SANCTIONING IRAN: Anatomy of a Failed Policy
Hossein Alikhani
I.B.Tauris Publishers
Sanctioning Iran
To Jila, for ...
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SANCTIONING IRAN: Anatomy of a Failed Policy
Hossein Alikhani
I.B.Tauris Publishers
Sanctioning Iran
To Jila, for being there and keeping me sane
SANCTIONING IRAN Anatomy of a Failed Policy
Hossein Alikhani
I.B.Tauris Publishers LONDON • NEW YORK
Published in 2000 by I.B.Tauris & Co Ltd Victoria House, Bloomsbury Square, London WC1B 4DZ 175 Fifth Avenue, New York NY 10010 Website: http://www.ibtauris.com
In the United States and Canada distributed by St Martin’s Press 175 Fifth Avenue, New York NY 10010
Copyright © Hossein Alikhani, 2000
All rights reserved. Except for brief quotations in a review, this book, or any part thereof, may not be reproduced, stored in or introduced into a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior written permission of the publisher.
ISBN 1 86064 626 3
A full CIP record for this book is available from the British Library A full CIP record for this book is available from the Library of Congress
Library of Congress catalog card: available
Typeset in Stone by Dexter Haven, London Printed and bound in Great Britain
CONTENTS Preface and Acknowledgements 1
THE SEEDS OF DISTRUST: THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
2
SANCTIONS: AN INTEGRAL PART OF US FOREIGN POLICY
3
1
Definition The History of Sanctions, Pre-1945 The History of Sanctions, Post-1945 The US Rationale for Sanctions Sources of Authority for US Unilateral Economic Sanctions The Trading With the Enemy Act The Export Administration Act – The EAA in the 1990s The International Emergency Economic Powers Act Limitations of Presidential Power – The Power to Vest Foreign Property – The Power to Regulate Purely Domestic Transactions
23 23 25 27 30 32 33 37 48 53 54 54 55
DOCUMENT 1: THE TYPOLOGY OF NON-VIOLENT SANCTIONS
57
DOCUMENT 2: THE INTERNATIONAL EMERGENCY ECONOMIC POWERS ACT
59
SANCTIONS: A RATIONAL RESPONSE TO THE HOSTAGE-TAKING
The United States’ Allies and Sanctions The Approach to the United Nations New Unilateral Measures – The Sanctions in Detail: Blocking the Assets – The Sanctions in Detail: Trade Embargo 4
ix
RESOLUTION OF THE HOSTAGE CRISIS
The Hostage Settlement Agreement – The General Declaration – The Settlement Declaration – Supplementary Agreements The End of the Crisis Implementation of the Hostage Agreements Regulations for Implementing the Hostage Agreements US Courts and the Hostage Agreements – Dames & Moore v Regan DOCUMENT 3: THE ALGIERS DECLARATION
66 71 72 77 83 86 90 93 93 94 94 95 96 101 103 106 108
5
DOCUMENT 4: DAMES & MOORE V REGAN
131
SANCTIONS: THE NEXT STAGE
154 158 160 166
Iranian Transactions Regulations Foreign Policy Export Controls Dual Containment: A New Policy
6
7
DOCUMENT 5: THE IRAN-IRAQ NON-PROLIFERATION ACT OF 1992
171
NEW SANCTIONS: THE EFFECT OF LOBBYING
D’Amato Demands More Sanctions New Sanctions Iranian Transactions Regulations – General Definitions – The Importation of Goods and Services from Iran – The Exportation of Goods and Services to Iran – Re-export to Iran – Banking Services – Other Prohibited Transactions A Customized Executive Order The United States Eases Sanctions Counternarcotics US Food and Medicine
177 186 192 195 196 197 198 199 200 201 203 207 207 207
DOCUMENT 6: THE IRANIAN TRANSACTIONS REGULATIONS
210
DOCUMENT 7: EXECUTIVE ORDER 13059 OF 19 AUGUST 1997 PROHIBITING CERTAIN TRANSACTIONS WITH RESPECT TO IRAN
246
DOCUMENT 8: AMENDMENT TO THE IRANIAN TRANSACTIONS REGULATIONS (31 MARCH 1999)
251
DOCUMENT 9: AMENDMENT TO THE IRANIAN TRANSACTIONS REGULATIONS (26 JULY 1999)
275
DOCUMENT 10: AMENDMENT TO THE IRANIAN TRANSACTIONS REGULATIONS (27 OCTOBER 1999)
284
THE SANCTIONS TIGHTEN FURTHER
The Iran Foreign Oil Sanctions Act of 1995 The New Iran Oil Sanctions Act of 1995 The Iran Oil Sanctions Act of 1996 (House of Representatives Version) Reaction to the Bill in the United States The Final House Version of the Bill 8
A BILL TO HAUNT A PRESIDENT
Iran in the ILSA Europe Stands Firm The Reaction of US Allies to the Act
288 289 297 299 301 307 309 314 320 322
The European Union Blocks the ILSA Total Ignores the ILSA The United States Yields to European Pressure Congress Strikes Back Russian Companies Targeted by Sanctions Iran, A Religious Rights Offender New Sanctions Welcome Changes in Iran
9
326 328 330 331 334 334 335
DOCUMENT 11: THE IRAN AND LIBYA SANCTIONS ACT OF 1996
336
DOCUMENT 12: EUROPEAN UNION COUNCIL BLOCKING REGULATION
350
EXTRATERRITORIALITY AND THE IRAN AND LIBYA SANCTIONS ACT
360 361 363 363 365 366 366 367 368 371 372 373 374 375 375 379 381 384 386 388 389 390 390 390 391 393 394 394
Jurisdiction – Bases of Jurisdiction – The Territorial Principle – The Protective Principle – The Nationality Principle – The Passive Personality Principle – The Universal Principle – The Extension of the Bases of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction The Enforcement of Extraterritoriality in the Economic Sphere US Extraterritoriality under the EAA – Re-export Control – The Control of Foreign Products – Export by a US Person – The Pipeline Controversy – The Jurisdictional Reach of Export Controls US Extraterritoriality Under the IEEPA The Cuban Democracy Act The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 The Legitimacy of the ILSA – The Territorial Principle – The Protective Principle – The Nationality Principle – The Universal Principle – The Reasonableness Principle Economic Coercion and UN Resolutions The United Nations Rejects Extraterritorial Sanctions Conclusion
10
IRAN SANCTIONS: A POLICY DEFYING LOGIC
The Scope and Extent of Iran Sanctions – The International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), as Amended – The Iran and Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA) of 1996 – The Iran-Iraq Arms Non-proliferation Act of 1992, as Amended – The Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1999 – The Foreign Operations Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act of 1998 – The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as Amended – The International Security and Development Cooperations Act (ISDCA) of 1985 – The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 – The Internal Revenue Code – The Department of Defence Appropriations Act of 1987 – The National Defence Authorization Act – The Spoils of War Act – The Arms Export Control Act (AECA), as Amended – The Export Administration Act (EAA), as Amended – The Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991 – The National Defence Authorization Act for 1990–91, as Amended – The Foreign Relation Authorizations Act for 1994 and 1995, as Amended – The Export-Import Bank Act, as Amended – The International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, as Amended Why the Sanctions? – Iran’s Support for International Terrorism – Iran’s Opposition to the Arab-Israeli Peace Process – Iran and the Development of Weapons of Mass Destruction US Sanctions: Prospects for the Future BIBLIOGRAPHY INDEX
397 397 398 398 398 398 399 399 399 399 399 400 400 400 400 400 400 401 401 401 401 402 402 405 406 408 414 424
PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
One of the most controversial issues of the past decade has been the role of economic sanctions in US foreign policy. Since the time of the Jefferson administration economic sanctions have been an integral part of US foreign policy. But it is the new pattern of practice which began to emerge during the Clinton administration that has made the subject controversial. For the past 20 years, successive US administrations have tried to isolate Iran diplomatically, militarily and economically, relying on existing legislation to invoke sanctions against it. During the Clinton administration, the US Congress, influenced by domestic political interest groups connected to a foreign country, designated Iran the ‘enemy of the year’, accusing it of supporting international terrorism, undermining the Middle East peace process and seeking to obtain weapons of mass destruction. With new legislation, Congress forced Clinton to subject Iran to the most rigorous and unprecedented forms of sanction which conflicted with the interests of other nations and led to diplomatic rifts with the allies of the United States. Several characteristics of these measures make Iran an interesting case study of the use of unilateral economic sanctions. The purpose of this study is to explore US sanctions against Iran in depth, to examine their history and current status, as well as their political and economic impact, and the conditions under which they were imposed. Having completed this book, I realize that without the substantial assistance, advice and encouragement of many people it could not have materialised. I am particularly indebted to Bruce Zagaris and Hugh Turner for guiding me through the maize of sanctions, and Eric Wemple and his staff for their help in retrieving numerous congressional documents and unfolding the mysteries of US export controls. I would like to thank Sandy Killen and Janet McMahon, whose help was indispensable in acquiring the material for my research.
ix
I owe a special debt of gratitude to many Iranians, especially those involved in the events of 1979–81, who agreed to be interviewed but wished to remain anonymous. My appreciation goes to a number of colleagues and friends, especially Gerald Butt, who read various drafts of the book and offered valuable comments. My grateful appreciation goes to Anoushirvan Ehteshami for having read the last draft of the manuscript with a critical eye and made valuable suggestions. A number of his suggestions have been incorporated in the final draft. Finally, I want to thank Olga Messios and Marianna Christou for the patience and careful work in the production of the manuscript, and Jonathan McDonnell and other staff of I.B.Tauris, especially my editor Robert Hastings, for their extensive advice. Last, but not least, Jila, Helia, Borna and Dana, my family, deserve special thanks for their support, understanding and remarkable tolerance. While many people in Iran and the United States contributed information for this study, any inaccuracy or mistakes are my responsibility. Hossein Alikhani March 2000
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1 THE SEEDS OF DISTRUST: THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
L
ooking back at the twentieth century, the Iranian revolution remains one of the most significant and perhaps least understood social and political upheavals. Its consequences resonated throughout the diplomatic, business and financial worlds. The events of 1979 and their aftermath were particularly problematic in the United States. Gary Sick, former White House aide for Iran during the revolution, states in his seminal work, All Fall Down, that the United States has been permanently and irrevocably changed. ‘Not since the fall of Saigon had a series of foreign policy events so shaken the United States.’ 1 For the United States and for the international community as a whole the Islamic revolution – to quote one commentator – was ‘a completely unanticipated event that had transformed a dependable regional ally to a seemingly implacable foe’.2 The revolution surprised and shocked the world because up to that moment the Shah and the regime which he headed had seemed to be impregnable. In the end, an opposition ‘armed only with slogans and leaflets overthrew a ruler with formidable assets at his disposal’.3 The word most commonly encountered in Western writings to describe the Iranian revolution is ‘baffling’. And nowhere was it more baffling than among officials in the US diplomatic and political communities. Little
1 2 3
Gary Sick, All Fall Down: America’s Tragic Encounter with Iran, Penguin, 1986, p. viii. Eric Hooglund, ‘The United States and Iran, 1981–9’ in Anoushirvan Ehtesmami and Manshour Varasteh (eds), Iran and the International Community, p. 31. Shaul Bakhash, The Reign of the Ayatollahs: Iran and the Islamic Revolution, Basic Books, 1984, p. 9.
1
2
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more than a year before the revolution, President Carter referred to Iran as ‘an island of stability in one of the more troubled areas of the world’.4 As late as 15 November 1977, President Carter met with the late Shah, reaffirmed US support of his regime and characterized the situation in Iran as stable. The revolution shocked governments around the world because up to the moment it ignited, the Shah and his regime appeared unassailable. According to Sick, during the early years of the Carter administration ‘Iran appeared to be stable, the Shah seemed to be firmly in control, and the policy differences between Iran and the United States were regarded as relatively minor and manageable’.5 In the years since the revolution, there has been an attempt by a number of scholars and foreign policy analysts both inside and outside the United States to analyse the events and individuals involved. There are many interpretations of the causes of the Iranian revolution, and the conditions and circumstances in which it took place. The framework for analysis appears to have been shaped by the allegations of Iran’s post-revolutionary leadership that the United States was responsible for the spark which ignited the revolution. Prevailing scholarship focuses on establishing a cause and effect relationship between US foreign policy and the upheaval of 1979. Tacit in many of these examinations is the supposition that the United States had no choice but to intervene in Iranian affairs. These works preclude the inevitability of interaction between the United States and Iran, resulting from national pursuits of economic and political self-interest. Key to all of these interpretations is defining a role for the United States which adversely impacted upon the internal affairs of Iran and thus fomented revolution. Current scholarship covers the entire spectrum of opinions, which range from indicting US foreign policy as a sole or primary cause of the revolution to that which presents the United States as a benevolent victim nation. Perhaps better than any other author, Barry Rubin, in his work Paved with Good Intentions, identifies the central issues concerning US involvement when he states: ‘What exactly had the nation done to cause the current leaders of Iran to hold the United States in such utter contempt, to charge it with rank imperialism, and to lay at the doorstep of the White House all the sins of its own former monarch?’6 In answer to his own question, Rubin indicates that US foreign policy with regard to Iran ‘seemed in theory, if not in execution, directed toward 4 5 6
Address to the Iranian people, 31 December 1977, Tehran. Gary Sick, All Fall Down: America’s Tragic Encounter with Iran, Penguin, 1986, p. viii. Barry Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions: The American Experience and Iran, Oxford University Press, 1980, p. ix.
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reasonably attainable, rational goals but failed nonetheless because it did not take into account the currents of Iranian and Middle East politics’.7 Rubin states that a country’s behavior, as the Iranian crises so vividly demonstrates, is not merely a product of a rational pursuit of objective national interests. Rather, it is the result of the interaction of the collective historical experience of the nation with the individual life experiences of its citizens. The former creates a nation’s political course, the latter shapes its political consciousness.8
The US role in the revolution in this context would factor quite minimally in the revolutionary equation. It is not the purpose of this chapter to question or challenge prevailing scholarship, much less provide new interpretations. The purpose is to provide a limited analysis of the historical record on US-Iran relations in order to demonstrate that the seeds of distrust between Iran and the United States had already been planted long before November 1979, when the radical Muslim students seized the US embassy in Tehran and took the embassy staff hostage. The hostage episode became the turning-point in relations between the two countries, leading to US economic sanctions against Iran, the topic of this study. As Rubin points out, any relationship between two nations hinges upon an understanding of the history of each. This encompasses social as well as economic history. Viewed from a historical perspective, Iran presents a particularly interesting and complex diplomatic case study. Diplomatic relations between the United States and Persia (Iran) were not established and ratified until 1857, and until the late 1930s, contact between the two was minimal but cordial. Indeed, according to Rubin, ‘at the beginning of this century, few Persian officials had even heard of the United States’.9 However, this period is critical to understanding the ‘complex and controversial relationship between the United States and Iran’.10 Since the Second World War, and certainly since 1953, the United States was the Shah of Iran’s strongest supporter. Indeed, Iran, through the person of the Shah, actively sought the support and involvement of the United States. According to Kuross Samii, even as early as the late nineteenth century, Persian monarchs ‘sought to establish a friendship with the United States to counter the Anglo-Russian exploitation of Iran’.11 And 7 8 9 10
Ibid., p. x. Ibid. Ibid., p. 3. Yonah Alexander and Allan Nanes, The United States and Iran: A Documentary History, Publication of America, 1980, p. xi.
4
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incredibly, according to another expert on Iran, Richard Cottam, ‘somehow in a little more than one generation, American policy toward Iran had succeeded in replacing what was probably unreasonably strong good will toward the United States with unreasonably strong resentment’.12 Iran, in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, was undergoing tremendous cultural and political changes. According to Cottam, ‘traditional nineteenth-century Iran was pre-mass politics and pre-national’.13 It was, paraphrasing Cottam in Iran and the US, a traditional system which is, by definition, stable and resistant to change. During this same period, Britain and Russia played a significant role in the internal affairs of Iran. As Cottam has meticulously documented and diplomatically stated, these two great powers ‘by their actions and by their example induced forces that would challenge and ultimately overturn the traditional system’.14 According to Dr Mohsen Milani, ‘Iranian society had its own unique form of government, its own code of laws, its own system of Justice and its own social equilibrium. But Western penetration of Persia became a catalyst for the breakdown of the country’s social fabric.’ 15 Meanwhile, the United States was simultaneously moving towards a position of world prominence and leadership. Unlike the great European powers, the United States was not engaged in a massive colonization effort in third-world countries such as Iran. American contact with Iran was limited to that of Christian missionaries who provided Iranians with generally positive impressions of the United States. According to Rubin, ‘to Persian intellectuals, who were beginning to delve into Western political history and thought, America’s distance and disinterestedness were fascinating’.16 Noted Iranian scholar Kuross Samii indicated that ‘America’s anticolonial posture, coupled with the tendency of American presidents to express foreign policy through a universal set of principles, had sent a message of hope to subjugated peoples from around the world… The craving for hope on the one hand, and the nobility of expressed American ideals on the other, became the formidable force that carved the savior image of the United States.’ 17 It was against this backdrop that Iran began to perceive 11 Kuross A. Samii, Involvement by Invitation: American Strategies of Containment in Iran, Pennsylvania State University Press, 1987, p. 34. 12 Richard W. Cottam, Iran and the United States: A Cold War Case Study, University of Pittsburg Press, 1988, p. 3. 13 Ibid., p. 19 14 Ibid. 15 Mohsen M. Milani, The Making of Iran’s Islamic Revolution: from Monarchy to Islamic Republic, Westview Press, 1994, 2nd edition, p. 24. 16 Barry Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions: The American Experience and Iran, Oxford University Press, 1980, p. 4.
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the United States as a potential and benign friend and ally in balancing Russian and British interventions in Iran. It is critical to note that the nineteenth century witnessed the formative years of US-Iran diplomatic relations. Perceptions were formed and tacit understandings developed on both sides, based upon statements and documents which neither country formally articulated as policy or necessarily intended to communicate one to the other. These perceptions laid the cornerstone for all future communications, and in effect became unstated foreign policy. That said, there was a belief among both Americans and Persians, according to Rubin, ‘that indeed the United States with its growing power and yet with no national interest in Persia’s resources might come to play some special, beneficial role in rescuing Persia from its humiliating servitude and in restoring it to some semblance of its past glory’.18 As a result, although US relations with Iran did not substantively begin until the early 1940s, an understanding of US-Iran relations needs to encompass a time-frame dating from the late nineteenth century. The titles of two important works on US-Iran relations literally speak volumes about the early intent and purpose of each nation’s diplomatic goals: Kuross Samii’s Involvement by Invitation and Barry Rubin’s Paved with Good Intentions. As early as the late nineteenth century, Iran had begun to encourage involvement by the United States in the internal affairs of the country. The increasing missionary presence had led, in 1883, to the establishment of an American diplomatic mission in Tehran. Iran’s Foreign Ministry was also keenly aware of the need to involve third countries in its diplomatic and commercial activities. Throughout its long history, Iran had been subjected to outside intervention, which often required balancing the interests of competing nations as a method of containment. At the turn of the century, Britain and Russia were dual forces competing for influence over Iranian resources. Iran’s constitutional movement, which took seed in the 1820s, flourished under the rule of Mozaffar ad-Din Shah (1896–1907). It culminated in the 1906 Persian Constitution and the creation of the Majlis, a consultative assembly. Coinciding with these developments came a virtual collapse of the Persian economy. In 1911 and again in 1925, the Iranian government sought external financial expertise, which was provided by the US government. A forced dissolution of the Majlis, due to intervention by Russia, 17 Kuross A. Samii, Involvement by Invitation: American Strategies of Containment in Iran, Pennsylvania State University Press, 1987, pp. 32, 33. 18 Barry Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions: The American Experience and Iran, Oxford University Press, 1980, p. 4.
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once again caused internal social turmoil and resulted in a government easily manipulated by both Britain and Russia. In the early 1920s, a powerful military officer, Reza Khan, appeared as the major national figure. He promised to restore order to Persia, and eventually led an uprising deposing the ruling Ahmad Shah (last of the Qajar dynasty). Reza Khan adopted the name Pahlavi, the language of preIslamic Persia, and began a period of compulsory modernization which continued throughout his reign into the 1940s. The new Shah’s reforms included attempts as secularizing Iranian politics and laying the foundations of a modern economy and infrastructure. However, as Anne Lambton identifies, ‘the old structure of society was destroyed, but no new mechanism through which [Reza Shah] could undertake effective social action replaced it’.19 Force became the method to achieve political and economic ends. Reza Shah’s ascendancy also created a dichotomy for the supporters of the Persian Constitution. The programmes instituted by the Shah were those created by the architects of the Constitution. However, they were implemented in a despotic way which violated the spirit if not the intent of the Constitution. The Shah made many enemies in his despotic attempts to modernize and secularize Iran and, according to Milani, he ‘failed to institutionalize his support, a mistake his son was to repeat’.20 This failure included ‘Reza Khan’s underestimation of Islamic radicalism, [which] was particularly dramatic’.21 His reign over Iran lasted until 1941, and ushered in a modern age of mass politics, one for which the populace was unprepared. During his reign, according to Cottam, ‘the percentage of the population predisposed to participate in political life multiplied several times’.22 To his credit, ‘the economy, thanks to rapid development of the transportation and communications infrastructure, became truly national. Education, health and social services were developed and Iranian dependence on foreign powers declined.’ 23 Ultimately, the Shah’s contradictory modernization programmes and his despotism combined to create pervasive political unrest and long-term instability. In the United States there continued to be surprisingly little knowledge of, or interest in, Iran. ‘On the eve of World War II it was difficult to 19 Anne Lambton: ‘The Impact of the West on Persia’, International Affairs, January 1957, p. 23. 20 Mohsen M. Milani, The Making of Iran’s Islamic Revolution: from Monarchy to Islamic Republic, Westview Press, 1994, 2nd edition, p. 34. 21 Richard W. Cottam, Iran and the United States: A Cold War Case Study, University of Pittsburg Press, 1988, p. 44. 22 Ibid. 23 Ibid., p. 45
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imagine that the relative isolation of America from Iran would ever change. They seemed as distant and as mutually exotic as might any two countries on the planet.’ 24 And yet a popularly held belief in Iran, ‘that the United States, alone among Western nations, cared for the Enlightenment values of national self-determination’ 25 persisted. Thus, ‘on the eve of the American moment in Iran, the Iranians held an idealized image of the United States. The expectation was that the Americans would do what they could to allow Iranians to gain control of their own destiny.’ 26 Therefore, ‘Iranian disappointment was inevitable’.27 Significantly, no one in the United States was aware of this widely held and impossibly high expectation and the impact it would have on future relations. The events of the Second World War and the onset of the Cold War drastically changed the relationship between the United States and Iran. In a world polarized between Soviet communism and Western capitalism, the United States was propelled into the role of world’s great democratic superpower. And the inevitable reshaping of the geo-political map gave Iran a position of vital importance. According to Ann Tibitts Schulz, noted Middle East scholar, ‘American involvement in Iranian military affairs began in 1941, when, on his father’s forced abdication, Mohammad Reza Shah became the titular ruler of Iran’.28 No longer could the United States remain disinterested in Iran. The year 1941 witnessed a watershed in American relations with Iran. The ascendancy of Mohammed Reza Shah occurred precisely at a moment when US interests compelled it to take an active interest in Iran and the Middle East. According to Schulz, ‘Iran is situated within the Middle East shatterbelt, a region that historically has been of strategic interest to world powers’.29 During the war, the young Shah was preoccupied with saving his throne in a highly volatile environment. Support from the West, and particularly from the United States, was critical to that goal. Lacking a base of popular support, the Shah ‘was able to consolidated a domestic base of support in the armed forces, using the US military assistance as political leverage’.30 Thus, from 1941 onwards, the Shah ‘looked upon the United States and the armed forces as the twin pillars of his regime’.31 24 Barry Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions: The American Experience and Iran, Oxford University Press, 1980, p. 17. 25 Richard W. Cottam, Iran and the United States: A Cold War Case Study, University of Pittsburg Press, 1988, p. 50 26 Ibid., p. 54. 27 Ibid. 28 Ann Tibbitts Schulz, Buying Security: Iran Under Monarchy, Westview Press, 1989, p. 14. 29 Ibid., p. 13. 30 Ibid., p. 14
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In the earliest stages of the war, the United States, and particularly President Franklin Roosevelt ‘had hoped to make the country [Iran] an example of Big Three Co-operation… A balance of power [in Iran] would share out influence while preventing excessive infringements on Iranian sovereignty’.32 Iran’s best hope after being invaded by combined British and Soviet forces during the war was a reliance on the intervention of the United States. Meanwhile, US diplomats looked favourably upon the new Shah and the return of parliamentary democracy in Iran. Throughout the war, the United States sought to prevent domination of Iran by either Britain or the Soviet Union. As a result, the 1943 Tehran conference included a promise by the three Great Powers to preserve Iran’s independence. According to Rubin, ‘in later years Iranian governments would often refer to that document [the Tehran Declaration] as the basis for an American obligation to protect their country and to furnish large-scale aid’.33 The advent of Soviet aggression towards Iran after the war presented a clear danger to the country’s future. ‘Soviet behavior also influenced American policy. Moscow’s actions in Iran, as well as in neighboring Turkey and in Eastern Europe, heightened United States suspicions toward Stalin’s postwar intentions.’ 34 Global aggression by the Soviet Union demanded action. The invasion of Azerbaijan by the Soviets created much speculation as to the purpose among the international diplomatic community. Various explanations were given, but regardless of the objective, Soviet policy over the next twelve months… was to lead to an international crisis that, along with Soviet policy in Eastern Europe, was to generate what came to be known as the Cold War perspective. In this view, the Soviet Union was seen as ineluctably aggressive and to be contained only by great will and determination and a full understanding of its devious and conspiratorial style.35
The Azerbaijan crisis was an early testing ground for the theory of ‘containment’ in dealing with the Soviet Union. Regardless of Soviet intent, the crisis was successfully presented by the Shah and influential US diplomats as a case of Soviet aggression and a test case for the US containment policy. Iran’s sovereignty was to become an integral component of subsequent US global containment strategy, a development welcomed by the 31 Ibid. 32 Barry Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions: The American Experience and Iran, Oxford University Press, 1980, p. 29. 33 Ibid., p. 23 34 Ibid., p. 25. 35 Richard W. Cottam, Iran and the United States: A Cold War Case Study, University of Pittsburg Press, 1988, p. 67.
