Russia and the Formation of the Romanian National State, 1821-1878

Russia and the formation of the Romanian national state 1821-1878

This book has a double emphasis: It examines the role played by tsarist Russia in the formation of an independent Romanian national state, and it discusses the reaction of a Balkan nationality to the influence of a neighboring great power that was both a protector and a menace. In the early nineteenth century the centers of Romanian political life were the Danubian Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia, which were both under Ottoman rule but which had separate, autonomous administrations. Although welcoming Russian aid against the Ottoman Empire, the Romanian leadership at the same time feared that the Russian government would use its military power to establish a firm control over the Principalities or would annex Romanian lands, as indeed occurred in 1812. Here this difficult relationship is examined in detail as it developed during the century in connection with the major events leading to the international acceptance of Romanian independence in 1878. The conflicts that arose in this period, in particular the issues of political domination and the possession of Bessarabia, have remained disturbing elements in the relations of the two states.

Russia and the formation of the Romanian national state 1821-1878 BARBARA JELAVICH

CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS CAMBRIDGE LONDON

NEW YORK MELBOURNE

NEW ROCHELLE SYDNEY

PUBLISHED BY THE PRESS SYNDICATE OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE

The Pitt Building, Trumpington Street, Cambridge, United Kingdom CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS

The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge CB2 2RU, UK 40 West 20th Street, New York NY 10011-4211, USA 477 Williamstown Road, Port Melbourne, VIC 3207, Australia Ruiz de Alarcon 13,28014 Madrid, Spain Dock House, The Waterfront, Cape Town 8001, South Africa http://www.cambridge.org © Cambridge University Press 1984 This book is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take place without the written permission of Cambridge University Press. First published 1984 First paperback edition 2004 A catalogue recordfor this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloguing in Publication data Jelavich, Barbara, 1923Russia and the formation of the Romanian national state, 1821-1878. Bibliography: p. 1. Romania - Politics and government - 1821-1866. 2. Romania-Politics and government- 1866-1914. 3. Romania - Foreign relations - Soviet Union. 4. Soviet Union - Foreign relations - Romania. I. Title. DR242.J44 1984 949.8'01 82-23578 ISBN 0 52125318 7 hardback ISBN 0 521 52251 X paperback

Contents

List of maps and illustrations Preface Introduction: The establishment of Russian influence in the Danubian Principalities I The Russian protectorate Toward a Russian protectorate: the Greek revolution, Tudor Vladimirescu, and the Russo-Turkish War The protectorate established The resistance to the protectorate: the national opposition and the revolutions of 1848 The protectorate renewed, 1849-1854 The Romanian emigration The Crimean War II T h e European guardianship The Romanian question at the Paris conference The implementation of the congress decisions: the double election of Alexander Cuza III T h e Cuza era, 1859-1866 The recognition of the double election The administrative and legislative union of the Principalities Revolutionary Europe The Dedicated Monasteries

Page vii ix 1 16 21 31 39 50 52 55 61 66 71 101 102 109 122 130

Contents The coup d'e'tat of 1864

142

The overthrow of Cuza

146

IV Prince Charles, 1866-1871

153

The provisional government

153

The accession of a foreign prince

164

The first years of Charles's reign, 1866-1869

1*79

T h e crisis of 1870-1871

198

V Prince Charles, 1871-1878: the Eastern crisis

215

The Catargiu government: the first period

215

The St. Petersburg agency

219

The commercial conventions

221

The first phase of the Eastern crisis: Romanian neutrality

227

Toward a Russian agreement

241

War and independence

259

The Congress of Berlin

277

The implementation of the Treaty of Berlin

286

Conclusion

292

Notes

301

Bibliography

335

Index

346

VI

Maps and illustrations

MAPS

The Ottoman Balkans, 1815 The Danubian Principalities, 1859 Between pages 148 6- i^p ILLUSTRATIONS AND MAP

Alexander Cuza Prince Charles Nicholas I Alexander II A contemporary American map of the military operations in the summer of 1877.

Vll

page 18 99

Preface

The purpose of this narrative is twofold: on the one hand, to examine the role played by tsarist Russia in the formation of an independent Romanian state, and on the other, to study the reaction of a Balkan nationality to the influence of a neighboring great power that was both a protector and a menace. The period of emphasis is the years from 1821, when a revolt with both Romanian and Greek leadership occurred in the Danubian Principalities, to 1878, when Romanian independence was accepted by the powers in the Treaty of Berlin. All of the events pertaining to Russian-Romanian relations do not receive equal attention; the weight is placed on those episodes that were crucial to the formation of the modern Romanian state and its leadership: the establishment of the Russian protectorate, the revolution of 1848, the reorganization of the Principalities after 1856, the double election of Alexander Cuza and his subsequent unification of the administrations and legislatures of the Principalities, the advent of Charles of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen in 1866, and, finally, the Balkan crisis of 1875-1878. The relationship of Russia and the Romanian Principalities involved far more than the issues common in diplomatic history. The conservative nature of Russian autocracy and the basically liberal stance of the Romanian national leadership after 1848 made political ideology a major cause of friction. The Russian government was always deeply concerned about the political institutions established in the Principalities. In addition, two related questions, the revolutionary movements and the status of Orthodox institutions, played a major role in the mutual relationship. The Russian government throughout the nineteenth century was repeatedly troubled by the fact that the Principalities were a center of revolutionary agitation, both national and liberal, IX

Preface which involved dangers for Russian interests. At the same time Russian officials watched diligently over the interests of the Orthodox church not only in the Romanian lands, but throughout the Balkans. The protection of Orthodoxy was regarded as a religious duty as well as a good policy for the securing of Russian influence in the peninsula. Less attention is devoted to economic and social issues, except as they relate to diplomatic, political, and ideological questions. In the period under study Russia and the Principalities had parallel, but not competitive, economies. Both were agricultural, and large estates worked by peasant labor prevailed. Their social structures were also similar. In both, the landed aristocracy held absolute social, economic, and political preponderance. The Romanian peasants were enserfed until the middle of the eighteenth century, the Russian until the 1860s. That decade witnessed land reforms in both areas. The large estates were divided, with a part of the land given to the peasants in return for redemption payments. Because both regions were exporters of grain, there was some limited competition for markets between Russian and Romanian producers, but this condition never caused major conflicts like those that arose, for instance, between Romania and the Habsburg Monarchy over similar issues. Both governments were in theory under autocratic rule, either by tsar or by sultan. In fact, in each the predominating influence was exerted by landowners or those connected with landed interests. As the nineteenth century progressed, other educated groups in both societies - the government officials, army officers, merchants, lawyers, writers, and teachers - played an ever-increasing role in politics. Because neither region had an industrial economy, workers and capitalists, with their unique interests and problems, had little influence. In the Principalities, where commerce tended to be in the hands of those of a non-Romanian background, including Jews, Greeks, Armenians, and Germans, businessmen were not major participants in political life, although there were important exceptions. In both Russia and the Principalities the peasantry, the overwhelming majority of the population, was effectively excluded from political affairs. They had almost as little actual representation under the Romanian constitutional system as under the Russian autocratic institutions. In terms of power, whether political or military, Russia and the Principalities were entirely unequal. By the beginning of the eighteenth century Russia was a great European power with a vast national territory and a strong army; the Romanian Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia were weak states under Ottoman control. However, although they were a part of this Muslim empire, they did enjoy, at least in theory,

Preface certain rights that separated them from the rest of the sultan's domains. In contrast to other Balkan lands, they were never Turkish pashaliks. Thus Ottoman administrators did not directly govern Romanian lands. Instead the Principalities were entrusted to native princes, often called hospodars in the diplomatic correspondence of the day. Their power in turn rested on the support of a native aristocracy, the boyars, who controlled local administration. Despite the fact that they enjoyed internal autonomy, the Principalities were under Ottoman jurisdiction as far as foreign policy and military matters were concerned. In their relationship with the Porte (a term regularly used in diplomatic correspondence, along with Sublime Porte, to refer to the Ottoman government), the position of the provinces varied over time. A low point was reached in the eighteenth century. In addition to submitting to the suzerain powers of the sultan, the Principalities were required to pay a large tribute as well as certain taxes and gifts, and the Ottoman authorities had the right of preemption over Romanian agricultural products. Constantinople in the eighteenth century was provisioned from these rich lands. This narrative deals mainly with events in Moldavia and Wallachia. Although a predominantly Romanian population lived in Transylvania and Bukovina, under Habsburg rule, and in Bessarabia, under Russian control after 1812, the affairs of these regions only marginally affected Russian relations with the Romanian political center, that is, with the Danubian Principalities. Therefore developments in these areas are discussed only as they became important in international relations or played a major role in the Romanian national movement. At this time both Russia and the Principalities, as Orthodox states, used the Julian rather than the Gregorian calendar. Therefore double dates are usually given. It is, unfortunately, at times difficult to determine which system was used in a particular document. A Russian or Romanian writing from Paris, for instance, might employ either style. When doubt exists, the date on the document cited is used. Otherwise, all single dates are in the new style. Some difficulties are also to be encountered in the spelling of proper names. Many Russian and Romanian diplomats, for instance, used French versions of their names. In this text the form that is in common use today has generally been adopted. Some first names have been anglicized; others remain in their national spelling. Geographic place names are usually in the form commonly used in diplomatic histories and in the documentation. It is thus, for instance, Jassy, not Ia§i, and Plevna, not Pleven. A completely standard and uniform system is an impossibility. This narrative is based primarily on Russian and Romanian diploxi

Preface matic documentation, material that is listed in the Bibliography. Because of the great amount of writing on diplomatic history and in particular on the "Eastern Question," that is, on the international controversies caused by the decline of the Ottoman Empire, the notes are of necessity limited to a citation of documents and the major works in Russian and Romanian used in the preparation of this book. Only some of the many valuable works in other languages have been included. Similar limitations have been placed on the Bibliography. The author wishes to thank Professors Keith Hitchins, University of Illinois; Frederick Kellogg, University of Arizona; and Paul E. Michelson, Huntington College, for their comments on the manuscript. Her husband, Charles Jelavich, as usual, had a major part in the preparation of the book. She would also like to acknowledge her deep gratitude for the assistance given her in her research in the archives and libraries in Romania. As before, she would like to thank Serge Giers for allowing her to use the papers of his grandfather. The preparation of this study was aided immensely by a fellowship from the American Council of Learned Societies, which allowed the author the time necessary for research and writing, and by research grants from the Office of Research and Advanced Studies, Indiana University, which covered, in particular, copying and microfilm expenses. The author is also indebted to Debbie Chase, who typed the final manuscript; to Lin Maria Riotto, who prepared the index; and especially to Janis Bolster, whose expert editorial comments added much to the final text.

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Alexander Cuza

Prince Charles

Nicholas I

Alexander II

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A contemporary American map of the military operations in the summer of 1877. F. V. Greene, Report on the Russian Army and its Campaigns in Turkey in 1877-1878: Atlas (New York: Appleton, 1879).

Introduction: the establishment of Russian influence in the Danubian Principalities

Although Russian influence over political life in the Principalities did not become firmly established until the Treaty of Kuchuk Kainardji in 1774, Russian actions were already playing an important role in their internal development at the beginning of the eighteenth century. The main direction of the policy of Peter the Great was toward the Baltic rather than the Black Sea, but he had early in his career also shown an interest in expansion southward toward the Black Sea and, in particular, in the acquisition of Azov. The entire question of Russian relations with the Ottoman Empire became especially acute when in 1709, after his defeat at Poltava, Charles XII of Sweden fled to Constantinople and there, with French assistance, attempted to stir the Porte into action. His efforts met with success, and in 1711 the Ottoman Empire declared war on Russia. Within the Principalities the Russian victory over the Swedish king made a deep impression. The temptation was strong to enter into relations with the Russian court in an attempt to break the Ottoman control over the Principalities. Accordingly, both Constantine Brincoveanu, the prince of Wallachia, and Dimitrie Cantemir, the ruler of Moldavia, opened negotiations with Peter. In April 1711 Cantemir and Peter concluded the Treaty of Luck. This pact of mutual assistance placed Moldavia under Russian political control; the terms stated that Cantemir, the boyars, and all of the Romanian population would henceforth be considered the Russian ruler's faithful subjects. Other sections of the treaty guaranteed Cantemir's personal and political future. Engaged in a struggle with the boyars, the prince used his Russian connection to strengthen his own position. The terms of the treaty thus declared that "all the state power will rest in the hands of the prince," that the no-

Introduction bility and the subject population should submit to his orders, and that the cities should be regarded as "his own property." Should the new allies lose the war, Cantemir was to emigrate to Russia, where he and his family would be supported in a proper manner by the Russian treasury.1 After a similar understanding had been reached with Brincoveanu, Peter launched in June 1711 an ambitious Balkan campaign. In a pattern that was to be a standard feature of Russian policy during the next two centuries, he called upon the Ottoman Balkan Christians to rise in his support. The Russian armies crossed the Pruth River and advanced as far as Jassy. Although Cantemir fulfilled his alliance obligations, Brincoveanu remained passive. In July, when the Russian troops were surrounded, Peter was forced to make a treaty with the Ottoman Empire that contained highly unfavorable terms. Cantemir, who was placed in a dangerous situation, left with the Russian army. He subsequently lived in St. Petersburg, where he pursued a highly productive literary career. In accordance with the promises in the previous treaty, he received from the Russian government fifty villages and fifty thousand serfs, together with two houses in the Russian capital. His family and his descendants were subsequently to hold prominent positions in Russian service. Brincoveanu remained on the Wallachian throne until 1714, when he and his four sons were executed for suspected treasonous relations with the Habsburg Monarchy. The Russian defeat had enormous political consequences for the Principalities and resulted in a severe restriction of their autonomous position. Since the Ottoman government no longer trusted the native boyars, it henceforth appointed the princes only from among the ranks of the Phanariot Greeks. This group derived its name from the Phanar, or Lighthouse, district of Constantinople, which was not only the residence of the Orthodox patriarch, but also the home of many Greek or Hellenized families who had come to be closely associated with the Ottoman administration. Although those of Greek background predominated, some were of Italian, Romanian, or other ancestry. Often extremely wealthy, they had won their power and riches through their service to the Porte and through exploiting the economic opportunities to be gained by this association. Since at this time the highest positions in the Ottoman administration went to those with the money to purchase them, the Phanariot Greeks were in an advantageous situation. For over a century they were thus able to control some of the major posts in the Principalities. They were also deeply involved in other aspects of Ottoman foreign affairs and internal administration.

Introduction The Phanariot period is usually pictured as the worst in modern Romanian history. Although the Porte did not divide the Romanian lands into pashaliks or send in regular troops to occupy the land, it did place the provinces under extreme fiscal pressure.2 Undergoing a century of internal economic decline, domestic political chaos, and repeated defeat on the battlefield, the Ottoman government regarded the relatively rich Principalities as excellent sources of tax revenues and food supplies for the army and the population of Constantinople. The Phanariot princes became the agents of the Porte for the collection of these prizes. Some were indeed responsible for important reforms, but the majority represented the interests of the central government more than those of the people whom they ruled. This situation also resulted from the conditions under which they governed. Themselves the victims of the Ottoman system, the Phanariot princes held office but a short time. They thus did not have the opportunity to become closely acquainted with or to identify their interests with those of the Principalities, although they often became large property owners in the region. Naturally, the native boyars, belonging to the formerly dominating class, deeply resented the power and influence of the new princes, despite the fact that they usually cooperated closely with them. The temptation for certain groups of boyars to look for assistance to foreign courts, in particular Vienna and St. Petersburg, was accordingly strong. After the defeat of Peter, the Habsburg Monarchy stood in the forefront of the European powers from whom dissident boyars might expect aid against the Porte. Some of these men were willing to accept Habsburg suzerainty over the Principalities as long as the boyar domination of local government was retained. In 1718, when Austria gained Oltenia and the Banat in the Treaty of Passarowitz, they were able to experience the consequences of Habsburg rule directly. At first the region was allowed a measure of autonomy, with boyar control retained. The administration was in the hands of a council under the ban, or governor, George Cantacuzino. However, at this time the Austrian court had other objectives in mind for Oltenia. With the intention of converting the new possession into a major grain-producing area to supply the imperial army, the Habsburg officials were more interested in establishing a centralized, efficient administration than in protecting the interests of the Romanian aristocrats. The introduction of imperial institutions both reduced the political power of the boyars and increased the obligations of the peasants who worked the land. Habsburg rule thus lost much of its attraction as an alternative to Ottoman suzerainty. Moreover, throughout the century the Habsburg government was especially

Introduction interested in expansion directly southward into the lands of the western half of the Balkan peninsula. It therefore had less need to win the support of, or to make promises to, the Romanian leadership. In contrast to the Habsburg Monarchy, the Russian government recognized the prime strategic importance of the Romanian lands in its continuing struggle with the Porte. Throughout the period of this narrative the Russian leaders, tsars and officials alike, were fully aware of the role that the Principalities would play in their conflicts with the Ottoman Empire, both as staging areas for campaigns against Constantinople and as a source of agricultural supplies for the army. In 1736 the continuing Russian pressure against the Khanate of the Crimea, an Ottoman tributary state, and the lands north of the Black Sea led to the outbreak of further hostilities. Austria joined the conflict in 1737.3 Although the initial Russian campaign was conducted in the steppe zone and the Crimea, in 1739 an army under the command of General Miinnich entered Jassy. The Moldavian boyars once again welcomed foreign intervention, but their hopes were disappointed. First, Austria was forced to make a peace in September 1739 in which it surrendered most of the gains of the Treaty of Passarowitz, including Oltenia. The Russian government, after signing a similar agreement, withdrew from the Romanian lands and kept finally only the city of Azov. For the next thirty years, from 1739 to 1768, the Principalities enjoyed a period of peace. At this time, during the reigns of Constantine Mavrocordat in both Wallachia and Moldavia, reforms were introduced in both principalities. Since the measures affected the privileged position of the boyars, in particular their relations with the peasants, this group became even more hostile to the Phanariot princes and more willing to look abroad for assistance against the Ottoman-sponsored regime. With the accession of Catherine the Great in 1762, Russian policy became more adventurous and aggressive, especially in regard to Poland and the Ottoman lands north of the Black Sea. In 1768 the Porte declared war as a result of Russian encroachments in Poland, and once more Russian armies entered the Principalities. At the same time a fleet was sent from the Baltic to the eastern Mediterranean to challenge the Ottoman navy. Since the Russian forces were almost uniformly victorious, the hopes of the native boyars were again high. The political status they preferred was the establishment of two independent principalities, but under the protection of one or more of the great powers - Russia, Austria, or even Prussia. The question of annexation by Russia, with the maintenance of internal autonomy, although discussed, was an unrealistic alternative. All of the European states at this time were extremely apprehensive about the Russian intentions. In fact, the

Introduction Treaty of Kuchuk Kainardji of 1774, which brought peace, was concluded under great-power pressure to prevent Russia from making even wider gains at Ottoman expense. The first partition of Poland, in 1772, was arranged in part as a diversion to hinder Catherine from making further demands on the Porte. Even with these limitations, the Treaty of Kuchuk Kainardji was a major triumph for Russia, and it is a landmark in the Russian advance to the south and west. Its terms gave Russia lands between the Bug and the Dnieper rivers, formerly in the possession of the Khanate of the Crimea. The latter state was declared independent, a condition that left it open to eventual Russian annexation. Russia also gained important commercial privileges. Its ships were allowed the right of free navigation in the Black Sea, which had previously been closed to non-Ottoman shipping, and through the Straits into the Mediterranean. The Russian government could now appoint consuls in Ottoman cities, and it was to enjoy commercial rights there similar to those which had been previously granted to France and Britain. In the highly controversial Article 7 Russia received what was later interpreted by its diplomats as the right to speak in behalf of the Orthodox population of the Ottoman Empire. The presence of Russian shipping in the Black Sea and the official representation in Jassy and Bucharest were, of course, to be of great significance for the future, but even more important was Article 16, which related directly to the Principalities and gave Russia the right to oversee Romanian internal life. Of the ten points, the most significant was the last, which stated: "The Porte likewise permits that, according as circumstances of the two principalities may require, the ministers of the Imperial Court of Russia .. . may speak in their favor, and promises to listen to them with the attention that is due to friendly and respected Powers/'4 In other sections of this article the Ottoman government granted amnesty to those who fought with Russia, gave assurances of tax relief, allowed those who wished to emigrate to Russia to do so, and agreed in no way to obstruct the free exercise of religion or the building and repairing of churches. The princes were also permitted to send official representatives to Constantinople to defend their interests. Although this treaty brought undoubted benefits to the Principalities, Moldavia in the same period was forced to accept the Habsburg Monarchy's annexation of Bukovina, which was claimed as a reward for theoretical services rendered in the conclusion of the peace. Unable to hinder the cession, because of its military vulnerability, the Porte accepted the action in 1775. The Treaty of Kuchuk Kainardji, in officially recognizing Russian

Introduction rights of intervention, gave the great northern power a major voice in all subsequent political changes in the Principalities.5 In the ensuing years the Russian statesmen made full use of their privileges, both to extend Romanian autonomous rights and also to tie the provinces closer to their interests. With Russian encouragement the Porte next proceeded to make a series of declarations and agreements that defined the obligations of the Principalities to the Porte and gave certain political guarantees. The most important of these were the Hatti Sherif of 1774, the Sened of 1783, and the Hatti Sherif of 1784. In these the payments due the Porte from the provinces received closer definition, and the already existing exclusion of Muslims as residents or property owners in the Principalities was reconfirmed. Russian influence was also strengthened. The Porte agreed that the princes were not to be removed arbitrarily and that depositions would be carried out only in agreement with Russia. When the Porte in 1786 dismissed Alexander Mavrocordat in Moldavia without consulting St. Petersburg, the Russian representative in Constantinople immediately protested the action as a violation of treaties. In addition to the strengthening of its position in the Principalities, the Russian government was concerned with exploiting other gains made in the treaty. In 1779 the Treaty of Ainali Kavak, which was followed by another agreement in 1783, gave Russia additional commercial rights. Much attention was directed toward developing the newly annexed territory, including the Crimea, which became a part of the Russian Empire in 1783. Colonists were brought in not only from Russia, but from other lands, in particular from the German states. Efforts were also made to build up Russian naval power; Kherson became the major base, and construction of a Black Sea fleet was begun. The Russian colonization of the former Ottoman lands and the establishment of a naval presence in the Black Sea profoundly altered the power balance in the area. Despite the enormous gains of the previous years, Catherine was not content. As long as Maria Theresa remained empress of Austria, Catherine could not tempt her into an alliance aimed at further advances at the expense of the Porte. After Maria Theresa's death, when Joseph II proved easier to influence, the Russian empress proceeded to propose nothing less than the full partition of the Ottoman possessions in Europe, as well as the distribution of some of the Asiatic lands of the sultan. In an exchange of letters in 1782 Joseph and Catherine agreed upon a division: Austria was to obtain Oltenia, a part of Serbia, Bosnia, and Hercegovina; Istria and Dalmatia, then in Venetian possession, were also assigned to Vienna, with their former owner re6

Introduction ceiving compensation with Crete, Cyprus, and the Peloponnesus. France, which had yet to be approached with the scheme, was allowed Syria and Egypt. The Russian share was to be the largest of all. Two areas, the lands between the Bug and Dniester rivers and territory in the Caucasus, were to be annexed directly. Two puppet kingdoms were then to be established. The first, a revived Greek-Byzantine state, was to include Bulgarian, Macedonian, and Greek territories. Catherine's grandson, Constantine, was the intended ruler, but with the provision that the state should never be united with Russia. The second kingdom, composed of Wallachia, Moldavia, and Bessarabia, was to be named Dacia and placed under an Orthodox prince. It was rumored that Catherine's favorite, Gregory Potemkin, who had done a great deal to build up southern Russia, was a possible candidate. Obviously such wide aims could be achieved only after a crushing military victory. In September 1787 Russia again went to war with the Porte; Austria joined in February 1788. Both governments sent armies into the Principalities. Russian war aims in this campaign were set in November 1787. Despite Catherine's ambitious schemes, the principal objective was the acquisition of the land between the Bug and the Dniester. The establishment of an independent buffer state, comprising Wallachia and Moldavia, was also foreseen. The war, however, did not proceed as expected. The allies found their efforts distracted by the subsequent events in Western Europe connected with the French Revolution; Austria was compelled to make peace in August 1791 because of the dangers in that region. Moreover, in the previous year Joseph II had died; his successor, Leopold I, was more cautious. Events were also not proceeding well for the Russian government. Although the gifted general Alexander Vasil'evich Suvorov was able to win impressive victories in the Principalities, the international situation became increasingly unfavorable for Russia. In 1788 Sweden declared war, an action that prevented the sending of a Russian fleet to the Mediterranean. In addition, the attitude of the other great powers to the Russian efforts was becoming increasingly hostile. Therefore, in the Treaty of Jassy, concluded in 1792, the Russian government contented itself with the acquisition of the territory between the Bug and the Dniester. This agreement, like those preceding, had a great significance for the Principalities. Russia was now a neighbor of Moldavia. Moreover, Article 4 stated that the Porte would abide by the provisions of the previous agreement, and the arrangements concerning taxes, emigration, and amnesty were reaffirmed.6 The Porte was, of course, well aware of the dangers of the increasing

Introduction Russian rights in regard to the Principalities. The Ottoman officials had also witnessed the dubious loyalties of the Romanian boyars. In 1792 and 1793 attempts were made to win the support of this group by a series of declarations and promises concerning the provinces and their unique privileges. Unfortunately for the Porte, the internal weakness of the state and the continuing pressure of the great powers limited its ability to assure a stable and acceptable administration. In fact, during the rule of Constantine Hangerli, prince of Wallachia from 1797 to 1799, Phanariot rule probably reached its lowest point. Not only was the Porte unable to retain the loyalty of its Romanian subjects, but Russian interference continued unabated. Although a period of relative tranquility followed the conclusion of the Treaty of Jassy, Catherine did not abandon her previous objectives in regard to the Principalities. The primary Russian attention, however, was focused on the Polish question and the conclusion of the final partitions of 1793 and 1795. From 1792 to 1796 the Russian agents in the Principalities concentrated their efforts on winning adherents among the boyar families and maintaining and consolidating their predominant influence.7 At this time the center of Russian activities was Jassy, where the consulate-general was located. The Russian officials were particularly concerned with assuring that the princes were in their camp. In this endeavor they soon faced competition, not only from the Porte, but from France. Although Sultan Selim III wished to maintain the peace, he also continued the traditional Ottoman policy of close ties with France. Deeply concerned about his military weakness, he embarked upon a period of military reform for which he depended on French advisers and support. From their advantageous position in Constantinople, the French diplomats wished to extend their influence into the Principalities. In 1796 a temporary agent was dispatched to Bucharest; in 1797 regular representatives were appointed for the Principalities. They joined the Russian agents, who had held office since 1782, and the Austrians, who arrived in 1783; British representation was not established until 1803. From the Russian viewpoint, the French presence introduced a disturbing element. Like their Russian colleagues, the French consuls attempted to play between the factions in Romanian politics and to set up their own party of clients and supporters. The French actions caused annoyance and anxiety in St. Petersburg for other reasons too. The Russian government was well aware that the French agents in the Principalities could keep a close eye on Russian military preparations across the border. French advisers to the sultan were involved in the strengthening of the Ottoman fortifications .

8

Introduction in the area, in particular the strongholds of Bender, Ismail, and Akkerman. The Polish situation was also a consideration. With the defeat of the national forces, bands of Polish rebels crossed into Moldavia. Not only were these groups ferociously anti-Russian, but they also formed a center for the dissemination of French revolutionary ideas and propaganda. The Russian officials feared their possible influence within Russia and the role that they could play in support of France in this strategically sensitive area. Because of these additional considerations the Russian government continued to keep a close watch on Romanian affairs; it remained particularly concerned about the attitude of the princes and the possible attraction of France for them. These apprehensions led the Russian diplomats to insist on the replacement in 1795 of the prince of Moldavia, Michael Sutu, with Alexander Callimachi, who henceforth acted in the Russian interest. Similarly, in 1796 in Wallachia, Alexander Moruzi was replaced by the apparently more ardent Russian partisan Alexander Ipsilanti. Despite the declared aim of good relations with the Porte, Catherine began diplomatic preparations for a more active policy. In an agreement negotiated in 1794, Austria and Russia decided that the Principalities should be united to form an independent state under Russian control. In 1795 Britain adhered to this pact; a favorable attitude could also be expected from Prussia. Further Russian campaigns against the Porte, however, were hindered by the death of Catherine in 1796. Her son and successor, Paul, reacted against what he considered the overly aggressive and expansionistic activities of his mother. He preferred an accommodation with the Porte to further territorial gains at Ottoman expense. Adopting a policy of maintaining the empire, rather than partitioning it among the powers, he sought to establish Russia instead of France as the government with the principal influence in the sultan's councils. Russian political predominance in Constantinople and the support of the territorial integrity of the empire were to become henceforth a standard alternative policy for the Russian diplomats should a program of partition seem unfeasible or dangerous. In the 1790s European diplomacy was dominated by the ambitious schemes of Napoleon. The Russian position in Constantinople was immensely strengthened when in 1798 Napoleon launched an attack on Egypt; on the way he picked up the Ottoman possessions of the Ionian Islands and Malta. France, not Russia, had become the principal danger to the Porte. In September 1798, for thefirsttime, a Russian fleet sailed through the Bosphorus and anchored outside Constantinople.8 An alliance agreement negotiated in 1799 contained a secret

Introduction clause permitting the Russian fleet to pass freely in and out of the Straits; Britain subsequently adhered to this treaty. A joint RussianOttoman operation was next launched against the French-held Ionian Islands, which quickly fell before this assault. Since Russia was an ally of the Ottoman Empire and a supporter of its territorial integrity, Russian officials in the Principalities of necessity adopted a passive policy. Even during the unfortunate period of Hangerli's rule, when conditions were extremely bad, no move was made in the Romanian interest. In March 1801 Paul was murdered; he was succeeded by his son, Alexander I. At the end of his reign Paul was in the process of breaking with his allies and entering into negotiations with France. His successor, while not pursuing this policy, did favor a position of neutrality. In October Russia made peace with France, and in the following year Britain and the Ottoman Empire reached similar agreements with Paris. The Porte was to be spared further fighting until 1806. During this period a bitter battle for supreme influence was fought out in Constantinople among the representatives of Russia, France, and Britain. Undergoing a process of internal dissolution that was accompanied by the rise of strong local military leaders, the Porte tended to follow the dictates of the power that appeared to have the greatest military resources at the moment. Meanwhile, the attention of Europe had shifted from the Near East and Mediterranean to Central Europe, where the great battles for Continental predominance were being fought. For Russia too the main concerns centered on Europe proper. However, its government continued to pursue certain definite aims in the Principalities. Following a policy of expansion in Georgia and the settlement of the southern steppelands, the Russian government wished to assure that a stable situation existed in the region and that friendly regimes held power in the Principalities. French activity, in particular, continued to cause concern. The blocking of foreign intrigues and the winning of as many partisans as possible from among the Romanian boyars remained standard Russian objectives. The annexation of the Principalities, or their reduction to the position of Russian vassals, also continued to be considered. From 1796 to 1801, as we have seen, Russian activities remained circumscribed. After this date new considerations led to a change of policy. By this time the Porte had lost control over large sections of its lands in the Balkans, Asia Minor, and North Africa to local notables, the ayans, who organized their own military forces, set up personal regimes in their districts, and successfully defied the central authority. 10

Introduction Unable to assemble the military force needed to subdue these rebels, the Ottoman government attempted to pit one against another. Pasvanoglu Osman Pasha, with his center in the city of Vidin, was among the most successful of the ayans. He was able to organize a dangerous band of bandits, political dissenters, and rebellious janissaries. Usually at odds with the central government, he fed and paid his followers by organizing raids on the surrounding Bulgarian, Serbian, and Wallachian lands. His actions were particularly devastating for Wallachia, which had no local force of sufficient strength to counter these attacks. Boyars, peasants, merchants, and clerics alike were forced to flee to Transylvania. Some boyars favored calling in Russian troops, since the Ottoman army could not handle the situation. Although the question was a matter of negotiation between Russia and the Porte, the latter naturally hesitated to accept Russian military aid that might lead to a further weakening of Ottoman control in the Principalities. Nevertheless, the Russian government was able to use the opportunity to increase its treaty rights. Under Russian pressure the Ottoman Empire in 1802 issued a hatti sherif that confirmed the former privileges and immunities of the Principalities and offered further advantages both to the inhabitants and to the Russian government. The term of office of the prince was set at seven years; he could not be deposed unless he was proved guilty of a crime and then only with Russian concurrence. Article 4 gave explicit recognition to the Russian influence in the domestic affairs of both Principalities: "The hospodars will take into consideration the representations that the Russian envoy will make to them."9 Other parts of this document, together with additional acts issued in 1802 and 1803, enlarged and defined the provisions of the previous hatti sherifs and the Sened of 1783, The rights at this point enjoyed by Russia caused concern among contemporary statesmen. The Habsburg minister, Prince Clemens von Metternich, considered that the Porte had for all practical purposes surrendered its suzerainty over the Principalities. The French ambassador at Constantinople, General Brune, observed that "the protection over the Wallachians and Moldavians allowed by the treaties to Russia has become a sovereignty, almost without disguise/'10 The lull in military activity among the great powers in the Mediterranean and the Balkans came to an end in 1805 when France and Russia resumed the war. A Russian naval squadron was once again active in the Adriatic. As before, the allegiance of the Porte was important to both belligerents. Because of its own military impotence, the Ottoman government tended to side with the power that it saw as the ulti11

Introduction mate victor. In August 1806, probably as a result of French suggestions, the Porte removed the Russian candidates Ipsilanti and Moruzi and replaced them with Alecu Sutu and Scarlat Callimachi. Since the action was carried through without consultation with Russia, it was in violation of the previous treaties. Although the Porte very soon regretted its decision and restored the former princes, Russian troops were sent into the Principalities in November. In December 1806 the Porte declared war despite the extremely unfavorable military situation that it faced. The Ottoman difficulties were compounded when in 1807 France and Russia signed the Treaty of Tilsit, thus depriving the Porte of the hope of French assistance. Moreover, the agreement dealt directly with the Ottoman Empire's problems and contained provisions potentially disastrous for that government. Alexander I and Napoleon agreed that France should attempt to mediate between the Porte and Russia. Should this effort fail, the two signatory powers would discuss a division of the Ottoman Empire. During a meeting at Erfurt in 1808, when no agreement or armistice had been achieved, Napoleon and Alexander decided that Russia should annex the Principalities, but they did not consider further partition plans. Meanwhile, the Ottoman position continued to deteriorate. In 1804 a revolt had broken out in Serbia, which the Ottoman army was unable to crush. In 1807 a rebellion in Constantinople resulted in the deposition of Selim III and his replacement, first by Mustafa IV, and then by Mahmud II. The provincial ayans still defied the central power. After 1807 negotiations continued between the Russian and Ottoman representatives over possible peace conditions. They failed to reach a successful conclusion largely because of the Ottoman refusal to abandon the Principalities. From 1806, when their armies entered the Principalities, until 1812, when a peace agreement was finally signed, Russian officials administered both Moldavia and Wallachia. During this occupation they worked principally through the divans and their boyar partisans. Their main concern was assuring supplies to the army, which not only was in occupation of the Principalities, but was waging a war against the Porte. At first the Russian government relied primarily on Constantine Ipsilanti, who had been ruler of Moldavia from 1799 to 1801 and of Wallachia from 1802 to 1806, and who in 1807 was appointed prince of Wallachia. His loyalty to Russia seemed assured. He had previously called for Russian intervention against Pasvanoglu; in 1806 he had encouraged the Russian government to invade. At that time he had offered assurances that the provinces could provide both financial and military assistance and that there would be no difficulty in 12

Introduction finding provisions for the Russian troops. These promises could not be fulfilled. Once in the Principalities the Russian authorities found it extremely difficult to obtain adequate supplies in this impoverished region. They also had to deal with opposition from those boyars who disliked Ipsilanti and the Russian occupation. The situation was made worse by the intrigues of the Russian military commanders, who involved themselves in the social and political life of the region. In August 1807 Ipsilanti was removed from office and sent to Russia, but he was given an estate near Moscow as a reward for his services. The administration of the Principalities was next placed in the hands of a Russian official, Sergei S. Kushnikov, assisted by a group of Russian clerks and officials. Their major immediate problem was securing supplies for the army. If sufficient food and materiel could not be provided through official channels, the army simply seized what it wanted. This situation was bound to create a great deal of animosity among the peasantry, who were directly affected by these actions. The burden of supporting a Russian army and administration at this time, as in the past and the future, was extremely heavy. Moreover, both provinces had been impoverished by the previous extortionate methods of government and taxation, and Wallachia had suffered from the repeated raids of Pasvanoglu. On top of these problems, the cost of the Russian occupation was to prove devastating. One study of this question contains this description: A Russian source states that in 1808 the income of Wallachia was 2,737,809 lei, of which 1,969,968 lei were spent for the maintenance of the army. In 1809 Wallachia contributed a similar percentage of her income to the Russians. In Moldavia, the 1809 income was 2,561,866 lei, of which 1,569,720 lei was spent on the army. Moldavia contributed an even greater percentage of its income to the Russians in 1811. Romanian sources indicate that during the war more than half of the Principalities' income went to supply the Russian army . . . By the end of 1809 almost all of the working cattle and wagons in the Principalities were being used to move supplies for the army. 11

In addition to the friction caused by problems of military supply, the administration of the region proved frustrating for conscientious Russian officials, who attempted to introduce orderly methods into the Principalities. Where previously government business had tended to be conducted orally and informally, the Russian representatives preferred written records and formal procedures. Individual officials also continued to involve themselves in local politics and often on opposite sides. In March 1810 Kushnikov was replaced by V. I. KrasnoMilashevich. Meanwhile, negotiations continued between the Ottoman Empire and 13

Introduction Russia. The principal stumbling block to peace was the status of the Principalities. At first the Russian government sought control of both provinces; in 1811 the demand was reduced to Moldavia. Russian relations with France were by this time in a process of swift decline. With the increasing probability that war with France would again break out, the Russian representatives were more willing to make concessions to the Porte. The chief issue in the negotiations remained the line of the new boundary: the Porte wished to draw it at the Pruth; Russia insisted on the Sereth. Finally, in May 1812, the two powers signed the Treaty of Bucharest.12 Among the articles affecting the interests of the Principalities, the most important was the cession to Russia of the territory between the Dniester and the Pruth, which came to be known as Bessarabia. Since the border ran along the Kilia Channel of the Danube Delta, Russia became a riparian power of that river. The treaty also reconfirmed the previous privileges granted to the Principalities, including those which gave the Russian government predominant influence. After the negotiation of the treaty the Russian troops were withdrawn from the Principalities and sent home to meet the French invasion. The Ottoman government was not happy with the agreement: the chief negotiators were beheaded. Neither the Porte nor the Principalities were directly involved in the great campaigns that resulted in the final defeat of Napoleon. Nor were Ottoman or Balkan problems the subject of negotiation at the Congress of Vienna. For the Principalities the Treaty of Bucharest was to inaugurate a period of relative peace. Nevertheless, most of the major political problems remained to be settled. The rule of the Phanariot princes still caused deep resentment; it could also be expected that the Porte would, where possible, attempt to undermine Russian influence in the region. The major issue of which power should predominate had not yet been conclusively settled. The eighteenth century was thus, as we have seen, a period of almost continual conflict for the Principalities. In an age of rapid expansion the Russian government correctly assessed the enormous strategic significance of the provinces. In turn, at least some sections of the Romanian aristocratic leadership recognized that the Russian court was the best source of support against the Ottoman suzerain. Both benefited from the relationship thus established. Russian armies did use the Principalities as a staging area and a source of supplies in their campaigns against the Porte. In return, and largely because of Russian pressure, the Principalities received from the Porte a further confirmation and a more exact definition of their privileges. However, at the same time the Ottoman government was forced to grant to the Russian 14

Introduction government special rights of intervention in the internal affairs of the Principalities. Thus, as Ottoman influence weakened, that of Russia increased proportionately. In addition to the military aspects of the problem, the Russian government had other objectives in the Principalities, ones that varied with the circumstances of the moment. At times the Russian officials and their boyar partisans thought of a full annexation of one or both of the provinces; the erection of puppet states, such as Catherine's kingdom of Dacia, was also considered. Toward the end of the century another alternative, Russian domination of the Ottoman government, became a possibility. In this case the Russian diplomats preferred the maintenance of Ottoman integrity and thus full Turkish control over the Principalities. At no time was the establishment of a truly independent Romanian political unit a matter of serious consideration. By 1812 a sort of compromise had been reached. Russia annexed directly only Bessarabia. Although puppet kingdoms were not formed, Russia gained a position of political domination through the treaty provisions that allowed its officials to intervene in the internal affairs of the Principalities and to act as a kind of intermediary in relations between the Porte and its Romanian subjects. As far as the Romanian leadership was concerned, there was as yet, of course, no true national government. The Phanariot princes, except under unusual circumstances, acted as agents of the Porte. The boyars, whose ranks were weakened by internal divisions, were as much interested in maintaining their privileged social and economic position as they were in resisting foreign control. In their opposition to Phanariot rule and Ottoman fiscal exactions, many were indeed willing to turn to Russia, as well as to the Habsburg Empire and France. Because of its geographic position, Russia offered the best hope of effective assistance against Constantinople. Nevertheless, Russian power and prestige themselves constituted a danger. The next half century was to demonstrate the difficulties in the relationship and to show whether the Principalities could accept Russian backing against the Ottoman suzerain and retain at least a degree of political autonomy.

CHAPTER I

The Russian protectorate

With the establishment of peace in 1815 the Russian government had occasion to be well satisfied with European conditions. After the menace of French aggression and French-supported revolutionary upheaval was suppressed, Russia emerged as the predominant Continental military power. Joined in close alignment with the Habsburg Monarchy and Prussia, a combination usually referred to as the Holy Alliance, the Russian government was a part of the most important European alliance system. With the acquisition of the major share of Poland, it also had no more territorial claims in the West. Weary of war and revolutionary upheaval, and with few pressing foreign policy objectives, Russia became the principal supporter of the status quo in European politics. Russia's relations with the Ottoman Empire could be viewed with similar satisfaction. If the Porte kept its treaty obligations, the Russian government was in a position to dominate the internal politics of the Principalities and to play a major role in the relations of the Ottoman government with its Orthodox subjects. During the eighteenth century, as we have seen, Russia waged repeated campaigns with the aim of attaining certain territorial objectives. This direction of policy was, at least temporarily, to be reversed. The Russian government now wished to maintain the status quo in the Near East as well as in Europe. With the achievement of the Pruth boundary, the Russian leaders recognized that they had little more to gain by an aggressive policy in either area. The desire to maintain the conditions of 1815 went beyond the territorial settlement reached at the Congress of Vienna. In addition, Tsar Alexander I was to become deeply concerned about the maintenance of the conservative regimes in power after the defeat of Napoleon. For 16

The Russian protectorate Russia, as for other European states, the long period of the wars of the French Revolution and Napoleon had involved not only the threat of French Continental domination, but also that of the overthrow of established governments and their replacement by revolutionary regimes. However, it is important to emphasize that Alexander, despite his support of the suppression of revolts after 1815, was not against political reform if it were carried through by regular means. Following the principles of enlightened despotism, he favored the introduction of orderly administrative procedures and just legal systems in states suffering from the evils of corruption and misgovernment, but these measures were to be introduced from above by the legitimate authorities. He also was not against constitutional government: he was, after all, a constitutional monarch at least in theory in the Congress Kingdom, established after 1815 in the Russian-dominated Polish lands. What he was to combat with intensity was the overthrow of legitimate governments by force and violence. With these convictions he was able to work well with Metternich, who shared a similar outlook. When revolutionary movements broke out first in the German and Italian states and then in Spain, Portugal, and South America, the conservative monarchies - Russia, the Habsburg Empire, and Prussia - together adopted a policy calling for armed intervention by outside states in support of legitimate governments. Although these policies were followed with relative consistency in Western and Central Europe, some adjustments had to be made in the Russian attitude toward events in the Ottoman lands. Russia usually backed Serbian demands for increased autonomy despite the revolts of 1804 and 1815. Moreover, as we have seen, Russia had acquired certain treaty rights in regard to the Balkan Christians, in particular in the treaties of Kuchuk Kainardji and Bucharest, which had to be upheld. In addition, Orthodoxy was a basic element in the Russian conservative ideology, and the interests of the church had to be defended. Thus the revolt of an Orthodox Balkan people, even though it might be against the "legitimate monarch," the sultan, might present the Russian leaders with difficult choices. The Russian support of Orthodoxy also involved another aspect, which was to be important for Romanian affairs. The Russian government and Russian church dignitaries naturally wished to remain in close touch with the Patriarchate of Constantinople, the chief representative of the Balkan Christians. In the eighteenth century this office, like the Danubian Principalities, came to be dominated by Phanariot Greeks, who used their position to extend their control over all of the ecclesiastical establishments in those parts of the Balkans under direct 17

Russia and the Romanian national state

RUSSIA

Odessa «

50'

100

MEDITERRANEAN The Ottoman Balkans, 1815

18

The Russian protectorate Ottoman rule. The Greek influence over Orthodox affairs in the Principalities was also strong. Most important was the control of the socalled Dedicated Monasteries, whose lands embraced about an eleventh of the territory of the provinces. Despite the fact that the Patriarchate was a part of the Ottoman administrative system, and that it was extremely corrupt, the Russian government gave it immense support throughout the century. The aim was to preserve as far as possible the unity of the Balkan Christians under this organization. Although the Russian officials would have liked to obtain a position of dominance in the councils of the church, this aim was never achieved. In fact, the Patriarchate was usually able to exploit Russian power for its own goals; it was never a tool in Russian hands. In the Principalities the situation after 1812 continued to be bleak. Both provinces had been devastated by the war and foreign occupation. Moreover, under the new princes, loan Caragea in Wallachia and Scarlat Callimachi in Moldavia, the population was to undergo a period of extreme fiscal oppression. Both rulers had been forced to pay a high price in bribes for their positions, and they wished to recoup their expenditures. The resultant increase in taxes and other payments was naturally passed on down to the peasantry. Caragea's misrule was so flagrant that he was finally forced to flee to Pisa in 1818. His replacement, Alecu Sutu, arrived with a suite of eighty relatives and eight hundred other retainers, including an Albanian guard. The Phanariot system was thus still firmly in place. However, by the 1820s a situation had developed that was fast becoming unendurable for both the native boyar and the dependent peasant. As in the previous century change would have to come through boyar leadership; the small middle class of merchants and artisans contributed only a few political leaders. The great majority of the peasants, although no longer enserfed, had no political power and were forced to make high payments both to the state and to the landholders. Their grievances were primarily social and economic and were directed against the boyars. They were more concerned with gaining changes in the agrarian relationships and in securing a free title to their land than with problems of Ottoman suzerainty, Phanariot domination, or Russian intervention. With this social and economic situation, it is understandable why political power lay, and was to remain, in the hands of a relatively small minority. The boyars themselves were divided by their personal interests, and, of course, by the size of their estates and their comparative wealth. Those who held their rank because they belonged to ancient families felt superior to those who were enobled because of state 19

Russia and the Romanian national state service or for similar reasons. Many members of this class were well educated. They kept in touch with events in Europe, and they were well aware of contemporary ideological trends. During the Phanariot period they had, as could be expected, divided into factions, and they fought for influence and power. Primarily interested in maintaining their own privileges in landholding and local administrative control, they seldom concerned themselves with peasant problems. The corruption and injustice of Phanariot rule had, as we have seen, caused extreme dissatisfaction. The Greek princes were correctly regarded primarily as Ottoman agents, and they were blamed for the draining of Romanian resources for Ottoman benefit. Although they developed no set program or ideology, as did the reformers of 1848, many boyars did seek radical changes in the government of the Principalities. First and foremost, they demanded an end to the Phanariot regime. They wished to control their own administration, and they wanted native princes. They were divided on the powers to be assigned to their ruler; some wished him to be subordinate to a boyars' council. Most obvious was the need for the establishment of a just administrative system and the assurance of law and order throughout the provinces. The chaotic financial situation also had to be confronted. Unlike later leaders, the boyars of this generation were not nationalists in the modern sense. Nevertheless, they desired to have each principality run its own affairs, and they assumed a basic unity and similarity between Wallachia and Moldavia. They did not regard each other as foreigners, but as members of the same family, sharing a common language and past history. The boyar attitude toward Russia had remained ambivalent. Russian support was indeed sought against Ottoman rule during the eighteenth century. When, however, it appeared that Russia might seek to annex the provinces, the attitude changed. Under Ottoman rule the Principalities did indeed enjoy a special position; they were not Turkish pashaliks. An increase of Russian influence, even if not a direct annexation, might result in an even further reduction of the boyar's role in his government. Moreover, after 1815 there was no sign that the Russian leaders were greatly dissatisfied with Phanariot rule. They recognized the necessity of political and economic reform in both provinces, but in this period Greek influence was strong in St. Petersburg. Many Greek nationals had entered Russian service. The Russian carrying trade in the Black Sea was in Greek hands. The Treaty of Kuchuk Kainardji had given Greek ships the right to fly the Russian flag. Therefore, should issues involving the Greek influence in the Principalities come into question, the Russian attitude could not be predicted beforehand. 20

The Russian protectorate TOWARD A RUSSIAN PROTECTORATE: THE GREEK REVOLUTION, TUDOR VLADIMIRESCU, AND THE RUSSO-TURKISH WAR

By the beginning of the 1820s, despite the urgent need for reform, it was clear that some radical event would have to occur to alter the basic conditions in the Principalities. There appeared little chance that the necessary changes would be made by the regimes in power. An entirely new situation was created, however, not because of Romanian initiatives, but because of the activities of Greek leaders intent on securing independence from Ottoman rule. Their precipitation of a revolution both in the Principalities and in Greece was to open once again the dangerous issue of the Eastern Question and to force another Russian intervention in the affairs of the peninsula. The Greek revolution of 1821 had its origins in multiple and complex developments, but for the Principalities the major role was played by the Phanariots and by a secret organization, the Filiki Etairia (Friendly Society). Organized in 1814 by three Greek merchants, it had as its objective the freeing of Greek lands from Ottoman control. The organization made a slow start, but in 1818 it moved its headquarters to Constantinople and by 1820 it had enrolled hundreds of members, both in the Greek-inhabited territories and in the Principalities. Although the movement had Greek liberation as its primary aim, attempts were made to involve other Balkan peoples, including the Serbs, Bulgarians, and Romanians, in a united uprising. Even more important than the gaining of Balkan Christian adherents, however, was the task of attracting Russian support. From the beginning the leaders of the society understood that it was essential that they win not just passive Russian acquiescence, but active armed intervention. That assistance would come from St. Petersburg seemed to some an obvious assumption. Certainly, in the past Russia had aided resistance to Ottoman rule; before each invasion of Ottoman territory the Russians, like the Austrians, had called upon the Balkan people to revolt. In order to attract members to the organization, the Etairia usually let it be understood that Russia stood behind the movement. The apparent link with the Orthodox great power was one of the major strengths of the entire undertaking. The Etairia had another apparent advantage. Russia had at this time two foreign ministers. The first, Karl Vasilevich Nesselrode, was a Rhineland German, but the second, Ioannis Capodistrias, was a Greek from Corfu with a strong interest in Greek causes. He had entered Russian service in 1809 and had risen rapidly thereafter. Although a 21

Russia and the Romanian national state strong nationalist, he in fact was convinced that Greek interests would be better served by a concentration on education and moral awakening than by an emphasis on revolutionary activity. To the Etairia he seemed, nevertheless, an ideal leader. He was approached by members of the organization in both 1817 and 1820. When he refused to head the movement, the position was taken by Alexander Ipsilanti, who was similarly of Greek ancestry and in the Russian service. The son of the pro-Russian former hospodar Constantine Ipsilanti, Alexander had been educated in Russia; he was a general in the Russian army and an aide-de-camp of the tsar. Although the question of Russian official involvement in the conspiracy has been much debated, it appears that the tsar was aware of the existence of the society, but not of its specific plans. Capodistrias probably knew more; he certainly gave strong warnings to his Greek acquaintances not to provoke disturbances in the hope that Russia would intervene. The general European situation was not at all propitious for the renewal of a Russian advance in the Balkans; the tsar was strongly against revolutionary activity. The Etairia, however, appears not to have taken the realities of the diplomatic situation into serious consideration. Despite the fact that the society could gain no open official encouragement, it continued to use the Russian name freely. Plans for an uprising proceeded, and in 1820 it was decided that there should be simultaneous revolts in the Peloponnesus and the Principalities.1 Despite the widespread Romanian resentment of Greek influence, the provinces offered certain advantages as centers for rebellion. The Etairia had been able to gain many recruits from among the boyars of Greek background, although not from among the native Romanians. The prince of Moldavia, Michael Sutu, was a member. Alecu Sutu, the ruler of Wallachia, had not joined, but by 1821 he appeared close to death. The Russian consuls in Jassy and Bucharest, Andrei Pisani and Alexander Pini, maintained a neutral attitude. Moreover, the provinces had an excellent strategic location. Despite the lack of official Russian support, Bessarabia was a center for the organization of the movement. Men and supplies were assembled there and elsewhere in the Black Sea territories. Moreover, the idea persisted that once the revolt commenced, the Russian government would be forced to send an army into the Principalities both to prevent the Ottoman government from crushing an Orthodox movement and in reaction to the expected atrocities. The Etairia could count too on the military support of princes' guards and volunteer forces. Assistance was also expected from another quarter. The Etairia had come to an understanding with a Romanian leader, Tudor Vladimires22

The Russian protectorate cu, who headed a native Romanian movement, although one whose aims differed radically from those of the Greek conspiracy.2 Born in a family of free peasants, Vladimirescu had risen to the rank and position of a boyar. Formerly a commander of the pandours, a Romanian militia organized during the previous wars, he had fought with the Russian troops and had received a decoration. Vladimirescu was, in fact, the first to move. He came to an agreement with the agents of the Etairia and with members of the provisional government in Bucharest who were in charge during the illness and death of Sutu. In January 1821 he departed from Bucharest for Oltenia, where he organized an uprising among the peasants. He was able to join together a formidable force of pandours, peasants, and other volunteers, which was called the People's Assembly. In a declaration issued at Pade§ on January 23/February 4, he addressed the peasants in fiery words that had little to do with the Greek movement or even with the Romanian grievances against the Porte: Brothers living in Wallachia, whatever your nationality, no law prevents a man to meet evil with evil . . . How long shall we suffer the dragons that swallow us alive, those above us, both clergy and politicians, to suck our blood? How long shall we be enslaved? . . . Neither God nor the sultan approves of such treatment of their faithful. Therefore, brothers, come all of you and deal out evil to bring evil to an end.3 This clear call to revolution received an immediate response. Peasants attacked the property of the landowners and burned and looted their houses. Despite stern warnings from Vladimirescu, his followers engaged in violent and lawless actions. It should be emphasized that this revolt was directed against the prevailing social and economic conditions, not against Ottoman rule. Vladimirescu sent frequent messages to the Porte giving assurances that the uprising was against the abuses of the Phanariot regime and that the peasants sought only the restoration of "old rights" that they had lost. He called upon the Ottoman officials to investigate the situation. Victorious in the countryside, he and his followers next marched to Bucharest. Meanwhile, Ipsilanti was putting his plans into action. On February 221 March 6, wearing a Russian army uniform, he crossed from Bessarabia into Moldavia, accompanied by a few followers. There the Etairia members joined him, and they were able to take over the government in Jassy with little difficulty. Ipsilanti continually assured his supporters that the Russian army was right behind him. Once established in power, he and the Moldavian boyars sent a petition to the tsar. They could not have chosen a worse moment. Alexander I was at that time attending the Congress of Laibach, which had been called to deal

Russia and the Romanian national state with the revolutionary movement in the Italian peninsula. In a period of strong conservatism, deeply disturbed by the European events, Alexander was unlikely to approve a similar event in an adjacent region. However, because communications were poor, the Russian reaction was slow in coming. Thus in the first weeks Ipsilanti's claim to Russian backing was not disputed. The Russian consuls took no action. Although instructions were sent to Pini in Bucharest in early March denouncing Vladimirescu's actions and stripping him of his Russian decoration, he did not learn of this until the end of the month. Persuaded by the Etairia's promises of Russian backing, he too had assured his followers of the tsar's support. Alexander's repudiation of Ipsilanti was also not known in Bucharest until the end of March. The tsar's reaction to the events in the Principalities left no doubt about the Russian position. A circular dispatch, sent by Nesselrode in March, clearly reflected the imperial disfavor. The conspiracy of Tudor Vladimirescu, who was described as "an obscure adventurer at the head of some irregular troops," was to be treated with speed and firmness: Always frank and loyal in his policy, the emperor, from the time that he learned of the insurrection of Vladimirescu, made haste to notify the Porte that this individual, who had formerly been decorated with the cross of St. Vladimir, had been removed from the list of the knights of that order, and that His Majesty would observe with pleasure if the Turkish government without the least delay would take the most appropriate measures to reestablish calm in the Principalities.

The dispatch added that Alexander strongly disapproved of Ipsilanti's actions, "that his conduct is entirely contrary to the wishes and intentions of His Imperial Majesty and that, removed from the registers of the army, with the prohibition of ever returning to Russia, he could count neither on any aid nor even on any sign of interest... as long as he misleads his compatriots and brings them to inevitable misfortunes."4 With this unequivocal Russian stand, neither Vladimirescu nor Ipsilanti could hope for success. Moreover, it soon became clear that the two men had opposing objectives. On March 1/13 Ipsilanti, with a force of only a few thousand untrained and undisciplined volunteers, left Moldavia for Wallachia; at the end of that month Vladimirescu, with about eight thousand men, arrived at the outskirts of Bucharest. Of the two forces, the Romanian was obviously the stronger. Both armies were facing grave dangers. Russian aid had been refused; a Russian army under generals Wittgenstein and Kiselev stood watch on the border, but remained neutral. With Russian approval, Ottoman troops had entered the Principalities in May. In this situation the com24

The Russian protectorate manders decided to retreat to Oltenia and the mountains. The difference between the movements was becoming increasingly evident. Vladimirescu never abandoned his attempts to reach an understanding with the Porte; his aim was an improvement of peasant conditions in the Principalities, not Greek liberation. Although he had the larger army, he had alienated many of his followers, in particular when he executed some of his commanders for looting. Taking advantage of defections in Vladimirescu's ranks, the Etairia attempted to assume command of his forces. He was kidnapped, tortured, and murdered on May 21 /June 2. Although the Greek commanders were successful in taking over the army, it in fact began to dissolve. Defections had already begun when the peasant volunteers realized that a true social revolution was not likely to be accomplished. With the death of their commander, many simply went home. The ill-organized and undisciplined army of the Etairia was finally crushed at the battle of Draga§ani on June 7 / 19. At the end of the month the last Greek forces were annihilated at Sculeni on the Pruth. Meanwhile, the character of the Greek revolution had changed. At the beginning of April a revolt had broken out in the Peloponnesus, which was to have far wider repercussions than the disaster in the Principalities. Faced with such widespread rebellion, the Ottoman government was forced to take immediate action. Larger military forces were sent into the Principalities. Other, more drastic, measures were then implemented against the Christian population in both the Greek and Romanian lands, and these altered the attitude of the Russian government. After the victory of the Etairia in Moldavia in March, its adherents had massacred part of the Turkish population in Jassy and Galatz. Similar atrocities accompanied the outbreak of the revolt in the Peloponnesus. The reaction of the Porte was equally violent. Not only were reprisals taken against Christian civilians, but on Easter eve the patriarch of Constantinople and some of his bishops were killed. When news of these events reached St. Petersburg, Alexander I felt obligated to take some steps in support of his fellow Orthodox Christians. Although the Russian government at this point spoke out in defense of both the Greeks and the Romanians, it did not alter its attitude toward the revolutionary movements as such. As before, it considered any actions taken by the Ottoman authorities against the participants in the revolt justified. What were denounced were the widely reported atrocities committed against Christian populations who were not actively engaged in rebellious activity. A circular dispatch of July 1821 made this distinction clear. It condemned the measures taken "not 25

Russia and the Romanian national state against the insurgents but against the entire Greek nation" and continued: The emperor is fully justified in demanding that the Turkish government protect the exercise of the Christian religion, the persons of its ministers, the inviolability of its temples, and that it not at all carry devastation and death into the Principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia, and that for the inhabitants of these countries, as well as for those of the isles of the Archipelago and the rest of Greece, it observe a just and constant distinction between innocence and crime.5

In addition, the Russian government was determined to maintain its rights under the treaties. In August the Russian representative in Constantinople, Gregory Aleksandrovich Stroganov, was recalled from his post. The questions in dispute concerned not only those involved in the Greek uprising, but also the evacuation of Ottoman troops from the Principalities and the nomination of the princes. By this date all of the great powers had become involved in the new and dangerous situation in the Balkans. The Ottoman army remained in occupation of Wallachia and Moldavia for sixteen months. Throughout this period the Principalities were once more under the heavy burden of supplying the needs of an army of occupation. Domestic affairs were also in a state of turmoil. During the peasant revolt and after the entrance of the Ottoman troops, a mass migration of thousands of boyars and merchants into Transylvania had occurred. Many of those who had been involved with the Etairia feared retribution. Bra§ov and Sibiu were the center for the refugees, some of whom remained out of the country as late as 1826. In May 1822 an agreement was reached among the powers, and the Ottoman troops began to leave the Principalities, with the last departing in September. The failure of the Greek revolt had beneficial consequences for the native boyars, who were finally able to gain their chief objective. Since the Porte could no longer trust its Greek officials, the period of Phanariot rule came to an end. In April 1822 a six-man delegation from Moldavia under the leadership of Ion Sturdza and a similar one of seven members from Wallachia under Gregory Ghica went to Constantinople with a common program. Both groups sought the appointment of native princes, the formation of a Romanian armed force to replace the previous princes' guard, the restriction of officeholding to Romanians, the right to petition the Porte for the redress of grievances, and other similar measures. Most of these desires were granted in a firman. With the appointment of Sturdza and Ghica to head their respective principalities, the Phanariot era came to a formal end. 26

The Russian protectorate Although the actions of the Porte met most of the Romanian requests and gave evidence of an Ottoman desire for reconciliation, the Russian government refused to accept these measures. The Porte had made its decisions without consulting Russia; the princes had been named without the consent of the tsar. The terms of treaties had thus been broken, a condition that the tsar and his government would not accept. The Russian officials, nevertheless, did not at this time go further than issuing protests. With a new regime in power, life in the Principalities could return to normal. Some measures were taken against the peasants who had revolted under Vladimirescu's leadership. However, although villages were disarmed and attempts were made to collect the taxes and labor obligations that were due from the period of the rebellion, the entire matter was handled with relative moderation. During this time the Principalities' financial condition had deteriorated further. The Ottoman occupation had cost fifteen million piasters, and the provinces owed the Porte large sums in tribute and other payments. In political affairs the major change to be noted was that the official positions were now entirely in the hands of native boyars. Meanwhile, the European diplomats continued to be concerned about the ramifications of the Greek revolt. A stalemate between the Ottoman army and the revolutionary forces was broken in 1825 when the sultan called in Mehmed Ali, the pasha of Egypt. His son Ibrahim, a brilliant general, led the Egyptian forces. His victories changed the balance of power in the Mediterranean. Recognizing the dangers in the situation, the three powers principally affected, Britain, France, and Russia, came to an understanding. After 1825 Russian policy was decided by a new tsar, Nicholas I, who was to pursue a more active policy in Eastern affairs. In 1826 Russia and Britain agreed to cooperate and act as mediators to attempt to establish an autonomous Greek state; France joined them in 1827. The Greek question was thus made the common concern of these powers. Each received the assurance that its alliance partners would not use the new Eastern crisis to gain disproportionate advantages. Although its actions were thus limited in Greek questions, the Russian government was free to pursue unhampered the negotiations with the Porte that involved other matters. In 1826 Mahmud II was in a dangerous domestic situation. Not only had he been unable to crush the Greek revolt, but he was about to take major steps to reform the Ottoman military forces. Thus, when the Russian government delivered a virtual ultimatum in March, the Porte was forced to agree to negotiations on the issues in dispute between the two countries. The Conven27

Russia and the Romanian national state tion of Akkerman, signed on September 25/October 7, dealt with the Asiatic frontiers, the status of Serbia, and similar problems, as well as with the affairs of the Principalities. The most important provisions concerning the Romanian lands were incorporated into a Separate Act, which reaffirmed the previous arrangements and strengthened the Russian right of intervention and supervision. The princes were to be elected from among the native boyars by the divans, the traditional councils, associated with the hospodars and composed of the most influential men; the choice was to be confirmed by both courts. They were to serve for seven years, and they could be reelected. They could only be deposed for crimes and with the approval of the two powers. The Hatti Sherif of 1802 was reconfirmed. The divans were to handle matters of taxation; freedom of commerce was guaranteed except in relation to the supplies due to the Porte. Most significant for the future was the stipulation that administrative reform should be undertaken: The disorders of the last years in Moldavia and Wallachia having caused the most severe injury to order in the different branches of the internal administration, the hospodars shall be bound with the least possible delay, together with the respective divans, to take the necessary measures to improve the conditions of the Principalities confided to their care, and those measures shall form the subject of a general regulation for each province, which shall be put immediately into execution.6

The Convention of Akkerman did not remain long in effect. Mahmud II was soon to face a major foreign crisis. After the Ottoman government refused to accept allied mediation, a joint French-British-Russian squadron was organized for duty in the Mediterranean, the task of which was to prevent supplies from reaching the Egyptian army that was operating in the Peloponnesus. In October 1827 tn * s f°rce annihilated a Turkish-Egyptian fleet anchored in the harbor of Navarino. The Duke of Wellington, at the head of the British government, was shocked by this unexpected occurrence and withdrew from the cooperative effort. The British influence would thus not be available as a restraint on Russia in the next months. As might be expected, a violent reaction occurred in Constantinople; in December the sultan declared a "Holy War" on Russia and the Convention of Akkerman was denounced. The first belligerent act, however, did not take place until April 1828, when Russian armies once again entered the Principalities. The Russian occupation, under General Wittgenstein, proceeded with great speed; there were, of course, no Ottoman troops in the country.7 The Principalities faced another extended and difficult period of military occupation. As before, the Russian command took full control of the country. The princes Ghica and Sturdza, who had cooperated 28

The Russian protectorate with the Porte, were deposed. Count F. P. Pahlen was appointed to head the two divans and given full power over the civil government. He was, however, himself under the authority of the commander of the army of occupation. The familiar problems arose at once. The first interest of the Russian authorities was, of course, the conduct of the war. The Russian command had arrived on the scene with optimistic hopes about the supplies that could be acquired in the country. The Russian officials were soon involved in bitter conflicts with both the Romanian peasants and the boyars over questions of requisitioning and mode of payment. As usual, the population was expected to provide housing for the Russian troops and transport for war materiel. The Russian officials were also determined to collect the regular taxes. As long as Pahlen remained in charge of the civil administration, concern for the interests of the Principalities was shown. He wished equitable arrangements to be worked out. He was, however, replaced in January 1829 by the much tougher and more exacting General P. F. Zheltukhin, who placed first emphasis on fulfilling the needs of the military forces. During this period the Russian authorities were in full control of the country. The regular Romanian officials remained in office, but they could do little more than carry out the Russian directives. As in previous wars, the Russian army made use of some Romanian fighters, with the pandours again playing a major role. The harshness of the Russian attitude in the Principalities reflected in part the difficulties of the war. This campaign was not to result in an easy victory. The fighting was brought to an end in September 1829, but the moderation of the terms of the peace reflected Russia's fear that the other powers might intervene and a realization of the basic weakness of its military position. Supplies were short and the army was far from its base. In considering what terms they wished to impose upon the Ottoman government, the Russian statesmen had to consider some real limitations on their position. They were already bound by the agreements of 1826 and 1827 w * t n Britain and France, which set limits on large acquisitions of territory. Moreover, they had to weigh carefully the advisability of severely weakening, or even destroying, the Ottoman Empire. Russian military power was not sufficient, at this time or later, to impose a unilateral settlement. If large territorial gains were made, the other powers would have to be compensated. Austria as well as France and Britain would expect equivalent acquisitions. With these considerations in mind the Russian government adopted a policy that was to be maintained to the 1850s. Instead of seeking the destruction or partition of the Ottoman Empire, the Russian statesmen decided that the state should 29

Russia and the Romanian national state be maintained, but as a weak power under Russian influence. The terms of the Treaty of Adrianople of September 1829 reflected this attitude. Russia made only minor gains of territory, chiefly in Asia but also including the Danube Delta. An indemnity of 11.5 million ducats was levied, though the sum was later reduced. The Ottoman government agreed to recognize Greek autonomy and to allow more privileges to Serbia.8 Russia's decision concerning its attitude toward the Ottoman Empire naturally affected the provisions of the peace in regard to the Principalities. Except for the acquisition of the Danube Delta, Russia took no more Romanian territory. Instead the peace terms reaffirmed and strengthened the rights that Russia had gained in the Hatti Sherif of 1802 and the Convention of Akkerman. Article 5 dealt with this question: The Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia having been in consequence of a Capitulation placed under the Suzerainty of the Sublime Porte, and Russia having guaranteed their prosperity, it is understood that they shall preserve all the privileges and immunities which have been granted to them either by their Capitulations, or by the Treaties concluded between the two Empires, or by the Hatti-sherifs promulgated at different times. In consequence whereof, they shall enjoy free exercise of their Worship, perfect security, an independent national Government, and full liberty of Commerce.9

Other sections of the treaty lessened the economic controls of Ottoman suzerainty and reduced the payments that could be collected. Most advantageous was the termination of the Ottoman right of preemption: The Sublime Porte, animated by the sincere desire of insuring to the two Principalities all the welfare of which they are susceptible, and being informed of the abuses and annoyances to which they were subjected on account of the supplies required for the consumption of Constantinople, the provisioning of the Fortresses situated upon the Danube, and the requisitions of the Arsenal, fully and entirely relinquishes in their favour its right in this respect.10

Although a set annual tribute was still to be collected, the Principalities were required to make only a few other payments, such as the gift offered at the accession of each prince, who was now to be chosen for life. Other provisions reflected the Russian desire to accent sharply the division between the Principalities and the rest of the empire. The boundary was to be the thalweg of the Danube; the fortified towns of Turnu Severin, Giurgiu, and Braila, which had been under Turkish control, were to be returned to Wallachia, and their Muslim inhabitants were to sell their property within eighteen months. No Ottoman fortifications were to be allowed in the Principalities; "no Mussulman can ever establish his residence, and . . . the only Mohametans who can be 30

The Russian protectorate admitted therein are merchants provided with firmans, whose object in repairing thither is to purchase, on their own account in the Principalities, the goods necessary for the consumption of Constantinople, or other articles."11 The line of division at the Danube was further emphasized by the fact that a quarantine was to be established along the river. The Principalities were allowed to organize a militia to handle the quarantine as well as to provide border guards and to preserve law and order. The Treaty of Adrianople brought to a close a process that commenced with the Treaty of Kuchuk Kainardji. By 1829 the Ottoman government for all practical purposes was excluded from effective influence in either Wallachia or Moldavia; it had little more than the right to confirm the nomination of the princes and to collect a fixed tribute. Russia, the recognized protecting power, exerted the real authority. Henceforth, the governments of the two Principalities were to consider the continued Ottoman suzerainty as only a minor burden. Instead they were to find themselves under constant pressure from the Russian government and its representatives in Bucharest and Jassy. Although in many instances the Russian actions were to the ultimate benefit of the inhabitants, the conditions of the protectorate and the regular interference were bitterly resented. T H E PROTECTORATE ESTABLISHED

With the war successfully concluded the Russian government could proceed with the program of political reform in the Principalities already enunciated in the Convention of Akkerman.12 According to the peace terms the Russian army was to remain in occupation of the Principalities until the Ottoman war indemnity was paid. With an armed force on the scene and with a recognized right of protection, the Russian authorities could introduce any regime they wished. They had certainly every interest in assuring prosperity and tranquility in this dependent area. The region was an important military outpost, which could serve as a base against Constantinople and as a source of supplies should war break out again. The strategic position in regard to the Habsburg Empire and the Danube River was also of significance. A friendly administration and a contented population could be of immense advantage in the future. Not only did the Russian government have every desire to create favorable conditions in the area, but it had the services of an excellent administrator, General Paul Dmitrievich Kiselev, who replaced Zheltukhin in November 1829 and remained in office until April 1834. An ex-

Russia and the Romanian national state tremely able man of enlightened political views, Kiselev was well suited to give expression to the Russian determination to endow the Principalities with an efficient and modern system. Immediately upon assuming his post, he went to work to solve the obvious problems. The occupation had caused devastation in the land even though fighting had not taken place in the provinces themselves. To ease the severe food shortages, Kiselev imported supplies from Odessa. He also organized a quarantine to deal with pressing health problems, in particular the prevalence of cholera. Among his first acts was the formation of a militia composed of regular, salaried soldiers. His chief contribution, however, was his supervision of the drafting of new administrative statutes for both Principalities. Already, in June 1829, committees had been established in each principality to consider political reforms. They consisted of four members, two named by the divans and two by Zheltukhin, who met under the chairmanship of the Russian consul-general, Matei Leovich Minciaky (Minchaki). Most of their work was completed during the period when Kiselev was in charge. The general was both president of the divans and the chief of staff of the Russian army corps in occupation of the country; he thus held the highest civil and military positions. In contrast to his predecessor, who alienated the Romanian boyars by his brusque manners, Kiselev was a tactful and conciliatory diplomat. Although he favored Russian annexation of the Principalities, his views were not generally known. Despite his personal opinion, he worked within the framework of his instructions and attempted to establish as good an administrative system as possible, with the hope that it would serve to join the provinces closely to Russia. By April 1830 the two committees had completed their work. The texts of their proposed administrative regulations were somewhat altered by Kiselev before being forwarded to St. Petersburg, where a commission examined them and made some additional changes. They were then returned to the Principalities and there considered by two special assemblies, which were given only limited rights to amend them. The first assembly, presided over by Kiselev, was held in Wallachia in March 1831; it was composed of fifty-four members chosen chiefly from the wealthy boyars. After it had finished its work in April, Kiselev proceeded to Jassy, where he headed a similar assembly. The Russian authorities faced more opposition in Moldavia, where the previous annexation of Bessarabia was in the boyars' minds. The documents, known collectively as the Organic Statutes, were promulgated in Wallachia in July 1831 and in Moldavia in January 1832. The texts were similar but not identical.13

The Russian protectorate The new statutes thus were the product of a Russian initiative, drawn up under the close supervision of Russian officials, and put into practice during a Russian occupation. They were, nevertheless, a real step forward in Romanian political development. The governments of the Principalities were henceforth to be conducted on the basis of legal documents, which were introduced for the express purpose of assuring an orderly, modern administrative system. The documents cannot be described as true constitutions; they were instead detailed administrative regulations for the government of each Principality. Their provisions met most of the demands that had been set forth by the boyars in their petitions to the Russian court and the Porte in the previous years. They assured that this class would retain its predominant position in the state, a result fully consonant with the desires of the conservative Russian regime. Its aim was a stable, prosperous government, not a change in social relationships. The establishment of parallel sets of regulations in the two principalities was to aid in the accomplishment of their eventual unification, an event that was foreseen at this time. The Organic Statutes provided for a centralized state system and the separation of the executive and legislative powers. The executive branch was to be headed by a prince, who was to be elected for life by a special assembly of high boyars. The legislature, consisting of thirtyfive members in Moldavia and forty-two in Wallachia, was also composed of members of this class. The assemblies could pass laws, but the prince had a veto right. The prince could also prorogue the assemblies, although he could not dissolve them without the permission of the Ottoman Empire and Russia. The assemblies voted the budget, but they could not force the prince out of office. They could, however, appeal over the head of the ruler directly to the Ottoman and Russian courts. The possibility of Russian interference was thus assured all along the line. The new charters offered great benefits to the boyars, who used this opportunity to make gains at the expense of the peasants. With the end of the Ottoman right of preemption on Romanian products, and with the growing demand from the West, the landowners saw the opportunity to make greater profits from their estates. It was obviously to their interest to gain control of as much land as possible and to assure themselves of a steady supply of labor. In the Organic Statutes they were able to have themselves designated for the first time as the actual owners of the land; the peasants were allotted only the right to the use of two-thirds of each estate. During this period the labor obligations were increased and peasants were required to give six months' notice before

Russia and the Romanian national state leaving the land. Kiselev, incidentally, did not approve of the agrarian measures. In January 1834 Russia and the Ottoman Empire signed the Convention of St. Petersburg. The Porte accepted the Organic Statutes, and the annual tribute was set at three million piasters. The two powers further decided that as an exception they, not the assemblies, would name the first princes, and that their terms would be limited to seven years. The Russian candidates, Alexander Ghica in Wallachia and Michael Sturdza in Moldavia, thus assumed office. After Kiselev and the Russian army of occupation departed, the consuls, P. I. Riickmann (Rikman) in Bucharest and Timkovskii in Jassy, represented the Russian interests. During this period the Russian government was actively pursuing the policy of close cooperation with the Porte that was adopted after the Treaty of Adrianople. An opportunity to strengthen further the ties with Constantinople came in 1831. Mehmed Ali, who had given loyal support during the Greek revolution, rebelled against his suzerain power, and he was able to win decisive victories over the Turkish army. In a desperate situation, Mahmud II turned to the European powers, but only Russia would help him. In July 1833 Russia and the Porte concluded the Treaty of Unkiar Iskelesi, which ranks with Kuchuk Kainardji and Adrianople in significance. Ostensibly a treaty of mutual defense, the agreement in effect placed the Ottoman Empire in a relationship of dependence on St. Petersburg. Russian soldiers and sailors were sent to the Straits area to aid the new ally. As long as this advantageous situation could be maintained in Constantinople, the Russian diplomats had no wish to weaken or endanger Ottoman interests. In order to improve its position in the Near East even further, the Russian government in September 1833 concluded the Treaty of Miinchengratz with the Habsburg Empire. In this understanding the two signatories agreed that they would cooperate to support the Ottoman Empire and to oppose Mehmed Ali. Should their efforts fail, and should that state collapse, they would work together to establish an alternate arrangement. These two agreements had a great significance for the Principalities. Their immediate neighbors, the Habsburg Empire, the Ottoman Empire, and Russia, were now on excellent terms, and they all favored the maintenance of the status quo, a condition that included Russian predominance in the Principalities. Until some event should occur that would break this combination, there was little chance that Romanian political conditions could be changed. Neither Britain nor France had the ability to influence events in the Principalities, and their policies too favored Russian control in the area. 34

The Russian protectorate The Russian decision to come to an agreement with Austria on Near Eastern questions was in conformity with the general tightening of relations among the conservative powers that occurred as a result of events in Western and Central Europe. In the early 1830s another round of revolutions took place, including a major revolt against Russian rule in the Polish territories. This rebellion proved exceedingly difficult to crush, and its consequences were to have a long-term effect on Russian foreign policy. After the failure of the movement a massive emigration from Poland took place, and many of its members organized revolutionary centers in their new homelands. The most effective leader among this group was Prince Adam Czartoryski, who had been Russian foreign minister in the reign of Alexander I.14 With an office in Paris that functioned like a government-in-exile, he conducted negotiations with heads of state and dispatched agents all over Europe. A radical wing of the Polish emigration was also active; it cooperated with the Young Europe movement and was attracted to carbonari tactics. The great national enemy of the Polish groups, right and left alike, was tsarist Russia. Wherever they went, they carried with them their intense dislike of this conservative power, which held the majority of the Polish lands under its sway. Polish emigrants were henceforth to have much influence in the Principalities. Some settled in the region. A large number fled into the Ottoman Empire, where they entered state service. From this base they worked to reconcile the Romanians and the Ottoman officials and to join them in a common front against Russia. Within the Romanian lands the Polish leaders were naturally received with sympathy by those who opposed the Russian protectorate. The Polish representatives in turn recognized the value of establishing a base in the Principalities, in particular in Moldavia, because of its strategic location in relation to the Russian-dominated Polish territories. The Russian government, well aware of these activities and their potential danger, continually put pressure on Romanian officials to restrain Polish exile groups. The predominant Russian position in the Principalities was maintained until 1854, but not without great difficulty and a major crisis in 1848. One problem that the Russsian officials faced was their lack of a firm base of support among the population at large. Russian rule was soon identified with the Organic Statutes and the control of the government by the great boyar families. Yet even the men who benefited by these conditions did not become reliable Russian partisans. The princes regularly got in touch with the agents of other powers; the boyars themselves were split into hostile factions. Individuals supported the Russian position only when it suited their personal interests. Moreover, although 35

Russia and the Romanian national state the Organic Statutes represented progress, they did not introduce the representative government that some members of the educated classes came increasingly to favor. When the Russian officials insisted on the maintenance of the statutes virtually intact, those who sought more liberal institutions naturally saw Russia as the chief hindrance to further progress. Nevertheless, despite the many problems that arose, the Russian officials assigned to the Principalities did attempt to carry through their task of protecting Russian interests and assuring good government in the region. As individuals they established close relations with the wealthy boyar families, many of whose members had been in the Russian service. Cosmopolitan, well educated, and experienced, the Russian representatives shared with the Romanian aristocracy a knowledge of the French language and a similar political outlook. A good description of life in the Principalities and the relations of Russian officials with the Romanian boyars from the Russian point of view is given in the memoirs of Nicholas Karlovich Giers, who became Russian foreign minister in 1882, but whose first post in the diplomatic service was in the consulate in Jassy. Giers showed his complete awareness of the Russian position in the country and the system his government wished to maintain. He described the Organic Statutes as "a gift from Russia" and commented: "Our consuls were instructed to make sure that the regulations were strictly adhered to. This political aspect of their duties was of great importance and gave them an exceptional position in the Principalities." He recognized the powerlessness of the suzerain and noted that "the vassal dependence [of the Principalities] upon the Porte was so weak that it was reduced merely to the paying of tribute. The Turks did not dare to interfere in questions of internal administration in Moldavia and Wallachia." 15 With the departure of the Russian armies, the newly appointed princes took over the administration of the country. Ghica and Sturdza faced many similar problems. The chief immediate difficulty was the bad economic situation in the provinces and the heavy payments that were due. During the Russian occupation the tribute had not been paid; the back installments were still owing. Additional obligations were the traditional gifts that had to be made at the time of the investiture of the princes and the expenses left over from Kiselev's administration, which, of course, the Principalities were supposed to pay. In addition, serious political controversies soon arose. In both provinces a similar division of interest was to emerge. Under the rule of the Organic Statutes three centers of influence were established - the princes, the assemblies, and the Russian consulates. Any combination was possible 36

The Russian protectorate among them. Usually the assemblies and the princes came into conflict, and both appealed for support to the Russian representatives, who then had the task of acting as final arbiters. This position gave the consulates a great deal of influence, but it also drew them into even relatively minor conflicts. From the Russian point of view, Wallachia proved the more troublesome province. The prince, Alexander Ghica, was a brother of a former ruler, Gregory Ghica. He had worked with Kiselev, and the Russian government considered him a reliable supporter. Once in office he proceeded to make many enemies by his methods of administration, which included appointing his two brothers as ministers. The consul-general in Bucharest, Riickmann, worked with him, but a major issue that arose, involving Russian influence, caused friction between the consulate and the Wallachian government. Riickmann was given the difficult task of securing the acceptance of a so-called Additional Article to the Organic Statutes, one that the Russian government claimed had been "left out" of the original version. This highly controversial provision made the approval of both Russia and the Ottoman Empire necessary for any change in the statutes. This further limitation on the political rights of the Principalities was strongly resented, but, as Giers commented, "It was considered necessary to keep Moldo-Wallachian political independence within definite bounds."16 Although Ghica acceded to the Russian demands, the Wallachian assembly, by then opposed to the prince, refused to accept the article. This obdurate attitude resulted in the dissolution of the assembly and the election of another, which proved similarly stubborn. The Russian government finally met the problem by persuading the Porte to issue a firman in May 1838 that forced the acceptance of the provision. The mood of the assembly remained hostile to the prince. Elections held in 1841 strengthened the ranks of his opponents. Meanwhile, in the previous year a new Russian consul-general had been appointed. Like his predecessor, I. A. Dashkov was soon drawn deeply into the conflict between the prince and the legislature.17 The assembly drew up a petition against the ruler, as it had the right to do, and the document was presented to both the Russian and Ottoman governments, which then sent commissioners to investigate the situation. What then happened is described in the Giers memoirs as follows: One can imagine the intrigues that brought about the appearance of these political inspectors. The Turkish commissioner, as is customary, took full advantage of the situation, and made a fortune by taking bribes from the hospodar as well as from each of the candidates for the office of prince by promising each individual the support of the Porte. While our representative, listening

37

Russia and the Romanian national state to anybody and everybody, tried to form a fair opinion on the state of affairs, he was deceived, being unfamiliar with both the region and the people.

In this situation the opposition triumphed, and Ghica was deposed in October with the approval of both the Ottoman and the Russian governments. Giers disapproved, believing that "the kind and noble" Dashkov had been too much influenced by his friend George Bibescu. Although the Ghica administration had been bad, Giers commented that nothing better could be "expected of his opponents, trained in the school of political intrigue, as were all the boyars of that time intrigue of which you can receive a true conception only in the East."18 In December 1842 a specially elected assembly chose a candidate favored by Dashkov - Bibescu. One of the richest boyars in the country, he was well educated and he had studied law in Paris. Although he had been part of the opposition to Ghica in the assembly, that body turned against him as strongly as it had against his predecessor. Some legitimate grievances existed, but the basic problem remained that neither in Wallachia nor in Moldavia would the great boyars accept the authority of one of their number. Each individually sought the office for himself and fought against whoever held it. Soon a new issue involving Russian influence became the center of the conflict between the prince and the assembly. The quarrel this time concerned the question of concessions given to a Russian engineer, Trandafilov, to explore the country and exploit the mineral resources he discovered. The opposition became so intense that Bibescu finally obtained the approval of Russia and the Porte to dissolve the assembly. He then governed the country by decree for two years. The next assembly, elected in 1846, was packed with his supporters. Despite the continual controversies, some advances were made in this period. A law on naturalization passed in 1847 m a de it easy for a Moldavian to become a Wallachian citizen. A customs union, a matter of great importance for the future, was agreed upon in Wallachia in 1846 and in Moldavia in 1847. I* carQ e into effect in 1848. Conditions were relatively more tranquil in Moldavia, where a clever prince ruled. Michael Sturdza, thirty-nine years old at the time of his appointment, was a practical, enterprising, and strong ruler, but also crafty and corrupt. Although he sought relations with the other powers, he took great care not to antagonize the Russian government. He secured the acceptance of the Additional Article without difficulty. He was also responsible for many important internal advances; during his reign roads, bridges, and hospitals were built and the postal service was improved. Like his colleague in Wallachia, Sturdza faced the constant opposition of boyars who were jealous of his position or who dis38

The Russian protectorate liked his policies. His rule was also identified with the Organic Statutes and the Russian domination. Those who opposed the system and the protecting powers naturally sought his removal. T H E RESISTANCE TO THE PROTECTORATE: THE NATIONAL OPPOSITION AND THE REVOLUTIONS OF 1 8 4 8

By the 1840s the Russian government had gained a large number of enemies in the Principalities. The obvious position of dominance, together with the often crude and demeaning manner in which it was enforced, rankled. The identification of the Organic Statutes with Russian rule damaged the regimes based on these documents. The unwillingness of the Russian officials to accept basic modifications in the system and their insistence on approving any changes whatsoever caused further feelings of grievance. Moreover, Russian rule, as has been emphasized, maintained the domination of a class and a political and social system. Opposition to boyar preeminence or to the unrepresentative character of the state institutions could only reflect on the protector. Meanwhile, although the Russian government continued to attempt to preserve the status quo, life in the Principalities was changing. In his memoirs Giers made particular reference to the contrast between the older generation, who usually wore the national costume, and the youth, who followed the latest Paris fashions - differences that also reflected evolving attitudes. The change, Giers believed, had begun during the administration of Kiselev.19 Certainly, during the years of the protectorate, Romanians were, as in the past, in touch with and aware of the political, social, and cultural events in Central and Western Europe. The attitude of the privileged youth, the sons of the boyars, was to become particularly important for the transmission of radical ideas into the Principalities. Since no institutions of higher education were available in the Principalities, students had to go abroad for university-level training. The great majority went to Paris, although some attended universities in Vienna or the German states. Few were attracted to St. Petersburg. Paris, of course, was the center for the propagation of the liberal-national revolutionary doctrines of the age, ideals that were to prove immensely attractive to young Romanians and applicable to the conditions in their country.20 The Russian government was well aware of the situation. During the reign of Nicholas I, France, despite the relatively conservative regimes of, first, the Bourbon restoration, and second, Louis Philippe, was regarded with extreme suspicion as the harborer of dangerous revolution39

Russia and the Romanian national state ary movements. In foreign relations too France was regarded as the chief Russian adversary. The influence that students educated in Paris could have on the Russian protectorate was recognized. In November 1846 Nesselrode instructed Dashkov to try to persuade Romanian students to attend universities in countries "where public instruction is under the control of governments that profess monarchical and conservative principles." If the authorities in the Principalities could not stop students from going to Paris, they should at least "discourage that tendency by encouraging in contrast studies made in Russia, Austria and Prussia." Subventions could enable needy students to go to these countries, and when they finished their education, "they could be given preference in advantageous employment in the teaching career as in the other branches of public service."21 Despite the Russian awareness of the problem, Romanian students and intellectuals made Paris their spiritual center. Most of the major political leaders for the future congregated there, including Nicholas and Radu Golescu, C. A. Rosetti, Ion and Dumitru Bratianu, Nicholas Balcescu, and Alexander loan Cuza. Michael Kogalniceanu, in contrast, studied in Berlin. Their constant discussions and debates concerning the conditions in their country did not result in the formulation of a single program, but they did share certain conceptions common to the liberal-national revolutionary programs of the time. In general, they agreed that a constitutional regime should be introduced into the Principalities, one including representative institutions that would widen the base of the government to bring in the educated, property-owning section of society. They approved of the principle of equality before the law and in the assessment of taxes. They also sought provisions to guarantee civil liberties, such as freedom of speech, the press, and assembly. Their major problem was to be the resolution of the land and peasant question. Since the majority, as sons of landholders, benefited from the existing social conditions, many proved reluctant to espouse doctrines that might cause them personal losses. Thus few of the proposals were democratic. The open and free participation in national politics of the great peasant majority was not a goal of the major revolutionary programs. All, of course, wished to change the government of the Principalities to eliminate the Russian influence and to alter, or dispense with, the Organic Statutes. Perhaps more important than the generally liberal cast of the Romanian revolutionary ideology was its national direction. Certainly, as far as the Russian position in the Principalities was concerned, it was this aspect which was to have the deepest and most negative results. The Romanian intellectuals were fully aware of and deeply humiliated 40

The Russian protectorate by the implications of the Russian protectorate. In Paris they came under the influence of the ideas of romantic nationalism, including revolutionary concepts of national liberation. Like others in the romantic age, they became greatly interested in the origins of their people and in classical civilization. With their emphasis on the Roman and Dacian heritage of the Romanian people, they naturally tended to have an attitude toward Russia divergent from that of many in the older generation, some of whom saw Russia as an Orthodox brother and a useful balance to Ottoman control. In contrast, the Latin background of the Romanian nationality appeared to link the Romanian people, not with the Slavs, but with the French and the Italians. Moreover, like other revolutionaries of the period, the Romanians looked at tsarist Russia as the embodiment of political and social backwardness; France, in contrast, symbolized progress, reason, and beauty. Educated in Western countries and deeply convinced of the validity of the revolutionary ideals, the emerging Romanian leaders were to reject the Orthodox, Ottoman legacy with its Russian ties and to stress their Roman and Dacian origins and the Latin basis of their language. The national program was exceedingly broad. The emphasis was on the ending of both Russian and Ottoman political control in Moldavia and Wallachia and the unification of these Principalities. Some, however, looked forward to the full union of what they regarded as the rightful Romanian lands, including not only these two provinces, but also Bukovina, Transylvania, and Bessarabia; Habsburg possessions, as well as Russian and Ottoman interests, were thus involved. The most effective leadership of the movement against Russian protection and the regime of the Organic Statutes was in the hands of the revolutionary youth both within and without the Principalities. The boyars' opposition to the princes has been described. Their internal jealousies, however, prevented the organization of a strong opposition. The new leaders had the advantage of a single ideology, and they used European examples of revolutionary strategy. Most important was the formation of various societies, either secret or public. Within the Principalities literary societies could meet openly. Others were secret and remained in close touch with similar organizations abroad. All recruited members from those who opposed the protectorate, the regimes in power, and, in particular, the close association with autocratic, backward, Orthodox Russia. The strong anti-Russian attitude, the "tendency toward ingratitude," as the Russian consul in Jassy at this time, Karl Evstafevich Kotesbu, expressed it, was well known to the Russian government. In a memorandum to Nesselrode, Kotsebu commented on the "spirit hostile to Russia that wins over the masses, exalts

Russia and the Romanian national state their imagination, and turns them away from the horizon of their natural destiny in order to lose them in the shadow of an ideal hope."22 The Russian agents were particularly apprehensive about the obvious links between the Romanian revolutionaries and the Polish movement. In 1846 a revolt broke out in Cracow, which was under Habsburg control. The failure of this action did nothing to quell the intensity of Polish feeling or to limit the intrigues of the emigrants. The Russian officials remained concerned in particular with the activities of those connected with Czartoryski. The obvious sympathy with which the French government regarded Polish actions and the assistance that French diplomats offered were similarly observed with distaste. In February 1848 the fall of the government of Louis Philippe marked the commencement of a revolutionary wave that swept through Europe. Italy, the German states, and the Habsburg Monarchy were the scenes of revolts that succeeded in overturning the governments in power. The Principalities too were caught up in these events. The first crisis occurred in Moldavia, where on March 27/April 8 a large crowd, consisting chiefly of townspeople, liberal boyars, and those who opposed the Sturdza regime, assembled in the St. Petersburg Hotel. Speeches attacking the prince were made, and a committee was appointed to draw up a petition. This document, which reflected the standard liberal program, was submitted to Sturdza, who not only rejected it but proceeded to arrest about three hundred of the participants in the demonstration. Many were subsequently sent to prison or into exile. This firm reaction ended revolutionary activity in that principality.23 The course of events in Wallachia was to be quite different. Here the revolution had the services of talented leaders, some of whom were to exert the predominant influence on Romanian political life for the next four decades. Two of these, Ion Ghica and C. A. Rosetti, were in Bucharest already, but they waited for the return of some of their friends who were abroad, notably Nicholas Balcescu and Ion Bratianu. They were joined by the Golescu brothers. In one of the first moves Ghica was sent to Constantinople to reassure the Ottoman government on the aims of the revolt. As in the time of Tudor Vladimirescu, the leaders tried to secure at least the neutrality of the suzerain power through assurances that the position of the Porte in the Principalities would not be affected. In Constantinople the efforts of Ghica were supported by the Polish emigres and the French and British embassies. The Wallachian revolution was formally announced at Islaz on June 9/21, at which time a proclamation was read that included a twenty-two-point program of reform. The clear objective of the rebel-

The Russian protectorate lion was the end of Russian protection and the overthrow of the regime based on the Organic Statutes. The revolutionary forces won an almost immediate victory. In Bucharest Bibescu agreed to sign the Islaz Proclamation, but he soon lost his nerve, abdicated, and left for Transylvania. A government was then set up with Metropolitan Neofit at its head. Despite this bloodless victory, the revolution had certain obvious weaknesses. It did not have, for instance, an armed force at its command. Vladimirescu, it will be remembered, had organized the People's Assembly. In June Colonel George Magheru was entrusted with the formation of a national guard; he subsequently left for Oltenia to set up a camp. The many domestic difficulties faced by the revolutionary leaders and the friction among them certainly weakened the movement, but for the ultimate success or failure of the effort the reaction of the Russian and Ottoman governments would be the determining factor. Obviously, the revolutionary regime could not assemble the forces needed to resist an Ottoman or Russian occupation. Although there was some hope for an understanding with Constantinople, the Romanian leaders could not expect anything but enmity from Russia. The entire revolutionary effort was directed against Russian control and the government that Russia sponsored. Moreover, the Wallachian movement was but a small part of the Europe-wide changes that threatened to disturb the balance of power and to endanger Russian security. The events of 1848 caused extreme anxiety to Nicholas I. Although known for his highly conservative views, he had been willing to accept some liberal reforms under certain circumstances. He was a constitutional ruler in Poland until 1830; in 1844 he had accepted the constitutional government established in Greece even though it had been brought about by revolutionary action. Some regarded the Organic Statutes as constitutions of a sort. In general, the tsar, like his predecessor, was willing to accept political reform as long as it was introduced through legal procedures and preferably under the sponsorship of a legitimate ruler. He was, however, strongly opposed to revolutionary activity such as that which won such astounding victories in 1848. Although he held these principles, Nicholas did not particularly regret the fall of the July Monarchy; he had never liked Louis Philippe's regime. The subsequent victory of the revolutionary forces in Vienna and Berlin in March, however, was an entirely different matter. Russia had lost the support of its closest allies, and the entire Central European area had been opened to revolutionary influences. The Russian government was, nevertheless, paralyzed. In fear of a similar uprising in its 43

Russia and the Romanian national state Polish territories and unprepared for military intervention on a wide scale, the tsar could only wait, observe the course of events, and strengthen his armed forces. The policy of abstention adopted toward the revolt in Western and Central Europe was not to be applied to the Principalities. From the beginning the Russian government made it clear that the situation there was quite different. The Romanian revolutionary movement had as a main objective the removal of Russian control. It also represented the first truly national manifestation in the region. Previous revolts had been rooted either in peasant social and economic grievances or in the conspiracies of the boyars against the regimes in power. In contrast, the Wallachian rebellion not only was specifically anti-Russian in direction, but was part of a great European movement whose success would alter the balance of power on the Continent and perhaps lead to similar internal disorders in Russia itself. Even before the outbreak of revolutionary activity in the Principalities, the Russian government had made its attitude known. In an instruction of March 16/28 to Kotsebu, Nesselrode wrote that although Russia would not intervene in European countries unless requested, this policy did not apply to the Ottoman lands under Russian protection. There political changes would not be tolerated, and force would be the response to attempts to change political conditions. These decisions were communicated to the hospodars, and the determination to intervene if necessary was made clear. Sturdza's prompt suppression of the agitation in Jassy made such action unnecessary. Nevertheless, the tsar did take certain steps. In April he sent General Alexander Osipovich Duhamel, an aide-de-camp, to the Principalities to report on the situation. At the same time he concentrated his Fifteenth Division in Bessarabia. Duhamel visited both capitals, where he discussed the situation with the leading political figures and emphasized the Russian determination not to allow political changes. In addition to taking these measures, the Russian government remained in contact with the Porte, which in May dispatched its own special commissioner, Talaat Effendi. The Ottoman envoy, like his Russian counterpart, warned that the political organization established by the Organic Statutes must remain unaltered. Thus both the Russian and the Ottoman governments had made their attitudes known before the outbreak of the Wallachian revolution. The provisional government in Bucharest therefore had good reason to fear immediate Russian military action. On June 12/24, even before Bibescu abdicated, Kotsebu strongly protested the breaking of the 44

The Russian protectorate Organic Statutes, and he announced his departure. He told the French representative that he did not know what the tsar would decide, but he believed that sufficient motives for intervention existed. Duhamel, who was still in Bucharest, withdrew to Bessarabia. The decision to initiate a military occupation was in fact made not by Nicholas I, but by Duhamel, who had been given the power to call in a special military unit organized for that purpose. Considerable confusion, including counterorders by the tsar, accompanied the action, but Russian troops did enter Moldavia on June 25/July 7. They first marched to Jassy, where their objective was to assure that a revolt similar to that in Wallachia did not take place in Moldavia. The occupation of Moldavia, where the revolutionary danger was now minimal, should have been the first step to a similar action in Wallachia. Expecting such an occurrence, the members of the provisional government, in a moment of panic, fled to the mountains on June 28/July 10. A new regime was established, but it was immediately overthrown by a popular reaction. The revolutionary leaders then returned to Bucharest, where they were given a three-month respite from further outside dangers. Although Russian troops were stationed in Moldavia, Nicholas I regretted Duhamel's decision. He believed that the cooperation of the Ottoman government should have been first obtained. Not only did he wish to end the occupation of Moldavia as soon as possible, but he did not at first foresee intervention in Wallachia. The decision to act in concert with the Porte was communicated to the Russian representatives in Constantinople, who initiated discussions with Ottoman officials concerning the question of possible joint action. The Russian attitude at this time was stated in a circular dispatch of July 19/31, which declared that the previous occupation of Moldavia was designed to prevent the spread of revolutionary activities from Wallachia. The Russian government had no intention of interfering in the affairs of other states, but it was determined to maintain its treaty rights in the Principalities, whose obligations to both Russia and the Porte were stressed. The document declared that the objective of the Wallachian revolutionaries was to set up, under the name of a Daco-Roman kingdom, a new separate and independent state, for the formation of which they will come to an agreement with their brothers from Moldavia, Bukovina, Transylvania and Bessarabia. The realization of such a plan, if it is allowed to happen, wTould lead to serious consequences. Should, in the name of an alleged nationality, whose origin is lost in the night of the ages, the Moldo-Wallachians come sometime to separate 45

Russia and the Romanian national state from Turkey, in pursuance of the same principle, under the influence of the same desire, one would soon see Bulgaria, Rumelia, all of the races with diverse languages that make up the Ottoman Empire, aspire also to emancipate themselves, in order each to form a separate state.

