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Spting thp Invisibk National Security Intelligence in an Uncertain Age
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Seeing the Invisible National security intelligence in an Uncertain Age
Thomas Quiggin Centre of Excellence for National Security
S. Rajaratnarn School of international Studies Nanyang Technological University, Singapore
a world scientific
s. RAJARATHAN SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES A Graduate school of Nanyang Technological University
Published by World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd. 5 Toh Tuck Link, Singapore 596224 USA ofice: 27 Warren Street, Suite 401402, Hackensack, NJ 07601 UK ofice: 57 Shelton Street, Covent Garden, London WC2H 9HE
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Quiggin, Thomas. Seeing the Invisible : national security intelligence in an uncertain age i by Thomas Quiggin. p. cm. Inlcudes bibliographical references and index. ISBN-13 978-981-270-482-5 (pbk.) -- ISBN-10 981-270-482-5 (pbk.) 1. National security. 2. Security, International. 3. Intelligence service. UA10.5 .Q55 2007 335'.033--dc22 2006053268
British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.
Copyright 0 2007 by World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd. All rights reserved. This book, orparts therenJ may not be reproduced in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording or any information storage and retrieval system now known or to be invented, without written permission frnm the Publisher.
For photocopying of material in this volume, please pay a copying fee through the Copyright Clearance Center, Inc., 222 Rosewood Drive, Danvers, MA 01923, USA. In this case permission to photocopy is not required from the publisher.
Inhouse editor: Juliet Lee Ley Chin
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Printed by Mainland Press Pte Ltd
Dedicated to Christopher James Blackburn
with hope f o r a better tomorrow
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Foreword
The role of national security intelligence is increasingly'difficult as developed states are under new security pressures in a complex and u n c ~ ~ t a i n international environment. Protecting sovereignty, growing the economy, and enhancing internal social harmony are just a few of the major policy concerns. A web of interdependency and competition among states and non-state actors exists.These issues, combined with the fragi~ityof developed infrastr~ctures,pose challenges to state security. The new challenges to national security come from forces which are asymrnetric in nature. Terrorism and organized crime are increasingly t~ansnatio~i~l, while other threats such as resource shocks, supply chain fragility and disease can put the security of state in peril. Knowledge is the only weapon that can allow a state to prevail in the face of asymmetric threats. Power, in and of itselr', is not the answer. Currently, leaders and decision makers in many states are struggling to find answers to the challenges which now face them. Natlonai security problems are now a "whole-of~governm~nt" problem, so there needs to be a "who~e-of.-gove~nment" response. The answers will not come from just a few select intelligence and law enforcement agencies. Providing intelligence for the responses to concurrent symmetric and asymmetric threats is increasingly the responsibility of all government bodies. ln~elligencesystems must adapt so that they can provide a n t i ~ i ~ a ~ # ~ y warning to government on the types of problems t h a t are coming from
viii
RISK ASSESMENT AND HORIZON SCANNING
"over the horizon," While it has become fashionable to attack intelligence agencies for failures which may not have been of their own making, this book by Tom Quiggin, Senior Fellow at the Centre of Exceller-tcefor National Security (CENS), based in the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), takes the "road less traveled," so to speak. Torn suggests bu~ldingon older and known strengths while exploiting new opportunities. One such new opportunity, made possible by the combination of recent advances in methods, concepts and technology, is the ~ela~ively new but important Risk Assessment and Horizon Scanning (RAHS) process in Singapore AsTom will show, the RAHS process may well be a global first as it directly confronts the classic intelligence problems of bureaucratic stove piping and rigid mindsets. It is hoped that this volume will help promote fresh thinking on the strategies for enhancing national security intelligence processes to better cope with the uncertainties of the ~nternationalenvironment, and as a case study, showcase how the city-state of Singapore has tried to broaden the definition of national security and provide the intelligence support necessary to make this happen.
Kumar Ramakrishna Acting Head Centre of Excellence for National Security S. Rajaratnam school of international studies Nanyang Technological University
Preface
This book is intended to explain the intelligence responses required for the emerging asymmetric threats to national security. This subject is critical now that the state is forced to operate in a complex and uncertain i n t e ~ n a t ~ o n ~ ~ e r i v i ~ o n r ~ eEconomic, ~~t. social, health, and environmental issues today are as important to national security as border issues and stability have been in the past. This book is also intended to be a policy relevant study, rather than an academic one. It is aimed a t leaders, decision makers and the “worker bees” who occupy the worlds of security, economics, intelligence and policy. In other words, it aims to support the people who actually have to get things done.The book will also be useful reading for students at the undergradiiate and graduate levels as well as the citizen who wants to understand the co i-np I ex i nt e m a t i o n a 1 arena and its impact on their lives. The d e f i n i t i o n o f national security can no longer be limited to defending borders or maintaini~~g internal stability. With the role of the state having expanded and changed, past experiences arc? rendered less valuable.The emerging asymmetric threats .to”national”security
x RISK ASSESMENT AND HORIZON SCANNING
are not controllable at the ”national” level. The risks to national security are often global in their origin, although the impacts can be localized and catastrophic. The economic, social and health aspects of the threat to the state can be every bit as damaging as the conventional state-to-statemilitary threats. The book will focus primarily on the emerging asymmetric threats. Definitions of asymmetric conflict vary, but one useful definition can be taken to refer to threats which are designed to employ an inferior strength against a stronger opponent’s vulnerabilities to achieve a disproportionate effect with the aim of undermining the opponent’s will to win.’ Natural or man made threats from biological weapons, pandemics and environmental degradation can be grouped into this area as well. The response to this sort of threat, from an ~~~~~~~~
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~~~~~
a
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intelligence point of view, i5 similar to that of other
Knowledge is critical in defeating asymmetric threats. A useful defence in an asymmetric struggle can come only from an und~rstandi~g of the threat and an ability to stop it before it materializes. Power by itself cannot prevail nor can power prevent fear. Over the past 20 years, I have had the privilege to work for a number of intelligence institutions. Among them have been the Director General of Intelligence (Canadian Armed Forces), the United Nations Proteclion Force in Yugoslavia (1 994), the Intelligence Assessment Secretariat of the Privy Council Office of Canada, the War Crimes Section of Citizenship and immig~ationCanada, the International War Crimes Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) War Crimes Section and the RCMP “A” Division Integrated National Security Enforcement % m .n Intelligence related work with the Conventional Forces in Europe lreaty and the Vienna Document has taken me to five countries in Eastern Europe from ~
‘The Rire of Asymmetric Threats, by Kenneth F. McKenzie, Jr., available at: www.ndu.edu/ii?ss/press/ QRR..-%OOI / s d c ~ ~ ~ h ~ ~ . h t ~ l .
Preface
xi
northern Albania to central Russia. Shore time periods were spent with the National Military Joint lritelligence Centre in the Pentagon, the Canadian Security Establishment and the Netherlands Institute for War Documentat~on. This book exists because of support from many other people. My thanks must go to them. Among them are the head of the Centre of Excellence for National Security, 5r. Kumar Ramakrishna. He has tolerated my many eccentricities and supported this project at all times. Dr. Amitav Acharya of the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies a t Nanyang Technological University has played a major role in creating an academic atmosphere where ideas can be put forward, even if they challenge the boundaries normally imposed on such institutions. Sir Richard Dearlove KCMG OBE MA was generous in allowing me to use ideas that he had previously published. Dave Snowden of Cognitive Edge did likewise as did Dr. Kumar Ramakrishna and Dr. Norman Vasu of the Centre of Excellence for National Security. Some sections in the book also draw from work that was origi~iallypublished in the RUSI/Janes Homeland Security and Resilience Monitor. My thanks must also go to the Associate Research Fellows of IDSS' who had aided me along the way: Hoo Tang Boon, Yolanda Chin and Ng Sue Chia. Phil Berikoff has been a friend and guide over many years. Others will know who they are: ED., R.W., and C.'H'S. Colonel Patrick Nathan of the National Security Coordination Secretariat (Singapore) has also been of invaluable assistance. Warren Coons and Glenn arti in dale of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police played a major role in my success as well. Gilies Michaud was an operational leader from whom I gained considerable support for my work. Colonel Kent Koebke (United States Marine Corps -- retired) was a major influence in developing my intelligence skills as was Major David Declerq (Canadian Arrried Forces retired). Dr. Munroe Eagles, Dr. David Dewitt, Ds Paul Evans and Dr. Ron Landes were also formative influences who taught me the values of rigorous and theoretically informed work,
-
'The Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, currently renamed as the 5 Rajaratnam School of Internationdl Studies
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Contents
foreword
Profffce
b
1. The plan of the book
1. I
1.2
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Outline of the Book.. .....................................
1 ,1 .3
2. ~ ~ ~ e ~ National ~ ~ aSecurity ~ d i n ~ 9 2.1 The Changing Role of the State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8 2.2 The State and Globalization ............................ 10 2.3 2.4
2.5 2.6
2.7 2.8
2.9
Other Globalization Actors.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . Global and Local Identities .......................
The Cornplex Security Envir The Asymmetric Threats. . . . .
13
......... .....................
15
Transnational Organized Cri Current State Responses. . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
The Future Role of Nationa
3. The Complex and U n ~ ~ ~ ~R ~t ear ~~ a ~t Security i ~ R a ~ ~ R ~ j ~ o R ~ @ n t 24 24 3.1 Threats, Risks and Vulnerability ............................... 3.2 Types of Threat Actors.. ...................................... 30
xiv
RISK ASSESMENT AND HORIZON SCANNING
3.3 3.4 3.5 3.6
.
34 The Fragility of the Developed States ........................ Converging Technology Trends and the Threat Environment . 36 Complexity and Uncertainty in the International System . . . . . 41 Predicting the Future . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
4 Strategic ~ n ~ @ ~Ass@ssment ~ ~ ~ @ and n ~Surprise e Attacks
41 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 4.6
45 Underlying Themes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 47 Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Data, Information, Knowledge and Assessment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 The Intelligence Cycle: Direction, Collection. Analysis. and Dissemination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 Strategic Surprise and Predictabi~ity.......................... 53 The Need for Strategic Intelligence Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
.
5 Ancient and ~0~~~~ Ass$ss~~nt§: Common Problems 64 5.1 The Ancients and Strategic Surprise .......................... 64 5.2 Knowledge and Assessment Failures in Ancient Times . . . . . . . 68 5.3 Modern Literature and the Study of Intelligence . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 54 Categories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 The State of Strategic Intelligence Assessment ............... 85 5.5
.
6 ~ e ~ ~~ fn ~o ~ ~ ~ Failures ~l ~i ~ ~ $ ~n ~ e 6.1 The Academic Response. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.2 Strategic Assessment and Terrorism .......................... 6.3 Reinforcing Failure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
.
7 ~ 7.1 7.2 7.3 7.4 7.5 7.6
89 91 93 96
@and l ~ t @~l i i g e n ~ e~ n ~ ~ ~ 97 The Outlook . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98 A Lack of Balance in Resources............................... 98 103 7he M~lit~rization of Intelligence............................. Secrecy Undermines the Analyticai Process. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104 A Lack of Training and Upgrading ........................... 105 Outlook and Coriclusions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
8. structure and organization: The Weakness of centralized intelligence
111
~
447
9. Faint Signals 9.4
9.2
9.3 9.4
40. More 10,1 10.2 10.3 10.4 10.5
The Case of the Flying Telephone Pole.. , . . , . , . . . . . . . . . . . 118 'The Case of the Missed Declaration of War.. . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122 The Case of the Missed Diplomatic Signals.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125 Conclusions.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . 127 e . .
(.
Faint Signair Being Mir;aed? '831 The Case of Animal Disease and Panderrtics... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131 The Case of Technology Trends and Home Made Weaports . 134 The Case of Bangladesh . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . 137 The Case of the United States and Information Sharing.. , I . 140 The Case of Nano Technologies . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . , . . 142
'D 1. ~ a ~ i o nSecurity a~ lntell~genceand the Fsoot Line ~ e ~ u ~ ~ e 4~47e n ~ 1%. Open Source ~ n t e ~ ~ i ~ e n c e
7 57 OSINT and National Security. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158 12.2 What Constitutes Open Source Intelligence?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161 12.3 Secrecy is the Enemy of Knowledge.. . . . . .. . . . . . 12.4 'The Private Sector has More Information and Expertise . . . . . 165 12.5 Contingencies and Surprises. . . . 12..6 OSINT and Information Flexibili 12.7 Limitations of Classified lntellig . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . 170 12.8 OSlNT and Reliability High Resolution Space-Based Open Source Imagery. . . . . . . . 173 12.9 12.10 Global Tracking of Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ' 175 12.1 1 Outlook and Conclusions.. ' ?77
12.1
.
.
.
.
I
.
I
I
13. ~ n ~ i ~ ~Future ~ a tThreats: i n ~ The Problem Areas
479
Predicting the Future . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , , . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180 The Changing Role of the State and National Security.. . . . 182. The Complex and Uncertain Environment.. . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183 Technology and Future lntelligericx . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184 . . . . . . . 185 Traditional Methods of Strategic intelligence Wa~ning 13.6 Artificial Intelligence?. . . . . , . . . . . . , . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185
13.1 13.2 13.3 13.4 13.5
~
xvi RISK ASSESMENT AND HORIZON SCANNING
189 94, A n t ~ ~ ~ Future ~ a t ~Threats: n ~ The Areas of Strength 74.1 Resiliency and Efficiency.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 490 14.2 Diverse Views or Consensus? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192
7 4.3 14.4 14.5 14.6
Asymmetric Threats and Knowledge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192 Knowledge Workers and Small Groups.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 194 Order and Choice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195 Outlook and Conclusions.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . 197
15. The ~ i n ~ a Risk ~ o A~ ses ~ s s ~ @and n t Horizon canning Process 199 15.1 Risk Assessment and Horizon Scanning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ,201 15.2 Interview with Ambassador Lam Chuan Leong . . . . . . . . . . . . .202
15.3 Interview with Civil Service Head Mr. Peter Ho. .. . . . . .. . . . . ,207 15.4 Interview with Mr. Dave Snowden of Cognitive Edge . . . . . . .212 16. ~ ~ t h Nationall ~ n ~ Security ~ n ~l n t ~ ~ ~ i ~ e n c e
16.1
16.2 16.3 16.4 16.5 16.6 16.7 16.8 16.9 16.10 16.11 16.12 4 6.1 3 16.14 16.15 16.16
227
An / ~ ~ e Future / ~ i ~ foreStrategic ~ ~ Intelligence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 228 The Changing Role of the State.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 228 National Security Must be a Public Issue.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .229 The Future Cannot be Predicted, but it Can be Anticipated. 229 Faint Signal Detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 230 2314 Emerging Threats are Asymmetric in Nature 231 Diversity is the Key.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . r . .
231 Hurnans are not Rational Decision Makers Government is not a Business.. . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . ,232 Open Source intelligence is Critical . . . . .. . I233 Education is Required . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ,233 Short Term Future - A Bit Bleak in Some States.. . . . . . . . . . .233 Methodology is not Critical . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 234 235 Digital and Analogue 235 'The Future Could be .
I
.
.
'The Future of Intelligence? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . .226 ~
Appendix A: National security and Education: Thing Across the Boundaries of Time and specialization
237
Bibliography
239
index
243
chapter 1
The plan of the Book
National security intelligence must function in a complex and uncertain internatior~a!environment. Under such circumstances, trying to anticipate and prepare for the future is the most difficult task that governments face. How can any government, especially those of small to medium sized developed states, be expected to anticipate contingencies when there are no maps to the future? that which achieves an advantage over ~ ~ ~ n ~ astrategic ~ e n surprise ~ a l an unprepare~enemy - is a fact of history, It has been with us for as long as there have been recorded histories of conflict and that is more than 2,500 years. The past record is not encouraging. Despite warnings about how to prepare for the future (Sun Tzu - circa 500 5.C. - and Phucydides - 400 B.C.), strategic surprise has been a fact of life from the days of the ancients to the present.
1.1 Introduction I arn not an academic, but rather a practitioner of intelligence. At some point in the future, academics must return to play a larger role. But their insistence on bui!dir~gboundaries for knowledge instead of breaking them down causes them to disappear down their own silos, a practice that is well known in the intelligence community.
2
RISK ASSESMENT AND HORIZON SCANNING
An over fascination with "definitions" and the need to be labeled as a "neo realist," a "critical theorist" or even a "critical theorist from the Frankfort school of thought" renders them inaccessible to mainstream intelligence analysts, policy makers, and decision makers. This is a pity, as academia has produced valuable schools of thought and tools of analysis that could further help to inform us about our world. I am a generalist. Many people believe that a room full of specialists from differing backgrounds equals general knowledge. This is simply not true. Specialists articulate arguments from within their own area of expertise and they have difficulties integrating knowledge across the boundaries that define specialization. However, being a generalist is currently out of fashion and our various developed societies have placed a premium on specialization. This is occurring at a time when we need more people who can see the big picture. Our education systems and many of our leaders are failing us badly in this area. This book may have some weaknesses that are unavoidable as a result of the previous two points. First, no academic agreement exists on many of the key issues. For instance, what is the role of the state now? Is the state becoming more powerful as we move to increase the roles of securitization and surveillance?Or, as others argue, are the institutions of the state under attack and facing collapse under the pressures of globalization? Or rnaybe both are true depending on the location and condition of the individual state. As such, generali~ationshave to be made because policy makers and decision makers have to work from a framework of understanding, even if it is sometimes inexact. Second, this book is intended prirnarily to be read by leaders, decision makers and thel'worker beesl'who occupy the worlds of security, intelligence, economics, and policy. For them, an endless mound of detail is not the requi~ement.They need finite analysis and, within this context, clarity and brevity are the essence of communication. I accept the fact that counter arguments exist, but in the world of operations and policy, the practical imperatives outweigh the theoretical. I have seen the consequences of state failure. The potential brutality of our fellow human beings under these circumstances is astounding. One look into the eyes of a refugee or a walk through a bombed out village in Yugoslavia serves as a warning lesson as to the consequences of failure.
The Plan ~f the E)
3
As such, I make the decision to generalize for the purpose of functionality with a clear conscience in the hope that we car) partially avoid further catastrophic failures. The genesis for this book comes from many areas. Not least is my twenty years in a variety of intelligence positions in a nurnber of countries. Some
of the experiences were positive and exciting, such as being declared a court expert on jihadism in support of a criminal investigation. Other experiences were less positive, especially when dealing with those p-ersons who favoured centralization and bureaucratic processes over any actual intelligence analysis. However, all of the experiences have been educational.
1.2 The outline of the book This book presents a framework for thinking about national security, the int~rnatior~al environment, and the intelligence requirements needed to support leaders and decision makers. This may come as a shock to many, but all too often individuals are thrust into an iritelligence or enforcement role with little or no training.The individual may have some relevant background experience, or they may not. This has been my situation on a number of' occasions. This is a common problem in many countries and even the so-called "developed" countries are every bit as guilty. This book hopes to provide at least a partial solution to the problem by providing a framework of analysis for thinking about national security intelligence problems. The book is structured into six main sections as fo!lows: ~ ~ ~ i~~~w~~~~ ~ n f a f~ ~~ i~t fsf w i ~ ~ nIn~Chapters ~ f f ~ .2 and 3, the changing role of the state will be examined. Without understanding what the role of the state requires, it is difficult to understand how to provide security for that state. Following that, the international environment will be examined with respect to the intelligence requirements that are needed to support national security in a complex and sometimes hostile environment. ~~~~i~~ and ~ ~ ~ w f ~ ~f Five ~ ~chapters i s ~ ~ .~of varying i ~ length will examine the issues of strategic surprise, strategic warning and the failures that have occurred. Chapter 4 provides background information on strategic
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4
RISK ASSESMENT AND HORIZON SCANNING
warning and strategic surprise as well as definitions of the key terms used. It also examines key reasons for intelligence failures. Chapter 5 provides a historical overview of strategic surprise from the time of the ancients to the present.Chapter 6 explains why we tend to reinforce failures in the intelligence world and how this has been done again after 91’1 4 . Chapter 7 looks at the pervasive and frequently corrosive role that technology has p!ayed in intelligence and how this has negatively impacted intelligence assessment capabilities. It also examines a related phenomena of the dangerous trend in some states towards the increasing militar~zationof the whole intellige~ce process. Finally, Chapter 8 takes a short look at one of the great contradictions of the intelligence world -- the belief in a centralized intelligence capability. “Central intelligence” can be a contradiction in terms under some circumstances. ~~ ~ ~ and f ~f~ ~ ~ fScanning. pf After ~ ~ every ~ ~ major ~ ~ intelligence n failure, an exercise occurs whereby it is established that ”faint signals” that should have been seen or heard were missed. The dots, as they say, were not connected. This kind of retrospective coherence is common not just in the intelligence world, but right across most forms of human behavior. Chapter 9 will examine the issues of faint signals, trend ~ i o n i t ~ r i nand g “horizon scanning” as tivell as five cases of missed faint signals that were detrimental. Chapter 10 will contrast this with an examination of several current examples where faint signals are being missed now that may cause upset later. ~
Sscrcceese5 and ~ ~ ~It is common, ~ pand perhaps ~ even ~ fashionable ~ j to attack the intelligence community for its ”failures,” even when it is often clear that the event failures were more directly related to policy shortcomings. To contrast this, Chapter 11 will use examples of successes that have occurred in counter terrorism operations as a means to demonstrate how intelligence has worked. More importantly, it will examine where it has worked. Almost all the successes have been close to the front lines and initiated by human judgment, or they were cases of the front line analysis of technical clues provided by computers. Another poorly understood function of national security Is that of the role of the citizen. Great successes have occurred when “average citizens” have taken a role in a crisis situation. Further to that, the ultimate outcome of any event depends more on the response to the event rather than the actual event itself. In national security terms, some of the most critical first responders may be citizens. Their actions may shape the outcorne of the event. Chapter 12 will examine one of the most underused opportunities that exists for national security operations - that of open
~
'The Plan of the
45
source intelligence. Secrecy is the ally of the weaker party in an asymmetric conflict while knowledge is the friend of the stronger party. Knowledge (and the sharing of knowledge) is the critical component in defeating an asymmetric threat situation. A good defence in an asymmetric struggle can only come from an und~rstandingof the threat (knowledge) and therefore an ability to combat it or stop the threat before it materializes. As such, open source intelligence may be the most underused tool in the national security tool box. ~ i ~ ~ ~ §and $ Horizon ~ § $~ ~ ~ ~ nGiven ~ the ~ uncertain n and~complex
~nvironment,is there anything that can be done to prepare for the future, or must we simply wait for disasters to occur? Options do exist to enhance
the odds for success or survival. "Technology by itself is riot the answer, a combination of cognitive skills and technologica! support are a1,~hou~h emerging to allow for the detection of faint signals and the ability to put them into a warning context. Chapter 13 twill extend this discussion on some of the current probleni areas and how they needed to be avoided. Chapter 14 will examine the areas of naturally occurring strengths that exist and how these can be adapted for service in the fu,ture. Chapter 15 will examine the Risk Assessment and Horizon Scanning Program in Singapore which is a ~ ~ ~ ~ ptot break i n gthe"stove-pipes"and mindset failures that have pla~ued the world of insti~utionalizedintelligence. This chapter will also examine how a globalized network of "horizon scanning" programs needs to be integrated among like-minded developed nations in order to provide the besr warning and protection to all concerned. ~ ~~ ~The ~ entire ~ concept i ~ of~ national ~ security ~ i in ~a~ cornplex and uncertairi world needs to be addressed. First and foremost, national security discussions have to be dragged out of the closet and into the public arena. They should not be kept hidden away from public view. Issues such as sovereignty and the strength of the national social fabric are at stake and secrecy undermines the entire process. As a conclusion to the book, Chapter 16 will examine the complex issues at stake and rnake specific policy recornmen~ationsto face future threats. Often overlooked are the education and experience requirements for personnel recruiting. While not a direct pare of the national security process, education is a critical issue. It is a dangerous fallacy to assume that an intelligence "process"can somehow improve the quality of intelligence above the level of the quality of its producers. Appendix A, therefore,takes a look at the edu~ationalrequi?ements for the future. ~
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chapter2
Underststanding National sercurity
What is national security? On the surface, this appears to be a fairly simple question. It is the measures taken by the state to ensure the security of itself, and its citizens or subjects. On a deeper Jevel, however, a much more complex question exists that involves ur~derstandingthe role of the state and how far the state must go to define and protect its interests.This requires knowing what the interests of the state are in political, military, economic, social and er~vironmentalterms. The state has both a right and duty to protect it citizens. However, the state must also deal with the idea of a necessary balance between needs and resources and also rights and duties. Perhaps the most d i ~ c ~ofl all t is the need to provide equilibrium between the peace and order needed for a functioning society and the tolerance required for the citizens to be able to function. IdentiQing the critical elements of national security is a much more ~ i ~ ~question u l t than it seerns. It is both critical and necessary, however, to understand the changing role of the state and the envi~onmentin which the state operates. At the same time, this operating environment is increasingly complex and uncertairi with a series of traditional and emerging threats. In the following sections a number of issues will be addressed. These include the changing role of the state, the international role of the state,
8
RISK ASSESMENT AND HORIZON SCANNING
E
AND e e
globalization, non-state actors, organized crime, global and local identities, the complex security environment, asymmetric
responses, and the future role of national security. Tied to all of this, of course, will be the intelligence requirements that fall out of this assessment.