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Shah. A New York Times editorial, coinciding with the Shah’s first visit to America, stated that he was ‘not only a progressive ruler but also the head of a friendly nation which provided the lifeline of the grand alliance during the war and which has now become one of the principal bulwarks against Soviet imperialist expansion’.36 Once again, the United States and Iran were about to enter a new period of diplomatic relations as the result of third-party intervention. This time, US policy towards Iran would be incorporated into a global plan for containing the Soviet Union. Such a policy did not involve an in-depth analysis of its effects on Iran. Indeed, even after the war and in light of Iran’s strategic significance, according to Cottam, ‘US political analysis of Iran as reflected in documents in this period was surprisingly superficial, almost casual’.37 On the other hand, Iranians ‘expected the Americans to behave as the British and Russians had before them. Since the pattern they knew was one of indirection and subtle manoeuvering, they had always depended on reading (and misreading) between the lines.’ 38 The critical lack of interest and mutual understanding between the two nations was to have serious ramifications. The instability of the Shah’s government, combined with his inexperience during the period 1945–53, did not bode well for the nationalist movement taking shape during these years. Socio-economic progress was sporadic but culminated in the nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) in 1951. This action precipitated a crisis which drastically increased America’s involvement with Iran and the Shah. In April 1951, the Majlis voted to nationalize AIOC, to the dismay and anger of British investors. The movement’s leader, Muhammed Mossadegh, was appointed Prime Minister. The United States tried to remain neutral, balancing friendship with Britain with a desire to see Iran in control of its own natural resources. The dispute dragged on in the courts, and Mossadegh’s failure to resolve the situation threatened a complete collapse of the Iranian economy. Mossadegh, in order to solicit financial and moral help from the United States, on 23 May 1953 wrote to President Eisenhower and warned that ‘if prompt and effective aid is not given to this country now, any steps that might be taken tomorrow to compensate for the negligence of today might well be too late’.39 36 Barry Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions: The American Experience and Iran, Oxford University Press, 1980, p. 41. 37 Richard W. Cottam, Iran and the United States: A Cold War Case Study, University of Pittsburg Press, 1988, p. 87. 38 Ibid., p. 89.
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This, of course, created the image in American minds of an Iran which might thereafter come under communist influence. ‘This message had exactly the opposite effect [from the one intended]. Eisenhower, rather than fearing the threat of communism in Iran and assisting Mussadegh, decided to cooperate with the British in operation Ajax, ousting Mussadegh.’ 40 The role of the United States in the downfall of Mossadegh and the return of a temporarily exiled Shah in 1953 is central to any discussion of US-Iran relations from that moment forward. It was a crucially important development which radically altered perceptions of the United States within Iran. The facts surrounding the level of US involvement are probably less significant that their interpretation. Misperceptions, both inside and outside Iran, have permanently distorted all subsequent interpretations of US involvement in Iran. According to Cottam, the US role in the overthrow of Mossadegh was ‘essentially the CIA’s buying into an alliance of British intelligence and a diverse group of Iranians centred on General Zahedi’.41 He continues, ‘neither the Americans nor the Iranian victims of their success were willing to face the unavoidable conclusion… that the success of the coup was a consequence of, first, a major Tudeh [the Iranian communist party] miscalculation, and second, the timing of a counter-demonstration that was critically fortuitous’.42 Among the many ironies surrounding the overthrow of Mossadegh, two, according to Cottam, are particularly noteworthy. First, the Americans, who prided themselves on being the primary proponents of liberal democratic nationalist values, played a decisive role in denying to Iran a regime that conceivably could have incorporated those ideals as the prevailing political values in Iran. Second, the very elements of the population that would later be the core support base for the bitterly anti-American Ayatollah Khomeini, the urban lower and lower middle class, provided the crowds that granted the British and Americans their victory.43
Barry Rubin states the case more succinctly: ‘It cannot be said that the United States overthrew Mossadegh and replaced him with the Shah. The CIA merely provided minimal financial and logistical aid for Iranians to 39 Yohan Alexander and Allan Nanes, The United States and Iran: A Documentary History, University Publication of America, 1980, p. 233. 40 Mahdavi Abdulreza Houshang, Iran’s Foreign Relations During the Pahlavi Period, Peykan Publishing, Tehran, 1998, p. 213. 41 Richard W. Cottam, Iran and the United States: A Cold War Case Study, University of Pittsburg Press, 1988, p. 103 42 Ibid., pp. 108–9. 43 Ibid., p. 109.
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do so.’ 44 Iranian Expert Abdulreza Mahdavi agrees with Rubin’s assessment. ‘The CIA paid most of the coup’s expenses and therefore planted the ignominious reputation of the coup in the minds of the Iranians. The coup was planned by the British and executed by their Iranian partisans. But it became known as the “American coup”.’ 45 But again, most significant was the perception in both Iran and the United States ‘that the United States had saved the Shah’s throne’. This interpretation was critical to decisions that the United States would make thereafter as they assessed Iran’s significance in relation to their containment policy, and to the Shah in his efforts to sustain his rule. Whatever interpretation one chooses to place on the objectives and consequences of Operation Ajax, it abruptly and permanently ended America’s political innocence with respect to Iran. Until 1953 the United States had played an essentially benevolent role in the great-power politics of Iran, restraining both British and Soviet appetites during World War II, firmly opposing Soviet encroachments immediately following the war, and playing the honest broker between Iran and the AIOC five years later. But the direct intervention in 1953 cast the United States in the role so common in Iranian history of cynical external power prepared to manipulate Iranian political circumstances for its own benefit. Whether or not such a description is a fair characterization of US Policy, it is unfortunately true that after 1953 the United States would never again be able to enjoy the presumption of benign objectives and enlightened self-interest when engaging itself in the affairs of Iran.46
Throughout the next decade, the Shah strengthened his power. The Majlis was reduced to a token body, and the Prime Minister became merely the Shah’s executive assistant. For the first time, the United States began to intervene actively in the affairs of Iran. ‘US policy after August 19, 1953, was effectively to give the new regime total and unquestioning support.’ 47 The United States, at this time, according to Mark Gasiorowski, ‘began to implement measures designed to enhance Iran’s long-term political stability and integrate Iran into the US global strategy for containing the Soviet Union’.48 This era marks a major shift in the evolution of US-Iran relations.
44 Barry Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions: The American Experience and Iran, Oxford University Press, 1980, pp. 88–89. 45 Mahdavi Abdulreza Houshang, Iran’s Foreign Relations During the Pahlavi Period, Peykan Publishing, Tehran, 1998, p. 214 46 Gary Sick, All Fall Down: America’s Tragic Encounter with Iran, Penguin, 1986, p. 7. 47 Richard W. Cottam, Iran and the United States: A Cold War Case Study, University of Pittsburg Press, 1988, p. 115. 48 Mark J. Gasiorowski, US Foreign Policy and the Shah: Building a Client State in Iran, Cornell University Press, 1991, p. 85.
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In the 1950s, the United States dramatically increased its foreign aid to promote stability in Iran as a means of retaining it as a pro-Western country. Meanwhile, the Shah continually pressed for greater military aid and assistance. According to Gasiorowski, a ‘cliency’ relationship developed between the United States and the Shah, and ‘helped weaken the main Iranian opposition groups during and after the 1953 coup, and it subsequently strengthened the state’s repressive apparatus and its co-optive mechanism’.49 He continues: the growing effectiveness of the repressive apparatus and the era of prosperity created by the US aid program and Iran’s growing oil revenue kept opposition political activity to a minimum in the mid- and late 1950s, enabling the Shah to consolidate his control over the state. Nominally democratic institutions and practices still existed, including elections, a legislature, legislative controls over the executive branch, and even political parties; but the absence of an effective opposition enabled the Shah to subvert these institutions and practices, rendering them ineffective as mechanisms through which society could constrain the state.50
By 1961, the Kennedy administration correctly identified growing repression and instability in Iran. A full-scale push for modernization and reform, particularly land reform, became a condition upon which the future US support of Iran was predicated. The administration believed that if land reform could be encouraged in developing countries it would prevent unrest and bolster resistance to communism. In response, the Shah instituted the ‘White Revolution’, which included six provisions: land reform, nationalization of forests, sale of state-owned enterprises to the public, a workers’ profitsharing plan, women’s suffrage and the creation of literacy corps. In so doing, ‘the Shah appeared to have won a total victory. President Kennedy, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, and the specialists at the CIA and State Department were relatively satisfied by the Shah’s initial steps toward reform.’ 51 The extent to which the reform programme was heralded further underscored the ignorance of US policymakers on the political and social situation in Iran. The White Revolution, particularly land reform, was violently opposed by Iran’s Muslim clerics led by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. For the part he played in the uprising, Ayatollah Khomeini was deported, an action that appeared to confirm his strongly held belief that only US aid and support were keeping the Shah in power. The popular revolt against the 49 Ibid., p. 130. 50 Ibid., p. 159. 51 Barry Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions: The American Experience and Iran, Oxford University Press, 1980, pp. 111–112.
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White Revolution clearly illustrates how third-world events run the risk of being grossly misinterpreted when interpreted through the Western media. What should have been clear to American officials and the press alike were the real causes underlying the revolt: ‘the regime’s lack of a popular base, its illegitimacy in the eyes of so many Iranians because of the events of 1953 and the growing dissatisfaction of the urban middle class’.52 However, in the American media ‘the “reactionary” revolt only validated the Shah’s reform credentials’.53 The New York Times defined the revolution as one in which the Shah had successfully aligned himself directly with the peasants and workers against the traditionalists and conservatives. More significantly, the White Revolution underscores the dangers inherent in one nation mandating policy for another, particularly a thirdworld one. The policies and programmes needed to create positive reform in Iran had little to do with those advocated by the Kennedy administration. Iranian society was radically different from that of the United States. The models and assumptions upon which US policy were based ultimately paved the way for the formation of a new Islamic organization and the emergence of Khomeini as its religio-political leader. ‘That he emerged in 1979 as the symbol of the revolutionary movement was no historical accident.’ 54 Over the course of the late 1960s and early 1970s, the Shah continued his headlong rush towards economic development. His ‘regime embarked on a massive development project that led to uneven development of the economic and political spheres, modernizing the former without changing the nature of the latter’.55 Concurrently, the Shah ‘harshly suppressed all forms of opposition and… continued to develop institutions and mechanisms to co-opt the modern middle class, the industrial working class and other key societal groups, undermining support for opposition organizations’.56 By the end of the 1960s, Britain’s long military presence in the Middle East had ended. In 1969, the newly-elected American president, Richard Nixon, understanding the strategic significance of the Persian Gulf, with its vast oil reserves, realized measures to ensure security and stability would need to be taken. Facing a war in Vietnam and hostility in the Middle East towards a US military presence, the administration developed what became known as the Nixon Doctrine. This was ‘intended to signal a new 52 Ibid., p. 109. 53 Ibid. 54 Mohsen M. Milani, The Making of Iran’s Islamic Revolution: from Monarchy to Islamic Republic, Westview Press, 1994, 2nd edition, p. 55. 55 Ibid., p. 59 56 Mark J. Gasiorowski, US Foreign Policy and the Shah: Building a Client State in Iran, Cornell University Press, 1991, p. 187.
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American policy toward Southeast Asia… and provide the basis for a twopillar strategy in the Gulf.’ 57 In May 1972, President Nixon and his National Security Advisor, Henry Kissinger, met with the Shah in Tehran. ‘The outcome [of this meeting] was a bargain that radically restructured the US Iranian relationship.’ 58 The May agreement gave the Shah primary responsibility for maintaining Western interests in the Persian Gulf region, in return for a substantial increase in the number of uniformed US advisors and technicians living and working in Iran and a guarantee of access to state-of-the-art US non-nuclear weapons and technology. By implication, senior officials of the Nixon administration ‘let the Shah know that so long as he remained a staunch prowestern ally, they wouldn’t inquire too closely into his handling of Iran’s internal affairs’.59 For the Shah, ‘this was a personal triumph beyond his wildest dreams. For years he had dealt with successive US presidents and had always been kept on a short leash… Now, at last, he was recognized as a world-class strategic thinker by no less an authority than Henry Kissinger.’ 60 The carte blanche which the Shah received to purchase American arms was unprecedented. The US Department of Defence objected vigorously, but in vain. In July 1972, Secretary of State Kissinger ‘in the president’s name, formally served notice to the bureaucracy that, henceforth, decisions on purchases of US military equipment would be left primarily to the government of Iran’.61 As a result, the Shah immediately increased substantially arms purchases from the United States. In addition, to strengthen Iran’s military control of the entrance to the Persian Gulf, he ordered his armed forces to get back three small islands situated close to the United Arab Emirates, Abu Musa, Greater Tunb and Lesser Tunb, which had been under British and Arab control. Despite vigorous protests by Arab regimes about the seizure of the islands, they were powerless to act. ‘The United States and Britain at least tacitly approved the Shah’s move as another step toward the stabilization of the Gulf.’ 62 The Shah’s massive arms buying was fuelled by a sudden and enormous increase in oil revenues in the aftermath of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. By the end of the 1970s, Iran’s annual expenditure on defence was running 57 Barry Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions: The American Experience and Iran, Oxford University Press, 1980, p. 128. 58 Gary Sick, All Fall Down: America’s Tragic Encounter with Iran, Penguin, 1986, p. 15. 59 H.W. Brands, Into the Labyrinth: The United States and the Middle East, 1945–1993, McGraw-Hill, 1994, p. 154. 60 Gary Sick, All Fall Down: America’s Tragic Encounter with Iran, Penguin, 1986, pp. 15, 16. 61 Ibid., p.17. 62 Marvin Zonis, ‘Iran’ in The Middle East, Michael Adams (ed.), Facts on File, 1988, p. 362.
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at US$9.94 billion. Its arsenal included 447 combat aircraft, 1985 tanks, 14 naval vessels and 710 artillery pieces.63 As the stocks of military hardware grew, it became evident that Iran lacked the technical expertise to handle it all. As a result, the Shah made increasing demands for US advisers and trained technicians. ‘By July, 1976 there were 24,000 Americans working in Iran, with their numbers increasing at a remarkable rate.’ 64 The arrival of large numbers of foreigners bred resentment in Iran. They were regarded as further unwelcome signs of the manner in which the Shah was trying to westernize the country and marginalize traditional and Islamic culture. To many in Iran it appeared that the Shah was building an army to defend the monarchy from the Iranian people and not from external attack. A perception also developed that the Shah was transferring wealth to America and that the imported weaponry would be used to serve American not Iranian interests in the Persian Gulf. The opposition charged that the Shah had become ‘an agent of American Imperialism’.65 Meanwhile, domestic difficulties in Iran continued to mount, with little recognition or understanding of them in the West. The Shah’s superficial modernization programmes caused increasing social disorientation and dissatisfaction. Particularly disastrous was the government-led migration effort of rural poor to urban centres. As government investment dried up in rural areas, even greater numbers of people migrated to cities, only to encounter a strange twentieth-century world without hope of jobs. Those who stayed behind became increasingly embittered as their poverty deepened. Meanwhile, the disparity between rich and poor, compounded by government corruption and the repressive action of the secret police (SAVAK), alienated millions of Iranians from the Shah. The image of Iran presented to the West by the Shah contrasted starkly with reality. A particularly glaring example was the celebration in 1971 of the two-thousand-five-hundredth anniversary of the founding of the Persian kingdom by Cyrus the Great in 549BC. Dignitaries from around the world attended a lavish crowning ceremony in Persepolis, estimated to have cost US$200 million. (The Shah also scrapped the Islamic calendar, replacing it with one starting in 549BC.) Such extravaganzas were possible due to the increase of Iran’s oil revenues, which rose from US$1.1 billion in 1970 to US$20.5 billion in 63 Shahram Chubin, Iran’s National Security Policy: Capabilities, Intentions and Impact, Carnegie Endowment For International Peace, 1994, pp. 36, 37. 64 Barry Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions: The American Experience and Iran, Oxford University Press, 1980, p. 137. 65 Marvin Zonis, ‘Iran’ in The Middle East, Michael Adams (ed.), Facts on File, 1988, p. 363.
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1976. The astronomical increase in oil revenues in Iran led to a remarkable economic expansion during 1970s. For the outside world, therefore, the Shah was able to create an illusion of prosperity, stability and harmony. The economic expansion shifted Iran’s economy from agriculture/ service to industry/service. This new economic structure was controlled by a tiny segment of the population, which Milani refers to as ‘The Triangle of Fortune’.66 At the apex of the triangle was the Shah, along with Western industrialists and their Iranian junior partners. The Iranians in this elite group ‘identified with and emulated the West to such an extent that they became alienated from their own culture. This created a ubiquitous cultural gap between this small portion of the population and the bulk of Iranians… The Islamic revolution, in some ways, was directed against the abuses of this group.’ 67 The drastic economic growth and transformation in Iran’s economy created serious problems in the nation’s economic and cultural infrastructure. As the decade moved toward its conclusion, the oil boom passed and the inherent economic problems surfaced. First and foremost, the economic boom was not experienced in any substantive way either by the majority of the traditional middle class or by industrial working and urban lower classes. A great disparity in income distribution had developed, with the bourgeoisie deriving the greatest benefits. Iran’s rural lower class remained, as before, mired in poverty. Second, the heavy emphasis on military over infrastructure spending left Iran without many basic human services and staple products, causing a great deal of political unrest. Shortages in building supplies, housing, skilled labour and most noticeably electricity underscored this fact. One inevitable consequence of economic growth is social mobilization, defined by Karl Deutsch as the process in which major clusters of old social, economic and psychological commitments are eroded or broken and people become available for new patterns of socialization and behavior. The faster the rate of social mobilization, the greater the chances of political tension.68
Throughout the 1970s, Iran experienced rapid social mobilization of its populace. For Iran, ‘the most significant consequence of social mobilization was the intensified demand by various groups to participate in the political process’.69 In response to these demands the Shah instituted even tighter 66 Mohsen M. Milani, The Making of Iran’s Islamic Revolution: from Monarchy to Islamic Republic, Westview Press, 1994, 2nd edition, p. 66. 67 Ibid., p. 61. 68 Ibid., pp. 65–6. 69 Ibid., p. 67.
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controls to repress his opposition. Those who refused to accept the iron fist of the Shah were, therefore, forced to organize increasingly radicalized forms of opposition to his regime. It was clear that change could not happen by working within the existing constitutional framework. As the Shah battled with the economic crisis and the radical opposition groups, in 1977 he faced other pressures – this time, to his surprise, from quarters outside Iran which he had always regarded as friendly. The US administration, led by President Jimmy Carter, started calling for Iran to make reforms in order to improve the country’s record on human rights. While previous US administrations had been prepared to overlook the repression, frequently brutal, of members of the Iranian opposition, Carter was not. The President was responding to critical reports produced by Amnesty International and other human-rights organizations which spoke of the routine and systematic use of torture. These reports caused shock and outrage around the world – not least among members of the US Congress. The first rumblings of revolution occurred as the result of limited liberalization undertaken by the Shah in response to the incoming president’s human-rights policies. Albeit limited, the opposition groups in Iran saw a crack in the door and decided to seize the opportunity. In May 1977, 54 Iranian lawyers signed a public declaration protesting against legal revision, which they insisted undermined the independence of the judiciary. A month later, leaders of the National Front issued an open letter calling for an end to absolutism and for implementation of the 1906 Constitution. The fact that SAVAK did not harass the signatories was seen by opposition forces as confirmation of an end to outright repression. The liberalization policy provided the opposition with the first opportunity since 1963 to organize and mobilize its resources. Numerous professional associations were reactivated, with students and secular intellectuals the most visible component. This marked the first of eight phases in the revolution, as identified by Mohsen Milani. The next phase in the revolution was the resurgence of the Shiite movement. Protests entered a new phase on 9 January 1978, when seminary students in the holy city of Qom took to the streets in protest against the publication of an article in the Ettelaat newspaper. The article was critical of Khomeini for allegedly violating the true meaning of Islam. During the protest, the police panicked and opened fire, killing at least six people. The protests in Qom marked the beginning of the end for the Shah. Forty days after the demonstration there, serious rioting erupted in Tabriz,
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followed by bloody encounters in other cities, including the 11 May 1978 uprising in Tehran. Such were the inadequacies of US intelligence that even as late as January 1978 Ambassador William Sullivan reported to Washington that the Shah was in ‘full command of the situation’.70 The third step in the revolution involved the consolidation of the opposition forces. The Shah was becoming increasingly indecisive, and his confusion regarding the situation was more readily apparent. The fourth phase of the revolution involved widespread and paralyzing strikes throughout Iran. Oil production fell from 5.8 million barrels per day to 1.1 million. In response, the Shah installed a new prime minister, Ja’far Sharif-Emami, who established a government of reconciliation. He then abolished the new calendar, created two years earlier, and restored the Islamic one, closed down casinos and night clubs, abolished the post of Minister of State for Women’s Affairs, released clerics from prison and eased restrictions on prayer meetings. Despite these concessions, the new government did not succeed in achieving reconciliation or stopping the violent protests. ‘As the popular movement grew stronger, the Carter administration became more confused and divided.’ 71 On 2 September 1978, martial law was declared, the fifth phase in the rapid-fire succession of events. By this time protesters were taking to the streets in tens of thousands. Unaware of the martial law restrictions, participants in the demonstration in Tehran’s Jaleh Square refused to disperse, and troops opened fire, killing large numbers. Even though demonstrators chanted Khomeini’s name, the mounting opposition was united more by a hatred of the Shah than by Islamic fervour. In November, the ailing Shah elected General Gholam Reza Azhari to head a military government. But by early December, ‘it became abundantly clear that Azhari’s military government was unable to contain the revolutionary movement’.72 On 10 and 11 December, millions of citizens participated in well organized marches, intended as ‘a walking referendum for dismantling the Shah’s rule’.73 This sixth phase in the revolution was brilliantly conceived and executed by the opposition. The religious pretext of the marches in Tasu’a and Ashura left the Shah no choice but to permit them. A ban would have been interpreted as further
70 71 72 73
Ibid., p. 115. Ibid., p. 122. Ibid., p. 123. Ibid.
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proof of the ‘sacrilegious policies of the Shah’;74 and approving them would provide the opposition the ideal opportunity to demonstrate to the entire world the ‘immensity of their popular base of support’.75 The Shah’s vacillation on policy reflected the mixed messages he was receiving from Washington. President Carter’s National Security Advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski, advocated taking whatever action was necessary to suppress the uprising with the full support of the United States. On the other hand, the advice coming from the Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance, was that the Shah should begin negotiations with the opposition to resolve their differences peacefully. The conflicting views inside the US administration, channelled to the Shah by the American Ambassador, William Sullivan, and by the Iranian envoy, Ardeshir Zahedi, ‘added to the ruler’s paralysis and indecision’.76 Dialogue of a sort began later in December when the Shah invited the leader of the National Front, Karim Sanjabi, to his palace. His intention was to ask Sanjabi to form a new government. Such an offer might have succeeded some months earlier, but at this late date reconciliation was now impossible. Sanjabi rejected the offer and informed the Shah that he should leave Iran. By mid-December, the full implications of the situation finally became clear to Western envoys, who now urged the Shah to go abroad. President Anwar Sadat of Egypt in later years would write that the Shah himself indicated that he had been forced to leave Iran because the Americans had exerted a great deal of pressure on him. He told me how the American ambassador came to meet him and kept looking at his watch and telling him that every minute that passes and delays your departure is not in your interest and not in the interest of Iran, you have to hasten your departure immediately.77
Acting under a combination of external and internal pressures, the Shah turned to another member of the National Front, Shahpour Bakhtiar, to try to form an administration that would be acceptable to the opposition. Bakhtiar agreed to accept the prime ministership from the Shah on condition that the Shah hand over authority to a Regency Council and leave the country. The Shah’s departure was now imminent, and marked the seventh phase in the revolution. The top echelons of the Iranian military were in agreement that the Shah should not leave Iran and were contemplating a military coup, a fact 74 75 76 77
Ibid. Ibid. Shaul Bakhash, The Reign of the Ayatollahs: Iran and the Islamic Revolution, Basic Books, 1984, p. 17. Anwar al-Sadat, Those I Have Known, Jonathan Cape, 1985, p. 33.
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confirmed by US Envoy General Robert Huyser. However, constrained by their own limitations and reliance on direct orders from the Shah himself, nothing came of this plan. On 16 January 1979, the Shah boarded a plane at Tehran airport, having delegated authority to the Regency Council, and flew to Egypt. The official word was that he was vacationing. But neither he nor the Iranian public were fooled by this explanation. They knew full well that the Shah would never return. The House of Pahlavi, staunch and powerful ally of the United States, had fallen, and the revolution’s first and most difficult goal had been attained. Khomeini returned to Iran on 1 February 1979, having already created his Council of Islamic Revolution and appointed its secret members, and chose Mehdi Bazargan to lead the provisional government. Creating a dual sovereignty with Bakhtiar’s government and the Regency Council was the final phase of the revolution. While Bakhtiar continued to seek public support, Khomeini’s aides maintained their secret negotiations with the military, which eventually, on 10 February, led to the military declaring neutrality and swinging its support behind the Islamic Republic. ‘With the Shah in exile in Egypt, Khomeini in Iran, Bakhtiar in hiding, Bazargan in charge of the Provisional Revolutionary Government and the armed forces demoralized and neutralized, a new chapter in Iran’s history opened, one in which an Islamic order was built on the ashes of imperial Iran.’ 78 In addition to the common objective of toppling the Shah, one of the platforms that united the nationalists, socialists, Islamists and other opposition forces were anti-imperialistic sentiments, especially against the United States which was to be blamed for anything evil that had happened to Iran for the past 25 years. Notwithstanding those widespread negative sentiments, the Western-educated liberal government of Bazargan, recognizing Iran’s need of reasonable relations with the United States and not desiring to antagonize a superpower did not cut ties with Washington and followed Bakhtiar’s moderate non-alignment policy. On at least two occasions, attacks on the US embassy instigated by leftist forces were contained successfully by the Bazargan government. Despite these attacks, the United States did not pay attention to the anti-US sentiments in the Iranian political environment. Regardless of constant warnings by part of the US administration that admitting the Shah to the United 78 Mohsen M. Milani, The Making of Iran’s Islamic Revolution: from Monarchy to Islamic Republic, Westview Press, 1994, 2nd edition, p. 133.
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States would destroy any chances of achieving better relations with Iran and possibly lead to another attack on the embassy, Carter, under pressure from individuals like Henry Kissinger, David Rockerfeller and others, agreed to allow the Shah to enter the country for medical treatment. The Shah’s admission to the United States and the adamant refusal of the United States to approach the central leaders of the revolution, who had the support of the masses, radically deepened the anti-American sentiments of many Iranians. The meeting in Algiers on 1 November between Brzezinski and Bazargan and two of his cabinet ministers reinforced the views of the revolutionaries that the United States, in co-operation with the Western-educated liberals, intended to weaken and ultimately overturn the revolution and restore the Pahlavi dynasty, as they had done in 1953. In less that two weeks after the Shah’s admission, and three days after the Algiers meeting, on 4 November 1979, 400 militant Islamist students, calling themselves the Moslem Students Following the Line of Imam, separated themselves from the demonstrating crowds, entered the US embassy and took its 63 American occupants hostage, demanding the return of the Shah. The hostage-taking certainly was not, as has been widely reported ever since, the direct result of the Shah’s admission to the United States. Rather, it was a product of an internal power struggle between the Islamic groups and leftists. Both groups had one goal in common: to bring down Bazargan’s moderate government, thus ending the policy of maintaining the normalization of US-Iran relations. Since the admission of the Shah to the United States, the leftist groups had intensified their ‘anti-US’ campaign, and had mobilized many forces with different ideologies. The militant Islamist students, for their part, not wanting to be outmanoeuvered by the leftists, decided to implement the seizure of the US embassy to prevent the leftist Fedaiyan-e Khalq and Mujahedian-e Khalq from gaining the initiative. According to Abbas Abdi, one of the three leaders of the students who seized the embassy, ‘the students speculated that the role of American public opinion in ending the Vietnam war could have similarly helped their cause as well. They predicted that the whole seizure of the embassy would last no more than a week and the relations between the two countries would return to normal.’ 79 With the resignation of Bazargan, 36 hours later, the students achieved their main objective, but hostages were not released. 79 ‘Hostage Meets Captor: Towards a Reconciliation’, meeting organized by Centre for World Dialogue, Paris, 31 July 1998.