The dispatch concluded with the assurance that the Russian intervention in Moldavia was not a precedent for similar action in Europe, since the Russian rights in the East "are based on treaties that do not exist in the West."24 Faced with the apparent danger of an immediate Russian intervention, the revolutionary government in Wallachia suffered from the extreme disadvantage that it could expect assistance from no outside European power. Although the new regime did send emissaries abroad, it was soon obvious that their efforts would be in vain. France, the country to which the Romanian leadership felt its closest attachment, was faced with grave internal problems of its own. The French government expressed its sympathy and advised the Wallachians not to provoke a Russian intervention by extreme actions. Even less success was gained in Britain, where the government, for considerations of general policy, could not become involved in the events of the region. Prussia and the Habsburg Monarchy, of course, were in the midst of a domestic revolutionary crisis. In these dangerous circumstances the Wallachian revolutionary leaders had no alternative but to turn to the Porte. Regarding Ottoman suzerainty as a lesser evil and recognizing the common interest in the removal of Russian predominance, they made a great effort to gain the acceptance of the Porte for their actions. In Constantinople Ion Ghica, the representative of the revolutionary government, continued to assure the Ottoman officials of Romanian loyalty and to promise that no measures would be taken that would lessen the sultan's authority. Should an intervention be necessary, the Romanian leaders preferred that it be carried out by the Ottoman army alone, rather than by a joint action with Russia. The Ottoman government found itself in a most uncomfortable position. The Turkish statesmen were, of course, delighted with the success of a movement directed against Russian predominance in the Principalities, although they, of course, were against revolutionary activities in principle. The opportunity might be exploited to remove Russian control from the provinces. The military weakness of the Porte, however, prevented it from acting to achieve such an objective. In fact, it soon came under strong pressure to take actions that would in fact result in the reestablishment of Russian influence. The ambassador, Vladimir Pavlovich Titov, and the other Russian representatives urged the Porte

The Russian protectorate to join with St. Petersburg in crushing this revolutionary disturbance. Because of the problems that it faced in Central Europe at the time, the Russian government at first wished the Ottoman army to deal with the crisis in Bucharest. Under conflicting pressures, the Porte finally sent a new commissioner, Suleiman Pasha, to investigate the situation. Should he need it, he had at his service an army of twenty thousand under the command of Omer Pasha. Suleiman arrived in Giurgiu on July 19/31. Entering into negotiations with the Wallachian leaders, he was able to obtain changes in the government, but it was still dominated by those who had been prominent in the revolution. When the conciliatory nature of Suleiman's actions became obvious, the Russian government objected strongly. The Ottoman envoy had negotiated with the revolutionary leaders and had agreed to some of their requests. The Russian officials, in contrast, wanted a complete change of government, a full disavowal of the revolutionary acts, and a punishment of the conspirators. The old order of the Organic Statutes was to be restored intact. Although the Ottoman government attempted to justify Suleiman's actions, it agreed that more drastic changes would have to be made. One of the leading statesmen of the empire, Fuad Pasha, was thus sent to Wallachia. He proceeded to Galatz, where, during his days in the quarantine, he consulted with Duhamel and with some Romanian leaders. Meanwhile, an atmosphere of increasing tension was apparent in Bucharest; rumors of an impending occupation spread. With the population in a state of agitation and excitement, incidents could be expected to occur. A mob in Bucharest burned a copy of the Organic Statutes, and a small monument erected in honor of Kiselev was destroyed. Many peasants arrived from the countryside. With so much combustible material at hand, some demonstrations were inevitable. On September 13/25 Fuad entered the country together with the Ottoman troops. Acts of violence, the most notable being a clash with a group of firemen resulting in about two hundred casualties on each side, accompanied the occupation. Once in Bucharest Fuad called together the leading boyars. He read to them a firman dissolving the previous government and naming Constantine Cantacuzino, a Russian candidate, as the single regent. The former conditions had thus been brought back with little bloodshed. Faced with overwhelming military might, the Wallachian revolutionaries could not resist, although there was some disagreement on the question. The volunteer camp in the mountains, under the direction of Magheru, was disbanded. Without a military force of their own the revolutionary leaders could only surrender. 47

Russia and the Romanian national state Despite the Ottoman action, carried through under pressure from Russia, that government was not satisfied. There were fears that the Ottoman commissioner would not show sufficient enthusiasm in uncovering any remaining revolutionary actions. Moreover, a proper attitude of contrition was not apparent in Bucharest. Other justifications for action also existed. Some conservative boyars, fearing a resurgence of the revolutionary movement, were requesting assistance. The concurrent victory of the Hungarian revolution and events in the Habsburg Empire made the control of Wallachia of increased strategic significance. The political situation in the province had to be kept under firm control. In addition, Nicholas I was now prepared to move against the revolutionary danger both in Central Europe and in the Principalities. With 250,000 soldiers ready to march, he had the means to intervene decisively in both areas. The Russian intervention did not please the Porte, which saw no need for the action. When Fuad arrived in Bucharest on September 13/25, Duhamel informed him of the imminent arrival of a Russian army under the command of General Alexander Nikolaevich Liiders.25 Fuad, although without official instructions on the matter, opposed the Russian intervention, arguing that order was fully restored and further military action was not necessary. The danger of incidents should Russian and Turkish troops occupy the city together was also stressed. Nevertheless, on September 16/28 the Russian army entered Bucharest. The Russian official pronouncements emphasized cooperation with the Porte, although no prior agreement had in fact been made. Once the Russian army crossed the Wallachian frontier, it became obvious once again that Russia, not the Ottoman Empire, was the state that in fact controlled Wallachia. General Liiders, working with Duhamel and Kotsebu, dominated the Cantacuzino administration; Fuad played a distinctly secondary role. The Russian occupation was carried out without the least sign of resistance. Peaceful conditions had been reestablished before the arrival of the Russian army. Moreover, the administration in office had Russian approval. With the major steps taken toward assuring stable government, the Russian officials could turn to the task of arresting and punishing those who had taken part in the revolt. The Russian officials, in contrast to the Ottoman, placed emphasis on the apprehension of former revolutionaries. They also wished to make sure that the administration was purged of those who had taken office during the period of the revolt. Although the Russian measures were often harsh, there was certainly no reign of terror. In fact, in comparison to what happened to revolutionary leaders in other areas, for instance in Transylvania in 48

The Russian protectorate 1849, the treatment was mild. Some of those apprehended served prison sentences; others lost their government offices or had property confiscated. Of course, after the failure of the revolution those most deeply implicated in it fled abroad. There they continued their political activities and, as shall be seen, caused great concern to the Russian officials. However, only a decade later the majority of those involved in the movement were back in the Principalities and engaged in their former occupations. Meanwhile, the revolutionary ideals and goals remained alive among the exiles. Despite the relative moderation of the occupation, the new intervention caused extreme bitterness. Although the Russian declarations emphasized that the intention was to rescue the majority of the nation from the misdeeds of a minority, the fact remained that the revolutionary leadership had commanded the support of most of the population. The Russian actions were thus viewed as yet another attempt to suppress the true wishes of the people. This difficult situation was compounded by the presence of the army of occupation and the numerous problems that we have seen in previous similar episodes. Once again complaints were made that the Russian soldiers were taking supplies and not paying for them. Difficulties were met in connection with the requisitioning of housing and transport. The occupation was also a major financial burden for the state. The entire cost of the undertaking was charged to the Principalities, with the sum divided between them. To meet the immediate problem of payment, the tsar "magnanimously" granted a loan of 300,000 rubles.26 The Ottoman government, in contrast, did not charge the cost of the occupation to the provinces, and its officials paid for supplies. The major Russian objectives were achieved during the first months, and thereafter the affairs of the Principalities assumed a secondary position in Russian policy. In June 1849, answering an appeal from the young emperor Franz Joseph, Nicholas I sent his armies into Transylvania. After the suppression of the Hungarian revolution and the failure of similar movements throughout Central Europe, the tsar could regard the European scene with satisfaction. Despite their limited extent and ultimate failure, the events of 1848 were to leave a lasting imprint on Romanian political development. As we shall see, the revolutionary movement was to provide the national leadership for the next four decades. The future relationship with Russia was similarly shaped by this episode. It was clear that the program of the Organic Statutes represented the furthest limit that the Russian government would allow for political reform. Although Russian backing had previously aided the Principalities in resisting the claims of the 49

Russia and the Romanian national state Porte, the Russian protectorship by the middle of the century had become as burdensome as the former Ottoman control. Autocratic Russia, holding Polish lands, could not be expected to be sympathetic to the liberal, national ideals of the most advanced and effective element in Romanian political life. T H E PROTECTORATE RENEWED,

1849-1854

After the suppression of the revolutionary government in Wallachia and the occupation of both provinces, the Russian authorities were next faced with the problem of setting up governments that would serve their interests. In April 1849 General Grabbe was sent to Constantinople to negotiate a new agreement, and in May the protecting power and the suzerain signed yet another treaty regulating the status of the Principalities. The Convention of Balta Liman marked the high point of the Russian domination. The princes were henceforth to be named by Russia and the Porte, rather than elected by native assemblies. Their terms of office were reduced from life to seven years. The boyar assemblies were replaced by smaller councils, known again as divans, whose members were to be chosen by the princes. In addition, commissions were to be set up whose function would be to revise the Organic Statutes. Their work was to be examined by the Ottoman government, which would then consult with Russia.27 If the changes were approved, the Porte would issue the necessary proclamations. Barbu §tirbei, the brother of Bibescu, was named the ruler of Wallachia; Gregory A. Ghica was appointed for Moldavia. The new arrangements did nothing at all to improve political conditions or to calm the general dissatisfaction. The revolution had indeed been suppressed, but liberals and conservatives alike wanted an end to the Russian intervention. Moreover, it was difficult to establish stable administrations. No sooner had the new princes been named than they became the targets of attack by the boyar factions who had lost out by the nominations. The previous bitter struggles over political offices continued, and the disaffected parties once again addressed appeals to the Russian consulates. Although all groups complained about Russian interference in principle, few, as in the past, were adverse to calling for Russian aid to defend their individual interests. The official Russian attitude to expressions of dissatisfaction was given in a Nesselrode instruction of 1851 to the consulates in the Principalities: We have certainly not had the hope of setting up in the Principalities governments secure from every reproach, from every complaint. What we had in view two years ago was to reestablish in these provinces the tranquility that 5°

The Russian protectorate was profoundly troubled by some audacious agitators and to place at the head of their new administration men who were the most generally considered as competent and honest. Until this time the princes §tirbei and Ghica have justified the choice of the two courts that gave them their votes and it will not be on the basis of vague grievances or to satisfy personal rivalries that we will change our opinion in their regard, or that we will consent to modify the clauses of the Convention of Balta Liman.28 Despite the support given the princes, the Russian officials continued to report on the prevalent corruption and misgovernment. There were attempts to improve the situation. Nominations were made for commissions that were to revise the Organic Statutes, and they began their work. It is interesting to note that the man in charge of military administration, General Duhamel, was, like his predecessor, Kiselev, concerned about the condition of the peasants. In 1849, lXi regard to the nominations for the commissions, he wrote: Since it is a question of improving the situation of the farmer, and since this result can be obtained only by concessions on the part of the landlords, I believe that it is necessary, as far as possible, to place on the committees of revision individuals who have compassion for the miseries of the people and who by their social position have it in their power to take the initiative toward some indispensable sacrifices.29 Duhamel also recognized the political helplessness of the peasant. Writing in 1851, he described how the agents of the landholders came to understandings with the lower officials, who were able to place such pressure on the peasants that many, in despair, emigrated to other Ottoman lands or to Transylvania. 30 Despite such Russian official concern, the regulations adopted in 1851 concerning agrarian relations in both Principalities in fact worsened the peasants' relative position. Even though the necessity for reform was recognized, and indeed some changes were introduced, the Russian officials were limited in their choice of actions. The fear of revolutionary ferment far outweighed any convictions that the political system had to be changed. The consulates had in the past regularly reported on the feelings that remained from the revolutionary period. 31 Both princes were warned by the Russian authorities to remain on guard against subversive activities and to keep a close watch over correspondence carried on between individuals in the provinces and those in the emigration. The Russian consuls were fully aware of the activities of the exiles and their influence in the country. On September 21/October 3, 1851 the Russian consul in Bucharest, Khaltchinskii, reported to Nesselrode on the continuing problems in regard to the emigrants: "Besides the incendiary writing that is sent back into the country, the numerous Wallachian travelers who this year

51

Russia and the Romanian national state visited Paris and London brought back on their return the inspirations of their exiled compatriots and they kept alive an agitation of spirits that deserves an added vigilance on the part of the two hospodars." 32 Before the termination of the occupation in 1851, the Russian officials took the occasion to warn about what could happen should disturbances again break out. In a declaration designed to appear in the official journals of the Principalities, the Russian authorities made it clear that they were prepared for another intervention.33 In his instructions to his consuls Nesselrode also emphasized that Russia intended to maintain its influence and its rights under the treaties. Should "the revolutionary spirit again raise its head" and should the princes be unable to handle the situation, the army corps stationed in Bessarabia would march in "to reestablish order and to deliver the guilty to a severe justice."34 With this Russian determination it did indeed appear as if the goals of the revolutionary movement had little hope of success, at least in the immediate future. Indeed, in the years following the crushing of the revolt, the international situation too appeared extremely dark for the Romanian revolutionaries, as well as for their Polish, Hungarian, German, and Italian counterparts. The conservative forces had triumphed throughout Central Europe. The Convention of Balta Liman had tightened the Russian hold on the Principalities, and few expected that the tsarist government would soon consent to modifications in its strong position. In this bleak scene only one encouraging sign remained. As we have seen, the revolutionaries had been greatly influenced by their French connections. The single major success of 1848 had been achieved in Paris with the victory of Louis Napoleon. The experiences of the revolutionary year had shown the Romanians as well as the Italians that they could not hope to achieve their national goals without great-power assistance. In the next years Louis Napoleon was to prove a valuable ally and a supporter of the national movements. T H E ROMANIAN EMIGRATION

The political activities of the Romanian emigration were to have a major importance not only in winning support for the national cause, but also for future Russian relations with the Principalities.35 Although most of those who had participated in the revolutionary events in Moldavia were soon able to resume their former lives, none of the major Wallachian leaders could return. Moreover, the Wallachian government, as we have seen, took measures to attempt to prevent any correspondence or contact between them and their friends and relations

The Russian protectorate in the Principality. During this period of exile they continued their political activities from various centers, including England, the Ottoman Empire, Greece, and Switzerland, although Paris remained the center. At first, the factionalism and ideological division that had been apparent during the revolutionary period continued. Separated by personal feelings and lacking a common social and political goal, they could not rally around a single leader or program. In fact, the one major objective that won universal approval was the destruction of the Russian protectorate. In other matters there was considerable difference of opinion. Some, for instance, sought complete independence, whereas others favored a continuation of the association with the Ottoman Empire. Similar disagreements existed over the form of government to be established in the future and the great powers that should be sought as friends and allies. Vienna and Berlin had their partisans, as well as Paris. France, nevertheless, continued to offer the chief attraction. Many of the emigres simply returned to their former associations and activities. Two organizations, the Romanian Democratic Committee and the Association of Romanian Students, were formed under the leadership of men who not only had been prominent in the revolution, but were to play major roles in the future, such as C. A. Rosetti, Dumitru and Ion C. Bratianu, Alexander Golescu, George Cretulescu, and others. The majority supported a radical program, including the unification of all of the Romanian lands, full independence from both Russian and Ottoman control, a republican government, and social equality. The outstanding theoretician, N. Balcescu, died in 1852. At first, the emigres' closest connections were with French intellectuals, such as Edgar Quinet, Jules Michelet, and A. de Lamartine, and with socialist circles. They also, naturally, were close to other exile groups, notably the Poles. Some became associated with radical movements, in particular with Mazzini and his European Democratic Committee. These activities did not endear them to French official circles, especially as the government of Louis Napoleon moved to the right. Their radical programs made them even more suspect after Napoleon's coup d'etat of December 1851. In June 1853 Ion Bratianu was arrested in connection with a plot to assassinate Napoleon. Although he was cleared of the major charge, he was condemned to three years' detention for his other activities. The change of atmosphere in Paris forced the exiles to face realities. The retention of their more radical social and political ideals could obviously lead to a complete disaster. Moreover, these were the issues that had been the chief cause of dissension within the emigre ranks pre53

Russia and the Romanian national state viously. Faced with this situation, the Romanian leadership wisely accepted the necessity of circumscribing the national program. The emphasis was shifted to the securing of limited goals: the removal of the Russian protectorate, the unification of Moldavia and Wallachia, and the appointment of a foreign prince. The more radical aspects of the revolutionary program were abandoned; national unification was limited to the two Principalities, with the question of Transylvania, Bukovina, and Bessarabia left for the future. Some former radicals, such as the Bratianu brothers, were to move quite noticeably to the right. The basis was thus set for winning the support of the French ruler, who took the title of Emperor Napoleon III in 1852. Already a firm adherent of the national idea, he added the Romanian cause to his previous Polish and Italian enthusiasms. This French connection was certainly a logical association for the Romanian nationalists. With their emphasis on their Daco-Roman origins and their Latinity, an alliance with the strongest Latin great power was advisable. Moreover, the attention given to the common cultural association won the Romanians supporters among French intellectuals oi a romantic-nationalist bent. The Latin linguistic bond had a particularly great attraction here. For instance, Quinet wrote: "The first qualification (titre) of the Romanians, the most striking, is incontestably their language. It is their true mark of nobility amid the barbarians." In the same vein he continued: "The Romanians say to the West: 'Restore to us our rightful place (droit de cite) in the family of Latin peoples. We are yours, although surrounded by barbarians. Rescue us from this captivity.' " 36 The cultural superiority repeatedly emphasized in the declarations of both the Romanian and the French romantic nationalists, of course, directly reflected on the Russian position in the Principalities. The deep conviction of Latin superiority over the surrounding Slavic people, in particular the Russians, was to be an abiding attribute of Romanian nationalism. Previously, Russian and conservative Romanian leaders had emphasized the cultural advantages of their Orthodox civilization over that of the "barbarian" Muslim conquerors. Now French-oriented Romanian liberals were to use the same vocabulary to attack the Russian protectorate. Although the major emphasis of the Romanian effort was directed toward gaining French support, attempts were also made to win British approval. Here the major work was carried out by D. Bratianu, who lived in London from 1851 to 1857. In 1851 the Philo-Romanian Society was formed among sympathizers with the Romanian cause. In Britain the arguments used were those which would have most appeal to local interests, including the iniquity of the Russian protectorate and 54

The Russian protectorate the opportunities for commercial gain that would be opened once the Russian control over the lower Danube was lifted. Despite the fact that the Romanian arguments fitted well into the growing anti-Russian sentiment, they did not convince the influential British statesmen, such as Lord Palmerston. Although the ending of the protectorate did become part of the British peace objectives during the Crimean War, the restoral of Ottoman authority, rather than the establishment of a strong Romanian national unit, was the goal of the British leadership. Nevertheless, the Romanian emigres in both Britain and France by 1854 had accomplished much toward educating influential public opinion about conditions in the Principalities. Placing great emphasis on publicity and propaganda, they wrote books, pamphlets, and articles for journals and newspapers. They also organized countless public meetings and made efforts to convert prominent public figures to their cause. Although they disagreed among themselves on the details of the political program they wished introduced into the Principalities, the majority continued to share the general beliefs held by European liberals in the middle of the nineteenth century. They supported constitutional government, with the principal power held by the legislative bodies. As we have seen, their first goal was the establishment of an independent national state. Although they had no formal organization, they did in a sense form a political party, and in subsequent sections the designation "Liberal Party" will be used to refer to this group. In the same manner, their opposition will be called the Conservatives or the Conservative Party, although again the term covers many varying political opinions. Here the name will be used to refer to those who opposed radical political change, who wished to preserve historic institutions, and who desired to limit popular participation in the government. Conservatives also usually preferred to allow the executive branch to exert the major power in the government. With the failure of the revolution the Conservative influences were predominant in the Principalities. Despite their undoubted success in winning foreign partisans, the Liberals could not really hope to attain their goals unless some event should occur that would end the overwhelming Russian military and political influence in the Principalities. It was thus most fortunate for the Romanian national leadership that such an unexpected occurrence was soon to take place. T H E CRIMEAN WAR

At mid-century the Russian government appeared to have won triumphs everywhere. Its Holy Alliance partners, Prussia and the Habs55

Russia and the Romanian national state burg Monarchy, once again enjoyed stable, conservative governments. Although Louis Napoleon, whose regime represented revolutionary principles, held office, France appeared diplomatically isolated. In addition, Nicholas I believed that he had an understanding with Britain and that he would work with this power in Eastern affairs. Although the Russian government still favored the maintenance of the status quo in the Near East, the dangers that could arise from future upheavals in this sensitive area were recognized. In conversations in January 1853, the tsar presented to the British ambassador in St. Petersburg, Sir Hamilton Seymour, a plan for a possible future partition of Ottoman territory. At this time Nicholas I declared his continued interest in holding a protectorate over Wallachia, Moldavia, and Serbia. The Principalities were thus seen as a permanent part of the Russian sphere of control. This extremely favorable Russian position was about to collapse. Although the origins and events of the Crimean War are not a part of this narrative, it is interesting to note that the conflict came about largely over the interpretation of the treaties that gave Russia a special position in relation to the Orthodox Christians of the Ottoman Empire, the same agreements that had so influenced the fate of the Principalities in the past.37 Moreover, the first belligerent action leading to the outbreak of hostilities involved the Principalities. In July 1853, scarcely two years after their previous departure, Russian troops again crossed the Pruth. In October the Ottoman Empire declared war; France and Britain did not join in until March 1854. The Principalities were thus once again under military occupation. During the first weeks the princes §tirbei and Ghica were caught between two opposing pressures. On the one hand, the Russian officials demanded that they break relations with the Porte and refuse to pay the tribute; on the other, the Ottoman government, backed by Britain, pressed them to obey the directives of the suzerain power, end all communications with the Russian authorities, and leave their posts. In October they did indeed abandon their offices and depart for Vienna. The Russian officials then took over the government. General Andreus F. Budberg, in command of the Russian forces, like Kiselev before him, assumed the title of president plenipotentiary. The divans, established as a result of the Convention of Balta Liman, remained, but their members were appointed from among the Russian partisans. The Russian occupation was of short duration - from July 1853 to August 1854. The familiar problems recurred; the securing of housing, transportation, and supplies caused tension between the military authorities and the population. The Russian administration carefully enforced the censorship regulations, and public meetings were pro56

The Russian protectorate hibited: the memories of 1848 were still fresh. As before, the Russian officials sought to attract local support for their war against the Ottoman Empire. Although their cause awakened much enthusiasm in other parts of the Ottoman territories, particularly among the Slavic and Greek inhabitants, they won few adherents in the Principalities. In fact, largely because of the events of 1848, many had sympathies favoring the Porte, feelings that were strengthened once France and Britain entered the war. The political situation in the provinces was soon, however, to change radically. In June 1854 the Habsburg Monarchy concluded an agreement with the Porte and then turned to St. Petersburg with the demand that the Russian armies evacuate the provinces. Because of its weak military position, the Russian government was forced to comply. Austrian and Ottoman forces then took their place.38 Omer Pasha was once again in Bucharest. Assurances were given that the joint occupation was only temporary and that the previous conditions would be restored after the war; Ghica and §tirbei returned to resume their offices. Despite the declarations and the Russian withdrawal, the Romanian nationalists were not happy about the new situation. They remained deeply suspicious of Austrian and Ottoman intentions. They certainly had no desire to exchange Habsburg for Russian domination. Moreover, bitter feelings were aroused when the Habsburg authorities had to deal with the problems that had caused so much ill will during previous Russian occupations. Conflicts arose over the requisitioning of supplies and housing and matters of local internal administration. Like their Russian counterparts, the Habsburg authorities were able to gain the support of some conservative Romanians, but they could not win the allegiance of any sizable groups among the population. The Habsburg occupation had one great advantage: it prevented the Principalities from becoming a battlefield. The Romanian lands thus did not suffer from the devastation of a war fought among the great powers. Although the Principalities were neutralized, their ultimate fate was a matter of constant concern to the diplomats. Throughout the war Vienna remained the center of continual negotiations. In August 1854 the European allies and the Habsburg government agreed upon a set of conditions, known as the Vienna Four Points, which were designed to serve as the basis for peace. After the allied victories in the Crimea and the fall of Sebastopol, the cession of Bessarabian land adjacent to the Danube and the neutralization and demilitarization of the Black Sea were added as concrete demands. Obviously, these points had great significance for the future of the Principalities. In January 1856 the Russian government, after suffering a defeat in the Crimea and 57

Russia and the Romanian national state receiving a Habsburg ultimatum, accepted a strengthened version of these terms. The Congress of Paris, called to formulate the final peace terms, opened on February 13/25, 1856. Each nation was represented by two plenipotentiaries: Count K. F. Buol-Schauenstein and Count J. A. von Hiibner for Austria; Count Alexander Walewski and Baron Francois A. Bourqueney for France; the Earl of Clarendon and Earl Henry R. C. Cowley for Britain; Prince Aleksei Fedorovich Orlov and Baron Filip Ivanovich Brunnow for Russia; Count Camillo de Cavour and the Marquis de Villamarina for Sardinia; Ali Pasha and Mehmed Djemil Bey for the Ottoman Empire. The Prussian delegates, Otto von Manteuffel and Maximilian von Hatzfeldt, were admitted only later in the sessions. Although Napoleon III was not personally in attendance - no rulers were - he was able to exert a great deal of influence and to decide the policy of the French representatives on a day-by-day basis. His sympathetic attitude was an immense aid to the Romanian position. The final terms of the treaty were based on the points previously discussed. For Russia the most damaging clauses were those concerned with the Black Sea and the Danube. The Black Sea was declared neutralized and demilitarized; neither Russia nor the Ottoman Empire was to maintain a fleet on its waters or naval arsenals on its shores. The Straits remained, as before, closed to warships of all powers. In addition, Russia was compelled to surrender to Moldavia three districts of southern Bessarabia, a cession which meant that this state was no longer a Danubian riparian power. The river as a whole was placed under international control, and the delta was returned to the Ottoman Empire. Among the other provisions of particular significance for the Principalities was the ending of the Russian protectorate. The Romanians, as well as the Serbs, were placed under a joint European guarantee. The specific provisions made for the future organization of the Principalities, which caused much controversy, will be discussed in detail subsequently. These terms, deeply humiliating for Russia, were to have an enormously liberating effect in the Danubian lands. Most important was the termination of the Russian protectorate. The period of the Organic Statutes and Russian domination had been of great significance for Romanian national development. On the positive side, certain Russian actions had undoubtedly been to the Romanian benefit. The establishment of the protectorate as well as earlier Russian interventions had indeed greatly weakened the bonds between the Principalities and the Porte. Previously, during the period of Phanariot rule, the suzerain state had often transgressed the autonomous rights of the provinces. The Russian treaties with the Ottoman Empire placed definite limits on 58

The Russian protectorate Ottoman interference: the relationship between the vassal and the suzerain power was defined; the tribute and other payments were set; an end was made to the Ottoman right of preemption in the purchase of Romanian agricultural products; and, in addition, an Ottoman occupation of Romanian territory, unless under unusual circumstances, was made almost impossible and Muslims were prevented from buying property or establishing permanent residences. The Organic Regulations had also provided the provinces with a better political system than they had enjoyed previously. The administration introduced at this time was progressive for the time and the place. The negative aspects, were, however, to take precedence as time passed. The protectorate did represent great-power domination. As such, it became a symbol of national oppression. Russia thus became the state that drew the chief focus of nationalist hatred. In comparison, Ottoman influence appeared relatively benign; the Turkish ability to compel obedience was extremely limited. Moreover, although the Organic Statutes had once represented progress, this element was largely negated by the subsequent Russian refusal to consider changes in the political system. As a result, those who sought a further evolution in political development were forced into the opposition. The intellectuals and educated youth, deeply influenced by contemporary European thought, were to be particularly effective in combating Russian influence. Attracted by Western liberal-national doctrine, they came to share the common feeling of the European revolutionary that autocratic Russia was the great enemy of humanity and progress. This conviction, of course, was intensified by the Russian role in the suppression of the revolutions of 1848. In addition to the specific terms of the treaty, other aspects of the Crimean War crisis were to have an equally beneficial effect on Romanian affairs. Before 1853 the Russian position in Europe had been immensely strengthened by the fact that it was a member of the strongest Continental coalition, the Holy Alliance, which included Prussia and the Habsburg Empire. The diplomatic maneuvering during the war, particularly the support given by the monarchy to Russia's adversaries, resulted in the breaking of the alignment. In 1855 Nicholas I died. His son, Alexander II, thus came to the throne at a time of military defeat and diplomatic isolation. After the war he appointed as foreign minister Alexander Mikhailovich Gorchakov, who had previously been ambassador in Vienna. He shared with the tsar a feeling of disgust and anger at what they felt had been a Habsburg betrayal and a failure to return the support that had been given against the Hungarian revolution in 1849. For the next several years they were to show themselves de59

Russia and the Romanian national state lighted to cooperate in diplomatic combinations that would weaken and humiliate their former ally. They thus welcomed the opportunity that arose at this time to work with France, the power that the previous tsar had regarded as the chief menace to the Russian position in Europe. The rapprochement between Russia and France, now the patron of the Romanian cause, was to set the stage for a major advance in the national program.

60

CHAPTER II

The European guardianship

The Treaty of Paris opened a new era in European diplomacy, one that was to be characterized by victories for the German and Italian, as well as for the Romanian, national movements. Since there was as yet no representative Romanian administration, the fate of the country lay primarily in the hands of the great powers. The decisions were to be made no longer by one power, in collaboration with the Porte, but by a concert of the seven signatories of the treaty. The rivalry among these governments was to be a great advantage for the Romanian leadership over the next years.1 The Crimean disaster compelled a change of policy in the Russian relationship with the Principalities, as well as in other areas of international relations. The humiliation of the defeat and the dangers that had arisen during the war forced the Russian government to consider radically different courses of action. Alexander II regarded the treaty as a national humiliation and a stain on his personal honor. The breaking of the terms of the agreement that were damaging to Russia thus had first priority for the future. Four aspects of the settlement, in particular, had profoundly altered the Russian diplomatic position in the Near East: the neutralization of the Black Sea, the cession of the three districts of southern Bessarabia, the loss of a special position in relation to Constantinople, and the assumption by the powers of additional guarantees for the Porte. Of these provisions the Russian government was most immediately concerned with the limitations on its activity in the Black Sea. The neutralization hampered its ability to exert pressure on Constantinople and was bound to affect any future moves in the Balkans or the Caucasus. Even worse, the Russian southern shores were now vulnerable to 61

Russia and the Romanian national state attack from British, French, and Ottoman navies, which could operate from the straits or the eastern Mediterranean. Should the Crimean coalition hold in peacetime, Russia would face a permanent threat. This section of the treaty deeply influenced the attitude held toward other powers, and its removal became the major aim of Russian policy in the next years. The second provision that the Russian leaders were most anxious to change concerned the Bessarabian territory. At issue was not only the strategic value of the lands, but the question of Russian prestige. Like other monarchs, the tsar regarded any loss of territory, of his "patrimony," as a personal affront to his honor. His determination to regain this land was bound to affect his relations with the successive governments of the Principalities. As far as the loss of exclusive control over the provinces was concerned, this matter appears to have caused less regret. Despite the treaty, the common frontier and the continued interest in all of the Orthodox people made it inevitable that the Russian government would remain deeply involved in Romanian affairs. Treaty stipulations could not change this situation. In the immediate postwar period the major Russian concern was to assure that the protectorate was not replaced by an exclusively Habsburg influence or an increase of Ottoman control. The unfortunate outcome of the war forced the Russian government to revise its relationship with the Ottoman Empire. As we have seen, in the previous thirty years Russian diplomacy in the area had moved in two directions. After the signing of the treaties of Adrianople and Unkiar Iskelesi it had followed a policy of working with, but also dominating, the Porte. As long as the Russian representatives held the predominant influence in the councils of the sultan, they had a natural interest in protecting the territorial integrity of the empire. This objective was seen in particular in the 1830s, when assistance was offered against the threat from Egypt. The conclusion of the Convention of Balta Liman marked a high point in this policy of collaboration. After the Crimean defeat it was naturally to be expected that Britain and France, not Russia, would have the primary influence in Constantinople. Since this fact was recognized, Gorchakov in his instructions to the Russian representative, Apollinarii Petrovich Butenev, emphasized that he should seek not a special position, but "parity" with the other powers. Efforts should be made to assure that no single state obtained a controlling position. Parallel with the previous policy of cooperation with the Porte had been that of the protection of Orthodox Christianity. The Russian rights in this regard had been most clearly defined in relation to the 62

The European guardianship Serbs and Romanians, but Russian statesmen certainly felt that they had a unique relationship with and obligations toward all the members of their faith. The attempt by Prince Alexander Sergeevich Menshikov to obtain a clear statement of Russian rights in this regard had been a major cause for the outbreak of the Crimean War. The fear of the powers, Britain in particular, that Russia would continue to use its links with the Orthodox to exert control in the empire was reflected in the peace settlement. Guarantees for the independence and territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire were given in Article 7 of the treaty and in a special agreement signed by Britain, Austria, and France in April. In addition, Article 9 of the treaty prohibited the powers from interfering "either collectively or separately, in the relations of His Majesty the Sultan with his subjects, nor in the Internal Administration of his Empire."2 Despite the endeavors of the victors, the Russian government had no intention of abandoning what were regarded as its "permanent interests" in the East. Among these, and in the most prominent place, continued to be the Orthodox church and the fate of the Christian nationalities. Russian concern over these people could, of course, not be expressed without some form of "interference" in the internal affairs of the empire. The Russian awareness of the link between religion and politics and the determination to pursue past policies was well expressed in an instruction sent to Butenev in July 1856. The future relations with the Orthodox church were discussed here. Because of the importance of this subject for the Principalities, the text will be quoted at length. Attempts had been made by Russia's adversaries, the memorandum stated, to persuade the clergy and the Orthodox populations of the East that the only aim of our [the Russian] intercessions in favor of the church was political domination; that we were intending to bring the church and the populations under our influence with a view to conquest. We do not need to say that this is not so. It is true that our political interests are, as they have always been and as they will not cease to be in the Orient, by the nature of the conditions themselves, tightly linked to those of Orthodoxy. Our adversaries know this perfectly. When they combat the church of the East, as well as when they pretend to protect it in order to better procure means of fighting it, it is not only from zeal for Catholic and Protestant propaganda, but also and above all with arriere-pensee against our influence. Since the wars of Empress Catherine, the Orient has gone through a period of transition. Our great interest for ourselves is that it be able to emerge one day without losing the principal element of preservation and homogeneity that dwells there, living and powerful, for centuries, despite the vicissitudes to which it is a prey, despite the diversity of the races subjugated by the Ottoman conquest. It is an interest of the first order for us to have in our immediate 63

Russia and the Romanian national state neighborhood populations that are attached to us by the ties of the faith that brought Greece back to life and that will bring about progressively under our eyes the resurrection of the Slav and Romanian nationalities. We do not hesitate to repeat that our interest in favor of our co-religionists of the East should not at all be concealed. It is based on two perfectly avowable principles: that of an intimate religious union and that of the conservation of the Ottoman Empire according to the sense of the Treaty of Paris.3

Nevertheless, despite the determination to continue certain past policies that was expressed, the defeat did compel some radical, if temporary, alterations in policy - domestic as well as foreign. The Crimean disaster had shown not only Russia's military weakness, but the economic and social backwardness of the society. Since the necessity of reform was clearly recognized, the Russian leaders were well aware that the major national attention would have to be concentrated on internal problems. Russia could no longer play the role of the gendarme of Europe and the main prop of the conservative order. Gorchakov thus adopted what he characterized as the policy of recueillement: Russia would turn into itself and place its major emphasis on internal reform. For the moment an aggressive active role in foreign policy would have to be abandoned. Neither in European affairs nor in issues connected with the Eastern Question could the Russian state maintain a predominant position until its military establishment was strengthened. The great reforms of the 1860s included a thorough reorganization of the army. Despite this negative approach, the Russian government in the next years was to have certain specific foreign policy aims. The first, as we have seen, was the breaking of the Treaty of Paris, or parts of it, should the opportunity arise. Like all defeated powers, Russia was to await the first moment possible to overturn an unacceptable settlement. Moreover, the Russian leaders after the experience of the war remained acutely conscious of the danger of isolation, particularly during a period of internal reform. The war had shown the vulnerability of the state when it was forced to face Europe alone. A major Russian goal in international affairs thus became to split the Crimean alliance and to win one of the partners as its own ally. Unfortunately, among these powers the possibilities of securing a friend and supporter were extremely limited. Prussia, of course, had not participated in the war; its neutral attitude had been regarded as favorable. However, the Russian government did not believe that Prussia was strong enough to provide major assistance in a time of crisis. A Russian-Prussian alliance was not considered an adequate counterweight to the combination of states that had won the Crimean War. Moreover, two of these powers had to be immediately eliminated as

The European guardianship possible close associates - Britain and Austria. Britain remained the chief adversary, with interests in conflict with Russia's all over the map, but in particular in the Caucasus, Central Asia, and the Balkans. Both the former foreign minister, Nesselrode, and Gorchakov considered this state the major challenge to St. Petersburg. Relations with the Habsburg Monarchy were similarly sensitive. After the war the Russian leaders felt a great animosity toward this power. In the next years a strong note of reprisal and revenge can be seen in their attitude toward Vienna. The Russian statesman and the tsar felt personally betrayed by the Habsburg actions, and they certainly wished to see their former conservative ally paid back for its desertion. The elimination of these states left only France as a possible partner. The choice of this power as an ally would, of course, signify a complete reversal of former attitudes and the abandonment of ideology as a prime consideration of foreign policy. Despite his increasingly conservative internal direction, Napoleon III did stand for significant changes in the map of Europe and he did support the use of revolutionary means for the accomplishment of national goals. However, the Russian leaders had, in fact, no real choice. If they wished to break the Crimean front, the weak point lay in Paris. Even during the war some connections had been maintained with France. It was also obvious that the two sea powers, Britain and France, were keen rivals in many areas. With a French alignment, the Russian attitude toward revolutionary change in the Balkans was thus modified. Until 1877, when Russia finally went to war with the Ottoman Empire on the issue, the Russian government was often tempted to support Balkan national movements not only because of the traditional sympathy for the Orthodox subjects of the sultan, but also because of the possibility that independent and autonomous Balkan states might provide useful allies. During the next twenty years some Russian diplomats were to consider that an alliance of Russia with the Orthodox people, particularly the Slavs, would be more satisfactory than any European partnership, and that they would provide a sufficient counterweight to threats from other powers. This willingness to support national revolt did not in any manner mean that the tsarist government had lost its apprehension over revolutionary activities whose aim was the abolition of monarchical regimes and the establishment of democratic parliamentary systems. As shall be shown, great care was taken in the assessment of each movement. Russian policy after the Crimean War was thus essentially defensive. Prime emphasis was placed on internal reform. The association with France was to avoid diplomatic isolation, and for the future the first objective was to be the breaking of the peace provisions. In Eastern 65

Russia and the Romanian national state affairs there was continued interest in the Orthodox population and in achieving a parity of influence in Constantinople. In this total picture the affairs of the Principalities had but a minor place. Here too the Russian government aimed at assuring itself an equal influence with the other powers; exclusive Habsburg control was particularly feared. At some time Russia also intended to take back the Bessarabian districts. As far as Romanian internal development was concerned, the value of the regime of the Organic Statutes was defended, but the need for further reforms was recognized. As to their exact extent, this decision was to be made on the basis of the demands of Russia's general European policy, in particular the alliance with France. T H E ROMANIAN QUESTION AT THE PARIS CONFERENCE

Even before the end of the Crimean War it had become apparent that important changes would be made in the internal administration of the Principalities. The abolition of the Russian protectorate was one of the Vienna Four Points; the issue had played an important role in the preliminary conference held in Vienna in 1855. As in the case of Greece in the 1820s, the great powers assumed that they would make the final decisions on the form of government to be given the Principalities; the question was simply what that should be. Obviously, the regime of the Organic Statutes, closely identified with Russian domination, had to be brought to an end. Even the Russian government recognized that major changes would have to be made here. Before any reforms could be introduced, the basic issue had to be met: should Moldavia and Wallachia remain separate states, or should they be united, perhaps under a foreign prince, in accordance with the clear wishes of the active political elements in each principality? On this issue the powers fell into two distinct and opposing camps. The Ottoman Empire naturally feared any settlement that would weaken its hold on these lands, feeble as it was. Not only did the Porte wish to keep the area as a buffer against Russia, but the question involved Ottoman prestige. At this time the Ottoman state was in a period of internal reform whose aim was the modernization and strengthening of the state. Following French examples, the direction was toward centralization and the tightening of the hold of the government on the provinces. Certainly, a true federal solution was never seriously considered. The union of the Principalities was thus opposed because of its probable effect on the Romanian relationship with the 66

The European guardianship Porte and the inevitable influence that it would exert on the other Christian people of the empire. Further autonomous rights for the Romanians would lead to immediate, similar demands by others. The Ottoman stand was strongly supported by the Habsburg Empire. As previously, this government's position was determined by its concern for the more than two million Habsburg Romanians who would undoubtedly be attracted to Bucharest should it become the capital of a vital, successful Romanian national state. Moreover, another consideration had arisen. With the end of the Russian protectorate the monarchy had an opportunity to assert its political and economic preponderance. During the occupation measures had been taken to strengthen the ties of the provinces with their western neighbor. Roads had been built, the most important of which ran from Bra§ov to Bucharest to Braila. The navigation of the Danube had been improved, and the Austrian intention to dominate that waterway was made clear during the peace negotiations. Telegraphic communications were opened between Jassy and Bucharest. Plans were also developed for building a railroad network that would connect the provinces with the lands of the monarchy. Unlike Russia, the Habsburg Empire could offer economic advantages to the Principalities both as a supplier of manufactured goods and as a market for Romanian agricultural products and raw materials. Already, full use had been made of the privileges gained through the capitulations and consular jurisdiction. It was clear that a weak government and two separate Principalities would be more accessible to control from Vienna in both a political and an economic sense. Along with the Habsburg Empire, Britain stood as a strong defender of Ottoman integrity, including the continued control of the Principalities. Britain had fought the Crimean War to maintain, not to weaken further, the Ottoman Empire. Although Austria was perhaps the chief benefactor of the removal of the Russian protectorate, Britain had a similar interest in securing the permanent blocking of Russian southward expansion at the Pruth. The return of the Danube Delta to Ottoman rule was certainly an aid to British commerce. The government also had a major interest in the establishment of stable regimes in the Principalities. At this time and later, British statesmen were to give much verbal support to the idea of constitutional government, particularly in regard to the affairs of Western and Central Europe, but they never allowed these principles to hamper their policy in the Ottoman lands or, of course, in the Asian and African territories under their control. The prime British concern at this time was to be whether the provinces united would form a better barrier against Russia, as France 67

Russia and the Romanian national state argued, or whether the move would simply further weaken the Ottoman Empire and diminish its ability to function as a buffer. If union would indeed promote British interests, then the government would welcome the opportunity to respect the "wishes of the people." Certainly, Britain would not be reluctant to aid movements that were to the detriment of Russia. A firm British decision was not made until July 1856. The French position, in contrast, was clear. Napoleon III henceforth was to be the strongest advocate for the Romanian nationalists, although individual French interests were never sacrificed. His support of the idea of union and a foreign prince was made clear during the peace negotiations. Although he always subordinated Romanian interests to those of the Italians, he did, when there was no other conflict, usually promote the Romanian national idea. Indeed, France had nothing to lose and much to gain from the establishment of a strong Romanian state. It was obvious that the Romanian liberal leadership found its true inspiration in Paris. A liberal-national victory in Bucharest would assure France a firm outpost for the defense of its interests in Eastern Europe. The political balance was to be decisive for the attitude Russia took toward the Romanian question. Although the Russian government never did adopt a firm, open, unwavering position, the advantages to be gained by acting in collusion with France were too obvious. The issue was one, and about the only one, over which France and Britain could be divided. Russia's general need for an ally thus outweighed the obvious disadvantages of the establishment of a national political unit on the lower Danube. It was obviously preferable, as it had always been, to have two weak principalities that could be more easily controlled. Similarly, the dangers to the Russian autocracy presented by a neighboring state with a liberal government remained as before. The preeminent position that France would enjoy in a united Romania was also fully realized. Nevertheless, Russia's desire to break the Crimean alliance and to gain a partner for its own policy overrode these negative considerations. Moreover, support for the nationalist position in Romanian affairs had the major advantage of also serving to thwart Habsburg policy. Should their own loss of predominant influence be inevitable, the Russian leaders were determined that they should not be supplanted by the Habsburg adversaries. Because of these considerations Russian policy during the next years was essentially to support the French proposals, even when they underwent basic alterations. The question of the future political organization of the Principalities was discussed at the sixth meeting of the Paris conference on February 25/March 8. At this time Walewski stated the French support for 68

The European guardianship union. Cowley concurred with his arguments. Ali, in rebuttal, replied that the Principalities had been separated since ancient times and that they had developed along different lines. The population, he claimed, favored the division. Supporting the Ottoman stand, Buol also maintained that the provinces did not want union and that they had not been consulted. The French position was backed by Orlov, who declared that Russia favored unification as an aid to the prosperity of the Principalities. Cavour also consistently seconded the French declarations. Because of this division among the powers, and because they did not wish to delay the conclusion of the peace, the delegates on February 27/March 10 agreed to a Walewski proposal that the treaty contain only a general statement concerning the political and administrative regime to be established, leaving the details for a subsequent conference. A commission of Buol, Ali, and Bourqueney was named to draw up this document. On two later days, February 29/March 12 and March 2/14, the conference considered the text of the articles proposed. The aim was to find a basis that all of the representatives could accept and to postpone the actual decision on the future of the provinces. The provisions were thus of necessity vague. It was agreed that the wishes of the Romanian population "relative to the final organization of the Principalities" would be determined through the instrumentality of assemblies to be chosen in each Principality, which were to represent "the interests of all classes of society."4 At the same time an International Commission, composed of representatives of the guaranteeing powers and the Porte, was to be established in Bucharest. Its task was to inquire into conditions in the Principalities and, taking into account the decisions of the assemblies, to make recommendations to the powers concerning the future organization of the country. These proposals would then be considered by a conference to be held in Paris, where the final arrangements would be made. In this settlement the interests of the powers and the Porte would be taken into consideration, as well as the desires of the Principalities. The decisions of the conference were to be expressed in a convention; the Porte would then issue a hatti sherif to put these into effect. This procedure, which in no way settled the major Romanian issues, signified the powers' recognition of the difficulty of securing an agreement on the problem among the members of the Crimean coalition. The question of the Principalities was dealt with in Articles 20 through 27 of the Treaty of Paris. In addition to the provisions already discussed, the agreement stated that no power had the right of exclusive intervention in the Principalities, which were to be the collective con69

Russia and the Romanian national state cern of the signatory powers. The provinces were to "continue to enjoy, under the suzerainty of the Sublime Porte and under the European guarantee, the privileges and immunities which they possess," and to have an independent and national administration "as well as full freedom of religion, of legislation, of commerce and of navigation."5 They were also allowed to have an armed force for defense. Extremely important for the future were the severe limitations placed on the Ottoman right of military intervention. Article 27 stated: "If the Internal Tranquillity of the Principalities should be menaced or compromised, the Sublime Porte shall come to an understanding with the other contracting powers in regard to the measures to be taken for maintaining or reestablishing legal order. No armed intervention can take place without previous agreement between those Powers."6 In practice, this condition made any Ottoman intervention most improbable, since it was very doubtful that such a "previous agreement" could ever be obtained. Not only were the powers divided, but none of the guarantors, because of their own public opinion, could easily consent to an Ottoman suppression of a Romanian revolt. A joint action, such as had occurred in 1848 by Russian and Ottoman troops, and in 1854 by Habsburg and Ottoman forces, was after 1856 more difficult to contemplate. Thus, although the Principalities remained under Ottoman sovereignty, the Porte had no adequate means of enforcing its decisions. The European powers together, not just Russia alone, stood between the Porte and its Romanian subjects. This settlement and the new diplomatic alignments were to be of enormous benefit to the Romanian national leadership. Certainly, the substitution of a great-power protectorate for the former exclusive Russian control was a great advantage. It was obvious that the guarantors would seldom agree on a single course of action; the disputes among them were to give the Romanian statesmen considerable latitude in which to move. At the same time great-power jealousy could be used to prevent any single country from again exerting real domination. Austria, although still in occupation, was soon to be forced to withdraw its troops; the Porte had been effectively blocked from gaining the military means to exert control over the Principalities or to enforce its rights as the suzerain power. Moldavia, of course, had also gained by the annexation of Bessarabian territory, although its acquisitions were but a small section of the area to which the Romanian nationalists lay claim. As far as the decisions of the powers on the international organization of the country were concerned, their success or failure would be determined over the next years. 70

The European guardianship T H E IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CONGRESS DECISIONS: THE DOUBLE ELECTION OF ALEXANDER CUZA

Although the procedures to be followed had been established at the congress, their implementation was to lead to continual controversy and confusion. The steps to be taken had been set down clearly. A firman was to be issued by the Porte, with the cooperation of the powers, establishing the procedures for the elections to the assemblies, called divans ad hoc, and determining who should vote. These bodies, once elected, were to express their desires, which in turn would be considered by the International Commission and transmitted to the powers, who would then meet in Paris to make the final decisions. Although the general lines of action were obvious, many details, in particular in connection with the franchise, remained unsettled. Moreover, the entire process created a situation in which the animosities among individuals and political groups would be given ample opportunity to express themselves. Added to these difficulties were the problems connected with the sharp conflicts among the representatives of the guarantor powers and their struggles to secure the victory of their candidates. During the period of the protectorate the Russian predominance had not been seriously challenged. However, after the Crimean War other states saw the possibility of winning, if not control of Romanian political life, at least the first position among the great powers. Austria, standing for conservative interests and Moldavian separatism, and France, with its support of the liberal-national position, were the chief adversaries, but the representatives of all of the powers in both Jassy and Bucharest entered into competition to influence events. In the same manner individual Romanian politicians sought assistance from the foreign consulates. Although there was much talk about the danger of outside intervention, both the Romanians and the guarantor states freely violated the principle in practice. Serious objections were made usually only when one's opponent thereby gained an advantage. Few took seriously the practicality of applying a rule of nonintervention universally. The most extreme example of consular interference was shown in the activities of the Austrian agent Godel de Lannoy and the French representative Victor Place in Jassy. Burdened with the previous military defeat and the legacy of 1848, Russia could not at first compete on an equal basis with the Crimean victors, but it did have a number of important and influential supporters, particularly in Moldavia. Any conflicts that arose over the elections in the Principalities, ac-

Russia and the Romanian national state cording to the regulations, were to be referred to the representatives of the powers in Constantinople and to the Porte. Here the situation was complicated by the fact that a struggle for influence over the Ottoman government was again taking place. Russia, of course, was temporarily out of the race. Instead, Britain and France, the Crimean allies, fought for first position. The situation was made worse by the deep personal animosity between the ambassadors, Stratford de Redcliffe and Edouard Antoine Thouvenel. The British representative's long tenure at the Ottoman capitol had evidently given him the feeling that he was something like a Turkish minister. The two sides had their adherents within the government. Reshid Pasha was regarded as a British partisan; Ali Pasha and Fuad Pasha were considered friends of France. The Habsburg representative, Anton von Prokesch-Osten, who had long years of experience in Ottoman affairs and who was the agent of a power that supported Ottoman integrity, also had much influence. The two other powers involved in Romanian affairs, Sardinia and Prussia, played relatively minor roles in the contest. On the eve of the launching of their own national unification movements, both states tended to support the national idea and to be anti-Habsburg. Their firm support of the French position on Romanian issues meant that France had automatically two supporters on every question. Before the elections could be held, the Porte had to appoint the men who would run the country until the final organization was decided. Barbu §tirbei and Gregory A. Ghica were in office, but their terms of seven years were coming to an end. According to the Organic Statutes the Porte should have appointed a caimacamie (regency) of three members. Instead, one man was named for each province. The office of caimacam was of central importance in view of the coming elections. This official could exert a controlling influence over the voting through the Ministry of Interior and the judicial system, over which he would have control. He could change officials, and he could interfere in court decisions. In July 1856 the Porte chose Alexander Ghica, then sixty years old, for Wallachia. This nomination was at first generally approved, but his actions soon alienated many. In Moldavia, T. Bal§, the first appointment, died in March 1857, anc^ w a s followed by a very controversial figure, Nicholas Vogoride. Vogoride was of Greek origin; he had gained Moldavian citizenship only in 1846. He was married to a Moldavian heiress of the Conachi family. Although his original nomination had been supported by Place, the consul soon turned against him. Since his main links were to be with the Austrian consulate, both Vogoride and his minister of interior, Costin Catargiu, soon came under strong attack from nationalists, as well as from the French and Russian 72

The European guardianship consuls, for their pro-Habsburg sympathies and their obvious corruption. Without a doubt, and as was attested by almost all contemporary observers, union was the general desire of the politically involved section of the Romanian population. The issue of the foreign prince was clouded by skepticism whether the powers would allow such an appointment, but this idea too had general approval. The choice of a native ruler, whether over a united state or in each principality, continued, as in the past, to cause much controversy. As before, in each province every major politician appeared to have the ambition to be prince. In Wallachia the chief candidates were the caimacam, Alexander Ghica, and the brothers §tirbei and Bibescu. At first the latter two cooperated against their common rival. In Moldavia the major contest was between Michael Sturdza and his son Gregory, who were separated by an intense and irreconcilable hatred. All of these candidates, as well as those belonging either to the unionist or to the separatist camp, at this point prepared for the elections. They organized committees and distributed political literature. They also gave out bribes and attempted to assure that officials sympathetic to their views would be in the right positions during the elections. Fraud and the corruption of public officials was, of course, as much a part of Romanian political life at this time as previously. The problem of corruption was greatest in Moldavia. Under the administration of Gregory Ghica, the unionists had been in a better position there than in Wallachia. In May 1856 a liberal press law had been passed that allowed the continuing publication of Steaua Dundrii (Star of the Danube) under the editorship of Michael Kogalniceanu. This paper was to be the central organ of the unionist movement. On May 25/June 6, nineteen Moldavian leaders met in Jassy to form the the society "the Union/' The central committee of this organization included the conservative landowners G. Sturdza, §. Cantacuzino, and Peter Mavrogheni; their liberal counterparts D. Rallet and K. Rolla; and, from the professional class, Kogalniceanu, A. Panu, and V. Malinescu. However, after the advent of the Bal§ administration, the separatists gained the upper hand. The Moldavian government directed its efforts toward suppressing the unionist movement and securing the election of separatist candidates. The caimacam used his influence to dismiss officials who were for union and to replace them with his own men. The police and the courts were similarly employed to hamper unionist activity. When Vogoride came to office, he continued this policy and retained the Bal§ administration. At this time Austrian influence was predominant. The caimacams were in close touch with the Austrian consul and 73

Russia and the Romanian national state thus earned the extreme displeasure of Place and his Russian colleague, Sergei Ivanovich Popov. The Moldavian regime was obviously following policies approved and supported by the Habsburg Empire and the Porte. With these conditions Moldavia was the best hope of the supporters of separatism, both within the Principalities and among the great powers. Since this issue was to remain important until the 1870s, the position of those who opposed union should be reviewed. It is difficult to obtain sufficient exact information on the members and programs of this group because the overwhelming emphasis in Romanian historical writing has been on the unionists and their activities. Although undoubtedly the majority of the politically active citizens in the Principalites wanted union, a significant minority saw it as damaging to their interests and to their principality. In 1856 the exact political conditions that would exist in a unified country were not clear. The Liberal Party, the main carrier of the idea, contained among its members many who supported radical political change, a republican form of government, and, even more important, a solution of the land question to the advantage of the peasant. Many great landowners in both provinces saw their position challenged in two directions. They had previously always held the controlling position in the political life of the state; they had elected the princes, and this right had a practical and often commercial value. In addition, their political influence had assured their domination of the land and the peasantry. Many now feared, and with justification, that a Liberal regime would introduce a new agrarian system that would result in the passing to peasant control of all or part of the lands of the great estates. For the Moldavians there were additional considerations. Moldavia was the smaller of the two provinces in territory and population, and Jassy was off the main trade routes. It was obvious that in a unified state Bucharest, not Jassy, would be the capital. Since Romanian administrative practice followed the French system of strong centralization, the national government and the important public offices would be in that city. Unification would mean that Moldavians would lose direct control over their government and some important public offices. Thus, in addition to the conservative landowners, some officials and members of the merchant and professional middle classes joined the separatists. In Moldavia there were accordingly separatist organizations with their own literature and propaganda. They were, however, never strong enough to win the elections through strictly legal means, nor could they compete with the Liberals in electoral tactics. The Vogoride regime was 74

The European guardianship forced to resort to fraud because the clear advantage was held by the unionists. Unlike Moldavia, Wallachia had no important separatist organizations. This province, nevertheless, had severe political problems. Here the principal struggle centered on the issue of who would be prince. Even those who favored a foreign candidate were involved because most recognized that the great powers would probably block such a solution. Moreover, the ranks of the unionists were split by strong disagreements over policy as well as over individuals. The situation became more acute with the return of the 1848 exiles, many of whom belonged to the radical wing of the Liberal Party. Ion Balaceanu, a moderate, came back in February 1855. In the spring of 1857 N. and §tefan Golescu, C. A. Rosetti, and D. Bratianu followed; by July most of the exiles had returned. Thereafter they took the lead of their party, to the detriment of the moderates; they knew well how to conduct campaigns and win popular support. They were regarded by some of the representatives of the guarantor powers as dangerous radicals. Despite the fears of the conservative governments, the Liberal program during the elections was in fact moderate. Although there was some talk of revolutionary action, particularly in the face of fraudulent and illegal procedures by the caimacams, the concentration was on gaining power through legal means and within the rules established by the Treaty of Paris. The unionists knew that they could win if these were enforced. Experienced politicians, they launched an active and aggressive political campaign. Committees were organized to support the unionist position. A regular correspondence had by this time been established between Liberal groups in both provinces. A great emphasis was placed on freedom of the press so that the national program could be circulated. The Conservatives had no really competitive ideological program and thus could not benefit to a similar extent from the introduction and guarantee of civil liberties. The political positions described hitherto were those held by the landowners, the small middle class, and the clergy. The reaction of the majority of the population, the peasantry, is not so clear. This subject is difficult to treat because of the absence of critical analyses of peasant awareness of national issues. All Liberal leaders claimed to speak for "the people"; Conservatives too believed that their program was for the best interests of the entire population. Certainly, Liberal politicians were able to recruit large crowds for partisan demonstrations, but the means by which this was done at times leave doubts about the true convictions of those who participated in such actions. The true interest 75

Russia and the Romanian national state of the peasant lay, of course, less in political questions concerning the organization of the state than in land reform. Because of this, the Liberal Party, with its left wing that supported radical change, probably best represented peasant concerns. There were, nevertheless, no major Liberal spokesmen who had a peasant background, nor, of course, was land reform a major item on the Liberal program at this time. The Liberal Party was in no sense a peasant organization. Its attitude was at the best paternal, at the worst condescending. One cynical observer commented concerning its leadership: "It is only lawyers and professors who preach that political combination"; they were men who wished to bring about a miniature French Revolution that would give them political power and public office.7 Certainly, this aspect of the party was to be shown in coming years when it enjoyed political predominance. True peasant parties were not to come into existence until the next century. At this time the majority of the people played only a passive role in events that were, however, to create a situation to their advantage. Meanwhile, the representatives of the great powers prepared to play their assigned role in the proceedings that were intended to discover "the wishes of the population." Russia was reduced to the level of the other powers; it was one of seven guarantor states. Although general policy had been set at the peace conference, many details still had to be decided. Specific questions regarding the franchise and the duties of both the divans and the International Commission had yet to be settled. After the appointment of the caimacams, the next matter of importance was the formulation of the firman that would set the rules for the election. The representatives of the powers took an active part in this task, with each pressing for decisions that would favor his government. A major problem was the franchise. The treaty specified that all levels of society should be represented, but it was assumed that the major influence should be retained by the propertied classes. France, supporting the popular program of union, wished as wide a franchise as possible. In contrast, the Habsburg Monarchy demanded a strict limitation on the number of voters in order to give the advantage to the great landowners, who were more likely to be separatists. In the final version the voting was by electoral college, with different procedures for the proprietors, who kept their disproportionate representation, the middle class, and the peasants. The voting for each group was held on separate days; the representatives were to sit in the divans grouped by their colleges, and they were to present individual reports to the International Commission. As regards the subjects that could be considered by the divans, an

The European guardianship effort was made by the Habsburg government, backed by the Porte, to force the exclusion of the question of union from the debates, since, it was argued, the issue involved the rights of the sovereign power. The French, supported by the Russians, insisted that the assemblies should be completely free to express their wishes. Of course, the great powers were under no obligation to accept the proposals presented by the divans, which could only make recommendations: they were not constituent assemblies, and they could not legislate. The duties of the International Commission, set forth in Article 23 of the treaty, included the investigation of conditions in the Principalities and the formulation of suggestions for their future organization. The commission was also to supervise the elections and assure that they were conducted fairly. The members assembled in Constantinople in the fall of 1856;8 they included Sir Henry Bulwer for Britain, Rafaello Benzi for Sardinia, Safvet Pasha for the Ottoman Empire, Baron E. Richthofen for Prussia, and Charles A. Talleyrand-Perigord for France. The Habsburg delegate, Baron Roller, was soon replaced by Liehmann von Palmrode. The Russian commissioner, Constantine Mikhailovich Basily (Bazili), was well prepared for his task by his considerable experience in Eastern affairs.9 Born in Constantinople, he came from a Greek-Albanian family. His father had participated in the Greek revolution and had been forced to flee to Russia, where he entered state service. Basily's major post previously had been that of consul-general at Beirut. His position on the commission made him the senior Russian official in the Principalities. There he was assisted by Popov, the consul in Jassy, and by E. R. Shchulepnikov, the vice-consul in Bucharest. Despite the fact that the commission was formed so promptly, its members did not arrive in Bucharest until March 1857. The delay was occasioned by conflicts over the new Russian boundary and the consequent postponement of the evacuation of the Habsburg army. Arrangements also had to be made concerning the transfer of the three districts of southern Bessarabia and the Danube Delta. The major disagreements that arose over the drawing of the frontier involved the town of Bolgrad and the possession of Serpent's Island, which had an important strategic position at the mouth of the Danube. Finally, the points in dispute were awarded to the Ottoman Empire in return for some minor border rectifications in favor of Russia. The Habsburg army was withdrawn by March 1857. The Russian government had been particularly adamant that its commissioner should not proceed to Bucharest until this evacuation had been accomplished. The instructions issued to the Russian agents reflected the considerations previously described. They were to cooperate with France and to 77

Russia and the Romanian national state insist on an equality of treatment with the other powers on all matters. On the Romanian question the provisions of the treaty were to be strictly followed. The Russian representatives were to maintain an attitude of complete abstention in local affairs; they were to support no party or candidate. They were to observe conditions, but take no initiatives, and report to their government on Romanian politics and public opinion. On the vital questions of union and a foreign prince, they were to express no views whatsoever - in favor either of the status quo or of a radical change. T h e attitude to be maintained was clearly indicated in an instruction from Basily to Popov, reflecting the orders from St. Petersburg, sent in the summer of 1857 when the preparations for elections were in progress: The essential matter for us, even more, the only objective that we have in view, is the free and frank expression of the wishes of the country. The question of union, as every other political question, is for the moment outside the sphere of our preoccupations. But if anyone uses any means whatsoever to influence the expression of the wishes of the country in one sense or another, for or against the idea of union, we should watch out for it with the same solicitude, the same impartiality. One should not suppose us favorable to union because we protest against the abuses brought into play in order to stifle that wish.10 The Russian government was also most eager to see the election proceed in a correct and orderly fashion. T h e principal concern was lest the radical elements cause disorders that would provide a pretext for the powers, notably the Habsburg Empire and the Porte, to intervene. The Russian agents were told to emphasize to the Romanians that nothing would be more detrimental than to provide the occasion for a collective intervention, or even to impose on the powers the obligation to intervene. The Russian government was fully informed of the general desire for union and a foreign prince. Although Basily was personally conservative and distrustful of the "men of 1848," he made no attempt to oppose their cause, and his reports reflected faithfully the national desires. For instance, he wrote in April 1857 that Safvet had argued that only about a thousand were unionist. Basily, in expressing his disagreement, commented that certainly there were few leaders: the number does not go beyond several hundred in this country, but that of the convinced and the converted rises perhaps to a hundred thousand. I do not say that the masses are aroused; the intellectual state of the masses in the Principalities is known. But men capable of thinking and acting, the mass of the boyars and the bourgeoise, are avowed partisans of union.11 The idea of union, Basily believed, was closely connected with that of a foreign prince. Few thought that the system would work under a native

The European guardianship ruler, since he could not provide the necessary stability or prestige. Basily, of course, followed his instructions to cooperate with Talleyrand, whose government similarly supported free elections and the right of the divans to express their opinions. However, by this time the French agents were urging their partisans to work only for union, since a foreign prince would arouse too much opposition among the powers. The Sardinian and Prussian commissioners backed their French and Russian colleagues. As previously, the Austrian and Ottoman representatives took a strongly antiunionist stand. Their position was strengthened exceedingly when the British adopted a similar attitude. Although, as we have seen, the British representatives at the Congress of Paris had sided with France on the question of union, they now abandoned this stand. For Britain the major consideration would always be whether union would or would not be beneficial to British policy in the Near East. The firm support of Ottoman integrity was, as before, occasioned by the belief that the empire must be maintained as a barrier against further Russian advances in the Balkans. The French government had previously argued that the United Principalities would play a similar but even more effective role. However, after further consideration, the British leaders came to a negative decision. In July 1856 Lord Palmerston commented: "The united principalities would be a field for Russian intrigue and not a barrier against Russia."12 After this month the British representatives were instructed to oppose union by all legal means. British policy therefore continued in the Crimean tradition. The union was seen as a weakening of the Ottoman Empire's control and thus of its ability to withstand Russian pressure. The separation of the provinces appeared necessary to secure the British objectives. As we have seen, the best hope for the powers who opposed union lay in Moldavia. If a negative return could be gained there, a unionist majority in Wallachia would have no significance. Repeated protests were delivered to the commissioners on the electoral proceedings. In May all of them except Basily, who saw little to gain from the trip, visited Jassy. Despite the continuing controversy, preparations for the elections continued. In June the initial electoral lists for Moldavia were ready. Their composition assured a separatist victory. Although many unionist sympathizers were inscribed, a majority for their opponents was guaranteed. The names had been carefully selected. As one Romanian historian wrote: Of 2,000 great proprietors in Moldavia, they [the lists] contained the names of only 350; of the 20,000 or more small proprietors, they had inscribed only 2,264. Among the electors of the cities one had found to register in the whole

79

Russia and the Romanian national state state of Moldavia only 11 persons who exercised the liberal professions. In all the lists were comprised of [but] 4,658 electors of the upper classes instead of 40,000 which they should have contained.13

According to the firman, thirty days were to elapse before the elections could be held. Unionist protests flooded the friendly consulates in Jassy. In Constantinople, on French initiative, the four ambassadors on June 13/25 delivered a note of protest to the Porte, warning that it would not be in keeping "with the dignity of the commission . . . to put itself in touch with a Divan, which will not be composed in a manner to be able to pass for the true expression of the wishes and needs of the country, and which will respond so badly to the intentions of the Congress of Paris in that regard."14 In the commission Basily on June 20/July 2 proposed that Vogoride be censured, but the move was opposed by Bulwer, Liehmann, and Safvet.15 Caught between the opposing pressures of the powers, and itself against union, the Porte hesitated. Finally, after a delay of eight days in the scheduled date, the elections commenced on July 7/19 and continued for three days. The Moldavian unionists, in protest against the situation, simply stayed away from the polls. As a consequence, of the 193 priests on the lists, only 17 voted; of the 465 electors chosen from the great landowners, only 207 appeared.16 Thus the fraudulent electoral procedures had not fulfilled the intentions of the separatist caimacam. Although the separatists did win the elections in a technical sense, the divan chosen in this manner could not be regarded as a true expression of the wishes of the population. An immediate international crisis followed. In Bucharest the four commissioners announced their refusal to accept an assembly elected under these circumstances. The meetings of the commission were suspended, and attention was focused on Constantinople. There Thouvenel, supported by his three colleagues, demanded the annulment of the elections. Although the Porte refused to act on its own authority, it did agree to delay the convening of the Moldavian divan until the powers had come to an agreement. The lines were drawn: Britain and Austria opposed an annulment; the other four powers demanded it. With this division of France from Britain and Austria, a major Russian aim - the breaking of the Crimean coalition - appeared to have been achieved. Gorchakov made a great effort to impress on France the extent of the Russian support. He directed Victor Petrovich Balabin, the Russian charge in Paris, to ask Walewski what the French cabinet expects to do on this occasion. Our opinion is formed. But, desiring to conserve a perfect accord with the French government, we will delay the official and final announcement in order to come to an understanding 80

The European guardianship with it, for certainly its dignity is more at stake than ours. M. de Thouvenel has been in the forefront of the entire discussion of this affair. The challenge has been openly made by Lord Redcliffe and M. Prokesch, and the diplomats as well as the public of Constantinople are watching to see who will prevail. On such things local respect and rightful influence in the Orient depend in a large part.17

Balabin was further instructed to assure Walewski of full Russian support, and similar directions were sent to Butenev in Constantinople. When the Porte did not annul the elections, the French, Russian, Prussian, and Sardinian governments broke relations. Despite this apparent shattering of the British-French entente of the previous years, the experienced Russian ambassador in Paris, Kiselev, who had already played such a major role in Romanian affairs, had few illusions. On June 24/July 6 he wrote to Gorchakov that he did not think that Napoleon III would break his ties with Britain. His views were to prove prophetic.18 Indeed, Napoleon III, for both external and internal policy, could not afford to end the British alignment. Among the nationalities competing for his favor, the Italians rather than the Romanians held his major interest. He could not antagonize the greatest sea power and hope to achieve a political success in the Italian peninsula. French economic concerns also dictated cooperation with Britain. Moreover, this part of the emperor's policy was not supported by other French diplomats. For instance, despite his dislike of Redcliffe, Thouvenel favored working with Britain. There was, in addition, a question whether union was the best policy for France and whether a foreign prince would not simply introduce more problems into the Romanian situation. As a result of these hesitations, the basis for a compromise was set. A meeting held at Osborne in August was attended by Napoleon III, Queen Victoria, and their principal ministers and ambassadors. An understanding was reached in which Britain agreed to the French desire for the annulment of the Moldavian elections; in return, France backed down on the question of union. A British memorandum on the bargain stated: "It is agreed to be desirable that the two Provinces should have similar organic institutions, and that while retaining their separate Governments, they should have a common system in regard to all matters civil and military to which such a community of system can advantageously be established/'19 This highly ambiguous wording was open to many interpretations, but it was clear that Napoleon had abandoned his support of union as well as the idea of the nomination of a foreign prince. Moreover, both France and Britain had violated 81

Russia and the Romanian national state the spirit of the Treaty of Paris in that they had prejudged the question of the future of the Principalities. Although previously neither power had wished to limit the right of divans to discuss unification, they now acted in a manner to assure that such an objective could not be put into practice. The two powers in secret session decided the main issue on which the election campaigns in the Principalities were based. However, because of the secrecy of the proceedings, only the British concession on the annulment of the elections became immediately known. It thus appeared on the surface as if Napoleon III had won a diplomatic victory; his retreat on the major question remained concealed. Not only did the French government reverse its position, but it did not inform Russia about the shift. The Russian attitude, it will be recalled, favored not union, but the assurance of the right of the Principalities to express their wishes through free elections. The final decision would be made by the representatives of the powers in conference after the proper procedures, as dictated by the treaty, had been followed. The Osborne agreement, of course, meant that such a course of action would not be adopted. Given the diplomatic balance of the time, the major issue had already been settled. The holding of the elections was thus in fact a futile exercise. Despite the French concessions, Walewski, in discussing the Osborne meeting with Balabin, stated that Napoleon III had rejected British attempts to negotiate separately. Rumors, however, soon reached St. Petersburg from both British and Austrian sources that Napoleon had renounced union. The concern that this ambiguous situation aroused in St. Petersburg is reflected in the letters of Gorchakov to Balabin at this time. In recounting a conversation with the French diplomat Charles Baudin, Gorchakov wrote that he told him: The newspapers . . . are full of allusions to the concessions that the Emperor Napoleon made at Osborne, and they assume that the result was reached only as a result of a compromise. Redcliffe has gone further. He expressly hinted to the Porte that Emperor Napoleon had explicitly renounced union at Osborne. Austria supports the same version in less ostensible ways. Emperor Napoleon . . . had certainly the right to renounce union. We would not have been justified in showing surprise about this subject, even less in raising any objection whatsoever. But then he should have told us and above all he should not have instructed his minister to tell us the contrary. But, we have full confidence in the loyalty of Emperor Napoleon, we do not call into question the perfect accuracy of the communications that he has made to us.

In this letter Gorchakov also admitted that he believed that something more had been conceded at Osborne than had been announced. If this were true, it would be a warning for the future. It would be particularly bad, Gorchakov believed, if, at a time when a meeting was 82

The European guardianship scheduled between Napoleon III and Alexander II, the French emperor "concealed from us the knowledge of his acts bearing upon a question on which we have given him the most loyal cooperation, and if, what would be even worse and which I refuse to believe, the French government has knowingly misled us on the significance of the engagements made at Osborne."m When the two rulers, accompanied by their foreign ministers, met at Stuttgart on September 13 / 25, the question of the Principalities was discussed, but the French statesmen maintained their silence on the Osborne bargain. Gorchakov at this time repeated the Russian position that no decision on union would be taken until the divans had made their opinions known. On the question of a foreign prince, the Russian minister declared that the tsar would not accept a ruler who was not Orthodox and that he would also not allow a Russian prince to take the position. Walewski gained the impression from these discussions that Russia opposed union. The Russian desire to work with France and the willingness to back any French proposal was, however, again repeated. With France and Britain in basic agreement, the crisis over the Principalities came to an end. The Habsburg government, if not the Russian, was informed of the settlement. Redcliffe and Prokesch together advised the Porte to annul the Moldavian elections. Once this was accomplished the four powers resumed their diplomatic relations with the Ottoman Empire. The International Commission again carried on its functions in Bucharest. Elections then proceeded in both provinces. Those held on September 8/20 in Moldavia, on the basis of revised lists and with the cooperation of Vogoride, returned a clear mandate for union. Of the eighty-seven deputies elected, sixty-six were unionist, six were separatist, and fifteen were peasants who would probably support union.21 The unionists also won in Wallachia, but the predominant aspect of that election was the split of the delegates into §tirbei and Bibescu factions. Among the Liberals the victory went to the radicals and the recently returned emigres, rather than to the moderates.22 Once called into session, the assemblies proceeded as could be expected. The Moldavian divan opened on September 22/October 4. On October 7/19 it voted a program of five points, including union, a foreign prince, autonomy under Ottoman suzerainty, a representative government, and neutrality. The Wallachian deputies, meeting first on September 30/October 12, adopted an almost identical program on October 8/20. Autonomy, union, a foreign prince, and representative institutions were thus the clear wish of the Romanian people as expressed by the divans. The powers had the answer to the question they had originally asked. After adopting its program the Wallachian 83

Russia and the Romanian national state assembly suspended its sessions until the great powers should come to a decision on the demands. The Moldavian divan, in contrast, continued its discussions. The representatives did not limit their debates to questions concerning future political institutions, but also dealt with controversial social questions. At the beginning of 1858 the Ottoman government declared both assemblies dissolved, since they had accomplished their basic functions. The International Commission then proceeded to draw up its report, which was completed on March 26/April 7. The wishes of the Romanian population had been determined; the powers now had to meet to reach a final decision. During this period the instructions to the Russian agents remained the same. They were to limit their statements to generalities, advise moderation, and secure the execution of the regulations for the elections as set down in the firman. Disorders that could lead to a military occupation had to be avoided. The second round of elections caused no complaints as far as procedure was concerned. Vogoride, it was recognized, acted in a correct manner. Despite the satisfaction with the conditions of the election, Basily was most concerned about the radical composition of the assemblies, whose membership he regarded as having an anarchical spirit.23 He did not like the prominent position won by the former leaders of the revolution of 1848, who, it will be remembered, had returned to Wallachia in 1857. They were obviously popular with the electorate and they were able, he believed, to intimidate the moderates. At the time of their arrival he had expressed his suspicions that the Porte, on British urging, had authorized their return with the hope that they would cause so much disorder that a military intervention would be justified. He was also extremely disturbed by the debates in the Moldavian assembly and by the discussions of social questions, in particular the relations of the peasants and the landowners. Despite his concerns over these matters Basily in his reports to his government expressed clearly the obvious desire of the Romanians for union and a foreign prince. Sympathetic to the nationalist position, Basily argued that union was not possible without a foreign prince, who could provide the stability and strength needed by the country. The dangers of an elective native prince had been demonstrated in the past. The Russian agent advised his government not to oppose an idea which is that "of the masses as well as the intelligent classes."24 With the completion of the work of the divans and the International Commission, the final decision rested in the hands of the powers. The Russian position on union and a foreign prince had to be clearly stated. For the formulation of Russian policy in regard to the Principalities 84

The European guardianship the important views were, of course, those of Alexander II, Gorchakov, and Kiselev. The opinions of Kiselev, who was regarded as the main Russian expert on the Principalities, had great influence. An exchange of letters between Gorchakov and Kiselev, with the tsar's comments, shows the ideas of these statesmen.25 This correspondence clearly reveals the concern felt over the political instability in the region and the dangers to be faced should a representative government be established in a state directly adjacent to Russia. The Principalities could become a center of unrest and contribute to Polish rebellion. Certainly, in theory, the separation of the provinces had many advantages for Russian policy. Nevertheless, it was the opposing considerations that took precedence. Obviously, a success of the separatists would serve only to strengthen the influence of Austria, the Porte, and Britain at the expense of Russia and France. Moreover, the Russian government did not want to take a position contrary to that of France. It must be remembered that the Osborne decisions were not known in St. Petersburg. Finally, the Russian diplomats, in particular Kiselev, did not want to oppose the wishes of the Romanian population without a good cause. With this general agreement on union, there remained the problem of how this solution could be implemented. Both Alexander II and Kiselev opposed the nomination of a foreign prince. Any candidate would necessarily come from a Western, non-Orthodox family, since Russia could provide no suitable choices. He would probably be either French or pro-French; in any case he would not be oriented toward St. Petersburg. Under the circumstances the best alternative appeared the nomination of a native prince to rule over the united provinces. Kiselev wished him to be given a life or even a hereditary appointment. It should be emphasized that the Russian diplomats considered that any settlement reached at this time would be only temporary. The purpose was to postpone a final regulation of the affairs of the provinces until Russia had regained its military strength and could exert a stronger influence. The Russian officials believed that the rivalry within the Principalities would keep any government weak, a situation that was considered an advantage to Russian policy. Union under a native prince was thus favored as a temporary expedient. It would allow Russia to stand by its declarations at the Paris conference of 1856; it would win favor among the Romanians; and it would maintain good relations with France. The Russian government also believed that the majority of the powers would oppose a foreign prince. The conference opened in May 1858 with the ambassadors of the powers in Paris serving as the representatives for their countries: Hubner for Austria, Hatzfeldt for Prussia, Villamarina for Sardinia, Cowley 85

Russia and the Romanian national state for Britain, and Kiselev for Russia.26 Fuad Pasha came from Constantinople for his government. Walewski served as president of the conference, and again he was closely instructed by Napoleon III. The delegates immediately decided on secrecy for their proceedings. During the subsequent discussions Kiselev did not play a leading role on most questions. Before the opening he had been informed of the Osborne decisions by Walewski. He was surprised, and he did not think the French alternate plan, which was soon to be introduced, would contribute to the tranquility of the area. During the discussions the main issue was, of course, the political organization of the Principalities. However, the chief dispute was to arise from the relatively minor issue of the flag. Of the powers France was obviously in the most difficult position. Previously the chief advocate of union and a foreign prince, the French government had to back down on both issues. In the attempt to achieve a solution as close to union as possible, Walewski sponsored a plan that would have brought about a form of legislative unification. He suggested that two hospodars and two assemblies be chosen, but that a central commission with real powers be established, composed of nine members from each assembly. This body would be empowered to make laws of interest for both principalities. It would also approve the laws passed by the separate assemblies and have a role in the preparation of the budgets for both provinces. The reaction to this proposal was as might be expected. Hiibner and Fuad opposed anything approaching union; Kiselev stood by France. Cowley, while accepting some measures to assimilate administrative institutions, believed that the French plan went too far. The opposition finally triumphed. As will be shown, a central commission did form part of the final agreement, but its powers were limited. Whereas agreement was reached on this point, the conference almost broke up on the question of the commonflag.Although Austria and the Ottoman Empire accepted the name "the United Principalities" when on the British suggestion the words "of Moldavia and Wallachia" were added, the flag was to be another matter. It was a question on which the Habsburg Monarchy would not yield; such a symbol of Romanian unity would have an effect on its Romanian population. During these discussions both the Austrian and the French delegates threatened to leave. Many alternatives were suggested; for instance, a crescent could be added to the flag indicating Ottoman suzerainty. Both Walewski and Kiselev objected to this; Kiselev indicated the problem of attaching a Moslem emblem to the flag of a Christian country. Napoleon III, who had yielded so much on the matter of the organization of the 86

The European guardianship provinces, proved very stubborn on this issue. Hiibner too declared that Austria would leave rather than back down. When consulted by the French ambassador in St. Petersburg, Gorchakov agreed to support France, but believed that it might be well to yield on form. A suggestion by Prussia that the two militias when united could use the same standards, but separate flags, was also turned down. After long arguments the matter was finally settled when Austria agreed that the two separate flags would fly on two poles, but that a common blue pennant could be attached to each. Although Kiselev did not play the leading role in these debates, he did take the initiative on the question of the autonomous rights of the Principalities. It should first be mentioned that both France and Russia were concerned about public opinion in the Principalities. During the first meeting of the conference Walewski made a plea for union and a foreign prince, although his government had already in fact abandoned the idea and his new plan called for neither. Similarly, Kiselev spoke in favor of the national solution despite the fact that his declarations were outside his official instructions and he knew very well that the powers would not accept this solution. In the conference Kiselev introduced a memorandum whose objective was to define the relationship among the Porte, the Principalities, and the guarantor powers. His arguments had influence on the final agreement in that in Article 2 the rights of the Principalities received a more precise definition. Moreover, again according to a Kiselev proposal, the payment formerly made to the Porte at the investiture of a prince was abolished and the tribute increased. The sum was fixed at 1 million piasters for Moldavia and 2 million piasters for Wallachia. In the conference Kiselev also argued that the Principalities should be allowed certain additional rights. For instance, he proposed that the stipulations of commercial treaties contracted between the powers and the Porte should not apply to the Principalities without their consent. He also brought up the question of consular jurisdiction and the Dedicated Monasteries. The final convention, signed on August 7/19, was a document of fifty articles, of which only the most significant for the future are summarized here.27 The document established a government for the Principalities with parallel but separate institutions: two governors, two assemblies, and two separate administrations. A Central Commission, with limited functions, was to be composed of sixteen delegates, eight from each principality, chosen by the prince from the assemblies or from the ranks of the high officials. The commission could prepare laws of a common interest to both provinces - for example, concerning matters such as the tariff union, the post, and the telegraph. These 87

Russia and the Romanian national state would then be submitted through the prince to the assemblies. The commission was also to work on the codification of the laws and a revision of the Organic Statutes. The regulations, except where they had been replaced by the August convention, were thus recognized as being still in force. The princes were to be elected for life by assemblies chosen on a very restricted franchise; they were to be invested by the sultan. The Principalities remained, of course, under Ottoman suzerainty. This relationship had been reduced to little more than a nominal control of the foreign relations of the provinces and the payment of tribute. As before, the Ottoman government had no means of enforcing its decisions. Despite efforts to change the limitation, the Ottoman armies, according to Article 8, could still enter the Principalities only with the consent of the guarantor states.28 It was recognized that this could be obtained only under highly unusual circumstances. The Russian government continued to react strongly on this question: matters of Russian security would be involved if the Ottoman armies were able to occupy the neighboring provinces easily. For the future another section of the treaty was to have great significance. Article 46 covered both civil rights and the peasant question. All Moldavians and Wallachians were declared equal before the law, in taxation, and in the right to hold public office in both provinces; other individual liberties were guaranteed. In addition, Romanian nationals "of all the Christian rites" were to "enjoy political rights equally/' Similar conditions were to be extended to the other religions by legislation in the future. These stipulations, while maintaining restrictions in particular on the Jews, did formally abolish previous special privileges held by certain sectors of Romanian society. The final section of this article dealt with the most controversial internal question - peasant emancipation - and stated: "The revision of the law which regulates the relations of the landlords with the farmers will be undertaken without undue delay with a view to improving the condition of the peasants."29 The Russian government had every reason to be satisfied with the agreement as a whole. As we have seen, union had been accepted because it was believed to be the solution favored by France and by most Romanians. Separation, however, still had its advantages. The conference had also given the Russian delegate an opportunity to talk about autonomy and even to speak in favor of union and a foreign prince. Support had been ostentatiously given to France. Russia thus received the settlement that conformed to its best interests, but its lead88

The European guardianship ers could also claim credit for backing the position preferred by the French government and the Principalities. The terms now had to be applied, and here difficulties could obviously arise. Most important, the convention called for another round of elections. Even though the franchise was still extremely limited, the most active political group remained the Liberals, and among them, the leaders were the men of 1848. The emigres had returned; the previous elections had shown their strength. The danger persisted that their victory, even in separate principalities, would result in the establishment of political units that could have a dangerous effect on conditions within Russia. The Polish connection remained a source of extreme anxiety. To avoid unfavorable complications, the Russian policy became the strict enforcement of the treaty stipulations, which seemed the best means of maintaining the status quo in the area and preventing a complete radical victory. The Russian government was fully aware that the Romanian nationalists had no sympathy for Russia or for the past regime of the protectorate. The only Russian partisans were some large landowners, from whose ranks the separatists usually came and who had enjoyed a favorable position under the protectorate. The higher clergy also had connections with Russian Orthodoxy. Both of these elements in Romanian society were, however, declining in political influence. Even in the church, the majority of the clergy were nationalist in sympathy. The closest ties between Russia and the Principalities lay, now as in the past, in the relationship of members of the Russian and the Romanian aristocracy. As we have seen, Romanians had won high positions in the Russian service. Further, some families were closely connected by marriage. The period provides excellent examples. After the tsar, Gorchakov was, of course, most influential in the formulation of Russian policy in regard to the Principalities, and he certainly had intimate ties with the area. Not only was his sister married to George Cantacuzino, a Moldavian large landowner, but his second son married a daughter of Michael Sturdza. In addition, in September 1858 Nicholas Giers, who had been in the Principalities in the 1840s and 1850s, returned as consul-general.30 In 1848 he had married George Cantacuzino's daughter, Olga, and thus Gorchakov was the uncle of Giers's wife. There were other similar marriage alliances. In every case the relationship was with those sections of Romanian society which were conservative, if not always separatist. The Russian diplomats, with some exceptions, were bound to see Romanian questions through the eyes of those with whom they had the closest personal ties.