2.1 The changing Role of the state The state as we currently understand it is a relatively new invention of history. Opinions vary amongst historians and political scientists, but the state as we now know it in legal terms evolved out of Eurorse from the 13th to the 19th Centuries. Many students of history suggest that the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia was critical.q This treaty effectively recognized the principle of state sovereignty and the state's ability to control affairs within i t s own fixed borders. 7he treaty also established the principle that all states were equal in dealings with each other as states, regardless of their individual size or capabilities. These principles (in general) remain in place today. The concept of a sovereign and independent state gradually spread around the globe to a point now whev almost all land on the planet is controlled by states. The only exceptions are the continent of Antarctica and some disputed areas such as the PalestinianTerritories or Mashmir.The spread first occurred to other areas influenced by European culture such a5 North and South America. The state concept later spread t h r o u ~empires ~ that were in decline such as the Ottoman Turkish Empire. Finally, the concept of the state spread through Africa and Asia during the period of de-colonization in the 20th Century In its original form, the role of the state was limited to defending its borders and providing a minimal level of physical security for the inhdbitants '§ee,among many others, GeoffreyTreasure,7beMaking ~fModernEurope 1648-1780 See also Daniel Pi-iilpott, Revolutions in Sovereignly How Ideas Shaped Modern li~terriation~l Relations
Understanding National security
9
of the state. The state also came to be recognized as the only legitimate actor for international relations. As such, and especially in the 20th Century, the state m m e t o play the major role in any matter that was transnational. The role of the state began to expand rapidly following World War Two. Many states began to take on larger roles in regulating their economies. Even free market states believed that the state should take on some iole in correcting the problems not addressed by other means. These issues were often focused or1 full employment, trade balances, resource shortages, and price stability. Seen from another point of view, States were attempting to expand their areas of control into the economic sphere to provide sta~ilityand security. Not far behind various state interventions into the economy came the state's increasing role in mair~tainingthe standard of living of its citizens. Issues such as medical care, welfare, unemployment insurance,and individual rights were part of this change. The state also wanted to support the goals of full employr~eritand internal regional economic development to offset the failings of the market. By providing material benefits to the in~abitants of a state, the state was able to further increase it own internal legitimacy while creating a further role foor itself in national unity. Taking on these new roles was a double edged sword, however. By providing the benefits and increasing its profile with .the citizens, the state was taking a chance on decreasing its legitimacy and stability if it could not meet the ever rising expectations of its citizens. The state was becoming ~:~~~~~~~~ of the staft? has ~~a~~~~ not just the protector, but ~ o09:lthe~ state to a and rsoa fectoa. This is a ~~i~~~~~ ~ ~as the j ~ i t was becoming the what ~ ~ ~ ~ provider. o f personal lo^^ with the role of the state itself. financial security as well. While the individual state has d o ~ i n a t e the d international scene as the predominant voice, states have also gone about ~ u i l d i n ginternational institutions which they run for thernseives. The reasons foor creating such institutions vary, but in general ~~~~~~~~
~~~~~
~~~~~~~~
~~~~~~~~~
~~~~~~~~~
t
10
RISK ASSESMENT AND HORIZON SCANNING
terms they are created to establish a system of stability for the states themselves.The states attempted to do this by shutting out non-state actors such as religious movements, ethnic, linguistic, or cultural groups. In essence, the states have tried to create an international system in which only they are players. This system would ensure that the state was the final arbitrator. Those groups that did not have a territorial based state to represent them would have no voice on the international stage. The desire for states to form such institutions has been clear as such examples abound. The United Nations (UN) is one such institution. One indicator of the desire of states to be a part of the international state system is the number of states in the UPI.The UN was founded with only 51 original members, but each new state born of de-colonization or succession ~ o \ / e m ~ nhas t s usually sought to join this "club to establish itself as the legitimate voice of its territory. The number of member states in the UN as of 2006 was 192. This number was reached on 28 June 2006, when the most recent member (~ontenegro)was accepted. Other international state run organizations have included those with relatively clear mandates and rules such as the North Atlantic Treaty O~ganization(NATO). Some state institutions have been less formal and more cooperative such as the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN).
2.2 The state and globalization VJhat does the term globalization mean? More interestingly, what does it mean to the policy maker and those who must make decisions in the complexity of the inte~national~nvironment?One of the key issues to be considered is whether or not globalization (however you define it) affects the role of the state and whether this effect has made the state stronger or weaker. The academic literature is not helpful in this question. Kenneth N. Waltz, Emeritus Professor of Political Science at the University of California at Berkeley, is considered one of the leading scholars in international relations. He was one of the founders of what academics call the theory of neo-realism, or structural realism. He has made the argument that ~ l o b a ~ i ~ and a t ~its o~ negative effects on the state are not much more than a passing fad and
Understanding National security
114
that the state will increase i t s functions and roles as a result of globali~ation.~ Other scholars have disputed this and believe that the te~hnological revolution in transportation and co~)municationshas begun to break down social, economic, and cultural barriers. Ulrich Beck, a t the Lud~~~g~Maxim University in Munich Germany for instance, would argue that the term globalization itself implies a weakening of state structures as well as their autonomy and power? What should the policy makers take from this sort of discussion?Whatever the academic discussion, some issues are inescapable from a policy point of view. On the economic side, large scale interstate trade and the rapid rnovernent of fluid capital is a reality and states must deal wirh it. A sudden shock in one part of the globe, such as a shutdown of an oilfield in Alaska, can cause price ripples the same day around the world. An event of transitional terrorism in the United States, such as the 9/11 World Trade Centre and Pentagon attacks, can cause major financial headaches for airlines and other businesses around the world. The state has been forced to adapt to find a new approach for itself in the face of globalized economic and security trends. Many developed states find themselves incapable of meeting some roles that citizens have come to expect. No longer is the state capable of being the economic provider to the population and a guarantor of internal social stability and a competitor in the i~ter~ational stage all at once. There are inherent contrad~~tions in these roles. At the same time, the state cannot control many of the factors that determine its 1.E FOR -!-HE STATE interrial economy such AL ~ ~ as resource prices, the impact of technology or) the labour markets, or currency values. Whether this weakens
'Kenneth N. Waltz, Globalizutionand American Power as published in The National Interest, Spring,
2000. 'lllrich Beck, ~ ~ r / dSociery, ~ i sPolity ~ Press/Blackwell Publishers, Cambridge, UK, 1999.
~
12
RISK ASSESMENT AND HORIZON SCANNING
or strengthens the role of the state is a matter of debate, but it is clear that it changes .the role of the state and the factors that the state must react to in times of change or crisis.
2.3 Other globalizationActors One purpose of the creation and maintenance of the state as well as the formation of international institutions had been to exclude other ”non-state” actors from having a voice or an effect on state affairs. Whatever one’s vievvs are on the state, changes have occurred and non-state actors appear to be escaping from the boundaries that had been set for them. No longer are they content to stay within established boundaries and not have a voice in the international arena. For policy makers, this is of concern. Phis is certainly clear in the case of transnational terrorism. In the 1990s and up to the year 2001, al-Qaeda was clearly a non-rtate actor, although it did operate out of Sudan and Afghanistan. While denied a “legitimate” voice in the international arena as it was not a sovereign territorial based state, it did nonetheless manage to force states to react to its presence. Its terrorist attacks on American embassies in Africa, its attack on the American warship the iJSS Cole, and the attacks of 9/11 demonstrated that it has had an effect on states and the state based systems. Hizbollah is another such non-state actor. Like al-Qaeda, it has been considered by some to be nothing more than a terrorist organization. Yet it holds seats in the Lebanese Parliament and is a wide scale provider of social services in Lebanon. To many Lebanese citizens, especially the Shia, Hizbollah is the only provider of social services including education, health, and welfare. While its status as a non-state actor should deprive it of an international voice, it is clear to many That Hizbollah has been able to drag the state of Israel into conflict on more than one occasion and it has forced states around the world to react to it. Numerous other non-state actors on the world stage are demanding greater attention and getting it. Some of these actors are rn~ltinat~onal corporations whose budgets and power are greater than that of some smaller states. Oil companies and car rnanu~acturers,for example, fit into this category. Such companies can demand and get states to change their taxation or
Understanding National security
13
investment policies by simply promising to add new jobs in a given state. Conversely, those same companies can threaten to remove capital or jobs in order to coerce the state into making changes in their favour. Other actors have also emerged and play roles in the area of social and environmental issues. Aggressive environmental groups such as Greenpeace have focused attention on, and have been responsible for state law changes or mo~ificationsin issues such as fishing, whaling, and pollution. While the academic community may be split on the issue of vvhether non-state actors are capable of weakening or changing the role of the state, one thing is clear. Non-state actors can cause events to happen which si~r~ificantly alter the policies of states. The best answer to the quesrion of state versus non-stare power may lie in momentum. Who is making the action, who is reacting, and who is maintaining the rno~nentum? The entity that is acting and causing the other entity to react clearly has the upper hand. Whatever the view on state power, it is clear that non-state actors such as al-Qaeda and Hizbollah can set their own agendas and cause states to react.
2.4 global and local identities While globalization is on the agenda of many, other processes are at work that frequently escape public discussion, but are nonetheless relevant to national security issues. One of these issues is the politics of identity. The modern state has worked hard to try to ensure that its citizens identity themselves with their state. Patriotism and nationalism are a part of this process and goal. However, sociologists, political scientists and informed observers have noted a change in many developed states, particularly since the lC38Os. ~ndividualsare frequently losing or distancing themselves from their “state identity” and choosing to identify with non-state groups instead. It is to these groups that the individuals then give their primary loyalty and obedience. Radical jihadists, organized street gang members, and organized crime figures all fit into this category. A drug cartel member may feel a greater sense of loyalty and association to his cartel brethren than his own state, which he frequently sees as the oppressor and enerny anyway. Many
14
RISK ASSESMENT AND HORIZON SCANNING
jihadists come to the radicalization process based on events in their own countries, and their goals are to overthrow the government in that country. This is to say that they may not identify with their current government, but they still recognize the state as the political unit they want to control. I-lowever, another class of jihadists also exists, sometimes referred to as the home grown jihadists. Their identity and loyalties are not to their country of birth or even that of another country. Their identity is with the larger global community of jihadists whom they see as being oppressed brethren on a global basis and not just on a national level. The intent in this book is not to get into the whole issue of the politics of identity, or what other issues can attract the loyalty of individuals. But the issues are many and they include: gender, religion, race, politics, ethnicity, caste, sexual orientation, and physical disability. Even within those categories, there can be sub-categories that are in conflict with each other.
2.5 The Complex security Environment No clear theory exists that will explain what the role of the state will be in the future. As noted above, a number of theories exist on how issues such as globalization and technology will affect the state and society. However, whatever the theory, the state is now faced with trying to deal with a number of emerging issues while remaining competitive in a rather unforgiving marketplace.This is on the minds of many politicians, bureaucrats, and academics. It should also be on the minds of intelligence personnel on a daily basis. The international security envi~onmentshows every sign of becoming more complex and uncertain. Separatist movements, state failures, and decolonization have increased the number of states from 51 in 1945 to 192 UN recognized states in 2006, plus the Vatican, Taiwan and other anornalies. Technology has greatly changed both comm~~nications and t~anspo~tatior~, both of which are providing security challenges to the state. Most inte~esting, and perhaps the most challenging is that power is devolving in some cases rather than evolving as it relates to threats to the state. Previously, it took a military force organized by the state to constitute a major threat to most states. In the not so distant future, small groups or even an individual may
Understanding National security
15
be able to produce bioiogical or chemical weapons or even radiological devices such as dirty bombs.This will give them the ability to directly threaten the state, thus compounding the state's security problems to an even greater degree. This is a worrisome trend. It can be dangerous to extrapolate too far, but current indicators suggest that non-state actors, small groups, or even individuals may soon be able to take on a strategic role and influence state behavior a t that level. The attacks of 9/11 highlight this trend as does the conflict between the state of Israel (a UN recognized state) and Hizbollah (a non-state actor). Most interesting in the case of the 2006 Israeli-Hizbollah conflict was the lack of a clear winner or loser in the conflict. This does not bode well for the future security of the state, as a long established sovereign state was not able to fully express its will over a nor)state actor.
2.6 The Asymmetric Threats The definition of what constitutes power in the international system is changing. Most political scientists and other observers generally view the state as the primary unit of analysis in the international arena. This is still true in many respects, but surprisingly, small groups of individuals or even single individuals now have the power and capability to affect major change at the international level. The most glaring example of this is the 9/11 attacks whereby it can be argued that 19 men quite literally provided the pivot point around which history changed. Other small groups have also had a huge impact, such as the four London bombers of 7 July 2005 or the Bali bombers in 2002. These types of attacks, whereby a small group of individuals attack a much larger power, are frequently called asymmetric attacks. Much debate
16
RISK ASSESMENT AND HORIZON SCANNING
exists in academic circles as to what constitutes an asymmetric relationship. In general it can be stated that the perpetrators of an asymmetric attack avoid attacking the strongest points of their adversaries while seeking to exploit vulnerabilities in the weakest points. At the same time an implicit premise exists that there is an element of surprise not just in the timing of the attack, but also in i t s method, means and goals. Lying behind many asymmetric attacks is the expectation by the attacker that while the attack itself may go as planned, one attack by itself will not achieve success. Rather, the perpetrators of the attack expect that many attacks will be required over a long period of time to break down the will of the stronger power. Victory, for the attacker, comes not from battlefield success, but instead d gradual wearing down of the will of the stronger power. David A. Charters is the Director of the University of New Brunswick's Centre for Conflict Studies, and is also the Executive Editor of its Journal of Conflict Studies. Seen from the historian's point of view, he examines asymmetric threats in the following way:
"They circumvent fhe state's militcrry strength, und try to 'decapitcrte' or (~ndermine government by using covert violence, corruption, and di5rupti~n to attack or exploit a country's 'cenferr of gravity' and critical infrusrruc~ure5."~ History is replete with examples of asymmetric conflicts that have been won by the weaker power. The Vietnamese drove both the French and the Americans out oftheir homeland. Algeria defeated the French and the Soviet Union was forced to retreat in humiliation from Afghanistan. Hizbollah has successfully driven American, Israeli and French forces out of Lebanon (1 982 to 2000). The actDr5 that carry out asymmetric amcks can be both state level (Vietnam) and non-state level (al-Qaeda and Hizbollah) actors. The current national security problems for most states do not derive from the state level threats. It is the non-state actors that are creating most of the mayhem. 'For this and further informationon asymmetric threats and non-traditional security see David A. Charters, "Canadian Foreign Policy, Terrorism, and Non-Tradiri~n~l Security Threats: Temporary Aberration or Permanent Condition?"It is availableon the website of the Canadian Defence and ForeignAffairs Institute at: http://www.cdfai.org.
Understanding National security
17
Asymmetric attacks are generally associated with terrorism and political violence. To reduce it to its most basic, terrorisrn and political violence exist for simple reasons. If the state cannot provide a suitable level of economic and social protection for those living on its territory, then those groups which can promise a brighter future or salvation will prosper. The "cause" will attract adherents locally and iriternationally who are willing to perform attacks against stronger opponents. An asymmetric conflict cannot be won with brute strength or firepower. Knowledge, experience, and organization are the major assets needed to survive and prevail in an asymmetric conflict. Technology itself is not necessarily an asset either. Rather it is often a major v~~lnera~~ility. Secrecy, so loved by intelligence services and by governments themselves, is the ally of the weaker power and the enemy of the stronger. Secrecy is also the enemy of knowledge, and with knowledge being the only real weapon against an asymmetric threat such as terrorism, the developed nations who still have large secret bureaucracies are making the problem more difr'icu1.t for themselves, What of other non-traditional threats that are emerging? Other nontraditional threats or re-emerging threats may also be fit into the asymmetric mold or need to be considered in the national security matrix of threats as well. Among the most obvious (beyond transnational terrorism) are t~ansna~io~al organized crime and cyber-terrorism. However, a long list of other threats exists such as pandemics, re-emerging disease threats such as tuberculosis, supply chain fragility, resource price and supply shocks, environmental changes, and economic rrieltdowns such as the 1997 Asian econornic crisis. Many of these threats are of a nature whereby the probability of such an event is relatively low, but the physical, social, economic, and political costs ofthe impact would be disproportionately high. Of all of the threats listed in this chapter, the only ones that have a potential for mass casualties are tiansnational terrorism and pandemics.
18
RISK ASSESMENT AND HORIZON SCANNING
2.7 Transnational organized Crime as aNational security Threat Organized crime of a domestic nature is not a new issue for law enforcernent and intelligence agencies. Most local and national level institutions have become familiar with the nature of its activities (drugs, prostitution, smuggling, money launder~ng,murder for hire, etc.). "Old fashioned" organized problem is a criminal and social issue, but it /s not necessarily a nationai security issue. However, new developments in trans~Jafiona1organized crime call this into question. Consider the following:
Today we are a world in which trunsnational criminal gungs have rnore one^ better c~mputers,better information and vastly more motivati~nto act and to act ruthless^ thun most states. Perhaps even more fri~htening, we face a world /n ~ h i we c ~are allowing technology and ljmited pohcy ~jnderstandin~ to create very ~ i g n i ~ c a masses nt of disposed and u / i e n a ~ ~ d sizeable elements v~ithinour own borders; und at p ~ ~ p ~ ~ a t-i o nincluding s ?he s(sme time we ore igno~ingour ~ o v e r n m e nobl~gations ~~ to provide for home defence and for electronic defence in the private sector."' Transnational organized crime has prospered greatly since the end of the Cold War and the period of rapid globalization that occurred a t roughly the same time. Cri~n~nal networks have been able to take advantage of improved technology, weaker border controls, ethnic and regional conflicts, and new growth in financial markets. The newer tran~nationalorganized crimes groups also tend to have different structures than the older organized crime groups. The new t~ans~~ational groups tend to be more fluid, networked, and form associations
for the purposes of convenience and profit. This is in sharp contrast to the older organized crime networks that were ohen family led, strictly hierarchical in nature, and relatively stable in their areas of interest.The newer tran~nation~l ~ ~ ~ acrime n i networks ~ e ~ also lack the structure and o r g a r ~ ~ z a t0f~ othe ~ older networks and at the same tirne, they operate across more inte~n~tional
'Robert David Steel?,On /nte//f~ence Spw and Secrecy fn an Open World, O S S International Press, Oaktori Viiyinia, 2001, page 194
Understanding National security
19
boundaries.Therefore, the newer groups are harder for intelligence and law enforcement agencies to track and prosecute. As with the other forms of asymmetric threats, however, a response to them is required by the state and it will fall wholly or partly into the realm of national security intelligence to deal with this issue. Knowledge is only answer to dealing with such forms of activity. At least in the short to medium term, the outlook for states dealing with asymmetric threats is not positive. By their very nature, those people who attempt asymmetric attacks are exploiting known weaknesses. A t the current time, those weaknesses appear to be multiplying for a number of reasons. Among those reasons are:
a. ~ ~ ~ ~~ @ ~ ~~ For ~ ~instance, p ~ a /the n ~improvements ~ ~ ~ ~ . ~in computer i n technology mean that technological crime can affect more people faster.
b. % n g @ P n Q ~ ~ ~ p ~ / I r cLaw B ~enforcement ~ ~ P ~ ~ i ~ pagencies . are improving and work well in sorne areas. In others, however, they remain weak. With respect to intelligence flows, however, the sharing between states remains limited and the knowledge required (which is the only useful weapon) does not flow easily. Perhaps even worse is the issue of internal intelligence flows. Intelligence agencies within one country do not necessarily communicate with others in their own country. Numerous failures, such as the 9/11 attacks, were due to both inte~nationalintelligence sharing failures and domestic sharing failures. c. ~ ~ ~ e / and g ~k w g ~~ ~~ e ~~ Q ~~n~~~~~~~ P ~ @ The ~ intelligence @ ~ ~ and law enforcement agencies do not have the same roles in all countries. What may be a law er~fo$cement issue in one country may be the provenance of an intelligence agency in another. The international diplomatic system, with it series of attaches and liaison officers is frequently frustrated by a lack of what could be called interoperability and the refusal of some intelligence agencies to deal with police and judicial agencies.
d. Legal ~~~~i~~~~ What constitutes legal "proof" in one country may not constitute proof in another. Given the nature of asymmetric activity, it is a rare case when there is a"smoking gun"that will rise to the level of absolute proof in all jurisdictions.
20
RISK ASSESMENT AND HORIZON SCANNING
e. Ski// sets. Sad as it is to say, the skill sets of criminal and terrorist organizationsare sometimes more highly developed than that of government bureaucracies. Modern transnational crime and terrorist groups frequently have highly educated individuals working for them who function under the double pressures of performance requirements which can be high (leadership pressure from above) and the fear of getting caught. Some bureaucracies, on the other hand, tend to rotate persons around from job to job with little to no focus on skills sets, training or responsibility for performance.
2 4 current stste Tesponses ~~~~~~~
~~~~~
Given all the changes in the role of the state arid the problems it faces, how do we in general assess the response of the state? Like rnost other problem areas, there is good news and bad news. There are four key problems with current gotvernmental structures and processes, which are in fact common to almost every state.“ The first issue is the over-dependence on the “centre”- normally the institutional apex of ministries and agencies - to collect, analyze and contro! the incoming information that the state needs to operate. In today’s world the centre simply cannot cope with the multitude of incorning information. To adapt successfully it must more effectively decentralize intelligence collection, analysis and control to as near the street level as possible and becorne more of a policy guidance and senior decision- making operation instead. This process of “intelligence decentralization” must take place not only within t h e overall governmental ”centre” outward to the ministries and agencies, but within the ministries and agencies as well. In one Canadian municipal police force, for example, emergency phone operators and dispatchers are being trained to become aware of unusual incidents that may involve terrorism or other national security-related incidents, no matter how rninar the issue. When they do notice an unusual pattern or event, a ‘Large parts of rhis section were originally published a t the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies a t the Nanjiang Technological University in Singapore. For the full text of the article, see “Singapore‘s
DarwinianImperative: Survival in a Complexand UncertainWorld,” Kuniar RamakrishnaandTom Quiggin, IDSS commentary 29/06,28April 2006 at: http://www.idss.edu.sg/publications/Perspective/lDSS0292006. pdf
Understanding National security
21
notation is passed to the force's intelligence section for analysis and possible follow-up. This example runs contrary to that of most, but it is an excellent example of what can be done effectively and simply. The second problern is that of expanding the understa~~ding of the kinds of signals in the environment that may well have a security implication. In the past it was reckoned that it was sufficient for the defence, home affairs and foreign ministries to focus on security threats while the non-security agencies focused on conventiona~issues such as public health, trar~s~o~tation and community relations. Today, the boundaries are not that cut and dried: a seemingly innocuous flu outbreak may well be a bioterrorist attack. Buses and trains may be subjected to terrorist bombs. Radical religious ideas may be circulating within the body politic, undermining community ties and fuelling radical recruitment. The upshot of all this is that the business of preserving national security today is now the preserve of both the traditional security as well as the non-security agencies. The third problem is that of institutional "stove-piping".This refers to the deepiy entrenched habit of government agencies the world over of operating in "information silos" detached from one another, even if they are working in say, the same national security dornain. Part of the reason for this stovepiping is sheer bureaucratic rigidity. Organizations are hierarchical and information tends to flow vertically from the street level to the apex, rather than horizontally. Another reason for this institutional stove-piping is more banal: bureaucrats in any domain tend to jealously guard information from one another. Whatever the cause, institutional stove-piping is no laugh in^ matter. The 9/11 Commission Report, put out by the U S Congress in 2004, demonstrates in detail how the inability of the CIA, the FBI and other US national agencies to coordinate and act on intelligence in a timely and effective manner played a role in the catastrophic intelligence failure that led to the attacks on September 11, 2001. The fourth problem area runs hand in hand with the issues of silos and stove-piping. This is the issue of mindsets. Virtually every intelligence failure (and policy failure) froin Pearl Harbor to 9/11 was attributable to some extent to rnindset problems. Whether it is an inaccurate view of reality, the refusal to deal with change, leadership pathologies, or the sycophants who surround leaders who have lost touch, the mindset problem is critical.
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RISK ASSESMENT AND HORIZON SCANNING
The problem, as can be seen here, is very much an all-of-government problem. Therefore, the response that is required is an all-of-gove~n~ent issue as well. Networked government is part of the answer.
