m o d e r n war: 80,000,000 G e r m a n s against 40,000,000 F r e n c h m e n . This, c o m b i n e d with several political decisions that disavowed any strategic offensive objectives, led the French to an extremely a n d almost exclusively defensive doctrine. T h e French military design a i m e d at using the power of the defense to save their m e n a n d wait for the G e r m a n s to break their strength before the French assumed the offense. T h e French d o c t r i n e evolved between the world wars a n d ultimately became k n o w n as "Methodical Battle." This n a m e implies a rigidly-controlled operation in which all units a n d w e a p o n s were carefully marshaled a n d then employed in c o m b a t . The French developed this d o c t r i n e — w h i c h was characterized b y t i m e - c o n s u m i n g p r e p a r a t i o n a n d t h o r o u g h p r e - p l a n n i n g — 1

2

3

199

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because they believed that artillery d o m i n a t e d the m o d e r n battlefield. In an a t t e m p t to best s u p p o r t the artillery, they centralized c o m m a n d in order to synchronize the infantry a n d a r m o r with the artillery. In the offense or the defense, the French favored a step-by-step battle, with units obediently m o v ing between phase lines a n d a d h e r i n g to strictly-scheduled timetables. T h e focus of decision m a k i n g was kept at higher c o m m a n d levels, because they believed that a centralized c o m m a n d system was necessary to coordinate the actions of n u m e r o u s s u b o r d i n a t e units. 4

3

French doctrine was predicated on the a s s u m p t i o n that there was little chance of c o n d u c t i n g a successful b r e a k t h r o u g h of an enemy's defenses. T h e y predicted that the defender would be able to establish subsequent defensive positions quicker t h a n the attacker w o u l d be able to exploit the b r e a k t h r o u g h . In keeping with the m o d e l of World War I, they t h o u g h t that only after successive offensive o p e r a t i o n s — o n e s that would "grind d o w n " the defender— w o u l d a successful exploitation of a b r e a k t h r o u g h be possible. In other words, only a successive series of attrition-oriented "methodical battles," facilitated by artillery, would lead to the ability to c o n d u c t any operational maneuver. French a r m o r d o c t r i n e u n d e r w e n t n u m e r o u s changes t h r o u g h o u t the inter-war period, b u t it all revolved a r o u n d the best way to i m p l e m e n t the methodical battle. French classification of tanks b e c a m e confused, as did other countries' classifications t h r o u g h o u t the inter-war period, and did not always c o n f o r m with the doctrinal mission a t a n k was to perform. T h e French did not always adhere to the classic definitions of b r e a k t h r o u g h or r u p t u r e tanks being heavy, exploitation tanks being m e d i u m , a n d reconnaissance tanks being light. A 1919 t a n k p r o g r a m study outlined three types of tank: the accompanying, battle, and r u p t u r e . These tanks loosely c o r r e s p o n d e d to light, m e d i u m , a n d heavy tanks except that the accompanying tanks were to a c c o m p a n y the infantry d u r i n g the methodical battle. T h e reason for this was that light tanks were cheaper a n d easier to m a k e a n d there w o u l d t h u s be m o r e of t h e m to s u p p o r t the infantry. Also, because of the conceptual constraints of m e t h o d i cal battle, it is unclear what doctrinal role was envisioned for the m e d i u m tanks. In other words, if a b r e a k t h r o u g h was theoretically impossible, then m e d i u m tanks were unnecessary because a b r e a k t h r o u g h was a necessary precondition for exploitation forces. A 1921 c o m m i s s i o n concluded that only two types of tanks were needed: a battle a n d a heavy, or r u p t u r e tank. A new c o m m i s s i o n in 1925 changed this view again, a n d r e c o m m e n d e d three types of tanks: light, battle, a n d heavy. T h e light a n d heavy t a n k roles remained the same doctrinally. T h e role of the battle tank was less well defined, but in general, it was to protect the light tanks from e n e m y anti-tank w e a p o n s a n d other tanks as they accompanied the infantry.

APPENDIX: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

201

In 1934 the Superior War Council eliminated the heavy tank, leaving only two t a n k types in accordance with French doctrine: the light a n d battle tanks. This was d o n e based u p o n the recognition that, because of the size a n d highm a i n t e n a n c e requirements of heavy tanks that were being p r o d u c e d at that time, they were highly vulnerable. T h e council assumed that the new models of m e d i u m tanks could fulfill the doctrinal role of the heavy tank as well as defending the light tanks. In deliberately calling it a battle tank instead of a m e d i u m tank, the French were either u n s u r e or deliberately unclear, possibly because of a lack of agreem e n t , on the specific doctrinal role of the tank. On the other h a n d , they may have purposely called it a battle tank because they envisioned a truly multip u r p o s e t a n k capable of performing multiple roles. In the years prior to World War II, however, the doctrine for the e m p l o y m e n t of the battle tank in the French military c a m e to resemble the doctrinal e m p l o y m e n t originally envisioned in the heavy tank. Despite the doctrinal change, by the late 1930s, the battle tank was referred to as the "heavy" t a n k . This came a b o u t because the French, when faced with the increasing defensive firepower in t e r m s of antitank weapons, slowly added m o r e a n d m o r e a r m o r protection for the battle tank. They choose the greater protection afforded by additional a r m o r over greater speed, obviously because they were only concerned with s u p p o r t i n g a n d staying with the infantry d u r ing the m e t h o d i c a l battle. Having a tank that was fast was n o t needed a n d in fact was looked d o w n u p o n as a weakness because greater control would be needed to ensure that the tanks a n d infantry stayed in close proximity to each other to s u p p o r t one another. 6

French d o c t r i n e saw tanks as vehicles to assist the m a n e u v e r of the infantry. Infantry maneuver, in t u r n , w o u l d be facilitated by massed artillery. Some French theorists did realize that tanks were m u c h m o r e mobile t h a n the infantry, but did not see a need to change their doctrine, however, a n d conformed emerging technology to fit their doctrine of methodical battle. T h e y only saw that tanks would be able to take advantage of the fire of artillery at a quicker rate. Instead of waiting for infantry to occupy an area " c o n q u e r e d " by the artillery, this occupation could be d o n e m u c h m o r e rapidly with tanks. Both G e r m a n a n d French doctrine focused on and addressed the p r o b l e m of defeating the enemy's artillery. T h e responsibility of defeating e n e m y artillery in G e r m a n doctrine was assigned to the leading waves of tanks. Specifically, after defeating the e n e m y t a n k counterattack that G e r m a n doctrine theorized would be launched in order to save the e n e m y artillery, G e r m a n heavy tanks were to destroy that artillery before it could withdraw. This would be accomplished by c o n d u c t i n g a quick a n d deep thrust t h r o u g h the enemy's defensive depth.

SLEDGEHAMMERS

202

French doctrine sought to reach the enemy's artillery, b u t envisioned that it would be accomplished t h r o u g h successive, methodical b o u n d s . T h e infantry support/heavy tanks w o u l d be protected by the suppressive effects of French artillery fire, b u t were n o t assigned a specific task to destroy e n e m y artillery. T h e n u m e r o u s changes in French d o c t r i n e a n d the continual debate t h r o u g h o u t the inter-war period m e a n t that tanks were p r o d u c e d a n d fielded with a wide variety of roles in m i n d . They were also organized in a variety of ways, with the p r i m a r y focus being on h o w they could best be integrated into the methodical battle. T h e French initially developed a n d fielded the B-model (Char B) t a n k as their battle t a n k . T h r o u g h o u t its life, the B-model was referred to as a battle tank, a m e d i u m tank, a n d eventually by m a n y in the French A r m y as a heavy tank. It was a r m e d with a low-velocity 7 5 m m m a i n gun, h a d 6 0 m m a r m o r plating a n d weighed 33 t o n s . Although this tank suffered from m a n y mechanical problems, it was fielded a n d operating at a time in the war w h e n the G e r m a n A r m y did n o t field any heavy tanks. T h e most heavily-armed G e r m a n tank at the time of their attack into France in 1940 was the Panzer IV. At the time, this tank was a r m e d with a low-velocity 7 5 m m KwK 37 L/24 m a i n gun a n d had only 30 millimeters of frontal armor. 7

8

Although the B-model t a n k was to be used as a t a n k in massed formations, such as an a r m o r e d division, constant modifications t h r o u g h its development, a n d slow p r o d u c t i o n , reduced its availability. In 1936, a plan was p r o p o s e d to p r o d u c e e n o u g h B-model tanks to field twelve b a t t a l i o n s . These were intended to be organized into two a r m o r e d divisions of six battalions each. By the time the G e r m a n s attacked in 1940, the French A r m y h a d only created three a r m o r e d divisions. B-model tanks c o m p r i s e d less t h a n half of the strength of these a r m o r e d divisions, with the r e m a i n d e r of the tanks being light H - 3 9 m o d e l t a n k s . 9

10

11

12

T h e a r m o r e d divisions were intended to assist the maneuver of a larger infantry formation such as an infantry corps or a r m y . This would increase the offensive power of the infantry, which r e m a i n e d the decisive b r a n c h of the army. French doctrine envisioned the a r m o r e d division operating in several echelons of two or three battalions each. T h e lead echelon's flanks were to be protected by the following echelon of tanks that w o u l d also reduce any bypassed e n e m y positions or units. 13

French theorists also saw a role for the a r m o r e d division in the defense. They noted that it could be used in a counterattack role, although the m e t h o d ical battle doctrine saw artillery as the p r i m a r y m e a n s of defeating breakt h r o u g h attempts. French doctrine differed radically from G e r m a n d o c t r i n e in that it did not accept t h e possibility of successfully breaking t h r o u g h e n e m y defenses

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without a long period of attrition. French offensive d o c t r i n e saw the "breakt h r o u g h " as being a long series of highly-coordinated a n d synchronized methodical battles, d o m i n a t e d by the artillery, c o n d u c t e d by the infantry, a n d supported by tanks. This doctrine led to a continual debate within the French Army a b o u t the various roles of the tank. T h e variety of ideas on the employm e n t of a r m o r prevented the French from developing a coherent concept that enabled a r m o r to achieve its fullest potential. T h e emphasis u p o n methodical battle ensured that the development, p r o d u c t i o n , a n d fielding of tanks a n d a r m o r units were all focused u p o n s u p p o r t i n g the methodical battle doctrine. The deficiencies in this doctrine were highlighted d u r i n g the Battle of France in 1940.

United Kingdom and United States United States a n d British doctrine closely m i r r o r e d each other, a l t h o u g h there were notable differences in several aspects of doctrine a n d in the labeling of tanks based u p o n their envisaged doctrinal role. By the t i m e the w a r began, the official British policy called for two types of tanks: one, with heavy a r m o r protection to give close s u p p o r t to the infantry; a n d the other, with lighter a r m o r b u t with a high degree of mobility to exploit success. In neither case did a r m o r - p e n e t r a t i v e capability or tank-killing capability a p p e a r to have been of major i m p o r t a n c e initially. The first type of t a n k was called the infantry tank. These tanks were slower a n d m o r e heavily a r m o r e d than other tanks a n d were similar to other c o u n try's heavy classification of tanks. They were intended to precede the infantry in the attack a n d s u p p o r t t h e m in overcoming the enemy's defenses. T h r o u g h o u t the war, the British developed several subcategories of infantrytype tanks for specific roles. Although they were called different things, such as assault tanks or close-support tanks, their doctrinal role was still similar to the overall concept of infantry tanks. British d o c t r i n e did see a role for tanks in fighting other tanks. Early in the war, however, this was n o t the case for infantry tanks that were i n t e n d e d to deal with e n e m y infantry, m a c h i n e - g u n emplacements, b u n k e r s , a n d other m i n o r fortifications. As such, infantry tanks did n o t have m a i n g u n s with armor-defeating ability until later in the war. T h e British developed a n d fielded several infantry s u p p o r t tanks, including the Matilda, the Valentine, a n d the Churchill. T h e earliest Matildas were a r m e d only with two .303-caliber m a c h i n e guns a n d although fairly well a r m o r e d , were useless against o t h e r tanks. Later marks of the Matilda were 14

15

16

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m u c h m o r e heavily a r m o r e d a n d e q u i p p e d with a t u r r e t - m o u n t e d 2 - p o u n d e r ( 4 0 m m ) m a i n gun. The m o s t c o m m o n a n d widely-fielded t a n k was the Churchill. Each infantry tank u n d e r w e n t m a n y modifications a n d was fielded in several different variations. For example, the Matilda had at least six variants, a n d the Valentine a n d the Churchill had at least twelve different varia n t s ! Most, b u t n o t all, of the modifications involved increasing the caliber a n d the velocity of the m a i n g u n . 17

Infantry tanks were g r o u p e d into a r m y t a n k brigades and were normally assigned to s u p p o r t an infantry division. Usually, these a r m y tank brigades were then further broken up within the infantry division, with a regiment s u p p o r t i n g an infantry brigade, a s q u a d r o n s u p p o r t i n g a battalion, a n d a t r o o p supporting a company. 18

19

Infantry tank tactics early in the war saw two waves of tanks preceding the infantry. These tanks were to secure the objective area a n d remain on the objective until the infantry arrived with their o w n organic antitank guns. Later in the war, infantry tanks coordinated their attack closely with a r m o r e d vehicles that were e q u i p p e d with higher-velocity guns capable of defeating e n e m y a r m o r . These were either t a n k destroyers or u p - g u n n e d S h e r m a n s , which s u p p o r t e d the infantry tanks from an overwatch p o s i t i o n . Except u n d e r unusual circumstances, infantry tanks o p e r a t e d u n d e r the control of the infantry unit that they s u p p o r t e d . W h e n faced with an e n e m y a r m o r threat, a c o m p a n y might c o m b i n e a n d fight as a unit, b u t the occasions w h e n a battalion or the brigade of infantry tanks fought as a c o m b i n e d unit were rare. 20

21

22

T h e British saw the infantry, s u p p o r t e d by infantry tanks, as the p r i m a r y m e a n s with which to c o n d u c t a b r e a k t h r o u g h of the e n e m y defenses. O n c e this b r e a k t h r o u g h was m a d e , the other type of British t a n k w o u l d exploit that b r e a k t h r o u g h . These tanks, which the British labeled as cruiser tanks, were m o r e balanced, a n d were m u c h faster and capable of long-range o p e r a t i o n s . These fulfilled a doctrinal role similar that envisioned for the m e d i u m tanks of other countries a n d were c o m b i n e d together in a r m o r e d divisions. 23

U.S. doctrine was very similar to British d o c t r i n e in that m e d i u m tanks were g r o u p e d together into a r m o r e d divisions to be employed primarily to exploit b r e a k t h r o u g h s in the enemy's defenses. U.S. d o c t r i n e also called for a heavy emphasis on reconnaissance a n d therefore included a n u m b e r of light tanks. T h e y were also to be used in conjunction with the m e d i u m tanks d u r i n g exploitation of b r e a k t h r o u g h s , m o v i n g quickly a n d operating across vast distances. T h e U.S. stands alone—unlike Germany, England, a n d the Soviet U n i o n — in rejecting the need for a special tank type to assist the infantry in the attack. Adherence to this doctrine is largely to b l a m e for the lack of development, a n d 24

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inability to field, a U.S. heavy t a n k capable of defeating the G e r m a n heavy tanks in direct c o m b a t until late in the war. Like the British, U.S. doctrine saw the infantry as the p r i m a r y m e a n s for c o n d u c t i n g a b r e a k t h r o u g h of the enemy's defenses. Although U.S. doctrine did incorporate a n d discuss m a n y different branches of the service—including armor, artillery, a n d engineers—the infantry were viewed as being the s u p ported b r a n c h . To assist infantry forces in the attack, the U.S. A r m y fielded independent tank b a t t a l i o n s . These units were e q u i p p e d with m e d i u m tanks, a n d just like British infantry-tank-equipped brigades, were attached to infantry divisions a n d further subdivided d o w n to infantry brigades a n d battalions. 21

26

Although the 1941 version of Field M a n u a l 100-5, Operations, m e n t i o n e d the e m p l o y m e n t of these battalions in echelons similar to the G e r m a n waves, the m a n u a l portrays the idea that they were to accomplish their mission by incorporating the basic infantry tactics of fire a n d m o v e m e n t . In other words, one section of tanks would overwatch a n d suppress enemy forces if necessary, while a n o t h e r section maneuvered to a position of advantage. Using these tactics, U.S. tanks did not need to be heavily a r m o r e d because doctrine did not envision t h e m frontally attacking e n e m y defenses. Those defenses w o u l d either be suppressed or attacked from a flank or other position of advantage, or b o t h . Regardless of h o w s u p p o r t i n g tanks helped accomplish the breakt h r o u g h , U.S. doctrine rejected the need for a t a n k in the traditional heavy classification because the j o b of creating the b r e a k t h r o u g h fell primarily to infantry forces. 27

U.S. A r m y doctrine led t h e m to develop, field, and m a n u f a c t u r e a massive n u m b e r of m e d i u m tanks. By far, the m o s t c o m m o n a n d u b i q u i t o u s m o d e l was the M4 S h e r m a n . This t a n k was used in b o t h a r m o r e d divisions for exploitation purposes, and in i n d e p e n d e n t t a n k battalions for infantry s u p port. It was mass produced a n d exported in incredible quantities to the British Army as well as to the Red Army. In March 1942, U.S. and British tank experts m e t in Washington, D.C. to discuss and develop a c o m b i n e d t a n k p r o g r a m . They agreed to reduce the n u m b e r of t a n k designs to as few as possible and discussed p r o d u c t i o n p o t e n tial to meet with the requirements. T h e official U.S. A r m y history relates the results of this c o m b i n e d effort a n d highlights the differences between the two country's doctrines: The Americans had already agreed a m o n g themselves that the principal item of t a n k p r o d u c t i o n in the United States should be the M4 m e d i u m t a n k series, with a subsidiary p r o d u c t i o n of light tanks. T h e British accepted this decision since the S h e r m a n met their r e q u i r e m e n t for a

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206 "cruiser" t a n k to fulfill the mobile role in a r m o r e d divisions. However, they also had large r e q u i r e m e n t s for an "assault" tank—heavier a n d less mobile t h a n the cruiser t h o u g h a r m e d with the same g u n s — w h i c h they t h o u g h t necessary for use in s u p p o r t of infantry or in attack on fortified positions. T h e Americans agreed to develop experimental models of an assault tank, t h o u g h their o w n doctrine recognized no need for the type. 28