Russia and the Romanian national state After the convention was concluded Gorchakov sent to his agents a general instruction on the attitude to be adopted toward the Principalities. As was usual in his directives, the tone was lofty and the measures advised were expressed in vague and cloudy terminology. The main emphasis in his dispatch was that, though Russia did not seek domination or an exclusive interest in the provinces, great care was to be taken to assure that no other state acquired this position. The Russian government wished the Principalities to keep the autonomous rights they had gained and to remain a neutral country under great-power guarantee. For this a strict execution of the treaty stipulations was necessary. Although the treaties had been framed in an anti-Russian sense, they would guard against changes in an unfavorable direction. Therefore the Russian agents should attempt to influence Romanian public opinion and the political leaders to abide by the international agreements. They should concentrate on consolidating the advantages they had won. Particular warning should be given against disorders at the time of the elections; these could bring foreign intervention. Disturbances would show the powers that conditions in the Principalities were unstable and that "their independent and national administration is not compatible with the existence of the Ottoman Empire." The emphasis was thus to be on the maintenance of the political status quo. Although the Russian role was not to be completely passive, Russian agents were instructed not to enter into intrigues. Russia had "neither candidates to bring forward, nor individuals to protect." The Russian government would support those who respected "the legally established conditions with the aim of order, improvements and progress" in maintaining them.31 As far as the other powers were concerned, the Russian diplomats, as before, were to watch with care both Austrian and Ottoman activities. The Habsburg Monarchy, it was stated, continued to base its domination on its economic influence and on the abuse of consular jurisdiction. In relation to the Porte, the Russian consuls were to guard against any Ottoman intervention that passed beyond the limits of the treaties, such as an arbitrary interpretation of the election rules or interference in the elections. Strong emphasis was placed on relations with France: As for France, the entente established between that power and Russia and consecrated last year at Stuttgart by a loyal exchange of ideas and friendly assurances between the two August Sovereign has principally taken shape in the region of the East. It has for a starting point the circular [dispatch] addressed by the two governments to their agents in Turkey and which requires them to avoid any struggle for influence between themselves, above all in religious questions, and to proceed as mudi as possible in paths of complete accord. It has developed in the diverse incidents which have arisen since then and today

9°

The European guardianship it is the gage for the maintenance of peace, the security of the Christian populations, and the political influence of the two governments in the East.32 The Russian representatives were further directed to cooperate closely with their French colleagues. These instructions, vague as they were, called for the maintenance of the status quo established by the treaties, cooperation with France, and enmity to Austria. This policy was, of course, a reflection of the course of action adopted in all European affairs at the time. The Russian government did not want more crises to develop until its military reorganization was complete; revenge against Vienna remained a constant element in its plans. The dispatch, nevertheless, was open to various interpretations concerning its implementation. In fact, the two main Russian representatives in the Principalities, Giers in Bucharest and Popov in Jassy, worked in directions that were different if not in actual conflict.33 Giers gave his support to the moderate conservative position and emphasized a strict adherence to the convention. He worked closely with his French counterpart, Louis Beclard. In Jassy Popov took a far more active position. Attracted to the unionist cause, he became violently anti-Austrian and expressed an extreme dislike of Michael Sturdza. He cooperated with his frankly and openly unionist French colleague, Victor Place. Both diplomats were to be cautioned by their governments on their attitude. When the convention became known in the Principalities, few were content. As Popov wrote: "The effect that it has produced here is not very satisfactory; no one I know is satisfied with it; neither the friends of the old system nor the so-called progressives, these because they had counted on a more liberal constitution, the others because privileges have been abolished."34 Although union remained the predominant desire of the politically aware, the franchise established by the convention gave the advantage to the Conservatives, if they remained together. The problem here was that they could not. Since the Conservative program was essentially the maintenance of the status quo, both politically and socially, there existed no real basis for organization for the achievement of a positive goal. The right in Romanian politics thus splintered into factions supporting a multitude of candidates for the hospodarship, all in bitter enmity to each other. The Liberals, as we have seen, did have a definite goal in union and a foreign prince. They were also closely connected through political clubs, an active correspondence among the leaders in both provinces, and a partisan press. They knew what they wanted, and they had a framework of political organization far more developed and sophisticated than their opponents. Their strength was in their 91

Russia and the Romanian national state program; their weakness was the fact that they did not have a single candidate in either principality around whom they could all gather as the symbol of their cause. Like the Conservative, the Liberal camp was divided into competitive factions backing individuals who were seeking the top positions. There was also some disagreement on tactics. Since the electoral laws seemed to preclude a victory through legal means, some thought of revolutionary action. Others favored a declaration of union and a foreign prince either within or without the new assemblies. Finally, however, there was general agreement that it would be best to work within the convention stipulations and to try to elect a unionist assembly, even though it was recognized that it would be very difficult under the circumstances. Again, as in the previous elections, the question who would run the interim government was of vital concern for both sides.35 As before, the men in control could dominate the prefects and the courts and have the final say on the composition of the electoral lists. In Paris the powers had decided that the government would be in the hands of new caimacamies made up of the three principal ministers of the last reigning hospodars. The positions were taken in Wallachia by I. Manu, E. Baleanu, and I. A. Filipescu; in Moldavia by A. Panu, Vasile Sturdza, and §. Catargiu. This decision was bound to cause difficulties, since it brought about a complete change of direction in both administrations. The new regimes were the avowed opponents of their predecessors, and mass dismissals of officials commenced at once. Moreover, it soon became apparent that in both provinces the caimacamies were severely divided within themselves. Two questions had to be solved at once. First, would the caimacams resume their former ministerial posts? This question had major significance because of the very important role of the Ministry of Interior in any election. It was agreed that the former positions would be retained. Second, would the caimacamie make decisions by majority rule, or did all three members have to agree unanimously? This decision was to split in particular the Moldavian government and to endanger the election. In fact, the major controversies centered in this province. As in the previous campaign a multitude of candidates emerged to dispute the Moldavian hospodarship. The change of administration was a particular blow to Vogoride, who nevertheless remained a candidate, along with Costin Catargiu, T. Bal§, V. Ghica, and others. The chief rivals, however, were Michael Sturdza and his son Gregory. As before, Michael Sturdza was the choice of most conservatives. Very rich, he was willing to use his money to win the office. He had returned to Moldavia after many years abroad, spent mostly in France. He at9*

The European guardianship tracted those who were against peasant reform and the separatists. At this time he was also the preferred candidate of Austria and the Ottoman Empire. In contrast, his son was less conservative; he favored gradual reform, and he was not against union. Gregory Sturdza won the support of some unionists who did not like the social and political programs associated with the more radical Liberals. The Russian agents opposed his candidacy. Dissensions marred the actions of the Moldavian caimacamie from its inception. Of the members, Panu and Sturdza were inclined toward union; §. Catargiu was a conservative who acted in the interest of the separatists. Since it was decided that the caimacams would resume their former offices, Catargiu controlled the vital Ministry of Interior. The question of appointments came up at once. The two unionists wanted an immediate widespread dismissal of the officials who had served under the previous administration, whereas Catargiu was willing to keep the Vogoride appointments. However, it had also been decided that within the caimacamie decisions would be taken by majority rule. A situation was thus created that could easily lead to a crisis in the government. The break in the caimacamie came over two issues in particular. By a two-to-one vote the control over the press was ended. Liberal papers were again able to publish, a distinct advantage for the unionists. The major controversy, however, came over the question of appointments. The two majority members, proceeding with a cleanout of the administration, soon quarreled sharply with Catargiu over the choice of new prefects, who would be responsible for drawing up the election lists and who were, of course, under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Interior. Overruled in the voting, Catargiu left the meetings. His colleagues then went ahead and made the appointments themselves. Particularly controversial was their choice of A. Teriachi as director of the Ministry of Interior, an act that was a direct challenge to their colleague. In reply, Catargiu appealed to the Porte to intervene. The Ottoman government acted through Afif Bey, who had been sent to Jassy to communicate the firman on the election. Catargiu cooperated closely not only with Afif, but also with the Austrian consul, Godel. The caimacams for their part would not negotiate with Afif, who they claimed was an official Ottoman agent and whose real mission had ended with the delivery of the firman. The telegraph office refused to accept his cipher telegrams. Having absolutely no means of enforcing its decisions, the Porte turned to the other powers. On November 15/27 the ambassadors in Constantinople met at the British embassy. They were in agreement that the two caimacams should be warned about their actions and their 93

Russia and the Romanian national state attitude toward the Porte. Decisions could be made by the majority, but special account should be taken in making appointments of the opinion of the caimacam whose department was affected. The representatives also thought that the caimacams were exceeding their assigned duties in some of the measures they had taken, for instance, in regard to the press. This diplomatic intervention accomplished nothing. The Ottoman government considered suspending the elections, but it received no support from the powers. The recalling of the conference of Paris was also discussed, but here again no agreement could be reached. Austria felt reluctant to attend an international meeting in which it would be in the minority. As the election approached, the situation in Jassy continued to deteriorate. The two caimacams had been willing to change some of the officials whom they had appointed, but Catargiu wanted all of his choices to be accepted. Finally, the majority dismissed Catargiu. Even though the election had thus been to a degree compromised in Moldavia, the situation was very favorable for the unionists. The caimacams had interpreted the restrictive electoral rules in a manner that made the maximum number eligible to vote. The larger the electorate, of course, the more opportunity the unionists had to win. The quarrel among the caimacams had deeply involved the foreign consulates. As has been mentioned, Godel had again collaborated with the separatists and had favored Catargiu. Victor Place energetically backed the majority decisions. Although Popov had been instructed to refrain from partisan activity, he enthusiastically supported his French colleague's position. His particular villain became Michael Sturdza. Aware that his instructions forbade him to take a partisan position, he nevertheless argued that it was necessary to defend legality and the rights of the country just as energetically as our friends the French. I agree that we should avoid complications; but if the Turko-Austrians all want them - and that is evident - what can we do? We must accept the situation on a day to day basis. While waiting let us try to disrupt their intrigues by the firmness of our attitude and the invariability of our principals.36

Popov was chiefly concerned about Austrian activities. He queried Giers whether it was proper that they should yield to Austria and abandon the Russian role "of defenders of right, of autonomy and of nationality."37 Popov's partisan stand aroused not only Austrian and Turkish displeasure, but also that of his superiors. Shortly before the election Aleksei Borisovich Lobanov-Rostovskii, who was the Russian charge^ in Constantinople, wrote Giers: 94

The European guardianship The Turks complain of the too dogmatic attitude of Popov; it is said that he is completely under the influence of (sous la pantoufle de) Place. On the other side, I received an indirect complaint from Michael Sturdza, who is equally disappointed that Popov refutes him openly. Sturdza, according to the news that one has here, appears to have little chance to succeed; that is true; but still that is no reason to burn our ships completely in case he becomes hospodar. In his report Popov lays stress above all on the immorality of Sturdza; but what has that to do with us? These are certainly not models of virtue that one has before one's eyes and that one looks for in the East; however that does not stop one from carrying on business with the people in office and not rejecting those who have a chance of coming to power. As to the relations of Popov with Place, it seems to me that they can and should remain intimate, without our consul seeing only through the perhaps too unionist glasses of his French colleague.38

Although the conflict within the caimacamie was not as serious in Bucharest as in Jassy, Giers had to deal with many similar problems in the Wallachian capital. The conservatives there also did not have a candidate; their votes were divided among §tirbei, Bibescu, and A. Ghica. As in Moldavia, the new caimacamie as its first act turned to getting rid of officials appointed by its predecessor. Before leaving office Ghica had made additional appointments from among his loyal supporters and had raised many officers in rank. Once out of office, feeling that his chances of victory were extremely diminished, he turned to the left to try to make an alliance against the two strong Conservative candidates. The caimacamie itself split in a manner similar to that in Jassy, but the issues were quite different. Manu and Baleanu were extreme conservatives; Filipescu, who was minister of justice, was a moderate. The quarrel among the three centered on the question of the qualifications for the franchise, with the majority attempting to limit it as much as possible. A test came over an ordinance that would have disqualified many members of the middle class, including the leading Liberal journalist C. A. Rosetti. When the matter was referred to the courts, the judges, partisans of Ghica, declared the disqualification void. Their decision was then approved by Filipescu. Despite the caimacam's influence, the final voting list was very small. The unionists were therefore in a much weaker position than in Moldavia. In this quarrel, as well as in that in Moldavia, Giers took a moderate position. He did not approve of the actions of the Moldavian caimacamie; he disliked the mass dismissals and the attitude taken toward Afif Bey. Nor did he accept the interpretation given the electoral law, because it would have a "great effect on the composition of the future Moldavian assembly in having enter into it elements which would not possess the necessary guarantees of order and stability."39 He was thus in opposition to Panu and Sturdza because he considered them too liberal. In Wallachia he opposed Manu and Baleanu for the opposite reason: 95

Russia and the Romanian national state they were too conservative. Giers's attitude was shared by Beclard; both held moderate conservative opinions. Beclard, in contrast to Place, distrusted the Liberals, whom he saw as the equivalent of the Jacobins during the French Revolution.40 Giers's position was thus the support of legality and the observation of treaties. He wished a tranquil situation to be established and, if possible, a reconciliation between the parties so that the elections would not be endangered and the choice of the members of the assembly not compromised through illegal procedures. The elections would then have to be annulled, a possibility that, he wrote, "makes me shudder."41 Lobanov followed a similar policy in Constantinople. He did not want the Porte to interfere in or postpone the elections. The Russian diplomats also feared that disorders might break out at the time of the voting or that the assemblies would again proclaim union and a foreign prince. The first elections were held in Moldavia, where the unionists won thirty-three out of fifty-five seats. The remaining twenty-two places were divided between the adherents of Michael and Gregory Sturdza. The Liberals were thus in control, but they could not agree on one candidate. The names most often mentioned were Vasile Sturdza, Costache Negri, Lascar Rosetti, Vasile Alecsandri, Lascar Catargiu, and Peter Mavrogheni. Recognizing that a single name would have to be selected, the unionists assembled in the Museum of Natural History to choose their candidate. After much debate, they finally settled on Alexander loan Cuza, whose name had not been previously considered. Cuza, who was not at the meeting, was himself surprised at the choice. When the assembly met on January 5/17, the unionists were able to win a unanimous vote. The elections for the Wallachian assembly took place between January 20/February 1 and January 22/February 3. Of the seventy-two deputies elected, forty-six were conservatives. The liberals C. A. Rosetti, Vasile Boerescu, and N. Golescu were, however, returned for Bucharest. With around thirty votes, Bibescu appeared to have the best chance of winning, but again family rivalry proved fatal. The brothers Bibescu and §tirbei could not cooperate, and their partisans were willing to vote with the Liberals rather than switch allegiance. The actions of the caimacams in restricting the voting had already had a deep effect on the Liberal leaders. Feeling that they could not win through the ballot, they considered using revolutionary means. Although this action was rejected, they did employ their superior organizing abilities to assure mob support to gain their desires. Liberal agitators went among the Bucharest city population and to outlying villages to stir up the inhabitants against the Conservative deputies and the caimacams. They 96

The European guardianship thus gained a weapon that they could use against their political opposition. When the assembly opened on January 22/February 3, about twenty thousand people gathered around the building where the meeting was held.42 Through the three days of the session the Liberals held control of the crowds; the galleries were also in the hands of their supporters. It was soon clear that the police and the army could not be counted on to act against this assembled population. But despite the advantage thus gained, the Liberals were hampered by the fact that they had no candidate. On the night of January 23/February 4-January 24/February 5 the leaders assembled at the Hotel Concordia. During the long discussions the name of Cuza was introduced. Although there had been previously some talk about the possibility of a double election, this alternative had been only one of many, taken seriously neither by the Romanian politicians nor by the foreign representatives. Nevertheless, it was adopted here as an obvious solution to the problem of the many Liberal candidacies and the need to win the Conservative deputies by something more than the threat of the crowds. The national idea and union, of which Cuza would be the symbol, could be the unifying concept. It must be remembered that many Conservatives were unionists; their position had often been determined by local political and social questions and not by opposition to an advance of the national cause. In a secret session held on January 24/February 5 Boerescu proposed the name of Cuza; subsequently all sixty-four votes went to this choice. The double election of Alexander Cuza, perhaps the single major event in the formation of the Romanian national state, was thus accomplished by a unanimous vote of both assemblies. Although a product of Liberal political organization, the personal union undoubtedly had wide support. The choice of a compromise candidate who had not sought the position was perhaps the only possible solution in a campaign where bitter personal rivalries over the office split both the Conservative and the Liberal camps. In accepting Cuza the assemblies were emphasizing the fact of union, rather than the man who occupied the supreme position. He was, nevertheless, a good choice. He had both administrative and military experience; moreover, he had done nothing in the past either to arouse antagonism or to win fervent personal supporters. His actions in the future, particularly in regard to the furtherance of the national interests, would determine his popularity with the electorate. Cuza also had the great advantage of being a Romanian candidate. As we have seen, the protecting powers had all interfered in some part of the political process. In the weeks before the election, rumors 97

Russia and the Romanian national state abounded about which candidate had the support of one or more guarantor states. Michael Sturdza was regarded as an Austrian man; §tirbei as the favorite of France. Cuza, in contrast, had incurred no obligations to any foreign power, and he had no domestic political debts. He was a Liberal and a unionist, but he had no group or individuals behind him to whom he owed special favors. Whether the new prince would be a help or a hindrance to the accomplishment of Russian policy in the Balkans was yet to be seen. Since 1856 the Russian diplomats had been successful in securing the modest goals set by their government. France had been gained as a partner in diplomatic affairs, even if its link with Britain had not been broken. Russian support of Romanian union and the increase of autonomous rights was bound to win favorable opinions in the Principalities and to counteract to some degree the unpopularity left from the period of the protectorate. The aim of preventing Austria from replacing Russia as the major influence had also been achieved; in a similar manner the Porte was blocked from gaining greater rights of intervention. In the future the Russian government was to continue in its policy of supporting the fulfillment of the treaty stipulations and of maintaining the status quo. Cuza, of course, had broken the spirit and perhaps the letter of the August convention by accepting the two offices. However, as we have seen, the Russian leaders had previously been willing to accept a personal union. Their attitude toward Cuza would depend on his future actions. From the Russian viewpoint there were bound to be many disturbing aspects to Cuza's victory. Treaty stipulations had probably been ignored. The second election had been accomplished by the use of crowds and electoral tactics that would be open to question under any regime. Moreover, the chief support for the action had come from radicals whose political program was strongly opposed by the Russian government. Like the other powers, Russia had to consider what its attitude should be toward this new Balkan political disturbance.

Boundary of Principalities at the time of the union

•

5O0-150O

meiers above

sea level

Over 1500 meters sea level

CO

The Danubian Principalities, 1859

above

CHAPTER

III

The Cuza era, 1859-1866

The double election of Alexander Cuza, an action that was in opposition to the clear intention of the protecting powers, was to bring a profound change in the relationship of the Principalities and their guardians. Although the alteration was not at once recognized, from this time forward Romanian interests were to be represented by a national leadership that rested usually on a strong domestic foundation. Moreover, although Cuza and his successors were to face continual opposition from various political opponents, neither these groups nor the princes themselves were henceforth dependent upon the favor of the Porte or another outside power. The change in the relationship with Constantinople and St. Petersburg was particularly striking. The subservient position of the former hospodars and caimacams contrasted sharply with the relatively independent stance of the new prince. This condition was brought about, at least in part, by the able and clever manner with which Cuza usually handled the great powers. The new prince, as we have seen, was not well known to the European representatives.1 He had, nevertheless, previously enjoyed a moderately successful career in public service and commerce. Born in March 1820 in a Moldavian boyar family, he had received an excellent secondary and university education in France. While a student in Paris he moved in the same circles as did the leaders of the revolutions of 1848 whom we have met before, among others the Golescu brothers and Ion Ghica. After the completion of his legal studies in 1839, Cuza lived in Galatz, where he subsequently held judicial and administrative positions; he also received a commission in the Moldavian militia. Actively involved in the events of 1848 in Moldavia, he was imprisoned, but he soon escaped to spend a brief exile in Transylvania. Returning to Moldavia 101

Russia and the Romanian national state in 1849, he continued to hold judicial posts, and he was a prosperous businessman. His military career also continued to advance. During the Vogoride administration he rose quickly from second lieutenant to major in three months, from March to May 1857. Although he was elected to the Moldavian divan, he did not play an outstanding role in the deliberations. In August 1858 he was promoted to the rank of colonel, and in October he was appointed the acting commander of the army in Moldavia, a post that he was holding at the time of his election. This military position, however, did not play a role in his candidacy. Aged thirty-eight at this time, Cuza thus came to office with experience in the judicial, administrative, and military aspects of state service. A compromise candidate, he had at no time previously shown inordinate ambition or a strong desire for political power. Despite the moderation of his attitude, Cuza did have certain clear ideas. He had been a forty-eighter, and he remained true to the basic ideals of that movement. From the time of his election until his final overthrow he continued to make it absolutely clear that he regarded himself only as a temporary ruler. He recognized that the general desire was not only for union, but also for a foreign prince. He repeatedly uttered his willingness to retire should such an appointment become possible. In addition to his liberal inclinations, he was extremely proFrench and certainly sympathetic to any "latinizing" influences. His attachment to and his genuine affection for France were to be repeatedly demonstrated. He sought close connections with Napoleon III and saw this ruler as the patron of Romanian nationalism. T H E RECOGNITION OF THE DOUBLE ELECTION

The election of Cuza in both principalities, with the apparent violation of the August convention, reopened the entire issue of the political future of the country.2 As might be expected, the alignment of the powers closely resembled that of the previous conference in Paris, with France as the strongest supporter of Romanian national interests and Austria and the Porte the principal antagonists. Although the Russian government, as before, backed the French position, the earlier hesitations and doubts reappeared. In their previous discussions of Romanian affairs, the Russian diplomats had not shown as much concern over the possibility of union with a native ruler as over such union with a foreign prince, but they were nonetheless still the firm defenders of legality in international relations. They recognized that a question of the interpretation of the treaties was involved, and a conference of the protecting powers would have to decide the matter.

The Cuza era, 1859-1866 Their first reaction to the event thus showed both a willingness to accept it and a hesitancy on procedure. When Gorchakov received a telegram from Giers, dated January 25/February 6, concerning the Wallachian election, he noted on the form: "I do not find any reason to protest against this double election." Kiselev and Baron A. F. Budberg, at this time the Russian ambassador in Berlin, reacted in a similar manner. Budberg considered it the least of the possible evils.3 However, as in previous episodes involving the Principalities, the Russian government adopted a waiting attitude. In a letter to Lobanov of January 26/ February 7 Gorchakov noted that in answer to a query from the French government, "by order of the Emperor, I replied that we would not raise any opposition, but that we will wait to learn the opinion of the other courts/' Explaining his reaction to the question of legality, Gorchakov wrote: Although the convention of August 7/19 does not anticipate explicitly the eventuality of a double election, it is nevertheless contrary to the spirit of the Treaty of March 18/30 [1856]. There is, besides, in the convention itself Article 3 which says: "The public powers will be entrusted in each principality to a hospodar." The powers who wish to invalidate the Wallachian election will take their stand, not without reason, on this Article 3 as well as on the Treaty of Paris and we will never act against the law. We act the way we do today because we do not believe it in our interests to set ourselves up as the leader at the head of those who pursue the annulment of the Moldavian election. Nothing more, nothing less.4

Soon, however, the Russian attitude became more positive. In a conversation with the Prussian representative in St. Petersburg, Karl von Werther, Alexander II expressed his support of the recognition of the double election, saying that "he had only the tranquility of those lands in mind, since he himself did not take a further interest in union, for it was, besides, a measure that had been designed during the war as an anti-Russian institution."5 On February 9/21 Gorchakov wrote to Lobanov that the event was now approved. "We support it," he wrote, "as a measure of urgency, of advisability and of public order, and one which does not affect the principle of the suzerainty of the Porte."6 As a result of this decision, the Russian position in the negotiations over the recognition of the double election was similar to that adopted on previous occasions; support was given to French initiatives in favor of the Romanian position. Gorchakov instructed Lobanov to cooperate with the French representative in Constantinople, at this time the charge d'affaires, Count A. de Lallemande, and similar directions were sent to the Russian agents in the Principalities. A common program was thus adopted by the two powers. The aim was to obtain the recog103

Russia and the Romanian national state nition of the double election, but only for the reign of Cuza. No attempt was to be made to assure the permanence of the union of the provinces through a common ruler. Sardinia, as before, stood with France and Russia on Romanian issues. On the opposite side were, predictably, the Ottoman Empire, the Habsburg Empire, and Britain. Fuad and Ali argued that the problem could be best handled by a unanimous declaration by the protectors condemning the proceedings as illegal. If not, the Ottoman leaders believed that a corps of twelve thousand troops, accompanied by representatives of the powers, could enforce a return to the basis of the treaties. Should the powers, however, decide to accept the double election, the Ottoman government requested as compensation an alteration of Article 27 of the Treaty of Paris that would facilitate its intervention should further violations of agreements occur. As Ali told Lobanov: "The entire question of the Principalities is in the right of intervention."7 The Ottoman officials were thus willing to allow Cuza to remain in office, but they sought assurances for the future. Their desire for compensation received British support. The chief opponent of allowing an expansion of Ottoman rights of intervention remained the Russian government. Gorchakov sent strong instructions to Lobanov to oppose any modifications in the article in question. Not only did Russia still intend to stand as the patron of Balkan Christian interests as against the Porte, but the question had certain immediate military implications. The Russian diplomats recognized that the great power that dominated at any given moment in Constantinople would also have control of the Ottoman military forces. Since the Crimean victors were clearly more influential with the Porte than Russia, it was sound policy to oppose a military compensation involving the Principalities. The attitude of all of the protectors was thus decided soon after the double election. There was general agreement that the treaties had been violated and that the Ottoman proposal for a conference should be accepted. The opposition to the personal unification of the Principalities expressed by the Porte was backed strongly by the Habsburg Empire. That state, however, could not act effectively because of its growing concern over the deteriorating situation in the Italian peninsula. Britain, although a firm upholder of Ottoman rights, was, as we have seen, willing to accept a compromise that would give the Porte some sort of compensation. The Ottoman Empire recognized the extreme difficulty of enforcing any decision calling for new elections. The French, Russian, and Sardinian position was support for the double election and opposition to a modification of the limits on Ottoman 104

The Cuza era, 1859-1866 rights of intervention. Prussia in this period followed the British lead in Eastern affairs. Once again a conference of ambassadors met in Paris to deal with the problems of the Principalities.8 In attendance were Hiibner for Austria, Cowley for Britain, Count Albert Pourtales for Prussia, Villamarina for Piedmont, Kiselev for Russia, Kostaki Musurus Pasha for the Ottoman Empire, and Walewski for France. In the first meeting, held on March 26/April 7, Musurus denounced the double election as a violation of the treaties and called for the application of Article 27 of the Treaty of Paris and Article 8 of the Convention of 1858. In the next gathering, on April 1/13, after Hiibner had declared the Austrian support of the Ottoman position, the five representatives of the other powers presented a counterproposal: The double election of Cuza, although not in conformity with the August convention, was to be recognized as an exception. In addition, some attempt was to be made to meet the Ottoman demand for a strengthening of its right of intervention should further violations of the treaties occur. The proceedings of the conference were at this point halted by the outbreak of war in Italy. Two of the protecting powers, France and Sardinia, were by the end of April fighting a third, the Habsburg Empire. This conflict, which was settled by, first, the armistice of Villafranca on June 28/July 11 and, second, the Treaty of Zurich on October 29/November 10, naturally absorbed the principal attention of Europe. Russia, although not involved directly in the hostilities, remained in close touch with the events taking place and wished to be in a position to influence the final peace negotiations. After it became clear that the Porte would not accept the formula offered on April 1/13, the entire question of the Principalities was postponed until the powers could again assemble. The delay in the announcement of the final decision had, as might be expected, an unsettling effect on the affairs of the Principalities. Cuza himself made clear his personal desire to advance the national cause by every means possible. Soon after his election he proposed to the friendly consuls, Popov and Place, further steps that he wished to take. Among these were the summoning of the Wallachian and Moldavian assemblies to Foqani and their union into a single body, the appointment of a common ministry for both provinces, and the uniting of the militias. After strong warnings from both France and Russia, Cuza refrained from such radical actions, but the situation in the Principalities remained dangerous. Both Popov and Giers were favorably impressed by the new prince. After meeting Cuza in Bucharest Giers reported to Lobanov: 105

Russia and the Romanian national state Since his arrival in Wallachia Prince Cuza has displayed great activity for the maintenance of order and public tranquility which have been gravely compromised by past events. His attitude inspires much confidence and one can hope that he will know how to resist the influence of the parti exalte that wishes to see him enter upon the road of dangerous reforms, incompatible with the political situation of the country.9

Giers's personal reaction to the double election was similar to that of his government, whose decisions he, of course, also influenced. He recognized that the personal union both expressed the wishes of the majority and violated the August convention. The problem, he stressed, should be dealt with by the protectors and not by the Porte alone. He did not think that new elections could be carried through without turmoil. In a report of February 21 /March 5 he expressed his "conviction that the best if not the only means" of reestablishing regular conditions and order in the country "would be the recognition of the double election of Cuza. The pure and simple return to the dispositions of the convention could be maintained, I fear, only with the assistance of a foreign armed force."10 While the powers debated, Cuza proceeded to take what actions he could. Since the Principalities were under Ottoman suzerainty, they did not have regular agencies in other countries, with the exception, of course, of their representation in Constantinople. After the elections, special delegations were appointed by the assemblies to bring the results of the voting to the official attention of the Porte. The Moldavian delegation was led by Costache Negri, the Wallachian by 1.1. Filipescu. In addition, in order to present the Romanian position, special representatives were sent to the courts of the protecting powers: Vasile Alecsandri was dispatched to Paris, London, and Turin; Ludovic Steege to Berlin and Vienna; and §tefan Golescu to Paris and Berlin. Prince Obolenskii was the link with St. Petersburg. Although Cuza did not attempt to introduce major changes at this time, he did carry through the duties assigned to the princes by the agreements. He therefore exercised the executive power in both principalities, and he convened the Central Commission to meet at Focsani. This body, which was composed of sixteen delegates chosen in equal numbers from the two principalities, was to prove extremely radical in its political direction. In a more controversial move, the prince established a military camp near Ploe§ti, where he intended to concentrate the militias of the two provinces, whose numbers he wished to bring to twenty thousand. The crisis in the Italian peninsula and the subsequent outbreak of war, events that dominated the first part of his reign, presented both 106

The Cuza era, 1859-1866 dangers and opportunities for the prince. His great hope lay in France. In discussing Romanian problems with Napoleon III, his emissary, Alecsandri, appealed to the emperor in almost abject terms: "Sire . . . Prince Alexander Jean is devoted to you body and soul; he wishes to make of his country a little France and he hopes only in your magnanimous generosity in order to accomplish the task of the regeneration of the Romanian nation." 11 Cuza's ambitions were clearly expressed in a letter that he wrote to Alecsandri on April 13/25: As a Romanian, I feel the need to raise my country in the eyes of the nations and in its own esteem; as prince, I am convinced of the necessity of acting vigorously and I have decided, for the happiness and the independence of my people, to gain all the advantage possible from the events that are about to take place. The time has come to awake from that torpor which made of us an easy prize and an object of cupidity for our powerful neighbors. We have decided to throw ourselves into the arena and to support to the limits of our power the policy of France, which is that of our prosperity and our greatness.12 Cuza requested from his patron money, arms, and munitions. He also wanted military advisers sent from France to assist him in building up his army. The major advantage that the Principalities gained from the war in Italy was that, with their attention concentrated on that peninsula, the powers did not want to precipitate a Balkan crisis. It was soon obvious to all of the diplomats that the double election could not be reversed without a military intervention, and it appeared impossible to gain an agreement among the powers in support of such an action. An Ottoman occupation required the assent of all of the powers, an impossible condition. A joint intervention by the neighboring states, Austria, Russia, and the Porte, was precluded by the Habsburg involvement in Italy and Gorchakov's clear statement that his country would not participate. The other protectors either would not or could not act. Despite its stand in this matter and its prior approval of the French involvement in Italy, the Russian government remained intensely apprehensive about the war and its possible ramifications in areas where its own vital interests were at stake. It was feared, and with full justification, that France would enlist revolutionary and national elements in Galicia and Hungary and use them against Vienna. Gorchakov was also concerned that France might arrange an exchange with Austria of Lombardy and Venetia for the two principalities. Writing to Michael D. Gorchakov, the governor-general of Poland, the foreign minister told of the danger of such an action and the necessity of a Russian concentration of troops on the Moldavian frontier to prevent it. Rumors of such an exchange were to recur frequently in the next years. T h e Rus107

Russia and the Romanian national state sian government always made it clear that such a bargain was not acceptable and that it could be a casus belli.lz Warnings were also issued in Bucharest. At the beginning of the war Giers asked for and received assurances from Cuza that he would not involve himself in revolutionary actions in neighboring lands, meaning, of course, the Habsburg Empire. The Russian fears all had solid foundations. Despite his assurances to the Russian agent, Cuza was to remain in close touch with Italian, Polish, and Hungarian revolutionary leaders not only at this time but throughout his reign. The repeated consideration given by the French government to an exchange of territory was, of course, not known to the prince. Although the Paris conference was officially in recess during the war, the Romanian problem remained a topic of diplomatic negotiation. The five sponsoring powers continued to urge the Porte to accept their compromise solution. Although their single firm supporter was out of the picture, the Ottoman representatives maintained their previous position. They would accept the double election for the reign of Cuza, but only in return for compensation in the form of the strengthening of their right of intervention. In these months the Russian government continued to press the Porte to recognize the realities of the situation and agree to the conference protocol. The war, Gorchakov warned, had created dangers for the Ottoman government, which "finds itself in the presence of an accumulation of combustible material with a fire in its immediate neighborhood. It depends on it whether to fan the flame or to stop its progress."14 Cuza received similar cautionary messages. In an instruction of May 2/14 Gorchakov told Giers to speak with the prince and make him understand that the Russian advice came from "a friend who wishes well for the country within the limits" of the possible. We understand that one listens attentively to insinuations from a source perhaps equally benevolent, but less circumspect and careful, when it opens larger horizons to the mind. That is human nature and we do not wish to blame Prince Cuza, but we should call to his serious attention that in rushing into adventures one risks compromising the advantages already acquired and that the statesman should always avoid surrendering to the hazards of fortune a work which can be completed gradually owing to the force of circumstances.15

Throughout the war and in the weeks after the armistice the Russian warnings were repeated. Support would be given to the recognition of the double election, but Cuza was to make no further moves in the national direction. As Lobanov wrote to Giers in June: "For his part, it is necessary that Cuza remain quiet; that is the condition sine qua non of our protection."16 108

The Cuza era, 1859-1866 With the cessation of fighting in July and the Villafranca agreement, the stage was set for unanimity among the powers. The question of the recognition of the double election was settled at a single meeting held in Paris on August 25 / September 6. Here the Ottoman Empire agreed to confer the investiture on Cuza for the position of prince in both provinces, but only as an exception. In the future the choice of a prince would be made according to the stipulations of the August convention; that is, two separate assemblies would be chosen to elect in theory different rulers. The Porte's approval of the temporary arrangement was to be expressed in two separate firmans. As a concession to the Ottoman desire for compensation and a guarantee that no further infractions of treaties occur, a very complicated formula was adopted that did little more than allow the Porte to point out violations of the convention. This long statement is quoted here in full because of its significance for future diplomatic negotiations and as an example of the intricate arrangements that the powers had to accept in order to find a settlement to which all of the guarantor states could agree: As the Signatory Powers of the Convention August 19 have resolved not to suffer any infraction of the clauses of this Convention, the Sublime Porte, in the case of a violation of this act in the Principalities, after having taken steps [demarches] and requested the necessary information from the hospodarial administration, shall bring this circumstance to the knowledge of the representatives of the Protecting Powers at Constantinople: and, once the fact of infraction is verified by them, the suzerain court shall send to the Principalities a commissioner ad hoc, charged with requiring that the measure which constituted the infraction should be withdrawn; the commissioner of the Sublime Porte shall be accompanied by delegates of the representatives at Constantinople, with whom he shall proceed in concert and in common accord. If this demand is not granted . . . the commissioner of the Sublime Porte and the delegates will signify to the hospodar that, having observed his refusal to obey it, he will be advised of the coercive measures to be employed. In that case, the Sublime Porte will come to an agreement without delay with the representatives of the Protecting Powers on the measures to be taken.17

Although the minor concession given here soothed Ottoman feelings, it was still in practice impossible for the Porte to undertake a military action in the Principalities without the unanimous consent of the protecting powers. T H E ADMINISTRATIVE AND LEGISLATIVE UNION OF THE PRINCIPALITIES

While the great powers were debating in this desultory fashion, Cuza was forced to deal with the difficulties of administering a country that had one prince, but two assemblies and two administrations.18 From the 109

Russia and the Romanian national state beginning it was also apparent that the assemblies, the ministries, and the Central Commission were working in entirely different political directions. Fundamental to the problem was the limited franchise, which assured that Conservative landowners would dominate the assemblies. These bodies were soon brought into conflict with the ministries, which were in the hands of Cuza's Liberal supporters. At this time, as in the past, the Liberals were the most active and vigorous element in Romanian political life. The prince also had to meet the opposition of the many powerful and ambitious individuals who either disliked his policies or coveted his position. For the first three years of his reign, Cuza, because of the stipulations of the treaties and the insistence of the protectors, was compelled at least to attempt to run a government on this basis. The result was just short of complete political chaos. Between January 1859 and January 1862 Moldavia had nine different ministries and Wallachia eleven.19 The political confusion was, unfortunately, also accompanied by a very difficult economic situation. A backward country, the United Principalities lacked all of the prerequisites of a modern state, such as adequate roads, good schools, and basic social services. To make matters worse, a world crisis in agriculture meant that Romanian farm products, the basis of the economy, either could not find a market or were sold at low prices. The poverty in the countryside put further pressure on the government. Peasant unrest was shown in frequent rioting and in other disturbances. It was quite clear that the problem of regulating the relationship between the peasant and the landholder had to be met. The treaties also called for a solution to this issue. However, it was apparent that measures to alleviate the sufferings of the peasantry could not be taken without fundamental alterations in the political system, and, in particular, in the electoral laws. For the next years the prince had to turn his attention to international relations; basic changes could not be made in the state structure without the concurrence of the Porte and the powers. Political questions had to be solved before the economic and social evils could be remedied. Unfortunately for Cuza, the protectors also had a stake in the internal order of the provinces, and none wished to be faced with further disturbances in the area. Even France and Sardinia, both of which gave verbal encouragement to national advancement and constitutional reform, were unwilling to risk their greater interests elsewhere to assist Cuza. The Porte, the Habsburg Monarchy, and Britain, for different reasons, all wished to preserve the status quo in both the domestic affairs and the external relations of the Principalities. Of the protectors, Russia took probably the most restrictive position as far as internal 110

The Cuza era, 1859-1866 political reform was concerned. Although Popov had previously supported the unionists, Giers and Gorchakov had been concerned with their liberal doctrines. After the double election, the Russian agents pressed Cuza strongly to rely upon the Conservatives and to appoint them to his ministries. In October 1859, for instance, Giers reported to Gorchakov that in his conversations with Cuza he "never ceased repeating to him that according to my opinion no combination would be able to succeed without the predominant participation of the Conservatives who enjoy the reputation that they owe to their social position, their experience in affairs and finally the majority in the chamber, with which every constitutional government must necessarily reckon."20 Although Cuza did not dare adopt extreme measures, like the uniting of the assemblies, he continued to move forward where he could. He had, as we have seen, joined the two militias, and he summoned the Central Commission to meet at Focsani. This body soon proved fractious. Of the sixteen delegates, Cuza was entitled to appoint half and the assemblies the rest. The commission thus expressed in its composition the basic split in the country: Cuza appointed Liberal delegates, whereas the assemblies preferred Conservatives. As Giers feared, the body immediately took up the issue of union and a foreign prince, subjects that were outside its competence. Moreover, to the Russian dismay, the leadership in this initiative came from the Conservatives under the direction of G. Sturdza. Giers believed that their intention was to force a concentration on political questions, so that all discussion on internal reforms, in particular on the peasant problem, would be postponed. He was most disturbed by the Conservative stand and believed that it was motivated by "the disquiet that the reforming inclinations of the parti avance inspires in them in the indecisive situation of the moment."21 In November, after the issue of the double election had been settled, Giers received an unofficial draft of the constitution that had been prepared by the Central Commission. A radical document, which completely ignored the directives of the protecting powers as expressed in the August convention and the recent decisions, it called for the full union of the country with the capital in Bucharest. The prince, although restricted in his internal authority by the powers given the legislature, was to have many of the attributes of the ruler of an independent country. He could, for instance, make agreements with foreign governments, coin money, and confer national decorations. The administration and the judiciary were to be organized on French models. Presented with this document, which obviously would never receive great-power approval, Cuza had to decide what to do. Facing a grave 111

Russia and the Romanian national state political crisis, he dissolved the Central Commission and both assemblies. The domestic conflicts of the first year of his reign had made it abundantly clear to the prince and his collaborators that the system was not working. The Principalities faced two major problems that needed solution and that were interconnected. First, the administrations and the assemblies would have to be united, and, second, the franchise would have to be widened. The second measure not only would give Cuza a Liberal base for his government, but also would make possible a practical program of peasant reform. It was understood that changes in the electoral laws would benefit the Liberals and harm the Conservatives. Since the second question was highly controversial, Cuza chose to emphasize first the question of union, an issue that commanded the strong support of the majority from all factions and parties. In seeking a change in the political organization of the country, Cuza wisely placed the emphasis on negotiations with the suzerain power. The Principalities were represented in Constantinople by the extremely able diplomat Costache Negri, who proceeded to initiate discussions on the major Romanian problems with both the Porte and the ambassadors of the protecting powers. In March i860 Negri was instructed to inquire if objections would be made should the meetings of the Central Commission be moved from Focsani to Bucharest. Emphasis was placed on the difficulties of life in Foes, ani, which was far from both provincial capitals. New elections had been held, and the commission as well as the assemblies would soon convene. Once again the powers divided on the regular lines, with France supporting the request and the Habsburg Monarchy the major opponent. With this impasse, nothing could be accomplished. In June i860 Cuza made another attempt. He sent Negri a long memorandum on the political conditions in the country and the difficulties of governing with the organization established by the international agreements.22 He called not only for a full unification of the Principalities, but also for a revision of the electoral laws. Negri informally circulated this document and discussed its content with the Ottoman officials and others. As a result of their comments he advised Cuza that the time was not propitious for action on the matter. Indeed, in these years, even after the conclusion of the war in Italy, the protecting powers were deeply engaged in other areas. In 18571858 Britain had faced the Sepoy rebellion in India; from 1859 to 1862 a great deal of attention had to be devoted to administrative reform in that colony. In the Far East, where Britain and France cooperated, the two governments were engaged in a joint pressure on China; in i860 112

The Cuza era, 1859-1866 they joined forces in the occupation of Peking. In the Ottoman Empire, the major conflict concerned the struggle of the Druses and the Maronites in Syria. The French government sent an expeditionary force into the area. For all of the powers, moreover, the Italian problem continued to cause concern. The settlement after the war did not satisfy the Italian nationalists. From May i860, when Garibaldi arrived in Sicily, until March 1861, when the establishment of the Kingdom of Italy was proclaimed, the European governments were principally interested in events on that peninsula. The affairs of the Principalities became matters of secondary importance. In this difficult situation Cuza accomplished what he could without arousing the ire of the protectors. He united his two military ministries as well as the administration for the post, telegraph, customs, and medical services for both provinces. The main offices were all located in Bucharest. He also made this city his chief residence. At the same time he continued to present the problems of the Principalities to the foreign representatives. In September i860 he made an official visit to Constantinople, where he was cordially received. He spoke with the Ottoman officials and the ambassadors about the difficulties of governing a divided country and the wisdom of moving the Central Commission to Bucharest. When speaking with Lobanov he did not bring up the question of a widening of the electoral law, since he was well aware of the Russian interest in preserving Conservative influence. Lobanov cautioned the prince not to diverge from legality.23 Returning to Bucharest, Cuza renewed his efforts to obtain further concessions. The visit evidently made him feel more confident of the attitude of the Porte. With his chief hopes still in Paris, he wrote a letter to Napoleon III, enclosing his June memorandum.24 A copy was also forwarded to Charles Felix de Lavalette, the French ambassador in Constantinople. Cuza emphasized in particular his desire for union and a revision of the August convention. The French reaction, though not enthusiastic, was not discouraging. Thouvenel instructed Lavalette to counsel the Romanians to follow a prudent policy, but to assure them of French support in their efforts to obtain concessions from the Porte. The French advice was that Cuza negotiate with the Porte and also try to secure the summoning of yet another conference. The British government also favored this position. Meanwhile, Russian policy was in the process of stiffening. Support for the recognition of the double election had been given, as we have seen, because the government wished to work with France and because no better alternative presented itself. Cuza's subsequent behavior had not proved reassuring. From the beginning it had been clear that he

Russia and the Romanian national state would base his foreign policy on the French connection and that he would, when possible, press forward the liberal-national program of unification and a foreign prince. His internal policies soon gained him the enmity of the Conservatives, whom the Russians favored. His relations with the Russian consulate were also not close or intimate. As early as July 1859 Giers wrote his wife: "Cuza is a scoundrel of the worst kind - he promises everything and does nothing."25 The prince sent his trusted delegates to the Western capitals - London, Paris, Turin, Berlin, and Vienna, not to St. Petersburg - for advice and assistance. The first permanent diplomatic agency was established in Paris in September i860; a similar office was not opened in Russia until 1874. This situation could be acceptable to the Russian government only as long as its relations with France were good. Aside from the diplomatic aspects, the Russian officials had other worries in connection with the Principalities. There was extreme concern lest the area become a center of revolutionary intrigue that would have repercussions inside Russia as well as in other neighboring lands. The Russian diplomats agreed that the August convention contained serious flaws, but they hesitated to change it. They did not see what they could gain by contributing to an increase of Cuza's prestige or power. They also recognized that any reforms would only weaken their position. For instance, it was clear that a widening of the franchise would undermine the strength of the Conservatives, who best represented their interests in the provinces. The other protecting powers were in a similar dilemma. They understood the weakness of the prince's position and the pressure exerted upon him from both the right and the left in his country. The British government feared that if some concessions were not made, Cuza would be ousted and the question of a foreign prince would at once arise. With these considerations in mind, both the French and the British representatives pressed the Porte to make some accommodation with the prince. At the same time, all of the governments, including the French, strongly urged Cuza not to present them with another fait accompli, this time in the form of a unilateral proclamation of full union. Meanwhile, another internal crisis was mounting. In April 1861 the Moldavian assembly voted to meet with its counterpart in Bucharest to discuss the peasant question, to which the Wallachian body agreed. This decision, carried through with the support of both the Liberals and the Conservatives, greatly disturbed the powers, who feared that the united assemblies would simply declare union, with or without the assent of the protectors. When Popov protested to Cuza that the action was a violation of the convention, the prince replied that he could not oppose 114

The Cuza era, 1859-1866 the wishes of the nation. He had been elected on the hope of union; "he was even the personification of that idea ... he was ready to take on himself the risk and to submit to all of the consequences of the act that was going to take place."26 Although the joint session was in fact not held, the obvious dissatisfaction and unrest in the Principalities convinced the powers that something had to be done. Finally, under French and British pressure, the Porte officially took up the study of the questions raised by Cuza's requests. Its answer was contained in a circular of April 19/May 1, in which the Ottoman government, recognizing that the Principalities could not be administered as originally ordered, agreed that the ministries and the assemblies could be united. The Central Commission was to be abolished. However, like the recognition of the dual governorship, this concession was granted only for the reign of Cuza. The Porte declared that this limitation was "the condition sine qua non" of its agreement. As far as the revision of the electoral law was concerned, Cuza should draw up proposals for reform and then submit them to the powers.27 Since these changes would involve an alteration of the treaties, the approval of the protecting powers was once again needed. The French position, of course, remained the same. This government would have accepted permanent union and a foreign prince if that had been practical. The British too supported the Ottoman decision, but from different motives. Primarily interested in assuring the maintenance of Ottoman sovereignty over the Principalities, the British government believed that it was wiser to accept this temporary solution rather than risk another fait accompli, which would further damage Ottoman prestige. Although the British backed the idea of restating the principle of separation, Lord John Russell, the foreign secretary, believed that the union, once granted, would be permanent. Prussia and Sardinia supported the French and British position. Despite the Ottoman acceptance, the Habsburg Empire remained opposed to any changes leading to a strengthening of Romanian national rights. In a conversation with Lobanov on February 13/25, 1861, Prokesch-Osten restated the basic Austrian problem: "There are under Austrian domination around three millon Romanians; if union is achieved, they will seek necessarily to unite with their compatriots of Moldavia and Wallachia; it is thus for Austria a matter of its integrity to oppose in the most absolute manner the union of the two Principalities/'28 Johann Bernhard von Rechberg, the Habsburg foreign minister, uttered a similar opinion: "It is evident that union would only pave the way to the complete independence of Daco-Romania."29 Nevertheless, despite its strong opposition, the Habsburg government

Russia and the Romanian national state realized that it could do little to hinder the actions of the majority of the powers. The defeat in Italy had drained its military capabilities and damaged its prestige. Support was, however, given to attempts by the Porte to place restrictions on, or make reservations concerning, the concessions granted the Principalities. Of all the powers, Russia was to prove the most active in attempting at least to delay the implementation of the decisions granting full union. The majority of the objections raised were well founded. Like the British, the Russian diplomats did not believe that, once union had been granted, it could later be denied. They were also apprehensive that even if the powers accepted Cuza's requests, the action would lead only to further demands. The next step would be the appointment of a foreign prince. Lobanov expressed a common feeling when he commented that "a foreign prince would be the complete independence of Moldo-Wallachia, because no member of a sovereign house of Europe would submit to the suzerainty of the Porte/' 30 In a later letter he discussed his reservations further: What should this foreign prince be like, covered at present with the veil of the

unknown? I do not think anyone can say; the only thing that appears certain to me is that, no matter who he is, he would not have any more the hesitations of Cuza and he will enter resolutely in the path where the other ventured only reluctantly. He would of necessity not be Orthodox, for it is not with us that they will go to find him; he will be Catholic and he will accomplish the work of the latinization of the country; with that he will raise the flag of Romanian, Italian, revolutionary, etc., sympathies - and he would be able even more than Cuza to count on the support of France.31

After the Porte had expressed its agreement, the problem of how to register the opinion of the other powers remained. The convening of a conference was made difficult because Victor Emmanuel I had been recognized as king of Italy by only one state; the question of the status of the Sardinian vote was thus at issue. Thouvenel made the wise suggestion that each power should simply send its individual agreement to the Porte, which could then issue a firman.32 Russia, however, refused to accept this procedure, arguing that a conference was essential because changes in the treaties were being made. In a circular dispatch of July 12/24 Gorchakov stated the Russian belief that the granting of "a temporary and limited union, such as the Porte intends it, would be based on an illusion." Once the Principalities gained this concession, it could not be denied later. Moreover, the administrative union was only a step toward complete union and perhaps even toward the demand for a foreign and hereditary prince. The Russian minister also stated his objections to the manner in which the powers were meeting the suc116

The Cuza era, 1859-1866 cessive challenges from the Principalities and to the policy of expediency, which had "no other end than to put off questions without having regard for a past which engages the dignity of the powers nor of the future which is imprudently anticipated in burdening it with all the charges of the present."33 Negotiations on the question were interrupted by the death of Abdul Mejid in June and the succession of his brother, Abdul Aziz. In July the Russian government modified its position to some extent. It agreed that the question of union could be dealt with by a conference of the ambassadors at Constantinople rather than at Paris. However, it proposed that the question of franchise reform be discussed first. Moreover, the status quo was to be maintained for three years. Isolated in this position, the Russian government was soon to soften its attitude.34 In late summer Cuza sent a delegation to visit Alexander II at Livadia. Here the major problems were discussed, including the question of the resettlement of Bulgarians who lived in the parts of Bessarabia ceded in 1856 and the fate of the property of the Dedicated Monasteries, a most sensitive question that will be discussed in detail later. By September the Russian government had altered its attitude on union; the question of a change in the electoral laws was dropped. With general agreement achieved beforehand, the conference of ambassadors, which opened in Constantinople on September 14/26, was able to settle the matter with little difficulty. Once again the Porte presented a demand for some sort of compensation in the form of increased rights of intervention. It now wished to be designated as the state that would enforce the decisions of the protecting powers should further violations of the treaties take place. Should coercive actions be adopted, then "these measures would be executed by the suzerain power and . . . the guarantor powers would be represented with the commander-in-chief by their respective delegate."35 As usual, the British and Habsburg governments were sympathetic to the Ottoman position, but the French and Russian remained firm on the question of intervention. With the acceptance of union by the guaranteeing powers, the Porte could proceed with the formulation of the firman.36 In the text the union was limited to the reign of Cuza. Should he die or be overthrown, the provisions of the August convention would be applied; new assemblies would be chosen in each principality. When transmitting the firman to the powers the Ottoman government attached a note saying that if the throne became vacant, an Ottoman commissioner, accompanied by representatives of the powers, would be sent to the Principalities to assure the carrying out of the stipulations of the agreement. 117

Russia and the Romanian national state Should violations take place, the commissioner would invoke the agreement of September 1859. No mention was made of further consultations among the powers or of obtaining their prior approval of Ottoman actions. All of the guarantors except Austria notified the Porte of their reservations in this regard.37 The majority opinion was well expressed in a British instruction of January 1/13, 1862. Lately the Sultan has sanctioned the union of the Administrations and the Legislatures of Moldavia and Wallachia. But . . . the sanction of the Sultan is given only during the tenure of Prince Couza as Prince. Upon his death or resignation, if it should happen that the two Principalities have been disappointed in the fruits of Union and wish to be separate, the separation will take place without convulsion. If on the other hand the effects of the Union have been concord, order and prosperity, it is not to be supposed that the Sublime Porte and the great Powers will oppose themselves to a renewal of Union in a more permanent and regular form.38

Gorchakov had expressed the same opinion in October. He did not see how the powers could later dissolve the union. If it worked, it would be unjust to deprive the Principalities of the benefits.39 With the recognition by the powers of the double election and the administrative and legislative unification of the Principalities, the major steps in the establishment of the Romanian national state had been accomplished. Although the union had been limited to the reign of Cuza, the negotiations among the powers had clearly indicated that there would be no opposition among the majority of the protectors to a permanent continuation of the unification should it prove successful. Since the world situation was not propitious for an advancement toward the next goals, a foreign prince and independence, Romanian attention should have turned to internal development and social reform. Although economically backward, the rich resources of the provinces appeared to promise a prosperous future.40 Despite the fact that the official name of the state was still the United Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia, a Romania was in fact in existence. Because of the significance of this achievement, it might be well to examine briefly the condition of the country after the unification. No major changes were to occur in the next twenty years. In the 1860s the two provinces had a combined area of 121,000 square kilometers and a population of 4.6 million. Of these, 2.6 million lived in Wallachia, with 140,000 in Bucharest. Moldavia had 2 million people, with 70,000 in Jassy. The urban population totaled less than 18 percent. As far as religion was concerned, 95 percent were Orthodox and 3 percent Jewish. The social divisions reflected the argicultural economy. Of the three classes - the landowners or boyars, the middle class, and the 118

The Cuza era, 1859-1866 peasants - the latter were the overwhelming majority. In Moldavia 2 percent of the population belonged to the landowning class, 19 percent to the middle class, and 70 percent to the peasantry. In Wallachia the boyars represented 4 percent, the middle class 20 percent, and the peasants 75 percent. Among these figures that of the middle class deserves further clarification. In the past native Romanians had not held predominant positions in trade or commerce, which were traditionally in the hands of those with another national background. In Wallachia Greeks, Jews, Serbs, and Armenians predominated; in Moldavia the Jews were the strongest element. The prominence of Greeks, Jews, and Armenians in trade was common to the entire Ottoman Empire. Romanians did, however, engage in these occupations, and they dominated the government, military, and religious posts. The middle class, as the figures show, was not strong; the majority were small merchants and artisans. Of the 155,600 heads of families included in this classification, three groups are important for Romanian political life: the 22,800 government officials, the 18,450 religious dignitaries, and, in particular, the 838 in the free professions, including among others doctors, lawyers, teachers, and engineers. As has been noted, the treaties set a very tight limit on the number of those who could vote. In 1858 the 2.6 million Wallachians were entitled to 2,482 votes and the 2 million Moldavians to 1,397. Because of peculiarities of the system, perhaps only 700 could actually vote in Moldavia and 1,000 in Wallachia. Political power was thus concentrated in the hands of a very small group. We shall see the same names and the same families play the principal role in Romanian politics. Although the term political party has been used throughout this account, this term has designated what were at the best loose coalitions of men with similar aims. With the establishment of regular institutions, the parties came to have stronger organizations and better-defined objectives. Nevertheless, as elsewhere in the Balkans, political power still lay primarily in the hands of a few powerful men and their followers. In the Principalities there was no significant break in political alignment according to social or economic background. Almost all the politicians were landowners or had firm connections with boyar interests. Some, like Cuza and Kogalniceanu, were involved in commerce. In addition, members of the free professions, in particular government officials, lawyers, and journalists, were, by the nature of their tasks, able to exert disproportionate influence under the constitutional system. The army officers, of course, because of their control of the armed power of the state, could if they wished play the determining role in any political crisis.

Russia and the Romanian national state In the first elections the restricted franchise had given the control of the assemblies to the Conservatives. Although they were favored by the Russian government, there is no evidence that this party was under any sort of Russian influence. Its chief men were Barbu Catargiu, A. Arsache, Dimitrie Ghica, Lascar Catargiu, G. §tirbei, G. Sturdza, and Peter Mavrogheni. Satisfied with conditions as they were, they wished to preserve the electoral system, and they certainly did not wish to see social or political reforms introduced into the country. Lacking a positive goal, they tended to break into competing factions and to dissipate their political strength in personal rivalries and private quarrels. They did not like Cuza, but they accepted him, at least at first, as the best of the available alternatives. The Liberal Party, as has been repeatedly demonstrated, showed the real initiative in Romanian politics. From their center in Wallachia, the party's leaders, among them I. C. Bratianu, C. A. Rosetti, and the Golescu brothers, remained devoted to the program of 1848 - including a foreign prince and, eventually, full independence. In domestic affairs they continued to support the classic liberal position. They wished the state to be governed under a constitutional system that would give the real power to the legislature and reduce the position of the prince to that of a figurehead. They put a strong emphasis on guarantees of civil liberties, in particular free speech, a free press, and the right of association. Their principal newspaper, Romdnul, edited by Rosetti, was the most widely circulated publication in the Principalities. Approximately two thousand copies were printed. The party was also interested in economic modernization and in an expansion of the state boundaries. As far as the peasant question was concerned, their attitude remained, as it had been in 1848, ambivalent. With the majority depending on their positions as landholders, they were reluctant to accept economic losses as a result of social reform. In addition to the parties, certain individuals were able to exert a great influence in Romanian politics. First in importance at this time was Cuza himself. Although he has been described as a Liberal, he in fact stood alone. A moderate, he worked with friends and close associates, but he never formed his own party. Associated with him were Costache Negri, Vasile Alecsandri, Nicholas Cretulescu, M. C. Epureanu, General Ion E. Florescu, Dimitrie Bolintineanu, Ion Strat, and Michael Kogalniceanu, the last a man of particular importance in this study. Educated primarily at the University of Berlin, Kogalniceanu was moderate and balanced, but he was willing to lead in the introduction of new measures and to follow policies that caused members of both parties, as well as the Russian consulates, deep concern. Among 120

The Cuza era, 1859-1866 other prominent leaders who had strong personal followings were Ion Ghica, Dimitrie A. Sturdza, and A. G. Golescu. For Cuza the unification brought both advantages and difficulties. Whereas the national question had united the parties, the country now had to deal with internal problems on which there was great disagreement. After the approval of the Porte was received, the prince prorogued the two assemblies and then directed them to reassemble in Bucharest on January 24/February 5, 1862. As the first premier of the united Romania, he appointed the Conservative Barbu Catargiu, hoping thereby to gain the backing of his party. The major problem before the new administration was clearly that of the peasant-landholder relationship; Article 46 of the August convention had directed that action be taken on this matter. With the backing of his party, Catargiu introduced a bill that would have granted the landholders full ownership of their entire estates; the peasants would thereafter have to rent their plots. The measure was strongly attacked by the left, in particular by Kogalniceanu. On June 8/20 Catargiu was assassinated when leaving the assembly. His death removed from the scene the one man who had appeared capable of organizing and holding together the Conservatives. His successor was a Cuza partisan, N. Cretulescu. By this time the prince had abandoned his attempts to cooperate with the Conservatives. He refused to ratify their agrarian law, and he prorogued the assembly. Cuza's former problems thus remained. The executive and legislative branches of government were effectively blocking each other. Moreover, by the beginning of 1863 it became clear that personal opposition to Cuza was strong among both the Liberals and the Conservatives. In the first months of this year some members of both parties joined in what was to be called "the monstrous coalition." The strength of this group was shown when, after the reconvening of the assembly, its members joined in a negative reply to the prince's address. They thereafter demonstrated their influence by passing no-confidence votes against the ministry and rejecting the budget. On March 2/14 Cuza prorogued the assembly, and for nine months it remained in recess. On October 11/ 23 the Cretulescu government resigned; Cuza next appointed Kogalniceanu as his principal minister. When the assembly reopened in November, Kogalniceanu initiated an era of thoroughgoing reform in Romanian political life. The debates in the assemblies and the factional quarrels were followed carefully, of course, by the foreign representatives. Giers, as previously, strongly urged the prince to govern with the Conservatives, advising him that "there would be nothing easier for him than to take the direction of the Conservative Party by attaching it to him by a com121

Russia and the Romanian national state munity of interests." Such an alliance would be a guarantee of order and prosperity and would counter the "revolutionary tendencies" that had appeared in the assembly.41 T h e events of the next months did nothing to allay his fears. He particularly regretted the disorganization of the Conservatives after the assassination of Catargiu; Cuza's leadership he characterized as "inconsistent and unskillful/' 42 When in November the prince discussed the situation with him, Giers expressed his opinions with force and clarity, as is shown in his report of November 2/14, 1862: I began by expressing to Prince Cuza my strong regrets that he had abandoned the correct path adopted under the ministry of M. Barbu Catargiu, which made his position unassailable in bringing him the cooperation of the assembly and the support of the guarantor powers. His distrust and his hostility toward the old boyars caused some intrigues . . . and his complaisance toward the party of disorder could naturally only alienate from him the chamber, where the Conservatives are in the majority, estrange the great powers in his regard, and in the last analysis introduce anarchy into these lands because, after having used it in bringing about the fall of their political enemies, the radicals believe themselves strong enough to seek to overthrow the government itself.43 Although the Russian diplomats were indeed concerned about the internal organization of the Principalities, their attention of necessity had to be directed toward the protection of their interests in the area. Two questions, both connected with the apparently increasing radicalization of Romanian politics, continued to worry both the agents in the Principalities and the leadership in St. Petersburg. As we have seen, Russian policy since the beginning of the century had been deeply concerned with two major issues - the struggle against revolutionary conspiracies and the defense of Orthodoxy. T h e Cuza regime now appeared to be challenging Russian interests in both areas. T h e close links of the prince to Napoleon III and to revolutionary movements were obvious to the Russian agents. Even more serious were the moves that the Principalities took against the Dedicated Monasteries, religious institutions that enjoyed full Russian patronage. T h e question of revolutionary activity and the treatment of the monasteries became the main concerns of the Russian government after 1859. REVOLUTIONARY

EUROPE

Much of Russia's lack of enthusiasm for the approval of full unification came from that government's realization that its general policies were not obtaining the desired results either in the Danubian region or in Europe. T h e entente with France established after the Crimean War 122

The Cuza era, 1859-1866 had as its objective the securing of an ally during a period of retrenchment in foreign affairs and reform at home. Otherwise, basic Russian aims had not changed. One of the fundamental principles of Russian policy had been, as we have repeatedly seen, to combat revolutionary conspiracies whose aim was the overthrow of established governments and their replacement with radical regimes. Particular apprehension was felt over Polish activities, representing either the right or the left political orientations, because the accomplishment of their main objective, the reestablishment of an independent Polish state, involved Russian territorial integrity. Since the Hungarian underground activities were so closely linked to the Polish and since the Hungarian leaders after the events of 1849 were intensely anti-Russian, their revolutionary organizations were also of interest to the Russian diplomats. Unfortunately for Russia's interests, certain other aspects of traditional Russian policy led its representatives to support measures that were not consistent with a clearly antirevolutionary stand. The Russian government was obviously deeply involved in the defense of Orthodox Christianity. The aim of its efforts had hitherto been the reform of the Ottoman administration and an increase in the autonomous rights of the Balkan nationalities. The breakup of the Ottoman Empire and its division into independent states was not sought. Yet most Balkan national movements, whether conservative or radical in leadership, aimed at exactly this goal. The dilemma that faced Russia at the time of the Greek revolt has been discussed. Even more difficult situations were now to arise with the increasing activity among the South Slavs, that is, among the Serbs, Bulgarians, and Montenegrins, directed at improving their position within the empire. In addition, independent Greece and autonomous Romania, despite their relatively favorable positions, were not satisfied with their boundaries. Both adopted irredentist policies for the future. All of the Balkan leaderships were delighted to take support where they could find it. They were thus willing, even eager, to link their efforts with those of other European conspiratorial groups and to act in violation of their commitments to the sultan and the great powers. Because of its reluctance to stand against an Orthodox people or to support an Ottoman policy detrimental to their advancement, the Russian government at times found itself condoning actions that violated its own principles concerning the defense of legality in international relations. Even worse, some of its policies in practice gave aid and comfort to the great European underground movements, aimed at national emancipation and liberal reform, in which, of course, Polish and Hungarian revolutionaries played a leading role. 123

Russia and the Romanian national state These contradictions in Russian attitudes had particular significance for the Principalities. Situated on the lower Danube, a crossroads between Polish, Hungarian, Serbian, and Bulgarian lands, the provinces were an obvious staging area for national conspiracies. Moldavia, with its access to Galicia and Transylvania, was of particular importance to the Polish and Hungarian movements. In addition, after the cession of southern Bessarabia to Moldavia in 1856, Russian aid to Balkan proteges had to pass through Romanian territory. Moreover, the very loose surveillance that any Romanian regime was able to exert over its educated and politically active citizens, combined with the liberalnational sympathies of the Liberals, made the Principalities an ideal center for revolutionary organization. The advantage taken of this situation by the Poles in Moldavia has been mentioned; Bulgarian conspiracies were already well organized along the Danube frontier. Romanian interests were thus involved both with the cause of the Poles and Hungarians, which the Russian government abhorred, and with the goals of the Balkan Orthodox, which St. Petersburg felt, at the very least, it could not openly oppose. The alliance with France compounded the confusion of the Russian leaders' policy toward national movements. The France of Napoleon III, of course, stood sponsor to most of the contemporary national movements, especially the Italian and the Polish, but also the Romanian and Hungarian. Accordingly, Paris became the center of revolutionary conspiracy, and these activities received official sanction. French agents actively promoted Italian-Polish-Hungarian-Romanian cooperation in common endeavors. Cuza, of course, fell well into these plans. Not only did he actively seek French support, but as a man of 1848 he thoroughly sympathized with the national objectives of his neighbors. He could thus work enthusiastically with Italians and Hungarians against Habsburg rule, with Poles against Russian domination, and with Serbs and Bulgarians against the Porte. All of these actions could have either directly or indirectly threatening implications for tsarist Russia. Between 1859 and 1863 a series of European crises, all involving revolutionary movements, clearly illustrated the difficulties of the Russian alliance with France and demonstrated the central position of the Principalities in political conspiracies. Although living in a region peripheral to the main centers of stress, the Romanian leaders were involved in the conspiracies connected with the unification of Italy, the Serbian actions against the Porte, and, most significant, the Polish revolt against Russia in 1863. All of these, of course, had deep implications for Russian-Romanian relations.44 The advantages that Cuza gained from the war in Italy in 1859 had 124

The Cuza era, 1859-1866 been great; by the time the conflict had terminated and the powers could again turn to Romanian questions, it was really too late to change the double election. Moreover, the Principalities could only gain by a strengthening of Sardinia, a state that had previously supported the Romanian national position. Cavour himself had been delighted by the double election, since he believed that it assured him "of the support of the governments of Moldavia and Wallachia."45 With Cuza in charge, moreover, there would be less opposition to the use of these lands for revolutionary organization. During the first years of the prince's reign, therefore, the Principalities were drawn into the conspiracies involved in the Italian unification movement, the link being primarily through the activities of Hungarian emigres active in Sardinian service. These men naturally regarded the Principalities as the obvious staging area for their work in Transylvania and the Hungarian lands. Most active in negotiations with the Romanian authorities were Generals G. Klapka and S. Tiirr. Although the terms of the Treaty of Zurich strengthened Sardinia's position and gave it additional territory, they did not satisfy the Italian nationalists. In May i860 Garibaldi landed in Sicily with a small force, and once again the Italian question dominated European diplomacy; the Principalities assumed a renewed strategic importance. In the fall of i860 Cavour and the Hungarian revolutionary leader Lajos Kossuth made plans to launch an attack on their common adversary, the Habsburg Monarchy, from three directions - Serbia, Moldavia, and northern Italy. In preparation for such an action, Sardinia was to provide arms for Hungarian forces organized outside Austria. Meanwhile, Romanian lands had become a center of Hungarian activity. In i860 Kogalniceanu was the premier of Moldavia.46 With his knowledge and connivance, military camps were set up and arms depots organized. The Hungarian emigres were housed and fed by the local authorities. These actions were carried out primarily by Klapka and Kogalniceanu, probably without the full knowledge of Cuza. The prince, of course, had to be careful. He was never quite certain of the extent of French involvement in the entire conspiracy. His relations with the Sardinian government, however, were close, and he sent some of his officers to train with its army. The entire relationship of the Principalities, the Sardinians, and the Hungarians produced a local crisis in December i860.47 At that time five ships loaded with arms left Genoa, bound for Galatz. Two arrived there and immediately started unloading. The consuls, and in particular the Habsburg government, whose interests were primarily affected, at once made it an international matter. The massive importa125

Russia and the Romanian national state tion of arms into the Danube port involved Ottoman regulations as well as great-power interests. The Porte, the Habsburg Empire, Britain, and Russia at once demanded that Cuza sequester the arms that had arrived; the three other ships were stopped. Under pressure Cuza did impound the guns that had not already been unloaded, but the problem of what to do with the rest of the shipment remained. Finally, a British vessel transported them to Constantinople, where the Ottoman authorities evidently eventually returned them to Genoa. At this time, it will be noted, the Russian government approved the British, Ottoman, and Habsburg positions. In this issue the interests of Russia were similar to those of the Habsburg Monarchy. The ItalianPolish-Hungarian conspirators, with their links to France, endangered Russian territorial integrity too, and they also had ties with similar movements within Russia directed against the tsarist regime. Nevertheless, despite the clear evidence of the danger of using the Principalities in conspiracies, in the next arms crisis, this time involving Serbia, Russia became a prime supporter of a contrary principle. Although seldom an active inciter of Balkan uprisings, the Russian government nevertheless felt compelled to intervene whenever such events occurred. The years after the Crimean War witnessed such activity in other parts of the Balkan peninsula, as well as in the Principalities. In October 1862 an army coup in Greece led to the ouster of King Othon and his replacement by George I, a British candidate. For both the Russian government and the Principalities, however, events in Serbia were more significant. In December 1858 Prince Alexander Karadjordjevic was forced out of office and Milos Obrenovic returned for a second reign. After his death in i860, he was succeeded by his son Michael, who was to be an active and strong ruler. Like their counterparts in the Principalities, the Serbian leaders wished to widen their rights of autonomy. Their principal grievance at the time was the fact that Ottoman troops still garrisoned six fortresses within their territory. In June 1862 a local disturbance resulted in the bombardment of Belgrade. In order to strengthen its diplomatic position, the Serbian government needed both foreign supporters and military supplies. An obvious source of assistance was to be found in Russia, a protecting power that had repeatedly declared its concern with Serbian affairs. Collaboration with the government of the Principalities could also be of advantage to both states. Cuza throughout his reign was in regular touch with Belgrade. In 1862 measures of practical assistance given to Serbia involved the Principalities in another international incident. In November 1862 the British consul, John Green, reported that a large convoy of arms had crossed the Russian frontier into the Princi126

The Cuza era, 1859-1866 48

palities. Although there was considerable confusion at first, it was soon learned that these weapons were destined for Serbia. Since the delivery appeared far larger than what was necessary for the internal needs of the state, the Ottoman, Habsburg, and British governments demanded that the Principalities sequester the arms. It appeared that they could only be intended for use against the Ottoman Empire. Under strong pressure from these powers, Cuza during the next week used every means to win enough time so that the shipment could cross safely through the Principalities to its destination. He was aided by the fact that the guarantors were not united on this question. France, Russia, Prussia, and Sardinia, for different reasons, failed to protest. The Russian stand was particularly determined. Gorchakov argued that the transfer of weapons was legal and that the Serbs needed the guns for legitimate purposes. The Serbian position was, of course, identical. The Russian diplomats also insisted that the Romanian officials could not sequester weapons that belonged legally to Serbia. The successful transport of arms across the Principalities and Cuza's resolute support led to even closer relations between the Romanian and Serbian governments. In February 1863 a Serbian agency was opened in Bucharest; in March a similar Romanian office was established in Belgrade. Although no vital interests were at stake in either the Sardinian or the Serbian arms deliveries, the next episode, involving the use of Romanian territories by Polish revolutionaries, hit directly at sensitive and vulnerable areas of Russian policy.49 Ever since the Polish revolution of 1830, the Principalities had served as a refuge for emigres from Russian-controlled Polish lands. In addition, many former revolutionaries lived in other parts of the Ottoman Empire or had entered Ottoman state service. Throughout the empire committees to forward the Polish cause were organized, the most effective of which were affiliated with the Paris-based organization of Prince Adam Czartoryski. At his death in July 1861 his son Ladislas continued his work. After his election, Cuza kept in close touch with Polish agents. One of the most prominent, Dr. Theophil Gliick, lived in Jassy and was the prince's personal physician. From Moldavia the Polish organizers maintained contacts with their counterparts in Galicia and in other Polish-inhabited lands. The Polish cause aroused much enthusiasm within the Principalities; it attracted support from both the left and the right in Romanian politics. In the country the police, the border guards, and the customs officials all cooperated with the movement. The Principalities were, of course, an ideal center for the collection of arms. Weapons were brought in from the West, past Constantinople, and then up the Dan127

Russia and the Romanian national state ube to Braila and Galatz. The ships of the French Messageries Imperiales, among others, were involved in this transport of arms. The Russian consuls in the Principalities were fully aware of what was happening and also of the widespread sympathy in the Principalities for the Polish cause. In January 1863 a major revolution broke out in the Russiancontrolled Polish lands. Not only was the revolt exceedingly dangerous for Russia, but it opened enormous possibilities for other national movements in Central and Eastern Europe. The situation was particularly delicate for Cuza. Although France, Britain, and the Habsburg Monarchy all assumed attitudes sympathetic to the Polish rebels, it was not clear if they would take any action beyond the issuance of formal diplomatic protests. The Hungarian and Italian leaders too hoped that the situation would develop to their benefit. The prince was thus caught between conflicting pressures. The Polish revolutionary leadership wished to use Moldavian territory. Within the Principalities there was great enthusiasm for cooperation, among both the prince's partisans and his foes. Most of the Polish actions could not be controlled; arms did pass through the country. However, an incident finally occurred that was so open and blatant that Cuza had to take action. In July 1863 a group of about two hundred Poles, Turks, and Italians, led by Colonel Zygmunt Milkowski, who had assembled at Tulcea, crossed into southern Bessarabia at Cahul. The Romanian government obviously could not allow this force to march into Russian territory, and at the city of Costangalia a Romanian unit engaged it in combat. Casualties were suffered on both sides. The defeated Poles, imprisoned under very lenient conditions, were soon released. The attitude of the prince to the Polish crisis was clear; what lay in the shadows were the sentiments of Napoleon III. Had the French emperor been willing to fight for Poland, as he had for Sardinia, then the Romanian leadership would have been eager to lend assistance. In an effort to extract a clear response, Cuza wrote to Napoleon on November 11, 1863: It is without surprise that I have seen several organs of the French press, anticipating events, enumerate the considerable advantages that the United Principalities, chosen as a base of operation, would procure for a French army. I have ascertained with satisfaction that this eventuality would be greeted with general delight throughout the entire country . . . Sire, Romania, its resources, its army, its prince, are at the orders of Your Imperial Majesty. Romania, which would arise as one to repel a Russian or Austrian occupation, would receive a French occupation with joy.50 128

The Cuza era, 1859-1866 In his reply of December 8/20 Napoleon declared himself touched by the sentiments in the letter. However, by this time it was obvious that no effective French aid would be given the Poles.51 The Polish uprising had a ruinous effect on Russian diplomacy. The French entente was completely broken. Only Prussia had, in Russian eyes, adopted a satisfactory attitude. Virtually isolated in Europe, the Russian government henceforth was to look with even greater suspicion on activities in neighboring lands that carried revolutionary implications. The Russian diplomats were fully aware of the Romanian sentiments. Despite the bitter Russian resentment of the Habsburg attitude in the Crimean War, the interests of the two countries were obviously closely bound in regard to national revolutionary conspiracies. In the future the Russian attitude toward Romanian questions was to come to resemble that adopted by the Habsburg Empire, Britain, and the Porte, all of which wished to maintain the status quo in the area. As far as Cuza personally was concerned, Gorchakov told the Austrian representative in St. Petersburg: "I leave to you Prince Cuza, who is only an adventurer and will never be anything but a docile instrument in the hands of the revolution."52 In the next years instructions were repeatedly sent out to the agents in the Principalities to watch out for signs of revolutionary conspiracy. In January 1864 Gorchakov wrote to G. G. Offenberg, who had replaced Giers as consul in Bucharest, that he read with interest reports concerning "the revolutionary intrigues in the United Principalities, above all those which tend to spread abroad."53 In a letter to the ambassador in Vienna, Gorchakov commented: "The moral situation of the United Principalities becomes more intolerable from day to day. There is organized there, perhaps under a foreign influence, but in any case as a result of the illusions and ambitious desires of the hospodar, a revolutionary center, which would react inevitably upon the repose of the neighboring states."54 An even stronger statement on the Principalities was contained in a letter to the Russian representative in Constantinople, Evgenii Petrovich Novikov, of March 1864. Here Gorchakov wrote that the information on revolutionary intrigues was of the highest interest, and even the smallest details should be followed: It is evident that the revolution wishes to make a supreme effort and that the Polish, Hungarian, and Italian leaders are in agreement. I would assign to this fact only a secondary value if the tolerance, not to say the encouragement, of the French government, or of the agents who make use of its name, did not give it a force that one cannot treat lightly. 129

Russia and the Romanian national state From the information that you sent us and from that which comes to us from elsewhere, it is more than probable that one of the principal centers, doubly dangerous because of its geographic position, is established in the United Principalities, under the secret protection of Prince Cuza.55 The Russian anger at the prince, expressed in these dispatches, was caused not only by his attitude on the question of revolutionary conspiracy, but on yet another matter of deep concern to Russian interests. At the end of 1863 the Romanian government sequestered the lands of the Dedicated Monasteries, an act that brought it into direct conflict with Russian patronage of Eastern Orthodoxy. T H E DEDICATED MONASTERIES

In the relationship between Russia and the Principalities no single matter was to provide greater friction and controversy than the fate of the Orthodox monasteries.56 Russia's involvement in this affair drew its representatives deep into the religious controversies of the country and placed them in the difficult position of standing as intermediaries between the patriarchs and the Romanian government, backed by its own ecclesiastics and public opinion. The Orthodox church in the Principalities, as in the other Balkan countries, was linked with the Patriarchate of Constantinople. Separate metropolitanates in Bucharest and Jassy were headed by metropolitans whose nomination had to be approved by the patriarch. In both provinces the monasteries played a particularly significant role in national life because of the enormous tracts of land under their control. They thus had economic and political as well as spiritual and religious influence. The monasteries had been established under different conditions, but one category, the Dedicated Monasteries, caused unique problems. These institutions were "dedicated" to certain Holy Places, such as the monasteries of Mt. Athos and Jerusalem, and to the Patriarchates of Constantinople, Jerusalem, Alexandria, and Antioch. These institutions had come to depend on the Romanian income. All of the Romanian monasteries were expected to provide social services, such as hospitals, schools, and homes for the sick and the aged. Usually the founders of the monasteries, or those who had made donations to them, intended the income to be used primarily for charitable purposes. Even in the case of the Dedicated Monasteries only a percentage of the income, or the surplus, was evidently intended for the support of the Holy Places. In both Principalities the monasteries controlled about a quarter of the land, with the Dedicated Monasteries holding about 11 percent. Although all monastery property was bound to be under attack in an 130

The Cuza era, 1859-1866 increasingly secular age, the Dedicated Monasteries were in a particularly vulnerable position. Not only was a large percentage of their income sent out of the country, but they were not under the control of either the state or the church hierarchy of the Principalities. Instead they were administered by superiors, called hegumens, who were appointed by the Holy Place to which the monastery was dedicated. They were normally Greeks, and the services were in the Greek language. Although dedications dated from as early as the seventeenth century, the status of the institutions changed over the years. Their thoroughly Greek nature was established in the eighteenth century in the Phanariot period. These monasteries had also at this time become closely attached to the Russian interests. During the wars against the Ottoman Empire they had served as centers of intelligence and sources of supply. Like the other Romanian institutions under Phanariot rule, the monasteries suffered from widespread corruption. The profits from the lands went into the pockets of those who administered the funds; the churches were not repaired, and the charitable works lapsed. The Holy Places too suffered, since income that should have been sent to them ended in private hands. The major difficulties arose after the revolution of 1821 when the hegumens, as a result of the Greek revolt, were forced to leave the country. Although the Russian government insisted on their later reinstatement, the special position of these institutions came increasingly under attack. In this matter all elements of Romanian society stood together. The native clergy resented the privileged position of the foreign monasteries; the peasants often worked under worse conditions on church lands than on the private estates. Moreover, after the Treaty of Adrianople removed the Ottoman control of the grain trade, the boyars looked with covetous eyes on the rich lands of the church. In fact, it was to be the great landowners who were to lead the movement against the monasteries. During their occupation of the Principalities after 1828 the Russian officials were forced to deal with the problem. In acute financial distress, the governments of the Principalities wanted to levy taxes or collect contributions from the monasteries, as they had done in the past on an irregular basis. The conflict of views between the governments and the Greek clerics was made extremely clear at this time. The Romanian position was that the lands had been given the monasteries to administer under the stipulations stated in the original acts of donation. In other words, the monasteries held in trust funds to be used for certain purposes, usually charitable, with any surplus to be sent to the Holy Places. The Greek clerics, in contrast, claimed a right of full ownership.

Russia and the Romanian national state They argued that some of the property had been given to them and that they had purchased other sections. They therefore believed that they alone should determine how their lands were administered and how the money should be distributed. They strongly objected to paying any taxes or to submitting themselves to state regulation. They also expected their institutions to be treated differently from the other monasteries. Kiselev faced this problem during his administration. A commission was appointed, composed of delegates from the Principalities and the Holy Places. In meetings held in 1832 and 1833 the clerics adamantly upheld their position: the lands were the property of the Holy Places, and the hegumens, who were not accountable to anyone, could act as they wished. They recognized no obligations but the holding of religious services in the chapels of the monasteries. At this time the sympathy of the Russian officials, particularly Kiselev, lay with the Romanian arguments. They felt that the monasteries should make some contributions to the state, which would go to the support of local social services. They also expressed concern over the administration of the property and the extreme corruption. It was clear that a large part of the profits was being diverted into private pockets; both the Principalities and the Holy Places were thus deprived of needed funds. In order at least to attempt to limit corruption, it was now proposed that the farming contracts for the monastery lands should be awarded at public auction. The question of the monasteries was dealt with in Article 363 of the Organic Regulation for Wallachia and in Article 416 of that for Moldavia. In practical terms, the settlement of the controversy was simply postponed.57 In 1843, under Russian sponsorship, another attempt was made to meet the problem. The Russian officials again supported a program that would have allowed the state to receive a fixed sum or a percentage of the monastery income, which was to be devoted to charitable purposes or to education.58 The farming contracts were to be let out for a nine-year term and by public auction, with the leasing supervised by representatives from the Greek clergy, the government of the Principalities, and the Russian consulates. Although no general settlement was reached at this time, the Patriarchate agreed to pay a fixed sum of a million piasters a year for nine years; at the end of this period another sum was to be agreed upon. Although Bibescu was dissatisfied with the amount, Sturdza accepted 500,000 piasters for Moldavia. In 1851 negotiations recommenced, with the Russian representatives acting as intermediaries. Their aim continued to be to bring the two sides together and to persuade the monasteries to make a financial 132

The Cuza era, 1859-1866 settlement. Attempts were made to calm the fears of the representatives of the Holy Places and the patriarchs and to assure them that the Russian proposals did not involve an infringement of their property rights or their privileges. The Russian agents in the Principalities remained sympathetic to the Romanian desire for a financial contribution, and they recognized the corruption in the administration of the lands. In 1851 the consul in Bucharest, Khaltchinskii, reported: If there were a counsel to give the Greek clergy, it would certainly be that of being on guard, not against the government of the Principalities, which in reality is not considering preventing the exercise of their rights, but against the hegumens, against that crowd of greedy people who live at the expense of the church and are interested in perpetuating the abuses.59

Although the system of awarding tax-farming contracts by public auction was introduced, it did not lessen the corruption. These matters were often now handled between dishonest officials who took payments from those who wanted the awards. In the years preceding the Crimean War the Russian government continued to try to gain an agreement acceptable to both sides; it did not wish to impose a settlement. The negotiations were held in Constantinople with Ottoman and Russian officials as well as representatives from the religious institutions participating. The Russian position remained favorable to the Principalities in that the monasteries were urged to make contributions, in the form of either a block sum or a percentage of their income. The figure of a quarter of the revenues, or 65,000 ducats for both principalities, was named. The Russian representatives were very critical of the attitude of the Greek clergy, who sought to avoid negotiations and who did not like public auctions or government interference in their affairs. With a more realistic attitude, the Russian government urged the Patriarchates to make an arrangement under Russian sponsorship, which would assure their rights for the future. Otherwise conditions might arise that would force them to accept a far more drastic settlement. And that, of course, is exactly what happened when the defeat in the Crimean War strongly affected the ability of the Russian representatives to aid the Greek clergy.60 The religious question became a major issue when the powers were discussing the reorganization of the Principalities. Not only the status of the monasteries, but the entire relationship of the Romanian church to the Patriarchate of Constantinople, came under review. The divans, arguing that these were entirely internal issues, wished to decide them without outside interference. The Romanian clergy itself was divided. Deeply concerned with all Orthodox problems, the Russian government desired to continue its role as mediator. Its position, however, 133

Russia and the Romanian national state shifted slightly. Since it was no longer the sole protector of the Principalities, it tended to be more concerned about the rights of the Patriarchates, institutions over which it enjoyed some influence. Moderation, however, continued to be the main theme, as was indicated in an instruction sent to Popov in May 1857 W Easily, who, it will be remembered, was the Russian representative on the International Commission: "It is to the unity of which the center is at Constantinople that the church of the East has owed its marvelous conservation through the secular vicissitudes of the East. On the other hand, it is by respecting the rights of nationality that the church of Constantinople has been able to conserve its authority."61 The first serious problem concerning religious affairs in the postCrimean era arose in Moldavia and involved not only the monasteries, but also the question of the establishment of an autocephalous church organization. Like the other Balkan nationalities, the Romanians, in advancing toward further internal autonomy, desired to loosen the bonds with Constantinople. When Greece became independent, one of the first acts of the government was the establishment of a national church, despite the fact that the Patriarchate was Greek in language and culture. Following the same path, the Moldavian authorities wished to have an independent church and to make its administration a part of the state apparatus. Once again the Russian government tried to moderate between the Principalities and the Patriarchate. Basily argued for a compromise in which the Moldavian authorities would agree not to interfere in questions involving dogma and rites and the Patriarchate would not intervene in administrative and disciplinary affairs. Although he tried to maintain a moderating central position, the Russian representative believed that the rights of the Moldavian church were inherent in the nationality of its members. The Orthodox institutions should remain together, but with full recognition of their national individuality. The entire question was a very delicate one for the Russian government. Although it did favor the granting of more political autonomy to the Christians under Ottoman rule, it did not want to break the bonds of unity of the Orthodox Balkan people. A middle position thus had to be found. As Basily expressed it: We preach moderation to both sides. By encouraging the aspirations of nationality with a view to ecclesiastical autonomy we can provoke fatal complications for the future peace of the church of the East, above all in the present circumstances, and then we will see the natural enemies of the church of the East use the awakening of nationalities, by all sorts of open and secret means, in order to sow discord between them and to detach them from the common 134

The Cuza era, 1859-1866 center which has guaranteed for centuries the unity of faith among the Christian nations of the East.62 Basily himself had to face this contradiction between the national demands and the unity of the faith directly when the question of the monasteries was debated in the International Commission. Basily and Bulwer were entrusted with the task of drawing up a report on church affairs, and the British representative at this point became the champion of the Romanian national position. His proposal was that the right of ownership of the monasteries' property be conceded to the Principalities, which would in turn surrender to the Holy Places a quarter of the revenue; or, as an alternative, the Greek clergy should give up claims on the lands in return for a fixed sum. T h e majority on the commission - France, Britain, Prussia, Sardinia, and the Habsburg Empire - accepted the Romanian argument that the property of the Dedicated Monasteries was intended principally to support local pious works and "to contribute subsidiarily to the maintenance of the convents of the Holy Places." 63 As the sole defender of the Patriarchates, Basily argued in defense of the position that the land was the absolute property of the Greek clergy and that the original documents would have to be examined to determine the status of the property in dispute. T h e disposition of these possessions was anything but a trivial question for Eastern Orthodoxy. As Basily explained in the meetings of the International Commission: The Orthodox church in all of the East has its principal resource in the Principalities. The ecclesiastical academy, the numerous schools, and the Greek and Arab press, all of the recent establishments of the patriarchate of Jerusalem, as well in Palestine as in Constantinople, the schools founded a few years ago in Alexandria, in Cairo, and in several other localities are maintained by this single revenue. The ancient patriarchal seat of Antioch, reduced to an extreme misery and having only three to four million francs of diocesan revenue, is, however, even able to maintain some schools through the revenue which it receives from its two convents in Moldavia.64 In these discussions the Porte, also tending to support the patriarchs, argued that the rights of the monasteries to the property had never been contested by the princes. It had been argued only that the institutions did not adhere to the conditions under which they had acquired their lands. Moreover, some land had been given with no obligations whatsoever attached, and other property had been purchased outright. The Ottoman position was that the question could best be handled by negotiations between the Principalities and the church, in which the Porte would take some part. 65 After examining the differing viewpoints and the report of the In-

Russia and the Romanian national state ternational Commission, the conference of Paris of August 1858 adopted a complicated formula that in practice simply postponed a settlement. Protocol 13, which was to be the basis for subsequent negotiations, stated: The interested parties shall be invited to come to an understanding among themselves by means of a compromise; in case they do not succeed in coming to an understanding in a year's time, it will be settled by means of arbitration. In case the arbiters do not succeed in coming to an understanding, they will choose an over-arbiter. If, in turn, they find it impossible to agree on the choice of this over-arbiter, the Sublime Porte will confer with the Protecting Powers for the purpose of designating one.66

The problems connected with this solution became obvious soon after the double election of Cuza, when the uncertainty regarding his position made the initiation of discussions almost impossible. Hard pressed for money, the Principalities could not be expected to overlook this obvious source of funds. In the spring of 1859 the Wallachian government announced that it intended to appropriate a quarter of the revenues of the monasteries. When Giers sought an explanation, the Wallachian secretary of state, S. Falcoianu, explained that a previous decision was being carried out. Although Wallachia had refused the settlement in 1844, the §tirbei administration had in 1855 determined to collect a quarter of the revenues. Giers, of course, protested and urged that an agreement be reached with the Greek clergy. The Russian consul personally believed that the monasteries should make some payments in order to calm public opinion in the Principalities.67 The Russian officials saw the danger of a major crisis arising that would place the question again in the hands of the powers, who could not be expected to be protective of Orthodox interests. As in previous years, the Russian government regarded this question as of major importance in its Eastern policy. On May 5/17, 1859, Gorchakov instructed Lobanov: Repeat to our agents in the Danubian Principalities the order to oppose energetically the despoiling of monastery property, an intention that is indicated in your dispatch No. 58. Prince Cuza should not venture to deviate at all from the decision contained in Protocol XIII of the conferences of Paris. Not only would he put himself in contradiction with solemnly guaranteed rights, but he would incur all the reproof of the powers, who have sanctioned the acts of Paris and of whom the great majority are today disposed to agree to his double election, [an act] that is already not in perfect accord with the thought that has prevailed in the conferences with respect to the reorganization of the Principalities.68

The official Russian position was now that the representatives of the Principalities and the Greek clergy should at once commence nego136

The Cuza era, 1859-1866 tiations. The wisdom of a voluntary contribution was also expressed. The situation became even worse in the summer when the Moldavian government levied a payment of 45,000 ducats on the monasteries. This amount, it claimed, represented the back payments due on the annual 12,500 previously received but suspended in the Vogoride administration. The levy greatly disturbed Giers, who recognized the depths of the passions that could be aroused on the issue. The action, he wrote, "which cannot be condemned enough, shows the capabilities of the irreligious sentiments of the Moldavians and the passionate partiality that they will probably bring into the discussion on the conflict relative to the property of the Greek monasteries."69 When it became obvious that the stipulations of Protocol 13 could not immediately be fulfilled, the powers at the Paris conference in September 1859 agreed to delay by another year the time allowed for a settlement by negotiation, with the new term commencing a month after Cuza received his investiture.70 The matter remained the major single question dominating Russian-Romanian relations in the next year. Balabin, by then the Russian representative in Vienna, wrote Giers that the issue was "unquestionably one of the most important that we have up for consideration and on it will depend to a great extent our relations with the government of the Principalities. No matter from what individual or from what part it comes, enmity in that question will not be forgotten." 71 Lobanov wrote in a similar vein: "This question of the monastery property rightly preoccupies our ministry which sees with regret the covetousness of the Moldo-Wallachian government and its resolutely hostile attitude toward the Orthodox clergy."72 If the Russian government was under conflicting pressures, the position of Cuza was even worse. Romanian opinion, including that of the native ecclesiastical authorities, was strongly opposed to any nonnational influences. This attitude was expressed also in the stipulations of the constitution drawn up by the Central Commission, which declared the Romanian church to be united with the ecumenical church in dogma, but independent in canonical, spiritual, and disciplinary matters. Similarly, the Greek clerics were not to administer property in the Principalities. Despite the strength of domestic opinion, Cuza was still bound by Protocol 13, which the Porte in November 1859 requested that he implement. Some disagreement occurred over where the negotiations should take place. The patriarchs chose Constantinople, but finally yielded to the preference of the Principalities for Bucharest. In January i860 a Romanian invitation was issued, asking the Patriarchates and the religious communities connected with the Dedicated Monasteries 137

Russia and the Romanian national state to choose representatives, who should bring with them the documents pertaining to their claims.73 Although the Greek delegates were named in March, those for the Principalities were not chosen until June. Moreover, no meetings were scheduled.74 Meanwhile, the governments of the Principalities continued to harass the monasteries. In July i860 the powers in a collective note asked the Porte to warn Cuza.75 Ali Pasha, transmitting the complaints, told the prince that the guarantors wished the conditions in relation to the monasteries to remain as they had been previously and wanted the meetings among the delegates to begin. The representatives of the Holy Places had written similar protests.76 Whereas the use of delaying tactics had previously been to the advantage of the Greek clergy, it was now clearly the best weapon in the hands of the governments of the Principalities. The animosity against the monasteries was particularly strong in Moldavia, where Kogalniceanu headed the ministry. Cuza met the pressure from the powers by setting dates for meetings and then postponing them. Finally, in the middle of October, the representatives of the Holy Places announced that the year allowed for negotiation had passed. Since no agreement had been made, they wished to proceed to step two, that is, to arbitration. They declared that they had the necessary documents with them and that the Principalities were violating the previous conditions regulating tax farming.77 After consulting with the powers, Ali, at the end of December i860, asked Cuza to send arbiters to Constantinople to meet with the representatives of the patriarchs.78 For the next two years the entire question of the Dedicated Monasteries continued to be a matter of endless, fruitless, diplomatic correspondence. As before, the Principalities drew out the discussions as long as possible. Throughout 1861 their major concern was the achievement of administrative and legislative unification. The endeavor of the Porte to initiate the arbitration section of Protocol 13 was, meanwhile, successfully evaded. In 1862 a similar policy was followed. At the end of the year, in November, Cuza sequestered the revenue of the monasteries and put it in the public treasury; in January 1863 the assembly attempted to include this fund in the budget. The Porte, under continual pressure from the patriarchs, tried to intervene, but with no success. Meanwhile, the government of the newly united Principalities had begun a major program of internal reform, many of whose measures directly affected the religious establishments. Most important, in March 1863, the use of the Greek language in church services was forbidden. In an effort to explain these and other actions taken against the monas138

The Cuza era, 1859-1866 teries, the government in June 1863 sent a long memorandum to the protecting powers.79 They, in turn, reacted as they had in the past. The Russian officials, concerned mainly about their Eastern interests, stood for the implementation of Protocol 13. The Ottoman government, having also an obligation to protect the interests of the Patriarchate, wished the process of negotiation to continue as provided for in the agreements. This position had the approval of Britain and the Habsburg Monarchy. In opposition, France, backed by Italy, supported the Romanian arguments that the religious question was an internal affair of the Principalities. Finally, in December 1863, the Romanian assembly cut the process of negotiation short and voted for the secularization of the lands of all of the monasteries. At the same time a payment of 51 million lei was offered as compensation to the Holy Places. The Principalities were thus determined to meet the problem alone. They had avoided negotiations and had handled the matter as a strictly internal affair. They had, of course, also once again violated international understandings. The secularization of the monasteries and the complete disregard of the wishes of the protecting powers, as might be expected, aroused deep indignation in St. Petersburg. There was, however, little that could be done. Action was hampered by the repercussions of the Polish revolt and the fact that Russia had no allies on whom it could count in Orthodox affairs. Forceful concerted moves were out of the question because of the French support of the Romanian position. The frustrations over the question of the Dedicated Monasteries, together with the anger felt over the Romanian attitude during the Polish revolt, combined to turn the Russian statesmen completely against the prince. They now wished his downfall. In a January 1864 letter to the Russian representative in London, F. I. Brunnow, concerning a reunion of the ambassadors at Constantinople to discuss the question of the Dedicated Monasteries, Gorchakov wrote that, should the representatives wish to examine, in addition to this problem, modifications to introduce in the organization of the Principalities, the two points on which from our part there would be no objections - rather the contrary - would be: a reprimand in the most severe terms of the conduct of Cuza, even if that reprimand should lead to his dethronement - revocation of the arrangement of the union of the Principalities and in this regard a return to the former status quo, that is, a hospodar for each of the two provinces.80

The desire to secure the fall of Cuza was also reflected in a letter to Karl von Knorring, the Russian representative in Vienna. Here the prince was accused of using the resources taken from the monasteries to build up the armament of the country in order to serve his "am139

Russia and the Romanian national state bitious and revolutionary views which none of the conservative powers can approve and which menace at the same time the integrity of the Ottoman Empire and the repose of the neighboring states." If his conduct led to his fall, the Russian government would certainly not oppose it. Gorchakov thought that fears, such as those held by the Porte, that Cuza would be replaced by a foreign prince were "chimerical," since no conservative power would furnish a candidate and all would oppose "an arrangement that would modify the status quo from top to bottom."81 Although the Principalities had secularized all of the monastery lands, the protecting powers were concerned only with those of the Dedicated Monasteries, since their disposition was provided for in international agreements. In the preceding pages the major role played by Russia as the intermediary between the Greek clergy and the Romanian officials has been emphasized. In this crisis, however, Russia was in fact pushed aside.82 In the negotiations Britain, in the person of the ambassador, Bulwer, became the defender of the patriarchs, a policy that was also supported by the Habsburg Monarchy and the Porte. In Eastern affairs Britain was a champion of Greek, if not necessarily Orthodox, interests. France remained the principal spokesman for the Principalities. All of the powers, of course, were now acting in an anti-Russian sense. The Orthodox institutions had been previously considered a source of Russian influence; a removal of a large part of their income would reduce their power, an advantage to French and Catholic interests. The British support was given to demonstrate to the Greekdominated hierarchy that its real friends were in London, not St. Petersburg. The policy meshed with that adopted toward independent Greece, which was a British client. Much to the indignation of the Russian embassy, the important negotiations were handled between the Patriarchate of Constantinople and the British embassy. The Russian representatives were informed only after the decisions were taken. The Russian position was thus difficult; the government did not have the military or diplomatic strength to secure its desires. The basic Russian program, however, did not differ too much from that of the majority of the powers. The question was to be handled through a conference, with Protocol 13 serving as the basis of discussion. The Russian government was realistic enough to recognize that the property would probably eventually have to be surrendered. The aim was to gain as high an indemnity as possible. For this purpose the rights of the clergy were to be defended until a satisfactory compromise could be reached. Because of its historic stand, the Russian government could 140

The Cuza era, 1859-1866 not take the initiative in suggesting major concessions on the Greek side; as Gorchakov wrote, "The representative of Russia should not speak out to impose sacrifices on the church of the East." 83 In March Gorchakov received the British suggestions for a settlement. These involved three points: first, Cuza should return the property and the revenues to an international commission named by the representatives of the protecting powers at Constantinople; second, a careful investigation should be made and the value of the property determined; and, third, the Principalities should pay an indemnity equal to the entire value of the properties seized.84 The British government was also in contact with the French, which accepted this program. The solution adopted by the powers followed the British proposals. Meeting in Constantinople in three sessions, held in May, the representatives agreed to take Protocol 13 as their point of departure. 85 Since they recognized that its provisions had not been followed and that the Romanian government had acted in violation of its obligations, they declared the secularization decree null and void. They also reprimanded the Romanian authorities for acting beyond their competence. However, having thus acted, they then proceeded to lay the basis for the acceptance of the Romanian desire to take the property in return for an indemnity. The conference agreed to establish a commission composed of representatives of the Porte and the other powers to study the question and to set the value of the property. It was to meet in Constantinople and to draw up a report that would serve as the basis for further discussions. In the meantime, the revenues of the monasteries were to be placed in a special treasury under the surveillance of the powers. Although it could not express this opinion openly before the other powers, the Russian government felt strongly that the representatives of the Holy Places should negotiate an indemnity and not persist in their negative attitude of refusing even to admit in principle that such a solution could be reached. Gorchakov wrote to Novikov that he should try to influence the Greek clergy: "The moment has come for them to see the light . . . As for the warm sympathy of the emperor, that cannot be placed in doubt, but it is clear that neither Our August Master nor any of the sovereigns represented at the conference will make war on Prince Cuza over that question."86 The Russian representatives continued thereafter, on the one hand, to urge the Greek clergy to come to terms and, on the other, to attempt to press the Romanian government into paying a much higher indemnity. Neither effort met with success. The patriarchs remained 141

Russia and the Romanian national state adamant. Their attitude was expressed in two notes to the Porte, dated September 10/22, 1864, and March 16/28, 1865. In both the religious leaders categorically declared that they would never "consent to the alienation of the property of the church, nor accept any monetary indemnity whatsoever."87 Meanwhile, the relations of the Principalities with the Patriarchates became even worse. In January 1865 the Romanian church was declared autocephalous. Although the government was willing to raise the indemnity, it would not, of course, compromise on the seizure. Although his action increased the prince's popularity at home and responded to strong domestic pressures, it weakened his position with the guarantors, who saw it as yet another flaunting of their decisions. When visiting London at the end of May, Alecsandri was struck by the strong reaction in Britain, which he blamed on the influence of Bulwer, on the question of the secularization.83 The opposition of Russia, the Porte, and the Habsburg Empire was to be expected, but even the French government, despite its outward support, was displeased. The protecting powers had meanwhile also been faced by yet another major crisis in Bucharest. T H E COUP D'ETAT OF

1864

By the beginning of 1864 Cuza had thus gained the opposition of the majority of the protecting powers. He faced a similar gathering of hostile forces in internal politics. During 1863 he had taken measures against the Liberals; Rosetti was arrested in August. The prince's opponents, consisting of both Liberals and Conservatives, sent representatives abroad to try to win support against him; the growing distrust of his government in Paris was due at least in part to their efforts. The Liberals were actively working for the deposing of Cuza and his replacement by a foreign prince. As before, Cuza found that his program of internal reform was blocked by the assembly, dominated by Conservatives. Although the question of franchise revision had been dropped while the recognition of the administrative unification was being negotiated, the prince recognized it as his first priority. Once again he chose to work through the Porte. In June 1863 he sent Costache Negri a memorandum concerning his problems in governing and his recommendations on how they could best be solved.89 He proposed a simultaneous widening of the franchise and limitation on the power of the assembly, objectives that were to be achieved through a lowering of the property qualification for voting 142

The Cuza era, 1859-1866 and the creation of an additional legislative body, a council of state, whose members would be nominated by the prince. Its function would be to draw up laws and to defend the government's policies before the assembly. To prepare for the new system the prince wished to suspend the meetings of the legislature forfiveyears, during which time he would introduce reforms and prepare a constitution. The prince's political model was the Second Empire of Napoleon III. Negri presented the Porte in the fall with a draft constitution, which included provisions not only for a council of state, but also for a senate. The protectors observed these events with growing apprehension. As before, there was little that they could do. A military intervention was impractical, and the only alternative to Cuza appeared the foreign prince that no great power wished to see ruling in Bucharest. Gorchakov instructed Offenberg to warn Cuza against further adventures. The Russian foreign minister believed that Cuza was "taking a great gamble. His faith in the doctrine of faits accomplis blinds him." Russian opinion remained as before: Cuza did not have "the right to modify on his own authority institutions invested with the mutual guarantee of the great powers."90 On this issue Russian policy coincided with that of Britain, the Porte, and Austria. Although the relations between Russia and the Principalities reached their lowest point in December, when the assembly secularized the property of the Dedicated Monasteries, this measure, which enjoyed immense domestic popularity, united all parties and factions at home. The proposal was one of a number of reforms introduced by the Kogalniceanu ministry, which had come into office in October 1863. The second major question, that of the regulation of the relationship between the peasants and the landlords, involved the protecting powers only in that reform had been mandated in the agreements, but it tore the country apart. All of the Conservatives and some of the Liberals opposed it. In the spring of 1864 this issue dominated all others. The prince and his ministers stood in opposition to the Conservative legislature. On April 13/25 the assembly voted a motion of no-confidence in the Kogalniceanu administration. In the ensuing crisis Cuza first prorogued the session until May 2/14, and then dissolved the assembly. He next, in a bloodless coup d'etat made possible by the support and approval of the army, took complete control of the government. He issued a proclamation to the country and presented it with a new constitution and electoral law. Next, following Napoleonic precedents, he held a plebiscite on a widely expanded franchise to ask for approval of his 143

Russia and the Romanian national state measures. The elections were held from May 10/22 to May 14/26; Cuza received 682,621 votes of approval and 1,307 votes of disapproval, with 70,220 abstensions. Romania was now in effect a dictatorship. Once again Cuza had unilaterally broken the treaties that determined the political organization of the Principalities; the protectors were faced with another fait accompli. In Constantinople the familiar pattern repeated itself. The French representative, Marquis Lionel de Moustier, supported the coup;91 the majority of the other powers were indignant about the repeated challenges to their authority. Ali, representing their opinion, sent a letter to the prince again asserting that he did not have the right to alter the laws established for his country by the treaties.92 Of the powers, Russia expressed the strongest reaction. The coup simply added to the resentment felt over the Polish issue and the Dedicated Monasteries. The Russian statesmen had previously recognized that some changes would have to be made in the Romanian political system; the powers of the prince did need to be strengthened. The Russian position, however, was that the basic institutions could not be altered without the prior consent of the Porte and the other powers.93 The major Russian problem continued to be the designation of a successor to the Cuza regime, should the prince's position be rendered untenable. There was always the threat of far worse alternatives. A more conservative regime was obviously impossible to obtain. If Cuza were overthrown, a foreign prince was probable, and Russia had no serious candidates. The one Orthodox name, that of the Duke of Leuchtenberg, was not likely to receive the approval of the other protectors. The candidate would, it seemed clear, be named by the Liberals, and would come from a Western European family. With so few choices, the Russian government stayed with its position of the defense of legality and the Paris convention. Nevertheless, and despite the misgivings over the replacement of Cuza, the Russian representatives were willing to take the risk. After the coup the Russian government made great efforts to induce the Porte to take a firm stand. On May 25/June 6 Gorchakov wrote to Novikov to try to influence the Ottoman ministers in this direction and to emphasize that the "dignity of the sultan can only be safeguarded by himself."94 The other powers could approve whatever measures were taken, but the initiative had to come from Constantinople. Although at first the Habsburg Monarchy also supported this view, it soon adopted another position. France, as usual, blocked unanimity. Without any chance that effective pressure could be exerted on Bucharest, the powers had little choice but to accept the new situation. 144

The Cuza era, 1859-1866 In June Cuza visited Constantinople. It had been agreed that he would come to an understanding with the Porte, which would then submit the results of the discussions for the approval of the other powers. During his stay in Constantinople, Cuza was obviously under the patronage of France. He completely ignored the Russian embassy and did not even make a courtesy visit. Novikov was not a participant in the negotiations, which were, in fact, kept secret from him. The final agreement was based on a paper drawn up by Bulwer, which was agreed to by Prokesch and the Porte.95 The project, which was communicated to the ambassadors in a conference held on June 16/28, 1864, gave Cuza the concessions he wanted on the reorganization of the government and the franchise. The powers' acceptance of the coup was a victory not only for the prince personally, but also for Romanian national interests. As we have seen, the protecting powers had hitherto asserted their rights to determine the internal organization of the Principalities and to interfere constantly in their domestic affairs. In the new agreement, entitled "Additional Act to the Convention of 1859," they in effect recognized the futility of further efforts in this direction, but in an oblique fashion. The preamble stated that although "the United Principalities may henceforth modify or change the laws that regulate their internal administration" without outside intervention, they could nevertheless not alter their relations with the Porte or the treaties existing between the Ottoman Empire and the other powers, whose terms were also obligatory for the Principalities.96 Despite Russia's extreme aversion to the course of events in the Principalities, the government had no alternative but to consent to the settlement. In a dispatch to Knorring, Gorchakov expressed the opinion that the main repercussions would be felt by the Porte and that Russia could not concern itself about "the dignity of the sultan more than his ministers themselves have shown." The example of Cuza was bound to have an effect on the other Orthodox nationalities, which would not, however, be harmful to Russia. In a revealing commentary on Russian Balkan policy, Gorchakov continued: One does not escape one's destiny, it is said. If the Porte blinds itself to what

is coming, the interests of Russia, capably managed, will not have to suffer from the realization of that future which is more or less indicated. We have not encouraged nor do we encourage the attempts at emancipation of the Christian populations under Ottoman domination.