2.9 The Future Role of National Security The state cannot eliminate risk for itself, its citizens or those national and international businesses that operate on its territory.To expect this to happen under even the most ideal circumstances would be delusional. The state will continue to face a number of threats from other states, political extremists, transnational organized crimes, natural disasters, man made disasters, market forces and environ~entaldegradation. The role of national security is to support the state and its interests while protecting it against threats. This role is expanding and will continue to expand, regardless of the wishes or plans of those involved. Senior leaders and policy makers will have to deal with these problems as they arise. By extension, national security intelligence will have to deal with ail of these issues as well. National security intelligence agencies will have to change and adapt quickly in the future in time periods measured in weeks or months. They will also have to reach outside their own institu~ionalboundaries to find the knowledge they need to rneet the challenges. If national security related intelligence agencies cannot assist the state by anticipating the types of problems that are coming over the horizon, they will face the threat of becoming redundan.t or will be relegated behind will those non-intelligence or ~~~~~
private organi~at~ons that can provide anticipatory warning
Chapter 3
The complex and Uncertain
International security Environment Newspaper headlines are filled with stories about the thredt of nuclear terrorism, biological attacks, and possible chemical accidents resulting in the deaths of thousands. Horror stories abound about everything from missing Soviet era nuclear weapons to biological labs being built in the apartments of radical jihadists. Rogue states may have long range missiles with nuclear warheads and trar~sriationalterrorists may be plotting to send a nuclear warhead into the heart of a city‘s harbor by hiding it in a 40 foot sh~pping container. Suicide terrorists lurk behind every wall or tree and hand held missiles shoot down unarmed civilian airliners. On top of these potential disasters, we are also told about pandemics that could kill millions, just like the Spanish Flu pandemic of 1918 that killed some 20 to 40 million people in a matter of months. Then there are fears of computer hacker attacks that could knock out our electrical power and phones. Global warming may now affect our weather and climate. Old nuclear reactors might produce another Chernobyl like disaster. On top of all of this, we might be running out of oil and water. Are we living in an “Age of Fear”? And if so, how do we even begin to deal with the threats and risks that are “out there”? In order to be able to work with a complex and uncertain inte~national ~ ~ v i ~ o n m eitn its, worth the effort to understand some of the terms and ideas. As such, this chapter will first identify a number of key t e r m and
RISK ASSESMENT AND HORIZON SCANNING
24
definitions, and then move on to deal with the new threat environment. The chapter will be structured in the following way: 1. Definitions of key terms such as threat, risk, vulnerability, fear and risk
2. 3.
4.
5.
managemer~t; A description of the types of threat actors that are in play and how these varied actors require a different type of intelligence response; An introduction to the concept of fragility in developed states and why this concept is of increasing importance to national security intelligence analysts; An example of converging technology trends that should serve as a warning to future problems in national and transnational terrorism and organized crime; and A description of complexity and why predictability is not possible in our in~ernationa~ system, despite the views that have been expressed by many people over, literally, centuries.
3.1 Threats Risks and vulnerablity One of the most difficult problems in dealing with national security is the issue of understanding the difference between a threat and a risk. Unfortunately, these two terms are often used interchangeably. Consider the following two hypothetical statements:
“There is a threat being developed by terrorists to use nuclear weapons against us and we cannot ignore this kind of risk,” and,
“We have never lived under such great threats before in our his tor^^ Both of these statements suggest that we should be afraid of something, but neither statement by itself is useful to intelligence analysts or policy makers because they lack clarity or any real indication of the level of action that needs to be taken. Let us first look at the term threat, and then compare it to risk. A threat can be defined in a number of ways, but for the purposes of national security
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intelligence, it can be put this way: A ,threat is a potential for an individual or a group (source) to exercise (accidentally or intentionaily) an action which exploits a vulnerability. The key term here is potential.' The use of the term threat does not automati~allyimply any actual level of how much danger exists. For instance, one could say that there is a threat that transnat~on~l terrorists could obtain weapons grade plutonium and use it 'to contaminate a major port .facility or a passenger transit hub such as Victoria Station in London, UK. In today's age, this is in fact a possibility. But to say something is a "threat" is actually meaningless to decision makers. Just because there is a "threat"doesnot mean there is actually any real chance of it happening. Therefore the threat $0~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~bxpkl~ ~ i 3 n statement is meaningless as it provides no indication of what action should be taken. This brings us to the term risk. While there may be a potential for tra~~snational terrorists to obtain such dangerous materials and then deploy them in a contaminatior~attack, what is the actual probability .that this wili happen?This is the concept of risk. Risk, therefore, can be defined as the ~~robab~lity of ha~mfu~ consequences arising from an action taken by a source to exploit a known vulnerability.This can be expressed in a number of ways, but one cornniorily used statement is that risk is equal to .the severity of the consequences multiplied by the probability of the event occurring. Therefore, the term risk, when used in its proper context, can be ~eaningful to policy makers as it implies a course of action or reaction that can he taken by them. Statements such as the two hyporheticals above are not reaily useful because they offer no insights to policy makers beyond the obvious. ~~~~~
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'Part of this definitiori was taken from hMp~/www.disastercenter.corn/t@rror/~~-risk.ht~. See this site for more discussion on threats and risks
26 RISK ASSESMENT AND HORIZON SCANNING The issue of vulnerability frequently comes u p in be the Of relation to threats and risks. from ar\ o n c e again, however, ken by ld %8jrce to (a confusion about the use of fity. A risk ~~~~~~~~~t the terms and their meaning causes a hck of focus and ~~~~S~ of or ~~~~~~O~ that unhelpful actions. Simply put, vulnerability is a flaw or weakness that can he exploited by an attacker. It can be a weakness that is a result of a rnanmade situation, such as weaknesses in software programs that allow for easy hacking. It can also he a natural vulnerability, such as a long coastline of a sparsely populated country which is vulnerable to smuggling. As with the concept of threat, there is frequently confusion with vulnerah~lity.A vulnera~il~ty on a website may allow hackers to deface the site or take control of the banners.While this is embarrassing, it is not critical to the core interests of the website. If, however, the vulnerability allows hackers to enter the website and remove the credit card information of the customers, then this is a critical vulnera~ility.With policy makers, it is necessary that intelligence assessments make a pairing between the vu~ne~ability, and the actual consequences of the action. Without the distinction, policy makers may take unnecessary actions to protect minor vulne~abilities~ while a t the same time developing a sense of "fatigue" in responding to issues. Crying wolf on minor issues will cause policy makers to ignore larger issues when they arise later. 1Ve live in an Age of Fear? This is an unfortunate reality. While marly societies have become increasingly risk aversive a t any rate, the terrorist events of the 1990s and the 9/11 attacks have changed the way our societies operate. ~~~~~~
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'Most of the information presented here on fear is adapted from the work by Dr. Arriitav Acharya at the Institute of Defence and Stratqic Studies, Manyang Technological University,Singapore. Fur further e information on fear and power in politics, see Arnitav Acharya, Age offear: Power versus ~ r i f l c j ~in/fhe War on Terror, Marshall Cavendish International, Singapore, 2004
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The various government led discussions on terrorism, and the climate of fear they have created, have drowned out or blurred almost all other threat issues a t a time when numerous other problems should be receiving attention. The years since the 9/11 attacks have produced three main kinds of fear. The first and most obvious is the fear of an attack itself. Given the global nature of the attacks and their seeming randomness, it is not irrational to be fearful on an airplane, on a subway or at a crowded market area. Another form of fear is fear of the "hegemonic"or imperial state. Many governments have used the climate of fear to justify a whole series of security actions, many of which have little or nothing to do with terrorism itself. And lastly, there is the enhancement of the fear of a "surveillance state." While it is the private cornpanies who probably abuse privacy the most, the ongoing fear of the state having the ability to monitor private citizens on a constant basis has been increased since 9/11. Froen a national security point of view, two critical issues fall out of the discussion on fear. First 0% power does not defeat fear. The United States is the most powerful nation on earth and has a military capability to strike anywhere. At the same tirne, it is one of the rnosr fearful states. Fear can only be defeated by knowledge, experience and organization, It cannot be defeated by firepower or coercion. More power wiil not defeat fear as the relationsh~pbetween the two forces is asymmetric in the first place. In the case o f terrorism, a s methodology and not a ~~~~~~~-~ FEAW force, the terrorists have resorted to their violent veat attacks precisely because and expe they are the weaker party are the ~~~~~~~~~~, in the conflict. The second issue of concern to national security relating to fear is that of distortion. We are repeatedly given statements such as "terrorism is the greatest threat of our times" or "terrorism is the greatest threat to civil society." Is this actually the case? Terrorism can kill dozens or hundreds or even thousands of people at one tirne, yet a flu pandemic could kill millions. Cigarettes kill millions ~~~~~~~~~~~~~
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28 RISK ASSESMENT AND HORIZON SCANNING while small arms are the greatest single source of violent death on a global basis. Resource shortages and economic disparities create both wars and famines. Organized crime is spreading fast under the cover of terrorism and it is penetrating legitimate businesses and governments. Clearly terrorism is important, mainly because of its ability to drive wedges into civil society and to tear apart the social fabric of multi-cultural societies. But it is by no means the greatest or only threat. ~Jnfortunately,intelligence agencies and others have focused on terrorism at the expense of other threats. This kind of distortion, especially in budget and resource areas, is a type of threat to national security itself. Ironically,this inadvertently plays directly terrorist groups: weakening societies by creating a Given the climate of fear, and the seemingly uniimited sources of risk (used in its proper context), how are the intelligence and law enforcement agencies of the state to respond?“Risk management” is a term used by many, but the lack of clarity in the national security context is rather shocking when it is examined. Large carporations are responsible to shareholders and they live in great fear of unforeseen issues that wipe out profits. As such, they go through a process of identifying their assets, their personnel, and their activities. Following that, they identify the localized or globalized threats to their companies. The results are put on a matrix and those high probability threats that carry hiyh potential for losses (i.e., high risk) are dealt with first. The vulnerabilities that caused the threats are addressed and therefore the risk is lowered. Following that, lower probability issues are assessed (along with their potential for losses) and they are addressed later. Again, it may come as a shock to many people both inside and outside of the national security and i n t e l ~ i ~ e ~communities ce that most countries have never gone through the exercise of doing a national level risk assessment. The risk assessment process tends to be disjointed and focused more on
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ind ivid ua I issues (crime, terrorism, threat of invasion) and do not take an overall view. As such, national security priorities are never id~ritifiedand the responses t o them tend to be unfocused and driven by the "flavour of the month" approach c)r whatever issue will yet the most funding in the next budget. Resources and manpower are limited. As such, ~ o v ~ r n ~ r ~ ealready nts, operating under d i ~ c u lcircumstances t cannot afford unnecessary distractions caused by waste. Consider the following statements from a ~ o v e r n t Accoiintability Office (GAO) reports on threat assessments:
"What is important about intelligence agency threat assessments is the very critical distinction between what is conceivable or possible and what is lik~ly in terms of the threat of a terrorist attack. Some of the public s~a~e~nents mude by intel/igence ~ommunityofficials about the terrorist CBRN threa~do not i n ~ l u d ei m p o r ~ a nqualifications ~ to the informatio~they present. Rased upon our reading of the classified threat documzrirs, such as national intelligen~eestimates, such qualifications include the fidelity and a m o u n ~of credible intelligence, the terrorists' in tentions versus their capa~ilities,w h e t t ~ ~ r the target is m i l i ~ or a ~ivilian, ~ whe~herthe target is inte~nationalor d ~ m ~ s ~ i ~ ant? whether the enemy is a government or terrorists w i t ~ o u foreign t ~overnmentsponsors hi^. ~ i t h o uthe t benefits that a threat and risk assessmefit pr~vides,many a ~ e n ~ i have e s been relying on worst case scenarios to generate countermeasures or establish their programs. Worst case scenarios are exireme 5ituation.s and, as such, may be out of balance w i ~ hehe threat. In our vie&% by using worst case scenarios, the federal g o v e r n ~ e n tis fo~usingon vulrierabilities ~ w h i care ~ i unlimited} rather than credible threats ~ ~ t i i are ch ' S e e the IJS ~overr~~7ient's report of GAO/T-NSIAD-OO-l45, Cornhating 72rrorisrn: lssires in M ~ n u ~ i n ~ ~ ~ u n f ~ f ~ ~Programs, f f o f i s ~Statement of Norrnaii J. Rabkin, Director National Security Preparedness lssiies, National Security and International Affairs Division Testimony before the Svbconimittee on Clversiglit l n ~ ~ s ~ ~ and a t ~Emergency ns, ~~nagerflent, Committee (~n'rra~spor~a~iofl and lri~rastru~ure, I-louse of Representatives Urlited States General Accounting Office. It is available through the GAO ofice or it can be found on the on the World Wide Web at: http~/~~ww.gao.gov/arcl-ii~e/2000/ns0014fjt. pdf.
30 RISK ASSESMENT AND HORIZON SCANNING lirnited~.By targeting investments bnsed on worst case scencrrios, the ~overnmer)t may be over f u n ~ i some ~ g jni~iativesand ~rogramsand under fundjn~ the more likely threats the country will face. These types of ~ u a l i ~ c a t j o n . ~ are important because, without them, decision makers in both the executive or legislative branch may get an exaggerated view of the terrorist threat"
As such, what a risk actually is, as distinct from a threat, is frequently overlooked and the responses are - to put it politely -- inadequate.
3.2 Types of Threat Actors Multiple threat actors exist in the international environment and the national security intelligence agencies must be prepared to contend with all of them a t one level or another. Some of the threat actors are decidedly high technology forces, while others could be referred to as low technology brutes. it is not easy to categorize or identify them all, but Robert David Steele' has provided one such categorization which is useful for thinking about the problem. He uses four classes of threat actors as a means of generating an understanding of how to deal with the threat e n v ~ ~ o n r ~ e n t . The four classes he identifies are: a. b. c. d.
High Technology Brutes, High Technology Brains (technology, and knowledge based), Low Technology Brutes, and Low Technology Brains (ideological and culture based).
Let us consider each one of the types of threats in turn and consider the problems that will arise in dealing with them from a national security intelligence point of view. 'This section on Types of Threat Actors draws heavily and almost exclusively from Robert Steele. He has written extensively on the issue of the various classes of threat that exist or are emerging. See, f t iWar o ~ And The Future Of The Corps, among many others, for further information: The 7 ~ f f n ~ f o r ~ fOf Mzjor Robert David Steele, USMCR, 28 April 1992, available at: http~/www.well.com:70/0/MiIitary/4_. warriors. See also "The Asymmetric lhreat: Listening to the Debate,"Joint Forces Quarterly, Auturnnl Winter 1998-1 999, pages 78 to 84 which is also available on the World Wide Web at: http://www.well. corn:~O/O/~iIit~ry/4-~arriors. See also Robert Steele, 017 /nre//igence,Spies andSeirecyin on Open World, OSS International Press, Oakton Virginia, October 2001.
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a.High Technology Brutes. This is the Threar that most intelligence personnel imstinctively understand and they have been the traditional state-to-state ~~~~
threat for the last several hundred years. The examples of this kind of threat are the conventional state powers that have organized military forces. These states are equipped for, and practice, medium and high intensity warfare. The forces they use are complex, expensive and require extensive logistics support to keep them in the field. The source of the power of these states is taxation and conscription or highly paid volunteer armies. They depend on technology for their effective communica~ionsand intelligence. Their precision targetir~gof munitions provides them with some effectiveness. Unfortunately for such states, the balance of power is shifting away from state supported organized forces and moving towards autonomous groups with electronic support and towards single individual or small groups who can target complex systems which are difficult to defend. In many ways, the capability of states no longer matches such threats. b. Low ~~~~~~~~~yBrutes. These are the types of threat actors that first began to prominently emerge in the 1980s and 1990s. Two of the best examples of this type of threat are the drug cartels and traditional old style organized crime (Sicilians and Albanians are current examples).These types of organization practice criminality and conflict at a low-intensity level.Their source of power is their ruthlessness and their ability to create ambiguity and unanticipated scenarios.They rely on natural stealth and random targeting for their effect. Tracking them is the classic needle-in-a-haystack problem and they use randomness of both methods and objectives to frustrate physical or electronic surveillance. They have wealth and a steady supply of expendable individuals to use a t the front lines of their operations. They do not necessarily have a supporting ideology or belief structure, beyond that of profit. However, at least in the short term, their capabilities match their goals and requirements.
32 RISK ASSESMENT AND HORIZON SCANNING c. Low ~~~~~~~~~y These groups may pose the largest and most significant problem t o national security intelligence agwxies for the foreseeable future. They are reliant on popular appeal to the masses and are relatively impervious to attacks from higher technology forces, especially ifthe attdcking forces do not maintain the ideological and moral high ground. It is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to defeat such a forte using only brute force. They can only be defeated by a comprehensive ideological, moral, and cultural catnpaign that wins support away from the grass roots. The bottom line of their support is actually rather simple. If the existing institution^ (i.e., the state) are not providing a degree of economic and social stability, then the low technology "brain" groups can receive support by promising the masses a form of either salvation or comfort in the future. These groups also attempt to dominate the moral arena, and when they can they have a powerful persuasive force at their disposal that can move their members to undertake spectacular feats against more powerful opponents. Their ability to create amb~guiryand confusion is a major capability. like many other non-state violent actors, they have also become expert5 at exploiting legal loopholes in various states and will ofken rnake their international plans accordingly. These kinds of groups are not adverse to using high technology and it serves them. But their strength comes from brute force attacks such as bombings, hijackings or assassinations, not from sophisticated attacks such as computer viruses or hacking into bank mzounts. It is still not clear if their capabilities will clearly match their goals and r~quirementsin the long run, but in the short term, they appear to be successful. ~~~~~~~
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d. ~j~~ ~ @ These ~ types of ~ threat actors ~ are associated ~ with ~ high end hackers who hack for monetary profit, friendly and unfriendly nations that practice economic espionage, transnational corporat~onsthat are linked to or operated by organized crime, money launderers for drug cartels, and similar groups and individuals.~heypractice i n f o ~ m a ~ warfare, ~on have knowledge as their source of power, and rely on cyber stealth and data~asetargeting for their effect. Individual hackers are r~lative~y untouchable, especially if they operate across state borders. It is worth noting that high end hackers can exist and operate in states which are otherwise seen as being low technoiogy environments. As a general rule, their capabilities are w e ~ l - ~ a t c h etod their goals and requirements.
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As can be seen from the four categories above, each type of threat possesses a different set of skills and capabilities. Each category also requires a different sort of response,This constitutes a serious problem for the national security intelligence community. Intelligence requirements and capabilities against the high technology brutes are -- on average - fairly well developed in most states. The intelligerice institutions of many states were designed arid funded with foreign threats in mind and have developed accordingly. Not only that, the structure and organization of the intelligence agencies themselves usually mirrors the structure and organization of the states that are perceived to be d threat. As with the high technology brutes, intelligence capabilities for working against low technology brutes are reasonably good in most states. Long practice and experience have built up a knowledge base on how to work against low technology organized crime,These organizations (frequenrly family based) also have a predictable structure and organization which facilitates intelligence collection against them. The most problematic intelligence problern is that of the low technology brdins. Dealing with this form of political violence and terrorisrn is fundame~tallydifferent and more complicated than even previous forms of terrorism. Previous experience with terrorist groups such as the Irish ~epub~ican Army or the Bader-Mienhoff Gang may not be of direct use. In the past, many such terrorist groups developed a clear structure and o~gani~ation which could be mirrored by intelli~enceor law enforcement agencies. Such groups also had political agendas that were relatively clear. As such, designing an intelligence collection program to operate against them was a straight forward (albeit difficult) task. Why make a distinction between groups of the past and the threat posed by contemporary terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda and other such
group^?^ Even though al-Qaeda had a relatively clear structure and organization, it lacked a direct political agenda.The destruction of the House of Saud and the removal of American troops from Muslim majority lands may have been ________^.
...
31hisextract is taken from the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies Commntary Paper entitled “ ~ o n ~ ~ m pTerrorism ~ r a ~ yand intelligence^' by Sir Richard Dearlove and Torn Quiggin, 7 August 2006. It is available on the World Wide Web at: hbp~/~w.idss.edu.sg/pu bli~arions/Pe~specr~~~/lDSSOS22001j.
pdf.
34 RISK ASSESMENT AND HORIZON SCANNING
al-Qaeda goals, but it does appear that al-Qaeda was more about ideology than a specific agenda Due to the success of the attacks against al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and investigations in other countries, al-Qaeda has mutated. It no longer has a viable structure and organization nor does it have a clear political agenda other than some vaguely stated ideas about restoring a caliphate reaching from Spain to Indonesia. Recent attacks such as those in London, Madrid, and Mumbai have been planned, financed and executed by locally formed groups acting without central direction. These groups lack the structure and organization that was typical of earlier terrorist groups. The lack of defined structure and organization on the part of contemporary terrorist groups poses significant new intelligence collection challenges to intelligence and law enforcement organizations. Infelligence collection in the p a s t h a s been designed to confront other intelligence organizations, or to collect intelligence against organizations that have si m i Ia r hieia rchicaI structures. Conternporary terrorist groups do not have such structures; t h e re fo re i n t e I I ig e n ce collection efforts have to be recast in order to more closely mirror the groups they are working against.
3.3 The Fragility of the Developed ststes Fragility is not a term that is used often in discussing national security in many countries. However, it is increasingly apparent that modern developed societies are vulnerable due to the complexity of their infrastructure systems. This applies to energy supplies, communications, banking services, water, stock markets, air trafTic control systems and a host of other networks.
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Reduced to its most basic description, the fragility of our infrastructure systems is an unintended consequence of the nature and o r g a n i ~ a t ~ofo ~ our highly centralized technologies. We have built an interlocking series of supply and support services with no overall consideration for how vulnerable a system this process was creating.* On top of these problems, we have a series of other \/ulnerabilit~esbeing built into the system as well. The highly successful "just-in-time" delivery systems now mean that there is very little excess stock available should there be a supply disruption. While this may not be critical for DVD players or flat-screen TVs, the issue is critical when energy or food supplies are considered in some countries. As such, these highly complex systems are vulnerable with wide spread failures becoming increasingly likely. The major power outage in Auckland, New Zealand in 7 998 left some business without power for weeks. In August 2003, large portions of the American Midwest, Northeast and Ontario, Canada were lef? without power, Some 50 million people were affected due to a series of cascading grid failures that were not anticipated. In September 2003, another 60 million people were left without power in Italy, most likely due to a tree hitting a power line in Switzerland! Similar failures have occurred in London, UK (2003), Kuala Lumpur ( 2 0 0 3 ) , and numerous other areas. The reasons for failure in OUT fragile systems can be varied. Among the most common are acts of war or terrorism, atlacks from disgruntled former employees, technical failures, or weather. These technical factors are being aggravated by legislative factors
'For this arid further information on the issue of fragility, see Amory 8. Lovins and L. Hunter Lovins, 8rirr-lePower: Energy Struregy for ion^/ Security, Rocky Mountain Institute, Snowrnass, Colorado 1982. The book has been updated (2##1) and released on the internet and is available at: httpJ/wmv.rrni. or~jitepages/pidl#~ 1 ,php
36 RISK ASSESMENT AND HORIZON SCANNING such as deregulation and privatization, both of which are responsible for decreased investment in infrastri~ct~~re and tower levels of redundancy and maintenance. This fragility has not been lost on terrorists at both the narional and transnational level. In 1982, authors Amory B. Lovins and L. t-tunter Lovins noted that the disruption of energy supplies had become something of a fad with terrorists.7 Following an attack on a French oil tanker in 2002, Qsarna Bin Laden released a statement that cut to the heart of the matter: "the mujaheddin hit the secret line, the provision line and the feeding to the artery of the life of the crusader's nationl'Oil, in other words, is the lifeblood of many developed states and terrorists know this. Other attacks against oil and gas have occurred in Iraq, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, Nigeria, Iran, Pakistan, India and Russia. ~ n f o r t i ~ n a t ecurrent l~, developments suggest that fragility will continue to be a major issue. An ongoing drive for "efficiency" and profit means that r ~ ~ i ~ n d a are n c being ~ e ~ removed from marly systems. An increased amount oftech~ologica~ speciali~ationmeans that more systems are becorning fragile while at the same time, aging infrastructure such as power grids are becoming weaker due to age and overloads. From a national security intelligence point of view, this means more vulnerabilities that can be exploited.
3.4 Converging Technology Trends and the Threat Environment The intelligence community regularly monitors trends in technology to identify which of them may become either a threat or an asset to national security operations. What frequently gets missed by observers is the issue of convergence and adaptation. New threats often emerge not just from the d e ~ e l o ~ m eof n t one new technology, but rather from a cornbination of new technologies or an adaptation of new methods and uses for existing technologies. Fringe groups and small groups under pressure tend to be best at: cornbining new technologies or adapting them to uses for which their 'For more details in this ~rruesee Amory B Lovins and L Hunter Lovins, Rntlle Power Fnerqy S r r ~ f ~ g y br ~ ~ rSecurity, / ~Rocky ~ Mountain ~ ~ /Institute, Snowmass, Colorado T 982
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original desigriers did not envision. Two of the best examples of this are the 9/11 attack5 and the use of turntables by rap musicians. Jeff "Skunk Baxter IS a fcxmer rock guitar musician (The Doobie Brothers and Steely Dan) who now makes a living as a consultant to a number of major consulting firms, many of them connected to the American defence community. He states the case quite clearly when he notes, "We thought turntables were for playing records until rappers began to use them as instruments, and we thought airplanes were for carrying passengers until terrorists realized they could be used ds missiles."' While there are many examples of convergence, the following is a n explanatory example of one set of four trends that are already converging to create new national security problems. These four trends are: __.
1. i he uncontrolled spread of information and improved technologies to build better home made weapons; 2. The droppirig costs of technology and materiel acquisition; 3. The increased availability of raw materials to build weapons; and 4. The trend towards self-directed and self-funded terrorist attacks by locally formed terrorist groups using do-it-yourself (DIY) technologies.