Later in the war, British a r m o r development shifted to fielding a universal tank. This tank would fulfill the roles of b o t h the cruiser a n d the infantry tanks in the same way that the U.S. m e d i u m tanks fulfilled b o t h doctrinal roles of heavy a n d m e d i u m tanks. Based u p o n A m e r i c a n e n c o u n t e r s between their m e d i u m tanks a n d G e r m a n heavy tanks d u r i n g the war, it was u n f o r t u n a t e for the U.S. A r m y that they did not embrace the need for a heavy tank in s o m e form within their d o c trine. Even t h o u g h a heavy t a n k was not identified as necessary within U.S. doctrine, development of a heavy t a n k began prior to the war a n d c o n t i n u e d t h r o u g h o u t the w a r . A p r o t o t y p e of a U.S. heavy t a n k labeled the T1E2 u n d e r w e n t testing by the A r m y O r d n a n c e D e p a r t m e n t b e g i n n i n g in August 1 9 4 1 . Initially, this t a n k h a d m a n y problems a n d deficiencies, especially in the transmission. It was originally a r m e d with only a 7 6 m m m a i n gun, b u t was eventually u p g r a d e d to a 9 0 m m and even a 1 0 5 m m m a i n g u n . W h e n c o m p a r e d with the d e v e l o p m e n t of the G e r m a n Tiger, whose first p r o t o t y p e did n o t u n d e r g o initial testing until May 1942, o n e w o n d e r s what might have been accomplished with this headstart in d e v e l o p m e n t a n d potential p r o d u c tion h a d U.S. d o c t r i n e identified a need for a heavy tank. 29

30

31

T h e end result of the lack of a heavy tank in U.S. d o c t r i n e a n d the valid reasons for their rejection, is best s u m m e d up by the Chief of Staff of the Army, General George C. Marshall, after the war in Europe ended: A n o t h e r n o t e w o r t h y example of G e r m a n superiority was in the heavy tank. From the s u m m e r of 1943 to the spring of 1945 the G e r m a n Tiger a n d Panther tanks o u t m a t c h e d o u r S h e r m a n tanks in direct combat. This s t e m m e d largely from different concepts of a r m o r e d warfare held by us a n d the G e r m a n s , a n d the radical difference in o u r a p p r o a c h to the battlefield. O u r tanks h a d to be shipped t h o u s a n d s of miles overseas a n d landed on hostile shores amphibiously. T h e y h a d to be able to cross i n n u m e r a b l e rivers on t e m p o r a r y bridges, since w h e n we attacked we sought to destroy the p e r m a n e n t bridges b e h i n d the e n e m y lines from the air. Those that o u r planes missed were destroyed by the e n e m y w h e n he retreated. Therefore o u r tanks could not well be of the heavy type. We designed o u r a r m o r as a w e a p o n of exploitation. In other words, we desired to use o u r tanks in long-range thrusts deep into the enemy's rear

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where they could chew up his supply installations a n d c o m m u n i c a t i o n s . This required great e n d u r a n c e — l o w c o n s u m p t i o n of gasoline a n d ability to move great distances w i t h o u t b r e a k d o w n . 32

British, Soviet, a n d even G e r m a n sources validate the fact that the S h e r m a n was highly reliable mechanically. G e r m a n heavy tank battalions in Italy, for example, went o u t of their way to capture S h e r m a n s to use as recovery vehicles. A British major with extensive a r m o r experience stated that, " T h e c o m m a n d e r of a unit equipped with S h e r m a n s can be confident of taking 99 percent of his vehicles into battle [while] if he were equipped with Cromwells or Centaurs he w o u l d be in a c o n t i n u o u s state of anxiety as to w h e t h e r e n o u g h of his tanks w o u l d reach the battlefield to carry o u t the n o r m a l tasks expected of his u n i t . " 33

34

Even the leaders within the U.S. A r m y a r m o r c o m m u n i t y rejected the need for a heavy t a n k t h r o u g h o u t the war. Writing on 7 December 1942, the C o m m a n d i n g General of the A r m o r e d Forces, General Jacob Devers stated that " D u e to its t r e m e n d o u s weight a n d limited tactical use, there is no requirem e n t in the A r m o r e d Force for the heavy tank." D u r i n g the war, the U.S. A r m y never identified a doctrinal r e q u i r e m e n t for a heavy tank, although they did realize the need for tanks with increased firepower to effectively defeat G e r m a n heavy tanks. Efforts to develop a U.S. heavy t a n k never stopped a n d the O r d n a n c e D e p a r t m e n t designed, p r o d u c e d , a n d tested several prototypes. Eventually, the U.S. A r m y realized that their m e d i u m tanks were at a distinct disadvantage against G e r m a n heavy tanks, no matter what large-caliber a n d high-velocity m a i n gun was m o u n t e d o n t h e m . But while that [exploitation] was the m o s t profitable use of the tank, it b e c a m e unavoidable in stagnant prepared-line fighting to escape tankt o - t a n k battles. In this c o m b a t , o u r m e d i u m t a n k was at a disadvantage, w h e n forced into a h e a d - o n engagement with the G e r m a n heavies. Early in 1944 it was decided that a heavy American tank, on which o u r O r d n a n c e experts h a d been continuously experimenting since before the war, m u s t be p u t into mass p r o d u c t i o n . As a result the M - 2 6 (Pershing) tank began to reach the battle lines last winter [the winter of 1 9 4 4 - 4 5 ] . This t a n k was equal in direct c o m b a t to any the G e r m a n s h a d a n d still enjoyed a great advantage in lighter weight (43 tons), speed, a n d e n d u r a n c e . At the same time, w o r k was begun on two new models, the T-29 a n d T-30, which weighed 64 tons, o n e m o u n t i n g a high-velocity 105mm rifle, the other a 1 5 5 m m rifle. 35

T h e M - 2 6 Pershing reached Europe t o o late to have any real impact u p o n the by-then inevitable course of the war. There were only a handful

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of instances in which the Pershing encountered a n d engaged a Tiger in combat. An interesting aspect of the Pershing is that, even t h o u g h it was a direct descendant of several heavy t a n k prototypes a n d was classified as a heavy t a n k t h r o u g h o u t its development, when the U.S. A r m y finally fielded it, it was classified as a m e d i u m tank. A l t h o u g h there may well be a n o t h e r reason, one possible explanation is that official U.S. A r m y doctrine still did n o t see any d o c trinal role for a heavy tank a n d it was thus designated as a m e d i u m tank in accordance with that doctrine. 36

An interesting and auxiliary aspect of British a n d U.S. tanks d u r i n g World War II is the development of super-heavy assault tanks. T h e r e q u i r e m e n t for these was established before the Allied invasion of N o r m a n d y . These massively-armored, powerfully-armed, and turretless vehicles were to be used to break t h r o u g h the formidable defensive line expected along the G e r m a n border, the Westwall ( k n o w n to the Allies as the "Siegfried Line"). T h e British vehicle was called the Tortoise a n d the U.S. vehicle was designated as Superheavy Tank T28. A l t h o u g h neither of these vehicles was fielded before the e n d of the war, they were awe inspiring w h e n finally built. The thickness of the frontal a r m o r of the U.S. t a n k was 304 millimeters, it was a r m e d with a high-velocity 1 0 5 m m m a i n gun, and it weighed over 85 t o n s . 37

In the end, despite the absence of a heavy tank, the sheer n u m b e r of m e d i um tanks p r o d u c e d by the Americans, along with a wide variety of other mechanized and motorized vehicles, allowed t h e m to achieve a level of m e c h anization u n m a t c h e d by the G e r m a n s . G e r m a n tanks could not be everywhere on the battlefield at the same t i m e a n d the m e c h a n i z a t i o n of the American forces allowed t h e m to overcome the superior firepower of G e r m a n tanks like the Panther and King Tiger. 38

The British also m a n a g e d to achieve a remarkable level of p r o d u c t i o n , given their relatively limited natural resources, c o m p a r e d to the remainder of the c o n t i n e n t of Europe. In the three a n d a half years between September 1939 a n d March 1943, the United K i n g d o m actually p r o d u c e d 3,000 m o r e tanks t h a n did G e r m a n y . F r o m 1940 to the e n d of the war, they p r o d u c e d a total of 24,803 tanks of all t y p e s . Although of superior quality, d u r i n g the same t i m e period, G e r m a n y p r o d u c e d only 23,967 t a n k s . 39

40

41

American and British b r e a k t h r o u g h operations developed a high degree of coordination of all a r m s t h r o u g h o u t the war. A l t h o u g h their doctrine called for infantry to make the p r i m a r y effort in c o n d u c t i n g b r e a k t h r o u g h s , armor, engineer, and artillery forces were eventually i n c o r p o r a t e d into an efficient team. T h e element that a d d e d the undeniably decisive piece to the breakt h r o u g h operations c o n d u c t e d by U.S. a n d British forces in World War II was the effective i n c o r p o r a t i o n of air power, a n d s o m e t i m e s even strategic air power. Although there were several mistakes m a d e , especially d u r i n g the 42

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initial a t t e m p t s , later use of strategic b o m b e r s was characterized by highlyinnovative c o o r d i n a t i o n measures that effectively broke t h r o u g h enemy defenses with ease. Even if o n e ultimately judges American a n d British d o c trine a n d t a n k quality to be inferior to their G e r m a n c o u n t e r p a r t s , the incorporation of strategic b o m b e r s a n d tactical g r o u n d s u p p o r t aircraft m o r e t h a n c o m p e n s a t e d for these shortcomings by bringing massive a n d overwhelming firepower to bear on the G e r m a n defenses. A n o t h e r aspect of American a n d British e q u i p m e n t development, eventually i n c o r p o r a t e d as a key element of b r e a k t h r o u g h operations, was a r m o r e d vehicles capable of breaching minefields. Both countries developed, tested, a n d fielded an impressive variety of m i n e rollers, m i n e flails, a n d other mechanical m i n e - b r e a c h i n g devices capable of being m o u n t e d on an a r m o r e d vehicle. These a r m o r e d vehicles breached minefields w i t h o u t requiring engineers or other troops to d i s m o u n t u n d e r fire to clear a p a t h t h r o u g h the mines, thus saving m a n y lives. Additionally, they were able to breach a m i n e field w i t h o u t a high n u m b e r of tanks being disabled from mines. This stands in stark contrast to G e r m a n heavy tank battalions whose c o m b a t power was reduced quickly on m a n y occasions after e n c o u n t e r i n g a minefield.

Soviet Union T h r o u g h o u t m o s t of the 1930s, the Soviet U n i o n developed a t h e o r y of warfare that was conceptually advanced, which incorporated all technical m e a n s , branches, a n d a r m s of service. T h e y then t o o k measures to field the w e a p o n s that would allow t h e m to accomplish the concepts established in that theory. Although there were obvious inadequacies in Soviet doctrine, or at least in the i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of that doctrine d u e to the purges of the Soviet officer corps in the years preceding hostilities, they ultimately adapted their basic concepts to the realities of war against the G e r m a n s . Ultimately, Soviet doctrine was i m p l e m e n t e d with a high degree of effectiveness by the end of the w a r . D u r i n g the pre-war years, Marshal Mikhail Tuchachevskiy played a p r o m i nent role in developing the d o c t r i n e that the Soviet Union used d u r i n g World War I I . Before being m u r d e r e d in 1937 d u r i n g Stalin's purges, his ideas were codified in the publication of the Soviet Army's field service regulations, P U 36 (Vremennyi Polevoi Ustav), in 1936. M a n y of the concepts found in this m a n u a l are similar in w o r d i n g to those found in Guderian's Achtung Panzer, or m o r e accurately, the concepts found in Achtung Panzer are similar to those found in P U - 3 6 , because Guderian's b o o k was published a year after PU-36. W h e r e the Soviet concepts differed from any other country's doctrine, and as their subsequent o p e r a t i o n s in World War II d e m o n s t r a t e d , was in the scale and scope of operations. 43

44

45

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Tuchachevskiy wrote a b o u t two techniques for destroying an enemy, n a m e ly, the envelopment a n d the b r e a k t h r o u g h . Although he saw the envelopm e n t as the preferred form, he a n d other Soviet theorists realized that m o d ern warfare would be vast in breadth, a n d that envelopments would rarely be possible w i t h o u t first c o n d u c t i n g b r e a k t h r o u g h o p e r a t i o n s . Tuchachevskiy, P U - 3 6 , as well as other Soviet theorists like V. K. Triandafillov, were explicit in continually emphasizing the successive n a t u r e of o p e r a t i o n s . 46

47

48

T h e Soviets theorized that m o d e r n mechanized warfare would extend in b r e a d t h across one b o r d e r or natural barrier to another, similar to World War I. T h e y also theorized that the battlefield would extend in depth, with successive tactical zones as well as subsequent operational, a n d even strategic, leve l s . In light of this appraisal of the future battlefield, they developed offensive concepts that addressed the b r e a d t h and d e p t h of those defenses. 49

Soviet doctrine a n d t h o u g h t essentially divided their forces, conceptually at least, into " h o l d i n g " a n d "striking" forces. In the offense, the holding force attacked the e n e m y across the breadth of the defense, effectively fixing t h e m in place to prevent t h e m from repositioning to the threatened b r e a k t h r o u g h sector. T h e striking force c o n d u c t e d the b r e a k t h r o u g h a n d c o n t i n u e d on into the d e p t h of the e n e m y defenses as quickly as possible to accomplish subseq u e n t missions such as envelopment, pursuit, exploitation, a n d so o n . Soviet d o c t r i n e emphasized c o n d u c t i n g wide b r e a k t h r o u g h s rather t h a n n a r r o w o n e s . V. K. Triandafillov addressed the breadth, d e p t h , a n d successive n a t u r e of o p e r a t i o n s in relation to a b r e a k t h r o u g h : 50

31

32

A b r e a k t h r o u g h can c o u n t u p o n success only in the event that it involves a significant p o r t i o n of the e n e m y forces occupying a given front a n d w h e n the direction of the blow is selected so that the penetrating forces will break out to an advantageous operational position relative to the r e m a i n i n g e n e m y front, if the attacker's shock g r o u p i n g will break o u t on routes from which it is possible to develop the blow against the flank a n d rear area of the e n e m y front not involved directly in the offensive. . . T h e first blow m u s t engage at least half, m i n i m u m one-third, of the e n e m y forces occupying a given front to deprive the e n e m y of the capability of m a k i n g a wide m a n e u v e r with reserves. To do so, the attack frontage m u s t be so wide that liquidation of the resultant b r e a k t h r o u g h will require forces equal to a n o t h e r third or the other half of his forces. 53

Soviet d o c t r i n e called for armies, or specially-reinforced armies called "shock armies," to be assigned the mission of breaking t h r o u g h the enemy's defenses. These were c o m b i n e d a r m s organizations that contained robust t a n k a n d / o r mechanized forces, as well as large quantities of field artillery. In accordance with the theory of the deep offensive o p e r a t i o n , these units were 34

APPENDIX: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

211

required to p e n e t r a t e n o t only t h r o u g h the tactical depth of the enemy's defenses, b u t to the operational d e p t h of his defense. In doing so, it was essential that the speed of the attackers' advance surpass the rate of defenders' withd r a w a l . A r m o r e d / m e c h a n i z e d forces were ideal for this. The c o m p o s i t i o n of a shock a r m y n o r m a l l y included 3 to 4 rifle corps consisting of a total of 12 to 15 rifle divisions; 1 to 2 mechanized corps or a cavalry corps; a n d a r m y air units consisting of 3 to 4 air divisions. Additionally, other reinforcements could include between 10 to 12 artillery regiments, several t a n k regiments, a n d engineer battalions. Although the initial attacks could incorporate all branches of the military, the mechanized forces were specifically assigned to overtake the retreating e n e m y to prevent h i m from establishing a subsequent defensive l i n e . Soviet c o m m a n d e r s organized their assault groups by integrating infantry, tanks, artillery, a n d engineer units for the b r e a k t h r o u g h of the tactical zone. The assault c o m m a n d e r s formed special m o b i l e groups in the lead rifle divisions to seize deep tactical objectives quickly. D u r i n g the latter part of the war, Soviet assault forces usually broke t h r o u g h the m a i n positions of the G e r m a n tactical defensive zone within 24 h o u r s of the start of the offensive a n d passed second echelon units forward. These units c o n t i n u e d the attack deep into the G e r m a n rear, even while the r e m a i n d e r of the G e r m a n defensive line was being held. 35

56

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58

T h e width of the sector of the m a i n attack, or the b r e a k t h r o u g h area, of a shock army, was 20 to 30 k i l o m e t e r s . T h e shock a r m y was expected to penetrate the e n e m y defenses to a d e p t h of between 75 a n d 100 k i l o m e t e r s . On several occasions, fronts attacked with as m a n y as three shock armies. These could be employed in different sectors to break t h r o u g h on several axes or in adjacent sectors to further widen the b r e a k t h r o u g h sector. 59

60

61

Tuchachevskiy p r o p o s e d that a r m o r e d units be divided into different categories, d e p e n d i n g u p o n the characteristics of the tanks a n d the specific mission they were to accomplish. Prior to World War II, he advocated the creation of three types of tanks: (1) tanks for close s u p p o r t of infantry, which could be slower models of relatively limited range; (2) tanks for distant s u p p o r t of infantry, which could move faster a n d farther; a n d (3) i n d e p e n d e n t longrange striking a r m o r . P U - 3 6 m e n t i o n s only two tank types, infantry s u p p o r t tanks a n d "strategic" t a n k s . T h e discussion in the m a n u a l associated with these t a n k types reveals a close conceptual correlation with the traditional definition of heavy a n d m e d i u m t a n k s . 62

63

64

W h e n World War II started, the Soviet U n i o n fielded a wide array of tanks that are n o t easily classified, b u t can loosely be associated into the heavy, m e d i u m , a n d light categories. In the early stages of the war, their p r i m a r y heavy tank was the "KV." The standard m o d e l , the KV-1, was heavily a r m o r e d a n d 65