Nevertheless, if the other Balkan people followed the Romanian path, Russia could benefit by the traditional links with the region: 145

Russia and the Romanian national state The confederation of emancipated Christian populations is a thought of Emperor Nicholas. If the Porte favors it by the course that it has adopted, we have only to see that it develops on patriarchal bases corresponding to the primitive nature of these people and to the exclusion as far as possible of the democratic and revolutionary inspiration of the West.97 Such an occurrence would not be provoked or accelerated by Russia, which had, however, no reason to fear it. In 1864, while these events were taking place in the Principalities, the great powers were far more concerned about other disturbances in international relations, in particular the crisis over Schleswig-Holstein and the subsequent Prussian-Austrian war against Denmark. None of the governments wanted another Eastern crisis. Despite the many grievances against the prince, Gorchakov in August 1864 instructed Offenberg not to repulse any advances that the prince might make; Cuza should not be led to believe that he had burned "his vessels irrevocably" in regard to Russia.98 His attitude on the question of the Dedicated Monasteries would, nevertheless, remain the touchstone of the relationship. T H E OVERTHROW O F C U Z A

The prince had reached the high point of his career. He had successfully defied the powers, broken international agreements, and seized dictatorial powers. In internal affairs he was free to carry through the reforms that he believed necessary. His greatest accomplishment was the passage of the Agrarian Law of August 1864, which regulated the relationship of the peasants and the landlords. This settlement, which was similar to the peasant reform in Russia in the same period, caused no international repercussions and is therefore not discussed here, despite its tremendous importance in Romanian history. The changes were not revolutionary in any sense that could cause alarm in St. Petersburg. During the Kogalniceanu ministry a whole series of other laws was drawn up by the State Council and introduced by decree. Of particular importance were the Law on Public Instruction and the Civil Code, both enacted in December 1864. The sweeping nature of the reforms inevitably increased the numbers of those inside the country who opposed the prince and his policies. In addition, as in the case of all radical reforms, years would be needed before the favorable effects of the changes could be felt. The period of radical readjustment, caused in particular by measures taken in association with the agrarian reforms, was bound to be difficult. Unfortunately for Cuza, the Principalities also experienced at this time a 146

The Cuza era, 1859-1866 period of very bad weather, which hurt farm production and added to the misery of life in the countryside." Problems were also caused in Romanian political life by the personal characteristics of the prince. As we have seen, he had not sought the position; he recognized the desire of his countrymen for a foreign prince. Moreover, most contemporary accounts picture him as lazy and erratic, although it is often difficult to coordinate such descriptions with his very significant achievements.100 His position was in a sense strengthened by the fact that both the double election and the union were by treaty tied to his reign. These stipulations, however, also aroused fears for the future. Should he die or be overthrown, the country would face an immediate crisis. Under the circumstances, it was natural that some should consider the establishment of a hereditary dynasty in the Cuza family. The problem here was that the prince had no legitimate heirs. He did, however, have two children with his mistress, Marie Obrenovic. In May 1865 he adopted the elder son, and later the younger. However, even if his family relationships had been satisfactory, there was so much opposition to the idea of a native prince, as well as to Cuza personally, that this alternative had little chance of success. By 1865 Cuza had won a formidable array of opponents on both the right and the left.101 On January 26/February 7 the Kogalniceanu government was replaced by a ministry headed by Constantine Bosianu; the prince thus lost the services of perhaps his most able collaborator. By the middle of 1865 the "monstrous coalition" was again active. Both Liberals and Conservatives felt hampered by the prince's absolute rule. Emissaries were sent out again to the capitals - for example, Ion Ghica went to London and Ion Bratianu to Paris - to prepare the ground for the future. The conspirators were joined by the conviction that the Principalities should have a foreign prince chosen from a Western dynasty. Of the Cuza reforms, those relating to church matters continued to arouse Russian anger. The problem of the Dedicated Monasteries had, of course, not been solved. The Russian government also did not like other legislation that weakened the ties of the Romanian church to the Patriarchate. Despite its disapproval of Cuza, the Russian representatives were in a more difficult position than their colleagues, because no alternate possibility of advantage to Russia existed should the prince be overthrown. The Liberals, the "red" party, would undoubtedly make the decisions, and French influence would increase even more. After the Polish revolt, France replaced the Habsburg Empire as the state that the Russian government regarded with the most suspicion. After the coup and with the introduction of the new political or147

Russia and the Romanian national state ganization, Offenberg remained intensely pessimistic, as is shown in his comments on the legislative bodies: The work of the two assemblies, legislative so-called, which are at present meeting in Bucharest, does not merit any mention. All that takes place in these chambers has only the worth of a monologue in which the ministry replies to itself. In spite of the parliamentary display with which the public is amused, the executive power continues to promulgate organic laws without consulting the national representation. In order to provide an occupation for the senators and deputies, they are allowed to flatter the hospodar and his government in addresses in response to the prince's message. Never perhaps have constitutional forms been parodied in a more shameless manner.

Offenberg was equally critical of Kogalniceanu and his work. Mr. Kogalniceanu takes us here by surprise every morning with some new law, or some new institution. Nothing embarrasses that regenerator on paper, he decides with equal facility the largest as well as the smallest questions . . . It is true that the greatest part of his activity consists of having the French codes and regulations translated and in applying them just as they are. 102

When Kogalniceanu left office, Offenberg was happy to see the departure of a man whose spirit was "restless and superficial" and whose character was "greedy and despotic/'103 Meanwhile, the mild and conciliatory Novikov had been replaced in Constantinople in 1864 by Nicholas Pavlovich Ignatiev, who was one of the most aggressive Russian diplomats of the century.104 Although he wished to inaugurate a more forceful policy, there was little he could do to influence the situation in the Principalities. Like those of the other powers, the Russian agents were at this time approached by representatives of the groups or individuals who wished to secure the overthrow of Cuza. Although they were in strong opposition to the prince, the Russian leaders certainly did not intend to initiate any positive actions. Their attitude was well expressed in a letter from Gorchakov to Ignatiev in June 1865: "Never will His Imperial Majesty accord anywhere protection to conspirators. Although Prince Cuza has given us several just causes for discontent, the emperor will not deviate in his regard from this invariable principle." Nevertheless, Gorchakov continued, the Russian government would welcome the formation of a party in the Principalities that would favor the principles of order supported by the Russian government and that would serve as a counterweight to the dominating influences in the Principalities. It would also be good if that party would seek the moral support of the Russian government and in "strictly confidential ways" ask Ignatiev for advice. However, "plots hatched in the dark" would not be supported: "It is 148

The Cuza era, 1859-1866 essential above all that nothing like clandestine intrigues even in appearance falsify the policy of Our August Master/'105 At the same time, Ignatiev was directed in another letter not to discourage Cuza should he seek an agreement. On the contrary, the prince should be told that a return to the correct path was assured of the "benevolence" of the Russian government, and "even a warm cooperation." The gauge of Romanian sincerity remained, of course, the treatment of the question of the Dedicated Monasteries.106 Meanwhile, the political situation in the Principalities worsened. In July 1865 Cuza, who had long suffered from asthma, among other complaints, left Romania to go to Ems for a cure. In August, during his absence, a riot was started in Bucharest by fruit and vegetable vendors who did not like a new regulation requiring them to rent booths in the market. This disturbance took on a different character when a crowd gathered and proceeded to march against government buildings. The army intervened, and about twenty people were killed. There were examples of looting and unnecessary violence by the soldiers. Cuza's enemies were able to use this incident to increase their own influence and to discredit the prince abroad. The opposition had by this time become formidable. A new secret society was formed with a directing committee composed of representatives of all political directions; it included Lascar Catargiu, Dimitrie Ghica, Ion Ghica, C. A. Rosetti, Peter Mavrogheni, Ion C. Cantacuzino, D. A. Sturdza, and N. Blaremberg. In November Ion Bratianu left for Paris, where he laid the basis for the overthrow of the prince.107 This group was now painting Cuza as the tool of Russia, an attitude that was reinforced by the reports of the French agent in Bucharest, J. H. Tillos, who had a similar erroneous opinion. The August incident not only delivered ammunition into the hands of Cuza's enemies, but also led to international repercussions. In September Fuad, at this time foreign minister, wrote the prince a letter on the riot and criticized the use of force.108 Cuza on October 29 / November 10 sent a strong reply.109 Although nothing came of this exchange, the prince was well aware of his weakening situation. There were also numerous signs that he had lost the sympathies of France. At the beginning of October he wrote to Napoleon offering to resign should the French emperor wish it. He had never wanted the throne, he insisted, and he would willingly return to private life. He would accept any arrangement Napoleon indicated.110 In his speech opening the assembly in December 1865 he expressed the same sentiments, declaring that he would never allow his "person to be an obstacle to any 149

Russia and the Romanian national state event which would permit the consolidating of the political edifice of which I have contributed to lay the foundation."111 By the first months of 1866 Cuza had not only an unstable internal situation, but also no strong personal support abroad. All of the protecting powers favored his maintenance only because they dreaded another Eastern crisis. Relations between the Principalities and Russia showed a decided upswing at the end of 1865; there were even some improvements in the religious controversies. As in his previous instructions, Gorchakov directed his agents not to discourage any advances from the prince, although the Russian foreign minister felt no great confidence in any assurances the prince might give. The Russian attitude was expressed by Gorchakov in October 1865: "We do not work for the fall of Prince Cuza, but we have no interest in cooperating for his conservation. If Cuza seriously mends his ways, so much the better, but I doubt if that improvement will go beyond an obvious maneuver."112 The Russian agents were also aware of the conspiracies being organized against the prince. Offenberg, for instance, reported on December 31/January 12: The secret organization of the party of action has made notable progress recently as much in Wallachia as in Moldavia. It includes today all of the honorable and patriotic elements of the youth, alongside of many intriguers and a great number of revolutionaries by profession and vocation. They hope to be able to undertake something decisive in the spring, but I continue to believe, my prince, that the government has less to fear from these plots than from the misery and discontent of the agricultural classes.113

Should Cuza fall, the Russian government was prepared to call for the separation of the Principalities. Gorchakov hoped to have British support, but he felt that he could not count on the Porte. "It is difficult," he commented, "to lay any kind of plans when one is faced with a government as fearful as that established on the shores of the Bosphorus." lu The hesitations felt in St. Petersburg about supporting the Ottoman Empire against a Christian state had obviously weakened. Until 1866 Cuza had maintained himself in power because he was able to retain a sufficient number of supporters, and, most important, he kept the loyalty of the army. In the winter of 1856-1866 the major factions and politicians joined against him, and they won to their side some officers, in particular Colonel Nicholas Haralambie. On the night of February 11 /23 the conspirators acted. Cuza was forced to resign, and a provisional government representing all of the groups was formed. A regency was named, and a government led by Ion Ghica was set up. The overthrow of the prince, a matter long discussed in diplomatic circles, was thus brought about as a result of an internal conspiracy. There was 150

The Cuza era, 1859-1866 no foreign involvement. As far as the Russian government was concerned, the time was inopportune: Russia still held some hope that Cuza would change his policy and even establish a Conservative government.115 After the abdication members of the consular corps were able to visit Cuza. Offenberg reported that he was "very calm and resigned, deploring only the part that the national army, created by him, had taken in the last events." Far from protesting against his overthrow, he accepted fully and freely all the consequences, and he assured Offenberg that he had always had the appointment of a foreign prince as his goal. He would not regret his fate if it contributed to the consolidation of the nation. He subsequently left for Transylvania.116 The Cuza period, which had thus come to an end, was not a time of great success for Russian diplomacy. Russia had accepted the double election, but had expressed severe doubts about the administrative and legislative union. In two questions, those of assistance to revolutionary conspiracies and of the sequestration of monastery lands, the Romanian government had persisted in following policies that harmed major Russian interests. A great handicap under which the Russian agents worked had been the fact that they had no party with which they could act in the Principalities, nor did they have political leaders closely attached to them who would defend their policies. Cuza and the Liberals looked to France. Although Russia supported the Conservatives, this group not only was disunited but it certainly could never be called a Russian party in any sense of the word. The Russian government had in fact very little to offer any Romanian political group. The parties and their members all sought national advancement, that is, unity and eventual independence. They differed on their internal, not their foreign, programs. Russia could give support only to the maintenance of the status quo - not to hope for future gains. In the years after the Crimean War the Russian leaders were, of course, severely limited in what they could accomplish in foreign policy. Gorchakov gave a clear statement of the situation in a letter to Ignatiev in March 1866, after the fall of Cuza: Our internal situation, the great reforms in the process of execution, impose

upon us the duty of reducing to the least possible extent our action abroad and of avoiding all that can interfere with the great work that will be the glory of the reign of Our August Master and that is called upon to develop in Russia a strength which, once acquired, will give us all the alliances that we can desire.11?

Russia should not deviate from this attitude, the foreign minister continued, unless a matter of national necessity arose, like the affairs of

Russia and the Romanian national state Poland or other questions having to do with the honor or integrity of the country. The policy of retrenchment had, of course, made necessary an entente with France. Russia could not stand alone in a period of internal upheaval. However, France's sponsorship of national movements brought real dangers in the Polish question and embarrassment in the Balkans. Although support had traditionally been given to the Balkan Christians, the Russian government was not in a position in the 1860s to give strong backing to any fundamental changes in their status. Moreover, as far as Romania was concerned, the Russian leaders disliked the formation on their borders of a strong Orthodox national unit that looked to Paris rather than St. Petersburg. These feelings became even stronger when after 1863 the French entente broke. Then the course of Romanian national development under the leadership of Cuza appeared to pose threats to Russian interests in the East. From a Romanian national point of view, the reign of Cuza was a period of triumphs. With the recognition of the union and the double election the foundations for the modern state were laid. Despite his continual problems in domestic politics, Cuza's leadership in foreign affairs was excellent. He achieved the Romanian goals by the only means possible for a weak and dependent state - by the use of the fait accompli and by manipulating the divisions among the protecting powers. As long as they remained divided, an outside military intervention was impossible, and only such an action could have reversed the process of national consolidation. Although at the end of the prince's reign the state was still formally designated the "United Principalities," a Romania in fact existed after 1861.

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CHAPTER IV

Prince Charles, 1866-1871

T H E PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT

After the successful coup the conspirators established a government whose composition reflected the interests of those associated with the revolt. Replacing the prince as the executive power were three regents, General Nicholas Golescu, Colonel Nicholas Haralambie, and Lascar Catargiu. Ion Ghica, as premier and foreign minister, headed a ministry that included both Liberals and Conservatives, with, among others, Dimitrie Ghica as minister of interior, Ion C. Cantacuzino as minister of justice, Peter Mavrogheni as minister of finance, C. A. Rosetti as minister of education and religious institutions, and Major Dimitrie Lecca as minister of war. The assembly that had been chosen after Cuza's coup remained in place and was now called upon to ratify the choice of the foreign prince named by the revolutionary leaders - Philip of Flanders. This candidate, the brother of the king of Belgium, had not been previously consulted on his selection, and he refused the office. The principal task of the new government then became to find another candidate as soon as possible. As long as the uncertainty existed, the country was in a precarious political situation. Moreover, the internal economic conditions were very bad. The state had a debt of twenty-one million lei. Until a stable regime could be established, this situation could not be adequately dealt with. The ouster of Cuza was accompanied by a repudiation of many of the changes he had made in the political structure of the state. A new constitution was thus necessary, and the drafting of such a document was commenced in February under the direction of Rosetti. In March it was 153

Russia and the Romanian national state presented to the ministry, but it was not considered by the legislature until June. In the meantime, new elections had to be held. On March 18/30 the chamber was dissolved, and the voting was held in April. Although its task was clear, this chamber was not called a constituent assembly. In all these questions, it will be noted, the provisional government acted as if it were not subject to the supervision of the Porte or the protectors. The new leaders strongly maintained that the choice of a prince and the reorganization of the government were matters of internal concern only and not subject to outside intervention. The great powers, of course, had other views. The overthrow of Cuza, in fact, brought into force sections of the Treaty of Paris of 1856, the conventions of August 1858 and September 1859, and the firman of December 1861. Although the European governments did not receive a direct forewarning of the coup, they all knew that the situation in the Principalities was extremely unstable.1 After the event the immediate reaction was toward cooperation on the basis of treaties to see that the procedure laid out previously was followed; no attempt was made to restore the prince.2 It was generally felt that his ouster was the result of his own mistakes. Immediately after the coup became known, Ali called for the convoking of a conference of the guaranteeing states at Constantinople, and he sought the assurance that the terms of the understandings of 1858, 1859, and 1861 would be applied. The agreement on union had been only for the reign of Cuza; the Porte wanted separate elections held in the two principalities. It also wished to send Ottoman commissioners to supervise the situation. Hints were dropped that the best guarantee of tranquility would be an Ottoman occupation.3 Observing the revolution from the Romanian capital, Offenberg commented that the events taking place had more of a carnival than a revolutionary character. Nevertheless, the usual Russian fears occasioned by political changes in the Principalities were again aroused. The consul was concerned over anarchical conditions and the possibility of "excesses," such as the election of a foreign prince or a declaration of independence should there be no intervention from the outside. He recognized that the nomination of a foreign prince would not be to the Russian advantage, since his chief support would rest on states whose policies were inimical to Russia. The time was not right for this change. At first Offenberg supported the idea of an Ottoman intervention, but he soon changed his mind.4 Gorchakov's reaction was complicated. On February 14/26 he sent instructions to Offenberg to maintain an "absolute reserve," but to 154

Prince Charles, 1866-1871 keep his government informed of any changes.5 Gorchakov then turned his attention to Constantinople and, as in 1864, attempted to persuade the Porte to take actions in the Russian interest. In its negotiations with the other powers the Russian government ostentatiously supported the Porte. It was announced, for example, that the opinion of the Porte would be sought before Russia accepted the French suggestion of the convocation of a conference at Paris.6 Since the Ottoman reply was long delayed, the Russian government could also put off any decisions. No disapproval was expressed to the Ottoman desire to send a commissioner, who would, according to the stipulations of the treaties, be accompanied by delegates of the other powers. The Russian minister's real intentions were made clear in a letter to Ignatiev. Russia, Gorchakov wrote, did not intend to act directly in the Principalities; Offenberg had been instructed to remain quiet. Russian desires were to be secured instead through the instrumentality of the Porte. Ignatiev was instructed to urge the Ottoman leaders to take a strong stand and to strengthen their character and courage, but he was not to apply direct pressure toward this goal. The ambassador, Gorchakov suggested, could approach the matter indirectly, for instance, by suggesting ideas that might have occurred to him had he by "accident of birth" been called into "the councils of the sultan." It was clear, the letter continued, that the majority in the Principalities - in fact, it was perhaps a unanimous opinion - favored a foreign prince. It would, however, be very difficult to find a suitable candidate from an acceptable dynasty who would consent to be a vassal of the sultan. Should the Romanian people be convinced that a foreign prince was not a practical idea, the Russian minister believed, they would return to the idea of separation. Gorchakov, like most Russians in official life, was convinced that this move would find support, particularly in Moldavia. The Ottoman government was in the best position to act in this direction. Its attitude was clear; it had accepted union only for the reign of Cuza. A return to the former political conditions could be supported. The Porte could also use any disillusionment with the impossibility of finding an acceptable foreign prince "in order to incite the separatist dispositions that exist already in these localities," and if the Ottoman government had the competency, it could "lead the populations to declare themselves for separation." The basis of the French arguments for union was that it was the desire of the Romanian people; should this be shown to be otherwise, then the powers would not support it. Britain, Gorchakov recognized, would stand with France. The impossibility of a return to Cuza was accepted.7 Ignatiev was instructed not to state the Russian views openly or to 155

Russia and the Romanian national state take any formal initiatives. Instead he was to argue for them indirectly in conversations with Ottoman leaders. He could express as a personal opinion the suggestion that a demarche of the Porte to the powers in the sense outlined would be a good idea. Gorchakov also made it clear that the opinions expressed in his letter were supported by the tsar. The difficulty of this backdoor approach was recognized. On February 15/ 27 Gorchakov wrote to Pavel Petrovich Oubril, the Russian representative in Berlin, that the task was delicate.8 The Russian position was based on an apparently strong conviction that real sentiments for separation existed. The reports of Offenberg and the Russian consul in Jassy strengthened this opinion. Gorchakov had strong family ties with just that element in Moldavia which most disliked union. As he wrote to Count Ernest Stackelberg, the Russian ambassador in Vienna: "We have reason to believe that if pressure is not exerted on Moldavia, such as the sending of troops that the provisional government has directed there . . . Moldavia would return voluntarily to the former order of things."9 Gorchakov, as we have seen, admitted that the first wish was for union with a foreign prince; it was thus important that this alternative be excluded. Any armed intervention by the provisional government in Moldavia in support of union also had to be blocked. Since direct Russian intervention in the affairs of the Principalities would cause severe international complications, Gorchakov throughout the next weeks continued to seek to use the Ottoman government as his instrument. In another letter to Ignatiev he again urged that the Porte be encouraged to take a strong stand: "One cannot support a man who gives up himself." He did not like the fact that the conference would be held in Paris because he regarded Safvet, who as the ambassador there would be the Ottoman delegate, as weak. He was also not above encouraging positive Ottoman action in the Principalities to secure a vote against union. It was important, he emphasized, that the other powers see that separation was the desire of the people; and it "remains to be known if the Porte has enough ability and credit to obtain a local vote in favor of separation. It seems to me that the attempt should be made or at least the Porte should take this endeavor into its calculations."10 A further statement of Gorchakov's conviction of the importance of encouraging a separatist movement is contained in his letter to Ignatiev of February 24/March 8. The instructions that I addressed to you previously by order of the emperor will have made known to you the value that is attached to a separatist movement declaring itself in the Principalities. It is the best argument to oppose 156

Prince Charles, i866-i8yi to the doctrines supported by France. I have told you that the Porte should show here all its ability. We reserve for you to give our agents in Bucharest and Jassy secret directions that they should follow with prudence. We have touched on this question in our confidential instructions to Baron Budberg. Our consuls should watch with the greatest vigilance the intrigues of the provisional government having for their object the exercise of pressure on the separatist dispositions in Moldavia and even, if there are any, in Wallachia. They should give us an account in the greatest detail, in order that from our side we can make use of it.11 Although separation was strongly desired, Gorchakov did not want the Russian consulates to act in an open, blatant manner. Offenberg was instructed to limit his activities to three tasks: he was to see that the provisional government did not do more than assure public order; he was to make certain that no pressure was exerted on those who wanted separation; and he was also to "encourage discreetly" the separatists, or at least let them know that care was being taken that "their convictions were not done violence to." All of these actions were to be carried through with caution. Here you will find yourself on a very delicate ground that will require all your tact and above all your prudence. We desire separation, because it is most in conformity with our interests and we believe it also most favorable to those of the Principalities. But we would follow a false path if we set ourselves up as propagandists. Such an attitude, if it became obvious, would immediately bring forward the action of contrary opinion abroad. - We should avoid local contests.12 Although at this time the Russian government was supporting a program directly opposed to Romanian national desires, the former paternal attitude was maintained and the "people" were regarded as apart from the "government." A ministerial instruction of February 23/March 7 stated: Certainly, the hostile attitude of the Romanian government toward us and toward the church of the East should give us the right to withdraw from it the benevolent protection that we have at all times shown it. Nevertheless, the emperor does not consider the populations of Moldavia and Wallachia responsible for the errors of the government that they have just overthrown. Besides, we are not able to forget that it is a question here of a principle that includes the entire body of the Christian populations of the East to whom our traditions have always made us sympathetic.13 The Russian policy was thus set. In the negotiations with the powers the representatives were to support legality; the terms of the treaties calling for the separation of the Principalities were to be followed. The argument was to be used that such a course of action conformed to the wishes of the Romanian people. The powers, moreover, should

Russia and the Romanian national state exclude the possibility of a foreign prince. Once this alternative was removed, it was believed that the Romanians, if consulted, would vote against union. In the negotiations, however, the Russian government would not lead in the insistence on the enforcement of the treaties. The Porte was to take a firm stand and require the maintenance of its rights. Although well expressing Russian interests, this program had certain grave weaknesses that soon became apparent. Most obvious was the mistaken belief that there was a strong undercurrent of support for a division of the state should a foreign prince be excluded. Even worse, perhaps, was the attempt to rely on the Porte. Russia certainly could not stand openly as the champion of the Ottoman government in its relations with its Christian subjects, but the Porte fully realized how futile previous protests had been. Without a right of military intervention, which the guarantors would not grant, there was not much that could be done. Fuad told Ignatiev that his government was not concerned as much about losing the Principalities as about the principle of the integrity of the empire. Once the idea of national separation crossed the Danube, the radical solution of the Eastern Question would follow, to the benefit of France.14 Like the Russian, the Ottoman officials were particularly eager to avoid the choice of a foreign prince. Ali even told Ignatiev that he would prefer the annexation of the provinces by one of the conservative powers, because otherwise the other Christian people would be encouraged.15 The annulment of the union was recognized as very difficult. If they had to retreat, the Ottoman leaders were willing to accept another native prince, perhaps Ion Ghica.16 Another major flaw in the Russian, which was also the Ottoman, position was the lack of strong supporters or a party through which the Russian diplomats could work. The overthrow of Cuza had been accomplished by a coalition of the active and energetic forces in the Principalities; they remained in control of the provisional government. Cuza had accepted his abdication. There was no organized group of aggrieved politicians. Moreover, the Russian government did not even have possible friendly candidates for the position of prince, either for a united country or for separate principalities. France had such a man in Prince Bibescu.17 Other names that were being discussed, such as Ion Ghica and Gregory Sturdza, had been hostile to Russian policies at times in the past.18 Meanwhile, the Russian government prepared for the meeting of the guarantors. Despite the Ottoman and Russian desire for a conference in Constantinople, most powers agreed that Paris, where a meeting had already been called to ratify an act concerning the European Commission of the Danube, was a preferable site. Although Russian consent

Prince Charles, 1866-1871 was given, the choice of Paris brought up another difficulty for Gorchakov, because Budberg would be the representative at the conference. At the time that the decision was taken, Budberg was in St. Petersburg. In strong disagreement with Gorchakov on policy both toward France and toward the Principalities, he wished to draw up his own instructions for the meeting. In contrast to his superior, he favored cooperation with France and support of union. Gorchakov, it was reported, threatened to resign over the issue.19 Although the foreign minister gained his way, Russia was represented by a delegate who did not really approve of the policy of his government and who was bound to be less than enthusiastic in presenting the official position. The instructions that Budberg received were similar to those expressed in the letters to Ignatiev, but in some respects weaker. Again the Russian desire to secure a return to 1858 was stated, but the ambassador was cautioned not to take a firm stand. The strong position was to be assumed by the Ottoman delegate; Budberg was simply to offer support. Should the Ottoman representative retreat, the Russian conditions would be similarly modified. Although the tsar wished a separation of the Principalities and believed that this step conformed to the Romanian wishes, Budberg was to take no initiative in this regard; the Russians should not "give the appearance of ardently desiring such a solution." He was to support the principle of the return to the convention of 1858; the Porte could be expected to demand its application. However, should the idea of union prevail and "the opposition of the Porte weaken before the pressure of the cabinets," then Budberg should also shift his position. Should the question of consulting the wishes of the population arise, the ambassador was to agree but to insist that these be expressed without outside pressure. Should the question of union come to the point of decision, Budberg was to refer back to St. Petersburg. Russia also was not going to suggest a candidate to replace Cuza. The instruction did not directly deal with the question of the foreign prince.20 In this crisis, as previously, it will be noted that the Russian government made a great effort to avoid openly opposing the national demands of a Balkan Orthodox people. The separation was justified on the grounds that it was the true wish of the Romanian people as well as the legal condition based on the treaties. Russia was willing to support strong Ottoman decisions and measures, but not to initiate them alone. The instruction cautioned Budberg to express himself with circumspection, particularly since Russia found itself on the side of the suzerain power and opposed to the Romanians. It appeared that the Western courts were now acting as their defenders even at the risk of 159

Russia and the Romanian national state injuring the Porte, which they had previously supported. This position, which was not in the Russian interest, perhaps explained the tolerance of these governments for the Principalities. Budberg was thus, the instructions cautioned, to be very prudent in his language: We support the maintenance of treaties, because they exist and they are for the Principalities themselves a guarantee of security; but, if deviations from these treaties are admitted by the powers and should they conform to the real and legally verified wishes of the populations, it is not fitting for us to place an obstacle to them; our task would be, on the contrary, to extend this precedent to all the Christian nationalities of the East.21

The policy of the Russian government, thus clearly stated, not only conformed to that of the Ottoman Empire, but should also have won the approval of Austria and Britain, two powers that supported Ottoman integrity and that had not been strong partisans of union in the past. However, once again Romanian events were to be decisively influenced by parallel crises in other parts of Europe. The Austro-Prussian quarrel over Schleswig-Holstein and the discussions over the fate of Venetia were of more concern to the powers than the Romanian question. Moreover, the general European situation had placed France again in a pivotal position in diplomatic affairs. Austria, Prussia, Italy, and Britain all sought its support, and it exerted great influence in Constantinople. French official policy remained at this time in line with the traditional support of union and a foreign prince. Nevertheless, since France, like the other powers, considered Romanian issues as of secondary importance, its government was willing to sacrifice the concept of a foreign prince in order to maintain the European concert. The emphasis was thus placed on the maintenance of the union. French policy was not exactly benevolent. In March, April, and May the government was again involved in discussions concerning the possibility of using the Principalities as compensation to Austria for the surrender of Venetia. Thus, despite the strong words expressed in support of Romanian national aims, Napoleon III was willing to hand over the country to the Habsburg Monarchy. Whereas French aims appeared defined, British policy under the leadership of Lord Clarendon was weak and contradictory. The government was caught among conflicting desires: maintaining the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, abiding by treaty stipulations, and following the wishes of the Romanians. It was also felt that the powers should not use force to carry through their decisions. Paramount in British calculations was the attitude of France. Britain wished to maintain a close understanding with France in European and Mediterranean affairs. As will 160

Prince Charles, 1866-18J1 be seen, the British government eventually met its dilemma over Romanian affairs by simply following, although with protests, the French direction. The most difficult decisions were made in Vienna. As we have seen, in previous crises Austria had stood strongly for the maintenance of Ottoman rights and for the separation of the Principalities. Unlike the Western powers, the monarchy had a direct interest in blocking Romanian national gains. Logically, the government should have cooperated with the Porte and Russia, with the aim of securing a return to the conditions of 1858. However, in view of its strained relations with Prussia and Italy, Austria could not afford to break with France. Openly and officially the Austrian government thus had to associate itself with the power whose friendship was needed in German affairs. It was recognized that not only union but perhaps independence might have to be accepted. Even the appointment of a foreign prince could be approved as long as the candidate was not from the family of an enemy power, for instance, the house of Savoy.22 Although the Habsburg first concern was relations with Paris, the monarchy could not afford to antagonize the Russian government too greatly. Moreover, the Russian stand reflected the basic Habsburg interest. Indirect actions, such as encouraging Russia to support Ottoman resistance to union, could be taken. The Habsburg government apparently also shared the Russian belief that a really free election would bring a vote for separation. The reaction of the other two protecting powers, Italy and Prussia, was strictly self-serving. Openly, Italy supported Romanian national aims; privately, negotiations for the exchange of the Principalities for Venetia were actively promoted. The Prussian position was directly tied to the German question; the Prussian minister-president, Otto von Bismarck, was eventually to find the Romanian problem a welcome diversion and another card in his complicated game. At first, it is interesting to note, all of the major powers shared the common belief that the Romanian search for a foreign prince would fail because no member of a suitable family would accept the position. The states were also unanimous in their support in principle of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire and their opposition to Romanian independence. They all wanted to avoid an Eastern crisis at a moment when hostilities threatened to break out in Central Europe. Similarly, they approved of the concept of consulting the wishes of the Romanian population, because each government was convinced that a free election would produce an expression of its own desires. Between February 26/March 10 and May 23/June 4 the conference 161

Russia and the Romanian national state met in ten sessions in Paris. The president was the French foreign minister, Edouard Drouyn de Lluys. Britain was represented by Cowley, Austria by Richard Metternich, Prussia by Count Robert von der Goltz, Italy by Constantine Nigra, the Ottoman Empire by Safvet Pasha, and, of course, Russia by Budberg. In these meetings the contradictory positions of the guaranteeing powers soon became obvious. The first meeting was largely formal in character.23 Budberg had not yet returned from St. Petersburg. Although his second in the embassy, Chicherin, attended, serious negotiations were delayed, on Russian insistence, until the arrival of the ambassador.24 Safvet, however, did state the Ottoman position: the conference should be based on the treaties, and the question of a foreign prince should not be discussed. The representatives all agreed that identical telegrams should be dispatched to the consuls in Bucharest, instructing them to inform the provisional government that its responsibility was principally to maintain order; no measures were to be taken that would exceed its powers or prejudice the decisions of the conference. The Romanian government was thus expected to wait patiently until the conference should transmit its decisions on the future political organization of the Principalities. At the second meeting, held on March 6/18, Budberg stated the Russian position: the rules of 1858 were to apply on the vacancy in the hospodarship.25 The problems to be met in this regard were then discussed. Since 1858 not only had a single prince been elected for both principalities, but the administrations had been merged. The problem of disengaging the political institutions of the country was recognized as great. The representatives then proceeded to discuss the question of union. Budberg expressed the Russian opinion that the Romanians should have the opportunity to give their views on the subject; Russia, he declared, was convinced that the majority of Moldavians wanted their own government. They would agree to union with a foreign prince, but that was not acceptable. He wished a separate vote taken in Moldavia and Wallachia for assemblies that would choose two rulers. At the end of this meeting the representatives agreed that they would have to consult their governments before proceeding further. Meanwhile, a Romanian delegation consisting of Falcoianu and Bratianu had arrived in Paris, but the two were denied admission to the conference. The French government, however, agreed to their submission of a memorandum stating the viewpoint of the provisional government. Ion Balaceanu was at this time the official Romanian agent in Paris. Through the delegation and the agency, the government in Bucharest received full information on the actions of the powers, although the meetings of the conference were in theory secret.26 162

Prince Charles, 1866-18J1 Again in the meeting of March 19/31 the representatives failed to take any definite action.27 Budberg announced that his instructions had not arrived, so no decisions could be taken. Cowley quite correctly brought up the fact that the powers had to take action soon because of the conditions in the Principalities. Nevertheless, the discussions consisted primarily of restatements of each government's position. Budberg repeated that union was not the desire of the Romanian population. To prove his point he read a dispatch from the Russian consul in Jassy stating that the provisional government had sent an agent to work for union and had brought in a battery of artillery. Union was popular only with a foreign prince.28 Russia could not, Budberg declared, agree that "freedom of opinions be suppressed in Moldavia/' 29 By the session of March 23/April 4 Budberg had received further instructions.30 Again the former arguments were repeated. Russia wished two separate assemblies to be chosen; elections were to be held to determine the true wishes of the population. It was argued that the majority had wanted union in 1858, but the experience of the reign of Cuza had caused a change of attitude. The Russian position was, of course, supported by Safvet, who, in addition, wanted assurances that no foreign prince would be allowed by the guarantor states. Russian agreement was assured on this point. The opposing view was presented by France. Drouyn argued that the Principalities should make their own decisions; the powers should intervene only if there was a direct violation of treaties. The French support of union was backed unenthusiastically by Britain, whose government saw no practical way of separating the Principalities. This measure could be accomplished only by the use of force, which Britain opposed. Fears were also expressed that either a republic or independence would be declared. It was also clear that the British government would accept a foreign prince if one could be found. With this division of opinion the conference could accomplish little. The Ottoman Empire and Russia stood together in favor of positive action, but neither power was willing to risk separating itself from the majority and acting alone. Since a common program could not be adopted, the powers could do nothing. They agreed that the responsibility would be placed on the provisional government and that they would wait to see what happened in Bucharest. The consuls there were instructed to warn the new government not to break the treaties and not to change the basic relationship with the Porte. The conference then adjourned; there was agreement only on the general principle of Ottoman integrity. The conference would wait and only later examine and pass judgment on the actions of the Romanian government. A new 163

Russia and the Romanian national state session could be held if necessary on the request of any of the members. Gorchakov, as might be expected, was highly displeased with the results of the conference and with the attitude of the powers. He was particularly concerned that a clear position had not been taken on the issue of a foreign prince. Since he recognized that this was the first wish of the Principalities, he wanted this possibility clearly eliminated before any sort of a vote was taken. Budberg was now sent instructions in this sense. Gorchakov wanted the powers to make a categorical declaration on the question and to destroy unrealizable Romanian illusions. He also did not want the existing chambers, which had been appointed by Cuza, to make the decisions. He would not accept "a bastard union extorted by terror or falsehood by vote of deputies without a regular mandate/' 31 In a conversation at this time with Count Frederick Revertera, the Habsburg representative in St. Petersburg, Gorchakov expressed what was undoubtedly a true Russian view of the situation in the Principalities and the source of his exasperation: The Principalities are the work of Russia, who made them by her battles and by her treaties with Turkey. She has endowed them with institutions better than those that were substituted afterward. And if the collective protectorate of Europe had not come to take the place of that of Russia, tranquility would reign there still, and Europe would have one embarrassment less on its hands.32

While the powers thus debated futilely in Paris, changes proceeded in the Principalities. Two important events greatly affected the Russian position: first, the provisional government found the candidate it needed for the vacant throne, and second, a separatist uprising occurred in Jassy. Of the two events, the first was, of course, of far greater significance. As we have seen, the powers had acted on the assumption that a suitable prince could not be found. T H E ACCESSION OF A FOREIGN PRINCE

Who first suggested the name of Charles of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen is not clear.33 Most contemporary observers believed that he was the French choice, but Napoleon III later categorically denied it. Nevertheless, Napoleon knew of the negotiations; Drouyn gave the impression that he approved.34 The candidature probably resulted from the combined efforts of Hortense Cornu, a close friend of Napoleon and of the Sigmaringen family, and of Ion Bratianu, who recognized the immediate need of his country for a prince. With the refusal of Philip, the provisional government showed itself willing and eager to take any candidate suggested by France. Napoleon, who at the time felt that his 164

Prince Charles, 1866-1871 interests were best served by cooperation with the powers, declined to name a candidate officially. He was also still involved in the negotiations that would have made the Principalities an object of compensation for Austria. There were, in fact, few available princes; the Romanian government needed a candidate at once. Charles had from the beginning been considered along with other German princes. He had certain outstanding advantages. Not only was he a member of the Catholic south German branch of the Hohenzollern family, but his maternal grandmother was Stephanie de Beauharnais, the adopted daughter of the first Napoleon. His other grandmother was from the Murat family. He thus had ties with both the Prussian king and the French emperor. His age, twentyfive, was also suitable. On March 18/30 Bratianu traveled to Diisseldorf to meet with Charles and his father, Karl Anton. The Romanian agent proposed that Charles take the throne and claimed that he spoke with the approval of Napoleon III. Charles, although he showed himself eager for the position, replied that he could not accept without the permission of the Prussian king, William. The prince did not consider the fact that he would be an Ottoman vassal a hindrance to his acceptance. He regarded the tie with the Porte as a protection until the state could stand alone; then the connection could be broken. Despite the fact that he had not received a clear acceptance, Bratianu telegraphed Bucharest on March 20/April 1: "Charles of Hohenzollern accepts the crown without conditions. He has been immediately put in touch with Napoleon III." 35 Balaceanu, at this time the Romanian agent in Paris, similarly informed his government that Charles had accepted without conditions. Bratianu then returned to Bucharest to assist in the preparations for a plebiscite that was to be held between April 2/14 and 8/20.

The candidacy of Charles raised serious misgivings in the Prussian government, particularly on the part of the king. It had been a strength of the Prussian position, especially in regard to Russia, that the state had no interests in the Eastern Question. In his conversations and letters on the subject William showed extreme hesitancy, fearing the reaction of the powers. Should the conference accept the idea of a foreign prince, the matter would be different, but the king felt bound by his participation in the cooperative European action. The crown prince, Frederick, and Bismarck were more encouraging. Largely concerned with the German question, Bismarck was primarily interested in seeing if the candidacy could be used to advance the Prussian cause. Since he placed a first emphasis on relations with St. Petersburg, he had 165

Russia and the Romanian national state to pay close attention to the Russian views. Nevertheless, his advice, always given as a "personal opinion," tended to become increasingly optimistic. During this period Charles and his father both tried repeatedly, but without success, to obtain an open French reaction. Meanwhile, the plebiscite was held in the Principalities. On April 4/16, before the vote was in fact concluded, Bratianu telegraphed to Karl Anton: "Five million Romanians acclaim Prince Charles as their sovereign."36 Although the results of the plebiscite did not involve such a high number, the results were impressive. In a tightly controlled election Charles received 685,696 votes out of 686,193 cast. After receiving Bratianu's telegram, Charles informed his father that he intended to accept the throne even against the will of the conference and to proceed to the Principalities.37 The problems of dealing with the Prussian king and bringing the prince to Bucharest still remained. William's reaction continued to be discouraging. However, although he did not openly agree to the candidature, he certainly did not clearly declare against it. In a letter to Karl Anton of April 2 /14 he advised the prince to wait. The king was chiefly concerned about the conference and the dangers of involvement in the Eastern Question. He also emphasized the importance of the Russian reaction and advised Karl Anton: "If you want to follow the matter therefore further, then your son must before all win the agreement of Russia."38 The most positive encouragement came from Bismarck, who had come to see the candidacy as an advantage for Prussia. In a meeting with Charles on April 7/19 he strongly urged the prince to act: "You are by a whole nation unanimously elected as prince; follow this call, go directly to the land to whose reign you are summoned."39 As far as the problem of royal approval was concerned, Bismarck advised that the prince should go without it and thus take from William's hands the necessity of making a difficult and embarrassing decision. Charles was an officer in the Prussian army. He should ask for leave from his military command; the king would understand. Neither he nor Bismarck as Prussian minister-president could give formal assent. Once Charles was in Romania the matter would be settled; the powers would protest, but do nothing further. The policy of the fait accompli was the best and most honorable means of solving the problem. Bismarck further advised Charles to pay particular attention to Russia. The prince should send the tsar a letter declaring that he saw Russia as his protector and hoped with Russia "some day to solve the Eastern Question."40 The idea of a Romanov marriage was also to be considered. Bismarck regarded the Russian reaction as of first importance. Before making his final decision, Charles saw William again. The king 166

Prince Charles, 1866-1871 not only wished Charles to wait, but expressed the opinion that it was unworthy of a Prussian prince to be the subject of the sultan. Charles replied that he would take the position only with the intention of winning "full independence on the battlefield for the land that had today elected him."41 Finally, on April 25/May 7, Charles informed Bratianu that he would accept the throne.42 He then made preparations to leave. The only practical route to the Principalities was through the Habsburg Empire, but because both the Prussian and Austrian armies were in the process of mobilization, utmost secrecy had to be observed. As a Prussian officer, Charles could be detained by the Habsburg authorities. His adventurous trip commenced in Switzerland, where he picked up a false passport. Traveling under an assumed name and with elaborate preparations to avoid identification, he finally reached Turnu Severin on May 8/20. He arrived in Bucharest on May 10/22. After the arrival of the prince a new ministry was formed and the provisional government formally came to an end. Lascar Catargiu became prime minister, with Peter Mavrogheni as foreign minister. During the trip Charles prepared letters to Franz Joseph, Sultan Abdul Aziz, and Alexander II. In the message to the Habsburg monarch, he declared that he held no hostile intentions toward Austria and that he hoped for future friendly relations. The letter to the tsar similarly called for friendship and a continuation of the "entente that has existed for such a long time between the two peoples, and in the shade of which Romania has grown greater/' 43 Charles arrived in his new capital at a time of crisis, involving great apprehension over the reaction of the neighboring states; both a Russian and an Ottoman occupation were feared. There was some agitation in the country, and concern still existed about separatist feeling. In fact, the major threat to the Romanian union from within had been met before the arrival of the prince. As we have seen, the Russian government was convinced that, given a chance, the Moldavians would show a preference for their own prince and assembly. In the middle of April a movement in favor of this aim did occur. The discontent of some of the Moldavians with their second-class position in the state, as well as the difficulties in organizing a serious separatist movement, have already been discussed. On April 3/15 the first and last significant demonstration took place.44 The provisional government in Bucharest was, of course, well aware of the problem in Jassy and the desire of some to return to the pre-Cuza era. Immediately after the coup efforts were taken to forestall the organization of opposition and to make sure that the police and the local administration were 167

Russia and the Romanian national state under control. §. Golescu, a brother of the regent, was appointed the prefect of Jassy. Two special commissioners were also sent to assure the loyalty of the other officials; those who could not be counted on were replaced. The army and the police were firmly in Wallachian and unionist hands. The press was controlled. Nevertheless, some signs of opposition continued to appear. In a further move to counter separatist agitation, two members of the regency were sent to Jassy to answer criticisms and to organize an active campaign in support of the regime and the choice of the prince. These men and their followers organized meetings to arouse enthusiasm for the union. They, however, were met everywhere with manifestations of criticism and opposition. The separatists, as the Russian officials well knew, did not have a strong organization or an able leader. The major figure who now emerged was Nicholas Rosetti-Roznovanu, a wealthy boyar with Russian connections. He also gained the support of the metropolitan, Calinic Miclescu, and other Conservatives, including Constantine and Alexander Moruzi. After the provisional government announced Charles's candidacy, the separatists issued a declaration against the impending plebiscite and called for the election of a separate Moldavian assembly. Rumors on preparations for some kind of protest soon began to circulate. On the morning of April 3/15 some separatist supporters joined the metropolitan in the cathedral after the service. A crowd then gathered and accompanied Miclescu on a march toward the administration buildings. The people, expressing their feelings in antiunionist slogans, such as "Long Live the Convention" and "Long Live Moldavia," were soon challenged by government troops, and fighting commenced. In this unequal battle, the demonstrators were easily crushed. Jassy was placed under military rule. The separatist leaders, including Roznovanu and the metropolitan, who was wounded, were imprisoned. The estimates on the casualties ran from fifteen to seventy killed. When the reports on the action were received in Bucharest, the general feeling was, in particular in government circles, that it had occurred as a result of a Russian plot. Although, as we have seen, Gorchakov and the Russian diplomats hoped for a strong and viable separatist movement, they also knew that they could not themselves organize such an action. The leader of the demonstration did indeed have some ties with Russia and with the consulates, but there is no evidence that the demonstration resulted from anything but local initiatives. Offenberg, in his first report to Gorchakov, placed the blame on the provisional government and the pressure that it had exerted to secure the election of the prince. It had, the consul believed, finally exhausted 168

Prince Charles, 1866-18J1 the patience of the Conservatives, the separatists, and "all of the men devoted to the welfare of their country." The violence, persecutions, and mistakes of the party in power had finally caused them to take action: "The same people whose apathy had resisted seven years of Cuza's reign could not endure two months of the democratic regime."45 The failure of this movement did demonstrate convincingly the weakness of the Moldavian separatist movement. The powers were shown that the union could not be dissolved without an outside military intervention, a matter on which it was clear that they could never agree. The provisional government in Bucharest obviously had complete control of the domestic scene. When the powers met again on April 12/24,46 the results of the plebiscite and the suppression of the separatist movement in Jassy were known. Despite the fact that events had thus gone forward in the Principalities, the powers continued to argue along the old lines. The session had been called together on the request of Budberg, who was acting on the instructions of Gorchakov. The intention was to secure the rejection of the concept of a foreign prince without reference to a specific person.47 It is interesting to note that most of the diplomats were unaware of the specifically Prussian, or rather Bismarckian, role in the Hohenzollern candidature and tended to regard Napoleon III as the main supporter of the prince.48 The Habsburg foreign minister, Alexander von Mensdorff-Pouilly, for instance, wrote Metternich that if France abandoned the treaties, Austria would have to join with Russia to fight Charles's election.49 When Safvet and Budberg asked for a declaration on the Prussian role in the affair, Goltz, on instructions, replied that his country stood aside and acted as an observer in Eastern affairs. In a later meeting, the Prussian representative took the same stand: the Prussian government was not responsible for the prince's actions; Charles had acted spontaneously.50 Even Metternich appears to have accepted these statements. As instructed, Budberg at the conference again expressed the Russian position. He declared that his country had no bias for or against union, but that the government of Cuza had not been satisfactory. It was necessary to have a vote, but the Romanians must be told the limits on their actions. They hoped for independence through a foreign prince. As long as the conference let them believe in this possibility, they would support union as a step toward this major goal. Thus a true vote on union could not be obtained unless the powers firmly excluded the alternative of a foreign prince. Once this was accomplished, elections for two assemblies, which would express the real will of the people, could be held. 169

Russia and the Romanian national state When asked by Cowley what should be done if the Romanian government refused the advice of the powers in this matter, Budberg declared that the protocol of September 1859 should be applied; an Ottoman commissioner accompanied by the delegates of the powers should be sent to Bucharest. The Russian government would sanction the use of force if necessary, but it did not think that such measures would be necessary if the conference clearly expressed its opinion. The session did meet the Russian demands to a limited extent. The representatives agreed to refer back to their governments for approval the text of a collective declaration stating that the prince must be a native. Gorchakov was pleased with the results of this session; he declared to the Austrian ambassador that it was as if he had been "transported himself to Paris, and had crushed the phantom of the foreign prince/' 51 On April 20/May 2 the powers met again.52 The declaration on the foreign prince that was approved at this point stated that the election of Charles controvened Article 13 of the convention of 1858. The choice of a ruler was to be made by a new assembly in which the Moldavian and Wallachian deputies could vote separately should they so desire. The candidacy of Charles was thus specifically rejected and the door left open to a dissolution of the union. The Russian government had the statement it desired. No provision was, however, made for action should the Principalities reject the advice of the conference. As we have seen, France had so far stood in principle as the chief defender of Romanian national goals. Russia and the Ottoman Empire, in contrast, had wished the Principalities to return to the conditions of 1858. However, while France was standing openly for the idea of union, its diplomats were still using the Principalities as an object of negotiation with Austria and Italy. With enthusiastic Italian backing, the question of an exchange was under active consideration during the sessions of the conference. These negotiations collapsed finally owing to the refusal of the Habsburg Monarchy once again to consider such an arrangement. The Russian and Ottoman governments similarly rejected the concept; Gorchakov made it clear that war could result. The fact that such an arrangement was under discussion was known in diplomatic circles; the Romanian agents were aware that their land was a possible object of barter. It is significant that at this time Drouyn in his conversations with Romanian representatives pressed them to choose not a foreign prince, but a temporary ruler who would hold office for a period of around four years. Then, it was argued, the situation might be more favorable for the election of a foreign prince.53 Austria also supported this suggestion. The arrangement had the ob170

Prince Charles, 1866-1871 vious advantage for France that it would be easier to deal with the Principalities under a weak native ruler than under a prince of a recognized European royal family. This solution was formally presented to the conference by Safvet on May 5/17. He proposed that the powers name a candidate for a short term. The discussions supported the opinion that the Principalities should be given the chance to adopt this measure and that the Porte should propose it. Meanwhile, Charles arrived in the Principalities. He had been proclaimed ruler on April 16/28, but he was not received by the assembly until May 10/22. The formal accession of the prince and the formation of his first ministry led to the period of the greatest external danger for the Romanian state. The threat of a foreign occupation appeared acute. In Paris Safvet summoned another meeting of the conference.54 Here, on May 13/25, he read a strong note of protest from his government in which the right of the sultan to enforce the treaties was emphasized. The discussion then centered on the question of an Ottoman occupation. France again was the chief supporter of the Romanian position, arguing that the Ottoman Empire could not act alone. In conclusion, the delegates agreed to refer back to their governments for further instructions. They also were to direct the consuls in Bucharest to have only formal relations with Charles's government. Gorchakov by this time had become completely disillusioned with the collective action. He still wished Russia to take part in the sessions, but he was prepared for a collapse of the discussions. As he told Talleyrand: "It is up to the conference to act. If it accepts the fait accompli, I will propose its dissolution. Russia will withdraw."55 The final meeting of the conference was held on May 23/June 4-56 Budberg stated that his government did not think that the powers had acted strongly enough; Charles held his office in flagrant violation of the treaties. The dignity of the great powers was at stake. An Ottoman commissioner and the delegates of the powers should be sent to Bucharest. These arguments were supported by Safvet, who further stated that the legal order could not be restored without a threat of force.57 Metternich agreed that the powers had either to accept the prince or to take coercive measures. Otherwise, European influence in the Principalities would be destroyed. Should the conference not act, each power should then resume its freedom of action and protect its own interests. This position was also supported by Budberg. In the further discussions it became clear that France, Britain, Prussia, and Italy all opposed any attempt to force the Principalities to follow the directives of the conference. Budberg, unable to secure the adoption of the measures desired by his government, declared that the 171

Russia and the Romanian national state failure of the delegates to take any common action would probably result in a Russian withdrawal. He would request further instructions, but he believed that his government would direct him to leave the conference. The failure of the great powers to act placed the burden of upholding the treaties on the Ottoman Empire. The position of the Porte in the Principalities had clearly been endangered; the legal order could obviously not be restored without an occupation, or at least the threat of one. The Ottoman government, of course, did not have the right to intervene alone, and the majority of the powers opposed an occupation. The question thus arose whether the Porte would proceed in violation of the treaties to secure its rights according to these same agreements. In this difficult situation the Ottoman government wavered. On May 10/22 Britain was informed that troops would be sent; on May 12/24 t n e Council of Ministers decided on an occupation. Musurus on May 30/June 11 gave the British foreign secretary, Lord Clarendon, a note declaring a determination to use force.58 But still no positive steps were taken. French and British opposition remained strong. Russian policy toward the use of force remained unchanged. Gorchakov did not openly tell the Porte to take strong measures against the Orthodox Christian state, but he did continue to advise that government to follow its own interests. Should these call for intervention, Russia would not offer any opposition. All the responsibility lay on the Ottoman government. In Constantinople Ignatiev continued to urge a strong policy.59 Prokesch reported that Gorchakov's advice took the line that "if he were the Turkish Minister then he would know what he had to do."60 With the stalemate in Paris, it was obvious that the conference would have no more practical value, and on May 31/June 12 Budberg was instructed to obtain its dissolution.61 Austria supported this action.62 When, on June 5/ 17, war broke out between Austria and Prussia, it was clear that the conference would have to close.63 In agreement with Metternich and Drouyn, Budberg sent the French foreign minister, as president of the conference, a note asking that the sessions come to an end. The guaranteeing powers thus had been given a good excuse for abandoning the attempt to act in concert in Romanian affairs. The fait accompli had succeeded. The outbreak of hostilities in Europe and the subsequent Prussian victories were to have a most favorable effect on the Romanian position in other respects too. As long as the war lasted in Central Europe no power wanted complications on the Danube. In this period the Russian attitude toward a foreign prince, specifically a Hohenzollern, also ap172

Prince Charles, 1866-1871 pears to have softened. As we have seen, when Bismarck urged Charles to accept the Romanian throne, he warned him that it was very important to conciliate Russia. He had also met the protests of the powers with repeated denials of Prussian responsibility. It appears that Russia as well as the other powers accepted these statements. Throughout the negotiations on the Principalities the Prussian government had ostentatiously declared its desire to consult and act in concert with Russia.64 The news of Charles's arrival in Bucharest caused a strong reaction from both the tsar and his wife.65 Revertera reported that the Russian court was surprised that a member of the Prussian family would be tempted by such an adventure, and without the approval of the king.66 Talleyrand also observed the discontent with Prussian actions.67 On the eve of a war in which Russian benevolent neutrality was of utmost importance, Bismarck had to be very careful of Russian feelings. His approach, as expressed in his instructions to the Prussian charge, Count Heinrich von Redern, combined a denial of reponsibility with a subtle appeal for support: The royal government had not the smallest part in the enterprise of the prince. He has undertaken it at his own risk and responsibility and, whether it succeeds or fails, we have no state interest in its development . . . Whether it meets the interest of Russia more to oppose the position of the prince and to remove him or rather to use his readiness to accept in fact Russian protection, about that I abstain from any judgment and must leave this to the wisdom of the imperial government.68

The same double approach was used by General Hans Lothar von Schweinitz, the special military representative of Prussia in St. Petersburg. He told the tsar that he knew Charles, who was not a model Prussian officer, but not a bad young man. If Russia could tolerate his presence, he could restore order in the Principalities and prevent France from dominating in Bucharest.69 Undoubtedly, from the Russian point of view, a Prussian candidate was the least of evils if a foreign prince was to rule in the Principalities. The Russian government had by this time adopted a policy of supporting Prussia in the German question. The tsar and his advisers had consistently been concerned about maintaining political stability in Bucharest and blocking revolutionary movements. The former French influence had not been satisfactory, and the native prince, Cuza, had aroused extreme Russian antagonism. Moreover, in the preceding months the danger had arisen that the Principalities might be used to compensate Austria for Venetia. Under no condition could Russia accept Habsburg domination of the two provinces and control of the 173

Russia and the Romanian national state entire course of the Danube. Gorchakov had repeatedly made it clear that this question could lead to war.70 In March, in a conversation with Talleyrand, he declared that he spoke in the name of the tsar in saying that Russia would not permit the aggrandizement of Austria on the Danube; he added, "Even if I had the nature of a sheep, I would rebel at the very idea."71 It is also important to note that although the Russian position in the conference and in the negotiations was extremely unfavorable in regard to the provisional government, the Russian diplomats did not express themselves similarly to the representatives of that regime. The attitude was critical, but it did not exclude the possibility of agreement. The Romanian representatives in Paris, Boerescu and Steege, spoke with Budberg in April before the choice of Charles had been announced.72 At this meeting the ambassador declared that Russia was not against union, but that his government would not support it against the will of the population. Moldavia did not want unification; only the force employed by the provisional government kept the province in check. Moreover, although union was acceptable, Russia would never agree to a foreign prince. No suitable candidate would consent to be an Ottoman vassal. At best the Principalities would obtain a little German prince, "a poor prince of the third or fourth rank." He would not bring order to the country, and he would soon be expelled. A republic, Budberg declared, would be better than a foreign prince. In another conversation held after the choice of Charles, Budberg repeated that Russia would not support him and that union would be accepted, but only if the Moldavians approved. He warned that commissioners would be named if the Romanian government did not follow the directives of the powers.73 He advised against the sending of a delegation to St. Petersburg to speak with Gorchakov. Nevertheless, soon after assuming office in Bucharest, Charles sent Boerescu and Costaforu on such a trip.74 Arriving in the Russian capital by way of Berlin, they first visited Bismarck, who strongly advised them to deal carefully with the Russians. France would remain a supporter, but Russian friendship would be of great use. He also suggested that the two men visit high ecclesiastical functionaries while they were in Russia.75 The Romanian agents arrived in St. Petersburg on May 18/30 and saw Gorchakov on May 21 /June 2. In their report to their government they stated the view that their visit was a success, but that Gorchakov's attitude had changed only slowly. At first he was reserved and cold. He repeated the familiar Russian grievances against the Principalities and recalled past services. He characterized the country as politically 174

Prince Charles, 1866-1871 unstable and the center of Polish conspiracy. In the course of the conversation he also brought up the religious question and the reforms made by Cuza, which he stated were against church dogma. As far as the election of the prince was concerned, he attacked the action as contrary to the treaties. He believed that the conference would break up and each of the powers would regain full freedom of action. He did not think that outside military force would be used against the new government in Bucharest. He also complained that the delegation had come to Russia last; the agents naturally replied that Budberg had advised against their visit. On May 26/June 7, in accordance with Bismarck's advice, Boerescu and Costaforu visited the metropolitan of St. Petersburg, Isidore. His chief concerns were about the alleged Catholic propaganda in Romania and the changes that had been made in the church regulations. The agents reassured him on both issues. On the same day they paid a visit of farewell to Gorchakov, who showed himself in a much more friendly mood. He claimed that Russia had always believed that the Romanians did not want union unless they could have a foreign prince; he had thus supported in the conference what he believed to be the wishes of the country. He also stated his dissatisfaction with the results of the meetings and his intention to take the initiative in securing an ending of the conference. If the results had been known beforehand, his country would never have participated in it. He believed that a dissolution would be favorable for the Principalities. Each nation would then be able to act freely. Russia, he assured his visitors, would use its freedom for the good of the Principalities, but he wanted some guarantees. The Romanian agents naturally asked to have these guarantees more precisely defined. Gorchakov was chiefly concerned that the country not become a center of revolutionary activity and that the church be protected. He wanted some assurances in regard to the political refugees, particularly the Poles resident in Moldavia. Because the security of the Russian borders was in question, he wished the government either to expel these Poles or to imprison them in the interior of the country. Gorchakov also complained about the "demagogic element" in the Romanian government. As far as the religious issue was concerned, he appeared content when he heard about the visit to the metropolitan. He hoped that Cuza's reforms would be rescinded and the question of the Dedicated Monasteries settled. At the end of the visit the Romanian agents were well satisfied with the results. It appeared that when Russia was free to act alone, and after the Romanian authorities had taken some measures in regard to 175

Russia and the Romanian national state religion and internal order, opposition to the changes in Bucharest would be abandoned. The fait accompli would be accepted. Not only did the Austro-Prussian War offer a welcome distraction, but the Prussian victories gave added strength and prestige to the Hohenzollern prince. By the summer of 1866 it was clear that his nomination could not be reversed without a foreign occupation. As we have seen, the Porte had contemplated such an action; indirect Russian support and Austrian moral backing could be counted on. Nevertheless, the strong opposition of the sea powers, France and Britain, and the fear of a rising of other Balkan Christians made the Ottoman government hesitate. The decisive moment for action came at the time of Charles's arrival in Bucharest. When neither the Porte nor the powers made a move to enforce their decisions, it became clear that the prince was safe from the threat of outside interference. For the Ottoman government the logical next move was to accept Charles, but with strong conditions attached. On May 24/June 5 the grand vezir, Fuad, was replaced by Mehmed Rushdi Pasha. On June 4/16 Ion Ghica was sent to Constantinople. During the subsequent negotiations the French government and the ambassador in Constantinople, Moustier, played a major role. On June 21 /July 3 Napoleon received Balaceanu and agreed to use his influence in Constantinople to obtain a settlement.76 In the next weeks the French government pressed Charles to take an open and flexible position in regard to the Ottoman demands and to come to an agreement as soon as possible. Drouyn also advised the prince to go personally to Constantinople to negotiate with the sultan. He believed that it would be well "to profit from the prestige that Prussia exercises at this time in Constantinople and which it owes to its victories/*77 The question of recognition by the suzerain court was also of first importance for the prince and his government. Should this be obtained, the approval of the other powers would soon follow. The financial situation in the Principalities remained precarious; the much-needed French loan would not be available until the question was settled. The continued mobilization of Romanian troops, which had been ordered in the spring, remained a severe drain on the country. Rumors of separatist agitation continued to circulate. The prince, however, because of his own domestic situation, could not accept terms damaging to his prestige. He was willing to travel to Constantinople, as the French government had suggested, but he was discouraged by the Porte.78 Meanwhile, the Russian position had indeed shifted. Gorchakov's conversations with the Romanian agents have been discussed. Ignatiev 176

Prince Charles, i866-i8r/i was now instructed to abstain from offering the Porte any advice and to adopt an attitude of observation.79 Henceforth the ambassador limited his comments to stating that Russia was not responsible for the loss of European dignity or for the fact that the rights of the Ottoman government were damaged by those who claimed to be its protectors. Russia could not be more Turk than the Turks; it could not urge the occupation of an Orthodox nation. Open Russian opposition to Charles was thus dropped - an action that, of course, signified the acceptance of union. It was recognized that separatist activities would succeed only if backed by an armed intervention, which, as a ministerial instruction noted, Russia could "support as long as the blame for its initiative fell, in the eyes of the Romanians, on the Turks"; but Russia could not, however, act itself in place of the Porte. It was also recognized that the idea of union had made a deep impression on the mass of the Romanian people; separatism did not offer a basis for serious action, "as the disorders that occurred at Jassy during the summer [sic] of 1866 proved, on the occasion of the plebiscite of May 20."80 In the discussion of the rights and privileges of the Principalities, which formed a part of the question of recognition, the most serious dispute came over the Ottoman insistence that the Principalities be described as an "integral part" of the Ottoman Empire. The prince could not yield on this issue without compromising his position within the state. The negotiations proceded more favorably from the Romanian viewpoint after the outbreak of a revolt in Crete in August. At this point the pressure was on the Porte to come to an agreement, because of the danger that other parts of the empire might also rise. Finally, Charles agreed to a formulation that made use of the limiting phrase "within the limits fixed by the capitulations and the Treaty of Paris." With this major matter settled, the recognition was accorded through an exchange of letters between the prince and the grand vezir and in a firman based on these documents. In the final agreement the Porte recognized Charles as hereditary prince; the Principalities were described as "an integral part of the Ottoman Empire."81 In return, Charles agreed that the Romanian armed forces would not surpass thirty thousand; that no order or decoration would be awarded in the name of the Principalities; that money would be minted, but under conditions to be settled later; that the amount of the tribute would be raised; and that no revolutionary organizations that would menace the empire or the neighboring states would be tolerated on Romanian soil. Most important for the future, the treaties and conventions between the Porte and the powers were recognized as obligatory on the Principalities as long as their 177

Russia and the Romanian national state terms did not conflict with other engagements. The Principalities were to conclude no treaties or conventions directly with other powers, although "local arrangements" were not covered in this exclusion. With these conditions settled, Charles paid a formal six-day visit to Constantinople. At his departure from Bucharest all of the consuls but Offenberg appeared in uniform, a sign of recognition. The Russian consul explained that he had received no instructions.82 Similarly, in Constantinople the Russian embassy did not officially receive the prince. Ignatiev explained to Charles that the Russian attitude was occasioned by the desire to be correct; the government was awaiting the formal communication of the firman of investiture before recognizing the prince. In this conversation Ignatiev emphasized the standard Russian concerns: the dangers of the parti rouge, the church regulations, and the Dedicated Monasteries.83 The prince blamed the difficulties of the past on Cuza's policies and assured the ambassador that he desired a rapprochement with Russia. His country understood that the Western powers would not help with the realization of Romanian aims; they sought chiefly to break the natural ties with Russia and bind Romania more closely to the Ottoman Empire. Gorchakov appeared well pleased at this time with the settlement and with the prince. In a conversation with Revertera he reviewed the events of the recent past.84 Charles would be recognized by Russia because the sultan had accepted him. The minister thought that Charles was better for the post than a native prince as long as he did not ally with the revolutionary forces. Formal Russian recognition came a short time later. On November 14/26 Offenberg gave Charles a letter from Gorchakov in which the regular themes regarding Russian friendship, the church, and the monasteries were repeated.85 In reply, Charles expressed the hope for a swift solution to the religious questions, and he promised that he would not allow political agitation against neighboring states. Despite the Russian recognition, the accession of Charles marked a failure of Russian policy. After the overthrow of Cuza, as we have seen, the Russian aim was not only the separation of the Principalities, but, before all, the blocking of the appointment of a foreign prince. It is interesting to note how strongly, during the negotiations, Gorchakov attacked not only this idea, but also the previously conceded union. During the course of the discussions both Budberg and the French diplomats accused the Russian government of taking a position in contradiction to its previous stand on the unification of the provinces.86 Gorchakov took pains to refute this argument and to justify his position as consistent with previous Russian policy. He claimed that the sole aim of 178

Prince Charles, 1866-1871 Russia in dealing with the Principalities was securing the welfare of the inhabitants.87 The Russian role in the drafting of the Organic Statutes showed that no prejudice existed toward union if it was apparent that it contributed to the prosperity of the area. The declaration in support of union and a foreign prince that had been made by Kiselev in the Paris conference of 1858 had been in fact contrary to the views of the government. It was the personal opinion of an individual and it did not bind Russia. The subsequent double election and the "temporary union" had been accepted "as an expedient intended to forestall regrettable complications."88 Russia had held no illusions about the settlement and had pointed out its defects and warned of its consequences. Russian policy had been based on the supposition that union was necessary for the prosperity of the country; the experience with Cuza had shown the contrary. To Talleyrand Gorchakov explained further: "An objection has been raised [about] our past adhesion to union; let me tell you that we have never been more than lukewarm partisans and that it was only the desire to prove to you our friendly dispositions that made us agree."89 T H E FIRST YEARS OF CHARLES'S REIGN,

1866-1869 With the arrival of Charles in Bucharest the basic program of the nationalists - union and a foreign prince - was completed. Moreover, despite dire predictions, in particular from the Russian diplomats, Romania had acquired a ruler with a most distinguished background. Born on April 8/20, 1839, Charles was the second son of Karl Anton von Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen. The prince had the typical family life and education of a member of the highest European aristocracy. He was educated in Dresden, he lived in Paris, and he had traveled. As an officer in the Prussian army, he had taken part in 1864 in the war against Denmark. As far as political convictions were concerned, his background inclined him to moderation. His father was the Prussian minister president during the liberal "New Era" government, from 1858 to 1862, that preceded the conservative Bismarck era. Charles had, of course, absolutely no experience with Romanian affairs, nor had he held any public office. In May 1866 the provisional government was replaced by a ministry headed by the Conservative Lascar Catargiu. This group contained a balance of Liberals and Conservatives, with Peter Mavrogheni in foreign affairs, General Ion G. Ghica as minister of war, C. A. Rosetti for religion and education, and, most important, Ion Bratianu for finance. A 179

Russia and the Romanian national state new constitution was also drawn up. Modeled on the Belgian constitution of 1831, the document provided for a two-house legislature and ministerial responsibility. Although it contained most of the provisions on civil liberties and legislative power desired by the Liberals, the Conservatives were able to obtain a restricted franchise. With a collegial voting system, where the electorate was determined by income, the country was henceforth to be controlled by perhaps twenty thousand of the population of five million. In July 1866 a new ministry was formed under Ion Ghica, which was in essence a continuation of the previous provisional government. In the fall elections were held for the legislatures. Since no group won a clear victory, Romanian politics resumed its previous discordant course. Of the Romanian political leaders, Charles preferred working with Bratianu and the Liberals. In March 1867 the moderate Liberal Constantine Cretulescu was appointed prime minister in a ministry in which Bratianu wielded the real power. This government remained in office until August 1867, when it was replaced by another Liberal cabinet headed by §tefan Golescu. Although Bratianu was not the prime minister, he remained the dominant figure in political life. Despite the fact that the Liberals were clearly the strongest political grouping and Bratianu was the most able Romanian politician, their control of the government was to have unfortunate repercussions in foreign policy. The new regime soon managed to win the distrust of all of the great powers, although for quite different reasons. The basic cause for the lack of faith in Bratianu abroad was the obvious fact that both he and his party remained the nucleus of the national movement. When in power they could be counted on to continue a forward policy aimed at gaining more sovereign rights for their state and eventually an independent status. They were also likely to favor the national movements in other provinces of the Ottoman Empire and to support the idea of the cooperation of the Christian people against the Porte. After 1866 France, Britain, and Austria wanted no more disturbances in the Balkans connected with the national movements. At first Russia was more sympathetic to such actions, but its policy soon changed. Thereafter the Romanian government found itself faced with a solid front of European powers opposed to any major moves toward loosening the bonds with the suzerain power. Throughout this period European opposition tended to center on the person of Ion Bratianu, who was simply not trusted. Certainly, the policy of the fait accompli, applied previously under his direction, meant that Romanian statesmen had often misled or directly lied to foreign representatives. Bratianu had also come to stand as the most obvious representative of 180

Prince Charles, 1866-1&J1 the "red" danger in the Principalities in the eyes of many conservative leaders. The general situation in Europe and the Near East, in addition, presented dangers for the state. In the years until 1871 Romania was to be involved, although often only as a side issue, in two major areas of contest. First in importance were to be the continuing Prussian moves toward the unification of Germany, actions that were bound to involve the Principalities not only because the prince was a Hohenzollern, but also because of the strategic position of Romania in relation to the Habsburg Empire. Second, in 1866 a revolt in Crete opened another Eastern crisis. Although these events took attention away from Bucharest, the new revolution gave impetus to the national unrest throughout the Balkans, which directly involved sentiments in Romania. As far as thefirstissue was concerned, despite the fact that the Prussian government repeatedly denied responsibility for Romanian actions to the other courts, it did not hesitate to use its undoubted influence with the prince to its advantage when possible. Bismarck himself constantly put strong emphasis on Romanian relations with Russia, a country whose support was essential to the wider Prussian program. Charles was repeatedly urged to remain close to St. Petersburg. Romanian relations with the Habsburg Empire involved Prussian interests equally. After the great defeat of 1866, it was to be expected that the Austrian government, whose foreign policy was now under the direction of Frederick Ferdinand von Beust, would pursue, if not an active and aggressive policy against Prussia, at least one that resisted further advances in German affairs of the victorious state. A tightening of Habsburg relations with Paris could also be expected. With this situation it was obviously to Prussian interests to maintain a tie with the Austrian border states, including Serbia as well as Romania. For Romania, relations with the Habsburg Empire came to involve increasingly other than strategic considerations. The fundamental reorganization of the monarchy in the Ausgleich (Compromise) of 1867 gave the Hungarian minority not only control of a half of the empire, but what was in fact often a deciding voice in foreign affairs. Moreover, the restrictive Hungarian nationality policies, aimed at maintaining Magyar predominance, caused increasing unrest among the Romanian majority in Transylvania. Similar Hungarian pressure in Slavic areas led to friction there too. In a period of national upsurge Romanian leaders could not be expected to remain indifferent to events in Transylvania or to remain aloof from appeals for and from Romanians in that area. Again the Liberal party and its press led the way. Romanian agitation concerning Transylvania, official or unofficial, up181

Russia and the Romanian national state set all of the powers, but in particular Prussia. Bismarck at this time was cultivating close ties with Hungarian national leaders, whose support he wished to use to paralyze Vienna. Although the diplomatic alignments in Europe remained, as before, fluid, the Romanian government in the next years faced a situation where, at least in matters involving its vital interests, Russia and Prussia usually stood against France and Austria, often seconded by the Ottoman Empire and Britain. Thus, during the first period of his reign, Charles and his Liberal governments tended to stand closer to Russia and Prussia than to France, in a sense reversing the previous reliance of Romanian national governments on Paris. This condition was caused in part by the evolution of events in other parts of the Ottoman Empire and the influence that the French government by then enjoyed in Constantinople. The uprising in Crete in 1866 turned the attention of the powers once more to that restless island. At the same time, stimulated by Greek events, the Balkan states, under the leadership of Prince Michael of Serbia, carried on negotiations toward an eventual alliance against the Ottoman Empire. At first, the Russian government, well informed on the discussions, gave its approval to these efforts. In the Cretan question the Russian diplomats worked to secure either an autonomous administration for the island or its union with Greece. The Russian government preferred that these measures be introduced through common European pressure. These policies conformed with the general direction followed by the Liberal ministry of Cretulescu, which came to office in March 1867. This regime favored cooperation with the other Christian people against the Porte and assistance, even if only indirectly, to the Bulgarian revolutionary groups located on Romanian territory. Negotiations were commenced with other Balkan governments, particularly with Serbia. The climax of this policy was the ratifying of a friendship treaty with Belgrade on January 21 /February 2, 1868. However, the endeavor of the Balkan leaders to form a common alignment collapsed after the assassination of Michael in June 1868. During this period, despite the support given to certain Balkan aspirations, the basic aims of the Russian government remained, as before, limited and conservative. Prime attention remained concentrated on internal affairs and on the eventual breaking of the Treaty of Paris. Certain new trends, however, began to influence Russian opinion.90 Gorchakov, supported by men such as Michael Khristoforovich Reutern and Peter Andreevich Shuvalov, retained the conviction that Russian policy should emphasize cooperation with other powers; prime attention should still be focused on internal affairs, and adventures abroad 182

Prince Charles, 1866-18.J1 should be avoided. In contrast, Dmitri Alekseevich Miliutin, Nicholas S. Gagarin, and Ignatiev came to favor a stronger national policy including more support to Balkan national movements. This second group represented a current of opinion that was to become increasingly influential in the next decade. The defeat in the Crimean War had naturally been felt deeply throughout Russian society. Similarly, although the policy of reform and recueillement was obviously the wisest course, it was difficult for many to remain content with what was largely a passive attitude in foreign affairs, particularly in the face of the rising influence of Prussia and the rapidly changing conditions in Central Europe. Of those who favored a stronger and more active role in international relations, the Panslavs were certainly the most influential. They also attracted the most attention abroad. Although the Panslavs differed among themselves, all supported an active foreign policy, based on Russian assistance to the Slavic people not only in the Ottoman Empire, but also in the Habsburg Monarchy. Their ultimate aim was the formation of a federation of Slavic states that would inevitably be under Russian domination. The program excluded the Romanians and Greeks, except as they were involved in the breakup of the two empires. Panslavs, intensely Orthodox, were also usually hostile to Catholic Slavs, especially the Poles, who were regarded as traitors. Since the movement was politically conservative, cooperation with radical Balkan revolutionary movements was largely excluded. In 1858 the Slavic Benevolent Society was formed, with branches opened in Moscow, St. Petersburg, and Kiev. It was the center of Panslav activities, but its first endeavors were largely of an educational and propagandistic nature. For instance, Bulgarian students were brought to study in Russia. The movement, which had a sentimental and altruistic side, as well as obvious implications for the increase of Russian power, attracted great attention. It won the sympathy of many with strong nationalist convictions, who, while not supporting certain aspects of the program, believed that Russia should assume a more active role abroad. Aside from Gorchakov, perhaps the single most important diplomat for Russian policy in the Balkans for the next twelve years was to be a man whom we have met before, the highly controversial diplomat Nicholas Pavlovich Ignatiev, who represented both the national and the Panslav alternative to official Russian policy.91 Although he usually stood in opposition to the foreign minister and supported courses of action that were in fact not adopted, his influence is to be seen in every crisis in the next years. In July 1864 he was named the Russian min183

Russia and the Romanian national state ister to Constantinople; when the post was raised to an embassy in 1867, he became the ambassador. Previously he had undertaken a very successful mission to China, and he had been the head of the Asiatic Department. In foreign policy he was to stand for extreme nationalist courses of action. His goal in the Near East was consistently to win and maintain Russian predominance both through influence over the Ottoman government and through control of the Balkan national movements and their leaders, aims that were often contradictory. Because of his desire to win the first position among the foreign representatives in the councils of the Porte, he always strongly opposed whatever power seemed to stand in his way. In 1867 France, with its support of Ottoman reform, awakened his principal fears. That power was always dangerous to his program because it too could stand sponsor to national liberation movements. Neither Britain nor Austria, on the other hand, could easily compete with Russia in this field. In his relations with the Balkan people Ignatiev also sought to use the unifying influence of the Orthodox church. In the late sixties and early seventies this endeavor faced increasing difficulty, as both the Bulgarians and the Romanians attempted to break the Greek ecclesiastical influence on their own national religious establishments. 92 By the middle seventies Ignatiev's policy was to rest instead on the Slavic peoples - thus on race rather than on religion. In his relationship with all of the Balkan nationalities his emphasis remained on securing Russian power and on using historic ties to strengthen Russian interests. The Balkan people were to be instruments of Russian policy and were to follow the directions of St. Petersburg. Ignatiev strongly supported the moves of the Balkan governments to cooperate against the Porte, as long, of course, as they were supervised and coordinated with those of Russia. As he wrote: "Indeed, Russia should always have the supreme control over the destinies of the Balkan peninsula and be the cement that binds the different co-religionist races to each other." 93 Ignatiev's relations with Romanian circles were never as close as his links to Bulgarians, Serbs, and Montenegrins. He was, however, the chief Russian diplomat concerned with the negotiations over the settlement of Romanian ecclesiastical questions, and, as we shall see, he had an immense influence over all aspects of Russian policy toward Romania. Conservative in political ideology, he could never approve of Liberal regimes in Bucharest. He considered that the Liberal Party was composed of "disorganizing elements, enemies of all social order, servile in relation to France and openly hostile to Russia/' 94 Within Russian official circles Ignatiev was regarded as the leading contender for Gorchakov's position as foreign minister; Gorchakov in 184

Prince Charles, 1866-18.J1 turn recognized him as his principal rival. Ignatiev disliked his chiefs diplomatic methods; he did not favor a policy of close cooperation with the other great powers on Eastern questions or the use of European alignments and conferences for the solution of problems that arose in that area. In the future he was to be a strong proponent of unilateral negotiations with the Porte on Balkan issues. Despite the fact that his arguments usually lost out in imperial councils, Ignatiev was regularly consulted by the tsar, who was undoubtedly influenced by his opinions. In the Balkans the ambassador's views were often shared by the numerous Russian consular employees who were under his jurisdiction and whom he tended to use for the implementation of his own policies. After the outbreak of the Cretan insurrection the Russian government, although sympathetic with the Cretan demands, did not wish to separate from the other great powers.95 Negotiations proceeded over the winter and spring of 1866-1867, but basic differences among the states prevented a solution by diplomatic means. As has been mentioned, the Russian government at this time aimed at a Cretan settlement that would give the Christian Cretans effective control of the island and thus in fact weaken the hold of the Porte over a part of its domains. In contrast, France, with an upper hand in Constantinople, proposed reforming the administration of the entire empire and strengthening the central government. Since Turkish reforms owed much to French influence, France would retain the primary position in the empire. To this end the French government wished also to cooperate with Austria, now a Russian opponent. In August 1867 Napoleon III and Franz Joseph met at Salzburg. The official reason for the visit was the execution of Maximilian in Mexico, but the two rulers also discussed their common interests in Europe and the Near East. They agreed on a joint policy in Constantinople based on the encouragement of administrative reform for the Balkans and the disapproval of further national uprisings. Thereafter France and Austria tended to cooperate in the Eastern Question to the detriment of Russia and at this time also of Romania. The division among the protecting powers, the instability within his own political system, and the renewed national strivings throughout the peninsula placed difficult choices before Charles. To secure his own domestic position the prince had to rely on Bratianu and Liberal support and to make moves in the national interest. When he did so he was attacked by France, Austria, Britain, and the Porte, who accused him of being a Russian or a Prussian satellite. Despite the inevitable criticism of the powers that did not wish him to endanger the status quo, Charles did attempt to follow this course of action. In March 185

Russia and the Romanian national state 1867 Bratianu became minister of interior in the Cretulescu cabinet; in August 1867 French pressure led to his dismissal. Charles, who regarded him as the ablest Romanian statesman, brought him back into the government as minister of finance in November 1867, where he remained until collective great-power pressure led to his removal in November 1868. During this period the Romanian government pursued a policy of seeking to widen its autonomous rights and of cooperating with other Balkan governments. As immediate aims, the Romanian leaders sought the recognition by the powers of the name "Romania" to replace the "United Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia," the right to mint coins of all denominations with a national symbol placed upon them, and the authority to conclude postal and consular conventions with other countries without the Porte's acting as intermediary. In addition, the prince in particular was anxious to begin the construction of a railroad system. All of these measures involved the political or economic interests of the protecting powers. As far as cooperation with other Balkan states was concerned, discussions were indeed carried on with Greek, Montenegrin, and Serbian leaders. The prince and his advisers, however, were not eager to involve themselves in what might be adventurous policies until they were in a position to benefit from them. Charles put first emphasis on military preparations. A French military mission was already in Bucharest. As an officer in the Piussian army, with a military training in this tradition, the prince naturally preferred Prussian instructors. After a great deal of friction over the matter, the French mission finally left in 1869. Charles was able to purchase twenty thousand Prussian needle guns, which had to be transported through Russia, since they could not cross Austrian or Ottoman territory because of the opposition of these governments to intensive Romanian armament. The prince also increased the size of his army beyond the limitations indicated in the treaties and strengthened the police and the militia. These moves, which were a financial burden, were strongly criticized by France, Austria, Britain, and the Ottoman Empire, but supported by Prussia and Russia.96 Difficulties with the protecting powers arose also from other Romanian actions. Habsburg concern over possible Romanian propaganda directed toward Transylvania has already been mentioned. In addition, in this period outbreaks of violence against Jews drew strong protests from abroad, but not from Russia, a country in which the Jewish position was becoming increasingly difficult. The chief dissatisfaction with the Romanian government was, however, caused by its failure to halt Bulgarian revolutionary bands from crossing the Danube. The suspicion was strong that Romanian officials were in fact cooperating in 186

Prince Charles, 1866-1871 these actions. Again the chief pressure came from France and Austria. The national feelings stirred up by the Cretan revolt and the Serbian activities had a strong effect on the Bulgarians. The revolutionary leadership was in the hands of Bulgarian nationals living either in Constantinople or in the Principalities, mainly in Bucharest and in Danubian port cities. There was no single central organization embracing all factions, but the most influential group was the Benevolent Society, commonly called the Elders. It was Russophile and in contact with the Russian consulates in the Principalities. Another section of the Bulgarian emigration held more radical ideas and was closer to the West in political conviction. The major tactic that it used at this time was the employment of small armed bands, chetas, that were sent across the Danube with the hope that a revolution could be started in the Bulgarian lands. The first attempts were made in the 1840s and were unsuccessful. The defeat of Russia, on whose aid the Bulgarians counted, in the Crimean War led to a period of inaction until the late 1860s. Both Romanian and Russian officials in the Principalities were aware of the organization on Romanian soil of Bulgarian conspiracies against the Ottoman Empire, and some were indeed closely involved in the preparations. Despite Charles's repeated assurances to the contrary, Romanians were implicated, and the government had a good knowledge of the Bulgarian intentions. In April and May 1867 bands led by Filip Totiu and Panaiot Khitov crossed the Danube. Rumors circulated that preparations were under way for further similar attempts. Although the Ottoman authorities in Bulgaria had no difficulty in handling these groups, which failed completely in their efforts to arouse the population, the Porte naturally protested strongly to Bucharest and was supported in doing so by the powers, particularly France. The Romanian government continued to reply with assurances that it had no part in the conspiracies and that action was being taken to prevent such events in the future. The major raid across the Danube occurred in July 1868. The Russian government learned before the action of the preparations being made, and on July 5/17 Offenberg warned Bratianu: "Around a hundred individuals are gathered at Giurgiu and Zimnicea or are en route to go there; I believe that it would be in your interest as in that of peaceful men, who could be gratuitously compromised, that measures, rapid and energetic, be taken in order to stop reprehensible and thoughtless acts."97 On that same night a raid led by the Bulgarian revolutionaries Hadzhi Dimitur and Stefan Karadzha took place. Although a failure, 187

Russia and the Romanian national state it created a truly dangerous situation for the Romanian government. Once again the question of an intervention was discussed. The Porte claimed that the bands had been armed with weapons from Romanian arsenals, with the complicity of Romanian officials.98 Fuad demanded that a European commission of inquiry be appointed to investigate the situation, a proposal that was supported by France, Austria, Britain, and Italy, but blocked by Russia and Prussia. Despite this stand behind Romania, the Russian government opposed the Bulgarian activities: the raids were being carried out without Russian approval or participation. They were compromising to Russian policy and to the interests of the Bulgarian groups in Romania that were not involved and that were close to the Russian consulate. The issue of the use of Romanian territory for the organization of conspiracies in neighboring lands was an extremely sensitive one in itself. Strong Russian protests had been sent many times in the past over similar Polish activities. Because of the Russian and Prussian attitude, international intervention was limited to the sending of identical telegrams by the protecting powers to their consuls in Bucharest. The Bulgarian question remained the subject of diplomatic correspondence throughout the fall of 1868. In September Ali sent a letter to Charles reminding him of his obligations and complaining that the revolutionary committees continue to enjoy all their freedom of action and plot new endeavors against the security of our adjacent provinces. They have even obtained a large stock of arms. These facts are attested by the journals of even the United Principalities . . . what we demand only, my prince, is that the territory of the Principalities not serve as a point of reunion for agitators."