Both the internet arid regular book publishers are increasingly becorning sources of information for DIY information on how to make all types of explosives. The internet is an excellent source of information for learning how to make home made weapons of all types. There is little to no effort made to control or suppress this information. Ironically, one of the most (in)famous ai-Qaeda training manuals, known frequently as the " ~ a r i c ~ e s t e ~ Manual"' is available on the internet at a site hosted by the United States Govc?rnrnen.tD e p ~ r t ~ ~ofeJustice." r~t It contains directions on how to make 'For further in~~rrnation on this see the article Rocker ieff Baxter M o m and Shakes In National Security. Once With Doobie Brothers, Now in Co~~ntertefrorisrr~, He Has Ear of Pentagon," by Yochi J. Dream$ Staff Reporter ofThe Wall Street Journal, 24 May 2005, page A l . 'This manual received the name the "Manchester Manua1"after it was found during the search of a suspected al-Qaeda member's house in Manchester, Uti. It was translated and entered as evidence during the"Ernbassy $ornbi~g"trialin New York in 2001. I@
See the United States Department of Justice website for a copy of the Manchester Manual at: http:// w\Nw.usdoj.gov/ag/manualpartl-1 .pdf.
38 RISK ASSESMENT AND HORIZON SCANNING a number of chemical and biological substances as well as offering guidance on "Assassinations Using Poisons And Cold Steel" (Lesson 16). Print manufacturers are useful as well, with a wide range of books available. Among the best of the older books for creating mayhem is the Anarchists Cookbook which is also now available in an updated web version." Among the newer and more dangerous books are examples such as Uncle Fester's Home Workshop Explosives. This book, which is available on Amazon. among other places, describes the process to man~~facture a number of different explosives using material that are easily available. Among the explosives described for home manufacture are: RDX, ammonium nitrate, acetone peroxide blasting caps, nitroglycol, nitromannitol, PETM and fuel-air explosives. In another book, Silent Death, the same author discusses how to manufacture biochemical weapons such as tabun and sarin gas, botulinum (botulin toxin), ricin, phosgene, and arsine. On top of the current explosives being manufactured, internet articles also discuss new explosive technologies such as superthermites and nano metals. Articles and manuals also exist for the DIY manufacture of the deadly poison ricin. This poison can be manufactured in your kitchen for less than twenty American dollars; provided the producer has access to normal kitchen equipment." This form of ricin production will create a powder that will field test positive for ricin. While the increasing availability of information about the home manufacture of weapons is increasing, the cost of technology is dropping for all consumers, including terrorists and those involved in activities such as organized crime. While the criminal elements can profit from lower costs of mobile phones, internet access and electronic products, they also have increased access to low cost technologies such as cell phone jammers. Among other things, cell phone jammers are useful for protecting remotely detonated bombs during the deployment phase. See the new version at: hrtp://~iome.tiscaIi.be/comicstrip/anarcoo~indariarcook.htrt~I
"See Amazon.com at: http:llv~ww.amazon.eom/Workshop-Explosives-Second-Uncle-Fester/ dp/0(370148.~2/sr-8-l/qid=1157446106/ref=sr~l~l/l02-2322972-418493~~ie~~F~~~b~~~s. 'is
The author conducted an informal experiment by purchasing the required items from a garden supply store and a drug store.7'he cost was less than twenty Aimerican dollars.The raw materials and the directions obtained from the internet were taken to a Level Three laboratory and were presented to lab experts on toxins. It was their opinion that the powder that wolrid have been produced would have field tested positive for ricin.
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Overall, the costs of conducting terrorist attacks are dropping rapidly. Loretta Napoleoni is an economist and long term expert on terrorist financing. In an interview with the BBC World Service she stated that: "Ifyou look at 911 ?,which cost only $500,000 to execute, and then you look at all the subsequent attacks that have taken place - going from Bali to lstanbul to ~ a ~to ~London i d - we actually see that the cost of the attacks is decreasing e x p o n e n t i ~ l ~ ' ~ The cost of the London bombing was estimated to be just a t or below one thousand dollars. The Madrid bornbings, just over a year earlier, were estimated to have cost some $10,000 while the cost of the Bali bombing (2002) was estimated to be around $35,000. Whatever the actual costs, the trend is clear that the costs of operations for carrying out such a major attack are dropping. Given the widespread availab~lityof information and raw materials, it is highly probable that the costs for terrorists will remain low while their lethality increases. The manu~actur~ of explosives and biochemical weapons requires access to a number of raw materials which were previously either hard to find or raised suspicions when ordered. This is changing as both the availability of raw materials is growing as is the understanding of materials that can be obtained from common commercial products. Aluminum powder, for instance, is now generally understood to be useful for increasing the power of ammonium nitrate explosives. This powder is ofteri available in a painter's shop. Another example is acetone which is used in the production of ricin. Rather than trying to obtain acetone directly, purchasers can buy nail polish remover which is available in any drug store or cosmetic shop. Information also exists on how to purify such useful ingredients as glycerin or how to synthesize nitric acid with ~ i n i m aequipment. l Due to the attacks against al-Qaeda in Afghanistan (2001 and 2002) and the large scale investigations and arrests in other countries, al-Qaeda is no longer the leading organization that is was in the 1990s. It no longer has a viable command and control system. The attacks in Mumba~(2006) London (2005),Madrid (2004, Istanbul (2003) and others were planned, financed . -
the BBC story"London bombs cost just hundreds" by Michael BuchananJuesday, 3 January 2006, 0O:OO GMT.
40 RISK ASSESMENT AND HORIZON SCANNING and executed by locally formed groups acting without central direction. These groups lack the structure and organization that was typical of the earlier al -Qaeda operations.The attacks do, however, demonstrate that locally organized, directed and funded groups are capable of launching high impact, low cost attacks with materials that are widely available. Other such &Tacks have been prevented.The arrests of eight British individuals and one Canadian on 28 March 2001 demonstrated that these”self starters” had a good working knowledge of ammonium nitrate and aluminum powder explosives which would have been highly destructive.7’ The London attacks of July 7th 2005 may be the best example of the convergence of the trends. The group in London did not receive its training, financing or equipment from al-Qaeda. They were self-starters who sought out their own involvement and were not “recruited”in the traditional sense of the term. The choice of targets was their own, albeit in line with the general aims of the ”economic jihadl’aimed a t inflicting the highest possible economic costs on the target country. At the same time, the London bombers appear to have made a sig~i~cant breakthroi~~h by using homemade TATP (triacetone triperoxide).This explosive has been used before by other more organized terrorist groups, but this may be the first example of a locally organized and funded group using DIY home made TATP successfully. The base ingredients for TATP are available in most states and can be bought as drain cleaner, bleach and acetone. Ail of these substances can be bought without raising suspicion from even a vig~lar~t observer. Based on these four trends alone, the outlook for national security operations is not positive. Terrorists, organized crime figures and others involved ira various forms of political violence may soon be able to widely produce “do it yourself” high explosives that have the same destructive capability as TNT or C4. At the same time, the technology for making home made fuel air bombs is also gradually becoming more popular and may also make its appearance during an act of political violence. The same can be said of biochemical products such as ricin or similar substances. While 1%
For a good overview of the CanadianAJK case, see the Ottawa Citizen story ~ n t i t I e d ” ~ 1 ~Khawaja n~in comtitutes the Canadian end of the conspiracy,” published on Thursday, 23 March 2006. httpJ/vvww. canada.com/ottawacitizc‘n/newslstory.html~id=~~~~2~d-d9~~)~4e~~-a4b~-392ebSfaaf34&k=75 162.
The complex and uncertain international security Environment
41
hard to weaponize, the use of such toxic substances, even a minor dispersion with minimal or no fatalities, would result in a huge disruption and high cleanup costs.
3.5 Complexity and Uncertalnty in the international systrm Leaders of all sorts want control over the organizations they lead and the environmer~tsin which they operate. This is especially true of national level decision makers involved in the field of national security. For leaders who are concerned with policy and operations in the international environment, the ability to control the factors that affect them is limited, and especially so for less powerful states. If they cannot have control, then leaders and decision makers want an understanding of the env~ronment,so as to avoid risk or damage. Part of this desire for control is clearly connected to the idea of predicting the future. Is it possible to predict future events that will be of concern to leaders and decision makers who work in the ever expanding field of national security? Simply put, it is not possible to predict the future, no matter how much data is obtained or how much human or machine processing is done. Multiple reasons exist for why is it is impossible to predict the future. Two of them are quite clear and easy to understand. The first one is that the variables we need to track for predictability are not constant arid they operate in an open system.The second one concerns the number of variables a t play and how many outcomes can occur with just a few variables. Many people still believe that if you understand why one intelligence failure occurred, you can take that information and prevent the next failure. This is a false assumption. The reality is that the international threat environment is an "open" system and there are multiple variabies that afTect each situation differently. You will get predictability in a system only if the exact same variables occur in the same order in the same env~ronment.'This will occur only in a closed system that operates in a controlled environment. However one conceives of the interriational threat er~virori~ient, it is not a closed system with constant variables.Therefore, the same set of circumstances will not occur and predictability based on past learning is not possible.
42 RISK ASSESMENT AND HORIZON SCANNING The other main problem with predictability is the issue of the number of variables a t play. The assessment process simply cannot capture the number of variables a t play and make sense of them. Consider an arialyrical problem where there are only four variables at play. To put the problem in a different light, consider that there are four variables and it is your job to "connect the four dots" in such a way that your intelligence consumers can understand the outcome of this connection. With only four dots to connect, there are six different ways of linking up the dots. With these four dots and six different links, it is then possible to see that there are sixty-four different possible patterns that could be formed. Your intelligence consumer can now see that there are sixty-four different ways of connecting the dots or sixtyfour different possible outcomes to a problem that has only four variables. An intelligence problem with only four variables is an unlikely event, however. Perhaps a more realistic intelligence analysis problem would have ten variables. How many different ways are there to connect the dots? The answer is quite startling. With only ten different dots to connect, there would be a total of forty-five different dot patterns that could be created. What is stunning, however, is that the ten dots and forty-five patterns can produce 3.47 trillion different outcomes. Needless to say, even with the most advanced computers, doing the calculations for 3.47 trillion different possibilities is a daunting task. Even this assumes that each variable can be reduced to a mathematical form so that the binary decision making process of a computer can handle the problem. At the end, all you would have is a report to your consumers that says there are a few trillion different possible outcomes. With all of this understood, it should be clear that each real world intelligence problem in national security is likely to have hundreds or maybe even thousands of different variables at play. The number of possible o ~ ~ t ~ o r nineas real world situation would be astronomic.
3.6 Predicting the Future It is not possible to predict the futLire.Tirne and resources which are expended in trying to do so are largely being wasted. This is not to say that the
The complex and uncertain international security Environment
43
intelligencecommunity at large should simply give up. The survival of some states and the prosperity of many depend on the states’ ability to react intelligently in a time of crisis. In the case of a major naturai disaster or large scale terrorist attack, it is not so much the event, but the reaction, that matters. Leaders and decision makers a t all levels need to react in the best possible way and they need to be informed ahead of time about the problems. While predicting the future is not possible, it is possible to anticipate the types of problems that are coming over the horizon before they arrive. This form of risk assessment and horizon scanning will be discussed in later chapters.
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Chapter4
Strategic Intelligence Assessment and surprise Attacks
Operating in the international environment is a complex task, requiring broad based expertise in a number of fields such as politics, economics, law, military affairs and psychology. In order to decide on how to act in crisis or in conflict "a person must predict how others will behave. If he seeks to influence thern, he needs to estimate how they will react to the alternative policies he can adopt."' The intended role of strategic intelligence assessment is to provide actionable knowledge or anticipatory warning to decision makers. The key word in this is actionable, or as otherwise stated: "Knowledge, if it does not determine action, is dead to us.? This actionable knowledge should anticipate risk through foresight into complex situations. However, one of the most remarkable aspects of human history IS the continuity of strategic surprise and the associated intelligence issues. Perhaps even more interesting is that while the causes of the failures appear to have been consistent over history, they have been repeatedly studied and then the failures have re-occurred, usually for the same reasons again.
'Robert Jeivis, Perception andMijpe~ce~fio~ in /n~ernuriona/ Poiitics, Princeton Oniveisity Press, Princeton, NJ, 1976, page 32. 'Walter ILaqueur, World of Secrerr,Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1985, referring to Plotinus Rome
205-279 AD, page ix.
46 RISK ASSESMENT AND HORIZON SCANNING of the key reasons is that the entire field of strategic intelligence lacks a positive working theory that can explain the capabilities and limits of the field. With no accepted working theory, it is d i ~ c u l to t frame discussions about how to make changes and imp~ovements.A limited theoretical basis now exists' and it is useful as a means of discussion, but the field is a long way from being considered a mature one. Before examin~ngwhy this is so, it may be worth looking a t two themes that will underlie this chapter. After that, the chapter will look at how key intelligence terms are defined and how the process of intelligence works.
4.1 Underlying Themes Two themes will underlie this chapter. The first is that the problems whit-h in the past have plagued decision makers whert they have Tried to reduce strategic surprise are comparable to those same problems of today. Ancient authors, such as Sun Tzu and Thucydides, were separated geographically by thousands of kilometers, yet they observed similar views on how their societies reacted in times of crisis, especially with respect to predictability and the avoidance of strategic surprise. The behavior of their two widely divergent societies was similar, as they held out that oracles and other divine devices would provide them with the predictive insights they wished. The Prussian strategic thinker, Karl von Clausewitz, writing in the 19th Century, observed many of the same problems as the ancients. The second underlying theme is the information revolution and what it is doing to intelligence analysis and strategic surprises. At the close of the 20th Century, considerable discussion had evolved from the rapid advances in technology, especially as it relates to information. The high priests of the info~mationrevolution, such as the futurist authors Alvin and Heidi Toffler, and Bill Gates of Microsoft, had outlined a positive view of the future and how the spread of information would help. Unfortunat~ly~ the informat~o~ ~ e ~ o l u t i ohas n a negative aspect as well. As the means of producing and *See the paper "Studying and leaching about Intelligence: The Approach in the United Kingdoin" by Michael S. Goodman. It is part of the CIA series of intelligence papers and is available to rhe public oil the CIA'S primary website at: www.cia.gov or a t t~~ps://www.cia.gov/csi/st~dies/vol50noZ/html~~files/
Studyliig-~~achirig.-b.htm.
starategic intelligence Assessment and surprise Attacks
47
t r a r ~ s ~ ~ i t information tir~g increase, so does the volume. The rapid increases in both technology and volume have created many more opportunities for distortion of that information. For anyone interested in international relations in general, the information revolution poses immense challenges."
4.2 Definitions Considerable difficulty exists in any investigation into the rather huge field of intelligence. Defining terms which are ill-defined or misunderstood is a key part of the problem. Even the term infe//igence is broadly misused in academic literature. For instance, Jarnes Der Derian defines intelligence only as a covert activity.5 Many, if not the majority of observers, believe that the terms infe//igen~e and spying are synonymous.7he popular literature available as well as TV and movies have reinforced this view. The term i ~ ~ e / / i g e also ~ c e conjures up visions of secret agents dashing about the planet ordering vodka martinis'lshaken, not stirredl'This f i c t i o n a ~ i ~ e ~ i-lollywood version of what is more properly known as covert action does not reflect what the vast majority of intelligence workers actually do. Intelligence is also viewed as a technical activity whereby imagery and communications satellites collect otherwise inaccessible info~mation.This popular view is closer to the reality. Rarely is intelligence pictured, however, as being a group of analysts in their work spaces trying to make sense of the data and in for ma ti or^ provided to them. in most cases, however, this is what intelligence is, particularly at the strategic assessment level. In order to achieve a degree of conceptual clarity, the terms used in this chapter will be defined and explained. The definitions used will be those that are either clearly defined or generally accepted within the intelligence ~ i r ~ f o r ~ ~overload a ~ i o nand getting ail the right information to analysts was an intelligence problewi as early as the late 1960s. See Major General Sir Kenneth Strong KBE, CB, Men ~~/nre//gencc?, Cassel and Company, London, 1979, pages 1 52/153. See also Henry Ransom, The /nle//~~c?nceEstab/isishnlgnt Harvard [Jniversity Press, Cambiidge University Press, 1970, pages 106-1 07. Ransom writes that US congressmen believed that an excess ofdara and a paucity of assessment may have been responsible for such events as the North Korean seizure of ttte Pueblo in 1968, the israeii attack on the Arnerican ship Liberty in 1967,and the surprise cornmunist offensive of7'et in 19668. 'Jarnes Der Deiian, ' ~ n t i . ~ ~ i p l o mIntelligence a~y~ Theory and Surveillance Practice,'' published in / n t e / / i ~ ~and i~cN e ~ r i ~ nSecurity, a/ Vol. 8, No. 3, July 1993, page 3 1.
48 RISK ASSESMENT AND HORIZON SCANNING community. Where a possibility of ambiguity exists due t o multiple ~nterpreta~ions of the same term, one usage will be identified and adhered to throughout the chapter. As the major focus of the chapter is strategic intelligence assessment, this term will be broken down and defined first. For this chapter, the term strategic will be used in a broad form, that is “important, a matter of concern to the national government.” In temporal terms, something that is of interest to strategic assessment can be historic, current, or of future concern. I t will include military, economic, and political rnatters as well as issues such as resources, terrain, demographics and ir~fo~mat~on technology capability. This definition will be closer to the work of strategists such as Sun Tzu rather than the latter day views of others such as Clausewitz or Jomini. For SunTzu, strategic thinking had to include eight main areas of concern: economics, sovereign power, the character of generals, o~ganization, movement, control, terrain and weather.* This is strategic thinking at its broadest. For Jomini and perhaps even Clausewitz, the term Strategic was much narrower and tended to include factors that were only relevant to tactics and the battlefield. Modern day decision makers and strategic assessment analysts are forced to deal with a complex environment with multiple factors sometimes spanning the entire globe. As such, it is appropriate to use a broader rather than a narrower definition of srrategic. The definition of intelligence is somewhat more problematic, given the broad spectrum of interests covered by intelligence. At a basic and benign level, intelligence can be defined simply as processed information. Or it can he more specific when it is described as being ”knovdedge and analysis designed to assist action.”3 At its most aggressive, intelligence has been described as “the continuation of war by clandestine interference of one power into the affairs of another.”’ Each of these definitions is narrow, however, and none of them take into account the depth and breadth of knowledge and activities that fall under the broad heading of intelligence.
‘Sun Tzu: TheArt of Waf, translated by Samuel 6. Ciriffiths, New York Oxford University Press, 1963. ‘Robert Rowie, as quoted in Ernest May, Knowing One’sEnemies,Princeton University Press, Princeton,NJ, 1986, page 3. ‘James Der Derian, “Anti-diplomacy, intelligence Theory and Stirveillance Practice,”op. cit.
starategic intelligence Assessment and surprise Attacks
49
There has been much discussion over the issue of whether intelligence should be defined as a science or a craft. General Maurice-Henri Gauche argued that intelligence is potentially an exact science. As the iong time head of the French Deuxikme Bureau, he held great sway in the 1950s.’ Despite some strong supporters for the “science” side of the debate, intelligence defies categorization as a science and remains very much a craft. Walter Laqueur, a long time historian and expert on intelligence, sidesteps the debate of whether or not intelligence forecasting should be defined as a scierice or a craft when he argues that success in being predictive is more a rnatter of basic assumptions than it is methodology.”l~thebasic assumptions are! correct almost any approach will do; if they are wrong, even the most sophisticated method cannot repair the damage.”” Laqueur is clearly in line with Karl Popper when he quotes Popper as saying that it is doubtful whether long term predictions can be made. Popper felt that long ‘term predictions could apply only to those systems that are isolated, stationary arid recurrent. These system are very rare in nature and ”modern society is not one of‘ them:’” Sherman Kent, in his classic 1949 work on strategic intelligence, identifies intelligence as multifaceted enterprise.q27 0 Kent, intelligence has three main attributes; it is a form of knowledge, a form of organization, and a form of activity. This broad definition captures the nature of intelligence and the many different types of institutions and people who are involved. ‘This chapter will examine one of those forms of intelligence, that is, irirelligence as knowledge. Of the four major elements of intelligence (collection, counter-intelligence, analysis, and covert this chapter intends to focus primarily on the end products of analysis. Thus, when this
*See the discussion in Ernest May, editor, Knowing One4 Enemies, page 3. “Walter Laqveur, world ofsecrets, page 306. ”Karl Popper as quoted in Laqveur, page 296. a2
Sherman Kent, Strategic Intelligencefor Arnericnn Fofeign &/icy, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1949, page vii. 19
Roy Godson, Intelligence Requirements for the 1980’s; Elernents of Intelligence, National Strategy lnforniation Centre, Washington D.C., 1979, pages 6 to 9.
50 RISK ASSESMENT AND HORIZON SCANNING chapter uses t h e word intelligence, unless otherwise W@k'I
strategic intelligence as a form of knowledge. in the Western context, strategic intelligence can be defined as "info~mationneeded or desired by the government in pursuance of its international objectives."B4 Assessment is a difficult term to define. Assessment is the final step in the analytic process that combines all sources of info~mationinto a final product. Assessment, for the purpose of this chapter, will be defined as being distinct from analysis and appraisal, although the three terms are frequently used interchangeably. Analysis and appraisal occurs at all levels of intelligence and it can be single source, multi-source, or all-source. Assessment is the final step in the analytical process which includes all sources of intelligence and other forms of data, information and knowledge. It is the definitive all-source product and is written for senior consumers, usually with action or policy implications.~~ Strategic intelligence assessment cannot be done with only a single type of information. It must be created with all sources of intelligence, both overt and covert as well as being contextualized by the experierlce of the analyst or organization. The definition of strategic intelligence assessment therefore is: The final all-source intelligence product of actionable knowledge provided to government to anticipate or reduce uncertainty in its pursuit or protection of inter~~ational political, economic and seciirity objectives. ~~~~~~
gy
~~~~~~~
4.3 Data,Information, Knowledge and Assessment Great confusion exists about the use of various termir~olo~ies associated to the general subject of information. It is worth clariQing some of the terms and how they can be used. Definitions vary, depending on how one I6
Godson, Ekrnenrs ~ ~ / n t e / / / gpage e ~ c 5. ~,
"Micliael t-lerman, / ~ t e / / / g ePower ~ ~ e I/? P ~ U Cand P War, London, RIIA, 1996, page XVI
starategic intelligence Assessment and surprise Attacks
51
makes them, but a useful way to look a t the whole field is to put the terms on a continuum running. The terms dara, i n f o ~ ~ u ~and ion, ~ ~ ~are ~frequently / e d ~ ~ used i n t e ~ c ~ i a n g e a b l y , one of them, leading to a lack of clarity in practical and conceptual terms. ~dditionally,the term ussessrnenf (in cornmori usage perhaps i n r i ~ ~ f , ~ i ~or ~ en/ig~i~enrnen~) o ~ ~ is, used frequently in various contexts without the benefit of clarity. The term data would be located at the far left when located on a cor~tinui~m. This is the lowest form of collection and it has not undergo~e any form of processing. I t is the "zeros and ones" of digital methods of t~ansmission. For example, an imagery satellite creates a signal to send its image to earth in a digital form. The ground station receives a strearn of zeros arid ones in a digital form and stores it on a disk. Similarly, most other collection systems, such as signals intelligence radios and computers receive and store their product in a digital form. The same can be said of systems that store bulk amounts of text in a digital form. Terabytesqsof data are collected and stored in this matter. But without an initial level of processing or analysis, the stored data is useless to the consumer. lriforrnation is next on the continuurn and it is what is obtained in the primary level of processing. To continue with the satellite analogy, the zeror and 0ne.s are then organized in such a way that a human being can derive benefit, In most cases, this means that the digitalized data is converted into an image or picture from which information can then be obtained. For example, an analyst could view the image and determine that there is a large formation of armored vehicles and tanks outside of a military garrison, While this may be useful information, it is the limit of what can be derived from the imagery. Without some form of further processing, the . . . .
"One terabyte equals I012 bytes or 1,000 gigabytes or 1,000,00~,000~0~0 bytes
52 RISK ASSESMENT AND HORIZON SCANNING analyst cannot make judgments about what the vehicles are doing. By itself this is insu~cientand the analyst needs a further source of information. Knowledge is the next level of analysis that allows for initial judgrnents to be made. Further sources of information are required in order for this to happen. The other sources can be, for example, previous imagery analysis, diplomatic reporting, signals intelligence, or open source reporting. By putting the new information into context with previous information, knowledge is then produced. "Knowledge is a broader term, since it comprises not just knowing the facts, but understanding their causal and consequential relati onships."" Continuing with the imagery analogy, the image in question may have been taken the day before the country's national day. Large military parades are common on the natiorial day, so what initially was seen as possible threat info~m~tion, is novv knowledge that this type of behavior is quite normal and need not cause further alarm. The intended role of assessment is to provide actionable knowledge to decision makers. The key word in this is actionable: "Knowledge, if it does not determine action, is dead to US."" This actionable knowledge should reduce surprise and risk through foresight into complex situations. In the case of the satellite imagery example above, the final assessment from the intelligence community could be that the action seen is not a threat, and therefore the leadership can order a return to norrnal monitoring W h no further action required.