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Khomeini did not know of the students’ plan in advance. Immediately after the takeover of the embassy the students’ leaders sent him a message confirming that they would evacuate the compound if he ordered them to do so. But, recognizing its potential benefits, Khomeini three days later called it the ‘second revolution, which is more important than the first one’. For the next 444 days, the hostage crisis became the centre of the whole dynamic of the revolution and served a domestic political function: to put the revolution and all its institutions in order. ‘This action has many benefits… We keep the hostages, finish our internal work, then release them,’ Khomeini explained to Foreign Minister Bani Sadir. ‘We can put the constitution to the people’s vote without difficulty, and carry out presidential and parliamentary elections. When we have finished all these jobs, we can let the hostages go.’ 80 The takeover of the embassy had an immediate impact on US-Iran relations. It ruptured formal relations completely and forced the United States, in an effort to resolve the crisis, to employ diplomatic, economic, judicial and military measures against Iran. Although the hostages were released on 19 January 1981, the punishment of Iran continues. This punishment, by various sanctions, is no longer for overthrowing the ‘US Shah’ or for holding the American diplomats hostage. It is for other alleged misdemeanours that since 1981 Iran has remained continuously the subject of US sanctions, and it appears that for years to come these will be an essential feature of US policy towards Iran.
80 Baqer Moin, Khomeini: Life of the Ayatollah, I.B.Tauris, 1999, pp. 227, 228.
2 SANCTIONS: AN INTEGRAL PART OF US FOREIGN POLICY
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n the decades since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, the United States has tried to isolate Iran diplomatically, militarily and economically, relying on wide-ranging unilateral sanctions and export controls. First, sanctions were imposed as a response to the seizure of the American embassy in Tehran. Following the release of the hostages, the United States’ objectives in using sanction tools were to alter what it regarded as the unacceptable political and military behaviour of Iran. These sanctions and export controls were imposed, withdrawn and imposed again, using not only the legislative vehicles existing in United States law, but through the enactment of new pieces of legislation to suit the needs of successive administrations. In order to understand better this complex area of US foreign policy – sanctions against Iran – one needs to discuss definitions of economic sanctions and export controls, the US rationale for imposing sanctions and the legal authority for the imposition of such measures. DEFINITION What is meant by the term ‘sanction’ in the context of foreign policy making? It is important to make a distinction between technical and descriptive definitions of the term in order to focus on economic sanctions as distinct from normal trade regulations. The latter are restrictions imposed by
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national governments on international commerce. They resemble economic sanctions in their effects, but they meet different objectives. These trading restrictions are the defined objectives of a government’s trade policy as distinct from the defined objectives of foreign policy, for which the United States increasingly employs economic sanctions. It is also necessary to distinguish the technical term ‘economic sanctions’ from the related strategy of the denial of favourable or preferential trade treatment. The task of defining ‘economic sanctions’ can, according to a legal study by Michael Malloy, become ‘complicated by the fact that at the extremes, certain objectives of trade policy may bear a resemblance to the objectives served by, or the techniques employed in, economic sanctions programmes’. There may also be ‘some interposition of the techniques of economic sanctions into international economic policy’. Nevertheless, it can be seen that there are certain distinct foreign policy purposes served by economic sanctions that exist outside general economic policy.1 Barry E. Carter takes economic sanctions to mean ‘coercive economic measures taken against one or more countries to force a change in policies, or at least to demonstrate a country’s opinion about the other’s policies’.2 Most recent studies quote sanctions defined by Hufbauer Schott and Elliott as ‘deliberate, government inspired withdrawal, or threat of withdrawal, of customary trade or financial relations’.3 Excluded from this definition are economic restrictions for economic purposes, such as tariffs and quotas, or ensuring market access or compliance with trade arrangements. These are reactions to the economic behaviour of a state. Economic sanctions are used for foreign policy purposes, and the objective is to change the political behaviour of the target country. As a means of promoting a nation’s foreign policy interests, economic sanctions can be seen in the middle of the spectrum of possible courses of action. At one end of the spectrum, the most coercive courses of action are the use of military force, covert action and the threat of force. At the other end of the scale are diplomatic measures: the expulsion of diplomatic personnel; the recall of an ambassador; formal diplomatic protest; the suspension of cultural exchanges. Sanctions fall somewhere in the middle: 1 2 3
Michael P. Malloy, Economic Sanctions and US Trade. Little, Brown, 1990, p. 7. Barry E. Carter, International Economic Sanctions: Improving the Haphazard US Legal Regime, Cambridge University Press, 1988, p. 4. Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Jeffrey J. Schott and Kimbely Ann Elliott, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered: History and Current Policy, 2nd Edition, Institute for International Economics, 1990, p. 2.
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they are sometimes used as a substitute for other measures. Diplomatic measures may not hit hard enough, but more extreme military solutions might be considered excessive. In the words of Hufbauer, Schott and Elliott, sanctions ‘add teeth to international diplomacy, even when the bark is worse than the bite’.4 Thus, we can use the term ‘economic sanctions’ to refer to ‘nonmilitary actions of the United States that adversely affect the flow of goods, services or financial assets to a specific foreign country in order to penalize or coerce a country for political purposes or to express US displeasure with that country’s actions’.5 In this context the term includes a range of trade and financial measures that may be imposed, in varying combinations. THE HISTORY OF SANCTIONS, PRE-1945 While sanctions and embargoes have become an integral part of the contemporary political world, their use has a long history. The earliest documented occasion is the Megarian decree in ancient Greece enacted by Pericles in 432BC in response to the kidnapping of three Aspasian women. Aristophanes, in the Acharnians, referred to the enactment of a sanctions law: For then, in wrath, the Olympian Pericles Thundered and lightened, and confounded Hellas, Enacting laws which ran like drinking-songs. ‘That the Megarians presently depart From earth and sea the mainland, and the mart’.6
Though sanctions have been used throughout history and by many nations, the purpose of this study is to examine the use of sanctions by the United States. In American history, sanctions have been employed since the eighteenth century. In one of the well documented acts leading to the American Revolution the colonists imposed a boycott on English goods – in 1765 – as a way of protesting the imposition of the Stamp Act. Another boycott, imposed in protest against the Townshend Act, to recover the salaries of colonial governors and judges eventually led to the ‘Boston tea party’ of 1774. The use of sanctions gradually became part of the tradition of the United States. In 1807, in an effort to avoid a war with England and 4 5 6
Ibid., p. 11. Erin Day, Economic Sanctions Imposed by the United States Against Specific Countries: 1979 Through 1992, CRS report for Congress, 92-631F, 10 August 1992. Aristophanes, The Acharnians, ‘Great Books of the Western World’, vol. 5, Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1990, p. 461.
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France, President Thomas Jefferson persuaded Congress to enact a trade embargo. American ships were prohibited from leaving for foreign ports, and the transporting of American goods by other vessels was banned. In the face of strong domestic opposition, the embargo was lifted in 1809. However, in 1822, in response to British orders limiting American trade with France, the United States stopped all trade with England. Until 1918, however, economic sanctions were used to complement military action. Only after the First World War was serious attention given to the idea that sanctions could be a substitute for armed activities. A crucial step in the history of economic sanctions was the creation of the League of Nations following the First World War. Influenced by the apparent effect of the sanctions against the Central Powers during the war, member nations incorporated the ‘economic weapon’ in the Covenant as a non-military deterrent weapon to enforce peace. Article XVI of the League Covenant, without using the specific word ‘sanction’, states: Should any Member of the League resort to war in disregard of its covenants under Articles 12, 13 or 15, it shall ipso facto be deemed to have committed an act of war against all other Members of the League, which hereby undertake to immediately subject it to the severance of all trade or financial relations, the prohibition of all intercourse between their nationals and the nationals of the covenant-breaking State, and the prevention of all financial, commercial or personal intercourse between the nationals of the covenant-breaking State and the nationals of any other State, whether a Member of the League or not.
In other words, this article provides for sanctions against any state which resorts to war before attempting to resolve its claims by peaceful means. There were two early successes enjoyed by the League against smaller powers that encouraged supporters of the notion of sanctions. In 1921, the threat of sanctions was enough to force Yugoslavia to give up its attempts to seize territory from Albania. In 1925, Greece was compelled to renounce territorial claims on Bulgarian territory under similar pressure. However, the picture was drastically different when a big nation was involved. The Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931 and Italian aggression against Ethiopia in 1935 are two examples of the failure of the League of Nations to influence the aggressors to withdraw from the occupied lands by imposing sanctions. Between the two world wars, most cases involving the imposition of sanctions were linked to military action. Even through the Second World
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War some of the objectives sought with the use of sanctions were noticeably military in character. However, during the war economic sanctions proved useful. The naval blockade against Europe and Japan, and the Allies’ pre-emptive purchase of strategic materials from neutral countries played a part, albeit small, in the defeat of the Axis Powers. Japan, so dependent on imports from overseas, was particularly vulnerable to such measures. In the 1930s, in line with the concept of the enforcement of international law, international sanctions meant League of Nations sanctions. These were ‘penalties to be collectively imposed by members of the body responsible for international peace and security on those who violated their obligation under the League Covenant’. This concept of penalties in an international framework was carried forward into the United Nations Charter, which introduced new norms of human rights and also gave limited authority to regional bodies to act in defence of regional peace and security. THE HISTORY OF SANCTIONS, POST-1945 Because the harmonization of the policies of the Great Powers was a major factor in winning the First World War, it was only logical that this approach should be continued for the maintenance of peace after the war. So on 2 June 1945 the Charter of the United Nations was signed. Like the League’s Covenant, which basically reflected big power policies, the Charter was also tailored to suit their interests. The five power community, as a Security Council, was empowered to decide on behalf of the other members when and how the sanctions should be applied. The term ‘sanctions’ is not used in the Charter, but the enforcement ‘measures’ used in its provisions have the obvious character of sanctions. The power to impose mandatory economic sanctions is given to the Security Council if it concludes that, under Article 39 of the Charter, a threat to peace or a breach of peace exists. Article 41 of the Charter states: The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.
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Although this article is associated only with economic sanctions, its actual scope is much wider. In addition to economic measures like embargoes on imports and exports or the freezing or confiscation of financial assets, it may also include restrictions or interruptions of communications and cultural exchanges, such as academic exchanges and sporting links, as well as the severance of diplomatic and political relations.7 Article 41, in conjunction with other articles in the Charter, shows that the UN approach to the application of sanctions, contrary to the automatic sanctions of Article 16 of the League, is flexible, and depends upon the formulation of a number of principles, findings and decisions. For the first 45 years of its life, the Security Council adopted sanctions only twice. The first time was in December 1966 when financial, economic and diplomatic restrictions were imposed on the racist minority regime of Southern Rhodesia. This was followed by an arms embargo against South Africa in 1977. Both were to address denial of human rights and domestic abuse of power rather than to counter the traditional threat to international peace and security. Lack of consensus on what constituted unacceptable behaviour, the absence of a combined will to respond to wrong-doing, and the use of the veto by the permanent members of the Security Council in defence of their own interests limited the United Nations’ role in imposing sanctions, and made the use of mandatory sanctions by the United Nations almost impossible. By the 1970s, the great hopes that UN economic sanctions might become a substitute for force were dashed, opening the way for the leading powers to assume a responsibility for righting what they perceived as ‘wrongs’ on a unilateral or multilateral basis. However, since the end of the Cold War, the Security Council has reactivated to a remarkable extent its sanctions mechanism. Since 1990, Iraq, Yugoslavia, Somalia, Libya, Liberia, Haiti, Unita in Angola, Rwanda and Afghanistan have become targets of sanctions. The Security Council, in its first heads of state joint declaration of 1992, stated: the absence of war and military conflicts amongst states does not in itself ensure international peace and security. The non-military sources of instability in the economic, social, humanitarian, and ecological fields have become a threat to peace and security. The United Nations membership as a whole need to give the highest priority to the solution of these matters.8 7
For a comprehensive list of non-violent sanctions suggested by Margaret Doxey, see Document 1.
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Indeed, the imposition of sanctions under the auspices of international organizations is happening more and more. During the years since 1945, the imposition of sanctions for foreign policy purposes other than military ones has become increasingly common. However, sanctions have still been deployed on occasion to force a target country to withdraw its troops from border skirmishes, to drop plans of territorial acquisition or to refrain from other military adventures. In most cases in the post-war period, where economic sanctions were used against a nation using military force, the United States played a prominent role in their imposition. With the exception of US sanctions in 1956, which forced Britain and France to withdraw their troops from Suez, major powers have never been able to deter the military adventures of other powers by means of economic sanctions alone. The successful cases are mainly against small and weak countries. US economic pressure on Turkey in the mid-1970s did not succeed in securing the withdrawal of Turkish troops from Cyprus, and 25 years later Turkish troops still remain on the island. The United States leads the world as a user of economic sanctions for foreign policy purposes. In the period following the Second World War, sanctions were imposed with the aim of limiting the growth of the Soviet Union’s military capability. Early on in the Cold War, in the 1950s and 1960s, in an attempt to contain the spread of communism, the United States used sanctions against communist countries and those that were engaged in trade with such countries. In the 1970s, human rights became a foreign policy concern of the United States, and Marxist-Leninist regimes were targeted with sanctions. Since the late 1980s, the threat posed by terrorism, narcotics and the proliferation of weapons has precipitated the implementation of sanctions. Of the 107 cases of economic sanctions world-wide between 1945 and 1990, the United States was involved in 74. The United Kingdom used sanctions 13 times in the same period, the Soviet Union 11 times.9 Although economic sanctions have always been powerful instruments in American diplomacy, now that the Cold War is over they have assumed a greater significance in US foreign policy, and now play a more central role, being used more frequently. From 1993 to 1996, the United States enacted 61 laws and executive actions authorising the use of sanctions 8 9
‘Security Council Summit Declaration, “New risks for stability and security”’, New York Times, 1 February 1992. Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Jeffrey J. Schott and Kimbely Ann Elliott, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered: History and Current Policy, 2nd Edition, Institute for International Economics, 1990.
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against 35 countries.10 The United States has enacted 142 sanction-related provisions under 42 federal statutes requiring or authorising the United States to impose sanctions against other countries.11 According to Richard B. Cheney, former US Secretary of Defence, 70 countries with almost twothirds of the world’s population are currently affected by US sanctions.12 The following 13 categories, in order of frequency, have been cited to justify the imposition of sanctions: • terrorism; • proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; • narcotics activity; • expropriation; • human rights; • communism; • military aggression; • environmental activity; • transition to democracy; • worker rights; • market reform; • harbouring war criminals; • boycott activity.13 THE US RATIONALE FOR SANCTIONS Three broad rationales are offered for the imposition of sanctions: the desire to influence a country’s policies or even bring about a change in its regime; the infliction of punishment on a country because of its policies; the symbolic showing of opposition to the target country’s policies for a variety of purposes, the demonstration of opposition to the target country itself, assuring audiences in the imposing country that its government is opposed to the target country’s policies, and showing allied states and other potential target countries that a stand has been taken.14
10 A Catalogue of New US Unilateral Economic Sanctions for Foreign Policy Purposes 1993-1996, National Association of Manufacturers (Washington DC), 1997. 11 Overview and Analysis of Current Unilateral Economic Sanctions, publication 3123, US-International Trade Commission,1998, p. ix. 12 Richard B. Cheney, ‘Defending Liberty in a Global Economy’ in Solveig Singleton and Daniel T. Griswold (eds), Economic Casualties: How US Foreign Policy Undermines Trade, Growth and Liberty, CARO Institute, Washington DC, 1995, p. 23. 13 See also Donald Zarin and Meha Shah, Survey of US Unilateral Economic Sanctions, a report prepared by Dechert, Price and Rhoads, Washington DC, for the President’s Export Council, 11 January 1977. 14 Barry E. Carter, International Economic Sanctions: Improving the Haphazard US Legal Regime, Cambridge University Press, 1988, p. 12.
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A decision to impose sanctions can involve more than one of these rationales. US sanctions against Iran were motivated by a mix of all three. They were intended to force Iran to abandon its unacceptable policies towards the United States, to punish Iran for those policies, and to make a symbolic statement to pro-Israeli groups in the United States. Aside from the three main rationales, sanctions may sometimes be imposed simply because a government feels the need to be seen to be taking action, and sees sanctions as the least controversial way of doing so. In these cases, diplomatic action might not seem compelling enough, while the use of military action might be considered too extreme. Within the broad categories mentioned above, an imposer country will generally have more precise foreign policy motives for the imposition of sanctions. Most studies on the subject quote the categories outlined by Hufbauer, Schott and Elliott.15 ‘Changing target-country policies in a relatively modest way’: these goals include promoting human rights, fighting terrorism and slowing nuclear proliferation. ‘Destabilising the target government’: the aim is generally to effect a change of regime in the target country, as illustrated by the US campaign against Fidel Castro and Manuel Noriega. ‘Disrupt a minor military adventure’: notable successes since 1945 include US opposition to the policies of President Nasser of Egypt in Yemen, and to events in the Congo (1963–5). A failure was illustrated by sanctions against Turkey over Cyprus (1974–8). ‘Impair the military potential of the target country’: the overall intention here is to weaken the target country, with a particular goal of weakening its military potential. Sanctions imposed during the First and Second World Wars, and COCOM (Co-ordinating Committee on Multilateral Export Controls) sanctions against the Soviet Union and its allies, fall into this category. ‘Change target country policies in a major way’: in this category major changes in a target country other than destabilization or reduction of military potential are sought. Sanctions against Poland (1981–4) to end martial law and obtain internal reform, and sanctions against South Africa over apartheid and control of Namibia are good examples. Another possible rationale for the imposition of economic sanctions, as suggested by the same scholars, is ‘Demonstration of resolve’. The need to show resolve has frequently been a motive behind the imposition of sanctions. This has been especially true for the United States, which has often used sanctions as a way of asserting its leadership on the world 15 Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Jeffrey J. Schott and Kimbely Ann Elliott, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered: History and Current Policy, 2nd Edition, Institute for International Economics, 1990, p. 38.
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stage. As Hufbauer, Schott and Elliott point out, US presidents appear to feel compelled to dramatise their opposition to foreign misdeeds even when the likelihood of changing the target country’s behavior seems remote. In these cases sanctions are often imposed because the cost of inaction, in terms of lost confidence at home and abroad in the ability or willingness of the US to act, is greater than the cost of the sanctions.16
Such action is often expected of the United States by the international community. There are expectations that the United States will demonstrate moral outrage and reassure its allies that America will stand by its international commitments. ‘Deterrence’ is another frequently given reason for sanctions: the idea that an imposing country may be discouraging future unacceptable policies by increasing the associated costs. In most cases, however, it is difficult, if not impossible, to ascertain whether sanctions really were a deterrent against further wrongdoing. Under Mikhail Gorbachev, the Soviet Union radically changed its domestic and foreign policies, but it is hard to prove a link between the combined effect of all US sanctions in the past and these changes. To summarize, the imposition of sanctions can be seen to send a threefold message: it indicates to the target country that the imposer condemns its actions; it says to allies that statements will be supported by action; and it shows a domestic audience that its government will act when necessary to look after the nation’s interests.17 SOURCES OF AUTHORITY FOR US UNILATERAL ECONOMIC SANCTIONS Although economic sanctions have been an instrument of US foreign policy since 1765, the recent approach to their use has changed. Prior to 1990, legislation enacted to impose sanctions reflected a co-operative relationship between Congress and the president, and allowed the president substantial discretion and flexibility in their use. However, since 1990 Congress has assumed a more directive role in conducting foreign policy, often by adopting legislation without considering sanctions already in place. In the new legislation, Congress mandates the imposition of sanctions rather than authorizing their imposition. It also specifies what behaviour 16 Ibid., p. 11. 17 Ibid.
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should trigger the imposition of sanctions and identifies the precise conditions for their removal. Moreover, state and local governing bodies have increasingly been targeting foreign countries and institutions by the imposition of their own sanctions. However, the basic statutory authorities which the United States administration can invoke in support of unilateral economic sanctions are the Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA), the Export Administration Act (EAA) and the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA). The application of these three depends on whether wartime, regular or emergency conditions exist. In addition to the above three basic authorities, US law contains dozens of other acts which can impose sanctions, including the Omnibus Consolidated Appropriation Act,18 the Foreign Assistance Act19 and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act.20 THE TRADING WITH THE ENEMY ACT 21 The oldest existing legislation in the United States relating to economic sanctions is the TWEA, enacted in 1917 when the United States entered World War I. The TWAE granted the president extraordinary power during a war ‘between the United States and any foreign country, whether enemy, ally of enemy or otherwise, or between residents of one or more foreign countries’.22 The act provided the president with four powers: broad regulatory power without explicit limit over any transactions in foreign exchange, banking transfers, possession or trading in gold, silver, bullion and currency or securities; regulatory power of even greater magnitude over any property in which a foreign country or its national has any interest; power to vest such foreign property; power to deal with vested property for the benefit of the United States. Section 5(b) of the act provides that: During the time of war, the President may, through any agency that he may designate, and under such regulations as he may prescribe, by means of instructions, licenses, or otherwise – (A) investigate, regulate, or prohibit, any transactions in foreign exchange, 18 19 20 21 22
Omnibus Consolidated Appropriation Act of 1996, Pub. L. no 208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996). Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Pub. L. no 757 Stat. 424 (amended 1996). Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978, Pub. L. no 242,929 Stat. 120 (amended 1994). 50 USC App. §1 et seq. Trading with the Enemy Act §5(b), 40 Stat. 411, 414 (1917).
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transfers of credit or payments between, by, through, or to any banking institution, and the importing, exporting, hoarding, melting, or earmarking of gold or silver coin or bullion, currency or securities, and (B) investigate, regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent or prohibit, any acquisition, holding, withholding, use, transfer, withdrawal, transportation, importation or exportation of, dealing in, or exercising any right, power or privilege with respect to, or transactions involving, any property in which any foreign country or a national thereof has any interest, by any person, or with respect to any property, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States; and any property or interest of any foreign country or national thereof shall vest, when, as, and upon the terms, directed by the President, in such agency or person as may be designated from time to time by the President, and upon such terms and conditions as the President may prescribe such interest or property shall be held, used, administered, liquidated, sold, or otherwise dealt with in the interest of and for the benefit of the United States…
The TWEA, as originally enacted, only delegated powers to a president in time of war. But Franklin Roosevelt, confronted with a financial crisis in 1933, in his first official act after taking office invoked Section 5(b) of the act and declared that massive withdrawals of gold and currency from the bank had created a national emergency – and so he ordered a bank holiday.23 Congress obligingly amended section 5(b) within five days and provided that its authorities could be invoked ‘during any other period of national emergency declared by the President’.24 The amendment made the act a significant economic weapon to be utilized not only during wartime and against enemies of the United States or its allies, but also against countries whose policies could threaten US interests. The national emergency language stayed in the TWEA until 1977, when the IEEPA was enacted. On 10 April 1940, relying on the authority of Section 5(b) of the TWEA, President Roosevelt blocked the transfer of the property of Denmark and Norway and its nationals.25 This step was taken to prevent Nazi Germany, which had already invaded these two countries, from extortion of property subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. On 7 May 1940, Congress ratified the President’s action and amended Section 5(b) to include yet another authority that the president could exercise ‘during any period of national emergency’. The treasury regulations
23 Proclamation no 2039, 48 Stat. 1689 (1933). 24 Amendment of 1933, Ch. 1, 48 Stat. 1 (1933). 25 Executive Order 8389, 5 Fed. Reg. 1400 (1940).
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issued pursuant to this Order were later expanded to include other countries occupied by the Axis Powers themselves. In response to Chinese communist forces becoming involved in the Korean War, President Truman invoked the TWEA on 16 December 1950 and declared a national emergency to prohibit all trade and other financial transactions with China and North Korea.26 This proclamation became the legal basis for all TWEA post-war controls, and served as the authority in other important situations, totally unrelated to the original premise of the TWEA. In 1968, President Johnson cited Section 5(b), relying on President Truman’s declaration of a national emergency in 1950, and prohibited all export of capital for foreign direct investment.27 President Nixon, on 27 March 1970, in response to the Postal Service strike, declared a state of national emergency to render the strike illegal.28 In August 1971, President Nixon again declared a state of national emergency in respect of concerns about a balance of payments deficit, and imposed a 10 percent surcharge on imports.29 Finally, the TWEA was invoked to extend the EAA when it lapsed. In early 1973, in the wake of the Vietnam War and Watergate, Congress decided that it was necessary to control the President’s abuse of the TWEA. It sought to reform emergency powers by enacting statutes whose framework would define the power of the branches and establish correct procedures for declaring and continuing emergency powers. Congress appointed a special committee to review presidential emergency powers. To the surprise of both the general public and Congress, it was revealed that the ‘majority of the people of the United States have lived all their lives under emergency rule. For forty years freedom and governmental procedures guaranteed by the Constitution have, in varying degrees, been abridged by laws brought into force by states of national emergency.’ 30 The committee discovered that the state of national emergency, brought about by a financial crisis and declared by Roosevelt in 1933, had never been terminated. Neither had the much cited Korean-War-related national emergency of President Truman’s era in the 1950s, nor that of Nixon’s emergency with respect to the 1970 postal strike. Likewise, the imposition of a 10 percent surcharge on imported items and the declaration of a balance of payment crisis in 1971 were found to be still in effect. Johnson used the emergency authority to place controls on US direct investment 26 27 28 29 30
Proclamation 2914, 15 Fed. Reg. 9092 (1950). Executive Order 11387, 3 CFR (1970). Proclamation 3972, 3 CFR 471 (1970). Proclamation 4074, 36 Fed. Reg. 15724 (1971). 93rd Congress, 1st Session 1 (1973).
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abroad in 1968, and this continued until 1974. This revelation eventually resulted in the formation of the National Emergency Act (NEA) 31 in September 1976. The NEA terminated all previous national emergency acts and prescribed procedural requirements to govern all future declarations. Although Section 5(b) of the TWEA was exempted from the provisions of NEA, a mandate was included for its revision. Supporters of the revision and reform of the TWEA attacked Section 5(b) on two grounds. Firstly, they saw its vast ‘dictatorial’ powers as a threat to con-stitutional and democratic government. Objections on these grounds focused primarily on the absence of any specific provision for congressional review or termination of presidential emergency declarations and on the breadth of power granted. Secondly, legislators criticized the ‘extensive use by Presidents of emergency authority under Section 5(b)… to regulate both domestic and international transactions unrelated to a declared state of emergency’. After lengthy congressional review pursuant to the required mandate under section 502(b) of the NEA, Public Law 95-223 was enacted on 28 December 1977.32 Title I of the law removed the national emergency authority from Section 5(b) of the TWEA. Section 101(a) of the act states that: ‘Section 5(b)(1) of the Trading with the Enemy Act is amended by striking out “or during any other period of national emergency declared by the President” in the text preceding subparagraph (A)’. Henceforth the act was to provide authority to the president during time of war. However, the existing use of the authorities in Section 5(b) of the TWEA were extended by Section 101(b) of the Law. ‘The authorities conferred upon the President by Section 5(b) of the Trading with the Enemy Act which were being exercised with respect to a country on July 1, 1977 as a result of a national emergency declared by the President before such a date may continue to be exercised with respect to such country…’ 33 until 14 September 1978. The president could extend the authority for successive year periods if he determined that it was in the interests of the United States; and this power has been used in extending the TWEA ever since. Title II of Public Law 95-233 established the IEEPA 34 for the purposes of declaring a national emergency in response to a foreign threat to the 31 32 33 34
Pub. L. no 94-412,90 Stat. 1255 (1976). Pub. L. 95-223, 91 Stat. 1625 (1977). Sect. 101(b) Pub. L. no 95-223. Pub. L. no 95-223, 28 December 1977, 95th Congress Ist Session (1977), 50 USC 1701-1706.