The activities of the Bulgarian revolutionaries also gave the Habsburg foreign minister, Beust, the opportunity to attempt to remove the Liberal government, which he regarded as pro-Prussian, proRussian, and a danger to Transylvania, and to propose an active intervention by the protecting powers and the Porte. In November he sounded these states on the possibility of changing the April 1856 convention and Articles 22, 25, and 27 of the Treaty of Paris so that the Porte could intervene in Romania. In Constantinople Prokesch proposed that the Porte concentrate troops on the Danube and then send Bucharest an ultimatum demanding the strict observance of the treaty stipulations. Charles was to be forced to dissolve the Bulgarian committees and reduce his armaments and the size of his army to the legal limits. If he refused, Ottoman armies should occupy certain points in Romania. These Austrian moves had little chance of success. Britain and France wanted no revision of the Treaty of Paris. The Porte con188

Prince Charles, 1866-1&J1 sidered the occupation a good idea, but refused to act without a prior change in the treaties. Gorchakov reacted very strongly against any intervention, particularly against an Ottoman occupation, even if it were a police action, and threatened a parallel Russian move. The Russian government, of course, was always willing to discuss the revision of the Treaty of Paris.100 The final blow to the Liberal government came not from the Western powers and the Porte, and not over the Bulgarian issue, but from Berlin, and it was caused chiefly by Hungarian concern over Transylvania. By this time all of the powers were opposed to the Liberal ministry and sought its downfall. Although Bismarck continued to maintain the fiction that Prussia had no direct interest in Romania, he certainly followed events in the region closely.101 He did not want a European war to commence over Romanian issues, or for that matter over any problem connected to the Eastern Question. The European alignment that would probably result from a conflict there and its potential effect on southern German opinion might favor the French and Austrian, rather than Prussian, interests. He was also deeply concerned about the effect in Hungary of Romanian propaganda concerning Transylvania. Since he knew that Beust could not carry through a policy of close alliance with France while Hungary was favorable to Prussia, he wished to end a situation that could have disastrous repercussions on his German policy. In November 1868 he instructed Count Heinrich Keyserling, the Prussian consul in Bucharest, to warn the prince about relations with Budapest. If no satisfaction were obtained, he would ask the Prussian king to recall the consul. Keyserling spoke with Charles on November 11/23; o n December 16/28 the Liberal cabinet was dismissed.102 The new ministry, under the Conservative Dimitrie Ghica, but also containing the moderate Liberal Kogalniceanu, was to embark on a policy of attempting to conciliate the powers and the Ottoman Empire. D. A. Sturdza, who had been successful in dealing with the Porte in 1866, was sent to Constantinople. In the period previously discussed, when Bratianu was in power, the chief attacks on the Romanian position had come from France, Austria, and the Ottoman Empire. Russia and Prussia, although strongly critical of many of the Romanian actions, had opposed outside intervention. Bismarck had consistently urged the prince to remain close to Russia and had argued that dependence on St. Petersburg was "a correct and healthy policy." Karl Anton in writing to his son in January 1868, had expressed similar opinions. Russia could be either a good friend or a bad enemy for Romania. It appeared that in the future the East would 189

Russia and the Romanian national state fall into Russian hands. Although a complete break with France should not be made, it would be better for Romania "to step voluntarily into the sphere of influence of Russia" before it was forced to do so.103 At this time, although Russian-Romanian relations remained openlyfriendly, old issues continued to divide the governments. Religious differences were still important. The Russian leaders, despite their limited support of Balkan national movements at this time, remained deeply concerned about the revolutionary aspects of some of the developments in the Principalities. On June 8/20, 1867, the tsar wrote Charles concerning his interest in the country and commented: "The hopes that I maintain in that regard are based above all on the fact that a spirit of order and authority prevail there over the passions that have been only too excited lately."104 In order to try to settle the questions that remained open between the governments, Charles decided at the beginning of 1868 to send a special mission to Russia. He also wished to obtain permission to send the guns that he had purchased in Prussia through Russia, since the routes through Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire were closed. Because of his awareness of the importance of the religious issue, the prince included in the delegation, in addition to Ion Cantacuzino, a former minister of justice, the metropolitan of Ismail, Melchisedek, who had received his training in Kiev and who spoke Russian. On January 13/25, 1868, Offenberg was informed of the intention of sending a mission; five days later he told Charles that it would be received with pleasure.105 The Russian government also welcomed an opportunity to improve relations. The delegates took with them letters from the prince to both the tsar and Gorchakov. The message to Alexander was phrased in very general terms and placed the emphasis on the religious theme. Charles assured the tsar that since his arrival in the country he had made efforts to "revive the religious feeling that, although innate in the people, has been nevertheless so much disturbed under the last reign."106 The letter to Gorchakov mentioned in general terms the questions to be raised. The prince also asked for assistance in the arms question, writing that the time would come when he would put to the test "all the forces of my country in favor of the sacred interests that form the indelible bond between it and Russia."107 The two delegates arrived in St. Petersburg on February 6/18 and stayed about a month.108 The visit was extremely important in that, on a number of subjects, it started negotiations that were to continue in the future. Most significant were the discussions on a consular convention and on general church matters. The two representatives spoke with the tsar, Gorchakov, Peter Nikolaevich Stremoukhov, Ignatiev, and 190

Prince Charles, 1866-18,71 other men closely connected with Eastern affairs. In addition, Melchisedek saw Metropolitan Isidore. The conversations with the tsar were conducted on more general terms, with the emphasis placed on ideological and religious matters; Alexander II expressed his approval of the mission. The metropolitan assured the tsar of the prince's religious sentiments and of the efforts being made to repair the damage done to the church during Cuza's reign. The serious negotiations were undertaken with Gorchakov, who emphasized to the delegates the Russian good will toward their country. He claimed that Russia had not in fact opposed a union or a foreign prince in theory. The Russian position had been adopted only to show concern for the Treaty of Paris. Gorchakov also brought up the question of the Dedicated Monasteries, but Cantacuzino explained that he was not empowered to carry on negotiations on this question. It had been regulated by law in the Principalities and was still under discussion in Constantinople. Although he could not negotiate, he knew that Charles wanted the matter settled. The delegates would be glad to listen to whatever Gorchakov had to say and to communicate it to their government. During the initial conversations Gorchakov requested that the Romanian representatives draw up for him a list of the questions that they wished to discuss. After this had been provided, Gorchakov was able to give direct, and usually satisfactory, answers concerning almost all the points mentioned. Because of the importance of the issues raised, the major problems, with the Russian replies, are discussed here in greater detail. The first question that the Romanian government wanted settled dealt with consular jurisdiction and the capitulations. Negotiations on this extremely sensitive subject had already begun during the reign of Cuza. As in other parts of the Ottoman Empire, in the Principalities the great powers enjoyed rights of extraterritoriality that had been gained through special agreements, or capitulations, concluded in the past with the Porte. Through these the foreign consulates had acquired unusual privileges, including administrative and police functions, which they later expanded and often abused. Foreign merchants were also exempt from taxes and from payment for patents, that is, the papers allowing them to carry on business. The original justification for these arrangements had been the difficulties of subjecting Christians to Muslim laws and courts. The Romanian representatives now argued that consular jurisdiction of this type was not necessary in a Christian state. They thus requested that the capitulations should be annulled or a new arrangement made that would regulate the position of Russian

Russia and the Romanian national state subjects in the Principalities. Gorchakov agreed to renounce the capitulations and to make the requested arrangement. He refused to discuss the details, but he said that he would instruct Giers, then minister to Persia but at that time in St. Petersburg, to make a preliminary study. The negotiations would take place in Bucharest. In these conversations the Russian foreign minister emphasized the concession that Russia was making in consenting to discuss this matter without first referring to the other powers. He also warned that he could not allow Russian citizens to be placed at a disadvantage in relation to other foreigners in Romania and that provisions would have to be made on this matter. In regard to the question of patents, the Romanian representatives argued that it was unfair for foreign traders to refuse to pay the sum established by Romanian law and for them to be protected in this by the consuls; Romanian merchants were thus placed at a disadvantage. Gorchakov agreed that Russian merchants should pay the same amount for patents as did Romanian citizens. In a similar manner, the Romanian delegates wanted an agreement reached on the question of the application to Russian citizens of other Romanian civil laws, for example, those pertaining to births, deaths, and marriages. Gorchakov agreed that this too would be part of the new arrangement. The Romanian requests concerning the passage of arms and the negotiation of a postal convention were similarly met. In a further concession the Russian government agreed that the debt left from the costs of the Russian army of occupation in the Principalities during the Crimean War would be paid in four instead of eight years, a measure that aided the financially pressed Romanian government. Two matters were not settled by the foreign minister. The Romanian delegates wished to discuss the revenue on lands in Bessarabia belonging to Moldavian monasteries, payments that had been held back by the Russian government during the reign of Cuza as a result of the quarrel over church regulations and the Dedicated Monasteries. Regarding this as an ecclesiastical matter, Gorchakov replied that it should be handled by Ignatiev and that it belonged to the general negotiations concerning church affairs. Gorchakov also declined to take any initiative on a Romanian request that the foreign representatives in Bucharest be given the title of minister or charg£ d'affaires, instead of consul or consul-general. He believed that either Britain or France could better persuade the Porte to accept this measure, which Russia would then approve. Apart from these discussions, Melchisedek had two conversations with the metropolitan of St. Petersburg, in which the Romanian cleric attempted to reassure this important church dignitary about conditions 192

Prince Charles, 1866-18,71 in his country. Isidore was extremely concerned about Catholic activities in general and about Catholic propaganda in Romania, which he believed had commenced under Cuza. He was also suspicious about the actions of the Catholic powers, France and Austria-Hungary; Polish and Jesuit intrigue was similarly always a matter of deep concern and suspicion in Russian Orthodox circles. Melchisedek tried to reassure him that Orthodoxy was not in danger in Romania and that the prince, although himself a Catholic, did not serve as a tool of Catholic propaganda. The Romanian cleric emphasized that Charles wished to reestablish the church on the basis of the canons and historical rights and to bring the Russian and Romanian churches back to their former relationship. The delegates returned from this successful trip with letters to Charles from Alexander II and Gorchakov. The tsar in his message again placed his major emphasis on the religious question, writing that he was glad that Charles "shows himself filled with the desire to revive religious feeling in the country." "Faith," he declared, "is the most solid base of every social order. It has been in the past the traditional bond that has united the Principalities to Russia."109 Gorchakov also pressed this point. Negotiations on the still unsettled problem of the Dedicated Monasteries were of particular importance, since the tsar placed great weight on a question "that concerns the future of the church of the East." This issue would have to be settled on the basis of justice and general Orthodox sentiments. The matter, the foreign minister continued, concerned primarily the church and the Holy Places; Russia wished to conciliate the divergent positions.110 In the next months negotiations between the Principalities and Russia were concentrated primarily on the question of the church and the consular convention. Despite strong protests from the other protecting powers and the Porte, discussions were begun at once on the second matter.111 On February 27/March 10, 1868, Offenberg received instructions from the Asiatic Department to begin conversations in Bucharest on a new agreement to regulate the position of the consuls and the citizens of Romania and Russia in each other's countries. Ignatiev also took part in the discussions. A draft that offered many advantages to the Romanian government was prepared and sent to St. Petersburg. In this document the two negotiating states were regarded as being on an equal political level; Romania was given the right to appoint consuls in Russia; and the consular jurisdiction of Russian agents in the Principalities was significantly limited. Unfortunately for Romanian interests, the Russian government did not accept this initial version, largely because of the protests of other 193

Russia and the Romanian national state powers. Ignatiev too objected to the section allowing official Romanian representation in Russia. Since Gorchakov agreed with Ignatiev, Offenberg was directed in October to change the draft. The new instructions involved chiefly the question of the equality of the contracting partners and the appointment of Romanian consuls. Romania was to be allowed only unofficial representatives. The Russian government thus accepted the argument of the other powers that these questions, involving the relationship of Romania to the Porte and thus the treaties, could not be settled in this manner. The most important omission in the new version concerned the consuls. Since in this agreement, as in others made in the next years, the Romanian government was chiefly interested in securing a widening of its autonomous rights, this question was of major importance; the Russian draft was thus rejected. At the same time, at the end of 1868 and the beginning of 1869, after the dismissal of Bratianu, the Ghica ministry made attempts to improve its relations with Austria, France, and the Porte and to negotiate similar agreements with them. These efforts were unsuccessful. The Habsburg Monarchy wished to retain its special privileges connected with consular jurisdiction; the Porte naturally continued to deny that the Principalities could make agreements of this nature with another power without its participation. The question of the status of Romanian agents abroad also remained controversial. In April 1869 Steege was appointed as the special Romanian agent to Berlin, Vienna, and St. Petersburg.112 In May he went to the Russian capital, where he was received with the honors customarily accorded to an official representative. He discussed the consular agreement with Stremoukhov and with members of the finance and justice ministries. In writing to Charles, Steege emphasized his friendly reception and pointed out the importance of the question of the Dedicated Monasteries. He advised that this issue should be settled at once and voluntarily.113 He also made arrangements for a visit of the prince to the tsar in the Crimea, which was to take place in the summer. Returning to Bucharest on July 5/17, Steege brought with him another draft of the consular convention, which again raised difficulties. When Charles journeyed to the Crimea in August the matter was discussed further.114 Throughout this period foreign opposition continued, but finally, on November 29/December 11, an agreement was signed. In this convention, for the first time, the name "Romania" was used in an international document. In reporting on the course of the negotiations in April 1869 Offenberg admitted that the Porte might object to this designation. However, he argued, the Constitution of 1866 had formally substituted this name for "United Principalities," and there 194

Prince Charles, 1866-1871 had been no protest. Also "Romania" appeared on all the official papers and had been accepted. Although the Habsburg Monarchy had tried to refuse visas for passports with the designation, it had soon abandoned this effort. The postal convention between Vienna and Bucharest had the name at the head in the printed versions.115 The Porte did indeed at first protest, but this usage was soon to be adopted by all of the governments. In February 1870 Sturdza formally asked the Porte to recognize the name.116 In that month Russia officially accepted the designation, and the other powers soon followed.117 The signing of the draft of the consular agreement did not end the controversies. Since the terms were not fully satisfactory, the Romanian assembly refused to ratify the pact. Similarly, the Russian government, under pressure from abroad, rejected a final approval.118 In 1871, instead of a formal agreement, the Russian and Romanian governments exchanged notes limiting the jurisdiction of the Russian consuls in Romanian territory and putting into practice other sections of the pact.119 The appointment of an official Romanian representative in St. Petersburg was to be postponed until 1874. Progress was also slow on the church controversies. Two questions had to be settled. The first involved the new arrangement that had to be worked out for the Romanian church to replace the one made during the Cuza period, which had caused so many conflicts with St. Petersburg. This matter concerned chiefly the Romanian church hierarchy and the government, but the settlement had to have the approval of the patriarch. The second question, that of the Dedicated Monasteries, was handled through negotiations in Constantinople, with Ignatiev as moderator. The Russian ambassador had the unenviable task of trying to mediate a conflict that was national as well as religious. At the same time he was forced to deal with similar controversies between the Bulgarian and Greek ecclesiastical authorities. Ignatiev's prime aim remained the preservation of the unity of the Orthodox people and their close ties with Russia. He thus worked hard to secure an acceptable solution. In the same manner Charles too wished to find a satisfactory arrangement, but he could not accept a settlement that involved losses to the Romanian position, which would, in turn, damage his own prestige within the country. In January 1869 he wrote to the patriarch concerning the initiating of discussions.120 However, the entire question of the Dedicated Monasteries was soon to pass from the scene as a major issue in Russian-Romanian relations. Although negotiations continued, the Romanian government had in fact triumphed over the Patriarchates. The secularization of the monastery property was maintained, and no compensation was ever paid. 195

Russia and the Romanian national state At the same time work continued on the new church laws.121 Cuza had made Romanian bishops civil officials who were appointed by him and could similarly be dismissed by him. Article 21 of the Constitution of 1866 had dealt with the church question and declared: "The Orthodox church is and remains independent of any foreign hierarchy," but it was joined to the ecumenical Eastern church as regards dogma - a statement open to divergent interpretations. Because the interest of the Romanian legislature was centered chiefly on other matters, it had delayed regulating church affairs. There was also disagreement within the government and among the church officials concerning the terms of the settlement to be reached. The final version placed the control of the church in the hands of a synod of church officials with the minister of religion given only an advisory role in this body. Bishops were to be chosen from members of the monastic orders by the synod, but the election had to be confirmed by the prince. This settlement, once agreed upon in Romania, had to be submitted to the patriarch. In February 1870 he responded, giving his conditions for acceptance: the metropolitans elected in Romania were to be subject to his approval, his name was to be mentioned in prayers, and the holy oil was to be obtained from him.122 In addition, he found the necessity of securing the prince's assent to the decisions of the synod unacceptable, since that body was infallible and its decisions were not subject to review by a lay official. Because the Romanian government did not accept these terms, the entire question of the relationship with the Patriarchate remained open. Despite the continuation of negotiations on these matters, RussoRomanian relations in fact were not close. As long as Bratianu was in office the Russian government was constantly apprehensive about his intentions. Concern arose in particular about the strengthening of the revolutionary influences among the Bulgarian emigrants in Romania. Moreover, Gorchakov, like the leaders of other governments, feared that the Liberal ministry would proclaim independence without the consent of the protecting powers. This action could bring about the intervention of the states that could not tolerate a revolutionary center on their borders. The Russian statesman shared the general distrust and dislike of Bratianu. Although some European diplomats considered him a Rusian tool, Gorchakov feared that he was trying to play the role of a Bismarck in the East and to replace Russian influence with Romanian in Balkan affairs. As we have seen, the Russian government did not support the Austrian proposal for an Ottoman intervention, but the fall of Bratianu's ministry in November 1868 was certainly welcomed. With the advent of the Ghica administration, relations improved. During this period the Romanian government, under Conservative 196

Prince Charles, 1866-1&J1 leadership, sought not only to maintain ties with St. Petersburg, but to improve relations with all of the protecting powers and the Porte. Emphasis was placed on making gains by diplomatic means. The Romanian approaches were welcomed in Paris and Vienna. Throughout 1869 the French and Habsburg statesmen, in particular, made an effort to change what they believed was the strongly pro-Russian and pro-Prussian orientation of the Romanian government. After seeing the tsar at Livadia in August 1869, Charles visited the other European courts, where he was received as a reigning monarch. In their conversations with the prince and with other Romanian representatives, French and Habsburg statesmen strongly emphasized the theme of the danger to Romania from Russia. As Napoleon III told the Romanian agent in Paris, Ion Strat: "One cannot say as much about Russia, whose traditional policy, which has never been denied since the Treaty of Tilsit, has been and can only be that of incorporating the Principalities."123 Instead of an alignment with Russia, Romania was urged to form a dam against "Slavdom" and to head a movement of Balkan states apart from Russia. As the French foreign minister, Lavalette, urged Strat, Romania should "understand that your role in the East urgently demands that you become the most civilized and strong nation among all the Christian populations of the east."124 The state would then be the center of gravitation for the Balkan Christian peoples. Romanian interests were declared identical to those of France in this respect. In the Habsburg Monarchy both Austrian and Hungarian leaders spoke in a similar manner. Beust argued that it was better for Romania to remain under Ottoman control than to become independent and fall under Russian domination.125 Good relations with Hungary were forwarded in particular through the efforts of Marquis Gioacchimo Pepoli, an uncle of Charles, who was the Italian ambassador in Vienna.126 He urged that Romania cultivate close relations with Hungary and stop the national propaganda in Transylvania. Hungary and Romania together could seek a solution of the Eastern Question to the exclusion of Russia; in partnership they could form a dam against the Slavs. Transylvania was the natural fortress of the Magyars against the Slavs. For the present, Pepoli urged, the Romanian government should concentrate on its internal development so that the country could be a center to which the Christian population of the Balkans could turn. In June 1869 D. A. Sturdza reported that all the Hungarians wanted a union of their country, Romania, and the Ottoman Empire against the Slavs, but with Romania remaining in a vassal position.127 Although the removal of Bratianu improved Romanian relations with the powers, it left a very unstable domestic situation. The Conservative 197

Russia and the Romanian national state ministry needed advances in the national interest to strengthen its position within the country. The principal negotiations were of necessity with the Porte, but these did not proceed smoothly. As we have seen, the Ottoman government would make no concessions on the question of the Romanian right to negotiate agreements with other powers without the intervention of the suzerain state. The exact line of the Danube frontier between the Romanian lands and those of the rest of the empire was also in dispute. Equally important, however, was the controversy over Romania's desire to mint its own coins.128 The agreements in effect in 1866 allowed Romania to have its own coins, but of a low denomination and with an emblem representing the Ottoman Empire. Subsequently, the Romanian chamber passed a law providing that the money should have a national designation, and coins of a small value were issued. After further discussions, in which France supported the Romanian claims, the Porte accepted this action and agreed that silver and gold coins could be minted in the same manner. However, in March 1870, the Principalities issued a gold coin with a picture of Charles and the title "prince of Romania " but with no designation that the country was a part of the Ottoman Empire.129 All of the protecting powers, including Russia, protested. The Porte was particularly disturbed by this action, which in its eyes further demonstrated the unreliability of the Romanian government and its unwillingness to abide by the terms of the agreements made with it. This question remained a matter of further negotiation in the next years. T H E CRISIS OF

1870-1871

By 1870 the Romanian government had again succeeded in arousing the concern of all of the protecting powers and the Porte. In a period of reform designed to fortify the empire against further disintegration, the Ottoman government naturally resisted any Romanian attempts to throw off the few remaining links with Constantinople. All of the powers were hostile to the continued efforts to weaken the relationship with the Porte, and they were angry at the repeated violations of treaties. No state in the disturbed European environment of the early 1870s wanted Romania to precipitate another Eastern crisis by further moves toward independence. The Russian government, in addition, was not satisfied with Romanian internal conditions. The revolutionary spirit appeared to be rising; at the end of 1869 Offenberg reported on the increasing political agitation in the country, on the struggle between the "reds" and the conservatives, and on the growth of antidynastic sentiment.130 Russian concern over the Principalities as a revolutionary 198

Prince Charles, 1866-18.71 center had been a constant theme in the previous years. Even more significant was the Russian apprehension over what appeared to be closer ties between Romania and Russia's adversaries, which since the Polish uprising were France, Austria-Hungary, and, in some instances, Britain and the Ottoman Empire. In June 1870 an article in the Journal de St. Petersbourg expressed old fears in stating that the Western powers in 1856 had seen the Principalities as a kind of "sentinel" against Russia: Poland should be set up as a rampart against Muscovite ambition, Romania should represent an outpost... It is thus that one sees, in defiance of the protocols of Paris, the Moldo-Wallachians proclaim their union and later place at their head a foreign prince, flaunting the conference and the suzerain power. Europe and the Porte consoled themselves, thinking that they had played a trick on Russia.131

In addition, relations were not proceeding smoothly on individual matters. The consular convention had not been ratified, and negotiations between the Romanian government and the patriarch on church matters were progressing very slowly. In February 1870 Ignatiev spoke with D. A. Sturdza, now the Romanian representative in Constantinople, about the chamber's failure to approve the consular convention. Sturdza in his comments to his government expressed his regret about the delay, which he regarded as harmful to Romanian interests. The advantage that a swift conclusion could offer in persuading other powers to make similar agreements was being lost. He concluded: "A diplomat, who is in a position to know the details of this question, assured me that what is happening is more especially unfortunate since the decision taken by Russia was the result of the good impression that the mission of Monsieur Ion Cantacuzino and the Bishop of the Lower Danube produced at St. Petersburg."132 Meanwhile in Bucharest, Offenberg continued to comment in negative terms about the chaotic internal situation, although he was sympathetic to the prince personally. It will be remembered that at the beginning of his reign Charles had preferred to work with Bratianu and the Liberals. Largely owing to foreign pressure, he had been forced to change the basis of his government and to rely on moderates and conservatives for his ministry. The legislative bodies, in contrast, had remained in the hands of the Liberals. After November 1868 Bratianu was president of the assembly and N. Golescu of the senate. Amid the wide sweep of opinion designated as "liberal," the far left now stood for a strongly antidynastic position and for the establishment of a republic. The Liberals, who had been previously loudest in the call for a foreign prince and who had been responsible for Charles's nomination, were by this time his fiercest opponents. Although the prince had made 199

Russia and the Romanian national state adjustments in his internal affairs to suit the wishes of the powers, he had received no real gains from this policy of compliance that he could use to calm domestic criticism. He desperately needed to show major achievements in foreign affairs. It must also be remembered that Charles had no personal party; he was not even surrounded by a coterie of influential friends of the kind that had aided Cuza. In his reports to St. Petersburg Offenberg noted the increase in the opposition to the prince. Bratianu, because of his role in bringing Charles to power, retained a reserved position, but, the consul wrote, his associates had deserted the prince in favor of a republican stand.133 Offenberg himself blamed the tense situation on the constitution, which limited the powers of the executive and gave free rein to the expression of "revolutionary" opinion. Friendly to the prince, Offenberg was extremely critical of both the opposition leaders and the political system. He saw the conflicts in the government as simple struggles for power among ambitious individuals, with "malice, jealousy, greed or boredom" as the basis for the actions of groups with no ideals or plan of operation. "What they call the parliamentary regime in Romania is only the former game of intrigues in a modern form. Far from working for the good of the nation, it only excites passions, perverts ideas, and substitutes phrases for real progress."134 Neither the domestic nor the foreign situation was thus favorable when the candidacy of Charles's brother Leopold for the Spanish throne threw Europe into a major crisis. On June 7 / 19, 1870, Leopold accepted the nomination, an act that had immediate effects on Romania. The power most directly harmed by the candidacy was, of course, France. Although Napoleon had accepted a Hohenzollern in Bucharest in 1866, the Spanish throne was an entirely different matter. Not only had Prussian power increased in relative terms since 1866, but a Hohenzollern king in neighboring Spain could be a threat to French security, something a vassal prince on the lower Danube could never be. The French government had also not been consulted directly or indirectly on Leopold's nomination. A matter of vital importance for France had obviously arisen. The new crisis placed Charles in a most difficult position. As a Hohenzollern, whose brother was directly affected, the prince could only hope for a Prussian success, but the majority of his countrymen were bound to support France. Moreover, the question immediately involved French-Romanian relations and the influence that France could exert on Romanian internal policy. In July Strat telegraphed from Paris that the candidature was a real danger for Romania and that Charles should try to persuade his brother to decline. The French leaders did 200

Prince Charles, 1866-iSrji not hide their intentions. The foreign minister, Alfred de Gramont, told Strat that the moment Charles conspired against French interests, efforts would be made to overthrow him. Should war start, France would pursue a similar policy in order to give satisfaction to French public opinion, which blamed Napoleon for allowing a Hohenzollern prince to rule in Bucharest. Strat was so disturbed by the situation that he traveled to Sigmaringen to speak with Karl Anton.135 Largely because of the French reaction, Leopold officially renounced his candidacy on June 30/July 12. Thereafter relations between the French government and the prince improved. Napoleon III told Strat that Charles could count on him; the French government ended its contacts with his political opposition.136 However, the entire situation again became sensitive after France declared war on Prussia on July 7/19. The Romanian chamber immediately wished to express its proFrench sentiments, despite the fact that the treaties prescribed a policy of neutrality. A resolution was adopted stating that Romanian sympathies lay with the Latin race meaning, of course, France.137 Fully expecting a Prussian victory and believing that the war would remain localized, Charles used his influence to try to avoid any Romanian involvement. One issue, however, arose at once. After the war started it was made clear that the Russian government would honor the promise given previously by the tsar to Prussia to exert pressure on the Habsburg Monarchy to force it to remain neutral. Russia, although not a belligerent, was clearly in the Prussian camp. On July 12 / 24. Strat telegraphed that the French government wished to know if Romania would make a treaty should Russia enter the war. Romania would be obligated only in case of an actual conflict and would win advantages at the peace. The Romanian government replied: If France categorically demands from us the signature of a treaty that would influence our attitude toward Russia in case of an Eastern complication then you are empowered to conclude this treaty on the following basis: The Romanian government is determined hand in hand with the Western Powers and Turkey to oppose any hostile step of Russia . . . We could provide a well-armed army of 30,000 men.138

On July 13/25 Strat informed his government that there was no need for an agreement. He also reported that Gramont had given further assurances that the French government would support Charles, and that he had spoken with D. Bratianu.139 The latter in turn had promised in the name of his party that attacks would not be made on the prince or his ministry.

The position of France in regard to Romania was complicated by the French friendship with the Habsburg Monarchy. During the war in 201

Russia and the Romanian national state particular the government wanted to maintain these good relations. It therefore wished to assure that no event would occur that might lead Vienna to fear an outside attack. Within Romania, of course, the antidynastic pro-French faction was also vigorously irredentist and anti-Hungarian. As such, it was bound to disturb Hungarian opinion, which in turn would influence the monarchy's stand in other affairs. Therefore, throughout this period, France stood behind Charles and wished him to keep the throne. His relations with the French consulate were good. During the crisis the Russian government, as we have seen, took an attitude favorable to Prussian interests. When the question of the candidacy of Leopold arose, the Russian reaction was in essence indifference. Gorchakov compared it to the situation in 1866 when Russia had protested over the election of Charles. Once Leopold withdrew, the tsar and Gorchakov felt that no further grounds existed for French discontent. On July 4/16 Alexander II gave Bismarck additional assurances of his attitude in case of a war; he told the Prussian representative, Pfuel, that if Austria declared war on Prussia, Russia would concentrate an army of 300,000 on the Habsburg border and, if necessary, occupy Galicia. On July 11/23 the tsar informed the Habsburg government that Russia would remain neutral only if the monarchy adopted a similar attitude. Once the war commenced and the Prussian victories occurred, Gorchakov wanted a European conference called to negotiate the final settlement. When Prussia refused his solution, and when it became probable that France would lose Alsace and Lorraine, the Russian government turned its main efforts toward seeking compensation.140 The war presented the Russian government with the welcome opportunity of breaking the section of the Treaty of Paris that it regarded as the most damaging and the most humiliating - that concerning the neutralization of the Black Sea. This action had been the major Russian foreign policy goal since 1856. Even before his government had determined on such a course of action, Ignatiev had discussed the question with Ali. On October 15/27, in a meeting attended by Gorchakov, Miliutin, and other Russian advisers, Alexander II decided to denounce the Black Sea clauses. According to his own account, Miliutin argued against the retaking of southern Bessarabia, a matter that was also discussed.141 The method chosen, a unilateral denunciation, was to cause more controversy than the act itself. On October 19/31 Gorchakov announced the Russian intentions in a circular dispatch to the Russian representatives abroad. It is interesting to note that he used the repeated Romanian violation of treaties during the previous years as his main argument justifying the Russian move. In view of these previous ac202

Prince Charles, 1866-1871 tions breaking the Treaty of Paris, he wrote, "it would be difficult to affirm that written law, based on respect for treaties as the base of public law and the rule for relations between states, has conserved the same moral sanction that it has had in other times." Concerning Romania he wrote: We have seen the principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia, whose destiny has been determined by the treaty of peace and by the subsequent protocols, under the guarantee of the great powers, carry out a series of revolutions contrary to the spirit as well as the letter of these transactions . . . which have led them first to union, then to the call for a foreign prince. These deeds occurred with the recognition of the Porte, with the acquiescence of the great Powers, or at least without these [states] believing it necessary to make their judgments respected. The Representative of Russia has been the only one to raise his voice to point out to the cabinets that they put themselves in contradiction to the explicit stipulations of the treaty by that tolerance.142 In a further instruction to Brunnow, whose arguments were designed to be communicated to the British government, Gorchakov elaborated on the theme that treaties had been broken and that Russia alone could not be expected to honor them. This document also carried the strong implication that Russian interests had been harmed by the national development of the Romanian state: What should impress Russia in these modifications is not the tendency to factious hostility in her regard, of which they bear the imprint; it is not even the consequences that the creation on its frontiers of a small semiindependent state can have for a great country; it is above all the facility with which, scarcely ten years after its conclusion, a solemn transaction, clothed in a European guarantee, can be violated in its letter and in its spirit, under the eyes of the same powers who should be the guardians. In the presence of such a precedent, what value can Russia attach to the effectiveness of that transaction and to the pledge of security that she had believed to find in the principle of the neutralization of the Black Sea? The equilibrium established in the east by the Treaty of 1856 is thus disrupted to the detriment of Russia. The resolution taken by Our August Master has no other aim than to reestablish it.143 The Russian denunciation became immediately the subject of an exchange of messages among the governments.144 No power was content with the method, the timing, or the action itself. Even though Prussia and Austria-Hungary had previously promised to support the Russian desire to modify the treaty, both were displeased by the introduction of a new issue in the general European crisis. Bismarck wanted no more problems to arise until the conflict with France was settled. The strongest reaction, however, came from Britain, which saw its major gain from the costly Crimean War nullified. Austria-Hungary supported the 203

Russia and the Romanian national state British stand. In his reply to the Russian government, Beust discussed the question of Romania and argued that, because of its status, its actions could not be used as a justification of the denunciation: it was not a signatory of the Treaty of Paris, and it was under the suzerainty of the Porte.145 In a dispatch of November 10/22 Gorchakov answered this argument in terms that well expressed the Russian frustration in dealing with the Principalities in the past.146 He recognized, he stated, that Moldavia and Wallachia were indeed not signatories of the peace agreement. These provinces, joined to the Porte by relations of vassality, cannot be contracting parties of transactions concluded between great powers. They had no part in them and cannot be made responsible for the infringements of which they have been the pretext, in carrying through internal revolutions under the inspiration of their local passions. The infraction rests precisely in the fact that the great powers, meeting in conference, after having in vain pronounced judgments that imposed a reprimand on the faits accomplis, have ended by tolerating them and recognizing them, although they were contrary to the spirit as well as to the letter of the treaty and although the Plenipotentiary of Russia pointed out that this tolerance placed them in formal contradiction with the stipulations of this treaty. This infraction does not only invalidate the idea of law. It tends by its consequences to modify the situation in the basin of the Black Sea, by introducing a third riverain not foreseen by the treaty . . . which, connected to the center of the continent by a network of commercial and strategic routes, can acquire a political importance much superior to its geographic dimensions.147

In commenting on the Russian arguments, the British ambassador in Constantinople, Sir Henry Elliot, pointed out: It has perhaps escaped the memory of the Government of His Majesty, that it was Count Kiselev, plenipotentiary of Russia at the conference of Paris, who, in the meetings of May 22 and June 5, 1858, declared that the almost unanimous desire of the Principalities in favor of a union under the government of a foreign prince was legitimate and rational, and that it was the same Count Kiselev who invoked the same Treaty of Paris in favor of their right to have their demand taken into consideration.148

The question of the Russian denunciation was finally settled in November when the powers agreed to hold a conference in London whose discussions were to be limited to this question. The meetings did not commence until January, however, and meanwhile an internal crisis had occurred in Romania. The crushing defeat of France had been a great shock to the Romanian leaders, particularly to the Liberals. Despite disagreements in the past years, France had been the major supporter of the Romanian national movement. Romanian propaganda had repeatedly laid stress on common Latin racial ties. D. A. Sturdza expressed his surprise and 204

Prince Charles, 1866-1871 chagrin in these words: "What a terrible lesson for little people and weak states! If a great nation, so civilized, so well organized, so powerful as the French, can suffer because of levity, of lack of prudence such great defeats, Romania should tremble over the results of a policy, where folly and anarchy dictate law."149 After the Franco-Prussian War broke out there was concern in Romania that Russia would make a move, and probably one involving Bessarabia. Rumors abounded of Russian concentrations of troops across the frontier. Aware of these fears, the Russian government on July 22/August 3 published in the Journal de St. Petersbourg a denial both of the troop concentrations and of the intention of intervening in Romania unilaterally. On September 24/October 6 Offenberg gave further assurances of Russia's peaceful intentions.150 Nevertheless, most observers in Romania, like those in Europe, expected Russia to take advantage of the situation and to seek some compensation to balance Prussia's great gains. After the denunciation of the Black Sea clauses the Romanian government remained concerned over Russian intentions, even though southern Bessarabia had not been mentioned. When the question of a conference came up, fears arose that this issue might be raised in such a meeting, where, of course, Romania would not have a representative. Strat was sent to London to try to get support for the Romanian interest. The foreign minister, Nicholas Callimachi Catargi, wrote: "Our country is fully satisfied with its political situation; it considers the Treaty of Paris with the subsequent international acts as the best guaranty of its security; so that all its wishes are for a strict status quo without as well as within."151 Meanwhile, Charles was preparing to move in a contrary direction. Despite the Prussian victories, which had naturally aroused his great enthusiasm, the prince was becoming increasingly discouraged with the Romanian domestic situation and with his own position as prince. In February 1870 he had replaced the Ghica cabinet with one led by the Liberal A. G. Golescu, which lasted until May, when Monolache Costache Epureanu, a Conservative, became premier. This weak government was the constant target of attack from its opponents, who continued to dominate the legislatures. In reporting on conditions in the country, Offenberg commented on the attacks on the prince and the pro-French manifestations in the assembly, where each speaker tried to surpass the previous in praise of the "Latin races." The consul himself believed that the intensity of the pro-French position was not entirely sincere, but rather a cover for antidynastic actions. Many saw it as a means of ridding the country of Charles by linking him to an anticipated Prussian defeat. Offenberg recognized that if France won, the 205

Russia and the Romanian national state prince's position would be "difficult, if not desperate."152 France, of course, was officially supporting the status quo exactly because the government feared such complications in the East at this time. Once Prussia began to win victories on the battlefield, Offenberg reported the resulting sensation in Romania. He believed that these victories would help the prince, commenting: "This country resists with difficulty the prestige of power and yields willingly to all those who are able to serve its interests."153 Until the results of the war were clearly apparent, however, Charles remained in a precarious situation. The outward signs of opposition increased. The height of agitation occurred when on August 8/20 a revolt broke out in Ploesti, the leaders of which supported an antidynastic and republican program.154 Even worse, in October the participants were acquitted, an act that Offenberg denounced as giving a sort of legal sanction to armed revolt and as justifying in the eyes of the population attacks against authority.155 Despite the Prussian military successes, culminating in the capitulation of Napoleon III at Sedan on August 21/ September 2, the continued opposition on the domestic front led Charles by the end of October to consider abdication. First, however, he decided that he should address himself to the protecting powers directly and inform them of his difficulty in governing with the liberal constitution. This action would be a first step toward his abdication. Although he had sworn to uphold the constitution and would do so as long as he reigned, he hoped that his successor would rule under better conditions. At the beginning of December, without the knowledge or approval of his ministers, he sent personal letters to the rulers of Britain, Italy, the Habsburg Empire, Prussia, and Russia. In these messages he attempted to "show clearly to the guarantor powers the state of affairs in Romania in order to know that the future of the country was assured before leaving/' 156 He also wanted the powers to discuss the Romanian question at the conference, a course of action that of course, his government opposed. The prince also wrote to the journalist Auerbach, expressing his displeasure at conditions in Romania. This letter, which was printed in the Augsburger Zeitung, contained a direct attack on the Liberals and a strong criticism of Romania's political system. He blamed the difficulties on these people who, forgetting the situation of their country, have had their political and social education abroad, have no other thought than to apply at home and without discrimination ideas accepted there and clothed in a certain Utopian form. It is thus that this unhappy country, which has always lived in the hardest 206

Prince Charles, 1866-1871 servitude, has passed, without any transition, from a despotic government to the most liberal constitution, a constitution the likes of which no other people in Europe possess. I consider this, after my own experience, as a misfortune so much greater in that the Romanians cannot flatter themselves as possessing the domestic virtues indispensable for a quasi-republican constitution. 157

Neither Charles's letter to the rulers nor that just quoted remained long a secret. Copies of both soon appeared in Romanian newspapers. Charles not only had not discussed the letters with his ministers, but he had also written directly to the rulers over the head of the sultan. The prince in fact sent a letter to Abdul Aziz only after three weeks and on the strong urging of the British consul in Bucharest, John Green. Charles thus was acting without the consent or approval of his government or the Porte. These events placed the Romanian representatives abroad in an extremely awkward position. The reaction within the country was, as could be expected, extremely negative, particularly on the left. The prince had openly criticized the country and its institutions. Moreover, his action had been taken at a time of international crisis. On December 16/28 Charles appointed a Liberal government, again headed by Ion Ghica, with Callimachi Catargi as foreign minister. Ghica was not regarded as a strong supporter of the prince, and he felt that the constitution was workable.158 Thus neither the cabinet nor the legislature could be expected to assist Charles. From an international point of view the prince's initiative had been exceedingly ill-timed. It provided an opportunity for all of the forces inimical to Charles to come into play. The state most affected was, of course, the Porte. The Ottoman leaders agreed with Charles that the country could not be governed under the existing constitutional system; a change would have to be made. The Ottoman government, however, did not like the prince's methods, which were considered illegal. It also believed that Charles's intention was not to change the constitution as much as to alter the relationship of Romania with the empire. Should this question be brought up at the coming conference, the Ottoman delegates would leave.159 The letters did indeed strengthen the Ottoman position in regard to Romania. Discussions were being carried on at this time in preparation for the conference that was to be held in London. As the power most severely injured by the Russian denunciation of the Black Sea clauses, the Ottoman government could be expected to claim some sort of compensation. Although its leaders would have preferred the maintenance of the provisions intact, they recognized that this was impossible. It was therefore decided that, as compensation, a change would again be sought in Article 27 of the treaty, which, as we have seen, limited the 207

Russia and the Romanian national state Ottoman right of military intervention in Romania.160 The Ottoman Empire once more tried to have itself named specifically as the state that would occupy the country in a time of crisis, although it was willing to act only with the consent of the guaranteeing powers, and although the Ottoman army would be accompanied by commissioners of these states. Charles's letters naturally gave support to the Ottoman arguments about the instability of the Romanian political situation. If the prince indeed abdicated, anarchy could prevail or a republic be established. In either case a military force in the opinion of the Porte, would have to be sent in to set up an acceptable regime. Therefore the powers were to be asked to agree that the Turkish army should carry out this task. A new government would then be organized, based on the international agreements, with the separation of the Principalities and the appointment of native princes. The Porte, it was emphasized, could not permit the formation of "a hotbed of anarchy" or a "Red Republic" because of the effect on the other members of the Ottoman Christian population.161 The Ottoman government thus proposed that Charles be allowed to try to handle the situation. When he failed, as he was expected to do, the powers should then take the responsibility of providing Romania with a new administration. After the prince had left the country, the Ottoman army, accompanied by commissioners of the powers, would be sent in and Moldavia and Wallachia would be separated. A new political system would then be introduced by the protecting powers. Although the Ottoman proposals were not accepted, the sympathy with which some sections were met, particularly from the Habsburg Monarchy and Russia, clearly showed the precarious position of Romania after the defeat of France, the one power that had usually stood behind the principle of unity. No other power gave similar assistance or had the same direct interest in Romanian integrity. The prince himself had no real support among the great powers, including Prussia; Bismarck at this time was highly annoyed by this added complication in the international scene. On January 12/24 William replied to the prince's letter and warned him that he must rely completely on his own internal support and not count on aid from the outside.162 The British leaders, who were in favor of the constitution and the principle that the wishes of the Romanian people should be followed, consistently expressed strong personal criticisms of the prince. Austria-Hungary and Russia were more understanding of Charles's desire to change the constitution, but they were also ready to consider separating the Principalities. 208

Prince Charles, 1866-1&J1 A major complication at this stage was that Charles's letter was largely misunderstood. In fact, some diplomats regarded it as little more than an attempt by Charles to strengthen his personal position and to change the constitution. Others agreed with the Porte that the real aim was to use the international crisis to advance Romania toward independence. Most of the European statesmen were also personally unsympathetic to the prince. Previous strong attacks on his government and his person in the European and Romanian press had produced their effect. It was widely felt, particularly in the West, that conditions in the country were chaotic and that Charles was in a hopeless position. He did not appear to have firm control of the army, and he did not have a political party on which he could count. Despite the almost universal criticism of Romanian political conditions and of the prince, the powers were faced with the familiar and unpleasant task of deciding what they should do about a Romanian crisis. All of the alternatives available presented enormous difficulties. The conservative powers feared that if the monarchy fell, either anarchy or a republic would replace it; division of the Principalities and a return to the old hospodarial system was thus seen as preferable. The other states wished the maintenance of a constitutional system. None, however, could see how any influence could be exerted in the area without a military intervention, which the Porte desired to carry through. On this issue, as on the others, the protectors split into opposing camps. Romanian interests, in particular as regards a military intervention, were probably best protected by Britain, despite that state's steadfast determination to uphold Ottoman integrity. The Porte's desire to send an armed force into the Principalities was firmly rejected. At the same time, the actions of the prince were harshly criticized. For instance, the Romanian agent in Constantinople, Balaceanu, reported that Elliot "thinks that there are in the last letter of his Highness some matters profoundly wounding for our country and that this letter in showing that the prince of Romania still considers himself as a Prussian" harmed him as much abroad as at home.163 Green described his position at this time as that of "a complete nonentity, a mere ornamental expression of mock sovereignty, in a country which had never been accustomed to view their Princes in any other light than that of irresponsible Governors invested with sufficient power to cause their decisions to be respected."164 The British government at this time was headed by a Liberal cabinet with William E. Gladstone as prime minister and the Earl of Granville as foreign secretary. Gladstone was personally annoyed by the prince's letter, which had been addressed to Queen Victoria. In January he 209

Russia and the Romanian national state wrote to Granville: "What scandalizes me in P. (Prince) Charles' letter is its shabby intriguing clandestine character. I hope it may be found proper and practical to snub him."165 In his instructions to Green, Granville told him not to support attempts to change the constitution. On the question of abdication the foreign secretary advised that, if Charles really intended to leave, he should inform the responsible Romanian leaders. They could then plan for the future, and the powers would subsequently judge if their actions were according to the treaties. The British government opposed direct military intervention, such as the Porte desired, since the political decisions should be made by the Romanians without outside interference. Granville feared that if "the Powers take a contrary course and assume the initiative of giving a government to the Principalities, they will in some degree be responsible for its proper working."166 In contrast to the conservative powers and the Porte, Britain, particularly during the Gladstone administration, felt that the wishes of the Romanians should be determined before the political institutions of the country were changed. Of course, by the Romanian "people" the British government meant the restricted group that held the franchise. The Habsburg government too believed that Charles's true goal was to increase his own power and make a move toward independence. Although not sympathetic to the Hohenzollern prince, most Austrian diplomats considered him the best available ruler. Like the British they favored a moderate solution to the Romanian problem, and they did not support any particular party. They were against a unilateral Ottoman intervention, but were more willing to consider the eventual separation of the provinces than the British. Nevertheless Count Rudolf Apponyi, the Habsburg ambassador in Britain, told Granville that such a change should not be imposed by the powers against the wishes of the people. Beust instructed Prokesch along a similar line. The Habsburg foreign minister himself felt that Ottoman policy was shortsighted. When united, the Principalities were a barrier against Russia. Divided, they might fall under exclusive Russian influence, Moldavia in particular.167 Russia's role in these discussions was not as active as that of Britain, Austria-Hungary, and the Ottoman Empire. Gorchakov was primarily concerned with gaining the powers' acceptance of the ending of neutralization of the Black Sea. The reannexation of southern Bessarabia, the second major aim, was postponed for the future. Although it had no immediate goals to secure, the Russian government continued to be deeply concerned with the political evolution of the neighboring 210

Prince Charles, 1866-18,71 state. On February 16/28 the tsar finally responded to Charles's appeal. He wrote that he understood the difficulties of the prince's position, but that he regretted the decisions that had been taken. The protecting powers could give only moral support. The emphasis in the message was on the dangers of revolutionary activity. Everywhere it is the inertia of men of good will that brings the success of revolutions. Conservative elements exist in Romania. The fear of the disorder that would follow your withdrawal will contribute perhaps to gather them around you. In working for this with firmness and perseverence, I am pleased to believe that you will attain a better situation. Your task is arduous, but it is worthy of your efforts.168

At the beginning of the crisis Gorchakov had believed that Charles would abdicate. Because he feared that disorders would result, he was at first not against an intervention, provided that it was not a unilateral Habsburg action. Should a "red republic" be set up, he was willing to consider an Ottoman occupation if it was on the basis of the treaties. On the question of the separation of the Principalities, Gorchakov did not object in principle to a return to the Treaty of Paris but he believed that Russia should take no steps to initiate it. Like the British and the Habsburg governments, the Russian hoped that the Romanian question would be settled without the necessity of outside intervention. Compared to other questions at issue in international relations at the time, Romanian affairs were of secondary importance. In his conversations with the Ottoman officials, Ignatiev stood for a similar point of view. Sharing a common fear of what might happen should the prince fall, the ambassador did not oppose an Ottoman occupation in principle. He similarly agreed that a return to the system of two provinces was acceptable. Throughout the crisis he kept in mind the possible Russian use of the situation to take back southern Bessarabia. For instance, in a secret dispatch to Gorchakov of September 9/21, 1870, he reported the Porte's intention not to tolerate a republican government in the Principalities. If one were proclaimed, and an occupation were agreed upon, Ignatiev thought that Russia could perhaps reoccupy the lost territory.169 Meanwhile, Offenberg continued to write dispatches that were sympathetic to the prince and intensely critical of the Liberal politicians. The consul had known of Charles's abdication plans and, on instructions, had warned him not to act. In arguing the prince's case, Offenberg wrote that Charles did not want to remain the "involuntary plaything and flag-holder" for the parties fighting for power. He had appealed to the powers because he could not continue under the same 211

Russia and the Romanian national state conditions. The consul thought that the prince would leave without regret if he could do so in an honorable manner. He was also willing to sacrifice himself for the situation in Germany.170 Offenberg's attitude toward the constitution and the laws of the country remained, as before, highly critical. They placed the government of the country, he complained, in the hands of "the most dangerous class of Romanian society, that composed of lawyers, clerks, journalists and other representatives of the ideas of republican France." These people dominated the ministries and opposed Charles. He also feared what would happen if the prince were overthrown. There was no dominant party or individual. If the guarantors did not act, he expected the establishment of a republic, which would be "restless, aggressive and irresponsible."171 After the first of the year Offenberg became more optimistic about the prince's chances of remaining in power. He felt that Charles could win if he acted effectively and was able to gain changes in the constitution but, he noted with regret, "firm decisions and energetic actions" were foreign to the prince's nature.172' On January 30/ February 11 he wrote that Charles should seize the political leadership and should base his actions on the Conservatives, whose interests he had often sacrificed to constitutional practices. With another assembly and ministry the prince could control the situation. The consul continued to believe that the Prussian victory would aid the prince; the French disaster had been a shock to those who took inspiration from that country. Aside from his opinions on the immediate situation, Offenberg retained his negative sentiments on Romanian political life. In addition to the dynastic question, he commented, there was also a Romanian question: The Byzantine spirit and modern corruption, acting together on the rude instincts of Moldo-Wallachian society, have produced a state of affairs absolutely incompatible with the needs of the civilization and the positive interests of Europe. Led on by their national vanity and encouraged by a too long impunity, the Romanians believe today that they can do anything they want.173

When by March there had been no improvement in the situation. Offenberg, again pessimistic, reported that no one was paying any attention to the prince and that the ministry and legislatures were doing nothing, against a background of increasing financial disorder.174 Although the Romanian politicians did not know the details of the great-power discussions, the extreme danger of the situation was obvious. The domestic crisis was somewhat eased when Charles at the beginning of the year was able to gain an expression of support from both the senate and the chamber, although their statements conflicted on the major issue: the question of the constitution. The declaration 212

Prince Charles, 1866-1&J1 of the chamber stated: "The chamber, as a result of explanations given by the ministers, expresses with profound emotion its sentiments of devotion for the throne and the dynasty that are guaranteed by the Constitution and full of confidence in the future of the country, determined to hold steadfastly to the Constitution, it proceeds with the business of the day."175 The more lengthy senate declaration read in part that the current state of affairs had resulted from the "application of our new laws in view of the degree of our political education and in part from the propagation of certain erroneous ideas that are entirely foreign to the spirit and to the patriotic sentiment of the great majority of the nation."176 On February 3/15 the ministers asked the prince to reconsider his decision to abdicate and to think "of the responsibility, which he would assume before history if by his abdication he delivered the country to ruin."177 Charles thus had received tokens of support from within the country, but no similar signs of approval abroad either for his rule or for his attempt to change the constitution. On March 10/22 the final event in the abdication episode took place. On this day the German colony in Bucharest held a dinner in honor of the birthday of William I, with the German consul-general, Joseph Maria von Radowitz, presiding. A large crowd invaded the hall, and anti-German and antidynastic demonstrations disrupted the celebration.178 The premier, Ion Ghica, did not handle the situation with firmness. As a result, Radowitz delivered a strong protest and demanded that his government resign. The prince asked D. Ghica to form a ministry, but he refused. Charles then announced his intention of calling together the regency that had been in power before his accession and of transferring to it his authority. In this crisis the Romanian political leaders recognized finally the extreme danger in which their country could be placed. An abdication could lead to internal chaos and foreign intervention. The Conservatives, in particular, rallied to the prince's support and were able to put aside for a time their individual differences. When Charles received appeals to change his decision, he agreed not to resign if the legislature would approve a ministry that he could accept and would vote the laws that he needed. On March 11 /2% a new ministry, with Lascar Catargiu as premier and minister of interior, George Costaforu as foreign minister, and General Ion E. Florescu as minister of war, was appointed. Since this ministry was based on a minority in the legislatures, elections soon proved necessary. They were conducted by the men in power, who used tactics perfected previously by the Liberals, and a majority was obtained. Offenberg regarded the results with satisfaction; he be213

Russia and the Romanian national state lieved the ministry was the best one since the union had been established. He also approved of the assembly; dominated by boyars, it had a better attitude, in his judgment, than its predecessor. Although Charles still declared his intention of abdicating if he could not work with the new political order, there was every indication that he would have fewer problems with the Conservative ministry under the determined leadership of Catargiu. Despite the fact that the Porte took the occasion to deliver a strong warning to Bucharest, the prince thereafter also tried to improve his relations with the sultan. In May Charles received a personal letter from Abdul Aziz, the first time that an Ottoman ruler had sent such a message to a vassal prince.179 Although few of the main issues in either the domestic or the international situation had been settled, political life within Romania became more tranquil. Charles had not changed the constitution, but he had acquired a government that would assure stable internal conditions for the next five years. He had received no support from the protecting powers, but their divisions had again prevented them iii combination from intervening in Romanian internal affairs. As far as relations with Russia went, the tsar had shown personal sympathy, but his main concern was over the London Conference and the status of the Black Sea and the Turkish Straits. The Russian government still preferred a division of the Principalities, but certainly no active measures were to be taken to this end. The principal fear was over the establishment of truly revolutionary governments in Bucharest. Then an intervention might be necessary, but it was to be accomplished according to the treaties and with a general European sanction. The years since 1866 had thus brought about exactly those political conditions which the Russian government had previously tried to avoid: a foreign prince and a constitutional regime based on liberal principles. Nevertheless, the picture was not entirely black. European international relations in these years were dominated by the events culminating in the unification of Germany under Prussian leadership, an event that enjoyed Russian approval. During this period, as we have seen, Bismarck and the Prussian government used their influence to urge the Hohenzollern prince to work with Russia. If a foreign prince was inevitable, Charles was from the Russian viewpoint perhaps the best candidate. His ability to meet the internal domestic pressures and to guide Romanian foreign policy had, of course, yet to be demonstrated. Nevertheless, after the crisis of 1871 it could be expected that the prince, with his new Conservative regime, would initiate a period of better relations between Bucharest and St. Petersburg. 214

CHAPTER V

Prince Charles, 1871-1878: the Eastern crisis

T H E CATARGIU GOVERNMENT: THE FIRST PERIOD

With the successful conclusion for Russia of the London Conference and the establishment of the government of Lascar Catargiu, a period of comparative calm that was to last until the spring of 1876 was introduced in the foreign policies of both Russia and Romania. General European diplomatic affairs remained in a similar condition. Like the other European states, both the Russian and the Romanian governments had to adjust to the new diplomatic balance that had come about with the unifications of Germany and Italy, the reorganization of the Habsburg Monarchy, and the weakening of France. For Romania the elimination of France as a major element in Eastern diplomacy was to be of prime significance for the future. Although relations had not always been smooth, this power had contributed more to Romanian national development than any other state. Since the two countries were geographically separated, France could never pose the same threat to Romanian territory as had the neighboring Habsburg Monarchy, the Ottoman Empire, and Russia at different periods. The new Germany was not to be a substitute despite Charles's Hohenzollern family ties. Bismarck was to prove particularly difficult, as would be shown in the negotiations over the controversial Strousberg railroad concession. He was also a man to hold a grudge. In May, in a conversation with Peter P. Carp, he complained about the Romanian attitude during the Franco-Prussian War, the comments in the press, and other incidents that had occurred and concluded: "We are the friends of our friends and the enemies of our enemies."1 He also showed no objection to the possible separation of the Principalities. In future crises he was 215

Russia and the Romanian national state constantly to subordinate the interests of Romania to those of Russia. His policy in the 1870s, as during the period of German unification, was to maintain the close ties between Berlin and St. Petersburg. As far as Balkan affairs were concerned, he favored the division of the peninsula into Austrian and Russian spheres of influence, a policy that, of course, did not correspond to the interests of the Balkan states. Britain also was to remain a power on whose support the Romanian government could not reckon. Primarily interested in maintaining the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire, the British government consistently opposed the Romanians' efforts to widen their autonomous rights. Moreover, the British diplomats and statesmen continued to hold the critical and bitter attitude toward Bucharest that we have seen in the past. No attempt was made to gain a political position in the Principalities or to use this connection to balance Russia's improved position at Constantinople after the end of the neutralization of the Black Sea. For both Romania and Russia the most important power for Balkan affairs was the Habsburg Monarchy. This state, after the defeat of 1866 and reorganization of 1867, was undoubtedly in a weaker condition than before. Moreover, the direction the country would take after the Ausgleich - in particular, the major influence to be exerted in foreign policy by the Hungarian interests - was not at first apparent. In November 1871 Julius Andrassy replaced Beust as foreign minister. The advantages and disadvantages of his appointment for both Bucharest and St. Petersburg were the subject of debate in both capitals. The Hungarian emphasis that Andrassy introduced into Habsburg policy was to be detrimental to the Romanian concern over conditions in Transylvania. He was, however, a member of the generation of 1848, the group that had brought about Romanian unification and the appointment of the foreign prince. His basic antagonism to Russia assured that the monarchy would not come to an agreement with St. Petersburg that would seriously compromise Romanian integrity. Undoubtedly, Russian influence on Balkan affairs was greatly strengthened by the breaking of Black Sea clauses of the Treaty of Paris. The change was principally in matters of prestige. Until Russian Black Sea fortifications were restored and until a fleet could be built, the balance of military power in the area remained the same. With enormous internal problems, chiefly financial, the Russian government was in no position to rush the remilitarization of the Black Sea. In fact, at this time the principal Russian statesmen, recognizing the primacy of internal concerns, had no interest in a militant foreign policy. They 216

Prince Charles, 1871-1878 desired no advancement in the Balkans, and they wished no complications to arise in the area. The desire of Russia, the Habsburg Monarchy, and Germany for a period of peace and stability on the Continent was expressed in the Three Emperors' Alliance. This agreement, which was based not on a formal treaty, but rather on understandings reached among the three monarchs during their visits to one another, meant that these states would act together in foreign affairs. As long as the partners remained in agreement, they could, of course, dominate European diplomacy. Since the preservation of the status quo was the basis of the alignment, any radical Romanian attempts to move toward independence were likely to be received unfavorably. In addition, like their predecessors in the Holy Alliance, the three rulers agreed on a common defense against revolutionary forces, an attitude that would also affect Romanian internal affairs. The defeat of France and the subsequent joining together of the three conservative powers signified for Romania that a policy of playing the guarantor states against one another would henceforth be very difficult. As long as Vienna and St. Petersburg remained in agreement, they could dominate Romanian policy. If they opposed changes in the Balkans, any Romanian steps forward would be impossible. Conditions within the Ottoman Empire after 1871 also favored the maintenance of the status quo. After the death of Ali in 1871, the Ottoman government entered a period of decline. Sultan Abdul Aziz took a leading part in state affairs. Although attempts were made to improve internal conditions and to strengthen and modernize the military establishment, the process of decomposition continued. Ministries changed frequently between 1871 and 1876, but one minister, Mahmud Nedim, emerged as the most influential figure in the government. Working closely with Ignatiev and the Russian embassy, he assured the primacy of Russian influence in Constantinople. With this advantageous position, Ignatiev supported not Balkan liberation, but at least a temporary return to the policy of Unkiar Iskelesi. Balkan problems were to be settled by close agreement between St. Petersburg and Constantinople; peace and the status quo were to be maintained in the Balkans as well as in Europe proper. Of course, both Britain and the Habsburg Empire continued to defend Ottoman integrity. Despite the unity of the powers on the basic question of the maintenance of the empire, the Romanian government was able to make some advances in the national direction and to resist Ottoman attempts to infringe Romanian autonomous rights. Most of the incidents were 217

Russia and the Romanian national state minor, and Romania usually did receive support from St. Petersburg. In July 1871 a crisis occurred over the railroad question when the Romanian government terminated the contract with the German Strousberg concern because of mismanagement and fraud. In an attempt to exert pressure on Romania in behalf of the company, Bismarck turned to the Ottoman government, basing his action on the fact that, according to the Treaty of Paris, the Porte represented Romania in foreign affairs. The Romanian government countered that the railroad controversy was a strictly internal matter, and support for this interpretation came from Russia.2 In 1872 the Romanian government and the bondholders came to an agreement, but further controversies were to arise over this question in the future. In 1872 the Ottoman government made a proposal that would have severely limited Romanian rights. The suggestion was that the empire be reorganized in a manner that would give areas like Romania and Serbia a position similar to that of Bavaria and Wiirttemberg in the German Empire; the Romanian and Serbian armies would also become part of the Ottoman army. In return, the Porte offered concessions on matters such as the minting of coins and decorations. These plans were supported weakly by Britain and Austria-Hungary, but not by Russia, France, and Germany. Naturally, both Serbia and Romania were violently opposed to any change in their status that would strengthen the bonds with Constantinople. The idea had really no chance of success, and it was soon abandoned.3 Despite the generally discouraging situation, Charles at the end of 1872 and in the first half of 1873 decided to embark on a more determined campaign directed toward the achievement of independence. He received little encouragement from his ministers; Catargiu and Mavrogheni opposed the idea.4 On April 30/May 12 Vasile Boerescu, who had previously approved the prince's plan, became foreign minister.5 Attempts were made to secure the support of the powers, but without success. On August 24/September 5 a ministerial council was held and, since the attitude of Russia was uncertain, it was decided to postpone action.6 The Romanian government then returned to the policy of seeking the gradual acquisition of sovereign rights. In the next three years some definite advancements were to be made: regular diplomatic agencies were established in the major capitals, and, most important, commercial treaties were negotiated with the Habsburg Empire and Russia without the participation or approval of the Porte.

218

Prince Charles,

I8JI-I8J8

T H E ST. PETERSBURG AGENCY

As we have seen, Romanian diplomatic relations with the outside world had usually been carried on through the channel of the consuls resident in the Principalities or by means of special missions sent to the European capitals.7 A regular representative was assigned to Constantinople, but the Ottoman Empire was not a "foreign" power. In i860 a permanent agency had been established in Paris. Now several similar offices were set up - in Vienna and Berlin in 1872 and in Rome in 1873. The first agency in St. Petersburg was opened in 1874, with G. C. Filipescu as the representative; Emil I. Ghica was also assigned to this mission. Filipescu was received officially by the tsar in May.8 Alexander II at this time expressed regret at the recent death of Charles's infant daughter and then proceeded to emphasize the two themes that were always so important in Russian policy toward Bucharest - loyalty to St. Petersburg and stability in the government. Filipescu reported the tsar's remarks: "Affairs are going better with you . . . I have nothing to complain about; only there are among you some men who forget the blood that we have shed and that what you are, it is to Russia that you owe it (this is textual and His Majesty laid emphasis on these words)." Filipescu in reply stated that Romania had gone through a crisis and that the tsar should not make the country responsible for the actions of men who "pushed by a blind and guilty ambition do not hesitate from anything in order to disturb order at home and discredit us abroad."9 Every Romanian and the prince would remember what was owed to Russia and the tsar's family. The appointment of the Romanian agent was not accepted readily by the Porte. Kamil Pasha, the Ottoman representative at St. Petersburg, refused to receive Filipescu as a diplomatic agent, recognizing him only as a "distinguished subject" of the empire and claiming with some justification that the Ottoman ambassador represented all of the imperial provinces. In so handling the matter, however, Kamil, who was not in favor in the Russian court, offended the tsar.10 In his conversations with other Russian statesmen Filipescu repeatedly emphasized the theme of the difficulties faced by Romania as part of the Ottoman Empire. In general, his views were received sympathetically, but he was urged to advise his government not to act precipitously, but to wait with patience. His most direct relations were with Stremoukhov, the head of the Asiatic department. A strong supporter of ties with Vienna and Berlin who was opposed to adventures in the Balkans, Stremoukhov was not the man to encourage Romanian 219

Russia and the Romanian national state aspirations. Filipescu reported an interview held on December 7/19 in which the Russian official gave his opinions. He emphasized with frankness his keen sympathy for the Christians of the East. The Muslim downfall (textual) is for him an indestructible political belief. M. Stremoukhov then told me next that in the different phases of our history, Russia has shown us interest and sympathy. "They say," he added, "following a trite expression, that Russia fattens its turkeys (textual) in order to make a better mouthful; history is there to prove that occasions have not been lacking for Russia to realize such ambitions; but Russia has never had such intentions. Any augmentation of territory could be fatal for the empire. No government would dare assume the responsibility . . . The Treaty of Paris is a sword of Damocles that they wished to hang over our head. Today it is not us who are inconvenienced; it is those who thought they were putting a spoke in our wheels. Moreover, Russia has known, when she judged it opportune, how to free herself from all the obstacles that impede her; but, as regards Romania she has always been the object of a benevolent disinterestedness on the part of Russia. The sympathy of Russia for the Christians of the East has often carried her too far, for she has attracted to herself the distrust of other powers and even serious difficulties. It is for this reason that today the greatest reserve is essential for her.11

In reply, Filipescu emphasized the strength of the Russian position and claimed that Russia could support Romania's legitimate aspirations without risk. Although Stremoukhov agreed that the Russian situation was favorable, he pointed out that in issues connected with the Eastern Question suspicions were easily aroused. He continued to urge moderation on the Romanian government, arguing that "the last treaties had such an elasticity that with prudence, wisdom and a little patience, you can infer from them what you need." At the end of the conversation he emphasized this view: "As for your country, act like Germany; the best policy is to know how to wait."12 Filipescu was aware of the rivalries within the Russian official circles, the most obvious of which was the tension between Gorchakov and Ignatiev. In fact, Gorchakov warned him about Ignatiev. Thus in his reports the Romanian agent advised his foreign minister to be prudent in dealing with the Russian consul in Bucharest, Ivan Alekseevich Zinoviev, who was in a difficult position between the two adversaries. The policy of patience was advised in other conversations. In early January, Gorchakov's closest associate, Alexander Genrikhovich Jomini, admitted that the Ottoman government was difficult to deal with, but he too concluded: "A little moderation . . . moderation! That is what I advise you."13 The Ottoman army was strong and, Jomini warned, the other Balkan people had not come to the aid of the Cretans during the revolts on their island. Their support could thus not be assumed. 220

Prince Charles, 1871-1878 T H E COMMERCIAL CONVENTIONS

The major achievement of the Principalities in the first half of the 1870s was the successful conclusion of commercial conventions with both Austria-Hungary and Russia. In these negotiations the aim was to secure international acceptance of the Romanian right to make agreements directly with other nations. Political, not economic, objectives were thus of first importance. The Romanian government was primarily concerned with the form rather than the content of any commercial treaties. In 1873, when the question was first taken up, the international situation appeared most favorable. Russia, Germany, and Austria-Hungary, partners in the Three Emperors' Alliance, tended to work together in minor as well as in major questions in international relations. One of the three, Austria-Hungary, was not satisfied with its trade relations with Romania. Despite the fact that it was the major trading partner of that state, it was facing increasing French and British competition. The monarchy saw Romania as an important market for its manufactured goods, and it wished to purchase grain. It also wanted to secure Romanian cooperation on the regulation of the Danube traffic. Since its chief objectives were economic in nature, the Habsburg government was not concerned so much about the form of any future agreement. Discussions on a treaty commenced during the winter of 1873-1874.^ The Russian government regarded the question from another point of view.15 Having no major economic issues at stake, it did not want to come into conflict with the Porte on the question. At this time Ignatiev enjoyed good relations with the Ottoman government. It would certainly not be in the Russian interest to jeopardize this advantage for Romanian objectives. Nevertheless, despite these considerations, the Russian government was soon virtually compelled to adopt the Habsburg position. The Romanian government, desiring to hasten the beginning of serious negotiations, decided to put pressure on the powers. In June 1874 it passed a new customs law that penalized states not having special commercial arrangements with Bucharest. Despite its limited economic interests in Romania, Russia joined with Austria-Hungary in the summer of 1874 in agreeing to negotiate trade conventions directly with Bucharest. Both Russia and the Habsburg Empire took a similar position on the question in their discussions with the Ottoman representatives. The Romanian-Habsburg negotiations proceeded well in their 221

Russia and the Romanian national state first stages; in August Boerescu gave Andrassy the first draft of a proposed convention.16 In the discussions between the governments, which, of course, centered on Romania's right to sign separate agreements, the representatives of the powers allied in the Three Emperors' Alliance stood together. In London in July Beust, then the Austrian ambassador, and his German colleague, Count George Herbert zu Miinster, attempted to convince the British foreign secretary, Lord Derby, that Britain should recognize the right of both Serbia and Romania to conclude commercial treaties and should support this position in Constantinople.17 In October the representatives of the three states sent a memorandum to the Porte, supporting the right of Romania to negotiate separate agreements on customs, tariffs, and commerce and stating that these arrangements "deprived of all political character, will be signed only by competent departments and administrations, and will not be countersigned by the Sovereign/'18 The debate on this question continued through the fall and early winter months. Although strongly opposed to any concessions on the matter, the Ottoman government was in no position to take a strong stand. In a grave financial crisis itself, it had suspended its commercial agreements with other states. When in October 1875 it was forced to stop full payments on its foreign debt, it was technically bankrupt. 19 Moreover, there was no way that the Porte could force either Romania or the great powers to accept its arguments on the question. The Ottoman officials certainly felt that their position was justified and that Romania did not have the right to conduct negotiations on any question directly with other governments. Two documents - first, the treaty of August 1858 20 and, second, the firman of investiture of 1866 - stated the position of the Principalities. Article 4 of the firman read: To consider as in times past, as binding upon the United Principalities, all the Treaties and Conventions existing between my Sublime Porte and the other Powers, insofar as they should not infringe the rights of the United Principalities, settled and recognized by the acts relating to them; also to maintain and respect the principle that no Treaty or Convention could be directly concluded by the United Principalities with foreign Powers. My Imperial Government will, nevertheless, not fail to consult the United Principalities upon the dispositions of every Treaty or Convention that might relate to their laws and commercial relations. Arrangements of local interest between two neighboring administrations, and not bearing the form of an official Treaty, or of a political character, shall continue to remain as no part of these restrictions.21

This second paragraph could be used to advantage by both AustriaHungary and Russia, which were both, of course, "neighboring states/' 222

Prince Charles, 1871-1878 In addition, the Romanian and Habsburg officials argued that Romania had the clear right to regulate its internal commerce, including customs rates, and their adjustment involved direct negotiations with other states.23 As could be expected, the Romanian government adopted an uncompromising position on the question. In his instructions to the Romanian agents, Boerescu urged a strong stand: "Our right is clear and uncontestable . . . We will never solicit from Turkey a right that we possess and that we have always exercised."23 "One does not beg a favor when one possesses a right."24 The Romanian representatives further claimed that the Ottoman commercial treaties had never been in force in the Principalities, where a different tariff rate was in effect. The stipulations of the firman of 1866 were dismissed as constituting unilateral Ottoman declarations that had never received Romanian ministerial approval.25 In the discussions on the question the Romanian representatives firmly refused to consider any compromises. They were also able to use very effectively the argument that they should not be required to remain closely bound to a government that was facing economic catastrophe and whose actions were hampering Romanian economic development.26 In the past Britain had been the state with the greatest interest in Ottoman commercial policy, since it had previously negotiated treaties with the Porte that were most beneficial to its interests. The British government, however, at this time was aware that it would be impossible to prevent Russia, Germany, or Austria-Hungary from concluding trade agreements with Romania. The British representatives therefore shifted their position. Derby advised the Ottoman government to allow Romania the right to make trade treaties.27 In 1838 Egypt had been given permission to negotiate such agreements. The British statesman believed that such an action would not damage Ottoman interests and would "at the same time raise stronger barriers against the agitation for political independence so inadvisedly entered upon by Prince Charles and his councils."28 Derby, who agreed with the Ottoman contention that the negotiations were illegal, regretted that the powers had not consulted the Porte and requested its consent before proceeding with the discussions with Romania.29 In order to settle the controversy, Derby advised the Porte to issue a firman granting Romania permission to negotiate. The Ottoman government, unlike the Romanian, was willing to compromise and in fact to concede on some issues. It would not, however, issue a firman unless the powers and the Romanian government made a formal request. The Porte would have preferred that Charles 223

Russia and the Romanian national state as a vassal prince address a suitably humble petition to the sultan, who would then approve it as an act of royal grace. The authority of the suzerain power would thus be upheld.30 Since this procedure was exactly what the Romanian government would not accept, there was little chance of a settlement on this basis. The Romanian leaders were primarily interested in securing an international acceptance of their right to negotiate treaties without consulting the Porte; the political aspects of the question continued to be more important than the economic. The Porte would have agreed to a conference on the matter,31 but the three allied powers were against it. In January 1875 the Ottoman ambassador to Britain, Musurus Pasha, recognizing the difficulty of his government's position, told Derby: "we shall let matters take their course, and protest against an act that we consider a violation of the treaties."32 Meanwhile, the negotiations over the treaty came to a conclusion. In the final version the Habsburg government was able to gain important economic advantages. Despite this drawback Charles was most enthusiastic about what he regarded as a great political success. Although he recognized that sacrifices had been made, he asserted, "The fact that Romania concluded a treaty with one of the guaranteeing powers is the beginning of the recognition of her independence."33 On May 27/June 8, 1875 George Costaforu, the Romanian agent in Vienna, was authorized to sign the treaty.34 The convention was formally concluded on June 10/22; it had a duration of ten years. As the Romanian government so strongly desired, the imperial authorization was given the Habsburg signature. The Romanian government thus achieved its primary political aim. Costaforu wired the prince: "It is the greatest act of your reign! . . . Long live Romania!" Charles wrote his father with similar enthusiasm: "This international act is of great significance, for it contains in itself the seed of the independence of Romania."35 Although Charles thus achieved his main objective, the economic aspects of the treaty were strongly criticized. When it was discussed in the chamber, members of the Liberal opposition, in particular Kogalniceanu, Bratianu, and Rosetti, objected to the economic concessions. In reply, Boerescu emphasized the importance of the political aspect. The Romanian right to negotiate directly with other powers, which he claimed was based on the capitulations previously made between the sultan and the Wallachian and Moldavian princes, had been recognized. "For three centuries," Boerescu asserted, "Romania has not exercised this right in matters concerning her commercial interests, but this right has not ceased to exist, and it is by virtue of this same right that the negotiations have been opened with Austria-Hungary."36 Al224

Prince Charles, I8JI-I8J8 though certain aspects of the agreement also caused strong objections in the Habsburg Empire, both governments finally ratified the treaties. During this period the Russian government, although supporting the Habsburg position, had not attempted to inaugurate negotiations itself. At this time Russia had no major economic ties with Romania, so these questions did not play a significant role in their relations. In fact, the greater economic interests of the monarchy were always acknowledged. However, in May 1875 Gorchakov instructed Zinoviev to begin negotiations on a trade convention.37 Despite its previous stand, the Russian government was becoming concerned about the Habsburg gains. Moreover, certain questions, in particular some that related to the transit of grain from Bessarabia to Danubian ports, could best be handled by a formal understanding. A draft convention, drawn up according to the form of the French-Russian commercial agreement of 1874, was ready by the beginning of August.38 The negotiations then were brought to a halt. The purely economic aspects had caused no problems, but the Romanian insistence over who should sign caused major difficulties. The Russian government, which did not want to give a political significance to the treaty or to offend the Porte, wanted the final document to be signed by the minister of finance, but not by Gorchakov. Since this decision negated the value of the agreement for Romania, its leaders could not accept the Russian decision. As Boerescu told Zinoviev, the agreement gave Romania no economic gains; the purpose was to win the political objective. Therefore the treaty had to be signed on the Russian side with an imperial authorization, as the agreement with the Habsburg Empire had been.39 Charles argued strongly along the same lines. He believed that he would have to dismiss his ministry or dissolve the legislature before he could obtain approval for an agreement that did not follow the form of the Habsburg convention. In his reports to St. Petersburg Zinoviev supported the Romanian arguments. A postponement of an agreement would hurt not only Russian commerce, but also other interests in Romania. The consul believed that it had been a mistake to allow the Habsburg Empire to take the lead in this matter: It has always seemed to me that the traditions of our policy in the Principalities were of a nature to justify our taking the initiative in the conclusion of a convention of commerce with Romania, although the commercial interests that we possess in this country are much inferior to those of Austria-Hungary. We would have been able in that case to exercise a considerable influence on the subsequent arrangements.

But since the Russian negotiations followed the Austrian, it was very difficult to avoid the consequences of the previous agreement.40 225

Russia and the Romanian national state At this time, with the discussions temporarily deadlocked, events took place within Romania and in the Balkan peninsula that were to influence the negotiations. In February 1876 the Conservative government of Lascar Catargiu was reorganized, and Ion Balaceanu took the place of Boerescu as foreign minister. Although this ministry remained firm, the Russian attitude was increasingly influenced by the new crisis in the Balkans. In 1875 a revolt that the Porte could not suppress had occurred in Bosnia and Hercegovina. It was soon apparent that Serbia and Montenegro might intervene in aid of the insurgents. Should they do so, the Russian government might need Romanian cooperation. Despite these circumstances, Zinoviev's instructions remained the same. The Romanian government also refused to compromise and still insisted that Zinoviev must sign with an imperial authorization. On February 20/March 4 a ministerial council agreed that the convention would not be accepted "if the consul general is not specially empowered through an imperial authorization. The Romanian government will not acknowledge only a ministerial authorization."41 The Romanian government finally achieved its goal. Zinoviev, who favored granting the Romanian desires, on February 25/March 8 told Charles that he had received the necessary authorization.42 The convention was finally signed on March 15/27. The agreement was then sent to St. Petersburg to be approved by the Ministry of Finance. In April the Romanian chamber considered its ratification. At this time, however, the nation passed through a period of crisis. The Catargiu government fell on March 31/April 12 and was followed by a ministry under General I. E. Florescu. This administration was replaced on April 27/May 9 by a Liberal government under M. C. Epureanu, with Kogalniceanu as foreign minister and Bratianu as minister of finance. Finally, on July 24/August 5, Bratianu organized another Liberal ministry. The convention with Russia would now be considered by just those men who had been most critical of the previous treaty with Austria-Hungary. As could be expected, the agreement was severely criticized in the debates in the chamber. Conservative landowners and Liberals joined to attack its economic provisions. Again a treaty had been concluded that gave great concessions without securing adequate gains for the Romanian side. The owners of large estates, for example, objected to the aid given to the transport of competing Bessarabian grain across the country.43 Nevertheless, despite these criticisms, it was recognized that the agreement would have to be accepted; thus in July parliamentary approval was given. 226

Prince Charles, 1871-1878 Despite the negative aspects on the economic side, this treaty was a political success: it was formally ratified at the beginning of October by Gorchakov, who signed with the authorization of the tsar. Ratifications were exchanged between Nicholas Ionescu, by then minister of foreign affairs, and the new Russian consul, Dmitri Fedorovich Stuart.44 The two commercial conventions were thus concluded in the form desired by the Romanian government. Its right to conclude such agreements without the approval of the Porte had been accepted by the two great-power signatories. Although the first five years of the 1870s had thus been a period of relative calm, gains had been made. The strongly conservative internal administration had brought stability and aided in maintaining good relations with Russia. The conclusion of the economic agreements had been a major step forward. After 1876 the situation was to change dramatically - in regard to both domestic and foreign affairs. T H E FIRST PHASE OF THE EASTERN CRISIS: ROMANIAN NEUTRALITY

The period of tranquility had been in the best interest of both Russia and Romania, neither of which was prepared to face another Eastern crisis. The chief emphasis was on internal affairs. Both governments would have preferred the continuation of these relatively peaceful conditions, at least until their domestic conditions improved and their military establishments were strengthened. Thus neither welcomed the period of international tension that commenced with the revolt in Bosnia and Hercegovina in the summer of 1875.45 At first the Romanian and the Russian governments were not directly involved in these events. The revolt had been caused chiefly by the strained relations between the Christian Slavic peasantry of the two provinces and their Muslim Slavic landlords; the deteriorating financial condition of the empire, which was reflected in higher taxes and more violent and inefficient methods of collection, also played a part. If foreign provocation was present, it came from the Habsburg, not the Russian, side. Certain Habsburg Slavic and military circles wished to acquire the provinces, which were the hinterland of Dalmatia, and a visit of Franz Joseph to Dalmatia in the spring of 1875 gave encouragement to these views. Once the rebellion was under way, however, Montenegro and Serbia became deeply involved. These principalities also had designs on the territory, which was, of course, South Slav in ethnic composition. Refugees from the rebellious areas poured into the neigh227

Russia and the Romanian national state boring states, and arms and volunteers crossed over these same borders in return. The failure of the Ottoman military forces to control the situation soon made it of concern to the great powers. At first, the Russian government took only a secondary interest in the matter. Recognizing the priority of the Habsburg government in the affairs of the provinces that were directly adjacent, and wishing to act within the framework of the Three Emperors' Alliance, the Russian government joined in efforts to end the uprising that were largely of Habsburg initiative. Thus Russia worked with the other five great powers in the establishment of a consular commission that sought to negotiate an ending of the revolt. When this move failed, Russia supported the measures contained in the Andrassy Note of December 18/30, 1875, which attempted to settle the question by granting special reforms to the provinces. Although cooperation with the "Vienna center" was the official policy of his government, Ignatiev objected strongly to the association with the monarchy. He considered the revolt an Austrian provocation designed to lead to the annexation of the territory. Since he wished the conflict settled through bilateral negotiations between Russia and the Porte and the granting of Hercegovinian territory to Montenegro, he was in strong opposition to the policy he was forced to implement. He nevertheless presented the Andrassy Note, which he condemned, to the Ottoman government; the Porte accepted it in February 1876. Throughout the spring of 1876 Russian policy remained that of cooperation with the powers and recognition of the leadership of Andrassy in the negotiations. No attempt was made to exploit the situation to gain more influence for Russia among the Balkan nationalities. All responsible Russian leaders, including Ignatiev, recognized the dangers in another Eastern crisis as long as their country was not militarily prepared: Russia could not afford another Crimean debacle. Nevertheless, the involvement of a Slavic, Orthodox people in a bitter struggle against the Ottoman Empire awoke the emotions and considerations that we have seen in operation throughout the century. Moreover, by the 1870s a large sector of Russian society had become influenced by Panslav ideas. The movement served as a center for the organization and expression of the conviction that Russia should indeed go to the aid of the Balkan Slavs both for humanitarian reasons and for its own national interests. Increasing concern was felt over the fate of the Serbs, Montenegrins, and Bulgarians. Conversely, many groups among the Balkan people came to feel that they could rely on Russian aid in a crisis. They were convinced that in the last resort, rather than

Prince Charles, i8yi-i8y8 see a massacre of Balkan Slavs, the Russian government would go to war with the Porte - an assumption that was, in fact, not in error. For Romania the issues were quite different.46 Bosnia and Hercegovina were not adjacent territories. Although Romanians sympathized with other Balkan Christians, the movement had from the beginning a distinct Slavic rather than Christian overtone. A great Slavic state or a Slavic federation was as dangerous to Romania as to the Habsburg Monarchy and Greece. Most of the educated Romanian leaders continued to feel that Romanian history and the condition of the country separated them from their neighbors across the Danube under the principle that "the East commences at the right bank of the Danube; from the left bank the West already begins."47 Moreover, the lines of combat were not clear during this crisis. The issue was not so much the fate of the Ottoman Empire as the division of its lands. The empire was assumed to be on the verge of extinction, but the heirs had not been named. There was conflict and suspicion not only between Slavs and non-Slavs, but also among the Slavic people. For example, Nicholas of Montenegro and Milan of Serbia remained in rivalry for the leadership of the Serbs. Each national group at this time had to consider the new Eastern crisis from the point of view of its own interests and of the future balance of power. The simple Crossagainst-Crescent division was no longer valid, if indeed it ever had been. For the Romanian government the obvious policy was that of abstention. Not only were no direct Romanian interests atfirstinvolved, but all of the great powers advised neutrality. Charles too was determined to remain neutral until at least the Romanian economic and military position improved. Ottoman suzerainty, he recognized, was acceptable as long as it was empty form and was limited almost completely to the payment of tribute.48 The real danger in the Romanian position was that the state lay on the road to Constantinople. Should war break out between the Porte and Russia on Balkan issues, the Principalities would be either the battlefield or the route by which the Russian armies marched to Constantinople. For the Romanian government the immediate danger appeared to be a Russian rather than an Ottoman occupation. On November 24/December 6, 1875, a ministerial council was held on the question. Unsure of the situation, the ministers advised caution.49 Romanian fears seemed to have some justification. In December Ghica, the Romanian agent in Constantinople, reported that Ignatiev had stated that if a conflict arose with the Porte, Russia would perhaps have to occupy Romania as a guarantee.50 Although the Romanian statesmen realized 229

Russia and the Romanian national state that Ignatiev did not always speak with official sanction, they had no way of knowing whether he was acting by instructions or not. Certainly the circular of January 4/16, 1876, issued by Lascar Catargiu, who was foreign minister briefly after Boerescu resigned in October, had an anti-Russian direction. The document stated that the Romanian government was taking military measures. Should Romanian neutrality be menaced "whether by acts of acquisition on the part of Turkey, whether by the intervention of another power who wishes, no matter what the objective, to occupy Romania, its duty toward the country would not permit it to remain a passive spectator." At one time the Principalities had been an "open field," but the country was now under a collective guarantee. The policy of neutrality would be maintained unless another power intervened in the country in violation of Article 27 of the Treaty of Paris. If a general conflict involving all of the states occurred, Romania would cooperate with the guaranteeing powers if its territorial integrity and rights were assured.51 This policy, of course, had the full support of the prince. He did not expect a war, but he too expressed his determination to resist an occupation. He recognized that his army was not strong enough to defeat a great power, but it could put up enough resistance to assert Romania's determination to defend its rights and "not as before to advance to meet the army of occupation as a liberator."52 The apparent anti-Russian direction of Romanian policy was noted. The Romanian agent in Vienna reported that Novikov, the Russian ambassador, reproached him on the critical tone of the circular; Russia had given no cause for suspicion. There was no question of an occupation, since such an event would involve a conflict with the other powers. Andrassy similarly assured Costaforu that there was no chance of such a move. He also stressed the dissimilarity of the Romanian position to that of other Ottoman Christian populations, which were "half barbarian."53 On January 30/February 11, 1876, Lascar Catargiu rebuilt his cabinet with Ion Balaceanu as foreign minister. In his circular instruction of March 19/31 Balaceanu reiterated the principles of Romanian policy. The country, separated from the Ottoman Empire by one of the greatest rivers in the world, would remain outside the troubles that disturbed the rest of the peninsula. Romania was sympathetic with the problems of the other nationalities, although the nation was different "in language, blood and the spirit of its people."54 Nevertheless, the current disturbances would not turn it away from concentration on its own economic and social problems. A policy of strict neutrality and the observance of treaties would be followed. Romania would 230

Prince Charles, I8JI-I8J8 remain a disinterested spectator of the events across the Danube. Romanian neutrality received the support of all of the powers, including Russia. On April 18/30 E. I. Ghica, now the Romanian agent in St. Petersburg, reported that Giers, who had risen to the high post of director of the Asiatic Department in the Foreign Ministry, expressed his approval of the new ministry and the pacific policy shown in the Balaceanu circular.55 After his return to Bucharest, Filipescu, too, had commented on the tsar's desire for peace and the dangers in the situation should the Porte not follow the advice of the great powers.56 Although there was general agreement within Romania on the policy of neutrality, discontent with other facets of the Conservative regime had grown. In the spring of 1875 the opposition was organized in the so-called Mazar Pasha coalition, which was based chiefly on the left but which also had members from the Conservatives. The disagreement with the regime in power involved primarily internal policy. In foreign affairs the coalition called for a "Romanian policy, a policy of peace according to treaties with the Ottoman Empire and the Treaty of Paris"; this was, of course, also the view of the Catargiu government.57 On March 31/April 12, 1876, after elections had gone against the Conservatives, Charles formed a new ministry without Catargiu. This government, which marked a transition to what was to be a long period of Liberal rule, was under the direction of General Ion Florescu, with Bratianu as minister of finance and Dimitrie Cornea as foreign minister. Again the policy of neutrality, based on treaty relations with the Porte and the guarantee of the powers, was reaffirmed. A circular issued by Cornea stated that the new ministry, like its predecessors, was convinced that "it is in organizing the country, in avoiding dangerous complications and in persevering in a wise and peaceful path that we will succeed in safeguarding our rights and in assuring ourselves of the sympathies and the support of the guarantor powers."58 The Florescu ministry was short-lived; on April 27/May 9 a purely Liberal government was organized under the leadership of M. C. Epureanu, with Bratianu as minister of finance and Kogalniceanu as foreign minister. Although this government was to adopt slightly different policies in the face of a changing situation, its initial declarations on foreign policy repeated the previous assertions concerning Romanian respect for the treaties and the unique position of the country both in its ties with the empire and in its geographic location. The necessity of maintaining a strong military force capable of defending the frontiers and the neutral stand were also asserted. Again the Romanian position received Russian approbation. The spring of 1876 witnessed a progressive deterioration in the Bal231

Russia and the Romanian national state kans and in Constantinople. The Romanian government and the prince were well aware of the growing confusion and economic disintegration within the empire. Rumors of the physical decline of the sultan and the possibility of revolt grew. At the same time enthusiasm for war increased in Montenegro and Serbia, despite the continued opposition of Prince Milan. The Andrassy Note proved a failure. Although the powers and the Porte accepted its terms, the rebels, since they had no confidence in their implementation, rejected them. Faced by a growing crisis, the rulers and the foreign ministers of the Three Emperors' Alliance met in Berlin on April 29/May 11. There Gorchakov called for a European conference and extensive outside intervention in Ottoman affairs. The opposition of Andrassy, however, resulted in the issuance of the Berlin Memorandum, which was little more than an extension of the previous reform proposal. This document was accepted by Italy and France, but Britain refused to associate itself with the program. Meanwhile, the chain of events that was to lead to revolution in Constantinople and war in the Balkans began.59 On April 24 / May 6 a Muslim mob in Thessaloniki killed the French and German consuls in a riot provoked over an incident involving the conversion of a Christian girl. The powers responded immediately with a naval demonstration. Even more serious, on April 20/May 2 a revolt broke out in Koprivshtitsa and then spread through the towns of the Balkan mountains. The Bulgarian uprising was suppressed with massive reprisals by Ottoman irregular troops. At the same time swift changes also occurred within the Ottoman government. The failure to crush the rebellion in Bosnia and Hercegovina, massive discontent with foreign intervention, and the deteriorating internal conditions of the state led first to changes in the leadership and finally to revolution. On May 11 Mahmud Nedim left office; Russian influence thereafter declined precipitously. On May 18/30 a coup resulted in the replacement of Abdul Aziz with Murad V. The change of sultans was not to bring an improvement in Ottoman leadership. Severely shaken by the events surrounding his accession, Murad proved incapable of carrying on the functions of his office. The new government also could not deal with the growing rebellion in the Balkans. At the end of June Serbia and Montenegro, acting against the express wishes of the Russian government, but with the support of Panslav organizations and a large segment of Russian society, declared war on the Porte. Despite pressure from influential sections of its own population, the Russian government, at least at first, maintained an attitude of neutrality toward the new Balkan war. Deeply concerned lest Russia 232

Prince Charles, i8yi-i8y8 find itself in a dangerous position of diplomatic isolation, the Russian leaders sought close cooperation with the Habsburg Monarchy.60 In conformance with this policy, Gorchakov met with Andrassy at Reichstadt on June 26/July 8; here the foreign ministers sought to define a common attitude toward the war. The Reichstadt agreement, despite later disputes concerning its exact terms, was extremely significant because it defined and limited future Russian objectives in the Balkans; it was also a return to the traditional Habsburg-Russian cooperation to settle Balkan disputes on the basis of a balance of power and the assignment of spheres of influence. At this meeting it was agreed that, if the Porte won the war, it should not be allowed to crush Serbia or Montenegro. If, on the other hand, the Christian principalities were victorious, each would be given territorial advantages, and the great powers would also claim rewards. Russia would take back southern Bessarabia;61 Austria-Hungary would receive compensation in Bosnia and Hercegovina. Should the Ottoman Empire collapse entirely, the agreement stated that independent Balkan states would be established from its territory. The terms of the understanding, which were contained in two separate memoranda, were secret, but the fact that a Russo-Austrian compact did exist was known to the Romanian as well as to the other governments. Kogalniceanu as foreign minister thus faced a rapidly changing international situation. His first instructions, issued in May, reflected a continuation of the policy of strict neutrality and of nonintervention in affairs across the Danube.621 Once again this abstention met with the approval of St. Petersburg. Giers expressed the opinion that the Romanian attitude offered moral support to the Christian population; should the general situation deteriorate Romania could be a place of refuge for these people.63 Neutrality, however, proved more difficult to maintain as the Christian population began to suffer a series of disastrous defeats. The Bulgarian revolt, the massacres, and the subsequent Serbian and Montenegrin war against the Ottoman Empire placed strong pressure on the Romanian government to abandon its passive attitude. Moreover, the opportunity seemed at hand to use the situation to make concrete gains and to broaden Romanian autonomous rights. Even with such practical considerations left aside, it was also true that many Romanians felt strongly sympathetic to their fellow Christians and genuinely wished to join with them against the Ottoman Empire. The April uprising in Bulgaria and the subsequent Ottoman repression, in particular, faced the government with difficult choices.64 As we have seen, Romania had been a major center for the organization of Bulgarian conspiracies against the Ottoman Empire. The protests of 233