66

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was a r m e d with a 7 6 m m m a i n gun. The Red Army, based u p o n experience d u r i n g the Russo-Finnish War, identified the need for a " b u n k e r - b u s t i n g " t a n k . This led the Soviet A r m y to field the large-turretted KV-2 which was a r m e d with a low-velocity 1 5 2 m m howitzer. D u r i n g the initial stages of the war, these tanks suffered from mechanical b r e a k d o w n s , p o o r crew training, a n d fuel shortages, b u t achieved spectacular results in the defense on several occasions. 67

68

By the s u m m e r of 1942, the KV tanks were even less effective. They continued to suffer mechanically, b u t their two largest deficiencies were that they were extremely slow a n d that they were only a r m e d with a 7 6 m m gun. The result of this was that they could not keep up with the m u c h faster T-34s, a n d even when they could, they did n o t add an increase in firepower over the T-34 a r m e d with the same 7 6 m m gun. Beginning in 1943, after e n c o u n t e r i n g the G e r m a n Tiger, the Soviets began converting their KVs into turretless assault guns called SU-152s. Although SU-152s served primarily as an assault gun in the direct-fire s u p p o r t role, this vehicle, by most accounts, was an effective interim m e a s u r e in dealing with the Tiger. By late 1943, the Soviets developed and fielded a new heavy tank, the Josef Stalin. T h e initial tank, the JS-1, was a r m e d with an 8 5 m m m a i n gun, but was never issued to any units a n d never saw c o m b a t . Instead, the 107 JS-ls p r o duced were converted to JS-2s, a r m e d with 1 2 2 m m m a i n g u n s . This change was p r o m u l g a t e d from a debate within the Soviet A r m y a b o u t the appropriate roles for heavy tanks. T h e a d o p t i o n of the 1 2 2 m m gun gave the JS-2 the ability to accomplish its p r i m a r y role of s u p p o r t i n g infantry forces d u r i n g breakt h r o u g h operations. A l t h o u g h n o t designed for t a n k - t o - t a n k battle, the m a s sive size of the projectile m a d e the JS-2 a capable t a n k in destroying G e r m a n a r m o r . This allowed it to be employed in a tank-killing role when needed. 69

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JS-2s were fielded in similar fashion to G e r m a n heavy tanks, in separate heavy tank regiments, b e g i n n i n g in early 1944. These were smaller in size t h a n American and G e r m a n battalions. Soviet heavy t a n k regiments possessed a total of 21 JS-2 tanks, formed into 4 c o m p a n i e s with 5 tanks each, with 1 tank for the regimental c o m m a n d e r . A u g m e n t i n g the heavy t a n k regiments, b u t p e r f o r m i n g a similar tactical role were the heavy assault guns built on the JS-2 chassis. These turretless vehicles, k n o w n as the JSU series, were a r m e d with either a 1 5 2 m m or 122mm gun a n d were p r o d u c e d in m u c h greater n u m b e r s t h a n the JS-2 t a n k . T h e JSU152 was intended to be the p r i m a r y heavy assault gun, b u t because of a shortage of 1 5 2 m m howitzers a n d a surplus of 1 2 2 m m gun tubes, the Soviet A r m y fielded a significant n u m b e r of JSU-122s. Like the JS-2s, JSUs were organized as separate regiments. These heavy assault gun regiments were h o m o g e n o u s , being e q u i p p e d with either the JSU-122 or the JSU-152, b u t not b o t h . 72

73

74

75

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Although tactics a n d e m p l o y m e n t varied d e p e n d i n g u p o n the mission, both heavy t a n k regiments a n d heavy assault gun regiments were normally attached to a larger c o m b i n e d a r m s unit to assist in breaking t h r o u g h G e r m a n defenses. Both types of regiments appear to have worked in close cooperation with each other to perform their tactical roles of suppressing infantry strongpoints a n d destroying e n e m y antitank guns a n d armor. The JSUs were used to overwatch the attacking JS-2s from stationary p o s i t i o n s . W h e n the JS-2s reached a specified point, the JSUs would move forward a n d the b o u n d i n g overwatch process was repeated. 76

Soviet d o c t r i n e differed from G e r m a n doctrine in its higher degree of emphasis u p o n the integration of artillery into the b r e a k t h r o u g h o p e r a t i o n . PU-36, a n d Soviet theorists such as V. K. Triandafillov, emphasized the role of artillery in achieving tactical b r e a k t h r o u g h s of enemy defenses." T h e density of artillery firepower advocated by pre-war sources in s u p p o r t of a breakt h r o u g h , although high, steadily increased t h r o u g h o u t the w a r . T h e increase in the density of artillery firepower s u p p o r t i n g the b r e a k t h r o u g h has been attributed by several sources as a p r i m a r y reason for the continual improvem e n t in the p e r f o r m a n c e of the Red A r m y t h r o u g h o u t the w a r . 78

79

D u r i n g Soviet b r e a k t h r o u g h operations, the infantry/tank attack was preceded by a massive artillery b a r r a g e . This preparation was i n t e n d e d to destroy the e n e m y artillery a n d observation posts, antitank w e a p o n s , a n d areas heavily fortified by the e n e m y infantry. In addition to achieving these specific tasks, the artillery preparation was supposed to generally disrupt the enemy defenses t h r o u g h o u t their tactical d e p t h . Prior to the war, Soviet t h e o rists envisioned artillery being replaced by assault guns, tanks, a n d other mobile direct-fire weapons d u r i n g the b r e a k t h r o u g h . After m u c h practical experience, however, Red Army leaders found that, primarily because of the proliferation of antitank weapons t h r o u g h o u t the defensive depth, the density of artillery could not be decreased no m a t t e r h o w m a n y tanks a n d assault guns were assigned to the b r e a k t h r o u g h . In fact, artillery densities c o n t i n u e d to increase t h r o u g h o u t the war while b r e a k t h r o u g h operations were weighted with m o r e a n d m o r e tanks and assault g u n s . 80

81

82

83

G e r m a n d o c t r i n e a n d actions after 1943 focused on tactical b r e a k t h r o u g h s , presumably in the hopes of c o n d u c t i n g tactical envelopments. T h e Soviets saw the potential of c o n t i n u i n g a tactical b r e a k t h r o u g h into an operational breakt h r o u g h , which in t u r n could be exploited to achieve operational-level results. This distinction allowed the Soviets to achieve spectacular success on the battlefield. At the same time, after 1943, the G e r m a n s failed to successfully break t h r o u g h Soviet defenses t h r o u g h even their tactical depth a n d consequently were never able to achieve m o r e t h a n m i n o r tactical envelopments. This represented a major t u r n a b o u t from the first two years of the war, in which the G e r m a n s h a d been able to break t h r o u g h Soviet defenses consistently, a n d

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subsequently effect the e n v e l o p m e n t a n d destruction of whole Soviet field armies. Soviet operations, especially in the latter p a r t of the war, h a r m o n i o u s l y integrated artillery, tanks, infantry, air power, a n d engineers to achieve breakt h r o u g h s . These b r e a k t h r o u g h s were accomplished rapidly across a wide front, which allowed a following echelon force, such as a G u a r d s Tank Army, to c o n d u c t a subsequent o p e r a t i o n deep into the G e r m a n defenses. T h e rapidity a n d d e p t h of the b r e a k t h r o u g h prevented G e r m a n forces from repositioning forces to block the lead elements of the b r e a k t h r o u g h . T h e w i d t h of the b r e a k t h r o u g h prevented G e r m a n forces from restoring the m a i n defensive line by attacking into the flank of the b r e a k t h r o u g h . W h e n G e r m a n a r m o r was encountered, the Red Army's heavy tanks a n d heavy assault guns were sufficiently a r m e d a n d a r m o r e d to dispose of m o s t G e r m a n a r m o r e d vehicles. Beyond the 53,000 T-34s p r o d u c e d by the Soviets (and the roughly 10,000 British, Canadian, a n d A m e r i c a n tanks transferred as military aid), the Soviets also p r o d u c e d heavy tanks a n d heavy assault guns in n u m b e r s that dwarfed the relatively minuscule p r o d u c t i o n of late-model G e r m a n tanks such as the King Tiger. Soviet d o c t r i n e required the rapid i n t r o d u c t i o n of exploitation forces after the tactical b r e a k t h r o u g h . These forces, e q u i p p e d with a r m o r e d vehicles like the highly mobile and fast T-34 m e d i u m tank, penetrated as quickly a n d deeply as possible. In m a n y cases, this rendered inconsequential the counter-efforts of p o n d e r o u s G e r m a n heavy t a n k battalions.

The Char B l - b i s was France's principal heavy tank in 1940. Its design, w i t h a l i m i t e d traverse 7 5 m m m a i n g u n m o u n t e d in a sponson in the hull and a 4 7 m m gun in the turret c o m b i n e d w i t h excellent a r m o r w o u l d have made it a f o r m i dable foe if employed differently. (Patton Museum of Cavalry and Armor)

APPENDIX: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

215

The Matilda II replaced the earlier Matilda I I n f a n t r y Tank, w h i c h was only armed w i t h machine guns. The M a t i l d a II was slow and lightly armed, equipped w i t h only a 2-pounder ( 4 0 m m ) main g u n , but it was very heavily armored. U n t i l the appearance of the Panzer IV and Sturmgeschütz assault guns w i t h the longer 7 5 m m guns, it was practically invulnerable on the battlefield, except to the 8 8 m m antiaircraft g u n .

(Patton Museum of Cavalry and Armor)

The Valentine I n f a n t r y Tank was developed f r o m the cruiser series, but was more heavily armored. Like some other British tanks, the earliest versions were armed w i t h a 2-pounder ( 4 0 m m ) main g u n , but later marks were equipped w i t h 6-pounders ( 5 7 m m ) , such as the Valentine V I I I in the photo above. The final version even m o u n t e d a 7 5 m m gun. The Valentine saw action w i t h British forces in the battle for Tunisia in 1943, but most were ultimately either supplied to the Soviets, used against the Japanese, or used as chassis for self-propelled guns. (Patton Museum of Cavalry and Armor)

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A C h u r c h i l l I I I of the 14th Canadian Tank Regiment. Heavily armored but slow, this C h u r c h i l l is armed w i t h a 6-pounder ( 5 7 m m ) m a i n gun. Later variants were even more heavily armored and were reequipped w i t h a 7 5 m m main gun.

(The Tank Museum, Bovington)

The T1E2 (later, M6 series) Heavy Tank was an early US A r m y design for a heavy tank. The first prototypes were tested on the day after the attack on Pearl Harbor. In contrast, the first Tigers were not available for testing u n t i l over five September 1942. A r m e d w i t h a three-inch ( 7 6 m m ) gun and well armored, the design never saw combat.

(Patton Museum of Cavalry and Armor)

APPENDIX: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

217

The M e d i u m Tank M 2 6 was introduced in combat in the European Theater in early 1945. Its 9 0 m m m a i n gun, based u p o n an anti-aircraft g u n , was capable of defeating all German tanks at extended ranges. Very few—probably not more than 20—ever saw action in W W I I . (US Army Signal Corps Photo)

The U.S. T-28 Super Heavy Tank was to be used to break through the Westwall. Even t h o u g h available components were used when possible, the first vehicle was not available for testing p r i o r to the end of the war in Europe. O n l y two of these were ever produced, and the only surviving example is outside the Patton M u s e u m at Fort Knox, Kentucky. (Patton Museum of Cavalry and Armor)

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The K V - 1 (above) was very heavily armored, moderately well-armed (a medium-velocity 7 6 m m m a i n g u n ) , but slow. The K V - 2 (below), armed w i t h a 152mm howitzer, was meant for bunker busting rather than fighting other tanks, but otherwise suffered f r o m the same lack of agility and mechanical unreliability as the K V - 1 . M o r e KV tanks were abandoned due to breakdowns than were lost in battle. Still, in 1941, the Germans could only hope to destroy one by using an 8 8 m m antiaircraft g u n in the direct-fire mode. Experience w i t h the KV series spurred the acceleration of tank development that resulted in the i n t r o d u c t i o n of the Panther a n d Tiger series. (Patton Museum of Cavalry and Armor)

APPENDIX: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

219

A l t h o u g h it was more than a match for the Tiger, and about the equal to the Tiger I I , the JS-2 was produced in far greater quantities. The Soviets b u i l t about 3,850 JS-2s, compared w i t h the Germans' roughly 500 Tiger IIs. Supported by assault guns which shared a c o m m o n chassis— thereby m a k i n g maintenance m u c h easier—the JS-2 was especially effective in the offensive role for w h i c h it was designed. (Patton Museum of Cavalry and Armor)

Two variations of the Josef Stalin (JS) heavy tank were built in assault gun versions. These were armed w i t h either a 122mm gun or a 152mm g u n . (The one in this photo is a JSU-122). These were more economical to manufacture than the tank versions because they d i d not have a turret. W h e n used in conjunction w i t h JS-2s, the JSUs w o u l d provide overwatch for the JS-2s d u r i n g attacks. (Patton Museum of Cavalry and Armor)

Notes Chapter 1 1. Militärwochenblatt, 11 November 1936, No. 30, in Attack: A Study of Blitzkrieg Tactics, Major Ferdinand Otto Miksche (New York: Random House, 1942), 42. 2. John Keegan, The Second World War (New York: Penguin, 1990), 402. 3. Thomas L. Jentz and Hilary L. Doyle, Germany's Tiger Tanks, D.W. to Tiger I: Design, Production and Modifications (Atglen, Pa.: Schiffer, 2000), 10. 4. Thomas L. Jentz, Panzertruppen: The Complete Guide to the Creation and Combat Employment of Germany's Tank Force, 1933-1942 (Atglen, Pa.: Schiffer, 1996), 220. 5. Both the Tiger and Tiger II's numerical classification was Panzerkampfwagen VI or Panzer VI. 6. Thomas L. Jentz, Germany's Tiger Tanks, Tiger I and II: Combat Tactics (Atglen, Pa.: Schiffer, 1997), 38. 7. Ibid., 7. 8. Danny S. Parker, "German Tiger Tanks Were at the Battle of the Bulge, but Not in the Numbers Usually Cited for Them." World War II (March 1990): 8. 9. Jean Restayn, Tiger I on the Eastern Front, trans. Alan McKay (Paris: Histoire and Collections, 1999), 101. 10. Jean Restayn, Tiger I on the Western Front (Paris: Histoire and Collections, 2001), 4. 11. Ibid. 12. Peter Gudgin, The Tiger Tanks (London: Arms and Armour, 1991), 133. 13. In the summer of 1944, there were two heavy tank battalions operating in Italy and there would ultimately be three heavy tank battalions committed against the Allied beachhead at Normandy from June to August 1944. 14. Wolfgang Schneider, Tigers in Combat II (Winnipeg, Manitoba: J. J. Fedorowicz, 1998), 263. 15. Remarks by Colonel Stoves, "1st Panzer Division Attempts to Relieve the Cherkassy Pocket" (in Art of War Symposium, From the Dnepr to the Vistula: Soviet Offensive Operations, November 1943-August 1944. David Glantz, Chairman, Washington, D.C.: Center for Land Warfare, U.S. Army War College, 1985), 179. 16. For a good discussion on this, see David M. Glantz, American Perspectives on Eastern Front Operations in World War II (Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, Soviet Army Studies Office, April 1987), 9-13. 17. There are many different definitions of the operational level of warfare. This is only one simplified definition intended to provide a conceptual foundation. Since the Soviets were masters of the operational level by 1944, it is helpful to view their concept. The definition espoused by the Soviet Frunze Academy prior to World War II was, "An operation is the sum total of the maneuvers and battles in a given sector of a theater of military operations and is directed toward the attainment of a general goal established as the final objective during the given phase of the campaign. The conduct of operations is a subject of operational art and occupies an intermediate position 220

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221

between tactics and strategy." See Ministry of Defense of the USSR, History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union, 1941-1945, vol. 1, Preparation for the Unleashing of the War by Imperialistic Powers, unedited translation (Moscow: Military Publishing House of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR, 1960), 565.

Chapter 2 1. Heinz Guderian, Achtung-Panzer! The Development of Armoured Forces, Their Tactics and Operational Potential, trans. Christopher Duffy with an introduction by Paul Harris (London: Arms and Armour, 1995), 168. 2. Bryan Perret, A History of Blitzkrieg, with a foreword by John Hackett (New York: Jove, 1989), 66. 3. Examples of follow-on exploitation operations are an envelopment of the enemy's front line forces, or pursuit of fleeing enemy forces, or they could be tasked with seizing a deep objective. 4. Many country's medium tanks evolved to become universal tanks, which eventually became the main battle tank. 5. Range in this instance means radius of operation. 6. James S. Corum, The Roots of Blitzkrieg: Hans von Seeckt and German Military Reform (Lawrence, Kans.: University of Kansas Press), 140. 7. Reichswehrministerium, Die Truppenführung (Troop Leading), (Berlin: 1933) trans, by the U.S. War Department, in the Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth, Kans., 57. 8. Ibid., 62. 9. Ibid., 63. 10. Ibid., 76-77. 11. Ibid., 69. Die Truppenführung also included antiaircraft elements following closely behind the leading elements. 12. Ibid., 63. 13. Ibid. 14. Ibid., 82-92. 15. Ibid., 87. 16. Ibid., 89. 17. Ibid. 18. Ibid 19. Ibid., 90-91. 20. Heinz W. Guderian, Panzer Leader, trans. Constantine Fitzgibbon, with a foreword by B. H. Liddell Hart (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1952), 20. 21. Guderian references Soviet thought and compares his ideas to Soviet theory in Achtung Panzer! 190-91. The Militär-Wochenblatt translated and published the writings of many foreign theorists. 22. "Nutzanwendungen aus der Tankschlacht von Cambrai II," Militär-Wochenblatt No. 24, (1929), in Imagining War: The Development of Armored Doctrine in Germany and the Soviet Union, 1919-1939, ed. Mary Ruth Habeck (Ann Arbor, MI: UMI Dissertation Services, 1996), 153.