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United States. The reform legislation was, in reality, an effort to limit the peacetime granting of emergency powers in three ways: diminishing the breadth of power granted; more strictly defining the occasion for the use of the power; establishing a procedure for declaring emergencies that include congressional input and veto. THE EXPORT ADMINISTRATION ACT There is no other single piece of legislation that gives the president more power to control US commerce than the EAA. Traditionally, the US government restricted the export of war materials or controlled such exports to countries at war. In 1898, three days prior to the declaration of war against Spain, Congress authorized the president ‘to prohibit the export of coal or other materials used in war from any seaport of the United States until otherwise ordered by the President or Congress’.35 Congress amended this legislation in 1912 to allow the president to prohibit the export of arms or munitions to any American country where conditions of domestic violence could be promoted by the availability of US arms.36 On the United States’ entry into World War I, Congress expanded the power of the president to restrict ‘during the present war’ the export of any articles to any country to be named in a presidential proclamation,37 and the TWEA of 6 October 1917 made it unlawful for any person in the United States, except with the authorization of the president, to trade with designated enemies or with nationals, agents or allies of such enemies. The 1898 and 1912 legislation was replaced by a resolution on 31 January 1922, giving the president the authority to license the export of arms and munitions to ‘any country in which the United States exercises extraterritorial jurisdiction’.38 On 31 August 1935, Congress, fearing that the United States may be drawn into war by other belligerent nations, enacted the Neutrality Act of 1935,39 which empowered the president to control the export of arms, ammunition or implements of war to the combative nations. Following the German conquest of France, Congress, on 2 July 1940, passed ‘an Act to Expedite the Strengthening of National Defense’.40 Section 35 36 37 38 39
Joint Resolution of 22 April 1898, no 25, 30 Stat. 739. SJ Res. 89, 37 Stat. 630 (1912). Act of 15 June 1917, Ch. 30, Tit. VII §1, 40 Stat. 225. SJ Res. 124, Ch. 44, 42 Stat. 361 (1922). SJ Res. 173, Ch. 837, 49 Stat. 1081.
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6 of this act authorized the president to prohibit the export from the United States ‘of any military equipment or munitions, or component parts thereof, or machinery, tools, or material, or supplies necessary for the manufacture, servicing or operation thereof’. Although the act was due to expire on 30 June 1942, it was extended by two years, and Section 6 was broadened to include ‘technical data’ as well as any goods and materials. The war had brought about world-wide shortages of chemicals, steel, raw materials, food and other essential items, so the export restrictions during the period 1945–7 were based primarily on ‘short supply’. The national security consideration was for critical material supplies and not, as it is in today’s rationale, for strategic materials. With further extensions, this act continued until 28 February 1949, when the Export Control Act (ECA) 41 came into force. However, the ECA merely set out the forms to be used and listed the terms, which were placed under licensing requirements. It was the first comprehensive US peacetime legislation for export restrictions. In the period between the end of World War II and the passage of the ECA, US policy-makers concluded that peacetime export control was an indispensable component of US policy towards the Soviet Union and its allies. With the ECA of 1949, these policies were continued, and exports to communist countries were controlled. The ECA authorized the president ‘to prohibit or curtail’ the export of ‘any articles, materials or supplies, including technical data, except under such rules and regulations as he shall prescribe’. The original aim of the ECA was to restrict exports for two reasons. Firstly, the domestic economy of the United States, following World War II, was faced with world-wide shortages of essential commodities such as steel, building supplies and chemicals which, in the absence of export controls, would have depleted the local market and caused inflation. Secondly, under the European Recovery Programme (later known as the Marshall Plan) the United States sponsored the rehabilitation of the economies of pre-World War II European nations, requiring the channelling of particular goods to particular countries on a priority basis. When the Soviet Union and other Eastern European countries stopped participating in the plan in its early stages, a third and still more important reason emerged. This was the need for close monitoring of the shipment of goods 40 R 9850, Ch. 508, 54 Stat. 712. 41 Act of 28 February 1949, Ch. 11, 63 Stat. 7.
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to the Soviet Union and other communist countries which might have had military significance. The threat of spreading Soviet political influence made national security a necessary aspect of the ECA. A Senate committee stated that ‘in light of the growing concern of democratic nations over the policies of the Eastern European nations, it is quite clear that our national security requires the exercise of such controls’.42 The US authorities came to the conclusion that the Soviet Union would be a permanent peacetime threat to American interests. They cited the establishment of communist regimes in the Soviet-occupied states of Eastern Europe, Soviet pressure on Iran, the threats of the occupation of Turkey and of communist insurrection in Greece, the communist overthrow of the Czechoslovakian government in February 1948 and the establishment of the Berlin blockade in June 1948. Thus, the passage of the ECA of 1949 was a direct response to Soviet activities. In April 1949, shortly after ECA legislation, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) came into being, comprising the United States and its Western allies. Furthermore, in the same year the United States, through its economic leverage, trade and financial aid, forced Europe and Japan to sign up to COCOM, to control trade with the Soviet Union and its allies. Europe and Japan were at that time recuperating from the ravages of war and were being fed back to life by the Marshall Plan. Although the ECA was to be terminated on 30 June 1951, the Korean conflict, coupled with the need to restrict the export of items of strategic significance to the People’s Republic of China, the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies, prompted its extension. In the same year, Congress also passed the Mutual Defence Assistance Control Act,43 commonly known as the Battle Act in honour of its sponsor, Congressman Laurie Battle. This act gave the US government the authority to control the export of arms, ammunition, implements of war, nuclear materials, petroleum and other strategic items to any country where access to such items would threaten the security of the United States. It also prohibited military, economic and financial assistance to any country in violation of the act. In 1954, Congress enacted the Mutual Security Act, 44 which placed control over the export of arms, ammunition and other implements of war under the auspices of the State Department. 42 US Congress, Senate, S. Rept. 31, 81st Congress, 1st Session, 1949. 43 22 USC §1611-13d (1964). 44 22 USC §1934 (1958).
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The ECA did not lapse in 1951 as originally intended and, with minor amendments, was extended until the 1960s. By the 1960s, the use of export controls was deemed an acceptable foreign policy weapon, and by then comprehensive lists of controlled items of economic and military significance had been drawn up. While approval was routinely given for the shipment of goods to the free world, it was withheld if the ultimate recipient was a communist country. A committee to control exports was headed by Representative Paul Kitchen, who firmly believed that a total embargo on communist countries was necessary and, on his recommendation, Congress enacted a series of amendments and reinforced export controls. One of these amendments required the president to consider not only the potential military significance, but also the ‘economic significance’ when determining whether or not to approve exports. The president was empowered to ban any item ‘to any nation or combination of nations threatening the national security of the United States, if the President shall determine that such export makes a significant contribution to the military or economic power of such nations which would prove detrimental to the nations security and welfare of the United States’.45 These amendments were an expansive authorization given to the president by Congress: they provided that the export of any items that could assist the economic development of any country hostile to the United States be controlled for the purposes of national security and foreign policy. In the late 1960s, several factors alerted the United States to the fact that dramatic changes to its export controls were necessary. The most significant were: US trade balances declined from a 1964 credit of US$6.823 billion to US$5.432 billion in 1965 and US$3.031 billion in 1966, decreasing to US$2.583 billion in 1967, plummeting to US$611 million in 1968 and falling further to US$399 million in 1969; European Economic Community states, Japan and the Soviet Union had fully recovered from the losses of war, and their industries prospered; US control on 2029 export commodity categories to the Soviet Union, in comparison with the 552 categories of other COCOM members, was unreasonably high; trade between the United Kingdom, France, West Germany, Italy and Japan on one side and the Soviet Union on the other was growing rapidly; the United States no longer dominated the Western system as it once had in the 1950s and early 1960s; the United States no longer had a military advantage over the Soviet Union, which was 45 Publ. 87-515, 76 Stat. 127 (1962), 50 USC App. Sec. 2023(a) (1964), as amended (supp. I, 1965).
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approaching nuclear equality; the Soviet Union was capable of either producing its requirements or obtaining them from other sources (out of 1300 items on the ‘non-military lists’ subject to export control, over 1100 were freely available from other Western sources); the Labour Union supported the easing of trade with communist countries because inflation and growing unemployment were affecting their vital interests. In addition, the outcome of the Vietnam War and the unlimited power of President Johnson under the Tonkin Gulf Resolution of 1964 provided a background for Congress to examine the unrestricted powers of the president, especially within the ECA. Through the EAA of 1969, Congress wanted to terminate 20 years of unlimited presidential power over export control. Its actions represented an important departure from the ECA in both tone and substance. During the legislative process of the 1969 act, Congress attempted to instigate four major reforms: that the number of commodities subject to export control for national security be limited, and that the prohibition of the export of goods contributing to the ‘economic potential’ of hostile nations, which was included in the 1962 amendment to the ECA, be lifted; that the administration should consider the foreign availability of a controlled commodity when restricting its export; that Congress also seek to make the export licensing process more open and accountable to the business community by requiring the Department of Commerce to consult manufacturers regarding the control list and foreign availability; that Congress instruct the executive to harmonize US export control practice with other members of COCOM with the view to promoting trade. It also subjected the departmental action to judicial law. The Nixon administration was opposed to such reforms limiting presidential authority, and simply requested an extension to the act until 1973. It also sharply opposed the suggestion that the executive should consider the foreign availability of controlled goods, as well as the requirement to justify its decision to control goods to Congress or to the courts under the Administrative Procedures Act. The administration also favoured the need to restrict more commodities than the other COCOM members, who only regulated goods and technology of direct military significance. During the legislative process the executive won important compromises from Congress on major issues: agency and presidential decisions would not be subject to judicial review; the president retained flexibility in pursuing national security and foreign policy export controls; the president remained free to choose the purpose for which export controls were to
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apply – he could also cite foreign policy instead of national security reasons in order to avoid Congressional restraints; the president could still control exports for national security purposes even if the goods were available from foreign sources, provided the reasons were given to Congress. In summary, the final passage of the EAA of 1969 46 was an ‘administrative victory’. The executive maintained export controls and could cite national security, foreign policy and ideological objectives; but, at the same time, it ‘balanced the need for export controls with awareness of the adverse effects that an overly comprehensive and strict control system produced for the country’s economy and its balance of payments’.47 Although the substitution of ‘administration’ for ‘control’ in the title of the 1969 act reflected the political mood of that time, the final form was, in reality, not much changed, with the exception that it required the president to make various reports to Congress. However, it was a subsequent trend which precipitated some remarkable changes over the next ten years. The administration’s opposition to expanded trade with Eastern Bloc countries underwent a reassessment in the early 1970s when Nixon established relations, including trade, with the People’s Republic of China and negotiated a trade agreement with the Soviet Union. This agreement with Moscow was not ratified by Congress because Senator Henry Jackson, under pressure from active Jewish organizations and the leaders of the American Jewry, wanted to link the granting of most favoured nation (MFN) status for the Soviet Union to the freedom of Jews and, in general, to the improvement of that country’s human rights record. Congress, contrary to the wishes of Nixon and Ford, attached the human rights issue to the agreement, and passed what later became known as the Jackson-Vanik Amendment. The Soviets did not accept such conditions and so the agreement came to nothing. During the early 1970s, the Department of Commerce made minimal progress in decontrolling non-military exports. A significant reduction in the number of controlled commodities on the commodity controls list (CCL) was agreed in May 1973 when the commodity categories on the CCL were reduced from 550 entries to 73 48 (certain entries contained hundreds of actual commodities). 46 Export Administration Act of 1969, Publ. no 91-184, Stat. 841 (1969) (Codified at 50 USC app. §2401– 2413). 47 Gernot Stenger, ‘The Development of American Export Control Legislation After World War II’, Wisconsin International Law Journal, vol. 6 no 1, Fall 1987. 48 US Department of Commerce, Special Report to the President and Congress, 29 May 1973.
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The Department of Commerce may have reduced the number of controlled commodities, but it ignored Congress’s requirement on foreign availability of a controlled commodity. In 1977, under pressure from the private sector, Congress modified the EAA of 1969 and restricted the executive authority to impose export control on goods and commodities that were available abroad in ‘significant quantities and comparable in quality’ to US products. Section 4(c) reads as follows: Foreign availability – In accordance with the provisions of this Act, the President shall not impose export controls for foreign policy or national security purposes on the export from the United States… unless the President determines that adequate evidence has been presented to him demonstrating that the absence of such controls would prove detrimental to the foreign policy or national security of the United States.49
With this amendment, however, a new category of export control was authorized, providing the power to restrict export for foreign policy reasons. Together with reporting duties, consultation requirements and other measures, congressional checks on export control reached an unprecedented level in 1977. In order to reduce further presidential power over export control matters, the IEEPA was established. Under the 1977 amendment, the declared policy of the United States was to encourage trade with all nations except those ‘with which such trade has been determined by the President to be against national interest’.50 Export could also be prohibited ‘to the extent necessary to further significantly the foreign policy of the United States and to fulfil its international obligations’.51 Under the 1977 amendment, the President was given the authority to ‘implement this policy by prohibiting or curtailing export… under such rules and regulations as he shall prescribe’.52 President Carter used this authority in 1978–9 to prevent the export of US$400 million worth of trucks, aircraft and spare parts to Libya for its alleged aggression towards Egypt, and a Sperry Univac computer to the TASS news agency to express his displeasure with the trial and conviction of Alexander Grinzberg and Anatoly Shcharansky, two anti-Soviet activists. The extensive use by the Carter administration of this authority to impose foreign policy control prompted Congress to add provisions to guard against the misuse of foreign policy controls. 49 50 51 52
Export Administration Act of 1979, Publ. no 96–72. 50 USC §2402(a)(A) (1977). 50 USC §2402(7)(1977). 50 USC §2403(b)(1) (1977).
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The congressional hearings of 1978 and 1979, taking into consideration a deficit of more than US$14 billion in 1978 and in excess of US$15 billion in 1979, demonstrated the need for an increase in exports, and thus the EAA of 1979 was enacted with a pro-export emphasis. ‘The ability of United States’ citizens to engage in international commerce,’ the legislation stated, ‘is a fundamental concern of United States policy’.53 It continued: ‘it is important for the national interests of the United States that both the private sector and the Federal Government place a high priority on exports which would strengthen the nation’s economy’.54 The whole issue of expanding exports and restricting them only to the extent necessary came to a sudden end immediately after the EAA of 1979 was enacted. Two serious international incidents caused President Carter to restrict exports. The first restriction was against Iran in response to the seizure of the American embassy in Tehran in the autumn of 1979. President Carter restricted all exports to Iran. He declared the event to be an emergency case and, accordingly, based his actions on the IEEPA, which was being invoked for the first time. Secondly, the invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 by Soviet troops prompted Carter to impose embargoes on grain, high-technology and phosphate exports to the Soviet Union. In this instance, Carter relied on the national security stipulations of the EAA for all three embargoes, and on the foreign policy clause for grain and high-technology embargoes. The President’s use of both sections for these embargoes was to avoid Congress overriding them, as they could have done if national security reasons alone had been cited. The grain embargo against the Soviet Union severely affected American farmers. In 1980, income dropped by an estimated US$11.5 billion, with 310,000 jobs lost. Congress was forced to react to criticism and amend the Agricultural and Food Act of 1981 with an agricultural embargo protection clause.55 This section provided for mandatory compensation for losses caused by export controls on agricultural products for either national security or foreign policy reasons. The period 1981–2, which also witnessed comprehensive sanctions being imposed against Poland and the Soviet Union, was a remarkable era in US export control policy. Some of the sanctions were for foreign policy 53 50 USC §2401(1). 54 50 USC §2401(3). 55 Agricultural and Food Act of 1981, 7 USC §1736(j) (1982).
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reasons, and were intended to control exports to the Soviet Union ‘of commodities for transmission (including transportation) and refinement of petroleum and natural gas and technical data related to oil and gas transmission or refinement’.56 All licences to export to the Soviet Union were suspended on 30 December 1981. In June 1982, President Reagan extended control to foreign subsidiaries of US corporations and foreign companies using American technology in their manufacturing. Reagan based his decision on a section that Congress added to the EAA in 1977 which allowed the president to impose export control on articles, materials and technical data ‘subject to the jurisdiction of the United States’. Whilst all this was happening, Congress was still following the trend of the EAA of 1979 to promote exports. By enacting two pieces of legislation in 1982 it proved that it had not abandoned its pro-export goals. One action was included in the Future Trading Act of 1982 where, in Section 238, it was provided that: Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the President shall not prohibit or curtail the export of any agricultural commodity or the products thereof under an export sales contract (1) entered into before the President announces an action that would otherwise prohibit or curtail the export of the commodity or products thereof, (2) the terms of which require delivery of the commodity… within two hundred and seventy days after the date the suspension of trade is imposed, except that the President… has declared a national emergency or… Congress has declared war.57
The second action was the Export Trading Companies Act,58 which permitted the creation of companies solely engaged in export under very favourable conditions. One major component of this act permitted banks to be financially involved in trade activities, and another was its anti-trust exclusion features. Both provided striking examples of trade-oriented legislation and represented another attempt to cope with the trade deficit. US trade policy, at the end of 1982, was mixed, with the enactment of the Export Trading Companies Act acknowledging the need to increase exports, whilst maintaining control over exports for foreign policy reasons. What emerged, however, was a clear intention that – in contrast to the grain embargo experience – export controls should not harm America more than the target nation. 56 47 Fed. Reg. 141 (1982). 57 7 USC §12C-3 (1982). 58 15 USC §4001 (1982).
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The EAA was due to expire on 30 September 1983 but, as Congress still had not reached a decision on the role of the Department of Defence in reviewing exports to COCOM members and sanctions against South Africa, it was extended until 14 October 1983 before being allowed to lapse. Reagan immediately used the IEEPA and declared a national emergency in order to maintain the EAA. Congress reinstated the act in December 1983, but let it expire in March 1984. The President used the EAA again, and continued export control under the umbrella of the IEEPA until Congress again authorized the EAA in July 1985. Negotiations on the EAA of 1985 had started early in 1983, but due to differences between the House and Senate the bill was not put to a vote until 1985. The Senate Bill S979 pushed for stricter limits on the use of export controls for foreign policy interests and tighter export controls for national security purposes. Further, the Senate wanted to curtail the president’s authority to impose export controls on agricultural products and prevent the president from breaking existing contracts when imposing foreign policy controls. The House bill HR3231 sought to liberalize licensing requirements for exports to COCOM members and to give the Department of Commerce the exclusive authority to review West-West trade and to be the enforcement body. It also required a congressional role in any presidential decision to extend foreign policy export controls extraterritorially. The administration opposed any restrictions on its authority in connection with export-control issues, and within the administration itself the jurisdiction over West-West licensing caused a major conflict between the Departments of Commerce and Defence. In contrast to the administration and Congress, the business community agreed on basic principles for revising export-control laws, including the addition of the sanctity of contracts and a total prohibition on the extraterritorial application of foreign policy controls. The House and Senate, by deleting these controversial issues, eventually presented the final bill for a vote. As a result, on 12 July 1985, following two years of debate and deliberation, Reagan signed into law the Export Administration Amendments Act of 1985 59 and stated that it was ‘an acceptable balance between enhancing our commercial interests and protecting our national security interests’.60
59 Export Administration Amendments Act of 1985, Publ. no 99-64, Stat. (1985). 60 Statement by the President, 12 July 1985.
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The EAA of 1985 made major changes to the EAA of 1979, namely: requiring the president to make certain determinations and to consult Congress, submitting a detailed report before imposing foreign policy controls; prohibiting the president from imposing foreign policy controls which would interfere with contracts entered into prior to any decision to restrict export; issuing validated licences authorizing multiple exports, allowing exporters to ship the same goods many times under a single licence; decontrolling the export of low-tech items to COCOM members and expediting the processing of export applications for controlled goods and technology to those countries; limiting the power of the Department of Commerce to deny export applications for the goods and technology available in the international marketplace; granting the Customs Service and the Department of Commerce police powers. The Customs Service would conduct investigations overseas, and any activity of the Department of Commerce would relate only to pre-licensing and post-shipment investigations. The 1985 act symbolized success for those in Congress and the business community who sought to liberalize US export controls. The two highlights, the sanctity of contract and the executive limits on foreign policy controls were, in reality, more nominal than actual. The president could break existing contracts if he determined and certified that the strategic interests of the United States were under threat. In order to avoid the limits on foreign policy restrictions, the IEEPA became a flexible weapon in the hands of the president. Thus, Reagan could use the IEEPA rather than the EAA to impose sanctions against Libya. The IEEPA allowed Reagan to avoid the sanctity of contract provision and the prohibition on the use of foreign policy export controls for agricultural products in the 1985 act. With the exception of minor amendments, Congress did not focus on export control until 1988, when the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act (OCTA) of 1988 61 became law. The main goal of the act was to promote US exports in order to reduce the trade deficit, which by 1987 stood at US$170 billion. The act provided the United States with the necessary tools with which to participate in the Uruguay round of the Multilateral Trade Negotiations (MTN). Title I of the OTCA deals with trade, customs and tariff laws. Title II, which comes within the subject of this study, deals with export enhancement and control. Although this law did not alter the policies of the EAA, the amendments to the EAA made a number of important 61 Pub. L. no 100-48, 102 Stat. 1107 (1988).
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operational changes and some reforms. The most important was the substantial freeing of trade to COCOM members. The act authorized the export and re-export of goods and technology to foreign affiliates of domestic concerns. Similarly, it authorized the issuance of distribution licences for export to the People’s Republic of China, which had previously been grouped with the ‘controlled countries’ specifically excluded from authorization. There was also a general relaxation on the re-export of goods, provided that they were incorporated into a manufactured product and constituted less than 25 percent of the total value of the goods manufactured. The act addressed the issue of ‘foreign availability’ again. In the 1985 act this issue had been interpreted very narrowly; but the new act established more precise standards and procedures for exporters to export goods to controlled countries if such goods were available to them from alternative sources. The EAA in the 1990s Since 1990, there have been major efforts to rewrite the EAA, each one ending in failure. It has expired several times, being kept alive only by shortterm extensions granted by Congress or by the issuing of presidential executive orders invoking the IEEPA. The first failed attempt to rewrite it was in 1990. Senate and House officials, after months of debate among themselves and days of consultation with each other, eventually resolved their difference on many controversial provisions, including chemical/biological weapons sanctions, commodity jurisdiction, China sanctions, Iraq sanctions, Cuba sanctions and missile technology controls. In October, Congress passed the Export Facilitation Act of 1990 to extend and amend the EAA of 1979. But President Bush ‘pocket vetoed’ the bill in November 1990 (a pocket veto is an indirect veto which becomes effective when the president fails to act upon a bill before the adjournment of Congress.) The second failed effort to re-authorize the EAA was in 1991. Sam Gejdenson, the Democrat chairman of the House subcommittee with jurisdiction over the EAA, drafted HR3489. This bill, which had the support of the industry, would have required the administration to propose that COCOM eliminate the review of the telecommunication exports, mandate a revision of the procedures for deciding commodity jurisdiction between the Departments of Commerce and State, and remove mass market software from control under the US munitions list.