Russia and the Romanian national state the Porte, as well as pressure from the guaranteeing powers, including Russia, had forced the Romanian government to deport the leader Liuben Karavelov, who went to Serbia in 1872. Romania nevertheless remained the principal sanctuary for Bulgarian revolutionaries, whose major organization was the Bulgarian Central Revolutionary Committee under the direction of Khristo Botev. Local branches existed in the major Romanian cities with Bulgarian inhabitants. The last major event in the Bulgarian uprising was especially compromising for Romanian neutrality and relations with the Porte. On May 4/16 Botev, with about two hundred followers, seized the Austrian steamship Radetsky and forced its captain to land them in Bulgaria. Not only was the enterprise a disastrous failure, but it was obvious that the action had been organized on Romanian territory and that it had benefited from the laxness of the Romanian authorities. As a neutral country, and according to the treaties with the Porte, the Romanian government was obligated to prevent the organization of similar conspiracies against neighboring countries. The revolutionary activities in the Bulgarian lands had a far greater significance for Romania than similar events in Bosnia and Hercegovina. It was estimated that about 200,000 Bulgarians lived in Romania, chiefly in the Danubian port cities, and a similarly large number of Romanians were to be found in Bulgaria. Many of these were involved in the revolutionary movement or had witnessed Ottoman atrocities during the suppression of the April revolt. The Liberal government thus was under great pressure to aid the rebels and the victims. Sympathies aside, the Romanian government recognized that something would have to be done to prevent the organization of further conspiracies on its soil, or its neutrality would be seriously compromised. Measures were taken to limit the assistance that was crossing the Danube; port captains were instructed to control the movements of foreigners and block the shipment of arms. The authorities were to confiscate any weapons they found that were bound for the other side of the river. Some attempts were made to control the activities of the Bulgarian organizations. However, the enforcement of these directives was anything but stringent. Some Bulgarians were indeed arrested, but usually they were released after a few days. The revolutionary committees remained active, and volunteers from Russia bound for Serbia continued to cross Romanian territory. As might be expected, the Romanian government was criticized severely by both the Porte and the Balkan Christians. The Ottoman government did not give the Romanians credit for the actions taken to preserve the neutral position; the Christian belligerents expected massive active assistance. 234

Prince Charles, i8yi-i8y8 The pressures on the Porte, owing to the war and the internal instability, also appeared to offer the Romanian government an opportunity to make gains in its own interest. In June Kogalniceanu sent a long memorandum to the Ottoman foreign minister summarizing in seven points the chief matters at issue between Bucharest and Constantinople. Here the difficulty in maintaining neutrality, because of the large number of Bulgarians and the sacrifices that had to be made to guard the Danube border against the Bulgarian rebels, was emphasized in the attempt to demonstrate Romanian loyalty to treaty obligations. As far as concrete demands were concerned, the Romanian government proposed (1) Ottoman acknowledgment of Romanian "political individuality" and the historic name; (2) the acceptance of the Romanian agent in Constantinople as a member of the diplomatic corps; (3) the regulation of the status of Romanian citizens living in other parts of the empire and the acknowledgement of Romanian consular jurisdiction over them; (4) the recognition of the inviolability of Romanian territory and the settlement of the question of the ownership of certain disputed islands in the Danube; (5) the conclusion of extradition, post, and telegraph conventions; (6) the acknowledgement of the Romanian passports and the nonintervention of Ottoman consuls in the affairs of Romanian subjects abroad; and (7) the establishment of the Romanian-Ottoman boundary along the middle line of the thalweg of the Danube.65 As the Russian consul, Zinoviev, commented, although the word independence was not mentioned, the character of some of the demands showed the aim of ending Ottoman sovereignty.66 The Romanian memorandum received the approval and support of no power. Giers told Ghica that the demands were badly timed. Europe was absorbed by the war in the Balkans, which had just started; pressure would not be put on the Porte except in matters relative to that event. Most of the demands, he believed, were just and would be obtained sooner or later; the last he considered the most controversial.67 The Ottoman reaction, predictably, was negative. The outbreak of the war between the Ottoman Empire and its Serbian and Montenegrin vassals in the summer of 1876 did not surprise the Romanian government. Charles had maintained contact with Milan, and although the relationship was not close, the Romanian leaders were well aware of the Serbian prince's internal difficulties. Like Charles he had wished to avoid a conflict with the Ottoman Empire; he was well aware that Serbian military preparations were not adequate. However, unlike the Romanian prince, Milan faced enormous pressure from a public that was eager for war and a strong political opposition that exploited the situation.68 The Romanian agent in Bel235

Russia and the Romanian national state grade, Alexander Sturdza, reported the low quality of the Serbian army and the illusions of the people concerning their military prowess. Milan's unpopularity was also noted.69 When the revolt in Bosnia could not be suppressed, the Serbian ruler found himself faced with the alternatives of supporting a war or facing a revolution. Prince Nicholas of Montenegro was more a rival than a friend; he sought to make his small principality the center of Serbian and South Slav nationalism. Milan also always had to be concerned about the activities of Peter Karadjordjevic, the pretender to the Serbian throne, who in fact participated in the Bosnian rebellion. On March 25/April 6, 1876, Colonel George Catargiu, an uncle of Milan, came to Bucharest and appealed in the name of his nephew for Romanian assistance, arguing that both nations sought an end to Ottoman domination.70 Charles refused the request and warned against the initiation of a conflict that would not have Romanian support.71 Once Serbia was at war with the Ottoman Empire, relations became even more difficult. Serbia needed to use Romanian territory for the transit of men and of military equipment. The Romanian government, concerned that its neutrality not be openly compromised, sought to prevent any actions that would be obvious to the Porte and the powers. The formation in Romania of bands organized to fight in Serbia was stopped, but small groups and individuals continued to cross the Danube. The committees also remained active and collected money for the war.72 Sturdza was instructed to inform Milan that the transport of guns would have to be halted: these could only be carried by the railroads, which were administered by an Austrian company; any such actions would be observed and Romanian neutrality endangered.73 In June rumors that an Ottoman fleet might be sent up the Danube to attack Serbia seriously disturbed the Romanian government, which began negotiations with the Porte and the other powers to try to neutralize the river.74 The assent of the Porte was gained; Romania agreed to supply the Ottoman military garrison on Ada Kale. This measure assisted Serbia, by allowing it to concentrate on its other fronts. During the summer of 1876 the Romanian situation was uncomfortable. Determined to keep a neutral position, because of both its own interests and the urging of the powers, the government had to take some measures detrimental to Serbia. The problem was compounded by the massive aid that was dispatched by the Slavic Benevolent Committees to the belligerent Slavic states. Volunteers, military equipment, and medical supplies destined for the battlefields were being sent through Romania. The chief effort was directed toward blocking the passage of arms; less attention was devoted to halting volunteers. Rus236

Prince Charles, I8JI-I8J8 sian citizens with valid passports were allowed to travel on to Serbia, although efforts were taken to stop large groups.75 Despite the Romanian attitude of benevolent, rather than strict, neutrality, the Serbian government became strongly critical, particularly after its armies suffered a series of grave defeats.76 It was easy to blame Romania for these disasters. A similar reaction occurred in Russia. About five thousand Russian volunteers fought with the Serbian army; the Russian general Michael Gregorovich Cherniaev was in command. The Slavic committees were active in the collection of money and the recruitment of volunteers. Bucharest's less than enthusiastic attitude toward the war was naturally condemned by that segment of public opinion which had been caught up in the wave of support for the Balkan armies. In addition, despite the fact that the Russian government approved of Romanian neutrality, it wished it to be even more benevolent than it was - in particular, to allow the passage of men and arms. The Romanians were also criticized for their apparent attempt to gain political benefits for themselves from the situation.77 The Romanian government, meanwhile, had not been successful in its dealings with the Porte. Having received no positive response to his first approach, Kogalniceanu on July 19/31 dispatched an even stronger note.78 In this he referred to the Ottoman massacres of Bulgarians and to the fact that his government by its silence was open to the accusation that it sanctioned such actions. The demand for further gains for Romanian autonomy were repeated. At the beginning of August Safvet answered that the Ottoman government could not consider the initial memorandum until the war was over; some of the points were also in the competence of the great powers.79 Kogalniceanu's policies in this crisis were criticized from two sides. On the one hand, some said that he had gone too far; on the other, those who wanted to aid the warring states attacked his moderate course. This opposition, together with the growing economic problems in the state, led to the naming of yet another government. On July 24/August 5 Ion Bratianu formed a ministry that was Liberal-Radical in composition. Kogalniceanu was replaced by Ionescu, a strong partisan of strict neutrality, who believed that the last memorandum to the Porte had gone too far. The international situation was fast deteriorating. The Ottoman victories at this time foreshadowed a quick Serbian disaster. The humiliation of the South Slav armies, led by a Russian general and filled with Russian volunteers, deeply wounded Russian sensitivities. As the summer passed pressure on the Russian government to come actively to the aid of Serbia and Montenegro increased. The tsar, Miliutin, 237

Russia and the Romanian national state Gorchakov, and others who were strong nationalists at heart were affected not only because of the ties with the South Slavs, but because of the obvious repercussions that a crushing defeat of the Balkan Christians would have on Russian influence and prestige. With the growth of these sentiments, Russian impatience with Romania increased. At issue was not the policy of neutrality, but its definition. The Russian government wished the state to remain formally neutral, but to close its eyes to the passage of arms and volunteers, which, Giers said, Serbia needed "to combat the savage hordes of Asia."80 Romania continued, nevertheless, to prohibit arms while allowing passage of individual volunteers. By the end of August the rout of the Serbian forces had become clear; on August 12/24. Milan asked for an armistice. In September and October the tsar and his family were at their summer home in the Crimean resort of Livadia, which became the center of the Russian government for these weeks. The principal Russian statesmen - Gorchakov; Miliutin; the minister of finance, M. K. Reutern; General Nicholas Nikolaevich Obruchev; Ignatiev; and the heir to the throne, Alexander - spent all or part of this period in the Crimea, and the questions of war and peace were thoroughly discussed. The chief fear of the Russian leaders remained what it had been before: that a war with the Ottoman Empire could lead to a reformation of the Crimean coalition and a repeat of the disaster of that conflict. Reutern gave strongly pessimistic reports on the Russian economic situation; Miliutin believed that, although the military reforms were not complete, a war could be contemplated. The Russian diplomats were disturbed by the fact that should they decide on war, their potential enemies could not be named with certainty. The chief opponents to a Russian advance in the Balkans were, as before, Britain and AustriaHungary. British opposition had been severely blunted by the public outrage at the reports of atrocities committed during the suppression of the Bulgarian revolt. The attitude of the Habsburg Monarchy, despite the Reichstadt understanding, still caused concern. In order to ascertain the Austrian reaction to a Russian war with the Ottoman Empire, a special envoy, Feliks Nikolaevich Sumorokov-Elston, was sent in September to Vienna. The negotiations that commenced at this time between Vienna and St. Petersburg ended in the agreements of January and March 1877. Simultaneously, the Russian government made an effort to learn whether the German government would maintain an attitude of benevolent neutrality should hostilities break out between Russia and the Habsburg Empire as a result of the Eastern crisis. 238

Prince Charles, I8JI-I8J8 Although war had not yet been decided upon, the diplomatic preparations had thus been launched. As part of this program, plans also had to be made for a campaign in the Balkans. Of first importance was the securing of Romanian consent for the passage of the Russian army through the country to the Danube. Active Romanian military participation was not desired, but the use of the railroads, cooperation in the question of supplies, and, of course, an end to the policy of strict neutrality were sought. I. Cantacuzino, who became the Romanian agent in St. Petersburg in August 1876, reported that all of Russia except the tsar wanted war.81 There was therefore dissatisfaction in St. Petersburg with the Romanian attempt to adhere as closely as possible to a truly neutral position. The passage of arms as well as volunteers remained the delicate point.82 As the Russian attitude was becoming more belligerent, the consuls observed parallel tendencies in Bucharest. The shift from Conservative to Liberal political control in the first half of the year had aroused some misgivings, because of the Liberals' past record of hostility to Russia and because of their promotion of revolutionary causes. For example, in June Zinoviev commented on the Liberal-dominated assembly that it "would not hesitate to become a blind instrument of the subversive tendencies and evil instincts" that distinguished the radical party. 83 He also was not favorably impressed by Kogalniceanu, and he had advised against sending the memoir to the Porte. His successor as consul, D. F. Stuart, was even more critical of the Liberal ministries, but he too saw the necessity of working with them. The advent to power of a new Liberal government on July 24/August 5 was favorable to Russian interests in that its strongest figure, Bratianu, adopted a foreign policy based on a program of national advancement and cooperation with Russia. Despite their previous strongly critical attitude toward this statesman, the Russian diplomats now found him the most influential advocate of their position. In June Zinoviev reported to the tsar that in the Epureanu ministry only Bratianu favored the adoption of a pro-Russian stand: "According to this statesman," the consul wrote, "Russia alone is able to assure the Romanian nationality against an absorption that threatens it from the side of the Germans, of whom the numerous Jews who invade this country would be only the precursors." Bratianu, however, laid down a condition for cooperation that he was to maintain firmly throughout the next turbulent months. In order to attract Romania to its side, the Russian government would have to renounce forever the three Bessarabian districts that Moldavia had annexed in 1856. This territory was vital to Romania, Bratianu emphasized, because it gave his country access to the Black 239

Russia and the Romanian national state Sea. In his report on this conversation Zinoviev commented that Bratianu had held these views since the Franco-Prussian War.84 Once in power, Bratianu did indeed begin to implement a new policy. Immediately after the formation of his ministry, he spoke with Stuart and declared his sympathies for Russia. He and his government were ready to cooperate fully and fulfill all the Russian desires "if they could be sure that Russia would not abandon Romania and would guarantee its integrity with its present boundaries." Stuart, of course, understood the significance of this statement and refrained from commenting, only reminding Bratianu of all that Romania owed to Russia and the advantages of a good relationship with a powerful neighbor, standard themes for Russian consuls in their conversations with Romanian leaders. Stuart also reported with approval that the policy toward Serbia had become more favorable since the departure of Kogalniceanu.85 Romania's increasingly pro-Russian stand was also shown in the attitude of Charles. The prince had since his assumption of the leadership of the country repeatedly stated his determination to end his vassal status. In January he made a strong statement on this subject to Zinoviev, who reported: His Highness let me clearly understand that the present state of affairs by virtue of which Romania sees itself chained to a state in full decomposition could become intolerable, and that he hoped to see an end soon to a situation that was as wounding for the national self-esteem as it was incompatible with the moral engagements that he had contracted in his capacity as Prince of Hohenzollern in regard to the country that had confided its destinies to him.86

Determined to use the Eastern crisis for Romanian national interests, the prince had few choices. Kogalniceanu's attempt to obtain concessions from the Ottoman government by negotiation had failed. The policy of strict neutrality had thus brought no advantages and had annoyed the powerful Russian neighbor. An approach to Russia and a more lenient attitude on aid to Serbia was the obvious alternate policy. In October, when Stuart visited him in Sinaia, the prince's summer home, Charles assured the consul that he and his government recognized how much their country owed to Russia and expressed their eternal gratitude for the benefits it had bestowed on Romania. The prince regretted the disagreements of the past and promised he would do all in his power to assure "the benevolent dispositions and the powerful protection" of the Russian government. He hoped that in the future this "protection and strong assistance to which the country owes its existence and prosperity" would not be refused. Charles also gave assurances on Serbia: volunteers could cross the country and refugees 240

Prince Charles, I8JI-I8J8 would be aided. The victories of the Balkan Slavs, he declared, were those "of Christianity and civilization over the barbarism and oppression represented by Islam."87 These themes were henceforth to be repeated in other conversations between the Romanian leaders and the Russian representatives. For instance, Charles assured Stuart that Romania would do all it could to avoid "the reproach of ingratitude in regard to its benefactor Russia."88 These assurances quite convinced the consul. Despite his previous strong criticisms of the left - the "reds" and "radicals" - he now believed that their maintenance was "an absolute necessity." He was quite won over to Bratianu, whom he believed was sincerely converted to the Russian point of view. A "zealous patriot," the Romanian premier understood that the interests of his country called for close ties with Russia. In contrast, Stuart strongly disliked Kogalniceanu, who in the consul's eyes was a man "without any principles, enemy of any straightforward action, and a partisan of the system of small deals (petits procedes)."8*

Even though a policy of seeking a closer association with St. Petersburg had thus been adopted, the Romanian government had received no clear indication of exactly what the Russians wanted and what their program for the future would be. In order to attempt to fathom Russian intentions, Charles decided to send a special delegation to Livadia. In the middle of September Bratianu informed Stuart of the mission. No exact purpose was given; the visit was stated as the equivalent of a meeting with Franz Joseph that had been held at Sibiu the previous month. Thus ostensibly it was designed simply as an act of courtesy to greet the tsar. After some hesitation, Alexander II agreed to receive the delegation. TOWARD A RUSSIAN AGREEMENT

The visit to Livadia marked the commencement of an extended period of negotiation that was to end in the Romanian abandonment of neutrality and a decision for war.90 Although Russia in the fall of 1876 was, like Romania, neutral, it was, of course, no secret to the Romanian government where Russian sympathies and interests lay. As the Serbian armies suffered continual defeats, the possibility, even the probability, of Russian intervention increased. Quite obviously, should Russia go to war with the Ottoman Empire, the Russian armies would have to march through Romania to the Danube as they had done in the past. Old fears of the political domination involved in previous occupations were aroused. Moreover, in the Treaty of Paris the Russian protectorate 241

Russia and the Romanian national state had been removed, and the three districts of southern Bessarabia had been given to Moldavia. The Russian intention of breaking the treaty was clear; the Black Sea clauses had already been changed. Military cooperation with Russia thus brought up two major dangers: first, that the former Russian political preponderance would be reestablished; second, that southern Bessarabia would be lost. However, it was recognized that, should Romania refuse to cooperate, then the country might become the theater of war for the Ottoman and Russian armies. The Romanian aim at Livadia was thus to discover the Russian objectives. The importance and character of the visit was shown in the composition of the delegation. Headed by the prime minister, Bratianu, it was also composed of the war minister, Colonel George Slaniceanu; a member of the court, Teodor Vacarescu; and an adjutant of the prince's, Singurov, who knew Russian. Ionescu, the foreign minister, was not included. The mission arrived in Russia at a time when the war spirit was at a high point; its members were presented to Alexander II on September 28/October 10. Isolated at the Crimean resort, the tsar was influenced by those who wanted a militant nationalistic policy in defense of the South Slavs. Although the delegation received a warm reception, the Russian leaders continued to press for a more positive Romanian attitude in favor of the Balkan belligerents. Since Russian entrance into the war was being considered, the question of Romanian cooperation in the event of hostilities was of first importance. The Russian government concentrated on obtaining an agreement on passage; at no time was Romanian active participation a matter of official negotiation, although the question was discussed in detail within Russian political and military circles. At Livadia the Romanian visitors talked with the tsar, Miliutin, Gorchakov, Ignatiev, and others. According to Russian accounts, Bratianu's attitude was most satisfactory; he made an effort to please the Russians. He proposed that the Romanian army join in the war and that a military alliance be made. In return, he asked for an assurance of Romanian independence and territorial integrity. He suggested that Russian officers should come to Romania to acquaint themselves with the conditions in the country and to aid the Romanian army in preparing for war. Most of the Russian leaders were well satisfied with his words. Jomini, still Gorchakov's close assistant, wrote to Giers, who was at this time in St. Petersburg: "The Romanians are very nice (so sincere). They offer to be our advance guard in return for compensations: independence, royalty - annexation of Dobrudja as far as 242

Prince Charles, I8JI-I8J8 Kustendje [Constanta]."91 The offer to be the "advance guard" was also discussed with Ignatiev.92 From the Romanian point of view, the negotiations were not so satisfactory, despite the fact that Bratianu was pleased by their friendly tone. In these conversations the Russian diplomats had a very simple objective: they wished to negotiate with Romania a military agreement that would facilitate the passage of the Russian army through the country to the Danube and would then assure lines of communication and supply for the rest of the war. The use of the Romanian railroads was essential. The Romanian delegates were willing to make an agreement, but they sought a formal political understanding. We have seen the Romanian concern over such matters previously in the negotiations over the economic conventions. Such a treaty would place the Russian and Romanian governments on an equal level, and it might even discourage a Russian acquisition of southern Bessarabia. The Romanian visitors discussed the question with Gorchakov, who now adopted the tough and unyielding attitude that he was to maintain throughout this period and that was in contrast to the general atmosphere of the conversations with other Russian leaders. Gorchakov warned Bratianu that if Romania would not make an agreement, Russia would regard the country as an Ottoman province and march in. The Romanian minister replied to this threat "that Russia would not auspiciously begin a war for the liberation of its Christian brothers from the yoke of the infidel with the crushing of a Christian army."93 Since the Romanian first concern remained the possible fate of Bessarabia, Bratianu asked Gorchakov directly if Russia intended to seize the region. Avoiding a frank reply, the Russian minister said that he would like his answer to be "guessed (devine)." Later Bratianu told Gorchakov that he "guessed" that Russia wanted the territory back. Gorchakov answered: "What! Aren't there treaties?" Bratianu found Ignatiev more direct, although he too did not address the question openly. He instead expressed his curiosity about why Bessarabia was so important to Romania: there was no military problem on this border, and a large compensation could be obtained. Bratianu replied that his country had need of "frontiers to defend itself while the great Russian empire did not certainly need to fear being invaded by Romania." 94 Alexander II also brought up the question. Later Bratianu confided in Balaceanu, who wrote down the details of the conversation: After dinner the tsar and the tsarina led Bratianu to take coffee in a part of the park where they were alone. The tsar took out a cigar from his pocket, offered it to Bratianu; then the empress, striking a match, offered the light to 243

Russia and the Romanian national state him, thus forcing Bratianu to light his cigar. Alexander II then phrased the question in the following manner: It is not from the point of view of territory that the question is important, because Russia possesses enough, but, from the point of view of the tsar, there is here a question of principle. It is the first time since Russia has existed that she has been obliged to cede a part, even a small fragment, of territory that she has conquered by her arms. On these grounds Alexander II would consider it as a pious duty toward his father to return to the Russia of Nicholas I what the Treaty of Paris had made him lose.

Bratianu did not try to answer these arguments.95 Despite the frank discussions, the Russian government did not press for an agreement. It was certainly not willing at this time to assume any obligations toward Romania for the future. War with the Ottoman Empire had not yet been decided upon. The Romanian government had agreed in principle to accept passage of Russian troops and arms. Although Bratianu had avoided direct answers on some issues, the Russian statesmen gained the impression that they would meet with no great difficulties in Bucharest. In contrast, Bratianu returned home greatly disturbed. At Livadia the Russian leaders had made clear their desire for a military agreement. The Bessarabian question had also been brought up, but certainly Russia's intention of taking the territory had not been declared in the open manner that had characterized the discussions with AustriaHungary and Germany. It was obvious that Russia was preparing for war and that Bessarabia was in danger. Despite these negotiations, Romanian policy did not change in essence. Neutrality remained the official position, although a more lenient attitude toward the passage of volunteers and supplies was adopted. Military preparations were accelerated, and Russian military representatives arrived in the country to prepare for a possible future entrance. Although other alternatives had thus been explored, most Romanian leaders at this time preferred a continuation of the policy of neutrality. Further attempts were made to ascertain what if anything other states would do to support a neutral course and what could be obtained from the Ottoman Empire without war. In October and November Ion Ghica, the vice-president of the chamber, who was regarded as proBritish and anti-Russian, visited Vienna, Paris, and London to attempt to win European guarantees for neutrality. At the same time efforts were continued to try to gain a widening of Romanian autonomous rights. The Ghica mission was doomed to failure. The Habsburg government was in negotiation with St. Petersburg on a war agreement, and it had no interest in assisting Romania in defending an independent course. France, severely weakened after the Prussian defeat, was not in a position to play its previous role in regard to Romania. The 244

Prince Charles, i8yi-i8y8 French advice was that Romania should remain neutral, but no concrete guarantees of aid could be given. In London Ghica delivered a memorandum to the British government. Its tone was anti-Ottoman, but its emphasis was on neutrality and the preservation of the Romanian barrier between Russia and the Porte. The document stated the difficulty of the Romanian position should Russia go to war. If passage was allowed to the Russian troops, unless they were acting on a European mandate, this act would infringe the neutrality dictated by the Romanians' "instinct of their national conservation and what is for Romania an obligation imposed by the treaties as a duty." The intervention of the powers was requested.96 Despite the failure to receive outside support, the neutral policy remained in effect. It was particularly favored by Ionescu and was also preferred by the prince and Bratianu. Until the general situation changed and until the Russians were willing to give more satisfactory guarantees for the future, the Romanian government could not take the risk of placing its fate in Russian hands. This would be the case should a military agreement be signed on a bilateral basis with St. Petersburg without effective assurances on the questions of territorial integrity and political independence. Throughout the fall of 1876 the war fever in Russia remained at a peak. The defeat of the Serbian army and the difficulties in the armistice negotiations made hostilities seem imminent. The army was partially mobilized, and troops were concentrated in Bessarabia. The tsar's brother, the Grand Duke Nicholas, assumed command. Under these circumstances a definite agreement with Romania on passage became essential and was demanded by the army in particular. The major problem was the form of the agreement. In conflict with his colleagues, Gorchakov sought to disassociate himself from the negotiations; he wished to make them a purely military matter. The Russian army circles insisted on their diplomatic nature. At the beginning of November Gorchakov telegraphed Ignatiev, who had returned to Constantinople, to begin the discussions. The foreign minister, however, directed that the negotiations were to concern only technical questions connected with the Russian passage; he remained firmly opposed to a political treaty. Alexander Ivanovich Nelidov, who had been appointed the head of Nicholas's diplomatic chancery, was sent to Bucharest for these discussions. In accordance with his instructions, Nelidov went first to Odessa, arriving on November 4/16. There he had expected to receive further directions from the army staff and perhaps a draft treaty. According to his own account, his instructions and the information he was given 245

Russia and the Romanian national state were entirely insufficient. He was joined by Colonel Michael Cantacuzino, a member of the Russian general staff with relatives in Romania. In the forthcoming negotiations Cantacuzino took almost complete charge of the military aspects of the agreement.97 Nelidov and Cantacuzino traveled from Odessa to Kishinev, which was the army headquarters, and in great secrecy crossed over to Romania. A leakage of the news that a military agreement was under negotiation would have been extremely embarrassing for both governments, and in Bucharest extreme precautions were taken to conceal the delegates' identity. They used false names: Nelidov became Alexandrescu and Cantacuzino, Karsky. Of the Russian representatives in Romania, only Stuart and Colonel Ivan Fedorovich Zolotarev were informed of the proceedings. Charles did not receive the Russian delegates. Nelidov negotiated principally with Bratianu; Ionescu, still the proponent of strict neutrality, was not told of the discussions. Bratianu and Nelidov met at different places and usually at night. The Russian diplomats were well informed on the differences within the Liberal Party on the issue of cooperation with Russia. The negotiations did not proceed smoothly. Nelidov arrived in Bucharest with two letters, one of which contained his confidential instructions. In these the Russian envoy was cautioned not to discuss political matters. He was not to discourage the Romanian minister, an act that might increase British and Austrian influence in Bucharest, but he was to accept no obligations for the future in the name of the tsar. He could assure Bratianu that Romanian wishes would be taken into consideration if after a war major alterations were made in the map of the Ottoman Empire. If political changes occurred at that time, then the tsarist government would not oppose Romanian independence and would grant other advantages, such as, for example, the cession of Tulcea on the Danube and a port on the Black Sea. The issue of Bessarabia would thus be avoided. The second letter, designed to be shown to Bratianu, was little more than a letter of introduction. Nelidov was thus closely circumscribed in the subjects that he could discuss. Ignatiev, who would have preferred to allow him more latitude, was overruled by the foreign ministry. There was also a difference within the Russian official circles on the military aspects of the negotiations. In contrast to Gorchakov and the foreign ministry, which wanted the agreement limited to questions of passage and supplies, the army wished an active Romanian participation in the war. A project of cooperation had been worked out by the general staff that would have placed the Romanian army under Russian control; the Russian command would thus have determined where the Romanian army would 246

Prince Charles, I8JI-I8J8 fight and who its commanders would be, and it would have assumed jurisdiction in Romanian areas directly involved in military actions. Miliutin personally favored active Romanian participation. On the question of organization he would have allowed the Romanian army separate fields of activity, but with these closely coordinated with the Russian command. Ignatiev too advised that the Romanian army operate as a separate unit. In the discussions with Nelidov, Bratianu, as instructed by Charles, continued to insist that a formal political convention guaranteeing Romanian territorial integrity should be concluded. It would follow the pattern of the previous trade agreement, and be signed by the Romanian prime minister and then ratified by the prince and the legislature. Gorchakov would be expected to sign it on behalf of the Russian government. On the military side of the negotiations, Bratianu proposed that the 50,000-man Romanian army participate in the war, but he wanted to define clearly separate theaters of activity. He also asked for 100,000 rifles, 50 canons, and 20 million francs. Romania lacked both the economic means and adequate military equipment for a major war. Nelidov, in accordance with his instructions, tried to avoid the political issues. He argued that he was empowered only to discuss the military agreement, not the future political condition of Romania or its boundaries. When war actually came, he insisted, Romania could request to join and then the future would be considered. In any case, because of its geographical position, Romania could not remain out of the war. If a pact were not signed with Russia, the fighting would take place on Romanian territory. Nelidov personally appreciated Bratianu's difficult position; he could not put his country into the dangerous situation that the ending of neutrality would entail without assurances from Russia. In their conversations Bratianu and Nelidov considered at length the question of southern Bessarabia. From the Romanian side the insistence on a guarantee of territorial integrity was, of course, designed to protect this area. Although Nelidov did not know the terms of the Reichstadt agreement, in which Russia assured itself of the Bessarabian districts, he was well aware of the Russian intentions. In the discussions he supported the Russian position to the best of his ability. He claimed that an article containing territorial guarantees "wrongs Russia" and that "the Russians have enough with Poland." At one point, Bratianu later told Balaceanu, Nelidov burst into tears, declaring: "It is . . . because you do not trust in the good faith of my government, and that grieves me."98 Nelidov argued skillfully in his attempt to gain a Romanian acceptance for treaty terms that would not limit future Russian 247

Russia and the Romanian national state actions. He declared that Russia could not sign a general agreement that would provide for all eventualities; his country, for instance, could not aid if Romania went to war with Austria-Hungary over Transylvania. Bratianu too used devious means to try to gain a frank statement of Russian intentions. He even asked what compensation might be offered for a surrender of Bessarabia and inquired about the possibility of a partition of Romania between Russia and the Habsburg Monarchy. Meanwhile, because of the apparent imminence of war and the vital importance of the military agreement, the Russian government was forced to yield on the question of a political agreement. Bratianu then pressed to secure inclusion in it of an assurance of the granting of independence, while Nelidov continued to try to limit the scope of the arrangement. Then finally, in early December, an acceptable draft convention was ready; Nelidov, however, was not authorized to sign it. He had only a letter of introduction from Ignatiev. Because Nelidov feared that his mission would be discovered if he remained longer in Bucharest, it was agreed that the authorization should be telegraphed to Stuart, who would then sign. Two separate agreements had been drawn up: a short political convention and a special military pact. In the first Romania agreed to passage and Russia promised to defend the political rights and the territorial integrity of its neighbor. The second, the military agreement, was more detailed and covered such items as the use of the railroads and the provision of supplies. The Russian army officials were completely satisfied with these arrangements when they were communicated to them. The two agreements were based on the equality of the signatories; Romania had thus advanced another step in the assertion of autonomous rights. Despite the fact that a political agreement had been obtained, the Romanian government delayed its signature." The other great powers were all advising neutrality; the assurances on territorial integrity were in fact vague, and negotiations were also in progress with the Ottoman Empire. The Porte sent Ali Bey, the head of the Tulcea sanjak, to Bucharest to try to obtain Romanian cooperation against Russia. He arrived while Nelidov was still there. The Ottoman aim was to secure the support of the vassal principality, and to this end economic and military assistance was offered. The Porte also wished to send the regular Turkish army into the country, an action that would have made Romania a battlefield; in return, more political privileges would be granted. In Constantinople, Safvet Pasha, now grand vezir, made similar proposals, but the chances of securing an Ottoman-Romanian arrangement were minimal. The Porte could offer little in exchange for 248

Prince Charles, i8yi-i8j8 Romanian assistance. Moreover, any such agreement would have turned Romania into a theater of war. Neither the Russian nor the Romanian government pressed hard for the completion of the agreement. The general diplomatic scene had again altered; war fever in Russia declined. Most Russian leaders, including the tsar, still preferred to settle the Eastern crisis by negotiation and on a European basis. Because of this attitude, a British proposal for a conference to be held in Constantinople was accepted. The great powers agreed to send two representatives each to the Ottoman capital to discuss the question of the peace terms for Serbia and Montenegro and reforms for Bosnia, Hercegovina, and Bulgaria. Until the results of this conference were known, negotiations on military cooperation were less urgent. Should the conference succeed, the agreements would be unnecessary. As a vassal of the Ottoman Empire, Romania, of course, was not invited to attend the conference, which opened in December. Nevertheless, the Romanian government sent D. Bratianu, the brother of the prime minister, to Constantinople to protect the Romanian interests, which it was hoped would be discussed. He was instructed to attempt to obtain the advice of the powers on what they believed the Romanian attitude should be if Russia went to war with the Ottoman Empire. He was also to find out if it were possible for Romania to secure some sort of special guarantee for its neutrality and assurances on its territorial integrity and political rights. In addition, discussions were to be carried on with the Porte on the familiar issues of the Danube boundary and the right to coin money and award decorations.100 Bratianu did not obtain a sympathetic hearing from the representatives of any of the great powers. None wished to complicate the international situation further; the Romanian problems were a side issue and a nuisance. The major figure at the conference was Ignatiev, no partisan of Romania. He cooperated with the British chief delegate, Lord Salisbury, to arrange a satisfactory settlement. Their main achievement was the formulation of a plan for the establishment of two autonomous Bulgarian states. The attention of the conference was directed toward the problems of the Slavic peoples - not those of the Romanians or the Greeks. A similar failure was met in the Romanian negotiations with the Porte. In fact, here relations took a great step backward. On December 11/23 the Ottoman government issued a new constitution in which the "United Principalities" was referred to as a "privileged province" and was ranked with Egypt and Serbia. The Romanian government wanted instead a statement that Romania was not a province, 249

Russia and the Romanian national state but a separate state linked with the empire through their mutual treaties and international arrangements. The definition of Romania's exact place in the imperial scheme had, as we have seen, been a subject of constant controversy in the past. The conference was similarly a failure for the great powers. Rejecting international interference, the Ottoman leaders claimed that the new constitution would meet the problem of the subject nationalities. According to its provisions, all were equal in the empire. On January 3/15, 1877, the powers reduced their demands. When these were not accepted, the ambassadors left Constantinople on January 8/20 but relations with the Porte were not broken. Once again a European conference had failed to settle a major Balkan crisis. These results were particularly unfortunate for the Romanian government. The probability of an Ottoman-Russian war had increased, but, at the same time, there was little likelihood that Russia would fight with a European mandate, a situation that would have given Romania some protection. A decision on the signing of the agreement with Russia now had to be made. During the Constantinople discussions Charles and Bratianu had wavered in their attitude, but in general the prince was more willing to adopt a positive policy. When the conference appeared to be failing, and after the issuance of the Ottoman constitution, Charles declared that he was willing to sign the document on the condition that it be kept secret until war was actually imminent. The agreement was to be ratified and put into effect not earlier than twenty-four hours before the beginning of hostilities. The prince then evidently had further doubts. On December 22/January 3 Stuart proposed that the agreement be signed. Charles was again willing, but Bratianu hesitated and declared that public opinion would have to be prepared.101 On January 8/20, when the failure of the conference was obvious, Charles wrote to his father that he had decided on his course of action. He would conclude the convention with Russia and actively enter the war against the Ottoman Empire.102 Yet he changed his mind once more. The vacillation in Romania had parallels in Russia. As before, Gorchakov had no desire to undertake political obligations in regard to Romania, and he did not press for a written agreement. In contrast, the military circles, anxious to be ready for war, wanted a signed document. Direct contact between Charles and Grand Duke Nicholas was established through Stuart. On January 12/24 Nicholas wrote the prince and urged him to make a military arrangement. The purpose of the Russian action was stated in exalted terms: This objective, exempt from any idea of invasion, of conquest or of warlike ambition, is no other than to defend the oppressed against the oppressor, to 250

Prince Charles, 1871-1878 have restored to our co-religionists of the East their too long unrecognized legitimate rights, and to render forever impossible the return of those scenes of horror and carnage which have moved the conscience of outraged Europe.

If war came, the Russian army would have to go through Romania, "a friendly country, whose independence, authority and well-being we have at heart to respect." The grand duke also stated the difficulties of operating an army in a foreign country and the need of an advance arrangement. He requested Charles to suggest how they could best arrive at "a practical entente from a purely military point of view, exempt from any political character."103 In his reply of January 24/February 5 Charles refused, explaining that if such a treaty were signed before Russia declared war, it would seem to the other powers as if Romania on its own initiative were breaking the agreements that guaranteed the political existence of the state.104 Throughout February the Romanian government went through a period of political crisis involving both foreign and domestic issues. The conflict on foreign policy crossed political lines. The basic problem facing the nation continued to be how a Russian war with the Ottoman Empire should be handled. Three practical choices were discussed: first, the continuation of the policy of neutrality; second, a limited agreement with Russia, but no participation in the war; and, third, full cooperation with Russia and a declaration of war on the Ottoman Empire. Undoubtedly, the maintenance of neutrality received the strongest support. The Romanian leaders, like the Russian, hoped that the Eastern crisis would be settled by negotiation and on a European basis. Certainly, Romania had nothing to gain by a war that would outweigh the dangers of having a Russian army in the country. The fears over southern Bessarabia were constantly present. Unfortunately, the continuation of neutrality was obviously becoming impractical in face of the fact that the guarantor powers would give Romania no concrete assurances. Only if it were possible to recreate the Crimean War situation, when a combination of British, French, and Habsburg pressure forced the Russian armies to leave the Principalities, could Romania hope to keep out of a conflict. However, no state was willing to risk war on the issue. Britain, France, and Italy all advised neutrality, but none was in fact in a position to assist in Romania's defense. The two powers with armies capable of backing the Romanian position, Germany and Austria-Hungary, were allied with Russia. For Romanian interests the attitude of Vienna was most important; only there could adequate assistance be gained. In December, when asked what the Romanian policy should be, Andrassy gave an answer that was to be the

Russia and the Romanian national state Habsburg standpoint thereafter; it did not encourage resistance to Russian desires: "It is not our task to give Romania directions from our standpoint; we could at the most make a declaration . . . about what position its own interests demanded and what position we planned to take in regard to it/' 105 Andrassy did not believe that there was any danger of a Turkish invasion. If one should occur and the Romanians should resist the occupation, the Habsburg government would not object. A Russian intervention could scarcely happen before the end of the Constantinople conference. Even if it took place, it would be a simpler problem than the Romanian government appeared to believe. On the important issue of the extent to which the monarchy would defend Romanian interests against Russia, Andrassy declared: Romania does not have to choose between ourselves and Russia. A connection with us is always welcome to us in the interest of Romania, but that absolutely does not imply an anti-Russian policy. Romania at the time of a Russian occupation should simply declare that it would yield to superior force, withdraw its troops, and remain neutral. This is the direct way; it is also the best. In this manner Romania protects its political and territorial stability and comes into conflict neither with us nor with Russia. For our part we could, as long as Romania maintains a correct attitude in regard to Austria-Hungary, categorically assure that we, as much in the Romanian as in our own interests, would in no case allow Romania to suffer any damage in regard to its political position or its territorial interests.106

In February 1877, apparently on his own initiative, Balaceanu spoke with Andrassy on the question. Appealing for Habsburg aid, he insisted that his government did not want to sign a treaty with Russia and that it would oppose Russian passage if it could be sure of support from Vienna. Andrassy, who was deeply involved in further negotiations with Russia, gave an evasive reply that was in fact similar to the previous advice: "We have not wanted to dictate to Romania its decision." Although he was well aware that Russia did intend to annex southern Bessarabia, he nevertheless told Balaceanu that he did not believe that Russia would take actions that "infringed on the political position of Romania guaranteed through the treaties or that would endanger its territorial integrity."107 The Habsburg government, he declared, stood by the European treaty system and would not allow such actions. However, he also made it clear that his government would not view a Russian entrance into Romania as a casus belli. In further conversations Andrassy expressed the opinion that the Romanian government should sign with Russia a treaty that was a simple modus vivendi providing only for the passage of the Russian army. The Habsburg Monarchy thus offered no support for a policy of resistance to Russia. 252

Prince Charles, 1871-1878 Despite the obvious difficulties, many Romanians continued to favor a policy of strict neutrality, even if Russia should go to war.108 Ghica, D. A. Sturdza, and Ionescu maintained this position until the spring. Ghica believed that, if the Russian army entered, the Romanian government should protest to Europe. Charles should then withdraw his troops to Oltenia. The great weakness of this policy was not only that it had no foreign support, but that its implementation could turn Romania into a battlefield. At the outbreak of war, under these circumstances, it could be expected that Ottoman troops would cross the Danube to meet the advancing Russian army. If the policy of strict neutrality was not followed, the Romanian government had two obvious alternative paths of cooperation with Russia. The first, as we have seen, was for Romania to remain technically neutral, but to allow the passage of the Russian army. The negotiations had been based on this choice; it was the solution preferred by Gorchakov, and it appeared to involve the least danger to Romania. The second possibility, a full military alliance and war with the Ottoman Empire, had the advantage of probably allowing the state to press for the maximum gains in the future peace treaty. Any cooperation with Russia, of course, carried with it the danger of the loss of southern Bessarabia; the presence of the Russian army endangered Romanian political freedom. The Liberal Party, the heirs of 1848, had no trust in tsarist Russia. A Romanian declaration of war on the Ottoman Empire would also nullify the great-power guarantee contained in the Treaty of Paris. The Romanian government had one other possible choice. As a vassal state Romania should have cooperated with the Ottoman Empire to resist a Russian invasion. Such a policy never received serious consideration. As we have seen, the Porte was unwilling and unable to meet the Romanian demands for an extension of autonomous rights. The Ottoman revolution of 1876 had been based on the principle of the strengthening of the state and not on its continuing dissolution. The new regime could not grant Romania the equivalent of an independent status. Moreover, in a war between Russia and the Ottoman Empire, it was universally assumed that the northern state would triumph; Romania could not afford to be on the losing side. Even more important was the attitude of the vast majority of the Romanian people. With five hundred years of Christian-Muslim conflict behind them, the Romanians could not be expected to fight with the Ottoman forces against Christian Orthodox neighbors. The average Romanian also had a deeply rooted fear of any Ottoman military presence. In fact, as Ottoman forces were concentrated on the right bank of the Danube in 253

Russia and the Romanian national state preparation for a possible war, virtual panic reigned on the Romanian side of the river. Reports of the excesses of the irregulars in suppressing the Bulgarian uprising gave real substance to this feeling. Despite the obvious problems connected with a policy of strict neutrality, this course of action remained the one preferred by the Romanian government. A ministerial crisis at the beginning of February led to a cabinet reorganization that brought to power the opponents of an agreement with Russia. D. A. Sturdza became minister of finance, and the military negotiations were halted. Bratianu, still the strongest figure in the government, wavered, but he also continued to press additional demands on the Russians. Undoubtedly, the Romanian economic position was critical. If war came, the country would need financial assistance as well as military supplies. Requests were thus made for horses, arms, torpedoes, heavy artillery, and other war supplies. The Russian government was also asked to pay in gold for the cost of the passage of the army.109 The Russian officials were reluctant to agree to these conditions because their own financial position was precarious and they had certainly no surplus of military equipment. Like the Romanians, the Russians still hoped for a peaceful solution to the crisis. Until April they sought to cooperate with the powers to secure acceptable peace treaties for Serbia and Montenegro and reforms for Bosnia, Hercegovina, and Bulgaria. As the weeks went by with no solution in sight, pressures increased on the tsar to go to war; questions of honor and national interest were at stake. The Russian army could not remain mobilized forever; the financial strain was extreme. In the first months of 1877 the Russian government continued its two sets of negotiations: the first toward a settlement with the Porte, the second in preparation for war. In February it was decided that if the powers would agree to support a common program in the Balkans, and one that would give them the right of supervision and intervention, and if they would require the Porte to adhere to it, then the Russian forces could be demobilized as long as the Ottoman army took similar steps. Meanwhile, negotiations with Vienna continued. In November discussions had commenced between Gorchakov and Baron Ferdinand von Langenau, the Habsburg ambassador, in St. Petersburg and between Andrassy and Novikov, the Russian representative, in the Habsburg capital. On January 3/15 a military convention was signed. The political agreement was concluded on March 6/18, but it was postdated to conform with the previous arrangement. Both pacts contained sections pertaining to Romania. The military convention provided for Russia the assurance of Habsburg neutrality and delimited the spheres of 254

Prince Charles, 1871-1878 military activity of the two powers. Serbia, Montenegro, and Novi Pazar were to be neutral zones, although individual Serbs and Montenegrins might fight with the Russian forces. Austrian responsibility was to cover Bosnia and Hercegovina and was to be excluded from Romania and Bulgaria. Russian forces could, of course, march through Romania and Bulgaria. In the political agreement the Habsburg Monarchy was given control of Bosnia and Hercegovina; Russia took southern Bessarabia. The bases of the Reichstadt agreement were reaffirmed with the stipulations that in case of a territorial rearrangement or of a dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, the establishment of a great compact Slav state, or other, is excluded; in return Bulgaria, Albania, and the rest of Rumelia could be constituted as independent states; Thessaly, a part of Epirus and the island of Crete could be annexed to Greece; Constantinople with a suburb, the boundary of which remains to be determined, could become a free city.110

The convention was secret, but Bismarck was informed of its contents. Throughout March preparations for war were accelerated. On March 14/26 Gorchakov telegraphed Stuart that a definite response was needed.111 On March 17/29 the Russian consul tried again to obtain from Bratianu a clear answer. The minister accepted in principle, but he wished to sign only if war were inevitable. He requested a two-week warning before the commencement of hostilities so that there would be time for the chambers to ratify the agreement and the army to mobilize. The tsar commented that it would be difficult to fulfill this demand, since the Russian government itself did not know when it would act. By this time Charles appears to have become even more inclined toward signing the agreement and even fighting. He wrote to his father on March 28/April 9 that neutrality was impossible; Romania had to ally with the stronger power. An end to the vassal status could be won. The prince did not believe that Russian control of the country would result, since Austria-Hungary would never allow the "German Danube" to be surrendered to Russia.112 After the first week in April, war became increasingly probable. The powers had formulated another proposal, the London Protocol; its rejection by the Porte on March 28/April 9 brought to an end the attempt to find a settlement on a European basis. Ottoman negotiations with Montenegro had also broken down. On March 30/April 11 the tsar set April 12/24 a s the day f° r t n e commencement of hostilities.113 An agreement with Romania was needed at once, and from March 29/April 10 through March 31 /April 12 Stuart repeatedly urged the Romanian government to act.114 Miliutin and the military leaders 255

Russia and the Romanian national state saw the pact as absolutely essential. The Romanian demands for military equipment were met; on April 1/13 the Russian government agreed to pay in gold.115 During this time Russian officers were in Romania preparing for the Russian entrance. The Romanian government could not postpone its decision any longer. War was inevitable. Ionescu, still supporting neutrality, had resigned on March 25/April 6, and Ion Cimpineanu temporarily took charge of foreign affairs. On April 1/13 Cimpineanu issued a circular declaring that, since war could not be avoided, Romania would conclude an agreement regulating Russian passage; the country, however, would remain neutral: "This modus Vivendi excludes any alliance and all cooperation." Neutrality would be maintained as long as the Ottoman Empire did not extend the hostilities to Romanian territory.116 On April 2/14 Charles convened a royal council that included not only his ministers, but also leading politicians.117 The entire question was once more reviewed. Of those present only Rosetti, Kogalniceanu, and Charles were definitely in favor of an active policy. Kogalniceanu supported an agreement concerning passage and supplies, but he did not want a political or military alliance. Rosetti was willing to accept a stronger stand. Despite the deep concern over the possible consequences of cooperation with Russia, the decision to sign a convention was finally made. Changes in the government were required to implement the new policy. General Alexander Chernat became war minister. On April 3/15 Kogalniceanu took the post of foreign minister. The final agreement was signed on April 4/16 by Kogalniceanu and Stuart. Suspicious to the last, the Romanian government had insisted on a final change. Under extreme pressure because of the impending war, the Russian leaders agreed to the insertion of the word present in the last sentence of the second article of the political agreement. When Baron Stuart telegraphed this demand to St. Petersburg, he received authorization to make the alteration.118 The military agreement, as has already been discussed, covered problems dealing with the passage of Russian troops. The political convention had far greater general significance. The first article provided for military passage. Through the second article the Romanian leaders hoped that they had secured themselves against a Russian seizure of Bessarabia or a takeover of political control: Article II. Should any inconvenience or danger result for Romania owing to the passage of the Russian troops on its territory, the government of His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias undertakes to maintain and to respect the political rights of the Romanian state, as they are established by the domestic 256

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laws and the existing119 treaties, as well as to maintain and defend the present integrity of Romania. Despite the signing of this agreement, the Romanian government was not yet ready to accept the entrance of the Russian troops. At the time of the negotiation of the pact the Romanians had been assured that the army would not cross the border until the chambers had approved the treaty and it had been formally ratified. The deadline for the Russian declaration of war was fast approaching. After setting the date of April 12/24 t n e t s a r n a d left for Kishinev, the army headquarters. The meeting of the Romanian chambers was delayed because new elections were being held for the senate, so that legislative approval could not be obtained by the crucial date. One day before April 11/23, some Russian troops crossed into Romanian territory. Kogalniceanu immediately protested against this passage before the convention had been approved by the legislature.120 On the insistence of Charles, Stuart took the train to Kishinev. There the tsar, Grand Duke Nicholas, Miliutin, and others discussed the problem, but rejected a postponement because of the general military situation.121 On April 12/24 t n e Russian army crossed the frontier in the face of Romanian protests.122 Relations became even more strained when the Russian command put up posters with a proclamation addressed to the Romanian people. Charles and his ministers regarded this action as an affront; all such declarations should have been made by the prince.123 Because of these disagreements, the prefects were instructed not to cooperate with the Russian army; Romanian troops were ordered to retire as the Russians advanced.124 In general, the Romanian authorities were well satisfied with the conduct of the Russian soldiers, but friction continued among the higher officials; there were complaints that the Russian officers were not aware of the agreement and acted as if a convention did not exist. Russian and Romanian cooperation thus had a bad beginning. Not only had the Russian government signed an agreement protecting Romanian territorial integrity when it clearly intended to take southern Bessarabia,125 but the Russian army had also entered the country before the pact was legally in effect. Nevertheless, the convention was approved by the chambers when they met on April 16/28 and 17/29. Kogalniceanu defended the arrangements as the only possible choice for the country. Romania could not side with the Ottoman Empire or allow Ottoman troops on its soil. The minister placed the blame for the Romanian predicament on the Treaty of Paris, which did not guarantee neutrality. Although there was opposition to the agreements, they were approved 257

Russia and the Romanian national state in the senate by 41 to 10 votes and in the chamber by 85 to 26. The army had already been mobilized and ordered to concentrate on defending the Danube line. The Romanian government had thus allowed the Russian army to enter the country and to make use of Romanian suppl ies and means of transport. War, however, had not been declared. The policy in operation had been adopted after long hesitation and with real fears for the future. The guarantor powers had also not given their approval; Romania had not acted with a European mandate. In his first circular to the Romanian agents after the war had started, Kogalniceanu placed the blame on those states which had not moved to defend either Romania's neutrality or its political existence. He wrote that the Romanians, abandoned by the powers, in face of the imminent entry of the Russian army, had to draw from ourselves the necessary moral force in order to face the perils of the situation. We therefore had to come to an agreement with the imperial Russian government, in order to safeguard what we possess, that is to say our political individuality, our institutions, and our frontiers, such as they are guaranteed to us by the Treaty of Paris.

The circular also emphasized the limited nature of the agreement: "These conventions have no other political character than that of guaranteeing for us, during the war, our present political status quo. There is no independence with regard to Turkey, no annulment of any of the present ties with that power; no cooperation of the Romanian army with the Russian armies; no alliance against Turkey." 126 Immediately before and after the outbreak of hostilities one of the major concerns of the Romanian government was to protect the country against Ottoman reprisals. Just before the war commenced the Porte had called on its vassal to cooperate under the terms of the previous treaties.127 At the same time the Romanian government requested the powers to advise the Ottoman government not to extend military operations across the Danube to Romanian territory. The argument used was that an Ottoman invasion could not be justified by the passage of Russian troops, whose actions had more or less the tacit consent of the powers. Rumors of an impending Ottoman invasion were circulating; the entrance of Ottoman irregular troops, Circassians or bashibozuks, could turn Romania into a second Bulgaria.128 The diplomatic appeals reflected the great concern not only of the government, but of the Romanian population along the Danube. After the war started, some of these fears proved justified. Danube port cities were bombarded, and incursions of armed bands occurred. The Ottoman Danube fleet also made attacks on the ports. There was no major Ottoman effort, how258

Prince Charles, 1871-1878 ever, to cross the river with a strong military force or to occupy Romanian territory. The Ottoman government had long regarded the Danube River as its true northern military boundary. Once Russian troops had entered Romania, the Russian command made a great effort to maintain smooth relations with the Romanians. Alexander II sent his aide, General Vladimir Andreevich Dolgorukov, to the prince with a letter explaining the failure to give an adequate forewarning. Strategic necessities, the tsar wrote, demanded an immediate entrance to defend the country for which Russian armies "already more than one time have shed their blood."129 On April 14/26 Grand Duke Nicholas wrote in the same sense and requested that a regular correspondence be resumed.130 From this time until the end of the war he and Charles regularly exchanged letters; the prince's direct relations with the Russian command were thus with the grand duke rather than with the tsar. After the initial friction, the occupation proceeded with relatively few problems. As the Russian army entered the country, the Romanian forces moved to guard the line of the Danube. They then retired into Little Wallachia on the other side of the Olt River. There they remained separated from the Russian army, but they in fact formed a protection for the Russian right wing. WAR AND INDEPENDENCE

Despite the convention the Romanian government was in an uncomfortable position. The state was still officially neutral, but a foreign army was encamped within its borders and some Ottoman attacks had been made along the Danube. Romania was neither at war nor at peace. On April 30/May 12 the chambers solved this problem by declaring that a state of war existed because of the Ottoman actions. This act led logically to another: a declaration of independence. On May 9/21 the chambers voted for national independence; the date May 10/22, 1877, when Charles signed the act, was celebrated as the official day marking a new stage in Romanian development. With this event the program of the nationalists attained yet another success. The step also marked the achievement of what had been Charles's major aim since he ascended the throne. Many months were to pass, however, before the great powers accepted the Romanian action.131 Although the declaration was of major significance in Romanian domestic history, it had a negative effect abroad. The Russian government did not approve it: independence was to be awarded as a prize at the peace table. Andrassy declared that Romania's political 259

Russia and the Romanian national state status was set by international agreements, and the powers would make the decision; Romanian independence was de facto, not de jure.132 A similar policy was followed by the other powers, who indicated that they would reserve their judgment until after the war. Thereafter, although the Romanian leaders considered their state independent, the great powers dissented. Certainly Charles ceased to regard himself as a vassal prince. The conviction also grew that "only on the battlefield could the independence of the country be sealed."133 Once independence had been declared, the limited role of Romania in the war came under increasing criticism. In the previous weeks the question had divided Romanian opinion. Charles and Bratianu favored an active policy; Kogalniceanu wished to wait.134 There were similar disagreements on the Russian side. Gorchakov strongly opposed active military cooperation with Romania; Grand Duke Nicholas and the army commanders, in contrast, were eager to make use of the Romanian army, which, although small, was in excellent condition. Even should military action be decided upon, the question of the form and manner of the cooperation of the two armies had yet to be settled. In the conversations on this matter, two aspects had to be considered. The first involved the place of the Romanian army in the Russian plans. The Romanians insisted that their forces should be under their own commanders and be assigned a separate theater of operation. The second problem concerned military supplies. Romania was unprepared for a major conflict; all manner of military equipment and financial assistance would be necessary for an offensive war against the Ottoman Empire. The question of money was to cause much friction until the end of the war and was one of the major reasons why the Russian government discouraged the cooperation of the Balkan states in the war. Even before the war started, on April 10/22, Kogalniceanu asked for five million francs.135 On the next day General Ion Ghica, the newly appointed Romanian agent, received an assurance from the tsar that financial assistance would be given.136 On April 20/May 2 Bratianu went to Kishinev, where he discussed the question of a new military agreement.137 He wanted a clear statement of the advantages that his country would receive from participation in the war, since he claimed that there was much opposition to it. The subject was further considered when Charles and Bratianu visited Ploesti, the Russian army headquarters. Bratianu made another series of demands: he wanted a money subvention whose amount would be determined by how many thousand Romanian soldiers crossed the Danube;138 he also wanted a guarantee against a possible intervention by Austria-Hungary139 and an assurance that Romanian interests would 260

Prince Charles, 1871-1878 be taken into consideration if the Ottoman Empire collapsed. The report of these negotiations made a very bad impression on the tsar, who commented: "One sees by this that they think only of squeezing money from us under the pretext of a cooperation that we can quite well do without."140 A similar approach was made at the same time in St. Petersburg, where Ghica discussed with the Russian officials both the loan and military cooperation. The request for five million francs, as could be expected, did not receive much encouragement, but he did obtain a lesser amount later.141 The suggestion of a Romanian participation in the war was also received with disfavor. Gorchakov, in line with his own opinion and official policy, declared: His Majesty charges me to let you know that he does not depend on the cooperation of Romania and that he does not advise it. If, in spite of that, the Romanian government decides to make war on the Turks and orders its army to cross the Danube, Romania must provide for the costs and expenses of the campaign undertaken.142

A virtually identical reply was sent through Nelidov on May 17/29. Again the statement was made that the tsar did not favor a Romanian intervention across the Danube; "if the Romanian government wishes to undertake such an action at its own expense and its own risks and perils," it could do so, but only on the condition that the direction of the entire operation remained in the hands of the High Command of the Russian army. Although the Romanian military authorities had previously shown a desire to act alone and in a separate theater, such a plan was dangerous and impossible. Romanian participation was not desired; "Russia does not need assistance from the Romanian army. The forces that she has brought into action to combat Turkey are more than sufficient to attain that noble objective that the emperor has set in beginning the present war." If the Romanian government insisted on a more active role, the Russian note emphasized, "that action should not in any case impede the execution of the general plan of the great operations of the Russian army, in whose shadow exclusively can be laid the foundations of the future destinies of the Romanian state."143 Despite the discouraging reception of the Romanian overtures, Charles continued to desire a more active role in the war. He was convinced that his army would have to fight to assert the position of the country; he did not want Romania to be treated as an Ottoman province.144 In June, when the tsar and Gorchakov were in Ploe§ti, the prince continued to argue for a larger military role, but once again Gorchakov discouraged Romanian military cooperation. Romania, he 261

Russia and the Romanian national state maintained, could gain the recognition of its independence without fighting. At this time he brought up the question of the Russian desire to obtain control of the Kilia Channel of the Danube Delta, an acquisition that would, of course, involve southern Bessarabia.145 It would, further, be in violation of the recently signed agreement with Romania. Gorchakov discussed the question with Kogalniceanu too.146 Charles during this visit also spoke with the Grand Duke Nicholas, who continued to favor Romanian participation in the war and who expressed the opinion that the Foreign Ministry was meddling too much in questions that did not concern it.147 On June 14/26-15/27, two months after the entrance into Romania, the Russian army crossed the Danube at Zimnicea. See map on page facing p. 149. For the next month the Russian campaign was very successful. It seemed that Russia would win a swift victory. During this period Grand Duke Nicholas did want to make use of Romanian troops, but only in minor matters. At the time of the crossing of the Danube he requested Charles to send a regiment across the Olt and to extend the line the Romanians were defending on the Danube to Flaminda.148 Charles agreed but with the proviso that the action would not be permanent.149 On July 7/19 a further request was made that Romanian troops be provided to garrison Nicopolis and also to accompany seven thousand Turkish prisoners to the Russian frontier. Charles, with the strong support of his ministers, refused; he declared that it was against the dignity of his army to escort prisoners that it had not taken.150 The tsar then personally requested a Romanian occupation of Nicopolis to free Russian troops for other actions.151 The victorious march of the Russian army came to an abrupt halt on July 8/20 with the first Ottoman victory at Plevna. At the same time the overextended forces of General Iosif Vladimirovich Gurko met their first setbacks. These events put the value of Romanian military cooperation on a much higher level. When the Russian army first entered Romania, the Russian leaders had expected a short and glorious war; their rejection of both Romanian and Serbian offers of assistance had been based on their conviction that Russian manpower would be sufficient and that the small Balkan states would cause more difficulties than their participation was worth.152 Plevna reversed this judgment. The possibility of a long costly war had to be faced, and additional manpower was urgently needed. Charles was thus requested to provide immediate aid. On July 13/25, under strong pressure from the tsar, Charles agreed to send troops across the Danube to garrison Nicopolis.153 When Kogalniceanu protested,154 the prince justified his decision by the tsar's 262

Prince Charles, 1871-1878 request and argued that it was not the equivalent of a major crossing of the Romanian army to face the enemy, for which the Romanian government would insist on the securing of supplies and a definite military agreement.155 On July 30/August 11 an even stronger plea came from Nicholas, who telegraphed: "The Turks having gathered in large numbers at Plevna, I ask you to make a strong show of force and if possible passage of the Danube . . . This show of force is indispensable to facilitate my movements."156 The entire question of Romanian military participation was now a matter of urgent importance. The attractiveness of taking a major role in the campaign was under these circumstances much lessened from the Romanian standpoint. Moreover, the prince continued to believe that a convention defining the role of the armies was essential. In contrast, Bratianu was convinced that aid should be given in this crisis; he feared that the Russian army might be forced back across the Danube and that Romania would become a battlefield.157 The prince, Bratianu, and Kogalniceanu all favored assuming an active military role, but only after the conditions had been settled. Of first importance was the place of the Romanian army in the Russian operations, an issue that also involved the question of command. Money and munitions were still a matter of concern, but, under pressure, the Russian authorities were more willing to meet the Romanian requests. Despite the clear Russian need for Romanian support, the negotiations were difficult. Both Bratianu and the prince remained suspicious of the Russian intentions. On July 28/August 9 Bratianu wrote to Charles that the Russians "wish to draw our army completely into their embrace and thus make any individual action impossible."158 At the same time Charles wrote to his minister: "My impression has always been that the day when we would back up the Russians on the battlefield or give them our assistance in any manner whatsoever, they would try to wipe us out or absorb us."159 While these discussions were going on, a Romanian army of thirty thousand prepared to move.160 Even the place of its crossing of the Danube caused disagreement. The Russian commanders wished it to use their major bridgehead at Nicopolis, whereas Slaniceanu advised a separate crossing at Corabia so that the Romanian army could arrive at Plevna by way of the valley of the Vid and Isker. This route, Slaniceanu believed, was "the last means of preserving for our army a distinct line of operation as much in the undertaking against Plevna as in the last periods of the campaign."161 A crossing at Nicopolis would lead to a fusion of the armies. The Corabia crossing did not meet with Russian approval; it was argued that Russia could not protect this second route. 263

Russia and the Romanian national state Nicholas wanted the Romanian army to assemble at Nicopolis and then form the right wing of the Russian operation at Plevna.162 Under mounting pressure, Nicholas in a letter of August 6/18 agreed that the main Romanian forces might cross at Corabia and also that the army would conserve its individuality and be under its own commanders. Meanwhile, the military situation became worse.163 On August 9/21, when the Russian forces were under strong attack, Nicholas telegraphed the prince: "When can you cross? Do it as soon as possible. They are fighting desperately at Shipka. Several attacks have been repulsed since the morning of August 9."164 On August 10/22 Charles informed Nicholas that Bratianu and the chief of staff would be sent to make an agreement. The Romanian army would keep its individuality and its unity of command, but would operate according to the general plan of the Russian staff.165 Romanian troop passage across the Danube commenced on August 12/24.166 The final hindrances to Romanian action were removed when Charles on August 16/28 was offered the command of all of the troops at Plevna.167 The opportunity was too flattering for the Hohenzollern prince to refuse; he did not continue to bargain. He thus did not use the opportunity afforded by the Russian embarrassment to gain precise political advantages for his country in the peace negotiations, and no detailed military convention was prepared. The final decision was made by Charles in direct negotiations with the tsar; the ministers were not consulted. Kogalniceanu did not fully approve, but Charles argued that his actions avoided greater complications and assured that the Romanian army would not be under Russian command.168 Romania was now an active Russian ally; Romanian national enthusiasm was at a peak. Independence had been declared, and the Romanian armies were "saving" the Russians. In September, when a disastrous attack was made on Plevna, the Romanian troops achieved the single memorable victory with the taking of the Grivitsa redoubt. Thereafter it was decided that Plevna would be taken by siege; General Eduard Ivanovich Totleben, the hero of Sebastopol, directed the operation. While this action was prepared, Romanian soldiers won victories on other fronts. On November 9/21 a Romanian and Russian force took Rakhovo; on November 18/30 Lorn Palanka fell. On December 4/16 Romanian troops took over the garrisoning of Nicopolis, and they played a major role in the final assault on Plevna on November 28/ December 10. During the war the Romanian government was able to carry out one of the objectives that had been in dispute with the Ottoman government - the awarding of a Romanian decoration. The prohibition had 264

Prince Charles, 1871-1878 been included in the firman of 1866. The government had previously considered pressing the matter, but had been discouraged by the other powers.169 On May 9/21, as the first act of Romanian independence, the chamber voted for the institution of the order of the "Star of Romania."170 In September the tsar accepted the decoration in an act intended to be a tacit recognition of independence. In November Grand Duke Nicholas received the order "For Military Valor."171 In return, Charles was awarded the Russian decorations of St. George and St. Andrew. At this time the Romanian and Russian leaders were cooperating well, since they had a common military goal. Charles was on very good terms with the tsar, Grand Duke Nicholas, and General Totleben. The prince, of course, had the great advantage of being a Hohenzollern and thus having excellent family connections with the Russian court. He also gained the impression that he could use Alexander's apparent affection for him to obtain advantages for Romania during the peace negotiations.172 Certainly, the terms of the future treaty were on the minds of the Romanian statesmen. In the months before the fall of Plevna they made great efforts to try to obtain a declaration on the matter from the Russian government. Both Charles and Bratianu wished their troops to occupy certain cities on the right bank of the Danube that would be held until the Porte paid a war indemnity.173 They also wished to assure that Romanian representatives would take part in the peace negotiations. The adamant Russian refusal to discuss these questions was particularly apparent in November, when Bratianu attempted to obtain a precise declaration of intentions from the tsar and Miliutin. The tsar avoided any clear commitments and instead used the phrase that was to become the standard Russian answer to Romanian requests for a statement on the peace terms: Romania would not regret having entered the war. In his conversations with Miliutin, Bratianu could speak more directly. He discussed the Romanian desire to occupy Nicopolis, Rakhovo, Lorn Palanka, and Vidin, an action that the Russian officials opposed. He further strongly emphasized that he needed to know what Romania would obtain in return for its participation in the war, in order to reassure the public and the parliament, which was about to open. At this time Miliutin, speaking "academically" and in cautious tones, discussed the question of Bessarabia. He gave the standard arguments: the Russians felt deeply about the loss of the land in 1856, and its status would have to be altered. In reply, Bratianu also emphasized the feelings of his countrymen about a territory that they were convinced was justly theirs. Although he personally would accept a sur265

Russia and the Romanian national state render of the area, the Romanian public would not. The action would cause bad relations between the countries, and certainly, he argued, the Russian ties with the Balkan Christian populations should take precedence over the ownership of this territory. Bratianu was also at this time able to speak with Gorchakov, who was in Bucharest. Not attempting to conceal his feelings, Gorchakov admitted: "Yes . . . the emperor wants Bessarabia. It is stupid, but he wants it."174 Meanwhile, the expected Russian demand for the return of southern Bessarabia was receiving full coverage in the Romanian opposition press. There was every sign that its loss should be expected. Nevertheless, despite the domestic problems that these rumors caused, neither the prince nor the Romanian political leaders dared to bring up the subject directly with the tsar, the man who would, after all, make the final decision. Charles, who apparently never discussed the subject with Alexander personally, "considered it impossible after his relations with the Russian ruler, that such a demand would be made of him." 175 The prince continued to expect that the tsar, in whom he continued to have great faith, would not break an agreement that he had made. Bratianu, when he was at the Russian headquarters at Poradim, similarly avoided the topic in his conversations with Alexander, on the strong advice of General Ghica.176 After Plevna was finally taken on November 28/December 10, the Romanian military activities were limited to the investiture of the Ottoman fortresses at Vidin and Belogradchik and to garrison duty along the Danube. The Romanian army thus did not join the Russian forces in the victorious campaign that brought them almost to Constantinople. Close to complete victory, the Russian government had little need to conciliate its Romanian ally or to take into consideration Romania's desires for the future. When the tsar was in Bucharest in December, on his way back to St. Petersburg, he spoke with both Charles and Bratianu. Once again he avoided discussing specific terms and merely repeated the assurance that Romania would not regret having fought. He did not favor Romanian participation in the peace negotiations because of the nation's dubious status: no power had recognized its independence.177 The Russian determination to negotiate alone with the Ottoman Empire was now clear. Neither the Balkan allies nor the great powers were to have a significant influence on the first agreements. Even before the fall of Plevna the grand duke's diplomatic chancery had drawn up preliminary peace terms, w^hich were then sent to both the tsar and Gorchakov. After they had been approved, with some small changes, they were communicated to Germany and Austria-Hungary, but not to Romania. The most important sections of the proposal 266

Prince Charles, 1871—1878 called for the creation of a large Bulgarian state that would be occupied by Russia for two years, reforms in Bosnia and Hercegovina, and changes in the Straits settlement to the Russian advantage. Romania's independence was to be recognized, and it was to acquire Dobrudja. Southern Bessarabia was to be ceded to Russia. The negative reaction to the terms, particularly in Vienna, led the Russian leaders to decide to negotiate an armistice agreement with the Porte that would define the future peace only in general terms. A more definitive agreement would be drawn up later, and even this pact would be subject to revision. The powers were to be informed that it would be "preliminary" and that all questions involving general European interests would be decided in consultation with them. The actual negotiation of the armistice was left in the hands of Grand Duke Nicholas and his staff. Alexander II returned to St. Petersburg in December. Repeated rumors arrived in Bucharest concerning the peace. No move had been made by Russia to include Romanian representatives in any of the discussions, nor had their views or desires been solicited. To meet this situation Charles decided to send Colonel Eraclie Arion to Nicholas's headquarters and General I. Ghica, who was the Romanian agent in St. Petersburg but who had been attached to the tsar's headquarters during the war, back to his post. At the same time he wrote letters to both the tsar and the grand duke. To the latter the prince stated that he had heard that negotiations with the Porte had commenced, and that public opinion in Romania was disturbed over the course these discussions might take in regard to the interests of the country. The prince requested that he be informed how Romania could participate in the negotiations and how he could transmit his views on the conditions that he wanted included in the agreement.178 In answer, both Nicholas and Nelidov replied that Romanian demands should be sent directly to St. Petersburg.179 In his letter to Charles, the grand duke gave the usual reassurances: "I propose for the acceptance of the Turks only the essential bases of the peace that have been sent to me from Petersburg and all Romanian interests [that] have not been forgotten."180 He also assured the prince that once the armistice was signed he would inform him of the details and the places the Romanian troops were to occupy. Despite this discouraging message, Arion did go to the Russian headquarters at Kazanlik, taking with him a list of the Romanian proposals for the peace. These included the occupation of certain Danubian cities and the land in between, the dismantling of Ottoman fortifications on the Danube, the Romanian acquisition of the Danube Delta, including the St. George Channel, and an indemnity of one hundred 267

Russia and the Romanian national state million francs. The cities were to be held only until this amount had been paid.181 At the Russian headquarters Arion was treated with coldness and excluded from the deliberations. In a note to Stuart, Kogalniceanu backed up the Romanian claims, arguing that the Romanian position was distinct, that the active participation in the war had come about as a result of a Russian request, and that justice demanded that Romania take part in the negotiations as in the fighting. Arion, he concluded, had full power to negotiate.182 The prince and his ministers were now thoroughly alarmed. Not only had the Russian government not sent the terms of the future peace, but it had refused to accept Romanian cooperation or even to request a statement of the Romanian desires. Charles continued to hope that the Romanian participation in the war and his close relations with the tsar would dissuade the Russian government from annexing southern Bessarabia. Nevertheless, it was recognized that the support of other governments was needed. Kogalniceanu instructed Nicholas Callimachi Catargi, the Romanian representative in Paris and London, to ask the Turkish ambassador in Paris to inquire if his government would recognize Romanian independence. The Russian government could then not require the Ottoman government to give up a territory that was not under its control. At this time Ion Ghica was sent to London and Cimpineanu to Berlin to find out if the powers would back Romanian resistance to Russian demands. Finally, just before the signing of the armistice, the Russian government stopped evading the question; it informed the Romanians that southern Bessarabia would have to be surrendered.183 Ignatiev was instructed to go to Bucharest to try further measures of persuasion.184 Russian interests would obviously be better served if the Romanian government would accept the transfer without making an international issue of it and also would bargain on compensation. The announcement of Russian intentions, which was conveyed by Gorchakov to Ghica in St. Petersburg and by Ignatiev to the Romanian government in Bucharest, was not handled with tact. Ghica was simply informed that Russia would take Bessarabia to the Kilia Channel; in return, Romania would receive the Danube Delta and part of Dobrudja, including Constanta. The argument used was that southern Bessarabia had been ceded to Moldavia, not Romania, in a treaty that was no longer respected and that Russia alone could not justly be compelled to honor, especially since "that demand is for her a question of honor and of national dignity." In reply, Ghica retorted that the territory was "a piece of our body, a possession of ours from antiquity."185 In a later conversation 268

Prince Charles,

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with Ghica, Gorchakov disposed of Article 2 of the April convention by declaring that it engaged Russia "to defend and to guarantee Romanian rights and the integrity of her territory only against Turkey."186 In reporting these conversations to his government, Ghica made clear the Russians' determination to take the area and their preference for having the matter settled directly between Bucharest and St. Petersburg. During these same discussions the Russian diplomats made clear that it was they who would represent Romanian interests at the peace negotiations; Romanian independence had not been recognized, and its direct participation was impossible. Strong objections were also made to the visit of Ion Ghica to London. Ignatiev carried a similar message when he arrived in Bucharest on January 19/31, bringing with him a letter from the tsar and one from Gorchakov. Alexander's letter introduced Ignatiev and urged Romania to cooperate with Russia for its own good.187 Gorchakov's words were more ominous. He stated that Russia wished to do everything possible for Romania diplomatically, but that "we have also interests and rights to safeguard about which we cannot compromise. What we expect from the Romanian government is a just and rational appreciation of its situation and of ours."188 The letter did not mention the word Bessarabia, but Ignatiev told the prince that Alexander II was personally determined to take the territory; Charles refused to believe that the initiative came from the tsar. The Ignatiev mission failed; the Romanian attitude remained firm. Charles, from his conversations with the Russian envoy, gained the impression "that he did not always move within the boundaries of reality, but often let his imagination have free reign."189 In a letter to the tsar Charles wrote that the question of border rectification that had been discussed with Ignatiev was delicate because of national sensibilities; the matter would cause domestic difficulties in Romania.190 This blatant understatement in no way reflected the outburst of indignation that resulted from reports of the Russian demands. The strong Romanian reaction was well expressed in an impassioned dispatch from Kogalniceanu to Ghica, written on January 14/26, 1878, when the news first arrived: It is unworthy of a great empire to thus deceive a country that had given up everything on the assurances alone that the word of an emperor is worth more than a treaty. If they had wanted to despoil the Romanians of a part of their patrimony, it would have been honest to tell them that before the conclusion of the convention of April 4, before we crossed the Danube, before we saved the imperial army and perhaps the emperor at Plevna . . . Then it would have been 269

Russia and the Romanian national state better to let the Turks be victorious, for they certainly would not have taken from us some of Bessarabia in case of victory.191

In later instructions to Ghica, Kogalniceanu objected that the Russians handled Romania like a conquered province and that "never had the Bulgarians been treated by the Turks in the manner that the Russian authorities treat the Romanians in the towns and villages of the Danube."192 Kogalniceanu further requested Ghica to find out what boundaries Romania could expect in Dobrudja and to investigate the possibility of an indemnity. An armistice between Russia and the Ottoman Empire was signed at Adrianople on January 19/31, at which time Nicholas informed Charles that all military operations were to cease; Romanian troops should prepare to occupy Vidin and Belogradchik.193 On January 21 /February 2 the grand duke forwarded a copy of the agreement with the assurance that Romania would find in it provision for the satisfaction of its interests by "the recognition of its independence on the part of the Porte and by a territorial compensation that is assured to it in principle."194 Charles was directed to discuss the terms with Ignatiev in Bucharest. The provisions of the armistice were very general; specific details were not given. However, the agreement provided for the formation of an autonomous Bulgaria; the granting of independence and some additional territory to Serbia, Montenegro, and Romania; administrative changes for Bosnia and Hercegovina; and the provision that the Ottoman Empire would pay an indemnity, either in territory or in money, for the Russian expenses of the war. An understanding was to be reached later on the Straits between the sultan and the tsar. Bessarabia was not mentioned specifically. In a letter of January 23/ February 4 to Nicholas, the prince expressed his dissatisfaction with the fact that a Romanian delegate had not participated in the negotiations. The government was thus placed in a difficult position before the country.195 Charles also announced that he intended to occupy Vidin and Belogradchik until he was awarded an indemnity and territorial advantages. Although Charles and his ministers soon found that their defiant attitude would receive no backing from abroad - Cimpineanu and Callimachi Catargi both reported a lack of concern over the Bessarabian question196 - they did obtain the enthusiastic approval of the Romanian parliament and people. The fate of southern Bessarabia became a matter of public controversy when the armistice terms were announced on January 22/February 3.197 The matter was heatedly debated, and there was no difference of opinion on the stand that should be taken. On January 28/February 9 the chambers passed a motion opposing 270

Prince Charles, 1871-1878 the loss of the territory. This action virtually precluded any settlement with Russia that involved the loss of southern Bessarabia. Neither party would accept a deal with Russia; the opposition attacked the ministers for weakness in face of Russian demands, not for a failure to compromise on the Bessarabian question. Although the country appeared united on the Bessarabian issue, a division of opinion had developed between Kogalniceanu and Bratianu. The foreign minister by the beginning of February feared that the territory would be lost and that the Romanian public should be prepared for the inevitable.198 Bratianu, making a firm stand, came to believe by the beginning of March that Kogalniceanu, who had signed the April treaty, would have to be replaced to soothe public opinion.199 This disagreement between the two most important Romanian ministers remained a disturbing element in Romanian political life through the Congress of Berlin. With the lack of a firm, united stand among his chief advisers, Charles was forced to come to a decision. He gradually came to realize that southern Bessarabia was lost. He recognized that the press campaign taking place at the time wrould only anger the Russian government.200 Because of the unanimity of public opinion on the issue, he could not, however, express his feelings openly, or he might endanger his position as prince. Meanwhile, relations between Russia and Romania were still bad. Gorchakov, adopting his usual menacing attitude, strongly protested the vote in the chamber, which he regarded as an insult to Russia.201 The terms of the Treaty of San Stefano, which was signed on February 19/March 3, further embittered the atmosphere. The Romanian government learned of its content on March 7/19, when Ghica read a report in the Journal de St. Petersbourg.202 The agreement spelled out in precise terms the general stipulations of the armistice. Of the sections concerning Romania, Article 5 recognized its independence and Article 19 provided that the Ottoman Empire would cede Dobrudja and the Danube Delta to Russia, which in turn "reserved the right to exchange them against the part of Bessarabia detached by the Treaty of 1856." The treaty also contained an unpleasant surprise. Article 8 stated that Russian troops would occupy Bulgaria for two years; this force would "preserve their communications with Russia not only by Romania, but also by the ports of the Black Sea, Varna and Burgas, where they can organize, for the duration of the occupation, the necessary depots."203 This provision meant that for the two years during which Russian troops were to remain in Bulgaria Russian supply lines and the right of passage would be maintained through Romania. The significance of this continued presence of Russian soldiers for the free271

Russia and the Romanian national state dom of action and the independence of the country was obvious. No Romanian government could accept such a proposal.204 The fears were too strong that Russia would use the opportunity to reestablish its former protectorate. To meet the new situation Bratianu on March 19/31 left again to seek aid from the other powers.205 The message that he was to carry was clearly stated in a Kogalniceanu instruction to Balaceanu: Our resolution to refuse any compromise on Bessarabia has been taken from the day when the demand was made of us. We are appealing to the great powers in order to have their support. The government does not understand how after a demarche so categorical and after acts so formal and solemn there could still remain a doubt in the mind of anyone about the sincere and unanimous decision of the ministry not to compromise at all. 206

The announcement of the terms of the Treaty of San Stefano caused a violent reaction not only within Romania, but also among the great powers. The provisions were in contradiction to recognized international treaties and to the agreements that the Russian government had made with the Habsburg Monarchy prior to the war. An immediate and severe crisis followed, which lasted until the opening of the Congress of Berlin in June. In this period, or at least until the end of May, the Russian government had to face the possibility that it might have to go to war with Britain and Austria-Hungary. And, indeed, at this time the Russian military position was dangerous. From the beginning of the war the Turkish navy had commanded the Black Sea; in February a British squadron entered the Straits and anchored in the Sea of Marmora. The bulk of the Russian army engaged in the campaign lay encamped south of the Balkan mountains. If war broke out, these troops could be cut off by a combined Austrian and Romanian action. With the British and Ottoman navies dominating the sea, the supplying or even withdrawal of this army would not be possible. This threatened entrapment perhaps explains the bitter reaction of Russian statesmen such as Gorchakov to the Romanian attitude at the time. Should war break out with the other powers, an angry Romania could be a danger.207 Nevertheless, despite the fact that Russia could not afford to antagonize its war ally, the tsar continued to place a first priority on the reacquisition of southern Bessarabia. Throughout this period of international crisis the Romanian leaders were operating in the dark. They were not a part of the general European negotiations; they did not know of the secret understandings. Since France was not playing a major role in international affairs at this time, Romania had no great power advocating its interests. The policy of resistance was followed to a great extent because of internal political 272

Prince Charles, I8JI-I8J8 considerations. The Liberal Party, which had consistently stood for a policy of national advancement and which had made the agreement with Russia, could with difficulty accept this disappointment of its hopes. At this time, the focus of concern was not only on southern Bessarabia, but on the more immediately dangerous question of military passage. This issue became all the more sensitive when it soon appeared that the Russian army was in the process of carrying out a redeployment of forces that would assure it full military control of Romania. The relations between the governments at this point were, as could be expected, extremely strained. At a reception on February 26/March 10 the tsar told Ghica that he wished Romania would remember "the great services that Russia had rendered it and the blood" that had been spilled.208 On March 16/28 the Journal de St. Petersbourg published an article on the Bessarabian question that justified the Russian standpoint and declared: "The participation of Romania in the war has not been a sacrifice, or an act of devotion, but a careful calculation from which she has benefited, without taking into account the rain of gold that the war caused to fall on the country."209 In reply, the Romanian leaders and writers emphasized their historic rights to Bessarabia, the treaty of April 4/ 16, and their sacrifices in the war. In addition to the dead and injured, the Romanian arguments stressed the material damages caused by the Russian passage and the supplying of these troops. A dispatch from Kogalniceanu to Ghica of March 8/20* pointed out: Our sacrifices are shown by the loss of two harvests, and by the deterioration of our lines of communication. In fact, on the one hand, the appropriation of our railroads to the almost exclusive service of the imperial armies has condemned our products to rot in place instead of being disposed of; on the other hand, our highways and our roads are all ruined, and it will be very burdensome, if not even impossible over the long years for us to reassemble the immense capital absorbed by their construction.210

In their arguments against the cession of southern Bessarabia, the Romanian statesmen protested not only against the loss of the three districts, but against the original acquisition of the entire region by Russia. On March 10/22 Kogalniceanu wrote to Ghica that after the devastating war of 1806 to 1812 Moldavia had seen stolen from it "half of its territory by that same protecting power to whose success the Romanians have so often dedicated and sacrificed themselves."211 In a review of the issue, entitled "Memoir on the question of Bessarabia," designed for circulation abroad, Kogalniceanu gave the reasons why the region should remain with Romania and again emphasized the theme that all of Bessarabia belonged to Moldavia and that the Treaty of Paris had brought about a return to the principality "of a portion of 273

Russia and the Romanian national state its former territory."212 As a Moldavian and a historian, Kogalniceanu was particularly sensitive to these issues. The threatening tone to the Russian communications was to become even more pronounced. In a conversation with Ghica on February 28/ March 12 Gorchakov objected that Romania was forcing Russia to make the question an international one.213 The tsar, the foreign minister emphasized, had definitely decided to take Bessarabia. He preferred to negotiate directly with Romania rather than submit the issue to a congress.214 If the Romanians refused an agreement, Gorchakov warned, "we will take from you the territory demanded and you will not have any compensation. What will you do? Oppose us with arms? That would be useless and dangerous for you."215 Gorchakov's words were even harsher weeks later, on March 20/April 1, when asking Ghica if his government truly intended to object to the section of the treaty concerning the future passage of troops. The tsar, he warned, "has lost all patience and he has charged me to tell you to let your government know that if you have the intention of protesting or of opposing the article in question, he will have Romania occupied and the army disarmed."216 Two days later Jomini told Ghica that the tsar was beginning to put this policy into execution "in the sense that orders have been given to increase and reinforce the Russian troops that are in Romania."217 To the menace contained in the last statements the Romanian government again gave a firm reply. Kogalniceanu instructed Ghica to answer that the prince wished it to be known that "an army which has fought at Plevna under the eyes of Emperor Alexander II may well be crushed and slaughtered, but it will never let itself be disarmed."218 Charles told Stuart personally that Russia should not forget that "there is a Hohenzollern on the throne of Romania who will oppose the disarmament of the army, it is an army that knows how to do its duty toward the throne and the fatherland."219 Throughout the month of April Romanian concerns centered not so much on Bessarabia as on the fact that the threat of military occupation appeared to be in the process of implementation. In addition, Miliutin had decided that a new military convention needed to be formulated, and efforts were made to gain Romanian acceptance. Again the government refused to accept a Russian proposal. Kogalniceanu argued that there was no point in concluding another treaty when the first had been violated even before the chambers approved it.220 The intensification of Russian pressure on Bucharest coincided with the international crisis caused by the terms of the Treaty of San Stefano. Ghica, observing the scene from St. Petersburg, recognized that Russia 274

Prince Charles, 1871-1878 was preparing for war with Britain and Austria-Hungary by new military measures and by securing its communications across Romania.221 To meet the situation Charles in March had withdrawn his troops from Vidin and brought them back across the Danube, with the intention of concentrating his army in western Wallachia. The obvious increase in the number of Russian troops in the country naturally caused extreme concern. On March 27/April 8 Kogalniceanu wrote Bratianu, who was in Berlin, that the Russians were taking steps to occupy the land; more soldiers were entering and officers were studying the geography of the area.222 A few days later he wrote to Ghica that an occupation was becoming a sad fact. Russian troops were surrounding Bucharest on the excuse of returning to Russia.223 On April 5/17 Kogalniceanu informed Balaceanu that Romania was under a real occupation: "Bucharest is literally encircled by a corps of the Russian army."224 At the same time cooperation between the military authorities was at a standstill. More and more conflicts occurred between the Russian military and civil authorities and their Romanian counterparts. The government also faced many protests from the public. Russian officials appeared to be continually violating the clauses of the April 4/16 treaty. The Romanian leaders feared not only a Russian occupation, but a move to overthrow the government. On April 28 in a telegram to Balaceanu, Bratianu expressed the Romanian panic: The tsar proposes a convention while menacing us; we do not want one at any price. The Russians are taking possession of our country and are installing themselves without taking account of the government. Even in Bucharest they have, under different pretexts, four times more soldiers than we have. A fake revolt would suffice to legitimize the government of Florescu. New troops arrive daily from Russia.225

The Liberal ministry's fear of a Russian-sponsored coup was at least partially based on an exchange of communications between the prince and the tsar in which Alexander II directly attacked the Romanian political leaders. On February 21 /March 5 Charles wrote the tsar a letter congratulating him on the peace and declaring: "During all this terrible and bloody war, there has been for me a bright point: It is the figure of Your Majesty, serene and calm amid the storm, heroically enduring without lament and without complaint, what many others would find unbearable."226 In reply to this piece of blatant and servile flattery the tsar over one month later sent both a telegram and a letter. The telegram stated: "I can only regret the conduct of individuals who are at the head of your government and who have created such strained relations, completely in contradiction to the true interests of Romania."227 The letter, dated March 28/April 9 but delivered by Stuart 275

Russia and the Romanian national state on April 7/19, restated the point; the tsar declared that "the difficult relations created by the conduct of your ministers" could not alter his constant and cordial interest in the prince, and that he regretted the measures he had been forced to take because of "their manner of acting." He also announced that he was sending a representative to negotiate a new military arrangement, an action that, as we have seen, was not desired by the Romanian leaders.228 Despite the belligerent declarations, the Russian government did to an extent soften its attitude in April. Gorchakov delivered no more threats; he was to enter a period of sickness. Ghica recognized the signs of a change in attitude, caused by the pressure from Europe, but he did not think Romania would benefit from it. On his own request, he returned to Bucharest in April. At this last meeting with Gorchakov the minister advised "calm and moderation" and expressed the opinion that the situation would quiet down.229 By this time it was clear that the fate of Bessarabia and the entire question of Romania's future would hinge not on the negotiations between Romania and Russia, but on those being carried on among the great powers. Since the transfer of Bessarabia involved an alteration of the Treaty of Paris, this question should obviously have been decided by the signatories. In March Gorchakov had accepted in principle the holding of a European congress, with Berlin as the site, but protracted negotiations defining its scope were to follow. Similar complicated discussions were held among the powers on the terms to be finally agreed upon. Romanian representatives took no part in these negotiations, nor did they have a patron state that specifically represented their interests, as France had done previously. By this time the hopelessness of the Romanian position on Bessarabia was evident. Bratianu had returned from Berlin and Vienna empty-handed. Quite obviously, no government would challenge Russia over the Bessarabian issue. Romania could expect to hold the territory only should a general war break out over other issues and result in a Russian defeat. After it became evident that the powers would adjust their differences peacefully, the Romanian government could not realistically hope to retain the land. Nevertheless, the Romanian leaders, largely because of public opinion, could not easily alter their stand and bargain with Russia over the issue. Bratianu still believed that a conference of great powers might give support to his position. He thus had hopes that the Congress of Berlin, which opened in June, could be used to protect Romanian interests. Even though Romania was admitted only as an observer, and not a full member, its representatives would have an opportunity to state their arguments. 276

Prince Charles, 1871-1878 T H E CONGRESS OF BERLIN

Meanwhile, in negotiations carried on without the knowledge of the Romanian government, the representatives of the great powers had settled many of the problems at issue, using the principles of the balance of power and mutual compensation. Before the outbreak of the war and during the hostilities, the Russian government had been in continuous communication with the states most directly affected by its actions, the Habsburg Empire and Britain. The Budapest Convention of January and March 1877, as we have seen, assured that Russian armies would not operate in the areas of principal Habsburg concern: Bosnia, Hercegovina, Serbia, and Montenegro. The British government in a note of April 24/May 6 similarly indicated where its interests lay: the Suez Canal, Egypt, the Persian Gulf, and the Straits.230 In a reply of May 18/30 the Russian government acknowledged this declaration with a reservation regarding Constantinople. The Russian intention of annexing southern Bessarabia and compensating Romania with Dobrudja and independence was also communicated to London.231 The Habsburg government on May 17/29, in a note that discussed the general situation, let St. Petersburg know that it would not accept the incorporation of Romania into Russia or its reduction to the status of a dependency. Austria-Hungary had, of course, already conceded Bessarabia to Russia in the Reichstadt and Budapest agreements.232 Until the fall of Plevna in December 1877, the Russian leaders had been primarily concerned with winning the war. They had made, of course, the preliminary political arrangements with other powers. However, once victory appeared assured, the Russian appetite grew. In December, at his headquarters at Poradim, Alexander II accepted as a basis for peace proposals that went beyond what had been agreed upon with the other governments. Most important was the Russian intention of establishing a large, autonomous Bulgarian state, which was to be under Russian military occupation for two years and thus under obvious Russian political domination. Not only would this act upset the diplomatic balance in the Balkans, but it was also in conflict with previous agreements with Austria-Hungary.233 The expanded Russian program was expressed in the terms of the Treaty of San Stefano. This agreement called for the formation of a large Bulgarian state, the cession of Ottoman territory to the Balkan nations, and compensation to Russia in the annexation of southern Bessarabia as well as territories in Asia Minor. The terms of the treaty were acceptable neither to the Habsburg Empire nor to Britain, but the two powers placed emphasis on different 277

Russia and the Romanian national state issues. Lord Salisbury, the British foreign minister, was primarily interested in protecting his country's imperial interests. He was thus chiefly concerned with the status of the new Bulgarian state, the Russian intention to annex the major Black Sea port of Batum, and the maintenance of Ottoman control over the Straits and Constantinople. The British government believed that Vienna should take the responsibility for Danubian and Romanian affairs; the Russian annexation of southern Bessarabia would not affect British vital interests. This attitude was well expressed in the report of a British cabinet committee of March 15/27: The restoration of Bessarabia to Russia, and the control thus given to Russia over the Danube, are serious departures from the Treaty of Paris, and are in themselves open to grave objection. These matters, however, concern primarily Austria and Romania, and our policy should be rather to support them in such objections as they will make than to originate objections of our own.234 This decision was not made clear at once to the Romanian representatives. The Romanian defiance of Russia was an asset to both Habsburg and British policy. Until it was absolutely certain that war would not break out, the British government needed to give encouragement to the Romanian leaders. Sir William White, the British representative in Bucharest, was instructed: "Of course, you will do all you properly can to encourage the plucky attitude of Roumania." 235 However, the British government would certainly give no assurance on Bessarabia, and as a British diplomat commented, "Europe is not likely to go to war for the sake of saving Romania from being plundered by her ally."236 Moreover, the British government had no hesitation about using the Bessarabian issue as a bargaining point in the negotiations with Russia. The decisive discussions toward a settlement of the crisis were carried on between Salisbury and Peter A. Shuvalov, the Russian ambassador, in May. In these Russia made the major concession of allowing the partition of San Stefano Bulgaria, but insisted on the Bessarabian annexation. In the agreement of May 18/30 the British government accepted the Russian position on Bessarabia: The government of Her Britannic Majesty believes that it should express its profound regret in case Russia should definitely insist on the retrocession of Bessarabia. As, however, it is sufficiently established that the other signatories of the Treaty of Paris are not ready to support with arms the delimitation of Romania stipulated in the treaty, Britain is not so immediately concerned with this question that she would be justified in incurring alone the responsibility for opposing the proposed change, and thus she agrees not to contest the final decision of Russia in regard to the retrocession of Bessarabia.237 278

Prince Charles, 1871-1878 Thu8, by the opening of the congress, Russia had gained the approval of Britain for the reannexation. The German government had already given its assent. In fact, at this time German influence was used to back the Russian position. Bismarck strongly urged the Romanian government to come to an agreement with the Russian government. Thus in spite of Charles's membership in the Hohenzollern family and his illusions about the protection of the "German Danube," it was very clear that the Romanian leaders could not rely on Berlin.238 The Habsburg attitude was to prove equally detrimental, but the government did not make its position immediately clear. The major Habsburg interest in the negotiations was to concentrate on the fate of Bosnia and Hercegovina. In December 1877 the tsar had sent to William I and Franz Joseph his conditions for peace. These, as we have seen, included the establishment of a large Bulgarian state, but they did not give Austria-Hungary control of Bosnia and Hercegovina, as had been agreed upon previously.239 Franz Joseph, replying on December 26/ January 7, 1878, protested in particular about those stipulations which violated the previous understandings, especially the agreement that a large Slavic state would not be created. The Habsburg emperor also pointed out that the Russian acquisition of southern Bessarabia was directly linked to the Austrian interest in Bosnia and Hercegovina. Alexander's answer on January 4/16 was not conciliatory. He insisted on the large Bulgarian state and on the reacquisition of southern Bessarabia. He was, however, willing to grant the monarchy control of Bosnia and Hercegovina.240 The Habsburg government, nevertheless, maintained its strong objections to a Bulgarian state that would cover a large area and be under Russian domination.241 In April Ignatiev was sent to Vienna to try to reach an understanding. His failure made the Russian government all the more eager to attain a settlement with Britain. Despite the continuing negotiations, the Russian government was unable to come to an agreement with Austria-Hungary similar to that concluded with Britain on May 18/30. In the further discussions it became clear, however, that southern Bessarabia was never a major issue. If the other Habsburg demands were met, then Austria-Hungary too would agree to the cession. This decision was, of course, not communicated to the Romanian diplomats. Although no understanding was reached with Russia, the Habsburg Empire concluded with Britain on May 25/June 6 an agreement whose most important section dealt with the Bulgarian question. The British government also backed the Habsburg demand that Russia should under no circumstances acquire 279