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23. Ludwig Beck, "Nachträgliche Betrachtungen zu dem Einsatz des Panzerkorps in der Lage der Truppenamsreise vom 13.6.1935," in Habeck, Imagining War, 313-14. 24. Heinz W. Guderian, "Die Panzertruppen und ihr Zusammenwirken mix den anderen Waffen," in Habeck, Imagining War, 335. 25. See Guderian, Achtung Panzer! 190-91 for his views on the different waves and their missions. 26. Shimon Naveh, In Pursuit of Military Excellence: The Evolution of Operational Theory (London: Frank Cass, 1997), 157. 27. Guderian, Achtung-Panzer! 170. 28. Ibid. 29. Ibid. 30. Ibid., 179. 31. Ibid. 32. Ibid. 33. Ibid. 34. Ibid. 35. Albert Kesselring and others, eds., "Manual for Command and Combat Employment of Smaller Units." MS #P-060b. trans. G. Weber and W. Luetzkendorf, ed. G. C. Vanderstadt [Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Military History (CMH), 1952], 115. 36. Ibid., 115-16. 37. Ibid., 116. 38. Ibid., 175. 39. Ibid. 40. Jentz, Panzertruppen, 1933-1942, 63. 41. Ibid., 64-65. 42. Ibid., 69. 43. Rolf Möbius, "German Heavy Armor," MS #D-226. Draft Translation (Washington, D.C.: CMH, 1954), 2. 44. Ibid., 3. 45. Jentz, Tiger I and II, 23. 46. Gudgin, Tiger Tanks, 91. 47. Egon Kleine and Volkmar Kuhn, Tiger: The History of a Legendary Weapon, 1942-45, trans. David Johnston (Winnipeg, Manitoba: J. J. Fedorowicz, 1989), 9. 48. Gudgin, Tiger Tanks, 91. 49. Jentz, Tiger I and II, 24-25. 50. These are essentially the U.S. Army equivalent of Tables of Organization and Equipment. 51. Jentz, Tiger I and II, 24-25. 52. Ibid., 25-26. 53. Wolfgang Schneider, Tigers in Combat I (Winnipeg, Manitoba: J. J. Fedorowicz, 2000), 147. 54. Ibid., 79, 228, 264,312. 55. Gudgin, Tiger Tanks, 93. 56. Jentz, Tiger I and II, 24. 57. Schneider, Tigers in Combat I, 79, 147, 264.

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58. Dr. Franz-Wilhelm Lochmann and others, eds., The Combat History of schwere Panzer-Abteilung 503: In Action in the East and West with the Tiger I and Tiger II (Winnipeg, Manitoba: J. J. Fedorowicz, 2000), 14. 59. Jentz and Doyle, Tiger Tanks: D. W. to Tiger I, 69. 60. Ibid, 27. 61. Hans-Joachim Jung, Panzer Soldiers for "God, Honor, Fatherland," The History of Panzerregiment "Grossdeutschland:" The German Army's Elite Panzer Formation, trans. David Johnston (Winnipeg, Manitoba: J. J. Fedorowicz, 2000), 145. 62. Others, like Heavy Tank Battalions 501 and 504, were attached temporarily to the 10th Panzer Division during operations in Tunisia. 63. Schneider, Tigers in Combat II, 3. The Panzer Regiment already had a heavy tank company assigned that was fighting in the battle of Kursk when the rest of the battalion was forming in Germany. 64. Schneider, Tigers in Combat I, 443. 65. Schneider, Tigers in Combat II, 3, 6-7. 66. Ibid., 7. 67. Patrick Agte, Michael Wittmann and the Tiger Commanders of the Leibstandarte, trans. David Johnston (Winnipeg, Manitoba: J. J. Fedorowicz, 1996), 216. 68. Lochmann et al., schwere Panzer-Abteilung 503, 309. 69. Ibid. The title Feldherrnhalle ("Field Commanders' Hall," a memorial to fallen German military leaders) refers to the building on the Odeonsplatz in Munich where the attempted Nazi Putsch, or coup d'etat, of 1923 was defeated by government forces. Several Nazis died in the fray, and the building became a shrine of the Nazi Party. 70. Jentz, Tiger I and II, 27. 71. Gudgin, Tiger Tanks, 133. 72. See Schneider, Tigers in Combat I, 82, 152, 231, 314, 346-47, 374, 441; idem, Tigers in Combat II, 364, 324-25, 397. 73. Jentz and Doyle, Tiger Tanks: D.W to Tiger I, 9. 74.Ibid. 75. Ibid., 10. 76. Ibid., 12. 77. Ibid., 25, 30. 78. Kleine and Kuhn, Tiger, 4. 79. Flak was a German abbreviation for antiaircraft guns. The L/74 suffix referred to the length of the gun that measured 74 calibers from the muzzle to the rear face of the breech ring. The caliber is the diameter of the bore of the gun, in this case, 88mm. Increasing the length of the gun tube increased the velocity of the round fired, which in turn increased the armor-penetrative capability of kinetic energy rounds. 80. Kleine and Kuhn, Tiger, 4. 81. Jentz and Doyle, Tiger Tanks: D. W. to Tiger I, 12, 23. 82. Directives began bearing the stamp of "Hitler's Order. All deadlines must be met unconditionally!" 83. Jentz and Doyle, Tiger Tanks: D. W. to Tiger I, 19-20, 67, 69. 84. 88mm KwK 36 L/56 means that the diameter of the projectile is 88mm; it is a tank gun (Kampfwagen Kanone); its development was finalized in 1936; and the length of the gun tube is 56 times the diameter of the projectile, or 56 x 88mm.

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85. Jentz, Tiger I and II, 9-10. 86. Thomas L. Jentz, Panzertruppen: The Complete Guide to the Creation and Combat Employment of Germany's Tank Force, 1943-1945 (Atglen, Pa.: Schiffer, 1997), 295. 87. Thomas L. Jentz and Hilary L. Doyle, Germany's Tiger Tanks: VK45.02 to Tiger II (Atglen, Pa.: Schiffer, 2000), 10. 88. Ibid., 16. 89. Jentz and Doyle, Tiger Tanks: VK45.02 to Tiger II, 59. 90. Jentz, Panzertruppen: 1943-1945, 296. 91. Jentz and Doyle, Tiger Tanks: VK45.02 to Tiger II, 59. 92. David Fletcher, Tiger! The Tiger Tank: A British View (London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1986), 228. 93. Jentz, Panzertruppen: 1943-1945, 294-95. 94. Gudgin, Tiger Tanks, 49. 95. Major Lüder, Commander of the Heavy Tank Battalion 501, "Tiger Experiences in Tunisia," dated 18 March 1943, in Jentz, Tiger I and II, 59. 96. These railcars were called Ssyms Cars. 97. See Heinz Guderian, Generalinspektur der Panzertruppen, Tiger Fibel, D656/27, written by Josef von Glatter-Goetz (n.p., 1943), 91; Taylor Downing, Heavy Metal: Tiger! written and directed by Patrick King, (n.p., The History Channel, 2002). 98. Guderian, Tiger Fibel, 91. 99. Ibid. 100. See Gudgin, Tiger Tanks, 77; Jentz and Doyle, Tiger Tanks: VK45.02 to Tiger II, 68. 101. Gudgin, Tiger Tanks, 93-94. 102. Schneider, Tigers in Combat I, 315, 349, 375. 103. Kleine and Kuhn, Tiger, 39. 104. Gudgin, Tiger Tanks, 107. 105. Jentz, Tiger I and II, 23, 31-37. 106. Merkblatt 47a/29 (20 May 1943) in Jentz, Tiger I and II, 31-32. 107. Ibid., 32-33. 108. Ibid., 34-35. 109. Ibid., 34. 110. Ibid., 36. 111. Ibid. 112. Ibid. 113. Merkblatt 47a/30 (20 May 1943) in Jentz, Tiger I and II, 36-37. 114. Ibid. 115. Ibid., 37. 116. Ibid. 117. Ibid. 118. Kleine and Kuhn, Tiger, M-42. 119. Ibid. 120. Ibid. 121. Ibid. 122. Ibid.

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Chapter 3 1. Jentz, Tiger I and II, 40. 2. Ibid., 24-26. 3. Jentz, Panzertruppen: 1943-1945, 32. 4. Schneider, Tigers in Combat I, 43, 83-85, 234. 5. Ibid., 83-85. 6. Ibid., 83-85. 7. Guderian, Panzer Leader, 280. 8. "Armee-Oberkommando 18 Summary," dated 2 April 1943, in Jentz, Tiger I and II, 40. 9. Ibid., 39. 10. Ibid., 40. 11. See Ibid., 41; Schneider, Tigers in Combat I, 84. 12. Schneider, Tigers in Combat I, 83-85. 13. Jentz, Panzertruppen: 1943-1945, 13. 14. Gudgin, Tiger Tanks, 107, 111. 15. Schneider, Tigers in Combat I, 42. 16. Ibid., 43. 17. George F. Howe, Northwest Africa: Seizing the Initiative in the West, United States Army in World War II, The Mediterranean Theater of Operations (Washington, D.C.: CMH, 1957), 311. 18. In addition to elements of the 10th Panzer Division and Heavy Tank Battalion 501, he added elements of a separate panzer battalion, the 190th. 19. Howe, Northwest Africa, 314. 20. See Schneider, Tigers in Combat I, 41; Howe, Northwest Africa, 314. 21. Jentz, Tiger I and II, 42. 22. Ibid. 23. Howe, Northwest Africa, 317. 24. Schneider, Tigers in Combat I, 41. 25. See Schneider, Tigers in Combat I, 41; Jentz, Tiger I and II, 42-43. Schneider claims 15, but an after-action report from Heavy Tank Battalion 501 only mentions eight tanks destroyed during this time period. 26. At the beginning of the operation there were probably about 50 German tanks available in all four combat groups, including Tigers and Panzer IIIs from Heavy Tank Battalion 501. 27. Schneider, Tigers in Combat I, 41. 28. See Howe, Northwest Africa, 331; Rick Atkinson, An Army at Dawn: The War in North Africa, 1942-1943 (New York: Henry Holt, 2002), 231. 29. Records do not indicate what type of obstacle. Considering that movement was restricted primarily to the roads, it is plausible that a simple point minefield supported by accurate artillery fire would have sufficed to stop the attack. 30. Howe, Northwest Africa, 331. 31. The ten "Medium" German tanks were probably a mix of Panzer IIIs and IVs. 32. Howe, Northwest Africa, 332-33. 33. Schneider, Tigers in Combat I, 42.

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226 34 This was the first time Heavy Tank Battalion 501 conducted an operation with the majority of the battalion. The battalion did not, however, operate as a unit, but was divided into three groups between two different combat groups. The honor of being the first battalion to conduct an operation as a cohesive unit went to Heavy Tank Battalion 503, operating with Army Group Don. They conducted an attack around Stavropol, southeast of Rostov, on 6 January 1943 with the entire battalion, 12 days prior to Operation Eilbote. 35. I.S.O. Playfair, C. J. C. Molony; F. C. Flynn; and T. P. Gleave, The Mediterranean and the Middle East: The Destruction of the Axis Forces in Africa, vol. IV, History of the Second World War, United Kingdom Military Series (London: HMSO, 1966), 278. 36. Howe, Northwest Africa, 376-77. 37. Ibid. 38. Ibid., 377. 39. Major Lüder, "Combat Report for the Period from 18 to 22 January 1943," dated 27 January 1943, in Jentz, Tiger I and II, 48. The "suspension problems" were caused by "hits" from mines. The Tiger was later cannibalized because of a lack of spare parts for Tigers in Tunisia. See Schneider, Tigers in Combat I, 42. 40. Ibid. 41. See Howe, Northwest Africa, 377; Schneider, Triers in Combat I, 42; Major Lüder, "Combat Report for the Period from 18 to 22 January 1943," dated 27 January 1943, in Jentz, Tiger I and II, 48. 42. See Major Lüder, "Report for 18 to 22 January 1943," 48; Schneider, Tigers in Combat I, 42. One of these Tigers was reportedly knocked out by a 6-pounder (57mm) antitank gun of 2 Troop, A Battery of the British 72d Antitank Regiment. It was the first Tiger captured by Allied forces and was subsequently used for testing to discover its weaknesses and strengths. See Gudgin, Tiger Tanks, 106-11, for numerous photos and Fletcher, Tiger! 11-27, for more pictures and copies of the tests conducted on this Tiger and the results. See also the report detailing this loss in Major Lüder, "Combat Report for the Period from 31 January to 1 February 1943," dated 3 February 1943, and Technical Reports No. 4 from the Engineer of the Panzer Battalion 501 on the "Tiger Situation in Tunisia for the operation during the period from 31 January to 1 February 1943" in Jentz, Tiger I and II, 51-53. These German reports misleadingly indicate that the Tiger was destroyed completely and nothing useful or of any consequence was captured by the British. 43. Major Luder, "Report for 18 to 22 January 1943," 48. 44. Ibid. 45. Ibid. 46. Ibid. 47. Ibid. 48. Ibid. 49. See Schneider, Tigers in Combat I, 42. Howe, Northwest Africa, 382, lists total Allied losses of 87 machine guns, 16 antitank guns, 36 artillery pieces, 21 tanks, 4 armored reconnaissance cars, 4 self-propelled gun carriages, more than 200 other vehicles, and over 300 horses; Major Lüder in "Report for 18 to 22 January 1943," 49, lists Combat Group Lüder's total claims as 25 guns; 9 self-propelled guns or armored

NOTES

227

half-tracks; 7 tanks (Sherman, Lee, Grant), about 125 trucks and cars; and 2 armored cars. Also listed are 235 prisoners, of which 8 were officers. 50. Major Lüder in "Report for 18 to 22 January 1943," 49. Presumably, the statement about one in nine Tigers being operational is a reference about one of the two companies and not the entire battalion. The battalion had 16 Tigers available at the end of this operation, not counting the one being used for spare parts. 51. Howe, Northwest Africa, 407. 52. Ibid., 411. 53. Ibid., 412. 54. Ibid. 55. See Schneider, Tigers in Combat I, 43; Jentz, Tiger I and II, 54. Jentz states that only 15 were claimed by Heavy Tank Battalion 501, while Schneider claims 20. Howe, Northwest Africa, 415, lists the total American losses from Combat Command A for the day as 44 tanks, all but 2 antitank guns, 9 of the 12 authorized 105-mm pieces of the 91st Armored Field Artillery Battalion, and the entire 2d Battalion, 17th Field Artillery. 56. This battalion, under Lieutenant Colonel Alger, lost 50 of their 54 tanks during the day. 57. Schneider, Tigers in Combat I, 43. 58. Howe, Northwest Africa, 415. 59. Ibid. 60. See Howe, Northwest Africa, 505-7; Playfair et al., The Destruction of the Axis Forces in Africa, vol. IV, 327-28. 61. British forces reportedly destroyed or disabled 40 of the 77 tanks in Combat Group Lang during the day, although many were repairable and were in action again in a short amount of time. 62. Howe, Northwest Africa, 506. 63. Schneider, Tigers in Combat I, 43. 64. Ibid. 65. Howe, Northwest Africa, 507. 66. Playfair et al., The Destruction of the Axis Forces in Africa, vol. IV, 328. 67. "Kampgruppe Lüder Operational Strengths during Operation Ochsenkopf," and "Schwere Panzer-Abteilung 501 Operational Strength," dated 5 March 1943, in Jentz, Tiger I and II, 55-56. 68. Ibid., the battalion was issued with Panzer IVs to replace some lost Panzer IIIs. 69. Ibid., 70. Restayn, Tiger I on the Western Front, 3. 71. Ibid., 41-43. 72. See Ibid, 43; Jentz, Tiger I and II, 50, 55; Gudgin, Tiger Tanks, 117. The battalion was authorized 20 Tigers in a two-company battalion and received two Tigers as replacements on 28 February 1943. Gudgin claims that there were 20 operational Tigers, but this is highly unlikely as the battalion never had more than 20 Tigers at any one time. 73. Jentz, Tiger I and II, 50. 74. Gudgin, Tiger Tanks, 104, 107.

228

SLEDGEHAMMERS

75. "Technische Report Nr. 3 von Truppen-Ingenieur Panzer-Abteilung 501, 18-25 Januar 1943," in Jentz, Tiger I and II, 50. 76. "Technische Report Nr. 4 von Truppen-Ingenieur Panzer-Abteilung 501, 31 Januar-1 Februar 1943," in Jentz, Tiger I and II, 51. 77. "Tiger Experiences in Tunisia," dated 18 March 1943 in Jentz, Tiger I and II, 59. 78. Ibid. 79. In other words, a way to breach minefields mechanically without damaging the tanks by driving over them. 80. See Schneider, Tigers in Combat I, 47; David Rolf, The Bloody Road to Tunis (London: Greenhill, 2001), 127-31; Paul M. Robinett, Armor Command (Washington, D.C.: McGregor and Werner, 1958), 163-64; Charles Whiting, Kasserine: First Blood (New York: Stein and Day, 1984), 173-91. German claims cannot be verified in every instance, however, they do not appear to be exaggerated in the cases where some level of verification is possible. The Germans, for example, claim they destroyed 20 U.S. Sherman tanks on 14 February 1943 as part of Operation FRÜHLINGSWIND. This is a reasonable number considering the fact that a large portion of Combat Command A was destroyed during the operation, which the Americans called "the battle for Kasserine Pass." 81. Schneider, Tigers in Combat I, 41-43. 82. Ibid., 43. 83. Major Lüder, Commander of Heavy Tank Battalion 501, letter dated 16 February 1943, in Jentz, Tiger I and II, 54. 84. Lüder, "Combat Report, dated 16 December 1942," in Jentz, Tiger I and II, 43. 85. Ibid., 45. 86. Lüder, "Report for 18 to 22 January 1943," 48. 87. Schneider, Tigers in Combat I, 233-34. 88. Ibid., 233. German sources credit Heavy Tank Battalion 504 with destroying 35 U.S. tanks. American sources universally mention that this attack was halted— although rain and swampy conditions are usually given as the primary factors—while no losses are provided. 89. See Schneider, Tigers in Combat I, 233-34; Jack Coggins, The Campaign for North Africa (New York: Doubleday, 1980), 137, 155-57. In this attack, part of the Allied offensive Operation VULCAN, British losses within the 1st and 6th Armored Divisions on 21 April 1943 were 162 tanks. Heavy Tank Battalion 504 claims to have destroyed about 40 of them. Although they claim these tanks belonged to the British 9th Armored Division, only the 1st and 6th Armored Divisions attacked in the Medjez el Bab area on this day. 90. Jentz, Tiger I and II, 60. 91. Schneider, Tigers in Combat I, 234. 92. See Restayn, Tiger I on the Western Front, 44; Schneider, Tigers in Combat I, 234. Restayn lists the number as 150, but Schneider lists more than 250 enemy tanks destroyed. Verification from American and British sources leads one to the conclusion that 250 is an extreme over-estimate, and that 150 may, in fact, be accurate. 93. "Technischer Report Nr. 6 von Truppen-Ingenieur Panzer-Abteilung 501, 3 März-1 Mai 1943," in Jentz, Tiger I and II, 62. 94. Ibid.