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The proposed change was a response to political events in the Soviet Union that have resulted in the liberation of the Baltic republics and the end of the political monopoly of the Soviet Communist Party. The House, in October 1991, passed HR3489. The Senate version of the EAA re-authorization (S320) passed in February 1991 did not reflect industry’s interests and lacked the provision of the House version. The Bush administration preferred the Senate version of the bill, and indicated that the telecommunication provisions and the mass-market provision would be grounds for a veto of the legislation. In October 1992, the House and Senate agreed to a compromise on the language of the bill, and the conference report was scheduled for floor votes. However, the House floor vote was blocked by several Republicans from the House Armed Services Committee, who claimed that the bill diminished unfairly the role of the Department of Defence in Department of Commerce export licensing decisions. No action was taken during the remaining few weeks of the Bush administration. On 27 March 1993, President Clinton signed a law extending the EAA until 30 June 1994. The extension was encouraged by industry while they began to lobby the Clinton administration and the new members of Congress to draft a new bill that reflected the changes in the international strategic environment. Also in 1993, a coalition of companies was formed to offer an industry proposal on EAA re-authorization. The Coalition for Export Control Reform drafted a comprehensive bill which was introduced to the House by Congressman Toby Roth (a Republican) who was, at the time, a member of the House subcommittee with jurisdiction over the EAA. On 20 September 1993, Representatives Gephardt, Gejdenson, Gingrich and Roth advised Clinton that the rationale for the reform of the EAA was to ‘enhance the ability of this nation to compete overseas and… improve the effectiveness of our controls on dual use exports’. Although Congress and the Clinton administration agreed that the rationale for national security controls, which was originally designed to block exports to the Soviet Union and the Communist Bloc countries, had changed, they did not agree on the bill. In early 1994, there was renewed interest in the EAA from Congress and the Clinton administration. Both the House and Senate held hearings on the issue, and the administration promised to draft a comprehensive proposal for revising the EAA. The administration finally produced a bill, despite inter-agency disagreements between the Departments of Commerce, Defence and State. In March 1994, Gejdenson introduced a
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bill, whilst another was introduced to the Senate. Although there were hearings on these two bills, neither was ever passed. Following the elections, the Republicans gained control over the House and Senate. In 1995, export controls liberalization advocate Toby Roth, chairman of the House International Relations subcommittee on trade and economic affairs, began a new and vigorous effort to enact a new EAA. The debate over the EAA gained some momentum, with the House and Senate holding hearings and the administration saying that the passage of a new EAA was a priority. Although a substantial amount of work was done behind the scenes on the bill, and different meetings were held between Congress and the administration, no legislation moved at all, even at a subcommittee level. The 1995 pro-industry EAA was eventually sunk by national security hawks, and so a new version was drafted without industry input for 1996. The Bureau of Export Administration (BXA), the agency which has broadest impact on US export and re-export activities, and the Capitol Hill EAA supporters hoped that a less pro-industry bill would finally allow the passage of a new EAA. Industry approached the new EAA bill with little enthusiasm. The American Electronics Association (AEA), on 18 April, attacked the bill’s proposed elimination of foreign availability relief, which would have given exporters the ability to request de-control if they could show that products were widely available from foreign competitors. Additionally, the AEA rallied against the codification of Clinton’s Executive Order 12981, which allowed any government agency to involve itself in licence processing systems. The rest of industry remained quietly on the sidelines, without denouncing it but providing no support either. On 26 June, the House Ways and Means Committee approved a new EAA (HR361), clearing the way to send the legislation to the House floor. On 16 July 1996, the House of Representatives passed the new EAA by voice vote, without a single dissenting voice and with no amendment. It was sent to the Senate, where the Senate Banking Committee began working on it. Several amendments were made, including the addition of foreign availability provisions. The committee also removed a controversial provision which would have allowed companies to sue competitors for advantages gained by complying with the Arab League boycott of Israel. Once again, industry refused to support the amended version of the EAA, and concluded that it did not constitute a ‘real reform’. As the BXA’s
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operation under the IEEPA gave it just enough authority to operate, industry did not feel the same sense of urgency to support a bill which did not help them much. In the end, the Senate did not find the 1996 bill compelling enough to bring it to a floor vote before going into recess for the elections. The new EAA, which had the active support of the House, the Clinton administration and the BXA, once again, while passing through Congress’s multi-layered legislative channels, died quietly. In July 1996, the United States and 32 other countries established the Wassenaar Arrangement in order to replace COCOM, which, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, had lost its raison d’etre. The Wassenaar Arrangement provides for unified export control on conventional arms and dual use goods and technology, including computer systems, with the intention of preventing the military development of countries regarded by the signatories as dangerous to international or regional security and stability. In 1997, the active champion of a new EAA, Toby Roth, had retired. Roth’s successor in the House International Relations subcommittee on trade and economic affairs, Republican Representative Elena Ros-Lehtinen, had no prior experience in export controls and represented a district in Miami where there was strong support for a continued trade embargo against Cuba. Ros-Lehtinen’s presence resulted in an exodus of export control staffers on the subcommittee. As a result, the office was not in a position to draft a new version of the EAA, so the 1996 bill was essentially resurrected as a beginning of a new EAA in 1997. A preliminary hearing was held before the subcommittee on 16 May to decide if a new bill would be introduced for vote in the autumn. Although BXA supported the 1996 bill, they were not favourably impressed with the hearing, and their scepticism eliminated any hope that a bill would be brought to the House floor for a vote in 1997. Although further hearings were held before the subcommittee in October, with the exception of the BXA and the Clinton administration, few seemed interested in the new bill. The year ended without any bill being introduced into Congress, and EAA proponents lost another annual legislative battle. Movement on the new EAA in 1998 was subsumed by the political drama played out between the White House and Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr through impeachment hearings. However, some changes in US export policy were noticed. In response to nuclear testing by both Pakistan and India, the Export Administration Regulation (EAR) was amended on 19 November to limit export of US-origin items to both countries. Also, on
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22 September, by amending EAR, US policy with regard to the export of commercial encryption items changed. The new licence exception allowed for export of strong encryption to the banks and financial institutions in all countries except those designated as state sponsors of international terrorism (Iran, Iraq, Syria, Sudan, Libya, Cuba and North Korea). During 1998, the United States engaged in extensive negotiations with signatories to the Wassenaar Arrangement. The United States amended the EAR as of 23 July in order to harmonize its export controls with Wassenaar. The year also saw the United States finalize attempts to implement the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) via the EAR. In 1999, with allegations of both Chinese spying and the illegal transfer of US technology abroad, there was a sense of urgency on the part of Congress to address US export controls. Congress proposed significant changes to the 1999 draft (still pending at the time of writing) of the EAA, which contains 19 different sections on 116 pages. Section 301 deals with national security export controls, under which the administration must establish a five-tier structure based on ‘risk factor’. Each country will be placed into one of the five tiers. The risk factors are based primarily on the countries’ relationship with the United States and its allies, as well as their potential for the diversion of US-origin products. Like the country list, the national security control list would also have different tiers, including an expedited list, containing items with a low risk of export diversion and a critical list, representing items with the highest export diversion risk. An application for export must be reviewed by the Departments of Defence, Energy, Commerce and State. A licence to export will be issued only if there is consensus among these four. The 1999 EAA imposes new and stricter penalties for export violations. An individual who knowingly violates the provisions of the act will be fined US$1 million and/or imprisoned for up to ten years for each violation. Life imprisonment could be imposed for multiple violations in aggravated circumstances. Civil penalties include denial of export privileges. Corporations will be fined up to US$10 million or ten times the value of the exports involved, whichever is higher. The Clinton administration strongly criticized key provisions of the proposed bill. William A. Reinsch, Undersecretary of Commerce, told the Senate Banking Committee on 23 June that requiring consensus ‘all the way through the Cabinet level’ before a decision could be made ‘would cripple the existing effective export licensing process without any appreciable
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gain to national security’. He said the proposal would replace the current system’s ‘default to decision’ mechanism with a ‘default to delay’. Another concern, Reinsch said, was that the 1999 EAA would prevent the administration from exercising the ‘judgment and discretion’ needed to improve effectiveness of multilateral export-control regimes by requiring congressional approval of any future international agreement. The administration and the Banking Committee have to wrestle with other issues, like anti-boycott provisions, foreign policy controls, commodities and country lists, before the 1999 EAA draft is acceptable to all parties. THE INTERNATIONAL EMERGENCY ECONOMIC POWERS ACT The imposition of economic sanctions during a declared state of national emergency would be done through the IEEPA. A national emergency, defined for the first time, is any ‘unusual and extraordinary threat, which has its source in whole or substantial part outside the United States, to the national security, foreign policy or economy of the United States’.62 Thus, if the president wants to use the powers granted by the IEEPA to deal with a threat, he must declare a state of national emergency with respect to that threat, and any subsequent threat requires a new declaration of emergency. Under Section 204 of the IEEPA (50 USC 1703), the president must comply with a range of procedural safeguards. The president in ‘every possible instance, shall consult with the Congress before exercising any of the authorities granted by [the act] and shall consult regularly with Congress so long as such authorities are exercised’.63 It is interesting to note that in 1980 President Carter failed to consult with Congress, as required by law, when he imposed sanctions on Iran, and that Congress did not insist upon this point. It is also required that the president immediately transmit a report to Congress setting forth: (1) the circumstances which necessitate such exercise of authority; (2) why the President believes those circumstances constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat, which has its source in whole or substantial part outside the United States, to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States; (3) the authorities to be exercised and the actions to be taken in the exercise of those authorities to deal with those circumstances; 62 50 USC §1701(a)1. 63 50 USC §1703(a).
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(4) why the President believes such actions are necessary to deal with those circumstances; and (5) any foreign countries with respect to which such actions are to be taken and why such actions are to be taken with respect to those countries.64
This report is required to be supplemented every six months for the duration of the emergency.65 (For the full text of the act, see Document 2.) LIMITATIONS OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER Certain powers granted to the president under the TWEA were excluded from the IEEPA. The Power to Vest Foreign Property The most significant power the president was denied was the power to ‘vest’, or expropriate foreign property. Prior to its amendment in 1977, the TWEA provided that: Any property or interest of any foreign country or national thereof shall vest, when, as, and upon the terms, as directed by the president, in such agency or person as may be designated from time to time by the president, and upon such terms and conditions as the president may prescribe such interest or property shall be held, used, administered, liquidated, sold, or otherwise dealt with in the interest of and for the benefit of the United States.66
The omission of this clause from the IEEPA is significant. The idea of the legislators involved in the passage of the act was to remove the vesting powers of the president. It was agreed that the president could only put a freeze on foreign property, not seize such property. Unfortunately, the final language of the statute is not clear. If to ‘vest’ property literally means to ‘take’ title, this does not differ from other actions permitted by the IEEPA’s foreign property control. Under Section 203(a)(1)B of the IEEPA, the president is authorized to ‘direct and compel [the property’s] transfer’, and if the title of such property permits the exercise of some right or privilege with respect to property, the president can ‘nullify, void, prevent’ the exercise. This was tested in Dames & Moore v Regan.67 On 19 January 1981, when President Carter agreed to end the legal proceedings against Iran and 64 65 66 67
50 USC §1703(b). 50 USC §1703(c). Trading with the Enemy Act, §5(b)(1). 453 US 654, 101 SCT 2972.
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nullify attachments contained therein, some 450 actions were pending in the American courts. The claim of Dames & Moore was one of them. The claimants argued that the transfer of Iranian assets beyond the jurisdiction of the United States would permanently deprive them of their property in Iranian accounts, and hence was invalid under the IEEPA as a vesting. The Supreme Court reasoned that although ‘IEEPA does not give the president power to vest or to take title to the [Iranian] assets, it does not follow that the president is not authorised under… IEEPA… to otherwise permanently dispose of the assets in the manner done here’. (For details, see Chapter 4.) The Power to Regulate Purely Domestic Transactions Congress also denied the president the power that had been granted to him by the TWEA to regulate ‘purely domestic’ transactions during peacetime. Under the IEEPA the president has the authority over banking transactions only to the ‘extent that such transfers and payments involve any interest of any foreign country or a national thereof’.68 This restriction is, however, less relevant than it appears. The legislative history of the IEEPA indicates that this clause was added to the act once it became clear that the president under other statutes has substantial emergency powers to regulate domestic banking transactions. Presidential powers under the IEEPA differ from the TWEA in three additional respects. Firstly, the president lacks power under the IEEPA to regulate personal commutations which do not involve the transfer of anything of value. Furthermore, he cannot regulate uncompensated transfers of articles for humanitarian aid. Secondly, the IEEPA does not contain the language found in the TWEA authorizing the president to regulate gold or silver coins or bullion. Thirdly, the IEEPA does not allow the president to seize records. Although Congress, by enacting the IEEPA, attempted to limit the president’s power to times of war, a grandfather clause in the act provides that the powers granted to the president by Section 5(b) of the TWEA which were in force prior to 1 July 1977 could continue to be exercised by the president under the saving clause of the IEEPA, without the need for additional action. Economic sanctions against Cuba remain in force pursuant to the TWEA. The decision of the US Supreme Court in the case of Regan v Wald 69 construed presidential emergency powers to be expansive. 68 50 USC §1702(a)(1)a(ii). 69 Regan v Wald, 104 S. Ct. 3026 (1984).
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Regan v Wald was a challenge to controls on travel to Cuba that were considerably tightened in 1982 by an amended regulation.70 However, the new control could not be justified by the IEEPA because there were no travel restrictions placed on Cuba when the saving clause of the IEEPA (50 USC §1706) was enacted. President Reagan did not declare a new state of national emergency, and he failed to comply with the relevant reporting requirement. The Supreme Court verdict of five-to-four ruled that reliance on the TWEA was sufficient for new controls against countries subject to grandfathered controls. The court reasoned that travel-related sanctions, such as payment for transportation within Cuba and payment for food and lodging, were transactions carried out in respect to property in which Cuba or Cuban nationals had an interest. These transactions, the court believed, fell within the statutory language of the TWEA because the president is authorized to regulate any transaction involving any property in which a foreign country or national has any interest. The court failed to recognise that it was the intention of Congress to freeze existing restrictions by amending the TWEA and enacting the IEEPA. The Wald ruling effectively defeated congressional attempts to narrow the president’s authority to impose additional restrictions. Despite the declared intention of the IEEPA to restrict the peacetime emergency powers of the president, most legal experts believe that it was unsuccessful. The IEEPA did not add any notable procedural or substantive restraints to those imposed by the TWEA. The powers delegated to the president remain wide-ranging and complex to define. For example, to quote Michael Malloy, ‘I would contend that those statutory developments did virtually nothing to curb the President’s economic sanctions authority’.71 The rulings of the Supreme Court in the cases of Dames & Moore v Regan, Regan v Wald and the Immigration and Naturalization Services v Chadha and the Congressional amendment after the decision in the last of these 72 (a declared national emergency may continue at the president’s pleasure) construed the IEEPA’s definition broadly. Such decisions, in addition to the failure of Congress clearly to place restraints on the use of such authority, has undoubtedly expanded the president’s power to impose economic sanctions.
70 31 CFR §515.560 (1984) 71 Michael P. Malloy, Economic Sanctions and US Trade, Little, Brown, 1990, p. xviii. 72 Immigration and Naturalization Service v Chadha, 462 US 919 (1983).
DOCUMENT 1 The Typology of Non-violent Sanctions
I.
DIPLOMATIC AND POLITICAL MEASURES (a) Public protest, censure, condemnation (b) Postponement, cancellation of official visits, meetings, negotiations for treaties and agreements (c) Reduction, limitation of scale of diplomatic representation affecting status of post, diplomatic personnel, consular offices (d) Severance of diplomatic relations (e) Withholding recognition of new governments or new states (f) Vote against, veto admission to international organization; vote for denial of credentials, suspension or expulsion; removal of headquarters, regional offices of international organizations from target
II.
CULTURAL AND COMMUNICATIONS MEASURES* (a) Curtailment, cancellation of cultural exchanges, scientific cooperation, edu-cational ties, sports contacts, tourism (b) Restriction, withdrawal of visa privileges for target nationals (c) Restriction, cancellation of telephone, cable, postal links
*
These measures can also have economic effects.
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(d) Restriction, suspension, cancellation of landing and overflight privileges; water transit, docking and port privileges; land transit privileges III. ECONOMIC MEASURES (i) Financial (a) Reduction, suspension, cancellation of development assistance, military assistance (b) Reduction, suspension, cancellation of credit facilities at concessionary or market rates (c) Freeze, confiscation of bank assets of target government, target nationals (d) Confiscation, expropriation of other target assets (e) Freeze interest, other transfer payments (f) Refusal to refinance, reschedule debt repayments (interest, principal) (g) Vote against loans, grants, subsidies, funding for technical or other assistance from international organizations (ii) Commercial and Technical (a) Import, export quotas (b) Restrictive licensing of imports, exports (c) Limited, total embargo on imports, exports (Note: arms embargoes) (d) Discriminatory tariff policy, including denial of most favored nation (MFN) status, access to General Preferential Tariff (e) Restriction, cancellation of fishing rights (f) Suspension, cancellation of joint projects (g) Suspension, cancellation of trade agreements (h) Ban on technology exports (i) ‘Blacklisting’ those doing business with the target (j) Curtailment, suspension, cancellation of technical assistance, training programs (k) Ban on insurance and other financial services (l) Tax on target’s exports to compensate its victims
Source: Margaret Doxey, International Sanctions in Contemporary Perspective, Macmillan Press, 1996.
DOCUMENT 2 The International Emergency Economics Powers Act
1701. Unusual and extraordinary threat; declaration of national emergency; exercise of Presidential authorities. 1702. Presidential authorities. 1703. Consultation and reports. (a) Consultation with Congress. (b) Report to Congress upon exercise of Presidential authorities. (c) Periodic follow-up reports. (d) Supplemental requirements. 1704. Authority to issue regulations. 1705. Penalties. 1706. Savings provisions. (a) Termination of national emergencies pursuant to National Emergencies Act. (b) Congressional termination of national emergencies by concurrent resolution. (c) Supplemental savings provisions; supersedure of inconsistent provisions. (d) Periodic reports to Congress.
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§1701. Unusual and extraordinary threat; declaration of national emergency; exercise of Presidential authorities (a) Any authority granted to the President by section 1702 of this may be exercised to deal with any unusual and extraordinary threat, which has its source in whole or substantial part outside the United States, to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States, if the President declares a national emergency with respect to such threat. (b) The authorities granted to the President by section 1702 of this title may only be exercised to deal with an unusual and extraordinary threat with respect to which a national emergency has been declared for purposes of this chapter and may not be exercised for any other purpose. Any exercise of such authorities to deal with any new threat shall be based on a new declaration of national emergency which must be with respect to such threat. (Pub. L. 95-223, Title II, §202, Dec.28, 1977, 91 Stat. 1626.) §1702. Presidential authorities (a) (1) At the times and to the extent specified in section 1701 of this title, the President may, under such regulations as he may prescribe, by means of instructions, licenses, or otherwise – (A) investigate, regulate, or prohibit – (i) any transactions in foreign exchange, (ii) transfers of credit or payments between, by, through, or to any banking institution, to the extent that such transfers or payments involve any interest of any foreign country or a national thereof, (iii) the importing or exporting of currency or securities; and (B) investigate, regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent or prohibit, any acquisition, holding, withholding, use, transfer, withdrawal, transportation, importation or exportation of, dealing in, or exercising any right, power, or privilege with respect to, or transactions involving, any property in which any foreign country or a national thereof has any interest; by any person, or with respect to any property, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.
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(2) In exercising the authorities granted by paragraph (1), the President may require any person to keep a full record of, and to furnish under oath, in the form of reports or otherwise, complete information relative to any act or transaction referred to in paragraph (1) either before, during, or after the completion thereof, or relative to any interest in foreign property, or relative to any property in which any foreign country or any national thereof has or has had any interest, or as may be otherwise necessary to enforce the provisions of such paragraph. In any case in which a report by a person could be required under this paragraph, the President may require the production of any books of account, records, contracts, letters, memoranda, or other papers, in the custody or control of such person. (3) Compliance with any regulation, instruction, or direction issued under this chapter shall to the extent thereof be a full acquittance and discharge for all purposes of the obligation of the person making the same. No person shall be held liable in any court for or with respect to anything done or omitted in good faith in connection with the administration of, or pursuant to and in reliance on, this chapter, or any regulation, instruction, or direction issued under this chapter. (b) The authority granted to the President by this section does not include the authority to regulate or prohibit, directly or indirectly (1) any postal, telegraphic, telephonic, or other personal communication, which does not involve a transfer of anything of value; (2) donations, by persons subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, of articles, such as food, clothing, and medicine, intended to be used to relieve human suffering, except to the extent that the President determines that such donations (A) would seriously impair his ability to deal with any national emergency declared under section 1701 of this title, (B) are in response to coercion against the proposed recipient or donor, or (C) would endanger Armed Forces of the United States which are engaged in hostilities or are in a situation where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances; or
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(3) the importation from any country, or the exportation to any country, whether commercial or otherwise, of publications, films, posters, phonograph records, photographs, microfilms, microfiche, tapes, or other informational materials, which are not otherwise controlled for export under section 2404 of the Appendix to this title or with respect to which acts are prohibited by chapter 37 of Title 18. (Pub. L. 95-223, Title II, §203, Dec. 28, 1977, 91 Stat. 1626; Pub. L. 100418, Title II, §2502(b)(1), Aug. 23, 1988, 102 Stat. 1371.) §1703. Consultation and reports (a) Consultation with Congress The President, in every possible instance, shall consult with the Congress before exercising any of the authorities granted by this chapter and shall consult regularly with the Congress so long as such authorities are exercised. (b) Reports to Congress upon exercise of Presidential authorities Whenever the President exercises any of the authorities granted by this chapter, he shall immediately transmit to the Congress a report specifying – (1) the circumstances which necessitate such exercise of authority; (2) why the President believes those circumstances constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat, which has its source in whole or substantial part outside the United States, to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States; (3) the authorities to be exercised and the actions to be taken in the exercise of those authorities to deal with those circumstances; (4) why the President believes such actions are necessary to deal with those circumstances; and (5) any foreign countries with respect to which such actions are to be taken and why such actions are to be taken with respect to those countries. (c) Periodic follow-up reports At least once during each succeeding six-month period after transmitting a report pursuant to subsection (b) of this section with respect to an exercise of authorities under this chapter, the
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President shall report to the Congress with respect to the actions taken, since the last such report, in the exercise of such authorities, and with respect to any changes which have occurred concerning any information previously furnished pursuant to paragraphs (1) through (5) of subsection (b) of this section. (d) Supplemental requirements The requirements of this section are supplemental to those contained in title IV of the National Emergencies Act [50 U.S.C.A. §1641]. (Pub. L. 95-223, Title II, §204, Dec. 28, 1977, 91 Stat. 1627.) §1704. Authority to issue regulations The President may issue such regulations, including regulations prescribing definitions, as may be necessary for the exercise of the authorities granted by this chapter. (Pub. L. 95-223, Title II, §205, Dec. 28, 1977, 91 Stat. 1628.) §1705. Penalties (a) A civil penalty not to exceed $10,000 may be imposed on any person who violates any license, order, or regulation issued under this chapter. (b) Whoever wilfully violates any license, order, or regulation issued under this chapter shall, upon conviction, be fined not more than $50,000, or, if a natural person, may be imprisoned for not more than ten years, or both; and any officer, director, or agent of any corporation who knowingly participates in such violation may be punished by a like fine, imprisonment, or both. (Pub. L. 95-223, Title II, §206, Dec. 28, 1977, 91 Stat. 1628.) §1706. Savings Provisions (a) Termination of national emergencies pursuant to National Emergencies Act. (1) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, notwithstanding the termination pursuant to the National Emergencies Act [ 50 U.S.C.A §1601 et seq.] of a national emergency declared for purposes of this chapter, any authorities granted by this chapter, which are exercised on the date of such termination on the basis of such national emergency to prohibit transactions involving property in
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which a foreign country or national thereof has any interest, may continue to be so exercised to prohibit transactions involving that property if the President determines that the continuation of such prohibition with respect to that property is necessary on account of claims involving such country or its nationals. (2) Notwithstanding the termination of the authorities described in section 101(b) of this Act, any such authorities, which are exercised with respect to a country on the date of such termination to prohibit transactions involving any property in which such country or any national thereof has any interest, may continue to be exercised to prohibit transactions involving that property if the President determines that the continuation of such prohibition with respect to that property is necessary on account of claims involving such country or its nationals. (b) Congressional termination of national emergencies by concurrent resolution. The authorities described in subsection (a)(1) of this section may not continue to be exercised under this section if the national emergency is terminated by the Congress by concurrent resolution pursuant to section 202 of the National Emergencies Act [50 U.S.C.A §1622] and if the Congress specifies in such concurrent resolution that such authorities may not continue to be exercised under this section. (c) Supplemental savings provisions; supersedure of inconsistent provisions. (1) The provisions of this section are supplemental to the savings provisions of paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) of section 101(a) [50 U.S.C.A §1601(a)(1), (2), (3)] and of paragraphs (A), (B), and (C) of section 202(a) [50 U.S.C.A. §1622(a)(A), (B), and (C)] of the National Emergencies Act. (2) The provisions of this section supersede the termination provisions of section 101(a) [50 U.S.C.A. §1601(a)] and of title II [50 U.S.C.A §1621 et seq.] of the National Emergencies Act to the extent that the provisions of this section are inconsistent with these provisions.
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(d) Periodic reports to Congress. If the President uses the authority of this section to continue prohibitions on transactions involving foreign property interests, he shall report to the Congress every six months on the use of such authority. (Pub. L. 95-223, Title II, §207, Dec. 28, 1977, 91 Stat. 1628.)
3 SANCTIONS: A RATIONAL RESPONSE TO THE HOSTAGE-TAKING
T
hree days after the seizure of the US embassy in Tehran, when Ayatollah Khomeini refused to allow Ramsey Clark, the former US Attorney General, and William Miller, Staff Director of the Senate Committee on Intelligence, to enter Iran to deliver a message from President Carter, the US administration decided to take punitive action against it. The first measure was imposed on 8 November 1979, when the Secretary of State, at the direction of Carter under the authority of Section 2 of the Arms Export Control Act,1 suspended the shipment of about US$300 million worth of military spare parts which Iran had bought and paid for. On 12 November, Carter, acting on the grounds of national security under section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act,2 proclaimed that ‘recent developments in Iran have exacerbated the threat to the national security posed by imports of petroleum and petroleum products. Those developments underscore the threat to our national security which results from our reliance on Iran as a source of crude oil.’ 3 The importation into the United States of Iranian crude oil and refined finished products of such crude oil, and its possession by the United States, or within free trade zones of the United States, was banned. This section of the Trade Expansion Act authorizes the president to regulate imports of any commodity if he finds
1 2 3
Publ. L. no 90-629, 22 USC §2752. Codified at 19 USC §1862 (1976). Proclamation no 4702, 44 Fed. Reg. 67.602 (1979).
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that such a commodity ‘is being imported into the United States in such quantities or under such circumstances as to threaten or impair the national security’.4 The intention was to simply disrupt Iran’s foreign exchange earnings from the sale of crude oil to the United States, which, at that time, stood at US$13.8 million a day.5 The impact of the withdrawal of Iranian crude oil from the US market was significant enough for the United States that by 23 November 1979 the US Department of Energy had to implement a standby mandatory crude oil allocation programme. The international political angle of the hostage taking was highlighted by Carter: the lives of our people in Iran are at stake. I must emphasize the gravity of the situation. It’s vital to the United States and to every other nation that the lives of diplomatic personnel and other citizens abroad be protected and that we refuse to permit the use of terrorism and the seizure and holding of hostages to impose political demands. No one should underestimate the resolve of the American Government and the American people in this matter.
On 13 November 1979, the US Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) introduced new requirements with respect to Iranian post-secondary students, and revoked deferred departure dates previously granted. Entry visas issued prior to this were also cancelled. The new INS requirements were challenged by the Iranian students as selective and discriminatory, but were upheld in the US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia as a rational response to the crisis at hand.6 Iran’s Acting Foreign and Finance Minister at the time was Abolhassan Bani-Sadr, and it was his ill-considered suggestion that Iran might withdraw its assets from US banks, putting them out of reach of US jurisdiction, that prompted Carter, on 14 November, to act under the authority of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) 7 and the National Emergencies Act (NEA) to declare a national emergency. Lloyd N. Cutler, Carter’s Counsel, in describing the events leading to the assets freeze, said: While we were debating the issue overnight on the 12th and 13th of November, Bani-Sadr, then the finance minister of Iran, announced that Iran was going to take all of its deposits out of US banks both in the United States and Europe. This, he said, would do very serious damage to the dollar. Because of the eight hour time gap, we heard of the announcement around three or four o’clock on the morning of November 14th. That ended all 4 5 6 7
19 USC §1862(b). Makio Miyagawa, Do Economic Sanctions Work? St Martin’s Press, 1992, p. 121. Narenji v Civiletti, 617F.2d 745, DC Circuit, 1979). Codified at 50 USC §1701-1706.
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debate and hesitancy within the administration. We decided that we had to go ahead…’8
Issuing Executive Order 12170,9 Carter stated: Pursuant to the authority vested in me as President including the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 USCA Sec 1701 et seq., the National Emergencies Act, 50 USC Sec 1601 et seq., and 3 USC Sec 301, I, JIMMY CARTER, President of the United States, find that the situation in Iran constitutes an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy and economy of the United States and hereby declare a national emergency to deal with that threat. I hereby order blocked all property and interests in property of the Government of Iran, its instrumentalities and controlled entities and the Central Bank of Iran which are or become subject to the jurisdiction of the United States or which are in or come within the possession or control of persons subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. The Secretary of the Treasury is authorized to employ all powers granted to me by the International Emergency Economic Powers Act to carry out the provisions of this order. This order is effective immediately and shall be transmitted to Congress and published in the Federal Register. The White House November 14, 1979
Jimmy Carter
This Executive Order represented the first exercise of authority available to the president under the IEEPA. The Iranian assets, amounting to over US$12 billion, consisting of the following, were with a stroke of a pen frozen: deposits and securities held with the Federal Reserve Bank, US$1.418 billion; deposits and securities held with overseas branches of US banks, US$5.579 billion; deposits held with US banks in the United States, US$2.050 billion; other assets held by US persons, about US$2 billion; Bank Markazi Iran’s gold with the Federal Reserve Bank, 1,632,917 ounces. To announce the freeze of Iranian assets, the While House issued a statement, referring only to Iranian intents to withdraw their deposits from US banks. The statement said: ‘The President has today acted to block all official Iranian assets in the United States, including deposits in United States banks and their foreign branches and subsidiaries. This Order is in response to reports that the Government of Iran is about to withdraw funds.’ 10 Oddly enough, there was no mention of the hostages 8 Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Trade Controls for Political Ends, Matthew Bender, 1983, p 540. 9 44 Fed. Reg. 65581 (1979). 10 15 Weekly Comp. Pres. Docs 2117, 14 November 1979).