Russia and the Romanian national state 242

Dobrudja. Other issues involving Romanian interests did not play a major role in these negotiations. Even though Habsburg interests were predominantly involved in other areas, the Romanians' best hope lay clearly in Vienna. The relations of the Habsburg government with Russia were obviously bad. Although Andrassy had previously agreed to the Russian military actions in return for compensation, the breaking of the Budapest agreements at San Stefano caused deep uneasiness. There was also continual pressure from the Hungarian half of the monarchy, where pro-Ottoman and anti-Russian feeling predominated. The Russian government, as we have seen, was constantly concerned over possible Habsburg reactions. One of the considerations that had led to the discouragement of Romanian participation in the fighting had been the Habsburg attitude. In the spring of 1878 the common strategic interests of the monarchy and Romania were clear. Should war break out, their armies acting together could effectively trap the Russian forces south of the Balkan mountains.243 The Romanian representative in Vienna during the war and postwar years, Ion Balaceanu, was a strong partisan of cooperation with the Dual Monarchy. He felt that he was on intimate terms with and was trusted by Andrassy. He also seems to have been convinced that the foreign minister would not lie to him. When both Bratianu and Kogalniceanu heard indirectly about the provisions on Bessarabia in the Reichstadt agreement, Balaceanu refused to believe them. In fact, until after the Congress of Berlin he remained convinced that Vienna had not made a bargain on the subject with another power. Of course, throughout the Eastern crisis Andrassy did what he could to strengthen these convictions. He was anxious to preserve the ties with Bucharest without at the same time openly contravening the secret agreement with Russia; his attitude on Romanian affairs was thus largely negative. When consulted on a possible treaty between Russia and Romania, it will be remembered, he advised that a simple modus vivendi providing for passage be concluded; he did not like the agreement of April 4/ 16, which he believed went too far. On April 10/22, 1877, Balaceanu reported the foreign minister's attitude toward Romanian cooperation with Russia: The last time that I saw Andrassy, he told me that when we ask him for the hundredth time that question about what Austria will do he would not have a word to change in the clear and precise declarations that he made to me on three different occasions. Austria does not oppose the passage of the Russians through Romania, but she will not permit the passage to change into an occupation nor that Russia exercise the slightest act of government over us nor 280

Prince Charles, 1871-1878 above all that she annex an inch of our territory. These declarations are official, but dependent on our absolute neutrality - in case of an alliance or cooperation with Russia we would act at our own risk and peril and Austria would attend only to her own interests!244

On the question of the declaration of independence, Andrassy, like the other European statesmen, asserted that the issue would be determined after the war. He did, however, oppose the Romanian decision to enter the conflict. He did not advise the crossing of the Danube, but he did not object as long as the army did not operate beyond the Timok River, and no attempt was made to annex territory on the right bank of the Danube. After January, when the question of Bessarabia arose, Andrassy refused to make a statement, to the intense disappointment of Balaceanu. Throughout the spring the Romanian government sent continual appeals to Vienna for aid in protecting the threatened territory and in blocking a Russian occupation. As long as there was a chance that negotiations might break down and a European war follow, Andrassy encouraged the Romanians in their attitude of resistance. On the eve of the opening of the Congress of Berlin the two states came the nearest to discussing the question of fighting. The initiative came from the Romanian side. At the beginning of June Bratianu directed Balaceanu to appeal to Andrassy for aid: We will not cede an inch of Bessarabia for the most brilliant of compensations. We have sixty thousand men in strong positions and the country is ready to rise as one to defend its right. We wish to know if Austria-Hungary is resolute enough so that you can obtain a categorical declaration from Count Andrassy. The moment is critical for Romania is on the verge of playing its last card.245

Andrassy, in answer to these Romanian attempts to obtain a clear statement, encouraged resistance, but he did not offer definite assurances of aid. He advised Balaceanu that "a right that one does not oneself renounce is never lost."246 He also declared his belief that the congress would probably lead to war. The furthest that the Habsburg minister was willing to go was reported by Balaceanu in a letter to Charles of May 28/June 9. After hearing Bratianu's message, just quoted, Andrassy commented: I have heard that the Russians have passed beyond Ploe§ti; it is the first serious demonstration that they have made against us. For my part I am sending troops into Transylvania. I have been unfortunately delayed by the parliamentary maneuvers that you know of and without which I would be already prepared; but I will arrive just the same on time!247

Although the Romanian government could have some hope of support in Vienna, no change in attitude was, quite rightly, expected from St. Petersburg. Not only was the annexation a pet idea of the tsar's, 281

Russia and the Romanian national state but it had become increasingly apparent that Russia was going to gain very little indeed from the war and its attendant expenses and losses. The Romanian question had a major place in the instructions that were drawn up for the Russian delegation that was going to Berlin. The document noted the relationship of the cession of southern Bessarabia to the Habsburg compensation in Bosnia and Hercegovina. Even if Vienna should abandon its claims to these provinces, Russia would still insist on southern Bessarabia. As for passage to Bulgaria, the Russian government wanted the congress to insist that Romania allow Russian troops through the country. The details could then be arranged by a special bilateral convention. It was felt that the obligation would not weigh too heavily on Romania, since the military forces could also travel by sea and through the reclaimed parts of Bessarabia. Dobrudja was not to be ceded until an engagement had been obtained on passage. The instructions firmly opposed any idea of Romanian neutrality, since "that would in effect close to us forever access by land to the Balkan peninsula."248 Despite the ever-diminishing chances of success, the Romanian government remained determined to resist. No offer was made to bargain for increased gains in Dobrudja. The first emphasis for the future peace remained the retention of Bessarabia. Romanian possession was justified not only by treaty rights and the part played by Romanian troops in the war, but also by the danger that a cession would create for the freedom of the Danube. Once in possession of the territory Russia would have a vote on the Danube commissions, and it would be supported by Serbia and Bulgaria.249 Despite the lengthy negotiations preceding the congress, all the issues had not been decided. Major problems were to arise over both the areas that Russia wished to annex - Batum and southern Bessarabia. On June 2/14, as the conference commenced, the newspaper Globe in London published the contents of the Russo-British agreement. The strong and highly critical public reaction to the acceptance of the Russian acquisition of Batum embarrassed and hampered the work of the British delegation. In addition, Austria-Hungary now insisted on control not only of Bosnia and Hercegovina, but also of the sanjak of Novi Pazar. The Habsburg government wished to assure that this area, which separated Serbia and Montenegro, would fall under its domination. It did not want the two Slavic states to have a common frontier. The Habsburg diplomats thus tied their approval of the Russian annexation of southern Bessarabia and the changes on the Russian Asiatic frontier to the acceptance of their wishes on the sanjak. In order to gain Habsburg support on the acquisition of territories in 282

Prince Charles, i8yi—i8y8 Asia and southern Bessarabia, the Russian government during the congress accepted the Habsburg demands on the sanjak. The Congress of Berlin, one of the three great international gatherings of the nineteenth century, thus opened with most of the questions of interest to Romania settled, but without Romanian participation. Assembled under the presidency of Bismarck, the delegates included most of the leading diplomats of the great powers, among whom numbered Andrassy and Heinrich von Haymerle for Austria-Hungary, Benjamin Disraeli and Salisbury for Britain, Count Corti for Italy, and William Waddington for France. The Russian delegation consisted of Gorchakov as first plenipotentiary, with Peter Shuvalov and M. K. Onou as second and third. Other Russian officials accompanied them, including Jomini, Nelidov, Colonel D. G. Anuchin, Major General Bogoliubov. and Colonel G. I. Bobrikov. Gorchakov, now eighty years old, was long past his prime as a statesman and was frequently ill; Shuvalov thus had to handle the major problems. The principal issues that caused conflicts at the congress did not involve Romanian interests. Since the reacquisition of the three districts of southern Bessarabia was to be one of the few Russian gains at the peace, its representatives continued to remain adamant on the question. The Romanian delegation, consisting of Bratianu, Kogalniceanu, George Liteanu, the representative in Berlin, and Callimachi Catargi, arrived in Berlin on May 29/June 10. The question of the role that Romania would play in the congress had not yet been settled. In the first days the Romanian representatives paid visits to the other delegations to argue the Romanian case, but although much sympathy was expressed, no assurances of aid were given. Kogalniceanu remained pessimistic; he believed that the congress would succeed but at the expense of weak states like Romania. The prince's opinion was close to that of his foreign minister. Charles judged the situation impossible and thought that it would be sensible to negotiate for better conditions, perhaps the Ruschuk-Varna line for Dobrudja.250 Bratianu, still hopeful, continued to search for support. The German diplomats were firm in their advice that Romania come to an agreement with Russia.251 The head of the French delegation, Waddington, also expressed the opinion that Bessarabia was lost.252 Once they had an agreement with Russia, the British representatives were cool; Disraeli told Kogalniceanu that "in politics ingratitude is often the reward of the best services."253 The Romanian delegation brought with it a memorandum to present at the congress on the policy that had been followed in the past crisis.254 This statement argued that the country had been compelled to make a treaty wTith Russia in order to protect Romanian territorial integrity; 283

Russia and the Romanian national state the pact would not have been signed without the inclusion of the words present integrity. Five demands were then presented. The Romanian government wished to cede no part of its territory, and it opposed granting Russia a right of passage to Bulgaria. On the positive side, it claimed the islands at the mouth of the Danube, in particular Serpent's Island, and an indemnity; it also asked to have Romanian independence and neutrality recognized. This statement was the Romanian program for the conference, and it remained unchanged. Even after the congress opened, the Romanian Council of Ministers again reaffirmed the decision that there would be no bargaining concerning Bessarabia. If the congress forced the cession of the territory, the government would protest and await a more favorable occasion to gain its desires. Dobrudja thus was not claimed openly by the delegation. On June 19/July 1 the congress heard the Romanian arguments. By this time the major differences among the great powers had been settled; Bessarabia was no longer an issue. Nevertheless, both Kogalniceanu and Bratianu placed first emphasis on the question. The principal speech before the delegates was made by Kogalniceanu, who discussed the other four points of the memorandum as well as the Bessarabian question. Bratianu concluded with a few short remarks. After the Romanian representatives had withdrawn, the great powers continued their discussions and made their final decisions. Romanian independence was recognized, but with political restrictions attached. Shuvalov announced that his country would not agree to independence until the cession of Bessarabia had been accepted. Waddington, arguing that the Romanians had been treated "a little harshly," suggested that they should be given increased compensation in the form of the Silistria-Mangalia line in Dobrudja. The congress accepted this proposal.255 The Romanian delegates were well aware how little impression their arguments had made; Kogalniceanu wrote home at once advising that Romania try to get as large a compensation as possible, perhaps the Silistria-Mangalia line.256 On June 22/July 4 the Romanian ministers agreed that, despite the previous decision, compensation would be taken.257 Both Bratianu and Kogalniceanu realized the political reaction that would occur in Bucharest when the terms were announced. Both wrote from Berlin that great restraint would have to be shown; there was even danger to the national existence. In the final treaty, signed by the representatives of the great powers on July 1/13, Romania was given the Danube Delta and part of Dobrudja, but the recognition of independence was tied to the acceptance of conditions that were to be fiercely resented inside the country.258 The boundary of Dobrudja, whose exact definition was to be determined later, was to be drawn from 284

Prince Charles, 1871—1878 a line running just east of Silistria to a point south of Mangalia on the Black Sea. As far as the question of passage was concerned, Article 22 of the treaty provided that the Russian troops, who were to occupy Bulgaria for nine months, would communicate with Russia by way of Romania and the Black Sea ports. However, a definite time limit was thereby placed on the continued presence of Russian troops in the country. Romania had thus made two major gains at the conference: the recognition of independence and the acquisition of the Danube Delta and Dobrudja. Neither was, however, without drawbacks. At the urging of the Western powers, but not Russia, Romanian and Serbian independence was made dependent upon the acceptance of a guarantee that within either state "the difference of religious creeds and confessions shall not be alleged against any person as a ground for exclusion or incapacity in matters relating to the enjoyment of civil and political rights, admission to public employments, functions, and honours, or the exercise of the various professions and industries in any locality whatsoever."259 This clause, which involved principally the Jewish problem in Romania, was resented in Bucharest as interference in the internal affairs of the country. Independence also meant that the former great-power protection, although weak and unreliable, had been removed. Romania was a free agent in international relations, but this situation could be dangerous for a weak state. As far as the new territory was concerned, the Romanian leaders welcomed the acquisition of the delta and Dobrudja, but no one would admit publicly that these territories were a fair exchange for southern Bessarabia. Not only were the advantages gained less than desired, but the treaty contained much else that was unpleasant for Romania. Bessarabia and the conditions attached to independence, of course, ranked first. The failure to provide for an indemnity or the neutrality of the country was also criticized. But most significant were the great political changes that the agreement introduced in the Balkans. Russia was once again a Danubian power; an autonomous Bulgaria, which was expected to be a Russian satellite, had been established across the Danube. In the future, however, largely owing to Austria-Hungary, which took care to have its preponderance preserved through the international organization of the river, Russian influence on the Danube did not become a significant issue. Romania eventually joined the European Commission of the Danube, which controlled the river to Galatz. Effective domination remained in the hands of Germany and the Habsburg Empire. For the Russian statesmen the decisions taken at Berlin were equally devastating. The settlement was regarded by most as a national humili285

Russia and the Romanian national state ation. Using the terms of the Treaty of San Stefano as a standard, Russia had indeed been forced to retreat. The greatest loss was undoubtedly the three-part division of Bulgaria.260 The area north of the Balkan mountains, called Bulgaria, was to be established as an autonomous state with a foreign prince; it was tacitly recognized by the powers that Russia would have predominant influence here. To the south a second political unit, called Eastern Rumelia, would have a semiautonomous position and a Christian governor; here all of the powers would have an equal position. The rest of the territory was returned to direct Ottoman rule. Not only did the Russian program for Bulgaria receive a severe setback, but difficulties were also encountered in the negotiations over the Asiatic territory. In the treaty Russia had to agree that Batum, the major city, would be maintained as a free port and demilitarized. Only in the acquisition of southern Bessarabia did the Russian government receive what it had originally designated as a major war aim. In contrast to the Russian disappointments, Britain and AustriaHungary had done quite well, particularly in view of the fact that they had not been forced to pay the costs of a war. In conformance with the prewar agreements Austria-Hungary was able to gain compensation in important areas. Habsburg officials took over the administration of Bosnia and Hercegovina and the army occupied the sanjak of Novi Pazar. Moreover, the altered diplomatic relations assured that Vienna would be able to exert in Serbia much the same predominating influence as that which Russia intended to exercise in Bulgaria. Britain too received rewards. In a separate agreement with the Ottoman Empire, this government took control of the island of Cyprus. The war also assured that in the next years the British - and certainly not the Russian - representatives would have the first voice in the councils of the sultan. The real winners in the crisis of the years 1875 to 1878 thus appeared to be these two powers, which were able to exploit the Russian military effort to secure major prizes for themselves and to withhold rewards from the victor in the war. T H E IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TREATY OF BERLIN

Not only were the Russian and the Romanian governments - and, needless to say, also their citizens - unhappy with the treaty, but its provisions were to separate the former war allies for many years to come. Neither had made gains that justified the enormous expenditures or the casualties of the war. For Russia the chief advance was the establishment 286

Prince Charles, i8yi-i8y8 of an autonomous Bulgaria, even with its diminished area. This state, it was recognized, would be under the political direction of St. Petersburg, and the treaty allowed Russian troops to remain in occupation for nine months. In this period Russian officials were to aid in the establishment of the new political institutions much as they had done in the Principalities after 1829. The Russian government took this task very seriously. Since Bulgaria was expected to serve henceforth as the major base for Russian influence in the Balkans, every effort was made to make the state as strong and secure as possible. The measures taken were often to the detriment of Serbian as well as Romanian interests. Nevertheless, despite the establishment of a dependent Bulgaria and, of course, the annexation of the Bessarabian and Asiatic lands, the war, which many had regarded as a crusade for Balkan Christianity, had not brought the expected results. Public anger turned not against Britain and Austria-Hungary, which were chiefly responsible for the setbacks, but against Germany, from whom official Russia had expected more support. The Russian resentment was so strong that for a short period the Three Emperors' Alliance, which, although not based on a written treaty, had functioned efficiently in the previous years, was broken. In 1878 Russia thus found itself again, as in 1856, in a position of diplomatic isolation. The consequences of the war were, if anything, even worse for Romania. The state had no reliable ally or dependable friend on whose aid it could count. Nor did it have a patron who would defend its interests in the discussions among the great powers as France had once done. In addition, the government was faced with the task of implementing the highly unpopular terms of the treaty. The major problems here were, first, the territorial transfers in regard to Bessarabia and Dobrudja, and, second, the securing of the necessary alterations in the Romanian constitution in regard to the Jews. The first issue involved primarily relations with Russia, the second, relations with Germany and to a lesser extent with France and Italy. The loss of southern Bessarabia had by this time been accepted as inevitable. Thus, in October, without internal turmoil, the legislature voted the necessary measures. A Russian occupation of the area followed immediately. Although the entire matter led to more friction between Russian and Romanian officials, there were no major questions that had to be settled. The boundaries of the lands in question were not at issue. In contrast, the transfer of Dobrudja and the delta caused further conflicts.261 Although the Russian government had itself offered Romania the territory as compensation for Bessarabia, the Russian statesmen were 287

Russia and the Romanian national state forced to recognize the problems that this exchange would cause them. Once the region was in Romanian hands, Russia would have no direct access to Bulgaria. The terms of the Treaty of Berlin assured a right of passage, but only for the nine-month period to May 1879. Foreseeing the difficulties that might arise in assuring access to its new client state, the Russian government pressed the Romanians to negotiate another agreement which would prolong the term of the Russian right of passage and assure that the treaty of April 1877 would apply to Dobrudja. Since Russian troops were still in occupation of the region, a refusal to remove them before a convention had been accepted was a viable threat. The Romanian reaction to this proposal, particularly after the experiences of the war and the peace negotiations, was predictable. The Russian demands were firmly rejected, and appeals for support were addressed to the other great powers. The Russian moves were particularly disturbing to the British and Habsburg governments, both of which wrere determined to preclude Russian control of Dobrudja. A lengthened duration for the Russian right of military passage could not be allowed. In November 1878, after a series of bitter exchanges between Bucharest and St. Petersburg, and in the face of outside disapproval, the Russian government gave up its attempt to secure such an agreement. However, other problems still had to be solved. Although the treaty specified the transfer of Dobrudja to Romania, the boundaries of the area to be ceded were to be decided by a European commission. Primarily interested in a strong Bulgaria, the Russian officials used their full influence to gain the maximum territory for it. The Romanian government did not receive similar support for its interests. The main point in dispute was the ownership of Silistria. In January 1879, in an effort to strengthen its arguments by a fait accompli, the Romanian government ordered its forces to occupy Arab Tabia, the most important of the fortresses commanding Silistria. The Russians, of course, strongly protested against the action. At first it appeared that Britain and the Habsburg Empire might back the Romanian stand, but they joined the rest of the powers in opposition; in February the Romanian government was forced to remove its troops. In the final drawing of the boundary Romania received Arab Tabia, but not Silistria itself. The firm Russian support of Bulgaria and the loss of Silistria, to which Romania never acquiesced, gave emphasis to another aspect of the peace settlement that was to have serious implications for the future. The establishment of Bulgaria as a Russian client state and an expected stronghold of Russian power was no more to the interest of 288

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Bucharest than to that of any other state. Moreover, like the Habsburg Empire, Romania had in the past not welcomed the idea of strong Slavic states in the Balkans. Keenly aware of their own background, which they believed linked them to a Latin heritage and French culture, the Romanian leaders were particularly sensitive to the implications of a strengthening of their Slavic neighbors' position. The recent conflicts with Russia and the continuing fear of control by that state heightened such apprehensions. Certainly, Romanian-Bulgarian relations were not at this time on a particularly friendly footing, despite the past services of the Romanians, in particular the Liberals, to the Bulgarian revolutionaries. Moreover, the Romanian government, which had previously had some hopes of further annexations on the left bank of the Danube and influence in the new Bulgarian state, was not happy about the treatment of Romanian nationals under Bulgarian and Russian authority. In a circular of May 17/29, 1878, Kogalniceanu protested: "Today the Romanians are mistreated more by the Bulgarians than they were by the Turks, with whom they maintained harmonious relations. Now they see themselves persecuted for their language; their schools and national churches are closed."262 Future Romanian-Bulgarian relations would depend largely on the direction of Russian policy in autonomous Bulgaria. In contrast to the question of territorial transfers, the problems attendant on the securing of great-power recognition of Romanian independence did not involve an increase in Russian-Romanian animosity. As we have seen, the change in political status had been made conditional on alterations in the Romanian legal structure that would give non-Christians an equal position with Christians. Although the Habsburg Monarchy and Britain were willing to proceed with the formal recognition after Romanian assurances of compliance were received, Bismarck took the lead in insisting that changes would have to be made in the constitution before this assent would be given. This stand was supported by the French and Italian governments, which like the German were under strong pressure from influential Jewish leaders and organizations. The entire question of the Jews, a highly sensitive Romanian internal issue, now became closely intertwined with another delicate domestic problem, that of the railroads built as a result of the ill-fated Strousberg concession.263 After the collapse of the original enterprise, and at the strong urging of Bismarck, the financiers Gerson Bleichroder and Adolph Hansemann, both Jews, in 1871 undertook the organization of a new joint-stock company that took over the obligations of the defunct Strousberg concern. An Austrian company was entrusted with building 289

Russia and the Romanian national state the railroads. Meanwhile, the financial burdens had increased further. From the German side the best solution was obviously to persuade or force the Romanian government to buy the railroads and thus to shoulder the immense financial obligations. With his prime interest in protecting the German investors in what had been a highly corrupt and mismanaged affair, Bismarck was perfectly willing to use the power of his government and the weapon of the threat to withhold a recognition of independence. Meanwhile, and with enormous difficulty, the Romanian government was attempting to persuade the legislative bodies to act in conformity with the desires of the great powers. The entire matter dragged on until finally, in October 1879, agreement was reached on a change in Article 7 of the constitution to read: "Difference of religious creed does not constitute an obstacle to the acquisition or exercise of civil and political rights."264 However, Romanian citizenship, which would allow the enjoyment of such privileges, was henceforth to require a special legislative act for each individual. Although the changes did, in fact, not fulfill the intentions of the treaty, the powers did not delay action longer. Since the railroad question had been settled to its satisfaction previously, the German government withdrew its opposition. Moreover, in October 1879 Germany signed the treaty forming the basis of the Dual Alliance with Austria-Hungary, a state that was anxious to win Romania as an ally against Russia. By the end of February 1880 Romanian independence was accepted by all of the powers. This major step in Romanian national development was followed by another in May 1881, when Charles, after a legislative action in March, was crowned king of Romania. The newly independent kingdom, however, was to remain in a precarious position. The dangers of the previous years had shown the need for a strong diplomatic alignment. France, the power to which most Romanian statesmen felt most closely attached, was still not in a position to play a major role in the Eastern Question. Britain, maintaining a policy of "splendid isolation," consistently refused to make any alliances of a general nature. The Hohenzollern link with Germany had certainly not proved a major advantage previously. Since Russia was regarded as the major national threat, only Austria-Hungary was left as a potential ally. In October 1883 Romania signed with the monarchy a defensive pact directed against Russia, to which Germany adhered. Through this treaty Romania remained linked with the Triple Alliance until World War I. The alignment gave Romania some protection against Russia, and it assured the maintenance of the status quo in the Danubian area. In June 1881 the Three Emperors' Alliance was re290

Prince Charles, 1871-1878 formed, this time on the basis of a treaty. As long as Russia and Austria-Hungary remained partners, it could be assumed that conditions would remain stable. Moreover, as a result of their experiences in the previous years, both Russia and Romania were to hesitate before embarking on further adventures in foreign relations.

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Conclusion

In the previous pages the close relationship between tsarist Russia and the Danubian Principalities has been traced from the 1820s to the achievement of Romanian independence in 1878. The narrative has shown, on the one hand, the extreme difficulties that can be encountered by a great power in dealing with a small peripheral state occupying a strategical geographic position, whose policies might at times contain dangers for its large neighbor. On the other hand, the account has stressed the parallel problems met by a Balkan nation, with a highly conscious national leadership, in handling the great power whose attitude was critical for its political development. The support or at least the acquiescence of Russia was essential for the attainment of the major Romanian goals. The intervention of tsarist officials was thus often requested. Care had to be taken, however, that this assistance did not result in the complete domination of the country or in its annexation. The balance, as we have seen, was precarious. Romanian leaders usually followed a policy of seeking Russian aid against the Ottoman suzerain, but also of calling upon other governments to block a domination of their nation by Russia. Russian policies toward the Romanian national movement were similarly ambivalent. Although some plans were indeed made for the partition of the Balkan peninsula, with the Principalities as a part of their sphere, the majority of the Russian leaders, tsars and diplomats alike, favored an indirect approach. In fact, the preferred policy throughout much of the nineteenth century, exemplified by the Treaty of Unkiar Iskelesi, was the control of the central Ottoman government and thus of the entire empire. Only when this objective failed did they fall back on the alternatives of a partition of influence with other 292

Conclusion great powers or a patronage of national liberation movements. As far as the Principalities were concerned, their location in relation to Constantinople made their political alignment of particular significance. Successive Russian governments wished the road to the Ottoman capital kept open. In addition, the position of these lands, bordering on the Habsburg Empire and, most critical, near Polish-inhabited territories under Russian or Habsburg rule, posed additional questions. Under an unfriendly regime, the Principalities could block Russian access to the rest of the peninsula and serve as a haven for Polish and other revolutionary groups hostile to Russia. The country could also become a staging area for an invasion of Russia should a European coalition, such as that formed in the Crimean War, again be organized. In friendly hands, the provinces gave Russian forces easy access to the rest of the Balkans. The significance that a complete Russian military control of the Romanian lands would have for Habsburg strategy was always clear to Vienna. During the nineteenth century the opposition of the Habsburg Empire to total Russian dominance, and, conversely, the Russian refusal to contemplate an Austrian annexation, was a major safeguard for Romanian freedom of action. In addition to the military, diplomatic, and political aspects of the relationship, this account has given much attention to the ideological considerations, including both the Russian concern for Orthodoxy and the Romanian sympathy for liberal-national movements that might have grave implications for tsarist policy, not only in Europe but within Russia itself. In the eighteenth century few problems arose; Russians and Romanians combated Ottoman control under the banner of Christian Orthodox solidarity. The internal regimes of the Phanariot period had no effect on the political fortunes of other areas, certainly not on those of tsarist Russia. After 1821, however, another element was introduced. Tsar Alexander I and Tsar Nicholas I both stood against the overthrow of legitimate governments by violent means. In Europe proper they cooperated with Austria and Prussia to suppress the revolutions of the 1820s, the 1830s, and 1848-1849. In all of these movements, the Romanian lands played some part, although at times a limited one. The Greek revolt broke out first in Moldavia; Polish refugees fled into the Principalities after the Polish revolution of 1830. Wallachia had a revolutionary government in 1848. In addition, after 1856 the Romanian governments were usually in the hands of leaders and parties that, although not always liberal, did feel that their primary political ties were with the West, in particular Paris, and not with autocratic, Orthodox Russia. At the same time, while denouncing revolutionary activity in theory, 293

Conclusion the Russian leaders did show much concern over the fate of the Balkan Christians. They thus had great difficulty in dealing with revolutionary conspiracies that had programs aimed at an improvement of the condition of these people, and they also felt a certain obligation to intervene should Orthodox interests come under attack. In 1821 they broke relations with the Porte and in 1828 went to war on issues connected with the protection of Orthodoxy. The disastrous Crimean War broke out largely because of the undefined nature of the rights that the Russian government believed it held in regard to the Balkan Orthodox. Even after this conflict the Russian government could not easily take an open stand against revolutionary movements of Orthodox people, although the leaders of these actions often held political principles abhorrent to the Russian officials. The conflict between the support of Orthodoxy and the denunciation of revolutionary ideas caused considerable confusion in Russian policy in this liberal-national era. In regard to the Principalities, the Russian government tended to support Romanian demands for autonomous rights against the Ottoman government, but, while doing so, it used its role as protector or guarantor to attempt to assure that friendly, conservative, and pro-Russian regimes would rule in Bucharest and Jassy. This intervention in time came to be seen by many Romanians as a greater burden than the control exercised by the Porte. It also strengthened the position of the liberal, anti-Russian elements in the country. The picture, however, was never clear; the relationship fluctuated over the years. Reviewing the period under consideration, these conflicting elements - the Romanian desire to use Russian support against the Porte but to resist Russian control and the Russian determination both to aid an Orthodox neighbor and to assure a continuing strong influence over its government - are reflected in the events that have been discussed. Russia's influence in the Principalities was effectively secured in the eighteenth century, when the repeated wars with the Ottoman Empire brought its armies into the region. Special rights in regard to the provinces were gained in the Treaty of Kuchuk Kainardji, the pact of 1802, and the Treaty of Bucharest. In this period Russian backing was extremely effective in weakening the links of the Principalities with Constantinople. At the same time, however, the relationship did little to improve domestic conditions. The Phanariot rulers continued their exploitative polices. The European national movements of the early nineteenth century, with their basic programs of nationalism and political reform, modified the attitude of not only the Romanians but also the other Balkan people toward both the Porte and Russia. Western ideological influences, 294

Conclusion given wide circulation during the period of the French Revolution and Napoleon, had lasting effects in the Balkan lands. Even the new conservatism after 1815, with its strong romantic overtones and its emphasis on past history, contributed to the formation of the Balkan revolutionary mentality. The growing awareness of national identity and the ideal of the national state clashed with both Ottoman overlordship and Russian protection. After 1826, as we have seen, the Russian policy toward the Principalities was that of dominating the internal regimes through the protectorates established in the Convention of Akkerman and the Treaty of Adrianople. Viewing its role as that of a father toward his children, or a patron toward his clients, the Russian government did indeed attempt to improve political conditions. The Organic Statutes were progressive for their time and place. Moreover, the officials entrusted with the handling of Russian policy, for instance, Kiselev, Kotsebu, and Giers, were all extremely sympathetic to the country, and they had close friends and relatives among the wealthy landowners. Despite the benevolence of their intentions, however, the methods used by the Russian officials to assure their influence aroused enormous antagonism. Moreover, the very fact that they involved themselves in domestic squabbles made it necessary for them to form internal alliances with individuals and factions. When joining one side in a political quarrel, they inevitably won the enmity of the other. In a sense the Russian officials, no matter what policies they adopted, were fighting a losing battle. Their aim was bureaucratic reform in a conservative direction. They also wished to maintain the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, at least for a time, since in the 1830s and 1840s they exercised much influence in Constantinople. In internal Romanian politics they allied, as could be expected, with the great landowners, the high clergy, and those who wished to maintain the status quo. Meanwhile, in the Balkan peninsula as throughout Europe, times were changing. The great liberal-national movement, which swept through Europe from 1820 to 1848, had, as we have seen, repercussions here too. Romanian opinion was affected by the general European political current chiefly through the activities of the privileged youth of the Principalities, who went to Paris and other European cities for their education. Thus in 1848 Romanian liberal-nationalist reformers joined with those who disliked the internal social and political conditions and the protectorate to overthrow the pro-Russian regime in power in Bucharest. Their principal target was the Russian control, not Ottoman suzerainty. The revolutionary leaders, in fact, attempted to appease the Porte and to reassure it about the aims of the revolt. The Russian military intervention in 1848, although successful in

Conclusion the attainment of the immediate goals, assured the future enmity of those who had participated in the revolt or who had approved of the revolutionary goals. The national program remained intact; the Liberal leadership became in the future the most active and able element in Romanian political life. It should be strongly emphasized that its objectives were liberal, not democratic or socialistic. Its goal was the unification of the Principalities under a constitutional regime in which a legislature, dominated by property owners, would control the state. The Liberal leaders also wanted a foreign prince, who would give added stability and prestige to the government. The principal enemy remained tsarist Russia; Ottoman suzerainty was an affront to national sensibilities, but it involved no overwhelming burdens. Although the opposition to Russian influence remained strong after 1848, it was recognized that little could be accomplished unless some event would occur that would sharply reduce Russia's ability to dominate the Romanian lands. The Crimean War thus proved to be an unexpected and welcome opportunity for the national leadership. Although the conflict at first brought a foreign occupation, the Russian defeat created a situation greatly to the advantage of the national movement. In the Treaty of Paris Moldavia received three districts of southern Bessarabia, giving it an important position at the mouth of the Danube. Even more significant, the Russian protectorship was replaced by a general European guarantee. This latter occurrence immensely aided the Romanian national leadership. In the future Romanian affairs were in theory to be decided on an international basis; no important changes could be made in the political condition of the country without the consent of the seven guarantors. Moreover, among these the Romanians now had a powerful friend and patron. France, under the leadership of Napoleon III, willingly accepted the trust placed in it by the national leaders. Napoleon's support, at least at first, also had a great effect on the Russian attitude. After the Crimean disaster, as we have seen, the Russian government, recognizing its grave internal problems, turned inward to concentrate on domestic reform. In a period of weakness, believing that they could not stand alone in international relations, the Russian statesmen established an entente with France. Thus after 1856 the Romanian nationalists, because of the intricacies of the diplomatic situation, could count on the support of four of the powers in any moves to increase their autonomous rights - France, Russia, Prussia, and Sardinia. At times even Britain joined this group. The opposition to Romanian advancement at this point came almost exclusively from the Habsburg Monarchy and the Ottoman Empire. Habsburg actions, however, were largely neutralized by the national 296

Conclusion movements in Italy and the German states, which absorbed the full attention of Vienna. Ottoman opposition was effectively blocked because of the difficulties connected with the enforcement of the treaty stipulations. Obviously the governments of the Danubian Principalities could not be compelled to follow the directives of the great powers unless at least the threat of force existed. Yet such action was clearly at all times difficult to contemplate. The obvious policeman, the Porte, was by treaty prevented from occupying the provinces without the unanimous consent of the other guarantors, which was impossible to obtain. The cooperation of Russia and the Habsburg Empire in a joint intervention also brought up insurmountable difficulties. Thus, although in theory bound by treaty restrictions and the decisions of the guarantors, the Principalities were in fact in a good position to do what they wished. The policy of the fait accompli could succeed. As we have seen, several changes were made in the administration of the Principalities, all of which involved the guarantors but were put into affect without their prior consent. The double election of Alexander Cuza, the amalgamation of the legislatures and administrations, and the later changes in the electoral laws were all allowed to stand because a majority of the guarantors opposed active measures to compel their change. The Romanian leaders were also very able in their exploitation of the opportunities offered in international relations. They kept in close touch with current European affairs, and they sent emissaries to the Western courts. They cultivated the favor of Napoleon III, their best hope for foreign support, and they took care not to antagonize the Ottoman government needlessly. After the election of Cuza and the union of the administrations of the two provinces, a Romanian state had indeed come into existence. Previously, the two principalities, with their separate governments, had been extremely vulnerable to outside pressure. Now a single government with a strong national policy could confront Europe. Although weakened by internal opposition, Cuza played his role in international relations well. The Russian government viewed the new situation with mixed feelings. The Romanian leadership was openly, enthusiastically pro-French. As long as Russia worked with France, this alignment was to a degree acceptable, but certainly not to be favored as a permanent factor in the affairs of the lower Danube. The strong position of the Liberal Party was also viewed with suspicion. The former revolutionaries of 1848 had lost none of their distrust of St. Petersburg and their tendency to view Russia as representative of all that was backward and despotic. The Russian government therefore supported the double election, following the French example, but then began to shift its position. 297

Conclusion Gorchakov was certainly not pleased by the administrative unification, and he soon came into open conflict with Cuza over the question of the Dedicated Monasteries and the Romanian links with other revolutionary national movements, in particular that of the Poles. Although no overt attempts were made to overthrow the prince, the Russian government called for a separation of the Principalities and a return to the old order at the end of his reign. An attempt to implement this policy was made when in February 1866 Cuza was forced to abdicate by an internal conspiracy. Aware of the outside dangers, the revolutionary government made haste to find a new prince and adopt a constitution. The acceptance of the throne by Charles of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen strengthened the Romanian position considerably. Since the prince was a member of the Prussian royal dynasty, a family traditionally close to the Russian imperial family, it was difficult for the Russian government to oppose him on personal grounds. As far as Habsburg opposition was concerned, the outbreak of the Seven Weeks' War with Prussia in 1866 played the same role as the Franco-Austrian War in 1859; Vienna could do little with its major strength concentrated elsewhere. The program of 1848, the unification of the Principalities with a foreign prince, was thus achieved. Despite the fact that Prince Charles, like his predecessor, had great difficulty in controlling his domestic opposition, his accession did immensely strengthen the position of the Romanian state. Although still in theory an Ottoman vassal, the government conducted a foreign policy worthy of an independent nation. Agencies were established in other capitals, and treaties were negotiated. Every opportunity was exploited to gain more rights at Ottoman expense. Although friendly relations were established with St. Petersburg, the chief ties remained with France. The defeat of that power in 1871 was thus a damaging blow to Romanian interests. Nationalist sentiment, with its emphasis on the Latin origins of the Romanian people, felt its principal outside links to be with Paris and Rome. The old feelings of Orthodox solidarity with Russia had largely died with the secular emphasis of the new age. Romania did not really have an acceptable alternate close ally. Despite the Hohenzollern prince, the new Germany, under the leadership of Bismarck, did little to aid Romanian interests. With his principal concern directed toward maintaining close relations with St. Petersburg, the German chancellor continually urged the importance of good relations between Bucharest and St. Petersburg. The Eastern crisis of 1875 to 1878 thus found Romania in an unhappy position. The events of these years could offer no positive rewards or opportunities equal to the dangers that threatened. The Romanian na298

Conclusion tionalist irredenta were Transylvania, under Habsburg rule, and Bessarabia, a Russian possession. There were no more major claims on Ottoman territory. Moreover, the Slavic emphasis in the revolt in Bosnia and Hercegovina, in the Bulgarian uprising, and in the war of Montenegro and Serbia against the Ottoman Empire all aroused fears. Old nightmares of a Roman people drowning in a Slavic sea resurfaced. The policy of neutrality adopted at first reflected the Romanian interests, as well as the advice offered by all of the great powers. Despite the fact that they could hope to gain few advantages from a war, the Romanian leaders were forced to recognize the realities of the European situation. When the diplomatic efforts of the powers failed, it became obvious that Russia would go to war. If such a conflict broke out, a Russian military passage through Romania became inevitable. This unpleasant fact faced the nation with two dangers: first, that once in occupation of the country the Russian government would take back the Bessarabian districts lost in 1856, and, second, that it might reimpose the former exclusive political control. Seeking to avoid these possible consequences, the Romanian leaders attempted to make an agreement with Russia that, while allowing military passage, would protect Romanian territorial integrity and political freedom. The Treaty of April 4/16, 1877, was designed to guard the basic national interests. In May 1877 Romanian independence was declared. Although the original intention had been to remain neutral, Romania entered the war and in July joined the Russian army in the campaign across the Danube. Thereafter the Romanian government expected to be treated by Russia as a full partner in the war and in the peacemaking. The disappointments of Romania, as well as of Serbia and Greece, have been described. The Treaty of San Stefano, largely the work of Ignatiev, gave the territorial rewards to the Bulgarians and the Montenegrins. The Romanian fears over the loss of southern Bessarabia were fully realized; Dobrudja was not considered an adequate compensation. Moreover, during the international crisis of the spring of 1878, the Romanian government was made acutely aware of the dangers that the Russian army, encamped on its soil, posed for the country's independence. Although it overturned many of the stipulations of San Stefano, the Treaty of Berlin also did not fulfill the Romanian hopes, in particular regarding the retention of southern Bessarabia. It did, however, contain some favorable features, including the division of the large Bulgaria and the limitation of the term of the Russian occupation; Romania received Dobrudja, and, of course, the independence of the state was recognized. With the establishment of an independent Romania, our narrative comes to an end. Despite the close ties that Russia had maintained with 299

Conclusion the Principalities in the first stages of their national development, the attainment of the final objective of complete independence found the two governments in opposition. Before the Crimean War the Russian statesmen had placed a major emphasis on their relationship with the Principalities. Russian officials had acted as political advisers and had blocked much Ottoman interference. They had considered themselves the patrons and protectors of the neighboring Orthodox people; the relationship was thus paternal and unequal. Although many sections of Romanian society had accepted this situation, the next generation, led by the Liberal Party, sought other allies. The outside inspiration for the major stages in the Romanian national movement in the second half of the century - the double election, the unification, and the foreign prince - thus came from France, the land to which the Romanian nationalists felt the closest ties. In a sense rejected, the Russian government naturally shifted its major concern to the fate of the Slavic people. Although the Russian diplomats would have preferred no crises in the area, when events finally pulled them into a conflict with the Ottoman Empire, they felt no desire or obligation to deliver particular advantages to the "ungrateful" Romanians. In conclusion, it can thus be seen that the Russian government did play a major role in the establishment of the modern Romanian state, with the major achievements concentrated in the first half of the century. Russian treaties with the Ottoman Empire secured the Principalities a protected autonomous position. Even after 1856 the Russian opposition to an Ottoman military intervention made it possible for the Romanian leaders to use the policy of the fait accompli. The Romanian preference for a Western connection and the cultivation of links with France were bound to affect the relationship with Russia. Although wishing to retain a friendly regime in Bucharest, the Russian government turned increasingly to other Balkan nations. The relations of the two states after 1878 were not close; the Romanian government remained deeply affected by the events of the war and the immediate postwar period, particularly by the loss of southern Bessarabia. Romania thus joined in a close diplomatic association with Germany and Austria-Hungary. This alignment, however, was not to withstand a major European cataclysm. In 1916 Romania entered World War I as an ally of Russia.

300

Notes

Introduction The terms are printed in Dimitrie A. Sturdza et al., Acte si documente relative la istoria renascerei Romdniei (Bucharest: Carol Gobi, 1900), I, 15-21. This work will henceforth be cited as Acte si documente. For a consideration of the economic aspects of Ottoman rule see Nichita Adaniloaie, "Implicajiile economice ale dominatiei otomane asupra principatelor romane, 1750-1859," Revista de Istorie 34, no. 3 (i98i):44i-463. On the effect of the wars on the Principalities see Constantin Cazani§teanu, "Urmarile razboaielor ruso-austro-turce din secolul al XVIII - lea aspura tSrilor romane," Revista de Istorie 34, no. 2 (1981) 1259-269. Austrian policy is discussed in Karl A. Roider, Jr., The Reluctant Ally: Austria's Policy in the Austro-Turkish War, 1737-1739 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1972). The Treaty of Kuchuk Kainardji is printed in Acte si documente, I, 125For Russian policy in the next years see G. S. Grosul, Dunaiskie kniazhestva v politike Rossii, 1774-1806 (Kishinev: Izdatel'stvo "Shtiintsa," 6 The terms are in Acte si documente, I, 219-225. 7 Consular reports for this period are printed in A. Otetea, ed., Rapoarte consulare ruse, 1770—1796, Vol. I, new series, of Documente privind istoria Rominiei: Colectia Eudoxiu de Hurmuzaki (Bucharest: Editura Academiei Republicii Populare Romine, 1962). 8 See Norman E. Saul, Russia and the Mediterranean, 1797-1807 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970), pp. 64-65. 9 Acte si documente, I, 260. 10 Brune to Napoleon I, Pera, March 14/26,1803, Documente privind istoria Rominiei: Colectia . . . Hurmuzaki, II, supp. 1, no. 2, p. 266. 11 George F. Jewsbury, The Russian Annexation of Bessarabia, 1774-1828: 301

Notes to pp. 14-26 A Study of Imperial Expansion (Boulder, Colo.: East European Quarterly, 1976), pp. 51-52. 12 See Acte si documente, I, 296-302.

1

2 3

4

5

Chapter I The Russian protectorate For events in the Principalities see Dan Berindei, VAnnee revolutionnaire 18 21 dans les pays roumains (Bucharest: Editions de l'Acad^mie de la Re*publique socialiste de Roumanie, 1973); L. E. Semenova, "Vosstanie 1821 g. v Valakhii i Rossiia," in Mezhdunarodnyi otnosheniia na Balkanakh (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "Nauka," 1974), pp. 61-70; and the documentary collection, Andrei Otetea, ed., Documente privind istoria Rominiei: Rdscoala din 1821, 5 vols. (Bucharest: Academia Republicii Populare Romine, 1959-1962). Two other books cover this period as well as later episodes: Radu R. N. Florescu, The Struggle against Russia in the Roumanian Principalities, 1821-1854 (Munich: Societatea academica Romana, 1962); and V. la. Grosul and E. E. Chertan, Rossiia i formirovanie rumynskogo nezavisimogo gosudarstva (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "Nauka," 1969). For the ideological background see Vlad Georgescu, Political Ideas and the Enlightenment in the Romanian Principalities, 1750— 1831 (Boulder, Colo.: East European Quarterly, 1971). See Andrei Otetea, Tudor Vladimirescu si revolutia din 1821 (Bucharest: Editura §tiintifica, 1971). Andrei Otetea, ed., The History of the Romanian People (New York: Twayne, n.d.), p. 317. Much the same language was used in a letter written by Vladimirescu. Russian support was sought, and Pini was asked to use his influence with the Wallachian government to prevent it from using force. Tudor warned: "For I must inform you, sir, that, if a single shot is fired against the nation, there will not be a single soul of the boyar race left in the Wallachian lands. For the entire nation is aflame with the desire for vengeance against that class and waits only the first signal to satisfy it" (Vladimirescu to Pini, Ceovirno§ani, January 20/February 1, 1821, Revolutia din 1821 condusd de Tudor Vladimirescu: Documente externe [Bucharest: Editura Academiei Socialiste Romania, 1980], pp. 69-70). Nesselrode to Pahlen, circular no. 8, Laibach, March 18/30, 1821, Barbara Jelavich, Russia and Greece during the Regency of King Othon, 1832-1835: Russian Documents on the First Years of Greek Independence (Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1962), pp. 123-124. Documents from the various foreign ministry archives on the revolts of Vladimirescu and Ipsilanti can be found in the collection Revolutia din 1821. Of the relatively few that concern Russian policy in this period, those of the greatest interest are the instructions sent from Laibach to the Russian representative in Constantinople, Baron G. Stroganov, for February 23/March 7, 1821, pp. 98-102; March 14/26, pp. 166-168; and from St. Petersburg on June 4/16, pp. 322-328; as well as the instructions from Laibach to Pisani, March 13/25, pp. 161-162. A description of events in the Principalities is given in two reports by Lieutenant Colonel I. P. Pestel, March 9, pp. 138-150, and April 15, pp. 245-255. Confidential dispatch to General Pozzo di Borgo, Count Golovkin, Count

Notes to pp. 26-39 Alopeus, and Baron Nikolai, St. Petersburg, June 22/July 4, 1821, pp. 124-128. The Russian position is also given in two notes presented to the Porte by Stroganov on July 6/18, in Revolupa din 1821, pp. 363-371. 6 Dimitrie A. Sturdza et al., Acte si documente relative la istoria renascerei Romdniei (Bucharest: Carol Gobi, 1900), I, 310-318. Cited hereafter as Acte si documente. 7 See loan C. Filitti, Les Principautes roumaines sous Voccupation russe, 1828-1834 (Bucharest: Imprimerie de T'lndependance Roumaine," 1904).

8 The treaty is discussed in V. I. Sheremet, Turtsiia i AndrianopoVskii mir 1829 g. (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "Nauka," 1975). 9 The terms of the treaty, as well as of the Separate Acts, are printed in Edward Hertslet, The Map of Europe by Treaty (London: Butterworths, 1875), II, 813-831 (p. 817 quoted here), and Acte si documente, I, 318-332. 10 Hertslet, Map of Europe, II, 826. 11 Ibid., p. 825. 12 Two important books for this period are loan C. Filitti, Domniile Romdne sub regulamentul organic, 1834-1848 (Bucharest: Librariile Socec, 1915); and V. la. Grosul, Reformy v Dunaiskikh kniazhestvakh i Rossiia, 20-30 gody XIX veka (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "Nauka," 1966). See also Georges Bibesco, Regne de Bibesco, 2 vols. (Paris: Librairie Plon, 18931894); Panaioti Rizos, ed., Memoires du Prince Nicolas Soutzo: GrandLogothete de Moldavie, 1798-1871 (Vienna: Gerold, 1899); and Alexandre A. C. Sturdza, Regne de Michel Sturdza: Prince Regnant de Moldavie, 18'34-1849 (Paris: Librairie Plon, 1907). 13 The Moldavian regulation is printed in Great Britain, Foreign Office, British and Foreign State Papers (London: Ridgeway, 1859), XXXII, 58678914 On Polish activities see in particular Robert Allen Berry, "Czartoryski and the Balkan Policies of the Hotel Lambert, 1832-1847" (Ph.D. diss., Indiana University, 1974). 15 Charles Jelavich and Barbara Jelavich, eds., The Education of a Russian Statesman: The Memoirs of Nicholas Karlovich Giers (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1962), pp. 146, 144. 16 Ibid., pp. 194-195. 17 Giers described Dashkov with sympathy: "I liked his noble manners and restrained politeness. He could pass more easily for an Englishman than for a Russian. This is not surprising because he was born in America when his father was ambassador to the United States and had received an entirely English education. Several years spent in the Pages Corps could not efface his English mannerisms. He spoke Russian rather badly" (ibid., P-/53)18 Ibid., pp. 192-193. 19 Ibid., pp. 148-149. 20 For the national movement see Cornelia Bodea, The Romanians' Struggle for Unification, 1834-1849 (Bucharest: Publishing House of the Academy of the Socialist Republic of Romania, 1970); and John C. Campbell, "French Influence and the Rise of Roumanian Nationalism: The Generation of 1848" (Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 1940). On student activity see E. A. Dzhaparidze, "Kul'turno-prosvetitel'skoe 'Obshchestvo Rumyn-

Notes to pp.

21

22 23

24 25 26 27

skikh Studentov' v Parizhe i ego rol' v natsional'no-osvoboditernom dvizhenii, 1845-1848," in Formirovanie natsionaVnykh kul'tur v stranakh Tsentral'noi i lugo-V ostochnoi Evropy (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "Nauka," 1977), pp. 230-236; and Alexandru Zub, "Rumanische Studierende an europaischen Universitaten," Zeitschrift fur Siebenbiirgische Landeskunde, no. 1 (1979): 21-40. Nesselrode to Dashkov, St. Petersburg, November 15/27, 1846, enclosure in Dashkov to Kotsebu, no. 20, Bucharest, November 30/December 12, 1846. Russian Foreign Ministry documents on microfilm, Bucharest. Cited hereafter as RFM. Kotsebu to Nesselrode, no. 188, Jassy, January 5/17, 1847, RFM. This section on the revolution of 1848 is based on Barbara Jelavich, "The Russian Intervention in Wallachia and Transylvania, September 1848 to March 1849," Rumanian Studies 4 (1979)116-74. See also N. Adaniloaie and Dan Berindei, Revolutia de la 1848 in tdrile romdne: culegere de studii (Bucharest: Editura Academiei Republicii Socialiste Romania, 1974): E. Andics, Das Bundnis Habsburg-Romanow (Budapest: Akade*miai Kiado, 1963); R. Averbukh, Tsarskaia interventsiia v bor'be s vengerskoi revoliutsiei, 1848-1849 (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe Sotsial'noekonomicheskoe Izdatel'stvo, 1935); N. V. Berezniakov, Revoliutsionnoe i natsionaVno-osvoboditeVnoe dvizhenie v dunaiskikh kniazhestvakh v 1848-1849 gg. (Kishinev: Gosudarstvennoe Izdatel'stvo Moldavii, 1955); and the documentary collection Anul 1848 in Principatele Romdne, ed. I. C. Bratianu, 6 vols. (Bucharest: Gobi, 1902-1910). Nesselrode circular to the Russian diplomatic missions, July 19/31, 1848, Acte si documente, II, 4-8. Draft of a letter to Fuad Effendi, no. 1, September 13/25, 1848, B. Jelavich, "Russian Intervention," p. 40. Kotsebu to Cantacuzino, Bucharest, October 1848,, Anul 1848, V, 85. The Convention of Balta Liman is in Hertslet, Map of Europe, II, 10901094.

28 Nesselrode to Khaltchinskii, no. 251, St. Petersburg, January 26/February 7, 1851, RFM. 29 Duhamel to Tumanskii (in Jassy), no. 302, Bucharest, September 6/18, 1849, RFM. 30 Duhamel to Nesselrode, no. 329, reserve, Bucharest, January 12/24, 1^5i» RFM. 31 For instance, Tumanskii to Nesselrode, no. 2, Jassy, February 7/29, 1849, RFM. Tumanskii also reported the strong feelings of sympathy, especially among the young, for the Hungarian revolutionaries who were fighting the Russians; some thought they might even win. Songs were sung in honor of Bern. The consul commented: "Such are unfortunately the fruits of the benefits and the generous institutions that have been given to these perverse people, unworthy of appreciating them, who pay for them by the most black and revolting ingratitude" (Tumanskii to Seniavin, no. 12, Jassy, August 21/September 2, 1849, RFM. 32 Khaltchinskii to Nesselrode, no. 70, Bucharest, September 21/October 3, 1851, RFM. 33 Khaltchinskii to Tumanskii, no. 49, Bucharest, April 14/26, 1851, in RFM. 34 Nesselrode instructed the consuls to deliver this warning to the princes

3°4

Notes to pp. 52-77

35 36 37

38

and their councils (Nesselrode to Khaltchinskii, no. 991, March 26/April 7, 1851, enclosure in Khaltchinskii to Tumanskii, no. 55, Bucharest, May 4/16, 1851, RFM). Florescu, The Struggle against Russia, pp. 223-248. Quoted in Ernst Birke, Frankreich und Ostmitteleurapa im 19. Jahrhundert (Cologne: Bohlau Verlag, i960), p. 227. The background and events of the Crimean War are discussed in Ann Pottinger Saab, The Origins of the Crimean Alliance (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1977); John Shelton Curtiss, Russia's Crimean War (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1979); and Paul W. Schroeder, Austria, Great Britain, and the Crimean War (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1972). Also see Radu R. Florescu, "The Rumanian Principalities and the Origins of the Crimean War," Slavonic Review 43 (December 1964): 46-67. See Leonid Boicu, Austria si principatele romdne in vremea rdzboiului Crimeii, 1853-1856 (Bucharest: Editura Academiei Republicii Socialiste Romania, 1972). Chapter I I The European guardianship

1

2 3 4 5 6 7 8

The diplomatic aspects of the Romanian question for this period have been discussed in a number of books. Of first importance is T. W. Riker, The Making of Roumania (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1931); the Russian position is covered in V. N. Vinogradov, Rossiia i ob'edinenie rumynskikh kniazhestv (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Akademii Nauk SSSR, 1961). See also Dan Berindei, L'Union des principautes roumaines (Bucharest: Editions de l'Acade'mie de la R^publique socialiste de Roumanie, 1967); Leonid Boicu, Diplomatia europeand si triumful cauzei romdne, 1856-1859 (Jassy: Editura Junimea, 1978); W. G. East, The Union of Moldavia and Wallachia, 1859 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1929); Dumitru Vitcu, Diplomatii unirii (Bucharest: Editura Academiei Republicii Socialiste Romania, 1979); and three volumes of documents: A. Otetea, ed., Documente privind unirea principatelor (Bucharest: Editura Academiei Republicii Populare Romine, 1959-1963); Documente interne, 1854-1857, ed. Dan Berindei et al. (n.d.); vol. II, Rapoartele consulatului Austriei din lasi, 1856-1859, ed. Dan Berindei et al. (1959); vol. Ill, Corespondents, politico,, 1855-1859, ed. Cornelia C. Bodea (1963). Edward Hertslet, The Map of Europe by Treaty (London: Butterworths, 1875), II, 1255. Gorchakov to Butenev, reserve, St. Petersburg, July 14/26, 1856, Russian Foreign Ministry documents on microfilm, Bucharest. Cited hereafter as RFM. The protocols of the conference meetings are printed in Great Britain, Foreign Office, British and Foreign State Papers (London: Ridgeway, 1865), XLVI, 63-138. Hertslet, Map of Europe, II, 1262. Ibid. Report of Sadyk Pasha, Braila, April 30/May 12, 1857, Otetea, Documente privind unirea principatelor, III, 247-249. The protocols of the meetings and the final report of the International 305

Notes to pp. 77-89

9 10

11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22

23 24 25 26

Commission are in Dimitrie A. Sturdza et al. Acte si documente relative la istoria renascerei Romdniei (Bucharest: Carol Gobi, 1900), VI, pt. 2, 399-672. Cited henceforth as Acte si documente. See Vasile Maciu, "Diplomatul C. Baisly §i adunarile ad-hoc," Studii: Revista de Istorie 25, no. 3 (1972): 485-510. Basily to Popov, no. 107, Bucharest, June 15/27, 1857, RFM. The same ideas were expressed in Gorchakov's instructions to Kiselev: "Along with France, Prussia and Sardinia we insist on complete freedom for the expression of the wishes of the populations. We do not seek to influence them in any sense. We do not prejudge any question; we await the vote of the divans in order to express at the conference of Paris the final judgment that we will declare" (Gorchakov to Kiselev, June 1/13, 1857, RFM). Basily to Gorchakov, no. 30, Bucharest, April 12/24, 1$57, RFM. Riker, Making of Roumania, p. 61. A. D. Xenopol, Domnia lui Cuza Voda, II, p. 569, trans, in Riker, Making of Roumania, pp. 111-112. Note of the representatives of France, Prussia, Russia, and Sardinia to Ali Ghalib Pasha, Constantinople, June 13/25, 1857, Acte si documente, IV, 967. Protocol no. 9; meetings of June 20/July 2 and June 21/July 3, 1857, Acte si documente, VI, pt. 2, 430-433. Riker, Making of Roumania, p. 125. Gorchakov to Balabin, private letter, July 1857, RFM. Vinogradov, Rossiia i ob'edinenie rumynskikh kniazhestv, p. 166. Quoted in East, Union of Moldavia and Wallachia, p. 131. Gorchakov to Balabin, private letter, August 17/29, 1857, RFM. Riker, Making of Roumania, p. 144. I. Balaceanu, a moderate, wrote very bitterly about the victory of these men, whom, he said, the press had made into real heroes, martyrs, and statesmen. "The halo of persecution glitters around their heads" (Balaceanu to I. Ghica, Nice, October 20/November 1, 1857, O.tetea, Documente privind unirea principatelor, III, 327-331). See three dispatches of Basily to Gorchakov: no. 81, Bucharest, September 27/October 9, 1857; no. 88 (quoted here), October 18/30, 1857; n o 94, November 17/29, 1857, RFM. Basily to Gorchakov, no. 88, Bucharest, October 18/30, 1857, RFM. Vinogradov, Rossiia i ob'edinenie rumynskikh kniazhestv, pp. 209-223. The protocols are printed in British and Foreign State Papers, XLVIII, 81-132.

27 The text of the treaty is in ibid., pp. 70-81. 28 Article 8 stated in part: "The suzerain court will, in case of external aggression, come to an agreement with the Principalities for measures of defense of their territory; and it is the responsibility [of the Porte] to initiate, by an entente with the guarantor courts, the measures necessary for the reestablishment of order should it be compromised" (Ibid., p. 72). 29 Ibid., pp. 77-78. 30 For Giers's background see Barbara Jelavich, Russia and the Rumanian National Cause, 1858-1859 (Bloomington, Ind.: Slavic and East European Series, 1959; reprint ed., Hamden, Conn.: Archon, 1974), pp. 23306

Notes to pp. 89-102

31 32 33 34

35 36 37 38

39 40 41 42

37; R. V. Bossy, "La Diplomatic russe et l'union des prindpaute's roumaines, 1858-1859," Revue d'Historie Diplomatique 3 (1962): 255-266. Included in Giers to Popov, no. 14, Bucharest, October 10/22, 1858, B. Jelavich, Russia and the Rumanian National Cause, pp, 139-142. Ibid., p. 142. See Vasile Maciu, "S. I. Popov §i luptele politice din Moldova in octombrie-decembrie 1858," Studii: Revistd de Istorie 26, no. 1 (1973): 5-31Popov to Giers, private letter, Jassy, September 26/October 8, 1858, Barbara Jelavich, "Russia and the Double Election of Alexander Cuza, 18581859: The Letters of S. I. Popov to N. K. Giers/' Sudost-Forschungen 24 (1965): 124. This section on the double election is based on B. Jelavich, Russia and the Rumanian National Cause, pp. 38-60. Popov to Giers, Jassy, private letter, November 14/26, 1858, B. Jelavich, "Russia and the Double Election," pp. 126-127. Popov to Giers, private letter, Jassy, December 12/24, 1858, B. Jelavich, "Russia and the Double Election," pp. 129-130. Lobanov to Giers, private letter, Pera, December 22/January 3, 1859, B. Jelavich, "Russia, the Great Powers and the Recognition of the Double Election of Alexander Cuza: The Letters of A. B. Lobanov-Rostovskii to N. K. Giers, 1858-1859," Rumanian Studies 1 (1970): 20-22. Giers to Butenev, no. 26, Bucharest, November 24/December 6, 1858, B. Jelavich, Russia and the Rumanian National Cause, p. 47. Ibid., p. 36, n. 28; Vinogradov, Rossiia i ob'edinenie rumynskikh kniazhestv, p. 251. Giers to Balabin, private letter, January 8/20, 1859, B. Jelavich, Russia and the Rumanian National Cause, p. 48. Giers's dispatch on the election in Wallachia is printed in B. Jelavich, Russia and the Rumanian National Cause, pp. 143-146. Chapter I I I The Cuza era, 1859-1866

1

For Cuza's reign see Gerald J. Bobango, The Emergence of the Romanian National State (Boulder, Colo.: East European Quarterly, 1979); Constantin C. Giurescu, Viata si opera lui Cuza Vodd (Bucharest: Editura §tiintifica, 1966); Alexander D. Xenopol, Domnia lui Cuza Vodd (Jassy: Tipografia Editora "Dacia" P. Iliescu and D. Grossu, 1903); and the articles in Cuza Vodd in memoriam (Jassy: Editura Junimea, n.d.). For the diplomacy of the period see in particular E. E. Chertan, Russko-Rumynskie otnosheniia v 1859-1863 godakh (Kishinev: Izdatel'stvo "Kartia Moldoveniaske," 1968); and Irina Radulescu-Valasoglu, Alexandru loan Cuza si politica europeand (Bucharest: Editura Academiei Republicii Socialiste Romania, 1974). 2 On the diplomatic aspects of this question see N. Corivan, "Lupta diplomatica. pentru recuno§terea dublei alegeri a lui Al. I. Cuza," in Studii privind unirea Principatelor (Bucharest: Editura Academia Republicii Populare Romine, i960), pp. 387-412; N. Corivan, "Russko-frantsuzskie vzaimootnosheniia v 1859 gody i ob'edinenie rumynskikh kniazhestv," in O Rumyno-russkikh i rumyno-sovetskikh sviaziakh (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo 307

Notes to pp. io2-1 op

3 4

5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13

14 15 16 17 18

inostrannoi literatury, i960), pp. 158-186; and B. Jelavich, "Russia, the Great Powers and the Recognition of the Double Election of Alexander Cuza: The Letters of A. B. Lobanov-Rostovskii to N. K. Giers. 18581859," Rumanian Studies 1 (1970): 3-34. Chertan, Russko-Rumynskie otnosheniia, pp. 75-76. Gorchakov to Lobanov, private letter, January 26/February 7, 1859, Barbara Jelavich, Russia and the Rumanian National Cause, 1858-1859 (Bloomington, Ind.: Slavic and East European Series, 1959; reprinted. Hamden, Conn.: Archon, 1974), p. 65. Werther to the Prince Regent, no. 15, St. Petersburg, February 4/16, 1859, Christian Friese et al., eds., Die auswdrtige Politik Preussens, 1858i8yi (Oldenburg: Verlag Gerhard Stalling, 1933), I, 247-248. Gorchakov to Lobanov, private letter, February 9/21, 1859, B. Jelavich, Russia and the Rumanian National Cause, p. 66. Lobanov to Gorchakov, no. 471, Pera, February 28/March 12, 1859, B. Jelavich, Russia and the Rumanian National Cause, p. 69. The protocols of the meetings of March 26/April 7 and April 1/13 are in Great Britain, Foreign Office British and Foreign State Papers (London: Ridgeway, 1858-1859), XLIX, 454-457. Giers to Lobanov, no. 7, Bucharest, February 10/22, 1859, from the collection of the private papers of Nicholas Karlovich Giers. Cited hereafter as NKG. Giers to Gorchakov, no. 12, Bucharest, February 21/March 5, 1859, Russian Foreign Ministry documents on microfilm, Bucharest. Cited henceforth as RFM. Alecsandri to Cuza, Paris, February 13/25, 1859, R. V. Bossy, Agentia diplomaticd a Romdniei in Paris sub Cuza Vodd (Bucharest: Cartea Romanesca, 1931), pp. 164-165. Cuza to Alecsandri, Bucharest, April 13/25, 1859, Bossy, Agentia diplomaticd a Romdniei in Paris, pp. 165-167. B. Jelavich, Russia and the Rumanian National Cause, p. 71. Gorchakov declared very strongly to the Habsburg ambassador, Revertera, that Russia would never allow another power to hold the mouths of the Danube (Friedrich Count Revertera, "Erinnerungen eines Diplomaten in St. Petersburg, 1860-1868," Deutsche Revue 29, no. 2 [1904]: 30). Gorchakov to Lobanov, no. 338, June 4/16, 1859, B. Jelavich, "Russia, the Great Powers and the Recognition of the Double Election," pp. 17-18. Gorchakov to Giers, no. 267, May 2/14, 1859, B. Jelavich, Russia and the Rumanian National Cause, p. 75. Lobanov to Giers, private letter, Buyukdere, June 8/20, 1859, B. Jelavich, Russia and the Rumanian National Cause, p. 72. T. W. Riker, The Making of Roumania (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1931), p. 248. The protocol of the final conference is in British and Foreign State Papers, XLIX, 457-459. The diplomatic aspects of this period are discussed in Dan Berindei, "Lupta diplomatic^ a principatelor unite pentru desavisirea unirii, 24 Ianuarie 1859-24 Ianuarie 1862," in Studii privind unirea Principatelor, pp. 413-449; and B. Jelavich, "The Ottoman Empire, the Great Powers 308

Notes to pp. 109-124 19 20 21 22

23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44

and the Legislative and Administrative Union of the Principalities," Rumanian Studies 2 (1973): 48-83. Bobango, Emergence, p. 89. Giers to Gorchakov, no. 32, Bucharest, June 13/25, 1859, NKG. Giers to Gorchakov, no. 62, Bucharest, October 17/29, 1859, NKG. Cuza memoir to Negri, Archives diplomatiques (Paris: Librairie diplomatique d'Amyot, 1866), pt. 2, pp. 179-188. For Negri's reaction see Negri to Cuza, Constantinople, July 2/14, i860, Alexandru loan Cuza si Costache Negri: Corespondent a, ed. Emil Boldan (Bucharest: Minerva, 1980), pp. 129-131. Cited hereafter as Cuza si Negri: Corespondentd. Chertan, Russko-Rumynskie otnosheniia, pp. 110, 111. Cuza to Napoleon III, Jassy, October i860, Bossy, Agentia diplomaticd a Romdniei in Paris, pp. 198-199. Giers to Olga Giers, private letter, Bucharest, July 7/19, 1859, NKG. Popov report, no. 10, Jassy, March 31/April 12, 1861, RFM. Circular note to the ambassadors and ministers of the Porte at the courts of the guaranteeing powers, Constantinople, April 19/May 1, 1861, Archives diplomatiques (1866), pt. 2, pp. 188-190. Lobanov to Giers, private letter, Pera, February 13/25, 1861, NKG. Rechberg to Prokesch-Osten, March 5/17, 1861, R. V. Bossy, VAutriche et les Principautes-Unies (Bucharest: Imprimerie nationale, 1938), pp. 316-317. Lobanov to Giers, private letter, Pera, February 13/25, 1861, NKG. Lobanov to Giers, private letter, Pera, February 27/March 11, 1861, NKG. Thouvenal to the French representatives in London, Vienna, St. Petersburg, and Berlin, May 1/13, 1862, Archives diplomatiques (1866), pt. 2, pp. 191-192. Gorchakov to Oubril, Peterhof, July 12/24, 1861, B. Jelavich, "The Ottoman Empire . . . and the Union of the Principalities," pp. 70-73. Chertan, Russko-Rumynskie otnosheniia, p. 136; Negri to Cuza, Constantinople, July 31/August 11, 1861, Cuza si Negri: Corespondentd, pp. 244f. Note of the Porte communicated to the representatives of the powers, October 2, 1861, Archives diplomatiques (1861), pt. 4, pp. 285-286. Firman on the administrative and legislative organization of the Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia, December 2, 1861, Archives diplomatiques (1863), pt. 3, pp. 102-104. Ibid., pp. 104-108. Russell to the British consuls at Bucharest and Jassy, January 1/13, 1862, Bossy, L'Autriche et les Principautes-Unies, p. 333. Gorchakov to Lobanov, St. Petersburg, September 19/October 1, 1861, B. Jelavich, "The Ottoman Empire . . . and the Union of the Principalities," pp. 79-80. This section on internal conditions in the Principalities is based in part on material in Paul E. Michelson, "Conflict and Development in Romanian Politics, 1861-1871" (Ph.D. diss., Indiana University, 1975). Giers to Gorchakov, no. 4, Bucharest, February 9/21, 1862, RFM. Giers to Gorchakov, no. 49, Bucharest, November 2/14, 1862, RFM. Ibid. On the general question of revolutionary activities see Alexandru Marcu,

3°9

Notes to pp. 124—135

45 46 47 48

49

50 51 52 53

54 55 56

57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64

Conspiratori si conspiratii in epoca renasterii politice a Romdniei, 184818JJ (Bucharest: Cartea Romaneasca, 1930). Riker, Making of Roumania, p. 266. See Dan Berindei, "Mihail Kogalniceanu, Prim-Ministru al Moldovei, §i emigratia maghiara, 1860-1861," Studii si materiale de istorie modernd 2 (i960): 223-244. This episode is described in Riker, Making of Roumania, pp. 265-281. See Constantin C. Giurescu, "Tranzitul armelor sirbe§ti prin Romania sub Cuza-Voda, 1862," Romanoslavica 11 (1965): 33-65. See also R. V. Bossy, Agentia diplomaticd a Romdniei in Belgrad si legdturile politice romdno-sirbe sub Cuza-Vodd (Bucharest: Imprimeria nationala, 1934); and Riker, Making of Roumania, pp. 373-402. See V. la. Grosul, "Deiateli pol'skogo osvoboditel'nogo dvizheniia v Iugo-Vostochnoi Evrope, pervaia polovina 60-x godov XIX v," Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia na Balkanakh (Moscow: IzdateFstvo "Nauka," 1974), pp. 96-122; P. P. Panaitescu, "Unirea principatelor romine, Cuza Voda §i Polonii," Romanoslavica 5 (1962): 71-84. Cuza to Napoleon III, November 11, 1863, Bossy, Agentia diplomaticd a Romdniei in Paris, pp. 294-296. Napoleon III to Cuza, December 8/20, 1863, Bossy, Agentia diplomaticd a Romdniei in Paris, p. 309. Thun-Hohenstein to Rechberg, St. Petersburg, December 20/January 1, 1864, Bossy, L'Autriche et les Principautes-Unies, pp. 359-360. Gorchakov to Offenberg, January 9/21, 1864, Gerhard Hilke, "Russlands Haltung zur rumanischen Frage, 1864-1866," Wissenschaftliche Zeitschrift der Martin-Luther-Universitdt Halle-Wittenberg 14, no. 4 (1965): 196. Gorchakov to Knorring, February 18/March 1, 1864, Hilke, "Russlands Haltung," p. 197. Gorchakov to Novikov, March 9/21, 1864, Hilke, "Russlands Haltung," pp. 197-198. On the diplomatic aspects of the problem see Riker, Making of Roumania, pp. 342-372. See also Bobango, Emergence, pp. 142-157; C. C. Giurescu, "Suprafata mo§iilor manastire§ti secularizate la 1863," Studii: Revistd de Istorie 12, no. 2 (1959)- !49-i56; and a report of Prokesch of April 11/23, 1863, in Bossy, L'Autriche et les Principautes-Unies, pp. 351-353. An excellent collection of documents on the problem of the Dedicated Monasteries is contained in Archives diplomatiques (1864), pt. 2, pp. 163-339. See article 416 of the Moldavian regulation, British and Foreign State Papers, XXXII (1859), 784. Memorandum, Buyukdere, August 1/13, 1843, Archives diplomatiques (1864), pt. 2, pp. 256-259. Khaltchinskii to Titov, no. 31, Bucharest, March 22/April 3, 1851, RFM. See Nesselrode to Ozerov, May 23/June 4, 1852, Archives diplomatiques (1864), pt. 2, pp. 259-263. Basily to Popov, no. 91, May 1857, RFM. Ibid. See the protocols and reports of the European Commission, Acte si documente, VI, pt. 2, 399-672. Ibid., p. 637. 310

Notes to pp. 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79

80 81 82

135-141

Ibid., pp. 638-639. Riker, Making of Roumania, p. 357. See B. Jelavich, Russia and the Rumanian National Cause, pp. 106-108. Quoted in Giers to Popov, no. 38, Bucharest, May 30/June 11, 1859, NKG. Giers to Gorchakov, no. 40, Bucharest, July 11/23, 2^59» NKG. Extract from the protocol of the conference, Archives, diplomatiques (1864), pt. 2, p. 162. Balabin to Giers, private letter, Vienna, date illegible, 1859, NKG. Lobanov to Giers, private letter, Buyukdere, September 28/October 10, 1859, NKG. See the invitations, January 22/February 3, i860, Archives diplomatiques (1864), pt. 2, pp. 162-163. Letter of the patriarchs and the Greek community to Negri, March 10/22, 1860, and note of Kogalniceanu to the delegates from the Holy Places, June 23/July 5, i860, Archives diplomatiques (1864), pt. 2, pp. 164-165. Note of the guaranteeing powers to the Porte, June 22/July 4, i860, Archives diplomatiques (1864), pt. 2, p. 165. AH to Cuza, August 9/21, i860, Archives diplomatiques (1864), P*- 2, p. 166. Notes of the delegates to the representatives of the powers and the Romanian government, October 13/25, i860, Archives diplomatiques (1864), pt. 2, pp. 167-175. December 13/25, i860, Archives diplomatiques (1864), pt. 2, p. 176. Memorandum of the government of the United Principalities on the convents, Archives diplomatiques (1864), pt. 2, pp. 197-226; Negri to Cuza, Pera, June 15/27, and Constantinople, September 5/17, 1863, Cuza si Negri: Corespondent a, pp. 325-326, 347-350. Gorchakov to Brunnow, January 17/29, 1864, Hilke, "Russlands Haltung," pp. 196-197. Gorchakov to Knorring, January 18/30, 1864, Hilke, "Russlands Haltung," p. 197. The extremely difficult position of the Principalities is reflected in the many dispatches written in this period on the details of the negotiations with all of the powers. In defending the rights of the patriarchs, the British government was, of course, supporting a position similar to that of Russia. Negri's dispatches reflect his difficulty in convincing the other representatives of the justice of the Romanian arguments. In 1864 n e wrote: "The majority of the powers, while having no direct interest in the question, lean however much more toward Russia than toward us and that is very understandable" (Negri to Cuza, Constantinople, November 25/December 7, 1864, Cuza si Negri: Corespondentd, pp. 390-391). Negri considered the question of the monastery property "the most arduous affair that I have dealt with during six years" (Negri to Cuza, Constantinople, October 15/27, 1864, Cuza si Negri: Corespondentd, pp.

83 Gorchakov to Novikov, March 8/20, 1864, Hilke, "Russlands Haltung," P- !9784 Gorchakov to Novikov, March 26/April 7, 1864, Hilke, "Russlands Haltung," p. 198.

Notes to pp. 141-14J 85 The protocols of the conferences are in Archives diplomatiques (1864), pt. 4, pp. 421-42386 Gorchakov to Novikov, May 10/22, 1864, Hilke, "Russlands Haltung," P- *9987 Declaration to Ali by the heads of the Holy Places, Constantinople, September 10/22, 1864, Archives diplomatiques (1864), pt. 4, p. 424; note of the patriarchs to Ali, Phanar, March 16/28, 1865, ibid. (1865), pt. 3, pp. 1 53"15488 Alecsandri to Cuza, June 15, 1864, Paul Henry, L'Abdication du Prince Cuza et Vavenement de la dynastie de Hohenzollern au trone de Roumanie (Paris: Librairie Felix Alcan, 1930), pp. 116-125. 89 Cuza to Negri, Bucharest, June 15/27, 1863, Cuza si Negri: Corespondentd, pp. 506-521. 90 Gorchakov to Offenberg, October 19/31, 1863, Hilke, "Russlands Haltung," p. 196. 91 Prokesch to Rechberg, May 11/23, 1864, Bossy, L'Autriche et les Principautes-Unies, pp. 370-371. 92 Ali to Cuza, n.d., Archives diplomatiques (1866), pt. 2, pp. 228-229. 93 Grosul and Chertan, Rossiia, p. 134. 94 Gorchakov to Novikov, May 25/June 6, 1864, Hilke, "Russlands Haltung," p. 199. 95 In 1894 Ignatiev wrote a long memoir on the events of this time, which was published under the title "Zapiski grafa N. P. Ignatieva, 18641874," in various issues of Izvestiia ministerstva inostrannykh del in 1914 and 1915. This work will be cited hereafter as Ignatiev, "Memoir," with a reference to the issue appropriate for the note. Here, see 1 (1914): 104105.

96 Documents diplomatiques, 1864 (Paris: Imprimerie Imperiale, 1865), P-9497 Gorchakov to Knorring, June 26/July 8, 1864. Hilke, "Russlands Haltung," p. 200. 98 Gorchakov to Offenberg, August 18/30, 1864, Hilke, "Russlands Haltung," p. 201. 99 In February 1865 Offenberg wrote: "Providence seems to have really abandoned the Moldo-Wallachians, or it wishes to chastise them by moral and material trials. The excessive humidity of the past autumn, at least in part, made the harvest less and the fall of cereals on the markets of Europe has paralyzed the exports. The precipitate and blundering application of the dispositions of the agrarian law, by putting everything in doubt and by throwing the greatest confusion into the territorial delimitations, has had as a consequence that the autumn work has been completely neglected." Because of this situation, he continued, good spring weather was necessary. Instead, the season was worse than normal, with floods hurting the fields and with epidemics reducing the number of animals. This situation was having a bad effect on public credit, with interest running from 18 to 24 percent (Offenberg, private letter, Bucharest, February 19/March 3, 1865, in RFM). In March the consul reported the great damage done by floods (Offenberg dispatch, no. 9, Bucharest, March 16/ 28, 1865, RFM). 100 J. H. Tillos, the French agent in Bucharest, was particularly critical of 312

Notes to pp. 147-154

101 102 103 104

105

the prince. In January 1866 he wrote: "Prince Cuza . . . has the qualities neither of an organizer nor of an administrator and his incurable casualness never allows him to be concerned with details that are distasteful to him." The consul also commented on his "laziness" and his "intrigues" (Tillos to Edouard Drouyn de Lhuys, January 2 and 6, 1866, in Henry, VAbdication, pp. 146-153). On the background of these events see Gr. Chirifa, "Preludiile §i cauzele detronarii lui Cuza VodaV' Revista de Istorie 29, no. 3 (1976): 347-371. Offenberg to the Asiatic Department, Bucharest, December 25/January 6, 1865, RFM. Offenberg to Gorchakov, no. 3, January 29/February 10, 1865, RFM. See Ignatiev, "Memoir." Although Ignatiev did in fact feel strongly about the Holy Places issues, Negri found him "less stubborn (tenace)" than his predecessor (Negri to Cuza, Constantinople, September 2/14, 1864, Cuza si Negri: Corespondentd, p. 367). Gorchakov to Ignatiev, June 3/15, 1865, Hilke, "Russlands Haltung," p. 203.

106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117

Gorchakov to Ignatiev, June 7/19, 1865, Hilke, "Russlands Haltung," p. 203. Michelson, "Conflict and Development," p. 92. Fuad to Cuza, September 2, 1865, Archives diplomatiques (1866), pt. 2, pp. 266-267. Cuza to Fuad, October 29/November 10, 1865, Archives diplomatiques, (1866), pt. 2, pp. 272-277. Cuza to Napoleon III, October 1, 1865, Henry, L'Abdication, pp. 132-133. Riker, Making of Roumania, pp. 481-482. Gorchakov to Budberg, October 6/18, 1865, Hilke, "Russlands Haltung," p. 204. Offenberg to Gorchakov, no. 46, Bucharest, December 31/January 12, 1866, RFM. Gorchakov to Ignatiev, November 21/December 3, 1865, Hilke, "Russlands Haltung," p. 205. Ignatiev, private letter, Constantinople, February 15/27, 1866, RFM. Offenberg to Gorchakov, no. 6, Bucharest, February 13/25, 1866, RFM. Gorchakov to Ignatiev, secret letter, St. Petersburg, February 27/March 11, 1866, RFM. Chapter IV Prince Charles, 1866-1871

1 On the diplomatic background of the event see the chapter "England, Russia and the Roumanian Revolution of 1866" in W. E. Mosse, The Rise and Fall of the Crimean System, 1855-18JI (London: Macmillan, 1963), pp. 131-157; E. E. Chertan, "Velikie derzhavy i gosudarstvennyi perevorot 1866 g. v. Rumynii," in Voprosy istorii i istoriografii iugovostochnoi Evropy (Kishinev: Izdatel'stvo "Shtiintsa," 1977), pp. 17-65; T . W. Riker, The Making of Roumania (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1931), pp. 507-566; and Gr. Chirija, "Romania in 1866: Coordonate ale politicii interne §i internationale," Revista de Istorie 31, no. 12 (1978): 2197-2220.

2

Gorchakov to Brunnow, St. Petersburg, February 22/March 6, 1866, Ar-

3*3

Notes to pp. 154-161

3 4 5

6 7 8

chives diplomatiques (Paris: Librairie diplomatique d'Amyot, 1868), pt. 1, pp. 274-276; Mensdorff to Metternich, telegram, Vienna, February 12/ 24, 1866. Haus-, Hof-, und Staatsarchiv, Vienna (cited hereafter as HHS). Prokesch to Mensdorff, tel., February 14/26, 1866, HHS; Apponyi to Mensdorff, no. 16, London, February 15/27, 1866, HHS. V. la. Grosul and E. E. Chertan, Rossiia i formirovanie rumynskogo nezavisimogo gosudarstva (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "Nauka," 1969), pp. 146-147. Gorchakov to Offenberg, February 14/26, 1866, Gerhard Hilke, "Russlands Haltung zur rumanischen Frage, 1864-1866," Wissenschaftliche zeitschrift der Martin-Luther-Universitdt Halle-Wittenberg 14, no. 4 (1965): 206. See also Drouyn to La Tour d'Auvergne, no. 21, February 19/March 3, 1866, Paul Henry, L'Abdication du Prince Cuza et Vavenement de la dynastie de Hohenzollern au trone de Roumanie (Paris: Librairie Felix Alcan, 1930), pp. 210-211. Talleyrand to Drouyn de Lhuys, tel., February 15/27, 1866, Henry, L'Abdication, p. 199. Gorchakov to Ignatiev, very secret, February 14/26, 1866, Hilke, "Russlands Haltung," pp. 205-206. Gorchakov to Oubril, February 15/27, Hilke, "Russlands Haltung," p. 206.

9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20

21 22

Gorchakov to Stackelberg, February 23/March 7, 1866, Hilke, "Russlands Haltung," p. 209. Gorchakov to Ignatiev, February 21/March 5, 1866, Hilke, "Russlands Haltung," pp. 206-207. Gorchakov to Ignatiev, February 24/March 8, 1866, Hilke, "Russlands Haltung," pp. 207-208. Gorchakov to Offenberg, February 24/March 8, 1866, Hilke, 'Russlands Haltung," p. 208. Gorchakov to Budberg, St. Petersburg, February 23/March 7, 1866, Archives diplomatiques (1868), pt. 1, pp. 270-273. Ignatiev to Gorchakov, no. 38, Pera, February 22/March 6, 1866, in Russian Foreign Ministry documents on microfilm, Bucharest. Cited hereafter as RFM. Ignatiev to Gorchakov, very secret, Pera, March 30/April 11, 1866, RFM. Ingatiev to Gorchakov, no. 60, Pera, March 15/27, 1866, RFM. Ignatiev to Offenberg, no. 121, February 21 /March 5, 1866, RFM. Offenberg report, no. 9, Bucharest, March 5/17, 1866, RFM. Revertera to Mensdorff, no. 10D, St. Petersburg, March 15/27, 1866, HHS. Gorchakov to Budberg, St. Petersburg, February 23/March 7, 1866, Archives diplomatiques (1868), pt. 1, pp. 270-273. See also N. P. Ignatiev, "Zapiski grafa N. P. Ignatieva, 1864-1874," Izvestiia ministerstva inostrannykh del 1 (1914): 115 (cited hereafter as Ignatiev, "Memoir"); and Revertera to Mensdorff, no. 7D, St. Petersburg, February 24/March 8, 1866, Henry, L'Abdication, p. 228. Gorchakov to Budberg, St. Petersburg, February 23/March 7, 1866, Archives diplomatiques (1868), pt. 1, p. 272. Mensdorff to Metternich and Apponyi, no. 3, Vienna, February 17/March 1, 1866, HHS; Mensdorff to Metternich, no. 4, reserve, Vienna, February 17/March 1, 1866, HHS.

3*4

Notes to pp.

161-169

23 The protocols of the conference are to be found in Demetre A. Sturdza,

24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44

45 46 47 48

ed., Charles ler, Roi de Roumanie: Chronique-Actes-Documents (Bucharest: Charles Gobi, 1899), Vol. I. The first meeting is covered on pp. 12-15. Revertera to Mensdorff, no. 8, February 25/March 9, 1866, HHS. D. A. Sturdza, Charles ler, I, 22-32. Steege, Falcoianu, and Boerescu, confidential letter to Ghica, March 19/ 31, 1866, ibid., pp. 61-64. D. A. Sturdza, Charles ler, I, 57-61. Similar opinions were expressed by Gorchakov to Talleyrand (Talleyrand to Drouyn de Lhuys, no. 28, March 16/28, and no. 32, March 29/ April 10, 1866, Henry, L'Abdication, pp. 271-272, 296-297). D. A. Sturdza, Charles ler, I, 60. Ibid., I, pp. 64-73. Gorchakov to Budberg, March 18/30, 1866, Hilke, "Russlands Haltung," pp. 208-209. Revertera to Mensdorff, no. 11B, reserve, St. Petersburg, March 26/April 7, 1866, HHS. There is no satisfactory biography of Charles. For foreign policy consult Frederick Kellogg, "Rumanian Nationalism and European Diplomacy, 1866-1878" (Ph.D. diss., Indiana University, 1969). Boerescu, Steege report, very confidential, March 30, 1866, State Archives, Bucharest, Casa Regala, 16/1866. This important collection of documents on Charles's reign will be cited hereafter as CR. D. A. Sturdza, Charles ler, I, 64. Aus dem Leben Konig Karls von Rumdnien (Stuttgart: J. G. Cotta'schen Buchhandlung, 1894), I, 9. This work will be cited hereafter as Aus dem Leben. Ibid., p. 10. Ibid., pp. 11-14. Ibid., pp. 16-19. Ibid., p. 18. Ibid., p. ig. Ibid., p. 28. Ibid., pp. 36-37. This section is based on B. Jelavich, "Russia and Moldavian Separatism: The Demonstration of April, 1866," in Russland-Deutschland-Amerika: Festschrift filr Fritz T. Epstein, ed. Alexander Fischer, Giinter Moltmann, and Klaus Schwabe (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1978), pp. 73-87. See also Gh. Cristea, "Manifestari antidinastice in perioada venirii lui Carol I in Romania, aprilie-mai 1866," Revista de Istorie 20, no. 6 (1967): 1073-1091. Offenberg to Gorchakov, no. 17, Bucharest, April 4/16, 1866, RFM. D. A. Sturdza, Charles ler, I, 126-135. Gorchakov to Budberg, St. Petersburg, April 4/16, 1866, Archives diplomatiques (1868), pt. 1, pp. 277-280. Drouyn, in contrast, saw the affair as an intrigue between Prussia and Russia. The advantage had been gained by Russia, which would now dominate Romania. Drouyn swore to Metternich that he knew nothing of the matter (Metternich to Mensdorff, no. 27B, Paris, May 9/21, and

3*5

Notes to pp. 169-173

49 50

51 52 53 54 55 56 57

58 59 60

61 62 63 64

Metternich to Mensdorff, no. 28D, May 11/23, 1866, Henry, L'Abdication, pp. 385-386, 387-388; Metternich to Mensdorff, no. 28B, May 11/23, 1866, HHS). Mensdorff to Metternich, no. 3, reserve, Vienna, April 7/19, 1866, HHS. The Austrian government appears to have accepted the Prussian declaration at face value. On May 13/25 Mensdorff informed Count Aloys Karolyi, the Austrian ambassador in Berlin, of Werther's assurance that Prussia had nothing to do with Charles's actions (Mensdorff to Karolyi, Vienna, May 13/25, 1866, HHS). Revertera to Mensdorff, no. 17B, St. Petersburg, April 18/30, 1866, HHS. D. A. Sturdza, Charles ler, I, 140-143. Boerescu, Costaforu, and Steege reports, Paris, April 11/23 an( * April 20/May 2, 1866, CR 21/ 1866 and CR 27/1866. D. A. Sturdza, Charles ler, I, 270-274. Talleyrand to Drouyn, tel., May 12/24, 1866, Henry, VAbdication, p. 390. D. A. Sturdza, Charles ler, I, 279-288. Ignatiev described Russian policy as follows: "Under these conditions we believed it possible to bring about a change in our favor on the Lower Danube, in allowing the carrying out of the occupation that the Turks considered indispensable to bring back order and tranquility in the Principalities. Conforming myself to the orders of the imperial cabinet, I therefore applied myself - without compromising myself by an ostensible action, or binding our final decisions - to support the Ottoman government in the path that it had adopted on its own initiative." However, the Porte became more hesitant as the situation became more dangerous. The Ottoman Empire would not oppose France and Britain unless Russia offered serious support, which was lacking "at the decisive moment. The attitude that had been prescribed for me at Constantinople was in flagrant opposition to the declarations of our ambassador at Paris, who in the meeting of May 25 of the conference, declared himself very warmly against the project of the Porte, while supporting the point of view of the French government." Safvet, "who had been instructed to act in everything with our plenipotentiary, was embarrassed and the Porte began to doubt our sincerity" (Ignatiev, "Memoir," 1 [1914]: 112). Mosse, Rise and Fall of the Crimean System, p. 151. AH told Prokesch that Ignatiev was speaking strongly in favor of an occupation. Prokesch to Mensdorff, no. 32B, May 27/June 8, 1866, HHS. Prokesch to Mensdorff, no. 31AB, Constantinople, May 24/June 5, 1866, HHS. Gorchakov told Talleyrand that Russia never advised the Porte to take violent measures. Rather, the government had been informed that, if Ottoman interests demanded such action, Russia would not oppose it. The responsibility, the Russian minister believed, thus lay with the Porte (Talleyrand to Drouyn, no. 56, June 4/16, 1866, HHS; Henry, L3Abdication, pp. 423-424). Gorchakov to Budberg, St. Petersburg, May 31/June 12, 1866, Archives diplomatiques (1868), pt. 1, pp. 280-282. Mensdorff to Metternich, no. 3, Vienna, June 3/15, 1866, HHS. Metternich to Mensdorff, no. 34B, Paris, June 11/23, 1866, HHS. See Bismarck to Redern, tel., no. 27, Berlin, February 13/25, 1866, Christian Friese et al., eds., Die auswdrtige Politik Preussens, 1858-1871 (Ol-

Notes to pp. 173-179 65 66 67 68 69 70

71 72 73 74 75

76 77 78

79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87

denberg: Verlag Gerhard Stalling, 1933), VI, 602-603; and Oubril to Gorchakov, secret tel., Berlin, February 13/25, 1866, ibid., p. 605. Hans Lothar von Schweinitz, Denkwiirdigkeiten des Botschafters General von Schweinitz (Berlin: Reimar Hobbing, 1927), I, 218. Revertera to Mensdorff, no. 20C, St. Petersburg, May 11/23, l 8 6 6 » HHS. Talleyrand to Drouyn, no. 49, May 16/28, 1866, Henry, ^Abdication, PP- 394-395Bismarck to Redern, confidential, Berlin, May 18/30, 1866, Otto von Bismarck, Die gesammelten Werke (Berlin: Otto Stollberg Verlag, 1928), V, 516-18. Schweinitz, Denkwurdigkeiten, I, 220-221. See, for example, Talleyrand to Drouyn, no. 23, March 2/14. Revertera to Mensdorff, no. 19 A-C, St. Petersburg, May 4/16, and Revertera to Mensdorff, no. 19B, May 4/16, 1866, Henry, L'Abdication, pp. 241242, 377, and HHS. Talleyrand to Drouyn, no. 27, March 9/21, 1866, Henry, U Abdication, PP- 255~258Falcoianu, Boerescu, and Steege report, Paris, April 2/14, 1866, CR 17/ 1866. Costaforu and Steege report to Ghica, Paris, April 20/May 2, 1866, CR 27/1866. Boerescu and Costaforu wrote three reports, dated May 27/June 8, in St. Petersburg on their visits to Berlin and St. Petersburg (CR 37, 38, 39/ 1866). Karl von Eder, the Austrian consul general in Bucharest, later reported that Bismarck had advised the Romanian delegates on how they should act in St. Petersburg in order to win Russian favor. They should, he emphasized, come to know church dignitaries who could introduce them around; they should also visit churches diligently and behave in a very "godfearing and orthodox" manner (Eder to Mensdorff, no. 114, Bucharest, August 3/15, 1866, HHS). Aus dem Leben, I, 78. Balaceanu to Charles, Paris, July 27/28, 1866, CR 30/1866. Aus dem Leben, I, 90-94. Charles did not like being an Ottoman vassal. He told Eder of his aversion to acknowledging the suzerainty of the sultan: "This step had cost him a great effort; as a German prince, Christian and Catholic he had done it with reluctance" (Eder to Mensdorff, no. 84, Bucharest, May 16/28, 1866, HHS). Moustier to Drouyn, tel., June 4/16, 1866, Henry, L'Abdication, p. 423. Ignatiev, "Memoir," 1 (1914): 115-116. Aus dem Leben, I, 132-135. Filek to Mensdorff, no. 132, Bucharest, October 14/26, 1866, HHS. Ignatiev, "Memoir," 1 (1914): 116-117. Revertera to Beust, no. 32 A-C, St. Petersburg, November 7/19, 1866, HHS. Aus dem Leben, I, 160-161. Drouyn to Talleyrand, no. 24, March 19/31, 1866, Henry, L'Abdication, pp. 282-284. Gorchakov to Budberg, St. Petersburg, March 10/22, 1866, Archives diplomatiques (1868), pt. 1, pp. 276-277.