4.4 The intelligence cycle:Direction, Collection, Analysis, and Dissemination How are strategic assessments done and how is the data processed to the final end product of assessment? Put another way, how does ineelligence analysis work at its most basic level? Multiple ways of looking at this exist, but one way is to examine the intelligence cycle and how it would function in an ideal world. 17
Susan Strange, Structure5 of Power in the World Economy8Printer Publishers Limited, London, 1988, page 1 18.
s.s
Walter Laqwur, World ofSecrefr, referring to Platinus Rorne 205-270 AD, page IX.
starategic intelligence Assessment and surprise Attacks 5.3
The intelligence cycle is normally referred to as a cyclical process whereby consumers of intelligence make their demands known (direction). Following the demand, the intelligence community attempts to gather the necessary data (collection). The data is then processed (analysis) and passed back to the director (dissem~nation). In actual practice,the intelligence cycle represents
an ideal which is not usually reached in the day-to-day workings of the community. Rut it remains a useful way of understanding hov~ the intelligence conirnunity works and where the strengths and weaknesses of the community are to be found.’s The most problematic part of the cycle rnay be direction. Marly decirion makers do not know what kinds of questions need to be asked until a crisis is looming. By that point, insuffcient time exists for the intelligence cycle to function and the leadership will not, in all probability, get the information they need.
4.5 Strategic surprise and Predictability A t the heart of strategic intelligence assessment lies the issue of predictability and risk management.Leaders of all sorts want control over the organizations they lead and the environment in which they operate?@For leaders who are concerned with policy and operations in the international environment, the ability PO control is frequently limited if not impossible even for iarger states and even less so for smaller states. If they cannot have control, then a t the very least they want an understanding of the environment, so as to lessen risk or damage to their states. The desire for control and/or understanding is what drives the require~r~e~~t for predictability.The predictive need has been a common feature of history frorn Sun Tzu’s time to modern day. Sun Tzu stated that “What is called forekno~/l~dge cannot be elicited from sprits, nor from gods, or by analogy ”For a further explanation of the intelligence cycle and some of its problems see Walter Laqueur, World oFSecrets, pages 20-27.See also Loch K. Johnson, ”Analysis for a New Age<”published in intelligence and National Security, Vol. 11, No. 4, October 1996, pages 657 to 671, Frank Cass, London. See also Michael Herman, /nte//igericePower in Peace and War, pages 100 to 101. “Jervis, Perceptionnnd Mispercepfion in /nternafional Politics, Princeton University Press, 1976, pages 32 to 33.
54
RISK ASSESMENT AND HORIZON SCANNING
with past events nor from calculations. It must be obtained from men who know the enemy situation.ffar The predictive ability, however, has never reached a level of capability where strategic surprise has been removed as a function of international relations. Despite unwavering beliefs in oracles, spirits, quantitative analysis, and computers, leaders throughout the ages have been exposed to crisis when strategic surprise has overtaken their policies or actions. Examples abound, even in the last half of the 20th Century. For example, there was the invasion of South Korea by the North, the entry of Chinese troops into the Korean War, the oil price shocks of the 1970s, the fall of the Shah in Iran in 1979, the collapse of the Soviet Union at the end of the Cold War, Saddam Hussein‘s invasion of Kuwait, the attack on the World Trade Centre in 1993 and the various other al-Qaeda sponsored attacks of 2001 to 2G06 in the United States, ‘Turkey, Indonesia, Spain, the United Kingdom, and India. Strategic surprise is a constant in the literature of different fields. Robert Jervis has wrirten extensivelyon perception and misperception in international relations drawing on the literature of psychology, history, and politics.” Jervis’ views on how ~ i s p ~ r c e p t i oisncommon throughout international relations are not hopeful for the students of strategic intelligence analysis. The literature associated with strategic surprise in general is not hopeful either. Roberta Wohlstetter has written what is probably the definitive book on the ir~telligen~e failure a t Pearl Harbor. Drawing on the records of Congressional hearings and other sources, her final observation is that there can be no assurance that strategic surprise will not happen again. “We have to accept the fact of uncertainty and learn to live with it. No magic, no code, or otherwise will provide certainty. Our plans must work without it.”” Wohlstetter was writing in the early 196Qs,before the advent of high resolution satellite imagery, SIGINT and other advanced forms of intelligence collection. Does the change in technology mean that strategic surprise can be avoided? According to Ephraim Kam, writing in 1988, the issue of strategic surprise is still present. He states in the last paragraph of the book that: ~
11
S.B. Griffiths, Sun Tzu: TkteArt of War, page 14.5,
22
Robert Jervis, Perception and ~ i s - ~ r c e p t i oinnlnfernatioiial Politics, op. cit.
”Roberta Wohlstetter, Pear/Harbor: Warning and Decision, Stanford University Press, Stanford, Ca!ifornia, 1962, pages 400 to 41 0.
starategic intelligence Assessment and surprise Attacks 55
history does not encowage potential victims of surprise attack. One can on& ~ i o p eto reduce the severity - to be only partly surprised, to issue clearer ~ ~ a r r i i nto g ~gain , a few days for bet~erpreparationsarid to be more ade9uate~ pre~aredTO minimize rhe damage once a surprise attack occurx"" Even more pessimistically, Kam observes that military surprise is likely to continue to be a reality as well. His conclusion on this matter reads: A l t h ~ u ~we h can provide a genera/ explanati~nas to why surprise attacks are not prevented, at this stoge there appears to be no general explanation for those cases in whic~tan attack was anticipared. Each case has to be explained on its own merits. This may mean that successful surprise alracks are the general rule while rheir prevenrion is t h e exceprion.a' Writing in the area of political psychology, Alex Hybel has also come to some rather pessimistic conclusions concerning the issue of surprise. While he holds out more hope than some other writers for discovering surprise attacks a t the strategic level before they occur, Hybel is not categorical. In his view:
"There ir no sure method for avoid in^ surprise. But it is possibie to ~ i i n i ~ i ~ ~ sufprise by unders~a~ding the circumstances under ~uhichit might be sought, the variety of obstacles that must be .~urmountedin order to achieve dif~eren~ surprises, and the types of steps that must be taken to overcome such obstacles." One of most comprehensive recent books on strategic intelligence was published in 2004 by Loch Johrison and James J. Wirtz (editors) of the anthology Strategic /n~e//igertce~ ~ i ~ d o into w s a Secrer World. It was p u b l ~ s t ~ e ~ three years after the events of 9/17, so it has some space between its publ~~hing date and the trauma caused by the attacks. 21
Ephraini Kam, Surprise Attack, l-iarvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1988, page 233. Karn is a former analyst from the Israeli Ministry of Defence.
"/bid, page 232. 3s
Alex Roberto Hyktel, The Logic of Surprise in / n t e r ~ ~ a f i oConflicf, n~/ Lexington Hooks, Lexington, Massacl-iuWfs, 1986, pages 166 to 167.
56
RISK ASSESMENT AND HORIZON SCANNING
In a chapter titled "Analysis, War and Decision: Why Intelligence Failures are Inevitable," author Richard K. Retts concludes by saying that the best way to deal with strategic surprise is to develop a "tolerance for disaster."27As with other previous works, this chapter does not produce an optimistic view about the capabilities of the intelligence community when it looks a t predicting the future. Nor does it offer any concrete suggestions on how to improve this problem. The reasons for the failure of intelligence (and other) systems to be predictive has its causes in numerous areas. Drawing frorn Jervis and Ford?' they can be grouped into the following: a. ~~~~~~~i~~ and is^^^^^^^^^^. The world may be different from the way the leader or assessment oM'icer perceives it. Therefore the psychological milieu of the leader may not conform to the operational milieu of the world in which the policy has to work."g ~ ~ ~An absence ~ f of knowledge, f ~ ~ as well~ as prejudice, ~ e and ~ often outright bigotry has led intelligence and other organizations to make poor decisions concerning the intentions and capabilities of other actors?
~~~~~~~~.
c. Decision Trying to be predictive about the decisions that others will make during a time of crisis or under pressure is difficult. Most often, individuals are unaware of what their own reactions would be when faced with crisis or danger. Trying to predict what others will do when those people themselves do not know is impossible. ~~~~~~
d. Coals f f ~ ~ As a~crisis l or~situation ~ s develops, ~ the goals and plans of the leadership may change. A leadership, having been aggressive at the
n
Richard K. Wells in Johnson and Wirtz (eds.), StrategicInteIligence;Windows Into aSecret World, Roxbuiy Publishing Company, Los Angeles, California, 2004, pages 97 to 11 1,
18
Hobert Jervis, Perception and ~ispercepfionin /nteri~ati~~ia/ Politics, op. cit, pages 13 to 28 and 3 1 to 57. See also Harold P. Ford, Estimarive Inrelligence, University Press of America, Maryland, 1993, pages 18 and 23.
"Robert Jervis, hid., page 13 s(i
For examples of this see, amongst others, Harold P Ford, Estimative /nte//igence,Refeiise Intelligence College, Maryland, page 18, paragraph 14 in the comments by Admiral Kimmel.
~
starategic intelligence Assessment and surprise Attacks
57
start of a crisis, may lose heart and decide that instead of seeking gains in a crisis, they are content to settle for the status quo or even just survival.
Knowing how and when an opponent or ally changes their pattern of decision making is a perilous process at best. Strategic intelligence assessment may or may not be aware of leaders’ intentions as their goals change. P~edictability,as a result, suffers. e. ~~~n~~~~$~~~~~~~~~~ Leaders may make policy statements about what they will and \.will not do concerning their role in international relations. The reality is, however, that a long standing policy (therefore one thought to be predictable) may suddenly change in the context of a crisis. States frequently make statements concerning their respect for other natior~s’sov~rei~nt~ and their unwillingness to involve themselves in interventionist policies. When their national interests are suddenly threatened, however, this can change suddenly.
f. ~ ~one’s own ~ ~~ ~ ~ Assessment ~ j 9~ i t systems, ~ . ~leaders and states tend to overestimate their own ability to understand the opposition while unde~estimatingtheir own weaknesses. Concurrent with this problem is overconfidence that the signal they are sending will be clearly understood. g. ~~~9~~~ to to new i ~ ~ ~Assessments ~ ~ ~made ~ under j oone ~set . of conditions frequently are not reassessed or challenged when new ~ n f ~ ~ m ~becomes t i o n available. This is especially certain when long held beliefs are suddenly challenged. This type of thinking was evident as the Soviet Union began to collapse. Many assessment officers (and others) firmly believed the strength of the Soviet Union and the threat that this strength held. Consequently, they were unable to believe the evidence that started coming in that the Soviet Union could collapse. ~~~~~
h. ~~~~o~ in^. This intellectual process is where individuals tend to assign their own thought processes to those people they are trying to assess. By doing so, they assume that the group being assessed has the same values and thought processes - a dangerous and sometime fatal as~umption.3’ >a
See tiaruld I?Ford, Estimative / ~ t ~ / / i gpage e ~ c23, ~ ~paragraph 10, for a further discussion of mirror
irnagiiig.
~
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RISK ASSESMENT AND HORIZON SCANNING
Drawing from Mybel and Handel, almost the same reasons can be seen for their belief that strategic surprise will remain constant. Hybel believes that Handel has established two main frameworks for why misperception is a problem. In the secand part of the framework which deals with the erroneous estimations of others intentions, tiybel notes: a. One‘s own intentions influence the perceptions of enemy intentions. 6. Misunderstanding of the opponent’s character and of his willingness to take risks prevents the analyst from accurately picturing how the opponent approaches the balance between capability and intentions. C. Ignorance about what the enemy knows about oneself makes it easier to mjsunde~standthe willingness to take risks. d. The assessment of enemy intentions, when based on the assessment of his capabilities will be inaccurate if the enemy has hidden the trtie state of his capabilities or provided erroneous information. e. There is a tendency to underestimate or overestimate the opponent’s capabilities. f. The cry wolf syndrome. As it relates to straregic intelligence, it can be stated that most if not all of the problems above derive directly from the problem areas of knowledge and assessment, not data and information. Few, if any, of the problem areas would be seriously improved by a greater collection effort that produced more data and information. For all the above reasons, it is clear that predictability in strategic intelligence assessment has not been achieved. From a strategic intelligence point of view, interesting theoretical implications can be perceived. Strategic surprise may remain the norm.
4.6 The Need fdor strategic Intelligence Theory “Anyone who tries to make some sense out of the apparent incoherence of the world scene, so that discrete events, instead of being purely random, can be explained within an orderly, intelligible pattern, is a theorist a t heart.” So write Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff while examining various theories of
starategic intelligence Assessment and surprise Attacks
59
international While these two academic authors were not writing the book with strategic intelligence assessrnent iri mind, their opening comments on theoretical approaches to international relations could just as easily be describing what it is strategic intelligence analysts attempt to do: "make some sense out of the apparent incoherence of the world scene." "Theory is essential in every discipline for an unde~standingof phenomena, for t~inkingabout their interrelatedness, for guiding research."" But what theory actually consists of is problematic in the social sciences, and it is an especially difficult endeavor with respect to how strategic inte~ligen~e assessment fits into a theoretical framework. Strategic intelligence assessment is very much a rriatter of "what do we know arid how do we know it" as well as "how is it that we change our minds about that which vie think we know?" Tl-iese two questions plague strategic intelligence assessment as much as they do academics. Within academia, however, the questions are likely to be clearly articulated, both on a practical and theoretical level. The intelligence community is more adjusted to dealing with these questions at only the practical level and as a whole tends to be resistant to selfexamination, particularly with respect to theory. The subject of intelligence itself is problematic. In order to be an effective author of theory, the theorist would have to have a working knowledge of politics, bureaucracy, international relations, economics, statistics, the military, the psychology of learning, statistics, sociology and many fields of learning as well. To effectively study the field of strategic intelligence, the academic investigator would have to be a generalist in nature with capabilities in a wide range of issues. Currently, it appears that the academic environment encourages specialization in narrow fields of research. As such, undertaking such a study W O L J tend ~~ to run against the mainstream in addition to all the other problems. It has been difficult for academics to study intelligence in general for a number of reasons. Most of the reasons relate to either the secretive nature of the work or the sheer complexity of such a large and diverse community.
"James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., C o f f f ~ ~ Theories ~ i f f of~ / f f f ~ ~ n u !?elutions, ~ i o ~ ~ 3rd / Edition, Harper Collins, 1990, page 1.
""Doirgherty and Pfaltzgraff, page 1.
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RISK ASSESMENT AND HORIZON SCANNING
Berkowitz and Goodman were probably correct in their 1989 assessment that "analysts tend to be rather practical minded people and are reluctant to embrace anything as abstract as theory" and that "... there is no well developed theory on how to produce intelligenceassessment."34This remains the case, even though numerous books have been written on intelligence since then. Other authors have noted that strategic intelligence is "the most undertheorized part of international relations" and that "the analytical part of this work still has the hallmarks of a young subject.?' Furthermo~e,due to the emotive response that the word intelligence tends to drdw, it has also been noted thdt "analytic work on the subject is dominated (and thus distorted) by works of opposition or apology.''s6 As one observer noted,'% is true that the only ideal book on intelligence could be written only by an insider, for only an insider could combine all the ~ ~ i a l i t i eneeded s for understandirig the subject. Yet I do not expect such a book to appear."" Theory should be, however, a matter of critical importance to both the study and the practice of strategic intelligence assessment. A clearly articulated and understood theory will guide what questions get asked, how they get asked, and, perhaps even more importantly, what questions do inot get asked. As noted above, however, no coherent theory of how strategic intelli~enceassessments work has been articulated, either in the academic comniur~ityor within the intelligence community itself. Another less obvioiis reason also explains the lack of study arid theory as it relates specifically to strategic intelligence assessment. Contrary to what might be assumed by the (tax paying) public and the academic community, very little effort is expended by the intelligence community on strategic level analysis.The vast majority of budgets spent on intelligence are consumed by items such as technical resources (i.e., satellites, aircraft, computers,
"Bruce Berkowitz and Alldri Goodman, Strnlegic /nte///geficearid Afnerum Nulionol Security, Fjfinceton University Press, 19S9, pdge 85
"Herman, M , Intelligence Power in Peace and War, page 3 YQllXd '*Walter Laqueur, A ~ o f / d ~ f S e c r epage ts, x
starategic intelligence Assessment and surprise Attacks
61
inf~astructure,managers, collections people, and dissemination). Accurate budget figures, broken out by specific function, are not publist~ed.However, one researcher who has detailed work in this area suggests that the actual percentage of the budget spent on higher level analysis is less than one percent?* Although this figure does seem low, it appears consistent with the number of people employed in various strategic assessment ofices versus the nurnbers of people employed in the intelligence comm~inityas a whole. ~nterestir~gly, even rnuch current academic literature on the intelligence community overlooks the strategic intelligence function. One journal article, which did a broad overview of the British intelligence cornmun~ty'schanges since the end of the Cold War, did not even mention the Joint Intelligence Committee or the strategic intelligence Theory, as Kenneth Waltz has noted, has been used by students of international politics "to cover any work that departs from mere ~ e s ~ r i p t i o n and seldom to refer only to work that meets philosophy-of-scien~e standards,? Whatever one defines a theory as being, ultimately, it has to be both descriptive and explanatory. Without some element of explanation, a theory is merely a simple description of observable facts. For the last forty years, the discipline of international relations, and thus much of the study of intelligence, has been d o ~ ~ i r ~ aby t e positivisrn." d This positivist tradition has included a number of various elements (in and out of favor) including empiricism, behavioralism, rationalism, and p r a g ~ ~ a t i s r ~ . Although debates have occurred about the validity of the positivist tradition, it continues to serve students of all types as they seek to understand the ~nterrelate~ness of the phenomena that surround them in their field of study. If positivism is a deterministic approach to defining how study should be carried our to build cumulative knowledge, then anyone using positivism
m/bid,p a p 8. as
K. G. Robertson,"Recent Intelligence Reform in the United Kingdom: as published in /nfe//igencennd N c ~ i o n a / S ~ u rVol. i ~ y ,13, No. 2, Summer 1998, pages 144 to 158. 0;9
Kenneth Wale, in Robert Keohane, Neortwiisrn and it5 Crifics, Columbia University Press, New York, 1986, page 27.
$1
Steve Smith, Ken Baoth, and Marysia Zalewski, / r i t e r n ~ t i ~ nTheory: n/ Posi~ivisrn n n d ~ ~ y o nCambridge d~ University Press, 1996, page 1 1.
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RISK ASSESMENT AND HORIZON SCANNING
must carry certain core values or use residuals that are common. These core values, common to most positivist approaches, are observability, testability, and verification. Whether a positivist can move beyond pure observation and description towards explanation remains a matter of debate, based at least in part on induction and whether or not induction can be part of a pure positivist theory. Ultimately, however, theories, including positivist ones, need t o both observe and describe, while a t the same time offer explanations. Theory on strategic intelligence assessment must therefore be both descriptive and explanatory about the variables it hypothesizes.Thetheoretical construct for this study would have to start by defining some of the ~ e ~ o n s t ~and ~ bknown le limits of the domain in which strategic intelligence assessment operates. The strategic intelligence community is therefore left without internal or external guidance as to what can be expected from assessment. Witl~outa clear understanding of limits and boundaries, the intelligence commu~ity and rhose who would study it:are always a t a loss to define its own capabilities. Without a clear understanding of capabilities, it is impossible to have a reasonable discussion on what constitutes successes and failures. Most dangerously, it is also impossible to assess the strengths and weaknesses of strategic intelligence or how to make positive changes.
CFhapter 5
Ancient and Modern Assessments: Common Problems
Despite the huge amounts of money spent in the 20th Century on inteliigence assets, modern decision makers and leaders still find themselves lacking key re~uirementsa t critical moments, just as their ancient counterparts did. Even with the most sophisticated assets at their disposal, decision makers are unable to answer the most important questions that pertain to predicting how other parties will react to a decision taken by themselves or their allies. Modern decision makers, even with national level assets or with assistance from organizations such as NATO and the UN, are often no better informed than a commander in the Peloponnesian War of 400 B.C. From antiquity to the present, leaders and decision makers have sought f o ~ ~ s i gand h t knowledge of their environments and the future.The perforrners of the task previously have often been soothsayers, oracles, necromancers, priests, clairvoyants, and palmists. Each has been the "crystal ball gazer" of their particular time or culture and were, in effect, workers who were responsible for providing the relevant leader with strategic insights. Soothsayers and others sometimes worked under considerable stress. Incorrect predictions could result in severe punjshm~nts,including death. Therefore, the soothsayer was faced with a considerable problem. How do you divine the future from a few rattling chains, the flight of some birds, or the intestines of an unfortunate domestic anirrtal?The soothsayer was at a
64
RISK ASSESMENT AND HORIZON SCANNING
particular disadvantage, as the source of information (i.e., the crystal ball) had no direct relevance to the questions at hand.i Leaders wanting to avoid surprise and risk in western states today rarely call in soothsayers when they want hard-to-get information on the future or potential adversaries. The "crystal ball gazer" of today is more likely to be called a strategic intelligence analyst." Modern assessment officers are in much the same position as their predecessors from antiquity. How does one provide insight and prevent major surprises from a paradoxical collection of intercepted electronic signals, satellite imagery, and a mass of contradictory evidence collected from diplomats, journalists, and academic experts?The modern day assessment officer has some advantages over the soothLayer, in that the evidence a t hand is sometimes relevant to the questions being asked. Much like the soothsayer of olden days, however, the strategic intelligence assessment officer is forced to bridge evidence gaps using intuition, belief systerns and guesswork. Fortunately for the modern analysts, failure is not likely to be met with death, a[ least not their own.
5.1 The Ancients and strategic surprise The concept of foreknowledge through some form of intelligence is probably as old as organized society itself." Ever since humans have organized themselves into a polity, or a political community, leaders have sought information and tried to organize it. Sun Tzu is the author of the oldest known written military work that dates back to c.400-320 BC. He spends one of his thirteen chapters discussing how the e~~lightened prince and the wise general should gather the ____ 'Oracles most probably had their owii sources of information beyond their divine connections. k e Allen Dulles, The Cmfi of /~re//ige~~ce, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, Landon, 1963.
'There are exceptions, however. Canadian Prime Minister King used to discuss policy matters with his mother, who had been dead for several years, by using mediums at seances. President Nixon was reported to have talked to the portraits of former presidents as his White House tenure was corning to a close. PM Margare~Thatcherrepeatedly spoke in terms of"w"when it was not altogether clear if she was referring to "herself and cabinet" or if in fact she was usiiig the "royal wenand was referring to herself and the Divine Being! 'See, among others, Walter Laqueur, World of Secrers, page 3.
Ancient and Modern Assessment 10Common problems
65 65
foreknowledge necessary to know the enemy situation. Curiously, however, SunTzu does not undertake to explain how the information gathered should be collated or analyzed. As it was in Sun liu’s day, and remained s o until the 19th Century, it appears that the strategic level of intelligence analysis was presumed to be done only a t the level of the ruler or supreme cornmander. Another Chinese scholar and warrior, Wu Ch’i (430-381 BC), identifies the classic intelligence problem that continues to plague strategic intelligence assessment today. His writings address the issues of decision making (and related information) a t what we would nowadays refer to as the strategic, operation and tactical level.4 Referring to the political decision on whether to plan operations against another state, Wu Ch‘i lists four matters in which problems may occur. If the sovereign cannot be certain that a concord cannot be established, then Wu Ch’i courisels the sovereign ”not to presume to place confidence in his own personal plans, but necessarily discusses them in the‘remple of the Ancestors after tortoise divination. If the omens are auspicious he launches the army.’” Clearly, strategic intelligence analysis was not a function of the army a t that time. Wu Ch’i lists the factors that should guide decision makers a t the operational and tactical level. His list has eight factors that should allow the commander or sovereign to launch an individual military operation with confidence, He then lists six factors that should lead the sovereign not to launch an operation. I t however, the sovereign does not have a situation before him that clearly falls into one set of factors or the other, then once again Wu Ch’i counsels the sovereign or commander to resort to turtle divination.@ While Sun Tzu and Wu Ch’i were advising Chinese leaders on how to conduct a war, Thucydides (c. 460-400 BC) was undertaking an equally ambitious project in ancient Greece. Thucydides undertook to write a history
”See, among others, the t o r k j of Wu Chi as disccussed in Samuel 8. Griffith, Sun Izu and rhe Art of iivnr, Oxford liniversity Press, Oxford IJK, 1963.
I‘Samuel 8. Griffith, Sun Tm and the Art of War, page 152.
‘/bid, pages 152 to 157.
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RISK ASSESMENT AND HORIZON SCANNING
of the Peloponnesian War (431 BC to 411 BC) and desired that his work should be written "not as an essay which is to win the applause of the moment, but as a possession for all time."' This ambitious project was not just recording the process of what would be the biggest war in the history of the region, but it would also offer timeless insights into the politics, economics and military issues of the day. By examining the book The ~ u T h u c ~y ~ i ~and e ~~its ~ index, ~ it can a be seen tha~Thucydidesmakes multiple references to intelligence collection efforts, but offers no advice on how information gathered on enemy forces and allies should be institutionally dealt with. He does, however, offer clear insights into how decision making was carried out in his day.' Various i$~div~d~~als, most with no professional qualifications as we would recognize them today, were involved in leadership and command roles, sometimes for relatively short periods of time.?" Permanent advisors with a mandate to observe, analyze and report on political or military matters appear to be non-existent. Strassler notes no less than 32 occasions where Thucydides writes of "intelligence"being provided to various commanders and leaders. In each one of these cases, however, the intelligence being passed is simply that which is referred to as data or information and not assessment. At no point is there a notation of an individual or group responsible for collating and assessing the information for presentation to leaders or decision makers." Once again, the task of providing information to the leadership during periods of uncertainty often fell to the oracles. Thucydides felt that the outcome of a decision was often the same whether or not oracles were consulted. He rather clearly feels that the proliferation of oracles and
7Robert B. Strassler, The Lar~dfnur~ Thucydides --A Comprehensive Guide In the Pelop~nnesia17 War,The Free Press, New York, 1996, page 16.