NOTES

229

95. Dana V. Sadarananda, Beyond Stalingrad: Manstein and the Operations of Army Group Don (New York: Praeger, 1990), 56. 96. Ibid., 60-61. 97. Schneider, Tigers in Combat I, 153. 98. Sadarananda, Beyond Stalingrad, 61. 99. Lange, Commander of 2d Company, Heavy Tank Battalion 502. "After Action Report, 29 January 1943," in Lochmann et al., schwere Panzer-Abteilung 503, 56. 100. Schneider, Tigers in Combat I, 153. 101. Ibid. 102. Kleine and Kuhn, Tiger, 48. 103. Ibid. 104. Ibid. 105. Ibid. 106. Schneider, Tigers in Combat I, 153. 107. Kleine and Kuhn, Tiger, 52. 108. Ibid. 109. Schneider, Tigers in Combat I, 154. 110. Ibid. 111. Ibid. 112. Ibid. 113. Ibid., 155. 114. Ibid. 115. Ibid., 153-55. 116. Ibid. 117. Ibid., 154, 226. 118. Ibid., 226. 119. Richard von Rosen, "Initial Employment with Heeresgruppe Don," in Lochmann et al., schwere Panzer-Abteilung 503, 44. 120. Ibid. 121. Jentz, Tiger I and II, 68. 122. von Rosen, "Initial Employment with Heeresgruppe Don," in Lochmann et al., schwere Panzer-Abteilung 503, 43. 123. Kleine and Kuhn, Tiger, 52. 124. Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett, A War To Be Won: Fighting the Second World War (London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2000), 292. 125. See David M. Glantz and Jonathan M. House, The Battle of Kursk (Lawrence, Kans.: University of Kansas Press, 1999), 19; Walter S. Dunn, Jr., Kursk: Hitler's Gamble, 1943 (London: Praeger, 1997), 30. 126. Dunn, Kursk, 31. 127. Ibid., 28. 128. Ibid., 91. 129. Ibid., 91-92. 130. Ibid., 92. 131. Pavel Rotmistrov, "Tanks Against Tanks," in Main Front: Soviet Leaders Look Back on World War II, with a foreword by Marshal of the Soviet Union S. Sokolov and a commentary by John Erickson (New York: Brassey's, 1987), 110.

230

SLEDGEHAMMERS

132 See Lüder, "Letter dated 16 February 1943," "Tiger Experiences in Tunisia, dated 18 March 1943," and "schwere Panzer-Abteilung 503 Combat Report for the Period 2 to 22 February 1943," in Jentz, Tiger I and II, 54-55, 59, 65; Captain Lange, "After Action Report of the 2./schwere Panzer-Abteilung 502, dated 29 January 1943," in Lochmann et al., schwere Panzer-Abteilung 503, 57-58. 133. "The 13.(Tiger) Company/Panzer-Regiment Grossdeutschland After Action Report on Employment 7-19 March 1943 in the area of Poltawa-Belgorad," Jentz, Tiger I and II, 75. 134. Guderian, Generalinspekteur der Panzertruppen, 14 May 1943, quoted in Jentz, Tiger I and II, 79. 135. Ibid. 136. "Infanterie-Division 'Grossdeutschland' Report, Dated 3 April 1943" in Jentz, Tiger I and II, 74. 137. Guderian, Generalinspekteur der Panzertruppen, 27 April 1943, quoted in Jentz, Tiger I and II, 74. 138. Panzer officer on the staff of the Chief of the Army General Staff, "Comments on the reports from the Tiger Company of Infantry Division 'Grossdeutschland', Dated 11 April 1943" in Jentz, Tiger I and II, 77. 139. Guderian, "Comments of the Experience Report from the 13.Company (Tiger)/Panzer-Regiment 'Grossdeutschland', Dated 14 May 1943" in Jentz, Tiger I and II, 79. 140. See Niklas Zetterling and Anders Frankson, Kursk 1943: A Statistical Analysis (London: Frank Cass, 2000), 134; Schneider, Tigers in Combat I, 156. 141. See Jentz, Panzertruppen: 1943-1945, 74; Schneider, Tigers in Combat I, 267. 142. Schneider, Tigers in Combat I, 156. 143. Jentz, Tiger I and II, 85. 144. Schneider, Tigers in Combat I, 267. 145. See Schneider, Tigers in Combat I, 267-68; Restayn, Tiger I on the Western Front, 138. 146. Karlheinz Munch, Combat History of schwere Panzerjäger Abteilung 653, formerly the Sturmgeschutz Abteilung 197: 1940-1943, trans. Bo H. Friesen. (Winnipeg, Manitoba: J. J. Fedorowicz, 1997), 51. 147. Jentz, Tiger I and II, 85-86. 148. Schneider, Tigers in Combat I, 268. 149. Dunn, Kursk, 55-56. 150. Hermann Breith, General der Panzertruppen, Commander of III Panzerkorps, "Breakthrough of a Panzer Corps Through Deeply Echeloned Russian Defenses During Battle of Kharkov [Kursk], July 1943." MS # D-258, Draft Translation (Washington, D C : CMH, 1947), 2. 151. Dunn, Kursk, 109. 152. Glantz and House, Battle of Kursk, 104. 153. Graf Kageneck, Commander of Heavy Tank Battalion 503 "Daily Report, dated 6 July 1943," in Jentz, Panzertruppen: 1933-1942, 92-93. 154. von Rosen, "ZITADELLE," in Lochmann et al., schwere Panzer-Abteilung 503, 107-8.

NOTES

231

155. Dunn, Kursk, 137. 156. Jentz, Panzertruppen: 1933-1942, 87-91. 157. Glantz and House, Battle of Kursk, 136. 158. The corps' start line was essentially the Donets River southeast of Belgorod. 159. von Rosen, "Zitadelle" in Lochmann et al., schwere Panzer-Abteilung 503, 108-9. 160. See Schneider, Tigers in Combat I, 156-57; Breith, "Breakthrough of a Panzer Corps," M S # D-258, 11. 161. Schneider, Tigers in Combat I, 226. 162. Jentz, Tiger I and II, 90. 163. Glantz and House, Battle of Kursk, 86. 164. Robin Cross, Citadel: The Battle of Kursk (New York: Sarpedon, 1993), 163. 165. Ibid. This is an overly optimistic assessment of the situation given that the Soviets had not committed any operational or strategic reserves at this point in the battle. 166. Schneider, Tigers in Combat I, 268. It is unclear whether the author used the word "front" in this statement to mean an echelon of the Soviet defenses or the Soviet Central Front, which was similar in size to a German Army Group. If the former, destruction of an echelon of the tactical defense was probably possible. If the latter, destruction of the entire Central Front by the commitment of one panzer division is a very optimistic and probably unrealistic assessment. Although the Central Front commander obviously saw penetration of the first defensive echelon as a threat, the Central Front stabilized the situation with operational reserves and did not require reinforcement from any strategic reserves at any time during the battle. 167. Glantz and House, Battle of Kursk, 89. 168. Ibid. 169. Ibid., 93. 170. Ibid., 91. 171. David M. Glantz and Harold S. Orenstein, eds., The Battle for Kursk, 1943: The Soviet General Staff Study (London: Frank Cass, 1999), 114. 172. See Ibid; Glantz and House, Battle of Kursk, 93. 173. Glantz and House, Battle of Kursk, 93. 174. Ibid., 117. 175. Schneider, Tigers in Combat I, 268. 176. Ibid. 177. Ibid. 178. See Ibid., 267-68; Glantz and House, Battle of Kursk, 18. 179. Schneider, Tigers in Combat I, 268. 180. Ibid. 181. Ibid. 182. Ibid., 311. 183. Jentz, Tiger I and II, 90. 184. Ibid. 185. Ibid. 186. Glantz and Orenstein, Battle for Kursk, 1943, 71.

SLEDGEHAMMERS

232 Chapter

4

1. "R.A.C. Liaison Letter," issued April 1943 in Fletcher, Tiger! 28. 2. Robin Cross, Citadel, 234. 3. Jentz, Tiger I and II, 125. 4. Ibid. 5. See Major Gomille, "Report of III.(Tiger) Abteilung/Panzer Regiment Grossdeutschland," dated 31 August 1943; Captain Graf Kageneck, "Experience in Panzer Operations" by Heavy Tank Battalion 503, dated 10 October 1943; Major Withing, "Preliminary Experience Report for Tiger Abteilung 506," dated 30 September 1943; Major Gierka, "Tiger Abteilung 509 Report" [Extract], dated 17 December 1943 in Jentz, Tiger I and II, 124, 128-32, 135-37, 139-40, 142-44, 146, 148. 6. Withing, in Jentz, Tiger I and II, 135-37. 7. Ibid. 8. Ibid. 9. Ibid. 10. Ibid., 137. 11. Ibid. 12. Schneider, Tigers in Combat I, 316. 13. Lange, "Experience Report from Tiger Abteilung 506," dated 15 January 1944 in Jentz, Tiger I and II, 144. 14. Ibid. 15. Schneider, Tigers in Combat I, 159. 16. Alfred Rubbel, "The Operations of Schwere Panzer-Abteilung 503 in Opening the Tscherkassy Pocket," in Lochmann et al., schwere Panzer-Abteilung 503, 120. 17. Ibid., 118. 18. Ibid., 131. 19. Ibid., 118, 122. 20. See Franz Bäke, "The Balabanowka Pocket (25 January-30 January 1944)," in Lochmann et al., schwere Panzer-Abteilung 503, 122; Schneider, Tigers in Combat I, 160. These numbers are only from German sources and as such, are unconfirmed. 21. Schneider, Tigers in Combat I, 160, 226. 22. Rubbel, "Tscherkassy Pocket," 131. 23. Ibid. 24. Douglas E. Nash, Hell's Gate: The Battle of the Cherkassy Pocket, JanuaryFebruary 1944 (Southbury, Conn.: RZM, 2002), 129. 25. Ibid. The overall relief operation was called Operation HOMECOMING by the OKH. 26. Ibid., 158. 27. See Rubbel, "Tscherkassy Pocket," 132; Nash, Hell's Gate, 125. 28. Nash, Hell's Gate, 160. 29. Ibid. 30. Ibid. 31. Franz Bäke, "Tcherkassy (3-20 February 1944) Advance Northeast Toward Medwin (3-9 February 1944)" in Lochmann et al., schwere Panzer-Abteilung 503, 123. 32. Nash, Hell's Gate, 161. 33. Franz Bäke quoted in Nash, Hell's Gate, 166. 34. Nash, Hell's Gate, 162.

NOTES

233

35. Ibid., 163. 36. Rubbel, "Tscherkassy Pocket," 137. 37. Nash, Hell's Gate, 161. 38. Ibid., 166. 39. Ibid., 165. 40. Ibid., 174. 41. Rubbel, "Tscherkassy Pocket," 131. The two panzer divisions within the III Panzer Corps were also extremely weak. The 16th Panzer Division, for example, had 19 tanks and the 17th Panzer Division had 4 tanks operational on 9 February 1944. See remarks by David Glantz, 1985 Art of War Symposium, 153. 42. Five officers were authorized in the battalion headquarters or specialty platoons, and four were authorized in each tank company. 43. Rubbel, "Tscherkassy Pocket," 131. 44. Schneider, Tigers in Combat I, 318. This battalion also took part in the first attack (Operation WANDA). It was, like Heavy Tank Battalion 503, in the III Panzer Corps but was attached to the 16th Panzer Division that trailed the Heavy Panzer Regiment Bäke. 45. Schneider, Tigers in Combat I, 318. 46. Nash, Hell's Gate, 232. 47. Rubbel, "Tscherkassy Pocket," 132. 48. Ibid. 49. See Ibid.; Schneider, Tigers in Combat I, 160-61. A fifth Tiger was damaged but was repairable. 50. Rubbel, "Tscherkassy Pocket," 134. 51. See Ibid.; Schneider, Tigers in Combat I, 161. 52. Rubbel, "Tscherkassy Pocket," 134. 53. Ibid. 54. See Ibid.; Schneider, Tigers in Combat I, 161. Schneider claims 15 while Rubbel states the number as 14. Because Rubbel was present, I have chosen his number. 55. Rubbel, "Tscherkassy Pocket," 134. 56. Nash, Hell's Gate, 268-69. 57. Ibid., 267. 58. See Rubbel, "Tscherkassy Pocket," 135; Nash, Hell's Gate, 271. 59. Rubbel, "Tscherkassy Pocket," 134. 60. Nash, Hell's Gate, 295. 61. Leon Degrelle, Campaign in Russia: The Waffen SS on the Eastern Front (Costa Mesa, Calif.: Institute for Historical Review, 1985), 213-14. 62. Nash, Hell's Gate, 320-21. 63. Rubbel, "Tscherkassy Pocket," 135. 64. Ibid., 136. 65. Schneider, Tigers in Combat I, 160-61. 66. Remarks by David Glantz, 1985 Art of War Symposium, 166. Glantz states that 56,000 German soldiers were trapped inside the pocket, 35,000 attempted to break out on 17 February 1944, of which 30,000 men made it out safely. 67. If half of the kills are attributed to each battalion of Heavy Panzer Regiment Bäke, then Heavy Tank Battalion 503 destroyed 164 enemy tanks, a 7.5-to-l kill ratio.

234

SLEDGEHAMMERS

68. Schneider, Tigers in Combat I, 375. 69. Ibid., 380. 70. Ibid., 236, 242. 71. Kleine and Kuhn, Tiger, 247. 72. See Jentz, Tiger I and II, 93; Schneider, Tigers in Combat I, 236, 375. 73. Jentz, Tiger I and II, 93. 74. See Kleine and Kuhn, Tiger, 247; Schneider, Tigers in Combat I, 236,375; Martin Schmidt, "Employment of Panzer Units in Central Italy in 1944, and Peculiarities Thereof." MS #D-204. (Washington, D.C.: CMH, 1947), 4. 75. Schneider, Tigers in Combat I, 236, 375. 76. Hans Bahr, "The 2./Schwere Panzer-Abteilung 508," in Kurt Hirlinger, ed. The Combat History of schwere Panzer-Abteilung 508: In Action in Italy with the Tiger I (Winnipeg, Manitoba: J. J. Fedorowicz, 2001), trans. David Johnston, 34. 77. Erich Amann, quoted in Hans Bahr, "2./s.P-Abt. 508," 34. 78. Hans Bahr, "2./s.P-Abt. 508," 34. 79. Schneider, Tigers in Combat I, 375-76. 80. Kleine and Kuhn, Tiger, 247. 81. Curt Riegel, "The Panzerwerkstatt-Kompanie (Tank Maintenance Company)," in Hirlinger, schwere Panzer-Abteilung 508, 142. 82. Ibid. 83. Schneider, Tigers in Combat I, 376. 84. "Report on activities of s.Pz.-Abt. 508 between 23 and 25 May 1944 in the area of Cisternia" in Jentz, Tiger I and II, 97-98. 85. See Ibid., 98; for a good description of the U.S. dispositions and the larger picture involving the commitment of Heavy Tank Battalion 508 see Ernest F. Fisher, Jr., Cassino to the Alps, United States Army in World War II, The Mediterranean Theater of Operations (Washington, D.C.: CMH, 1977), 137. 86. GMDS by a combined British, Canadian, and U.S. Staff, The German Operation at Anzio: A Study of the German Operations at Anzio Beachhead from 22 Jan 44 to 31 May 44 (Camp Ritchie, Md.: German Military Documents Section, Military Intelligence Division, War Department, 9 April 1946), 107. 87. "Report of Activities of 3.Kompanie/schwere Panzer-Abteilung 508 between 23-25 May 1944," in Jentz, Tiger I and II, 97-98. 88. Schneider, Tigers in Combat I, 408. 89. Ibid., 377. 90. Restayn, Tiger I on the Western Front, 81. 91. AFV(T) G-H/JB, Technical Branch, "Who Killed Tiger?" dated August 1944 in Fletcher, Tiger! 215-18. 92. Ibid., 216. 93. Ibid., 236. 94. Ibid., 236-37, 263. 95. Fisher, 261. 96. George F. Howe, The Battle History of the 1st Armored Division "Old Ironsides" (Washington, D.C.: Combat Forces, 1954), 354. 97. Ibid., 354, 356. Both Company A and D were detached from the division during this operation.