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in the Executive Order or the White House statement; nor were they referred to in any other statement. The Order stated that the action was taken in view of ‘an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy and economy of the United States’. The exceptional feature of this Order was the threat to ‘the economy of the United States’. The US government appreciated the very real threat to the stability of the dollar in the world market that would have been caused by the withdrawal of US dollars by Bank Markazi and other Iranian commercial banks. Such action would certainly have had a destabilizing effect and had serious implications for the liquidity of US banks. Later this was confirmed by Roberts Owen, the legal advisor to the US Secretary of State during the hostage crisis. In defending the assets freeze in the International Court of Justice, Owen noted that the Iranian threat of withdrawal of assets from the United States ‘constituted nothing less than an attack on the stability of the world economy and the international monetary system’. However, the stated purpose of the US government’s decision to block Iranian assets, as Carter reported to Congress, was to ‘enable the United States to assure that these resources will be available to satisfy lawful claims of citizens and entities of the United States against the Government of Iran’. Later, it became known that the US government had, as of November 1978, about a year before the embassy take-over, and while the Shah was still in Iran, drawn up a plan to freeze Iranian assets. Fernand St Germain, chairman of the House Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, stated in July 1981: Nine months before the hostages were seized, during a period when economic conditions were relatively calm in Iran and in a time in which there was no evidence that Iran might withdraw its funds, legal technicians in the Department of Treasury concluded that the conditions for invoking the IEEPA existed. Such a case for a freeze made at that time on economic grounds was tenuous at best. The ‘emergency’ apparently resulted from the alleged vulnerability of the US banking and financial system to the threat of a withdrawal of Iranian assets.11
He also confirmed that ‘the Treasury Department was prepared with draft freeze regulations as early as February 1979. Those draft regulations later became the basis for the regulations issued after President Carter’s freeze order on November 14, 1979.’ 12 11 ‘Iran, The Financial Aspects of the Hostage Settlement Agreement’, Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, House of Representatives, 97th Congress, 1st Session, July 1981, p. iv.
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The freezing of US$12 billion worth of Iranian assets was, and remains, the most significant measure taken by the United States in the history of sanctions. The next biggest assets freeze was that of Libyan assets in 1986, totalling US$818 million. Aside from the record total in the Iranian case, another unique feature was that about US$6 billion of Iranian assets held outside of the United States were also blocked. Although countries previously sanctioned by the United States had their assets blocked outside the United States, none actually had any significant assets to render such sanctions really effective. Cuban assets frozen totalled US$33 million, and only US$100 million of North Vietnamese assets were frozen, whilst remaining assets blocked were insubstantial. The significance of the Iranian assets freeze can only be understood if one recalls that with the involvement of the United States in World War II, and at the height of that war, the US Treasury blocked the assets of virtually the entire globe, which amounted to less than US$8 billion. The comparison between the two figures is interesting, even though of course inflation must be taken into account. The freezing of Iranian assets, as ordered, had a narrower scope than earlier US practice. The Iranian assets freeze applied only to the assets controlled by the Iranian government in the United States and those assets in the possession of US citizens overseas. Earlier assets freezes, similar to those applied to Cuba, China and Vietnam, also included assets belonging to the nationals of sanctioned countries. Such a departure from the general practice could only be explained if the desire was not to block the assets of the Shah and his family. The US government did not want the consequences of freezing Iranian assets to disrupt commercial transactions or create a trade embargo. ‘We intend to keep normal commercial transactions going as usual because these are appropriate and we should not try to interfere with the legitimate activities of private individuals or private firms’.13 This, inevitably, was not feasible. The assets freeze did have an effect on trade to some extent. There were goods waiting to be shipped to Iran, the titles of which had already been passed to the Iranian government or to some other entity acting on its behalf. Furthermore, the accounts of all Iranian banks, through which funds were to be transferred to the US suppliers or manufacturers of such goods, were blocked, making it impossible for trade with the United States to continue. 12 Ibid., p. 5. 13 Office of the White House Press Secretary, press briefing by G. William Miller, Secretary of the Treasury, 14 November 1979.
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THE UNITED STATES’ ALLIES AND SANCTIONS Historically, a unilateral trade embargo has never been fully effective. Aware of this, the United States sought to obtain the co-operation of its allies before imposing trade sanctions against Iran. From 10 to 13 December, the US Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance, visited the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Italy and the NATO Council in Brussels to seek their support for punitive economic and financial measures against Iran. The United States requested its allies to: freeze Iranian assets; support the United States in the United Nations; restrict exports to Iran; prohibit the import of Iranian oil; insist on timely payment of Iran’s loans. Although US allies agreed that the principle of diplomatic immunity ought to be maintained, the only support they extended to the United States was that of a diplomatic and political nature. A communiqué issued by all 15 NATO foreign ministers at the end of their meeting on 13 December stated that the organization had no desire to intervene in Iran’s internal affairs. But the statement went on to say that ‘the seizure of the US embassy in Tehran should be opposed by the international community as a whole, and it called for the immediate release of the hostages’.14 This negative response to US requests is understandable if the economic interests of these countries at the time are considered. Oil imports from Iran accounted for 7.1 percent of the United Kingdom’s total oil imports, and existing contracts were worth over $1 billion. A contract for Chrysler’s British subsidiary to supply car kits with a value of £150 million and a Marples Ridgeway contract valued at £125 million to build a highway in Iran – among other deals – constituted business that the United Kingdom could not afford to lose. A trade embargo on Iran would have inflicted much greater hardship on the Germans. Germany depended on Iran for 12.6 percent of its oil imports, and after the United States was the largest exporter of goods to Iran. Italian state-owned companies Societa Italiana per Conduitte d’Acqua and Italimpianti alone had contracts worth approximately US$1 billion for the expansion of the Bandar Abbas port and a steel complex in Iran.15 Similar situations existed in other European countries, and commercial and financial gain was the final factor that denied the United States the support requested. For example, on 7 December, Richard Cooper, US Under Secretary for Economic Affairs, and Anthony Soloman, Under Secretary 14 ‘US may call for sanctions on Iran’, Financial Times, 14 December 1979. 15 ‘How much will sanctions cost us?’ The Economist, 26 April 1980, p. 54.
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responsible for international monetary affairs, were sent to Switzerland to request the freezing of Iranian assets in all branches and subsidiaries of American banks in Switzerland. The Swiss government viewed an assets freeze as a move ‘encroaching on its sovereignty and threatening international monetary stability’.16 No doubt the size of Iranian deposits in Swiss financial institutions was the main factor behind Switzerland’s rejection of such an idea. The United States also greatly needed the support of Japan, the largest importer of Iranian goods and the third-largest exporter to Iran. Japanese oil companies imported 600,000 barrels a day, or 13 percent of their total oil requirements, from Iran. The US Deputy Secretary of the Treasury, Robert Carswell, flew to Tokyo on 16 December especially to seek Japanese co-operation in imposing sanctions on Iran. Japan, like the Europeans, refused to co-operate. Harold Saunders, US Assistant Secretary of State and the head of the Iran Working Group during the crisis, admitted that the ‘allies were supportive but, with no end of the crisis in sight, were increasingly restive with the idea of committing themselves to a long term interruption of economic relations with Iran’.17 This failure to obtain allied co-operation prompted the United States to adopt a more persuasive measure to encourage their participation. THE APPROACH TO THE UNITED NATIONS During the early stages of the crisis, on 9 November 1979, the United States wrote to the President of the Security Council requesting its intervention in securing the release of the hostages. In response, the President of the Council, supported by all members, issued a statement calling on Iran to release the hostages without delay.18 The statement, issued on 27 November 1979, was closely followed on 4 December by Resolution 457 calling upon Iran ‘to release immediately the personnel of the Embassy of the United States of America being held at Tehran, to provide them with protection and to allow them to leave the country’. The resolution further called upon Iran and the United States ‘to take steps to resolve peacefully the remaining issues between them to their mutual 16 Peter Norman, ‘Mr Vance seeks allies in Bonn and London over Iran money war’, The Times, 8 December 1979. 17 Harold H. Saunders, ‘Diplomacy and Pressure, November 1979–May 1980’ in Warren Christopher, American Hostages in Iran: The Conduct of a Crisis, Yale University Press, 1985. 18 United Nations Security Council Distribution General, S/13616, 1979.
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satisfaction in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations’.19 On 29 November, the United States filed a suit in the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in The Hague and petitioned the court for a legal decision that Iran’s action in taking and holding the hostages violated certain articles of the 1961 Vienna Convention of Diplomatic Relations, the 1963 Vienna Convention of Consular Relations, the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against International Protected Persons including Diplomatic Agents, the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Rights between the United States and Iran, and of the Charter of the United Nations. On 30 November, the President of the Court informed the parties that a public hearing would be held on 10 December. Iran decided not to be represented at the hearing. Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sadeq Ghotbzadeh advised the court by telegram on 9 December that Iran refused to recognize its jurisdiction over the case, stating that the question of the hostages only represents a marginal and secondary aspect of an overall problem, one such that it cannot be studied separately, and which involves, inter alia, more than 25 years of continual interference by the United States in the internal affairs of Iran, the shameless exploitation of our country, and numerous crimes perpetrated against the Iranian people, contrary to and in conflict with all international and humanitarian norms. The problem involved in the conflict between Iran and the United States is thus not one of the interpretation and the application of the treaties… but results from an overall situation containing much more fundamental and more complex elements. Consequently, the Court cannot examine the American Application divorced from its proper context, [which]… includes, inter alia, all the crimes perpetrated in Iran by the American Government, in particular the coup d’état of 1953 stirred up and carried out by the CIA, the overthrow of the lawful national government of Dr Mossadegh, the restoration of the Shah and of his regime which was under the control of American interests, and all the social, economic, cultural and political consequences of the direct interventions in our internal affairs, as well as the grave, flagrant and continuous violations of all international norms, committed by the United States in Iran.20
Despite this Iranian claim, the International Court of Justice decided that it did have jurisdiction over the matter, and on 15 December issued a 19 United Nations Security Council Resolution 457, S/INF/35, 1979. 20 International Court of Justice, case concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, Order of 15 December 1979, General List 64.
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‘provisional’ decision condemning the hostage seizure as a violation of international law and ordering the release of the hostages along with the return of the property. THE COURT, unanimously, 1. Indicates, pending its final decision in the proceedings instituted on 29 November 1979 by the United States of America against the Islamic Republic of Iran, the following provisional measures: A (i) The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran should immediately ensure that the premises of the United States Embassy, Chancery and Consulates be restored to the possession of the United States authorities under their exclusive control, and should ensure their inviolability and effective protection as provided for by the treaties in force between the two States and by general international law; (ii) The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran should ensure the immediate release, without any exception, of all persons of United States nationality who are or have been held in the Embassy of the United States of America or in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Tehran, or have been held as hostages elsewhere, and afford full protection to all such persons, in accordance with the treaties in force between the two States and with general international law; (iii) The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran should, as from that moment, afford to all the diplomatic and consular personnel of the United States full protection, privileges and immunities to which they are entitled under the treaties in force between the two States and under general international law, including immunity from any form of criminal jurisdiction and freedom and facilities to leave the territory of Iran; B The Government of the United States and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran should not take any action and should ensure that no action is taken which may aggravate the tension between the two countries or render the existing dispute more difficult of solution; 2. Decides that, until the Court delivers its final judgement in the present case, it will keep the matters covered by this Order continuously under review.
The Court issued a final judgement on 24 May 1980 affirming the above provisional order. This favourable judgement from the International Court of Justice was interpreted by the United States as giving US policy international
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legitimacy to use the UN framework for preparing collective measures against Iran. On 21 December, President Carter stated that ‘we have made clear from the very beginning that the United States prefers a peaceful solution in preference to other remedies which are available to us under International Law. For a peaceful resolution to be achieved it is now clear that concrete action must be taken by the international community’.21 He also requested that the Security Council impose sanctions against Iran under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. President Carter requested that the world community ‘support the legal machinery it has established so that the United Nations and the International Court of Justice will continue to be relevant in settling serious disputes which threaten peace among nations’.22 On 31 December, with the Soviet Union, Bangladesh, Czechoslovakia and Kuwait abstaining, the Security Council approved, by a vote of 11 in favour to none against, a resolution requesting Iran ‘to release immediately all persons of US nationality being held as hostages in Iran, to provide them protection and to allow them to leave the country’.23 The resolution also requested the Secretary General to lend his good offices to the search for a solution. Kurt Waldheim, the Secretary General, in accordance with this resolution, flew to Tehran to meet the Iranian authorities. But he was not able to meet Khomeini, the only decision-maker in Tehran at that time. After returning to New York he told the Security Council on 7 January 1980, that ‘at present Iran was not prepared to respond to the call from the United Nations for the release of the hostages’. Under Resolution 461, the Security Council also agreed to meet on 7 January ‘to review the situation and, in the event of non-compliance with the present resolution, to adopt any effective measures, under Articles 39 and 41 of the Charter of the United Nations’.24 With the passage of the resolution and Iranian non-compliance, the process of finalizing UN economic sanctions against Iran began. In order for the Security Council to adopt ‘effective measures’ (sanctions) against Iran, the United States on 10 January 1980 presented to the Security Council a draft resolution and requested that, until the release of all the hostages, all state members of the United Nations: 21 ‘Economic sanctions against Iran’, remarks announcing the intention to seek UN action, 21 December 1979, 15 Weekly Comp. Pres. Docs 2277, 24 December 1979. 22 Ibid., Doc. 2278. 23 UN Security Council Resolution 461 (1979). 24 Ibid.
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(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e) (f)
(g)
shall prevent the sale or supply, by their nationals or from their territories, whether or not originating in their territories, to or destined for Iranian Governmental entities in Iran or any other person or body for the purposes of any enterprise carried on in Iran, of all items, commodities or products except food, medicine and supplies intended strictly for medical purposes; shall prevent the shipment by vessel, aircraft, railway, or other land transport of their registration or owned by or under charter to their nationals, or the carriage, whether or not in bond by land transport facilities across their territories of any of the items, commodities and products covered by subparagraph (a) which are consigned to or destined for Iranian Governmental entities or any person or body in Iran, or to any enterprise carried on in Iran; shall not make available to the Iranian authorities or to any person in Iran or to any enterprise controlled by any Iranian Governmental entity any new credits or loans; shall not, with respect to such persons or enterprises, make available any new deposit facilities or allow substantial increases in existing non-dollar deposits or allow more favourable terms of payment than customarily used in international commercial transactions; and shall act in a businesslike manner in exercising any rights when payments due on existing credits or loans are not made on time and shall require any persons or entities within their jurisdiction to do likewise; shall prevent the shipment from their territories on vessels or aircraft registered in Iran of products and commodities covered by subparagraph (a) above; shall reduce to a minimum the personnel of Iranian diplomatic missions accredited to them; shall prevent their nationals, or firms located in their territories, from engaging in new service contracts in support of industrial projects in Iran, other than those concerned with medical care; shall prevent their nationals or any person or body in their territories from engaging in any activity which evades or has the purpose of evading any of the decisions set out in this resolution.25
On 10 January 1989 the draft resolution was put to a vote. The Soviet Union and East Germany, claiming that the issue was a bilateral one between the United States and Iran, voted against the resolution and, as the negative vote of the Soviet Union constituted a veto, it was defeated. Ambassador McHenry expressed US anger by calling the Soviet Union vote ‘a cynical and irresponsible exercise of its veto power. The Soviets
25 S/13735, 10 January 1980.
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hoped that, by blocking sanctions, they can divert attention from their subjugation of Afghanistan and carry favour with the Government of Iran, who are among those most directly affected by the Afghan invasion.’ 26 NEW UNILATERAL MEASURES When efforts to secure multinational sanctions through the United Nations failed, Carter announced on 7 April a number of new decisions. Diplomatic relations with Iran were broken off, and all Iranian diplomatic and consular personnel and military trainees were ordered to leave the United States. US entry visas held by Iranians were invalidated, and new visas were issued only on strong humanitarian grounds. Carter also announced that he had ordered the Secretary of the Treasury to make an inventory of the frozen Iranian assets and the outstanding claims of US citizens and corporations against Iran in order to prepare a claims programme against Iran for the hostages, their families and other US claimants. He added that legislation would be introduced to Congress which would facilitate the processing and payment of these claims. The most important action of the day was the issuance of Executive Order 12205 by Carter under the authority of Section 203 of the IEEPA and Section 301 of the NEA which prohibited trade and other transactions with Iran: By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and statutes of the United States, including Section 203 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 USC 1702), Section 301 of Title 3 of the United States Code and Section 301 of the National Emergencies Act (50 USC 1631) in order to take steps additional to those set forth in Executive Order number 12170 of November 14, 1979, to deal with the threat to the national security, foreign policy and economy of the United States referred to in that Order, and in furtherance of the objectives of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 461 (1979) adopted on December 3, 1979, it is hereby ordered as follows: 1-101. The following are prohibited effective immediately, notwithstanding any contracts entered into or licenses granted before the date of this Order: (a) The sale, supply or other transfer, by any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, of any items, commodities or products except food, medicine and supplies intended strictly for medical purposes, and donations of clothing intended to 26 Statement by Donald F. McHenry, US ambassador to the United Nations, before the UN Security Council, 13 January 1980.
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relieve human suffering, from the United States or from any foreign country, whether or not originating in the United States, either to or destined for Iran, an Iranian Governmental entity in Iran, any other person or body in Iran or any other person or body for the purposes of any enterprise carried on in Iran. (b) The shipment by vessel, aircraft, railway or other land transport of United States registration or owned by or under charter to any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States or the carriage (whether or not in bond) by land transport facilities across the United States of any of the items, commodities and products covered by paragraph (a) of this section which are consigned to or destined for Iran, an Iranian Governmental entity or person or body in Iran, or to any enterprise carried on in Iran. (c) The shipment from the United States of any of the items, products and commodities covered in paragraph (a) of this section on vessels or aircraft registered in Iran. (d) The following acts, when committed by any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States in connection with any transaction involving Iran, an Iranian Governmental entity, an enterprise controlled by Iran or an Iranian Governmental entity or any person in Iran: i) Making available any new credits or loans; ii) Making available any new deposit facilities or allowing substantial increases in non-dollar deposits which exist as of the date of this Order; iii) Allowing more favorable terms of payment than are customarily used in international commercial transactions; or iv) Failing to act in a businesslike manner in exercising any rights when payments due on existing credits or loans are not made in a timely manner. (e) The engaging by any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States in any service contract in support of an industrial project in Iran, except any such contract entered into prior to the date of this Order or concerned with medical care. (f) The engaging by any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States in any transaction which evades or avoids, or has the purpose of evading or avoiding, any of the prohibitions set forth in this section. 1-102. The prohibitions in Section 1-101 above shall not apply to transactions by any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States which is a non-banking association, corporation, or other organization organized and doing business under the laws of any foreign country.
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1-103. The Secretary of the Treasury is delegated and authorized to exercise all functions vested in the President by the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 USC 1701 et seq.) to carry out the purposes of this Order. The Secretary may re-delegate any of these functions to other officers and agencies of the Federal Government. 1-104. The Secretary of the Treasury shall ensure that actions taken pursuant to this Order and Executive Order number 12170 are accounted for as required by Section 401 of the National Emergencies Act (50 USC 1641). 1-105. This Order is effective immediately. In accord with Section 401 of the National Emergencies Act (50 USC 1641) and Section 204 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 USC 1703) it shall be immediately transmitted to the Congress and published in the Federal Register’. The White House April 7, 1980
Jimmy Carter
In his remarks, Carter also stated that he had made ‘every effort to obtain [the hostages’] release on honourable, peaceful and humanitarian terms, but the Iranians have refused to release them, or even to improve the inhumane conditions under which these Americans are being held captive’.27 He also warned Iran that ‘other actions may become necessary if these steps do not produce the prompt release of the hostages’.28 The trade sanctions were symbolic, and would never have hurt Iran, nor prompted the release of the hostages. Since the accession to power by Khomeini, US exports to Iran had drastically declined. In 1978, US exports to Iran totalled approximately US$280 million per month. Before the hostage crisis, exports had dropped to as little as US$26 million per month, and just before the 7 April sanctions decision they were down to a mere US$1.4 million. The 7 April order expanded the economic sanctions against Iran from the blocking of assets to a full economic embargo. But despite the magnitude of the block on Iranian assets and the trade embargo, Iran steadfastly refused to release the hostages. So, on 17 April, ten days after imposing the export ban, the President further expanded sanctions and issued Executive Order 12211, forbidding all imports from Iran: By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and statutes of the United States, including Section 203 of the International Emergency 27 ‘Sanctions Against Iran’, remarks announcing US actions, 7 April 1980, 16 Weekly Comp. Pres. Docs 611, 14 April 1980. 28 Ibid., p. 612.
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Economic Powers Act (50 USC 1702), Section 301 of Title 3 of the United States Code, Sections 1732 and 2656 of Title 22 of the United States Code, and Section 301 of the National Emergencies Act (50 USC 1631), in order to take steps additional to those set forth in Executive Order 12170 of November 14, 1979 and Executive Order 12205 of April 7, 1980, to deal with the threat to the national security, foreign policy and economy of the United States referred to in those Orders, and the added unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy and economy of the United States created by subsequent events in Iran and neighbouring countries, including the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, with respect to which I hereby declare a national emergency, and to carry out the policy of the United States to deny the use of its resources to aid, encourage or give sanctuary to those persons involved in directing, supporting or participating in acts of international terrorism, it is hereby ordered as follows: 1-101. Paragraph 1-101(d) of Executive Order No 12205 is hereby amended by the addition of a new subparagraph (v) as follows: (v) Make any payment, transfer of credit, or other transfer of funds or other property or interests therein, except for the purposes of family remittances. 1-102. The following transactions are prohibited, notwithstanding any contracts entered into or licenses granted before the date of this Order: (a) Effective immediately, the direct or indirect import from Iran into the United States of Iranian goods or services, other than materials imported for news publication or news broadcast dissemination. (b) Effective immediately, any transactions with a foreign person or foreign entity by any citizen or permanent resident of the United States relating to that person’s travel to Iran after the date of this Order. (c) Effective seven days from the date of this Order, the payment by or on behalf of any citizen or permanent resident of the United States who is within Iran of any expenses for transactions within Iran. The prohibitions in paragraphs (b) and (c) of this section shall not apply to a person who is also a citizen of Iran and those prohibitions and the prohibitions in section 1-101 shall not apply to a journalist or other person who is regularly employed by a news gathering or transmitting organization and who travels to Iran or is within Iran for the purpose of gathering or transmitting news, making news or documentary films, or similar activities. 1-103. The Secretary of the Treasury is hereby directed, effective fourteen days from the date of this Order, to revoke existing licenses for transactions by persons subject to the jurisdiction of the United States with Iran Air, the National Iranian Oil Company and the National
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1-105.
1-106.
1-107.
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Iranian Gas Company, previously issued pursuant to regulations under Executive Order No 12170 or Executive Order No 12205. The Secretary of the Treasury is delegated, and authorized, to exercise all functions vested in the President by the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 USC 1701 et seq.) to carry out the purposes of this Order. The Secretary may re-delegate any of these functions to other officers and agencies of the Federal Government. The Secretary of the Treasury shall ensure that actions taken by him pursuant to the above provisions of this Order, Executive Order No 12170 and Executive Order No 12205 are accounted for as required by Section 401 of the National Emergencies Act (50 USC 1641). The Secretary of State is delegated, and authorized to exercise in furtherance of the purposes of this Order, the powers vested in the President by Section 2001 of the Revised Statutes (22 USC 1732), Section 1 of the Act of July 3, 1926 (22 USC 211a) and Section 215 of the Immigration and Naturality Act (8 USC 1185) with respect to: (a) the restriction of the use of United States passports for travel to, in or through Iran, and; (b) the regulation of departures from and entry into the United States in connection with travel to Iran by citizens and permanent residents of the United States. Except as otherwise indicated herein, this Order is effective immediately. In accord with Section 401 of the National Emergencies Act (50 USC 1641) and Section 204 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 USC 1703), it shall be immediately transmitted to the Congress and published in the Federal Register.
The White House April 17, 1980
Jimmy Carter
The stated purpose of this Order, which, like the 7 April measure, was issued under the authority of the IEEPA and the NEA, was to deal with the ‘threat to the national security, foreign policy and economy of the United States’ caused by the events in Iran, as well as ‘to carry out the policy of the United States to deny the use of its resources to aid, encourage, give sanctuary to those persons involved in directing, supporting or participating in acts of international terrorism’. As the import of crude oil to the United States had been banned since November 1979, the import ban of the 17 April sanctions had little real impact. Only very small quantities of rugs and pistachio nuts were affected. This new Order imposed additional financial restrictions by prohibiting ‘any payment, transfer of credit, or other transfer of funds or other property
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or interests therein, except for family remittances’. The original blocking programme did not include the blocking of assets subject to US jurisdiction in which Iranian nationals who were naturalized had an interest. It only prohibited all transactions involving property in which Iran or Iranian entities had an interest. This amendment, by adding ‘Iranian nationals’, completed the blocking prohibitions. The most controversial element of the new Order, however, was the ban on travel to Iran, which would have raised troublesome legal and compliance issues. So, based on this Order, Secretary of State Vance issued a public notice, effective 23 April, restricting the use of US passports to travel to or through Iran. The notice stated: This action is required by the increasingly unstable situation in Iran and the concomitant increase in the threat of hostile acts against Americans. The governing authorities in Iran have repeatedly demonstrated their unwillingness to maintain public order and to protect United States nationals from hostile and uncontrolled mob action. The Government of Iran has approved the holding in unlawful captivity of 51 United States diplomatic and consular personnel and two additional United States nationals who are not employees of the United States Government; both the governmental authorities and militant groups express extreme hostility to the United States in their public statements. In these circumstances, where the governing authorities have approved attacks upon United States nationals and where protection against such attacks is unavailable, there is an imminent danger to the physical safety of United States nationals in Iran. Accordingly, United States passports shall cease to be valid for travel to, in, or through Iran unless specifically validated for such travel under the authority of the Secretary of State.29
Although journalists were exempt from this ban, they were required to report to the Treasury Department. This rule was largely ignored, but the US government did not make an issue of it. Some other exemptions were allowed. A licence was issued after the mother of one of the hostages travelled to Iran, and later the US authorities chose not to prosecute Ramsey Clark, a former Attorney General, who led a delegation to Iran to attend a conference sponsored by the Iranian government. Following the enactment of the 17 April sanctions, Carter again urged US allies to co-operate with the United States and impose sanctions against Iran. However, in carrying on discussions with its European and
29 45 Fed. Reg. 26,685 and 26,686, 21 April 1980.