'bid.
*See Robert B. Strassler, ibid., antl the discussion of the Mytilene debate on pzges 175 to 184. 10
Thucydides himself was a commander and was exiled for his loss at Amphipolis. See Robert Strassler,
ibid., page 316. 71
For further details on intelligence as written about by Thucydides, see Robert Strassler, ibid., page 672 on intelligence.
~
Ancient and Modern Assessment 10Common problems
67
prophecies at the time was only useful for clouding human reason.'2 On only one occasion does he mention that the oracles were correct, and then he notes this in what appears to be a very sarcastic tone of voice: So that the first ten yeur4 war, the treacherous armistice thur f o l / o w eit, ~ und rhe s u ~ s e ~ ~wur e n t ill, calcfflating by the seasons, be found to ~ u upkthe~ number ofyears which I have mentjoned, with the difkrence of a few days, and fo provide an instance of faith in oracles being for oncej ~ s f j f i ~byd the ewn t.'' Thucydides clearly felt that the outcome of an event was the same whether or not the oracles were con~ulted.'~Of interest t o this study, however, is more of what was not covered by Thucydides. Although a comrnander himself and a person clearly well informed by the events before and during his time, he makes no suggestions as to how irifor~iation problems and the issue of surprise could be alleviated. The Bible also provides numerous examples of information gathering missions. Allen Dulles, who spent nine years as Director of the CIA, points out that David, in the book of Samuel, consults the Lord directly for tactical infor~nationduring a military operation." David asks God, "Shall I pursue after this troop? Shall I overtake them?" God answers,"Pursue, for thou shalt surely overtake them, and without fail recover all.'' The Bible also makes note of intelligence information gathering and some limited assessment capability at the strategic level. God instructed Moses to send a ruler of each of the tribes out into the wilderness to do a reconnaissance mission in the land of Canaan. When they returned after 40 days, the twelve produced a mission report for Moses. Ten of the agents reported that the people in Canaan were well organized and that the Israelites should not move against them. Two of the agents, however, dissented from the majority view and reported that Canaan was not really stronger. The Lord, ~ n h a p p ywith the
13
Robert Strassler, ibid., page .m.
'"bid., page 316. 1.f
See various references to oracles in Robert Strassler, ibid,npages 56, 65, 69, 93, 101, 121, 205, 208, 212, 316,353 and 481. "Allen Dulles, The Craft of inreliigence, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 19S3, see l n t r ~ d ~ ~ t i o n .
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RISK ASSESMENT AND HORIZON SCANNING
lack of faith shown by the Israelites in Him, condemned the Israelis to spend the next 40 years wandering in the desert. Charlemagne is another example of a leader who appears to have been active in gathering information about the world around him. While there are clear indications that he expended effort in unde~stan~ing what neigh~o~ing leaders were doing in peace and war, there are no hints that he involved others in the process of assessing what the i n f o ~ ~ n a t i o ~ meant.’“
5.2 KNowledge and Assessment Failures in Ancient Times From this quick review of older literature, it is clear that a problem that plagues us now has remained unchanged from the earliest recorded writings on intelligence and leadership. The problem is that societies of various sorts placed a p ~ e m i ~on ~m having information and would expend conside~ab~e resources and energy to gather the information. Once the gathering process had occurred, however, the system began to break down. An eMective collation and analysis system (i.e.?knowledge and assessment prod~~ction) to exploit the full realm of available information did not exist. Not until the 20th Century would there be the creation of a body of persons whose role it was to serve the leadership by gathering, assessing and disseminating intelligence. Even then, many leaders, some in positions of great influence, preferred to keep the strategic intelligence assessment function to themselves. President Khrushchev of the USSR was one leader who preferred to keep the function of strategic analysis within his own control. Blight and Welch note this when They describe some of Khrushchev’s actions during the Cuban missile crisis: “Khrushchev preferred to conduct his own analysis, apparently under the misapprehension that the raw information that found its way haphazardly onto his desk provided an adequate basis for policy.”” (6
Einhard 2nd Notker the Stammerer, Two Lives ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ f Penguin / e ~ Boolc5, ~ ~ /Middlesex, ? e , England, 1969, pages 138 to 139.
”For further irif#rmati~iion this, see the article by J.G. Blight and D.A. Welch itn”Wtiat can Intelligence Tell us about the Cuban Missile Crisis, and what can the Cuban Missile Crisis tell us about Intelligence?”, / ~ f ~ / / i g eand ~ c eInternational Securiry Vol. 13, No. 3, Autumn 1998.
Ancient and Modern Assessment 10Common problems
69
5.3 Modern Literature and the study of intelligence Organized intelligence has been "a 20th Century growth industry and most governments now have it as a permanent institution,"^^ The growth of intelligence has fueled a corresponding expansion in the literature available on it, both popular in writing and in more serious academic work. The work has gradually matured from a study of covert activity and memoirs into a recognizable body of literature in the academic sense of the term. This growing body of literature exists on what roles intelligence should play (i.e., military, economic, political, environmental, health, war crimes, human rights, etc.). Accompanying that is a body of literature on historical matters, technical advances, processing, and inteliigence management. Ad~itionally,there is a limited body of literature made up of retired intelligence personnel reviewing their careers and offering insights and ideas. Unfortunately from a theoretical point of view, much of what passes for intelligence literature is in fact accounts of covert activity. While these studies are useful in and of themselves, they do not really represent most of what goes on in strategic ititeliigence assessment and they do li'rtle to advance theoretical insight into this rather cornplex subject?' Without this theoretical backgroun~, the study and practice of intelligence will remain limited. In order to examine this body of literature that has been expanding since the end of World War Two, and particularly since the 19705, an exaniinatio~ will be made of the general categories of literature that have been produced since World War Two.
5.4 Categeries Only a limited body of literature exists that deals with the analytical and assessment (or estimative) function of intelligence. Additio~ially,there is d
"Michael Herman, Intelligence Power in Peace und War, 1996, page 2. "As an example see James Adarns, The New Spier: Exploring the Frontka oftspionage, Pirnlico Edition, 1995. Adains examines the roles of various intelligence agencies in the post-ColdWar era, but focuses only on covert activiry. See also James Rusbridger, The lnt~lligenceGame, I.B. Tauris and Company Limited, London, 1989. Rushridpr writes a critical expose of intelligence as the Cold War is ending, but again the focus is on covert activity.
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RISK ASSESMENT AND HORIZON SCANNING
near void of work that deals specifically with strategic intelligence assessment. The only major book to date that deals directly with this most critical function of intelligence is Estimative /nte//igence:The Purposes arid Prob/~rnsof ~ ~ t /nte//jge~ce ~ e ~ o r t ~by n gHarold , Ford. Fortunately, a literature does exist where the various authors have looked, at least in part, at the strategic intelligence assessment function.This literature has its roots in the post-World War Two era when academics and social scientists specifically became interested. It has only been since about 1975 that a truly serious literature has developed.”@As such, the literature will be categorized as follows:
~
1. The Post-World War Two period of initial interest, from 1949 to 1969. The work of this period is typified by Sherman Kent’s classic work on US
intelligence foreign and policy, Roberta Wohlstetter’s analysis of the Peari Harbor attack, and Allan Dulles’ 1963 memoirs from when he was head of the CIA. 2. The Intelligence Debate of the 19TOs, and the rise of academic interest. An extensive and acrimonious debate occurred in the United States that involved elected government officials, the press and the intelligence community. So stinging was the debate that it prompted the first wave of serious academic investigation which began in about 1975.The debate was watched not just in the US, but in most other nations as well. The work of this period is typified by the creation of the US based C o n 5 ~ r ~ ~ ~ m for the Study of /nte//ige~ce and their recurring volumes published by Roy Godson, editor, which cover a number of intelligence topics. At the same time, former insiders such as R.V. Jones and General Sir Kenneth Strong published their books containing historical insights from an insider’s perspective. 3. As a result of the 1970s debate and the interest it generated, the 1980s and early 1990s saw a major upturn in serious academic work. Diplomatic historians such as Christopher Andrew began historical work and the journal / ~ t ~ / / i g e nand c e ~ u t i ~ nSecurity u/ was started. Other authors such as Ernest May contributed to the historical foundations of rnodern ”“See Michael I-lerrnan, /ffte//ig~~ce Power in Peace and War, page 2, when he states that ”Intelligence of this kind now has a serious literature which has developed over the last twenty years.”
o
Ancient and Modern Assessment 10Common problems
71
bureaucratic inrelligence while Walter Laqueur investigated some of the practical limits of modern intelligence. The 1980s saw a ~aturationof the debate on intelligence and a clear move toward serious analysis of intelligence functions, rather than just examinations of organization and technologies. 4. The literature in the mid to late 1990s saw a significant split in its direction. With an end of the Cold War in 1989, there began another series of debates within goverriments about the role of intelligence. At the same time, academics and journalists saw an opportunity to examine i n t ~ l l i ~ e n c ~ activity in the Cold War, which becdrne easier now that “the war was over.” As a result, some of the literature moved back towards looking a t just covert activity. Other work, however, developed in analytic depth, and for the first time, a book that dealt only with strategic intelligence assessment appeared. The post-World War Two period saw an initial interest, and the majority of the intelligence literature available to scholars today has become accessible only sirice the end ofthat war.” The most influential figures in the intelligence literature in this period were Sherman Kent, Roberta Wohlstetter, and Allen Dulles. Sherman Kent had a major influence both on intelligence and the academic study of intelligence. A widely respected former Yale history professor, Kent was the Deputy Director of the CIA’S Ofice of National Estimates (ONE) when it was created in November 1950 and eventually became its head for 16 years?’ The ONE’Sonly role was to produce National Intelligence Estimates, the CIAs version of strategic intelligerice assessment at the time.” Aside from his leadership role in ONE, Kent’s greatest influence on the study and development of intettigence was in his major book, Stmfqic 28
There are some exceptions. In 1931, Canadian Army Major Hahn wrote lnreliiqence in World War One. This extensive book examined military intelligence operations at the front in Europe. While a useful work in its own right, this book did not attempt to generalize about its own findings or theorize about intelligence operations in war. ”Walter l.aqwr, World of Secrets, Chapter 1, footnote 31, page 348. See also Harold Ford, Esrin7ative lntelliger7cee,page 73.
“Walter Laqueur, Worid of Secrets, pages 17 and 34.
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Intelligence for A~)ericffn~ o r l dPolicy. This book was considered the basic textbook for work on strategic intelligence and many of its key points remain debated today.'" Kent's other rnajor cont~ibutionwas the creation of a journal on intelligence which started publishing in 1955. The three major points that Kent raised in his book that are still debated -today are: 1. The interface between policy and intelligence. Kent proposed in his book that intelligence analysts and assessment should be kept at arm's length
from policy makers. If under the best conditions intelligence found itself guilty of hasty and unsound conclusions, how much more likely were such conclusions if it were subjected to the administrative control of its customers? Kent's initial debate on this issue carried on for years. In 1985, Walter Laqueur wrote that: The debate about integration versus separation of in~elligencenow .seems to be over. 7he fears expressed by Sherman Kent, ~ i l l i u r nLonger and their c ~ n t e ~ ~ o r a rwere i e s by no means groundless. But the experience of sevual decades hns shown that the danger of loss of objectiveness in the inte/li~erfc~ process would have existed even if the CIA had been Q totally uu~onomous organi~ution.~ 2. Kent also used his book to define intelligence in three different,: but inclusive, ways. As noted above, Kent viewed intelligence as a form of knowledge, a form of organization and as a form of activity." 3. The view that intelligence could be treated as a science was one of Kent's most controversial contributions to the literature?' Kent believed in the application of social sciences principles to intelligence, but there was never any clear indication of how these translated principles were to work when applied. Quantitative research was a relatively new idea ....
._
21)
Walter Layucur, World of Secrets, Chapter 3, fii 31, page 355.
2s
See Walter Laqueur, Wodd of Secrets, page 90.See also Harold Ford, Essiirriative /flt~l/igeflce,pages 302/:!03 as he quotes CIA Director Robert Gates and his beiiefs on Kent's positions.
7.4
Siierrrian Kent, Strategic /flt~l/ig~nce for American Worid Policy, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ. 191.9, page vii. See also individual chapter headings in the book.
4.
Sherman Kent, Strutegic /~re//igeflce for American World Policy, 2nd Edition, Hamden, Connecticut, 1953, Vage 156.
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a t the time and Kent’s views were welcomed by a t least some. As was noted, ”No behaviorist could have asked for more.? The debate over
social science principles and quantitative analysis continues with no final answer available. Kent’s other main contribution to the study of intelligence was his creation of the journal Studies in Intelligence. Kent defined the purpose of the journal in i t s first issue as follows: Intelligence today is not merely a profession, but like most professions it has taken on the aspects o f a discipline:it has developed a recognized methodology; it has developed a vocabulary; it has developed a body of theory and doctrine; it has elaborate and refined techniques. I t now has a large professional following. What it lacks is a literature ... As long as this discipline lacks a literature, its method, its vocabulary, its body of doctrine, and even its fundamental theory run the risk of never reaching full maturity. I will not say that you cannot have a discipline without a literature, but I will assert that you are unlikely to have a robust and growing one without one ...’$ In a 37-year long period of publishing between 1955 and 1992, the journal put out some 473 articles. Of that, there are 93 articles under the headings of”Research and Analysis‘; or”Evaluation, Estimates and Application to Policy.” Even generously viewed, the titles reveal that only 22 articles had any bearing on issues of theory, and most of the 22 were given over to issues such as defining terms in use or establishing what the relationship of assessment estimates should be to policy makers. Not one title reveals a direct interest in establishing a theory of what strategic intelligence assessments or estimates should be capable of doing. Kent’s journal has been a valuable tool for its readership, but it does not yet appear to have achieved one of its own stated goals. As it noted, without a literature, even the fundamental theory of intelligence might never reach full maturity. Kent’s fears appear to have been realized in this case as no accepted theory of intelligence is in place.
28WalterLaqueur, World of Secrets, page 296. ”These comments were on the first page of the first copy of the journal in 1955
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Another key writer and scholar, Roberta Wohlstetter, has written an extensive study on the failures at Pearl Harbor that was able to benefit from the works of others before her. Her 1962 work on the warnings and surprise at Pearl Harbor laid bare some of the intelligence problems of World War Two. She also warned that the events at Pearl Harbor were by no means unique and that such an event could easily occur again?* The greatest contribution of Wohlstetter was her observation that, unlike many others, she did not believe that the intelligence system of its day lacked information. To the contrary, she argues that "Never before have we had such a complete picture of the enemy. And perhaps never again will we have such a magnificent collection of sources a t our disposal?' This view has maintained its credibility and her work remains valid despite the increases in technology that have occurred since then?' Wohlstetter also wrote on a further problem that intelligence had at the time and which is still a problem. Several analysts a t the time were 'convinced that the Japanese would break their diplomatic relations with Great Britain and the United States and that war was a real possibility. As Wohlstetter notes, however, "But their efforts were unsuccessful because of the poor repute associated with Intelligence, inferior rank, and the province of the specialist, or long hair? She goes on to further state that General Gerow, a t the time head of the War Plans Division of the US Army, said that "enemy information of such grave moment would be brought to me by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 and not by a Signal Corps Offi~er."'~Intelligence today still has a dubious reputation. Many organizations, such as the UN, do not wish to admit to its existence, even when they are using it.55 3e
Roberta Wohlstetter, Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision,Stanford University Press, Stanford, California, 1962, pages 397 to 401.
"/bid., page 382. %a
See Harold Ford, Estimative Intelligence, page 27. See also D.C. Daniel and K.L. Herbig, Strategic ~ i l i t a r ~ D e ~ e p t iPergamon on, Press, New York, 1981, page 75 and 101 to 102. "Roberta Wohlstetter, op. cit., page 312 "/bid. "See, among others, Thomas Quiggin's response to "No Cloak and Dagger Required: Intelligence Support To UN Peacekeeping," lntelligence and ~utionalSecurity, Vol. 13, No. 4, Winter 1998, pages 203 to 207. On page 205 of this article it is noted that the UN euphemistically referred to its intelligence section as the Military Information Office.
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After Wohlstetter’s work, the only other major work on intelligence in this period was that of the former Director of the CIA, Allen Dulles.The book written by Dulles is not easy to categorize. Part of the book is a memoir, as Dulles recounts his own life and career.The book also has a series of anecdotes t o illustrate various successes and failures of the CIA and other organizations.” Another theme that runs throughout the book is Dulles’ own anti-communist views and how intelligence is an important part of defeating the com munist threat.” The book is useful as an examination of some of the issues that plague intelligence and as an insight to operations of the CIA. At no point, however, is there an effort to examine a theory of intelligence or to explore the bounds and limits of the subject. The academic community was still showing no major interest in how intelligence affected international relations in the early 1970s.Two interesting works did appear as exceptions to an otherwise vacant area. Harvard political science professor Harry Ransom explained his reasons for publishing his 1970 book, The intelligence €5~ff~/j5hr~enr,”My purpose was to explore a major terra incognito of American government, the national intelligencecommunity, the original role of which was to bring the main facts of the outside world to the attention of policy makers.”’” At the same time, General Sir Kenneth Strong published a book that was, in many ways, similar to that of Allen Dulles seven years earlier.”* It describes a period of history (World War One to the 1960s) and illustrates its observations with factual and anecdotal information. Unlike Dulles, however, Strong takes the last chapter of his book to try and answer the question, What is /nte//jgence~ Although Strong does not take an academic or theoretical approach to his work, he nonetheless ______._
s4
See, for instance, the case of an American Ambassador to Romania who lost his code book while storing it under his bedld, Allen Dulles, The Craft of Intelligence, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1963, pages 77 to 78.
37
Allen Dulles, The Craft of Infeliigence, page 53. Dulles makes this clear when he writes: in our time, the United States is being challenged by a hostile group of nations that profess a philosophji of life and of government inimical to our own. 9%
The book achieves its aims in the sense that it does a survey of American intelligence organizations and offers some views on the British system as well. See Harry Howe Ransom, The Inrelligence Fsrub/isb~ent,Cambridge, MA Harvard University Press, 1970. 3e
General Sir Kenneth Strong, Men of InfeI/igence, Cassel and Company, London, 1970.
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examines issues that are germane to the formation of intelligence theory. As such, it can be said that his last chapter undertakes the type of work that could be considered as foundational for theoretical work."' In the mid-1970s events occurred that would change the academic relationship to intelligence. An extraordinary governmental, and very public, debate occurred on the role of intelligence in an open and democratic society.'Phe debate was mainly focused in the United States and was driven by two main issues. First, there was concern over the control of intelligence agencies and whether they should be subject to executive or legislative control. Real and alleged abuses of civil liberties were investigated. Second, and more germane to this discussion, was the debate concerning the quality of the intelligence work being done, particularly as it concerned analysis and assessment. The debate was frequently acrimonious and was complicated by a series of real and perceived intelligence failures a t the time. While the ferocity of the debate greatly demoralized much of the intelligence community, it did stimulate an interest in the academic community.This new academic interest manifested itself in a number of different ways. Where a near void had existed previously, academic interest spawned a series of works.4' One other event did much to spur further academic interest. As a result of the above noted debate, an experiment was carried out in 1976 whereby outsiders were given access to intelligence material and asked to write reports on specific issues,Their reports, referred to as the A-B Team Episodes, were then compared against reports written by insiders. The so-called B team of outsiders found serious flaws in the work of the insiders, or the A team. The results were embarrassing to the intelligence community: . . . embarrassment succeeded embarrassment, pressure mounted from the Congress. In his last appearance before the Senate as DCI (Director of Central Intelligence) GeorgeBush (senior) attempted to defend the CIA4 analytic record 4v
Kenneth Strong, Men of Intelligence, pages 152 to 170
"The 1998 UNI Company list of Dissertation Abstracts has one data base that covers January 1861 to December of 1974. The list, covering mainly American universities, does not have a single thesis listed in that time period that deals with strategic intelligence, military intelligence or intelligence of any sort.The interest generated in the late 1970s become evident as a number of dissertations began to have intelligence themes starting in 1981.
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by questioning its critic’s commi~mentto peace. Senator Hubert Humphrey replied that his own distinct political background did not keep him from appreciating facts and arguments on their merits, and that, prima facie, the critic’s case looked good.gz The degree of debate in the US was so intense that it generated a long overdue interest and investigation by scholars and other interested professionals. The Consortium for the Study of Intelligence was started when: A group of scholars interested in national security policx law and values of the open society, came together in early 1979 under the auspices of the
~ a t i o n aStrategy l Information Centre. Their purpose was to study intelligence, and to determine what steps might be taken to ensure that US performance would enhance American values. To achieve their objectives ... the group assembled scholars, intelligence specialists, and other organizations and professionals interested in the subject.*’ The Consortium has since produced a series of books covering most aspects of intelligence. Among these have been Elements of Intelligence (1 979), Analysis and Assessments (1 980), Counterintelligence (1980), Covert Action (1 981) Clandestine Collection (1 982), Domestic Intelligence (1 986), and Intelligence and Policy (1 986).The Consortium continues to publish and has provided a continuing series of useful insights by a variety of academics, professional intelligence personnel and business people. The most relevant of these volumes for strategic assessment was Analysis and Estimates, which offered a multi-disciplinary look a t the subject of analysis and associated doctrine. In the introduction, the editor Roy Godson identifies two main schools of thought in the American analytic community. He discusses the first by saying that:
. . .
4%
For further information on the A and 8 team experiments, see pages 101 to 104 of Roy Godson in /ntel/igenceRequirements for the 196iJs: Elements of Intelligence,Transaction Books, New Jersey, 1983. For a larger explanation of the A-B teams experiment see also Harold P. Ford, fstimatib*eIntdligence, Annex Three: The A-B Team Experiment in Competitive Estimating, 1976, page 261 t o 277.
4s
Roy Godson, editor, /nte//igenc~ R&quire~ents for the 1960’s: Elements of/nte//igence,TransactionBooks, New Brunswick USA and London UK, 1983, page 4.
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One school, as clearly as it can be defined, is found in the writings ofSherman Kent and particulurly in his Strategic Intelligence (3949). Those who follow Kent hold that while analysts should make every effort to screen surprise from nutional security policymaking, they cunnot be expected to predict major events - that analysts cannot be expected to know exactly what is going to happen in any given situation because most often the actors in thar si~uationhave not themselves decided on a course of action. Proponents of this view hold that prediction is literally impossible and that the primary tasks of the analyst are to give warning of impending attack and to plot long term rrends on the basis of whatever factual evidence is uvailable.~
Godson notes, however, that there is a differing view that is not expressed officially, but has resonance in the intelligence community. While the orthodoxy in both the literature and practice is that analysts should not be policy predictive and should maintain a discreet distance from policy makers, the contrarian view dismisses this. Intelligence analysts should: . . .not only assess world conditions and thus assist policy makers but should
a~rmativelyarticulate and evaluatealternativepolicies. They believe of course that policy makers must be finally be responsible for deciding what is likely to take place and what US policy should be, but also that analysts should force policy makers to confront a/rernative views of foreign situations and alternative US policies.
What this literature means is that analysts are put into a situation where they face a continuous contradiction. On the one hand, they are required to be close enough to policy makers so that they understand their needs. Then they can adjust the flow of intelligence collection and analysis to suit the requirements of policy makers. On the other hand, intelligence analysts should not get too close to the policy makers. If they are too close, then intelligence analysts will begin to judge policy and might involve themselves in determining whether policy makers are being successful in the implementation of their stated objectives. In short, analysts should only watch foreign trends and developments and should not be”policy prescriptive.”
“/bid., page 2.
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This view seems to predominate most official thinking in the English speaking intelligence community. These three issues raised by Godson in 1980 have not been resolved in the literature, and they still form the basis for much discussion. The first issue, that of the nature of surprise in the international system, has been the focus of authors such as Joseph Nye and Michael Handel. The second issue, that of the closeness of the relationship between analysts and policy makers, also remains unresolved, although current practice is for the intelligence community to reach out to policy makers more so than it did in the Seventies and the Eighties. The third issue, whether or not analysts should be policy prescriptive,remains problematic. Current official bureaucratic policy in some countries holds that the intelligence community should refrain at all cost from being policy prescriptive. In fact, this is usually taken as an article of faith and any questioning of it is considered sacrilege. Like many articles of faith, it needed re-examination to determine if it is (or ever was) a correct and useful viewpoint?’ The 2003 American led attack into Iraq will re-ignite this debate again once academics and others are able to access archived documents that are applicable to this issue. The 1970s were rich and productive for the academic study of intelligence. Very little was actually produced in terms of books and journal articles, but the interest of academics was clearly stimulated. As a result, the 1980s would be the first decade that would see academics begin a serious and sustained study of intelligence. The types and amount of literature available on intelligence grew rapidly in the 1980s and the early 1990s. Numerous fields of inquiry were started by historians, political scientists and others.This included former intelligence officers who were not writing memoirs, but rather were doing academic works of inquiry. The 1980s literature demonstrates a maturing of views on intelligence. Less of the literature is on covert operations and spying and more of it concentrates on a description of the intelligence community and its effects 41
While the issue of not being policy prescriptive seems to dominate in English speaking countries, particularly in Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States, this is not always the case in other countries. Many mainland European militaries expect their intelligence analysts to comment on possible policy options, while making it clear that the commander has the final word.