NOTES

235

98. Fisher, 262. 99. Schneider, Tigers in Combat I, 236-37. 100. See Ibid.; for an excellent description of a typical encounter between U.S. forces and German forces, supported by Tigers, during this operation, see Howe, 1st Armored Division, 357-60. 101. Schneider, Tigers in Combat I, 377. 102. Ibid., 236-37, 376-77. From 23 May 1944 to 1 July 1944 Heavy Tank Battalion 508 lost 36 and Heavy Tank Battalion 504 lost 28 Tigers. 103. Ibid., 379, 408. 104. Ibid., 379. 105. Ibid., 378. 106. See Ibid., 381, 408; Restayn, Tiger I on the Western Front, 60; GMDS, The German Operation at Anzio, 64, 68, 107. 107. Schneider, Tigers in Combat I, 408. 108. Ibid., 263. 109. Ibid. 110. Ibid. 111. Jentz, Tiger I and II, 98-99. 112. This includes Heavy Tank Battalion 501 through 509 and 3d Battalion, Panzer Regiment Grossdeutschland. Chapter 5 1. Hans-Joachim Schwaner, Battalion Commander, "After Action Report on the Employment of the 502d Heavy Panzer Battalion in the 16th Army Sector from 4 July to 17 August 1944," dated 20 August 1944 in Otto Carius, Tigers in the Mud, (Winnipeg, Manitoba: J. J. Fedorowicz, 1992), 240. 2. Jentz, Panzertruppen: 1943-1945, 204-5. 3. Schneider, Tigers in Combat II, 255, 327. 4. Schneider, Tigers in Combat I, 164, 443. 5. Operation OVERLORD is used here, but includes subsequent operations following the cross-channel attack until the breakout from Normandy. 6. Schneider, Tigers in Combat I, 45, 276, 319-20. Heavy Tank Battalion 501 was totally destroyed, Heavy Tank Battalion 505 transported 11 Tigers back to factories in Germany and Heavy Tank Battalion 506 handed its 6 remaining Tigers over to Heavy Tank Battalion 507. 7. See Schneider, Tigers in Combat I, 165.; idem, Tigers in Combat II, 260, 262, 333; Restayn, Tiger I on the Western Front, 88. 8. Overwatch is a basic principle of mounted movement where an element occupies a position, usually stationary, that offers cover and concealment, good observation, and clear fields of fire to support another element that moves under the "protection" of the overwatch element. 9. Generalinspekteur der Panzertruppen, Comments on "Report From a Tiger Company," Nachrichtenblatt der Panzertruppen, September 1944, in Jentz, Tiger I and II, 148-52. 10. See Curtis S. King, "Operation BAGRATION: A Soviet Victory." Military Review (April 1994): 89-90; Paul Adair, Hitler's Greatest Defeat: The Collapse of Army Group

SLEDGEHAMMERS

236

Centre, June 1944 (London: Arms and Armour, 1998), 56-61, 177-80; William M. Connor, Analysis of Deep Attack Operations: Operation BAGRATION, Belorussia, 22 June-29 August 1944 (Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: Combat Studies Institute, March 1987), 18-19. Connor states that at the beginning of the Soviet attack there may have been as few as 200 tanks and assault guns in all of Army Group Center. Although he says that the number may be double that, it is nothing compared to the 4,050 tanks and assault guns the Soviets fielded against them. Glantz also gives the number as 200 tanks/assault guns for the Germans, making the force ratio, initially at least, 20 to 1. 11. Jentz, Panzertruppen: 1943-1945, 205. 12. Ibid. 13. Schneider, Tigers in Combat I, 45. 14. See Ibid., 45; Steve Zaloga, Bagration 1944: The Destruction of Army Group Centre (Hong Kong: Osprey, 1996), 54-55. 15. Schneider, Tigers in Combat 1, 45. 16. Ibid., 45. 17. Zaloga, Bagration,

59.

18. Ibid. 19. See Ibid; Schneider, Tigers in Combat I, 275. 20. Schneider, Tigers in Combat I, 275. 21. Ibid. 22. Ibid. 23. See Ibid., 276, 311; Zaloga, BAGRATION, 69. 24. Schneider, Tigers in Combat I, 275. 25. See Ibid., 351; Zaloga, Bagration, 46-47. 26. Schneider, Tigers in Combat I, 352. 27. Ibid. 28. Ibid., 351-52, 372. 29. Zaloga, Bagration, 72-73. 30. Werner Haupt, Army Group North: The Wehrmacht in Russia, 1941-1945. (Atglen, Pa.: Schiffer, 1997), 228. 31. Ibid., 231. 32. Hans-Joachim Schwaner, Heavy Tank Battalion 502 Battalion Commander. "After Action Report on the Employment of the 502d Heavy Panzer Battalion in the 16th Army sector from 4 July to 17 August 1944," in Carius, Tigers in the Mud, 223. The divisions came primarily from the 18th Army sector and included several assault gun brigades and battalions, Flak and heavy artillery battalions, as well as Heavy Tank Battalion 502. 33. Ibid.; Schneider, Tigers in Combat I, 92. 34. Schwaner, "AAR from 4 July to 17 August 1944," in Carius, Tigers in the Mud, 224. 35. Ibid. 36. Ibid., 224-25. 37. Ibid., 225. The enemy forces were believed to be in regimental strength and were located in Garniai (two kilometers south of Daugailiai). 38. Ibid. 39. Ibid., 226.

NOTES

237

40. Ibid., 228. The length of the roadmarch was not the shortest route because the shortest route contained bridges incapable of supporting Tigers. 41. Ibid.; Schneider, Tigers in Combat I, 92. 42. Schwaner, "AAR from 4 July to 17 August 1944," 234. 43. Ibid., 235. Carius personally destroyed 10 of the 17. Three Soviet tanks managed to escape to the east. Carius received the Oak Leaves to the Knight's Cross for his actions this day. 44. Ibid., 237. 45. This action was northwest of Dünaburg where the Düna River flows southeast to northwest instead of straight east to west. 46. Schwaner, "AAR from 4 July to 17 August 1944," 243. 47. Schneider, Tigers in Combat I, 164-65. 48. Rubbel, "The Battalion Receives the Königstiger (King Tiger)" in Lochmann et al., schwere Panzer-Abteilung 503, 234. 49. Late in August elements of Heavy Tank Battalion 503 did defend against U.S. forces. 50. L. F. Ellis, G. R. G. Allen, A. E. Warhurst, and James Robb, Victory in the West: The Battle of Normandy. History of the Second World War, United Kingdom Military Series, vol. I (London: HMSO, 1962), 546. 51. Ibid. Further research developed a discarding sabot (DS) round that was issued later in the war. This round had a tungsten core enclosed in a light metal casing or 'sabot' that was discarded as the projectile left the gun and resulted in greatly increased velocity and penetration ability. 52. Additionally, the Tiger had a lower probability of making a hit than the 17pounder at that range. 53. A British regiment was a U.S.-battalion-sized unit. Companies were called squadrons and platoons were called troops. 54. Ellis, Victory in the West, 541. 55. See Constance McLaughlin Green, Harry C. Thomson, and Peter C. Roots, "The Search for Increased Fire Power: Ammunition" in The Ordnance Department: Planning Munitions for War, in United States Army in World War II, The Technical Services (Washington, D.C.: CMH, 1955), 355-61. 56. Agte, Michael Wittmann, 313-16. 57. Schneider, Tigers in Combat II, 256. 58. Agte, Michael Wittmann, 317-18. 59. See Ibid., 318; Daniel Taylor, Villers-Bocage: Through the Lens of a German War Photographer (London: Battle of Britain, 1999), 18. Taylor states that Möbius's 1st Company had ten Tigers. The discrepancy in numbers could be the difference between what was available in the morning and what was committed to the battle later in the day. Taylor's account of the Battle of Villers-Bocage is by far the most comprehensive and thoroughly researched of all available publications. 60. Taylor, Villers-Bocage, 9. This operation was codenamed Operation PERCH. 61. Michael Wittmann, quoted in Agte, Michael Wittmann, 318. 62. Taylor, Villers-Bocage, 9. 63. Agte, Michael Wittmann, 319. 64. Taylor, Villers-Bocage, 17.

238

SLEDGEHAMMERS

6 5 . Ibid., 16. 6 6 . Ibid., 3 8 . 6 7 . Ibid., 7 6 . Several of these tanks were light reconnaissance tanks (Stuarts) that were no match for a Tiger and one was an artillery observer's tank. This Cromwell tank had the gun removed in order to provide room for more radios. In order for it to "blend in" with other tanks so as not to highlight itself as a high priority target, it had a "fake" wooden gun tube installed. 6 8 . See Taylor, Villers-Bocage, 7 6 ; Ellis et al., Victory in the West, 2 5 4 . The British official history lists their total losses as 25 tanks, 14 armored trucks, and 14 Bren carriers. 6 9 . Michael Reynolds, Steel Inferno: 1st SS Panzer Corps in Normandy (New York: Dell, 1 9 9 7 ) , 1 2 6 .

7 0 . Agte, Michael Wittmann, 3 2 5 - 2 6 . 7 1 . Ellis et al., Victory in the West, 2 5 4 - 5 5 . 7 2 . See Taylor, Villers-Bocage, 7 6 ; Agte, Michael Wittmann, 3 2 4 ; Schneider, Tigers in Combat II, 2 5 6 - 5 7 . This records for this engagement are unclear in terms of Tiger losses. Taylor claims that the Germans lost 5 Tigers while Schneider claims only 3. Agte provides the most extensive account that identifies losses by tank commander. He claims the Germans lost 6 Tigers in the town of Villers-Bocage and another 1 outside of the town. Agte could, however, be listing the total number destroyed and disabled instead of delineating the Tigers totally destroyed. 7 3 . Taylor, Villers-Bocage, 19. Wittmann's own Tiger was still en route to Normandy and he actually used Unterscharführer Kurt Sowa's Tiger. 7 4 . See Taylor, Villers-Bocage, 5 6 ; Schneider, Tigers in Combat II, 2 5 6 - 5 7 ; Agte, Michael Wittmann, 3 2 4 . 7 5 . See Taylor, Villers-Bocage, 7 6 ; Schneider, Tigers in Combat II, 2 5 6 . 7 6 . Agte, Michael Wittmann, 3 2 6 . 7 7 . If only six Tigers from Möbius's company entered the town, then every single Tiger that entered the town was damaged or destroyed. 7 8 . Taylor, Villers-Bocage, 8 3 . The British reserve crews were called Left Out of Battle, or LOB, crews. 7 9 . Jentz, Panzertruppen: 1933-1942, 1 1 0 . 8 0 . Guderian, Tactical Analysis of the Situation in Normandy, to Adolf Hitler, 19 June 1 9 4 4 , in Jentz, Tiger I and II, 1 7 7 , 1 8 0 - 8 2 . 8 1 . Guderian, Situation Report Presentation to Adolf Hitler, 28 June 1 9 4 4 , in Jentz, Panzertruppen: 1933-1942, 1 8 2 . 8 2 . von Rosen, "Operation GOODWOOD 18 July 1 9 4 4 : The Darkest Day for schwere Panzer-Abteilung 5 0 3 , " in Lochmann et al., The Combat History of schwere PanzerAbteilung 503, 2 3 9 . 8 3 . Ellis et a l , Victory in the West, 3 3 6 . 8 4 . See Restayn, Tiger I on the Western Front, 3 4 ; Schneider, Tigers in Combat I, 1 6 4 - 6 5 ; von Rosen, "Operation GOODWOOD," in schwere Panzer-Abteilung 503, 239-42.

8 5 . See Ellis et al., Victory in the West, 3 3 7 ; von Rosen, "Operation GOODWOOD," in schwere Panzer-Abteilung 503, 2 3 9 .

NOTES

239

86. See Schneider, Tigers in Combat I, 164; von Rosen, "Operation GOODWOOD," in schwere Panzer-Abteilung 503, 239. The 3d Company was still equipped with the Tiger I, but the 1st Company had the King Tiger/Tiger II at this time. 87. von Rosen, "Operation GOODWOOD," in schwere Panzer-Abteilung 503, 239. 88. Ibid., 241. 89. Ibid. 90. See Ellis et al., Victory in the West, 340-41; von Rosen, "Operation GOODWOOD," in schwere Panzer-Abteilung 503, 241; Hans von Luck, Panzer Commander: The Memoirs of Colonel Hans von Luck (New York: Dell, 1989), 193-99. Von Luck was the commander of the 21st Panzer Division and literally forced the Luftwaffe captain in charge of the battery to begin engaging the British tanks after he refused because his "concern is enemy planes, fighting tanks is your job." Von Luck drew his pistol, aimed it at the captain and said, "Either you're a dead man or you can earn yourself a medal." The Luftwaffe captain obviously chose the latter. 91. von Rosen, "Operation GOODWOOD," in schwere Panzer-Abteilung 503, 241. 92. Ibid. 93. Four tanks reportedly made it all the way to the village of Demouville. Taking and holding this town would have been a huge undertaking as it was on the primary route of British attack. This would have stopped the British attack from advancing and cut off any British forces that had already passed by and continued toward Cagny. See von Rosen, "Operation GOODWOOD," in schwere Panzer-Abteilung 503, 242. 94. See von Rosen, "Operation GOODWOOD," in schwere Panzer-Abteilung 503, 242; Schneider, Tigers in Combat I, 164-65. 95. See "The Gorman Story" and "The Thaysen Story" in schwere Panzer-Abteilung 503, 242-43. The British account has the Sherman ramming the Tiger and the German account has the King Tiger inadvertently backing into the Sherman. 96. von Rosen, "Operation GOODWOOD," in schwere Panzer-Abteilung 503, 241. 97. Ibid. 98. Schneider, Tigers in Combat II, 258. 99. Agte, Michael Wittmann, 404. 100. See Schneider, Tigers in Combat II, 258; Agte, Michael Wittmann, 404. 101. British sources give high credit to Tigers, usually equating their "suffered heavy losses" with "Tigers and 88s." See Ellis et al., Victory in the West, 340-43, 347. 102. Ellis et al., Victory in the West, 345. 103. von Luck, 197. The 21st Panzer Division commander states that "In the extensive cornfields to the north of the village stood at least 40 British tanks, on fire or shot up. I saw how the tanks that had already crossed the main road were slowly rolling back." He fails to provide an exact time, but based upon the remainder of his narrative, this was probably still early in the afternoon. Schneider, Tigers in Combat I, 165, claims that Heavy Tank Battalion 503 destroyed 40 British tanks on 18 July 1944. 104. Ellis et al., Victory in the West, 317. 105. Ibid. 106. Will Fey, Armor Battles of the Waffen SS, 1943-45 (Panzerkampf), trans. Harri Henschler. (Winnipeg, Manitoba: J. J. Fedorowicz, 1990), 148.

240

SLEDGEHAMMERS

107. Schneider, Tigers in Combat II, 328-29. 108. Ibid. 109. Ellis et al., Victory in the West, 419. 110. Ibid., 420. The U.S. self-propelled guns were known as the "Priest" because of the offset sponson that resembled a pulpit. The Canadians removed the guns as well as the seats and ammunition bins and welded steel sheets across the openings in the front of the vehicle. The troops then referred to these vehicles as "unfrocked priests" or "holy rollers." 111. Ibid. 112. Ibid. 113. Ibid. 114. Kurt Meyer, Grenadiers (Winnipeg, Manitoba: J. J. Fedorowicz, 1994), Translated by Michael Mende, 157-58. After seeing German soldiers from the 89th Infantry Division retreating along the Caen-Falaise road, he wrote, "I suddenly realize that the fate of Falaise and the safety of both [German] armies depends on my decision." 115. Ibid., 158. 116. Agte, Michael Wittmann, 406, 423. 117. See Schneider, Tigers in Combat II, 259; Agte, Michael Wittmann, 423. Agte states that the number was eight and not ten. 118. Agte, Michael Wittmann, 401. 119. Ibid., 423-33. First Lieutenant Heurich never commanded a tank company and this was his first combat action. 120. Ibid., 423. 121. Meyer, 159. 122. Ken Tout, A Fine Night for Tanks: The Road to Falaise (Gloucestershire, UK: Sutton), 133. 123. Agte, Michael Wittmann, 424. 124. Ibid.; Tout, Fine Night for Tanks, 129. 125. Tout, Fine Night for Tanks, 129. Tout, who was present at this battle, stated "If there was a flaw in the German dispositions, it must have been the failure to integrate fully a tiny but potentially deadly Tiger force with other counterattacking Panthers and Mark IVs, supported by Panzergrenadiers." He concludes his assessment by saying "had they been used in a more elusive and better supported role the delay to the Allies could have been far worse." 126. Agte, Michael Wittmann, 424. 127. Tout, Fine Night for Tanks, 130. 128. See Ibid., 130; Taylor, Villers-Bocage, 6. This number includes three tank companies of 19 tanks each in each regiment as well as 4 tanks in the Headquarters element and 11 Stuarts in the reconnaissance troop. 129. Tout, Fine Night for Tanks, 130. Tout puts the number of Fireflys at 34, but if each platoon had one firefly, the number would be 36. 130. For a synopsis see Tout, Fine Night for Tanks, 131. 131. Ibid., 89. 132. Ibid.

NOTES

241

133. See Tout, Fine Night for Tanks, 89; Agte, Michael Wittmann, 424. According to Tout, the gunner of this Firefly, Trooper Joe Ekirts, is definitely credited with three Tigers and another tank at the range of 1,200 yards (1,100 meters). Agte states that four of the six Tigers traveling on the east side of the road were destroyed (Dollinger's Wittmann's, Iriohn's, and Kisters' Tigers were destroyed. Blase and the new company commander Heurich survived). The fifth Tiger destroyed during this attack was traveling on the west side of the road (Hoflinger's Tiger was destroyed and von Westernhagen survived). 134. Tout, Fine Night for Tanks, 102. Altogether, this one U.S.-battalion-sized unit claimed the destruction of five Tigers, four Panthers, six Panzer IVs, and five assault guns. This accounted for 20 of the fewer than 50 armored vehicles included in the German counterattack. In doing so, they lost 16 tanks. 135. The destruction of the Tigers can only be credited to the gunner because the original tank commander, Sergeant Gordon, was injured by return fire after the first Tiger was destroyed and Lieutenant lames took over during the engagement and destruction of the final two Tigers. 136. Tout, Fine Night for Tanks, 164. 137. See Schneider, Tigers in Combat II, 259; Meyer, 160; Ellis et al., Victory in the West, 419. The British official history states that only six were destroyed. 138. Schneider, Tigers in Combat II, 259. 139. Ibid. 140. Agte, Michael Wittmann, 432. SS Captain Dr. Rabe wrote, "Toward evening I drove to Major General Kraemer [Chief of Staff of the 1st SS Panzer Corps] and reported the day's events to him. As I was the battalion's senior serving officer he instructed me to lead back the remnants of the battalion and placed me under Wunsche's command." 141. See Meyer, 163; Schneider, Tigers in Combat II, 259. 142. See Schneider, Tigers in Combat I, 164-65, 226-27; idem, Tigers in Combat II, 259-61, 320, 332-33, 365. 143. Schneider, Tigers in Combat I, 164-65, 226-27'. 144. Schneider, Tigers in Combat II, 259-61, 320, 332-33, 365. 145. Ibid., 365. 146. Ibid., 259-61, 320, 332-33, 365. 147. Restayn, Tiger I on the Western Front, 34, 88, 116. 148. Normandy: SS-Heavy Tank Battalions 501 and 503, Heavy Tank Battalion 503. Italy: Heavy Tank Battalions 504 and 508. 149. Army Group North: Heavy Tank Battalions 502 and 510, and 3d Battalion, Panzer Regiment Grossdeutschland. Poland: Heavy Tank Battalion 507 in the north and Heavy Tank Battalion 509 in the south. 150. Ohdruf: Heavy Tank Battalions 501. 505, and 506. 151. The fact that three heavy tank battalions were operating in East Prussia and Lithuania was probably due to the emphasis on protecting German territory. 152. Schneider, Tigers in Combat I, 45. 153. Ibid., 276. 154. Ibid., 319-20.