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Japanese allies the United States encountered significant difficulties. The allies, whilst continuing to voice their public support for the US position, were not willing to impose a ban on imports from Iran, and with respect to export restrictions insisted on exceptions. They also refused to take any action on loans on which Iran had defaulted, and they still paid a premium for Iranian crude on the spot market. Some countries – for example the United Kingdom, which had substantial export contracts with Iran – resisted any proposal. On 22 April, the European Community (EC) passed a resolution requiring member nations to impose sanctions against Iran should the American hostages not be released by 17 May that year. On 17 and 18 May, EC foreign ministers met in Naples and voted to impose limited sanctions on Iran, commencing on 22 May. These amounted to a ban on export credits and restrictions on capital transfers. The trade embargo, however, excluded existing contracts entered into prior to 4 November 1979, and allowed case-by-case exceptions for any new contracts. The United Kingdom, although implementing the sanctions, diluted the effect of such sanctions by applying them only to contracts entered into after the EC agreement, and by excluding any new contracts that reflected a continuation of previous supply relationships, provided that the level of exports remained the same. Although the European Community eventually united in solidarity with the United States and imposed sanctions on Iran, figures provided by the European Commission showed that EC exports to Iran between January and November 1980 had increased by over 53 percent, compared with the same period in 1979. Total exports to Iran by EC member states in the reported period of 1979 were valued at US$2.691 billion, in comparison with US$4.132 billion during 1980.30 The Sanctions in Detail: Blocking the Assets The blocking of Iranian assets under Executive Order 12170 of 14 November 1979 was the most important action taken by the US government during the hostage crisis. The Order, which became effective immediately, blocked: all property and interests in property of the Government of Iran, its instrumentalities and controlled entities and the Central Bank of Iran which are or become subject to the jurisdiction of the United States or which are in or
30 Official Journal of the European Communities, no C115/20-21, 18 May 1981.
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come within the possession or control of persons subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.31
The US Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) was delegated to implement the Order. The regulations as originally implemented were far from complete, and many definitions and interpretative provisions not initially included were added at later stages. The main provision of the Iranian Assets Control Regulations (IACRs) 32 was Section 535.201, which provided that: (a) No property subject to the jurisdiction of the United States or which is in the possession of or control of persons subject to the jurisdiction of the United States in which on or after the effective date Iran has any interest of any nature whatsoever may be transferred, paid, exported, withdrawn or otherwise dealt in except as authorized.
This provision was narrower in scope than Section 500.201 of the Foreign Assets Control Regulations (FACRs), and did not prohibit any transaction if an individual Iranian national had an interest. It was set to come into effect from 8.10am Eastern Standard Time on 14 November 1979.33 ‘Iran’ and ‘an Iranian entity’ were defined to include: (a) 1. The State and the Government of Iran as well as any political subdivision, agency, instrumentality thereof or any territory, dependency, colony, protecto-rate, mandate, dominion, possession or place subject to the jurisdiction thereof; 2. Any partnership, association, corporation, or other organization substantially owned or controlled by any of the foregoing; 3. Any person to the extent that such person is, or has been, or to the extent that there is reasonable cause to believe that such person is, or has been, since the effective date acting or purporting to act directly or indirectly on behalf of any of the foregoing; 4. Any territory which on or since the effective date is controlled or occupied by the military, naval or police forces or other authority of Iran; and 5. Any other person or organization determined by the Secretary of the Treasury to be included within paragraph (a) hereof.34
Provision 535.202, in the absence of a licence, prohibited: the acquisition, transfer (including the transfer on the books of any issuer or agent thereof), disposition, transportation, importation, exportation, or
31 32 33 34
Executive Order 12170. 31 CFR Part 535. 31 CFR §535.201. 31 CFR §535.301.
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withdrawal of, or the endorsement or guaranty of signatures on or otherwise dealing in any security (or evidence thereof) registered or inscribed irrespective of the fact that at any time (either prior to, on, or subsequent to the effective date) the registered or inscribed owner thereof may have, or appears to have, assigned, transferred or otherwise disposed of any such security.
Section 535.203 was rendered null and void with respect to any transfer involving Iranian properties, and a transfer prior to 15 November 1979 would not be recognized unless ‘the person with whom such property is held or maintained had written notice of the transfer or by any written evidence had recognized such transfer prior to such effective date’.35 It was also asserted under this provision that ‘Unless licensed or authorized pursuant to this part any attachment, judgement, decree, lien, execution, garnishment, or other judicial process is null and void with respect to any property in which on or since the effective date there existed an interest of Iran’.36 This part of the provision was an important issue in the final negotiations for the release of the hostages. The terms of the prohibitions contained in provisions 535.201, 535.202 and 535.203 were broad in scope and blocked virtually anything of value in which Iran or Iranian entities had an interest if they were ‘subject to the jurisdiction of the United States’ or within ‘the possession of or control of persons subject to the jurisdiction of the United States’. A ‘person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States’ was defined as: (a) Any person wheresoever located who is a citizen or resident of the United States; (b) Any person actually within the United States; (c) Any corporation organized under the laws of the United States or of any state, territory, possession, or district of the United States; and (d) Any partnership, association, corporation, or other organization wheresoever organized or doing business which is owned or controlled by persons specified in paragraphs (a), (b) or (c) of this section’.37
The idea of such a broad definition was to enable the United States to exercise its jurisdiction over branches and subsidiaries and US commercial banks, even when they were established in other countries and doing business under that country’s laws. In response to concerns about the
35 31 CFR §535.203(b). 36 31 CFR §535.203(e). 37 31 CFR §535.329.
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scope of US jurisdiction voiced by foreign governments and the IMF, OFAC, on 19 November 1979, mitigated the effects of such broad jurisdictional claims by amending the regulations to allow the Iranian authorities to withdraw funds from foreign branches and subsidiaries of US banks should the deposited funds be in non-US currency.38 The other significant provisions of the IACRs, which were issued on 4 and 18 December 1979, were provisions 535.504 and 535.418, in which the judicial proceedings against and the prejudgement attachment to the blocked Iranian property became authorized. Although this authority did not permit the enforcement or carrying out of any judgement or order, it did open the way to a flood of litigation. American claimants filed all sorts of suits against the Iranian government and its entities, and in many proceedings they even obtained prejudgement attachments. Whilst these cases were pending, the Carter administration negotiated the Hostage Settlement Agreement, in which it was agreed (in January 1981) that the United States would ‘terminate all legal proceedings in the United States Courts involving claims of United States persons and institutions against Iran and its state enterprises, to nullify all attachments, and judgements, obtained therein, to prohibit all further litigation based on such claims, and to bring about the termination of such claims through binding arbitration’.39 Carter suspended all domestic litigation against Iran on 19 January, and President Reagan ratified the Order on 24 February by issuing Executive Order 12294. Although the president’s power to dissolve the prejudgement attachments and suspend litigation was upheld by the Supreme Court in Dames & Moore v Regan,40 the issue remains the subject of scholarly debate. The Sanctions in Detail: Trade Embargo With Executive Order 12205 of 7 April 1980 and Executive Order 12211 of 17 April 1980, Carter not only intensified the financial restrictions against Iran which had existed since November 1979, but also imposed an extensive trade embargo on Iran. Executive Order 12205 prohibited:
38 31 CFR §535.566. 39 Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria, General Declaration, 19 January 1981. 40 101 S CT 2972 (1981).
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The sale, supply or other transfer, by any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, of any items, commodities or products, except food, medicine and supplies intended strictly for medical purposes, and donations of clothing intended to be used to relieve human suffering, from the United States, or from any foreign country, whether or not originating in the United States, either to or destined for Iran, any Iranian Governmental entity in Iran, any other person or body in Iran or any other person or body for the purposes of any enterprise carried on in Iran.
OFAC amended the IACRs to implement the new Order. The trade restriction in section 535.207 reproduced verbatim the provisions of the Order itself. It was more detailed than any other provisions implemented by the Treasury Department in any previous embargo programmes. It was also forbidden to transport goods by Iranian vessels or aircraft and by any ‘vessel, aircraft, railway or other land transport of United States registration or owned by or under charter to a person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States or the carriage by land transport facilities across the United States… for Iran, an Iranian Governmental entity, or any person or body in Iran, or to any enterprise carried on in Iran’.41 A significant feature of this sanction was the exemption from the embargo controls of ‘food, medicine or supplies intended strictly for medical purposes, and donations of clothing intended to be used to relieve human suffering’.42 The range of financial sanctions covered by Executive Order 12170 was expanded. Under section 535.206, certain activities were prohibited by any person subject to US jurisdiction and involving any transaction with Iran, an Iranian entity or any person in Iran. This meant that Americans were not allowed to: 1. Make available any new deposit facilities or allow substantial increases in existing non-dollar deposits. 2. Allow more favourable terms of payment than customarily used in international commercial transactions. 3. Fail to act in a businesslike manner in exercising any rights when payments due on existing credits or loans are not made in a timely manner, provided the exercise of such rights is not otherwise prohibited by this part. 4. Make any payment, transfer of credit, or other transfer of funds or other property or interests therein to any person in Iran. 41 31 CFR §535.207. 42 31 CFR §535.207(1).
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In addition, entering into service contracts in support of industrial projects in Iran without a specific licence was forbidden.43 Executive Order 12211 also amended Executive Order 12205 and added further financial restrictions by prohibiting ‘any payment, transfer of credit, or other transfer of funds or other property or interest therein, except for the purpose of family remittances’. The blocking prohibitions, which were originally limited to Iranian government assets or its controlled entities, were now extended, by this Order, to Iranian nationals as well. OFAC amended its previous regulations accordingly to implement the President’s Order. The banning of any transaction, directly or indirectly involving ‘Iran, an Iranian Governmental entity, an enterprise controlled by Iran or an Iranian Government entity, or any person in Iran’ 44 completed the blocking of the assets of the Iranian government and of Iranian nationals. In addition, the trade embargo was completed with the prohibition providing that ‘no merchandise, other goods or services of Iranian origin may be imported into the United States if such merchandise or goods are or have been located in or transported from Iran after the effective date’ 45 of 17 April 1980. Travel to Iran by US nationals was prohibited. To implement this part of the Order, the President delegated his authority to the Secretary of State to impose the restrictions on the ‘use of United States passports for travel to, in or through Iran’ and ‘to regulate the departure from and entry into the United States in connection with travel to Iran by citizens and permanent residents of the United States’.46 As per the instructions of the Secretary of State, US passports, as of 23 April, were no longer valid for travel to or through Iran, and permanent resident aliens were also forbidden to travel to Iran unless they could justify that their proposed visit was in the national interest of the United States.47 OFAC also issued provision 535.209 prohibiting persons subject to the jurisdiction of the United States from ‘any direct or indirect payment or transaction (including any transfer, other dealing in, or use of property) either to, by, on behalf of, or otherwise involving, any foreign country or any national thereof, which is incident to travel to, or travel or maintenance within Iran of any individual who is a US citizen or US permanent 43 44 45 46 47
31 CFR §535.424. 31 CFR §535.206. 31 CFR §535.204. Executive Order 12211, Part 1-106. 45 Fed. Reg. 27600, 23 April 1980.
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resident alien’. In order to avoid constitutional challenges to this part of the IACR, news gathering and dissemination activities were permitted. Journalists were exempt from the travel ban to Iran provided that any trip was ‘for purpose of gathering or transmitting news, filming news or making documentary films or similar activities’.48 Under provision 535.550, ‘importations of publications, films, posters, photograph records, photographs, microfilms, microfiche and tapes, originating in Iran’ were also allowed, with a specific licence. In addition, the export to Iran of a wide range of publications, such as newspapers, magazines, journals, newsletters, books, film etc. were authorized, unless such materials were principally devoted to the dissemination of technical data.49 To encourage its allies to support its sanctions, in drafting provisions 535.206 and 535.207 OFAC elected not to impose the sanctions on an extraterritorial basis. But it did not, however, give US subsidiaries complete freedom to continue to export to Iran. Under provision 535.603, ten days prior to any transaction with Iran, US subsidiaries were required to submit a report to OFAC, giving full details of the proposed transactions. During those ten days, OFAC contacted the US parent companies and let them know that the information given by the subsidiaries was not immune from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act. In other words, their business relationship with Iran would become public knowledge. According to Richard J. Davis, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury in the Carter administration, ‘Given the high emotional feeling about the hostage crisis in the United States, that deterred a great number of exports’.50
48 31 CFR §535.562(b). 49 31 CFR §535.575. 50 Richard J. Davis, ‘The Decision to Freeze Iranian Assets’ in Andreas F. Lowenfeld et al. (ed.) Revolutionary Days: The Iranian Hostage Crisis and the Hague Claims Tribunal, Juris Publishing, 1999, p. 15.
4 RESOLUTION OF THE HOSTAGE CRISIS
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n 24 April 1980, exactly a week after the expansion of sanctions against Iran, the United States resorted to a military plan to free the hostages which had taken six months to prepare. The decision reflected the frustration felt by the US administration at the failure of economic or diplomatic sanctions to achieve their goal. The military mission, code-named ‘Eagle Claw’, involved eight RH-53D helicopters from the aircraft carrier USS Nimitz, stationed in the Persian Gulf, and six C-130 Hercules transport aircraft, taking off from Egypt with 90 special forces personnel aboard. Their objective was to rescue the hostages from the US embassy compound in the middle of Tehran, a daring – some might say impossible – mission. On 25 April, shortly after the team had landed in Iran’s Tabas Desert, the venture had to be aborted because of equipment failure. During the subsequent evacuation, one of the helicopters collided with a tanker plane. Both burst into flames, killing eight members of the rescue team and injuring another five. The pilots and remaining members of the mission fled to Egypt, leaving the helicopters and the bodies of their dead colleagues in the desert. The failed rescue mission was a sharp blow to US military prestige, and did not help the Carter administration domestically or internationally. Not only was its image of competence seriously damaged, but it was also criticized by the International Court of Justice in a judgement issued on 24 May, on the grounds that the United States had ignored the Order of
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15 December not to aggravate tension, adding that the rescue mission had not been compatible with ‘respect to the judicial process’. After the failed rescue mission, which was the last viable US option to resolve the crisis, no new initiatives were undertaken in the following months. The death of the Shah, in July 1980, while eliminating the original cause of the crisis, did little to resolve matters. A decision-making process in Iran on how to resolve the crisis was only possible with the nomination in the Iranian parliament (Majlis) of a speaker, the appointment of a prime minister and the approval of the cabinet. By the end of August all these steps were taken. Now that the liberal government was ousted, the left destroyed, Islamic institutions fully formed and the revolution stabilized, there was no further reason to keep the hostages. ‘The hostages now,’ said Behzad Nabavi, the Iranian Minister of State for Executive Affairs ‘are like fruit from which all the juice has been squeezed out’.1 Now, with some kind of face-saving commitment from the United States, the hostages could be released. Ayatollah Khomeini, on 12 September 1980 in a message to pilgrims, set the terms for the release of the hostages; ‘They can be set free if the property of the dead Shah is returned, all claims of America against Iran are annulled, a guarantee of political and military non-interference in Iran is given by America, and all our capital is released’. The next day, the Iranian Foreign Minister informed the Majlis ‘now that the seizure of the embassy has helped us to lay down the foundation of the Islamic Republic… we have no more interest in keeping [the hostages]’.2 On 2 November, the Majlis issued a resolution based on Khomeini’s four points, demanding that: the US pledge not to interfere in Iranian affairs; the freeze on Iranian assets be lifted and that these assets be placed at the disposal of Iran; economic and financial sanctions against Iran be lifted and all claims against Iran be cancelled; the property of the Shah and his close relatives be returned to Iran. The Iranian Prime Minister, Mohammad Ali Rajaei, stipulated that Algeria should act as an intermediary between Iran and the United States. Washington accepted the conditions as a workable proposal, and serious negotiations for the release of the hostages began. The power struggle and the rivalry between the Islamic Republic Party and President Bani-Sadr, both trying to dominate the course of the negotiations, delayed the release of the hostages for weeks. Asking the United 1 2
Keyhan (newspaper), 15 January 1981. Enghelabe Islami (newspaper), 13 September 1980.
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States, as late as 17 December, to release US$14 billion in frozen assets and give a US$10 billion guarantee that the Shah’s wealth would be returned and a political apology were the direct result of this rivalry. Months earlier – in Bonn on 16 September in a secret meeting between Warren Christopher, US Assistant Secretary of State, and Sadegh Tabatabaei, a close relative and aide of Khomeini – the US rejection of these demands had been conveyed to Tehran. Early in January 1981, Iran dropped its demands for apologies and the US$24 billion. What remained on the list of demands was the cancellation of the claims of US citizens and entities, which were subject to judicial attachment, and the release of the Shah’s assets. Lifting the existing attachment and dismissing the pending litigation against Iran was agreed to with the condition that another forum be found for the settlement of claims, and it was this which ultimately brought the two parties to agree to international arbitration. On the matter of the Shah’s assets, and those of his close relatives, it was agreed that Iran would commence litigation in the US courts, and that whilst the cases were pending the United States would prohibit any transfer of such assets outside US jurisdiction. Intensive negotiations between Iran and the United States, through Algerian intermediaries, continued until mid-January, when all major issues were resolved and the text of the agreement formulated. The Algiers Agreement was objected to by President Bani-Sadr and his aides. Alireza Nobari, then head of the Iranian Central Bank, in a letter to Majlis deputies, wrote, ‘the Algiers Agreement has seriously harmed the economic interests of the Islamic Republic and has adversely affected Iran’s national sovereignty’.3 In response to this letter, and criticisms by the Islamic Republic newspaper to the effect that nothing in the Algiers Agreement was to the benefit of Iran, the chief Iranian negotiator, Behzad Nabavi, said, ‘the Iranian government had been pushed into a difficult corner… the hostage crisis is now at an end as far as the government is concerned, and making this into a new issue is not to the benefit of the revolution’.4 The Majlis approved the agreement on 14 January, with two amendments. Firstly, contracts that provided that they should operate under the exclusive jurisdiction of Iranian courts were to be excluded from the claims settlement tribunal and, secondly, arbitration should not cover claims arising from the seizure of the embassy, nor from the Iranian Revolution itself. 3 4
Mahmood Toloei, Shah in the Court of History, Elm Publishing, Tehran, 1995, p 126. Ibid., p. 127.
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The headline-grabbing 444-day international crisis ended on 19 January 1981 with the signing of the Algiers Accords, or the Hostage Settlement Agreement. The next day, as President Reagan was taking office, half an hour after the end of Carter’s term, the hostages left Iran. THE HOSTAGE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT The Iran-US agreement of 19 January stipulated that in return for the release of the American hostages, the United States agreed to restore the financial position of Iran, as much as possible, to that prior to the crisis. The most major aspect of the settlement affected about US$12 billion worth of Iranian investments and about 2150 law suits pending in US courts against Iran. The deal, as agreed, contained two declarations by the Algerian government, known as the Algiers Accords. In addition, there were three other agreements to further the implementation of the declarations. The two declarations lay at the heart of the agreement to end the hostage crisis. The General Declaration This declaration was the primary document from which all others were derived. It is the only document which in part, albeit briefly, deals with the political issues of the hostage crisis. ‘The United States pledges that it is and from now on will be the policy of the United States not to intervene, directly or indirectly, politically or militarily, in Iran’s internal affairs’. The inclusion of ‘it is and from now on will be’ elicited the admission from the United States that it had interfered in Iran’s internal affairs in the past. To ensure the release of the hostages the US also undertook: to restore the financial position of Iran to that which existed prior to 14 November 1979; to ensure the free transfer of Iranian assets; to terminate all legal proceedings in US courts against Iran and Iranian entities, and nullify all attachments and judgements obtained against Iran; to revoke all trade sanctions against Iran; to freeze the assets and property of the late Shah and his close relatives and prohibit any transfer of such property; to withdraw its claims before the International Court of Justice.
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The Settlement Declaration With this document, the United States and Iran agreed: to establish an international tribunal (the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal) in order to decide the claims of the United States and its nationals against Iran, and of Iran and its nationals against the United States; that the tribunal have nine members, each government appointing three, the remaining three selected by mutual agreement; that the tribunal conduct its business in accordance with the arbitration rules of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL); that claims of nationals of either state be presented by the claimants themselves or, if the claims are less than US$250,000, by the government of such nationals; that decisions and awards of the tribunal shall be final and binding, and that no appeal will be heard; that The Hague shall be the seat of the tribunal; that the expenses of the tribunal shall be equally divided. Supplementary Agreements The Undertakings, the Escrow Agreement and the Technical Agreement were agreed upon to further the implementation of the two declarations. The first document was entitled ‘Undertakings of the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran with respect to the Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria (Undertakings)’. This document provided that the 52 hostages would depart from Iran when the Banque Centrale d’Algerie received confirmation that 1,632,917,779 ounces of Iranian gold and US$7.955 billion worth of Iranian cash and securities, blocked since 14 November 1979, had been transferred to the Bank of England. It also provided that US$3.667 billion would be returned to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York to pay off principal and interest on Iran’s outstandings on syndicated loan agreements to US banks and foreign members of the syndicates. In addition, US$1.418 billion would remain available to pay other loans, once disputes over the amounts involved were settled. The second document was the Escrow Agreement, which was to be executed by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York as the Fiscal Agent and Bank Markazi Iran, with the Banque Centrale d’Algerie acting as escrow agent for the implementation of financial provisions of the General Declaration.
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The third document was the Technical Agreement between Banque Centrale d’Algerie, as the escrow agent, the Governor and Company of the Bank of England, and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, as fiscal agent of the United States. This agreement detailed the manner in which the banks should deal with the deposits, securities and other technicalities concerning the receipt and transfer by the Bank of England of Iranian assets. (For the complete declaration, see Document 3.) THE END OF THE CRISIS In order for the provisions of the two declarations and undertakings to be implemented, President Carter issued the following executive orders on 19 January 1981. This action effectively ended the crisis and secured the release of the 52 American hostages after 444 days in captivity: Executive Order 12276, ‘Direction relating to the establishment of Escrow Accounts’; Executive Order 12277, ‘Direction relating to the transfer of Iranian Government assets’; Executive Order 12278, ‘Direction relating to the transfer of Iranian Government assets overseas’; Executive Order 12279, ‘Direction relating to the transfer of Iranian Government assets held by domestic banks’; Executive Order 12280, ‘Direction relating to the transfer of Iranian Government financial assets held by non-banking institutions’; Executive Order 12281, ‘Direction relating to the transfer of certain Iranian Government assets’; Executive Order 12282, ‘Revocation of prohibitions against transactions involving Iran’; Executive Order 12283, ‘Non prosecution of claims of hostages and for actions at the United States Embassy and elsewhere’; Executive Order 12284, ‘Restrictions on the transfer of property of the former Shah of Iran’. Executive Order 12285, ‘President’s Commission on Hostage Compensation’. In comparing the terms of the Algiers Accords with the demands of the students, Khomeini’s conditions and the Majlis resolution of 2 November, one can see how much the conditions were reduced because of the pressure to settle before the end of the Carter administration. Behzad Nabavi, in response to criticism of the Algiers Agreement, admitted ten years later that ‘the defeat of Carter in the polls and his imminent replacement by Reagan, who had labeled Iran barbaric and a blackmailer, did not make it likely for the new president to agree to the conclusion of the Agreement as it had been drafted’. He adds that ‘if the hostage crisis had not been resolved during Carter’s presidency, it was likely that the US, during
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Reagan’s tenure, would have treated the Islamic Republic the same way it is now treating Iraq’.5 The United States did not confess to any crimes, nor offer any apology. Its siding with Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War puts into question its pledge not to intervene in Iranian affairs. Of US$12 billion of frozen assets, less than US$3 billion was returned to Iran, and none of the Shah’s wealth was ever recovered. Relaxation of the export controls and sanctions lasted only for a short period, and, most important, US private claimants received much better treatment in The Hague than they could have hoped for in any US court. Due to the sovereign immunity doctrine and other legal technicalities, it is doubtful if those claimants would have any chance of recovery in a US court. Walter J. Stoessel, Under Secretary for Political Affairs at the US Department of State defended, in the Senate on 4 March 1981, the arbitration clause of the hostage agreement and affirmed that ‘access to Iranian assets and satisfaction of the American contract claims were by no means legally assured prior to the taking of the hostages… we believe the agreements provide for more certain protection of claimants’ interests than we enjoyed previously’. Claimants against the People’s Republic of China got 40 cents on the dollar after 30 years, those against Cuba and Libya have had nothing yet. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE HOSTAGE AGREEMENTS The agreements with Iran to release the hostages were negotiated and agreed upon during the last days of the Carter administration. Executive Orders 12276 to 12285 were signed on 19 January 1981 by Carter, and the hostages were released during the first hour of the Reagan presidency the following day. But the new administration seemed reluctant to implement the agreements associated with the hostage release. Formal action was taken by the Reagan administration only a month later. The US State Department issued a statement on 18 February, saying: Our position up until now has been that the US will, of course, honour its obligations under international law. Because of the complexity of the agreements and the extraordinary conditions under which they were negotiated, we have undertaken a review to determine precisely what our obligations are under them. That review has been completed. Having considered all the circumstances carefully, we have decided to approve implementation of the agreements in strict accordance with the terms of the agreements. 5
Behzad Nabavi, ‘An Answer to the Critique of the Algiers Agreement, Journal of Foreign Policy, vol. V, Autumn 1991, p 677.
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[The] Review considered the impact of implementing or not on: • Rights of US claimants; • US terrorist policy; • US international interests, including US obligations to third parties, particularly Algeria, who had themselves made commitments during the course of these negotiations; • Long-term US interests in the Persian Gulf, including Iran. … did not consider several questions, of great potential interest to historians and of possible value for drawing lessons with respect to future policy, but of no practical bearing on the immediate question of whether or not to implement the agreements. … The review just completed did not consider: • How could the whole crisis have been handled better? • Could a better set of agreements have been negotiated? • We did not consider whether these agreements should have been signed. … We are confronted with an accomplished fact. We have an agreement signed by a President of the US and the question is whether, given the existence of this agreement and the consequences (legal, financial and political) of implementing it or not, what should this country do? The conclusion of the agreements was a legal exercise of Presidential authority. This authority will be subject to challenge in our courts and the executive branch will of course abide by the determination of our judicial system. We did not find it necessary to reach a conclusion as to the legally binding character of these agreements under international law. We are proceeding because we believe it is in the overall interests of the United States to carry out the agreement. The decision represents a practical judgement that implementation provides the surest resolution of the issue consistent with the best interests of the United States in the Gulf region and throughout the world. Iran has not profited from these agreements. It was ultimately forced to settle on terms that simply restored status quo ante because the advent of the new Administration finally confronted it with a serious deadline. The funds already returned to Iran and those which may be returned following the implementation of these agreements and the settlement of commercial and financial claims are funds which belonged to Iran before the seizure of the American hostages. It should be well understood that the decision to faithfully implement the agreements does not represent a precedent for future actions by the United States Government in similar situations. The present Administration would not have negotiated with Iran for the release of the hostages. Future acts of state sponsored terrorism against the US will meet swift and sure punishment.6 6
US Department of State, statement on Hostage Agreements implementation, 18 February 1981, reprinted in International Legal Materials, vol. XX, no 2, March 1981, p. 554.