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on international relations. Despite the increase in intelligence literature, it still remains largely void of research directed a t the level of strategic intelligence assessment. At the same time, the attempts a t theory were minimal. The only major exception to this was the extensive article by Isaac Ben-Israel,4Qin which he attempted to develop a philosophy and methodology of intelligence assessments. It remains an elusive problem to explain why theory did not command extensive interest. Quite possibly, however -the later 1990s literature seems to support this - is that there was very little known about intelligence and its impact in the 1970s and 1980s. Without a basic knowledge on the roles and effects of intelligence, few generalizations could be made that would lead to a development of theory. Some starts were made on theory in the works of individuals such as James Der Derian and Angelo Codevilla." The general public debate concerning intelligence prompted more writing on intelligence of a scholarly nature:' Perhaps the most effective book produced on looking a t strategic intelligence and surprise was that by Walter Laqueur. In 1985, Laqueur wrote World of Secrets, a critical examination into political intelligence and US foreign policy. The foreword of the book by M.J Rossant, Director of the Twentieth Century Fund, makes no secret what the book considers applicable to intelligence and surprise: Political intelligence is critical to the making of US foreign policy. Despite technologicaladvances in data gathering, the assessmentsprovidedour policy makers are fiequently wrong headed, either becauseabundantdata is analyzed
@Isaac Ben-Israel, "Philosophy and Methodology of Intelligence: The Logic of Estimate Process: lntdligence and National Security, Vol. 4, No. 4, October 1989, pages 660 to 718. James Der Derian, "Anti-Diplomacy, Intelligence Theory and Surveillance Practice," lnte/ligence and Narionai Security, Vol. 8, No. 3, July 1993, pages 29 to 51. See also James Der Derian James, Anfidipbmclcy: Spies, Terror, Speed and War, Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1992. See also Angelo Codevilla, lnfarming Statecraft: lntelligence for a New Century, New 'fork The Free Press, 1992. 49
+'See, among others, Colby, William E. "Deception and Surprise: Problems of Analysts and Analysis:' See Intelligence Policy and National Security, Robert F. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., Uri Ra'anan. and Warren Milberg (eds.), pages 91-97, 1981. Hamden, CT: Archon, See also Handel, Michael I. "Intelligence and the Problem of Strategic Surprise.- Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 7, No. 3, September 1984, pages 229 to 281. See also ~ i / i t Deception a~ and Strategic Surprise, Gooch, John, and Amos Perlmutter, (eds.). London: Cass, 1982.
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incorrectly or sound intelligence is ignored. Due to miscalculations on the part of the intelli~encecommunit~or its failure to anticipate the course of political and military developments, all too often policy makers have been taken by surprise, unprepared to cope with untoward event^.^' Laqueur clearly enters the debate on whether intelligence can be predictive or not when he says that "It (forecasting) is both feasible and necessary, even though it is no more a science now than it was fifty years ago." He does, however, note that "Political and sociopolitical forecasting is the most difficult kind."'" Laqueur also adds that: The case in favor of the feasibility of foolproof forecasting is based, broadly speaking, on the argument that forecasters are not concerned with unique or random events, with the highly individual impact of the great (or maniacal) sratement or prophet, but with patterns of change and development that exist independent^ As there are no independent patterns ofchange, however, such forecasts will result either in exceedingly vague (or false) statements, or, alternative^ in a variety of scenarios trying to cover all the variouspossibilities open at a time of rapid change. Such predictions are not helpful to the policy maker. Because prediction is impossible without at least some measure of extrQpolations,and because extra~olationdoes not work without at least some continuity, prediction becomes most difficult when it is most needed ot a time of rapid or radical change." Laqueur's work does not develop any final statements on the role of predictiveness in intelligence. He does conclude, however, by saying that "If political prediction is not a science, it still needs adequate political theory." Laqueur, however, suggests that such a book may not appear when he states that "the only ideal book on intelligence could be written only by an insider, for only insider could combine all the qualities needed for understanding the subject. Yet I do not expect such a book to appear."
"Walter Laqueur, M/or/d of Secrers, page vii.
"/bid., page 307. "/bid.
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RISK ASSESMENT AND HORIZON SCANNING
In the late 199Os, there were a limited number of books and articles that dealt with the issues of strategic surprise and intelligence analysis.s2 Some of these looked a t individual cases and were valuable in that respect." Other looked at the broader themes of risk assessment and early warning." Among them was the ground breaking work by David Kahn. In his insightful 1995 article entitled "Toward a Theory of Intelligence," he states that: Intelligence has been an academic discip/inefor fifteen or twenty years now. Almost from the start, scholars have called for a theory of intelligence.None has been advanced. Though some authors entitle sections of their work "theory of intelligence," to my knowledge no one has proposed concepts that can be tested - the mark of a true theory." Kahn sets some rather ambitious goals for his paper and lays them out clearly, albeit qualifying them slightly when he reveals that he will only deal with military intelligence. The goal of the paper is to "account for the rise of military intelligence to its current importance, explain how it works, and specify its main problems."" The theory on how military intelligence grew so quickly at the time of World War One is based on his analysis of what he refers to as physical intelligence and verbal intelligence. Physical intelligence is the study of
52
Among the most useful works from experiencedauthors were: Harold k? Ford,"The US Government's Experience with Intelligence Analysis: Pluses and Minuses." lntelligence and National Security, Vol. 10, No. 4, October 1995, pages 34-53; Charles E. Allen. "Warning and Iraq's Invasion of Kuwait: A Retrospective Look," Defense lnte/ligenceJournal, Vol. 7, No. 2, Fall 1998, pages 33 to 44; Mikhail A. Alexseev, Without Warning: Threat Assessment, lntelli~ence,and GlobalStruggle. New York St. Martins, 1997. London: Macmillan, 1997; Richard K. Betts, "Intelligence Test: The Limits of Prevention.'' In How Did This Happen?Terrorism and the New War, James F, Hoge, Jr., and Gideon Rose (eds.). New York Public Affairs, 2001. 33
Two reports were written on why the government of India's decision to resume nuclear testing caught many by surprise. See the The Jeremiah Report (/nte/ligenceCommunity's PerfbrmanceOR the lndian Nuclear Tesfs, June 1998) and the Ofice of Inspector General (OIG) report (AlrernativeAnalysis in the Directorate of hfelligence, May 1999). MDavies, John L., and Ted Robert Gurr (eds.), Preventive Measures: Building Risk Assessment and 0isi.s tarly Warning Systems. Lanham, M D Rowman & Littlefield, 1998. 59 David Kahn, "Toward a Theory of Intelligencet"The Quarfer~~ourna/ of Mi/ifary History, Vol. 7, No. 2, Winter 1994, page 92.
"David Kahn, Toward a Theory of lntelligence, page 92.
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"things: guns, supply trains, campfires, tank-motor noise."" Kahn contrasts this with verbal intelligence by describing it as information from a verbal source, such as a stolen plan, a report on troop morale, or an overheard order. Kahn makes the argument that physical intelligence has been a longstanding source of information, but verbal intelligence has been relatively sparse. Up to World War One, physical intelligence has provided the majority of information. But it was 1914 when "two major new sources of verbal intelligence appeared: radio, which in effect turns over a copy of its messages to the foe, and the trench telephone, which lets indiscreet chatter be easily overheard."" Kahn's theory of why intelligence grew so quickly is loosely consistent wi.th that of other scholars. At the same time that mass warfare was becoming an entrenched method of warfare, the technologies available to it were expanding. The same impetus for greater collection of verbal intelligence has been noted by Michael Herman when he states: Thus, by 1914 military espionage was on an increasing scale. coincident^ the use of the telegraph for diplomatic telegrams had stimulated virtual^ all major powers to acquire copies of them, form their telegraph offices, and revive their Black Chambers for cipher-breaking. This gradual growth of covert collection was followed by its explosion in the First World War? In order to explain how intelligence works, Kahn suggests that three permanent principles are a t work. The first of these is more like a definition rather than an operating principle. Intelligence, to Kahn, "optimizes one's resources -allowing an effective commander to magnify the unit's strength and improve command.''w Kahn argues that without effective intelligence, a unit's resources are "dispersed, disorganized, entropic." This analysis, while perhaps offering some form of descriptive insight to general readers, is
s7/6id.,page 93.
@/&Id.,page 94. ?a For these quotes and more on the issue of intelligence growth see Michael Herman, intelligence Powerin Peaceand War, pages 22 to 25. General Sir Kenneth Strong makes similar observations about how intelligence came of age. See Men of Intelligence, pages 34 to 35. (A
David Kahn, Toward a Theory of Inlelligence, page 95.
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axiomatic rather explanatory. As such, it offers little towards a theory of military intelligence, or to intelligence in general. The second principle is that intelligence is an auxiliary element in war. Intelligence "speaks to commanders, not for them. It is a service, not an arm."57 Kahn makes this analysis while pointing out that intelligence has an indirect rather than direct effect on the outcome of events. Again, this may be an insight to general readers, but it has been common knowledge that intelligence is a "support trade." Kahn's third principle is more interesting. He posits that intelligence has been more important to the defensive than offensive side in battles. He goes SO far as to make the case that intelligence is essential to defense but not to offence." Intelligence for Kahn exists in both the offence and the defense, but in different ways. Kahn uses Clausewitz to suggest that defense is thel'parrying of the blow and that its characteristic feature is awaiting the blow." The army cannot, Kahn argues, await the blow or parry it if it does not have the intelligence that says that that blow is coming. He continues the defense/offense argument by suggesting that another of Clausewitz's statements should be inverted. Clausewitz stated that surprise is necessary for offensive victory, and therefore Kahn argues that the inverse must be true of the defense: intelligence is necessary for the success in defense. Kahn continues this line of thought by saying that: To defend is to acknowledge that the initiative comes from the enemy. And, indeed, the offense acts, the defense reacts. The offense prescribes to the enemy; it makes basic decisions. "It is complete in itself,"says Clausewitz.Thus, information about enemy intentions, while helpful and to a certain degree always present ... is not essential to victory. A strong invading force can march about the countryside imposing its will, without needing to know where the enemy is."'
'"bid., page 95.
"/bid., page 95. "/bid., pages 95 to 96
Ancient and Modern Assessment sessments 10Common -. Commonproblems Pt-obi
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Unfortunately, while Kahn lists a number of cases where his principle appears correct, he does not offer an expansive list of examples. Nor does he at any point offer an indication that he has done a larger study to back up his claims. His statement that the principle “came to me while, when I was writing a book, I was looking for incidents in which intelligence had helped win battles. I noticed that I was finding more defensive victories than offensive.”a The third principle that Kahn advances is not really supported by a wide range of empirical evidence. Still, his point raises interesting questions for any theory on intelligence.What Kahn does not identify in his third principle is how it relates to his first principle - that of intelligence optimizing resources.Typically, the force on the defensive is the weaker one -- otherwise it would not be on the defensive. Either way, the force on the defensive feels the greater pressure to optimize its resources. Thus, it could be argued that Kahn’s first and third principles are simply corollaries of each other. The force that is under the most pressure will feel the need to exploit its resources, including intelligence. Kahn’s article is aptly titled. While his article does not offer a working theory of intelligence, nor one of military intelligence, it does provide groundwork. His first and third principles seem interwoven and do not stand alone. He does, however, offer valid insights into the development of intelligence and its future, especially on his analysis of verbal and physical intelligence. As such, his work is outstanding in the field as it does tackle the difficult problem of strategic intelligence theory.
5.5 The state of strategic intelligence Assessment In 1978, Professor Richard Betts, writing from an academic point of view, stated his belief that intelligence failures were inevitable.” Writing from an operational perspective many years later in the 199Os, United States Air Force officer Jeffrey O’Leary made the observation that: -/bid, page 96. e9
Richard K. Betts, Analysis, War and Decision: Why lnteiligence failures are Inevitable,World Politics,Vol. 31, No. 1, October 1978, pages 61-89.
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RISK ASSESMENT AND HORIZON SCANNING
Historical evidence seems to indicate that strategic surprise in the twentieth century has rarely been prevented despite a plethora ofavailable intelii~ence. Strategic surprise, in this case, may not only be possible, it may be
inevitable.^ At the close of the 20th Century, it was clear that neither academics nor operational personnel had created a working theory of strategic intelligence and its relation to strategic surprise. However, it was also clear that some sort of theory needed to be produced to reduce the probability and cost of surprise. As Walter Laqueur wrote, "If political prediction is not a science, it still needs adequate political theory."" As both a subject of academic study and as an organized form of bureaucracy, strategic intelligence assessment is just over a century old. As late as the 199Os, authors have noted that strategic intelligence is "the most under-theorized part of international relations" and that "the analytical part of this work still has the hall marks of a young subject."Q81 Furthermore, due to the emotive response that the word intelligence tends to draw, it has also been noted that "analytic work on the subject is dominated (and thus distorted) by works of opposition or apology."@ Prior to this in 1989, two leading authorities, Berkowitz and Goodman, wrote in 1989 that "...there is no well developed theory on how to produce intelligence To this is added already noted earlier comment from respected historian Walter Laqueur. "I do not expect such a book (on intelligence) to a~pear.''~' As such, it is correct to state that there is not yet a positive working
&l
Major Jeffrey OLeary, Surprise and lnte//igence;Towards a Clearer Understandi~g,Air War College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, 1997, report number: A001923 or see the journal Airpower, Spring 1994.
61
Walter Laqueur, World of Secrets, page 307.
6s
Michael Herman, intelligence Power in Peace and War, page 3
*'
lbd.
18
Bruce Berkowitz and Allan Goodman, Strategic Intelligence and American ~ariona/Security, page 85. 71
Walter Laqueur, World of Secrets, page x.
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theory on what strategic intelligence can be expected to do.” It is clear, however, that strides have been made and the time may be ripe for such a project to emerge. Most distressing a t the end of the 20th Century, however, is the role of political and community leadership in strategic intelligence issues -and their failures. No matter what the crisis or failure a t the close of the century, few ind~vidualsor oversight committees were held responsible. With the lack of responsibility being endemic, it is unlikely that significant changes will occur in the most critical areas of strategic intelligence - direction and analysis. 1-t-1EOKY
No well ~~~~~~~e~~~e~~~ exists on the ~~~~~c~~~~ of at^^^^ level in ~ ~ the ~ e ~r sf ~ ~ e ~ ~ ~ c ~an~artnor a~cmft, ~ ,it stiii needs a ~ ~ ~ ~~~~r~ if it is to ~~0~~~~a ~~e~~~ level of ~~~~~~
~~~~~
~~~~~~~~~~~~
~~~~~~~~~~~
”In 1999, Amy B. Zebart published the book Flawed By Design - The Evolution of the 0.4, JCS and NCS. The introductory chapter does address the issue of intelligence theory, but it only looks at American based National Security Agencies.
~ ~
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Chapter 6
Reinforcing Intelligence Failures
Following the events of 9/11 and the other associated attacks around the world, there has been a renewed interest in all matters of intelligence. Unfortunately, there have not been many attempts to look at strategic surprise and intelligence theory in a rigorous manner.' Nor have there been any major attempts to address other pressing national security intelligence problems. While there have been some exceptions (Singapore, Australia and a handful of others) most of the intelligence changes made after the 11 September 2001 attacks merely reflect the changes of the past. Reduced to the most general level, the rather recent round of changes has done little more than rework previous organizational wiring diagrams. Worse, often they have added another layer of bureaucracy to organizations that are already choking on centralized systems. Another crop of promises have emerged that tell us some technological wonder will solve all our problems, but techniques such as data mining will no more predict the future than Delphic oracles or reading the entrails of sacrificial animals. In the United States and Canada for example, there has been a move to create "super ministries" that amalgamate existing intelligence and enforcement functions under new layers of command and leadership. In
'See, among others, Jack Davis, "improving CIA Analytic Performance: Strategic Warning: Occasional Papers: Vol. 1, No. 1, September 2002,The Sherman Kent Centre.
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the United States, this can be seen through a number of examples such as the creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the new office of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI). Perhaps the most interesting example is the creation of the Office of Homeland Security, which was announced on 20 September 2001, a very quick nine days aker the 9/11 attacks. The first head (Governor Tom Ridge) was put into position on 20 October 2001, only a month later. It is difficult, if not impossible, to believe that the American government, having been taken completely by surprise on 11 September 2001, was able to assess the new realities of transnational terrorism, understand the intelligence failures, and provide the outline of a new working model in nine days (11 September 2001 to 20 September 2001). According to the White House, the mission of the new office:
... wi//be to deve/opand coordinate the imp/ementationof a comprehensive national strategy to secure the United States from terrorist threats or attacks. The Office wi//coordinate the executive branch's efforts to detect, prepare for, prevent, pratect against, respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks within the United States.2
Following the creation of the Office of Homeland Security, the Department of Homeland Security came into being on 25 November 2002 as a result of the Homeland Security Act of 2002. The new department was created by combining 22 other government agencies and it was to have the following three main missions: Prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce America's vu/nerabi/ity to terrorism, and minimize the damage from potential attacks and natural disasters.'
In Canada, most of the intelligence and enforcement functions from various departments were brought together into the new Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Department. As with the situation in the United _ _ _ _ . . . . _ _ . . I
'See the official website of the White House (President George W. Bush) at: httpJ/vdww.whitehouse. go~~/news/releases/2001/10/20011008.html. 'See the DtiS website at h~p~/v~v~v~.dhs.go~/dhspubli~faq.jsp.
91 Reinforcing intelligence Failures 91
States, it appears that these rapid reactions were the result of political imperatives to "do something" in reaction to the events of 9/11. Rather than determine what the causes of the failure were, or assess the national level risk of the international environment, the creation of these departments was simply bureaucratic and political. There is no indication that any serious consideration was given to solving known intelligence problems. Rather, the huge amount of effort and resources spent on these new agencies suggests that more, not less problems will be created. Overall, the effect has been to retain the systems and structures that were causing the problems, and then add to them by building yet more layers of bureaucracy. The future successes needed against asymmetric threats demand more knowledge, quicker response times and more integration. Whether this happens remains to be seen, but the initial signals are not hopeful.
,I The Academic Response So far, there has been no major academic work unfold that has addressed the issue of a positive strategic intelligence assessment theory. One of the most comprehensive recent books on strategic intelligence was published in 2004. Loch Johnson and James J. Wirtz are the editors of the anthology Strategic Intelligence: ~ i n d o into ~ 5 a Secret World. It has a section on strategic surprise, but using the 1978 article by Richard K. Betts, "Analysis, War and Decision - Why Intelligence Failures are Inevitable,"" the book makes the final conclusion that the best way to deal with the idea of strategic surprise is to develop a "tolerance for disaster." What is needed to help avert the disasters?The most basic problem with strategic intelligence over the ages has not been the lack of basic data or information. It has been the lack of knowledge and assessment. The reasons for this failure to develop effective assessment capabilities are widespread, but once again, they boil down t o the issues of stove-piping and mindsets.
'Richard K. Betts in Johnson and Wirtz (eds.),Strategic Intelligence: Wmdows lnto a Secret World, Roxbury Publishing Company, Los Angeles, California, 2004, pages 97 to 11 1
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This problem has not changed at the end of the 20th Century. According to Mathew M. Aid, in the United States, the National Security Agency's biggest problem"is not its ability to collect intelligence. In reality, the Agency's biggest problem is the continuing decline of its SlGlNT processing, analysis and reporting infrastructure." He furthers this by adding that "The problem was that NSA spent comparatively little on the equipment and personnel to take these intercepts and turn them into finished intelligence."' These thoughts are clearly restated by GregoryTreverton, the former Vice Chair of the National Intelligence Committee in Washington.Treverton notes that there should be a doubling or trebling of the resources allocated to analysis, but he does not think that this will happen. As he so clearly states, 'A s h i ~of that magnitude is not likely to happen soon, in part because there are no lobbies for analysts but there are lobbies for expensive technical systems. But the required direction is clear.The world requires more processing and analysis, not less.'" Perhaps it was not directly their role, but the authors of the recent 571'7 1 Report - The tion on^^ Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States do not directly address the role of what could or should be expected from national level strategic assessment capabilities.There is one section entitled "Foresight - and Hindsight," but it does not delve into a larger discussion of improving capabiIities. The 9/11 Report also does little to address the critical issue of responsibility. Without the direct and responsible involvement of the relevant oversight committees and political leaders, the critical issue of direction (as part of the intelligence cycle) does not receive the focus that it should. The 9/7 I Report makes only a passing commentary on oversight and has nothing on leadership responsibility.'
'For this information and a further discussion on the NSA see Matthew M. Aid in "The Time of the Troubles: The US National Security Agency in the Twenty First Century," as published in Johnson and Wire (eds.), Strategic lntelligence - Windows Into u Secret World, pages 73 to 90. 'Gregory Treverton, Reshaping ~utionu/ Intdigence for an Age of/~formation~ Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 2003, page 227. 'Thomas H. Kean and Lee H. Hamilton et al, The 9/1 I Report - The ~utionu/Commission Report on Terrorists Attucks Upon the UnitedStutes,St Martin's Press, New York, 2004.
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6.2 strategic Assessment and Terrorism As an intelligence target, it must first be established that there is “not one terrorism but a variety of terrorisms and what is true for one does not necessarily apply to others.”@Despite some trite comments from political officials such as “terrorists hate us because they hate our freedom,” the causes of terrorism are varied. While it is not possible here to enter into the larger debate of the definition or the causes of terrorism, it can be said that there are various causes such as alienation, humiliation, history, territorial disputes and dem ographics.” Nationalism can be a major factor’” and terrorism can also be a form of insurgency.*’ Despite the numerous discussions about religious terrorism, it should be noted that the first suicide bombers in the Middle East in the 1980s were not Islamic, but secular Christians.” Despite the current association between Islamic terrorism and suicide, the reality is that the group that produced the most suicide bombers in the 1990s was the Tamil Tigers, who have little, if any, religious motivation.” Again, despite the popular perceptions concerning “Islamic terrorism,”Christian, Jewish and Muslim groups have all been violent extremists, and the Aum Shinrikyo sect in Japan also had strong religious
‘Walter Laqueur, No End To Vb‘ur: Terrorism in the 21sr Centuiy, The Continuum International Publishing Group, London, UK, 2003, page 8. ’For a broader discussion of these causes of terrorism, see Jessica Stern, Terror in the Name ofGod,
Harper Collins Books, NewYork, 2003, pages 9 to 138.See also Rohan Gunaratna, /nsideA/Qa&da;G/oba/ Nefwrk of Terror, Berkley Books, New i’ork, 2003. 10
Walter Laqueur, No End to War, page 26.
11
For more information on terrorism as a form of insurgency see Arid Merari,”Terrorism as a Strategy of 1nsurgency:‘Terrorism and PoiiticalViolence, Vol. 5, No. 4, Winter 1993, pages 13 to 25 1. *2
Walter Laqueur, No End to War, page 26.
”/bid.
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beliefs.'" 111 short, understanding terrorism and the threat it poses is an extraordinarily complex task. It may prove to be a more difficult task than that of the Cold War or World War Two. Ironically, one of the key issues is that the role of the state is key to understandingthe issues.The state is often failing in its role to provide basic security and social measures to the populations.Therefore, alternative ideas, including those espoused by violent terrorist groups or other forms of political extremism are becoming increasingly attractive. Another feature of strategic intelligence that will complicate, rather than aid analysis, is the issue of crossover from organized crime to terrorism. Terrorists need operating money and many histories of terrorism shows that terrorists have sometimes turned to criminal methods for fundraising. Terrorists, almost by definition, are not usually rich at the outset. Currently, however, some major terrorist groups, such as Hezbollah" are turning to international organized crime to fund their operations. There are also a series of low level indicators that the so-called "home grown jihadists" are often self funding or raise funds through low level criminal activity or basic levels of organized crime. At the same time, some organized crime groups are becoming more political." Unfortunately, most intelligence and law enforcement agencies are still organized into "stove-pipes'' in such a way that the two functions are seen as separate entities with little overlap. At the same time, terrorism is seen more as an intelligence function while organized crime is seen as a law enforcement function. As such, not that much is known about the cross-over between the two, and the knowledge base inside the responsible agencies is limited. More importantly, terrorist groups can and do change their structures and organizations rapidly and can adapt faster than the larger, more
"For further information on the Aum Shinrikyo sect in Japan see Bruce Hoffman, h i d e Terrorism, Colurnbian University Press, New York, 1998, pages 88 and 121 to 127. "See among many others,"Terror funded by U.S. tobacco smuggling,"UPI NewsTuesday, 8 June 2004 and "Al-Qaeda and other militants turn to crime to fund terrorism amid crackdown on financial Friday , August 13,2004. institutions," By Alexandra Zavis, AP ~ o r / ~ s t r e u m "Walter Laqueur, The New Terrorism: Fanaticism and the Arms of Muss Destruction, Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK, 1999, pages 216 to 218.