242

SLEDGEHAMMERS

155. Ibid., 276. 156. See Ibid., 45; "The Royal Opponent", 2002, unpublished manuscript, based upon article in Tankomaster, No. 6, 1999. 157. Schneider, Tigers in Combat I, 276. 158. Ibid., 45. 159. "The Royal Opponent," 2. 160. See Ibid., 3; Lieutenant Colonel Shapar, 71st Independent Guards Heavy Tank Regiment Commander, Report about Operations of the 71st Independent Guards Heavy Tank Regiment from 14 July to 31 August 1944, 1. 161. "The Royal Opponent," 6. 162. Ibid., 6. Sources indicate that this King Tiger had only operated a total of 444 kilometers. 163. Shapar, Operations of the 71st Independent Guards Heavy Tank Regiment, 1. 164. "The Royal Opponent," 3. 165. Shapar, Operations of the 71st Independent Guards Heavy Tank Regiment, 2. 166. Ibid. 167. Schneider, Tigers in Combat I, 46. 168. "Was the Tiger Really 'King': Testing the King Tiger at Kubinka," 2002, unpublished manuscript, based upon article in Tankomaster, No. 6, 1999, translated by Douglas Rauber, 1. 169. Ibid. 170. Ibid. 171. Ibid., 2.

Chapter 6 1. The Combat History of schwere Panzer-Abteilung 507: In Action in the East and West with the Tiger I and II, 116. 2. See Schneider, Tigers in Combat I, 166; von Rosen, "Employment in Hungary" in Lochmann et al., schwere Panzer-Abteilung 503, 282. 3. Schneider, Tigers in Combat I, 166. 4. von Rosen, "Employment in Hungary," 282. 5. The pro-Nazi elements were composed of some pro-German elements in the Hungarian Army and units of the Arrow-Cross, a Hungarian Fascist organization. The other primary German unit involved in overthrowing Admiral Horthy was the 8th SSCavalry Division "Florian Geyer." 6. See von Rosen, "Employment in Hungary," and Hauptmann Fromme, "After Action Report dated 25 November 1944," in Lochmann et al., schwere PanzerAbteilung 503, 284, 300. 7. von Rosen, "Employment in Hungary," 284. 8. Ibid. 9. Ibid. 10. Ibid. 11. During the Battle of the Bulge, SS-Heavy Tank Battalion 501 penetrated 60 kilometers on 17 and 18 December 1944, although they did not lead the attack, but formed the trail element of Combat Group Peiper and followed as best they could.

NOTES

243

12. von Senger und Etterlin, quoted in Lochmann et al., schwere Panzer-Abteilung 503, 283. 13. Fromme, "After Action Report dated 25 November 1944," in Lochmann et al., schwere Panzer-Abteilung 503, 300-301. 14. von Rosen, "Employment in Hungary," 285. 15. Schneider, Tigers in Combat I, 167. 16. Ibid. 17. Ibid. 18. For an overview of these operations, see Remarks by Glantz, 1985 Art of War Symposium, 155, 160. 19. Schneider, Tigers in Combat I, 168. 20. von Rosen, "Employment in Hungary," 292. 21. For an overview of these operations, see Remarks by Glantz, 1985 Art of War Symposium, 167, 170, 175. 22. Schneider, Tigers in Combat I, 168. 23. von Rosen, "Employment in Hungary," 293. 24. Schneider, Tigers in Combat I, 168-69. 25. See Schneider, Tigers in Combat II, 263; Agte, Michael Wittmann, 505-7. 26. Michael Reynolds, Men of Steel, I SS Panzer Corps: The Ardennes and Eastern Front 1944-45 (New York: Sarpedon, 1999), 42-43, 48. 27. See Agte, Michael Wittmann, 507; Parker, "German Tiger Tanks," 54; Kleine and Kuhn, Tiger, 219. 28. Agte, Michael Wittmann, 506. 29. Ibid., 508. 30. Ibid., 506. 31. See Ibid., 508; Schneider, Tigers in Combat II, 263. 32. Schneider, Tigers in Combat II, 263-65. It was again "destroyed" by a Sherman of the 740th (U.S.) Tank Battalion on 25 December 1944. 33. Agte, Michael Wittmann, 508-9. The 2d and 3d Companies, as well as the battalion command element, followed Combat Group Peiper's route. 1st Company, starting in the trail of the battalion, ended up taking a more southerly route. 34. See Agte, Michael Wittmann, 509-11; Hugh M. Cole, The Ardennes: Battle of the Bulge, United States Army in World War II, The European Theater of Operations (Washington, D C : CMH, 1965), 265-69. 35. Agte, Michael Wittmann, 510. 36. Ibid. 37. Ibid. SS-Unterscharführer Wortmann says that two vehicles emptied their tanks to supply the other two so that the ones with fuel could tow the ones without fuel. 38. Schneider, Tigers in Combat I, 321. 39. See Schneider, Tigers in Combat I, 321; Cole, The Ardennes, 162. 40. See Schneider, Tigers in Combat I, 321; Cole, The Ardennes, 404-5. 41. Cole, The Ardennes, 404-5. 42. See Schneider, Tigers in Combat I, 321-22, 344; idem, Tigers in Combat II, 263-65, 320. 43. Schneider, Tigers in Combat I, 321-22, 344. 44. Schneider, Tigers in Combat II, 263-65, 320.

244

SLEDGeHAMMERS

45. Schneider, Tigers in Combat I, 322. 46. See Ibid., 321-22, 344; idem, Tigers in Combat II, 263-65, 320. 47. Rubbel, "The End of Separate Unit Status: Incorporation into Panzer-Korps 'Feldherrnhalle'," in Lochmann et al., schwere Panzer-Abteilung 503, 309. 48. The Combat History of schwere Panzer-Abteilung 503 states that they did not want to refer to themselves as FHH because of the name's Nazi implications. Another reason may have been that they were justifiably proud of their accomplishments as Heavy Tank Battalion 503 and were reluctant to change unit designations. See Rubbel, "The End of Separate Unit Status: Incorporation into Panzer-Korps 'Feldherrnhalle" in Lochmann et al., schwere Panzer-Abteilung 503, 309. 49. The other army heavy tank battalion assigned to a corps was 3d Battalion, Panzer Regiment Grossdeutschland, which was actually assigned down to the divisional level. All three Waffen SS heavy tank battalions were assigned directly to a corps HQ. 50. von Rosen, "Employment in Hungary," 282. 51. Remarks by Glantz, 1985 Art of War Symposium, 670-708. 52. Ibid., 670-718. A German counteroffensive—which could be viewed as a limited fourth German offensive—occurred 3-18 February. 53. Ibid., 670-84. 54. See Ibid; Schneider, Tigers in Combat I, 169. 55. Dr. Nordewin von Diest-Koerber, "Diary Entries from 14 December 1944 to May 1945 as Commander of schwere Panzer-Abteilung 503," in Lochmann et al., schwere Panzer-Abteilung 503, 312. 56. See Schneider, Tigers in Combat I, 169; von Rosen, "Employment in Hungary," 295. 57. Remarks by Glantz, 1985 Art of War Symposium, 686-92. 58. Ibid., 688-89. 59. See Remarks by Glantz, 1985 Art of War Symposium, 686-92; Schneider, Tigers in Combat I, 169; von Diest-Koerber, "Diary Entries," 313; and von Rosen, "Employment in Hungary," 296-97. 60. See Schneider, Tigers in Combat I, 169; von Diest-Korber, "Diary Entries," 313-14; and von Rosen, "Employment in Hungary," 296-97. 61. Ibid. 62. von Rosen, "Employment in Hungary," 296-97. 63. Ibid. 64. Remarks by Glantz, 1985 Art of War Symposium, 684, 686, 717-18. The Germans were able to achieve a superiority in armor of 1.5:1 in the offensive sectors. The overall strength, in personnel, of Army Group South was less than 450,000 while the combined strength of the 2d and 3d Ukrainian Fronts was about 850,000 to 900,000. In the attack sectors the Soviets had about 200,000 troops while the combined strength of the IV SS Panzer Corps, the III Panzer Corps, and the 1st Cavalry Corps was about 100,000. 65. von Rosen, "Employment in Hungary," 296-97. 66. von Diest-Korber, "Diary Entries," 313. 67. See von Diest-Korber, "Diary Entries," 314; and von Rosen, "Employment in Hungary," 297. The airplanes were destroyed attempting to take off from a forward Soviet airfield that the battalion overran.

245

NOTES

68. See von Diest-Korber, "Diary Entries," 314; von Rosen, "Employment in Hungary," 297; and Schneider, Tigers in Combat I, 169. 69. Schneider, Tigers in Combat I, 417. 70. Ibid. 71. Remarks by Glantz, 1985 Art of War Symposium, 684. 72. Ibid. 73. Kleine and Kuhn, Tiger, 208. 74. Ibid. 75. For example, Heavy Tank Battalion 503 during Operation Zitadelle and during their first employment in Hungary, and Heavy Tank Battalion 501 during Operation

Wacht am

Rhein.

76. For example Heavy Tank Battalion 505 during Operation Zitadelle; SS-Heavy Tank Battalion 501 and Heavy Tank Battalion 503 (FHH) during Operation SÜDWIND; Heavy Tank Battalion 506 during Operation Wacht am Rhein, and SS-Heavy Tank Battalion 501 and Heavy Tank Battalion 509 during Operation Frühlingserwachen. 77. Kleine and Kuhn, Tiger, 208. 78. It is unfortunate that there is no mention made of the other platoons in the battalion (such as the antiaircraft platoon, the scout and engineer Platoon, and so on) and what their actions were during the attack. 79. Schneider, Tigers in Combat I, 417. 80. Kleine and Kuhn, Tiger, 208. 81. Schneider, Tigers in Combat I, 417. 82. Kleine and Kuhn, Tiger, 208. 83. Ibid. 84. Schneider, Tigers in Combat I, 417. 85. Because the German attack continued to make substantial progress past the Sarviz Canal, it is apparent that other vehicles were able to ford the canal and continue the attack. On 19 January 1945, German engineers built a bridge across the Sarviz, but it was not strong enough for the King Tigers. Engineers finally made a ford site reinforced with railroad ties for the King Tigers to cross. 86. See Schneider, Tigers in Combat I, 418; remarks by Glantz, 1985 Art of War Symposium, 708; Kleine and Kuhn, Tiger, 209-10. 87. See Schneider, Tigers in Combat I, 418; Kleine and Kuhn, Tiger, 209-10. The Soviet tank brigade was either from the 23d Tank Corps, the 1st Guards Mechanized Corps, or the 5th Guards Mechanized Corps. These Soviet tank losses, like literally all on the Eastern Front, have not been verified by Soviet sources. A careful examination of the German account reveals that the four King Tigers probably did not "own the battlefield" after their successful defense and thus did not themselves check out each destroyed Soviet tank to confirm that it was totally destroyed. Given the fact that elements of three Soviet corps did attack in this area on 27 January 1945, however, the number of destroyed Soviet tanks is totally plausible. 88. Schneider, Tigers in Combat I, 418. 89. Reynolds, Men of Steel, 187. 90. Ibid. 91. von Rosen, "Employment in Hungary," 299. 92. See Reynolds, Men of Steel, 190; Schneider, Tigers in Combat II, 265.

246

SLEDGEHAMMERS

93. See von Rosen, "Employment in Hungary," 299; Schneider, Tigers in Combat I, 170. 94. von Rosen, "Employment in Hungary," 299. 95. Ibid. 96. See Ralf Tiemann, The Leibstandarte, vol. IV/2. Translated by Frederick Steinhardt (Winnipeg, Manitoba: J. J. Fedorowicz, 1998), 188; Schneider, Tigers in Combat II, 265. 97. von Rosen, "Employment in Hungary," 299. 98. See Ibid., 300; Schneider, Tigers in Combat I, 171. 99. Ibid. 100. Reynolds, Men of Steel, 197. 101. Ibid., 188. 102. Schneider, Tigers in Combat II, 266. 103. Ibid. 104. Schneider, Tigers in Combat I, 419. 105. Schneider, Tigers in Combat II, 266. 106. Ibid., 267. 107. Schneider, Tigers in Combat I, 419. 108. Ibid. 109. Ibid., 353-54. Prior to the battle, Heavy Tank Battalion 501 was officially renamed Heavy Tank Battalion 424 to confuse Soviet intelligence. 110. See Schneider, Tigers in Combat I, 45-46; Kleine and Kuhn, Tiger, 145. 111. Major Krebs, "General Staff Officer of the 17th Panzer Division, Situation Evaluation," in 1986 Art of War Symposium, David Glantz, Chairman (Washington, D.C.: Center for Land Warfare, U.S. Army War College, 1986), 610-15. 112. See Ibid; Schneider, Tigers in Combat I, 45-46. 113. Ibid. 114. See Ibid., 46; Kleine and Kuhn, Tiger, 145; Russ Schneider, Götterdämmerung 1945: Germany's Last Stand in the East (Philomont, Va.: Eastern Front Warfield, 1998), 47. Estimates from sources vary from between 20 and 27, although most state that 27 were destroyed. Schneider states that this battalion destroyed a further 50 to 60 Soviet tanks fighting in and around Lissow. 115. Kleine and Kuhn, Tiger, 145. 116. See Ibid; Schneider, Tigers in Combat I, 46. 117. Schneider, Tigers in Combat I, 354. 118. Ibid. 119. Ibid., 355. 120. Ibid., 446. As late as 10 April 1945, Heavy Tank Battalion 510 still had 13 operational Tigers in Kurland. 121. Schneider, Tigers in Combat II, 370-71. 122. Ibid., 375.

Chapter 7 1. Paul Carrel, Foxes of the Desert (New York: Bantam Dell, 1967), 318; quoted in Charles Whiting, Kasserine, 174.

NOTES

247

2. Alfred Rubbel. "Technical Services and Supply/Logistics" in Lochmann et al., schwere Panzer-Abteilung 503, 27. 3. Heavy Tank Battalion 505's attack as part of the northern pincer of Operation Zitadelle; SS-Heavy Tank Battalion 501 and Heavy Tank Battalion 503's attacks during Operation SÜDWIND; and Heavy Tank Battalion 509's attack during Operation Frühlingserwachen were all successful at penetrating the first or second echelons of the Soviet defenses. 4. In all the books listed in the bibliography, only two mention a mine roller for the Tiger as a counter to the increased use of mines. Only one of these is from a German source. Otto Carius mentions a mine roller, but states that they were not used, probably because of the swampy terrain that Heavy Tank Battalion 502 operated in as part of Army Group North. The Soviet General Staff also mentions Tiger tanks mounting mine rollers during the Battle of Kursk. In terms of antitank guns, Joachim Peiper provides good insight when he stated, "by all rights the destruction of a dug-in antitank gun should have been valued higher than the destruction of an enemy tank." See Kleine and Kuhn, Tiger, 219. 5. Joachim Peiper endorsed including heavy tank companies in the panzer regiment of a panzer division, "I am of the opinion that the Tiger would have fared better if the army had not formed independent battalions, but rather incorporated an organic heavy company in every regiment. The Tigers would then have been part of a firm structure and their employment in conjunction with the light tanks would have been more flexible and tactically more sensible." See Kleine and Kuhn, Tiger, 219. 6. The 1st and 2d SS Division's heavy tank companies formed the nucleus of SSHeavy Tank Battalions 501 and 502. Grossdeutschland's heavy tank company expanded to become a full battalion. 7. Patrick King, Heavy Metal: Tiger! Narrated by Greg Stebner, produced by Taylor Downing, edited by Andrew Mason (The History Channel, 2002). 8. Michael Swift and Michael Sharpe. Historical Maps of World War II: Europe (London: PRC, 2000), 85. The map shows eight heavy tank battalions when in fact there were only 2 in the west at this time. 9. While many Tigers were lost because they could not be recovered or broke down during extensive withdrawals and must be included in the ratio to obtain an accurate picture, the total Tiger losses includes all Tigers issued to the heavy tank battalions, or total annihilation. 10. To discover how many enemy tanks each Tiger had to destroy, to be cost-effective at the national level, would require a macroeconomic study of all countries involved in WWII, incorporating labor, time, and natural resources/minerals. 11. Franz Bäke, quoted in Kleine and Kuhn, Tiger, 97; Dr. Bäke cites the limited radius of action as the greatest disadvantage of the Tiger. He took part in nearly 500 missions in virtually every type of German tank and was one of the few WWII German tank commanders who was involved in the tank battle at Cambrai during WWI. He was a dentist by profession, and passed away in 1978. 12. For a good discussion of the inability of the Germans to develop a plan to fully utilize and maximize the resources they had available, see Richard Overy, "A Genius for Mass-Production: Economies at War" in Why the Allies Won (New York: W. W. Norton, 1995), 180-207.

248

SLEDGEHAMMERS

13. The majority of heavy tanks and heavy tank battalions were built and fielded after the battle of Kursk in the summer of 1943.

Appendix 1. Gordon Waterfield, What Happened to France (London: Butler and Tanner, First edition 1940, Reprinted 1941), 21. 2. Robert A. Doughty, The Seeds of Disaster: The Development of French Army Doctrine, 1919-1939, (Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 1985), 3-4. In French the term is bataille conduite. 3. Ibid., 4. 4. Ibid., 154-55. 5. Ibid., 4. 6. Ibid., 143. 7. Ibid., 141. 8. Ibid. 9. Ibid., 162. 10. Ibid., 164. 11. Ibid., 177. 12. Ibid. 13. Ibid., 168. In 1939, the Inspector General of Tanks in the French Army published The Provisional Notice on the Use of Units of the Armored Division. This document continued the emphasis on tank support of infantry during the methodical battle. 14. Ellis, et.al., Victory in the West, 254-55. 15. Chris Ellis and Peter Chamberlain, eds., Handbook on the British Army 1943 (Reprint of the U.S. Army Technical Manual 30-410, Handbook on the British Army, first published in 1943) (New York: Hippocrene, 1976), 164. 16. See Bryan Perrett, The Churchill Tank, (London: Osprey, 1980), 15; David Fletcher, The Great Tank Scandal: British Armour in the Second World War, Part 1 (London: HMSO, 1989), 6. 17. Gudgin, Armoured Firepower: The Development of Tank Armament, 1939-1945. (Gloucestershire, U.K.: Sutton, 1997), 74-75. 18. See Ellis and Chamberlain, eds., Handbook on the British Army 1943,42; Perrett, The Churchill Tank, 14. The Army tank brigade had a total strength of 178 tanks, almost all of which were infantry tanks. 19. Perrett, The Churchill Tank, 14. British regiments were U.S.-battalion equivalents, a squadron was company-sized, and a troop was platoon-sized. 20. Ibid. 21. Ibid. 22. Ibid., 14-15. Some tank brigades were equipped with both upgunned Shermans, which provided overwatch support, and traditional infantry tanks like the Churchill, which "bounded" forward under the protective fire of the stationary Shermans.