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The assertion by the new administration that it ‘would not have negotiated with Iran for the release of the hostages’ is inconsistent with the facts of the ‘Iran-Contra affair’, in which the same administration secretly and illegally negotiated with Iran for the release of Western hostages in Lebanon. Executive Orders 12276 to 12285 were signed by Carter on 19 January 1981, but were not actually issued until 22 January. As they were challenged in litigation, they had to be ratified by Reagan to remove any doubts as to their effect. On 24 February, Reagan issued Executive Order 12294, ratifying Carter’s orders and providing that: all claims which could be presented to the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal under the agreement be suspended in the United States; in cases where the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal determines that it did not have jurisdiction, suspension would be terminated and the claimants could reactivate their claims in US courts; determinations of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, whether accepting or discharging a claim, should be final. In connection with the implementing of the Hostage Settlement Agreement, Walter J. Stoessel, Under Secretary for Political Affairs at the Department of State, on 4 March in a statement before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, presented the views of the Reagan administration on the hostage agreements, and stated why it was in the interest of the United States to implement the agreements. I welcome this opportunity to discuss the Administration’s decision to implement the agreements with Iran for the hostages’ release. I will address my comments to why we believe it is in the interests of the United States to implement the agreements. I will also talk about the legal basis for proceeding with the agreements and the practical steps we plan to take in this regard. Our decision to implement the agreements must be considered in the context of both our international interests and domestic concerns. Given Iran’s strategic location, its oil resources and the possibilities for Soviet influence there, movement toward improved relations may at some point be in the interest of the United States. However, it is also in our interest to take care that any such movement is consistent with our strong opposition to terrorism and the stake which we, and all law abiding nations, have in the system of international law and custom. I want to stress that, by itself, our decision to implement the Algerian agreements does not constitute a decision to normalize relations with Iran. However, a benefit of implementing the agreements is that this option is left open. In short, in completing a very thorough review of our obligations under the agreements, we have considered our strategic concerns – and the
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extraordinary conditions under which the agreements were negotiated – very carefully. Our decision to approve implementation, strictly in accordance with the terms of the agreements, also takes into account the legitimate rights of US claimants and our policies for dealing with terrorism. We did not in our review of the agreements address whether the crisis could have been better handled or whether a better set of agreements could have been negotiated. However, the agreements are an accomplished fact, authorized by the President of the United States acting within the authority of his office. We are satisfied that our obligations under them do not violate US law. We did not see it as necessary to reach a conclusion as to the agreements’ legally binding character under international law. We are proceeding with implementation because it appears to be clearly in the overall interests of the United States to do so. Let me say that Iran has not profited from these agreements and in fact paid a considerable economic price from the sanctions and political isolation imposed upon it. Faced with the serious deadline imposed by the advent of a new Administration which was not committed to continue the negotiations underway, Iran had to settle for terms that restored financial relations with the United States roughly to where they were before the hostages were seized and had to give up many of their demands, including the return of the Shah and the return of his assets. The funds already returned to Iran and those which may be returned as the agreements are implemented and commercial and financial claims are settled are assets that belonged to Iran before the seizure of the hostages. No US funds have been sent to Iran as a result of these agreements. Three actions required under the agreements have already taken place: • The United States has pledged noninterference in Iran’s internal affairs. This is in accordance with our policy and international law. • $7.9 billion was transferred to an Escrow Account with the Bank of England. Of this, $3.7 billion was then returned to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York to pay off syndicated bank loans and credits, and $1.4 billion was retained in the account to pay nonsyndicated loans and credits of banks and disputed interest owing on Iranian deposits in US banks. • We have revoked economic sanctions on Iran in response to the hostage taking. Normal control under the Arms Control Act continue to apply and a Department travel advisory points out the dangers of travelling there. However, a number of additional steps are required to complete implementation of the agreements. The executive branch published regulations last week to implement Executive Orders signed by President Carter on January 19, and a new Executive Order signed by President Reagan on February 24, 1981. These regulations explain the responsibilities of US holders of Iranian assets. We have discussed these regulations in detail with US claimants; their views have been fully considered in the drafting process. We are working to conclude a security account arrangement with a foreign central bank into which to place a portion of the $2.2 billion in Iranian
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assets now in US branches of US banks. One half of these assets, as they are transferred, are to go into such an interest bearing account for payment of arbitration awards to US claimants. When $1 billion has been placed in the security account, the additional funds will be transferred to Iran. However, when the balance in the security accounts should drop below $500 million as a result of payment claims, Iran is obliged to make new deposits sufficient to maintain the $500 million balance. We must also transfer to Iran $1–1.5 billion of other Iranian assets subject to US jurisdiction. Claims not settled within six months by direct negotiation between the parties may be submitted to the arbitration tribunal. We are seeking a site for the tribunal and will shortly begin to make other arrangements as well, including the selection of arbitrators. The new Executive Order signed by President Reagan suspends the claims in US courts that may be presented to the arbitration tribunal. These claims will be discharged only after the tribunal takes jurisdiction and makes a judgement on the merits. We will also lift the legal attachments by US claimants on Iranian assets. These attachments must be removed before the transfers can begin that will – in addition to returning some Iranian property to Iran – fill the security account from which arbitration awards will be paid. We will also, in due course, withdraw US claims against Iran before the International Court of Justice. (We will, however, continue to press our claim for the return of our Embassy and other properties in Iran). A category of obligations of which I have not spoken concerns the Shah’s wealth. The regulations that I have mentioned will require that whenever the Shah’s estate or any close relative is served as a defendant in US courts by Iran, pursuant to an effort to recover Iranian property, the assets involved will be frozen and information regarding them will be for the courts to decide, as the agreements made clear. Moreover, the regulations will expressly permit those family members whose assets are frozen as much money as they need for personal expenses. The banks seem to be satisfied with the agreements and stand to be paid in full – something that was by no means assured previously. The principal concern of the contract claimants is that Iran may not pay awards made by the arbitration tribunal. However, under the terms of the agreement, arbitral awards against Iran would be enforceable against its assets in any country. Iran has waived its sovereign immunity defense with respect to awards made by the arbitration tribunal. Because of its dependence on oil sales, Iranian assets would be available in a number of countries for satisfaction of arbitral awards. Access to Iranian assets and satisfaction of the American contract claims were by no means legally assured prior to the taking of the hostages either. Most of those with claims upon Iranian assets now understand and are reasonably satisfied with these arrangements. Others may have a different view, however, and some will go to court to try to keep Iranian assets here
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or to delay the transfer of the funds. In general, we believe the agreements provide for more certain protection of claimants’ interests than was enjoyed previously. On the question of hostage claims, we have concluded that given our sovereign immunities law, the former hostages stand little chance of successful litigation against Iran. Thus, our obligation under the agreements to block hostage claims against Iran will have little practical effect. When the agreements were being negotiated the hostage families themselves made clear that they did not want the claims issue to impede the earliest possible release of the hostages. Nevertheless, the Administration believes that the question of compensation should be considered in the context of compensation given other Government servants who have endured similar hardships, such as prisoners of war and other ex-hostages. President Carter created a commission to make recommendations on the issue of hostage compensation by the United States – the Administration now has the question of this commission and its mandate under active review.7
REGULATIONS FOR IMPLEMENTING THE HOSTAGE AGREEMENTS The Secretary of the Treasury was delegated and authorised to carry out the executive orders and issue the relevant regulations. Under Executive Order 12282, the trade sanctions imposed against Iran on 12 November 1979, 7 April and 17 April 1980 were lifted. A general licence was issued authorizing all trade and financial transactions, without terminating the national emergency with respect to Iran. OFAC issued provision 535.579, and authorized exports to Iran. It also announced additional regulations concerning the implementation of the hostage agreements. Under 535.217, access to the property of the former Shah of Iran and that of his close relatives was blocked: (a) For the purpose of protecting the rights of litigants in courts within the United States, all property and assets located in the United States in the control of the estate of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, the former Shah of Iran, or any close relative of the former Shah served as a defendant in litigation in such courts brought by Iran seeking the return of property alleged to belong to Iran, is blocked as to each such estate or person, until all such litigation against such estate or person is finally terminated. This provision shall apply only to such persons as to which Iran has furnished proof of service to the Office of Foreign Assets Control and which the office has identified in paragraph (b) of this section. 7
US Department of State statement, 4 March 1981, Current Policy no 262, US Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, reproduced in International Legal Materials, vol. XX no 2, March 1981, p. 555.
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b) [Reserved] (c) The effective date of this section is January 19, 1981.
On 11 May 1981, the property of Ashraf Pahlavi, and on 15 August, the property of Shams Pahlavi, sisters of the former Shah, was identified and paragraph (b) was amended accordingly. The agreed formula under the Algiers Accords was that Iran should file lawsuits in US courts requesting the return of the Shah’s assets and those of his close family. The US government would then block the assets under litigation pending the courts’ decisions. Living expenses deemed necessary for the Shah’s relatives were considered under provision 535.580: ‘The transfer, payment or withdrawal of property de-scribed in §535.217 is authorized to the extent necessary to pay living expenses of any individual listed in that section. Living expenses for this purpose shall include food, housing, transportation, security and other personal expenses.’ One of the most important regulations was issued under provision 535.216 which reflected the provisions of Executive Order 12283: (a) Persons subject to the jurisdiction of the United States are prohibited from prosecuting in any court within the United States or elsewhere, whether or not litigation was commenced before or after January 19, 1981, any claim against the Government of Iran arising out of events occurring before January 19, 1981 relating to: 1. The seizure of the hostages on November 4, 1979; 2. The subsequent detention of such hostages; 3. Injury to United States property or property of United States nationals within the United States Embassy compound in Tehran after November 3, 1979; or 4. Injury to United States nationals or their property as a result of popular movements in the course of the Islamic Revolution in Iran which were not an act of the Government of Iran. (b) Any persons who are not United States nationals are prohibited from prosecuting any claim described in paragraph (a) of this section in any court within the United States. (c) No further action, measure or process shall be taken after the effective date of this section in any judicial proceeding instituted before the effective date of this section which is based upon any claim described in paragraph (a) of this section, and all such proceedings shall be terminated. (d) No judicial order issued in the course of the proceedings described in paragraph (c) of this section shall be enforced in any way.
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The above regulation effectively banned the former hostages from filing any law suits against Iran, and those who did try to sue Iran lost their cases on different grounds. The innocent hostages who had suffered for 444 days of captivity were the biggest losers from the Algiers Accords. On the other hand, the US banks – which knew that interest on Iranian loans, mounting with every delay in resolving the hostage crisis, would be paid from frozen funds – were the greatest winners. During the assets freeze, US banks holding Iranian assets were not required to pay interest on Iranian accounts. Under the final agreement, banks were ultimately required to transfer the funds to Iran, ‘including interest from 14 November 1979, at commercially reasonable rates’. Under provision 535.440 ‘commercially reasonable rates’ were interpreted for savings deposits, as the rate provided in the deposit agreement, for demand accounts as no interest, and for other accounts as any rate agreed to by the bank and Iran. In practice, this worked in favour of US banks. US COURTS AND THE HOSTAGE AGREEMENTS In John D. McKeel Jr et al v the Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States of America,8 12 former hostages and the wives of two others sued Iran, seeking compensation for damages suffered during, and as a result of, their captivity, and sought declaratory relief against the United States. The Appeal Court affirmed the District Court’s dismissal of the action for lack of subjectmatter jurisdiction. The appellants requested that the case be remanded to determine whether the President’s agreements negotiated for the release of the hostages constituted a valid claim against the United States for the ‘taking’ of property without just compensation. The court rejected this, and their claims were dismissed. Suits filed by other hostages, for example Persinger v Islamic Republic of Iran,9 Williams v Iran,10 Lauterbach v Iran 11 and the cases of Cooke v Iran 12 and Amburn v United States,13 were all dismissed on the grounds that their cases were precluded by the executive agreements negotiated by Carter to secure the release of the hostages. The claims of former hostages were, in effect, extinguished by Carter’s actions, while the commercial claims of other US citizens were suspended 8 9 10 11 12 13
722 F2d 582. No 690 F2d 1010, DC Circuit 1982. No 81-1672, DC Circuit, 1982. No 81-1672, DC Circuit, 1982. No 1 CI CT 695. No 564-82C.
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by Reagan under Executive Order 12294 of 24 February 1981. The claimants were given the opportunity to take their cases to the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal. OFAC provision 535.222, giving effect to the President’s Order, provided that: (a) All claims which may be presented to the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal under the terms of Article II of the Declaration of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria concerning the Settlement of Claims by the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Islamic Republic of Iran, dated January 19, 1981, and claims for equitable or other judicial relief in connection with such claims, are hereby suspended, except as they may be presented to the Tribunal. During the period of this suspension, all such claims shall have no legal effect in any action now pending in any court in the United States, including the courts of any state and any locality thereof, the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico, or in any action commenced in any such court after the effective date of this section. (b) Nothing in paragraph (a) of this section shall prohibit the assertion of a defense, set off or counterclaim in any pending or subsequent judicial proceeding commenced by the Government of Iran, any political subdivision of Iran, or any agency, instrumentality or entity controlled by the Government of Iran or any political subdivision thereof. (c) Nothing in this section precludes the commencement of an action after the effective date of this section for the purpose of tolling the period of limitations for commencement of such action. (d) Nothing in this section shall require dismissal of any action for want of prosecution. (e) Suspension under this section of a claim or a portion thereof submitted to the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal for adjudication shall terminate upon a determination by the Tribunal that it does not have jurisdiction over such claim or portion thereof. (f) A determination by the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal on the merits that a claimant is not entitled to recover on a claim or part thereof shall operate as a final resolution and discharge of such claim or part thereof for all purposes. A determination by the Tribunal that a claimant shall have recovery on a claim or part thereof in a specified amount shall operate as a final resolution and discharge of such claim or part thereof for all purposes upon payment to the claimant of the full amount of the award including any interest awarded by the Tribunal. (g) Nothing in this section shall apply to any claim concerning the validity or payment of a standby letter of credit, performance or payment bond or other similar instrument. (h) The effective date of this section is February 24, 1981.
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Under the Algiers Accords, US claimants with certain forum selection clauses requiring litigation in Iran could not take their claims to the IranUnited States Claims Tribunal. Litigation in Tehran was their only course of action. Executive Orders 12279 to 12281 and the OFAC regulations, proclaimed on the basis of the Orders which, in effect, revoked and withdrew the court orders and attachments against Iranian assets, were challenged by a number of litigants. In fact, the constitutionality and enforceability of the Hostage Settlement Agreement was brought into question. On this issue, the rulings of the courts were different. In Electronic Data Systems Corporation v Social Security Organization of the Government of Iran 14 the court found that there was ‘a substantial likelihood that the Executive Order was not validly promulgated during President Carter’s term of office’. The court also found that under IEEPA the president did not have the authority to vest himself with custody and control of the assets. The president could ‘freeze but not seize’ the assets. It was the opinion of the court that Congress did not, under the IEEPA, grant power to the president to nullify or void attachments or judgements, actions which demonstrated a valid exercise of judicial power. Judge Porter went further and said, ‘If I am wrong with regard to the intended reach of the IEEPA, I likewise conclude that the Act itself is not in harmony with the United States Constitution’. In Marschalk Co. v Iran National Airlines Corp,15 Judge Duffy reached the same conclusion, and said, ‘It was the hostage crisis that was settled by the Agreement, not… plaintiffs’ claims… I know of no case, other than those arising from the present situation, that holds that the President has the Constitutional power to take possession of private property and bargain with it to secure the release of American hostages or for any other foreign policy’. However, in Chas T. Main International Inc. v United States,16 the court concluded that the president was indeed empowered by both the Constitution and the IEEPA to reach an agreement with a foreign government requiring the removal of civil actions pending in the US courts. The conflicting conclusions of the courts made it clear that the Supreme Court had to decide the issue. The Supreme Court took Dames & Moore v Donald T. Regan, Secretary of the Treasury et al 17 as a test case, as it was, in many ways, a typical example of the cases filed against Iran. 14 15 16 17
508 518 509 453
F Supp. 1350 (ND Tex. 1981). F Supp. 69 (SDNY 1981). F Supp. 1162 (D Mass 1981). US 654, 69L Ed 918, 101 S Ct. 2972.
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Dames & Moore v Regan On 19 December 1979, a few weeks after the seizure of the US embassy in Iran, Dames & Moore filed suit in the US District Court for the Central District of California against Iran, the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) and Iranian banks. Dames & Moore alleged in their complaint that AEOI owed its wholly-owned subsidiary, Dames & Moore International, SRL US$3,436,694.30, plus interest, in respect of site studies undertaken for a proposed nuclear power plant in Iran. The District Court issued orders of attachment directed against Iranian property in the United States and the property of Iranian banks until the judgement was entered. On 27 January 1981, following the release of the hostages and President Carter’s Executive Orders, Dames & Moore moved for a summary judgement against Iran and AEOI, but not against the Iranian banks. The court granted Dames & Moore’s motion, and awarded them the amount claimed plus interest. Iran and AEOI appealed against this judgement and the court stayed execution, pending appeal. The court, in light of the Executive Orders, also ordered that all prejudgement attachments obtained against Iran be vacated and further proceedings against Iranian banks be stayed. On 28 April 1981, Dames & Moore filed another action in the District Court against the United States and the Secretary of the Treasury for declaratory relief, seeking to prevent the enforcement of the executive orders and the OFAC regulations implementing the Algiers Accords. Dames & Moore alleged that by implementing the agreements, the President and the Secretary of the Treasury had gone beyond their powers, and that their actions were unconstitutional because they would adversely affect the final judgement against Iran and AEOI, prejudgement attachments and any ability to litigate against the Iranian banks. On 28 May, the District Court dismissed the complaint, on the grounds of failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, but entered an injunction pending appeal to the Court of Appeals blocking the Iranian property that was subject to any writ of attachment issued by any court in favour of Dames & Moore. On 3 June, Dames & Moore appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and simultaneously petitioned the Supreme Court with a writ of certiorari before judgement. The Court granted certiorari on 11 June and, against a 19 July 1981 deadline for the transfer of assets to Iran, adopted an expedited briefing schedule, setting oral argument for 24 June.
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Eight days after the oral argument ended, on 2 July, the last day of its 1980 term, the Supreme Court upheld the authority of the president provided for under the IEEPA, to suspend legal proceedings instituted in US courts by American plaintiffs, to nullify attachments obtained in such proceedings, and to transfer to Iran the blocked assets previously subject to attachment. (For the Court’s decision, see Document 4.) It was the opinion of the court that blocking assets would permit the President to maintain the foreign assets at his disposal for use in negotiating the resolution of a declared national emergency. The frozen assets serve as a bargaining chip to be used by the President when dealing with a hostile country. Accordingly, it is difficult to accept petitioner’s argument, because the practical effect of it is to allow individual claimants throughout the country to minimize or wholly eliminate this ‘bargaining chip’ through attachments, garnishments, or similar encumbrances on property.
The court’s findings on the purpose of blocking, at least in the case of the frozen Iranian assets, was contrary to what President Carter had declared to be his purpose. President Carter’s statement to Congress, released concurrently with the initial freeze regulations, was that the freeze would ‘enable the United States to assure that these resources will be available to satisfy lawful claims of citizens and entities of the United States against the Government of Iran’.18 The Supreme Court’s decision in the case of Dames & Moore allows presidents virtually unlimited power, and gives them the authority to lawfully dispose of private claims against foreign governments in order to resolve an international crisis. This power is so sweeping that there is little that American businesses can do to protect themselves. Political and diplomatic considerations seem destined once more to take priority, and presidents may again bargain away their commercial claims in order to further foreign policy objectives.
18 President’s Message to Congress, 14 November 1979, Weekly Comp. Pres. Docs 2118, 19 November 1979.
DOCUMENT 3 The Algiers Declaration
Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria The Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria, having been requested by the Governments of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States of America to serve as an intermediary in seeking a mutually acceptable resolution of the crisis in their relations arising out of the detention of the 52 United States nationals in Iran, has consulted extensively with the two governments as to the commitments which each is willing to make in order to resolve the crisis within the framework of the four points stated in the resolution of November 2, 1980, of the Islamic Consultative Assembly of Iran. On the basis of formal adherences received from Iran and the United States, the Government of Algeria now declares that the following interdependent commitments have been made by the two governments. GENERAL PRINCIPLES
The undertakings reflected in this Declaration are based on the following general principles: A. Within the framework of and pursuant to the provisions of the two Declarations of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic
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of Algeria, the United States will restore the financial position of Iran, in so far as possible, to that which existed prior to November 14, 1979. In this context, the United States commits itself to ensure the mobility and free transfer of all Iranian assets within its jurisdiction, as set forth in Paragraphs 4–9. B. It is the purpose of both parties, within the framework of and pursuant to the provisions of the two Declarations of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria, to terminate all litigation as between the Government of each party and the nationals of the other, and to bring about the settlement and termination of all such claims through binding arbitration. Through the procedures provided in the Declaration relating to the Claims Settlement Agreement, the United States agrees to terminate all legal proceedings in United States courts involving claims of United States persons and institutions against Iran and its state enterprises, to nullify all attachments and judgements obtained therein, to prohibit all further litigation based on such claims, and to bring about the termination of such claims through binding arbitration. Point I: Non-Intervention in Iranian Affairs 1. The United States pledges that it is and from now on will be the policy of the United States not to intervene, directly or indirectly, politically or militarily, in Iran’s internal affairs. Points II and III: Return of Iranian Assets and Settlement of U.S. Claims 2. Iran and the United States (hereinafter ‘the parties’) will immediately select a mutually agreeable central bank (hereinafter ‘the Central Bank’) to act, under the instructions of the Government of Algeria and the Central Bank of Algeria (hereinafter ‘The Algerian Central Bank’) as depositary of the escrow and security funds hereinafter prescribed and will promptly enter into depositary arrangements with the Central Bank in accordance with the terms of this declaration. All funds placed in escrow with the Central Bank pursuant to this declaration shall be held in an account in the name of the Algerian Central Bank. Certain procedures for implementing the obligations set forth in this Declaration and in the Declaration of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria concerning the settlement of claims by the Government of the
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United States and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran (hereinafter ‘the Claims Settlement Agreement’) are separately set forth in certain Undertakings of the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran with respect to the Declaration of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria. 3. The depositary arrangements shall provide that, in the event that the Government of Algeria certifies to the Algerian Central Bank that the 52 U.S. nationals have safely departed from Iran, the Algerian Central Bank will thereupon instruct the Central Bank to transfer immediately all monies or other assets in escrow with the Central Bank pursuant to this declaration, provided that at any time prior to the making of such certification by the Government of Algeria, each of the two parties, Iran and the United States, shall have the right on seventy-two hours notice to terminate its commitments under this declaration. If such notice is given by the United States and the foregoing certification is made by the Government of Algeria within the seventy-two hour period of notice, the Algerian Central Bank will thereupon instruct the Central Bank to transfer such monies and assets. If the seventy-two hour period of notice by the United States expires without such a certification having been made, or if the notice of termination is delivered by Iran, the Algerian Central Bank will thereupon instruct the Central Bank to return all such monies and assets to the United States, and thereafter the commitments reflected in this declaration shall be of no further force and effect. ASSETS IN FEDERAL RESERVE BANK
4. Commencing upon completion of the requisite escrow arrangements with the Central Bank, the United States will bring about the transfer to the Central Bank of all gold bullion which is owned by Iran and which is in the custody of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, together with all other Iranian assets (or the cash equivalent thereof) in the custody of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, to be held by the Central Bank in escrow until such time as their transfer or return is required by Paragraph 3 above.
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ASSETS IN FOREIGN BRANCHES OF U.S. BANKS
5. Commencing upon the completion of the requisite escrow arrangements with the Central Bank, the United States will bring about the transfer to the Central Bank, to the account of the Algerian Central Bank of all Iranian deposits and securities which on or after November 14, 1979, stood upon the books of overseas banking offices of U.S. banks, together with interest thereon through December 31, 1980, to be held by the Central Bank, to the account of the Algerian Central Bank, in escrow until such time as their transfer or return is required in accordance with Paragraph 3 of this Declaration. ASSETS IN U.S. BRANCHES OF U.S. BANKS
6. Commencing with the adherence by Iran and the United States to this declaration and the claims settlement agreement attached hereto, and following the conclusion of arrangements with the Central Bank for the establishment of the interest-bearing security account specified in that agreement and Paragraph 7 below, which arrangements will be concluded within 30 days from the date of this Declaration, the United States will act to bring about the transfer to the Central Bank, within six months from such date, of all Iranian deposits and securities in U.S. banking institutions in the United States, together with interest thereon, to be held by the Central Bank in escrow until such time as their transfer or return is required by Paragraph 3. 7. As funds are received by the Central Bank pursuant to Paragraph 6 above, the Algerian Central Bank shall direct the Central Bank to (1) transfer one-half of each such receipt to Iran and (2) place the other half in a special interest-bearing security account in the Central Bank, until the balance in the security account has reached the level of $1 billion. After the $1 billion balance has been achieved, the Algerian Central Bank shall direct all funds received pursuant to Paragraph 6 to be transferred to Iran. All funds in the security account are to be used for the sole purpose of securing the payment of, and paying, claims against Iran in accordance with the claims settlement agreement. Whenever the Central Bank shall thereafter notify Iran that the balance in the security account has fallen below $500 million, Iran shall promptly make new deposits sufficient to maintain a minimum balance of $500 million in the account. The account shall be so maintained
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until the President of the Arbitral Tribunal established pursuant to the claims settlement agreement has certified to the Central Bank of Algeria that all arbitral awards against Iran have been satisfied in accordance with the claims settlement agreement, at which point any amount remaining in the security account shall be transferred to Iran. OTHER ASSETS IN THE U.S. AND ABROAD
8. Commencing with the adherence of Iran and the United States to this declaration and the attached claims settlement agreement and the conclusion of arrangements for the establishment of the security accounts, which arrangements will be concluded within 30 days from the date of this Declaration, the United States will act to bring about the transfer to the Central Bank of all Iranian financial assets (meaning funds or securities) which are located in the United States and abroad, apart from those assets referred to in Paragraph 5 and 6 above, to be held by the Central Bank in escrow until their transfer or return is required by Paragraph 3 above. 9. Commencing with the adherence by Iran and the United States to this declaration and the attached claims settlement agreement and the making by the Government of Algeria of the certification described in Paragraph 3 above, the United States will arrange, subject to the provisions of U.S. law applicable prior to November 14, 1979, for the transfer to Iran of all Iranian properties which are located in the United States and abroad and which are not within the scope of the preceding paragraphs. NULLIFICATION OF SANCTIONS AND CLAIMS
10. Upon the making by the Government of Algeria of the certification described in Paragraph 3 above, the United States will revoke all trade sanctions which were directed against Iran in the period November 4, 1979, to date. 11. Upon the making by the Government of Algeria of the certification described in Paragraph 3 above, the United States will promptly withdraw all claims now pending against Iran before the International Court of Justice and will thereafter bar and preclude the prosecution against Iran of any pending or future claim of the United States or a United States national arising out of events occurring before the date
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of this declaration related to (A) the seizure of the 52 United States nationals on November 4, 1979, (B) their subsequent detention, (C) injury to United States property or property of the United States nationals within the United States Embassy compound in Tehran after November 3, 1979, and (D) injury to the United States nationals or their property as a result of popular movements in the course of the Islamic Revolution in Iran which were not an act of the Government of Iran. The United States will also bar and preclude the prosecution against Iran in the courts of the United States of any pending or future claim asserted by persons other than the United States nationals arising out of the events specified in the preceding sentence. Point IV: Return of the Assets of the Family of the Former Shah 12. Upon the making by the Government of Algeria of the certification described in Paragraph 3 above, the United States will freeze, and prohibit any transfer of, property and assets in the United States within the control of the estate of