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bureaucratic, intelligence agencies that try to track them. They have a Darwinian imperative that forces them to adapt in the face of frequently superior forces." As noted in the writings of David Kahn (and others), in a conflict, it is the side on the defensive that needs the best intelligence. In the case of transnational terrorism, it is clearly the state and its various agencies and institutions that are on the defensive. Those individuals planning a terrorist attack, especially one calculated to have an effect at the strategic level, have the advantage of choosing the time and place of their attacks. Additionally, terrorist organizations, if organized into cells, can afford to have some potential attacks exposed or some members captured. In the face of terrorism in the age of weapons of mass destruction, one successful attack may have a catastrophic effect on a society. Perhaps the most critical factor, from the point of view of strategic intelligence assessment, is that the smaller the terrorist group, the more outlandish or extreme its doctrine may be. With the rapid changes in technology and the ability of small groups or individuals to manufacture radiological, chemical, or biological weapons, the future may hold fearful events.'@Small groups tend to leave only a small "footprint" which is extraordinarily difficult to detect and track. The knowledge and assessment needed for accurate strategic assessment analysis are tough enough to get in a stable international environment when so-called "rational" state actors are involved. Now, strategic intelligence assessment will have to seek accurate assessments on multiple targets in a fast changing fluid and violent environment. Terrorism - in whatever form - will prove a formidable challenge for strategic intelligence assessment.
I7 Mark Stout and Thomas Quiggin, Exploiting The New High Resolution Sate//iteimagery: Darwinian Imperatives?,Commentary Number 75, The Canadian Security and Intelligence Service, Summer 1998. See also Walter Laqueur, No End to War, pages 25 to 29. 1%
For a wider discussion of weapons of mass destruction and their potential use by terrorists, see Walter Laqueur, The New Terrorism:fanaticism and the Arms ofMass Destruction,Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK, 1999.
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6.3 Reinforcing Failure Transnational terrorism is just one of the challenges facing national security intelligence agencies in the future. In a complex and uncertain international environment, the state can expect to face numerous other challenges in the coming years. As previously noted, these challenges will include transnat~o~ai organized crime, pandemics, resource shocks, environmental degradation, supply chain issues, natural disasters and man made disasters. Since 9/11, the majority of attention has been focused, in many developed countries, on terrorism. To date, the reforms and changes that have been made are not promising as they have tended to simply reinforce previous problems and ignore attacking the real problems. As such, national security issues in the future look like they will be more problematic and the intelligence resources needed to deal with them will be less capable, rather than more agile and responsive.
Chapter 7
chnology and lntelli
Legends of prediction are common throughout the whole Household of Man. Gods speak, spirits speak, computers speak. Oracular ambiguity or statistical probability provides loopholes, and discrepancies are expunged by Faith. Ursula K. Le Guin, The Left Hand of Darkness Intelligence analysts are charged with the responsibility of making sense of the complex and uncertain environment in which decision makers operate. Currently, the role of the intelligence analysts is under considerable stress. The traditional roles of seeking out information about foreign militaries and political intelligence remain, but a rapidly developing series of asymmetric threats will challenge the intelligence community in new ways. Globalization, however defined, will bring a new rush of threats that confront decision makers, frequently with little to no advance warning. Combined with that, due to the devolving nature of the security threat, the newer threats are smaller, less structured and are adapting quickly. The events they cause will change the security and political environment swiftly. Keeping up with them will be difficult, but more difficult will be doing what is actually needed: staying ahead. In order to meet the current and future challenges, intelligence analysts will have to develop global outlooks on many issues that are now thought
......
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to be primarily domestic. Even domestic police forces at the large city level will have to develop both the knowledge and informal networks to deal with issues that now have international reach. Rapid and relevant information flows will be required to support the analysis for these problems. It will not come from secret or highly technical sources as in the past for the simple reason that most of the earth's problem areas are not covered by "spies" or high tech monitoring devices, Even if they were, the most sophisticated of them cannot pick up the capabilities and intentions of small groups of angry, motivated young people. This reality means that open source intelligenceand voluntary information sharing across current boundaries will have to occur. If it does not, then analysts will continue to function "in the dark," deprived of the most basic information needed to do their jobs.
7.1The outlook While experiences vary from country to country, it can be generalized that the outlook for improved intelligence analysis is not positive. In fact, with a few bold exceptions, it is rather negative.I Reasons for this are varied, but they can be explained as follows: I. 2. 3. 4.
A lack of balance in resources between analysis and technology. A creeping process of militarization of intelligence in some countries. Secrecy continues to undermine the analytical process. A critical lack of training and upgrading.
7.2 ALack of Balance in Resources Following major events of strategic surprise, the investigations usually lead to many of the same conclusions about the causes of strategic surprise. And they lead to the same recommendations about how to solve these problems. 'For further reading on this see the works of individuals such as Robert David Steele, On Inte'elligence; Walter Laqueur, A World ofSecrets;Anthony Cordesman, Terrorism,Asymmetric Warfareand Weapons of Mass Destruction; or Gregory F. Treverton, Reshaping National Security /nfe//ige~ce for an Age of Inforrriafion.
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The conclusions can be loosely grouped around the issues of the failure to share information (stove-piping) and the failure to adapt to the new information (mindsets). Rarely during investigations does the matter of a lack of information arise. To the contrary, in investigations from the German invasion of Russia (1941) to 9/11 (2001), it has been pointed out that the information needed to come up with the right assessments was in fact present. It may not have made it to the right places in a timely manner or been understood, but it was there. If the problems are known, why do we keep getting the same failures? Many issues are at play, but one of them is the total imbalance in how we deal with analysis. Reduced to its most basic, there is an extreme imbalance in the way the analysis process works. We can explain this in the following manner. Intelligence is basically a process that assembles data and other discrete "bits" or "grains" of information into a more complete and understandable assessment and then delivers that assessment to policy and decision makers. Multiple views can be taken on how this process works, but one method of explaining would be as follows. The terms ''data,''''information,''''knowledge,'' and "assessment" are frequently used interchangeably, leading to a lack of clarity in practical and conceptual terms. For purposes of this explanation of strategic intelligence, the four terms are actually on a continuum, with each progressive movement to the right on the continuum being a higher level of processing or analysis. Data -+ Information -+Knowledge -+ Assessment When look a t past problems, investigations repeatedly point out that the necessary amount of raw information was entering the system (i.e., data) and that there were people who saw this "data" and did something with it (i.e., it became information). This is where the process often breaks down, however. Frequently, the"information"was not combined with other sources or given to other areas of expertise (i.e., stove-piping) so no "knowledge" is obtained, due to this critical breakdown. As such, the process usually never even had a chance to work and no assessment was made, or it was made with information that was incomplete.There is nothing to indicate that the problem has been significantly improved today.
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Getting the right information to the right people at the right time is not a new problem. Technology, thought to be of assistance in many cases, has merely increased the volume of information. This problem has been in existence as far back as the late 1960s.” The problem has mainly worsened with the advent of greater capabilities in signals intelligence and space based imagery. Rather than having more useful information, intelligence systems are frequently overwhelmed by the flood - lessening the likelihood of the detection of weak signals. For the sake of simplicity, the problem can be reduced to this. The intelligence community as a whole across many countries is very strong at the left end of the above noted continuum (data -+ information). It collects, stores and collates many different sources of information and usually does it well. Moving on, however, it can be seen that thel’knowledge to assessment” part of the continuum is the weakest. It is here that the most work needs to be done to fix the problems. The continuing failure, however, is in the imbalance of resources applied. lntelligence agencies generally spend most of their budgets on technology, infrastructure and various support systems. They spend only the most minor portion of the budget on analysis. This fact has remained consistent since the 1970s (perhaps earlier) and appears to have worsened as time goes by. In the 197Os, a series of investigations in the United States revealed considerable information about intelligence activities. The various commissions, such as the Pike Committee and the Church Committee focused on operations, but one of the little noted factors that surfaced was how little focus was put on analysis. Total budget spending put on analysis was about 1%. Stated the other way, about 99% of budget spending was put on everything else but analysis. Since the 1960s and 1970%there has been a series of new IT technologies, each one requiring new spending and each one making a new series of promises. None of them, however, have been focused on the problems areas (i’e., knowledge -+ assessment). Rather, each one of them has been focused on the areas where we are already the strongest (i.e., data -+ information). ’See Major General Sir Kenneth Strong KBE, CB,Men of/~fe//igence, Cassel and Company, London, 1970, pages 152 to 153. See also Henry Ransom, The lntelligence fsfab/isbmenf, Harvard University Press, Cambridge University Press, 1970, pages 106 to 107.
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Put the other way, we are re-enforcing failure and refusing to address possible successful solutions. The bluntest assessment of this comes from Robert David Steele.' In his views on technology and analysis he makes the following points: Information technology up to this point has been a resource drain, and ultimately reduced the ability of government to hire and retain world-class experts. ~nformationtechnology has imposed on the policymaker financial, productivit% secrecy, and opportunity costs. The "iron curtains" between classified information technology systems, policymaker information technology systems, and private sector information technology systems have created a wasteful and counter-productive archipelago of information, which the policymaker needs but cannot access electronically. Billions of dollars are being wasted through a lack of coordination and standurdization, and a lack of focus on re~uirementsanalysis, human productivit%and the need for ecasy access to multiple remote multi-lingual and multi-media databases. Information technology continues to offer extraordinary promise, but only if the policy maker begins to manage the technology rather than abdicate technologyprocurement decisions to technologists far removed from the core competencies of the policy environment.
Informationtechnology, in relation to"content,"appears to have swamped the end-user with three waves. Each has left the end-user less productive and less informed than they were before having information technology imposed on them. The "first wave," when ~ ~ ~ 0 ~ ~~a~~~~~ ~ 0 1 1 vet may have been an ~ v ~ r ~ ~ electronic publishing and electronic storage of data first became possible, brought with it two major
'Robert David Stesle, "Virtual Intelligence: Conflict Avoidance and Resolution Through Information Peacekeeping," as available on the USlP main honiepage website at: http://www.usip.org/ virtuaidiplomacy/publications/pape~s/virinteil.html.
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negatives. Because computer memory was so limited, the end-user was turned into a ”virtual slave”tothe computer, and obliged to master all manner of arcane commands with which to feed the “c prompt: Because librarians were focused on hard copy, and technologists were focused on processing generic bytes, the computer industry developed without any strategy for data classification and data archiving. The”second wave,“when increasingly sophisticated word processing and database management programs became available, also brought with it two major negatives. Because the programs were so sophisticated, end-users were required to either spend a significant amount of time in training, or to forego most of the features offered by the programs. Because the programs kept changing and managers kept allowing the technologists to specify ever-more sophisticated programs for use, the end-user ended up losing access to much of their legacy data, and spending a great deal of time reentering data to satisfy the changing formats and features of the new programs. Now comes the “third wave.”The internet is touted by the most optimistic as well as the least principled (two different classes of advocates) as the be-all and end-all for meeting the information needs of the policymaker. Again there are two major negatives. Because the internet is such an interesting environment, and new programs do indeed have a lot of power, analysts are disappearing into the void, either hopelessly lost or hopelessly addicted to wandering in cyberspace. Because the internet does offer a superficial amount of information on virtually any topic, albeit with no real source authentication or validation, it has become the ”classic comics” of knowledge, and too many policymakers and their analysts are accepting the internet as the first and last stop in their quest for information.4 The end result of the pursuit of technology a t the expense of personnel has produced a situation where it is likely that we will have a less capable analysis community in the future. Unless there is a substantial correction, this trend will continue. We will produce analysts who work well in short
‘All of the information on the three wabm of technology is taken directly from Robert David Steele’s book On Intelligence. See pages 157 to 159 for more on this subject.
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term or specialized areas, but we will have few that have the "big picture" skills that are required.
7.3 The Militarization of intelligence The militarization of the field of intelligence is a problem that can most easily be seen in the United States. flowever, it is not uniquely an American problem and given the great sway that America holds in intelligence communities around the globe (formally and informally), it warrants concern. In order for any country's overall intelligence capability to be useful at the national level, it must combine knowledge from a number of military, political, diplomatic, economic, social and environmental areas. Since the emergence of modern strategic intelligence (early 20th Century), there has been a natural competition between agencies on where to place the focus. This competition appears to have been the norm in a number of different countries. During the Cold War, ex-General and retiring President Eisenhower famously warned the American people about growth of the"miIitary industrial" complex and how this could shape both threat perceptions and hardware requirements in a detrimental way. During his time as President, Eisenhower managed to keep a balance in the intelligence community by giving the CORONA satellite imagery system to the CIA rather than the Air Force, thus ensuring some civilian agency control over this new technological wonder. Eisenhower also gave approval to the joint management of the space surveillance missions to a newly created National Reconnaissance Officer in August 1960. To Eisenhower, this ensured that control would be shared between the Pentagon and the CIA.' The Eisenhower approach remained in place for about three decades. In 1996, however, there was a substantive change with the creation of the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA)? With the creation of NIMA, 'For more information on President Eisenhower's roie in the intelligence community, see rhe chapter entitled"The Militarizationof Intelligence"in Gregory F. Trwerton, Reshaping National intelligence for an Age of/nfor~ation,Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 2003, pages 62 to 92. 'ibid., page W.
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and its essential takeover of many reconnaissance functions, the direction was now obvious. Support to military operations (SMO) would become the primary function. SMO is now the "first among equals" to other national missions such as political, diplomatic, economic, social and environmental intelligence. This is not a minor technical point. Even during the Cold War, it was understood that the mission of intelligence agencies was at the national or strategic level. Without doubt, military targeting and order of battle issues played a critical role, but the overall mission was broad. Now, however, the overall mission of the US intelligence commuriity is becoming increasingly focused on military issues, and even then mostly on issues of targeting. This i s not a national or strategic level mission; it is very much a tactical mission. The tradeoffs in the American case may be very high in the long run. They are building an unparalleled targeting capability that will allow for precise attacks on targets anywhere in the world on very short notice. The timing for some attacks may be cut to as little as 10 minutes from when detection is first made by a satellite to when the target coordinates can be sent to an already operational weapons platform such as an orbiting fighter jet. This is truly an amazing technical capability, but what it costs in other areas is what is truly the question. What is being lost in all of this discussion is the capability to do effective long term political and diplomatic intelligence.This is critical at a time when the number of traditional symmetric threats is in decline while the asymmetric threats are growing. As previously noted, the only effective weapons against asymmetric threats are knowledge-based, not firepower based. Yet a t this time, the intelligence community that tends to lead or influence the decisions of many others (directly or indirectly) is moving in the wrong direction to tackle asymmetric threats.
7.4 Secrey Undermines the Analytical process It has been stated elsewhere in this book at length that the analytical process
is best served if it has rapid access to the widest possible body of basic data and information. In dealing with asymmetric and non-traditional threats, there are at least three major problems associated with secrecy.
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First, barriers are built between classified intelligence and unclassified intelligence areas, weakening both of them and ensuring that there is frequently no combined analysis made. The second major problem area is that intelligence analysts are weakened by their security clearances and are not allowed, on many occasions, to have contacts with experts outside of government.We now live in an age of distributed information and intelligence, and most information and expertise now lie outside of government corridors in the private sector. Without external access, intelligence analysts are cut off from their greatest potential sources. The third area is that of technology and security. Increased secrecy means increased security. And increased security means increased costs. With computers dominating much of the intelligence community, these costs are not insignificant. Intelligence costs remain classified, but some estimates suggest that protected or shielded computer equipment costs more than twice that of unclassified equipment. Add to that the guards, alarms and monitoring equipment and the costs become apparent. The following comments capture the overall problems in a succinct manner: On the one hand, we practice such excessive secrecy as to actually handicap our policy makers and acquisition managers. On the other hand, we have no architecturefor connecting the classified intelligence analysts to the wealth of open sources - including commercial imagery - available from the private sector, nor, even for that matter, to the vast quantities of information availa6le to the rest of government. We are nor ready to function effectively in the information age.'
725 A Lack of Training and U ~ ~ r a ~ i n g It is conceivable to argue that intelligence analysts are not just important, but in fact increasingly critical to the survival of the state. Given the risks involved (war, pandemics, transitional terrorism, and transnational organized crime), the ability of governments to deal with these types of threats is 'Robert David Steele, On InteKyence, op. cit., page 223
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crucial. It should follow then, that those persons charged with making sense of the world around policy makers are to be well trained and provided for in order to assist policy and decision makers in understanding the complex and uncertain environment in which they operate. Quite frequently, this is not the case. One of the problems with overspending on technology issues is the related underspending on personnel issues. "Things" get more attention than "people" when a budget crisis hits. People can be laid off and costs disappear - even though most of the organization's capabilities disappear with them. Intelligence analysts frequently receive minimal training, the updates in training are few and far between, turnover is high, and many analysts leave government service as soon as they develop superior skills. While this is good for private industry and think tanks, it bears high costs for governments. The security environment for intelligence agencies may have been rather stable during the Cold War. Changes were few and new developments in weapons or polices often took years to unfold. Consider the implications of just one current form of threat - transnational terrorism. While there are many terrorist groups with both the interest and the capability to work across international boundaries, al-Qaeda provides the most fascinating example. This group has undergone repeated and serious changes to its structure and organization when it is traced back to its 1979 roots. In a very broad brush way it could be argued that al-Qaeda has had nine main organizational changes in its 27-year history, with five of these change periods being encompassed by just the last five years alone. They are: 1979-1984: the formative years as the MaK (Maktab al-Khidmat) 1985- 1989: ideological forming of al-Qaeda and the Soviet withdrawal 1989- 1991: transitional and developmental years 1991- 1996: the Sudan years and the first major attacks 1996-2001: the move back to Afghanistan and the 9/11 attacks, 2001 - 2002: defeat in Afghanistan and scattering of al-Qaeda's forces 2002-2003: period of decline, first period of the inspired group attacks 2003-2005: US led attack on Iraq 2006 -present: the re-emergence of the al-Qaeda tactics in Afghanistan
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The key part to examine here is the difference between the first 21 years (1979 to 2001) where there are roughly four or five major phases of al-Qaeda's evolution. In just five years from 2001 to 2006, there are yet another four phases. Not only is there change occurring, but the rate a t which it occurs is increasing as well.This does not appear to be an isolated problem relevant only to transnational terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda. For those who work in the technology sector, there may be some familiarity here. Knowledge at one point may be considered "cutting edge." However, in six or twelve months, that which is previously considered cutting edge can very rapidly become common knowledge and then be either outdated or just plain wrong. The impact here should be obvious. Training and updates need to occur frequently and rapidly. The cycle time is not crystal clear and it will vary, but periods of about six to eighteen months should be considered normal. Let us be clear here on other issues as well. It is not just in the field of transnational terrorism that this rapid change is occurring. Transnational organized crime has a similar pattern to its developments. So do other asymmetric threats such as pandemics and issues such as commodity supply line fragility. Training and upgrading are key issues. Yet in most countries, there is no standardized training, little or no follow-on or upgrading training, no culture of learning and few leaders that back such programs. There are only a few limited efforts in place to produce a professional standards body such as exists for the legal or medical profession. While intelligence analysts are frequently blamed for their failures, it is rare that the lack of support is identified as the cause.
7.6 outlook and condusions A lack of balance in resources remains a critical deficit. While exact figures are unclear, it is apparent that intelligence agencies spend some 99% or more of their budgets on technology, secrecy, infrastructure and other items, and less than 1% on actual analysis. At the same time, it is also clear that the people who do this work spend the majority of their time receiving, reading, manipulating and handling the data. As well, they must also conform
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to all of the usual other requirement such as filling out forms and doing administrative and financial work. Seen in an uncharitable light, it may not be hard to see why governments make some unwise choices. They have less than one percent of their intelligence budgets spent on "thinking," and even those who are doing the "thinking" part are spending less than half of their time actually working on the main problems. When a government commits less than 1% of spending Ai'\d[JA ~ its intelligence ~ ~ to "thinking," and even ~~~~~~e~~ ~ * less than ~ 1%~ of ~ then~less than s half ofthat !Id effort goes into the actual process OF analysis, (>I .ON x SO% = >.5%) it is perhaps ~ ~ haw ~ ~~~~~i~~~ ~ get made,~ s ~ a ~ easier to understand how weak decisions get made. The United States has tremendous influence on other intelligence communities around the world. Part of that influence is clear and direct, such as intelligencesharing programs and technology transfers.This influence continues a t events such as international intelligence conferences and symposia. Other effects are indirect, however, such as other countries monitoring the methods and technology of the United States and then consciously (or subconsciously) adapting the ideas. During the Cold War, cooperating or sharing information with the United States probably made sense for many other countries. They may have had common goals as the United States and found it useful or politically beneficial to simply follow along. Now, however, things are changing. Most developments in the US intelligence community are geared towards technology driven issues such as Support to Military Operations (SMO). This is occurring at the cost of other forms of intelligence such as diplomatic and political intelligence. At a time when many states are facing asymmetric threats or internal threats, this model is a doubtful one for small- to medium-sized developed states. The management of knowledge in the intelligence community is an issue that is becoming more critical. Not only are we in the midst of the "information revolution," we are also facing a series of asymmetric threats where knowledge is the only functional weapon. It is a critical issue to ~~~~~
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understand when best t o use IT (data and information collection) and when best to use the inherent skills and talents of humans (knowledge and assessment). Yet we do not see that many leaders in the intelligence community even understand the nature of the threat environment, the threat actors, or the responses to them. One of the common attributes seen in many countries and agencies is the endless rotation of intelligence and operational staffs with little to no concern about consistency or the growth of knowledge. Given the complexities of today's security environments, it can take years to develop competencies. Yet we rotate and promote personnel with only the most minimal considerations to a career path. This is self-destructive at best and negligent a t worst. The outlook a t this STAFF ~~-~~~~~~ point remains guarded. Many opportunities 910 term ~a~~~~ for e~~~~~~~ exist for intelligence ~ ~ to ~ a For ~ ~~~~~~X ~ su n ~ communities around the in ~ ~~e~~~~~~ t ~ ~ ~ofie! ~~ world to react to new and emerging threats with the next r o ~This~ is a~s i ~~ ~ ~~ effective and relatively low ~n~~~ a%~ e ~at abest~andi ~e~~~~~~~ ~ ~ at cost systems. The lowest cost of these systems and the most effective may alreadybe in place -the intelligence analysts. But trapped in a system overwhelmed with high cost but non-productive technology driven "solutions," it is not clear that the analysts will receive the support or training needed to break free. All too frequently, these are good people trapped in a bad system. Until the focus moves away from technology and towards the humanization of the intelligence process, no substantive progress is likely. ~~~~
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Chapter 8
Structure and OrganizatiQn: The Weakness of Centralize Intelligence Is the concept of a centralized intelligence analytical capability an ongoing
weakness?This is a critical question, and it is becoming more so in the face of asymmetric style threats to national security. In order to prevail in the face of an asymmetric threat, knowledge is the key weapon. Power in and of itself will not work. Therefore, how knowledge is to be produced by intelligence agencies is a question worthy of public debate. In order to have its greatest effectiveness, intelligence and operational information needs to be integrated as close to the front lines as possible and as quickly as possible.Those analysts and operators working at the front lines need to have a "strategic view" or big picture outlook (albeit scaled down) and they need to be able to cross institutional boundaries at the front lines as well. Put bluntly, an individual on the front lines will be better able to recognize the impact of a piece of information against its background than someone who is distant from the scene. Information is most valuable when the analysis starts at the front lines in an immediate and relevant context. Removed from that frontline context, much knowledge becomes of lesser value or its significance can be missed or misinterpreted. Clearly, an ongoing integration of knowledge as it moves up the chain is important, but if that process has not started at the front lines, the most important opportunities would have been lost.
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Currently, however, we are faced with a number of intelligence organizations that have a belief in a "centralizedonly" analytical capability. Many of the individuals responsible for national security related information losf. and intelligence are still trying t o operate their centralized bureaucracies as though they were capable of processing and understanding all of the information needed to make informed decisions without reference to the inputs and views of the front line. Worse still, many intelligence agencies avoid or disdain getting front line information from non-intelligence agencies and will not allow direct communication with other agencies or institutions. This is a form of structural and organization weakness that is built in. It is not necessary, but it has become an inbred habit. Whether governments or intelligence agencies like it or not, we now live in an age of distributed information and intelligence. Government no longer has a monopoly or even a majority share of expertise on traditional areas of government interest such as military weaponry or foreign policy. This remains a valid view, even when non-traditional issues such as transnational terrorism, organized crime or other asymmetric style threats are concerned. It is doubtful that it ever made sense to centralize analytical capabilities,' although this has not stopped generations of bureaucrats from trying to use industrial era and Fordist approaches to do just this. National leaders now find themselves operating in a complex and uncertain international environment when it comes to national security threats. Even the most powerful states find themselves in a position where they have to "defend against uncertainty" when there is "no way to predict the probable nature of the threat ..."' In the past, national security usually 'I For further on this issue see, op. cit., Gregory Treverton, Reshaping National Security /nre//igence,page 65 and Robert David Steele, On Inteiligence,pages 141, 196 and 234.
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meant defending borders and trade routes externally while watching for instability or insurrection domestically. Currently, the list of threats, both symmetric and asymmetric, is increasing rapidly. Depending on the individual state, these threats can come from disease, the environment, technological changes, energy supply shocks, energy price shocks, commodity price changes, or threats from transnational terrorism such as biokh