NOTES

249

23. See Ellis and Chamberlain, eds., Handbook on the British Army 1943, 41, 164-65; Gudgin, Armoured Firepower, 44-59. 24. See Christopher R. Gabel, "World War II Armor Operations in Europe" in Camp Colt to Desert Storm: The History of U.S. Armored Forces (Lexington, Ky.: The University Press of Kentucky, 1999), 145; U.S. War Department, Field Manual 100-5, Field Service Regulations, Operations (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 22 May 1941), 127, 263-76; idem, Field Manual 100-5, Field Service Regulations, Operations (Washington, D C : GPO, 15 June 1944), 305-12. 25. U.S. War Department, Field Manual 100-5 (1941 edition), 5-6,97-111,120-23, 127; idem, Field Manual 100-5, (1944 edition), 305-12. In the 1941 manual, U.S. doctrine sees two forms of the offense: the penetration and the envelopment. The word "breakthrough" is discussed in Chapter 12, "Special Operations" when talking about attacks against strong, prepared enemy defenses (called fortified localities in the manual). Although no specific taxonomy is provided, it appears that the breakthrough was seen as a specialized form of a penetration. For the sake of consistency, the word breakthrough is used when discussing doctrine, for the U.S. Army as well as other countries, although in some instances the doctrinally precise wording would be the penetration. 26. U.S. War Department, Field Manual 100-5 (1941 edition), 278-80; idem, Field Manual 100-5, (1944 edition), 316-18. The 1941 manual refers to these units as General Headquarters (GHQ) Tank Units and the 1944 manual calls them nondivision armored units. 27. U.S. War Department, Field Manual 100-5, (1944 edition), 115. The only exception was when wide gaps were identified in the defense or when the defense was extremely weak. Only then were mobile forces, including armor units, to lead the breakthrough. This type of "breakthrough" cannot be classified in the same category as other country's breakthrough doctrine which saw a World-War-I-type breakthrough of a prepared defense. The exception is the French doctrine, which saw an eventual breakthrough of a weak defense based upon massive prior attrition through failed enemy attacks and preparatory artillery fire. 28. Richard M. Leighton and Robert W. Coakley, Global Logistics and Strategy: 1940-1943, United States Army in World War II, The War Department (Washington, D.C.:CMH, 1955), 288. 29. R. P. Hunnicutt, Firepower: A History of the American Heavy Tank (Novato, Calif: Presidio, 1988), 27. 30. Ibid., 28-30. 31. Ibid., 28-59. 32. George C. Marshall, General Marshall's Report, The Winning of the War in Europe and the Pacific: Biennial Report of the Chief of Staff of the United States Army: July 1, 1943 to June 30, 1945, to the Secretary of War (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1 September 1945), 95-96. 33. Green, Thomson, and Roots, The Ordnance Department, 286-87. In the European Theater, Shermans lasted five times longer mechanically than their German adversaries. Soviet tank designers held a different view of the importance of mechanical reliability than U.S. designers. On the assumption that a tank was almost certain

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to be knocked out after a brief period of fighting, the Soviets considered a lifetime of fourteen hours for its mechanical components to be excellent. U.S. tanks, by comparison, were required to last for a minimum of forty hours. This was an intelligent design requirement considering that U.S. equipment was employed thousands of ocean kilometers away from any factory-level repair facilities. This ruled out transporting tanks back to the U.S. for major overhauls like German, Soviet, and British armies were able to do with their tanks. 34. David Fletcher, The Universal Tank: British Armour in the Second World War, Part 2 (London: HMSO, 1993), 81. 35. Marshall, The Winning of the War in Europe and the Pacific, 96. 36. George Forty, United States Tanks of World War II in Action (Dorset, U.K.: Blandford, 1983), 138-41. Forty provides several interesting stories of Pershings in combat against Tigers. 37. Superheavy Tank T.28 Pamphlet, Archive copy available in the Patton Museum of Cavalry and Armor, Fort Knox, Kentucky. 38. As General Omar Bradley wrote, "our tank superiority devolved primarily from a superiority in the number rather than the quality of tanks we sent into battle." 39. Ellis, et.al, Victory in the West, 254-55. 40. Forty, Tanks of World War 11,21. 41. Ibid. 42. Operations GOODWOOD, COBRA, and BUCKLAND are three examples of the use of

strategic bombers to affect a breakthrough of German defenses. 43. One of the primary reasons that the Soviets fared so poorly during the initial stages of the war was the purges of the senior military leadership undertaken by Josef Stalin in the late 1930s. Any army would have had trouble recovering from the severe losses in professional leadership. Only a few years before the war began, 3 out of 5 marshals, 13 out of 15 army commanders, 57 out of 85 corps commanders, 110 out of 195 division commanders, and 220 out of 406 brigade commanders were killed. See Bryan I. Fugate, Operation BARBAROSSA: Strategy and Tactics on the Eastern Front, 1941 (Novato, Calif: Presidio, 1984), 28. 44. For an interesting overview of Marshall Tukhachevskiy and his background, see J. F. C. Fuller, A Military History of the Western World, vol. 3, From the Seven Days Battle, 1862, to the Battle of Leyte Gulf (New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1956), 339-40. 45. Daniel K. Malone, "Introduction" in Foundation of Military Theory (Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, School of Advanced Military Studies, Course 1), v. 46. Mikhail N. Tukhachevskiy, Problems of the Higher Command (first published in 1924), excerpts contained in "Foundation of Military Theory," (Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: U.S. Army, Command and General Staff College, School of Advanced Military Studies, 1983), 45. 47. Ibid. 48. See Tukhachevskiy, Problems of the Higher Command, 45; Soviet Commissariat of Defense, Field Service Regulations, Soviet Army, 1936 (Tentative). Originally published in Moscow: Soviet Military Publication Division, 1937, Translated by Charles

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Borman, U.S. Army War College Translation Section (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1937), 63, 66, 75, 77. Ministry of Defense of the USSR, History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union, 1941-1945, vol. 1, Preparation for the Unleashing of the War by Imperialistic Powers, unedited translation (Moscow: Military Publishing House of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR, 1960), 565-67; V. K. Triandafillov, The Nature of the Operations of Modern Armies (Kharakter operatsii sovremennykh armiy, first published in 1929), edited and with a foreword by Jacob W. Kipp and an introduction by James J. Schneider, (London: Frank Cass, 1994), 115-18, 127-36. Tukhachevskiy wrote "But the breakthrough itself makes no sense without the further applications of the enveloping movement. Both forms serve to surround the enemy, that is, the most effective of all means of destruction." 49. Although he took the opposite view of Tukhachevskiy in the "destruction versus attrition" debate within the Soviet military prior to World War II, Aleksandr A. Svechin provides good insight into the Soviet military thought in the levels of the defense up to the strategic level. See Aleksandr A. Svechin, Strategy, 2d Ed. (first published in 1927) with a foreword by the Russian First Deputy Minister, Andrei A. Kokoshin and introductory essays by Valentin V. Larionov, Vladimir N. Lobov, and Jacob W. Kipp (Minneapolis, Minn.: East View, 1997), 175-96, 239-56. 50. PU-36 labels these as the assault group and containing group. See Soviet Commissariat of Defense, Field Service Regulations 1936, 35-36. 51. PU-36 stated, in part, that "the enemy is to be paralyzed in the entire depth of his deployment, surrounded, and destroyed." See Soviet Commissariat of Defense, Field Service Regulations 1936, 35-36. 52. Triandafillov, Modern Armies, 113. Triandafillov wrote "Given today's elongation of the fronts of million-man armies and stability of the defense, it is impossible to break open these fronts by means of breakthroughs in a narrow sector." 53. Ibid., 113-14. 54. See Connor, Analysis of Deep Attack Operations, 15; Ministry of Defense of the USSR, History of the Great Patriotic War, vol. 1, 568. 55. Ministry of Defense of the USSR, History of the Great Patriotic War, vol. 1, 566. 56. Ibid., 568. 57. Ibid. 58. Connor, Analysis of Deep Attack Operations, 32. 59. Ministry of Defense of the USSR, History of the Great Patriotic War, vol. 1, 568. 60. See Ministry of Defense of the USSR, History of the Great Patriotic War, vol. 1, 568; Triandafillov, Modern Armies, 109. The depth increased throughout the war. Prior to the war, V. K. Triandafillov theorized that a tactical breakthrough would need to penetrate 25-35 kilometers. 61. Ibid. 62. Fugate, Operation Barbarossa, 25. 63. Soviet Commissariat of Defense, Field Service Regulations 1936, 38, 63-66, 71-72. 64. The only mention of heavy and medium tanks in the manual is made in discussing attacks against fortified areas, see Soviet Commissariat of Defense, Field Service Regulations 1936, 79.

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65. These included several types of heavy tank, medium tanks, cavalry tanks, and amphibian tanks to name just a few. 66. Named after Klimenti Voroshilov, the murderous Defense Commissar in the late 1930s and later Soviet President. 67. Steven J. Zaloga, Jim Kinnear, Andrey Aksenov, and Aleksandr Koschchavtsev, Stalin's Heavy Tanks, 1941-1945: The KV and IS Heavy Tanks (Hong Kong: Concord, 1997), 3. 68. See "The Armored Roadblock, June 1941" in Armor in Battle, Fort Knox Supplemental Material 17-3-2 (Fort Knox, Ky.: U.S. Army Armor School, Leadership Branch, Leadership and Training Division, Command and Staff Department, March 1986), 2-1 to 2-7; Zaloga et al., Stalin's Heavy Tanks, 4-5. During Army Group North's attack during the initial stages of Operation BARBAROSSA, a single KV-2 succeeded in blocking the advance of a reinforced Panzer Division (the 6th Panzer Division) for two days in Lithuania. Massed German armor, attacking from three sides, eventually managed to distract the KV-2 while an 88mm antiaircraft gun was brought up behind the KV-2. After eight shots from the 88mm, the KV-2 was finally knocked out. Throughout the two days, it does not appear that the KV-2 ever moved from its key position on the road. 69. Zaloga et. al., Stalin's Heavy Tanks, 8. 70. Ibid. 71. Ibid., The JS-2 fired a 55-pound (25 kilogram) projectile. This is more than double the weight of a round fired from a Tiger whose round was under 25 pounds (9 kilograms). 72. Ibid. 73. Ibid. 74. Ibid., 8-9. 75. Ibid. 76. Ibid., 9. 77. See Fugate, Operation Barbarossa, 26; Soviet Commissariat of Defense, Field Service Regulations 1936, 38-39, 70-72; Triandafillov, Modern Armies, 76-79, 92, 118; Mikhail Nokolayevich Tukhachevskiy, New Problems in Warfare (believed to have been written in 1931), excerpts contained in "Foundation of Military Theory," (Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: U.S. Army, Command and General Staff College, School of Advanced Military Studies, 1983), 14; Ministry of Defense of the USSR, History of the Great Patriotic War, vol. 1, 568, 572. 78. Ministry of Defense of the USSR, History of the Great Patriotic War, vol. 1, 568, 572. 79. Remarks by Glantz, 1985 Art of War Symposium, 535. 80. Ministry of Defense of the USSR, History of the Great Patriotic War, vol. 1, 569. 81. Soviet Commissariat of Defense, Field Service Regulations 1936, 70. 82. Ministry of Defense of the USSR, History of the Great Patriotic War, vol. 1, 568. 83. Ibid.; remarks by Glantz, 1985 Art of War Symposium, 535.

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Playfair, I. S. O., C. J. C. Molony, F. C. Flynn, a n d T. P. Gleave. History of the Second World War: The Mediterranean and Middle East. Vol. 4, The Destruction of the Axis Forces in Africa. L o n d o n : H M S O , 1966. Schmidt, M a r t i n . " E m p l o y m e n t of Panzer Units in Central Italy in 1944, a n d Peculiarities Thereof." MS # D - 2 0 4 . Translated by G. Kohler. Washington, D.C.: C M H , 1948. Soviet C o m m i s s a r i a t of Defense. Field Service Regulations, Soviet Army, 1936 (Tentative). Originally published in Moscow, Soviet Military Publication Division, 1937. Translated by Charles B o r m a n , U.S. A r m y War College Translation Section. Washington, D.C.: G P O , 1937. U.S. Army, A r m o r School. Armor in Battle, Fort Knox Supplemental Material 17-3-2. Fort Knox, Ky.: U.S. A r m y A r m o r School, Leadership Branch, Leadership a n d Training Division, C o m m a n d a n d Staff D e p a r t m e n t , March 1986. U.S. Army, C o m m a n d a n d General Staff College. Foundation of Military Theory. Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: U.S. A r m y C o m m a n d a n d General Staff College, School of Advanced Military Studies, 1983. U.S. War D e p a r t m e n t . Field Manual 100-5, Field Service Regulations, Operations. Washington, D C : G P O , 2 2 M a y 1941. U.S. War D e p a r t m e n t . Field Manual 100-5, Field Service Regulations, Operations. Washington, D.C.: G P O , 15 June 1944. von Brauchitsch, Walther, "Provisional Instructions for Leadership a n d Action of the Tank Regiment a n d Tank Battalion, dated 18 January 1941" British translation of captured G e r m a n d o c u m e n t . In Kasserine Pass Battles, Doctrines, and Lessons Learned, Vol. II, Part 4. Washington, D.C.: C M H , 1995. von Manteuffel, Hasso, "Fast Mobile a n d A r m o r e d Troops." MS #B-036. Translated by Mysing. Washington, D.C.: C M H , 1945. Ziemke, Earl F. Stalingrad to Berlin: The German Defeat in the East. Washington, D C : C M H , 1987.

Video Recordings C a r r u t h e r s , Bob. Achtung Panzer! Steel Tigers: The Evolution of a Legend, 1939-1945. P r o d u c e d by Vanessa To veil. 90 m i n u t e s . C r o m w e l l P r o d u c t i o n s , 1999. Videocassette. King, Patrick. Heavy Metal: Tiger! Produced by Taylor D o w n i n g . 60 m i n u t e s . The History C h a n n e l , 2002. Cable broadcast.

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Journals and Magazines King, Curtis S. " O p e r a t i o n BAGRATION: A Soviet Victory." Military Review, April 1994, 8 9 - 9 3 . Nipe, Jr., George M. "Kursk Reconsidered, Germany's Lost Victory?" World War II, February 1998, 2 6 - 3 2 , 76. Parker, D a n n y S. " G e r m a n Tiger Tanks Were at the Battle of the Bulge, b u t N o t in the N u m b e r s Usually Cited for Them." World War II, March 1990, 8, 54, 56, 5 8 , 6 0 - 6 1 .

Unpublished Material Rauber, Douglas. Translator. "Was the Tiger Really 'King': Testing the King Tiger at Kubinka," U n p u b l i s h e d m a n u s c r i p t based u p o n an article in Tankomaster, No. 6, 1999. Shapar. Lieutenant Colonel, 71st I n d e p e n d e n t Guards Heavy Tank Regiment C o m m a n d e r . Report a b o u t O p e r a t i o n s of the 71st I n d e p e n d e n t Guards Heavy Tank Regiment from 14 July to 31 August 1944. n.p., n.d. Superheavy Tank T.28 Pamphlet, Archive copy available in the Patton M u s e u m of Cavalry and Armor. Fort Knox, Ky. " T h e Royal O p p o n e n t , " U n p u b l i s h e d m a n u s c r i p t based u p o n an article in Tankomaster, No. 6, 1999.

About the Author Chris Wilbeck is a serving US A r m y a r m o r officer assigned to the 1st Cavalry Division. H e is a v e t e r a n of O p e r a t i o n s DESERT SHIELD a n d DESERT STORM, in

which he served as a Scout Platoon Leader in the 3d A r m o r e d Division. He has also completed tactical assignments with the 1st A r m o r e d Division a n d the 3d Infantry Division. Major Wilbeck is a graduate of the US A r m y C o m m a n d and General Staff College a n d the School of Advanced Military Studies. He holds a Masters in Business Administration, a n d Master of Military Arts a n d Sciences degrees in Military History a n d Theater O p e r a t i o n s . At the time of publication, Major Wilbeck is serving in the 1st Cavalry Division in Iraq.

The Tiger and King Tiger tanks gained legendary status during World War II. Numerous Tiger commanders achieved phenomenal numbers of kills and accomplished extraordinary combat feats, increasing the legend to nearly mythic proportions after the war. As vast in breadth and scope as the employment of Tiger battalions themselves, Sledgehammers provides dozens of detailed historical case studies and analysis of heavy tank battalions' actions in North Africa, Italy, Normandy, and the Ardennes, as well as numerous battles on the Eastern Front including Kursk, the Cherkassy Pocket, Operation BAGRATION, late-war combat in Hungary, and many other more minor engagements. Although much is available about Tiger tanks' technical details and some of the most famous soldiers and units that employed them, until now, there has been little concerning the organization and tactical use of heavy tank battalions across the theaters in which they were employed. Sledgehammers provides an in-depth look at heavy tank battalions' organizations and tactics, including the tactical doctrine by which these elite units were supposed to fight and case studies to illustrate how they were actually employed on the battlefield. Even given the Tiger's reputation, many readers will be amazed by the fearsome casualties inflicted by the crews ofTiger battalions. Many will, however, also find it equally stunning to learn of the Tigers' many technical and tactical vulnerabilities. Through the systematic use of extremely detailed primary source and other highly accurate information, Sledgehammers demolishes several of the major myths about Tigers in World War II. Meticulously researched and written with the perspective that only a professional tanker can bring to the subject, Sledgehammers provides new and definitive insights into the strengths and flaws of World War II's most feared and legendary armored units. ISBN 0-9717650 - 2-2