317

Notes to pp. 179-193 88 Gorchakov to Budberg, March 18/30, 1866, Hilke, "Russlands Haltung," pp. 208-209. 89 Talleyrand to Drouyn, no. 21, March 9/21, 1866, Henry, L'Abdication, 90

91

92 93 94 95 96 97

PP- 255-S58On general Russian policy in the Balkans see Dietrich Beyrau, Russische Orientpolitik und die Entstehung des deutschen Kaiserreiches, 18661870/71 (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1974). See also B. Jelavich, "Russland und die Einigung Deutschlands unter preussischer Fiihrung," Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht, September 1968: 521-538. See Gisela Hiinigen, Nikolaj Pavlovic Ignat'ev und die russische Balkanpolitik, 1875-1878 (Gottingen: Musterschmidt Verlag, 1968). On Panslavism see Michael Boro Petrovich, The Emergence of Russian Panslavism, 1856-1870 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1956). See Thomas A. Meininger, Ignatiev and the Establishment of the Bulgarian Exarchate, 1864—1872 (Madison: State Historical Society of Wisconsin, 1970). Ignatiev, "Memoir," 3 (1914): 108. Ibid., p. 111. For Russian policy on Crete see I. G. Senkevich, Rossiia i kriskoe vosstanie, 1866-1869 g. (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "Nauka," 1970). D. A. Sturdza, Charles ler, I, 406, 489-490. Ibid., p. 438. On Bulgarian affairs see also Traian Ionescu-Ni§cov, "Unele aspecte in mi§carea de eliberare nationala a bulgarilor in nordul Dunarii intre 1850-1870," in Relatii Romdno-Bulgare de-a lungul veacurilor (Bucharest: Editura Academiei Republicii Socialiste Romania, 1971), I, 369400.

98 99 100 101

102 103 104 105

106 107 108

109

D. A. Sturdza, Charles ler, I, 438-439. Aus dem Leben, I, 292-293. Beyrau, Russische Orientpolitik, pp. 119-124. See Z. R. Dittrich, "Bismarck und Rumanien: Die turbulenten Jahre 1866-1868," in Romanian History, 1848-1918, ed. A. P. van Goudoever (Groningen: Wolters-Noordhoff, 1979), pp. 19-45- See also Claus Bormann, "Bismarck und Siidosteuropa vom Krimkrieg bis zur Pontuskonferenz" (doctoral diss., Hamburg, 1967). Aus dem Leben, I, 306; D. A. Sturdza, Charles ler, I, 464-465. Aus dem Leben, I, 239-240. Ibid., pp. 209-210. Ibid., pp. 241-243. See also Nicolae Ciachir, "Donne'es concernant la mission diplomatique roumaine de 1868 en Russie," in Nouvelles etudes d'histoire (Bucharest: Academia Republicii Socialiste Romania, 1970), IV, 223-234. D. A. Sturdza, Charles ler, I, 410. Charles to Gorchakov, Bucharest, January 22/February 3, 1868, CR 32/ 1868; Aus dem Leben, I, 242-243. The reports of this visit are Cantacuzino to Charles, St. Petersburg, February 24/March 8, 1868, CR 40/1868; Melchisedek report, CR 41/1868; and Cantacuzino to Golescu, Bucharest, April 3/15, 1868, in the Romanian Foreign Ministry archives in Bucharest. Documents from this latter source will be cited as MAE (Ministerul Afacerilor Externe). D. A. Sturdza, Charles ler, I, 421. 318

Notes to pp. 193-198 n o Ibid., pp. 421-422. 111 For the negotiations on the consular convention see E. E. Chertan, "Iz istorii zakliucheniia Russko-Rumynskoi konsul'skoi konventsii 1869 g.," Izvestiia Moldavskogo filiala Akademii Nauk SSSR 80, no. 2 (1961): 39-55112 Offenberg to Gorchakov, no. 8, Bucharest, April 3/14, 1869, RFM. On the establishment of regular relations between Russia and the Principalities see the chapter "Petersburg" in Reprezentantele diplomatice ale Romaniei, 1859-191J (Bucharest: Editura Politica, 1967), I, 187-214. 113 Steege to Charles, St. Petersburg, May 25/June 6, 1869, CR 52/1869. 114 Offenberg approved of the visit, which, he noted, preoccupied Romanian public opinion. The opponents were silent, but the "enlightened" men saw it "as an indication of the return of the Principalities to the only political path that is in conformity with their traditions and their interests" (Offenberg to Westmann, no. 12, Bucharest, July 25/August 6, 1869, RFM). For the trip see Aus dem Leben, I, 369-378. 115 Offenberg to Gorchakov, no. 7, March 25/April 6, 1869, RFM. 116 Ignatiev to Gorchakov, no. 27, Constantinople, February 3/15, 1870, RFM. 117 Golescu to Strat, February 5/17, 1870, Nicolae Iorga, Correspondence diplomatique sous le roi Charles ler, 1866-1880 (Bucharest: Au Siege de l'lnstitut, 1938), p. 56. 118 For instance, Prokesch protested to Ignatiev concerning the text of the convention. He considered the document a recognition of the Romanian independence, and he feared that the encouragement given to Romanian desires would result one day in the monarchy's loss of Transylvania (Ignatiev to Gorchakov, no. 10, Pera, January 13/25, 1870, RFM). 119 On November 16/28, 1871, Offenberg wrote a strong dispatch on the need to conclude such conventions to protect Russian interests, since "Romanian autonomy" signified "for foreigners: confusion, arbitrariness, and anarchy. In introducing here the Code Napoleon and French procedure, the Moldo-Wallachian government has virtually abolished consular jurisdiction and all the exemptions that derive from the capitulations with the Porte" (Offenberg to Stremoukhov, Bucharest, November 16/28, 1871, RFM; see also Grosul and Chertan, Rossiia i formirovanie rumynskogo nezavisimogo gosudarstva, pp. 167-172). 120 Aus dem Leben, I, 324-325. 121 Ibid., II, 55-56. 122 Ibid., p. 64; Ignatiev, "Memoir," 1 (1915): 170. 123 Strat to Charles, Paris, January 29/February 10, 1869, Iorga, Correspondance diplomatique, pp. 36-38. 124 Strat to Ghica, no. 27, Paris, January 26, 1869, CR 27/1869. 125 For Habsburg policy toward Romania after 1866 see Beyrau, Russische Orientpolitik, pp. 114-126. 126 Strat to Charles, Diisseldorf, January 17, 1869, CR 23/1869. 127 Aus dem Leben, II, 96, 97. 128 The question of the minting of money is discussed in Victor Slavescu, Recunoasterea dreptului de a bate moneta: Actiunea diplomaticd a Romdniei in 1866-18jo (Bucharest: Fundatia Regele Carol I, 1941). 319

Notes

to pp.

198-206

129

Aus dem Leben, II, 69; Offenberg to Gorchakov, no. 5, Bucharest, March 2/14, 1870, RFM. 130 Grosul and Chertan, Rossiia i formirovanie rumynskogo nezavisimogo gosudarstva, pp. 167-168. 131 Beyrau, Russische Orientpolitik, p. 179. 132 Very confidential report of D. A. Sturdza, January 30/February 11, 1870, CR 26/1870. 133 Offenberg to Gorchakov, no. 7, Bucharest, March 26/April 7, 1870, RFM. 134 Offenberg to Gorchakov, no. 2, Bucharest, January 29/February 10, 1870, RFM. 135 Aus dem Leben, II, 97-101; D. A. Sturdza, Charles lev, I, 589-592. 136 D. A. Sturdza, Charles Ier, I, 593. Aus dem Leben, II, 101-102. 137 Aus dem Leben, II, 106. 138 Ibid., pp. 107-108. 139 Ibid. 140 For the diplomacy of this period see in particular W. E. Mosse, The European Powers and the German Question, 1848-1871, with Special Reference to England and Russia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1958), pp. 291-358. See also Beyrau, Russische Orientpolitik, pp. 184-224. 141 Mosse, European Powers and the German Question, pp. 342-343; Beyrau, Russische Orientpolitik, pp. 231-232. 142 Gorchakov to Brunnow, Tsarskoe Selo, October 19/31, 1870, D. A. Sturdza, Charles Ier, I, 610-613. 143 Gorchakov to Brunnow, Tsarskoe Selo, October 20/November 1, 1870, D. A. Sturdza, Charles Ier, I, 613-615. 144 For the reaction of the powers to the Russian denunciation see Barbara Jelavich, The Ottoman Empire, the Great Powers, and the Straits Question, 1870-1887 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973); and Serge Goriainow, Le Bosphore et les Dardanelles (Paris: Plon-Nourrit, 1910).

145

Beust to Chotek, Vienna, November 4/16, 1870, D. A. Sturdza, Charles Ier, I, 623. 146 Gorchakov to Venikov, Tsarskoe Selo, November 10/22, 1870, D. A. Sturdza, Charles Ier, I, 628-631. 147 Ibid., p. 630. 148 Elliot to Granville, Therapia, August 16/28, 1870, D. A. Sturdza, Charles Ier, I, 628. 149 Sturdza to Carp, very confidential, Therapia, August 16/28, 1870, MAE, 127, Politice 1870-1873. 150 Aus dem Leben, II, 123. 151 Callimachi Catargi to Strat, Bucharest, January 14/26, 1871, MAE. 152 Offenberg to Gorchakov, no. 19, Bucharest, July 4/16, and no. 20, July 11/23, 1870, RFM. 153 Offenberg to Gorchakov, no. 24, Bucharest, August 2/14, 1870, RFM. 154 Aus dem Leben, II, 115-117. Offenberg thought that the radicals were using the reports of French victories to provoke an antidynastic movement. He believed that the leaders "wrapped themselves" in the French flag so that they could attack the Prussian prince, whom they themselves had brought into the country (Offenberg to Gorchakov, no. 25, Bucharest, August 10/22, 1870, RFM).

320

Notes to pp. 206-218 155 Offenberg to Gorchakov, no. 31, Bucharest, October 19/31, 1870, RFM. 156 Aus dent Leben, II, 134. 157 D. A. Sturdza, Charles ler, I, 642-644. For further details on the abdication question see Barbara Jelavich, "The Abdication Crisis of 1870-71: The International Aspects," Revue roumaine d'histoire 21, no. 1 (1982): 89-99158 D. A. Sturdza, Charles ler, I, 646. 159 Ibid., pp. 646-648. 160 Musurus to Ali, confidential, London, January 15/27, 1871, B. Jelavich, The Ottoman Empire, the Great Powers, and the Straits Question, pp. 175-180. 161 Prokesch to Beust, no. 5 A-F, Constantinople, January 8/20, 1871, HHS XII/98. 162 William to Charles, Versailles, January 12/24, 1^71$ D. A. Sturdza, Charles ler, I, 656-657. 163 Balaceanu to Callimachi Catargi, personal letter, n.d., MAE. 164 Green to Granville, no. 88, confidential, Bucharest, October 4/16, 1870, Great Britain, Public Record Office, Political Despatches, 195/967. Cited hereafter as PRO. 165 Gladstone to Granville, Hawarden Castle, December 24/January 5, 1871, Agatha Ramm, ed. The Political Correspondence of Mr. Gladstone and Lord Granville, 1868-18j6 (London: Royal Historical Society, 1952), I, 205. 166 Granville to Elliot, FO 195/971, Foreign Office, January 11/23, ^ I , PRO. 167 Bloomfield to Granville, FO 7/788, no. 121, confidential, Vienna, March 4/16, 1871, PRO. 168 Alexander II to Charles, St. Petersburg, February 16/28, 1871, CR 14/ 1871; D. A. Sturdza, Charles ler, I, 667-668. 169 Ignatiev to Gorchakov, no. 209, secret, Buyukdere, September 9/21, 1870, RFM. 170 Offenberg to Gorchakov, no. 28, Bucharest, September 15/27, 1870, RFM. 171 Offenberg to Gorchakov, no. 35, Bucharest, November 29/December 11, 1870, RFM. 172 Offenberg to Gorchakov, no. 1, Bucharest, January 10/22, 1871, RFM. 173 Offenberg to Gorchakov, no. 3, Bucharest, January 30/February 11, 1871, RFM. 174 Offenberg to Gorchakov, no. 5, Bucharest, March 2/14, 1871, RFM. 175 Callimachi Catargi circular, January 30/February 11, 1871, MAE. 176 Callimachi Catargi to Balaceanu, February 6/18, 1871, MAE. 177 D. A. Sturdza, Charles ler, I, 661. 178 Ibid., pp. 669-670. 179 Ibid., p. 681. Chapter V Prince Charles, 1871-1878 1

Report of P. P. Carp, Berlin, May 2/14, 1871, Nicolae Iorga, Correspondance diplomatique sous le roi Charles ler, 1866-1880 (Bucharest: Au Siege l'lnstitut, 1938), pp. 83-84. 2 Aus dem Leben Konig Karls von Rumdnien (Stuttgart: J. G. Cotta'schen

Notes to pp. 218-221

3

4 5 6 7

Buchhandlung, 1894), II, 212-213. A major Russian concern, Ignatiev wrote, was that an Austrian company not take over the Strousberg concession. With Romania's commercial and industrial dependency on the monarchy and Austria's leading position on the Danube, control of the railroads would give clear predominance to the Habsburg government (Ignatiev, "Zapiski grafa N. P. Ignatiev, 1864-1874," Izvestiia ministerstva inostrannykh del 1 [1915]: 168-169; cited hereafter as Ignatiev, "Memoir"). Ghica dispatches, Constantinople, November 3/15, 6/18, and 7/19, 1872, Iorga, Correspondance diplomatique, pp. 97-99. Ignatiev commented that the changes the Porte sought would have to be approved by a conference. Should one take place, Russia could use the opportunity to ask for southern Bessarabia (Ignatiev, "Memoir," 1 [1915]: 170-172). Aus dem Leben, II, 298, 301. Ibid., p. 310. Ibid., p. 333. On the establishment of permanent agencies see Reprezentantele diplomatice ale Romaniei, 1859-191J, Vol. I (Bucharest: Editura Politica, 1967).

8 Aus dem Leben, II, 372. 9 Filipescu to Boerescu, no. 21, St. Petersburg, April 23/May 5, 1874, Romanian Foreign Ministry archives in Bucharest, 267, Corespondenta cu agentia din Petersburg, 1856-1879. Cited hereafter as MAE. 10 Filipescu to Boerescu, confidential letter, no. 15, St. Petersburg, April 16/28, 1874, MAE, 267; Kamil to Filipescu, particuliere, St. Petersburg, April 15/27, 1874, R. V. Bossy, Politica externd a Romaniei intre anii 1873-1880 privitd de la agentia diplomatics, din Roma (Bucharest: Cultura Nationals, 1928), p. 103; Silvian Costin, "Un episod din lupta diplomatica pentru independenta de stat a Romaniei," Romanoslavica 15 (1967): 237-243. 11 Filipescu to Boerescu, no. 14, confidential, St. Petersburg, April 15/27, 1874, MAE, 267. 12 Ibid. 13 Filipescu to Boerescu, no. 83, St. Petersburg, December 26/January 7, 1875, MAE, 267. At a meeting in Berlin Gorchakov gave Cretulescu similar advice to abide by the treaties (Aus dem Leben, II, 374; Cretulescu to Charles, April 23/May 5, 1874, State Archives, Bucharest, Casa Regala 4/1874 [cited hereafter as CR]). 14 For the negotiations with the Habsburg Empire see Frederick Kellogg, "Conventia comerciala din 1875, un pas catre independenta?" Studii Revistd de Istorie 25, no. 5 (1972): 989-1003; and Uta Bindreiter, Die diplomatischen und wirtschaftlichen Beziehungen zwischen OsterreichUngarn und Rumdnien in den Jahren 1875-1888 (Vienna: Hermann Bohlaus Nachf., 1976), pp. 42-100. 15 This section is based on B. Jelavich, "Russia and the Rumanian Commercial Convention of 1876," Rumanian Studies 3 (1976): 39-60. Only the political aspects of the negotiations are discussed here. For the economic issues see in particular E. E. Chertan, "Russko-Rumynskaia torgovaia konventsiia, 1876 g.," in Vekovaia druzhba (Kishinev: "Shtiintsa," 1961), pp. 436-463. See also Cornelius G. Antonescu, Die rumdnische 322

Notes to pp. 221-224

16 17

18 19 20 21 22 23

Handelspolitik von 1875-ipio (Leipzig: W. Schunke, 1915); and Georges D. Cioriceanu, La Roumanie economique et ses rapports avec Vetranger de i860 a 1 pi5 (Paris: M. Giard, 1928). Aus dem Leben, II, 384-385. See Derby to Buchanan, Foreign Office, June 24/July 6, 1874, and Derby to Elliot, Foreign Office, July 10/22, 1874, Great Britain, Foreign Office, Accounts and Papers, Vol. LXXXIII, Turkey, no. 4 (1875), Correspondence respecting the Question of the Negotiation of Commercial Conventions by the Principalities, 1875 (C-1242), pp. 1-3 (cited hereafter as Accounts and Papers [C-1242]). Elliot to Derby, Therapia, October 11/23, ^74, Accounts and Papers (C1242), pp. 13-14. See also Derby to Elliot, Foreign Office, October 19/31, 1874, Accounts and Papers (C-1242), pp. 11-12. Donald C. Blaisdell, European Financial Control in the Ottoman Empire (New York: Columbia University Press, 1929), pp. 80-84. The convention of August 1858 is printed in Archives diplomatiques Amyot (Paris: Librairie Diplomatique d'Arnyot, 1866), pt. 2, pp. 102-111. Quoted from Accounts and Papers (C-1242), p. 21. The firman of investiture is to be found in Archives diplomatiques (1867), pt. 1, pp. 270-272. Elliot to Derby, Therapia, October 29/September 10, 1874, including a Memorandum by Prince Ghica on the Romanian Customs Law, Accounts and Papers (C-1242), pp. 5-10. Boerescu to Esarcu, Rome, July 12/24, 1874, Bossy, Politica externa, pp. 103-106.

24 Boerescu to Esarcu, October 18/30, 1874, Bossy, Politica externa, pp. 106-109.

25 Boerescu to Esarcu, Rome, July 12/24, x^74» Bossy, Politica externa, pp. 103-106.

26 Charles wrote to his father, Prince Karl Anton, on November 15/27, 1875: "As long as the suzerainty was an empty form, which was limited to the payment of a tribute or to difficulties in affairs relating to treaties, coinage or decorations, our complaints could be rejected by Europe; however, if our dependent relationship to the Porte holds up our economic development, our financial reforms, hurts our credit, then we could with justice demand that a sharp political line of demarcation be drawn between an empire that is incapable of any reform, and a young, flourishing state, which has in the last years given Europe real guarantees" (Aus dem Leben, II, 477). 27 Derby to Elliot, Foreign Office, November 8/20, 1874, Accounts and Papers (C-1242), pp. 20-22. See also Elliot to Derby, Therapia, September 3/15, 1874, Accounts and Papers (C-1242), pp. 10-11. 28 Derby to Elliot, Foreign Office, October 2/14, 1874, Accounts and Papers (C-1242), p. 11.

29 Derby to Russell, Foreign Office, September 28/October 10, 1874, Derby to Russell, November 1/13, 1874, Accounts and Papers (C-1242), pp. 30 Arifi Pasha to Musurus Pasha, Constantinople, October 11/23, 1^74» c o m " municated to Derby on October 26/November 7, Accounts and Papers (C-1242), pp. 14-17.

3*3

Notes to pp.

224-230

31 Derby to Elliot, Foreign Office, December 5, 1874, Accounts and Papers (C-1242), pp. 24, 25. 32 Derby to Elliot, Foreign Office, January 8/20, 1875, Accounts and Papers (C-1242), p. 26. 33 Aus dem Leben, II, 441. 34 Ibid., pp. 441-442. 35 Ibid., p. 446. 36 Zinoviev to Jomini, no. 19, Bucharest, July 7/19, 1875, Russian Foreign Ministry documents on microfilm, Bucharest. Cited hereafter as RFM. 37 Chertan, "Russko-Rumynskaia torgovaia konventsiia," p. 452; Zinoviev to Jomini, no. 14, Bucharest, June 2/14, 1875, RFM. 38 Zinoviev to Jomini, no. 25, Bucharest, August 9/21, 1875, RFM. 39 Chertan, "Russko-Rumynskaia torgovaia konventsiia," pp. 452-454. 40 Zinoviev to Jomini, Bucharest, September 7/19, 1875, RFM. 41 Aus dem Leben, III, 11. See also Zinoviev to Giers, Bucharest, February 20/March 4, 1874, B. Jelavich, "Russia and the Rumanian Commercial Convention," pp. 53-55. 42 Aus dem Leben, III, 11; Zinoviev to Gorchakov, no. 8, Bucharest, March 7/19, 1876, RFM. 43 Chertan, "Russko-Rumynskaia torgovaia konventsiia," pp. 457-458. 44 Ibid., p. 462. The convention is printed in Great Britain, Foreign Office, British and Foreign State Papers, 1875-1876 (London: Ridgeway, 1883), LXVII, 698-704, and in Documente privind istoria Rominiei: Rdzboiul pentru independentd (Bucharest: Editura Academiei Republicii Populare Romine, 1954), I, pt. 1a, 304-312. 45 Russian and Romanian policy during the years 1875 to 1878 is covered in Nicolae Ciachir, Rdzboiul pentru independenta Romdniei in contextul European, 1875-1878 (Bucharest: Editura Stiintifica §i Enciclopedica, 1977); N. Corivan, Lupta diplomaticd pentru cucerirea independentei Romdniei (Bucharest: Editura Stiintifica §i Enciclopedica, 1977); M. M. Zalyshkin, Vneshniaia politika Rumynii i rumyno-russkie otnosheniia, 1875-1878 (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "Nauka," 1974); and Diplomatia romdna in slujba independentei (Bucharest: Editura Politica, 1977). Revolutionary action is analyzed in V. la. Grosul, Revoliutsionnaia Rossiia i Balkany, 1874-1883 (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "Nauka," 1980). 46 See Nicolae Ciachir, "Rumyniia i vostochnyi vopros, 1875-1878," Revue roumaine d'etudes internationales 2, no. 8 (1970): 69-95, an< ^ "La Position de la Roumanie a Te'gard des soulevements de Bosnie et de Herze"govine durant la periode 1875-1878," Posebna izdanja 30 (1977): 363366. 47 Cantacuzino to Boerescu, August 30/September 11, 1875, Bossy, Politica externd,pp. 119-123. 48 See M. M. Zalyshkin, "Politika neitraliteta praviashchikh krugov Rumynii v 1875-1876 gg.," Vestnik Moskovskogo Universiteta, no. 3 (1957): 27-78. 49 Aus dem Leben, II, 480. 50 Ibid., II, 483, III, 6. 51 Catargiu instructions for the Romanian agents, January 4/16, 1876, Iorga, Correspondance diplomatique, pp. 160-161. 52 Aus dem Leben, III, 7. 324

Notes to pp. 230-237 53 Costaforu report, Vienna, January 23, 1876, Iorga, Correspondance diplomatique, pp. 163-166. After Costaforu read the circular to him, Novikov reported to his government that the document was a curious indication of the desires and hopes of the Romanians, who no doubt hoped to profit from the situation (Novikov to Gorchakov, no. 25, Vienna, January 30/February 11, 1876, RFM). 54 Balaceanu to Esarcu, March 19/31, 1876, Bossy, Politica externd, pp. 133134; Iorga, Correspondance diplomatique, pp. 168-169. 55 Ghica to Cornea, tel., St. Petersburg, April 18/30, 1876, Iorga, Correspondance diplomatique, p. 171. 56 Aus dem Leben, III, 16. 57 Ibid., pp. 13-15. 58 Cornea circular, April 9/21, 1876, Bossy, Politica externd, p. 137. 59 On European diplomacy in this period, see especially B. H. Sumner, Russia and the Balkans, i8yo-i88o (Oxford: Oxford University Press [Clarendon Press], 1937). 60 For Habsburg policy see B. Jelavich, "Austria-Hungary, Rumania and the Eastern Crisis, 1876-1878," Siidost-Forschungen 30 (1971): 111-141. 61 On the Russian determination to retake the three districts of southern Bessarabia and the effect of this decision on general diplomacy see B. Jelavich, "Russia and the Reacquisition of Southern Bessarabia, 1875-1878," Siidost-Forschungen 28 (1969): 199-237. 62 Aus dem Leben, III, 27; Kogalniceanu circular, April 30/May 12, 1876, Iorga, Correspondance diplomatique, p. 172 (also printed in George Macovescu et al., eds., Mihail Kogalniceanu: Documente diplomatice [Bucharest: Editura Politica, 1972], pp. 164-165). 63 Ghica to Kogalniceanu, St. Petersburg, May 12/24, 1876, Iorga, pp. 173174. 64 Constantin N. Velichi, "Rascoala antiotomana bulgara din aprilie 1876," Revista de Istorie 29, no. 3 (1976): 373-394; B. Jelavich, "Russia and the April Uprising," Southeastern Europe 4, no. 2 (1977): 217-232; Aus dem Leben, III, 27, 34, 38-40. 65 Aus dem Leben, III, 42-43. The memorandum is printed in Macovescu, Kogalniceanu: Documente diplomatice, pp. 106-113. 66 V. la. Grosul and E. E. Chertan, Rossiia i formirovanie rumynskogo nezavisimogo gosudarstva (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "Nauka," 1969), p. 190. 67 Ibid.; Ghica report, July 18/30, 1876, Iorga, Correspondance diplomatique, pp. 204-205. 68 Aus dem Leben, II, 457-458. 69 Ibid., pp. 408-409. 70 Ibid., Ill, 15. 71 Ibid., pp. 20-22. 72 Sturdza report, Belgrade, June 14/26, 1876, Iorga, Correspondance diplomatique,-pip. 178-179. 73 Kogalniceanu to Sturdza, June 16/28, 1876, Iorga, Correspondance diplomatique, pp. 179-180. 74 Aus dem Leben, III, 44. 75 Kogalniceanu to Costaforu, June 28/July 10, Kogalniceanu to Sturdza, June 28/July 10, instructions to the Mehedinti prefect, Iorga, Correspondance diplomatique, pp. 187, 188, 202. See also Kogalniceanu cir325

Notes to pp. 237-245 76

77 78 79 80 81 82

83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91

92 93 94

95 96

cular dispatch, Bucharest, July 15/27, 1876, in Macovescu, Kogdlniceanu: Documente diplomatice, p. 132. The Serbian complaint that the Romanians living in Serbia did not fight well was denied by Sturdza, who commented that the Serbian government was just "harvesting what it had sowed." The Romanians in Serbia were not justly treated; they could have only Slavic priests who were forbidden to use the Romanian language (report of Sturdza, Belgrade, July 6/18, 1876, Iorga, Correspondance diplomatique, pp. 193-195). Ghica report, St. Petersburg, July 8/20, 1876, Iorga, Correspondance diplomatique, p. 196. Kogalniceanu circular, July 19/31, 1876, CR 19/1876. Ghica report, tel., Constantinople, July 24/August 5, 1876, Iorga, Correspondance diplomatique, pp. 209-210. Ghica report, St. Petersburg, August 10/22, 1876, Iorga, Correspondance diplomatique, pp. 216-217. Aus dem Leben, III, 60. Cantacuzino report, October 1876, Iorga, Correspondance diplomatique, pp. 225-226. Gorchakov wanted the Romanian government to "close its eyes to the passage of Russian aid" and to make certain that its neutrality did not seem more sympathetic to the Porte than to the Christians (ibid.). Zinoviev to Alexander II, no. 21, June 15/27, 1876, RFM. Zinoviev to Alexander II, no. 2, Bucharest, June 9/21, 1876, RFM. Stuart to Gorchakov, no. 27, Bucharest, July 28/August 9, 1876, RFM. Zinoviev to Gorchakov, no. 1, Bucharest, January 19/31, 1876, RFM. Stuart to Gorchakov, no. 30, Bucharest, September 22/October 4, 1876, RFM. Stuart to Gorchakov, no. 31, Bucharest, October 11/23, l876> RFM. Stuart to Gorchakov, no. 34, Bucharest, November 19/December 1, 1876, RFM. For the negotiations in the Crimea see Zalyshkin, Vneshniaia politika Rumynii, pp. 127-139. Jomini to Giers [1876], Charles Jelavich and Barbara Jelavich, eds., Russia in the East, I8J6-I88O: The Russo-Turkish War and the Kuldja Crisis as Seen through the Letters of A. G. Jomini to N. K. Giers (Leiden: Brill, *959)> P- 3°D. A. Miliutin, Dnevnik (Moscow: Biblioteka SSSR imeni V. I. Lenina, !949)> n , 92. Aus dem Leben, III, 62-63. An account of the meeting at Livadia is to be found in the memorandum "Notes on the Participation of Romania in the War," written by Dimitrie Sturdza. It is located in the State Archives, Bucharest, in the Bratianu papers, dosar nr. 162/1877 and 164/1877-78, and is printed in the appendix to B. Jelavich, "Russia and the Reacquisition of Southern Bessarabia," pp. 233-237. The Bratianu collection in the State Archives will be cited hereafter as Bratianu papers. From the Balaceanu memoir "Souvenirs politiques et diplomatiques, 1848-1903." This unpublished manuscript is to be found in the library of the Romanian Academy of Sciences in Bucharest. Report of Ghica, London, November 15/27, 1876, Iorga, Correspondance diplomatique, pp. 229-230. 326

Notes to pp. 246-257 97 The most complete account of these negotiations by a participant is given in A. I. Nelidov, "Souvenirs d'avant et d'apres la guerre de 1877-1878," Revue des deux mondes 28 (July 1915): 244-255. See also Aus dem Leben, III, 76-87; and Miliutin, Dnevnik, II, 113. 98 Balaceanu, "Souvenirs," p. 127. 99 Miliutin, Dnevnik, II, 114-115; Aus dem Leben, II, 85; Stuart to Gorchakov, tel., secret, St. Petersburg, December 16/28, 1876, Osvobozhdenie Bolgarii ot Turetskogo Iga, 3 vols. (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Akademii Nauk SSSR, 1961-1967), I, 567. Cited hereafter as OBTI. 100 Aus dem Leben, III, 76-77; V. Maciu, "Romania §i conferinta de la Constantinopol din decembrie 1876-ianuarie 1877," Analele Universita\ii Bucuresti: Istorie, no. 11 (1962): 165-184. 101 Aus dem Leben, III, 91. 102 Ibid., pp. 92-93. 103 Grand Duke Nicholas to Charles, January 12/24, 1877, CR 16/1877. 104 Charles to Grand Duke Nicholas, January 24/February 5, 1877, CR 16/ 1877. 105 Andrassy to Bosizio, Pol. Archiv, XXXVIII, tel., Budapest, December 5/ 17, 1876, Haus-, Hof-, und Staatsarchiv, Vienna. Cited hereafter as HHS. 106 Ibid. 107 Andrassy to Bosizio, Vienna, February 9/21, 1877, HHS; also Balaceanu report, Vienna, February 7/19, Iorga, Correspondance diplomatique, p. 238. 108 The difficult choices before the Romanian government are discussed in B. Jelavich, "Diplomatic Problems of an Autonomous State: Romanian Decisions on War and Independence, 1877," Southeastern Europe 5, no. 1 (1978): 26-35. 109 Aus dem Leben, III, 80, 116; Miliutin, Dnevnik, II, 114-116. 110 The secret conventions are printed in Sumner, Russia and the Balkans, pp. 596-601. 111 OBTI, I, 629. 112 Aus dem Leben, III, 112-115. 113 Miliutin, Dnevnik, II, 153. 114 De"metre A. Sturdza, ed., Charles ler, Roi de Roumanie: Chronique-ActesDocuments (Bucharest: Charles Gobi, 1899), II, 531, 545. 115 Aus dem Leben, III, 116. 116 Cimpineanu circular, April 1/13, 1877, Iorga, Correspondance diplomatique, pp. 243-244. 117 Ibid., pp. 244-248. 118 In his memoirs Nelidov expressed his disapproval of the action: "I did my utmost to spare my country that humiliation" ("Souvenirs," Revue des deux mondes 28 (July 1915): 253, 254). 119 D. A. Sturdza, Charles ler, II, 550-551; Stuart to Gorchakov, tel., April 4/16, 1877, OBTI, I, 636. 120 Kogalniceanu to Ghica, cipher tel., Bucharest, April 11/23, 1&77> i n General R. Rosetti, ed., Corespondenta Generalului Iancu Ghica, 2 aprilie i8yy-8 aprilie 18j8 (Bucharest: Cartea Romanesca, 1930), pp. 34-35. This valuable collection, which contains the diplomatic correspondence of the Romanian agent in St. Petersburg, is hereafter cited as Corespondenta . . . Ghica. 327

Notes to pp. 257-260 121 Miliutin, Dnevnik, II, 155-156. 122 Aus dem Leben, III, 130. Kogalniceanu telegraphed Ghica: "The entrance of the Russian army before the legislative bodies have decided and without being warned 24 hours beforehand strikes us with amazement. The proclamation of the grand duke is in patent contradiction to that convention. It neither takes into account our right nor does it safeguard the dignity of the country and the prince, [by] asking the country for permission for the passage of troops and considering [it] as a sovereign friend" (Kogalniceanu to Ghica, Bucharest, April 12/24, 1877, Corespondenta . . . Ghica. pp. 37-38). 123 Aus dem Leben, III, 132. 124 Kogalniceanu circular, April 12/24, 1^>11> Vasile M. Kogalniceanu, ed., Acte si documente din corespondenta diplomaticd a lui Mihail Kogalniceanu relative la resboiul independentei Romdniei, 1877-1878, 2 vols. (Bucharest: Tipografia Basilescu, 1893). Hereafter cited as Kogalniceanu, Corespondenta, with the date for the document noted. Here the reference is to pp. 44-45 of the volume for 1877. 125 Bratianu's strong defense of an agreement with Russia was to cause him embarrassment later. In the senate on March 15/27, in answer to a direct question, he denied that the return of Bessarabia was in question (Nicolae Iorga, Histoire des Roumains et de la romanite orientale [Bucharest: Academie roumaine, 1945], X, 207). 126 Kogalniceanu circular, April 17/29, 1877, Kogalniceanu, Corespondenta 1877, pp. 70-71. 127 Edhem Pasha to Charles, Constantinople, April 13/25, 1877, Kogalniceanu, Corespondenta 1877, p. 41. 128 Kogalniceanu circular, April 10/22, 1877, Kogalniceanu, Corespondenta 1877, pp. 39-41. 129 Alexander II to Charles, Kishinev, April 13/25, 1877, CR 16/1877. 130 Grand Duke Nicholas to Charles, Kishinev, April 14/26, 1877, CR 16/ 1877. Charles replied that he appreciated the strategic necessity of the Russian action and that he also would like to remain in correspondence (Charles to Nicholas, Bucharest, April 17/29, 1877, OBTI, II, 30-31). 131 See Gr. Chirita, "Atitudinea puterilor europene fata de proclamarea independentei Romaniei," Revista de Istorie 30, no. 4 (1977): 673-690. 132 On the Austrian attitude see B. Jelavich, "Austria-Hungary, Rumania and the Eastern Crisis," pp. 121-122. Franz Joseph commented on the act that it was "curious to see the Romanians choose the moment when their country is occupied by foreign troops to declare themselves independent" (Novikov to Gorchakov, no. 65, Vienna, May 4/16, 1877, RFM). Andrassy told Novikov that he was not against Romanian independence but that "this question, like so many others, should be reserved for the time when a European conference will have to decide the final fate of the Balkan peninsula" (Novikov to Gorchakov, no. 72, Vienna, May 22/June 3, 1877, RFM). 133 Aus dem Leben, III, 179. 134 Ibid., p. 141. 135 Kogalniceanu wrote to Ghica: "Our negotiations consist before all, as the beginning and the end, to obtain at least five millions without which we cannot move. These millions should not be delayed a single day" 328

Notes to pp. 260-262

136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143

144 145 146 147

148 149 150 151 152

153 154

(Kogalniceanu to Ghica, Bucharest, April 10/22, 1877, Corespondenta . . . Ghica, p. 33). Ghica to Kogalniceanu, very urgent, Kishinev, April 11/23, 1877, Kogalniceanu, Corespondenta 187 j , p. 36. Aus dem Leben, III, 142. Alexander II wrote comments on Nelidov's report of the meeting. On the question of money he noted: "That is too much! (C'est trop fort!)" (Nelidov to Gorchakov, secret, Ploe§ti, May 7/19, 1877, OBTI, II, 67). The tsar's comments here were: "She [Austria] does not dream of attacking them" {OBTI, II, 67). OBTI, II, 67. Ghica to Kogalniceanu, St. Petersburg, May 7/19, 1877, CR 7/1877. Ghica to Kogalniceanu, St. Petersburg, May 9/21, 1877, Corespondenta . . . Ghica, pp. 74-75. Gorchakov to Charles, Aus dem Leben, III, 167-169. Nelidov wrote to Ignatiev that the Romanians were requesting participation in the fighting and money, arms, and assurances for the future. He found them very difficult to please and thought that Russian relations with the Bulgars should be considered first (Nelidov to Ignatiev, Ploe§ti, May 15/27, 1877, N. P. Ignatiev, "Zapiski," Istoricheski Vestnik 137 [1914]: 65-66). Aus dem Leben, III, 172-173. Ibid., pp. 178-179. Kogalniceanu explained his past policy in a secret meeting of the Romanian parliament on January 23/February 4, 1878 (Bratianu papers, P- 25)Ignatiev favored Romanian participation because it would let Russia take southern Bessarabia with greater ease. He told Gorchakov: "The Turks . . . probably will defeat our allies or place them in a critical position; then we will come to their assistance, save their army and we can demand in compensation that the part of Bessarabia which is inhabited primarily by Russians and Bulgars be added to Russia. Otherwise, that is, without this direct assistance, rendered by us to Romania, it would be awkward to seize territory from our allies at the end of the war and it would make it very difficult to satisfy them territorially without damage to our interests." Gorchakov considered this plan "Machiavellian" (Ignatiev, "Zapiski," pp. 70-71). Nicholas to Charles, Zimnicea, June 18/30, 1877, CR 16/1877. Charles to Nicholas, Bucharest, June 20/July 2, 1877, CR 16/1877. Charles to Kogalniceanu, Poiana, July 7/19, 1877, CR 16/1877. Kogalniceanu was indignant at the Russian request (Kogalniceanu to Charles, Bucharest, July 7/19, 1877, CR 16/1877). Aus dem Leben, III, 204. The Russian opinion of the value of the Balkan allies was given by A. F. Hamburger, an assistant to Gorchakov. "In my humble opinion all these miserable allies have cost us much money and one has already had sufficient proofs of what they can provide . . . What services has Romania rendered us until now?" (Hamburger to Giers, Bielo, July 28/August 9, 1877, C. Jelavich and B. Jelavich, Russia in the East, p. 164). Ghica to Charles, July 11/23, 1877, CR 7/1877; Aus dem Leben, III, 205. Kogalniceanu to Charles, July 13/25 (or 12/24), C R 7/1877. 3*9

Notes to pp. 263-268 155 156 157 158 159 160 161 162 163 164 165 166 167 168

169 170 171 172 173 174 175 176 177 178 179 180 181 182 183

184

Charles to Kogalniceanu, Poiana, July 13/25, CR 7/1877 (two letters). Nicholas to Charles, Trnovo, July 30/August 11, 1877, CR 16/1877. Aus dem Leben, III, 212-213. Bratianu to Charles, Turnu Magurele, July 28/August 9, 1877, CR 7/ 1877, Aus dem Leben, III, 222. Charles to Bratianu, Simnic, August 9, 1877, Bratianu papers, 22. Charles to Nicholas, Poiana, July 22/August 3, 1877, CR 16/1877. Slaniceanu to Charles, Corabia, July 28/August 9, CR 16/1877. Nicholas to Charles, Bulgareni, July 27/August 8; Nicholas to Charles, very confidential, Gorni Studen, August 3/15, 1877, CR 16/1877. Nicholas to Charles, Gorni Studen, August 6/18, CR 16/1877. Nicholas to Charles, Gorni Studen, August 9/21, CR 16/1877. Charles to Nicholas, Simnic, August 10/22, CR 16/1877. Charles to Nicholas, Simnic, August 13/25, CR 16/1877. Aus dem Leben, III, 237-238. Kogalniceanu to Balaceanu, August 25/September 6, 1877, Iorga, Conespondance diplomatique, pp. 292-293. Charles was not keeping his ministers informed of his actions. Kogalniceanu requested that he do so, commenting, "Public opinion in Bucharest is very apprehensive and very agitated"; this feeling was increased "by the ignorance in which even the ministers find themselves" (Kogalniceanu to Charles, August 25/September 6, 1877, CR 16/1877). For example, see Boerescu to Charles, Bucharest, July 5/17, 1874, and Boerescu to Charles, July 11/23, l874> CR 13/1874. Aus dem Leben, III, 158. Ibid., pp. 276, 355-356. Ibid., pp. 173-174, 323, 358-359; see also Ghica to his wife, Poradim, November 14/26, 1877, Corespondenta . . . Ghica, pp. 113-115. Aus dem Leben, III, 337, 469. For the conversations held at this time, see Miliutin, Dnevnik, II, 238239; and Aus dem Leben, III, 337. Aus dem Leben, III, 354, 469-470. Charles, it appears, never spoke to the tsar about Bessarabia. For Bratianu's discussions at this time see the appendix to B. Jelavich, "Russia and the Reacquisition of Southern Bessarabia," pp. 236-237. Aus dem Leben, III, 379-380. Charles to Nicholas, Bucharest, December 29, 1877/January 10, 1878, CR 16/1877. Aus dem Leben, III, 446-447. Nicholas to Charles, Kazanlik, January 10/22, 1878, CR 16/1877. Aus dem Leben, III, 436-438. Kogalniceanu to Stuart, Bucharest, January 11/23, 1878, Kogalniceanu, Corespondenta 1878, pp. 19-21. Miliutin commented in his diary on January 14/26: "Finally Prince Gorchakov has recognized the necessity of categorical declarations to the Romanians. Too bad that it is rather late" {Dnevnik, II, 14). See also Aus dem Leben, III, 450-453. Ghica to Kogalniceanu, St. Petersburg, January 14/26, 1878, Corespondenta . . . Ghica, p. 128.

Notes to pp. 268-2J3 185 Ghica to Kogalniceanu, St. Petersburg, January 14/26, 1878, Corespondenta . . . Ghica, p. 128. 186 Ghica to Kogalniceanu, St. Petersburg, March 1/13, 1878, Corespondenta . . . Ghica, p. 161. 187 Alexander II to Charles, St. Petersburg, n.d., CR 16/1877; Aus dem Leben, III, 457. 188 Aus dem Leben, III, 456. 189 Ibid., p. 458. 190 Charles to Alexander II, n.d., CR 16/1877. 191 Kogalniceanu to Ghica, Bucharest, January 14/26, 1878, Corespondenta . . . Ghica, p. 129; see also Kogalniceanu to Ghica, Bucharest, January 15/27, 1878, Kogalniceanu, Corespondenta 1878, pp. 23-24. 192 Kogalniceanu to Ghica, Bucharest, January 18/30, 1870, Corespondenta . . . Ghica, pp. 133-134. 193 Nicholas to Charles, Adrianople, January 19/31, 1878, CR 16/1877. 194 Nicholas to Charles, Adrianople, January 21 /February 2, 1878, CR 16/ 1877. 195 Charles to Nicholas, Bucharest, January 23/February 4, 1878, CR 16/ 1877. 196 Aus dem Leben, III, 459-462. 197 The text of the armistice agreement is given in Sumner, Russia and the Balkans, pp. 625-626. 198 Aus dem Leben, III, 458. It will be noted that despite Kogalniceanu's personal attitude, the Romanian notes sent under his name to the powers on the Bessarabian question are strong. 199 Ibid., Ill, 501; IV, 9. 200 Ibid., IV, 4. 201 Ghica to Kogalniceanu, St. Petersburg, January 29/February 10, 1878, Corespondenta . . . Ghica, pp. 141-142. 202 Ghica to Kogalniceanu, St. Petersburg, March 7/19, 1878, Corespondenta . . . Ghica, p. 166; Aus dem Leben, IV, 9. 203 The Treaty of San Stefano can be found in Sumner, Russia and the Balkans, pp. 627-636. For the Russian objectives see B. Jelavich, "Negotiating the Treaty of San Stefano," Southeastern Europe 6, no. 2 (1979): 171-193. 204 Kogalniceanu to Ghica, Bucharest, March 23/April 4, 1878, Corespondenta . . . Ghica, pp. 176-178. 205 Aus dem Leben, IV, 13-15. 206 Kogalniceanu to Balaceanu, Bucharest, March 15/27, 1878, Independenta Romdniei: Documente (Bucharest: Editura Academiei Republicii Socialiste Romania, 1977), IV, 346. 207 The consideration that the Romanian leaders were giving to a possible war with Russia is shown in the Sturdza notes. It was estimated that Romania had 78,800 troops available, of which 60,000 were stationed in a favorable position against the mountains. There were believed to be 40,000 Russian soldiers in Romania, 60,000 in Bulgaria, and 150,000 near Constantinople. The Romanians had suffered 900 to 1,000 dead in the assaults on Plevna and 500 to 600 losses in the Rakhovo-Vidin operations (Bratianu papers, 165/1877-1878). 208 Ghica to Kogalniceanu, St. Petersburg, February 26/March 10, 1878, Corespondenta . . . Ghica, pp. 159-160.

331

Notes to pp. 2J3-2J5 209 210 211 212 213 214

215 216 217 218 219

220 221

222 223 224 225 226 227

Ghica to Kogalniceanu, St. Petersburg, March 16/28, 1878, Kogalniceanu, Corespondenta 1878, p. 81. Kogalniceanu to Ghica, March 8/20, 1878, Kogalniceanu, Corespondenta 1878, pp. 59-63. Kogalniceanu to Ghica, March 10/22, 1878, Kogalniceanu, Corespondenta I8J8, pp. 64-73. "Memoir on the question of Bessarabia," Bucharest, February 25/March 9, 1878, Kogalniceanu, Corespondenta 1878, pp. 186-190. Ghica to Kogalniceanu, St. Petersburg, February 28/March 12, 1878, Corespondenta . . . Ghica, pp. 160-161. The Russian government later denied this statement. Since the cession to Moldavia of southern Bessarabia had been a part of the Treaty of Paris, it was obviously a question that would be dealt with at a congress. See Ghica to Kogalniceanu, St. Petersburg, March 29/April 10, 1878, Corespondenta . . . Ghica, pp. 184-185. Ghica to Kogalniceanu, St. Petersburg, February 28/March 12, 1878, Corespondenta . . . Ghica, pp. 160-161. Ghica to Kogalniceanu, St. Petersburg, March 20/April 1, 1878, Corespondenta . . . Ghica, pp. 171-173. Ghica to Kogalniceanu, St. Petersburg, March 22/April 3, 1878, Corespondenta . . . Ghica, p. 175. Kogalniceanu to Ghica, Bucharest, March 21/April 2, 1878, Corespondenta . . . Ghica, p. 174. Kogalniceanu circular dispatch, March 25/April 6, 1878, Kogalniceanu, Corespondenta 1878, pp. 95-96. The Romanian leaders were proud of their army, in particular of its accomplishments at Plevna. In contrast, the Russian judgment was not so favorable. For example, in an interview published in the French newspaper Gaulois, it was reported that Ignatiev, "questioned on the conduct of the Romanian soldiers, began to laugh and answered that they had turned their backs to the enemy two times in succession" (B&laceanu to Kogalniceanu, Vienna, October 5, 1877, Bratianu papers, 22). Kogalniceanu to Ghica, April 7/19, 1878, Kogalniceanu, Corespondenta 1878, p. 118. Ghica to Kogalniceanu, St. Petersburg, March 23/April 4, 1878, Kogalniceanu, Corespondenta 1878, p. 93. In answer to Ghica's request for an explanation of the Russian troop movements, Giers said that they were in preparation for a return of the army, but he admitted "that they could have an aim to deal with certain eventualities that could menace the communications of the army in Bulgaria" (Ghica to Kogalniceanu, St. Petersburg, April 6/18, 1878, Corespondenta . . . Ghica, pp. 203-204). Kogalniceanu to Bratianu, March 27/April 8, 1878, Kogalniceanu, Corespondenta 1878, p. 101. Kogalniceanu to Ghica, St. Petersburg, March 31/April 12, 1878, ibid., p. 107. Kogalniceanu to Bratianu, tel., Bucharest, April 17, 1878, HHS. Bratianu to Balaceanu, tel., confidential, Bucharest, April 28, 1878, HHS. Charles to Alexander II, February 22/March 6, 1878, Aus dem Leben, IV, 2-3. Alexander II to Charles, tel., March 28/April 10, 1878, Ibid., pp. 20L 33*

Notes to pp. 276-282 228 Alexander II to Charles, private letter, March 28/April 9, 1878, CR 16/1877. 229 Ghica to Kogalniceanu, St. Petersburg, April 8/20, 1878, Corespondenta . . . Ghica, p. 204. 230 George Hoover Rupp, A Wavering Friendship: Russia and Austria, I8J6— i8y8 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1941), p. 371. 231 Ibid., p. 379; Gorchakov to Shuvalov, reserve, St. Petersburg, May 18/30, 1877, OB TI, II, 83-87. 232 Rupp, A Wavering Friendship, pp. 391-392. 233 The Poradim proposals are to be found in ibid., pp. 421-422; and OBTI, ll > 339-341. 234 Harold Temperley and Lillian M. Penson, Foundations of British Foreign Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1938), p. 370. 235 Salisbury to White, April 22/May 4, 1878, H. Sutherland Edwards, Sir William White (London: Murray, 1902), p. 134. During this period the Romanian leaders were attempting to gain some assurances of British support. On May 1/13 Bratianu in a meeting with White expressed alarm about a possible clash with the Russian troops and requested British assistance, in particular ten thousand carabines for the cavalry (White to Salisbury, no. 91, secret, Bucharest, May 1/13, 1878, Independent^ Romdniei, II, pt. 2, 318-319). White reported further on May 12/24 o n t n e Romanian attitude of resistance and on May 15/27 on the Romanian regret concerning British reserve on the question of Bessarabia (White to Salisbury, no. 98, secret, Bucharest, May 12/24, and no. 105, secret, May 15/27, 1878, ibid., pp. 323-326). 236 Elliot to White, Vienna, May 5/17, 1878, Edwards, White, pp. 135-136. 237 Summer, Russia and the Balkans, p. 648. 238 Aus dem Leben, IV, 25-27. See also Nothomb to Aspremont-Lynden, no. 199/119, Berlin, April 1/13, 1878, Independent^ Romdniei, II, pt. 2, 296-298. 239 Rupp, A Wavering Friendship, pp. 422-424. The Russian government too acknowledged the connection between southern Bessarabia and BosniaHercegovina. In the instructions drawn up for the Russian representatives to the Congress of Berlin it was stated: "The two annexations were dependent upon one another in the terms of our agreements" {OBTI, III, 126-132). 240 Rupp, A Wavering Friendship, pp. 439-441. 241 Ibid., pp. 445, 446. 242 W. N. Medlicott, The Congress of Berlin and After (London: Cass, 1963), pp. 25-26. 243 This section is based on B. Jelavich, "Austria-Hungary, Rumania and the Eastern Crisis," pp. 111-141. 244 Balaceanu to Bratianu, tel., Vienna, April 10, 1877, Bratianu papers, 15. 245 Bratianu to Balaceanu, Bucharest, June 3, 1878, HHS. 246 Balaceanu to Bratianu, very confidential, Vienna, May 26/June 7, 1878, Bratianu, Acte si Cuvdntdri, IV, 55. Balaceanu in his memoir noted that Andrassy, before leaving for Berlin, declared, "Keep your powder dry" ("Souvenirs," p. 135). 247 Balaceanu to Charles, Vienna, May 28/June 9, 1878, CR 32/1878. 248 OBTI, III, 131. 333

Notes to pp.

282-290

249 Kogalniceanu circular, Bucharest, March 16/28, 1878, Kogalniceanu,

Corespondenta 18y8, pp. 191-195. 250 Aus dem Leben, IV, 59. Charles was also interested in being elected prince of Bulgaria: when Ignatiev had visited Bucharest, he had mentioned this possibility (ibid., Ill, 458, 460). 251 On June 12/24 Br^tianu wrote Rosetti that only Bismarck had been truthful with him; the other representatives, in contrast, had wished Romania to cause difficulties for Russia to serve their own interests (ibid., IV, 72). 252 Kogalniceanu to Cimpineanu, Berlin, June 9/21, 1878, Kogalniceanu, Corespondenta 1878, pp. 164-167. 253 Bratianu and Kogalniceanu to Cimpineanu, Berlin, June 19/July 1, 1878, Kogalniceanu, Corespondenta 1878, pp. 173-174. 254 The memorandum is printed in Kogalniceanu, Corespondenta 1878, pp.

166-170. 255 The protocol of the session is given in ibid., pp. 203-219. 256 Kogalniceanu to Cimpineanu, Berlin, June 20/July 2, 1878, ibid., p. 229. The telegrams sent by Bratianu and Kogalniceanu from Berlin during the congress all emphasize the importance of the Bessarabian question and the hopelessness of the Romanian position. Quotations from some of these can be found in Barbara Jelavich, "Romania at the Congress of Berlin: Problems of Peacemaking," in Der Berliner Kongress von 1878, ed. Ralph Melville and Hans-Jiirgen Schroder (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1982), pp. 189-204. 257 Aus dem Leben, IV, 75. 258 The text of the Treaty of Berlin can be found in Edward Hertslet, The Map of Europe by Treaty (London: Butterworths, 1891), IV, 2759-2798. 259 Ibid., pp. 2785-2786, 2790-2791. 260 For the Russian experiences in Bulgaria see Charles Jelavich, Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism: Russian Influence in the Internal Affairs of Bulgaria and Serbia, 1879-1886 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1958). 261 Medlicott, Congress of Berlin, pp. 178-179, 214-217, and "The Recognition of Roumanian Independence, 1878-1880," Slavonic Review 11 O933): 354-372, 572-589262 Kogalniceanu circular, May 17/29, 1878, Kogalniceanu, Corespondenta 1878,p. 151. 263 The interrelationship of the railroad issue, the Jewish question, and the recognition of Romanian independence is discussed in Fritz Stern, Gold and Iron: Bismarck, Bleichroder, and the Building of the German Empire (New York: Knopf, 1977), pp. 351-393. 264 Quoted in R. W. Seton-Watson, A History of the Roumanians (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1934), p. 352.

334

Bibliography

This book is based primarily on unpublished Russian and Romanian documents. The Russian material comes from two separate collections. The first, the private papers and official reports of Nicholas Karlovich Giers, who was consul general in Bucharest from 1858 to 1863, was kindly made available to the author by Serge Giers, his grandson. The second consists of a selection of documents from the Russian Foreign Ministry archives on relations with Romania from 1846 to 1876, which are available on microfilm in the State Archives, Bucharest. The Romanian documents are primarily from the collection Casa Regald, State Archives, or from the Romanian Foreign Ministry Archives, Bucharest. This material gives an excellent view of Romanian-Russian relations. Diplomatic reports from the Public Record Office in London and the Haus-, Hof-, und Staatsarchiv in Vienna have also been used. Historians interested in Romanian diplomatic history are particularly fortunate in the excellent collections of published documents available to them. Those pertaining to this study have been listed here. Since it is impossible to include all of the many books and articles on European diplomacy for this period, the bibliography includes principally works on Russian and Romanian events. The attempt has been made to include as many of the major books and articles in Romanian and Russian as possible, but here again it has been necessary to impose limitations. For other books and articles on Romanian history, the reader is referred to Bibliografia istoricd a Romdniet, 4 vols. (Bucharest: Editura Academiei Republicii Socialiste Romania, 19701975). Further titles of Russian material can be found cited in the bibliographies of the books listed. Published documents Anul 1848 in Principatele Romdne. 6 vols. Bucharest: Carol Gobi, 1902-1910. Archives diplomatiques. Paris: Librairie diplomatique d'Amyot, 1861, 18631868. Bengesco, Gr£goire. Memorandum sur les eglises, les monasteres, les biens

335

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Russia in the East, 1876-1880: The Russo-Turkish War and the Kuldja Crisis as Seen through the Letters of A. G. Jomini to N. K. Giers. Leiden: Brill, 1959. Miliutin, D. A. Dnevnik. 4 vols. Moscow: Biblioteka SSSR imeni V. I. Lenina, 1947-1950. Ramm, Agatha, ed. The Political Correspondence of Mr. Gladstone and Lord Granville, 1868-1876. 2 vols. London: Royal Historical Society, 1952. Rizos, Panioti, ed. Memoires du Prince Nicolas Soutzo: Grand Logothete de Moldavie, 1798-1871. Vienna: Gerold, 1899. Schweinitz, Hans Lothar von. Denkwilrdigkeiten des Botschafters General von Schweinitz. 2 vols. Berlin: Reimar Hobbing, 1927. Sturdza, De*metre A., ed. Charles Ier, Roi de Roumanie: Chronique-Actes-Documents, 2 vols. Bucharest: Charles Gobi, 1899, 1904. Books and dissertations Adaniloaie, N., and Dan Berindei, Revolutia de la 1848 in tdrile romdne: Culegere de studii. Bucharest: Editura Academiei Republicii Socialiste Romania, 1974. Andics, E. Das Bundnis Habsburg-Romanow. Budapest: Akade*miai Kiad6, Antonescu, Cornelius G. Die rumdnische Handelspolitik von 1875-1910. Leipzig: W. Schunke, 1915. Averbukh, R. Tsarskaia interventsiia v bor'be s vengerskoi revoliutsiei, 18481849. Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe Sotsiarno-ekonomicheskoe Izdatel'stvo, 1935337

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345

Index

Abdul Aziz, 117, 167, 207, 214, 217, 232 Abdul Mejid, 117 Additional Act (to Convention of 1859), 145 Additional Article, 37, 38 see also Organic Statutes administrative reform and Convention of Akkerman, 28 Kiselev draft statutes for, 32-34 see also Organic Statutes Adrianople, Treaty of (1829), 30-31, 34, 62, 131, 295 Afif Bey, 93, 95 agents and agencies, 8, 106, 114, 127, 193, 194, 195, 218, 219, 298 Agrarian Law (August 1864), 146 aims, Russian, 7, 10, 15, 64-65, 151, 182 Ainali Kavak, Treaty of (1779), 6 Akkerman, 9 Akkerman, Convention of (1826), 27-28, 30, 31, 295 Alecsandri, Vasile, 96, 106, 107, 120, 142 Alexander I, 10, 12, 16, 17, 23-24, 25, 26, 27, 35, 293 Alexander II, 83, 84-85, 90, 103, 109, 117, 141, 197, 219, 259, 270, 277, 279, 281282 and Charles, 190, 193, 211, 214, 264265, 266, 269, 274, 275, 276 denunciation of Black Sea neutralization, 202, 203 early policy as emperor, 59-60, 61-62 and the Eastern crisis, 1875-1878, 237238, 241-246, 255, 261, 262, 265-267 Alexandrescu, see Nelidov, Alexander Ivanovich

Ali Bey, 248 Ali Pasha, 58, 69, 72, 104, 138, 144, 154, 158, 188, 202, 217 Andrassy, Julius, 216, 222, 228, 233, 251252, 254, 259-260, 280-281, 283 Andrassy Note (1875), 228, 232 Anuchin, Colonel D. G., 283 Apponyi, Count Rudolf, 210 Arab Tabia, 288 Arion, Colonel Eraclie, 267-268 Armistice of January 1878, 270 army Romanian, militia, 106, 111, 113 Romanian, as part of Ottoman, 218 Romanian, in Russian operations, 260266 Arsache, A., 120 Association of Romanian Students, 53 Auerbach, 206 Ausgleich of 1867, 181, 216 Austria, see Habsburg Monarchy ayans, 10-11 Azov, 1, 4 Balabin, Viktor Petrovich, 80-81, 82, 137 Balaceanu, Ion, 75, 162, 165, 176, 209, 226, 230,243,247,252,272, 275,280-281, 306 n22 Balcescu, Nicholas, 40, 42, 53 Baleanu, Emanoil, 92, 95 Balkan campaign of Peter the Great, 2 Bals, T., 72, 73, 92 Balta Liman, Convention of (1849), 50, 51, 52, 56, 62, 306 n28 ban, 4 Banat, 3, 4

346

Index bashi-bozuks, 258 Bourqueney, Baron Francois A., 58, 69 Basily, Constantine Mikhailovich, 77, boyars 78-79, 80, 84, 134-135 and Bibescu, 38 Batum, 282, 286 Cantemir and, 1 Baudin, Charles, 82 changes sought by, 20 Bazili, see Basily, Constantine Mikhailodivision among, 16, 19-20, 35, 41, 50 vich and Filiki Etairia, 22 Beauharnais, Stephanie de, 165 and Habsburg Monarchy, 3 Beclard, Louis, 91, 96 in official positions, 27, 28 Belogradchik, 267, 270 and Organic Statutes, 33 Bender, 8-9 and Ottoman Empire, 2, 8, 16 Benevolent Society (Bulgarian), 187 and Phanariot rule, 3, 4, 16, 20, 41 Benzi, Rafaello, 77 and Russia, 20 Berlin, Congress of (1878), 272, 276-286 and Michael Sturdza, 38-39 Berlin, Treaty of (1878), 284-288, 299 Braila, 30 Berlin Memorandum (1876), 232 Brasov, 26 Bessarabia Bratianu, Dumitru, 40, 53, 54, 75, 201,249 and Congress of Berlin, 278, 279 Bratianu, Ion C, as part of Dacia, 7 and the Eastern Crisis, 1875-1878, 226, and Filiki Etairia, 22 231 grain of, 225 and the election of Charles, 162, 164, and Journal de St. Pe'tersbourg, 273165, 167 274 as leading politician, 1866-1870, 179, Livadia discussion about, 243-244 180-181, 185-189, 194, 196, 197 and Reichstadt Agreement, 233 and the liberal movement, 40, 42, 53, and Russia, 15, 45, 52, 57, 58, 61, 62, 66t 120 124, 239, 265-284, 287, 299 and the overthrow of Cuza, 147 territory of, 14 as prime minister, 237-250, 254, 255, transfer of, 77 260-266, 271, 272, 275, 276, 280, 283, and Treaty of San Stefano, 271, 277 284 and unification with Principalities, 41, Brincoveanu, Constantine, 1, 2 54 Brune, General M. G. A., 11 Beust, Frederick Ferdinand von, 181, Brunnow, Baron Filip Ivanovich, 58, 139, 188, 189, 197, 210, 216, 222, 345 203 Bibescu, George, 38, 43, 44, 50, 72, 73, 83, Bucharest, as Romanian capital, 113, 118 95, 96, 132, 158 Bucharest, Treaty of (1812), 14, 17, 294 Bismarck, Otto von, 161, 165, 166, 169, Budberg, Baron Andreus F., 56, 103, 157, 173, 179, 181, 186, 189, 196, 202, 203, 159, 160, 162, 164, 169, 170, 171, 172, 215, 216, 218, 255, 279, 289, 290, 298, 174, 178 317 n75 Bug River, 5, 6, 7 Black Sea Bukovina, 5, 41, 54 free navigation of, 5 Bulgaria, 46, 117, 123, 188, 270, 277, 279, neutralization and demilitarization of, 285-289 57, 58, 61-62, 202, 210, 216 emigrants from, 196 Blaremberg, N., 149 revolutionaries from, 117, 186-188, 234 Bleichroder, Gerson, 289 Bulgarian Central Revolutionary ComBobrikov, Colonel G. I., 283 mittee, 234 Boerescu, Vasile, 96, 97, 174, 175, 218, 222, Bulwer, Sir Henry, 77, 80, 135, 140, 142, 223, 224-226 145 Bogoliubov, Major General, 283 Buol-Schauenstein, Count K. F., 58, 69 Bolgrad, 77 Bolintineanu, Dimitrie, 120 Butenev, Apollinarii Petrovich, 62, 63, 81 Bosianu, Constantine, 147 Callimachi, Alexander, 9 Bosnia, 6, 227, 286 Botev, Khristo, 234 Callimachi, Scarlat, 12, 19

347

Index Callimachi-Catargi, Nicholas, 205, 207, 268, 270, 283 Cantacuzino, Constantine, 47, 48 Cantacuzino, George, 3, 89 Cantacuzino, Ion C, 149, 153, 190, 191, 192, 193,199, 239 Cantacuzino, Colonel Michael, 246 Cantacuzino, §., 73 Cantemir, Dimitrie, 1-2 capitulations, 191-192 Capodistrias, Ioannis, 21-22 Caragea, loan,19 Carp, Peter, 215 Catargiu, Barbu, 120, 121, 122 Catargiu, Costin, 72-73, 92 Catargiu, Colonel George, 236 Catargiu, Lascar, 96, 120, 149, 153, 167, 179, 213, 214, 215, 218, 226, 230, 231 Catargiu, §., 92, 93, 94 Catherine the Great, 4, 5, 6-7, 8, 9, 15 Cavour, Count Camillo de, 58, 69, 125 Central Commission (1858), 87-88, 106, 110,111-112, 113,115,137 Charles of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, 164-182, 185, 223-224 abdication threatened, 206-214 and the army, 186, 188 crowned king, 290 and the Eastern crisis, 227-291 and foreign occupation, 171-172, 176, 188 and independence, 167, 218, 259 opposition to, 199-200 and Russia, 177, 178, 240 Charles XII, King of Sweden, 1 Chernat, General Alexander, 256 Cherniaev, Michael Gregorovich, 237 chetas, 187 Chicherin, 162 Cimpineanu, Ion, 256, 268, 270 Circassians, 258 Civil Code (1864), 146 Clarendon, Earl of, 58, 160, 172 collegial voting system, 180 commercial conventions (1875,1876), 221227 commercial privileges of Russia, 5, 6 Congress Kingdom of Poland, 17 Conservative Party, 55, 75, 91-92, 111, 112, 114, 120, 121, 122 Constanta, 242-243, 265, 268 Constantine, 7 Constantinople, Conference of (1876), 249 constitution of 1863, 143

of 1864, 143-144 of 1866, 153, 179-180, 194, 196, 206-207, 209, 213-214 of 1876 (Ottoman), 249, 250 Consular Convention (1869), 194, 195 consular jurisdiction, 87, 191 consuls, 5, 37 convention of April 1856, 63, 188 of August 1858, 87, 88, 105, 109, 113, 114, 121, 154, 170,222 of January and March 1877, 238, 277 of September 1859, 109, 118, 154 Cornea, Dimitrie, 231 Cornu, Hortense, 164 corruption after 1848, 51 of caimacam elections, 73, 75 of loan Caragea, 19 of Catargiu, 72-73,75 of Dedicated Monasteries, 131, 133 of Moldavian elections (1857), 79-80 of Phanariot rule, 20 and railroads, 218 of Michael Sturdza, 38 of Vogoride, 72-73, 75 see also electoral corruption Corti, Count Luigi, 283 Costaforu, George, 174, 213, 224, 230 Costangalia, 128 coup d'etat (1864), 143-145 Cowley, Earl Henry R. C, 58, 69, 85-86, 105,162,170 Cracow, 42 Crete, 7 insurrection in, 1866, 177,181,182 Cretulescu, Constantine, 180, 182, 186 Cretulescu, George, 53 Cretulescu, Nicholas, 120, 121 Crimea, 4, 5, 6 Crimean War, 29, 56, 59, 61, 62, 294 customs administration of Principalities, 113 customs union, 38 Cuza, Alexander loan, 40, 71, 96,120-122, 162, 164,173,175,196, 200,297,312313 nlOO and coup of 1864, 143-144 and desire for union and foreign prince, 102, 107, 114 double election of, 97-98, 101-102 economic situation during early reign of, 110 great power reaction to election of, 102-109

348

Index internal order under, 110-111 and Napoleon III, 102, 113, 122, 128129 opposition to, 121, 139, 142, 146-148, 149, 150 overthrow of, 150, 153, 154, 159 and Polish revolution, 128-129 and revision of electoral laws, 112, 115, 117 Cyprus, 286 Czartoryski, Prince Adam, 35, 42, 127 Czartoryski, Ladislas, 127

European Commission of the Danube, 285 European Democratic Committee, 53

fait accompli, policy of and Arab Tabia, 288 Bratianu and the, 180 Charles and the, 166, 171, 172, 176 Cuza and the, 114, 115, 143, 144, 152 as policy, 297 Falcoianu, S., 136, 162 Filiki Etairia, 21-26 Filipescu, G. C, 219-220, 231 Dacia, 7, 15 Filipescu, I. A., 92, 95 Daco-Roman kingdom, 45, 54 Filipescu, I. I., 106 Dalmatia, 6, 227 firman Danube Delta, 14, 30, 67, 284-285, 287 of 1822,26 Danube frontier, 198, 249 of 1838, 37, 38 Dashkov, I. A., 37, 38, 40, 303 nl7 of 1848,47 decorations, issue of national, 218, 249, of 1861,154 264 of 1866,177,178,222,223,265 Dedicated Monasteries, 19, 87, 117, 122, flag, issue of the common, 86-87 130-142, 143, 144, 146, 147, 175, 178, Florescu, General Ion E., 120, 213, 226, 191-195, 298 231 Denmark, 146, 179 Foc§ani, 112 Derby, Lord, 222, 223 foreign prince, issue of a Dimitur, Hadzhi, 187-188 great power attitude toward, 79, 116, Disraeli, Benjamin, 283 118, 160-164, 169-171 Dnieper River, 5, 6, 7 and Paris Conference, 66-70 Dniester River, 14 and Romanian emigres, 54 Dobrudja, 268, 277, 279-281, 283, 284, 285, and Romanian people, 73, 155 287, 299 Russian attitude toward, 83, 88, 154, Dolgorukov, General Vladimir Andree158, 169-170, 173, 174, 191 vich, 259 France Draga§ani, 25 and 1872 partition proposal, 7 Drouyn de Lluys, Edouard, 162, 163, 164, and Ottoman Empire, 8-9 170,172,176 and Principalities, 8-9, 40, 68, 215 Druses, 113 and revolutionary movements, 39-41, Dual Alliance, 290 71 Duhamel, General Alexander Osipovich, and Russia, 65, 122-124,129,152 44-45,47,48,51 franchise, issue of the and Convention of Paris, 89, 91, 95 Eastern Rumelia, 286 in 1850s, 119 and International Commission, 71, 76 Egypt, 7, 9, 27, 28, 34, 62, 223, 249 limited, 110, 120, 180 Elders, see Benevolent Society reform, 115-142 elections of 1857, 79-84 widening sought, 112, 113, 114, 142-144 electoral corruption, 73-75, 79-80, 83 Franco-Prussian War (1870), 201-205 electoral laws, 112, 115, 117 Franco-Russian alignment, 65, 122-123, Elliot, Sir Henry, 204, 209 129,152 emigration problems, 51-55 Franz Joseph, 49, 167, 185, 227, 241, 279 enlightened despotism, 17 Epureanu, Monolache Costache, 120, 205, Frederick, Prince of Prussia, 165 French Revolution, 7, 17, 76, 96, 295 226, 231, 239 Friendly Society, see Filiki Etairia Erfurt, 12 Friendship, Treaty of (1868), 182 Etairia, see Filiki Etairia

349

Index Fuad Pasha, 47, 48, 72, 86, 104, 149, 158, 176, 188 Gagarin, Nicholas S., 183 Garibaldi, Giuseppe, 113, 125 generation of 1848, 78, 89, 102, 216 George I, King of Greece, 126 Georgia, 10 Germany, 217, 221 and Charles, 215-216, 298 and the Eastern crisis, 1875-1878, 228, 279, 290 and the railroad question, 289-290 unification of, 181, 215 Ghica, Alexander, 34, 36, 37, 38, 72, 73, 95 Ghica, Dimitrie, 120, 149, 153, 189, 194, 196, 205, 213 Ghica, Emil I., 219, 231 Ghica, Gregory, 26, 28-29, 37 Ghica, Gregory A., 50, 51, 56, 57, 72, 73, 95 Ghica, Ion, 101, 121, 149, 158, 253 as emissary, 42, 46, 147, 176, 244, 245, 268, 269 positions in government of, 150, 180, 207,213 Ghica, General Ion G., 179, 229, 260, 261, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 273, 274, 275, 276 Ghica, V., 92 Giers, Nicholas Karlovich, 36, 39, 94, 103, 192, 295 and caimacamie, 95-96 and Cuza, 105-106, 108, 114, 121-122 on Dashkov, 37-38 and Dedicated Monasteries, 136, 137 and Eastern crisis of 1875-1878, 231, 233, 235, 238, 242 moderate conservative position of, 91, 111 and Organic Statutes, 36 personal ties to Principalities of, 89 Giers, Olga, 89, 114 Giurgiu, 30 Gladstone, William E., 209-210 Gltick, Dr. Theophil, 127 Godel de Lannoy, 71, 93, 94 Golescu, Alexander G., 53, 121, 205 Golescu, Nicholas, 40, 75, 96, 153, 199 Golescu, Radu, 40 Golescu, §tefan, 75, 106, 168, 180 Goltz, Robert von der, 162, 169 Gorchakov, Alexander Mikhailovich, 127, 184, 185, 196, 211, 220, 225, 227, 308 nil

and administrative unification, 116-117 appointed foreign minister, 59-60 and Cuza, 103, 104, 108, 111, 129-130, 139-140, 143, 144, 146, 148-151, 155 and Dedicated Monasteries, 136-141 and denunciation of Black Sea neutralization, 202-204 and the Eastern crisis, 1875-1878, 232, 233, 238, 246, 250, 253-255, 260, 262, 264, 268, 270-275, 280, 283, 284, 289 and election of Charles, 154-160, 164, 168-176 foreign policy after 1856, 62-65 and organization of Principalities, 1856-1859, 79-87, 90-91 personal ties to Principalities, 89 and Romanian delegation, 1868, 190— 194 Gorchakov, Michael D., 107 Grabbe, General, 50 Gramont, Alfred de, 201 Granville, Earl of, 209, 210 Great Britain, 54, 55, 56, 58 and Charles, 160-161, 208, 209-210, 216, 223 and Cuza, 104-105, 115, 125-127, 140 and the Eastern crisis, 1875-1878, 277280, 282, 283 policy after 1856, 67-68, 79, 81-82, 85 Greece, 43, 123, 126, 134 Greek revolution of 1821, 21-28, 131 Green, John, 126, 207, 209,210 Grivitsa, 264 Gurko, General Iosif Vladimirovich, 262 Habsburg Monarchy, 3-4, 6-7, 9 and Charles, 161, 169, 172,181-182,188, 197, 216 commercial convention, 221-224 and Cuza, 102, 104, 105, 110-111, 115116 and the Eastern crisis, 1875-1878, 227-228, 232, 251-252, 254-255, 277, 279-281,286,289,290 occupation of Principalities, 1854, 57 policy toward Principalities after 1856, 67, 71, 85-87, 90, 93, 94, 95 Hangerli, Constantine, 8, 10 Hansemann, Adolph, 289 Haralambie, Colonel Nicholas, 150, 153 hatti sherifs of 1774,6, 11 of 1784,6,11 of 1802, 11,28,30,294 Hatzfeldt, Maximilian von, 58, 85

350

Index Journal de St. Petersbourg, 199, 205, 271, 273 July Monarchy, 43

Haymerle, Heinrich von, 283 hegumens, 131, 132, 133 Hercegovina, 6, 227, 286 higher education in the Principalities, 39-40 Holy Alliance, 16, 55-56, 59, 217 Hiibner, Count J. A. von, 58, 85, 86, 87, 105 Hungarian emigres, 125-126 Hungarian nationality policies, 181 Hungarian revolutionary activities, 123, 124, 125, 126, 129, 304 n31 Ibrahim, 27 Ignatiev, Nicholas Pavlovich, 148-149, 151, 155, 156, 158, 159, 172, 176-178, 190-195, 199, 202, 211, 217, 220, 228, 313 nlO4, 316 n57 and the Eastern crisis, 1875-1878, 229, 238, 242, 243, 245-249, 329 nl47 and the Eastern Question, 183-185, 217, 228 and the peace negotiations, 1878, 268, 269, 270, 279, 299 independence, Romanian declaration of, 259 recognition of, 259-260, 267, 270, 281, 285, 290, 299 International Commission (1856) and Dedicated Monasteries, 134, 135, 136 duties of, 76, 77 establishment of, 69, 71 and Principalities, 83 report of, 84 Ionescu, I., 237, 242, 245, 246, 253, 256 Ionescu, Nicholas, 227 Ionian Islands, 9, 10 Ipsilanti, Alexander, 9, 12, 22-23, 24 Ipsilanti, Constantine, 12,13, 22 Isidore, 175, 191, 192-193 Islaz Proclamation (1848), 42-43 Ismail, 9 Istria, 6 Italian unification movement, 124-125 Italy, 105-107, 113, 116,124-125, 161, 283

Kamil Pasha, 219 Karadjordjevic, Prince Alexander, 126 Karadjordjevic, Peter, 236 Karadzha, Stefan, 187-188 Karavelov, Liuben, 234 Karl Anton, Prince, 165, 166, 179, 189-190, 225 Karsky, see Cantacuzino, Colonel Michael Keyserling, Count Heinrich, 189 Khaltchinskii (Halcinski), J., 51-52, 133 Kherson, 6 Khitov, Panaiot, 187 Kilia Channel, 14, 262, 268 Kiselev, Paul Dmitrievich, 24, 47, 295 administers Principalities, 1829-1834, 31-32, 36, 37, 39, 56, 132, 295 and agrarian reform, 34, 51 as ambassador in Paris, 81, 84-85, 86, 87, 103, 105, 179 Klapka, General G., 125 Knorring, Karl von, 139, 145 Kogalniceanu, Michael, 40, 73, 119, 120, 121, 138, 143, 146, 147, 148, 189 and Bessarabia, 268-274 and Congress of Berlin, 283-285 as foreign minister, 226, 231, 233, 235, 237, 239-241, 256-258,260,262, 264, 268, 270-275, 280, 283, 284, 289 and Hungarian activities, 125 and seven-point memorandum of 1876, 235 and Treaty of San Stefano, 272 and war role of Romania, 260, 262-263 Roller, Baron, 77 K,oprivshtitsa, 232 Kossuth, Lajos, 125 Kotsebu, Karl Evstafevich, 41-42, 44-45, 48, 295 Krasno-Milashevich, V. I., 13 Kuchuk Kainardji, Treaty of (1774), 1, 5-6, 17,20,31, 34,294 Kushnikov, Sergei S., 13 Kustendje, see Constanta

Jassy, 4, 7, 74 Jassy, Treaty of (1792), 7-8 Jews, 88, 118, 119, 186, 239, 285, 287, 289, 290 Jomini, Alexander Genrikhovich, 220, 242-243, 274, 283 Joseph II, Habsburg Emperor, 6-7

Laibach, Congress of (1821), 23-24 Lallemande, Count A. de, 103 Lamartine, Alphonse de, 53 Langenau, Baron Ferdinand von, 254 Latinity, 54, 102, 116 Latin racial ties, 41, 54, 201, 204, 205, 289, 298

35*

Index Lavalette, Charles Felix, Marquis de, 113, 197 Law on Public Instruction (1864), 146 Lecca, Major Dimitrie, 153 Leopold I, 7 Leopold of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, 200-201, 202 Leuchtenberg, Duke of, 144 Liberal Party and Charles, 199 and Cuza, 110, 111 objectives of, 55, 91-92, 295 and peasant concerns, 75-76 program of, 74, 75, 120 and Russia, 89, 239, 253 and unification, 74, 91, 97, 180 Liehmann von Palmrode, 77, 80 Liteanu, George, 283 Livadia, 241-244 Lobanov-Rostovskii, Aleksei Borisovich, 94-95, 96, 103, 104, 105, 108, 113, 115, 116, 136, 137 Lorn Palanka, 264, 265 London, Conference of (1871), 204, 207, 214, 215 London Protocol, 255 Louis Napoleon, see Napoleon III Louis Philippe, 39-40, 42, 43, 52, 53, 54,56 Luck, Treaty of (1711), 1 Liiders, General Alexander Nikolaevich, 48 Magheru, Colonel George, 43, 47 Mahmud Nedim, 217, 232 Mahmud II, 12, 27, 28, 34 Malinescu, V., 73 Malta, 9 Manteuffel, Otto von, 58 Manu, L, 92, 95 Maria Theresa, 6 Marmora, Sea of, 272 Maronites, 113 Mavrocordat, Alexander, 6 Mavrocordat, Constantine, 4 Mavrogheni, Peter, 73, 96, 120, 149, 153, 167, 179, 218 Maximilian, 185 Mazar Pasha Coalition, 231 Mazzini, Giuseppe, 53 medical services administration of Principalities, 113 Mehmed Ali, 27, 34 Mehmed Djemil Bey, 58 Mehmed Rushdi Pasha, 176 Melchisedek, 190, 191, 192, 193, 199

"Memoir on the Question of Bessarabia," 273-274 Mensdorff-Pouilly, Alexander von, 169 Menshikov, Prince Alexander Sergeevich, 63 Metternich, Prince Clemens von, 11, 17 Metternich, Richard, 162, 169, 172 Michael, Prince of Serbia, 182 Michelet, Jules, 53 Miclescu, Calinic, 168 Milan, Prince of Serbia, 229, 232, 235, 236, 238 Miliutin, Dmitrii Alekseevich, 183, 202, 237, 238, 242, 247, 255-256, 257, 265266, 274 Milkowski, Colonel Zygmunt, 128 Minchaki, see Minciaky, Matei Leovich Minciaky, Matei Leovich, 32 minting of coins, 198,218,249 Moldavia as buffer state, 6 and Bukovina, 5 and Hungarian movement, 124 and Organic Statutes, 32-33 Polish emigrants in, 35, 124, 175 Polish rebels in, 9 reforms in, 4 "The monstrous coalition," 121, 147 Montenegro, 123, 232, 235-238, 241 Moruzi, Alexander, 168 Moruzi, Alexander, Prince of Wallachia, 9,12 Moruzi, Constantine, 168 Moustier, Marquis Lionel de, 144 Muhammad (Mehmed) Ali, 27, 34 Miinchengratz, Treaty of (1833), 34 Miinnich, General, 4 Miinster, Count George Herbert zu, 222 Murad V, 232 Mustafa IV, 12 Musurus Pasha, Kostaki, 105, 172, 224 Napoleon I, 9, 12, 14, 16, 165, 295 Napoleon III, 56, 65, 90, 185, 206, 297 and British alignment, 79, 81, 82, 83 and Charles, 160, 164, 165, 169, 197, 200-202 and Congress of Paris, 58 and Cuza, 102, 107, 113, 122, 124, 143, 149 and Polish revolution, 128-129 and Principalities as compensation, 160 and revolutionary nationalism, 65, 124, 296 and Romanian cause, 54, 68, 81, 86-87

35*

Index and Russian intention toward Principalities, 197 Naturalization Law of 1847, 38 Navarino, 28 Negri, Costache, 96, 106, 112, 120, 142143,311 n82 Nelidov, Alexander Ivanovich, 245-248, 261, 267, 283 Neofit, Metropolitan, 43 Nesselrode, Karl Vasil'evich, 21, 24,40, 41, 44, 50-51, 52, 65 neutrality, policy of, 230, 233-241, 244259,299 Nicholas, Grand Duke, 245, 250-251, 257, 259, 260, 262-265, 267, 270 Nicholas, Prince of Montenegro, 229, 236 Nicholas I of Russia, 27, 39-40, 43, 45, 48, 49, 56, 59, 69, 244, 293 Nicopolis, 262-265 Nigra, Constantine, 162 Novikov, Evgenii Petrovich, 129, 141, 144, 145, 148, 230, 254 Obolenskii, Prince, 106 Obrenovic, Marie, 147 Obrenovic, Michael, 126 Obrenovic, Milos, 126 Obruchev, General Nicholas Nikolaevich, 238 occupation of Bessarabia (1878), 287, 299 of Bulgaria (1878), 271-273, 277, 287 of Peking (1860), 113 of Principalities, Austrian and Ottoman, 1854, 57, 70; Ottoman, 1821, 24-27; Russian, 1806-1812, 12, 13; Russian, 1828, 28-29, 31, 33; Russian, 1848, 45, 48-49, 50, 52; Russian, 1853, 56; Russian, 1877-1878, 257259, 274-275 of Transylvania (1849), 49 Offenberg, G. G., 129, 143, 146, 147-148, 150, 151, 154, 155, 157, 168, 178, 193, 194, 198, 199, 200, 205-206, 211-214, 319 nll9 Oltenia, 3-4, 6, 43 Omer Pasha, 47, 57 Onou, M. K., 283 Organic Statutes (1831 Wallachia, 1832 Moldavia) assessment of, 59, 295 centers of influence under, 36, 37 and Convention of Paris, 88 and limit of Russian reform, 49 organization under, 32-34

overthrow of, sought, 43 restoration of, 44, 47 revision of, 50, 51, 66 revolutionaries and, 40, 41 and Russian rule, 35, 39, 58, 66, 179 Orlov, Prince Aleksei Fedorovich, 58, 69 Orthodoxy, 17, 62-65, 123, 130-142, 195, 196 see also Ottoman Empire, Balkan Christians under Osborne Agreement (1857), 81, 82, 83, 85, 86 Othon, King, 126 Ottoman Empire Balkan Christians under, 2, 56, 62-64, 145-146, 195, see also Orthodoxy integrity of, 67, 79, 161, 216 military reform of Selim III in, 8-9 right of intervention of, 70, 98,108, 117, 207-208 right of preemption of, 30, 59 and Russia, 10, 16, 58-59, 122 Oubril, Pavel Petrovich, 156 Pade§ declaration (1821), 23 Pahlen, Count F. P., 29 Palmerston, Lord, 55, 79 pandours, 23, 29 Panslav movement, 183, 228-229 Panu, A., 73, 92, 93, 95 Paris, Conference of (1858), 85 (1864), 161-162 Paris, Treaty of (1856), 58-59, 61, 64, 75, 82, 154, 182, 189, 202-204, 205, 241-242, 244, 257, 273, 276, 296 Article 22 of, 188 Article 23 of, 77 Article 25 of, 188 Article 27 of, 105, 188, 207-208, 230 Articles 20-27 of, 69-70 partition of Ottoman possessions, 6-7, 9, 12, 56 of Romania, 248 passage of arms, 125-128, 192, 236, 237, 238 of supplies, 236, 244, 271 of troops, 236, 237, 239, 243, 245, 246, 248, 251-258, 271, 273, 274, 282, 288 of volunteers, 238, 240, 244 Passarowitz, Treaty of (1718), 3, 4 Pasvanoglu Osman Pasha, 11, 12, 13 patents, 191-192 Patriarchate of Constantinople, 17-19, 130, 132, 134, 147 Paul, Emperor of Russia, 9, 10

353

Index peasants emancipation of, 88 emigration of, 51 grievances of, 19 and land reform, 75-76, 112, 114-115, 121 and national issues, 75 and Organic Statutes, 33-34 and regulations of 1851, 51 Peking, 112-113 Peloponnesus, 7 People's Assembly, 23, 43 Pepoli, Marquis Gioacchimo, 197 Peter the Great, 1, 2, 3 Pfuel, 202 Phanar, 2 Phanariot rule, 14, 15, 17, 19, 20, 26, 5859, 131, 294 background of, 2-3 lowest point of, 8 Philip of Flanders, Prince, 153, 164 Philo-Romanian Society, 54 Pini, Alexander, 22, 24 Pisani, Andrei, 22 Place, Victor, 71, 72-73, 74, 91, 94-95, 105 plebiscite of 1866, 166, 168 Plevna, 262-264, 266, 277 Ploe§ti, 106 Poland, 4, 5, 8, 9, 43-44 emigrants from, 293 revolutionary movement in, 9, 35, 42, 53, 85, 89, 123, 124, 126, 127-129, 139, 147, 174, 175, 293 Poltava, 1 Popov, Sergei Ivanovich, 74, 77, 78, 91, 94-95, 105, 111, 114-115, 134 postal administration of Principalities, 87-88, 113 Postal Convention, 192 Potemkin, Gregory, 7 Pourtales, Count Albert, 105 press law (1856), 73 Prokesch-Osten, Anton von, 72, 81, 83, 145, 172, 188, 210, 319nll8 protectorate, Russian, 16-52, 58-59,71 protocol of September 1859, 109, 170 Protocol 13 (1858), 136-142 provisional government (1866), 150, 154, 157, 158, 162, 164,167,179 Prussia, 9, 16, 105, 129, 135 and candidature of Charles, 161, 165167,172-173,176 Franco-Prussian War and Romania, 201-213 Pruth River, 2, 14

Quinet, Edgar, 53, 54 Radetsky, 234 Radowitz, Joseph Maria von, 213 railroads, 67, 186 Rakhovo, 264-265 Rallet, D., 73 Rechberg, J. B. von, 115 recueillement, 64 Redern, Count Heinrich von, 173 Reichstadt agreement (1876), 233, 238, 247, 255, 277, 280 religion free exercise of, 5 during reorganization, 133, 142 see also Orthodoxy Reshid Pasha, 72 Reutern, Michael Khristoforovich, 182, 238 Revertera, Count Frederick, 164,173 revolts and revolutions 1804: Serbia, 12, 17 1815: Serbia, 17 1821: Greece, 21,25, 26, 293 1821: Principalities, 22 1830: Polish territories, 35, 293 1846: Cracow, 42 1848: Moldavia, 42, 44, 45-46, 295 1848: Wallachia, 42-43, 44, 45-46, 293, 295 1848-1849: Hungary, 49 1862: Greece, 126 1863: Poland, 124, 125 1866: Crete, 177, 181, 182, 185 1866: Jassy, 164, 177 1870: Ploe§ti, 206 1875: Bosnia and Hercegovina, 226, 227-229 1876: Bulgaria, 232, 233 1876: Constantinople, 232, 253 see also revolutionary activities revolutionary activities Bulgarian, 187-188, 232-234 and exiles, 40-41, 49, 51-55 Hungarian, 123, 125 Polish, 123, 127, 175 and Principalities, 114, 124, 129-130, 175, 177, 187-188, 198-199, 211, 214, 233-234 Romanian, 39-50, 52-55 Transylvanian, 181-182, 189 see also revolts and revolutions Richthofen, Baron E., 77 Rikman, see Riickmann, P. I. roads, 67

354

Index Rolla, K., 73 "Romania," adoption of name, 186, 194-195 Romanian Democratic Committee, 53 Romanian emigres, 52-55 Romdnul (The Romanian), 120 Rosetti, C. A., 40, 42, 53, 75, 95, 96, 120, 142, 149, 153, 179, 224, 256 Rosetti, Lascar, 96 Rosetti-Roznovanu, Nicholas, 168 Riickmann, P. I., 34, 37 Ruschuk-Varna line, 283 Russell, Lord John, 115 Safvet Pasha, 77, 78, 80, 156, 162, 163, 169, 171, 237, 248, 316 n57 St. Petersburg, Convention of (1834), 34 Salisbury, Lord, 249, 278, 283 Salzburg, meeting at (1867), 185 Sanjak of Novi Pazar, 282, 286 San Stefano, Treaty of (1878), 271272, 274, 277, 278, 280, 286, 299 Sardinia, 104, 105, 110, 116, 125-126, 135, 296 Schleswig-Holstein, 146, 160 Schweinitz, General Hans Lothar von, 173 Sculeni, 25 Sebastopol, 57 secularization of monasteries, 139-143 Sedan, battle of, 206 Selim III, 8, 12 Senedof 1783,6, 11 separation of the Principalities great-power position on, 156-157, 159, 161, 163, 168-169, 208-209, 215 and Moldavia, 74-75, 79-80, 167-168 separatist uprising in Jassy, 164, 167-169, 177 Sepoy Rebellion, 112 Serbia, 6, 17, 27-28, 30, 123, 126-127, 181 Serpent's Island, 77, 284 Seven Weeks' War (1866), 298 Seymour, Sir Hamilton, 56 Shchulepnikov, E. R., 77 Shipka, 264 Shuvalov, Peter Andreevich, 182,278, 283, 284 Sibiu, 26 Silistria, 288 Silistria-Mangalia line, 284 Singurov, 242 Slaniceanu, Colonel George, 242, 263 Slavic Benevolent Society, 183, 236 Stackelberg, Count Ernest, 156 Star of the Danube, see Steaua Dundrii

"Star of Romania," 265 state debt, 153 Steaua Dundrii (The Star of the Danube), 73 Steege, Ludovic, 106,174, 175, 194 §tirbei, Barbu, 50, 51, 56, 57, 72, 73, 83, 95, 96, 98, 136 §tirbei G., 120 Strat, Ion, 120, 197, 200, 201, 205 strategic importance of Romanian lands, 4,31, 181,229,293 Stratford de Redcliffe (Stratford Canning), 72, 81, 82, 83 Stremoukhov, Peter Nikolaevich, 190191, 219-220 Stroganov, G. A., 26 Strousberg railroad concession, 215, 218, 289, 321-322 n2 Stuart, D. F., 227, 239, 240, 241, 246, 248, 250, 255, 256, 257, 274, 275-276 Sturdza, Alexander, 235-236 Sturdza, Dimitrie A., 120, 149, 189, 195, 197, 199, 204-205, 253, 254 Sturdza, Gregory, 73, 92-93, 96, 111, 120, 158 Sturdza, Ion, 26, 28-29 Sturdza, Michael, 34, 36, 38-39, 42, 44, 73, 89, 91, 92-93, 94, 95, 96, 98, 132 Sturdza, Vasile, 92, 93, 96 Stuttgart, meeting at (1857), 83 Suleiman Pasha, 47 Sumorokov-Elston, Feliks Nikolaevich, 238 Sutu, Alecu (Alexander), 12, 19, 22 Sutu, Michael, 9, 22 Suvorov, General Alexander Vasirevich, 7 Sweden, 7 Syria, 7, 113 Talaat Effendi, 44 Talleyrand-Perigord, Charles A., 77, 79, 173, 174, 179 tariff union, 87 telegraph, 67, 87 telegraph administration of Principalities, 113 Teriachi, A., 93 term of office for prince, 11, 28, 88 Thouvenel, Edouard Antoine, 72, 80, 81, 113 Three Emperors' Alliance, 217, 221, 222, 228, 232, 287, 290-291 Tillos, J. H., 149, 312nlOO Tilsit, Treaty of (1807), 12, 197 Timkovskii, 34

355

Index Titov, Vladimir Pavlovich, 46-47 Totiu, Filip, 187 Totleben, General Eduard Ivanovich, 264, 265 Trandafilov, Alexander, 38 Transylvania, 26, 41, 54, 181-182, 186, 189, 197,298-299 Treaty of April 4/16, 1877, negotiation of, 241-257 Treaty of Paris, March 1856, terms of, 58-59, 68-69 tribute, 30, 34, 36, 56, 87, 177, 229 Triple Alliance, 290 Turnu Severin, 30 Turr, General S., 125 Union, the (Unirea), political society, 73 union of Principalities administrative, 32, 111-116 electoral call for (1857), 83 as goal of Romanian emigres, 54 and great powers, 78-79, 83, 88, 114118, 153-164, 174, 191 and landowners, 74 and Paris Conference, 66-68, 179 and Romanian people, 74, 83, 163 1794 agreement on, 9 statistics after, 118-119 Unkiar Iskelesi, Treaty of (1833), 34, 62, 217, 292 Vacarescu, Teodor, 242 Venetia, exchange for Principalities, 107— 108, 160, 161, 170, 173-174 Victor Emmanuel I, 116 Victoria, Queen, 81, 209 Vidin, 265, 267, 270, 275 Vienna, Congress of (1814-1815), 16 Vienna Four Points (1854), 57, 66 Villafranca, Armistice of (1859), 105, 109 Villamarina, Marquis de, 58, 85, 105 Vladimirescu, Tudor, 22-25, 27, 42, 302 n2-4 Vogoride, Nicholas, 72-73, 74, 75, 80, 83, 84, 92, 93, 102, 137 Waddington, William, 283, 284 Walewski, Count Alexander, 58, 68, 69, 80, 81, 82, 83, 86-87, 105

Wallachia as buffer state, 6 naturalization law for, 38 and Organic Statutes, 32 and Pasvanoglu, 13 reforms in, 4 revolutionary government of, 293 wars 1711: Ottoman Empire against Russia, 2 1736: Ottoman Empire against Russia, 4 1768: Ottoman Empire against Russia, 4 1787: Ottoman Empire against Russia, 7 1788: Sweden against Russia, 7 1805: France against Russia, 11 1806: Ottoman Empire against Russia, 12 1828: Ottoman Empire against Russia, 28, 294 1853: Ottoman Empire against Russia, 56 1859: Habsburg Empire against France and Sardinia, 105, 298 1864: Denmark against Prussia and Austria, 146, 179 1866: Austria against Prussia, 172, 176, 298 1870: France against Prussia, 201 1876: Ottoman Empire against Serbia and Montenegro, 232, 235-236 1877: Ottoman Empire against Russia, 65 see also Crimean War Wellington, Duke of, 28 Werther, Karl von, 103 White, Sir William, 278 William I, King of Prussia; 1871 Emperor of Germany, 165, 166-167,208, 213, 279 Wittgenstein, General, 24,28 Zheltukhin, General P. F., 29, 31, 32 Zinoviev, Ivan Alekseevich, 220,225,226, 235, 239, 240 Zolotarev, Ivan Fedorovich, 246 Zurich, Treaty of (1859), 105, 125

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